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The role of Shaykh Muhammad Khiyābānī
and the Democratic Movement of Azerbaijan
in the Socio-Political History of Iran 1910-1920

Presented by

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شیخ محمد خیابانی

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ABBREVIATIONS

- A.B.N. E.G. Browne, A Brief Narrative of Recent Events in Persia, London, 1907.
- C.L. L. Lockhart, "The Constitutional Laws of Persia" M.E.J., 19, 1965.
- D.M. R. Ra'īs Niyā and ^CA. ^CĀshūrī, Du Muḃ āriz-i Junbish-i Mashrūṭa, Tabriz, 1969.
- F.O. Public Record Office 371/4927, London 1919-21 (unpublished documents).
- F.O. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, first series, vols.IV and XIII, London, 1939, (published documents).
- H.P. P. Sykes, A History of Persia, vol.II, London, 1915.
- I.I. M. Mujtahidī, Īrān-u Ingilīs, Tehran, 1947.
- I.P. N. Keddie, "Iranian Politics, 1900-1905: Background to Revolution", M.E.S., 5, 1969.
- I.U.P. G. Lenczowski, Iran Under the Pahlavis, Stanford, 1978.
- M.I. L.P. Elwell-Sutton, Modern Iran, London, 1941.
- P.C.M. E.G. Browne, "The Persian Constitutional Movement", Proceedings of the British Academy, 1917-1918, 9, 1918.
- P.P.P. E.G. Browne, The Press and Poetry of Modern Persia, Cambridge, 1914.

- P.R. E.G. Browne, The Persian Revolution, 1905-1909,
Cambridge, 1910.
- Q.Kh. ^CAlī Āzarī, Qiyām-i Shaykh Muhammad-i Khiyābānī. 2nd.ed.
Tehran, 1967.
- R.A.D. M. Mujtahidī, Rijāl-i Āzarbāyjān Dar ^CAsr-i Mashrūṭiyyat,
Tabriz, 1948.
- R.W. G. Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, New York,
1949.
- T.H.S.A. A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-i Hijdah Sāla-yi Īrān, Tehran, 1954.
- T.M.I. A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-i Mashrūṭa-yi Īrān, Tehran, 1951.
- T.N.I. M.S. Ivanov, (Tārīkh-i Nuvīn-i Īrān, Persian translation).

TRANSLITERATION

The system used for transliterating Persian is that used by the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at Edinburgh University.

PREFACE

I was interested in history while I was in school and I pursued this interest as a history student at the University of Tabriz where I graduated in history in 1973. Apart from a major part of our studies in history, which were about the Iranian and foreign dynasties, we had to study a great deal about the lives of individual Kings; but hardly any space was allocated to the history of social and political movements in Iran. The names of patriots and political thinkers such as Khayābānī were not, for political reasons, mentioned. These movements, however, no matter how briefly they were covered in our history books, were still able to arouse my curiosity and interest in discovering more about these movements and their leaders. In 1977 I decided to undertake research in modern history. My decision coincided with social and political upheavals in Iran which resulted in the revolution of 1979. This by itself strengthened my conviction that we must study and understand our history in its particular social and political content. That is to say revolts and revolutions are not something which appear suddenly, but are the product and result of historical developments in which peoples, as a living force, have taken part. These revolts and revolutions are, in fact, the manifestations of longstanding social injustices and oppressions which have been imposed on the people by despotic kings, irresponsible governments

and reactionary rulers. In recent social upheavals of Iran I witnessed how thousands of sincere people and patriots gave their lives and wished to free their country from age old backwardness. This reflected the continuation of the constitutional revolution and Kẖiyābānī's uprising (1910-1920). Since my grandfather Mīrzā Muḥammad Tagī Ṭabāṭabā'ī Khātambakḥsh was involved in the constitutional revolution and Kẖiyābānī's uprising and I naturally had heard a lot about Kẖiyābānī through my relatives, both personal curiosity and historical interest made me choose Kẖiyābānī as the subject of my research.

Some books and articles have been written about Kẖiyābānī which are either very superficial or based on misrepresentation. They are superficial because they have not attempted to explain why and how Kẖiyābānī's uprising began and the reasons for its success and failure and the role of central government in Tehran in this event is not examined. Kẖiyābānī's original speeches and works have not been studied in depth. The opposition to Kẖiyābānī's uprising has misrepresented him in different ways. The most striking aspect of this is the fact that he has been accused by his political opponents over and over again of being a "separatist". Some historians have even either spelt Kẖiyābānī's name wrongly or copied the errors of others.

I came to Edinburgh and was accepted as a postgraduate student in October 1979, and then went to London where I studied and examined the British Foreign office archives and also studied in the British Library. Through the Edinburgh University Library I received some

books and newspapers in Russian, French, English, Persian and Azari. Three times I travelled to Iran where I could consult the Iranian Parliamentary documents, newspapers, books and interviewed a number of Iranians who either participated in or had valuable memories of Khiyābānī's uprising. It is hoped, therefore, that the present study will shed a great deal of light upon a hitherto much-neglected episode in modern Iranian history.

ABSTRACT

In this thesis we have attempted to describe and analyse the uprising of Shaykh Muhammad Khiyābānī in Tabriz in 1920. The main purpose is to show that contrary to the view often held, Khiyābānī was a patriot whose Democratic Movement did not wish to separate Azerbaijan from Iran. This is illustrated clearly by his speeches. Khiyābānī's uprising is to be regarded as a continuation of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905.

In the first chapter the social and political situation in Iran before the Constitutional Revolution is briefly reviewed, and the Russian intervention in the internal affairs of Iran, the elements in the formation of the Constitutional Revolution and the gains and failures of the Constitutional Revolution are discussed.

In the second chapter Khiyābānī's life and his political activities both in Azerbaijan and in Parliament are examined, and the nine months of fighting during 1908-9 between the constitutionalists and the government forces which was ended by the Russian occupation of Tabriz, are discussed. During this period all Khiyābānī's political activities were carried out secretly and the democratic movement went underground because of political suppression by the central government.

In the third chapter we have shown how the withdrawal of Russian forces from Iran due to the October Revolution of 1917 gave the opportunity to Britain to establish herself as the sole foreign power

in Iran by obtaining the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919. The nature of this agreement and most of the original correspondence between the British Embassy in Tehran and the Foreign Office in London have been examined, and the views of Khiyābānī and also the views of other countries in regard to this agreement have been recorded and analysed.


In the fourth chapter the reasons for Khiyābānī's uprising, his activities during this uprising, the manner in which his uprising was suppressed and what happened after Khiyābānī's death in Azerbaijan have been discussed.

In the final chapter, our purpose is to illustrate the political views of Shaykh Muḥammad Khiyābānī through his speeches.

An attempt has also been made to give an overall picture of Khiyābānī's philosophy and outlook by using material from his speeches which were published in the Newspaper Tajaddud in Tabriz between 1917 and 1920.

Certain material which is of interest but which we have been unable to utilise in the body of the thesis, in addition to some photographs, have been included in a number of appendices.

MAP OF THE CENTRES OF REVOLT IN IRAN IN 1920-21



CENTRES OF REVOLT IN IRAN IN 1920-21

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ KHIYĀBĀNĪ'S UPRISING IN ĀZARBĀYJĀN

● ● ● ● ● MĪRZĀ KŪCHĪK KHĀN'S MOVEMENT IN RASHT

▨ ▨ ▨ ▨ ▨ MUHAMMAD TAGHĪ KHĀN-I PĪSĪYĀN'S REVOLT IN MASHHAD

Chapter 1

IRAN'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POSITION BEFORE THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION

The Qājār period marks a turning-point in the history of Iran. At the time of its establishment western influence was still almost non-existent. The Portuguese had attempted to dominate the trade of the Gulf at an earlier period, and from the time of Peter the Great onward the Russians had already shown signs of interest in expansion southward through Iranian territory, although in the late 18th century the main concerns of the Russian Empire seemed to lie elsewhere. In little more than a century, however, the aggressive policies of these two states were playing a vital role in Iran's internal affairs, and the country was virtually partitioned between them. Other states, notably Germany, were seeking a role in Iran also, and with the outbreak of the First World War the Ottomans also became briefly involved.

By the beginning of the 20th century, Iran had become in reality, virtually a semi-colonised state under the control of Britain and Russia, whose interference was a factor in keeping Iran backward.¹

1. See N. Fatimi. Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917-1923, p.244; M.S. Ivanov. Novyeshaya Istoriya Irana, Tr. into Persian by Tizābī and Qāyim Panāh under the Persian title (Tārīkh-i Nuvīn-i Īrān), p.10; N.R. Keddie, "Iranian Politics 1900-1905: Background to Revolution", ^{M.E.J. 15,} p.6, and A. Qāsimī, Shish sāl Inqilāb-i Mashrūṭiyyat-i Īrān, p.4.

The effect of Russian and English domination and in particular of the military aggressiveness of Russia turned the country into a battlefield of Western imperialism. Unjust agreements,¹ and licences and facilities for trading granted to Russia and Western European countries, opened Iran's gates to a flood of foreign products and manufacturers, while foreign investment increased in Iran.²

In theory, the emerging industries of Iran were invigorated by these developments; in reality, this foreign investment further harmed Iran economically. It caused bankruptcy, dissatisfaction and deeper social inequality in Iranian society. The court was composed of people who had little understanding of political reality and only sought to bolster up their own position.³ They held on to their wealth by imposing burdensome taxes on the people, especially the poor farmers. Those in power eventually had to find a further source of income. One lucrative source was the dealing in trading licences with foreign countries.⁴ The increased income was often spent on frivolous pursuits or corruptly frittered away.

1. See L.P. Elwell-Sutton, Modern Iran, p.59.

; M. Afshar, La Politique Européenne en Perse, p.189; F. Ādamiyyat, Fikri Āzādī va Muqaddama-yi Nihzat-i Mashrūtiyyat, p.22, and for more details see, M. Ittiḥādiyya, Gūsha hā'i Az Ravābiṭ-i Khārijī-yi Īrān, pp.40-51.

2. See, A. Jahān Bānī, Marzhā-yi Īrān va Shūravī, p.22 and for more details see A. Qāsimī, op.cit. pp.5-7.

3. See ^CA.A. Bīnā, Tārīkh-i Siyāsī va Dīplumāsī-yi Īrān, p.57; M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., p.14, and L.P. Elwell-Sutton, M.I., p.61.

4. See E.G. Brown, The Persian Revolution 1905-1909, (Cambridge, 1910) p.57. M. McCarthy, Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Persia, p.37; and R. Ra'īs Niyā and D. ^CĀshūrī, Zamīna-yi Iqtisādi va Ijtimā'ī-yi Inqilāb-i Mashrūṭa-yi Īrān, p.26.

The guarantors for the repayment of loans raised by the court were the small cultivators and other lower classes who were in the power of their court and their masters.¹ The crippling loans which coincided with the arrival of foreign advisors affected the administration of customs, finance, the army and postal services.² The deals had two beneficial consequences for the foreign countries involved. Firstly, they could sell their products at their own prices, without paying any customs duties or taxes. Secondly, they had control of administration.³ The court's practice of bestowing estates, towns and villages on landowners and feudal lords in return for money and gifts had regrettable results for the small farmers. A farmer could have his land confiscated or be deprived of water and seed.⁴ Besides these misfortunes, they were obliged to pay four-fifths of their annual produce to their feudal overlords and masters. Sometimes they had to pay oil, butter, chicken and sheep to their masters.⁵

1. See R. Rizā Zāda-yi Malik, Ḥaydar Khān-i Amū Ughli, p.7, and Y. Āryan Pūr, Az Šabā Tā Nīmā Vol.2, p.51.

2. See E.G. Browne, P.R., p.104.

3. See M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., p.8.

4. See A. Kirmānī, Nāma hā-yi Āqā Khān-i Kirmānī, No.16 (Tehran N.D.), and R. Rizāzāda-yi Malik, op.cit., p.7.

5. See M. Abbāsī, Tārīkh-i Inqilāb-i Īrān, p.41; A.A. Bīnā, op.cit., p.57, and R. Ra'īs Niyā and D. Āshūrī, Z.I.I., p.21.

When there was a famine and the amount of produce was reduced, the peasant farmers were sometimes forced to give their daughters to the overlords in lieu of the annual taxes. Thus for example

"In 1905 the people of Qūchān had not been able to pay their annual tax to their masters because of shortages, and the overlords accordingly took 300 Qūchānī girls and sold them to the Turkman chiefs."¹

In villages, the overlords could rule independently. They were free to organise the local court, to pass judgements and bring charges.²

In a few parts of Iran such as Balūchistān and Fārs, they could arrange the purchase and sale of slaves. Because of grinding poverty the people were obliged to live at subsistence level. Their rulers and overlords, meanwhile, were living in luxury.³

Famine and epidemics of cholera and plague occasionally spread throughout the country. The pitiful position of the people was made worse by the failure of many domestic industries because of ever increasing competition from foreign goods and products. This resulted in massive unemployment. Thousands of these unemployed people were forced to emigrate to escape from hunger and death. Every year they were obliged to emigrate to Russia and India. The number of these people at the beginning of the twentieth century was more than two hundred thousand.⁴

1. See M.N.I. Kirmānī, Tārīkh-i Bīdārī-yi Īrānīyān, p.198, and M.I. Rizvānī, Inqilāb-i Mashrūṭīyyat, p.52.

2. See A. Kasravī, Tārīkh-i Mashrūṭa-yi Īrān, p.7; R. Ra'īs Nīyā and D. Āshūrī, op.cit., pp.12,18.

3. See M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., p.9, and A. Kasravī, T.M.I., p.287.

4. See Mahnāma -yi Āzarbāyjān, No.10, (Tabriz, 1968).

The people left behind were at the mercy of their rulers, who frequently committed acts of barbarism, and people could be mutilated or hanged at a whim. Iranians thus suffered at the hands of their own rulers, and also suffered because of foreign intervention in their country.¹

RUSSIAN AND BRITISH INTERFERENCE IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Owing to her important strategic and geographical situation lying as she does on the direct route between Europe and the East (India in particular); her rich and potential resources, and eventually because of her vital position in the Gulf, Iran suffered greatly from the attentions of the two major powers of the nineteenth century.

From the time of Peter the Great, Russia has wished to bring into reality her dreams of having access to the warm and open waters of the Persian Gulf, one of the most important routes in the world in fact. Equally, the reason Britain attempted to establish a position within Iran was to protect her rich colony of India by transforming Iran into a strong-point against foreign interference.²

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1. See Hon. J.M. Balfour, Recent Happenings in Persia, p.76; J. Malcolm, History of Persia, Vol.2, p.300; A. Qāsimī, op.cit., p.5, and M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., p.13.
 2. See E.G. Browne, P.C.N., p.329; R. Kumar, "Anglo-Turkish Antagonism in the Persian Gulf" in, Islamic Culture, 1960, p.100; D.N. Walker, Iran Past and Present, p.79, and M. Mujtahidī, Īrān-u Ingilīs, p.75. For a full account see, R.L. Greaves, Persia and the Defence of India, **London, 1959**.

Russia and Britain competed in seeing who could gain more influence in Iran and thus take advantage of the country more successfully. As well as the Northern provinces, which Russia gained from Iran by invasion and military force most of the country had become Iranian in name only.¹

Britain interfered with Iran's affairs so that she could control Iran's frontiers with Afghanistan and Iraq. To enable Britain to strengthen her power in India, she had to build up a barrier before the Russians. With this end in mind, Britain obtained from Iran a Licence to erect a telegraph line from Baghdad to India through Iran.²

A missed opportunity for Iran occurred when Britain learned of the existence of the oil field in the South of the country. Britain obtained a licence for sixty years through the agency of William Knox D'arcy in 1901. According to this agreement, the company agreed to pay the sum of £20,000 at the beginning of the exploration and also took to give £20,000 worth of shares. Sixteen

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1. See Hon. G.N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, Vol.2, pp.607-610; L.P. Elwell-Sutton, "The Pahlavi Era", on Persia: History and Heritage, ed. by J.A. Boyle and H. Mellard, p.51; D.N. Wilber, I.P.P., p.79. For more details see, Iranian Foreign Office, "Majm^u-i ^CAhd Nāma Hā-yi Tārīkhī-yi Īrān Az ^CAhd-i Hakhāmanishī tā ^CAṣr-i Pahlavī" ed. by V. Māzandarānī, pp.126,170.
 2. See M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., p.3 and M. Mujtahidī, I.I., p.75.

per cent of the company's annual profits were to be paid to the Iranian Government.¹

The foreign powers vied with each other in gaining influence at court, but were on good enough terms with each other eventually to come to a compromise.² By 1907, Iran had been divided into three spheres of influence: Northern Iran was under Russian control, Southern Iran under British, while the central area was neutral. This neutral area was further divided in 1915.³

In 1910, the Iranian Government invited an American advisor, William Morgan Shuster, to attempt to reform the disorganised and bankrupt financial administration. There was a temporary improvement and finances became better regulated, but the reaction of Russia to this improvement shows how deep and malign was her interference in Iran's internal affairs.⁴ The Iranian Government, she declared,

1. See L.P. Elwell-Sutton, M.I., p.64; A. Hā'irī, Shi'a'ism and constitutionalism in Iran, p.171; and ^CA. Mustawfī, Tārīkh-i Idārī va Ijtimā'ī-yi Qājār, Vol.3, pp.218-9.

2. See A. Kasravī, Tārīkh Hijdah Sāla-yi Āzarbāyjān, p.337, and M. Mujtahidī, I.I., p.18.

3. See G.P. Gooch and J.H.B. Masterman, A Century of British Foreign Policy, p.76; M. McCarthy, op.cit., p.50; and A. Rāzī, Tārīkh-i Mufaṣṣal-i Īrān, p.519.

4. See G. Lanczowski, Iran under the Pahlavis, p.11; E.G. Browne, P.C.M., p.328; H. Kafur, Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917-1927; p.144; "Persia" in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol.XXI and, M. Dāwūdī, ḌAyn al-Dawla va Rizhīm-i Mashrūṭa, pp.187-252.

must dismiss Shuster and take note, henceforth, that if Iran wished to invite any foreign advisor, she should first consult with Russia and Britain.¹

Many thinking Iranians were affronted by this ultimatum, which they saw as yet another example of foreign interference. In the National Parliament of Iran, one of these leading thinkers, Shaykh Muhammad Khiyābānī, the subject of the present thesis, spoke out against this ultimatum. But as we know Russia continually used force to impose her demands on Iran.

Previously, in 1908, the Majlis had been bombarded and forcibly dissolved by Colonel Lyakhov,² the Russian Commander of Muhammad ^CAli Shāh's Cossack Brigade, by order of the Shāh, who was firmly supported by Russia.³ The action was mounted to close parliament, exile some leaders and kill certain liberal people.⁴ Britain and Russia, the two competitors, both benefited equally from their involvement in Iran, but Russia caused more harm to the country.⁵ Britain was involved in political manoeuvres and plans

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1. See M.W. Shuster, The Strangling of Persia, p.182; D.N. Wilber, I.P.P., p.85; A. Banani, The Modernization of Iran, (1961), p.37.
 2. The Persian Cossack Brigade was formed in 1879 by Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh as a royal bodyguard. This guard later received most of its orders from Russia. For more details, see also, M.A. Afschar, op.cit., p.26 and P. Mansfield, op.cit., p.81.
 3. See L.P. Elwell-Sutton, M.I. (London 1941), p.63.
 4. For more details see F. Ādamiyyat, op.cit., pp.330-31 and M.I. Rizvānī, op.cit., pp.170-72.
 5. See Sir P. Sykes, A History of Persia II, p.426; Y. Āryan Pūr, op.cit., Vol.2, p.8 and M. Bahār, Tārīkh-i Ahzāb-i Siyāsī-yi Īrān, p.225.

but Russia harmed the very life of the people.¹ Her behaviour in Tabriz was particularly notorious. When people protested at Russian interference and misdeeds, many people were cruelly executed, some cut in half like sheep.² The most famous monument in Tabriz, the Mongol Ark-i ‘Alī Shāh was bombarded by Russian troops.³ However in 1915, Russia and Britain signed another agreement which completed the 1907 Agreement. The neutral zone of Iran was now also divided between the two major powers. Thus, they concluded, Iran would cause them no bother and would be a country in name only. Britain and Russia used different methods to gain their ends, but basically shared a common aim and secretly united to carry it through.⁴

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1. See M.W. Shuster, op.cit., p.43; H. Makkī, Tārīkh-i Bīst Sāla-yi Īrān, Vol.2, p.24, in the introduction; and K.T. Zāda-yi Bihzād, Qiyām-i Āzarbāyjān Dar Inqilāb-i Mashrūṭiyyat, p.315.
 2. M. Mujtahidī, Rijāl-i Āzarbāyjān Dar ‘Aṣr-i Mashrūṭa, pp.114-222, and A. Kasravī, T.H.S.A., pp.337-39, 340-42.
 3. See M. Machray, "Mesopotamia and Persia" in, Fortnightly Review, 108, (London, 1920), pp.618-19 and M. Ittiḥādiyya, op.cit., p.28.
 4. E.G. Browne, A brief narrative of recent events in Persia, p.24, and A. Kasravī, T.H.S.A., p.337.

CAUSES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT

From the previous discussion we have seen that most Iranians lived in a miserable life at the beginning of the twentieth century. The oppression of the Qājār Dynasty and bribery had reached unprecedented heights.¹

Other elements played a major part in creating a constitutional movement. One element in the movement for constitutional reform was the minority class of broad-minded intellectual thinkers. They were generally familiar with the laws of European countries and understood the workings of democratic government. They put forward the idea that government springs from the nation and that religion and state should be kept separate. They favoured a European-style Constitutional Monarchy and wanted a new political society in Iran.

The majority of people were ignorant and illiterate, however, and were not receptive to the ideas of this minority. Their contribution to new thoughts and ideas in Iran was, nevertheless, considerable and should not be overlooked. Mīrzā Malkam Khān, (1833-1908) was one of the first men to work for the enlightenment and reform of Iran. He entered government service and rose to the position of Minister to Great Britain, and published the newspaper Qānūn in London (1889-1890). His political activities were extremely

1. See Sh. Bakhsh, Iran, Monarchy, Bureaucracy and Reform under the Qājārs, 1858-1896, p.305; A. Kasravī, T.H.S.A., pp.148-49, and M.I. Rizvānī, op.cit., p.50.

influential. The role of Qānūn in diffusing ideas hostile to the regime was unquestionably great, and Mīrzā Malkam Khān was also a strong advocate of the application of western values in order to end European Colonial investment in Persia.¹

Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn Asad ābādī (Afghānī) (1838-1892) bitterly attacked the court in his speeches and sought to rouse the people from their slumbers. His hope was to establish a constitutional and republican regime, declaring that it would be impossible for the distinguished liberal politicians to ignore their own interests unless a constitutional government was established.² Among his best known followers were Shaykh Ahmad Rūhī, Mīrzā Āqā Khān and Khabīr al-Mulk.³

Mīrzā Hasan Rushdiyya, the founder of new schools in Iran, was the publisher of the paper Maktab, in Tehran. Mīrzā Hasan Rushdiyya had been pronounced an infidel by the ^CUlamā and his school destroyed by a mob of tullāb (religious students).⁴

1. See H. Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906, pp.192,458; H. Nātiq, Az Māst Ki Bar Māst, pp.165-194; A. Hā'irī, op.cit., p.39;

A. Kasravī, T.M.I., p.10.

2. See E.G. Browne, P.R., pp.1-30; ^CA. A. Halabī, Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn Asad ābādī; for a fuller account see G.R. Şabrī-Tabrīzī, The Bibliography of Sayid Jamāl Eddin Asad ābādī, the Islamic Philosopher of the East, Tabriz, 1965.

3. See E.G. Browne, P.R., p.94.

4. See H. Algar, op.cit., p.244, and A. Kasravī, T.M.I., p.19.

Mīrzā ^CAbd al-Hāshim Tālibof, (1855-1910) was born in Tabriz, but lived mostly in Russia. His numerous Persian books, written in simple style, helped popularize modern political ideas and science in Iran. He was one of the famous scholars who worked to enlighten public opinion. His contribution to the Persian awakening and the development of constitutional theory in Iran was as important as theirs, if not more so. He used to say, "first I love the universe, then I love Iran, and eventually, I love the clean soil of Tabriz".¹

Mīrzā ^CAlī Akbar-i Šābir, (1862-1911) was one of the most active and famous opponents of despotic government and a radical poet of Iran. He is especially known for his satirical poems written under the title of Hup Hup Nāma. He defended the poor people and attacked the powerful, and is particularly known for his attacks on religious hypocrisy. He examined the laws and government of European countries and compared them with the situation in Iran, thus helping the Iranians to appreciate the shortcomings of their own system.²

Another element was the manner in which Iranian leaders granted licences to foreigners and raised loans to maintain their luxurious lifestyle. When loans could not be paid, rich lands or resources were

1. See M. ^CAbbāsī, op.cit., pp.22,35, M.A. Tarbiyat, Dānishmandān-i Āzarbāyjān, p.41.

2. See E.G. Browne, P.R., p.35. For more details, see ^CA.A. Šābir Tāhirzāda, Kulliyāt-i Hup Hup Nāma, and A. Šihāt, Āsar-i Bar Guzīda, pp.355-6.

sometimes given, thus increasing Iranian discontent.¹ In 1900, a loan of two and a half million roubles was borrowed from Russia at the interest of five per cent to be repaid within seventy five years for Muzaffar al-Dīn Shāh to go for medical treatment to Europe. Subsequently one and a half million roubles was borrowed from Russia, again for the King to go to London. In exchange for these loans to Iran, Russia demanded the right to the customs of Northern Iran and the licence to build a highway from Julfā to Tehran through Tabriz and Qazvīn.²

The constitutional movement owed much to the clergy. They were an effective force in society and had the trust of the people to whom religion was important. The ^CUlamā (clergy) called for justice and criticised oppression which was roundly denounced in the mosques.³ Some ^CUlamā were well informed about the working of European Governments. In response to questions about the Constitutional Laws, which had been put by leading Iranian clergy in 1905 to the most famous Iranian religious leader in Najaf (Iraq), Āyat-Allāh Kāzīm Khurāsāni,⁴ who had similarly demanded constitutional

1. See M. McCarthy, op.cit., p.36, and M.N. Kirmānī, op.cit., p.376.

2. See H. Algar, op.cit., p.226; A. Kasravī, T.M.I., p.24.

3. See M. Savory, "Persia", in The Cambridge History of Islam, Vol.III, p.597; L.P. Elwell-Sutton, M.I., p.61 and Ḥā'irī, op.cit., p.109.

4. See E.G. Browne, P.R., pp.262,421 and M.N. Kirmānī, op.cit., pp.66-68.

rule, security, justice and eventual freedom for Iran,^{he} declared:

"We have learned about European countries which are governed by democracy; we wish to have a real constitutional government in Iran. We state categorically that this would not involve any conflict with Islam; rather that this type of government would be in accord with religious law and the Prophet's orders which decree that the rule of law and justice should be administered to the people."¹

Certain spiritual leaders, however, rejected the movement. These spiritual leaders were generally from the wealthiest class, or those who had control of lands² held as religious Awqāf (endowments). At the beginning of the movement many members of this class had supported the people in their struggle for their legal rights, but realising that their interests were endangered by constitutional advance, they gradually left their former position, and took the Shāh's side. Among members of this group were Mīr Hāshim and the Imām Jum'a of Tabriz.³ There was a certain group of clergymen like Hājī Mīrzā Hasan Mujtahid-i Tabrīz and the Imām Jum'a of Tehran for instance, who themselves were from the highest feudal families of Iran, and had an inseparable connection

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1. See N. Keddie, I.P., pp.150-60; A. Hā'irī, op.cit., p.183, for more details see M. Pavlovich, S. Iranski and V. Terya, op.cit., p.42.
 2. See F. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864-1914, p.545 and R. Riżāzādi-yi Malik, op.cit., p.194.
 3. See M.Q. Hidāyat, Khātirāt va Khatarāt, p.172; M.B. Vījūya'ī Balvā-i Tabrīz, p.23; A. Rāzī, op.cit., p.518.

with the court. Others however like Ṭabāṭabā'ī, Bihbahānī, Shaykh Salīm, Malik al-Mutakallimīn and Shaykh Muḥammad Khiyābānī had a connection with the mass of the people. Their lives had no apparent difference from those of the rest of the people and most of them were at the service of the masses. As the constitutional movement developed these two groups began to accuse each other of deviating from Islam. The ideology of the second group was based on the poor and labouring classes, while that of the first group, lay in pressing the people to obey the court, making use of the Qurānic text; "O ye who believe obey God and obey the Apostle, and those charged with authority among you".¹

At the beginning of the movement, one of the most famous spiritual leaders who helped and supported the people greatly was Shaykh Faḏl-Allāh-i Nūrī, but like most of the other clergymen, he changed his attitude and took a position which was against the movement and the Iranian Revolution.² There exists a letter which was written by him to Mushīr-al-Sultān (The Prime Minister) while there was an anti-constitutional demonstration going on at the Bāgh-i Shāh in Tehran. In this letter Shaykh Faḏl-Allāh expresses his aims³ and

1. Qurān, 5:59.

2. See E.G. Browne, P.R., p.148; M.B. Vījūya'ī, op.cit., pp.14,15 and M.N. Kirmānī, op.cit., pp.545-560.

3. See Ḥ. Muḥāsīr, Tārīkh-i Istiqrār-i Mashrūṭiyyat, Vol.II, (Tehran, 1956), pp.1002-3. See also, R. Ra'īs Niyā and A. Nāhīd, Dū Mubārīz-i Junbish-i Mashrūṭa, p.38.

point of view, and his support for the Shāh and his disagreement with the constitutional laws. Kasravī's view of the members of this class, particularly Shaykh Fażl-Allāh, is interesting. Kasravī believes that the Shaykh had another aim in his mind. He liked to live at ease, comfortably at his pleasure leading a luxurious life and living in a fabulous building. He had built a park (Pārk Al-Sharīḳ) and possessed many coaches, owned much property and was living aristocratically. He was genuinely interested in establishing Islamic laws in theory, but we have to realize that the country and nation had no value in his mind as compared to his personal well-being.¹

Newspapers explained the aims and content of the proposed constitutional reform. Reactionary clergy spoke out emphatically against it and managed to persuade some of the erstwhile supporters of reform to oppose the movement. It is said that as soon as they spoke about developing the country, the power of the masses, the proposed education of girls or the possibility of sending students to Western countries, the reactionary clergy saw these suggestions as a turning away from religion and abandoning the law of Islam.²

1. See A. Kasravī, T.M.I., p.287.

2. See L. Lockhart "The Constitutional Laws of Persia", M.E.J. 19, 1918, p.376; M. Pavlovich, op.cit., pp.48,81; A. Qāsimī, op.cit., p.25 and H. Algar, op.cit., p.233 and see also A. Kasravī, Zindagānī-yi Man, (Tehran 1945), p.31.

On the other hand, there are other views which completely differ from the above argument. Although Shaykh Faḏl-Allāh allied himself with the other two Mujtahids, Ṭabāṭabā'ī and Bihbahānī, and supported the reform of the constitution, he turned against the constitution, when the supplementary fundamental law was approved in 1907.¹

Shaykh Faḏl-Allāh was supported by other famous Mujtahids such as Ḥājī Sayyid Muḥammad Kāẓim Ṭabāṭabā'ī-yi Yazdī and other religious leaders such as Shaykh Abū al-Ḥasan Marandī and Mīr Ḥāshim. This was the first effective setback which the new Iranian Constitutional regime suffered.

There were meanwhile, other clergy who put themselves at the service of the people and worked hard to achieve a constitution. Āyat Allāh Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī was one of these.²

A final element in bringing about the campaign for constitutional reform was the influence of the revolutionary movements abroad. Foremost among these were the revolutionary activities in Russia and Ottoman empire, which particularly influenced the people of

1. For more details see M. Malik Zāda, Tarīkh-i Īnqilāb-i Mashrūṭa-yi Īrān, Vol.IV, pp.209-220.

2. See N.R. Keddie, I.P., pp.234-5, Y. Āryan Pūr, op.cit., p.236; M. Malik Zāda, op.cit., p.263.

Āzarbāyjān, whose province bordered on these areas.¹ Merchants also gained enlightenment when they travelled to Russia, and compared and contrasted their home situation with that in other countries.² All of these diverse elements combined to inspire the constitutional movement which roused Iran from the sleep of centuries.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT

We have now examined the background causes of the constitutional movement. There was however a particular incident which finally gave the movement the impetus it needed to translate thought into action. The Régie (Tobacco monopoly) episode of 1891 made people realize that it was possible to combat the ruler who oppressed them. In the Régie Agreement, a monopoly of the purchase and sale of tobacco was given to a British merchant. The people opposed this agreement and Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh was finally obliged to cancel it.³ This outcome made the people realize that it was possible to gain their

1. See N.K. Belova, Revolyutisonnoye dvizheniye V Iranskom Azerbaydzhane, pp.7-8; A. Kasravī, T.M.I., pp.268,272 and I. Şafā'ī, Rahbarān-i Mashrūṭā, Vol.1, p.35.

2. See N. Keddie, I.P., pp.455,57,59.

3. See L.P. Elwell-Sutton, M.I., p.305; M. Dāvūdī, op.cit., p.58 and Sh. Bakhash, op.cit., p.305. For more details see M.N. Kirmānī, op.cit., pp.36-42.

legal rights by perseverance and persistence in face of the king and his despotic court.¹

The Iranian Constitutional Revolution began in December 1905 with massive demonstrations in Tehran. The people were demanding the dismissal of the reactionary and despotic prime minister,

ḤAyn al-Dawlā, and that:

"Belgian² employees should be dismissed from government positions, and that a court should be established to investigate the people's complaints and to ensure that the law worked fairly for everyone."³

This movement quickly spread to other parts of Iran, especially Tabriz. The people made more demands. They wanted constitutional laws to be drawn up, an effective parliament to be formed and the rights of private ownership secured.⁴

The movement gathered momentum. Young intellectuals and even some students studying abroad left their books to join in the struggle. Patriotic clergy like Āyat Allāh Sayyid Muhammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī and Āyat Allāh Sayyid ḤAbd Allāh Bihbahānī were at the forefront of the battle, providing leadership in the struggle for

1. See E.G. Browne, P.R., p.119; A. Bausani, The Persians, Tr. from the Italian by J.B. Downe, p.169 and ḤA. Parvīz, Tārīkh-i

Tamaddun-i Jadīd-i Duniyā va Īrān, p.538.

2. See a full account A. Kasravī, T.M.I., pp.29,34,37.

3. See M. ḤAbbāsī, op.cit., p.67; A. Qāsimī, op.cit., pp.14.15.

4. See M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., p.17; A. Kasravī, T.M.I., p.162 and A. Kasravī, Z.M., p.129.

freedom and legal rights in the spirit of the great Amīr Kabīr. Leading intellectuals in Tabriz demanded constitutional laws for Iran.¹

Under increasing daily pressure, on August 5, 1906 Muzaffar al-Dīn Shāh finally issued a decree conferring Iranian Constitutional Laws. This temporarily satisfied the people, but it soon became obvious that this decree was not going to fulfil any promises. Muzaffar al-Dīn Shāh was a sick and a weak² man who had issued the order merely to quiet the people.

The nobles and ^CAyn al-Dawla in particular would certainly not agree to it. What happened was that anybody caught talking about freedom or even justice was sent to prison by order of ^CAyn al-Dawla; and any meeting held to discuss people's rights was broken up with violence.³

Once awakened from their sleep of centuries, however, the people could not be so easily subdued. Activities and discussion continued and the country seemed set on the course of revolution.

Eventually, on September 9, 1906, Muzaffar al-Dīn Shāh gave permission for an elected assembly. Despite some reservations, this was a major victory for the people in the face of opposition from the despotic court, King and prime minister.

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1. See K. Tāhir Zāda-yi Bihzād, op.cit., pp.50,57 and A. Kasravī, T.M.I., pp.15,156,906.
 2. Sukhan, (Tehran 1953), No.6, p.369.
 3. A. Qāsimī, op.cit., p.13 and A. Kasravī, T.M.I., pp.415,418.

Clergy like Shaykh Faẓl Allāh Nūrī, a favourite at court¹ and opponent of the constitutional movement, were banished. Finally, on December 30, 1906, the Iranian Constitutional Law was approved and signed by Muzaffar al-Dīn Shāh.

Newspapers and other publications continued to play a leading role in informing and educating the people. In the years of revolution there were many publications in Iran; about three hundred and fifty papers and magazines were printed, one hundred and fifty in Tehran and fifty in Tabriz.²

The first parliament in which sat many of the most dedicated and politically aware members passed some useful laws. Life pensions held by the aristocracy were cancelled, the problem of corruption was tackled and feudal lords were dismissed.

The court and the aristocracy in general reacted swiftly. They began to plot against the very foundations of the constitution with the help of Muḥammad ^CAlī Shāh who was crowned after the death³ of his father Muzaffar al-Dīn Shāh on 8.1.1907.

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1. See M. Bahār, Tārīkh-i Mukhtaṣar-i Ahzāb-i Siyāsī, Vol.1, p.168, and N. Fathī, Zindagī Nāma-yi Siqat al-Islām Shāhid, p.184, where the author declares: "To destroy the constitution, Muḥammad ^CAlī Shāh, had guaranteed T.40,000, of which Shaykh Faẓl Allāh had received T.28,000...", and see also, M.N.I. Kirmānī, Tārīkh-i Bīdārī-yi Īrānīān, p.563.
 2. For a full and valuable account see E.G. Browne, The Press and Poetry of Persia, and also see M. ^CA. Tarbiyat, op.cit., pp.405-414.
 3. See F. Ādamiyyat, op.cit., pp.330-31 and M. Kirmānī, op.cit., pp.193-201.

In the middle of all this Russia now began to interfere actively again in Iran's internal affairs. On June 23rd 1908, the Shāh's reactionary troops and the anti-revolutionary forces carried out a coup d'état in Tehran. The National Assembly was bombarded by Lyakhov.¹ Newspapers were banned and local associations were closed down. Tabriz rebelled at this threat to the constitutional gains and tried to make its own revolution. Muhammad ^CAlī Shāh sent ^CAyn al-Dawla with a large number of troops to quell the rebellion. They were supported by Mīr Hāshim,² a leading reactionary cleric in Tabriz.

