

A Study in Evil: Najm al-Dīn Il-Ghāzī and Renaud of
Châtillon as ‘The Other’ in the Histories of the Crusading
Period

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PhD
University of Edinburgh
2009



I confirm that this thesis is all my own work. It has not been submitted or published before in any way, except for an edited version of Chapter One, which will be published in the journal *al-Masaq* in 2010.

Acknowledgements

The completion of this thesis would have been impossible without the help, advice and support of a vast number of people. Foremost among these has been Carole Hillenbrand, who has been the model supervisor, and whose guidance, suggestions, patience, and help with Arabic, have been invaluable. I would also like to thank Andrew Newman, Judith Green, Kirsten Fenton, David D'Avray, Jonathan Phillips, Tom Asbridge, Stephen Burge, L. Stephanie Tait, Saeko Yazaki, Christine Lindner, Jokha al-Harhi, and Songul Melcit, all of whom have provided me with help and support over problems and questions of methodology, source material or Arabic. I would also like to thank the council of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, who awarded me a 2006 postgraduate research grant and the 2007 Abdullah al-Mubarak scholarship.

This thesis would not have been possible without my wife, Sarah, whose patience and understanding have often been tested, but who has always been full of love and support. I would also like to express my gratitude to my parents, Philip and Anne, whose interest in history and culture has had a profound effect on me, and whose support through my undergraduate university course laid the foundation for my interest in the Crusades. Lastly, and by no means least, I would like to express my sincere thanks to Martin and Geraldine Shenton, without whose help this thesis would never have been completed. My gratitude for their help cannot be adequately expressed.

For Sarah

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Abstract

Throughout the medieval period, the chroniclers who wrote the sources which modern historians use as the bases of their enquiries wrote them with particular concepts in their minds. These concepts permeate every aspect of their work, from grand, sweeping themes to the vocabulary employed, and each aspect makes a contribution, large or small, to the history of ideas. This thesis will use a case-study approach to explore one aspect of medieval chronicles of the crusades: the concept of the evil ‘other’. This will be achieved by examining the image of two of the most controversial figures in the history of the crusades, Najm al-Dīn II-Ghāzī and Renaud of Châtillon. This thesis will examine the themes in the writings of the period, to understand the reasons for the presentations of the individuals in each chronicle, and whether the themes cross political and religious boundaries, and if so, why. In the first chapter, the image of II-Ghāzī in the Christian chronicles will be examined, to help in the understanding of the reasons for and development of Christian ideas of the Muslim as evil. This will be followed by his image in the Islamic chronicles, in the second chapter, to elucidate whether the same characteristics are highlighted or not, and why this might be. In the third chapter, the image of Renaud of Châtillon in the Islamic sources will be studied, in order to illuminate the reasons why the Islamic writers saw the Christian as an evil other. Finally, Renaud’s image in the Christian sources will be expounded in chapter four, to shed light on whether he is presented in the same way as the Muslim sources, or not, and the reasons for this. The conclusions reached through these chapters will provide a contribution to the history of ideas of the ‘other’, particularly the underlying reasons behind these ideas. This thesis will also evaluate current views on how the chroniclers perceived the individuals, as well as helping to establish whether current historical theories involving II-Ghāzī and Renaud are tenable.

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Key to Transliteration

<u>Arabic</u>	<u>Roman</u>
ب	b
ت	t
ث	th
ج	j
ح	ḥ
خ	kh
د	d
ذ	dh
ر	r
ز	z
س	s
ش	sh
ص	ṣ
ض	ḍ
ط	ṭ
ظ	ẓ
ع	‘
غ	gh
ف	f
ق	q
ك	k
ل	l

م m

ن n

ه h

و w

ي y

ء ʾ

Vowels

ا a

ي i

و u

أ ā

إ ī

أ ū

Diphthongs

أ ي ay

أ و aw

Guide to Footnotes

The footnotes are numbered consecutively throughout the thesis. Each new reference is given in full, with the exception of those which have been cited in the abbreviations.

A Note on Dating

The dates are given in both Christian (A.D.) and Muslim (A.H.) calendar. When dealing with Christian sources, the Christian date is cited first, and when referring to Muslim sources, the Islamic date is given first. In the introduction and conclusion, the former has been employed.

A Note on Placenames

The placenames in this thesis are given in transliteration of their Arabic names, except where there is a recognisable, well-known English equivalent, such as Jerusalem for al-Quds, and Cairo for al-Qahira.

Guide to Abbreviations

- Amedroz: Ibn al-Qalānisī, *Dhayl ta'riḫ Dimashq*, ed. H.F. Amedroz, Leiden, 1908
- Anonymous Syriac Chronicle: Partial tr. A.S. Tritton as 'The First and Second Crusade from an Anonymous Syriac Chronicle', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. XCII, 1933, 69 – 101 & 273 – 305
- Bahā' al-Dīn: Ibn Shaddād, Bahā' al-Dīn, *al-Nawādir al-Sulṭāniyya wa'l-maḥāsin al-yūsufiyya*, tr. D. S. Richards, as *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, Aldershot, 2002
- Continuation: 'The Old French Continuation of William of Tyre', in *The Conquest of Jerusalem and the Third Crusade*, ed. & tr. P. W. Edbury, Aldershot, 1996
- Edbury & Rowe: P. Edbury & J. Rowe, *William of Tyre, Historian of the Latin East* Cambridge, 1988
- Harris, *Byzantium*: J. Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, London, 2003
- Hillenbrand, *Crusades*: C. Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, Edinburgh, 1999
- Ibn al-'Adīm: Ibn al-'Adīm, Kamāl al-Dīn 'Umar, *Zubdat al-ḥalab fī ta'riḫ Ḥalab*, ed. S. al-Dahan, 3 vols, Damascus, 1954 – 1968
- Ibn al-Azraq: Ibn al-Azraq, *Ta'riḫ Mayyāfāriqīn*, partial tr. C. Hillenbrand as *A Muslim Principality in Crusader Times*, Leiden, 1990
- IQ: Ibn al-Qalānisī, *Dhayl ta'riḫ Dimashq*, partial tr. H.A.R. Gibb, as *The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades*, London 1932
- John Kinnamos: *Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus*, tr. C.M. Brand, New York, 1976
- Al-Kāmil: Ibn al-Athīr, 'Izz al-Dīn 'Alī, *Al-Kāmil fī'l-ta'riḫ*, ed. U. A. Tadmurī, 11 vols, Beirut 2006
- 'Imād al-Dīn: 'Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī, *Conquête de la Syrie et de la Palestine par Saladin*, tr. H. Massé, Paris, 1972

- Matthew of Edessa: *Armenia and the Crusades: The Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa*, tr. & ed. A.E. Doustourian, Lanham, Maryland, 1993
- Michael the Syrian: *Chronique de Michel le Syrien, Patriarche Jacobite d'Antioche (1166 – 1199)*, ed. & tr. J.B. Chabot, 4 vols, Paris, 1899 – 1924, Volume III
- Niketas Choniates: *O City of Byzantium – The Annals of Niketas Choniates*, tr. H.J. Magoulias, Detroit, 1984
- Peter of Blois: Peter of Blois, *Passio Raginaldi*, ed. R.B.C. Huygens, in *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievals*, vol. 194, Turnhout, 2002
- WC: Walter the Chancellor, *A History of the Antiochene Wars*, tr. S. B. Edgington & T. S. Asbridge, Aldershot, 1999
- WT: William of Tyre, *A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea*, tr. E.A. Babcock & A.C. Krey, 2 vols, Columbia University Press, New York, 1943

Introduction

Aim of the Thesis:

Najm al-Dīn Il-Ghāzī and Renaud of Châtillon are two of the most controversial characters in the history of the Crusades. Their actions against their enemies – and sometimes their co-religionists – caused outrage among some chroniclers, while eliciting praise from others. The aim of this thesis is to examine the image of these two individuals – one from each side of the religious divide – in the chronicles, from the other side of this divide, in order to understand the creation and development of images of the ‘other’ in writings from this period. The result of this study will be to enhance understanding of both the history and literature of the crusading period, an aim which will be realised in two main ways.

Firstly, this study will examine the idea of the ‘other’ by attempting to show in microcosm how ideas of the ‘other’ formed in the chronicles, what the bases for these ideas are, how they changed across time and religious perspective, and whether, broadly speaking, the presentations are consistent across the chronicles. To achieve this, the individuals will firstly be examined in the writings of the chronicler from amongst their religious opponents which contain the most information about them. This will then be compared with other chronicles of that same opposing religious group to evaluate whether there are common themes running throughout. Finally, the presentation of these two leaders will be examined in the chronicles of their own religious community to discover whether the views in these works tally with the descriptions already examined, and if not, why and how these discrepancies emerged.

These two leaders have been chosen because their actions have produced some of the fiercest vitriol from sources from outside their own communities, and so it will be possible,

through investigating sources from both sides of the religious divide, to determine whether or not they are seen in the same way, or if there are noticeable differences. The conclusion reached will, it is hoped, provide a more balanced view of the individual in question, an understanding of why the medieval chroniclers portrayed their opponents as they did, and contribute to investigations of concepts of the 'other' in the Crusades, and more widely. A better understanding of the individuals will lead to a fuller appreciation of the events in which they participated. For example, a shift in understanding the personality of Renaud of Châtillon will put a different interpretation on the events for which he has been criticised, such as the attack into the Red Sea in 1183/578, or the pillaging of Cyprus in 1156/551.

Secondly, this thesis will be one of the first studies in modern times to view the Crusades from both the Christian and Islamic traditions at the same time, to an equal extent. A tradition of using sources from both sides existed during the late nineteenth and twentieth century, and valuable work was carried out in this manner by the great Claude Cahen.¹ Yet since his passing there has been little attempt to take up his mantle and attempted to study the Crusades using material from both sides equally. The result is that crusade historians have access only to translated versions of Arabic texts, which are few in number compared to the overall extant corpus of material available on the crusade side and, in the case of the *Recueil*, which is still the main source used by crusade historians, its text are badly translated.² This means that while research on the Latin side of the Crusades has forged ahead with great success by historians who can read Latin, that of the Islamic perspective has not made significant progress in the last hundred years when compared to research on the Latin side. There have, recently, been some attempts to rectify this discrepancy, notably

¹ See, for example, C. Cahen, *La Syrie du nord à l'époque des croisades et la principauté franque d'Antioche*, Paris, 1940.

² *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Documents Orientaux*, 5 Vols, Paris, 1872 – 1906, vols. I, pp. 189 – 714 & II, pp. 3 – 180. See also C. Hillenbrand, 'Sources in Arabic', in *Byzantines and Crusaders in Non-Greek Sources*, ed. M. Whitby, *Proceedings of the British Academy* 132, Oxford, 2007, p. 316.

Maalouf's narrative history of the Crusades³ and Hillenbrand's recent thematic study.⁴ Yet in the last twenty-five years since Maalouf's book was first published these have been the only two volumes devoted to the Islamic side of the Crusades, while there have been hundreds published from the Latin side, with the result that the history of the Crusades is glaringly one-sided. This study will attempt to correct these problems, as it will utilise both western European and Arabic texts, in order to gain a more balanced view of the events and personalities in question, while hopefully encouraging other scholars of the Crusades to study in the same way.

A Note on the Use of the Terms 'the Other' and 'Evil':

The idea of 'the other' forms the backbone of this thesis, and a brief explication of its employment is necessary. As demonstrated below, the idea of 'the other' has been investigated to some extent by historians of the Crusades, and Latin and Islamic Medieval History more generally⁵. On the basis of their views, for the purposes of this study, the term 'the other' will be used in its broadest possible sense, in order to gain as full an appreciation as is achievable of the attitudes surrounding these individuals. Therefore, the Muslim Il-Ghāzī will be studied not only from the perspective of the Latins, but also, where possible, from that of the Byzantines and the Native Christians, while the Latin Renaud of Châtillon will be studied through the prosopography of these two groups as well as those of the Muslims. The term 'evil' is one which is examined when it is employed by the medieval writer as a realist idea. It is used in this thesis to signify the opinion of the medieval writer that the subject upon which he was writing was particularly, vehemently opposed to God/Allāh, who is by definition good, meaning that any opposition would automatically be

³ A. Maalouf, *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*, London, 1984.

⁴ C. Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, Edinburgh, 1999

⁵ See below, pp. 15 – 29.

evil. Thus, it is a term which signifies the subject as one who is strongly and actively opposed to the author's own worldview.

Aims of this Chapter:

This introductory chapter is intended to act as a background to the historical and historiographical basis for the theory of 'the other', the Crusades in general, and Il-Ghāzī and Renaud of Châtillon in particular. This background will present a sound basis for the enquiry of this thesis, enabling the issues explored to be fully appreciated by the reader.

In order to achieve this aim, this chapter will focus on four main points. The first of these is the theory of the other. An understanding of this concept will give the background to the theory on which the thesis is based, including how it has developed and why it is important. The theory will be the basis for the ideas being discussed in the thesis, yet it will also be tested by the thesis itself to examine whether or not the theory is accurate in the circumstances examined.

Secondly, this chapter will review the Crusades and the Islamic writings which are studied in a historical context, in order to elucidate both the circumstances which influenced the writers of the sources, and to gain a full appreciation of the events in which the two individuals participated.

Thirdly, it will examine scholarly approaches to the crusade and counter-crusade, including how – and if – they relate to the theory of the 'other'. This will provide a sound starting point as a basis for the thesis, and the theories which have been previously put forward. These theories include the motivations of the individuals, the reason for their particular presentation in the sources, and whether the theory of the 'other' has or can be used in the context of the Crusades.

Finally, this chapter will present an overview and background to the source material. The material which deals with the Crusades is an extremely large corpus, coming from a great number of different political, ethnic, religious, and cultural arenas – and is in a variety of different languages – and all these need to be considered when examining them. While a full review of every source is impossible in this thesis, due to space if nothing else, a basic understanding of them will serve to highlight current ideas as to their preoccupations and biases, helping the reader to understand how each source will be approached, and why their presentations of the individuals may be as they are.

Theory of the ‘other’ in crusader studies and beyond:

In one of the few works to examine issues of identity in the crusader states, Murray has stated that the writings of William of Tyre, Walter the Chancellor and Fulcher of Chartres, the three main sources for the Crusades up to 1187/583, ‘describe the Europeans of Outremer in a way which primarily stresses their distinctiveness from the other peoples of the Middle East’⁶, and that their use of terms such as *Franci* and *Latini* are in direct contrast to terms such as *Turci*, *Saraceni* and *Suriani*.⁷ Yet this article only examines how the Latin chroniclers built up an idea of commonality, a *gens nostra*, and, like the medieval chroniclers themselves, rather ignores the Muslims and Eastern Christians when examining the ‘other’ during the crusades. Thus, for previous examinations of the presentation of the ‘other’ in the crusading period, it is necessary to look to more general studies of this topic.

In his excellent account of the history of Christian views of Muslims during the medieval period, Southern has written that, up to the end of the twelfth century, there were two main stages in the development of these views. The first stage lasted between the

⁶ A. Murray, ‘Ethnic Identity in the Crusader States’, in *Concepts of National Identity in the Middle Ages*, ed. S. Forde et al, Leeds, 1995, p. 61.

⁷ *ibid.*, p. 64.

seventh/first century and the year 1100/493, while the second was 1100/493 until 1140/534. In the first period, Islam made Europe feel uneasy, as it both questioned their own beliefs and was unpredictable.⁸ This was because little was known of Islam, as it was just one of a number of threats, and, although the Muslims were a definite threat at the time, they were not particularly attacked by Latin writers. The Christians of Latin Europe used the Bible as their main source of knowledge about Muslims, using the account in Genesis of Abraham, Hagar, and Ishmael to place the Arab-Muslims into a historical context. It was only in Spain that they were regarded as part of the eschatological forces mentioned in Revelations.⁹ It was with the change in the year 1100/493 that literature began to mention Islam more, although initially this was more from general gossip brought back by returning crusaders and from Constantinople. Southern writes that it was in these circumstances that ‘men inevitably shape the world they do not know in the likeness of the world they do know. Nowhere is this more clear than in early Latin literature about Islam’. Thus, if Christianity had a trinity, so must Islam; if Christians think Christ was God, so Muslims must think Muhammad was.¹⁰ Yet, Southern continues, this imagination led to observation, and first steps to understandings were taken by men such as William of Malmesbury and Petrus Alfonsi.¹¹

Jones is broadly in agreement, noting that the Christian writers of the medieval period rarely used ‘barbarian’ to describe Muslims. When this term is employed for Muslims, it is usually to highlight their non-Christian status, because they were not barbarians in the classical sense of being pagan or lacking in moral values. Christian writers could see that Muslim societies were, generally, sophisticated and religious, which implied a set of moral values, and the religion was believed to be a heresy, albeit a very dangerous one, instead of a

⁸ R.W. Southern, *Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages*, London, 1978, p. 4.

⁹ *ibid.*, pp. 14 – 5.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 32.

¹¹ *ibid.*, pp. 33 – 5.

pagan religion.¹² He thus suggests that the medieval Europeans regarded Islam as being peripheral to European attitudes towards barbarians, and so there was a respect towards Islam. This implies that, perhaps subconsciously, medieval Christendom regarded Islam as an ‘other’, but a closer ‘other’ than barbarians such as the pagans of Scandinavia and Eastern Europe.

Edward Said, on the other hand, takes a very different view, believing that ‘the European encounter with the orient, and specifically with Islam...turned Islam into the very epitome of an outsider against which the whole of European civilisation from the middle ages was founded’.¹³ In his view, while the earlier barbarian invaders had incorporated themselves into the old Roman Empire, the Islamic invasions stiffened the resolve of Europe against the invaders and shifted the centre of European culture from the Latinate Mediterranean to Germanic Northern Europe. Said thus believes that from the very moment of the first Islamic attack on Europe, European attitudes to Islam were hostile and were to remain so for centuries.¹⁴ Daniel has written along much the same lines, though he implies that the Islamic invasions, acknowledged by Said, were in the imagination of the Europeans¹⁵, and that this was the catalyst for the latent xenophobia which was bubbling under the surface in Europe, to find its expression in cultural arrogance and a ‘complex and fully articulate theory of defensive war’.¹⁶ From this perspective, Latin Europe, from the very start, thought of Islam as a menacing ‘other’, and this image continued throughout the Middle Ages.

There are thus two main theories regarding the Latin attitude to Islam in the Middle Ages. Southern and Jones see the Latins as having little interest in Islam during the early

¹² W.R. Jones, ‘The Image of the Barbarian in Medieval Europe’, in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 13 (1971), pp. 388 – 392.

¹³ E. Said, *Orientalism*, London, 1995, p.70.

¹⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 70 – 1.

¹⁵ He writes that the Europeans had ‘a belief in an Islamic aggression’. N. Daniel, *The Arabs and Medieval Europe*, London, 1975, p. 114.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 115.

medieval period and beyond, occupied as they were by other, more pressing, threats, posed by others who were more 'other'. Southern goes further, and implies that there was a gradual interest in learning about Islam which started c. 1100/493; this date would imply that the Crusades played an important part in helping Europe to discover Islam. The exception to this was in Spain, although Islam had taken hold here so much that it was culturally not Latin any more. Said and Daniel take the opposite view, and argue that Islam was from the start regarded as a threat by Europe, and the Muslims were thus the very definition of 'the other' right from the very beginning. Of these two views, that put forward by Southern and Jones seems the most plausible, as they engage with source material from both sides of the discussion, weighing up both sides of the argument before reaching their conclusions, while Said and Daniel do not consider evidence from the opposing view in theirs.

In his study of Muslim perceptions of non-Muslims, Azmeh makes a number of conclusions relevant to this study. Firstly, he notes that many of the stereotypes prevalent during the crusades were initially voiced during the ninth and tenth centuries, in travellers' tales, which were copied verbatim by chroniclers across the Muslim world, without question. The result was that the early prejudices were repeated, without question, over the centuries until it was commonly acknowledged as 'the truth'.¹⁷ Secondly, the Arabs divided the world into climactic zones, each of which determined the personality of the peoples of that zone. Their area, particularly Syria, Mesopotamia and Egypt, was seen as the perfect zone for human development, meaning that the Arabs regarded themselves as being, through their civilisation, learning and culture, the pinnacle of humanity. The Franks, on the other hand, were from a colder northern climactic zone, which meant that they were barbarous – though not barbarians. This indicates that the Arabs regarded them as given to

¹⁷ A. Azmeh, 'Barbarians in Arab Eyes', in *Past and Present* 134 (1992), pp. 5 – 6. See also Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, p. 268.

sociologically inferior pursuits such as war and the chase, instead of more civilised pursuits, while their personal cleanliness, sexual licence and funerary rites also demonstrated their barbarous condition. The Franks were also seen as physically inferior, being fat, infertile, and with reddish complexions, all of which contrasted with the Arabs' own looks.¹⁸ In essence, the Arabs formed the image of 'the other', and therefore of the Franks, by regarding them as being an inversion of the norm – of the inhabitants of the perfect climactic zones, in which they lived.¹⁹ This situation was not regarded as accidental. They had been chosen by Allāh as a special people, and so had been placed in the perfect position in terms of society, culture and geography, and this could be seen in the power relations the Arabs had with the rest of the world.²⁰ Therefore, Azmeh sees the Arabs as believing that they were superior to the Franks through both logic and experience.

General Introduction to Cross-Cultural Relations and the 'Other' During the Crusades: The Latin Perspective

The address which Pope Urban II gave to the crowd which had gathered in a field at Clermont in November 1095/Dhu'l-Qa'da 488 to hear him was not one about which he had any doubts. His sermon which would spawn the Crusades was something which would benefit everyone under his care – all of 'us'. As head of the Latin Church, with an eye on the welfare of the Eastern Christians, he stated that it was his duty to look after their spiritual interests, a responsibility he appeared to take very seriously. Using the main tenets of centuries-old ideas about just war, together with more recent developments in the scope and role of the papacy, a means had been created by which the problems among his own society

¹⁸ A. Azmeh, 'Barbarians in Arab Eyes', in *Past and Present* 134 (1992), pp. 6 – 14, and Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, p. 270.

¹⁹ A. Azmeh, 'Barbarians in Arab Eyes', in *Past and Present* 134 (1992), p. 17.

²⁰ *ibid.*, p. 18.

could be channelled to a just cause – fighting the enemies of Christ – in the Holy Land.²¹ The result of this was that those fighting would gain forgiveness for their sins, and the Eastern Christians would receive protection. This was required as they had, according to one account, been ‘reduced...with sword, rapine and flame’ by the Muslims, who ‘cut open the navels of those whom they choose to torment with a loathsome death, tear out their most vital organs and tie them to a stake, drag them around and flog them, before killing them as they lie prone on the ground with their entrails out’.²² The imagery used in this account by Robert of Rheims is clear in its portrayal of the Muslim ‘other’ as savage and ungodly²³, and although these may not have been Urban’s exact words, they surely reflect his sentiment.²⁴ Thus, from the very inception of the Crusades, the lines were drawn – the Christians, including non-Latins, were ‘us’, and the Muslims were the ‘other’.

This Latin idea of the Muslim as the ‘other’ continued throughout the history of the Crusades without great change. There were individual cases when a new perspective on Muslims developed, particularly among those Latins living in the Holy Land, such as Raymond of Tripoli, but generally this assessment holds. However, the attitude of the Latins to the Byzantine Greeks, and to a lesser extent to the native Christians of Syria, did change. Although the Greeks were initially regarded as being among the beneficiaries of the crusade²⁵, political disagreements between the two religious groups meant it was not long before the Greeks were being seen in some quarters as another ‘other’. As early as 1104/497 Bohemond, ruler of Antioch, returned to Europe to seek soldiers to fight against the

²¹ See, among others, M. Bull., ‘Origins’, in *The Oxford History of the Crusades*, ed. J. Riley-Smith, Oxford, 1999, and *The First Crusade: Scope and Consequences*, ed. J. Phillips, Manchester, 1997.

²² From the account of Robert of Rheims (Robert the Monk), in J. & L. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: Idea and Reality*, London, 1981, p.43.

²³ This is especially underlined in the account of Robert of Rheims, who writes ‘the Persians (Muslims), a foreign race, a race absolutely alien to God’. Cited in J. & L. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: Idea and Reality*, London, 1981, p.43.

²⁴ *ibid.*, pp. 10 – 11.

²⁵ Fulcher of Chartres, Robert of Rheims and Guibert of Nogent all underline the threat to Byzantium in their accounts of the sermon of Urban II. See J. & L. Riley-Smith, *The Crusade: Idea and Reality*, London, 1981, pp. 41 – 49.

Byzantines, presenting them as a religious ‘other’ to be fought after his experiences on the First Crusade.²⁶ This awareness of difference grew steadily wider over the next century, with demands to attack Constantinople itself being heard as early the Second Crusade in 1147/541, when a number of crusaders believed that the Greeks were deliberately not helping them, thus developing still further the idea of the Greeks as ‘other’²⁷. The situation came to a head in the Fourth Crusade, in 1204/600, when Constantinople was captured by the crusaders, who set about creating a Latin state centred on the city²⁸ – creating something familiar from something which was an ‘other’. Thus, the history of Latin attitudes towards the Greeks during the crusades was one which was transformed from regarding them as being part of ‘us’ to being a very different ‘other’.

The crusaders went through a similar process with the native Christians in Syria, though perhaps to a lesser extent. When Urban II spoke at Clermont, the protection of these groups was a main priority²⁹, and for the first decades the crusaders were supportive of them. However, the attitude of the crusaders towards these groups did gradually change, and they were eventually regarded as another ‘other’, primarily because of the increasingly bad treatment which the Eastern Christians received at the hands of the political and religious rulers amongst the Franks. In the same way the Muslims had been able to conquer much Byzantine territory in the seventh century because of the resentment among local Christians to Byzantine Orthodoxy, so the Latins gradually created the same feeling among the Eastern Christians, meaning that this potentially useful group of people did not co-operate.³⁰

²⁶ S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1952, pp. 46 – 49; and Harris, *Byzantium* p. 78.

²⁷ J. Phillips, & M. Hoch, ‘Introduction’, in *The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences*, pp. 10 – 11, and Harris, *Byzantium*, p. 100.

²⁸ M. Angold, *The Fourth Crusade*, London, 2003.

²⁹ See the account of the Council of Clermont by Baldric of Bourgeuil, in J. & L. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: Idea and Reality*, London, 1981, pp. 49 – 53.

³⁰ M. Moosa, ‘The Crusades: An Eastern Perspective, With Emphasis on the Syriac Sources’, in *The Muslim World* 93:2, 2003, pp. 249 – 289.

The Muslim Perspective

From the perspective of the Muslims, who were on the receiving end of the crusades, this phenomenon was not, of course, the noble quest which the Pope had described. The Franks of Latin Europe were regarded as a backward and barbarous race by the self-assured Muslims; their only skill was in military action, and they had none of the culture, learning or sophistication which made the Muslims so self-confident.³¹ From the very start of Islam the Muslim community had been aware that they were one group, an 'us', and everyone around them was regarded as an 'other'.³² Whether Byzantine, Sassanian, pagan, or Frank, the Muslims saw the 'other' everywhere, and although they could, and did, distinguish between different groups of 'other', the awareness of that concept existed right from the beginning of Islam, and was reinforced by Arabic literature of the time.³³ The Crusades did nothing to change this, and indeed heightened the Muslim awareness of the Franks as 'other'³⁴ – from being a previously unencountered group from the remote and cold northern lands who were little threat, they became a chief enemy of the Muslims of Syria.

The central cause of this was the unexpected damage wrought by the Franks. The results were devastating: many Muslims were killed in the aftermath of crusader victories - especially during the early crusader successes - and they lost a large tract of territory. However, it was the psychological blow as much as the physical loss which hurt. Never before had their territory been conquered so quickly and so unexpectedly, the loss being

³¹ Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, esp. pp. 267 – 271; and A. Maalouf, *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*, London, 1984, p. 3.

³² This concept of Muslim community, known as the '*umma*', as 'us', forms one of the core bases of the Islamic identity. It is based on the pre-Islamic Arabian tribal system, which regarded everyone outside one's own tribe as an 'other'. The '*umma*' became an 'Islamic tribe', being both a new tribe – thus behaving like the old tribes and operating in the old tribal system – and a supra-tribe, made up of members of many differing tribes. The result of this was that, as the previous tribes had done, Muslims automatically regarded anything outside the Islamic community as an 'other'. See H. Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates*, London, 1986, p. 34.

³³ Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, p. 274.

³⁴ *ibid.*

intensified because it was delivered by so contemptible a people.³⁵ The strength of feeling due to the violation was so much that the poetry of the time, such as Ibn Khayyāṭ's *Dīwān*, described the loss as akin to rape.³⁶ These physical and psychological blows underlined clearly to the Muslims how different, how 'other', the Frankish crusaders were. Their ethnic otherness was understood by the Muslim world, but it was the religious otherness which was to matter most, and their mere presence served to underline this.³⁷ Although the regional Muslim rulers did not initially regard the crusaders as religious enemies, Muslim religious scholars and judges did, and to them the territory lost was part of the *Dār al-Islām*, Islamic territory, and so the loss was regarded not so much a political embarrassment as either a challenge from Allāh to the faithful, or as punishment for their sins, or both.³⁸ Whichever it was believed to be theologically, this 'other' – in the form of the Latin crusaders – had become their sworn enemies – the most 'other of the others' – and the belief that this war was between two religions gradually permeated Islamic society until it reached the ruler, and it was then that the anti-crusader *jihād* began in earnest.³⁹

The Byzantine Greek Perspective

The Muslims were not the only people to suffer at the hands of the crusaders. Although supposedly one of the chief beneficiaries of the whole crusading idea, from the very beginning of the enterprise the Byzantine Greeks were affected negatively. The Greeks were also very aware, right from the beginning of the Crusades, that the Frankish crusaders

³⁵ *ibid.*, pp. 69 – 74

³⁶ Ibn Khayyāṭ, *Dīwān*, ed. H. Mardam Bek, Damascus, 1958, pp. 184 – 6. See also Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, pp. 297 – 298.

³⁷ Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, p. 293 – 297.

³⁸ *ibid.*, pp. 69 – 74.

³⁹ For a full discussion on the Muslim responses to the coming of the Crusades, see Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, esp. pp. 69 – 84, and P.M. Holt, *The Age of the Crusades*, London, 1986, pp. 27 – 29.

were an 'other'.⁴⁰ Their appeal to the west for help against the Muslims, while having the illusion of reflecting similarities between the two groups, actually serves to highlight their differences. These differences, while initially hidden, rose to the surface as soon as the crusaders approached Greek territory. Whenever a crusading army chose the land route to Syria, it had to pass through almost the entire length of the Byzantine Empire, including often long stays just outside the capital Constantinople before they were taken across the Bosphorus. As is typical of a large army, the crusaders often left a trail of destruction in their wake, and on several occasions threatened the capital itself.⁴¹ Thus the Greeks became terrified of what the crusaders might do⁴², as they did not comprehend the motives or aims of this 'other'.

Although Byzantine awareness of the 'otherness' of the crusaders was at its height when crusading armies were passing through Greek territory, it remained high, and consequently relations between the two were at a low level, throughout most of the history of the crusades, and it was centred around who was to have jurisdiction over northern Syria. The seeds of this were sown before the First Crusade had even reached Syria, at the time when the crusaders committed to give back to the Byzantine Empire any land which had previously been Byzantine land that was captured.⁴³ When the crusaders captured the formerly Greek city of Antioch, the Byzantines believed they should be given it, as per the terms described above.⁴⁴ However, the crusaders, and Bohemond in particular, refused to do

⁴⁰ Relations between the Greeks and Latins over the fifty years leading up to the crusades had served to highlight the Greek view of the Latins as an 'other', particularly questions over papal primacy and who was the inheritor of the Roman Empire. Harris, *Byzantium*, pp. 22 & 44 – 46.

⁴¹ J. Shepard, 'Cross-Purposes: Alexius Comnenus and the First Crusade', in J. Phillips (ed.), *The First Crusade: Origins and Impact*, Manchester, 1997, pp. 108 – 110.

⁴² John Kinnamos writes that the crusaders 'had been set in motion, on the handy excuse that they were going to cross from Europe to Asia to fight the Turks en route and recover the church in Palestine and seek the holy places, but truly to gain possession of the Romans' (i.e. Byzantines') land by assault and trample down everything in front of them', p. 58. This view is echoed by Anna Comnena, *The Alexiad*, tr. E.R.A. Sewter, Penguin, 1979, pp 311 – 312.

⁴³ J. Shepard, 'Cross-Purposes: Alexius Comnenus and the First Crusade', in J. Phillips (ed.), *The First Crusade: Origins and Impact*, Manchester, 1997, pp. 108.

⁴⁴ Harris, *Byzantium*, pp. 69 – 70.

so, claiming the Greeks had reneged on their promise to help, so the agreement was void.⁴⁵ The situation was never fully resolved, and other disputes over sovereignty served simply to underline the nature of the difference between the two sides, and that to the Greeks, the crusaders were an ‘other’, whose motives and priorities were difficult to comprehend.

Various Differing Perspectives on the ‘Other’:

The relationship described above contrasts sharply with the relationship which the Byzantines had had with the Muslim powers in the centuries leading up to the Crusades. Despite the loss of huge swathes of territory suffered by the Byzantines as a result of the Arab invasions of the seventh century, the ninth century had seen the establishment of a something approaching a steady border. There were occasional skirmishes, and territory could and did change hands during this time, but the line was reasonably stable.⁴⁶ This period also saw the build-up of diplomatic links between the Byzantine government, and those of both the ‘Abbāsīd and Fāṭimid Caliphates.⁴⁷ The main reason for this was the Byzantines’ desire to be accepted as head of the Christian world by Christians in these lands, with the result that the Greeks were not as interested in physically controlling land as they were in extending their spiritual influence over these areas, through gaining positions and concessions for churchmen of the Greek rite in these lands from the Muslim rulers.⁴⁸ On the Muslim side the Fāṭimid Caliphate was more concerned with defeating the ‘Abbāsīds to extend the influence of Shi‘ite Islam⁴⁹, while the ‘Abbāsīds had let the concept of jihād lose

⁴⁵ *ibid*, p. 70.

⁴⁶ J.F. Haldon, and H. Kennedy, ‘The Arab-Byzantine Frontier in the Eighth and Ninth Centuries: Military Organisation and Society in the Borderlands’, in *Arab-Byzantine Relations in Early Islamic Times*, ed. M. Bonner, Aldershot, 2004, pp. 144 – 145.

⁴⁷ For an overview of diplomatic contacts between Byzantium and the Muslims prior to the Crusades, see H. Kennedy, ‘Byzantine-Arab Diplomacy in the Near East from the Islamic Conquests to the Mid-Eleventh Century’ in *Arab-Byzantine Relations in Early Islamic Times*, ed. M. Bonner, Aldershot, 2004, pp. 81 – 91.

⁴⁸ Harris, *Byzantium*, p. 15 – 32, especially p. 23.

⁴⁹ H. Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates*, Longman, London, 1986, pp. 309 – 345; and I. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, 2nd Edition, Cambridge, 2002, p. 108.

its importance and became increasingly decadent.⁵⁰ This status quo had remained for several centuries, and though it was upset in the early decades of the eleventh/fifth century with the arrival of the Turks, the Byzantines had generally been strong enough to resist their aggressive tendencies.⁵¹ It was, therefore, into a generally settled situation that the Crusaders came, and their arrival upset this balance.

Furthermore, although one of the original intentions of the First Crusade was, in theory at least, to protect the Eastern Christians⁵², in every possible way it harmed them. Before the arrival of the First Crusade, the native Christians had generally been treated well by their Muslim masters. As *ahl al-kitāb*, it was believed by most that it was a religious duty for the Islamic authorities to protect them.⁵³ There were a number of restrictions on the Christians, such as the payment of the *jizya* tax, and not being able to build churches bigger than mosques.⁵⁴ Yet these restrictions did not stop many Christians living without persecution in Islamic lands, some reaching high office, especially in Egypt, and the occasional disruption to this status from individuals such as the Fāṭimid Caliph al-Ḥākim did not last long.

However, in the aftermath of the crusades, the Eastern Christians lived in a much changed environment in the Islamic world. A new tone was set after the second Muslim capture of Edessa in 1146/540, when the whole native Christian population was massacred,

⁵⁰ H. Kennedy, *The Court of the Caliphs*, esp. pp. 261 – 296; and H. Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates*, pp. 158 – 199.

⁵¹ Despite the disastrous defeat of the Byzantine army at Manzikert in 1071/463, including the capture of the Emperor, Romanus IV Diogenes, which had been considered a sign that the Byzantine Empire was in full decline, the Greeks were still a very powerful army, and even this defeat, recent research has shown, was the result of more of Turkish luck and lack of intelligence from the Byzantines than by one side being much stronger than the other. See Harris, *Byzantium*, pp. 33 – 34.

⁵² Pope Urban II's sermon at Clermont specifically mentioned the help and protection needed by the Eastern Christians, and was a prime motive for the crusade. See the accounts of Urban II's sermon in J. & L. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: Idea and Reality*, London, 1981, pp 40 - 53

⁵³ J.J. Saunders, *A History of Medieval Islam*, London, 1978, p. 33.

⁵⁴ Bat Ye'or, *The Dhimmi*, tr. D. Maisel, P. Fenton, & D. Littman, London, 1985, pp. 51 – 77.

just as the Latins had been after the first capture of the city in 1144/539.⁵⁵ Although the perpetrator of these acts, Zengī, is regarded as a monster, and an evil man even amongst the Muslims, it can be argued that there was a sound motivation for his actions. The presence of large numbers of Christians in a Muslim-controlled town could constitute a ‘fifth column’, and their removal would negate that threat. That the threat was real was evident from the very beginning of the Crusades, as the city of Antioch fell to the crusaders in 1098/491 only when an Armenian inside the town allowed the crusaders in.⁵⁶ Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn also acted against this perceived threat, gradually removing Christians from office when he ruled Egypt, and banning non-Muslim traffic from the Red Sea after a crusader raid there in 1183/578. Similar situations occurred on many occasions thenceforth; the native Christians were killed or forced from their lands or jobs, never to get them back, a situation which reached its nadir during the Mamlūk rule of the thirteenth/seventh century and their governance of both Syria and Egypt.⁵⁷ But it was not just the Muslim reaction which was the cause of woe for the Eastern Christians – the crusaders themselves could be just as problematic for them. For example, the account of Walter the Chancellor states that ‘the people of Antioch had been deprived of their goods by the force and deviousness of our people (the crusaders)’⁵⁸, a criticism which, though veiled, was still unusual for the time⁵⁹; while there were several occasions on which the crusaders massacred the native Christian population of towns.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ Matthew of Edessa pp. 243 – 245; WT, pp. 140 – 144 & 157 – 161; J.B. Segal, *Edessa: The Blessed City*, Oxford, 1970, pp. 244 – 254.

⁵⁶ See Guibert of Nogent, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, tr. R. Levine, Woodbridge, 1997, pp. 90 – 93; Raymond of Aguilers, *Historia Francorum qui Ceperunt Iherusalem*, tr. J.H. Hill, & L. Hill, Philadelphia, 1968, pp. 46 – 48; and Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, ed. & tr. S.B. Edgington, Oxford, 2007, pp. 273 – 285.

⁵⁷ Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, pp. 415 – 417.

⁵⁸ WC, p.138.

⁵⁹ WC, p. 138 n.136.

⁶⁰ For example, the Crusade of 1101 massacred the Christians of Ankyra (modern Ankara) who had come out to meet them. Anna Comnena, *The Alexiad*, p. 356; and Harris, *Byzantium*, p. 70.

Thus the understanding of the nature of individual groups as ‘other’ between differing religious groups permeated crusading history from the very start. The Crusades were launched to try to regain land which had been taken by the Muslims, who were, it had been made very clear by the papacy, ‘the other’. And despite the initial claims of goodwill, both the Greeks and the Eastern Christian groups were, to the crusaders, an ‘other’, as they are identified as separate groups in the initial speeches of Clermont, and became more so, to their detriment, during the history of the Crusades. The idea of the ‘other’ in Islamic thought, which was any groups or persons not part of the *umma* – which was itself modelled on the pre-Islamic tribal system in Arabia, where the ‘other’ was any groups or persons not part of one’s own tribe – was heightened and intensified by the Crusades. Not only did a group of vicious soldiers from a despised barbaric race arrive unannounced, creating cruelty and destruction wherever they appeared, but there was the growing realisation that the native Christians who had lived with the Muslims in relative peace for centuries were part of another way of life, one that constituted a threat to the established Islamic order.

These ideas of the ‘other’ which formed both before and during the crusading period are based on one central idea. While modern scholars have seen ideas of ethnicity and nationalism as the basis of ideas of the ‘other’⁶¹, the chroniclers and central figures in the crusades, on all sides, see religion as the defining characteristic. For both Christian and Muslim, the other was an ‘other’ because they were not of the same religious group, and while the crusades were initially launched to help Eastern Christians, who were part of the Christian ‘us’, the experience of the religious differences between the groups soon made it clear to the Latins that the Eastern Christians were different religiously, so were part of the ‘other’. This thesis will use this idea to examine Najm al-Dīn Il-Ghāzī and Renaud of

⁶¹ See J. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, London, 1992; and A. Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*, Cambridge, 1997.

Châtillon, exploring the ways in which they were perceived through the religious perspective, and whether or not this theory is accurate in their case.

The Reasons for the Crusades:

Over the last one hundred and fifty years there has been much scholarly debate focussed on the causes of the Crusades, particularly with regard to the First Crusade, with ideas about the causes being first posited, subjected to scrutiny and then either accepted or discredited.⁶² However, there are four main points which have stood the test of time, and so can be regarded with a certain amount of confidence as being among the main reasons for the Crusades. Firstly, there was a purely religious reason. While in the past the tendency has been to regard going on crusade as a selfish act, perpetrated for reasons such as profit or land acquisition, recent research has shown that these were not major motivating factors, and the fact that most crusaders returned to Europe after the Crusade, and the huge expense of taking part, highlight that. The evidence gathered suggests that most crusaders went because of religious motivation, and that going on crusade was an extremely expensive and perilous undertaking. They would lose their income, leave their family, not be guaranteed any recompense when they got to the Holy Land, suffer disease, famine and harassing by enemies of all faiths and might, of course, die on the way. It was not, therefore, an easy thing to do, or something that was entered into lightly.⁶³

Secondly, there was the current of violence in Latin society into which Urban II's message fitted perfectly. The society of Western Europe had become steadily more and more violent throughout the eleventh century for a variety of reasons, and the papacy was

⁶² One of the most famous of these is the idea that the Crusades were an early attempt at European colonialism, which has been discussed among scholars in the West. See, for example, M. Amouroux, 'L'église régulière, outil de la colonisation de la Syrie par les croisés aux XIIe-XIIIe siècles', in *Coloniser au Moyen Age*, ed. M. Balard, & J. Ducellier, Paris, 1995, pp. 281 – 288 & 293 – 295.

⁶³ See J. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusaders 1095 – 1131*, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 109 – 113; and G. Constable, 'The Financing of the Crusades in the Twelfth Century', in *Outremer: Studies in the history of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem*, ed. B.Z. Kedar, H.E. Mayer, & R.C. Smail, Jerusalem, 1982, pp. 64 – 88.

looking for a way to control it, because the church itself was being weakened by the lack of security. Therefore it took the initiative and created the idea of the *Pax Dei*, based around solving disputes in the inviolable sanctuary of the church, in the same spirit as the Ka'ba in Mecca. The knights who had previously been the cause of much of the trouble which had plagued Europe were now employed in the service of the church to prevent it, and their military capability was channelled to keeping peace in Europe. It was just a short step from this to using the knights in a whole new form of warfare – fighting the enemies of the church elsewhere.⁶⁴

The third factor which helped in the formation of the Crusade idea was the reforms in the papacy itself which enabled the message to spread so quickly. These reforms were many, but the most important was that which led to the centralisation of papal authority, meaning that the messages of the papacy to the people of Europe could be disseminated much more quickly than previously, and that the idea of an army owned and controlled by the church or churchmen could be established. Thus, the message of the crusade could be easily disseminated throughout Europe.⁶⁵

Finally, and most controversially, was the influence of the Byzantines in the whole process, the extent of which has been energetically debated by scholars of the Crusades, the Latin West, and Byzantium. Opinions have ranged between those who believe that there was already a plan afoot by the Pope to launch the Crusades and that the Byzantines' ideas simply encouraged his pre-existing ideas, to those who believe that the whole scheme was a Byzantine invention, and that the Papacy and the nobility of Latin Europe had become unwitting pawns in the schemes of the Greeks.

Recent research on this subject has favoured a compromise between the two ideas, and that both sides had been thinking of using Latin forces to conquer Muslim land at the same

⁶⁴ See J. Riley-Smith, *The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading*, London, 1986, pp. 2 – 4.

⁶⁵ *ibid*, pp. 4 – 9.

time.⁶⁶ Byzantine appeals for mercenaries from the Latin West to aid them, which was not without precedent, was developed by the Pope into a great mission which would both help the Byzantines in their struggles with the Turks and liberate the holy places of Palestine in the name of Latin Christendom. This scheme only went wrong because the Emperor and the Latin rulers disagreed over who should have control over which territories, and because of the perceived threat which the unexpectedly large army was to Byzantium. Wherever the truth lies, it is clear that there was Byzantine encouragement in plans for the First Crusade. At the Council of Piacenza in March 1095/ Rabī‘ I 488, eight months before Clermont, an envoy from the Byzantines carried a message asking for assistance from the knights of Western Europe against the Turkish threat⁶⁷, and the speech given at Clermont heavily emphasised the plight of the Eastern Christians at the hands of the Muslims.⁶⁸

Scholarly works on Najm al-Dīn Il-Ghāzī:

The study of Il-Ghāzī has been largely ignored by historians in the field, particularly when compared to his importance in the history of the Crusades.⁶⁹ This, like many other areas of Islamic interest in this field, has largely been caused by a lack of understanding both of Islam and the Arabic language by crusade historians, meaning that little attempt can be made. Furthermore, as his dynasty, the Arṭuqids, were little more than local rulers in the Jazīra in the early twelfth century, they have been largely ignored by scholars of Islamic history, with only a few works devoted to him. The main study which has been carried out

⁶⁶ See P.E. Chevedden, ‘The Islamic Interpretation of the Crusade: a New (Old) Paradigm for Understanding the Crusades’ in *Der Islam* 83 (2006), pp. 90 – 136; and J. Shephard, ‘Cross-purposes: Alexius Comnenus and the First Crusade’, in *The First Crusade: Origins and Impact*, ed. J. Phillips, Manchester, 1997, pp. 107 – 129.

⁶⁷ J. & L. Riley-Smith, (eds.), *The Crusades: Idea and Reality – 1095 – 1274*, London, 1981, p. 10.

