

PATRIOTISM OR CONCILIATION IN SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS, 1839-1848:

LIN TSE-HSÜ AND CH'I-YING

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Lin Tse-hsu 林則徐 (1785-1850), Imperial Commissioner and fore-runner of China's resistance movement to the West.



Ch'i-ying 耆英 (d. 1858), Imperial Commissioner and pioneer of China's policy of conciliation.

FOR MY PARENTS

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INTRODUCTION

Now and Then

Every nation lives with its past, even if unaware. The Chinese remember with pride the time when they were respected as a great civilization and were a great power; they also remember with bitterness the time when they were despised as an inferior race. Chinese communists firmly believe Lenin's saying: "Imperialism means aggression and war." In their memory, imperialism from the beginning of modern Chinese history (the Opium War) first sapped China of her wealth and her people of their health, later it detached her vassal states, and eventually turned her into a "semi-colonial state."

Mao Tse-t'ung, like many other Chinese patriots in modern Chinese history, was a self-confident and a resolute character. He was fired with a burning desire to restore China's pride as a big power by adopting a bold attitude toward the Americans, even when this involved heavy risks. The attitude was reflected in many actions. In the infant years of the "People's Republic", he unhesitatingly sent a million "volunteers" to fight against the American "invasion" of Korea in 1950, when he and his associates had barely set up their regime. They played the role of "big brother" to the North Vietnamese at the 1954 Geneva Conference, and extended to it substantial aid in its war against the American-backed South Vietnamese government, despite their own pre-occupation with the Cultural

Revolution.

In spite of China's continuous resistance to American "imperialism", Chou En-lai, the late Premier, suddenly shocked the world by showing a sign of good will to the Americans in his famous "ping-pong breakthrough" in 1969. No doubt Chou shared the same hatred for the Americans as Mao felt. But after a small but real war along the frozen banks of the Ussuri River, the easternmost boundary between China and the Soviet Union in March 1969, Chou, being a pragmatist, realized that China's limited number of tanks and insufficient anti-aircraft and artillery were no match for the strong Soviet opponent. Under such circumstances, he had to swallow the insult of losing "face" to draw the United States to China's side in order to cope with the Soviet Union which had replaced the United States as China's "principal enemy." When President Nixon visited Peking in February 1972, Chou rose from his sickbed to welcome the highly esteemed guest at the Peking airport.

The British interest in China was centred more in commerce than in sovereignty. No one could deny that the British sword after the failure of the missions of Lord Macartney and Lord Amherst in 1793 and 1814 to establish normal trade relations with China, had time and again hacked away at Chinese stubbornness to cut open a path for trade and enterprise. When the news of Lin Tse-hsü's confiscation of the British stocks of opium and his confinement of the British subjects in

Canton reached Whitehall in 1840, the hawks in parliament asserted that a war would be fought anyway for the normalization of diplomatic and commercial relations as well as for the protection of British lives and property. Lord Palmerston, the then British Foreign Secretary blusteringly declared that the only way to deal with China was to give her a good beating first and explain afterwards. As a result, the British parliament decided to send expeditionary forces to Chinese waters.

In the Opium War, China suffered a serious defeat by Britain. The Sino-British treaty signed in Nanking on August 29, 1842 for the termination of the War set a precedent for other states to impose harsh and humiliating terms on China. Similar provisions were embodied in the Sino-American and Sino-Franco treaties of 1844.

In the decade after the Treaty of Nanking, the British government expressed clearly to the Chinese authorities that the British treaty rights had to be secured and British prestige maintained even though bitter anti-British sentiment was prevalent in the country.

In early 1850's, the British merchants in China, after digesting the treaty benefits from the Opium War, demanded from China more open ports, steam navigation on inland waterways, inland trade and residence and the immediate redress of local grievances. They expected their government to force open the Chinese oyster with another sword in order to gather more pearls and they

found their government helpful. As J.O.P. Bland, an Old China Hand, sometime Times correspondent in China, said British foreign policy "represents in the main the collective opinions and interests of British traders."

After the Treaty of Tientsin and the Treaty of Peking in 1858 and 1860, the British traders had obtained all the benefits which they expected from the Chinese government.

Like Mao, Lin was a man of undoubted talent and a man of determination. We know much about Lin's strong policy of suppressing the opium trade in Canton, and his exile to Ili as his punishment for precipitating war with China.

The Chinese communists pay homage to Lin Tse-hsü partly because they regard him as a patriot, partly because he was a pioneer in mobilizing the people to fight against the British invaders in the Opium War. In 1954 a monumental collection of Chinese materials on the Opium War: Ya-p'ien chan-cheng (The Opium War) was published under the editorship of Ch'i Ssu-ho (齊思和), in which Lin's patriotism and the mobilization of the people are richly recorded. Later, a film entitled "Lin Tse-hsü" was produced in 1958 in honour of this patriot. On the other hand, Ch'i-ying (耆英) (also spelt as Keying or Kiying), a Manchu grandee, the negotiator of the Treaty of Nanking, and the Imperial commissioner in charge of foreign affairs in the post-war period, has been seriously attacked as a shameless capitulationist and suppressor of popular resistance to the British.

Many modern historians have done much research on Lin. Arthur Waley's Opium War through Chinese Eyes (1958) makes Lin's diary during his mission in Canton the basis for a short discursive account of the Opium War. Hsin-pao Chang's Commissioner Lin and the Opium War (1964) is a painstaking reconstruction of the coming and early course of the conflict; however, it ends abruptly in 1840. Peter Fay's The Opium War: 1840-1842 (1975), as he himself points out, is "about the first step in the opening, not the whole process."¹ Jack Beeching's The Chinese Opium Wars (1975) is a precise description of the two Wars which relies completely upon English sources. These scholars scarcely mention the influence of Lin on his country, and specially, on the people of Kuang-tung, after his exile to Ili.

As a matter of fact, the famous incident of San-yuan-li in May 1841 (in which the people of Kuang-tung under the command of the local gentry killed several British soldiers in an attack under cover of a heavy storm), and the imperial decision to revive the militia (t'uan-lien 團練) in Kuang-tung, were strongly influenced by Lin's "patriotism", the people hailed him as a national hero and swore to continue their "struggle" against the British invaders. Here, a question deserves our attention: Did the people of Kuang-tung have greater innate predisposition to anti-foreignism than Chinese in other provinces?

A group of war advocates, usually regarded as War Party

1. Peter W. Fay, The Opium War (University of North Carolina Press, 1975), p.xii.

after

the Opium War, and mainly composed of members of the Board of Censorate in Peking, were strongly against China's submission to the British demands embodied in the Treaty of Nanking. They shared a prevailing ignorance of the military strength of the British forces, they believed by that employing the people and their militia, China would be able to cope with further British encroachments. These censors had a feeling of solidarity with Lin's resistance, and a violent hatred of the British.

On the other hand, Ch'i-ying was responsible for the management of China's foreign affairs in the post-war period. At the beginning of the Opium War, he also had been^a dedicated war advocate. But towards the end of the war he had occasion to spend some time in Central China, where first-hand observation of British arms convinced him of the necessity of concluding peace. Ch'i-ying observed that the Emperor was too obstinate in fighting the British: as soon as one soldier fell, he was determined to call another to fill his place. In order to persuade the Emperor to allow him to negotiate with the British, Ch'i-ying exaggerated the might of British weapons by saying that the range of the British cannon was up to ten to twenty li (one li is about 1/3 mile), while that of the Chinese was only a few li.)

Ch'i-ying's post-war career has not yet been treated at full length. John Fairbank's "The Manchu Appeasement Policy of 1843" (1939) has offered us much insight into Ch'i-ying's policy of conciliation from 1842 to 1844. His book, Trade and Diplomacy on

2. See Shih-liao hsün-k'an (Historical materials published thrice monthly) (Peiping: Palace Museum, 1931. Photolithographic reprint, Taipei, 1963) 35, ti, 288b-289a. I am indebted to Professor V.G. Kiernan for calling my attention to this point.

the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854 (1953) is the best diplomatic history of this period, and in it Ch'i-ying's diplomatic career from 1844 to 1848 is briefly described. Frederic Wakeman's Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861 (1966) is "An attempt to assess the social effects of the Opium war upon Kwang-tung province."³ In his book Wakeman touches on Ch'i-ying's management of foreign affairs from 1842 to 1848. Wakeman's mastery of the Chinese language is impressive, but he has been confused by certain Chinese expressions, which have misled him into some dubious conclusions.

Conciliation was the hallmark of Ch'i-ying policy in the post-war period. Like Premier Chou, Ch'i-ying was a pragmatist and a wily diplomat. He decided to build up a personal friendship with the British plenipotentiary, Sir Henry Pottinger, a bluff, straightforward administrator from India, and thereby to gain over British policy a useful influence. He believed that both sincerity and condescension were necessary in this course. Ch'i-ying sang operatic airs, played "guess-finger", drank to everyone's health at one of the banquets with Pottinger in June 1843. Such behaviour was designed to show personal warmth to the British plenipotentiary. Premier Chou behaved similarly towards President Nixon in February 1972. At one of the banquets given to the president at the People's Hall in Peking, Western reporters observed that Chou selected morsels of food from his own plate and deftly transferred them to Nixon's; a gesture common enough between close friends, but by no means a casual courtesy.

3. F. Wakeman, The Fall of Imperial China, (New York, 1975), p.262.

Apart from this, Chou insisted on drawing on his personal collection of wine when he invited the president to join him in a toast to the two countries.

Ch'i-ying's career in Canton relied heavily upon the assistance of Huang En-t'ung (黃恩彤), a Chinese whom the foreigners respected much.⁴ Both Ch'i-ying and Huang repudiated the traditional Chinese tactics of "Using barbarians to control barbarians" which Lin and his colleagues once advocated during the Opium War.

When Sir John Davis succeeded Pottinger as British plenipotentiary in the middle of 1844, the honeymoon period of Sino-British relations deteriorated. Ch'i-ying at first tried to make Davis an "intimate" friend as he had done with Pottinger, but Davis gave him the cold shoulder. From 1845 Ch'i-ying was caught between the ever-increasing pressure of Davis for British entry to the city of Canton and the stubborn resistance of the gentry and the people of Canton. When he bowed to the pressure to proclaim the opening of the city to the British in January 1846, he himself became the focus of attacks by the people in Canton and the censors in Peking. His inferior, Liu Hsin (劉濤), the Canton prefect was attacked in his office by a mob which suspected him of having arranged the entry of the British. Huang En-t'ung, was degraded by the Emperor for his open criticism of the anti-foreign sentiment of the people.

The year 1847 had been unkind to Ch'i-ying. Friction between

4. Of this Huang, a foreigner remarks: "Whang (黃恩彤)... is considered one of the most rising statesmen in China, and his manners and conversation marked him a perfect gentleman. I do not remember ever having met, even in my own country, a person of more gentle and polished manner or courteous breeding than this Chinese, so different from the majority of his countrymen in their intercourse with foreigners." See Granville G. Loch, The Closing Events of the Campaign in China (London, 1843), p.150.

the people and young British merchants had increased since 1846. In April 1847 Davis directed British warships carrying 900 soldiers to force their way up the estuary into the inland waters to force Ch'i-ying to accept the British entry to the city at the end of two years and punish those Chinese who had offended the British. Ch'i-ying's concession to Davis had tarnished his public image in Canton and lost him the imperial trust in Peking. In December 1847 war between Britain and China seemed inevitable when six British merchants were killed in Huang-chu-ch'i village near Canton, though Ch'i-ying was able to prevent a war by executing four Chinese culprits. By these acts he antagonized not only the Cantonese but many censors in Peking who accused him of being an oppressor of the people and an ally of the British. At this stage all the Emperor's trust in Ch'i-ying evaporated. In early 1848 the Emperor accepted the request of Ch'i-ying for his transfer to Peking from Canton. A new policy of relaxing control over the anti-foreign elements at Canton then began.

In this thesis, I propose to examine the genesis of Lin's policy of resistance during the Opium war and its influence contending with Ch'i-ying's conciliatory policy in the post-war period. By analysing Lin's victory and Ch'i-ying's failure, we can observe that China's management of its foreign relations during and after the Opium War suffered from pride, prejudice and hatred against the Westerners. These elements jeopardized the conciliatory policy of those open-minded persons who insisted that _____ must be _____ in order to prevent conflicts between China and the West. My basic sources of information are furnished by Chinese materials

both published and unpublished, specially the F0682 Canton archives from the yamen of the governor-general^{of} Kuang-tung and Kuang-si in the Public Record Office, London, supplemented by the rich western accounts and archives. Before embarking on a detailed scrutiny of the happenings of the period covered by this thesis, it will be well to describe these elements before the Opium War.

Pride

Chinese civilization had its origins over three thousand years ago. The ethos of Chinese civilization was based on "the way of Confucious." Way-tao (道)-meant the principles governing the nature of man and the cosmos. The Chinese believed they had devised man's most perfect system of government and society by the understanding of tao.

Unlike the countries of Europe which for centuries challenged each other, China, geographically surrounded by small states with lower culture in East Asia, did not receive much challenge from them. The Chinese viewed their empire as the sole centre of civilization and believed that they had nothing to learn or gain from other countries.

The Chinese, with the conception that they were people of the Middle Kingdom (chung-kuo 中國), had been emphasizing their cultural superiority over other nations, upon which they distinguished themselves from barbarians i (夷), who had not embraced Chinese culture. The term i is used in classical Chinese to denote: "rude and barbarian tribe," specially those tribes in the east of China in ancient times.⁵ These tribes, said Confucius: "Even with their princes were still not equal to China with their anarchy."⁶ With such a conception, the Confucian disciples developed a sinocentric way of thinking crystallized in the saying of Mencius: "I have heard of men using the doctrines of our great land to change barbarians, but I have never yet heard of any being changed by barbarians."⁷

5. Legge, Chinese Classics, 3rd ed. (Hong Kong, 1960) v.1, p.328.

6. Analect, III, 5; Legge, op.cit., v.1, p.20.

7. Mencius, IIIA, 4, 12; Legge, op.cit., v.2, p.129-130.

The Chinese classified all barbarians in different categories based on geographical considerations. With the Middle Kingdom as the centre of civilization, non-Chinese states more distant from China were presumably less civilized, their people were bound to receive less Confucian rites and were thus placed much lower in the hierarchy, like a ladder starting from China descending from higher civilization to the lower rungs of barbarism. To the Chinese idea, Europe, separated from China by vast gulf (ocean) was much more uncivilized than the small states in Asia: Korea, Vietnam (Annam) and Burma. The Europeans were supposed to be morally and intellectually uncultivated. The Chinese were not eager to know about the Europeans. Why should a superior study an inferior, as they might ask.

On the other hand, the Chinese thought that their country being a large and fertile state bounding in all good materials, had therefore no need to import the materials of outside barbarians in exchange for their own products. But materials such as tea and silk which China produces were necessities to other countries. Opinionated by this idea of material superiority, together with the prejudice of cultural superiority, the Chinese set up the tribute system as ^{the} principal assumption in her foreign relations.

The principle of the tribute system was that kings of non-Chinese states who desired to partake of the benefits from trade with China were requested to send tributary emissaries to Peking to perform the full ceremony of the kowtow—three kneelings and nine knockings of the head on the ground—before the Chinese emperor. Traders attached to the tributary missions enjoyed privileges of bring^{ing} their goods to

China duty-free. Tributary relations were costly to maintain for China, as all travel expenses and ^{the} maintenance of the tributary missions were borne by the Chinese government. Both the tributary kings and the Chinese emperors enjoyed the system. The former were eager to heighten the cultural and economical ties with the Middle Kingdom, and in the case of foreign invasion and natural disasters, China would send troops or funds to help them. As for the latter, it was an immense pleasure and satisfaction to see the myth of their universal overlordship acknowledged.

During the Ch'ing times, the Manchu emperors insisted that the time-honoured tribute system applied not only to the small states of Asia but also to all other European states that wanted to trade with China. Tempted by trading benefits, Western envoys from Portugal, Holland and Russia did perform the ceremony of kowtow, albeit reluctantly, during the imperial audience. Although Russia and the Western European nations were not formally included in the tribute system which existed between China and its vassals in Asia, the Manchu government did treat the Western missions as though they were tributary missions.

In the Ch'ing times, the Chinese kept a pride to the Western nations because they were not aware of the strong West. A couple of factors - the expansion of the empire and the scepticism of the westerners - were responsible for their unawareness.

The Manchu empire embraced a good deal more than China proper. Before 1644 the Manchu had achieved the final and definite conquest of the Mongol tribes of the north, who had for centuries raided

China and conquered Sung China. The "Ten complete victories" (Shih-ch'uan wu-kung 十全武功) of the Ch'ien-lung Emperor (1735-1796) had brought the territories of Tibet and Turkestan under the rule of the Manchu government. In Ming times, Li Pu 禮部, (Board of Rites), arranged state ceremonial sacrifices, court banquets for state occasions. It was also responsible for relations with the tributary countries. But in Ch'ing times, the affairs in the newly occupied territories were too burdensome for the Board. The Manchu government had to establish the Li-fan-yuan 理藩院, (Court of Dependencies), a special agency for the handling of Inner Asian Affairs, including control of Tibet and the Mongol tribes and princes. Before the nineteenth century, Inner Asia had been the focus of the dynasty's foreign policy and the government did not pay much attention to the West.

The scepticism of the Manchu rulers towards the Westerners had totally denied them the chance of knowing the West.

Chinese history abounds with examples of how an alien nation replaced an existing Chinese government: the Mongols conquered Sung China in 1279; the Manchus themselves overthrew Ming China in 1644. Naturally, the Manchus possessed a morbid fear of outside powers, especially those they never dealt with.

During the Ch'ing times there were two places from where the government could acquire Western knowledge: Peking and Canton. From the late Ming period until middle Ch'ing, a total of about five hundred Jesuits pioneered by Matteo Ricci came to China. They first got the Ming literati interested in maps of world which showed strange countries to the West. Unfortunately, the early Manchu emperors were not interested in Western maps, but in science subjects.

The Shun-chih Emperor (1644-1661) did keep the Jesuit Adam Schall to run the Imperial Bureau of Astronomy. The K'ang-hsi Emperor (1661-1722) himself was fond of mathematics. He employed a Jesuit to teach selected young students the subject. The Yung-cheng Emperor (1722-1735) developed a dislike for Western missionaries because some of them had taken the side of his opponents on the issue of his succession to the throne. His son, the Ch'ien-lung Emperor also disfavoured the missionaries. He refused to use them in the government departments and stopped their long-continued activities. It was a pity that the Manchu emperors and the officials were not interested in Western maps, which were important tools *for understanding the* geography of the West.

As for the situation in Canton, since 1757 maritime trade by foreign ships in China had been limited to the single port of Canton. The trade in Canton was under the "Canton system" ^{which} *under* a group of Chinese traders known as Hong merchants had monopolized trade with the West. The Hong merchants were personally responsible for the activities of foreigners. No direct communication was permitted between the foreign traders and Chinese government officials, i.e. the governor-general, the governor, and the Hoppo (Customs superintendent) at Canton.

The Westerners were confined in the "Thirteen Factories" outside the walled city of Canton. They were not allowed to learn ^{the} Chinese language. The Western merchants could only communicate with the Chinese compradors ^{and} linguists through a special language - pidgin English, a mixture of English, Portuguese and Indian words being spoken and not written, ^{which} *changed* rapidly with the passage of time.

It is not difficult to understand why the Manchu government *confined* the foreign merchants to the Factory area. There was four-fold stratification in old Chinese society: scholar-gentry, peasants, artisans and merchants. According to ^{the} Chinese conception, Western merchants were the lowest form of people in barbarian countries. How could the officials of the Middle Kingdom communicate with them?

In 1759 James Flint, a translator of ^{the} British East India Company sailed to Tientsin to hand officials there a bitter request, written in Chinese, complaining of the strict restrictions on British trade imposed by the Hoppo in Canton. The then Ch'ien-lung Emperor was shocked at Flint's presence at Tientsin and his ability of writing Chinese. He blamed the authorities in Canton and dismissed the Hoppo.

After the Flint episode, Li Shih-yao (李侍堯), the Governor-general of Liang-Kuang (Kuang-tung and Kuang-si) submitted to the Emperor for his consideration a draft of "Regulations for the Control of Foreigners". Part of the draft reads:

"...It is my humble idea that when untutored barbarians, who live far beyond the border of China, come to our country to trade, they should establish no contact with the populations, except for business purposes. Therefore, it is better to take precautionary measures to restrain them than to punish them after they have transgressed ..." 8

Li's suggestion had obviously impressed the Emperor; the latter ordered the officials in Canton to restrict dealings between Westerners and local Chinese.

The expulsion of the missionaries in Peking and the exclusion of

8. Shih-liao hsün-k'an 9, ti, 307.

Westerners in Canton had deprived the Manchu government of all opportunities of knowing what was happening among the Western countries. At the end of the eighteenth century, the British industrial and commercial bourgeoisie had gained much more political strength in parliament, which reinforced their drive towards overseas expansion. The Anglo-French conflicts in India during the eighteenth century hardly touched the Chinese ears. After the domination of India, the British brought their base for trading and military activities in the Far East considerably nearer to the Chinese coast. They were knocking at the door.

Prejudice

The prejudice of the Manchu government and its officials towards the Westerners can be observed from two rumours. The first rumour spread in Canton; the second in Peking. These two rumours had a *disastrous* influence on China's *fight* during the Opium War.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, tea gradually became a national beverage for the British. In 1793 Lord McCartney went back to Britain with an imperial edict after his mission to Peking. In the edict the Ch'ien-lung Emperor proudly stated:

"... there was no need (for China) to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own products. But tea, silk, and porcelain, which the Celestial Empire produces, are absolute necessities to European nations and to yourselves..."⁹

Rhubarb, a purgative root from ^{the} hinterland of Canton, was depicted by the Canton authorities as being physically essential to the British with their greasy meat and boiled vegetables. In 1834 Lu K'un (盧坤), the then Governor-general of Liang-kuang reported to the Tao-Kuang Emperor (1820-1850) that rhubarb, like tea, was essential to the lives of foreigners.¹⁰

Later, both tea and rhubarb were greatly exaggerated as constituting a matter of life or death for the Westerners. Chou Hsiang (周頊), censor of Kiang-nan Circuit (江南道), impressed the Emperor that if the Westerners did not take tea and rhubarb for several months, they would lose their eye-sight and their intestines would be obstructed. Chou concluded the foreigners might lose their lives

9. E. Backhouse and J.O.P. Bland, Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking (London, 1914), p.326.

10. Shih-liao hsün-k'an, 21, ti, 769.

because of the lack of those two materials.¹¹ Wei Yuan-lang (魏元琅), Governor of Fukien also held the idea that depriving the foreigners of tea and rhubarb could bring about an end to their lives.¹²

Before the outbreak of the Opium War, Canton officials had considered *using* tea and rhubarb as tools to halt the overbearing manner of the Westerners. They were quite confident that the Westerners would give in to the Chinese authorities because of the two materials. Teng T'ing-chen (滕廷楨), the Governor-general of Liang-Kuang and Wen Hsiang (文祥), the Hoppo of Canton, mentioned in their joint memorial of 2nd February, 1838: "rhubarb, tea... are necessities for the foreigners. When the foreigners defied the Chinese authorities in the thirteenth year of Chia-ching reign (1802); ninth and fourteenth years of Tao-kuang reign (1829 and 1834). Our government declared a halt in trading with them that brought them to their knees. Judging from these precedents, we believe that foreign countries could not but bow to our order."¹³

And
Why, these high-ranking officials in Canton such wrong ideas about tea and rhubarb? Restricted by the "Canton system", they were not able to communicate with the Westerners directly. Their information about the Westerners depended deeply on a group of Hong merchants and ignorant petty officers. Among them there were charlatans. As

11. See Ch'ing-tai ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo (The complete account of the management of barbarian affairs) (Peking, 1930), Tao-kuang section, 2.10a, hereafter cited as IWSM, TK.

12. IWSM, TK 4.30a.

13. IWSM, TK 2.26-3a.

Captain Charles Elliot, the chief superintendent of British trade in China during the Opium War commented: "In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, connected with foreigners, which are submitted to high Chinese authorities, their determination must be taken upon the report of low and corrupt officers and the higher functionaries are not in a situation to detect error, or to repair it when made."¹⁴

The second rumour was concerned with the physical weakness of the Westerners. Their beak noses, tawny hair, red complexion, deep eyes, long legs and thin waists are different from those of the Chinese. With prejudice, the Chinese thus belittled their functions. Among the body organs of the Westerners, their waists and legs which are tightly bounded with trousers were very much disparaged. (Chinese trousers were comparatively wider than the Western ones with much more room for legs inside to exercise.) During the Opium War, the Chinese war junks were no match for the powerful British warships. Some Chinese officials thus advocated land battle with the British by toying with such an idea. Chin Ying-lun (金應麟),^a censor in Peking remarked: "the uppers of the foreigners' bodies are protected with bovine skin that is able to resist attacks from knives and arrows of our Chinese soldiers, but their waists are unbending. Once they fall, they will not be able to stand up again."¹⁵ Cheng En-tse (程恩澤), vice-president of a department in Peking mentioned in his letter to Yuan Yuan (阮元) a grand secretariat that once the foreigners came ashore, their legs would become weak. When they fell their bodies would not be able to remain upright. When this happened, the

14. Parliamentary Papers: Additional Papers relating to China (1840), p.5.

15. IWSM, TK 41.4a.

weakest among the Chinese people would be able to use their cudgels to beat them down; and the stronger ones could easily use the spurs of their shoes to kick them down.

J.K. Fairbank says that the origin of such rumours concerning the physical weakness of the foreigners is unknown.¹⁶ But in my opinion the rumour about the weakness of Westerners' legs might have originated from the British missions. Unlike the rumour of tea and rhubarb that derived from foreign trade in Canton, this rumour was widely spread in Peking. In 1793 when Lord Macartney refused to perform ^{the} kowtow, the imperial court spread a saying that the British envoy could not perform the ceremony because his knee buckles and garters were tightly bounded with cloth. The Chinese escorts to Lord Macartney were instructed to suggest to the British envoy to remove the articles of clothing temporarily in order to fulfil the kowtow.¹⁷ However, the British envoy did not agree to do so. This might have added support to the mistaken idea of the Emperor and his courtiers. In 1816 Lord Amherst bluntly refused to perform ^{the} kowtow again. It is possible that the courtiers in order to save the dignity of their emperors could have spread the rumour that the British envoy was not able to bend their legs in order to perform kowtow, as a tributary envoy should.

16. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, I, p.20.

17. J.L. Cranmer-Byng, ed., An Embassy to China: Lord Macartney's Journal 1793-4 (London, 1962), p.98, 119.

Hatred

Although the Manchu emperors were able to resist the demands of trading benefits from the British envoys in 1793 and 1816, they were not able to thwart the smuggling of Indian opium by the British merchants.

Opium had been used as a medicine in China for over a thousand years. However, in 1620 some Formosans began mixing it with tobacco and smoking it. This practice later spread to the coastal areas of Fukien and Kuang-tung. The Chinese eventually developed their own mode of consumption by burning opium extract, a refinement of the raw stuff, over a lamp and inhaling its fumes through a pipe.

Teas and silks were the major purchases made by the British firms in Canton. The British commodities to China, mainly Indian textiles, did not alone suffice to generate enough silver dollars to buy all the teas and silks which the British merchants required. British merchant ships coming to Canton for trade had to bring more in silver dollars than in goods. The British did not want to go on paying for Chinese goods with silver. The sources of British silver were from the mines of Peru and Mexico. However, the American Revolution in 1776 cut Britain off from the Mexican silver supply. Lacking the bullion to pay for teas and silks, the British merchants and other Western merchants engaged in the large-scale smuggling of opium to China.

Opium was^a highly profitable commodity with a good sale in China.¹⁸

18. Shortly before the Opium War, William Jardine, the leading British opium dealers, disclosed in a private letter that "in the good years... gross profits were sometimes as high as \$1,000 a chest." Quoted in Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China 1800-42 (Cambridge University Press, 1951) p.105, n.2.

While the American merchants brought the Turkish opium into China, their British counterparts smuggled the Indian opium. The development of smuggling and the consumption of opium in China led to a shortage of silver that had an erosive effect on the monetary system. The sale of Chinese goods to Westerners no longer balanced Chinese purchases of Opium, and the difference was made up by the export of Chinese silver. Worst of all, the smuggled opium brought terrible calamity to the nation. At first only aristocrats and rich merchants smoked the opium. Later, court eunuchs, yamen runners, Buddhist monks and nuns and soldiers became addicts. Prohibitions of opium were decreed in 1800, 1813 and 1815, but all to no effect.

In 1821 the new Tao-kuang Emperor took strict prohibition measures by ordering the removal of the Westerners' opium ships from Canton waters. However, the smuggling continued on an ever-increasing scale.

In 1832 it was proven beyond doubt that the opium addiction in certain parts of the army had become so serious that the troops were incapable of combat. The garrison troops of Kuang-tung in that year suffered serious defeats against the Yao rebels in the area of Lien-chou 連州 (in northwest Kuang-tung). Hsi-en was appointed imperial commissioner to investigate the case. He reported to the Emperor that: "six thousand combat troops were sent (from Kuang-tung), but they were not used to the mountains; and many of the troops from all the coastal garrisons were opium smokers, and it was difficult to get any vigorous response from them." Lin Hung-pin (李鴻賓), the governor-general of that province and Liu Jung-ch'ing (劉榮慶) the provincial commander (t'i-tu 提督) were exiled to Urumchi and Ili respectively by the Emperor on charges that they failed to eradicate

the opium smoking from among their troops.¹⁹

In the late 1830's, the Manchu government officials gradually divided into two groups on the opium problem: one advocating legalization and other thorough suppression. The advocates of the first group held that legal measures however stringent, could never eliminate the use of the opium, so, in face of the constant silver outflow, it would be possible just to put a tax on opium to relieve the financial problems of the country. Those in the second group, dissatisfied with the loose and superficial policies on the existing problem, demanded that both opium dealers and addicts should be dealt with severely.

In May 1836 Wang Yueh (王瑛), a censor of Hu-Kuang Circuit (湖廣道) memorialized that the government should strictly prohibit the opium smoking among the troops; other opium smokers, the "vagabonds" could be left alone and allowed to smoke.²⁰ In June, Hsu Nai-chi (許乃濟), a minister in charge of the Court of Sacrificial Worship, supported the suggestion of Wang Yueh and advocated the legalization of opium. For Hsu reasoned that though opium smoking certainly shortened people's lives, China's population was growing so there was no need to worry that it might start to fall. He also advised a permissive policy on the cultivation of the poppy, allowing anyone who wished to do so. Hsu believed that when enough people did the cultivation, the foreign opium poppy would no longer be profitable and the foreign merchants would abandon the opium trade of their own accord.²¹

19. See the biography of Li Hung-pin in Ch'ing-shih Lieh-chuan (Biographies of the Ch'ing dynasty) (Taipei, 1962), 36:46b.

20. Liang T'ing-nan, Yueh hai-kuan chih (Gazetteer of the maritime customs of Kuang-tung) (Canton, post-1839), 18:26.

21. Details of his memorial, see IWSM, TK 1.1a-4a.

In 1838 Huang Chieh-tzu (黃鵬滋), a minister in charge of the Court of State Ceremonial, warned the Emperor that the opium ban had been ineffective in the past century. If the situation was allowed to continue, the price of silver vis a vis the other exchange medium - copper coin - would go on rising. The silver resources, which were the state's main source of revenue, would thus keep on diminishing, and the government would soon have no funds available to meet expenditure. In order to avoid this situation, he stressed that capital punishment should be inflicted upon opium addicts.²² A heated debate on the opium ban had thus begun. The Emperor sent the proposal of Huang Chieh-tzu to all the provincial governor-generals and governors to invite their opinions. The outcome was eight for the proposal and twenty against. Lin Tse-hsü, the then Governor-general of Hu-Kuang (Hupeh and Hunan) was in the minority party. Being a faithful supporter of Huang's idea, he cautioned the Emperor with his famous saying: "Opium is extremely harmful and must be relentlessly suppressed. If things are left to slide, I am afraid in a few decades, China will have no soldiers capable of resisting its enemies and insufficient silver to finance its armed force."²³ The Emperor was deeply impressed by Lin's saying. On the last day of 1838 the Emperor appointed Lin as imperial commissioner (ch'in-ch'ai ta-ch'en 欽差大臣) to Canton with command of the "water-force" in Kuang-tung to suppress the opium trade.²⁴

22. IWSM, TK 2.4a-9b.

23. Ch'i Ssu-ho, et al., eds. Ya-p'ien chan-cheng (The Opium War) (Shanghai, 1954), 2:142, hereafter cited as YPCC.

24. IWSM, TK 5.16b-17a.

PART ONE

LIN TSE-HSU'S STRONG POLICY AND ITS INFLUENCE AT CANTON

CHAPTER 1

THE COMMISSION AND LIN'S STRONG POLICY

Before his appointment in 1838 Lin was already laden with honours for civil service. Born in Hou-kuan (侯官) Fukien in 1785, Lin became a chin-shih (a successful candidate of the national civil service examination held at the imperial capital in the Ch'ing dynasty) at the age of 27 (in 1811), and he started his career as a bachelor of the Hanlin Academy in Peking. In 1820 he was appointed intendant of the Hang-Chia-Hu Circuit (杭嘉湖道) in Chekiang as an administrative official. In 1822 he was made acting salt controller in Chekiang, and he became the provincial judicial of Kiangsu in the following year. His uprightness in the judgment of cases so impressed the people that they called him "Lin Ch'ing-t'ien" (Lin, the Clear Sky).¹ At the age of 49, Lin was made governor of Kiangsu in 1832. Before his office in Kiangsu, the Emperor received him in a court audience, reminding him that the government had great expectations of him and adding that he should make himself a good governor. Lin kept his post in Kiangsu until 1837. During this period, he twice acted as governor-general of Hu-kuang (Hupeh and Hunan) staying in this post until his appointment as Imperial Commissioner to Canton on the last day of 1838.

Apart from his brilliant civil records, Lin was also famous for his work in local matters, such as sea transportation, salt administration and in particular, flood control. In 1824 even though he was still in his period of mourning over his mother's death in his

1. Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period (1644-1912) (Washington, 1944), I, 511.

home town, he was summoned by an emergency imperial decree to repair a broken dyke on the Yellow River in Kiangsu.² Again in the autumn of 1841, he was sentenced to exile in Ili, Sinkiang, as a result of his strong policy with regard to the opium trade. The Emperor delayed his exile and ordered him to hasten to Kai-feng (開封), in Honan to assist Wang Ting (王鼎), the then grand councillor, in conservancy work.³

Lin did not engage in military affairs before his imperial commission except in a coincidental case in 1823. In that year a flood of the Sung River (松江) in Kiangsu drove the stricken people to the verge of revolt. Lin, being the judicial commissioner of that province, went in one boat to plead with the people. He succeeded in quieting them and bloodshed was avoided.⁴

In the middle of 1838 Lin carried out an anti-opium programme within the territory of his viceroyalty - Hupeh and Hunan, by destroying the equipment of smokers, and arresting opium addicts. In September of the same year, Lin reported to the Emperor that in his two provinces he had searched out and confiscated some 5,500 pipes and some 12,000 Chinese ounces of the drug opium. At the same time, innumerable opium users were arrested.⁵ This achievement gave him confidence to urge the Emperor to attack the opium problem on three fronts simultaneously.

2. Hsin-pao Chang, Commission Lin and the Opium War (Harvard University Press, 1964), p.124 .

3. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, I, 513.

4. Ch'i Ssu-ho, et al. (eds.), Ya-p'ien chan-cheng (The Opium War) (Shanghai, 1954), 6:320, hereafter cited as YPC.

5. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, I, 511.

First, there should be medical care to cure the opium addicts, with a death sentence for violators; second, Chinese opium dealers had to be rounded up and punished until the domestic distribution network was completely smashed; and third, foreign stocks of opium had to be confiscated and the signing of a bond for the termination of opium smuggling by foreign merchants was indispensable.

Before his appointment as Imperial Commissioner, Lin had little experience in foreign (barbarian) affairs. However, he already had a bad impression of the British. In 1832, when the Lord Amherst, the surveying ship at Canton branch of the East India Company under the joint command of H.H. Lindsay and Charles Gutzlaff⁶ tarried along the coast of Shanghai, Kiangsu, Lin, the then governor of Kiangsu, immediately gave instructions to the commander-in-chief of that province, Kuan T'ien-p'ei (關天培) to drive off the British vessel. Lin remarked that his instructions were necessary as the barbarians were deceitful and roguish by nature; a watchful eye on them was requisite.⁷

Like other Chinese statesmen of that time, Lin did not have much knowledge about the West. He treated the Western countries outwith Chinese civilization as vassal states, not strong powers. Thus, in his imperial commission to Canton in 1839, Lin's manner towards the British was bound to be arrogant. It was difficult for such a character to sit down before^{the} negotiating table to iron out difficulties with his British counterpart, except with an inflexible and uncompromising approach.

6. Lindsay was then a merchant to East India Company. Gutzlaff was described as "the Prussian buccaneer missionary interpreter", see Arthur Waley, The Opium War through Chinese Eyes (London, 1958), p.110.

7. YPCC, 1:106, 107.

The appointment of the imperial commissionership put much psychological pressure on Lin. In Ancient Chinese society, the terms "Chih-yü chih-ên 知遇之恩" (Literally, the debt one owes to somebody who understands one and has treated one well) and "Chü-kung chin-ts'ui 鞠躬盡瘁" (Literally, to devote oneself to state affairs body and soul) were deeply involved in the relationship between the emperor and his official. Chu-ko Liang, (諸葛亮) famous premier of Shu Han (蜀漢) during the Three Kingdoms Epoch (A.D. 220-265) was at first a recluse. Later, Liu Pei (劉備), the ruler of Shu Han, went to visit him at his remote farm in Nan-tien (南田) to discuss current affairs. Liu realized that Chu-ko was a man of parts, and so he implored the latter to help his regime and offered him the post of premiership. When Liu Pei was at death's door, he asked Chu-ko to help his son to cope with the other two rival regimes (Wu 吳 and Wei 魏). Chu-ko consoled the dying ruler, saying that he had always felt that he owed the ruler a great debt for his understanding and good treatment of him, and adding that he would devote himself to help his son body and soul.

Before his mission to Canton, Lin received from the Tao-kuang Emperor similar words ^{those} to ^{those} Chu-ko received from Liu Pei who was at death's door. In one of the imperial audiences, the emotional Emperor even said to Lin with wet eyes: "How, alas, can I die and go to the shades of my imperial fathers and ancestors, until these dire evils are removed!"⁸ In order to remove the anxiety of his gracious Emperor, Lin had to fulfil his obligation to stamp out the opium trade. Even when he failed in his mission and was exiled to Ili in the middle of 1841, he did not blame the Emperor for his harsh

8. Chang, Commissioner Lin, p.120. This is a translation of Chang.

punishment, but regretted his inability to complete his job in Canton.⁹

In his mission to Canton Lin also took with him the hopes of the scholars of the chin-wen (今文), the "modern text" school. The chin-wen scholars interpreted the teachings of Confucius as being in favour of reforms. The chin-wen school rose as a protest against the Ch'eng-Chu-Li-Hsüeh 程朱理學 (the "Sung School of rationalism" by the Ch'eng brothers [Cheng Hao 程顥 and Cheng I 程頤] and Chu Hsi (朱熹)). Immanuel C.Y. Hsü describes it thus:

"The Sung school of Rationalism (li-hsüeh), commonly known in the Western world as Neo-Confucianism, was a syncretic philosophy which contained elements of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, and which provided a system of metaphysics to sanction the old Confucian moral order. Its most eminent apostles were Ch'eng Hao (1031-85), Ch'eng I (1032-1107), and Chu Hsi (1130-1200). These Sung scholars advanced the dual concepts of the rational principle (li) and its material manifestation (ch'i). According to this school, everything has a rational principle for its being. "All things under heaven," Ch'eng I wrote, "can be understood in the light of their (rational) principle. As there are things, there must be their specific (rational) principles. One thing necessarily has one principle." Thus, a tree or a blade of grass has its own rational principle which makes it what it is. There is only one universal rational principle, although there are many manifestations of it. For instance, the concept of jen, often translated as humanity of benevolence, is manifested in filial piety, in affection to one's children, in loyalty to one's ruler, etc. Thus, there is only one jen but many manifestations." 10

9. Hsiao I-shan, Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih (General history of the Ch'ing period), II, 993.

10. Hsü, Rise, p.106.

The Ch'eng-Chu Li-hsueh became the main stream of intellectual thinking because of the support of K'ang-hsi Emperor (1662-1722), who honoured Chu Hsi as a great philosopher. The support of course had a political motive, for Chu Hsi's ideas of the importance of honouring the ruler were helpful for the Manchu domination of the state. Chu Hsi's learning was even more emphasized by the high-handed Yung-cheng Emperor (1723-35). In 1729 Hsieh Chi-shih (謝濟世) was sentenced to hard labour by the Emperor for his criticism of the learning of Chu Hsi and the Ch'eng brothers.¹¹ Time-serving scholars in the country therefore flocked to study the philosophy of the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi.¹²

On the other hand, the cruel suppression of anti-Manchu thinking in the literary inquisitions during the reigns of Yung-cheng and Ch'ien-lung was a nightmare to scholars in later generations. These scholars found refuge in the Li-hsueh which was politically safe. They spent all their time and energy in antiquarian research. As a result, no scholars paid attention to current political affairs.

The chin-wen learning was pioneered by Chung³ Ts'un-yu (莊存與) (1719-1788), who emphasized the reformist spirit as shown in the Kung-yang Commentary of the Spring and Autumn Annals of Confucius. The learning after its development by Liu Feng-lu 劉逢祿 (1776-1829) stressed the spirit of "to-ku kai-chih 託古改制" (literally, finding in antiquity the sanction for present-day changes). In the 1830s the chin-wen

11. For details of Hsieh's life, see Hummel, Eminent Chinese, I, 306-307.

12. Hsü, Rise, p.44.

scholars advocated the pursuit of knowledge for practical use.¹³ They criticized the scholars of Li-hsüeh, who being immersed in ancient textual research and commentaries had lost contact with the reality of society and deprived the country of practical leadership.

Lin belonged to the chin-wen school. When he took office in Peking (1811-1818), he joined the "Hsiao-han Shih-she 消寒詩社" (Poetry Club Concerning the Method of Dispersing Poverty) which was formed by chin-wen scholars in Peking in 1814. The poetry club consisted of reformers and officials with progressive views. They made a conscious effort to solve economic and social problems. It is interesting to note that there was no Manchu in that poetry club in Peking which was the very heart of the Manchu administration.

In 1830 Lin, together with Kung Tzu-chen (龔自珍) and Wei-yuan (魏源) regenerated the "Hsiao-han Shih-she" and changed its name to the "Hsuan-nan Poetry-Club (宣南詩社)". The new poetry club became the "think-tank" of the chin-wen scholars who shared a common feeling that reforms in both social and economic affairs were urgently needed. Abolition of the evil opium traffic was the most serious issue of all. In my opinion, among the "Hsuan-nan" members by this time there had emerged the patriotic spirit of the early Ch'ing nationalist, Ku Yen-wu 顧炎武 (1613-1682), who cried out for the growth of the national consciousness which was lacking among the li-hsüeh scholars, saying that: "The rise and fall of a nation is the concern of every citizen."

In one sense the imperial commissionership of Lin was the first success of the "Hsuan-nan". If Lin succeeded in stamping out the

13. Chang, Commissioner Lin, p.123.

opium traffic, the members of the poetry club would earn the Emperor's confidence and more of his support for their reforms in other areas, such as local administration, land and taxation systems and military organization.

Lin's mission to Canton was blessed by all his "Hsuan-nan" collaborators, especially by Kung Tzu-chen who was his bosom friend and co-founder of the poetry club. When Kung heard of Lin's mission, he expressed his eagerness to go with Lin to Canton. As it was impossible for Kung to join the imperial commission, he wrote two letters to Lin, suggesting to him possible measures for abolishing the opium trade.¹⁴ Kung also wrote a parting poem for the Imperial Commissioner. He praised ^{the} courage and righteousness of Lin in taking up such a meaningful and difficult mission, adding that the future of the nation depended upon him. Kung wished that he could stamp out the opium traffic so that the outflow of the silver could be stopped; if the corresponding rise in commodity prices (in the eighteen provinces) of the empire could be controlled, then the Chinese people would be able to enjoy peaceful and prosperous lives.¹⁵

We can understand how Lin must have felt under the shadow of the gracious appointment of the Emperor, and with the blessing of his "Hsuan-nan" collaborators. Before he started his journey to Canton on 8th January 1839, he wrote to a friend that he would exert himself

14. For details of Kung's letter, see Chang, Commissioner Lin, p.126-127.

15. Feng Yu-lan, "Ya-p'ien chan-chang yü Lin Tse-hsü" (The Opium War and Lin Tse-hsü), Chung-kuo chin-tai ssu-hsiang shih lun-wen chi (Collected essays on modern Chinese intellectual history) (Shanghai, 1958), p.6.

fully in the matter of eradicating the evil opium traffic, adding that he was ignoring all the negative results which might befall him in his mission.¹⁶

After the appointment of Lin as the Imperial Commissioner, the Emperor sent an edict to Teng Ting-chen, the Governor-general of Liangkuang, and I-liang, a Manchu, the Governor of Kuang-tung, to demand full support for Lin's mission.¹⁷

In the great debate in 1838, Teng supported the proposal of Huang Chueh-tzu that the opium traffic should be abolished, but he did not agree that capital punishment should be inflicted on the Chinese smokers. Teng suggested punishing the smokers by tattooing the face on the left cheek with four Chinese characters, "Hsi-shih ya-p'ien 吸食鴉片" (smoking opium). If the offenders smoked again, they should be flogged and tattooed with another two characters "Tsai-fan 再犯" (a second-time offender), or "San-fan 三犯" (a third-time offender) on their right cheek. For those repeated offenders, Teng deemed it right to be exiled to Sinkiang.¹⁸ I-liang held the same idea on the punishment of the smokers. He also did not agree with capital punishment.¹⁹

As a matter of fact, Teng had been ordered by the Peking government to stamp out opium and to devise a long-range plan of control in

16. Chen Shêng-lin, "Lin Tse-hsü ti i-shêng" (The life of Lin Tse-hsü), Chung-kuo chin-tai jen-wu lun-ts'ung (Collection of articles on modern Chinese personalities) (Peking, 1965), p.6.