The troops surrounded the city but the people resisted and ^CAyn al-Dawla was forced to return to Tehran. Defence forces in Tabriz were led by Sattār³ Khān, Bāqir Khān and Shaykh Muḥammad Khiyābānī who were determined not to give in. Tabriz was besieged for eleven months. The people suffered and starved but would not submit. They gained valuable experience in resisting oppression

1. See W.M. Shuster, op.cit., p.40; A. Qāsimī, op.cit., 35; M.I. Riẓvānī, op.cit., pp.170-72 and K. Tāhirzāda-yi Bihzād, op.cit., pp.119-121.

2. See R. Ra'īs Niyā, A. Nāhīd, D.M., p.24; I. Ṣafā'ī, op.cit., p.436 and A. Qāsimī, op.cit., p.33.

3. Sattār Khān was the leader of the Tabriz volunteer fighters. After Muḥammad ^CAlī Shāh's coup d'état in 1908, all Iran except one quarter in Tabriz came under the Shāh and here, Sattār Khān refused to give up. He was an illiterate man of the people, and was a horse-seller before the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. (Photograph p.210)

and the might of the court, and were an example¹ to the rest of the country. The stand taken by the Tabrizis against the despotic rule of those years played a considerable role in preserving the constitutional revolution in Iran and prevented it from collapsing until its final downfall.²

The spirited defence of Tabriz gave fresh hope and inspiration to Iran. When the coup d'état took place it had seemed that civil liberty was at an end but the stand taken by Tabriz Anjuman (Political Society) revived the idea of constitutional government.

On July 9, 1909, Gīlānī insurgents commanded by Sipahdār and Bakhtiyārīs commanded by Ṣamsām al-Saltāna approached Tehran to face government troops defending the Shāh.

Muhammad ^CAlī Shāh was forced to flee to the Russian Embassy.³ A council made up of ex-members of the Majlis, ^CUlamā and Military leaders then voted to depose Muhammad ^CAlī Shāh and replaced him by his fourteen year old son, Ahmad Shāh.

Muhammad ^CAlī Shāh was sent into exile. He went to Russia and raised another force, but failed in his efforts to destroy the

1. See Markazī Tablīghāt Shu^Cbasının Nashriyyası, "Shahrīvarın On İkısı" 1324-1325 (Tabriz 1981), p.25; M.N. Kirmānī, op.cit., p.201, and for more details see A. Qāsimī, op.cit., pp.17,28,34,35.

2. R. Ra'īs Nīyā / A. Nāhīd, D.M., pp.54,222.

3. See K. Tāhir Zāda-yi Bihzād, op.cit., p.125 and M. Pavlovich / S. Iranski / v. Terya, op.cit., p.93.

revolutionaries. The Majlis then cancelled his regular annual salary. His brother Sardār As^Cad attacked the revolutionary forces from Kirmānshāh in the West but, he too, was unsuccessful.¹

Thus by 1914 Iran seemed set fair on a course to success and achievement but, unfortunately, the outbreak of World War I dashed all her hopes.

"The Iranian Government made a feeble gesture of neutrality, which the belligerents with one accord decided to ignore. The North-West became a battleground for Russian and Turkish armies; in the South British troops operated to prevent a Turkish thrust towards Afghanistan and German agents (supported by Swedish gendarmeries) stirred up trouble among the tribes."²

During the disastrous war, Iran became a battlefield for the different warring factions. The Iranian people who had recently had cause to celebrate their release from the clutches of Muhammad ^CAli Shāh, saw all their gains nullified and rendered void.

Iran sank back into her previous hopeless and distressed state. Poverty and hunger were again on the increase and epidemics were rife.³ Apart from her permanent guests, Russia and Britain, Iran

1. See

M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., p.26 and A. Qāsimī, op.cit., p.49.

2. See L.P. Elwell-Sutton, M.I., p.66; Sir Percy Sykes, H.P., Vol.2, p.263 and A. Jahān Bānī, op.cit., p.20.

3. See M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., pp.11,28, for more details see also, M. Kasravī, T.H.S.A., pp.668-704.

now found herself playing host to representatives from Germany and Turkey. The latter saw the war as an opportunity to pursue its dreams of Pan-Turkism but any hopes that the Tabriz insurgents would join Turkey were soon disappointed and the Turks were forced to leave Iran.¹

The Germans were involved in Iran because they realized the country's importance as a gateway to India, Britain's main colony in the East, and because Germany and Britain were rivals in the competition to market their goods in Iran. Before the war was over, Russian involvement in Iran came to a halt because of the Russian Revolution. With their defeat, Germany and Turkey also had finally to leave the country.² It seemed that Iran might be left in peace, but, unfortunately, the 1919 agreement once again disturbed the political atmosphere.³

Finally it should be noted that the two super-powers' interference in Iran's affairs and her constitutional movement drove many intellectuals and militants to opposition both to the Iranian regime and to its foreign backers. One of these opponents was Shaykh Muhammad Khiyābānī, whose life and political activities will be the concern of the following chapters.

1. See M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., p.26.

2. See M. Kumaramangalam, Iran at the Crossroads, p.6; M.S. Ivanov, T.N.I., p.26 and A. Kasraṽī, T.H.S.A., pp.705-714.

3. This will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

Chapter 2

EARLY LIFE OF KHIYĀBĀNĪ

Shaykh Muhammad Khiyābānī was born in 1889 in the village of Khāmina in Azerbaijan.¹ His father ^CAbd al-Hamīd was a merchant who traded with Russia. Khiyābānī after spending some time at a Maktab (religious school) in Khāmina, went to Petrovsk (modern Makhach Kala, in Daghistan) to join his father. Khiyābānī finished his secondary studies in the latter town. Because of his father's acquaintance with liberal intellectuals, Khiyābānī was able to meet Mīrzā ^CAbd al-Rahīm Ṭālibov and became a close friend of this revolutionary poet and intellectual. Khiyābānī's friendship with revolutionary activists in Petrovsk turned him into a revolutionary. After a while Khiyābānī came back to Tabriz where he studied philosophy with Mīrzā Ismā^Cīl, mathematics with Ḥājī Najm al-Dawla, history and geography with Mīrzā Riżā Khan Muhandis-i Qarajadāghī, and religious science with Ḥājī Mīrzā ^CAbd al-Hasan Āqā Mujtahid-i Angajī. He became extremely proficient in all of these subjects and in addition

1. Few details are available of Khiyābānī's life. Later writers such as Āzarī and Ṭāhir Zāda-yi Bihzād have been able to add nothing new to the account given by Bādāmchī in the Monograph devoted to Khiyābānī published by Iranschāhr in 1926 in which remains our only source in Persian for this period and from which the following account is taken.

was fluent in French, Turkish, Arabic and Russian.¹ Khiyābānī was very interested in study. One of his teachers, Mīrza Ismā^Cīl, said of him, "Mīrzā Muḥammad Khiyābānī is a clever and intelligent student. Whatever I taught him, he has learnt to perfection. It is obvious that if he carries on as he has done so far, he will succeed me". A remark like this from such a scholar is an important testimony to Khiyābānī's abilities. Khiyābānī married the daughter of Hājī Sayyid Husayn Āqā the Pīshnamāz of Khāmina and succeeded his father-in-law as Pīshnamāz (Prayer Leader) of the Masjid-i Jum^Ca-yi Tabrīz (Tabriz Friday mosque) and the Masjid-i Karīm Khān (Karīm Khān Mosque) where his sermons are said to have attracted audiences of more than one thousand, for four years. He had a brother who lived in Bākū and an uncle who was killed during the Russian Civil War in 1918 during the shelling by Denikin's forces of Petrovsk. Khiyābānī had six children, four sons and two daughters. Five of these children are still living in Tabriz and Tehran while the other has recently emigrated to Canada.

KHIYĀBĀNĪ'S POLITICAL LIFE UP TO THE AZERBAIJAN UPRISING

From his earliest days freedom and independence were consistent themes running through Khiyābānī's life. He realised that a person must struggle to gain his rights however difficult that struggle may be, and in addition to his fight to change the way of thinking of his fellow

¹ see B. Āzar Ughli, (ed.)

Āzarbāyjān Rūznāmasının Nashriyyası, (Baku, 1961), p.3.

countrymen, he always showed himself ready to carry on the struggle by the use of force if necessary.

Khiyābānī was introduced to Siqat al-Islām, a famous religious revolutionary figure of Azerbaijan, by Mustashār al-Dawla and had connections with Hājī ʿAlī Dawā Furūsh, one of the leading Social Democrats of Azerbaijan and an active member of this Party.

Thus during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, in which the people of Tabriz fought bravely to restore the constitution, Khiyābānī fought rifle on shoulder along with Sattār Khān and other patriotic volunteers against the anti-constitutional forces of the central government.

During the Istibdād-i Saḡhīr,¹ along with Mīrzā Ismāʿīl Hashtarūdi (a famous and courageous revolutionary of Tabriz and Tabriz deputy to the second Majlis of Iran) he carried the Bayraq-i Kāviyānī beside Sattār Khān and other revolutionaries, who were proposing to march on Tehran to impose the nation's demands on Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāh. Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāh no sooner received this report than he agreed to put into effect the supplementary laws of the constitution, which Khiyābānī believed to be progressive laws for the conditions of that period.

1. A period in which the Majlis was bombarded and many Iranian liberals were killed, after which the Majlis was shut down for three months from June 1908.

When Tabriz was surrendered by ^CAyn al-Dawla, Khayābānī was the representative of the Mujāhidīn (freedom fighters) who negotiated with him in the face of his demands for Tabriz to submit. He and his colleagues Mīrzā Muḥammad Taqī Ṭabāṭabā'ī Khātambaksh,¹ Ḥusayn Khān-i ^CAdālat and Mīrzā Ḥusayn Vā^Ciz refused to accept the conditions of the central government and declared,

"we are not afraid of your powerful troops and heavy artillery and we will not abandon our rights; we want to have a government like the European countries and be strong like them and stand on our own feet without any external interference".²

They fulfilled this promise, and resisted the central government troops and, while they were surrounded, preferred to eat yūnjā (lucerne) in the lack of other food rather than submit.

Thus during this period Khayābānī took part in the revolt of a people who were oppressed and deprived of their rights, and discharged his duty fully. It is presumably from this period that he became politically aware and active, and during the following years he was to assume a leading part in awakening and enlightening the people.

THE TABRIZ ANJUMAN

The Tabriz Anjuman or council was founded in 1906, after the establishment of the constitution. In the beginning, the only

1. See Appendix No.1.

2. ^CA. Āzarī, Qiyām-i Shaykh Muḥammad Khayābānī, p.12.

purpose of this council was to choose the Azerbaijan deputies for the National Assembly. However this council eventually became so powerful and dealt with so many important matters that the crown Prince Muhammad ^CAli, who was residing in Tabriz, was obliged to accept its existence and to follow its orders.

The establishment of the Tabriz council brought a great deal of improvement to Tabriz;

"The council dealt with the complaints of the Tabrizis.

Its members were broad-minded, liberal and well-informed people. Some of its members were the following:

Mīrzā Muhammad Taqī Tabātabā'ī, Shaykh Muhammad Khiyābānī Shaykh Sālīm, Hājī Ismā^Cīl Amīr Khīzī and Muhammad Husayn Vā^Ciz."¹

Following the hoarding of certain vital provisions, especially wheat, the council requisitioned this reserve of wealth and established a fixed price for bread and meat. But the most important action of the Tabriz council was to challenge Muhammad ^CAlī Shāh, who had now succeeded his father, and his illegal activities. The leaders of the council were attempting to put a stop to the Shāh's activities and those of the local reactionary groups and the external enemies of the country who supported him, while the reactionary and anti-constitutional groups, who were helped by Russian funds and encouraged by Muhammad ^CAlī Shāh, were working against the constitution along with Shaykh Fażl Allāh-i Nūrī, culminating with

1. See K. Tāhir Zāda-yi Bihzād, op.cit., pp.=48-49.

the demonstration of Maydān-i Tūpkhāna, which took place in 1909.

The council took certain steps against the reactionary groups.

Ahmad Kasravī says of this event;

"In the event of the Tūpkhāna some of the reactionary rebels under the supervision of Shaykh Faḏl Allāh were demonstrating against the constitution with the encouragement of the Shāh and financial aid from the Russians and were demanding, 'we want the Prophet's religion, and we are not interested in the constitution.'"¹

Because of this event the Assembly and the Constitution were in a dangerous position, and the Tabriz council carried out two important tasks; they declared Muhammad ḌAlī Shāh deposed, who had sworn on the Quran to rule the country according to the constitution but who had been involved in dishonest activities against the country and the nation, and they informed the Shāh and all foreign ambassadors in Iran of their action.

Furthermore, the Tabriz council instructed all the Azerbaijani soldiers and officers who were in the service of Muhammad ḌAlī Shāh not to obey him any longer; otherwise the council would arrest their relations, destroy their property and sequester their wealth if they did not recognize the power of the deputies of the Majlis. As a result of these moves there was a great surge of pro-constitutional activity among Iranians throughout the country.

1. R. Ra'īs Niyā, D.M., p.238.

R. Ra^Cīs Niyā, writing about this incident, states;

"Muhammad ^CAlī Shāh in this situation, due to much harassment, was losing his patience and was obliged to ask the deputies to talk to the nation on his behalf because the Tabriz council, through the assembly, had even gone as far as to demand that another king be chosen".¹

However, the Tabriz council stood firm and the Shāh was forced to ask for support from British and Russian representatives. In spite of everything he clung to power, and although he had promised to recognise the assembly and act in accordance with the constitution he gave orders to destroy the assembly. The Tabriz council assumed its duties and they informed all embassies in Iran of this matter. Muhammad ^CAlī Shāh knew the Tabrizis very well, as he had ruled in Tabriz when he was still crown prince. He was absolutely aware of the fact that he would never be able to impose his dictatorship on the country without much resistance from such a people. The following lines from H. Taqīzāda may help us to understand the position further.

"...One day Majīd al-Mulk, who was a close friend of Muhammad ^CAlī Shāh said that the king and his associates had been discussing the people's wishes. The king said; 'my greatest wish is to be ruler of Kirmān'. This claim surprised them very much and they felt much unhappiness on hearing it. As we know Tabriz has always been the pride of Iran because of its resistance in the face of despotism and its movements for freedom.

1. R. Ra^Cīs Niyā, D.M., p.40.

We asked the king the reason for this wish. He answered 'Don't be foolish! There would be no resistance in Kirmān even if we were to skin them alive, but the people of this city (Tabriz) are emotional...'¹

In order to inform people of what was happening in the capital, the Tabriz council published pamphlets and asked people to take notice of what was going on and to gather in the mosques. They taught people how to use a rifle and how to defend themselves. Through these activities, which were directed by the politically conscious and well-informed leaders of Tabriz such as Muḥammad Khiyābānī and Mirzā Muḥammad Taqī Ṭabāṭabā'ī (chairman of the Tabriz council and also the Tabriz deputy for the fourth assembly) they would, they hoped, be able to defeat despotism and all those who were reactionary and anti-constitutional.²

K.T. Bihzād in his interesting work on this council and its activities states that

"in fact the Tabriz council was the only Iranian political force to resist in the face of an arbitrary government. During the 11 months in which it was surrounded by the Shāh's troops, Tabriz was still the only city to maintain the constitution and keep it alive, putting up a brave resistance. Most of the decisions made in this council were proposed by Sayyid Ḥasan Taqī Zāda who was one of Iran's most famous politicians. His speeches were tough and effective - M. ^CAlī Shāh would say 'let's have our supper, if Taqī Zāda will allow us'. The Tabriz

1. H. Taqī Zāda, Khaṭābahā-yi Sayyid Ḥasan Taqī Zāda Mushtamalbar Shamma'ī Az Tārīkh-i Avāyil-i Inqilāb-i Mashrūṭiyyat-i Īrān (Tehran 1958), p.58.

2. ^CA. Āzarī, Kulunil Muḥammad Taqī Khān-i Pisyān, p.71.

council had asked all newspaper correspondents throughout the world to come and see what was going on in Tabriz. The Islamic Council had been acting against the constitution and this centre of aggression was destroyed in Ramażān and closed down forever".¹

RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN TABRIZ

During this period Tabriz in particular suffered many upheavals and disturbances provoked by foreign interference. Especially brutal and tragic in its results was Russian intervention. Russia took a great part in the events of these years, including the dividing of Iran between herself and Great Britain in 1907 and 1915 and the bombardment of the Majlis by Lyakhov by which he hoped to destroy the Iranian constitutional base and Iranian hopes for constitutional progress. The suppression of the liberals and patriots of Tabriz in 1908-9 was carried out only because the Tabrizis were demanding their legal rights of Constitutional Law and Assembly. In order to enforce this the Russians sent three divisions from Yerevan and Tiflis to Tabriz. On this occasion Tabriz became a slaughterhouse of the liberals. A number of books which analyse this event in Tabriz show us the magnitude of the Russian interference with the Tabrizis. The most valuable of these accounts is that given by E.G. Browne, who explains these events much more fully than

1. See K. Tāhir Zāda-yi Bihzād, op.cit., p.150.

anybody else.¹ When the Russians discovered that they would not be able to achieve their aims through their local agents, they decided to operate directly themselves. At this period, Ṣamad Khān-i Shujā^c al-Dawla was in open revolt against the constitution and the liberals. The Russians openly protected him and supported him indirectly until they realized that the Tabrizis were determined to resist their aggressive aims. The Russians then started to arrest and imprison the liberals² and Mujāhidīn (freedom fighters) and occupied the important points in the city. By the beginning of February, refugees from Tabriz were arriving in Constantinople, and one of these refugees reported all of the events which were happening in Tabriz. This account was published in the Manchester Guardian of February 9, 1912, with the help of E.G. Browne.³ While discussing this aggression, we should mention some of the patriotic Tabrizis who lost their lives for the sake of freedom. Those who were hanged in December 1911 were the two brothers Ḥasan and Qadīr, the sons of ^cAlī Monsieur, Shaykh Salīm, Ṣādiq al-Mulk, Kāzīm Zāda, Ziyā' al-^cUlamā and his uncle and finally Siqat al-Islām.

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1. E.G. Browne is the only person who has given an accurate and full account of the Iranian constitutional events outside Iran. There are also a few historians writing in Persian whose works are valuable and useful, e.g. Kasravī and Bihzād.
 2. In this period Vuṣūq al-Dawla was the Foreign Minister. In answer to the Tabrizis' appeal for help against the Russian tortures and killings, his only reply was to blame them for fighting against the Russians. See Yaghmā, No.37, (Tehran 1951), pp.230-231.
 3. The original reports are kept at the library of Cambridge University. These valuable and important letters were presented by Professor E.G. Browne to this Library. They have been published under the title of Nāmahā'ī Az Tabrīz (letters from Tabriz) by Ḥ. Javādī.

Hasan was sixteen years old and his brother was twelve. Their offence was merely that their elder brother was one of the Mujāhidīn who was not captured by the Russians. They were the first sacrifices. Hasan bravely climbed on the chair and cried "Long live Iran, Long live freedom", then he was hanged, before Qadīr's eyes. While his elder brother was in his death-throes, the younger brother was prepared for hanging. He repeated what his brother had said and shouted, "down with Russia". Siqat al-Islām having prayed, was the third in this tragic event. He declared, "It is our pleasure to be killed by the enemies of our religion on this day". Then Siqat al-Islām personally put the rope round his neck and the hanging took place. Kasravī, who was an eyewitness of these tragic days, describes an execution as follows;

"...first Mashhadī ^CAmū Uqlī came bravely and climbed up on a chair and put the noose round his neck, took off his hat and threw it in the face of a Russian officer who was in charge, then immediately pushed away the chair which was holding his body; after a while, he was dead. He lived bravely and died generously."²

The Tabrizis who were executed by the Russians numbered forty two. This figure does not include those who were killed by the Russians during the fighting. The next shock produced by Russia was the 1911 ultimatum in which Russia put forward the following demands;

1. See A. Kasravī, T.H.S.A., p.369

The Persian Government should dismiss Mr W.M. Shuster;
The Persian Government should undertake to appoint no
foreigners in government service without previously consulting
the Russian and British¹ ministers in future; and the
Iranian government should pay an indemnity for the expenses
involved in the despatch of the Russian expedition.²

It was not possible for the people to endure such demands, indeed
it was a matter of life and death; acceptance of this ultimatum
would have meant that Iranian independence³ and the country itself
would no longer exist. Many thinking Iranians were affronted by
this ultimatum which they saw as yet another example of foreign
interference. In the National Parliament of Iran, Shaykh
Muhammad Khiyābānī, who was the deputy for Tabriz in the second period
of the parliament, declared that he was amazed at this note which
had been delivered by Russia. *The following is a free translation of his speech:*

From the hour that this note from the Russian Government
was read in a special session of the Majlis and we learned
about the contents of the note, since then, I, as an
Iranian, am in a state of astonishment and shock. For
when I think about the question in this
note I realise that this is not simply an article of
law about which we must sit and discuss. All gentlemen
here and even all the world if it were present here
could agree that there are some questions in the world

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1. Although this event is known as the Russian ultimatum, we should, nevertheless, realize that it was given by both Russia and Britain to Iran.
 2. See Banani, op.cit., p.37; E.G. Browne, The Persian Crisis of December 1911, p.14 and W.M. Shuster, op.cit., p.37.

whose answers have been given three or four hundred years ago and have been approved universally in the high courts of the world... the question is this: when human beings appeared on earth and laid the foundation of finding food and existence, obviously there was an age of barbarism - that is to say every man instinctively desired to acquire anything which attracted him or her and rejected laws and regulations. This selfish drive in man has been the cause of conflict and war. In order to free themselves from such a situation they, thousands of years ago, gathered together and formed governments. This was done to protect what is in the interest of man and reject what is against the human interest. In order to prevent aggression by one group against another group and in order to make man realize his own rights, national and social governments were formed. However this did not stop people from being aggressive and war mongers, and conflict among nations existed and continued. They plundered each other, and what an individual naturally used to do, the same was done by nations. One nation tried to destroy another or reduce it to poverty. But fortunately now we live in an age in which nations have sat and agreed upon certain international laws which should be obeyed. These laws are being gradually observed and I hope will continue to be observed. Now if one nation treats another nation as was done a thousand years ago and expects her demands to be fulfilled, then we have to say that history has answered this kind of relationship four hundred years ago. We have to tell a demanding nation politely, 'your demand is contrary to the present age and contrary to all agreements made on the world level'. Now we return to the subject of demands that have been put forward by the Russian government to the Iranian government. There are a few points that perhaps other persons might describe

and discuss. I shall express the matter as I feel. There has been an agreement made in the world and taken for granted, that is, that anyone who possesses something which is transferred to or acquired by him lawfully, he or she has the right to protect and keep this thing and to have all freedom to do with his possession whatever he likes. 'This is called independence.' That is to say every individual has the right to use his property as he wishes. It is the same with social matters - namely with governments. A government is independent when it can control all its possessions freely. When it is slightly in danger of being harmed it should be able to defend itself. Now as I pointed out before, no-one has a right to deprive others of independence and freedom unless he thinks in terms of two thousand years ago. Regardless of the long history of Iran, 6000 years old, Iran has formed a government and is one of the founders of social law and order. Now anybody realizes this, that the demands that have been put to Iran are contrary to her freedom and independence. I do not want to discuss these demands in detail; the time is short, and my friends will discuss it in detail, but one of the articles in the Russian Ultimatum is this, that 'if the Iranian Government wishes to employ any advisors she should consult both the Russian and British Governments'. This means that if they do not agree then Iranian Government can not take any action. Well, in this world in which there is so much trade, commercial and financial relationships, if someone sees that his freedom and independence are slightly threatened he has the right to protest and say that his interests are based on universal agreements. I as a representative of a nation which has acquired these rights thousands of years ago say that so far we have been independent; that is to say we can protect the rights and advancement of our country. If we now accept this

ultimatum, which we have not experienced before; then the independence of our country will suffer. This means they will not allow us to think about and prepare for the advancement and independence of our own country. With the utmost courage and with the utmost regret and with the utmost open heart I must tell our neighbour government that it is never possible for a nation which regards itself as a living one, to transfer her own responsibility to others. Finally I must add that since these demands will damage the independence of Iran, there is not any doubt and it is impossible that Iran would accept this demand willingly; and I am sure that the Russian Government, in view of her friendship with Iran and her efforts to improve this friendship will realize that this demand is contrary to the universally accepted agreements among nations, and contrary to all statements expressed by Russia as regards Iranian independence. I hope that this demand will be withdrawn and that Iranians' feelings will not be hurt; and I hope that the honourable ministers will go along with the nation and Majlis in order to reject this Russian demand.'

Persian Parliamentary Documents 1911

Although as we have seen the Majlis rejected the ultimatum Muḥammad ^CAlī Shāh with the aid of Lyakhov shut down the second Majlis. Khiyābānī then made another speech against this ultimatum at Sābza Maydān (a square in Tehran). Afterwards, on government orders, he was forced to leave Tehran for Mashhad. In the meantime some of Khiyābānī's friends were arrested and some banished to Qum and Kāshān. After a few months' stay at Mashhad, Khiyābānī decided to visit Tabriz. He travelled to Julfā via Southern

Russia, a route which was rather safer than travelling through Iran. In Julfā he was advised to go to Petrovsk where his father had a business and not to visit Tabriz. In Tabriz there was no protection from the government's officers and the Russian appointed agent Shuj ā' al-Dawla, a man who was known to be cruel and oppressive and to be anti-constitutional. After a few years sojourn at Petrovsk and Baku he returned home, but because of the terrible situation in Tabriz, there was no chance of political activity among the people. Shuj ā' al-Dawla dominated Tabriz until 1917, the year in which the Tzarist Government collapsed.

The collapse brought a ray of hope to the people of Tabriz who were struggling to survive in the hands of a despotic government and its agents. Indeed, the onset of the Russian revolution helped to change the whole political atmosphere of Iran, particularly Tabriz, because the most aggressive and disruptive oppressor of Iran had been greatly weakened.

THE FORMATION OF THE ANJUMAN-I AYĀLATĪ VA VILĀYATĪ

We have studied in the previous chapter the various events which followed the fourth election to the Majlis and led to Khiyābānī's rising. On July 2, 1917 a manifesto was published by the committee of the Azerbaijan Ayālat which can be summarised as follows:

Dear fellow countrymen, The period of the great Iranian Revolution, in which there was such anarchy and bloodshed, is now over. In order to prevent the return of such a dark

situation which threatens our independence and freedom; and in order for the Ayālat committee to control the governmental officials according to the Iranian Constitutional Law; in order to rebuild our ruined country and prevent the interference of such unauthorised people in the governmental departments, we would like to hold an election to select the members of the Anjuman-i Ayālāti va vilāyatī who are famous for being honest, active and patriot personalities.¹

On July 12, 1917 the Committee sent a telegram to Tehran stating its demands as follows:

"There is no need to describe Azerbaijan's necessities; the harsh conditions in Azerbaijan are obvious to our government, nevertheless, due to the lack of objection and protest by Azerbaijanis no attention is paid to by the government to this province. We as the deputies of the people will not leave the Telegraph Office, unless you seriously examine our demands as follows:

- a. the appointment of a wise and responsible governor-general who is trusted by the people.
- b. the appointment of officials to the Azerbaijan finance and justice departments.
- c. the sending of a committee for the Gendarmerie in order to build up security both outside and inside of Azerbaijan.

Signed by the representatives of the people, Shaykh Muhammad Khīyābānī, Mu^Cīn al-Ra^Cā yā, Mu^Ctamad al-Tujjār, Mushīr al-Sādāt and Mīrzā Ja^Cfar Javān... ."2

1. See ^CA. Āzarī, Q.Kh., p.163.

2. See ^CA. Āzarī, op.cit., pp.109-110.

Meanwhile elections were held in Tehran in August 1917 but the date of elections was not announced for other provinces. On September 1, 1917 another telegram was sent to Tehran by the Anjuman-i Ayālatī committee in regard to the delay of elections in Azerbaijan. According to the Iranian Constitutional Law, fifteen days after elections in the capital, the other provinces must hold elections, but this did not take place either in the other provinces or in Azerbaijan.

In response to the telegrams from the Anjuman-i Ayālatī the following telegram was sent by the government to Tabriz:

"To prevent a crisis, the Prime Minister has agreed to appoint as soon as possible a governor-general whom Anjuman-i Āzarbāyjān wanted... ." ¹

Of these events Tajaddud, the official organ of the Democrat party, wrote: ²

"...The spirit of democracy and revival has suffered from the events which have taken place in our country. There was no way to freedom unless society was in a normal situation. We democrats would not wish to live in this poisoned atmosphere and stand these conditions any more. We would like to ask our responsible government to put an end to this abnormal position and we democrats hereby announce that we reject this and are going to challenge it through our democracy." ³

On August 23, 1917 the Anjuman-i Āzrbaijan published its policy which briefly runs as follows:

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1. See ^CA. Āzarī, Q.Kh., p.121.
 2. See p.141 of this thesis.
 3. See ^CA. Āzari, op.cit., p.146.

1. Azerbaijan and its policy: They declared that Azerbaijan was inseparable from the rest of Iran and neither external powers nor internal reactionary groups had the right to destroy their freedom. The Democrat Party of Azerbaijan wished to take steps on the path to revival and declared its opposition to the present anarchy in Iran. The Ayālat Committee demanded the appointment of honest governors who had demonstrated their good character. As regards the tribes they frankly demanded of them that they should live in peace and not be permitted to make trouble for others, and finally they stated that they would react against those who opposed them.
2. Concerning the Parliament elections: The Committee declared that, due to the importance of the National Parliament in which all laws were drawn up and put in action; according to the Iranian Nation's demands, the Committee asked for quick elections. At the time of elections the democrats would work to support their own Party's representatives to the Majlis.
3. The importance of the District and Provincial Anjumans: The Anjuman-i Ayālatī-yi Āzarbāijān realized that how important were the district and provincial Anjumans, and the Committee therefore immediately took steps in the latter mentioned Anjumans.
4. The Āyālat Committee and the recent Revolution in the U.S.S.R.: Since the Iranian and Russian Nation's relations were close and friendly, in accordance with both nations' struggle against their despotic governments, the Committee was pleased to announce how grateful they were for the recent Revolution in the Soviet Union. They accordingly wanted to further activities and relations between the two nations.

5. Discipline in the Party: Since discipline was an important matter for any party, the Committee noted its importance and asked its members to put themselves in order as quickly as possible.

6. The Democrats and other Parties: As regards the other Parties in the country the Committee asked for their co-operation and that they should all work together for the Iranian Nation's prosperity.¹

Despite these activities of Khiyābānī and other democrats in the Anjuman-i Ayālatī-yi Āzarbayjān, anarchy still existed at an extreme level. The people of Garūs who were being plundered by the tribes took refuge in Tabriz where many of them were forced to beg and were reduced to a desperate situation. Urūmiya was burnt down and its Bāzār was plundered and set on fire by the Russians; in Ahar the situation was so bad that local Shāh Savan tribesmen rebelled; in Miyāna Muqtadir Nizām the governor-general had caused many troubles for the people; in Tabriz a demonstration took place against the injustice committed by governmental officials; in other cities and villages of Āzerbaijan conditions were the same as in Tabriz.

Meanwhile in other cities, apart from Āzerbaijan, particularly in Tehran, terrorism was rife; the American Consul was killed by a group of people; Matīn al-Sultān, director of the newspaper Āshr-i Jadīd, Muntakhab al-Dawla, Ahmad Khān-i Safā, Mushīr Zāda and Abū al-Fath and some others also were killed by a "Committee" in Tehran and other cities. The members of this Committee who called themselves

1. Tajaddud, 1,6,1296 (20.8.1917).

Kumīta-yi Mujāzāt (Punishment Committee) were Mīrzā Ibrāhīm Khān-i Munshī Zāda, Asad Allāh Khān-i Abū al-Faṭḥ Zāda and Muḥammad Nazar Khān-i Mishkāṭ.¹

World War I caused a great deal of hardship in Iran. The allied forces who were using Iran as a supply route to Russia, and the famine of 1917 in Azerbaijan had a dire affect on the living conditions of the people, which were made much worse by hoarders and greedy merchants. The people suffered both physically and spiritually, that is to say, not only did they live in misery and want, but were treated cruelly by the allied forces. Tajaddud protested against this situation in the following words:

"...Young men of the South! shame on you who are co-operating with foreigners. Are you not traitors to the country?! Be aware that the democracy of Iran is not going to forget traitors to Iran. There has occurred an unbelievable incident which has saddened your hearts. Two days ago while a 15 year-old boy was selling bread, he was stopped by some British soldiers who attempted to rape him. The boy resisted so one of the soldiers cut his throat. When some Shirazis appeared who were passing by chance, the soldiers left the boy but unfortunately he soon died. This is a definite proof about these gentlemen who are fighting in the name of humanity and democracy and supposed to be protecting a poor nation's rights."²

The opposition of the Azerbaijan Anjuman to the government continued. Although more telegrams were sent to Tehran and vice versa, Khiyābānī in a telegram in which he urged the government

1. See Iranschāhr, No.14 (Berlin 1926); M.Q. Hidāyat, Kh.Kh., p.309.

2. Tajaddud, 12/8/1296 (22.10.1917).

to fulfill the demands of Azerbaijan and to pay particular attention to the present situation declared,

"We did not think that the government representatives were such negligent and thoughtless persons in regard to the truth. I would like to notify you that most Azerbaijanis have noticed that the present anarchy is caused by some reactionary statesmen in the Cabinet. That is why we have opposed the government and demanded our rights. But unfortunately, the Cabinet openly tried to ignore our needs. We would like to ask for the formation of a Cabinet in which honest politicians will take part as quickly as possible. Otherwise we would think that the Cabinet is not interested in Azerbaijanis' affairs. I am disappointed in this policy and worried by this situation.
Khīyābānī."¹

Khīyābānī received a reply to his telegram from Tehran which admitted that there were reactionary elements in the government but urged him to be patient;

"..... I am very surprised that although you have been in the capital for a few years, nevertheless you are complaining of the situation, and similarly other Azerbaijanis do not look seriously at the situation in Tehran. I do not deny that there are some reactionary elements in the Cabinet, but the spirit of freedom will never die down and no pressure will be able to spoil the truth; our kind and nationalist Shāh, in particular will meet Iranians' demands. Zanjānī."²

1. ^cA. Āzarī, Q.Kh., p.163.

2. ^cA. Āzarī, op.cit., p.163.

Khiyābānī and other democrats in the Azerbaijan Anjuman demanded the dismissal of the Cabinet in which nationalist and honest statesmen had not taken part. After the passing of some time the government not only had not met its promises to the Azerbaijanis, but had delayed the holding of Majlis elections in Azerbaijan. The communications between Azerbaijan and the government were described by various newspapers in Tehran. Khiyābānī and other democrats were condemned by the press. Kawkab-i Īrān on December 9, 1917 described Khiyābānī's activities as anarchy and declared:

"...how can we describe the existence of two governments within one country? The answer is very clear, anarchy, lack of government and feudalism..."¹

Nawbahār writes:

"...we do not believe in this government; there has been a protest in Rasht; a rebellion took place in Āzarbayjān... We must await other acts of opposition from other parts of Iran..."²

Like other papers, Sitāra-yi' Īrān anxiously warned the government not to give further opportunities to the opposition

1. Kawkab-i Īrān, December 7, 1917 (16.9.1296).

2. Nawbahār, December 8, 1917 (17.9.1296).

and suggested that the Iranian government must pay more attention to the situation. The government it stated should show firmness and take drastic action against the rebellions.¹

Īrān in an article wrote:

"...Iran is passing through abnormal days and, in order to establish a powerful government, she needs to form her cabinet from wise and learned politicians..."²

In the meantime in Tabriz there was another meeting on Monday December 22, 1917 at Tajaddud. First a short speech was made by Mīrzā Taqī Khān-i Raf^Cat, the second editor of Tajaddud, addressing the Azerbaijanis and talking about their unfortunate fate which had been caused by the plundering, killing and harsh conditions to which they had been exposed. The second speaker, Mīrzā Īsmā^Cīl Nawbarī spoke about the democrats' activities in Tabriz, stating that the activities of the democrats naturally hindered the reactionary plans which the central government wanted to carry out. Finally Karbalā'ī ^CAlī Ḥarīrī gave another short speech and mentioned the effective and useful role of the democrats in the fall of the Cabinet.

Following this meeting a telegram was sent by the Committee to Tehran in which the previous demands were once more repeated.

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1. Sitāra-yi-Īrān, December 8, 1917 (17.9.1296).
 2. Īrān, December 11, 1917 (20.9.1296).

However the government was involved in the First World War and had little time to devote to internal policy. This development was nevertheless obviously disturbing to the Cabinet. Russia was absorbed with her revolution and struggling with World War I, and in response to this Great Britain had adopted a more active policy in Iran. According to Nawbahār¹, British troops advanced in Sīstān and increased their influence both in the East and the West of the country, filling the vacuum created by the departure of the Russians and establishing new bases. Five thousand British troops were involved in Kirmān, Shīrāz, Sīrjān and Bandar-i ^CAbbās. Tajaddud on Wednesday February 27, 1918 wrote:

"...Britain was running a Cabinet in Tehran which intended to destroy the country. But Azerbaijan did not give them the opportunity and instead demanded its rights. The reactionary religious groups hatched satanic plots; tribes started to create anarchy in the countryside; Britain was effectively involved in the capital..."

Azerbaijan's opposition to the government and members of the Cabinet was not superficial or based on likes or dislikes of personalities, but was based on a political stand, being opposed to the ruling government and their self interest.

"...Azerbaijan is not going to be an idle spectator of the capital's politicians; instead, she will rebel without any hesitation..."²


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1. Nawbahār, (12.3.1918).
 2. Tajaddud, February 27, 1918.

In Tehran, according to the Sitāra-yi Īrān, the following demands were put to Sir Charles Marling the British Minister Plenipotentiary: to leave the running of the Police in the South to the Iranian Government and recall the British officers from that area; to release all the currency belonging to Iran which was kept at the Shāhanshāhi Bank, to evacuate Iranian territory as soon as possible.¹

The situation in Iran was most unsatisfactory. On the one hand the political atmosphere in the capital had caused instability throughout Iran and on the other hand insecurity, lack of law and order, famine and above all involvement in the World War I, had made life difficult in general and in Azerbaijan in particular.