⁶⁸ See the accounts of Fulcher of Chartres, Robert of Rheims, Guibert of Nogent, and Baldric of Bourgueil, all of which underline the distress which the Christians were suffering because of the actions of the Turks. All four accounts can be found in *The Crusades: Idea and Reality 1095 – 1274*, ed. J. & L. Riley-Smith, London, 1981, pp.41 - 53

⁶⁹ The name Il-Ghāzī is an honorific title meaning ‘Land Warrior’; the Encyclopaedia of Islam 2nd Edition, Vol. III, ed. B. Lewis *et al*, Leiden, 1971, pp. 1118 – 1119, mistakenly translates the name as ‘Champion of the People’.

on Il-Ghāzī is primarily a historical account of his life, and there has been little prosopographical study, how he is presented across a number of chronicles.⁷⁰

Scholarly Works on Renaud of Châtillon:

Renaud of Châtillon is one of the most famous – or infamous – crusaders in the whole history of the enterprise. From his first appearance in the Holy Land his actions produced horror and celebration in equal measure, and they have fascinated historians ever since. The first modern historian to produce a work on Renaud was Schlumberger at the end of the nineteenth century. Writing at a time when it was acceptable for the German Emperor to enter Jerusalem dressed as a crusader, it is perhaps unsurprising that his work is a highly romanticised account of Renaud’s life, with little scholarship displayed, presenting Renaud as a hero for his raids against Muslims without considering their results.⁷¹ In a reaction to this presentation, the next wave of scholars to comment on Renaud, in the mid-twentieth century, led by Runciman, a titan of crusading history, attacked Renaud severely. He was regarded as a buccaneer, a selfish pirate whose actions were politically and diplomatically nonsensical, and who could even be blamed for the failure of the whole crusading enterprise.⁷² Recently, however, there has been an attempt to redeem Renaud’s reputation, led by Hamilton, who has suggested that Renaud was not a buccaneer causing chaos for his own amusement, but instead that there could be logical explanations for his seemingly rash behaviour.⁷³ This idea has recently been taken up by Hillenbrand, who has suggested a compromise between the two scholarly positions; that Renaud may have been a buccaneer

⁷⁰ The only major study which has been devoted to Il-Ghāzī is C. Hillenbrand, ‘The Career of Najm al-Dīn Il-Ghāzī’, in *Der Islam* 58:2 (1981), pp. 250 – 291, although part of C. Cahen’s ‘Le Diyar Bakr au Temps des Premiers Urtukides’, in *Journal Asiatique* 227, 1935, pp. 219 – 276 has also been devoted to the Artuqid.

⁷¹ G. Schlumberger, *Renaud de Chatillon, prince d'Antioche, seigneur de la terre d'Outre-Jourdain*, Paris, 1898.

⁷² S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, vol. II, Oxford, 1952, pp. 185 – 186.

⁷³ B. Hamilton, ‘The Elephant of Christ’, in *Studies in Church History 15: Religious Motivation*, ed. D. Baker (Oxford, 1978), pp. 97 – 108; and B. Hamilton, *The Leper King and his Heirs* (Cambridge, 2000), esp. pp. 159 – 185.

before a period in prison, but that afterwards he was a changed man, devoting much energy to aiding the crusader states.⁷⁴

Limitations of this Study:

The study of the Crusades is one which encompasses a huge number of different ethnic and religious groups, each one of which had their own language or languages in which their chronicles were written down. As previously stated, the aim of this thesis is to open up a new perspective on the Crusades by using material from both sides of the Islamic/Christian divide. However, there is, unfortunately, plenty of material which cannot be utilised, as it is still not translated from the original language, or the author of this thesis cannot as yet read these languages; thus, the evidence from the Greeks and native Christians which will be used is based around the few translations which have been carried out so far. In consequence, although this study will open up a new perspective on the crusades, it is by no means an exhaustive study of all the extant material.

Furthermore, the study has been limited to only two individuals. Although this will prove extremely useful in some areas, it does mean that any conclusions reached can only be used to understand the two individuals studied, and cannot be used to make assumptions about other leaders. Consequently, there is much more research to be done on the other individuals who both led and resisted the Crusades.

General Comments on the Sources:

Islamic Sources – There are two main problems facing the predominantly western crusade historians of the crusades in dealing with the Islamic sources of the period. Firstly, there is the problem alluded to above, that few crusade historians can read Arabic, and that

⁷⁴ C. Hillenbrand, 'The Imprisonment of Reynald of Chatillon' in *Texts, Documents and Artefacts: Islamic studies in honour of D.S. Richards*, ed. C.F. Robinson (Leiden, 2003), pp. 79 – 102

the main translations they use are faulty.⁷⁵ Secondly, even when the Arabic sources are translated well, there are still problems with them which only the Arabist is aware of, such as the stereotyped images Arab writers had of the Turks or Kurds – such as the Turks’ penchant for alcohol – an important feature of some works, but one which cannot be fully understood by western, Latinist historians of the crusades due to their lack of understanding in this area. In contrast to this situation, this study will employ a broad range of the available sources, and use them in the original Arabic where possible, in order to fully recognise their implications and importance, which will ensure a better overall understanding of the opinions of the Islamic writers of the time and the images they created.

The Purpose of History in Islam:

The history recorded by Muslim scribes in the period of the Crusades had a specific purpose to it, and certain rules governed its writing. Its function was partially as entertainment, but its main import was in how it related to Islam, and the advancement of Islam. This could be achieved in several ways: it served to highlight both good and bad rulers, so that later generations would know how to be good rulers⁷⁶; the study of history would allow a person to develop a good character⁷⁷; and it was through history that Allah’s revelations were made known to humanity.⁷⁸

With regard to the Crusades, references to the events and personalities in question are found in many different forms of historical writings, including universal histories⁷⁹, histories

⁷⁵ See above, p. 12.

⁷⁶ See M. Hilmy M. Ahmad, ‘Some notes on Arabic Historiography During the Zengid and Ayyubid Periods’, in *Historians of the Middle East*, ed. B. Lewis, & P. Holt, (Oxford, 1962), esp. pp. 81 – 82; and T. Khalidi, *Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period*, Cambridge, 1994, p. 216. See also A.A. Duri, *The Rise of Historical Writing Among the Arabs*, ed. & tr. L.I. Conrad, Princeton, 1983, pp. 152 – 159.

⁷⁷ M. Hilmy M. Ahmad, ‘Some notes on Arabic Historiography During the Zengid and Ayyubid Periods’, esp. p. 81.

⁷⁸ See also F. Rosenthal, *Muslim Historiography* 2nd Edition, Leiden, 1968, esp. pp. 30 – 53.

⁷⁹ The best example of this for the crusades is Al-Kāmil.

of cities⁸⁰, and biographies.⁸¹ They are couched both in certain ideological terms and within a specific historiographical framework, so it is vital to understand these terms and frameworks in order to fully appreciate the sources.⁸² Thus, there are numerous sources available of varied types, resulting in a broad historiography of the period. This means an overall understanding of the period and personalities can be developed by utilising the various forms together.

The Islamic Chronicles:

The writings of Islamic medieval historians provide modern crusade historians with a wealth of information which is both illuminating yet difficult to penetrate. The accounts are illuminating for the perspective they provide for crusade historians, and they also reveal events which were not recorded by Latin historians, because they deal with subjects outside their range of knowledge, such as how Islamic rulers gained or kept power, or how they recruited their armies. However, the Islamic records also present problems to the modern historian, based on the methodology used by the chroniclers.

Firstly, many Arabic chronicles are in the form of annals which, useful though they are for recording events, rarely give explanations for events or contain the writer's opinion on them. Thus the historian has to infer from the limited information what the chronicler's opinion was, and often why the event happened.⁸³ Secondly, the Crusades as understood in the western sense were not seen as a separate phenomenon and so do not have whole histories devoted to them; information only occurs about the events when they relate to a different topic which the chronicler is describing.⁸⁴ For example, a chronicler may only speak of the crusaders in relation to how they behaved towards a Muslim ruler, or when they

⁸⁰ Examples of these include IQ and Ibn al-'Adim.

⁸¹ For example, Ibn al-'Adim, *Bughyat al-ṭalab*, ed. S. Zakkar, Damascus, 1988.

⁸² See Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, pp. 9-10.

⁸³ Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, pp. 9 – 10.

⁸⁴ *ibid.*

relate to a particular city about which the chronicler was writing. There is, therefore, a deliberately slanted view of every situation. Finally, the ideological world in which they operated means terms are often employed about which the modern reader cannot be sure of their meaning – a crusader may be termed a ‘devil’, for example (i.e., particularly evil) yet it is not clear whether this is the author’s actual opinion, or whether just the rhetorical device used many times by Islamic writers.⁸⁵

These problems, though, can be mostly avoided if the modern historian is aware of them, and if the style of each medieval writer is appreciated, as this helps to sort out rhetoric from conviction, and understand the author’s views through the distorting lens of the annalistic form. With this in mind, a deconstruction of each chronicle utilised in this thesis is a necessary starting point for examining images within them, which will be carried out in chronological order.

Ibn al-Qalānisi:

Ibn al-Qalānisi (d. 1160/555) came from a notable family in Damascus, and was well educated in order to be able to embark on a career in the civil service of the city. In this, he rose to become a secretary in the chancery before becoming *raʿīs* (‘chief’, or ‘mayor’) of the town twice, one of the highest civil offices there was.⁸⁶ His work is extremely useful for the historian of the Crusades as it is one of few contemporary accounts for the time he writes of – all the events which are reported occurred in the lifetime of either himself or his father.⁸⁷ Not only that, but it is believed to be accurate in both chronology and its reports of events, and was extensively used by others later including Ibn al-Athīr and Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī –

⁸⁵ *ibid.*

⁸⁶ See Gibb’s Introduction to IQ; p. 8, Amedroz pp. 6 – 7.

⁸⁷ *ibid.*, p. 9, Amedroz; p. 4.

which attests to its supposed accuracy.⁸⁸ In its focus it is slanted towards events surrounding the city of Damascus⁸⁹, meaning it has little to say about events in northern Syria, so Il-Ghāzī is mentioned only sporadically, while the geographical focus for the piece precludes any appearance from Renaud of Châtillon. That which it does say about Il-Ghāzī is important, however, as it may reveal the attitudes of Muslims towards co-religionists under different rule and of different ethnic stock.⁹⁰

Ibn al-Azraq:

Reading the *Ta'riḫ Mayyāfāriqīn* of Ibn al-Azraq (d. after 1176/571), the historian faces the problem of a lack of evidence regarding both the name of the text and who the author himself was. This means that it is not immediately clear what the prejudices of the author were, and so their avoidance is all the more difficult.⁹¹ There is, however, one main assumption which can be made over the reason for writing, that Ibn al-Azraq composed his work under the patronage of local dynasts, who he was expected to glorify, and that these were the Artuqids, of whom Il-Ghāzī was a prominent member.⁹² However, there are several problems which it is difficult to resolve about Ibn al-Azraq's work. Firstly, it has been argued by some, and disputed by others, that the author was a Shī'ite, which would of course have a significant influence on his interpretation of persons, particularly those of Sunni leaders, but also influencing how he views events involving Fāṭimid and Nizārī

⁸⁸ *ibid.*, p. 10.

⁸⁹ *ibid.*, p. 11, Amedroz; p. 3.

⁹⁰ It is a little acknowledged and little explored truth that while the vast majority of Islamic writers on the subject of the crusades were Arab, the Muslim rulers they were writing about were almost exclusively not – they were either Turkish or Kurdish. This naturally leads to further extension of the concept of the 'other' into Sunni Muslim Arab circles.

⁹¹ C.F. Robinson, 'Ibn al-Azraq, his *Ta'riḫ Mayyāfāriqīn*, and early Islam', in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 3rd Series, Vol. 6, 1996, p. 8.

⁹² *ibid.*, p. 13.

Shī'ites.⁹³ There is also a limited influence by that which has been described as 'regional chauvinism' in the work of Ibn al-Azraq, the copying of other histories of cities of the region which were written solely to glorify that city.⁹⁴ Furthermore, the author is said to be 'no great historian' when compared to others of a similar period, with poor chronology, while 'his historical narrative is frequently garbled'.⁹⁵ Despite these issues, his sources are believed to have been eye-witnesses⁹⁶, so it remains a useful work.

Usāma bin Munqidh:

Usāma bin Munqidh's (d. 1188/584) work is unique as it is the only account of Syria at the time of the Crusades taking the form of memoirs, the recollection of the personal experiences of his life, rather than being a town chronicle or universal history. The importance of this is because it gives the view of someone who was writing outside the strict governmental boundaries of other chronicles. As well as this, the work also captures the mood amongst others in Muslim society of the time who were also outside those boundaries, and highlights the views of an Arab Muslim at a time when the crusades were being fought between Western Europeans and Muslims under Turkish command; thus, ethnically at least, Usāma was not linked to either of the protagonists.

'Imād al-Dīn al-Isfahānī:

The writings of 'Imād al-Dīn (d. 1201/597) are some of the most important works for the whole period of the Crusades. The source used here, the *Kitāb al-fatḥ al-qussī fi'l-fatḥ*

⁹³ This view has been put forward by V. Minorsky in *A History of Sharvān and Darband in the 10th and 11th Centuries* (Cambridge, 1958), p. 170, and C.F. Robinson, 'Ibn al-Azraq, his Ta'rīkh Mayyāfāriqīn, and early Islam', in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 3rd Series, Vol. 6, 1996, pp. 14 – 16. This view was challenged by C. Hillenbrand in *A Muslim Principality in Crusader Times*, (Leiden, 1990), p. 6.

⁹⁴ C.F. Robinson, 'Ibn al-Azraq, his Ta'rīkh Mayyāfāriqīn, and early Islam', p. 24.

⁹⁵ C. Hillenbrand, 'Some Medieval Islamic Approaches to Source Material', in *Oriens* 27, 1981, p. 197.

⁹⁶ *ibid*, p. 197.

al-qudsī is, as a piece of Arabic, an extremely intricate work, full of rhetoric and overblown language⁹⁷, yet under these trappings it is ‘an excellent first-hand source, a faithful witness, intelligent and informed...free from prejudice as well as flattery’.⁹⁸ The text is very useful in itself as the author was the personal secretary of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn after 1175/570, meaning he had a wealth of information available to him from this period onwards, and it broadly agrees with the other chronicles. However, there are a number of problems associated with the text. A consequence of his position is that ‘Imād al-Dīn’s chronicle is, like Bahā’ al-Dīn’s, biased in favour of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, resulting in little assessment of the Sultan, instead being full of praise and in agreement with the ruler in almost every point. There is also the fact that ‘Imād al-Dīn’s work can be regarded as being useful only after 1187/583⁹⁹, as it was during this period that he was an eyewitness to the events he describes.¹⁰⁰

Ibn al-Athīr’s *Al-Kāmil fī’l-ta’rīkh*:

Ibn al-Athīr (d. 1233/630) is one of the greatest of thirteenth/seventh century Islamic scholars. He was born in Cizre, now in Turkey, but moved at the age of twenty-one to Mosul, where he served the Zengids for many years. His majestic work of universal history contains perhaps the largest amount of material on the period of the Crusades, chronicling events which were not recorded by others, and over a greater timescale.¹⁰¹ It is also useful because, unlike most other writers of the time, Ibn al-Athīr is not merely a chronicler, but he also attempts to explain events and develop a historiography, thus having ‘the instincts of a

⁹⁷ M. Hilmy M. Ahmad, ‘Some notes on Arabic Historiography during the Zengid and Ayyubid Periods (521/1127 – 648/1250)’, in *Historians of the Middle East*, ed. B. Lewis & P.M. Holt, London, 1962, p. 87.

⁹⁸ F. Gabrieli, ‘The Arabic Historiography of the Crusades’, in *Historians of the Middle East*, ed. B. Lewis & P.M. Holt, London, 1962, p. 104.

⁹⁹ H.A.R. Gibb, ‘The Arabic Sources for the Life of Saladin’, in *Speculum* 25, 1950, p. 71.

¹⁰⁰ Ahmad, M. Hilmy M., ‘Some notes on Arabic Historiography during the Zengid and Ayyubid Periods (521/1127 – 648/1250)’, p. 87.

¹⁰¹ F. Gabrieli, *Arab Historians of the Crusades*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1969, p., xxvii.

true historian'.¹⁰² He tries to explain the Crusades as one stage in the struggle between Christianity and Islam, and as one part of a larger assault on Muslim lands by Europeans, which also included Sicily and Spain.¹⁰³ This means, according to one scholar, that his perspective on the Crusades is closer to that of the Latin Church than to that of other Muslim chroniclers.¹⁰⁴

It has been suggested that there are numerous problems with his chronicle – such as Gibb's view that some parts of Ibn al-Athīr's chronicle were lifted wholesale from the work of 'Imād al-Dīn and Ibn al-Qalānisī, and often misinterpreted or deliberately altered them, which, he suggests, means that Ibn al-Athīr's work is sometimes of no real value as an independent source.¹⁰⁵ There is also believed to be a pro-Zengid bias which affected all his writings¹⁰⁶, and as a consequence he had a bias against Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and the Ayyubids which has been called 'notorious'.¹⁰⁷ However, these issues have been somewhat over-played by Gibb, as his own appreciation of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn has distorted his whole view of Ibn al-Athīr, who is not so complimentary to the conqueror of Jerusalem as some writers.

Bahā' al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād:

It is fortunate that a long account of the life of Bahā' al-Dīn (d. 1239/636) was penned by the Arabic biographer Ibn Khallikān in the thirteenth/seventh century, less than a century

¹⁰² C. Hillenbrand, 'Sources in Arabic', in *Byzantines and Crusaders in Non-Greek Sources*, ed. M. Whitby, *Proceedings of the British Academy* 132, Oxford, 2007, p. 315. Also F. Gabrieli, *Arab Historians of the Crusades*, p. xxvii.

¹⁰³ Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, p. 50.

¹⁰⁴ See P.E. Chevedden, 'The Islamic Interpretation of the Crusade: A New (Old) Paradigm for Understanding the Crusades', in *Der Islam* 83 (2006).

¹⁰⁵ H.A.R. Gibb, 'The Arabic Source for the Life of Saladin', in *Speculum* 25, 1950, p. 61; H.A.R. Gibb, 'Notes on the Arabic Materials for the history of the Early Crusade', in *The Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 7, 1933 – 5, pp. 739 – 754, esp. pp. 745 – 753. See also D.S. Richards, 'Ibn al-Athīr and the Later Parts of the Kāmil', in *Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds*, ed. D.O. Morgan, London, 1982, p. 83.

¹⁰⁶ The main Zengid rulers for the period of the Crusades were Zengī (1127/521 – 1146/541) and Nūr al-Dīn (1146/541 – 1174/569).

¹⁰⁷ H.A.R. Gibb, 'The Arabic Source for the Life of Saladin', in *Speculum* 25, 1950, p. 58. This view is also taken by M.F. Elshayyal in 'Relations between Nūr al-Dīn and Salāḥ al-Dīn as portrayed in Ibn al-Athīr's al-kāmil fī al-tārīkh', in *Islamic Quarterly* Vol. 48, 2004, pp. 238 -249.

after the death of the chronicler, as a great deal can be deduced about his reasons for writing from the entry in that biographical dictionary.¹⁰⁸ The most important point from the perspective of this study is that Bahā' al-Dīn was in the service of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn as a *qāḍī* from 1188/584 until the Sultan's death in 1193/589. So while he used the writings of 'Imād al-Dīn to supplement his information, he probably also had Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's own testimony, as well as his own eyewitness account.¹⁰⁹ Thus he had plenty of evidence about the events during his time as *qāḍī*, and the work is unusual in being a biography based on character, instead of just anecdotes as was usual for medieval Muslim chronicles.¹¹⁰ For some time, a belief persisted that there is not an obvious personal bias in his work – which was seen as quite an achievement for that time and his position in society – and that he wrote with 'sober good sense and honesty'.¹¹¹ This has led to some believing that his writings are much more reliable than those of Ibn al-Athīr. However, some historians have challenged this view, and are much more cautious in the claims made about the chronicle, mainly because the reason for its having been written was 'out of a pious wish to record the moral excellencies of its main subject, the Sultan Saladin'.¹¹² This means, of course, that the virtues of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn are overplayed, and his flaws understated. Consequently, not only will this be the basis for the image of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, but it may also affect other personalities in the account – those who the Sultan judges as good will be seen as good, those who he judges as bad will be seen as bad. Furthermore, the information in the chronicle for the period from its beginnings as an historical account in 1163/558 up until 1188/584, when Bahā' al-Dīn joined the service of the Sultan, which includes that about Renaud, needs to be used carefully. This is because the chronicler was only in a position to be able to gain the

¹⁰⁸ Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-a'yān*, ed. I. 'Abbās, Vol. VII, Beirut, 1977, pp. 84 – 100. This is well summarised in Richards' introduction to Bahā' al-Dīn, pp 1 – 3.

¹⁰⁹ Bahā' al-Dīn, p. 5.

¹¹⁰ F. Gabrieli, 'The Arabic Historiography of the Crusades', in *Historians of the Middle East*, p. 104.

¹¹¹ H.A.R. Gibb, 'The Arabic Source for the Life of Saladin', p. 58.

¹¹² Bahā' al-Dīn, p. 4

information he required for writing his work after 1188/584 when he was made judge of the army. Thus the account of Renaud is necessarily drawn from other sources whose provenance is not clear.

What all agree on, however, is that as well as a biography of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, the reason for the text's existence is as a propaganda piece for the *jihād*. Its existence is based on a concern in the mind of the writer, which is put into the mouth of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn in the text, that after the death of the Sultan the struggle will not be carried on, allowing the crusaders time to regain possessions and territory.¹¹³ The text is also a reminder to the Muslims that they should not give up the struggle, and that those who Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn struggled against are those who should be fought, as they are evil and unbelievers.

The chronicle is therefore a combination of praise for Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and encouragement to others to continue the struggle which forms the core of the work. As such, any events or people who appear in the narrative are bound by these principles.

Ibn al-‘Adīm:

Ibn al-‘Adīm (d. 1262/660) was born into an important Aleppan family in the second half of the twelfth century, whose members had held important positions within the government for many years. His father was a *qāḍī* in the administrations of Nūr al-Dīn, ‘Imād al-Dīn, and Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn.¹¹⁴ Thus, he had access to official records and the testimony of people who had taken part in some of the events he describes. The account used here, *Zubdat al-ḥalab fī ta’rīkh Ḥalab*, is based to a large degree on historiographical traditions

¹¹³ *ibid*, pp. 4 – 5. This, indeed, did happen, as Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's Ayyubid descendants were very apathetic to the idea of the *jihād* – see Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, p. 204 - 211.

¹¹⁴ F. Gabrieli, ‘The Arabic Historiography of the Crusades’, in *Historians of the Middle East*, p. 111.

which are not used by other extant sources. He also seems to be very reliable in the details of his work.¹¹⁵

Despite these, there is a significant part of his work which is based on Ibn al-Athīr's chronicle, and as such those parts do not add much to the overall perspective on an event.¹¹⁶ It is also a work which is a history of the city of Aleppo, meaning that his work is very useful and detailed when it dealing with that city, but it is not very helpful for the history of other theatres of the Crusades. In reality, this means that for the purposes of this study, his image of Renaud is less important than that of Il-Ghāzī. He is also regarded as being generally pro-Zengid and Ayyubid in his outlook, as his family worked for them, meaning that he is naturally biased against those who opposed those families, such as the Arṭuqids from whom Zengī wrested Aleppo in 1128/522.

General Comments on the Arabic Sources:

While the Arabic sources do, in individual terms, all have their faults, one of the most pleasing and useful aspects of the total extant corpus is that there is a good mix of styles, genres, dates of composition, and political persuasion. This means, in practice, that many of the possible interpretations for events are found in these chronicles, and thus it is easy to know which issues are contentious and close study can help to resolve them. On the other hand, if there is consensus across these boundaries of time, space, and politics, then it will be reasonable to assume that this consensus reflects opinions of Islamic society at the time.

Latin Sources – There is a huge body of sources available on the Crusades which have been translated into English, and a similarly large canon of works which have been edited in

¹¹⁵ *ibid*, p. 113.

¹¹⁶ See H.A.R. Gibb, 'Notes on the Arabic Materials for the history of the Early Crusade', p. 753

their original language. By far the largest of these collections is the *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades; Historiens Occidentaux*.¹¹⁷ These were edited and published at the end of the nineteenth century with a French translation, and are useful as they provide a huge amount of primary source material in one place. However, some of the translations are very poor, and as a result of this, new translations have been made of some, particularly those in the series *Crusade Texts in Translation*.

Latin Chronicles:

The phenomenon known as the Crusades has left a canon of history and literature unequalled in both scope and measure from medieval times. While some were writing histories¹¹⁸, others wrote hagiographical pieces¹¹⁹, while still others wrote down crusading songs which were popular at the time¹²⁰; these, along with charters and papal bulls issued at the time, provide a rich variety of sources from which historians can gather evidence. For the purpose of this thesis, however, the evidence comes from only a few sources, which are either histories in the medieval sense or hagiography. This is both to fit in with the overall purpose of the thesis, and because very few chronicles make reference to Renaud, important though he was. Thus, the evidence is limited to the writings of William of Tyre, Peter of Blois, and the anonymous author of the Lyons *Eracles* text. Latin writings referring to Il-Ghāzī are even scarcer, with only Walter the Chancellor and William of Tyre giving enough of an account to build up an image. Thus both Renaud and Il-Ghāzī are seen through the eyes of very few Latin historians.

¹¹⁷ *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Documents Occidentaux*, 5 Vols, Paris, 1844 - 1895

¹¹⁸ There are many Latin historical chronicles which deal with the Crusades; see, for example, Guibert of Nogent *Dei Gesta per Francos*, ed. R.B.C. Huygens, *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis* 127a, Turnhout, Brepols, 1996; Odo of Deuil, *De Protectione Ludovici VII in Orientem*, ed. V.G. Berry, New York, 1948; Albert of Aachen, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, ed. S.B. Edgington, Oxford, 2007; and John of Joinville, 'History of St. Louis', in *Chronicles of the Crusades*, ed. M.R.B. Shaw, Penguin, 1963.

¹¹⁹ See, for example, Peter of Blois

¹²⁰ *La Chanson d'Antioche*, ed. M. Duparc-Quioç, 2 vols., (Paris, 1977 - 8).

The Purpose of History in 12th-century Europe:

The writing of history in twelfth-century Europe had various rationales, and these did not vary to a great extent across the range of religious writing which made up the majority of the chronicles of the time. What all history writing had in common, however, was that it was written down because ‘it mattered to someone’¹²¹. The chronicles of the Middle Ages were not meant to be history in the modern sense; instead there is more emphasis put on history as a form of literature, and because of these histories were meant to be as much entertainment as an aid to knowledge. Yet being an aid to knowledge is certainly an important part of history’s role; it was aimed at being a way in which the mistakes of the past could be learned and avoided, and seeing and understanding the role of God in the events of the world.¹²² It could also be written simply from scholarly curiosity, as a justification of contemporary modes of thinking, or to ‘create, establish or justify an institution’.¹²³ Thus, among the chronicles of the crusading period, each will have been written with a particular idea in mind, and so it is necessary to discuss each in turn, to understand what the writers were hoping to achieve overall.

The Latin Chroniclers:

Walter the Chancellor.

Walter (d. mid-twelfth/fifth century) was the Chancellor of Antioch from c. 1114/507-8 to 1119/512, and from his position was in contact with the highest authorities in the

¹²¹ D.M. Deliyannis, ‘Introduction’, in *Historiography in the Middle Ages*, ed. D.M. Deliyannis, Leiden, 2003, p. 12.

¹²² See, among others, N. Partner, *Serious Entertainments: The Writing of History in Twelfth Century England*, Chicago, 1977, and C. Brooke, *Europe in the Central Middle Ages, 962 – 1154*, London, 1975, p. 5.

¹²³ D.M. Deliyannis, ‘Introduction’, in *Historiography in the Middle Ages*, ed. D.M. Deliyannis, Leiden, 2003, p. 12.

principality.¹²⁴ His writings also show that he was an eyewitness to many of the events he described, including the Battle of Balāṭ in 1119/512 at which he implies he was captured and sent as a prisoner to Aleppo.¹²⁵ His chronicle seems to have been written in three sections – Book One between 1115/508-9 and 1119/512 before Balāṭ; Book Two up to chapter twelve soon after 1119/512, and the remainder sometime later, though exact dates are difficult to ascertain.¹²⁶ The themes which permeate the chronicle are not uniform throughout the text, because of how it has been arranged into two books. Book One's main theme is that 'Christian warfare must be carried out with divine sanction and with pure intention' – everything else flows out of this idea.¹²⁷ The theme of the second book is much more difficult to pin down, as there are several interrelated themes which form the basis for the work. The main one is a need to 'rationalise the Latin defeat at the Field of Blood (Balāṭ)', the reason for which was ungratefulness to God for their victory in 1115/508 - 9¹²⁸, leading to a need for spiritual purity in warfare. Other themes in Book Two are the spiritual purity of Roger of Salerno, God's favour returned on the crusaders, and His omnipotence.¹²⁹ Thus, these two themes are the framework around which interpretations are hung.

William of Tyre:

William (d. 1184-5/579-81) was born around the year 1130/524 in Jerusalem, and was sent to Western Europe for an education in the liberal arts and canon law when he reached his mid-teens, staying there for around twenty years, returning to his homeland around

¹²⁴ Walter says that on the eve of the Battle of the Field of Blood, Prince Roger 'secretly called his chancellor and settled with him what should properly be done for the business in hand', thus implying he had a direct hand in the events – WC II.3, p. 120.

¹²⁵ WC, p. 114 implies Walter was present at the battle, and his vivid descriptions of the aftermath reinforce this possibility.

¹²⁶ For a full discussion, see the Introduction to *The Antiochene Wars* by S. Edgington and T. Asbridge, pp. 1 – 72.

¹²⁷ WC, p. 11.

¹²⁸ WC, p. 11.

¹²⁹ *ibid*, p. 12.

1165/560.¹³⁰ Almost immediately he was given important duties in the service of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. He was sent as a diplomat for King Amalric to the Greeks in 1168/563 to organise a joint Byzantine-Crusader offensive against Egypt¹³¹, and in 1170/565 - 566 he was appointed tutor to the future King Baldwin IV.¹³² Being placed in these two positions of responsibility show how trusted he was by the king, and how suitable he was regarded for high office. William was elected chancellor in 1174/569 - 570 and appointed Archbishop of Tyre in 1175/570 - 571.¹³³ It is believed that he wrote the *Chronicon* between approximately 1170/565 - 566 and 1184/570 - 580.¹³⁴ While it is generally agreed that William of Tyre was an excellent historian of the time, seeking out the truth and writing as accurate an account as possible with access to members of the ruling classes and important documentation, it is necessary to note two important issues which affect the reliability of the work. Firstly, as he was born in the year 1130/524, was a child for the time before he went to Europe, and did not re-enter the Holy Land until the year 1165/560, it follows that he was not an eyewitness for the events of the period when he was in Europe. Thus, he must have used other accounts and witnesses for events in this period, possibly utilising the same sources for his *Chronicon* as for his now lost *Gesta Orientalium Principum*, meaning it is not possible to gauge the accuracy of his accounts where there is no other evidence. Secondly, in the bitter factional dispute which plagued the Kingdom of Jerusalem after the death of King Amalric in 1174/569 - 570, he sided with Maria Comnena. Consequently, it has been suggested that he may have been willing to assign more criticism to members of the opposing faction than they deserved¹³⁵, of which Renauld of Châtillon was one member.

¹³⁰ Edbury & Rowe p. 13.

¹³¹ *ibid*, p. 16.

¹³² *ibid*, p. 17.

¹³³ *ibid*, p. 18.

¹³⁴ *ibid*, p. 26.

¹³⁵ *ibid* p. 18.

The Continuations of William of Tyre:

During the thirteenth century, the popular appeal of William of Tyre's history was so great in Europe that many translations were carried out, especially into the French vernacular of the time, and many – both in the original Latin and Old French – had continuations added to the end. Together, these form a corpus known as the *Eracles* manuscripts, all of which seem to have been based on an original continuation. This original is the now lost chronicle of Ernoul, who was a participant in the Battle of Ḥaṭṭīn, and who was a squire of Balian of Ibelin. The main point which should be understood from this is that because Ernoul was part of the Ibelin retinue, he was automatically hostile to the king, Guy, and to the king's men, of whom Renaud was one, because of the factionalism which plagued the kingdom of Jerusalem at the time. Furthermore, as each individual manuscript in the *Eracles* corpus is 'a collection of sources rather than each a source'¹³⁶, it means that they were each compiled from a number of sources without much thought as to continuity or understanding. Thus, Renaud's role as a villain is retained from Ernoul's part of the *Eracles* chronicles, while he could just as easily be a hero in another part of the same account. The extant accounts are adaptations and continuations of this original, and have very complex relations with each other.¹³⁷

The Old French Continuation of William of Tyre:

The continuation of William of Tyre's chronicle used in this thesis is found in a single manuscript in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Lyon¹³⁸, was edited by Morgan¹³⁹, and

¹³⁶ M.R. Morgan, *The Chronicle of Ernoul and the Continuations of William of Tyre*, Oxford, 1973, p. 177.

¹³⁷ For attempts to explain the monumentally complex relationships between the extant manuscripts, see L. de Mas-Latrie, *Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier*, Paris, 1871; Comte-Riant in *Archives de l'Orient Latin*, I Paris, 1880 – 1; M.R. Morgan, *The Chronicle of Ernoul and the Continuations of William of Tyre*, Oxford, 1973; Introduction to Continuation

¹³⁸ Bibliothèque de la Ville de Lyon MS. 828. The Continuation begins at f. 286r.

¹³⁹ M.R. Morgan, *La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184 – 1197)*, Paris, 1982.

translated by Edbury.¹⁴⁰ For the purposes of this thesis, only this *Eracles* text will be examined, reasons for which are twofold. Firstly, the other edited texts, such as *La Chronique d'Ernoul et La Continuation de Bernard le Trésorier*, while having some marked differences with the Lyons manuscript, are practically identical in their reportage of Renaud, therefore only one needs to be utilised. Secondly, the Lyons manuscript is that which has most recently been edited, and with due respect to the nineteenth-century scholars who edited the aforementioned texts, the Lyons' edition is far superior, so this is the version which shall be used. The Lyons *Eracles* is a re-working of the account of Ernoul, yet it contains more information than this or any other source, which led the editor to state that this chronicle 'provides the fullest version of the narrative for 1184 – 97'.¹⁴¹

Peter of Blois:

The *Passio Raginaldi* of Peter of Blois (d. c. 1203/599) is one of the most extraordinary sources for the Crusades. An intense, vital, vivid description of the end of Renaud, it describes in deeply spiritual terms his demise, using it to summon the powers of Europe from their slumber with regard to the crusader states. Peter presents the heroic Renaud as the perfect Christian, and writes how he had laid down his life for Christendom, while urging others to do the same. The tract was written between the time when news of the defeat at Ḥaṭṭīn reached the west in late 1187/583, and the departure of the Third Crusade in 1189/585¹⁴², and the highly charged emotions evident in the chronicle were caused by Peter's horror at the news of the defeat at Ḥaṭṭīn and the loss of Jerusalem.¹⁴³ This, in turn,

¹⁴⁰ Continuation, pp. 11 – 145.

¹⁴¹ Continuation, p. 6.

¹⁴² R.W. Southern, 'Peter of Blois and the Third Crusade', in *Studies in Medieval History presented to R.H.C. Davies*, ed. H. Mayr-Harting & R.F. Moore, London, 1985, pp. 207 – 218.

¹⁴³ Southern has written that the *Passio* 'gives us our best view of the passions aroused by the disasters which preceded the Third Crusade'; see 'Peter of Blois: A Twelfth-Century Humanist?', in *Medieval Humanism and Other Studies*, ed. R.W. Southern, Oxford, 1970, p. 127. Markowski reports that Peter received this news while at the Papal Curia, the place at which the news would have met its most intense reception. M. Markowski,

caused him to write the piece, a powerful part of the propaganda which accompanied the call for the Third Crusade. Its purpose, therefore, was to inspire the men of Europe to the Crusade.

Greek Sources – With the benefit of hindsight, it is all too easy for the modern historian to regard the twelfth/sixth century Byzantine Empire as being in a constant state of decline from the heights of power and strength it had enjoyed in the sixth century under Justinian. However, that is certainly not the viewpoint which the Byzantines of the time had themselves, nor was it the view of contemporary outsiders.¹⁴⁴ The Byzantines regarded themselves as the continuators of the Classical Roman Empire, to the extent that public disagreement occurred with the western powers and the Papacy over who had the right to the title ‘Emperor of the Romans’¹⁴⁵; this belief encouraged them to regard themselves as being the most powerful and important empire on earth. Reinforcing this view, the Byzantine Emperors saw themselves as the heir of Constantine, and by extension God’s representative on earth¹⁴⁶ (what position could be more powerful or important?) and protector of Christians everywhere.¹⁴⁷ And even when the empire had an emperor whose leadership skills lacked something, it was the civil service who ran the country and so the emperor’s lack of governmental talent did not affect how the empire was run, because the civil service ran it. Treaties were made with potential enemies, of course, but that had

‘Peter of Blois and the Conception of the Third Crusade’, in *The Horns of Hattin*, ed. B.Z. Kedar, Jerusalem, 1992, p. 263.

¹⁴⁴ Harris, *Byzantium*, esp. pp. 1 – 32.

¹⁴⁵ Harris, *Byzantium*, pp 22 & 42; S. Runciman, *The Eastern Schism*, Oxford, 1955, pp. 1 - 27; J.M. Hussey, *The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire*, Oxford, 1986, p. 72 -79

¹⁴⁶ Harris, *Byzantium*, p. 14; S. Runciman, ‘The Byzantine Theocracy’, Cambridge, 1977, p. 5 -25; D.M. Nicol, ‘Byzantine Political Thought’ in *Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought* ed. J.H. Burns, Cambridge, 1988, p. 51-79, esp. 52-3; and P.A. Alexander, ‘The Strength of Empire and Capital as Seen Through Byzantine Eyes’, in *Speculum* 37, 1962, pp 339-357

¹⁴⁷ Harris, *Byzantium*, p. 23 – 4; G. Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, tr. J.M. Hussey, Oxford, 1968, p. 553-4; F. Mikloisch & W. Muller, *Acta et Diplomatica Graece Medii Aevi Sacra et Profana*, Vol. II pp. 190-2, Vienna, 1862, tr. in *Social and Political Thought in Byzantium*, ed. E. Barker, Oxford, 1951, pp. 194 – 196; D. Obolensky, ‘The Byzantine Commonwealth: Eastern Europe 500 – 1453’, London, 1971, esp. pp. 287 – 302.

always been done. The Byzantine Empire itself was still the vast, powerful, important empire it had always been, despite the loss of territory it had been suffered, as it was not land or possessions which were of concern to them, but ideas of sovereignty and its spiritual position.¹⁴⁸

This Byzantine viewpoint was reflected in that of their enemies. To practically all outsiders, Constantinople was the greatest city in the world, and evinced both the greatest respect and the greatest envy. Thus the Muslim forces of the Arabs, the Bulgars and the Vikings, had all tried, and failed, to capture the imperial capital in the centuries before the First Crusade, which highlight both the desire to possess the city and the respect these Byzantine victories must have gained for the empire.

Therefore, at the time of the Crusades, Constantinople was still, in the eyes of most, one of the most important cities in the world, and the main theme which runs through the Byzantine historical narratives of the time is that what is good is what is good for Byzantium, and what is bad is what is bad for Byzantium.¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, these histories are, despite notable exceptions such as John Kinnamos, mercifully free of much of the flattery which sometimes affects medieval histories, and could be very critical of certain rulers or events.¹⁵⁰ They are, however, generally regarded as reflecting contemporary Byzantine attitudes, as they were mostly written by civil servants who had been classically

¹⁴⁸ Harris, *Byzantium*, p. 23; G. Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, tr. J.M. Hussey, pp. 553-4; F. Mikloisch & W. Muller, *Acta et Diplomatica Graece Medii Aevi Sacra et Profana*, Vol. II pp. 190-2, tr. in *Social and Political Thought in Byzantium*, pp. 194 – 196.

¹⁴⁹ The main theme running throughout Harris' book *Byzantium and the Crusades* is that the foreign policy aims of the Byzantines were dictated by two ideological absolutes. The first was to ensure the safety of Constantinople and the Greek Christian community; the second was to ensure that the emperor's position as supreme Christian ruler was accepted by everyone. Because almost all of the writers of the period had originally been trained as civil servants, with a good deal of foreign policy experience, these chroniclers' priority was to illustrate that this foreign policy was a worthy one. Thus, a policy, whether Byzantine or foreign, was good when it achieved the above aims and bad if obstructed them. Harris, *Byzantium*, esp. pp. 15 – 32.

¹⁵⁰ Harris, *Byzantium*, p. 21.



educated and had spent their life in government, in close contact with the events and personalities they described.

This becomes very interesting during the period of the Crusades, as it is possible to trace the mood of the Byzantines throughout their relationships with the crusaders, as they alternatively suffered at the hands of the crusading armies, fought with them, against them, made treaties with them, before ultimately being defeated by them.¹⁵¹

There are three main Greek sources for the period of the crusades in English translation. These are the *Alexiad* of Anna Comnena, the *Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus* by John Kinnamos, and *O City of Byzantium* by Niketas Choniates, though only the latter two will be employed here, as the *Alexiad* contains no pertinent information.

John Kinnamos' *Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus*:

The chronicle of John Kinnamos (d. 1185/580 - 1) was written between 1180 – 2//575 - 578, by a man who was an imperial secretary, thus being attached to the imperial courts and the emperor himself. Though his chronicle covers the period 1118/511 – 1176/572, he was only an eye-witness after 1165/560, so had to rely on others for periods beforehand, though his sources are not clear in the chronicle. In respect of his personal views which come through in the chronicle, John Kinnamos is very hostile to the Latins in general, while his praise for Manuel Comnenus is hyperbolic¹⁵², and unfavourable events are ignored. This, though, was central to his purpose of writing, as by praising the emperors, he was trying to regain his place at court which he had lost. Thus, the chronicle is based around praising the

¹⁵¹ For a general introduction to the state of the Byzantine Empire before and during the period of the Crusades, and Byzantine relations with the Crusaders, see Harris, *Byzantium*, and M. Angold, *The Byzantine Empire: 1025 – 1204*, 2nd Edition, London, 1997.

¹⁵² 'his (John Kinnamos') style is partially spoilt by his excessive praise for Manuel Comnenus. Every quality of Manuel, his dashing valour in warfare, his shrewd perception of an enemy's strategic dispositions, his horsemanship, his medical skill, and his penetrating intellect all inspire Kinnamos to excesses of enthusiastic admiration' See C. M. Brand's Introduction to John Kinnamos, p. 8

emperors, which by extension means criticising Latins generally, and particularly those with whom the emperors had disagreements.¹⁵³

Niketas Choniates' *O City of Byzantium*:

Niketas Choniates (d. 1215-6/611-3) was the son of a minor noble from the provincial town of Khonas, born around 1155/550.¹⁵⁴ He was sent to Constantinople at the age of nine in order to gain an education, and here he started a career in the imperial government which lasted until his voluntary exile after the capture of the city by the Fourth Crusade in 1204/600. The aim of his history is stated as being to achieve objectivity without rhetoric or storytelling¹⁵⁵, and it is based on eye-witness accounts, and so contains information which is not recorded in any other source. For the purposes of this study, however, the most important fact to note is Choniates' attitude to the Latins, who he implies were uncouth, unrefined and uneducated, and he 'could not forgive the Latins for their wanton acts of sacrilege' in 1204/600 after they attacked Constantinople.¹⁵⁶ This, then, must be assumed to colour his entire writing, because although much of it was written before this date, it was revised afterwards, and presumably changed to reflect his new feelings towards the Latins¹⁵⁷.

Sources from Other Ethnic Groups:

In contrast to the huge amount of work carried out on Latin, and to a lesser extent Greek and Arabic, sources in western academia, the research carried out on sources from other linguistic and ethnic groups who were involved in the great drama of the Crusades has

¹⁵³ See C.M. Brand's Introduction to John Kinnamos, p. 1 – 11; Harris, *Byzantium*, p. 93.

¹⁵⁴ H.J. Magoulias, Introduction to Choniates, p. xi

¹⁵⁵ *ibid*, p. xvi

¹⁵⁶ H.J. Magoulias, Introduction to Choniates, p. xxvi. There is no mention of individual Muslims in his work so there is no comparative opinion for them.

¹⁵⁷ *ibid*

been relatively scant. Some sources from the period have been translated from a relatively obscure language into English, and they are useful to show the opinions of those who were caught between the two sides in the Crusades. However, little quality research has been carried out on them, and consequently problems arise when one source contradicts other sources, as even educated guesses are difficult. Despite this, each source is useful, and with the little research which has been done, they can give a picture of the situation as the chronicler saw it. The fruit of research on the major work is set out below.

Armenian Sources:

The main source for the period of the Crusades which has been translated into English is the chronicle entitled *The Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa*.¹⁵⁸ The author of this chronicle was a monk of lower-order rank who was an eyewitness of some of the events and persons with which this study is concerned, those of 1101/494 – 1136/528. As a monk, religious interpretations permeate Matthew's chronicle, as God is shown as being the agent of victory or defeat, and Matthew tries to explain these as far as he can. He also has a passion for the Armenian Christians and is critical of the sufferings they endure. As a result of this, he 'praises all individuals, including Muslims, who act benevolently towards the Christians'¹⁵⁹, and is very concerned with the universal church, rather than just his own rite.¹⁶⁰ The chronicler known as Matthew, however, only wrote up until the year 1137/531, presumably a year close to that in which he died. The chronicle for the period after that date – and therefore containing all references to Renaud – was compiled by one Gregory the Priest, although this only runs until 1162/557, and there has been little commentary on this author.

¹⁵⁸ Available in *Armenia and the Crusades*, tr. & ed. A.E. Doustourian, University Press of America, 1993.

¹⁵⁹ Introduction to *Armenia and the Crusades*, tr. & ed. A.E. Doustourian, University Press of America, 1993, p. 6

¹⁶⁰ A full appraisal of Matthew of Edessa's work is in *ibid.*, pp. 1 – 16. See also T. Greenwood, 'Armenian Sources', in *Byzantines and Crusaders in Non-Greek Sources*, ed. M. Whitby, pp. 221 - 252

Syriac Sources:

There are several Syriac sources which deal with the crusades, each of which lends a different perspective on the Crusades, though as their insights into Renaud and Il-Ghāzī are brief, only a short description of them will be carried out. The main source is that written by Michael the Syrian (d. 1199/595), the Jacobite Patriarch of Antioch between 1166/561 and 1199/595, the critical period in the crusading enterprise when almost the entire crusader territories were lost¹⁶¹, and which, in crusading terms, deals with events from the coming of the First Crusade until the death of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn in 1193/589. As a work of history, it is extremely useful, as it not only provides information found nowhere else, but also because it provides a fairly objective view of the events and personalities of the time, whether they were Muslims or from his own church.¹⁶²

Secondly, there is also an anonymous Syriac chronicle which deals with the events of the First and Second Crusades¹⁶³, whose author was an eyewitness for some of the events of the Crusades in the late twelfth century, although his sources for the earlier episodes of the Crusades are unknown.¹⁶⁴

*An Historical Overview of the Crusades and Preceding Events*¹⁶⁵:

¹⁶¹ This is available only as a French translation, as *Chronique de Michel le Syrien, Patriarche Jacobite d'Antioche (1166 – 1199)*, ed. & tr. J.B. Chabot, 4 vols, Paris, 1899 – 1924

¹⁶² See M. Moosa, 'The Crusades: An Eastern Perspective, With Emphasis on the Syriac Sources', in *The Muslim World* 93:2, 2003, pp. 249 – 251.

