

**Narcissism, Personality and Personality Pathology**

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## Declaration

I, Thomas Kubarych, declare that this PhD thesis is my own work

Signature.

Date 6 August 1999



For my family.

## Acknowledgements

I could not have produced this thesis without the love and support of my family.

I thank my supervisors, Ian Deary, Mick Power and Martin Kusch, for making this thesis possible. Ian Deary deserves special mention as the finest supervisor any Ph.D. candidate ever had.

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As Carl Jung said, "Ultimate truth, if there be such a thing, demands the concert of many voices". Research is a collective activity. This thesis would not have been possible without the work of many who came before. I am especially grateful to the researchers who gave permission for the use of the instruments used in this thesis, which were the result of long and hard work, and to the 524 people who gave their time and effort as subjects in the two empirical studies reported. I thank the many researchers who I consulted in producing this work, especially Elizabeth Austin.

## Abstract

This thesis used the methods of differential, cognitive and theoretical psychology to investigate the relationships between pathological narcissism and maladaptive personality and behaviour in general, and to attempt the beginnings of construct validation of M. Scott Peck's proposed 'evil' subtype of the DSM-IV Narcissistic Personality Disorder in particular. After a review of theoretical and empirical contributions to the psychology of narcissism, two empirical studies were conducted. In the first, joint self-report survey research using 338 subjects investigated the psychometric structure of narcissism, normal and abnormal personality, and constructs theoretically related to narcissism. Item-level exploratory principal components analysis and confirmatory factor analysis resulted in new subscales for the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. Scale-level exploratory principal components analysis of the combined questionnaires found evidence for a five-factor structure of abnormal personality. One of the five factors was related to narcissistic will to power and low agreeableness; another was related to narcissistic self-love and extraversion. Confirmatory factor analysis of a subset of the data found fair fit for the model.

The second study investigated the relationships between narcissism, compartmentalisation, splitting, attribution style and response to disconfirming feedback. No evidence was found to support the hypothesis that narcissists have compartmentalised self-concepts. Moderate test-retest and alternate-form reliability data were obtained for the card-sort task used to assess compartmentalisation. No evidence was found that narcissists use splitting to translocate unwanted self-aspects onto others. Narcissistic dominance was associated with claiming personal credit for positive outcomes, while narcissistic vulnerability was associated with self-blame for negative events. Multiple regression with interaction terms indicated that the relationship between narcissism and response to disconfirming feedback is a function of other personality traits such as neuroticism, and may have opposite effects in different personalities and circumstances. Zero-order correlations suggested significant roles for splitting, narcissistic grandiosity and idealisation, and 12 NEO-PI-R facet-level variables in response to disconfirming feedback.

Peck's proposed subtype of narcissistic personality disorder is theoretically distinguished from psychopathy by the use of self-deception to defend the conscience against guilt for the consequences of one's actions, rather than the absence of conscience that characterises psychopathy. Self-deception is among the most difficult and controversial topics in philosophical psychology. Theoretical chapters approached the issue with historical and literary examples, argued that splitting may be a fundamental basis of much self-deception, offered a model of malignant narcissism within the Schematic Propositional Associative Analogue Representation Systems (SPAARS) theory, and addressed the issue in the philosophy of science of whether the proposed personality disorder is a natural or social kind.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction

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A comprehensive account of narcissism is beyond the knowledge and skill of any one person (Kohut, 1971). When a topic is that complex, the more one knows about it, the harder it is to define (James, 1982/1902). Definitions such as “self-absorption” (Peck, 1983) are ambiguous because the term “self” has at least seven different definitions in psychology (Westen, 1990). Psychoanalytic definitions such as “libidinal cathexis of the self” (Kernberg, 1975) multiply the problem by adding more terms with multiple definitions. Kernberg (1989b), for example, has redefined “libido” as “the hierarchically supraordinate integration of positive affective investments of self and objects”. Wittgenstein’s (1922) advice - to look at how a key term is used, and how it acquired its meanings - is the best antidote for this ambiguity.

### *The Myth*

In most versions of the myth (Bulfinch, 1959; Graves, 1990), Narcissus was so handsome, talented and spoiled by his mother that he believed himself to be one of the gods. He was admired for his gifts, but his arrogance and coldness won him enemies. He proudly rejected lovers of both sexes. For such a person, self-knowledge would be so guilt producing that the seer Teiresias foretold that Narcissus would live to a ripe old age, provided that he never knew himself.

The nymph Echo’s constant talking and need to always have the last word incurred the wrath of the goddess Hera (in Greek; Roman name Juno), who decreed that henceforth

Echo would only be able to repeat what others said. One day Echo saw Narcissus in the forest and immediately fell in love with him. She offered herself to him, but Narcissus said that he would rather die than lie with her. Devastated, Echo ran away into the woods to hide her blushes, living from then on in caves and among cliffs. Pining away from grief, she faded until only her voice was left, still replying to those who call, and having the last word.

When Artemis heard the pleas of Narcissus's heartlessly rejected lovers, she decreed that he would fall in love, but be denied love's consummation. Narcissus fell in love with his own reflection in a pond. He repeatedly tried to embrace his reflection, but each time it fragmented. His grief was unbearable, and yet he rejoiced in the knowledge that whatever happened, his love would remain true to him, being himself. Eventually, Narcissus committed suicide (Graves, 1990) or pined away and died (Bulfinch, 1959), while Echo, not forgiving yet still grieving with him, repeated his final words. Nymphs later found a flower growing on the spot where Narcissus' dead body had lain.

### *Narcissism and Love*

In the above versions of the myth there are two protagonists, both of whom end up completely incapable of giving or receiving love, and therefore in an important sense completely and perhaps permanently alone. The myth is usually interpreted (Jorstad, 1995) as a warning that there may be two paths ultimately leading to this unhappy fate: either by being, like Narcissus, completely self-absorbed, or, like Echo, completely

dependent on others for any sense of self whatsoever, with no true self of one's own which can give or receive love.

One thread running through the psychological literature (Wink, 1991; Masterton, 1993) is an intellectual descendent of this interpretation. Some psychologists argue for two kinds of narcissism - sometimes called "overt" and "covert" (e.g. Wink, 1991), or "exhibitionistic" and "closet" (e.g. Masterton, 1993) - which, although in their outward manifestations could scarcely be more distinct, can still profitably be seen as two sides of the same coin: pathological self-love. On this view, the inability to love oneself in a healthy and appropriate fashion ultimately leads, through one path or the other, to the inability to love anyone. A variant of this view (Wink, 1991) holds that both conditions can and do coexist within the same person: that at least some narcissists are like the Roman god Janus, having two faces, one facing outwards of grandiosity and arrogance, but another facing inwards of inferiority. Fear of their inadequacy being exposed constantly fuels their outward self-inflation. Empirical support for this view is provided by Wink's (1991) principal components analysis of six MMPI narcissism scales, which found two orthogonal components. One was associated with extraversion, aggression, and self-assurance, the other with introversion, anxiety and defensiveness. Both were associated with conceit, self-indulgence, and disregard of others.

### *Narcissism and Power*

In other versions of the myth (Graves, 1990), Narcissus is called "Antheus", a surname of Dionysus, the God of 'sex, drugs and rock' and roll whom Nietzsche (1973c/1872)

identified as the source of his Will to Power, and Carl Jung (1908) went so far as to identify with Christ. Nietzsche (1973a/1886) proposed that all psychology be viewed as the morphology and development of the Will to Power:

All psychology has hitherto remained anchored to moral prejudices and timidities: it has not ventured into the depths. To conceive it as morphology and *the development-theory of the will to power*, as I conceive it, has never yet so much as entered the mind of anyone else: in so far as it is permissible to see in what has hitherto been written a symptom of what has hitherto been kept silent.

Granted finally that one succeeded in explaining our entire instinctual life as the development and ramification of one basic form of will - as will to power, as is *my* theory -; granted that one could trace all organic functions back to this will to power and could also find in it the solution to the problem of procreation and nourishment - they are *one* problem - one would have acquired the right to define *all* efficient force unequivocally as: *will to power*. The world seen from within, the world described and defined according to its "intelligible character" - it would be "will to power" and nothing else.

Power is surely *not* the *only* important human motive, but it is certainly one very important motive, and, for better or worse, modern psychology has been profoundly influenced by Nietzsche. Another thread running through the psychological literature (e.g. Fromm, 1965; Kohut, 1986) traces virtually all human initiative, creativity and goodness to healthy narcissism, and virtually all psychopathology to unhealthy narcissism. In contrast to the view that there are two kinds of narcissism, both pathological, and the central issue is love, on this view we will never be able to count how many kinds of narcissism there are; they are not all pathological, or even avoidable; "will to power" is ontologically prior to good and evil; even the pathological kinds are not all pathological in the same way or to the same extent; and the central issue is power. Between two and uncountable one can find arguments for three (O'Brien, 1987), four (Bursten, 1973), and five (Baker and Baker, 1987) types of narcissism.



### *Sex, Development, Relationships and Self-Esteem*

Many psychologists have complained that the term “narcissism” is overused (Westen, 1990; Pulver, 1970; Kernberg, 1975; Neumann, 1949). Havelock Ellis and Paul Näcke usually share the credit for introducing the term into psychology in 1898 and 1899, partly to describe patients who treated their own bodies as sexual objects (Strachey, in Freud, 1986). Others were soon applying the term to other sexual phenomena such as homosexuality (Millon, 1981). Freud (1986/1914) considered it a component in all perversions. Today, these uses of the term to mean a sexual phenomenon are rare, but in the early psychological literature they are the dominant uses of the term (Pulver, 1970).

“Primary narcissism” (Freud, 1986/1914) is a phrase often used to describe the early developmental phases of life, before there is any distinction between self and other, or subject and object. A new-born baby experiences the world as part of itself. When a caretaker does not immediately respond to an infant’s needs, from the infant’s perspective, it is as if its own body was refusing to obey it. This belief that others have no independent existence and that one is entitled to control others is normal for an infant. It is not normal or healthy in an adult; in fact, the temptation to subsume psychopathology under narcissism (e.g. Fromm, 1965) arises in part from the observation that an insane person can be described as being in the same state as an infant, approached, so to speak, from the opposite side: in psychosis, one loses touch with reality. Whereas for the infant the outside world does not yet exist, for the psychotic it no longer exists (Fromm, 1965). Others such as Neumann (1954) objected to this use, but applied the

term to other developmental phases where there is an increase in self-focus. Neumann (1954) applies the term to adolescence. The term has also been used with respect to interpersonal relationships, and as a synonym for self-esteem (Pulver, 1970).

Thus, when psychologists use the term “narcissism”, they could be talking about love, power, sex, phases of development, psychopathology, interpersonal relationships or self-esteem, and in specific or general terms. Many have complained that, if we want the term to mean anything at all, we have to stop using it, a la Humpty Dumpty, to mean anything we like. This complaint seems to conflict with either psychology’s claim to be a science, or the notion that science is parsimonious (McBurney, 1994). The most parsimonious theory of all the above psychological phenomena is that they are all simply different ways in which a linguistic subject can take itself as the object. Physicists would love to develop a unified field theory that can account for all forces in nature as manifestations of one force. If psychologists object that it is too confusing to call things that seem different by the same name so that they can be explained in the most parsimonious way possible, is this not just more proof that psychology is merely pretending to be a science?

This “complaint about the complaint” is not beyond criticism. The more general a theory becomes, the less it applies in specific instances. Following Heidegger (1927), many have disputed the validity of the subject – object distinction. A related issue is that other people have written about narcissism and called it something else. Among famous psychologists cited in this vein are Jean Piaget (Weston, 1990), Karen Horney (Akhar,

1989) and Alfred Adler (Ansbacher, 1985; Akhar, 1989). Seen from the perspective of relationships between subject and object, Jung's Psychological Types, cited by Costa and McCrae (1992) as a "landmark book that offered a way to integrate the insights of depth psychology with the psychometric methods of differential psychology", might have been called "Narcissistic Types". Jung himself (1961) said that the book "was an effort to deal with the relationship of the individual to the world, to people and things". Volume 10 of Jung's collected works, Civilisation in Transition, is a collection of essays on the relationships between the individual and society. Concepts in Analytical Psychology, such as inflation, one-sidedness (Jung, 1961) and centroverson (Neumann, 1954) are arguably different names for what has often been called "narcissism".

The upshot is that narcissism *has to do with* the relationships between the part and the whole, the self and other, subject and object, organism and environment - and that these relationships inevitably raise issues of love and power. Empirical research on narcissism remains, as does much of psychology, in what Thomas Kuhn (1970) called the "pre-paradigm" phase: there are no widely accepted agreements about basic issues, such as definitions, the range phenomena to be explained, the acceptable explanations for those phenomena, or methods and tools of investigation. As Kuhn said, when a field of study is in this phase, data collection is nearly random, restricted to whatever is easily accessible and tends to produce a morass of facts that all seem equally relevant and can only by courtesy be called "scientific". We should not expect to get very far in the empirical study of narcissism without drawing boundaries, however temporary and revocable. To make matters worse, if Dostoevsky (1994/1864) is right in asserting that

the human will is the one thing science can never possibly hope to classify, narcissism is one puzzle that will never be completely solved:

“His own will, free and unfettered; his own untutored whims; his own fancies, sometimes amounting almost to a madness - here we have that superadded interest of interests which enters into no classification, which forever consigns systems and theories to the devil. ...what man most needs is an independent will - no matter what the cost of such independence of volition, nor what it may lead to. Yet the devil only knows what mans will ----”

### *Narcissism and Human Evil*

Clearly there are many forms of narcissism. One must be very careful not to equate narcissism with evil or maladaptive behaviour. It has, however, been widely held that certain aspects of *pathological* narcissism (under whatever name) play a central role in human evil and destructiveness, at both the individual and collective levels. All of Western Ethics has arguably been nothing but an attempt to develop tools to help us compensate for our inevitable and natural narcissism. From the Ten Commandments, which reflect the minimum requirements for community, through Socratic dialogs, in which objective truth is sought by having each side argue its position as strongly as possible, through Kant's categorical imperative, these things are a quest for an omnipotent, omniscient judge or judging point, from which moral questions can be decided from a vantage point which takes into consideration how a decision affects all concerned parties, not simply from our own points of view.

In literature, individual villains are invariably portrayed as profoundly self-serving characters, unconcerned if others are hurt or great destruction wrought so long as they get what they want, and evil in general is brought about by runaway one-sidedness and

excess (von Franz, 1974). The world's religions, both east and west, are full of exhortations against the illusions of self-centredness - illusions blamed for all that is unendurable and hinders progress. Christianity regards pride as the primary sin (Lewis, 1997); Confucianism and Taoism in China provide the complementary functions of first (Confucianism) forcing the developing individual to fit into the social order and later (Taoism) restoring and developing the inevitable loss of spontaneity (Watts, 1957); and Buddhist enlightenment concerns insight into the true nature of the self being more than just one's own ego (Suzuki, 1964; Watts, 1957; Graham, 1963; Kadowaki, 1980), as do Hinduism, Brahmanism, Tantrism and Yoga (Eliade, 1958). While this does not mean that all religion is the same, they have all had to address the complex questions of relationships between the part and the whole.

The modern social and behavioural sciences seem to be pointing to the same conclusions. Erich Fromm was the first to propose a psychiatric classification for an evil individual (Fromm, 1965) and wrote extensively on the role of group narcissism in nationalism, hatred, destructiveness and war (Fromm, 1965; Fromm, 1973); to illustrate his point, Fromm went on to insist that although Hitler, Stalin and Himmler had very different overt personalities, all were classic examples of a particular kind of narcissist (Fromm, 1973). Otto Kernberg (1989a) insists that virtually all patients with Antisocial Personality Disorder exhibit a Narcissistic Personality Disorder plus deterioration of their object relations and moralities, and that the prognosis for antisocial behaviour is favourable in a non-narcissistic personality and becomes progressively pessimistic in direct proportion to the degree of pathological narcissism. Kernberg proposes a dimension of destructive

behaviour linking the narcissistic and antisocial personalities, with an intermediate syndrome he calls “malignant narcissism” characterised by such endearing personality traits as paranoia, pathological lying and sadism.

The psychiatrist Michael Stone (1989) used the biographies of notorious British and American murderers to compare various examples of Kernberg’s malignant narcissism and construct a scale of evil personalities, adding that he believes it is important to acknowledge what we are dealing with here as “evil”. The central characteristics of this pathological narcissism - self-centredness and self-absorption, immense pride (not in the healthy sense of satisfaction in a job well done, but in the sense of having an unduly inflated opinion of oneself that must be defended at all costs, which is what Christians mean when they call pride first among sins), pathological lying, lack of empathy, sadism, envy - are conspicuously prominent in the personality of the classic psychopath (Harpur et al, 1995) and mythologically associated with the devil.

Group narcissism has been blamed for genocide, war and other forms of social conflict (Fromm, 1965, 1973; Peck, 1983). Organisational psychologists have pointed to narcissistic currents within organisations as having highly undesirable tendencies, and urged that highly narcissistic individuals be excluded from positions of authority (Symington, 1993). Studies of SS mass murderers have concluded that all of the perpetrators, from early adulthood on, had suffered from severe personality disorders, with a predominance of narcissistic, antisocial and paranoid disorders - all of which, according to some theorists (e.g. Bursten, 1973), are narcissistic disorders - but that they

only committed their worst crimes with the facilitation of the [extremely group-narcissistic] SS environment (Kernberg, 1989). As with religion, literature and philosophy, there seems to be impressive agreement that evil has something to do with the relationships between the part and the whole. Since those relationships can be extremely complex, it is not surprising that there are disagreements about exactly which kinds of relationships are healthy or pathological and to what extent, but there is little doubt that it has something to do with what is here called narcissism.

### *M. Scott Peck on Evil*

There have been a number of calls for serious scientific study of the problem of evil (e.g. Baumeister, 1996; Goldberg, 1995; Sui, 1995; Klose, 1995; Peck, 1983). The 1983 call by Peck included a highly sophisticated analysis, along with several specific proposals for empirical study: biochemical, medical and genetic research on the relationship between evil and schizophrenia (p.128), research on interracial and intercultural differences in non-verbal behaviour (which possibly are related to the likelihood of atrocities being committed in war, p.245), anthropological research on possession and exorcism (p.200), research into the “early warning radar” mechanism that seems to cause people to experience revulsion in the presence of evil (p.65), research on the relationship between individual and group evil, historical research on atrocities (their frequencies in different wars or under different circumstances, failures to report atrocities, whether or not atrocities are equal at all points of a war, whether or not certain instances are unique, when and where they are more likely, etc., p.237), and inclusion in the DSM (p.129) of an evil variant of the narcissistic personality disorder:



...the time is right, I believe, for psychiatry to recognize a distinct new type of personality to encompass those I have named evil. In addition to the abrogation of responsibility that characterizes all personality disorders, this one would specifically be distinguished by:

- (a) consistent destructive, scapegoating behavior, which may be quite subtle.
- (b) excessive, albeit usually covert, intolerance to criticism and other forms of narcissistic injury.
- (c) pronounced concern with a public image and self-image of respectability, contributing to a stability of lifestyle but also to pretentiousness and denial of hateful feelings or vengeful motives.
- (d) intellectual deviousness, with an increased likelihood of a mildly schizophrenic like disturbance of thinking at times of stress.

The suggestion for anthropological (and physiological) research on possession is part of a highly controversial (e.g. Klose, 1995) chapter on demon possession. Peck also insists that the only legitimate reason for the research he proposes is to heal evil wherever we can and, where we cannot, to study it further in the hope that it might be healed in specific instances in the future (p.44). This emphasis on healing leads him to say that any legitimate psychology or science of evil must be a psychology of religion, not in the sense of rigidly adhering to the doctrines of a particular faith or denomination, but in the sense that it cannot be value free.

A criticism of Peck's account of evil (Klose, 1995) has been:

- its stated principal thesis (p.10) is that if we really want to do something about human evil, we are going to have to study it not just philosophically and abstractly but scientifically: "not merely Rorschachs but the most advanced biochemical procedures and sophisticated statistical analyses of hereditary patterns";
- it presents an analysis in terms of narcissism, laziness, scapegoating, lying, and self-deception which is amenable to empirical study; and



- by including demon possession and religion, the author causes his sophisticated analysis to be ignored by the scientific community, which is largely hostile to religion.

One book review, for example, complained that the chapter on demon possession is not clearly related to the rest of the book, but then said virtually nothing about the entire rest of the book (Klose, 1995). More seriously, other book reviewers have inaccurately said that demon possession fits into Peck's scheme as the extreme point on a continuum along which people move from good to evil (Klose, 1995). Serious scholarly discussion of the work has been restricted to religious journals.

Objections to the inclusion of religion and other controversial subjects in Peck's account of evil must be addressed concurrently with other issues and potential objections (foreseen and addressed by Peck):

- that research on evil violates the value-free status of science;
- warnings that scientific study of evil that is not based on a system of values is extremely dangerous; and
- the issue of naming.

The value-free status of science has been seriously challenged. Peck (1983) argues that, in an age where the majority of scientific research is funded by governments and special interest groups, value-free science is untenable, and that the end result of value-free science is the 'Strangelovian lunacy of the arms race'. Much stronger arguments against

the value free status of science are currently articulated by a number of authors in the “strong programme” in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (e.g., Barnes, Bloor and Henry, 1996). Historically, Nietzsche’s (1973a) much misunderstood and maligned perspectivism, that value-free scrutiny of the world is impossible, was another strong counter-position to the claim of value-free science.

If science cannot be value free, the best we can do is to be explicit about what our values are. Perhaps the most serious charge against Sigmund Freud is that he was not a healer. Freud disliked being a physician, and placed a higher value on the advancement of scientific knowledge and precise theoretical formulations (particularly psychoanalysis) than on healing (Wolf, in Siegel, 1996). Evil is a value judgement, as is the judgement that healing must have priority over knowledge. If advancement of knowledge or special interests is given more value than healing, the study of evil will do great harm. At the same time, the only hope of healing evil is to study evil, which requires giving it a name. Naming something correctly can give power over it. Naming identifies. We will not heal a disease that we do not even acknowledge with a name. Even when we do not currently have an effective treatment for a disease, it is of great value to know its name (Peck, 1983). According to Brewin and Power (1997), all psychological therapies deal with the problem of meaning. According to Peck (1983), it is in the struggle with evil that life has its meaning. Studying evil may provide us with the insights into meaning that are essential to psychological therapies. We should not, however, apply the name “evil” without serious forethought. People of the Lie (Peck, 1983), opens with a chapter “Handle With Care”, which opens with the sentence “THIS IS A DANGEROUS BOOK”

(capitals in original). The Jungian analyst M.L. von Franz emphasises that there are certain behaviours that tend to invite evil. One of these is “*Frevel*” or infantile daring (von Franz, 1975, p.173ff).

One can easily make a *prima facie* case for a connection between pathological narcissism and evil or destructive behaviour. If one is extremely self-centred, does that not imply that everyone and everything else is far less important than the self is? That in turn seems to make it far too easy to justify doing whatever one wishes, regardless of the consequences for others, especially for the kind of narcissist characterised by the belief that what he/she wants is more important than considerations of right or wrong, true or false. As Fromm (1973) illustrates in his discussion of Hitler, when one is extremely self-absorbed, one’s perception of other people can become so distorted that others do not seem real in the same sense that the oneself is real- in which case what does it matter what happens to them? That the central characteristics of pathological narcissism are mythologically associated with the devil does not mean that narcissists are demonically possessed, but is not this what has been called “evil” throughout human history and across cultures?

The morass of facts that all seem equally relevant which has resulted from lengthy pre-paradigm phase study of evil all indicate that evil has something to do with pathological narcissism. As Kuhn says, the only way we can move beyond the pre-paradigm stage and obtained detailed knowledge about specific cases is to address the problem scientifically. If the sciences are going to study human evil, narcissism provides a logical

construct with which to start. Such an endeavour does require recognition of the fact that science is not and cannot be value free. The position taken in this thesis is that there is an intimate connection between pathological narcissism and human evil, that science inevitably must adopt values, and that future science, especially psychology and medicine, must value healing more than the advancement of science or theoretical formulation. In the words of an anonymous medieval mystic (Johnston, 1973):

“I charge you with love’s authority, if you do give this book to someone else, warn them (as I warn you) to take the time to read it thoroughly. For it is very possible that certain chapters do not stand by themselves but require the explanation given in other chapters to complete their meaning. I fear lest a person read only some parts and quickly fall into error. To avoid a blunder like this, I beg you and anyone else reading this book, for love’s sake, to do as I ask.”

- The Cloud of Unknowing

### *Malignant Narcissism and Militant Ignorance*

Malignant narcissism is the result of an unsubmitted will (Peck, 1983). All moral people subordinate their personal desires to something more universal and important than any isolated individual’s desire. When there is a conflict between what is right and what they want, moral people do what is right; when there is a conflict between the truth and what they want to believe, moral people accept the truth. For the malignant narcissist, it is the other way around: they do what they want, regardless of what is right or wrong; if there is a conflict between their fantasies and reality, it is reality that must give. As in Douglas Adams’ (1980) The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy, “The guide is authoritative. Reality is frequently in error”.

Now, among malignant narcissists, those comprising the specific variant of narcissistic personality disorder Peck proposes as “evil” (public lecture, circa 1992) are characterised by “militant ignorance.” If merely doing evil things made a person evil, all people would be evil; there would be no point in proposing a separate diagnostic category for the evil among us. What distinguishes people with evil character structures is being so unwilling to tolerate the discomfort of honest self- evaluation and criticism that, faced with a threat of narcissistic injury - in the form of evidence that what they want to be true about themselves or their group might not be true, or that their ideology might not be true - they try to exterminate the evidence. This leads to the pervasive pattern of destructiveness, scapegoating, self-deception, other-deception, denial, bizarre thinking patterns (particularly under stress) and excessive concern with issues such as power, image and status mentioned earlier. A parallel account is offered to explain group evil, but is not the focus of this thesis.

This view of evil draws support from thousands of years of moral teaching, across cultures. The emphasis on deception, both self- and other- deception, connects with an extremely long tradition in philosophy, literature and theology that, directly or indirectly, evil usually (perhaps always?) involves lies. The co-emphasis on destructiveness conforms with the view that evil is “live spelled backwards” (Peck, 1983) - evil is that which destroys life, not only physical life, but spiritual and emotional life as well. It is compatible, for example, with Kant’s analysis of the human will (Kant, 1934/1796), which concluded that the difference between good and evil people lies in the order of

subordination of their wills: is it to the moral law or personal incentive? The evil person subordinates the demands of the moral law to his or her desire.

One interesting consequence of this definition is that it distinguishes an “evil” personality from the psychopath, who on this view remains outside of evil (Klose, 1995). It is based on the view that we hold as morally responsible only those who accept morality (Fingarette, 1967). Psychopathy - the notion of an individual who theoretically has no conscience and accepts no morality - is fundamentally the absence of morality (Fingarette, 1967; Klose, 1995). Evil is rather a perversion of morality; evil comes about in the effort to escape responsibility and guilt, not in the absence of it. Since it is painful self-examination that is being avoided at all costs, the deception involved must extend to self-deception. This leads to another criticism of Peck’s account: self-deception is one of the most difficult and controversial problems in philosophical psychology. Can one really deceive oneself? The distinction between Peck’s evil personality and psychopathy would seem to hinge on the answer to this question.

It is not necessary to accept that psychopathy is outside evil in order to accept that there is a useful distinction between the personality disorder proposed by Peck and psychopathy. Nietzsche (1973b/1887) devotes a third of Genealogy of Morals to distinctions between “bad” and “evil” and between different kinds of evil. Ricoeur (1967) proposes a morphology of evil tracing four different conceptions of evil to different mythological accounts of the origin of evil:

1. In myths such as the Babylonian creation epic *Enuma Elish*, evil is identified with original state of chaos that is heroically overcome in the establishment of order that constitutes creation.
2. In myths such as the Judeo-Christian Adamic myth, evil results from an irrational event in an already completed creation. The separation of the problems of creation and evil leads to a transition to a new “type”, in which evil is no longer identical with chaos.
3. Intermediate between the above, Greek tragedy traced evil to a god or gods who tempt mortals and lead them astray. The solution can only come from understood necessity.
4. Myths of the exiled soul, such as Plato’s *Phaedo*, establish a sharp cleavage between the body and soul, and try to solve the problem of evil by concentrating on the destiny of the soul.

On this view, there is a valuable distinction between the kind of evil that is identified with primordial chaos - the psychopath, who rejects the order offered by the morality of society, and the kind of evil associated with myths of The Fall. An overall hypothesis of this thesis is that individual differences in tolerance for the anxiety and discomfort that comes with honest self-evaluation and criticism are as real as the individual differences in other personality traits, and therefore there is a useful distinction to be drawn between Peck’s “evil personality disorder” and psychopathy. This thesis will also argue that the

concepts of splitting and dissociation go a long way toward addressing the theoretical difficulties involved in self-deception (Power and Dalglish, 1997).

In sum, it seems that evil generally involves pathological narcissism (and that good involves healthy narcissism). Presumably, if we wish to have detailed knowledge about specific instances of either or both, we will have to apply the scientific method. Using science to study evil would require giving up the notion of value-free science. One way or the other, narcissism is currently an active area of research in psychology. We will need names for the subtypes of narcissism we identify. We need not choose the name “evil” for any subtype; if we do, we have abandoned value-free science. After reviewing the research literature on narcissism, this thesis will investigate the psychometric structure of narcissism with a view towards contributing to efforts to determine how many kinds of narcissism exist. The psychometric approach will only be able to take us so far. A further step would be to identify and measure the cognitive mechanisms associated with narcissism. Candidate cognitive mechanisms for investigation will be sought during the literature review and pursued thereafter. Many of these cognitive mechanisms will involve complex theoretical issues, such as self-deception, that are currently the focus of much research. These theoretical issues will be addressed through historical and literary examples.



## Chapter 2: A Review of Theoretical and Empirical Contributions to the Psychology of Narcissism

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In 1899, the German psychiatrist Paul Näcke used the term “Narcismus” for the perversion of treating one’s own body as a sexual object. Although Näcke was an obscure figure in the psychiatry of his day, his paper interested and was cited by Sigmund Freud (1986/1914), who credited Näcke with introducing the term into psychology. Later, Freud stated that this was an error, and that Havelock Ellis had introduced the term into psychology. Ellis himself then corrected Freud’s correction, explaining that he had used the term “narcissus-like” in 1898 to describe both “autoeroticism” - sexual gratification without stimulation by another person - and a generalised expression of self-admiration, and suggested that the credit should be shared between himself and Näcke (Freud, 1914, in Morrison, 1986). The term was soon extended to a variety of sexual phenomena, including homosexuality (Millon, 1981), sadism, masochism and exhibitionism (Pulver, 1986, p.93). Today, these uses of the term are rare (Pulver, 1986; Millon, 1981). The present chapter reviews subsequent theoretical and empirical contributions to the psychology of narcissism.

### Theoretical Contributions

Most of the theorising on narcissism within psychology has come from psychoanalysis. According to Pulver (1986, p.93) the term “narcissism” was first used in the psychoanalytic literature in 1908 by J. Sadger, who was also the first (1910) to use the term to refer to a normal stage of development. The first psychoanalytic paper devoted specifically to Narcissism was Otto Rank’s 1911 essay “*Ein Beitrag zum Narzissmus*”. In this paper, Rank also became the first to connect Narcissism in non-overtly sexual ways with vanity and self-admiration. Sigmund Freud first used the term in 1910 to refer to a

normal phase of development midway between autoeroticism and object love, in which sensations fuse into the experience of the body (Pulver, 1986, p.93).

Freud's only major work devoted exclusively to narcissism was the 1914 essay "*On Narcissism- an introduction*" (Freud, 1986/1914). Here Freud introduced the distinction between primary narcissism - the state where an infant has not yet distinguished between self and other, and secondary narcissism - the withdrawal of libido from external objects into the self or objects internalised into the self (Freud, 1986/1914). This distinction has since been lauded by some theorists, such as Kohut (1986), who credited this distinction with leading to numerous contributions in the psychoanalytic literature and with determining his own general pattern of thought, and attacked by others. Many have argued, for example, that Freud unwittingly showed that people are born in state of intense relatedness to their environment, and hence all narcissism is secondary and its cause is disturbance between individual and environment (Ansbacher, 1985).

A literature review on narcissism is complicated by the already mentioned fact that many researchers in the field insist on the relevance of theoreticians who wrote about narcissism but called it something else. Ansbacher (1985), for example, argues that our current understanding of narcissism is very similar to Alfred Adler's views on psychodynamics and neurotic egocentricity, and that contemporary criticisms of Freud's view of narcissism (particularly the questioning of "primary narcissism") are similar to Adler's. Adler proposed that "masculine protest" replace the "aggression drive" as the basic neurotic drive. By "masculine protest" Adler meant wanting to be strong and privileged like a man, not weak and underprivileged like a woman in the culture of his day. The term applied to both sexes, was tied in with self-esteem, and was the starting point in Adler's goal-oriented value psychology, in which the ego or self is central. In Adler's subsequent writings, "masculine protest" was replaced by such terms as "will to power" (already connected with

narcissism in the introductory chapter of this thesis), “striving for an exaggerated personality ideal”, “striving for superiority”, and many others (Ansbacher, 1985).

Ansbacher argues that Adler’s descriptions refer to neurotic personality in general. Adler can thus be seen as an intellectual predecessor of current views of a broad range of narcissistic personality pathology. Bursten (1973), for example sees narcissism in paranoid, antisocial, dependent and avoidant personality disorders, covering all three DSM personality disorder clusters, while Vaillant and Perry argue for some degree of narcissism in all personality disorders (Ansbacher, 1985). Adler’s theory of social interest allows narcissism to be subsumed under lack of social interest rather than as an expression of innate socially negative tendencies. There is no necessary conflict between altruism and egotism. Social interest can be seen as a general attitude that influences the directions of personal interest but does not necessarily conflict with it. With social interest, personal goals have positive social-cultural implications; without social interest the same goals become socially irrelevant or detrimental. On this view, social interest is the main criterion for mental health, and lack of social interest is characteristic of abnormal personality. The crucial aspect of narcissism is not self-love but exclusion of others, attributed to lack of self-confidence (Ansbacher, 1985). Ansbacher thinks that narcissism can be regarded from a more optimistic view of human nature than Freud: that while Freud spoke of “primary mutual hostility of human beings”, Adler started with given social relations that some subjects have either excluded or never found. Adler, in fact, once said that his decisive difference with Freud was Freud’s assumption that people only want to satisfy drives (the pleasure principle). Adler thought that people are inclined towards social interest and the good (Ansbacher, 1985).

Ansbacher’s case for the relevance of Adler’s thought to narcissism is a strong one. Other researchers in the field have put forth cogent arguments for the relevance of other thinkers

as well. Weston (1990), for instance, argues that Piaget wrote much that is of great relevance to narcissism. Other cases might be made as well. The introduction to this thesis argued that narcissism has to do with relationships involving love and power. Does this not pull the interpersonal circumplex literature (e.g. Wiggins, 1996) into the picture? Many of Jung's concepts, such as inflation and one-sidedness (Jung, 1961), are clearly relevant. James Strachey (in Freud, 1990) claimed that Freud wrote "On Narcissism" at least partly to offer an alternative to Jung's de-sexualised libido and Adler's masculine protest. Jung retained the term "libido" for psychic energy, but whereas for Freud libido was the instinctive orientation toward all that leads to physical satisfaction, Jung conceived of it as a life-drive (rather than a sex drive) that operates on the principle of opposites. For every "good" thought there is a corresponding "bad". If the bad is "repressed" into the "Unconscious" it may become part of the shadow complex, but then its libido or psychic energy can lead to "one-sidedness" (O'Neil, 1979). Freud considered Adler's theory the more important (Ansbacher, 1985).

At the time he wrote "On Narcissism", Freud's theorising was dominated by his libidinal instinctual view and economic approach. Trying to fit problems of self-representation, self-object relations and self esteem into the libido framework, which has since been seriously challenged, was a serious handicap (Fromm, 1965; Pulver, 1986). Freud proposed that ultimately narcissism matured into object relations, spoke of criminals and humorists who "keep away from the ego anything that would diminish it", and suggested that narcissism was the foundation of the ego ideal as a psychic structure (Freud, 1986). The "Narcissistic Libidinal Type" Freud proposed in 1932 was similar to the DSM-III Narcissistic Personality Disorder (Akhar, 1989).

Narcissism was, according to many psychoanalytic historians, central to Freud's metapsychology (Raskin and Terry, 1988). It was only one of several posited sources of

libidinal self-cathexis. While Freud's metapsychology of narcissism has been harshly criticised as causing more confusion than clarification, he has been credited with stimulating important clinical advances in narcissism: that the aetiology of narcissistic disorders often involves difficulties from the separation-individuation phase of childhood that result in dependency vs. autonomy conflicts and unempathic parenting later in life; the role of aggression in narcissism, particularly devaluation of others; and the narcissist's lack of internalised mechanisms for self-esteem regulation (Millon, 1981).

### *The God Complex*

In a 1913 essay widely viewed as an early work on the narcissistic personality disorder, Jones (1973/1913) argues that, if a "God Complex" is guided and controlled by valuable higher factors, the result can be a man "truly God-like in grandeur and sublimity" such as Nietzsche or Shelley, but that otherwise (and more frequently) the result is "highly unsatisfactory". According to Jones (1972/1913), when insane, people with a "God Complex" openly expressed delusions of being God, while in sane persons the complex expressed itself through excessive self-admiration and confidence, exhibitionism, and fantasies of omnipotence. Jones described these persons as always looking for short cuts, and disinclined to accept new knowledge; he said they had exaggerated needs of love, admiration and praise, contempt for others, and cognitive peculiarities that included circuitous diction, subtle learning deficits, inattention to objective aspects of events, love of language, and a series of opposing tendencies. He also commented "In my experience the main foundation of the complex is to be discovered in a colossal narcissism" (Jones, 1973/1913).

### *Akhar and Thompson's Synthesis Akhar and Thompson's Synthesis*

Akhar and Thompson reviewed the research literature on narcissism and proposed a synthesis in 1982 (Akhar, 1989). In 1925, Waelder's depiction of condescending,

unempathic “narcissistic personalities” asserted that such persons regard sexual partners only as means to a pleasurable ends, have a morality governed by narcissistic motives, prefer concepts over facts and overvalue mental processes (Akhar, 1989). Wilhelm Reich believed that one’s character reflected defensive structures that originated in the avoidance of narcissistic injury, which often took priority over other needs during personality development. Reich was probably the first to stress the role of narcissism in the development of both normal and abnormal personality (Cooper, 1986). He proposed a “phallic-narcissistic character” in 1926, which anticipated the DSM-III description of narcissistic personality disorder and is close to the view Freud expressed in 1932, except that Reich placed the origin at fixation in the phallic stage:

The typical phallic-narcissistic character...is self-assured, sometimes arrogant, elastic, energetic, often impressive in his bearing. The most pronounced types tend to achieve leading positions in life and are ill suited to subordinate positions among the rank and file. If their vanity is offended, they react with cold disdain, marked ill humour, or downright aggression. Their narcissism, as opposed to that of other character types, is expressed not in an infantile but in a blatantly self-confident way, with a flagrant display of superiority and dignity (Reich, quoted in Millon, 1994).

Reich also believed his phallic-narcissists to be warding off feelings of inferiority, prone to impotence, addictions, homosexuality and super-ego defects, and that they were distinguished from compulsive personalities by 1) use of reaction formation as a defence against their aggressive, sadistic behaviours 2) their boldness, and 3) a lack of attention to details. Their level of social functioning allegedly ranged from great success and fame to daydreamers, addicts and criminals. Later, Reich added that narcissists concentrate libido on themselves at the expense of object-love, are highly dependent on outside approval, preoccupied with fantasies of aggrandisement, driven, unable to wait, predisposed towards perversions and hypochondriacal, with an unduly high opinion of themselves. This was attributed to narcissistic injuries at the pre-oedipal and Oedipal stages (Akhar, 1989).



In the 1940s, the desire for greatness led Fenichel's "Don Juan of Achievement" (1945) to run from achievement to achievement without experiencing inner satisfaction, and a lack of tenderness and faithfulness. Fenichel viewed this as an attempt to undo unconscious guilt from maternal seduction. In 1946, Olden blamed Oedipal anxieties for what he termed "Headline Intelligence" - a desire not to know details. Nemiah's Narcissistic Character Disorder was another predecessor of the DSM personality disorder, characterised by great ambition, unrealistic goals, intolerance of imperfection, insatiable craving for admiration, and motivation exclusively based on what others would think, which he blamed on parental high demands and harsh criticism internalised by the child (Akhar, 1989).

Annie Reich (1960) viewed narcissistic self-inflation as an aggressive and pathological form of self-esteem regulation ultimately based on contempt for others (A. Reich, 1986). In 1966 Tartakoff coined the term "Nobel Prize Complex" for gifted individuals who were obsessed with winning the coveted award (Akhar, 1989). Tartakoff said his aspiring Nobel Laureates were dominated by two kinds of fantasies: active omnipotent fantasies of being powerful, and passive fantasies of being special (Raskin and Novacek, 1991).

Akhar and Thompson's synthesis of the above literature resulted in a profile of six areas of psychosocial functioning, each having overt and covert manifestations: Self-concept, interpersonal relations, social adaptation, ethics, standards and ideals, love and sexuality and cognitive style (Akhar, 1989). The first five of Akhar and Thompson's six categories can be matched almost feature by feature with Adler's neurotic personality. Cognitive style has a general counterpart in Adler's "schema of apperception" (Ansbacher, 1985). The distinction between overt and covert manifestations has the advantage of emphasising splitting and the divided self; it has the disadvantage of frequently being assumed to correspond to conscious and unconscious, a topographical distribution that may or may not apply, despite warnings to the contrary.

## *Malignant Narcissism*

Erich Fromm (1965) described a wide range of narcissistic personalities and phenomena. Fromm singled out distortion of rational judgement and intense emotional reaction to criticism as particularly dangerous aspects of pathological narcissism, and tyrants such as Hitler and Stalin as a particularly interesting subtype of narcissistic personality:

A particular instance of narcissism which lies on the borderline between sanity and insanity can be found in some men who have reached an extraordinary degree of power. The Egyptian pharaohs, the Roman Caesars, the Borgias, Hitler, Stalin, Trujillo - they all show certain similar features. They have attained absolute power; their word is the ultimate judgement of everything, including life and death; there seems to be no limit to their capacity to do what they want. They are gods, limited only by illness, age and death. They try to find a solution to the problem of human existence by the desperate attempt to transcend the limitation of human existence. They try to pretend that there is no limit to their lust and to their power, so they sleep with countless women, they kill numberless men, they build castles everywhere, they "want the moon", they "want the impossible". This is madness, even though it is an attempt to solve the problem of existence by pretending that one is not human. It is a madness which tends to grow in the lifetime of the afflicted person. The more he tries to be god, the more he isolates himself from the human race; this isolation makes him more frightened, everybody becomes his enemy, and in order to stand the resulting fright he has to increase his power, his ruthlessness and his narcissism. This Caesarian madness would be nothing but plain insanity were it not for one factor: by his power Caesar has bent reality to his narcissistic fantasies. He has forced everybody to agree that he is god, the most powerful and the wisest of men - hence his own megalomania seems to be a reasonable feeling. On the other hand, many will hate him, try to overthrow and kill him - hence his pathological suspicions are also backed by a nucleus of reality. As a result he does not feel disconnected from reality - hence he can keep a modicum of sanity, even though in a precarious state (Fromm, 1965, p.66).

According to many psychoanalysts, narcissistic object relations are characterised by omnipotence, preponderance of identification, and defence against the recognition of the separateness between self and object. There is a ruthless use of others concomitant with a denial of dependence upon them. Through introjective identification, the desirable aspects of others are claimed for the self, while through projection the undesirable attributes of the self are attributed to others. This results in an idealised self-image that is maintained and vigorously defended. It is most malignant when the destructive aspects of self are



idealised: offered love is destroyed in an effort to maintain superiority and the sane, loving, dependent self is killed off (Akhar, 1989).

Kernberg (1989) says that nearly all patients with antisocial personality disorder exhibit typical features of narcissistic personality disorder plus deteriorations of their object relations and morality. He proposes a dimension of antisocial behaviour linking the narcissistic and antisocial categories, and a "Malignant Narcissism" syndrome intermediate between the two disorders, combining (1) a narcissistic personality disorder (2) antisocial behaviour (3) ego-syntonic aggression or sadism and (4) a strong paranoid orientation. On this view, a diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder is a clinician's first warning that an antisocial diagnosis may ultimately be necessary, and although anti-social behaviour is seen in non-narcissistic personalities, it is prognostically less favourable within a narcissistic personality organisation (Kernberg, 1989).

Stone (1989) reviewed American and British literature on celebrated murder cases, and concluded that the murderers "can, with a fair degree of certainty, be considered examples of malignant narcissism" and illustrate "phenomena associated with pathological narcissism and with the attributes collected under the rubric "narcissistic personality disorder"". Most people, according to Stone, have known murderous feelings when humiliated, injured or rejected by another person; those who harbour fantasies of violent revenge, given the opportunity, have often seized it. Stone views malignant narcissism as a continuum, and has constructed a scale of malignant narcissism from the biographies of these notorious murderers, ranging from people whose "inhumanity and propensity towards evil are of modest proportions" to the most extreme degree of evil personality (Stone, 1989).

At the former end of his scale, Stone (1989) places killers motivated to transform themselves from nobodies into somebodies by killing a real somebody, such as John

Lennon's assassin Mark David Chapman. Negative notoriety is still fame. Moving up the scale, he places murderers who killed out of jealousy (a form of narcissistic injury), those who kill in fits of [narcissistic] rage, those who kill people who are "in the way" (particularly when blood relatives are killed for inheritances), and "loner" multiple murderers incapable of intimacy with anyone.

Next come serial murderers, who are "almost invariably psychopathic sexual sadists", especially those like Ted Bundy and Jeff MacDonald who "carried lying and self-centredness to the outer reaches of these concepts" and deceived others as to their true nature by being intelligent, handsome, well-dressed, outwardly conventional and hard working. After killers so lacking in empathy that their cruelty is ego-syntonic, Stone (1989) places a type in which paranoid mechanisms inspire mistrust of all humanity and intense hatred of certain groups, such as racial minorities. These murderers have often subjected their victims to methodological, sustained torture. While shockingly they have invariably come from socially respected backgrounds, Stone says that in most cases they were brutalised in childhood, and sought to restore self-esteem through revenge. Stone considers them "stimulus-response machines."

Near the extreme end of the scale, torture becomes the primary motive, the murder executed merely to exterminate evidence, as in the case of schizoid psychopath John Wayne Gacy. At the extreme end of his scale, Stone (1989) places Ian Brady and Myra Hindley. Together, the couple not only tortured and murdered at least six children, but forced the children to pose for pornographic photographs and tape recorded their screams, later using the pictures and recordings for sexual stimulation. Brady, who had already killed several people, had shown uncommon cruelty at an early age, and since his teens passionately devoured Nazi literature, from which he derived fantasies that accelerated the rate of his killing. Although "malignant narcissism" has been seen as merely the conjunction

“Narcissistic Personality Disorder x Antisocial Personality Disorder”, Stone considers it more useful because it captures the connotation of evil in this particular personality disorder.

Stone (1989) blames the easy availability of handguns in American society for enabling murderers to “stand up and be counted”. While having guns available certainly increases the opportunity for murder, Stone’s contention that most people have known murderous feelings, but the overwhelming majority have never acted on them, is better explained in terms of an unsubmitted will. Most people who have been angry enough to kill have never done so because, realising that killing is wrong, and therefore there is a conflict between what they want and what is right, they do what is right. Malignant narcissists do what they want.

### *Kernberg*

In addition to writings on malignant narcissism, Kernberg’s contribution to the understanding of narcissism restructured the traditional psychoanalytic framework for characterology to de-emphasise libidinal development:

My particular theoretical position has been distinguished by my belief that the characteristics specific to patients with narcissistic personality disorders reflect a pathologic narcissism that differs from both ordinary adult narcissism and fixation at or regression to normal infantile narcissism. Pathologic narcissism reflects libidinal investment not in a normal integrated self-structure but in a pathologic self-structure. I should mention that I have redefined the concept of the “libido” as the hierarchically supraordinate integration of positive affective investments of self and objects. The pathologic grandiose self, in my view, contains real self-representations, ideal self-representations, and ideal object representations. Devalued or aggressively determined self- and object representations are split off or dissociated, repressed, or projected. In other words, in contrast to the normal integration of libidinal and aggressively determined self- and object representations into the normal self, here what might be called a “purified pleasure ego” constitutes the pathologic self-structure (Kernberg, 1989b, pp.723-724)).

According to Kernberg, the main characteristics of narcissism are excessive self-absorption, intense ambition, grandiosity and need for tribute. Narcissists have little capacity for either empathic concern for others or enjoyment of life. They may work very hard and be quite successful, but only in the service of their exhibitionism, not for joy. Extreme contradictions in self-concept result in coexistence of feelings of inferiority, envy, omnipotent control and withdrawal. Kernberg's narcissists exhibit three levels of social functioning reminiscent of Reich's phallic narcissists: those who are talented, bright and highly successful, who rarely seek treatment; the majority who seek treatment due to no long term relationships and aimlessness despite reasonable success; and some with seriously impaired social functioning. Kernberg sees narcissism as a result of parental rejection of abandonment.

### *Heinz Kohut and Self Psychology*

According to Kohut (1986), narcissistic libido has its own line of development, is not transformed into object libido, and in its healthy forms is the source of such positive attributes as humour and creativity. In Kohut's self-psychology, the failure of parental empathy to meet developmental needs prevents the development of intrapsychic structures for self-esteem regulation. The result, and source of almost all psychopathology, is dependence on others to provide that self-esteem regulation. The earlier and more pervasive the empathic failures, the more severe the developmental deficits and inevitable psychopathology.

"Self-psychology" refers to the effort to be the perfect, grandiose, exhibitionistic self. Empathic failures result in either merger-hungry personalities who are unable to discriminate their own thoughts, wishes and intentions from those of others, contact-shunning personalities who isolate themselves to avoid further empathic failures, and mirror-hungry personalities who feel worthless without constant admiration and

confirmation (Baker and Baker, 1987). Although originally described as psychopathology, these three personalities Kohut later considered variants of normal personality (Akhar, 1989).

In similar fashion, children have developmental needs for an “idealised parental imago” or someone who makes them feel safe, as well as for connectedness to the human community. When failures to meet idealised parental imago needs are minor or phase-appropriate, the child develops from initially wanting to merge with the idealised parental imago, through merely wanting to be close to it, to being satisfied with the support of loved ones in time of stress. When failures are more serious, the result is an ideal-hungry personality who constantly needs others to provide emotional security. When failures to develop a feeling of alikeness with other people are serious, the result is an alter-ego personality with exaggerated needs for others to conform to their values. These last two personalities Kohut continued to regard as pathological (Baker and Baker, 1987; Akhar, 1989). Akhar points out that Kohut’s merger-hungry and contact-shunning personalities seem to overlap with, and may be related to, the borderline and schizoid personalities, respectively.

In 1972, Kohut coined the term “narcissistic rage” for disproportionate anger in response to injured self-esteem involving need for revenge, righting the wrong and undoing hurt at any cost. Kohut also anticipated others in describing “hypomanic exaltation”, an anxious excitement often accompanied by trance-like ecstasy and near-religious transcendence that often follows favourable occurrences in reality that fuel the narcissist’s exhibitionism and grandiosity. In 1978 Kohut distinguished Narcissistic Personality Disorders, the symptoms of which concern the subject’s psychological state, from Narcissistic Behaviour Disorders, which concern the subjects actions and interactions. It is not clear whether they represent different degrees of the same construct (Akhar, 1989).

### *Millon's Social Learning Theory and Narcissism*

Millon (1981) combines the insights of Kernberg and Kohut with biosocial and learning theory. In Millon's theory the narcissistic and antisocial personalities comprise, respectively, the passive and active variants of what Millon calls the Independent Personality Style. While dependent and histrionic personalities look to others for reinforcements, independents look to themselves and avoid relationships where power, prestige and status are not in their favour. According to Millon, narcissists overvalue personal worth, direct their affections toward themselves and expect to be catered to; this attitude is often conducive to success and admiration in contemporary society, but falters when poorly grounded or grating. Unlike Kernberg's and Kohut's theories, Millon says that his does not rely on narcissists' experience of negative affect (Millon, 1981).

Millon denies that narcissists are hostile, as antisocial personalities are; his narcissists merely have an unfounded assumption of superiority and self-worth. He observes, however, that narcissists assume that mere desire is justification for possessing what they seek, which leads to interpersonal exploitiveness and an attitude of inherent entitlement to privileges others must expend effort to merit. Surely in extreme cases this is not far from malignant narcissism: was not the mere desire to kill all the justification required by Stone's murders?

Millon uses the term "narcissism" at a lower level of a hierarchy than authors such as Ansbacher (1985). Millon (1994) argues that personality is the psychological equivalent of the body's system of structures and functions. The body as a whole is a well-organised yet open system of relatively stable structures that interconnect functionally as they process events in a coherent way. The functions and structures are extremely complex and elaborate. The distinctive configuration of structures and functions that have evolved ensures that the system as a whole remains viable and stable by maintaining internal



cohesion and by adaptation to external events. Biological disorder results when the balance among the interrelated parts go awry, a structure is damaged, or invading entities like bacteria undermine the system's integrity.

Personality, says Millon, is a psychic analogue of the body. Its structures include internalised memories and self-images. Its functions include unconscious mechanisms and cognitive processes. Through experience this system develops into a pattern that cannot easily be changed and affects adaptation. Personality is a system of interconnected perceptions, feelings, thoughts and behaviours that maintain psychic viability and stability. Personality disorder is not just a matter of intrusive "viruses" but reflects deficiencies in the personality's ability to cope with inevitable stresses.

Therefore clinical diagnosis of both physical and mental disorders require data beyond those inherent in the individual, such as the psychosocial environment. Something can be advantageous in one environment but not another. An ecological perspective takes account of external social and interpersonal dynamics, not just the patient's internal characteristics as is traditionally done in psychological diagnostics. They may be impossible to disentangle. Millon argues that expanding our conception of disorder to include interplay of internal and external systems is especially appropriate for personality. One's personality elicits reactions from others that feed back into the system. Personality disorder is not necessarily exclusively external or internal. Most disorders result from the interplay between the personality and the environment it has to live in. Thus, Millon's view of psychopathological disorder is conceived as reflecting the interactive pattern of relationships between self and other, organism and environment, subject and object – and these are the foundation of his or her ability to function in a healthy and appropriate manner.



### *Narcissism, Splitting and Doubling*

Robert Jay Lifton (1986) has argued that “doubling” provides a key to understanding human evil. In the psychoanalytic literature, doubling is an extreme instance of the universal phenomenon of splitting, a construct central to some theoretical conceptions of narcissism (e.g. Kernberg, 1998). Among the cognitive peculiarities associated with doubling, Akhar (1989) cites the use of language in an autocentric manner for the purpose of self-esteem regulation, rather than communication or understanding. Much of the literature on self-deception (e.g. Power and Dalgleish, 1997) argues that what is distorted in self-deception is not what one actually did, but the meaning and emotional significance of one’s actions. Doubling may be a mechanism that allows some people to commit crimes without suffering the emotional consequences, such as guilt. Lifton (1986) emphasises that the individual is morally responsible for doubling, even though much of it takes place outside of awareness. An outstanding literary depiction of a double is Dostoevsky’s (1957) Mr. Golyadkin.

### *Narcissistic Deficits*

According to Bach (Akhar, 1989), narcissists have deficits in five areas: perception of self, language and thought organisation, intentionality and volition, regulation of mood, and perception of time, space and causality. The gap Bach describes between words and perceptions is also notable in light of the fact that sabotage of verbal labels is widely believed to be one of the key mechanisms of self-deception (Badcock, 1994). A loss of flexibility in perspective results in over-abstractions, fluctuations between extremes, subtle learning problems and memory deficits, restrictions in volition, spontaneity, intentionality, a great deal of fruitless pseudo-activity and a tendency to infer causality from simultaneity. In contrast to Tartakoff (above), Bach distinguishes between self- and other- related fantasies, the self-related fantasies being narcissistic, and identifies four characteristic

narcissistic fantasies: the “wise baby”, the “death of the self”, the “double” or “companion” and the “rope to another world” fantasies (Raskin and Novacek, 1991).

### *Volkan and Horowitz's Criteria*

Volkan, who has written about the role of pathological narcissism in social and political processes, cites three criteria for narcissistic personality disorder: the surface picture of the grandiose self, the clinical picture, and attempts to protect the grandiose surface picture from reality. This protection is attempted by two specific manoeuvres: the “fantasy of the glass bubble” in which the self is isolated, and “transitional fantasies” in which the narcissist loses him/her-self in banal tales of personal glory.

Horowitz also cites three sets of criteria for narcissism. The first two correspond to the criteria of Kernberg and Kohut. The third is information processing. There is an undue attention to praise and criticism, a tendency of attitudes to cluster and characteristic coping devices for threat, notably a strong tendency to slide around the meaning of events to place the self in best light (Akhar, 1989; Horowitz, Marmar, Krupnick, Wilner, Kaltreider and Wallerstein, 1984).

### *Narcissism, Sadism and Masochism*

Several authors have tied narcissism to sadism (Cooper, 1989) and Cooper (1989) argues that narcissism and masochism are developmentally and clinically intertwined, calling for recognition of a narcissistic-masochistic character as a clinical entity. Cooper points to the self-centredness, the satisfaction derived from feeling that no one else suffers so, the self-pity and the need to be liked described in the masochistic Self-Defeating Personality Disorder once proposed in DSM-III-R as clearly narcissistic. The essence of masochism in Cooper's view is the desire to feel narcissistically injured. Like Nietzsche's scathing attack

on “herd morality”, behind the masochist’s submissive facade Cooper sees a pathologically grandiose fantasy life and an attitude of entitlement based on felt superiority.

Another criticism of Peck’s (1983) account of the evil personality (Klose, 1995; Goldberg, 1995) is that a comprehensive account of human evil must account for sadism, and that it is not clear if Peck’s does. While not explicitly mentioned in Peck’s description of the characteristics of an evil person, sadism has a prominent place in much of the literature on narcissism. Reich believed phallic-narcissists tended toward sadistic perversions. Many of the malignant narcissists comprising Stone’s scale of evil personalities were sexual sadists, particularly at the higher end of the scale. Regarding others as merely means to ends seems the logical outcome of extreme self-absorption coupled with an unsubmitted will. Peck (1983, p.165) says that, for the complete narcissist, other people are no more psychologically significant than furniture. In the case of Heinrich Himmler, this was literally true. Himmler’s lair at Berschtesgaten included chairs made of human legs and a human pelvis for a seat, and a copy of Mein Kampf with a cover of human skin (Sereny, 1996).

### *Bursten*

For Bursten (1986), narcissistic personality is of a different logical order than the DSM narcissistic, antisocial and other personalities. The DSM-III Narcissistic and DSM-II Antisocial personalities, for example, are both narcissistic personalities according to Bursten. He believes that there are three broad personality types or groups: narcissistic, complementary and borderline. Early in life, a course is set for one of these types. Bursten’s four narcissistic personality types - craving, paranoid, manipulative and phallic - represent “variations on a theme” each of which he has observed in both a US Veterans Hospital and his psychoanalytic work. His manipulative personality, which overlaps with the DSM antisocial personality, has two main affects: contempt for others, and exhilaration

of power upon successfully deceiving another (Bursten, 1986). His paranoid narcissists overlap with the DSM paranoid personality.

### *Overt and Covert Narcissists*

Masterton (1993) distinguishes between healthy narcissism on the one hand and exhibitionistic and closet narcissistic disorders of the self on the other through differences in intra-psychoic structure. In normal personality development, the infant's grandiose self and omnipotent object are brought into accord with reality during the rapprochement sub-phase (circa 15-22 months) of the separation-individuation phase through phase-appropriate disappointment. The result is a self-representation that has separated from the object representation, had its grandiosity and omnipotence brought into accord with reality, and includes both positive and negative representations of the self. In this "healthy narcissism" state, a feeling of competence is derived mostly from reality with some input from fantasy, and the individual is able to function autonomously.

In the intra-psychoic structure of pathological narcissism, a pathologically grandiose self-representation remains fused with an omnipotent object-representation. In the exhibitionistic case, the major emotional investment is in the false grandiose self, which is based on fantasy and intended to defend against negative affect rather than deal with reality. The self is then experienced as unique and admired. In the closet disorder, the major emotional investment is in the omnipotent object-representation, and the self is experienced as feeling unique or special through its relationship to the perfect other. The fixation involved in disorder must occur before the rapprochement sub-phase because the object representation remains fused with the self-representation. Masterton (1993) urges that one can have narcissistic traits without having a narcissistic disorder.

