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**The Metaphors of the Nation:
The Architectural Programme of the KMT under Chiang
Kai-shek's rule in Post-war Taiwan**

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Abstract

This is a study of nationalism and its visual representation in Taiwan's architecture. Although nationalism studies have achieved significant theoretic breakthroughs in sociology, politics and history over the past decades, its close relationship with architecture has not received enough attention. In recent related architectural literature, too much emphasis is placed on stylistic analysis concerning 'national style', and less on those wider social, cultural and political factors which also play an important role in shaping nationalistic architecture during nation-formation. In order to bridge the gap, this thesis attempts to carry out a cross-disciplinary study, engaging architecture with the notion of nationalism and other relative perspectives in a quest for better understanding. In doing so, Taiwan's nationalistic architecture is divided into four different building types: the martyrs' shrine, the museum, the parliament building and the memorial hall. By examining these types and cases, this thesis argues that nationalistic architecture is a particular type of building created by specialised architects who were encouraged to select certain visible and cultural markers, establishing a symbolic link connecting the current nation with its previous ethnic roots in the service of politics during the age of nation-building. As a part of a growing body of research on nationalism and its architectural representations, this thesis aims to advance our understanding of the important issue regarding the relationship between nationalism and architecture in Taiwan, and to contribute to future research on similar topics.

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The author

Jung-Jen Tsai

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Introduction

In March 2007, in the Asia section of *the Economist*, there was an article with the title *Taiwan Cultural Revolution: the Fight over a Dictator's Legacy*. It discussed the most controversial political issue in Taiwan; how to deal with Chiang Kai-shek's cultural and political legacy, especially the grand Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Taipei city centre. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the ruling party at that time, intended to intensify a campaign against Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) (1887-1975) and his political heirs when the island marked the 60th anniversary of the 228 Incident. According to a new official report, *Research Report on Responsibility for the 228 Massacre* (二二八事件責任歸屬研究報告) (2006), Chiang Kai-shek was accused as the executive who should bear the full responsibility for the Incident, which caused 18,000 to 28,000 deaths during the violent military suppression of local uprisings against Chiang's regime on 28 February 1947 in Taiwan.¹

Blaming the massacre on Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Party (Koumingtang or KMT), former President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) (1950-) announced a plan to rename the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall as the 'Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall' and to tear down the perimeter wall of the Memorial Hall.² In that speech, Chen also called Chiang Kai-shek the 'true murderer' who caused a terrible tragedy for Taiwanese people under his dictatorship. Chen made an apology to the victims and their families for the incident and expressed his discontent about 'imperial treatment;' that the perpetrators and their families still enjoyed privilege, shielding themselves from being brought to justice. The existence of the

¹ Zhang Yan-xian 張炎憲 *二二八事件責任歸屬研究報告* (*Research Report on Responsibility for the 228 Massacre*), (Taipei: Wu Press, 2006). This is the second official report on the 228 Incident and the first issued by the DPP government.

² 'Chen Blasts Chiang over 228 Role,' *Taipei Times*, 27 February 2007.

Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall was proof that showed that the ‘murderer’ was still treated with the highest respect in Taiwan. Chen described the Memorial Hall as ‘a building with a strong tinge of one-party rule’ and ‘the product of a feudal time which does not conform to democratic trend’. Chen vowed that he would begin to seriously tackle the totalitarian legacy left by Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT in the last year of his term in office.³

Indeed, it seemed like good timing for Chen Shui-bian to deal with Chiang’s totalitarian legacy after the KMT had fallen from power in 2000.⁴ The DPP is the biggest pro-independence party in Taiwan, and its political stance and national ideology are completely different to that of the KMT. When the DPP won the Presidency and elections in local administrations, it planned to eliminate the cult of Chiang Kai-shek and its references in the Taiwanese landscape step by step.⁵ The prominent target of the campaign was the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. In aiming for this target, the campaign used this iconic piece of architecture to symbolise the victory of the pro-independence groups.

Following President Chen’s announcement, the Premier of the Executive Yuan Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌) (1947-) conceived a project aimed at demolishing the perimeter walls of the Memorial Hall.⁶ Later, however, this project was forced to be suspended due to strong objections. Thousands of people gathered together in the

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Some scholars believe that the reason that Chen launched this anti-Chiang Kai-shek campaign was that in the six years of ruling, the DPP unfortunately had no significant achievement in political and economic reforms to persuade their supporters to vote for them. A major newspaper’s post-election poll also showed that only 21% of population was satisfied with Chen’s ruling. See Zhou Yang-shan 周陽山, ‘三合一大選選舉結果的整體分析 (Three-in-one Elections in Taiwan: A General Analysis),’ *台灣民主季刊 (Taiwan Democracy Quarterly)* 2, no. 4 (December 2005): 130.

⁵ More details about the DPP’s anti-Chiang Kai-shek campaign please see Jeremy E. Taylor, ‘*QuJianghua*: Disposing of and Re-appraising the Remnants of Chiang Kai-shek’s Reign on Taiwan,’ *Journal of Contemporary History* 45, no. 1 (January 2010).

⁶ ‘CKS memorial hall the latest to be rechristened,’ *Taipei Times*, 03 March 2007.

square of the Memorial Hall to demonstrate in protest at this project.⁷ Not only did the KMT and many pro-reunion groups oppose Su's idea, but some members of the DPP showed deep concern about the manner and timing of the anti-Chiang Kai-shek campaign, conveniently coming during the Presidential election.⁸

These political brawls over the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall provoked a series of questions which needed to be answered: why had the Memorial Hall become the main focus of Taiwan's political struggles and historical debates? Why it is the Memorial Hall, but not other buildings connected to certain national and political ideology? In other words, the main concern of the current thesis is how are particular types of buildings constructed and interpreted as metaphors of the nation in Taiwan? What is the social and political condition that helps to produce these buildings? What kind of architectural aesthetics on which these buildings are based are to be utilised as visual cultural markers to express a strong sense of national identity and community?

Fundamental to these questions are the close relationships between nationalism and its visual representations in Taiwan. These questions are concerned more with the ways in which certain public buildings are used to serve politics in order to manifest the *glory* of national traditions. In asking this type of question, this thesis attempts to search for a better understanding of nationalistic architecture through the exploration of theories and methodologies from other disciplines. Therefore, the intersection between architecture and national identity in the age of nation-formation in Taiwan will be presented in this study. Without uncovering the reason why certain architecture is used as a political tool in the service of national ideology, and the role

⁷ '萬人連署 反對中正紀念堂拆圍牆 (More than 10,000 people signed the petition against the project of demolishing the perimeter walls of the Chiang Kai-shek memorial hall),' 聯合報 (*United Daily News*), 07 March 2007.

⁸ Taylor, 'QuJianghua: Disposing of and Re-appraising the Remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Reign on Taiwan,' 182.

that particular politicians and architects play in the construction of these buildings, a satisfactory explanation cannot be found.

In recent years, a growing number of studies have explored the notions of nations and nationalism. The works of three leading scholars, Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm, who is also known as the founder of the modernist approach, have paved the way for many relative studies on nations and nationalism.⁹ They share the belief that it is the transformation of modern society, not the root of ethnicity as primordialists have suggested, that is the key factor forming national consciousness in the modern era. Although they use slightly different terms to describe nationalism in their research, the fundamental assumption is the same, namely nationalism is a modern phenomenon; it is not possible to have a greater understanding of nations and nationalism without locating them in a modern context.

Although this modernist perspective marks out a significant departure in nationalism studies, their arguments still attract a great deal of criticism. Post-colonial theorists Bhikhu Parekh and Partha Chatterjee criticise the modernist approach as a type of Euro-centralism. It oversimplifies the processes of nation-building in non-European countries and views them as passive consumers of the European model but without their own translations, re-interpretations and colonial resistance.¹⁰ Umut Özkirimli, Steven Grosby and John Hutchison also point out that the modernist approach is based on an assumption of cultural and social homogeneity within a nation. It largely ignores that most countries in the world are comprised of varying

⁹ See Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991); Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

¹⁰ Bhikhu Parekh, 'Ethnocentricity of the Nationalist Discourse,' *Nations and Nationalism* 1, no. 1 (March 1995); Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

degrees of cultural and ethnic differences, which may generate different imaginations of a nation. During nation-formation, these differences may encounter violent elimination processes and finally lead to serious political conflicts and civil wars.¹¹

Among these critics, Anthony D. Smith is one of the most influential scholars. He argues that nations and nationalism are rarely ‘invented’ or ‘imagined’ as most modernists have claimed. There must have been something ‘real’ inside the nation for these nationalists to create. Smith does not deny that modernism plays an important role in the formation of national consciousness, but without the pre-existence of traditions and ethnic ties, such as the symbols of constitutive political myths and ethnic cultural roots, nationalist builders could not build a solid foundation for a nation in modern times.¹² Therefore Smith developed the ethno-symbolist approach to offer cultural and historical perspectives to nationalism studies.

Inspired by Smith’s studies, this thesis will apply ethno-symbolism to the examination of Chinese nationalism and its cultural representations in architecture in Taiwan. Due to the distinctive developments of Chinese nationalism in China and Taiwan, Smith’s theory provides a better explanatory framework to the studies of cultural and historical factors in nationalism. In addition, his theory also emphasises the importance of visual representations, especially in architecture, in the formation of the nation.¹³ Thus ethno-symbolism offers a profound insight to the relationship between nationalism and architecture.

In this thesis, nationalism refers to a term used to describe an ideological

¹¹ Umut Özkirimli and Steven Grosby, ‘Nationalism Theory Debate: The Antiquity of Nations?’ *Nations and Nationalism* 13, no. 3 (July 2007); John Hutchinson, ‘Ethnicity and Modern Nations,’ *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23, no. 4 (July 2000).

¹² Anthony D. Smith, ‘The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?’ *Journal of International Studies* 20, no. 3 (March 1991).

¹³ Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (London: Routledge, 1998).

movement on behalf of a population attaining their common political goal on autonomy, unity and identity in certain area.¹⁴ National identity is an emotional bond ties the nation with its members through an act that constantly reproduces and reinterprets values, memories, myths, symbols, and traditions of a nation.¹⁵ Nationality is an external expression of national identity in a variety of ways to show one's distinctive national characters used to indicate the racial differences between one group and others. Nationalisation is a social and cultural movement directed by political elites with an aim to monopolise the identity in an established nation.¹⁶ The concept of these terms in nationalism studies is crucial for understanding nationalism and its relation to cultural and art expressions.

In this thesis, 'Nationalistic Architecture' is a term used to describe a type of building created by architects who were encouraged to adopt a 'national style' from the past to satisfy the needs of politics. Architecture would become the 'metaphors of the nation', because nationalists tended to carefully select particular visible cultural markers, establishing a symbolic link connecting the current nation with its previous ethnic roots during nation-formation. Therefore, the study of nationalistic architecture should take wider political, historical and cultural factors into consideration.

This thesis is an attempt to explore this topic. It is an interdisciplinary study aimed at advancing our understanding of the important issue concerning the relationship between nationalism and architecture in Taiwan. It will also put architecture into a particular social, cultural and political focus for further examination, but will limit stylistic analysis to cataloguing these buildings. It does not

¹⁴ Anthony D. Smith, *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach* (London: Routledge, 2009), chapter 4.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 15-6. Also see Anthony D. Smith, *The Nation Made Real: Art and National Identity in Western Europe 1600-1850* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 7.

¹⁶ Benedict Anderson has a clear introduction to nationalisation in the chapter 6 of his famous book *Imagined Communities*. Please see Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 83-111.

mean that a traditional formalist manner is not important to the topic, but the true meaning of these buildings would not be identified if a cross-disciplinary explanation was not considered.

It should be noted that although Smith offer a path-breaking contribution to the study of nationalism in cultural and historical aspects, he is still skeptical about political accounts of nationalism.¹⁷ He pays less attention to the impact of political factors which also play an important role in nationhood.¹⁸ The development of Chinese nationalism in Taiwan, for example, was largely a top-down model manipulated by certain politicians and elites who would like apply their idea of the Chines nation to the new occupied island. If the political factors had not been fully explored, the discussion on Chinese nationalism in Taiwan would not be complete. Therefore, this study will emphasise on the top-down model of politics to explain how leading political figures made use of national myths and symbols in China and in Taiwan to sustain the legitimacy of ruling power.

In recent years, Smith shifts his focus of nationalism study from historical, social and cultural subjects to visual art. In his new book *The Nation Made Real: Art and National Identity in Western Europe, 1660-1850*, Smith conducts a study focusing on late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Western European (especially British and French) visual culture.¹⁹ Inspired by the abstract concept of the nation, the artists (especially the painters) concerned about the theme which had never emerged in the history of art: the creation of memorable images of the nation in the age of nationalism. Through the pre-existing materials like artistic symbolisms, mythologies,

¹⁷ Jonathan Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 137.

¹⁸ Montserrat Guibernau, 'Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity: A Critical Assessment,' in *History and National Destiny: Ethnosymbolism and Its Critics*, ed. Guibernau and Hutchinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 140-1. Also see Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism*, 206.

¹⁹ Smith, *The Nation Made Real*.

and heroic national pasts, the rise of national art creates a new connection between the nation and its people to evocate an emotional bond and cognitive framework for the reception of national sentiments. Since that time, antiquities, relics, monuments of the area's past took on a new life and meaning.²⁰

Indeed, Smith's book shows that the artists at that time attempt to translate the idea of the nation into rendered tangible and accessible works of art to appeal to the wider public and draw them into the conceptual and emotional world of nationalism. However, Smith's researches mainly focus on Western European painting and its relation to the nation and nationalism. Architecture as art has not been paid enough attention in his book, not to mention the developments of nationalistic architecture in Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, Japan, China and Taiwan during nation-formation. Therefore, nationalistic architecture is an important issue worth further study in depth for better understanding of the nation and its representations in art.

In recent years, studies of architectural history seem to be more concerned with the social, cultural and political influences upon architecture. Andrew Ballantyne has mentioned that the discipline of architectural history traditionally tended to exclude political, economic and social considerations from its discussions, that fine aesthetic effects may not be enough to map out completed contours of architectural history. It has to be supplemented with knowledge of the social and political context.²¹ As Eric Fernie has also pointed out, architectural history, especially the history of cathedrals, needs to involve a wider range of disciplines.²² In addition, in an article titled 'Modernity and Architecture', Iain Boyd Whyte noted that modern architecture must

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p12-3.

²¹ Andrew Ballantyne, 'Architecture as Evidence,' in *Rethinking Architecture Historiography*, ed. Dana Arnold, Elvan A. Ergut and Belgin T. Özkaya (London: Routledge, 2006), 47-48.

²² Eric C. Fernie, 'Art History and Architectural History,' in *Rethinking Architecture Historiography*, ed. Dana Arnold, Elvan A. Ergut and Belgin T. Özkaya (London: Routledge, 2006), 20.

be understood as a response to social, political and scientific discourses in the late eighteenth century. Stripped of this relationship, modernism in architecture would simply become an empty formalism.²³ Therefore, this thesis will carry out a cross-disciplinary study, engaging architecture with the notion of nationalism and other relative perspectives from political, social and cultural studies.

However, contemporary nationalism studies have given too much weight to political, social and literary issues. Only a few studies have explored the subject of nationalistic architecture.²⁴ It should be noted that although these researchers were early explorers in this topic, their main focus was European, American and some African architecture. For example, Barry Bergdoll's book *European Architecture, 1750-1890* (2000) was perhaps was one of the earliest studies examining the close relationship between architecture and nationalism in the English-speaking world.²⁵ Although this book mainly concentrated on the growth of nationalistic architecture in Western Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this model is obviously limited to the boundary of geopolitics in Europe. Lawrence J. Vale's book *Architecture, Power, and National Identity* (1992), also mentions the development of some areas of architecture and urban planning under the influence of political power

²³ Iain Boyd Whyte, 'Modernity and Architecture,' in *Tracing Modernity: Manifestations of the Modern in Architecture and the City*, ed. Mari Hvattum and Christian Hermansen (London: Routledge, 2004), 53.

²⁴ Lauren S. Weingarden, 'Naturalized Nationalism: A Ruskinian Discourse on the Search for an American Style of Architecture,' *Winterthur Portfolio* 24, no. 1 (1989): 43-68; Rhodri Windsor Liscombe, 'Nationalism or Cultural Imperialism?: The Château Style in Canada,' *Architectural History* 36 (1993): 127-44; Nuala Johnson, 'Cast in Stone: Monuments, Geography and Nationalism,' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 13, no. 1 (1995): 51-65; Bratislav Pantelić, 'Nationalism and Architecture: the Creation of a National Style in Serbian Architecture and Its Political Implications,' *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 56, no.1 (March 1997): 16-41; Janet Berry Hess, 'Imagining Architecture: The Structure of Nationalism in Accra, Ghana,' *Africa Today* 47, no. 2 (2000): 35-58; Keith L. Eggener, 'Nationalism, Internationalism and the 'Naturalisation' of Modern Architecture in the United States, 1925-1940,' *National Identities* 8, no. 3 (2006): 243-58; Valéria Salgueiro, 'Visual Culture in Brazil's First Republic (1889-1930): Allegories and Elite Discourse,' *Nations and Nationalism* 12, no. 2 (April, 2006): 241-60 Maya Gervits, 'Historicism Nationalism and Museum Architecture in Russia from the Nineteenth to the Turn of the Twentieth Century,' *Visual Resources: An International Journal of Documentation* 27, no. 1 (2011): 32-47.

²⁵ Barry Bergdoll, *European Architecture, 1750-1890* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

and national ideology.²⁶ However, Vale mainly put his focus on capital planning, the offices of President and parliament buildings, while other building types have not been fully presented in his book.

In the introduction of an edited book *Nationalism and Architecture*, Raymond Quek points out that it was German architects who began to raise a debate over the issue on the adoption of the appropriate style for the nation during the early eighteenth century.²⁷ The debate has strongly emerges and quickly became the central preoccupation across Europe from Scandinavia, Italy, England, France, Holland to Germany. Heinrich Hübsch's book 'In What Style Should We Build?' was one of the key references provoked a serial of intense discussions on stylistic options for the representation of the German nation.²⁸ Hübsch believes that the classical architectural doctrines (especially the Greek revival's) impeded the establishment of a new style. He argues that the basic determinants of style are the four factors: material, technical experience, climate, and present needs.²⁹ In order to attain a new style, it is necessary to probe into the factors for developing a style representing the present. As a result, Hübsch concludes that the *Rundbogenstil* (rounded-arch style) is the most suitable style for the new era, because it totally satisfies the requirement of the four factors and evades to be confined by the ancient conventional architectural rules.³⁰

'Ein neuer Baustyl' (A new Style of Building) is another article shifting its focus of the making of an architectural style from classical architectural doctrines to the

²⁶ Lawrence J. Vale, *Architecture, Power, and National Identity* (London: Yale University Press, 1992).

²⁷ Raymond Quek, 'Nationalism and Architecture: An Introduction,' in Raymond Quek, Darren Deane and Sarah Butler ed. *Nationalism and Architecture* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012) 9-11.

²⁸ Heinrich Hübsch, 'In What Style Should We Build?' in *In What Style Should We Build? The German Debate on Architectural Style*, ed. Julia Bloomfield, Kurt W. Forster and Thomas F. Reese (Santa Monica: The Getty Center Publication Programs, 1992), 63-123.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 71.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 99-100.

nationalistic art norms.³¹ The historical background of this article was that the *Akademie der bildenden Künste* in Munich processed a competition for a new institution of higher education with clear intention to find a new style at the behest of a King. Germanic art intellectuals were sufficiently alarmed to the manipulation of architectural style from politics. Therefore, in 1851, the *Duetsches Kunstblatt*, a famous German language art and art criticism journal in the nineteenth century, published a cover article called ‘ein neuer Baustyl’ to demonstrate that the development of an architectural style is mainly dependent on social and political conditions, rather than a demand from the authority. As Quek notes, this article fully shows an inherent ambiguity in the problem of national identity in architecture at that time: a dilemma between natural origins and cultural expression of an architectural style.³²

However, the discussions on the national style both in Heinrich Hübsch’s book and *Duetsches Kunstblatt*’s cover article reflects a primordialist thought of nationalism, rather than modernist or ethno-symbolist methods in explanation for the development of the architectural style. As mentions earlier, primordialism tends to view the style as an organic body, or a linear, progressive process evolved from time immemorial. It indicates that the style is a fix ethnic maker attached to certain groups of people as *a priori*, but not a developing concept swayed by leading elites in particular time and place. In addition, due to historical and cultural differences, the debates over the national style in Germany barely have any influence on Far Eastern architecture. Therefore, this thesis will mostly focus on China’s and Taiwan’s debates on the national style to explore the way political ideology exercises its power over architecture.