17. IWSM, TK 5.16b-17b; YPCG, 6:320.

18. IWSM, TK 5.2b-3a.

19. IWSM, TK 5.6a.

September, 1836. Within one year Teng had prosecuted many Chinese opium dealers,^{and} many opium addicts had been arrested.²⁰ At the same time, Teng had destroyed a ^{deal} great of "fast crabs" and the native smuggling networks outside Canton. However, Teng's achievement proved a humble one in comparison with Lin's. By mobilizing and organizing the gentry and literati to assist in his anti-opium campaign, Lin arrested 1,600 opium violators and confiscated 28,845 catties of opium and 42,741 opium pipes within his first nine weeks in Canton. In the following seven weeks, 192 more violators were arrested and 11,000 catties of opium and 27,538 opium pipes were confiscated. In sixteen weeks Lin arrested five times as many opium violators and confiscated seven times as many opium pipes as Teng had done in three years.²¹

After his arrival at Canton, Lin's efforts were directed first to forcing the surrender of British stocks of opium and then to eliminating the source of the British imports.

In the first place, Lin told the British merchants that their import of opium was illegal and immoral. He requested that all the opium should be surrendered and none should be concealed.²² Later, Lin used moral remonstrances in a letter to the Queen of England: "I have heard that the smoking of opium is very strictly forbidden by your country; that is because the harm caused by opium is clearly

20. Teng arrested about 345 opium addicts but did not inflict serious punishment on them. See Chinese Repository. E.C. Bridgman and S. Wells Williams, ed. (Macao or Canton, 1832-1851), 7:112,232, 336, hereafter cited as CR.

21. See Chang, Commissioner Lin, p.129.

22. Li Chien-mung, The Political History of China 1840-1928, tr. and ed. by Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls (Princeton, 1956), p.30.

understood. Since it is not permitted to do harm to your own country, then even less should you let it be passed on to the harm of other countries - how much less to China."²³ When these methods did not succeed in bringing about the surrender of British opium, Lin decided to take coercive measures.

Lin knew the important role of the Hong merchants in the business transactions of the Canton trade. When foreign merchants came to trade with China, the Hong merchants offered them compradores, linguists, shroffs,²⁴ and servants. Also, they managed the selling of foreign commodities and the purchase of Chinese goods.²⁵ The British merchants alone could not do their trade with China without the Hong merchants. When the British ignored the request of Lin, the angry Imperial Commissioner threatened to decapitate the two leading hong merchants, Howqua (伍浩官) and Mowqua²⁶ (盧茂官). The British merchants gave in and surrendered 1,036 chests of opium. Lin of course was not satisfied with such a small amount of opium. He informed the British that until they had completely surrendered their opium, they would not be allowed to leave Canton. Garrison troops were ordered to barricade the factory area, and gunboats were sent to patrol the river in front of the factories.²⁷

23. Teng, S.Y., and J.K. Fairbank., China's Response to the West (Harvard University Press, 1954), I, 25.

24. Shroff - an Indian word for an old-style banker. For detailed description, see Chang, Commissioner Lin, p.234, n.32.

25. Hsü, Rise, p.190.

26. Lin was hostile to the Hong merchants because they supported repealing of the opium prohibition in 1836, and dealt with the opium traffic at Canton. See Li, Political History, p.28.

27. CR, 7:621.

During the siege of the factories, Lin demanded Lancelot Dent, the alleged leader of the opium trade, as a hostage, but the British refused to hand over their countryman. On 24th March, Charles Elliot, the British superintendent of trade, tried to rescue the confined merchants.²⁸ The troops on guard allowed him to enter the factory, but he was not permitted to leave. When all the British merchants were confined with their leader, Lin then ordered the withdrawal of the Chinese compradores and servants from the factory and informed Elliot that the stoppage of trade would forever be in force. Elliot wrote a letter to Lin requesting passports for the British to Macao, but he got the reply that until the opium was completely surrendered, his request would not be considered. It seemed to Elliot that surrender of the opium would relieve the weary confined British merchants and make possible the continuation of the trade. On 27th March, Elliot ordered the British merchants to give up all their opium to Lin, pledging them that he himself and the Her Britannic Majesty's Government would be responsible for their loss.²⁹ When the total number of 21,306 chests of opium were surrendered, Lin allowed the British to leave the factory. All the British subjects thus took refuge in Macao.

Lin's achievement in forcing the surrender of opium was that he

28. CR, 7:623-625.

29. Chang, Commissioner Lin, p.264-265.

made full use of the available Chinese forces. He ordered the soldiers to blockade the factory, but reminded them not to stir up trouble. After the complete surrender of the opium from the British merchants, he reported to the Emperor with satisfaction: "Our policy is to control the moving with the quiet, and to be rigorous without resorting to any offensive action. But the barbarians, revering the Virtue of the Emperor and dreading his Authority, already have begun to tremble."³⁰

The surrendered chests of opium were publicly destroyed between 3rd June and 5th June, on a beach at Bogue, with foreigners among the many spectators.³¹ At this time Lin started to eliminate the source of the opium imports. He insisted that the captain of each foreign merchant ship entering Whampoa (厦 門), the port at Canton should sign a bond that his ship would never carry opium to China. Lin made it clear that if the foreign captains broke the pledge, "the cargo will be confiscated, and the persons involved will receive due punishment according to law."³²

Elliot considered the signing of the bond to be intolerable: punishments under the Manchu code had a touch of brutality—beating with the light and the heavy bamboo, transportation, banishment and death

30. IWSM, TK 6.13b-14a.

31. Jack Beeching, The Chinese Opium Wars (London, 1975), p.84-85.

32. CR, 7:648.

by strangulation or decapitation. Elliot did not approve that the merchants should individually sign the bond.

On 7th July a critical incident occurred at Chien-sha-tsui, (尖沙嘴) Kowloon, in which a Chinese villager, named Lin Wei-hsi (林維喜) was beaten so badly by a group of British sailors in a quarrel over a wine order that he died the following day.³³ Lin repeatedly demanded the surrender of the culprits, but Elliot refused to submit British subjects to Chinese law. Elliot organized a navy court aboard the Fort William, and himself acted as judge in the trial of the British suspects. Lin argued that since the murder was committed in Chinese territory where British jurisdiction was not recognized, the culprits should be surrendered and tried by a Chinese court. However, Elliot did not surrender the culprits, saying that he was not able to find out the murderer.

Elliot's reply made Lin very indignant. Lin decided to expel all the British subjects who took refuge in Macao after the siege of factories ordered by Lin in March as a reprisal. In an edict to the Governor of Macao, he ordered the latter to order all the Portuguese who had rented their houses to the British, to oblige them to quit. But his edict added: "So soon as the English be brought to repentance, and deliver up the murderer ... you can then rent their houses as heretofore."³⁴ The departure of all British subjects from Macao was demanded by the Portuguese governor. On 26th August, the British took refuge in their ships and some of them left for Hong Kong. Although

33. CR, 8:180.

34. Parliamentary Papers (Blue Books). Correspondence Relating to China (1840), p.438, hereafter cited as PP: China Corr.

they later requested the permission of the Portuguese governor to move back to Macao, the governor refused their request under the pretext of preserving strict neutrality.³⁵

In addition, the supplies of food and water were cut off because of Elliot's refusal to give up the murderer. The springs along the coast were poisoned. Driven by hunger and thirst, Elliot ordered Gutzlaff, to lead three armed vessels - his cutter Louisa, together with schooner-rigged Pearl and the Volage's pinnace - to make their way to Kowloon to demand provisions. Three large Chinese war junks appeared to greet the British vessels; the battery on shore was also ready for conflict.

Gutzlaff, unarmed, went ashore to try to present two letters written in Chinese to the Chinese officials. The first letter warned the officials that if the British were not supplied with food, the officials were bound to suffer reprisals. The second was addressed to the natives on the coast urging them not to poison the springs of fresh water. The Chinese officials told Gutzlaff that they lacked authority to accept the British letters.

In the afternoon, Elliot sent the Chinese officials an ultimatum: if the British did not get supplies within half an hour, they would

35. The Portuguese obeyed Lin's order to expel the British subjects from Macao because the sovereignty of Macao at that time still belonged to Chinese government (China officially lost her sovereignty over Macao after the murder of Portuguese Governor Amral (in Macao) by Chinese aggressors in August, 1849). Hostilities between China and Portugal at that time would affect the political situation of Macao. Besides, Lin might have declared the stoppage of trade with the Portuguese if they had not expelled the British from the island.

sink the junks. When the full thirty minutes had expired, the British fired the first shot of the yet undeclared Opium War. The fight lasted till two o'clock in the morning. Both the Chinese and the British suffered minor damage on their vessels. But Lin exaggerated the victory on the Chinese side. In his report to the Emperor, he said that a two-mast British ship had been sunk and several British marines were shot dead by the Chinese water-force.³⁶ On hearing the report of the Chinese victory on 4th September, the Emperor instructed Lin: "Since such action (in Kowloon) had taken place already, weakness should not be shown. It is not our worry that you might be reckless, but we want to warn you not to be timid."³⁷

In retrospect, Lin's own will had caused the coercive measures in the abolition of opium. Lin was firmly of the idea that the greed of the barbarians was boundless. A short time after his arrival at Canton he expressed his opinion about the nature of the barbarians in one of his reports: "If we hold firm in our position (by one [Chinese] centimeter), they will stay where they are if we yield one step, they will move one step. The nature of the barbarians is unpredictable and changeable."³⁸ Later, Lin cautioned the Emperor

36. IWSM, TK 8.15a.

37. IWSM, TK 8.17b.

38. IWSM, TK 8.27b. The War Party members in the post-war period were influenced by this idea. Take Hsü Kuang-chin as an example, he thought that China's appeasement policy in the post-war period was out of question. Since "the barbarian's nature is to covet Profit." He continued, "no matter what China does, the barbarians would continue to demand more and more territory and resources."

that if the government was not able to startle the barbarians, once the barbarians of one country had succeeded in benefiting from the empire, other barbarians would follow their example and demand benefit from the country.³⁹

Lin shared with his contemporaries the view that the Canton trade was beneficial to the foreign merchants, but not to the Chinese people. Besides, he^{also} believed that the tea and rhubarb were essential to the health and the livelihood of the foreigners. In his letter to Queen Victoria in 1839, he said: "Take tea and rhubarb for example, the foreign countries cannot get along for a single day without them. If China cuts off these benefits with no sympathy for those who are to suffer, then what can the barbarians rely upon to keep themselves alive?"⁴⁰ In a joint memorial with Teng, in March 1839 Lin told the Emperor: "Tea and rhubarb are basic needs for the foreigners ... if such exports were suspended, we would bring about the end of their lives and retrieve the right of making profit."⁴¹ Lin could not allow the British merchants to come to covet China's wealth and destroy the lives of the Chinese people with their opium. When the British refused to surrender their stocks of opium and sign the bond, Lin did not hesitate to order the "forcible detention" of the factories in order to clip the wings of the arrogant British merchants.

As for the dispute over the murder of Lin Wei-hsi, Lin was convinced that the British merchants, while enjoying enormous profit

39. IWSM, TK 16.21a.

40. Teng, China's Response, p.23.

41. YPCC, 2:144, 148.

from the Chinese trade, should be regulated by Chinese government and laws.⁴² Lin had already reminded the merchants on 18th March, 1839 that since the merchants had come into the territory of China, they should ^{be} pay ⁺ obedience to its laws and statutes, equally with the natives of the land. After the murder of Lin Wei-hsi, Lin emphasized the Chinese code that: "He who kills a man must pay the penalty of life." From the point of view of China's sovereignty, Lin's demand for the British culprits was rightful and lawful.

Elliot's refusal to give up the murderers was not surprising. In 1837, when two lascars were accused of wounding Chinese subjects, Elliot refused to surrender the two attackers. He wrote to Lord Palmerston on 20 September, 1837: "They^(the lascars) have been in my custody ever since; and your lordship may be assured that I will never give them up to any other form of trial than that to which I have pledged myself, namely, a trial according to the forms of British laws."⁴³ Yao T'ing-fang (姚廷芳) had mentioned in his book on Opium War that in the nineteenth century when foreign sailors, especially the Portuguese sailors, caused harm or death to natives, the Chinese authorities always insisted on the surrender of the culprits to be tried according to the Chinese laws. Eventually, the foreigners learned how to use money to smooth over a homicide. They gave money to the victims' families and asked them not to take the lawsuits to the murderers. At the same time, they bribed the Chinese authorities not to take

42. Lin estimated that the British merchants could obtain 300% of profit by selling their commodities in China. See IWSM, TK 6.30a.

43. H.B. Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (Shanghai, 1910), p.244.

official action to investigate the cases.⁴⁴ Elliot took a leaf out of the Portuguese book to smooth over the murder of Lin Wei-hsi. After the murder, he sailed to the village where the murder had taken place, handing out \$1500 to the family of the victim; \$200 as a "reward for evidence convicting the real murder", \$100 to distribute among the villagers, and \$400 to bribe local officials.⁴⁵

H.B. Morse has impressed on us that the Tao-kuang Emperor took a "stern policy of repression" as regards the opium trade, adding "of all the problems he (the Emperor) had to deal with, none exceeded in importance the opium question, and on this he showed no hesitation."⁴⁶

Commissioner Lin had more unrelenting vigour in the abolition of the opium trade than the Emperor. When Lin ordered the foreign merchants to surrender their opium stocks on 18th March 1839, he stated resolutely: "I will not leave Canton until the flow of opium is stemmed. I have solemnly pledged to see this matter satisfactorily dealt with and nothing can obstruct me in this respect."⁴⁷

However, the Emperor after Lin's success in confiscating 21,306 chests of British opium felt that this was already a great achievement. He feared that Lin's further

44. Yao T'ing-fang, Ya-p'ien chan-cheng yu Tao-kuang huang-ti, Lin Tse-hsü, Ch'i-shan, Ch'i-ying (The Opium war and the Tao-kuang Emperor, Lin Tse-hsü, Ch'i-shan and Ch'i-ying) (Taipei, 1970), I, 192.

45. Beeching, Opium wars, p.88.

46. Morse, International Relations, p.214.

47. YPCG, 2:243-244.

coercive measures on British opium traders might eventually stir up frontier conflict. On 22nd April, he issued an edict to Lin urging the latter to leave Canton for Nanking to take up his new appointment as governor-general of Liang-kiang. Eventually, Lin insisted on remaining in Canton to carry out the thorough eradication of the opium trade.⁴⁸

48. YPCC, 2:103, 147-149.

CHAPTER 2

THE DIFFICULTIES OF LIN AND THE USE OF "WATER-BRAVES"

In October, 1839 Lin's anti-opium campaign was very close to full success, when Mr. Warner the British captain of the merchant ship, the Thomas Couttes entered Whampoa to trade after signing of the following bond:

A truly and willing bond¹

The foreigner commander of ship belong to..... under..... consignment, present this to His Excellency the Great Government of Heavenly Dynesty, and certificate that the said ship carry goods come and trade in Canton; I, with my officer, and the whole crew are all dreadfully obey the new laws of the Chinese Majesty, that they dare not bring any opium; if one little bit of opium was found out in any part of my ship by examination, I am willingly deliver up the transgressor, and he shall be punished to death according to the correctness law of the Government of Heavenly Dynesty; both my ship and goods are to be confiscated to Chinese Officer; but if there found no opium on my ship by examination, then I beg your Excellency's favor permit my ship enter to Whampoa and trade as usual; so if there are distinguish between good and bad, then I am willingly submit to Your Excellency: and I now give this bond as a true certificate of the same,

Heavenly Dynesty, Taou-Kwang

year..... moon..... day,

Name of Captain " Ship " " Officer...

Warner's action had influenced another British merchant Mr. Danne the captain of Royal Saxon^{to} sign the same bond in the following

1. CR, 8:327.

October, intending to enter Whampoa for trade shortly. More British merchants gathered their ships at Ling-ting Island 伶仃島 (at the mouth of Pearl River), attacking a wait-and-see policy. On 25th October Elliot received a peremptory edict from Lin for the immediate surrender of the murderers of Lin Wei-hsi, and demanding that the ships gathering at Ling-ting^{Island} should either enter to trade or sail away, otherwise the Chinese authorities would use fire-rafts to burn them.²

Elliot responded to Lin's edict by ordering Captain Smith to lead a fleet as a precaution to Ch'uen-pi (穿鼻) outside the Bogue. At the same time, Lin instructed Kuan T'ien-pai to send war junks there to watch the British fleet.

On 3rd November when the Royal Saxon was approaching Whampoa, Captain Smith despatched two war ships to obstruct her. A shot was fired across her bow from Captain Smith's Volage. Kuan, trying to protect the Royal Saxon responded with shots. The naval engagement lasted in two hours at Ch'uen-pi. Of the twenty-nine Chinese war junks, one was blown to pieces immediately, three were sunk, and several more were seriously damaged, but the British ships did not suffer serious damage.³

After the Ch'uen-pi conflict, Elliot ordered attacks on Kuang-yang (官場), in Kowloon six times from 4th to 13th November, 1839.⁴ The Emperor was already angry on account of the British action in the

2. Morse, International Relations, p.245.

3. CR, 8:491-493; cf. IWSM, TK 8.29a-30b.

4. IWSM, TK 8.32a-35b.

Kowloon clash on 4th September. This time he ordered hostilities against the British in an edict: "Lin Tse-hsü and his colleagues are hereby enjoined to consider the present situation at Canton, and to bring about the stoppage of the trade with the British. All the ships of that country should be driven out from the port. Do not require them to sign the bond any more. Nor is it worth while to ask them to surrender the offender in the murder of the native."⁵

On 5th January, 1840 Lin carried out the imperial edict and proclaimed the formal closure of the port of Canton and the stoppage of British trade. The British ships in Lingting Island were ordered to leave, but the British captains turned a deaf ear to the order. They continued to anchor their ships there under the armed protection of the Volage and the Hyacinth.⁶

By the end of January Lin received an imperial edict, ordering him to take over the governor-generalship of Liang-kuang from Teng T'ing-chen while the latter was ordered to leave Nanking to take up the new post.⁷ War clouds were getting thicker in Canton. But was Lin's confidence in the on-going confrontation with the British getting greater?

Lin faced two problems in contending with the British. The first one was the weakness of the "water-force" of Kuang-tung which the Emperor entrusted to him in his imperial commission.

5. IWSM, TK 8.36b.

6. CR, 8:442.

7. Tung Hua Lu (The record of the Tung-hua [gate] .) (Peking, 1887), Tao-kuang period, 40:6.

The "water force" of Kuang-tung was a fleet of various size of old junks. One-mast junks were the backbone of the force. These junks were made of sort of hard timber called t'ieh-li-mu (鐵力木). Each of these junks had ten guns. The defect of the junks was that the hull was too thin. When they sailed in the high seas, the vessels could easily be shaken by waves. Besides, the sailors found it difficult to fire accurately at their targets.⁸ The "water-force" was mainly designed for inland-river patrols and anti-pirate operations along the coast.

Like "water-forces" in other coastal provinces, the "water-force" of Kuangtung was a subordinate part of the provincial organized Chinese Green Banner troops.⁹ It had nine grades of officers from admiral to sub-lieutenant. The admiral was under the instruction of the Governor-general.¹⁰ Kuan T'ien-p'ei, the admiral of the "water-force" of Kuangtung was a dutiful and brave old man. Before he took charge of the "water-force", he had been the commander-in-chief of Su-Sung Circuit (蘇松道) of Kiangsu. At that time, he became acquainted with Lin who was then the governor of Kiangsu. The admiral was famous for his clemency to his inferiors, but this made it hard for him to discipline them.¹¹

Before his arrival at Canton, Lin had already heard of the

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8. Juan Yuan, ed., Kuang-tung t'ung-chih (Gazetteer of Kuangtung) (compiled 1818, reprinted 1864), 124:2434-2435, passim. More information concerning the Chinese fleet can be obtained from Yukien (a Mongol), the then governor-general of Liang-Kiang in 1841. He once told the Emperor that the war junks were equipped with bamboo masts and wooden anchors. See IWSM, TK 20.11b-12a.
 9. John I. Rawlinson, China's Struggle for Naval Development 1839-1895 (Harvard University Press, 1967), p.106.
 10. Wang Hsien-ch'ien, comp. Tung-hua hsü-lu (Continuation of the record of the Tung-hua (gate)) (editor's preface 1884), Tao-kuang period, v. 38.
 11. IWSM, TK 19.13a.

corruption in the "water-force": the members accepted bribes from opium smugglers to smooth the opium traffic; the officers submitted regularly to the local government opium and silver provided by smugglers. They got promotion from the pretended accomplishments. Worst of all, Lin found out that many of the members of the force were opium addicts. He remarked: "... the men (marines) remain on board with nothing to do. One or two fill in the time by having a pipe of opium, and soon the rest follow suit... It happens, too, that when in the course of their duties they capture a cargo of opium, they do not hand the whole of it over to the authorities, but abuse their official capacity by keeping some of it for themselves, either for their own use or to sell..."¹² Shortly after his arrival in Canton, Lin personally tried many of those corrupt officers of the "water-force" and seriously punished them. Afterwards, he put the force directly under the command of his own men, and planted detectives in the midst of the crews to try to stop their corruption.¹³

In order to acquire information about the West Lin organized a staff of translators to collect and translate European language materials. From the translations of the Canton Press and the Chinese Repository, Lin learned that the foreigners held a low opinion of the "water-force." The "water-force" in return feared the prestige of Britain. Lin complained to the Emperor that the "water-force" was not able to drive out the British ships in certain waters where the foreign

12. Arthur Waley, The Opium War through Chinese Eyes (London, 1958), p.26. This is a translation of Waley.

13. YPCC, 2:168.

vessels had never officially been permitted to pass; occasionally, the British ships threatened the junks of the "water-force" with their guns in those restricted areas when the latter tried to approach them.¹⁴

The second of Lin's problems was the lack of funds for warfare with the British. Before his appointment to Canton, Lin's contribution to local affairs such as improving dams, dykes and various forms of social relief were achieved by his hard work with the local people.

When Lin was the governor of Kiangsu in early 1832, the people of that province were suffering from a flood disaster. Lin could not forget when he petitioned to the Emperor for the postponement of the tax collection owing to the natural disaster, the Emperor approved his request with remarks that the taxation was very important to the government; Lin should work hard against the difficulties instead of petitioning postponement of taxation.¹⁵ Lin then struggled with the repair work by raising funds from the donation of the local merchants and wealthy gentry.

The Emperor was notorious for his meanness. His imperial gown was badly darned, but he refused to change it for a new one. The Emperor limited annual expenditure for the palace to 200,000 taels which made it difficult for the palace keeper (warden) to run the huge place. The Peking opera had been a favorite of the Emperor. But when he realized that it was costly to perform, he gave it up.¹⁶ The

14. IWSM, TK 7.10b.

15. See Chen Shêng-lin, "Lin Tse-hsü ti i-shang" in Chung-kuo chin-tai jen-wu lun-ts'ung, p.2.

16. See Chiang T'ing-fu, "Chung-kuo yü chin-tai shih-chieh ti ta-pien-chü (China and the great changes of the modern world), in Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo wu-shih nien wen-hsien (Collection of materials on the origins of the Chinese Republic), First series, v.3, p.43.

Emperor also abstained from expensive foodstuffs. Early Ch'ing rulers always gifted their *favoured* officials and eunuchs with precious materials such as gold, silver or pearls. But such *officials and* ^{eunuchs} during the Tao-kuang reign could only receive satin, porcelain. Sometimes, they even received fruits as gifts from their Emperor.¹⁷

It is not difficult to understand that the thrifty Emperor highly appreciated the ability of Lin and even hailed him as the most capable official in the empire as Lin was able to fulfil difficult obligations by himself without asking for funds from local or central governments.

The Emperor simply did not have the conception that war is made with money. He should have realized that his grandfather, Ch'ien-lung Emperor achieved the "Ten Complete Victories 十全武功" by spending 600 million taels; his father the Chia-ching Emperor used up 200 million taels to put down the White Lotus Revolt. Unfortunately, when Lin needed to struggle against his strong British opponents during the Opium War, the Emperor did not give him financial help.

After the surrender of the British opium in April 1839, Lin sent a report to the Emperor requesting imperial approval to allow him to grant five catties of tea to each chest of surrendered opium as compensation to the British merchants. He mentioned that, ^{the money} for the tea would not be taken from the government treasury but would be contributed by Teng, I-liang and himself.¹⁸ After the Chuen-pi battle, Lin set up a defence scheme and requested the Emperor to permit him to draw funds from the local treasury to support it. The Emperor approved his

17. Fan Wen-lan, Chung-kuo chin-tai shih (*History of modern China*), v. 1, p. 33.

18. IWSM, TK 6.15b-16a.

scheme but nevertheless did not allow him to take money from the treasury.¹⁹ Since then, Lin did not again petition for funds from the Emperor. Later, when the War with Britain caused the Emperor to spend much money on coastal defence, Lin was harshly accused by the Emperor for financial reasons. The angry Emperor sent an edict to the Grand Secretariat: "Internally, they (Lin and Teng) were not able to wipe out the outlaws (opium smokers and smugglers); externally they were not able to eliminate the opium source. The English barbarian ships came to tarry along our coast this year. As a result, such provinces as Fukien, Chekiang, Kiangsu, Shantung, Chihli, and Mukden, made haste to collect troops for resistance, and that resulted in vast military expenditure and waste of men. All these were caused by the incompetency of Lin Tse-hsü and his colleagues."²⁰ Again on 24th September Lin reported to the Emperor that if China had used one-tenth of the Canton customs revenue for making gunboats she would have no difficulty in tackling the barbarian problem. The imperial *vermilion* (硃批) on his proposal was: "All nonsense."²¹

In January, 1840 Lin failed to carry out the imperial instruction to drive the British ships off the Lingting Island with the feeble "water-force". He gave the Emperor an unconvincing reason for not taking naval action: "If we send the whole fleet of our "water-force"

19. Chiang T'ing-fu, "Ch'i-shan yü ya-p'ien chan-cheng", in *Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo wu-shih nien wen-hsien*, First series, v.4, p.110. (Ch'i-shan and the Opium War),

20. *IWSM*, TK 15.11b.

21. *YPCC*, 4:67-68.

to the outer ocean to drive off the foreign ships, there will be no problem about success. We can even destroy them without much difficulty. But our boats, after being sent out to sea, would not be able to return immediately... the ocean is of high waves and changeable winds... if one or two of our boats meet accidents, what we achieve will not be worth our loss."²² In fact, the "water-force" had proved powerless to drive the British ships off Nan-ao (off eastern Kuangtung), where foreign vessels had never been officially permitted to stay, in June 1839. Lin was angry with the impotence of the force and he requested the emperor to dismiss some of its high-ranking officers.²³

Lin learned from the translations of Western materials, that the British feared coastal pirates and Tanka people (boat dwellers) the most hardy and venturesome classes at Canton.²⁴

When Lin urged Elliot to surrender the British opium in 1839, he warned Elliot that coastal people were amphibious, they treated ocean as land. If the British incurred their anger (in smuggling opium), they could destroy the receiving ships of opium easily.²⁵

In April 1840, Lin and Admiral Kuan drew up defence plans by enlisting fishermen and Tanka people as "water-braves."²⁶ Lin paid

22. IWSM, TK 10.5b.

23. See Chang, Commissioner Lin, p.130-131.

24. YPCC, 4:345.

25. YPCC, 2:302.

26. Waley, Opium War, p.99-100.

each member six dollars a month, and another six dollars to the brave's family. Later, he recruited another 5,000 strong men, pirates and small boatmen to strengthen the defences of the Canton river.²⁷

Lin accepted the idea of Admiral Kuan^{of} using fire-rafts to attack the British ships in the outer ocean.²⁸ On 8 April, Lin sent a report to the Emperor, telling him that he and Admiral Kuan had considered using large and small fire-rafts which were constructed during peace time. They would recruit fishermen and Tanka people as "water-braves" and teach them how to sail boats and operate fire tactics. When all training was finished, they would send those water-braves to off-shore islands to lie in ambush. When all the treacherous Chinese and British barbarians on the ships had slept, he and Admiral Kuan would order those concealed "water-braves" to sail their boats up to the British ships and set fire to them. Lin also suggested that the "water-braves" should be rewarded.²⁹

In order to encourage the combatant spirit of the "water-braves" and people, Lin offered rewards for the capture and destruction of British ships, and the capture or death of British officers and men, the money rewards being on the following scale:³⁰

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27. Shih Ch'eng, ed. Kuang-chou fu-chih (Gazetteer of Kuang-chou prefecture (1879), 81:34b, hereafter cited as KCFC). Lin's recruitment in 1840 was very different from Tseng Kuo-fan (曾國藩)'s in 1852. When Tseng was ordered by Peking to organize an army in his home province (Hunan) he recruited his men not from the available unemployed, but from the hardy and loyal peasantry, especially from the mountain villages to form his Hsiang-chün 湘軍 (Hunan Army).
28. IWSM, TK 10.5b, 14a-b.
29. IWSM, TK 10.6a-b.
30. See Morse, International Relations, 263, passim.

For the capture of an 80-gun ship-of-war		\$20,000
For the capture of a merchant ship		\$10,000
For the capture of a barque		\$ 5,000
For the capture of a brig or schooner		\$ 3,000
For the capture of a large boat		\$ 300
For the capture of a small boat		\$ 100
For her destruction	$\frac{1}{3}$ of	\$ 100
For the capture of a naval commander		\$ 5,000
For the death " " " "	$\frac{1}{3}$ of	\$ 5,000
For the capture of a soldier		\$ 100
For the death " " " "		\$ 40

On 9th May the "water-braves" led by one or two petty officers in each fire-raft launched a fire attack on the British ships at Kap-sing-moon. Similar attacks on the British ships had been made in June. Lin in reporting the result of the attacks, exaggerated the achievement of the "water-braves" in burning the British vessels and killing the British and treacherous Chinese.³¹

The "water-force" was excluded from those naval attacks. The officers who led "water-braves" in fire-craft were selected from the combat troops. Again money for operating these attacks and other expenditures were charged to the Hong merchants, not the local treasury.³²

What was Lin's motive in using the Tanka people and fishermen? As a matter of fact, Lin had an ill-feeling towards those people. When Charles Elliot refused to give up the murderers of Lin Wei-hsi in August, 1839, Lin stopped the supply of food and water to the floating

31. IWSM, TK 10.6b-7a. But according to the record of CR: "little or no damage (on British side) was sustained.

32. E.J. Eitel, Europe in China. The History of Hong Kong from the Beginning to the Year 1883 (London, 1895), p.114-115.

British community, hoping that depriving the British of their provisions might bring Elliot to his knees. However, the Tanka people and fishermen used their boats to convey provisions and other materials to the British ships in the outer ocean in exchange for opium.³³ Lin at once sent out orders to all fishing boats that they were not to carry more than one day's provisions for their distant fishing, fearing that their superfluous food would aid the British. On the other hand, the Tanka people formed the largest part of the pirates along the coast of Kuangtung, and were nicknamed "robber people." Their piratical action started in the early period of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). When the Japanese pirates invaded the coast of China in 1387, a great number of Tanka people joined their action to loot the coastal provinces.³⁴ In peace time, they always captured Chinese merchant boats and ravaged the coastal district. During the Opium War, many of them worked on British ships and helped the British to spy on the Chinese camps. In every fire attack on British ships ordered by Lin and Admiral Kuan in May 1840, the Chinese force killed and captured a lot of the fishermen and Tanka people.

Lin himself had a special hatred for the Tanka people. He once reported to the Emperor that the Tanka people were "fond of money and made light of their lives." Their supplies to the British had impeded the national anti-opium campaign against the British.

To recruit fishermen and Tanka people as "water-braves" became Lin's

33. CR, 8:442.

34. Kuan Li-yin, "Kuang-tung, min-tsu ti kou-ch'eng ho chi sheng-ke" (The nationality and identity of the people of Kuang-tung) in Min-shih hui-k'an (The collected materials of literature and history), v.1, p.81.

policy in order to prevent these people from working ^{for} the British. After recruiting these people as "water-braves" to fight the British, he reported to the Emperor that his tactic was "to control traitors with traitors; to attack poison with poison."³⁵ Obviously, the first traitor and poison refers to the fishermen and Tanka people, and the second to the British. YuKien, during the Opium War offered us a clear picture of Lin's tactic. He told the Emperor: "The 'water-braves' are no better than rascals. If we employ them to attack the English invaders, it is a matter of 'using poison to attack poison.' Even if we lose many water-braves in the attacks on the English, the strength of the empire will not be weakened. On the contrary, when these 'water-braves' disappear, the local district will be at peace."³⁶

35. IWSM, TK 10.6a.

36. IWSM, TK 24.36a-b.

CHAPTER 3

DISGRACE AND PUBLIC SYMPATHY

The British expeditionary force headed by Admiral George Elliot arrived at Kuang-tung water by the middle of June 1840. Having established a blockade at the Pearl River estuary, the force followed the instruction of the government and sailed northwards to take military action.¹ On 5th July, the British reached T'ing-hai in Chekiang Province and occupied the city. From T'ing-hai, the British expedition sailed up to Pei-ho (白河) near Tientsin. On 9th August George Elliot, the plenipotentiary, transmitted a letter from Lord Palmerston to Chi-shan, the governor-general of Chihli demanding, among other things, satisfaction for the illegal detention of the British Superintendent of Trade and of British subjects at Canton; compensation for the surrendered opium; the payment of an indemnity and the cession of one or more islands.²

In Canton Lin knew that the Emperor would be very angry with him about the British occupation of T'ing-hai. He had been offering mistaken ideas to the Emperor. At first he told the Emperor that the British government would not stand behind the British opium traders in China saying that the British opium vessels at Nan-ao (Nan-ao 南澳) of eastern Kuangtung did not hold licences from their home country. If discovered, Lin stressed, they would be punished by the British

1. CR, 9:419.

2. For details, ^{See} IWSM, TK 12.30a-39b.

government. Later, Lin told the Emperor the British would hardly send their fleet to attack China from 70 thousand ³ li.

After the fall of T'inghai in July 1840 Lin wasted no time in persuading the Emperor to manoeuvre the *populace* in the adjacent area of T'inghai to destroy the invaders. He argued that although the British were strong in ³ naval battles, once they left their ships they would lose their military vigour. In ⁴ land battles, the Chinese people could easily defeat them. Lin also suggested disguising garrison troops as villagers to fight against the British soldiers. With the help of armed *populace*, he stressed that they would kill their enemies like chickens and dogs.⁵

The first reason behind using populace to defeat the British was because Lin shared the wrong idea of his contemporaries concerning the inability of the British in land battles. He memorialized the Emperor: "the British soldiers did not know how to use fists or swords. Also their legs were firmly bound with cloth,

3. IWSM, TK 7a-b. Before 1840, the traditional Chinese frontier crisis always occurred in the northern part of the empire by the "land barbarians". After the Ch'in Shih-Huang-Ti 秦始皇帝 (the First Emperor) unified China in 221 B.C., he ordered **the building** of the famous Great Wall for the purpose of protecting Chinese territory from the potential invasion of the Hsiung Nu, a strong nomad tribe from the North. The frontier crisis caused by "sea barbarians" had never been serious until the attacks of the Japanese pirates along the eastern and southern coast of China in 1387. However, the Chinese emperor treated the disturbance of Japanese pirates as a short-term emergency. Not until the arrival of the British expeditionary forces in June, 1840 did the Peking government pay serious attention to those "sea barbarians".

4. YPCC, 2:223.

5. IWSM, TK 14.3a-b.

and consequently it is extremely inconvenient for them to stretch. Should they come on land, it is apparent that they can do still less. Therefore, what is called their power can be controlled without difficulty."⁶ Lin adhered to this wrong idea after his official visit to Macao on 3rd September 1839. He described the Portuguese: "The bodies of the men are tightly encased from head to toe... they look like actors playing the part of foxes..."⁷

The second reason was that Lin realised the propitiatory actions of the British at T'inghai. The British commander, Colonel Burnell, did not want to upset the people after the occupation of T'inghai. He prohibited his troops from staying in the civil houses, temples and public buildings. The troops were put under canvas amid paddy fields.⁸ Elliot and Gutzlaff appointed a mainland Chinese as Civil Magistrate of T'inghai. Each catty ($1\frac{1}{3}$ lb) of opium was sold at the price of one foreign dollar.⁹ The British authorities posted placards in public inviting Chinese traders to come from outside the district of T'inghai. They guaranteed them handsome profits in the foreign trade.

Lin told the Emperor that the people of T'inghai so far had refused to have any dealings with the British. But he feared that if the Chinese government was not able to take back T'inghai as soon as

6. IWSM, TK 6b.

7. Beeching, Opium Wars, p.90.

8. Beeching, Opium Wars, p.117.

9. Waley, Opium War, p.118.

possible, the honest Chinese traders would not trade with the British. But the temptation of the huge profit from trading with the British would drive the lawless Chinese traders to engage in secret deals with the British.¹⁰

After the fall of T'ing-hai, the Manchu dignitaries in Peking began to heap recriminations on Lin, saying that he had invited trouble by being too harsh in his handling of the opium affair. Thus, it became necessary for Lin to achieve victories at Canton in order to cover the Chinese military failure at T'ing-hai as well as to keep those Manchu mouths closed. At that time five British warships were anchored in Kwangtung waters: 44-gun Druid, 20-gun Larne; 20-gun Hyacinth, 18-gun Columbine and ^{the} steamer Enterprise.¹¹ On 17 August Lin inspected his newly recruited "water-braves" with their war vessels at Szu-tzu Yang (about twenty-eight miles downstream from Canton) and *carried out a* rehearsal. Two days later, Lin ordered all "water-braves" and vessels to launch an attack on those British warships in the ocean.¹² In September Lin again sent five large war-junks, each with six hundred "water-braves" to attack the British warships at the Mo-tao Yang, (near the Pearl River). In both of the naval attacks, the "water-braves" suffered heavy casualties from the British, but Lin did not make real reports to the Emperor.

Lin's attacks were emotional. Early on 24th September, Lin had already reported to the Emperor that: "The English ships are

10. IWSM, TK 14. 43b-44b, passim.

11. CR, 9:419.

12. YPCC, 2:220-221, 225.

successful on the high seas; it is their forte to break waves and sail under great winds. But if we refrained from fighting with them on the seas, they would find no opportunity to take advantage of their skills." When the Emperor knew of his hazardous attacks on the ocean he angrily reprimanded Lin: "You have mentioned before that it is not worthwhile to fight with the barbarian's ships in high seas. Why you ordered naval attacks this time?"¹³

In this respect, Teng was much more realistic. When he was ordered by the Emperor to recover T'ing-hai in July, 1840,¹⁴ he plainly told the Emperor that the Chinese force was powerless to drive the English barbarians off T'ing-hai. He even added that he found it difficult to defend Chinese territory from another English attack, let alone to attack the invaders. As for the idea of using Chinese war-junks to attack English warships, Teng stressed that the Chinese war-junks were primarily designed for apprehending smugglers and privateers along the coast, they were absolutely not strong enough to cope with English battle ships. He remarked that the largest war-junks were only a bit more than 20 ch'ih (1 ch'ih approximately equal to 14.1 inches) but the English warships were ^{guns} with guns in tens. To attack the English with Chinese junks was impossible. As for the defence in Chekiang, Teng reminded his *colleague* that the Chinese force could only be strengthened by imposing strict discipline on the garrison troops at the same time; efforts should be made to boost the morale of Chinese soldiers, in order to stir their combatant spirit.¹⁵

13. YPCC, 4:69.

14. IWSM, TK 11.38a-b.

15. YPCC, 2:585-590.

On 14th September, 1840 Lin learned from the messengers from Peking that the Emperor had instructed Chi-shan to receive Palmerston's letter from the British Plenipotentiary and he became worried. In his letter to I-liang, the then Governor of Kuangtung on the next day, he said that he could not sleep upon hearing the news, adding that an imprudent decision of the court in this issue would bring the prohibition of opium into complete failure.

Palmerston's letter mainly complaining against Lin's inexpedient proceedings at Canton, contained a phrase: "to demand from the Emperor satisfaction and redress" which was translated as "ch'iu-t'ao huang-ti chao-hsueh shen-yuan 求討皇帝昭雪申冤" (to beg the emperor to settle and redress a grievance). The Emperor thus thought that the opium prohibition had been the very cause of the coming of the British force, and that Lin had privately disposed of communication from the British side. The situation at that time was that the British fleet had already demonstrated its power at Pei-ho (白河), near Tientsin, and was causing extreme uneasiness to the Peking government. The Emperor thus dispatched Chi-shan to open negotiations with the British Plenipotentiary.¹⁶

Chi-shan later reported to the Emperor that Chinese guns were obsolescent, while British ones were powerful. With such inequality in weaponry, it was senseless to fight. Chi-shan concluded: "Even if they could be thrown back this year they might come the next, so war, once started, would indeed be endless."¹⁷ On 28th September, the Emperor issued an edict reprimanding Lin and Teng: "As they had failed

16. IWSM, TK 13.3b-4a.

17. IWSM, TK 14.32a-b.

to effect any substantial improvement in the situation (of strained relations between China and Britain), and further gave rise to many complications. There can be no higher misdemeanor to the nation and the people than this! It is for this reason that special punishments are now being visited upon them."¹⁸ He removed them from office pending investigation in Canton. At the same time Chi-shan was made Imperial Commissioner to Canton to continue negotiations with the British Plenipotentiary.¹⁹

On 25th October the Emperor set another edict to order Lin to remain in Canton to offer assistance to Chi-shan. I-liang was made Acting Governor-general of Liang-kuang before the arrival of Chi-shan. The new Imperial Commissioner, Ch'i-shan arrived at Canton on 29th November.²⁰ His awareness of Britain's "sturdy warships and powerful cannons," made him realize that it was essential to appease the British. In order to show his earnestness for negotiation, he adopted a humble manner toward Elliot, which was in direct contrast to Lin's. Later, Ch'i-shan received an imperial edict ordering the Chinese force to be cut down.²¹

On the other hand, one of the obligations of Ch'i-shan's mission was to investigate the litigation between Elliot and Lin. He wanted to find out whether or not Lin did not communicate to the Emperor a letter from the King of England as well as to correct Lin's action.²² Ch'i-shan tried to collect materials to prove that the armed conflict

18. IWSM, TK 15.11b-12a.

19. Tung-hua hsü-lu, TK 42:4.

20. CR, 11:528.

21. IWSM, TK 15.15b.

22. IWSM, TK 13.40b-41a.

at Canton was initiated by Lin's refusal to communicate with the British. The British under such an occasion could only request redress of grievance by sailing up to Pei-ho, Tientsin. I-liang got angry with Ch'i-shan's fault-finding measures with Lin. Although I-liang had not agreed that capital punishment should be imposed on the opium addicts during the great debate in 1838, he did see eye to eye with Lin in the matter of the eradication of the opium. I-liang supported Lin's strong policy that the British opium in the receiving ships at Ling-ting^{island} should be completely surrendered. He^{had} helped Lin to draft the edict to the British merchants, ordering them to surrender their stocks of opium. In April, 1839 I-liang took an active role in the destruction of the surrendered opium in the harbour of Bogue.²³

As we have mentioned above, when the imperial edict announcing the dismissal of Lin first arrived from Canton, I-liang honoured him with a farewell reception in his office. According to Lin's diary, I-liang visited Lin seven times after the latter's disgrace. I-liang picked Lin's brains on foreign affairs and defence works. When I-liang received an imperial injunction to cut down the "water-force", he invited Lin's opinion as to the number.²⁴

I-liang and Ch'i-shan were never on good terms. The latter did not consult with the former, except when he asked him to provide evidence that Lin had refused to accept the letter from the King of England at Canton.²⁵ It is understandable that the more harassment

23. IWSM, TK 6.13a, 7.6a.

24. Chen Sheng-lin, "Lin Tse-hsü ti i-sheng" in Chung-kuo ch'in-tai jen-wu lun-ts'ung, p.19.

25. YPCC, 6:113-114; 4:209.

Ch'i-shan placed on Lin, the more sympathy I-liang felt for Lin.

Negotiations between Ch'i-shan and Captain Elliot began early in December 1840. Elliot demanded the cession of Hong Kong; an indemnity and redress of past grievances. Ch'i-shan accepted all the terms except the cession. As Ch'i-shan was not willing to yield the cession of Hong Kong, Elliot attacked the forts at Chuen-pi on 7th January 1841, and threatened to occupy the Bogue. In the conflict, the Chinese suffered 500 killed and 300 wounded, but the British only had a few casualties.²⁶

Ch'i-shan became frightened of the British military achievement at Chuen-pi, and he signed the "Chuen-pi Convention" with Captain Elliot on 20th January. The terms of the Convention were:²⁷

1. The cession of the island and harbour of Hong Kong to the British crown. All just charges and duties to the empire upon the commerce carried on there to be paid as if the trade were conducted at Whampoa.
2. An indemnity to the British government of six millions of dollars, one million payable at once, and the remainder in equal annual instalments ending in 1846.
3. Direct official intercourse between the countries upon equal footing.
4. The trade of the port of Canton to be opened within ten days after the Chinese new-year, and to be carried on at Whampoa till further arrangements are practicable at the new settlement.

During the negotiations with Elliot, Ch'i-shan mercilessly

26. CR, 10:37-43.

27. CR, 10:63. For the Chinese text, see IWSM, TK 23.16a-17a.

criticized Lin's defence works at Canton. In his report dated 12th January 1842 Ch'i-shan complained to the Emperor that the forts in the district from Bogue to Canton were poorly built. The iron-chains constructed to block the river on the orders of Teng and Lin were of no use in defence: the advance of the British ships easily broke through the iron-chains. Ch'i-shan remarked that the literary officials (Lin and Teng), were distinguished in literary accomplishment but did not have much knowledge of defence work.

Ch'i-shan also attacked Lin's tactic of cutting off the supply of water and food to the British community on their ships. He pointed out that the British could easily obtain a supply of water from the islands along the coast of Kuangtung. As for the supply of food, Ch'i-shan said that the British would find no problem in getting food from the greedy boat-people (Tanka), as there were more than 10 thousand "family boats" anchored close to the British ships. Ch'i-shan went further, disclosing the fact that Lin had been deceiving the government with his fake reports of victory in the armed conflicts with the British during Lin's imperial commission.

The "water-force" of Kuangtung did not escape from the criticism of Ch'i-shan. The new imperial commissioner told the Emperor that not only were the vessels and cannons of the force inferior to those of the British, but the sailors were lacking in battle experience and their fighting strength was weak. The members of the "water-force" were keen to attack a tiny fleet of British ships so as to make their grade and seek promotion. But when the barbarian ships appeared in great numbers they had turned out to be chicken-hearted and took no

action.²⁸ Ch'i-shan even said that Kuan T'ien-p'ei, the admiral of the "water-force" was so genial to his undisciplined inferiors that he could hardly be termed as an audacious military leader.²⁹

Every dog has its day. The signing of the Chuen-pi Convention provided Lin with a good chance to take vengeance on Ch'i-shan. In Lin's opinion, Ch'i-shan had usurped the power to cede Hong Kong to Britain and to allow the resumption of trade to the British. Lin urged I-liang to disclose Ch'i-shan's misdeeds to the Emperor as Lin himself was already a disgraced person, without the status which allowed him to report to the Emperor. I-liang at first showed hesitation to act, because substantial proof of Ch'i-shan's agreement of ceding Hong Kong was lacking.