### *Symington's Theory*

The psychoanalyst Symington (1993) proposes a theory of narcissism based on a concept he calls the "lifegiver" - a mental object that the mind can accept or reject at a deep level. Different from, and opposed to, the self, the lifegiver can be chosen instead of the self; it is in the other, associated with the breast and mother, and only comes into existence at the moment of being chosen. According to Symington, not trauma itself, but the individual's response to trauma, causes pathological narcissism. When the infant is separated from the mother it may respond by turning away from the mother, upon the self - the narcissistic choice. Making an unconscious choice to disavow the lifegiver and use magical pretence to avoid reality, instead of towards the authenticity and spontaneity of the lifegiver, leads to narcissistic disorders. Although the separating infant can choose the narcissistic option, there is a compulsion to choose the lifegiver under threat of death. Part of the self repudiates the narcissistic option, and a split occurs. The result is that only this part of the self includes the lifegiver - the source of action and coherence.

Symington (1993) emphasises the intentional element in narcissism, its effects on character, and that the essence of narcissism is hatred of the relational, destruction of separateness. Narcissism is only one way of managing trauma, and one that distances one from reality: grandiosity is anaesthetic, pushing away the painful. Some traumatic experiences Symington thinks are so severe that inevitably the human spirit collapses. Whether or not it would have been possible to resist the pull towards narcissism, however, there are always opportunities to reverse it. In fact, trauma can also pull one *out* of narcissism. Symington also emphasises that the self-centredness of narcissism is different from selfishness. Selfishness is sometimes open, but self-centredness and narcissism are always hidden. Symington also alludes to research on narcissistic groups and organisations which has urged that highly narcissistic individuals be excluded from key

posts, and research that concludes that the speech patterns of narcissists interfere with the thought and natural communication processes of others.

Symington (1993) asserts that practically all psychopathology flows from narcissism. If Bursten's inclusion of four personalities under the penumbra of pathological narcissism has been criticised as over-inclusive (Akhar, 1989), surely the inclusion of virtually all psychopathology will be criticised as even more so. On the other hand, perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between. Surely there are forms of psychopathology with organic aetiology, but if personality disorders reflect social adaptation gone awry, in a social species perhaps all personality disorders flow from narcissism; perhaps DSM Axis II flows from narcissism. As Fromm (1965) says, for the infant, the outside world has not yet become real, all is part of the self; for the psychotic, the outside world has ceased to be real. There has been a break with external reality leaving only internal reality. The narcissism, in a descriptive sense, of such person is the result, not the cause, of psychopathology.

### *Conclusions and Assessment*

The above theorising runs the gamut from viewing narcissism as a discrete entity, as in Reich's phallic narcissists (who correspond closely to the DSM category), to diverse dichotomous accounts (e.g., primary vs. secondary, exhibitionistic vs. closet, healthy vs. unhealthy), to Bursten's several narcissistic personalities which span all three DSM clusters but allow for some non-narcissistic personality disorders, to the view that all personality disorders involve narcissistic pathology (Vaillant and Perry), to claims that virtually all psychopathology period flows from narcissism (Kohut, Symington). This suggests that the authors are speaking on different levels of a hierarchy. Specific narcissistic personalities such as Reich's phallic narcissists can be viewed as low-level instances of disordered personality, while in theorists such as Kohut narcissism is a high-level



construct concerned with the relationships between the individual personality and the outside world.

In the top-level view, pathological narcissism seems synonymous with personality disorder. Recent evidence argues for a four-factor structure of abnormal personality which Mulder and Joyce (1997) call the "four As": antisocial, asocial (schizoid), asthenic (related to neuroticism) and anankastic (obsessive-compulsive). Malignant narcissists would fall in the antisocial group. The asocial group is characterised by disavowal of relationships, which one could justifiably call narcissistic, but need not be hostile. The asthenic group includes the avoidant and dependent personalities, which Bursten has called narcissistic, and the masochistic self-defeating personality that Cooper argues is narcissistic. The obsessive-compulsive personality is the only personality loading on Mulder and Joyce's anankastic factor. Based on a review of the theoretical literature, Peck's subtype of narcissistic personality seems a distinct possibility. In the four As typology, it would fall under the antisocial A with other malignant narcissists, but be distinct from the DSM Antisocial Personality Disorder.

## **Empirical Contributions**

### *Measuring Narcissism*

The majority of self-report narcissism scales have been developed using the DSM-III criteria for Narcissistic Personality Disorder in combination with the internal consistency method of scale construction (Wink, 1996). The Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI, Raskin and Hall, 1979) is the most widely used scale. The Wink and Gough (1990) California Psychological Inventory (CPI) and Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) Narcissism Scales are based on the writings of Akhar and Thompson, Kernberg and Kohut. Morey, Waugh and Blashfield's 1985 Narcissism scale was developed as part



of a battery of tests to measure all DSM-III personality disorders (Wink, 1996). The internal consistency method of test construction produces scales with items that are highly inter-correlated with each other and with the total scale, a feature which tends to facilitate clarity of interpretation but fails to capture multiple facets of a complex construct (Wink, 1996). The above scales correlate significantly with each other (from approximately .50 to .80) and with observer ratings of narcissism, but not with self-report narcissism scales that have been developed using different methods of test construction, such as the 1979 Narcissistic Personality Disorder Scale (NPDS) and two scales developed from factor analysis of the MMPI Masculinity/Femininity scale: Serkownek's 1975 Narcissism-Hypersensitivity Scale and Pepper and Strong's 1958 Ego-Sensitivity Scale (Wink, 1996).

Self-report scales developed from non-DSM-III theoretical perspectives include the O'Brien (1987) Multiphasic Narcissism scale (OMNI); Millon's 1982 Narcissism scale, based on social learning theory; and the Pseudoautonomy, Peer Group Dependence, Shame Proneness, Goal Instability and Superiority scales developed by Patton and his students based on Kohut's writings (Patton, personal communication). The OMNI and Millon scales both correlate with the NPI (Wink, 1996). The OMNI also correlates with the NPDS (Wink, 1996). Observer rating scales include Wink's 1992 California Q-set (CAQ) Narcissism prototype, which includes wilfulness, hypersensitivity and autonomy scales, and 10 Kohut-based scales developed by Patton, Connor and Scott (1982). In 1979 Harder developed projective narcissism tests for the Early Memory, Thematic Apperception and Rorschach tests (Wink, 1996; Patton, personal communication).

### *Diagnostic Interview*

Gunderson, Ronningstam and Bodkin developed the Diagnostic Interview for Narcissism (DIN) by comparing 23 psychiatric patients with narcissistic personality disorder or narcissistic disturbances with 28 patients with other disorders. Twenty-seven features of

narcissism were assessed, 15 of which differentiated the two groups. The DIN evaluates 33 features of pathological narcissism in five domains: grandiosity, interpersonal relations, reactivity, affects and moods and social and moral adaptation, with grandiosity and interpersonal relations being the best discriminators (Gunderson, Ronningstam and Smith, 1991).

The DIN also identified three non-DSM criteria relevant to narcissism: boastful or pretentious behaviour, arrogant and haughty attitude and behaviour, and self-centred, self-referential behaviour. The authors called for further research on whether cut-offs and criteria capture patients on whom clinical literature is written - clinicians made the diagnosis twice as often as patients met DSM-III criteria. They also cited an absence of validity studies on whether identifying clinical narcissists postdicts the aetiology and pathogenesis of the syndrome or predicts the course and response to treatment, and the need for more phenomenological research not confined to DSM (Gunderson, Ronningstam and Smith, 1991).

## **Factor Analytic Studies**

### *Two kinds of narcissism?*

The fact that measures developed using different methods do not correlate with each other, while those developed using the same methods do, suggested to Wink (1991) that, like the Roman God Janus, narcissists may have two faces: overtly of grandiosity, covertly of inferiority. Wink's principal components analysis of six MMPI narcissism scales found two orthogonal factors: vulnerability-sensitivity and grandiosity-exhibitionism. Both were associated with conceit, self-indulgence and disregard of others. The Vulnerability - Sensitivity factor was also associated with introversion, defensiveness, anxiety and vulnerability, while the Grandiosity - Exhibitionism factor was associated with self-

assurance, exhibition, extroversion and aggression. Wink suggests that the NPDS reflects the Vulnerability-Sensitivity aspect of narcissism, and lack of empathy and satisfying love relationships. Alternately, the NPDS may measure not narcissism but general maladjustment (Wink, 1991).

### *NPI Factors*

Emmons' (1984) factor analysis of the NPI found four factors, which he labelled Leadership-Authority (LA), Self-Absorption/Self-Admiration (SS), Superiority/Arrogance (SA) and Exploitativeness/Entitlement (EE). All but SS correlate with the Narcissistic Personality subscale of Millon's MCMI. Because extreme item endorsement splits may make factor analytic results of dichotomous items unstable, Emmons (1987) performed a second factor analysis on a different sample, which replicated the 1984 result.

Raskin and Terry (1988) reviewed Emmons' pattern loadings and suggested that items loading on the same factors address different conceptual dimensions, causing latent factors to be lost in the four factor solution, and that for dichotomous items, tetrachoric correlations were more appropriate than the phi-coefficients used by Emmons. Since the higher order construct of narcissism is traditionally conceived of as a syndrome of distinct but related behaviours, with eight criteria identified in DSM-III, the authors conducted a principal components analysis of the NPI to look for evidence for a general component of narcissism with roughly eight interrelated components. Criteria for the general component were: no significant negative correlations among NPI items, a first unrotated component with an eigenvalue substantially greater than the next largest component, positive loadings of all NPI items on the first unrotated component, a rotated component pattern showing no substantial negative loadings, no significant negative correlations between components with each component correlating positively with at least two others, and a principal components analysis of first-order components that produces a higher order first unrotated component

accounting for substantial intercomponent variance and all components showing nontrivial positive loadings on the higher order first unrotated component.

After reducing the NPI to a 40- item scale which correlated .98 with the original 54- item measure, the investigators found evidence for a general construct of narcissism with seven first order components that accounted for 52% of the NPI variance. The components were labelled authority, exhibitionism, superiority, vanity, exploitiveness, entitlement and self-sufficiency. According to Watson, Hickman and Morris, the four- factor solution has better documented effects in the partial correlations and is slightly superior in differentiating healthy from unhealthy narcissism (Watson, Hickman and Morris, 1996).

Mullins and Koppelman (1988) reported that as of 1988 there were at least eight pencil-and-paper measures of narcissism in existence, and did a factor analysis and construct validation of four of them: the NPI, the Margolis-Thomas Measure of Narcissism (MT), the Narcissistic Personality Disorder Scale (NPDS) and the Narcissism-Hypersensitivity Subscale of MMPI Scale 5 (NHMF). A principal factor analysis with varimax rotation found four dimensions : 1) desire for attention, admiration and authority, 2) feelings of inadequacy, unhappiness and worry, 3) disturbances in interpersonal relationships, including exploitiveness, entitlement and lack of empathy, and 4) sensitivity to criticism and defeat. Of the four scales, the NPI had highest internal consistency, but was not correlated with the other three measures of narcissism and may not tap same dimension. A fifth factor consisting of a single item loading in the opposite direction to the narcissistic response was not included.

Cluster analysis of 107 outpatients who received base rates of 85 or above on the MCMI-II Narcissistic Personality Disorder scale found three clusters, which the authors (DiGiuseppe, Robin, Mitchell, Szeszko and Primavera, 1995) labelled true, compensating

and detached narcissists. No significant differences were found with respect to gender, age or marital status, but the authors believe that this may be peculiar to the sample. The three clusters had very different MMPI profiles, making them easy to distinguish, and correctly identified 97% of subjects according to a discriminant function analysis. Two of the clusters (True and Detached) had no emotional distress, and one was socially detached. The lack of emotional distress in the True and Detached clusters is at variance with the view that all narcissists experience negative affect, but consistent with Millon's (1981) theory. The authors believe both compensating and true narcissism theories may be supported. Compensating narcissists had a high incidence of MCMI-II dependent and avoidant personality disorders, suggesting dependence on approval. MCMI narcissism measures were not associated with negative affect and positively correlated with life satisfaction and psychological well-being. The NPI EE subscale correlated with measures of pathological narcissism and intensity of affect. The authors recommended that future research focus on elucidating different subtypes of narcissism and abandon notion that all narcissists experience negative affect or are emotionally vulnerable (DiGiuseppe et al, 1995).

The choice of measurements and clustering algorithms in cluster analysis can affect the results, sometimes imposing unwarranted structures on data (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1995). The researchers therefore subsequently performed a factor analysis on the data. The factor analysis yielded four factors that accounted for 72 % of the variance. The factors were labelled 1) compensating, 2) true or antisocial, 3) detached and 4) paranoid. This fourth factor was unexpected and requires replication (DiGiuseppe et al, 1995).

Ronningstam reported in 1988 that, of the theoretical descriptions of narcissism, three that have adequate coverage and the potential to develop clear criteria are 1) Akhar and Thompson's, 2) Kernberg's, and 3) the DSM-III-R diagnosis (Ronningstam, 1988). Perry and Perry (1996) evaluated the reliability and convergence of these three constructs

using videotaped interviews with guided scoring procedures, and found intercorrelations of .56 to .80. All three constructs had one factor describing grandiosity and over-dependence on admiration (explaining 12.4 to 33.2% of variance), one describing exploitation and indifference to others (17.0 to 38.9% of variance) and one factor describing hypersensitivity and poor self-esteem regulation (6.5 to 11.6%). Akhar and Thompson's construct also had a unique factor describing pathological love and sexuality that explained 9.7% of the variance. Kernberg's system had a factor describing a sense of emotional neglect explaining 8.4 percent of the variance. The authors assert that the changes in DSM-IV are unlikely to change these figures much. Rathvon and Holmstrom's (1996) correlational analysis of six narcissism measures supported three interpretations: a continuum of narcissism, narcissism as a pathological defence against depression and rage, and two forms of narcissism, one grandiose and overt, the other depleted and covert (Rathvon and Holmstrom, 1996).

From the foregoing we know that different narcissism measures are not measuring the same thing. Whether they measure different kinds of narcissism, different degrees of narcissism, or some do not measure narcissism at all remains an open question. The cluster analysis data are interesting in the light of the Mulder and Joyce (1997) "4 As" view of disordered personality. Again we see avoidant and dependent personality as a dimension of narcissism ("compensating narcissists") that may correspond to the asthenic A, the true or antisocial narcissists (Mulder and Joyce Antisocial), and the detached (asocial). The Perry and Perry (1996) reliability and convergence data show an antisocial (exploitation and indifference), an asthenic (hypersensitivity and poor self-esteem regulation) and possibly and anankastic (grandiosity and over-dependence on admiration) factor in all three systems investigated (Akhar and Thompson, Kernberg and DSM).

### *Narcissism and Affect Intensity*



In addition to the DiGuiseppe et al study above, Emmons tested the hypothesis that narcissistic individuals experience intense emotions and great mood variability. In a sample of 62 undergraduates, the total NPI score correlated with positive and negative affective variability as measured by the Affective Intensity Measure (AIM). On closer examination, however, only the SA and EE subscales correlated with mood variability, and only EE with intensity.

Emmons (1987) concluded that “individuals who have adopted an interpersonal style of exploitation react with strong emotion to experiences in their lives. It is apparent that any general statement regarding emotional reactivity as it relates to narcissism needs to be restricted to the interpersonal exploitation domain”. Alternatively or additionally, the emotional reactivity of narcissists may be restricted to specific areas. As Fromm (1965) points out, narcissists very often strongly identify themselves with a particular aspect of their personality - intelligence, power, looks, honour. Narcissists may react with strong emotion only to experiences that relate specifically to a particular self-aspect.

#### *Associations with Social Desirability and Machiavellianism*

The Mullins and Koppelman (1988) study also investigated linkages with the related constructs of Machiavellianism (using the MACH-IV scale), social desirability (assessed by the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale), need for achievement and autonomy, and four unrelated constructs: attitudes towards Palestinians and gun control, job facet satisfaction and perceived job characteristics. The MT, NPDS, and NHMF correlated positively with the MACH-IV (.52, .38 and .44, respectively, all  $p < .01$ ), negatively with the MC (-.34, -.29, and -.38, respectively, all  $p < .01$ ); the NPI correlated .63 with need for achievement. All four scales correlated with need for autonomy (.17-.22,  $p < .05$ ). The negative correlation with social desirability suggests differences between need for admiration and need to display the self as socially desirable: as the investigators observed,



disregard for social conventions goes with exploitiveness, and grandiose fantasies may conflict with behaviours necessary for achievement. The authors recommended developing subscales for each dimension, using non-abbreviated scales and clinical populations (Mullins and Koppelman, 1988).

At least two other studies have linked narcissism with Machiavellianism. McHoskey (1995) found that Machiavellianism was positively associated with the EE scale of the NPI, and inversely associated with adaptive narcissism (self-sufficiency). Biscardi and Schill (1985), using the NPI, the Defence Mechanism Inventory (DMI) to measure defensive style in response to criticism, Hogan's empathy scale and the MACH V Machiavellianism scale, had previously found small but significant positive correlations between narcissism and the defence categories of Turning Against Object and Projection, and negative associations with Reversal, Turning Against Self, and Principalization. In this study narcissism was positively correlated with defence categories that involve outward expression of aggression, and negatively correlated with defences that avoid or inhibit aggression. There was a small but significant positive correlation between narcissism and Machiavellianism. On the empathy scale, narcissism showed a significant negative correlation (-.29) with the subscale for Tolerance and Considerateness, and a significant positive correlation with the Social Self-Confidence subscale.

The positive correlations of narcissism with Machiavellianism, outward expression of aggression and social self-confidence, and negative correlations with tolerance, consideration and inhibition of aggression, are hardly surprising. The negative association with social desirability does not preclude a subtype of narcissist distinguished from other narcissists at least in part by being high rather than low in social desirability. As Stone (1989) pointed out, the well-dressed, outwardly conventional and hardworking facade of malignant narcissists such as Bundy and MacDonald deceived others as to their true nature.

Albert Speer, who knew Hitler better than anyone, insisted that Hitler never said anything without first calculating the effect it would have. Stalin's biographers credit his rise to power in part to his ability to conceal the extent of his ambitions and maliciousness (Bullock, 1992; Tucker, 1973).

### *Associations with Hostility and Fantasy*

Fukunishi, Hattori, Nakamura and Nakagawa (1995) examined the influence of narcissism on hostility using student and myocardial infarction (MI) patients, and found that the MI patients had higher cynical hostility (as assessed by the Cook Medley MMPI Hostility Scale) and lower Marlowe-Crowne social desirability than the students. In both samples hostility was related to narcissism both before and after controlling for social desirability (Fukunishi, Hattori, Nakamura and Nakagawa, 1995).

Two studies by Raskin and Novacek (1991) support the DSM criteria of preoccupation with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty or ideal love, and theorising that narcissists use these fantasies to regulate self-esteem, particularly when coping with stress. The first study (Raskin and Novacek, 1991) used the NPI and the 344-item Imaginal Process Inventory (IPI) to assess fantasy style. Narcissists experienced achievement, heroic, sexual, hostile, self-revelation and future-oriented daydreams. A principal components analysis indicated that these daydreaming categories represent a narcissistic fantasy style.

In their second study Raskin and Novacek (1991) used the NPI, the Sustaining Fantasy Questionnaire (SFQ) and a measure of daily stress (the Revised Daily Hassles Scale) to investigate relationships between narcissism, stress and the use of sustaining fantasies. Narcissism and stress independently predicted 1) total use of sustaining fantasies, and 2) use of self-admiration, power and revenge and suffering fantasies, and jointly predicted



competitive fantasies; there was also a unique narcissism contribution to prediction of competitive fantasies. In terms of the seven NPI factors, high entitlement and low self-sufficiency independently predicted power and revenge fantasies under stress; high superiority and low self-sufficiency predicted self-admiration fantasies. An earlier study by Watson and Morris (1991) found that irrational beliefs, as measured by the Attitude and Belief Scale - 2 (ABS-2), correlated with the EE factor of the NPI (Watson and Morris, 1991). Thus, we know that narcissists are hostile, and have a characteristic fantasy style that is employed in managing stress.

### *Narcissism and Self-Esteem*

Also in 1991, Raskin, Novacek and Hogan reported on two studies of narcissism and self-esteem which used multiple construct measures and samples to increase the reliability and breadth of measurement and estimate the consistency of results across samples. These studies included observer data as a validity check on self-report measures. In the first of these studies (Raskin et al, 1991a), principal components analyses found that defensive self-enhancement is composed of two orthogonal components: grandiosity and social desirability. The authors consider these results consistent with Paulhus' model of socially desirable responding being composed of 1) conscious impression management and 2) unconscious self-deception, and with other two-component theories of self-esteem regulation and personality development. Grandiosity and social desirability independently predicted self-esteem. Narcissism was positively related to grandiose self-enhancement but not social desirability, and positively associated with both defensive and non-defensive self-esteem. The NPI components associated with non-defensive self-esteem were authority, self-sufficiency and vanity. Observer data confirmed the self-report data (Raskin, Novacek and Hogan, 1991a).

The second study (Raskin et al, 1991b) found that hostility, grandiosity, dominance and narcissism are intercorrelated and form a coherent system of constructs whose common variance significantly predicts variations in self-esteem. Reduced form equations analysis showed that the correlations among these five constructs are consistent with a model of narcissistic self-esteem regulation in which persons use grandiosity, dominance and narcissism to regulate their hostility and self-esteem. The authors propose that the dominance and affiliation strategies described in literature on interpersonal interaction can be either defensive or non-defensive, that narcissism is a defensive form of self-esteem regulation, and that narcissists manage hostility and self-esteem through grandiose self-representation and interpersonal dominance (Raskin, Novacek and Hogan, 1991b).

Watson, Little, Sawrite and Biderman (1992) examined relationships between narcissism, self-esteem and empathy and found, in conformance with Kohut's self-psychology, evidence for both healthy and unhealthy forms of narcissism. The apparent influence of each on the other became more obvious when partial correlations controlled for covariance and linkages with narcissistic personality disorder and grandiosity. In addition to the NPI, which the authors charge cannot partition adaptive from maladaptive narcissism, the O'Brien Multiphasic Narcissism Inventory (OMNI) was used. The OMNI operationalises the psychiatric definition of the disorder and Alice Miller's factors of Poisonous Pedagogy (PP - the belief that one can and should control others) and the Narcissistically Abused Personality (NAP - a false self resulting from abuse from dominating parents). The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) was used to measure four aspects of empathy: perspective taking - (the ability to assume another person's point of view), empathic concern (the ability to experience empathy), fantasy (the ability to lose oneself in fictive characters) which co-vary, and personal distress the tendency to experience distress when confronted with the suffering of others.

The NPI EE factor was associated with lower levels of emotional and cognitive empathy, less self-esteem and more distress. PP correlated with all four NPI factors, and was associated with superiority, lower cognitive empathy and high fantasy. NAP was more strongly associated with EE and tied to goal instability, low self-esteem, diminished perspective taking and higher fantasy and distress. The authors suggested a continuum of narcissistic pathology, with EE at the most maladaptive end of the spectrum, followed by the also maladaptive PP, the somewhat adaptive LA, and Rosenberg Self Esteem at the adaptive end of the spectrum. The authors recommended that future research assess other measures (such as the MCMI) containing adaptive forms of narcissism, use clinical samples, and operate from diverse theoretical perspectives. They concede, however, that the tie between shame and narcissism suggests an alternative for those who object to combining maladaptive with adaptive narcissism (Watson, Little, Sawrite and Biderman, 1992).

Watson, Hickman and Morris (1996) found that inverse NPI association with shame was reduced when self-esteem was entered into multiple regressions before the NPI, and that the NPI and self-esteem did not interact in predicting shame. The authors interpret this result as support for the hypothesis that some narcissism measures record relatively more adjusted aspects of self-function than others, and challenging the hypothesis that inverse NPI correlations with shame reflect a defensive self-esteem (Watson, Hickman and Morris, 1996).

Little, Watson, Biderman and Ozbek (1992) found support for Kohut's view that narcissism can be both pathological and adaptive, but not his description of narcissism as a bipolar self-structure. NPI factors were more strongly associated with grandiosity than immature forms of idealising, and poor object relations were associated with idealising deficits. Taken as a whole, these results support theorising that narcissists think they can

and should control others, suffer from pathological (and hostile) self-esteem regulation and have little empathy for others.

#### *Association with Other Personality Disorders*

It is rare to meet the criteria for narcissistic personality disorder without also meeting the criteria for other personality disorders. The co-morbidity with other dramatic cluster personality disorders (histrionic, antisocial and borderline) is especially high; there is also high co-morbidity with passive aggressive, schizotypal and paranoid disorders. There is considerable disagreement, however, between studies of co-morbidity, possibly due to differing samples and assessment methods (Gunderson, Ronningstam and Smith, 1991).

Gunderson, Ronningstam and Smith's (1991) review of DSM III- R data found that the general effect of DSM III-R changes was to increase the number of patients diagnosed with narcissistic personality disorder, diminish the co-morbidity of narcissistic and histrionic disorders, and at the same time increase co-morbidity with other disorders. The DSM-III criteria "relationships characterised by idealisation and devaluation" was dropped from DSM-III-R because it overlapped with a similar criteria for borderline personality disorder. Grandiosity, fantasies of unlimited success and need for attention and admiration were the best criteria (based on phi-coefficients) for differentiating narcissistic from other personality disorders; DSM III-R criteria 1 (reaction to criticism), 8 (lack of empathy) and 9 (envy) were the worst. The authors conclude that reaction to criticism could be either dropped, or modified to add defeat and rejection as precipitators of rage (or better still, disdain) to distinguish narcissistic from other dramatic cluster personality disorders. The above lead the authors to suggest adding arrogant and haughty behaviour to DSM-IV. This dimension has cognitive and interpersonal dimensions and captures disdain/contempt indirectly reflected in entitlement and insensitivity (Gunderson, Ronningstam and Smith, 1991).



A number of semantic changes have been proposed to help differentiate narcissistic from other DSM personality disorders. Morey (Gunderson, Ronningstam and Smith, 1991) suggests egocentricity, dominance, interpersonal disdain, preoccupation with status, petulant anger and fragile self-concept. Millon and Tringone (Gunderson et al, 1991) suggest acts arrogantly self-assured and confident, has sense of high self-worth, viewed as vain and self-indulgent, and views self as gregarious and charming. Lack of empathy is equally associated with antisocial and passive aggressive personalities. In the narcissist, however, it is due to inability to identify with the feelings of others, whereas in the antisocial it is due to uncaring callousness and in the passive-aggressive it is due to obstruction. Either/or thinking is thought to be characteristic of narcissism and could be added (Gunderson, Ronningstam and Smith, 1991).

The Psychopathy Check List (PCL) has a highly replicable 2-factor solution. The callous and remorseless use of others captured by the first factor reflect the self-centredness, lack of empathy and grandiosity of pathological narcissism. The second factor captures social deviance. Harpur, Hart and Hare (1994) contend that the narcissistic traits measured by Factor 1 co-vary with a general trait of social deviance to form the construct of psychopathy.

#### *Associations with Axis I Psychopathology*

According to Ronningstam (1996), the prevalence of narcissistic personality disorder in Axis I disorders rarely exceeds that of the general psychiatric and personality disordered populations (< 22%), but 42-50 % of diagnosed narcissists suffer from major depression or dysthymia. It is important to note, however, that Kernberg denies that narcissist suffer from depression, saying it is really anger. There are also high rates of narcissism among substance abuse and bipolar patients, and unusually low rates in obsessive-compulsive



disorder. The high changeability of traits of narcissists suggests a context-dependent, covert type of pathological narcissism.

Bipolar patients when manic can resemble narcissists, for example in lack of empathy and superficial relationships. While there are certainly experiential, affective and behavioural similarities between acute mania and narcissism, the concepts are conceptually and phenomenologically distinct. The suggestion is that depression and mania reflect narcissistic balance and may be two ways of directing and expressing shame and rage. The low narcissism rate in depressed patients has been attributed to lack of measures for depression as a reaction to the loss of support for the grandiose self (Ronningstam, 1996).

According to Ronningstam (1996), the only investigation to investigate personality disorders in schizophrenic patients produced two vastly different results - 5% and 35% - depending on the measure used. Early psychoanalytic theory strongly linked narcissism with psychosis, particularly linking schizophrenia to libidinal regression to a narcissistic stage, but later theorists, including Kernberg, say that the loss of reality testing in psychotics contraindicates a diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder. Without accurate and reliable measure of the capacity for reality testing, investigation of the relationship is impossible. Anorexic patients have been considered extremely narcissistic, but studies to date have yielded inconsistent results (0 to 33%). Ronningstam attributes this to a lack of measures of covert narcissism (Ronningstam, 1996)

#### *Associations with Normal Personality Traits*

In the Five Factor Model (FFM) of personality, narcissism is associated with high Extraversion (E) and low Agreeableness (A), while antisocial personality is associated with low Conscientiousness (C) and low A (Widiger, Trull, Clarkin, Sanderson and Costa, 1994). The DSM attribute "pervasive pattern of grandiosity, lack of empathy and

hypersensitivity to criticism...” may be conceptualised as extreme, dysfunctional variants of FFM normal personality, such as conceit, tough-mindedness and self-consciousness. The primary dimension of FFM personality concerned with narcissism is antagonism. Widiger et al (1994) suggest that extremely low variants of the A facets of Modesty, Altruism, Tendermindedness and Straightforwardness are characteristic of narcissists, as are high variants of Openness to Fantasy and the Neuroticism (N) facets of Self-Consciousness and Hostility.

A number of complications have been cited with regard to the FFM profile of narcissism: there is much ambiguity related to narcissist’s response to criticism; the denial of faults and insecurities may lead narcissists to deny vulnerability, self-consciousness, and hostility; the reasons for seeking treatment may lead to a unrepresentative distribution of different types of narcissists in study samples. Costa and McCrae (1990) found significant negative correlations between MMPI and MCMI narcissism scales and Neuroticism (N). Wiggins and Pincus’ (1994) combined factor analysis of the Big Five and several personality disorder scales also found negative loadings between Narcissism and Neuroticism. Trull (1992) found a negative correlation between MMPI Narcissism and Neuroticism in a personality disordered sample. Narcissists appear to present themselves as psychologically healthy rather than vulnerable to emotional weakness.

Different types of narcissists may have very different five factor profiles, and even the narcissists of the same type may have very different overt personalities. If, for example, the arguments presented above, that at least the antisocial and asocial personalities in the Mulder and Joyce “Four As” model are types of narcissists, are correct, then we must expect this to be reflected in the normal personality traits exhibited as well as the abnormal; antisocial narcissists would resemble narcissistic, antisocial, histrionic and paranoid personality profiles, asocial narcissists would resemble schizoids and asthenic narcissists

would resemble avoidant and dependent personality profiles. If a high- impression management subtype of narcissist exists, presentation factors may obscure the true personality profiles of these narcissists, which may in fact be less important than their membership in this particular group of narcissists, as Fromm (1973) argues was the case with Hitler, Stalin and Himmler.

#### *Interaction between Narcissism and Neuroticism*

Davis, Claridge and Brewer (1996) found evidence for a significant interaction between narcissism and neuroticism. In a study of the influence of both constructs on body esteem in women, the associations between body esteem and narcissism were complex and sensitive to the degree of neuroticism. High narcissism was associated with body esteem only at low levels of neuroticism. Increasing levels of neuroticism were associated with decreasing levels of body esteem at all levels of narcissism, but especially at high narcissism levels. The authors attribute this to the NPI mostly measuring adaptive aspects of narcissism in normal subjects, and the distinction between healthy and unhealthy narcissism. Narcissism and Neuroticism in these authors' view are largely independent sources of personality variance. Even within the same individual, narcissism is sometimes healthy and sometimes unhealthy, and therefore calls for empirical investigation throughout the life-span.

#### *Interaction between Healthy and Unhealthy Narcissism*

Davis, Claridge and Cerullo (1997) speculated that this interaction between narcissism and neuroticism may be due to pathological aspects of narcissism eroding the effects of healthy narcissism. To test this hypothesis, a second study of narcissism, neuroticism and body esteem in women the O'Brien Multiphasic Narcissism Inventory (OMNI, O'Brien, 1987). Regression analyses indicated that the slope of the relationship between healthy narcissism and body esteem was systematically attenuated by increases in pathological narcissism.

### *Cognitive Aspects of Narcissism*

In a study of narcissist's distortions of causal attributions, Hartouni (1992) found a significant association between narcissistic personality disorder and internal, stable attributions for positive outcomes in a sample of 20 patients diagnosed with narcissistic personality disorder and 20 neurotics assumed to be relatively low in narcissistic traits. On the basis of reformulated learned helplessness theory, Hartouni interprets narcissist's attribution style as a means to obliterate the experience of helplessness. Subject's attributions of negative outcomes were not statistically significant, although they were in the direction of external and specific. Hartouni suggests that, after securing controls, narcissists may feel confident they can overcome negative events. Hartouni indicates that further studies of the role of cognition in narcissism are needed to clarify the conditions under which narcissists are willing to accept responsibility for negative outcomes.

Consistent with theorising that linguistic styles reflect personalities, Raskin and Shaw (1988) found that high scorers on the NPI used more first person singular pronouns and fewer first person plural pronouns in monologues. This study also replicated Raskin's 1981 findings that the NPI is positively related to Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) extroversion and psychoticism.

Robins and John (1997) contrasted the predictions of theories of narcissism and cognitive-informational theories of self-perception bias. Viewing themselves from an external perspective boosted narcissists' self-confidence; narcissists overestimated their performances irrespective of perspective, and became even more positively biased when viewing themselves from an external perspective. Non-narcissists showed less bias when viewing themselves from the external perspective.

### **What should be done next?**

Narcissism is clearly not a unitary construct, and researchers have urged that future work attempt to elucidate the different subtypes of narcissism. Peck's "evil" subtype of narcissistic personality - which may as well be known as malignant narcissism – may be a specific subtype of malignant narcissism distinct from any disorder currently recognised by the DSM. In the psychometric portion of this thesis, combined questionnaire (survey) research will examine the joint factor space of measures of normal personality, abnormal personality, overt and covert narcissism, and measures of constructs that come under the penumbra of malignant narcissism. These constructs will include self-deception and impression management, affect intensity, sensitivity to criticism, hostility, splitting and empathy.

Studies of the cognitive mechanisms underpinning narcissism have also been called for in the research literature. Emmons (1987) points out that Linville's work on self-complexity (the capacity to differentiate among aspects of self) and affect suggests that narcissists may have simple self-representations, but that this has not been tested. Other promising investigations Emmons suggests are the attribution styles of people who differ in narcissism and the relation between subjective well-being, narcissistic defensiveness and self-esteem in healthy and pathological narcissists. Emmons believes that the potential for social conflict may increase in proportion to self-seeking, which may lessen individual willingness to pursue common social objectives. These will be addressed in the cognitive section of this thesis.

## Chapter 3: Psychometric Methodology and Rationale

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This study attempted to investigate the relationships between narcissism, normal personality, abnormal personality and traits theoretically related to malignant narcissism. Efforts to avoid specification error (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1995) - the omission of one or more key variables - had to be balanced against practical research considerations, such as increasing the demands on subjects to the point where sufficient numbers of subjects would not be willing to participate, or the timely availability of appropriate measures. Efforts to obtain the desired envy scale (Gold, 1996) were unsuccessful; the only known wilfulness scale, a subscale of Wink's California Q-set (Wink, 1996) is not a self-report scale; the absence of items that tap pathological submissiveness is a shortcoming of available self-report personality disorder scales; and there may be types of narcissism that are not tapped by the measures included.

### **Pilot Study**

A pilot study was conducted to estimate the time required to complete the questionnaires, and to ensure that the format of the questionnaire was easily understood. Initially, three subjects completed the eleven scales ultimately used, plus the Mach-IV measure of Machiavellianism, in 55 to 70 minutes. Two of the subjects complained that the Mach-IV was written too much from the male perspective (for example, a woman could not answer how she felt about her wife or girlfriend). In consideration of this, along with the fact that the Machiavellianism measure was more complicated than the other measures used, it was dropped. Without the Machiavellianism measure, three more subjects in the pilot study completed the questionnaire in 40, 41 and 50 minutes without making any errors, despite taking it in a pub. Two additional subjects accurately completed the questionnaires, but could not be timed as they insisted on taking the questionnaires home. Only one mistake was made by any of the pilot subjects. It was concluded that the questionnaire could be

accurately completed in about 45 minutes, especially since subjects in the full study would complete the questionnaires in the privacy of their own rooms.

### **Choice of Measures**

Table 1 summarises the instruments used in this study. Appendix 1 contains the full, combined-questionnaire used in this study.

#### *Normal Personality*

There is growing consensus among researchers that the Five Factor Model (FFM) or “Big 5” model of personality is the most appropriate model for normal personality (Digman, 1994). Normal personality was assessed by the **NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI)**, Costa and McCrae, 1992a). The NEO -FFI is a 60-item version of the NEO-Personality Inventory - Revised that is scored for the five domains of Neuroticism (N), Extraversion (E), Openness (O), Agreeableness (A) and Conscientiousness (C) that comprise the five factor model of normal personality. Each question is answered on a 5-point scale. The FFI does not assess the lower level facets of each domain, but it would have been difficult to recruit the number of subjects required should it be necessary to perform a factor analysis of a 240-item scale, especially as that would have increased the demands on subjects’ time. Internal consistency coefficients are .86, .77, .73, .68 and .81 for N, E, O, A and C respectively. In the five-factor model, narcissism is associated with high E and low A (Costa and McCrae, 1990; Ramanaiah, Detwiler and Byravan, 1994). This, and previously reported FFM associations with other personality disorders, were expected to be replicated. The associations between normal personality and the other constructs listed below are less well known.



### *Abnormal Personality*

Abnormal personality was assessed by the **Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire-4+ (PDQ-4+)**, Fossati, Maffei, Bagnato, Donati, Donini, Fiorilli, Novella and Ansoldi, 1998), developed by Steven Hyler to assess the ten official and two proposed-for-further-study DSM-IV personality disorders. This scale consists of 99 true or false questions. One item, question 37 (“Others will use what I tell them against me”, associated with the paranoid disorder), was inadvertently omitted. One subject circled both “true” and “false” to the question “people have difficulty understanding what I say” and wrote next to it “accent”. Since the intent of the question is to assess the presence of personality pathology and not accent, this response was scored as false.

The PDQ-4+ includes two questions intended to detect suspect questionnaires: item 64 “A nuclear war might not be such a bad idea” and item 76 “I have lied a lot on this questionnaire”. Questionnaires are considered “suspect” if the subject circles “true” to either of these questions. Moreover, if a subject neglected to answer either of these two questions, the questionnaire was considered a suspect questionnaire.

Because the PDQ-4+ is significantly different from previous versions of the PDQ, normative data were not available at the time of this study. Subsequently, low agreement was observed between the PDQ-4+ and the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders, Version 2.0 (SCID-II), and satisfactory discriminatory capability demonstrated only for the dependent and antisocial scales (Fossati, Maffei, Bagnato, Donati, Donini, Fiorilli, Novella and Ansoldi, 1998).

Using structural equation modelling, Hamburger, Lilienfeld and Hogben (1996) found support for hypotheses that psychopathy underlies both antisocial and histrionic personality

traits and that the relationship between psychopathy and both antisocial and histrionic traits is moderated by gender, but not for the hypothesis of moderation by gender roles. Since leading psychopathy experts regard psychopathy as the combination of pathological narcissism and social deviance (Harpur, Hare and Hart, 1994) and to test Bursten's view of narcissism, it was hypothesised that at least one measure of narcissism would underlie the narcissistic, antisocial, histrionic and paranoid personality disorders. A stronger hypothesis was that at least one measure of narcissism would underlie all personality disorders, as measured by the PDQ-4+.

A four-factor structure of abnormal personality was expected. Previous studies have consistently found one factor related to impulsive, sociopathic behaviour and one related to avoidant, dependent behaviour. Most identify two further factors, one involving obsessive-compulsive behaviours and another involving social indifference and oddness (Mulder and Joyce, 1997). Since this study included many measures of narcissism and constructs theoretically related to narcissism, the results likely do not assess all characteristics of abnormal personality equally. Nevertheless, narcissism and the included constructs are most likely higher level constructs flowing into a variety of personality pathology.

### *Narcissism*

Overt Narcissism was assessed by the **Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI**, Raskin and Hall, 1979). The NPI is a 40-item, forced choice measure intended for non-clinical populations. The NPI has a four factor (Emmons, 1984; Emmons, 1987) solution and a seven-factor solution (Raskin and Terry, 1988). The four factor components are labelled Leadership-Authority (LA), Self-Absorption/Self-Admiration (SS), Superiority/Arrogance (SA) and Exploiteness/Entitlement (EE). The seven-factor components are labelled authority, exhibitionism, superiority, vanity, exploitiveness,

entitlement and self-sufficiency. Scores were computed for both solutions. The total NPI has an alpha of .83, a mean of 15.6 and a standard deviation of 6.7 (Watson, personal communication). There are no published alphas for the subscales.

It was expected that the Exploitiveness/Entitlement factor of the four factor, and the exploitiveness and entitlement factors of the seven factor solutions, would be associated with narcissistic, antisocial, paranoid and histrionic disorders. All NPI factors, and the pseudoautonomy (PA) scale, were expected to be associated with PDQ Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

Covert Narcissism was assessed by the **Pseudoautonomy (PA)** and **Shame Proneness (SP)** scales (Patton and Meara, 1992), both based on the writings of Kohut. The PA is an 8-item, forced choice scale reflecting Kohut's conception of grandiosity as hypersensitivity and independence from others in a kind of rebellious non-conformity; item analysis of the PA scale yielded a Cronbach reliability of 0.77 (Patton and Meara, 1992). The SP is a 10-item Likert scale. The SP has a published alpha estimate of .93 and a two-week test-retest reliability of .81 (Patton and Meara, 1992). The PA seemed to be the shortest available measure of covert narcissism.

It was also hypothesised that, if the four factor structure of abnormal personality (Mulder and Joyce, 1997) was replicated, these would be distinguishable by the patterns of their associations with the NPI factors and covert narcissism: for example, certainly exploitiveness/entitlement (and possibly superiority/arrogance) should predict Mulder and Joyce's antisocial factor; measures of covert narcissism may go with the avoidant/dependent behaviour factor.

Vulnerability to shame is so central to most conceptions of narcissism that inverse correlations between shame and some measures of narcissism, including the NPI, have puzzled researchers (Watson, Little, Sawrite and Biderman, 1992). It was hypothesised that this inverse relationship could be accounted for by measures of defensiveness (socially desirable responding). SP was also expected to be associated with covert narcissism and avoidant personality disorder.

### *Self-Deception and Impression Management.*

The **Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR, Paulhus, 1991)** was used to assess self-deception and impression management. This scale is a descendent of the self- and other- deception scales developed by Sackheim and Gur (1979), which were based on psychoanalytic theory, but recent versions focus on exaggerated claims of positive cognitive attributes (Paulhus, 1991).

The BIDR has 20 items each for self-deceptive enhancement (SDE), self-deceptive denial (SDD) and impression management (IM), each answered on a 7-point scale. The recommended method for scoring the BIDR is to score one point for each response of six or seven for each of the three subscales. There are no normative data for the denial subscale. For the SDE and IM scales, typical alphas are .67 - .77 for SDE and .77 - .85 for IM; test-retest reliability (5 - week) is .69 and .65, respectively. The means (with standard deviations) for males and females are: SDE males 7.6 (3.1) and females 7.3 (3.1), and IM 7.3 (3.1) for male and 8.9 (3.2) for females (Paulhus, 1991).

In previous studies (Paulhus and Reid, 1991), self-deceptive enhancement was positively correlated with high self-esteem (.34,  $p < .01$ ), illusion of control (.28,  $p < .01$ ) self-fulfilling prophecy (.16,  $p < .01$ ), and dogmatic thinking (.23,  $p < .01$ ); self-deceptive denial was associated with denial of hostility (.42), sexuality (.22) and undesirable acts (.54, all

$p < .01$ ). Malignant narcissists who have achieved a high degree of political power (Fromm, 1965) have certainly employed impression management, at least at times. Narcissism in general, however, has been negatively correlated with social desirability. A minority of subjects who score high on narcissism may thus also score high on impression management. SDE was expected to be positively correlated with all narcissism measures and personality disorders. SDD was predicted to correlate with hostility, low empathy, low A, measures of narcissism, and with PDQ 4+ narcissistic, antisocial, histrionic and paranoid disorders. The view taken here is that self-deception is a general mechanism underlying denial, repression, reaction formation, illusion, self-serving bias and other defences.

### *Affect Intensity*

Affect intensity was included because of the DSM criteria that narcissists react to criticism and defeat with unusual intensity, and the Kohutian conception of narcissistic rage (Kohut, 1972). Larsen's **Affect Intensity Measure (AIM)** (Larsen and Diener, 1987) was used. Larsen originally presented a structure of five oblique factors with eigenvalues greater than one; subsequently, four and three factor solutions have been reported (Larsen and Diener, 1987; Bryant and Yarnold, 1996). The four-factor solution consisting of positive intensity, positive reactivity, negative intensity and negative reactivity was used in this study. The three-factor solution collapses positive reactivity and intensity into one factor, labelled "positive affectivity". Larsen and Diener report test-retest reliabilities for the total scale at 1-, 2- and 3- month intervals of .80, .81 and .81, a 2 year test-retest correlation of .75, and Cronbach's alpha across four separate samples as .90 to .94. These figures are not available for the three, four or five subscales of the previous reported factor models. Individuals prone to narcissistic rage, including Narcissistic, Antisocial, Histrionic and Paranoid personalities, were predicted to be correlated with negative intensity and reactivity.

### *Sensitivity to Criticism*

Sensitivity to criticism has been considered a central characteristic of the obsessive-compulsive, narcissistic and paranoid personality disorders, but there is a paucity of empirical evidence to substantiate these claims. Some researchers have found elevated levels of fear of criticism in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) patients; others have argued that fear of criticism is not specific to OCD but a characteristic of complex phobias (Atlas, 1994). It was hypothesised that high scores on Atlas' (1994) **Sensitivity to Criticism Scale (SCS)** would be associated with avoidant, obsessive-compulsive, narcissistic and paranoid personality disorders, and with high narcissism measures, particularly exploitiveness and entitlement. Subjects who report low sensitivity to criticism and high defensiveness were hypothesised to show profiles similar to repressors, who have previously been identified as low self-report anxiety and high self-report defensiveness (Weinberger, 1990).

Past research on sensitivity to criticism has used instruments that may include, but are not limited to sensitivity to criticism, such as measures of interpersonal sensitivity, which are global measures of responsiveness to others rather than specific measures of sensitivity to criticism (Atlas, 1994). Biscardi and Schill (1985) used the Defence Mechanism Inventory to gauge narcissists' response to criticism. Gunderson, Ronningstam and Smith (1996) found sensitivity to criticism to be among the poorest discriminators between narcissistic and other personality disorders and suggested that it could be either dropped or modified. Sensitivity to criticism and defeat was, however, one of the 4 factors in narcissism found by Mullins and Koppelman (1988). An important issue here is: Is there a distinction between *sensitivity* to criticism and *intolerance* of criticism or narcissistic injury, which may be quite subtle? The above relationship between sensitivity to criticism and defensiveness could prove interesting in this regard.



The SCS scale conceptualises sensitivity to criticism as involving a threshold for perception of criticism and emotional reaction to criticism. It should therefore be related to all factors of the AIM. The SCS has been associated with neuroticism, depression, fear of negative evaluation, pessimistic explanatory style, low self-esteem, repression, decreased academic motivation and performance and avoidance of opportunity to receive critical feedback (Atlas, 1994). The scale consists of hypothetical situations in which subjects may perceive criticism, and asks subjects to rate on a 7-point Likert scale both the degree of perceived criticism and the extent to which they would feel hurt by such a situation. The full SCS contains 30 items. Many of these items, which were developed in America, were considered inappropriate for British respondents. These items were fortunately absent from the short version. Therefore the short version, which includes 15 items, was used. One subject had a SCS score of 30, the lowest score possible and well below all other scores. Although an extreme outlier, this score was kept.

### *Hostility*

Hostility was measured by the **Hostility** subscale of the **Aggression Questionnaire** (Buss and Perry, 1992). The Aggression Questionnaire was constructed in order to bring the earlier Hostility inventory of 1957, one of the most frequently used aggression questionnaires, up to current psychometric standards while retaining the virtue of analysis of aggression into several components. Buss and Durkee's factor analytic research on aggression (1957) found two factors, one consisting of assault, indirect aggression, irritability and verbal aggression (labelled "aggressiveness"), the other consisting of resentment and suspicion (labelled "hostility"). This work resulted in the Hostility inventory, whose division into seven separate scales to measure Assault, Indirect Aggression, Irritability, Negativism, Resentment, Suspicion and Verbal Aggression made the instrument very popular with aggression researchers. Subsequent factor analytic studies, however, resulted in different factors. Commonly the factors received labels such



as Covert and Overt Hostility, or Assault and Verbal Aggression vs. Resentment and Suspicion. Factors were not invariant across samples of subjects (Buss and Perry, 1992).

The full Aggression Questionnaire contains physical aggression, verbal aggression, anger and hostility subscales. In the interest of keeping the questionnaire as short as possible, only the Hostility subscale was used. This subscale has an alpha of .77, and a test-retest correlation of .72 (Buss and Perry, 1992). The Hostility subscale contains 8 items measured on a 5-point Likert scale, and is a combination of resentment and suspicion items, which were separate scales in the original 7-subscale inventory (Buss and Perry, 1992). Narcissism factors of exploitiveness and entitlement, personality disorders falling under the antisocial "A" were expected to be associated with hostility, as was sensitivity to criticism.

### *Splitting*

Splitting plays a central role in many theoretical accounts of narcissism, psychopathology and self-deception. The construct of splitting is most developed in the writings of Kernberg (1975) which were the theoretical foundation of the **Splitting Index (SI)**, Gould, Prentice and Ainslie, 1996). The SI contains 24 items in three 8-item subscales of Splitting of Self-Images, Splitting of Family Images and Splitting of Other images. Gould, Prentice and Ainslie (1996) report alpha coefficients of .90 for the full 24-item measure, and .89, .85 and .84 for the self-, family- and other- subscales, and test-retest correlations (n=31) of .86 for the total scale, .83 for self-images, .90 for family images and .75 for other-images. The total scale does not show significant gender differences, but females have scored significantly higher than males on the self-factor, while males have scored significantly higher than females on the other-factor

Since many authors have considered splitting the hallmark defence in borderline, narcissistic and other severe personality disorders, the SI was expected to be significantly correlated with the PDQ-4+ total score, as well as its narcissistic, histrionic, antisocial, borderline, paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal scales, and with all measures of narcissism. Other associations were predicted with self-deception, narcissism, affect intensity, sensitivity to criticism, hostility and lack of empathy. In the five factor model, splitting was expected to go with low A and high N.

### *Empathy*

According to Davis (1980), a distinction between cognitive and emotional aspects of empathy has existed for at least 200 years, and until recently research efforts tended to focus on one or the other. A growing consensus among empathy researchers holds that the cognitive and affective components comprise an interdependent system in which each influences the other. Preliminary evidence points to predictive superiority of considering both aspects together (Davis, 1980).

Most available individual differences measures of empathy are intended to tap either the cognitive or the emotional dimension, not both, and have been criticised for lack of precision. Some of these instruments, such as Hogan's empathy measure (used in the Biscardi and Schill study), include both cognitive and emotional items, but yield only a single empathy score (Davis, 1980). Since separate assessments of the cognitive and emotional aspects of empathy were desired, empathy was assessed using the **Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)**, Davis, 1980). The IRI was used in the Watson, Little, Sawrite and Biderman (1992) study, which found that the NPI EE factor was associated with lower levels of emotional and cognitive empathy, less self-esteem and more distress.

The IRI contains 28 items assessed on a 5-point Likert scale. Some of these items were borrowed or adapted from previous measures, but most were written specifically for the IRI. A four-factor structure that was nearly identical for both sexes emerged in two independent samples. The scales comprising the four factors have substantial test-retest and internal reliabilities (see below). For both sexes, the 7 items comprising the scale were the 7 loading most heavily on that factor, and only 1 item loaded significantly on 2 factors (Davis, 1980).

The perspective taking (PT; standardised alpha coefficients .75 males, .78 females) scale measures the tendency to adopt the perspectives of other people. The fantasy scale (FS; standardised alpha coefficients: .78 males, .75 females) measures the tendency to identify with characters in fictional settings such as movies and stories, and includes three items from Stotland's 1978 empathy scale. These two subscales tap the cognitive dimension of empathy. The empathic concern (EC; standardised alpha coefficients .72 males, .70 females) scale measures feelings of warmth, compassion and concern for others. The personal distress (PD; standardised alpha coefficients .78 males, .78 females) scale measures the tendency to experience anxiety and discomfort in response to the negative experiences of others. These last two subscales tap the emotional dimension of empathy. In a sample of 56 male and 53 female undergraduates, test-retest reliabilities (over 60 to 75 days) for the subscales ranged from .61 to .79 for males and .62 to .81 for females. Consistent with previous research, females score higher than males on all 4 subscales, with the largest difference being on the FS and the smallest on PT (Davis, 1980).

Intercorrelations between the subscales are similar for both sexes. The two cognitive subscales, FS and PT, correlate about .10 in both sexes, while the two emotional subscales correlate .11 for males and .01 for females. In both sexes, there is a moderate correlation (.33 males, .30 females) between FS and EC and a negative correlation (-.16 and -.29)

between PT and PD. Thus, there is some association between cognitive and emotional, but they are not measuring the same construct (Davis, 1980).

Greater perspective taking is associated with less personal distress and more concern for others (Davis, 1980). Davis interprets this as supporting Hoffman's views on the development of empathy: early in development, there is little differentiation between self and others; the distress of others tends to be experienced as one's own. With the development of role-taking skills and the capacity to adopt another's perspective, this self-centred "empathic distress" gives way to other-oriented "sympathetic concern" or compassion and concern for the other (Davis, 1980). It was thus hypothesised that narcissists would show deficits in PT and excess PD. Narcissists' preoccupation with fantasies of unlimited success, power, beauty, etc. were expected to be reflected in high FS scores. In the five factor model, fantasy was expected to be correlated with O, personal distress with N, empathic concern with A.

The type of malignant narcissist proposed as having an evil character structure would be expected to score high on all NPI factors, self-deception, impression management, affect intensity, sensitivity to criticism, hostility, splitting, and empathy the facet of fantasy, low on other empathy facets. While the mathematical complexity of combining so many different factors does not permit a profile to be constructed from the data here, the overall personality profiles of any subject in this category would be interesting.

### **Subjects and Response Rate**

Due to the multiple constructs being measured, each with their potential effect size in their association with the others, this study did not lend itself to a power analysis. A minimum subjects-to-questions ratio of 3:1 for the longest questionnaire that might have to be factor analysed was sought. Since the longest individual questionnaire consisted of 98 questions

(one question was inadvertently omitted from the PDQ-4+) an absolute minimum of 294 subjects were required, should item-level factor analysis be necessary for a scale.

The above 11 scales were stapled together in a single package. Subjects were 374 residents of University of Edinburgh Halls of Residence. The author went door-to-door, requesting students to complete the combined questionnaires. Of the 374 completed questionnaires successfully retrieved, 36 were suspect questionnaires: the subject either answered "true" to either item 64 ("A nuclear war might not be such a bad idea") or item 76 ("I have lied a lot on this questionnaire"), or failed to answer one or both of these items. Eight questionnaires were insufficiently completed. Eighteen were accepted by potential subjects, but never returned. There were 37 outright refusals, and 115 requests for the researcher to come back another time. If subjects inquired what the study was about, they were told that it was an individual differences study in the areas of personality psychology, investigating how people differ on various measures of personality. The principal investigator returned in approximately one hour to collect the questionnaires. There were a total of 338 non-suspect questionnaires.

If only non-suspect, completed questionnaires are counted as acceptances, and refusals, comeback requests, and unreturned, incomplete and suspect questionnaires are counted as refusals, the worst case response rate is 62% from "cold calling". If both suspect and non-suspect questionnaires are counted as "completed questionnaires" and all incomplete, unreturned, refusals and comebacks counted as refusals, the response rate improves to 68%. If the eight incomplete questionnaires are not counted as refusals, a questionnaire was successfully retrieved from 69% of those approached. If the 18 questionnaires that were accepted but never returned are counted as acceptances, 72% of persons approached as potential subjects accepted. If only outright refusals are counted against the response rate, the response rate soars to over 93%.

There is considerable ambiguity about the distinction between suspect and non-suspect questionnaires. Subjects who answered “true” to both “I have never told a lie” and “Lying comes easily to me and I often do it” do not qualify as suspect questionnaires. The Cronbach alphas of the suspect questionnaires were examined, and in many cases exceeded those of the non-suspect questionnaires. Interestingly, subjects with suspect questionnaires were nearly a full standard deviation higher than subjects with non-suspect questionnaires on antisocial personality. Many of them seemed to be valid questionnaires. For example, one subject who threw the completed questionnaire out into the hallway with “don’t come back” written on it scored very high on hostility. In one case, the investigator had reason to suspect that the final nine questions on the BIDR were not filled out by the same person that completed the remainder of the questions. This was scored as a suspect questionnaire. Since there were more than enough non-suspect questionnaires to meet requirements, suspect questionnaires are not included in the analysis.

### **Audit**

All data were entered at the item level into an SPSS database. A ten- percent audit was performed on the item-level data entry of the non-suspect questionnaires. Overall, 38 errors were found in the 34 audited questionnaires. This yields an error rate of just over 1 per 406 questions, or about  $2.86 \times 10^{-3}$ . There were substantially more errors at the beginning: 17 errors in the 5 earlier questionnaires, for an average of 3.4 per questionnaire, about 0.87 percent. After that, there were only 21 data entry errors in 29 questionnaires - less than 1 per questionnaire (i.e. 406 items). Examination of the frequencies for the 406 data entry items for the 338 non-suspect questionnaires confirmed that there were no out-of-range values.

**Table 3.1: Instruments Used**

Scale Name	Acronym	Key Reference	Factors and Acronyms	Number of Items	Response Format
NEO Five Factor Inventory	NEO-FFI	Costa and McCrae, 1992a	Neuroticism (N), Extraversion (E), Openness (O), Agreeableness (A), Conscientiousness (C)	60	5-point Likert
Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire-4+	PDQ-4+	Fossati, Maffei, Bagnato, Donati, Donini, Fiorilli, Novella and Ansoldi, 1998	Narcissistic (NAR), Antisocial (ASP), Histrionic (HIS), Paranoid (PAR), Borderline (BOR), Negativistic (NEG), Schizoid (SZD), Schizotypal (STP), Obsessive-Compulsive (OC), Avoidant (AVD), Dependent (DEP), Depressive (DPR)	99	True/False



Narcissistic Personality Inventory	NPI	Raskin and Hall, 1979	<p><i>Four Factor Solution:</i> Exploitativeness/Entitlement (EE), Leadership/Authority (LA), Superiority/Arrogance (SA) Self-Sufficiency/Self-Admiration (SS);</p> <p><i>Seven Factor Solution:</i> Authority (AUT), Exploitativeness (EXP), Entitlement (ENT), Exhibitionism (EXH), Superiority (SUP), Sufficiency (SUF), Vanity (VAN)</p>	40	Forced Choice (Example "I have a strong will to power" or "power for its own sake doesn't interest me.")
Pseudoautonomy	PA	Patton and Meara, 1992	N/A	8	Forced Choice (Example: "I do what I want" or "Most always, I follow the law")

Shame Proneness	SP	Patton and Meara, 1992	N/A	10	6-point Likert
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding	BIDR	Paulhus, 1991	Self-Deceptive Enhancement (SDE), Self-Deceptive Denial (SDD), Impression Management (IM)	60	7-point Likert
Affect Intensity Measure	AIM	Larsen and Diener, 1987	Negative Intensity (NI), Negative Reactivity (NR), Positive Intensity (PI), Positive Reactivity (PR)	40	6-point Likert
Sensitivity to Criticism Scale	SCS	Atlas, 1994	N/A	15	7-point Likert
Hostility	Host	Buss and Perry, 1992	N/A	8	5-point Likert
Splitting Index	SI	Gould, Prentice and Ainslie, 1996	Splitting of Self-Images (SSI), Splitting of Family Images (SFI), Splitting of Other-Images (SOI)	24	5-point Likert
Interpersonal Reactivity Index	IRI	Davis, 1980	Perspective Taking (PT), Fantasy (FS), Empathic Concern (EC), Personal Distress (PD)	28	5-point Likert

## Chapter 4: Examination of the Psychometric Data

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In a multivariate analysis, missing data, the influence of outliers and violations of the assumptions of techniques used can be compounded across several variables to have substantial effects (Hair et al, 1995). The data were therefore screened to determine the extent of their suitability for various statistical techniques.