¹⁶³ *Anonymi Auctoris Chronicon ad Annum Christi 1234 Pertinens*, ed. J.B. Chabot, tr. A. Abouna, 2 vols, Louvain 1952 – 1974. There is a partial English translation by A.S. Tritton as 'The First and Second Crusade from an anonymous Syriac Chronicle', in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1933, 69 – 101 & 273 – 305

¹⁶⁴ M. Moosa, 'The Crusades: An Eastern Perspective, With Emphasis on the Syriac Sources', p. 251; and W. Witakowski, 'Syriac Historiographical Sources', in *Byzantines and Crusaders in Non-Greek Sources*, pp. 253 – 282.

¹⁶⁵ References for this section of the paper will cite secondary sources only – references to primary sources can be found in these secondary sources.

In order to understand the significance of the personalities examined, it is necessary to construct a brief overview of the historical circumstances in which they played a part.

Since the death of Muḥammad in 632/10, Islamic armies had steadily spread out from the Arabian peninsula in every direction. They moved east into Persia, defeating the Sassanian empire which had grown weak through its constant struggles with Byzantium, north into Syria where they soon captured, among others, Jerusalem and Damascus, thus taking a large proportion of Byzantium's land, and west across north Africa as far as Morocco and then north into Spain and France.¹⁶⁶ Since the middle of the eighth/second century, however, the Islamic armies had not, with the exception of several Mediterranean islands, made any significant gains. Through the internal squabbles of a large empire, the united front that had been the mainstay of the early Islamic world crumbled, leaving by the eleventh/fifth century two main, mutually hostile, political units in the Middle East, the Sunni 'Abbāsīd caliphate based in Baghdad, and the Shī'ite Fāṭimid caliphate in Cairo.¹⁶⁷ By the end of the eleventh/fifth century, each of these had become so weakened that the Islamic world had become, in effect, a feudal system, with the ruler of each city holding that territory, in principle at least, through being empowered by one of the two caliphs. This resulted in plenty of internal problems for the caliphs to deal with and in great difficulty organising resistance to any outside threat.¹⁶⁸

The first occasion on which this had been realised was in the tenth/fourth century when waves of Turks began to penetrate the Islamic Empire from Central Asia. These nomadic peoples had recently converted to Islam, and took over the governance of large swathes of territory in the Muslim Middle East.¹⁶⁹ As a consequence, the mood in the

¹⁶⁶ H. Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates*, London, 1986, pp. 57 - 103

¹⁶⁷ H. Kennedy, *The Court of the Caliphs*, London, 2004, pp. 294 - 296.

¹⁶⁸ *ibid*, p. 295.

¹⁶⁹ B. Spuler, 'The Disintegration of the Caliphate in the East', in *The Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol. IA, ed. P.M. Holt et al, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 143 - 174.

Islamic world changed considerably, as the refined, cultured Arabs made way for the more earthy ways of the Turks.

Then, in 1071/463 - 464, two important events happened to the Byzantines. Firstly, the Normans of southern Italy, under Robert Guiscard, captured Bari, the last Byzantine territory in Italy, so permanently removing Greek rule from Italy after 1500 years.¹⁷⁰ Secondly, a Turkish army under Alp Arslān inflicted a huge defeat on the Byzantine army at Manzikert, capturing the emperor Romanus IV Diogenes in the process, and swept through Asia Minor, capturing and settling in cities on the Anatolian plateau, from where they started making incursions ever closer to Constantinople.¹⁷¹ Both these events would have lasting repercussions.

By the 1090s/480s – 490s, however, the Byzantine Emperor Alexius I Comnenus had managed to recapture some of the lost territory in Asia Minor and this, combined with a chaotic situation in northern Syria, meant that the Byzantines were in a much better position than they had been in the preceding decades.¹⁷² The political situation in Syria in the late-1090s/early-490s made it much easier for the Crusades to be successful than they would have been if they had arrived a few years earlier. If the crusading armies had invaded before 1092/485, they would have faced a united Seljuq empire under the great vizier Niẓām al-Mulk. He died in this year after a reign of thirty years, and two years later, in 1094/487, the Fāṭimid Caliph al-Mustaṣir and his vizier, al-Jamālī, both died, along with the Sunni ‘Abbāsīd Caliph al-Muqtadī.¹⁷³ At the end of this period, Islamic Syria, which had previously been a relatively strong and united state, collapsed into a series of small, mutually hostile geo-political units, many of whom were no bigger than a single city.¹⁷⁴ As a

¹⁷⁰ Harris, *Byzantium*, p. 34.

¹⁷¹ J. Richard, *The Crusades, 1071 – 1291*, Cambridge, 1999, p. 12; Harris, *Byzantium*, 33 – 34.

¹⁷² Harris, *Byzantium*, p. 47.

¹⁷³ Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, p. 33

¹⁷⁴ *ibid*, p. 47

consequence of their hostility to each other, some were to ally with the crusaders against their enemies, rather than fight with their co-religionists against a foreign invader.¹⁷⁵

In the year 1095/488 the Pope, Urban II, held the council of Clermont in France, at which he gave the call to go to the Holy Land and recapture Jerusalem, in order to protect it.¹⁷⁶ The reasons for his call include an attempt to curb the endemic warfare in Europe¹⁷⁷, to protect the Byzantine Empire¹⁷⁸, and to ensure that Christian pilgrims had access to the city of Jerusalem.¹⁷⁹ Whatever the reasons, however, there was an immediate wave of enthusiasm across Europe, and the First Crusade departed the following year. Travelling for the most part overland, successive waves of crusaders passed through the Byzantine lands causing a certain amount of mayhem wherever they went¹⁸⁰, until they arrived in Syria, having suffered several lost battles against the Turks in Asia Minor.¹⁸¹ Immediately the crusaders besieged two important cities, Antioch and Edessa, both important centres to the Christians. Edessa was captured in February 1098/491, while Antioch fell on the June 3rd/29th Jumādā II after a siege lasting almost ten months.¹⁸² Each of the two cities was declared the centre of an administrative district, the county of Edessa and the principality of Antioch, and each was made up of other towns which had been, or soon would be, captured by the crusaders. It was against these two states that Il-Ghāzī, emir of Mārdīn, was ranged.

Meanwhile, after the capture of Antioch, most of the army continued south down the Levantine coast, besieging and capturing towns and cities on the way, until they arrived at

¹⁷⁵ S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. II, Cambridge, 1952, pp. 112 – 114.

¹⁷⁶ J. & L. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: Idea and Reality*, London, 1981, pp. 37 – 53; J. Richard, *The Crusades, 1071 – 1291*, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 19 – 30; P. Cole, *The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, 1095 – 1270*, Cambridge, Mass., 1991.

¹⁷⁷ J. Riley-Smith, *What were the Crusades?*, 2nd Ed., London, 1992, p. 37

¹⁷⁸ J. Riley-Smith, 'The Crusading Movement and Historians', in *The Oxford History of the Crusades*, Oxford, 1999, p. 2; Harris, *Byzantium*, pp. 46 – 51.

¹⁷⁹ S. Runciman, 'The Pilgrimages to Palestine before 1095', in K. Setton et al (eds.), *A History of the Crusades*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1955, p. 78.

¹⁸⁰ Harris, *Byzantium*, pp. 60 – 63.

¹⁸¹ Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, pp. 54 – 55; J. Richard, *The Crusades, 1071 – 1291*, pp. 47 – 49.

¹⁸² S. Runciman, 'The First Crusade: Constantinople to Antioch', and 'The First Crusade: Antioch to Ascalon', in K. Setton et al (eds.), *A History of the Crusades*, Pennsylvania University Press, Philadelphia, 1955, pp. 299 – 324; Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, pp. 56 – 59; Harris, *Byzantium*, pp. 68 – 69.

Jerusalem.¹⁸³ After a 6-week siege, Jerusalem fell on July 15th 1099/23rd Sha‘bān 492. Godfrey of Bouillon was elected to be king in all but name – he had the title of Advocate of the Holy Sepulchre – and ruled over the largest of the four crusader states, the kingdom of Jerusalem, until his death almost exactly a year later.¹⁸⁴

Over the next forty years, the crusaders cemented their position in the Levant, establishing four states – centred at Jerusalem, Antioch, Tripoli and Edessa – and a feudal system which linked these states to each other, to the Byzantine Empire, and to Western Europe.¹⁸⁵ During this period there were numerous battles between the Muslim powers of the region and the crusader states, but the lack of a united Islamic front against the crusaders meant that the crusader states were able to resist, for the most part, the attacks of Muslim armies. There were battles won by both sides during this period, such as battle of Hauran in 1104/497¹⁸⁶ and the battle of The Field of Blood/Balāṭ of 1119/512¹⁸⁷, both Muslim victories, and Tell Dānith, a crusader victory in 1119/513¹⁸⁸, and the outcome of these underline the situation of stalemate in the Levant. The Latins were not particularly concerned with conquering other Muslim territory, except to protect what they already possessed, while the Muslims were not able to mount any kind of successful campaign against the crusaders.¹⁸⁹

However, in the late 1120s/early 1150s Zengī, the atabeg of Mosul, started a campaign to unify the disparate Muslim powers in Syria which turned into a concerted resistance against the crusader states. Through a systematic campaign of warfare, treaties, and

¹⁸³ T. Asbridge, *The First Crusade*, London, 2004, pp. 241 – 319.

¹⁸⁴ J. Richard, *The Crusades, 1071 – 1291*, Cambridge, 1999, p. 79

¹⁸⁵ J. Richard, *The Crusades, 1071 – 1291*, pp.77 - 123

¹⁸⁶ S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. II, pp. 41 – 44.

¹⁸⁷ T. Asbridge, ‘The Significance and Causes of the Battle of the Field of Blood’, in, *Journal of Medieval History* 23, 1997, pp. 301 – 316; S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. II, Cambridge, 1952, pp.148 – 151, and Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, p. 22.

¹⁸⁸ See S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. II, pp. 153 – 4, who refers to the battle as the battle of Hab.

¹⁸⁹ Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, pp. 103 – 108.

intimidation, he was gradually able to gain control of a number of cities in Syria, including Aleppo, Ḥamā, Ma'arrat al-Nu'mān, and al-Athārib, thus gaining a power-base in both the north and south of Syria.¹⁹⁰ It was to the forces of Zengī that the Crusaders suffered their first major setback in 1144/539, when the city of Edessa and all the territory east of the Euphrates was captured, thus reducing the county of Edessa to a small area of land on the west bank of the river.¹⁹¹ However, while it was a blow to the crusader states, it was even more important an event, ideologically and politically, to the Muslims. While the crusaders had from the very start been fighting the Muslims for religious reasons, the forces of Islam were slower to respond in an ideological, religious manner. Although Zengī's capture of Edessa was an important event for him, its role as part of a *jihād* has been disputed, and is currently viewed as another step in the atabeg's attempts to carve out a personal territory; it had not, for example, been great leadership, but luck or opportunism which led to his capture of the city.¹⁹² It was not until the time of Zengī's son Nūr al-Dīn that the idea of *jihād*, such a prevalent idea in the early days of Islam, resurfaced.¹⁹³

To the Christians, however, this was an ideological challenge, and in response to it Pope Eugenius III produced the papal bull *Quantum Praedecessores*, encouraging people from the Latin west to go to the Holy Land as their forebears had done, to protect the land from the Muslims.¹⁹⁴ The consequence of this call was the Second Crusade, which is believed to be the time Renaud of Châtillon left France for the Holy Land.¹⁹⁵ This was very different from the First Crusade for a number of reasons. Firstly, unlike the First Crusade,

¹⁹⁰ C. Hillenbrand, "'Abominable Acts': The Career of Zengi", in *The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences*, eds. J. Phillips & M. Hoch, Manchester, 2001, pp. 111 – 132, and H.A.R. Gibb, 'Zengi and the Fall of Edessa', in *A History of the Crusades*, ed. K. Setton, Vol. I, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1955, pp. 449 – 462.

¹⁹¹ H.A.R. Gibb, 'Zengi and the Fall of Edessa', pp. 460 – 462, J. Richard, *The Crusades, 1071 – 1291*, p. 153, and S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. II, pp. 235 – 237.

¹⁹² C. Hillenbrand, "'Abominable Acts': The Career of Zengi" pp. 118 – 119.

¹⁹³ Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, pp. 116 – 141.

¹⁹⁴ In L. & J. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: Idea and Reality*, London, 1981, pp. 57 – 59.

¹⁹⁵ M.W. Baldwin, *Raymond III of Tripoli and the Fall of Jerusalem*, Princeton, 1936, p. 61.

there was no agreed target for the expedition. Jerusalem had been clearly in the minds of all of the First Crusade, yet that was still in crusader hands, and the papal bull mentioned only the need to go to the East and ‘defend in this way the Eastern church’ – not a very clear instruction from the man who launched the crusade. There were, therefore, already seeds of discord which would plague the journey.¹⁹⁶

The expedition started badly, with simmering disharmony with the Greeks, flash-floods destroying camps, and disastrous defeats to the Turks in Asia Minor.¹⁹⁷ When the expedition finally arrived in the East, Raymond, the Prince of Antioch, wanted to entice Louis, because of his ties of vassalage, to campaign in northern Syria.¹⁹⁸ For a number of reasons, though, Louis decided against this, and instead marched south to Jerusalem, and near there attended a conference of the nobility of Jerusalem, where the decision was taken to try to capture the city of Damascus. In the event, this siege was a disaster. The army started to besiege the south of the city, and then – it is thought – moved to the north of the city. However, they found no water there, and had to abandon the operation after just three days.¹⁹⁹ Thus the high hopes of the Latin East and West were dashed, and many bitter accusations were thrown around in the aftermath.²⁰⁰ Whatever the reason for the debacle, the majority of the western armies returned home, having achieved nothing, though a few – Renaud of Châtillon among them – remained. It seems that if territorial progress was to be made by the crusader states, it would have to be the nobility of those lands which would make it – the west could not help.

¹⁹⁶ J. Richard, *The Crusades, 1071 – 1291*, pp. 164 - 165

¹⁹⁷ S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. II, pp. 260 – 261 & 268, & J. Richard, *The Crusades, 1071 - 1291*, p. 163

¹⁹⁸ J. Richard, *The Crusades, 1071 – 1291*, pp. 164 – 165.

¹⁹⁹ S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. II, pp. 281 – 285.

²⁰⁰ J. Richard, *The Crusades, 1071 – 1291*, pp. 166 – 169.

In the next few years some territorial advances were made, as the crusaders captured the city of Ascalon in 1153/548, and came close to achieving the same feat at Shayzar.²⁰¹ However, in general terms, the period after the fall of Edessa marked the beginning of the very slow death of the crusader states, and even of the crusading ideal itself. Zengī's struggle against the crusader states was continued after his death by his son Nūr al-Dīn. Firstly, through treaties and intrigue, he brought all Syria under his control, with the consequence that for the first time the crusaders were faced with a united Islamic polity down almost the whole length of the eastern frontier. The Latins, with Amalric, a powerful, resourceful and intelligent king, as leader, were able to counter-balance the strength of the Muslims almost perfectly. Because of this, both leaders started to look elsewhere, and the struggle between the two powers became focussed on Egypt, the seat of the rich yet politically impotent Fāṭimid Caliphate, under the last Caliph, Al-'Adīd. In the 1160s/560s both the crusaders and Nūr al-Dīn tried to gain influence over Egypt, either through treaties with the Fāṭimids or military power, as Egypt was regarded as the key through which the future of Syria and Palestine would be decided.²⁰² Yet throughout the decade the trend was for military action by the crusaders aimed at capturing Egyptian cities for the crusader states, and for the Zengids to use military force as a way of preventing the triumph of the crusaders, while keeping dialogue open with the Fāṭimids.²⁰³ By the end of the decade the tactics employed by Nūr al-Dīn's deputies had won through, and one of Nūr al-Dīn's followers, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, became the Caliph's vizier in 1171/566.²⁰⁴ The Caliph died shortly afterwards, possibly murdered, leaving Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn as ruler of Egypt, and the Syria and

²⁰¹ J. Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land*, Oxford, 1996, pp. 271 – 281.

²⁰² J. Richard, *The Crusades, 1071 – 1291*, pp. 183 – 190.

²⁰³ H. Mayer, *The Crusades*, 2nd Edition, tr. J. Gillingham, Oxford, 1972, pp. 120 – 122.

²⁰⁴ P.M. Holt, *The Age of the Crusades*, London, 1986, p. 49.

Egypt united against the crusaders for the first time.²⁰⁵ Though some Latin commentators of the time saw the danger of this situation, they could not persuade others of it, and so there was little help coming from Europe for the increasingly beleaguered crusader states.²⁰⁶

Nūr al-Dīn died in 1174/571 and on his death Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn took over his position. In the same year Amalric died, and he was succeeded by his son, Baldwin IV.²⁰⁷ This is a microcosm of the way fate seemed to be intervening in the destiny of the crusading enterprise. While the Muslims were ruled by an ambitious, strong, and strategically intelligent general, the position of head of the crusaders was taken by a boy of fourteen who had been struck with leprosy, and who could not contain the powerful political forces around him. Thus, as the Muslim world became more united, the crusaders became more and more divided. Over the next decade there was both regular skirmishing and treaties between the crusaders and Muslims, but in 1187/583 the situation was brought to a head. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn had spent his time as leader of the Muslim lands of Egypt, Syria and the Jazīra consolidating his position of power and preparing his men for a large-scale assault on the crusader states, especially on Jerusalem.²⁰⁸ Meanwhile, Renaud of Châtillon, who held the position of lord of Kerak in Oultrejourdain, had become increasingly belligerent in his actions in the previous years, including an alleged attempt to attack Mecca and Medina in 1183/578.²⁰⁹ The last straw, or possibly the excuse, for Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was in February 1187/Dhu'l-Ḥijja 582, when Renaud attacked a Muslim ḥajj caravan containing some of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's relatives while it was passing through his territory during a time of truce.²¹⁰

²⁰⁵ M.W. Baldwin, 'The Latin State under Baldwin III and Amalric I', in *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. I, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2nd edition, ed. K. Setton, 1969, p. 556.

²⁰⁶ William of Tyre is a prime example of this. See Edbury & Rowe, pp. 159 – 160.

²⁰⁷ S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. II, pp. 398 – 400.

²⁰⁸ Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, pp. 183 – 5.

²⁰⁹ G. Leiser, 'The Crusader Raid in the Red Sea in 578/1182 – 83', in *Journal of the American Research Center in Cairo* Vol. XIV, 1977, pp. 87 – 100, and A. Mallett, 'A trip down the Red Sea with Renaud of Châtillon', in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 18/2, 2008, pp. 141 – 153.

²¹⁰ S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. II, p. 450; M.C. Lyons & D.E.P. Jackson, *Saladin: The Politics of the Holy War*, Cambridge, 1982, p. 248; J. Richard, *The Crusades, 1071 – 1291*, p. 206

He is also said to have insulted Muḥammad during this incident.²¹¹ As a result of this, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn mobilised his forces and prepared to attack the crusaders.²¹² The crusader army was made up of the army of all three remaining states, as well as the Templars and Hospitallers – almost all the fighting men in the crusader states, as well as hired mercenaries. On July 4th, they were outmanoeuvred and then routed at the Battle of Ḥaṭṭīn, after which the knights of the military orders were all executed, along with Renaud.²¹³ Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn allowed the king of Jerusalem to go, along with most of the other nobility, but the destruction of the crusader army meant that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was able to take Acre, Jaffa, Haifa, Caesarea, Toron, Sidon, Beirut, Ascalon, and Jerusalem, all in the last six months of 1187/583.²¹⁴

A Historic Overview of the Lives of the Protagonists:

In order to fully appreciate the image of the ‘other’ in the chronicles regarding Il-Ghāzī and Renaud of Châtillon, a brief account of their lives is necessary.

The Life of Il-Ghāzī:

Najm al-Dīn Il-Ghāzī was a Turkish warrior (d. 1124/518) who fought in the service of the Great Seljuq Sultan Malikshāh until the latter’s death in 1092/485.²¹⁵ His reward for his services to the Sultan was to join his brother Suqmān in controlling the territory of Jerusalem, as his father Arṭuq had previously.²¹⁶ After the capture of Jerusalem by the Fāṭimids in the year 491/1098, Il-Ghāzī and Suqmān moved to the Jazīra, and Il-Ghāzī gained high position within his Arṭuqid family dynasty upon the death of his father that

²¹¹ Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, p. 344.

²¹² S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. II, pp. 450 – 451; M.C. Lyons & D.E.P. Jackson, *Saladin: The Politics of the Holy War*, p. 248.

²¹³ S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. II, pp. 459 – 460; M.C. Lyons & D.E.P. Jackson, *Saladin: The Politics of the Holy War*, p. 264; J. Richard, *The Crusades, 1071 – 1291*, p. 207.

²¹⁴ S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. II, pp. 461 – 473; M.C. Lyons & D.E.P. Jackson, *Saladin: The Politics of the Holy War*, p. 264 – 277; J. Richard, *The Crusades, 1071 – 1291*, p. 208 – 212.

²¹⁵ C. Hillenbrand, ‘The Career of Najm al-Dīn Il-Ghāzī’, in *Der Islam* 58, 1981, pp. 250 – 292, esp. p. 254.

²¹⁶ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 424.

year. When Malikshāh died Il-Ghāzī, along with other commanders in the Seljuq armies, fought to free himself of control by the Seljuq sultanate and so gain a position of independent power.²¹⁷ His initial attempts in this area were unsuccessful, but he did manage to gain some authority when he was appointed *Shihna* of Baghdad by the new Sultan, Muḥammad, in 1102/495.²¹⁸ However, this position lasted only until 1105/498, when he was replaced in the role because he had switched his allegiance from Muḥammad to Berk-Yārūq, Muḥammad's rival for the sultanate, in 1102-3/494.²¹⁹ Following this Il-Ghāzī went to Diyār Bakr in the Jazīra in order to exercise the power which his position as one of the heads of the Arṭuqid family would permit. While maintaining a pretence of obedience to the Sultan, he started to ally himself with the latter's enemies and to control more territory. In the year 1108-9/502, he gained control of the city of Mārdīn, a position of strength from which his position became more and more hostile to the Sultan.²²⁰ As a result of this attitude, Il-Ghāzī became a main focal point for a series of expeditions by Mawdūd, the leader of Mosul, against rebellious emirs in the years 1106-7/500 – 1115-6/509. His behaviour during this period did, however, remain inconsistent, perhaps because he still hoped to gain favour with the Sultan to gain advancement in his career. When Mawdūd was murdered in 1113-4/507, it was al-Bursuqī who was made his replacement at Mosul instead of Il-Ghāzī, who wanted the post. As a result of this, Il-Ghāzī stopped co-operating with the Sultan altogether. To counter this, the Sultan sent an army against him in 1114-5/508 under al-Bursuqī to force the Arṭuqid to submit, but Il-Ghāzī defeated him in battle. This victory was quickly reinforced when Il-Ghāzī made an alliance with Ṭughtegīn of Damascus and the crusader

²¹⁷ C. Hillenbrand, 'The Career of Il-Ghāzī', pp. 250 – 292, esp. pp. 254 -255.

²¹⁸ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 462; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafāyāt al-a'yān*, tr. W.M. de Slane, (Paris, 1843 – 1871), Vol. III, pp. 171 – 172.

²¹⁹ C. Hillenbrand, 'The Career of Najm al-Dīn Il-Ghāzī', p. 257.

²²⁰ *ibid*, pp. 250 – 292, esp. p. 259.

prince Roger of Antioch against the Sultan.²²¹ Il-Ghāzī's victory and the subsequent treaty caused the Sultan to send another army into the area in 1115-6/509, both to quell the resistance of the Turkish emirs and to continue the struggle against the Franks. This second expedition also ended in defeat, as the army, under the command of Bursuq ibn Bursuq, fell into an ambush set for him by Roger of Antioch at Tell Dānith.²²² Having neutralised the threat from the Sultan, Il-Ghāzī asserted his independence further by breaking his alliance with Roger, and continuing to ignore the Sultan, seeing no need to be reconciled. When the Sultan Muḥammad died in 1118/512, Il-Ghāzī sent his son to the successor, Maḥmūd, presumably because he wanted to have better relations with the new holder of the title, while still maintaining independence for his small territory.²²³

From the time of his breaking off the truce with Roger until his death, Il-Ghāzī was heavily involved in the Muslims' struggle with the Frankish crusaders of Antioch and Edessa. His main victory during this time was in 1119/513, at the battle of Balāṭ/Field of Blood, in which he inflicted a crushing defeat on the army of Antioch and killed Roger, Prince of Antioch.²²⁴ This was short-lived, however, and soon Baldwin, king of Jerusalem, arrived with an army and defeated Il-Ghāzī, thus meaning the emir lost any advantage he had gained.

During Maḥmūd's sultanate (1118-1131/511-525), Il-Ghāzī extended his influence over other cities of the Jazīra, including Mayyāfāriqīn, Arzan, and Āmid, but his position as lord of Mārdīn remained, personally, his most important position, as it was strategically vital in order to ensure the survival of the Artuqid dynasty as a political power. The most politically valuable city he gained possession of was, though, Aleppo. He became the ruler

²²¹ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, pp. 603 – 607; Matthew of Edessa, p. 219.

²²² Matthew of Edessa, p. 219; WC, pp. 77 - 108

²²³ C. Hillenbrand, 'The Career of Il-Ghāzī', pp. 250 – 292, esp. pp. 264 -265.

²²⁴ WC, pp. 127 ; T. Asbridge, 'The significance and causes of the battle of the Field of Blood', in *Journal of Medieval History* 23, 1997, pp. 301 – 316.

in 1117-8/511, after the townspeople had reluctantly offered it to him. Though it had once been an important town, and though there was still kudos around its possession, Aleppo was in a difficult state, the countryside around it having been subjected to ravaging by various armies for over thirty years. At the time Il-Ghāzī took over the city it was threatened by the crusaders of Antioch, and the treasury was empty.²²⁵ This explains why, despite Aleppo being in theory a much more important city, Il-Ghāzī did not choose to reside there but at Mārdīn.²²⁶ Instead, he left his son Sulaymān in charge of the town, to deal with the dual threat of the crusaders and the large number of Nizārīs in the city. In 1121/515 Sulaymān revolted against his father, so Il-Ghāzī tried to exert his control over the city by marrying the daughter of Ridwān, the former ruler of Aleppo, by removing his own son and replacing him with his nephew, Badr al-Dawla.²²⁷ Having accomplished this, Il-Ghāzī negotiated a one-year truce with the Franks in order to try to allow Aleppo to recover. In 1122/516 he went to the city of Tiflis to try to exert his influence over this potentially useful area; yet despite his military strength, his ignorance of the terrain meant that he suffered a large defeat at the hands of the Georgian king, David, and his son Dmitri. Many of Il-Ghāzī's men died or were taken prisoner, and only a small number, including himself, escaped back to Mārdīn, where he died soon afterwards.²²⁸

The Life of Renaud of Châtillon:

Throughout the history of crusade scholarship no individual has aroused stronger feelings than the hot-headed Renaud of Châtillon²²⁹, erstwhile Prince of Antioch and Lord of Oultrejourdain. These feelings have been almost exclusively negative. As far back as the

²²⁵ Ibn al-'Adīm, Vol. II, p. 180.

²²⁶ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, pp. 623 – 4; Amedroz, p. 199.

²²⁷ C. Hillenbrand, 'The Career of Il-Ghāzī', pp. 250 – 292, esp. p. 269.

²²⁸ Il-Ghāzī's death is vividly described by Walter the Chancellor, see WC, pp. 166 – 171; also al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII p. 680. A full account of the life of Il-Ghāzī can be found in C. Hillenbrand, 'The Career of Najm al-Dīn Il-Ghāzī', pp. 250 – 92.

²²⁹ Renaud of Chatillon is known in the Arabic sources as Prince Arnāṭ.

twelfth century writers started to disparage Renaud, and his presentation in the writings of William of Tyre, the foremost historian of the twelfth century Latin East and a contemporary of Renaud, is believed to have done much to create these feelings. Historians have traditionally seen in William's works a hatred and contempt for a man who was a member of the rival court faction.²³⁰ However, I will argue that this is inaccurate, and that William of Tyre did not criticise Renaud as is believed. Instead, this disparagement of Renaud started with chroniclers who disliked him for political reasons, such as Ernoul, the original author of the *Eracles* texts.²³¹ Unlike the kings of Jerusalem or house of Ibelin, whence came Ernoul, there was no-one who wrote a historical narrative from the perspective of Renaud or which glorified his deeds, which explains his presentation in the sources. This hatred is also reflected in the writings of the Arab historians of the time who, while having no great regard for the leaders of the crusaders generally, spared no ire in their description of Renaud.²³²

However, despite this wave of contemporary criticism, there were some who tried to rehabilitate Renaud soon after his death, notably Peter of Blois, whose spiritual piece *Passio Raginaldi* is remarkable in its praise of Renaud, regarding him almost as a second Christ.²³³

Yet when the propaganda from all sides had subsided, along with the raw emotions which had created it, the feeling which remained, and which persisted down the centuries, was that Renaud was at best a loose cannon who was a crusader entirely for selfish reasons,

²³⁰ Edbury & Rowe, p. 18.

²³¹ The *Eracles* texts are a vast corpus of similar, though not identical, continuations of William of Tyre's chronicle, written in western Europe in the late 12th to mid-13th centuries. The complexity of the relationships between the various texts are of byzantine proportions, and those scholars who have studied the corpus are not wholly agreed on large parts of the relationships. The central texts have, however been edited in various forms over the decades, though the theorised original manuscript, believed to have been written by the squire Ernoul, from which all the extant ones have sprung, has been lost. The main *Eracles* texts are: L. de Mas-Latrie, *Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier* Paris, 1871; J. Shirley, *Crusader Syria in the thirteenth century: the Rothelin continuation of the history of William of Tyre*, Ashgate, 1999; *L'Estoire de Eracles l'Empereur et la Conqueste de la Terra d'Outremer*, in *Receuil des Historien des Croisades; Documents Occidentaux Vol. II* p. 1 – p. 481, Paris, 1854; and Continuation.

²³² See Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, p. 344, who writes 'by far the greatest acrimony and hatred are reserved for the arch-villain of the Crusading ruling class, Renaud of Chatillon'.

²³³ Peter of Blois, pp. 50 – 63. This is discussed in detail below, pp. 155 – 160.

and at worst someone on whom blame for the loss of Jerusalem, and consequently the failure of the whole crusading enterprise, could be placed.

That this view existed in the first place is not surprising from the sources. Renaud appears to have gone out of his way to infuriate those around him. During his life in the Latin East, he provoked the wrath not only of his Muslim foes, but also individuals and groups who could – perhaps should – have been allies, such as the Byzantine Emperor Manuel Comnenus²³⁴, and even a large section of the nobility of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.²³⁵ As a result, there were very few people he had not exasperated by the end of his life, and his behaviour has fascinated historians ever since, being both abhorred and praised.²³⁶

Very little is known of Renaud before he exploded onto the political scene of the Latin East with his marriage in 1153/547. He was the youngest son of a French noble of the great Donzy family from the town of Châtillon-sur-Loing²³⁷, and he left for the Holy Land around 1147/542, when he took the cross and joined the Second Crusade with King Louis VII of France. This expedition ended in disaster, first with the defeats by the Turks of Asia Minor in 1147/542 and 1148/543, then with the fiasco under the walls of Damascus in July of that year. On the departure of the European armies from the Latin East, Renaud was one of a small minority of pilgrims who decided to stay in the crusader states. After a short space of time, he married Constance, the dowager heiress of Antioch, in 1153/548. The consequence of these nuptials was that this newly arrived, relatively minor noble, instantly became the ruler of the Principality of Antioch, a position second in importance only to Jerusalem on

²³⁴ See WT, Vol. II, p. 253 – 4, & 276 – 7.

²³⁵ See Continuation, pp. 24 - 6, where the author shows Renaud as being heavily involved in an extremely bitter factional dispute amongst Jerusalem's nobility.

²³⁶ G. Schlumberger, *Renaud de Châtillon, prince d'Antioche, seigneur de la terre d'Outre-Jourdain* Paris, 1890, holds Renaud in very high esteem, while S. Runciman, in *A History of the Crusades* Vol. II, p. 186, writes, 'newcomers from the West (were) aggressive, unadapted and uncomprehending...like the fatal Renaud of Chatillon'.

²³⁷ J. Richard, *The Crusades: 1071 – 1291*, pp. 172 – 173.

the political scene of the Latin East.²³⁸ This was a highly controversial choice on the part of Constance, and it seems to have caused the first stirrings of criticism against Renaud among others in positions of power.²³⁹ He was to hold this position for just seven years, yet during this short time he managed to cause major embarrassment to the polity of the crusader states, especially the Kingdom of Jerusalem, through his politically senseless actions.

In 1153/548, Renaud appears to have single-handedly caused the abandonment of the siege of Shayzar when it was on the verge of falling after he demanded that Thierry of Flanders, the ruler-in-waiting of the city, had to pay homage to him as well as the king.²⁴⁰ Thierry refused and because of this, the crusaders abandoned the town and never returned – it is only possible to speculate how the whole history of the crusades may have unravelled differently had the crusaders captured it. However, perhaps his most notorious effort occurred in 1156/551, when he attacked and pillaged the Byzantine island of Cyprus after the Byzantine emperor - Renaud's own liege-lord - was slow in giving Renaud what he believed he was owed.²⁴¹ Renaud's reign in Antioch was brought to an abrupt end in 1160/555, when he was captured by the local Muslim emir Majd al-Dīn while raiding the lands of Christian peasants in Islamic territory to the east of his Antiochene possessions in northern Syria, and was taken to Aleppo where he was imprisoned for sixteen years.²⁴² This capture is regarded by some scholars as being yet another example of his recklessness, as he was captured after he failed to retreat when he perhaps should have done, thus losing

²³⁸ WT, Vol. II, p. 224

²³⁹ William of Tyre describes how the leading men of the city of Antioch were displeased by Constance's choice of husband, and how some were not backwards about letting Renaud know about it. WT, Vol. II, p. 224: 'Many there were, however, who marvelled that a woman so eminent, so distinguished and powerful, who had been the wife of a very illustrious man, should stoop to marry an ordinary knight'. John Kinnamos goes so far as to claim that one of the men Constance turned down was the Byzantine emperor himself: John Kinnamos, p. 136.

²⁴⁰ WT Vol. II, p. 268; J. Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land*, Oxford, 1996, p. 134 & 271 – 281.

²⁴¹ WT, Vol II, pp. 253 – 4; John Kinnamos, pp. 136 – 7.

²⁴² WT Vol. II, pp. 283-5; Ibn al-'Adīm, Vol. III, p. 34.

everything through his impulsiveness.²⁴³ The period of his life in prison is shrouded in darkness, with no hard evidence whatsoever of the occurrences or his circumstances during this time, meaning that any reconstruction of this time is necessarily based on conjecture; thus there is a sixteen year period when Renaud disappears completely from the chronicles.²⁴⁴

During his imprisonment, Renaud's wife Constance died, meaning that on his release, Renaud was obliged to move onto the political scene of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, having lost any claim to Antioch. Almost immediately in 1176/571 he received the hand of Stephanie, the heiress of Oultrejourdain, and so gained a lordship on the front-line in the war with the Muslims, who had Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn as their leader.²⁴⁵ From the massive fortresses of Kerak and Shawbak, Renaud embarked on a series of belligerent attacks against the Islamic territories surrounding his own. Possibly the most audacious of these occurred in 1183/578, when he built a series of pre-fabricated ships in his territory, dragged them over the Sinai Desert to Ayla with the help of local Bedouin, assembled them there and launched them onto the Red Sea. Some of his followers stayed near Ayla and besieged the fort there and the nearby Isle des Grayes, while the rest sailed down the Red Sea, attacking merchant and pilgrim shipping, as well as coastal towns, before being intercepted near Medina.²⁴⁶ The crusader force was said to have got to within a day's march of the town before they were caught, and most, if not all, were captured and subsequently killed.²⁴⁷ Renaud escaped and made his way back to Latin territory, but the damage – both material and psychological –

²⁴³ M.W. Baldwin, 'The Latin States under Baldwin III and Amalric I', in K. Setton (ed.) *A History of the Crusades* Vol. I, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958, p. 546.

²⁴⁴ Despite this problem, Hillenbrand has attempted to piece together what may have happened to Renaud during this time. C. Hillenbrand, 'The Imprisonment of Renaud of Chatillon', in *Texts, Documents and Artefacts Islamic studies in honour of D.S. Richards*, ed. C. F. Robinson, Leiden, 2003, pp. 95 – 101.

²⁴⁵ WT, Vol. II, p. 414.

²⁴⁶ Al-Kāmil, vol. IX, p. 468 & Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, *Mi'rāt al-Zamān*, ed. unidentified, Hyderabad, 1951, vol. VIII, part I, p. 369. See also 'Imād al-Dīn al-Isfahānī, quoted in G. Leiser, 'The Crusader Raid in the Red Sea in 578/1182-3', in *The Journal of the American Research Center in Cairo*, vol. 14 (1977), p. 89.

²⁴⁷ Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, *Mi'rāt al-Zamān*, ed. unidentified, Hyderabad, 1951, vol. VIII, part I, p. 369.

which had been wrought on the Muslims, great as it was, had been done. After a period of relative peace, Renaud attacked a Muslim caravan – his favourite quarry for easy booty – which was crossing his territory during a period of truce in 1187/583. Some chronicles report that when reminded of the truce he had made, Renaud replied by insulting Muḥammad. After this Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn made an oath to personally kill Renaud when he had the opportunity.²⁴⁸

During this period of time Renaud had also been heavily involved in the politics of Jerusalem, particularly in the factional dispute over the succession to the kingship following the death of Baldwin IV, which occurred during the mid-1180s/late 570s – early 580s. In this, he was on the opposing side of the dispute from most of the chroniclers, and the hostility to Renaud which is believed to occur in some of the chronicles is considered a reflection of this.²⁴⁹ In July of 1187/Jumādā I 583, Renaud was one of the main protagonists in the debates over how to handle Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's threat in the build-up to Ḥaṭṭīn; whether to fight the Muslim army or to try to avoid confrontation. He was one of a section of the nobility of the kingdom who were keen to fight, and their views won through.²⁵⁰ This decision, however, was to prove fateful, as the crusader army was destroyed in the battle, and Renaud was captured, along with most of the other nobility of the crusader states. In an episode which is narrated at length and with great glee in the Islamic sources, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn fulfils his oath to kill Renaud, an accomplishment with which both he and the Islamic chroniclers are very pleased.²⁵¹

²⁴⁸ Bahā' al-Dīn, p. 37; Ibn al-'Adīm, Vol. III, p. 96.

²⁴⁹ Edbury & Rowe, p. 18.

²⁵⁰ Continuation, pp. 37 - 8; Al-Kāmil, Vol. X, pp. 22 – 4.

²⁵¹ Al-Kāmil Vol. X, p. 26; Ibn al-'Adīm, Vol. III, p. 96; 'Imād al-Dīn, pp. 104 – 5.

Chapter 1 – The Image of Il-Ghāzī in the Christian Sources:

Il-Ghāzī in Walter the Chancellor's 'The Antiochene Wars':

Walter the Chancellor's vivid and extraordinary text known as *The Antiochene Wars*²⁵² is by far the most useful for studying the presentation of Il-Ghāzī in a Latin mindset. It is useful not only because of the sheer volume of detailed information provided by Walter about Il-Ghāzī, but also because it is clear that Walter himself was amongst those captured by Il-Ghāzī after the Battle of Balāṭ in 1119/513, and so was an eyewitness to a significant proportion of the events he describes.²⁵³ However useful this eyewitness information is, it seems almost certain from Walter's account that he himself was tortured by Il-Ghāzī's troops after the defeat of Balāṭ, at the emir's orders, and this had a large effect on his judgement of the situation.

Walter's chronicle is in two parts. The subject of Book I is what he regarded as the First War, the occasion of the attack on northern Syria by Bursuq, the atabeg of Mosul, in 1115/509, when the crusader army of Antioch combined with those of regional Muslim rulers, including Il-Ghāzī, to defeat Bursuq's army. The subject of the much longer Book II is the Second War, covering the events of 1119/512-3, when Il-Ghāzī defeated the army of Antioch at the Battle of Balāṭ, after which he ravaged the area of northern Syria between Aleppo and Antioch, before his aggression was checked by a crusader relief force led by the King of Jerusalem at the battle of Tell Dānith, also in 1119/513.

²⁵² Walter the Chancellor, *A History of the Antiochene Wars*, tr. S. B. Edgington & T. S. Asbridge, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999

²⁵³ WC, p. 114 implies Walter was present at the battle, and his vivid descriptions of the aftermath reinforce this.

The Image of Il-Ghāzī in Book I:

In the account of the first war fought between the Antiochenes and the Muslim powers to the east, Il-Ghāzī is described as simply ‘emir of the Turcomans’,²⁵⁴ a neutral assessment which will be in contrast to his portrayal later in the second book. He is also mentioned as part of a group of Muslim rulers from Syria who made an alliance with Roger of Antioch in 1115/509. This treaty is described as ‘a pretended peace’, and one which was made because these Muslims were as afraid of the Christians as they were of the Persians.²⁵⁵ Il-Ghāzī is one of a number of small rulers who could not face the might of the Sultan’s army alone, so needed outside help – he is not viewed as a strong ruler. After this treaty was signed, however, it is not mentioned again, and Walter shows Roger as facing the army of Bursuq alone.²⁵⁶ This silence with regard to the treaty may be because he did not want to show the Christians as fighting with Muslims, or because the Christians received no help from their allies. The latter is unlikely. If Roger had been betrayed and left to fight alone by his allies then Walter would surely have reported this, yet he does not. Instead, the inference has to be that the treaty was not ignored by the Muslims of North Syria, but instead that either they did help Roger in some way, or they were not able to. The lack of direct criticism of Il-Ghāzī or any other Muslim ruler at this stage implies that they did nothing wrong in Walter’s eyes and so are not attacked in his work at this point.²⁵⁷

In Book I, Il-Ghāzī is seen simply as another Muslim ruler whom the Franks had to engage with for the sake of practicality and survival. He is seen as neither good or bad, nor friend or enemy, but a local ruler whose limited power could have been useful if channelled

²⁵⁴ WC, p.87.

²⁵⁵ WC, p.88.

²⁵⁶ WC, p. 90.

²⁵⁷ The reason why Il-Ghāzī did not fight alongside Roger is suggested by the writings of the Armenian Matthew of Edessa. He states that after Bursuq marched into Northern Syria, the Muslim and Christian allies came together to fight him. At that, Bursuq feigned a retreat, leading to the dispersal of the allies who believed he was returning to Mosul. After this he returned to the lands of Antioch and ravaged them. Therefore, the reasons for Il-Ghāzī’s non-appearance are apparent; he honoured the treaty, yet was fooled, along with the other leaders, by Bursuq’s tactics, and it was for this reason he is not criticised by Walter the Chancellor.

in the right direction. His fight was for survival against the powerful rulers around him, whatever their religion. His difference from the crusaders is not highlighted at this point, apart from being a Muslim. Instead, it is the Muslims who threatened the crusaders, the troops of Bursuq, who are highlighted as an ‘other’.

The Image of Il-Ghāzī in Book II –

The portrayal of Il-Ghāzī in Book II is in stark contrast to that of Book I. From being a petty local ruler looking after his own interests amongst the factional and dynastic squabbles of northern Syria, fighting to defend his territory, Il-Ghāzī suddenly becomes a monster, a powerful tyrant whose objective is to destroy both the crusader states and Christianity in general. He is cruel, malicious, and evil – the personification of the very reasons why the Crusades were happening – and the swift, sharp break between the two parts of the narrative heightens the effect.

Il-Ghāzī is right at the forefront of Walter’s account in the second book, and his deeds are always regarded by the chronicler as driven by his desire to destroy the Christians, which itself was caused by the evil which was present in him, or even part of him. Il-Ghāzī is given many epithets which reflect his role as the evil one, such as ‘minister of death²⁵⁸’, and ‘wicked’.²⁵⁹

Yet Walter knows that his readership will not simply accept his word for this, and so he supplies clear examples of the evilness of Il-Ghāzī in the narrative, at two main points. The first of these is the account of the behaviour of Il-Ghāzī in the vivid description of the torture of prisoners after the Battle of Balāṭ. Here, Walter leaves no doubt as to the viciousness of the treatment of the prisoners:

²⁵⁸ WC, p. 133.

²⁵⁹ WC, p. 135.

'led to execution, the badly wounded and the others, they fell at the hands of the heathen not only with their heads cut off but they even suffered agonising death with the skin flayed from the living and half-severed head. Also the rest, knowing they were to be tortured, spent that night in outrage and dread'.²⁶⁰

This is just one of a number of examples Walter gives of the torture that was suffered by the prisoners during this time, torture which Walter believes went beyond the bounds of normal behaviour in war²⁶¹, and he leaves us in no doubt as to who was the instigator of these actions – it was Il-Ghāzī. Not only was he the instigator of these atrocities, he is shown as not being satisfied with them, but trying to think up other, more vicious devices.²⁶² He also took great delight in the torture, as is clear from the chronicle:

'this wicked man was delighted by their torments and he laughed at them as if he were refreshed by some food to fuel his cruelty...they (Il-Ghāzī's soldiers) could...tear the prisoners to pieces and delight the unholy one'.²⁶³

There is constant repetition throughout of comments that Il-Ghāzī is evil, and new activities appear consistently, carried out by the Turkish emir, which Walter uses as examples of this evil. Therefore, Il-Ghāzī would 'savour to the full in every possible way a universal sacrifice of destruction for the increase of his enjoyment'²⁶⁴, so that 'the enormity of his cruelty would prevail in all things'.²⁶⁵ He is also reported to have used psychological warfare to hurt the prisoners, bringing water in front of them while they were suffering

²⁶⁰ WC, p.132.

²⁶¹ WC, p. 166.

²⁶² WC, p.134, and also in the introduction, p. 65.

²⁶³ WC, p.134.

²⁶⁴ WC, p. 134.

²⁶⁵ WC, p. 135.

badly from thirst, then allowing his men to drink it, offering the Christians only ‘the muddy dregs’.²⁶⁶

The second occasion on which Il-Ghāzī’s evil persona is clearly demonstrated by Walter is in the aftermath of the defeat of the Turks by the army of the kingdom of Jerusalem at the battle of Tell Dānith. After this defeat, the prisoners who remained at Aleppo from those captured at Balāṭ were, according to Walter, subjected to more torture in front of large crowds at the hands of Il-Ghāzī, after he had spent the night in a drinking bout caused by self-pity. The chronicler gives many examples of the tortures suffered, such as ‘some of them were hanged by ropes from a post, with their heads turned downwards and their feet upwards, and exposed to constant blows of arrows...some were buried...up to the chin in a pit in the ground, as the hands of wicked ones brandished spears...(and) several of them, indeed, were thrown with every single limb cut off into the squares and districts’.²⁶⁷ After these tortures were inflicted, Walter relates how those who remained were sent back to their prisons, where they

‘were worn down...(by tortures which were) amazing and astounding to describe and put down in words...(and which) I think it is better for me to keep quiet about the kind and quantity of their tortures than express them, lest Christians bring the same to bear against Christians and turn them into accustomed usage’.²⁶⁸

This last part particularly would have horrified the Latins reading Walter’s account. As violence was a normal part of life in Latin European society at the time, for a chronicler to have insinuated that there were tortures as yet unused in their areas would have

²⁶⁶ WC, pp. 133 – 4.