On 1st February 1841, George Elliot and General Bremier issued a joint proclamation in Hong Kong, stating: "The island of Hong Kong having been ceded to the British crown under the seal of the Imperial minister and high commissioner Keshen, all native person residing there in understand, that they are now subjects of the Queen of England to whom and to whose officers they must pay duty and obedience..."³⁰

In early February Lin and I-liang received from Colonel Lai Un-chio (賴恩爵) in Hong Kong a communication concerning the British ordering the Chinese troops to be withdrawn from Hong Kong.

I-liang lost no time in submitting to the Emperor a copy of

28. IWSM, TK 19.12b.

29. IWSM, TK 19.13a.

30. CR, 10:64.

Elliot's proclamation sent by Colonel Lai from Hong Kong. The Emperor was infuriated on hearing that Chinese residents in Hong Kong had become British subjects. He on 26th February ordered the dismissal of Ch'i-shan's Imperial Commissionership and instructed I-liang to conduct him to Peking in chains. All his family properties were confiscated.³¹

The Chuen-pi Convention was *only a temporary agreement*. It was repudiated by both the Chinese and British governments. This situation ushered in a new stage of conflict between the two countries. The Emperor's nephew I-shan (奕山) was appointed as "Ching-ni Chiang-chün 靖逆將軍" (Rebel-Quelling General) and Imperial Commissioner with Lungwen (隆文) and Yang Fang (楊芳) as his assistants. The three were to command a large force from various provinces to fight the British at Canton, with the imperial injunction to "quell the rebels without faltering."³²

The hostilities at Canton were resumed. The British fleet headed by the powerful flat-bottomed, shallow-draft steamship Nemesis stormed the forts in Macao (near Canton) in the latter half of February.³³ On 25th February the fleet shelled the fort of the Bogue. The garrison under the command of Admiral Kuan put up a stiff resistance. Stories spread that the soldiers in the fort had refused to apply the fuses to the guns. They were bribed

31. IWSM, TK 23.2b-4b.

32. IWSM, TK 20.32b.

33. CR, 11:579.

by the British not to open fire on the British ships. The angry Admiral killed some of the disobedient soldiers and tried himself to fire a gun, but he found that the fuse hole was soaked in water. Admiral Kuan later got multiple bayonet wounds from the British landing soldiers. However, he still fought gallantly and died with his boots on.³⁴

Early on 13th February 1841 when the imperial edict of dismissal of I-shan's appointment to Canton reached Kuangtung, Lin urged I-liang to issue a proclamation offering rewards for the capture of the British and their ships. I-liang was hesitant to do so. The death of Kuan brought the issue to a head. On 25th February an official proclamation of rewards was issued by the Canton authority. The rewards were on the following scale:³⁵

	\$
For the capture of a ship of the line	100,000
For the destruction	30,000
For a frigate or sloop, in proportion	
For the capture of a large steamer	50,000
For the capture of a small steamer	25,000
For the capture alive of Captain Elliot, Mr. Morrison or Commodore Bremer, each	50,000
For their heads, each	30,000
For the capture of an English officer	10,000
For his head " " " "	5,000
For the capture of an English soldier or sailor	500
For his head " " " " " "	300
For the capture of a sepoy or lascar	100
For his head " " " " "	50
For those who lost their lives in effecting seizures, a gratuity to their families of	300

34. IWSM, TK 24, 19a-b; CR, 11:580.

35. See Morse, International Relations, p.263-264. One incident, involving the disappearance and apparent death of three British in March, 1841 may be treated as the result of Lin's proclamation of offering rewards. See CR, 10:182-183, KCFC, 81:43b.

The offer of rewards not only had excited the Cantonese to kill the British, but also aroused the anger of the British so that they made a hasty military attack. On 27th February the British forces ascended the city river. They destroyed another fort just below Whampoa. Immediately the British forces cleared a passage from Humen to Whampoa intending to make an attack on the city.

Lin heard that the British fleet had succeeded in forcing its way to the fort at Lieh-te (獵德), seven miles east of Canton on 2nd March. He knew that the next step of the British was to attack the city. On 3rd March Lin suddenly appeared at the Foochow-Ch'ao-Chow Club to recruit volunteers to defend the city. Eventually he got 560 men, he paraded them in two files, one to the east, one to the west at one of the city gates.³⁶

However, Lin's recruited volunteers did not have a chance to fight with the British. Yang Fang arrived at Canton before I-shan and Lungwen on 5th March and took over the responsibility of the warfare with the British. On 10 February the British started **attacking** again. Yang Fang finding himself unable to stop the advance of the British forces towards Canton, pulled his soldiers into the city. The British fleet pushed on up the city river on 16th March and succeeded in taking several forts and destroying many Chinese war junks. Two days later, the British troops took possession of the Factories and the city was at their mercy.³⁷

Yang Fang this time submitted a report to the Emperor, pointing out

36. Waley, Opium War, p.142; YPCG, 2:63.

37. CR, 10:181.

the difficulties of the Chinese force in defending Canton: the Chinese "water-force" had been completely destroyed and China did not have the naval forces to bar the advance of the invading British fleet; the local troops were unreliable as their morale was undermined by the infiltration of traitors in their ranks; the imported troops from other provinces were not familiar with the terrain and the commandship of these troops was divided so that the troops were not able to take united action against the British.³⁸ In order to buy off the immediate British attack on Canton, Yang Fang agreed to reopen the Canton trade with the British. However, he did not dare tell the Emperor about this.

Now Yang Fang was in a melancholy position: the Emperor was bound to become aware of the reoccupation of the foreign factories by the British and his crime of usurping power in allowing the resumption of trade, a similar crime to that of Ch'i-shan in ceding Hong Kong to the British. Yang Fang became a frequent visitor to Lin's lodging hoping that the latter would offer him advice and assistance in defending the city with Lin's recruited volunteers. However, on the 19th March Yang Fang even lived with Lin in order to get frequent advice. All Lin could do in preparation for the possible British attack was to strengthen the number of the recruited volunteers.³⁹

On 1st May an imperial decree reached Canton ordering Lin to proceed to Hang-chow (杭州), Chekiang to wait for further instructions. This time Lin was given an official post of fourth grade (in a scale of nine). Two days later, he made his journey to the new appointment.

38. Shih-liao hsun-kan, 35, ti, 304-305.

39. Waley, Opium War, p.146.

He was seen off by the governor-general, governor and other high-ranking officials.

Modern Chinese historians show sympathy for Lin's disgrace. Hsin-pao Chang says that Lin served the volatile and vacillating Emperor who pushed Lin into the course of rash actions but soon withdrew his support.⁴⁰ Fan Wen-lan, a communist historian even remarks that Lin was not defeated by the British in military affairs, but was politically defeated by the absurdity of the Emperor and the vandalism of the capitalationists.⁴¹

Lin's contemporaries had the same feeling as Fan. The only difference was that those persons did not dare to condemn the Emperor for his punishment of him. In June 1840, the British expeditionary forces obeyed government instructions not to attack Canton, but occupied T'ing-hai as their naval base. The British action was construed by the Chinese as meaning that the British feared the "Unconquerable" Lin and his strong defence works at Canton. Wei-yuan highly praised Lin that the latter was able to defend Kuang-tung without recruiting a single soldier from other provinces or asking for a single tael of silver from the central government, adding that if other coastal provinces had the same defence as that in Kuang-tung and Fukien, the British barbarians would not be able to invade China.⁴² After Lin's disgrace provincial administrators, such as Lin Yun-k'o (林韻珂) succeeded in persuading the Emperor to reinstate Lin and send him to Chekiang to

40. Chang, Commissioner Lin, p.216.

41. Fan, Chung-kuo chin-tai shih, v.1, p.30.

42. YPCC, 6:151 .

assist in defence works. Lin arrived at Chen-hai (鎮海) in June 1842. When the British troops were about to meet in the field the "unconquerable" Lin, the Emperor suddenly ordered Lin to go to Ili for his exile. Once again Lin had no opportunity to show what he could do.

The Cantonese on the other hand felt deeper sympathy for Lin than his colleagues did. When the news of Lin's disgrace arrived at Canton in October 1840, the popular feeling was one of melancholy. The Cantonese showered Lin with souvenirs and eulogies. A board, inscribed: "To one whose favour drenched the people; whose might barbarians feared" was presented to Lin. The people even planned to practise the passionate traditional method of "P'an-yuan 攀轅" (Literally, trying to stop the departure of a popular official by grasping the shafts of his carriage and lying down in the wheel ruts), to keep Lin at Canton.⁴³ It is not difficult to realize why the Cantonese thought that they were drenched with Lin's favour. Shortly after his arrival at Canton in March, Lin published an edict to convince the Cantonese that even a man addicted to opium for many years was not a hopeless case, but might be helped to a cure. Lin had brought with him two Chinese prescriptions to cure opium addicts. Later, he approached the Medical Missionary Society asking if Western medical science could help in finding another prescription to cure the Cantonese. On the other hand, before the arrival of Lin, foreign murderers of Chinese people at Canton had been able to escape due punishment by sending money to victims' relatives to keep their mouths

43. Lin Tse-hsü jih-chi (Diaries of Lin Tse-hsü). (Peking, 1964), p.372-373.

shut, and by bribing local magistrates. In the murder of Lin Wei-hsi, Lin's insistence on the surrender of the British culprits, although it was to assert Chinese jurisdiction over foreign offenders on Chinese soil, might have seemed to the Cantonese to be a sign of his love for the people. No doubt the Cantonese were glad to hear that the expulsion of the British community from Macao was the result of the British refusal. When Lin and Teng paid a visit to Macao after the expulsion, the local people, young and old, greeted their esteemed officials with all their hearts.⁴⁴

What did the foreigners fear from Lin? In the minds of the Cantonese, the foreigners feared the surrender of opium; the submissive retreat of all of the British to Macao after their confinement in the factories; the obedience of the Portuguese governor expelling the British merchants and their families from Macao; besides, the wooden-rolls and iron-chains which Lin ordered to be placed in the shallow water of Heng-tang (橫欄), the narrowest point of the Pearl River estuary and the establishment of new forts at Chien-sha-tsui and Kuan-yang, dreadful constructions to the foreigners. Exaggerated reports of victories of Lin's recruited "water-braves" were also encouraging.

In one sense Lin and the Cantonese were in the same boat. Lin was seriously criticized by Ch'i-shan for his strong policy, while the Cantonese were also reprimanded by the same person as "Han-chien 漢奸" (*Chinese traitors*). In early 1841, Ch'i-shan reported to the Emperor that the Cantonese are "ungrateful and avaricious" and "dwell indiscriminately with foreigners whom they are accustomed to see... day by day and after living many

44. YPCC, 2:183.

years together, the utmost intimacy has grown up between them... These plain evidences of the want of firmness on the part of the people here, give us still more cause for anxiety."⁴⁵

Lin became a hero and patriot among the people of Kuang-tung. His influence in increasing their anti-foreign feeling was deep and lasting. Only twenty-six days after Lin's departure from Canton on 3rd May 1841,⁴⁶ several thousand village braves outside Canton launched an attack on the British troops at San-yuan-li, and continuous anti-British movements took place in the post-war period.

45. CR, 10:239.

46. "Jih-chi", p.390.

CHAPTER 4

THE SAN-YUAN-LI INCIDENT

I-shan and his assistant, Lung-wen arrived at Canton on 14th April 1841. Their duty was to fulfil the imperial injunction to annihilate the British troops in Chinese territory. At about the same time, regular troops gradually arrived at Canton from various provinces. As the Chinese troops far outnumbered the British soldiers I-shan was full of groundless confidence about the warfare. However, Yang Fang, his deputy who arrived at Canton in March had already received several defeats in battles with the British. He eventually was forced to negotiate with Captain Elliot for suspension of hostilities and to allow resumption of trade with the British merchants.¹ From his experience, Yang Fang did not agree with I-shan's strategy of launching sudden attacks on the British; instead he insisted that they should send all the troops from various provinces under a single command before taking any military action.

However, I-shan was eager to defeat the British in order to win praise from the Emperor. On 21st April, I-shan secretly ordered a night attack on the British ships lying off the factory area with about 200 fire-rafts.² No serious damage was inflicted upon the British vessels, but a large number of fire-rafts were destroyed during the course of attack. The next day, I-shan gave orders for another attack on the factory and this time the Chinese troops this time did

1. CR, 10:182.

2. CR, 10:294; E.H. Parker, Chinese Account of the opium War (Shanghai, 1888), p.31-32.

not receive strong resistance, and within a few hours, they destroyed the factory area completely.

The British took military retaliation. A body of troops under the command of Major Pratt struck at the factory area where I-shan expected to meet. But the main force of the British troops, numbering about two thousand, was to attack Canton City from its northern heights under the command of Sir Hugh Gough and Sir Le Fleming Senhouse. On 24th May, the British sailed their flotilla northward from Macao Passage to Tsingpu (縉浦), from there they went ashore and occupied the nearby strategic point called Ni-ch'eng (泥城). The next day the British troops captured the Ssu-fang Fort^(四方炮台) on the heights just outside the north gate of Canton City. Sir Hugh Gough then ordered his troops to instal guns in the fort that put the city under the shadow of British bombardment.³

On 26th the British shelled the city from the Ssufang Fort. The imperial examination hall in the south eastern corner of the city where I-shan and his colleagues resided was heavily stormed.⁴ On the other hand, I-liang, Governor of Kuang-tung was astonished when thousands of Cantonese, old and young, cried at his office, begging him to sue for peace with the British. Frederic Wakeman quotes from Liang T'ing-nan (梁廷幹)'s saying: "Since the army crouched in one corner, conducting

3. Details for the British military action may be found in CR, 10:296; John Ouchterlony, Chinese War: An Account of All the Operations of the British Forces from the Commencement to the Treaty of Nanking. 2nd ed. (London, 1844), p.136-139. For the Chinese description, see KCFC, 81:38; IWSM, TK 29.1a-3a.

4. YPCC, 4:333.

only halfway measures and not marshalling to meet the enemy, the people clamoured like rushing water, saying that the soldiers were not to be depended on. The city would certainly be destroyed, and the barbarians would enter to burn and loot ..."⁵

Thrown into a great panic by the British fire and the popular apprehension, I-shan sent Yu Pao-chun (余保純), the prefect of Canton and Wu Shao-yung (伍紹榮) a Hong merchant, as emissaries to sue for peace with Captain Elliot. The latter eventually accepted six million dollars as the ransom of the city on 27th. The Peace Convention with five terms was as follows:

1. The three Imperial Commissioners and their troops to quit the city of Canton and proceed to a distance of upwards of 60 miles.
2. A ransom for Canton of 6 million silver dollars to be paid within one week; 1 million before sunset of the 27th.
3. When all was paid, the British troops to stay in their present positions for the time being, neither side to be reinforced. If the ransom was ^{not} paid in full within seven days, the total to be raised to 7 million silver dollars; if not cleared within 14 days, to 8 million; if 20 days, then 9 million. The British forces to withdraw to outside Bogue when the ransom was paid in full.
4. A sum of 300,000 silver dollars to be paid as the compensation for destruction of factories.
5. Kwangchow-fu (the negotiator) to produce full powers with seals of three Imperial Commissioners, Governor-general, Governor, and Tartar-general of the province. 6

The whole empire was shocked by the ransom of the city. What had been the point of sending distant troops to Canton? When Ch'i-

5. See Wakeman, Strangers at the Gate (Berkeley, 1966), p.53.

6. Cf. Morse, International Relations, p.283.

shan reported to the Emperor that the garrison troops in Kuangtung were not reliable, the Emperor ordered troops from provinces of Szechuan, Kueichow, Hunan and Kiangsi fight the British troops at Canton, hoping that they would be able to "cut off the rear of the barbarian soldiers, (the outnumbered Chinese troops) then close in from all directions and recover Hong Kong."⁷ When I-shan and Lungwen impressed the Emperor that they were confident of victory, the latter remarked: "I am awaiting the good news of victory with the greatest impatience."⁸

In 1976 a huge number of the regular troops of South Vietnam retreated speedily as if they were running from a plague when a comparatively small number of North Vietnamese soldiers staged an assault on the heights of the South Vietnamese territory. The situation of the Chinese troops in May, 1841 was similar to the timid South Vietnamese troops when facing the British attack upon Canton. The distant troops, numbering more than 17,000 retreated from outposts around Canton to the city when about two thousand British troops threatened to attack. After the ransom of the city, Ts'ao Lu-t'ai (曹履泰), censor of the Hu-kuang Circuit, remarked that when the British troops marched east from Ni-ch'eng to Ssu-fang Fort, the garrison troops along that district escaped from their post without firing a single shot."⁹ Wang T'ing-lan (王廷蘭), the provincial judicial of Kuangtung also commented that the battle attracted 17,000

7. IWSM, TK 25.43a.

8. IWSM, TK 26.42b.

9. Fan Wen-lan, Chung-kuo chin-tai shih, v.I, p.68.

troops from other provinces and consumed several million silver dollars from various local treasuries. The timber for military constructions was purchased from Kuangsi and cartridges and other military equipments were brought from Kiangsi and Anhui. Even with such good preparation, the result of the battle was such a miserable defeat. He remarked that the defeat was because both principle and discipline were both lacking in the army.¹⁰

Instead of protecting the Cantonese, the distant troops, the Hunan soldiers especially, annoyed them. Censor Lo Ping-chang (駱秉章) reported that the Hunan troops looted and plundered common people on their way from Hunan to Canton. The district magistrates and townspeople complained of the disturbance they caused when passing by.¹¹ On 26th May when I-shan and the others were in the city, and it came under heavy bombardment, the troops spread a rumour that the British artillery had an intelligence report of the location of the imperial commissioners from Cantonese traitors. They immediately launched a traitor-hunt and plundered the Cantonese, accusing them of being traitors.¹² A Chinese witness recalled: "Several thousand of our soldiers after loading themselves with robbed goods, ran away out of the city pretending to trace the enemy."¹³ In addition to plundering

10. Hsia Hsieh, Chung-hsi chi-shih (A record of Sino-Western affairs (Taipei, 1962)) 6:15-20; Hsiao I-shan, Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih, Vol.2, p.950.

11. IWSM, TK 28.24b.

12. YPCC, 4:22.

13. J.F. Davis, China, During the War and Since the Peace (London 1852), I, 125.

and looting, some Hunanese troops stole out from their camps to molest village women. The gentry of the neighbouring villages outside Canton warned the authorities to discipline the Hunanese soldiers, and not to let them leave the city. When the village braves discovered that the Hunanese stayed with their women, they butchered them in cold blood.

It was crystal clear that the distant troops did not help to bolster defence in Canton, but created local unrest. Was not Commissioner Lin great enough? He was able to defend Canton without asking for troops or funds from any authorities. "Why can't we take up the example of Commissioner Lin?" the village braves might have asked.

A local prefectural gazetteer records that the "righteous braves" had formed militia in the districts of Fu-shan (佛山) and Nan-hai (南海) shortly after the departure of Lin in early May, 1841. At that time, there were about 36,000 "righteous braves" drilling day and night in those districts.¹⁴ On the other hand, of the 103 villages in the north-west and north-east outside the city, each gathered 15 to 100 "righteous braves", prepared to draw their swords against the British troops.¹⁵

14. KCFC, 81:40b-41a.

15. Hsia Hsieh, Chung-hsi chi-shih, 6:11-12; CR, 10:350. In early 1841 Lin adopted another plan for the defence. Although he was disgraced at that time, still he suggested I-liang, the then governor of Kuangtung, "to gather gentry for discussion as to vitalize their conscience with 'righteousness', and encourage them to defend themselves and families with mutual operation", Lin continued, "only if a close relationship exists among those people can we calm the people and preserve the country." See Ch'en Shêng-lin, "Lin Tse-hsú ti i-shêng" Chung-kuo chin-tai jen-wu lun-ts'ung, p.16.

Several thousand British troops roaming through the countryside from Tsingpu to Ssu-fang Fort from 24th May caused trouble to the villagers.¹⁶ In a "Condemnation of the devils by the San-yuan-li villagers", the villagers reprimanded the British troops' violent behaviour: "disturbing our villages; looting our cows; destroying our paddy fields; lewdly plundering the graves and molesting our women."¹⁷ But it was the last two items that brought the anger of the San Yuan Li villagers to fever pitch.¹⁸

Frederick Wakeman has described it thus: "If hsiao (filial piety) was offended by tomb-robbing, i (righteousness) was most certainly aroused by having one's own, or one's neighbour's wife molested."¹⁹

In order to understand the cause of San-yuan-li incident, it is worthwhile to mention that there are two concepts that discipline social norms in Chinese society. They are: "Pai-shan hsiao wei hsien 百善孝為先" (Literally filial piety is the most important of all virtues), and "Wan-o yin wei shou 萬惡淫為首" (Literally, lewdness is the worst of all sins). These two concepts were very much emphasised in Kuang-tung. The act of "opening graves and scattering the bones about"²⁰ by the British

16. KCFC, 81:39.

17. YPCC, 4:22.

18. See KCFC, 81:39a. The British troops were curious to know how the Chinese embalmed the corpses by opening the coffins. A British officer named MacPherson writes: "The features presented as dried and shrivelled appearance, and there was strong pungent aromatic smell perceptible on rising the lid." See CR, 10:396. As for the molestation of the Chinese women, Sir John Davis remarked that the permanent feeling of hostility of the Cantonese had "commenced with the violence suffered by their women from Sepoy troops in 1841. See FO 17/140, Davis to Palmerston, 8 February 1848.

19. Wakeman, Strangers, p.17.

20. KCFC, 81:39a. Yu-kien also reported to the Emperor that British troops had committed the same crime of "opening graves and scattering the bones about." after their occupation of T'ing-hai in July, 1840, see IWSM, TK 24.38b.

troops was an unforgivable crime to the ancestor-worshipping Cantonese. After Hung Hsiu-ch'üan (洪秀全) and Yang Hsiu-ch'ing (楊秀清), the two Taiping leaders, had broken out in their rebellion in early 1850, the then Hsien-feng Emperor was in thundering wrath. He secretly ordered the Governor-general of Liang-kuang to dig out the ancestral tombs of those rebellious leaders in order to insult them.²¹ On 22nd August, 1849, Governor Amaral of Macao, was murdered by two Cantonese. His head and his left hand (the Governor did not have a right hand) were cut off and carried away.²² Hsü Kuang-chin (徐廣綬) the then Governor-general of Liang-Kuang was responsible for the investigation of the murder. Hsü later disclosed the reason of the murder as being a retaliation, because the Portuguese Governor had ordered that the ancestral graves of the Cantonese in Macao should be removed in order to evacuate the place to build roads.²³

On the other hand, in several districts of Kuangtung, such as Shun-te, P'an-yü there existed the custom of "Pu-lo-chia 不嫁家" (literally, (the women) not to take abode in husbands' home). Some of the women ^{in these} districts, when reaching their marriage age were match-made to men. But they refused to have intimate relations with their so-called husbands: they simply wanted to keep their virginity. After the superficial wedding ceremony, the sworn sisters of the woman helped her to sew up every corner of her clothes with thread in order to avoid the man's sexual impulse in the night. Three days after the wedding,

21. See Kuo T'ing-i, Chin-tai chung-kuo shih-shih jih-chih (A Calendar of historical events of modern China) (Taipei, 1963), I, 157.

22. Details of the murder may be found in Morse, International relations, p.340.

23. FO 682/1555, Seu (Hsü) to Bonham, date TK 29/7/10 (27 August 1849): Chinese Text.

the woman back to her mother's home Her sworn sisters then examined the thread of her clothes. If broken, the woman was supposed to have had intercourse with her man, and that was regarded as a shameful matter.²⁴

Liang T'ing-nan, author of I-fen wen-chi 夷氛聞記 (An account of the barbarian invasion) recorded a case that a Chinese (most likely, a Cantonese) was employed as janitor to a foreign house in Macao after the Opium War. One night he heard the screams of several Chinese women who were being molested by the English barbarians. He was so indignant that he felt an impulse to kill those English by burning down the house. His action was thwarted when he considered the result that his fellow countrywomen would die with the English if he did so.²⁵ Even in Hong Kong nowadays, sexual attackers are listed as most notorious criminals. They are bound to receive cruel torments by prison officers and other prisoners.

On 25th May, the gentry of various villages held a meeting in Niu-lang-kang (牛欄崗), a hilly region about 6 kilometres to the north of Canton. They selected Ho Yü-cheng (何玉成), a chü-jen (舉人)²⁶ of P'an-yü (hsien) and Kao Liang-ts'ai (高梁才) (a gentry of P'an-hu hsien) as their

24. Kuan Lü-yin, "Kuang-tung min-tsu ti kou ch'êng ho chi shêng-ke" (The nationality and identity of the people of Kuang-tung) in Min-shih hui-k'an, Vol.1, p.80 (June 1959).

25. YPCC, 6:82.

26. A successful candidate in the provincial examination in Ch'ing dynasty.

leaders to superintend "righteous braves" from various villages. Wei Shao-kuang (魏紹光), a villager of San yuan-li was appointed to run along other villages to arouse other villagers against the British violence.²⁷ They agreed to use a three-star black flag as their standard. An oath-taking ceremony took place among the gentry, pledging to advance when it advanced and to retreat when it retreated, with no fear of casualties.

On the morning of 27th May when Sir H. Gough was about to give orders to storm the city of Canton from the Ssufang Fort, he received a despatch from Captain Elliot dated 26th instant ordering the cancellation of the bombardment of the city. The angry Gough complained: "You have placed us in a most critical situation. My men of all arms are dreadfully harrassed, my communications with the rear continually threatened and escorts attacked. My men must suffer dreadfully from the necessity of continued watchfulness..."²⁸ Gough's complaint was not groundless. During their manoeuvre from Tsingpu to Ssufang Fort their disturbance had aroused the indignation of the villagers. They would meet trouble on their return journey.

On 29th a group of British patrols passed Tung-hua-li (東華里), near San Yuan Li (三元里). They dropped into the house of Wei Shao-kuang (an active member at the Niu-lang-kang meeting on 25th) and attacked the women of the household.²⁹ The countrymen with their

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27. Lieh Tao, Ya-p'ien chan-cheng shih lun-wen ch'uan-chi (Special collection of historical articles on Opium War) (Peking, 1958), p.279.
28. R.S. Rait, The Life and Campaigns of Hugh, First Viscount Gough, Field Marshal (Westminster, 1903), I, 193.
29. Hsia Hsieh comments that the attack of the British troops to the women was the outbreak of the San-yuan-li incident, see Chung-hsi chi-shih, 6:18.

cudgels and hoes in hand went to help the females. Fighting thus started and eventually the patrols were driven out.³⁰ The next day, a group of "righteous braves" numbering 5000 marched on a hill where the British troops were encamped. Gough records: "I perceived numbers of men, apparently irregulars, and armed for the most part with long spears, shields and swords, collecting upon the heights three or four miles to my rear."³¹ He immediately divided his troops into several groups, under command of Captain Duff and Pratt, etc. and he himself kept the main force on the hill. When Gough ordered a charge to the braves, the latter retreated rapidly to a distance beyond the range of the musket. Within a brief period, more villagers joined the braves and the number of the Chinese reached 7,000. Suddenly, a gun roared out and banners ^{were} hoisted, the braves formed themselves into battle array and made an advance on their British opponents. The British this time retreated and stayed on the heights. However, the braves surrounded them without launching an attack. In the afternoon, Gough ordered another charge. Captain Duff's men were put in the centre with Captain Pratt's on his left and the Bengal volunteers on the right. The braves again gave ground. Not long after, fortune was with the braves. A heavy storm had started, that drenched all the gunpowder and rendered their muskets useless. The heavy rainfall had obliterated the paths, and the British troops were submerged in a vast expanse of water. A Chinese witness recorded: "The English soldiers in leather

30. Lieh Tao, Ya-p'ien chan-cheng, p.281. Frederic Wakeman also uses the same description of the incident of Lieh Tao, he misspells Wei Shao-kuang as Chang Chao-kuang, see Wakeman, Strangers, p.17; cf. Lieh Tao, op.cit., p.281.

31. CR, 10:540-542.

boots were not able to move an inch forward on the slippery, muddy paths."³² The braves now approached their enemies, setting ambushes to pick off a man here and a man there.³³ They, knowing that the British muskets were not working because of the rainfall, engaged in hand-to-hand combat with their ^{enemies.} This time the braves had the upper hand as far as weapons were concerned. As J. Ouchterlony remarked that the fixed bayonets of the British soldiers were a poor defence against the long spears of the Chinese.³⁴

During the storm one company of sixty sepoys and three British officers from Captain Duff's camp were sent to contact other camps. Those sixty-three men were surrounded by the braves and one of the sepoys was snatched from the ranks by a kind of Chinese hooked spear. A young officer named Berkeley and six other men tried to save him but were surrounded by the braves, who greatly outnumbered them. In the fight the braves wounded Berkeley with knives and spears; one of them picked up Berkeley's fallen musket and made his way to the woods. He dried the rain-water off the barrel and trigger of the musket and lodged a ball in Berkeley's arm. The British main force, two companies of marines with new percussion muskets were sent to rescue their surrounded soldiers. They brought them out by firing volleys. Eventually, they were able to return to camp by late evening. In the turmoil one sepoy had been killed, one officer and a dozen soldiers were seriously wounded.

32. See Lieh Tao, op.cit., p.283.

33. Cheng Heng-yü, ed. Hsü-hsiu Nan-hai hsien-chih (Revised gazetteer of Nan-hai district) (1872), 26:6-7,11, hereafter cited as HHNHHC.

34. Ouchterlony, Chinese War, p.228.

The news of the victory in San-yuan-li spread rapidly to other villages around Canton. People from more remote villages went to join the braves in the late evening of 30th. The next day Gough discovered the number of braves massing on the hillside was around ten to twelve thousands. Gough was angry with the braves. He sent a message to Yü Pao-chun (俞保純), Prefect of Canton warning that if he did not stop the hostilities of the braves, he would denounce the Peace Convention of 27th and advance to attack the city.

Having read Gough's message, the Prefect hastened to the place of confrontation, convincing Gough that the Canton authorities had not known of the braves' activities and that there were certainly no Canton officers among them. Yu together with Liang Hsing-yuan (梁星淵) and Chang Hsi-jü (張熙宇) the magistrates of Nan-hai and P'an-yü hsien, and one British officer named Moore went to talk to the braves. When they reached the braves, the latter did not allow the British officer to get through their ranks. Only the three officials went on. They told the gentry leaders to disband their braves, threatening that if they failed to do so, they would be held responsible for everything. The gentry bowed to the intimidation of Yu Pao-chun. Some slipped away, and others persuaded the braves to disperse. Leaderless, the immense crowd of braves gradually disappeared.

It is important to emphasise that the San-yuan-li incident was a spontaneous action of the gentry and the village braves; I-shan and other Canton officials had neither sponsored nor assisted them during the whole course of the incident.

However, Frederic Wakeman holds different ideas. He says:

But by March, 1841, the simple problem of defending Canton overrode any objections he might still have had. Virtually on the eve of the San-yuan-li incident, he (I-shan) found himself officially ordering "the two hsien of P'an-yu and Nan-hai to secretly defend themselves immediately." Prefect She Pao-shan had lied to General Gough that morning on the heights. The officials were indeed sponsoring the militia of the ninety-six villages.³⁵

Unfortunately, the statement is mistaken. The Chinese characters "fang 訪" and "fang 防" have confused Wakeman. "訪" means "to inquire about" and "防" means "to defend." On 28th May there was a fight between the Hunanese troops and the braves of Nan-hai and P'an-yü hsien that resulted in casualties of more than ten members in each party.³⁶ I-shan thus instructed the district magistrates of the two hsien "to inquire about" the cause of the fight.³⁷ The fight did not have a connection with the British troops, but Wakeman assumes that I-shan had ordered the braves of the two hsien to defend themselves.

In fact, I-shan had an unusual hatred for and distrust of the Cantonese. He treated them as traitors. In his early arrival to Canton, he memorialized the Emperor: "The danger lies within, not without", and he went on to say, "it is more important to defend ourself against the Cantonese than the enemy."³⁸ Disloyal Cantonese once detected were executed without trial.³⁹ When I-shan made preparations for the warfare with the British, in early May 1841, he did not consider the use of the Cantonese. He brought "water-forces" all the way from

35. See Wakeman, Strangers, p.28.

36. YPCC, 3:391; cf. IWSM, TK 30.8b, 9b.

37. IWSM, TK 30.9a.

38. YPCC, 4:102.

39. Wakeman himself also says that when the city was threatening to fall apart in late May, 1841, I-shan, who was proceeding in retinue near the Great Buddha Temple, was stopped by coolies demanding to know how he would save the city. He became infuriated and ordered some of them to be decapitated on the spot. See Wakeman, Strangers, p.52.

Fu-k'ien even though they needed heavy expenses.⁴⁰

When Sir H. Gough ordered that the city should be stormed from Ssu-fang Fort on the 26th, the Canton authorities had decided to negotiate with the British. On the same day, Lin Fu-hsiang (林福祥) sent a message to Ch'i-kung (祁工頃), the then Governor-general of Liang-Kuang, that the village braves and his "water-braves" outside the city were eager to attack the British troops. Ch'i-kung bluntly rejected his offer, saying that the Peace Convention was being negotiated between both the Chinese and British authorities. The next day the Convention was signed, and on the following day (28th May) I-shan, Lungwen and Yang Fang immediately issued a joint proclamation, stating: "... Since the peace is now resumed, the people must not create trouble. At the same time, han-ch'ien (traitorous Chinese) must be apprehended. The capture of any landing foreign parties is strictly prohibited. Any violation of the order will be punishable by martial law."⁴¹

As we have mentioned before, the Peace Convention was signed on 27th May. At that time I-shan agreed to pay 6 million silver dollars as a ransom to the city. He ordered 4 million dollars to be collected from provincial revenue-collection offices: the treasury, department of transport and maritime custom. The Hong merchants were forced to contribute 2 million dollars. Hsiao I-shan records that the money for the ransom "was collected day and night (27th to 28th) in hot

40. Fan Wen-lan, Chung-kuo chin-tai shih, p.43.

41. YPCC, 3:539.

haste."⁴² On 29th the ransom had been paid,⁴³ and the British troops withdrew from Ssu-fang Fort. If I-shan had intended to resume hostilities with the British, he would not have paid the ransom in such a quick time.

To the Chinese, the San-yuan-li incident was a great popular victory. Contemporary records exaggerate that over 200 British soldiers and two officers were killed, including a general whose head was as large as a bucket.⁴⁴ The village braves were full of groundless confidence after the incident. As one of the San-Yuan-li leaders claimed after the battle: "How can we look on the barbarian soldiers with fear? How can we think them ferocious now?"⁴⁵ Mowqua, the famous Hong merchant told Edward King of Russell and Company: "That if the mandarin had not interfered, the twenty thousand villagers who rose against the British troops would have made an end of them."⁴⁶

It is important to note that Commissioner Lin was praised by the San-Yuan-li "righteous braves". The British after the incident issued a proclamation in Chinese, saying that they would forget and forgive the attack of the villagers, but they would not tolerate further

42. Hsiao I-shan, Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih, 2:948.

43. Morse, International Relations, p.284. The third item of the "Peace Convention" stipulates that before all the money of the ransom were paid, the British troops would stay in their position (Ssu-fang Fort). The British troops withdrew from the Fort on condition that the Canton authorities had paid all the ransom.

44. The people of Kuangtung believed that the righteous braves had killed Admiral J.J. Gordon Bremer and Major Becher during the incident, see, IWSM, TK 31.19b.

45. See Wakeman, Strangers, p.58. This is a translation of Wakeman.

46. Coolidge to Matheson, 4 June 1841, unbound miscellaneous correspondence, Jardine Matheson Papers.

assaults. The angry villagers of San-yuan-li immediately retorted to the British: "You said that your ships and guns were irresistible, why did you not dare to take *the offensive* at Canton while your respectful Commissioner Lin was in office in Kwangtung instead of shifting your attack to Chekiang to harass people in T'ing-hai... The covetous minister, Ch'i-shan was deceived by your machinery of trickery. He withdrew soldiers from Shakok and Heng-tang and prohibited soldiers from attacking you."⁴⁷

During the incident the guns and muskets of the British troops were drenched because of the heavy storm. In such a situation cudgels, hoes, spears and long knives of the village braves were superior fighting weapons. On 26th May, the citizens of Canton and high-ranking officials had suffered much from the bombardment of the British artillery from Ssu-fang Fort. Unfortunately, the village braves at that time were busy with their preparation for the imminent warfare without the city and they did not have the chance to perceive the powerfulness of the British guns. In the same placard, the braves expressed their total denial of the might of the armament; "Although you (British troops) were able to occupy the Fort in the previous days, your rockets and other weapons were not useful." They even challenged the British to fight with them in land, positional, horse or common warfares. The braves also did not fear the British ships, they told their British counter-part: "As for naval battles you first withdrew your ships from the Eogue for a hundred days so that we were

47. IWSM, TK 31.17a.

able to build our ships within that period. After that, we can compete with your ships in the outer ocean. If you can beat us, (we admit that) your ships are tough (li-hai 利害)⁴⁸

Commissioner Lin no doubt appreciated the resistance of the village braves in the San-yuan-li incident, but he would not share in their contempt for the powerful British weapons. In September, 1840 Lin still kept his prejudice against the British ships which he did admit *their powerfulness* in the ocean. He memorialized the Emperor on 24th September 1839: "Because the British ships are sturdy and guns fierce, the people call them powerful... Yet they do not realize that the British battleships are very heavy, taking water to the depth of tens of feet. These vessels are successful only on the outer ocean; it is their speciality to break the waves and sail under great winds."⁴⁹ Not long after his memorial, the "water-force" engaged in a naval battle with a small fleet of British battleships at Ch'uan-pi on 3rd November of the same year and *suffered* a miserable defeat. Although Lin exaggerated the damage done to the British, he himself had experienced the might of the British ships. After his disgrace in October 1840, he sent a secret memorial to the Emperor, pointing out that ships and guns were absolutely indispensable to the naval warfare with the British. Although China was not able to develop them at the time, still the country had to plan how to acquire them. Lin suggested using one-tenth of the custom duties at Kuang-tung to develop Chinese guns and ships for the national defence. Again in 1842, Lin was exiled by the Emperor to Ili in Sin-kiang. En route, he

48. IWSM, TK 31.18b.

49. IWSM, TK 6a-9b.

wrote a confidential letter to one of his close friends in which he sadly admitted that the British "rapid-fire" guns and speedy ships were greatly superior to any the Chinese possessed, adding that "even though the rebellious English had fled and returned beyond the seas, these things (guns and ships) would still have to be quickly planned for... Moreover, unless we have weapons, what other help can we get now to drive away the crocodile and ^{to} get rid of the whales?...⁵⁰

The situation had been uneasy for the practice of conciliatory policy at Canton in 1840's. Commissioner Lin was not given a chance to fight vis-a-vis the British and to be defeated at Canton. Lin's supporters: the village braves were able to cause some minor casualties to the British troops due to the heavy thunderstorm, and believed that the British armaments were not to be feared. With such notions, the people of Kuangtung dared to challenge the arrogant British young merchants in the post-war period.

The village braves had a strong anti-urban feeling among them, they simply did not like the way Canton had been behaving: the citizens begged their Governor to take measures of expediency to save them from the British bombardment; the Canton authorities, headed by I-shan sent Yu Pao-chun and Wu Shao-yung to arrange the Peace Convention with their enemies by paying six million dollars as "ransom".

Beyond such spineless begging for suing for peace with the British, the villages had another reason to condemn the citizens. T.F. Tsiang has given us a clear picture of the activities of the people and officials within the city:

50. See Teng, China's Response, I, 28.

Even before the Opium War, facts of actual life in Canton in special did not always fit tributary system. No matter what the literati might think and emperors might decree, the craftsmen and merchants at the marts were eager for the profit they could make from trade with foreigners. Local officials were glad at the increase of customs revenue which trade with foreigners promoted and at the private fortune which they derived from concealed participation in the trade and from illegal exactions. On the other hand cessation of trade brought economic difficulties to the local population and loss to the local officials both in their public and private capacities, furthermore, it might drive the barbarians to war. It was therefore to the interest of the local officials and population to wink at irregularities of the foreigner so long as the emperor did not get wind of them. 51

On the other hand, the citizens of Canton and the Hong merchants had taken part in the opium traffic. When the Opium War began in 1839 the term "traitor" was used to indiscriminately that it came to include the opium smugglers and the entire commercial establishment of Canton. The Hong merchants got the nickname from Commissioner Lin of "chien-shang 奸商" (Traacherous merchant) Hsia Hsueh remarked that the traitorous Chinese who engaged in the opium trade, hated the strong policy of Commissioner Lin of extirpating the opium traffic. They feared that once the opium trade was captured, their livelihood (from the opium trade) would then be threatened. They even helped the British fight against their own government in the hope that the former could win the warfare and maintain the opium trade.⁵² When Lin declared a boycott against the British commercial community in December, 1839 their Chinese servants and han-chien smuggled food and other provisions to them. Later, traitorous Cantonese helped guide

51. T.F. Tsiang, "China and European Expansion" in Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, ed. Readings in Modern Chinese History (Oxford, 1971), p.131.

52. Hsia Hsieh, Chung-hsi chi-shih, 6:18; Hsiao I-shan, Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih, I, 952.

British ships along the Pearl River,⁵³ and pulled away the impediments that Lin had ordered to block the river.

The traitorous merchants on the other hand even petitioned Lin, begging him not to disturb the province's trade by declaring war with Britain. Lin was genuinely convinced that the Hong merchants had betrayed their country for the sake of commerce.⁵⁴

After the San-yuan-li incident, the "righteous villagers" distinguished themselves from those "traitorous" Chinese. In the "Placard of the righteous people of Kwangtung denouncing the English barbarians", the villagers blamed them as "fellow who renounce their fathers and ruler", but they, themselves were completely different, loyal to the existing government and not compromising with English invaders. On the same placard, the villagers said: "... we righteous people have received the favour of the Celestial Dynasty in nourishing us for two centuries. Today, if we do not exterminate you English barbarians, we will not be human beings..."⁵⁵

The distrust of the British had made the villagers become xenophobes. In the final part of the placard, they stated:

"Our hatred is already at white heat. If we do not completely exterminate you pigs and dogs, we will not be manly Chinese able to support the sky on our heads and stand firmly on the earth. Once we have said this, we will never go back on it, even if frustrated ten thousand times. We are definitely

53. W.H. Hall and W.D. Bernard, The Nemesis in China, Comprising a History of the Late War in That Country with an Account of the Colony of Hong Kong (London 1855), p.133, 139.

54. IWSM, TK 23.14a.

55. Teng, China's Response, Vol.1, p.36.

going to kill you, cut your heads off and burn you to death! Even though you ask people to admonish us, we will not obey. We must strip off your skins and eat your flesh, and then you will know how tough (li-hai) we are..." 56

In retrospect, was the movement of San-yuan-li organized by the village braves themselves, or by the gentry? The facts indicate the latter. There first took place the gathering of gentry at Niu-lan-kang on 25th May, then came the attack of the British troops on 29th May. On the other hand, it is clear that when the gentry leaders of the village braves agreed to stop hostilities against the British troops on 31st May, the braves, being leaderless, dispersed. As for the "Placard", written in such vigorous and vulgar terms, it is understandable that it must have been inspired or at least drafted by the gentry, as the illiterate villagers were not able to do the writing.

During the Opium War, the villages not only had to bear war costs, but they also suffered from disturbance by the British troops. Thanks to Lin's patriotic influence among them, they were willing to follow their gentry leaders to fight the British. The gentry, who appeared to be the mainstay of the social order, also assumed responsibility for the safety and security of the rural area in this way.

56. Teng, China's Response, I, p.36.

CHAPTER 5

MILITIA (T'UAN-LIEN) AFTER SAN-YUAN-LI

The signing of the Peace Convention of Canton on 27th May 1841, was merely a local issue between Captain Elliot and Canton leaders. In London Lord Palmerston was not satisfied with the benefit acquired by Captain Elliot in the Ch'uen-pi Convention on 1st January 1841. He therefore recalled Elliot and appointed Sir Henry Pottinger as his successor. The arrival of Pottinger at Macao and the departure of Elliot for England in August 1841 marked the beginning of a new stage in the war. Pottinger had been instructed to bypass Canton and go north to reoccupy T'ing-hai and seize the strategic points on the Yangtze River. He was invested with full powers to negotiate a treaty with the representatives of the Emperor of China.

After leaving a few ships to guard Hong Kong, Pottinger launched an expedition to the north with thirteen men-of-war, a surveying vessel and a force of 3,519 men. On 26th August, Amoy in Fuch'ien was captured.¹ On 1st October T'ing-hai was taken, now for the second time. A British provisional government was established.

At this stage, leaders of coastal provinces grew frightened of the British military success. They realized that the garrison troops were not able to cope with the invading troops. The achievement of the "righteous braves" in the San-yuan-li had offered them an idea for improving their defence. Were the braves not stronger than the garrison troops for defeating the British? In order to persuade the Emperor to allow them to use the local braves

1. CR, 10:621.

to form militia for defence, they highly praised the victory of the San-yuan-li. Liang Chang-chu (梁章鉅), former Governor of Kuang-si, recently appointed Governor of Kiangsu, impressed the Emperor: "the real factor that saved Canton from (British) destruction was a group of braves from the neighbouring villages of the city."² He suggested that the Emperor should order Ch'i-kung, the then Governor general of Liang-kuang, to train the village braves to form a military force to defend Kuangtung. Pao Shih-chen (包世臣), a famous scholar and censor of Nan-king, also suggested that the Emperor should recruit the "righteous braves" to replace the demoralised garrison troops. Yen Po-tao (顏伯焄), the Governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang, on the other hand told the Emperor that the braves when on the point of destroying the surrounded weary British troops in San-yuan-li were ordered to disperse by the Canton Prefect, Yu Pao-shun. In a memorial to the Emperor, he enclosed hand-written copies of the placards written by the San-yuan-li braves and the righteous people of Kuangtung, stressing that the braves and the people were both soldierly and loyal to the government.³ He implored the Emperor to use the "ardour of the people" to form militia as at San-yuan-li to establish a coastal defence force.⁴

On the other hand, the Canton authorities headed by Manchu and Chinese leaders found it necessary to strengthen the militia to cope with the local unrest caused by natural calamities and the scourge of war.