### Missing Data

In a minority of cases, a subject failed to answer all items on a questionnaire. Some of these missing responses were what Hair et al (1995) call “censored data” - the question was not valid for that subject. For example, to the BIDR item “I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit” some subjects wrote “do not drive” instead of answering on the 7-point scale. More often, there was no stated or obvious reason why the question was left unanswered. Where the number of missing values was small, the mean of the subject’s responses to other items on that specific subscale was substituted. Thus, for example, if an item from the exploitiveness/entitlement subscale of the NPI was missing, the mean of that subject’s responses on the remaining items of the exploitiveness/entitlement subscale was substituted, not the mean of the subject’s total NPI score. This “all available imputation” approach has the advantage that the mean is the best single replacement value; it has the disadvantages of understating the true variance in the data, distorting the true distribution of values and depressing the observed correlations of a variable (Hair et al, 1995). These disadvantages were considered acceptable because the number of substitutions required was small. As can be seen from Table 4.1, after imputation, no scale had more than three subjects with missing data; most had none.

**Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Variables (Non-suspect Questionnaires)**

Variable (See Fold- out)	Cases with Valid Data	Mean	Standard Deviation	Smallest Value	Highest Value	Missing Cases	Cron- bach's Alpha
A	338	30.1	6.0	11	46	0	.75
AIM_AVG	335	3.8	0.5	2.4	5.5	3	.88
ASP	338	1.4	1.4	0	5	0	.46
AUT	338	3.5	2.2	0	8	0	.73
AVD	338	2.7	1.9	0	7	0	.64
BIDR_IM	338	5.4	3.0	0	15	0	.74
BIDR_SD	338	6.1	2.8	0	16	0	.73
D							
BIDR_SD	338	5.4	2.9	0	17	0	.67
E							
BOR	338	2.4	1.7	0	8	0	.49
C	338	28.5	7.7	4	47	0	.86
DEP	338	1.5	1.5	0	7	0	.45
DPR	338	3.1	1.8	0	7	0	.64
E	338	30.2	6.4	11	48	0	.77
EC	338	25.7	4.4	11	35	0	.77
EE	338	2.0	1.9	0	9	0	.64
ENT	338	1.6	1.5	0	6	0	.57
EXH	338	1.9	1.8	0	7	0	.70
EXP	338	1.4	1.3	0	5	0	.52
FS	338	24.1	4.9	9	35	0	.74
HIS	338	2.4	1.7	0	8	0	.54
HOST	337	22.4	6.1	8	40	1	.82
LA	338	3.4	2.4	0	8	0	.76
N	338	22.4	8.6	2	48	0	.87
NAR	338	2.8	1.8	0	9	0	.51
NEG	338	2.1	1.6	0	7	0	.40
NI	335	3.4	0.8	1.2	5.8	3	.68
NPI_TOT	338	12.9	6.8	1	37	0	.85
NR	338	4.0	0.8	1.3	6.0	0	.63
O	338	31.3	6.2	16	46	0	.73
OC	338	3.2	1.4	0	7	0	.28
PA	337	0.9	1.2	0	6	1	.54
PAR	338	2.3	1.4	0	6	0	.40
PD	338	19.3	4.3	8	32	0	.73
PDQ_TOT	338	27.4	11.1	4	69	0	.88
PI	336	3.9	0.9	1.9	6.0	2	.83
PR	335	4.1	0.7	2.0	6.0	3	.80
PT	338	23.9	4.9	10	34	0	.78
SA	338	2.4	1.7	0	8	0	.55
SCS	337	133.7	27.7	30	194	1	.90
SFI	338	1.8	0.8	1.0	4.9	0	.85
SI_TOT	338	2.3	0.6	1.0	4.3	0	.88
SOI	338	2.1	0.7	1.0	4.6	0	.85
SP_TOT	338	30.1	9.0	10	60	0	.82
SS	338	2.2	1.9	0	7	0	.67
SSI	338	3.0	0.8	1.0	5.0	0	.84

STP	338	2.4	1.7	0	8	0	.47
SUF	338	1.8	1.4	0	6	0	.43
SUP	338	1.7	1.3	0	5	0	.46
SZD	338	0.9	1.1	0	5	0	.32
VAN	338	1.0	1.0	0	3	0	.66

### Outliers, Normality and Other Assumptions

Histograms and frequency diagrams were examined for all scales used. Frequencies confirmed that all cases were in the expected range; for example, responses on all 7-point scale items ranged from 1 to 7. Extreme scores were investigated to ensure that they were not due to scoring or data entry errors, but not discarded; for example, one subject reported the lowest possible score (30) on the Sensitivity to Criticism Scale. This was 33 points lower than the second lowest score, and one of four extreme values reported by the stem and leaf. Upon investigation, these questionnaires were accurately scored, and were not discarded.

Deviations from normality are unavoidable in some of the measures used, such as personality disorder scales, where subjects are often reluctant to endorse items related to psychopathology or socially undesirable traits. Candidates for transformation were identified from the histograms, but transformations were found to make negligible differences. For example, the Splitting of Family Images (SFI) variable is positively skewed. If one performs the recommended remedy (logarithmic transformation) to normalise this distribution (Hair et al, 1995), the resulting correlations with N, E, O, A and C become respectively .28, -.09, -.01, -.21, and -.14, compared to .28, -.11, -.01, -.21 and -.15 for the untransformed variable. Antisocial Personality (ASP) is an example of a scale on which many subjects will not endorse any items, and few will endorse many items. Transforming ASP scores by adding one to each score and taking the logarithm results in correlations of -.06, .10, .11, -.36, and -.31 with N, E, O, A and C, compared with untransformed correlation of -.06, .14, .14, -.34 and -.30. Since these

transformations introduce interpretation issues without substantially changing the correlations, it was decided not to transform any of the variables. The planned analyses (Pearson correlations, factor analyses and structural equation models) are able to cope with a degree of deviation from normality, and previously published research of this type has not often used transformations.

Cronbach alphas (Table 1) ranged from excellent (.90 for the Sensitivity to Criticism Scale) to appalling (.28 for obsessive compulsive personality).

### **Gender Differences**

Examination of the correlation matrixes (Tables 4.2 – 4.5) revealed significant gender differences in the data. The most striking (Table 4.2) is that there is a strong negative correlation between N and A for females (-.33,  $p < .001$ ,  $N = 164$ ) but not for males (-.04,  $p = .56$ ,  $N = 174$ ). Additional significant gender differences are collected in Table 4.6.

The probability of committing a type one error through the repeated use of significance tests, each of which has a given probability of error, is unacceptably high in this data set. If the variables were all independent, and the probability of error was .05 in each case, for  $p$  independent tests there would be a probability of  $1 - 0.95^p$  of falsely identifying at least one significant difference (Manly, 1986). The variables in this data set are not all independent, and the probability of error is often less than .05, but the same principle applies, and there are hundreds of tests. A multivariate analysis is clearly necessary. There are relatively few gender differences, and detailed examination of gender differences is beyond the scope of this thesis. A chapter with separate analyses for each gender will be included, but further examination is left to future research.

**Table 4.2: NEO-FFI Intercorrelation Matrix for Males (Above Diagonal, N=174) and Females (Below Diagonal, N=164)**

	N	E	O	A	C
<b>Neuroticism (N)</b>	-	-.35	-.04	-.04†	-.18
<b>Extraversion (E)</b>	-.47	-	.10	.09	.09
<b>Openness to Experience (O)</b>	-.11	.11	-	-.02	-.18
<b>Agreeableness (A)</b>	-.33†	.27	-.01	-	.09
<b>Conscientiousness (C)</b>	-.26	.22	-.03	.20	-

† = correlation significantly different between genders

### Assessment

On the basis of the associations among many variables of interest, it was decided to subject the data to factor analysis and structural equation modelling. Multiple regression analysis assumes perfect measurement of variables (Hair et al, 1995). The Cronbach's alphas of this data set clearly violate this assumption. The highly intercorrelated variables, however, suggest that the variance among these variables may be explainable by a smaller set of higher-order variables via factor analytic techniques. SEM is particularly appropriate since it provides an assessment the degree of imperfection in measurement and whether or not an independent variables failure to predict a dependent variable is due to poor reliability of measuring instrument. Since some of the subscales of the NPI share items, it will be necessary to derive new subscales for the NPI.



**Table 4.3 Associations among Personality Disorders by Gender (Females below Diagonal, Males above Diagonal)**

	NAR	ASP	HIS	PAR	BOR	NEG	SZD	STP	OC	DPR	DEP	AVD
Narcissistic (NAR)	.51											
Antisocial (ASP)	.31	.39										
Histrionic (HIS)	.46	.24	.35									
Paranoid (PAR)	.28	.31	.26	.40								
Borderline (BOR)	.35	.40	.41	.46†	.49							
Negativistic (NEG)	.48	.23	.46†	.45	.49	.40						
Schizoid (SZD)	.22	.11	-.09	.20	.23	.23	.32					
Schizotypal (STP)	.36	.24	.26	.38	.40	.30	N/A	.47				
Obsessive-Compulsive (OC)	.25	-.04	.17	.23	.16	.35	.05	.17	.28			
Depressive (DPR)	.22	.02	.28	.29	.41	.47	.17	.25	.37	.64		
Dependent (DEP)	.24	.07	.39	.19	.38	.46	.09	.28	.30	.39	.45	
Avoidant (AVD)	.27	.03	.17	.31	.45	.48	.32	.33	.25	.63	.59	.64

N = 164 females, 174 males. Figures in diagonals are Cronbach's alphas combining both genders.

correlations above approximately .15 are  $p < .05$

correlations above approximately .20 are  $p < .01$

correlations above approximately .27 are  $p < .001$

† = correlation significantly different between genders.

Table 4.4: Intercorrelations among Measures of Narcissism by Gender (Females below Diagonal, Males Above)

	NPI	EE	LA	SS	SA	AUT	EXH	ENT	EXP	SUP	SUF	VAN	PA	SP	NAR
NPI	(.85)														
EE		(.64)		.40	.50					.35		.23	.38	-.06	.55
LA			(.76)	.50				.50		.40			.24	-.14	.38
SS		.43	.43	(.67)	.28	.34	.37	.34	.26				.22	-.12	.44
SA		.44		.42	(.55)			.52		.32		.13	.30	-.13	.28
AUT				.41		(.73)	.43	.52	.47	.36	.21	.17	.26	-.16	.34
EXH				.40		.40	(.70)	.40	.37	.41	.13	.35	.28	.09	.46
ENT			.43	.29	.42	.41	.28	(.57)	.42	.30	.34	.14	.37	.11	.50†
EXP				.35		.35	.37	.27	(.52)	.27	.24	.15	.23	-.03	.34
SUP		.35	.40		.42	.39	.33	.30	.33	(.46)	.23	.38	.19	-.10	.40
SUF					.34	.34	.21	.28	.33	.26	(.43)	.18	.26	-.16	.10
VAN		.30			.18	.18	.33	.11	.14	.42	.17	(.66)	.08	-.06	.33
PA	.31	.30	.12	.25	.18	.11	.24	.30	.22	.15	.26	.15	(.54)	.15	.30
SP	-.23	.03	-.23	-.27	-.32	-.32	.03	.02	-.10	-.16	-.27	-.17	.04	(.82)	.18
NAR	.39	.48	.26	.34	.16	.22	.35	.31†	.25	.27	.13	.24	.25	.24	(.51)

† = correlation significantly different for males and females.

correlations above approximately .15 are  $p < .05$

correlations above approximately .20 are  $p < .01$

correlations above approximately .27 are  $p < .001$

- = part-whole correlations that would be spurious associations

A list of acronyms is available as a foldout chart (Appendix 3).

Table 4.5: Intercorrelations among Constructs Related to Narcissism

IM	SDE	SDD	AIM	NI	NR	PI	PR	HO	SCS	SI	SSI	SFI	SOI	EC	FS	PD	PT
IM	.30	.49	-.05	-.04	.20	.05	-.12	-.27	-.16	-.26	-.20	-.19	-.21	.17	-.05	-.12	.36
SDE	.16	.26	-.10	-.23	-.06	.05	.04	-.32	-.17	-.45	-.39	-.30	-.34	-.11†	-.16	-.33	-.00
SDD	.51	.21	-.07	-.08	.29	.09	-.12	-.39	-.09	-.34	-.21	-.24	-.33	.34	-.09	-.17	.33
AIM	-.01	-.05	-.11	-	-	-	-	.15	.18	.14	.31	.07	-.11	.44	.34	.21	-.05
NI	-.09	-.13	-.17	-	.45	.42	.49	.32	.17	.27	.35	.21	.03	.33	.16	.34	.03
NR	.15	-.04	.12	.37	.12	.37	.43	.01	.26	-.05	.16	-.12	-.19	.60	.27	.26	.36†
PI	-.01	.09	.01	-.32	.30	.69	.72	.02	.05	-.02	.14	.00	-.22	.38†	.24	.00	.04
PR	-.03	.12	-.09	-.36	.30	.03	.07	.11	.16	.05	.22	-.02	-.11	.32	.26	.10	-.03
HO	-.18	-.19	-.23	.47	.13	-.03	.02	.34	.23	.49	.40	.33	.37	-.04	.05	.38	-.17
SCS	-.15	-.26	-.07	.14	.29	-.05	.02	.50	.24	.12	.20	-.02	.07	.12	.00	.22	-.06
SI	-.29	-.30	-.28	.35	-.00	-.05	-.07	.56	.29	-	-	-	-	-.10	.15	.36	-.19
SSI	-.21	-.29	-.21	.46	.10	.12	.14	.24	.13	-	.21	.29	.30	.13	.29	.21	-.07
SFI	-.20	-.18	-.20	.21	-.06	-.05	-.08	.24	.13	-	.36	.41	.46	-.13	-.01	.36	-.13
SOI	-.24	-.20	-.22	.10	-.05	-.19	-.22	.31	.11	-	.08	.26	.33	-.26	.02	.25	-.24
EC	.30	.13†	.27	.14	.42	.17†	.22	.09	-.08	-.30	-.08	-.26	-.33	.22	.32	.15	.41
FS	.01	-.04	-.05	.34	.31	.32	.36	.18	.07	.14	.36	-.02	-.04	.22	.22	.11	-.00
PD	-.14	-.31	-.10	.40	.25	.05	.08	.35	.37	.33	.40	.21	.11	-.05	.22	.11	-.01
PT	.25	.16	.28	-.04	.12†	.05	.03	-.20	-.25	-.25	-.06	-.26	-.24	.46	.20	-.20	-.01

N= 174 for males (above diagonal), except correlations involving HOST where N = 173.

N= 164 for females (below diagonal), except correlations involving AIM, NI, and PR (N=161), PI (N= 162) and SCS (N=163).

† = correlation significantly different between genders. - = spurious/invalid correlation

correlations above approximately .15 are p<.05  
 correlations above approximately .20 are p<.01  
 correlations above approximately .27 are p<.001  
 A list of acronyms is available as a foldout chart

**Table 4.6 Significantly Different Correlations Between Males (N=174) and Females (N = 164)<sup>1</sup>**

Variables	Correlation (m)	Correlation (f)	z	p (2-tailed)
N-A	-.04	-.33	-2.76	.01
NEG-HIS	.23	.46	2.40	.02
PAR-BOR	.26	.46	2.11	.02
EC-SDE	.13	-.11	2.19	.03
EC-PI	.38	.17	2.08	.04
NR-PT	.12	.36	2.23	.02
NAR-ENT	.50	.31	2.08	.04

<sup>1</sup> Significance correlation differences were determined using the INDEPCOR of Professor John Crawford of the University of Aberdeen, which is available at Internet address <http://www.abdn.ac.uk>.

## **Chapter 5: Associations among Measures of Narcissism, Normal Personality, Abnormal Personality and Constructs Theoretically Related to Narcissism**

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We have argued that empirical research on narcissism is currently in what Kuhn (1970) called the “pre-paradigm” phase. The same is true to an extent for the personality disorders, all of which, according to some writers, contain some degree of narcissism (Ansbacher, 1985). Our data collection is almost random, restricted to ready-at-hand, easily accessible data, and may be described as a “morass of facts that all seem equally relevant” (Kuhn, 1970). Therefore, although whatever single model or “paradigm” we choose can only give a partial description of something as complex as narcissism or human personality, we will be forced to draw boundaries before we proceed with empirical or clinical study of narcissism, personality and personality disorders. Since personality disorders are often conceptualised as either extreme or maladaptive variants of normal personality traits, with which they share much variance, and narcissism overlaps with both normal and abnormal personality traits, it is interesting to note

- the intercorrelations among measures of narcissism, personality disorders and constructs related to narcissism;
- the associations among personality traits from the five factor model and narcissism, personality disorders and constructs related to narcissism; and
- the associations between narcissism and personality disorders, narcissism and constructs related to narcissism, and between narcissism-related constructs and personality disorders.

## Associations among Measures of Narcissism

Associations among measures of narcissism are shown in Table 5.1. Correlations among the subscales were all significant (.35 to .49 for the four- factor solution, .12 to .48 for the seven- factor solution) and the size of many of these correlations indicates much shared variance<sup>1</sup>. Narcissistic Personality Disorder, as measured by its PDQ-4+ scale (NAR, which is based on the DSM-IV description) was much more strongly related to overt narcissism (e.g., NPI,  $r = .49$ ,  $p < .001$ ) than covert narcissism as measure by either PA (.29,  $p < .001$ ) or SP (.17,  $p < .01$ ). Among the NPI subscales, NAR was most associated with exploitiveness/entitlement in the four- factor solution (.52,  $p < .001$ ), and entitlement in the seven factor solution (.48,  $p < .001$ ). Given the size of the Cronbach alphas (e.g., .51 for NAR, .54 for PA), these correlations are presumably underestimates. The covert grandiosity of the PA relates modestly to the overt narcissism of the NAR and NPI, and the correlations of SP tend toward the opposite direction, e.g. low authority (-.28,  $p < .001$ ) and sufficiency (-.24,  $p < .001$ ) in the seven- factor NPI solution, or leadership/authority (-.21,  $p < .001$ ) in the NPI four factor solution.

Previous principal components analysis of narcissism measures (Wink, 1991, see Chapter 2 of this thesis) has found two orthogonal components apparently capturing overt and covert narcissism. In this data set, the intercorrelation between the two measures of *covert* narcissism was insignificant (.06), but the measures of *overt* and *covert* narcissism were not orthogonal: the measure of overt narcissism, the NPI, correlated .36 ( $p < .001$ ) with the Pseudoautonomy Scale and -.18 ( $p < .001$ ) with the Shame Proneness scale. While this places restrictions on the degree to which our findings can be attributed to overt or covert narcissism, the construct is clearly a collective term for a set of distinct but interrelated components.

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<sup>1</sup> Some correlations between some NPI subscales are omitted because they share one item.

Table 5.1: Intercorrelations Among Measures of Narcissism (N=338, Genders Combined)

	NPI	EE	LA	SS	SA	AUT	EXH	ENT	EXP	SUP	SUF	VAN	PA	SP	NAR	Mean	SD
NPI	(.85)																6.81
EE		(.64)		.42	.49					.52		.25	.36	.03	.49	12.89	1.89
LA			(.76)	.41			.48			.40			.20	-.21	.33	3.44	2.39
SS				(.67)	.35	.38	.32		.30				.24	-.20	.41	2.16	1.90
SA					(.55)		.49			.37		.14	.27	-.23	.24	2.44	1.68
AUT						(.73)	.42		.42	.38	.29	.17	.21	-.28	.30	3.51	2.18
EXH							(.70)		.37	.38	.18	.34	.27	.04	.42	1.93	1.84
ENT								(.57)	.36	.31	.32	.12	.35	.03	.48	1.57	1.45
EXP									(.52)	.30	.29	.15	.23	-.08	.31	1.38	1.27
SUP										(.46)	.25	.39	.18	-.15	.35	1.73	1.27
SUF											(.43)	.17	.27	-.24	.13	1.80	1.38
VAN												(.66)	.10	-.10	.29	0.95	1.03
PA													(.54)	.06	.29	0.89	1.19
SP														(.82)	.17	30.09	9.03
NAR															(.51)	2.80	1.75

NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory

Four Factor Solution

EE= Exploitativeness/Entitlement  
 LA = Leadership/Authority  
 SS = Self-Sufficiency/Self-Admiration  
 SA = Superiority/Arrogance

- = spurious/non-valid results

Cronbach's Alphas in diagonal

PA= Pseudoautonomy

SP = Shame Proneness

NAR = PDQ-4+ Narcissistic Personality Disorder

Seven Factor Solution

AUT = Authority  
 EXH = Exhibitionism  
 ENT = Entitlement  
 EXP = Exploitativeness  
 SUP = Superiority  
 SUF = Sufficiency  
 VAN = Vanity

Correlations > ± .11 are p < .05

Correlations > ± .14 are p < .01

Correlations > ± .18 are p < .001



## Associations among Personality Disorders

Co-morbidity between personality disorder diagnoses is frequently reported in the literature, and it is rare to meet the criteria for narcissistic personality disorder without meeting the criteria for other personality disorders (e.g. Gunderson, Ronningstam and Smith, 1991). Correlations among the PDQ-4+ personalities are shown in Table 5.2. Each disorder is significantly positively correlated with all or most of the other disorders. There are only five insignificant correlations in the entire matrix, four of which are near-zero correlations between antisocial personality and obsessive-compulsive, depressive, dependent and avoidant personality. Some of these intercorrelations, such as between Depressive and Avoidant (.62,  $p < .001$ ), Borderline and Negativistic (.52,  $p < .001$ ) and Avoidant and Dependent (.56,  $p < .001$ ), are extremely high.

Narcissistic Personality Disorder was significantly correlated with every other disorder, and correlated .60 with the PDQ-4+ total score. Correlations, which again are presumably being depressed by low Cronbach alphas, among Cluster B disorders (Narcissistic, Antisocial, Histrionic and Borderline) were in the range of .31 to .40 (all  $p < .001$ ), with the exception of .18 between Antisocial and Histrionic. In some cases, there are stronger correlations across than within DSM clusters. Paranoid personality (Cluster A, odd or eccentric personalities) correlates more strongly with the Cluster B (dramatic, emotional or impulsive) personalities (.37 with Borderline, .31 with both Narcissistic and Antisocial, and .25 with Histrionic) than with its Cluster A companion Schizoid Personality (.20). Paranoid personality's .31 correlation with Borderline personality is equal to its correlation with the other denizen of Cluster A, Schizotypal Personality. The correlations of .45 between Narcissistic and Negativistic and .52 between Borderline and Negativistic are higher than among any two Cluster B personalities. The mean correlation between disorders is .29.

**Table 5.2 Associations Among Personality Disorder Scores Measured by the PDQ-4+**

	NAR	ASP	HIS	PAR	BOR	NEG	SZD	STP	OC	DPR	DEP	AVD	Means (SD)
Narcissistic (NAR)	(.51)	.37	.38	.31	.31	.45	.19	.33	.20	.20	.21	.18	2.8 (1.8)
Antisocial (ASP)		(.46)	.18	.31	.33	.34	.13	.26	-.02	.02	.04	-.00	1.4 (1.4)
Histrionic (HIS)			(.54)	.25	.40	.33	-.11	.26	.15	.27	.35	.16	2.4 (1.7)
Paranoid (PAR)				(.40)	.37	.40	.20	.37	.29	.25	.17	.23	2.3 (1.4)
Borderline (BOR)					(.49)	.52	.15	.37	.19	.47	.38	.43	2.4 (1.7)
Negativistic (NEG)						(.40)	.19	.34	.30	.48	.37	.40	2.1 (1.6)
Schizoid (SZD)							(.32)	-	.09	.17	.12	.27	0.9 (1.1)
Schizotypal (STP)								(.47)	.24	.32	.25	.35	2.4 (1.7)
Obsessive-Compulsive (OC)									(.28)	.35	.26	.28	3.2 (1.4)
Depressive (DPR)										(.64)	.44	.62	3.1 (1.8)
Dependent (DEP)											(.45)	.56	1.5 (1.5)
Avoidant (AVD)												(.64)	2.7 (1.9)

N=338, Cronbach's alphas in diagonal. Correlations above approximately .11 are  $p < .05$ , above approximately .14  $p < .01$ , and above approximately .18 are  $p < .001$ .

There is clearly a great deal of overlap among current personality disorder categories, some of which is not captured by the official boundaries of the DSM clusters. These strong intercorrelations between personality disorders will again limit the degree to which their associations with other constructs can be attributed to a particular DSM disorder. They are consistent with the burgeoning view (e.g. Mulder and Joyce, 1997; Deary and Austin, 1998) that a more parsimonious description of abnormal personality in terms of a smaller number of higher-order factors is appropriate.

### **Associations among Constructs Related to Narcissism**

Correlations among narcissism-related constructs are presented in Table 5.3.

**Table 5.3: Intercorrelations among Constructs Related to Narcissism**

	IM	SDE	SDD	AIM	NI	NR	PI	PR	HO	SCS	SI	SSI	SFI	SOI	EC	FS	PD	PT
IM	(.74)																	
SDE	.22 (.67)																	
SDD	.18 (.73)	.50																
AIM	.01 (.88)	.13 (.73)	.01 (.88)															
NI	-.04 (.68)	.19	.47 (.68)															
NR	-.22 (.63)	-.12 (.63)	.41 (.63)															
PI	.04 (.83)	.02 (.83)	.45 (.83)															
PR	-.07 (.80)	.05 (.80)	.45 (.80)															
HO	-.22 (.82)	-.27 (.82)	.34 (.82)															
SCS	-.13 (.90)	-.25 (.90)	.22 (.90)															
SI	-.27 (.88)	-.38 (.88)	.31 (.88)															
SSI	-.19 (.84)	-.36 (.84)	.42 (.84)															
SFI	-.23 (.85)	-.21 (.85)	.20 (.85)															
SOI	-.25 (.85)	-.29 (.85)	.04 (.85)															
EC	.24 (.77)	-.06 (.77)	.30 (.77)															
FS	-.01 (.74)	-.14 (.74)	.30 (.74)															
PD	-.11 (.73)	-.35 (.73)	.41 (.73)															
PT	.31 (.78)	.03 (.78)	.31 (.78)															

*N* = 338, except when involving AIM (335), HOST (337), NI (335), PI (336), PR (335) and SCS (337). Cronbach alphas in diagonal

IM = Impression Management  
 SDE = Self- Deceptive Enhancement  
 SDD = Self- Deceptive Denial  
 AIM = Affect Intensity Measure  
 NI = Negative Intensity  
 NR = Negative Reactivity  
 PI = Positive Intensity  
 PR = Positive Reactivity  
 HO = Hostility  
 SCS = Sensitivity to Criticism  
 SI = Splitting Index  
 SSI = Splitting of Self Images  
 SFI = Splitting of Family Images  
 SOI = Splitting of Other Images  
 EC = Empathic Concern  
 FS = Fantasy  
 PD = Personal Distress  
 PT = Perspective Taking  
 Correlations > .11 are  $p < .05$   
 Correlations > .14 are  $p < .01$   
 Correlations > .18 are  $p < .001$

### *Socially Desirable Responding*

Intercorrelations among the three socially desirable responding factors (impression management, self-deceptive denial and self-deceptive enhancement) replicated the pattern reported by Paulhus and Reid (1991). Denial items were closer to the impression management factor ( $r = .50, p < .001$ ) than enhancement items ( $r = .22, p < .001$ ), and the two self-deceptive factors correlated virtually the same in this study ( $.18, p < .001$ ) as in Paulhus and Reid's study ( $.19, N=130$ ).

Previous studies have reported strong negative correlations between socially desirable responding, particularly what Paulhus termed "self-deceptive positivity", and self-report psychopathology (Sackheim and Gur, 1979, Paulhus and Reid, 1991). It can be seen from Table 5.3 that socially desirable responding was generally associated with low hostility, sensitivity to criticism, splitting and personal distress, all of which are generally maladaptive, and high perspective taking and empathic concern, both of which are considered healthy. As in Paulhus and Reid's (1991) study, constructs that correlate with Impression Management show highly similar correlations with Self-Deceptive Denial.

Paulhus and Reid's (1991) data also provide BIDR correlations with the IRI that can be compared with those found here. In the present study ( $n = 338$ ), BIDR Impression Management correlated .24 with Empathic Concern, -.01 with Fantasy, -.11 with Personal Distress, and .31 with Perspective Taking; in the Paulhus and Reid study ( $n = 157$ ), the corresponding figures were: .24 with Empathic Concern, -.01 with Fantasy, -.18 with Personal Distress and .23 with Perspective Taking. BIDR Self-Deceptive Enhancement in this study correlated -.06 with Empathic Concern, -.14 with Fantasy, -.35 with Personal Distress, .03 with Perspective Taking; the corresponding figures from Paulhus and Reid were: -.03 with Empathic Concern, .00 with Fantasy, -.31 with Personal Distress and .19 with Perspective Taking. BIDR SDD in this study correlated .36 with Empathic Concern, -

.00 with Fantasy, -.06 with Personal Distress and .35 with Perspective Taking; SDD correlations in Paulhus and Reid were: .35 with Empathic Concern, -.01 with Fantasy, -.13 with Personal Distress and .26 with Perspective Taking. Overall, the results from this study are highly comparable to earlier results.

### *Affect Intensity*

Correlations between Affect Intensity and the IRI measure of Empathy were consistent with those previously reported (Bryant, Yarnold and Grimm, 1996). The Bryant et al study ( $n = 218$ ) found that the AIM total score correlated .45 with Empathic Concern, .16 with Perspective Taking, and .40 with both Personal Distress and Fantasy. Our corresponding figures ( $n = 338$ ) were .43, .04, .28 and .43. For Negative Intensity, the correlations in Bryant et al were: .24 with Empathic Concern, .05 with Perspective Taking .38 with Personal Distress and .32 with Fantasy; in this sample, the corresponding correlations were .30, .01, .41 and .30. For Negative Reactivity, correlations reported by Bryant et al were .55 with Empathic Concern, .28 with Perspective Taking, .41 with Personal Distress and .34 with Fantasy, vs. correlations here of .58 with Empathic Concern, .31 with Perspective Taking, .32 with Personal Distress and .35 with Fantasy. Bryant et al lump positive intensity and reactivity together as positive affective, and report correlation of .38, .09, .24, and .32 with Empathic Concern, Perspective Taking, Personal Distress and Fantasy. Overall, affect intensity seems to show the same patterns as in previous studies.

The total AIM scores also went with splitting of self images (.34), somewhat with sensitivity to criticism (.24) and hostility (.18), and .43 with the empathy facets of fantasy and empathic concern and also with personal distress (.28). Negative Reactivity but not Negative Intensity go with Perspective Taking (.31), while both Negative Intensity and Reactivity were strongly associated with the other empathy factors. Positive affect seems to go with fantasy and empathic concern.

### *Hostility, Sensitivity to Criticism, Splitting and Empathy*

The type of hostility tapped here is not necessarily expressed as blatant aggression (sample items: “I am suspicious of overly friendly strangers” or “At times I feel I have gotten a raw deal out of life”). Hostility showed its strongest association with splitting (.50 with the SI as a whole and .48, .28 and .34 with the subscales for self, family and other, respectively), but also went strongly with the personal distress factor of empathy (.37), the negative intensity factor of affect intensity (.34), sensitivity to criticism (.29) and low socially desirable responding (-.22, -.27 and -.28 for IM, SDE and SDD, respectively). This seems consistent with the strong correlation of .52 between Hostility and Emotionality ( $n = 1253$ ) reported by the scale’s developers (Buss and Perry, 1992).

Sensitivity to Criticism (SCS) showed significant correlations with the AIM as a whole (.24) and its subscales for positive reactivity (.14) negative intensity (.22) and most strongly negative reactivity (.36). The scale correlated with Hostility (.29), the SI as a whole (.18) and its self-images subscale (.27) and two aspects of the empathy measure: empathic concern (.12) and personal distress (.34). It was noted in the methodology chapter that sensitivity to criticism might not be the same as intolerance of criticism. The associations here with low IM (-.13) and SDE (-.25) contrast with the associations reported by Paulhus and Reid (1991) with rejection of criticism from the Miscellaneous Index of Bias (MIB): .22 with SDE, .37 with SDD and .42 with IM.

Subscale correlations for the Splitting Index are similar to those reported by its developers (Gould, Prentice and Ainslie, 1996). In the larger of the two reported validation studies ( $n = 841$ ), intercorrelations were: .71 between SI and SSI, .72 between SI and SFI, .79 between SOI and SI, .32 between SSI and SFI, .47 between SSI and SOI, and .42



between SFI and SOI. The corresponding results here were .72, .75, .76, .25, .31 and .44.

In investigating the convergent validity of the SI, Gould, Prentice and Ainslie reported significant correlations with negative affectivity as measured by Tellegen's Negative Affectivity scale. This is replicated in the present study by the significant correlations between a) the total Splitting Index and the Negative Intensity subscale of the AIM (.31), Hostility (.50) and the Personal Distress subscale of the IRI (.34), b) Splitting of Self Images and NI (.42), NR (.19), PD (.33) and Hostility (.37), c) SFI and NI (.20), PD (.27) and Hostility (.28), and d) SOI and Hostility (.34) and PD (.15). It is noteworthy, however, that SOI was significantly negatively associated with NR (-.15).

Davis (Davis, 1980) reports intercorrelations among the four empathy subscales for both males (N = 582) and females (N = 587). The .14 perspective taking - fantasy correlation here compares with .10 for males and .12 for females in Davis' sample. The .32 empathic concern -fantasy correlation here compares with .30 and .31 for males and females, respectively. For personal distress - fantasy, Davis obtained .16 and .04 intercorrelations for males and females; the correlation here was .21. Empathic concern and perspective taking correlated .47 in the present study vs. .33 and .31 for males and females in Davis. Perspective taking and personal distress in our study correlate -.05 vs. -.16 for males and -.29 for females in Davis. The personal distress - empathic concern correlations were .12 in our data vs. .11 for males and .01 for females in Davis' data. It would seem that the subscales are indeed assessing separate and relatively independent aspects of empathy.

Taken as a whole, these associations among constructs selected because of their theoretical role in narcissism, personality and personality replicate previous found associations. The strength of the associations again suggests that the underlying structure of the data may be

accounted for by a smaller number of higher-level factors, which may largely correspond to the dissimilar collection of phenomena that have been called “narcissism”.

### **Narcissism in the Five Factor Model**

Recall from the preceding chapter that the N and E scales of the NEO were very strongly negatively intercorrelated (-.35 for males, -.47 for females). Similarly, the NEO C scale also correlated (though not as strongly) with both the N and E scales (-.18 and .09 for males, -.26 and .22 for females, respectively). Previous research (Deary et al, 1996) indicates that this is due to the NEO E scale being contaminated with N, and the NEO C scale being contaminated with both N and E. Therefore partial correlations were also examined for E controlling for N, and C controlling for both N and E. It can be seen from Table 5.4 that, in the case of Shame Proneness, partialling out N completely removed a correlation of -.22 with E. A significant relationship of NPI Sufficiency is also thus removed. Similarly, partialling out E causes significant N correlations with exploitiveness/entitlement and superiority to vanish. Partialling out N and E contributions eliminates statistically significant correlations between C and both Shame Proneness and Authority.

Other noteworthy associations from Table 5.4 include the differences between the NPI total score, which is intended to measure overt narcissism in the non-clinical population, and NAR, the PDQ-4+ measure of the DSM-IV NPD: the significant associations between the NPI and low N (-.24), high E (.36) and high O (.20) are absent in the measure of the DSM disorder, which also shows a modest correlation with low C (-.12). Previous studies using the MCMI have reported an association between NPD and E (Costa and McCrae, 1990), but the correlation between PDQ-4+ NAR and E in this study was -.02, and changes only to .01 when partial correlations are considered. In the FFM the NAR most

closely resembles the Pseudoautonomy scale, which is considered a measure of covert narcissism.

**Table 5.4: Narcissism in the Five Factor Model (Genders Combined)**

	N	E	E <sup>2</sup>	O	A	C	C <sup>3</sup>
NPI Total	-.24***	.36***	.30***	.20***	-.36**	.04	-.03
Exploitativeness/ Entitlement	-.02	.14**	.14**	.05	-.46***	-.03	-.05
Leadership/ Authority	-.26***	.36***	.29***	.17**	-.28***	.08	.00
Superiority/ Arrogance	-.28***	.26***	.18***	.12*	-.27***	.01	-.07
Self-Sufficiency/ Self-Admiration	-.20***	.24***	.19***	.20***	-.13*	.08	.02
Exploitativeness	-.08	.21***	.19***	.10	-.33***	-.09	-.13*
Entitlement	-.01	.04	.03	.05	-.44***	.01	.00
Exhibitionism	-.05	.38***	.39***	.13*	-.24***	-.13*	-.19***
Authority	-.31***	.31***	.22***	.14*	-.30***	.13*	.06
Superiority	-.14*	.23***	.20***	.25***	-.07	.03	-.02
Sufficiency	-.33***	.15**	.04	.15**	-.10	.21***	.15**
Vanity	-.11*	.23***	.21***	.07	-.07	.01	-.03
Pseudoautonomy	.00	.05	.06	.11*	-.37***	-.22***	-.23***
Shame Proneness	.67***	-.22***	.02	-.11*	-.13*	-.15**	-.03
PDQ-4+ NPD	.10	-.02	.01	.07	-.39***	-.12*	-.11*

N=338

\* = p < .05

\*\* = p < .01

\*\*\* = p < .001

<sup>2</sup> Controlling for Neuroticism, N=329.

<sup>3</sup> Controlling for Neuroticism and Extraversion, N = 328.

In Table 5.4, NAR and NPI subscales tapping exploitiveness and entitlement are particularly associated with low A, as is covert grandiosity (Pseudoautonomy). NPI Leadership and Authority, which have been called “somewhat adaptive (Watson et al, 1992) were also associated with low A. The Shame Proneness measure is based on Kohut’s conception of narcissism. It would appear from the results to be tapping a different construct than any of the other measures of narcissism; in fact, its association with N is so strong (a raw correlation of .67) that it might be considered essentially to tap Neuroticism. Overall, these results are consistent with the view that pathological narcissism is primarily associated with low A.

In previous studies (Wink, 1991) measures of overt narcissism have correlated with extraversion, aggression and self-assurance while instruments intended to assess covert narcissism have correlated with introversion, defensiveness and anxiety. The NPI was associated with extroversion (with (.36) or without (.30) partialling out neuroticism. One measure of covert narcissism, the SP, was associated with low E (-.22,  $p < .001$ ), but this association disappears when the contribution due to N is removed. The two measures of covert narcissism in this study may not tap the same construct as those used in other studies.

In sum, different aspects of narcissism appear to relate differently to the dimensions of normal personality. The kind of neurotic self-absorption measured by the SP - sample items include “When I fail at something, I feel as if all eyes are on me”, I think that my nose (or some other part of my body) just doesn’t look right” and “I feel ashamed even when I make a minor mistake” - has a very high loading on NEO N. Different aspects of overt narcissism also make different contributions to personality: while the scale as a whole goes with low N (-.24), high E (.30 if N is partialled out) high O (.20), and low A (-.03), the exploitiveness and entitlement dimensions are mainly associated with low A.

This association with antagonism weakens, and the associations with low neuroticism, extraversion and openness increase, when aspects such as leadership and authority are singled out. There are also some aspects of narcissism - exhibitionism and the covert brand of grandiosity tapped by the PA scale - that are associated with low C, even though narcissism as a whole does not correlate with this dimension of personality.

### PDQ-4+ Personality Disorders in the Five-Factor Model

Associations between DSM-IV Personality Disorders as assessed by the PDQ-4+ and the “big five” as assessed by the NEO FFI are shown in Table 5.5. These results are generally consistent with DSM diagnostic criteria, clinical literature and earlier empirical results (Widiger, Trull, Clarkin, Sanderson and Costa, 1994).

**Table 5.5 Five-Factor Profiles of Personality Disorders**

	N	E	E <sup>4</sup>	O	A	C	C <sup>5</sup>
Narcissistic (NAR)	.10	-.02	.01	.07	-.39***	-.12*	-.11*
Antisocial (ASP)	-.06	.10	.08	.11	-.36***	-	-.35***
Histrionic (HIS)	.28***	.17**	.30***	.10	-.14*	.31***	-.17**
Paranoid (PAR)	.19***	-.03	.04	-.04	-.45***	-.17**	.03
Borderline (BOR)	.48***	-.16**	.01	.12*	-.25***	-.00	-.20***
Negativistic (NEG)	.38***	-.20***	-.07	.04	-.38***	.26***	-.23***
Schizoid (SZD)	.09	-.42***	-.42***	-.04	-.25***	.28***	.06
Schizotypal (STP)	.21***	-.21***	-.16**	.13*	-.25***	-.09	-.04
Obsessive-Compulsive (OC)	.30***	-.10	-.01	-.04	-.13*	.11*	.18***
Depressive (DPR)	.66***	-.38***	-.19***	-.04	-.23***	-.17**	-.06
Dependent (DEP)	.53***	-.16**	.04	-.10	-.02	-	-.26***
Avoidant (AVD)	.61***	-.39***	-.24***	-.10	-.08	.30***	-.04
PDQ-4+ Total Score	.55***	-.26***	-.08	.04	-.41***	-.15**	-.19***
						.26***	

N = 338. \* = p < .05, \*\* = p < .01, \*\*\* = p < .001

<sup>4</sup> Controlling for Neuroticism, N = 329.

<sup>5</sup> Controlling for Neuroticism and Extraversion, N = 328.

The DSM-IV Narcissistic PD (NPD) is characterised by grandiosity, arrogance, entitlement and exploitation (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Table 5.5 shows that PDQ-4+ NAR was most strongly associated with low A (-.39). The only other significant NEO association with NAR was low C (-.12,  $p=.033$ ), and this paled by comparison to the low A association. As stated above, there was no association with E (even after partialling out N).

Antisocial PD (ASP in Table 5.5) was associated with low A (-.36) and low C (-.30). Partial correlations made very little difference in this pattern. This disorder is also conceptually associated with three facets of neuroticism: angry hostility (and associated feature of complaints of tension), depression and impulsivity are associated with (Widiger, Trull, Clarkin, Sanderson and Costa, 1994) that are not assessed by the NEO-FFI.

Histrionic PD (HIS in Table 5.5) was presented raw correlations with high N (.28), high E (.17,  $p= .002$ ), low A (-.14,  $p = .009$ ) and low C (-.16,  $p = .003$ ). Millon (Millon, 1981) has dubbed this disorder as “the gregarious pattern” and it has been characterised as extreme extraversion (Widiger, Trull, Clarkin, Sanderson and Costa, 1994). Therefore, the strength of the association with E was expected to be higher, and partialling out N does raise the E correlation to .30. Cronbach’s alpha for the Histrionic personality scale is only .54, so the true correlations of histrionic personality with both N and E may be much more significant.

Paranoid PD (PAR in Table 5.5) was correlated somewhat with high N (.19,  $p < .001$ ) but most strongly with low A (-.45). This is in line with the description of Widiger, Trull, Clarkin, Sanderson and Costa (Widiger, Trull, Clarkin, Sanderson and Costa, 1994) which was based on DSM-III-R, and was hardly altered at all when partial correlations were considered.

Dependent PD (DEP in Table 5.5) was very strongly associated with high N (.53,  $p = .000$ ) and low E (-.16,  $p < .01$ ) but also showed a strong relationship with low C (-.30,  $p < .001$ ) and failed to show a significant association with A. According to Widiger, Trull, Clarkin, Sanderson and Costa (Widiger, Trull, Clarkin, Sanderson and Costa, 1994), this disorder represents an extreme variant of agreeableness with high neuroticism and low assertiveness. In addition to failing to show the association with extreme agreeableness, the strength of the low C correlation is also surprising: Dependent PD goes with only one of the C facets (low achievement striving). Although significant at the .01 level, the association with E was made to disappear by our partialling; not so with C.

Borderline PD (BOR in Table 5.5) was primarily related to high N (.48), but also low E (-.16,  $p = .003$ ), low A (-.25) and Low C (-.26). An association of borderline personality with low E, which is removable by partial correlations, is somewhat unexpected, would be unpredicted by DSM criteria, but not with respect to the clinical literature. Widiger et al cite high E facets of gregariousness, assertiveness and positive emotions that are not included in the DSM description but based on clinical literature.

Our scale for Obsessive-Compulsive PD (OC) has a Cronbach's alpha of only .28, the lowest of any scale. Table 5.5 shows it to be correlated with high N (.30), low A (-.13,  $p = .02$ ) and high C (.11,  $p = .045$ ). Since the disorder is defined as a maladaptive, extreme variant of conscientiousness, it is particularly appropriate to examine the partial correlations; removing the N and E contributions, however, only raised the association to .18 ( $p < .01$ ). The prototypical obsessive-compulsive personality is also somewhat antagonistic (Widiger, Trull, Clarkin, Sanderson and Costa, 1994).



Schizoid PD (SZD in Table 5.5) went with low E (-.42) and low A (-.25). The extreme low E is consistent with the description of Widiger et al (Widiger, Trull, Clarkin, Sanderson and Costa, 1994) and does not change in the partial correlations, but the disorder is not usually associated with low A. Schizotypal PD was correlated with high N (.21), low E (-.21) and low A (-.25), in line with Widiger et al.

Rounding out Table 5.5, Avoidant PD was associated with its hallmark traits (Widiger, Trull, Clarkin, Sanderson and Costa, 1994), of high N (.61,  $p =$  really small) and low E (-.39). There was also a smaller association with low C (-.14,  $p = .008$ ). Depressive PD was associated with high N (.66), low E (-.38), low A (-.23) and low C (-.15,  $p = .004$ ). Negativistic PD was associated with high N (.38), low E (-.20), low A (-.38) and low C (-.28).

Only the Narcissistic, Antisocial and Schizoid personalities were not associated with high N, and as in previous studies (e.g. Deary et al, in press) there were no personality disorders associated with low N. Histrionic PD is the only disorder associated with high E. The Dependent, Borderline and especially Depressive, Avoidant, Negativistic, Schizoid and Schizotypal personality disorders were associated with low E. There were no significant correlations between O and any disorders, presumably due to not having the facets.

Histrionic and Narcissistic personalities, for example, are theoretically high on the O facet of fantasy. Low agreeableness is strongly associated with disordered personality: only Dependent and Avoidant personality disorders were not associated with low A. Only Obsessive-Compulsive PD was associated with high C; Paranoid, Schizoid and Schizotypal disorders were not significantly correlated with C, but all other disorders were associated with low C.

While the risk of a type one error would be too great if the above relationships were taken at face value rather than as the starting points for multivariate analysis, the above associations are consistent with the view that currently recognised personality disorders may be more parsimoniously explained by a smaller number of higher order variables that represent extreme or maladaptive variants of normal personality dimensions (e.g. Mulder and Joyce, 1997; Deary and Austin, 1998, Livesley et al, 1998). The strongest associations are between certain disorders - particularly depressive, dependent and avoidant - and neuroticism; the next strongest are between another group - including narcissistic, antisocial and paranoid - and low agreeableness. It is probably not a coincidence that these correspond to the first two factors that generally emerge in the above studies. Low conscientiousness and extraversion may also relate to factors explaining a smaller but significant amount of variance in abnormal personality. Only O seems to have little explanatory power with respect to disordered personality.

### **Narcissism Related Constructs in the Five-Factor Model.**

Table 5.6 show the five-factor profile of the constructs that were deemed to come under the penumbra of malignant narcissism.

Affect Intensity has been moderately associated with Extraversion (Larsen and Diener, 1987). In Table 5.6, the association is more than moderate, especially after controlling for N : .49. The association between Affect Intensity and N (.36) is evidently due to negative affect: .56 for intensity and .34 for reactivity; while the association between Affect Intensity and E (.29,  $p < .001$ ) is derived from the .41 and .31 correlations with positive intensity and reactivity, respectively (both  $p < .001$ ). The Negative Reactivity subscale also went strongly with Agreeableness (.35,  $p < .001$ ). Perhaps this differential effect of Agreeableness between reactivity and intensity for negative but not positive affect is an alternative hypothesis to Bryant et al's (Bryant et al, 1996) suggestion that extremely high

correlations between positive reactivity and intensity are due to a lack of items that differentiate positive reactivity from intensity. Evidently contamination of the E scale with N completely masks correlations of .28 with Negative Intensity and .21 with Negative Reactivity that are significant at the .001 level.

**Table 5.6 Five-Factor Profiles of Constructs Related to Narcissism**

	N	E	E <sup>6</sup>	O	A	C	C <sup>7</sup>
Affect Intensity (Total)	.36***	.29***	.49***	.12*	.14*	.00	.04
Negative Intensity	.56***	.01	.28***	.12*	-.01	-.04	.06
Negative Reactivity	.34***	.06	.21***	.02	.35***	.12*	.18***
Positive Intensity	.06	.41***	.47***	.17***	.13*	.06	.03
Positive Reactivity	.11*	.31***	.38***	.07	.11*	.05	.04
Impression Management	-.15**	.06	.01	.01	.27***	.30***	.28***
Self-Deceptive Enhancement	-.37***	.18***	.06	.05	-.03	.26***	.21***
Self-Deceptive Denial	-.12*	.09	.05	.04	.34***	.17***	.15**
Hostility	.58***	-.25***	-.05	-.12*	-.31***	-.09	.03
Sensitivity to Criticism	.40***	-.09	.07	-.15**	.10	.02	.10
Splitting Index (Total)	.48***	-.27***	-.13*	.02	-.25***	-.25***	-.17**
Splitting of Self Images	.54***	-.22***	-.03	.11*	-.06	-.28***	-.22***
Splitting of Family Images	.28***	-.10	-.02	-.01	-.21***	-.14*	-.09
Splitting of Others Images	.25***	-.30***	-.24***	-.08	-.30***	-.12*	-.06
Empathic Concern	.16**	.18***	.26***	.25***	.41***	.05	.06
Fantasy	.19***	-.03	.04	.37***	.04	-.12*	-.09
Personal Distress	.53***	-.27***	-.10	-.05	-.01	-.15**	-.05
Perspective Taking	-.08	.07	.05	.24***	.40***	.16**	.15**

N=338, \* =  $p < .05$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \*\*\* =  $p < .001$

The BIDR associations with NEO-FFI “Big Five” personality dimensions were similar to those Paulhus and Reid (Paulhus and Reid, 1991) reported between the BIDR scales and the Interpersonal Adjective Scale - B5 Revised (Short Form), with the exception of conscientiousness. In this study, the NEO-FFI associations for Impression Management,

<sup>6</sup> Correlation with Extraversion after partialling out Neuroticism, N = 329.

<sup>7</sup> Correlation with C after partialling out Neuroticism and Extraversion, N = 328.

which partialling did not significantly alter, were: -.15 with N, .06 with E, .01 with O, .27 with A and .30 with C. The correlations reported by Paulhus and Reid (1991) were: -.07 with Neuroticism, .04 with Surgency, .01 with Openness to Experience, .18 with Agreeableness and .08 with Conscientiousness. The main difference appears to be the high association with C in the FFM, which decreases only to .28 when controlling for N and E.

The Five-Factor profile for Self-Deceptive Enhancement was -.37, .18, .05, -.03 and .26 for N, E, O, A and C, respectively. Paulhus and Reid reported correlations of -.30 (Neuroticism), .29 (Surgency), .09 (Openness/Culture), .11 (Agreeableness) and .05 (Conscientiousness). Again, the main discrepancy appears to be Conscientiousness, although the significant E relationship in the present study disappears when the contribution from N is removed. The corresponding figures for Self-Deceptive Denial are -.12 (N), .09 (E) .04 (O), .34 (A) and .17 (C) in the present study vs. -.22 (Neuroticism), .13 (Surgency), .02 (Openness/Culture), .13 (Agreeableness) and .01 (Conscientiousness) in Paulhus and Reid's study. These modest differences may be due to use of different instruments to measure normal personality in the two studies.

Hostility was extremely highly correlated with high N (.58,  $p < .001$ ), highly correlated with low A (-.31,  $p < .001$ ), and significantly correlated with low O (-.12,  $p < .05$ ). The fact that a correlation with low E (-.25) that is significant at the .001 level becomes insignificant (.05) after partialling out the contribution from N illustrates that the NEO-FFI E scale is contaminated with N, and show that this kind of covert, non-aggressive or violent hostility is primarily a combination of neuroticism and disagreeableness.

Sensitivity to Criticism was mainly associated with N (.40,  $p < .001$ ) but also significantly with low O (-.15). Atlas (Atlas, 1994) reports a .65 ( $p < .001$ ) correlation with Eysenck's 1967 neuroticism scale.

The Splitting Index as a whole correlated significantly with N (.48,  $p < .001$ ), low E (-.27,  $p < .001$ , but only .13 ( $p < .05$ ) after partialling out N), low A (-.25) and low C (-.25,  $p < .001$ , but only -.17 in the partial correlation). Splitting of Self- Images also showed a slight association with O (.11). The associations with high N and low C are less pronounced in the family (.28, -.14) and others scales (.25, -.12) than in the total scale (.48, -.25) and self-images subscale (.52, -.28).

The healthy aspects of the IRI - empathic concern and perspective taking - are primarily explained as high A, while personal distress appears mainly to be a consequence of high N and fantasy of high O. In the case of Personal Distress, once again a highly significant ( $p < .001$ ) correlation with E drops to insignificant after controlling for N.

As with the personality disorders, it appears that a factor related to neuroticism may account for the most variance of any higher order factors that may underlie the constructs related to narcissism, followed by a second factor related to antagonism. The other "big five" factors may also be related to other constructs. In particular, affect intensity seems to go quite strongly with extraversion, especially after controlling for neuroticism, which would dovetail with a schizoid higher-order dimension of personality pathology associated with low E.

### **Narcissism and Personality Disorders**

In Table 5.7, all personality disorders as assessed by the PDQ-4+ were associated with at least one measure of narcissism. One might argue that some of the scales used here to

measure narcissism do not measure narcissism: in particular, the Shame Proneness scale is so strongly associated with N, and so negatively associated with other measures of narcissism, it might be argued to tap neuroticism. Non-narcissism scales may be measuring types of narcissism: in particular, the PD subscale of the IRI. Greater perspective taking is associated with less personal distress and more concern for others (Davis, 1980). Davis (1980) interprets this as supporting Hoffman's views on the development of empathy: Early in development, there is little differentiation between self and others; the distress of others tends to be experienced as one's own. With the development of role-taking skills and the capacity to adopt another's perspective, this self-centred "empathic distress" gives way to other-oriented "sympathetic concern" or compassion and concern for the other (Davis, 1980).

**Table 5.7 PDQ-4+ Personality Disorder Correlations with Measures of Narcissism**

	NPI	EE	LA	SA	SS	AUT	EXP	ENT	EXH	SUF	SUP	VAN	PA	SP
Narcissistic	.49***	.52***	.33***	.24***	.41***	.30***	.31***	.43***	.42***	.13*	.35***	.29***	.29***	.17*
Antisocial	.36***	.34***	.21***	.30***	.20***	.22***	.37***	.29***	.30***	.13*	.15**	.13*	.47***	-.01
Histrionic	.31***	.28***	.25***	.08	.23***	.11*	.18**	.19***	.50***	-.08	.26***	.23***	.18**	.28*
Paranoid	.23***	.30***	.17**	.24***	.07	.19***	.40***	.25***	.16**	.02	.07	.03	.26***	.20*
Borderline	.10	.16**	.02	.04	.03	-.04	.16**	.17**	.19***	-.09	.05	.02	.25***	.39*
Negativistic	.16**	.26***	.08	.07	.09	.04	.18**	.24***	.20***	-.07	.08	.09	.32***	.38*
Schizoid	-.01	.13*	.17**	.01	.02	-.08	.15**	.18**	-.13*	.12*	-.09	-.05	.21***	.11*
Schizotypal	.06	.12*	-.11*	.02	.10	-.07	.18**	.09	.07	.05	.02	.02	.18**	.28*
Obsessive	.07	.19***	.03	-.02	.08	.02	.02	.17**	.04	-.01	.03	.09	.06	.27*
Depressive	-.10	.14*	-.14**	-.16**	-.10	-.18**	.01	.15**	-.04	-.22***	-.07	-.05	.10	.56*
Avoidant	-.24***	-.01	-.28***	-.23***	-.18**	-.31***	-.12*	.01	-.10	-.23***	-.15*	-.11*	.03	.57*
Dependent	-.12*	.06	-.17**	-.18**	-.07	-.23***	-.03	.02	.05	-.29***	-.03	.03	.05	.46*
PDQ-4+	.18**	.35***	.05	.05	.12*	-.01	.21***	.30***	.24***	-.09	.10	.10	.33***	.54*

\* = p < .05  
 \*\* = p < .01  
 \*\*\* = p < .001

NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory  
 EE = Exploitativeness/Entitlement (From NPI 4 Factor Solution)  
 LA = Leadership/Authority (From NPI 4 Factor Solution)  
 SA = Superiority/Arrogance (From NPI 4 Factor Solution)  
 SS = Self-Sufficiency/Self-Admiration (From NPI 4 Factor Solution)  
 AUT = Authority (From NPI 7 Factor Solution)  
 EXP = Exploitativeness (From NPI 7 Factor Solution)  
 ENT = Entitlement (From NPI 7 Factor Solution)  
 EXH = Exhibitionism (From NPI 7 Factor Solution)  
 SUF = Sufficiency (From NPI 7 Factor Solution)  
 SUP = Superiority (From NPI 7 Factor Solution)  
 VAN = Vanity (From NPI 7 Factor Solution)  
 PA = Pseudoautonomy  
 SP = Shame Proneness



### *Overt Narcissism*

NPI, the most widely used instrument for measuring overt narcissism in non-clinical populations, was most strongly correlated with the PDQ-4+ Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NAR). The total NPI score was also strongly associated ( $p < .001$ ) with the PDQ-4+ subscales for Antisocial, Histrionic and Paranoid disorders, significantly correlated with Negativistic PD and the PDQ as a whole, and negatively associated with the Dependent and especially Avoidant disorders. This is consistent with at least three of Bursten's (Bursten, 1973) four narcissistic personalities: Bursten's phallic, manipulative and paranoid narcissists are clearly akin to the DSM Narcissistic, Antisocial and Paranoid personalities. Bursten's fourth narcissistic personality, the "craving" personality, require a great deal of attention from others "includes many people who have been called dependent or passive-aggressive" and are clinging, demanding, often pouting and whining". Bursten doubts that these personalities can ever truly be dependent on others, and asserts that they expect to be given to, increase their demands in subtle or obvious ways when not given to, and are often overtly charming and lively but one often senses desperation behind their charm and a "drivenness" to their liveliness. This description clearly overlaps with the Histrionic personality.

### *NPI Four Factor*

In previously reported results (e.g. Watson, Little, Sawrite and Biderman, 1992), exploitiveness/entitlement (EE) factor was considered the most pathological of the four NPI factors. In the present study EE was the factor most strongly associated with Narcissistic PD (.52) and was significantly associated with all but the Avoidant and Dependent disorders. EE correlated .35 with the PDQ-4+ as a whole; in fact, EE was the only four-factor subscale significantly related to abnormal personality in general. In addition to the Narcissistic, the EE associations with Antisocial, Paranoid, Histrionic, Borderline, Obsessive-Compulsive and the Negativistic were all significant at the  $p < .01$  (Depressive

was  $p = .01$ ). EE had particularly strong associations with poor impression management, perspective taking and empathic concern.

The NPI's Leadership/Authority (LA) factor has been argued to be somewhat adaptive (Watson et al, 1992). LA was, however, strongly correlated with Antisocial, Histrionic, Narcissistic, and Paranoid personality; LA showed a negative correlation with Avoidant, Dependent and Depressive personality. Again, the strongest correlation is with Narcissistic personality. LA also went with low perspective taking and empathic concern.

In the four-factor solution, Superiority/Arrogance (SA) was the only NPI factor to show the strongest correlation with a personality other than the Narcissistic: its highest correlation was with Antisocial personality, closely followed by Narcissistic, and Paranoid personality. SA correlated negatively with Avoidant, Dependent, and Depressive personality. SA was the factor most strongly associated with self-deceptive enhancement ( $.39, p < .001$ ) and went with lack of empathic concern.

Self-Sufficiency/Self-Admiration (SS) was clearly associated with Narcissistic far more than any other personality, but also showed significant association with Antisocial and Histrionic personality, and PDQ total Score. SS was negatively correlated only with Avoidant personality.

#### *NPI 7 Factor*

NPI Authority showed its strongest association with Narcissistic personality, but also went with Antisocial and Paranoid personality, and negatively with Avoidant, Dependent, and Depressive personality.