Khiyābānī's activities were interrupted by the Turkish invasion of Azerbaijan in 1918 which resulted in Khiyābānī and two other democrat leaders, Bādāmchī and Nawbarī, being banished to Qārs in Turkey. This Turkish aggression coincided with a miserable famine in which about ten thousand Iranians died. Despite these circumstances in which every grain of wheat was equal to the life of a human being the Turks nevertheless forcibly obtained their requirements directly from the city granary without paying its price. It became clear that the Turkish plan was not only to arrest and punish the Assyrians, but to pursue their Pan-Turkist ideas. A

1. See The Sitāra-yi Īrān, March 18, 1918.



man called Yūsuf Ziyā Bayg was appointed by the Turks to establish the Ittiḥād-i Islām (Pan Islam). The intention was to unite the Turkish speaking people of Russian Azerbaijan, Iranian Azerbaijan and the Turks of Turkey under the Turkish flag, into a new country in the name of Pan Turkism. The people of Tabriz led by Khiyābānī and his comrades resisted the Turkish demands. As a result, Khiyābānī Bādāmchī and Nūbarī were arrested and sent to Urūmiyya. After two months they were banished to Qārs prison in Turkey and sentenced to fifteen days in jail. They were then released and sent to Tabriz as a direct result of the defeat of the central powers with whom Turkey was allied. When Khiyābānī and his colleagues were once more among their fellow-citizens he declared:

"I would not wish to be born again, but if I were I would prefer to be born among the hungry and rejected people so that I can share their rejection and humiliation. I would not wish to deny my fellow countrymen even if I were to be cut in pieces."

In conclusion we must observe that during the period between 1908-1919, two major foreign intervention took place in Iran. This period began with Tsarist Russia's attack against the Constitutional Revolution and ended with the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919. Tsarist Russia, opposing the Constitutional Revolution and taking its opportunity from the weak state of the Iranian government, attacked the Majlis, killing many democrats in Tehran,

1. See R. Ra'is Niyā, D.M., p.234.

while in Tabriz Şamad Khān-i Shujā^C al-Dawla who was closely backed by Tsarist Russia killed or hanged many constitutionalists. Tsarist Russians in fact had a direct role in the killing of eminent members of the Constitutional Revolution like Şiqat al-Īslām. Khīyābānī strongly opposed the Russian ultimatum of 1911 and left Tehran after the closure of the Majlis. Finding himself unsafe both in Tehran and Tabriz he had to go to Petrovsk where he stayed a couple of months before returning to Tabriz. Due to the presence of Şamad Khān-i Shujā^C al-Dawla as governor of Azerbaijan, a bitter enemy of the Constitutional Revolution, Khīyābānī could not take part openly in political activities, and for the time opened a shop in the Bāzār where he could communicate with freedom fighters. The start of World War I and the invasion of Azerbaijan by the Turks caused more anarchy and disorder in Azerbaijan. Khīyābānī, who opposed Pan-Turkism in Azerbaijan, was arrested by the Turks and sent into exile in Turkey. The ending of the First World War and the return of Khayābānī from exile, together with the evacuation of Iran by the Russians following the October revolution, paved the ground for further political activities and formation of the Anjuman-i Ayālatī va valāyatī in Azerbaijan by Khīyābānī. This can be regarded as the starting point of Khīyābānī's uprising. In these circumstances Britain decided to fill the vacuum in Iran by making the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 by which Britain proposed to support the Persian Central Government against internal democratic movements like the uprising of Khīyābānī in Azerbaijan. The nature and aims of this agreement will be discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter 3

THE ANGLO-PERSIAN 1919 AGREEMENT

The outbreak of World War I and the weakness of the Iranian government destroyed for the time being any prospects of democracy or progress in Iran although by the end of the war circumstances had changed so radically that the atmosphere was once more suitable for the revival of political and democratic activity. Although Iran had declared its neutrality in 1914 this was ignored by the combatants. Britain and Russia continued to maintain large numbers of troops on Iranian territory, and in 1915 signed a new treaty whereby the whole of Iran was occupied, by Russia in the North and Britain in the South. In 1916 identical notes were presented by the two powers to the then Prime Minister, Sipahdār, demanding that Persian finance and customs and the Persian army should be under joint Anglo-Russian supervision. The first Majlis was dissolved on June 23, 1908 because of Liyakhov's bombardment of the Parliament; the second Majlis which was convened on November 15, 1909 was shut down on December 1, 1909 due to the Russian ultimatum; the third Majlis election took place in June 1914 but did not meet because of the Russian occupation of Iran.

In effect Britain and Russia were the real masters of Iran during these years. The fact that the nominal Iranian government had no real powers inevitably led to the spread of anarchy throughout the

country, with a breakdown of law and order, the interruption of normal commercial life and widespread hunger, 1917 in particular being a year of famine. The first revolt against this situation took place in 1916, when an anti-British movement was led in Būshīhr by Shaykh Husayn Khān-i Chāh Kūtāhī which was assisted by Wassmuss, a German agent. This revolt which was directed against the British-raised occupation force, the South Persia Rifles (S.P.R.), was not suppressed until 1921.¹

The collapse of the Tsarist regime in 1917 changed the situation in Iran drastically. The bulk of Russian troops simply made their way back to Russia, although a number of units remained loyal to the Tsar and remained in Iran, where they later entered the service of the Shāh. The disappearance of the Russian armies on her Eastern front led to a brief Turkish occupation of Azerbaijan, in which a number of German agents were involved.

This sudden disappearance of Russia from the North of Iran inevitably led to a state of anarchy in the region. British troops were insufficient to occupy the whole area, and after a brief attempt to occupy Baku in order to prevent the Bolsheviks from establishing themselves there they only played a minor role in the North of Iran, since British public opinion was now strongly opposed to further military ventures. For the meantime the Iranian army was too weak to occupy these areas effectively itself. A striking example of the weakness of the Iranian government at this

1. For more details see H. Makkī, op.cit., Vol.1, pp.22-24, and M.Q. Hidāyat, Kh.Kh., pp.273-280.

period is the ease with which Ismā'īl Sīmītqū, with his Kurdish followers was able to create serious disturbances in Urūmiyya, Salmās, Khuy and Lakistān, plundering and killing, and on one occasion, setting fire to Urūmiyya, as a result of which six thousand one hundred people are said to have died.¹ The central government did not merely fail to take any measures against him, but actually appointed him to maintain order in Western Azerbaijan.² The disappearance of the Russians did not lead to any lessening of the autocratic style of government of Ahmad Shāh. In 1918, recognising the realities of the new international situation, he appointed as Prime Minister the pro-British politician Vuṣūq al-Dawla. Britain was now the most influential power in Iran and was determined to maintain this position. In order to do so it was necessary for her to co-operate with anti-democratic forces such as Ahmad Shāh and Vuṣūq al-Dawla, since it was clear that the nationalist and democratic forces within Iran would never agree to the domination of Iran by any outside power, Britain or any other. If we consider the position of Britain in the Persian Gulf and the Indian subcontinent, British support of the Iranian government seems very logical. This in turn explains why Democratic Movements such as that ^{of} Khiyābānī fell victim to this co-operation.

1. Tajaddud, 25,12,1296 (18.3.1918).

2. For more details see, F. Nūrī-i Isfahānī, Rastākḥīz-i Irān, (Tehran 1957), pp.50,61,111 and A. Āzarī, Q.Kh., pp.112-118.

British interests may be discussed under three headings, political commercial and financial. Britain's political interests, apart from the maintenance of her previous dominant position in Iran in general, were the protection of Mesopotamia and the defence of India. In addition there were British commercial interests in Iran, such as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the Imperial Bank of Persia, and finally the British Financial interests in Iran which at that period consisted of the Iranian debt to the British Government of several million pounds. To keep these interests in Iran, Great Britain had need of a secure guarantee by which not only the British interests in Iran were safeguarded but also her interests in Mesopotamia, India, the Persian Gulf on the one hand and prevention of Russian expansion to these areas on the other. This briefly accounts for British interference in Iranian internal affairs and her permanent support of the Iranian Shāh, Prime Minister, Cabinet and other politicians.

Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Minister and Vuṣūq al-Dawla both played an important part in the activities of this time. In 1918, Vuṣūq al-Dawla was the Iranian Prime Minister, and was making preparations to sign a convention with Great Britain. To this end the British Plenipotentiary in Tehran was instructed to reach a mutual agreement with Vuṣūq al-Dawla in order to maintain British influence in Iran. Lord Curzon affirmed British responsibility for supporting Mesopotamia, because Great Britain did not wish to jeopardize her Middle East interests in the future and also did not

want to cause financial and political discord between India and Mesopotamia.¹

Faced by revolution in Russia and political upheavals in Iran, Britain decided to prop up the government of Ahmad Shāh and indeed exerted a great deal of pressure upon it. Lord Curzon wrote in 1919:

"Very urgent: The Persian Minister for foreign affairs thinks that the Shah should be urged to take energetic action without delay, to prove possibility that he supports Prime Minister, that for this purpose he should issue a proclamation urging that order and security be maintained and warning the people against dangerous propaganda... ." ²

In order to keep in power the government of Vusūq al-Dawla, which was regarded by Britain as being in her interests but was not democratically elected by the majority of Iranians, the British government was prepared to use what can only be described as bribery. As long as Ahmad Shāh kept Vusūq al-Dawla in power and supported him and his cabinet, he received monthly payments from Britain:

"...A personal payment of Ts.15,000 a month to the Shah, to be continued so long as he keeps Vusūq al-Dawla's cabinet in power... ." ³

Ahmad Shāh's greed for money is commented on very explicitly in the following telegram:

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1. See Public Record Office [114911/150/34] Memorandum by Lord Curzon on the Persian Agreement, 8.9.1919.
 2. See F.O. No.311 [201530/150/34] Tehran, June 7, 1920.
 3. Public Record Office No.371/4927, London, August 15, 1919.

"...He is now thoroughly well disposed towards us and determined to work with us in his own rather odd way. Best method of keeping him in this frame of mind is to give him as much money as we can for that is what he loves most in the world... ." ¹

Lord Curzon's report to the British Cabinet contains a clear statement of British Policy and her interests in Iran:

"...A year ago, when our fortunes in the Western theatre of operations were drawing towards a successful issue, and when Persia herself ceased to contemplate a German victory, a leading Persian statesman named Vuṣūq al-Dawla who had always been friendly to British interests, was appointed by the Shah as the head of the Ministry. With him in the Persian Cabinet were two other Ministers equally convinced that the future of Persia lay in friendly reliance upon ourselves. The Shah himself adopted the same line and backed his Ministers. Simultaneously we had sent to Tehran as our Minister Sir Percy Cox, for many years British resident in the Persian Gulf, and latterly chief political officer in Mesopotamia. His object and his instructions were to come to some arrangement with the Persian Government by which British interests in that part of the world should be safeguarded in the future from a recurrence of the recent shocks, and by which Persia, incurably feeble and unable to stand by herself, should be given the support that would enable her to maintain her position among the independent nations of the

1. F.O. No.417 [206097/150/34] Tehran, June 25, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.538-39.

world. The negotiations which have proceeded during the last nine months, and which have now reached a satisfactory conclusion, are the result of the joint efforts of the Persian Government and Sir Percy Cox. What they mean in practice is this: not that we have received or are about to receive a mandate for Persia - on the contrary, the attempts of the Persian representatives in Paris to be heard by the peace conference have been attempted by uniform failure; not that Persia has handed over to us any part of her liberties; not that we are assuming fresh and costly obligations which will place a great strain upon us in the future; but that the Persian Government, realizing that we are the only neighbouring Great Power closely interested in the fate of Persia, able and willing to help her and likely disinterested in that object, have decided of their own free will to ask us to assist Persia in the rehabilitation of her fortunes... ."1

THE 1919 AGREEMENT

We shall attempt to show in this chapter how Khiyābānī reacted against the 1919 Agreement, and what were the reasons for his vigorous attack upon this agreement, and we shall also attempt to study the reaction of foreign powers to this agreement, particularly as expressed in the press, and the reactions of the

1. F.O. [114911/150/34] August 9, 1919, Vol.IV, pp.1119-1122.

Iranians themselves. We must therefore study the contents of this agreement closely and also examine the letters and documents which are to be found in the British Foreign Office. This will show that the reaction of Khiyābānī against this agreement was wellfounded and rational.

In order to understand Khiyābānī's political thinking and his objection to Vuṣūq al-Dawla and his conduct of Iranian affairs we need to examine the policies of the government inside Iran and her foreign policy as regards agreements with foreign powers, and also study the reaction to these policies and agreements. The enmity of the Iranian ruling circles to Khiyābānī is understandable only in this context.

Vuṣūq al-Dawla, having established a secure position in Tehran, decided to organize a strong administrative system and a powerful government in Iran. This seemed impossible with an empty treasury, and so he approached Great Britain which was the strongest neighbour of Iran at that period.

During the Summer of 1918 the situation was tense, but the end of World War I and the collapse of the monarchy in Russia removed all possibilities of outside intervention from that quarter for the moment and left Great Britain without a rival in Iran. It was in these circumstances that the 1919 agreement was formulated.¹ The story of this agreement has been told in several works, but the

1. For the full text of the agreement see Appendix No. 3.

results which would have been achieved by the two countries, Great Britain and Iran, have not been analysed in any detail. A study of the articles of the agreement reveals the extent of Iran's dependence upon Great Britain. By the conclusion of this agreement four objects were contemplated by the Foreign office: the reorganization and control of the Iranian army by British officers and experts; the loan of the services of such advisors as might be necessary to effect a similar control of the police and civil administrations; the revision of the existing customs tariff; and the development of communications, railways and roads in particular. Although this agreement was not approved by the Majlis and was therefore not valid in terms of article 24 of the Iranian constitution, the British began actively planning to implement it. A team of staff officers headed by General W.E.R. Dickson planned the reorganization of the army; the customs tariff was revised by a joint commission; a senior treasury official, Mr Sydney A. Armitage Smith was appointed to reform the Iranian financial system and the first instalment of the proposed loan was paid over. However the government of Iran was not able to spend it directly and independently; rather she was obliged to spend it under the direct supervision of the British advisor:

"...That instalment of the loan cannot properly be made till the British Financial Advisor has taken up his duties in Tehran... ." ¹

1. Public Record Office 371/4927, August 14, 1919.

The Shāh of Iran was invited to London, where the British Government was confident of the ratification of the agreement. In London he received a magnificent welcome from the British Government and King George V, who gave a speech at a reception in which he declared:

"...We welcome your Majesty's present visit here as a renewed proof of the close ties of friendship which have united our two countries for more than a century. We welcome it more especially at the present moment, when the relations between Persia and Great Britain have become even closer than they have ever been, and we are about to embark upon a collaboration in the field of material and administrative progress which will ensure to your country a future not unworthy of its famous past... ." ¹

Although Vusūq al-Dawla had signed the agreement personally he still needed to have it passed by the Majlis before it could become valid. The weakness of his position was recognized by the British Government, who while determined to give him every assistance were realistic enough to offer him asylum should this be necessary:

"Your Highness. It gives me much pleasure to inform Your Highness that His Majesty's Government authorise me to intimate that, in view of the agreement concluded this day... They are prepared to extend to Your Highness their good offices and support in case of need, and further to afford Your Highness asylum in the British Empire should necessity arise... ." ²

1. The Times, November 1, 1919.

2. Copy of a letter, dated the 9th August, 1919, from His Majesty's Minister to their Highness Vossough-ed-Dowleh, Vol.XIII, pp.1141-42.

However Vusūq al-Dawla pressed on and ordered an election, though taking the precaution of engaging in corrupt practices, thus becoming the originator in Iran of an unfortunate tradition of fraud, partiality and violence in the pursuit of political aims. Mustawfī says, writing of these elections and Vusūq al-Dawla's actions that the chief of the Damāvand Gendarmerie region said:

"...I have done my job well and I have obeyed whatever the government has ordered. With this whip I hit the people so that they would vote for a representative who was recommended by the government... ." ¹

He also states that fifteen thousand ballot papers were sent to Shīrāz and Kirmānshāhān for the elections, although the number of Shīrāz voters was twenty five thousand and that for Kirmānshāhān was twenty two thousand. In Kirmānshāhān every Lur with a rifle in one hand and a dozen votes in the other one came to the Anjuman and entered his votes, without any rejection by the election supervisory council. ² A telegram sent by the people of Sīrjān to Vusūq al-Dawla illustrates how openly Vusūq al-Dawla allowed elections to the Majlis to be manipulated:

"Dear Prime Minister, According to an order issued by the Governor General of Sīrjān, the people who do not take part in this election will be charged Ts.10. Because of our fear of the governor and of the penalty we were obliged to take our ballot papers

1. ^cA. Mustawfī, op.cit., p.92.

2. Ibid., p.96.

and hand them over to the governor. He kept them all and on the day of election we were all called and had to cast the ballot papers which had already been written out and prepared by the governor in the presence of the election supervisory council. Now a person has been elected who is an absolute stranger in our city and whom we do not know. The consequences of this, good or bad, are the responsibility of the Prime Minister... ."1

In order to ensure approval for this agreement, Vuṣūq al-Dawla realized that he would have to impose martial law in Tehran, as otherwise the opponents of this agreement would be too dangerous for his cabinet. Spying on the people was thoroughly organized and a firm censorship of the papers was established. Vuṣūq al-Dawla also used religion as a political means, and his attempts in this field were reported by Mr Norman from Tehran to Earl Curzon as follows:

"...Prime Minister also spoke this afternoon... He told me in confidence that he was also about to send secret mission to Holy places in Mesopotamia with a view to inducing the religious authorities there to issue a fetwa condemning Bolshevism as contrary to Islam, a step which I myself had been intending to advise... ."2

1. Ibid., p.96. See also, Ḥ. Makkī, op.cit., p.17.

2. F.O. No.465 [C830/56/34] Tehran, July 7, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.559-60.

Vusūq al-Dawla received monetary payment from the British to aid his efforts to get the agreement passed by the Majlis, although this proved somewhat counter-productive:

"Imperial Bank of Persia have supplied me with following particulars of transaction:-
Amount paid was 400,000 tomans, and equivalent in sterling £131,147, and not £250,000 as I had been told. On 11th August, 1919, 10,000, and on 13th August 90,000 tomans were handed to Sarem-ed-Dowleh in cash by the then chief manager of the bank. On 19th September, 1919 balance of 200,000 tomans was credited to Vossugh-ed-Dowleh and a credit note sent to him... ."1

Indeed British attempts to dominate Iran by bribing a dishonest and corrupt King and Prime Minister aroused opposition throughout Iranian society. Norman in another telegram states:

"...We are in the meantime also alienating sympathies of other sections notably rich reactionary landowners by our failure to carry on what they regard our moral obligations towards Persia in the matter of her defence...
We are now identified with most autocratic elements in country... ."2

Britain had in fact established her own government within Iranian territory. In other words she had her own troops and her own administrative organization in Iran where she was able to do whatever she wished. In these matters the Iranian Government had

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1. F.O. Norman to Earl Curzon, No.754, [C11774/82/34] Tehran 19.11.1920. Vol.XIII, p.639.
 2. F.O. No.393 [204748/150/34] Tehran, June 18, 1920. Vol.XIII, pp.526-27.

no power to do as they wished, but were obliged to consult the British Government before taking any step. We see this in Lord Derby's telegram to Lord Curzon:

"Very urgent, Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs has been to see me... What advice does British Government give as to their proper conduct? Shall they enter into negotiations with Soviet Government?... ."1

THE 1919 AGREEMENT AS SEEN BY THE FOREIGN PRESS

The Anglo Persian Agreement was openly criticised by European and American Press and Politicians. Thus the New York Daily News stated:

"...Persia had died; the death certificate was the Anglo-Persian Treaty; this treaty was completed for the exclusive interest of Great Britain... ."2

The Washington Post of October 5, 1919 declared of the agreement and the British role in it;

"...none of those who have paid attention even superficially to the Treaty signed on the 3rd [9th] August between Great Britain and Persia can fail to see that Great Britain has struck a blow, voluntarily or involuntarily, at the League of Nations whose creation is now proposed.

1. F.O. No.602 [199077/150/34] Paris, May 20, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.491-2.

2. Daily News, 29.8.1919.

Before the ink was dry on Great Britain's ratification of the Treaty of Peace even while the British Parliament was discussing the covenant of the League of Nations, negotiations at Tehran had reached a point where the independence of Persia was surrendered and where the control of the Persian nation was transferred to British hands... ."1

Like the American Press the Government of the United States were opposed to the Anglo-Persian Agreement. Congress passed a resolution calling on the State Department to communicate the text of any correspondence between His Majesty's Government and United States Government with regard to the Anglo-Persian Agreement.²

Both American politicians and the American Press supported the Iranian nation and its rights and blamed the British policy and the Iranian Government. The Americans indeed wanted to follow the declaration of Woodrow Wilson who had said on February 11, 1918:

"...People and Provinces should no longer be bartered for among Governments like cattle or like the pawns on a chess-board... ."3

In the hope of heading off American opposition to the Anglo-Persian Agreement, Britain offered America the opportunity to participate in it by sending advisors to take part in financial and administrative reforms. Viscount Grey gives his views on this subject in a telegram sent to Lord Curzon, from Washington:

1. Washington Post, 5.10.1919.

2. F.O. No.26 [170326/150/34] Washington, January 13, 1920, Vol.XIII, p.433 .

3. F.O. No.960 [1176/150/34] Paris, August 17, 1919, Vol.IV, p.1135.

"...Embassy here tell me that subject has not attracted much attention in press, but feeling in State Department is very strong; they think move has been kept in the dark intentionally, and represent agreement as a policy of virtual annexation of Persia but friendly senator has spoken of it with regret in this sense.

I shall tell United States Government history of Agreement and draw attention to your Lordship's speech on Persia. But I propose to explain our policy is not one of annexation but encouraging a strong independent Persia as a buffer state on Indian frontier.

In fact I should propose saying we should be glad if United States Government would become partners in this loan and in accompanying conditions of agreement. American Policy will never be aggressive against India and no doubt Americans in Persia would secure at any rate moral influence of United States Government against any revival of aggression from Russia or elsewhere... ." ¹

However, the United States showed no interest in this offer and continued to be opposed to the agreement until its final collapse.

SOVIET REACTION TO THE ANGLO-PERSIAN AGREEMENT

The Russians also opposed the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement, and declared that the Soviet Government refused to recognize its validity. They regarded this agreement as a serious threat to

1. F.O. No.1392 [134895/150/34] Washington, September 28, 1919, Vol.IV, p.1185.

the independence and sovereignty of the Iranian people and at the same time declared all unjust agreements between Russia and Persia from 1907 to 1915 null and void. A translation of an extract from a Caucasian newspaper, sent by Sir Percy Cox from Tehran to Lord Curzon illustrates the Russian point of view:

"One of the first and firmest opinions of the Russian Republican Soviet of Labour and Peasantry has been to declare that all nations, weak and strong, independent, or forced to be under other powers, must be free and must not be under foreign influence, and no government should bring them under its own authority by force... The Russian Nation will return to Persia whatever has been taken from her by the Imperial Russian generals. The Persian Government has, on the other side, declared all such treaties null and void. Under these circumstances we expected Persia to have a new political life and to put an end to the oppression of savage foreigners. Now that the victorious, but cruel, English are strangling Persia and want to bring her under their yoke the Russian Republican Soviet of Labour and Peasantry most emphatically declares that it will not recognize the Anglo-Persian Agreement, which will lead to the slavery of Persians. Russian labour considers the Persian labourers as their sincere friends and brothers and that they must share its liberty. The Russian Republican Soviet of Labour and Peasantry regards that weak agreement as a scrap of paper having no legal validity. The agreement shows that the Persian statesmen have sold themselves and the independence of their nation to the oppressive English. We have

cancelled all the guarantees which the Persian Government, under pressure, had undertaken towards the Russian Imperialism. Henceforth the Russian Government will not interfere in Persian affairs. The Caspian Sea has been cleared of the formidable ships of English Imperialism and commercial ships, under Persian flags, will sail on that sea with full liberty. All Government privileges will be abolished. The extra-territorial rights will be abolished, the Banque d'Escompte in Persia, railways, roads, buildings, harbour administrations, telegraphs, and telephones will be handed over to Persia. All Russian administration and arrangements which may interfere with the domestic affairs of Persia will be abolished and cancelled."¹

The new Soviet Government was soon to become involved in Iranian affairs itself, but for the present it is sufficient to note Russian disapproval of the 1919 Agreement.

THE REACTION OF THE FRENCH PRESS

The publication of the Anglo-Persian Agreement evoked a storm of protest in France. In the French press, British policy in Iran was examined closely and when the terms of the agreement were released the general response was that the British Empire had, in fact received another territorial extension. Thus Paris-Soir proclaimed:

1. Part of a translation of an extract from an unspecified Caucasian newspaper, sent by Sir P. Cox to Lord Curzon, F.O. No.169 [154949/150/34] October 21, 1919, Vol.IV, pp.1207-09.

"...A territory nearly three times the area of France, very rich in undeveloped natural resources and possessing oil deposits of very great value to the British navy, passes, to all intents and purposes, under British control... ."1

On the other hand, Le Temps² maintained that it appeared that the new Anglo-Persian treaty explicitly preserved the integrity and independence of Persia. These expressions of course had been previously used in the 1907 Anglo-Persian agreement³ and to this extent British policy in Iran had not changed.

Liberté wrote:

"...it is to guard India that Great Britain went to Egypt and stayed there, that she protects Afghanistan, instals herself in Mesopotamia, intends to keep Palestine, and disputes with us Syria, which, nevertheless, was assured to us by the treaty of 1916... such is the treaty of independence which our allies have imposed on Persia. It is not said that to do this they ask for the least mandates from the League of Nations, nor even that they intend to submit the agreement to the executive council of the League, as the statutes enjoin... ."4

1. Paris-Soir, August 24, 1919.

2. Le Temps, August 17, 1919.

3. The Anglo-Russian Agreement of August 31, 1907 began with the words: "The Government of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia..."

4. Liberté, August 15, 1919.

Jean Herbette, the Foreign Editor of Le Temps, describes on August 17, 1919 'the wonderful geographical position of Persia' and says

"Persia lies at the cross-roads of three influences, English, Russian and German, which have opposed one another in the East... it is impossible to calculate the advantages which Persia in twenty or thirty years may bring to a power which employs modern methods of exploitation there."

The writer says that the new Anglo-Persian Agreement explicitly maintains the integrity and independence of Persia, but that the same expression was used in the preamble to the Anglo-Russian Agreement of August 31, 1907, the object of which was to divide Persian territory into a British and a Russian zone. "The same words integrity and independence now reappear, and it is difficult to give them in 1919 a different meaning to that attached to them in 1907, namely a purely oratorical precaution."

On 14th August 1919 Le Temps and Débats published articles in which British policy and the Anglo-Persian Agreement were criticized. Débats especially made a bitter attack, describing the agreement as, "placing Persia on the footing of Egypt". The writer added that "the agreement was not well received in Persia by public opinion".

Eventually, however, the French government not only did not follow up her nation's rejection of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, but even co-operated with the British. She did not make any unfavourable comments on the Anglo-Persian Agreement and even apologised for not publishing the full details in France. Lord Curzon explains this in the following telegram,

"The French Ambassador called at this Department on October 27th and read to Lord Hardinge of Penshurst a despatch which he had just received from his Government, offering excuses for the non-publication in France of the complete text of the speech which I made on September 18th on the occasion of the dinner given to his Highness Nosret-ed-Dowleh. Monsieur Paul Cambon also read at this interview telegrams which had been despatched to Monsieur Bonin, instructing him to co-operate with you closely and directing that no unfavourable comments on the Anglo-Persian Agreement should be allowed."¹

This meeting took place after the French Ambassador to Tehran had shown 'unfriendliness' in his attitude to the Anglo-Persian Agreement. Subsequently he had to modify his attitude and act in accordance with his government's instructions. The following telegram illustrates this;

"...A strong representation has been made to the French Embassy regarding your French colleague's unfriendliness... The French Government have been asked to instruct him to alter his attitude. The French Chargé d'Affaires assured me that the attitude complained of was not in accordance with the instructions or wishes of the French Government which were to an altogether contrary effect, and undertook to report the matter at once to French Government. I gather that the French Government are not unaware of M. Bonin's activities."²

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1. Lord Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran), No.236 [147145/150/34] Foreign Office, November 1, 1919, Vol.IV, p.1218.
 2. Lord Curzon to Sir P. Cox (Tehran), No.443 [116167/150/34] Foreign Office, August 19, 1919, Vol.IV, p.1136.

THE REACTION OF THE BRITISH PRESS

Predictably, the attitude of the British press was very different from that of the other countries considered. Thus the Daily Herald described Iran as 'an orphaned Persia', and on August 20, 1919 stated:

"...the disappearance of Imperial Russia has enabled us to act for the first time without the fear of local opposition in Persia. In 1907 we divided it into sphere of influence with Russia. Russia is gone, and to an orphaned Persia we must now endeavour to be father and mother both.... we alone may appoint the advisors who will assist Persian Ministers to reorganize their country while we also will appoint the officers who will command the troops, who will see that our advice is respected... ." ¹

In a similar but more restrained vein The Times wrote;

"The Anglo-Persian Agreement which was signed on the 9th inst., provides for the restoration of Persia through British brains and money. British experts are to be supplied for the Civil administration and British officers and equipment for the new force that is to be raised for the maintenance of order... ." ²

The Times was naturally aware of French opposition to this treaty, and a few days later wrote;

"...naturally quite a number of the French arguments in both the Syrian and the Persian discussions are debatable. There is on more than one point a conflict of evidence and information, but the whole development

1. Daily Herald, August 20, 1919.

2. The Times, August 16, 1919.

of the Near Eastern situation seems to show that the time has come when events themselves will force even the Peace Conference to bestir itself... ."1

Clearly at this period The Times was hoping that it would be possible to overcome French opposition to British policies in the Middle East by presenting France with a fait accompli, both in Syria and Iran. This is commented on also from a somewhat different point of view by Foreign Affairs;

"The anger of the French imperialists leaves us cold. They are angry because our imperialism snatches at the Persian peach, while objecting to French imperialism devouring the Syrian fig. What matters is not the irritation of French imperialism, which cares nothing for Persia qua Persia, but the steady moral declension, of which Persia is the latest example, of British policy."2

In general, however, the attitude of the British press at this period was one of unqualified enthusiasm. This contrasts sharply with the disillusion of the press a year later, as we shall see below.

THE REACTION OF THE IRANIANS TO THE 1919 AGREEMENT

The Agreement was most unpopular in Iran and was rejected by the mass of Iranians. It was believed that with this agreement

1. The Times, August 19, 1919.

2. Foreign Affairs, London, November, 1919.

Vusūq al-Dawla had sold Iran to the British Government. This is explained by Mr Norman in a telegram which was sent on August 6, 1920 from Tehran to Lord Curzon in London;

"It does not appear to be realized at home how intensely unpopular agreement was in Persia and how hostile public opinion had become to Vosuq's Cabinet before it fell. It was believed in Persia that notwithstanding pledges given agreement really aimed at destruction of her independence and that Vosuq and those acting with him had sold their country to British for fact that money had been received by them for signing agreement could not be kept secret."¹

The 1919 Agreement had its supporters however as well as its opponents in Iran. The people who were pro-Agreement, were from the rich landowners and politicians in the capital and Tabriz, people such as ^CAyn-al-Dawla, Mushīr al-Dawla and his brother in Tehran,² and the merchants of Tabriz.³ The opponents of this agreement were from the rest of the Iranians; some of these are listed by Sir P. Cox in a report sent on August 22, 1919;

"1. Extreme demands headed by well-known individuals, Mudarris and Imam Juma Khoi. 2. Political enemies of Prime Minister, and certain politicians out of work who have little to expect from us. 3. Officers, Russian and Persian, of Cossack division. 4. French, American and Russian Legations, as far as they can oppose it with safety."⁴

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1. F.O. No.562 [C3302/82/34] Tehran, August 6, 1920, Vol.XIII, p.585.
 2. F.O. No.595 [123784/150/34] Tehran, September 1, 1919, Vol.IV, p.1150.
 3. F.O. No.570 [120553/150/34] Tehran, August 22, 1919, Vol.IV, pp.1139-40.
 4. F.O. No.569 [120074/150/34] Tehran, August 22, 1919, Vol.IV, pp.1138-39.

Internal opponents were threatened with banishment if there was any further activity against the agreement. Meanwhile some individuals were warned and some politicians were deported, for example Mumtāz al-Dawla, Mu^Cīn al-Tujjār, Mustashār al-Dawla, Mumtāz al-Mulk and Muhtasham al-Saltāna.¹

Despite the unpopularity of this agreement, so readily recognized by his successor Norman, Cox continued to believe that the agreement was widely acceptable in Iran, as shown by a telegram sent in August 1919 to Lord Curzon in which he summarises the reports of British Consuls in various provincial towns:

"...Tabriz. Merchants and respectable...s² very glad.
...Kazvin. Better class of landowners and merchants favourable...
Rasht. This unfavourable comment [sic] but details of agreement not generally known to public.
Hamadan. Agreement popular where majority are concerned and accepted by all.
North Arabistan. Agreement most favourably received.
Khorassan. Large public meeting held on 18th August. Terms of Agreement which we had published were read and unanimously appreciated.
Shiraz. Reception generally favourable - full details not yet published.
Kerman. Public feeling in favour of agreement, which is on the whole approved by all classes particularly businessmen... ." ³

1. F.O. No.618 [127632/150/34] Tehran, September 10, 1919, Vol.IV, pp.1160-61.

2. The text here is uncertain.

3. F.O. No.570 [120553/150/34] Tehran, August 22, 1919, Vol.IV, pp.1139-40.

Despite Cox's optimism however, a demonstration against the agreement and Vuṣūq al-Dawla was held in Tehran on 31 September by the Tehran students, on which occasion they were quickly seized by the police. This student demonstration was described by Sir P. Cox as follows;

"...it attacked Vussugh and agreement; called on clergy to drape the mosques in black, and on all patriotic Persians to rise and demand its cancellation. Meanwhile the members of gang continued to meet at each other's houses and hatch plans... ." ¹

Opposing this agreement Khiyābānī wrote:

"...As long as this agreement has not been ratified by the Majlis, we regard it as nothing more than a piece of paper and do not regard that agreement as effective... ." ²

A further cause of discontent was furnished by Ahmad Shāh's visit to Europe, which further drained the depleted Iranian treasury. ³

On the day of his return (3.6.1920) the students of Tehran held a demonstration of which they shouted 'long live the Shah, death to the English and the agreement'. ⁴

1. F.O. No.618 [127632/150/34] Tehran, September 10, 1919, Vol.IV, pp.1160-61.

2. Tajaddud, 16/5/1298 (12.8.1919).

3. About 10,000,000 Francs, see F.O. No.189 [191064/150/34] Tehran, April 9, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.463-64 and No.388 [189321/150/34] Paris, March 30, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.459-60.

4. F.O. No.332 [201783/150/34] Tehran, June 3, 1920, Vol.XIII, p.502.

This unnecessary and financially ruinous journey to Europe attracted unfavourable comment from Khiyābānī;

"..nobody asks where the King goes to, nobody asks why he does so. Nobody asks why this kind of expenditure must be taken from the impoverished Iranian treasury. While the people are suffering from hunger, Ts.40,000 are being spent for the celebration of the King's return from Europe... ." ¹

The position in the cities in general and the capital in particular was very difficult. The press were warned not to write any article about the agreement, about troop movements or about Bolshevism and martial law was proclaimed in Tehran. ²

Although Vusūq al-Dawla had openly interfered in the elections, nevertheless in Azerbaijan six out of the nine who were elected to the Fourth Majlis were from the Democrats. These were Khiyābānī himself, Mīrzā Muḥammad Taqī Ṭabāṭabā'ī, Fiyūzat, Sayyid al-Muḥaqqiqīn, Nāẓim al-Dawla-yi Dībā and Mu^Ctamad al-Tujjār. According to H. Makkī, Vusūq al-Dawla realized that if Khiyābānī and the other democrat deputies from Azerbaijan attended the Majlis, their determined opposition to the 1919 Agreement would make its ratification impossible. For this reason he delayed summoning the Majlis. ³ The growth of the movement in Tabriz was perhaps the main reason for the downfall of the Cabinet of Vusūq al-Dawla on the

1. Tajaddud, 3/5/1299 (26.7.1920).

2. For more details see, F.O. No.509 C2158/82/34 Tehran, July 20, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.568-69.

3. See H. Makkī, op.cit., Vol.1, p.17 and also see R. Mihrabānī, Gūshahā'ī'āz Tārīkh-i Mu^Cāsir-i Īrān (Tehran, 1982), p.11.

25th June 1920, despite the fact that he was positively and directly supported by Great Britain. Due to his personal unpopularity and his political dishonesty, e.g. his attempts to rig the elections to the 4th Majlis and to ensure the return of his own followers in order to ratify the 1919 Agreement; his establishment of martial law in Tehran during the latter part of his period in office and his banishment of political opponents and suppression of newspapers, he was ultimately forced to resign and to give way to Mushīr al-Dawla.

When Vusūq al-Dawla realized that he was unable to carry out his policies, he had no choice except to resign. Winston Churchill states in a memorandum on the Persian situation;

"...Mr Norman succeeded Sir P. Cox at Tehran on June 10th and found that it was useless to continue to support Vusouk-ed-Dowleh, who had become very unpopular and had determined to withdraw from office. A. because the Shah did not like him. B. because we did not support him, and C. because he was ill and tired of office... ." ¹

Nevertheless after Vusūq al-Dawla's resignation, he received a telegram which was sent by Lord Curzon on July 1, 1920. The text runs as follows:

1. F.O. [C4966/82/34] Foreign Office, July 9, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.562-63.

"Urgent.

Please convey to his Highness Vosouk-ed Dawleh a personal message of thanks and appreciation from me for the eminent services he has rendered to his country and to our joint interests from the date he took office as Prime Minister in August 1918 until his retirement after two years of strenuous labour. I hope that his health will benefit by the rest he so much deserves and I feel sure that he will assist His Majesty's Legation whenever required with his valuable advice and guidance in matters concerning the interests of our two countries... ."1

The Times writing on June 28, 1920, shows its anxiety about the worsening situation in Iran, due to this agreement and the failure of British imperial policy;

"...The impending resignation of the principal Persian author of the Agreement, following on the departure of Sir Percy Cox, raises large issues. If he had been supported, he could have put into effect the Anglo-Persian Military Commission's report... ."2

The Times makes firm suggestions in regard to the change of Persian Cabinet members in order to achieve the ratification of the agreement.