2. IWSM, TK 31.15a.

3. Hsiao I-shan, Ch'ing-tai t'ung-shih, II, 954.

4. IWSM, TK 30.15a-16a.

A decade before the outbreak of the Opium War, Kuangtung had been suffering from unkind tricks of nature. In 1829 high tides to "a degree unprecedented in the memory of the oldest inhabitant" flooded the provincial city and swept away villages. Hundreds were drowned, and the rice crop was largely destroyed.⁵ During the summer of 1833 and 1834, torrential rains raised the level of the rivers as much as ten feet above normal, and "boats navigated the streets of Canton." In July 1833, 10,000 lives were reported lost, 1,000 in the town of Fu-shan^{Asien} alone. Most of the rice crop was lost in 1833 and the destruction of the dykes in the southern part of Nan-hai hsien resulted in the loss of most of the silk crop.⁶ Even the temperature had been unkind to the people, for local histories record a number of cold spells and snowfalls during these years. People found their lives difficult each day. Water supply for irrigation and other benefits caused fighting between villages. At the same time, vagabonds multiplied and banditry flourished in the districts. In 1829, it was reported that 1,000 men were involved in a village feud in Hsun-teh hsien, and in 1834, 400 people were reported killed in a similar affair in Tung-kuan (東莞) hsien. The district magistrate of Nan-hai hsien in 1830 was forced to issue a proclamation in which he condemned the bandits who extorted money from the peasants.⁷ There are records in the English language published in Canton, that: "vagabonds and banditti" abounding in the countryside; and "instances of kidnapping by ex-pirates... were so

5. The Canton Register, 18 June 1829.

6. For details, see pertinent issue of CR; the Canton Register. Also KCFC, 81:306.

7. The Canton Register, 6 September 1830.

frequent that no man could feel himself safe alone in the streets of Canton after 9 o'clock at night."⁸

On the other hand, the warfare had despoiled the people of Kuang-tung. Lu Hsien-chi (魯賢基), censor of the Hu-kuang Circuit, memorialized the Emperor that the people in the coastal area had been suffering from various sorts of extortion, such as forced labour and the requisition of materials and draught animals.⁹ Although the Kuang-tung authorities got subsidies from other provincial treasuries for the warfare, local officials still squeezed money from the people in order to cover the military expenditure. Additional taxation and other extortion thus simultaneously were inflicted upon the people. Many peasants left their jobs to escape the intolerable extortion and became raacals.

Worst of all, the suspension of trade since the War had created a high number of unemployed in the province. Yung Hung (容閔) the first Chinese graduate from Yale university (also the first Chinese graduate in America), estimated that the people of Kuang-tung who were directly engaged in the foreign trade were more than 100 thousand. If the number of people who indirectly earned a living from it were also taken into consideration the amount would be more than one million.¹⁰ When jobs ran out, these people spread over the city and

8. CR, v.3, passim.

9. IWSM, TK 45.17a.

10. See Lieh Tao, Ya-p'ien chan-cheng, p. 124.

its suburbs and became trouble-makers. The situation deteriorated when Ch'i-shan disbanded the "water-braves" recruited by Lin in late 1840.¹¹ The disbanded "water-braves" together with rascals roaming the border of the provinces of Kuang-tung and Kuang-si, joined the local bandits and devastated the area. Since the local authorities were ^{un}able to apprehend them, they soon developed into a strong force.

When the British took forces up the Canton River, succeeded in occupying forts and threatened to attack Canton in early March, 1841, the officials in the city immediately settled their families to other safe places from the city. Their action had aroused the fear of the common people. Eight or nine out of every ten shops and families within the city followed suit and left the city. The rascals in the rural districts rose in hundreds or thousands, robbing and plundering. Some of them kidnapped women of the families for ransom; others killed people for their belongings. Lo Ping-chang commented that the unrest was because the garrison troops were fully engaged in the defence of the city and were not able to spare strength to protect the people.¹² British bombardment from Ssu-fang Fort in May 1841 revealed the deterioration of the unrest. One Chinese official reported: "Innumerable bodies strewed the streets. All discipline was lost; a confused clamour filled the ways, and everywhere I observed plunder and murder..."¹³

11. IWSM, TK 28.23a.

12. IWSM, TK 28.23b-24a.

13. See John F. Davis, China, During the War and Since the Peace (Londod, 1852), I, 125-127.

To decide whether or not officially to strengthen the existing militia in Kuang-tung was a difficult problem for the Emperor. It was natural that the conservative Manchu Emperor was unwilling to mobilise the militia-men to fight against the British. We can find some analogies in the European wars of liberation against Napoleon. Metternich in Austria was always hesitant to use the common people to defeat Napoleon. He wanted to defeat Napoleon with regular troops, whose obedience he could rely on.

Besides, the ancestors of the Emperor had had too much trouble in Kuang-tung in the past. In the early years of the Manchu government, Chêng Ch'êng-kung 鄭成功 (1624-1662), occupied Taiwan (Formosa) as a base to launch a bitter campaign against the government. At that time, innumerable people in Kuang-tung gathered under Chêng's flag. The Manchu government at that time had to adopt the proposal of Huang Wu (黃梧), a surrendered general from Chêng Ch'êng-kung, and put into effect a scheme of forced evacuation of all who lived within fifty li (Chinese mile) of the sea coast.

In 1674, the "Revolt of the Three Feudatories" (San-fan chih luan 三藩之亂) led by Wu San-kuei (吳三桂), Keng Ching-chung (耿精忠) and Shang Chih-hsin (尚之信) was taking place. Kuang-tung at that time was one of the strongest bases for this anti-Manchu warfare. When the Revolt failed, the "Anti-Ch'ing, Restore-Ming" ("Fan-ch'ing fu-ming 反清復明") idea was covertly preserved and nurtured in the secret society of the "Heaven and Earth Society" (T'ien-ti hui 天地會) in Southern China, especially in Kuang-tung. As we know, Hung Hsui-ch'üan, the leader of the Taiping Rebellion was a native of Hua-hsien (花縣) in Kuang-tung.

However, the situation in Kuang-tung after the San-yuan-li incident was obvious: the regular troops were proven neither able to defend the province from the English attack, nor to protect the people. Another force was urgently demanded to replace them.

The Emperor believed the memorials of his governors-general and censors that the San-yuan-li braves had killed two high-ranking English officers and soldiers in high numbers.¹⁴ What impressed the Emperor most was that the "righteous braves" in the San-yuan-li battle were different from the rebellious people of Kuang-tung in the past. The braves called themselves the "righteous people" in their "Placard" that denounced the English barbarians, and stressed that they were all gratified with the favour of the existing dynasty in nourishing them for two hundred years.

Besides, the Kuang-tung leaders had proclaimed the loyalty of the braves, adding that if the Emperor approved the form of militia in Kuang-tung, it would be supervised and commanded by the loyal and upright local gentry.

When the Emperor was still considering whether or not to use the militia, the leaders of Kuang-tung in early September, 1841 boldly told him that they had already selected certain members of the prestigious gentry to go out into the villages near Canton to summon the villagers and train militia.¹⁵ Under such circumstances, the Emperor agreed to form the militia in the province.

14. IWSM, TK 29.26b.

15. IWSM, TK 32.15b.

After all, what drove the Emperor in Peking to support the Kuang-tung leaders' initial action of using the traditional rebellious people of Kuang-tung to form militia after the San-yuan-li incident?

Frederic Wakeman holds the view that it was due to the financial reason: locally financed militia would reduce Peking's expenses for upkeeping regular troops.¹⁶

To^a certain extent, I agree with Wakeman's view. We have mentioned the frugality of the Emperor in the previous chapter. In the early stage of the Opium War, after the British had taken T'ing-hai on 5th July, 1840 for the first time, the Emperor did order the locally financed militia be used to defend the maritime provinces in order to save military expenses for maintaining regular soldiers in those places.¹⁷ However, facts indicate that the imperial approval of using the militia after the San-yuan-li incident was not chiefly devised to reduce military expenses.

As a matter of fact, the military expenses after the San-yuan-li incident in Kuang-tung were much more than the period before that.¹⁸

Military expenses below the red line were those after the San-yuan-li incident

Periods	Total Military Expenses (tael)	Days	Taels (per day)
TK 21/1/23 (14 February 1841) to TK 21/4/24 (13 June 1841)	1,074,000	121	8,876.0331
TK 21/4/24 (13 June 1841) to TK 21/10/15 (27 November 1841)	1,671,000	168	9,946.4286
TK 21/10/15 (27 November 1841) to TK 22/2/8 (19 March 1842)	1,157,879	114	10,156.833

16. Wakeman, Strangers, p.65.

17. Charles Gutzlaff, The Life of Taou-kwang, Late Emperor of China with Memoirs of the Court of Peking (London, 1852), p. 67.

18. Cf. IWSM. TK 40.32a-b.

In my opinion, the motive of the Emperor in using the militia was due to the urge of recovering lost territories. Early Manchu emperors were meritorious in enlarging the extent of the empire. The Chien-lung Emperor, the grandfather of the Tao-kuang Emperor had made the empire the second largest one in Chinese history, just next in size to the Mongol Empire. Although the Chia-ching Emperor, his father, suffered from social, economic and political decline after the Ch'ien-lung period, still he was able to put down the White Lotus Revolt at the turn of the 18th-19th centuries. Beside, he had succeeded in dismissing the British envoy, Lord Amherst, who demanded, apart from trading benefits, a port to prosper British trade in China in 1816.

The fall of T'ing-hai on 1st October, 1841 for the second time was a great insult to the Emperor. The painful feeling of the Emperor towards the British occupation of T'ing-hai is recalled in the diary of Weng T'ung-ho 翁同龢 (imperial tutor to the Kuang-hsu Emperor (1875-1908)) dated 29th May, 1866. The diary describes that the Tao-kuang Emperor during the Opium War period was very frustrated on reading the depressing military reports from his defeated generals. After the second fall of T'ing-hai, the Emperor once paid his routine visit to his mother. The latter shouted to him: "Your founding ancestors won every inch of territory and every subject of the empire with utmost difficulties, how can you lose them so easily?" The kneeling Emperor did not dare to stand up for a long while.¹⁹

The Emperor had decided to use the newly established militia in Kuang-tung to recover territories. On 20th October, 1841 he urged the Kuang-tung officials to use the militia-men to take back Hong Kong which was then occupied by the British troops.²⁰

19. Ch'ên Yün-lung, comp., Chung-ho yueh-k'an shih-liao hsüan-chi (Selected articles of the "Chung-ho monthly") (Taipei, 1970), I, 278.

20. IWSM, TK 32.17a-b.

What was militia? Were those in Kuang-tung able to come up to the expectation of the Emperor: repulsing the British troops from Chinese territories?

The foundation of militia was based on t'uan-lien 團練 (Lit. "grouping and drilling"). T'uan-lien was principally designed for local defence and based on a system of registration and conscription. It ^{was} closely tied to the civil mutual security system known as pao-chia (保甲). The pao-chia system was a Tithing system devised by Prime Minister Wang An-shih 王安石 (1021-1086) of the Sung dynasty to maintain civil mutual security. Pao-chia registered every rural household. It stipulated ten households forming one p'ai (牌), ten p'ai forming one chia (甲), ten chia forming one pao (保). The chang 長 (chief) of the pao was responsible to ^{the} local magistrate. The pao-chia posts were ordinarily assigned to commoners, the gentry not usually taking part in it.²¹ The system was an official effort to ensure that villagers formed no links with unorthodox groups. Once pao-chia was in force, one could "divide the good from the bad".²² When Commissioner Lin arrived at Canton in 1839, he enforced the existing pao-chia system and made it a useful vehicle of his authority. The opium dealers and smokers were easily distinguished among common people after the enforcement. In a short period, Lin was able to imprison opium dealers in hundreds and smokers in thousands. The enforcement of pao-chia also offered him a good base upon which he was able to select law-abiding people as "righteous braves".

21. Hsiao Kung-chüan points out that this feature of pao-chia was in fact designed partly as a counterweight to the gentry's local influence. See Hsiao Kung-chüan, Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century (Seattle, 1960), p.68.

22. Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China (Harvard University Press, 1970), p.60.

The pao-chia system, however, was not necessarily capable of defending itself, as local defence required the power of unity and a firm popular will. The functions were left to the t'uan-lien as it emphasized unity.

The t'uan-lien system originated during the late seventh century in reference to a state militia system, designed for border defence. The system was helpful, considering the inadequacy of government military power, in that it provided security for its own people and cut off their contact with the rebels. The modern meaning of t'uan-lien can be traced back to late Ming period. In 1636, Lu Hsiang-sheng/盧象昇 (1600-1639), a *brilliant general*, drew up a plan to fight the rebels who had escaped the suppression of government troops by mixing with the village people. In response, Lu built strong and thick walls in selected villages, within which would be gathered the grain supplies of the surrounding countryside. The people of these villages were to be organized into groups (t'uan 團). Each group would be supervised by a group head (t'uan-chang 團長), under each group-head was appointed a drilling-head (lien-chang 練長).²³

The village-basis system ^{on} which Lu Hsiang-sheng based his defence programme was *developed* by ^{the} Manchu government in its t'uan-lien system. "Local community schools" (she-hsüeh 社學) served as depots *for* recruiting members into t'uan-lien. According to the recruitment system, each household (hu 戶) provided one conscript for every three adult males (ting 丁), and these were then grouped into larger units to form t'uan, and drilled (lien)

23. Kuhn, Rebellion, p.41.

by the appointed trainers. There were strict rules against recruiting t'uan-lien members from outside ^{the} area in order to guarantee members in every t'uan-lien were recognized by their leaders.

The official model of t'uan-lien stressed bureaucratic lines of authority. In theory, the district magistrate was the head of t'uan-lien. He had power to examine the t'uan-lien leaders and to confirm or dismiss them. Top t'uan-lien posts were generally reserved for members of the upper gentry. The gentry's place in t'uan-lien was rationalized by the formula: "official supervision and gentry management." The gentry's power in locally financed t'uan-lien was much emphasized as the principal source of its funds came from their contribution.

In the Ch'ing period, t'uan-lien found application in large-scale battle during the White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1804). Manchu rulers before the Chia-ching Emperor (1796-1820) were able to maintain order throughout the empire. At least rebellions were not obvious in the major cities; minor disturbances there could be halted by the empire's regular troops: the Eight Banners and the Army of ^{the} Green Standard. The Eight Banners encamped in Manchuria and in and around Peking and important cities of Chihli; the Army of ^{the} Green Standard ^{was} stationed in provincial and prefectual cities outside Manchuria and Chihli. Neither force could penetrate China's village substructure where rebellions rose and flourished. They were adequate in times of relative stability but not in times of major social disruption. The Eight Banners, established at the beginning of the seventeenth century and instrumental in the Manchu takeover of China (1644), declined rapidly after the conquest. However, the force enjoyed

special privileges from the Manchu government. Housed in isolated city quarters (in a generally unsuccessful attempt to keep them separate from the Chinese population at large), Bannermen received grants of land for farming and raising livestock. In addition, they received amounts of rice, cloth, and cotton, as well as a small pension. Soon after the establishment of the Manchu regime, the Eight Banners became an expensive, cumbersome and almost useless haven of vested interest. The Army of the Green Standard, an exclusively Chinese army, comprising of Ming military remnants and additional levies. Unlike the Banner army, which the Manchus originally intended solely as a fighting machine, the Green Standard army was designed to perform a variety of diverse and often non-military functions. In addition to acting as both a national defense army and internal security force, the Green Standard provided an escort service for funds, provisions and prisoners, guarded graneries, tombs and city gates, assumed police duties such as surveillance and crime prevention, carried out postal functions, and stood ready to undertake other designated tasks, including providing labor for public works. However, the force provided a useful, indeed essential, complement to the declined Eight Banners following the Manchu conquest. Unfortunately, the Army retained its vitality for only about a hundred years, and then it too declined.²⁴

During the White Lotus Rebellion, both the Banner and the Green Standard forces were proven strengthless to cope with the rebel. Li Chien-nung (李劍農) quotes a contemporary account

24. See Stanley, Spector, Li Hung-chnag and the Huai Army: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Regionalism (Seattle, 1964), p. xxxii-xxxv.

stating that in many bitter fights with the rebels in various provinces, both forces timidly stood behind the militia-men and took no direct fight with the rebels.²⁵ After the Rebellion, militia became the backbone of the combating forces.

Militia organization in Kuang-tung was similar to those in other provinces. "Local community schools" were the foundation of militia. She-hsüeh in Kuang-tung also called as shu-yüan 書院 (college) or i-hsüeh 義學 (charity school). Its main function was to provide "place where scholars present classes and students learn." Occasionally, she-hsüeh functioned as meeting places for gentry to mediate clan disputes and feuds.²⁶ In the Ch'ing period, there were 258 she-hsüeh in Kuang-tung, sponsored by local government; 153 by private funds.²⁷

During the Opium War, she-hsüeh near Canton were actually founded specifically as t'uan-lien headquarters. They, each of which was already coordinating the gentry activities of many villages, were natural spots for the location of ta-t'uan (大團) headquarters. An office (kung-so 公所) was established by the gentry leaders to supervise the headquarters.²⁸

The militia in the Pearl River delta where the prefecture of Canton located were stronger than others all over the province, and

25. See Li, Political History of China, p.8.

26. NHHC, 15:18b-19a; T'ien Ming-yueh, ed. Hsiang-shan hsien-chih (Gazetteer of Hsiang-shan district) (1879), 15:36a.

27. Ping-ti Ho, The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368-1911 (New York, 1962), p.199-203.

28. Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu (The veritable records of the successive reigns of the Ch'ing dynasty) (1937), 394:13.

the role of gentry in those militia was very much emphasized. There are a number of reasons to account for this. The Pearl River delta is criss-crossed by an amazing number of creeks and tributaries, which rendered the enforcement of law and order difficult under any circumstances. The circumstances were definitely not favourable. The officials had neither the will nor the power to enforce the law. The vacuum left by the instituted authorities was filled to some extent by the local gentry. On the other hand, the region was the richest and most thickly settled part of Kuang-tung due to the foreign trade in Canton. For more than a century, Canton had been the only Chinese port open to foreign trade. The order in Canton and the Pearl River delta deteriorated after the flourishing or growth of the illegitimate trade in opium as the Chinese opium trafficants were well-armed and did not shun battles with government patrols.

The disorder in ^{the} Pearl River delta stimulated the co-operation of the villages for mutual defence under the leadership of the gentry. K'ang Yu-wei 康有為, the protagonist of the ill-fated Hundred Day's Reform, has left a succinct description of these entities:

"With the outbreak of troubles of the Tao-kuang (1821--1850) and Hsien-feng (1851--1861) periods, the gentry took the initiative in organizing militia to protect their villages. In case the strength of one village was insufficient, several neighbouring villages, in conformity with the dictates of topographical features, would band together to form regional alliances. Or one large village might function as the unit of defence and a corps was organized. These corps were called chü 局 (Literally, "bureau"), which regularly levied taxes and were run by a permanent staff of functionaries. Take, for example, the case of T'ung jen chü (同濟局) of Nan-hai hsien. Its jurisdiction extended over thirty-six villages with a combined population of fifty or sixty thousand people. There were two chü-chang (局長), heads of the bureau to be recruited from those holding the chin-

shih or chü-ien degrees... Thereupon, the villagers had the local gentry and the clan leaders to arbitrate their disputes and the militia, specially selected and trained to defend their properties... The organizational framework of the chü might vary in its complexity, but in the main, it was as has been set forth above. It was to be found over the greater part of the province of Kuang-tung. The managing gentry of the chü were selected by all the ranking gentry of the locality and approved by the district magistrate. There were also cases in which appointments in the chü had not been approved by the magistrate. For all major decisions, all the gentry members were entitled to participate in the deliberations."²⁹

Before the Emperor's approval of using the militia in October, 1841, local gentry had asked their officials reconstruct militia due to the local unrest. In the summer of 1841, Li Fang

(李方), a chü-jen of P'an-yü hsien, petitioned the Governor-general of Liang-kuang to be permitted to reconstruct the "Sheng-p'ing she-hsüeh" 昇平社學 (School of prosperous peace) which formed in Shih-ching (石井), a market town about four miles northwest of San-yuan-li in 1764.³⁰

After the official approval of the Peking government to strengthen the militia at the end of October 1841, the Sheng-p'ing she-hsüeh experienced rapid growth. Ho Yu-cheng and Wang Shao-kuang, the active leaders of San-yuan-li, were very happy to sponsor the Sheng-p'ing she-hsüeh. Thanks to their prestige, eleven she-hsüeh in Nan-hai and P'an-yü hsien were gathered under the banner of the Sheng-p'ing she-hsüeh. There were:³¹

<u>Names</u>	<u>Location</u>
1. "Hsun-feng (洪風) she-hsüeh"	Nan-hai <u>hsien</u>
2. "Liu-shun (六順) she-hsüeh"	Nan-hai <u>hsien</u>
3. "En-chou (恩周) she-hsüeh"	Pan-yü <u>hsien</u>

29. K'ang Yu-wei, K'ang Nan-hai kuan-chih i (A discussion of the official system by K'ang Nan-hai), 2nd ed. (Shanghai, 1905), 8:15.

30. Kuhn, Rebellion, p.71.

31. Cf. Kuhn, Rebellion, p.74.

<u>Names</u>	<u>Location</u>
4. "Huai-ch'ing (懷濟) She-hsüeh"	Pan-yü <u>hsien</u>
5. "Chung-yung (鐘鏞) She-hsüeh"	Pan-yü <u>hsien</u>
6. "Ch'eng-feng (成風) She-hsüeh"	Pan-yü <u>hsien</u>
7. "Ch'un-feng (春風) She-hsüeh"	Pan-yü <u>hsien</u>
8. "Ho-feng (和風) she-hsüeh"	Pan-yü <u>hsien</u>
9. "Hsi-hu (西湖) she-hsüeh"	Pan-yü <u>hsien</u>
10. "Lien-hu (蓮湖) she-hsüeh"	Pan-yü <u>hsien</u>
11. "Hsing-jen (興仁) she-hsüeh"	Pan-yü <u>hsien</u>

Later, Ho Yü-shu (何有書) a chin-shih of P'an-yü hsien established the "Sheng-p'ing kung-so 昇平公所" in Chiang-ts'un (江村) to recruit more members for the "Sheng-p'ing she-hsüeh". The "Kung-so" was located in a relatively poor but densely populated area near the boundary of neighbouring Hua-hsien (the home town of Hung Hsiu-ch'uan), that brought certain influences to the Rebellion in 1850. The gentry of the various she-hsüeh asked the rich people where the she-hsüeh was located to donate money. As for the poor, their direct contribution was to join the she-hsüeh. The "Sheng-p'ing she-hsüeh" and "Kung-so" were able to raise 20,000 taels in subscriptions, of which 11,000 were actually received. More than 10,000 braves were actually recruited.³²

The Emperor had taken the risk of using the rebellious people of Kuang-tung to form militia to recover Chinese territory. But was his risk worth it? I-shan, who remained Imperial Commissioner in Canton after the San-yuan-li incident, was responsible for the military action of taking back Hong Kong with the help of the newly-recruited militia-

32. Kuhn, Rebellion, p.73.

men. Unfortunately, he did not have confidence in the militia. In a report to the Emperor, he painfully told the Emperor that the some thirty-six thousand militia-men could manage to defend the strategic points of the City River, but they were not strong enough to attack the English barbarians in Hong Kong.³³

Other provincial leaders who praised the success of San-yuan-li incident had kept a large number of militia-men in their jurisdiction. Yen Po-tao, the Governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang impressed on the Emperor that the militia in the villages were well-organized, saying that once the recruitment of mercenaries (yung) was completed, he would order those forces to destroy the invading barbarians.³⁴ However, Tuan Hua (端華), the vice-president of the Board of Revenue, reported from Fu-kien during his appointment there that there were some 58,000 militia-men in that province who only protected themselves but did not help the garrison troops to fight the English. Besides, they accepted neither official order nor military grant.³⁵

In October 1841, the British troops gained several victories in Chekiang. The Emperor thus gave Associate Grand Secretary I-ching (奕經), his nephew, the title of "Majesty-Bearing General", to superintend warfare in Chekiang. After his arrival, he reported to the Emperor that there were some ninety thousand militia-men in the province. However, they were not well selected. I-ching commented

33. IWSM, TK 41.17a-b.

34. IWSM, TK 32.19b-20b.

35. IWSM, TK 41.31a.

that they could not even defend themselves, let alone attack the powerful enemy.³⁶ In another report, he told the Emperor that the militia-men had declared that in case of British attack, they would attend the battle field to increase the ranks of the Chinese camp, but they would not actually engage in fighting. I-ching thus concluded that although the number of militia-men were impressive, their combatant strength was doubtful.³⁷

What depressed the Emperor most was the traitorous action of the people of Kuang-tung and Fukien in helping the British troops to attack the Chinese garrison. In one of the battles in Chekiang in October, 1841, Yukien the then Imperial commissioner and Governor-general of Liang-Kiang reported that the British placed ten thousand rascals whom they recruited from Kuang-tung and Fu-k'ien in front of their troops while they *commanded*^{them} from behind. Those rascals were equipped with advanced British weapons. They scaled the city walls to attack and eventually succeed in occupying the city. Yukien seriously criticized the idea of using the militia-men to defend Chinese territory, saying that such characters were no different from traitors.³⁸

However, the continuation of the British attacks on Chinese territories had caused the Emperor to snatch at the use of militia. Despite the serious criticism of the militia, the Emperor did not consider disbanding this force. On 5th June 1842, he sent an edict to the Grand Secretariat to emphasize the importance of the militia:

36. IWSM, TK 41.38b.

37. IWSM, TK 42.7a-b.

38. IWSM, TK 33.34a-36b.

"As to the officers and soldiers in the army, there is a current belief among them that the sturdy ships and fierce cannons of the barbarians are irresistible. Hence, they gave up fighting the moment they saw the enemies on the battle-fields. But they should know that the cause of the invasion of the enemies was our concession at the beginning. Should every one go forth bravely and with the co-operation of the village braves, it must be obvious that not only is there great difference between us the hosts and them the strangers, but also there is no comparison between the numerical strength of the two parties." 39

On the other hand, the development of militia since the establishment of Sheng-p'ing kung-so developed in an unorthodox way. Many complicated members from the poor families in Chiang-ts'un where the Kung-So was located, had joined the t'uan-lien. Trouble thus occurred. The prestigious gentry were not willing to lead such groups of "black sheep"; the leadership was left to the less prestigious and "righteous" gentry and other minor degree-holders, such as chien-sheng 52 4 (holder of a degree obtained by purchase). The situation worsened when the War was over in August 1842. Former leaders of the Sheng-p'ing she-hsüeh, such as Ho Yu-cheng had withdrawn from their roles in the t'uan-lien. More top posts were replaced by the less prestigious gentry. The Kuang-tung authorities had less influence on the less prestigious gentry, and the t'uan-lien ran out of provincial control. Worse yet, such kind of gentry and minor degree-holders had never before experienced the power of leading t'uan-lien. Once they landed such positions they tried to hold on to them. Some of them even made use of their position to build up their own power. To arouse popular sentiment to

39. See P.C. Kuo, A Critical Study of the First Anglo-Chinese War (Shanghai, 1935), p.290. This is a translation of Kuo.

fight against the British invaders was a good means to this end. At the same time, they had to condemn the provincial leaders and the garrison troops who were not able to protect the people so as to draw the popular support to their side. Ch'ien chiang (錢江), a chien-sheng from Chekiang was a good example. He went to Canton to try his luck when the Opium War began. At that time, the rural gentry near Canton recruited braves to protect their villages. Ch'ien managed to register as a local ting (丁) and entered the t'uan-lien. As he was a chien-sheng he was entitled to become a leader of a small t'uan-lien unit. During ^{the} San-yuan-li incident, he led a t'uan-lien unit to fight the British troops and was much in the public eye. After the Opium War, he got the opportunity to lead a large group of t'uan-lien with financial support from a local notable named Su Lang-Jao (蘇朗堯).⁴⁰ In November, 1842, he posted a proclamation in the Confucian temple (Ming-lun-t'ang 明倫堂) ferociously condemning the British invaders who brought opium to China, sapping the country of her riches and her people of their health. At the same time, he humiliated the provincial leaders for "valuing their lives being as heavy as mountains; the civil and military officers feared the barbarians as if they were tigers. They ignored the peril of the country and the lamentation of the people, doing everything according to their own will as well as to cede (Chinese) territories and pay huge indemnities (to the English invaders)."⁴¹ He stimulated the people to defend themselves by their own strength and curb the further invasion of

40. See Wakeman, Strangers, p.69.

41. YPCC, 3:354.

the English. The immediate result of Ch'ien Chiang's militant proclamation was the anti-foreign disturbance. On 7th December, a group of some 170 lascars appeared in the factory area without officers. They started a quarrel with some Chinese fruit-sellers. The quarrel soon turned into a street riot. During the affray, one Chinese was stabbed and several lascars were injured. Due to the increasing number of Chinese during the affray, the lascars sought refuge in the British factory, which became the focus of attack from the angry Chinese. By midnight the British factory was ablaze. Within a short period, the fire spread to other factories (Greek and Dutch factories). By that time plunder and looting had started. The riot did not disperse until the arrival of 200 Chinese troops.⁴²

42. PP, Correspondence respecting insults in China (London, 1857), p.1-10, hereafter cited as Insults; CR, 11:687-688; IWSM, TK 64.20a-22b.

PART TWO

CH'I-YING'S CONCILIATORY POLICY AND ITS FAILURE

CHAPTER 6.

CH'I-YING AND THE TREATY OF NANKING

The second British occupation of T'ing-hai on 1st October, 1841 had frightened the Emperor. Sir Henry Pottinger made an announcement after the occupation: "... Under no circumstance will T'ing-hai and its dependencies be restored to the Chinese government, until the whole of the demands of England are not only complied with but carried into full effect."¹

After the occupation of T'ing-hai, what shocked the Emperor most was the fall of Chen-hai (鎮海) on 10th October. Chen-hai lay on a narrow peninsula, between the mouth of the Yung River and the sea. At the tip of this peninsula, commanding both the town and the mouth, was a great cliff over two hundred feet high, with very steep sides and a citadel on top. Chen-hai had formidable defences and was under the strict command of the Mongol Imperial Commissioner, Yukien. During the battle, Yukien placed himself at the front of the fighting to encourage the spirits of the garrison troops.² However, although the Chinese soldiers, had the geographical advantage of height, they were not able to obstruct the advance of the scaling British. Yukien committed suicide by throwing himself into the river when the British broke into the city.

The fall of Chen-hai proved that the British were not only well-versed in sea battle, but also in land combat. In a joint memorial, Ch'i-ming-pao (奇明保), the then Tartar-general of Hangchow

1. This is a quotation from Beeching, Chinese Opium War, p.137.

2. See IWSM, TK 34.22a.

(Chekiang) and Liu Yun-ke, the governor of Chekiang, told the Emperor that the British troops were able to scale the cliff and climb the city walls to occupy Chen-hai, adding that the rumour that once the British went ashore they would lose their vigour, was completely groundless.³

Three days after the occupation of Chen-hai, the British captured Ningpo (寧波). The irrational Emperor ignored the bare fact that the Chinese forces were no match to their British opponents. On 18th October he gave Associate Grand Secretary I-ching (英紹), his nephew, the title of "Majesty-Bearing General", with Wen-wei (文蔚) and Te-i-shun (特依順) as his deputies. They were given troops transferred from the interior, and sent to Chekiang to recover the cities of T'ing-hai, Chen-hai and Ningpo.⁴

The appointment of I-ching was similar to that of I-shan in January of the same year. These two appointments throw significant light on the conduct of the war whenever the British occupied Chinese territory, the furious Emperor would immediately order his own relatives to gather troops from various provinces to recover the lost territory. The loss of territory was considered a great offence to "the prestige of the Celestial Empire."

The reasons why the Emperor preferred appointing the Manchus rather than Chinese to superintend important actions of the war with the British are understandable. On the one hand, the Emperor, being himself an alien ruler in China, did not want the Chinese to

3. IWSM, TK 35.3a-b.

4. IWSM, TK 35.9b.

superintend large forces. On the other hand, the Chinese were less belligerent than the Manchus. While the former studied the classics, the latter were more inclined to practise archery and horsemanship.

The Emperor practically overlooked the fact that I-shan, his nephew and the troops from the various provinces had received a humiliating defeat from the British at Canton in May 1841. This time the Emperor pinned his hopes on I-ching, another of his nephews, to lead the troops from the various provinces to drive away the British. When I-ching showed confidence that he would no doubt recover the three lost cities, the Emperor praised him adding that he was waiting for his future victory.⁵

By the end of 1841, the Emperor with groundless confidence decided to launch counter-attacks against the British not only in Chekiang, but also in Canton. At the beginning of 1842, the Emperor reproached I-shan for not holding firm either by attacking the British troops at Hong Kong or strengthening the defence of Canton, but instead wasting more than 300 thousand taels per month to maintain the military forces.⁶ Ch'i-ying, the military governor of Shêng-ching (盛京), the home base of the Manchus, was appointed as "Tartar General of Canton" on 24th February 1842 to take charge of military affairs in Canton in the hope that he would recover Hong Kong. In early March, Ch'i-ying was ordered to hasten to his new post. On the other hand, I-ching, Wen-wei and Te-i-shun started their counter-attack on the cities of T'ing-hai, Chen-hai and Ning-po on 10th October. However,

5. IWSM, TK 44.8a.

6. IWSM, TK 43.16b-17a.

they were not able to drive the British from the cities. A large number of Chinese soldiers were killed in these attacks. The warfare in Chekiang at that time was much more serious than that of Canton. Ch'i-ying on his way to Canton was detained at Hangchow in Chekiang. He was ordered to stay at that city to act as Tartar General instead of going to Canton.⁷

Ch'i-ying was a member of the Manchu Plain Blue Banner and an imperial clansman.⁸ His forefathers were not particularly renowned. The existing Chinese documents concerning his family background start with his father, Lu K'ang (祿康), who had a good record in dealing with academic affairs, but was bad at military administration. He first served as secretary in the Imperial Clan Court (宗人府) and was later promoted to the post of Grand Secretary in 1804. After Lu-K'ang became the commandant of the Peking Gendarmerie in 1809, his inability to discipline his inferiors was noticed. In 1811 he was accused of failing to prohibit gambling by the officials under his jurisdiction. Two years later, while he was serving as lieutenant-general of the Plain Yellow Banner, several of his soldiers joined the rebels who attacked the palaces in Peking. As a result he was exiled to Ili, Sin-kiang and died there.⁹

Ch'i-ying landed the post of supernumerary secretary in the Imperial Clan Court in 1806 by virtue of his status as a yin-sheng

7. IWSM, TK 44.35b.

8. Clansmen were direct male descendants of Nurhachi (1583-1615), the founder of the Ch'ing dynasty. Clansmen were entitled to wear the "yellow girdle" (黃馬褂) in order to show their nobility.

9. See Hummel, Eminent Chinese, I, 130.

(廕生).¹⁰ He became the administrator to the Imperial Clan Court in 1813. Two years later he served as the superintendent of customs at Shanhai-kuan (山海關),¹¹ and held the post until 1819. In 1820 he served as sub-chancellor of the Grand Secretariat.

When the Tao-Kuang^{Emperor} ascended to the throne in 1820, Ch'i-ying enjoyed more influential and lucrative posts. He was promoted chancellor of the Grand Secretariat, with concurrent titles of vice-president of the Board of Rites, and superintendent of the Summer Palace (Yuan-ming-yuan 圓明園) in 1820. In the later years, Ch'i-ying became the president of the Board of Ceremonies in 1834, and shifted to take charge of the Board of Revenue in the same year. In 1836 he chaired the Board of Civil Appointments. From 1824 onwards, Ch'i-ying was also given top posts in military affairs: lieutenant-general of the Plain Yellow Banner (1824); commandant of the Peking Gendarmerie (1827-37). In June 1838 he became military governor of Shêng-ching (盛京), which entailed residence at Mukden. He kept the post until he was appointed Tartar-general of Hang chow in 1842.

Ch'-ying did not have a meritorious record in the civil service. In fact before his appointment as military governor of Shêng-ching, he was accused three times of malpractices which included corruption. In 1827, when the people of Yuan-ping hsien (宛平縣),¹² made a request

10. Yin-sheng was the son of a distinguished official holding a rank conferred in recognition of the latter's contribution to the Manchu government.

11. Shan-hai-kuan (Mountain and Sea Pass) was a key pass in the Great Wall in Northern China.

12. Yuan-ping hsien of Hopei is famous for its Marco Polo Bridge 盧溝橋 (located in the southern part of Peking). On 7th July, 1937, the Japanese warlords started their invasion in China with the pretext that a Japanese soldier had got lost in a military exercise.

to start mining silver in their district, the idea was rejected by the imperial court.¹³ Ch'i-ying made use of his administrative influence in the Board of Revenue eventually to approve the proposal. He was demoted by 2 grades when someone exposed this matter to the court. In 1830 Ch'i-ying was involved with the issue of a false document from the same Board, demanding donation. Again, Ch'i-ying was degraded by 2 grades. In November 1836, he was charged with illegally releasing a eunuch, Chang Tao-chung (張道忠), who had been gambling in the imperial court. This time he was accused by the Emperor himself of "practising favoritism" and was degraded to the rank of vice-president of a Board.¹⁴

Despite his malpractice in office, Ch'i-ying was able to regain high offices after short periods of demotion. He was after all an imperial clansman. Besides, he had an intimate relationship with the imperial house and the Tao-kuang Emperor. His sister was married to a member of the imperial house;¹⁵ and his niece was married to the Tao-kuang Emperor.¹⁶ Ch'i-ying himself was a childhood playmate of the Emperor. Through the reign of Tao-kuang (1820-1850), Ch'i-ying enjoyed special preferment from the Emperor and escaped serious punishment under imperial mercy.

13. In order to safeguard its silver resources, the Manchu government set up strict regulations for the mining of silver. In 1833 Lin Tse-hsú and then Governor-general of Liang-Kiang proposed to the Emperor that the govt. should coin silver dollars. However, the Emperor was not willing to use the silver reserves. He turned down Lin's proposal, adding that it was wholly incompatible with long-established usages (ta-pien ch'eng-fa, pu-ch'eng shih-t'i 大變成法, 不成事體), see Chang, Commissioner Lin, p.124.

14. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, I, 130-131.

15. See Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, I, 92.

16. Davis, China during the War, I, 251.

Unlike a provincial leader whose success in the bureaucracy was based on the merit of his record within his own sphere, the political success of an imperial clansman, apart from earning trust from the emperor, depended on support from influential figures in the imperial court. Ch'i-ying in his long service in different Boards and in the Imperial Household had built up a close relationship with Mu-chang-a, another clansman and the chief grand councillor who had a good deal of power because he had the ear of the Emperor. The British also observed the intimate relationship between the two clansmen. The British diplomatic correspondence with China in the post-war period were always addressed to Ch'i-ying and Mu-chang-a.¹⁷

The Ch'ing officials who dealt with foreign affairs before the Opium War actually executed the instruction of Peking. Even though they realized that the government policy was not suitable, they still had to implement it. But Ch'i-ying made an exception after the war. Due to his intimate relationship with the Emperor and Mu-chang-a, he was able to hold his own views in foreign policy, which made him a colourful diplomat.

When the Opium War broke out, Ch'i-ying, who was in the post of military governor of Shêng-ching, was ordered to prepare the coastal defence of the Liao-tung Peninsula (遼東半島). In a report to the Emperor in January, 1839, he listed twelve items in his defence programme, including the practice of the pao-chia system among the bannermen; constant drilling of the garrison troops; the use of

17. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, I, 133.

militia; the improvement of fire-arms; the speeding up of military dispatches between Peking and Mukden and the evacuation of the coastal people and their cattle and other military materials.¹⁸ In his comment on Ch'i-ying's defence programme, the Emperor acclaimed it as an exemplary stratagem.¹⁹

After the capture of T'ing-hai by the British troops on 5th July, 1840, the British were proven well-versed in naval warfare. Ch'i-ying at that time voiced his opinion that he disagreed with the Chinese forces engaging in naval battle with the British any more. However he shared the same idea of other provincial leaders that Chinese troops were able to defeat the British in land battles. He suggested that once the British troops had left their ships to go ashore, the Chinese soldiers should first lure them to move inland and then block their return journey. The Chinese troops should then encircle the British troops and attack them with a shower of musket shots and arrows.²⁰ If the British ships occupied Chinese strategic harbours, Ch'i-ying deemed that the Chinese soldiers could disguise themselves as fishermen to approach the British ships on the pretext of selling fish to them. In this case, the Chinese soldiers could know the actuality of the British ships. In the middle of the night, they could attack their ships with fire.²¹

18. IWSM, TK 19.22b-25b.

19. IWSM, TK 19.25b.

20. IWSM, TK 39.45b-46a.

21. IWSM, TK 39.48a.

The development of Ch'i-ying's strategy was influenced by the current rumour. Ch'i-ying shared the mistaken idea of his contemporaries that the British, although good at using firearms, did not know how to use swords. Besides, their waists were stiff and their legs were bound with cloths. Once they had fallen down, they could not stand up again. Under such circumstances, the British troops would not be able to cope with the Chinese soldiers. Besides, Ch'i-ying believed that the British had poor eye sight, and that they could only see things at a short distance. In the middle of the night, they would lose their eye sight completely.²²

As far as the defence in Shêng-ching was concerned, Ch'i-ying revealed his idea in a report to the Emperor that the local troops, although not able to launch attacks on the invading British, could defend themselves by using topographical protection. As for principle of the military action, Ch'i-ying insisted that the Chinese troops should first show the might of their military power to the British troops and then conciliate them afterwards in order to manifest the dignity and the grace of the empire.²³ Fortunately, Shêng-ching at that time was not engaged with actual fighting with the British troops, otherwise, Ch'i-ying would face the same fate of other defeated generals in various provinces and receive severe punishment.

22. IWSM, TK 39.48a.

23. Shih-liao hsun-k'an, 35, ti, 288b.

Ch'i-ying, while strengthening the defence in Hangchow, paid special attention to the manoeuvres of the British fleet. He reported to the Emperor that more than twenty British battleships had gathered near Cha-pu (乍浦), intending to occupy that city. Under these circumstances, he had assigned I-li-pu together with Hsien-ling (咸齡) to Cha-pu to try to "chi-mi" 羈縻 (halter) the British in order to save the city from attack.²⁴ The Emperor at that time received a report from a censor, Su T'ing-k'uei (蘇廷魁), saying that a rumour was spreading that Britain had been attacked by her feuding enemies. The battle ships engaged in warfare in Chinese water had been ordered back.²⁵ With this good opportunity, the Emperor decided to gather all the available military forces to make a counter-attack on the British invaders. In this case, Ch'i-ying's effort of "haltering" the British in Cha-pu would affect the fighting spirit of the troops. The Emperor thus ordered Ch'i-ying to leave Hangchow for Canton, telling him to report on the progress of the defence in Bogue. He was also ordered to recover Hong Kong, a rescript which I-shan could not fulfill. Having the wrong idea that the British were having trouble themselves in their own country, the Emperor proclaimed: "Why should the rebellious barbarians be allowed to keep it (Hong Kong) permanently!"²⁶

During his appointment as the Tartar General of Hangchow in May 1842, Ch'i-ying was able to escape from actual fighting with the British troops. Being the commander-in-chief in Hangchow, he was responsible for the safety of that city. The British, however, did

24. IWSM, TK 47.44a-b.

25. IWSM, TK 47.42b.

26. IWSM, TK 47.43a-b.

not attack Hangchow, but shifted their attack to Cha-pu where I-ching suffered a serious defeat on 18th May. After the fall of Cha-pu, Ch'i-ying was ordered to take charge of the defence of the whole of Chekiang province. If the British launched attacks and defeated Chinese troops in that province at that time, he was bound to suffer defeat and be punished by the Emperor. However, the British after the capture of Cha-pu, moved their offensive to Kiangsu.

On 16th June the British attacked the fort of Woosung (吳淞), the port of Shanghai, which was protected by heavy lines of defence works superintended by Niu Chien (牛鑑), the Governor-general of Liang-kiang. The Chinese soldiers resisted the British boldly. But within a short period the British took the port by storm. Over three hundred guns were captured by the British troops.²⁷ With the fall of Woosung the city of Shanghai was at the mercy of the British. It eventually fell on the 19th of June 1842. The Emperor at that time still insisted upon war. Probably the extension of the warfare by the British had caused him consternation. After the loss of Woosung and Shanghai, Niu Chien requested that he be allowed to break off hostilities with the British through negotiations.²⁸ The angry Emperor warned him: "Your request aggravates my anxiety and anger."²⁹

It is important to note that Ch'i-ying after a short span of time (from May to July 1842) in the combatant province of Chekiang had perceived the backwardness of the Chinese armaments and the superiority of that of the British. He felt sure that China at that

27. IWSM, TK 48.1a-b. For details of the battle, see CR, 11:398; IWSM, TK 50.14b-24b.

28. IWSM, TK 53.24b-27b.

29. IWSM, TK 53.28a.

time should end the war with the British as the continuation of the war could only result in causing more casualties to the Chinese soldiers and increasing local unrest. Without much hesitation Ch'i-ying exerted himself in the matter of conciliating the British in order to be able to start peace negotiations with them. In a report to the throne in the post war period, Ch'i-ying recalled that his peace-making motivation arose from his observation of the destruction on the battle fields in Chekiang and Kiang-su after the British attacks from May to July 1842. The serious destruction of the defence works by the British armament had frightened him. After his investigation of the ruins of the combatant provinces and the description of the natives about the British damage in those places, Ch'i-ying concluded that the superiority of the British armament was the sole reason for the British military victory in China. He ascertained that the Chinese troops in the battle fields were brave to meet their enemies. However, no matter how gallantly they fought, they still lost the battle. Ch'i-ying pointed out that the British cannons were able to reach the Chinese front from ten to twenty li away, while the Chinese guns failed to reach the British because of their limited range of a few li. Besides, the British cannons were swift and movable while the Chinese guns were heavy and immovable.³⁰

The above statement of the power of British armament had been proven in the battles for the defence of Woosung on 16th June 1842. On the eve of the battle, Chen Hua-ch'eng (陳化成), Admiral of Kiangnan, assured Niu Chien that he saw no difficulty in checking the British

30. Shih-liao hsun-k'an, 35, ti, 288b-289a.

attack as he himself had spent half a century in naval service and had won innumerable naval victories. Niu Chien, impressed by the confidence of Admiral Ch'en, bravely reported to the Emperor that he had no doubt about being able to check the British attack.³¹

When the British attacked Woosung, Niu Chien, like other brave generals, appeared on the battle front in order to strengthen the morale of the Chinese troops. But the British cannons were fierce, Niu Chien reported: "... innumerable (British) cannon balls flying in awful confusion through the expanse of Heaven, fell before, behind, and on either side of him, while in the distance he saw the ships of the barbarians, standing erect, lofty as the mountains. The fierce daring of the barbarians was inconceivable. Officers and soldiers fell at their posts. Every effort to resist and check the coast was in vain, and a retreat became inevitable."³² After his experience in the battlefield and his witnessing of the course of the war, Niu Chien assured the Emperor that the Chinese troops were not able to withstand the attack of the barbarians. It was not that they were timid, but in fact that their enemies were too powerful.³³

After making the Emperor realize that the Chinese armaments were inferior to those of the British, Ch'i-ying took steps to persuade the Emperor to reach peace with the British. As an imperial clansman, Ch'i-ying knew the real fear of the Manchu court: the unrest from within was more much more dangerous than the crisis from without to

31. IWSM, TK 50.26b.

32. CR, 11:455-456; IWSM, 51.16a-18a.

33. IWSM, TK 51.30b-31a.

an alien regime. The War had already stirred up local disturbance. Not only the British invaders looted and plundered the common people; the local rascals, making use of the warfare, committed the same crime. (People leaving the combatant cities to the suburbs to avoid British plunder were looted by the local rascals). It was understandable that the destitute people driven by hunger and insecurity would accept British rewards to fight against their government troops. The situation became worse in the spring of 1842. Before the fall of Cha-pu on 18th May 1842, Ch'i-ying warned the Emperor that if the city of Cha-pu were captured by the British, the popular fear in the provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang would increase.³⁴ Ch'i-ying in late June went further to warn the Emperor that the British tried to draw the Chinese people on to their side to use them to fight against the Chinese troops. The British, he continued, after occupying Shanghai, distributed imperial grain to the local people and claimed that they were not in hostility with the common people. They were eager to build up a close relationship with them. The British invited the Chinese traders and people in the vicinity of Shanghai city to trade with them in the city.³⁵ In early July, Ch'i-ying plainly opined that the disastrous factor of the empire at that time was not the invading British but the small group of Chinese traitors who secretly schemed to make use of the local unrest to fish in troubled waters. He suggested that it was wise for the government

34. IWSM, TK 47.44b.

35. IWSM, TK 53.9b-10a.

not to dissipate too much of its military power in fighting with the British troops, otherwise, when the traitor-led revolts broke out, the government would not have enough power to suppress them.³⁶

The Tao-kuang Emperor and his officials during the Opium War were imbued with an idea that "the greed of the British barbarians knows no bounds", and that "the empire was being conquered". Ch'iying in this respect was able to relieve the fear of the Emperor. By the end of May 1842, he told the Emperor that when I-li-pu sent an emissary, Ch'en Chih-kang (陳志剛),³⁷ to see the British in one of their battleships, a British chieftain named Kuo (the interpreter Gutzlaff) told Ch'en that the British expeditionary force sought not war but trade.³⁸ Later, he made this point clear to the Emperor: "Although the demands of the barbarians are indeed rapacious, yet they are little more than a desire for ports and for the privilege of trade. There are no dark schemes in them. Compared with war which inevitably entails great disasters, we would rather see assent be given to their demands and thus save the whole country south of the Yangtze."³⁹

Chi-ying was finally made chief negotiator. However, he understood that the Emperor had suffered loss of dignity by appointing him to the negotiation table. Certain national assets would have

36. IWSM, TK 54.36b-37a.

37. Ch'en had been serving as an officer in Canton garrison in 1843, see Earl Swisher, China's Management of the American Barbarians: A Study of Sino-American Relations, 1841-1861, with Documents (New Haven, 1951), p.33.