Entitlement would appear to be the most pathological of the seven factors, being significantly associated with nine out of twelve DSM-IV disorders and showing a strong association with the PDQ-4+ as a whole. Entitlement was far more associated with Narcissistic than any other personality, and the next two strongest correlations were with Antisocial and Paranoid personality.

Exploitiveness was also clearly pathological, and showed even stronger associations with Paranoid and Antisocial personality than with Narcissistic personality. Exhibitionism was even more strongly associated with Histrionic than Narcissistic personality, and was the second strongest association with the PDQ-4+ total score. Sufficiency appeared to be the least pathological of the NPI's factors, and Superiority and Vanity went strongly with Narcissistic and Histrionic personality, and to some extent with Antisocial.

#### *Covert Narcissism*

Although considered a measure of covert narcissism, the Pseudoautonomy scale has been argued to tap a particularly pathological flavour of grandiosity. This is perhaps less surprising when one considers that *both* of Wink's orthogonal factors were associated with conceit, self-indulgence and disregard of others. PA showed the strongest association (.47) with Antisocial personality, and went with the total PDQ score and Negativistic personality even more than with Narcissistic personality. Eight of twelve DSM personalities (as measured by the PDQ-4+) were associated with this covert brand of grandiosity.

The Shame Proneness (SP) scale, based on Kohut's view of narcissism, was associated with every personality disorder except Antisocial, and showed notably high correlations with those personalities which seemed least "narcissistic" and even non- or anti-narcissistic

based on their associations with other measures of narcissism: Avoidant and Dependent personalities.

One cannot conclude from the data that all personality pathology flows from narcissism, yet narcissism does appear to be a higher level construct flowing into much personality pathology across DSM clusters. Overt narcissism appears especially to flow into the Narcissistic, Antisocial, Histrionic and Paranoid personalities. This may lend support to Bursten's (Bursten, 1973) four variants of narcissistic personality, which seem to correspond to the DSM Narcissistic, Antisocial, Histrionic and Paranoid personalities fairly well. To some extent, overt narcissism also seems to flow into the Negativistic and Borderline personalities. Covert narcissism would seem to flow into a different brand of psychopathology. Pseudoautonomy, however, was the strongest predictor of ASP, and also associated with NEG.

In sum, we have cause to suspect that narcissism may account for a substantial portion of the variance in disordered personality. A multivariate examination of the hypothesis is at least called for.

### **Personality Disorders and Constructs**

Several constructs theoretically related to narcissism were associated with narcissistic *personality disorder* - the NAR subscale of the PDQ-4+ - but not with overt narcissism - the NPI. Hostility, for example, was *negatively* associated with the NPI ( $r = -.13$ ,  $p = .018$ ), but *positively* associated with NAR ( $.21$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

**Table 5.8: DSM-IV Personality Disorder Associations with Constructs Related to Narcissism**

	NAR	ASP	HIS	PAR	BOR	NEG	SZD	STP	OC	DPR	DEP	AVD	Total
Impression Management	-.25***	-.30***	-.12*	-.18**	-.24***	-.30***	.00	-.11*	-.04	-.17**	-.16**	-.13*	-.28***
Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.05	.12*	-.13*	.05	-.13*	-.14**	.12*	-.00	-.03	-.29***	-.32***	-.27***	-.15**
Self-Deceptive Denial	-.17**	-.30***	-.07	-.22***	-.22***	-.26***	-.07	-.11*	-.06	-.11*	.05	-.11*	-.24***
AIM Total Score	.10	-.02	.43***	.13*	.31***	.17**	-.23***	.16**	.22***	.22***	.26***	.22***	.29***
Negative Intensity	.08	-.06	.44***	.14*	.41***	.22***	-.09	.21***	.26***	.44***	.32***	.33***	.41***
Negative Reactivity	-.12*	-.24***	.16**	-.00	.10	-.00	-.15**	.08	.18**	.19***	.18**	.21***	.10
Positive Intensity	.13*	.04	.29***	.10	.17**	.04	-.18***	.14**	.11*	-.02	.08	.00	.14**
Positive Reactivity	.14**	.05	.28***	.17**	.17**	.11*	-.19***	.12*	.18**	.03	.12*	.07	.18**
Hostility	.21***	.09	.17**	.33***	.40***	.42***	.09	.34***	.27***	.48***	.34***	.47***	.52***
Sensitivity to Criticism	.05	-.10	.05	.00	.16**	.17**	-.09	.02	.10	.28***	.24***	.34***	.18**
Splitting Index Total	.22***	.21***	.24***	.23***	.46***	.34***	.13*	.33***	.15**	.40***	.36***	.42***	.50***
Splitting of Self Images	.20***	.14**	.35***	.15**	.49***	.37***	-.01	.30***	.18**	.47***	.40***	.49***	.52***
Splitting of Family Images	.12*	.14**	.13*	.16**	.27***	.15*	.10	.15**	.11*	.18**	.15**	.17**	.26***
Splitting of Others Images	.17**	.19***	.03	.20***	.24***	.22***	.21***	.27***	.04	.22***	.25***	.26***	.32***
Empathic Concern	-.12*	-.16**	.13*	-.17**	.01	-.07	-.21***	-.02	.02	.05	.06	-.00	-.06
Fantasy	.09	.03	.32***	-.02	.22***	.09	-.10	.17**	.08	.15**	.15**	.13*	.19***
Personal Distress	.02	-.09	.17**	.01	.24***	.13*	.05	.18**	.13*	.37***	.37***	.38***	.29***
Perspective Taking	-.23***	-.20***	-.09	-.16*	-.15**	-.26***	-.12*	-.02	-.05	-.13*	-.11*	-.16**	-.24***

NAR = Narcissistic, ASP = Antisocial, HIS = Histrionic, PAR = Paranoid, BOR = Borderline, NEG = Negativistic, SZD = Schizoid, STP = Schizotypal, OC = Obsessive/Compulsive, DEPR = Depressive, DEP = Dependent, AVD = Avoidant, PDNOS = Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified. Significant Correlations in boldface.  
 \* = p < .05, \*\* = p < .01, \*\*\* = p < .001.

The Splitting Index was associated with every personality disorder and .50 with the PDQ as a whole. The subscale correlations, particularly for Splitting of Self-Images, are also remarkably high. Splitting is the hallmark defence of narcissism in a number of theoretical accounts, including Kernberg's (1975), whose writings the Splitting Index is based on.

In addition to hostility, there are other interesting differences between the associations of the NPI - the most widely used measure of narcissism in research - and NAR, the PDQ-4+ Narcissistic Personality scale. Shame proneness - a highly controversial issue in the narcissism literature - is almost as *positively* correlated with NAR (.17) as it is *negatively* associated with the NPI (-.18). The NPI is insignificantly *negatively* associated with the supposed hallmark defence of narcissism, splitting, while NAR is strongly associated with splitting. Self-Deceptive Enhancement is very strongly associated with the NPI, but not with NAR. Neither, but particularly not the NPI, is associated with fantasy or sensitivity to criticism - at variance with the DSM description of narcissists as preoccupied with grandiose fantasies and intolerant of criticism.

At first glance, the associations between Hostility and Personality Disorders appear perplexing: the only disorder NOT associated with hostility is - Antisocial !! The hostility associations with Avoidant, Depressive, and Dependent personalities seem shockingly high. Surely these personalities cannot be more hostile than Antisocial personalities! Can this be so?

Recall that the measure used - the Hostility subscale of the Aggression Questionnaire (Buss and Perry, 1992) - is composed of resentment and suspicion items. This was the result of Buss and Durkee's factor analytic research on aggression, which found two factors, one

consisting of assault, indirect aggression, irritability and verbal aggression (labelled “aggressiveness”), the other consisting of resentment and suspicion (labelled “hostility”). Let us examine these resentment and suspicion items which comprise the Hostility scale:

1. I am sometimes eaten up with jealousy.
2. At times, I feel I have gotten a raw deal out of life.
3. Other people always seem to get the breaks.
4. I wonder why sometimes I feel so bitter about things.
5. I know that “friends” talk about me behind my back.
6. I am suspicious of overly friendly strangers.
7. I sometimes feel that people are laughing at me behind my back.
8. When people are especially nice to me, I wonder what they want.

Nietzsche (Nietzsche, 1973) frequently warned against this latent hostility :

“How poisonous, how cunning, how bad every protracted war makes one when it cannot be waged with open force! How *personal* a protracted fear makes one, a protracted keeping watch for enemies, for possible enemies!”

According to Nietzsche, these “persecuted” inevitably become “refined vengeance seekers and brewers of poison”, even if they do so under a facade of martyrdom. Viewed in this light, perhaps the only surprising thing is that, since questions 4-8 would appear to reflect a paranoid orientation, the association with paranoid personality (which had the strongest correlation with low A) is NOT the highest correlation with hostility.

In Hoffman’s theory of the development of empathy, early in development, when there is little or no differentiation between self and others, the distress of others tends to be



experienced as one's own. As development progresses, this self-centred "empathic distress" gives way to other-oriented "sympathetic concern" or compassion and concern for the other (Davis, 1980). Evidently people who are able to see things from another's point of view without confusing that point of view with their own react to negative events but without undue proportion, while those who lack appropriate boundaries not only react, but react strongly.

Perhaps the upshot, however, of the associations between the measures of abnormal personality and the constructs in this study is given in the final column: the most frequent personality disorder diagnosis is "personality disorder not otherwise specified (PDNOS)" (Clark et al, 1997). It would seem to be justified to say that, in general, subjects with abnormal personality use the immature defence mechanism of splitting ( $r=.50$ ), are secretly hostile ( $.52$ ), react with intensity to negative events ( $NI = .41$ ), lack perspective taking skills ( $PT = -.24$ ) and appropriate boundaries ( $PD = .29$ ), indulge in fantasies more than most people and do not make a good impression on others. This is consistent with the view that there is an element of narcissism in all disordered personality.

### **Narcissism and Related Constructs**

Associations between narcissism and related constructs are given in Table 5.9.

The disorder that the DSM calls "Narcissistic" is an overt narcissism. If we take NAR as measuring the clinical syndrome and the NPI total scale as non-clinical, overt narcissism, from Table 5.9 it appears that the difference is the presence of splitting in the disorder and self-deceptive enhancement in the NPI.

Table 5.9 Associations Between Narcissism and Related Constructs

	NPI	EE	LA	SA	SS	AUT	EXH	EXP	ENT	SUF	SUP	VAN	PA	SP	NAR
IM	-.15**	-.25***	-.10	-.13*	-.03	-.10	-.15**	-.19***	-.20***	.02	.03	-.06	-.20***	-.15**	-.25***
SDE	.33***	.13*	.23***	.39***	.25***	.29***	.10	.28***	.12*	.37***	.20***	.15**	.07	-.36***	-.17**
SDD	-.17**	-.27***	-.10	-.08	-.07	-.10	-.12*	-.14**	-.25***	-.04	-.04	-.06	-.28***	-.12*	.05
AIM	.12*	.08	.09	-.07	.16**	.02	.23***	.01	.05	-.03	.13*	.17**	.03	.31***	.10
NI	.03	.10	.04	-.11*	.01	-.04	.17**	.02	.08	-.08	-.02	-.01	.04	.43***	.08
NR	-.26***	-.27***	-.23***	-.28***	-.10	-.24***	-.11*	-.21***	-.24***	-.18***	-.08	-.06	-.22***	.31***	-.12*
PI	.23***	.11*	.20***	.07	.25***	.14*	.26***	.10	.07	.10	.17**	.21***	.06	.08	.13*
PR	.21***	.13*	.16**	.05	.22***	.13*	.19***	.10	.09	.12*	.15**	.18***	.04	.15**	.14*
HOST	-.13*	.06	-.19***	-.16**	-.15**	-.21***	-.01	.00	.11*	-.23***	-.11*	-.11*	.03	.60***	.21***
SCS	-.12*	-.05	-.15**	-.17**	-.09	-.18**	.01	-.12*	-.04	-.12*	-.04	-.03	-.19***	.39***	.05
SI	-.06	.08	-.09	-.14**	-.04	-.12*	.06	-.04	.11*	-.15**	-.06	-.05	.16**	.50***	.22***
SSI	-.06	.03	-.11*	-.15**	-.02	-.18**	.10	-.02	.02	-.18**	-.01	.04	.07	.50***	.20***
SFI	-.01	.07	-.01	-.03	-.05	-.01	.06	.00	.09	-.07	-.07	-.08	.14**	.30***	.12*
SOI	-.06	.09	-.10	-.13*	-.04	-.07	-.05	-.08	.14**	-.09	-.06	-.05	.16**	.50***	.17**
EC	-.17**	-.25***	-.12*	-.18**	-.03	-.17**	-.04	-.14**	-.25***	-.12*	.04	-.04	-.15**	.04	-.12*
FS	.03	-.00	-.01	-.12*	.09	-.08	.10	-.08	.02	.02	.08	.10	.06	.16**	.09
PD	-.28***	-.11*	-.29***	-.32***	-.17**	-.33***	-.11*	-.14**	-.12*	-.23***	-.18**	-.07	-.08	.46***	.02
PT	-.20***	-.32***	-.18**	-.10	-.05	-.18**	-.18**	-.10	-.30***	-.01	.02	-.09	-.22***	-.07	-.23***

N= 338. See foldout for acronyms.

\* = p < .05, \*\* = p < .01, \*\*\* = p < .001

The NPI's subscales correlate with different constructs (Table 5.9). In terms of SDR, exploitiveness and entitlement) go mainly with poor impression management and low denial, while leadership, authority, superiority, arrogance and vanity are mainly correlated with high self-deceptive enhancement. In terms of affect intensity, exploitiveness, entitlement, and leadership appear to go with low negative reactivity, while self-sufficiency and conceit go with positive affect. The subscales that tap leadership, self-sufficiency and authority that go most with low hostility (of this type) and sensitivity. Splitting does not appear to make much contribution to NPI variance, but low perspective taking goes, as one would expect, with exploitiveness. All NPI subscales go with low personal distress.

Our two measure of covert narcissism (PA and SP in Table 5.9) again do not appear to be tapping the same construct. Shame Proneness has very high correlations with splitting (.50 for the total scale and self and other subscales, .30 with the family subscale), the particular brand of hostility measured by our instrument (.60), personal distress (.46), sensitivity to criticism (.60, which as we have seen is not the same as rejection of criticism), and negative emotionality in general. Pseudoautonomy's associations are much less strong, the two biggest being low self-deceptive denial (-.28) rather than enhancement and low perspective taking (-.22).

In sum, while the likelihood of at least one association occurring by chance rules out stopping at a univariate analysis, constructs theoretically related to narcissism correlate with aspects of the construct; for example, low perspective taking has its strongest association with exploitiveness/entitlement. As in the previous tables, Shame Proneness shows a different and largely contrary pattern of associations than other measures of narcissism.

These correlations suggest that the variance among measures of normal personality, abnormal personality, narcissism and traits theoretically related to narcissism can be

accounted for by a smaller number of indexes. Exploratory item-level principal components analysis will be applied to the NPI to obtain subscales without overlapping items. Exploratory scale-level principal components analysis will be applied to the combined questionnaires in both single sex and combined samples to investigate the psychometric structure of the traits. Confirmatory factor analysis will be performed for both genders combined.

## Chapter 6: New Subscales for Facets of Narcissism from a Principal Components Analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory

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Shared items between subscales render the four- factor solution of the NPI unusable for subscale-level factor analysis of the Pollock Halls data. Examination of the NPI scree plot further suggest that the data may be characterised by two or three factors - far fewer than the previously published seven factor NPI solution. Therefore, an item-level principal components analysis of the NPI was conducted to extract subscales for use in factor analysis of the data.

Initially, the 40 NPI items were entered as variables in a principal components analysis with the number of factors extracted equal to the number of variables. The Keyser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy was .80. Based on the Scree Plot (Figure 1) two and three component solutions were then examined using VARIMAX rotation. Results are given in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.


In the two factor solution, 10 items load on factor one, a dominance factor that might be called "Will to Power". In fact, the highest loading item on this factor (.66) is "I have a strong will to power". Factor 1 accounts for 12.1 percent of the variance. Factor two contains 10 items with loadings over .4 which are related to exhibitionism and self-admiration, the highest being .65 on "I like to show off my body". This factor accounts for 9.5 percent of the variance.

In the three factor solution, factor one is similar to factor one in the two factor solution, with the seven items with significant ( $>.40$ ) loadings appearing to relate to will to power. The same 10 items load on factor 2 in the three factor solution as in the two factor solution. The six items loading on factor 3 appeared to tap self-admiration or self-absorption. These

factors would appear to tap dominance/will to power, exhibitionism and self-admiration/self-absorption, and accounted for 10.6, 8.6 and 7.0 percent of the variance. One might site Friedrich Nietzsche, Mick Jagger and Kenneth Brannagh as famous individuals exemplifying these traits. One item (“I like to look at my body”) loaded on both factors two and three. If the 10-item Will-to-Power and Self-love subscales are treated as scales, they have Cronbach’s alphas of .78 and .74. For the three factor solution, the Cronbach’s alphas were .77, .74 and .62.

At least in the present data, the NPI appears to have a two or three factor structure, rather than the four and seven factor structures previously published. The Pollock Halls factors appear to be concerned with will to power and self-love, which may be higher-level constructs than the previously published NPI facets. Since there is one shared item in the three factor solution, the two factor solution will be used in subscale-level analysis in this thesis. The associations of these two subscales with other constructs in this study are given in Tables 6.3-6.5 below.

**Figure 1: Scree Plot**



**Table 6.1: Narcissistic Personality Inventory Items After Varimax Rotation of the Principal Components - Two Factor Solution.**

<b>NPI Item (narcissistic choice)</b>	<b>Factor 1</b>	<b>Factor 2</b>
I have a natural talent for influencing people.	.37	.27
Modesty doesn't become me.	.21	.27
I would do almost anything on a dare	.14	<b>.42</b>
I know I am good because everybody keeps telling me so.	.25	.39
If I ruled the world it would be a better place.	<b>.55</b>	.00
I can usually talk my way out of anything.	.32	.23
I like to be the centre of attention.	.30	<b>.55</b>
I will be a success	.39	.01
I think I am a special person.	<b>.42</b>	.21
I see myself as a good leader.	<b>.58</b>	.13
I am assertive.	.32	.25
I like having authority over people.	<b>.65</b>	.05
I find it easy to manipulate people.	<b>.49</b>	.21
I insist on getting the respect that is due me.	.20	.12
I like to show off my body.	-.07	<b>.65</b>
I can read people like a book.	.24	.11
I like to take responsibility for making decisions.	.30	.10
I want to amount to something in the eyes of the world.	.33	.26
I like to look at my body.	.01	<b>.55</b>
I will usually show off if I get the chance.	.25	<b>.57</b>
I always know what I am doing.	.21	-.03
I rarely depend on anyone else to get things done.	.17	-.11
Everybody likes to hear my stories.	.22	.20
I expect a great deal from other people.	.29	.01
I will never be satisfied until I get all that I deserve.	<b>.46</b>	.07
I like to be complimented.	.08	<b>.41</b>
I have a strong will to power.	<b>.66</b>	-.00
I like to start new fads and fashions.	.07	.34
I like to look at myself in the mirror.	.01	<b>.54</b>
I really like to be the centre of attention.	.30	<b>.55</b>
I can live my life anyway I want to.	.16	.13
People always seem to recognise my authority.	<b>.59</b>	.06
I would prefer to be a leader.	<b>.63</b>	.13
I am going to be a great person.	.32	.28
I can make anybody believe anything I want them to.	.30	.19
I am a born leader.	<b>.40</b>	.10
I wish someone would someday write my biography.	-.05	<b>.44</b>
I get upset when people don't notice how I look when I go out in public.	.03	<b>.54</b>
I am more capable than other people.	.35	.12
I am an extraordinary person.	.29	.24

*N*=338. Loadings above .40 are in boldface. NB: The NPI is a forced-choice instrument. Only the narcissistic choice is listed here. For instance, the subject chooses between "modesty does not become me" and "I am essentially a modest person."



**Table 6.2: Narcissistic Personality Inventory Items After Varimax Rotation of the Principal Components - Three Factor Solution**

NPI Item (narcissistic choice)	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
I have a natural talent for influencing people.	.33	.24	.22
Modesty doesn't become me.	.28	.33	.09
I would do almost anything on a dare	.13	<b>.41</b>	-.09
I know I am good because everybody keeps telling me so.	.13	.30	.12
If I ruled the world it would be a better place.	<b>.50</b>	-.05	.25
I can usually talk my way out of anything.	.35	.25	.03
I like to be the centre of attention.	.36	<b>.59</b>	.00
I will be a success	.35	.02	.18
I think I am a special person.	.20	.04	<b>.65</b>
I see myself as a good leader.	<b>.56</b>	.10	.20
I am assertive.	.28	.22	.21
I like having authority over people.	<b>.64</b>	.04	.15
I find it easy to manipulate people.	<b>.51</b>	.22	.09
I insist on getting the respect that is due me.	.17	.09	.13
I like to show off my body.	-.13	<b>.60</b>	.25
I can read people like a book.	.24	.11	.07
I like to take responsibility for making decisions.	.19	.01	.33
I want to amount to something in the eyes of the world.	.29	.23	.21
I like to look at my body.	-.17	<b>.42</b>	<b>.51</b>
I will usually show off if I get the chance.	.32	<b>.62</b>	-.04
I always know what I am doing.	.17	-.06	.13
I rarely depend on anyone else to get things done.	.05	-.21	.32
Everybody likes to hear my stories.	.16	.15	.22
I expect a great deal from other people.	.33	.04	-.03
I will never be satisfied until I get all that I deserve.	<b>.40</b>	.03	.24
I like to be complimented.	.07	<b>.41</b>	.09
I have a strong will to power.	<b>.65</b>	-.00	.13
I like to start new fads and fashions.	.08	.35	.05
I like to look at myself in the mirror.	-.11	<b>.45</b>	.38
I really like to be the centre of attention.	.38	<b>.61</b>	-.04
I can live my life anyway I want to.	-.06	.05	.31
People always seem to recognise my authority.	<b>.56</b>	.03	.20
I would prefer to be a leader.	<b>.67</b>	.16	.03
I am going to be a great person.	.14	.13	<b>.54</b>
I can make anybody believe anything I want them to.	.17	.08	<b>.41</b>
I am a born leader.	.39	.09	.11
I wish someone would someday write my biography.	-.05	<b>.44</b>	.06
I get upset when people don't notice how I look when I go out in public.	.06	<b>.56</b>	.02
I am more capable than other people.	.21	.01	<b>.42</b>
I am an extraordinary person.	.11	.10	<b>.51</b>

N=338. Loading above .40 are in boldface. NB: The NPI is a forced-choice instrument. Only the narcissistic choice is listed here. For instance, the subject chooses between "modesty does not become me" and "I am essentially a modest person."

**Table 6.3: Five Factor Profiles of the Two Factor NPI Solution**

	N	E	O	A	C
Will to Power	-.19***	.20***	.12*	-.40***	.09
Self-Love	-.10	.40***	.17**	-.13*	-.08

**Table 6.4: Associations of Will to Power and Self-Love Subscales with PDQ-4+ Personality Disorder Measures**

Personality Syndrome	Will to Power	Self-Love
Narcissistic	.40***	.41***
Antisocial	.28***	.25***
Histrionic	.15**	.47***
Paranoid	.26***	.09
Borderline	.05	.12*
Negativistic	.15**	.16**
Schizoid	.10	-.17**
Schizotypal	.04	.01
Obsessive-Compulsive	.09	.05
Avoidant	-.16**	-.14*
Dependent	-.10	.04
Depressive	-.02	-.05
PDQ-4+ Total Score	.17**	.18***

\* = p&lt;.005

\*\* = p&lt;.01

\*\*\* = p&lt;.001

**Table 6.5: Associations Between Will to Power and Self-Love Subscales and Constructs Related to Narcissism**

	Will to Power	Self-Love
Impression Management	-.17**	-.12*
Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.21***	.15*
Self-Deceptive Denial	-.17**	-.10
Affect Intensity	.04	.24***
Negative Intensity	.02	.09
Negative Reactivity	-.25***	-.09
Positive Intensity	.13*	.28***
Positive Reactivity	.15**	.22***
Hostility	-.05	-.09
Sensitivity to Criticism	-.13	-.01
Splitting Index	-.03	-.01
Split Self Images	-.10	.08
Split Family Images	.03	-.03
Split Other Images	.00	-.10
Empathic Concern	-.21***	-.01
Fantasy	-.05	.14*
Personal Distress	-.23***	-.13*
Perspective Taking	-.22***	-.12*

\* =  $p < .005$

\*\* =  $p < .01$

\*\*\* =  $p < .001$

## *Discussion*

The NPI 4- factor solution (Emmons, 1984; Emmons, 1987) was based on an earlier 54-item version of the NPI which Raskin and Terry (1988) reduced to 40- items. Some of the items that were dropped from the 54- item instrument had much higher loadings on Emmons' 4- factor solution than items that were not dropped. Raskin and Terry (1998) explain that they examined the response characteristics of the 54- items to determine whether each of the items was behaving in a monotonic fashion in relation to the full NPI score. This was done by segmenting the score distribution into 10 groups ranging from low to high. The frequency of item endorsements for each item across the groups was examined by chi- square. Seven items were dropped because of non-monotonic patterns.

If narcissism is a unitary construct, we should expect a monotonic pattern. Narcissism, however, is not a unitary construct. In this data set, it seems to have a two- or three- factor structure; in Raskin and Terry's own argument it is a seven- factor construct. Therefore we should not expect the items to be monotonic. Furthermore, items may be thought of as one-item tests and are thus extremely unreliable, the reliability of a test being proportional to its length (Kline, 1994).

With dichotomous variables, the correlation coefficient has to be carefully chosen (Kline, 1994). Raskin and Terry's analysis used tetrachoric coefficients. The tetrachoric correlation has a large standard error and is appropriate only for "huge" sample sizes (Kline, 1994, p. 126). Raskin and Terry had a sample size of 1,018. The present study (N= 338) used Pearson correlations. Future studies with the necessary sample sizes may use tetrachoric correlations, but researchers who have run analyses using both Pearson and tetrachoric correlations report that differences are negligible (Deary, personal communication). Raskin and Terry (1988) used a weighted promax oblique rotation procedure and did no confirmatory analysis. The present scales were derived from both

orthogonal and oblique rotations and will be subjected to confirmatory factor analysis (Chapter 10).

In addition to the seven items dropped due to non-monotonic patterns, four items were dropped because they did not load on the desired 7-factor solution. It is possible that these items may load on factors from a two-, three- or four-factor solution. Three items were dropped because of significant negative loadings in the pattern matrix. The seven-factor solution explained less variance (52%) than the four-factor solution it was intended to replace (70%).

One of the objections to factor analysis is “you only get out what you put in” (Kline, 1994). Including items that are essentially paraphrases of each other has been particularly criticised as leading to “useless factors (Kline, 1994, p. 12). Some NPI item pairs, such as “I see myself as a good leader” vs. “I would prefer to be a leader”, or “I like to show off my body” vs. “I will usually show off if I get the chance”, while not quite paraphrases, are more similar to each other than items that were dropped from the 54-item instrument, such as “I would be willing to describe myself as a strong personality” or “I have good taste when it comes to beauty”. It would be worthwhile to factor analyse the 54-item instrument to see if some of the dropped items should be resurrected in the 2- or 3-factor solutions. Nevertheless, the present data set appears to be characterised by two factors mapping to two key aspects of narcissism identified in the literature review.

## Chapter 7: A Scale-level Combined Principal Components Analysis of Measures of Narcissism, Normal and Abnormal Personality and Traits Theoretically Related to Narcissism

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The intercorrelations among variables of interest discussed in previous chapters suggest that the variance among them can be more parsimoniously accounted for by a smaller number of indexes (Manly, 1994). Similar studies (e.g. Mulder and Joyce, 1997; Livesley et al, 1998; Deary and Austin, in press) have accounted for much of the variance in personality traits related to personality disorders in terms of a smaller number of traits which can be understood as extreme or maladaptive variants of normal personality traits. Since the variables in this study were chosen for their relevance to narcissism, the results will accordingly be biased and not directly comparable to the above mentioned studies. An assessment of narcissism in five factor model however, including an estimate of how much of the construct can be accounted for by the five factors and how much remains unexplained, would be of value.

Additionally, an issue in the above studies concerns the big five domain of Openness to Experience (O). O is the only domain of the five- factor model that has failed to be useful in understanding abnormal personality traits. This is thought by some to be due to the lack of items in personality disorder measures reflecting pathological facets of O (e.g. Widiger, 1998). Since it is often argued that all personality disorders include some pathological narcissism (e.g. Ansbacher, 1985), and preoccupation with grandiose fantasies is characteristic of narcissism, inclusion of narcissism-related measures such as fantasy may discover some role for O in abnormal personality.


### *Procedure*

For descriptive purposes, as well as to compare the present data set with other similar data sets, the underlying structure of the psychometric data was examined at the subscale level using principal components analysis. Included in the analysis were:

- The five dimensions of normal personality assessed by the NEO-FFI: Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness;
- The twelve personality disorders assessed by the PDQ-4+: Narcissistic, Antisocial, Histrionic, Paranoid, Borderline, Negativistic, Schizoid, Schizotypal, Obsessive-Compulsive, Dependent, Depressive and Avoidant;
- The Will to Power and Self-Love scales derived from the NPI in the previous chapter and the Pseudoautonomy (PA) and Shame Proneness (SP) scales. These are measures of overt and covert narcissism in the non-clinical population;
- The BIDR scales for Impression Management, Self-Deceptive Enhancement and Self-Deceptive Denial;
- Four subscales comprising the Affect Intensity Measure: Negative Intensity, Negative Reactivity, Positive Intensity and Positive Reactivity;
- The Sensitivity to Criticism scale;
- The Hostility subscale of the Aggression Questionnaire;
- The three subscales of the Splitting Index: Splitting of Self-Images, Family-Images and Other-Images;
- The four subscales of the IRI empathy instrument: Empathic Concern, Fantasy, Perspective Taking and Personal Distress.



Initially, for descriptive purposes, these scales were entered as variables in an unrotated principal components analysis with the number of factors equal to the number of variables (37)<sup>1</sup>. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy was .87. Hair et al consider values of this statistic in excess of .80 “meritorious” for factor analysis and values in excess of .90 “marvellous” (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black, 1995). The data set is therefore appropriate for factor analysis. On the basis of the scree plot (Figure 1), a five factor solution was examined. Though a principal components analysis was performed, the usual convention of referring to rotated components as factors will be adopted.



### *Orthogonal Rotation*

Since the clearest possible separation of components was sought, VARIMAX rotation was used (Hair et al, 1995). The result is shown in Table 7.1. Loadings greater than .4 are shown in boldface, though loadings above approximately .16 are significant at the .01 level.

<sup>1</sup> The SPSS package was used.

**Table 7.1: Normal, Abnormal and Narcissistic Personality Traits After Varimax Rotation of the Principal-Components Analysis.**

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
Neuroticism	<b>.86</b>	-.01	.05	-.03	.02
Extraversion	-.39	.01	-.11	<b>.70</b>	-.07
Openness	-.12	.14	.07	.11	<b>.69</b>
Agreeableness	-.05	<b>.50</b>	<b>-.56</b>	.11	.02
Conscientiousness	-.20	<b>.45</b>	.17	.07	<b>-.51</b>
Narcissistic	.11	-.31	<b>.56</b>	.21	.13
Antisocial	-.11	<b>-.48</b>	.37	.10	.37
Histrionic	.31	-.15	.20	<b>.51</b>	.28
Paranoid	.21	-.17	<b>.64</b>	.10	-.09
Borderline	<b>.52</b>	-.21	.35	.11	.33
Negativistic	<b>.44</b>	-.31	<b>.46</b>	.06	.16
Obsessive-Compulsive	.37	.14	<b>.43</b>	.11	-.22
Schizoid	.09	.05	<b>.52</b>	<b>-.54</b>	.06
Schizotypal	.31	.07	<b>.47</b>	-.11	.38
Avoidant	<b>.75</b>	-.01	.19	-.17	.01
Dependent	<b>.64</b>	-.11	.06	.05	.10
Depressive	<b>.72</b>	-.05	.26	-.09	.07
Will to Power	-.27	-.28	<b>.52</b>	.30	-.07
Self-Love	-.16	-.26	.21	<b>.60</b>	.16
Pseudoautonomy	-.07	-.38	<b>.42</b>	.07	.31
Shame Proneness	<b>.79</b>	-.07	.09	.02	-.05
Impression Management	-.18	<b>.65</b>	-.01	-.10	-.06
Self-Deceptive Enhancement	<b>-.51</b>	.27	<b>.44</b>	.03	-.09
Self-Deceptive Denial	-.12	<b>.66</b>	-.10	-.02	-.02
Negative Intensity	<b>.61</b>	.14	.08	<b>.42</b>	.11
Negative Reactivity	<b>.47</b>	<b>.58</b>	-.14	.31	.02
Positive Intensity	.11	.23	.12	<b>.72</b>	.13
Positive Reactivity	.20	.18	.14	<b>.72</b>	.02
Sensitivity to Criticism	<b>.52</b>	.02	-.17	.16	-.25
Hostility	<b>.68</b>	-.21	.20	-.04	-.12
Split Self Images	<b>.66</b>	-.16	.01	.10	.33
Split Other Images	.33	<b>-.44</b>	.08	-.32	.03
Split Family Images	.33	-.38	.01	-.08	.02
Empathic Concern	.17	<b>.59</b>	-.21	.32	.32
Perspective Taking	-.08	<b>.61</b>	-.20	-.00	.28
Personal Distress	<b>.65</b>	.02	-.15	-.03	.04
Fantasy	.26	.19	-.02	.29	<b>.55</b>

Note:  $N=338$ . Loadings greater than .40 are in boldface type.

Factor 1 has high positive loadings for Neuroticism (.86), the Avoidant (.75), Depressive (.72), Dependent (.64), Borderline (.52) and Negativistic (.44) personalities, Negative Intensity (.61) and Negative Reactivity (.47), Hostility (.68), Personal Distress (.65), Sensitivity to Criticism (.52), Shame Proneness (.79) and

Splitting of Self Images (.66), and a negative loading for Self-Deceptive Enhancement (-.51). Consistent with previous combined normal and abnormal personality trait survey research (e.g. Mulder and Joyce; 1997, Deary and Austin, in press; Livesley et al, 1998) the first factor extracted relates to aversive arousal and is clearly captured in the five factor model by high N. Factor 1 explained 18.7 percent of the variance.

Factor 2 appears to be the mirror image of the Mulder and Joyce antisocial factor. This factor, which explained 10.4 percent of the variance, has high positive loadings for Agreeableness (.50) and Conscientiousness (.45), Impression Management (.65), Self-Deceptive Denial (.66), Negative Reactivity (.58), Empathic Concern (.59) and Perspective Taking (.61), with negative loadings for Antisocial Personality (-.48), and Splitting of Other Images (-.44). Low scorers on this factor exhibit traits associated with pathological narcissism: they are low- agreeableness people who lack empathy and perspective taking and impression management skills, and split other- images into “all good” or “all bad”.

Factor 3 has high positive loadings for Narcissistic (.56), Paranoid (.64), Negativistic (.46), Obsessive-Compulsive (.43), Schizoid (.52) and Schizotypal (.47) personalities, Will to Power (.52), Pseudoautonomy (.42) and Self-Deceptive Enhancement (.44), and a negative loading on Agreeableness (-.56). It is interesting to compare this factor with factor 2. Both involve Agreeableness, positively in Factor 2 and negatively in Factor 3. The low agreeableness on this factor loads with the will to power and pseudoautonomy measures of narcissism, narcissistic personality disorder and disorders considered by some theorists to be narcissistic (e.g. paranoid (Bursten, 1973, Klein, 1957); schizoid (Klein, 1957)) and self-deceptive enhancement. Agreeableness loads in opposite directions on Factors 2 and 3. The association with paranoid personality in Factor 3 (low A) as compared with empathy and perspective taking in the high- A Factor 2 reminds one of McCrae and Costa's (1989) criticism of Jung's

(1971/1923) thinking vs. feeling types: agreeableness is not just feeling over logic, but warm feeling over cold logic. Factor 3 explained 9.0 percent of the variance.

Factor 4 has high positive loadings for Extraversion (.70), Self-Love (.60), Negative Intensity (.42), Positive Intensity (.72), Positive Reactivity (.72), Histrionic Personality (.51) and a negative loading for Schizoid Personality (-.54). This factor seems to concern (mostly) positive emotions, sociability and the need to be with others. The fact that Positive Intensity and Positive Reactivity differ little in their five-factor profiles adds support to the three-factor model of the AIM (Bryant and Yarnold, 1996). Just as the “nasty” kind of narcissism seems to melt into the five-factor model domains of Agreeableness, the “vain” kind seems to overlap with the domain of Extraversion. Later we will be concerned with much of these kinds of narcissism is accounted for by these two domains and how much remains outside the five factor model. Factor 4 explained 9.0 percent of the variance.

Factor 5 has high positive loadings for Openness to Experience (.69) and Fantasy (.55) and a negative loading on Conscientiousness (-.51). Factor 5 appears to describe people who are more interested in their fantasy world than their responsibilities in the real world. Note also the high loading on O in this data set, with its abundance of narcissism-related measures, that does not appear in other data sets (e.g. Deary and Austin, in press). Factor 5 explained 5.9 percent of the variance. Together, the five factors accounted for 53 percent of the variance.

### *Oblique Rotations*

Due to the likelihood that personality factors are correlated, it was appropriate to examine an oblique as well as an orthogonal rotation. The Pattern Matrix following Direct Oblimin rotation is shown in Figure 2.

Factor 1 has high positive loadings for Neuroticism (.86), Avoidant (.74), Depressive (.71), Dependent (.63), and Borderline (.47) personalities, Negative Intensity (.61), Negative Reactivity (.50), Hostility (.67), Personal Distress (.66), Sensitivity to Criticism (.56), Shame Proneness (.79) and Splitting of Self Images (.63), and a negative loading for Self-Deceptive Enhancement (-.55). This differs little from the orthogonal rotation.

Factor 2 has loadings for Agreeableness (.51), Impression Management (.65), Self-Deceptive Denial (.67), Negative Reactivity (.60), Empathic Concern (.66) and Perspective Taking (.65), and negative loadings for Antisocial Personality (-.46) and Splitting of Other Images (-.42). This is again similar to the same factor in the orthogonal rotation.

**Table 7.2: Normal, Abnormal and Narcissistic Personality Traits after Direct Oblimin Rotation of the Principal Components (Pattern Matrix)**

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
Neuroticism	<b>.86</b>	.02	-.05	.02	.01
Extraversion	-.37	-.04	<b>.72</b>	-.11	-.11
Openness	-.18	.21	.06	-.03	<b>.70</b>
Agreeableness	-.01	<b>.51</b>	.11	<b>-.45</b>	-.05
Conscientiousness	-.14	.38	.08	.35	<b>-.51</b>
Narcissistic	.07	-.32	.20	<b>.45</b>	.18
Antisocial	-.18	<b>-.46</b>	.09	.20	<b>.42</b>
Histrionic	.28	-.14	<b>.49</b>	.09	.28
Paranoid	.18	-.19	.09	<b>.60</b>	-.03
Borderline	<b>.47</b>	-.16	.07	.23	.36
Negativistic	<b>.40</b>	-.29	.04	.35	.20
Obsessive-Compulsive	.38	.12	.10	<b>.48</b>	-.20
Schizoid	.05	.08	<b>-.57</b>	<b>.53</b>	.14
Schizotypal	.26	.13	-.16	<b>.41</b>	<b>.43</b>
Avoidant	<b>.74</b>	.02	-.20	.18	.03
Dependent	<b>.63</b>	-.08	.03	.00	.09
Depressive	<b>.71</b>	-.01	-.12	.23	.09
Will to Power	-.30	-.33	.32	<b>.47</b>	-.02
Self-Love	-.19	-.29	<b>.60</b>	.10	.17
Pseudoautonomy	-.14	-.36	.06	.27	.36
Shame Proneness	<b>.79</b>	-.05	.01	.07	-.06
Impression Management	-.16	<b>.65</b>	-.12	.14	-.06
Self-Deceptive Enhancement	<b>-.52</b>	.23	.03	<b>.51</b>	-.04
Self-Deceptive Denial	-.10	<b>.67</b>	-.05	.04	.00
Negative Intensity	<b>.61</b>	.16	.39	.06	.08
Negative Reactivity	<b>.50</b>	<b>.60</b>	.28	-.04	-.03
Positive Intensity	.11	.22	<b>.70</b>	.12	.08
Positive Reactivity	.21	.16	<b>.70</b>	.14	-.01
Sensitivity to Criticism	<b>.56</b>	-.01	.16	-.12	-.30
Hostility	<b>.67</b>	-.20	-.05	.17	-.12
Split Self Images	<b>.63</b>	-.10	.07	-.10	.32
Split Other Images	.31	<b>-.42</b>	-.31	-.01	.02
Split Family Images	.31	-.37	-.08	-.07	.02
Empathic Concern	.17	<b>.66</b>	.27	-.15	.27
Perspective Taking	-.07	<b>.65</b>	-.04	-.12	.26
Personal Distress	<b>.66</b>	.05	-.05	-.16	.01
Fantasy	.22	.26	.24	-.10	<b>.53</b>

*N*=338. Loadings greater than .40 are in boldface type. Schizoid and Schizotypal scales were computed without one shared item.

Factors 3 and 4 in the oblique rotation are much like Factors 3 and 4 in the orthogonal rotation, but appear in the reverse order and with Pseudoautonomy failing to reach practical significance. Factor 3 has high positive loadings for Extraversion (.72), Histrionic Personality (.49), Self-Love (.60), and positive affect (.70 for both Positive Intensity and Positive Reactivity). There is a negative loading for schizoid personality (-.57). Factor 4 has a negative loading for Agreeableness (-.45), and positive loadings for the Narcissistic (.45), Paranoid (.60), Obsessive-Compulsive (.48), Schizoid (.53) and Schizotypal (.41) personalities, Will to Power (.47) and Self-Deceptive Enhancement (.51), but not Antisocial personality.

As in the orthogonal case, Factor 5 has high positive loadings for Openness to Experience (.70), and Fantasy (.53), and a negative loading (-.51) on Conscientiousness. Additionally, the Antisocial (.42) and Schizotypal (.43) personalities reach the .4 level in the oblique rotation.

## **Discussion**

Previously published research on narcissism using the NPI has either been based on the total scale score or on subscales from the four- and seven- factor NPI solutions. The present study is the first empirical investigation assessing narcissism using subscales for will to power and self-love. The four and seven factor scales are probably lower order facets. When this is done, will to power and self-love correlate with the extraversion and agreeableness domains of the five-factor model as assessed by the NEO-FFI.

One candidate paradigm in the field of personality disorders is called “the four A’s” (Mulder and Joyce, 1997). A variety of factor analytic studies designed to reduce personality disorders to a smaller number of categories or dimensions with less overlap have consistently identified one factor involving antisocial behaviours and another



factor involving asthenic (prone to negative emotion) behaviours (Deary and Austin, in press). Additional factors that have been identified less invariably involve a factor that can be called "asocial" (e.g. schizoid) and another that can be called "anankastic" (Obsessive-Compulsive) - four As. Mulder and Joyce (1997) propose that the asocial and anankastic factors be taken as provisional, and this four factor edifice related to normal personality traits, with a view towards conceptualising personality disorders as extreme or maladaptive variants of traits that are distributed throughout the general population. High Neuroticism, low Agreeableness, low Extraversion, and High Conscientiousness load on the Asthenic, Antisocial, Asocial and Anankastic factors, respectively. Openness to Experience is the only domain of the five-factor model that has not found a parallel in abnormal personality. One possible explanation offered (Widiger, 1998) is that the instruments used to measure O do not include items that tap the magical thinking that may characterise excessive or pathological O.

Since neither the EPQ nor the TPQ assesses Openness, it could not possibly have emerged in the Mulder and Joyce study. It has not emerged in joint normal and abnormal personality trait studies where it might have been expected (Livesley et al, 1998). In this study, which differs from previous studies by the inclusion of measures related to narcissism, Openness to Experience loaded on the fifth factor extracted, along with low Conscientiousness and fantasy. According to Carl Jung (1971/1923), fantasy is the source of all solutions to the problem of how the subject (personality) can relate to the object (outside world):

"Fantasy is just as much feeling as thinking; as much intuition as sensation. There is no psychic function that, through fantasy, is not inextricably bound up with the other psychic functions. Sometimes it appears in primordial form, sometimes it is the ultimate and boldest product of all our faculties combined. Fantasy, therefore, seems to me the clearest expression of the specific activity of the psyche. It is, pre-eminently, the creative activity from which the answers to all answerable questions come; it is the

mother of all possibilities, where, like all psychological opposites, the inner and outer worlds are joined together in living union. Fantasy it was and ever is which fashions the bridge between the irreconcilable claims of subject and object, introversion and extraversion. In fantasy alone both mechanisms are united (p.52).”

Openness to Experience is thus an area in which McCrae and Costa's (1989) call for research on Jungian theory within the five-factor model may prove fruitful for abnormal personality. McCrae (1993-1994) credits Jung's Psychological Types as having led to the development of measures of variations on the construct of Openness that have repeatedly appeared in personality psychology, such as Thinking Introversion or Thoughtfulness and Intuition.

Intercorrelations between O, its facets and other personality variables reveal the inadequacy of conceiving this domain as “intellect” and suggest interesting avenues for study (McCrae, 1993-1994). The Intellectance scale of the Hogan Personality Inventory correlates with the O facet of ideas, but not with the facets of Fantasy, Feelings, Actions and Values (McCrae, 1993-1994). Full scale IQ is related only to the domain score as a whole and the Ideas facet (McCrae, 1993-1994). If Openness to Experience is narrowly conceived as Intellect, traits that emphasise an interest in sensory rather than intellectual experience fall through the cracks. McCrae (1993-1994) suggests that studying non-intellectual traits such as need for variety, sensation seeking and aesthetic reactivity would improve our understanding of Openness to Experience. The discovery that traits with a long history in the field of personality psychology correlate with the broad domain of Openness to Experience places research on imagination, consciousness and artistic processes “squarely in the mainstream of contemporary trait psychology” (McCrae, 1993-1994).

Particularly relevant to O may be Jung's (1911-12/1952) distinction between “two kinds of thinking”: directed and fantasy. Directed thinking is completely conscious,

while fantasy thinking is partly unconscious. Directed thinking operates with language and speech, is used for communication and is difficult and tiring. This kind of thinking operates in logical sequences, produces innovation and adaptation, copies reality and tries to act on it. Fantasy thinking spontaneously operates with images and feelings already present, is effortless (and therefore should therefore correlate with low C, which it does) and guided by “unconscious” (unknown) motives. The goal of fantasy thinking is not to understand reality as objectively and accurately as possible, but to adapt it to subjective fantasy and expectation. Fantasy thinking appears as soon as directed stops, replacing adaptation to reality with fantasy. If fantasy is not constantly corrected by adapted thinking, it produces an overwhelmingly subjected and distorted view of the world. Any intensive train of thought must be worked out in more or less verbal form, directed towards the outside world for expression. This directed or logical thinking is adapted to reality; we use it to imitate the order of objectively real things, so that our mental images follow the corresponding causal sequence of external events.

If, as Jung asserts above, fantasy “bridges the gap between the irreconcilable claims of subject and object”, research on Jungian theory related to fantasy, narcissism and the role of Openness to Experience in personality pathology may uncover a fifth factor in abnormal personality. According to Jung, the mainly unconscious (unknown) inner motive that guides fantasy is itself an objective fact. The instinctive, archaic part of the mind is also an objective fact inherited with the brain and having an evolutionary history. Fantasy brings directed thinking into contact with this resource. Therefore fantasy is also involved in dealing with unresolved questions. Adaptation to reality is the goal of effort partly consisting of directed thinking, but is abetted by fantasy.

McCrae (1993-1994) says there is no direct link between Openness to Experience and mental health. This is supported by the joint questionnaire studies of normal and abnormal personality traits that have been repeatedly cited in this thesis (Deary and Austin, in press; Mulder and Joyce, 1997; Livesley et al, 1998) that do not produce a

factor involving openness. According to Jung, however, in split-off complexes there are unconscious fantasies that become separate personalities. According to Jung, there are “unconscious” (or, as this thesis argues below would be a better term, “unknown”) as well as “conscious” causal sequences. Power and Dalglish (1997) assert that the cognitive paradigm at its best may be able to shed some light on unconscious (unknown) phenomena. Thus, Costa and McCrae’s (1992a) suggestion that Jung’s theory of Psychological Types may offer a way of integrating the insights of depth psychology with modern psychometric methodology might be amended to include cognitive psychology.

According to McCrae (1993-1994), Openness to Experience is an individual differences dimension with both structural and motivational aspects. With respect to the structural aspect, McCrae suggests links between Openness with compartmentalised beliefs and “thick and thin boundaries in the mind”. “Thick” boundaries in the mind may correspond to “irreversible splitting”, which is, according to Stein (1995) “by all accounts, what horrified Jung most”. The relationship between narcissism and compartmentalisation will be examined later in this thesis.

Mulder and Joyce (1997) compared two other candidate models of normal adult personality traits to be included in the proposed paradigm of disordered personality: the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) and the Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire (TPQ). The latter contains four temperament scales, plus three character scales which have been added to more recent versions. The TPQ dimensions related to the four As better than the Eysenckian dimensions. The five-factor model was not included in the Mulder and Joyce study ( $N = 148$ ). The correlations obtained between five-factor domains as measured by the NEO-FFI in this study are far higher than those reported by Mulder and Joyce. The highest TPQ correlation among Mulder and Joyce’s factors is .528 between Harm Avoidance and the asthenic factor. The highest EPQ correlation was .582 between Psychoticism and the antisocial factor. Since subjects in

the Mulder and Joyce study were psychiatric patients assessed by structured clinical interview, the studies are not directly comparable. Nevertheless, the five factor model appears to be at least as useful for conceptualising the data from this study as the models used in the Mulder and Joyce study for understanding that data. If a fifth factor related to Openness to Experience is found in abnormal personality, the five-factor model becomes the only model on the market for unifying research on normal and abnormal personality.

Matthews and Deary (1998) comment that, given Eysenck's longstanding contempt for psychoanalysis, it is interesting that he took over the introversion - extraversion dimension from Jung. But is introversion-extraversion the same in Eysenck and Jung? In the Eysenckian model, the basis of the dimension differences in levels of cerebral cortex arousal when in a resting state. Extraverts have a sub-optimum level of cortical arousal, and hence seek out stimulation. Introverts normally have above-optimal levels of cortical arousal and seek environments that keep their already high level of arousal from becoming aversive (Burger, 1990, p.199). According to Jung (1971/1921) the difference between the introvert and extravert lies in the subject-object dichotomy:

But in general one could say that the introverted standpoint is one which sets the ego and the subjective psychological process above the object and the objective process, or at any rate seeks to hold its ground against the object. This attitude, therefore, gives the subject a higher value than the object, and the object accordingly has a lower value. It is of secondary importance; indeed, sometimes the object represents no more than an outward token of a subjective content, the embodiment of an idea, the idea being the essential thing. If it is the embodiment of a feeling, then again the feeling is the main thing and not the object in its own right. The extraverted standpoint, on the contrary, subordinates the subject to the object, so that the object has the higher value. In this case the subject is of secondary importance, the subjective process appearing at times no more than a disturbing or superfluous appendage of objective events. It is clear that the psychology resulting from these contrary standpoints must be classed as two totally different orientations. The one sees everything in terms of his own situation, the other in terms of the objective event (p.5).

Eysenck's conception of the introvert-extravert dimension seems to overlap with neuroticism. Perhaps this is why many extraversion scales are contaminated with neuroticism. On Jung's conception, one could be habitually oriented either in towards

the subject or out towards the object, regardless of base-level arousal. The factor defined by extraversion in this data set (.70 on factor 4 in the Varimax, .72 on factor 3 in the Oblimin) has near-zero loadings from neuroticism. Extraversion in the Costa and McCrae (1992a) version of the five- factor model also differs from Jung's conceptualisation: introspection or reflection is part of Openness to Experience in the NEO.

As discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis and in Deary et al (1996), the NEO-FFI Extraversion scale is contaminated by Neuroticism. McCrae and Costa (1989) point out that Jung's conception of extraversion is more diffuse than that operationalised in the NEO, and invite future research on how Jung's theory fits into the five- factor model. The five-factor model is not based on any one theory of personality. Presumably future version of the NEO or other measures of the five- factor model with strive for an extraversion scale that is orthogonal to the neuroticism scale. Perhaps an adequately operationalised Jungian extraversion dimension might turn out to be orthogonal to neuroticism.

The NEO-FFI domains of Agreeableness and Extraversion can account for much, but not all, of the variance in the nasty and vain types of narcissism, respectively. If factors 2 and 3 represent disorders associated with "nasty" narcissism, low Agreeableness accounts for slightly more than one quarter of the variance in these dimensions. Much of what is left over may be attributable to aberrations of the human will - - Dostoevsky's (1994) "superadded interest of interests which enters into no classification, which forever consigns systems and theories to the devil". But even if we have no hope of ever neatly classifying the human will, can we not say that an *unsubmitted* will must account for much of what is left over after low Agreeableness has been taken into consideration? Do not antisocial personality, lack of empathy, unconcern with impression management, etc. simply reflect doing what one wants, regardless of right or wrong? If factor 4 (in the orthogonal rotation) represents



narcissistic vanity, Extraversion accounts for 36 percent of the variance in narcissistic vanity.

It has been argued (Ansbacher, 1985) that there may be some degree of Narcissism involved in most or all personality disorders. This thesis has suggested that this may reflect use (or non-use) of the term "narcissism" at different levels of a hierarchy. At a top level, narcissism seems to be a collective term having to do with relationships between the individual (structures and functions that make up the personality) and the environment. In this sense "narcissism" becomes synonymous with Millon's (1994) definition of "personality disorder" and the argument is reduced to a tautology. As a collective term, narcissism has many aspects. The consistent appearance of a factor related to neuroticism in this and previous studies would seem to argue against both Millon's definition of personality disorder and the view that all personality pathology flows from narcissism. According to these data, narcissistic will to power loads on a common factor with the narcissistic, paranoid, schizoid, schizotypal and obsessive-compulsive disorders, as well as with covert grandiosity (Pseudoautonomy) and Self-Deceptive Enhancement. The Self-Love subscale of the NPI, which seemed to combine exhibitionism and self-admiration, loaded on another factor with Histrionic Personality and measures of emotionality. Interactions between narcissism and neuroticism may also be important.

In sum, it appears that, when measures of narcissism and constructs related to narcissism are added to measures of normal personality and personality disorders in studies of this type:

- A factor containing Openness to experience, that has failed to appear in other studies does appear in a factor along with fantasy and low Conscientiousness. Conceivably this may be due to narcissistic traits of preoccupation with fantasies of extreme power, wealth, beauty, and success.



- Some of the “nasty” and “vain” varieties of pathological narcissism are understandable in terms of already operationalised models of agreeableness and extraversion. The portion of variance in narcissism unaccounted for by extraversion and agreeableness presumably can account for a significant portion of the variance in abnormal personality.

## **Chapter 8: A Scale-level Principal Components Analysis of Gender Differences in Measures of Narcissism, Normal Personality, Personality Disorder and Traits Theoretically Related to Narcissism**

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Jang, Livesley and Vernon (1998) recently reported significant gender differences in personality traits delineating personality disorders. Females scored significantly higher on what the authors labelled the “Emotional Dysfunction dimension” of a four-factor personality disorder structure, while males scored significantly higher on the “Dissocial” and “Inhibitedness” factors. These factors, which biometric genetic analyses indicated are influenced by gender-specific genetic and environmental factors, correspond very well to the Asthenic, Antisocial and Asocial factors of the Mulder and Joyce “Four As” typology.

We saw in Chapter 5, “Examination of the Data”, that there are significant gender differences in the Pollock Halls data, notably discrepancies between genders for the correlation between neuroticism and agreeableness (-.33 for females, -.04 for males) and neuroticism and perspective taking (-.03 for females, -.27 for males). Detailed study of gender differences in all of the personality traits considered in this study, which are collected in Appendix 2, is beyond the scope of this thesis. A preliminary investigation of how the many constructs used in this study may relate to the gender differences in traits underlying personality pathology found by Jang et al is, however, appropriate and potentially useful to the research community. Were all the correlations examined one at a time, the probability of a type 1 error would become unacceptably large. Therefore, to investigate how the constructs used in this study relate to gender differences in the structure of abnormal personality, additional principal components analyses were conducted on the Pollock Halls data for each gender.

This homogeneity (groups being composed of only one sex) is purchased at the price of stability (each group now has fewer subjects), and any significant findings will have to be investigated by future researchers with access to larger numbers of subjects. When the non-suspect questionnaires are divided in this way, there are 174 males and 164 females. If, as in the genders-combined study, these scales are entered as the variables in an unrotated principal components analysis with the number of factors equal to the number of variables, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy changes to .82 for both genders (from .87 for the combined sample), indicating that the data sets are still “meritorious” for factor analysis (Hair et al, 1995). The variables are the same as in the genders-combined analysis:

- The five dimensions of normal personality assessed by the NEO-FFI: Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to Experience, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness;
- The twelve personality disorders assessed by the PDQ-4+: Narcissistic, Antisocial, Histrionic, Paranoid, Borderline, Negativistic, Schizoid, Schizotypal, Obsessive-Compulsive, Dependent, Depressive and Avoidant. The Schizoid and Schizotypal scales of the PDQ-4+ share one item, which was omitted.
- The Will to Power and Self-Love subscales derived from the NPI, as well as the Pseudoautonomy (PA) and Shame Proneness (SP) scales. These are measures of narcissism in the non-clinical population;
- The BIDR scales for Impression Management, Self-Deceptive Enhancement and Self-Deceptive Denial;

- Four subscales comprising the Affect Intensity Measure: Negative and Positive Reactivity and Intensity;
- The Sensitivity to Criticism scale;
- The Hostility subscale of the Aggression Questionnaire;
- The three subscales of the Splitting Index: Splitting of Self-Images, Family-Images and Other-Images;
- The four subscales of the IRI empathy instrument: Empathic Concern, Fantasy, Perspective Taking and Personal Distress.

As in the combined analysis, although a principal components analysis was performed, the usual convention of referring to rotated components as factors will be adopted. Again, five factors were extracted based on the scree criteria.

### *Results*

Five factor solutions are shown in Table 8.1 for males and Table 8.2 for females.

Loadings greater than .40 are shown in boldface, though loadings above approximately .16 are significant at the .05 level. The five factors together account for 52.2 percent of the variance in females and 52.9 percent of the variance in males.

**Table 8.1: Normal, Abnormal and Narcissistic Personality Traits After Varimax Rotation of the Principal Components (Males)**

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
Neuroticism	<b>.82</b>	-.15	.06	.16	.07
Extraversion	-.38	.18	<b>.69</b>	-.24	-.08
Openness	-.16	.02	.09	.03	<b>.75</b>
Agreeableness	-.08	<b>-.69</b>	.17	-.25	.09
Conscientiousness	-.30	-.37	.09	.38	<b>-.48</b>
Narcissistic	.13	<b>.59</b>	.23	.29	.12
Antisocial	.04	<b>.67</b>	.03	.04	.28
Histrionic	.22	.34	<b>.48</b>	.01	.17
Paranoid	.13	<b>.44</b>	.21	<b>.48</b>	-.11
Borderline	<b>.56</b>	.25	.20	.21	.32
Negativistic	<b>.46</b>	<b>.43</b>	.05	.30	.27
Obsessive-Compulsive	.24	.08	.20	<b>.55</b>	-.12
Schizoid	.09	.11	<b>-.44</b>	<b>.60</b>	-.03
Schizotypal	.31	.11	-.03	<b>.63</b>	.26
Avoidant	<b>.69</b>	.01	-.07	.28	.01
Dependent	<b>.59</b>	.15	.07	.07	.01
Depressive	<b>.67</b>	.18	-.06	.31	.11
Will to Power	-.22	<b>.60</b>	.20	.21	-.12
Self-Love	-.14	<b>.52</b>	<b>.52</b>	-.08	.15
Pseudoautonomy	.04	<b>.61</b>	-.12	.18	.31
Shame Proneness	<b>.72</b>	.09	.10	.16	-.06
Impression	-.38	<b>-.49</b>	-.02	.29	-.01
Management					
Self-Deceptive	<b>-.61</b>	.02	.09	.34	-.18
Enhancement					
Self-Deceptive Denial	<b>-.42</b>	<b>-.46</b>	.08	.11	.17
Negative Intensity	<b>.46</b>	-.18	<b>.56</b>	.11	.06
Negative Reactivity	.19	<b>-.59</b>	<b>.48</b>	.23	.21
Positive Intensity	-.02	-.05	<b>.76</b>	.10	.18
Positive Reactivity	.15	-.05	<b>.75</b>	.07	.06
Sensitivity to Criticism	.39	-.11	.21	.04	-.11
Hostility	<b>.70</b>	.12	.06	.13	-.17
Split Self Images	<b>.63</b>	.10	.14	.01	.34
Split Other Images	<b>.53</b>	.25	-.34	.04	-.09
Split Family Images	<b>.49</b>	.21	-.07	-.10	-.02
Empathic Concern	.04	<b>-.52</b>	.40	.03	<b>.51</b>
Perspective Taking	-.19	<b>-.60</b>	.02	.07	.21
Personal Distress	<b>.60</b>	-.22	-.01	-.00	.06
Fantasy	.10	-.04	.18	-.03	<b>.63</b>

N=174. Loadings above .40 are in boldface. Schizoid and Schizotypal scales omitted one item that was shared between them.