³¹ ‘Ein neuer Baustyl,’ *Deutsches Kunstblatt* 19 (May 1851): 145-147, accessed August 6, 2015, <http://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/dkb1851/0161?sid=991ea9f8b05f9dec6ac03eab8b6854e1>

³² Raymond Quek, ‘Nationalism and Architecture: An Introduction,’ in Raymond Quek, Darren Deane and Sarah Butler ed. *Nationalism and Architecture* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012) 10.

In the Chinese-speaking academic community, Fu Chao-ching's book *New Architecture in the Chinese Classical Style* (中國古典式樣新建築) (1993) is perhaps one of the most widely-known books on nationalistic architecture both in China and in Taiwan.³³ Indeed, in this book, Fu fully examines China's new trend of architectural designs beginning in the early twentieth century, highlighting both foreign and Chinese architects, who had started to nudge in a new direction in adopting Chinese traditional building elements in modern construction. Fu's studies have paved the way for examination of the development of the Chinese classical style in the twentieth century. However, lacking further discussion on new theoretical contributions of nationalism studies in these three decades, Fu merely appeals to conventional stylistic analysis in his studies of nationalistic architecture. This means that the idea of nationalism as a serious and formative factor in the creation of early modern Chinese architecture is essentially unexplored. The same problem can also be identified in a new book, *Chinese Architecture and the Beaux-arts* (2011), edited by Jeffery W. Cody, Nancy S. Steinhardt and Tony Atkin.³⁴ In this book, most of the authors correctly point out that Beaux-arts aesthetics played a central role in the formation of the Chinese classical style. However, due to their overwhelming emphasis on stylistic analysis, they also fail to examine the way that many key public buildings and monuments embodied a sense of Chinese national identity in the early Republican era. Therefore, a further aim of this thesis is to bridge the theoretical gap between nationalism and architecture. Here, the stylistic analysis is only one of the auxiliary means to support the explanation of ethno-symbolism in nationalistic architecture.

³³ Fu Chao-ching 傅朝卿, *中國古典式樣新建築* (*New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style*) (Taipei: Nan-Tien, 1993).

³⁴ Jeffrey W. Cody, Nancy S. Steinhardt and Tony Atkin, ed., *Chinese Architecture and the Beaux-Art* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011).

The relationship between China and Taiwan in the history is controversial and complicated.³⁵ Although fragmentary human remains have been found on the island which could date to 20,000 to 3,000 years ago, not until the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) did the Han Chinese begin settling in the new territory and start competing for natural resources with aborigines. From 1624 to 1662, the Dutch East India Company established a trading outpost in Tainan for its value of trade to Southeast Asia. Following the fall of the Ming dynasty, Koxinga, a Ming loyalist and the formal commander of Ming troops on the maritime front for the post-Ming monarchs, expelled the Dutch government and military from the island to establish a base to supporting his grand campaign against the Manchu rulers. However, in 1683, Koxinga's grandson was defeated by the Qing court. The island was now formally annexed to the Chinese empire at the first time of the history.³⁶

When nationalism became a dominant ideology of China in the second half of the nineteenth century, Taiwan was still a peripheral territory of the Chinese empire with several severe rebellions needed to be surpassed. In 1895, the Qing court was defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War (甲午戰爭), and Taiwan were ceded in full sovereignty to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Taiwan was now became the first colony of the Japanese empire. The War also changed the discourse of Chinese nationalism at the turn of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.³⁷ However, the new development of Chinese nationalism did not extend its influence over Taiwan. At that time, the Japanese government began to conduct the *Kominka* Movement (皇民化運動) with the aim to shift the national identity of colonial populations from China to Japan.

³⁵ More details about the history please see the Chapter two of this thesis. For further information, please see Christopher Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society* (London: Routledge, 1997); Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., *Taiwan: A New History* (London: Routledge, 1999); Jieh-min Wu, Ping-Hui Liao, Rwei-ren Wu, and Ying-che Huang, eds., *Reimagining Taiwan: Nation, Ethnicity, and Narrative* (Taipei: Council for Cultural Affairs, Executive Yuan, 2004).

³⁶ Further details about the history please see the Chapter 4.

³⁷ Please see the Chapter 2.

Kominka means ‘transforming the colonial people into imperial subjects’ in English. The colonial government considered that through the Movement the Taiwanese could actually achieve the primary and ultimate aim of being ‘true Japanese’.³⁸

After the WWII, Taiwan once again became a possession of China. However, this time the suzerain was not the Qing court, but the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership. The people who lived on the island were compelled to face another national identity crisis. After the Chinese Communist Party took full control of the mainland in 1949, the Republic of China (R.O.C.) was forced to retreat to the island with around two million people, including officers, soldiers, scholars, professions and civilians.³⁹ During the Cold War period, in order to reintegrate Taiwan into Chiang’s idea of a ‘new China’, Chiang began to exercise his power to clear away all remaining Japanese colonial monuments under the de-colonisation policy culturally and politically. Not only did Chinese nationalism as dominant political ideology be implanted to Taiwan, Chinese nationalistic architecture was also introduced to Taiwan and changed the city landscape of the island. Today, Taiwan is a democratic country. But the totalitarian legacy that the Generalissimo Chiang leaves to the island has not yet been totally removed. The national identity of Taiwanese people is still swaying between China and Taiwan.⁴⁰

It is clear that the development of architectural styles in Taiwan is largely influenced by political power. The diversity of Taiwan’s cultural heritages adequately reflects the attempts that every regime in the past all intend to wield its power to re-shape the society and the city landscape. Until now, Taiwan still has a number of

³⁸ The history about Japanese colonial era in Taiwan will also be presented in the Chapter 4.

³⁹ Please see the Chapter 3.

⁴⁰ More details about the struggles of Taiwan’s national identity, please see Rou-lan Chen, ‘Reconstructed Nationalism in Taiwan: A Politicised and Economically Driven Identity,’ *Nations and Nationalism* Vol. 20, Issue 3 (July 2014): 523-545.

important relics, including the Dutch Fortress, the Qing administrative offices, temples and academies, Japanese impressive public buildings and shrines, and grand monuments cladding with Chinese palace style, represent the way that politics makes use of architecture as a means to display power in a tangible form.⁴¹

Based on the history, the major study period of this thesis begins from the retreat of the Republic from China to Taiwan after the WWII to the last grand nationalistic architecture in remembrance of Chiang Kai-shek during the 80s. It was also the period of time that Chiang exercise his power to eliminate the Japanese colonial legacy from Taiwan and to re-connect the historical and national bond between China and Taiwan. Influenced by the political ideology, a number of new architecture cladding with Chinese traditional style were started to emerge in every main cities of Taiwan. It seems fair to argue the regime and its leader Chiang had given these buildings a particular political function to sustain its historical and cultural links to China.

Although the main focus of this thesis is Taiwan's nationalistic architecture, it is also necessary for some mainland Chinese examples to be presented here. Although the 1940s to the 1970s was the age that witnessed a dramatic growth of nationalistic architecture in Taiwan, the early development of Chinese nationalistic architecture during the 1920s and 1930s in the mainland will also be discussed in this study. The reason for this is that nationalistic architecture does not originally stem from Taiwan. It was first developed in China and later introduced to Taiwan in the post-war period. The development of nationalistic architecture in the mainland had enormous influence on the island's architectural evolution in the first three decades of the nationalist government's rule. Therefore, nationalistic architecture in Taiwan could be viewed as a new development of Chinese nationalistic architecture in a new era. Without fully

⁴¹ For more information please see the Chapter 3.

understanding the development of Chinese nationalistic architecture in different periods, one cannot really understand its later progress in Taiwan.

This thesis divides Taiwan's nationalistic architecture into four different building types: the Martyrs' shrine, the Museum, the Parliament building and the Memorial Hall. Based on these types, four directions of nationalism studies, including national identity, the collection and exhibition of national treasures, political transformation of the nation and the making of the national heroes and saviors, will be fully discussed in this thesis. The reason for this typological classification is that different building types require different background knowledge and theoretical frameworks for analysis although they all could be included within the scope of nationalism studies. In addition, this classification can help to underline different architectural characteristics in different types. It also demonstrates the way in which politicians utilised different visual elements to convey particular political and national ideology with the help of specialised architects.

The main body of this thesis is divided into two parts. Composed of three chapters, part one focuses on contemporary debates in nationalism and its expression in architecture both in China and in Taiwan. The first chapter is a theoretical review in nationalism studies, and different schools and approaches will be discussed here. Focusing on the theoretical link between nationalism studies and architecture, this chapter will also construct a new framework for cross-disciplinary examination, providing a greater explanation of the development of Chinese nationalistic architecture. Chapter two is a historical review aimed at bringing the new framework to the study of Chinese nationalism. The origin, characteristics and debates of Chinese nationalism will also be presented here. Following the discussion of the previous two chapters, chapter three will map out a historical contour of nationalistic architecture in

China and in Taiwan; particularly the effects of political, historical and cultural factors.

The main focus of part two is case studies based on four different building types. National mythologies, heroes, political religions and the construction of national holy spaces will be the central topic of chapter four. Colonial and post-war martyrs' shrines especially illustrate the survival of a pre-modern ethnicity in national-formation in modern times. In chapter five, the close relationship between museums and nationalism will be presented. In analysis of Beijing's and Taipei's National Palace Museum and Nanhai Academy in Taiwan, this chapter will draw attention to establishment of museums, the selection of collections and the building processes, illustrating that museums are inevitably influenced by nationalism under political circumstances. Chapter six shifts the focus to the parliament building. Through examination of the historical development of China's and Taiwan's parliament buildings, this chapter will show that parliament buildings are not merely a place for political assemblies and elections, they are also an ideal site to express political cultures and traditions of nations. In chapter seven, the controversial issues of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall will be explored. This chapter will further discuss how Chinese modern monumentality is constructed and used to serve certain national rituals and political figures both on the mainland and on the island.

The principal limitation of this thesis is the limited number of case studies and their validity in supporting the main argument. Although Taiwan is a small island, nationalistic architecture is still a wide open topic to be investigated. There are some other subordinate building types, including educational institutes, religious architecture and commercial buildings (tourist hotels, restaurants and shopping malls), which will not be examined in this thesis. Instead, the buildings that are presented are

the most representative examples, which are largely sufficient to pursue the main topic of this study in great depth.

The other limitation of this study is the restrictions on further investigations into the architectural cases during field studies. For example, the Chung-shan Building are one of important cases for the study of nationalistic architectural in Taiwan. But the institution of the Building is only willing to open parts of space and rooms for visiting and photo taking for academic usages. Others are still under the control and not open to the public.⁴² The archives of the National Palace Museum also rejected all requests to view the files and historical documents which might record the early history of the Museum's decision making on the location and the architectural design competition. The Taipei Martyrs' Shrine is another example continually rejected any request to visit its archive. The Shrine belong to the military. Only a formal visiting to the building itself is allowed. Any further information about the building restored in the archive is classified and not open to the masses. There are many other similar problems that have limited a further attempt to de detailed research on nationalistic architecture in Taiwan. Only when one day these documents and rooms are open to the public, a detailed research of these building can possibly be conducted. Due to these primary sources are unable to obtain, the secondary sources are used to supersede at the present stage.

In addition, while this thesis emphasises the influences of nationalism of particular buildings from the point of view of the political elites that played their part, the influence on the perspectives of the populace have largely been left undiscussed. That is not say that people's perspectives and responses have no influence on

⁴² For instance, it is said that on the second floor of the Building there are a Chiang Kai-shek's resident and a war room decorated with Chinese antique furniture and ornaments selected by Soony May-ling, Chiang's wife. But without a permission to view the rooms, the information cannot be confirmed.

nationalistic architecture, but there is a stark contrast between the effect and the purpose behind its development. This thesis may not be a complete study of nationalistic architecture in Taiwan, but through the systematic analysis and discussion of four different types of buildings and their purpose, suffice it to say at this point that it can offer a satisfactory explanation for the issue of the metaphorical relationship between nationalism and architecture.

Part I: The Origin of Nationalistic Architecture in China

Chapter One: Contemporary Debates on Nations and Nationalism

1-1 The Modernist Approach to Nationalism

It is difficult to give a satisfactory definition of nations and nationalism. Different theorists and schools may bring different fundamental assumptions to the subject for a better understanding. These diverse approaches may point out different directions in this field. Therefore, it is necessary to classify various approaches and ideas of nations and nationalism into several groups. Most scholars would accept that nationalism studies can be divided into three camps: modernism, primordialism, and ethno-symbolism.¹ Before turning to a close scrutiny of primordialism and ethno-symbolism, a modernist approach is a good starting-point for review.

In recent years the modernist approach has been one of the most dominant approaches to nationalism studies. This dominance is not only illustrated by the number of theorists who accept the modernist assumption and apply it to their case studies, but is also present in the explanatory potency of the theory in their works. The writings of three leading scholars of this approach (Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, and Eric Hobsbawm) have been widely used not only in nationalism studies but also in other disciplines. Their arguments provide a convincing framework to explain the most widespread and popular ideology that profoundly shaped our political landscape during the last two centuries.

¹ See Jonathan Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Umut Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); Anthony D. Smith, *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach* (London: Routledge, 2009).

Most modernists believe that nations and nationalism is a recent product made by modern society. It is the basic features of modernity which require nations and nationalism to glue populations together in this new way. Before the eighteenth century there was no space left for nations to develop their form as the nation-state that we understand today. As Ernest Gellner points out in *Nations and Nationalism* (1983), during the eighteenth century Europe faced an enormous social structural transformation from a highly segmented agrarian culture to a more standardised industrial society. The growth of industrialism gradually eroded the traditional society and its pre-modern values, such as kinship, religions, customs and caste. These values became less able to integrate society as a whole. Moreover, the growth of modern society encouraged mobility and context-less communication which sought for a standardised platform provided by a new secular education system for citizens who live in a designated area called 'homeland'. It replaced a small village unit with a large nation-state, and asked for a highly specialised 'high culture' to forge and sustain this new type of social network in modern times. A narrow band of elites were involved in the making of high culture, which eventually helped to engender the idea of nationalism. From within this idea of nationalism persisted a homogeneous political unit that we call the nation today.²

In Gellner's writings, many of the effects, such as mass education, homogeneous unitarianism and modern systems of communications, are closely related to industrialism. To some extent, Benedict Anderson also pays a lot of attention to the effects of industrialism. He coins a new term, 'print-capitalism', and argues that it is industrialism that makes it possible to sustain a strong connection

² Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*.

between capitalism and new print technology. As Anderson demonstrates in his *Imagined Communities* (1991), after the Protestant Reformation Latin texts were gradually being overtaken by growing demands for new secular texts written in local vernaculars. The texts were widely spread by new forms of print media, such as books, periodicals and newspapers, and sold as commodities to educated middle-class readers. Anderson goes on to explain that in the absence of face-to-face communication these types of publications can help to develop a new way of thinking, which circulates in a limited area among people who share the same vernacular print languages. For Anderson, this imaginative process creates the possibility for a new form of ‘imagined community’ which helps to set the stage for the arrival of nation-states in modern times. It also fills an emotional void left by the fading of pre-modern social networks and religious bonds.

Eric Hobsbawm divides the development of nationalism into several phases from a historical point of view. He argues that it is the effect of the French Revolution that helps the idea of nationalism to take shape. Although he recognises that ‘proto-national’ bonds, such as supra-local religious ethnic communities or political bonds of selected groups, can link to pre-modern states, these bonds have no substantial relationship to the ‘nation’ as we understand it today.³ In his *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (1990), from a left-wing historical perspective on nationalism, Hobsbawm provides adequate evidence to suggest that there has not been enough political support to develop the idea of nations and nationalism in the pre-modern era. Hobsbawm argues that we should view nations and nationalism as a new political and cultural invention in modern times. It is not possible to have a fuller understanding of nations and nationalism without putting them into a modern

³ Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, 46-47.

context.⁴

In short, the modernist approach to nationalism studies is widely accepted in academic circles. Many scholars agree with the main assumption of this approach: nations and nationalism emerged in the eighteenth century in Western Europe and America. It was there that the principle of nationalism first developed with the characteristics of modern society, such as a centralised administration, standardised communication, a specialised education system, fixed borders and popular identification. These general features of the nation-state spread from Europe to the rest of the world following the steps of modernity. To be sure, the modernist approach offers a powerful explanation of nations and nationalism which makes other theorists unable to avoid discussing it or having a theoretical dialogue with it in their works.

However, the modernist approach is not a monolithic category. Under the rubric of modernism, there are some sub-divisions. The differences can be ascertained in the various positions that the theorists adopt. Apart from the basic belief, modernists all stress different factors in their accounts of nationalism. Anthony Giddens, for example, emphasises the state and political power which play an important role in the formation of nations and nationalism. He argues that nationalism exists only when the state has obtained a unified administrative power dominating a sovereign territory.⁵ Similarly, John Breuilly also stresses the relationship between nationalism and the state. He defines nationalism as ‘political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with

⁴ Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition, Past and Present Publications* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

⁵ Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-state and Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

nationalist arguments'⁶ For him, putting nationalism back in a political context can offer a better understanding of the ideological glue connecting members of the nation with state power. Tom Nairn on the other hand brings a neo-Marxist framework to modernist accounts of nationalism. He highlights the role of economic factors and argues that the key to understanding nationalism is the notion of 'uneven development' in the capitalist world order. Liah Greenfeld, like Nairn, sets out her examination of nationalism from the view of capitalism. She demonstrates that it is the power of nationalism that leads political and economic transformations in the nation.⁷

Although none of these modernists mentioned rely on a single factor in their examinations, they have one point in common: opposition to primordialist accounts of nationalism. As Ernest Gellner argues, nations, unlike the position primordialists have assumed, are not a natural, God-given way of classifying men, waiting to be 'awakened' through a long-delayed political destiny, but rather a new form of social organisation based on the effects of modernity.⁸ Since the 1970s the modernist approach has become a new established orthodoxy in nationalism studies. Primordialism failed to attract the support of the majority of scholars. Until now, only ethno-symbolists keep the momentum going in the debates on the notion of nationalism by challenging some of the established views inspired by the modernist approach. But many of the arguments that ethno-symbolists make stem from primordialism. Therefore it is worthwhile to look carefully at the primordialist approach before turning to a closer examination of ethno-symbolism.

⁶ John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982), 3.

⁷ Liah Greenfeld, *The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001).

⁸ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 48-49.

1-2 Primordialism and Ethno-symbolism

The earliest theoretical paradigm of nations and nationalism is primordialism. Before modernism established its academic reputation, primordialism was widely adopted in this field. As Umut Özkirimli mentions, primordialism is an umbrella term used to describe a group of scholars who claim that nationality is a natural part of being human. It has existed since time immemorial.⁹ In other words, primordialists tend to pay more attention to the notion of continuity between ethnic groups and nations in their understanding of nationalism. They tend to see nationalism as a modern variant of ethnicity which can be found long before the emergence of modern nation-states. Nations, in this vein, have evolved constantly from their pre-modern ethnic roots. Without the roots, nations have no foundation for taking their form in modern times.

According to Anthony D. Smith's and Jonathan Hearn's definition, primordialism can be divided into two main categories: socio-biological (or true primordialist according to Hearn) and cultural perspectives (or primordialist theories).¹⁰ The former view is that a genetic principle is the central factor for grasping the idea of nations and ethnic groups. For example, Pierre van den Berghe, a leading advocate of the socio-biological perspective, argues that kin selection, like Darwin's natural selection in biology, is the main genetic mechanism influencing animals' sociality and communal behaviour.¹¹ It also works for human sociality. Van den Berghe demonstrates that nations and ethnic groups can be seen as an

⁹ Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism*, 64.

¹⁰ Smith, *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism*, 8-9. Also see Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism*, 21.