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1. F.O. No.353 206083/150/34 Foreign Office, July 1, 1920, Vol.XIII, p.554.
 2. The Times, June 28, 1920.

"...A cabinet more Nationalist in colour but willing to continue the Anglo-Persian Agreement, is being sought. If found, such a cabinet would probably ordain fresh elections, involving the further postponement of the Majlis and an indefinite delay in giving effect to the Anglo-Persian Military Report... ."

While suggesting this The Times was aware of the unpopularity of the agreement in Iran, but was hoping that the nationalists could be persuaded to support the agreement:

"...But undoubtedly the Agreement needs popularizing and it will expire unless the Nationalists extend to it the support to which, on its merits, it is entitled. One of the objections offered to it, namely, the absence of a time limit, can doubtless easily be met."¹

The opinion of the British Government of the new Prime Minister of Iran, Mushīr al-Dawla,² is made clear in a speech by Lord Curzon which is summarised in a memorandum on the Persian Question made by Mr Ovey;³

"...His Majesty's Government have little confidence in the ability of this statesman whose character is weak and vacillating... ."⁴

1. Ibid.

2. See Appendix 7.

3. He was a member of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office.

4. F.O. [206831/150/34] June 25, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.541-42.

In the same memorandum Lord Curzon notes;

"...whoever succeeds Vussagh-ed-Dowleh must be a single-minded supporter of the Anglo-Persian Agreement on which conditions alone it is possible to continue to grant to Persia the financial assistance which Persia requires to 'carry on'."¹

Following this change, Britain made her demands on the new Prime Minister as follows,

- "(A) To continue the policy of Anglo-Persian co-operation on the basis of the agreement.
- (B) To summon the Persian Parliament ('Majliss') and submit the agreement to it for approval.
- (C) To consider the agreement in abeyance till this has taken place.
- (D) To govern Persia on constitutional lines with a Parliament.
- (E) To gain popularity in Persia by including notorious Nationalists in his cabinet.
- (F) To ask for British financial support."²

Despite this the 1919 Agreement was now in practice² dead letter, for the Majlis had not met to ratify it. Because of it Britain had become unpopular in Iran; Mr Norman in a telegraph sent from Tehran to Lord Curzon describes the reaction of the people to this agreement as follows;

1. Ibid.

2. F.O. [C4966/82/34] Foreign Office, July 9, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.562-63.

"...On my arrival I found in power a government almost universally detested and entirely subservient to a Prime Minister to whom ill-health had left only energy required to increase his private fortune at the public expense. His policy had caused Azerbaijan practically to separate itself from Persia and had driven Mazandaran into rebellion. Gilan was in possession of Kuchik Khan and his followers who were allied with Bolsheviks. Capital was seething with Bolshevik intrigue and invitations to occupy it were being sent to Resht from many influential quarters. Had Bolsheviks responded in time their advance might well have been assisted by a rising here, and they would, failing an occupation of Tehran by British troops, have received welcome from a large section of population chiefly of lower class. Anglo-Persian agreement was nominally in force but in practice remained a dead letter and Government neither intended nor dared to summon Madjlis to ratify it because they feared its rejection by that assembly. Policy of his Majesty's Government and their intentions as expressed in agreement were widely distrusted, not so much on account of terms of that instrument itself, as of manner of its conclusion and personality of its Persian signatory whose unpopularity Great Britain shared... ." ¹

This unsettled political situation in Iran, especially in Tabriz, (Sir P. Cox called it 'a dangerous situation in Tabriz') ² was of vital

1. F.O. No.654 [C7228/82/38] Tehran, September 25, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.610-11.

2. F.O. No.297 [199405/150/34] Tehran, May 22, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.493-4.

concern to both the Iranian and British Governments. One must realize that the defeat of the Tabriz uprising was the prime concern of both of these governments. The British regarded Khiyābānī and the Tabriz democrats as a serious threat to their 'own interests as well as... those of Persian Government'.¹

Sir P. Cox, in his telegram from Tehran to Lord Curzon, expresses his anxiety with regard to the situation in Azerbaijan and Khiyābānī's movement;

"...as before stated principal danger spot is Persian Azerbaijan where conditions are already thoroughly bad. If this province succumbs or secedes by default of Central Government effect on general situation in Persia will be disastrous enough. Cabinet will certainly fall and policy including agreement will be jeopardised... ." ²

In order to protect British interests, and to keep the Iranian Government in power, it was urged that the movement in Tabriz must be stopped by military force as soon as possible:

"...There is still some chance of saving situation if following measures are taken at once, and to save it is urgently in our own interests as well as in those of Persian Government: but nothing can be done without considerable expenditure.

1. Ibid.

2. F.O. No.271 [198025/150/34] Tehran, May 14, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.479-80.

Prime Minister makes following propositions on hypothesis that His Majesty's Government are still not prepared under any circumstances to send any reinforcements of British troops to Tabriz.

1. That garrison of gendarmes now at Ispahan should be withdrawn and replaced by detachment of South Persia Rifles from Kerman or failing that by a Bakhtiari garrison.
2. That gendarmes thus released plus Central Brigade and such other units as can be spared from Capital to total number of 3,000 be sent urgently to Tabriz... ."1

In the event these gendarmes were not transferred and Kh̄iyābānī's rising was suppressed by locally-based Cossāks. Although we shall describe the defeat of Kh̄iyābānī in the following chapter, it remains rather difficult to explain why this and similar movements were defeated if we only take into account political factors in Iran. British Foreign Office documents however shed a great deal of light on this problem. The archives show that political movements such as that of Mīrzā Kūchik Khān, were suppressed with the direct interference and assistance of Britain.

Sir Percy Cox in a telegram sent from Tehran to Earl Curzon on November 21, 1919, makes the following comment:

"...In Gilan situation is thoroughly unsatisfactory. Although a few months ago our troops in co-operation with Persian Government stamped out Jangali movement yet behaviour of Cossack detachments sent to occupy various points has been so atrocious and

1. Ibid.

incompetency of Persian (? administrative) officials so complete that peasantry would welcome the return of the Jangali regime, and movement is gathering head (? word omitted) again in close collusion with Bolshevist and Turkish elements in Baku... ."1

The nature of the British involvement in Tabriz will be discussed in the following chapter.

BOLSHEVIK PROPAGANDA IN IRAN

In the middle of 1920 the Red Army crossed the border into Iran in pursuit of the White Russian forces under Denikin who had been forced to take refuge in Iran. They occupied Gīlān, and for a while Russian influence in certain Iranian towns, particularly Tehran and Rasht, was strong. If Tehran were to fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks, it would mean not only that British interests and policy in Iran would be harmed but that, at least in the overwrought imagination of Norman, wholesale murder of Europeans and destruction of European property at Tehran,² would take place.

An announcement made by Sultān Zāda and Fathullāyev, of the ^cAdālat Party (Persian Communist Party) shows the Bolshevik point of view in Iran. They describe the Iranian Government as 'The criminal governors of the Kajar dynasty', and proclaim that there is only one way to destroy the power of the Shāh and liberate Iran from poverty

1. F.O., P. Cox to Lord Curzon, No.747 [154739/150/34] Tehran, November 21, 1919, Vol.IV, pp.1241-42.

2. F.O. No.468 [695/56/34] Tehran, July 7, 1920, Vol.XIII, p.558.

which is the Communist Revolution. The Democratic Party which was in power at the time is called 'a toy in the hands of the universal brigand, England'. The text of this Adalat Party declaration runs in part as follows:

"In Persia, the Government of the Shah of Iran, has by its grabbing policy, reduced the Persian people to penury, and, for centuries, has squeezed dues and taxes out of the pockets of the peasants, in order to support the Shah's harem, and his innumerable lackeys, and contemptible satraps and officials, who purchase their posts by generous bribery, and, with the connivance of the mullahs, are leading the popular masses of Persia to utter ruin. The criminal governors of the Kajar dynasty have done nought but indulge in bacchanalia and robbery, and have never even tried to take interest in popular education or to free the country from hereditary oppression... The Shah Ahmad Mirza himself, having received several sacks of English gold, has left for a tour in Europe: all ministers and officials receive their salaries from the English treasury... The democratic party, which is at present in power, is simply a toy in the hands of the universal brigand, England... In general the merchants have ruined industries in Persia, by bringing in foreign goods, thus hitting the small producers, transforming them into proletariat and semi-proletariat. All town centres are overcrowded with these unfortunate victims of the colonial policy of the Imperialists. How many of them have left their homes to find work under a foreign sky?... Only the Communist Revolution can liberate for all time the poor in

town and village, from the sufferings of continual hunger. Only the Communist Revolution with its firm hands is able to destroy the power of these tyrants, and hand over the country to the rightful people, and free it from taxation and dues, which have reduced it to state of beggary... A little more force and the edifice of hereditary oppression and slavery, will be demolished under the pressure of the revolutionary people. Away with the foreign brigands. Down with the traitors of the working classes. Long live free Persia. Long live the Persian Communist Party Adalat."¹

The reason for British troops remaining in Iran was explained by Lord Curzon, Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, who maintained that British policy in the Middle East must always be affected by the consideration of Mesopotamia. In justifying the presence of British troops in Iran he wrote as follows,

"...the troops in North-West Persia were there because their disappearance would simply open the door to invasion, partly by the Turks and partly by the Bolsheviks, which would bring, in all probability, the Persian Government to the ground, and would destroy almost in a breath the whole policy which we have been building up in agreement with Persia in the last few years, and which might recoil with very serious menace on Mesopotamia itself. That was why we were there... ." ²

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1. Announcement signed by Sulṭān Zāda ^CAlīkhānov and Fath aḡāyev, members of the Organising Committee. See Foreign Office, Public Record Office 371/4927.
 2. R. Machray, "Mesopotamia and Persia" Fortnightly Review, 108, 1920, pp.618-19.

A memorandum¹ on the Persian Question which was submitted by Mr Oliphant of the Central European and Persia Department of the Foreign Office in 1920, also illustrates this belief;

"...to withdraw British forces from Persia and to shut down supplies, thereby stultifying the agreement, would, in present circumstances, produce almost certainly the following results. 1. The Bolsheviks, who are reported to have already turned a part of the Ghilan into a Red republic, may be expected to spread their virus into Tehran and other parts of northern Persia, whose unruly elements would fall an easy prey to Bolshevik propoganda. The present pro-British Cabinet of Vossug at [a] Dowleh would fall and thereupon, the agreement would inevitably collapse while in the opinion of H.M. Minister at Tehran, no other government friendly to the agreement would be found willing to replace it... 2. The probable direct result of increased confusion in Persia would be that our position in Mesopotamia would be threatened at once, and the possibility of maintaining ourselves as far up as Bagdad even would be a matter for earnest consideration. 3. An indirect and most probable, though perhaps not immediate, result would be that the state of disorder and troubles in Persia would centre on the East in general, beginning with Afghanistan and the Baluchistan border with a consequent risk of its spreading to India... ."

1. F.O. [204900/15L/34] Foreign Office, June 14, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.517-18.

To maintain her interests in the East and her position in Iran in particular, Britain needed to take urgent steps. Accordingly she produced fresh ideas as a result of which her interests could be preserved. Mr Oliphant continues as follows:

"...Should it, therefore, be decided to continue our previous policy, certain further expenditure as may be required for military measures, and for supporting the Persian Government politically, would appear to be the following:- 1. that such forces as, in the opinion of the military authorities, may be required to strengthen our present lines in Persia from railhead at Quraitu to Kazvin should be supplied, 2. that such funds as are required to assist the Persian Government may be sanctioned. They would be (a) to maintain the administration which has recently received the assistance of a British financial advisor, i.e. continuance of monthly subsidy of Tomans 350,000 until September next: (b) to assist in counteracting Bolshevik propoganda. 3. to enable the Persian forces, as suggested by the Persian Minister and persistently supported by Sir P. Cox, to proceed from Kerman to Isfahan and thence to Azerbaijan."

Although Britain had made a huge expenditure¹ on Iran in order to preserve her interests there, a maintenance of the status quo in Iran would protect her other interests in other parts of the region;

"...The risks to Mesopotamia and India, should Bolshevism overrun Persia, would be of such a nature as to outweigh the present commitments."²

1. i.e. £3,000,000 a year for the upkeep of the Cossacks in Tehran; £6,000,000 for the upkeep of the British troops in Khorāsān; Tomans, 180,000 a year for the King of Iran and Tomans 1,200,000 for the upkeep of the Cossack Division. See the telegraph of [204900/150/34] F.O. June 14, 1920, Vol.XIII, pp.517-18.

2. Ibid.

RISE AND FALL OF MĪRZĀ KŪCHIK KHĀN'S MOVEMENT

On June 4, 1920 the Jangalī movement under the leadership of Mīrzā Kūchik Khān¹ was reorganized. They rebelled against both the Iranian government and British influence in Iran. The Jangalī's programme can be outlined under the following heads.

1. The people should be sovereign.
2. Elected representatives should hold executive power.
3. Civil rights for all people irrespective of their caste and creeds.
4. Abolition of all sorts of privileges given to certain people.
5. Abolition of indirect taxation.
6. Establishment of schools and universities.
7. Free education for all children.
8. Better conditions for working people.²

The committee engaged as instructors for its armed forces a number of German and Turkish officers of whom Ḡāḡkhan acted as a close military advisor to Kūchik Khān.

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1. Mīrzā Kūchik Khān was born in Duzākh near Rasht, and was educated in religious schools in Tehran and Isfahan. During 1905-11, he took part in the Constitutional Movement, and during World War I he joined an organization called Īttihād-i Islām (Islamic unity). In this organization rich people and traders of rural background were in the majority. For a full account of Kūchik Khān's life and activities consult I. Fakhra'ī, Sardār-i Jangal (Tehran 1965), and the archives of the British Foreign Office Documents (1920-21).
 2. See A. Bennigsen and M. Broxup, the Islamic Threat to the Soviet State, (London 1983), p.99, X.J. Eudim and R.C. North, Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-27 (California 1958), pp.177-181, and the newspaper Jangal, June 6, (Rasht, 1920).

The programme of the Jangalīs gained much popularity among the people due to the misrule of the Shāh and foreigners. A newspaper, Jangal (forest), was printed and acted as the organ of the committee. The Jangalī movement expanded to Māzandarān and other Caspian regions. The Jangalīs managed to capture a few Britons, among them Captain Noel, an intelligence officer who was on his way back from Baku, and Quakshot, the manager of the British Bank in Rasht.¹

The Times, referring to Kūchik Khān's movements, wrote,

"Kūchik Khān was well known to the Dunsterville force.

In the spring of 1918 General Dunsterville advanced from Kermanshah towards the Caspian, reaching Kazvin on June 1, where he joined the Russian Partisan troops under Bischarakoff. The further advance of the force to Rasht and Enzeli was unsuccessfully opposed by the Jangalīs under Kūchik Khān, but no serious trouble arose until July 20, when Kūchik Khān's followers attacked the small British force stationed at Rasht.

The Hampshires and Gurkhas, however, gave the Jangalīs a severe drubbing - over 100 were killed and after this Kūchik Khān gave the British little trouble."²

By the end of his uprising, Kūchik Khān had fallen out with his erstwhile allies and caused harm to the people. At the end of 1921 the Shāh's army led by Rizā Khān attacked Rasht and destroyed the Gīlān movement. After the collapse of the republic Kūchik Khān fled to the forest with one of his close associates, Gaok, a German

1. See Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, (New York, 1949), pp.54-5.

2. The Times, January 10, 1920.

agent, but because of snowfall and rain, he could not go much further with his followers, and was found frozen to death on the Tālīsh mountains.¹

Ākhwund Zāda says of Kūchik Khān's character,

"He was a demagogue and promise-breaker and his thinking was more backward than that of Iḥsān Allāh Khān. Kūchik Khān exploited the religious sentiments of his fellow men in order to cheat them. He always kept a Tasbīh (prayer-beads) with him and whenever he wanted to do anything or take any decision he used to take at random a part of the tasbīh and begin to tell the beads calling them good, bad, good, bad one by one. This was his peculiar method of taking a decision. If the last bead coincided with 'bad' he used to tell his followers, 'God did not ordain it'.²

The fall of the Gīlān uprising had at least one benefit, in that it caused the people to realise that the leadership and ability of Iranian society needed to be greatly improved.

According to the newspaper Ra^Cd,³ on June 15, 1920, a representative from the "Gilan Republic" arrived in Moscow. Although the greatest sympathy for this fraternal Government was shown, he however sensed vexation in the mind of the so called specialist in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Office. Vozniesensky, head of the oriental section in the Foreign Office, maintained that Kūchik Khān's

1. Mīrza M. Ākhwund Zāda, Āzarbāyjān Rūznāmasının Nashriyyası, (Tabriz 1974), p.78.

2. Ibid.

3. Ra^Cd, June 15, 1920.

Government was not at all Communist, but that it was composed solely of petty bourgeois and of nationalists and that its programme was merely anti-British.

In conclusion we may observe that the 1919 agreement provided yet more evidence of the weakness of the Iranian state during this period. The Iranian treasury was empty, the country was ravaged by warfare in which Ottomans, Germans, British and Russians had totally ignored Iranian neutrality, the provinces were in a state of anarchy and rebellion, and Iranian statesmen were so demoralised that it was possible for one of their number, Vuṣūq al-Dawla to see the only hope for improvement as lying with an agreement with Britain that would have turned Iran into a virtual protectorate, despite British claims to the contrary. In order to achieve this, Britain was prepared to offer administrators and loans to the Iranian treasury, but also paid subsidies to Vuṣūq al-Dawla and Ahmad Shāh which in practice were hard to distinguish from outright bribery, and were certainly perceived as bribery within Iran. In return, Britain would receive security for the borders of India and Mesopotamia, be able to prevent Communist influence from spreading from Russia, and would be in a position to benefit from Iranian resources once that country had been provided with a European-style administration.

It is not surprising therefore that this agreement was opposed even by Britain's allies, while it was completely unacceptable to nationalist-minded Iranians. Particularly opposed to it were the

constitutionalists, and in order to impose it it would have been necessary to bypass the Majlis and any kind of democratic procedures. Vuṣūq al-Dawla in fact attempted to do this by rigging the election of 1919, but even then did not dare to actually convene the Majlis. Eventually Vuṣūq al-Dawla had to resign, and with the replacement of the chief British architect of the scheme, Sir Percy Cox, by the much more pragmatic Norman, the entire project was allowed to lapse.

In the meantime, however, various revolts had broken out in Iran. Some like the Jangalī movement in Gīlān, were inspired by more than opposition to the 1919 agreement, and the main constitutionalist opposition came from Tabriz and from Khiyābānī, the leading spokesman for Tabriz at this time. As we shall see in the following chapter the government in Tehran for propoganda purposes accused Khiyābānī's movement of being separatist and of being supported by the Bolsheviks. This has since become a stock reaction to any provincial movement demanding reform in Iran, but nevertheless this claim needs to be investigated to see whether it rests on any fact. In the following chapter we shall study the history and political demands of the Tabriz uprising in an attempt to answer these and other questions.

Chapter 4

CAUSES OF THE UPRISING

Before studying the Tabriz Uprising it is necessary to examine the various elements which were to provoke it. Although there are different ideas concerning these elements, a study of some of the opinions of the witnesses, who had been active and had participated in this uprising, will make it possible to understand the main reasons behind this event.

Muhammad ^CAlī Bādāmchī, the close assistant of Khīyābānī and an active member of this movement discusses the elements which caused the start of Khīyābānī's Uprising, in an article published in Berlin in February 1924 in Iranschähr. We should also study the valuable writings of Ahmad Kasravī who had different opinions and views from Khīyābānī and did not agree with him on many points.

A study of foreign historians' opinions would also be helpful although we should study them with reservation since they have often merely copied from one another and have not even attempted to record correctly the names of the leadership of the uprising,¹ or have

1. For instance see C. Skrine, World War in Iran, pp.63-64 and G. Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, p.61.

hardly mentioned the uprising at all¹ or have not even given the right date of the movement.²

Some of the reasons were directly felt by the people, and have roots in the history of the area. In addition, there were other external causes which we should study as well.

M.^cA. Bādāmchī points out that by this time Vuṣūq al-Dawla had signed the notorious 1919 Agreement with Britain. The Democrat Party of Tabriz was unable to oppose this directly at the time, since elections were not called until after this date, but Tajaddud, the official newspaper of the Democrat Party, condemned this Agreement, and wrote, "without the ratification of the Majlis we do not recognize it as more than a sheet of paper".³

Vuṣūq al-Dawla knew that it would be impossible to obtain the Agreement's ratification by a Majlis which contained Khiyābānī and the other five members of the Democrat Party, who had been elected as deputies for Tabriz for the fourth period of the Majlis. Thus Vuṣūq al-Dawla sent two Swedish police officers, Marshal Björling and Fökl Klö accompanied by a detachment of Iranian police to Tabriz.

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1. For instance N. Nicholson, Curzon: The last phase, 1919-1925, (Edinburgh 1934); L.P. Elwell-Sutton, Modern Iran, (London 1941); W.Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, (London 1957), p. 151.
 2. For instance L.P. Elwell-Sutton, A Guide to Iranian Area Study, p.151, (Michigan 1952).
 3. Iranschähr, No.14, (Berlin 1926).

According to Āzarī the orders of these officers were to overthrow the Democrat Party and kill its leaders.¹ In the words of Bādāmchī, one of the officers who was drunk at a party said to the others "according to our orders we are to eliminate all Democrat leaders and destroy the Tabriz Democrat Party".² While sending these officers to take action against the latter party, Vuṣūq al-Dawla put the contents of the Agreement into action without the consent of the Majlis. The British advisors and officers arrived in Tehran and started working, and the Tabriz Democrat Party decided that in these circumstances to remain silent would be a great treachery to the country.

Kasravī however, gives a different explanation of the causes of Khīyābānī's Uprising. The Bolsheviks were gaining strength in Russia and the Red Army were sweeping away their opponents, especially in the South, and Vuṣūq al-Dawla was worried about the advance of the Soviet army to the Iranian borders, particularly to the Azerbaijan region. A Bolshevik centre was established by Kurt Wustrow in the German Consulate in Tabriz where a lot of weapons and ammunition were stored.³ The Consulate was ordered by

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1. ^CAlī Āzarī states "Vuṣūq al-Dawla informed the Governor-General of Tabriz that Marshal Björling was coming with two or three officers to take over the Tabriz Police Headquarters, but when we found out that the latter Marshall had brought forty four police and officers, we knew that a plot was being prepared". For more details see, ^CA. Āzarī, Q.Kh., p.238.
 2. Iranschähr, op.cit., No.14.
 3. These had remained in Tabriz since the final days of the First World War. They had been brought by the Ottomans who were allied to the Germans. See A. Kasravī, T.H.S.A., p.863.

Mukarram al-Saltāna, the then Governor General of Tabriz to hand over the weapons and ammunition in accordance with British demands, but Wustrow not only did not accept this request, but sent the following ultimatum: "if there is any further intervention, I shall blow up the consulate and whatever is hidden there". He also warned Mukarram al-Saltāna to evacuate all the people who lived in the neighbourhood of the consulate building. Beside this, he started to conduct propaganda for communism and spread a rumour that he and others were going to take over the town and establish a Bolshevik Government.

Because of this Vuṣūq al-Dawla wanted to protect Tabriz against a possible Soviet invasion and against communist sympathisers. On February 13, 1920, he therefore sent Marshal Björling to the Tabriz Police Headquarters to reorganize the police and prepare them to face a Soviet invasion. The first Police Headquarters in Iran had been founded during the early years of the Iranian Constitutional Movement under the strong discipline of Ijlāl al-Mulk in Tabriz. He was able to organize and establish a regular and responsible police force there which contributed to the security of the city. When the Tabriz Headquarters was taken over by Björling, there was a strong reaction from the police. The reason for this was that some of them would lose their jobs because of this change. There was another factor, Kasravī adds, which was dissatisfaction among the members of the financial department. Vuṣūq al-Dawla sent Tarjumān al-Saltāna to organize a new system and he established reform in the financial department of Tabriz. These two actions, namely the

moves against the police and financial employees in addition to an incident which took place in the early days of the Iranian New Year 1299 (April 6, 1920) brought the uprising to a boiling point. Some democrats and their supporters had been recently arrested. Among them was Mīrzā Bāqir, a supporter of the Democrat Party of Tabriz who was arrested and kept in detention at the Nawbar Police Station. Mīrzā Bāqir had refused to go to the police station because the man in charge of the police was not a Muslim, and this incident in fact became the spark which set fire to the movement and was used by the Democrats as a pretext for the uprising.¹

Finally we must consider Khīyābānī's own account of these events, which was published in Tajaddud and gives very clear reasons for the uprising. Khīyābānī writes,

"There is a great deal of insecurity, anarchy and public disorder in our society which is threatening our lives and properties. It is as if government has approved of the existence and continuation of this situation in our country. We are not receiving any benefit at all from the resources and facilities of our country. The chains of feudalism are still hanging from the hands of the despotism, which has not allowed us to organize our democracy. Our workers, peasants, businessmen and merchants have no security. due to the wild thieves and barbaric highwaymen. Due to the disobedient and violent people, the life in the cities is under their direct influence. Plundering, aggression and corruption are common occurrences nowadays, and are even believed to be natural in this country. But we declare and warn,

1. See A. Kasravī, T.H.S.A., pp.862-868.

that this is not a natural situation, this is anarchy which has been established and developed by the despotic and reactionary Vuṣūq al-Dawla. Fourteen years ago, Iranians rebelled and attempted to drive out all feudal landlords, parasites on society and the bourgeoisie and banish them from society for in fact they were the elements of despotism, oppression and anarchy. Then they established constitutional law in response to their country's demands. They held many demonstrations for their freedom, independence and equality in society, made many sacrifices, and asked for help from internal and external powers in order to achieve their demands. Iranian troops who were conscripted from the suffering nation used their weapons against liberals, freedom fighters and Constitutional Law. We would like to drive all backward thieves and wild brigands out of our country; we would like to destroy the doctrines of oppression, plunder and insecurity for ever in Iran; we would hope to preserve the lives and properties of Iran's democracy. But now we observe that not only have none of these wishes been met, but also that our freedom, freedom of speech and individual immunity which are provided by the Constitutional Law are violated by a group of plunderers and disobedient people. No! this treacherous plot will not succeed in the face of the Constitutional Law. The Constitutional Law will be alive, as long as Azerbaijan and its liberals are alive, Constitution will never be abandoned! Hands off our Constitutional Law! The liberals of Azerbaijan have rebelled to put an end to this abnormal situation and to wake up the people who have forgotten the sound of 'Long Live Constitutional Law.'¹

1. Tajaddud, April 26, 1920.

In a telegram to the Democrat member for Tehran and future governor general, Mukhbir al-Saltana,¹ Khayabani described the difficult situation both in Azerbaijan and other parts of the country. Then he pressed on Mukhbir al-Saltana the consequences of delay in the Majlis elections:

"...in view of our common aim, I advised Āzarbāyjānīs to be patient and not engage in opposition any more. But because of the baseless and false propaganda of the central government against us, we would like to take serious action and declare that the Āzarbāyjānīs are dissatisfied with this delay which has caused the Majlis elections not to take place...do take a serious step otherwise there will be more anarchy if power falls into the hands of the reactionary central leaders, who are traitor to both country and nation, and there will be no country with the name of Iran in future... ." ²

Mukhbir al-Saltana realized the important position of Iran for foreign powers and urged both political leaders and the Iranian government to consider this. He believed that if the government was disinterested in the fate of the country, the external powers would not treat the internal politicians seriously. Thus he declared;

"...the Great Powers were determined to preserve their interests in this part of the world... ." ³

However, apart from advising Khayabani, to be patient and obey the central government, he took no action which might have calmed the situation in Tabriz.

1. See Appendix No.3.

2. See M.Q. Hidāyat (Mukhbir al-Saltana) Kh.Kh., p.314.

3. See M.Q. Hidāyat (Mukhbir al-Saltana) Kh.Kh., p.320.

THE UPRISING

On Tuesday, April 6, 1920 a meeting was held by Khiyābānī and the Democrats in the Tajaddud building. During the last few days the police had started to arrest some of the Democrats. These arrests were carried out on the direct orders of Björling who was worried about the violence and demonstrations. A group of Democrats were instructed by the committee to go to Nawbar Police Station and release all those who had recently been arrested. This group of about fifty people released the prisoners after a little argument with the police and finally with the help of Sardār Intišār, the Deputy Governor of Azerbaijan who was in the area at that time. This incident was reported by an officer to Björling who then sent his deputy Fököl Klö with a group of police to recapture the released men. In order to reach the insurgents and demand the return of the prisoners, he surrounded the Tajaddud building. This gave Sardār Intišār the opportunity to go to the building and calm an escalating situation, which he did by ordering Fököl Klö to return to Police Headquarters. Kasravī states that it was due to Sardār Intišār's assistance that Khiyābānī was successful and that of course this event strengthened Khiyābānī and his followers.¹ On Wednesday April 7, 1920, the majority of the Tabrizis joined the Democrats and the Bāzār closed. The students of Tabriz marched through the streets, carrying the Iranian National flag. In

1. See A. Kasravī, T.H.S.A., p.870.

Qoyūn Maydāni, (Sheep Square) they burnt down all the gallows which had been set up by Mukarram al-Saltāna, the previous Governor General in Tabriz, on whose orders many liberals and democrats had been executed. They then carried one of the burnt gallows to Tajaddud where they were gladly received by the other people who were gathered there.¹ Kasravī writes of this event, "the students went to the Bāzār and forcibly closed all the shops, and then set the gallows on fire, on which some of Khiyābānī's assistants had been executed".² Following this a meeting took place to discuss the matter of the unpaid salaries of the soldiers. The Insurgents collected some money and the soldiers were told to collect their money at Tajaddud. When this news reached the police, who had not been paid for the last few months they also went to Tajaddud and were paid as well as the soldiers. This had a fruitful result for the Insurgents, because when the Democrats wanted to take over the Police Headquarters there was no resistance by the police. Following this Björling and his companions had to leave Tabriz for Tehran. Khiyābānī then made a speech in the presence of more than twenty thousand Tabrizis. The brief outline of his speech is as follows;

"The Constitution was achieved by sacrificing our best young liberals. Now we are struggling under the harsh pressure of a treacherous government.

1. See ^CA. Āzarī, Q.Kh., p.265.

2. See A. Kasravī, T.H.S.A., pp.870-71.

I hereby notify the inhabitants of the world that we have rebelled against this government which has accepted the Agreement between Vusūq al-Dawla and Britain. Tabriz is the place of freedom fighters and has sacrificed its liberals for the sake of Iran's independence. Thus we may call it Āzādīstān rather than Azerbaijan, and we would like to call for its recognition."¹

The Committee in its demands declared that state officials must submit to the rule of freedom in the country, and must without delay respect and carry out the constitution. The main tasks of the rising as set out by the public committee were as follows;

To put an end to the predatory activities of foreign imperialists; to dismiss local parasites out of Āzādīstān; to put the constitution, which was obtained by the people in 1905-11, into practice, and to fight for peace and democracy against external interference and Iranian reactionaries.

On Thursday 9, a manifesto was published in Persian and French, by the committee, and communicated to all foreign Consulates General in Tabriz as follows,

"The Liberals of Tabriz, prompted by the reactionary tendencies which have been manifested in a series of anti-constitutional acts committed by the local authorities and which have become extremely serious especially in the province of Āzādīstān, have risen to protest strongly against this.

1. Ghulām Mammadly, Khīyābānī, p.75.

The Liberals of Tabriz declare that their entire programme consists of obtaining complete satisfaction as regards the government respecting, on its part, the Constitutional Laws. The Liberals recognize the extreme importance of maintaining at all costs public order and peace. The Liberals programme consists of the following: To establish a system for social welfare and to put the Constitutional Laws from theory into practice."

Directing Committee for meetings, Tabriz, 9th April 1920.¹

THE DAY OF UPRISING

The first day of the uprising was described in a letter written by ^CAlī Akbar Āgāh² in 1949 which has been quoted by Āzarī;

"...I was informed that a man had come from Tajaddud to notify all the staff of the governor's office that they should leave the office and attend a meeting in Tajaddud at which all the people of Tabriz were invited to be present... I asked my servant to get some news from the Ark and I went to the Bāzār to find out what had happened. The most notable thing which attracted my attention was the students who

1. See Appendix No. 4.

2. ^CAlī Akbar Āgāh was an eyewitness of the uprising, and in his letter he states that this information was original and exclusive to him, but that he had kept it to himself for fear that it might be misrepresented. Āgāh was an employee of ^CAyn al-Dawla and was present in Tabriz during this period. For more details see ^CA. Āzarī, Q.Kh., p.237.

were marching through the Bāzār and carrying two burned gallows, saying that Mukarram al-Saltāna had executed Mujāhids on these gallows. Some other people were encouraging people to close down their shops and attend the meeting in Tajaddud. All Tabriz offices and governmental buildings were closed and the staff were directed to the Tajaddud building. At that time Bādāmchī and Ganja'ī arrived at the Ark in a coach and went into the office and delivered Khiyābānī's demands for Mīr Muḥammad ^CAlī's release.¹ I telephoned the Police Headquarters to ask for Mīr Muḥammad ^CAlī's release and then went to Tajaddud where Khiyābānī was giving a speech in the presence of twenty thousand Tabrizis."

Khiyābānī's brief speech was as follows;

"We people, who have gained our freedom and constitution with a great deal of our brave young people's blood are struggling under difficult conditions and under the pressure of the reactionary central government. I hereby announce to the people of the world that we have rebelled against a government which has agreed to Vuṣūq al-Dawla's destructive pact with England. Since Tabriz has been the place of freedom lovers and has offered many Mujāhids in order to gain her freedom we change the name of Āzarbāijān to Āzādīsītān² and now announce its birth."

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1. Mīr Muḥammad ^CAlī, whose name is given by most sources as Mīrzā Bāqir, had been arrested for distributing anti-government leaflets in Tabriz a few days before the uprising.
 2. We will discuss this in the fifth chapter where Khiyābānī's speeches are analysed.

At that time Mīr Muḥammad ^CAlī came along with Sattār Khān's son, both of whom were welcomed warmly by the people. I left for the governor's office at 10a.m. and later on Bādāmchī and Ganja'ī came in and delivered another of Khīyābānī's demands in which he asked for the dismissal of the Swedish Police Officers from Police Headquarters because these officers had not carried out their duty properly. He asked for command of the police to be handed over to Sardār Mukarram who had previously held this office and in whom the people of Tabriz had full trust. Following this action Björling was asked to leave Tabriz for Tehran, but he stayed in Bāsminj (a town in the countryside two miles outside Tabriz). Sardār Mukarram took office and all Swedish officers left Tabriz. Khīyābānī then asked the people to go and carry on with their daily activities, open their shops and be sure that there was no insecurity from now on throughout the city, because a trustworthy man was now in charge in the Police Headquarters.¹

According to the London Times:

"...The Tabriz Democrats once more have had their way and the opponents of British Policy and the Anglo-Persian Agreement here are quick to take advantage of the situation... ."2

1. For a full account, see ^CA. Āzari, Q.Kh., pp.281-82.

2. The Times, May 19, 1920.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE UPRISING

To lead the movement the Hay'at-i Ijtimā'ī (public committee) was formed under the leadership of Khiyābānī. The Insurgents seized all the administrative centres in Tabriz, including police stations, post office and financial office. All power in Tabriz fell into the hands of the Democrats and the town became the centre of the National Liberation Movement of Azerbaijan. The Hay'at-i Ijtimā'ī announced to the population that they had rebelled against the anti-democratic policy imposed by the central government. They then dismissed all government officials from their posts and expelled them from Tabriz. The Hay'at-i Ijtimā'ī considered the question of the reorganization of the various administrations in Tabriz and appointed trusted local members of the Democrat Party to take over police, finances, education and posts and telegraphs. Khiyābānī was anxious to organize a gendarmerie and strongly recommended young insurgents to join it. He also formed a National Guard in Tabriz to defend the countryside where there had been an invasion of the tribes.¹

The rising began to embrace an ever wider area. Thus within Iran a number of movements took place. In Gīlān, Mīrzā Kūchik Khān rebelled.

In June 1920, a movement led by Muhammad Alī Bāshmaqchī flared up in Zanjān in which the whole population of the town took part.

1. See A. Āzarī, Q.Kh., p.216.

In Ahar and Marāgha, the Democrats rebelled against the Shāh and central government, and established a connection with the Tabriz Insurgents. In Khūy government officials were driven out and power fell into the hands of Democrats. Ardabīl also established links with the Tabriz rebellion and revolted. The Insurgents organized a National Democratic Committee which was supported by the population.

These events are described by Tagiyeva as follows;

...The situation in Ardabīl was very tense, and British took the necessary measures for the Cossack force of 100 men and another armed unit to be continually prepared for retreat. The workers of Ardabīl, filled with a great hatred of the British and of the Persian reactionaries, attentively followed the struggle of the workers of Transcaucasia.¹

On June 23rd it was decided to form a National Government on the basis of the Hay'at-i Ijtimā'ī and the headquarters of the public commission were moved from the Tajaddud building to the 'Alī Qāpū (the seat of the government before the uprising). According to the newspaper Kumūnīst

"The National Government newly created in Azerbaijan was guided in its activities by the principles of government of a democratic republic. It was composed of 20 men of whom the president was Khiyābānī and who

1. See Sh.A. Tagiyeva, Natsionalnoe-Osvoboditelnoe Dvizhenie V Iranskom Azerbaidzhane V 1917-1920 godakh (Baku 1956) "The National Liberation Movement in Persian Azerbaijan 1917-1920" (Baku, 1956), p.89.

were all members of the Democratic Party of Persian Azerbaijan and belonged mainly to the merchant bourgeoisie. There were also among them representatives of small landowners, the clergy and intelligentsia."¹

During the Uprising Khiyābānī established full and regular security throughout the town. A mission was sent by the Armenians² of Azerbaijan to convey their satisfaction and happiness with the state of security which had been established by Khiyābānī in Tabriz. The main forces behind the revolutionary movement in Tabriz were the poor and the petty bourgeoisie, craftsmen and small traders.