**Table 8.2: Normal, Abnormal and Narcissistic Personality Traits After Varimax Rotation of the Principal Components (Females)**

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
Neuroticism	<b>.82</b>	-.05	-.19	.10	.01
Extraversion	<b>-.51</b>	<b>.56</b>	.04	-.12	-.10
Openness	-.16	.11	.08	.10	<b>.64</b>
Agreeableness	-.26	.05	.39	<b>-.57</b>	-.01
Conscientiousness	-.25	.10	.32	.17	<b>-.45</b>
Narcissistic	.23	.22	-.17	<b>.54</b>	.16
Antisocial	-.03	.20	-.24	.39	<b>.42</b>
Histrionic	.37	<b>.56</b>	-.13	.17	.27
Paranoid	.31	.05	-.14	<b>.62</b>	-.05
Borderline	<b>.51</b>	.13	-.22	.38	.36
Negativistic	<b>.58</b>	.15	-.18	<b>.41</b>	.03
Obsessive-Compulsive	<b>.44</b>	.11	.13	.25	-.25
Schizoid	.17	<b>-.51</b>	.05	<b>.50</b>	.17
Schizotypal	.26	.01	-.04	.25	<b>.58</b>
Avoidant	<b>.77</b>	-.21	-.05	.16	.06
Dependent	<b>.67</b>	.06	-.10	-.05	.17
Depressive	<b>.76</b>	-.09	-.01	.19	.03
Will to Power	-.20	<b>.43</b>	-.10	<b>.54</b>	-.09
Self-Love	-.13	<b>.60</b>	-.12	.17	.09
Pseudoautonomy	-.03	.28	-.22	<b>.46</b>	.17
Shame Proneness	<b>.81</b>	-.05	-.12	.04	-.04
Impression	-.11	-.13	<b>.65</b>	-.11	-.08
Management					
Self-Deceptive	-.37	.04	.38	<b>.53</b>	.03
Enhancement					
Self-Deceptive Denial	-.08	-.23	<b>.67</b>	-.03	-.07
Negative Intensity	<b>.63</b>	<b>.41</b>	.01	.11	.13
Negative Reactivity	<b>.47</b>	.24	<b>.42</b>	-.20	-.11
Positive Intensity	.04	<b>.71</b>	.14	.13	.11
Positive Reactivity	.15	<b>.73</b>	.20	.16	-.01
Sensitivity to Criticism	<b>.50</b>	.05	-.15	-.25	-.36
Hostility	<b>.69</b>	-.07	-.21	.21	-.05
Split Self Images	<b>.65</b>	.10	-.24	-.04	.35
Split Other Images	.23	-.24	<b>-.52</b>	.06	.16
Split Family Images	.23	-.08	<b>-.45</b>	.07	-.00
Empathic Concern	.05	.26	<b>.65</b>	-.18	.16
Perspective Taking	-.17	.01	<b>.56</b>	-.18	<b>.44</b>
Personal Distress	<b>.65</b>	-.00	-.12	-.17	.02
Fantasy	.31	<b>.40</b>	.20	-.07	<b>.47</b>

N= 164. Loadings above .40 are in boldface. Schizoid and Schizotypal scales omitted one item that was shared between them.

## Results

For both genders, the highest loading on Factor 1 is Neuroticism (.82). For both genders, this factor also pulls in the Borderline, Negativistic, Avoidant, Dependent and Depressive personalities; for females, Obsessive-Compulsive personality also reaches the .40 level. Shame Proneness, Hostility, Splitting of Self-Images and Personal Distress also load on this factor for both genders. Sensitivity to Criticism and Negative Reactivity load for females but not males (although Sensitivity to Criticism comes close at .39), while Splitting of Other Images, Splitting of Family Images, and low Self-Deceptive Enhancement and Self-Deceptive Denial load for males but not females. Thus, for both genders, the first factor extracted is consistent with the "Asthenic" factor in the Four As model and is captured in the five-factor model by Neuroticism. This factor explains 19.5 percent of the variance for females and 17.5 percent of the variance for males.

The factor explaining the second most variance is characterised in the five-factor model by low Agreeableness for males (-.69) and high Extraversion for females (.56). For males, this factor pulls in the Narcissistic (.59), Antisocial (.67), Paranoid (.44) and Negativistic (.43, which also loaded .46 on factor 1) personalities, the Will to Power (.60), Self-Love (.52) and Pseudoautonomy (.61) aspects of narcissism, and low Impression Management (-.49), Negative Reactivity (-.59, which loaded on factor 1 for females), Empathic Concern (-.52) and Perspective Taking (-.60). For females, factor 2 pulls in Histrionic Personality (.56), low Schizoid Personality (-.51), the Will to Power (.43) and Self-Love (.60) aspects of narcissism, Negative Intensity (.41), Positive Intensity (.71) and Positive Reactivity (.73).

The most variance in abnormal personality traits is explained by excessive Neuroticism for both genders. The second most variance is explained by a low Agreeableness factor in males that corresponds very well to the Antisocial factor in the Four As model, while for



females Histrionic personality traits account for the second most variance. The variance explained by the second factor was 12.9 percent in males and 9.1 percent in females. For females, this factor might be conceptualised as the flip side of the Asocial/Schizoid factor in the Four As typology: low scores on this dimension may be related to an Asocial dimension.

The second factor in males is most similar to the fourth factor in females. Factor four for females is also characterised in the five factor model by low Agreeableness (-.57) and pulls in the Narcissistic (.54), Paranoid (.62), Negativistic (.41), and Schizoid (.50) personalities, the Will to Power (.54) and Pseudoautonomy (.46) aspects of narcissism, and Self-Deceptive Enhancement (.53). Thus, there appears to be an Antisocial factor for females as well, but explaining a smaller amount of variance.

The second factor in females is most similar to factor 3 in males. Factor 3 for males pulls in Extraversion (.69), Histrionic personality (.48), low Schizoid personality (-.44), the Self-Love aspect of narcissism (.52) and all four subscales of the Affect Intensity Measure: Negative Intensity (.56), Negative Reactivity (.48), Positive Intensity (.76) and Positive Reactivity (.75). As in the females, one might postulate that this factor corresponds to a reverse measure of the Asocial/Schizoid dimension of the Four As paradigm, and accounts for relatively less abnormal personality variance in males than females.

For both genders the fifth factor is characterised in the five-factor model by high Openness to Experience and low Conscientiousness, and pulls in high Fantasy. For males, Empathic Concern (.51) also loads on this factor, while for females Antisocial (.42) and Schizotypal (.58) personalities and Perspective Taking (.44) load. That Perspective Taking loads on the same factor as Antisocial personality is surprising to say the least.

This factor is also unusual in that it is associated in the five-factor model with high O. Previous studies of this kind have consistently reported that O was the only five factor dimension that was NOT associated with one of the factor of abnormal personality. It is not known whether or not this is due to the lack of items on the O scales that tap the aspects of high O that may relate to abnormal personality, such as "magical thinking" (Livesley et al, 1998; Widiger, 1998). One criteria for the DSM Narcissistic Personality Disorder is preoccupation with grandiose fantasies (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). The present study included many measures of narcissism and constructs related to narcissism that were not included in previous studies of this type. Perhaps including measures of narcissism and related constructs brings out the preoccupation with fantasies that is associated with some personality disorder.

The remaining factor is Factor 4 for males and Factor 3 for females. Factor 4 in male subjects pulls in Obsessive-Compulsive (.55), Schizoid (.60) and Schizotypal (.63) personalities and accounts for 6.5 percent of the variance. Factor 3 in female subjects pulls in Impression Management (.65), Self-Deceptive Denial (.67), Negative Reactivity (.42), low Splitting of Other (-.52) and Family (-.45) Images, Empathic Concern (.65) and Perspective Taking (.56), and accounts for 9.6 percent of the variance. These factors do not appear to fit either the Four As or five- factor typology.

## **Discussion**

Surveying previous research on gender differences in personality traits, Jang et al (1998) report that males have generally scored significantly higher on assertiveness and self-esteem, while females have generally scored higher on extraversion, anxiety, trust, and tender-mindedness. On measures of personality disorders, males have scored higher on antisocial, schizoid, obsessive-compulsive, paranoid and narcissistic personality disorder measures; females have been higher than males on histrionic, dependent and avoidant

personalities, and in some studies schizotypal and passive-aggressive personalities. This is consistent with the finding in this study that the second most variance is accounted for by an antisocial factor in males but a histrionic factor in females.

The Jang et al (1998) study itself reports gender differences in Dimensional Assessment of Personality Pathology (DAPP-BQ) scores. The DAPP-BQ yields 18 basic (Affective Lability, Anxiousness, Callousness, Conduct Problems, Cognitive Dysfunction, Compulsivity, Identity Problems, Insecure Attachment, Intimacy Problems, Narcissism, Oppositionality (passive-aggressivity), Rejection, Restricted Expression, Social Avoidance, Stimulus Seeking, Submissiveness, Suspiciousness and Self-harm) and four higher order dimensions (Emotional Dysfunction, Dissocial, Inhibitedness and Compulsivity) of personality pathology. Using this instrument, the authors reported that all dimensions except submissiveness in males and cognitive dysfunction, compulsivity, conduct problems, suspiciousness and self-harm were significantly heritable. The genetic influences underlying all but four basic dimensions (stimulus seeking, callousness, rejection and insecure attachment) were gender-specific, but there were no gender differences in environmental influence. With the exception of dissocial personality in females, all higher level dimensions were significantly heritable (Jang et al, 1998). This would again be consistent with the notion that a greater amount of personality disorder variance should be captured by an antisocial factor for males than for females.

In terms of the Four As typology, Factor 1 in both genders is a clear "asthenic" (to use the Mulder and Joyce term) or "Emotional Dysfunction" (Livesley et al) factor. Factor 2 in males and factor 4 in females maps well onto the "Antisocial" (Mulder and Joyce) or "Dissocial" (Livesley) dimension. In the FFM, this factor clearly pulls in the low NEO agreeableness. The Asocial A would arguably be present for both genders as low scores

on Factor 2 for females and factor 3 for males. Only the provisional Anankastic (Obsessive-Compulsive) factor was not found.

Jang et al report that neuroticism and extraversion as measured by the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) have yielded inconsistent results, and were less likely to explain sex differences than more specific personality traits. The data from this study suggest that perhaps the different interaction between agreeableness and neuroticism in males and females may account for much of the inconsistent result for neuroticism. This topic, however, is beyond the scope of this thesis and left for future study.

## **Chapter 9: A Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Narcissism within the Five-Factor Model of Normal Personality and the “Four As” Model of Abnormal Personality**

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If abnormal personality is qualitatively distinct from normal personality, then a dimensional model analogous to dimensional models of normal personality may not be appropriate. If, however, normal and abnormal personality differ only quantitatively, a dimensional model becomes essential. Mounting evidence from the trait psychological perspective (e.g. Matthews and Deary, 1998) is making a rigid separation of normal and abnormal personality into distinct fields increasingly difficult to defend. Most personality traits are continuously distributed. Studies of relationships between measures of normal personality and measures of psychopathology (Mulder and Joyce, 1997; Deary et al, 1998; Deary and Austin, in press; Livesley, et al, 1998) repeatedly support the hypothesis that disordered personality has strong parallels in normal personality.

Sceptics of the factor analytic approach to personality have historically objected that the same technique has been used to produce vastly different results (Digman, 1994; Burger, 1990). The same technique which Cattell used to find evidence for 16 personality factors was used by Eysenck to find just two or three: Neuroticism, Extraversion and (later) Psychoticism. The same technique then produced alternative versions of a three-factor structure of personality (Costa and Widiger, 1994). This partly reflects the fact that factor analysis is sensitive to the data included in the analysis: inserting or removing data can lead to greater or lesser numbers of factors being extracted. It also reflects the measurement of traits at different levels of a hierarchy: Cattell’s 16 dimensions are actually correlated, primary-level traits that can be reduced to a smaller number of orthogonal supertraits (Matthews and Deary, 1998).

An enormous amount of research addressing these concerns suggests that the five-factor model may provide a framework within which to integrate personality theories that previously seemed incompatible. Recent research, notably by Costa and McCrae, has shown that other models of personality can be either subsumed under the five-factor model or interpreted in terms of it. The dominance and nurturance axes of the interpersonal circumplex, for instance, are analogous to the Extraversion and Agreeableness domains of the five-factor model (Wiggins and Pincus, 1994; McCrae and Costa, 1989). These impressive results have been obtained by joint factor analyses of scales measuring the five-factor model with scales measuring other models.

The five-factor model grew out of the lexical approach to personality. Analyses of trait-descriptive terms counted more than 4,000 personality-related adjectives in the English language (Burger, 1990). A series of studies found five clusters of personality descriptors in the adjectives, and five similar factors have been found in other languages (Matthews and Deary, 1998). Questionnaire studies and Q-sort techniques then produced further evidence for a five-factor structure of personality. Digman (1994) credits McDougall with first proposing a five-factor model of personality in 1932 and Thurstone with reporting the first factor analysis to show five factors in 1934. Deary's (1996) re-analysis of Webb's 1915 data showed that an earlier data set contained five factors, though the researcher was unable to extract them at the time.

In the same way, because of the joint factor space shared by the five-factor domains of Extraversion and Agreeableness and the self-love and will to power types of narcissism, we may be able to interpret our principal components with respect to an operationalised model of personality structure. Advocates of this approach (e.g. Wiggins and Pincus, 1994) argue that it avoids subjective interpretation, and has yielded a more coherent pattern of findings in over 50 years of research than studies not based on an operationalised model

of personality structure. The logical step following the descriptive and exploratory analysis of the preceding chapters is confirmatory factor analysis. Since the reliabilities of measurement instruments used are imperfect, an assessment of the degree to which measurement error rather than inadequacy of theoretical conceptualisation is responsible for lack of model fit is also desirable. To obtain these ends, the EQS package (e.g. Byrne, 1994; Dunn, Everitt and Pickles, 1993) was used to test the fit of a portion of the present data with the "four As" model of personality disorders (Mulder and Joyce, 1997) discussed in previous chapters.

The type of "nasty" narcissism characterised by an unsubmitted will to power appears to be largely understandable as low agreeableness. The "vain" type of narcissism may be largely unrestrained extraversion. The "asthenic" factor in our data characterised by high neuroticism invariably emerges in all factor analytic studies of personality disorder traits. Therefore the fit of these three aspects of the Pollock Halls data set were tested against the corresponding factors from the four As model. The method of maximum likelihood was used to analyse the correlation matrix based on 337 participants. The Wald and Lagrange multiplier tests were used to suggest paths in the model that might be dropped or added to improve the fit of the model. Starting values for the three factors were based on the exploratory analysis of the preceding chapters. The factors associated with self-love and will to power were allowed to correlate, as were the error terms associated with splitting of family and other images.



### *Choice of Variables*

The large number of variables in the Pollock Halls data set present formidable practical problems for modelling, and the choice of which to include or omit must be based on theory (Musil, Jones and Warner, 1998). The NPI is the most widely used measure of narcissism, and this thesis argues that narcissism has to do with relationships between self and others, which inevitably raise issues of love and power. Therefore the will to power and self-love subscales of the NPI were chosen as representing narcissism. Neuroticism, Extraversion and Agreeableness were included as the three domains of the five factor model involved in the three dimensions of abnormal personality under investigation; Conscientiousness and Openness to Experience do not relate to the three factors under scrutiny and were omitted. From a variety of theoretical perspectives (e.g. Kernberg, 1975; Kohut, 1971; Power and Dalgleish, 1997), splitting is fundamental to narcissism, self-deception, and psychopathology, and splitting was one of the best predictors of abnormal personality discussed in previous chapters. Therefore the three subscales of the Splitting Index (splitting of self, family and other images) were included.

### *Procedure*

Initially, Will to Power (WTP), Self-Love (SL), Neuroticism (N), Extraversion (E), Agreeableness (A), Splitting of Self Images (SSI), Splitting of Family Images (SFI) and Splitting of Others Images (SOI) were entered as the variables in EQS. Table 9.1 shows the correlation matrix that was input into EQS, along with standard deviations. The model is shown in Table 9.2.

**Table 9.1: Correlation Matrix Input into EQS**

Variable									
WTP	1								
Self-Love	.304	1							
N	-.231	-.091	1						
E	.230	.398	-.365	1					
A	-.416	-.115	-.103	.188	1				
SSI	-.120	.096	.539	-.217	-.063	1			
SFI	.016	-.023	.267	-.108	-.208	.249	1		
SOI	-.011	-.090	.251	-.300	-.297	.309	.447	1	
Std. Dev.	1.000	1.000	8.576	6.419	6.048	.8043	.7436	.6830	

N=337

**Table 9.2: A Three-Factor Model of Personality Disorder, Narcissism, Splitting and Five-Factor Neuroticism, Extraversion and Agreeableness**

	F1	F2	F3
Will to Power		-.459	.318
Self-Love			.687
Neuroticism	.616	.356	
Extraversion	-.487		.542
Agreeableness	-.607	.763	
Split Self Images	.641	.509	.331
Split Family Images	.360		
Split Other Images	.489		

Factors 2 and 3 correlate -.276. Split Family and Other Images correlate .333.

The chi-square was 17.347 on 12 degrees of freedom, meeting Loehlin's (1987) criterion that an acceptable chi-square is less than twice the degrees of freedom. The average off-diagonal standardised residuals was .0223, less than the value of 0.04 customarily taken as indicating that most of the variance has been accounted for (Deary et al, 1998). Other fit statistics indicated acceptable fit as well: the Bentler-Bonnet Normed Fit Index was .970, the Bentler-Bonnet Nonnormed fit index was .977 and the Comparative Fit Index was .990, all exceeding the value of .90 customarily taken as a good fitting model (Deary et al, 1998). All paths in the model were significant ( $> 1.96$ ) when their parameter estimates were divided by their standard errors.

### *Reliability and Variance Extracted*

It remains to calculate the reliability and variance extracted for each of the three latent constructs in the model. The reliability for each latent construct is calculated by dividing the square of the sum of standardised loadings by the square of the sum of standardised loadings plus the sum of indicator measurement errors. Indicator measurement error can be calculated as  $1 - (\text{standardised loading})^2$  (Hair et al, 1995).

### *Sum of Standardised Loadings*

$$F1 = .616 + .487 + .607 + .641 + .360 + .489 = 3.2$$

$$F2 = .356 + .763 + .509 + .459 = 2.087$$

$$F3 = .331 + .687 + .542 + .318 = 1.878$$

### *Sum of Measurement Error*

$$F1 = .620 + .763 + .632 + .581 + .870 + .761 = 4.227$$

$$F2 = .873 + .418 + .741 + .789 = 2.820$$

$$F3 = .890 + .528 + .706 + .899 = 3.023$$

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Reliability

---

$$F1 = (3.2)^2 / (3.2)^2 + 4.227 = 10.24 / 10.24 + 4.227 = .708$$

$$F2 = (2.087)^2 / (2.087)^2 + 2.820 = 4.356 / 4.356 + 2.82 = .607$$

$$F3 = (1.878)^2 / (1.878)^2 + 3.023 = 3.527 / 3.527 + 3.023 = .538$$

---

The variance extracted is calculated by dividing the sum of squared standardised loadings by the sum of squared standardised loadings plus sum of indicator measurement error (Hair et al, 1995).

*Sum of Squared Standardised Loadings*

$$F1 = .379 + .237 + .368 + .411 + .130 + .239 = 1.764$$

$$F2 = .127 + .582 + .259 + .211 = 1.179$$

$$F3 = .110 + .472 + .294 + .101 = .977$$

---

Variance Extracted

---

$$F1 = 1.764 / 1.764 + 4.227 = .294$$

$$F2 = 1.179 / 1.179 + 2.820 = .295$$

$$F3 = .977 / .977 + 3.023 = .244$$

---

*Discussion*

The confirmatory factor analysis found fair support for the model of these three of the four As. In factor 1, which accounts for 29 percent of the variance, splitting of self, family and other images are associated with neuroticism, introversion and disagreeableness. This is consistent with Kernberg's view of "borderline personality organisation" (Kernberg, 1975) underlying many personality disorders associated in previous chapters with high

Neuroticism and low Agreeableness (and in the case of Schizoid, low Extraversion).

According to Kernberg (1975), in infancy generalised splitting mechanisms at first build up separate “good” and “bad” internal objects simply because of the lack of integrative capacity of the early ego; later, the same mechanisms can be used defensively to prevent the generalisation of anxiety. In pathological cases, splitting becomes a means of dissociation, which prevents anxiety at the cost of integration of the personality.

Kernberg (1975) says that these splits adversely affect the integration of cognitive processes. According to Power and Dalgleish (1997), splitting and related concepts such as compartmentalisation and modularization are the fundamental cognitive self-deceptive mechanisms underlying a variety of emotional disorders. The highest loading variable on factor 1 is Splitting of Self-Images (.641). Splitting of Family (.360) and Other (.489) Images also make contributions. There are no strong scientific reasons to take any variable as causal; the model is silent as to whether the anxiety represented in this factor leads to splitting or splitting leads to high anxiety. It appears, however, that greater explanatory power is made possible by combining the five factor model domains with the narcissism-related construct of splitting. Reliability of this factor was .708.

It has been noted in previous chapters that the “nasty” and “vain” types of narcissism seem to be related to low Agreeableness and Extraversion, respectively. Agreeableness has the highest loading (.763) on Factor 2, which also extracts 29 percent of the variance. Also associated with factor 2 are Neuroticism, low narcissistic will to power, and splitting of self-images. As in previous chapters, this high Agreeableness factor can be viewed as the mirror image of the Antisocial A in the Mulder and Joyce (1997) “Four As” typology.

The variance in factor 2 accounted for by Agreeableness is its squared loading, .582, which is impressive. There is still another .418 unaccounted for however. The corresponding

figure for will to power is not negligible at .211. Reliability of measurement is only .607, so these data should be treated as only a starting point for future research. Nevertheless, by combining the five-factor domain of (low) agreeableness with will to power, we can explain nearly 80 percent of the factor 2 variance. It may be the case that unsubmitted will to power can be added to low agreeableness to account for much of the Antisocial dimension of the Four As typology.

According to Kohut (1971, see also Chapter 19 of this thesis) splitting keeps the exhibitionistic demands of the grandiose self outside of awareness by keeping perception and conception apart. Factor 3 is consistent with this view: splitting of self-images (not other or family images) is associated with the exhibitionistic tendencies of the vain type of narcissism we have dubbed "self-love", extraversion and some will to power. It is narcissistic self-love that has the highest loading on this factor (.687), thereby extracting .472 of the variance - the exhibitionism and self-admiration of NPI self-love explain almost half of the variance in this factor. Again, including the will to power, narcissism-related construct of splitting of self-images and extraversion can augment explanatory power. If we add the .293 of the variance accounted for by Extraversion, we obtain .765 of the variance. Adding splitting of self-images accounts for .875 of the variance; adding will to power accounts for .975 of the variance. The reliability of this factor was only .538, so these results should be treated as a starting point for future research.

In sum, there appears to be much that narcissism and narcissism-related constructs (particularly splitting) can contribute to the study of personality and its relation to personality pathology. The five factor model domain of Agreeableness is very useful for conceptualising the Antisocial factor of the four As typology, but even greater explanatory power is possible by combining low Agreeableness with will to power. Self-love can contribute to the understanding of personality traits related to, but not completely explained

by, Extraversion. The narcissism-related construct of splitting contributes to all three factors in this model. The reliabilities calculated here might also be more meaningful than the Cronbach alphas computed for the instruments in previous chapter. Cronbach's alpha assumes unidimensionality for the scale whose reliability is being assessed, which is certainly false for the self-report instruments used to assess personality traits relating to personality disorder.

Interestingly enough, this model suggests that narcissism is not associated with high N. The personality disorder literature reports mixed findings on associations between narcissism and N (see Chapter 2); whilst the results are contradictory, it seems pretty clear that N is not central to narcissism, in contrast to the majority of other personality disorders.



Until 1979, lack of a scale with desirable psychometric properties hampered the empirical investigation of narcissism (Emmons, 1987). Raskin and Hall (1979) developed the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) to explore individual differences in narcissism in non-clinical populations (Raskin and Terry, 1988). Using factor analysis, Emmons (1984, 1987) found four factors in the NPI. Using factor analysis, Raskin and Terry (1988) argued for seven factors in the NPI. Raskin and Terry's (1988) rationale for extracting more factors was that items loading on the same factor seemed to be addressing different conceptual dimensions. This may simply be another case of different factor analysts (e.g. Cattell and Eysenck) extracting factors at a different level of a hierarchy (Costa and Widiger, 1994; Matthews and Deary, 1998).

A theoretical perspective which views narcissism as a collective term for relationships between self and others which sooner or later raise issues of love and power suggests a structure with love and power as two top-level factors, similar to the love and dominance axes of the interpersonal circumplex (Wiggins, Phillips and Trapnell, 1989). The Emmons, Raskin and Terry factors may actually be lower-level facets in this hierarchy. Indeed, the scree plot of the Pollock Halls data set recommended two or three factors be extracted from the NPI, and the two-factor solution has been used in this thesis. A confirmatory factor analysis of the new NPI subscales derived and used in this thesis is therefore also appropriate. To assess the degree of measurement error, test the adequacy of theoretical conceptualisations of the NPI as a two- or three- factor instrument, and compare the two and three factor solutions of the NPI, the EQS package was again used (Byrne, 1994; Dunn et al, 1993).

It is clear from the results in previous sections that many of the NPI's items account for little variance. Therefore, it was arbitrarily decided to cut off all variables loading below .55 in both solutions from Chapter 6<sup>1</sup>. When this is done, the 13 items whose Pearson correlations and standard deviations are shown in Table 10.1 remain in both solutions. These items are displayed in Tables 10.2 through 10.6.

These correlations formed the basis of a structural equation modelling (SEM) exercise. The aim was to test the consistency of this correlation matrix with the *a priori* constraints of the two- and three- factor solutions of the NPI. The method of maximum likelihood was used to analyse the correlation matrixes of both solutions based on 337 respondents. The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test was used to suggest parameters fixed at zero that might improve model fit if allowed to vary. The Wald test was used to suggest free (non-zero) parameters included in the model that could be dropped in the interests of parsimony. The initial models are shown in Figures 1 (Two Factor) and 2 (Three Factor).

In SEM, the chi-square statistic and three "goodness of fit" indexes (the normed, non-normed and comparative fit indexes) are used to determine how well a model fits the data it is tested against. Loehlin's (1987) criterion for a well fitting model is that the chi-square is less than twice the degrees of freedom. Values exceeding 0.9 for the three goodness of fit indexes are customarily considered well fitting (e.g. Willock et al, 1999).

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<sup>1</sup> NPI item 7, which had a loading of .30 on factor 1 and .55 on factor 2 in the two factor solution, was allowed to vary with both factors in the two- factor CFA.

**Table 10.1: Pearson's (r) Correlations among Thirteen NPI Items with Loadings Above .55**

NPI	5	7	9	10	12	15	19	20	27	29	32	33	38
5	1												
7	.17	1											
9	.18	.14	1										
10	.27	.22	.24	1									
12	.27	.29	.26	.33	1								
15	.03	.22	.10	.13	-.02	1							
19	.02	.16	.24	.13	.03	.43	1						
20	.15	.43	.08	.15	.24	.24	.16	1					
27	.30	.14	.18	.28	.39	-.01	.09	.20	1				
29	.05	.18	.21	.05	.09	.35	.43	.15	.06	1			
32	.25	.16	.29	.35	.23	.02	.10	.22	.40	.06	1		
33	.35	.29	.12	.49	.43	.14	.02	.25	.41	.11	.38	1	
38	-.03	.29	.09	-.03	.08	.31	.14	.35	.11	.16	.06	.16	1
SD	.49	.48	.45	.50		.39	.43	.43	.44	.50	.46	.49	.39

N=337, SD = Standard Deviation. Correlations above approximately .11 are  $p < .05$ , .14  $p < .01$  and .18 are  $p < .001$ .

**Table 10.2: Items from the Two-Factor NPI Solution Defining Will to Power and Loading above .55.**

- |     |   |
|-----|---|
| 5.  | a) The thought of ruling the world scares the hell out of me.     |
|     | b) If I ruled the world it would be a better place.               |
| 9.  | a) I am no better or worse than most people.                      |
|     | b) I think I am a special person.                                 |
| 10. | a) I am not sure if I would make a good leader.                   |
|     | b) I see myself as a good leader.                                 |
| 12. | a) I like having authority over people.                           |
|     | b) I don't mind following orders.                                 |
| 27. | a) I have a strong will to power.                                 |
|     | b) Power for its own sake doesn't interest me.                    |
| 32. | a) Being an authority doesn't mean that much to me.               |
|     | b) People always seem to recognise my authority.                  |
| 33. | a) I would prefer to be a leader.                                 |
|     | b) It makes little difference to me whether I am a leader or not. |

**Table 10.3: Items from the Two-Factor NPI Solution Defining Self-Love and Loading above .55.**

- 
- 7. a) I prefer to blend in with the crowd.  
b) I like to be the centre of attention.
  - 15. a) I don't particularly like to show off my body.  
b) I like to show off my body.
  - 19. a) My body is nothing special.  
b) I like to look at my body.
  - 20. a) I try not to be a show-off.  
b) I will usually show off if I get the chance.
  - 29. a) I like to look at myself in the mirror.  
b) I am not particularly interested in looking at myself in the mirror.
  - 38. a) I get upset when people don't notice how I look when I go out in public.  
b) I don't mind blending into the crowd when I go out in public.
- 

**Table 10.4: Items from the Three-Factor NPI Solution Defining Will to Power and Loading above .55**

- 
- 5. a) The Thought of ruling the world scares the hell out of me.  
b) If I ruled the world it would be a better place.
  - 10. a) I am not sure if I would make a good leader.  
b) I see myself as a good leader.
  - 12. a) I like having authority over people.  
b) I don't mind following orders.
  - 29. a) I have a strong will to power.  
b) Power for its own sake doesn't interest me.
  - 32. a) Being an authority doesn't mean that much to me.  
b) People always seem to recognise my authority.
  - 33. a) I would prefer to be a leader.  
b) It makes little difference to me whether I am a leader or not.
- 

**Table 10.5: Items from the Three-Factor NPI Solution Defining Exhibitionism with Loadings Above .55**

- 
- 7. a) I prefer to blend in with the crowd.  
b) I like to be the centre of attention.
  - 15. a) I don't particularly like to show off my body.  
b) I like to show off my body.
  - 19. a) My body is nothing special.  
b) I like to look at my body.
  - 20. a) I try not to be a show-off.  
b) I will usually show off if I get the chance.
  - 29. a) I like to look at myself in the mirror.  
b) I am not particularly interested in looking at myself in the mirror
  - 38. a) I get upset when people don't notice how I look when I go out in public.  
b) I don't mind blending into the crowd when I go out in public.
-

**Table 10.5: Items from the Three-Factor NPI Solution Defining Self-Admiration with Loadings Above .55**

- 
9. a) I am no better or worse than most people.  
b) I think I am a special person.  
19. a) My body is nothing special.  
b) I like to look at my body.
- 

The models in Figures 1 and 2 were modified using Wald and Lagrange Multiplier tests to produce the best fitting models shown in Tables 10.7 (Two- factor) and 10.8 (Three-factor). For the two-factor solution, the chi-square was 110.182 on 55 degrees of freedom. The Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index was .881, the Bentler-Bonett Non-Normed Fit Index was .908 and the Comparative Fit Index was .935. For the three- factor solution, the chi-square was 112.106 based on 57 degrees of freedom, the Bentler-Bonett Normed Fit Index was .879, the Bentler-Bonett Non-Normed Fit Index was .911 and the Comparative Fit Index was .935. All of the parameters in Tables 10.7 and 10.8 make significant contributions to the models fits. The Wald and Lagrange Multiplier tests did not suggest that dropping or adding any associations would improve the fit of either model. Both models show similar goodness of fit statistics. In fact, the CFI, which is the index of choice (Byrne, 1994, p. 55) is identical for the two solutions.




Figure 1: Two Factor NPI Solution




Figure 2: Three Factor NPI Solution



Intercorrelations among the seven Raskin and Terry factors are shown in Table below (Raskin, personal communication). Nineteen out of 21 correlations are significant, 13 at the .001 level.

Factor	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Exploiteness	1	.31***	.39***	.42***	.12*	.24***	.15**
2. Entitlement		1	.31***	.46***	.26***	.20**	.07
3. Exhibitionism			1	.41***	.33***	.11*	.29***
4. Authority				1	.32***	.30***	.10
5. Superiority					1	.14*	.22***
6. Self-Sufficiency						1	.17**
7. Vanity							1

\* =  $p < .05$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \*\*\* =  $p < .001$

These results were obtained using only the 13 NPI- 40 items loading above .55. Factor analysis is sensitive to the data included or excluded from analysis. As has been discussed in Chapter 6, a number of items were dropped from the NPI- 54 for psychometrically questionable reasons. Future research on the instrument should examine the 13 items here, those items that were inappropriately dropped from the NPI- 54, and new items.

It would be premature to insist that consensus has been reached that the most comprehensive model of personality is the “Big Five” or any other version of five- factor model. Advocates of other models criticise the Costa and McCrae version of the five- factor model for lacking a foundation in biology (e.g. Eysenck, 1992). Other models, such as Cloninger’s (1993) seven- factor model and Eysenck’s three- factor model, postulate specific links between genetics and personality. Eysenck (1992) explicitly charges that accepting the five- factor model is “spurious orthodoxy”.

Costa and McCrae (1992b) reply that the Big Five is far from denying that personality has a basis in biology. In fact, evidence of heritability suggests some biological basis for the Big Five. The point is rather that the Big Five is not tied to any particular biological theory. The five- factor model is descriptive and atheoretical. At present, we know more about personality structure than we know about neuroscience. We also know that people share more than a common biology; for example, they share abstract thought and the use of symbols. Therefore we should not use the less advanced theory in biology to explain the currently more advanced knowledge of personality structure. Advances in biology may eventually support one theory of personality, but will presumably be describable in terms of five- factors. The five-factor model is not identified with any particular operationalisation; it is an evolving scientific construct that does not claim to account for all of human personality, but may be built into our cognitive system of person perception.

According to Eysenck (1992), the balance of the evidence is that Agreeableness and Conscientiousness are components of Eysenckian Psychoticism (P), so that a three- factor model is superior to a five- factor model. Even if the five-factor model eventually proves to

be the most appropriate model of personality, other versions of the exact dimensions have been proposed. The 'Alternate Five' proposed by Zuckerman et al (1993) is one possibility. Zuckerman's Alternate Five, however, deliberately excludes Openness to Experience. Openness to Experience is also not included in either the Eysenck or Cloninger models. The evidence from this study suggests that there may be a role for this dimension in abnormal personality. If so, the only model currently on the market that includes Openness to the domain is Costa and McCrae's. The greatest strength of the Big Five would seem to be the consistency with which five factors have been found across cultures and languages (Matthews and Deary, 1998).

### *Dimensions vs. Categories*

Similarly, the categorical approach to classifying personality disorders is not yet dead. Defenders of the categorical approach to personality disorders include Millon, arguably the most influential theorist in the field of personality disorder (Costa and Widiger, 1994). Cloninger (1987) argues that there is no necessary conflict between the categorical and dimensional approach. Solzhenitsyn (1975, p.174) suggested that evil may be like phenomena known to physics such as the photoelectric effect or liquid oxygen, which do not exist at all until a threshold has been crossed; then, they suddenly exist. It may be that at least some traits are continuous up to a point, after which discrete categories exist. If this is so, Peck's personality disorder would be hypothesised to be a discrete category that springs into existence at the point when Will to Power crosses the threshold where it is no longer subordinated to anything. Future research could use related statistical techniques such as latent structure and class analysis techniques can be used to identify discrete underlying categories (Loehlin, 1987, p.34).

Physics is also familiar with phenomena that exhibit linear relationships up to a point, but beyond that point behave in non-linear fashion. It may be so with personality traits. The

response from psychometricians has been development of Item Response Theory (Loehlin, 1987, p.33), in which a latent variable is fitted to a series of responses to test items.

Curvilinear traits can have negative consequences for behaviour at both extremes: listless vs. restless, stable vs. unstable (Millon, 1994).

Be that as it may, an enormous amount of empirical research has been done with the Costa and McCrae version of the five-factor model. The joint factor analysis methodology pioneered by Costa and McCrae and used in this research (and the present study) has led to impressive progress toward the difficult task of finding a framework within which to integrate personality theory and research. The unresolved issues are strong arguments further research using the Costa and McCrae methodology, even if different instruments are used to operationalise the personality traits under study.

#### *Lessons Learned*

If the present study is repeated, some scale substitutions are recommended. Since facet-level data on normal personality traits would be valuable, particularly for the Openness to Experience domain, the NEO-PI-R should be used in lieu of the NEO-FFI. The fact that this would require subjects to answer 240 questions instead of 60 can be partly offset by the fact that the facets would eliminate the need for some of the scales used in this study. The Hostility scale, for instance, could be omitted because angry hostility is one of the facets of N in the NEO-PI-R.

The PDQ-4+ was selected for its brevity. Research on the PDQ-4+ (Fossati et al, 1998) has found low agreement with structured interviews, a tendency to over-diagnose personality disorders, and satisfactory discriminant validity for only two of its 12 scales. Livesley et al (1998) report that the 290- item DAPP-BQ has Cronbach's alphas ranging

from .83 to .94 and three- week test-retest reliability of .81 to .9331. Since the DAPP-BQ has an affect lability scale, the AIM can be omitted.

Researchers wishing to investigate narcissists' intolerance of criticism should substitute the Miscellaneous Index of Bias (MIB, Paulhus and Reid, 1991) for the Sensitivity to Criticism scale (Atlas, 1994). Sensitivity to criticism is relevant to personality disorder, but is distinct from intolerance of criticism. Epstein (1994) has developed self-report scales that may be of use in clarifying the role of O in abnormal personality. The Rational versus Experiential Inventory could be used to get at the two kinds of thinking. The Constructive Thinking Inventory assesses the problem solving strategies subjects use to minimise stress. An improved version of the NPI, including the 23 items kept in the confirmatory factor analysis plus new items that may include items dropped from the 54- item NPI, should replace the NPI-40. As stated in previous chapters, however, much useful analysis can still be done on the current data set.

Past self-report research has been validated with other-report data (Costa and McCrae, 1992a). This was not possible in the present study and is generally not practical with large sample sizes and subjects who are approached at random. Research of this kind may suggest facets for the five domains that are not currently included, or clarify the relationship between facets that correlate across domains.

Narcissism does not appear to have either a four- or seven- factor structure, as previous research has claimed. Narcissism appears to be a two- or three- factor construct. The theoretical literature on narcissism seems to suggest one factor related to will to power, and another related to self- love. One NPI factor clearly relates to will to power. It is not clear whether narcissistic self-love is best described by one or two additional factors. Before choosing between the two- and three- factor models of the NPI, some items that were

previously included in the instrument but dropped should be re-incorporated, and perhaps additional items written. These two aspects of narcissism both appear to be associated with overt narcissism. Covert narcissism seems to be largely neuroticism, and is perhaps best viewed as a separate construct.

The self-love aspects of narcissism seem to be related to extraversion. There are different conceptualisations of extraversion. Which conceptualisation of extraversion most overlaps with self-love will require factor analytic studies including operationalisations of the competing models. Perhaps research on narcissism will aid us in deciding between different models of extraversion. It would be worthwhile to investigate the facet-level extraversion correlates of self-love. Similarly, as will to power is related to the five-factor domain of agreeableness, it would be worthwhile to investigate the correlations of will to power with the facets of agreeableness.

Psychometric research can only provide a possible classification system that must look elsewhere for validation (Matthews and Deary, 1998). The cognitive section of this thesis will try to find real-life correlates of the trait differences explored in the psychometric section of this thesis. Specifically, we will be most concerned with response to disconfirming feedback. Two cognitive constructs that may play a part in how people construe feedback, compartmentalisation and attribution style, will also occupy our attention.

Seen from an information processing point of view, models of the self as a collection of many aspects or selves (e.g. James, 1890) suggest that the organisation of self-knowledge may influence the availability, accessibility and processing of self-relevant information. Various approaches to meaning hold that organisation of the self into internal modules give us our sense and varieties of meaning (Gilbert, 1997; Power and Dalglish, 1997). It is possible that this organisation may be used to control the accessibility of different types of knowledge for self-deception.

Aspects of the self may be well or poorly elaborated, positive or negative, important to the person or not. Well-elaborated or “complex” self-schemas contain a number of independent attributes, while “simple” self-schemas involve fewer independent attributes. Empirical studies of response to both positive and negative feedback have shown that low complexity subjects respond with more extreme changes in mood and self-esteem in the direction of the feedback than high complexity subjects (Stein, 1994). Stein (1994) found that high complexity subjects were able to attend to and encode disconfirming feedback, but low complexity subjects responded by rejecting the feedback and reasserting positive aspects of the self. Theoretical speculation that the predictive power of self-aspects improves if perceived importance is taken into consideration has been confirmed (Showers, 1992). Power and Dalglish (1997) propose that knowledge about the self is organised to include self, world and other. Narcissists may differ, both from non-narcissists and among themselves, in how they organise information about self, world and other.

An extension of self-complexity is compartmentalisation or modularization (Power and Dalglish, 1997). Showers (1992) found that compartmentalisation (organisation of positive and negative knowledge about the self into separate, uniformly valenced



categories) was associated with high self esteem (assessed by the Rosenberg Self Esteem scale) and low depression (assessed by the Beck Depression Inventory) for individuals whose positive self-aspects were important, but the reverse held for individuals with important negative self-aspects, and that highly compartmentalised individuals tended to define negative self-aspects in especially narrow terms. Showers (1992) argues that compartmentalised individuals who can avoid activating negative categories activate only positive knowledge about the self. Robins and John (1997) argue that narcissistic individuals fit an egoist metaphor of the person as distorting information to enhance self-worth, and select situations that fit their personalities. Thus, narcissists are more often in situations that reinforce their grandiose self-perceptions, which may be one way of forming and maintaining distorted self-perceptions. Perhaps the puzzling inverse correlations between shame and narcissism (Watson et al, 1996) reflect narcissists avoiding situations that cause them shame and seeking situations that enhance self-esteem.

The present study attempts to extend the above findings to narcissism. Emmons (1987) suggested that Linville's work on self-complexity (the capacity to differentiate among aspects of self) and affect suggests that narcissists may have simple self-representations, but that this has not been tested, and that the attribution styles of people who differ in narcissism need to be studied. The tendency to vehemently reject disconfirming feedback is a central feature of some theoretical conceptions of narcissism (Peck, 1983).

## **Method**

A correlational design was used to investigate the relationships among narcissism, attribution style, cognitive complexity, splitting and response to disconfirming feedback. Subjects were offered £5 to participate in two sessions. In the first session, subjects were told:

Thank you for participating in this study. We are attempting to collect reliability and validity data on some relatively new measures of personality.

One important measure of an instrument's reliability is the test-retest statistic. If the same person takes the same test more than once, how close are the scores? A low test-retest correlation suggests that the instrument does not measure anything stable about personality.

Alternate form and inter-instrument reliability are important for at least three reasons: 1) It is known that, in some cases, seemingly innocuous details, such as the order in which questions are asked or slight changes in the wording of a question, can significantly affect the results. 2) Often measuring the same construct with different instruments yields different results. Does this reflect the validity of the scales, the constructs or both? Alternately, is one measure providing additional information that the other is not? 3) Questionnaires with a greater number of items tend to produce more accurate and reliable results, but at greater cost, including requiring more of the subject's time. If "good enough" results can be obtained with a shorter version of a scale, that is often preferable.

You will be asked to complete a number of measures of personality. Some of them have been widely used, others are fairly new; some of them attempt to assess the same construct by a different method. When you come back next week for your second session, you will again complete various measures of personality. Some may be the same questionnaires (used to compute test-retest correlations). Others may be slightly different - perhaps a shorter or longer version, or with differences in the order the questions are asked - and used to derive alternate form data.

Thanks again for your co-operation. The results will be kept strictly confidential.

Subjects then completed the measurements below:

## **Measurements**

### *Attribution Style*

The Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire (IPSAQ, Kinderman and Bentall, 1996) was developed because research suggested that individuals differ in the attribution of external events to other persons rather than situations. The most commonly used measure of attribution style, the Attribution Style Questionnaire (ASQ) does not tap this distinction and has shown poor internal reliability. The IPSAQ has 32 items that describe 16 positive and 16 negative social situations. Subjects are asked to generate the most likely cause of each situation and decide whether this cause is something about the subject (internal) something about another person or group (personal) or due to circumstances or chance (situation).

The IPSAQ yields positive and negative subscales for internal, external-personal and external-situational causal attributions. These subscales are used to derive scores of externalising bias (EB, the number of internal attributions for positive events minus the number of internal attributions for negative events) and personalising bias (PB, the proportion of external negative attributions made to personal loci). Preliminary reliability data on the IPSAQ claims mean subscale alphas of .6746 for EB and .7609 for PB (Kinderman and Bentall, 1997). Using the IPSAQ, Kinderman and Bentall (1997) found that depressed patients tend to attribute negative social events to internal causes, non-patients tend to situational or circumstantial external attributions, and paranoid patients locate blame in other individuals.

### *Five Factor Personality*

Normal personality was assessed using the NEO-PI-R (Costa and McCrae, 1992a). The NEO consists of 240-items scored on a five- point scale scored for the five domains of Neuroticism (N), Extraversion (E), Openness (O), Agreeableness (A) and Conscientiousness (C). Each of the five domains is composed of six more specific scales to measure facets of that domain. Table 12.1 gives Cronbach's alphas and test-retest statistics for the NEO-PI-R scales.

### *Narcissism*

In order to investigate the attribution styles of people who differ in narcissism, several measures based on a variety of theoretical perspectives were used:

The O'Brien Multiphasic Narcissism Inventory (OMNI) is a 41-item yes/no instrument with a three-factor solution. The first factor appears to correspond to Kernberg's conception of narcissism and constitutes the 16-item Narcissistic Personality subscale, which has a mean of 5.72 and standard deviation of 3.37. Factor two reflects Miller's notion of Poisonous Pedagogy (PP) - the belief that one can and should control others. The 15-item PP scale mean is 5.90 with a standard deviation of 2.99. The third subscale measures Miller's Narcissistically Abused Personality (NAP) and has 10 items. The NAP subscale has a mean of 3.92 and a standard deviation of 2.14. Cronbach's alphas for the three scales are .76, .73 and .71 respectively. Six-week test-retest correlations are .74, .72, and .71 respectively (O'Brien, 1987).

**Table 12.1: Cronbach's Alphas and Test-Retest Reliabilities of NEO-PI-R Scales**

NEO-PI-R Scale	Cronbach's Alpha	Estimated Three Month Test-Retest
<b>Domains</b>		
Neuroticism	.92	.79
Extraversion	.89	.79
Openness	.87	.80
Agreeableness	.86	.75
Conscientiousness	.90	.83
<b>Neuroticism Facets</b>		
N1: Anxiety	.78	
N2: Angry Hostility	.75	
N3: Depression	.81	
N4: Self-Consciousness	.68	
N5: Impulsiveness	.70	
N6: Vulnerability	.77	
<b>Extraversion Facets</b>		
E1: Warmth	.73	
E2: Gregariousness	.72	
E3: Assertiveness	.77	
E4: Activity	.63	
E5: Excitement-Seeking	.65	
E6: Positive Emotions	.73	
<b>Openness Facets</b>		
O1: Fantasy	.76	
O2: Aesthetics	.76	
O3: Feelings	.66	
O4: Actions	.58	
O5: Ideas	.80	
O6: Values	.67	
<b>Agreeableness Facets</b>		
A1: Trust	.79	
A2: Straightforwardness	.71	
A3: Altruism	.75	
A4: Compliance	.59	
A5: Modesty	.67	
A6: Tender-Mindedness	.56	
<b>Conscientiousness Facets</b>		
C1: Competence	.67	
C2: Order	.66	
C3: Dutifulness	.62	
C4: Achievement Striving	.67	
C5: Self-Discipline	.75	
C6: Deliberation	.71	

The Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) is a 40-item, forced choice measure intended for non-clinical populations. Previous research using the NPI has used a four factor (Emmons, 1984; Emmons, 1987) solution and a seven-factor solution (Raskin and Terry, 1988). The present study uses the will to power and self-love subscales derived in this thesis and the total score. The total NPI has an alpha of .83, a mean of 15.6 and a standard deviation of 6.7. The NPI is the most widely used measure of narcissism. Psychometric data on this scale is reported in Chapter 3, Psychometric Methodology and Rationale.

Patton (Patton and Meara, 1992) and his colleagues developed the Superiority and Goal Instability scales to measure Kohut's central developmental constructs of grandiosity and idealisation. Both scales contain 10 items answered on a 6-point Likert scale. Patton and Meara give the Cronbach's alphas at .76 and .81, and test-retest reliabilities of .80 and .76, respectively.

### *Compartmentalisation*

The measure of compartmentalisation was a variant of the Zajonc card-sort task used by Linville (1985) and Stein (1994) to study self-complexity and extended by Showers (1992) to study compartmentalisation. Subjects were given a deck of cards on which were written the self-descriptive adjectives and phrases in Table 12.2. Forty of the cards were from the Showers experiment, which investigated depression, and were used in the card sort during the second experimental session. Forty-eight additional cards were written for narcissism and added to the deck and used in the first session. Subjects were instructed to think of different aspects of themselves and their lives and sort the cards into groups of traits that go together. The subjects were instructed that they did not have to use all the traits on the cards, and that the same trait could be used in more than one category.

**Table 12.2: Self-Descriptive Adjectives and Phrases Used in Card Sorts**

From Showers Depression Study	Added Narcissism-related Terms
Successful	Selfish
Disagreeing	Strong
Giving	Unappreciated
Hopeless	Vain
Capable	Effective
Confident	Special
Lazy	Deserving
Self-centred	Loving
Unloved	Trusting
Comfortable	Responsible
Independent	Kind
Not "the real me"	Self-Sufficient
Needed	Reliable
Immature	Brilliant
Communicative	Masochistic
Wearry	Attractive
Mature	Dutiful
Uncomfortable	Fanatic
Sad & Blue	Secretive
Incompetent	Suspicious
Organised	Dishonest
Insecure	Zealot
Worthless	Liar
Inferior	Braggart
Intelligent	Controlling
Loveable	Vengeful
Fun & Entertaining	Inconsiderate
Interested	Boastful
Outgoing	Sadistic
Energetic	Damaged
Irritable	Assertive
Like a failure	A Born Leader
Hardworking	Desirable
Isolated	Flatterer
Happy	Needed
Indecisive	Perfectionistic
Friendly	Devoted
Disorganised	Forgiving
Optimistic	Envious
Tense	Submissive
	Truthful
	Misunderstood
	Timid
	Striking
	Giving
	Popular
	Cynical



The phi coefficient was computed as the measure of compartmentalisation. The phi coefficient is based on the chi-square and can be viewed as a contingency table where each self-aspect is a column and there are two rows, one each for the number of positive and negative cards in the subject's sort for that category. Expected frequencies of positive and negative attributes are computed from the overall ratio of positives to negatives in the subject's sort and used as chance values. The chi-square measures deviation from random sort, and  $\phi = \sqrt{\chi^2 \div N}$ . Phi ranges from 0 to 1, with 0 representing a perfectly random sort and 1 a perfectly compartmentalised sort independent of the number of categories.

*Disconfirming Feedback*

The on-computer screen self-descriptiveness measure used by Stein (1994) to study response to disconfirming feedback was adapted for this study. Subjects are asked to think of themselves as students, and respond to a series of two-part questions. In the first part of each question, the subject rates how he or she ranks compared to fellow students by identifying the point on a scale that most closely describes where he or she stands compared to fellow students. Examples are:

Intelligent	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	Unintelligent
Stingy	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	Generous
Industrious	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	Lazy

In the second part of the question, subjects rate how important it is to them to be "intelligent", "generous" or "industrious". It is emphasised that this means how important

is it to be “industrious” or “intelligent”, not how important is it to be, say, a 6 on a scale of 7<sup>1</sup>.

### *Splitting*

The Splitting Index (SI, Gould, Prentice and Ainslie, 1996) is based on the writings of Kernberg and contains 24 items in three 8-item subscales of Splitting of Self-Images, Splitting of Family Images and Splitting of Other images. Psychometric information on the Splitting Index is included in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

In the second session, subjects completed another card-sort, and were asked to write about their lives, goals and aspirations. This narrative was be scored for attribution style. At this time, subjects were given bogus feedback derived from the self-descriptiveness task concerning their participation in the first session. For example, subjects who described themselves as highly conscientious were told that they scored in the bottom 50% of students on conscientiousness. Subjects were then asked to complete the on-screen self-descriptiveness measure, with response times again recorded. Increases response latency times were interpreted as indicating that the subject is taking the disconfirming feedback into account, and thus must think more before endorsing self-descriptive items. Upon completion, the subjects were fully debriefed concerning the disconfirming feedback.

### **Examination of the Data**

Initially, subjects were 35 female and 20 male students who participated in exchange for £5. One male subject had to be disqualified due to bipolar illness, leaving 54 subjects for session 1. Two subjects, one male and one female, failed to return for session two. Self-report questionnaires and card sorts from session 1 from the two subjects who completed only the first session were included in the analysis, but their self-descriptions were

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<sup>1</sup> In Stein’s study, a 12-point scale was used. For the present study, a 7-point scale was used.

discarded, and they did not produce narratives. Therefore, questionnaire data were available for 54 subjects. Summary statistics for these data are shown in Table 12.3.

Of the 52 subjects who completed both sessions, one male subject did not properly complete the card sort task during the first session; this subject's first card sort was omitted from the analysis, but his other data were included. Thus, compartmentalisation (card sort) data were available for 53 subjects from the first session, 52 subjects in the second session. The mean number of categories was 6.5 for both sorts. The range was 3 to 14 for sort 1 and 3 to 13 for sort 2. Mean compartmentalisation for sort 1 was 0.36, standard deviation 0.18 (Table 12.1), which was significantly different from zero,  $t(52) = 14.89, p < .001$ . Mean compartmentalisation for sort 2 was 0.35, standard deviation 0.14, which was also significantly different from zero,  $t(50) = 17.2, p < .001$ .

For three subjects, a keypad equipment failure caused symbols such as "\$" and "%" to be recorded instead of an integer from one to seven during the first session during the on-screen self-description measure. This resulted in response to disconfirming feedback data being available for 47 subjects. More serious problems were found with response time data. One female subject who was not a native English speaker was extremely slow in her responses and was disqualified. Another female subject repeatedly stopped while performing the second on-screen self-description to argue that the disconfirming feedback she was given must be mistaken. The response times recorded for this subject were therefore expected to be extremely high on a number of items on which she spent minutes arguing with the researcher. Examination of her data found no items out of the usual range, casting serious doubt on the accuracy with which the computer program was able to record response times. Hypotheses concerning response time are therefore untestable with this data set. As an alternative, changes in subjects' self-reports on the traits assessed and

the importance to the subjects of those traits following disconfirming feedback will be examined using regression analyses.

For the narratives, the mean number of scorable statements was 4.5; the range was 1 to 10 and the standard deviation 2.1. Seven narratives were scored by a second researcher to check for inter-rater reliability. These seven narratives contained 29 scorable statements and 145 scoring decisions (5 for each statement, one for each LACS dimension). The two raters disagreed on 16 out of the 145 decisions, or 11 percent. The more experienced rater's decision was chosen in these 16 cases, and inter-rater reliability was estimated at 89 percent.

After entering the data into an SPSS database, frequencies were examined for all variables to ensure that all cases were in the expected range. A ten-percent audit of the data was then performed. The audit found 8 data entry errors in 33,560 cells, a rate of  $2.4 \times 10^{-4}$ .

### *Missing Data*

In most cases where a subject either accidentally omitted an item or made an invalid response (such as circling two response options) the researcher pointed the error out to the subject, who made the necessary correction. The only cases where this did not solve the problem involved the IPSAQ. One subject stubbornly insisted on circling more than one response, even after being corrected by the researcher for circling two or more responses and asked to choose only one as required by the instructions. For this subject, four out of the 32 items had multiple responses. Two other subjects expressed reservations about having to choose only one response on one IPSAQ item, and one subject strongly wanted to circle two responses on one item. Since there was no way to get a single response without pressure from the researcher invalidating the response, these items were omitted for these four subjects, and their IPSAQ scores computed on the remaining items.

**Table 12.3: Descriptive Statistics for Questionnaire Data**

Scale	N	Mean	Standard Deviation
Neuroticism (N)	54	93.1	26.4
N1: Anxiety	54	16.9	5.9
N2: Angry Hostility	54	12.6	5.4
N3: Depression	54	15.8	6.7
N4: Self-Consciousness	54	16.6	5.3
N5: Impulsiveness	54	18.9	4.0
N6: Vulnerability	54	12.3	5.6
Extraversion (E)	54	115.0	28.6
E1: Warmth	54	23.7	4.1
E2: Gregariousness	54	19.1	5.2
E3: Assertiveness	54	15.0	4.6
E4: Activity	54	17.9	4.4
E5: Excitement Seeking	54	20.1	4.5
E6: Positive Emotions	54	23.2	5.1
Openness (O)	54	138.0	18.6
O1: Fantasy	54	22.5	4.8
O2: Aesthetics	54	22.5	5.5
O3: Feelings	54	24.5	5.0
O4: Actions	54	19.0	4.0
O5: Ideas	54	24.1	5.1
O6: Values	54	25.2	3.2
Agreeableness (A)	54	120.4	18.8
A1: Trust	54	19.8	4.9
A2: Straightforwardness	54	18.2	6.4
A3: Altruism	54	23.3	3.5
A4: Compliance	54	19.0	4.0
A5: Modesty	54	18.3	5.0
A6: Tender-Mindedness	54	21.5	3.6
Conscientiousness (C)	54	104.4	18.9
C1: Competence	54	19.4	3.8
C2: Order	54	16.0	5.5
C3: Dutifulness	54	19.6	4.4
C4: Achievement Striving	54	16.8	5.2
C5: Self-Discipline	54	16.9	5.8
C6: Deliberation	54	15.5	4.2
NPI Total Score	54	12.9	7.2
Will to Power	54	2.6	2.2
Self-Love	54	3.7	2.5
Exploiteness/Entitlement	54	1.4	1.7
Leadership/Authority	54	3.3	2.3
Self-Sufficiency/Self-Admiration	54	2.6	2.3
Superiority/Arrogance	54	2.5	1.8
OMNI NPD	54	5.1	2.4
OMNI Poisonous Pedagogy	54	5.3	2.3
OMNI Narcissistically Abused	54	3.1	1.5
Goal Instability	54	30.5	7.7
Superiority	54	34.7	7.2
Splitting Index	54	57.5	12.5

Splitting of Self Images	54	24.6	5.7
Splitting of Other Images	54	16.4	4.5
Splitting of Family Images	54	16.4	6.9
Compartmentalisation (Sort 1)	53	0.36	0.18
Compartmentalisation (Sort 2)	52	.35	0.14
LACS Internal/External	52	.63	.29
LACS Personal/Universal	52	.89	.20
LACS Controllable/Uncontrollable	52	.75	.26
LACS Global/Specific	52	.47	.32
LACS Stable/Unstable	52	.88	.20
IPSAQ Externalising Bias	54	2.1	3.9
IPSAQ Personalising Bias	54	.55	.26
IPSAQ Internal Positive Attributions	54	7.7	2.3
IPSAQ Internal Negative Attributions	54	5.6	3.2
IPSAQ Personal Positive Attributions	54	4.2	2.4
IPSAQ Personal Negative Attributions	54	5.5	3.0
IPSAQ Situational Positive Attributions	54	4.0	3.0
IPSAQ Situational Negative Attributions	54	4.8	3.7

### *Outliers, Normality and Other Assumptions*

Histograms were examined to investigate normality, outliers and heteroscedasticity. As in the psychometric study, extreme scores were examined to ensure that they were not due to scoring errors, but were not omitted because they had been accurately scored. The LACS dimensions appeared to be candidates for transformation. Since these scales have ranges from 0.0 to 1.0, arcsine transformations were examined; the effect was minimal due to a ceiling effect (i.e., several subjects had scores of 1.0).