¹¹ Pierre van den Berghe, 'Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective,' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, no. 4 (October 1978): 402.

extended form of kinship stemming from ancient generations to the present connected by the genetic principle.¹²

Culturists, on the other hand, do not trace back to biological causes to observe kinship and ethnic ties, but share the belief with socio-biologists that kinship and ethnic ties play an important role in shaping ethnicity and nationality. In Walker Connor's definition, a nation is a group of people who feel that they are ancestrally related. It is the sense of kinship which holds the group together as a fully extended family, even if this sense is not based on factual history.¹³ For Connor, kinship ties are better understood as a sort of perception following subjective feelings rather than fact. This is why numerous nationalist leaders appeal to the power of emotions to mobilise the people from below. To achieve this goal, every nation requires its own national symbols to reach and trigger nationalistic responses. These symbols deliver messages to 'our people' and show that we belong to the same kinship and have common ancestry, and more importantly a shared destiny. As he argues,

The core of the nation has been reached and triggered *through* the use of familial metaphors which can magically transform the mundanely tangible into emotion-laden phantasma...¹⁴ (original emphasis)

Connor's concept of the cultural dimension to primordialism can also be found in Edward Shils' and Clifford Geertz's accounts of ethnicity and nationalism.¹⁵ On

¹² As Hearn notices, van den Berghe's latter works has modified his early theoretical direction and make him not a true socio-biologist. Smith also finds out the change and argues that the supplement of cultural explanations to socio-biological perspective may weaken his whole theory. See Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism*, 26 and Smith, *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism*, 8.

¹³ Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 202.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 205.

¹⁵ It must be noticed that Smith does not describe Connor as a primordialist. He calls Connor a

the one hand, Edward Shils recognises that Ferdinand Tönnies' classical sociological distinction between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* do not totally match with his observations on various kinds of social bonds tying the members of a nation together in modern society. In keeping the society going, he argues that these bonds existed and evolved for a long period of time before the modern era.¹⁶ He claims that some primordial elements in *Gemeinschaft*, such as territory, blood and gender, may remain in modern society and transform into new types of bonds, including confraternity, brotherhood, leagues and gangs.¹⁷ These bonds, derived from a basic need of maintaining and orienting a large-scale society like modern nation-states, can be described as primordial. On the other hand, Clifford Geertz takes up the notion of primordial attachments and applies it to new states with old societies, like Asia and Africa. These states have emerged since the end of Western colonialism after the Second World War. Geertz argues that the most influential attachments in these states are not civil but primordial ties, stemming from ancient adhesive strength, such as custom, religion, language and many other cultural markers. He calls these ties the 'givens of social existence'.¹⁸

In short, primordialists believe that every nation has its own pre-modern roots. Nationalism may be recent or novel, but nations are not modern phenomena. Nations need to be understood as a form of extended kinship which develops from time immemorial. Some theorists argue that the characters of kinship and ethnic groups can be identified via socio-biological ties. Others believe that cultural

perennialist. See Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 161-5. However, Özkirimli and Hearn still categorise Connor as a primordialist. See Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism*, 73-74 and Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism*, chapter 2.

¹⁶ Edward Shils, 'Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties: Some Particular Observations on the Relationships of Sociological Research and Theory,' *The British Journal of Sociology* 8, no. 2 (June 1957): 131.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 133-4.

¹⁸ Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 259-60.

attachments are central to determine the boundary of nation and ethnicity. For the latter, the sense of common ancestry and unique descent need not be in accord with historical fact. It is the non-rational or psychological essence of ethnicity that ties nations in the modern world.

Many critics of the primordialist approach come from modernists and constructivists. Among them, Jack Eller and Reed Coughlan raise the strongest objection to the fundamental assumption of the primordialist approach. They argue that primordialists tend to treat ethnicity as *a priori*. Their essentialised views seem to fix ethnic attachments to ethnic groups and leave no room for any possibility of multiculturalism and social change.¹⁹ In addition, primordialists are apt to over-emphasise the biological imperative of bond-formation. Their arguments overlook the fact that social interaction may play an important role in constructing emotional ties within nations.²⁰ In particular, Eller and Coughlan claim that many cases, especially the newborn states within Africa, have shown that ‘new primordials’ are ‘made’, but not ‘given’. Political entrepreneurs tend to create ‘new primordials’ when old ones are lacking.²¹ These cases strengthen their arguments for a constructivist perspective of nation-building in the accounts of nations and nationalism.

Some modernists stand in the same theoretical position with Eller and

¹⁹ Jack D. Eller and Reed M. Coughlan, ‘The Poverty of Primordialism: The Demystification of Ethnic Attachments,’ *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 16, no. 2 (April 1993): 186-9. However, several authors argue that Eller and Coughlan misread Geertz’s notion of culture as a form of ‘givens’. In fact, Geertz does not view the cultural ‘givens’ as *a priori*. See Virginia Tilly, ‘The Terms of the Debate: Untangling Language about Ethnicity and Ethnic Movements,’ *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 20, no. 3 (July 1997) and Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 155-8.

²⁰ Eller and Coughlan, ‘The Poverty of Primordialism,’ 192-3.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 188.

Coughlan in criticising primordialism²²; others disagree with primordialists' basic belief in the antiquity of nations as cultural responses to intrinsic human needs that can be found both in the past and the present. They argue that the emergence of nationalism is not possible earlier than the eighteenth century. Nations, as communities of action and purpose, based on a social and political foundation of modernisation, can only be found in the modern world. In Ernest Gellner's words, 'it is nationalism that engenders nations, not the other way round'.²³ If nationalism is a modern phenomenon, nations can only be modern, too.

The debates in the past few years between primordialism and modernism in literature on nationalism continue. Although primordialism receives less support nowadays, more nuanced positions have emerged in this field. Ethno-symbolism is one of the active camps laying the groundwork for the critique of both primordialism and modernism. One of the key authors in ethno-symbolism is Anthony D. Smith. He continually criticises the modernist approach and pays a great deal of attention to the symbolic legacy of ethnic identities for today's nations.²⁴ On the other hand, he also disagrees with some primordialist theoretical assumptions, especially the socio-biological perspective. He locates his theoretical position between modernism and primordialism and seeks for an alternative explanation which goes beyond these two polarised camps.²⁵

Firstly, Smith does not totally reject modernist accounts of nations and

²² Also see Paul Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison* (London: Sage, 1991) and Ernest Gellner, 'Do Nations Have Navels?' *Nations and Nationalism* 2, no. 3 (November 1996): 366-70.

²³ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 55.

²⁴ Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 224.

²⁵ John Breuilly, 'Approaches to Nationalism', in *Mapping the Nation*, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan (London: Verso, 1996), 150. Also see Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism*, 168-9.

nationalism. He notices that rapid social change in the modern era is an important trigger which constructs nations and nationalism in a new social order. However, opposing Hobsbawm's and Anderson's concepts of 'the invention of tradition' and 'imagined communities', Smith contends that nations and nationalism are scarcely 'invented' or 'imagined'. It is not possible to have 'invented' or 'imagined' nations and nationalism *ex nihilo*.²⁶ For him, their arguments seem to imply a view that every attempt to revive tradition or to envisage the nation is factitious. They dismiss the idea that pre-existent tradition and ethnic ties would be the solid foundation for national creators to build up a nation in the modern era. Smith goes on to argue that there must have been something 'real' inside the nation for ruling elites to mobilise the people and stir them into patriotic action during the period of nation-building.²⁷

Secondly, Smith rejects being labelled as a primordialist. He argues that primordialists preclude themselves from further exploration of historical and sociological accounts of nations and nationalism. This makes them unable to offer satisfactory explanations of different forms of ethnic and national attachments which have developed in the past.²⁸ For Smith, studies of nationalism require a diachronic analysis over *la longue duree*. Although the changes are slower than generally assumed, ethnic groups undergo different influences and modifications at various times.²⁹ But primordialists tend to highlight the unamenable features and the genetic principle in ethnicity and nations at all times. Moreover, primordialists' main focus of ethnic attachments is actual or imagined kinship ties. Smith attempts to shift away from this, arguing that ethnic communities are constituted not by the

²⁶ Smith, 'Memory and Modernity,' 374.

²⁷ Smith, 'The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?' *Journal of International Studies* 20, no. 3 (March 1991).

²⁸ Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 158.

²⁹ Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), 59-60.

line of physical descent, but by the line of cultural affinity embodied in distinctive myths, memories, symbols and values which are upheld by groups of people who are culturally related.³⁰

Smith introduces cultural and historical dimensions to the analysis of ethnic groups, nations and their historical continuity. Following John Armstrong's examinations of 'myth-symbol complexes' and 'mythomoteurs', a constitutive political myth, Smith contends that every nation has its own origin in ethnicity developed from the cultural root of its long-term history.³¹ He calls it '*ethnie*', a term borrowed from French meaning 'ethnic community'. According to Smith's definition, an *ethnie* is:

A named and self-defined human community whose members possess a myth of common ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of common culture, including a link with a territory, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the upper strata.³²

Smith defines a nation as:

A named and self-defining human community whose members cultivate shared memories, symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit and are attached to historic territories or "homeland", creates and disseminates a distinctive public

³⁰ Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin, 1991), 29.

³¹ About Armstrong's concepts of 'myth-symbol complexes' and 'mythomoteurs' see John A. Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), chapter 5. Umut Özkirimli calls Armstrong the founding father of ethno-symbolism. See Özkirimli, *Theories of Nationalism*, 170-1.

³² Smith, *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism*, 27.

culture, and observe shared customs and standardised laws.³³

In Smith's definition of nations, there are some characteristics that overlap with the definition of *ethnies*. It is the principle of culture and history which underlies both *ethnies* and nations. This view reflects Smith's belief that ethnic communities and nations have some significant and close relationships in common. In addition, in the definition of nations, Smith practically emphasises the power of modernity. Nations are described by modern features, such as 'a distinctive public culture, and observe shared customs and standardised laws'. For him, nations are the new modification of pre-existing ethnic communities in modern circumstances.

In short, Smith's ethno-symbolist approach provides a cultural and historical perspective of nationalism studies. He has taken some important steps in this direction, especially in his surveys on the role of *ethnies*, myths, memories and symbols. With the pictures that he provides, ethno-symbolism paves a way for cross-disciplinary research from traditional sociology and politics to wider applications in history, literature, cultural studies, visual arts, music, museology, and architecture.³⁴ It also offers theoretical insights which formulate new explanations of nations and nationalism at a global level.³⁵

³³ *Ibid.*, 29.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 84-90. Also see Athena S. Leoussi and Steven Grosby, eds., *Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), part II.

³⁵ Leoussi and Grosby, eds., *Nationalism and Ethnosymbolisms*, part IV to VIII.

1-3 Criticisms of the Modernist Approach to Nationalism in China

Every approach has its limits of explanatory power to some extent. In nations and nationalism studies, it is true that some approaches work better for certain areas or countries; some are less convincing in others. Therefore, re-examining the limits of the practical application of current nationalism theories from a critical point of view is relative and important for the purpose of exploring a feasible framework to gain a satisfactory explanation of Chinese nationalism in China and in Taiwan.

To begin with, while modernists mark out a unique departure in nationalism studies, their arguments have attracted a great deal of criticism. The first important point is that modernist explanations of nations and nationalism often imply a Eurocentric perspective in their basic theoretical assumptions. For example, in the introduction of their edited book *Asian Forms of the Nation* (1996), Tønnesson and Antlöv argue that Ernest Gellner's account of nationalism is built mainly on the experience of Christian and Islamic civilizations.³⁶ His main concern is always social change in European countries in the modern age. Some Asian nations do appear in his discussions, but Gellner uses them as an example only to demonstrate how agrarian societies preclude the developments of nationalism.³⁷ Therefore, for Gellner, nationalism is a modern political model made by European elites. It is possible to see nationalism occurring in other continents outside Europe only if these non-Western countries can meet the requirements of the European nationalist model.

³⁶ Stein Tønnesson and Hans Antlöv, eds., *Asian Forms of the Nation* (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1996), 4.

³⁷ The Himalayan peasant is one of Gellner's low-culture examples. He argues that the peasant can have multi-identities among different castes, clans or villages according to circumstance in Himalayan area, but little resonance to a national one. See Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 12-13.

It is true that nationalism is a European form of political thinking based on cohesive self-conscious communities sharing a homogeneous and long-established collective identity into the modern era, but other parts of the world often have very different social structures and historical developments. As Bhikhu Parekh points out, Western theorists of nationalism tend to universalise their experiences and imagine that nationalism outside the West has the same structure as its European origin.³⁸ Undoubtedly, no one can deny that nationalist ideas were first developed in Europe and played a vital role in European modern history, but outside Europe, this model usually did not work in the same way. Many non-Western societies have their own collective identities and traditions of political thought which existed long before European powers introduced their idea of nationalism. For example, India is a nation which has diverse ethnic cultures and distinctive political traditions. Political leaders in India during the period of independent movements realised that their country was not and could never become a nation in the European sense.³⁹ Although these anti-colonial movements were inspired by European nationalism, the language they used was selectively borrowed from European nationalist discourses. They integrated this language into India's political traditions and finally reversed it as a weapon to speak for their rights and fight for their nation and independence. It is wrong to argue that non-Western nationalist discourses are entirely derivative and heteronymous of the European model. On the contrary, these discourses are multi-stranded, multi-layered and multi-lingual, accompanied with partly autonomous and eclectic social strata that may rarely be found in Europe.

³⁸ Bhikhu Parekh, 'Ethnocentricity of the Nationalist Discourse' *Nations and Nationalism* 1, no. 1 (March 1995): 26.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 39.

Sharing this sentiment, Partha Chatterjee also criticises the modernist approach to nationalism from a post-colonialist point of view. He disagrees with Benedict Anderson's arguments on the spread of nationalism. In Anderson's view, nationalism first took place in Europe, the Americas and Russia as imperative models, and was later largely adopted by Asia and Africa. Chatterjee argues that this view is so-called sociological determinism.⁴⁰ It implies that the third-world countries finally would all follow the European footprint and witness the arrival of nationalism when they started developing their own industrialism and modernism. In the end, as passive consumers, these countries would wholly accept the overwhelming norm of the European nationalist model on the path towards modernity. Chatterjee objects to this argument, asserting that nationalism in the colonial world is not simply an imitation of the West, but a differentiated form that creates its own domain of political battle within colonial social strata fighting against imperial power.⁴¹

Secondly, it is also vital to notice that even in Europe not every country perfectly matches the modernist model. Adrian Hastings, for example, places the origin of English nationalism in the medieval consolidation of the relationship between state and religious culture in England. He argues that early English Bible translation provides a vernacular literature backdrop for the nation to develop its original model in pre-modern times.⁴² Anthony D. Smith, on the other hand, also argues that some nations in Europe do exist long before the birth of industrialism. He disagrees with Ernest Gellner's argument that high culture and the process of

⁴⁰ Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*, 19-22. Chatterjee also points out that Gellner's theory of nationalism has the same problem as Anderson's.

⁴¹ Partha Chatterjee, 'Whose Imagined Community?' in *Mapping the Nation*, ed. Balakrishnan, 217.

⁴² Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4.

modernisation are an important trigger to engender the idea of nationalism. He takes Eastern European low culture as example to claim that it is the low culture which inspires a deep-rooted loyalty and ethnic attachment for the future nation-states in Eastern Europe. In addition, Western Europe has a strong state-oriented tendency, but Eastern Europe seems to develop a cohesive sense of nations earlier than that of states.⁴³ Therefore, for Smith, to know one nation's pre-modern ethnic roots, symbols, memories and myths is far more important than knowing its new version in modern times.

Thirdly, modernists pay a great deal of attention to social and cultural homogeneity in nation-formation. This view denies that most nations encompass a varying degree of cultural differences that may generate different visions of community and political projects.⁴⁴ However, as Umut Özkirimli points out, there is no nation that can meet the norm of homogeneity in the modernist sense. Nation-formation is a process that has not come to an end. The nationalist dream of a homogeneous nation is just a dream that has not yet come true.⁴⁵ As John Hutchinson argues, these internal social and cultural differences may cause conflicts within a nation or lead to social breakdown or civil war by polarising groups. Even if violence or civil war does not happen, such conflicts may weaken the sense of community in a nation.⁴⁶ Thus, national identity in this regard is not a monolithic imagination without contestation or negotiation as Benedict Anderson argues, but a fluid network of representations containing different views of the nation from

⁴³ Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 73-75.

⁴⁴ John Hutchinson, 'Nations and Culture', in *Understanding Nationalism*, ed. Guibernau and Hutchinson, 93-94.

⁴⁵ Umut Özkirimli and Steven Grosby, 'Nationalism Theory Debate: The Antiquity of Nation?' *Nations and Nationalism* 13, no. 3 (July 2007): 527.

⁴⁶ John Hutchinson, 'Ethnicity and Modern Nations,' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23, no. 4 (July 2000): 661-4.

different social or political communities.⁴⁷

The final problem with the modernist framework is that it overlooks some crucial factors that may broaden our understanding of nations and nationalism. First of all, modernist approaches can only answer ‘how’ questions but not ‘why’ questions or ‘who’ questions. As John Breuilly argues, in *Imagined Communities*, Anderson provides a theory to explore ‘what’ kinds of new communities emerge in modern times, and ‘how’ communities are organised and developed among certain cultural elites, but he cannot explain ‘why’ these ideas can evoke a strong response from the population, and ‘who’ makes all the difference.⁴⁸ In addition, in *Nations and Nationalism*, Gellner’s functionalist view of nationalism makes him downplay the role of certain political thinkers and their ideas of nationalism.⁴⁹ He prefers to pay more attention to the transformation of social structure, rather than to certain persons who have the power to shift the course. Therefore, the agency of the people has surprisingly disappeared from his argument.

As shown above, the explanatory failure of modernist approaches on some theoretical levels implies that this approach cannot offer a satisfactory account of nationalistic origins in the development of Chinese nationalism. First, before industrialism and modernism were introduced to China in the second half of the nineteenth century, the attempt to seek a clear definition of the Chinese nation had already attracted a great deal of attention from traditional intellectual communities. When the idea of ‘Chinese nationalism’ arrived in China, there was no significant

⁴⁷ Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China*, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1995), 7-10.

⁴⁸ Breuilly, ‘Approaches to Nationalism,’ 159-60.

⁴⁹ Philip Spencer and Howard Wollman, *Nationalism: A Critical Introduction* (London: Sage, 2002), 35.

industrial development. China even did not truly achieve its industrialisation and modernisation projects in Gellner's sense until the first third of the twentieth century.

China's early developments of industrialisation and modernisation began from the Self-Strengthening Movement (自強運動) (1861-95). Following a series of military defeats by Western powers, the Qing court recognised that China had to learn from the West in order to strengthen itself against the West. However, the main focus of these industrial developments was military needs. The Qing court was unable to create conditions good enough for the private sector to promote new industrial development of other kinds.⁵⁰ The government did not have even enough of a budget to carry out its modernisation reform. All of these factors made the Qing court the obstacle to industrial development in the late nineteenth century in China.⁵¹ In addition, economic development did not improve significantly until the new Republic was founded in 1912. The first major change was the war between Western countries in Europe during 1914-18.⁵² It triggered new economic growth, reaching a new high in 1930s. China finally had an opportunity to make a social structural change from an agricultural-based to industrial-based economy and from traditional to modern forms of production.⁵³

However, this new wave of economic growth remained largely in certain areas like Shanghai or Northeast China. Only a few big cities and rich regions gained the

⁵⁰ Dwight H. Perkins, 'Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: The Case of Nineteenth-Century China,' *The Journal of Economic History* 27, no. 4 (December 1967): 486-90.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 491-2.

⁵² Wu Chengming, 'A Brief Account of the Development of Capitalism in China,' in *The Chinese Economy in the Early Twentieth Century*, ed. Tim Wright (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 34.

⁵³ Philip Richardson, *Economic Change in China, c. 1800-1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 39.

benefits from the growth. Most rural areas were marginalised by the changes.⁵⁴ In addition, these changes did not guarantee that the Chinese nation-state with its new industrial developments could be totally integrated as a whole. During the Beiyang government period of the Republic (北洋政府) (1912-28), the central government had little control over the warlord regimes in the provinces.⁵⁵ Although during the 1930s, China was reunited under the banner of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Party (Kuomintang or KMT) (國民黨), the processes of modernisation still encountered unexpected obstacles within the nation. The pre-existing popular religions and local cultures resisted being fully integrated into the idea of a new state.⁵⁶ China under Chiang's rule still could not establish an effective administrative control over the countryside to achieve a real integration of a nation-state from the top to the bottom. Therefore, contrary to Ernest Gellner's argument, industrialism and modernism barely made a distinctive contribution to the developments of Chinese nationalism.

Secondly, China had its own nationalist discourses which were very different from the European model. First of all, after the Opium War (鴉片戰爭) (1838-42), China's military defeats gradually shattered the nation's confidence in believing that China was still the 'Middle Kingdom' of the world. In 1895, the whole nation was badly shaken by the striking result of the First Sino-Japanese War (甲午戰爭) (1894-5): China was defeated by Japan, a new born nation-state which had launched its Meiji Restoration (1868-1912) and industrial revolution only thirty years before. It also symbolised China's failure to reach the goal of 'self-strengthening.'⁵⁷ Since

⁵⁴ Wong R. Bin, *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 65.