²⁶⁷ WC, p. 163.

²⁶⁸ WC, pp. 165-6.

underlined for those reading the severities of the torments the prisoners suffered at Il-Ghāzī's hands. That the very brutal torments in use in Europe were not as severe as those utilised by Il-Ghāzī would have served to emphasise further how evil the Turkish ruler was to the Latins reading the chronicle.²⁶⁹

There are, therefore, many times in *The Antiochene Wars* where its author shows that he believed that Il-Ghāzī was a figure of evil. The reason for this was, for the most part, the tortures and afflictions he wrought on the Christian prisoners. However, these were merely symptoms of the real cause of his evil nature as described by the chronicle – that of his role as persecutor of Christians and Christianity – an Antichrist figure. It is in the interpretation of and reasoning for the events described that Walter shows this, stating, for example, that Il-Ghāzī 'was ardently intent on the destruction of the Christians'.²⁷⁰ The chronicler then shows how the events he refers to witness to the truthfulness of this interpretation which he has for them. For example, Walter is intent on showing Il-Ghāzī as one whose hate for the Christians is so strong that he is shown as becoming more hateful towards the end of his life, not mellowing as people sometimes do, and as such even when he was ill and dying he preferred to fight against them than to rest as his hatred of the Christians was so ferocious.²⁷¹

However, despite Il-Ghāzī's posturing, Walter demonstrates to his readers that those who persecute and fight the Christians are fighting God Himself. Consequently, before his final defeat 'as he rode out in arrogance he met the wrath of God'²⁷², who helped cause the victory of the Christian king David of Georgia – it was, therefore, God who caused Il-Ghāzī's downfall. Another example of God intervening in the chronicle is that Il-Ghāzī,

²⁶⁹ For an explanation of violence in western society, see M. Bull, 'Origins', pp. 15 - 34 in *The Oxford History of the Crusades*, ed. J. Riley-Smith, Oxford, 1999, particularly the description of European torture on p. 15. See also, T. Asbridge, *The First Crusade*, London, 2004, pp. 3 - 5.

²⁷⁰ WC, p.171.

²⁷¹ WC, p. 171.

²⁷² WC, p.169.

during his drinking after his defeat at the battle of Tall Dānith, wanted to slay the prisoners one by one but was not able to because of ‘God’s agreement to protect them’, so there was nothing he could do.²⁷³ And on one occasion, which Walter relates to his readers with obvious glee, Il-Ghāzī killed the knight Sanson, who Walter claims had been signed with the Cross by Christ himself in a dream with 24 others who were also killed. After they had been killed, one of the bodies ‘transported itself to another place from the place where it lay’, whereupon Il-Ghāzī ‘lost his powers, foaming with blood which // poured out, he was crushed and fell, harshly disfigured’.²⁷⁴ All three of these examples show clearly how Walter believed that Il-Ghāzī was evil, because God stepped into the situation to protect the Christians from the Turkish ruler.

Finally, Walter has one last method by which he underlines the evil of Il-Ghāzī – he assigns that belief to other people. He does this by ascribing the belief to other Christians in order to lend weight to his claims. In the speech of King David of Georgia, just before the king defeats Il-Ghāzī in battle, Walter writes that David said: ‘we shall easily overcome not only the countless attendants of demons (the Turks, including Il-Ghāzī), we shall indeed overcome even the demons themselves’.²⁷⁵ As Walter was not present, it is certain that the speech of King David as the chronicler describes it was completely invented – both the timescale and the medieval Latin predilection for invented speeches²⁷⁶ attest to this – and so the words which are placed into the king’s mouth are those which Walter himself believed and which he wanted his audience to believe as well by using a broad range of characters to deliver his opinions. At this point, Walter also makes a delicate though deliberate comparison between Il-Ghāzī and David, the latter being referred to as ‘so great a king, a

²⁷³ WC, p. 165.

²⁷⁴ WC, pp. 166 – 8.

²⁷⁵ WC, p. 169.

²⁷⁶ See P. Ainsworth, ‘Contemporary and “Eyewitness” History’, p. 270, and P. Ainsworth, ‘Legendary History: *Historia* and *Fabula*’, p. 389, both in *Historiography in the Middle Ages*, ed. D.M. Deliyannis, Leiden, 2003.

true and perfect Christian'.²⁷⁷ One main reason for this reference to David as a perfect Christian is to highlight the imperfection of Il-Ghāzī.

Perhaps the most striking example of others believing Il-Ghāzī was evil is that Walter writes that Il-Ghāzī's own subjects in Aleppo rejoice, though privately, when they believe he is dead.²⁷⁸ It is to be expected that his Christian enemies would rejoice if they thought he was dead, but the fact that his own people rejoiced when they thought he was dead shows the extent to which Il-Ghāzī was reviled by his own people, according to Walter the Chancellor. This does, however, reveal a problem with the text which will be examined in detail later; that while at this point Walter suggests that the population of Aleppo did not like Il-Ghāzī, yet at other times they rejoiced at his behaviour to the crusader prisoners.

Despite this problem, the reported rejoicing of the people of Aleppo is one of several different devices used in the chronicle to demonstrate the accuracy of Walter's Christian belief that Il-Ghāzī was an extremely evil man. However, the chronicler then goes a step further, and attempts to show that, despite being shown as an evil man in the opinion of Walter, the Christians in general, and God, Il-Ghāzī's actions were in fact the actions of a good Muslim. Edgington and Asbridge correctly identified that at one occasion Walter deliberately contrasts the negative view of Il-Ghāzī in Latin eyes with how he was seen by the Muslims, in which he is shown as upholding Muslim law, by being referred to by one of his soldiers as 'star of the law'.²⁷⁹ Yet it is probable that Walter meant the comparison to go further, and he was demonstrating the difference between what he saw as the law of Christianity, which was good, and that of Islam, which he saw as encouraging such activity as Il-Ghāzī carried out. Thus, all Islam, and those who followed this law, including Il-Ghāzī,

²⁷⁷ WC, p. 169.

²⁷⁸ WC, p. 157. Walter writes that their joy was caused because Il-Ghāzī had deprived them of their possessions, or had been ransomed by him.

²⁷⁹ WC, p. 134, note 115.

was evil, while those who fought against it were good and were carrying out God's will. Thus, actions such as Crusades were entirely justified, and by definition good.

The main theme of the evilness of Il-Ghāzī brings to the fore the second theme of his image in *The Antiochene Wars*, which is that because of his evil, the emir became the victim of divine retribution. It has already been demonstrated how his evil deeds caused him to be battling God Himself²⁸⁰, and the implications of this can be fully explored.

The theme of divine retribution is particularly strong during the account of the end of Il-Ghāzī, as is Walter's interpretation of what this means. This theme forms the final part of Walter's chronicle, and is mainly linked to Il-Ghāzī's battle against the Georgian King, David II, and a subsequent battle against a combined crusader army, which would be his last. As David is regarded by Walter as a perfect Christian, it was natural that it should be he who was God's instrument of justice.²⁸¹ Walter's judgement on Il-Ghāzī's attack on King David is clear to see: 'as he rode out in arrogance he met the wrath of God'²⁸², which caused his army to be routed and himself put to flight. Although it might be expected that the wrath of God would mean that Il-Ghāzī would die on the field with his men, he did escape, a fact which Walter ascribed to the will of God, though he was 'half-dead, unarmed and famished'²⁸³, to be defeated again and then die in ignominious fashion soon after. Il-Ghāzī's death is the climax to Walter's chronicle, a death which is vividly described by the author to show God's victory and Il-Ghāzī going to hell:

²⁸⁰ See above, pp. 78 – 79.

²⁸¹ WC, p.168 - 70, and introduction, p. 65.

²⁸² WC, p.169.

²⁸³ WC, p. 170.

‘his filthy soul issued forth from his anus along with a flux of dung from his belly, and it was dragged away by the claws of infernal scorpions to tumble into the halls of deepest hell, which are full of dreadful fires burning without end’.²⁸⁴

Walter’s description of Il-Ghāzī’s divine punishment was ‘probably the primary reason why he continued his account to 1122 (516)’²⁸⁵, being a climax to the narrative of the struggles between the Christians and the Muslims which, in the end, the Christians won because God was on their side. The end of the chronicle is a reflection of Walter’s beliefs: in the narrative, as in life, God and his supporters will triumph in the end over the forces of evil, no matter how strong they may seem to be.

Although this death happens right at the end of the chronicle, the build-up starts sometime before, during the scene of the fate of prisoners who were to be killed after Il-Ghāzī’s drunken lamentations following the battle of Tell Dānith. At this time ‘by the power and a miracle of the Lord’ the decapitated body of one prisoner was transported ‘to another place’²⁸⁶, with the result that Il-Ghāzī had a fit which stopped him killing any others, and a recurrence of which led to his own death. During this fit, Il-Ghāzī ‘lost his powers, foaming with blood which poured out, he was crushed and fell, harshly disfigured by a savage kind of passion so that, I tell you, his mouth seemed to form a horrible shapeless mass with his ears and his ears with his nostrils’.²⁸⁷ This is the first direct intervention of God in the account, and from this point onwards, Il-Ghāzī was doomed. God appears several times more, on each occasion helping the crusaders and thwarting Il-Ghāzī’s evil intentions, before meting out a punishment to the Turk, each time more severely, until he finally met the ultimate divine retribution in the form of death.

²⁸⁴ WC, p. 171.

²⁸⁵ Introduction to WC, p. 65.

²⁸⁶ WC, p. 167.

²⁸⁷ WC, p. 167-8.

The conception of Il-Ghāzī as a figure of evil, and the consequences for him of this evil in the form of divine retribution are the two main themes which make up the main image of Il-Ghāzī in Book Two of *The Antiochene Wars*. However, there are several other aspects of Il-Ghāzī's character which are described by Walter the Chancellor. Firstly, Walter describes Il-Ghāzī as a drunkard.²⁸⁸ There are several occasions on which Il-Ghāzī is shown as drunk, including a famous incident where it is said he was ill for 15 days because of the amount of alcohol he had consumed.²⁸⁹ He also is shown drinking while the prisoners from Balāṭ were about to be executed.²⁹⁰ This theme is underplayed by Asbridge and Edgington in the introduction to their edition²⁹¹, yet it is an extremely important part of the narrative. It can be seen as the cause of much of the evil about which Walter has been so scathing, as many of his most brutal acts take place after he has been drinking. This is especially so during the drinking bout after his defeat at Tell Dānith. At this time, he accepted advice from Ṭughtegīn, the ruler of Damascus, that it would be more sensible and profitable for the prisoners to be kept alive, yet he then sent for the prisoners and his executioners as his drinking went on.²⁹² Thus as his drinking increased, so his capacity for logic disappeared to be replaced by sadistic rage, and so 'the more the infidel's drunkenness raged, the more the perversity of their tortures increased'.²⁹³ This link between drinking and evil action occurs throughout the narrative, and wherever it is mentioned that Il-Ghāzī was drinking, it is also mentioned that he became cruel because of it. Thus, Walter writes that 'under the influence

²⁸⁸ WC, p.138: 'he was keen on drink' – for a Muslim, this is an especially damaging accusation.

²⁸⁹ This may have been an exaggeration on the author's part. WC, p.168; Introduction, p. 65. However, it is reported by Usāma b. Munqidh that 'whenever he drank wine he would feel drunk for twenty days', so Il-Ghāzī may have suffered thus. Usāma b. Munqidh, *An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades*, ed. & tr. P. Hitti, New York, 2000, p. 149.

²⁹⁰ WC, p.167.

²⁹¹ Introduction to WC, pp. 64 – 5. The editors do make reference to it, but they do not investigate it thoroughly.

²⁹² WC, p. 163.

²⁹³ WC, p. 163.

of drunkenness he wanted to ruin them²⁹⁴, that the prisoners ‘were brought before the infidel in his exuberance from horrific drinking’²⁹⁵, and, after his victory over the army of the Principality of Antioch, he decided that instead of attacking and possibly capturing that city, which would have given him a famous victory, he sent his troops on expeditions for booty in the country, because ‘he was keen on drink’.²⁹⁶

Secondly, Il-Ghāzī is shown to be cowardly – he is said to have been ‘frightened by the flight and destruction which had happened to them (Il-Ghāzī and Ṭughtegīn)’.²⁹⁷ He is also regarded as arrogant, which causes him to believe that he is invincible: when he saw how big his own force was before the battle with King David he became arrogant²⁹⁸ because of its size, yet this arrogance was defeated by the wrath of God.²⁹⁹ There is clearly a link here between the arrogance of Il-Ghāzī and his eventual defeat; that arrogance is something which the divine takes very seriously and the consequences for which is divine retribution, forms of which have been seen earlier.³⁰⁰ Furthermore, Il-Ghāzī’s arrogance was not quelled by his defeat at the hands of God, but rather is multiplied. After his defeat to King David, he did not accept his defeat, and go back to his territory as he might have been expected to do, but instead kept trying to capture the city of Zardana.³⁰¹ Walter is keen to weigh the arrogance of Il-Ghāzī with the attitude of Christian King David, who ‘most humbly waited’ for the attack, putting his strength not in himself but in God, in the form of the Holy Cross, the benefits and results of which are clear from the outcome of the battle.³⁰²

²⁹⁴ WC, p. 165.

²⁹⁵ WC, p. 164.

²⁹⁶ WC, p. 138.

²⁹⁷ WC, p. 163.

²⁹⁸ WC, p. 168.

²⁹⁹ WC, p. 169.

³⁰⁰ See above, pp. 81 - 82. This arrogance was not limited to Il-Ghāzī, but is a characteristic of the Muslims generally – at the last battle ‘the countless multitude saw the Christians and their spirit of arrogance was stirred up’ – WC, p. 170.

³⁰¹ WC, p.170.

³⁰² WC, p. 170.

Il-Ghāzī is also presented as untrustworthy, which is certainly part of his evil character, but Walter writes about it in different situations so it can be placed in a different category. The prime example of this is his deception towards the townspeople of Zardānā in 1119/513, to whom he offered safe passage in return for their surrender, but then once the inhabitants had accepted this offer, he ordered his troops to kill the townspeople once they were inside the city.³⁰³

Perhaps the most interesting view which Walter has of Il-Ghāzī, however, is that the Turkish ruler was a good Muslim. There are several places where this happens: a Muslim crowd described him as being ‘the star of the law’³⁰⁴, and when he was considering whether to kill a seneschal, the ‘Patriarch’ of Damascus believed he should, as it would be an ‘act of respect for our law’.³⁰⁵ As suggested previously³⁰⁶, the reason for this attitude on Walter’s part is that he wishes to demonstrate to his reader the inherent wrongness of Islam, and to achieve this he presents an individual of the evil persona of Il-Ghāzī as being that of a model Muslim.

It is clear, therefore, that throughout Book II of *The Antiochene Wars* Il-Ghāzī is a figure of hatred, one who, generally speaking, has all the aspects of an evil man. This, however, makes it somewhat surprising that there are a number of occasions when Walter’s portrayal of Il-Ghāzī reflected some good in his character. For example, during his siege of Artāḥ in 1119/513, he negotiated a settlement with the town’s bishop which involved giving the townspeople safe passage with escorts. These escorts then robbed them, but Il-Ghāzī sent back the priestly vestments to them after he had recovered them from the escorting troops.³⁰⁷ Asbridge and Edgington have noted that Il-Ghāzī ‘may not have organised this

³⁰³ WC, Introduction, p. 64; WC, p.149.

³⁰⁴ WC, p. 159.

³⁰⁵ WC, p. 164.

³⁰⁶ See above, p. 80.

³⁰⁷ WC, p. 136.

robbery', but this does not go far enough - it seems certain that he did not organise it, as there would have been no reason for him to have sent the garments back to their owners if he had done. Though he may have kept some material possessions which were plundered, that did not mean that he organised the episode; it is more likely that he simply profited from a moment of good fortune.³⁰⁸ On this occasion, Walter comments that Il-Ghāzī 'partly kept this promise (of safe passage) and partly broke it'³⁰⁹, which for Walter to be commenting on Il-Ghāzī, ranks as praise.

Another example of this is the episode at Sarmada in 1119/513, which Il-Ghāzī besieged after his victory at the Field of Blood. On this occasion, the Frankish knight commanding the defence, Renaud of Mazoir, had no choice but to surrender himself to the Turkish leader in order to avoid potential death by starvation. Il-Ghāzī swore an oath to protect him for a month, after which he would be freed, to which Renaud had to acquiesce.³¹⁰ It is highly likely that this was kept to, and that no harm befell Renaud, because, as Asbridge and Edgington have discovered, he was witness to a charter signed in 1122/515-6.³¹¹

Finally, there are Il-Ghāzī's actions towards Robert Fitz-Fulk, who had been captured during the Battle of the Field of Blood. During this time, the Aleppan crowd gathered around the crusader, wanting to enjoy themselves, 'by torturing (him so) they could tear him limb from limb'.³¹² Il-Ghāzī, however, refused his permission for them to do so, which does not fit comfortably with the image Walter has attempted to portray throughout Book II of his narrative. It is possible that Il-Ghāzī knew that Robert was a leper and he may not have

³⁰⁸ For the opinion of Asbridge and Edgington, see WC, Introduction, p. 64.

³⁰⁹ WC, p. 136.

³¹⁰ WC, p. 129.

³¹¹ Introduction to WC, p.64.

³¹² WC, p.160.

wanted his troops to contract the disease.³¹³ However, if Il-Ghāzī had wanted him dead he could have achieved his aim without risking catching leprosy, but he does not, instead sending him to Ṭughtegīn. Thus, he saved from death a crusader whom he didn't have to spare.

Therefore, despite Walter's obvious loathing for Il-Ghāzī, there were occasions when events occur which mean the chronicler cannot avoid presenting the Turkish ruler as being something other than the monster he is determined Il-Ghāzī should be, even though he does attempt to diminish the impact by not praising these actions, instead letting them pass without comment. The implication of this is that there were aspects to Il-Ghāzī's character which were good, and therefore the chronicle should be properly evaluated to judge whether Walter the Chancellor's interpretation is accurate, or whether there could be other explanations.

A Critique of Walter's Interpretation:

In order to reach a satisfactory conclusion regarding Walter's account, it is necessary to examine the evidence to see whether it is consistent, and to see whether there are other ways of interpreting the facts which contradict the chronicler's interpretation. This results in a number of problems.

Firstly, and most clearly, Walter's evidence is not consistent throughout the narrative. In Book I his comments on Il-Ghāzī are simply neutral, while in Book II they are extremely negative. The cause of this was Walter's capture and probable torture by Il-Ghāzī's men between the time of his writing Books I and II, which can be explained by Walter's hatred of Il-Ghāzī after being tortured at his orders.³¹⁴

³¹³ See WC, note 241, p. 160.

³¹⁴ See the introduction to WC, p. 8.

However, while Walter criticises Il-Ghāzī constantly throughout Book II, interpreting all of his actions as being nefarious, the narrative account does not necessarily support Walter's claims, and for almost every hostile interpretation the chronicler gives, there is another explanation which is possible. Some examples of this follow.

During the Turks' celebrations following their victory at the Battle of Balāṭ, Walter reports that Il-Ghāzī ordered that the wounded prisoners be killed.³¹⁵ Walter is scathing in his attack on this. However, this action is no different, perhaps less vicious, than the actions of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn after the battle of Ḥaṭṭīn in 1187/583, when he ordered the execution of all the Templars he had captured³¹⁶, or those of Richard I after the siege of Acre in 1191/587³¹⁷, and those of the crusaders after the capture of Jerusalem in 1099/492.³¹⁸ Il-Ghāzī ordered that only the wounded should be executed, while on these other occasions, a massacre was ordered for all, or a large number, of those who had been captured. Thus not only was a massacre after a military confrontation not unheard of, that which Il-Ghāzī carried out was less violent than many others. Walter's revulsion presumably comes from being an eyewitness to the massacre, and so it must have had a large impact on his psyche and his subsequent attitude. From a practical perspective, having to look after hundreds, possibly thousands, of prisoners was extremely difficult. One of the explanations given for Richard's actions in massacring Muslim prisoners was that they would have been a burden to him.³¹⁹ Il-Ghāzī may have been dealing with the prisoners in simply the easiest way he could.

Immediately following this accusation, Walter claims that Il-Ghāzī brought out some water, and that he was cruel because he allowed his own troops to drink the water first, then

³¹⁵ WC, p. 132.

³¹⁶ Al-Kāmil, vol. X, p. 27.

³¹⁷ See Ambrose, *The Crusade of Richard the Lionheart*, ed. & tr. M. J. Hubert, New York, 1941, p. 228; Continuation, p. 108; Al-Kāmil, Vol. X, pp. 99 – 100.

³¹⁸ Raymond d'Aguilers, *Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem*, ed. J. Hill & L. Hill, Philadelphia, 1968, p.150.

³¹⁹ J. Gillingham, *Richard I*, Yale University Press, 1999, pp. 169 – 170.

the Christians were allowed to have 'the muddy dregs'.³²⁰ In the confusion that follows, though, it becomes evident that Walter does not know for sure that the muddy dregs were all that was left, as the prisoners' lack of discipline precluded the chronicler from getting close to the water to confirm this.³²¹ If Il-Ghāzī had wanted the prisoners to be tortured by their thirst then surely he would have allowed his troops to drink in front of them, without allowing the crusaders to have any. A more considered view of this scene is that Il-Ghāzī wanted to look after his troops first, as any commander would, before attending to the needs of the prisoners. Il-Ghāzī wanted to keep them alive, so offered them a drink. The scene only went wrong when some of the prisoners disobeyed commands meant to keep order, and all rushed forward. An out-of-control mob of prisoners was not something which Il-Ghāzī, or any commander, would have wanted, so a violent confrontation was the natural outcome. The criticism in this circumstance seems to be more the result of Walter's own experience than the reality of the situation. The Turks were thirsty, as were the crusaders, so they drank. Walter, though did not care for the Turks, so their thirst did not matter to him, only his own. So when the Turks started drinking, it may have seemed that they were only doing it to increase the torment of their prisoners, while in reality Il-Ghāzī was doing what any good commander would, by looking after the welfare of his own troops.

An interesting view on the situation can be obtained by comparing how Walter compares Il-Ghāzī with Ṭughtegīn, the ruler of Damascus, while describing the fate of Robert Fitz-Fulk.³²² After the rhetoric has been stripped away, Ṭughtegīn's actions are much more violent and shocking than those of Il-Ghāzī. When Ṭughtegīn saw Robert, he 'put on an exaggerated expression, with a bestial grin, and with a piercing gaze he goggled

³²⁰ WC, pp. 133-4.

³²¹ The crusaders ignored Il-Ghāzī's orders that they should come forward two by two to drink, and rushed forward to get some water. As a result, the Turks killed many of them. WC, pp. 133 – 134.

³²² WC, p. 159 – 162.

at that knight'.³²³ It was Ṭughtegīn, not Il-Ghāzī, who actually killed the crusader, and he is said to have made a drinking cup out of Robert's head.³²⁴ Then he requested permission from Il-Ghāzī to enter the prison at Aleppo to go to the crusaders 'so that when he had beheaded all who were in that prison with his own hand he could revel in the bloodshed instead of taking a bath and be restored to youth like an eagle'.³²⁵ Ṭughtegīn therefore comes across as a vicious monster who delights in the suffering of his prisoners³²⁶. Furthermore, in a description which compares Il-Ghāzī and Ṭughtegīn, albeit not deliberately, the behaviour of Ṭughtegīn seems much worse than that of Il-Ghāzī after the rhetoric has been removed. Walter tries to convince his readership that Il-Ghāzī behaved in a manner which was designed to inflict maximum humiliation on Robert Fitz-Fulk, but he does not actually do anything of the sort – he simply seems to have accepted from Ṭughtegīn a sum of sixty thousand bezants, which may have been ransom money. Ṭughtegīn, however, killed his former friend and made his skull into a drinking cup, yet, shocking as this behaviour is, Ṭughtegīn does not get the same vitriolic treatment as Il-Ghāzī does.³²⁷ Although much of what Walter reports occurred out of his vision, and so we cannot be sure of its accuracy, the image is important here, and Ṭughtegīn's actions in the chronicle are much worse than those of Il-Ghāzī, yet it is the latter who is explicitly criticised by Walter.

There are plenty of other examples of this, such as when Ṭughtegīn wants to kill all the Franks being held at Aleppo, but it is Il-Ghāzī who stops him, saying it would not be prudent as it would bring problems for them. Instead, he considers the possibility of

³²³ WC, p. 160.

³²⁴ WC, p. 161.

³²⁵ WC, p. 162.

³²⁶ Ṭughtegīn's behaviour is all the more disturbing when it is remembered that according to Usāma b. Munqidh, Robert was a friend of Ṭughtegīn. See Usāma b. Munqidh, *Kitāb al-I'tibar*, tr. P.K. Hitti as *An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades*, New York, 2000 p. 149.

³²⁷ WC, pp. 161 – 2.

exchanging the prisoners, either for other prisoners, or for the castle of ‘Azāz which he wants.³²⁸ However, Il-Ghāzī does not get praised for this action; instead, Walter constantly reminds the reader how evil Il-Ghāzī is through his use of harsh adjectives throughout the narrative. Furthermore, Il-Ghāzī then orders that the nobles and certain other prisoners should be ransomed, and the ransom money used to defend his lands.³²⁹ This action squares with the idea that Il-Ghāzī understands the importance of prisoners, but not with Walter’s image of him as a bloodthirsty tyrant.

Thus, it is clear that Il-Ghāzī’s motivations were not all based on the bloodlust of a lunatic, as Walter would have us believe. Furthermore, despite the vitriol Walter uses to describe the torture, he also seems to suggest that this was normal – ‘kings, princes and other powerful people of the world, and even powerless men of the same faith as these men were themselves (i.e. Muslims), inflict many different punishments on their prisoners to extort money when they capture them justly and when they capture them unjustly’.³³⁰ The editors have here underlined both how Walter acknowledges this, and also how he acknowledges that Christians do the same, thereby lessening the effect, or at least the coherence, of the arguments that Il-Ghāzī is evil because of his use of torture.³³¹

It is clear that Walter the Chancellor’s opinion of Il-Ghāzī as expressed in *The Antiochene Wars* does not sit well with his account of the events themselves. His vitriol against Il-Ghāzī is too strong, and his interpretation of events does not make sense in themselves – other explanations which show Il-Ghāzī as an ordinary ruler are more plausible.

³²⁸ WC, pp. 162 – 3. For the reasons he wants this castle, see p. 162, note 247.

³²⁹ WC, p. 168.

³³⁰ WC, p. 166.

³³¹ Introduction to WC, p. 63.

Conclusion:

Walter's presentation of Il-Ghāzī as the 'other' should be interpreted in the light of his purposes in writing – to explain the defeat at the Field of Blood in terms of a need for spiritual purity, and to show that once spiritual purity is attained, God will grant victory. When highlighting the spiritual purity of the ordinary soldiers such as Samson or the pious faith in God of King David, Walter's idea of the 'us' is in sharp contrast to his presentation of Il-Ghāzī, who is the opposite of all that is good amongst the Christians. However, this does not adequately explain the vitriolic abuse Walter hurls at Il-Ghāzī throughout Book II, especially as Il-Ghāzī's actions do not seem to have been any worse than those of Ṭughtegīn. The reason for this is the psychological effect Walter's imprisonment had on him. Thus, while Il-Ghāzī was a useful tool for Walter because he was a clear contrast to the 'us', a clear 'other', the strength of the criticism of him within the narrative was caused by something much more personal to the chronicler.

Il-Ghāzī in William of Tyre's Chronicle:

William of Tyre's work is the major chronicle for the history of the Latin East, and is extremely useful for the overall perspective it gives on the crusader states – which includes periods covered by no other chronicles³³² –, the obvious intelligence and wisdom of the author which finds its expression in the highly developed historiography in the chronicle, as well as the fact that he was the archbishop of Tyre at the time of the composition, thus both having access to important people and being present at important events. However, when looking at the image of Il-Ghāzī in the chronicle, it is significant that William was not alive during the events he describes surrounding Il-Ghāzī, and did not live as an adult in the Holy

³³² Specifically, the years 1127/521, when the First Crusade chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres' ends, until the point at which it ends, in 1184/580. Edbury and Rowe, pp 1 – 2.

Land until 1160/555, after he had been educated in Europe. Thus, his account is based on other chronicles, which almost certainly include *The Antiochene Wars*, and the memories of those who were present. The chronicle thus becomes a synthesis of many people's opinions, all of which have been taken by William of Tyre and moulded to fit the interpretation which suited him.

William shows Il-Ghāzī primarily as simply being a very strong leader, referred to as 'a powerful infidel prince', and 'lord of that wretched and perfidious race, the Turkomans'.³³³ As such, he is presented as being a real threat to the Latins, both through his military strength, and the manpower he could draw on if he really was the lord of the Turkomans.

William's portrayal of his personality, however, is more complicated, and certainly not as simple as Walter the Chancellor would have his audience believe. William attributes to Il-Ghāzī a shrewdness which serves him well in his operations. His tactics work well and his intelligence seems to be correct, which is illustrated during the account of Il-Ghāzī's attack on al-Athārib, which was successful because Il-Ghāzī had good intelligence about the crusaders and because he utilised siege techniques well.³³⁴ This is a feature which occurs throughout the narrative when referring to Il-Ghāzī's military manoeuvres – that they were well planned, and well executed. The only times when he loses battles it does seem to be because of ill-fortune, such as at the battle of Tell Dānith, he had split his army into three groups, and it was only luck that meant King Baldwin II of Jerusalem 'chanced to fall in with one of these', which caused the defeat of Il-Ghāzī's army.³³⁵

Therefore, Il-Ghāzī is viewed by William of Tyre as being an excellent military commander, yet with this quality come others that are not as praiseworthy. There are several occasions on which William shows him as arrogant; when he had captured a number

³³³ WT Vol. I, p. 528.

³³⁴ WT Vol. I, p. 532.

³³⁵ WT Vol. I, p.531.

of places, he became ‘convinced that no one could resist him’ so ‘he treated the entire region according to his own pleasure’.³³⁶ The basis of his confidence was in his strength in numbers, while the reliance of the Christians was humbly on God – ‘a far more reliable and unfailing hope’.³³⁷ Here, William deliberately compares the attitude of the two opponents, where one based their emphasis on worldly strength, the other on heavenly. This does, however, rather lose its effect during the battle itself, as he comments that both sides fought ‘with scornful disregard of the laws of humanity’.³³⁸ Thus both the crusaders and the Turks, and by inference their leadership, used very brutal tactics to try to defeat their enemy.

This brutal streak Il-Ghāzī possessed is seen elsewhere in William of Tyre’s work, not simply when dealing with his enemies, but to anyone, including his own men. For example, he forced his troops to work all night to prepare for battle ‘under threat of death’.³³⁹ The chronicler also implies that Il-Ghāzī’s instructions were that all the Latins should be killed in the surprise attack on the Latin camp.³⁴⁰ Perhaps one of the most shocking episodes was at Sarmada, where Il-Ghāzī forced the people inside to surrender, but that ‘scarcely a man...escaped to tell their tale’.³⁴¹ The implication here is that they were all killed after they had surrendered, although it passes without a clear statement to this effect from the chronicler.

As well as this, and despite comments that imply Il-Ghāzī was a good military leader, it seems that he was not such a good soldier, being instead cowardly, to the extent that he ‘abandoned his troops to their death’ when he perceived they were losing the battle.³⁴²

³³⁶ WT Vol. I, p. 531.

³³⁷ WT Vol. I, p. 532.

³³⁸ WT Vol. I, p. 533.

³³⁹ WT Vol. I, p. 532.

³⁴⁰ WT Vol. I, p. 532.

³⁴¹ WT Vol. I, p. 531.

³⁴² WT Vol. I, p. 534.

Finally, in an echo of Walter the Chancellor's theme, William of Tyre shows how Il-Ghāzī is very anti-Christian. He is described as being 'a determined and unwearied persecutor of the Christian faith and name...like a gnawing worm he was ever seeking whom he might injure'.³⁴³ However, in the end, God was against him, as 'the hand of God had touched Il-Ghāzī with apoplexy', and when he died 'doomed to suffer the eternal fires, is said to have breathed forth his wretched spirit'.³⁴⁴ These themes are very much like those of *The Antiochene Wars*, and it is a very real possibility that William of Tyre used Walter's chronicle as his basis for this part, especially as this last comment is almost exactly the same as that used by Walter the Chancellor to describe Il-Ghāzī's soul leaving his body.³⁴⁵

William of Tyre is not as forthright in his views of Il-Ghāzī in his chronicle as Walter the Chancellor is, being more restrained in his judgements and avoiding vitriolic comments. Instead, William's chronicle is more measured, being a historical account of events, coloured by his own worldview, which is that the Muslims are strong, but they are not of God and so are against Him. As a Muslim leader, Il-Ghāzī fits into this worldview perfectly. He is a powerful leader with good military skills, but he has a number of vices which William regards as sins, being arrogant, cowardly and brutal – probably gained from reading Walter the Chancellor's account – as well as being very anti-Christian and therefore bringing the wrath of God on himself. Thus, the conclusion of William of Tyre's comments on Il-Ghāzī has to be that no matter how strong he is, he is fighting God, who he cannot possibly defeat.

³⁴³ WT Vol. I, p. 536.

³⁴⁴ WT Vol. I, p. 537.

³⁴⁵ WC, p. 171: 'his filthy soul issued forth from his anus along with a flux of dung from his belly, and it was dragged away by the claws of infernal scorpions to tumble into the halls of deepest hell, which are full of dreadful fires burning without end'.

Il-Ghāzī in Eastern Christian Sources:

The appearance of Il-Ghāzī in the chronicles of the Eastern Christian groups, particularly the Syrian Christians, provides a useful comparison to the Latin sources when examining the image of the ‘other’. The chronicles in which he appears are not those of a group of recent arrivals in the Levant, as the crusaders were, but they are those of communities who had existed for hundreds of years and who had long experience of Islam and Muslims. They are particularly useful because the writers were either eyewitnesses or seem to have known eyewitnesses, as Il-Ghāzī’s territories lay in and around those in which the writers themselves lived, and the chroniclers were relating events which had happened in the near past. The writings do not have the same type of emotional intensity of the crusading narratives, as they were written by native Christians, and the authors do not generally regard the battles the crusaders were fighting as part of a holy war – although that is not to say they are without emotion.

The Anonymous Syriac Chronicle:

One of the most important of these is the work referred to as *The Anonymous Syriac Chronicle*, which deals with the events of 1119/512-3 both before and after the Battle of Balāṭ. Like the Latin chroniclers, the writer of the *Anonymous Syriac Chronicle* states Il-Ghāzī’s position, that he ‘had become powerful and was uplifted because he ruled his own land, that of his brother Suqman’s sons, and that of his uncle’s son Daud, as far as Assyria, Armenia and the land of the Iberians [Georgians]. His kin ruled over all Armenia’.³⁴⁶

However, despite this power in worldly terms, Il-Ghāzī is seen as nothing more than someone whom God used to display His thoughts or judgements, a puppet on the universal stage. The chronicler states that the result of the battle of the Field of Blood came about not

³⁴⁶ Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, pp. 88-9.

because Il-Ghāzī won the confrontation, but rather that God was angry with the crusaders because of their sins and so allowed them to be defeated.³⁴⁷ Similarly, when Il-Ghāzī lost at the second battle of Tell Dānith, it was because God was no longer angry with the crusaders, so that He could exercise His right to defeat His enemies.³⁴⁸

The most interesting comment that the chronicler makes is one which appears in no other source, yet may explain a lot about what happened in the years 1118-9/511-3. The chronicler states that the cause of the 1119/512-3 events was the invasion of Il-Ghāzī's land by the deputy of Baldwin of Edessa, Galeran of Birta, which 'was the cause of evil'.³⁴⁹ If this is correct, it means that far from being an unprovoked, or at least unexplained, aggressor, which seems to be the image from the Latin chronicles, Il-Ghāzī was instead trying to gain revenge for a crusader attack on his territory, much as he had done when the Sultan's army invaded several years before. In this interpretation, the battle of the Field of Blood was caused not by Il-Ghāzī, but instead the spiralling situation in northern Syria was caused by the Latins themselves.

However, the brevity of the appearance of Il-Ghāzī in the chronicle leaves little opportunity for any personality to develop, meaning he is just a shadowy figure outside the Christian religion whom God uses to punish those Christians who deserved it.

Matthew of Edessa:

Another Eastern Christian account which mentions Il-Ghāzī is the Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa, and this is particularly important for historians because Matthew was a

³⁴⁷ Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, p. 88.

³⁴⁸ Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, pp. 89 - 90.

³⁴⁹ Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, p. 87: 'He (Galeran of Birta) collected all the soldiers he could and attacked the camps of the Turkmen in the plains of Mt. Hisma east of Edessa and in the land of Ghazi son of Ortuq when they were not expecting it. He captured five hundred men, women, and children, twelve hundred horses, a hundred thousand cattle, camels, and goats, and killed many fighting men. He brought the captives to Edessa. This was in March, 1426 (1119/Dhu'l Hijja 512); it was the cause of evil'.

contemporary or near-contemporary of the events he was describing, and because his home town of Edessa was geographically close to the events in which Il-Ghāzī took part. Furthermore, Il-Ghāzī did not directly threaten Edessa at any time so he is not subject to the unrestrained ire of Walter the Chancellor, who was personally threatened by the emir.

There is no doubt that whatever else he may be, Matthew views Il-Ghāzī as being a very powerful ruler. He was ‘the great Persian emir Il-Ghazi’³⁵⁰, and Matthew states that he was regarded by the Turks themselves as ‘the supreme commander of the Turkish forces’.³⁵¹ These statements are reinforced by the size of the army which Il-Ghāzī was said to have been capable of gathering together because of his position – in 1119/513 he is said to have gathered a force of 80,000 men for what would be the Battle of Balāṭ³⁵², and then in 1121/514-5 he collected an army of over 150,000 men. These figures are certainly exaggerated, but they give the impression that Il-Ghāzī had tremendous power and influence at his disposal.

However, despite his powerful political position, Matthew implies that as a soldier, Il-Ghāzī was not a good one. Despite all his military expeditions over a period of around nine years, Il-Ghāzī did not manage to record one ‘proper’ victory. The chronicler does state that he was part of a force which won on two occasions, though these were down to the actions of others rather than his own skill. One of these was in 1115/509, when Matthew records that Il-Ghāzī combined his forces with those of his nephew Balak, ruler of ‘Āna and al-Ḥadītha, to defeat al-Bursuqi, in ‘a formidable battle, putting him to flight’³⁵³, although on this occasion it was Balak, more than Il-Ghāzī, who was the mastermind of this victory, and Il-Ghāzī simply took a lot of the credit for it.³⁵⁴ The other victory was at the Field of Blood,

³⁵⁰ Matthew of Edessa, p. 218.

³⁵¹ Matthew of Edessa, p. 223.

³⁵² Matthew of Edessa, p.223.

³⁵³ Matthew of Edessa, pp. 215 - 6.

³⁵⁴ Matthew of Edessa, pp. 215 – 6.

yet even here it was not really his victory, as he only won due to the fact that Prince Roger of Antioch was even more hopeless and arrogant than he was. Matthew states that ‘since the count of Antioch Roger was an arrogant and prideful man, having full confidence in his strength, he neglected to take any precautions...[and] was contemptuous of the Turkish forces’, which led to his defeat.³⁵⁵ Thus, on the two occasions when Il-Ghāzī won military victories, it was not because of anything he had done.

As well as not being a capable soldier, Matthew presents Il-Ghāzī as being positively ineffectual. There are numerous examples of this throughout the chronicle. The emir had an enormous army, but still was not able to do any harm to the city of Antioch, being able only to ravage areas east of the Euphrates which were not fortified.³⁵⁶ On the occasions he met a strong army, he lost, being ‘shattered by the king of the Franks’³⁵⁷, and, despite having an army of over 150,000, he still managed to lose a battle against King David of Georgia extremely heavily, so he ‘returned humiliated...barely escaping with [his life] and with only one hundred men remaining out of every thousand’.³⁵⁸

Yet although Matthew’s chronicle is clear that Il-Ghāzī was a bad military leader, he would nevertheless gain prisoners because he would attack defenceless areas, and the chronicler gives a picture of the fate of these people. He states that ‘the emir seized fortresses, farming villages and monasteries and also slaughtered everyone, including old people and children’³⁵⁹, and after his victory at the Field of Blood, ‘the Turks ravaged all the country from the Euphrates to the Mediterranean Sea, bringing bloodshed and enslavement to all the districts’³⁶⁰, while in 1120-1/514, he ‘led into captivity all the men and women from Tell Bashir right up to Kesoun. Moreover, he inexorably massacred everyone and even

³⁵⁵ Matthew of Edessa, pp. 223.

³⁵⁶ Matthew of Edessa, pp. 223.

³⁵⁷ Matthew of Edessa, pp. 224.

³⁵⁸ Matthew of Edessa, pp. 227 - 8.

³⁵⁹ Matthew of Edessa, pp. 223.

³⁶⁰ Matthew of Edessa, pp. 224.

had a tremendous number of children roasted over fires'.³⁶¹ Il-Ghāzī is therefore presented as an evil man.

Thus, the image of Il-Ghāzī in Matthew of Edessa's chronicle is not a positive one. While he is certainly powerful, he gained his power through underhand tactics, by taking advantage of others' skill and terrorising defenceless people. There is no redeeming feature in the image of Il-Ghāzī, and it can only be inferred from the chronicle that he is a very evil man.

Michael the Syrian:

The final Eastern Christian chronicle which mentions Il-Ghāzī is that of Michael the Syrian. The main trait of Il-Ghāzī's character in Michael's chronicle is that he was a ruler who wanted to obtain and maintain his independence as much as possible. This is clear throughout the chronicle in his reactions to the numerous events which occur around him and his territory. This occurs from the very start, as his first appearance in the chronicle the occasion in which he is part of a coalition brought together to defend the Artuqids against the army of the Sultan of Baghdad. As a ruler in the Jazīra, Il-Ghāzī should have been under the authority of the Sultan, but his actions here show that he did not want to be, and his entry into an alliance against the Sultan is part of that.³⁶² This action was repeated on several other occasions, such as the time when the son of the Sultan complained to his father about Il-Ghāzī's behaviour. This behaviour was presumably damaging what the Sultan regarded as the interests of the wider community, and therefore he again is acting for his own benefit, not that of his supposed overlord.³⁶³

³⁶¹ Matthew of Edessa, pp. 226.

³⁶² Michael the Syrian, p. 193.

³⁶³ Michael the Syrian, p. 217.

Il-Ghāzī also deliberately went against the specific orders of the Sultan regarding his own position in the Islamic world; after he was captured by the lord of Ḥims, he was freed on condition that his son would be a hostage, to guarantee Il-Ghāzī's future behaviour. Instead of meekly submitting to this arrangement the Sultan had created, as soon as he was freed Il-Ghāzī gathered a number of troops and marched back to Ḥims to free his son. He is presented as feeling not answerable to anyone, not even the Sultan himself.³⁶⁴

On occasion, Il-Ghāzī went even further in his efforts to gain his freedom, as on occasion he even makes treaties with the Franks, who he is supposed, religiously speaking, to be fighting, such as in the year 1115/508.³⁶⁵ It is not reported that these alliances ever resulted in a joint military operation between them, but the treaty is important because of what it highlights; that he was prepared to go against his co-religionists for the sake of his territorial ambitions. Not only did Il-Ghāzī make this treaty, he did act on it to a degree, in the only way he could, when the Sultan sent an army against the Franks, which recorded as having happened in the year 1114-5/508. On this occasion he was asked to provide troops to help with the attack on the Franks, which he had to do, as he was under the authority of the Sultan, yet he also had made a treaty with the Franks. As a result of this, he sent only three hundred troops, and warned the Franks that the Sultan's army was coming. Thus he tried to keep a balance between both sides, although the Sultan was, unsurprisingly, not happy, and ordered the kidnap of Il-Ghāzī's son. The Arṭuqid ruler, therefore, lost a great deal because of his attempts to gain some independence by allying with the Franks.

The result of this episode is another example of Il-Ghāzī's attempts to become more independent – he deliberately went after the army of the Sultan, commanded by the son of the Sultan, and fought them in order to get back his own son. It is clear that Il-Ghāzī was

³⁶⁴ Michael the Syrian, p. 217.

³⁶⁵ The year 1114/507-8, Michael the Syrian, p. 217.

thinking only of the prestige of himself and the affront caused to his family by this and so he was prepared to run the risk of incurring the wrath of the Sultan to protect his position.

From the above description, it would seem that Il-Ghāzī was desperately trying to distance himself from his supposed leader, the Sultan, which resulted in him allying with that man's enemies. This, however, is not the case all the time, as there are occasions on which the emir of Mārdīn fights the Franks.³⁶⁶ The reasons given for this vary - on some occasions it is even claimed to be because it was done to impress the Sultan³⁶⁷ - though the chronology implies that this was before his treaty with the Franks, perhaps when he had not decided to assert his independence.

As well as his independent spirit, there are a number of other facets to the image of Il-Ghāzī in Michael the Syrian's chronicle. Firstly, Il-Ghāzī is definitely a powerful character. His ability to survive the wrath of the Sultan with no real damage either personally or to his territory shows this, and is clearly demonstrated by the chronicler, who reports that Il-Ghāzī was offered the town of Aleppo by its lord 'parce que les Francs l'avaient affaiblie'³⁶⁸ - the implication is that Il-Ghāzī was the only one who was believed to be strong enough to protect the town, and was much stronger than its previous ruler. His ability to gather what seemed like innumerable Turks for the battle of Balāṭ/Field of Blood reveals the strength of Il-Ghāzī in the wider Turkish community of the Jazīra at the time³⁶⁹, and he was also able to crush a revolt in Aleppo in a way which seems to have been very easy for the emir.³⁷⁰

Secondly, he does seem to be rather an opportunistic character - it is reported that he managed to capture the town of Naṣībīn just after a battle when it seems to have been

³⁶⁶ Michael the Syrian, p. 215.

³⁶⁷ Michael the Syrian, p. 215 - Il-Ghāzī and Jāwalī 'rassemblèrent des troupes et montèrent contre les Francs, afin de se faire un nom auprès du grand sultan'.

³⁶⁸ Michael the Syrian, p. 217.

³⁶⁹ Michael the Syrian, p. 217.

³⁷⁰ Michael the Syrian, p. 218.

undefended, having been previously looted by another army³⁷¹, and he did not capture Aleppo by force, but instead it was simply given to him by the previous lord of the town.³⁷² He also went on raiding expeditions against lands which were poorly defended, looting and pillaging, and becoming more confident as he found scant resistance from the local rulers.³⁷³

Yet Il-Ghāzī does also seem to be a militarily intelligent leader, as he is described as having used clever ambush tactics in his victory over Roger of Antioch³⁷⁴, and he used the same tactics, initially successfully, against King Baldwin II of Jerusalem when he arrived to avenge the previous defeat.³⁷⁵ While this tactic was useful and successful, it does not reflect on Il-Ghāzī as well as it might, as he only seems to use that method of attack – he does not have a backup plan. Thus, when Baldwin II realised what was happening to the rear of his army after being ambushed, he was able to adjust his tactics accordingly, thus defeating the Turk.