Emmons (1987) suggested that research on the relationship between self-complexity and affect may provide clues as to why narcissists are vulnerable to intense affect (e.g. narcissistic rage, Kohut, 1972). The construct of complexity is derived from personal construct theory and usually defined as the number of distinct or independent attributes included in a cognitive structure (Stein, 1994). Different versions of complexity theory exist, with early articulations focusing on the number of constructs within a cognition and the extent to which these constructs are hierarchically organised, and more recent articulations focusing on the quantity of information. Self-complexity refers to the capacity to differentiate among aspects of the self; the more distinct units of information a subject can distinguish in his or her self-cognition, the higher the self-complexity. In previous research, greater self-complexity has been associated with less extreme and variable affect and less variation in self-appraisal (e.g. Stein, 1994; Showers, 1992).

The extension of self-complexity theory to compartmentalisation by Showers (1992) may be especially relevant both to narcissism theory and models of self-deception (e.g. Power and Dalgleish, 1997) that conceive of splitting, modularization and compartmentalisation as more fundamental self-deception mechanisms than repression. Compartmentalisation is the tendency to organise positive and negative knowledge about the self into separate categories (Showers, 1992). Showers found that, for highly compartmentalised subjects, if the self-aspects that the subject considered most important, experienced most frequently or which impacted the subjects' life most were positive, compartmentalisation was correlated with high self-esteem and low depression. If, however, it was negatively valenced categories that the subject considered most important, experienced the most often or impacted subjects' lives the most, compartmentalisation was correlated with low self-esteem and high



depression. McCrae (1993) says that closed minds tend to be compartmentalised, with relative isolation of ideas and affects.

According to many views of narcissism (e.g. Kernberg, 1975), narcissists simultaneously hold contradictory views and feelings about the self as a result of excessive or inappropriate splitting into “all good” and “all bad” representations. Evidence that narcissists have highly compartmentalised self-concepts would support this hypothesis. According to Power and Dalgleish (1997), organisation of information about self, world and others into modules determines how and even whether information is perceived and processed. Showers (1992) hypothesises that some people may use such categorical organisation of self-knowledge to control the accessibility of positive and negative knowledge about the self.

### *Results*

A possible objection to the card-sorting task is that the number and type of cards available may influence the outcome. It is conceivable that the absence of positive or negative cards in a subject's sort could be due to unavailability of cards corresponding to the subjects' views of a particular self aspect. The cards used in the second session in this study contained the same 40 adjectives used by Showers in her study of compartmentalisation and depression (Showers, 1994). The deck used in the first session contained more than double that number (88), with the additional descriptives chosen to relate to narcissism rather than depression. The test-retest correlation between two card sorts obtained approximately one week apart for two different decks of cards was .57,  $p < .001$ . By itself, this suggests that the card sort technique is relatively independent of the number and type of cards used and indicates that the card sort technique has reasonably good reliability.

Associations between the measures of narcissism and compartmentalisation for both card sorts are given in Table 13.1. Only the Self-love subscale of the NPI shows a significant

correlation with compartmentalisation (-.31,  $p = .025$ ) and this association is in the negative direction: compartmentalisation is associated with low NPI Self-love. Squaring this, we find that NPI Self-love accounts for 9.6 percent of the variance in compartmentalisation.

**Table 13.1: Correlations between Measures of Narcissism and Compartmentalisation**

Measure of Narcissism	$\emptyset_1$	$\emptyset_2$
NPI Total Scale	-.20	-.01
Will to Power (NPI)	-.15	-.05
Self-Love (NPI)	-.31*	-.19
OMNI Total Score	-.16	-.07
Narcissistic Personality Disorder (OMNI)	-.17	-.16
Poisonous Pedagogy (OMNI)	-.20	-.05
Narcissistically Abused Personality (OMNI)	.07	.12
Superiority	-.17	-.02
Goal Instability	.08	.06

N = 53 for Sort 1, 52 for Sort 2.

### *Discussion*

Contrary to the hypothesis, narcissism as measured by any of the instruments used in this study did not significantly predict compartmentalisation. In one card sort, a measure of narcissism was even significantly negatively associated with compartmentalisation. A possible explanation is that narcissists may have compartmentalised self-concepts only for certain aspects of themselves, such as the categories that they regard as particularly important, experience most frequently or impact their lives the most. If only those categories rated as of highest importance are included, the number of subjects for whom

sorts are available drops to 20, and none of the correlations reaches significance. Alternatively, the relationship between narcissism and compartmentalisation may be complex and sensitive to the presence or levels of other factors, or there may be no relationship at all. Perhaps certain aspects of narcissism are associated with compartmentalisation only in combination with certain levels of other personality traits. To test these hypotheses will require further study will access to larger sample sizes.

**Table 13.2: Correlations between Measures of Narcissism and Compartmentalisation for Only Those Categories Rated as Most Important (7 on scale of 7)**

Measure of Narcissism	$\phi_7$
NPI Total Scale	-.32
Will to Power (NPI)	-.35
Self-Love (NPI)	-.23
OMNI Total Score	-.21
Narcissistic Personality Disorder (OMNI)	-.21
Poisonous Pedagogy (OMNI)	-.08
Narcissistically Abused Personality (OMNI)	.20
Superiority	-.14
Goal Instability	.39 (p = .09)

N=20

The literature review (Chapter 2) called for investigation of the attribution styles of people who differ in narcissism. Furthermore, Hartouni (1992) asserts that narcissists' errors in attribution can be explained by Grotstein's (1981) concepts of splitting and projective identification (see Chapter 19): according to Hartouni (p.1345), narcissists attempt to translocate disavowed self-aspects onto others in order to rid the self of unwanted aspects. Therefore it was also appropriate to examine the relationship between splitting and attribution style. If splitting is particularly associated with the polarisation of good and bad images, as it is in the theories of Klein (1957) and Kernberg (1975), then we should expect to see differences in the attributions styles of subjects who differ in tendency to use splitting.

The attribution theory of emotion was a precursor to current views that posit two or more differentiated states that are characteristic of emotions (Power and Dalglish, 1997). Currently attribution style is believed to central to a range of psychological disorders, such as the reformulated learned helplessness theory of depression or the model of paranoia put forth by Bentall and his colleagues (Kinderman and Bentall, 1997). Empirical support for these theories has been mixed, possibly because the theories concentrate on causes of behaviour and ignore consequences of behaviour (Power and Dalglish, 1997).

### *Measures*

Psychometric data on the instruments used in this study is found in Chapter 15. To investigate the attribution styles of people who differ in narcissism, measures of different kinds of narcissism were needed. As in previous chapters, the NPI subscales derived in this thesis for Will to Power (WTP) and Self-love (SL) were included. The Superiority (S) and Goal Instability (GI) scales (Patton and Meara, 1992) are intended to measure Kohut's

central developmental concepts of grandiosity and idealisation, and were included. According to O'Brien (1987) the OMNI Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD) scale reflects Kernberg's conception of NPD, and the other two OMNI scales reflect Alice Miller's Poisonous Pedagogy (PP) and Narcissistically Abused Personality (NAP). The Splitting Index (SI, Prentice, Ainslie and Gould, 1994) was included, which has subscales for Splitting of Self (SSI), Family (SFI) and Other (SOI) Images. Attribution Style has proven particularly problematic for assessment by questionnaire (Kinderman and Bentall, 1997). Two measures of attribution style were used in this study: the Leeds Attributional Coding System (LACS, Brewin, 1988), which scores written narratives for attributions, and the Internal, Personal, and Situational Attribution Questionnaire (IPSAQ, Kinderman and Bentall, 1997).

#### *Comparison of the Attribution Style Measures*

Subjects frequently complained that the IPSAQ was difficult to complete and interpret. Examination of the IPSAQ also suggested problems with its face validity. For example, in response to the situation "A friend said that he (she) resents you" subjects sometimes wrote responses such as "Because I get good grades" as the most probable cause, and circled "a" for internal cause. In the IPSAQ scoring system, this is scored as an internal negative attribution, but getting good grades is clearly a positive attribute.

Although subjects found writing about their goals and ambitions for ten minutes far more agreeable than completing the IPSAQ, the LACS dimensions showed extremely non-normal distributions, particularly for the stable/unstable, personal/universal, and global/specific dimensions, which were incurable by transformation.

The LACS can be modified to score additional aspects of attribution style (Silvester, Anderson and Patterson, 1999). Previous studies of attribution style using the Attribution

Style Questionnaire (Dykema, Bergbower, Doctora and Peterson, 1996) have used combined dimensions. For example, studies of attribution style and depression failed to find evidence linking depression or low self-esteem to internal attributions for negative events. Reformulated Learned Helplessness theory postulated that the net combination of internal, stable and global attributions for negative events was needed to account for the emotional, motivational and cognitive problems of depression. It was the addition of stable and global to internal attributions for negative events that resulted in depression. Empirical studies (reviewed in Power and Dalgleish, 1997, pp.117-122) have supported this view. While the issue is far from closed, low self-esteem and depression are currently seen to derive from an internal-stable-global attribution style for negative events (Power and Dalgleish, 1997, pp. 117-122).

Hartouni (1992) has suggested that narcissists may be willing to accept responsibility for negative events only after they are convinced that they will be able to overcome them. Analogous to studies of attribution style and depression that combined the attributional dimensions of internal, stable and global to test Reformulated Learned Helplessness theory (e.g. Metalsky et al, 1993), a LACS combined category was computed. If Hartouni's hypothesis is true, then high scores on combined internal, controllable and unstable dimensions should correlate with measures of narcissism. This combined dimension, however, did not correlate with any of the other measures used in this study.

Combined categories were computed and examined for normality. Hartouni (1992) has suggested that, after securing controls, narcissists may be willing to confront negative events *if* they are confident that they will be able to overcome them. To facilitate testing this hypothesis, the LACS stable/unstable dimension was reverse-scored into an unstable/stable dimension, and a LACS score of the combined internal/external, controllable/uncontrollable and stable/unstable dimensions was computed. This score had

an acceptably normal distribution, but was not correlated with any of the other measures in this study.

Other combined scores were computed, including personal/universal, internal/external and controllable/uncontrollable. The only combination computed which showed a significant correlation with another measure in this study was combined controllable/uncontrollable, internal/external and stable/unstable, which correlated  $-.32$  ( $p = .02$ ) with Poisonous Pedagogy, presumably suggesting that people who feel they can and should control others attribute negative outcomes to external, uncontrollable events that they hope will be controllable in the future. The internal/external dimension was normal enough to examine separately, but did not correlate with anything.

Interestingly enough, the internal/external dimension of LACS was orthogonal to the Externalising Bias (EB) score of the IPSAQ ( $r = .08$ ,  $p = .58$ ), and the personal/universal dimension of the LACS was orthogonal to the Personalising Bias (PB) IPSAQ score ( $r = .03$ ,  $p = .81$ ). It is possible that one or both of the two measures is invalid. Alternatively, they may not measure the same construct.

#### *Examination of the Correlations*

Tables 14.1 – 14.5 show the intercorrelations among the above measures. OMNI NPD was not significantly correlated with splitting or any measure of attribution style. The highest correlations with OMNI NPD was the NPI Self-love scale ( $.35$ ,  $p = .01$ ) and the Superiority scale ( $.34$ ,  $p = .013$ ). Poisonous Pedagogy was associated with Will to Power ( $.47$ ,  $p < .001$ ), Self-love ( $.43$ ,  $p = .001$ ) and Superiority ( $.34$ ,  $p = .011$ ). The only measure of attribution style that PP correlated with was the LACS combination of Controllable/Uncontrollable, Internal/External and Stable/Unstable ( $-.32$ ,  $p < .05$ ). Narcissistically Abused Personality was associated with Splitting of Self ( $.59$ ,  $p < .001$ ),



and Others (.29,  $p = .034$ ), Goal Instability (.31,  $p = .021$ ) and negatively correlated with the total NPI score (-.36,  $p = .008$ ), Self-love (-.29,  $p = .031$ ), and IPSAQ Internal Positive Attributions (-.40,  $p = .003$ ) and Externalising Bias (-.35,  $p = .01$ ).

Hartouni (1992) reported a significant association between NPI total score and internal, stable outcomes for positive events as measured by the Attribution Style Questionnaire. In the present data set, the NPI total score was significantly correlated with IPSAQ Internal Positive Attributions (.35,  $p = .009$ ) but not with LACS combined internal/external and stable/unstable attributions. The Self-love items of the NPI are significantly correlated with Internal Positive Attributions (.32,  $p = .019$ ). Neither the GI or S scale correlates with a measure of attribution style, and no NPI scale correlates with any scale computed from the LACS.

**Table 14.1: Correlations between Measures of Narcissism and IPSAQ Attribution Style Measures**

	IPA	INA	PPA	PNA	SPA	SNA	EB	PB
NPD	-.03	.07	.22	-.13	-.15	.05	-.08	-.05
PP	.03	.11	-.07	-.09	.08	-.04	-.07	.04
NAP	-.40*	.10	.15	-.13	.21	.03	-.35*	-.15
WTP	.22	.08	-.16	-.02	-.02	-.05	.08	.11
SL	.32*	.09	-.11	-.09	-.17	.00	.14	-.01
NPI	.35*	.04	-.15	-.03	-.14	-.03	.20	.09
GI	-.25	.08	.24	-.04	.03	-.03	-.23	-.10
S	.21	-.09	-.16	.03	-.07	.07	.22	.03

N=54. IPA = Internal Positive Attributions, INA = Internal Negative Attributions, PPA = Personal Positive Attributions, PNA = Personal Negative Attributions, SPA = Situational Positive Attributions, SNA = Situational Negative Attributions, EB = Externalising Bias, PB = Personalising Bias, NPD = OMNI Narcissistic Personality Disorder, PP = OMNI Poisonous Pedagogy, NAP = OMNI Narcissistically Abused Personality, WTP = Will to Power, SL = Self-love, NPI = Total NPI-40 score, GI = Goal Instability, S = Superiority. Correlations above about .27 are  $p < .05$ .

**Table 14.2: Correlations between Measures of Narcissism and Attribution Style Scores Computed from LACS**

	IE	IS	PIC	CIS	CIU
OMNI NPD	-.11	-.19	-.01	-.15	-.02
OMNI PP	-.24	-.27	-.25	-.32*	-.24
OMNI NAP	-.04	.00	-.07	-.02	-.07
WTP	-.08	-.06	-.05	-.02	-.04
SL	.12	.07	.17	.11	.16
NPI_TOT	.04	.01	.04	.02	.05
GI	.06	.22	-.05	.18	-.05
S	-.05	-.00	.06	.04	-.01

N=52. IE = Internal/External, IS = Internal/External + Stable/Unstable, PIC = Personal/Universal + Internal/External + Controllable/Uncontrollable, CIS = Controllable/Uncontrollable + Internal/External + Stable/Unstable, CIU = Controllable/Uncontrollable + Internal/External + Unstable/Stable, NPD = OMNI Narcissistic Personality Disorder, PP = OMNI Poisonous Pedagogy, NAP = OMNI Narcissistically Abused Personality, WTP = Will to Power, SL = Self-love, NPI = Total NPI-40 score, GI = Goal Instability, S = Superiority. Correlations above about .27 are  $p < .05$ .

**Table 14.3: Correlations between Splitting and IPSAQ Attribution Style**

	SI	SSI	SFI	SOI
IPA	-.34*	-.26	-.23	-.27*
INA	.23	.12	.26	.08
PPA	.09	.17	-.05	.12
PNA	-.09	-.22	-.04	.09
SPA	.23	.10	.25	.13
SNA	-.13	.07	-.20	-.14
EB	-.41*	-.27*	-.36*	-.25
PB	-.03	-.20	.07	.06

N=54. SI = Splitting Index, SSI = Split Self Images, SFI = Split Other Images, SOI = Split Other Images, IPA = Internal Positive Attributions, INA = Internal Negative

Attributions, PPA = Personal Positive Attributions, PNA = Personal Negative Attributions, SPA = Situational Positive Attributions, SNA = Situational Negative Attributions, EB = Externalising Bias, PB = Personalising Bias.

**Table 14.4: Correlations between Splitting and LACS**

	SI	SSI	SFI	SOI
IE	.00	-.10	.06	.04
IS	.10	-.02	.11	.11
CIU	-.08	-.12	-.10	.08
CIS	.05	-.02	-.01	.18
PIC	-.11	-.17	-.09	.07

N=52. SI = Splitting Index, SSI = Split Self Images, SFI = Split Other Images, SOI = Split Other Images, Internal/External, IS = Internal/External + Stable/Unstable, PIC = Personal/Universal + Internal/External + Controllable/Uncontrollable, CIS = Controllable/Uncontrollable + Internal/External + Stable/Unstable, CIU = Controllable/Uncontrollable + Internal/External + Unstable/Stable.

**Table 15.5: Correlations between LACS and IPSAQ**

	IE	IS	CIU	CIS	PIC
IPA	.06	-.10	.18	-.02	.12
INA	-.05	-.09	-.05	-.11	-.07
PPA	.15	.19	.08	.17	.10
PNA	.08	.04	.05	.02	.02
SPA	-.16	-.05	-.25	-.13	-.20
SNA	.01	.06	.03	.10	.07
EB	.08	.01	.161	.08	.13
PB	.01	-.04	-.03	-.09	-.05

N=52. Internal/External, IS = Internal/External + Stable/Unstable, PIC = Personal/Universal + Internal/External + Controllable/Uncontrollable, CIS = Controllable/Uncontrollable + Internal/External + Stable/Unstable, CIU = Controllable/Uncontrollable + Internal/External + Unstable/Stable, IPA = Internal Positive Attributions, INA = Internal Negative Attributions, PPA = Personal Positive Attributions, PNA = Personal Negative Attributions, SPA = Situational Positive Attributions, SNA = Situational Negative Attributions, EB = Externalising Bias, PB = Personalising Bias.

In general, these correlations replicate the association (Hartouni, 1992) between internal attributions for positive events for high scorers on the NPI. Contrary to Hartouni (1992) the correlations do not indicate that narcissists are using splitting to translocate negative, unwanted aspects of the self onto others. If anything, these data suggest that narcissistically abused personalities tend to accept negative aspects of themselves more readily than positive aspects and more readily than to translocate them onto others or situations.

Given these correlations, there is no point in pursuing the hypotheses further with more sophisticated statistics. They do, however, suggest that a large portion of the variance in narcissistically abused personality can be accounted for by pathological splitting and disinclination to make internal positive attributions. OMNI Narcissistically Abused Personality was entered as the dependent variable in a multiple regression (Table 14.6). First, internal positive attributions and the self- and other- subscales of the Splitting Index were entered alone to ensure that each made a significant contribution to the model, which they did. When Internal Positive Attribution and Splitting of Self- and Other- images are simultaneously entered as the predictors, we obtain an  $R^2$  of .41 and an adjusted  $R^2$  of .36.

**Table 14.6: Simultaneous Multiple Regression Predicting Narcissistically Abused Personality from Low Internal Positive Attributions and High Splitting of Self, Family and Other Images**

	Unstandardised Coefficients	Standardised Coefficients			
Model	B	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1 (Constant)	.803	1.144		.703	.486
SOI	.05319	.041	.016	.129	.898
SSI	.138	.032	.513	4.274	.000
IPA	-.157	.069	-.260	-2.269	.028

## *Conclusions*

These data provide no evidence that narcissists use splitting to translocate devalued self-aspects onto others. No measure of projective identification, the other psychodynamic mechanism cited by Hartouni, was included. Hence, it is possible that narcissists use projective identification for this purpose, or that the effects of splitting only become apparent when combined with projective identification. Problems have also been cited with respect to the measurement of attribution style. Consistent with Hartouni's (1992) study, high will to power narcissists did tend to claim personal credit for positive outcomes. Covert narcissists tended to blame themselves for negative outcomes.

## *Two Kinds of Attribution Style?*

The "two kinds of thinking" hypothesis has a long history in psychology (Power and Brewin, 1991; Jung, 1950). Epstein (1994) suggests that narratives are emotionally engaging and represent events in a way similar to experience, and thus appeal to the "experiential" system. Questionnaires such as the IPSAQ presumably relate to the verbally oriented "rational" system. Could it be that the apparent inconsistencies between attribution style measured by our two instruments is due to the two kinds of attribution style corresponding to the two kinds of thinking?

According to Epstein (1994), a variety of theoretical positions converge on the view that two parallel models of information processing, and that integration of the two is necessary for mental health. Epstein has developed a self-report measure, the Rational versus Experiential Inventory (RVEI) to assess subjects' use of the two kinds of thinking. Future studies of narcissism and attribution style should include measures of projective identification and two kinds of thinking, and be designed to test 1) whether narcissists use splitting in combination with projective identification to translocate unwanted self-aspects,

and 2) whether different attribution styles can coexist within the same individual, one associated with rational, verbal thinking, another associated with experiential thinking.

While theorists disagree about the aetiology of narcissism, there is widespread agreement that narcissists have unrealistically high self-perceptions and cannot easily tolerate discrepancies between these idealised views of themselves and their actual selves (e.g. Kohut, 1971, 1977; Kernberg, 1975). Davis, Claridge and Brewer (1996) investigated the effects of narcissism on tolerance for discrepancies between idealised and actual self-images, specifically body image in women. The authors found evidence that associations between tolerance for body esteem discrepancies (ideal vs. actual) and narcissism were complex, and sensitive to the degree of neuroticism. High narcissism (NPI total scale) was associated with high body esteem only at low levels of neuroticism. Increasing levels of neuroticism were associated with decreasing levels of body esteem at all levels of narcissism, but especially at high narcissism levels. Narcissism can apparently have very different consequences for personality, depending on the levels of other personality factors.

Davis, Claridge and Cerullo (1997) speculated that this interaction between narcissism and neuroticism may be partly due to pathological aspects of narcissism eroding the effects of healthy narcissism, and partly due to the measurement characteristics of the NPI. A second study of narcissism, neuroticism and body esteem in women included the O'Brien Multiphasic Narcissism Inventory (OMNI, O'Brien, 1987) in addition to the NPI. The OMNI is intended to capture more specifically pathological aspects of narcissism than the NPI. Subjects who score high on the NPI and low on the OMNI may



be genuinely well adjusted (Davis et al, 1997). Regression and simple slope analyses indicated that the slope of the relationship between healthy narcissism and body esteem was systematically attenuated by increases in pathological narcissism. In both the above studies, total scale scores were used for the OMNI and NPI.

*Identification of Items for Disconfirming Feedback*

The on-screen self-description produced by each subject during the first session was used to identify potential items on which to give disconfirming feedback. An item was considered a candidate for disconfirming feedback if and only if the subject rated himself or herself as 6 or 7 on the 7- point scale for that item (after reverse- scoring appropriate items) and rated the importance of this trait as 6 or 7 on the 7-point scale. For example, one item asked subjects to rate themselves on the following scale:

Friendly      7      6      5      4      3      2      1      Unfriendly

After answering this question, the following would immediately appear on the screen:

How important is it to you to be friendly?

Very      7      6      5      4      3      2      1      Very  
Important      Unimportant

If a subject rated himself or herself as a 6 or 7 on “friendly” and rated the importance of being friendly as 6 or 7, the item was identified as a candidate for disconfirming feedback. All disconfirming feedback statements were negative. Subjects were given

disconfirming feedback on between 3 and 18 items. The average number of disconfirming feedback items was 7.1.

### *Presentation of Disconfirming Feedback*

Before completing the self-description for the second time, the subject was asked whether he or she wanted to run a practice session to re-familiarise themselves with the on-screen self-description task or remembered it well enough to “jump right in”. Only one subject requested a practice session. The principal researcher then told the subject: “I just have to set the file up. In the meantime, here is a summary of the results from first session”. The subject was then handed 1) the NEO summary sheet provided by the tests distributors (ample may be found in Costa and McCrae, 1992), and 2) disconfirming feedback in writing as in Figure 1 below:

“The numbers next to the trait are percentile rankings. For example, you are in the 20<sup>th</sup> percentile group on anger [here the researcher pointed to the “anger” line on the feedback sheet]. That means 80 percent of the population experiences more anger than you are, so you are well below average on the trait of anger. *You scored in 47<sup>th</sup> percentile for warmth and kindness and 43<sup>rd</sup> for friendliness* [now the researcher points to those lines in the feedback sheet]; i.e. *you are just slightly below average on the traits of friendliness, kindness and warmth*. But you scored in the 92<sup>nd</sup> percentile on the trait of trust. Only 8 percent of the population is more trusting than you.”

**Figure 15.1: Example of Disconfirming Feedback**

Subject Name

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Thank you for your participation in this study. All data will be treated as strictly confidential. No names will be stored with the data. Your percentile rankings compared with other students in North America and the United Kingdom are given below.

Your responses indicate that, although you are a relatively sensitive person, you suffer little from negative affect, such as depression or anxiety; you are average on extraversion, open to new experiences and have an active fantasy life; you are reasonably, but not excessively, pleasant, kind, romantic and friendly; and you are not particularly well organised or efficient, and can occasionally be unproductive.

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Trait	Percentile Rank
<b>Neuroticism (N)</b>	41
Anxiety	39
Anger	20
Depression	22
Self-Consciousness	54
Impulsiveness	61
Vulnerability	52
<b>Extraversion (E)</b>	50
Warmth	47

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Assertiveness	39
Excitement Seeking	67
Activity	59
Gregariousness	33
Positive Emotions	81
<b>Openness (O)</b>	94
Fantasy	96
Aesthetics	97
Creativity	47
Values	91
Ideas	94
Actions	92
<b>Agreeableness (A)</b>	59
Friendliness	43
Kindness	47
Trust	92
Generosity	49
Compliance/Modesty	86
Romance	55
<b>Conscientiousness (C)</b>	38
Competence	47
Carefulness	27
Motivation	49

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Self-Discipline	47
Organization	29
Productivity	48

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The subject's attention was then drawn to particular items on which disconfirming feedback was given under the pretext of being given an explanation of the "printout".

The researcher then sat down at the computer, taking approximately 3 or 4 minutes "setting up" while leaving the subject to examine the disconfirming feedback sheet. The subject then completed the self-description for the second time. Once the subject had completed the self-description, they were debriefed according to the following model:

"Thank you. I now need to de-brief you. What we are attempting to develop with the on-screen self-description you just completed for the second time is a measure of the degree to which people are willing to change strongly held beliefs about themselves when confronted with evidence that those beliefs may not be completely accurate. If you wish to take home your NEO summary [here the researcher presented the NEO summary again] please do, that really was properly scored. This however [here the researcher held up the disconfirming feedback sheet] was deliberately constructed to contradict some things you said about yourself last week. [The researcher then proceeded to tear up the disconfirming feedback sheet]. Please forget about this. It was an experimental

manipulation.” Finally, the subject was asked if he or she had any questions about the research, and paid £5 for participation.

### *Results*

Examination of some top-level correlations of the present data set (Table 15.1) indicates that it contains a similar pattern to the 1997 Davis et al data set. In the present study, the OMNI Narcissistically Abused Personality subscale is negatively, and the NPI Will to Power subscale positively, correlated with change in self- description after disconfirming feedback. A positive correlation indicates a tendency to rate oneself even higher on a trait after receiving disconfirming feedback. That is, high Narcissistically Abused Personality subjects tended to change their self- descriptions in the direction of the disconfirming feedback, while high Will to Power subjects tended to change their self- descriptions in the reverse direction. Also, total OMNI score and two of the three OMNI subscales are positively correlated with our measure of neuroticism, while the NPI total scale shows a significant correlation in the opposite direction and Will to Power fails to reach statistical significance. It seems likely that response to disconfirming feedback is a complex phenomenon, of which narcissism is one component that can have dramatically different effects depending upon the other factors. Stepwise multiple regression procedures were used to attempt to extend the Davis et al findings to more general discrepancies in ideal vs. real self- images.

**Table 15.1: Intercorrelations among Change in Self-Description After Disconfirming Feedback, the Five-Factor Domains, and Measures of Narcissism and Splitting.**

	$\Delta$	N	E	O	A	C	NPD	PP	NAP	WTP	SL	SI
$\Delta$	1	-.39**	.40**	-.11	-.05	.26	.03	.01	-.35*	.38**	.10	-.36*
N		1	-.32*	.03	-.02	-.35**	.29*	.20	.56***	-.25	-.13	.54***
E			1	.36**	-.12	.06	.04	.18	-.27*	.45**	.35**	-.21
O				1	.09	-.12	-.01	.05	-.04	-.06	.19	-.03
A					1	.11	-.45**	-.53***	.00	-.48***	-.51***	-.06
C						1	-.19	.21	-.25	.27	-.01	-.41**
NPD							1	.51***	.22	.16	.34*	.05
PP								1	.21	.47***	.43**	-.00
NAP									1	-.23	-.29*	.47***
WTP										1	.58***	-.19
SL											1	-.21
SI												1

N=47. \* =  $p < .05$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \*\*\* =  $p < .001$ . NB: A positive correlation with  $\Delta$  indicates a tendency to reject the feedback.

$\Delta$  = Change in Self-description following disconfirming feedback.

N = Neuroticism

E = Extraversion

O = Openness to Experience

A = Agreeableness

C = Conscientiousness

NPD = OMNI Narcissistic Personality Disorder

PP = OMNI Poisonous Pedagogy

NAP = OMNI Narcissistically Abused Personality

WTP = NPI Will to Power

SL = NPI Self-love

SI = Splitting Index



*Further Intercorrelations of Personality Variables with Changes in Self – Description after Disconfirming Feedback*

Tables 15.2 and 15.3 give associations between changes in self-description after disconfirming feedback and total scale scores for the NPI and OMNI and NEO-PI-R facets. The mean change in subjects' self-ratings after disconfirming feedback ( $\Delta$ ) was significantly correlated with the OMNI Narcissistically Abused Personality (-.35,  $p = .016$ ), the Splitting Index (-.36,  $p = .012$ ) and its' Self (-.34,  $p = .018$ ) and Family (-.33,  $p = .021$ ) subscales, the Will to Power (.38,  $p = .009$ ) subscale of the NPI, the Kohutian Goal Instability (-.34,  $p = .019$ ) and Superiority (.34,  $p = .018$ ) scales, and the NEO domains of Neuroticism (-.39,  $p = .007$ ) and Extraversion (.40,  $p = .005$ ). Facet-level NEO correlations were also found in the Neuroticism subscales for Anxiety (-.32,  $p = .026$ ), Angry Hostility (-.29,  $p = .050$ ), Depression (-.43,  $p = .003$ ), Self-Consciousness (-.34,  $p = .019$ ) and Vulnerability (-.41,  $p = .005$ ), the Extraversion facets of Warmth (.31,  $p = .037$ ), Assertiveness (.39,  $p = .007$ ), and Positive Emotions (.46,  $p = .001$ ), the Agreeableness facets Trust (.33,  $p = .025$ ) and Modesty (-.32,  $p = .028$ ), and Conscientiousness facets of Competence (.48,  $p = .001$ ) and Self-Discipline (.36,  $p = .014$ ). The only significant correlation with changes in subjects' ratings of the importance of these traits was with OMNI Narcissistically Abused Personality (-.35,  $p = .017$ ).

These are far too many independent variables (21) to include in a multiple regression analysis with 47 subjects. Will to Power and Narcissistically Abused Personality were chosen to measure narcissism. To assess the interaction with neuroticism, the domain-level N score was chosen rather than the five facet-level scales to minimise the number of

independent variables. The Splitting Index was also included because this thesis has argued that it is splitting that is the fundamental self-deceptive mechanism that enables some narcissists to insulate themselves from negative affect.

**Table 15.2: Associations among NPI and OMNI Total Scales, Change in Self-Description after Disconfirming Feedback and Neuroticism**

	$\Delta$	NPI	OMNI	N
$\Delta$	1	.31*	-.09	-.39**
NPI		1	.26	-.30*
OMNI			1	.43**
N				1

N=54, \* =  $p < .05$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \*\*\* =  $p < .001$ . NPI= Narcissistic Personality Inventory, WTP = Will to Power, SL = Self-love, OMNI = O'Brien Multiphasic Narcissism Inventory, NPD = Narcissistic Personality Disorder, PP = Poisonous Pedagogy, NAP = Narcissistically Abused Personality, N = Neuroticism.

**Table 15.3: Association between NEO-PI-R Facets and Change in Self-Description after Disconfirming Feedback**

	Facet 1	Facet 2	Facet 3	Facet 4	Facet 5	Facet 6
N	-.32*	-.29*	-.43**	-.34*	.07	-.41**
E	.31*	.28	.39**	.14	.09	.46**
O	-.04	-.19	-.04	.03	-.24	.06
A	.33*	-.12	.17	-.02	-.32*	-.17
C	.48***	.05	-.02	.20	.36*	-.06

N=47, \* =  $p < .05$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \*\*\* =  $p < .001$ . N = Neuroticism, E = Extraversion, O = Openness to Experience, A = Agreeableness, C = Conscientiousness. Facets (1-6) are respectively: for N anxiety, anxious hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness, and vulnerability; for E warmth, gregariousness, assertiveness, activity, excitement seeking, and positive emotions; for O fantasy, aesthetics, feelings, actions, ideas and values; for A trust, straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty and tender-mindedness; and for C competence, order, dutifulness, achievement striving, self-discipline and deliberation.

### Method

In the first step of the analysis, Neuroticism, Extraversion, Will to Power, Narcissistically Abused Personality and the Splitting Index were entered as variables in a stepwise linear regression with change in self-description as the dependent variable. Only Neuroticism and Extraversion made statistically significant contributions to the model (Table 15.4).

**Table 15.4: Regression Model of Change in Self-Description after Disconfirming Feedback**

Model	Unstandardised		Standardised		t	Sig.	R <sup>2</sup>
	B	Std. Error	Beta	Coefficients			
1 (Constant)	-1.899	.448			-4.235	.000	.162
Extraversion	.001095	.004	.403		2.950	.005	
2 (Constant)	-1.061	.565			-1.878	.067	.250
Extraversion	.008871	.004	.326		2.419	.020	
Neuroticism	-.006307	.003	-.307		-2.279	.028	
3 (Constant)	-.831	.557			-1.492	.143	.317
Extraversion	.005976	.004	.220		1.567	.124	
Neuroticism	-.006986	.003	-.340		-2.594	.013	
Will to Power	.0007612	.000	.278		2.047	.047	
x Neuroticism							

In the second step, an interaction between narcissism and will to power term was added to the model. It was anticipated that the interactive effect Davis et al found of narcissism and neuroticism on body esteem would find its parallel in an interactive effect of narcissism and Neuroticism on change in self-description in response to disconfirming feedback. As can be seen in Table 15.4, a significant interaction between Will to Power and Narcissism was found.

### *Discussion*

The above results are analogous to the Davis et al (1997) finding that the relationships between narcissism and women's ability to respond to incongruencies between real and ideal images of body esteem in a healthy and appropriate fashion are complex and sensitive to the levels of neuroticism. Relationships between narcissism and willingness to change strongly held beliefs about the self in response to disconfirming feedback also seem to be complex and sensitive to levels of neuroticism, to say nothing of other possible variables. Because of the correlational nature of this data set, multicollinearity of the predictor variables, and limited number of subjects, causal inferences based on these data are not justified. It seems likely however that narcissistic traits promoting the ability to tolerate discrepancies in real - ideal self- images in some circumstances or in combination with some traits may have the opposite effect in the presence of other circumstances and personality traits. Even within the same individual, narcissism is sometimes healthy and sometimes unhealthy, and therefore calls for empirical investigation throughout the life span.

The defining characteristic of malignant narcissism is not will (to power) itself but an unsubmitted will (Peck, 1983). As with Jones' (1973/1913) "God Complex", a strong will to power subordinated to higher values can have highly desirable results. Otherwise it can have opposite consequences. According to Peck (1983) the subtype of narcissistic personality disorder he judges as evil is driven by fear. It is possible that neuroticism plays an important role in determining whether or not a will is submitted. The other personality traits that correlate with change in self-description after disconfirming feedback, which should not be taken as exhaustive, may influence vulnerability to fear and non-submission of the will as well.

Intercorrelations between the NEO-PI-R facets that correlate with change in self-description following disconfirming feedback are shown in Table 15.5. Note that these inter-correlations are not limited to facets within the same domain. For example, the Neuroticism facet of depression and the Conscientiousness facet of competence correlate  $-.53, p < .001$ . The risk of a type 1 error in drawing conclusions from the NEO-PI-R facet level correlations with change in self-description after disconfirming feedback is unacceptably high. Treated as a "fishing expedition", however, the facet-level associations offer a rich source of testable hypotheses for future studies with larger sample sizes.

Five out of six Neuroticism facets correlate with lowering one's self-image following disconfirming feedback: anxiety, angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness and vulnerability. Three out of six Extraversion facets show the opposite pattern, correlating

with increased self-descriptions in response to disconfirming feedback: warmth, assertiveness and positive emotions. Among Agreeableness facets, trust is associated with increased, and modesty with decreased, self-ratings following disconfirming feedback. The C facet of competence showed the strongest correlation with change in self-description after disconfirming feedback of any variable in the study. The C facet of Self-Discipline is also significantly correlated.

These correlations make a great deal of intuitive sense, and suggest a dominance vs. submission issue. Doesn't someone who is (for example) vulnerable or depressed tend to go along with negative feedback, even if it is objectively invalid? Doesn't someone who is competent, self-disciplined and assertive tend to know what he or she is like and not be so easily swayed? The issue, however, is far from being as simple as dominant people are nasty and submissive people are nice. What matters is not whether someone is dominant (i.e. has a strong will to power) but whether that will is subordinated to something higher than itself. Being submissive is not desirable in itself. In light of this, it is unfortunate that equipment failure made the reaction time data unreliable. If someone's will is subordinated to higher values, they would have to take the time necessary to determine whether or not a decision to reject feedback is consistent with those value. If not, there is no need to spend the time. The interactions between these many variables can only be addressed with far greater sample sizes than are afforded by this study. Treated as exploratory data, these correlations clearly warrant further investigations with larger sample sizes and reliable equipment.

## Chapter 16: Self-Deception

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There are many kinds of self- deception. Not all of them are pathological. The cognitive paradigm in psychological science embraces post-empiricist epistemology (Bolton and Hill, 1996). Whereas empiricism assumed that the subject played a passive role in sense experience (upon which all knowledge except logic was based), the subject in post-empiricism is an active agent. Both post-empiricism and cognitive-behavioural science invoke the view that cognition and perception are in the service of action. On this view, beliefs about the self and world are hierarchically organised in theories that the subject uses to interpret experience and plan action. The subject's theory has a core set of beliefs that are indispensable. Without the core beliefs, action is impossible or pointless. There must be resistance to giving up core beliefs, so anomalies tend to be deflected elsewhere: there must be a mistake in the theory SOMEWHERE – but not here.

According to Peck (1983), those who suffer from the proposed personality disorder he calls “evil” are so unwilling to tolerate disconfirming feedback that they engage in extremely destructive and irresponsible behaviour to eliminate disconfirming feedback. The cognitive experiment suggests that personality traits play a role in response to disconfirming feedback. It is important to emphasise, however, that all people deflect disconfirming feedback away from core beliefs to some extent; the vast majority would not be candidates for Peck's disorder. Presumably, the sort of person who would be a candidate has an extremely inappropriate theory of self and world and is unwilling or unable to tolerate evidence that the theory is inaccurate.

Peck's (1983) contention is that these people deceive themselves concerning the inaccuracy of their beliefs and the consequences of their actions. Can one really lie to oneself? In a direct sense, no, but deception can take many forms, and lies and their motivations are not



always direct or simple. Many self-deceptions that mean a choice for evil resemble the model of Donald Davidson. According to Davidson:

An agent A is self-deceived with respect to the proposition p under the following condition. A has evidence on the basis of which he believes that p is more apt to be true than its negation; the thought that p, or the thought that he ought rationally to believe p, motivates A to act in such a way as to cause himself to believe the negation of p. The action involved may be no more than an intentional directing of attention away from the evidence in favour of p; or it may involve the active search for evidence against p. All that self-deception demands of the action is that the motive originates in a belief that p is true (or recognition that the evidence makes it more likely to be true than not), and that the action be done with the intention of producing a belief in the negation of p. Finally, and it is especially this that makes self-deception a problem, the state that motivates self-deception and the state it produces coexist; in the strongest case, the belief that p not only causes a belief in the negation of p, but also sustains it. Self-deception is thus a form of self-induced weakness of the warrant, where the motive for inducing a belief is a contradictory belief (or what is deemed to be sufficient evidence in favour of the contradictory belief). In some, but not all, cases, the motive springs from the fact that the agent wishes that the proposition, a belief in which he induces, were true, or a fear that it might not be. So self-deception often involves wishful thinking as well (Davidson, 1985).

By “weakness of the warrant”, Davidson means rejecting a hypothesis that the available evidence suggests is probably true. This violates Hempel and Carnap’s requirement of total evidence for inductive reasoning: when deciding among mutually exclusive hypotheses, accept the one most supported by all available relevant evidence. Weakness of the warrant is a cognitive error analogous to, and with the same logical structure as, weakness of the will: acting intentionally, or intending to act, on the basis of less than all relevant reasons. Conflict is necessary for both, and may cause lapses in reason, but does not necessitate its failure. In weakness of the warrant, an irrational belief is in conflict with the best or sum of the evidence; in weakness of will, an irrational intention is in conflict with one’s values. Weakness of the warrant, like self-deception, is more than simply overlooking evidence or not realising that things one knows contradict a belief. To be guilty of self-deception or weakness of the warrant, one must consider a hypothesis and reject it in spite of evidence to the contrary. There can be no failure of inductive reasoning unless evidence is taken to be evidence.

Like weakness of the warrant, self-deception is also similar but not identical to weakness of the will. Again, both occur in the context of a conflict. Weakness of the will, however, is an evaluative phenomenon whose outcome is an intention; self-deception is, like weakness of the warrant, a cognitive phenomenon whose outcome is a belief. The two often reinforce each-other and violate the normative principle that one should not act or intend to act against one's best judgement, i.e. perform or intend to perform an act even though one believes that a better alternative is available.

Now, according to Davidson, self-deception includes weakness of the warrant, but goes further in that there is a reason for the weakness of the warrant, which played a part in bringing it about. Weakness of the warrant always has a cause, but weakness of the warrant in self-deception is self-induced. Motivation and intervention by the subject are not necessary in weakness of either the will or warrant, but are necessary for self-deception. Self-deception may also involve wishful thinking, but not all wishful thinking is self-deception.

So, in Davidson's view, one belief can be the cause of another, contradictory belief. This does not mean that one can straightforwardly and consciously hold two contradictory beliefs. What it means is, as in Sackheim and Gur's criteria for self-deception, that one must hold two contradictory beliefs simultaneously, be unaware of holding one of the beliefs, and that the act of keeping one of the beliefs out of conscious awareness must be motivated (Sackheim and Gur, 1978). Is this possible? Does it occur? Consider the following example:

A vice president - call him "Dave" - of an engineering firm, who also happens to be an ordained Baptist minister, had a terrible reputation as a pathological liar who had risen to

his position by stabbing many people in the back. At staff meetings he sometimes spoke on neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) techniques for changing thoughts, perceptions, beliefs and behaviours, which he frankly used to twist reality to suit his needs. When he took charge of our division, morale plummeted and employees left the company in droves. Clearly, something was amiss. Further, the customer complained that the high turnover rate was affecting work on important projects of we were doing for them, and the corporate front office wanted to know why so many people were leaving the company.

Dave ordered his second-in-command, Bill, to call a meeting of my department, where morale was especially low and there had been several resignations recently. Bill was to find out what the employees were unhappy about, and report back to Dave. Fourteen out of 16 people at this meeting said that Dave had lied to them and was the cause of the unhappiness. When Bill reported this to Dave, Dave became furious, sternly warned Bill that he had better never dare come back with an answer like that again, and ordered Bill to go back and find out the “real” reason for employee unrest.

Dave had good reason to believe that morale was low and turnover high because he had lied to and hurt so many people. This thought motivated Dave to order his lieutenant to find alternative reasons for the unrest, presuming the lieutenant knew that it was dangerous and foolish to tell Dave “its because of you” and that low raises, cuts in benefits and the high work load conveniently provided other answers. So Dave’s self-induced weakness of the warrant originated in a belief that a proposition  $p$  was likely to be true, acted in such a way as to find evidence to bring about the contradictory belief, and both states coexisted. This was typical of Dave’s behaviour. He was an expert at self-deception.

It can be clearly seen that self-deception both differs from and is similar to lying. In both, the deceiver intends to produce a belief he/she does not, at that time, believe to be true. The

liar, however, may or may not intend the victim to believe what he or she says, or intend the victim to believe that the liar believes what he or she says. If the liar thinks the intended victim will reason “so-and-so is a liar, so whatever he/she says, the opposite must be true”, the liar may say the opposite of what he/she wants the victim to believe. A liar must intend only to represent him/her self as believing what he/she does not, and to keep his/her intentions hidden. This kind of deceit - the insincere representation of one’s beliefs - cannot be practised on oneself, because it requires that the intention not be recognised by the intender. Self-deception pits intention and desire against belief, and belief against belief.

### **The Case of Albert Speer**

Albert Speer was surely one of the most talented, interesting and enigmatic figures of the Third Reich, as well as one of the most ambiguous. Originally Hitler’s architect, Speer eventually became Armaments Minister and the second most powerful person in Nazi Germany. He was almost single-handedly responsible for preventing Hitler’s scorched earth policy at the end of the war. He protected employees in his ministry with “racial and political defects”. He took risks that few took in expressing disagreements with Hitler and asking for help and clemency for people he knew who were imprisoned in concentration camps and their families, even sending them packages with food, clothing, and medicine. He was also responsible for the use of slave labour, and worked feverishly to prolong a war he admitted he knew was already lost, in spite of increasingly recognising his Fuhrer’s goals as evil. Many considered it an outrage that the man (Fritz Sauckel) who recruited the slave labour Speer needed and demanded for the armaments industry was hanged for it at Nuremberg, while Speer escaped the death penalty by denying direct knowledge of Nazi atrocities, claims that he was trying to save the German people from Hitler’s intention to leave them nothing if the war was lost, and gaining sympathy through formal acceptance of

responsibility and appealing to the anti-communist sentiments of the western powers (Sereny, 1996).

Speer claimed that he did not notice the Kristallnacht and was not present during Himmler's speech of October 6, 1943 in which the true "final solution to the Jewish problem" was revealed. Although Viktor Brack testified at Nuremberg that by March 1941 the intention to exterminate the Jews was no secret in party higher circles, and in the course of his daily drives to his office Speer saw crowds of Jews being evacuated from Berlin, he continued to deny that he knew the Jews were being exterminated right up to his death in 1981. He did not deny, however, that he was blind by choice, not ignorant; he said that he had a suspicion of what was happening to the Jews. He had noticed the obvious destruction of the Kristallnacht, and that Jews were evicted from their homes, but had not sought to know the reasons. Speer said that he considered himself morally responsible for this failure from the moment when his friend Karl Hanke advised him never, under any circumstances, to accept an invitation to visit a concentration camp in Upper Silesia (Auschwitz):

He had seen something there which he was not permitted to describe and moreover could not describe. I did not query him. I did not query Himmler, I did not query Hitler, I did not speak with personal friends. *I did not investigate - for I did not want to know what was happening there.* ...From that moment on, I was inescapably contaminated morally; *from fear of discovering something which might have made me turn from my course, I had closed my eyes* (Sereny, 1996, p. 463, italics added).

Even if one accepts this incident as the beginning of Speer's culpability in Hitler's crimes, the evidence suggests that Speer's self-deception not only began much earlier than his conversation with Hanke, but also was central to his personality. On the testimony of those closest to him, Speer characteristically refused to know about things he could not accept (Sereny, 1996). His secretary, Annemarie Kempf, for example, said that he avoided knowing about his employee's extramarital affairs: "I think he felt that what he didn't know didn't exist." Kempf went on to say:

I suppose one could say...he didn't see anything he didn't want to see, but really I don't think it was that simple. In fact, I think he would have been glad to have the capacity to see- certainly he was glad whenever we could help people. But he didn't have that capacity; though, in that respect too, there was a change in him after Spandau (Sereny, 1996).

Why didn't he have the capacity to see? Both Speer and his biographer Gitta Sereny (1996) cited his feelings for Hitler as one reason for his self-deception. Speer could not bear to cease to believe in Hitler because there was nothing else in his life:

I continued to wear blinkers, long after anyone who wanted to see the truth could see it, because they enabled me to hold on to the two things which had become my life: my power and my feelings for Hitler.

Even in this statement, however, there is the admission of wanting to retain his position of power and prestige. And when asked why what he saw in Russia did not open his eyes, Speer himself confessed "I didn't see or think of them as human beings, as individuals." So however much his feelings for Hitler were involved, an even greater part was played by his self-absorption and arrogance - in a word, his narcissism. Speer insisted that there was one additional factor: fear. When asked how, even after he knew the war was lost, and in spite of all the horrors going on about him, he could continue to work so diligently for Hitler, he replied:

You cannot understand. You simply cannot understand what it is to live in a dictatorship; you can't understand the game of danger, but above all you cannot understand the fear on which the whole thing is based. Nor, I suppose, have you any concept of the charisma of a man such as Hitler.

At the beginning of his 20-year sentence, Speer asked the chaplain of Spandau prison, the French minister Georges Casalis, to help him become a better man. Casalis was frank with Speer that he considered him the most guilty of the six Nazi inmates at Spandau, yet agreed. Together they tried to create a rhythm of working, thinking and living that would



lead to Speer becoming a better man. Casalis saw his task as helping Speer to confront the truth and deal with it while remaining alive. Speer's feelings of guilt were so intense that this was extremely difficult. So difficult that, though Casalis knew that Speer was sometimes lying, he did not condemn him for those lies, as without them the truth would have been too much for Speer:

...all prisoners- are always an ambivalent entity; one lives with them in a perpetual state of half-truths or half-reality.....In a way it is the defence of their id: they can't give it up, even to someone they come to trust; if they did, it would destroy whatever "self" they have retained. So, you see, it isn't deliberate or even unconsciously dishonest. It is an instinctive self-protection process, So everything they show is always only partly really open, really true.

After three years Casalis left to pursue his doctorate. He later realised that this was disastrous as far as Speer's sincere efforts to become a different man were concerned. After a period of apathy and depression, Speer reverted from his difficult spiritual search to his narcissistic concentration on himself, and used the rhythm to he had developed to work towards obtaining his freedom.

The result was an adapted version of the old Speer: still narcissistic and avoiding the terrible truth, but with a conviction that life had a wider meaning beyond logic. The Benedictine monk Father Athanasius, who observed Speer in retreats that Speer attended once or twice a year for ten years, said that he never known a man as acutely aware of his deficiencies as Albert Speer. Speer's inner feelings of guilt were genuine, proof that he did not lack a conscience. He often quoted Jaspers: "Evil will rule unless I confront it at all times in myself and others." But there were limits to how much truth he could stand. The tasks omitted in Speer's writings and conversations are those that show he was in a position to know things he claimed not to know. When asked tough questions, Speer often used the evasive technique of generalising about specifics and admitting a little to deny a lot. This way of presenting the story was part of his self-deception, a way of hiding



unavowed knowledge and genuine guilt that he simply could not live with. He had taken Nietzsche's advice to avoid truths that were so terrible one could not acknowledge them and live. His will to live was stronger than his need to atone. I suspect most of us are the same.

There is no doubt that Speer lied about many things. The more he tried to explain away awkward facts- how he could not have known about the fate of the Jews or the conditions in slave labour camps, and his relationship with Hitler - the clearer he is avoiding the truth. But, as Sereny says, "to say that he was lying is too simple. Lies and their motivations are not like that. Speer's reflect his need to schematise his life into an alignment of feelings and fears he could live with."

### **Hitler and Forbidden Knowledge**

The popular conception of Hitler is as a bloodthirsty vampire. According to both Speer and long-time Hitler adjutant Nicolaus von Below, however, Hitler avoided both physical and visual contact with violence, and experienced guilt at ordering Roehm's murder. Hitler absolutely refused to listen to bad news, hated being tackled on anything unpleasant, and literally closed his eyes if forced to see the consequences of his orders. His valet, Hans Junge, asserts that he had the ability to hypnotise people; that Generals would go to meetings with Hitler fully prepared to tell him the truth and that disaster was imminent and leave having been overwhelmed and unable to do so (Sereny, 1996, p. 250). When hypnosis failed, there were more drastic measures. Speer states:

One was constantly walking a tightrope between telling him the truth and risking not just being thrown out (which could have been a blessing) but shot, or else going along with his fantasies in the hope of saving *something* for the German people (Sereny, 1996, p.300).

Henrietta von Schirach, daughter of the Reich Youth Leader and Gauleiter of Vienna, says she was forbidden access to the Berghof, where she had virtually grown up, after asking Hitler if he knew how Jews were being treated in Holland. Inevitably, this extensive self-deception meant that Hitler could not accurately perceive reality. Theo Hupfauer, one of the Nazi party's most important administrators and Speer's right hand man in the last years of the war (and who himself blocked from his mind what he saw in Russia, blaming it on administrative stupidity), asserts that, after Ribbentrop said he did not believe Britain would honour its pledge to Poland, Hitler was incapable of realising that she would. "This blindness was his doom."

According to Robert Jay Lifton (1986), division of the self into two functioning selves, each of which acts as an entire self, or "doubling", is a self-deceptive psychological process that enables one to adapt to evil environments. Sereny says that, after knowing many of the people who lived around Hitler, she has no doubt that Hitler led double life. All those who lived around Hitler were keenly aware of his exceptional capacity for "compartmentalisation". The decisions and life he led with Himmler, Goebbels, his Generals and staff he kept strictly separate from his small, private circle. He also required compartmentalisation of others, ordering them to "Think of nothing except your own sphere of activity - there is no such thing as collective responsibility." A notice on every wall read: "Every man need only know what is going on in his own domain." Albert Speer states:

Hitler required us not only to compartmentalise our activities but also our thinking. He insisted that each man should only think about his task and not be concerned about that of his neighbour. Carried to its logical conclusion, and linked with his secrecy order, this meant much more than his wanting people to concentrate their minds - it meant it was dangerous not to.

Gitta Sereny says that the astonishing thing about Germany under Hitler was not that the German people accepted that wrong was right - they did not - but that they accepted the

legitimacy of forbidden knowledge. They knew that knowledge could be dangerous, so even when it lurked in their minds, it was suppressed. Manfred von Poser, a long time Nazi sympathiser, put it this way:

One 'sensed' that there was something wrong. But you see, sensing isn't knowing. One hears things which make one feel uncomfortable, without being able to put one's finger on anything specific. It's almost an atmosphere - a way people talk, their conduct, or perhaps their gestures or even just their tone of voice. It is so subtle. How can one explain it to anyone who hasn't experienced that time, those small first doubts, that kind of unease, for want of a better word? We couldn't have found words to explain what we felt was wrong. But to find out, to look for an explanation for that... that 'hunch', well, that would have been very dangerous...One did know very early on that there were dangers in knowledge.

Or take the confession of Speer's legal counsel at Nuremberg, Dr. Hans Flaechsner:

One knew it was miserable to be a Jew in Hitler's Germany, but one didn't know it was a catastrophe; one didn't know what happened to them. Until a day in 1943, when a client of mine who was a medic in Russia came back with photographs of executions of Jews, I knew absolutely nothing of this. I told him to burn or bury the photographs and to tell no one what he had seen. And I didn't tell anybody either, not even my wife. I know that it wasn't right, but it was prudent. One wanted to survive- it was most unsafe to have seen such photographs. I don't think it was any secret that people were being executed; what we didn't know was that they were being systematically mass-murdered.

### **Self-Deception in Saturn's Children**

What W.A. Visser 't Hooft said of Nazi Germany, that "People could find no place in their consciousness for such... unimaginable horror...they did not have the imagination, together with the courage to face it. It is possible to live in a twilight between knowing and not knowing" can also be said of the Soviet Union. Speer once said: "The authoritarian state not only doesn't admit criticism, but doesn't know what it is. Mistakes can be made for years without any opposition" (Sereny, 1996). Thus, all authoritarian states are self-deceived, and self-deception in its citizens may be necessary for survival. The self-deceptions discussed so far insulated the subjects from guilt for the evil being done to others. One is astounded by cases where Saturn's child defends Saturn while being

devoured. The Gulag Archipelago (Solzhenitsyn, 1973) teems with such cases. One such example was Olga Petrovna Matronina, one of Solzhenitsyn's supervisors during his imprisonment. Matronina was an orthodox communist. When her husband was shot during Stalin's reign of terror, she was sentenced to eight years in the Gulag merely for being his wife.

Matronina refused to accept such blatant injustices, even when directed against herself, as evidence for the failure of her beloved communist ideology and party. She insisted that she did not resent her husband's execution or her own imprisonment. Injustices such as these were due to the henchmen of Beria's predecessors Yagoda and Yezhov (who by this time had been made scapegoats for the excesses of the security organs by Stalin). Under Beria all arrests had been just; she served the party whether in freedom or prison. Her reaction to anyone who mentioned her own arrest was "Those who arrested me can now see the proof of my orthodoxy" and "My long sentence has not broken my will in the struggle for the Soviet government, for Soviet industry."

While denying any resentment for her own imprisonment, Matronina brutally mistreated those who worked under her. She sometimes left orders for prisoners to be left out all night (this in Siberia). When, ordered to double the output of her section, she placed Solzhenitsyn in charge of achieving this impossible goal, and Solzhenitsyn suggested that he did not have the expertise, she became furious and gave orders to guards to "Put him to work with a crowbar and don't take your eyes off him! Make him load six cars a shift! Make him *sweat!*" When asked if the prisoners might not be allowed one Sunday of rest, she replied: "What right have we to a Sunday? The construction project in Moscow (by which she meant the construction of the new, socialist society) is being held up because there are no bricks." Matronina's self-induced weakness of the warrant enabled her to hold on to her faith in communism, but at a terrible cost.

In another example, Solzhenitsyn (1973) relates how he and a friend amused themselves with an orthodox communist while being transported to a camp. Despite overwhelming evidence of the failings of the Soviet system, this academic economist remained militantly ignorant of the failure of his ideology, even as one of its victims:

“Look over there: how poverty-stricken our villages are- straw thatch, crooked huts.”

“An inheritance from the Tsarist regime.”

“Well, but we’ve already had thirty Soviet years.”

“That’s an insignificant period, historically.”

“It’s terrible that the collective farmers are starving.”

“But have you looked in *all* their ovens.”

“Just ask any collective farmer in our compartment.”

“Everyone in jail is embittered and prejudiced.”

“But I’ve seen collective farms myself.”

“That means they were uncharacteristic.”

(The goatee had never been in any of them- that way it was simpler.)

“Just ask the old folks: under the Tsar they were well fed, well clothed, and they used to have so many holidays.”

“I’m not even going to ask. It’s a subjective trait of human memory to praise everything about the past. The cow that died is the one that gave twice the milk. [Sometimes he even cited proverbs!] And our people don’t like holidays. They like to work.”

“But why is there a shortage of bread in many cities?”

“When?”

“Right before the war, for example.”

“Not true! Before the war, in fact, everything had been worked out.”

“Listen, at that time in all the cities on the Volga there were queues of thousands of people...”

“Some local failure in supply. But more likely your memory is failing you.”

“But there’s a shortage now.”

“Old wives’ tales. We have from seven to eight poods of grain.”<sup>2</sup>

“And the grain itself is rotten.”

“Not at all. We have been successful in developing new varieties of grain.”

“But in many shops the shelves are empty.”

“Inefficient distribution in local areas.”

“Yes, and the prices are high. The workers have to do without many things.”

“Our prices are more scientifically based than anywhere else.”

“That means wages are low.”

“And the wages, too, are scientifically based.”

“That means they’re based in such a way that the worker works for the state for free the greater part of his time.”

“You don’t know anything about economics. What is your profession?”

“Engineer.”

“And I am an economist. Don’t argue. Surplus value is even impossible here.”

“But why is it that the father of a family used to be able to feed his family by his own labour, and that now two or three in the family have to work.”

"Because there was unemployment previously, and the wife couldn't get work. And the family went hungry. Furthermore, the wife's working is important for her equality."

"What the devil do you mean by equality. And who does all the household work?"

"The husband has to help."

"And what about you- did you help your wife?"

"I am not married."

"So each of them used to work during the day, and now both of them have to work in the evenings too. And the woman has no time for the main thing- for bringing up the children."

"She has quite enough. They are mainly brought up by the kindergarten, school, and Komsomol."

"Well, and how are they bringing them up? They grow up to be hooligans and petty thieves and the girls...run free and loose."

"Not at all. Our youth have lofty principles."