⁵⁵ Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (London: W. W. Norton, 1990), 288-9.

⁵⁶ Prasenjit Duara, 'Knowledge and Power in the Discourse of Modernity: The Campaigns Against Popular Religion in Early Twentieth-Century China,' *The Journal of Asian Studies* 50, no. 1 (February 1991): 75-80.

⁵⁷ John K. Fairbank and Merle Goldman, *China: A New History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 220-221.

the 1860s, China's repeated military defeats in confrontations with the West and Japan had eroded the confidence of the fading empire. Therefore, Chinese national identity did not evolve by the power of modernisation as Gellner argues, or print-capitalism in Anderson's view, but by the humiliating memories caused by the invasions of Western powers and Imperial Japan. Due to these distinctive historical experiences, a unique form of national narratives and ethnic solidarity with a profound feeling of love for the nation developed in China.⁵⁸

In addition, the translation of Western political and sociological books exerted a great influence on the early development of Chinese nationalism. These translations were quickly circulated in the intellectual community and had an enormous impact.⁵⁹ In 1862, the Qing court gave permission to Wen-xiang (文祥) (1818-1879) and Prince Gong (恭親王奕訢) (1833-1898) to open an interpreters' school in Beijing (北京同文館). The purpose of the school was to help the new generation learn European languages for absorbing Western knowledge. The school was later transformed into a full-fledged college with a proper curriculum of different subjects, such as mathematics, chemistry, geology and international law. It was also the first time in the history that Chinese traditional intellectuals took Western scholarship seriously.

As well as attending these schools and the growing numbers of missionary universities in China, some Chinese young people chose to study abroad in Europe, America and Japan. In the late nineteenth century, Chinese nationalist discourses to some extent were profoundly influenced by Japanese academic and political

⁵⁸ Jing Tsu, *Failure, Nationalism, and Literature: The Making of Modern Chinese Identity 1895-1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 5-8.

⁵⁹ Immanuel C. Y. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 419-21.

communities. Lots of new vocabulary, such as nationalism, democracy, feudalism and revolution, were first introduced to Japan and interpreted by Japanese scholars, and later imported to China via students returning from Japan and Chinese political reformers exiled to Japan.⁶⁰ In addition, many Western political and sociological classics were also translated into Japanese first and later circulated in Chinese academia. With these translations, Chinese intellectuals borrowed Western philosophies and methodologies to re-examine Chinese traditional thought, and developed new nationalist discourses based on a Chinese context. They attempted to use these discourses to serve the goal of national salvation, and to defuse the national crisis caused by foreign invaders.

After the idea of nationalism was brought to China by these young scholars and returned students, especially these who studied in Japan, the second wave of political, social, and economic reforms began to rise. It was those officers, new intellectuals and a new class (compradors and skilled labourers), who had an open mind to accept foreign ideas and knowledge, who contributed their effort to change China's political landscape and make it a modern nation-state.⁶¹ Their aim was to save the nation and prevent it from becoming one of the many colonies of Western powers or Japanese imperialism. They were eager to search for a new way to give China equal status with the foreign invaders.

⁶⁰ Federico Masini, *The Formation of Modern Chinese Lexicon and Its Evolution toward a National Language* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 89-108. Also see Wang, *Inventing China through History*, 10-1; Prasenjit Duara, 'The Global and Regional Constitution of Nations: The View from East Asia,' *Nations and Nationalism* 14, no. 2, (April 2008): 329; Wang Ke 王柯, '「民族」: 一個來自日本的誤會 (Minzhu: A Misunderstanding from Japan),' *Twenty-first Century* 77 (June 2003): 76-79.

⁶¹ This apparent change was started in the closing decade of the nineteenth century. The Reform Movement of 1989 was the most important event at that time. See Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 224-44.

Finally, these intellectuals all brought different imaginations to the definition of nation. Due to their divergent political stances and rival opinions, they had different interpretations of Chinese history, culture and national roots. As John Fitzgerald argues, each leader of the major movements had advocated a distinctive and mutually exclusive definition of the Chinese nation. Including Confucian reformers, Qing loyalists, nationalist revolutionaries and patriotic students, these intellectuals attempted to transform Chinese culture and traditions into the source of national discourse that could be used for forging a new Chinese national identity.⁶² Although their definitions of the Chinese nation were not quite the same, sometimes even contending with each other and offering no final consensus, they all agreed that China was an evolving ethnic group which deserved a new form of nation-state to meet the requirements of the changing world.⁶³

1-4 Re-examining Ethno-symbolism

As shown above, modernist approaches fail to offer a convincing explanation of the developments of Chinese nationalism. Compared to modernism, ethno-symbolism emphasised that the influences of historical and cultural factors can provide a better framework to explain Chinese nationalism. In Anthony D. Smith's theory, a nation stemmed from its pre-existing ethnic group and requires memories, myths and traditions as symbols to create a cultural boundary and identity of 'homeland' in modern circumstances. Nationalists can be viewed as myth makers who attempt to borrow symbols from the past as the best elements to define

⁶² John Fitzgerald, 'The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism,' *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 33 (January 1995): 76.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 30.

the nation and to keep ethnicity alive in the present day.⁶⁴

Smith also shifts his focus from reading texts to visual representations. He attempts to move beyond written texts, adding a new direction to his account of nationalism. He criticises Benedict Anderson for excessively emphasising the nation as a narrative of imagination. Anderson's view makes him miss other important elements that may also be central in building up a complex community like a nation. For example, visual elements usually contained stronger connections to the populations whose national sentiments could easily be stirred into patriotic actions.⁶⁵

In an architectural study, Smith's theory does shed light on widening the understanding of nationalistic architecture. Traditionally, when approaching these buildings, many architectural historians may pay too much attention to the form and style analysis, but less on social and political background research. Their perspective may limit our understanding, and overlook the fact that nationalist thoughts accompanied with political power play a vital role in shaping these buildings. It is clear that nationalists have their own aesthetic judgment based on their nationalist discourse. Although national style was the most obvious visible cultural marker to identify 'ours' from 'others', it should not be taken for granted. During the processes of nation-formation, a certain historical architectural style was often carefully selected as a symbol of the nation, to manifest the strong sense of community and identity in the modern era.

⁶⁴ Smith, *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism*, 23-26.

⁶⁵ Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 138-9.

In the case of China, the making of Chinese national style was not a natural process, but a new development of an old historical style promoted by early pioneer architects who attempted to create new architecture with modern construction that could show some deference to the Chinese context. It was also then that Chinese nationalism became a dominant political ideology that encouraged them to borrow traditional architectural elements from the past for their designs and give them a new meaning in the modern era. Especially after Chinese architectural historians had reported extensive and complete surveys of Chinese traditional architecture, these architects could precisely apply these research results to recreating what they believed to be the ‘authentic’ Chinese national style in their designs. When the KMT under Chiang’s leadership reunited China in the late 1920s, a new image of China needed to be constructed. The Nationalists selected the Chinese classical style as the best style that could totally represent its regime as a real successor of Chinese national heritage.⁶⁶

After the KMT took control of Taiwan in the post-war period, the Chinese classical style was also implanted in the Southern island, which had never been influenced architecturally by the Northern classical style. It should be noticed that, like the style, Chinese nationalism is also not an original thought developed in Taiwan. Not until the post-war period was Chinese nationalism introduced to Taiwan. The development of Taiwanese nationalism was earlier than 1949, the time when Chinese nationalism became a dominant ideology of Taiwan.⁶⁷ In 1895, the

⁶⁶ More details about the making of Chinese national style will be fully discussed in the Chapter 3.

⁶⁷ It should be noted that the main focus of this thesis is Chinese nationalism in Taiwan, but not Taiwanese nationalism. About the development of Taiwanese nationalism see Wu Rwei-ren, ‘*The Formosan Ideology: Oriental Colonialism and the Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism, 1894-1945*’ (PhD Thesis, University of Chicago, 2003); Hsiao A-Chin, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 2000); Danny Roy, *Taiwan: A Political History* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

Qing court was defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War and ceded the full sovereignty of Taiwan to Japan. Taiwan became the first colony (1895-1945) of Imperial Japan. Therefore, nationalist thought in Taiwan originated to resist Japanese rulers and troops.

After the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), Chiang Kai-shek and his party claimed the sovereignty of Taiwan and terminated Japan's fifty-year colonial rule. However, a few years after the victory, the KMT lost the Chinese Civil War (1946-50). Mainland China was taken by the Chinese Communist Party at the end of 1949 when Mao Zedong (毛澤東) (1893-1976) proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Chiang and the nationalist troops were forced to retreat to Taiwan with around two million refugees.⁶⁸ Chiang's regime later completely changed the political landscape of Taiwan. The violent conflict between new Chinese immigrants and Taiwanese in the early post-war period was suppressed by the totalitarian rule of the KMT.⁶⁹ Taiwanese nationalism was then forced to go underground, becoming the predominant focus of the Taiwanese independent movement fighting against the KMT's rule.

Under Chiang's leadership, Chinese nationalism was the coercive political ideology intensely propagated in media, education and political campaigns of Taiwan. In the Cold War period, the US supported Chiang's totalitarian regime and viewed Taiwan as the security cordon of the West Pacific Ocean to help their Asian allies from communisation.⁷⁰ The position of Taiwan became a complex balance of

⁶⁸ Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 744-6.

⁶⁹ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 339. Also see Peter Ferdinand, 'Ethnosymbolism in China and Taiwan,' in Leoussi and Grosby, *Nationalism and Ethnisymbolism*, 241.

⁷⁰ Francis Pike, *Empires at War: A Short History of Modern Asia since World War II* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 282-3.

power created by the antagonism of the Communist camp and the Western camp. In this international situation, the issue of Taiwan's independence became a political taboo. The development Chinese nationalism had reached a new culmination. The KMT attempted to use Chinese nationalism as a political tool to wipe out all Japanese colonial influences in Taiwan, and reintegrate the island's culture, history and society into the Chinese nation. At that time, Chinese classical style was viewed as the best symbol that could fully represent Chinese nationalism and the image of Chiang's regime on continuously preserving national culture and tradition in Taiwan. The style was later quickly spread all over the island and used as political propaganda to highlight a scenario: Free China in Taiwan was protecting Chinese culture, but communist China on the mainland was destroying their traditions during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76).⁷¹

Thus, whether in post-war Taiwan or in pre-1949 China, the leading elites influenced by Chinese nationalism tended to search for national symbols from Chinese culture and tradition to reconnect the old nation with the new regime. They were particularly interested in the symbols that could be visualised and characterised.⁷² Therefore, ethno-symbolist accounts of nations and nationalism do provide a theoretical insight on how Chinese nationalism plays a key role in the making of Chinese national style both in China and in Taiwan.

However, Anthony D. Smith's perspective may also encounter some theoretical problems as most modernists do. Some revisions of his theory should be made for it to pertain to China's and Taiwan's circumstances. For example, although

⁷¹ Fu, *中國古典建築新式樣 (New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style)*, 273-6.

⁷² Ferdinand, 'Ethnosymbolism in China and Taiwan', 233-47.

Smith offers a path-breaking contribution to the study of cultural and historical aspects of nationalism, he is still sceptical about political explanations of nationalism.⁷³ He underestimates the impact of political factors on nationalism, and fails to consider that political power in some extent is far more important than other strengths in nationalism.⁷⁴ Chinese nationalism, for example, was largely a top-down model manipulated by certain leading elites and politicians. National myths and symbols of China were frequently used to uphold the legitimacy of the ruling class.

To conclude, nationalism is a particular use of cultural artifacts. To understand it properly we need to carefully survey the way in which a group of people produce the idea and preserve it by a series of symbols to show their distinctive identity and ethnic roots. Culture in nationalism is a matter of consensus determined by elites with the power to determine it from above, but it is not enough to define culture, nations and nationalism merely in terms of a symbolic system. The system has to be put into a broader social and political sense in order to quest for a better understanding. As Jonathan Hearn argues, it is power in binding that creates culture, but not the opposite. Culture, as an epiphenomenon of power, is an essential conceptual tool for carrying out certain political projects during nationhood building.⁷⁵ Further questions should be borne in mind when putting the power / culture relationship in a priority position in nations and nationalism studies: who holds the power to create and define the meanings of culture for a nation? And what has been done?

⁷³ Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism*, 137.

⁷⁴ Montserrat Guibernau, 'Anthony D. Smith on Nations and National Identity: A Critical Assessment,' in *History and National Destiny: Ethnosymbolism and Its Critics*, ed. Guibernau and Hutchinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 140-1. Also see Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism*, 206.

⁷⁵ Hearn, *Rethinking Nationalism*, 208.

Built on this theoretical insight, architecture is one of the best examples to show that national culture can be embodied by certain visual languages to serve the need of power. Especially in the age of nation-formation, nationalists accompanied by architects, as myth-makers, tend to adopt cultural and traditional symbols from the past to create a sense of community and national identity in a visual way. Thus, a developing predominant style is best seen as a cultural representation influenced by national discourse and political elites. In the case of China, the rise of Chinese nationalism stimulated a number of architects and architectural scholars to search for a national style. They traced the root of Chinese national style from the past and reconnected it to their new designs. A growing number of buildings clad with Chinese classical style were appearing in China's main cities after the 1930s and were later introduced to Taiwan after the 1950s. The power / culture and its relations can help us to identify the political forces at work behind these buildings. It also compels us to think differently about these buildings with a new theoretical framework out with architecture.

Chapter Two: Narrating the Past in the Late Qing Era

2-1 Chinese Traditional Worldview and Its Challenges

Human societies, as we know, have constantly been involved in a process of redefining and re-orienting their perception of themselves and the symbolic universe to which they relate. The symbolic universe conveys a serial network of meanings, values, beliefs, signs and customs to form a structured system for a certain society to operate. Traditional China was no exception: it held a unique worldview which revealed a sense of awe toward the infinity of natural forces embodied in concepts like ‘heaven’ (天), the ‘way’(道), Yin(陰), Yang(陽), the ‘five agents’ (五行) and the ‘five virtues’ (五德). This worldview set up by early thinkers in ancient China affected Chinese people for thousand of years by teaching them how to live in harmony with the universe.¹ This worldview also established a symbolic system serving as a criterion to distinguish ‘Han people’ from other ethnic groups who were residing in the periphery of China. Theatrically the definition of ethnic groups between in-groups and out-groups was often determined by biological differences. Visual factors, like skin pigmentation, physical stature, different facial features, were usually used to indicate the racial differences between one group and others.² However, as Frank Dikötter points out in his research on the formation of the Chinese people, race is a cultural construct with no objective reality. Physical features are subjectively perceived and culturally constructed by the society which

¹ Luke S. K. Kwong, ‘The Rise of the Linear Perspective on History and Time in Late Qing China c. 1860-1911’, *Past and Present* 173 (November 2001): 160-1.

² Bradley A. Thayer, *Darwin and International Relations: On Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict* (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 249-50.

attempted to utilise these biological differences to legitimise the hierarchy of cultural differences between the ‘Han Chinese’ and other races.³ Therefore, the meaning of race is best viewed as a cultural given, based on a certain ideology forming a particular world order to mark the distinctiveness of the group identity.

However, the boundary of race is not fixed forever. As Dikötter noted, a racial category may change its way of grouping throughout history, according to the needs of social and political situations. Group definition is continually reoriented and reconstructed, with the in-group’s perceptions and out-groups’ valuations of the ‘Han’ ethnic group changing from time to time. Group membership can only exist in a network of inter-group relations based on the perception of group definition.⁴ In this regard, a successful cultural system must have sufficient flexibility to accommodate the changes of group definition throughout history.⁵ From this cultural constructive point of view, cultural systems played a more important role in group definition than biological differences in the racial history of China. Here, further questions should be borne in mind: what are the main characters of the Chinese cultural system? How is the Chinese nation defined by this system?

In traditional China, Confucianism became the predominant ideology. It constructed a set of signs, values and a symbolic system developed and perpetuated by ruling elites to adopt an attitude toward the world order called *tian-xia* (天下), ‘all

³ Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (London: Hurst & Company, 1992), viii.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. viii-ix. Also see Wang Ming-ke 王明珂, *華夏邊緣: 歷史記憶與族群認同* (*The Periphery of Hua-xia: The Historical Memory and the Ethnic Identity*) (Taipei: Asia Cultur, 1997), 71-6.

⁵ For example, Michael Ng-Quinn in his research on the national identity in pre-modern China distinguishes two types of Confucianism, ‘Harder’ and ‘softer’, to explain how Confucianism can flexibly adjust its core value and apply to the changing circumstances between Han Chinese and other ethnic groups in the history of China. See Michael Ng-Quinn, ‘National Identity in Premodern China,’ in *China’s Quest for National Identity*, ed. Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 32-61.

under heaven'. The world was conceived as a homogeneous unity named 'great community' (大同). The head of the empire was *tian-tzu* (天子), 'son of heaven', whose rule was legitimated by special rituals that marked his central position in the world.⁶ Following this world order, Confucianism organised society into a clear hierarchy based on a superior-inferior relationship from a family to the imperial monarchy. Each person, even the emperor, in the society had a role to perform. If everyone could find a way to fit in society and perform his role well, the society would be sustained and would operate stably. Confucianism also aimed to conserve traditional polity under the premise that the fundamental political system would remain the same in order to ensure social stability.⁷ As an idealised model, the core of this system passed the test of disunity of the feudal period, maintaining its cultural core and political entity until the last dynasty of Qing (清) (1644-1912).⁸

Thus, Chinese history can be periodised by a sequence of dynasties in a cycle in which every ruler attempted to maintain the political unification of the empire until it finally broke up and was succeeded by the next dynasty. As a repeating pattern, leaders and elites tried to avoid a fundamental change in the system by following the previous historical path. This cyclical interpretation of history and time in Chinese historical, political and philosophical thought was central to the Confucian perception of the Chinese worldview.⁹ The great unity under the Confucian idea of world order was a promise to create stability, peace and

⁶ For a general introduction to the Chinese traditional worldview and tributary system, see John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 1-4.

⁷ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 51-3.

⁸ Ng-Quinn, 'National Identity in Premodern China,' 42-5.

⁹ Kwong, 'The Rise of the Linear Perspective on History and Time in Late Qing China c. 1860-1911,' 165-73. It should be noted that this broad and theoretical way of dealing with the long trend of Chinese history may omit many empirical details and impose certain limitations. This thesis has no intent to build up a perfect model based on historical 'facts' of the history of China, but rather offers a hypothetical perspective to explain this historical phenomenon.

prosperity of the Chinese empire. As John K. Fairbank argues, Confucianism, which provides one of the great answers to the problem of social stability, was the most successful system in all conservatisms.¹⁰ As the heart of Chinese cultural ideology, Confucianism played a crucial role in fusing Chinese cultural unity with the political unit. That is to say China's high degree of integrated government helped ordinary people operate together, with local elites, gentries, ruling class and the emperor himself having an engagement in the construction of the unified culture of China.¹¹

Confucianism not only provided a core value sustaining the cultural and political system for the Chinese empire, but also produced a discourse to evaluate other ethnic groups outside the central area of 'Han' culture. In the early stage of Chinese civilisation, 'Han Chinese' had already built up a hierarchic system to deal with the relationship between the 'Han' and non 'Han' ethnic groups. Based on the concept of Sinocentrism, the fundamental principle of Confucian superior-inferior relationships constructing the hierarchy of China's social order was also used to serve China's foreign relations.¹² Under the assumption of *tian-xia*, Chinese people believed that the empire was the 'Middle Kingdom' with a cultural superiority to other ethnic groups who lived outside the scope of the Chinese cultural sphere. These ethnic groups were viewed as uncivilized, away from the centre of the universe. Unless they were willing to accept Chinese ways of enlightenment and assimilate into 'Han' culture, they were considered 'barbarians'.¹³

¹⁰ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 53.

¹¹ Watson, 'Rites of Beliefs? The Construction of a Unified Culture in Late Imperial China,' 82.

¹² Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order*, 2.

¹³ Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, 2-3. More details about the centre-periphery model of China's foreign relations please see Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order*, 2.