Another aspect to Il-Ghāzī's character as revealed in Michael the Syrian's chronicle is that he was a drunkard. While this is part of his character in other chronicles, it is only mentioned once, on the occasion of his capture by the unnamed lord of Ḥims. After the sultan sent threats to Il-Ghāzī, one of the Sultan's more loyal subjects, Jokermish, decided to carry out stronger action against the wayward emir, and fell on his city. He found him inebriated from drink and easily overpowered him, so that Il-Ghāzī's penchant for drink led him to lose his freedom.³⁷⁶ Finally, the behaviour of his troops can also be used to judge Il-Ghāzī's character, as they were under his control. Thus, the reports of massacres carried out

³⁷¹ Michael the Syrian, p. 193.

³⁷² Michael the Syrian, p. 217.

³⁷³ A typical example of this is just after his defeat to Baldwin II of Jerusalem, when he invaded first Edessan and then Antiochene territory. Michael the Syrian, p. 205.

³⁷⁴ The Battle of the Field of Blood/Balāṭ. Michael the Syrian, p. 204.

³⁷⁵ Michael the Syrian, p. 205. The chronicler describes how Il-Ghāzī used the same tactics against the rearguard of Baldwin's army that he had against Roger's, and that he initially was winning. However, when Baldwin realised what was happening to his army, he brought the rest of the army to bear on the ambushing Turks, who were destroyed, then turned on the rest of the Turkish army, who fled in panic. They had no response to the frontal attack by the crusader king and suffered 'une grande défaite'.

³⁷⁶ Michael the Syrian, p. 217.

by the troops do not reflect well on Il-Ghāzī, as they suggest that he did not mind their behaviour.³⁷⁷

The image of Il-Ghāzī in the chronicle of Michael the Syrian is very different to many of the other Christian chronicles. He is seen much more as a personality in his own right, instead of the Antichrist figure of Walter the Chancellor or the cowardly ruler described by Matthew of Edessa. Il-Ghāzī is presented as a strong, powerful ruler who is determined to carve out and preserve a territory for himself and his family in northern Syria, and who has the ability to do so. The opportunistic attacks on certain cities have to be contrasted with his ability to preserve himself from the wrath of the sultan, while his vices of drinking and massacring are put to the background. This reflects part of Michael's method of writing – an objective style that did not condemn simply because someone was a Muslim. Moosa has shown that the Syrians had, by that time, lost their initial trust in the Franks because of their behaviour towards the native Christian population, and this had resulted in a mindset among the Syrians that anyone who protected them was to be praised and admired.³⁷⁸ Michael the Syrian's account may, therefore, be a reflection of this.

³⁷⁷ See, for example, Michael the Syrian, p. 205.

³⁷⁸ M. Moosa, 'The Crusades: An Eastern Perspective, With Emphasis on Syriac Sources', in *Muslim World* 93 (2003), pp. 249 – 290, esp. pp. 258 – 262.

Chapter 2 – The Image of Il-Ghāzī in Arabic Sources

Il-Ghāzī in Ibn al-Athīr's 'Al-Kāmil fi'l-ta'rikh' (The Complete History):

Both the vast extent and the style of Ibn al-Athīr's chronicle mean that there is much scope for the development of the prosopography within it and the study of the same, particularly in comparison to the other chronicles being examined, and this is reflected in Il-Ghāzī's image, which is carefully developed throughout the chronicle, giving the reader a strong sense of how the author wanted to portray the Turkish emir. The clearest example of the development of Il-Ghāzī as a character comes in the presentation of his power, which is divided into three stages in the chronicle.

Il-Ghāzī is, at least initially, seen as a small fish in the big pond of northern Syrian and Jazīran politics. He is the son of Arṭuq, a petty Turkish ruler³⁷⁹, but that is the only advantage he has. He is mentioned at various points in the chronicle during the account of the early stages of his life, before the year 495/1101–2, but he is always under the command of others, including Riḍwān³⁸⁰, Tutush³⁸¹, and Sa'd al-Dawla Gūharā'in.³⁸² Il-Ghāzī is not even the stronger of the two sons of Arṭuq; it was to his brother Suqmān, and not to Il-Ghāzī himself, that Jerusalem was given by Tāj al-Dawla Tutush – he is not even mentioned in the account of the assignation of the city.³⁸³ He does appear later in the same paragraph, though, at the time of its capture by the Egyptians, but the tone here is that Il-Ghāzī was definitely the subordinate of his brother. In this first stage, he is an unimportant figure,

³⁷⁹ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, pp. 391 & 433.

³⁸⁰ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 391.

³⁸¹ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 391.

³⁸² Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 433

³⁸³ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 424.

whose only influence came ultimately from being his father's son, not anything he himself had achieved.

There is, however, a suggestion of his future power. On numerous occasions the writer states that Il-Ghāzī was part of a retinue of Turks who came together for a certain purpose. The difference between Il-Ghāzī and all the other Turks is that he is the only one mentioned by name³⁸⁴, which implies that either he was the most important of the group at that time, or that he was to become important later. These instances all occur during Il-Ghāzī's first appearances in the chronicle, and, taking into consideration the passages mentioned above which imply he was weak, the inference has to be that his name appearing in the chronicle, in contrast to the anonymity of the others, is caused less by his power and strength at the time than by the authority he would gain later in his life. So while initially he is seen as a weak Turkish warrior, not even being an emir, there is a hint that he will become important later.

This situation is in stark contrast to later in the chronicle, when the power Il-Ghāzī had acquired is clearly there to see. The first indication of this is during the year 509/1115-6, when he, along with certain other emirs, rebelled against the Sultan himself. On this occasion he was not strong enough to resist the Sultan's army alone, instead opting to form an alliance with others, but he had created a position where he was free from the rule of the Sultan.³⁸⁵ As his life continued, this strength, highlighted by his independence, continued to grow. This is underlined by his actions against the Franks, especially during victory at Balāṭ/the Field of Blood in 513/1119. Yet it is surprising that he was able to launch an attack at all. He was still in dispute with the Sultan over his position, and so had to be wary of any attempt to rein him in militarily by the Sultan. Despite this, he was still able to plan a

³⁸⁴ See, for example, Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, pp. 391 & 433.

³⁸⁵ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 607 – 8.

military incursion into Antiochene territory, without evident fear of the Sultan.³⁸⁶ At the battle itself, his strength as a leader is clearly seen. The number of troops he assembled is said to have been 20,000, he evidently knew the land, was well-informed about the movements of Roger's forces, and was able to rout the Frankish forces.³⁸⁷ He also won a second victory soon after against other Frankish forces³⁸⁸, thus cementing his reputation and completing his transformation from weak offspring of a regional dynast to celebrated hero of the *jihād*.

The transformation between the first and last phases in his power seems to have happened between the occasion of his installation as *shihna* of Baghdad and his first steps towards independence as ruler of Mārdīn. This covers the period between the years 495/1101-2 and 509/1115-6, and between these times there is a period when Il-Ghāzī was becoming stronger, yet was still not self-sufficient, and is still clearly subordinate to others. During this time, however, he developed some of the strategies which strengthened his position at the time, and which would lead to the great power he had after this, which are described above.

In the year 496/1102-3, shortly after his installation as Baghdad's *shihna*, Il-Ghāzī makes his first treaty recorded by Ibn al-Athīr, which was to become part of the pattern for his life.³⁸⁹ This treaty was made with his brother Suqmān and with Ṣadaqa, an emir based in southern Iraq and one who would often be an ally of Il-Ghāzī, against his rival for the position of *shihna*, Gümüshtegīn al-Qayṣarī.³⁹⁰ This treaty enabled Il-Ghāzī, with the help of his allies, to maintain his position in Baghdad, despite initially having been chased from the

³⁸⁶ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, pp. 634 – 5.

³⁸⁷ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, pp. 642 – 3.

³⁸⁸ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 643.

³⁸⁹ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, pp. 482 – 4.

³⁹⁰ The dispute over who was to have the position of *shihna* of Baghdad was caused by the virtual state of civil war into which the Seljuk sultanate had fallen in the 490s and 500s (1090s and 1100s). There were two rivals for the position of Sultan, Muḥammad and his brother Berkyārūq. Il-Ghāzī was Muḥammad's appointment as *shihna*, while Gümüshtegīn was the choice of Berkyārūq.

city by Gümüştegin. It was, therefore, the first time Il-Ghāzī used an alliance as a tactic, and it achieved what was desired. This was to be a tactic Il-Ghāzī was to use many times later in his life.³⁹¹

During this time, Il-Ghāzī had also grown strong enough to use others to do his work for him, although with mixed results. In the year 498/1104-5, when there were problems with brigandage on the Khurāsān road, he used his nephew Balak to quell the disturbances, which he did successfully.³⁹² However, another attempt, in the year 499/1105-6, to use someone else to carry out his wishes was not so successful. At this time, he caused Riḍwān, ruler of Aleppo, who was leading a Muslim army, and whose primary objective had been to attack the crusaders, to attempt to capture the city of Naṣībīn, which belonged to Jokermish.³⁹³ This, however, was unsuccessful after Riḍwān became annoyed with Il-Ghāzī for unexplained reasons, and Il-Ghāzī was captured outside the walls of Naṣībīn and imprisoned for a time in its citadel, before being freed by the command of the Sultan. Using others to do his work for him was to remain one of the main methods Il-Ghāzī had of operating when his power had grown – for example, he used Ṭugtegin to assist in his attack on Ma'arrat al-Nu'mān in the year 514/1120-1.³⁹⁴

Thus, there appear to be three stages in the strength of Il-Ghāzī in the chronicle. The first stage is that he is a weak man playing at being a strongman, yet overshadowed by his brother and overpowered by more established emirs. This then changes in 495/1101-2 when he becomes the *shihna* of Baghdad, during which time his power and influence grow, although he still lacks great strength, being demonstrably weaker than others around him on

³⁹¹ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, pp. 607 – 8.

³⁹² Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 513.

³⁹³ Il-Ghāzī was still in the employ of Sultan Muḥammad at this point, and Jokermish had, as Ibn al-Athīr reports, recently been unsuccessfully besieged by Muḥammad after a dispute with the sultan. This suggestion by Il-Ghāzī may have been an attempt to ingratiate himself further with Muḥammad. Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, pp. 521 – 3.

³⁹⁴ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, pp. 603 – 4.

a number of occasions. Finally, he becomes hugely powerful, gaining total independence for himself and the ability to run his own affairs, even managing to resist the great power of the Sultan in Baghdad, and his death comes at the height of his strength.

As well as his power and the development of it, Ibn al-Athīr's chronicle highlights a number of other aspects of the personality of Il-Ghāzī. Firstly, he was not above making treaties or agreements with his supposed enemies, demonstrating a certain moral manouvreability when it suited. The first account of this comes in the account of the loss of Jerusalem to the Egyptian Fāṭimids in 489/1096, when Il-Ghāzī, under his brother Suqmān, made terms with the Egyptians even though they were from the Ismā'īlī branch of Islam and were not Sunnis, as were the Arṭuqids.³⁹⁵ A different man may well have fought on against his enemies, but Il-Ghāzī was not above coming to terms. Although it may well have been Suqmān who made the agreement, as he was the senior of the two, there is no evidence that Il-Ghāzī was against it. Later in his life, he went even further, as he personally made several treaties with the Franks. He made one treaty with the ruler of Antioch in the year 508/1114-5 in order to gain his protection³⁹⁶, a further one with Roger of Antioch in 509/1115-6³⁹⁷, and another one with the Franks who were near his lands³⁹⁸ a little later, in the year 512/1118-9 – though this last treaty seems to have been in order to gain time to organise his troops against them, in what would be the battle at Balāt/the Field of Blood. However, it is not possible to get away from the fact that the ostensibly Sunni Muslim Il-Ghāzī made treaties with the Ismā'īlī Fāṭimids and the Latin crusaders. Although the idea of making treaties with non-Muslims is acceptable in Islamic law, under certain conditions, Ibn al-Athīr's chronicle shows that Il-Ghāzī broke these conditions, especially as the treaties with the Franks in the years 508/1114-5 and 509/1115-6 were with the Christians of Antioch

³⁹⁵ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 424.

³⁹⁶ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 603.

³⁹⁷ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 608.

³⁹⁸ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 634.

against the Sultan and Caliph in Baghdad, the leaders of the *sunna*. While this passes without comment from the chronicler, it is clear that Il-Ghāzī was going against Islamic law in order to help himself – not the actions of a good Muslim, but those of a leader trying to carve out an independent kingdom.³⁹⁹

There are indications, however, that his leadership was extremely good, and would help him to achieve his aim. The fact that he was made the *shihna* of Baghdad by the Sultan Muḥammad in the first place is testimony to that⁴⁰⁰, as it shows that the Sultan had great faith in him. That this belief was borne out in practice is shown by the sensible policies he used on a number of occasions during his period of rule. One such time is the occasion of a Turkoman uprising on the Khurāsān road near Baghdad – Il-Ghāzī’s response to this was to send his nephew Balak b. Bahrām b. Arṭuq to deal with them, at which Balak is successful.⁴⁰¹ Although it was not he himself who stopped the rebellion, he did make an excellent selection in who to send, and so his leadership here can be easily recognised.

The way he dealt with a threat posed to himself by Ṣadaqa is also proof of this. At this time, Il-Ghāzī had changed his allegiance from the Sultan Muḥammad to Berkyārūq, by having the *khutba* read out in the name of the latter, much to the ire of Ṣadaqa, who came seeking vengeance. Il-Ghāzī’s initial response was to run away, perhaps a cowardly thing to do, yet it did gain him time to think of a sensible response – that Berkyārūq had gained possession of Baghdad as part of his ‘fief’, and so it was perfectly proper of him to have the *khutbah* read in Berkyārūq’s name.⁴⁰² This response saved Il-Ghāzī’s position, and possibly his life, as he managed to resolve diplomatically a situation which could have had serious repercussions for him had he handled it badly.

³⁹⁹ This action went against the precepts of Islamic concepts of *jihād*, although there are many examples of other Muslim leaders doing similar, most famously Zengī, and even Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn. For a discussion of the laws of *jihād*, see M. Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, Johns Hopkins, 1955.

⁴⁰⁰ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 462.

⁴⁰¹ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 513.

⁴⁰² Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 494.

He also used his position to help other rulers close to him, as shown at the point when he interceded on behalf of Dubays b. Şadaqa with the Caliph.⁴⁰³ Although this led to nothing, the fact that he tried to help Dubays shows where his priorities were, and that he could be relied upon – at least by some.

Finally, Il-Ghāzī's skills as a military leader are shown on numerous occasions, most clearly identified during the battle of Balāṭ/the Field of Blood. Ibn al-Athīr's account states that the Franks wrote to Il-Ghāzī, telling him to wait for them before battle would be joined.⁴⁰⁴ However, the emir decided against this, and instead immediately marched against the Franks. The element of surprise which this caused was increased by a secondary tactic – that they arrived at the Frankish camp from three directions, having traversed very difficult terrain to get there.⁴⁰⁵ Thus, Il-Ghāzī used the element of surprise, in more ways than one, to gain his great victory over the Franks. Having defeated the Franks in one battle, Ibn al-Athīr then reports that he quickly had another victory over them, and consequently captured the forts of al-Athārib and Zardana.⁴⁰⁶ These victories mark the zenith of Il-Ghāzī's military prowess and consequently his power. It was thus his skill as a military leader which enabled his power to grow; he was given a chance and he took it.

Yet, in contrast to this positive presentation, there are numerous examples of this vanishing, and of his praiseworthy or strong exploits being replaced by more foolhardy activities. This clearest example of this is the occasion when, as Ibn al-Athīr states, there took place a 'violent civil strife between the troops of Il-Ghāzī b. Arṭuq, *shihna* of Baghdad, and the people of it (Baghdad)'.⁴⁰⁷ In this instance, Ibn al-Athīr reports that the troops of Il-

⁴⁰³ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 671.

⁴⁰⁴ While the likelihood of such a communication between the two sides can be doubted, it does help the reader to understand Ibn al-Athīr's presentation of Il-Ghāzī.

⁴⁰⁵ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 642 – 3.

⁴⁰⁶ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 643.

⁴⁰⁷ Al-Kāmil Vol. VIII, p. 468:

كانت فتنة شديدة بين عسكر الأمير إيلغازي بن أرثوق شحنة بغداد وبين عامتها

Ghāzī killed a boatman who was being slow to do as he was ordered. When the population seized the killers to punish them, more troops intervened to rescue the captured troops, but they were then stoned by the mob. As a result, Il-Ghāzī set out to punish the townspeople by looting and plundering the city with his army. This then spiralled out of control, with further actions by both the townsfolk and Il-Ghāzī's troops before the rioting was prevented by the intervention of the chief *qādī* and the head of the Nizāmiyya. Although Il-Ghāzī did not cause the chaos, he did not prevent it, and instead encouraged his troops to go on a rampage through the city; thus, he was responsible for their actions. Furthermore, he even appears as unable to control his troops during the siege of Ma'arrat al-Nu'mān, when he knew his troops would desert if there was no booty, as they were only there for quick gain⁴⁰⁸; thus he let them do as they wished.

There are also several places in which Il-Ghāzī is presented as being unpopular, which is possibly a consequence of how he behaved towards the local populations or other rulers. The actions of his troops towards the people of Baghdad when his soldiers rioted were not initially his fault, but as the situation continued, and he became involved in encouraging and increasing the actions of his troops, the people of Baghdad turned against him.⁴⁰⁹ The second occasion on which Il-Ghāzī's unpopularity is revealed is during his attempt to capture Naṣībīn. Here, he was challenged by Riḍwān when the latter realised that the best course would be to abandon the city, a siege he has only started because of the opportunism of Il-Ghāzī.⁴¹⁰ Il-Ghāzī refused to do so, and was thus abandoned by all his former allies and captured by the troops of the town and placed in the citadel as a prisoner, to await the return

⁴⁰⁸ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, pp. 603 – 604.

⁴⁰⁹ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 468.

⁴¹⁰ See below, p. 115.

of the city's ruler, Jokermish.⁴¹¹ Thus, at various points in the narrative, he is reviled by both his subjects and his Turkish allies because of his actions.

Il-Ghāzī is also presented as opportunistic in some of his endeavours. In the year 505/1111-2, when the Sultan's troops came to the territory of Aleppo, Il-Ghāzī tried to exploit the situation by using some of his own troops to capture booty from the funeral retinue of the emir Sukmān al-Quṭbī, who had died outside the walls of the city and whose coffin was being escorted back to his lands. There is no reason given by Ibn al-Athīr as to why Il-Ghāzī decided on this course of action, including no mention of a political dispute, so it must be assumed that the writer sought to show the attack as an opportunistic foray against a dead opponent. The fact that even this attempt was repelled and Il-Ghāzī's own property was taken highlights both the rashness of the decision and the fact that his power was still not very strong at this time, even though the report that he had his own troops shows it was growing. Another example of this is the occasion of the siege of Naṣībīn by Riḍwān and other emirs. At this time, Riḍwān had made preparations to fight the Franks, but Il-Ghāzī suggested to him that a preferable course of action would be to attack Aleppo, then ruled by Jokermish, who was absent. When he had suggested this, the other emirs agreed, and the siege was mounted. The siege ultimately failed, and Il-Ghāzī was subsequently blamed by all for the failure of the siege, and the failure of the original attempt at a *jihād*.⁴¹² What this episode shows is that Il-Ghāzī was very opportunistic, as well as cowardly, and would not let the ideals of the *jihād* come in the way of his ambition. It is true that Ibn al-Athīr believes that Il-Ghāzī wanted the town to go to Riḍwān, as he was the senior emir, but this is part of his ambition – to gain more influence by helping others, thus becoming stronger and more independent through his opportunism.

⁴¹¹ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, pp. 521 – 3.

⁴¹² Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, pp. 521 – 2.

In the latter part of his life, however, Il-Ghāzī is seen as a good *jihād* warrior, a good *ghāzī*. His actions against the Franks, though slow in developing through the course of his life, are nevertheless seen in the chronicle as being worthwhile. On occasions, in the part of the chronicle which describes events after the year 512/1118-9, Il-Ghāzī is described as making preparations specifically for the Holy War, not just for a general anti-Frankish campaign.⁴¹³ Having carried out the preparations, Il-Ghāzī then managed to gain a great victory against the Franks. While this is not openly admitted by the author himself, who states simply that ‘the victory was his’,⁴¹⁴ Ibn al-Athīr does report the views of others in response to this, which are more admiring. After this battle the Caliph al-Mustarshid bi-’llāh (r. 512/1118 – 529/1135) sent robes of honour to Il-Ghāzī for his attack on the Franks⁴¹⁵, while the poet al-‘Azīmī (d. after 556/1160) wrote verses in praise of Il-Ghāzī and his victory.⁴¹⁶ Therefore, although the author himself does not praise Il-Ghāzī, he does admit, and even describe how others praised him greatly for his role in fighting the Franks, thus creating in his work the image of Il-Ghāzī as a *jihād* warrior.

The image of Il-Ghāzī in Ibn al-Athīr is a fascinating one, as it means that it is possible to trace the development of the power of a local emir, and how this was achieved. Il-Ghāzī starts the chronicle as a very weak ruler, a man whose only power comes from being his father’s son. However, through the chronicle his power slowly increased, and the means by which he achieved power can be inferred – good political skill with a degree of opportunism. Whether Ibn al-Athīr believes this to be a good or a bad thing is, however, extremely difficult to tell. There are no direct views given by the writer on Il-Ghāzī – unlike his pointed views on Renaud – and so it is tricky to infer a definitive image. What can be said for sure, however, is that Ibn al-Athīr does not openly criticise Il-Ghāzī, and indeed fails to

⁴¹³ See, for example, Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, pp. 634 & 642.

⁴¹⁴ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 654.

⁴¹⁵ Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 653.

⁴¹⁶ Lines from the poem are in Al-Kāmil, Vol. VIII, p. 643.

mention what is his biggest vice according to the other chronicles, his penchant for alcohol. This suggests that he wished to show Il-Ghāzī positively, as he was presented as a champion of the *jihād*, in contrast to the lack of *jihād* spirit shown by leaders of his own day.

Il-Ghāzī in Ibn al-Azraq's 'Ta'rīkh Mayyāfāriqīn' (History of Mayyafariqin):

The account of Ibn al-Azraq provides much useful information for the scholar of northern Syria and the Jazīra during the early twelfth century, as it is one of the few extant accounts which is focussed on northern Syria.⁴¹⁷ There is a significant portion of the chronicle devoted to Il-Ghāzī's time as ruler in the area of Mārdīn and Mayyāfāriqīn, and in this part of the chronicle three main aspects combine to create the image of Il-Ghāzī.

The first of these is the political power Il-Ghāzī possesses. Right at the beginning of the account of the reign of Il-Ghāzī in the Jazīra, Ibn al-Azraq notes that he used to be ruler of Jerusalem with his brother Suqmān.⁴¹⁸ Thus, he had been the ruler of the third most holy city in the Muslim world. He is then revealed to have been in the service of Sultan Muḥammad, where he was first muqṭa' of Ḥulwān⁴¹⁹, then he was *shihna* of Iraq, living in Baghdad⁴²⁰, meaning that he had been one of the most powerful men in the polity of the 'Abbāsid Caliphate. Following that, he then became ruler of Mārdīn, which was one of the most strategically important cities in Diyār Bakr, sometime at the end of the first decade of the sixth century/early 1110s, although the text is not clear when exactly, or how.⁴²¹ His power can also be seen during his invasion of Georgia to help the citizens of Tiffis, who had appealed to him for help against their ruler, when he was able to gather a large number of

⁴¹⁷ Introduction to Ibn al-Azraq, pp. 7-8.

⁴¹⁸ Ibn al-Azraq, p. 30.

⁴¹⁹ Ibn al-Azraq, p. 30.

⁴²⁰ Ibn al-Azraq, pp. 30 – 31.

⁴²¹ Ibn al-Azraq, pp. 31-3.

other rulers with him for his expedition.⁴²² The writer here implies that the citizens of Tiflīs needed to be protected from someone who was terrorising them, and that they chose Il-Ghāzī because he was the strongest ruler in the vicinity. Finally, both his power and the esteem in which he was held by others is highlighted by his final resting place, which was in the Masjid al-Amīr, the same place as the great Qilij Arslān⁴²³ was buried.⁴²⁴ This was a clear indication that he was believed to have been a leader in the same mould as Qilij Arslān himself. The combined implications of these factors was that Il-Ghāzī was an extremely powerful man, and Ibn al-Azraq claims that that fact was recognised by everyone.

Part of the main reason why Il-Ghāzī had such power was, in the opinion of the chronicler, that he was a good military leader, which is the second part of his image in Ibn al-Azraq's chronicle. There are numerous occasions on which he is seen defeating his enemies in battle. For example, having gained Aleppo, he 'fought the Franks, inflicting a decisive defeat on them, plundering their possessions and taking a great number of them prisoner'⁴²⁵. This quick victory is couched in terms which shows Il-Ghāzī in the best possible way – the defeat of the Franks is shown as a great victory, through the decisiveness of the defeat and the huge number of men he captured, and there is no dwelling on the weakness of the opposition, making it clear that it was Il-Ghāzī's skill alone which gained this victory. Furthermore, he was also able to take over the town of Naṣībīn, and though this is given the briefest of references as an event, the fact that he was able to take over the city, which had previously been in the hands of his powerful enemy al-Bursuq, suggests his military prowess.⁴²⁶ The fact that he was able to gather a great many leaders together under his command for the expedition into Georgia also shows that the people of the Jazīra viewed

⁴²² Ibn al-Azraq, pp. 37-9.

⁴²³ Qilij Arslān was the Seljuk ruler of Rūm (r. c.1092 – 1107)

⁴²⁴ Ibn al-Azraq, pp. 45-6.

⁴²⁵ Ibn al-Azraq, p. 36. This was the Battle of al-Balāṭ/The Field of Blood.

⁴²⁶ Ibn al-Azraq, p. 37.

him as very strong militarily, as well as politically.⁴²⁷ However, he did lose this battle, so his military skills were not infallible, while the manner of the charge by which they were beaten does imply that it was bad tactics by Il-Ghāzī, as King David ‘swooped down on them from the mountain while they were at the bottom of it’⁴²⁸, being caught in a trap. However, despite this one defeat, the overall tone of the piece is that Il-Ghāzī was a very capable military leader.

Finally, Ibn al-Azraq also presents Il-Ghāzī as a good ruler. He is viewed as being very fair to his subjects; for example, on gaining Mayyāfāriqīn, ‘he abolished the athqāl⁴²⁹ and the aqsāt⁴³⁰ and the anzāl⁴³¹ from its (the city’s) houses, for the people were in great distress’⁴³², which had been caused by the bad governance which had previously afflicted the city. To the people of Mayyāfāriqīn, Il-Ghāzī’s rule meant that ‘their hearts became calm and the people became secure in their homes’.⁴³³ He is also said to have made the surrounding lands safe, as ‘the robbers fled and the villages flourished’, when they had once been terrorised and ruined.⁴³⁴ In the words of the chronicler, the reign of Il-Ghāzī meant that ‘Mayyāfāriqīn began to prosper and he ruled the people very well’.⁴³⁵ This may have been one of the reasons why, in the year 515 AH (22 March 1121 – 11 March 1122), he was invited by the people of Tiflīs to become their ruler after the city had been oppressed by the Georgian King David II.⁴³⁶ There is no direct reference here to the situation Il-Ghāzī had taken advantage of earlier on his reign at Mayyāfāriqīn, but it is clear to see the comparison

⁴²⁷ Accompanying Il-Ghāzī on this campaign were Sultan ʿUghrīl Beg, Dubais b. Ṣadaqa, and ʿUghan Arslān, together with many of the important men of Il-Ghāzī’s state, including qāḍīs and viziers. Ibn al-Azraq, pp. 38-9.

⁴²⁸ Ibn al-Azraq, p. 40.

⁴²⁹ - The athqāl was an extra tax paid by the general population to support a war effort. Ibn al-Azraq, p. 34, note 36.

⁴³⁰ - The aqsāt was the practice of paying off a debt in instalments. Ibn al-Azraq, p. 34, note 37.

⁴³¹ - The anzāl was the billeting of troops in the houses of the general population. Ibn al-Azraq, p. 34, note 38.

⁴³² Ibn al-Azraq, pp. 34-5.

⁴³³ Ibn al-Azraq, p. 35.

⁴³⁴ Ibn al-Azraq, pp. 35-6.

⁴³⁵ Ibn al-Azraq, p. 36.

⁴³⁶ Ibn al-Azraq, p. 38.

that Ibn al-Azraq was surely trying to make.⁴³⁷ The greatness of Il-Ghāzī's reign is also shown when he died, as 'the (whole) population of the town (Mayyāfāriqīn) and those soldiers who were there went up to the citadel'⁴³⁸, suggesting that the townspeople were very upset about the death of their leader, which reflects the image of Il-Ghāzī as a great civic leader. Although this may well be panegyric on behalf of the author, it does reveal how Ibn al-Azraq wished to present Il-Ghāzī.

There are three facets to Il-Ghāzī in Ibn al-Azraq's writing, all of which are positive, and there are very few negative aspects to him. The reason for this can be seen in the purpose Ibn al-Azraq had in writing the chronicle – to praise the Arṭuqid dynasty⁴³⁹, of which Il-Ghāzī was an important member, and the image produced is designed to bring glory and fame to him. To ensure this, his achievements are magnified and celebrated, being seen as an example of what good leaders should be – politically powerful, militarily strong, and benevolent to his people – while any negative aspects he may have had are ignored.

*Il-Ghāzī in the writings of Usāma bin Munqidh*⁴⁴⁰

The memoirs of Usāma bin Munqidh provide a useful counterpoint to other chronicles from the period of the Crusades which are extant. Instead of a narrative account of the great political and military events of the time, it is a social history, concerned with the everyday happenings and the personal experiences of the writer. This means that there are few comments on individual rulers, and those that do pass mostly without elaboration or the

⁴³⁷ Ibn al-Azraq, p. 37.

⁴³⁸ Ibn al-Azraq, p. 45.

⁴³⁹ See above, p. 37.

⁴⁴⁰ Usāma b. Munqidh, *Kitāb al-I'tibār*, tr. P. K. Hitti as *Memoirs of an Arab-Syrian Gentleman*, Columbia University Press, 2000.

author's own interpretation of those events. There are, however, a few details about Il-Ghāzī which can be gleaned from the account.

Firstly, he seems to be a good military leader. He is only mentioned on three occasions in the chronicle, but at every time it is in the context of a military victory. The first is when Usāma bin Munqidh writes that 'Najm-al-Din Ilghazi ibn-Urtuq (may Allah's mercy rest on his soul) defeated the Franks at al-Balāṭ...and annihilated them. He killed Roger, the lord of Antioch, and all his cavalry'.⁴⁴¹ The second is that of the events of 509/1115, when Il-Ghāzī, Ṭughtegīn, and the Franks joined forces to defeat the army of the sultan⁴⁴², and the third was when 'Najm-al-Dīn Ilghāzi ibn-Urtuq (may Allah's mercy rest upon his soul!) had an encounter with Roger at Dānith on Thursday, the fifth of Jumāda I, in the year 513/1119, killed him and slaughtered his entire army, of which less than twenty men returned to Antioch'.⁴⁴³ The words used are very strong indicators that Usāma believed he was a strong leader, not only because he only had victories in the narrative, never a defeat, but also that these victories were complete ones – words such as 'annihilated' and 'slaughtered the entire army' are used in the passages quoted above to underline this; Il-Ghāzī was not someone who would easily lose a military encounter.

Despite this, however, the way Usāma himself feels about Il-Ghāzī is rather a disjointed one, with little coherence to the image. Usāma does use the injunction 'may Allah's mercy rest upon his soul!' after the mention of his name twice out of three occasions, which is an honour reserved only for particularly important people in the narrative; yet he also writes about Il-Ghāzī's drinking, the results of which were that 'he

⁴⁴¹ *ibid*, p. 67. These three events are not presented in chronological order, consequently this is the last event of the three to happen, while it is written in the account first.

⁴⁴² *ibid*, p. 120.

⁴⁴³ *ibid*, pp. 148-9. This is a mistake by Usāma, as Roger did not die at Tell Dānith but at Balāṭ, as mentioned above. Furthermore, Il-Ghāzī was defeated at Tell Dānith by the army of Jerusalem.

would feel drunk for twenty days'⁴⁴⁴, for which no further explanation would be needed for his Islamic audience.⁴⁴⁵ Furthermore, Il-Ghāzī's 509/1115 treaty with the Franks passes without mention by Usāma, which is rather strange for a writer who follows his mentions of the Franks with invectives such as 'may Allah's curse be on them!'.⁴⁴⁶ He seems to have been aware of the situation of *Realpolitik* which pervaded northern Syria at the time – that in order to safeguard their own position the Muslim rulers had to make alliances with people who should have been their enemies.

Thus, there is rather an ambivalent attitude towards Il-Ghāzī by Usāma bin Munqidh. This is due in most part to the relative paucity of references to Il-Ghāzī, the lack of a political focus for the chronicle, and the conflicting deeds of the Turk mentioned in the chronicle. He does do the Islamic world great service by his battles against and defeats of the Franks, yet he also makes treaties with them, takes part in drinking bouts and, of course, is a Turk, ethnically subordinate to the Arab writer.⁴⁴⁷ However, it does not seem that the chronicler was deliberately trying to present Il-Ghāzī in a particular way. The style of the account leaves room for nothing else. Instead, he is presented purely as a minor figure in the theatre of North Syria; an Islamic fighter, yet one who also breaks Islamic law and sometimes makes treaties with the crusaders. An ambivalent image is all that Il-Ghāzī could have had.

⁴⁴⁴ *ibid*, p. 149.

⁴⁴⁵ As drinking alcohol is forbidden in Islamic law, the audience would automatically understand the seriousness of the offence.

⁴⁴⁶ See, for example, Usāma b. Munqidh, p. 121.

⁴⁴⁷ This is not an Islamic ideal, as all races are supposed to be equal. However, the idea that the Arabs were chosen by Allāh as the vehicle for the divine message to be given to the whole world meant that an underlying superiority complex did emerge amongst the Arabs. H. Kennedy, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates*, London, 1986, p. 94.

Il-Ghāzī in Ibn al-‘Adīm’s ‘Zubdat al-ḥalab fī tāriḫ Ḥalab’ (The Cream of the Milk in the History of Aleppo):

The chronicle of Aleppo by Ibn al-‘Adīm gives an extremely useful view of Il-Ghāzī, as it is written from the perspective of the citizens whose city was taken over by him. It was written over one hundred years after the events, with the result that this time-span carries with it the usual advantages, such as hindsight, and problems, such as loss of memory, of a gap of this length. The narrowness of the scope of the work also means that Il-Ghāzī only makes appearance as a main character for the part of his life when he is the ruler of Aleppo; for the rest of his life, the information is scanty.

This results in there being two aspects to his character in the chronicle; the first part, which tells of the time before he was the ruler of Aleppo, and the second, which tells of the years he held sway over that city. His possession of Aleppo came in the year 511/1117-1118, and events which occurred before that date are related with much less detail than those which happened after.

Il-Ghāzī’s presence in the chronicle before the year 511/1117-8 is as that of a player on the scene of northern Syria, yet one whose power is not fully explained. Instead, he is only a sideshow – one whose power, strength and influence are indeterminate, yet certain. He is shown them as part of a group of Muslim rulers who unite to wage *jihād* against the Franks⁴⁴⁸, as part of a group of Muslim rulers who unite with the Franks to repel armies sent against northern Syria by the Sultan.⁴⁴⁹ Yet he is also shown, albeit in an earlier situation than the previous examples, to have been captured and imprisoned by Duqāq, ruler of Damascus, after apparently slandering him; consequently, Il-Ghāzī has to be helped by

⁴⁴⁸ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, p. 154. This passage also states that Il-Ghāzī was able to muster ‘a large retinue of Turkmen’ – خلق كثير من التركمان – thus suggesting that he did have a considerable amount of power, which he was able to use in gathering together large numbers of soldiers.

⁴⁴⁹ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, pp. 174 & 179.

others.⁴⁵⁰ These are the only appearances of Il-Ghāzī in Ibn al-‘Adīm’s chronicle prior to his becoming ruler of Aleppo; because he was not directly involved in the city which mattered to the chronicler, Aleppo, he does not figure in the account. What can be seen, however, even in the brief appearance of Il-Ghāzī before his acquisition of Aleppo, is the increase in his power over a number of years – from being captured by a rival and needing help in being released, he and his troops are utilised by the Muslim forces fighting the Franks, before feeling strong enough to ignore his overlords’ commands and ally with the Franks and others against them. Thus, a definite increase in his power can be seen throughout the chronicle, and by the time he takes over Aleppo, he has become one of the most powerful figures in northern Syria and the Jazīra.

It is during the time of Il-Ghāzī’s rule over Aleppo that his character is developed more fully. Although there are many aspects to his character which Ibn al-‘Adīm’s chronicle elucidates, the overwhelmingly central one is that Il-Ghāzī was either an incompetent and or an unskilled military leader. This is seen throughout his time at Aleppo, but is most clearly demonstrated at the Battle of Balāṭ/the Field of Blood in 513/1119. While other chronicles suggest that this was Il-Ghāzī’s greatest victory, Ibn al-‘Adīm does not see it as such at all. Instead, had Il-Ghāzī had his way, the battle would never have happened. It was his soldiers who, in an almost mutinous act, demanded that they should fight the crusaders immediately, while Il-Ghāzī wanted to wait for Ṭughtegīn, quite possibly because he did not trust his own ability or troops.⁴⁵¹ Furthermore, it is not he who is shown to have inspired the troops to victory, but instead the *qāḍī* Abū’l-Faḍl, who is seen to have encouraged the troops to their famous victory.⁴⁵² Finally, Il-Ghāzī does not lead the Muslim army into, nor does he even

⁴⁵⁰ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, p. 124. This did, however, happen in the year 489/1096, while the two previous examples occurred in the years 504/1111, 509/1115-6 and 511/1117. It seems that Il-Ghāzī gained power after his capture, as there is no hint during the episode with Duqāq that he had any power.

⁴⁵¹ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, p. 188.

⁴⁵² Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, p. 188.

appear to take part in the battle, as he is not mentioned at all. Instead, the man who was the architect of the Muslim victory was Ṭughān Arslān, a military commander in the army, as it was he who led the charge, and he is the only fighter mentioned by name.⁴⁵³ In this chronicle, Il-Ghāzī's famous victory is painted as a farce – a battle in which he did not wish to take part, which only happened because the army was impatient, and a battle in which he does seem to have taken little or no part, even though at the end he takes the credit by sitting in Roger of Antioch's tent and dividing up the booty.⁴⁵⁴

This, though, is not the only time when Il-Ghāzī's military incompetence is revealed. Immediately after the victory at Balāṭ, Il-Ghāzī is said to have been fully able to capture Antioch had he advanced on it, but instead chose not to do so, advancing instead on Artāḥ and Zardana.⁴⁵⁵ This is an example of bad decision-making by Il-Ghāzī, which is a theme running throughout the chronicle. When he gathered a large army together to attack the Franks in the year 514/1120, Il-Ghāzī had no plan whatsoever – he seems simply to have led them around Antiochene territory for a few days, not knowing what to do or making any decisions, before the army got annoyed with him, and Ṭughtegīn had to help him out.⁴⁵⁶ The final military act of Il-Ghāzī highlights this again, and explains why Il-Ghāzī operated in this way. In the year 516/1122, he had once again come up against the Franks while he was besieging Zardana, and he knew he could not defeat them, so he ran from them; yet as they reached him again he brought his troops back to Zardana to continue the siege. This advancing and retreating with the crusaders seems to have gone on some time, and highlights that Il-Ghāzī knew he could not defeat them.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵³ Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Vol. II, p. 189.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Vol. II, p. 190.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Vol. II, p. 191.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Vol. II, p. 195.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Vol. II, p. 205.

As well as this, Il-Ghāzī seems to have had the underlying awareness that he was not a good military commander, as he avoided confrontation wherever he could, and he constantly needed to be helped by others to get out of the troublesome situations he was in. Immediately after the battle at Balāṭ, Baldwin of Jerusalem came to help the crusaders in northern Syria, and instead of fighting, Il-Ghāzī avoided it.⁴⁵⁸ He only decided to fight Baldwin later, when he was side-by-side with Ṭughtegīn and Ṭughān Arslān⁴⁵⁹, either because he was cowardly, or knew that he was too weak to win alone. This episode is repeated almost exactly the next year (514/1120), when the crusaders were defeated, and had to sign a peace treaty with Il-Ghāzī, giving up lots of territory. However, it is not Il-Ghāzī but Ṭughtegīn who is the architect of this victory; Il-Ghāzī is simply the one who takes the credit and the glory for it.⁴⁶⁰ The climax to this is in the year 516/1122, when again Il-Ghāzī is faced by an army of Franks. On this occasion, he asks them to come down into the valley to fight, but they refuse and he, seemingly not knowing what to do, goes to Ṭughtegīn for help against them, almost as a child would go to his older brother when faced by a stronger opponent that he knew he could not beat.⁴⁶¹

This part of his image is underlined by Ibn al-‘Adīm’s report that on occasions Il-Ghāzī was simply incapable of fighting the Franks, such as the time when all he could do was simply let them raid his lands at will⁴⁶², before signing a humiliating peace treaty with them⁴⁶³, or, on his last skirmish with them near Zardana, he simply kept running away to stop them attacking him.⁴⁶⁴

⁴⁵⁸ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, p. 190.

⁴⁵⁹ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, p. 192.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, p. 196.

⁴⁶¹ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, p. 204.

⁴⁶² Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, p. 197.

⁴⁶³ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, p. 199.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, p. 205.

Militarily, therefore, Il-Ghāzī is not a good leader. Not only did Ibn al-‘Adīm describe him as hopeless, weak and afraid, but there are no redeeming features to his leadership. He is simply incapable. Yet this is not the only negative aspect to Il-Ghāzī which the chronicler shows – there are a number of others.

Firstly, Il-Ghāzī’s political power was also limited, and this is highlighted by events in Aleppo during his rule. Although he did not cause them, he was unable to solve the social problems which were plaguing Aleppo at the time, and which a strong leader would have been more able to deal with.⁴⁶⁵ His rule over the city was not enough to stop the city’s army from joining up with the crusaders and attacking Bālis, which was another of Il-Ghāzī’s power bases. Thus, instead of joining together to fight the crusaders – or any other outside threat, Il-Ghāzī’s own people join with the Franks to fight nearby towns; certainly not the circumstances in which a strong leader would have found himself.⁴⁶⁶ Even the rebellion by his son in the year 515/1121⁴⁶⁷, while not unusual, does suggest weakness in Il-Ghāzī as a leader.

Secondly, Il-Ghāzī was opportunistic. Ibn al-‘Adīm may have been showing that the reason Il-Ghāzī managed to become so powerful, in spite of the military ineptitude which he also describes, is because of this. His seizure of Aleppo is the clearest example of this – he had not attempted to gain the town militarily beforehand, but as soon as it was offered to him – seemingly because he was the best of a bad lot – he took it.⁴⁶⁸ This is underlined further by his attitude when he took possession of the town; because there was no money, the town was in a bad state and the people and soldiers of the town were not easy to handle, he left as soon as he could⁴⁶⁹, and soon after put his son in charge of it⁴⁷⁰. Not only did he

⁴⁶⁵ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, p. 180.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, p. 180.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, pp. 198 – 202.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, p. 179.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, p. 180.

have this attitude to the town, but he also did not want to help the people who lived there. When the Antiochenes invaded and devastated Aleppan territory in 513/1119, he did not move to confront them, but instead invaded their territory⁴⁷¹, possibly to force them to retreat. While this is another example of Il-Ghāzī's military cowardice, it also shows that he was not willing to risk battle to protect his subjects. A very similar situation occurred in the year 516/1122, when again he did nothing to stop Frankish invasions.⁴⁷² He only seems to have wanted the town for what he could get from it, and he would not have taken any risks to capture or protect it – only when it was handed to him on a plate did he accept.

As well as his treatment of Aleppo and its inhabitants being opportunistic, his treatment of others was as well. In the aftermath of the victory at Balāṭ/the Field of Blood, Il-Ghāzī uses the prisoners which were taken as pawns in order to extract money from them. The ones who could ransom themselves were allowed to, in order to boost Il-Ghāzī's coffers, but those who could not were executed, as they were of no worth to him.⁴⁷³

Finally, the manner of Il-Ghāzī's death suggests that he was not a great leader. Although there is no reason to doubt Ibn al-'Adīm's account of the manner of Il-Ghāzī's death, the tone of the passage suggests that it was a rather inglorious end for a rather inglorious person, as he developed stomach troubles which were initially thought solved, but then reappeared to cause his death.⁴⁷⁴ The lack of mourning or listing of achievements, or praise of any kind, highlights Ibn al-'Adīm's attitude further.

However, as in other chronicles, there are not only parts of Il-Ghāzī's character which are despised. There are some, though few, examples of admirable qualities in him. When the

⁴⁷⁰ Ibn al-'Adīm, Vol. II, p. 198.

⁴⁷¹ Ibn al-'Adīm, Vol. II, p. 187.

⁴⁷² Ibn al-'Adīm, Vol. II, p. 197 – 198.

⁴⁷³ Ibn al-'Adīm, Vol. II, p. 193. Even this was rather foolish from a military standpoint, as next year (514/1120) the crusaders who had ransomed themselves organised themselves into an army to ravage Il-Ghāzī's territory, and the tone is that this was in revenge for what had happened to them: the humiliation of defeat and the loss of money from ransoming themselves. Ibn al-'Adīm, Vol. II, p. 195.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibn al-'Adīm, Vol. II, pp. 205 – 206.

people of Aleppo complained to him about a tax which they believed was unfair, he investigated the situation and rectified it, by revoking the tax. That this was an extremely popular can be seen in the reaction of the city crowds, who engraved his decree on a large piece of wood which was then nailed to the door of the great mosque.⁴⁷⁵ As well as this, he managed to swiftly and cleanly deal with the revolt of his son Sulaymān, executing most of those responsible while sparing his son, before marrying the daughter of the famous Aleppan ruler Riḍwān, thus clearly and cleverly establishing a political link between him and his fairly popular predecessor.⁴⁷⁶

Despite all his faults, Il-Ghāzī seem to have been liked by the population of Aleppo, at least initially, as Ibn al-‘Adīm writes that after the battle with the Franks at Zardānā in 513, when the people thought he was dead, they were very sad, but when they realised he was still alive, they rejoiced.⁴⁷⁷ Finally, although Ibn al-‘Adīm paints Il-Ghāzī as being powerful neither politically nor militarily, there are some small caveats to that. When Il-Ghāzī wanted to, he could gather huge numbers of troops together despite his inability to use them well⁴⁷⁸, which shows he did have influence⁴⁷⁸ in his own lands and beyond. Furthermore, Baldwin of Jerusalem was very concerned about Il-Ghāzī’s power, to the extent that he believed he could try to attack Tripoli or even Jerusalem itself.⁴⁷⁹ Although highly unlikely, Ibn al-‘Adīm does suggest that this was how strong the Latins believed Il-Ghāzī was, perhaps taking his cue from people like Walter the Chancellor, who, as has been seen, showed Il-Ghāzī as hugely powerful and a threat to Christendom in general.