"That's what the papers say. But our papers tell lies."

"They are much more honest than the bourgeois newspapers! You ought to read the bourgeois newspapers."

"Just give me the chance!"

"That's not necessary at all."

"And our newspapers still tell lies!"

"They are openly bound to the proletariat."

"That's the kind of upbringing that makes the crime rate grow."

"On the contrary, it's falling. Give me the statistics."

(This in a country where even the number of sheep tails is classified as a secret!).

"And another reason our crime rate is rising is that our laws themselves give rise to crime. They are ferocious and ridiculous."

"On the contrary, they are fine laws. They finest in the history of humanity."

"Especially Article 58."

"Without it our young state would not have been able to hold out."

"It's no longer so very young."

"Historically speaking it is very young."

"But look around at the number of people imprisoned."

"They got what they deserved."

"And what about you?"

"I was jailed by mistake. They will sort things out and release me."

(They all leave themselves this loophole.)

"By mistake? Then what kind of laws do we have?"

"The laws are excellent, it is the deviations from them that are unfortunate."

"Everywhere there is graft, bribes, corruption."

"We have to intensify our communist upbringing (Solzhenitsyn, 1975)."

## Conclusion

The above incidents illustrate that self-deception of a kind not unlike that described by Davidson does occur, and often means a choice for evil. In some cases these examples go one step further by not merely directing attention away from evidence in favour of p, or searching for evidence against p, but in exterminating evidence in favour of p. The cases of Saturn's children also illustrate the role of ideology, which can have a very powerful



effect that, as Solzhenitsyn says, has enabled twentieth century man to exceed the deeds of the villains of bygone eras.

On the basis of the above, perhaps the dichotomy “known/unknown” may be better (that is, more useful and less questionable) than the dichotomy “conscious/unconscious” that has been the centre of so much controversy. What self-deception often comes down to is this: usually, something is not known for certain until after some exploratory behaviour has taken place. One does not suspect in a vacuum; one suspects because one has evidence. This evidence may point to the truth of a proposition that the subject either fears, or desires to be false. The self-deceived subject intentionally does not initiate exploratory behaviour. To the contrary, he or she avoids or disregards evidence for its truth, seeks evidence favouring its negation, and in some cases exterminates the evidence. While the “dreaded homunculus” may be necessary for an “unconscious” in the Freudian sense of that term, it is not needed to explain self-induced weakness of the warrant.

These incidents also support the contention of Peck and Fingarette that the evil character structure is a corruption of morality, not the absence of it. The classic psychopath, having no conscience or sense of morality, has no need of self-deception. Unable to feel guilt or remorse, he need not hide the consequences of his actions from himself, as Hitler or Speer did. The evil character structure results from militant ignorance- the adamant refusal to tolerate legitimate feelings of guilt.



## Chapter 17: Splitting

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“...man is not truly one, but truly two. I say two, because the state of my own knowledge does not pass beyond that point. Others will follow, others will outstrip me on the same lines; and I hazard the guess that man will ultimately be known for a mere polity of multifarious, incongruous, and independent denizens.” - R.L. Stevenson, *The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde*.

The previous chapter dealt with the contentious issue of self-deception, which is crucial for distinguishing the personality type under study from psychopathy. The dominant account of our day - that of Davidson (1985) - seems to go a long way toward accounting for a particular kind of self-deception that was evidenced by Albert Speer and other examples cited. There are other kinds and other accounts of self-deception. Many which are of particular interest and founded on splitting.

According to Grotstein (1981) splitting - called “double consciousness” in nineteenth century psychiatry - “may be defined as the activity by which the ego discerns differences within the self and its objects, or between itself and objects” and comes in two flavours: splitting in the perceptual or cognitive sense is an act of discriminative separation; splitting in the defensive sense is an unconscious process in which the ego splits itself off from unwanted perceptions of itself, or splits an object in order to locate aspects of it separately, typically “good” and “bad”. Macroscopic splitting (Grotstein, 1981) refers to such phenomena as dissociation of personality; microscopic forms can be more subtle. Splitting originates, on the one hand, in the quality of distinctiveness and capacity to separate qualities, both defensively and non-defensively, and on the other hand in separate subselves that have not achieved at-one-ness:

It is splitting which allows the ego to emerge out of chaos and to order its experiences. This ordering of experience which occurs with the process of splitting into a good and bad object, however excessive and extreme it may be to begin with, nevertheless orders the universe of the child’s emotional and sensory impression and

is a precondition of later integration. It is the basis of what is later to become the faculty of discrimination, the origin of which is the early differentiation between good and bad. ...the ability to pay attention, to suspend one's emotion in order to form an intellectual judgement, would not be possible without the capacity for temporary reversible splitting (Grotstein, 1981, p.15).

Clearly not all splitting is pathological. Life would be impossible without temporary, reversible splitting. Pathological splitting, however, can not only become permanent and irreversible but alters the perception of the object by inappropriate divisions (Grotstein, 1981). Splitting in psychopathology can be seen in hysteria: for example, Grotstein quotes passages in Breuer and Freud's Studies in Hysteria where Anna O. complained of "having two selves, a real one and an evil one which forced her to behave badly" and experienced autohypnotic absences which were at first temporary but later became organised into a permanent "double conscience". Breuer concluded that "the patient was split into two personalities of which one was mentally normal and the other insane." This was apparently seen by Freud as a failed attempt at splitting the content of consciousness that backfired into splitting of consciousness itself. Concurrently in France, Janet was writing about "dissociation" as a tendency to sacrifice or abandon psychological functions, which become "dissociated" from the rest of the personality and result in autonomous symptom complexes. Janet said that once "baptised" - named or confirmed by an authority figure - a self is likely to become more clear and definite (Lifton, 1986; Power, 1997).

Thus, Grotstein argues, when psychoanalysis first emerged, splitting, not repression, was the primary psychodynamic defence mechanism and had advocates outside of psychoanalysis. In its early formulation, psychoanalysis posited a conscious personality constantly beset by an unconscious personality split off during a childhood trauma. In later formulations, the trauma was not a true memory, only a fantasy. Either way, the existence of a second personality, furtively impulsive and demonically impassioned, replaced the unified personality with one that was fundamentally split. Although eclipsed in Freud's writings by repression, Klein and Fairbairn made splitting the basis of a new extension of

psychoanalysis of which Kernberg and others are descended (Grotstein, 1981). Even as repression became Freud's cornerstone, splitting never vanished from his writings, as Grotstein shows with various examples. For example, in "On Narcissism: An Introduction" Freud says that the ego ideal is a split-off and projected aspect of the ego which then becomes a separate agent (Freud, 1986/1914). Freud tended to equate splitting and dissociation (Lifton, 1986).

### *Klein*

A more comprehensive treatment of splitting than is possible in this thesis would cover the work of (Otto) Rank, Ferenczi, Mahler, Fairbairn, Bion and many others, and is provided by Grotstein (1981). Splitting as conceived by the two major psychoanalytic theorists most associated with narcissism, Kernberg (whose work the Splitting Index used in this thesis is based on) and Kohut, owes much to the work of Klein. Klein called the early months of life the paranoid-schizoid position to reflect the persecutory anxiety that besets the infant and the defences against it - splitting and projective identification, and placed particular emphasis on division of the breast into good and bad objects, which she asserts is an expression of an innate love-hate conflict and ensuing anxieties (Klein, 1957). Since Klein, splitting has been particularly associated with the polarisation of good and bad imagery within the self, which can be consistent with normal development, but when exaggerated or inappropriate can lead to Kernberg's "borderline states", which are associated with severe personality disorders (Lifton, 1986).

### *Kernberg*

Generalised dissociative or splitting mechanisms affecting the integration of cognitive processes are one of several aspects of the "borderline personality organisation" Kernberg asserts typically underlie narcissistic personalities and all clear-cut antisocial personalities

he has examined. Kernberg (1975) appears to give what one might call a “pre-adaptation” description of the development of the mechanism:

Introjections and identifications established under the influence of libidinal drive derivative are at first built up separately from those established under the influence of aggressive drive derivatives (“good” and “bad” internal objects, or “positive” and “negative” introjections). This division of internalised object relations into “good” and “bad” happens at first simply because of the lack of integrative capacity of the early ego. Later on, what originally was a lack of integrative capacity is used defensively by the emerging ego in order to prevent the generalisation of anxiety and to protect the ego core built around positive introjections (introjections and identifications established under the influence of libidinal drive derivatives).

Kernberg goes on to say that normally the above mechanism is rapidly replaced after the first year of life by mechanisms centred on repression. In pathological cases, splitting and the related mechanisms of idealisation, early forms of projection and projective identification, denial, omnipotence and devaluation persist and become the means of dissociation:

Under these pathological circumstances, contradictory ego states are alternately activated, and as long as these contradictory ego states can be kept separate from each other, anxiety is prevented. Such a state of affairs is, of course, very detrimental to the integrative processes...

*Kohut: “Horizontal” and “Vertical” Splitting*

Kohut (1971) referred to the repression barrier of Freud’s mental apparatus as a “horizontal split”. In the topographic model, the repression barrier was between the systems preconscious and unconscious; in the structural model, it was between the ego and the id. Kohut invoked the vertical split (Figure 1) to explain the defence of disavowal, a division in the structure of the ego or self that serves to keep perception and conception apart (Kohut, 1971).




Figure 1: Vertical split (according to Kohut, adapted from Siegel, 1996, p. 93)

According to Kohut (1971), the exhibitionistic demands of the grandiose self can be kept outside of awareness by either a vertical or horizontal split (Figure 2). These splits make the narcissistic energies attached to the grandiose self unavailable to the ego in its efforts to deal with reality. It is the disavowal of the vertical split which Kohut thinks makes it possible for the subject to both know and not know something and is responsible for the contradictions in thought and action that coexist in the same person.




Figure 2: Vertical split containing disavowed grandiosity (according to Kohut)

Kohut's (1971) solution to this problem is to gradually expose and integrate disavowed contents of the split-off sector (Figure 3). When this is done, the energy that previously was tied up maintaining the split is available to engage the elements of the grandiose self that lie below the horizontal split.




Figure 3: Healed vertical split integrating disavowed grandiosity (according to Kohut, adapted from Siegel, 1996, p. 95).

### *Grotstein's Synthesis*

According to Grotstein (1981), splitting includes perceptual, cognitive and defence mechanisms and is a universal experience. Defensive splitting always involves projective identification, and is most significant in the experience of confronting alienated aspects of self. While not always defensive, it is splitting which facilitates the ego in disavowing any connection with what has been split off. Splitting exists in a continuum from passive to active, beginning with primal splitting (self from other) through alienation, premature closure, splintering, fragmentation, withdrawal, isolation, reaction-formation, phobia-formation, idealisation, doing-undoing, disengagement and finally arbitrary separation of object from container. Thus, splitting (along with projective identification) is a common denominator of all psychodynamic defences.



### *Splitting as a Means of Deadening Experience*

In Grotstein's view, splitting is both a mental mechanism and a way of "experiencing *or not experiencing* experiences" (italics added). The experiencing of experience normally requires the separation or splitting of the object of experience from the background of experience, which depends on the ego's ability to distinguish figure from ground and then distinguish further subqualities of the object. According to Grotstein, this depends on the infant's acceptance of the act of primal splitting (birth separation). Once this is passively accepted, the infant can conduct perceptual and later cognitive splitting. In pathological cases, however, the same process can attack the linkages of the senses, interfere with common sense and undermine perception and thought. Normal splitting depends on a link to the object and is a "narcissistic luxury bequeathed by an empathic self-object" (Grotstein, 1981).

### *Splitting and Doubling*

Thus, splitting contains, filters, dilutes or diminishes experience to make the ability to exist in the world easier. Lifton (1986) argues that, under certain conditions, splitting can be extended to doubling, a more radical operation through which Lifton argues that one can organise an entire self-structure or self-process encompassing virtually all aspects of behaviour, which can be used to adapt to an environment or situation in which one is expected to commit evil, such as the Auschwitz environment discussed at length in Lifton's The Nazi Doctors. Lifton defines doubling as "the division of the self into two functioning whole, so that a part-self acts as an entire self." One noteworthy example is the doubling of a person into a prior self with worldly commitments, including love, and a second self characterised by hubris and obsession with supernatural power, such as Goethe's Faust:

Two souls, alas, reside within my breast  
And each withdraws from and repels its brother  
One with tenacious organs holds in love  
And clinging lust the world within its embraces.

The other strongly sweeps this dust above  
Into the higher ancestral places.

According to Lifton, doubling involves five characteristics. First, the two selves must be both autonomous and connected: to do evil but still continue to see the “prior-self” as a good person, one needs the double - the split-off self-structure or process - to function in a way that violates his or her morals, but also needs that prior self-structure or process (including its skills) to see as moral and good. Thus, the self-structure created by doubling is required to be both autonomous from and connected to the prior self from which it split-off, and doubling does not include the radical dissociation and sustained separateness of multiple personality. Second, and what causes splitting to lead to doubling, is that doubling is “holistic”: the self-structure associated with the double is coherently connected to environment in which it functions - to the doing of the evil for which it is created. Third, doubling has a life and death dimension: it is perceived (and presumably rationalised) as a form of self-preservation. Fourth, doubling enables the prior-self to avoid guilt NOT BY THE ELIMINATION OF CONSCIENCE, but by what Lifton calls the “transfer of conscience”: it is the autonomous double, not I, that does evil, not the “me”, the good self. Finally, doubling takes place at least partly outside of conscious awareness - in the unknown - and results in a significant change of moral consciousness.

Splitting is historically part of that universal experience that William James (1890) called “the divided self”). Bolton and Hill (1996) assign splitting a major role in the cognitive paradigm in psychological science and its post-empiricist underpinnings, particularly when trauma is too strong for denial. According to Bolton and Hill, threats to the core of a theory presupposed by action require defensive action. When denial becomes unsustainable, the human capacity for multiple representation creates two cognitive responses, one which does not include the trauma but retains the capacity for action, the other containing the trauma but split off. It is, according to Bolton and Hill, possible for

possible for split- off processes to intrude into the self's activity. Peck (1983) cites J.R.R.

Tolkien's (1965) Gollum as the best literary depiction:

Gollum was talking to himself. Sméagol was holding a debate with some other thought that used the same voice but made it squeak and hiss. A pale light and a green light alternated in his eyes as he spoke.

'Sméagol promised' said the first thought.

'Yes, yes my precious,' came the answer, 'we promised: to save our Precious, not to let Him have it - never. But it's going to Him, yes, nearer every step. What's the hobbit going to do with it, we wonders, yes we wonders.'

'I don't know. I can't help it. Master's got it. Sméagol promised to help the master.'

'Yes, yes, to help the master: the master of the Precious. But if we was master, then we could help ourselves, yes, and still keep promises.'

'But Sméagol said he would be very very good. Nice hobbit! He took cruel rope off Sméagol's leg. He speaks nicely to me.'

'Very very good, eh, my precious? Let's be good, good as fish, sweet one, but to ourselves. Not hurt the nice hobbit, of course, no, no.'

'But the Precious holds the promise,' the voice of Sméagol objected.

'Then take it,' said the other, 'and let's hold it ourselves! Then we shall be master, *gollum!* Make the other hobbit, the nasty suspicious hobbit, make him crawl, yes, *gollum!*'

'But not the nice hobbit?'

'Oh no, not if it doesn't please us. Still he's a Baggins, my precious, yes, a Baggins. A Baggins stole it. He found it and he said nothing, nothing. We hates Bagginses.'

'No, not this Baggins.'

'Yes, every Baggins. All peoples that keep the Precious. We must have it!'

'But He'll see, He'll know. He'll take it from us!'

'He sees. He knows. He heard us make silly promises - against His orders, yes. Must take it. The Wraiths are searching. Must take it.'

'Not for Him!'

'No, sweet one. See, my precious: if we has it, then we can escape, even from Him, eh? Perhaps we grows very strong, stronger than Wraiths. Lord Sméagol? Gollum the Great? *The Gollum!* Eat fish every day, three times a day, fresh from the Sea. Most Precious Gollum! Must have it. We wants it, we wants it, we wants it!'

'But there's two of them. They'll wake too quick and kill us,' whined Sméagol in a last effort. 'Not now, not yet.'

'We wants it! But' - and here was a long pause, as if a new thought had wakened. 'Not yet eh? Perhaps not. She might help. She might, yes.'

'No, no! Not that way!' wailed Sméagol.

'Yes, we wants it! We wants it!'

Each time that the second thought spoke, Gollum's long hand crept out slowly, pawing towards Frodo, and then was drawn back with a jerk as Sméagol spoke again. Finally both arms, with long fingers flexed and twitching, clawed towards his neck.

Lifton (1986) stresses that there are varieties of doubling. Some are more limited or harmonious than others are. Some prior selves can be more easily absorbed into a double. Since each double is created out of a prior self, styles vary depending on the prior self. Doubling can even include hope and future goals. The potential for an opposing self (and for evil) is necessary to the human psyche - loss of shadow or double means death (Neumann, 1949; Lifton, 1986; Jung, 1961). But it can include, according to Lifton, elements of "sociopathic" character impairment - swings between numbing and rage, avoidance of sense of guilt, and violent behaviour to overcome "masked depression" (related to repressed guilt and numbing) and maintain a sense of vitality. It is the means by which one invokes the criminal potential of the self - not by altering reality itself, but by altering the meaning of that reality. Evil is neither inherent nor foreign to the self. To live out doubling and call forth evil is a moral choice whatever the level of consciousness. Doubling contains an overall key to human evil (Lifton, 1986).

#### *Cognitive and Neurological Underpinnings of Splitting and Doubling*

The finding that the corpus callosum and the deep cerebral commissures uniting the left and right brain do not begin to function until three to four months, and do not complete development of their functioning until adolescence, may be the neurological basis of splitting. Grotstein states:

Inborn splitting may be a method for achieving anaesthesia of experience by keeping the two brain-minds from communicating with each other too quickly. Having two brain-minds to process data separately with a minimum of communication between them suggests that the impact of experience may be mitigated or deadened through a lack of depth or third dimensionality, so to speak. The slow coming together of the connections between the two brain-minds allows for a slow development of stereoscopic binocularization neurophysiologically, tantamount to the acquisition of the depressive position of separation-individuation with phenomenological reconciliation.

Cognitively, according to Power and Dalgleish (1997) in extreme cases, positive feedback between different levels of an emotional module can become so rigidly automated and

difficult to alter that the module becomes separate from the rest of the self. This will be the subject of the next chapter.

## Chapter 18: A Strawman Model of Malignant Narcissism within the Schematic, Propositional, Analogical and Associative Representation Systems (SPAARS)

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According to Peck (1983, p.124-125) fear is the most painful emotion, and malignant narcissists are driven by fear - fear that their pretence will be exposed to themselves or others. The literature on narcissistic rage (e.g. Kohut, 1972) would also seem to suggest a significant role for anger in the emotional life of malignant narcissists. Therefore a model of malignant narcissism based on 1) fear and 2) anger may be worth exploring.

### *The SPAARS Approach*

Schematic, Propositional, Analogical and Associative Representation Systems (SPAARS) is the first model of cognition and emotion to attempt to integrate theory and research on both normal and abnormal emotional experience within one model. All emotion, normal and pathological, is derived from five basic emotions (fear, sadness, anger, disgust and happiness), either alone or in combination, or as components along with social and cultural factors in more complex emotional states. Multiple levels (or formats) of information representation - four, as the name implies - provide maximum explanatory power for the role of information processing in emotion.

Rooted in Aristotelian functionalism, SPAARS proposes that emotions are best conceptualised in terms of their functions, which in turn are best understood in terms of the plans or goals which the person is pursuing (Power and Dalgleish, 1997). SPAARS holds that emotions can be generated in two ways through the above formats: in a controlled fashion through the schematic format, but also automatically via the associative format. SPAARS admits an important role for key life events in the vulnerability to development of

emotional disorders, but views this vulnerability as a function of the models, goals and appraisals of self, world and others, not the event per se.

### *The Analogical - Propositional Debate*

One of the central issues in cognitive psychology is whether or not all knowledge can be represented in propositional form. “Propositional” here refers to knowledge, thoughts and beliefs that can be represented in natural language. Theorists such as Pylyshyn (1973, cited in Power and Dalgleish, 1997) argue that all knowledge can be thus represented without loss of content. Theorists such as Paivio (1971, cited in Power and Dalgleish, 1997) disagree: the fact, say, that my car is parked in the garage can easily be communicated to me in natural language without loss of meaning, but can, say, all the emotions and nuances evoked by music or poetry be captured in the same way? Can the “electricity” one feels when listening to Beethoven or Led Zeppelin be evoked by merely reading lyrics? On this issue, SPAARS sides with theorists such as Paivio in arguing that non-propositional representations are useful and valid for describing emotional phenomena, contrary to theorists such as Pylyshyn who argue that propositional representation alone is sufficient (Power and Dalgleish, 1997).

Analogical representation provides structures to represent what cannot be represented in natural language, including visual, olfactory, gustatory, auditory, tactile and proprioceptive information. The prototype analogical representation is the picture. Like a picture, an image represented in memory bears an analogous relationship to a corresponding object in the real world. If one imagines, say, a building or person that one knows, the colours of the image in memory are the same as the colours of the real building, skin, hair and eyes, just as they are in a photograph; the parts stand in the same relationship to each other, have the same proportions, etc. Even smells, sounds or voices, taste, texture and other sensations associated with the real object can be included in the representation. Unlike



propositional representation, where grammar dictates combination, analogical representations have loose rules of combination.

### *Schematic and Associative Formats of Representation*

Among the various theoretical structures in the cognitive literature are Schank and Abelson's "Scripts" (Power and Dalgleish, 1997): schematic representations of an expected order and set of events that may happen in commonly encountered situations. Scripts help organise and process information, and are constructed by abstracting large amounts of propositional information into a schematic whole, which, like most wholes, is more than the sum of its parts. Schematic models - the third representation format included in SPAARS - make scripts more sophisticated by including analogical representation of information. This combines propositional representation with a structure that represents what cannot be expressed in natural language. SPAARS proposes that these schematic models are distributed across all "levels" of the psychological system, for example, "conscious" and "unconscious" levels: stored schematic models are retrieved from long-term memory and combined with analogical and propositional information to build a real-time model of the current situation. The relationships between schematic models and goals provide functionality.

Activation of these schematic models is one path to emotion in SPAARS. A second path is automatic (i.e. via memory retrieval that makes no demands on executive resources or attention - single step, direct access to past solutions from memory) through the last of the four SPAARS representation formats, the associative level of representation. It is widely recognised that some (by no means all) human information processing is via an associative cognitive architecture similar to the distributed network and parallel distributed processing (PDP) architectures popular in computer science (Power and Dalgleish, 1997). SPAARS contends that this format is most likely in low-level, automated emotion. Automatic

emotion generation represents a transition from algorithm-based to memory-based performance (Power and Dalgleish, 1997). SPAARS holds that some events lead to automatic emotion generation. Automatic emotions can conflict with schematic model generated emotions, other automatic emotions and rationalisations. The generation of emotion via schemata can, through repetition, gradually become automatic.

Memory accommodates all four formats, and information in one format can (and often does) contradict information contained in another format. Abstract models are represented at the schematic model level. Less abstract information is represented at the propositional level. Shapes, forms, sounds, smells and the like are represented at the analogical level.

### *States, Moods and Dispositions*

Emotional states are conceived of in SPAARS as typically comprising 1) an event, 2) interpretation, 3) appraisal, 4) physiological change, 5) propensity for action and 6) conscious awareness. Moods are states in which a particular appraisal is more likely, i.e. a person in an irritable (angry) mood is more likely to appraise an event in terms of anger than the same person when in a happy mood. Dispositions reflect a readiness to make particular appraisals; i.e. a quick-tempered person has a more or less permanent readiness to make anger appraisals. Emotional states may also include references to patterns of behaviour.

### *Goals*

Sounding more than a little like Wittgenstein, SPAARS regards goals as a “way of talking” about the temporal dimension of representations and plans. Information about goals is hierarchically organised. The pattern of one’s goal hierarchy reflects the pattern of one’s schematic model level information. Goals *can* be represented propositionally but can only be the subject of emotion-related appraisal at the schematic model level. Thus, one

advantage gained by an approach that has both a schematic model format that includes both propositional and analogical information and separate formats with only propositional and analogical formats is that reasoning can be carried out without generating emotion by being carried out at the propositional level. Naturally, while some goals may be compatible and even facilitatory, other can and often do contradict each other; these are said to have inhibitory relationships. Emotions are conceptualised as processes that configure and reconfigure the psychological system to resolve goal-related issues.

### *Interpretations, Appraisals and Cycles of Appraisals*

When the mind perceives an event in the world, the event is interpreted. Otherwise, the event remains a mere perception, which may as well be responded to in one way as another. An interpretation is an interaction between events, analogical representation where applicable, and propositional information. The relationship between the individual's goal structure and interpretation determines emotion.

An appraisal is the processing of an interpretation with respect to a goal. Although emotions are often distinguishable from each other on one or more components, SPAARS proposes that emotions can only be unambiguously distinguished from each other by the appraisal component. SPAARS accepts the hypothesis that universal appraisal scenarios are associated with given emotions. The universal appraisal scenario that corresponds with fear is a physical or social threat to the self; with anger, the perceived interruption or frustration of a goal by an antagonistic agent. According to SPAARS, additional levels or cycles of appraisal can and often do occur after the initial universal appraisal scenario. Each appraisal cycle provides a more sophisticated analysis of the event or interpretation. In the case of fear, for example, the appraisal of threat may be followed by appraisal of whether or not the threat can be avoided or how much time is there likely to be in which to act; in the case of anger, the appraisal "Joe frustrated my goal" may be followed by "in

order to spite me". The emotions generated can feed back into the process. Appraisals are carried out with respect to goals. Emotions can be generated without appraisal occurring at the same time as the event. The appraisal need only have occurred during the personal or species history.

### *Domains*


The above four formats are useful for conceptualising how information is represented in the mind. It is also useful to distinguish between domains of the world which are represented. In SPAARS, these domains are self, world and other. Forming interpretations of others' intentions involves representations of others' goal structures, so included in one's representation of others are representations of their goals. The self and other domains include shared goals. Appraisals are made in terms of the mind's contents, which, in SPAARS, are conceived as comprising models of the domains of self, world and other. The three domains can each be represented using the above four formats.

Overinvestment of resources in one domain is one path to emotional disorder (Power and Dalgleish, 1997). Recall that, according to Masterton (1993), healthy narcissism is distinguished from exhibitionistic and closet narcissistic disorders of the self through differences in intrapsychic structure: in normal narcissism, the grandiose self and omnipotent object have been brought into accord with reality, resulting in a self-representation which has separated from the object representation, had its grandiosity and omnipotence brought into accord with reality, and includes both positive and negative representations of the self; feelings of competence derive mostly from reality with some input from fantasy, and the individual is able to function autonomously. In the intrapsychic structure of pathological narcissism, a pathologically grandiose self-representation remains fused with an omnipotent object-representation. In the exhibitionistic case, the major emotional investment is in the false grandiose self, which is based on fantasy and intended

to defend against negative affect rather than deal with reality. This self is experienced as unique and admired. In the closet disorder, the major emotional investment is in the omnipotent object-representation, and the self is experienced as feeling unique or special through its relationship to the perfect other. If Masterton is right, presumably overt narcissists have an inappropriate and disproportionate investment of resources in the self domain at the expense of investment in the world and other domains, while closet narcissists have severe deficits in the self domain and excesses in the other domain.

### *Fear in SPAARS*

According to SPAARS, both the conscious and unconscious (or known and unknown) representations and processes of emotion may be organised in a modular and functional fashion. In other words, there may be a “fear module” that the system “calls” in order to deal with fear, an “anger module”, etc. A model of a fear module in SPAARS is presented in Figure 1.




**Figure 1: SPAARS Model of Fear**

Appraisals are made with respect to something. In the case of fear is, the something is a threat to the self, defined primarily in terms of valued roles or goals. During the first appraisal cycle, an event or interpretation is appraised as incompatible with the goal of avoiding narcissistic injury. The fear module then takes over and reconfigures the psychological system. Attention is biased in favour of the fear module, and in further cycles of appraisal a response is prepared that is designed to resolve the conflict - in this case to remove the treat. Normally, once the conflict is resolved, the fear module relinquishes control of the psychological system. It is possible, however, for the psychological system to get "locked" into a module that cannot or will not relinquish control. The hypothesis that malignant narcissists live their lives in fear therefore suggests that the psychological system has been permanently taken over by the fear module: the system is hypervigilantly tuned to detect potential narcissistic injury.

#### *Anger in SPAARS*

Anger usually involves a judgement of moral culpability. In the SPAARS model of anger (Figure 2), interruption (as opposed to threat, as in fear) of a current goal is appraised as the act of an antagonistic agent, perhaps with additional appraisals, such as that this could easily have been avoided. The violation of the subject's wishes or expectations is appraised as a personal offence, perhaps leading to a loss of personal pride or status; there is judgement of blame and attribution of cause and intent; the response, which is prepared in a state that heightens one's disposition to aggression, is intended to punish the offender and right the wrong.



**Figure 2: Two Paths to Anger in SPAARS**

Anger can be a perfectly appropriate response in many situations. Pathological anger involves being angry in the wrong way with respect to the context in which the event occurred, or out of proportion to the magnitude of the event. In most cases, inappropriate anger is self-correcting: the effects of one's inappropriate anger are detectable in the world and others, so that one realises one's overreactions. Narcissists, however, have characteristic defects in their representation of self, world and others. Their anger therefore may not be self-correcting.

Taken as a whole, the above analysis suggests that the emotional life of the subtype of malignant narcissists Peck calls "evil" may be largely explainable by an equation like "automatic fear + schematic anger". If, as Peck asserts, such people are driven by fear that their pretences will be exposed to themselves and others, fear should be automatically generated anytime a stimulus is perceived that exposure is possible; all that experience of an



emotion *requires* in SPAARS is awareness of the emotional state, not conscious awareness of the event or interpretation, nor action potential. The propensity of such people to narcissistic rage suggests that extreme anger should be generated in the face of threatened narcissistic injury. The generation of anger could, of course, also be automatic. Figure 2 shows the two routes to anger in SPAARS.

Emotion biases the system in favour of information congruent with that emotion. Recall that, according to Davidson, at least one particular kind of self-deception is accomplished in something like this fashion: the subject is confronted with evidence that a certain proposition may be true; not wishing to tolerate the narcissistic injury that its truth would entail, he or she at least seeks to avoid evidence that lends support to the proposition, and possibly seeks evidence that argues against the proposition (which may have to be manufactured). We saw evidence *of a kind* for this type of self-deception in Sereny's biography of Albert Speer and Solzhenitsyn's accounts from the Gulag Archipelago - something arguably *approaching* what Matthews and Deary (1998) call "upward vertical validation" - real-life phenomena that relate in at least partially predictable ways to the construct seeking validation: for example, Speer and others regulating emotion by avoiding certain (as opposed to ambiguous) knowledge concerning the fate of the Jews or slave labourers "correlates" or corresponds well to Davidson's model of self-deception. Finding such a cognitive structure underpinning malignant narcissism would add some of what Matthew and Deary call "downward vertical validation".

### *Splitting and Possibilities for Self-Deception in SPAARS*

It has been argued in this thesis that the dichotomy known/unknown is better than the dichotomy conscious/unconscious, and that splitting, not repression, may be *the* central or primary self-deceptive defence mechanism. According to SPAARS, the highest goal of the psychological system is to preserve the current configuration of dominant schematic

models. According to Grotstein (1981) splitting leads to different selves that have different agendas and scenarios. If both are correct, the highest goal of one self could conflict with the highest goal of another self.

Can one self keep information from another self? The question is complicated by the fact mentioned earlier that the term "self" has at least seven different definitions in psychology. Inhibition in SPAARS can occur not just between conscious and unconscious systems but between different formats of representation. For example, reasoning being carried out at the propositional level of representation can inhibit emotion. It is awareness of the schematic model level that provides feelings. SPAARS asserts that one can be unaware of one's interpretations and appraisals. Since these interpretations and appraisals are what constitute emotional experience, one can be unaware of one's emotions. Further, one can be conscious of one interpretation but not another, contradictory one. The same event can be appraised consciously as one emotion and unconsciously as another. Thus, a picture begins to emerge at least of a self that is capable of deceiving itself concerning the full, emotional implications of its actions by the use of the propositional level. Perhaps inhibition is also possible between different selves.

## Chapter 19: Is Evil a Real?

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Is evil something “out there”, in nature, that exists in-and-of itself (an object), or is it merely a social construct that depends on one’s subjective perspective? What one society or ideology considers good is often seen as evil in another. That the number and definitions of personality disorders changes from one version of the DSM to the next seems to suggest that the categories into which we group personality pathology depend on how we arrange the data - meaning not that personality disorders do not exist, but that even our best models are only the best available, socially agreed upon approximations of something far too complex to ever be perfectly understood, not the *ding an sich*. Peck’s (1983) evil personality would then be just one of these socially sanctioned categories, not evil *qua* evil, which could either exist or not exist. Changes to the DSM, however, like changes in society, are based on new evidence and experience that is consensually validated by a community. We have defined evil as “militant ignorance” - extermination of the evidence against what one wishes to believe. Is extermination of the evidence a natural or social kind? It is often said that evil is “live” spelled backwards - it is that which destroys life (Peck, 1983). C.S. Lewis (1997) pointed out that we use the same word, “life”, to describe both biological life, which he called *bios*, and spiritual life, which he called *zoe*. Does militant ignorance abolish life in both or either of these senses, bios and/or zoe?

One possible answer is given by Stein (1995), who argues that evil is an “essential adjective” - a category of human thought that we cannot do without. Without an “ego” or centre of consciousness that judges events “good” or “evil”, there is only raw fact - a chain of causal events called in Buddhism “the Nidhanachain” whose consequences - suffering, ageing, death - have no a priori value (Jung, in Stein, 1995). Therefore, the dichotomy of good - evil presupposes the existence and perspective of an ego. The germ carrying a deadly disease is a natural kind; we call the germ “evil” because it may kill us. Are we evil

from the germ's perspective because we try to eradicate the germ? Evil is a judgement made from a particular perspective; it is not a natural kind - not a product of nature - but humans cannot function *qua* human without using this category of thought. There are various possible typologies of categories; but unless a typology includes this category, what we regard as essential for humanness cannot exist.

### *Methodological Individualism and Holism*

Arguments against methodological individualism might be cited to support Stein's view. One of the central questions in the philosophy of the social sciences is whether to understand social groups "from the bottom up" or "from the top down". Methodological Individualists, such as the economist Friedrich Hayek, Karl Popper and J.W.N Watkins, contend that large scale social phenomena must be accounted for by the situations, dispositions and beliefs of individuals (Watkins, 1952). Otherwise, one is forced to think of the group almost as an organism, with purposes and goals of its own. Methodological Holists, such as L. de Bonald and August Comte, object that the unintended consequences of individual behaviour are not always what the Methodological Individualist would expect (Lukes, 1970). The Holist points to seminal works in sociology, such as Durkheim's (1897) Suicide, which directly contradict Methodological Individualism. On the Holistic view, social laws must be regarded as applying to the whole, and are not derivable from individuals (Watkins, 1952).

An individualistic account of meaning is difficult to defend. The trouble for the methodological individualist begins with David Hume (1711-1776), in the form of what is often called the "circularity problem". An empiricist in the tradition of Bacon, Newton and Locke, Hume assumed that humans were rational, calculating and self-interested, and that they were endowed with sympathy, as understood by the physical analogy of resonating waves. In contrast to Nietzsche (Nietzsche, 1973, §32) who asserts that throughout most

of human history the value (morality) of an action was derived from its consequences, or Hume's friend Adam Smith, who believed that individuals acting in their own self-interest were inevitably "lead by an invisible hand" to benefit society, Hume insisted that we demand that our actions derive from proper motives, to which these actions point:

"Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produced them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. The external performance has no merit. We must look within to find the moral quality. This we cannot do directly; and therefore fix our attention on actions, as on external signs. But these actions are still considered as signs; and the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the motive, that produc'd them (Hume, 1969)."

Clearly, if the merit of a virtuous action comes from a virtuous motive, it is circular reasoning to contend that the original virtuous motive was a regard for the virtue of that action:

"For 'tis a plain fallacy to say, that a virtuous motive is requisite to render an action honest, and at the same time that a regard to the honesty is the motive of the action (Hume, 1969).

Arguing in this fashion, Hume's thoroughly destructive book A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-1740) challenged two of our most cherished assumptions: the causal nexus by which a past event necessitates a future event, and the inductive inferential nexus, whereby "all previous Xs have been Ys, therefore the next X shall be a Y." Hume concluded that human *convention* or *custom* is the source of all our inductive inferences, including many of those things we deem to be virtues, such as justice:

“From all this it follows, that we have no real or universal motive for observing the laws of equity, but the very equity and merit of that observance; and as no action can be equitable or meritorious, where it cannot arise from some separate motive, there is here an evident sophistry and reasoning in a circle. Unless, therefore, we will allow, that nature has establish’d a sophistry, and render’d it necessary and unavoidable, we must allow, that the sense of justice and injustice is not deriv’d from nature, but arises artificially, tho’ necessarily from education, and human conventions” (Hume, 1969).

Hume often stressed that he merely analysed common sense and did not oppose it (Hume, 1969, Kripke, 1982), and that he wished not to leave us with the difficulties he had revealed, but to remedy them. Hume’s remedy was “artifice” or custom. Nonetheless, Hume’s assault on established systems was so revolutionary, uncompromising and successful that Isaiah Berlin has said of him “No man has influenced the history of philosophy to a deeper and more disturbing degree” (Hume, 1969). Naturally, this made him enemies. Hume attracted the wrath of many people, often on the grounds that he had contradicted Holy Scripture or church doctrine. One Leipzig publication even called him “a new free- thinker” whose “evil intentions are sufficiently betrayed in the subtitle of his work” (“Being An Attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into Moral Subjects”, Hume, 1969). To his credit, Hume remained by all accounts a cheerful and amiable man throughout his life, in spite of the harshness of his critics, who referred to Hume’s Treatise as a “monster” and refused to treat it as worthy of serious study until well after Hume’s death (Hume, 1969). Bertrand Russell wrote a short story in which there is a particularly painful chamber in Hell for philosophers who have refuted Hume (Hume, 1969).

As Kripke (1982) observes, there are strong analogies between the scepticism of Hume and that of Wittgenstein. Both question nexuses from past to future: Hume the nexus by which

a past event *causes* a future event and the inductive inferential nexus, Wittgenstein the nexus from past “intentions” or “meaning” to present practice. Just as Hume insisted that he did not doubt our common beliefs, so Wittgenstein declared “philosophy only states what everyone admits” (Kripke, 1982, p.63). Most important, neither intended to leave the disturbing problem they had discovered unsolved. Both intended to solve it, but solve it with a sceptical solution. Solve it they did, but if Kripke is correct, in the process they destroyed the individualist account of meaning.

Kripke develops the Wittgensteinian Paradox, which he views as the central problem of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, by a dramatic device: he asks us to suppose that “68+57” is an addition we have never performed before; in fact, it is hypothetically, larger than any addition we have hitherto performed. We confidently arrive at the sum of 125. Enter a very strange man - call him “Kripkenstein” - who questions the certainty of this answer. In particular, Kripkenstein suggests that perhaps in the past we used “plus” and “+” to mean a function “quus”, which by definition returns “x+y” for all x and y less than 57, but returns 5 otherwise. Therefore, the correct answer is five. We have misinterpreted our previous usage (Kripke, 1982, p. 7-9).

Nobody doubts that this hypothesis is false, but if Kripkenstein asks us to produce some fact - either internal to our minds or in the external world - about our previous usage that refutes it, we will find ourselves unable to do so. Kripke proceeds to exhaustively list and refute all philosophical theories one might offer to counter Kripkenstein’s argument, to no avail. One may protest that, in adding, one does not merely extrapolate a table of results from a finite number of examples of addition; one uses a *rule* or *algorithm* - an internalised set of instructions - for addition. It goes something like this: take one pile containing x items, another pile containing y items, put them together, count the number of items. The result is x+y. But Kripkenstein can easily counter that in the past, when we said “count”



we really meant “quount” where to “quount” was defined as to count the pile in the ordinary way unless it contains more than 57 items, in which case the value is five (Kripke, 15-16). If someone suggests that we appeal to a more basic rule, Kripkenstein can repeat his non-standard interpretations until we are left with a rule that is not reduced to a more basic rule (Kripke, 17). Various dispositional analyses fail to provide the justification we seek (Kripke, 22-37). Appeals to simplicity turn out to be based on misunderstanding the problem we are dealing with, the role of simplicity considerations, or both (Kripke, 38). Arguments that appeal to introspective experience are shown to be irrelevant (Kripke, 41-54). Platonism evades the problem of how our finite minds can give rules that apply to infinitely many cases (Kripke, 1982, p.54).

Apparently, Kripkenstein has shown that we make an unjustified leap in the dark each time we make a new application of plus. In fact, since the sceptical problem applies to all meaningful uses of language, meaning itself appears to have been destroyed. Can this be so? If we attribute meaning to the individual, I am afraid it is. If meaning is social, no such conclusion follows.

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) is remarkable for having developed two of the most influential philosophies of the twentieth century, the second of which logically refuted the first. A key difference between the earlier and later Wittgenstein is the replacement of *truth conditions* in Tractatus Logico Philosophicus by justification conditions in Philosophical Investigations. The received interpretation of the theory of the Tractatus is that each sentence corresponds to a possible fact in the world. If the fact obtains in the world, the sentence is true, if not, the sentence is false. For atomic sentences, this correspondence is an *isomorphism* or single correspondence: *names* correspond to *objects*. An atomic sentence itself is a fact that places names in a particular relationship, and states that the

corresponding objects in the world have the same relationship. Declarative sentences derive their meaning from truth conditions (Kripke, 1982, p.71-72).

According to the theory of the Investigations, not truth conditions but justification conditions provide the basis for meaningful assertion. Where the Tractatus asked “what must be the case in order for this sentence to be true” the Investigations asked “under what conditions can this form of words be asserted or denied” and “what is the role and utility in our lives of asserting or denying the form of words under these conditions?” According to Wittgenstein, without a role in our lives, such an assertion or denial is meaningless. Similar to Berkeley’s claim that belief in matter and objects outside the mind is the consequence of an erroneous metaphysical interpretation of discourse, Wittgenstein’s claim in sections 183-193 of the Investigations is that any notion that the concept of meaning requires that we be able to produce some fact - some truth condition that determines its meaning - arises from a mistaken idea that we must find an individualist account of meaning (Kripke, 1982, p. 64-66), There is no fact, in either the external or internal world, that determines in advance the meaning of a term we wish to use. But no such fact is required for justification unless we restrict our view to an isolated individual. Within any linguistic community, other members of the community will have justification conditions for accepting the meaning of any putative terms. All that is required are roughly specifiable conditions under which they are legitimately assertable, and that the “language game” (to use Wittgenstein’s term) of asserting them under such conditions has a role in our lives (Kripke, 1982, p. 77-78). This solution is analogous to Hume’s solution to his inductive sceptical problem: custom, not a priori argument, is what justifies our inductive inferences.

Therefore one cannot speak of an isolated individual as meaning anything by any words, and as in Wittgenstein’s famous phrase, whereof one cannot speak, one must be silent (Wittgenstein, 1922). According to this analysis, meaning is social. If we insist on

Methodological Individualism, we are following the theory of the Tractatus. Truth conditions are the essence of meaningful assertions, and we must produce the fact that the monster Kripkenstein has asked for, or admit that he has destroyed meaning. This is intolerable: it implies that any use or definition of any word is just as good as any other use or definition, and anyone can interpret anything anyway at all. On the other hand, if we hold to Methodological Holism, the essence of meaning lies in justification conditions. We have what we need for meaning: conditions under which an assertion is made and a role for it in our language game. Since roles and conditions involve reference to a community, the day belongs to the Methodological Holists.

Kripke's influential account has not gone unchallenged. Bolton and Hill (1996) charge that Kripke ignores practical constraints. If Kripkenstein used his calculation to plan how much gasoline he needed to cross a desert, he would soon find out he is wrong. What is missing from Kripke's account is the fact that reality also passes judgement on our judgements. Our judgements are validated by both the collective and non-social reality. Now suppose that, in addition to his non-standard interpretations, Kripkenstein also has an enormous amount of power. Such people, who need *neither* facts in the outside world to prove their non-standard interpretations *nor* communal validation of their interpretation, have actually existed. Fromm (1965) called them "malignant narcissists":

"A particular instance of narcissism which lies on the borderline between sanity and insanity can be found in some men who have reached an extraordinary degree of power. The Egyptian pharaohs, the Roman Caesars, the Borgias, Hitler, Stalin, Trujillo - they all show certain similar features. They have attained absolute power; their word is the ultimate judgement of everything, including life and death; there seems to be no limit to their capacity to do what they want. They are gods, limited only by illness, age and death. They try to find a solution to the problem of human existence by the desperate attempt to

transcend the limitation of human existence. They try to pretend that there is no limit to their lust and to their power, so they sleep with countless women, they kill numberless men, they build castles everywhere, they “want the moon”, they “want the impossible”. This is madness, even though it is an attempt to solve the problem of existence by pretending that one is not human. It is a madness which tends to grow in the lifetime of the afflicted person. The more he tries to be god, the more he isolates himself from the human race; this isolation makes him more frightened, everybody become his enemy, and in order to stand the resulting fright he has to increase his power, his ruthlessness and his narcissism. This Caesarian madness would be nothing but plain insanity were it not for one factor: by his power Caesar has bent reality to his narcissistic fantasies. He has forced everybody to agree that he is god, the most powerful and the wisest of men - hence his own megalomania seems to be a reasonable feeling. On the other hand, many will hate him, try to overthrow and kill him - hence his pathological suspicions are also backed by a nucleus of reality. As a result he does not feel disconnected from reality - hence he can keep a modicum of sanity, even though in a precarious state.”

All of which goes to vindicate the Scottish Sceptic, who emphasised all along that while what he called “artificial” virtues are not “natural” in the sense of being derived from nature but based on human convention, this does not mean that they are arbitrary:

“To avoid giving offence, I must here observe, that when I deny justice to be a natural virtue, I make use of the word natural, only as oppos’d to artificial. In another sense of the word; as no principle of the human mind is more natural than a sense of virtue; so no virtue is more natural than justice. Mankind is an inventive species; and where an invention is obvious and absolutely necessary, it may as properly be said to be natural as any thing that proceeds immediately from original principles; without the intervention of thought or reflection. Tho’ the rules of justice be artificial, they are not arbitrary. Nor is the

expression improper to call them Laws of Nature; if by natural we understand what is common to any species, or even if we confine it to mean what is inseparable from the species” (Hume, 1969).

Conventions must be accepted as required for society, or, as Wittgenstein said, what must be accepted is “forms of life” or language games. When we consider the evidence, we must conclude that social groups must be understood “from the top down”. Hume’s artificial virtues, the Wittgensteinian Paradox and Barnes’ reification of social life, not to mention the evidence of Durkheim and so many others, demonstrate that Methodological Individualism is untenable, and Methodological Holism wins by default. Even in the natural sciences, the view that scientific judgement is community-based has gained widespread acceptance. This is what Thomas Kuhn (1970) said in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

If the foregoing analysis is correct, in order to have not just *bios* but *zoe* - meaningful life, and any society whatever - we must have what Hume called “conventions” and Wittgenstein called “language games” or “forms of life”. These, however, have always either bowed to changing reality or perished with their societies. Ancient Egypt could not change with a changing world - and so it no longer exists. Evil - militant ignorance - extermination of the evidence - abolishes new life. Over time, this is the same as abolishing all life. If we define evil as that which destroys life, militant ignorance must be evil.

All new knowledge is generated by acknowledging our ignorance and limitation, considering evidence that *may* contradict established categories, and, on occasion, changing those categories; had we *never accepted any* scientific paradigms in the past, no science would ever have left the pre-paradigm phase; but had we *exterminated the evidence*

against past scientific paradigms - say, Newtonian mechanics or Ptolemyan astronomy - the modern edifices of quantum mechanics or Copernican astronomy would never have been built; and if we now exterminate any evidence that contradicts our current hard-won knowledge, scientific progress must stop. We do not know how to cure cancer; if we hope to cure it, we must be willing to accommodate new information that makes no promises to conform to what we know so far.

Similarly, if we exterminate any evidence that reveals the inadequacy of our own ideology or social structure, then nothing can discredit that ideology or change that social structure. But the world changes. Individuals and societies alike that insist that reality conform to a pre-defined ideology - which refuse to make even essential changes - cannot survive. And no individual or society lives forever. So evil - militant ignorance - extermination of the evidence - if allowed to continue unabated - abolishes life itself. If evil has its way, there will be no future life. Even life that exists now will not be worth living. We know what life with militant ignorance is like: one description of it is available from Alexander Solzhenitsyn and 227 other survivors (Solzhenitsyn, 1973). One might therefore say, with Stein, that since evil as a thought category is absolutely necessary for life, evil is a *necessary* social kind; or, with Hume, that such a necessity "may as properly be said to be natural as any thing that proceeds immediately from original principles". But one can also say, with Chesterton, that the strongest saints and sceptics alike have both taken the existence of evil as the starting point of their arguments (Chesterton, 1908). If one can take pleasure in skinning a cat, either one can deny that God exists, or deny that there is a present union between man and God, but to deny the reality of evil is like denying the cat. Therefore, evil is real.



## Chapter 20: Conclusion

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As was said in Chapter 1, according to Kuhn (1970), a field of study does not become scientific until a group of specialists come to agreement about basic issues and pursue its study as a community. Prior to such agreements, data collection will usually be restricted to whatever is accessible without unified efforts, specially designed equipment and theoretical reasons for looking in particular places, and will tend to produce a mass of facts that may as well all be considered equally important. The kind of detailed knowledge about specific instances such as has enabled medical science to heal some diseases has come only through scientific investigation. According to Peck (1983), the only legitimate reason for studying evil is to try to heal it when we can, or at least learn more about how it might be healed in specific cases in the future when we cannot. Pre-paradigm work on narcissism in philosophy, literature, religion and science all points to the conclusion that evil has *something* to do with pathological narcissism. Presumably the only way to learn *exactly what* in specific cases and how to heal or prevent the disease in those specific instances is to study it scientifically.

The variant of the narcissistic personality disorder proposed by Peck (1983, p.129, see also Chapter 1), if it exists, is only one specific instance. If this personality disorder is distinct from any currently recognised disorder (notably the DSM-IV antisocial and narcissistic personality disorders), then how persons with this personality disorder might be healed may differ in important ways from how persons with other personality disorders might be healed, if indeed healing is possible. As has been said in Chapter 1, the disorder might be called “malignant narcissism” in order to avoid the loaded term “evil”. Klose (1995) insists that Peck’s analysis works at the collective as well as at the individual level. People of the Lie (Peck, 1983) calls for research into group evil as well. Assuming that the model could be shown to hold at the group level, which is not the task of this thesis, at the



group level, we might be more inclined to use the term “evil”. Few would dispute that when people are psychologically numbed to enable them to commit mass murders, and the evidence is then covered up, that evil has occurred.

After the cognitive experiment, it seems that individual differences in the ability to tolerate narcissistic injury exist. Is a variant of malignant narcissism distinguishable from the psychopath by self-deception also possible? According to cognitive theory (Bolton and Hill, 1996; Power and Dalgleish, 1997) mechanisms such as splitting, multiple representation and dissociation may make it possible. Consider the literary depiction of the disorder cited by Peck, J.R.R. Tolkien’s character “Gollum”. In The Lord of the Rings (Tolkien, 1965), it is Gollum’s misfortune to come into contact with the Ring of Power long lost by the Evil Lord Sauron. The attraction of the Ring (power) is too strong for Gollum to resist: he obtains it by murdering his friend Déagol. The murder torments Gollum’s conscience, so he assuages himself using words:

Gollum is a liar, and you have to sift his words. For instance, he called the ring his ‘birthday present’, and he stuck to that. He said it came from his grandmother, who had lots of beautiful things of that kind. A ridiculous story. I have no doubt that Sméagol’s grandmother was a matriarch, a great person in her way, but to talk of her possessing many elven-rings was absurd, and as for giving them away, it was a lie. But a lie with a grain of truth.

“The murder of Déagol haunted Gollum, and he had made up a defence, repeating it to his “precious” over and over again, as he gnawed bones in the dark, until he almost believed it. It was his birthday. Déagol ought to have given the ring to him. It had obviously turned up just so as to be a present. It was his birthday present, and so on, and on (Tolkien, 1965).

Note that Gollum/Sméagol only almost believes his self-deception. The crucial point is not that he succeeds in getting himself to believe what he knows is false, but rather that he diminishes his capacity to feel guilt for the murder, and hence distorts the meaning of the murder. This is perfectly in line with the post-empiricist cognitive processes that form the basis of the current cognitive paradigm.

Inability to feel leads directly to lack of empathy. In this condition, according to Solzhenitsyn, one lives all the more intensely in the “lower sphere” where, apart from hunger and sex, greed for money and especially greed for power are the two strongest instincts:

Power is a poison well known for thousands of years. If only no one were ever to achieve material power over others! But to the human being who has faith in some force that holds dominion over all of us, and who is therefore conscious of his own limitations, power is not necessarily fatal. For those, however, who are unaware of any higher sphere, it is a deadly poison. For them there is no antidote (Solzhenitsyn, 1973).

### *Can Gollum Be Healed?*

Peck (1983) urges that we should not be too quick to judge people with the personality disorder represented by Gollum. Things might easily have turned out otherwise, with anyone else who happened to encounter the ring when Gollum did in Gollum’s shoes, and Gollum in the role of one of those whom he hurt. Gollum was not evil before he succumbed to the lure of power, which was simply too strong for him to resist. He came from a family of high social standing, of which he was the most inquisitive and curious member, with a keen interest in roots and beginnings; had he not encountered the Ring, might he not have become an academic? We have already seen a historical incident that is quite similar: Sereny (1996) points out that it was only through a series of unlikely coincidences that Albert Speer became Hitler’s architect and later defence minister. Had things turned out otherwise, Speer was probably headed for a quiet career as a professor of mathematics, and would not have committed the crimes he did. More importantly, had someone else encountered the temptation of power, he or she might have suffered Gollum’s fate – or Speer’s. Sereny (1996) attributes Speer’s personality largely to the fact that he was raised in a materially comfortable but loveless environment. Von Franz (1974) says that there are two errors into which we can fall with regard to human evil. One is to deny any responsibility at all on the part of the individual who commits evil; the other is to

ascribe full responsibility to the individual as if he or she existed independent of the rest of us. A portion of anyone's evil is always "group shadow".

Even when we focus on the individual, we have little ground to feel superior. According to Peck (1983), an individual's evil can almost always be traced to his or her childhood, and genetics may be a causal or predisposing factor (p.126). Even if evil people bear some responsibility for their condition, they have also been most unfortunate and deserve compassion. A crucial theme in The Lord of the Rings is the hope for a cure for Gollum. In response to those who lament Bilbo Baggins' having had pity on Gollum and spared his life, the wise wizard Gandalf says:

Many that live deserve death. And some that die deserve life. Can you give it to them? Then do not be too eager to deal out death in judgement. For even the very wise cannot see all ends. I have not much hope that Gollum can be cured before he dies, but there is a chance of it. And he is bound up with the fate of the Ring. My heart tells me that he has some part to play yet, for good or ill, before the end; and when that comes, the pity of Bilbo may rule the fate of many - yours not least.

If we exist not as separate individuals but in relation to others, we would be wise to beware not only that our lives may have turned out differently (and still may) but that our fate may be intimately connected with the fate of those whom we judge to be evil, and in unpredictable ways. Stalin endured brutal treatment from his father as a child (Bullock, 1991; Tucker, 1974). When Stalin rose to power, Solzhenitsyn and millions of others then endured evil while imprisoned in Soviet concentration camps. In Solzhenitsyn's case, he was imprisoned for criticising Stalin in a private letter to a friend. Solzhenitsyn, however, offers the same warning as Peck and Gandalf:

And just so we don't go around flaunting too proudly the white mantle of the just, let everyone ask himself: "If my life had turned out differently might I myself not have become just such an executioner?"

It is a dreadful question if one really answers it honestly (Solzhenitsyn, 1973, p.160).

Solzhenitsyn does ask himself the question honestly. He painfully concludes that it is only because of the way his life turned out that he was an inmate in the camps rather than one of the brutal guards, and only because of the way their lives turned out that his tormentors had become monsters:

Confronted by the pit into which we are about to toss those who have done us harm, we halt, stricken dumb: it is after all only because of the way things worked out that they were the executioners and we weren't (Solzhenitsyn, 1973).

Is it possible to heal an evil personality? Tolkien (1965), who Peck (1983) credited with knowing more about evil than any psychiatrist, evidently thought it was unlikely but not impossible:

...Even Gollum was not wholly ruined. He had proved tougher than even one of the Wise would have guessed - as a hobbit might. There was a little corner of his mind that was still his own, and light came through it, as through a chink in the dark: light out of the past. It was actually pleasant, I think, to hear a kindly voice again, bringing up memories of wind, and trees, and sun on the grass, and such forgotten things.

"But that, of course, would only make the evil part of him angrier in the end - unless it could be conquered. Unless it could be cured". Gandalf sighed. "Alas! there is little hope of that for him. Yet not no hope. No, not though he possessed the ring so long, almost as far back as he can remember. For it was long since he had worn it much: in the black darkness it was seldom needed. Certainly he had never "faded". He is thin and tough still. But the thing was eating up his mind, of course, and the torment had become almost unbearable.

"All the "great secrets" under the mountain had turned out to be just empty night: there was nothing more to find out, nothing worth doing, only nasty furtive eating and resentful remembering. He was altogether wretched. He hated the dark, and he hated the light more: he hated everything, and the ring most of all.

When Gollum comes out from under the mountain (to search for the ring, which he loses to Bilbo Baggins) and is captured (Narcissus-like, while absorbed looking at his reflection in a lake!) his life is spared again in hope for a cure. Fearing that keeping him in dungeons under the earth would cause him to fall back into dark thoughts, he is treated kindly and kept in the most pleasant circumstances possible. Isolation is one of the behaviours that tends to invite evil in mythology (von Franz, 1974). Thus, mythology seems to suggest

that contact with others may be a *sine qua non* for healing, but is not sufficient. Perhaps empathic contact with others is most effective as preventive medicine, to reduce the chances of onset of the disease.

Gollum uses words to deceive himself as a defence against negative affect. Love of language was one of the clinical characteristics of narcissism cited in Chapter 2 (e.g. Jones, 1972/1913). Language can mis-communicate as well as communicate. For example, Wittgenstein (1922, 1953) warned that the structure of our language may deceive us into accepting invalid assumptions about the nature of ultimate reality, which makes no promises to be perfectly represented by the words that reflect our mental processes. Watts (1957) gives the following illustration: since in the west our languages are structured in terms of nouns and their predicates, we are accustomed to thinking of a fist as an object or thing, not as an action. Yet when one opens one's fist, the object has disappeared. Since in Chinese the same word does double duty as both a noun and a verb, the Chinese are as likely to think of a fist as an action as a thing. The assumption that a fist is an object, not an action, is embedded in our language.

Sabotage of verbal labels is another linguistic phenomenon cited in the psychological literature as one way of keeping knowledge of something inarticulate, vague and largely out of awareness (Badcock, 1994). Lifton (1986) cites language as crucial to the deceptive and self-deceptive tactics used by the Nazis to facilitate genocide. In one instance, a review of 10,000 Nazi documents found the word "killing" used only once, and that in relation to dogs. There were other, more utilitarian words, such as "The Final Solution" for genocide, which could distort the meaning of what was being done so as to lessen the impact on the conscience of those who carried out the murders. These examples could be multiplied at will. We need language to think, but we can use the same tool for self-deceptive affect regulation. It may be that the love of language Jones noted in his

narcissistic patients was a love of a device for constructing reality so as to fit their narcissistic fantasies. This suggests that research on the use of language in affect regulation may shed some light on the issue.

While language and splitting aid Gollum in his self-deceptions, however, it is power which leads to his destruction. Cognitive interventions may be of considerable use in treating language-related and other cognitive aspects of pathological narcissism. Schema-focused therapy (Young and Flanagan, 1998) has been specifically recommended as providing strategic techniques for changing the cognitive and behavioural patterns of pathological narcissism and character disorders over and above earlier cognitive therapies that were effective against depression. It seems unlikely that these techniques would be effective in treating the problem of an unsubmitted will. Solzhenitsyn's observations during his eight years in Stalin's concentration camps led him to the conclusion that there may be a point of no return (Solzhenitsyn, 1973):

Evidently evildoing also has a threshold magnitude. Yes, a human being hesitates and bobs back and forth between good and evil all his life. He slips, falls back, clambers up, repents, things begin to darken again. But just so long as the threshold of evildoing is not crossed, the possibility of returning remains, and he himself is still within reach of our hope. But when, through the density of evil actions, the result either of their own extreme degree or the absoluteness of his power, he suddenly crosses that threshold, he has left humanity behind, and without, perhaps, the possibility of return.