The tributary system (朝貢) was a unique Chinese system for managing non-‘Han’ regimes surrounding the empire by establishing a super ordination-subordination principle in conducting foreign relations.¹⁴ These regimes were not directly under the control of the Chinese emperor, but were expected to demonstrate their subservience to the emperor and pay tribute. In return, they would gain the status of the vassal, receive gifts, and they were allowed to establish a formal economic relationship with China. China tried not to use excessive military expenditures, preferring the tributary system, to maintain enough control over their neighbourhood countries which would not constitute a danger.¹⁵ However, it should be noted that this system also had the flexibility to respond to changing circumstances. When China could not keep the balance of power with foreign regimes, maintaining coexistence with these countries would be the best strategy to avoid violent conflicts around the empire.¹⁶ Some non-‘Han’ ethnic groups even had the power to threaten the survival of the empire. Historically, China had been ruled by two non-‘Han’ regimes, Mongol (1271-1368) and Manchu (1644-1912). Others had also ruled parts of China, such as Khitan’s Liao dynasty (遼) (907-1125) and Jurchen’s Jin dynasty (金) (1115-1234).¹⁷

It is true that separatism and foreign invasions did occasionally disrupt China’s unity, but the firm cultural core would eventually allow the empire to be reintegrated.¹⁸ Even when the non-‘Han’ ethnic groups reached the point of taking over imperial function, they still had to follow the Confucian classics in order to rule the empire effectively. For example, in the Qing dynasty, the Manchu

¹⁴ Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order*, 9-10.

¹⁵ Spence, *The Search for the Modern China*, 118.

¹⁶ Ng-Quinn, ‘National Identity in Premodern China,’ 45-57. Also see Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order*, 24-8.

¹⁷ Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order*, 9.

¹⁸ Ng-Quinn, ‘National Identity in Premodern China,’ 57

conqueror recognised that the teachings of Confucius had an undisputed place in Chinese society. In order to appeal to ‘Han Chinese’ and sustain his ruling legitimacy, the Manchu emperor had to show his reverence for the Confucian canon by following the core values of Confucianism.¹⁹ Therefore, the Confucian system of world order successfully led China’s political and social trajectory for many centuries without changing its main core.

Therefore, it can be seen that in pre-modern times, ethnic consciousness did exist in Chinese people’s minds well before the arrival of Europeans in the nineteenth century. However, this ethnic consciousness, based on the traditional cultural core, confined its power merely to Asia. Before that, the Chinese empire, as a ‘Middle Kingdom’ conducting this political order of East Asia, was outside the scope of the impact of European states’ political and military forces.²⁰ The empire did not need to use concepts corresponding to modern Western ideas of nations, states, sovereignty or international relations to sustain its status in Asia.

Not until the early nineteenth century did the Qing court confront the serious political and military problems which came with Western imperialism. These Western invaders, unlike other Asian barbarians that China had encountered in the past, were unwilling to pay homage to the Qing court, rejected the tributary system and refused to be culturally assimilated into Chinese society.²¹ They required the Qing court to remove its trade barriers and treat them with equal status by following the modern world order. Both the Qing court and China’s intellectuals began to

¹⁹ Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 59-60.

²⁰ Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order*, 3.

²¹ Frank Dikötter, ‘Group Definition and the Idea of “Race” in Modern China (1793-1949),’ *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13, no. 3 (September 1990): 421.

recognise that the symbolic universe of Confucianism which had operated throughout many centuries in China was neither total nor absolute.²² They were also forced to start the process of adjusting the *tian-xia* system to the contemporary Western worldview by considering that the Chinese empire was one of many nation-states but no longer the 'Middle Kingdom' in the world. Lots of new ideas, such as nations, nationalism, and sovereignty, were introduced to China and China's intellectuals became increasingly aware of the need for transforming the idea of Chinese ethnicity into a nation in the modern sense. In addition, the serial wars with Western powers and imperial Japan in the last half of the nineteenth century played an important role in awakening Chinese people to the issue of the survival of the Chinese nation.²³ The consequence of this historical development was that Chinese political elites began to reconstruct the national narratives and discourses to make China a nation and a sovereign state in the face of foreign aggression.

2-2 The Rise of Chinese Nationalism

At the beginning of the nineteenth century growing capitalism accompanied by imperialism in the west was eager for new markets and increasingly forced China to open up its market to world commerce. These European powers also reorganised the international order and required the empire follow this system. In addition, the military technology that they used to open up the trade barriers with the Qing court had deeply shocked the government and intellectuals. Their weapons made the Qing court and intellectuals realise that fundamental changes for China from a military, economical and political viewpoint were inevitable in order to save the nation from

²² *Ibid.*, 422.

²³ *Ibid.*, 423.

a fatal blow dealt by Western imperialism. China's intellectuals began to change their attitude toward Western scholarship. Beginning with the Self-strengthening Movement (1861-95), they started learning military technology from the West, and then reading and translating classical writings of Western thought. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, Western scholarship was systematically introduced to China and exerted a huge impact on the intellectual field. Their main concerns were to find the reasons why the Chinese empire could not compete with Western imperialism and search for the answers for 'national salvation'.

The most important war that changed China's attitude toward the West was the Opium War (1839-42). The war began to erode China's Sinocentric worldview, making the empire encounter a problem in relocating itself in the new world order. Chinese intellectuals attempted to address this problem by learning Western knowledge and technology to bridge the gap. As Liang Qi-chao (梁啟超) (1873-1929), the most important leader of scholarly elites and political reformers in the late Qing era, pointed out in his essay issued in 1922, the first time that China realised its insufficiency was after the Opium War.²⁴

Although the direct result of the War was that China was defeated by the British army and forced to open up its market to the West, the foundation of Confucian ideology and *tian-xia* system had not been shaken. Following Britain, other European powers also declared war on China and asked the Qing court to sign unequal treaties with them.²⁵ However, even though a group of concession

²⁴ Teng Ssu-yu and John K. Fairbank, *China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923* (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1979), 270.

²⁵ In John K. Fairbank's view, China at that time officially entered the so-called Treaty Century. Please see Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 201.

territories in coastal cities were occupied and governed by foreign powers, China still did not fundamentally change its universal worldview. For the Qing court, if Westerners could not be completely repulsed, the best strategy would be to tolerate them staying on the edges of the empire.²⁶ For the Qing court, the larger scheme was the survival of the Qing dynasty itself. Compared with mounting pressures of domestic rebellions, such as the Taiping Rebellion (太平天國之亂) (1850-64), the Nian rebellion (捻亂) (1851-68) and Muslim rebellion (回亂) (1876-8) sweeping over the major provinces of China, Western imperialism was a relatively small and manageable disaster.²⁷

However, some Qing officials were anxious to know more about the West, their military arms and machines. For example, Li Houg-zhang (李鴻章) (1823-1901), a leading statesman of the late Qing dynasty, explained to Beijing that it was hopeless to try to drive foreigners out of China because of their powerful weapons but, he concluded, learning to use Western machinery for strengthening China itself would be the best way to solve this crisis of foreign invasion.²⁸ In addition, these weapons were very useful to suppress domestic rebellions.²⁹ As a result, under the approval of the Empress Dowager Cixi (慈禧太后) (1835-1908) the real power holder in late Qing politics, and the support from both Manchu and Han progressive officials, the Self-strengthening Movement was launched in 1861 to carry out China's first modernisation movement. However, compared to the

²⁶ John E. Schrecker calls this strategy the 'mainstream approach', namely, managing foreigners within certain areas in a manner which did not threaten the existing Chinese polity in any concrete way. Please see Schrecker, *Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism*, 43-4.

²⁷ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 216.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 217-8.

²⁹ In order to protect Shanghai from the seizure of the Taiping rebellion, a foreign-officered mercenary army supported by gunboats fought alongside with Qing forces against the Taiping army and successfully drove the rebels out of Shanghai. In the suppression of the Nian rebellion, the Qing army also used rifles, artillery and gunboats purchased from the foreigners to suppress the rebellion. See Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 177 and 188.

development of modernism in the West, the Self-strengthening Movement in China to a large extent was based on military technology, rather than a wide range of transformations in wide-reaching industrial, commercial, economic and social reforms.³⁰ Despite this, small steps had been taken, such as opening a Western education school, sending students to study abroad, introducing tax collection and re-establishing international relations with Western powers. In this sense, the government did begin to adjust its pace to the changing world, albeit slowly.³¹

Later, a number of government departments were also established by the Qing court to deal with international affairs.³² This significant institutional innovation under the shadow of unequal treaties and inhospitable international diplomacy indicated that the old system of tributary which had performed for so many centuries in China could no longer continue. In addition, some intellectuals started pondering the problems of the Confucian world system, searching for a new way of looking at the world. Zhang Zhi-don (張之洞) (1837-1909), a Confucian scholar-official and an advocate of the Movement, formulated a theory called 'Chinese learning as the fundamental structure, Western learning for practical use' (中學為體西學為用), considered the best ideological framework to represent this Movement. In Zhang's theory, Western arms, steamships, science and technology could be utilised to preserve Confucian values and fit into a broader scheme of Chinese traditional thinking.³³

³⁰ According to Hsü, in the second period of the Self-strengthening Movement (1872-85), greater attention was directed to the development of profit-oriented enterprises, such as shipping, railways, mining, and the telegraph. In the third period (1885-95), some light industries, such as textile and cotton-weaving, were introducing to China. However, the defense industries remained a chief occupation in this Movement. See Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 284-7.

³¹ More details about this Movement, see Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, chapter 9 and 10.

³² Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 199.

³³ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 217.

In addition, the efforts of missionary groups, through their translations of major Western scientific and technical texts, their presses of books and journals and their schools, also provided a new opportunity for the Chinese to know the world in a different way.³⁴ A Chinese magazine, the *Review of the Times* (萬國公報), published by missionaries from 1875 was widely circulated within the Chinese scholar class and quickly became a direct channel to scholars and officials who wanted to gain knowledge of the outside world.³⁵ In addition, the Qing court established an interpreters' school in Beijing which also played an important role in enlightening Chinese intellectuals by introducing Western knowledge to China.³⁶ These changes during the Self-strengthening Movement allowed Chinese scholars to have a wider perspective and view their country and its relations to the world in a new way.

However, this first modernisation movement of China ultimately ended in failure.³⁷ Due to Japan's intervention in the Korean issue, China and Japan declared war on each other in 1894. The First Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) in fact was a significant contest between these two countries after a generation of modernization, but the humiliating defeat of China on land and at sea in the War revealed the brutal fact that after more than thirty years of Self-strengthening, China still could not achieve the goal of modernisation and national salvation. Compared to the Meiji government's successful restoration in Japan from 1868, the Qing court's Self-strengthening Movement eventually proved that the Manchu monarchy was

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 206-8.

³⁵ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 226.

³⁶ Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 202.

³⁷ The debates on the failure of the Self-strengthening Movement still do not come to an end, but most historians may agree that the First Sino-Japanese War was the last straw that broke the camel's back. More details please see Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 287-91, Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 220-1.

unable to transform the Chinese Empire into a modern nation-state to meet the challenges of the new world system.³⁸ In fact the monarchy itself was the major obstacle to reform.³⁹ In addition, Sinocentrism and the Confucian world order obviously could not lead the nation out of the political and diplomatic predicament. A strong feeling of national crisis and humiliation evoked by Japan's victory led to the inescapable conclusion that China must make great changes. In particular a new wave of imperialist expansions after the War made some Chinese begin to fear that their country was about to be 'carved up like a melon'.⁴⁰ This atmosphere of fear and hostility brought new questions to Chinese elites: what kind of changes were needed in order to save China from further aggressions of foreign powers?

As Jonathan Spence pointed out, during that time a vigorous force, which could be encompassed under the banner of nationalism, began to develop into three groups with different directions: the reformers, the Boxers, and the revolutionaries. Although it carried a corresponding sense that all Chinese people should be united as a nation, different groups brought different visions of carrying out their political projects of nation-formation.⁴¹ Their divergent political stances caused coups and severe disputes in intellectual spheres as a consequence of their radical political actions.

³⁸ Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 221.

³⁹ Lee En Han in his paper on the failure of the Self-strengthening Movement argues that the poor leadership in the Qing court, especially the incompetence of the true power holder, the Empress Dowager Cixi, was the main reason that the Movement failed. Wong Young-tsu, on the other hand, argues that the problem of corruption among the Qing officials during that time was the major cause hindering the success of the Movement. See Lee En-han 李恩涵, '論清季自強運動的失敗與清廷中心領導層的關聯 (On the Relationship between the Qing Court Poor Leadership and the Failure of the Self-strengthening Movement)' (paper presented at the Conference on the Self-strengthening Movement in Late Ch'ing China, 1860-1894, Academia Sinica, 1988), 845-869; and Wong Young-tsu 汪榮祖, '吏治問題: 試論清季自強運動成敗的一個關鍵 (The Problem of the Corruption: A Key Reason Led the Self-strengthening Movement to Failure)' (paper presented at the Conference on the Self-strengthening Movement in Late Ch'ing China, 1860-1894, Academia Sinica, 1988), 899-911.

⁴⁰ Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 230-1.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 230-8.

After the Qing court signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan in 1895, many disappointed young Confucian scholars came together in Beijing and presented a long memorial to the Emperor requesting resistance to Japan and urging a wide range of economic, industrial and administrative reforms. Among them, in 1898 two scholars, Kang You-wei (康有為) (1858-1927) and Liang Qi-chao led a radical political movement, the Hundred Day's Reform (百日維新) under the support of the Emperor Guangxu (光緒皇帝) (1875-1908).⁴² Between June 11 and September 21, Guang-xu issued more than 40 reform decrees aimed at modernising the Chinese state in administration, education, laws, economy, technology, military and the police system. However, most of them remained on paper until the Reform ended up in a coup d'état launched by the Empress Dowager Cixi who saw these radical institutional changes as a threat to her own supremacy in the Qing court.⁴³ This short-lived reform showed that conservatives in the Qing court still held the main power in the empire. They believed that maintaining the Chinese imperial system was the primary issue in preventing the collapse of the empire and the ruination of the nation. After the coup d'état, they soon became patrons of a secret society called the Boxers, which assembled a patriotic force to fight against the imperialism of the West and Japan in North China.

The Boxers United in Righteousness (義和團) began to emerge as a force in Shandong during 1899. In the beginning, they practised mysterious rites from a

⁴² More details about the Emperor Guangxu's interaction with Kang You-wei during the Hundred Day's Reform please see Jonathan D. Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace: the Chinese and Their Revolution, 1895-1980* (London: Faber and Faber, 1982), 17-22.

⁴³ She confined Guangxu to the southern island of the palace and drove Kang and Liang into exile in Japan in 1898. Please see Fairbank and Goldman, *China, 229-30*. Also see Spence, *The Search for Modern China, 224-7* and Frederic Wakeman, *The Fall of Imperial China* (London: Collier Macmillan, 1975), 208-16.

variety of secret societies in response to the provocation of Western missionaries and their Chinese converts. The Boxers' anti-Christian sentiment was quickly merged with anti-imperialism force, spreading in North China under the slogan of 'support the Qing, destroy the foreign' (扶清滅洋). Through spirit possession and special rites, they believed that they could gain sufficient strength to fight against Western weapons and by their flesh and blood, expel foreign powers out of China. With the support of the Empress Dowager Cixi and some senior Manchu officials, in 1900 these Boxers launched a series of attacks on missionaries and foreigners in Beijing and Tianjin. However, a foreign troop consisting of soldiers from eight different countries rapidly suppressed the Boxer Rebellion and occupied Beijing for over a year.⁴⁴ This humiliating result on the Qing court brought a widespread sentiment to the surface: the Manchus themselves were the source of China's weakness. Their blind patriotism failed to gain the support from most intellectuals and officials, even the relatively moderate Han officials. Revolutionaries at that time also strengthened their resolve to overthrow the Qing rulers as the necessary first step to rebuilding the Chinese nation.⁴⁵

After the Rebellion, reformers regained the initiative to lead a series of reform programs called the New Policies (新政) from 1901 to 12, which was to be the last decade of the Qing dynasty. By taking the Japanese Meiji Restoration as an example, the New Policies proposed carrying out a variety of new reforms in the education system, military, laws, the administration of the central government, with

⁴⁴ More details about the Rebellion see Joseph W. Escherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987) or Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 387-407, Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 231-5 and Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 230-2.

⁴⁵ Tsu, *Failure, Nationalism, and Literature*, 38. Also see Joseph W. Escherick, 'How the Qing Became China' in Joseph W. Escherick, Hasan Kayali, and Eric Van Young, ed., *Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 234.

a promise of a constitution and parliament.⁴⁶ However, the Qing court's slow pace of reforms failed to meet the expectations of the majority and attracted sharp criticism from many in the intellectual field.⁴⁷ Most importantly, the imbalance of power in politics between Manchu rulers and Han Chinese became a severe problem that forced revolutionaries to make a more radical response to this unbridgeable racial gulf.⁴⁸ These revolutionaries argued that it was the Manchu rulers who hindered the development of China as a nation in its pace toward the modern world. In the Manifesto of the Revolutionary Alliance (同盟會), Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙) (1866-1925), a key leader of the republican revolution, declared that Manchu barbarians from the North had conquered the Chinese empire and imposed servitude upon Chinese people for more than two hundred years. Once the Manchus were expelled from China, it would be possible to establish China as a nation-state with sovereignty based on the 'Han' Chinese.⁴⁹

However, it should be noted that anti-Manchu revolutionaries were not a united group with a proper organisation and well-trained military power, but rather diversified local leagues without close coordination with others.⁵⁰ Among these groups, the Revolutionary Alliance led by Sun Yat-sen was one of the largest and most active. In 1911, it recruited soldiers from the New Army (新軍) and supported by secret societies and urban elites, the insurrection broke out on October 10 in Wuchang (武昌起義), was quickly echoed by different revolutionary groups and spread throughout the major provinces of China. These series of insurrections

⁴⁶ In fact, New Policies were aided by Japanese advisers and oversea students who were trained in Japan. See Fairbank and Goldman, *China*, 241-7, Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 408-18 and Douglas R. Reynolds, *China, 1898-1912: The Xinhong Revolution and Japan* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1993).

⁴⁷ Wakeman, *The Fall of Imperial China*, 235-7.

⁴⁸ Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 414-7.

⁴⁹ Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 157-8.

⁵⁰ Wakeman, *The Fall of Imperial China*, 242-6.

finally led to the fall of the Qing dynasty and gave the birth to the new Republic of China (1911-).⁵¹

In short, for most Chinese, the last century of the Qing dynasty was a period of demoralisation on many fronts. The imperial decline, military defeats, foreign occupations, unequal treaties and unsuccessful reforms all marked massive political failures. Growing anxiety over the decline of Chinese civilisation finally spurred different groups of intellectuals to bring their political versions into nationalist actions, each one more radical than the last, until the final overthrow of the Qing dynasty. However, the establishment of the new Chinese state did not guarantee that the whole nation would successfully integrate as a homogeneous unit. Politicians' struggles for political power in the state were about to begin: intellectual disputes about national discourses and symbols had just moved to the next stage.

2-3 The Influences of Western Scholarship

As Prasenjit Duara argues, nationalism in China was largely formed by global competition with other nations in the system of nation-state building.⁵² China's repeated defeats by imperial powers had revealed the fact that its slow pace of reform was insufficient to solve the severest national crisis in its history. However, the crisis in turn served as a catalyst in spurring a sense of urgency to develop unique nationalist discourses on China's national salvation and regeneration.

⁵¹ About different revolutionary groups and the Wuchang insurrection, see *Ibid.*, 201-7. More details about the fall of the Qing dynasty see Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 262-8.

⁵² Prasenjit Duara, 'The Global and Regional Constitution of Nations: The View from East Asia,' in *Nations and Nationalism* 14, no. 2 (April 2008): 329.

Compared to developments of nationalism in other nations, China's discourses were largely based on the sentiments of national failures, humiliation, traumatic memories and the threat of racial extinction.⁵³ Many intellectuals at that time deeply believed that the Chinese nation had to awaken from these negative sentiments to shake off the shackles of foreign imperialism and to stand wealthy, strong and proud as an independent nation-state in the modern world order.⁵⁴ As Sun yat-sen pointed out in his six lectures on nationalism, 'unless Chinese people awoke to the dangers of imperialism, the Chinese nation could not avoid perishing at the hands of powerful foreign invaders.'⁵⁵ Therefore, awakening the Chinese people to a sense of national crisis became a vital part of Chinese nationalist discourse among intellectuals of the time.

Another question was also crucial for these intellectuals: how to shift the concept of a traditional Chinese world system to the modern Western framework. Through the inspiration of Western thought, especially the ideas of nationalism, linear historical writings and Social Darwinism, Chinese intellectuals attempted to establish a new perspective for understanding the decline of the Chinese empire and find a satisfactory answer to the question of national salvation. Some key scholar-officials and their book publications, such as Wei Yuan's *Illustrated Treatise on the Maritime Kingdoms* (海國圖志) (1843) and Xu Ji-yu's *A Short Account of the Maritime Circuit* (瀛環誌略) (1849), made an enormous contribution to the formation of Chinese nationalist discourse in the late Qing era. In these encyclopedic geography books, Wei and Xu attempted to move away from the Sino-centric worldview by placing the Chinese empire as one of numerous nations in the world.