In the chronicle of Ibn al-‘Adīm, Il-Ghāzī is not an impressive figure. Although he had steadily built up his power base in northern Syria, this was a process which is beyond the

⁴⁷⁵ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, pp. 196.

⁴⁷⁶ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, pp. 198 – 203.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, p. 192.

⁴⁷⁸ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, pp. 186 & 195.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. II, p. 204.

remit of the work. As soon as Il-Ghāzī becomes ruler of Aleppo, however, he is the main figure in the chronicle, and his successes and many failures are highlighted. He is incompetent militarily and politically, and he was opportunistic. The reasons he is shown in such hopeless terms surely lies in the reasons for Ibn al-‘Adīm writing. Ibn al-‘Adīm’s father had been a *qāḍī* in the Zengid administration of Aleppo, and his family more widely had been in important positions over many years.⁴⁸⁰ As it was Zengī, founder of the Zengid dynasty, who had captured the town in 522/1128, it is likely that Ibn al-‘Adīm was deliberately attempting to present Arṭuqid rule in Aleppo as hopeless in order to justify the Zengid takeover of the town, and the position of his overlord.

Il-Ghāzī in Ibn al-Qalānisī’s ‘Dhayl ta’rīkh Dimashq’ (Continuation of the History of Damascus):

As has been alluded to above, Ibn al-Qalānisī’s *Dhayl ta’rīkh Dimashq* is unlike many of the other extant chronicles which have come down to us.⁴⁸¹ It is an annalistic account in its purest form, not a historical work in the style of Ibn al-Athīr, meaning that the figures that appear in the chronicle are sketchy, rather like ghosts or shadows, having an ethereal quality but no substance to them. Consequently, the image of Il-Ghāzī in the chronicle is affected by this. Furthermore, as the chronicle itself is focussed on Damascus, the events of the territories under the control of Il-Ghāzī are of secondary importance.⁴⁸² Thus, there is considerable difficulty in understanding how Ibn al-Qalānisī wished to represent Il-Ghāzī.

Despite this, there are a number of aspects to the image of Il-Ghāzī which can be inferred. Firstly, he is most certainly an extremely powerful figure in the account; he is

⁴⁸⁰ F. Gabrieli, ‘The Arabic Historiography of the Crusades’, in *Historians of the Middle East*, ed. B. Lewis & P.M. Holt, London, 1962, p.111.

⁴⁸¹ See above, pp. 37 - 38.

⁴⁸² See Gibb’s Introduction to IQ, p. 11; Amedroz p. 3.

called one of the two ‘most prominent chieftains in Syrian affairs’, along with his brother Suqmān in the chronicle, in Gibb’s introduction.⁴⁸³ This power is demonstrated in practical terms as he is shown to be prominent in the power politics of northern Syria at the time, such as making an alliance with Duqāq of Damascus and Yāghī-Siyān of Antioch against Suqmān of Mārdīn and Riḍwān of Aleppo⁴⁸⁴, being part of an anti-Frankish alliance which laid siege to Edessa in 505/1110⁴⁸⁵, and being politically strong enough to arrange an alliance among the various north Syrian factions against the crusaders in 512/1118-1119.⁴⁸⁶

Secondly, Il-Ghāzī seems to have become powerful in spite of himself. On the occasions of Il-Ghāzī’s takeover of a city, his handling of the situation reveals a distinct lack of understanding of the circumstances or any leadership qualities. For example, in the year 511/May 1117–April 1118, he is seen to have taken possession of Aleppo, and the running of its affairs. This lasted only one month, however, before he withdrew and left his son Husām al-Dīn Timurtāsh in charge, ‘his plans having miscarried’.⁴⁸⁷ His attempt to destroy the Georgian army is also presented as a failure of his leadership qualities – he had them on the run, but he was somehow outwitted, leading to his defeat, as well as his own failure to protect Tiflīs, which was captured by the Georgians.⁴⁸⁸ Furthermore, his – and his brother’s – loss of Jerusalem to the Fāṭimids in 491/1098 is presented as an easy victory for the Egyptians, and his failure to protect Islam’s third holiest city seems a sign of weakness.⁴⁸⁹ His weakness is further underlined when Ibn al-Qalānisī reports that he was

⁴⁸³ IQ, p. 25.

⁴⁸⁴ IQ, pp 30 – 31.

⁴⁸⁵ IQ, p. 101.

⁴⁸⁶ IQ, p. 158.

⁴⁸⁷ IQ, p. 157.

⁴⁸⁸ IQ, p. 164. ‘The army of the Georgians fled in terror, and the Muslims pressed upon them and besieged them in the Durūb; but the Georgians turned on the Muslims, and having put them to flight, killed large numbers of them. Thereafter they advanced on the city of Tiflīs and captured it by the sword, and puts its inhabitants to death’.

⁴⁸⁹ IQ, p. 45. The text reads: ‘When they (Suqmān and Il-Ghāzī) refused his (Egyptian leader’s) demand (to surrender), he opened an attack on the town, and having set up mangonels against it, which effected a breach in the wall, he captured it and received the surrender of the Sanctuary of David from Suqmān.’ The victory

captured by the troops of the emir Jāwafī and had to pay his own ransom through an annual tribute, which could imply that nobody else wanted to pay for him to be released.⁴⁹⁰

Finally, and possibly linked to, or even a cause of, the weakness shown above, Il-Ghāzī is presented as a drunkard, as he is in other Arabic chronicles. In an account of a siege by Il-Ghāzī on the town of Ḥims, in the year 508/June 1114 – May 1115, the chronicler writes ‘when Il-Ghāzī drank wine and it got the better of him, he habitually remained for several days in a state of intoxication’⁴⁹¹, the clear implication being that this was something which happened often; the traditional Turkish ways not totally abandoned by these relatively new Muslims. Having found out that Il-Ghāzī was in such a state at one point in the siege, the lord of Ḥims, Khīr-Khān, launched an attack on his camp, and, with no-one able to take charge, was able not only to overcome it but also to capture Il-Ghāzī himself. This scene is a good example of how Il-Ghāzī is regarded in the chronicle. Superficially, he seems to be powerful – he is besieging an enemy camp – but he does not have the power to carry it through, and by his own fault he is captured and imprisoned, having made himself vulnerable through his drinking. He was only released after the intervention of the atabeg Zāhīr al-Dīn wrote to Khīr Khān expressing his displeasure at what he had done to Il-Ghāzī.

As well as this, however, he does have some qualities which are admired by Ibn al-Qalānīsī. The foremost of these is his strength in the *jihād*. He is seen to have invited the Turkomen tribes of his region to join in the struggle, then to join them into an army by destroying ‘the factions of infidelity and error’.⁴⁹² Thus, he was not only carrying out his religious duty militarily by prosecuting the Holy War, but he is also seen to be a model of

seems as if it was quick, easy, and straightforward, and the fact that it was Suqmān who received its surrender demonstrated that he was regarded as the more important of the two brothers, though this is because his powerbase had not been built up sufficiently at this point in the chronicle to the extent that it later had.

⁴⁹⁰ IQ, p. 80.

⁴⁹¹ IQ, p. 149. The passage continues ‘...without recovering his senses sufficiently to take control or to be consulted on any matter or decision’.

⁴⁹² IQ, pp. 158 – 9.

Islamic orthodoxy by preventing possibly heretical ideas and factions. This is just before the Battle of Balāt, the occasion on which the Muslim forces defeated the crusaders of Antioch in 513/1119, the aftermath of which is so vividly described by Walter the Chancellor.

He is also seen as a leader who cared about those under his rule. Ibn al-Qalānisi praises Il-Ghāzī highly because of his treatment of the citizens of Aleppo. He is reported to have ‘abolished the tolls levied on the people of Aleppo, together with the duties on natural products and other contributions, and had rescinded the oppressive innovations and objectionable imposts introduced by the evildoers’.⁴⁹³ Not only was this move ‘received with gratitude, praise, appreciation, and blessings’ by the populace who benefited from this, but also that Il-Ghāzī is again regarded as a protector of Islamic orthodoxy. The epithet given to those who had installed these levies – ‘evildoers’ – suggests that the levies are regarded as anti-Islamic, and so anyone who abolished them, as Il-Ghāzī did, would be a source of Islamic purity.

The image of Il-Ghāzī in Ibn al-Qalānisi is one of a person who tried hard to be a great leader, but his character had flaws which meant he could not achieve this. He has one quality which the annalist obviously admires – he was a champion of Islam, as he tried to prosecute the *jihād*, while his social reforms in Aleppo follow ideas of Islamic orthodoxy. He was also a powerful individual, a situation which can be admired, but the way he obtained and used that power was not, as he is not shown to have actually captured his territories, while failures in the sieges he attempted to undertake show his leadership skills to be questionable, at least in that type of warfare. Finally, the describing of Il-Ghāzī’s penchant for alcohol shows that to the chronicler, this breaking of Islamic law was not something to be applauded. Although Ibn al-Qalānisi is silent on the topic, as an annalist this was his prerogative – to his exclusively Muslim audience, the description of this Islamic warrior

⁴⁹³ IQ, p. 162.

failing due to drunkenness would have been a powerful enough image on its own regarding his inability to be a truly great jihadist. As such, Il-Ghāzī seems like a tragic figure – a man who has become powerful, although his attempts to lead are thwarted by his own inability, despite his attitude being, generally, one which is presented positively.

Chapter 3 – The Image of Renaud of Châtillon in the Arabic Sources

Renaud in Ibn al-Athīr's 'Al-Kāmil fī'l-ta'rīkh':

Ibn al-Athīr is generally regarded by scholars as a master of the historical art, one who seamlessly brings together many sources, creating a work which is broad in scope and – comparatively – restrained in judgement. He is also, fairly unusually, able to interpret events, not just record them.⁴⁹⁴ Despite this ability, when writing of Renaud, all these aspects disappear.

From the very start Ibn al-Athīr is unequivocal in the language he uses to sum up Renaud, leaving the audience in no doubt as to his view of the crusader. On the first occasion he is mentioned, the crusader is referred to as 'one of the most devilish of the Franks, and one of the most demonic, and had the strongest hostility to the Muslims',⁴⁹⁵ and is subsequently referred to as 'one of the greatest of the Franks, and one of the most wicked of them, and the most violent of them in hostility to the Muslims, and the one who caused the greatest harm to them'.⁴⁹⁶ These two comments come in the first three appearances of Renaud of Châtillon in Ibn al-Athīr's chronicle *Al-Kāmil fī'l-ta'rīkh*, and as such they serve both as an introduction to the reader of Renaud's perceived character and as an explanation for his subsequent behaviour; he was strong and evil. Yet it is the narrative accounts of events which reveal most about the chronicler's viewpoint, as they both explain and expand on these early comments.

⁴⁹⁴ C. Hillenbrand, 'Sources in Arabic', in *Byzantines and Crusaders in Non-Greek Sources*, ed. M. Whitby, *Proceedings of the British Academy* 132, Oxford, 2007, p. 316.

⁴⁹⁵ *Al-Kāmil*, vol. IX, p. 452:

البرنس أرناط، صاحب الكرك، كان من شياطين الفرنج ومردتهم، وأشدّهم عداوةً للمسلمين

⁴⁹⁶ *Al-Kāmil*, vol. X, p. 18:

كان البرنس أرناط، صاحب الكرك، من أعظم الفرنج وأخبثهم، وأشدّهم عداوةً للمسلمين، وأعظمهم ضرراً عليهم

There are only a few occasions on which Renaud enters the chronicle, but when he does Ibn al-Athīr highlights the behaviour which is both a cause and result of how he is described above, and both points are underlined on every occasion Renaud appears in the narrative. The first example of this is when Renaud launched an attack towards the Arabian city of Taymā' in 576/1181, which Ibn al-Athīr reports was ultimately aimed at Medina.⁴⁹⁷ The Muslim response to this threat was to send 'Izz al-Dīn Farrukshāh, military commander in Damascus, with the army of that city, to deal with it. Despite having the whole resources of Damascus and its environs at his disposal, Farrukshāh did not directly attack Renaud, but instead threatened Kerak to lure him away, even though the crusader was near Taymā', in Islamic territories around two hundred miles from his territory, and so should have been easy prey. This suggests that Farrukshāh was too worried about the strength of Renaud to confront him openly, and the extent of the threat he was to Muslim territories. The sense of Renaud's strength is heightened even further in the narrative after this event, when Ibn al-Athīr reports that Renaud threatened the ḥajj caravans passing by his territories, and it is once again the Muslim reaction to this which demonstrates the threat which Renaud was believed to pose. Ibn al-Athīr writes that in 583/1187:

'Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn wrote to all the lands calling upon the people to the jihād, and he wrote to Mosul and the region of the Jazīra and Irbil and other places from the lands of the East, and to Egypt and all the lands of Syria, calling them to the jihād'.⁴⁹⁸

The scale of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's response, calling on people from all his territories, shows just how much of a threat Renaud was perceived to be, the reason for which is seen in the

⁴⁹⁷ Al-Kāmil, vol. IX, p. 452.

⁴⁹⁸ Al-Kāmil, vol. X, p. 20:

كتب صلاح الدين إلى جميع البلاد يستنفر الناس للجهاد، وكتب إلى الموصل وديار الجزيرة وإربل وغيرها من بلاد الشرق وإلى مصر وسائر بلاد الشام، يدعوهم إلى الجهاد

chronicler's earlier comment that Renaud 'caused the greatest harm to them (the Muslims)'.⁴⁹⁹

While this underlines his military power, Renaud is also shown to have great political strength within the Kingdom of Jerusalem – he is presented as the person who persuaded the rest of the nobility of Jerusalem to fight the Muslims, at what would be the Battle of Ḥaṭṭīn. The discussion which will decide the fate of the crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem provides a wealth of information on Islamic ideas when it is viewed through the perspective of an Islamic writer who was not, of course, present at the event he describes. In this scene, Ibn al-Athīr invents a long speech by Count Raymond of Tripoli, who argues against attacking the Muslims. The reasoning he gives in the speech is sound; he argues that the Muslim army at the time was more powerful than before, that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn would not be able to hold Tiberias if he captured it, and soon he would have to disperse his army anyway as the ordinary soldiers would be wanting to return home. Furthermore, he also points out that Tiberias is part of his own territory, indicating that it was his problem and that his view should be taken very seriously.⁵⁰⁰ Responding to this, Renaud is seen to be engaged in full bluster. His reply is:

'You have tried to scare (us) of the Muslims, and there is no doubt that you are with them and you sympathise with them – if not, you would not have spoken thus; and as for what you said, that they are large in number, a large load of fuel for hellfire will not harm it'.⁵⁰¹

The nobility of Jerusalem settled on the course suggested by Renaud, implying that the powerful anti-Islamic sentiments which Renaud held reflect the attitude of the majority of

⁴⁹⁹ Al-Kāmil, vol. X, p. 18.

⁵⁰⁰ Al-Kāmil, vol. X, p. 23

⁵⁰¹ Al-Kāmil, vol. X, p. 23:

قد أطلت في التّخويف من المسلمين، ولا شكّ أنك تريدهم، وتميل إليهم، وإلا ما كنتت تقول هذا، وأما قولك؛ إنهم كثيرون، فإنّ النار لا يضرّها كثرة الحطب

Jerusalem's nobility instead of the more Islamophile mentality of the count of Tripoli. As such, Renaud becomes the *de facto* leader of the crusaders, as his voice is the one which represents the majority opinion and his argument the one which wins through; thus, he is the most powerful of the crusaders.

As well as his power and consequent threat to the Muslims, the other main theme which comes out in Ibn al-Athīr is that Renaud is evil, which is demonstrated in a number of ways. The first is his treacherousness, displayed most clearly by his breaking of treaties. This occurs for the first time in the chronicle at the time of Renaud's attack on a caravan in the year 582/1186-7. This occurred after Renaud was forced to ask for a treaty with Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, who had been harassing him. Ibn al-Athīr reports that as a result of this treaty, 'caravans could come and go from Syria to Egypt and from Egypt to Syria', through Renaud's land, without fear of harassment.⁵⁰² The tone of the passage is that this treaty suited both sides, as it would have meant that both sides could protect their own people and property and carry on their productive trade. However, a short time later ('this [same] year'), a large, rich caravan passed through Renaud's land, and the crusader broke the treaty by attacking the caravan and seizing goods and men, and throwing them into prison. Ibn al-Athīr's claim that Renaud 'betrayed them'⁵⁰³ shows how the chronicler views his actions.

The other occasion on which he highlights Renaud's perceived treachery is in the account of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's address to Renaud just before killing the crusader. Ibn al-Athīr writes that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn 'rebuked him for his sins, and enumerated to him his treacheries, and he rose towards him himself and struck his neck', i.e. killed him.⁵⁰⁴ That Renaud's

⁵⁰² Al-Kāmil, vol. X, p. 18:

ترددت القوافل من الشام إلى مصر، ومن مصر إلى الشام

⁵⁰³ Al-Kāmil, vol. X, p. 18:

فغدر اللعين بهم

⁵⁰⁴ Al-Kāmil, vol. X, p. 26:

وقرعه بذنوبه، وعدد عليه غدراته، وقام إليه بنفسه فضرب رقبتة

treacheries were many is clear from the use of the term ‘enumerated’.⁵⁰⁵ Additionally, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s list of Renaud’s faults ends with the comment on Renaud’s treacheries; coming at the end, just before Renaud’s death, suggests that his treacheries were his worst crime, as if his treacheries were the cause of his death, as the tension and his reported crimes build up. It is also likely that Renaud’s ‘sins’, which are mentioned first by Ibn al-Athīr, were his treacheries, which are mentioned afterwards. It was a feature of medieval Arabic historiographical writing that certain important points would be underlined through the use of repetition, and it seems that Ibn al-Athīr is doing so on this occasion, implying that sin and treachery were the same thing in the case of Renaud by placing them next to each other in his chronicle. While Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn does comment that it was Renaud’s attack on Mecca and Medina and his insult of Muḥammad which caused him to kill Renaud, Ibn al-Athīr seems to be suggesting that while these were the direct cause of his death, these were merely manifestations of the real reason he died; his evil treachery.

Another way in which the image of Renaud as evil is elucidated in Ibn al-Athīr’s chronicle is through his arrogance. Though not specifically mentioned by the author himself, it is again Renaud’s actions in the chronicle which leads to this conclusion. This is clear from his treatment of the Muslim pilgrim caravan which passed through his territories in the year 582/1187. The account states that Renaud ‘betrayed them and seized all of them and captured goods and their animals and their weapons and he threw into prison (those) of them who he had captured’.⁵⁰⁶ The lack of explanation in the passage or presentation of

The Arabic term *فصرب رقبته* used here is vague in its precise meaning. It is possible that this means that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn himself killed Renaud – that the implication is that he cut off Renaud’s head; but it could also imply that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn merely struck the first blow, and others finished the job. It is possible that Ibn al-Athīr is being deliberately vague, perhaps to absolve Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn from blame over killing a prisoner himself. However, it is clear he did order Renaud’s death, meaning that he is ultimately responsible.

⁵⁰⁵ The Arabic word is *عدد*, which can also mean ‘count’, and ‘calculate’, all of which carry the implication that there were many treacheries.

⁵⁰⁶ Al-Kāmil, vol. X, pp. 18 – 19:

فغدر اللعين بهم، وأخذهم عن آخرهم، وغنم أموالهم ودوابهم وسلاهم، وأودع السجن من أسره منهم

possibilities for why Renaud did as he did gives a feeling that he simply acted as he wished, with no concern for the consequences and with the idea that no power would be able to punish him. This feeling is increased by his retort to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's written response, which was to demand that Renaud release the prisoners and booty. Renaud 'persisted in refusing', the inference being that he felt himself to be untouchable, even by the strongest warrior of Islam.⁵⁰⁷

Furthermore, the arrogance which Ibn al-Athīr wants to show Renaud possessed is also to be seen in the account of the meeting between the crusader leaders just before Ḥaṭṭīn. In this scene, one part of Renaud's speech betrays an arrogance which the author would have the reader believe is ingrained in the crusader. This comes when Renaud is responding to the claim by Raymond of Tripoli that the Muslim army was very strong.⁵⁰⁸ Writing for an Islamic audience, Ibn al-Athīr uses a form of dramatic irony to show the arrogance of the crusader – Renaud believes that the Muslims would go to hell, when of course both the chronicler and his audience know that it is the infidel crusaders who would end up in the fires of hell by the end of the day.

Yet the act which highlights Renaud's evil most clearly, is the occasion of Renaud's raid down the Red Sea in 578/1183. The chronicler does not specifically comment on this event, as its presence alone in the chronicle would be enough to underline to his Islamic readership that Renaud is an evil, sacrilegious man. There would have been no need to point out to his Islamic audience the implication, or the scale, of the offence. It was bad enough that the Franks had defiled Jerusalem through their presence and disregard for its sacred status; but that a crusader should actually attempt to attack the holiest place in Islam, the Ka'ba itself in Mecca, would have been unquantifiably shocking. The strength of feeling

⁵⁰⁷ Al-Kāmil, vol. X, p. 19:

⁵⁰⁸ See above, note 501.

about the violation and those who perpetrated it can be seen in the fate of those who were captured: ‘some of them were taken to Mina to be ritually slaughtered (i.e. have their throats cut) there as punishment to (those) who alarmed the sanctuary of Allāh the Sublime and the sanctuary of his prophet’.⁵⁰⁹ The sacrificial nature of the killings reflects the fact that the Muslims believed Renaud and his troops had polluted sacred space, and the only way to cleanse it was to spill their blood.⁵¹⁰ It is this moment, more than any, which highlights the evil in Renaud for the Muslims, and which Ibn al-Athīr uses to highlight the same thing.

However, despite all these negative aspects to Renaud’s character which Ibn al-Athīr clearly despised, there are hints in the text that Renaud did possess qualities which can be admired. The first of this is his intelligence. Though not explicitly praised, or even stated, in the account, it is clear from the description of Renaud’s tactics in the chronicle that these were the actions of a highly intelligent man. There are several places in the chronicle where this shines through. For example, his attack on the holy cities of the Hījāz, while highly shocking, also showed his understanding of Islamic thought. He had threatened the very heart of the Islamic world, something that no non-Muslim had done before, thus showing his appreciation of the place it held in Islamic thought. It could be argued that this was a foolish thing to do from a military and diplomatic viewpoint, as it would mean that the wrath of the Muslim world would be brought down on either him if the Franks were lucky, or on all the crusading states themselves if they were not. However, if this is ignored – as Renaud seems to have been doing – and his aims examined, it is obvious that this was indeed a very intelligent move – he seems to have been trying to hurt the Muslims, and Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, as much as possible, and an attack on Mecca and Medina would do just that. A further

⁵⁰⁹ Al-Kāmil, vol. IX, pp. 468 – 9:

أرسل بعضهم إلى منى ليخروا بها عقوبة لمن رام إخافة حرم الله تعالى وحرم رسوله

⁵¹⁰ For a brief overview of the importance of Frankish pollution and Islamic purity in the period of the Crusades see Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, pp. 293 – 297.

demonstration of his intelligence comes in a description of Renaud's military manoeuvres when harassing Muslim pilgrim traffic. His actions in doing this again underline his understanding of the Islamic mindset. It was the duty of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn himself as ruler of Syria and Egypt to ensure the safety of the pilgrims in those lands. By consistently attacking the pilgrims, Renaud was undermining Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's claim to be worthy of rule, which could have led to others challenging for the leadership, thereby weakening opposition to the crusader states and consequently buying time for the Franks.

Furthermore, it is clear in the chronicle that Renaud himself was a very powerful man, as demonstrated by his ability to thwart Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's plans and by his offensive raids. While there is no clear statement by Ibn al-Athīr to the effect that he admired Renaud because of his power, political strength was something which was seen as laudable in the medieval Islamic world.⁵¹¹ Thus, despite the open hostility in Ibn al-Athīr's comments on Renaud, a grudging appreciation does filter through to the reader.

Evaluation of Ibn al-Athīr:

The writings of Ibn al-Athīr are determined to show Renaud as an extremely evil, calculating individual. He was a man whose actions were designed to cause harm to Islam, and the threat he posed was increased by his great power and intelligence. While power and intelligence were admired in Islamic thought, the problem with Renaud's is that these qualities were channelled against Islam, and were therefore negative in Ibn al-Athīr's eye rather than positive.

However, when judging the chronicle as a whole it is important to note that several important aspects of Renaud's life are ignored, aspects which would change the complexion of how he is viewed. While this would not be surprising in some of the medieval Arabic

⁵¹¹ See A. Al-Azmeh, *Muslim Kingship*, London, 1997.

chronicles, Ibn al-Athīr is generally held up as an example of an historian who tried to understand why things happened. With Renaud, however, he fails to do this. There are three main ways in which this manifests itself.

Firstly, the author fails to mention the vital factor of Renaud's strategic position. Barber has convincingly argued that the main reason for the Muslim antipathy towards Renaud was not anything special about the actions themselves, but the fact that it was he who was in the best possible position to cause harm to the Muslims. A similarly belligerent crusader whose territory lay, say, on the coast near Acre or Jaffa would not have had the ability to cause as much chaos to the Muslims, as there were no Muslims passing regularly through his territory, and it would not have been easy to collect a force to invade Muslim lands, especially with the king of Jerusalem close at hand to keep him in line. Renaud had no such restrictions, as his land was regularly crossed by pilgrims and caravans, and the king was not in a position – physically at least – to stop him; thus it was his situation as much as his beliefs that caused such harm to the Muslims.⁵¹² The position of Kerak and Shawbak so strongly dominated the surrounding area that the strategic potential of Renaud's territory is not even in question. Thus, the question arises of why this is not mentioned. It is likely that, as with other medieval writers, Ibn al-Athīr ignored this because it did not fit with the main theme of his narrative with regard to Renaud; that he was evil and constantly trying to hurt the Muslims. Having put the arguments in religious and moral terms, it would jar significantly if he was then to explain rather more earthly subjects like the strategic

⁵¹² See M. Barber, *Frontier Warfare in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem: The Campaigns of Jacob's Ford, 1178 – 1179*, in *The Crusades and their Sources: Essays Presented to B. Hamilton*, ed. J. France & W. Zajac, Aldershot, 1998. Barber does, however, significantly underplay the political and religious reasons for the Islamic hatred of Renaud. His territorial position was important, but it would have meant nothing without his political will and religious motivation to carry them out.

positioning of crusader castles and the impact they had on the nearby Muslims. It was much easier to ignore this than have it disrupt the flow of the narrative and his ideas.⁵¹³

Secondly, Ibn al-Athīr does not judge Renaud's behaviour, or the man himself, in a similar way to how he judges other crusader leaders. To elucidate this, the question over whether or not Renaud or his deeds were any worse than other crusade leaders who are praised by Ibn al-Athīr must be addressed. A good example of this is Richard I, of whom Ibn al-Athīr comments: 'He was the man of his time for boldness, cunning, endurance, and perseverance. The Muslims were tested by catastrophes because of him, the like of which had never before befallen them'.⁵¹⁴ To examine the reason for this lack of consistency, the actions of the two leaders must be examined alongside each other. Renaud appears in the chronicle as a man who attacked and tried to attack Muslim cities, such as 'Aydhāb during his Red Sea raid, and Medina which he attempted to attack as part of the same attack. Renaud also broke treaties, such as the time in which he attacked a Muslim pilgrim caravan during a time of peace; he is said to have insulted Islam and Muḥammad; and he is criticised for failing to comply with Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's demands. There are, therefore, a number of deeds which Renaud carried out which riled the author.

In the case of Richard, it is clear that the English king also did many of the same deeds which Renaud did. He attacked Muslim cities, such as the occasion of his capture of Acre⁵¹⁵, the majority of which the Muslims held before he arrived. Richard has also been criticised by various commentators for his actions when he killed three thousand prisoners after Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was late agreeing to the terms of an agreed treaty, which have been seen as Richard

⁵¹³ - As well as this, there are other reasons, particularly that, being primarily a religious scholar, Ibn al-Athīr both did not understand and was not interested in such earthly considerations, being much more concerned with religious explanations for events.

⁵¹⁴ Al-Kāmil, Vol. X, p. 95:

كان رجل زمانه شجاعاً ومكراً وجَلداً وصبراً وبُلي المسلمين منه بالذامية التي لا لها

⁵¹⁵ Al-Kāmil, Vol. X, pp. 95 – 8.

breaking his treaty, just as Renaud was accused of doing.⁵¹⁶ Finally, Richard also did not agree to some of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's demands, and yet he is treated quite differently from the lord of Kerak. The only difference between the two is that Richard is not reported to have attacked the holy cities of Islam as Renaud is reported to have done.

Finally, Ibn al-Athīr's account is very critical of the breaking of treaties by crusaders, yet he does not criticise his own side for breaking the treaties themselves. In the account of the attack by Renaud on the Muslim caravan, a piece which is entitled 'An account of the Treachery of Prince Arnāṭ', the chronicler castigates Renaud for his breach of the treaty which would allow Muslim caravans to pass through his lands.⁵¹⁷ Yet one line in the text is very important – the claim by the chronicler that Renaud 'seized all of them and captured goods and their animals and their weapons'.⁵¹⁸ The fact that the Muslims were carrying weapons was itself an initial violation of the treaty, and so Renaud's attack could be regarded as a ruler asserting his right to punish those who violate treaties – much as Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was claiming to do.⁵¹⁹ Yet the fact passes without comment from Ibn al-Athīr, and he skips over it without embarrassment, even though it would have been clear to his immediate audience that the treaty was broken by the Muslims first.⁵²⁰ Either he was lifting wholesale from another source on this occasion, as Gibb has suggested that he did on numerous occasions⁵²¹, and did not feel the need or inclination to change or explain it; or he is suggesting that anything is acceptable if it helps Islam to defeat its enemies. It is also

⁵¹⁶ Runciman calls the massacre 'cold-blooded', while Riley-Smith says it was carried out 'in a fit of rage'. S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. III, Cambridge, 1954, p. 53; J. Riley-Smith, *The Crusades: A Short History*, London, 1987, p. 116.

⁵¹⁷ Al-Kāmil, vol. X, pp. 18 – 19.

⁵¹⁸ Al-Kāmil, vol. X, pp. 18 – 19:

أخذهم عن آخرهم، وغنم أموالهم ودوابهم وسلاحهم

⁵¹⁹ See J.P. Phillips, *The Crusades: 1095 – 1197*, Longman, 2002, p. 133, who suggests this.

⁵²⁰ See M. Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, Johns Hopkins, 1955, pp. 220 – 222, who shows that, in theory, Muslims had to announce to their enemies that they were abandoning their treaty before taking any action. The action of arming the caravan goes against this Islamic proscription.

⁵²¹ H.A.R. Gibb, 'The Arabic Sources for the Life of Saladin', in *Speculum* 25, 1950, pp. 58 - 74; however, Gabrieli states that Ibn al-Athīr was not such a person, and instead was a very thoughtful and intelligent individual, although with a clear bias towards the Zengids. F. Gabrieli, *Arab Historians of the Crusades*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1969, p. xxvii.

possible that he is suggesting that the caravan needed to be armed because of what happened to them; yet there is no hint of an explanation in the account, which would be expected if he were trying to justify the actions of the members of the caravan. The passing over of the implication suggests Ibn al-Athīr implies ignorance, irrelevance or embarrassment, but there is no justification attempted. Whichever it is, it does make the account jar, with a discrepancy between his views on Muslims and Renaud when they did the same thing.

Conclusion:

Ibn al-Athīr's presentation of Renaud as an evil, calculating individual who had great strength was not a new phenomenon when writing of crusaders – other crusade leaders, such as Conrad of Montferrat, are also seen as strong yet evil – the image of Renaud is something different. Only he was 'the most devilish of the Franks'⁵²², and 'caused the greatest harm to them (the Muslims)'.⁵²³ The reason for this must be something which Renaud alone did, outside the conventions of crusader – Muslim warfare. What this was is obvious. Ibn al-Athīr claims that Renaud tried to attack Mecca and Medina. It has been argued elsewhere that the reported attack on the holy cities was not carried out by Renaud himself, and it is unlikely to have been the aim of the raid.⁵²⁴ However, the belief was that Renaud tried to attack the Ḥijāz, and that has produced the image which Ibn al-Athīr presents. Amongst the crusaders, Renaud is the only one who attempted such a daring attack, the consequence of which would be death, so his unique presentation is not surprising.

⁵²² Al-Kāmil, Vol. IX, p. 452.

⁵²³ Al-Kāmil, Vol. X, p. 18.

⁵²⁴ A. Mallett, 'A Trip Down the Red Sea with Reynald of Chatillon', in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 2008, pp. 141 – 153.

The Image of Renaud of Châtillon in Bahā' al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād's 'Al-Nawādir al-Sultāniyya wa'l Mahāsin al-Yūsufiyya:

The chronicle of Bahā' al-Dīn has one main purpose: to glorify Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and to underline his virtues, reflected in the Arabic title to the piece.⁵²⁵ The motivation for Bahā' al-Dīn, to eulogise Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, is the basis for everything else in the narrative, including the presentation of Renaud. With this in mind, there are three main aspects to the image of Renaud which Bahā' al-Dīn creates.

Firstly, Renaud is shown as a powerful man. On the first occasion that he is mentioned in the account, Bahā' al-Dīn states that Renaud was 'lord of Kerak', and refers to him as 'Prince', which immediately show his position as an important and powerful individual.⁵²⁶ This position is underlined at the two other points where Renaud appears in the chronicle. The first is during the account of the Muslims' defeat at Ramla/Montgisard in 573/1177. At this battle, Renaud is the commander of the victorious Latin forces, even though, as the chronicle correctly points out, he 'had been recently ransomed at Aleppo, for he had been a prisoner there since the time of Nūr al-Dīn'.⁵²⁷ It is not only his position as military leader which highlights his power, but his elevation to such a high position so quickly emphasises that he had great power, either politically or militarily, or both, as it would take someone very important to have spent such a long time in captivity to come out and immediately be given such an important command.

On the final appearance of Renaud in the chronicle, at the time of his death after the battle of Ḥaṭṭīn, his power is underlined still further. He is one of only three Latin nobles who were taken into Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's tent when they had been captured, the other two being King Guy and the king's brother. The fact that he is seen in such illustrious company

⁵²⁵ The literal translation from the Arabic is 'The Sultan-ly Prodigies and the Yusuf-ly Merits'; both Sulṭān and Yūsuf refer to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn.

⁵²⁶ Bahā' al-Dīn, p. 37.

⁵²⁷ *ibid*, p. 54.

underlines how important Renaud is, a fact which is lost neither on Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn or Bahā' al-Dīn.

However, despite the power which he clearly possesses, the chronicler is careful not to ascribe him too much; while in the political territory of the crusader states he is a powerful man, his eventual fate reflects that in the wider context of Syrian politics, his power is not as strong that of the Muslims, and Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn in particular. The first occasion on which this theme subtly enters the narrative is at the aforementioned Muslim defeat at Ramla. Although Renaud is the commander of the Latin army which triumphs, it is most definitely not because of anything which Renaud personally does. Instead, the comment that 'some of the (Muslim) army'⁵²⁸ decided to change the battle formation after lines had been drawn up, and were caught in a Frankish charge, shows that it was a huge mistake on the part of the Muslim army which led to the defeat, not any brilliance by the crusaders. They, and by extension Renaud, were just lucky.⁵²⁹

Following on from this, Renaud is shown as being no match for the might of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, and by extension, for Allāh. In the Frankish victory at Ramla, it was, ultimately, the will of Allah which determined the Muslim defeat. Similarly, the victory at Ḥaṭṭīn was an expression of the power of Renaud being overwhelmed by the power of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn; as Renaud's power is earthly and Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's comes from the divine, by that day Renaud's power had reached its limit. Bahā' al-Dīn writes that 'God had bestowed a great victory on him (Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn)',⁵³⁰ that the Sultan was had 'great delight, expressing his gratitude for the favour that God had shown him',⁵³¹ and that he said to Renaud that 'God has given me

⁵²⁸ Bahā' al-Dīn, p. 53.

⁵²⁹ 'The Muslims had drawn up for battle and when the enemy approached, some of our men decided that the right wing should cross to the left and the left cross towards the centre, in order that when battle was joined they might have at their backs a hill known as Ramla Land. While they were occupied in this manoeuvre, the Franks charged them and God decreed their defeat. They suffered a terrible reverse and they had no nearby fortress they could take refuge in'. Bahā' al-Dīn, p. 54.

⁵³⁰ Bahā' al-Dīn, p. 74.

⁵³¹ Bahā' al-Dīn, p. 75.

victory over you'. The last reference to Renaud in the chronicle is the intense image of Allāh giving the crusader his last judgement, hurling him into hell, a judgement for which Renaud's earthly power has no response.⁵³²

There is, therefore, an explanation of Renaud's power in the chronicle, which demonstrates his power on two levels, earthly and spiritual. With the earthly power, Renaud is very strong because of his position as a military and political leader among the Franks. However, this power is completely undermined by his strength spiritually, which is non-existent as he is a great opponent of Allāh. In the final analysis, then, despite seeming strong, Renaud is actually weak, because his temporal power is based on a house of cards, one which was always going to fall when confronted with the power of Allāh.

The second part of the image Bahā' al-Dīn creates of Renaud is that of his evilness in the writer's eyes. On Renaud's first appearance in the chronicle, he is described as 'a monstrous infidel and terrible oppressor'⁵³³, thus preparing the audience for the rest of the narrative, and giving an explanation of why the following events occurred. This point of the narrative is the occasion of Renaud's attack on a Muslim caravan, although the exact year is not stated.⁵³⁴ During his account of this attack, Bahā' al-Dīn leaves the reader in no doubt as to how he regards the actions of the infidel who attacked the caravan: 'He [Renaud] seized it treacherously, maltreated and tortured its members and held them in dungeons and close confinement'.⁵³⁵ Although treatment of this kind was not uncommon in warfare of the time, it was the violation of the truce which Bahā' al-Dīn most objected to, and this violation revealed Renaud's treachery. Furthermore, in this account, Renaud's evilness is increased by

⁵³² Bahā' al-Dīn, p. 75.

⁵³³ Bahā' al-Dīn, p. 37.

⁵³⁴ The first half of the chronicle, in which this account is found, is focussed solely on Salāḥ al-Dīn, 'containing an account of his birth, his individual characteristics and his personal qualities' (Bahā' al-Dīn, p. 15). It is therefore not in chronological order, and does not contain explanations of the years in which events happened. This is probably referring to the attack on a caravan in early 1187, which was one of the primary reasons why Salāḥ al-Dīn launched an all-out offensive on the Kingdom of Jerusalem in the middle of that year. See Ibn al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil*, vol. X, pp. 18 – 9.

⁵³⁵ Bahā' al-Dīn, p. 37.

his reaction when he is reminded of the truce, as he dismissively says ‘Tell your Muḥammad to release you’.⁵³⁶ This is the main demonstration of Renaud’s evil in the chronicle, though this is demonstrated again at the scene of his death and judgement. Here, Bahā’ al-Dīn again reminds the reader of Renaud’s attack on the caravan, as this was the reason for Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s vow to kill him. The truth of this view that Renaud was evil is also demonstrated, as after his death ‘God speedily sent his soul to hell-fire’. Thus the judgement of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn is the same as that of Allāh. Not only this, but Renaud also had the opportunity to accept Islam when it was offered to him by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, but refused it, even when it seemed obvious that it was the triumphant religion, highlighting his evil.

In addition to this, Bahā’ al-Dīn uses a further technique in his attempt to show how evil Renaud was. This is to use the reactions of the hero of the narrative, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, to Renaud. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn is presented as someone who sees the evil in the crusader and reacts to it. At various points in the narrative, the Sultan vows to kill Renaud because of his acts⁵³⁷, refuses to give him the hospitality which would ensure Renaud’s life was safe⁵³⁸, and will not even speak directly to the crusader.⁵³⁹ As the hero of the chronicle, the beliefs of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn are to be taken very seriously, and his actions with regard to Renaud demonstrate his beliefs. They show that Renaud was an evil man who was not to be trusted, and whose actions were those of a man with no sense of chivalry or decorum. They are best summed up by the final comment by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, delivered to the king of Jerusalem after he had killed

⁵³⁶ Bahā’ al-Dīn, p. 37. See also Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, p. 344.

⁵³⁷ Bahā’ al-Dīn, pp. 37 & 74.

⁵³⁸ Bahā’ al-Dīn, p. 75. Here, Bahā’ al-Dīn explains clearly that it was a deliberate decision on the part of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn not to give Renaud a drink, as this would mean he could not kill the crusader.

⁵³⁹ Bahā’ al-Dīn, p. 75 This may not seem surprising, but it must be remembered that Renaud himself could speak Arabic; see Peter of Blois, p. 52. Bahā al-Dīn says that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn said to the king through the interpreter that Renaud was not protected, rather than just tell Renaud in Arabic directly. This may have been because Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn did not even want to be civil to such a treacherous man by telling him this.

Renaud: 'It has not been customary for princes to kill princes, but this man transgressed his limits, so he has suffered what he has suffered'.⁵⁴⁰

Thirdly, Renaud seems to be an extremely determined man, which is an aspect more implied than clearly states, but it can certainly be seen. This can be clearly perceived during his attack on the caravan in 582/1187. Renaud wants to get the booty which the caravan has, no matter what – so much so that when the members of the caravan reminded him of the truce he had signed, he just ignored it⁵⁴¹; nothing gets in the way of his desire for booty. It can also be seen in Renaud's behaviour in the tent, when he grabbed the cup of iced julep from the king without permission from his captor. It seems that here, again, he was not going to let the niceties of convention prevent him from getting what he wanted. Renaud's determination is a part of what makes him so dangerous, and it would take a man even more determined to bring him under control – Şalāḥ al-Dīn clearly fitted this description.

The image of Renaud which appears in the writings of Bahā' al-Dīn is one which is based around certain concepts which the writer was attempting to underline about the hero of his work, Şalāḥ al-Dīn. Şalāḥ al-Dīn is presented as the opposite of Renaud – the anti-Renaud – and the deeds of Renaud are in direct contrast to those of Şalāḥ al-Dīn. Every comment on the evil of Renaud by the author is indirect praise of the hero, who managed to defeat this most evil of men, and the strength of Renaud is no match for the strength of the hero, who was blessed by Allāh with the courage, strength and fortitude to defeat such a powerful enemy. Thus the qualities of Şalāḥ al-Dīn are brought out in the chronicle by how he reacts to situations – while Renaud is presented as evil, powerful and determined, he is merely a shadow, a puppet in a play which the author has constructed in order to give the limelight to his hero. There is no attempt to understand Renaud as an individual, or his motives, but present him as an uncomplicated, one-dimensional character, which is much

⁵⁴⁰ Bahā' al-Dīn, p. 75.

⁵⁴¹ Bahā' al-Dīn, p. 37.

easier to work with. The image consequently reveals the aims and preoccupations of the writer rather than Renaud himself.

The Image of Renaud of Châtillon in ‘Imād al-Dīn al-Isfahānī’s ‘Kitāb al-fath al-qussī fī’l fath al-qudsī’ (The Book of Eloquent Rhetoric in the Conquest of Jerusalem):

‘Imād al-Dīn’s presentation of Renaud in this chronicle is short, primarily because his purpose in writing was to compose a biography of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, not to deconstruct those around the Sultan. Thus, as in other Arabic chronicles, Renaud is a character who appears solely at his own death, and even then as a mere ghost of a figure. However, despite this brief appearance, the manner of his death and the language used about Renaud implies that he has been a major figure in the events of the time.

The main point which ‘Imād al-Dīn relates is, like the other chroniclers, that he regards Renaud as being an evil man. But the technique he employs to demonstrate his view is subtler than Ibn al-Athīr’s more pointed criticisms. ‘Imād al-Dīn uses Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn as the mouthpiece for his own perspective that Renaud was evil. The Sultan is the hero of the narrative, therefore his opinions and judgements must be correct, and so his view of Renaud as evil is one which must also be true.

The first mention of Renaud in the chronicle highlights this. ‘Imād al-Dīn reports that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn promised to kill Renaud when he could, and while the reasons for this are not explicitly given at this point, the image of the Sultan which has been built up over the course of the chronicle does suggest there must have been a good reason for it.⁵⁴² A good ruler such as Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn would not have sworn death on an individual enemy for no reason, and so Renaud must have deserved it. ‘Imād al-Dīn then does give the inevitable reason for

⁵⁴² ‘Imād al-Dīn, p. 27. If Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, the great leader, had promised to kill someone, it would naturally have been for a very good reason. The audience would have known that the most likely reason is because the person was evil. Thus a clue is given by the writer to what will happen soon after and why.

this, as he reports that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's words were: 'How many times have you promised and [then] violated your oaths, made commitments that you have infringed, concluded a treaty that you have broken, accepted an agreement that you have [then] rejected!'⁵⁴³ This, the reason that 'Imād al-Dīn presents as the cause of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's ire, is one that not only is frowned upon in Islamic law⁵⁴⁴, but one that also seems to go against the vague sense of decorum which prevailed between the two sides in military matters at the time. Both of these points highlight what 'Imād al-Dīn is trying to say about Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn. By putting Renaud at odds with Islamic law, not only does 'Imād al-Dīn show Renaud as evil, he is also achieving the main aim of his narrative – to present the sultān as a great leader, on this occasion by being the upholder of Islamic values. The lack of decorum from Renaud is also at odds with the civilised Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, whose behaviour towards the king is exemplary.

This is itself part of a technique that continues through the length of Renaud's appearance in the chronicle – that he and Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn are subtly, though constantly, compared to each other, effectively underlining how different their characteristics are. This is one of the reasons for the presentation of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn as a humane, caring individual when he was attending to the king.⁵⁴⁵ The difference in his treatment of the king and of Renaud in the tent underlines how different they were in the eyes of both Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and by extension the chronicler himself. The king is seen as a good leader, while Renaud is anything but. In the final appearance of Renaud in the chronicle, on the occasion of his

⁵⁴³ 'Imād al-Dīn, p. 27.

⁵⁴⁴ The frame of reference in which both Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and 'Imād al-Dīn were working was the Islamic idea of a treaty, found in Islamic law. This states that a peace treaty is 'a valid instrument, the provisions of which must be binding on all'; M. Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*, Johns Hopkins, 1955, p. 203. Thus, the breaking of treaties can be seen to be a disgraceful act in Islamic thought, and this is clearly where Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's and 'Imād al-Dīn's thoughts were too. The only way a treaty could be terminated in Islamic law was by mutual consent, and here there is clearly no consent on the side of the Muslims; Khadduri, p. 221. Therefore, it is easy to see why Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and 'Imād al-Dīn were so angry at Renaud. However, while Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was clearly trying to take the moral high ground here, there are numerous examples of Muslims breaking treaties, from Muḥammad right through to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn himself (caravan being armed) - clearly the moral high ground is easier to take when on the winning side.