Note again the reference to power. Solzhenitsyn (1973) marks how perfectly bureaucrats perpetrating evil in the Soviet Gulag system resembled Tolstoy's character Ivan Illyich (Tolstoy, 1960). For Ivan Illyich, power as a high official and the possibilities of using it mercifully were the chief attractions of his position. As we have already seen, however, for those with an unsubmitted will this is fatal, and according to Solzhenitsyn, for them there is no antidote. If there is no antidote for some people, and those people can be identified, much evil might be prevented by following the recommendations of those



organisational psychologists (Chapter 1) who have urged that highly narcissistic persons should be excluded from positions of power.

The most pessimistic prognosis seems to be for healing an unsubmitted will. Cognitive psychology may have some useful tools for addressing some aspects of evil personalities, especially in countering distorted communication and self-deception. There may also be preventative measures we can take to reduce the likelihood of evil developing in the first place, such as screening vulnerable personalities out of positions where they are likely to succumb to power. We seem to be confronted with Dostoevsky's (Chapter 1) superadded interest of interests. This insistence on acting as one wants, regardless of the cost, seems to be manifested by many alcoholics. It is also manifested by ideological fanatics, as in the dismissal of legal and ethical issues which, because they were deemed inconvenient for the quickest possible construction of a communist society, were dismissed as "The Faculty of Useless Knowledge" by Marxist-Leninist ideologues in the Soviet Union (Dombrovsky, 1996). This illustrates the role of ideology in self-deception. Numerous illustrations can be found in Solzhenitsyn (1973) who comments in regard to ideology, self-deception and evil:

To do evil a human being must first of all believe that what he is doing is good, or else that it's a well considered act in conformity with natural law. Fortunately, it is in the nature of the human being to seek a *justification* for his actions.

The imagination and the spiritual strength of Shakespeare's evildoers stopped short at a dozen corpses. Because they had no ideology.

Ideology - that is what gives evildoing its long-sought justification and determination. That is the social theory which helps to make his acts seem good instead of bad in his own and other's eyes, so that he won't hear reproaches and curses but will receive praise and honours. That was how the agents of the Inquisition fortified their wills: by invoking Christianity; the conquerors of foreign lands, by extolling the grandeur of their motherland; the colonisers, by civilisation; the Nazis, by race; and the Jacobins (early and late) by equality, brotherhood, and the happiness of future generations.

Thanks to ideology, the twentieth century was fated to experience evildoing on a scale calculated in the millions" (Solzhenitsyn, 1973).



Much more work would be needed for construct validation of Peck's (1983) proposed personality disorder, but it seems to be on solid psychometric, cognitive and theoretical ground. Psychometrically, we know that will to power is a major aspect of narcissism, and that narcissism plays a role in psychopathology. An enormous amount of research effort is currently invested in the psychometric structure of abnormal personality, and it seems clear that narcissism has a role to play. From the cognitive experiment, we know that certain personality traits are associated with the rejection of disconfirming feedback. It seems clear that neuroticism is a factor, and we know that neuroticism interacts with narcissism. Peck (1983) believes the people he calls 'evil' are driven by fear. The correlations from the cognitive experiment provide a starting point for detailed investigation of personality and response to disconfirming feedback. Brewin (in Bolton and Hill, 1996) calls Bolton and Hill's (1996) project a "scientific project of categorising and describing meaning with respect to psychiatric disorders". If Brewer and Power (1997) are right we cannot learn how to help people in psychological therapies without studying meaning, and Peck (1983) is right that it is in the struggle against evil that life has its meaning, we cannot avoid studying the problem of evil and still hope for improved results from psychotherapy. Self-deception is a theoretical possibility, at least in terms of deceiving oneself as to the meaning of one's actions. The value free status of science is currently a major issue in the sociology of scientific knowledge. The time may be right, or not far off, for pursuing the scientific study of evil. We are certainly living at a time when several strands of research that would have to be included are being actively pursued.

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## **Appendix 1**

### **Questionnaire Used in Psychometric Study**



# NEO FIVE FACTOR INVENTORY

## FORM S

PAUL T. COSTA, JR., PHD., AND ROBERT R. MCCRAE, PHD.

### Instructions:

Carefully read all of the instructions before beginning. This questionnaire contains 60 statements. Read each statement carefully. For each statement **circle the response** that best represents your opinion.

Circle SD if you *strongly disagree* or the statement is **definitely false**.

Circle D if you *disagree* or the statement is **mostly false**.

Circle N if you are *neutral* on the statement, you **cannot decide** or the statement is about **equally true or false**.

Circle A if you *agree* or the statement is **mostly true**.

Circle SA if you *strongly agree* or the statement is **definitely true**.

For example, if you strongly disagree, or believe that a statement is definitely false, you should circle the SD for that statement.

SD   D   N   A   SA

Fill in only one response for each statement.

Respond to all of the statements, making sure that you fill in the correct response.

If you need to change an answer, make an 'X' through the incorrect response and then circle in the correct response.

# NEO FIVE FACTOR INVENTORY

STATEMENT	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. I am not a worrier.	SD	D	N	A	SA
2. I like to have a lot of people around me.	SD	D	N	A	SA
3. I don't like to waste my time daydreaming.	SD	D	N	A	SA
4. I try to be courteous to everyone I meet.	SD	D	N	A	SA
5. I keep my belongings clean and neat.	SD	D	N	A	SA
6. I often feel inferior to others.	SD	D	N	A	SA
7. I laugh easily.	SD	D	N	A	SA
8. Once I find the right way to do something, I stick to it.	SD	D	N	A	SA
9. I often get into arguments with my family and co-workers.	SD	D	N	A	SA
10. I'm pretty good about pacing myself so as to get things done on time.	SD	D	N	A	SA
11. When I'm under a great deal of stress, sometimes I feel like I'm going to pieces.	SD	D	N	A	SA
12. I don't consider myself especially "light-hearted".	SD	D	N	A	SA
13. I am intrigued by the patterns I find in art and nature.	SD	D	N	A	SA
14. Some people think I'm selfish and egotistical.	SD	D	N	A	SA
15. I am not a very methodical person.	SD	D	N	A	SA
16. I rarely feel lonely or blue.	SD	D	N	A	SA
17. I really enjoy talking to people.	SD	D	N	A	SA
18. I believe letting students hear controversial speakers can only confuse and mislead them.	SD	D	N	A	SA
19. I would rather co-operate with others than compete with them.	SD	D	N	A	SA
20. I try to perform all the tasks assigned to me conscientiously.	SD	D	N	A	SA
21. I often feel tense and jittery.	SD	D	N	A	SA
22. I like to be where the action is.	SD	D	N	A	SA
23. Poetry has little or no effect on me.	SD	D	N	A	SA
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

PAR Psychological Assessment Resources Inc.

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2 \_\_\_\_\_  
Decision Making Survey/Confidential  
NEO «Rec\_Num»

# NEO FIVE FACTOR INVENTORY

STATEMENT	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
24. I tend to be cynical and sceptical of other's intentions.	SD	D	N	A	SA
25. I have a clear set of goals and work toward them in an orderly fashion.	SD	D	N	A	SA
26. Sometimes I feel completely worthless.	SD	D	N	A	SA
27. I usually prefer to do things alone.	SD	D	N	A	SA
28. I often try new and foreign foods.	SD	D	N	A	SA
29. I believe that most people will take advantage of you if you let them.	SD	D	N	A	SA
30. I waste a lot of time before settling down to work.	SD	D	N	A	SA
31. I rarely feel fearful or anxious.	SD	D	N	A	SA
32. I often feel I'm bursting with energy.	SD	D	N	A	SA
33. I seldom notice the moods or feelings that different environments produce.	SD	D	N	A	SA
34. Most people I know like me.	SD	D	N	A	SA
35. I work hard to accomplish my goals.	SD	D	N	A	SA
36. I often get angry at the way people treat me.	SD	D	N	A	SA
37. I am cheerful, high-spirited person.	SD	D	N	A	SA
38. I believe we should look to our religious authorities for decisions on moral issues.	SD	D	N	A	SA
39. Some people think of me as cold and calculating.	SD	D	N	A	SA
40. When I make a commitment, I can always be counted on to follow through.	SD	D	N	A	SA
41. Too often, when things go wrong, I get discouraged and feel like giving up.	SD	D	N	A	SA
42. I am not a cheerful optimist.	SD	D	N	A	SA
43. Sometimes when I am reading poetry or looking at a work of art, I feel a chill or wave of excitement.	SD	D	N	A	SA
44. I'm hard headed and tough-minded in my attitudes.	SD	D	N	A	SA
45. Sometimes I'm not as dependable or reliable as I should be.	SD	D	N	A	SA
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

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# NEO FIVE FACTOR INVENTORY

STATEMENT	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
46. I am seldom sad or depressed.	SD	D	N	A	SA
47. My life is fast paced.	SD	D	N	A	SA
48. I have little interest in speculating on the nature of the universe or the human condition.	SD	D	N	A	SA
49. I generally try to be thoughtful and considerate.	SD	D	N	A	SA
50. I am a productive person who always gets the job done.	SD	D	N	A	SA
51. I often feel hopeless and want someone else to solve my problems.	SD	D	N	A	SA
52. I am a very active person.	SD	D	N	A	SA
53. I have a lot of intellectual curiosity.	SD	D	N	A	SA
54. If I don't like people, I let them know.	SD	D	N	A	SA
55. I never seem to be able to get organised.	SD	D	N	A	SA
56. At times I have been so ashamed I just wanted to hide	SD	D	N	A	SA
57. I would rather go my own way than be a leader of others.	SD	D	N	A	SA
58. I often enjoy playing with theories or abstract ideas	SD	D	N	A	SA
59. If necessary, I am willing to manipulate people to get what I want.	SD	D	N	A	SA
60. I strive for excellence in everything I do.	SD	D	N	A	SA
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree

Have you responded to all of the statements?    Yes        No      
 Have you responded accurately and honestly?    Yes        No   

**Thank you for completing the questionnaire.**

**Please check that you have answered all of the questions.**

**May we once again stress that the information which you have given will be treated in the strictest confidence.**

## Personality Dimensions Questionnaire – 4+ (PDQ-4+)

The purpose of this questionnaire is for you to describe the kind of person you are. When answering the questions, think about how you have tended to feel, think and act over the past several years. To remind you of this, on the top of each page you will find the statement “Over the past several years...”

T (True) means that the statement is generally true for you.

F (False) means that the statement is generally false for you.

Even if you are not entirely sure about the answer, indicate “T” or “F” for every question.

For example, for the question

xx. I tend to be stubborn T F

If, in fact you have been stubborn over the last several years, you would answer True by circling T.

If, this was not true at all for you, you would answer False by circling F.

There are no correct answers.

You may take as much time as you wish.

---

### Over the last several years...

- |  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
| 1. I avoid working with others who may criticise me.                                     | T | F |
| 2. I can't make decisions without the advice, or reassurance, of others.                 | T | F |
| 3. I often get lost in details and lose sight of the “big picture”.                      | T | F |
| 4. I need to be the centre of attention.   | T | F |
| 5. I have accomplished far more than others give me credit for.                          | T | F |
| 6. I'll go to extremes to prevent those who I love from ever leaving me.                 | T | F |
| 7. Others have complained that I do not keep up with my work or commitments              | T | F |
| 8. I've been in trouble with the law several times (or would have been if I was caught). | T | F |
| 9. Spending time with my family or friends just doesn't interest me.                     | T | F |
| 10. I get special messages from things happening around me.                              | T | F |
| 11. I know that people will take advantage of me if I let them.                          | T | F |
| 12. Sometimes I get upset.   | T | F |
| 13. I make friends with people only when I am sure they like me.                         | T | F |
| 14. I am usually depressed.  | T | F |
| 15. I prefer that other people assume responsibility for me.                             | T | F |

**Over the last several years...**

- |   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
| 16. I waste time trying to make things too perfect.                                     | T | F |
| 17. I am "sexier" than most people.   | T | F |
| 18. I often find myself thinking about how great a person I am, or will be.             | T | F |
| 19. I either love someone or hate them, with nothing in between.                        | T | F |
| 20. I get into a lot of physical fights.  | T | F |
| 21. I feel that others don't understand or appreciate me.                               | T | F |
| 22. I would rather do things by myself than with other people.                          | T | F |
| 23. I have the ability to know that some things will happen before they actually do.    | T | F |
| 24. I often wonder whether the people I know can really be trusted.                     | T | F |
| 25. Occasionally I talk about people behind their backs.                                | T | F |
| 26. I am inhibited in my intimate relationships because I am afraid of being ridiculed. | T | F |
| 27. I fear losing the support of others if I disagree with them.                        | T | F |
| 28. I suffer from low self-esteem.  | T | F |
| 29. I put my work ahead of being with my family or friends or having fun.               | T | F |
| 30. I show my emotions easily.  | T | F |
| 31. Only certain special people can really appreciate and understand me.                | T | F |
| 32. I often wonder who I really am.   | T | F |
| 33. I have difficulty paying bills because I don't stay at any one job too long.        | T | F |
| 34. Sex just doesn't interest me.   | T | F |
| 35. Others consider me moody and "hot tempered".  | T | F |
| 36. I can often sense, or feel things, that others can't.                               | T | F |
| 38. There are some people I don't like.   | T | F |
| 39. I am more sensitive to criticism and rejection than most people.                    | T | F |
| 40. I find it difficult to start something if I have to do it by myself.                | T | F |
| 41. I have a higher sense of morality than other people.                                | T | F |
| 42. I am my own worst critic.   | T | F |
| 43. I use my "looks" to get the attention that I need.                                  | T | F |

**Over the last several years...**

- |  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
| 44. I need very much for other people to take notice of me or compliment me.                     | T | F |
| 45. I have tried to hurt or kill myself.   | T | F |
| 46. I do a lot of things without considering the consequences.                                   | T | F |
| 47. There are few activities that I have any interest in.  | T | F |
| 48. People often have difficulty understanding what I say.                                       | T | F |
| 49. I object to supervisors telling me how I should do my job.                                   | T | F |
| 50. I keep alert to figure out the real meaning of what people are saying.                       | T | F |
| 51. I have never told a lie.   | T | F |
| 52. I am afraid to meet new people because I feel inadequate.                                    | T | F |
| 53. I want people to like me so much that I volunteer to do things I'd rather not do.            | T | F |
| 54. I have accumulated lots of things I don't need that I can't bear to throw out.               | T | F |
| 55. Even though I talk a lot, people say that I have trouble getting to the point.               | T | F |
| 56. I worry a lot.   | T | F |
| 57. I expect other people to do favours for me even though I do not usually do favours for them. | T | F |
| 58. I am a very moody person.  | T | F |
| 59. Lying comes easily to me and I often do it.  | T | F |
| 60. I am not interested in having close friends.   | T | F |
| 61. I am often on guard against being taken advantage of.  | T | F |
| 62. I never forget, or forgive, those who do me wrong.   | T | F |
| 63. I resent those who have more "luck" than I.  | T | F |
| 64. A nuclear war may not be such a bad idea.  | T | F |
| 65. When alone I feel helpless and unable to care for myself.                                    | T | F |
| 66. If others can't do things correctly I would prefer to do them myself.                        | T | F |
| 67. I have a flair for the dramatic.   | T | F |
| 68. Some people think that I take advantage of others.   | T | F |
| 69. I feel that my life is dull and meaningless.   | T | F |
| 70. I am critical of others.   | T | F |



**Over the last several years...**

- |  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
| 71. I don't care what others have to say about me.   | T | F |
| 72. I have difficulties relating to others in a one-to-one situation.                            | T | F |
| 73. People have often complained that I did not realise that they were upset.                    | T | F |
| 74. By looking at me, people might think that I'm pretty odd, eccentric or weird.                | T | F |
| 75. I enjoy doing risky things.  | T | F |
| 76. I have lied a lot on this questionnaire.   | T | F |
| 77. I complain a lot about my hardships.   | T | F |
| 78. I have difficulty controlling my anger, or temper.   | T | F |
| 79. Some people are jealous of me.   | T | F |
| 80. I am easily influenced by others.  | T | F |
| 81. I see myself as thrifty but others see me as being cheap.                                    | T | F |
| 82. When a close relationship ends, I need to get involved with someone else immediately.        | T | F |
| 83. I suffer from low self-esteem.   | T | F |
| 84. I am a pessimist.  | T | F |
| 85. I waste no time in getting back at people who insult me.                                     | T | F |
| 86. Being around other people makes me nervous.  | T | F |
| 87. In new situations I fear being embarrassed.  | T | F |
| 88. I am terrified of being left to care for myself.   | T | F |
| 89. People complain that I'm "stubborn as a mule".   | T | F |
| 90. I take relationships more seriously than do those who I'm involved with.                     | T | F |
| 91. I can be nasty with someone one minute then find myself apologising to them the next minute. | T | F |
| 92. Others consider me to be stuck up.   | T | F |
| 93. When stressed, things happen. Like I get paranoid or just "black out".                       | T | F |
| 94. I don't care if others get hurt so long as I get what I want.                                | T | F |
| 95. I keep my distance from others.  | T | F |
| 96. I often wonder whether my wife (husband, girlfriend or boyfriend) has been unfaithful to me. | T | F |

**Over the last several years...**

97. I often feel guilty. T      F
98. I have done things on impulse (such as those listed below) that can get me into trouble. T      F

*Check all that apply to you.*

- a. Spending more money than I have. \_\_\_\_\_
- b. Having sex with people I hardly know. \_\_\_\_\_
- c. Drinking to much. \_\_\_\_\_
- d. Taking drugs. \_\_\_\_\_
- e. Eating binges. \_\_\_\_\_
- f. Reckless driving. \_\_\_\_\_

99. When I was a kid (before age 15) I was somewhat of a juvenile delinquent, doing some of the things below. T      F

*Check all that apply to you.*

- (1) I was considered a bully..... \_\_\_\_\_
- (2) I used to start fights with other kids..... \_\_\_\_\_
- (3) I used a weapon in fights that I had..... \_\_\_\_\_
- (4) I robbed or mugged other people..... \_\_\_\_\_
- (5) I was physically cruel to other people..... \_\_\_\_\_
- (6) I was physically cruel to animals..... \_\_\_\_\_
- (7) I forced someone to have sex with me..... \_\_\_\_\_
- (8) I lied a lot..... \_\_\_\_\_
- (9) I stayed out at night without my parents permission..... \_\_\_\_\_
- (10) I stole things from others..... \_\_\_\_\_
- (11) I set fires..... \_\_\_\_\_
- (12) I broke windows or destroyed property..... \_\_\_\_\_
- (13) I ran away from home overnight more than once..... \_\_\_\_\_
- (14) I began skipping school, a lot, before age 13..... \_\_\_\_\_
- (15) I broke into someone's house, building or car..... \_\_\_\_\_

## Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI)

Instructions: In each of the following pairs of attitudes, choose the one that you MOST AGREE with. Mark your answer by writing EITHER A OR B in the space provided. Only mark one answer for each pair, and please DO NOT skip any items.

- \_\_\_\_\_ 1. A I have a natural talent for influencing people.  
B I am not good at influencing people.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 2. A Modesty doesn't become me.  
B I am essentially a modest person.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 3. A I would do almost anything on a dare.  
B I tend to be a fairly cautious person.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 4. A When people compliment me I sometimes get embarrassed.  
B I know that I am good because everybody keeps telling me so.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 5. A The thought of ruling the world frightens the hell out of me.  
B If I ruled the world it would be a better place.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 6. A I can usually talk my way out of anything.  
B I try to accept the consequences of my behaviour.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 7. A I prefer to blend in with the crowd.  
B I like to be the centre of attention.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 8. A I will be a success.  
B I am not too concerned about success.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 9. A I am no better or no worse than most people.  
B I think I am a special person.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 10. A I am not sure if I would make a good leader.  
B I see myself as a good leader.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 11. A I am assertive.  
B I wish I were more assertive.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 12. A I like having authority over other people.  
B I don't mind following orders.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 13. A I find it easy to manipulate people.  
B I don't like it when I find myself manipulating other people.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 14. A I insist upon getting the respect that is due me.  
B I usually get the respect that I deserve.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 15. A I don't particularly like to show off my body.  
B I like to show off my body.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 16. A I can read people like a book.  
B People are sometimes hard to understand.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 17. A If I feel competent I am willing to take responsibility for making decisions.  
B I like to take responsibility for making decisions.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 18. A I just want to be reasonably happy.

B I want to amount to something in the eyes of the world.

- \_\_\_\_\_ 19. A My body is nothing special.  
B I like to look at my body.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 20. A I try not to be a showoff.  
B I will usually show off if I get the chance.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 21. A I always know what I am doing.  
B Sometimes I am not sure of what I am doing.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 22. A I sometimes depend on people to get things done.  
B I rarely depend on anyone else to get things done.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 23. A Sometimes I tell good stories.  
B Everybody likes to hear my stories.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 24. A I expect a great deal from other people.  
B I like to do things for other people.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 25. A I will never be satisfied until I get all that I deserve.  
B I take my satisfactions as they come.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 26. A Compliments embarrass me.  
B I like to be complimented.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 27. A I have a strong will to power.  
B Power for its own sake doesn't interest me.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 28. A I don't care about new fads and fashions.  
B I like to start new fads and fashions.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 29. A I like to look at myself in the mirror.  
B I am not particularly interested in looking at myself in the mirror.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 30. A I really like to be the centre of attention.  
B It makes me uncomfortable to be the centre of attention.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 31. A I can live my life anyway I want to.  
B People can't always live their lives in terms of what they want.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 32. A Being an authority doesn't mean that much to me.  
B People always seem to recognise my authority.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 33. A I would prefer to be a leader.  
B It makes little difference to me whether I am a leader or not.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 34. A I am going to be a great person.  
B I hope I am going to be successful.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 35. A People sometimes believe what I tell them.  
B I can make anybody believe anything I want them to.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 36. A I am a born leader.  
B Leadership is a quality that takes a long time to develop.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 37. A I wish someone would someday write my biography.  
B I don't like people to pry into my life for any reason.

- \_\_\_\_\_ 38. A I get upset when people don't notice how I look when I go out in public.  
B I don't mind blending into the crowd when I go out in public.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 39. A I am more capable than other people.  
B There is alot that I can learn from other people.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 40. A I am much like everybody else.  
B I am an extraordinary person.
- 

### Pseudoautonomy Scale (PA)

Which of these statements describes how you feel most of the time ? Circle ONLY ONE response for each question.

1. a. I don't have to cheat to get what I want.  
b. Many times, I have to cheat to get what I want.
2. a. I do what I want.  
b. Most always, I follow the law.
3. a. I don't have to use my anger to get what I want.  
b. I use my anger to get what I want.
4. a. Sometimes, I ask advice from other people.  
b. I run my own life.
5. a. I am usually careful about what I do.  
b. Many times I do things on a dare.
6. a. I get respect by being tough.  
b. People seem to like me.
7. a. Many times, I like adults to offer me help.  
b. Adults stick their noses into what is my business.
8. a. I can depend on others to treat me fairly.  
b. Many times, I have to take what I need.

## Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR)

Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how true it is.

+	+	+	+	+	+	+
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
not true			somewhat		very true	

1. \_\_\_\_ My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.
2. \_\_\_\_ It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.
3. \_\_\_\_ I don't care to know what other people really think of me.
4. \_\_\_\_ I have not always been honest with myself.
5. \_\_\_\_ I always know why I like things.
6. \_\_\_\_ When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.
7. \_\_\_\_ Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.
8. \_\_\_\_ I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.
9. \_\_\_\_ I am fully in control of my own fate.
10. \_\_\_\_ It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.
11. \_\_\_\_ I never regret my decisions.
12. \_\_\_\_ I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough.
13. \_\_\_\_ The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.
14. \_\_\_\_ My parents were not always fair when they punished me.
15. \_\_\_\_ I am a completely rational person.
16. \_\_\_\_ I rarely appreciate criticism.
17. \_\_\_\_ I am very confident of my judgements.
18. \_\_\_\_ I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.
19. \_\_\_\_ It's all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.
20. \_\_\_\_ I don't always know the reasons why I do the things I do.
21. \_\_\_\_ I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
22. \_\_\_\_ I never cover up my mistakes.
23. \_\_\_\_ There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.
24. \_\_\_\_ I never swear.
25. \_\_\_\_ I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
26. \_\_\_\_ I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.
27. \_\_\_\_ I have said something bad about a friend behind his/her back.
28. \_\_\_\_ When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.
29. \_\_\_\_ I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.
30. \_\_\_\_ I always declare everything at customs.
31. \_\_\_\_ When I was young I sometimes stole things.
32. \_\_\_\_ I have never dropped litter on the street.
33. \_\_\_\_ I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.
34. \_\_\_\_ I never read sexy books or magazines.
35. \_\_\_\_ I have done things that I don't tell other people about.
36. \_\_\_\_ I never take things that don't belong to me.
37. \_\_\_\_ I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick.
38. \_\_\_\_ I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.
39. \_\_\_\_ I have some pretty awful habits.
40. \_\_\_\_ I don't gossip about other people's business.
41. \_\_\_\_ I sometimes feel irritated when I don't get my own way.
42. \_\_\_\_ I could never enjoy being cruel.
43. \_\_\_\_ Seeing any attractive person of the opposite sex makes me think about sex.
44. \_\_\_\_ I have never felt joy over someone else's failure.
45. \_\_\_\_ I have gotten so angry at a friend that I felt like hitting him(her).
46. \_\_\_\_ I have never felt like I wanted to kill someone.
47. \_\_\_\_ There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
48. \_\_\_\_ I never enjoy watching sexy scenes in movies.

49. \_\_\_\_\_ I enjoy it when obnoxious people get put down.
50. \_\_\_\_\_ I rarely have sexual fantasies.
51. \_\_\_\_\_ Once in a while I think of things too bad to talk about.
52. \_\_\_\_\_ I have never wanted to rape or be raped by someone.
53. \_\_\_\_\_ More than once it felt good when I heard on the news that someone had been killed.
54. \_\_\_\_\_ I can't think of anyone I hate deeply.
55. \_\_\_\_\_ There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things.
56. \_\_\_\_\_ Few of the things I do are simply for my own gain.
57. \_\_\_\_\_ I must admit that revenge can be sweet.
58. \_\_\_\_\_ I never get jealous over the good fortune of others.
59. \_\_\_\_\_ There have been times when I felt like rebelling against authorities, even though I knew they were right.
60. \_\_\_\_\_ I have never done anything that I'm ashamed of.

### Shame Proneness Scale (SP)

Directions: Following are ten statements that reflect various ways you may or may not feel about yourself. Read each statement one at a time and circle the number at the right that corresponds to your answer according to the following scale.

Strongly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Slightly Disagree	Slightly Agree	Moderately Agree	Strongly Agree
1	2	3	4	5	6
1. When I fail at something, I feel as if all eyes are on me.					1 2 3 4 5 6
2. I am afraid that if I fail at something, others will reject me.					1 2 3 4 5 6
3. I often feel disgraced.					1 2 3 4 5 6
4. I think that my nose (or some other part of my body) just doesn't look right.					1 2 3 4 5 6
5. I rarely express myself in groups for fear that others will laugh at me.					1 2 3 4 5 6
6. I feel ashamed even when I make a minor mistake.					1 2 3 4 5 6
7. When I feel ashamed, I want to run and hide.					1 2 3 4 5 6
8. When I say or do something stupid, I wish the earth would open up and swallow me.					1 2 3 4 5 6
9. My parents often made me feel ashamed.					1 2 3 4 5 6
10. I'm always worried that others will think that I am dumb.					1 2 3 4 5 6



### Affect Intensity Measure (AIM)

The following questions refer to the emotional reactions to typical life events. Please indicate how YOU react to these events by placing a number from the following scale in the blank space preceding each item. Please base your answer on how YOU react, *not* on how you think others react or how you think a person should react.

	ALMOST NEVER	NEVER	OCCASIONALLY	USUALLY	ALMOST ALWAYS	ALWAYS
	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. When I accomplish something difficult I feel delighted or elated.	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. When I feel happy it is a strong type of exuberance.	1	2	3	4	5	6
3. I enjoy being with other people very much.	1	2	3	4	5	6
4. I feel pretty bad when I tell a lie.	1	2	3	4	5	6
5. When I solve a small personal problem, I feel euphoric.	1	2	3	4	5	6
6. My emotions tend to be more intense than those of most people.	1	2	3	4	5	6
7. My happy moods are so strong that I feel like I'm "in heaven".	1	2	3	4	5	6
8. I get overly enthusiastic.	1	2	3	4	5	6
9. If I complete a task I thought was impossible, I am ecstatic.	1	2	3	4	5	6
10. My heart races at the anticipation of some exciting event.	1	2	3	4	5	6
11. Sad movies deeply touch me.	1	2	3	4	5	6
12. When I'm happy it's a feeling of being untroubled and content rather than being zestful and aroused.	1	2	3	4	5	6
13. When I talk in front of a group for the first time my voice gets shaky and my heart races.	1	2	3	4	5	6
14. When something good happens, I am usually much more jubilant than others.	1	2	3	4	5	6
15. My friends might say I'm emotional.	1	2	3	4	5	6
16. The memories I like the most are those of times when I felt content and peaceful rather than zestful and enthusiastic.	1	2	3	4	5	6
17. The sight of someone who is hurt badly affects me strongly.	1	2	3	4	5	6
18. When I', feeling well it's easy for me to go from being in a good mood to being really joyful.	1	2	3	4	5	6
19. "Calm and Cool" could easily describe me.	1	2	3	4	5	6
20. When I'm happy I feel like I'm bursting with joy.	1	2	3	4	5	6
21. Seeing a picture of some violent car accident in a newspaper makes me feel sick to my stomach.	1	2	3	4	5	6
22. When I'm happy I feel very energetic.	1	2	3	4	5	6
23. When I receive an award I become overjoyed.	1	2	3	4	5	6
24. When I succeed at something, my reaction is calm contentment.	1	2	3	4	5	6
25. When I do something wrong I have strong feelings of shame and guilt.	1	2	3	4	5	6
26. I can remain calm even on the most trying days.	1	2	3	4	5	6
27. When things are going good I feel "on top of the world."	1	2	3	4	5	6
28. When I get angry its easy for me to still be rational and not overreact.	1	2	3	4	5	6
29. When I know I have done something very well, I feel relaxed and content rather than excited and related.	1	2	3	4	5	6
30. When I do feel anxiety it is normally very strong.	1	2	3	4	5	6
31. My negative moods are mild in intensity.	1	2	3	4	5	6
32. When I am excited over something I want to share my feelings with everyone.	1	2	3	4	5	6
33. When I feel happiness, it is a quiet type of contentment.	1	2	3	4	5	6
34. My friends would probably say I'm a tense or "high-strung" person.	1	2	3	4	5	6
35. When I'm happy I bubble over with energy.	1	2	3	4	5	6
36. When I feel guilty, this emotion is quite strong.	1	2	3	4	5	6

## Sensitivity to Criticism Scale (SCS)

Please try to imagine yourself in the following situations. On a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing no perception of criticism or hurt and 7 representing extreme perception of criticism or hurt, please answer the following two questions, in that order, in the space provided.

To what extent do you perceive this as a criticism? To what extent are you hurt by this situation?

A friend says:

**1. "Do you shower every day?"**

To what extent do you perceive this as a criticism? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
To what extent are you hurt by this situation? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

**2. "I can't stand to be with you anymore."**

To what extent do you perceive this as a criticism? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
To what extent are you hurt by this situation? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

**3. "You sure made a fool of yourself last night."**

To what extent do you perceive this as a criticism? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
To what extent are you hurt by this situation? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

**4. "That colour sweater sure doesn't suit you."**

To what extent do you perceive this as a criticism? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
To what extent are you hurt by this situation? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

**5. "Have you considered going on a diet?"**

To what extent do you perceive this as a criticism? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
To what extent are you hurt by this situation? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

**6. "Have you considered seeing a counsellor?"**

To what extent do you perceive this as a criticism? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
To what extent are you hurt by this situation? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

**7. "Have you noticed that your friends tend to be losers?"**

To what extent do you perceive this as a criticism? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
To what extent are you hurt by this situation? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

**8. "You're really stupid."**

To what extent do you perceive this as a criticism? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
To what extent are you hurt by this situation? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

**9. "You're a lot more fun after a couple of drinks."**

To what extent do you perceive this as a criticism? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
To what extent are you hurt by this situation? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

**10. "Is that the way you wanted your hair to look?"**

To what extent do you perceive this as a criticism? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
To what extent are you hurt by this situation? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7



8. When people are especially nice to me, I wonder what they want.

1 2 3 4 5

### Splitting Index (SI)

This questionnaire contains a series of statements you might use to describe your opinions, attitudes or feelings. Please read each statement and decide how much you agree with it. Rate each statement on a scale from 1 to 5. A 1 means that you strongly disagree with the statement. A 5 means that you strongly agree with the statement. Use the other numbers to demonstrate different "degrees" along this dimension. For example, a 3 (Neutral) would mean that you neither agree nor disagree with the statement.

1. \_\_\_\_ I feel different about myself when I am with different people.
2. \_\_\_\_ My mother has faults, but I have never doubted her love for me.
3. \_\_\_\_ Being able to keep friends is one of my strong points.
4. \_\_\_\_ My parents always took care of my needs.
5. \_\_\_\_ My feelings about myself shift dramatically.
6. \_\_\_\_ It is impossible to love my parents all the time.
7. \_\_\_\_ The different parts of my personality are difficult to put together.
8. \_\_\_\_ My feelings about my mother change from day to day.
9. \_\_\_\_ My parents did the best they could for me.
10. \_\_\_\_ I have doubts about my closest friends.
11. \_\_\_\_ Sometimes I am not sure who I am.
12. \_\_\_\_ My feelings about myself are very powerful, but they change from one moment to the next.
13. \_\_\_\_ My friendships are almost always satisfying.
14. \_\_\_\_ My feelings about myself do not change easily.
15. \_\_\_\_ I have had many long-lasting friendships.
16. \_\_\_\_ I sometimes feel "pulled apart" by my feelings about myself.
17. \_\_\_\_ My relationship with my family is solid.
18. \_\_\_\_ My feelings toward those close to me remain constant.
19. \_\_\_\_ I have always been aware that my close friends really cared for me.
20. \_\_\_\_ My opinions of my friends rarely change.
21. \_\_\_\_ I almost always feel good about those close to me.
22. \_\_\_\_ I have extremely mixed feelings about my mother.
23. \_\_\_\_ My family was often hurtful to me.
24. \_\_\_\_ Who I am depends on how I am feeling.







## Appendix 2: Correlation Matrices by Gender

**Table 1: Narcissism in the Five Factor Model (Males)**

	N	E	E <sup>1</sup>	O	A	C	C <sup>2</sup>
NPI Total	-.28***	.42***	.36***	.19*	-.42***	-.04	-.11
Exploiteness/ Entitlement	-.07	.21**	.20**	.05	-.49***	-.10	-.12
Leadership/ Authority	-.29***	.42***	.35***	.20**	-.33***	.02	-.05
Superiority/ Arrogance	-.32***	.31***	.23**	.13	-.32***	-.03	-.10
Self-Sufficiency/ Self-Admiration	-.20**	.26***	.20**	.16*	-.15*	.06	.02
Exploiteness	-.16*	.28***	.24**	.11	-.38***	-.08	-.12
Entitlement	-.04	.06	.05	.03	-.53***	-.11	-.12
Exhibitionism	-.05	.43***	.44***	.14	-.25**	-.19*	-.24**
Authority	-.31***	.38***	.30***	.17*	-.34***	.06	-.01
Superiority	-.16*	.25**	.20**	.22**	-.13	.02	-.02
Sufficiency	-.34***	.13	.02	.11	-.10	.18*	.13
Vanity	-.14	.32***	.29***	.07	-.10	-.02	-.07
Pseudo- autonomy	-.02	.00	-.00	.15*	-.39***	-.31***	-.32***
Shame Proneness	.61***	-.16*	.07	-.11	-.17*	-.16*	-.07
PDQ-4+ NPD	.08	.08	.10	.08	-.40***	-.17*	-.17*

N=174

\* =  $p < .05$

\*\* =  $p < .01$

\*\*\* =  $p < .001$

<sup>1</sup> Controlling for Neuroticism, N = 170.

<sup>2</sup> Controlling for Neuroticism and Extraversion, N = 169.

**Table 2: Narcissism in the Five Factor Model (Females)**

	N	E	E <sup>3</sup>	O	A	C	C <sup>4</sup>
NPI Total	-.14	.33***	.31***	.23**	-.22**	.17	.12
Exploiteness/ Entitlement	.11	.09	.16	.07	-.39***	.08	.10
Leadership/ Authority	-.17*	.32***	.29***	.16*	-.16*	.17*	.11
Superiority/ Arrogance	-.16*	.26**	.22**	.14	-.12	.08	.03
Self-Sufficiency/ Self-Admiration	-.17	.23*	.19*	.26**	-.07	.12	.05
Exploiteness	.05	.14	.19*	.10	-.24**	-.09	-.10
Entitlement	.10	.05	.10	.10	-.28***	.18*	.21*
Exhibitionism	-.00	.35***	.40***	.14	-.20*	-.03	-.07
Authority	-.23**	.29***	.21**	.13	-.19*	.24**	.18*
Superiority	-.08	.20*	.24**	.30***	.05	.06	.01
Sufficiency	-.27***	.20*	.10	.21**	-.04	.26**	.20*
Vanity	-.09	.10	.09	.07	-.02	.06	.03
Pseudo- autonomy	.11	.14	.22**	.08	-.30***	-.09	-.09
Shame Proneness	.68***	-.37***	-.09	-.15	-.22**	-.18*	.01
PDQ-4+ NPD	.21**	-.12	-.04	-.11	-.35***	-.04	.02

N=164

\* =  $p < .05$

\*\* =  $p < .01$

\*\*\* =  $p < .001$

<sup>3</sup> Controlling for Neuroticism, N=156.

<sup>4</sup> Controlling for Neuroticism and Extraversion, N = 155.

**Table 3 Five Factor Profiles of Personality Disorders (Females)**

	N	E	E <sup>5</sup>	O	A	C	C <sup>6</sup>
Narcissistic (NAR)	.21**	-.12	-.04	.06	-.35***	-.04	.02
Antisocial (ASP)	.08	.09	.12	.15	-.24**	-.25**	-.28**
Histrionic (HIS)	.32***	.01	.19*	.14	-.24**	-.14	-.10
Paranoid (PAR)	.31***	-.11	.03	-.02	-.49***	-.01	.07
Borderline (BOR)	.53***	-.23**	.01	.13	-.35***	-.01	-.13
Negativistic (NEG)	.49***	-.23**	-.01	-.03	-.38***	-.24**	-.13
Schizoid (SZD)	.12	-.42***	-.43***	-.01	-.27**	-.09	-.01
Schizotypal (STP)	.18*	-.20*	-.15	.24**	-.29***	-.19*	-.16
Obsessive-Compulsive (OC)	.31***	-.14	-.02	.00	-.14	.06	.16*
Depressive (DPR)	.70***	-.47***	-.22**	.00	-.29***	-.14	.07
Dependent (DEP)	.53***	-.24**	.01	-.09	-.09	-.29***	-.28**
Avoidant (AVD)	.62***	-.48***	-.28***	-.05	-.22**	-.15	.03
PDQ-4+ Total Score	.64***	-.36***	-.11	.08	-.22**	-.25**	-.12

N=164

**Table 4 Five Factor Profiles of Personality Disorders (Males)**

	N	E	E <sup>7</sup>	O	A	C	C <sup>8</sup>
Narcissistic (NAR)	.08	.08	.10	.08	-.40***	-.17*	-.17*
Antisocial (ASP)	-.05	.15*	.15	.11	-.38***	-.34***	-.37***
Histrionic (HIS)	.16*	.30***	.38***	.05	-.13	-.22**	-.24**
Paranoid (PAR)	.12	.06	.12	-.05	-.41***	.02	.04
Borderline (BOR)	.46***	-.09	.09	.11	-.18*	-.29***	-.24**
Negativistic (NEG)	.38***	-.16*	-.03	.12	-.35***	-.32***	-.27***
Schizoid (SZD)	.14	-.40***	-.38***	-.06	-.21**	.08	.13
Schizotypal (STP)	.25**	-.23**	-.17*	.04	-.24**	-.01	.04
Obsessive-Compulsive (OC)	.27***	-.09	.01	-.08	-.15	.15*	.21**
Depressive (DPR)	.59***	-.33***	-.17*	-.03	-.28***	-.23**	-.16*
Dependent (DEP)	.49***	-.11	.07	-.14	-.03	-.29***	-.25**
Avoidant (AVD)	.57***	-.35***	-.20**	-.11	-.03	-.18*	-.10
PDQ-4+ Total Score	.48***	-.16*	.00	.01	-.40***	-.27***	-.21**

N=174

\* = p &lt; .05

\*\* = p &lt; .01

\*\*\* = p &lt; .001

<sup>5</sup> Controlling for Neuroticism, N = 156.<sup>6</sup> Controlling for Neuroticism and Extraversion, N = 155.<sup>7</sup> Controlling for Neuroticism, N = 170.<sup>8</sup> Controlling for Neuroticism and Extraversion, N = 169.

**Table 5 Five Factor Profiles of Constructs Related to Narcissism (Males)**

	N	E	E <sup>9</sup>	O	A	C	C <sup>10</sup>
Affect Intensity (Total)	.30***	.33***	.48***	.18*	.17*	-.03	.00
Negative Intensity	.45***	.11	.31***	.13	.06	.00	.08
Negative Reactivity	.28***	.08	.19*	.12	.43***	.18*	.24**
Positive Intensity	.05	.47***	.51***	.24**	.18*	.03	.03
Positive Reactivity	.16*	.33***	.42***	.07	.15*	-.01	.01
Impression Management	-.15*	.05	-.01	-.00	.25**	.38***	.36***
Self-Deceptive Enhancement	-.44***	.23**	.09	-.05	.01	.28**	.23**
Self-Deceptive Denial	-.22**	.17*	.09	.11	.34***	.17*	.13
Hostility	.58***	-.18*	.03	-.14	-.27***	-.09	.02
Sensitivity to Criticism	.34***	-.07	.07	-.08	.08	-.00	.07
Splitting Index (Total)	.50***	-.26***	-.11	-.04	-.20**	-.29***	-.23**
Splitting of Self Images	.50***	-.16*	.02	.08	-.01	-.33***	-.28***
Splitting of Family Images	.30***	-.09	.02	-.02	-.19*	-.18*	-.14
Splitting of Others Images	.30***	-.35***	-.28***	-.16*	-.29***	-.12	-.06
Empathic Concern	.19*	.14	.22**	.37***	.42***	.01	.04
Fantasy	.13	-.04	.02	.44***	-.13	-.20**	-.18*
Personal Distress	.45***	-.28***	-.14	.03	.02	-.10	-.01
Perspective Taking	-.03	-.00	-.02	.17*	.38***	.22**	.22**

N=174

\* =  $p < .05$

\*\* =  $p < .01$

\*\*\* =  $p < .001$

<sup>9</sup> Correlation with E after partialling out N,  $n=170$ .

<sup>10</sup> Correlation with C after partialling out N and E,  $n=169$ .

**Table 6 Five Factor Profiles of Constructs Related to Narcissism (Females)**

	N	E	E <sup>11</sup>	O	A	C	C <sup>12</sup>
Affect Intensity	.29***	.22**	.43***	.03	-.06	-.01	.03
Negative Intensity	.59***	-.13	.20*	.10	-.23**	-.13	.02
Negative Reactivity	.22**	-.04	.09	-.14	.11	.00	.05
Positive Intensity	-.08	.34***	.34***	.09	-.04	.05	-.00
Positive Reactivity	-.02	.26**	.29***	.04	-.01	.07	.05
Impression Management	-.21**	.08	-.02	.02	.28***	.21**	.16*
Self-Deceptive Enhancement	-.23**	.17*	.07	.20**	.01	.01	.23**
Self-Deceptive Denial	-.20**	-.03	-.14	-.06	.26**	.26**	.13
Hostility	.61***	-.34***	-.08	-.10	-.41***	-.10	.08
Sensitivity to Criticism	.35***	-.18*	-.02	-.26**	-.01	-.00	.10
Splitting Index (Total)	.48***	-.30***	-.12	.07	-.34***	-.21**	-.08
Splitting of Self Images	.54***	-.33***	-.10	.14	-.23**	-.26**	-.13
Splitting of Family Images	.26**	-.11	-.02	.01	-.25**	-.09	-.01
Splitting of Others Images	.27***	-.23**	-.14	.02	-.28***	-.12	-.04
Empathic Concern	-.06	.18*	.18*	.10	.31***	.22**	.02
Fantasy	.13	-.07	-.01	.29***	-.03	-.07	-.04
Personal Distress	.55***	-.33***	-.10	-.17*	-.17*	-.24**	-.11
Perspective Taking	-.27***	.13	-.00	.32***	.37***	.08	.01

N=164, \* =  $p < .05$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \*\*\* =  $p < .001$

<sup>11</sup> Correlation with E after partialling out Neuroticism, N = 156.

<sup>12</sup> Correlation with C after partialling out Neuroticism and E, N = 155.

**Table 7: Personality Disorder Associations with Narcissism-Related Constructs (Males)**

	NAR	ASP	HIS	PAR	BOR	NEG	SZD	STP	OC	DEPR	DEP	AVD	PDNOS
Impression Management	-.23**	-.34***	-.10	-.16*	-.26***	-.33***	.05	-.04	-.06	-.27***	-.23**	-.17*	-.30***
Self-Deceptive Enhancement	-.02	-.01	-.10	.03	-.19*	-.18*	.08	.01	-.00	-.32***	-.31***	-.30***	-.19*
Self-Deceptive Denial	-.17	-.25**	-.03	-.23**	-.25**	-.27***	-.14	-.08	-.11	-.25**	-.21**	-.25**	-.31***
AIM Total Score	.14	-.00	.32***	.10	.31***	.14	-.15*	.12	.20**	.11	.14	.15*	.23**
Negative Intensity	.08	-.12	.37***	.09	.36***	.12	-.10	.20**	.24**	-.06	.04	.26**	.29***
Negative Reactivity	-.05	-.23**	.08	-.00	.15	-.01	-.09	.12	.15	.01	.10	.14	.06
Positive Intensity	.15*	.03	.24**	.11	.15	.07	-.13	.10	.13	-.06	.04	-.00	.12
Positive Reactivity	.13	.03	.19*	.14	.17*	.12	-.17*	.09	.17*	.01	.10	-.12	.15
Hostility	.16*	.09	.15	.27***	.33***	.39***	.07	.35***	.25**	.47***	.33***	.41***	.49***
Sensitivity to Criticism	.10	.04	-.06	.07	.28***	.22**	-.07	.09	.06	.24**	.15*	.21**	.19*
Splitting Index Total	.20**	.24**	.24**	.16*	.47***	.38***	.16*	.33***	.16*	.46***	.38***	.44***	.52***
Splitting of Self Images	.17*	.23**	.30***	.11	.52***	.42***	.01	.28***	.18*	.46***	.32***	.44***	.49***
Splitting of Family Images	.11	.14	.21**	.12	.29***	.15*	.10	.17*	.11	.24**	.25**	.20**	.30***
Splitting of Others Images	.18*	.17*	.00	.14	.22**	.27***	.28***	.28***	.07	.31***	.28***	.34***	.36***
Empathic Concern	-.08	-.15	.10	-.17*	.11	-.02	-.19*	.02	.01	-.02	-.02	-.05	-.07
Fantasy	.08	.09	.11	.03	.23**	.08	-.15	.06	.05	.05	.02	.04	.10
Personal Distress	-.02	-.08	.10	-.04	.23**	.13	.04	.22**	.11	-.20**	-.15*	.32***	.21**
Perspective Taking	-.27***	-.28***	-.17*	-.18*	-.18*	-.25**	-.13	-.05	-.04	-.20**	.10	-.22**	-.30***

See foldout or glossary for acronyms.  $N = 174$ , \* =  $p < .05$ , \*\* =  $p < .01$ , \*\*\* =  $p < .001$ .

**Table 8: Personality Disorder Associations with Narcissism-Related Constructs (Females)**

	NAR	ASP	HIS	PAR	BOR	NEG	SZD	STP	OC	DEPR	DEP	AVD	PDNOS
Impression Management	-.27**	-.22**	-.17*	-.20*	-.24**	-.25**	-.03	-.20**	-.03	-.10	-.13	-.12	-.27***
Self-Deceptive Enhancement	.10	.20**	-.12	.06	-.08	-.13	.14	-.01	-.04	-.21**	-.29***	-.20*	-.10
Self-Deceptive Denial	-.12	-.25**	-.19*	-.19*	-.22**	-.21**	.07	-.17*	-.05	-.10	-.02	-.07	-.21**
AIM Total Score	.17*	.17*	.50***	.23**	.34***	.32***	-.28***	.24**	.22**	.23**	.29***	.20*	.39***
Negative Intensity	.17*	.16*	.47***	.23**	.47***	.42***	-.03	.24**	.27***	.51***	.41***	.34***	.54***
Negative Reactivity	-.13	-.06	.13	.06	.07	.12	-.14	.05	.19*	.22**	.17*	.17*	.14
Positive Intensity	.18*	.21**	.30***	.14	.20**	.08	-.20*	.20**	.07	-.08	.05	-.07	.15*
Positive Reactivity	.20*	.19*	.33***	.22**	.18*	.14	-.18*	.16*	.18*	-.00	.09	.02	.22**
Hostility	.29***	.14	.19*	.41***	.46***	.48***	.13	.33***	.28***	.48***	.34***	.53***	.58***
Sensitivity to Criticism	.06	-.14	.06	-.03	.05	.20*	-.03	-.09	.11	.24**	.25**	.41***	.18*
Splitting Index Total	.25*	.21**	.23**	.30***	.46***	.30***	.10	.33***	.13	.34***	.35***	.40***	.49***
Splitting of Self Images	.29***	.13	.36***	.22**	.49***	.37***	.01	.34***	.17*	.46***	.45***	.53***	.56***
Splitting of Family Images	.13	.15*	.07	.20**	.26**	.14	.11	.13	.10	.13	.09	.16*	.23**
Splitting of Others Images	.14	.17*	.08	.25**	.26**	.16*	.12	.27**	.01	.16*	.27***	.21**	.29***
Empathic Concern	-.10	-.02	.07	-.14	-.10	-.05	-.18*	-.09	-.00	.01	.03	-.05	-.08
Fantasy	.17*	.11	.46***	-.03	.22**	.16*	.01	.29***	.08	.16*	.19*	.15	.29***
Personal Distress	.12	.01	.18*	.09	.26**	.20*	.14	.14	.11	.44***	.41***	.39***	.36***
Perspective Taking	-.14	.00	-.08	-.13	-.15	-.23**	-.08	-.00	-.13	-.16*	-.15	-.18*	-.20*



See foldout or glossary for acronyms.  $N = 164$ , except for correlations involving AIM-AVG, where  $N = 161$ .

\* =  $p < .05$

\*\* =  $p < .01$

\*\*\* =  $p < .001$

**Table 9: Associations of Measures of Narcissism with Constructs Related to Narcissism (Females)**

	NPI	EE	LA	SA	SS	AUT	EXH	EXP	ENT	SUF	SUP	VAN	PA	SP	NAR
IM	-.12	-.18*	-.09	-.09	-.10	-.07	-.09	-.18*	-.12	-.02	.02	-.10	-.19*	-.13	-.27**
SDE	-.16	.17*	.23**	.41***	.24**	.30***	.12	.34***	.16*	.01	-.10	.10	.19*	-.36	.10
SDD	.38***	-.20*	-.12	-.02	-.13	-.09	-.15*	-.12	-.17*	.37***	.26**	-.13	-.24**	-.14	-.12
AIM	.26**	.23**	.23**	.06	.20*	.14	.37***	.11	.19*	-.02	.19*	.13	.21**	.26**	.17*
NI	.12	.28***	.12	-.10	.06	.03	.26**	.07	.20*	-.07	.03	-.01	.24**	.45***	.17*
NR	-.20**	-.17*	-.12	-.21**	-.20**	-.13	-.04	-.19*	-.09	-.24**	-.08	-.17*	-.05	.26**	-.13
PI	.34***	.19*	.27***	.20*	.31***	.22**	.34***	.18*	.16*	.17*	.20*	.22**	.21**	-.01	.18*
PR	.32***	.21**	.31***	.15	.29***	.25**	.31***	.16*	.17*	.14	.20*	.16*	.15	.09	.20*
Host	-.15	.07	-.20**	-.20**	-.17*	-.25**	.06	-.05	.12	-.28***	-.11	-.12	.06	.64***	.29***
SCS	-.11	-.04	-.13	-.15	-.12	-.17*	.01	-.15	.01	-.06	-.06	-.06	-.15	.36***	.06
SI	-.04	.17*	-.09	-.13	-.06	-.11	.09	.00	.11	-.11	-.06	-.12	.07	.49***	.25**
SSI	-.03	.13	-.09	-.13	-.03	-.17*	.11	.03	.10	-.13	.02	-.06	.01	.53***	.29***
SFI	.01	.11	-.00	-.04	-.01	.02	.09	.00	.05	-.03	-.08	-.07	.06	.29***	.13
SOI	-.08	.14	-.11	-.13	-.10	-.10	-.02	-.04	.09	-.09	-.07	-.14	.10	.27**	.14
EC	-.06	-.15	-.01	-.05	-.02	-.06	.02	-.03	-.11	-.10	.12	-.09	-.02	-.08	-.10
FS	.13	.12	.08	-.05	.12	-.03	.25**	-.02	.15	.08	.24	.06	.13	.18*	.17*
PD	-.20*	-.01	-.20**	-.24**	-.12	-.26**	.01	-.08	-.03	-.22**	-.20*	-.02	-.05	.47***	.12
PT	-.04	-.24**	-.11	.07	.09	-.07	-.08	-.02	-.19*	.09	.18*	-.00	-.13	-.14	-.14

N= 164, \* = p < .05, \*\* = p < .01, \*\*\* = p < .001

Table 10: Associations of Measures of Narcissism with Constructs Related to Narcissism (Males)

	NPI	EE	LA	SA	SS	AUT	EXH	EXP	ENT	SUF	SUP	VAN	PA	SP	NAR
IM	-.16*	-.30***	-.10	-.14	.04	-.11	-.19*	-.19**	-.26**	.07	.05	-.03	-.20**	-.21**	-.23**
SDE	.26***	.08	.19*	.35***	.25**	.23**	.06	.22**	.04	.34***	.14	.19*	-.07	-.31***	-.02
SDD	-.10	-.30***	.00	-.04	.01	-.02	-.06	-.12	-.28***	-.02	.06	-.01	-.27***	-.26***	-.17*
AIM	.15*	.08	.08	-.05	.20	.05	.22**	-.03	.05	.05	.15	.21**	-.03	.22**	.14
NI	.04	.05	.05	-.02	-.00	-.02	.16*	.02	.06	-.03	-.03	-.01	-.06	.31***	.08
NR	-.22**	-.29***	-.24**	-.24**	.01	-.23**	-.10	-.21**	-.29***	-.06	-.04	.01	-.29	.19*	-.05
PI	.24**	.12	.21**	.05	.25**	.17*	.26**	.08	.07	.11	.19*	.22**	.00	.04	.15*
PR	.18*	.12	.07	.03	.20**	.09	.15	.08	.07	.15	.13	.20**	-.01	.14	.13
Host	-.10	.08	-.16*	-.10	-.12	-.16*	-.06	.05	.13	-.17*	-.10	-.11	.01	.58***	.16*
SCS	-.05	.00	-.10	-.09	-.03	-.10	.06	-.07	.00	-.11	.01	-.02	-.16*	.31***	.10
SI	-.06	.03	-.09	-.14	-.02	-.13	.04	-.7	.12	.18*	-.07	.01	.25**	.53***	.20**
SSI	-.04	-.00	-.08	-.12	.03	-.15	.12	-.03	.00	-.18*	-.00	.10	.15*	.43***	.17*
SFI	-.03	.03	-.01	-.02	-.09	-.05	.03	-.00	.12	-.13	-.06	-.09	.22**	.34***	.11
SOI	-.07	.04	-.11	-.16*	.00	-.08	-.09	-.13	.16*	-.08	-.09	-.02	.19*	.41***	.18*
EC	-.18*	-.28***	-.14	-.20**	.00	-.17*	-.04	-.19*	-.31	-.08	.02	-.01	-.19*	-.01	-.08
FS	.01	-.04	-.04	-.11	.11	-.04	.03	-.10	-.03	.03	.06	.13	.06	.02	.08
PD	-.30***	-.14	-.32***	-.32***	-.20**	-.34***	-.17*	-.18*	-.15	-.18*	-.13	-.12	-.04	.38***	-.02
PT	-.28***	-.36***	-.20**	-.17*	-.13	-.21**	-.23**	-.14	-.36***	-.04	-.08	-.17*	-.26***	-.14	-.25**

\* = p < .05

\*\* = p < .01

\*\*\* = p < .001

**Appendix 3:**

**Fold-outs of Acronyms**

A	Agreeableness (domain of NEO-FFI)
AUT	Authority subscale of NPI (from 7 factor solution)
AIM_AVG	Affect Intensity Measure (total scale average score)
ASP	Antisocial Personality scale of PDQ-4+
AVD	Avoidant Personality scale of PDQ-4+
BIDR	Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding
BIDR_IM	Impression Management subscale of BIDR
BIDR_SDD	Self-Deceptive Denial subscale of BIDR
BIDR_SDE	Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale of BIDR
BOR	Borderline Personality Disorder scale of PDQ-4+
C	Conscientiousness (domain of NEO-FFI)
DEP	Dependent Personality scale of PDQ-4+
DPR	Depressive personality scale of PDQ-4+
E	Extraversion (domain of NEO-FFI)
EC	Empathic Concern subscale of IRI
EE	Exploitativeness/Entitlement subscale of NPI (from 4 factor solution)
ENT	Entitlement subscale of NPI (from 7 factor solution)
EXH	Exhibitionism subscale of NPI (from 7 factor solution)
EXP	Exploitativeness subscale of NPI (from 7 factor solution)
FS	Fantasy subscale of IRI
HIS	Histrionic Personality scale of PDQ-4+
HOST	Hostility scale
IRI	Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Empathy Scale)
LA	Leadership/Authority subscale of NPI (from 4 factor solution)
N	Neuroticism (domain of NEO-FFI)
NAR	Narcissistic Personality scale of PDQ-4+
NEG	Negativistic Personality scale of PDQ-4+
NEO-FFI	NEO Five Factor Inventory
NI	Negative Intensity subscale of AIM
NPI_TOT	Narcissistic Personality Inventory
NR	Negative Reactivity
O	Openness to Experience (domain of NEO-FFI)
OC	Obsessive-Compulsive scale of PDQ-4+
PA_TOT	Pseudoautonomy Scale
PAR	Paranoid Personality scale of PDQ-4+
PD	Personality Disorder/Personal Distress subscale of IRI
PDQ-4+	Personality Disorder Questionnaire - 4+
PI	Positive Intensity subscale of AIM
PR	Positive Reactivity subscale of AIM
PT	Perspective Taking subscale of IRI
SA	Superiority/Arrogance subscale of NPI (from 4 factor solution)
SCS	Sensitivity to Criticism Scale
SFI	Splitting of Family Images subscale of SI
SI_TOT	Splitting Index
SOI	Splitting of Others Images subscale of SI
SP_TOT	Shame Proneness scale
SS	Self-Admiration/Self-Sufficiency subscale of NPI (4 factor solution)
SSI	Splitting of Self Images subscale of SI
STP	Schizotypal Personality scale of PDQ-4+
SUF	Sufficiency subscale of NPI (from 7 factor solution)
SUP	Superiority subscale of NPI (from 7 factor solution)
SZD	Schizoid Personality scale of PDQ-4+
VAN	Vanity subscale of NPI (from 7 factor solution)

**NEO-PI-R Facets**

N1	Anxiety
N2	Angry Hostility
N3	Depression
N4	Self-Consciousness
N5	Impulsiveness
N6	Vulnerability
E1	Warmth
E2	Gregariousness
E3	Assertiveness
E4	Activity
E5	Excitement Seeking
E6	Positive Emotions
O1	Fantasy
O2	Aesthetics
O3	Feelings
O4	Actions
O5	Ideas
O6	Values
A1	Trust
A2	Straightforwardness
A3	Altruism
A4	Compliance
A5	Modesty
A6	Tender-Mindedness
C1	Competence
C2	Order
C3	Dutifulness
C4	Achievement Striving
C5	Self-Discipline
C6	Deliberation