In June 1920 the nomads³ belonging to the Shāhsuvan tribes joined the rebels. The reactionary section of the feudal landlords and the clerics who owned property on a large scale ranged themselves on the side of the government in Tehran. The movement in fact was led by the commercial bourgeoisie, small landowners and representatives of the lower clergy who did not share the view of their superiors that the participants in the rising were enemies of Islam.

KHIYĀBĀNĪ'S NON-POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

Khiyābānī, in addition to his political activities, set up some important charitable institutions. He established an orphanage

1. Kumūnīst, September, 1920 Baku.

2. ^CA. Āzarī, Q.Kh., p.270 and H. Makkī, op.cit., p.17.

3. These nomads lived in the North and North West of Azerbaijan.

with the assistance of Hājji Rahīm Bādkūba'ī, Hājji [°]Alī Asghar Shujā[°]ī and Hājji Mīrzā [°]Alī Akbar Bāfta'ī in a pleasant part of Tabriz at the foot of the Qulla mountain where Khiyābānī and his associates provided full equipment and facilities. Medicine and a permanent doctor were also provided for this establishment. A few members of the Democrat Party were chosen as teachers and trained the children in the orphanage in carpet-making and weaving in addition to school work. Hājji Muḥammad [°]Alī Haydar Zāda, a democrat and a close friend of Khiyābānī, was chosen as the chairman of this institution. At Khiyābānī's urging a hospital was established under Dr Pīlūsiyān in the Majīd al-Mulk Garden at Mārālān in Tabriz. This was later known as the Marīż Khāna-yi Shīr-u Khurshīd (Lion and Son Hospital) which became one of the famous hospitals of Iran. Khiyābānī also established a poorhouse for the disabled and those who were living in bad conditions, where they were provided with the necessities of life. An attempt was also made to establish a charitable institution in Tabriz to develop the provision of social services. Ismā[°]īl Āqā Amīr Khīzī and Mīrzā [°]Alī Asghar Khān-i Sartīp Zāda were chosen to be in charge. The foundations of the theatre in Tabriz were laid by this institution. Khiyābānī was interested in the theatre and believed that it was "one of the causes of cultural progress".

One of the best services provided was the establishment of a leper colony in Tabriz. These people were living uncared for and rejected in the village of Ārpā Dārāsī, one and half miles outside Tabriz. Khiyābānī attempted to look after them, and some of the well

known doctors of Tabriz such as Dr Sayyid Muḥammad Khān Ṭabāṭabā'ī, Jalīl Khān Nāṣir al-Hukamā, Fath Allāh Khān Fakhr al-Atibbā,^c Abd al-Husayn Khān Rukn al-Hukamā and Dr Pīlūsiyān used to work regularly at this village to treat them. These doctors worked free of charge.¹

The Uprising took a few steps to improve the living conditions of the town. An end was put to arbitrary rule in Tabriz. The price of food came down, and fixed prices for rice, wheat, sugar, kerosene and other goods were established. In the interests of the small traders, craftsmen and peasants, measures were taken to improve trade between Tabriz and surrounding towns, and a commission was appointed to work out projects for reforms in agriculture, education, finance, medicine, law and social services.²

This commission first turned its attention to a reform of agriculture and a system of taxation, and according to a new project various heavy taxes and duties imposed by the government on the peasants were abolished, and it was proposed to exact only income tax. In the plan for land reform worked out by the commission, it was proposed to distribute unconditionally among the peasants all Khāliṣa (state land) which, however, represented only four per cent of the land suitable for cultivation. Most of the privately owned land remained in the hands of the big landowners and clergy; but it

1. The material used in this section is drawn from an article in the newspaper Mardum (March 1981 - Tehran) by Z. Qiyāmī, who was an eye witness of the events of Khīyābānī's Uprising.

2. See Gh Mammadli, op.cit., pp.81-82.

was planned to advance loans from the agricultural bank to the peasants for a certain period so that they might buy land from the landlords; the commission also envisaged that the peasants would buy Waqf (pious foundation land) in the same way.

Distribution of the state lands among the peasants however only took place in certain parts of the Arvanaq - Anzāb and Dihkhārqān (Modern Āzar Shahr) regions of the province, and the new reforms failed to settle the agrarian problem satisfactorily.

The problem is analysed as follows by a Soviet writer;

"The correct solution to the agrarian question in an agricultural country like Iran was of enormous importance for only in this way was it possible to draw the peasantry into the revolutionary struggle. In this way it would have been possible to cause the National-Liberation movement to develop into a bourgeois-democratic revolution, since it is the agrarian revolution which forms the basis and content of a bourgeois-democratic revolution."¹

It is worth mentioning here that M.S. Ivanov states that nothing was done in the field of agricultural reform;

"The agrarian project worked out by the commission did not touch the interests of the landowners and did not improve the hard position of the peasants."²

1. See Sh.A. Tagiyeva, op.cit., p.97.

2. M.S. Ivanov, Ocherk Istorii Irana, (Moscow, 1952), p.277 and Sh.A. Tagiyeva, op.cit., p.97.

It was also proposed by the commission to study the possibility of exploiting the mineral resources of Azerbaijan province. The committee paid a great deal of attention to education, various new schools were opened, including one for girls in Tabriz. Special importance was attached to the liberation of women and their participation in the socio-political life of the country. It was also proposed to organize an unarmed national guard of twelve thousand men. A military school was established to train an armed police force. This armed police force consisted of two thousand men to support the movement. It was also planned to organize elections to a town Anjuman. The National and Agricultural bank were founded and the former issued its own currency.

In the words of Khiyābānī, the Democrats fought for the establishment of a free and democratic organization for the transformation of Iran into a powerful united country, and for the autonomy of Azerbaijan and other provinces, within a framework of a future democratic Iran. The leaders of the Tabriz rising aimed at extending it to the whole of Iran, their aim being to create in Iran a democratic government which would ensure the independence of the country, defend the constitution, carry out reforms without delay, abolish personal privileges, nationalize all businesses, and institutions, create a national industry, and ensure justice, equality of rights and freedom so that deputies elected to the Majlis should be true representatives of the people.

During the Uprising a garden party was held in Tabriz and from its funds a cemetery was established to honour the freedom fighters

who were killed during the Constitutional Revolution in Tabriz. On this special day, Khiyābānī and others gave speeches about Baskerville, an American volunteer who fought beside the Mujāhidīn and was killed during the Constitutional Revolution in Tabriz. Khiyābānī and his followers decided to send a valuable carpet on which Baskerville's¹ picture was woven, to his mother in America.²

KHIYĀBĀNĪ'S WAY OF LIFE

The following description of Khiyābānī's personality was given to the author in the summer of 1983 by Mashhadī Qanbār, then aged 84, who took part in the Tabriz Uprising and had many opportunities to observe him.

Khiyābānī had a robust intelligence and was dignified and modest. He thought deeply but spoke little. He always had a smile on his face. Since he had risen from the people he remained one with the people until his death. Because of his beliefs he respected the poor and the working class with a profound sympathy, sincerity and easy approach. Khiyābānī regarded it as his duty to attend to the needs of his fellow men and thought that and his earthly needs should be the first consideration. Khiyābānī was a remarkable thinker, a true patriot, a benefactor of society; he was a social man in the true sense of the word. Khiyābānī was brave and always

1. Baskerville was recognized as one of the local Mujāhidīn of the period of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. The grave of this brave American is in the Laylāvā Cemetery in Tabriz.

2. For more details see ^CA. Āzarī, op.cit., pp.308-9.

used to say that a timid person has many defects and that such people can damage society. He was an honest man and had a deep love of poetry and music. He respected great poets and admired each for his own particular approach and had faith in them. Khiyābānī liked cheerful music, recognised its value and thus respected and encouraged musicians. He especially liked and enjoyed folk music but criticized mournful music and said it should brighten up. Sometimes he jokingly commented that such music was not music but dirges. Khiyābānī was fond of horse riding and target shooting, whenever he had the opportunity. He regarded sport as very important and always emphasised its benefits, and he himself regularly used to take exercise twice a day. Early morning in Summer and Winter he used to walk for a long distance on the streets. It was through his efforts that the sports club was established in Tabriz. Khiyābānī did his best to develop and expand culture. He was a founder member of the Culture Society and worked enthusiastically on its behalf.

The following description of Khiyābānī's personality was taken from Dunyā No.11 (Tehran 1975) where Z. Qiyāmī's article runs as follows:

"...Khiyābānī lived in the Khiyābān district of Tabriz in a modest small house. At the entrance to the house there was a room which was used as Khiyābānī's library. In this room there were two book shelves, six chairs and a square table. The book shelves which ran all round the room and the shelves built in recesses in the wall were full of books piled on top of each other. In this room Khiyābānī received visitors

with the utmost modesty and kindness. Khiyābānī had a small shop in the Tabriz Bāzār at Hājī Muhammad Qulī Court. He used to sell cotton and haberdashery and thus earned his living. The shop was also a meeting place for his friends. Khiyābānī's life was very simple and without ceremonies. He wore a turban on his head but dressed in ordinary trousers and waistcoat, shoes and boots. He did not shave his head and had long hair. During my life I have seen three people with head wear like this. One was Khiyābānī, one was the famous freedom fighter Fakhr al-^CĀrifīn in Māzandarān, and the other was Abū al-Qāsim ^CĀrif-i Qazvīnī the great poet. All these people were very clean and well-dressed. They always dyed the cloth of their turban light blue, and wore a clean cloak. Khiyābānī regarded time as very important and was very conscious and attentive to it. He used to say that 'anybody who does not keep to time, has no discipline in life and this is the first discipline for society...'

Khiyābānī was very busy during the days of the uprising; nevertheless, from the beginning of the year 1298/1919 he started writing a book about the great October Revolution of 1917, its influence on Iran, its world-wide beneficial results, Lenin's support and help during the Constitutional Revolution, his sympathy to and friendship with the people of Iran and his generous and valuable concessions. This book was to be entitled Lenin and Iran. Khiyābānī had little time to spare from his preparations for the uprising, but nevertheless managed to spend a few hours a day on this book. He lost sleep over it, but did his best to finish the book as quickly as possible and to have it published. Only a few of his very close friends knew about his writing:

Hājji Muhammad ^CAlī Bādāmchī, Hājji Ismā^Cīl Amīr Khīzī, Hājji Mīrzā ^CAlī Naqī Ganja'ī Khān, Mīrzā Taqī Khān-i Raf^Cat and another man. Khīyābānī was so attached to this book that he yearned to finish it and sometimes said longingly that 'it will be ideal if I have the chance to live and finish this book and publish it'. But he did not succeed. He had avowed that he wished to sacrifice his life in the service of the county and the people, and indeed was killed and this important work remained unfinished and disappeared."

THE DEFEAT OF THE RISING

To quell the uprising which had swept over Azerbaijan, certain steps were taken by both Iranians and British. One group with which the British attempted to establish contact was that headed by Kasravī. Ahmad Kasravī (1890-1945) was born in Tabriz. He began his education at a maktab, but because of his unhappiness with his religious studies and his unwillingness to become a Mullā, he transferred to the American-run Memorial School where he studied modern subjects.¹ Kasravī was affected by the Iranian Constitutional Revolution and became a member of the Democrat Party of Tabriz in 1915, being an active member of the party until he had to move to Tehran because of his disagreement with Khīyābānī.²

1. See A. Kasravī, Chihil Maqāla, p.3.

2. See M. Mujtahidī, R.A., p.128.

His opposition to Khayābānī was more political than personal. Khayābānī believed that in order to defeat the enemy one should count on the support of the mass of the people and avoid ideological differences; whereas Kasravī was a democrat who believed that people with various political views should form the leadership. Of course one can argue that Khayābānī by avoiding different political views and indeed keeping people with different views out of his circle wanted to unite people against their common enemy but on the other hand this attitude had its own weaknesses. Although Khayābānī was supported by the masses of illiterate people, these people because of their lack of social and political consciousness were defeated quite easily after the death of Khayābānī. In other words there were no leaders who could replace Khayābānī and continue his struggle. A conversation between Kasravī and Khayābānī reported by the former explains some of their differences.

Kasravī addressing Khayābānī says,

"...The fault that they found in you and I myself agree with it is this, that the personalities who have struggled from the start of Constitutional Movement have been driven away by you, and instead you appoint person of bad repute and former enemies of freedom."

Khayābānī answering says:

"Those people whom you mention are the ones who stand up and impose their views. Whereas these people (i.e. his supporters) accept without

questions whatever we say." "But if a difficult time comes," Kasravī replies, "the former due to their own beliefs and convictions, will stand up and resist. But the latter are not bound to anything, and as soon as they find the enemy stronger than you they will quickly sway towards it."

Khiyābānī, disagreeing with Kasravī, finally replies, "You are still young and inexperienced."

Kasravī makes no answer to this statement of Khiyābānī and leaves him.¹

Besides these ideological differences, there were also other differences between Kasravī and Khiyābānī. In regard to the meaning of nationalism and independence Kasravī seems more specific in his approach to the question of nationalism and language. Having a common language, culture and religion should not necessarily mean that we have common interests. Kasravī for example criticises Raf^Cat's support of the Turks, believing that speaking the same language does not necessarily mean having the same political views. Raf^Cat while associated with the democrats in Azerbaijan, praised the Ottoman military governor Khalīl Pāshā in his articles and poetry,² while Khiyābānī and his

1. See A. Kasravī, Z.M., p.91.

2. ibid., pp.86-87.

friends were imprisoned by him in Qārş. One of Kasravī's criticisms of Khīyābānī was precisely his appointment of Raf^cat as editor of Tajaddud. Kasravī in fact criticises Khīyābānī on two grounds: firstly, his being rather autocratic and not encouraging other democrats to take part in decision making, and secondly his lack of carefulness in his choice of people for important positions. To put it briefly Kasravī and Khīyābānī could have been ideal leaders if only they had combined their intellectual and historical experiences with their patriotism.

It is perhaps ironic that Sattār Khān and Bāqir Khān, both regarded as illiterate, could unite their efforts at the beginning of the Constitutional Revolution whereas more educated people like Kasravī and Khīyābānī failed to do so. Thus we have to look for the reasons of failures in the weaknesses of individual leaders rather than in the nature of the uprising.

Vusūq al-dawla maintained connections with Kasravī's group through Karbalā'ī Husayn Āqā Fishangchī. Fishangchī

met Kasravī and discussed with him a telegram in which Vuṣūq al-Dawla declared that, if Kasravī would fight against Khiyābānī, the government would give him as much money as he wanted. As Kasravī states when describing this incident, "Fishangchī, who was the agent of Vuṣūq al-Dawla in Tabriz, met me and asked if I would co-operate with him".¹ He later says, "I refused Fishangchī" and said, "I am not interested in this matter. Furthermore I am unable to manage this action".² Fishangchī then met Mīrzā ^CAlī Hay'at, a leading member of the Democrats who was in disagreement with Khiyābānī on many points. They decided to fight against Khiyābānī with the direct assistance of ^CAyn al-Dawla who had been recently appointed Governor General of Azerbaijan but was not recognized by Khiyābānī and the Democrat Party of Tabriz, and with the help of a group of volunteers from Qara Dāgh who would invade Tabriz and defeat the uprising.

Khiyābānī discovered this plot and ordered the arrest of all the leaders of this opposition group. Fishangchī and Hay'at were arrested and Kasravī was obliged to leave Tabriz on the 10th of May. After the defeat of this opposition group and of other counter-revolutionary groups who were preparing to oppose the supporters of Khiyābānī with the support of landowners and people who had been driven out of Tabriz by the insurgents, the government of Vuṣūq al-Dawla in its turn sent a detachment of the Cossack division led by

1. A. Kasravī, T.H.S.A., p.879.

2. Ibid., p.880.

the future Shāh, Rizā Khān to put down the rebellion; but the attempt failed.

Meanwhile, Britain managed to take some action through her intelligence officer, Major Edmond, who was sent to Tabriz from Headquarters in Qasvīn to negotiate with Khiyābānī and also some of Khiyābānī's opponents. On arrival he met Kasravī and asked for his co-operation. About this meeting Kasravī states,

"Due to a note in which I was asked to meet Major Edmond at the British Consulate, I went there and saw the latter British officer. He said, "I understand that you are a leader of a group which is opposed to Khiyābānī. I would like to ask you about the possibilities of your fighting against Khiyābānī if you receive some help from the government". I answered him, "Because of the following circumstances we are unable to fight against Khiyābānī. Firstly most of our followers are tradesmen and could not fight properly; secondly, we have dispersed our followers from the beginning of the uprising and finally because of the uprising of Khiyābānī who has rebelled for the sake of Azerbaijan, we would not wish to fight against him".¹

Major Edmond, realizing after a meeting with Kasravī that previous schemes had failed, met Khiyābānī. But Khiyābānī refused to accept his conditions and urged him to withdraw the force of Indian Sepoys and also The Norperforce.²

1. See A. Kasravī, T.H.S.A., pp.879-880.

2. i.e. the British force in North Persia.

Since the British envoy Major Edmond had not succeeded in his meetings either with Kasravī or with Khiyābānī and since it was realised that anti-British feeling was high among the insurgents and had a great influence in the city the British detachment at Tabriz, as a result of the following instructions from London, was forced to leave Tabriz:

"War Office has no fresh news of movement of troops against Tabriz, but military position in North West Persia renders it impossible to maintain British detachment in Tabriz any longer and they insist that orders already issued for its withdrawal must hold good."¹

After studying this background one still wonders if Kasravī, if, as he had mentioned in his meeting with Major Edmond, he had these conditions available he would have taken any serious actions against Khiyābānī? As Kasravī has stated himself, both the British offer and Fishangchī's advice were ^{un}acceptable for him, and one can not see any reason for his reluctance taking action against Khiyābānī other than being in a helpless position.

Of course one cannot accuse Kasravī for being an anti-democratic movement in Azerbaijan, however it is fair to criticize Kasravī on the grounds that if he was a genuine democrat then he should have informed Khiyābānī of the existence of such a plot. Still the question "Why he did not inform Khiyābānī?" might remain unanswered.

1. Earl Curzon in his telegram to Sir P. Cox on June 5.

F.O. No.307 [20]215/150/34] Foreign Office, June 5, 1920, Vol.XII, p.503.

THE END OF KHIYĀBĀNĪ'S UPRISING

Meanwhile arrangements were being made by Mukhbir al-Saltana in Tabriz, with the assistance of the Central Government, to prepare the way for the final assault on Tabriz and the suppression of the insurgents. At the crucial moment two hundred armed supporters of the uprising had been sent out of the city to fight the counter-revolutionaries at Ahar, and only a small force remained in Tabriz. In Ahar Amīr Arshad, the chief of the Qara Dāgh tribe who were harassing the people of the countryside had declared against Khiyābānī, because the latter had arrested his brother.

Mukhbir al-Saltana, after spending a few days in town and assessing the situation, went to the barracks where Cossack forces under the command of Meshtich¹ were stationed. Here he planned to overthrow the uprising. In his memoirs, Mukhbir al-Saltana quotes the latter as saying that the uprising was not well protected and that the insurgents consisted of labourers.² Meshtich was subsequently ordered by the government to co-operate with Mukhbir al-Saltana. There was also, however, an indirect interference by the British Norperforce (North Persia Force) which in fact supported the Cossack Brigade in wanting to be rid of the rebels.³

1. He was one of the Russian officers who chose to remain in Tabriz after the October Revolution.

2. See M.Q. Hidāyat, Kh.Kh., p.315.

3. See C. Skrine, op.cit., p.64.

On the 12th September a sudden attack was made on Tabriz leaving the insurgents no time to unite. Khiyābānī had to leave his house and went to the house of Hājji Shaykh Husayn ^CAlī Miyānaji, his neighbour. Miyānaji offered to negotiate with Mukhbir al-Saltana in an attempt to secure his safety, but Khiyābānī replied,

"I have said whatever was necessary; we had a long discussion with him concerning our requests, but he rejected all of them and replied, "do whatever you wish". You were witness to our activities, and the fact that we democrats have always supported Mukhbir al-Saltana. Whenever the government has wanted to appoint a governor general, we have offered Mukhbir al-Saltana this post. Now we understand Hazrat ^CAlī's order

أَتَّقِ شَرَّ مَنْ أَحْسَنَ إِلَيْهِ

(Fear that you may suffer ill at the hands of one with whom you have dealt kindly)."¹

Because of this anxiety for Khiyābānī's life, Miyānaji repeated his request, but this time Khiyābānī became upset and replied,

"I prefer to be killed rather than give myself up. I will not kneel before the enemy. I am a son of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. I am a descendant of

1. See ^CA. Āzarī, Q.Kh., p.491.

Bābak Khurram-Dīn,¹ who in the presence of the Arab Caliph displayed such bravery and greatness."²

Finally on the information of a young girl the hiding place of Khiyābānī was found. Ismā^Cīl Qazzāq with other soldiers raided Miyānājī's house and after a brief struggle Khiyābānī was shot dead. Mukhbir al-Saltāna in his book declares,

"...in the afternoon a report was received. According to information given by a young girl, Khiyābānī was hidden in the cellar of Miyānājī's house. After a few shots Khiyābānī was injured and then a bullet which struck his head caused his death. It was said that he had committed suicide. In a letter which was found later, Khiyābānī said, "Goodbye friends; since I am alone and have decided not to give myself up I have killed myself. Follow our goals and do not be disappointed. Look after my family; I have nobody to take care of them. Such is Mukhbir al-Saltāna's liberalism. Muḥammad Khiyābānī, 14.9.1920."³

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1. The great Iranian revolutionary and peasant leader of the Ninth Century, who was cut into pieces alive by the Caliph al-Mu^Ctaṣim in 228 A.H. in Baghdād. For more details see, S. Nafīsī, Bābak Khurram Dīn, Dilāvar-i Āzarbāijān, (Tehran 1333); Z. Safa and M. Azizi, La domination Arabe et L'épanouissement du Sentiment National en Iran, (Paris 1938); The Book of government or Rules for Kings, The Siyāsāt Nāma or Siyar al-Mulūk of Nizām al-Mulk, Tr. from the Persian by H. Darke (London 1960), pp.238-245, and Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, No.3/15, V. Minorsky, "Caucasica, IV" (London 1953), pp.504-29.
 2. See ^CA. Āzarī, Q.Kh., p.491.
 3. See M.Q. Hidāyat, Kh.Kh., pp.319-20.

The present writer was told that this letter is kept by a person who is living in Tehran. Though I several times tried to obtain a copy, the owner has so far proved unwilling to produce the letter.

The whole question of Khiyābānī's death and this alleged suicide note presents many problems. Quite apart from the psychological improbability of Khiyābānī choosing to kill himself in this way, we can not understand how, having been wounded several times by a Cossack detachment specifically sent to take him, he would then find the time to write this letter and shoot himself before the soldiers arrived. Even had he decided to choose death we would have expected him to do so by confronting the Cossacks in person, furthermore, as we shall see below, Mukhbir al-Saltāna on another occasion stated that his troops had killed him. Thus we need to ask about the nature of this elusive letter, and point out that it is at least possible that it was a forgery which was placed on his body after his death.

Pīshavarī, in an article published in the newspaper Āzarbāyjān on 26.6.1324, gives some additional information on these events which casts further doubts on the claim that Khiyābānī committed suicide and quotes Mukhbir al-Saltāna as having said:

"...it is true that I killed him, but this is a great service, since Khiyābānī committed treason... ."

Furthermore several other historians state that Khiyābānī was killed when he was involved in a conflict with the Cossacks.¹

Finally C. Skrine the British Consul for Tehran and Mashhad who lived and worked in Iran during both World Wars and from time to time between them has another version, i.e. that "...Khiyābānī was duly caught and executed... ." ²

Miyānaji's grandson, speaking of Khiyābānī's last moments declares:

"...Khiyābānī promised my grandfather that there would not be shooting in his house on his part. My grandmother was crying and begging Īsmā^Cīl Qazzāq and the others not to kill Khiyābānī. Finally Khiyābānī collapsed and his arm was cut off by Īsmā^Cīl Qazzāq and his body was carried on a ladder towards Ālī Qāpū where Mukhbir al-Saltana was awaiting them. Khiyābānī's body was buried at Madrasa-yi Siqat al-Īslām in Tabriz... ." ³

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1. For instance, Iranschā^hr, No,14, 1/8/1926; A. Kasravī, T.H.S.A. p.897; Ā. Āzarī, Q.Kh., p.494; M. Mujtahidī, R.A., p.74; G. Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1945, a study in Big-Power Rivalry, (New York 1949), p.62; Fortescue (L.S.) Military Report on Tehran and adjacent Provinces of North-West Persia, (London 1921), p.353, and Ch. Mammadly, op.cit., p.108.
 2. See C. Skrine, op.cit., p.64.
 3. See Ā. Āzarī, Q.Kh., p.492.

When the Cossacks plundered Khiyābānī's house, they were shocked at Khiyābānī's way of life. They asked Khiyābānī's wife, "where is the life of luxury which has been talked about among the people".¹ They managed however to get seven liras and a few rugs, and also took away the doors and windows of Khiyābānī's house and ruined the building, even taking the rafters. They also took the earrings, necklace and bracelets of Khiyābānī's wife and the earrings of his seven year old daughter. They then paraded Khiyābānī's family, the oldest child being only seven, through the streets. On this day on the direct order of Mukhbir al-Saltana more than three hundred of the insurgents were killed, their property seized and their houses destroyed.

Norman, the British Consul, in a report sent on 19th September 1920 from Tehran to Earl Curzon, says,

"Situation in Persian Azerbaijan which has long given cause for anxiety has been now cleared up by energetic action of Mukhber us-Sultaneh, new Governor General. Town of Tabriz had been long dominated by a party under leadership of Sheikh Khiyabani who styled themselves democrats but whose object was separation of Azerbaijan from rest of Persia. They were prepared to invoke Bolshevik aid to this end. Their authority extended, however, to no more than a mile or two beyond city and active hostility of rural population and tribesmen disturbed peace of Province. In Tabriz they had seduced police and gendarmerie from

1. ^CA. Āzarī, Q.Kh., p.504.

their allegiance and late Governor General, Prince Ain-ed-Dowleh, who was helpless against them, was obliged to leave the province and return to Tehran. Acting Governor, whom he left behind, was compelled to defer to Separatists in all things. On arrival of Mukhber-us-Sultaneh, Khiyābānī refused to recognize him as Governor General or to call on him and told his Majesty's Consul that he would no longer recognize authority of Prime Minister unless the latter recognized him as dictator of Azerbaijan. Consul vainly endeavoured to induce him to adopt a more reasonable attitude. Early on the morning of September 13th Mukhbar-us-Sum(sic) with help of Cossacks, who have remained loyal, seized heir apparent's palace, citadel and other strongholds of separatists and, after four hours fighting, dispersed their forces killing fifty, wounding over one hundred and recovering all guns and machine-guns and most of rifles and ammunition which had fallen into their possession. Cossack losses were one killed and one wounded. Khiyābānī was discovered later in the day hiding in cellar of his house and was shot dead on offering resistance to Cossacks who attempted to arrest him. Arrest of other Separatist leaders is said to be only matter of time. Town is now quiet and people have been greatly pleased at turn which events have taken. Governor General is to be congratulated on success of his coup. Addressed to Foreign Office. Sent to India No.642, Baghdad No.303."¹

1. Public Record Office 371/4927, September 19, 1920.

Having received some local complaints about the Cossaks' brutality Mukhbir al-Saltana replied that victorious forces are allowed to do whatever they wish for three days. Thus the region of Amīr Khīz due to its location was badly damaged as a result of Cossack pillaging.

Having inspected Khiyābānī's body, Mukhbir al-Saltana sent it for burial at the Madrasa-yi Siqat al-Islām.

After Khiyābānī's death, Mukhbir al-Saltana published a public notice which read as follows:

"People imagined that the uprising of these gentlemen in Tabriz was really for establishing Constitutional Law. I myself who do not need any kind of introduction in Tabriz have undertaken the task of serving the people and have come to Azerbaijan with enthusiasm and all possible haste. From what I have observed between Jamāl Ābād and Tabriz, I have not seen a trace of democracy. Everywhere, the working people were suffering and the peasants in distress and had nobody to come to their rescue. In Miyāna I observed a pitiful situation; a state of insecurity prevails within one farsakh of the town, the whole province is in disorder, and in the town the people are miserable and lips are sealed by the threat of the rifle. During last week I tried to understand the wishes of these gentlemen by any

means possible but I did not find out anything except their personal views; I advised them but I did not receive any logical response. At a time when unity is the only remedy for the ills of the country, these gentlemen have chosen the path of disunity. To sit down and start reforms is better than rising up and creating anarchy in the country. The Police are hungry and the Gendarmerie is unprovided for and the roads are insecure, while these gentlemen are making speeches in the courtyards of the government. The insurgents have forced government officials to commit illegal acts and have dismantled the governmental machinery. Accordingly further waiting and patience are not acceptable. According to the power which has been entrusted to me I have ordered the army to save the city from this regrettable situation so that a start can be made in the reforming of internal and external affairs. The Police must be in charge of law and order as before, and the Gendarmerie must provide safe roads. We must keep their accounts in order so that they receive both salary and training. Mukhbir al-Saltana, 15.9.1920."¹

The opponents of the uprising asked Mukhbir al-Saltana to banish the leaders of the uprising when he had suppressed the movement;

1. See A. Kasravi, T.H.S.A., p.898.

"...the local merchants and aristocrats were pushing me to banish the leaders of the uprising. I disagreed but finally because of the pressure of the nobles, I sent the leaders to the countryside for a while... ."1

After suppressing Khiyābānī's Uprising Mukhbir al-Saltāna was congratulated by Ahmad Shāh and the Prime Minister Mushīr al-Dawla, from whom he received the following telegram;

"Dear Governor General,
We have received your report. The King has been most happy because of your excellent services. Accordingly he sends a medal of honour with a special sash to express His Highness' regards. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you. With best wishes.
Mushīr al-Dawla, 17.9.1920."2

Khiyābānī's uprising was openly suppressed by both central government which Mukhbir al-Saltāna, an appointed governor general who accompanied along the Cossacks and also by the British government who backed the Iranian government by sending her Norperforce to suppress the uprising:

"...The Triumvirate fell and were replaced by a Nationalist government led by Mushirud-Dawla, who sent a strong Governor General to Azerbaijan with an adequate escort to restore the situation. With the support of Norperforce the Cossack Brigade put the rebels to flight... ."3

1. M.G. Hidāyat, Kh.Kh., p.320.

2. M.G. Hidāyat (Mukhbir al-Saltāna) Kh.Kh., p.319.

3. See C. Skrine, op.cit., pp.63-4.

According to Kasravī, Khīyābānī's death left a great deal of dissatisfaction, both in Tabriz and Tehran.¹ Papers blamed Mukhbir al-Saltāna and condemned him for his action. Mīrzā Taqī Khān-i Raf^cat, a close friend of Khīyābānī, committed suicide in Arvanaq-Anzāb where he and some other democrats took refuge; some others allied themselves with Ismā^cīl Sīmīṭqū and rebelled against Mukhbir al-Saltāna; in Ahar, the insurgents led by Qiyāmī called themselves "Qiyāmiyyūn-i Intiqāmiyyūn" (revenge insurgents) and carried on a violent struggle against the central government for a couple of months. On Khīyābānī's anniversary in Tabriz some freedom fighters and democrats celebrated his first anniversary.² Two years later, in February 1922, the followers of Khīyābānī rebelled and called themselves "Partisans of freedom" and "enemies of despotism" and carried on their opposition to the central government.³ On the occasion of Khīyābānī's death the following Iranian poets wrote about him: Abū al-Qāsim-i ^cĀrif, Muḥammad ^cAlī Ṣafvat, ^cAlī Akbar-i Āgāh and Malik al-Shu^carā-i Bahār.⁴

It is very often the case in Iran that a movement which has not received any support from an external power, is either defeated by its own central government or is suppressed by external intervention. In countries such as Iran, which lies in a strategic

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1. See A. Kasravī, T.H.S.A., p.899. 2. For more details see, M. A. Ṣafvat,
3. See p.213 of this work. Dāstān-i Dūstān, pp. 82-3.
4. See G. Lenczowski, R.W., p.63.
5. See Appendix 5..

area and has rich natural resources, any such movement must have a bearing on the interests of foreign powers and social systems. The idea of belonging to neither East nor West which was espoused by Khayābānī was perhaps an impossible one at his time. While the central government and the enemies of the democratic movement in Azerbaijan, namely the big landowners and the rich, were supported by Britain, Khayābānī did not contemplate receiving any kind of support from outside forces. Khayābānī could easily have been supported by the only other existing power in the area, namely the Bolsheviks. In the case of the Constitutional Revolution democratic forces in Russia helped the constitutionalists in Iran and stood against Tzarist reactionary and military forces. As in the Constitutional Revolution, during Khayābānī's uprising there were two forces. One wanted democratic freedom, land reform, social justice and compulsory education and was headed by Khayābānī. The other force which consisted of feudal magnates, businessmen and reactionary elements were working with the central government, backed by Britain.

While Khayābānī was popular among progressive forces in Iran, the government media in Iran and the press in Britain were painting a negative picture of Khayābānī. The London Times for example described him as the "virtual dictator" of Tabriz.¹

There were many articles written in Iran, the government run press introducing Khayābānī as a dictator and separatist who had

1. The Times, September 20, 1920.

achieved nothing but killing the people and plundering the rich by his uprising. On the other hand, there is another statement which completely differs from this: "there was neither killing nor plundering in Khīyābānī's uprising".¹ Khīyābānī not only did not behave as a dictator to his opponents but in fact guaranteed their lives in order to prove the existence of democracy in his movement.² Khīyābānī's attitude and policy towards his opponents can be understood from one of his articles:

"...within these four months, we did not incline to harm anybody. After four months' activity there has been no anarchy; and while we have been obliged to take harsh measures, nevertheless we have not disturbed our opponents. We have banished and arrested our opponents in a civilized manner; we have forgiven our enemies and heard their advice...".³

Khīyābānī's strategy during this period is open to certain criticisms. The main one is perhaps that he did not take measures to organize large forces to protect the revolution. He had the opportunity to establish a considerable armed force, as there were many weapons and much ammunition at the German Consulate in Tabriz which had been taken over by Khīyābānī's followers after the death of Wustrow, the German Consul-General. If he had organized a strong army he would have been able to neutralise the local Cossack troops

1. M. Mujtahidī, R.A., p.75.

2. Tajaddud, 3/2/1299 (24.4.1920).

3. Tajaddud, 24/5/1299 (16.8.1920).

and repel an attack by central government forces. He also did nothing about the Tabriz Barracks, where the Cossacks remained under central government control. Thus they were eventually able to defeat the movement and kill Khiyābānī's followers within four hours. It seems entirely possible that if Khiyābānī had followed the example of Muhammad Taqī Khān-i Pisyān's¹ military policy, it would not have been possible to suppress the revolution so easily. Indeed he did not discuss military matters with other leaders. Karīm Tāhirzāda-yi Bihzād relates the following revealing account:

"One day Khiyābānī asked me to discuss the commander of the uprising force about whom he was interested in talking. He asked my opinion. I recommended Colonel Pisyān. Khiyābānī said, "I would like to appoint him as the commander of the uprising force" and then asked me to write a letter to Pisyān and invite him to Tabriz. After a while I received a letter in which Pisyān said, "I would be most grateful if Khiyābānī himself could write directly to me, and I am ready to be at his service". I met Khiyābānī and told him what Pisyān wanted, but Khiyābānī did not make any response. I met Khiyābānī again later about the matter of the commander but he did not pay any attention. I heard after a while that Khiyābānī had appointed Sayyid Murtażā Dībā who was an inexperienced military figure."²

1. See Appendix No. 6.

2. See K. T. Zāda-yi Bihzād, op.cit., p.507.

It must be also said that Khiyābānī was autocratic by temperament. He often made decisions independently rather than in co-operation with the other members of the committee. However, some historians maintain that Khiyābānī did sometimes co-operate with other leaders, as for example in sending some two hundred national guards to fight Sardar ^cAshāyir.¹

Khiyābānī was indecisive in some ways. He had a great opportunity to take advantage of the revolutionary situation which existed in other parts of Iran. If he had co-operated with other movements and co-ordinated their efforts he might have been successful in bringing about a fundamental change in the social structure of Iran. Nevertheless he deliberately ignored the opportunity of benefiting from this situation:

"...there is a great deal of co-operation from other parts of Iran, and they have asked for the uprising, but we ask them to remain patient... ." ²

Khiyābānī wanted to carry on his uprising by two ways, firstly by giving daily speeches and writing articles in order to prepare the minds of the people, and secondly, by military preparations which were mainly based on the National Guards. Perhaps Khiyābānī achieved more in the first way than in the second, as his National Guards were no match for the central government forces. In this case he became victim of his determined policy of pure nationalism, that is to say

1. Ibid.

2. Tajaddud, 13/2/1299 (4.5.1920).

complete reliance on the people and local forces. Probably he did this in order to avoid being accused by his enemies of being a separatist and the puppet of foreigners. But in reality, those who were accusing Khiyābānī of separatism were themselves receiving help from foreign power, namely Britain. Bearing in mind all these circumstances and the aggressive policy of the central government of Iran, we may conclude that Khiyābānī's uprising and democratic movement would have lasted longer and had much deeper influence if he had received help from other democratic forces.

Chapter 5

KHIYĀBĀNĪ AND HIS POLITICAL SPEECHES

A few Iranian Historians studied political figures such as Khiyābānī on an abstract level, that is to say their writings on Khiyābānī have been outside his social and political context. Here, however, we shall attempt to study Khiyābānī in his socio-political context. Khiyābānī made one hundred and one speeches during his uprising of which sixty one were delivered at the Tajaddud Building while the rest were given at ^ĀAlī Qāpū and published in Tajaddud, a weekly paper in Tabriz. Tajaddud was published for the first time on April 9, 1917. It was edited by Fuyūzāt up to number thirteen; later on he was assisted by Abū al-Fath Khān-i ^ĀAlavī and they jointly published Tajaddud until number fifty eight. After this number Raf^Āat became the chief editor until number eighty six. The last editor-in-charge was Shaykh Muhammad Khiyābānī who continued until number two hundred and two. The only existing copy of Tajaddud is to be found in the National Library of Tabriz in Iran but even here some numbers are missing. Khiyābānī's speeches explain the reasons for his uprising and help us to find out more about his ideology. This in turn helps us to understand his actions, the comments of his opponents and the social circumstances and political situation in which Khiyābānī's Uprising took place.