⁵⁴⁵ While there can be little doubt that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn did treat the king well, 'Imād al-Dīn's highlighting of this is to contrast Renaud with the king.

death, the scene is very calculated by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn. He had left the crusaders in his tent and had ridden on his horse to organise the setting-up of the Muslim camp. Then, when he came back, he seems to have gone straight to Renaud and killed him without a word.⁵⁴⁶ The manner in which Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn killed Renaud underlines the contempt felt for Renaud by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, and the lack of criticism by the chronicler shows that he did not feel the need to criticise the Sultan for his action.⁵⁴⁷

According to ‘Imād al-Dīn, Renaud was a great though evil man who was killed by someone who was a great and good man, reflecting the triumph of good over evil, Islam over its enemies. After this, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn explains to the king, and ‘Imād al-Dīn to his audience, why he killed Renaud – that his sins had been his undoing and that he deserved what happened to him.⁵⁴⁸ Finally, there can be no doubt that ‘Imād al-Dīn saw the death of Renaud as justice. The tone of the writing is full of satisfaction and glee as he writes: ‘the hand of vengeance extended onto him, grabbed him and pushed him; his head was taken, his breath cut, his bases were eradicated’.⁵⁴⁹ This constant repetition of how Renaud was killed serves to underline how pleased ‘Imād al-Dīn was with Renaud’s death, and the spiritual tone of the account, while not mentioning Allāh specifically, does hint at the victory of good over an evil man which is a strong theme in the writing overall.

⁵⁴⁶ ‘He returned to his tent, [and] he took Renaud [‘s life]: holding his sword, he came against him and struck him between the shoulder blade and the neck; when he was on the ground he cut off his head; when he took him outside [the tent] he dragged him by his feet in front of the king’. ‘Imād al-Dīn, p. 28.

⁵⁴⁷ M. Khadduri, in *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* Johns Hopkins, 1955, shows that the execution of prisoners is a legal concept in classical law. He demonstrates that in the Shāfi‘ī legal code, of which Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was an adherent, execution ‘should not be done unless dictated by certain reasons, such as the need of weakening the enemy, or required by high Muslim interests’, p. 127. Both of these could be applied to the historical circumstances in which Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn executed Renaud; the death of Renaud would prove a massive blow in weakening the crusaders, while the oath Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn took could be said to be a high Muslim interest which meant Renaud had to be killed. Furthermore, Khadduri quotes the jurist al-Awzā‘ī, who said that ‘before execution the prisoner should be given the opportunity of adopting Islam as an alternative to death’; ‘Imād al-Dīn does not mention that he did, although it is possible that he did so – certainly many of the other chroniclers wrote that this was the case.

⁵⁴⁸ ‘Imād al-Dīn, p. 27.

⁵⁴⁹ ‘Imād al-Dīn, p. 105.

In addition to the evil of Renaud, one of the most interesting aspects to his image is how he measures up to his fellow crusaders; compared to them, he seems to be a stronger, and more important, character. The mass of crusader leaders who were captured were brought before the Sultan ‘stumbling in their shackles like drunkards’ – hardly a dignified stance for the nobility of Jerusalem. Although Renaud would have been one of them, he seems to have been the only one who was not afraid. While the king trembled with fear in his tent, Renaud has a resigned air in the one active part he plays, responding to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s accusations of treachery with a stoical and resigned ‘such is the custom of kings; I have only been following previously taken roads’.⁵⁵⁰ He seems, therefore, to be the strongest of the crusaders, going to his death calmly and without drama. His strength is also shown during in a very telling statement of ‘Imād al-Dīn – that ‘the victory was inaugurated by his [Renaud’s] death’.⁵⁵¹ While a victory was usually started with the defeat of the king, having Renaud’s death as the start of the victory reveals that Renaud was the main enemy, not the king. Although it was surely not part of his intention, these few lines hint at a different idea that the chronicler had, or at least wanted to portray, about Renaud – that he was the strongest of the crusaders, and that he was the real danger to the Muslims because of it. This, however, highlights further the standing of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn; he defeated the most powerful of the crusaders.

Renaud’s role in ‘Imād al-Dīn is as the villain, the anti-hero, a role which he has in all the other Arabic chronicles. The difference here, though, is that the spiritual side to the struggle is almost completely ignored, and instead it is replaced by a more worldly struggle, which is between the hero of the tale, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, and the evil one, Renaud. That Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn is victorious over Renaud helps the image which ‘Imād al-Dīn wishes to create of him, of a true Islamic hero who is victorious over the forces of evil, no matter how strong and

⁵⁵⁰ ‘Imād al-Dīn, p. 27.

⁵⁵¹ ‘Imād al-Dīn, p 104.

powerful they may be – and Renaud is the strongest of the crusaders. The difference between Renaud and the other crusaders is that Renaud is the most powerful threat, so had to be eliminated, while the others were all too weak to pose a threat so Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn could afford to be magnanimous. Once again, therefore, Renaud is a puppet in the hands of another, and his image created to fit in with the wider themes ‘Imād al-Dīn had in mind.

The Image of Renaud of Châtillon in Ibn al-‘Adīm’s ‘Zubdat al-ḥalab fī ta’rīkh Ḥalab’:

Ibn al-‘Adīm’s chronicle, being a history of Aleppo, deals mostly with events concerning that town. However, events elsewhere are mentioned in passing when they are considered to be important enough, and Renaud’s appearance in the chronicle comes in that context. The narrative follows the Arabic tradition of annalistic writing, and as such little comment is given by the writer. Instead, his opinions need to be carefully inferred from what is written.

Ibn al-‘Adīm’s presentation of Renaud does not vary greatly from that in the other Islamic chronicles; it is, in fact, even more one-dimensional. The central theme in the narrative is that Renaud was evil. The report of his attack on the pilgrim caravan was that he ‘acted treacherously towards them (the pilgrims), and he seized them and their goods’, during a time of treaty.⁵⁵² When he was challenged on this, he is reported to have said ‘Say to Muḥammad to release you’.⁵⁵³ Reinforcing these points is the attitude of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn to

⁵⁵² Ibn al-‘Adīm, vol. III, p. 96.

⁵⁵³ *ibid*, p. 96. In this passage, the Arabic word for ‘release’ is ‘naṣara’, which contrasts with the word ‘khalāṣa’ used in the earlier chronicle, *Mufarrij al-Kuḥub* by Ibn Wāṣil, which is the only difference between the two accounts. This may be because the second form of ‘naṣara’, i.e. ‘naṣṣara’, carries the meaning ‘to Christianise’, and Ibn al-‘Adīm may be suggesting that Renaud wanted to underline the falsehood of Islam, and an effective way of doing this would be to have the prophet of Islam himself tell them that the religion was false. This would, of course, have been abhorrent to his Islamic audience. Ibn Wāṣil, *Mufarrij al-kurūb fī akḥbār Banī Ayyūb*, ed. J. al-Shayyāl, 5 Vols, Cairo, 1953 – 1977.

Renaud, which is one of contempt. Ibn al-‘Adīm recounts the scene of Renaud’s taking the drink from the King of Jerusalem in Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s tent after they had lost of the Battle of Ḥaṭṭīn, and in this he is at pains to underline the contempt in which Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn holds Renaud.⁵⁵⁴ Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn does not speak to Renaud, even though it is believed he could speak Arabic⁵⁵⁵, instead speaking through the interpreter to the king, and he makes it clear that Renaud will not receive any hospitality from his captor. Ibn al-‘Adīm clearly states why this is – that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn reminded them that if Renaud had taken anything from his captor, he would have received protection from him. By doing this, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was underlining that Renaud could not expect anything from him, and the readership would know he was going to die. Furthermore, after Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn killed Renaud he was thrown out of the tent, demonstrating the contempt in which the crusader was held, and possibly also being a visual image of Renaud being thrown into hell.⁵⁵⁶

The appearance of Renaud in the chronicle is brief, and this brevity is reflected somewhat in the opinion of Ibn al-‘Adīm. His main point is that Renaud was an evil man, worthy only of the contempt that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn gives to him. This contempt seems to be the cause of Renaud’s brief appearance; he is not worthy of much attention. Thus, the image of Renaud which Ibn al-‘Adīm’s chronicle paints is the same as the other Arabic chronicles, but its methodology is different. While others, such as Ibn al-Athīr and ‘Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī pay him plenty of attention to highlight again and again how evil Renaud was, Ibn al-‘Adīm deliberately affords him little attention to underline his contemptibleness, worthy only of the short shrift afforded him by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn.

⁵⁵⁴ Ibn al-‘Adīm, Vol. III, pp. 95 – 96.

⁵⁵⁵ Peter of Blois, pp. 51 – 52.

⁵⁵⁶ Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, p. 345.

Conclusion:

The image which pervades the Arabic accounts of Renaud of Châtillon is both narrow and one-dimensional. He is presented almost exclusively as a man who was both evil and powerful. The reason for this seems to be twofold. Firstly, Renaud is the man who was believed to have attempted to attack the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina, a dreadful deed in Islamic thought and one which should have led to his death. Secondly, the image created of Renaud by ‘Imād al-Dīn and Bahā’ al-Dīn was created by their purpose in writing, which was to eulogise Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, and show how great a leader he was. Thus, the man who opposed such a great leader and who caused him such great problems – and Renaud certainly did that – had to be presented as an evil man, as well as a mighty opponent, and be difficult to defeat. Yet defeat him Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn did, a man who was by definition evil, as he fought against the champion of Islam. Ibn al-Athīr’s writings, and those of Ibn al-‘Adīm, were based to a large extent on these eulogies, and so the belief that Renaud was a strong, evil man was perpetuated. Thus, Renaud’s image is based on a carefully constructed propaganda campaign.

The Image of Renaud of Châtillon in John Kinnamos' 'The Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus':

The main issue which Kinnamos wishes to express to his audience, and, indeed, his whole purpose in writing, is the greatness of the emperor, and the power he wielded and deserved to wield – presumably because of his wish to ingratiate himself with the Emperor after losing favour at court.⁵⁵⁷ The way in which this is achieved is to stress the comparative weakness of those around him, both allies and enemies, and how their actions both cause and reinforce the power the emperor had. Renaud is no different from any others in this respect, whether he is seen as friend or enemy; everything revolves around this concept.

Renaud of Châtillon is not an important figure in John Kinnamos' chronicle, which reflects the relative insignificance afforded the crusaders by the Byzantines.⁵⁵⁸ However, he is given plenty of attention in one part of John Kinnamos' chronicle, where the writer gives an account of Renaud's invasion of Cyprus and the subsequent mission by the emperor Manuel Comnenus into Renaud's territory for retribution. The prince of Antioch is also referred to in several other places, yet only in passing.

John Kinnamos' theme of the deserved power which the emperor had is reflected in Renaud's relations with Manuel; there are several examples of the crusader submitting to the power of the emperor. The best example of this is in the description of the entrance of the emperor into Antioch in 1157/552. Kinnamos recounts that 'Reginald and the nobles of Antioch (were) running on foot around the imperial horse'⁵⁵⁹, while Baldwin III of Jerusalem

⁵⁵⁷ Introduction to John Kinnamos, pp. 1 – 11.

⁵⁵⁸ See S. Runciman, 'The Visit of King Amalric I to Constantinople in 1171', in *Outremer: Studies in the history of the Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem*, ed. B.Z. Kedar, H.E. Mayer, & R.C. Smail, Jerusalem, 1982, pp. 153 – 158, which demonstrates the lack of interest even in the King of Jerusalem among the Byzantines.

⁵⁵⁹ John Kinnamos, p. 143.

rode a considerable distance behind the emperor, leaving the whole watching city in no doubt as to where the real power lay. Renaud's subordination is underlined by the fact that in early 1160/55 Manuel Comnenus gathered together a large army from all his vassals to form a force against the Seljuq Turks in central and eastern Anatolia, and John Kinnamos' list of those leaders who were summoned to the emperor starts with Renaud.⁵⁶⁰ Even when Renaud was effectively estranged from Manuel after his attack on Cyprus, he still was aware of both the political and military situation; that he was subordinate to the emperor in the feudal structure and in military strength, which is why he put on a performance such as he did rather than run away or fight. Renaud is presented as very much aware of his position in the wider scheme of things.

As Renaud is clearly subordinate to his overlords – the Emperor and the King of Jerusalem – in the account, it could be expected that he would take steps to ingratiate himself with them. This, however, is not the case. Renaud seems to go out of his way to annoy his overlords, and John Kinnamos is not reticent about saying so. The most obvious example of this is the attack on Cyprus in 1156/551. The reason that John Kinnamos gives is that 'the emperor did not accord him (Renaud) what he wanted', i.e. money.⁵⁶¹ As a result of this, Renaud invaded Cyprus 'in piratical fashion'⁵⁶², carried from the island 'an abundance of wealth' and also captured the governor.⁵⁶³ It is clear that Renaud's actions are not those of a good vassal, and the inference which results is that Renaud was greedy, impatient, ungrateful and stupid. The lack of comment by John Kinnamos on this subject in no way diminishes the effect of this – indeed, it almost heightens it as the reader can easily see the situation without the necessity of the writer pointing it out. Not only did Renaud not please

⁵⁶⁰ John Kinnamos, p. 151.

⁵⁶¹ John Kinnamos, p. 136. William of Tyre does not dispute that Renaud wanted money, but gives an explanation to the tone which John Kinnamos gives, which is that Renaud was simply being greedy. WT, Vol. II, pp. 253 – 4.

⁵⁶² John Kinnamos, p. 136.

⁵⁶³ John Kinnamos, p. 137.

his lord in Constantinople, John Kinnamos also implies that his lord in Jerusalem was not happy with him either. He records how Baldwin III came to Antioch hoping to take possession of it, as Baldwin thought that the populace would welcome him 'as they had been rescued by himself'.⁵⁶⁴ The implication here is that Baldwin did not like Renaud enough and so wanted to take his territory away. The surest explanation for this would be that for some reason Baldwin himself considered Renaud to be a problematic vassal.

As well as this, Renaud is clearly identified as a bad leader for, and by, his own subjects, peasant and notable alike. John Kinnamos recounts that Renaud's capitulation to Manuel Comnenus' demands – that the city was to provide a large military force for the Byzantines, and that a Greek patriarch was to be installed in the city – was not popular among the general population of the town, as it meant that the town's prestige was badly damaged. However, Renaud's attack on Cyprus had put him into a position where he could not refuse the emperor's demands; his own rash actions led to a situation which upset his subjects and lost his city some of its prestige – not the actions of a great ruler. Instead, it was left to Baldwin III of Jerusalem to intercede on behalf of the populace, as Renaud had put himself in an impossible situation.⁵⁶⁵ It was also the upper reaches of Antiochene society, at least partly, whom John Kinnamos shows as being hostile to Renaud, and the disputes the Prince had with these people are also seen to be Renaud's own fault. This is demonstrated during the dispute Renaud has with the Latin patriarch of Antioch, before the arrival of Manuel Comnenus, although the scene starts even before the attack on Cyprus. John Kinnamos writes that Renaud wanted money, so asked the rich patriarch, who refused. This was the cause of Renaud stripping him, smearing him with honey and leaving him in the full sun in the middle of the city. Although the bishop then offered to give Renaud everything he had, it was clearly a ploy to get out of the situation in which he found himself,

⁵⁶⁴ John Kinnamos, p. 141.

⁵⁶⁵ John Kinnamos, pp. 139 – 142.

as later the Patriarch wrote to the emperor offering to betray Renaud to him if he wanted. The emperor refused, though, as 'he desired to win by war rather than by treachery'.⁵⁶⁶ It is a measure of the annoyance which Renaud had created in the bishop that he, a Latin priest, was prepared to hand over a co-religionist to the Greek orthodox emperor. It is clear from the chronicle that Renaud created a dangerous enemy when there was no need to have done, and someone who may have assisted him was made to forever despise the ruler. John Kinnamos is clear, therefore, that Renaud was not a good ruler, either to the general mass of the population or to individuals in high society. He seems to have paid no heed to the consequences of his actions, nor to how it would reflect on him as a leader. He was, therefore, a bad leader as well as problematic as a vassal.

The account of John Kinnamos makes it clear, therefore, that Renaud was unloved by the Antiochenes, and regarded as truculent by his lords. Yet despite the amount of opponents ranged against him, he was not removed from his position of power. This means, therefore, that Renaud is seen as a political survivor, and his methods of survival are laid bare in the chronicle. The clearest of these is the scene of Renaud's grovelling apology to Manuel Comnenus, one which is described in full embarrassing detail. The author recounts that Renaud:

'removed the covering from his head, bared his arms up to his elbows, and going unshod through the city with a multitude of monks, he appeared before the emperor. A rope bound his throat, a sword was borne in his other hand. A splendid dais was raised there; Renaud stood far off from the imperial tent, as if not daring to approach, while a crowd of monks who were not monks, unshod, with bared heads, approached the emperor; all bending the knee wept tears from their eyes and held out their hands. At first the emperor refused,

⁵⁶⁶ John Kinnamos, p. 139.

but later, being beseeched, he ordered the prince to advance. Moved by his coming in the said fashion, he (Manuel) forgave him his drunken offence'.⁵⁶⁷

The sense which comes through is that Renaud felt desperate. He would not have humiliated himself to so great an extent if he had not felt thus, and his performance was that of a man with his last chance. He seems to have used every trick he could think of in creating this image, yet even this only just succeeded, as it took some time to persuade the emperor to even see him. Having achieved this, though, it did not take long for Renaud to gain absolution. Thus, despite being seen as a bad vassal and leader, Renaud still survived for seven years as Prince, including this grave threat to his leadership, meaning that, perhaps accidentally, Renaud has the image in John Kinnamos' history as a political survivor, who did whatever he had to in order to stay in power.

There are, however, several problems with the story John Kinnamos tells. Firstly, he ignores the fact that Renaud wanted money from the emperor which he was owed before he attacked Cyprus, and the emperor's recalcitrance in giving this to him is precisely the reason why Renaud attacked. As every other source which mentions this event states that the emperor should have paid Renaud money as part of a deal between them to suppress a rebellion by the Armenian Thoros, John Kinnamos' omission must have been because it did not fit with his chosen presentation of the emperor. Secondly, the idea that Baldwin III wanted to take Renaud's seat is very unlikely as Antioch was part of the dowry of Renaud from his marriage to Constance – a marriage which Baldwin himself had blessed. Legally it would have been very difficult to do so and in reality almost impossible had he wanted to.

The image of Renaud in John Kinnamos is one which was created to glorify the emperor for the author's personal reasons, which is achieved by the undermining of the

⁵⁶⁷ John Kinnamos, p. 139.

crusader. This fits exactly with the purpose which the Greek author had for writing the history itself, which was to eulogise the emperors and by extension criticise their enemies among the Latins.⁵⁶⁸ Renaud is portrayed as a man who was not a good ruler, to the extent that even the ordinary citizens of Antioch could see that. The contrast of the clearly bad Renaud with the clearly good Manuel Comnenus implies that the Byzantine emperor would be a much better ruler of Antioch than the crusader. The historical precedent for this is that during the First Crusade, there had been an agreement that any land which the Byzantines had previously held, and that was captured by the crusaders, was to be given back to the Greeks.⁵⁶⁹ Antioch was part of this, but for certain reasons the Byzantines did not receive it; John Kinnamos implies that the city would have been much better if it was under Greek control, as the Byzantine emperor was such a good leader. Therefore, as with many other chronicles, the writer presents an image of Renaud which was caused by the authors own preconceptions about the circumstances of which he wrote.

The Image of Renaud of Châtillon in Niketas Choniates' 'O City of Byzantium':

There is little reference to Renaud in the chronicle of Niketas Choniates. Rather strangely, he does not mention the raid on Cyprus by Renaud, or any of his other behaviour which caused such consternation among the Greeks. Instead, there is but one mention of the Prince of Antioch himself, on the occasion of the visit of Emperor Manuel Comnenus to Antioch in 1159/554, when a tournament was arranged. The chronicler states how 'Prince Reginald came forth mounted on a horse whiter than snow, wearing a cloak slit down the middle and reaching to his feet and a cap like a sloping tiara, embroidered in gold. He was escorted by knights, all of whom were mighty warriors tall in stature'.⁵⁷⁰ Renaud is seen as

⁵⁶⁸ See above, p. 52.

⁵⁶⁹ J. Richard, *The Crusades: 1071 – 1291*, Cambridge, 1999, p. 47.

⁵⁷⁰ Niketas Choniates, p. 62.

someone who is rich and powerful, with expensive tastes. The reason for this is based around Choniates' purpose in writing, part of which was to highlight the inferiority of the Latins compared to the Greeks and their emperor, which in turn would be used to criticise them for their conquest of Constantinople in 1204/600.⁵⁷¹ The reason that Renaud is presented in such a fine way is to highlight the power and majesty of the Byzantine emperor – though the crusader was so rich and powerful, even he had to bow before the awesome sight of Manuel Comnenus. In addition to this, what is omitted from the text is almost more interesting than that which is included; particularly, that there is no mention of the attack on Cyprus, one of the most important events of the time, and no mention of Renaud's pleading for forgiveness. This is also part of Choniates' effort to show the strength of the emperor. Had he written of this, it could have undermined the emperor's power and standing in the chronicle, as he did not have the power to stop an attack on his own territory. By simply not mentioning it, Choniates sidestepped this difficult issue while still allowing the emperor to be presented as someone who was close to infallible in all he did. Thus, in Choniates' chronicle, Renaud is simply used as a character through whom the author presents his main arguments: that the Latins were not worthy of Constantinople, and that the Comnenoi emperors were great rulers.

The Image of Renaud of Châtillon in The Continuation of the Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa, by Gregory the Priest:

The appearance of Renaud in the work of Gregory the Priest is brief, because almost immediately after he is introduced into the narrative, he is captured by Majd al-Dīn. Despite the short period in which he is mentioned in the narrative, the presentation of Renaud in the text highlights some aspects of his personality from the chronicler's perspective.

⁵⁷¹ See above, pp. 52 - 3. It is also likely he wished to praise the emperor in order to safeguard his own position at court – see Harris, *Byzantium*, p. 113.

Firstly, he is undoubtedly a powerful ruler. He appears in the same breath as the king of Jerusalem, seeming to be the equal of the king.⁵⁷² He is also shown as a close ally of the Greek emperor⁵⁷³, and is presented as the chief power in northern Syria, at least on the Christian side.

As the chronicle continues there are a number of anecdotes presented which underline how the chronicler regarded Renaud, which together help to highlight the image of the lord of Antioch in the writing. Thus, in the years 1157-8/552-3, the king of Jerusalem and Renaud were faced with a very difficult situation militarily, caused by Nūr al-Dīn's belligerence, and they did not know what to do. So God caused an illness to fall on Nūr al-Dīn so he could threaten them no longer.⁵⁷⁴ What this episode shows is that Gregory believed that God was clearly on the side of Renaud, as He intervened to help His servant. The illness given to Nūr al-Dīn was a manifestation of divine displeasure, and the passage overall is really about the evilness of the Muslim leader, so anyone who opposed him, especially on the Christian side, as Renaud did, was on the side of God. Renaud is, therefore, being shown as the counterweight to someone else – the basis of his representation is as the antithesis of someone the author wished to discredit.

Another occasion on which Renaud appears in the chronicle is in the years 1155-6/550-1⁵⁷⁵, when he and the king of Jerusalem were bribed by Nūr al-Dīn in order that they would 'accede to his evil designs', meaning that they made a peace treaty with him.⁵⁷⁶ Thus the atabeg was able to go to the Christian city of 'Aynṭāb and capture it. 'Aynṭāb was part of the remnants of the county of Edessa and it seems that the criticism of the treaty, and of those who made it, was made because the agreement allowed Nūr al-Dīn to attack Gregory's

⁵⁷² Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 271.

⁵⁷³ Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 272 – 'the lord of Antioch, whom Manuel had appointed as his vicar'.

⁵⁷⁴ Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 270.

⁵⁷⁵ Although the date is after that of the event in the preceding paragraph, this is the order in the chronicle.

⁵⁷⁶ Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p.271.

co-religionists in this mostly Armenian city. However, the mood of this changes somewhat later when it becomes apparent that this was not in the minds of the Latin leaders when they made this treaty, as when they realised the consequences of the agreement they broke ‘the treaty of peace they had concluded with him and were invading and ravaging his territories’.⁵⁷⁷ The initial tone of this passage is that it was the fault of the King and Renaud that ‘Aynṭāb was attacked, because they had signed a peace treaty which allowed the atabeg to capture Edessan cities, even though they did not realise what Nūr al-Dīn was planning. This is quite critical, because if they had understood the full ramifications of the treaty, they would have realised that the treaty did not cover the remnants of the county of Edessa, and so Nūr al-Dīn was free to attack that territory. However, when they saw what was happening they immediately broke the peace treaty to prevent the same fate happening to other territories, which rehabilitates them somewhat in the account – they risk the wrath of Nūr al-Dīn to protect other Christian cities.

Following on from this, Gregory gives an account of the infamous attack on Cyprus in 1156/551, saying that the leaders Renaud and Toros, the Armenian prince, treated the inhabitants very badly, especially as they were supposed to be Christians.⁵⁷⁸ In the scene made famous by William of Tyre, both men are forced to apologise to the emperor, though unlike in the Latin chronicle, much more space is given to Toros than to Renaud in the Armenian account. There does not seem to be any great discord between the Latins and the Greeks, just the comment that ‘the king of Jerusalem came, together with the soldiers of Christ – the Templars – and the lord of Antioch...to apologise for the expedition against Cyprus’.⁵⁷⁹ It seems to be a collective apology on behalf of the Latins, who are quickly

⁵⁷⁷ Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 271.

⁵⁷⁸ Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 272: The two rulers ‘treated them (the inhabitants) as the infidels would, devastating their towns and villages, depriving them of their homes and possessions, and maltreating many of the Greek clergymen, whose noses and ears were cut off’.

⁵⁷⁹ Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 273.

forgiven. For Toros, however, much more is needed to persuade the emperor to forgive him, including ‘a large group of Christians (who) gathered before the Greek emperor, entreating him with strong pleas to mollify his anger towards Toros’.⁵⁸⁰ In simple terms, in the English translation four lines are devoted to the account of Renaud’s apology, while that of Toros takes twenty-six. The reason for the discrepancy between this account and that of William of Tyre is that as an Armenian, the fate of Toros was much more important to Gregory than that of Renaud, which was important to William of Tyre. Both men also wanted to prove a point. While, as will be seen later, the archbishop was not pleased with the behaviour of Renaud, Gregory’s comment is that ‘the Greeks harboured a deep hatred against the Armenians’⁵⁸¹, a comment which seems to be borne out by the behaviour of the Byzantine emperor, who easily forgave the Latin Renaud, yet had to be begged and pleaded with and bribed to forgive the Armenian Toros. There was, therefore, a political reason behind how Renaud is described – his treatment is used as the rod by which that of the Armenian could be measured, and it was found to be deeply unfair.

Following on from this incident, there is an account of the alliance of Christian forces, Latin, Greek, and Armenian - including Renaud - against Nūr al-Dīn in 1158-9/553-4. Their forces were ‘invincible’, and these men ‘conceived of an excellent plan’⁵⁸² – to engage the forces of the Muslims in battle and defeat them by overwhelming the enemy through their greater numbers. As Renaud was one of them, this seems faint praise in his direction. However, the expedition failed to get started, and the blame for this failure is put squarely at the feet of the Greeks, and especially their emperor.⁵⁸³ So here, again, the image of Renaud is thrown into relief by comparison with another. Gregory’s clear dislike of the Greeks in general leads him to show them as being the cause of the failure, while it was

⁵⁸⁰ Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 273.

⁵⁸¹ Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 273.

⁵⁸² Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 273.

⁵⁸³ Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, pp. 274-5.

good Christian soldiers like Renaud who had to deal with the consequences; Renaud is good, but only because he was being compared to the Byzantine emperor.

The final occasion on which Renaud appears in the chronicle is that of his capture. At this juncture, it is reported that he had with him a fairly large force, one thousand men, and during this raid they managed to capture many of the enemy. The force which the Muslim commander Majd al-Dīn had with him was ten thousand men ‘who had gathered together previously’, which makes it seem as if the fact that they were there was purely down to luck – or, in the more spiritual tone at least, God’s will – and therefore Renaud’s capture was as well. The report of the ambush is different from that of William of Tyre, who states that Renaud could have escaped but chose to fight because of his own greed.⁵⁸⁴ Gregory’s implication is that there was no chance of escape because they were ambushed, and that fighting was the only option. After Renaud was captured Majd al-Dīn took him to Aleppo where the Muslim heaped ‘all sorts of insults and profanities upon him’.⁵⁸⁵ This seems as though Renaud was the passive recipient of these, while Gregory shows both the barbarism of the Muslim and Renaud’s civility can be inferred through these actions. Blame, or even explanation, is not given here, just a statement of what happened from the author, which seems like passive acceptance of the situation. This may have been caused either because Gregory did not care as Renaud was not an Armenian or his master; or, as an Armenian, he was used to things going wrong, so had come to the point where he was not surprised any more. It may have been obvious to Gregory that it was God’s will for Renaud to be captured, but he does not speculate why, unlike William of Tyre or Peter of Blois.⁵⁸⁶

There are also in this source a number of accounts of Renaud doing potentially bad things, yet he is never criticised for it, especially the raid on Cyprus which is criticised

⁵⁸⁴ WT Vol. II, p. 284.

⁵⁸⁵ Continuation of Gregory the Priest, in Matthew of Edessa, p. 279.

⁵⁸⁶ WT Vol. II, p. 284 – ‘In punishment for his sins, the prince (Renaud) was forced to expiate in person all the crimes which he had committed’.

harshly by others. It is possible that his position as Prince of Antioch made it too difficult for Gregory to attack him for political reasons, but it is more likely that these incidents passed without comment from the Armenian because they were carried out against the Greeks, who Gregory regarded as being the enemies of the Armenians. Renaud's attack on Cyprus was carried out against the Greeks, enemies of the Armenians who were constantly trying to dominate them, while the attacks on Nūr al-Dīn's territory, even that in which he was captured, were good deeds as they were part of a strategy to defend the Armenians against the Muslims. Thus, these incidents do not receive the same criticism which William of Tyre or John Kinnamos assign to them.

The image of Renaud in the writing of Gregory the Priest is, broadly speaking, a positive one. However, this is tempered somewhat by the fact that these passages in which he is given faint praise are ones in which he is being compared to another, usually someone who has done harm to Gregory's fellow-Armenians. Nūr al-Dīn's evilness and the result of that is compared to the divine help Renaud receives, the terrible behaviour of the Greek emperor is compared to that of the other Christian leaders, including Renaud, and is found wanting, while the light treatment Renaud receives at the hands of the Byzantine emperor is contrasted with the much firmer line – with a hint of persecution – taken with the Armenian Thoros. Thus Renaud's main role in the chronicle is as a highlighter, enabling the author to make a judgement about somebody or something else by bringing it into sharp relief through Renaud.

Gregory's writings thus are not very different from those of any other chronicler, in the sense that his account reflects what was important to him. The image of Renaud is broadly a positive one, because the Latin was, generally, doing what Gregory wanted; defending the Armenians, or, at least, not causing them trouble. This was a two-pronged invective, against both the Muslims and the Greeks. Furthermore, Renaud is used almost as

a literary device, whose experiences throw into relief issues and problems which Gregory wants to highlight. Renaud is good because he helped Gregory both through his deeds and through being a pawn in the narrative.

The Image of Renaud of Châtillon in The Chronicle of Michael the Syrian:

The main aspect of Renaud's character which is established by Michael the Syrian is that he is very powerful, both as a ruler and as an individual, and has proved himself to be a strong military leader throughout his life. His attack on Cyprus is the first occasion on which he showed this on a large scale, as he managed to overrun the whole island, pillaging it all, and capturing much wealth before leaving for his territory with much booty. That this was carried out on an island in the possession of the Byzantines, a very powerful empire itself, which had a very powerful ruler at the time, shows Renaud's own strength.⁵⁸⁷ As well as this, he had previously defeated the Armenian general Thoros, with whom he had gone to war in order to secure fortified places for the Templars⁵⁸⁸, who had been the previous incumbents of these places before the Greeks had captured them. The victory of Renaud is painted as an easy one because of his strength, and Thoros had to surrender and had to give Renaud everything he wanted.⁵⁸⁹

While these events occurred relatively early in his career, he is still seen as being very powerful militarily later in his career. Almost immediately after his release from Aleppo, he took charge of a Frankish raiding party which destroyed a party of Şalāḥ al-Dīn's troops in the vicinity of Aleppo, after which the Franks invaded and pillaged the land around Damascus.⁵⁹⁰ Having done this, he then sent troops into Egypt, which forced Şalāḥ al-Dīn to retire from Aleppo. This attack was successful, and the Sultan did as the Franks wished and

⁵⁸⁷ Michael the Syrian, p. 315.

⁵⁸⁸ The 'Phrer'.

⁵⁸⁹ Michael the Syrian, p. 314.

⁵⁹⁰ Michael the Syrian, p. 366.

retired.⁵⁹¹ Thus, Renaud came out of prison and almost immediately defeated part of the army of the most powerful Muslim leader, and also forced the same leader into abandoning his political ambitions due to the threat Renaud posed to him. It could be inferred, therefore, that Michael the Syrian is showing Renaud as the most powerful military ruler in Syria at the time, as not even the great Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn could stop him.

To underline this fact even further, it seems that even in defeat the chronicler wanted to show Renaud as almost undefeatable. When writing of the capture of Renaud by the Turks in 1160/555, the chronicler states that Renaud went into Muslim territory with just one hundred and twenty cavalymen and five hundred infantrymen. These forces were then overwhelmed by the hugely superior numbers of the Turks, who captured him by an ambush, but not before Renaud had ‘accomplished great feats’ in the face of these overwhelming odds.⁵⁹²

However, it was not just in a military context that Renaud was powerful, but politically as well, and this is highlighted on two main occasions. Firstly, when the Byzantine emperor came to northern Syria in 1157/552, it was he, along with the king of Jerusalem, who made an accord with him. Here, Renaud is described as ‘king of Antioch’, thus lifting his prestige even further. Secondly, he and the king of Jerusalem also managed to reconcile the emperor with the Armenian Thoros, with whom he had been in a virtual state of war. Thus Renaud is seen as a powerful political figure as well as a powerful military one.

This is further implied elsewhere, the clearest example of which occurs when he is ransomed from Aleppo. The chronicle reports that Renaud was ransomed for one hundred

⁵⁹¹ Michael the Syrian, p. 366. The editor has pointed out that this may be referring to the raid into the Red Sea which occurred in 1183/578, although the year in which this attack is said to have occurred by the chronicler is 1487 in the Syriac calendar, which corresponds to the year 1176/571. Thus, while it may be a chronological mistake by the author, it may also be that there was another raid by Renaud into Egypt, in the year 1176/571. However, as the image is important here, it does not matter which of these options is correct.

⁵⁹² ‘il accomplit de grandes prouesses’. Michael the Syrian, p. 319.

and twenty thousand dinars – a princely sum – while others who were ransomed with him were made free for much less – the Count of Tripoli was ransomed for eighty thousand, and Joscelin, titular count of Edessa, was ransomed for just fifty thousand. The amount given to secure their respective freedoms shows clearly who was regarded as the most important, by both sides.⁵⁹³ Furthermore, the chronicler also suggests that some people had been trying to secure Renaud's release for a number of years, as he reports that 'many / times they had sent gold from Constantinople for the latter (Renaud), but he had given for ransom others who were delivered and freed'.⁵⁹⁴ Thus, Renaud is again seen as being one of the most powerful and important figures in Syrian politics at the time, and one who was not only tolerated but also needed by the inhabitants of the area and other rulers at the time.

As well as this, there are several other traits which present themselves in Michael the Syrian's account of Renaud. Firstly, he was an aggressive individual. This is shown most clearly on his first appearance in the chronicle, which occurs at the siege of Ascalon in 1153/548. While Renaud is not here given his full name, being referred to simply as a man 'nommé Renaud'⁵⁹⁵, it is certainly Renaud of Châtillon as this man was given Antioch after the siege, as Renaud of Châtillon was. He is introduced by being referred to as 'a warlike man'⁵⁹⁶, and his actions bear out this assessment – it was he who persuaded the king to continue the assault on the town when it seems like all was lost for the crusaders, and he was proved to be right in doing so, as the crusaders did not abandon the siege, but instead pressed on to eventual victory.⁵⁹⁷ This event underlines a second quality in Renaud which

⁵⁹³ Michael the Syrian, p. 365.

⁵⁹⁴ 'plusieurs fois on avait envoyé de l'or de Constantinople pour ce dernier (Renaud), mais il l'avait donné pour la rançon d'autres qu'il avait délivrés et libérés'. Michael the Syrian, pp. 365 – 366. If this is accurate, it would fill an existing gap which some have claimed exists because nobody wanted Renaud to be freed because he was a liability for the crusaders; see S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, Vol. II (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 357 – 8. It also makes sense that the gold was coming from Constantinople, as the emperor was Renaud's liege-lord, so honour-bound to protect him and try to ransom him if he could.

⁵⁹⁵ Michael the Syrian, p. 309.

⁵⁹⁶ 'un homme belliqueux', *ibid.* p. 309.

⁵⁹⁷ Michael the Syrian, p. 309.

Michael the Syrian shows that he had – his tactical ability. He was, it seems, the only crusader who could see a way out of the supposedly lost situation in the siege of Ascalon, and his tactical nous led to a famous victory for the crusaders. His actions here evidently impressed the king of Jerusalem so much that he gave Renaud the Principality of Antioch as his reward⁵⁹⁸ – a sure sign that the king trusted that Renaud could do the job well as a military ruler, which would use his tactical ability. Finally, Renaud is shown as fighting for all Christendom, not just himself or the crusader states. This is most clearly seen in the account of Renaud's attempts to wrest control of the forts of northern Syria from the Armenian Thoros and give them to the Templars. When describing this episode, the chronicler writes that the Franks wanted the forts to go to the Templars 'who worked for all the Christians'.⁵⁹⁹ The motive for this campaign against Thoros was not, therefore, a selfish action, as it could be regarded, but rather an attempt by a good Christian to help all of Christendom by helping those who worked for the good of all Christians – the Templars. Therefore, as well as his great power, Renaud was also someone who had the tactical ability to use it to good effect, the appropriate measure of belligerence to use it well, and the correct motives in the way he used it – he does seem to be a great ruler.

There are, however, a number of problems with the content of the chronicle which need to be examined. The most important of these is the account of an event which causes great consternation in other chronicles, but for which this chronicle is strangely silent – Renaud's attack on Cyprus. Michael does not shy away from giving an account of what happened, stating that Renaud attacked the Byzantine island and pillaged the whole of it, carrying off religious leaders to ransom them, as well as much movable booty.⁶⁰⁰ Yet there

⁵⁹⁸ Michael the Syrian, p. 310. Michael states that Antioch was given to Renaud, presumably as a reward, and that he married the heiress as a consequence of this; not that he became the Prince because he married the heiress as most other chronicles state.

⁵⁹⁹ 'qui travaillaient pour tous les Chrétiens'. Michael the Syrian, p. 314.

⁶⁰⁰ Michael the Syrian, p. 315.

is no opinion given on this event, shocking though it was; it is a sanitised version of the events, failing to record the accounts of rape and killing which are in other chronicles⁶⁰¹, and it fails to mention the initial reason for the attack. The reason for this is one of two options; either the chronicler did not want to criticise a leader he praises in the rest of his chronicle, or it is not part of his style. It is certainly true that it is part of his style – the annalistic form of the chronicle and any sort of opinion, good or bad, testify to that – but the lack of details and of a reason for the raid imply something further; that he did not want to criticise Renaud and so deliberately missed these two points out. The possibility exists that the chronicler simply did not know, but there were enough other chronicles and witnesses to the events to make that highly unlikely. It seems that Michael the Syrian did not want anything to get in the way of the image he was producing of Renaud. Another important occasion when there is a problem with the account is when the Byzantine emperor comes to North Syria.⁶⁰² Other chronicles all agree that it was in response to Renaud's raid on Cyprus, and that the emperor came to put Renaud in his place. In Michael the Syrian, however, there is no mention of this, only that the emperor came, and that he had been angry with Thoros – though not why. There is mention of an accord made between Renaud and the emperor, though there is no suggestion it was because of anything Renaud had done, especially so as the king of Jerusalem was part of the same accord, and he was not part of the attack on Cyprus. It seems that, having ignored the reasons for the attack on Cyprus, Michael had to ignore those for the emperor's visit to Syria. Again, the reasons behind it are shrouded as it does not fit with the image of Renaud he wanted to present.

The image of Renaud which is created in Michael the Syrian's chronicle is one which is full of praise for Renaud. This is for two main reasons. Firstly, as one of Michael's main preoccupations was the safety of Christendom, anyone who furthered that cause would have

⁶⁰¹ See, for example, WT. Vol. II, p. 254.

⁶⁰² Michael the Syrian, p. 316.

been praised. Renaud certainly did do that, as he helped capture Ascalon, and was able to defeat Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn on several occasions, triumphs which helped secure the position of the Christians in Syria. Furthermore, it may have been Michael's position which helped form the image. As he had been the patriarch of Antioch, and as Renaud had been the Prince of that city, it is likely that Michael would have had good knowledge of Renaud's activities around the city and approved of them, thus giving rise to the image in Michael's writings.

The Image of Renaud of Châtillon in the writing of William of Tyre:

William of Tyre was one of the most brilliant, perceptive, and thorough historians of the Middle Ages, described as 'one of the greatest medieval historians'⁶⁰³, and as such his chronicle was used by many other writers as the basis or starting point of their own history. Not only did he describe the events themselves, but he also expounded historiographical themes which ran through the narrative⁶⁰⁴ - unusual at the time - and which are elucidated by his intelligent analysis of the situations he described.

It has been demonstrated by scholars that there are two main themes which William underlines in the narrative. One is his explanation of how the crusader states fell from the height of their power in the 1140s/late 530s to the precarious state into which they had descended by the time he was writing, in the late 1170s - 80s/570s - 80s.⁶⁰⁵ William continued by warning of the dangers which would face the Latin East if they did not solve the problems they were facing, problems caused by succession struggles, factionalism, and a lack of support from Western Europe. While William wrote, these problems were

⁶⁰³ S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades*, vol. II, Cambridge, 1952, p. 477.

⁶⁰⁴ D.W.T.C. Vessey, 'William of Tyre and the Art of Historiography', in *Medieval Studies* 35, 1973, p. 453; Edbury & Rowe, pp. 61 - 166.

⁶⁰⁵ D.W.T.C. Vessey, 'William of Tyre and the Art of Historiography', pp. 435 & 453-5; Edbury & Rowe, pp. 151 - 166.

approaching their zenith, as Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was threatening the crusader states both from Syria and Egypt, and this united Muslim front was something which the crusaders had not previously faced – the scale of this threat had never materialised before. Shortly after William's death, it would overpower them.

The second theme running through the chronicle is the effect which the sins of the crusaders, and those Christians in Europe, had on the political, religious, and military situation in the Latin East.⁶⁰⁶ This effect was one of the main causes of the position into which the Latin East had been pulled; the sins of the Christians were punished by a loss of power for the crusader states. Throughout the chronicle, William of Tyre underlines the sins of various members of the Latin East – there are few crusaders who are not criticised at some point in the narrative – and how these sins affected the status of the crusader states.⁶⁰⁷

Despite this clear understanding of William's purpose in writing, modern historians have tended to overlook these themes when examining William of Tyre's view of Renaud, and concentrate instead on a different theory – that William was consumed by a hatred of him which clouds his judgement and causes him to be very caustic towards the crusader.⁶⁰⁸ This supposed revulsion is believed to have been caused by the two being on opposite sides of a factional dispute in the kingdom of Jerusalem, which began after the death of Baldwin IV, and intensified after the death of Baldwin V two years later and the opportunistic seizing of the throne by Guy of Lusignan and his wife Sibylla.⁶⁰⁹ This factionalism was caused by a disagreement firstly over who would be regent for Baldwin V, then who would be king when that infant king died. William supported the claim of Maria Comnena, while Renaud supported Agnes of Courtenay, and it was, in the end, Renaud's faction which won

⁶⁰⁶ Edbury and Rowe, pp. 155 – 166.

⁶⁰⁷ D.W.T.C. Vessey, 'William of Tyre and the Art of Historiography', p. 453; Edbury & Rowe, pp. 155 – 6.

⁶⁰⁸ See, for example, the entry by A.V. Murray, on William of Tyre in *Encyclopaedia of the Crusades*, ed. A.V. Murray, 4 Vols., Oxford, 2006, Vol. IV, pp. 1281 – 1282.

⁶⁰⁹ J. Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land*, Oxford, 1996, pp. 225 – 266, for the background and results of this.

through when Agnes' daughter Sibylla and her husband Guy of Lusignan were crowned rulers, although this did occur after William's death.

This view is, however, not tenable, from a logical perspective at the very least. The idea that a historian of such stature as William of Tyre, with his great historical mind and perspective, would be prepared to let his usual high standards slip to satisfy a personal grudge is unlikely. Instead, as this chapter will attempt to demonstrate, William of Tyre's account of Renaud is instead based on a sound judgement of his actions as far as they relate to and affect the main issues he was trying to demonstrate to his readership – the weakness of the crusader states and the effect sins had on them.

The Image of Renaud as Prince of Antioch:

Reading William's account of the years 1153–1160/548-555, it is understandable how historians could have perceived in the chronicle a clear hatred of Renaud on the part of the author. There are plenty of occasions on which there is explicit criticism of Renaud. William writes about Renaud's abuse of the Patriarch of Antioch, commenting that Renaud made the archbishop 'sit in the blazing sun throughout a summer's day, his bare head smeared with honey'.⁶¹⁰ William is very clear about how he views this behaviour, calling it 'diabolic daring', 'an abominable act', and 'mad conduct'⁶¹¹, especially, as he pointed out, because the deed was carried out against a man who was not only 'a helpless invalid', but also 'a successor of Peter, the chief of the apostles'.⁶¹² These last comments, which are asides in the text, are there simply to remind the reader of the spiritual position of the Patriarch, and therefore underline just how shocking Renaud's behaviour was.

⁶¹⁰ WT Vol. II, p. 235.

⁶¹¹ WT Vol. II, p. 235. The Latin phrase used here by William of Tyre for 'diabolic daring' was *ausu diabolico*. William of Tyre, *Chronicon* ed. R.B.C. Huygens, in *Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Medievalis* 63A, Turnhout, Brepols, p. 809.

⁶¹² WT Vol. II, p. 235.

Renaud's invasion of Cyprus in 1156/551 elicits much the same response from William, who writes that it was:

'a shameful deed. He sent forth his legions as against an enemy and laid violent hands on Cyprus, the neighbouring island which had always been useful and friendly to our realm and which had a large population of Christians'.⁶¹³

The political stupidity of the act is clear from this passage, as William emphasises the diplomatic problems it caused for the crusader states⁶¹⁴, and the account of how Renaud behaved once there shows how sinful he believed the attack was.⁶¹⁵ It is clear from the account that the problem which arose from Renaud's invasion of Cyprus was primarily a spiritual one, and throughout the chronicle the emphasis on sins and spirituality is underlined so much that a link between it and the problems the crusaders were to have is obvious. On this occasion, the final comment William makes is a quote from Ovid: 'Booty wickedly acquired brings no good results'⁶¹⁶, from which the readership infers that in the future they will see serious consequences because of Renaud's attack on Cyprus.⁶¹⁷

The final point at which historians have traditionally seen that William found fault with Renaud is for his attack on Muslim territory in 1160/555, which led to his capture and imprisonment in Aleppo for the next sixteen years. William is sure to let the reader know that the people whom Renaud attacked were fellow-Christians, as he repeats the point to underline it, and that they were poor, since they 'tilled the soil and devoted themselves to

⁶¹³ WT Vol. II, p. 253.