38. See Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, I, 94.

39. IWSM, TK 58.35a.

to be paid in order to buy off the British. How to keep the Emperor always frugal and yet conscious of appearances, to agree to his idea of conciliating the barbarians during the negotiation became the tough job for Ch'i-ying.

After the capture of Chen-hai and Ning-po by the British in October 1841, Liu Yün-ke (劉韻珂) insisted on the necessity of conciliating the British barbarians. Liu told the Emperor that the British troops were able to "break through the ranks of the Chinese troops whenever they liked." The British "being ten thousand men of one mind" made forward march and never retreated" on the battle-fields. On the contrary, Liu pointed out: "The failing morale of our soldiers is caused by repeated defeats." The Chinese soldiers with "timorous hearts", on hearing that they were to be sent to fight with the barbarians became "shuddering and terrified ". He concluded that it was difficult for China either to attack or defend. It was also hard to conciliate the barbarians.⁴⁰

However, the Emperor did not appreciate this bare-fact statement of Liu. Liu's memorial indeed fitted a Chinese proverb: "Chang T'a-jen ch'i-yen; mieh tzu-chi wei-feng 長他人氣; 減自己威風" (lit. raising the arrogance of others by lessening the grandeur of oneself). Even after the fall of Cha-pu, the Emperor still insisted: "Should everyone (officers and soldiers) go forth bravely and fight with the advantage of knowing our own geography, there is no difficulty for us in achieving (military) success." He was also confident that if commanders and governors aroused "their conscience" to fight the

40. IWSM, TK 35.5a-6b.

English barbarians, China would surely defeat her enemies. He added: "I see no reason why any attack launched by us cannot achieve success, nor why any defence made by us is not impregnable."⁴¹

Ch'i-ying knew the character of the Emperor that he could not bear too much hurt on his grandeur. During the negotiations with the British in the middle of August, Ch'i-ying tried his best to make the Emperor feel at ease about conciliating the British. Although he knew that only the appeasement policy could save the country from further British encroachments, he still assumed a bellicose attitude to suit the Emperor's character. In his report dated 17th August 1842, he opined: "We will presently negotiate with them (barbarians) according to the conditions they proposed, and in the meantime we will petition the favour of your Majesty to give assent thereto. But should the animal temper of the barbarians still refuse to obey these commands, we have no alternative other than to stir up our soldiers and officers to make a last defence of the city regardless of what might be the consequences, victory or defeat."⁴² With these words Ch'i-ying was able to make the Emperor accept the peace terms with a certain dignity. What would happen if the negotiation broke down? Ch'i-ying later mentioned in his report: "Should we fail to take advantage of the occasion (negotiation), and fail to ease the situation by soothing the barbarians, they will run over our country like beasts, doing anything they like."⁴³

41. IWSM, TK 49.2b-3b.

42. IWSM, TK 58.35a-b.

43. IWSM, TK 59.32b.

CHAPTER 7

CHI-YING'S CONCILIATION POLICY AND HIS APPOINTMENT AS IMPERIAL
COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

After tedious negotiations headed by Ch'i-ying and Sir Henry Pottinger, the Treaty of Nanking was signed on 29th August 1842. A supplementary Treaty of ^{the} Bogue with eight regulations (shan-hou chang-ch'eng 善後章程) regarding the Treaty of Nanking was drawn up by Huang En-tung (黃恩彤) and Hsien-ling (咸齡), subordinates of Ch'i-ying and the British interpreters and completed on 8th October 1843. It was agreed by Ch'i-ying and Sir Henry Pottinger that they should meet in Kuangtung in November of the same year to settle the new tariff system for the post-war period. Ch'i-ying was ready for that mission. Early in October 1842, he reminded the Emperor that he should proceed to Canton from Nanking to settle the tariff system with the British first and afterwards he would arrange the same tariff system in the other four treaty ports.¹ To his surprise, the Emperor in his edict of 17th October, appointed Ch'i-ying as the Governor-general of Liang-Kiang; I-li-pu his deputy in managing the Treaty of Nanking, now handicapped by infirmities, was made imperial commissioner and Tartar General of Canton to settle the tariff system with Huang En-t'ung and Hsien-ling as his deputies.²

Immanuel C. Y. Hsü holds the view that Ch'i-ying's appointment to Nanking as Governor-general there^{was} "an indication of the need for a man of his experience take charge of the

1. IWSM, TK 61.23b.

2. IWSM, TK 61.25b.

opening of ports, the development of trade regulations, and the general superintendence of Sino-Western relations in Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Fukien."³ Probably the immediate diplomatic issue awaiting solution was the tariff system in Canton. The tariff system of the foreign trade was not negotiated by Chinese and British authorities until 17th November 1843, Ningpo in December 1843; Foochow and Amoy in June 1844.⁴ The appointment of Ch'i-ying and I-li-pu on 17th October was in fact a demonstration that the latter had entrusted a more influential task in foreign diplomacy than the former. Other facts also illustrated the loss of imperial favor of Ch'i-ying. Immediately after the Treaty of Nanking, Ch'i-ying emphasized in a memorial that Huang Eh-t'ung and Hsien-ling, who had devoted themselves to the Treaty of Nanking, should be raised in rank.⁵ But the Emperor only agreed to consider their promotion after the conclusion of work in Canton.⁶ Also, the Emperor made it clear that Ch'i-ying's management of the tariff negotiations in Kiangsu, Chekiang and Fukien should be discussed with I-li-pu and the local authorities in those provinces.⁷

The fact that the former chief negotiator of the Treaty of Nanking immediately after the Treaty of Nanking was only given authority to

3. Hsu, Rise, p.243.

4. See Morse, International Relations, p.346, 359, 361, 362.

5. IWSM, TK 61.18b-20a.

6. IWSM, TK 61.25b-26b.

7. IWSM, TK 61.28b-29a. For example, when Ch'i-ying proposed the idea that "Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment" should be granted to the United States and France on 18th January 1843, the Emperor instructed I-li-pu to make a comment on Ch'i-ying's idea, see IWSM, TK 64.46a.

have general superintendence of barbarian affairs, but had no direct say in the post-war negotiation needs explanation. During the negotiation of the Treaty, Ch'i-ying arrived at Nanking on 11th August 1842. He immediately sent Chang-hsi (張喜), the retinue of I-li-pu to have preliminary discussions with J.R. Morrison.⁸ At the same time, Ch'i-ying implored the Emperor that when the negotiation reached a certain stage, he should go to meet the barbarian chieftain in order to conclude the Treaty.⁹ But the Emperor instructed him not to do so. An imperial edict of 17th August addressed to Ch'i-ying reads: "(since) the barbarians are extremely tricky, the Imperial Commissioner should not present himself to meet the barbarians ... Only after the complete retreat of the barbarian ships (from Chinese water), could the said Commissioner choose a suitable place and summon the barbarian chieftains to the meeting. The said Commissioner must not recklessly board the barbarian ship since it might result in an accident."¹⁰ The Emperor treated the Imperial Commissioner's boarding on a barbarian ship as a symbol of loss of imperial dignity. However, before the edict reached Ch'i-ying,¹¹ he, on 20th August had accepted the invitation of Sir Henry Pottinger and led his colleagues to visit the British battleship, Cornwallis. Although Ch'i-ying was given full power as Imperial Commissioner to negotiate with the

8. Son of the first Protestant missionary to China.

9. IWSM, TK 58.32b-33a.

10. IWSM, TK 58.33b-34a.

11. The maximum speed of correspondence normally obtainable was five days from Peking to Nanking.

British, all the important decisions on the Chinese side had to have the permission of the Emperor before any action could be taken.

Ch'i-ying later explained to the Emperor that his boarding the British ship was to dispel suspicion and show earnestness to the British, so that he could achieve the peace settlement.¹² However, the Emperor would be angry with him because he took the initiative to approach the barbarians without imperial permission.

Ch'i-ying's awkward behaviour in trying to please the British would also arouse the consternation of the Emperor. At one banquet at Nanking after the signing of the Treaty, Ch'i-ying kept on asking Sir Henry Pottinger to open his mouth while he swiftly popped into it several immense sugar-plums.¹³ At another banquet Ch'i-ying *misbehaved whilst* a drinking with J.R. Morrison. After the banquet, I-li-pu angrily told Chang-hsi: "the behaviour of General Ch'i in greeting the barbarians is extremely unseemly."¹⁴ It is not surprising that I-li-pu himself or other members of his suite who attended the banquet had reported the unseemly behaviour of Ch'i-ying to the Emperor. Ch'i-ying's action and behaviour could not be pardoned by his contemporaries. Before the Treaty of Nanking, Ch'i-ying's boarding of the barbarian ship could be explained as being for the purpose of achieving peace. But his behaviour in amusing the British chieftain after the signing of the Treaty would receive criticism. The Emperor

12. IWSM, TK 67.4b-5a.

13. G.G. Loch, The Closing Events of the Campaign in China (London, 1842), p.170.

14. See Chang Hsi, Fu-i jih-chi (Diary during the course of conciliating barbarians) in Shen Yün-lung, ed. Chin-tai chung-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-k'an (Collected materials on modern Chinese history) (Taipéi, 1970), series 39, v.387, p.85.

who abhorred the invasion of the British barbarians might deem that his behaviour was a matter of trying to build up a relationship with the arch-enemies.

It is important to note that on the eve of the signing of the Treaty of Nanking, the Emperor had a different idea from Ch'i-ying on dealing with the British. The Emperor mentioned in his imperial edict: "the encroachment of the barbarians has seriously affected the lives of the people and the foundation of the empire. Although I cannot relieve the anguish in this respect, I cannot but agree to what they request, hoping that the efforts (in the establishment of the Treaty) which have been exerted are able once and for all to save future trouble."¹⁵ After the War, Ch'i-ying held the idea that although China had ceased hostilities with the British, it was necessary for him to maintain a friendly relationship with the British chieftains with both sincerity and a certain condescension.

Ch'i-ying's personal background (his intimate relationships with the Emperor and Mu-Ch'ang-a which was able to save him from punishment for official malpractice) might make him believe that discrepancy between the two parties could be solved by personal relationships. He could as well build up this sort of relationship with Sir Henry Pottinger by boarding the British ship and popping sugar-plums into his mouth. On the other hand, the Emperor, after repeated Chinese military failure in the middle of 1842, had eventually to agree with Ch'i-ying's idea of conciliating the barbarians in order to end the War. But his hatred towards the British invaders did not allow him

15. IWSM, TK 59.3b.

to tolerate the humiliating ways of Ch'i-ying. The stipulation of equal terms between Chinese high-ranking officials and British chieftains in the Treaty of Nanking had already lowered the majesty of the Celestial Empire. How could he again appoint the humble Ch'i-ying as the Imperial Commissioner? In this respect, I-li-pu, "the elderly man of the old school"¹⁶ was able to maintain a certain dignity in dealing with the British barbarians. It was not surprising that the Emperor preferred I-li-pu to Ch'i-ying as the Imperial Commissioner.

Ch'i-ying had never been satisfied with his appointment as Governor-general of Liangkiang. The actual management of foreign affairs after the war were handled by I-li-pu with Ch'i-kung the then Governor-general of Liangkiang, as his deputy in Canton. Ch'i-ying, like a fish out of water in his post in Nanking was not able to use his talent to implement his conciliatory policy. Time and again he expressed his eagerness for duties in Canton. In December 1842, Ch'i-ying even expressed his confidence that there was no one able to manage the foreign affairs but himself. But the Emperor did not show much interest in his proposal.¹⁷

In Canton I-li-pu met a lot of difficulties in negotiations which began on 23rd January 1843 with his British counterparts about the new tariff system. No agreement had been reached in a month. At the end of February, I-li-pu confessed that the tariff question

16. This is the impression Sir Henry Pottinger obtained of I-li-pu during the post-war tariff negotiations, see British Consular Archives, Ningpo: Thom's 33 to Davis, June 30 1845.

17. IWSM, TK 64.5b-7b.

was still most bewildering in its complexity (t'ou-hsü fên-fan 頭緒紛繁).¹⁸ On the British side, Pottinger did not feel pleased in negotiating with I-li-pu and Ch'i-kung.

The death of I-li-pu on 4th March 1843, at first did not offer Ch'i-ying a better chance of appointment to Canton. Both Ch'i-ying and Sir Henry Pottinger were surprised when the Emperor on 22nd March appointed Ch'i-kung to take up the post as the Imperial Commissioner to continue negotiations with the British. (Ch'i-kung's experience in foreign affairs was far less than that Ch'i-ying's). The appointment of Ch'i-kung was merely an indication that the Emperor had decided to keep Ch'i-ying out of foreign affairs. However, Sir Henry Pottinger did not appreciate the new appointment of Ch'i-kung. In the previous months, he had perceived that the tariff question would not be solved "from I-li-pu and KeKung's utter ignorance and impracticality."¹⁹ Ch'i-kung's presence at the negotiation table still did not help to establish the tariff system. Pottinger was not happy that Ch'i-ying was not made the new Imperial Commissioner. He looked to Ch'i-ying personally to settle the Treaty of Nanking. When Ch'i-ying was appointed Governor-general to Nanking and I-li-pu was made Imperial Commissioner to Canton, Pottinger protested vigorously against the imperial decision. In early November, I-li-pu told the Emperor that the British chieftain had a special trust on Ch'i-ying, saying that when the said British chieftain heard of Ch'i-ying's appointment to Nanking, he immediately contacted Liu Yün-kê, the then Governor-general of Min-Che (Fukien and Chekiang),

18. IWSM, TK 65.26b.

19. British Consular Archives, Ningpo: Thom's 33 to Davis, 30 June 1845.

asking Liu to send a report on behalf of him for the imperial explanation of Ch'i-ying's unusual appointment.²⁰ Later Sir Henry Pottinger was not satisfied with the imperial reply on 18th November 1842, that I-li-pu's appointment would really expedite the tariff questions. The British plenipotentiary only agreed to continue the negotiation of tariff systems after Ch'i-ying had declared that he himself still had general control over the negotiation.²¹ After the death of I-li-pu, two actions on the British side help to bring about the restoration of Ch'i-ying to Canton. Sir Henry Pottinger withdrew the British representatives from the negotiation table to Hong Kong in the middle of March on the pretext that the imperial commissioner was absent. The cargo ships of Britain and other nationalities made their shipments to Canton and other treaty ports which had not yet opened without paying custom. Smuggling flourished in those ports especially in Canton. Such events forced the Emperor to realize that a speedy appointment of a new imperial commissioner to Canton was inevitable. Sir Henry Pottinger favoured Ch'i-ying as the Imperial Commissioner. He, after the death of I-li-pu proposed to Ch'i-ying that he intended to go north to Shanghai or Ningpo to continue negotiations with him in order to save the trouble of his journey to Canton. This proposal of Sir Henry Pottinger gave the Emperor nightmares in case this might be the signal for another form of British encroachment in which it was designed to proceed from south to north, as happened during the Opium War.

20. IWSM, TK 62.50a-b.

21. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, I, 107.

Ch'i-ying was able to react to this salutary situation. Immediately, he presented Sir Henry Pottinger's correspondence to the Emperor enclosing his observation in his memorial that the presence of the British chieftain would arouse disquietude amongst the people in Kiangsu and Chekiang and the local vagabonds would make use of the situation to create trouble.²² The menace of crisis from without and unrest from within seemed to rise again. The Emperor after reading Ch'i-ying's memorial on 6th April 1843, had no other alternative but to appoint Ch'i-ying as the Imperial Commissioner to Canton. In his imperial edict to the grand councillors, the Emperor made an explanation of Ch'i-ying's appointment: "(Ch'i-ying) being the original negotiator of the (Nanking) Treaty is trusted and respected by the barbarians. His appointment as the Imperial Commissioner (to succeed I-li-pu) is much more suitable than that of Ch'i-kung. Imperial edict for his appointment has been made to-day. He should make haste to Canton to manage the tariff and general regulations of trade. Everything must be completed properly in order to accord with the barbarians' requests and to avoid complications."²³

After the appointment of Ch'i-ying to Canton, the tariff negotiation in Canton went on smoothly. Huang En-t'ung and Hsien-ling were ordered to revive the negotiations with their British counterparts. On 11th May, they went to Hong Kong for negotiations.

22. IWSM, TK 66.1a-b.

23. IWSM, TK 66.2a-b; see also YPCC, 1:431.

The British welcomed these two members of Ch'i-ying's previous staff with the best accommodation on the Island; they were given the use of carriages for transportation and were taken round the Island in an iron steamer. The British rapidly outlined their proposals for the tariff "so that they (Huang and Hsien) will be ready to communicate their opinions to Kiyung as soon as he comes."²⁴

Modern Chinese patriots might condemn the unassuming attitude of Ch'i-yung towards Sir Henry Pottinger after his appointment as imperial commissioner to Canton. Pottinger recalled after meeting Ch'i-ying twice in H.K. in June 1843: the latter "embraced me with all the warmth and sincerity of an old friend and was even visibly affected by the strength of his emotion at our meeting again."²⁵ Pottinger might not know why this dignified Manchu clansman behaved so emotionally. If the appointment of Imperial Commissioner was the favorite post which Ch'i-ying had been longing for, Pottinger should deserve such an embrace from Ch'i-ying, his "intimate" friend.²⁶

After Ch'i-ying's arrival at Canton, the tariff system between Britain and China, entitled "the tariff and general regulations of trade" was signed by Pottinger and Ch'i-ying on 22nd July. At the end of November 1843, negotiations in Canton had been completely settled, including the signing of the Supplementary Treaty of Bogue on 8th October. Shanghai had been opened for foreign trade on 15th

24. FO 17/67, Pottinger's 52 of 4 May 1843.

25. FO 17/68, Keying to Pottinger, encl: in Pottinger's 85 of 19 July 1843.

26. The term "因替密特" was the Chinese translation of the word "intimate". This term was used by Ch'i-ying in his letters to Pottinger.

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November. The local authorities had to negotiate the tariff system with the British consul there. In his memorial to the Emperor on 25th November, Ch'i-ying reported that tariff and regulations of trade in Canton and Shanghai would be the model for foreign trade in the post-war period. Once they were settled, those in Ningpo, Amoy and Foochow would be adjusted to them. As no negotiations with the British barbarians had ever taken place in Shanghai and barbarian experts were lacking there, he had to go back to Shanghai as soon as possible in order to prepare the tariff negotiations with the British representative.²⁷

Ch'i-ying's return to Kiangsu simply illustrated his eagerness for the management of foreign affairs. When he had been appointed as Governor-general of Liang-kiang a year before he felt uneasy because at that time there were no foreign affairs for him to deal with in his jurisdiction. He then yearned for the appointment to Canton. When all the treaty negotiations were settled in Canton, he hastened back to Kiangsu where other negotiations were waiting for his expert handling. We must admit that he had confidence in his management of foreign affairs and believed that his ability and experience were better than those of any of his contemporaries.

Ch'i-ying's achievement in the tariff negotiations in Canton had convinced the Emperor of his ability in barbarian affairs. He gradually regained trust from the Emperor. When Caleb Cushing, the

27. IWSM, TK 70.5a-b.

American plenipotentiary arrived at Macao in February 1844, he insisted on proceeding northwards to Peking. In March, Ch'i-ying was then appointed as Governor-general to Canton in order to curb his forward journey.²⁸ In April, Ch'i-ying was also titled as Imperial Commissioner to manage "post-war trade affairs in the various provinces" (ko-sheng t'ung-shang shan-hou shih-i 各省通商善後事).²⁹

28. Ch'ing-shih kao (Draft history of the Ch'ing dynasty), (1927), pen-chi, under Tao-kuang, 24th year.

29. IWSM, TK 71.18b-19a.

CHAPTER 8

CH'I-YING'S REFUSAL OF THE POLICY OF
"USING BARBARIANS TO CONTROL BARBARIANS"

The policy of "using barbarians to control barbarians" was a frequent practice in Chinese history. The term "control" (chih 制) here means "defeat and subdue". The emperors of China adopted this policy whenever the Chinese troops were not able to cope with the invading non-Chinese forces. However, China always suffered from the result of it. We can find examples in T'ang and Sung dynasties.

An Lu-shan (安祿山), was a military governor during the Hsüan Tsung Emperor's reign (713-755) of the T'ang dynasty. His mother was a Turkish shamaness, his father, a non-Chinese of unknown origin from the region of Jehol (Manchuria). An was permitted a large army in the north-eastern part of China to defend the country from the attacks of the Kitan, a league of tribes under the leadership of an apparently Mongol tribe. In 755 An broke out in revolt. He occupied the important city, Loyang, and claimed himself emperor of Yen dynasty. T'ang troops were sent against him but without effect. In the same year, he marched his troops against Ch'ang-an (長安), the T'ang capital. ^{The} Hsüan Tsung Emperor fled betimes into Szechuan and abdicated there. His son, Su Tsung Emperor also fled into Shensi. There the new emperor sought military aid from the Uighurs to bring An Lu-shan and his followers down.

Rewards for the Uighurs included future payment from the T'ang government rolls of silk in thousands, and a daughter of the emperor to the Uighur khan as his wife. However, the Uighurs

always reminded the T'ang government of their merit, and demanded more benefits from it.

The Hui Tsung Emperor (1101-1125) of the Northern Sung dynasty paid a price much more than the T'ang emperors in using barbarians to fight barbarians. After long-continued fighting with the Kitan, whose empire called "Liao", the Emperor invited Tungusic Juchên, who in the past had been more or less subject to the Kitan, to fight against the Kitan. Eventually, the Juchên defeated and even destroyed the Kitan empire. Knowing that China alone was entirely defenceless, the Juchen suddenly attacked and occupied Kai-feng, the Sung capital in 1126. The Hui Tsung Emperor, who had retired a year before, was taken prisoner with his son, and the Northern Sung dynasty was at an end.

Ignoring the devious result of the "policy", Chinese leaders during and after the Opium War considered it as a possible means to cope with the problem of the British aggression.

Commissioner Lin was the first person who advocated this policy. In early he suggested: "Let barbarians fight barbarians."¹ Later, he gave details of this idea: "to use various barbarians to check (the aggression) of the English barbarian is to make the stag (British barbarians) stumble and fall; to segregate the various barbarians in order to please the English barbarians is to beat fish."²

1. Tung-hua hsu-lu, 14:235.
2. IWSM, TK 10.29b. In Chinese conception: stag was supposed to be wild ; fish to be mild and docile. Lin deemed that other foreign barbarians were mild, compared with the wild English barbarians.

On the other hand, Yu-ch'ien, when facing the attack of the British troops in Che-kiang in 1841, proposed to invite other barbarians to fight against the British. He mentioned in his report on 24th March: "The strength of such countries as Europe(?), America and France is separately equal to that of the (English) rebels. It is not worthwhile for the Heavenly Court to issue an edict ordering them to render aid, but there is no harm in making a proclamation of the rewards that will be offered to the various barbarians for killing the English rebels."³

Although the Americans and the French men did not practically help China to fight the British they did show some sign that they were willing to help China in the warfare with Britain. In March, 1842 Commodore Lawrence Kearney, commander of the American East India Squadron, arrived at Macao with two war ships, the frigate Constellation and the sloop-of-war Boston, for the purpose of protecting American trade. The American officers of the ships notified the Chinese interpreters: "Our warships are strong and large. If the officials of the Heavenly Court wish to come on board and inspect them, they are entirely free to visit them."⁴ However the Kuangtung officials of high posts dared not board the American ships as there was no precedent. Ch'i-ying was the first high-ranking official who had boarded the British warship, Cornwalli during the negotiation of the Nanking Treaty. I-shan, Ch'i-kung and others went on board the Constellation at Canton in October 1842. After that they memorialized to the Emperor that

3. IWSM, TK 24.36a-b.

4. CR, 11:183.

the said American ship was powerful: "The warship is divided into two decks, top and bottom, set with forty-odd cannons, all on movable carriages. They fired trial shots and turned them around and were extremely dextrous."⁵

P'an Shih-chêng (潘仕成), a prominent citizen of Canton had used his own money to build warships and torpedoes for the defence of Kuangtung waters under the superintendance of an American officer named Jen-lei-shih (詹士 (Chinese pronunciation)) in 1842. When P'an reported to I-shan that torpedoes built by Jen-lei-shih were particularly ingenious and efficacious, I-shan sent men to him to learn his skill.⁶

The French officers on the other hand showed more enthusiasm than the American officers. In January 1842, Captain Cécille, commander of the French man-of-war Erigore had come to Canton and taken up residence there. Later, he approached the Canton authorities and requested a personal interview with top-ranking Kuangtung officials to discuss military affairs. In the interview, Cécille told I-shan and others that his country was profoundly grateful for the Heavenly Court's generous favours, adding that the King of France on hearing the English barbarians had taken up arms against China, feared that the commercial ships of France would be implicated, and thereupon sent his ships to provide protection, and in addition ordered him on his arrival to China to act as intermediary in the settlement of the

5. IWSM, TK 61.39a.

6. IWSM, TK 63.16b.

dispute.⁷ Cécille even mentioned that France and Britain once were enemy states but had recently made peace. He was willing to negotiate with the English barbarians in order to mediate in the hostilities between China and Britain, adding that if the English barbarians agreed, that would be the end of the hostilities; if they did not agree, then they would have a pretext for taking up arms against them.⁸

With the superficial kindness of the American and French officers and the advocacy of provincial leaders during the War, the policy of "using barbarians to control barbarians" began to gain ground in the post-war period. Since the policy was a traditional Chinese practice, it was easily accepted at the time as the Chinese honour the old way.

Wei yüan (魏源), an ardent supporter of Commissioner Lin was a famous scholar noted for his interest in current affairs. His famed book Hai-kuo t'u-chih 海國圖志 (An illustrated gazetteer of the maritime countries) was first published in 50 chüan (tomes) in 1844, the enlarged edition in 60 chüan came out in 1849, and the third edition in 100 chüan in 1852. In the preface of his book, Wei-yüan states that his book was based on the work called the "Gazetteer of the Four Continents", which had been written by western scholars and translated by Commissioner Lin. Wei stressed that his book was written for the purpose of "using barbarians to control barbarians; using barbarians "against" barbarians;⁹ imitating superior skills (or armament) of the

7. IWSM, TK 45.30b.

8. IWSM, TK 45.31a.

9. Wei Yüan suggests that by offering trading benefits to one group of barbarians, these would be willing to help China "against" another group of barbarians.

barbarians and using them against the barbarians."¹⁰ In his conception of "using the barbarians to control barbarians", Wei Yüan said that there were three barbarian countries which the English barbarians feared: Russia, France and America.¹¹ He went on further to say that at the end of the Ming Dynasty and the beginning of the Ch'ing Dynasty, war had taken place between France and England in the north-east part of America for the sovereignty of that territory. France was eventually defeated and lost rule of that territory to England. Since then, the two countries became state enemies. The English barbarians later levied numerous heavy taxes in the thirteen states of America and so the people there started a righteous revolt to drive the English barbarians away. The people recovered their territories and built up their country, "United States." Since then the English barbarians had not dared to invade that new country again.¹²

Wei Yüan insinuated in his book that I-shan had inadvertently turned down the offer of the American headman¹³ to act as mediator in the hostilities between China and Britain in 1840. The Chinese soldiers when attacking the factory area had mistakenly injured several Americans. Thereupon, the American headman no longer made an effort to mediate.¹⁴

10. Wei Yüan, Hai-kuo t'u-chih (An illustrated gazetteer of the maritime countries)(1844), preface, passim. Hereafter cited as HKTC.

11. HKTC, 1:36.

12. HKTC, 1:38.

13. Wei Yüan did not mention the name of the headman.

14. HKTC, 1:36-54.

Wei Yüan emphasized that the best way to practise the policy of "using the barbarians to control barbarians" was to "move the enemy states of the rebellious barbarian country (England) to attack that country."¹⁵ This idea through the publication of Hai-Kuo t'u-chih had attracted the attention of the whole empire. Not only the members of the War Party treated it as tactics to take revenge on the British invaders, the Emperor although in principle agreeing to the conciliation policy of Ch'i-ying in the post-war period, was willing to allow that tactic to exist, as he could hardly swallow the insult of being defeated by the British barbarians. He had been seeking every means to defend his empire and if possible, to take revenge on the rebellious barbarians.

Ch'i-ying who dealt with the Americans and French men in the post-war period found it difficult to use both nations to control the British. The real attitude of the two nations was far from being "respectful and obedient" as shown during the War. When Commissioner Lin proclaimed the stoppage of trade with Britain on 26th November, the American merchants were allowed to continue their trade. They made use of this opportunity to make fortunes. Russell & Co., the American firm managed to carry British goods from Hong Kong to Whampoa by American ships at the rate of thirty to forty dollars a ton. (Freight from London to Canton would at that time probably not have exceeded £12, or \$55, a ton) Chinese tea and silk were the return cargoes of those American ships. They were later shipped to England.¹⁶

15. This idea is repeatedly mentioned in four essays on "policies for maritime defence." See HKTC, ch.1, passim.

16. Between 1st October 1839 and June 18th 1840, as much as 24,826,599 pounds of tea were shipped to England with the help of American merchants, see Chang, Commissioner Lin, p.206.

Captain Elliot, Superintendent of Trade later wrote a letter to R.B. Forbes, the boss of Russell & Co., praising his assistance in helping the British merchants to convey merchandise during the stoppage of trade to the British merchants, adding that Her Majesty should thank him greatly.¹⁷

The fact of the American merchants' involvement in the opium traffic came out later. An American opium clipper during the period of Commissioner Lin's proclamation of prohibition of opium in 1839, brought 20 chests of opium from Canton to Singapore. When the clipper anchored at Singapore, coolies were ordered to carry out those chests to the wharf. At the same time the American merchants spread rumours that China had decided to stamp out the evil opium trade and no more opium was able to enter China. The rumour caused the price of the opium to fall suddenly. Within 24 hours, the Americans bought 700 chests of opium at the low price of \$250 per chest. After the bargain the Americans brought the 20 chests of opium back to the clipper and sailed to Fukien water where they sold the opium at the high price of \$2,500 per chest.¹⁸

After the Treaty of Nanking, Commodore Lawrence Kearney went to Canton again on 6th October 1842. He sent a letter to Ch'i-kung, the then Governor-general of Liang-kuang, requesting the imperial favour for the American merchants which the English merchants acquired through the Nanking Treaty.¹⁹ Ch'i-kung agreed to his request.

17. As Elliot told R.B. Forbes: "the Queen owes you many thanks for not taking my advice as to leaving Canton. We have got in all our goods, and got out a full supply of teas and silk." See F.B. Forbes, Personal Reminiscences (Boston, 1876), p.155.

18. W.C. Hunter, The "Fan Kwae" at Canton before Treaty Days, 1825-44 (London, 1882), p.78. Cf. Beeching, Chinese Opium Wars, p.82-83.

19. IWSM, TK 63.17a.

At that time the American ships dropped anchor in the ports of Canton, T'ing-hai, Ning-po and others and awaited the opening of those ports to trade. This situation had aroused the anxiety of the Chinese officials. At that time the "Tariff and General Regulations of Trade" between Britain and China was still in the course of negotiation, and the British merchants had not yet started their trade in those treaty ports except Canton. There was no reason why the American merchants should anchor their ships at those ports to await trade.

Ch'i-ying at that time was made Governor-general of Liang-kiang, which entailed residence at Nanking. He was responsible for the matter of the opening of ports and the trade regulations in Kiangsu, Chekiang and Fukien. The American ships in those ports had aroused his suspicion. In his report to the Emperor on 18th January 1843, he mentioned: "the English barbarians took the lead in causing troubles (in the Opium War) which have reached the present extremity. The rest of the barbarians, although outwardly respectful and obedient, in reality sat by to see who won and who lost. Should we succeed in overcoming the English barbarians (the other barbarians) would then take over England's benefits for themselves, but should it prove otherwise, they would then throw in their lot with the English barbarians, adhere to and join with them and thus their profit would still be there."²⁰

Ch'i-ying feared that if the American merchants were not allowed to trade, they might not dare openly to oppose Chinese authorities,

20. IWSM, TK 64.44a-b.

but by adhering to the English barbarians, they still could trade in those posts. In this case, the English could in the end gain the gratitude of those foreigners. If the latter lined up with the English barbarians, Ch'i-ying feared that the closer relationship between Britain and America would be increased while the estrangement between China and America would become daily wider.²¹ In the reaction to this situation, Ch'i-ying advocated that the "most-favoured-nation-treatment" of the Nanking Treaty be granted to Americans so that they could enjoy the same benefits in trade with China.²²

Ch'i-ying once again realized the craftiness of the Americans in the mission of Caleb Cushing. Cushing arrived at Macao on 24th February 1844. Soon after his arrival he received a letter from Edward Everett, American Consul at Canton which informed him that the Chinese government had agreed to grant the same privileges to all other nations as had been granted to the British. To obtain trading privilege was the main purpose of Cushing's mission. Another purpose of his mission was to petition for access to the Emperor and his Court in Peking.²³ Since the main purpose had been reached before negotiation with Chinese authorities, Cushing naturally forwarded the request of his journey to Peking, as otherwise he would have achieved nothing personally in the mission.

21. IWSM, TK 64.44b.

22. IWSM, TK 64.45b.

23. Cushing's instructions from his government, see United States Senate, 28th Congress, Second Session, Document 138, p.1-7, passim. Hereafter cited as Sen.Doc.

Ch'i-ying at that time had left Canton for Nanking. Ch'eng Yu-ts'ai (程高采), the acting governor-general of Liang-Kuang took the responsibility of approaching Cushing. The latter told him that he would make only a short stay at Macao for procuring provisions and then he would proceed to Peking.²⁴ The insistence of Cushing's northward journey was so strong that Cheng had to report to the Emperor on 1st April: "Although we are still stopping him (from going northward) yet we are afraid that he would not obey our orders."²⁵

After Ch'i-ying's reappointment as Imperial Commissioner to Canton on 22nd April, he immediately started negotiations with Cushing. At the negotiation table Cushing still insisted on the delivery of his government's letter as the reason for his going to Peking.²⁶ He also requested that the American consuls at their treaty ports be allowed to address communications directly to the Court of Censors in Peking instead of to the local governor-general. Moreover, the Chinese authorities should assume the responsibility of protecting the American ships in the treaty ports and that in the case of injuries caused to them by other foreign powers, the Chinese authorities should take revenge for them, or in case the vessels of the United States were seized in Chinese waters by other foreign countries while the Americans were engaged in war, the Chinese government should help Americans to attack their enemies.²⁷

24. Sen. Doc., 67, p.2.

25. IWSM, TK 71.16a.

26. IWSM, TK 72.1b-2a.

27. IWSM, TK 72.16a-b.

The demands of Cushing in the negotiation illustrated that Cushing tried to acquire additional concessions for the United States beyond the Anglo-Chinese treaties. Ch'i-ying commented in his report to the Emperor that Cushing had "a very cunning mind", and "no amount of caution in dealing with him would be superfluous."²⁸

Not only Ch'i-ying found the American plenipotentiary to be demanding, but Huang En-t'ung, his skilled aide in the management of foreign affairs also had a bad impression of the secretary and others of the American mission. When Huang held conference with Daniel Fletcher Webster (usually called Fletcher Webster), who was the son of the then American Secretary of States Webster, the latter proudly said that the Emperor of China should delegate an official to come to Macao to receive the American emissaries and credential.²⁹ The opprobrious language of Webster was an insult to Huang. Being the chief of staff of the Imperial Commissioner, Huang was well-qualified to negotiate with Fletcher Webster.³⁰ During the negotiations for the Treaty of Nanking and the Supplementary Treaty of Bogue, Huang received respectful receptions from J.R. Morrison and Gutzlaff on the Cornwallis and in Hong Kong. Webster's display of contempt towards Huang had naturally made him feel that the Americans were more arrogant than the British.

28. IWSM, TK 72.7a.

29. IWSM, TK 72.6b.

30. At that time Huang's official title was the financial commissioner of Kuangtung. As far as status was concerned, Huang was well-qualified to negotiate with Fletcher Webster.

In the course of the Sino-American negotiation, an affray between the Cantonese and Americans took place in the factory area on 16th June 1844. When the crowd watching the Americans playing a game of skittles was driven out by some of the players, the crowd began to throw brickbats at the players. The Americans took refuge in their factory. The angry crowd broke into the garden of the factory, but were driven out by the Americans armed with sticks and canes. The crowd in return threw stones and pieces of tile. The Americans in defence armed themselves with pistols and muskets. In the course of the affray, one American killed a Cantonese named Hsü A-man 徐亞曼 (also pronounced Hsü Ya-man).³¹ After the incident, Ch'i-ying was under pressure from the Cantonese and the local gentry to *hand over* the murderous American.³² But Cushing refused to submit the American to the Canton authority. He, in return demanded that the Ch'i-ying take protective measures to prevent a recurrence of similar violence. As a result a jury of six American residents of Canton, agreed that "the killing was a justifiable act of self-defence."³³ Cushing later concluded the case in a note to Ch'i-ying: "the mob who wantonly attacked the foreigners and the police who culpably neglected their duty in the matter are the parties really to blame, and who ought to be punished, not only for the assault committed on the

31. Sen. Doc. 67, passim; CR, 13:333-335.

32. CR, 14:490.

33. CR, 14:526.

foreigners, but for the death of Hsü A-man. For that death, the mob and the police deserve to be held responsible in the eyes of God and of man."³⁴

The proposal to use American barbarians to control British barbarians based on the idea that the former were of affable nature: "respectful and obedient." But what happened during the Cushing mission proved that the exigency of the Americans was much more than that of the British: the insistance of Cushing's northern journey to Peking; the arrogant attitude of Fletcher Webster to Huan En-t'ung, and the demand of protective measures to guarantee the safety of Americans after the killing of a Chinese. As far as Cushing's request to go to Peking for imperial audience was concerned, Ch'i-ying at that time could not understand why the American credentials should be presented by Cushing to the Emperor at Peking. Ch'i-ying remarked in his report to the Emperor: "His request for audience (in Peking) was actually to show off his achievement before the English barbarians."³⁵ Since both Ch'i-ying and Huang had worse impressions of the Americans than of the English barbarians how could they consider using the former to control the latter?

In the post-war period, the Chinese government did not consider much the idea of using French barbarians to control English barbarians. Traditionally, the Chinese thought that the French barbarians, like

34. CR, 14:531.

35. IWSM, TK 72.2b. Ching Yu-ts'ai also had such ideas when he first held negotiations with Cushing in March 1844, see IWSM, TK 71.16a.

the English barbarians, were noted for their defiance and were less amicable than the American and Russian barbarians. When Captain Cécille offered to act as intermediary to cease hostilities between Britain and China at Canton in January 1842, I-shan rejected his proposal by saying that no-one at that time dared to take the initiative for the peace negotiation with the English barbarians as the Emperor had selected I-ching, the "Majesty-Bearing General" to lead government troops of various provinces to bring about the complete defeat of the English barbarians. In his memorial, I-shan gave his impression of the French barbarians to the Emperor that they desired to share in the gains and territory in the conflict between China and Britain by means of assuming the role of mediation. I-shan stressed: "although the said military officers are apparently 'respectful and obedient', how do we know they will not avail themselves of this opportunity (the mediation) in order to spy out conditions in the interior or otherwise cause trouble?"³⁶ The Emperor also doubted the sincerity of French mediation. In his edict to the Grand Councillors he commented: "How can the said barbarian military officer be able to disperse the English barbarians (to stop hostilities with China)? In his report he was even unwilling to make clear the means by which he could disperse them."³⁷

After his rejection in Canton, Captain Cécille went to Shanghai in August 1842 with two battle-ships. When he anchored his ships at Wu-sung (port of Shanghai), he told the tao-tai (道台)³⁸ there that

36. IWSM, TK 45.31b-32a.

37. IWSM, TK 45.36b.

38. Tao-t'ai or "Intendant of Circuit" after the Opium War became an important role in dealing with the foreign consuls in Shanghai. The rank of the post was 4a in hierarchy of the Civil Service.

he wished to proceed to the Yangtze river to meet Sir Henry Pottinger and Niu Chien, the then Governor-general of Liang-kiang. Again, he mentioned that his purpose was to induce the English barbarians to cease hostilities.³⁹ Captain Cécille and his attaché were intent on forcing their way to Nanking. Niu Chien reported to the Emperor: "Cécille together with twenty other fellow countrymen boarded a 'sand' boat and drove out all the Chinese sailors off that boat except one (for guiding navigation), and sailed up to the north. He left word that he wanted to hire it to go to Nanking to arrange the peace negotiation."⁴⁰ Niu Chien commented on his northward journey: "Now they come to the Yangtze in ships, nominally to urge the English to cease hostilities, but actually, we fear, to take advantage of the time before the fighting ceases. As to the said barbarian leader's going out and mediating, it is hard to be sure that it is not simply because he plans to appear friendly to the Heavenly Court, in the hope of getting a pretext for making demands."⁴¹

The Treaty of Nanking had already taken form in late August, 1842. China did not need French assistance to establish the Treaty. The presence of Captain Cécille at the negotiation table would only complicate matters. Niu Chien suggested: "We certainly should instruct Pottinger to wait until such time as Cécille arrives at Nanking and give him specific instructions to return to a point outside Woo-sung harbour and then to take his warships back to his own

39. IWSM, TK 59.18b-19a.

40. IWSM, TK 59.20a-b.

41. IWSM, TK 59.20b.

country, without allowing him to tarry or cause additional trouble. Pottinger will thus reciprocate our Emperor's supreme purpose of restoring peace on the frontier."⁴² The Emperor did not appreciate the action of Captain Cécille; he suspected that the French military officer planned a secret scheme. In his edict to Ch'i-ying who was then in charge of the negotiation for Nanking Treaty, the Emperor ordered him to persuade Captain Cécille to return to Kuangtung as England had already made peace with China and would never resume hostilities.⁴³ It is important to note that the Emperor at that time got the idea of using the British barbarian chieftain to control the French barbarian chieftain. In the same edict, the Emperor ordered Ch'i-ying to instruct Pottinger to take the following attitude towards Cécille: "If (his motive) is sincere, then explain to him that now England is already at peace with China and will not trouble the barbarian leader to state your case for you... if Cécille's coming was nothing but a desire to get profit out of this. Pottinger should devise a means to admonish him and to destroy his illusions, so as not to cause him to interfere and disrupt matters."⁴⁴

On the other hand, Ch'i-ying's attitude toward the French differed from that of the Emperor. Ch'i-ying possessed a superficial knowledge of France. He knew that France had a historical feud with Britain. In Ch'i-ying's opinion the French barbarians might be willing to help China to fight against the British as they had helped the American

42. IWSM, TK 59.21a.

43. IWSM, TK 59.22a.

44. IWSM, TK 59.22b.

barbarians before. In his report on 28th July 1844, he mentioned: "the United States used to be a dependency of the English barbarians. Because the people there were oppressed by the English barbarians, one of their countrymen, Washington, led the people in the war of resistance, the French barbarians sent troops to help them, whereupon the English barbarians made peace and the American barbarians were able to set up a nation."⁴⁵

Ch'i-ying was able to realize the strong independent and egocentric character of the French barbarians. He stated in his report to the Emperor on 23rd September 1843: "of the various countries now engaging in trade, France has traded at Canton for the longest time and up to the present time has never been willing to accomplish things through others."⁴⁶ Ch'i-ying suspected that barbarians other than French barbarians had helped the British invade China in the Opium War. His argument was based on the fact that: "When the English barbarians first defied (Chinese) authority, their battle-ships were not numerous. Later on they increased day by day until finally numbering a hundred and several tens of vessels. The barbarians are separated by successive oceans, several tens of thousands of li wide... how can it be said to be easy to mobilize and distribute (forces). If anyone says that they are not in collusion with other barbarians and secretly helping each other, your slave certainly dared not put much confidence in it."⁴⁷ But Ch'i-ying assured the Emperor that the French barbarians even helped

45. IWSM, TK 72.18b-19a.

46. IWSM, TK 68.26b.

47. IWSM, TK 64.44a-b.

the American barbarians to set up their country from the English exploitation, of course, did not take part in the defiance of Chinese authorities by the English barbarians during the Opium War.⁴⁸

However, the good impression of Ch'i-ying towards the French barbarians was shattered by the French mission to China in August 1844. Ch'i-ying at first did not expect the French government would send its envoy to China to seek commercial benefit as the American plenipotentiary did. He told the Emperor: "France fundamentally does not regard trade as important. Her merchant ships coming to Kuangtung are not more than one or two per year."⁴⁹ Ch'i-ying was happy when Count de Rattimenton (the then French consul at Canton) told him that his country would not send an envoy to come to Kuangtung.⁵⁰ But in the spring of 1844, after Ratti-Menton had gone back to France, he suddenly sent a note to Ch'i-ying that a French envoy would arrive at Canton shortly.⁵¹

On 14th August 1844, T.M.M.J. de Lagrené, the French envoy, arrived at Macao with eight warships.⁵² Ch'i-ying immediately sent Chao Ch'ang-ling (趙長齡) and others to Macao to make inquiries about his arrival. In the first interviews, the French envoy did not state clearly the purpose of his coming. But Ch'i-ying had predicted that the coming of the French envoy was for a treaty of alliance with China to attack the English barbarians. In his report on 28th July, he had

48. IWSM, TK 72.19a.

49. IWSM, TK 72.18b.

50. CR, 12:503.

51. IWSM, TK 72.19b-20a.

52. CR, 13:477.

already impressed on the Emperor: "if the French barbarians have an envoy coming, it must be, as before, on the pretext of making an alliance with China to attack the English barbarians; they hope to see the glories of our superior country and expect imperial favour."⁵³

But different rumours were spreading at that time: the French envoy might wish to conclude a treaty of alliance; to proceed to Tientsin to request an imperial audience. He might want to demand the lifting of the ban on Catholicism in China or he might intend to imitate what the English barbarians had done, to provoke hostilities and to capture the Bogue.⁵⁴ After several negotiations, the French envoy eventually revealed his intention of securing a treaty of alliance between France and China as Ch'i-ying expected. He proposed the exchange of embassies between the two countries and if the exchange of embassies was not feasible, he hoped that China would accept French experts in astronomy to take service in Peking. China on the other hand would send officials to France to learn the technique of the western armament manufacture and strategy specially in naval warfare in order to defeat the English barbarians in the next battle.⁵⁵

Ch'i-ying rejected the proposal of Lagrené by saying that the existing dynasty possessed plenty of experienced persons in astronomy and there was no need to invite the French experts. As for the defence of the empire, Ch'i-ying said: "We have never relaxed military

53. IWSM, TK 72.20a.

54. IWSM, TK 72.44a-b.

55. IWSM, TK 72.44a-b.

preparedness since the conclusion of the peace with England and the building of ships and cannons, and the drilling of the fleet is going on in various provinces in order to be ready for future necessities."⁵⁶

Despite the disagreement over the exchange programme, Ch'i-ying and Lagrené continued their negotiations. Lagrené told Ch'i-ying that his country would not gain as much benefit as the England and United States get from the trade with China, because the trading capacity of France was far less than that of the other two countries. Lagrené demanded the lifting of ban on Catholicism in China as a compensation (the ban was imposed in the preceding century by the imperial court). Ch'i-ying accepted his demand on the grounds that if he refused this item among all the other lustful demands, it was likely that the angry envoy would stir up trouble. In his report to the Emperor, he mentioned: "After careful consideration and weighing the relative urgency of various points, I conclude that we should consent to his demand (toleration of Catholicism) and try to put him under our control."⁵⁷

The treaty between China and France, which was mainly based on the pattern of the American treaty, was concluded as the Treaty of Whampoa on 24th October 1844. Ch'i-ying had a bad impression towards the French envoy. Lagrené was not able to give a satisfactory explanation to Ch'i-ying why he brought eight warships with him for

56. Chung-yang yen-chiu-yuan. Chin-tai-shih yen-chiu-so, comp., Tao-kuang Hsien-feng liang-ch'ao ch'ou-p'an i-wu shih-mo pu-i (A supplement to the "Complete account of the management of barbarian affairs in the periods of Tao-kuang and Hsien-feng") (Taipei, 1966), p.98.