The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly we shall try to introduce the socio-political outlook of Khayābānī through his original speeches and writings. Secondly we hope to show that, contrary to official views in Iran that his uprising was based on a separatist movement, Khayābānī was a patriot with a deep love and respect for his country, especially Azerbaijan, and for his people. His deep patriotism and love of Azerbaijan and Tabriz does not necessarily mean that he did not love the rest of Iran. We shall attempt to show how his patriotism and interest in democratic movement has been misinterpreted by biased historians and by a hostile press.

Khayābānī in his speeches and writings has discussed or touched on a number of socio-political issues which we shall explain and discuss chronologically. In this chapter Khayābānī's aims in the Tabriz Uprising, his views on national revival, on monarchy, the Constitutional Law of Iran, discipline, the concept of 'freedom', his concept of government and his patriotism on the bases of freedom and independence of Iran will be illustrated.

1. KHAYĀBĀNĪ AND HIS AIMS IN THE TABRIZ UPRISING

Khayābānī's Uprising was not an individual movement or even a local rebellion. He indeed wanted to set up a movement in which an unbreakable bond would be created with other parts of Iran. In other words his uprising was a national rejection of reactionary and despotic rule in general, and of the existing situation of Iran in

particular. In short "The Tabriz Uprising has a deep bond and interest with the other parts of Iran... our uprising has taken place against the existing reactionary situation... ."1 Khayābānī then asks his fellow revolutionaries to pay particular attention to common interests rather than thinking of individual benefits. In this connection he believed that one must not sacrifice one's fellow countrymen's interests for one's own interest. "...One must not think of one's own individual benefit... ."2

Khayābānī, explaining the aims of the Tabriz Uprising, indicates that whoever wants to rule despotically in order to keep himself in power, is a person who is against enlightenment. He compares his own ideas with those of his opponents and central government as follows:

"...we demand a common brightness to cover all our country. Of course in order to create such a light, a clean and progressive programme is essential. It is the characteristic of despotism to act against enlightenment and freedom... we freedom lovers will fight on the bases of our principles, to develop freedom and expand enlightenment in this field... ."3

Khayābānī in another speech analysed the aims of the insurgents and the Tabriz Uprising. He reminds his listeners that we must be aware of our requirements and must not be impatient. He points out

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1. Tajaddud, 2/2/1299 (23.4.1920).
 2. Ibid.
 3. Tajaddud, 3/2/1299 (24.4.1920).

the benefits of discussion of political issues and warns the people to be aware of those who want to misuse their honesty and sincerity:

"...we must understand what we want, but this understanding is the result of troubles that one must bear; we must look and then with patience must see and hear and must acquire confidence and trust. In order to understand properly one must avoid being deceived and not fall into the valley of bewilderment... ." ¹

Khīyābānī then talks about his opponents and those who are against him. He regrets that those dishonest people who left Tabriz, following the insurgents activities, were appointed to other posts by the Tehran administration. He is unhappy to see that those who were known as absolute dictators in Azerbaijan and who were banished from the province have been reappointed in different parts of the country by the central government. Khīyābānī argues that the aims and demands of the uprising in Tabriz are not restricted to an individual interest or limited to Azerbaijanis only. He assures his fellow countrymen that they will establish a comfortable life and permanent peace, and promises them that they will prevent Iran from falling into anarchy:

"...The aim of our uprising is to put an end to this anarchy and disorder and to cut off the hands of those who are traitors to the country; we shall not forgive those who are against this uprising;

1. Tajaddud, 11/2/1299 (2.5.1920).

there will be no place for this kind of traitor in Iran. Those thieves who are thrown out of Tabriz should not get any post in Tehran. Those criminals who have run away should not be given any post in other parts of Iran, because all the sacred soil of Iran has a right to democracy. We do not think of and seek only our requirements and demands; we are not limited to Āzādī Sitān; we have not planned an individual programme... we know that our voice, at the moment, is kept unheard beyond Tabriz, but we will not be disappointed, because we have thought of this before and are prepared for this time... finally we shall carry on our activities until the establishment of a permanent democracy in Iran... we shall appoint those people who do not dare to destroy our nation and destroy our rights. We are going to establish a democracy in which both internal and external peace and relationships develop... ."1

Khiyābānī strongly emphasises reform which will cover all parts of Iran. He does not wish to fulfil his aims only within Tabriz. In other words he is interested in establishing a new and advanced democracy throughout Iran:

"...we would like to put the Constitutional Law into practice... we will run Iran in accordance with the present progressive laws and establish a government in keeping with our time's advanced laws... the freedom which this uprising wants to establish is not limited to the Azerbaijanis, but is for all Iranians... ."2

1. Tajaddud, 12.2.1299 (3.5.1920).

2. Tajaddud, 16.2.1299 (7.5.1920)

Khayābānī then argues that those reactionary people who are against their time are anti-enlightenment and are indeed backward looking. He blames those statesmen who have not managed any reforms since the Iranian Constitutional Revolution and have wasted valuable time. Khayābānī, emphasizing the necessity of compulsory education in Iran, regrets that no serious attention has ever been given to such an important issue:

"...There are forces which want to keep our nation in error and ignorance forever, and do not want to open these schools for our children: a compulsory education is one of the most essential articles of our programme which we have formally put into practice since our uprising. Unfortunately there has been a deliberate attempt to prevent the fulfillment of this programme; since the Constitutional Revolution no positive step has been taken in regard to education and the authorities have intentionally tried to ignore this matter... ." ¹

Khayābānī addresses school pupils and assures them of a sure future in regard to their ambitions: "...You, our young students, be sure that your parents and elders will sacrifice themselves so that you can live in comfort and freedom... ." ² Khayābānī, again explaining his aims in this uprising, addresses his fellow-citizens, asking them to pay particular attention to the fact that this movement has taken place in order to gain independence, democracy

1. Tajaddud, 19/2/1299 (10.5.1920).

2. Tajaddud, 21/2/1299 (12.5.1920).

and freedom. In other words he invites the people to work hard in order to establish permanent freedom in Iran:

"...This uprising has taken place only to gain our freedom, democracy and independence: all the principles of this uprising must be used for the success of our aims; nobody is allowed to abuse the power of this uprising for individual interests, and all personal problems and interests must be forgotten. Today, in the view of all individuals, only one aim and one interest must be seen, and that is the freedom and democratic independence of Iran and nothing else... ." ¹

Khayābānī stresses the point that he and the other real freedom lovers had been prepared themselves for an honourable death rather than living an unhappy life; he asserts that he would sacrifice his life in order to set up a permanent democracy and a stable future for the coming generation, rather than living in a reactionary and despotic society. For Khayābānī life had no value if there was no freedom and democracy in Iran. He had indeed thought of this fate and perhaps knew his destiny; nevertheless, for a man such as Khayābānī, life, freedom and democracy had a different meaning than for ordinary people in Iran. The people did not have a clear concept of freedom and democracy as did Khayābānī. Khayābānī knew that his life was permanently under threat, he had prepared himself for this kind of event. He was obviously a determined and revolutionary personality who was devoted to building real democracy and freedom in Iran. This is perhaps the most powerful driving force behind his movement:

1. Tajaddud, 23/2/1299 (14.5.1920).

"...We die so that the democracy of Iran shall live... this uprising wants to save Iran; Iran and its democracy must remain alive and firm forever... we have to rise up and carry out this uprising so that our sons' future will be secure; we are in fact the devotees of our children; we shall die so that they can live freely and independently... ." ¹

Although Khayābānī was a revolutionary man and had a clear concept of freedom and democracy in Iran, he, nevertheless believed that without full participation of the masses in the uprising and that without realizing their own power and ability in forming a new society, the uprising could not succeed. He blames previous rulers for this lack of confidence and social and political awareness among the people. The successive governments of Iran tried to keep the people in subjection and prevented them from forming political parties. Thus their social and political consciousness did not truly develop to the extent that they could spontaneously respond to present developments.

"...in Iran the people had never been given a chance to form their own government. Now the nation wishes to establish a government whose authority will be fully and unconditionally in the hands of the nation, and the policy of such a government will be the one which our time requires... ." ²

1. Tajaddud, 11/3/1299 (2.6.1920).

2. Tajaddud, 13/3/1299 (4.6.1920).

Khayābānī in most of his speeches stresses 'revival' and wants to adapt his ideas to the requirements of his time. He often talks about the present reactionary and despotic government and remarks that he and his followers will never disregard and ignore the present era of progress and advance. He urges his fellow countrymen to be honest and dedicated to human causes in the present century.

"...We are the sons of the present century; we will not be disinterested in our time; we have rebelled against a reactionary and despotic government, not against our time. We shall be successful and true children of our time if we carry out our firm determination... ." ¹

Khayābānī in his speeches wants to make it clear to his fellow countrymen that if they wish to have a democracy in Iran, it is their duty to practice it within society rather than contemplate theory and abstract ideas. He asks them to study and assess the achievements of other nations to find out the reasons for their successes and failures. He wishes the people to think about this fact, that a few ministers and a King have no authority to manage their affairs. In other words he addresses those who are aware of social and political issues and expects them to enlighten others who are ignorant.

Khayābānī wishes to establish the authority of the people in running the country, so that Kings and ministers would be dictated to by the interest of the people. If they wish Kings and ministers to

1. Tajaddud, 25/2/1299 (16.5.1920).

be changed or be replaced they can do so without any difficulty. This sense of democracy must be taught to the people. Democracy is not born with us but is acquired through understanding and social requirement:

"...We must replace our old and backward habits with new progressive ones. We must not allow an unrepresentative government to rule us; this uprising will make it clear that you must rule your country by yourselves. You must learn from other nations and understand how they are ruling their countries. You must understand that a few ministers and a King have neither power nor authority to impose their demands upon you and rule you in regard to their interests. They have to obey the will of the nation. You are asked to transfer whatever you know to those who do not. Without propaganda you will be unable to carry out your policy; you are asked to develop your advanced and democratic ideas among your nation through propaganda. The will of the nation must be above everything: if necessary they can dethrone the King; and if they so wish and consider it better to replace it with a republican regime they must do so; and if they dislike the parliament they can dismiss it and be able to do anything... ." ¹

Khiyābānī wishes to build up a system of government which has benefited other advanced countries. He wants a government in Iran which can devise laws which will protect the interest of the masses and which will be suitable for the twentieth century. In other

1. Tajaddud, 16/4/1299 (8.7.1920).

words he refuses to live in the past and let his fellow countrymen be fed on centuries old superstition and subjected to inhuman practices such as imprisonment, torture and execution merely because of having different political views from those of the existing ruling class. He assures his fellow countrymen that they can attain such a democratic system and promises them a social order which others have already gained. In fact Khiyābānī's major programme, a vital ambition, is to lead his fellow countrymen towards a civilized society:

"...I hereby announce that the uprising committee leads you all in the way of a complete and proper freedom; whatever is accepted as a freedom and democracy in the world we certainly want to use and adopt ourselves in the same way so that we can reach the same level of civilization in the world... ." ¹

Every country has its own peculiar circumstances and social conditions according to which their social leaders suggest or apply their policies and ideas. All these social circumstances and conditions form their conviction that if a change is needed in their society, this change must be carried out by the people who live and experience the reality. Perhaps we might describe this conviction as a quality of that nation which is not necessarily better or worse than others, but it is an important and decisive factor in changing and shaping the social system in any given nation:

1. Tajaddud, 14/5/1299 (6.8.1920).

"...every nation, during its life, follows a certain policy. The Germans believed that 'brave men are the owners of the world'. The English say that, 'great hearts are never defeated'. We must have both that braveness and this great heart because we have assumed the burden of establishing a democratic government in Iran."¹

Khayābānī realized that in order to establish a democratic government in Iran mere changes in the governmental system were not enough. In order to apply a democratic system in the country new favourable conditions and a favourable economic climate must be created first. The most important obstacles on the way to democracy, according to Khayābānī, were the existing feudal system and big land ownership in Iran. Therefore, Khayābānī believed that the feudal system in Iran must be abolished and that large land holdings must be distributed among landless peasants. Khayābānī knows that the big land owners are bitter enemies of his uprising because they would lose their interest. In fact he regards these feudal magnates as more dangerous to his uprising than his political opponents in the government. Therefore he was convinced that the revolutionaries must take the threat from feudalists very seriously:

"...it is understood that this uprising will not allow the feudal system to remain in this country for ever. The feudalists have started to plunder and kill in the name of the Shāh ² Suṣān and have started an attempt against the uprising; these people will receive punishment but their punishment will not

1. Tajaddud, 21/2/1299 (12.5.1920).

2. *e.ī* a tribe in Azerbaijan.

be the same as that of state criminals; on the contrary we will deal with them under martial law... ." ¹

Khayābānī wished to act forcefully on land reform, to make it clear that whoever is interested in common interests must accept that every peasant has a right to have his own land. However there were many feudalists who had a different view on the matter. They believed that the continuation of Khayābānī's uprising was against their individual interests, and that he and his uprising would not allow them to go on enjoying their wealth. Khayābānī regrets that no step has been taken in regard to land reform in Iran since the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. For this he blames those statesmen who were among the biggest landlords who talked a lot about freedom, democracy and nationalism but in practice did nothing in the interest of poor people and peasants:

"...What has been done? We had an article in our constitutional laws about land reform, none of which has been put into practice during the past fourteen years. The development, progress and achievements of the nation depend on the land on which the people live... ." ²

Besides feudalists who were against Khayābānī's uprising, the big merchants also were not pleased with the uprising. As a whole the rich upper class people including big landowners and merchants, together with the central government, were against Khayābānī:

1- Tajaddud, 3/5/1299 (26.7.1920)

2- Tajaddud, 24/4/1299 (16.7.1920)

"...there is a part of the nation in general and merchants in particular who are seeking their security, but are not thinking at all of how nation, including the majority of tradesmen and the lower class are suffering. We must ask them, 'what do you want?' why are they unhappy and why do they show resentment about national movements or any activities which lead to these movements?"¹

This shows that Khiyābānī took a radical stand against the interests of the existing ruling class in Iran. He was convinced that a small part of society, which formed the ruling class, were opposed to any radical movements in Iran. Khiyābānī had realized that this social conflict could not be solved and that there could not be a national unity without the elimination of hostile and reactionary forces such as big land owners from society. He did not like to see the majority of the Iranian peasants living in misery and poverty because they had neither their own land for cultivation nor the right to use the land which belonged to big land owners:

"...the manifestations of feudalism must be eradicated and destroyed in this country..."²

Khiyābānī wanted to build a society in which corruption, injustice, illiteracy and oppression would be rooted out. He had recognized that these social shortcomings were man made, in other words, they were imposed upon the people by the ruling class. In

1. Tajaddud, 10/3/1299 (1.6.1920).

2. Tajaddud, 22/1/1299 (12.4.1920).

order to root out these social maladies, he believed that social parasites and corrupt government officials must be dealt with radically:

"...it is obvious that radicalism requires deep, speedy, decisive fundamental change and programmes so that the manifest social deficiencies may be completely rooted out, thus freeing the people for good from the effects of such shortcomings... ." ¹

Khayābānī encouraged the people to resist and gave them hope for victory:

"...not only will you be able to resist the enemy in a harsh climate, under the hail and snow, but you will also maintain your unbending resistance and patience under the shower of fire, blood, bullets and mortar-shells... ." ²

Khayābānī believed that if a deputy to parliament is elected by the machinations of governmental officials, he is not a real representative of the people, but a traitor against the people. ³

Although Khayābānī had a deep trust in the authority of the people he was nevertheless aware of the pitfalls which are often created along the road to revolution by the enemy's taking advantage of the illiteracy and ignorance of the people:

"...In our country, the enemies of change and reform often seek an opportunity to mislead the people by crying wolf on behalf of the nation and the

1. Tajaddud, 28/1/1299 (18.4.1920).

2. Tajaddud, 30/1/1299 (20.4.1920).

3. Ibid.

government. When an office is closed for reorganisation and improvement they take advantage of this closure and try to defile the image of those who support reform and change. We ought to be aware of these sudden attacks and predict the time of the attack of these enemies who try to create confusion and troubles. We should follow a policy which will neutralize their attacks at the outset before they can threaten or defeat us. Having knowledge of these processes determines the position of individuals who should not ignore their essential aims and should not give up their resistance when confronted by temporary noise of opposition. On the contrary they ought to side firmly with their leaders and representatives in order to create an undefeatable line of resistance... ."1

Khayābānī believed that a democratic government must be declared in Iran, which would put the Iranian Constitutional Laws into practice. Referring to such a government he said:

"...the uprising of the freedom-loving people of Tabriz, must take a definite and firm form so that they can replace the accumulated mistakes by reality in order to improve the existing conditions... the Tabriz uprising aims to establish a free and democratic government within the framework of the

1. Tajaddud, 1/2/1299 (22.4.1920).

country's laws... accordingly the Tabriz uprising has a solid and deeply-rooted link with all cities and parts of Iran... ."1

When Khayābānī talks about the change of the social system in Iran he, in fact, wants to say that the achievements of the Constitutional Revolution were not translated from theory into practice. Khayābānī wished to revive the Constitutional Laws and on this base defend the freedom and independence of the people and of Iran. In other words his uprising was intended to restore the law and protect human lives against a selfish, aggressive and lawless ruling class. Khayābānī revolted against the jungle law which negated every kind of civil liberty and the constitution itself. The Shāh, the landowners, the rich and the army ruled without control:

"...Our uprising aims to achieve independence and freedom and we wish to respect and protect the Constitutional Laws. The travels of the Shāh, the waste of the budget, and decisions which are taken without the consent of the nation or without consulting the people, all are against the Constitutional Laws... ."2

Khayābānī's movement was a radical one and he wanted to change the whole social system of Iran:

"...this movement of yours is not an ordinary social gathering for debate, meeting and applauding. I have mentioned this over and

1. Tajaddud, 2/2/1299 (23.4.1920).

2. Tajaddud, 9/3/1299 (31.5.1920).

over again, that this movement wishes to change the regime of Iran. In earlier revolutions in Iran, personalities such as Muhammad ^CAlī were replaced by personalities like Nāṣir al-Mulk. But this most recent uprising either will end in the death of all freedom fighters or will turn the system of Iran upside down... ."1

In the past the poor and the working class took part in the revolution and died, but only the intellectuals or influential leaders benefited from these uprisings. In other words the revolutions were betrayed and no fundamental change took place in society. The rich and the land owners remained in their positions; the people made sacrifices but their leaders stayed behind and remained safe and well. Khīyābānī was not this kind of leader. He wished to lead the people and if necessary to die for them. He encouraged the leaders of the uprising to take part in the struggle and walk in front of the people:

"...In the past the lower class faced death and the influential personalities of the revolution reached higher positions by benefiting from it. But our uprising has this advantage and quality that whenever death is inevitable its leaders will die before the people... ."2

Khīyābānī did not want to become a hero by his own death. He was against hero worship and heroism. He believed that the success of

1. Tajaddud, 9/3/1299 (31.5.1920).

2. Tajaddud, 9/3/1299 (31.5.1920).

leadership depends on the support of the masses and that the leaders should not exclude themselves from the aspirations and wishes of the masses. If they face death they face it altogether. In a word Khiyābānī was against individualistic uprising:

"...before we die we shall convey our aim and philosophy with the utmost determination and forcefulness; we shall talk, we shall fight and we shall finally let every one be rewarded accordingly... ." ¹

KHIYĀBĀNĪ'S VIEW OF 'GOVERNMENT'

The driving force in Khiyābānī's political vision is the unity of all freedom fighters in Iran. His speeches have two distinct characteristics: firstly he talks not only for Azerbaijanis, but for the entire people of Iran. In other words he does not separate the freedom of Azerbaijan from the rest of Iran. Secondly he stresses on the importance of the masses regardless of their religion, language and origin. He regards Iran as a whole and wishes to see the creation of a government which can fulfil the needs of all people in the country. Khiyābānī believes that in order to create a government of the people all political forces must be united on a common ground. Only by this unity of interest and aim will the freedom fighters in Iran be able to overcome her problems:

1. Tajaddud, 9/3/1299 (31.5.1920).

"...All freedom fighters of Iran must become united in one view point and avoid division, and acquire a great spiritual capital, and be guided by powerful and well-informed leaders; and form a government which should not rule either by the will of a single person or despise the people, but on the contrary, the will of the nation must be the moving force behind the government and the originator of laws... ."1

Khayābānī knew that without respect and regard for the interests of all people in Iran a genuine freedom and political stability cannot be achieved:

"...The present duty of the Iranian nation is to achieve a place in the world of humanism and reach to a true and real freedom.. This is not possible unless the interest of the public is observed... ."2

This duty can be fulfilled by establishing a democratic government. The failure of governments in Iran in carrying out a radical change was due to their wrong and selfish policy. Khayābānī argues that a government either works from her own limited interest or works for the interest and welfare of all. The former leads to despotism and social injustice and sufferings but the latter results in social welfare and political democracy. All Iranian governments, Khayābānī is convinced, have been despotic and selfish. They had very little interest in the people and public opinion. Khayābānī wanted to

1. Tajaddud, 26/4/1299 (18.7.1920).

2. Tajaddud, 5/5/1299 (28.7.1920).

replace such unrepresentative government by a democratically elected government in Iran;

"...We want Democratic government... from the people's viewpoint (public interest) there are two kind of governments: one is an inferior government which seeks only its own interest and regards this its duty. Another government is of a superior kind which not only works for the interests of the whole community but also tries hard to provide for the needs of the people constantly and works hard for their security. We had a government which was hostile and a plunderer. Whenever we reminded it of the needs of the people they kept ignoring our demands... For this reason we decided to say 'down with such a government' and such governments must be destroyed... ." ¹

Khiyābānī did not believe that the removal of an individual or individuals from power would solve the problems of Iran. He rather wanted to change the system of government and above all the persons who represent the people. He argued that the representatives of the people must be those who know the problems of Iranian society and have experienced the sufferings of the people. Unless members of a governing body have lived among the people and experienced the real shortcomings in society, they cannot be sympathetic to the sufferings of poor people:

1. Tajaddud, 24/2/1299 (15.5.1920) and 1/3/1299 (23.5.1920).

"...the government in Iran must be formed of the persons who seek the interest of the people, and whenever the people are unaware of their own interests they must make the people aware of them; the government must not take advantage of the ignorance of the lower class and commit a crime in regard to the past, present and future of a great nation... there should be no longer such persons as 'al-Dawlas' and 'al-Salṭanas' (rich aristocrats and upper class) holding the destiny of our freedom in their hands... ."1

Although Khīyābānī was a patriot and a nationalist, he had a deep respect for and awareness of social and political developments in Europe. He admired the democratic achievements of European people through Parliament. Khīyābānī had noticed that Iranian governments have been copying European democracy only in form but not in content and meaning. In Europe, for example, the government cannot ignore the opinion of the members of Parliament whereas in Iran the government or King can rule without control or interference from the Parliament. In other words the Parliament in Iran is nothing more than a show of democracy:

"...most European people are used to national regimes; and democratic institutions have taken root in their social and political organizations. The National Assembly in Europe has held a governing status. European governments cannot ignore the opinion of their people and the services of the parliament. They even call an

1. Tajaddud, 1/3/1299 (23.5.1920).

election in the middle of a war if they have to. They take elections seriously and assemble parliament as speedily as possible because the government needs the guidance and advice of the parliament and also wants to free itself from responsibility. In our country governments have opposite views. Firstly there is not an election: whenever there is an election they adopt a plan so that the election would not take place before four years... the persons who are elected have been regarded as the 'butchers' of the nation. They have sucked the blood of the nation and will continue to do so as long as they can. Of course when one certain family have taken over a country's government and are not bound to any sort of discipline and consideration, they will trample on the rights of the nation. It would be surprising if they do not do this because such a government seeks only its own interest. We saw in the famous case of the ultimatum, that although the members of the parliament during exciting discussions in the Hall of Bahāristān (The Iranian National Parliament Building) had decided to reject this ultimatum, nevertheless the rulers of the time went along and accepted the ultimatum... ."1

Khayābānī's main policy was to spread freedom and democracy all over Iran and Azerbaijan in particular. He believed that without freedom of thought and political activities the country cannot advance along the road of democracy. He criticizes the governing system as follows:

1. Tajaddud 4/3/1299 (26.5.1920).

"...In our country a few people have taken the government and govern in a typical way. In their view a government is formed only of a minister who sits in his ministry and gives orders and issues decrees without thinking ...we must abolish this policy and fight against the spirit of such a concept and outlook... ."1

Khiyābānī's idea of freedom and democracy is based on the government of the people. He knew that this cannot be achieved unless the people take part directly in the making of the society and elect their own ministers and governments:

"...At the beginning of every governing system, many struggles for power are expected. The powerful side takes over and forms a government, then general affairs of the country take their shape and natural order. But in Iran no government by the people and for the people has ever taken shape. The people have made a revolution but received only promises from ministers and questions such as "what are your demands"?, the people are deceived and gradually lose heart in revolution... But now have risen in order to give a heart to the people, to prevent conflicts and encourage the people to choose or dismiss government... ."2

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1. Tajaddud, 15/3/1299 (6.6.1920).
 2. Tajaddud, 15/3/1299 (6.6.1920).

Expressing his views about democracy, various governments in the world and a democratic government in Iran, Khayābānī says:

"...The Ancient Greeks had an abstract concept of Democratic government, whereas the English (Anglo-Saxons) have shown a more independent view of the concept of it. They never ignore the practical side of the concept. The former (Greeks) have advanced in their theory, but the latter (English) practically have a wider view of freedom and independence. We wish to establish a kind of democratic government in Iran that in particular will put the people in charge of their destiny, achieve complete independence and move towards a full freedom. The present understanding of we Iranians is that we must have a stable democratic government which continuously reflects democratic desires and the feelings of the people. The institutions which are created by democracy should not finally take over control and assume despotic power for themselves. The power that the masses entrust to the institutions and the government that they create should not finally work against their interests and take a strongly established and conservative form... ."1

The government which Khayābānī wished to establish in Iran was not one which the central government could accept. Khayābānī wanted to set up a powerful and independent government, but central government wished to keep a government in power which could easily sell the country to strangers; Khayābānī wanted the people to control

1. Tajaddud, 8/2/1299 (29.4.1920).

their government and have a right to accept or reject whatever is good or bad for their country, but the present government wanted to ratify its own interests and not pay attention to common interests even if they had to impose martial law and censorship in order to keep the nation's mouth closed. Khiyābānī wanted to build up a government in which there would be no place for any traitor to the country or for thieves and opportunists, while the central government, following its own interests wanted to employ those whom Khiyābānī condemned in this way. In Khiyābānī's view the central government felt that its existence was at stake and was enrolling the aid of reactionaries, greedy feudalists and the wealthy in order to plot the suppression of Khiyābānī's uprising, an uprising which had no desire except to further the masses' fortune and ambitions and to establish Iranian independence and to strengthen the country.

KHIYĀBĀNĪ AND THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM

Khiyābānī's concept of freedom is not an abstract idea but has to be sought within a society. Individual freedom without social freedom, in other words, without economic, spiritual and intellectual freedom, is not really freedom. A society which is based on the exploitation of one class by another class, is not a free society because it is unbalanced. In order to create freedom in a society, Khiyābānī advises us to bring about a radical and fundamental change in society, and thus allow wisdom and thought to develop:

"...We cannot think of any kind of freedom which would allow us to be in error for ever. By this kind of freedom you will never be able to be free. The time of jungle freedom has passed. From now on it is the time for evolution and real reform. We must start fundamental and radical reforms and then let reason, logic, thoughts and ideas be our guide and leader... ."1

Khayābānī had learned that in the class society of Iran, not only is material wealth in the hands of the ruling class, but the law and every sort of moral code and political view are also at their disposal. The ruling class often use the terms 'freedom', 'democracy' and 'equality' but in reality their practice is contrary to their teachings. Khayābānī had realized that those in government who talk about freedom are in fact the negators of freedom:

"...they hinder freedom by thousands of different kinds of threat, aggression and finally destroy it completely - still they say 'we are free'. They talk about democracy on the one hand and create problems and push it towards an ultimate death on the other hand. Again they say 'we are free'. They sell out their country to foreigners and still say 'we are free'. They always talk about freedom, social welfare, democracy, advancement and the progress of the people and the country. They talk repeatedly of the principles of democracy but we have to consider who is talking, not what is he talking about;

1. Tajaddud, 29/2/1299 (20.5.1920).

the most wicked traitors in the country regard themselves as supporters of freedom... ."1

Khiyābānī believed that in order to be free and create a free society the social parasites and exploiters must be eradicated. This would give the people the opportunity to improve their living standards and develop their minds and their understanding. This sort of freedom, which means the protection of the interests of the people, can be achieved only by political discipline:

"...Discipline is the major condition of success. The powerful political groups of Europe are noted for their discipline and their programme... the Bolsheviks who were temporarily out of control became organized and effective under necessary discipline. After all these efforts, sacrifices and material losses we will realize that we have wasted all of our efforts and lives and that instead the enemy has succeeded, if we do not have correct discipline and definite and steady tactics. Freedom ought to be accompanied by reason and knowledge. Freedom means freedom to seek knowledge and understanding. We must raise the level of public understanding... ."2

Political freedom is meant to protect the people against any sort of aggression. There is a difference between a freedom which suppresses, exploits and destroys the freedom of others and a freedom which liberates and defends the interest of the majority of the

1. Tajaddud, 3/3/1299 (25.5.1920).

2. Tajaddud, 9/3/1299 (31.5.1920).

people against a minority ruling class. Khayābānī had experienced this the former kind of freedom which prevailed in Iranian society, when the rulers were free to commit any crime against their subjects.

"...freedom is for the protection of civil and human rights and is to prevent anyone from causing harm and committing crime against the people in society. Freedom does not mean that all people are free to do whatever they like without any consideration and respect for human dignity... ."1

Khayābānī argued that everyone in society is free according to the laws of the society and that these laws must be practiced on a basis of equality. The influential and the rich must not have privileges over the poor and working people. Without such laws and without the practice of equality in society the term 'freedom' is meaningless:

"...freedom requires equality; when a porter or grocer is arrested and punished by a law then I must also be punished by the same law if I commit the same crime. No one is above the law. All are equal in regard to the law... ."2

Khayābānī's uprising was directed against the enemies of freedom. He wanted to free the people from physical and intellectual exploitation. He repeated over and over again that his uprising was not to destroy law and order in society. He rather intended to create law and order in society so that everyone would be able to benefit from the

1. Tajaddud, 12/3/1299 (3.6.1920).

2. Tajaddud, 12/3/1299 (3.6.1920).

natural resources of the country. Social laws must punish those who seek only their own limited interest and protect those who work for the interest of society. In other words social laws must be the protector of the people. In order to achieve such a social condition Khiyābānī believed that the people should fight for it:

"...We are ready to sacrifice ourselves on the way to freedom. This road will not be without thorns. Disputes and struggle will take place. Some will lose their lives in this struggle but the rest of the people will benefit..."¹

Those who fight for personal ends are not true freedom fighters... True freedom fighters are those who do not expect wages or individual rewards for their efforts... everybody shouts 'long live freedom' but we should understand what we mean by independence and freedom. Whoever has the thought of independence and freedom in mind must sacrifice his own wealth and soul - not seeking self-interest and making profits by these slogans... ."2

Khiyābānī wanted everybody to have a real and true freedom in Iran. He believed that a human being in this world must be free and that freedom must be provided for everybody. In other words if there is no freedom, it is the people who must rise and achieve it. In some countries which are under a dictatorship, government freedom and its legitimacy are stolen. Khiyābānī believes that in this particular

1. Tajaddud, 11/4/1299 (3.7.1920).

2. Tajaddud, 21/4/1299 (13.7.1920).

circumstance, freedom will never be willingly granted so that the people themselves must rise and gain their freedom and rights. Even though constitutional law existed in theory in Iran and everybody was supposed to be free, because of the greedy and aggressive policy of the King and court, feudal landowners and the rich, all these freedoms had been forgotten and had no meaning any more. This is why Khiyābānī asks the Iranians to teach the meaning of freedom, independence and civil rights to their sons while they are children. A man who has no freedom is in fact a moving corpse.

KHIYĀBĀNĪ AND HIS VIEWS ON MONARCHY

Khiyābānī was particularly against those who had no sympathy and care for his people. He was deeply saddened to see that those personalities who were in the government did not think of the present social disorder and did not object to the current injustice or react to the existing anarchy by taking some positive action. At a time when the Iranian economy was in ruins and the treasury was empty, the King had a desire to travel to Europe, where he and his companions spent a lot of money on their pleasure. At the same time the people suffered from starvation and most of them lived in intolerable conditions. In other words it was the Iranian poor who had to provide the King's expenses so that he could enjoy travelling and live in leisure and pleasure. Khiyābānī, reacting against this social injustice and the court's wasteful expenditure said:

"...nobody says 'where does the king go to?
no one asks why he does! nobody asks why
this kind of expenditure must be taken from
the impoverished Iranian treasury! While
the people are suffering from hunger,
Ts.40,000, is being spent for the celebration
of the king's return from Europe... ." ¹

Khayābānī realized that as long as there was a king and his appointed ministers, there would be no comfortable life for the Iranian people. The King and his court often sacrificed the interest of the people for his own benefit. On the other hand the ignorance of the people played into the hands of the King who treated his nation as slaves and lived upon them. Khayābānī believed that this would not have happened if the people were wise and conscious of their rights. This in fact was a direct result of a backward society which was being ruled by superstition and baseless habits. These caused the people to remain at this level of unawareness, so that they could not think of current events happening both outside and inside their country.

"...the king and his ministers always sacrificed
the nation for their crown and throne. They
have always looked at people contemptuously... ." ²

Khayābānī wanted to make the people understand that they should not let the upper class and feudalists govern them. But he,

1. Tajaddud, 3/5/1299 (26.7.1920).

2. Tajaddud, 3/5/1299 (26.7.1920).

instead, asked them to think of their own power and rely on their own strength. Only in this way could they influence and direct their own socio-political affairs:

"...We should not let so and so al-Dawlas and al-Saltanas hold the destiny of our freedom in their own hands... ."1

Kh iyābānī nevertheless condemns those people who are not interested either in their own personal life nor in their country's affairs. He is aware of his country's rich resources, but he does not wish Iranians to benefit from such valuable resources unless they can stand up and exploit them independently, that is to say, without foreign penetration into Iran's economic and political affairs:

"...We are aware of such valuable jewels which are taken away from us; we know much of the remaining valuable resources in our country; we will not, however, explore them until we make sure of our capability. We have so far spent our time in making a king, but now it is the time for us to leave this kind of nonsensical politics and not bend down in front of any king; on the contrary we must rise from this seat of defeat and humiliation and ascend the ruling throne... ."2

Kh iyābānī, assuring his fellow countrymen of their success against Monarchy, says:

"...An ignorant nation has always been afraid of the king and his ministers and worshipped them. But this uprising will not be afraid of anything and will put an immediate end to this disorder... as long as ministers are chosen by the king's order our uprising will continue... ."3

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1. Tajaddud, 5/3/1299 (27.5.1920).
 2. Tajaddud, 11/4/1299 (3.7.1920).
 3. Tajaddud, 19/4/1299 (11.7.1920).

Khayābānī warns the people not to believe easily in what they are told by certain ministers or dignitaries. He was distressed to see that the people accept any word from a person who is called 'king' or 'minister' without any hesitation. He regards this as blind obedience and hero worshipping:

"...As far as a nation is not interested in her own freedom and independence; and has consented to worship despotic kings and accept whatever a minister wishes, it is impossible to take any step towards progress. In Iran hero worship and personal attachment have taken over all ideas and thoughts... ."¹

Khayābānī in another speech again addresses those who are indifferent to the affairs of their country and argues that it is indeed the indifference of a nation towards the burning social and political issues which reduces them to subjection and blind obedience. He regards this indifference a harmful and dangerous state of mind for a country. Therefore he encourages the people to think about their fate and believe in themselves and have the determination to declare whatever is good for their country. He wants his fellow countrymen to compare their fatherland with European countries and assess what is the difference between a country like Switzerland and Iran. He wonders how a foreign power manages to enter the country, influencing all aspects of life, economic, cultural and political. At the end he reaches the conclusion that the main disease must be inside Iran. The disease has been

1. Tajaddud, 12/5/1299 (4.8.1920).

the minority ruling interests who have sucked, like parasites, the blood of the nation. If the body is healthy it will not accept such a disease. In order to make the body of a country healthy these minority ruling interests must be eradicated. Giving Switzerland as an example of a healthy country he declares:

"...Although there were several million foreign troops all around Switzerland, not a span of this country suffered aggression and not even a fighter plane dared cross over her sky. Why can any aggressive power enter our country and put it in such a disorder? Because there is no determination in our fellow countrymen. Now rise and become determined that Iran belongs to the Iranians, and then you will find out that no impudent and aggressive power will dare to enter into Iran. This uprising is determined to free Iran and it will do so... ." ¹

Khiyābānī, addressing the Iranian leaders who have imposed themselves upon the people as the 'guardians' of the nation, urges them not to treat Iranians as a backward nation any more. In other words one of the main purposes of Khiyābānī's uprising was to get rid of all sorts of 'guardianship' and 'God given authorities', replacing them by educated and enlightened statesmen who could and would understand the problems of the people. Only the leaders who have lived, mixed with the people and shared their griefs and happinesses can be sympathetic to the people, and are able to understand the depth of their problems. When Khiyābānī attacks the

1. Tajaddud, 24/3/1299 (15.6.1920).

backwardness of the system in Iran he, in fact, attacks the nature of the relationship between the people and the government or leaders. The relationship between the rulers and the ruled is like the relationship between a slave owner and his slaves. For this reason he strongly objects to any 'guardianship' which the Iranian government had allocated to themselves. Khiyābānī in conclusion says:

"...the unworthy leaders of Iran have trained people in such a way that they must need a guardian. Our purpose in this uprising is to dismiss such guardians and establish a new and advanced spirit which will be transferred to the others... the majority of Iranians are unaware and have not yet adapted themselves to the thoughts of the present century, but you people of Tabriz are a deserving people and ready to accept a new advanced system.... Those who call you a savage and ignorant people will not have an excuse to keep you in captivity and dare to destroy your independence and freedom if you prove your ability in your own affairs and make them change their attitude to you and respect you... ." ¹

KHIYĀBĀNĪ AND HIS PATRIOTISM

It is perhaps a manifestation of Khiyābānī's patriotism that in his democratic movement he does not want democracy and freedom only for

1. Tajaddud, 18/5/1299 (10.8.1920).

Azerbaijanis, but for the entire country - Iran. His criticism of the minority ruling class, in the form of a government, has a far reaching implication and effect in the democratic movement of Iran. He argues that those in the court and government, who claim to be true nationalists and lovers of Iran, are in fact the worst enemies of Iran and the people, because the sign of love for one's own people is care and affection towards that nation not a destructive and punitive attitude towards them.