⁵³ Tsu, *Failure, Nationalism, and Literature*, 38.

⁵⁴ Fitzgerald, *Awakening China*, 3 and 48.

⁵⁵ Sun Yat-sen, *Sam Min Chu i: The Three Principles of the People* (Taipei: China Publishing), 8.

Their books astounded most of the Chinese traditional intellectuals by presenting them with another world order showing that China was no longer the ‘Middle Kingdom’. These countries and nations outside the Chinese empire gave intellectuals a new imagining of world geography.⁵⁶ As Frank Dikötter points out, by the process of mapping world geography with different nations, Chinese intellectuals in fact enhanced the identity of their own nation.⁵⁷ Benedict Anderson also mentions the power of geographical mapping and argues that these visible charts of the world profoundly shaped the way in which elites imagined the boundaries of their nations.⁵⁸

Another influential book in the late Qing period was Yen Fu’s translation of Thomas H. Huxley’s book *Evolution and Ethics*. Yen Fu (嚴復) (1854-1921) was a famous graduate of the British naval school and a translator of Western works. Due to his military experience, he was deeply affected by China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. Yen began to lash out at China’s weakness through his writings and translations.⁵⁹ Darwin’s works and social Darwinism at that time immediately attracted his attention. Before he began to translate Huxley’s book, Yen published four articles in newspapers on social Darwinism related to China’s attempted resurgence.⁶⁰ His main argument did not so much come from a Darwinian account of biological evolution, but from Herbert Spencer’s idea of struggle for survival.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Pan Kwang-che 潘光哲, ‘中國近代「轉型時代」的「地理想像」(The Geographical Imagination in the Transitional Period of Modern China, 1895-1925),’ in *中國近代思想史的轉型時代 (Transitional Period for the History of Modern Chinese Thoughts)*, ed. Wang Fan-sen 王汎森 (Taipei: Linking Publishing, 2007), 467.

⁵⁷ Dikötter, ‘Group Definition and the Idea of “Race” in Modern China (1793-1949),’ 422-3.

⁵⁸ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 170-8.

⁵⁹ Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 422. .

⁶⁰ Guo Jheng-jhao 郭正昭, ‘達爾文主義與中國 (Darwinism and China),’ in *近代中國思想人物論: 晚清思想 (Modern Chinese Thinkers in the Late Qing Period)*, ed. Jhou Yang-shan 周陽山 and Yang Su-sian 楊肅獻 (Taipei: China Times, 1980), 671-2. .

⁶¹ Benjamin Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 45-6.

Spencer, an advocate of social Darwinism, adopted the theory of evolution to explain the origins of human relations and civilization by arguing that the 'survival of the fittest' was also the fundamental principle which governed the biological world as well as human societies.⁶² Not surprisingly, Yen derived most of his ideas and his thoughts about China's problems and its position in the world system from Spencer.⁶³ Most Chinese elites at that time recognised that if China failed to compete with other nations, the whole nation would not survive in the new world order.

No doubt, the publication of Yen's translated book came just in time. Published in 1898, this book quickly circulated among intellectuals and inspired a great deal of patriotic discourse on 'saving the nation'. It also provided a new framework for understanding the decline of the Chinese nation due to its incapacity to respond to the logic of 'natural selection'. These intellectuals believed that only the fittest nation in the world had the opportunity to survive in a global evolutionary trend; that others will eventually become the slaves of the dominant races.⁶⁴

However, Huxley was an anti-social Darwinist. In this book, Huxley actually represents an attack on social Darwinism. As he points out, due to the major difference between human society and the natural world, the doctrine of the struggle for existence upheld by social Darwinists cannot simply apply to human society. If the doctrine is allowed to operate in society freely, it might help to destroy human civilisation.⁶⁵ But why did Yen Fu, Spencer's faithful Chinese supporter, choose to

⁶² Spencer's arguments attracted a great deal of criticism, see Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, 98-107.

⁶³ Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power*, 80.

⁶⁴ Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, 104.

⁶⁵ Thomas H. Huxley and Julian Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics* (London: the Pilot Press, 1947), 51.

translate Huxley's book instead of Spencer's original writings? First of all, Huxley's book provides a brief, vivid and almost poetic account of the main principle of Darwinism for Yen Fu to further explain his own views on the theory of evolution.⁶⁶ In this book, Yen's own comments and footnotes contributed almost the same length as Huxley's original text. Even the title of the book was changed from *Evolution and Ethics* to *On Evolution* (天演論). In addition, in one of his footnotes, Yen admits that Spencer's writings are abundant, profound and vast. They cannot easily be translated.⁶⁷ But Huxley's book offers an excellent opportunity for him to defend Spencer's views of social Darwinism.⁶⁸ Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that this book was not merely a translation, but a book mixed with Yen Fu's own thoughts and interpretation of social Darwinism.

However, even so, Yen's translation still had a huge influence on the formation of nationalist discourse at the turn of the twentieth century. His introduction of social Darwinism completely changed the course of Chinese nationalist development. This book inspired lots of intellectuals in generating new nationalist discourses from the social Darwinian point of view. The problem of the survival of the Chinese nation became the dominant concern shared by the majority of elites of that decade.⁶⁹ They firmly believed that only when the Chinese empire successfully transformed its old system into a modern form of nation-state could the nation fulfill its task of survival in the social Darwinian sense of the competitive

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 101.

⁶⁷ Huxley and Huxley, 天演論 (*On Evolution*), trans. Yen Fu 嚴復 (Beijing: the Commerical Press, 1981), xi-xii and 6.

⁶⁸ Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power*, 103.

⁶⁹ 'Survival for the fittest' or 'natural selection' suddenly became a popular slogan in China, after Yen's translation was published. Even lots of people were named after it. For example, Hu Shih (胡適) (1891-1962), a famous philosopher and writer, admitted in his autobiography that his courtesy name '適' (fit) was chose from the 'survival for the fittest'. See Hu Shih 胡適, *四十自述* (*Autobiography at Forty*) (Shanghai: Shanghai Shu Dian, 1987), 99-100.

world.⁷⁰

2-4 National Discourses, Historiography, and Symbols

Social Darwinism changed the way in which intellectuals viewed Chinese history. They began to search for a new path leading the historical perspective from the traditional cyclical view to the linear, progressive concept.⁷¹ As Jonathan Spencer points out, most Chinese historical texts implied a cyclical view of history and thus precluded any linear concept of ‘progress’ in China.⁷² However, in the late Qing period, most intellectuals had started recognising that the traditional cyclical narrative of the past could not continue its explanatory power in the national crisis that the Chinese empire had confronted since the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, after the Sino-Japanese War, intellectual communities began to promote new historical writings.⁷³ According to Prasenjit Duara, the emergence of the idea of linear, progressive history was influenced by the mode of Enlightenment History, which was introduced to China with the purpose of creating it as a national subject.⁷⁴ As the vehicle of passage to modernity, History became the principal method to convert the identity of non-nation into a nation.⁷⁵ The arrival of social Darwinism reinforces the demand for using the linear, progressive view of History to reconstruct China’s past. As James Reeve Pusey argues, it was Darwin, not Kant,

⁷⁰ Duara, ‘The Global and Regional Constitution of Nations: The View from East Asia,’ 325-6.

⁷¹ Although to some extent temporal linearity in Chinese thought did exist for a long time, such as in family genealogies or local histories, the mainstream historical perspective was dominated by the cyclical view. See Kwong, ‘The Rise of the Linear Perspective on History and Time in Late Qing China c.1860-1911,’ 165.

⁷² Spencer, *The Search for Modern China*, 145.

⁷³ Kwong, ‘The Rise of the Linear Perspective on History and Time in Late Qing China c.1860-1911,’ 170 177-8.

⁷⁴ Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, 25. This trend of the historical writing was also a global phenomena, see Stefan Berger, ed., *Writing the Nation: A Global Perspective* (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 9-13.

⁷⁵ Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, 27. Also see Berger, *Writing the Nation*, 6.

Hegel or Marx, who played an important role in reconceptualising the idea of history in China.⁷⁶

Xue Fu-cheng (薛福成) (1838-94), Wang Tao (王韜) (1842-1922), Zheng Guan-ying (鄭觀應) (1828-97) and Kang You-wei were the earlier Confucian scholars whose writings of Chinese history all implied a linear, progressive perspective,⁷⁷ but not until Liang Qi-chao proposed the ‘New Historiography’ (新史學) in 1902 did the traditional cyclical view of history completely lose its support from academic elites.⁷⁸ Liang views himself as a national historian who draws the idea of evolutionism as a determined element tying history together with nationalism. At the outset of *New Historiography*, Liang attacks the Chinese traditional dynastic principle of historiography by arguing that most Chinese historians only paid attention to the royal court, a few prominent figures and events that closely related to them. They failed to acknowledge the role of the people in history and the concept of the nation that could serve the interests of the present and the goal of nation-building.⁷⁹ Therefore, for Liang, Chinese traditional historiography was an impractical knowledge due to its inadequacy in achieving the aim of shaping a modern nation. Then, Liang comes to redefine history as a process of evolutionary, linear development. He argues that the role of historians was to delineate the course of history by discovering its laws and to describe the evolution of society.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ James Reeve Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 193.

⁷⁷ More details about their historical view, please see Kwong, ‘The Rise of the Linear Perspective on History and Time in Late Qing China c.1860-1911,’ 174-80.

⁷⁸ For example, even Kang You-wei divided the development of the history into three stages: (1) disorder, (2) approaching peace and small tranquility, and (3) universal peace and great unity, he still appropriated Confucian classics to secure his argument. But Liang Qi-chao, on the other hand, had already abandoned all the Confucian methods to approach history in his historical writings.

⁷⁹ Liang Qi-chao 梁啟超, *飲冰室合集* (*Collected Works of Yinbingshi*), vol. 1, part 9, *新史學* (*New Historiography*) (Shanghai: Shanghai, 1988), 2.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 283-7.

In his historical writings, Liang divides Chinese history into three periods: the ancient period (上世史), the medieval period (中世史) and the modern period (近世史). In this model, Liang traces the root of Chinese ethnicity and its profound connection to the modern Chinese nation. In his view, this historical line of the Chinese race has not been interrupted, but has to incorporate the non-‘Han Chinese’ into the ‘great nation’ of China.⁸¹ Liang’s *New Historiography* marked a new beginning in Chinese historical thinking and nationalist historiography.⁸² He attempted to address the deficiency of Chinese cultural tradition by opening up a new road toward a nation-oriented historiography.⁸³ Many other historians after him were deeply influenced by his thoughts on history.⁸⁴

After the linear progressive view of history had been established, a new narrative of the Chinese nation started taking shape. As Luke Kwong mentioned, the emergence of linear history was largely linked to the response to the foreign threat to China’s survival and national independence.⁸⁵ Not surprisingly, Chinese intellectuals at that time attempted to make use of national history to promote national pride and sentiments for mobilising the people.⁸⁶ Thus, the primary function of the linear narrative of history was firmly tied up with political discourse

⁸¹ Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, 35-6.

⁸² It should be noted that after WWI, the horrible aftermath of the War made Liang modify his view of history. He realized that as a Chinese historian, there was no need to admire the West any longer. China should not be a world cultural receiver anymore, but be a participant in its making. Liang began to search for the valuables in Chinese culture, and the role that China could play in the new world order. See Tang Xiao-bing, *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: the Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), Chapter 5.

⁸³ Wang, *Inventing China Through History*, 49.

⁸⁴ More details about other historians’ views of Chinese history please see Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, 36-47.

⁸⁵ Kwong, ‘The Rise of the Linear Perspective on History and Time in Late Qing China c.1860-1911,’ 189-90.

⁸⁶ Wang Q. Edward, *Inventing China Through History: The May Fourth Approach to Historiography* (Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, 2001), 15.

in the quest for re-orienting the definition of China's culture and the nation itself.⁸⁷ Under these circumstances, history became a vast resource of China's national narratives to secure its nationalist discourse. Three main discourses could be identified in the late Qing period: racial nationalism, cultural nationalism and civic nationalism.

(1) Racial nationalism: Sun yat-sen was one of the most influential advocates of racial nationalism. Starting with historical evidence, Sun identifies the nation with the idea of race and argues that since the Qin and Han dynasties (漢) (206 BCE-220 CE) China had been developing a single state out of a single race.⁸⁸ He claims that the 'Han Chinese' was the world's most perfectly formed nation bound together by all five natural forces (blood, livelihood, language, religion and custom).⁸⁹ But as Sun notices, it did not guarantee that the nation had awakened in the modern sense of nations and nationalism. There was a huge historical gap between the dormant antiquated empire and the awakened modern nation. Sun argues that China was a sleeping nation, because the original national spirit of Han independence had been weakened by the present Manchu regime and foreign imperialist invasions.⁹⁰ If the nation does not find a way to recover its lost nationalism, China will perish not only as a state but also as a race.⁹¹ According to the social Darwinian law of the 'survival of the fittest', this disastrous fate would be an inevitable result. In addition, Sun and his followers sought to mobilise a particular history, not only to uphold the Han racial core, but also to serve the ethnic foundation of the future Republic. Under the influence of Sun's national discourse,

⁸⁷ Kwong, 'The Rise of the Linear Perspective on History and Time in Late Qing China c.1860-1911,' 190.

⁸⁸ Sun, *San Min Chu I*, 2.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 3-5.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 37.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 28.

racial nationalism became the pivot of anti-Manchu movements.⁹² For example, in the influential book *The Revolutionary Army* (革命軍), Zou Rong (鄒容) (1885-1905), one of China's nationalists and revolutionary martyrs, argues that the Han race, according to historical texts, was the common descendant of the Yellow Emperor (黃帝), but the Manchus were derived from the barbarian tribes which were inferior to the yellow race.⁹³ In order to prevent the people of China from becoming a race of barbarians' slaves, the 'Han Chinese' had to reject the Manchu yoke and seize their own destiny.⁹⁴ As a result, racial nationalism was the biggest discursive boost to the revolutionary movements.

(2) Cultural nationalism: the rhetoric of racial nationalism and anti-Manchism attracted a great deal of criticism from the reformers. As Liang Qi-chao points out, like most of empires in the world, China was composed of different ethnic groups within its territory. The revolutionaries' definition of nation might erect a racial barrier to state-building in a multi-ethnic community such as China. Therefore, Liang invents a new term 'broad nationalism' to distinguish his ideal of multi-culturalism from 'narrow nationalism' which indicates anti-Manchism and Han centralism.⁹⁵ Kang You-wei also argues that it was a set of particular moral and cultural orders, but not racial affinity, that worked as a cohesive power binding the Chinese nation together. What China represents is not only a political entity, but also a long-standing cultural system.⁹⁶ In addition, the

⁹² It is important to notice that after the Republic of China was established in 1912, Sun changed his nationalist discourse from anti-Manchism to racial assimilation. He argues that new government should assist the people of Tibet, Mongolia, Manchuria, and Xinjiang to recover their national sentiment and loyalty toward the new Republic as Han race did. See Sun Yat-sen 孫逸仙, *國父全集* (*The complete works of Sun Yat-Sen*), vol. 2 (Taipei: KMT's Central Committee, 1973), 258-60.

⁹³ Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, 118.

⁹⁴ Spencer, *The Search for Modern China*, 236.

⁹⁵ Fitzgerald, 'The Nationless State,' 87.

⁹⁶ Shen Sung-chaio 沈松橋, '近代中國民族主義的發展: 兼論民族主義的兩個問題' (*The Development of Modern Chinese Nationalism: with a Consideration of Two Problems Concerning*

Manchus had already both racially and culturally assimilated into Han. It was unnecessary to separate the Manchus from a broader definition of the Chinese nation.⁹⁷ Most importantly, this internal racial division might cause further fragmenting of China's fragile social unity that made Western imperialism grasp the opportunity to conquer China.⁹⁸ Therefore, Kang argued that continuing to cultivate and carry forward national culture and spirit would be the vital method to save the nation, with the attempt to undertake political reform by means of reconstructing the image of Confucius as a politically oriented sage-king.⁹⁹ For Kang, Confucianism represented a core value of China's traditional moral and cultural order that could serve as a source to legitimise and stabilise the changes to China's present society. Therefore, Kang's ideal tended to culturally promote Confucianism as a national religion and to politically keep the monarchical system in China's future constitution.¹⁰⁰

(3) Civic nationalism: that the notion of nationalism contained a state-oriented direction within it was overlooked by many racial and cultural nationalist supporters. Liang Qi-chao was one of the earliest Chinese intellectuals who noticed this direction and led his discourse to this aspect of state-building at the beginning of the twentieth century. Liang sets out his argument by raising a question: who are the 'Chinese people' exactly? He argues, 'Our greater source of embarrassment is the fact that our country has no name. In common parlance, we refer to the people of Xia, Han, or Tang, which are all the names of dynasties. Such

Nationalism), *A Journal for Philosophical Study of Public Affairs* 3 (December 2002): 89.

⁹⁷ Shen Sung-chaio 沈松橋, '我以我血薦軒轅---黃帝神話與晚清國族建構 (The Myth of Huang-ti and the Construction of Chinese Nationalism in Late Qing),' *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies* 28 (December 1997): 50.

⁹⁸ Tsu, *Failure, Nationalism, and Literature*, 41.

⁹⁹ Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, 64.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 95-6.

foreign terms as *Chendan* or *Shina* are not the name we call ourselves.’¹⁰¹ To be sure, most people in China at that time failed to recognise that they actually constituted a nation, but the name chosen to define the people would determine who should be counted among them and how they should be expected to behave as a nation. Therefore, he links the awakened self with the community of the nation-state through the ideal of citizenship. He continues to argue that China can call itself a nation only if all Chinese people have been awakened as modern citizens.¹⁰² Here, race is not the boundary to block the people from having an equal opportunity to hold the same right to be part of the nation.¹⁰³ The task of saving the nation in this regard could only be achieved under the condition that the Chinese people had been instructed in a proper sense of national citizenship. Like most reformers, Liang emphasised the principle of democracy and sovereignty with the purpose of converting Chinese people from imperial subjects to modern citizens.¹⁰⁴

It should be noted that these intellectuals and their nationalist debates might not necessarily be so sharply divided. For example, Kang You-wei’s and Liang Qi-chao’s views of cultural nationalism had implied a racial hierarchy in their arguments. In Kang’s book *Book of Great Unity* (大同書), he proposes a utopian vision of the world and argues that in order to achieve universal harmony, darker races should be eliminated. All possible methods to whiten them, such as dietary change, intermarriage, migration and sterilisation should be taken into consideration.¹⁰⁵ In Liang’s earlier stages, he argues that in order to prevent yellow

¹⁰¹ Liang Qi-chao 梁啟超, *飲冰室合集 (Collected Works of Yinbingshi)*, vol. 1, part 6, *中國史敘論 (Outline of Chinese History)*, vol. 1, part 6, 3.

¹⁰² Fitzgerald, ‘The Nationless State,’ 86-7.

¹⁰³ Liang Qi-chao 梁啟超, *飲冰室合集 (Collected Works of Yinbingshi)*, vol. 2, part 13, *政治學大家伯倫知理之學說 (On Great Political Scholar Bluntschli’s Theories)*, 75-6.

¹⁰⁴ Shen, ‘近代中國民族主義的發展 (The Development of Modern Chinese Nationalism),’ 95-6.

¹⁰⁵ Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, 89.

racism from racial extinction caused by white imperialism, they should gather together to fight against white domination.¹⁰⁶ Although there were some common concerns and themes that could be identified in different nationalist camps, it did not mean that they had already reached a consensus on the definition of the Chinese nation. It is clear that in the late Qing era there was no united nationalist discourse or generally agreed definition of the nation in this battle of nationalism. As Prasenjit Duara argues, nationalism is rarely a unitary consciousness or identity, but rather a conflicting theory.¹⁰⁷

In addition, different nationalist camps might bring their own visions of nation to contest or negotiate with each other by selecting different symbols, myths, memories and cultural elements from history to secure their arguments. As Anthony D. Smith points out, nationalism operates on many levels, not only to be regarded as a species of political ideology or social movement, but also as a form of culture. It is impossible to grasp the idea of nationalism without exploring its cultural matrix based on a pre-existing ethnic past, myths, customs, historical figures and many other symbols.¹⁰⁸ These nationalist signifiers play an important role in awakening the nation and its members through the methods of communicating the abstract ideology of nation in printed texts or visualised icons to evoke instant emotional responses from all strata of the community.¹⁰⁹ In this regard, in the late Qing era Chinese nationalists also attempted to search for various pre-modern national symbols to arouse people's national sentiments.