57. IWSM, TK 73.30b-31a.

the Sino-French negotiation and he refused to disclose the purpose of his mission in the preliminary negotiations. Besides, Ch'i-ying discovered that Lagrené had a greater ambition in China than the American plenipotentiary. Cushing's mission to China was to obtain commercial privilege and his request to go to Peking was for imperial audience, while the French envoy, beyond securing commercial privilege, demanded toleration of Catholicism in China. As for the proposal of exchange of embassies between the two countries, Ch'i-ying thought that the French envoy "desired to obtain access to our Court by pretending to pay us homage. And they desired to occupy some territory on the frontier under the cloak of an ingenious scheme of contributing to our defence."⁵⁸

The refusal of Ch'i-ying to accept Lagrené's proposal of a treaty of alliance between China and France denoted that Ch'i-ying had given up hope of the idea of using French barbarians to control English barbarians. Although Ch'i-ying recognized France as a great power in the West, he still doubted that China with military assistance from France would be able to defeat the powerful England. He feared: "If China lose the battle again to England, the frontier crisis (of the empire) will arise; even though China is able to defeat the English barbarians with the help of France, the French barbarians will claim that they have done the empire good deeds and ask for imperial favor as a reward."⁵⁹

The geographical separation between China and France also caused

58. IWSM, TK 73.4a.

59. IWSM, TK 75.39a.

the abandonment of Ch'i-ying's idea of using French barbarians to control the English barbarians. Ch'i-ying told the Emperor that France being separated from China by great oceans was beyond the realm of our strength. Moreover, he did not believe that the French barbarians would really help China to harm their English neighbour. In one of his reports after the Treaty of Whampoa, he wrote: "Yet the French and English barbarians although having historical enmities are after all neighbouring nations. I am afraid that the French barbarians would not ignore an immediate neighbour to please a distant country by harming their brethren."⁶⁰

In retrospect, the missions of Cushing and Lagrené, caused Ch'i-ying to abandon the idea of using American and French barbarians to control the English barbarians because both the plenipotentiaries appealed to Ch'i-ying to be greedy and cunning. Technically speaking the Chinese authorities should not grant the Most Favoured-Nation Treatment to the United States and France before the coming of both plenipotentiaries. It was I-li-pu who first advocated this practice: "If we allow only England to establish additional trading ports and do not also allow other countries to come to trade in the same way, it is feared that as their ships and dress are not very different, it will be hard to distinguish clearly."⁶¹ He also feared that if other various barbarians were not given the same trading privilege, they would depend on English assistance to trade.⁶² (The British merchants

60. IWSM, TK 72.44b.

61. IWSM, TK 64.37a-b.

62. IWSM, TK 64.37b.

could convey the commodities of other foreign merchants with their ships, just as the American helped the British to convey their goods during the stoppage of trade to Britain in 1841.) Ch'i-ying supported I-li-pu in this respect. He explained the situation to the Emperor: "If other barbarians did not have the same privileges as the English barbarians enjoyed, the latter would certainly be willing to help them in the trade", Ch'i-ying went on further to caution the Emperor: "(other barbarians) adhering to the English barbarians secretly go to the various ports, how are we then going to akeep watch over them? Thus the English barbarians can in the end gain the gratitude of the other barbarians and secretly seize the lever of our country's wealth. The various barbarians not being able to expect favour from the Heavenly Court will be bound to the English barbarians hand and foot."⁶³

Caleb Cushing arrived on Kuangtung waters from Washington after a boring journey of 208 days. Before any negotiations with Chinese authorities he was informed that the Chinese government had already granted the Most Favoured-Nations Treatment to his country. In this situation Cushing could hardly just accept the Chinese offer and go back to America. So, the lesser purpose of his mission: the petition for access to the Emperor and his court to present credentials became his insistance.⁶⁴ When Cheng Yü-ts'ai first approached him in March 1844, Cushing thus tactfully told him that his 9-month journey to China was solely to ask permission to go to Peking for an

63. IWSM, TK 64.44b-45a.

64. The instruction of the U.S. government concerning the presentation of American credentials to the Chinese Emperor in Peking reads only "so long as may be becoming and proper." See note 23 of this chapter.

imperial audience. Cushing kept to the same tune in the negotiation with Ch'i-ying in July 1844. He told the Imperial Commissioner that he came under orders from his president and had credentials which must be presented for imperial scrutiny.

As for the French mission in October 1844, Lagrené had been seeking for something which he could achieve beyond the trading privileges. After Ch'i-ying had rejected his proposal of a treaty of alliance between the two countries, Lagrené eventually asked to secure the tolerance of Catholicism. If the Most Favoured-Nations Treatment had been the focus of argument in the negotiations with the American and French plenipotentiaries, and the Chinese negotiators showed that they could not but grant it to both countries reluctantly, Cushing would not have told Ch'i-ying that his sole purpose of his mission was for the imperial audience in Peking; Ch'i-ying would not have to report to the Emperor that if Lagrené did not secure the tolerance of Catholicism, his mission to China would be a complete failure.

CHAPTER 9

THE CANTON CITY QUESTION

The question of the British right to enter the city of Canton became a knotty issue in the post-war period. The Cantonese did not allow the British to enter their provincial city, but the people of the other treaty ports: Shanghai, Ningpo and Amoy did not have resistance to the British entry; except a tiny resistance in Foochow (see the following discussion.)

The people in the other four treaty ports had not had any contact with the foreigners before the Opium War. Their impression of the British immediately after the war was that they were the winners. The Cantonese on the other hand regarded themselves as victors in the San-yuan-li battle. The feeling of the Cantonese towards the British can be illustrated by a Chinese proverb: "Ch'ien-lú chi-ch'iuung 黔驢技窮" (Kweichow donkey at the end of its resourcefulness - a person who has exposed his limited ability (from the story of a donkey brought to Kweichow which the tiger first feared but soon overpowered after discovering that it could only bray and kick)). The Cantonese thought that after more than two centuries of trading with British barbarians in Canton, they had discovered the covetous nature of the British.¹ On the other hand their military strength as shown in the San-yuan-li incident was weak and fragile.

The British merchants before the Opium War were not allowed to

1. When Lin was in Canton in 1840, he also addressed to the British opium traders that having come from the sea coast of Fukien himself, he was well aware of the barbarians' tricks and would not fall into their traps.

enter the city. All the trading had been done in the factory area outside the city. The city itself did not have any connection with the foreign trade. When the British insisted on entering the city after the War the Cantonese naturally thought that the British had bad intentions to their city.

The British right of entry into Canton was based on article II in the English text of the Treaty of Nanking. The article reads: "His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees, that British subjects, with their families and establishments shall be allowed to reside, for the purpose of carrying on their merchantile pursuits, without molestation and restraint at the cities and towns of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai."² But the Chinese text differs considerably from the English version, it reads: "the Emperor of China graciously allows the subjects of Great Britain to bring their families to reside temporarily at the ports of the five coastal cities of Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai, there to carry on trade without the least restraint."³ According to the English text of the treaty, the British were allowed to the cities, but in the Chinese text, it was mentioned that the British were only allowed to the ports (harbour area) of the cities.

The Chinese at that time did not have much idea of the spirit of the western treaty system. They were accustomed to solving disputes according to the circumstances of each particular case. In fact

2. Imperial Maritime Customs III (Miscellaneous series: no.30) Treaties, Conventions etc., between China and foreign states, (Shanghai, 1908), I, 160, hereafter cited as Treaties.

3. Ibid.

the Cantonese did not pay much attention to the content of the treaty. They deemed that the treaty was unreasonable and harmful to their country. Both the British and the Chinese officials who signed the treaty were to be condemned. In the post-war period the Cantonese resisted the entry of the British to their city for the single reason that they were not willing to accept the British. They did not argue that the British were only allowed to reside "at the ports of the five coastal cities" as mentioned in the Chinese text of the Treaty of Nanking.

Why did the Cantonese so strongly resist the British entry into their city? A modern Chinese historian, Shen Wei-t'ai (沈惟泰) says that, apart from the hatred of the Cantonese towards the British, there was no other explanation for it.

There is no doubt that the Cantonese would never forget the British caused a disaster involving a huge loss of life and serious damage to property during the war. Besides, the ransom of the city by the Canton authorities in May 1841, was also an intolerable insult to them. On the other hand the Cantonese could hardly forgive the immorality of the British troops which was committed ⁱⁿ their city in war-time. Like other Chinese all over the empire the Cantonese despise the British from the cultural point of view.⁴ They did not treat the British as human beings but as ch'in-shou 禽獸 (animals). In a proclamation during the Opium War, the Cantonese humiliated the British: "You (barbarians) should take a mirror to look at yourselves,

4. Cf. John Fairbank's remark: "the Chinese have been willing to accept individuals from abroad on their merits as persons, to judge them not by the standards of race or colour or origin, but by the touchstone of Chinese culture." See John K. Fairbank, The United States and China (Harvard University Press, 1948), p.7.

your appearance is not different from animals. It is only that you are animals that can speak. You do not know a bit about the content of hsiao (孝) and i (義) (filial piety and righteousness)."⁵ During the war, family wives and daughters were annoyed by the British troops in the villages outside Canton city. Wherever the British troops attacked the women in those rural districts the male villagers did not hesitate to use their cudgels and knives to fight against the well-equipped troops. The outbreak of the San-yuan-li battle was one of the best examples. After the war the villagers faced the same threats from the foreigners. A member of the gentry of a village on French Island reported to the Canton authorities that all kinds of foreigners disturbed his village: "they have entered our houses and frightened our wives and daughters, so that the indignation of the multitude is kindled against them and our people think of nothing else but making an appeal at once to the sword."⁶ Ling Wen-lung (凌文龍), a member of the gentry of P'an-Yü (番禺) also reported that the foreign seamen entered his village in twos and threes, creating trouble and annoying women.⁷ The situation outside the city had caused a phobia among the Cantonese. How could the Cantonese accept the British barbarians into their city? Moreover, if the British were allowed to enter the city, they would bring their women with them. The conservative gentry dared not imagine how their fellow countrymen and their wives would feel when the barbarian women appeared in their city, taking sedans

5. IWSM, TK 31.16a.

6. F017/71, encl. I in No.163, Pottinger to Aberdeen, 14 December 1843.

7. F0682/1059, Keying and Ching (Yu-ts'ai) to Pottinger, date TK 23/11/5 (25 December 1843): Chinese text.

carried by Chinese bearers while the barbarian men opened the door for them, or simply walking side-by-side with their husbands. A few days before the riot on 7th December 1842, the presence of two foreign ladies in the factory area had caused alarm to the people of the city.⁸ Placards were posted to condemn the barbarian women appearing in that area. New rumours had spread that the British were planning to bring their wives to enter the city immediately. Those rumours added fuel to the fire that speeded up the outbreak of the riot.

The British treated their entry to the "cities and towns" of the five treaty ports as a matter of upholding their treaty right. Their first concern was to establish their residence and consulates. The British at Canton treated the "city question" as very serious because in the past 2 centuries they were not allowed into the provincial capital. A few days after the signing of Treaty of Nanking, the Chinese negotiators addressed a note to Sir Henry Pottinger in which they intimated that since Hong Kong had been ceded to Britain as a place of residence, there would be no need for the British to reside at Canton.⁹ Sir Henry Pottinger rejected such an idea on the grounds that "a quarter of each city in its suburbs being allocated to them at each port, they should be allowed freely to build or rent houses there so long as their business may render necessary...."¹⁰ Three hundred foreigners in Canton were stuffed

8. In 1835, the Canton authorities had set up regulations that no foreign women could be brought to the factories or trading stations where commercial agents resided and transacted business.

9. F017/57, encl.30, desp.38.

10. F017/57, encl.31.

into twenty-one acres of the old factory area, of which 17 acres were covered by buildings. The energetic foreign merchants there felt that they did not have enough space to exercise and build additional factories and accommodation. When they realized that their colleagues in other treaty ports had been accepted into the cities, they became infuriated. The foreigners at Shanghai were less than a hundred in number. After they had entered the city, they found that conditions there were not hygienic enough to set up living quarters. In this situation they voluntarily moved out from the city. Through the arrangement of their consul, G. Butler and the Tao-tai of Shanghai, they obtained an area of 180 acres in the vicinity of Shanghai city for their residence. The foreigners at Amoy, Ningpo and Foochow met the same hygienic problem in the cities. With the help of their consuls and the local officials, they moved out to the offshore islands Ku-lang-hsü (鼓浪嶼), of Amoy; Yao-chiang (姚江) of Ningpo and Nan-tai (南台) of Foochow.

The British at Canton were instigated by the achievements of their fellow countrymen in those ports. Bitter insistence in Canton was followed by bitter resistance, which was then followed by even more bitter insistence, and so on in a vicious circle.

On 22 July 1843, the "tariff and general regulations" between Britain and China were signed by Ch'i-ying and Sir Henry Pottinger. In order to honour the content of the "regulations", Ch'i-ying announced that five ports would be opened for trade. He felt confident enough to proclaim that Canton would soon be open to the British. Unexpectedly, his proclamation aroused a storm of protests from the Cantonese in the form of placards and meetings. Ch'i-ying

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was forced to inform Sir Henry Pottinger that the Canton authorities were not able to allow entry. At that time negotiations on the supplementary treaty (to the Treaty of Nanking) were taking place. Sir Henry Pottinger did not want the "entry question" to spoil the Negotiations. Since Ch'i-ying had promised that once the public sentiment of the Cantonese was less excited he would allow the British to enter the city. Under this condition Pottinger agreed to put the matter aside.

As the British were not able to enter the city at that time, they tried another method of seeking a place for residence. On 8th October 1843, Ch'i-ying and Sir Henry Pottinger signed the Supplementary Treaty of the Bogue on 8th October 1843. The seventh article of the supplementary treaty stated that when the British intended to rent Chinese territory, the local district magistrates and British consuls should pay due regard to the disposition of the people. In the course, the Chinese people should not raise an unreasonable rent on the land and the British merchants could not force the people to rent their land to them.¹¹ The British had long been covetous of the Honan District (the southern territory of the provincial river), because the place could be developed as residence and trading station.

Sir John Davis, the then British plenipotentiary to China and governor of Hong Kong on 8th May 1844, officially requested the renting of the Honan District. Ch'i-kung, the Governor-general of Liang-Kuang accepted the British request as the government policy at

11. Treaties, I, 392.

that time was to soothe the British and the Canton authorities were ordered to avoid any conflict between the two countries.¹² But the people of Honan District unanimously refused to rent even an inch of their land to the British.¹³ On 23rd May more than three thousand people from Honan District made a demonstration in front of the British factory in the factory area. The people later gathered at Shuang-chou shu-yuan (雙州書院) to draft a letter to the British, stating that even though the officials allowed the British to rent land from the people, the people of Honan District were of one voice that they were not willing to rent their land. The people threatened that if the British forcibly rented their land in devious ways and set up buildings there, the British residents there were bound to be attacked and their goods would be set on fire. The latter concluded that the people were of one mind. Even the gentry and the elders were not able to coerce the people; the high ranking officials could not suppress their unanimous sentiment.¹⁴

The citizen of Canton immediately echoed the people of Honan District in their resistance against renting their land to the British. The Cantonese ferociously proclaimed that all the Chinese land had been purchased by the people with their entire savings. Even the officials could not take away their land to rent it to the British.¹⁵

12. IWSM, TK 67.50a.

13. YPCC, 3:411.

14. YPCC, 3:355.

15. YPCC, 3:355.

The Cantonese went on further to warn the British that if they unscrupulously took the land away from the people, the Chinese people would not hesitate to draw their swords.¹⁶

While the people of Honan District and the Cantonese were carrying on their campaign to refuse the British request to rent, Ch'i-ying was on his way from Nanking to Canton to take up the post of Imperial Commissioner and the Governor-general of liang-Kuang. When he arrived at Canton on 30th May, the "anti-land-renting movement" was over. Chi-ying of course did not appreciate the action of the people. The anti-British sentiment of the people in Kuangtung was more fierce than that in the previous years: This was harmful to his conciliation policy. Two years later (in 1846) Ch'i-ying expressed his ill-feeling towards the people's action on the matter of renting land in his report to the Emperor, saying that the people despised the British too much and made frequent attacks on them. Occasionally, the British made small requests, for example to rent land for building residences, but the people gathered together to obstruct their requests.¹⁷ Ch'i-ying himself might feel regretful about the British failure to rent land in Honan District. The reason was simple: if the British succeeded in renting land in that district to build residences, they would lessen their pressure for entry into the Canton city. Now that the people had refused to rent their land to the British, the latter would feel that they had lost face. Their insistence on their right to entering the city would then become inevitable.

16. YPCC, 4:9.

17. IWSM, TK 77.37b.

The "entry question" became a more serious matter in 1845. From the Chinese side, the strength of the people, based on militia, became strong force after the San-yuan-li incident. Because of the increased local unrest and the conflicts between the British and the local people in Kuangtung, the local government decided to strengthen the militia. (It must be mentioned here that it was managed before the arrival of Ch'i-ying at Canton on 30 May 1844.) In early 1844 militia received arms from Canton authorities to form a defence force. Ch'eng Yü-ts'ai (程裕米) the Governor of Kuangtung, personally estimated that such kinds of irregular forces in some districts numbered as many as ten thousand individuals.¹⁸ Hundreds of thousands of volunteers and village braves, on the other hand, had been organised into societies for the purpose of creating an atmosphere of fear, so that the British dared not enter the city. Ts'ao Lü-t'ai (曹履泰) remarked: "all one had to do was whistle and within a short time they would be ready for action."¹⁹ This irregular force became a source of China's resistance to the British entry in the "city question" which deteriorated in March, 1845.

On the British side, Sir John Davis succeeded Sir Henry Pottinger as British plenipotentiary in May 1844. After a short period in office, Davis made Ch'i-ying understand that personal friendship technique which he had applied to Pottinger could not affect his policies as regards China. Davis believed that Britain's failure in subjugating the militia-men in the San-yuan-li incident resulted in a

18. Davis, China, during the War, II, p.30, who cites the Peking Gazette

19. IWSM, TK 75.14a.

lowering of British prestige and an intensification of the anti-British sentiment of the people. As far as the "entry question" was concerned, Davis trusted that the success of British entry to Canton would influence the prestige of Britain in China.

The British treated their failure to rent land in Honan District as being due to the treaty stipulation that they would only be allowed to obtain land with the consent of the natives.²⁰ In the following disputes of the "city question" with Ch'i-ying, Davis stressed that the British entry right was based on the stipulation of the Nanking Treaty.

On 18th March 1845, R. Montgomery Martin, the colonial treasurer of Hong Kong, R.B. Jackson, the British consul of Canton, and the Rev. Vincent Stanton, the British chaplain at Hong Kong, were assaulted by the Cantonese on the city wall in the north side of Canton when taking a stroll there.²¹ Davis took the opportunity offered by the incident to demand redress. At the same time, he urged Ch'i-ying to honour the right of British entry to the city.²²

Ch'i-ying answered that he himself did not object to the British entry. But the popular sentiment was still agitated, as the people would not tolerate such a violation of the traditional rules. If the British forced their entry, he could not guarantee their safety. However, Ch'i-ying told Davis that when the situation allowed, he

20. By Article VII of the Supplementary Treaty of October 1843, it was further provided that when the British subjects took up residence in the treaty ports, the rent or price of the ground and houses was to be fairly and equitably arranged for and the number of houses rented should not be subject to any limit. See Treaties, I, 392.

21. See Morse, International Relations, p.374.

22. FO682/1198, Davis to Keying, date TK 25/2/15 (22 March 1845).

saw no reason for the Canton authorities to refuse the British entry to the city.²³

Davis had a wrong conception that the Canton officials could use their prestige to impel the 'people's wishes' to allow the British entry. As shown in the San-guan-li battle, several thousand militiamen who surrounded a weary British squadron on 31st May 1841 were dispersed by a single She Pao-shun. As for the matter of entry, if the British authorities were able to urge the officials to admonish the people, the British might enter the city.

The success of the British entry into the city of Foochow in 1844 had given Davis much confidence. When Cousul Lay arrived at Foochow in June 1844, Hsú Chi-yü (徐繼畲) the provincial financial commissioner of Fuchien told him that the British entry was against the 'people's wishes.'²⁴ Hsú and his colleagues helped the British consul to find a common house on Nantai Island. When Davis took a trip to Foochow in October 1844, he instructed Lay to demand British residence inside the city by saying that the consular residence at Nantai Island was not hygienic.²⁵ Hsú argued that the Treaty of Nanking had not clearly provided for the British subjects dwelling within the city walls, adding that Foochow being the provincial capital of Fukien was "The area where people densely gathered. If the people and the foreigners are mixed together, disturbances will arise."²⁶

23. Insults, p.121.

24. FO682/1128, Davis to Liu (Yün-k'ê), date TK 24/5/6 (6 May 1846).

25. FO17/109, Davis to Aberdeen, 8 January 1846.

26. P'eng Tse-yi, "Chung-ying wu-k'ou t'ung-shang yen-ke k'ao" (A study of the five ports opened to the British in China) in Chung-kuo chin-tai shih lun-ts'ung (A collection of articles on modern Chinese history)(Taipei, 1958), Series 2, v.1, p.69.

Hsü told Lay that he could arrange a big clean house for the consular residence in Nantai but this proposal was rejected by the consul. In order to block the British entry, Hsü secretly instructed Pao tai (保泰), magistrate of Hou-kuan Hsien 侯官縣 (the birthplace of Commissioner Lin) to gather gentry to organize a petition to stop Lay's entrance. On the other hand, the gentry manoeuvred about two hundred people to give a street demonstration to show the people's disinclination to accept British entry. But the insistence of Lay had eventually made the Foochow authorities give way. The British were confused as they entered the city, "not a single member of the gentry nor a citizen appearing at the city gate to stop the entry of the foreigners."²⁷

Later, Pao Tai and other magistrates manoeuvred another popular movement. They instructed the people in Foochow and its suburb not to trade with the British merchants and not to buy British commodities. When Lay asked the Foochow authorities to help support Sino-British trade, Hsü told him that he could not force the people to trade with the British. However, some traitorous Chinese disclosed to Lay that the reason for the unpromising British trade was that the officials had instructed the people not to deal with the British merchants; the boycott of the British commodities was masterminded by the Foochow authorities.²⁸

The angry Consul immediately reprimanded Hsü for his machination, but the latter pretended that he did not know the whole course of the

27. Ibid., p.70.

28. Ibid., p.71.

matter. Lay urged Hsü to issue official proclamations to persuade the people to barter with the British merchants. After the issue of proclamations the British commodities attracted a lot of Chinese patrons.

Davis might have thought that a certain pressure on the Chinese authorities had brought about the entry of the British to the city of Foochow. Even though the British demands were sometimes against the "people's wishes", the prestige of the Chinese authorities, as demonstrated in form of proclamations, was able to thwart it. The Canton authorities also used the "people's wishes" to refuse British entry to Canton. If the British consul had succeeded in entering the city of Foochow by coercive measures, why not the British plenipotentiary in the city of Canton.

Davis in June 1845 instructed Consul MacGregor at Canton to put pressure on the magistrates of Nan-hai and Pan-yü to post official proclamations outside the city wall to induce the people to accept British entry to the city. The magistrates eventually agreed to do so. They told the consul that they had posted 70 proclamations.²⁹ But MacGregor later found out that only about ten proclamations had been posted in unnoticeable places.³⁰

When MacGregor reported this matter to Davis, the latter decided to coerce Ch'i-ying to post the proclamations again. The British plenipotentiary sent notes to Ch'i-ying arguing that the Chinese

29. FO682/1253, Davis to Keying, date TK 25/11/22 (20 December 1845).

30. FO 228/51, MacGregor to Davis, Desp. 93, 19 November 1845.

authorities should not use the 'people's wishes' to resist the British entry so as to spoil the spirit of the Sino-British peace treaty (Nanking Treaty).³¹ He warned his Chinese counterpart that the "city question" was a matter of "principle" and that the rights in the treaty must be upheld. Later, he plainly told Ch'i-ying that unless the "right of entry" was granted, the British authority would withhold the return of the Chusan islands which had been occupied by British forces during the Opium War and were being held until the last instalment of the indemnity had been paid by the Chinese government.³² The negotiation between the two plenipotentiaries was held on 21st November 1845, Davis told Ch'i-ying that if he was not able to achieve the entry for his people, that meant he could not fulfil the obligation which had been assigned to him by his government. He warned that if Chinese authorities refused the British entry, war seemed the only means to settle the issue.³³

In order to avoid further conflicts with Britain and to secure the recovery of the Chusan islands upon the final payment on 22nd January 1846, Ch'i-ying eventually agreed to issue other proclamations by himself. He sent a note to Davis telling him that he had ordered the gentry to stop all seditious speeches that would arouse the people's resistance to the British entry.³⁴ On 13th January 1846,

31. FO682/1254, Davis to Huang (Eñ-t'ung), date TK 25/11/23 (21 December 1845).

32. FO 17/102, encl. 2. in desp. 179, Davis to Aberdeen, 22 December 1845.

33. IWSM, TK 74.31a.

34. FO682/1257, Keying to Davis, date TK 25/12/14 (11 January 1846).

Ch'i-ying issued an official proclamation announcing that according to the Treaty of Nanking, the foreigners were allowed in to the treaty ports including Canton. The people of the other four ports had not resisted the British entry to their cities; the people in Canton should not make an exception. He extorted the "gentry and people to lay aside their suspicions and cease their opposition."³⁵

The issue of proclamations was of course against the will of Ch'i-ying. Peking in early 1843 had warned the officials at Canton not to cause displeasure among the people, saying that if they were repressed they would no longer be of one mind and determination, thus being of no use to the officials.³⁶ It is important to note that when Ch'i-ying came under pressure from Davis in the issue of entry to the city, he did not want to expose the inability of the Canton authorities to suppress the "ardour of the people", fearing that if the British authorities realized that he was not able to control the people, it was not only a matter of loosing face enormously, but also Davis might refuse to negotiate with him. But in a letter to the American Consul, Forbes in March 1845, Ch'i-ying told him that: "the people of Canton are of a ferocious disposition... and if the laws are contrary to their inclination, they will not regard them. Now hitherto, they have not wished foreigners to be permitted to enter the city, and the officers of the government cannot force them."³⁷

35. CR, 15:47.

36. IWSM, TK 64.27b.

37. CR, 18:277.

However, he decided to use his prestige to issue proclamations to bring about British entry. In a report to the throne, he explained his decision: "The barbarian chieftain (Davis) was obsessed by the misconception that the (Canton) authorities were making use of the pretext of the reluctance of the people to obstruct the 'right of entry' of the British barbarians. The failure to issue an official proclamation may put more doubt in their minds."³⁸

Before the issue of the proclamations, Ch'i-ying had reported to the Emperor: "the feeling of the Cantonese is unpredictable and if we do not comply with the public sentiment and suddenly allow the barbarians to enter the city, I am afraid that agitations will arise."³⁹ In this respect, Ch'i-ying had taken precautionary action. On the eve of the issue of the proclamations, he gathered the prestigious gentry and instructed them to persuade the people to allow the entry of the British to their city. But Ch'i-ying did not realize that before his appointment as Imperial Commissioner to Canton on 30th May 1844, the popular sentiment had been ferocious in the "anti-land-renting movement". When the Canton officials told the people to consider the hardships of persons from afar (British) and not to altercation with them in the matter of renting land.⁴⁰ The people rebuked the yielding officials: "Your unconditional surrender (to the barbarians) demonstrates your timidity; in dealing with the barbarians, you always *decide* matters *by your own will*."⁴¹

38. IWSM, TK 75.11b.

39. IWSM, TK 74.46b.

40. YPCC, 4:8.

41. YPCC, 4:9.

The furious reaction of the people upon the official proclamations was beyond Ch'i-ying's expectations. They tore down the proclamations and replaced them with their own placards, stating that they abhorred the perfidy and brutality of the English barbarians and warning that if the barbarians entered their city, the people had decided "first to decapitate and exterminate the odious race, (the English) and then to burn and destroy their habitations." The people also warned the Canton authorities that "If the foreigners are allowed to enter the city; (the righteous people) will capture the officials and slaughter them."⁴²

On 15th June, Liu Hsin (劉濤), the prefect of Canton, when passing through the city in the official state, found his way was obstructed by an insolent coolie (Wang Ya-p'ing 王亞平), sitting in the middle of the road. Liu ordered his retinue to drive him away, but the coolie refused to give way and a quarrel thus started. When Liu blamed the coolie for his wrong doing, the latter offended the prefect with bitter words. The enraged prefect immediately ordered his men to flog the offensive coolie and take him back to the yamen (office building). The onlookers began to mutter; they followed to the yamen and requested the release of the poor coolie. When more and more people gathered in front of the yamen, some suddenly shouted that the prefect had secretly brought the barbarians with him to the yamen. They pushed the yamen guards aside and broke into the living quarters forcing the fearful prefect ignominiously to flee by the

42. IWSM, TK 75.11-12.

back door. Before the arrival of the Chinese troops the whole building had already been gutted by fire.⁴³

After the riot on 15th June, Ch'i-ying painfully told Davis that the people had shown vigorous resistance to the British entry and burned the yamen after his issue of proclamations. He requested Davis to give up the right of entry.⁴⁴ However, Davis seriously informed Ch'i-ying that the British entry would not be waived; the British troops would withhold the Chusan islands if the British subjects were not allowed into the provincial capital.⁴⁵ Davis himself had the idea that the people of Canton were "always taught to hate and despise the foreigners."⁴⁶ Especially when he received the comment of the Canton government from Lord Aberdeen, the then British foreign secretary, saying that "those (Canton) authorities seemed to have the power, when they have the inclination, to keep the people in order"⁴⁷ he decided to put more pressure on Ch'i-ying about the matter of entry. He even suggested that his counterpart should consider the use of British troops to thwart the people's resistance.

This time Ch'i-ying responded in an argumentative fashion. He told Davis that if he allowed the British enter into the city, "not

43. IWSM, TK 75.9b-10a; cf. F0682/1267, Keying to Davis, date TK 26/1/7 (2 February 1846).
44. FO 682/1259, Keying and Huang to Davis, Date TK 25/12/21 (18 January 1846).
45. FO 682/1284, Davis to Keying, date TK 26/1/12 (7 February 1846).
46. Davis, China during the War, I, 33.
47. Insults, Aberdeen to Davis, 8 August 1845, p.23.

only would the British then be in a dangerous situation; but he himself, the governor of Kuangtung, all other various ranking Chinese officials and other foreigners at Canton would also be in a perilous situation."⁴⁸ Ch'i-ying went on further to use the stipulation of the (Nanking) Treaty to embarrass the British plenipotentiary: "... the first article of the Treaty of Nan-king provided that there shall be peace and friendship between Britain and China. The foreign subjects in both countries must be protected by the local government," he argued, "the atmosphere can only be called 'peace and friendship' on condition that the 'willingness' exists between the two nations. Now the Cantonese are not willing to allow the British to enter their city, but the British people demand entry. How can this situation be named as 'peace and friendship'?"⁴⁹ However, Ch'i-ying soothed the British plenipotentiary with the cliché that he himself did not resist British entry, but he feared that if the British subjects forced their way into the city, the ferocious Cantonese would attack them. As for the dispute about the return of the Chusan islands, Ch'i-ying separated it from the matter of entry. He argued that according to the twelfth article of the Treaty the British troops should be withdrawn from the Chusan islands after China's final payment of the indemnity. The British authority should not mix the

48. F0682/1259, Keying and Huang to Davis, date TK 25/12/21 (18 January 1846).

49. F0682/1267, Keying to Davis, date TK 26/1/7 (2 February 1846).

Chusan matter with the "city question".⁵⁰

Ch'i-ying bluntly rejected Davis's proposal to use the British troops to thwart the anti-British sentiment of the Cantonese. He answered Davis in this matter with a satirical tone: "This minister (he) is responsible for the protection of the territories and people of Kuangtung. There is no reason for the Empire to invite any foreign force to suppress its own people. Supposing that your honourable minister is not able to control the British subjects and asks assistance from the Chinese authority? It is nothing but a laughing stock."⁵¹

Ch'i-ying's strong argumentation had embarrassed Davis's coercive demand for entry. Davis by this time realized that Ch'i-ying was in fact not able to suppress the ferocious Cantonese enough to allow the British into the city. As matters stood, Liu Hsin had been sacrificed by the anti-foreign sentiment of the people. If he continued to place pressure on Ch'i-ying in the entry matter, it would not be surprising if this spokesman of the Peace party in Canton became the next victim. Of course Davis could take repressive measures to secure the British entry, but he had to consider that once the conflict between the British and Cantonese started again, British trade in Canton would be affected. Although Lord Aberdeen supported his firm stance in the matter of entry, the foreign secretary had reminded him "to conduct any discussion with Kiyong on the subject (the city question) with the utmost temper and on every account to avoid pushing the matter to the extremity of interrupting the free course of trade

50. Ibid.

51. F0682/1263, Keying to Davis, Date TK 25/12/25 (23 January 1846).

in Canton waters."⁵² Besides, Ch'i-ying had told him the Emperor's position on the matter of entry in the correspondence of 1st March: "the entry of the Englishmen to the provincial city of Kuangtung is not alluded to the (Nanking) Treaty. Besides, the odium of the people is so strong, the British entry to the city would cause disturbance. In order to avoid friction (between the two nations). the Governor-general (Ch'i-ying) should cautiously handle the affair in Canton in order to maintain the mutual friendship. As for the matter of the return of Chusan, it should be settled once and for all by the final instalment of the indemnity. It has no connection with the matter of entry."⁵³

Davis knew that Ch'i-ying would never dare to transgress the imperial instruction. On 26th March he eventually agreed to discuss the postponement of the British entry with Ch'i-ying.⁵⁴ After preliminary negotiations between the British representative and Huang Eñ-t'ung, Davis and Ch'i-ying on 4th April signed the so-called Bocca-Tigris Convention in which it was mutually agreed that the exercise of the right of entry should be indefinitely postponed, but not waived. As the first article of the convention reads:

"His Imperial Majesty having stated that after a lapse of time when tranquility is ensured it will be safe and right to admit foreigners into the City, and the Chinese Government being unable at present to coerce the people of Canton, the

52. Insults, Aberdeen to Davis, 8 August 1845, p.23.
 53. F0682/1274, Keying to Davis, date TK 26/2/4 (1 March 1846).
 54. F0682/1295, Davis to Keying, date TK 26/2/29 (26 March 1846).

Plenipotentiaries agree it be postponed, though the claim is not yielded by Her Britannic Majesty." 55

Davis's insistence on British entry had seriously damaged the prestige of the Canton authorities. The issue of the proclamations resulted in the attack on the yamen by the populace. The feeling of the people at that time was so ferocious, Ch'i-ying had to announce that he would abide by the feelings of the people and that the foreigners would not be permitted to enter the city.⁵⁶ At the same time, he sacked Liu Hsin in order to calm the populace.

What was the attitude of the Emperor towards the anti-official action of the Cantonese? Their attack to the yamen was no doubt an offensive movement to the local authorities. But if the Prefect was too pro-foreign and hostile to the people, the action of the people was right and patriotic. When the coolie was being flogged by the retainers of Liu Hsin, the onlookers muttered: "The official 'ch'ing-tao'⁵⁷ to greet the foreign devils; they treat us people as fish and meat." The attackers of the yamen in the Liu Hsin incident while burning the official robe of the prefect in his living quarters shouted: "If he is going to serve the barbarians, he

55. Treaties, I, 208. A proclamation by Sir John Davis, dated 18th May after the convention had been ratified by Peking, stating: "the previously questioned right of entry to Canton city is conceded and established under the Emperor's own hand, and the exercise of that right is agreed to be postponed only until the population of Canton shall be more under the control of the local government." See Morse, International Relations, p.380.

56. FO 228/61, Keying's proclamation translated by the British. Incl. 1, Desp, 13, 23 January, 1846; CR, 15:54-55.

57. The Chinese characters "ch'ing-tao" (; 道) in this sentence means "making a clean sweep of (ch'ing) the way (tao) - the resistance of the people to the British entry." However, Wakeman wrongly translates as "dispense with the tao of Ch'ing." See Wakeman, Strangers, p.77. Unfortunately, Wakeman's tao here is in a metaphysical sense. It is not applicable to the Liu Hsin incident.

is no more the official of Great Ch'ing."⁵⁸ The populace during the actions expressed a strong sense of protection to the country and loyalty to the existing government. Should the Emperor punish them?

It was certain that the ill-feeling of the Emperor towards the British had brought about some sympathy for the yamen attackers. In the final stage of the Opium War, the Chinese troops received continuous defeats from the British forces. I-li-pu succeeded in imploring the Emperor to allow him to arrange a peace conference with the British chieftain.⁵⁹ Whenever the British negotiators behaved arrogantly at the conference table, the Emperor ordered an end to the conference and resumed warfare.⁶⁰ Not until the fall of Woo-sung (the port of Shanghai) in June 1842, did the Emperor consider sacrificing Chinese interests to buy off the British threats. But the face-saving Emperor could never forget such an insult. Now the Cantonese had embarrassed the arrogant British barbarians in the entry matter and the Emperor was pleased with their achievement.

Unfortunately, Ch'i-ying after the Liu Hsin incident argued in his report that Liu Hsin was basically a responsible prefect, mindful of local administration. In order to maintain local order, he punished obdurate persons with heavy penalties. Ch'i-ying mentioned that in the Liu Hsin incident the punishment of flogging of the obstructing coolie was justifiable.⁶¹ The wretched dismissal of Liu

58. KCFC, 81:43a; Hsia Hsieh, Chung-hsi chi-shih, 13:2b & 3a.

59. See IWSM, TK 52.17a.

60. IWSM, TK 52.18a.

61. IWSM, TK 75.10b.

Hsin after the riot was to calm the ferocious feeling of the people.⁶²

Ch'i-ying distinguished the law-abiding people from the troublemakers in the riot. The former, when hearing that the flogged coolie was taken to the yamen, made a petition to the prefect for the release. Ch'i-ying commented that their action was reasonable and tolerable. The troublemakers on the other hand appeared in the yamen after the release, and they used the hunt for foreigners as a pretext to force their way into the inner yamen. When they broke into the living quarters, Ch'i-ying reported: "they either destroyed the ornamentation and house-fittings to give vent to their anger or snatched valuables to feather their nests."⁶³ Ch'i-ying argued that during the incident: "the prefect bore no responsibility for stirring up the agitation, but the troublemakers deserved the blame of raising disturbance."⁶⁴

After the Liu Hsin incident, Ts'ao Lu-t'ai, censor of the Hu-kuang circuit, criticized that the people and the local officials were not with one accord in the entry matter. He opined that since the Cantonese were not willing to accept the barbarians into their city, "the officials should not oppose the 'people's wishes' in order to please the barbarians." Ts'ao used a Chinese proverb: "Yü-pang Hsiang-ch'ih 商為法爭相持"⁶⁵ (literally, the contest between the snipe and the clam with both ending up as captives of the fisherman - a

62. IWSM, TK 75.34a.

63. IWSM, TK 75.12a.

64. IWSM, TK 75.12a.

65. IWSM, TK 75.14b.

quarrel which benefits only a third party) to describe the contention between the people and the officials in Kuangtung, as Britain (fisherman) would get benefits from the contest.⁶⁶ Ts'ao implored the Emperor to keep a special eye on the defence force of the people in Eastern Kuangtung, saying that the security of China's coastal defence depended on it.⁶⁷

In an imperial edict to Ch'i-ying, the Emperor enclosed a copy of Ts'ao's memorial and asked Ch'i-ying to make comments on that.⁶⁸ Ch'i-ying vigorously rebuffed the groundless charges of the censor. He said that the local officials did not contest with the people in the matter of entry. It was only that "the officials want to use artifice to control the barbarians, while the people want to carry out their will without deviating."⁶⁹ In domestic matters the law-abiding people and the righteous gentry stood in line with the local officials. But the vagabonds who participated in burning the foreign factories (in December, 1842) and yamen had placed the local government in a very embarrassing position in foreign and domestic affairs.⁷⁰ Ch'i-ying insisted that these yamen attackers must be

66. IWSM, TK 75.14a.

67. IWSM, TK 75.14b.

68. IWSM, TK 75.15a.

69. IWSM, TK 75.35b. This technique of Ch'i-ying was misunderstood by the people. In his proclamation after the Liu Hsin Incident, Ch'i-ying proclaimed: "We, the governor-general and governor are ashamed and covered with perspiration while we think of our inability, on the one hand to make the foreigners yield, and on the other to secure the confidence of our own Chinese. It is utterly impossible for us to exhibit to you, the people, all the toils and troubles connected with pending affairs..." See CR, 15:54.

70. IWSM, TK 75.37b.

severely punished. He told the Emperor that he had already instructed the local officials secretly to apprehend the ringleaders and they would be sentenced according to the strictest of law.⁷¹ As for the local defence, Ch'i-ying hinted that the strength of the people was not sufficient to cope with the British forces. Ch'i-ying explained subtly that the people possessed a strong anti-foreign sentiment, based on their prejudice: "(in the past hundred years) even though the people had social intercourse with the barbarians, they still call them fan-kuei. They do not even consider them to be human beings."⁷² Furthermore, their anti-foreign feeling had led to the creation of militia units which were sources of disorder and rebellion. On the other hand, the militia-men had not experienced actual contact with the British troops and their victory in the San-yuan-li incident was an accidental success. (The British troops were not able to use their fire-arms because of the heavy rain) Ch'i-ying commented that after the incident, the people had an idea that the barbarians were not to be feared. Ch'i-ying warned the Emperor that "the idea that the people are strong enough to subdue the barbarians shall not be heavily presumed upon."⁷³

71. IWSM, TK 75.34b.

72. IWSM, TK 75.36b-37a.

73. IWSM, TK 75.37a.

CHAPTER 10

THE AGREEMENT OF 6th APRIL 1847

After the signing of the Bocca-Tigris Convention on 4th April 1846, Ch'i-ying told the Cantonese that the British had forever given up their right to enter the city of Canton.¹ The Cantonese did not know that the British only agreed to postpone their entry, but not to waive it. With this misconception the hostile attitude of the Cantonese to the British had been improved. On the other hand, the British merchants who did not succeed in entering the city, started to behave ruthlessly to the Cantonese.

On 4th July, Charles S. Compton, a British merchant, while walking along the Old China Street near the foreign factories, found his way obstructed by Chinese vendors. When one vendor refused to give way, Compton kicked over his stall and went to the nearby Chinese guard house to demand removal of the vendors and their stalls. The Chinese officers of the guard house refused his demands and the case was dropped.² On 8th July another affray started between Compton and a vendor. This time fighting was the result. Compton together with some other colleagues from the Mingqua's Hong, dragged the vendor to their building and tied him up. The onlookers, including labourers and stall-owners collected on the street outside the Hong and threw showers of stones and brickbats. The Chinese Repository records:

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1. FO 682/1340, Keying to Davis, date TK 26/3/5 (31 March 1846):
 2. For details of this affray, see FO 17/120, passim; IWSM, TK 76. 15a-b.