Khayābānī had experienced the king and ministers and their *reactionary* religious backers all talk much about their devotion to and love of the people and country while in practice they did the opposite. The government frightened the people by terror and death.

Khayābānī 'heaven' existed in this world. It was his homeland, his city and his district in Tabriz where he lived. His 'heaven' contrary to the 'heaven' of the religious people, was located in this very world in which there are streets, houses, shops and people:

"...A person's desire is a driving force which depends on his knowledge, as all our desires and ambitions are manifest in a definite and real form, which are rooted in our daily experience. When we imagine a heaven we associate it with visions of worldly things, the heaven which is in our imagination is formed by streets which are similar to the streets and alleys of Tabriz... ." ¹

1. Tajaddud, 8/2/1299 (29.4.1920).

Thus Khiyābānī's patriotism and love of Iran was not in a verbal or abstract level. He had a deep love towards Iran and was a kind of nationalist who, by appreciating and acknowledging the importance of his own homeland - Azerbaijan, linked his love and feelings with the rest of Iran. He was convinced that unless one is a true nationalist and lover of one's own country one cannot possibly be a true and determined freedom fighter. Speaking against abstract thinkers and false patriots he states:

"...We believe that Iran is the best country among the others in the world because it is our home; and in the opinion of Iranians, Azerbaijan is the best province of Iran where we Azerbaijanis live; and in the opinion of Azerbaijanis, Tabriz is the best town of this province, and eventually the best place of Tabriz is Tajaddud where we freedom lovers are gathered together... ." ¹

The twentieth century with its outwardly advanced civilization has, nevertheless, some colonial and imperialistic laws. The capitulations were these laws which ruled Iran before and after Khiyābānī in an extreme and absolute manner. Khiyābānī like other nationalist and patriotic freedom lovers objected to being ruled by such a law in Iran. Khiyābānī believed that Iranians were able to manage their own internal affairs. He did not like hearing his country being called a 'dark' and backward country, and was disappointed to see foreigners dominating his fellow countrymen:

1. Tajaddud, 14/1/1299 (4.4.1920).

"...from now on the punishment of any Iranian must be carried out by an Iranian; we must have such a freedom in which nobody could say that Iran is a dark country. We have repeatedly seen that our rights and freedom have been disturbed by foreigners; Iran must be freed by Iranians... ."1

Khayābānī's love for his country was deeply rooted. He showed his feelings when the Iranian flag was being raised above the Police College. In the following speech Khayābānī once again emphasises the importance of knowledge and learning:

"...I realize that whatever I feel in my heart you Tabriz Policemen have the same feeling... your salute to the Iranian flag proves that you have absolutely understood your national duty... but we all know that without learning and knowledge we cannot perform our duties properly as regards humanity and our country... ."2

Khayābānī often talks about Iran and stresses patriotism. He wishes to have a democratic government in Iran in which no foreigner can dare to impose his own interest. In order to have such a government Khayābānī believes that Iran must prepare herself to be a powerful country. He warns those countries who may intend to violate Iran's rights. In other words he and his followers were ready to fight to the last man in order to prevent anybody from

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1. Tajaddud, 26/2/1299 (17.5.1920).
 2. Tajaddud, 23/5/1299 (15.8.1920).

entering their fatherland as an aggressor. Khiyābānī wishes from the depths of his heart the best and most perfect progress and the idea of advanced countries for Iran, and wants to build up a progressive force among the people in order to reach out to other civilized countries:

"...In our policy Iran is our property. In other words democratic Iran belongs to the democracy of Iran; any foreigner who wishes to enter Iran and try to imprison our democracy in his chains of slavery will face us and will be forced to turn back, and will not be able to cross the frontier of our country unless he crosses over our dead bodies. We must provide our own prosperity by our own hands; in our opinion Iran is a member of the human community and must prepare herself for a quick revival and progress so that she can unite with other civilized nations as soon as possible. This is our slogan and we in the name of Iran will learn and practice the best and most progressive ideas of the advanced countries in our country... ." ¹

Khiyābānī believed that superficial and fanatical patriotism is not enough and cannot instil a deep understanding and fighting spirit among the people. While stressing patriotism he believed that freedom, advancement and eventually being united with the progressive peoples of the world is something that must be experienced and acquired within the particular environment or society. For this

1. Tajaddud, 7/3/1299 (29.5.1920).

reason when Hājji Īsmā'īl Āqā Amīr Khīzī, one of the committee members of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, suggested that Azerbaijan might be renamed Āzādī-Sitān, Khīyābānī welcomed the idea, because Āzādī-Sitān meant to obtain or acquire freedom - in other words freedom is not something which can be bought or sold. It must be gained by people within their own social context. Since the people of Azerbaijan have always struggled to achieve this freedom from despotic kings and governments by their own efforts Khīyābānī regarded the word 'Āzādī-Sitān' an appropriate name for Azerbaijan. Khīyābānī's patriotism and the meaning Āzādī-Sitān, however, is either misunderstood or grossly misinterpreted and distorted by some historians who, translating or interpreting Āzādī-Sitān as 'country of the free',¹ 'land of freedom'² and 'country of freedom'³ accused Khīyābānī of being a separatist.

According to M.Q. Hidāyat⁴ (Mukhbir al-Saltāna) and ^CA. Mustawfī⁵ 'the changing of the name of Azerbaijan to Āzādī-Sitān is because of the separatist intention of Khīyābānī and his followers who wanted to separate Azerbaijan from the rest of Iran. Mushir al-Dawla in his speech in the Majlis accused Khīyābānī and called his

1. See G. Lenczowski, R.W., pp.60.64.

2. See P. Avery, M.I., p.219.

3. Annual Report for the Province, "F.O. 371/Persia 1921/34-6440", by British Consulate in Tabriz (unpublished document).

4. See M.Q. Hidāyat, Kh.Kh., p.320.

5. ^CA. Mustawfī, op.cit., p.179.

uprising a 'separatist movement'.¹ This false conception has also been repeated by foreign historians and diplomats.²

We believe that neither the Iranian sources nor the foreign ones mentioned above have looked closely into the nature of Khiyābānī's movement and the meaning of 'Āzādī-Sitān'. Firstly the changing of the name of Azerbaijan had some elements which seemed to make it necessary. After the 1917 October Revolution in Russia, the republic of Azerbaijan was declared at Bākū and its inhabitants decided to annex Iranian Azerbaijan to their territory. This is mentioned by A. Kasravī, who objects to this renaming of Arrān (the old name of the present Azerbaijan S.S.R.):

"...Azerbaijanis did not wish to accept their wishes and were not interested in this suggestion; and were unhappy of this name. Thus Democrats in Azerbaijan changed their state's name. This idea in fact was suggested by Hājjī Īsmā'īl Āqā Amīr Khīzī, who was a close friend and a famous democrat. Amīr Khīzī declared: Since Azerbaijan has struggled and suffered during the constitution, and has supplied freedom to the Iranians, we wish to rename Azerbaijan as Āzādī-Sitān... ." ³

1. See Appendix No. 7 .

2. See G. Lenczowski; Ibid.; P. Avery, Ibid. R.W. Cottam, op.cit., p.123, Annual Report for the Province, Ibid. and The Times, September 14, 1920.

3. A. Kasravī, T.H.S.A., p.877.

Secondly, this change of the name was only limited to Azerbaijan as a 'Province' not as a 'Country' which is stated by a number of diplomats and historians in Iran and the west.¹

While Khiyābānī stressed the importance of patriotism he also emphasizes the importance of social laws and order and the discipline that all people in general and the members of the Democratic Party in particular must absorb and practice. Therefore in Khiyābānī's speeches patriotism is not separated from 'discipline' and social law and order. Khiyābānī believes that one cannot have a proper organization without law and order. In other words he does not like to see those who attempt to create anarchy in public. Khiyābānī warns those people who want to put society in disorder of a severe punishment even if these people are his close friends:

"...In order to preserve discipline and keep order, any irresponsible action will face a punishment. Our closest friends and comrades will be punished if they commit a crime, more severely even than the ordinary people. We will punish our comrades if they try to ignore the rights of the people. There will be a harsh future for those members of the uprising who make a mistake or intend to do anything without the permission of the law... ."2

Discipline in Khiyābānī's opinion is a very important matter for one's achievement in society. Accordingly he urges people to tear

1. See p.181 of this work.

2. Tajaddud, 15/2/1299 (6.5.1920).

off all veils of ignorance and take steps towards progress and evolution. Khayābānī believes that civilized nations have been successful only under such strict discipline. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution failed, Khayābānī believes, because of the lack of discipline, and because there were no well organized forces:

"...you can be successful like the other civilized nations and have an organized association if you try to cast out irresponsible and fanciful intentions and to march towards a higher life and vision. The success that we have achieved during three months has not been experienced since the beginning of the Constitutional Revolution, because we had never worked under such discipline... ."1

Khayābānī, emphasising the integrity and the sense of responsibility of those who are in charge of various institutions such as police, law courts and all members of the uprising says:

"...if we receive a report that one of the uprising members of the police or the gendarmerie has committed a crime, not only will we punish them more severely than the ordinary people but also we will inform the people of their actions, because we wish to cast out the development of such bad manners in our society. Today we are standing in a position where all Iranians are watching our deeds. We must continue our lawful activities and prove that we are true freedom lovers in Tabriz... ."2

1. Tajaddud, 16/4/1299 (8.7.1920).

2. Tajaddud, 8/4/1299 (30.6.1920).

Khiyābānī in this speech discusses life and its importance; and states that we have to create a society where the people feel happy, peaceful and cheerful. In order to be successful in this life one must keep what is useful for the welfare of the society and get rid of those aspects that are harmful and a hindrance. In a society which on the other hand is dominated by poverty and lack of education and in which everything is in possession of the ruling class, the people realize their rights are considered to be one of the most essential tasks of their leaders. If leaders can create a happy and cheerful atmosphere in society and encourage the participation of all in building a society then the people become ready not only to sacrifice their own limited interests to society but even to give up their lives for their people:

"...life is the most valuable thing in the world and anybody has a great deal of interest in his life. In order to get a comfortable life and to benefit from a valuable and cheerful outcome, one must try hard to be able to enjoy such a pleasant life. However, we can see some people who sacrifice themselves for an ambition, and in fact exchange their present and temporary life for a permanent honourable life. The ignorant people do not understand or find out what is going on, but the learned men do understand that the life of the human being is not a permanent one but will finish sooner or later; this temporary life cannot impose its importance on the former persons, on the contrary this class wish to have a true life,

in which freedom, law and order dominate their activities in society. They prefer a permanent life rather than living under despotism and in an unjust world. In other words no one is willing to leave a happy life unless he is a stupid person. Those people who sacrifice their lives are aware of its value and consider their ideals to be worth much more than their own limited life. They sacrifice their own limited life in order to fulfil and materialize their love of society and the people... ."1

KHIYĀBĀNĪ AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF IRAN

Khiyābānī's uprising was not a disconnected event in the modern history of Iran. His struggle was the continuation of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911 which was thwarted by reactionary forces in Iran. What Sattār Khān, as a representative of the people of Āzarbāyjān, desired to take place in Iran was the freedom of people from internal despotism and external imperialism. Sattār Khān and his supporters succeeded in gaining the Constitutional Law in theory but they did not see the translation of the theory into practice. Khiyābānī's uprising was against enemies of the Constitutional Law and indeed his first article in Tajaddud was concerned with the problem of putting the laws into practice.

1. Ibid.

On April 30, 1917, he published an essay entitled Ch-i Bāyad Kard (What should be done). In it he analysed his nation's expectations from the Constitutional Laws and asked the authorities to pay particular attention to Iranian demands. He pointed to the 7th article of the Constitutional Laws, and reminded the government that now was the time for it to establish a fresh and energetic society in Iran.

Following the collapse of Tsarist Russia, there had been a great liberalising movement among nations. Everybody was interested to find out what had been happening under despotic rulers and what was demanded from a democratic government. Khiyābānī in another article which was published on May 5, 1917 declared:

"Since the overthrow of Tsarism in Russia there has been a new breeze of freedom in the world, and an opportunity for everybody and every party to achieve their individual freedom and the country's independence has arisen. With the example of their neighbour's rebellion before them, Iranians should not hesitate in the face of such a powerful movement. It is impossible to re-establish the previous despotic regime which we have been facing. Now what have we to do? First of all we must realize that this freedom and our Constitutional Laws have been achieved by our good and brave patriotic fellow countrymen and women. By sacrificing their valuable lives they have helped to keep our freedom alive. We should like to ask our government, which came to power as the result of direct election, to act in accordance with the Constitutional Laws. On the other hand we should not forget our beloved victims who died in the struggle for our freedom and independence."¹

1. Tajaddud, May 5, 1917.

Three years later Khiyābānī was inviting Azerbaijanis to tread in the footprints of their past freedom fighters:

"...While Āzarbāyjān is living and its freedom fighters are alive the 'Constitutional Law' will not be left defenceless. 'Leave our Constitutional Law alone.' This is a call which is heard all over Āzarbāyjān and shakes the foundation of the reactionaries. The Āzarbāyjān freedom fighters have risen in order to put an end to unbearable chaos in the country. The forgetful government ought to be awakened to the cry of 'Long live Constitutional Law'... ."1

Khiyābānī in another article about the Iranian Constitutional Law declared:

"...We freedom lovers have one aim, one desire and one idea; we all say that the true constitution must be the governing force in the country; personal influence and privilege must be abolished; the authority of the people must be a reality and all institutions must be nationalized - that is we have to rely on the principle of people's rule. We say that there must be justice, equality and freedom in society... in brief we want our children to live in our century... ."2

Khiyābānī looks upon the society of Iran as an ill person who is being attacked by germs and parasites. In order to cure the body

1. Tajaddud, April 16, 1920.

2. Tajaddud, 17/2/1299 (8.5.1920).

we must get rid of the germs and parasites. In the society of Iran land owners, profiteers and reactionary elements act like germs and parasites against the interest of the people and their advancement. There must be a party or an organized force who should guard the people and fight against these parasitic forces in society:

"...The aim of our uprising is the observation and guidance of those who serve the nation and securing a reliable future for the people. This care and observation is our duty because we should not turn against our time (History). We should not, as we have done so far, fall behind the development and advancement of our generation. We should not turn against human history because we shall be punished for that in this world... ." ¹

What does Khīyābānī mean by the term 'observation' and who are going to watch and guide the affairs of the country? Khīyābānī has a convinced belief in democracy and often refers to this in his speeches. His idea of uprising is not merely an opposition or a rebellion against the ruling authority; nor did he wish to replace them. He wishes to establish a democratic rule in Iran and thus let the people voice their opinions, likes and dislikes and control their destiny. He believed that this democracy could be created in society only by a free election and the formation of a democratic parliament. In other words Khīyābānī wanted true representatives of the people to be allowed to enter parliament, which could not be

1. Tajaddud, 19/2/1299 (10.5.1920).

done except in a society which is freed from all sorts of parasitic forces and elements. If these parasitic elements are not eradicated from the society, the honest and patriotic members of parliament will be unable to act freely in the interest of the country, and most probably they will be imprisoned or killed by various plots:

"...We need law-giving representatives who, on the one hand, understand their own 'time' correctly and, on the other hand, teach their fellow human beings the situations of the time. Law-givers of the present time must believe in the principle of democracy. Democracy should not be entrusted to the aristocracy. We want a parliament which is created by the sincere wishes of the people and which knows their needs and problems; not a parliament which is used as a net of hypocrisy and treachery in the government of Tehran. Now and then they rouse the political interest of a few servants of the nation but after a few days arrest them... ." ¹

Khayābānī knew that there was no political immunity or freedom in Iran and that the words of 'parliament', 'democracy' and 'freedom' which were often used by the government-run mass media, were no more than empty words. The people were taught to live in the past and believe in an ideal and abstract legendary kind of social justice:

1. Tajaddud, 20/2/1299 (11.5.1920).

"...each time has its own requirement and this requirement alters according to the level of our knowledge and human understanding. Gradually by study and research man's imagination expands and naturally his convictions and thoughts change. Our ancestors regarded Anū shīr Vān's Justice as above all kinds of individual desires. For them the justice of that Sasanid King was above and better than any thought of 'justice'. But today we children of today regard this justice of Anū shīr Vān as mere despotism and cannot accept living under such justice and regard ourselves lucky people... ."1

Khīyābānī had realized that the people of Iran were subjected to many abstract promises both by religion and government, but that none of these promises were fulfilled within the society and in reality. He wished to redirect the people from abstract promises to reality. However he did not harbour the illusion that after the uprising the people would automatically change and that everything would improve. He knew that his mission was to make the people realise the problems in society for themselves. He wanted the revolutionaries to act rather than give promises:

"...up to now Iranian revolutionaries have talked a lot and have expressed all their ideals in the form of promises; but we want to say less and act more. We must

1. Tajaddud, 19/2/1299 (10.5.1920).

carry out whatever we have promised. Our success and failure depends on our actions: either democracy will succeed and will make all the people prosperous or many supporters of democracy will lose their lives...

Do not assume that all things will improve soon after your uprising. Do not deceive yourselves. Our problems will rise from now on and the most important events may take place later - because you should not forget that Iran is the centre of Asian politics... ."1

Khayābānī believed that political speeches and slogans were far from enough. Keeping the people busy with political speeches and abstract slogans was regarded as contrary to revolution and the interest of the people. Those who did not work and did not show an interest in the affairs of the country were not regarded as friends of the uprising. In other words work and action were regarded as essential attributes of being a patriot:

"...as long as the employees in offices refuse to co-operate with us they will be suspected. If need arises we shall force them to work. This country must educate and treat her unemployed and idle children alongside her own brave and self-sacrificing ones. The condition of living in this country is to show enthusiasm and work hard... ."2

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1. Tajaddud, 24/2/1299 (15.5.1920).
 2. Tajaddud, 1/3/1299 (23.5.1920).

Khiyābānī not only did not see any effect of the 'constitutional law' in Iran but also observed with sorrow that people were suffering under the cover of the Constitutional Law from insecurity, injustice, disorder and plundering. People not only gained no notable achievements from their bloody revolution but also were again victims in the hands of a new regime which pretended to be a democratic government.

Under the Constitutional Law central government imposed martial law, torture, censorship and banishment and betrayed the country. Since the Revolution, people had said that their rising had achieved a remarkable result, but in reality nothing was gained by the people, but injustice, disorder, inequality and hopelessness. Finally anybody who wished to talk about the Constitutional Law and its effects met a fate no different than that of Khiyābānī.

KHIYĀBĀNĪ AND HIS VIEW OF 'TAJADDUD' (REVIVAL)

The demands that Khiyābānī made from the government are in fact something new in the democratic and intellectual movements of Iran. Thinkers and anti-despotic personalities such as Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn Afghānī (Asadā bādī), Mīrzā Malkam Khān, Rushdiyya and Muhammad ^CAlī Tarbiyat, expressed their views before and during the Constitutional Revolution. But these progressive ideas of Afghānī and the founders of the constitutional movement were all suppressed by the central government and the reactionary forces.

The Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 was in fact a manifestation of such suppression against which Khayābānī revolted, giving his revolt the name of 'Tajaddud'. By the use of this term Khayābānī meant that the spirit of the Constitutional Revolution and the Democratic Movement of Azerbaijan must be kept alive. He believed that the way of struggle against the ruling class and despotism, which was paved by Sattār Khān and other revolutionaries, must be continued. It was this 'Tajaddud' (revival) of the revolutionary spirit in Azerbaijan by Khayābānī which frightened the central government and its foreign backers. In this section we shall attempt to illustrate further the spirit and meaning of Iran's Tajaddud with the help of Khayābānī's speeches.

Khayābānī's 'revival' was directed against the same common enemy, namely despotism, fanaticism and backwardness. It had two distinct qualities: firstly he expressed his views in an atmosphere of political suppression after the set back of the constitutionalists. Secondly Khayābānī is more radical in his political stand, in that he wanted the formation of a government by the people, the introduction of compulsory education, the implementation of basic land reforms and the granting of freedom to the people. He had set himself up as an example of such a programme. His 'revival', therefore, did not mean that we have to sit down and speculate about the ideas of the past but instead we have to put into practice all progressive ideas expressed by the constitutionalists and go forward and make fresh discoveries in order to face the demands of the future upon our society. Khayābānī was always interested in taking part in the

theoretical discussions among young people, and was always trying to assist his society's young generation in order to develop their thoughts. He believed that we have to provide facilities for the progress of the younger generation. Khiyābānī hoped that scientific and philosophic discussions would encourage youth to absorb the creative influence of the literature and socio-political writings of other countries. He also encouraged youth to prepare themselves to attend and hold political discussions. His attempt to achieve this was made during a time when people had forgotten, not only how to conduct fruitful political meetings, but even how to think about politics. Khiyābānī, expressing his belief in the improvement of society, declared:

"...Society is changeable and open to improvements. A national society is established by the direct participation of its inhabitants and by the influence of their thoughts and outlook... ." ¹

Khiyābānī was a strong believer in science and called for its development in the country. He believed that:

"...Democracy is gained as a direct result of knowledge... ." ²

Here the word 'knowledge' is the key word in the understanding of Khiyābānī's outlook. There were two ways of thinking and social outlooks. One was backward-looking and based on superstition and traditional beliefs and abstract memories of the past. The other

1. Tajaddud, 9/3/1299 (31.5.1920).

2. Ibid.

outlook was forward-looking and based on progressive ideas, the ideas which are usually acquired by human experience and understanding. Khayābānī based his policy and ideas on his own experience and understanding, that is to say the knowledge which is acquired by living with people and experiencing their social shortcomings and political successes or setbacks. Perhaps we can also appreciate Khayābānī's concept of Tajaddud better by noting in which ways he differed radically from traditionalists. Khayābānī, while respecting the tradition and religion of the people, believed that traditions and religion must not be used as an obstacle on the way of that knowledge and understanding which alone can bring a sense of freedom and democracy among the people. Highlighting Khayābānī's interest in the developments of social and political thoughts especially among the youth, ^CA. Āzarī writes:

"...Khayābānī belongs to the way of thinking which is above the idealist group. I, as the author of this book, have understood that perhaps Khayābānī was very careful in expressing his opinion in regard to great world philosophers because of the existing social circumstances, and one can understand this through his speeches and articles. In other words he has shown a certain restraint in expressing his opinions. At any rate the truth is this that the best pleasure of life for him was the awakening of social thoughts, in particular the awakening of the genius and talent of the youth to whom the future world belonged.

Although Khiyābānī was deeply involved in the running of the political affairs of the Firqa organisation, nevertheless he took part in social and scientific discussions... ."1

All this perhaps shows that Khiyābānī's idea of democracy and freedom was based on a deep conviction that the people of Iran can achieve these only by knowledge and political awakening rather than by believing in superstitions and traditions.

Two factors were very important in Khiyābānī's movement. One was revival and the other social progress. One could not succeed without the other, because any revival, according to Khiyābānī, must be based on social and intellectual progress. Living in the twentieth century but thinking in the past is an illusion and contradiction in a changing society. He was disappointed to see his country so backward both economically and politically while other countries were advancing on the path of social progress and change, but nevertheless says:

"...the spirit which is ruling here is the same spirit of revival and this spirit must rule everywhere... ."2

Khiyābānī not only wanted to carry out his uprising in accordance with his ideas of Tajaddud but also clearly urged his fellow countrymen to free themselves from their present backwardness and prepare themselves to create a secure future:

1. ^cA. Āzarī, Q.Kh., p.251.

2. Tajaddud, 10/2/1299 (1.5.1920).

"...we wish to free ourselves from the chains of ignorance and walk towards civilization and revival. We understand what a great step our time has taken but we still remain a great distance from our aim. We have to adapt ourselves to this civilized and progressive world but we must also have a plan for our future... ."1

Khayābānī wants his fellow countrymen to think about this seriously and encourages them to study other nations. For this reason Khayābānī asks people to involve themselves with the affairs of other nations and societies by travelling and being influenced by their useful habits and thus to develop useful and progressive ideas among Iranians. Meanwhile he points out to his fellow countrymen that we should not think that whatever is good or acceptable is perfect and unchangeable for ever. In other words Khayābānī urges his fellow countrymen to come out of the cocoon of passive and self-opinionated habits and insists that they think them over and change them if necessary by observing the change and progress of other countries:

"...we must be influenced by the revolutions and movements in order to set up our progressive policies. In order to benefit from the outside progressive world, the best way is to travel; in other words we must observe the developments of other nations and adopt their useful achievements for the benefit of our people and society... ."2

1. Tajaddud, 20/2/1299 (11.5.1920).

2. Tajaddud, 20/2/1299 (11.5.1920).

When Khiyābānī was talking about the despotic Shah of Iran, unrepresentative government in Tehran and the corrupt governor of Azerbaijan - and demanding their resignation or dismissal by the people - he was in fact attacking and repudiating the entire social system and the concept upon which the system stood. The age-old concept was that the kings ruled by divine decree, and that his representatives, as governors, were expected to be accepted by the people without any question. Khiyābānī by his idea of Tajaddud intended to confront and indeed repudiate this kind of concept which was essentially based on sheer subjection and obedience. Since physical power was granted to the king and spiritual authority was given to reactionary Mujtahids, the people had no role to play in life but to work and obey. Khiyābānī, on the contrary, wanted to fling these physical and spiritual chains from the hands and minds of the people by giving them authority to think, to act and to decide about their own life. Khiyābānī's idea of Tajaddud therefore is the revolt of man against the ruling powers and their representatives. Khiyābānī regarded man as a creative and dynamic being who shapes, reshapes and changes his society or environment according to his new requirements. In order to give the people such a responsibility they must be freed from their old physical chains and intellectual enslavements. *The following is a free translation of Khiyābānī's Speech:*

...today our ideas and aims seem to some people extreme and exaggerated but these outstanding ideas will, in future, be regarded as deficient and out of date....You ought to learn and understand the problems and the learned and

wise men should teach and explain these problems and rescue you from the bonds of the traditions of the past and prepare you for a prosperous and dignified future... our opponents wanted to return us to the days of barbarism and lawlessness of the middle ages. They were and still are reactionary and backward-looking people... .¹

Khiyābānī refers to the precept "ادَّبُوا اَوْلَادَكُمْ لِمَا بَدَا مِنْكُمْ غَيْرَ مَا كَانَ" (train your own children for a time different from your own)² to explain further what he means by 'not living in the past' and being 'rescued from binding traditions of the past'. He was not, indeed, against Islam and past culture, and on the contrary believed that progressive ideas and good principles have been expressed in the past, but maintained that the men of interest and the ruling class in society prevented and defiled these progressive ideas in order to maintain their existing positions. The idea of Tajaddud, in fact, can be regarded as the social theory and political outlook of Khiyābānī, in which both men and women must have equal standing:

"...it is impossible for us to make a decision in which the doors of revivalism become shut in the faces of women... ."³

In other words in an oppressed society both men and women suffer and if we want to free the society from all sorts of injustices the women cannot possibly be excluded from this revival.

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1. Tajaddud, 20/2/1299 (11.5.1920).
 2. Tajaddud, 20/2/1299 (11.5.1920).
 3. Tajaddud, 27/3/1299 (18.6.1920).

CONCLUSION

Khayābānī's movement in Azerbaijan was not the same as earlier movements in Iran. Although Khayābānī himself regarded his uprising as the continuation of Constitutional Revolution, nevertheless his movement was more radical and he wanted to change ^{the} social system.

He wanted the people to form an independent and powerful government which would take notice of people's needs and aspirations. When he emphasised that the people could change the government if they wished he was, in fact, rejecting the established monarchical system.

Khayābānī believed that the negative influence of foreign powers on Iran was the result of the existence of weak, corrupt and selfish kings and governments who had ignored all human rights and principles in Iran. The King and his governments, while depriving the people of every sort of freedom, were free to misuse their power by making unjust treaties with foreigners and receiving unnecessary loans. In order to bring about government by the people Khayābānī believed that the people must understand the meaning of freedom and independence. In his speeches he explained the aims of the Constitutional Revolution and the way in which the enemies of the Revolution betrayed the Revolution. He told the people what should be done in defence of the constitution and democracy. Khayābānī had learned that governments change in Iran but the system, the corruption and selfish rulers still remain, in other words that those in charge change but the system remains. Accordingly he wanted to change the system from autocracy to democracy, from an unjust society to a society where social justice is observed, and big land owners and

the rich do not have any more control over the elections and formation of the governments. Khiyābānī was a patriot who wished the whole of Iran to be governed by a democratically elected government. Thus his movement was not, contrary to the assertions of hostile commentators and critics, a separatist movement. Finally Khiyābānī's idea of Tajaddud illustrates his dialectical approach to society and history. He did not accept society and its governing laws as static and unchangeable. He regarded human reason as superior to all sorts of superstitions. He wished the people to live in the present century and to face the needs and demands of their age with understanding and knowledge. Khiyābānī, while respecting the religion and traditions of the people, believed that these should not be used in order to keep the people backward. He was a political thinker and revolutionary who opposed the court, the big land owners, and the statesmen who exploited the people bodily and materially. Thus with his idea of Tajaddud Khiyābānī also opposed the philosophical system which supported the existing social and political system in Iran.

CONCLUSION

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Internal movements in Iran in general and the uprising of Khīyābānī in Azerbaijan in particular appear as the culmination of a long period of conflict between the court and the nation. Khīyābānī's uprising was in fact the continuation of the constitutional revolution, during which not only did the established institutions not change, but in the name of constitution itself the court continued its despotism. As a result the people gained nothing from the achievements of the constitutional revolution.

The uprising of Khīyābānī once more proved that there existed close links and co-operation between internal reactionaries in the form of the government, big land owners and big businessmen, and foreign imperial powers, in this case Britain, who could not afford to see any uprising which might threaten their vested interest. During and after the October Revolution of 1917 which resulted in the fall of the Tsarist regime the ruling class in Iran and Britain, in order to keep the existing system intact and save it from the influence of Bolshevism, attempted to prevent any democratic movement in Iran in general and Khīyābānī's movement in Azerbaijan in particular. They were determined not only to suppress any uprising in Iran but also to scrap all the achievements of the Constitutional Revolution. Britain, who at the beginning of the

Constitutional Revolution supported the revolution against Tsarist Russia, now finding her position and interests in Middle East threatened by Bolshevik influence, moved against the defenders of the Constitutional Revolution.

The Anglo-Russian agreements of 1907 and 1915 divided Iran between these two powers; the outbreak of World War I brought more intervention by foreign countries in the form of Turkish, German, Russian and British troops in Iran. Although Iran had declared its neutrality, she became a battlefield of the countries involved in the war. The evacuation of Iran by the Russians in 1917 and the end of the war gave a chance to Britain to reassert her influence in Iran. The movements which took place between 1916-1920 in Iran, were essentially democratic, anti-imperialistic and based on the principles of ^{the} Constitutional Movement which Khiyābānī supported and defended all along.

The agreement of 1919 between Iran and Great Britain is the manifestation of this policy of collaboration between the Iranian ruling class and Britain. Khiyābānī's uprising must be understood in the context of this period in general and against the 1919 agreement in particular and the collaboration of internal forces and Britain against Khiyābānī and other democratic forces during this period is worthy of study. In this work we have attempted to show social conditions in Iran before and during the Constitutional Movement under despotic rulers on the one hand and the rivalry and co-operation of Britain and Russia in Iran on the other, and the rôle of these forces and people in regard to Constitutional

Revolution. In order to show the role of foreign powers in Iran, particularly against the constitutionalists and democratic movements, we have discussed the Russian invasion of and involvement in Tabriz, and have attempted to record the impressions and reactions of Khayābānī to these events.

To turn to the following period, contrary to the central government propoganda none of the movements which took place between 1919-1921 were either communist or separatist but were directed against any external intervention and internal reactionary forces. Khayābānī's uprising started while the corrupt and despotic Iranian king, Ahmad Shāh and his government were in power. Khayābānī's uprising had the main aims of halting the reactionary and anti-constitutional activities of such men as Vuṣūq al-Dawla and putting the constitutional laws into practice and preparing people to create a free and an independent country where freedom would be the fundamental basis for advanced ideas which could improve the life of Iranians.

In order to be successful in this task Khayābānī wanted to establish an intellectual and political movement in Azerbaijan and to reform the administration in Tehran where corrupt and reactionary elements ruled the country in the name of the government. The government managed to label Khayābānī and his uprising a separatist movement. We have attempted to show that these charges against Khayābānī were unfounded and false. Khayābānī not only did not wish to co-operate with a foreign power; on the contrary, he threatened those who wished to interfere in the internal affairs of

Iran nor did he wish to co-operate with either the local reactionary groups or the corrupt central government. Khayābānī might have been successful if he had accepted the help of the Bolsheviks, but although he knew that this would have strengthened his position and most likely would have made his uprising successful, he refrained from doing so and relied only on his own native resources in Azerbaijan. In this decision he was motivated by his consistent and deeply rooted idea that revolution and national revival should be generated, grow and develop within a particular society and among its people. For this reason we have regarded him a nationalist democrat and patriot who, while respecting the progressive ideas of other countries, believed that Iran can be freed only by her own democratic forces and by the political awareness of the people. He backed his political uprising with his philosophy of revival which was again based on his conviction that political mobilisation and uprising must be home-based. There were two forces in the society of his time; one was the traditionalists who regarded their traditions as final word and disregarded reason and human experience. Khayābānī belonged to the other group who believed in human reason and experience; that man is a creative being and is able to direct his own life and society without relying on superstition and supernatural powers. His idea of Tajaddud is in fact the recognition of man's dignity, creativity and originality as a maker of history. By his philosophy that we have to train ourselves for the present and teach people to

understand their own problems in society Khayābānī, in fact, opposed the closed body of traditional knowledge which was exclusively in the hands of ^{reactionary} religious leaders, who backed the existing system by keeping the people ignorant of the creative and intellectual part that they could play. Thus his revivalism was essentially based on politically enlightened people without whom the struggle could not succeed. He knew that despotic rulers are more afraid of the speeches of thinkers than the bullets of freedom fighters, and that they plot day and night against such thinkers in order to silence them.

It is perhaps appropriate to allow Khayābānī to say the last word on this subject. Khayābānī's last word in regard to the people of Iran is still valid. He believed that if a nation has a united desire and conscious policy towards freedom and independence they cannot easily be betrayed by either politicians or kings. His criticism of the Iranian people, and perhaps his disappointment, is summarised in the following passage:

"...The freedom and independence of a nation depends on this, that the meaning of success and failure, honour, dignity and humiliation must be taught from childhood. A nation who does not recognize the difference between these qualities cannot possibly possess a good name. The past experience of Iranian history should have made the Iranian people utterly devoted to freedom, independence and advance on the way of development and progression more than any other nation. But on the contrary, today

backward black Africans understand the meaning of freedom and independence better than us. You are always seeking for a cruel shepherd who will save you from the wolves and will finally himself cut your throat. You do not have an independent enthusiasm and driving force so that you can personally stand up for your rights and interest... ."1

To conclude we may quote the text² of a speech delivered by Ja^Cfar Pīshavarī³ on the occasion of the unveiling of Khiyābānī's statue in 1946, which in some respects summarises the weaknesses as well as the strength of Khiyābānī and his movement which have been discussed in the course of this thesis:

"An uprising of personalities such as Shaykh Muhammad Khiyābānī secures a people's uprising and a nation's thoughts. If there is a pride for Azerbaijan the Azerbaijanis themselves and their pride secure this. The steps that the national leader Sattār Khān, Bāqir Khān and Shaykh Muhammad Khiyābānī have taken for the sake of the Constitution will never be forgotten. Any time the names of Azerbaijan and Tabriz are mentioned the honourable names of these leaders are mentioned. The people respected them in the name of Azerbaijan. We must keep their work alive forever; The work of Khiyābānī in particular. If the national leader Sattār Khān has raised the name of Azerbaijan by arms, the learned speeches of the Shaykh has had a more lasting effect in this respect. The Shaykh was a great thinker. Reading his speeches one learns fresh ideas. His words are very meaningful and deep. There are very few superfluous words in his speeches. But there are many practical suggestions. One must very regretfully say that Shaykh's social environment was not favourable. Freedom lovers had not yet been tested at that time. While the Shaykh was struggling for his belief and ideas, among his friends, one sometimes can find individuals who, while working with the Shaykh, used to stab him from behind. I think that the uprising of Khiyābānī, no matter how it ended, has a great importance in Iran. Our movement is the continuation of his uprising. The Shaykh was not able to express our demands very openly,

1. Tajaddud, 1/6/1299 (24.8.1920).

2. Yirmī Bīr Āzar (Nutqlar va Maqālalar) Sayyid J^Cafar Pīshavarī, op.cit., pp.106-110.

3. Sayyid J^Cafar Pīshavarī, leader of the Democratic Party and government of Azerbaijan 1945-1946 in Tabriz.

because the atmosphere at that time did not allow him. Looking at the Tajaddud newspaper, we can see this clearly. The Shaykh always used to respect the name of Azerbaijan in his own speeches. The people of Azerbaijan is itself a special nation. Even at the beginning of the Constitutional Revolution, Muḏaffar al-Dīn Shāh in his telegram addressing the Azerbaijanis, mentioned the national assembly of Azerbaijan. Kasravī also, although he has certain negative thoughts in regard to the Azerbaijan movement, nevertheless the history which he has written shows that the people of Azerbaijan in fact has always kept its own qualities and in truth it itself is a nation. The environment in which the Shaykh lived did not allow him to express these things openly. What the Shaykh was saying was an introduction to our demands. Now we have eternalized the memory of three great characters. From the point of view of bravery Sattār Khān was a hero. He did not give himself up to the enemy. But from the point of view of thought, ideas and knowledge the Shaykh has an extremely high position. Sattār Khān was brave. The Shaykh while having that quality also possessed a state of scholarship. Perhaps the Shaykh was not a military man but he used to encourage the riflemen. The Shaykh was well known before the uprising. His speeches were very famous. Especially during the constitution, at the time of reactionary developments in the Majlis, the Shaykh's speeches against the reactionary forces were strong and logical. Regrettably we must say that he was alone. One can say that it was like coming across with a flower in an arid desert. The Shaykh was one of these flowers. This movement was limited to the Shaykh and the people around him. At that time even the Shaykh could not trust those around him because there were traitors and they used to appear. This became more clear later, especially after Riḏā Khān took power. As I have said the Shaykh was like a flower in a dry desert. There were very few people in that society who could understand the whole meaning of the Shaykh's speeches. The Shaykh himself felt this. In his own speeches he always talked about unity, discipline, and sincerity.