¹⁰⁶ Liang Qi-chao 梁啟超, *飲冰室合集 (Collected Works of Yinbingshi)*, vol. 1, part 1, 變法通義 (*Principles of the Reform*), 77-83.

¹⁰⁷ Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, 7-8.

¹⁰⁸ Smith, *National Identity*, 71-4.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 77.

First of all, the symbolic role of the Yellow Emperor was revived as the common ancestor of all Chinese in the national narratives during the late Qing era. However, according to Charles Le Blanc's research, the image of the Yellow Emperor in Chinese history was changing all the time. He was initially recognised as the first ancestor and the perfect ruler of the Chou court within the Chou dynasty (周) (1122-222 BCE).¹¹⁰ Later, he was viewed as a mythical character who played an important role in legitimatising the Chou rulers' right to political domination.¹¹¹ He is also represented both as an epic hero and as a cultural hero who eliminated barbarians outside the border and pacified enemies within the border by establishing a new political order.¹¹² In Confucian classics, the Yellow Emperor was a sage emperor who invented a number of technological implements and introduced many social institutions for society.¹¹³ For Taoism, he was one of the masters and divine beings (仙) who knew the secret of universal harmony and order.¹¹⁴ During the late Qing period, the image of the Yellow Emperor began to link with the destiny of the nation. Under the influence of the linear perspective of history and new national debates, the Yellow Emperor was no longer the divine being or the founder of the Chinese noble clans, but the common ancestor of all 'Han Chinese'. Some nationalists even argued that all yellow races in pan-Asia were his descendants.¹¹⁵ Thus, the myth of the Yellow Emperor was appropriated from its original religious and political functions to become the symbol of the Chinese nation's racial heritage and cultural root.

¹¹⁰ Charles Le Blanc, 'A Re-examination of the Myth of Huang-ti,' *Journal of Chinese Religions* 13-4 (September 1985-6): 53.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 54-5.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 55.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 56.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 60-1.

¹¹⁵ Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, 74-5.

The Yellow Emperor was also described as China's 'William the Conqueror' who repelled barbarian tribes from the central area of China and established the initial racial boundary of the 'Han' nation.¹¹⁶ Chen Tian-hau (陳天華) (1875-1905), a revolutionary who wrote influential nationalist pamphlets in the late Qing era, argues that every family in China descends from one original lineage whose great ancestor is the Yellow Emperor.¹¹⁷ Chen viewed the Chinese nation as an extended family which had a cohesive and homogeneous racial core stemming from a common mythical character. Liu Shi-pei (劉師培) (1884-1919), a famous late Qing historian, advocated the introduction of a calendar in which the foundation year corresponded to the birth of the Yellow Emperor. Although the Yellow Emperor's actual year of birth provoked a number of debates, the idea of setting up a national calendar opposed to the Western calendar attracted an enthusiastic support from the revolutionary instigators.¹¹⁸ In addition, the ceremony of offering sacrifice to the Yellow Emperor symbolically during the late Qing period became a very popular rite which tied national genealogical origins to the birth of the Yellow Emperor.¹¹⁹ Thus, the Yellow Emperor and its new given meaning became a part of the process through which a sense of national identity was constructed by the late Qing new political culture emerging in certain intellectual fields.¹²⁰

Many other historical figures whose stories could contribute to the Chinese national narratives were also revived at the same time. When the late Qing historians devoted themselves to reconstructing Chinese national history, a

¹¹⁶ Shen, '我以我血薦軒轅---黃帝神話與晚清國族建構 (The Myth of Huang-ti and the Construction of Chinese Nationalism in Late Qing),' 38.

¹¹⁷ Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, 117.

¹¹⁸ Shen, '我以我血薦軒轅---黃帝神話與晚清國族建構 (The Myth of Huang-ti and the Construction of Chinese Nationalism in Late Qing),' 40-2.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 12-3. More details about the national rite see Chapter Four.

¹²⁰ The relationship between nationalism, national rite and the Yellow Emperor would be further discussed in the Chapter Four.

genealogy of national heroes was created as well. For them, national heroes as the flesh and blood of national identity provided models of virtue to inspire the faith and courage of building a nation for their descendants. Based on certain political ideologies, these heroes were carefully selected and often their legends were exaggerated by nationalists with the purpose of glorifying the ancestral civilisation and re-educating the masses in national values, memories and myths.¹²¹ Koxinga (鄭成功) (1624-62) were good examples to explain how particular historical figures were nationalised and placed in the list of heroes in the late Qing period. Koxinga was a Ming loyalist and the commander of Ming troops on the maritime front for the post-Ming monarchs. He refused to recognise the Qing dynasty and later took over the island of Taiwan from Dutch colonisers to support his grand campaign against the Manchu rulers.¹²²

Here, Koxinga's legends revealed the nature of being a national hero chosen by the revolutionaries: he was a military leader who fought against barbarian rulers for the Chinese empire. Although eventually his missions ended in failure, he showed his loyalty to the country and died for his faith that his homeland would be reunited under orthodox 'Han' successions. Before Koxinga became a national hero, he was worshiped in local legends only in certain areas of China. But through the processes of making national heroes, he quickly acquired a nation-wide reputation and became one of the well-known icons of the nation.¹²³ In addition, many other great emperors, navigators and explorers, statesmen, strategists and writers in the

¹²¹ Smith, *National Identity*, 65 and 128.

¹²² More details about the image-making of Koxinga and its relation to national rite please see Chapter Four.

¹²³ Shen Sung-chaio 沈松僑, '振大漢之天聲---民族英雄系譜與晚清國族想像 (Imagine China: Construction of the Genealogies of Chinese "National Heroes" in Late Qing),' *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History Academia Sinica* 33 (June 2000): 103.

history of China were placed in the genealogy of national heroes.¹²⁴ Again, they might originally belong to regional beliefs, worshiped by locals, or have a great status in certain communities, but now their merits were expanded to meet the need of being national heroes who deserved reverence from the whole nation. Even these heroes might belong more to the realm of legend than history and, if they lived, knew nothing of the nation which was so enthusiastically reclaiming them as great men in national history.

Finally, cultural heritages and popular icons also became national symbols in the late Qing period. Compared to mythical characters or historical figures, their symbols were closer to daily life and were more easily accepted by the masses. For example, the Mogao Caves, the Great Wall, the Imperial Mausoleums, the well-known landscapes such as the Yangtze and Yellow River and other popular icons like the dragon, tiger and phoenix were also viewed as national symbols at that time. What made these symbols different from previous ones was that their visual forms representing the nation made it easier to communicate the abstract idea of nationalism with the masses and were shared as part of daily life. As Anthony D. Smith argues, in many ways visual forms of national symbols are the most potent and durable aspects of nationalism. They embody basic concepts of nationalism connected to national history and culture by making them visible and which also evoke instant emotional responses from the masses.¹²⁵

One dimension which must be added to this type of national symbolisation is the use of architecture. There are many cases in history which reveal the fact that

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 105-6.

¹²⁵ Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 138-9.

architecture is part of power constructions which are demonstrated visually for that purpose. In the age of nation-formation, architects often consciously accepted national narratives constructed by nationalists to create a new form and style of architecture by borrowing traditional elements from the past for representing their own idea of nation. National narratives can pass messages of nationalism by certain visual languages.¹²⁶ Architecture as a powerful contributor of national symbolism cannot be ignored by those who are eager to forge the nation and fulfill their political blueprint through image-making and visual expressions.

¹²⁶ Smith, *National Identity*, 77.

Chapter Three: The Making of the National Style

3-1 Early Pioneers

Although the notion of nationalism had become mainstream in early twentieth century China, not until the 1930s did nationalism fully exert its influence in architectural circles. One reason was that the native architects who were trained in modern Western architectural education were not available until the 1920s. Before that, most of China's new architecture was built by foreign architects or missionaries. The other reason was that not until the 1930s did Chinese architectural scholars have the ability to compete with Western and Japanese scholars in the study of Chinese classical architecture. Without their contributions, Chinese traditional building knowledge could not be widely spread, and the expression of Chinese features in architecture was also difficult to achieve. After the 1930s, the dream of building with a Chinese national form and style designed by Chinese architects could finally be fulfilled.

However, before the change was made, the Chinese still did not view architecture as serious knowledge and art. Traditionally, construction work in China was not considered as a job for intellectuals, but a job for masons or carpenters who were viewed as belonging to a lower social position than the gentry-literati class within a strict Confucian social hierarchy.¹ Architectural knowledge in this regard was seen not as a serious subject or profession for intellectuals to put in extra effort for further studies. Thus, it is no surprise that Western scholars were the first group

¹ Li Shiqiao, 'Reconstituting Chinese Building Tradition: the Yingzao Fahi in the Early Twentieth Century,' *The Journal of the Society of Architectural Histories* 63, no. 4 (December 2003): 472.

of researchers to begin the academic examination of Chinese classical architecture. One of the earliest books on Chinese architecture issued in England in 1752 called *Chinese and Gothic Architecture Properly Ornamented*, was written by William Halfpenny (1723-1755) and his son.² Like many other early Western publications on Chinese architecture in the eighteenth century, this book was more like a designer reference handbook in a Chinoiserie style, rather than a serious academic work.³ In the middle of the eighteenth century, buildings and pavilions in royal gardens or palaces in the Chinoiserie style were a widespread phenomenon throughout Europe.⁴ These reference handbooks provided useful drawings and diagrams for European architects to imitate Chinese building style from a Western architectural point of view. The English architect and architectural historian Sir William Chambers (1723-1796) was also one of the important Chinoiserie style advocates who published a famous book on Chinese architecture called *Design of Chinese Buildings, Furniture, Dresses, Machines, and Utensils* in 1757. Due to his experiences travelling to Canton, a southeast city of China, this book provided a better quality and accuracy of architectural engravings of Chinese buildings than any other book of its kind.

² Certainly there were many other books published earlier than Halfpenny's and had mentioned Chinese architectural form and style, like Dutch Traveler Johan Nieuhoff's *An embassy from the East-India Company of the United Provinces, to the Grand Tartar Cham, Emperor of China* (1673). However, these authors were explorers, merchants, or missionaries but not architects. Their descriptions and engravings on Chinese buildings in their books were closer to travel notes and inaccurate sketches, rather than academic writings and professional drawings.

³ Walter Perceval Yetts, 'Writings on Chinese Architecture,' *The Burlington Magazine for Connoisseurs* 50, no. 288 (March 1927): 120.

⁴ More details about the development of Chinoiserie style in European gardens and architecture see Oliver Impey, *Chinoiserie: the Impact of Oriental Styles on Western Art and Decoration* (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), the chapter 11 and 12.




Fig. 3-1 William Halfpenny's Drawings of a Chinoiserie Style Castle.




Fig. 3-2 Sir William Chambers' Drawings of a Chinese Merchant's House.

In his book, Chambers presents drawings of Chinese building plans, sections, façades and details of decorative elements with his brief introductions and descriptions of different types of Chinese buildings. Based on these remarkable achievements, this book helped to build his high reputation on Chinese architecture in English academia.⁵ However, Chambers still made some errors in his engravings. For example, the building arrangement in the plan of 'houses of the Chinese' is not completely consistent with Chinese building traditions. The proportion of living spaces is also exaggerated by Chambers. In the section of Chinese roofs, Chambers only focuses on the Chinese paraboloid roof (卷棚), a special and rare type of curved roof, constructed with bent rafters, which is not as popular in China as other roofs, like hip, gabled or pointed. As Patrick Conner argues, Chambers' plates on Chinese architecture appear to be the work of a draughtsman playing with oriental detail but imbued with Western classical principles in order to make them acceptable to his Western readers.⁶ In addition, Chambers also shows his biases in his descriptions of Chinese architecture. In the preface, compared to European grand building

⁵ Patrick Conner, *Oriental Architecture in the West* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1979), 76.

⁶ Conner's argument is based on his finding of letters between Chambers and his brother. The evidence revealed that the engravings in Chambers' book were not entirely based on the sketches and measurements that he had taken at Canton. Chambers had requested his brother's help in making these plates for him. *Ibid.*, 76-77.

traditions, Chambers concedes that Chinese architecture is imperfect and unintelligible. Chinese classical style is neither rich in materials nor remarkable for magnitude. Therefore, Chambers argues that it is only suitable for use in less important parts of designs, like pavilions in parks or gardens in Europe.⁷

A Scottish architectural historian James Fergusson (1808-1886) also brought his biases to his writings on Chinese architecture in the famous books *A History of Architecture in All Countries* (1865-6) and *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture* (1876 and 1910). First of all, Fergusson admits that the advanced photographic camera can help to bring higher quality images of Chinese architecture to the West to change a long-established opinion of Chinese architecture. But from a Western architectural point of view, Fergusson still insists that the architectural forms and style of China, compared to that of Egypt or other advanced civilisations, are still not worth further exploration.⁸ What he really appreciates in Chinese building art is the polychromy, which is employed on the surfaces of buildings for decoration.⁹ In addition, Fergusson places pagodas in the first part of the introduction of Chinese building types. He mistakenly applies the method of identifying the characters of Indian architecture, on which he established a great reputation in Britain, to the studies of Chinese architecture. In fact, pagodas in China are subsidiary buildings. They are never the main focus of an architectural complex. Fergusson also mistakenly views the Hall of Prayer for Good Harvests (祈年殿) in Beijing's Temple of Heaven (天壇) as a pagoda. Actually the Hall is part of

⁷ William Chambers, *Designs of Chinese Buildings, Furniture, Dresses, Machines, and Utensils* (Farnborough: Gregg International Publishers, 1969), a-b. Before this was published, Chambers also worried that the book could not raise his reputation, because Chinese architecture at that time was regarded as an unworthy subject of a serious architect. See Conner, *Oriental Architecture in the West*, 76.

⁸ James Fergusson, *A History of Architecture in All Countries*, vol. II, (London: John Murray, 1867), 733-4.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 736.

imperial ritual architecture, used as a sacred place for the Emperor praying for good harvests for the year under his rule, and not a normal Buddhist pagoda for ordinary people.¹⁰ In the 1919 edition, Fergusson corrects this error, but still pays more attention to Indian architecture and less on Chinese and Japanese architecture.¹¹ He adds a new chapter to explain the complicated bracket set system of Chinese roofs, but mistakenly identifies a drawing of a Japanese roof as Chinese.¹² He also incorrectly illustrates the construction of Chinese curved roofs and concludes that the wooden system in Chinese buildings is ‘unscientific’.¹³

Following Chambers’ and Fergusson’s arguments, Sir Banister Fletcher (1866-1953), an English architect and architectural historian, is also biased against Chinese architecture. In his famous book *A History of Architecture on the Comparative Method* (1956, 16th edition), Fletcher argues that the Chinese always pay more attention to poetic art forms, such as gardening or painting, rather than architectural design, which is merely held subservient to human needs.¹⁴ Therefore, he mistakenly concludes that all Chinese building plans, from sacred to secular, and from public to private, are constituted by the same design principle which has undergone little change and progress in history.¹⁵ This Eurocentric architectural point of view is also shown in his famous diagram of the origin of architecture: the tree of architecture. Every style which is not categorised as part of the Greek-Roman-Romanesque lineage is regarded as an offshoot with no independent

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 737-9.

¹¹ In this 500 pages of architectural historical masterwork, Fergusson only spent less than one tenth of pages on introducing and examining Chinese and Japanese architecture. See James Fergusson, *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture* (London: John Murray, 1910).

¹² *Ibid.*, 453.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 454.

¹⁴ Banister Fletcher, *A History of Architecture on the Comparative Method for Students, Craftsmen and Amateurs*, 16th ed. (London: B. T. Batsford, 1956), 913.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 913.

tradition.¹⁶ Following this prejudiced conception, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and many other styles prevalent outside the Europe are termed ‘Non-Historical’.¹⁷

Therefore, there is no surprise that these sorts of misunderstandings and bias toward Chinese architecture hindered a more comprehensive understanding of Chinese building traditions in Western academic circles. Not until the beginning of the twentieth century did new research conducted by other scholars, such as the German architect Ernst Boerschmann (1873-1949), Japanese architectural historian Ito Chuta (伊東忠太) (1867-1954) and Chinese native intellectuals, make a significant breakthrough in Chinese architectural studies.

Like previous Western scholars, early missionaries who went to China for missionary work also did not have a favourable impression of Chinese buildings. The Jesuit missionary Père Louis Le Comte (1655-1728) in 1690 had written some disparaging comments on Chinese buildings. He argues that Chinese buildings are very unpleasing to foreigners.¹⁸ In 1735, the missionary Jean-Baptiste du Halde (1674-1743) also belittled Chinese architecture. He argues that the houses of Chinese nobility and rich people do not deserve to be mentioned in comparison with Western architecture. To call Chinese palaces a palace would be an abuse of the architectural term. These palaces are nothing but a ground-floor raised a little higher than other common houses.¹⁹

In the discussion of the construction of church buildings in China, these

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, iii.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 888.

¹⁸ Impey, *Chinoiserie*, 143.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 143.

European missionaries also believed that Western style had some merits that Chinese classical style could not compete with. In 1896 at a meeting of the Educational Association of China, Lucius Porter (1880-1958) pointed out the ‘hygienic’ problem in Chinese houses. He argues that Western architectural technique can provide a better built environment than the Chinese one.²⁰ Reverend P. W. Pitcher advocates missionaries erecting Western style churches with high steeples in the cities in order to destroy the nonsense of Chinese *fung-shui* (風水) (the Chinese art of geomancy).²¹ Early missionaries insisted that the Western church style was the orthodox style and should not be altered to suit Chinese circumstances. Therefore, from the late nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century, missionary buildings in China were predominately in the Western style.

Although most missionaries did not appreciate the beauty of Chinese traditional buildings, it was the missionaries who began to question the assumption that church buildings in China had to wear a Western architectural mask. By the 1920s, lots of churches, hospitals and Christian universities had changed their appearance to a new eclectic form combining Western construction techniques with the Chinese classical style to reflect some deference to the Chinese context. This changing attitude toward Chinese building traditions showed a shifting development of Christianity in China in adjusting its strategy of missionary work to reflect enormous changes in modern Chinese society.

²⁰ Jeffrey W. Cody, ‘Striking a Harmonious Chord: Foreign Missionaries and Chinese-style Building, 1911-1949,’ *Architronic* 5, no. 3 (December 1996): 4, accessed 30 August 2011, <http://corbu2.caed.kent.edu/architronic/v5n3/v5n3.03a.html>

²¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

Missionary work in China was never an easy task. Whether or not the orthodox Christian doctrine should adapt to suit China's cultural and social context was always a controversial issue. When the first Italian Jesuit missionaries, Michele Ruggieri (1543-1607) and Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), came to southern China for their missionary work, China was a rich and self-satisfied empire. In order to penetrate the high society of China to convert the Chinese to Christianity, missionaries had to learn classical Chinese (the literary language of scholars and officials), study Confucian classics and appear in the costume of the literate elite.²²

However the processes of carrying out missionary work were not quite as successful in the Qing dynasty. Although Emperor Kangxi (康熙) (1662-1722) had favoured the Jesuits and designated some missionaries as officials and advisers in the Qing court, Pope Clement XI's disagreement on allowing Chinese converts the right to worship their ancestors and pay homage to Confucius had deeply defied the Emperor's authority and the Chinese custom that he valued. Kangxi gave an order to expel missionaries who refused to sign a certificate accepting his position.²³ This was the first time that Catholic missionaries had encountered significant difficulty in preaching the gospel in China. Emperor Yongzheng (雍正) (1678-1735) was even sterner than Kangxi, especially on the issue of the Chinese Rites Controversy. Most missionaries were assembled in Canton or Macao and forbidden to propagate Christianity in the hinterland.²⁴

Not until the Opium War had this strict policy of prohibiting the Christian

²² Jacques Gernet, *China and the Christian Impact: A Conflict of Cultures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 16-17.

²³ Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 71-72.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 84. Also see Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 103.

mission in China been changed. The result of the War forced the Qing court to open up its market for Western traders. The industrial and residential sites in foreign concessions of five main port cities were quickly developed by Western powers for commercial activities and national interests. Missionaries at that time had a new opportunity to re-enter China for their mission. Under the protection of unequal treaties, clergymen not only had the same privileged status of extraterritoriality as foreign business men and diplomatic personnel, but were also granted the right to rent or buy land for the construction of churches in foreign concessions.²⁵ Therefore, Christian churches and church buildings began to prosper and grow in concession cities and Christianity overall became a useful and subtle part of the colonial aim of changing China.²⁶

However, several factors inhibited the development of Christianity in China. First of all, due to different value systems, customs, and traditions, some Christian doctrines and ceremonies caused a lot of misunderstanding in Chinese communities. Even the highly educated Chinese wrote posters or pamphlets attacking churches or assembled angry crowds for the anti-Christian movement.²⁷ During the climax of anti-foreigner and Chinese nationalism movements, missionaries and Chinese converts became primary targets. In addition, Western governments often played a role as a powerful protector of church enterprises. Not only were a missionary's right to promote church works fully protected, but also the delinquent behaviour of some Chinese converts were covered by churches with the diplomatic privilege that

²⁵ Paul A. Varg, *Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary Movement in China, 1890-1952* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958), 5 and 31. Also see Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 388.