⁶¹⁴ WT Vol. II, p. 276.

⁶¹⁵ William writes that Renaud: 'completely overran the island without meeting any opposition, destroyed cities, and wrecked fortresses. He broke into monasteries of men and women alike and shamefully abused nuns and tender maidens. Although the precious vestments and the amount of gold carried off were great, yet the loss of these was regarded as nothing in comparison with the violence done to chastity'. WT, Vol. II, p. 254.

⁶¹⁶ WT. Vol. II, p. 254.

⁶¹⁷ There are consequences of this action, and these are seen later during the arrival of the Byzantine Emperor Manuel I Comnenus, when Renaud begs for forgiveness from the Emperor. To secure this, Renaud made an elaborate show of penitence, so much so that 'all were disgusted and the glory of the Latins was turned to shame'. The political significance of this is great, as it meant that the crusader states, and Antioch especially, had come under the sway of the Greeks, which, to the Latin archbishop William, would have been a tragedy. WT Vol. II, p. 277.

agriculture'.⁶¹⁸ The cries of indignation from William are clear, and the actions of Renaud becomes even more foolish after he captured the booty; when the Muslim troops start to attack Renaud,

'the wisest plan was to abandon the booty and hasten home unencumbered, which could easily have been done; but instead they preferred to keep the plunder and, if necessary, put up a vigorous fight'.⁶¹⁹

William leaves the reader in no doubt as to the sensible course of action, but Renaud did not take it. Instead, he had to deal with the consequence of his action by spending the next sixteen years as a prisoner in the citadel of Aleppo. William's final comment is that

'in punishment for his sins, the prince was forced to expiate in person all the crimes which he had committed. A captive, bound with the chains of the foe, he was led to Aleppo in most ignominious fashion, there to become, with his fellow captives, the sport of the infidels'.⁶²⁰

The chronicler's glee is clear for all to see – Renaud had, at last, received what he deserved.

It is easy to see why historians believe that William of Tyre's work heavily criticises Renaud, as these episodes do cast grave doubts on his motivations and beliefs, and therefore his suitability to have any position of power. What is not certain, however, is the assumption that William was specifically blaming Renaud as the architect of these actions – which is the inference of modern historians. This is because in all of the examples which have been mentioned, it is written that Renaud was persuaded into carrying them out by people who have his ear. These came to pass either by persuasion to act as he did by direct

⁶¹⁸ WT Vol. II, p. 284.

⁶¹⁹ WT Vol. II, p. 284.

⁶²⁰ WT Vol. II, p. 284.

suggestion, or by the reporting of others' actions to him which caused Renaud's own rash acts. Thus, when Renaud tortured the Latin Patriarch, the main cause for it was that 'the patriarch...often expressed himself very freely, both in public and in private, about Renaud and his doings, and...these remarks were reported to the prince by persons who sought to increase the hatred between the two'.⁶²¹ The attack on Cyprus was done 'on the advice of evil men, by whom he was too greatly influenced'⁶²², while an embarrassing show of repentance to the Byzantine emperor was performed after 'the prince began to ponder, now in his own mind, and again in consultation with intimate friends whom he summoned, as to his course of action and how he might satisfactorily atone to his imperial magnificence for so great an injury'.⁶²³ Finally, the raid into Muslim territory was carried out after he had been 'informed by his scouts...that there was a land full of flocks and herds...easily exposed to pillage'.⁶²⁴ On all these occasions, it was not Renaud but his advisors or 'friends' who are the people who were to blame for Renaud's actions, as it is from their suggestions that Renaud took his cue. Although the actions were Renaud's own and so he must share some of the blame, he seems more a man led astray by the machinations of others rather than an impulsive monster, as he has previously been regarded as being.⁶²⁵

It is to be admitted that there are some occasions when William's narrative does criticise Renaud explicitly. The most noteworthy of these comes at the time he was part of the force which besieged Shayzar in 1157/552. It was Renaud himself who, William claims,

⁶²¹ WT Vol. II, p. 235.

⁶²² WT Vol. II, p. 253.

⁶²³ WT Vol. II, p. 276.

⁶²⁴ WT Vol. II, p. 283.

⁶²⁵ This theme of 'friends' or advisors causing problems in the crusader states is not confined to William's image of Renaud. Instead, there are other people whom they influence as well, such as Baldwin III. After he had made a treaty with some Turkomans in the territory of Banyas, 'certain wicked men, sons of Belial, who had no fear of God before their eyes, approached the king and easily persuaded him to fall in with their evil schemes' – that they break the treaty without warning and attack the nomads. The king 'lent a ready ear to the wicked counsellors and acquiesced in their suggestion'; WT II, p. 255. It is interesting that, although both Renaud and Baldwin seem to be guilty of doing the same thing, historians have traditionally cast Renaud as the villain of the piece, while Baldwin is not seen in the same light.

was the reason why the Latin leaders became divided and so did not capture the site even though it had been on the verge of falling.⁶²⁶ The problem arose after all the nobles came to an agreement that the count-in-waiting, Thierry of Flanders, should do homage to the King of Jerusalem. Renaud, however, declared that homage should be done to him, as Shayzar was part of his inheritance. This caused deadlock, and the siege had to be abandoned. Technically, Renaud was correct in his assessment⁶²⁷, but the tone of the passage is that it was Renaud's fault. While there is no open criticism of him, and instead William claims that the dispute happened 'in punishment for our sins'⁶²⁸, and that after the deal that Thierry should do homage solely to the king, 'Prince Renaud alone raised difficulties'.⁶²⁹ While there is some mild ire towards Renaud in this passage, it is nothing when compared to how it could have been had William wished to appear openly hostile to the Prince of Antioch. Instead, William shows that it was the sins of the whole community which caused this problem – not even stating that it was those of Renaud – thereby underlining his main theme, that the sins of the Christians were causing havoc in the crusader states.

Even on the rare occasions when Renaud is explicitly criticised by William, the circumstances surrounding this criticism seem to be more aimed at others than Renaud himself. This is most obvious during the account of the marriage of Renaud to Constance of Antioch. By marrying the dowager princess, Renaud immediately became one of the most powerful individuals in the crusader kingdoms. It was the choice of the princess herself to marry Renaud, and to do so she had had to turn down 'many distinguished nobles' and as a result, 'many there were...who marvelled that a woman so eminent, so distinguished and powerful...should stoop to marry an ordinary knight'.⁶³⁰ William's opinion about Renaud

⁶²⁶ WT Vol. II, p. 268.

⁶²⁷ J. Phillips, *Defenders of the Holy Land*, Oxford, 1996, p. 280.

⁶²⁸ WT Vol. II, p. 268.

⁶²⁹ WT Vol. II, p. 268.

⁶³⁰ WT Vol. II, p. 224.

could not be more obvious. He was plucked from the massed ranks of the knightly classes by a woman's fancy, and was not worthy of the office to which he had been called. It was, however, the result of the choice of the Princess, not Renaud himself, and Renaud was surely only being criticised because William could not openly criticise Constance.⁶³¹

The belief that William tried to criticise Renaud is further undermined by the lack of consistency throughout the chronicle. Just before this marriage is mentioned, William recounts the episode of the successful siege of Ascalon by the forces of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1153/548. In it, he gives a list of the lay princes present at the victory, and alongside luminaries such as Hugh of Ibelin, Philip of Nablus and Gerard of Sidon, all of whom were very powerful figures, he notes the presence of Renaud of Châtillon. The name of this knight in a list of such influential figures in the Kingdom passes without comment, so it must be assumed that, contrary to William's later protestation, Renaud was indeed a powerful figure⁶³², and that his comments otherwise are a veiled criticism of Constance.

The belief of some historians⁶³³ that William possessed a personal hatred of Renaud, clear in this part of the chronicle, is erroneous. It is correct that his actions are criticised, but this is tempered by the fact that the criticisms are carried out in the wider historiographical trends in William's chronicle – alluded to above – and because the chronicler also underlines that Renaud was given bad advice by others. Consequently, the implication is that the much greater sins of these people contributed more to the plight of the crusader states than Renaud's actions in following their advice. Thus Renaud, far from being the cause of these problems, seems like a victim of the forces around him which he is incapable of controlling.

⁶³¹ Constance was the niece of Queen Melisende of Jerusalem, a woman who seems to have been extremely important to William of Tyre, for she was still held in high regard by the nobility at the time he was writing, some thirty years later, and she was also the main dynastic link between the heroic nobles of the First Crusade and the people of William's time (See Edbury & Rowe, pp. 80 – 3). He certainly is keen in the chronicle to praise her for her actions. It would have been difficult for him to criticise Constance's actions openly, while still being true to his ideas.

⁶³² J. Philips, *Defenders of the Holy Land*, Oxford, 1996, p. 126.

⁶³³ See A.V. Murray on William of Tyre in *Encyclopaedia of the Crusades*, ed. A.V. Murray, 4 Vols., Oxford, 2006, Vol. IV, pp. 1281 – 1282.

The Image of Renaud as Lord of Oultrejourdain:

The part of William's chronicle which deals with Renaud's life after he was released from the citadel of Aleppo and became lord of Oultrejourdain underlines even further that Renaud is not picked out for particular criticism by William. Renaud appears five times during this part of the chronicle, and there is little suggestion of any criticism, and far less any direct assault on Renaud.⁶³⁴ The first of these is during the time when Renaud is made regent of the kingdom. In a statement which is the complete opposite of that which may be expected, William writes that 'Renaud, formerly the prince of Antioch, (was made) regent of the realm and commander in chief of the army...Renaud was a man of proved loyalty and remarkable steadfastness'.⁶³⁵ This is a truly remarkable statement that the archbishop makes if his attitude to Renaud was hostile, as most historians believe. William reports that Renaud worked 'with great ardour' to secure the betrothal of his stepson Humphrey III to Isabelle, the half-sister of Baldwin IV, thus ensuring a favourable marriage for him, and the tone of the passage makes him seem a generous, well-meaning individual, and the fact that the King was agreeable to the proposal underlines that Renaud was certainly not regarded badly by the establishment in Jerusalem.⁶³⁶ Renaud also appears as one of a group of notables who went to Antioch with the patriarch of Jerusalem to attempt to find a remedy to the problems which had broken out in the city because of what William regarded as the evil of Prince Bohemond, who had taken a mistress. William regarded this as being an

⁶³⁴ This is more important when it is noted that there are only seven references in total to Renaud, and the other two comments simply state that Renaud was ransomed by his friend. WT Vol. II, p. 414, and that he was one of a number of lords who engaged in battle with Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, in 1177/572-3. WT Vol. II, p. 430.

⁶³⁵ WT Vol. II, p. 418.

⁶³⁶ WT Vol. II, pp. 451 – 2.

extremely important mission, and, although he is not mentioned again, the acknowledgement that Renaud was part of it does imply that he was a trustworthy, highly-respected individual.⁶³⁷ As well as this remark, in William's account of the deeds of Renaud the blame for the breaking of a truce in 1181/576 firmly placed on Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, and in a scene which is almost exactly the reverse of those found in Arabic chronicles, it is Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn who captures and imprisons Christian pilgrims.⁶³⁸ If William was as determined to denigrate Renaud in his chronicle as it has been believed, then it would have been a good opportunity to do so. Renaud is also mentioned as part of a crusader force which assembled to attack Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, and in this he is named simply as a baron of the realm. During the account of the battle, William wrote that 'contention arose among the nobles'; yet he does not blame Renaud – instead it is Guy of Lusignan, the count of Jaffa, who was explicitly blamed. If William had been trying to criticise Renaud he could have done so here, as Renaud was one of Guy's allies. Yet he does not, instead choosing to only criticise Guy.⁶³⁹ The final episode in the chronicle in which Renaud appears is during an attack by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's forces on Kerak, in the year 1183/578.⁶⁴⁰ In this episode, the defensive measures which Renaud undertook are condemned by the chronicler – they are described as 'rash', and that they led to the loss of all the possessions of all the surrounding villagers, who came into

⁶³⁷ WT Vol. II, pp. 454 – 7. William implies that the taking of a mistress by the Prince of Antioch had led to the atrophy of all clerical operations with the exception of baptism, and makes it clear that this risked the crusader states themselves, as God would abandon them and so they would be defeated by their enemies.

⁶³⁸ WT Vol. II, p. 467-8: 'a certain ship with fifteen hundred pilgrims on board, driven by adverse winds, was wrecked at Damietta in the kingdom of Egypt. However, the shipwrecked people felt confident that they would be saved, for it was known that Saladin had made a truce and temporary peace with the Christians, both on land and sea. But the law of fate that befell them was far different from that required by the law of treaties. For Saladin, overcome by his desire for spoils, was reluctant to allow so many Christians to depart freely from his land, as he was bound to do by the terms of the agreement. He accordingly threw them all into prison and ordered their goods to be confiscated for his own use. He then sent a messenger to the king and, in direct defiance of the terms of the treaty, made demands upon him with which it was practically impossible to comply. He added as an ultimatum that, unless all these demands were met in accordance with his wishes, he would retain the aforesaid ship as compensation for himself and would, moreover, abrogate the pact which had been concluded between them'

⁶³⁹ WT, Vol. II, p. 497.

⁶⁴⁰ WT Vol. II, pp. 499 – 500.

the castle, thus becoming ‘a burden rather than a help to the besieged’.⁶⁴¹ However, William’s thoughts on the matter as expressed here are, again, very interesting, as they still do not corroborate what the viewpoint of earlier historians has been. There is no denying that Renaud is criticised by William for how he handled the situation, but if the archbishop had been trying to demonise him, then this would have been a good opportunity for him to do so. The fact that he criticises Renaud’s action without condemning the crusader himself – in other words, he criticises the actions, not the man – demonstrates that he was not deliberately trying to denigrate Renaud; his actions, yes, but not the man himself.

The image of Renaud during his time as lord of Oultrejourdain is certainly not one of hostility. There is mild criticism of some of his deeds, but the majority of his comments show Renaud in a neutral or positive way. He is regarded as a powerful individual who is trustworthy, and who had the needs of the crusader states foremost in his mind – even though the methods he used may not have been appreciated by William.

Conclusion:

William of Tyre did not intend to show Renaud of Châtillon as an evil man who was out to ruin the crusader states so he could settle a personal score with the crusader. Although William underlines that Renaud’s actions before his imprisonment were sins, he also demonstrates that they were caused not by Renaud himself, but by the intention of others, and it is this fact which reflects the reason William was writing. William was commenting on the broader issues at play in the kingdom, in which Renaud was merely one player. The focus of William’s chronicle is what Renaud’s actions reveal about the conditions and relationships in the crusader states more widely. The way they are presented, however, does change between the two parts of the chronicle. During the period of Renaud

⁶⁴¹ WT Vol. II, p. 500.

as Prince of Antioch, his actions were clear examples of the sins which were destroying the crusader states. His assault on the patriarch revealed divisions in the Christian community which should not have existed, and his attack on Cyprus occurred because he did not receive payment from the Byzantine Emperor as quickly as he had wanted. As it was an attack on an island 'which had always been useful and friendly to our realm and which had a large population of Christians'⁶⁴², it was doubly damaging to the crusaders' cause, affecting their relations not only with the powerful Byzantine Emperor, but also with the native Christians they had supposedly come to help. It also showed that some of the crusaders, of which Renaud was a prime example, were motivated more by money than the Christian principles they were expected to follow and honour. Furthermore, the detail William goes into about the violence carried out by Renaud's troops, especially against the monasteries and nuns, gives added strength to his charges to the damage the attack caused spiritually.⁶⁴³ This continues throughout the narrative, with every foolish action of Renaud being shown as a divisive force which threatened the unity of the crusading enterprise, but blamed not on Renaud himself, but the machinations of others.

During his lordship of Oultrejourdain, Renaud's actions are presented in a different way. Instead of being one of the main reasons for the divisions in the crusader states, Renaud is instead a man who was working hard to heal divisions which had occurred. Thus, he is chosen as the representative of the nobility of Jerusalem during the visit of the bishop of Jerusalem to Antioch, which was undertaken as an attempt to reconcile the Prince of that city to the clergy, who had taken exception to his extra-marital activities.⁶⁴⁴ He worked hard

⁶⁴² WT Vol. II, p. 253.

⁶⁴³ 'He...completely overran the island without meeting any opposition, destroyed cities, and wrecked fortresses. He broke into monasteries of men and women alike and shamefully abused nuns and tender maidens. Although...the amount of gold and silver which he carried off were great, yet the loss of these was nothing in comparison with the violence done to chastity.' WT Vol. II, p. 254.

⁶⁴⁴ WT Vol. II, p. 456.

to ensure a good marriage for his step-son⁶⁴⁵, and, in the most striking comment, he is described as steadfast and loyal in his service of the kingdom of Jerusalem when he was made regent.⁶⁴⁶

Renaud, therefore, holds two places in the narrative of William of Tyre. During his time as Prince of Antioch, Renaud was one of a number of powerful individuals whose behaviour is a cause of concern for the chronicler. It is he – encouraged by others – who caused problems for the crusader states and their mission, and his imprisonment was a blessing for all involved. However, on his release, Renaud became that which William wanted to see – a man whose first priority was to protect and help the crusader states. Although Renaud's methods were not always agreeable to William, he still saw the good works Renaud performed. Far from being openly critical of Renaud, William recognised that Renaud's life had been redeemed – he had been saved from his selfish life to become a force for good in the crusader states – everything William wanted to see happening.

The Image of Renaud of Châtillon in the Lyons 'Eracles' text:

Although the title of this chronicle suggests it is a continuation of William of Tyre's general history, the main purpose of it is to be a narrative of the Third Crusade, as it focuses both on the events leading up to and the passage of that event. Thus, unlike William of Tyre's chronicle, it has a definite central focus, and is more like the many First Crusade narratives than the history it purports to continue. The image of Renaud in both chronicles reflects this difference. William of Tyre criticises Renaud's personality for the period when he was the Prince of Antioch, in terms that highlight the sway which others held over him and his inability to resist temptation, which caused the problems William is so keen to highlight. This Eracles text, however, blames him more in terms of his actions – Renaud is a

⁶⁴⁵ WT Vol. II, p. 452.

⁶⁴⁶ WT Vol. II, p. 418.

man whose actions are reprehensible, but he has chosen to carry them out, rather than being coerced into doing so by his associates. There is, of course, some crossover between the two, but generally speaking this is an accurate assessment.

The figure of Renaud appears only in three scenes in the chronicle, but they are three critical occasions in the narrative and in the history of the crusader states, and the decisions taken at these times prove to be crucial in their fate. The first of these is during the disagreement over who would be crowned ruler of Jerusalem after the death of Baldwin V, which was caused by, and which furthered, the factional strife which swept through the crusader states in the 1180s/580s.⁶⁴⁷ The argument here was centred around who would succeed Baldwin V, and the choice was between those who supported the rule of the regent, Raymond III of Tripoli, and those who supported the rights of Baldwin V's mother, Sibylla, and her husband, Guy of Lusignan. This strife was to continue after a conclusion had been reached, and the author makes it clear that this was strife which could have been avoided if the population generally, and especially those powerful men who supported Sibylla and Guy – of whom Renaud was an important individual – had kept their promises. The chronicler states: 'They had all forgotten the oath that they had sworn to the count of Tripoli (to support him), and because of this it went ill for them later'.⁶⁴⁸ It is obvious that this last point refers to the defeat at Ḥaṭṭīn, and it may be implying that the internal political situation caused by this division led to the crusader defeat, or it may be that there is a more spiritual cause for it – that this was a sin and that they were punished for it – or it could be both.⁶⁴⁹ Whichever is the case, Renaud was heavily involved in causing this. It was he, along

⁶⁴⁷ For analysis of this factional strife and its causes, see J. Phillips, *The Crusades*, London, 2002 p. 126; J. Richard, *The Crusades, 1071 – 1291*, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 199 – 205; P.W. Edbury, 'Propaganda and Faction in the Kingdom of Jerusalem: The Background to Hattin', in *Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth-Century Syria*, ed. M. Shatzmiller, Leiden, 1993, pp. 171 - 187; H.E. Mayer, *The Crusades*, tr. J. B. Gillingham, Oxford, 1972, pp. 128 – 130.

⁶⁴⁸ Continuation, p. 25

⁶⁴⁹ Later in the chronicle, during the account of the Battle of Ḥaṭṭīn, the chronicle states that it was the divisions between the Poitevins – the newcomers – and the 'Poleins' – second or third generation settlers –

with the patriarch and the Master of the Temple, who are reported to have deliberately ignored the oath he had taken to the Count of Tripoli⁶⁵⁰, an action which was ‘treacherous’.⁶⁵¹ It was Renaud himself who took Sibylla to be crowned and was instrumental in persuading the crowd to accept her.⁶⁵² The results of his treachery can be seen after the coronation, when he is presented as having become very powerful at the court.⁶⁵³ It can be observed that the author is interested in presenting Renaud not only as a man who has treacherously broken his oath and thereby caused strife within the kingdom; the last point implies why he did so. The position of power he gained from his actions demonstrates that the chronicler believes Renaud acted as he did because he put his own ambition before the good of the crusader states, the crusading ideal, and Christendom.

The second occasion in which Renaud appears is perhaps the most significant. It is the account of Renaud’s attack on a caravan early in 1187/583. The account in the chronicle is very brief, stating simply that Renaud heard that a caravan would ‘pass by the land of Kerak’, and so went and captured everything in it, including Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s sister.⁶⁵⁴ As a consequence, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn became angry and insisted to Guy of Lusignan, the king of Jerusalem, that he wanted everything returned. The king, however, was unable to make Renaud do this. The result was that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn soon afterwards launched a great attack on the crusader states, which would lead to the battle at Ḥaṭṭīn which would be the beginning of the end for the crusades, and which would lead to the loss of Jerusalem. The author clearly makes this link, stating ‘the pretext for the loss of the kingdom of Jerusalem was the

which caused the defeat. These lines of divisions were, generally speaking, the same as those who supported Guy and Sybilla or the Count of Tripoli. This implies that it was political, rather than spiritual, motivations which the author saw as the cause, although it could also be the case that it would be clear to everyone reading that this was a sin. See Continuation, pp 45 – 6.

⁶⁵⁰ Continuation, p. 25

⁶⁵¹ Continuation, p. 24

⁶⁵² Continuation, p. 25

⁶⁵³ Continuation, p. 28. Renaud appears as a figure who is second only to the royal couple in importance, being the man Guy uses as the man to whom he entrusts his important tasks.

⁶⁵⁴ Continuation, p. 29. It is not clear if the caravan was going to go through Renaud’s territory or not, as ‘by’ could imply ‘through’ or ‘near’.

seizure of this caravan that we have just described'.⁶⁵⁵ Although the chronicler admits it was only a pretext, and not the real reason for the Muslim response – which can be assumed to be Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's desire to bring Jerusalem back into the Islamic world – the implication is that if Renaud had not attacked the caravan, or had done as the king, his liege-lord, had ordered, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn would not have attacked and captured Jerusalem at that time. It is, therefore, entirely at the feet of Renaud that blame for the loss of Jerusalem falls in this chronicle. The chronicler's belief that it is Renaud's fault which is expressed here is repeated several times during the course of the chronicle, both to emphasise his guilt in this matter and to ensure the reader knew whose fault it was.⁶⁵⁶

Renaud's final appearance in the account is during the scenes of the Battle of Ḥaṭṭīn, and in the events immediately preceding it. He features heavily in the scene before the battle, when the nobles of the kingdom argue over what to do about Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's army, which was camped near Tiberias, being instrumental in persuading the king to confront them, rather than allow the Muslims to leave. Renaud's accusations to the count of Tripoli, in whose territory Tiberias lay, that he was duplicitous with the Muslims, forced the count to agree to move towards the Muslims, albeit reluctantly, while Renaud urged the king not to 'appear a fool in the eyes of the Saracens'.⁶⁵⁷ As the medieval European readership would know the outcome of the impending battle, the author seems to be apportioning blame to those who counselled fighting, especially Renaud, as he is the most vocal. Once the crusaders' army had got to Ḥaṭṭīn, the king was still not sure whether or not to fight, but once again it was Renaud who encouraged him to do so.⁶⁵⁸ So not only did Renaud advise

⁶⁵⁵ Continuation, p. 29.

⁶⁵⁶ Continuation, p. 31: Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn told his son 'to enter the Christians' territory and challenge them because of the caravan that Prince Reynald had seized'; Continuation, p. 33: 'It (a crusader defeat near Nazareth) had come about because of the caravan that Prince Reynald had taken in the land of Kerak, and it was the beginning of the loss of the kingdom'.

⁶⁵⁷ Continuation, p. 37.

⁶⁵⁸ Continuation, p. 46. 'When the king saw the torments that were afflicting his army, he called the master of the Temple and Prince Reynald and asked their advice. They counselled him to join battle with the Saracens'.

the king to move towards the Muslims, rather than avoiding a direct confrontation with the Muslims, he also persuaded the king to join battle with them, a battle which will lead to an ignominious defeat and the loss of Jerusalem – once again it is clear who the chronicler blames for this.

Having seemingly caused the battle single-handedly, Renaud appears for the last time in the chronicle in a famous scene in Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's tent after the crusaders have been defeated. The account here is at odds with that in the Arab chronicles, and these differences are extremely telling. There are two main parts of the narrative in which the account in this chronicle is the diametric opposite of that which is reported in the Arab sources. The first of these is in the report of Renaud's argument with Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn over the cup of iced water. It has already been noted that the Arabic sources all report that Renaud took the cup without permission, and that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn did not want him to drink. The *Eracles* text, however, reports something quite different. It says that the king offered Renaud the cup but

'Prince Renaud would not drink. When Saladin saw that he (the king) had handed the cup to Prince Renaud he was angered and said to him "Drink, for you will never drink again". The prince answered that if it pleased God he would never drink or eat anything of his'.⁶⁵⁹

The implication from the chronicle from this is that Renaud is stubborn and proud, refusing to take the proffered drink from his enemy even though he would have been in need of it.

Renaud's ultimate appearance in the account hits new heights of pride and obstinacy. Having refused the water, he is then asked by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn what the crusader would do if the tables were turned, and it was he who was Renaud's prisoner. Renaud answers 'So help me

⁶⁵⁹ Continuation, p. 48.

God, I would cut off your head'.⁶⁶⁰ Enraged, because of the arrogance of this reply, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn tells Renaud he is arrogant, and then kills him.

Renaud's attitude at his death could be regarded in one of a number of ways – either he was being very stupid, or he was resigned to his fate, or he was trying to be killed, thus gaining martyrdom for himself. Whether the chronicler was trying to criticise Renaud or not is not clear, but it is certain that he is not trying to praise his actions and hold him up as a shining example of a martyr, in such terms as Peter of Blois described Renaud in the *Passio Raginaldi*.⁶⁶¹ There are no words of praise, no reasons given for Renaud's behaviour, and so the account of Renaud's self-martyrdom in this chronicle must be seen as a way the previously destructive Renaud could have thought he could make amends for the damage he had done to Christendom. The response of the chronicler does make it seem that he regards Renaud as having carried out an act which is meaningless after the damage he had caused, although the fact that he did lose his life for the cause does engender some admiration, though only enough to produce no response from the writer. If the author had wanted to criticise Renaud, he would not have had any qualms about doing so.

The reason for this presentation was surely the relationship between the family of Ibelin, for whom the author of the original chronicle for this section, Ernoul, was a squire, and Renaud. It has been established that the family of Ibelin was on the other side of the factionalism in Jerusalem from Renaud⁶⁶², and their hope for power in the kingdom of Jerusalem had been dashed by the coronation of Guy and Sibylla as king and queen.⁶⁶³

⁶⁶⁰ Continuation, p. 48.

⁶⁶¹ Peter of Blois, *Passio Raginaldi*, ed. R.B.C.Huygens, in *Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis* Vol. 194, Turnhout, Brepols, 2002, pp. 31 – 73.

⁶⁶² M.R. Morgan, *The Chronicle of Ernoul and the Continuations of William of Tyre*, Oxford, 1973, p. 43. Also Continuation, p. 5.

⁶⁶³ The opposite side of the argument over this coronation is put forward by Roger of Howden, in both the *Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi*, ed. W. Stubbs, Rolls Series, 4 Vols, London, 1868 – 71, Vol. II, pp. 315 – 6, and *Chronica*, ed. W. Stubbs, Rolls Series, 2 Vols, London, 1867, Vol. I, pp. 358 – 9, who both suggest that the nobility had agreed to let Sybilla be queen, and to let her choose her husband, expecting her to choose Raymond of Tripoli, having previously divorced Guy of Lusignan. She, however, ignored their wishes and

Renaud's elevation had been at their expense, as it is certain that the Ibelins would have gained a position, had their candidate, the count of Tripoli, been crowned king as they believed he should have been. Thus, it is more than simply two opinions from differing sides of a fierce dispute. Instead, it is much more of a personal rivalry, and the bitterness that goes with it is reflected in the chronicle – Renaud has not only treacherously wrested power from the liege-lords of Ernoul, but his foolhardy decisions and actions lost the whole kingdom of Jerusalem.

The Image of Renaud of Châtillon in Peter of Blois' 'Passio Raginaldi':

The *Passio Raginaldi* of Peter of Blois is one of the most extraordinary pieces of literature to result from the crusading experience. No other crusader, with the possible exception of St. Louis in the thirteenth century, had such a powerful tract dedicated to him. The contrast between the presentation of Renaud in this piece and his presentation elsewhere serves to heighten the effect further. What follows is a summary of the main ways in which Renaud is presented by Peter of Blois.

The *Passio Raginaldi* had but one purpose - to encourage the notables of Europe out of their apathy about the plight of the crusader states caused by the defeat at Ḥaṭṭīn and the loss of Jerusalem. To achieve this, Peter used Renaud as the shining example of the perfect Christian warrior; how one should behave, how one should be, how one should meet one's death; and what one's reward would be. This view of Renaud is summed up by Peter's comments that the crusader was 'cogitans, vigiliis, ieiuniis, disciplines, orationibus et

instead declared that she would take as her husband Guy, against which the nobility could do nothing. Renaud has no role whatever in the marriage, although this could have been because Roger was one of Richard I's subjects, and so was on the side of the Guy faction in the kingdom, and he did not want to present anything that could damage their reputation. See J. Gillingham, 'Love, Marriage and Politics in the Twelfth Century', in *Richard Coeur de Lion: Kingship, Chivalry and War in the Twelfth Century*, London, 1994, p. 245.

elemosinis iugiter insistebat, et sicut differentios ceteris obtinebat milicie christiane titulos'.⁶⁶⁴ What more could a Christian soldier be than this - upright, disciplined, fighting for what is right? It was an example that all Christian soldiers should attempt to emulate. It was a challenge to those who would follow - who would, hopefully, recover Jerusalem - be like Renaud and you will be successful. The image Peter creates of Renaud is based around his desire to present the crusader as a model Christian, one who should be an inspiration to others.

Within this overall image of Renaud, there are a number of themes which combine to create the image. The most important of these is that Renaud's life was one full of love for Christ - Peter writes that 'pro Christi amore honesta possessionum paucitate contentus ea dumtaxat sibi retenuit'.⁶⁶⁵

However, love for Christ is shown by actions, not just by words⁶⁶⁶, and Peter highlights a number of ways in which Renaud's actions show a love of Christ. Right up until the end of his life, Renaud is shown as a caring Christian, as he tried to persuade his executioner that only belief in Christ can save him. Renaud knew that Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn is destined for the fires of Hell, and tried to help him avoid this.⁶⁶⁷ Not only was he obeying the commands of Christ to go to the ends of the earth to tell people about Him⁶⁶⁸, Renaud also showed a genuine concern for the welfare of his enemies, another Christ-like quality.⁶⁶⁹ Furthermore, Renaud is also shown to be willing others on at death, telling them not to be

⁶⁶⁴ Peter of Blois, p. 45.

⁶⁶⁵ Peter of Blois, p. 45. Riley-Smith has shown that Peter of Blois had already argued that crusading itself was one of the ultimate acts of love. J. Riley-Smith, 'Crusading as an Act of Love', in *History* 65, 1980, pp. 177 - 192.

⁶⁶⁶ Peter may have had in mind Chapter 2 of the Book of James, which links faith to deeds, clearly stating that a faith without deeds to back it up is dead.

⁶⁶⁷ Peter shows Renaud as saying: 'Christus...neminem deceptit, sed ille deceptus est, qui in eum non credit: ipsum adoro, ipsum confiteor, ipsius tibi nomen annuntio. Si in eum crederes, evadere posses supplicia dampnationis eterne, que tibi parata esse non dubites' ('Christ...deceives no-one, but he who does not believe in him is deceived: I adore him, I confess him, I proclaim his name to you. If you believe in him you can avoid the eternal punishment of hell, which is no doubt prepared for you'). Peter of Blois, p. 52

⁶⁶⁸ The Book of Matthew, Chapter 28.

⁶⁶⁹ Matthew Chp. 5, vv. 43-8.

afraid but to embrace death.⁶⁷⁰ His actions in doing this demonstrate how Renaud's thoughts for his fellow-prisoners were not based on earthly needs, but instead were looking after their spiritual needs, as by carrying on unto death would guarantee all the rewards Peter describes.

The result of this love for Christ is that Renaud received something very precious - help from Christ himself. Peter uses Hebrews 2 v. 18 to highlight this⁶⁷¹, demonstrating how Christ can help those who need help. He seems to be implying a two-way link between Renaud and Christ; Renaud loved Christ so wants to do His will, while Christ has the ability to help Renaud and does so because Renaud loved him. The relationship between Renaud and Christ in Peter's mind is neatly summed up by the comparison he makes of Renaud with the biblical Jonathan; he is Jonathan to Christ's David. This is a remarkable comparison, as the friendship between David and Jonathan has been regarded as one of the greatest in the Bible, and the example of how a true friendship should be; comparing Renaud's relationship to Christ with that of Jonathan to David is astonishing. It has also been pointed out that the Biblical Jonathan renounced material possessions, only keeping arms and that which is necessary for survival⁶⁷², thus presenting the way in which he had lived as a purely spiritual one.

However, Peter then goes even further than presenting Renaud as Christ's friend - he almost becomes a Christ figure himself. No doubt Peter was not attempting to present Renaud as Christ himself, but there are allusions to Renaud as defeating death much as Christ did, and the agents of death, the Muslims. The comparison between his death and Christ's are striking. Like Christ, Renaud's death was a blessing of sorts from God, as they

⁶⁷⁰ 'Confidite...fratres, regnum enim glorie nobis parata est' (Have confidence...brothers, for the kingdom of glory is prepared for us'). Peter of Blois, p. 54.

⁶⁷¹ 'In eo autem in quo passus est ipse et temptatus, auxiliator et eis qui temptantur'; Peter of Blois, p. 60.

⁶⁷² M. Markowski, 'Peter of Blois and the Conception of the Third Crusade', in *The Horns of Hattin*, ed. B. Z. Kedar, Jerusalem, 1992, p. 263.

both became martyrs, giving up their lives for a greater cause. Because only those who are worthy enough to receive this blessing are allowed to become martyrs, the deaths of both Christ and Renaud were 'blessings in disguise'.⁶⁷³ Their martyrdom underlines that they were worthy of that honour. Furthermore, because Renaud was a martyr, he received great things because of his death, and the manner in which he lived his life. He has gained 'possessio glorie, regnum celi, corona inmarcescibilis et pax vite', that which was started by Christ and is the aim of every Christian.

Finally, like Christ, Renaud was loved by others, his friends, who were very much moved by his end.⁶⁷⁴ However, in the same way as Christ's friends' sorrow turned to joy, so will that of Renaud's mourners.⁶⁷⁵ He, like Christ, will be resurrected after a period of time, as 'non mors, sed dormitio est'.⁶⁷⁶ The comparison between Renaud's death and that of Christ is one of the main methods by which Peter of Blois creates the image of Renaud. His death is like Christ's, therefore Renaud himself is like Christ.

The image of Renaud of Châtillon in the *Passio Raginaldi* is unequivocal. There is no room for anything but the highest praise for the martyr. It presents Renaud and the circumstances surrounding his death in intensely spiritual terms. The reason for this is that in order to try to persuade the rulers of Western Europe to leave the comfort and familiarity of their homelands, he had to appeal to the part of their life the importance of which could not be denied. This had to be the spiritual side. They had to be presented with the idea that, if they took the cross, they would benefit, whatever the outcome. If the crusade was

⁶⁷³ 'Venerant [Renaud and the others] ad locum martyrii', ('They went to the place of martyrs'). Peter of Blois, p. 63.

⁶⁷⁴ 'Mors principis multos excitavit ad lacrimas', ('The death of the Prince moved many to tears'). Peter of Blois, p. 61. Although in the Bible, the people watching Christ's death were not said to have been moved to tears, they did 'beat their breasts' with sorrow (Luke 23 v. 48), a clear allusion to grief.

⁶⁷⁵ 'Gaudeamus ergo, fratres, nam et ipse gaudet ac tripudiat, introductus in gaudium domini sui', Peter of Blois, p. 62.

⁶⁷⁶ Peter of Blois, p. 62.

successful, they would have delivered Jerusalem from the polluting influence of the Muslims; if they died in the attempt, as Renaud did, they would be a martyr, with all the blessed benefits that entailed, and which were described in his writings.

One important issue to resolve is why Peter of Blois chose to concentrate on Renaud as his picture of the perfection of Christian martyrdom. The answer is that, out of all the nobility of the crusader states who were captured after the Battle of Ḥaṭṭīn, Renaud was the only one who was killed. He was not the only one of the crusaders who were executed - thousands of Templars and Hospitallers were as well. But of the famous, important nobility of Jerusalem, it was Renaud alone who was executed. Raymond of Tripoli ran away from the battle, King Guy was captured but then released, as were others including Humphrey of Toron and Renaud of Sidon, so Renaud was the only one of them who was martyred at the time.

Conclusion:

The aims of this thesis were twofold: to study the image of 'the other' within chronicles of the crusading period, in order to open up new perspectives on the history and historiography of the Crusades; and to encourage the adoption of a new methodology within crusader studies, that of using Arabic sources and Latin sources in combination.⁶⁷⁷

Beginning with the latter point, it should be clear from the reading of the thesis that this methodology has great value. The employment of Arabic and Latin sources equally has brought out aspects of the personalities which have not previously been fully appreciated by crusade historians, such as the place of Il-Ghāzī's struggles against the crusaders within his wider battles against the Seljuks. Furthermore, it has also helped in assessing the sources themselves. There has been a tendency in the past for crusade historians to use Arabic sources only as reference points when they agree with the Latin sources they have been using. This thesis has helped to show that each Arabic source has its own preoccupations and *raison d'être*, and by understanding these it is possible to posit different explanations for how and why events came to pass. For example, the description of Renaud as particularly evil must be seen in the context of the great threat he posed to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, a threat no other crusader was in a position to pose, and that the Arabic writers wanted to portray Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn as being a great warrior for Islam, defending it against its enemies.

Moving to the former point, throughout the corpus of material utilised in this thesis, the individuals examined are reviled by the chroniclers from what is usually termed their religious opponents. These chroniclers, operating in a framework of what 'us' was, which had been developed before the First Crusade ever reached the Holy Land, used primarily religious imagery in order to underline this point. This religious imagery was used because it

⁶⁷⁷ - See above, pp. 12 – 3.

was a way in which all members of their own community would be able to understand the significance of what was being written. Thus, both Il-Ghāzī and Renaud of Châtillon are referred to as being devilish, or evil, at the very basic level to which the writers lowered themselves at times. Using terms such as these would ensure that all who heard their accounts, whether peasant or ruler, would have understood that these men were anathema. However, the bases of these images which are portrayed come not from religious sentiment, but instead from political or personal reasons. It has been demonstrated that both Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn and Richard the Lionheart were praised highly by writers from their religious opponents, who were able to appreciate them. Both Il-Ghāzī and Renaud, on the other hand, were not.

Instead, the presentation of Il-Ghāzī as evil is based mainly on Walter the Chancellor's witness of the torture of prisoners. While normal practice at the time, Walter, essentially an administrator, was in shock at what he saw, and his hyperbolic criticisms of Il-Ghāzī are based on this. As Walter's chronicle was one of the main sources for the period of the 1110s/500s and 1120s/510s, William of Tyre's presentation of Il-Ghāzī would have used that of Walter the Chancellor, and so the image of a particularly evil man was perpetuated. For the Eastern Christians writers, the image of Il-Ghāzī was also that of an evil man, as he subjected their co-religionists in his lands and attacked other lands.

But evil is not the only way in which Il-Ghāzī is presented – although it is the main view the chroniclers attempted to underline. He was also powerful politically – which is something that none could deny – and militarily. The writers had to accept his power in these areas, as it was the basis for his ability to carry out persecution and evil.

The same reason for why Il-Ghāzī was demonised in the Latin sources also applies for why Renaud is demonised in the Arab sources – it was because of the personal preoccupations of the authors. It is established that for the period of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn's reign, all

later chroniclers, including Ibn al-Athīr and Ibn al-‘Adīm, relied on the very harsh testimony of Bahā’ al-Dīn and ‘Imād al-Dīn – hardly the most neutral of commentators. They, in turn, were extremely critical of Renaud because of how great a threat he was to their master, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, while they also highlighted Renaud’s strength in order to show how strong Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn was too. His attacks on caravans and into the Red Sea are highlighted as evil in order to demonstrate the need the Islamic world had for a strong leader like Salāḥ al-Dīn at the time, and his arrogance is presented as another reason why he had to be confronted by Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, as it seems, from the chronicles, that there was nothing that Renaud would not considering doing. Thus, Renaud’s image in the Arabic sources comes from the desire of Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn’s inner circle to praise their own leader of the time, and to make all who opposed him evil, both inside and outside the Islamic community.

Yet the Arab writers were almost equally caustic about Il-Ghāzī, though for much more individualistic reasons. Ibn al-‘Adīm, who was worked for the Zengids, the family who took over much of the lands Il-Ghāzī had ruled, openly criticises him, presumably because he had to justify the Zengid takeover. For Ibn al-Qalānsī and Ibn al-Athīr, on the other hand, Il-Ghāzī is more a figure of ambiguity. While he was portrayed as a sometime champion of the *jihād*, fighting against the crusaders in his last few years, something which was very important to the writers, he also had many vices – not the least of which was his drinking – and as such, he was does, overall, appear negatively. In the case of Ibn al-Athīr, the negative view of Il-Ghāzī must be caused, at least in part, by his being, like Ibn al-‘Adīm, in the service of the Zengids, while those from the – much later – non-Zengid historiographical traditions did not change the bias against Il-Ghāzī of the pro-Zengid historians. Ibn al-Azraq, on the other hand, was in the employ of Arṭuqids, and so took every opportunity he could to praise Il-Ghāzī as a great leader. Thus, when comparing the image of Il-Ghāzī across time and religious divide – when compared to the Christian view of him – very few

differences appear. While they all had their own reasons for presented Il-Ghāzī in a negative light, the negativity itself was remarkably consistent. Only Ibn al-Azraq, the author of the history of the Arṭuqids, presents him in a positive light. This, though, I would suggest, comes from the fact that the power of the Arṭuqid dynasty was severely restricted not long after Il-Ghāzī's death, and so, following this, the power of the Arṭuqids to create propaganda for themselves, against others, diminished. Political power dictated the sources we have for the period, and thus Zengid political strength must be taken into account when examining sources for the history of Il-Ghāzī and northern Syria during this period.

In the same way as the Arab writers, each of the Latin chroniclers had their own way of viewing Renaud, caused by their own concerns in writing. The continuators of William of Tyre based their image of Renaud on the testimony of one man whose family was very hostile to Renaud, and so regarded him as an 'other', politically at least. Peter of Blois used Renaud as an 'us'; a true Christian knight, in order to forward his own opinions over the condition of the crusader states. William of Tyre, on the other hand, seems to have been much more ambiguous, and his hostility towards Renaud while he was Prince of Antioch – being an 'other' because of his actions, was replaced by praise of his actions in Jerusalem after his imprisonment in Aleppo. In the same way as Il-Ghāzī, Renaud's image is fairly consistent across the Christian-Muslim divide, though not because the writers had the same preoccupations. Instead, their own political ideas coincided coincidentally, with the result that Renaud has been regarded as a troublemaker by crusade historians who have not taken into account the political considerations of the chroniclers. However, given the evidence presented about William of Tyre's image of Renaud, I hope that this thesis will prove that he has been harshly treated and is in need of much more study.

The comparison of sources from their own religious communities, compared with those from the other side of the divide, highlights some interesting points. Firstly, it cannot

be assumed that just because the chronicler and the figure they wrote about shared the same religious rite, does not mean that they can be yoked together as an 'us'. Instead – as can be most clearly seen in Ibn al-'Adīm's account of Il-Ghāzī and the *Eracles* text on Renaud, both of which heavily criticise their subject – new ideas of 'us' and the 'other' are created, a dividing line caused by political disagreements within the religious community. A second, and related, point is that the writers from across the religious divide sometimes agreed with each other because they despised an individual. This means that through their writings they created a new 'us', one whose focus is based on mutual loathing for someone.

When comparing these ideas to how the Greeks wrote, it seems that the image of Renaud came about for much the same reason. The two Greek writers, Niketas Choniates and John Kinnamos, both had individual reasons for writing as they did – Choniates wanted to highlight the power and majesty of his emperor, so presented Renaud as a hugely powerful ruler, yet one who still had to bow to the emperor, so awesome was the Greek ruler; while Kinnamos, too, tried to praise the emperor, albeit by showing Renaud as evil and hopeless as ruler of Antioch, as town which would have been much happier under the rule of the Byzantine emperor. Instead of viewing themselves as an 'us' with the Latin Renaud, they instead saw him as part of an 'other', because of the religio-political disputes of the time, and so painted an image of Renaud which was solely based on their desire to highlight the greatness of their 'us'.

The assumption that this thesis began with was that during the Crusades, the idea of the evil 'other' was based merely along religious grounds. However, this is too simplistic. A religious divide certainly could, and indeed was, used by chroniclers to underline a position of despising someone from the other side of that divide. But there was a much deeper divide in the politics which could blur the ideas of what defined 'us' and what defined 'the other'. What this thesis has shown is that the whole idea of what an evil 'other' is in the crusading

period is extremely complicated and is not based on religious boundaries. Instead, by basing their writings on their own preoccupations, the chroniclers would build new, fluid, inter-religious constructions of identity, constructions which could change within a short space in the chronicles. The images of Renaud of Châtillon and Il-Ghāzī are thus based not on objective analysis, but upon being building blocks on which the ideas of the writers are both constructed, and upon which they depend.

Glossary:

ghāzī - A Muslim warrior, usually associated with fighting in the jihād

jihād - Literally meaning ‘struggle’, but more commonly applied to the Muslims’ physical struggle against non-Muslims.

muqṭa‘ - Someone who was given the right to tax an area in exchange for military service.

qāḍī - A religious judge.

shihna - Military governor of a town.

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