This was because a number of the people behind him were not trustworthy people. One of the weaknesses of the Shaykh's time was lack of organization. It is true that the Firqa existed at that time but the Firqa in the meaning that we understand it did not exist. The government was encircled by reactionaries. In addition one of the weaknesses of this movement was this, that the movement was named after the Shaykh alone. The Shaykh was alone at that time and used to attend to everything himself and had to answer telegrams and letters himself. Because of this, that movement soon disappeared. If there had been a strong organization the movement would not have disappeared so rapidly. We must add this that the Shaykh believed a little bit in the reactionaries. He used to say that it was possible that Hājjiy Mukhbir al-Saltana was a democrat. If the Shaykh had known this person well he probably would not have met his death so easily.

Moreover, after World War I the treachery of Vusūq al-Dawla made people lose trust in political organizations. At that time Democrat Firqa was divided into two parts. Vusūq al-Dawla had deceived a number of freedom lovers and a number of people such as Sayyid Ziyā' al-Dīn and Malik al-Shu^carā Bahār. Because of this they became misled and corrupted. Certain acts were the result of their corruption. Rizā Khān's coming to power was a result of this. As we have said they made people lose their trust in political organizations by creating division among them. Our movement succeeded because of our strong organization and discipline. As a result of our strong discipline and our service to the people we have been able to increase the trust of people towards our party. In our first congress we decided that anybody who betrayed the Firqa would be executed. This had a great effect. It is true that various small things happened but they have been disclosed. The people oppose such persons and remove them from power. One of the reasons for the success of our movement is this, that we have made the thoughts of our people a mirror for ourselves. We act according to the wishes of the people. They could not do this at the time of the Shaykh. During the time of the Shaykh no step was taken towards reform in six months. The present democratic movement of Azerbaijan, contrary to the past, requires action every minute.

In regard to development of our towns, serious actions have been taken: new streets are being opened, new buildings are built, the streets of our cities are being asphalted. These have great importance on the way of development. By this way the cleanliness of the cities is being secured. Besides from the propaganda aspect it has a great importance. Nowadays those foreign political personalities who visit us see that we are truly working. They are

really seeing that we are doing new things.

We set up statues of our heroes. We bring their works to life. In this way we wish to show that the people respect those who have sacrificed themselves for them. Setting up statues of Sattār Khān, Bāqir Khān and Shaykh Muhammad Khiyābānī encourages the people and creates the feeling of freedom and patriotism in them. Since the Constitutional Movement, the district of Davachī has been called the district of reactionaries, but this is not true. No attention has been paid to it. No place can be reactionary by itself especially a working class district like Davachī. We are now building schools in Davachī. Now our newly built schools are visited from morning until evening by five hundred people. They show more interest because in the near future their children will be educated in them. The people see this and believe in our Firqa and follow us. The reform that has taken place in our villages did not take place in the Shaykh's time. Besides when the Shaykh delivered speeches the people used to gather round him and show their feelings. The Shaykh used to believe them, but their feeling being momentary used to disappear as soon as they returned home. The spirit and feeling of freedom must be awakened and strengthened. To do this a condition and atmosphere must be created and the feeling of the people must be utilized, and for this the existence of strong and powerful organization is essential. Such an organization that the atmosphere which it creates must produce steady and dignified freedom lovers. Because there was not such an organization at that time, such a favourable atmosphere did not come to existence.


These things do not lessen the great personality of Shaykh Muhammad Khiyābānī. We must learn from this experience. Now our condition is better than any part of Iran. Now something is happening in Shīrāz and Khūzistān and other parts of the south. We regard it too early to express our views on this matter. At the proper time the Firqa will express its views. We are sure that whichever side we support that side will win.

There is a great difference between our movement and that of Khiyābānī. In Khiyābānī's movement the people did not struggle under the leadership of a disciplined organization. But at the present movement the Azerbaijan Democrat Party leads us by a strong discipline and possesses great power.

Our Firqa attracts the confidence of the people and guides it by correct tactics. Our people offer their duties to their national heroes by erecting their statues and tombs which are worthy of their sacrifices. This action at the same time shows that the people and those who make sacrifices in the cause of their freedom are acknowledged."

ILLUSTRATIONS

A) Siqat al-Islām and eight other freedom fighters being hanged by Tsarist Russians in Tabriz 1911. (The picture is taken from E.G. Browne's collection (Nāma hā'ī as Tabriz)(Cambridge Library.)



از راست به چپ (۱) قدیر (۲) خیارالملک (۳) دایو او (۴) صادق الملک (۵) تقی‌الاسلام (۶) آقا محمد ابراهیم (۷) حسن (۸) شیخ سلیم .

B) Sattār Khān, the leader of the Constitutional Revolution in Tabriz 1905-9.





عکس A - چهارتن آزادیخواه که روسها آنان را بدار زده‌اند
از راست به چپ: ۱. میرزا علی ناطق ۲. حاجی صمد خیاط ۳. مشهدی حاجی خان ویجویه‌ای ۴. مشهدی شکور خرازی



عکس K - یوسف خان حکم آبادی، که به امر روسها و به دست حاج صمدخان
شجاع الدوله دو شقه‌اش کرده‌اند و چون گوسفند به قناره‌اش زده‌اند.

- B) Yūsuf Khān-i Ḥukmābādī, who was cut in half by Ṣamad Khān-i Shujā^C al-Dawla on Tsarist Russian orders in Tabriz 1911.
(Are taken from E.G. Browne's collection (Nama hā'ī as Tabriz) Cambridge Library.)


- A) Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī, one of the founders of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-9.




- B) Mīrzā Muḥammad Taqī Ṭabāṭabā'ī, the chairman of the Tabriz Anjuman in 1908-1918 (see Appendix 1).



- A) The first anniversary of Khiyābānī's death, celebrated by the Democrat Party of Azerbaijan in Tabriz 1921. (The picture taken from Āzarī's book on Khiyābānī.)



- B) The monument to Khiyābānī outside the Siqat al-Islām school in Tabriz built by the Democrat Party of Azerbaijan in 1946.



APPENDIX 1

M.M.T. ṬABĀṬABĀ'Ī

Mīrzā Muḥammad Taqī Ṭabāṭabā'ī¹ (1883-1937) was born in Tabriz. He studied religious subjects with his father Mīrzā ḤAlī Āqā and Siqat al-Islām and attended the Luqmān secondary school where he studied modern subjects. After his father's death he became the Pīshnamāz of the Āqā Machidi (Āqā Mosque) which was built by his father. During the Iranian Constitutional Revolution and the nine months of fighting in Tabriz he was active along with other freedom lovers. He became the chairman of the Anjuman-i Ayālatī va Valāyatī of which Khiyābānī was a member and was a deputy for Tabriz in the Majlis for the fourth and fifth periods. In Majlis he was the member of the Social Democrat Party. He later became the Qāzī Lashkar (Army judge) of Azerbaijan and died at the age of 55. His grave is in the cemetery of Dār al-Salām in Najaf.

1. The present author's grandfather.

APPENDIX 2.

THE 1919 AGREEMENT

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British Loan to Persia of £2,000,000 (August 1919).

The Anglo-Persian Agreement, with which is bound up the Agreement to grant to Persia a loan of 2,000,000L. sterling at 7 per cent., was signed in Tehran on 9th August 1919.

Ever since the negotiations for the Agreement reached their concluding stages there has been a tendency in most quarters to urge that advances and subsidies to Persia, for whatever purpose, should be made "as advances out of the loan."

It seems that it would be convenient to have available a comparison of the objects for which the loan was granted with those for which the various subsidies which it is suggested might be advanced from the loan are made, and to examine the extent to which the loan has been drawn upon, and whether properly or not.

I. The purposes and main conditions of the loan are clearly shown in the following extracts from the Agreement between the two Governments and the Agreement relating to the loan :—

Agreement between the Governments of Great Britain and Persia.

PREAMBLE: In virtue of the close ties of friendship which have existed between the two Governments in the past, and in the conviction that it is in the essential and mutual interests of both in future that these ties should be cemented, and that the progress and prosperity of Persia should be promoted to the utmost, it is hereby agreed between the Persian Government on the one hand, and His Britannic Majesty's Minister, acting on behalf of his Government, on the other, as follows :—

2. The British Government will supply, at the cost of the Persian Government, the services of whatever expert advisers may, after consultation between the two Governments, be considered necessary for the several departments of the Persian Administration. These advisers shall be engaged on contracts and endowed with adequate powers, the nature of which shall be the matter of agreement between the Persian Government and the advisers.

3. The British Government will supply, at the cost of the Persian Government, such officers and such munitions and equipment of modern type as may be adjudged necessary by a joint commission of military experts, British and Persian, which shall assemble forthwith for the purpose of estimating the needs of Persia in respect of the formation of a uniform force which the Persian Government propose to create for the establishment and preservation of order in the country and on its frontiers.

4. For the purpose of financing the reforms indicated in clauses 2 and 3 of this Agreement, the British Government offer to provide or arrange a substantial loan for the Persian Government, for which adequate security shall be sought by the two Governments in consultation in the revenues of the customs or other sources of income at the disposal of the Persian Government. Pending the completion of negotiations for such a loan the British Government will supply on account of it such funds as may be necessary for initiating the said reforms.

Agreement relating to Loan of 2,000,000L., at 7 per cent., redeemable in Twenty Years.

PREAMBLE: Contract between the British Government and the Persian Government with reference to an agreement concluded this day between the said Governments. It is agreed as follows :—

Article 1.—The British Government grant a loan of 2,000,000L. sterling to the Persian Government, to be paid to the Persian Government as required in such instalments and at such dates as may be indicated by the Persian Government, after the British Financial Adviser shall have taken up the duties of his office at Tehran, as provided for in the aforesaid agreement.

II. From these extracts it is apparent—

- (a) That the British Government¹ is convinced that it is to its interest as much as that of the Persian Government to promote the progress and prosperity of Persia.
- (b) That the loan was granted for the specific purpose of financing such reforms in the Persian Administration and military forces as would lead towards the achievement of the common interests of both nations.
- (c) That the loan may properly, therefore, be devoted to the expenses of reform, including the salaries of British officers lent to the Persian Government for advice in reform, civil and military, and the cost of equipment of the reorganised combatant forces.
- (d) That instalments of the loan cannot properly be made till the British Financial Adviser has taken up his duties in Tehran. (By mutual consent of the Persian Prime Minister and His Majesty's Minister this limitation was disregarded in respect of an instalment of Ts. 400,000 (131,000*l.*) drawn in August immediately after the signature of the Agreement, partly for the purpose of securing for it and the reforms a "good Press" in Persia.)

III. The subsidies still paid to the Persian Government in Tehran are :—

- (a) For general administrative expenditure, Ts. 350,000 per month. This subsidy is composed of "moratorium payments" begun in 1915, *plus* an additional advance begun in 1918. The whole is recoverable from the Persian Government, but does not bear interest. Its object is to make Persian Government expenditure balance with receipts, which, without the subsidy, it greatly exceeds.
- (b) For the maintenance of the Persian Cossack Division, Ts. 100,000 per month. This, which is equal to the amount found by the Persian Government monthly for the maintenance of the Division, is a non-recoverable subsidy. It was started as a war measure to obviate the risk of internal disturbance which would result from the dispersal of the Division as a consequence of inability to pay it.
- (c) A personal payment of Ts. 15,000 a month to the Shah, to be continued so long as he keeps Vossugh-ed-Dowleh's Cabinet in power.
- (d) A subsidy of Ts. 20,000 per month to the Persian Government was sanctioned in June 1919 for the maintenance of a force in Khorassan to guard against a possible Bolshevik invasion. What payments, if any, have actually been made is not clear from the information available. (Possibly payment is made by the Consul-General at Meshed to the Governor-General, by direct drawing on India.)

It is apparent that the above subsidies are not such as could legitimately be regarded as advances out of a loan granted to enable a campaign of administrative reform to be carried on. Yet the second² and the fourth² have been sanctioned, for certain periods, only on the condition that they are regarded as advances out of the loan of 2,000,000*l.*; and it is now proposed that a similar stipulation should apply to the first for two months at any rate.

To the above list should be added the payment to the Governor-General of Fars of Ts. 45,000 (for three months at Ts. 15,000 per month) for the maintenance of the North Road Guards. This subsidy was not even one to the Central Government of Persia, and to allocate any portion of it against a loan to that Government is obviously improper, except with the specific consent of the latter, which was, however, not sought. Yet the last authorised instalment (for three months) of this subsidy, which has now lapsed, was sanctioned only as an advance out of the loan.²

IV. Apart from the tendency, mentioned above, to allocate as "advances out of the loan" all sorts of payments to the Persian Government, there has been shown from time to time a similar tendency to expect that as soon as the loan becomes legitimately available on the arrival of the Financial Adviser in Tehran,³ the need for the various subsidies now paid for various services will cease to exist.

¹ The Government of India were sceptical about the Agreement and its virtues throughout the negotiations. The Secretary of State for India, however, stated that he did not endorse the Government of India's view; and while the Government of India might with consistency decline to subscribe to the statement of policy in the preamble, it has been accepted by His Majesty's Government as a whole.

² See Statement attached.

³ See extract from "Agreement relating to the loan of 2,000,000*l.*," Article I. above.

It is, surely, unduly optimistic to expect that any Financial Adviser, however able, will find it possible in less than a month so to reorganise Persia's revenue system, and so curtail expenditure, as to remove the existing excess of expenditure over receipts amounting to possibly Ts. 470,000¹ a month. Unless the Financial Adviser is to be faced with a task utterly hopeless from the start, it is only fair to allow him a considerable period before expecting tangible results; and during this period it will be necessary that the subsidies provided for the current needs of the administration should be continued—at, it may be hoped, a gradually decreasing rate. The alternative, to which a decided inclination is apparent on the part of the Foreign Office—under pressure of circumstances—is to devote the loan to current administrative expenditure; but this is to return to the procedure shown to be improper under the terms of the Agreements, and rendered no less improper by the fact of the Financial Adviser's arrival in Tehrau.

V. These considerations affect principally the subsidy of Ts. 350,000 for general administrative purposes. With the substitution of "Military Mission" for "Financial Adviser" they probably apply equally to the subsidy for the Cossack Division, though for a much less period. The Military Mission submitted on 21st March 1920 definite recommendations for the disposal of the Division, but it will presumably be at least one month before effect is given to them.² For the maintenance of such part of the Division as is to be retained the sum of Ts. 100,000 found by the Persian Government monthly without outside assistance, may or may not suffice; if it does not, a contribution from the British Government might not unnaturally be demanded by the Persian Government.

VI. If the British Government intends to follow out the policy indicated in the preamble to the Agreement of August 1919, and to endeavour to promote the progress and prosperity of Persia, the necessity must be faced of continuing to finance the country while the process of reform is in progress, in addition to financing the reforms themselves. It is thwarting any possibility of success that there may be to divert to improper uses what remains² of the loan of 2,000,000*l.*; and further, it is only fair to the policy as outlined in the Agreement that the allocations³ already improperly made against the loan should be cancelled.

¹ i.e., the combination of subsidies (a) (b) and (d) above. It is perhaps fair to include (b) still, for although the Military Mission has reported as to the disposal of the Cossack Division, the necessary measures can hardly be taken in a day.

² This was written before Tehran telegram No. 190 of 9th April 1920 (F.O. reference No. 191109/34) had been received.

³ See Statement attached.

Political Department, India Office,
22nd April 1920.

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References:-

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APPENDIX 3

MUKHBIR AL-SALTANA

Mahdī Qulī Khān Hidāyat (Mukhbir al-Saltāna) was born in 1860 in Tehran. He was educated in Berlin and on his return was appointed governor-general of Shīrāz. He was elected as a deputy for Tehran for the fourth period of the Majlis. He then became the head of the Tehran General Post Office, being subsequently imprisoned for dishonesty while occupying this post.¹ Siqat al-Islām says of Mukhbir al-Saltāna; "He is a conservative; if he tries to introduce himself as a democrat, that is because he is weak, but he is an absolute dictator when he is in power".² Of himself he says, "my rule is neither constitutional, nor despotic, but it is closer to despotism because people do not understand the constitution".³ Mukhbir al-Saltāna became Prime Minister in 1927 and held office until 1933. He built a hospital, a school and a mosque in Tehran and published a number of historical books. One of his most valuable works is the Guzārish nāma-yi Īrān in which he covers Iranian History from the beginning to the Pahlavī dynasty. Another is Khātirāt va Khaṭarāt in which he gives a brief account of Khiyābānī's movement among many other subjects. Mukhbir al-Saltāna died in Tehran in 1946.⁴

1. See, I. Safā'ī, op.cit., p.436.

2. See, N. Fathī, Zindagānī-yi Siqat al-Islām-i Shahīd, (Tehran, 1352), p.50.

3. See, R. Ra'īs Niyā, D.M., p.308.

4. For fuller account see I. Safā'ī, op.cit., pp.431-450.

APPENDIX 4

SPECIMEN PAGE OF TAJADDUD, ANNOUNCEMENT OF UPRISING

(taken from Az Şabā ta Nīmā),

AND ĀZĀDĪ-SITĀN STAMP

(taken from Khāṭirāt va Khatarāt)



مجله آگاهی

بازاریه سخی - مشهد -
معاون نشری
تیریز - مشهد
ناشر تیریز همایون
(آدرس: ترهسون، اعلان، مشرف بست)
محل فروش: مکتب خیرا، عباد خیر، بوزنج جریه

۱۷ خرداد ۱۳۲۸
عمالتا هفتک یک بار نشر میشود
وجه اشتراک: سربز - سالانه ۳۰۰ - ششماهه ۱۶۰ - فراس
واضع: ... ۳۵ ...
مراجعه: ... ۳۵ ...
تک سربز ۶ هاشمی
تمامه اعلان و کتاب بد - خط خوانا و تیریز و تیریز و تیریز
شمس اداره ارسال گروه و در هیچ صورت سربز و تیریز
اعلامت رجوع دفتر اداره خود

مطبوعات، مدنیت و ما

مطبوعات جزایه است که در تحت فشار احتیاجات نوآوری و برای تأمین مطابقت مدنیت بشریه با شرایط جدید زندگی، در مجموعه اعضا و جهالات وی، ضمیمه شده است.
مطبوعات، یکی از طرقات اساسی و نشان امروزی است.
سینه اعمال عقل و اراده حریفانه و سخن گفتن - ما به اندیاز انسان از حیوان است، همین ما به اندیاز انسان شدن از انسان وحشی و برزی، عادت از «روزنامه خواندن» و «مطالعه»
در اینصورت اساسی، با محیط خود زندگی میسر برهن است.
انسان شنیدن، غذا، پیچیده، نفس میکشد، و میخواند...
خواندن حسک نفس میکشد و غذای که

مطبوعات، در هر دو چیزها در محتلف آنها، به همواره و همیشه، چیزها در روی خواندن از درستیهای مطبوعات موعود، پیاده بود. که مجموع این چیزها عادت مدنیت آوردن پیوسته خواهند آورد.
چون وسیله اولین اطلاعات را وسیله به محیط خودش فرا خواهد گرفت. به ترتیب نویی را از حد خواهد بود، و مطبوعات خود خواهد افزود، و دنیا، با مضمون موقیفات زمان و جهان خودش آشنایی خواهد داشت. چنانچه، او را چینی است به یاد را از یاد بگذارد.
کوشش است تا او را، با همون خودش بتواند در حال نفس و معاشرت باشد. فواید است، لاس، نادر، تا کرده را از سرود، و زود را از دست نبردند.
دشمن و شایسته است تا به چینه، بزرگ

مکتبیت مطبوعات بست به کمال غرورمان است.
دولت مکتب مترق و مکتب، مطبوعات هم آن چیزهایی است که کفایت و چیزی هم دلار از آنها است.
در یک مکتبی که قدر میدان ترقی و نموده گذاشته و یاد داده است. مطبوعات شایسته یک آلت افکار و یک جنبش هاضمه است، که افکار و اطلاعات عقل سازد و اصلاح افکار و عقل کرده، به تحول خوانندگان خودش بدهد.
در یک مکتبی دیگر که نوز، مطبوعات با بر سر آمدن و تکامل گذارد، مطبوعات بهترین هادی و وهنما است. حرفهای تکلیف را از بگویند ملت برساند، راههای تازه را، از در پیش چشم قاریان بسپارد. میدهد. افکار جدید، را تلقین، عادت و اعتقادات مطبوعه و مطبوعه را قلع و قمع بنماید. فواید هر که یک نعت جدید زندهی واقع

زند ما را میانتیار میکند و پیشرو و در این محیط افکار و لایحه، کوشش چینی بر بسته های ما عطف نیکبند، او ای می محیط: که افکار و لایحه تا به هم هزار سربز پیچیده تر و ترس انگیز تر از آن هستی که ما کفایت، آبا میدانی در جنبه همان وسیع احتیاج و ضرورت، استیصال و مدلت - حرف و طاقان هستی...
همین حلا که او نوسخت موسوع بعث ما و طرز خطاب و طالب ما میانی، معما مسئله های اساسی و عهد را، موجود میباید حسک باید ستونهای این سربز و دانشیان نماید.
وضعیت مکتب و وضعیت ملک، امور سیاسی، اجتماعی، اقتصادی، طرز حکم، مت - زندگی ملی، روزگار حضرت یک حسه اکثر همکاران، و... و... مسائل و میانی هستند که وقت ما را بخود سپردن جلب میکنند.
میخواهیم بر تکلیف خود عمل بکنیم. تا بر وظیفه مکتبی خودمان، اصول تاریخیه

بیاننامه

آزادبمراهان شهر تبریز، بواسطه تأیلات از تمامین که در یک سلسله رفتاریات ضد مشروطیت حکومت محلی تجلی نموده و در مرکز انابت آذربایجان، یک طرز اندیشه یعنی فطیلت گرفته بود، به همان آمده، با قصد اعتراض و پروتست شدید و متین قیام نموده اند.
آزادبمراهان تبریز اعلام میکنند صفحه نامت بر گرام آبان عیادت است از تحصیل یک اطمینان تام و کامل از این حیث که ما در این حکومت، رژیم آلوده مکتب و معززه، و قوانین اساسیه را که چنگواکی آرا همین بنیاد، طاری سادقانه بر می و چیزی دارد.
آزادبمراهان، کیفیت فوق العاده باریک وضعیت حاضر را شدید کرده و همینکه که نظم و آسایش را، هر وسیله باشد، برقرار دارند. در دو کفه، بر این آزادبمراهان عیادت از این است:

- برقرار داشتن آسایش عمومی
- از قوه فعل آوردن رژیم مشروطیت

تبریز: پنجم ۱۹ خرداد ۱۳۲۸
هیئت هدیره اجتماعات
تبریز مطبوعه: ...



تمبر آزادی ستان که با استعمال نکشید

APPENDIX 5

POEMS ABOUT KHIYĀBĀNĪ

The following poems are extracts from the works of well known Iranian Poets who strongly attacked the enemies of Khiyābānī's uprising and admired the patriotism and progressive views of Khiyābānī.

ابوالقاسم عارف درباره خیابانی چنین میگوید:
هستی من با من آن کرد که عالم دانند
اجنبی پروری و روح خیانت کاری
مدر نشناسی یک ملامت این که عمر
پرتو نور تجدد ز خیابان جدید

محمد علی صفوت در سوگ خیابان میگوید:^۲
ننیده باغ و گلستان و ناچشیده ز عجب
وزید باد خزان چیده شد بساط همی
چو عمر بجی عوض از دست شد خیابانی
به ناله سال و فاشش ز طبع پر سیم

علی ابراهیم گاه در مورد خیابان چنین میگوید:^۳
زیانی که این دوره بجی تانی است
به نزدیک او را چو خورد ریه ام
درخشنده چون اختر کسبیک
به هوش و خرد تانی بوالعلاء
خوشا کتوری همچو فرزند زار
به حشمت قرین خاک سبزیار
نپیدار هرگز چنین کسکتوری
شوم بجی که از کارگان

مخبر السطنه با روح خیابان گفت کرد
چه بلویم که چه با کتور ساسا کرد
بدر از شهر چو درویش بیابان کرد
روح امتثال خیابان نور کرد

گذشت فصل بهار و رسید موسم دی
ششاد و زنده بلی رحمت بست جمله زنی
نکره یک قدم از شاهراه مقصد طی
جواب داد بگو «صد دروغ باد ازوی»

به تبریز مرگ خیابانی است
سخنلویش را پندیده ام
شفا بخش دلهای پیرو جوان
به آزادگی برهه مقصد
به رضوان رخش سار و خرسند باد
دل از مهر آن خطه لبونزبان
که میپرورد در دلش گوهری
که دارد بسی راد و زارگان

- ۱- رجوع کردیم، کلیات دیوان عارف، با اهتمام عبدالرحمن سرفراز، تهران ۱۹۶۱، صفحه ۴۳
- ۲- « « « تاریخ فرهنگ آذربایجان، تهران ۱۹۵۰، صفحه ۲۰
- ۳- « « « رژیم ریس نیا و اسماعیل راغب، دو مبارز جنبش مشروطه، تبریز ۱۹۶۹، صفحه ۱۷-۳۱۲

ملک الشراء دهار ترجیح بند ذیل اسبویاری خیابانی سرورده است: آن قوم، سرانند که زیر سر آنهاست
 الحق که خطا کرده و تقصیر نمودند
 در سلطنت مطلقه چندی پدرانشان
 نعم الخلفان نیز درین دوره فترت
 پامال نمودند و زدودند و ستردند
 کشتند بزرگانرا و ابقا نمودند
 این سلسله در سلسله جنبانی ایران
 بردند منافع ز پریشانی ایران
 ذیروح شدند از جسد فانی ایران
 آزادی ایران و مسلمانی ایران
 بر شیخ حسین و به خیابانی ایران (۱)

گر خون خیابانی مظلوم بجوشد
 سرتاسر ایران کفن سرخ بیوشد

کشت آن حسن (۲) از بهر وطن، گردوسه کاشی
 تقلید از او کرد و ندانست و خطا کرد
 این صاحب کابینه و آن والی تبریز
 که قتل مهین شیخ حسین خان رادر فارس
 که بر سر تبریز دویدند و نمودند
 در سایه قانون سر قانون طلبان را
 آوخ اگر ارواح شهیدان به قیامت
 کشت این حسن (۳) احرار وطن را چومواشی
 آری در کهدان شکند سارق ناشی
 صدی که چنین است چنانند حواشی
 تصویب نمودند بصد عذر تراشی
 قانون اساسی را از هم متلاشی
 از تن پیریدند و نکردند تحاشی
 گیرند گریبان نژاد لله باشی

گر خون خیابانی مظلوم بجوشد
 سرتاسر ایران کفن سرخ بیوشد

در یوزه گری کوفت در صاحب خانه
 از کثرت تلبیس وریا کرد بخود جلب
 از بهر گدائی شد و چون خانه تهی دید
 درخیم خیابانی ازین قسم به تبریز
 با آنکه در افواہ عوام است که مهمان
 این نره خران لگد انداز شتر کین
 در خانه احرار شدند، از ره اصرار
 وانگاه برفت از اثر صاحب خانه
 چون گریه عابد نظر صاحب خانه
 بگرفت بحجت کمر صاحب خانه
 وارد شد و شد حمله ور صاحب خانه
 من باب مثل هست خر صاحب خانه
 جستند بدیوار و در صاحب خانه
 مهمان و بریدند سر صاحب خانه

گر خون خیابانی مظلوم بجوشد
 سرتاسر ایران کفن سرخ بیوشد

رندان بگمانشان که شکاری سره کردند
 روبه صفتان بین که چسان پنجه خونین
 آزادی را بلهوسان ملعبه کردند
 راندند زخون شهدا سیل و بر آن سیل
 وز قتل مهمان، کار جهان یکسره کردند
 از فرط سفه در کلوی فسوره کردند
 حریت را بیخردان مسخره کردند
 از نعش بزرگان وطن قنطره کردند

- ۱- شیخ حسین خان مشهور به (چاکو تاهی) رئیس ایالات رشتی و مجاهد معروف جنوب
- ۲- اشاره است به حسن وثوق الدوله که چندین از بانیان کاشی را کشت.
- ۳- مراد حسن مشیر الدوله است.

قصری ز خیانت بنهادند و بر آن قصر
وانکه بی تنویر شبستان شقاوت
از لخت دل سوختگان کنگره کردند
از تیر جفا ، سینۀ ما پنجره کردند
کشتند و تو گوئی عملی نادره کردند

گر خون خیابانی مظلوم بجوشد

سرتاسر ایران کفن سرخ بیوشد

جمعی بی ترحیم خیابانی مظلوم
رسم است که چون مردم مسلمان، بی ترحیم
اجلاس نمودند نجیبانه درین بوم
قرآن بدعا ختم کند امت مرحوم
حکام مسلمان و مسلمانی مرسوم
از ختم وعزا منع حرام آید و مهضموم
بر مجلس ترحیم خیابانی مظلوم
و ابداع نمودند ز نو قاعده‌ای شوم
غافل که ازین حرکت مذبح، نکردد
این بلعجیبی بین که بجد حمله نمودند
بستند ره آمد و شد را برخ خلق
آزادی معدوم و ستمکاری مکتوم

گر خون خیابانی مظلوم بجوشد

سرتاسر ایران کفن سرخ بیوشد

از آستی ار دست حقیقت بدر آید
رخسار بیوشند وجیهان ریاکار
این دستکه غیر طبیعی بسر آید
گر چهر حقیقت ز پس پرده در آید
ای قاتل آزادی ایران بجزر باش
زان لحظه که قاضی بسر محضر آید
پر گیرد و در بار که عدل بنالد
این روح کزین کالبد خسته بر آید
ملت بود آن شیر که هنگام تراحم
چون بیشتر آزرده شود بیشتر آید
ای پیر مکن گریه که هنگام مکافات
از روح جوان تو بر تو خبر آید
وی کودک نالان بدر کشته مسکین
زاری مکن امروز که روز دگر آید

گر خون خیابانی مظلوم بجوشد

سرتاسر ایران کفن سرخ بیوشد!

۱- دیوان اشعار سارون مجرّقی چهار « ملک الشعراء »

جلد اول ، چاپ دوم ، چاپخانه فردوسی ، صفحہ ۴۲-۴۴ ، تهران ۱۹۶۲

APPENDIX 6:

M.T. PISYĀN

Muhammad Taqī Khān-i Pisyān (1891-1921) was born in Tabriz. He completed his studies in the Luqmān school and left Tabriz for Tehran where he attended army college in 1911. He served in the army until the outbreak of World War I, when he joined a group of Iranian army men who fought against the Russians and British and allied themselves with the Germans. When the Ottomans with their German advisors were defeated in Mesopotamia, Pisyān left Iran for Berlin where he served in the German army until the end of the war. On his return Pisyān was appointed chief of the Khurāsān gendarmerie and during Sayyad Ziyā al-Dīn's premiership he was appointed governor-general of Khurāsān, with instructions to arrest Qavām al-Saltāna, the former governor-general of Khurāsān, and send him to Tehran where the latter was imprisoned for some time. Following Sayyad Ziyā al-Dīn's fall, Qavām al-Saltāna became the new Prime Minister of Iran. Qavām was now eager to retaliate against Pisyān, and eventually relations between Qavām and Pisyān became so bad (3.4.1921) that the tribes and landlords of Khurāsān rebelled against Pisyān with the direct support of Qavām and central government troops. Finally a battle took place in Qūchān between the tribesmen and followers of Pisyān in which he was wounded and beheaded by the local Kurds, and his short lived movement was completely suppressed by Qavām al-Saltāna in Autumn 1921. Pisyān was a true nationalist and a brave patriot who demanded that Iran

should be freed from foreign influence. He was fluent in Turkish, French and German and interested in art and poetry.

For more details see, ^CA. Āzarī, Q.K., see also

Y. Āryan Pūr, op.cit., Vol.2, pp.352-54;
H. Makkī, op.cit., Vol.1, pp.275-303 and M. Mujtahidī, R.A.,
pp.43-45.

APPENDIX 7

MUSHĪR AL-DAWLA'S SPEECH IN THE MAJLIS

Speaking of these events in the Majlis Mushīr al-Dawla made the following statement on 22.10.1920.

"First of all I apologize for taking your time by my speech but I am obliged to tell you what I have in mind: In issue No.4 of Tūfān newspaper there is a note about the late honourable Shaykh Muhammad Khiyābānī part of which concerns my Cabinet. Since the reference is absolutely devoid of truth I think that it is necessary to give some explanation here for your information. During my time in the Cabinet all proceedings regarding Azerbaijan have been presented to the public through press statements at the proper time and you honourable members are aware of these statements. There are, however, certain new allegations made in the Tūfān newspaper which I have to refute and furthermore state that I have no connection with the affairs of Shaykh Muhammad Khiyābānī.

His intentions and his actions in Azerbaijan prior to the formation of the Cabinet are nothing to do with me, and I have no proper information about them either; at that time the authorities knew more about the circumstances. The explanation, approval and condemnation of these problems have nothing to do with my Cabinet, but the part which concerns my Cabinet must be explained.

In issue No.4 of the above mentioned newspaper there is an article which deals with the Azerbaijan problem as it manifested itself during my Cabinet. It specially mentions Mukhbir al-Saltana, and alleges that Khiyābānī was insisting that Mukhbir al-Saltana should not be sent to Azerbaijan while my Cabinet and myself were insisting that he should go.

This is not what happened and it is absolutely false. Repeated telegrams were sent for a whole month to Khiyābānī and the executive members of the insurrection committee with the knowledge of my Cabinet members: copies of these telegrams can be seen in the Cabinet of the Prime Minister and post office. They show that they told us explicitly that 'we do not accept a governor general appointed by Tehran. We do not want the central government to interfere with Azerbaijan's affairs, just give us as much money as possible'.

It is obvious that all honourable deputies would approve of a Constitutional regime, the very same Constitution that Khiyābānī, according to his supporters, demanded should be established by our Cabinet. Would such a Constitution allow governing bodies to accept the bases and principals of the decentralization and division of Iran? We said to Khiyābānī that Azerbaijan is an inseparable part of Iran. If the agreement is merely about who is to govern Azerbaijan then there is nothing to stand in the way of a solution to the Azerbaijan problem. After many suggestions and actions, we realized that they refused to listen to any logic and to accept any proper argument so we finally decided to send the governor that we thought suitable.

In this newspaper the article is written in such a way as to imply that the plot and plan for Khiyābānī's death had been drawn up in the Centre. I deny this. When the governor left Tehran for Azerbaijan we were still hopeful that the late honourable Khiyābānī would, in view of his robust common sense, take stock of the situation once the governor arrived and would extend the hand of brotherhood towards him, so that the two of them would work together. No plan and plot was drawn up here at all; the governor was also trying hard to solve the problem peacefully when he arrived. The reason that he did not succeed was because of an ultimatum handed to him by the late Khiyābānī.

Gentlemen, the points that I am making here are not only based on information from official sources; alongside official reports I was also receiving private information. I was not unaware of the situation in Azerbaijan and I know in particular that when our governor arrived he showed exceptional patience and endurance. This information is from reliable and impartial sources; if the Majlis ever wish to investigate this matter then I can provide the sources of information in detail but I will not now mention them. I repeat this again - that the allegation about a plot, which was supposedly drawn up here, is incorrect because the problems of Azerbaijan and the late Khiyābānī were not so important as some people imagine, not so very important in the eyes of the government; the government was trying to solve the problem peacefully.

The government knew well that, apart from a few people, no one in Azerbaijan agreed with the dictatorship of the late Khiyābānī and thus was not so desperate to find a solution to the problem that it was forced to draw up a plan against him. It was not a question of war that the Cabinet should waste its time on this; the aim was merely to let the whole business pass over as peacefully as possible because it was a domestic issue only involving Iran and Iranians. The governor also did his best to bring about a peaceful solution, but he did not succeed. When he arrived and received an ultimatum from Shaykh Muhammad Khiyābānī, he was obliged to use force and enlist the help of the Cossacks; the death of Khiyābānī was, as the governor states, by suicide. The events which took place proved at any rate that the government was correct in its view that the problem was not so important, for a mere 200 Cossacks were able to put down all the unrest in Tabriz. If the hearts of the Azerbaijanis were fully with Khiyābānī how could the entry of 200 Cossacks into Tabriz put an end to everything that was going on? Have you forgotten how the people of Azerbaijan supported Sattār Khān and how they resisted the forces of the central government, finally succeeding and becoming victorious?

Azerbaijan who has always seen herself as the right and strong hand of Iran, Azerbaijan who shed streams of blood to protect the boundary and nationality of Iran cannot be deceived by these kind of brilliant words.

A wise and perceptive man would know that Azerbaijan's prosperity lies only in unity and being part of Iran. Azerbaijanis are not deceived by these words, and they know that if Azerbaijan is separated from Iran she will not be able to stand on her own feet and will, sooner or later, become a part of some other country.

My Cabinet and I in front of the Majlis and on the holy Qurān take oath that we will protect the principles of the Constitution. Since our commitment was not to establish a feudal system in this country we have therefore done our duty. Now let them say whatever they like. I have made this statement to give information to the honourable members of the Majlis. After all what is written in the newspaper is directed against me in person. Since the subject is a personal matter I shall not waste any more of your time on it here, especially as I am not a good judge of myself. Nevertheless I must insist and I am sure, gentlemen, that you all agree with me, that my opponents outside the Majlis have no right to pass judgement on me. Any comment about me and the authorities must be based on unbiased and just sources."

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