"Cries of 'Kill the foreign devils!' 'Beat the foreign devils!' rang and re-echoed through all the streets in the vicinity of the foreign factories. Hundreds of the basest of men were already collected, and many hundreds more were hastening to the scene of the riot. It was now past 8 o'clock, and the action of the mob was every moment becoming more violent and more extensive. The gates and outer wall of Mingqua's hong had been demolished; one of the walls of the cook-house battered down; some of the iron-barred and stone-cased windows of the house dug out of the solid wall, against which a heavy battering-ram was being plied with great fury..." 3

The mob first attacked the Hong into which their countryman had been dragged, later they spread their attack to other foreign establishments. The British consul sent a messenger to the authorities, asking for protection and this was followed by a similar appeal from the American authority. A petty official from the local authority appeared with one police runner but was soon driven off by the mob. The foreign residents, therefore, armed themselves and shot from the factories, killed three and injured six of the Chinese.⁴

After the affray, Davis gave his feelings concerning his fellow merchants to Palmerston: "I am not the first who has been compelled to remark that it is more difficult to deal with our countrymen at Canton than with the Chinese government."⁵ The British merchants

3. See Morse, International Relations, p.381.

4. Papers relating to the riot at Canton in July 1846 (pres. to H. of Commons 1847), "Proclamation of Namhoi-hien", p.7, hereafter cited as Papers rel.riot. See also IWSM, TK 76.15a-b.

5. FO 17/115, Davis to Palmerston, 12 November 1846. Cf. Holt Edgar's comment: "In the gunboat years after the Treaty of Nanking the temporary Anglo-Chinese harmony was often disturbed not only by Canton Chinese attacks on foreigners but also by the provocative ways of the younger British residents who, as Palmerston sharply complained, used to amuse themselves 'by kicking over fruit-stalls and making footballs of the Chinese.'" See Holt Edgar, The Opium Wars in China (London, 1964), p.171.

at Canton showed a bullying manner towards the Cantonese. One of the old China hands at that time remarked: "We never paid any attention to any Chinese law that I know of."⁶ W.C. Hunter also remarks: "Should a foreigner get into a disturbance in the street, and it was generally safe to say that it was through his own fault, the Chinamen went to the wall."⁷

In the affray on 8th July, 1846 it was obvious that Compton took the initiative to attack the Chinese vendor. His action of dragging and tying a Chinese subject was serious offence on Chinese soil. The British merchants did not suffer from injuries in the affray, except that one Indian got a broken leg. But the arrogant merchants after the affray requested their consul at Canton to have a man-of-war stationed off the factories, so that it would be helpful for their protection when their safety was challenged by the Cantonese. When the consul refused their request, they directly addressed their request to the Foreign Office.⁸

The attitude of the Foreign Office in London headed by Lord Palmerston was equally militant. Palmerston was back in the Foreign Office in July 1846 after the fall of the Conservative Government of Peel in which Lord Aberdeen had been in charge of the Foreign Office. When he received the reports concerning the riot on 8th July and the request of the British merchants for a man-of-war in Canton water, he instructed Davis to inform the Chinese authorities that the mobs in the riot of 8th July should be punished. He declared: "British residents are not to be attacked or insulted with impunity... and the greater the violence of the mob the greater will be the loss of life, which will be inflicted upon them."

6. FO 17/120, Davis to Palmerston, 12 November 1846.

7. Hunter, Fan Kwae, p.26.

8. Papers rel. riot, p.8, ll.

Palmerston also instructed Davis to inform the Chinese authorities that a man-of-war would always be stationed in front of the factories.⁹

In order to defend the British action during the affray and fulfil the instructions of Palmerston, Davis argued with Ch'i-ying that the use of weapons by the British in the affray was necessary as the attack of the people on the factories challenged the safety of his fellow countrymen.¹⁰ Davis went further to demand that Ch'i-ying maintain Chinese police patrols in the factory area and the vicinity of the city, otherwise the British would take action to defend themselves in the next conflict.¹¹ When Ch'i-ying explained that the Chinese officer and his men were not able to arrive on the scene until after the shooting had occurred because the guard houses were far from the scene and that the troops available for such duty were widely dispersed throughout the city, Davis remarked that the officer on guard at the scene should be seriously punished as he failed to stop the incendiary actions of the mob.¹²

Davis actually took a leaf out of Celeb Cushing's book in arguing with Ch'i-ying in the affray. When Cushing was

9. FO 17/120, Palmerston to Davis, 3 October 1846.
10. FO 682/1305, Davis to Keying, Date TK 26/6/23 (14 August 1846).
11. FO 682/1307, Davis to Keying, Date TK 26/7/5 (26 August 1846).
12. FO 682/1308, Davis to Keying, Date TK 26/7/21 (11 September 1846).

negotiating with Ch'i-ying on the Sino-American treaty in June 1844, a Cantonese, named Hsú A-man was killed by the Americans in an affray on 16th June. When Ch'i-ying demanded the surrender of the American culprit, Cushing counter-demanded that Ch'i-ying take appropriate action to guarantee the safety of Americans.¹³

Ch'i-ying eventually bowed to the pressure of Davis. After the negotiations with Davis, he sent a memorial to the Emperor, saying that the Cantonese were of hasty character and whenever there was a chance, they would make use of it to create trouble.¹⁴ In order to avoid further conflict between the Cantonese and the British merchants, Ch'i-ying told Davis that he had increased the number of the garrison troops to a total amount of 100 in the factory area and its vicinity.¹⁵

Ch'i-ying's action had aroused the consternation of the Cantonese. The local gentry and the Cantonese at first expected Ch'i-ying to take retribution for the three dead Cantonese, but the result turned out to be the opposite. Ch'i-ying and other high-ranking officials decided to use garrison troops to protect the British murderers. Wasn't it a direct contrast to the action of Commissioner Lin in June 1839 who used garrison troops to surround the British in the factory area in order to bring about the surrender of British opium. The angry Cantonese produced angry placards blaming the high authorities for "ranking the Chinese

13. See Chapter VIII.

14. IWSM, TK 77.4b.

15. FO 682/1344, Keying and Kwang (Eñ-t'ung) to Davis, date TK 26/9/19 (7 November 1846).

people as fish and flesh and treating human lives as contemptuously as hairs in a cap."¹⁶ The gentry on the other hand proclaimed that they would take matters into their own hands to massacre the guilty barbarians. Just several months previously, these ferocious words were applied to the prefect of Canton, Liu Hsin; this time Ch'i-ying was not lucky enough to escape from them.

The Cantonese did not know that Ch'i-ying had demanded the surrender of the British culprits who shot three Cantonese to death. In a note to Davis, Ch'i-ying told his British counterpart that the death of the three Cantonese had already aroused the indignation of the people, he expected the surrender of the British culprits to calm the Cantonese and maintain local order.¹⁷ Davis, who treated the shooting by the British subjects as a matter of self-defence, of course would not surrender his countrymen to Ch'i-ying. What was his appraisal of the shooting during the affray? We can learn it from his words to Consul Macgregor after the affray: "The Chinese must learn to be convinced that if they attack our people and factories they will be shot; and that if they maltreat unoffending Englishmen, who are quietly exercising their right of walking about the town and neighbourhood of Canton, they will not escape with impunity."¹⁸

On 17th October 1846, a minor outrageous incident took place. Two seamen from the British ship, Mary Bannatyre, secretly left

16. See FO 17/120, "Proclamation of the Local Community Schools, dated September 15," Incl. 2, Desp. 12.

17. FO 682/1335, Keying and Kwang to Davis, date TK 26/8/4 (23 September 1846).

18. Correspondences relating to the operation, Davis to Macgregor, 26 March 1847, p.12, hereafter cited as Corr.rel.operation.

their ship for the city of Canton. Later they were maltreated in the back streets by the Cantonese.¹⁹

After the incident Davis demanded that Canton authorities reinforce the police patrol around the districts of the city. On 30th January 1847, Davis went further to caution Ch'i-ying that if the Canton authorities were not able to protect the British subjects at the suburb of Canton, he would follow his home government's instructions to use British forces to protect his people.²⁰

When Palmerston received the reports concerning the incident of 17th October, from Davis, he went two separate dispatches to the latter on 9th and 12th January; the one on the 9th reads:

"We shall lose all the vantage ground we have gained by our victories in China, if we take a low tone. We must take especial care not to descent from the relative position which we have acquired. If we maintain the position morally, by the tone of our intercourse, we shall not be obliged to recover it by forcible acts; but if we permit the Chinese, either at Canton or elsewhere to resume, as they will no doubt always be endeavouring to do, their former tone of affected superiority, we shall very soon be compelled to come to blows with them again." 21

The other on the 12th reads:



- 19. YPCC, 6:85; IWSM, TK 77.35b.
- 20. FO 682/1354, Davis to Keying, date TK 26/12/14 (30 January 1847).
- 21. Corr.rel. operation, Palmerston to Davis, 9 January 1847, p.2.

"I have to instruct you to demand the punishment of the parties guilty of this outrage; and you will moreover inform the Chinese authorities, in plain and distinct terms, that the British government will not tolerate that a Chinese mob shall with impunity maltreat British subjects whenever they get them into their power; and that if the Chinese authorities will not, by the exercise of their own authority, punish and prevent such outrages, the British government will be obliged to take the matter into their own hands, and it will not be their fault if in such a case the innocent are involved in the punishment which may be sought to be inflicted on the guilty." 22

Before these despatches reached Hong Kong, Davis had already had another anti-foreign incident in hand. On 12th March a party of six Englishmen (including a lieutenant-colonel, Chesney of Royal Artillery and officer of the steamer "Pluto" and four other British subjects) and one American took a trip to Fat-shan (佛山) a city fifteen miles above Canton. A Chinese mandarin and his followers went with them in order to protect the party. However, the foreigners were still stoned by the natives. Some of the mandarin's followers were severely wounded.²³

Davis's immediate action was to demand the punishment of those aggressors. He sent a note to Ch'i-ying on 22 March stating: "If they cannot be punished for this my Government will be obliged to take further measures for the protection of British subjects."²⁴ In the coming week Davis received Lord Palmerston's

22. Corr.rel. operation, Palmerston to Davis, 12 January 1847, p.3.

23. Corr.rel. operation, Davis to Palmerston, 27 March 1847, p.8-9.

24. Corr.rel. operation, Davis to Keying, 22 March 1847, p.10.

despatches of 9th and 12th January, he assumed a stronger tone and demanded reparation as instructed, for the attack of 17th October. He warned Ch'i-ying: "If your Excellency will not punish and prevent such outrages, it will be necessary for the British government to punish them... Should your Excellency not redress these matters, it is my duty to inform you that you will bring down calamity on the Chinese people."²⁵

Ch'i-ying replied that the attack of the natives on the British was because their sudden arrival at the villages had created astonishment. He argued: "the ringleaders who first gave rise to the riot, must be clearly ascertained, and then I shall be able to act, as it would really be unadvisable to seize and proceed in this matter at random, without making any distinction between the guilty and innocent, and thus occasion an insurrection. Would you the Honourable Envoy, who thoroughly understand reason and justice, not also act thus?"²⁶

Davis was not satisfied with Ch'i-ying's reply, he decided to back up his demands by a show of force. Major-general d'Aguilar, who was in command of the Hong Kong garrison led a sudden and slashing attack on Bogue effected with 900 soldiers, three steamers, and a brig.²⁷ As a result of his operations, the whole river to

25. Corr. rel. operation, Davis to Keying, 27 March 1847, p.11.

26. Corr. rel. operation, Keying to Davis, 30 March 1847, p.15-16.

27. It was an economical operation carried out for the modest cost of £700. Davis proudly reported to Palmerston that the attack to Bogue on 1st April was a great military success, adding that similar success in 1841 was won by 3000 British troops, three line-of-battle ships, eleven frigates and sloops and four steamers in many days. See FO 17/125, No.10, Davis to Palmerston, 12 April 1847.

Hong Kong to Canton within thirty-six hours was in British hands, 827 guns had been spiked or captured and the forts disabled. At 10 p.m. on 2nd April Davis sent an ultimatum to Ch'i-ying to force him to accept this demand within 8 hours, otherwise the British force would attack Canton. The demands were:

1. The punishment of the aggressors at Canton on the 17th October.
2. The punishment of those at Fatshan on the 12th March.
3. Sufficient ground for the dwellings of British merchants at Canton.
4. The practice now, or at a fixed period, of the right of free entry in the city. 28

The frightened Imperial Commissioner could not but agree to negotiate with Davis. On 3rd April Davis told Ch'i-ying that the negotiation would take place at the British Consulate within the city, with the purpose of increasing the British privileges and lowering the dignity of Canton authorities. Seeing there was no alternative, Ch'i-ying went to meet Davis at the Consulate. On 6th April an agreement was signed by the two plenipotentiaries. Ch'i-ying accepted the terms which Davis demanded on 2nd April. Other items, such as the offer of sites for a church and a cemetery; the building of a bridge over Hog Lane; the clearing of boats from the river before the factories were added to the agreement. Ch'i-ying also agreed that the British would have free entrance into the

28. Corr. rel. operation, Davis to Keying, p.19-20.

city in two years from the date of the agreement.²⁹

Before the agreement, Ch'i-ying always believed that disagreements between China and Britain could be solved through negotiations. However, the sudden attack of the British had smashed his belief. In his memorial to the Emperor, he told the Emperor that the assault was quite unexpected.³⁰ The Chinese commander-in-chief at Canton, Lai Ên-chüeh(賴恩爵) also gave his comment on this unexpected operation: "The said barbarians after their pacification showed no sign of military molestation the recent actions of the British troops are very unusual."³¹

Why did Ch'i-ying bow to the British military action? If Ch'i-ying had counter-attacked the British, the belligerent Cantonese would support him. But Ch'i-ying did not dare to take military action against the British. The British success in spiking Chinese cannons and occupying forts within thirty-six hours demonstrated that the Chinese defence was fragile. At that time the total number of military personnel in Kuangtung was about sixty-eight thousand three hundred, but only about two thousand four hundred soldiers were stationed at the provincial capital.³² The Canton authorities were not able to increase the military strength in the city, as soldiers at other strategic points of the province had to deal with local unrest. In a memorial to the Emperor,

29. See G.E.P. Hertslet, Treaties, etc., between Great Britain and China and between China and Foreign Powers (London, 1908), I, 17-18.

30. IWSM, TK 77.37b.

31. IWSM, TK 78.1b.

32. Shih-liao hsun-k'an, 35, ti, 301b.

Ch'i-ying remarked: "Once peace had been broken, unrest on the country's frontier (Kuangtung) would have started. It is difficult for us to cope with such a situation. Besides, the combatant strength of the Chinese forces along the coastal provinces are still doubtful. After serious consideration, I decide not to embark upon reckless and emotional acts towards the British."³³

Before the sudden British attack on Fat-shan, Ch'i-ying, time and again refused the British entry to the city under the pretext of "the people's will ". Although he did not believe that "the ardour of the people" was able to cope with British military strength, he had an idea that "If 'the ardour of the people' was too much suppressed, the barbarians will become more overweening."³⁴ But in the negotiations with Davis in early April, the British plenipotentiary told him that the British military action on 1st April could be regarded as a sign that the British authorities were no longer willing to keep a weak attitude in front of the Cantonese, so that after the Fat-shan incident, the British sent their troops to Fat-shan, looking for a chance to contest with the local people.³⁵

Since the hostile action of the Cantonese had invited the British invasion, Ch'i-ying decided to suppress the people in order to avoid further conflict between the two nations. Shortly after the British military action, Ch'i-ying instructed the district magistrates of

33. Shih-liao hsun-k'an, '35, ti, 295b.

34. IWSM, TK 75.36b.

35. IWSM, TK 77.37a.

Nan-hai and P'an-yü hsien to issue proclamation to warn the people not to molest the British excursionists who appeared in the vicinity of the city. Part of the proclamation reads: "If foreigners should in future proceed to the said places to walk for amusement, do not as heretofore assemble to look at, wrangle with and rail at them, so as to give rise to other troubles and draw down on yourselves inquiry and punishment. Be particularly careful to yield a reverential obedience! Make no opposition to this special proclamation!"³⁶ On the other hand, Ch'i-ying had to impress the Emperor that the order of the issue of proclamation was reasonable. In one of his memorials after the Agreement on 6th April, he complained about the hostile attitude of the Cantonese towards the foreigners: "It is a common matter for the foreigners to go to look at places and to walk about inspecting them (in the vicinity of Canton), but the people responded to their actions by immediate grouping, and driving the foreigners away with offensive acts," Ch'i-ying continued, "the people had in fact gone too far in this respect. The ringleaders of the attack (in Fat-shan) should be punished lest the barbarians should not be appeased. The barbarians who have 'the nature of dogs and sheep' will arouse the anger of our countrymen (in the matter of the Fat-shan incident) the rascals who participated in the attack should be punished by flogging. At the same time, report of the punishment should be delivered to the barbarian chieftain to allay his resentment."³⁷

36. Corr. rel. operation, "Proclamation issued by the District Officers of Canton", p.32.

37. IWSM, TK 77.38b.

to

The coercive measures by Ch'i-ying/suppress the people to please the British were manifested in the course of helping the British to rent land for warehouses, churches and residences in Honan District and Hog Lane after the agreement of 6th April. As we have mentioned before, the British for a long time had been looking for land to rent in Honan District but in May 1844 they did not get even an inch of land.

The people did not want to rent their land to foreigners for western buildings fearing that such kinds of constructions would disturb the fêng-shui 風水 (geomancy) in their land.³⁸ When Ch'i-ying ordered tenements of the vagabonds in Hog Lane to be cleared away in order to offer spaces for British buildings, the Cantonese condemned Ch'i-ying for allowing the barbarians to annex their land.³⁹ On the other hand, the house owners and landlords of Honan District and Hog Lane on hearing that the British intended to rent their land gathered at the Consoo house to discuss how to refuse them. They eventually agreed to hire braves to protect their properties. The house owners and the tenants agreed to share one month's rent to sponsor weapons and mercenaries while artisans pledged not to construct any building for the foreigners in those areas.⁴⁰ Several gentry were selected to superintend

38. IWSM, TK 78.10b.

39. See Wakeman, Strangers, p.85.

40. YPCC, 3:410.

those preparations to cope with the british requests for renting their land.⁴¹

However, Ch'i-ying decided to help the British to get access to land for buildings. Through the arrangement of Ch'i-ying, the British got some spaces in Hog Lane and Honan District by offering handsome rent to covetous land owners.⁴² While the British set up their buildings in those places, Ch'i-ying sent garrison troops to take precaution against possible attacks from the people.⁴³ In one of his memorials to the Emperor, Ch'i-ying frankly told the Emperor that he had instructed civil and military officials to suppress those people who resisted the British efforts to set up buildings (in Hog Lane).⁴⁴ At the same time, he had ordered the gentry to admonish the people not to create trouble. Ch'i-ying concluded: "Whenever the people deal unreasonably with the barbarians and cause affrays, they should receive due punishment immediately."⁴⁵

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Why ^{did} Ch'i-ying decide to please the British by suppressing the Cantonese after the sudden and slashing attack of the British troops on 1st April? On 2nd April Davis demanded beyond punishment of the aggressors in their attacks on the British, a fixed period within which the British should gain entry to the city of Canton.

41. Lieh (tao), Ya-p'ien chan-cheng, p.299.
42. FO 682/1366, Keying to Davis, date TK 27/4/9 (22 May 1847).
43. FO 682/1368, Keying to Davis, date TK 27/5/10 (22 June 1847).
44. Hog Lane located between the British and American factories. A lot of Chinese hucksters gathered in that lane. It had been the centre of disturbance between Chinese and foreigners. See IWSM, TK 78.9b; FO 17/114, Davis to Aberdeen, 31 October 1846.
45. IWSM, TK 78.6b.

Davis later fixed the period to one or two years. However, Ch'i-ying was not confident that he was able to persuade the Cantonese to accept the British entry in such a short period. He told Davis that he would request the Emperor to allow the British entry in four or five years and to issue distinct orders to admonish the people and gentry to accept the British into their city.⁴⁶ Davis refused his suggestion by saying that Ch'i-ying himself was Plenipotentiary and therefore did not need to refer it to the Emperor but could decide the entry matter himself.⁴⁷ Later, Ch'i-ying plainly stated his difficulty to Davis that if he did not consult the Cantonese and allowed the British entry, the Cantonese would raise a rebellion.⁴⁸ Although Huang En-t'ung at the negotiation table before the establishment of the Agreement of 6th April insisted that the Chinese authorities needed four to five years to arrange everything to accept the British entry, Davis did not agree but insisted on entry in two years. Due to the pressure of his British opponent, Ch'i-ying accepted the advice of Huang En-t'ung and Ch'ao Chan-ning to allow the British entry in two years. Within the two years, Ch'i-ying would scheme to leave Canton and wash his hands of foreign affairs by petitioning for transfer back to the capital with the excuse of old age and infirmity.⁴⁹

46. Corr. rel. operation, Keying to Davis, 2 April 1847, p.21.

47. Corr. rel. operation, Davis to Keying, 5 April 1847, p.22.

48. FO 682/1357, Keying to Davis, date TK 27/2/20 (3 April 1847).

49. Wu Chih, "Ya-p'ien chan-cheng hou kuang-chow ju-ch'eng chiao-shê" (Negotiations concerning the entry into Canton after the Opium War) in Ts'un-ts'ui hsüeh-she comp., Ying-fa lien-chün (Anglo-French Army), (Hong Kong) p.5.

T.F. Chiang holds the view that Ch'i-ying dared not report to the Emperor that he had permitted the British to enter Canton in two years.⁵⁰ It is understandable that permission for British entry in two years was no doubt a sign of capitulation policy in the eyes of the war party members. However, Ch'i-ying had told the Emperor in a special memorial that after circumspect discussion with his subordinates (including Huang Ê-t'ung, Chiao Chan-ning and Pan Shih-ching) he eventually agreed to allow the British entry in two years. He also mentioned that he could not guarantee that the sentiment of the Cantonese would be calm enough to accept the British into their city after two years.⁵¹ In the same memorial, Ch'i-ying expressed his eagerness to leave his post of managing foreign affairs at Canton. He told the Emperor: "Your slave has already passed the age of 60, the closing years (the west) of my life are forthcoming. In the recent years, all the (foreign) matters I dealt with were difficult to handle. Owing to my anxiety over the barbarian affairs, my spirit is not as good as before; besides, anguish from the troublesome barbarian affairs has caused irritation and constant pain in my eyes, especially the left one. I still exert myself to the job which I am responsible for and become exhausted. Your slave has always received massive imperial grace. I dare not shirk my responsibility so long as I still keep a breath. But the barbarian affairs are of utmost

50. T.F. Ch'iang (T.F. Tsiang), comp., Chin-tai chung-kuo wai-chiao-shih tzu-liao chi-yao (A source book of important documents in modern Chinese diplomatic history), I, 147.

51. Shih-liao hsun-k'an, 35, ti, 295b.

importance, I just fear that when one day my spirit is exhausted, at that moment it may be difficult to find someone to take over the responsibility. I really beg my enlightened Emperor can choose a man of ability as a reserve so as to heighten the majesty of the empire and to pacify the barbarian affairs."⁵²

The Emperor was anguished when hearing about the sudden British attack on the Bogue on 1st April. He was angry at the loose defence in Canton that enabled about 900 British troops easily to go ashore to capture the forts and spike the guns along the city river.⁵³ The Emperor ordered Ch'i-ying and Lai Eñ-chüeh to investigate the reason for the British military success in such a short period (36 hours) and punished those garrison troops who took loose defence. At the same time, he admonished Ch'i-ying and Lai Eñ-chüeh to take strong defence preparation in Canton, adding that they should memorialize the plan for strict defence at double quick time.⁵⁴ The Emperor ordered Ch'i-ying to choose an able character from the camp of generals in Kuangsi Province to train a corps of two to three thousand members, preparing to reinforce Canton when

52. Shih-liao hsun-k'an, 35, ti, 296a.

53. Cf. Ts'ao Lü-t'ai's memorial stating that when the English troops attacked the Nuddy Town near Kuangtung in May 1841, the garrison troops did not even fire a single shot to stop the advance of the invading soldiers. Wang T'ing-lan also commented: "If today's troops are like this, then we can expect what those of later days will be like; if one province's soldiers are like this, then we can imagine what those of the empire will be like." See Hsiao, Chin-tai t'ung-shih II, 953.

54. IWSM (Pu-wei), TK, p.175.

it received any further sudden British attack. Li Hsing-yuan (李星沅), Governor-general of Liang-Kiang was also ordered to make military preparation in order to reinforce the enforced military strength in Kuangtung when necessary.⁵⁵

We can observe that after the British attack on 1st April, while Ch'i-ying tried his best to satisfy the British demand by suppressing the anti-foreign movement of the Cantonese; the Emperor adopted a strong policy to prepare a defence force in order to cope with possible British attacks. It is important to note that when Ch'i-ying severely reprimanded the Cantonese for bluntly refusing the British to rent their land for building; the Emperor once praised such action of the Cantonese as being driven by "their righteousness and indignation."⁵⁶ As the garrison troops were not able to obstruct the British attack, the Emperor once again considered the use of militia to defend Canton. When the Emperor received Ch'i-ying's report concerning the British attack in late April, he order Hsü Kuang-ch'in, the then Governor of Kuang-tung, but not Ch'i-ying to notify the Cantonese to form militia to protect themselves, on condition that they should not use the pretext of establishing militia to gather together to molest the travelling barbarians so as to give the barbarians a pretext to create trouble and attack Chinese territory.⁵⁷ In an edict to Ch'i-ying and the grand councillors, the Emperor emphasized: "To get hold of the ardour of the people as the foundation (of defence)."⁵⁸ In May Hsü Kuang-ch'in approved a plan

55. IWSM (Pu-wei), TK, p.175; Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, p.276.

56. IWSM, TK 78.13b.

57. IWSM, TK 77.39b-40a.

58. IWSM, TK 77.42b.

drawn up by Wang Pei-chi for the collecting and training of militia.⁵⁹

Why did the Emperor prefer to use Hsü Kuang-ch'in rather than Ch'i-ying to form the militia? The prestige of Ch'i-ying in Canton since the Liu Hsin incident in January 1846, had much been lowered. He was condemned by the Cantonese for helping British barbarians to enter their city without regarding the "people's will." Shortly after the incident, Ch'i-ying tried to order the local gentry to halt the anti-foreign sentiment of the Cantonese, but the gentry did not listen to him. He had lost much face before the gentry and the Cantonese. On the other hand, the British attack on the Bogue on 1st April had severely injured Ch'i-ying's prestige. This time the Cantonese complained that he was not able to defend their province. Ch'i-ying's harsh method of suppressing the hostilities of the Cantonese towards the British after the agreement of 6th April demonstrated that he had lost power to discipline the Cantonese. In his memorial to the Emperor, he admitted that he could only use the gentry to soothe the anti-foreign sentiment of the people as the latter did not take any notice of official instructions after the Fat-shan incident. Besides, Ch'i-ying disclosed that the gentry had a better relationship with the people than the officials (including himself). The former were fit to take up the task of persuading the people to give up hostilities to the foreigners and to warn them of the punitive consequence if they attacked the barbarians.

In short, Ch'i-ying's public image was irreparably damaged after the signing of the Agreement on 6th April 1847. The Emperor had withdrawn his trust from him. The British plenipotentiary and Foreign Office in London had decided to force him to suppress the Cantonese in order to achieve security for the British at Canton. On the other hand, the Cantonese were out of his control, and the gentry were not willing to discipline them. After the Agreement, the British shifted their excursions from the vicinity of Canton to the rural areas where the anti-foreign sentiment was ferocious and official rule was weak. Ch'i-ying was bound to face more difficulties in handling the affrays between the country people and the young British merchants. It was under this condition that Ch'i-ying met a most trifling matter in one of the villages on 5th December 1847: the Huang-Chu-Ch'i incident.

CHAPTER 11

THE HUANG-CHU-CH'I INCIDENT OF 5TH DECEMBER 1847

The most serious hostility in the 1840's as far as loss of British lives was concerned, occurred on 5th December 1847, when six British merchants were killed in Huang-chu-ch'i (Hwang-chu-ke) village.¹ The second article of the Agreement on 6th April reads: "Whenever English go on shore to walk and meet with insult, the local authorities must investigate the matter and punish the aggressors; and the space of one day's journey, just as at Shanghai, is also assigned at Canton for such excursions."² The country life beyond the factory area had always attracted the curiosity of foreigners. Along the city river, there was a large population of families which were born, lived and died in their floating houses. Other scenes of the rural area, such as the market place, festival celebrations, district temples and other characteristics of the teeming life of the villagers, were of course alluring to the British. Foreigners before the Agreement were limited in the factory area. In early 1847 Davis and Consul MacGregor proposed

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1. See Davis's note to Ch'i-ying on 11th December 1847: "This is perhaps the most grievous outrage that England has experienced from the Chinese, and if it is not immediately and fully redressed, war will be inevitable." Papers relating to the murder of six Englishmen in the neighbourhood of Canton in the month of December 1847 (London, 1848), p.26, hereafter cited as Papers rel. to murder.
 2. Corr. rel. operation, "Commissioner Keying's Agreement" (6 April 1847), p.25. After the opening of the port at Shanghai in November 1843, mutual agreement had been reached between the local authorities and the consuls so that the foreigners were allowed to go and return within a day in the country-side. Later, the space was fixed at a conventional distance of thirty miles, see Alexander. Michie, The Englishman in China during the Victorian Era, as illustrated in the career of Sir Rutherford Alcock, K.C.B., D.C.L., many years consul and minister in China and Japan (London, 1900), I, 126.

the use of Whampoa as a recreation ground for the British community at Canton, but the idea was eventually turned down by the community on the ground that Whampoa was too far from Canton.³ However, the British were prepared to take the risk of being attacked by villagers by venturing in rural areas when travelling or shooting birds. After the Agreement in April the British merchants lost no time in using their so-called "unquestionable right"⁴ to make their excursions along the river to the villages. As a matter of fact, the attacks on the British after the Agreement was made mainly along city river districts instead of in factory areas and their suburbs as before the Agreement.

The harsh punishment inflicted upon the Chinese aggressors by Ch'i-ying had eased the fear of the British to take excursions along the city river. For example, on 13th May 1847, a lascar, belonging to a British Lorcha lying off the factories, came ashore at Canton to purchase some articles. He soon became the centre of a large crowd of Cantonese. One or more of whom attacked and robbed him.⁵ The principal culprit was apprehended by the police and municipal constable on the spot and severely punished by the Canton authorities.⁶ Later, Davis sent a note to Ch'i-ying, saying:

3. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy, p.272-273.

4. The British merchants claimed their "Unquestionable right" on the ground that "the Agreement of April last founded on it; for it is there expressly stipulated that British subjects shall have the privilege of going to a reasonable distance into the country." See Papers rel. to murder, p.45.

5. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 17 September 1847, p.2.

6. Insults, p.66.

"Her Majesty's Government have learned with great satisfaction the promptitude with which your Excellency punished the party who injured a Malay sailor in British employ, on the 13th May... If you will on every occasion thus vigorously employ your power to prevent and punish all acts of violence and wrong on the part of Chinese towards British subjects, Her Majesty's Government will take care that British subjects shall act justly and properly towards the Chinese and thus peace and good-will must continue to be maintained between the two nations for the profit and advantage of both."⁷

Although minor attacks on the British still persisted, since 13th May prompt redresses were made by Ch'i-ying. From a statement of A.R. Johnston⁸ on 19 November, we realize that the British were rather sure of their safety in Canton and the suburbs beyond it. The statement reads:

"There is a very observable improvement in the temper of the people at Canton; and after a few days' stay at that place, I was so struck by the improvement that I walked with the most perfect confidence round the city through the extensive suburb to the east and west of it; and I also visited the Buddhist Temple at Honan, where I remained for upwards of two hours. These expeditions were both made without meeting the slightest opposition or molestation. Some children occasionally called out after us in their usual way, but I several times observed the people correct and check them." ⁹

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7. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 17 September 1847, p.2.
 8. A.R. Johnston was the deputed officer to Davis, see Papers rel. to murder, p.41.
 9. Papers rel. to murder, "Statement of Mr. Johnston" (19 September 1847), p.16.

Johnston's statement was confirmed by a minor disturbance on the same day: While on a walk round the city, Consul MacGregor and his party became a target for stones thrown by two boys.¹⁰ In reporting this occurrence, one of the party declared that the people all along the path of the journey were civil and quiet and that the stones were thrown, "evidently to the annoyance of all the Chinese present, some of whom I observed depriving the boys of the stones."¹¹ Although no one was hurt, MacGregor's protest to Ch'i-ying resulted in the severe punishment of members of the garrison troops who failed to stop the boys from throwing stones.¹²

The city of Canton and the factory area were in good order after the reinforcement of garrison troops. Ch'i-ying reported to the Emperor after the Agreement in April: "The buildings in the foreign factories which are located at the outskirts of Canton city are the residence and warehouse of the barbarian merchants. In recent years, the vagabonds of the province (Kuangtung) frequently gathered together to molest the barbarians and gave them pretexts to create troubles."¹³ He had transferred 600 soldiers from the camps of Chao-ch'ing 肇慶 (a district in Kuangtung) to Canton to strengthen its police patrol in order to suppress possible hostilities of the Cantonese towards the British.¹⁴ However,

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10. FO 17/131, encl. 2 in No.205, Davis to Palmerston, 27 November 1847.
11. Papers rel. to murder, "Extract of a letter from Captain McDougall", p.17-18.
12. The punishment was given to twelve soldiers who received thirty lashes each from some people for not stopping the boys' stone-throwing, see FO 17/131, encl.2 in No.205, Davis to Palmerston, 27 November 1847.
13. IWSM, TK 78.9b.
14. IWSM, TK 78.4a.

Ch'i-ying did not pay much attention to the rural districts above the city of Canton where bitter anti-foreign sentiment existed among inhabitants. Some young British merchants, with the idea that the Chinese who attacked them would receive severe punishment from their own government, dared to make their excursions to these districts. Six of them unfortunately lost their lives in Huang-chu-chi village on 5th December 1847.¹⁵

Huang-chu-ch'i was one of the eleven villages in Huang-chu-ch'i Pao 堡 (petty military station) which was located in the southwest of Nan-hai hsien of Kuangtung.¹⁶ The village was about 3 miles above the factory area.¹⁷

On the morning of 5th December 1847, six young clerks, John Bellamy, Henry Balkwill, Patrick McCarte, William Brown, William Rutter, Alexander Small of Blenkin, Rawson & Co., at Canton,¹⁸ hired two native boatmen, Chow-A-pow and Hong A-much and proceeded several miles up the city river in a Hong boat, intending to take a country walk and shoot birds. After landing near the village of Huang-Chu-Ch'i, the British asked the boatmen to wait for them in the boat. The boatmen watched their employers passing through a stone archway of the village and never saw them again. The boatmen, while waiting in their boat, heard the sound of gongs in the village, and presumed

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15. Two of the six Englishmen who got killed on 5th December had joined a party to make an excursion to Huang-chu-ch'i village on 8th August 1847.
 16. Cheng Meng-yü, ed. Hsü-hsiu Nan-hai hsien-chih (Revised gazetteer of Nan-hai district) (1872), 4:17b.
 17. IWSM, TK 79.12a-b.
 18. Names of the six Englishmen may be found in Papers rel. to murder, p.22.

that the villagers were pursuing the foreigners.¹⁹ The villagers after discovering the boatmen had brought the foreigners to their village, stoned them from shore. Later, they even tried to catch the boatmen with two small boats. The two boatmen escaped to another nearby shore and waited for their employers until day-break. They eventually sailed back to Canton and reported the whole matter to the comprador of that British company at noon time on 6th December. Shortly, the British in Canton were told that the six young British got killed in the village which they had entered.²⁰

The killing of the six Englishmen was a shock to Ch'i-ying. He could not forget the British military action on 1st April. Fearing that Davis would use the killing as a pretext to start another war,²¹ Ch'i-ying immediately after the killing ordered occupation of Huang-chu-ch'i village by banner troops.²² Ch'i-ying dispatched the prefect of Canton to investigate the murder and seize the culprits with the help of local gentry. He told Davis: "Should

19. Papers rel. to murder, "Boatman's evidence" (11 December 1847), p.48.

20. Papers rel. to murder, MacGregor to Davis, 7 December 1847, p.23.

21. IWSM, TK 78.27b.

22. It was not impossible that Davis would send troops to occupy the offending villages, as he had warned Ch'i-ying in a note on 18th August 1847 that if the Chinese authorities failed to punish the aggressors of British subjects, the British authorities would settle matters by themselves, see FO 682/1381, date TK 27/6/25 (5 August 1847). As a matter of fact, the British merchants at Canton after the murder intended to proceed to the villages to take retaliation, see FO 228/73, desp. 254, MacGregor to Davis, 7 December 1847. Since Ch'i-ying had showed his serious concern in the investigation of the murder by sending banner troops to occupy the village, Consul MacGregor therefore disapproved the request of the merchants, see Papers rel. to murder, p.49.

they not submit, soldiers will instantly be appointed to surround and apprehend them and not one individual shall escape. Thus the national laws will be vindicated and the hearts of men will rejoice. The honourable Envoy need not entertain any anxiety on this point."²³ Later, Ch'i-ying fearing that the prefect might not be able to handle the case, further appointed the provincial judicial official to help the investigation.²⁴

What had been happening in the Huang-chu-ch'i village on the afternoon of 5th December? The British merchants at Canton suspected that the six young British were not all killed at the same time on 5th December. They thought that some of them were able to run away and were taken and confined. They believed that the confined persons were still alive even until 8th December. These merchants blamed the Chinese troops saying that even when they were despatched to the location of the killings in the evening of 7th December, they waited at some distance away from the village; even on the morning of 8th December the troops did not enter the village. The merchants thus insisted: "During this time the unfortunate gentlemen must have been living and in the hands of the country people, but the Chinese Government did nothing..." the British merchants continued, "the Chinese Government, who can hardly have failed to receive intelligence, even on Sunday night (6th December) of the commencement of the affray through their own

23. Papers rel. to murder, Keying to Davis, 7 December 1847, p.24.

24. Papers rel. to murder, Keying to Davis, 8 December 1847, p.25.

well-organized police and on the Monday (7th December) must have known of some of the foreigners being still alive, since they were in correspondence with Her Majesty's Consul about their release, could not or would not effectively interfere, their soldiers remaining entirely supine at some distance from the spot."²⁵

On the other hand, Ch'i-ying after investigating the killing, sent a note to Davis on 17th December, confirming that all the six British were killed on 5th December, His statement reads: "Six Englishmen went into the village of Hwang-chu-ke and on the villagers shouting out to drive them away, they, the Englishmen, in the first instance fired upon them, killing one of the people and wounding another; whereupon the villagers, becoming on the spur of the moment enraged, put the Englishmen to death." Ch'i-ying insisted that the result of the killing "was a case of mutual fighting between the two parties."²⁶

We cannot have a clear picture of the killing until reading Ch'i-ying's special memorial to the Emperor. The killing started when in the afternoon of 5th December, the six Englishmen (McCarte, Rutter, Bellamy, Balkwill, Brown and Small) carrying pistols went ashore from the Hong boat. They took a stroll and shot birds in Huang-Chu-Ch'i village. The villagers fearing that their presence and shooting would scare other people and cause an accident, went up to stop their actions. But the Englishmen ignored them. A quarrel thus started. Four villagers Leang A-lae (梁亞來), Chin A-chin

25. Papers rel. to murder, British merchants to Palmerston, 20 December 1847, p.44.

26. Papers rel. to murder, Keying to Davis, 17 December 1847, p.35.

(陳亞振), Wang A-ling (王亞擊) and Le A-keen (李亞健) joined the quarrel and turned it into an affray. Brown shot at Chin A-chin with his pistol and killed him on the spot; Small wounded Le A-keen to the ground with his pistol. At that moment Leang A-lae together with Chin A-hae (陳亞孩), Le A-ying (李亞硬) and Wang A-man (王亞曼) instructed other villagers to pursue the Englishmen. Le A-gan (李亞菴) first hurt Brown with his grain spear. Brown finally succeeded in snatching the spear, Chin A-tae (陳亞代) at this moment speared Brown to the ground. Brown shouted at his assailants. Le A-ying²⁷ becoming on the spur of the moment enraged landed a fatal chop on Brown's head. Wang A-ling approached another English shooter, Small, but was struck by his fists. Wang A-ling then hurt Small on the back with his spear. While Small was pounding Wang A-ling with his fists, Ho A-shing (何亞勝) attacked Small's midriff in order to help Wang make an escape. When Small turned to fight Ho, Wang A-ling drew his rice-field knife to stop Small and killed him. At that moment, McCarte, Rutter, Bellamy and Balkwill went all out to fight the assailants. McCarte first got hurt on his head by Leang A-lae's rice-field knife. When McCarte rocked and fell to the ground and berated them, Leang A-lae becoming on the spur of the moment enraged, took the spear from Chin A-tae (because the handle of Leang's rice-field knife had fallen off) and speared McCarte to death. Chin A-hae now hurt Rutter on his chest and legs with his spear. Rutter pounded Chin with his fists, the latter dodged quickly and hurt Rutter on his back. When Rutter succeeded in seizing the spear, Chin drew

27. Villagers underlined with red lines were those who killed the young British.

his rice-field knife and chopped Rutter on his shoulder, Rutter fell down and shouted at Chin, the latter got enraged, and Chin A-hae gave the Englishman a chop on the head and killed him. Le A-ying used his spear to hurt Bellamy on his back first and when Bellamy turned around to strike Le he got another wound on the front of his body, Bellamy then abused his assailant, Le A-ying became infuriated, he dropped his spear and taking out a small knife killed Bellamy. Wang A-man hurt Balkwill first on his body. Balkwill beat Wang heavily but was badly hurt on his throat and chest by Wang's spear. Balkwill fell down and berated Wang, the latter Wang A-man became enraged and landed fatal chops on his forehead with his knife. At this time, a villager named Leang A-urh (梁亞二) passed by and caught sight of the murder. Leang A-lae (who was supposed to be the leader of the assailants) fearing that the local authorities would discover their murder of the Englishmen, suggested throwing the corpses into the river in order to destroy any trace of their crime. Leang A-lae consulted Leang A-urh on how to manage this. The latter knew that the village river flowed into the ocean. The corpses being thrown into the river would be carried downstream and disappear. Leang A-urh then asked his reliable villagers Ho A-teen (何亞田), Leang A-e (梁亞伊), Chin A-kurn (陳亞均), Chin A-wan (陳亞閻), Leang A-chi (梁亞齊) and Leang A-fung (梁亞逢) to help in the cover-up. The group hired an unacquainted Tanka boat to carry the corpses to the centre of the river and drop them into the water. Afterwards, all the members dispersed.²⁸

28. IWSM (Pu-wei), TK p.198-199.

There was no doubt that the six Englishmen were killed in cold blood. But the case was not a sudden matter.²⁹ After the British had got the right to take excursions on shore along the city river by virtue of the Agreement of 6th April, the natives of towns and villages warned them by showing hostility to their excursions. On 8th August, a party of eight young foreigners, mostly British took a water tour along the river. When their boat went close to the Huang-chu-ch'i village, the villagers fired blank shots from their native guns to warn the party not to go ashore.³⁰ Although Ch'i-ying took rapid action to punish the aggressors, the hostility of the natives did not decrease. On 21st November, placards were spread to condemn the molesting behaviour of the British in the interior along the river:

"They first commenced with fishing and fowling, but in course of time they actually seized and stole fruit, cut trees, wounded boys with fire-arms, insulted females and by getting intoxicated, they acted as savages; in short there is no wickedness but what they have been guilty of; they are therefore in the highest degree detestable...

"The different townships had large commercial marts having already organized Braves, if Chinese traitors should still dare to guide the devils into these towns, and thereby cause mischief, then the towns in question must immediately sound their gongs in order to spread the intelligence and the adjoining towns must, on hearing the sounds, likewise immediately sound their gongs, so that

29. The permission of the British entry to the city of Canton and their success in setting up buildings in Honan District and Hog Lane with the assistance of Ch'i-ying made the Cantonese develop their phobia of territorial loss towards the British encroachment. On the other hand, the natives in the rural areas felt constrained by the presence of British in their villages, see Papers rel. to murder, "Printed handbill circulated and sold at Canton", p.41-42.

30. FO 682/1393, Keying to Davis, date TK 27/7/22 (1 September 1847). Cf. n.15 of this chapter.

from far to near every one may know of their presence. The Braves must at the same time be led out; one half must be placed so as to cut off their retreat, and the other half must pursue them in order to kill them. The Braves must not on any account rest until they have completely destroyed the Chinese traitors and devils." 31

This placard is very similar to those ferocious ones that condemn^{ed} the misdeeds of the British after the San-yuan-li incident in May 1841: the natives had decided to kill the intruding foreigners and the traitors who brought them to their villages in cooperation with members of neighbouring villages.³² The killing in Huang-chu-ch'i village on 5th December occurred in this way. When the two boatmen were waiting for the return of their British employers to their boat, a kind-hearted old man near Huang-chu-ch'i village, warned them to return home as soon as possible, saying that the villagers would immediately seize them and kill them if they stayed there.³³ Shortly, other villagers after realizing that the boatmen had brought the British to their village stoned them from shore. Within a brief period another group of villagers tried to catch them with two small boats, shouting: "This is the boat which brought the foreigners."³⁴ The two boatmen

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31. Papers rel. to murder, "A placard" (21 November 1847), p.51.
32. The murder to a certain degree was influenced by the San-yuan-li incident. Ch'i-ying told the Emperor after the murder that the common indignation felt by the people of Kuangtung and their view of the British as foes, dated from the serious outrage to which San-yuan-li was subjected, see IWSM, TK 79.12a-b.
33. See FO 17/132, encl.1, in No.220 of 1847, Davis to Palmerston, 29 December 1847.
34. Papers rel. to murder, "Boatman's evidence" (11 December 1847) p.48.

could only escape by a hair's breadth. On the shore the villagers who pursued and killed the British were from different villages. The six culprits who hacked or speared the British to death got capital punishment (four of them were beheaded on 21st December). Among these condemned convicts, only three of them (Leang A-lae, Chin A-hae and Wang A-ling) were villagers of Huang-chu-ch'i. The other three were Le A-gan, (H)wang A-man, from Hang-keaou (坑灣) village; Le A-ying, from Keaou-peaou (濤表) village.³⁵

Ch'i-ying's prompt reaction and harsh punishment of the Chinese culprits however seemed too mild to Davis. The British plenipotentiary demanded that all the culprits of the killing should be executed at Huang-chu-ch'i village. At the same time, he insisted that the villages of Huang-chu-ch'i, Hang-Keaou, Keaou-peaou be razed to the ground, saying, "I have abundance of force to act as a guard, and prevent disturbance at the execution, if you so please."³⁶ When he realized that the culprits were not executed nine days after the killing, Davis threatened Ch'i-ying with possible British military action. He subtly warned his opponent on 14th December: "I have one steamer already arrived, and can assist your Excellency immediately with 400 men to support your authority. It is plain to me that you are unable to act, and hence the delay in executing the guilty."³⁷ The next day, Davis

35. FO 682/1411, Keying to Davis, date TK 27/11/13 (20 December 1847). Huang-chu-ch'i, Hang-keaou, Keaou-peaou were neighbouring villages.

36. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 12 December 1847, p.27.

37. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 14 December 1847, p.30.

sent another note to Ch'i-ying, threatening: "It is time that I should now fix a limit beyond which I cannot communicate on this subject with your Excellency. I have therefore to state explicitly, that unless the murderers are executed at Hwang-chu-ke in the presence of my deputed officers before the 22nd instant, I must cease our correspondence and inform my Government that proper redress cannot be obtained."³⁸

Ch'i-ying replied to Davis with great statesmanship: he accepted the less important demands but turned down the harmful ones as far as sovereignty was concerned with convincing argument. As for the execution of the culprits, Ch'i-ying did not oppose the idea of carrying out the execution in Huang-chu-ch'i village, but he only agreed to execute the four principal culprits. His argument was "a life for a life" stating that: "In the present case the Englishmen have wounded two Chinese with fire-arms, one of whom has already died, and it is uncertain whether the other will live or die; while the Chinese beat six Englishmen to death.... four of them (the culprits) have been convicted as principals in the murders and it is proper that these be forthwith severely dealt with, their punishment being increased in degree."³⁹

Ch'i-ying refused to destroy the villages of Huang-chu-ch'i, Hang-keaou, Keaou-peaou. He told Davis: "As in every debt there

38. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 15 December 1847, p.32.

39. Papers rel. to murder, Keying to Davis, 16 December 1847, p.32. In another note to Davis, Ch'i-ying argued that the British who killed Chinese subjects never forfeited a life for a life, adding that the death punishment to the four murderers was serious enough to cover the death of the six Englishmen, see FO 682/1409, date TK 27/11/10 (17 December 1847).

is a debtor, so in all wrongs there are chief culprits. Now, the number of people in the village in question is great and if a whole village is destroyed, without distinction of good and bad, on account of a case of people being beaten to death, how could the azure heaven above which witnesses it possibly endure such an excessive implication of the innocent?"⁴⁰

The fact of not executing all the culprits before 22nd December was a most serious matter to Ch'i-ying. If he was not able to give convincing reasons to Davis, the latter would take action to settle the case of the murder at his own will: military action was the most likely way. Ch'i-ying told Davis that according to Chinese law, the execution of convicts sentenced to death had to await approval of the Board of Punishment at Peking; there was no clause directing immediate execution. However, Ch'i-ying agreed to carry out immediate execution of the four principal culprits as a specially severe punishment,⁴¹ adding that: "the remainder of the criminals will either be sentenced to decapitation, strangulation, military slavery or transportation for life, in every case awaiting the confirmation of the Criminal Board."⁴²

Fearing that Davis was not satisfied with his answer, Ch'i-ying sent another note to the British plenipotentiary, saying that he had paid great attention to the safety of the foreigners after the

40. Papers rel. to murder, Keying to Davis, 17 December 1847, p.35.

41. FO 682/1409, Keying to Davis, date TK 27/11/10 (17 December 1847).

42. Papers rel. to murder, Keying to Davis, 17 December 1847, p.35.

Agreement on 6th April by increasing the military forces to suppress the hostilities of the Chinese in the factory area. It was only that the six British did not notify the Chinese authorities of their excursion and entered the rural districts (above the city of Canton) by themselves. In this case, the Chinese officers were not able to save their lives in time.⁴³

Davis accepted the argument of Ch'i-ying. He gave up the demand for the destruction of the three villages, but insisted on the immediate execution of the four principal culprits in Huang-chu-ch'i village as a matter of "example for the future." Davis had lost much ground already, and he now warned his counter-part: "If your Excellency will not make the example at the place where the crime was committed, our present negotiation ought to stop."⁴⁴

The execution took place on 21st December in the front of the Hall of Ancestors of Huang-chu-ch'i village. One hundred Chinese soldiers were drawn up along two sides of the Hall. A.R. Johnston was sent by Davis to attend the execution with other British civil and military officers and a guard of thirty-three soldiers from a British regiment. In his report to Davis after the execution, Johnston especially mentioned that the culprits were "all stout men in rude health, having the appearance of able-bodied countrymen."⁴⁵ This may well have served as confirmation to Davis that these were

43. FO 682/1409, Keying to Davis, date TK 27/11/10 (17 December 1847).

44. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 18 December 1847, p.36.

45. Papers rel. to murder, Mr. Johnston to Davis, 21 December 1847, p.37.

the real culprits. For he had feared that criminals might be substituted.⁴⁶

One thing is worth mentioning in Ch'i-ying's management of the Huang-chu-ch'i incident. It concerns the number of culprits for execution. As we have noted above, six culprits took part in killing the Englishmen. On the Chinese side, one villager was killed and another was seriously wounded during the course of the murder. The Chinese code for homicide was based on a life for a life. When Lin Wei-hsi was murdered on 12 July 1840, Commissioner Lin reiterated the Chinese principle: "He who kills a man must pay the penalty of life." Ch'i-ying at first agreed to pass a death sentence on four culprits so that the number of the Chinese culprits could cover the death of six Englishmen. The sentences of the other two murdered culprits were not mentioned. However, Davis insisted on the execution of all culprits. In his note to Davis on 17th December, Ch'i-ying told his counter-part that he managed the execution of the culprits according to the rate of forfeiture of "a life for a life", adding that Englishmen of recent years had killed Chinese not merely on one or two occasions, but that they had not forfeited a life.⁴⁷ It is understandable that Ch'i-ying would feel that the demand of Davis was unfair. In 1840 Elliot

46. Davis's suspicion was not groundless. The corrupted district magistrates in Kuangtung always accepted bribery from criminals to find other people to bear crimes for them, so that the latter were able to get away scotch free. When Davis expressed a suspicion that the culprits in the killing might be substituted, Ch'i-ying argued that all the culprits were apprehended in the offending village, saying that "it would be impossible to close people's eyes and ears to the facts." See Papers rel. to murder, p.35.

47. FO 682/1409, Keying to Davis, date TK 27/11/10 (17 December 1847).

did not surrender the murderer of Lin Wei-hsi. When three Cantonese were shot dead by British merchants in their attack on the factory in July 1846, instead of giving up the British killers, Davis demanded enforced protection from Ch'i-ying of the British community. However, Ch'i-ying eventually confirmed the death sentence of the other two culprits. Davis was able to see Ch'i-ying's unwillingness to agree to the extra punishment. In his reply to Ch'i-ying's note of 17th December, he warned Ch'i-ying of what he had written to him: "the remainder of the criminals will either be sentenced to decapitation, strangulation, military slavery or transportation for life, in each case awaiting the confirmation of the Criminal Board."⁴⁸

Davis did not allow Ch'i-ying to dodge the issue of executing the other culprits. When he did not hear any report of the execution, in late January 1848 he cautioned Ch'i-ying in one of his notes:

"As regards the late murders at Hwang-chu-ke, the principal thing now is the punishment of the eleven criminals. My Government will consider this as the proof of sincerity on the part of your Excellency. I have already repeatedly declared that if punishment is not rigorously and publicly carried out against these criminals, peace and friendship cannot continue; and therefore I shall not be answerable for the results. More than a month has now elapsed, and I daily wait to hear the sentences reconfirmed. This point can never rest until they have been punished." 49

48. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 18 December 1847, p.36.

49. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 24 January 1848, p.75.

When Hsu Kuang-chin replaced Ch'i-ying as Imperial Commissioner and Governor-general of Liang-Kuang in late February 1848, Davis pressed him to settle the punishment of the remaining eleven culprits. Even on the eve of his retirement as British plenipotentiary, Davis told Ch'i-ying that he wanted the remaining question of the Huang-chu-ch'i killing to be ironed out before his departure.⁵⁰ The Board of Punishment in early March confirmed the punishment of the eleven culprits (two more Chinese culprits were sentenced to death). Only on this condition did Davis agree that the case was well settled.

Ch'i-ying's management of the killing had completely lost him the hearts of the people of Kuangtung. A characteristic martyr according to the people of Kuangtung was a hard fighter who not only resisted the local rebels but also the foreign invaders. The local gazetteers abound with examples of those martyrs' participation in the campaigns against the foreign encroachment.⁵¹ In 1840 Commissioner Lin offered awards for the killing of British military personnel and they were honoured to defend their country. When the British seamen killed a villager, Lin stopped provisions to the British and expelled them from Macao to force the surrender of the British culprit. Now the Manchu Imperial Commissioner did every thing in direct contrast. Once they had a patriotic commissioner, now they had a traitorous one.

50. FO 682/1428, Davis to Keying, date TK 28/1/22 (26 February 1848).

51. Examples may be found in NHHC, 14:35a-36b; T.F. Liang, ed. P'an-yü hsien-hsü-chih (Revised gazetteer of P'an-yü district), 19:16--19b.

The ancestor-worshipping villagers fought bravely against the British soldiers with their inferior weapons when those soldiers molested their ancestral halls during the San-yuan-li incident. They would never forgive the crime of Ch'i-ying, sending banner troops to their village to close their Ancestral Halls to force the surrender of the "defenders" of their villages who killed the Englishmen. During the course of the interrogation, the culprits endured much torture before speaking of the true facts.⁵²

The villagers of Huang-chu-ch'i showed their uncooperative manner in Ch'i-ying's investigation of the killing. Ch'i-ying memorialized to the Emperor saying that in the course of the investigation, "most of the village escaped from the investigators, except a few who were old and weak. When they were questioned about the killing, they replied that there was no fighting or killing between the villagers and the foreigners, adding that they did not even see any foreigner go ashore for a stroll."⁵³ Eventually, Ch'i-ying arrested some suspects. Although they admitted that the killing happened under their eyes, they still were not willing to say exactly who else had taken part in killing the British.⁵⁴

The villagers could not pardon Ch'i-ying for permitting the

52. Papers rel. to murder, Keying to Davis, 16 December 1847, p.32.

53. IWSM, TK 78.27a.

54. IWSM, TK 78.29a.

British officers and their troops to attend the execution of their countrymen on 21st December. In 1840 the patriotic Commissioner Lin invited foreigners to watch the destruction of opium at the harbour of the Bogue. This time the Ch'i-ying allowed their arch enemies to witness the execution.

The whole execution was performed in silence.⁵⁵ The villagers did not draw near but watched the decapitation from a distance.⁵⁶ Although no accident occurred during the execution, the anger of villagers near Kuang-tung soon developed into a full scale anti-foreign movement after the departure of Ch'i-ying in late February 1848.

When Ch'i-ying and Davis argued with heat on the number of culprits for execution, the latter shocked the former in one of his despatches by saying: "The wrong committed by the Imperial Commissioner Lin was not greater than the present. You either cannot or will not protect the lives of British subjects by proper control over the country-people. It is now time for the British Government to require not only satisfaction for the past, but

55. Papers rel. to murder, Mr. Johnston to Davis, 21 December 1847, p.37.

56. ibid.

security for the future. Proper security must be given that my countrymen will not be maltreated and murdered by the Chinese of this province, in violation of the First Article of the Treaty."⁵⁷

Fearing that further attacks on the British subjects by the villagers would result in serious retribution, Ch'i-ying told Davis that he had gathered the most prestigious members of the gentry class at the Ta Fo Ssu (Great Buddha Temple) to draft a proclamation, warning the people that they would suffer the same fate as the culprits in the Huang-chu-ch'i murder if foreigners were further molested.⁵⁸ At about the same time he instructed those gentry to send a suggestion to Davis offering the idea of getting Chinese gentry and literati and British merchants together for a meeting so as to establish a compact of Peace with the gentry and literati admonishing the elders of the villages to order their sons and brethren not to molest the British parties in their country walks. If the lawless infringed these prohibitions, the elders of the villages should tie them up and deliver them to the yamen. On the other hand, the British plenipotentiary should instruct his countrymen not to commit irregularities in the villages.⁵⁹ The suggestion, however was rejected by Davis on the grounds that the gentry members and the British plenipotentiary were not of equal official status; the gentry were also not entitled to correspond

57. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, 17 December 1847, p.33.

58. YPCC, 6:86-87. Later three of the province's highest officials personally visited the major towns of Nan-hai and P'an-yü to warn the inhabitants in the same tone, see FO 228/73, desp. 207, MacGregor to Davis, 27 December 1847.

59. See the enclosed copy called "a proclamation issued by all gentry in Kwangtung" in FO 682/1414, date TK 27/11/11 (18 December 1847).

with the British consul at Canton.⁶⁰ Later, Davis insisted that Ch'i-ying inflict serious punishment on those who were offensive to the British, adding that by so doing hostilities would be thwarted.⁶¹ It is important to find out the reason why Davis still insisted that Ch'i-ying suppress the people of Kuangtuang. In one of his notes to Ch'i-ying before the execution of the four Huang-chu-ch'i killing, Davis reprimanded Ch'i-ying's Pharisaism: "Your Excellency, in addressing your Emperor, appears to have stated as follows: 'Should the foreigners chance to have any object in view, such as the renting of lands, the erection of buildings, or the like trifles, the Canton people collect a mob, and interfere with them by making a disturbance. The local authorities, holding the people to be foremost in consideration, think it inexpedient to thwart their inclinations seriously, or to show a devious compliance with the requests of the foreigners.' This indeed is the real truth and being contrary to the Treaty, it is the whole cause of the constant troubles at Canton, while at the other ports there is perpetual quiet."⁶²

As the murder in Huang-chu-ch'i had already demonstrated that harsh punishment was not able to halt the hostilities of the people, poor Ch'i-ying was not able to impress his British counter-

60. FO 682/1414, Davis to Keying, date TK 27/11/26 (2 January 1848).

61. FO 682/1417, Davis to Keying, date TK 27/12/5 (10 January 1848).

62. Papers rel. to murder, Davis to Keying, p.36.

part with his difficulties. In order to avoid further affray between the people and the British he suggested that whenever the British took their excursion to the villages, the magistrates of Nan-hai and P'an-yü should each send ten experienced cadres to look after the excursionists.⁶³ His suggestion was deeply appreciated by Davis. However one man's meat is another man's poison. The people of Kuangtung could never bear the annoyance of a small group of British coming to their territory with twenty yamen cadres.

When the Emperor first heard of the killing in Huang-chu-ch'i village, he basically agreed with Ch'i-ying's policy that the aggressors should be punished in order to avoid a possible British attack on Chinese territory. But he instructed Ch'i-ying that affrays between the people and the barbarians must be fairly handled so as not to lose the loyalty of the people.⁶⁴ However, when the Emperor learned of the execution of 21st December, he was angry with Ch'i-ying's harsh punishment, saying that his practice would lose the people's loyalty. The Emperor also blamed the presence of the British in the rural areas. He angrily told his grand councillors: "The barbarians rambled through Chinese territory at their will. If the barbarian chief had disciplined his countrymen and restricted their roaming, how could the affray (Huang-chu-ch'i incident) have happened? As the people and the barbarians (in Canton) are mixed together, further conflicts are

63. FO 682/1419, Davis to Keying, date TK 27/12/8 (13 January 1848).

64. IWSM, TK 78.28a-b.

bound to happen. The said Governor-general (Ch'i-ying) should explain this matter to the barbarian chief and instruct him to restrict his people: except for trading purposes the barbarians are not allowed to enter inhabited farms and dwellings."⁶⁵

Ch'i-ying was able to sense the dissatisfaction of his Emperor with his conciliation policy. Huang En-t'ung, his dexterous hand in the foreign affairs had been degraded in January 1847.⁶⁶ Huang's degradation could be treated as a warning to Ch'i-ying as far as his conciliation policy is concerned. Hsü Kuang-chin was ordered to take over the post of governor from Huang. On 7th March 1847, the Emperor ordered Ch'i-ying to appraise the ability of Hsü in the management of the foreign affairs. Ch'i-ying by that time could feel that the Emperor was seeking a suitable person to take over his job. After the signing of Agreement on 6th April 1847, he had first planned his retirement.⁶⁷ Especially after the Huang-chu-ch'i incident, the people of Kuangtung, the British plenipotentiary and the Emperor, all disagreed with his management of foreign affairs. In his misery, Ch'i-ying once again expressed his eagerness to leave Canton on grounds of old age and infirmity. In a memorial to the Emperor, he wrote that the troublesome foreign affairs had already damaged his health in the past years. He added: "Since last year (1846) my hair and beard has turned white because of the burdensome management of the barbarian affairs.

The deterioration of my hepatitis caused the exhaustion of my mental

65. IWSM, TK 79.5a.

66. The reason of Huang's degradation was that he strongly disagreed with the idea that "the ardour of the people" was^{not} strong enough to resist the British barbarians, an idea much favoured by the members of War Party especially after the Liu Hsin incident in January 1846. At the beginning of 1847, he was degraded to sixth grade, see Wang Chih-chu'an, Kuo-ch'ao jou-yuan chi (Record of the ruling dynasty's graciousness to strangers), 12:10.

67. See chapter IX.

capabilities. At first it started with blurred vision, but recently it has resulted in my eyes streaming with tears. At the beginning, dizziness occurred, but now vertigo (giddiness) falls upon me suddenly. Although I always take medicine to release the pain and exert myself in my work, my vigour has decreased and my weariness has become obvious. It is in fact very difficult for me to continue my present jobs."⁶⁸ On the other hand, Ch'i-ying highly praised the ability of Hsü Kuang-chin in the foreign affairs, saying that the latter was getting on well with foreign affairs. Ch'i-ying remarked that Hsü's taking part in investigating the Huang-chu-ch'i killing evinced his extraordinary ability.⁶⁹

Ch'i-ying specially suggested that Huang En-t'ung should continue assisting with foreign affairs. He told the Emperor that Huang was an indispensable figure, saying; "When he was in the post of the governor of Kuangtung, I felt easy to leave for Kuangsi to inspect the drilling of the recruited troops there. (After the sudden and slashing assault of the British troops in April 1847) ... Hostilities exist between the people and the barbarians and frontier crises were twice bound to happen. But under the skilful and scrupulous management of that official, the crises were thwarted. In another memorial to the Emperor, Ch'i-ying once again praised Huang: "The said official has been helping your slave in handling the barbarian affairs for years. He knows very well the nature of the barbarians and has developed great knowledge in getting the

68. Shih-liao hsun-k'an, 35, ti, 298a-b.

69. Ibid.

barbarians under his control. Besides, he had been in charge of financial and judicial administration for a long period and had been in the post of governorship. With such experience, he knows every inch of provincial affairs. Although he was deprived of his previous posts because of misdeeds, he has been acting as my adroit helper."⁷⁰

In late February, Ch'i-ying received an imperial edict, permitting his transfer to the capital. In early March Ch'i-ying left Canton for Peking. The change of imperial commissionership was a great joy to the people of Kuang-tung. The shameless capitulationist was down, then came the faithful follower of their respected Commissioner Lin: Hsü Kuang-chin.

To the old Manchu clansman, Ch'i-ying's office in Canton since April 1844, had been a nightmare. In one sense, his resignation was no better than Richard Nixon's in 1973 when the latter became unpopular with his people. Ch'i-ying once was so confident that only he was well-qualified to manage the post-war foreign affairs,⁷¹ but now he left amidst the condemnation of the Cantonese and the British plenipotentiary, and even his childhood playmate - the Tao-kuang Emperor.

70. Shih-liao hsun-k'an, 35, ti, 302b.

71. See Chapter VII.

CONCLUSION

Success or Failure

We may ask, how anti-British was Hsü when he succeeded Ch'i-yung as acting imperial commissioner to take charge of the foreign affairs in March 1848?

Judging from his memorials to the Emperor, Hsü did not appear to have a homicidal hatred towards the British as the censors in Peking shared; nor did he indiscriminately support the anti-foreign feeling after he took up the governership of Kuang-tung in 1846. In the Huang-chu-chi killing, Hsü agreed with Ch'i-ying's idea that only an immediate punishment of the four culprits could have forestalled a British attack on the city of Canton.¹ In this matter, he won praise from Ch'i-ying and earned his recommendation to succeed him as the governor-general and imperial commissioner.²

However, the Emperor after the Huang-chu-chi killing had decided to go along with the feelings of the people to take action against the overbearing manner of the British. When appointing Hsü Kuang-chin and Yeh Ming-ch'en (葉名琛), as acting governor-general and governor respectively, he issued an edict to impress the grand councillors: "The most important matter is to appease the people's emotions. If the 'ardour of people' is not lost, then the foreign barbarians can be handled."³

1. IWSM, TK 78.30a-31b.

2. Shih-liao hsün-kan, 35, ti, 298a-b.

3. IWSM, TK 78.36a.

On the other hand, Hsü was able to see the miserable result of Huang En-t'ung, who once criticized the "anti-foreignism" of the people. The Emperor reminded him of the remorse of Huang in the same edict:

"Hereafter if Hung En-t'ung exerts himself energetically and shows perfect sincerity, the said governor-general (Hsü) will naturally be able to surmise his remorse, and relying on the facts, recommend him in a memorial and await our granting of favour. If he does not know how to be diligent and relied on words to shirk responsibility, other cannot help but be aware of it. In that event, let him be memorialized for impeachment. (We) shall have to see whether or not Huang En-t'ung is capable of meeting this serious punishment. Tremble!" 4

However, Hsü had stayed long enough in Canton. He observed the British pushing their warships and soldiers into the inland river of Canton when their entry to the city was denied; their demands on punishing Chinese attackers were ignored. These two issues^{had} annoyed Chü-ying and Hsü. In his first meeting with Sir George Bonham, who succeeded Sir Davis as British Plenipotentiary in March 1848, Hsü made a statement which did not offend both the British authority and his government. He declared that he was determined to abide by the provisions of the treaties and to make "no distinction between the central and outside people, so long as the foreigners were properly restrained."⁵ Bonham did not find his statement evasive, as Hsü at that time was still acting as governor-general.

Hsü was made governor-general on 4th July. Three days later Bonham wrote to Hsü suggesting preliminary arrangements should be made

4. IWSM, TK 78.36b.

5. See Costin, Great Britain and China, 1833-1860 (Oxford University Press, 1937), p.135.

to give effect to the Ch'i-ying-Davis Agreement that allowed the British entry to Canton in 1849. It came the time Hsü had to show his standing on this aspect. Later in the same month, he picked brains in this matter from his friend, Lin Tse-hsü. The latter replied him with a terse suggestion: Yueh-min k'o yung 粵民可用 (lit. the people of Kuang-tung are reliable), adding that they were the only available forces to cope with the aggressive barbarians.⁶

Hsü accepted Lin's suggestion and adopted a bold stance toward the British entry.

Hsü first memorialized the Emperor in November that "the temper of the Cantonese is stubborn," adding that "to prevent the British entering the city might not precipitate war, but indiscreetly to consent to their demand would certainly give rise to immediate hostilities from the people."⁷ On 17th February 1849 a meeting between Bonham and Hsü took place aboard the HMS Hastings. When Bonham reminded Hsü of the British entry, the latter replied that in view of the strong opposition of the Cantonese, the Chinese authorities could not act against the will of the people.

After the meeting Hsü once more reminded the Emperor that public opinion in Canton had been highly emotive in 1847 when Ch'i-ying agreed to open the city two years later, and that if the British were ever permitted to enter the city the problem would be much more serious.⁸

6. Chen, "Lin Tse-hsü ti i-sheng", p.23; Ch'iang, Chin-tai chung-kuo wai-chiao-shih tzu-liao chi-yao, I. p.163.

7. IWSM, TK 79.24a. See also 79.43b.

8. IWSM, TK 79.38a.

Hsü decided to strengthen the militia to cope with the British entry. Soon after his meeting with Bonham, he ordered Hsu Hsiangkuang (許祥光), a prestigious gentry, to re-activate the local militia of the surrounding countryside. At about the same time, he instructed another gentry, Liang T'ing-nan (梁廷柝) to supervise the militia within the city. In late March about 100,000 militia-men were organized as an armed force in and out the city.⁹ Other gentry had contributed the enormous sum of 440,000 taels to the militia to help in the defence of the city. Canton merchants were ordered to stop trade with the British.

Evidence shows that the Canton authorities had offered the militia-men arms to strengthen their forces. A foreigner in Canton wrote in 26th March that "the people have begun to ... parade the streets at night in uniform, and armed with spears, match-locks and muskets."¹⁰ Such weapons as match-locks and muskets were only available to the regular Chinese Soldiers. As we can observe the weapons which the people used in the incidents of San-yuan-li and Huang-chu-chi were unsophisticated - merely cudgels, clubs, field-knives and spears.

^{Made}
A confident by the reinforcement of the militia Hsü on 1st April (falsely) told Bonham that he had been forbidden by the throne to open the city to the British, adding that the government could not ignore the spontaneous and unanimous opinion of the people of Canton in order to comply with the wishes of "men from afar."¹¹

9. YPCC, 6:96.

10. F.W. Williams, The Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams, LL.D. (New York, 1889), p.169.

11. F0682/1537, Seu (Hsü) to Bonham, date TK 29/3/9 (1 April 1849). For a detailed review of his episode, see John J. Nolde, "The 'False Edict' of 1849," Journal of Asian Studies, 20:299-315.

What frightened Bonham were the large body of militia, and the inflammatory placards carried by the people threatening to attack the British if they entered the city. Besides, he feared that the entry would jeopardize the prosperous British trade. Thus, he informed Hsü on 9th April that "the entry rests where it was and must remain in abeyance."¹²

When the jubilant Hsü and Yeh reported to the Emperor that the British plenipotentiary had agreed to give up the entry to Canton, the Emperor rewarded Hsü with the title of viscount and Yeh with that of baron. At the same time, Hsu Hsiang-kuang and Liang T'ing-nan were also awarded, upon the recommendation of the Governor-general.¹³

The "victory" in Canton received applause from all parts of the country. It is worth mentioning that Tseng Kuo-fan (曾國藩), the later Taiping rebel suppressor gave his comment on this aspect shortly after the "victory". Tseng was serving as junior vice-president of the Board of Rites in Peking at that time. He wrote in one of his family letters: "... the English barbarians reclaimed their entry to the city of Canton. Viceroy Hsü handled this matter with dexterity, that the barbarians agreed to give up their entry. From now on, the crisis caused by the foreign devils can be halted. The Emperor is very much delighted."¹⁴ The local gentry and the Cantonese too were grateful to Hsü and Yeh for mobilizing the popular action of resistance, and spiritually regenerating the province. They decided

12. F0682/1539, Bonham to Seu, date TK 19/3/17 (9 April 1849).

13. IWSM, TK 80.15b.

14. Quoted from Tseng-wen-cheng kung ch'uan-chi (The complete work of Tseng-Wen-Cheng Kung).

to erect monuments of the two heroes.

There appeared to be a great difference between the policy of suppressing the people to appease the barbarians and that of mobilizing the people to resist the barbarians. Ch'i-ying tried his best to appease the British but they still rocked the city with their warships and marines. He himself was repudiated by the people and the imperial trust upon him had been removed. On the contrary, by showing a bold stance to the British, Hsü was able to make the British put aside their entry, and was applauded by the Emperor and the people.

After the "victory" Hsü reminded the Emperor that "the people are the foundation of the state."¹⁵ The Emperor did see eye to eye with him in this respect. He honoured the people of Canton with votive tablets inscribed: "The people's will is as strong as a walled city."¹⁶

The "victory" in 1849 heralded the resurrection of Lin Tse-hsü and the downfall of Chi-ying in 1850. The Tao-kuang Emperor stayed in his throne only several months more after the "victory." He died on 25th February, 1850 and was succeeded by his fourth son, the Hsien-feng Emperor (1850-1860). The new emperor held a different point of view on foreign affairs from his father. The Tao-kuang Emperor had experienced the Chinese defeat in the Opium War. He realized the military strength of China was no match to that of Britain. In the post-war period, he supported Ch'i-ying's conciliatory policy during the latter's tenure of Office in Canton and continued his personal favour to him until his death. On the other hand, the new emperor was young and arrogant. He appeared to have been definitely hostile to

15. IWSM, TK 79.44a.

16. IWSM, TK 80.14b.

foreigners. His view on foreign affairs was vindictive and chauvinistic. After the "victory" in 1849, he was confident that the strong and uncompromising policy which Lin and Hsü had been implementing was suitable in conducting foreign affairs. He acquiescedⁱⁿ the provocative anti-foreign feeling of the War-Party at the court.

In early 1850 a xenophobic official suggested to the new emperor that Lin Tse-hsü be summoned to serve in the capital as a warning to the British: "The management of the barbarian affairs at Canton were begun by Lin and concluded by Hsü; both were most feared and respected by the British."¹⁷ The Emperor agreed with his opinion. He summoned Lin to await an appointment in Peking.¹⁸ However, Lin had been in bad health since the summer of 1849. He was not able to answer the imperial summons.

In mid-1850 the Taiping rebels were so active that officials cried out for attention to the chaos in Kuang-si.¹⁹ The court reacted with alarm. The Emperor ordered the Kuang-si officials get hold of the local militia to face the Taiping challenge.²⁰

17. See Hsü, Rise, p.251-252.

18. Kuo T'ing-i, Chin-ta chung-kuo shih-shih jih-chih, I, p.162.

19. Dr. Charles A. Curwen has a terse explanation for the outbreak of the Taiping Rebellion: "The opium War and the intrusion of imperialism exacerbated the strain on the state, damaged the prestige of the dynasty and made deeper and more complex the crisis of the economy. The most immediate influence of the West was felt in the two provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. No other region of China had quite the same coincidence of favourable circumstances with combustible material: distance from the capital (often resulting in administrative vacuums), increasing land concentration (therefore increasing tenancy), economic and social troubles connected with the disruption of trade after the Opium War and, in addition, famine, flood and plague, from which Kwangsi in particular was rarely free. There was moreover, in this region, a long tradition of anti-Manchu sentiment." See C.A. Curwen, Taiping Rebel, the Deposition of Li Hsiu-ch'eng (Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.2.

20. Ta-ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu (Veritable records of successive reigns of the Ch'ing dynasty) (Mukden, 1937), Hsien-feng, 12:3b.

In Canton Hsü was exhausted in dealing with foreign and domestic affairs. It is natural that Hsü was eager to have his old friend, Lin, to join him in the South, so that he could consult the latter in both the foreign affairs and the Taiping campaign. What Hsü planned in this respect was subtle and tactful. He first impeached the Governor of Kuang-si, Cheng Tsu-ch'en (鄭祖琛) as "weak and incompetent" in fighting against the Taiping rebels.²¹ He then implored the Emperor to appoint an able official to replace his post.

The Emperor this time appointed Lin as Imperial Commissioner and acting governor of Kuang-si to take charge of the suppression of the Taiping rebels in October 1850.

On the other hand, the downfall of Ch'i-ying was due to the Hsien-feng Emperor's discontent with of his policy of conciliation and the result of the British complaint after the "victory".

It had become customary for a new emperor to seek advice from high-ranking officials. One suggestion came from Ch'i-ying, who in March 1850 advised the young Emperor to discard men of little ability, even though they were known as "models of high conduct" (chun-tzu 君子) and to appoint men of talent, even though others called them "inferior men" (hsiao-jen 小人). Ch'i-ying, being a wily diplomat, meant that although some war advocates were regarded as "models of high conduct", they were not suitable to conduct foreign affairs. Instead, officials of conciliatory policy whom others condemned as "inferior men" should be appointed. Ch'i-ying's saying was similar to Teng Hsiao-ping's: "No matter whether it is a white cat or a black cat, the one that can

21. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, I, p.320.

catch mice is a good cat." But to the fanatic Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, Teng's saying was regarded as anti-revolutionist poppycock. The xenophobic new Emperor of course did not like Ch'i-ying's saying. He waited for chances to dismiss the "ridiculous capitulationist."

After Hsü had rejected the British entry to the city, Bonham warned him in a correspondence on 9th April: "I can but repeat my regret at the unsatisfactory report (Hsü's), which this evasion of the Treaty will compel me to make to my own Government."²²

In London, Lord Palmerston did not take the refusal of the British entry lightly, and especially when he received a Chinese document from Bonham concerning the ^{intention of the} people of Kuang-tung to honour Hsü and Yeh, he expressed: "If that document is to be considered as expressing in any degree the sentiments of the Chinese Government or of the great officials at Canton, Her Majesty's Government would despair of being able to continue to maintain relations of peace between Great Britain and China."²³

He instructed Bonham to send separate protest notes to Hsü, and the Peking government. Bonham could not send the protest to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs as there was no such designated officer in Peking. In May he however succeeded to forward the notes addressed to Ch'i-ying and Mu-chang-a via the Governor-general at Nanking, Lu Ch'ien-ying (陸建勳). The Emperor's anger on receiving the British protest was directed at the two officials. He angrily told the grand councillors that only the appointed imperial commissioner was entitled

22. FO17/154, Bonham to Hsü, Incl. 4, 9 April 1849.

23. FO17/152, Palmerston to Bonham, 18 August 1849.

to deal with foreign affairs. As Mu-chang-a and Ch'i-ying were no longer imperial commissioners, how could they have sayings in foreign matters.²⁴

The laws of ^{the} Manchu government stipulated that Jen-ch'en wu szu-chiao 人臣無私交 (lit. common officials are excluded from foreign affairs.) The government officials outside the court of Peking who were allowed to deal with foreign affairs were designated as the imperial commissioners of ch'in-ch'ai (欽差). Theoretically speaking, Hsü was the only imperial commissioner for foreign affairs at that time. All the British correspondence therefore was to have been addressed to him.

The British protest seem to have resulted in the discharge of Mu-chang-a and the degradation of Ch'i-ying. On 30th November Ch'i-ying was denounced by the Emperor for having oppressed the people to please foreigners and for having exaggerated to the throne the power of the British. In the same edict Mu-chang-a was condemned for making false reports to the Tao-kuang Emperor and for suppressing Lin Tse-hsü and other patriots.

Ch'i-ying's official humiliation followed in June 1858 when the British and French allies forced their way from Tientsin to Peking as the result of the initial Arrow incident and the killing of the French missionary, Father Chapedelaine in 1856. Ch'i-ying was sent to Tientsin to negotiate with the allies. However, both the British and French plenipotentiaries refused to meet him because they had discovered from one of Ch'i-ying's memorials in 1844 that his friendly gesture to Sir Henry Pottinger was only an ostentatious manner.

24. IWSM, HF 1.13b.

Ch'i-ying left Tientsin without the imperial permission. He was arrested and was punished to death after a trial headed by I-hsin (奕訢), the half-brother of the Hsien-feng Emperor.

Patriot or Capitulationist

China's defeat in the Opium War was instrumental to the decline of the empire. However, the whole nation did not grasp the meaning of it. They simply did not believe that several thousand British expeditary soldiers were able to humble the world's mightiest empire to accept the Treaty of Nanking which was the most striking symbol of its submission to the British encroachment. Moreover, both the scholar-official censors and the people of Kuang-tung thought that China's defeat was mainly because the "shameless capitulationists" were in power at that time. They removed the tough fighter - Lin Tse-hsü from the battlefield at the early stage of the War.

The Opium War hurt the pride of the nation and increased its hatred against the Westerners. Enraged and humiliated, the Chinese hailed Lin as patriot because of his undaunted resistance and his mobilization of the people to curb the British invasion. On the other hand, they condemned Ch'i-ying as capitulationist for being the signatory of the Treaty and the propagandist of his policy of conciliation in the post-war period.

In retrospect, how can we appraise Lin Tse-hsü and Ch'i-ying? Hsin-pao Chiang says: "the real contribution of Lin to his country was his timely warning of the pernicious effect of Opium on the health of the people and the economy of the nation."²⁵ However, it was Huang Chuen-tzu, who first pointed out sharply that the British opium had brought disaster to the Chinese nation and implored the Emperor to

25. Chang, Commissioner Lin, p.215.

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eradicate the opium smuggling. Lin echoed Huang's idea with enthusiasm and was appointed to extirpate the opium smuggling.

We praise Lin because of his patriotism and his mobilization of the people that brought them into practical political life which was traditionally dominated by the ruling class, bureaucracy and gentry.

Unfortunately, Lin was too patriotic. He insisted^{on} combatting the British although he realized that the firepower of the British warships outclassed that of the Chinese. Before the coming of the British expeditionary fleet, Chinese junks had clashed on several occasions with the petty British warships in Canton waters. Each time the Chinese suffered from serious loss of junks and personnel. However, Lin reported to the Emperor claiming smashing victories, putting the whole country in a very optimistic mood.

When Lin was exiled by the Emperor to Ili in late 1842, he wrote a letter to a close friend in which he sadly admitted the might of the British weapons and recounted all the Chinese military shortcomings. But he asked his friend to keep all these in confidence.

On the other hand, when the Chinese communists praise Lin for his mobilization of the people to fight the British, they have to consider his motivation. To the communist criterion, the Tanka people whom Lin recruited to form "water-braves" in Canton were the most "exploited" class of people. Because of their strange customs and the style of living, they were dismissed as "an insignificant race" and excluded from the Chinese society. They were not allowed to live ashore; they could not sit for the imperial examinations, become civil servants or marry land people.

However, Lin regarded them as "traitors" and "poison". He

recruited them because there were other "traitors" and "poison" - the British invaders. When Lin ordered them to attack the British ships, he appointed one or two officers to command the Tanka recruits in each boat. Obviously, Lin did not trust them.

After his exile to Ili, Lin devoted his attention to local affairs. He had improved the civil administrations and opened up a lot of lands to cultivation. In late 1845 he was rewarded for his efforts with the post of acting governor-general of Yunnan and Kueichow in 1847. In Yunnan Lin was noted for his suppression of uprisings of the local Muslims. With such merits he was rewarded with the title of Grand Guardian of the Heir Apparent in 1848.

In October 1850 Lin answered the imperial summons to combat the Taipings in Kuang-si from his sickbed. However, he died on his way to the Taiping base and was canonized as Wen-chung (文忠). Had he survived a few years more, he must have received the same notorious name which the Chinese communists call Tseng Kuo-fan: the "revolution suppressor." But, Lin's name continued to remain in high esteem amongst the people and the scholar-officials.

On the other hand, Ch'i-ying did everything to embitter the nation. He discredited the traditional policy of "using barbarians to control barbarians" which Lin advocated during the Opium War. He implemented the policy of conciliation which was ⁱⁿ direct contrast to Lin's resistance to the British.

The traditional policy of "using barbarians to control barbarians," was re-inspired by Lin's literary colleague, Wei Yuan, in his Hai-kuo t'u-chih (An illustrated gazetteer of the maritime countries), in which

Wei had hopefully opined that "there is no better method of attacking England than to use France or America." However, Ch'i-ying saw things with ^{more} far-sightedness and perception than the others. He refused to implement this policy because he doubted the sincerity of French in helping China against the British and he believed that "the French barbarians would not ignore an immediate neighbour (England) to please a distant country (China) by harming their brethren." In fact, French interest in China was dove-tailed with that of the British. When Sir Boham and Hsü Kuang-chin argued vehemently on the British entry to Canton in late 1848, the French plenipotentiary in China, Forth-Rouen, impressed his superiors in Paris that if Britain was forced to abandon her entry, she would sink and lose all her influence. This would be an event much to be regretted by other Europeans. He concluded that the Western nations had a joint interest in China and he did not share the view of those who held that they could profit by England's loss."²⁶

tribute system was inapplicable in China's post-war relations with the West. The Treaty of Nanking had stipulated new diplomatic relations between China and Western countries based on ^{the} modern Western pattern of diplomacy. Ch'i-ying's policy of conciliation threw new light on Chinese foreign affairs. Nineteenth century Westerners had already believed in change and progress as the basis of all modern human life. However, the Chinese of Tao-kuang Emperor's reign could not yet conceive of it. The scholar-officials and the censors could not accept critical changes in policies. They changed only within the tradition, meeting new challenges by turning to the past for time-test^{ed} solutions. Chinese past experience had convinced them that foreign victors in China

26. See China dispatches to and from the Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (Quai d'Orsay), vol.5, Forth-Rouen to Min. Aff. Etr., 5 November 1848.

might rule for a while, but sooner or later they would be absorbed into Chinese polity. ^{Through} The Opium War rocked China, did not deliver the coup de grace. They did not agree that the time-honoured tribute system should be terminated only because of the "accidental" defeat caused by the capitulationist. Ch'i-ying's brilliant diplomatic talents and his conciliatory policy, were misapprehended by his contemporaries. When he showed a sign of good will to the British plenipotentiary, both the censors and the people of Kuang-tung got angry. They called him a traitor and "ally of the Barbarians."

I-hsin might be the first person in modern Chinese history who realized the farsightedness of Ch'i-ying in his diplomacy. Like Ch'i-ying, he was also a devoted war advocate when he first faced the British encroachment. Before 1860 he had shown an attitude of disdain mingled with hatred and prejudice in his contact with foreigners. In 1858 he headed the commission to conduct the trial of Ch'i-ying and petitioned the capital punishment onto the aged diplomat. However, when he was entrusted ^{with} the onerous task of negotiating with the Anglo-French allies in Peking in 1860, he realized that only a treaty with these Western powers could save the existing government. He agreed to open more trading ports to the Westerners including Tientsin which is close to Peking. He also approved permanent residence for Western envoys in the capital. In January 1861 he proposed to establish an office to take charge of foreign affairs: Tsung-li ko-kuo shih-wu ya-men (總理各國事務衙門). During his tenure in this office, China's foreign policy was one of conciliation, adjustment and realism. However, the same policy of Ch'i-ying was ^{previously} denounced by the censors at Peking as pusillanimous. In 1870 Tseng Kuo-fan was appointed to investigate the

Tsientsin Massacre in which several French missionaries were killed by the Chinese. Tseng prevented a war with the French by executing the Chinese who were responsible for the killing. By so doing, Tseng was seriously attacked by the censors though he had once saved the empire from the Taipings. In this case, I-hsin protected Tseng and agreed with his idea that a conciliation policy towards the Western powers should henceforth be implemented.

Poor Ch'i-ying entered his diplomatic career two decades earlier. Had he managed China's foreign affairs after the Treaty of Peking in 1860 instead of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, he would have earned the praise from I-hsin instead of a petition for^{his} capital punishment.

APPENDIXES

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反故此不得不作速將不准外國人等進城最為反理之禁條及早裁別
矣查

貴大臣前宜然照會

璞大臣云兩國和好毫無芥蒂豈有城外城內之分况江寧福州上海
等處既可進城何獨廣州不可也所以本大臣甚為合意故懷殷友之

至意即行修文照覆

貴大臣部院查核並候

福祿齊天須至照會者

右

照

會

大清欽差大臣太子太保兵部尚書兩廣總督部堂宗室者
欽命兵部侍郎廣東巡撫部院黃

道光二十五年三月

初二

日

一千八百四十五年四月

初八

日

物甚為可悅但以嚴治該匪較之此寔屬區區小事耳今蒙

貴大臣應承查獲匪類加刑嗣後照會無不鳴謝焉竊思既能得

獲其洋表亦可踪尋該賊之跡而無難也至進城一節前任璞大

臣暨本大臣

奏明不准進粵東省城之事不過係癸卯年暫時而已等言查當是時

貴大臣照會

璞大臣文內稱及現在本大臣會同督撫轉飭地方官設法開導容

俟開關貿易彼此相安如有應行入城相商之件自應會商此中如有

一語相欺

上帝鑒之等詞切思

貴大臣如此虔肅稱明而所言定然係誠寔矣今已歷兩年有餘結約應

行及早屆期並無駁詰矣惟因交戰之時先有人苦意挑惑居民倘不

如此則粵城百姓之情慕向貿易之相交並與上海寧波之民所行無異

矣縱使里巷愚蠢小人意欲亂作斷不能緣此壞兩國之友誼矣夫

貴國宜應言行兼守和好之約方可日久相安永消疑貳不然亦毋庸

引稱和約之詞又不能彼失而此守也然望恒友與不友待係屬人情相

APPENDIX A: CANTON ARCHIVE (FROM SIR JOHN DAVIS TO CH'I-I-ING STATING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY OF NANKING REQUIRE THE ABOLITION OF RESTRICTIONS TO ENTER THE CITY OF CANTON, FO 682/1201, DATE FR 25/3/2 8/APRIL 1845/).

EXTRADE 10

The Plen: in reply to N-1000 that the provisions of the treaty require the abolition respecting the restrictions to enter the City of Canton
8th April 1845.



F.O. 682/1201

大英欽奉全權公使大臣總理香港地方軍務兼領五港英商貿易事宜德

為

照覆事昨接

貴大臣
撫院
來文內稱英國官憲受害等情均已閱悉查已獲被搶原

大英欽差權使官總理香港地軍務兼領港英商貿易事宜龔亨爵德

道光

二十五年三月

二十五

日



守土之官本土之民萬無煩他國相助管束之理如使
貴公使不能管束英人轉求中國協助此言一出不
且為天下笑耶本大臣欲成全我兩國大信且表
和好友誼是以不惜盡言尚祈再四熟思是所至
要為此照復順候

履祉亨佳頃至照復者

右

照

會

貴國人強欲進城以致招惹事端禍不始於中國
實起於英人各國公論具在諒不能與中國理論且
恐轉向

貴國索賠情理如此以

貴公使之靈慧聰明豈不知曉又稱幫助管束小民
等因查粵省民人難以數計即省城一隅亦不下數
百萬以理撫馭本大臣自能管束無煩幫助若不以
理激成事變

貴公使即欲幫助恐亦勢所難行且本大臣為粵東

貴公使知照今來文稱請煩全保居粵省之外國人
無虞等因查外國人遵守條約本大臣自可保全
今於約外添出進城一節羣情駭怪激成公憤
致有焚搶府署巨案看此情形若英人必欲進城

本大臣等且難自保何能保及各國人民來文又稱
十三行或該所居之人受害惟仰貴國家賠還伸

冤等因查十三行及所居之人如果無端被害自應

照中國例辦理若因

APPENDIX B: CANTON ARCHIVE (FROM CH'K-YING TO SIR JOHN DAVIS WARNING THAT THE ENTRY OF THE BRITISH TO CANTON WILL AROUSE UNREST IN THE CITY, FO 682/1265, DATE TX 25/12/25 [23 JANUARY 1846]).

二十五

N 23
Reply in reply to No. 21. desiring all
foreign assistance
23rd January Received 26th 1846



F.O. 682/1265

大清欽差大臣關防

為

照復事現接

貴公使來文均已閱悉進城一事昨已將萬難辨

理緣由照會

PATRIOTISM OR CONCILIATION IN SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS, 1839-1848:

LIN TSE-HSÜ AND CH'I-YING

WAN CHI-HUNG

Thesis submitted for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Edinburgh

June 1978