²⁶ John K. Fairbank, ed., *The Missionary Enterprise in China and America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 2-3. Also see Varg, *Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomat*, 76-7.

²⁷ Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 205. Also see Varg, *Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats*, 33.

they held.²⁸ Therefore, the excessive protection that churches offered their Chinese members often aroused great resentment in Chinese communities. Sometime this resentment could turn into a serious diplomatic incident.²⁹

As a result, the emergence of anti-Christian, anti-foreigner and nationwide patriotic movements forced Western churches to reconsider their methods of propagating Christianity in China. The Roman Catholic Church started its Inculturation Movement to respond to the appeal for church reform made by Chinese Catholic converts.³⁰ For example, Pope Benedict XV (1914-1922) strongly supported the world-wide church, to eliminate any cultural domination retained by Western missionaries.³¹ It was vitally important for the Church to evangelise the sacred texts to natives, not only by the vernacular they used, but also through the local culture they lived with.³² The Pope also advocated allowing local clergymen to take responsibility for the running of their own churches.³³ On the other hand, Protestant churches in China did not confine themselves only to the missionary sector. They began to establish other enterprises such as church universities, hospitals and publishing companies to promote Christianity, and the educational sector quickly became the second great field of missionary activities.³⁴ To some

²⁸ Paul A. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism 1860-1870* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), 141.

²⁹ The Tianjin Massacre (1870) was an example to show that how the French consul got involved with the bloody conflict targeted at the French Catholic church in Tianjin. See *ibid.*, 300-2. The Boxer Rebellion (1899-1901) was another example to reveal how the anti-Christian and anti-foreigner movement gradually evolved into a severe bloody outbreak and a diplomatic incident in northern China. During this uprising, a great deal of church property was stolen and destroyed. 12 foreign ministers and around 2300 Chinese Christians were killed. See *ibid.*, 396.

³⁰ Fu Chao-ching 傅朝卿, '傳教主義與中國古典式樣新建築在 1890-1949 (The Missionary Doctrine and the New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style, 1890-1949),' *建築師 (Taiwan Architect Magazine)* 216 (December 1992): 125.

³¹ Aylward Shorter, *Toward a Theology of Inculturation* (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 1999), 180.

³² Peter C. Phan, *In Our Own Tongues: Perspectives from Asia on Mission and Inculturation*, (New York: Orbis Books, 2003), 25.

³³ Shorter, *Toward a Theology of Inculturation*, 180.

³⁴ Varg, *Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats*, 26 and 89.

extent, these new enterprises did help to change the Chinese attitude toward Western Christianity. The growth of Chinese national self-consciousness made the churches recognise that having a discussion on establishing a Chinese Christian church was an unavoidable issue.³⁵ Chinese converts eventually had to carry out the evangelisation of the nation by themselves. Thus, more and more Protestant churches were willing to give their Chinese members some voice in Christian communities.³⁶

The Catholic Church's Inculturation Movement and Protestant churches' Indigenous Church Movement facilitated the rise of indigenous churches in China. Most missionaries began to reflect some deference to Chinese traditions and customs in their teachings. For example, Celso Benigno Luigi Costantini (1876-1958), the first Catholic Apostolic Delegate of China, highly commends China's traditional art and culture. He argues that in order to treat Chinese traditions and cultural wisdom with respect, Chinese art forms should be adapted into the propagation of Christianity.³⁷ As a vital part of missionary work, church buildings should also wear Chinese costume in order to give Chinese members a sense of being at home in the chapel, instead of feeling that they are in an alien environment.³⁸ In addition, in the journal *Church Missionary Review* Margaret E. Faithfull-Davies also argues that missionaries have to recognise that church designs in China were very important for the image of Christianity. Christianity is daily judged by locals from the appearance of its buildings. Early missionaries do not put enough effort or thought into church buildings with regard to the quality and

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 98.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 103.

³⁷ Fu, '傳教主義與中國古典式樣新建築在 1890-1949 (The Missionary Doctrine and the New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style, 1890-1949),' 126.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 127.

suitable style. Later missionaries should endeavour to avoid these past errors. He suggests that clergymen should hire professional architects to survey Chinese building art and apply their research to the design of indigenous church buildings.³⁹

Indeed, before the Inculturation and Indigenous Church Movements were taking place, most of church buildings in China were assumed to be European basilica or hall-church building type designed by missionaries.⁴⁰ After the initial Church Movements, missionaries were aware of the need to redesign the churches without an obvious foreign character. As M. H. Troop criticises in *the Chinese Recorder*, the high steeples of Mid-Victorian-Gothic chapels are utterly out of harmony with the Chinese city and architectural tone of China. When building chapels, church leaders should not disregard the Chinese viewpoint and the way they do things.⁴¹



Fig. 3-3 A Church in Showchow, 1924.



Fig 3-4 The Church of Our Savior in Shanghai, 1918.

³⁹ Margaret E. Faithfull-Davies, 'Christian Architecture in China,' *Church Missionary Review* 76 (1925): 69-71.

⁴⁰ Cody, 'Striking a Harmonious Chord,' 4.

⁴¹ M. H. Troop, 'An Indigenous Church,' *Chinese Recorder* 55, no. 1, (January 1924): 57. Jonathan Spence also mentions that the Catholics received a great deal of criticism from the Chinese when the church leader insisted to build a new huge church on the site of a former imperial park and temple of Tianjin despite the public objection. See Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 204.

Therefore, a general consensus on the issue of an indigenous church was that church buildings should have a clear aesthetic link to China's past and the Chinese context.⁴² In order to make church buildings closer to Chinese culture, missionaries began to employ professional architects to run building projects. These architects created the earliest Chinese church style adapted to contemporary needs of space without sacrificing traditional features. Based on new construction techniques and materials topped with Chinese decorations and grand curved roofs, these buildings started to match clergy's vision of an indigenous church. As a result, the indigenous church style quickly became a new mainstream fashion in the Christian community.

Among these architects, Henry K. Murphy (1877-1954) was one of the most famous and influential designers at that time. In his early career in China, Murphy's concern for the preservation of Chinese tradition created what he termed an 'adaptive Chinese architectural renaissance' style.⁴³ He earned a great reputation in China's Christian community as an architect who had found a balance between economy and beauty in design.⁴⁴ When churches were expanding their educational activities in China, Murphy took the opportunity to embody his design ideas. In the case of the Ginling College for Girls in Nanjing, Murphy successfully placed classrooms and modern laboratory spaces under Chinese big roofs, and arranged them in a traditional Chinese quadrangle order with an axis corresponding to Nanjin's landscape.⁴⁵ Because his vision of Chinese church buildings coincided

⁴² Cody, 'Striking a Harmonious Chord,' 3.

⁴³ Henry K. Murphy, 'An Architectural Renaissance in China,' *Asia: Journal of the American Asiatic Association* 28, no. 28, (June 1928): 468-475.

⁴⁴ Cody, 'Striking a Harmonious Chord,' 12.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 11-14.

with many of his missionary clients, Murphy quickly become a successful architect, surpassing many of his rivals in China.



Fig. 3-5 Henry Murphy's Design of the Ginling College for Girls.




Fig. 3-6 Bird's-eye view of the Ginling College for Girls.

However, as Jeffery W. Cody points out, due to the limited insight in Chinese traditional architecture, the results of indigenous church buildings were not quite convincing.⁴⁶ Without fully understanding the real Chinese building structure and form, many Western architects had to use their own assumptions or imagination to mimic the Chinese classical style. For example, in the case of Shandong and Ginling collage buildings (1921-37), Chicago architects Perkins, Fellows & Hamilton mistakenly assumed that Chinese architecture was defined solely by the big roof.⁴⁷ Other architects also paid too much attention to designing a big roof copied from the prototype of Beijing's Forbidden City, but overlooked that the *dougong* (斗拱), a wooden bracket set worked as a buttress for bearing the vertical loads from the top, also needed to be added under the roof.⁴⁸ Even Murphy, who paid more attention to details than any other architect, had also made some mistakes. On the ridge finials of Chinese buildings, a monster, a decorative character, should symbolically

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

swallow the whole ridge. But in Murphy's drawing, the ridge was simply passed through the monster.⁴⁹

As Fu Chao-ching (傅朝卿), a famous Taiwanese architectural historian argues, these foreign architects do not precisely grasp the principle and the nature of Chinese traditional architecture. Their imitative designs are not significantly different from European Chinoiserie style.⁵⁰ The main reason hindering these designers from further mastering Chinese building was the lack of sufficient systematic surveys on Chinese building traditions. As mentioned earlier, Western scholars had either shown clear biases against Chinese architecture in their historical writings, or had made limited investigation on real Chinese buildings. Regardless, Chinese scholars at that time had not yet reported on Chinese architectural traditions in a systematic method.⁵¹ Therefore, the designs of indigenous church buildings often contained several basic errors or misuses of elements which did not conform to Chinese architectural traditions.



Fig. 3-7 The Administration Building of the Cheeloo University in Shandong.




Fig. 3-8 Murphy's drawing of the Chinese Ridge finials.

⁴⁹ Fu, *中國古典式樣新建築* (*New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style*), 98.

⁵⁰ Fu, '傳教主義與中國古典式樣新建築在 1890-1949 (*The Missionary Doctrine and the New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style, 1890-1949*)', 124.

⁵¹ Cody, 'Striking a Harmonious Chord,' 5.

3-2 Chinese Successors

When Western architects and missionaries had begun to erect indigenous church buildings in China and undertake some pioneering research in Chinese architecture, a number of Chinese traditional intellectuals were also aware of the importance of preserving their own building traditions. Although European and Japanese scholars had shown their interest in Chinese architecture and made considerable progress in research earlier than Chinese scholars, it was the Chinese scholars who achieved a significant breakthrough in studies of Chinese architecture. Their work and reports had later been adopted by many Chinese architects for the practice of the Chinese classical style.

Zhu Qi-qian (朱啟鈞) (1872-1964) was one of the earliest Chinese intellectuals who had established the early academic foundation of the Chinese architectural investigations in China during the Republic era. He was a traditional gentry-literati who occupied a higher social position and normally distanced themselves from building work which was viewed as belonging to lower class. His interest in construction came from his experiences in Beiyang government as a minister of transportation and communications, minister of the interior and the premier of the State Council. He participated in the construction of the Anglo-German-funded railway, the span bridge across the Yellow River, railway stations in Nanxiakou and Dezhou and the urban renewal project in Beijing's Forbidden City.⁵² But what made Zhu devote himself to the research of Chinese traditional architecture and its conservation was his discovery of the *Yingzao Fashi* (營造法式) (*Treaties on*

⁵² Li, 'Reconstituting Chinese Building Tradition,' 472. Also see Zhu Qiqian 朱啟鈞, 'Inaugural Address, the Society for the Research in Chinese Architecture,' 中國營造學社匯刊 (*Bulletin of the Society for the Research in Chinese Architecture*) 1, no. 1 (July 1930): 2-3.

Architectural Methods), an old construction manual of Chinese architecture, in Nanjing's Jiang-nan library (江南圖書館) in 1919.

According to history, the *Yingzao Fashi* was first printed in 1103. The author Li Jie (李誡) (1065-1110) served the imperial court as director of the imperial construction department for thirteen years in the Northern Song dynasty (960-1127). In 1097, he was commissioned by the emperor to compile the *Yingzao Fashi* in order to establish a clear construction standard based on a modular system, down to the smallest construction unit, for officers and royal craftsmen to follow in building imperial public works. In so doing, the cost of materials and labour could be fully estimated with minimum waste.⁵³ This book also could be used to prevent corruption in the construction department.⁵⁴ As a practical construction manual, the *Yingzao Fashi* was still in use in the Ming dynasty (1368-1644).⁵⁵ After that, technical jargon and construction methods in China had undergone enormous changes, so this book had been forgotten for centuries. Only the imperial library and a few private book collectors preserved this book for its collection value, but not for its use value.⁵⁶

When Zhu discovered this book in Nanjing, he quickly recognised that what he found was a key text to gain access to the knowledge of Chinese architectural traditions. In 1920, a year after he found this book, he sent it to one of leading publishers, the Commercial Press, in Shanghai for reprinting. Zhu also realised that

⁵³ Else Glahn. 'On the Transmission of the "Ying-Tsao Fa-Shih",' *T'oung Pao* 61, no. 4/5 (1975): 235-6.

⁵⁴ Li, 'Reconstituting Chinese Building Tradition,' 471.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 471.

⁵⁶ About the history of the transmission of the *Yingzao Fashi* in different book collectors and libraries see Glahn. 'On the Transmission of the "Ying-Tsao Fa-Shih".'

the book had been transcribed many times since the Song dynasty original, so he attempted to reconstruct the original Song edition of 1103. He established a special institute for carrying out research on the book, and began to collect as many different versions as he could. Later, Zhu entrusted Tao Xiang (陶湘) (1870-1940), a well-known book restorer, to restore this book. Tao set out to collate all available copies of the *Yingzao Fashi* with the assistance of several book collectors and librarians. After his diligent work on re-editing, countless errors and distortions made by processes of transcription and printing from the original had been corrected. Zhu also employed a master builder of the Qing imperial palaces to redraw diagrams of timber structure for the book. Moreover, the original black and white illustrations of painting decoration were also reproduced by colour printing.⁵⁷

This new edition of the *Yingzao Fashi* was published in 1925. It immediately attracted global attention from many scholars in Chinese art and architecture. The English sinologist Walter Perceval Yetts (1878-1957) wrote an article to introduce this new edition to his English readers and called it ‘triumphs of book-production’.⁵⁸ Some Japanese architectural scholars also used this book as a main source when doing Chinese architectural research.⁵⁹ Even Liang Qi-chao recognised the importance of the book. He sent a copy to his son Liang Si-cheng (梁思成) (1902-72) who studied architecture at the University of Pennsylvania during that time. However, for most scholars and intellectuals, the book was not easy to understand. In the past eight hundred years so many technical terms had changed and some

⁵⁷ Li, ‘Reconstituting Chinese Building Tradition,’ 476-7. It should be noticed that although lots of research had been done to make this edition as true as possible to the original, the book restorer still made a few mistakes in correcting the technique terms. See Glahn. ‘On the Transmission of the “Ying-Tsao Fa-Shih”,’ 256-61.

⁵⁸ Yetts, ‘A Chinese Treatise on Architecture,’ 474.

⁵⁹ Anonymous, ‘李明仲八百二十週年紀念 (In Remembrance of the Death Anniversaries of Li Ming Zhang),’ *中國營造學社匯刊 (Bulletin of the Society for the Research in Chinese Architecture)* 1, no. 1 (July 1930): 18.

descriptions of structural details were undecipherable for modern readers. In addition, due to the class difference, most Chinese researchers, who were traditional gentry-literati, were not familiar with the language that craftsmen used in the book.⁶⁰ Young scholars like Liang Si-cheng, who was trained in American architectural education, also had a big problem with the obscure archaic language.⁶¹

Indeed, as Zhu admits, re-editing an old construction manual of Chinese architecture is not enough for fully understanding Chinese building traditions. It is necessary to establish an academic society for research in Chinese architecture.⁶² Zhu believed that Western scientific methodology should be introduced to the Society in order to conduct a systematic investigation of Chinese classical architecture. In so doing, Chinese scholars could contribute their knowledge to world art and architectural academic circles, and open a dialogue between the East and the West.⁶³

In addition, the series of nationalist movements in China inspired Zhu to found the Society. Like Liang Qi-chao and many other reformers at that time, Zhu attempts to find a form of unchanging ‘Chinese-ness’ in history to anchor the changes in modern China.⁶⁴ He believes that Chinese culture and traditions as a historical foundation of the modern Chinese nation should be fully protected.⁶⁵ The *Yingzao Fashi* is the book illustrating the greatest achievements of China’s

⁶⁰ Zhu, ‘Inaugural Address,’ 9.

⁶¹ Wilma Fairbank, *Liang and Lin: Partners in Exploring China’s Architectural Past* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 29.

⁶² Zhu, ‘中國營造學社緣起 (The Origin of the Establishment of the Society for the Research in Chinese Architecture),’ *中國營造學社匯刊 (Bulletin of the Society for the Research in Chinese Architecture)* 1, no. 1 (July 1930): 1.

⁶³ Zhu, ‘Inaugural Address,’ 6 and 10.

⁶⁴ Li, ‘Reconstituting Chinese Building Tradition,’ 473.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 474.

construction history. Therefore, it is an important task to restore the book and decipher the texts to revive Chinese culture and traditions. In addition, when China began its Westernisation and modernisation movements in architecture and urban reconstruction, the appeal of preserving traditional building techniques and craftsmanship did not receive enough attention. If the puzzles hidden in the book could not be solved, all the ancient construction knowledge and heritage would gradually be forgotten and disappear in the future.⁶⁶ Most importantly, Zhu hoped that one day the status of Chinese architecture could be raised to the same level as Western architecture in the world, and that Western scholars one day would recognise the great achievements of Chinese architecture without bias.⁶⁷ Therefore, in 1930, Zhu founded China's first and most important research group of Chinese architecture, named the Society for Research in Chinese Architecture (中國營造學社), to conduct a systematic survey of Chinese building traditions.

The Society had to save the dying knowledge of Chinese architecture. They carried out interviews with old master builders in order to reveal the undecipherable technical terms remaining in the texts. As Zhu Qi-qian argues, these builders who knew the building technique probably did not know the *Yingzao Fashi*, and these intellectuals who knew the texts did not understand building construction. Therefore, the Society had to find a 'middle road' to facilitate communication on both sides.⁶⁸ As a result, their groundbreaking researches and reports published in the *Bulletin* quickly became the most important sources of Chinese architectural studies in twentieth century international academia.

⁶⁶ Zhu, '中國營造學社緣起 (The Origin of the Establishment of the Society for the Research in Chinese Architecture),' 2.

⁶⁷ Li, 'Reconstituting Chinese Building Tradition,' 476.

⁶⁸ Zhu, 'Inaugural Address,' 4.

Despite this, the Society had to catch up with European and Japanese investigations in Chinese classical architecture. In order to set out a new approach to the study of the *Yingzao Fashi* and Chinese building relics, they began to recruit young scholars who studied architecture or related disciplines in Europe, America and Japan.⁶⁹ Indeed, traditional gentry-literati were experts at interpreting ancient literature and re-editing different versions of rare books, but they could not totally master the architectural methodology conforming to Western academic standards. These young scholars, including Liang Si-cheng, a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania, Lin Hui-yi (林徽因) (1904-55), also from the University of Pennsylvania and Liu Dun-zhen (劉敦楨) (1897-1968), a graduate of the Tokyo Polytechnic University, later played a vital role in taking the Society in a new direction in researching Chinese classical architecture.⁷⁰

There were three major differences making the research achievement of the Society unique from that of European and Japanese scholars. First of all, the Society particularly emphasised team work. As Vimalin Rujivacharakul notices, every member of the Society contributed parts of their work to the final results of reports published in the *Bulletin*.⁷¹ This teamwork model was very different from the European academic tradition which required mostly a single author who conducted a research project independently. Secondly, due to the language and cultural

⁶⁹ Wen Yu-qing 溫玉清, '中國建築史學史初探 (*The Summary Reviews of Chinese Architecture History Studies during the 20TH Century*)' (PhD Thesis, Tianjing University, 2006), 67.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 478. Further information about the Society's full list of members see Lin Zhu 林洙, *中國營造學社史略 (*The Brief History of the Society for Research in Chinese Architecture*)* (Taipei: Architecture and Culutre, 1997), 25-36.

⁷¹ Vimalin Rujivacharakul, '國外對中國營造學社的接受史---從費慰梅到李約瑟 (*The Reception of the Society for Research in Chinese Architecture outside China: from Wilma Fairbank to Joseph Heedham*)', *世界建築 (*World Architecture*)*, April 2010, 118.

boundary, most Western researchers had encountered difficulties in accessing primary sources to advance their understanding of China's craftsman system and unique Chinese timber construction. Finally, the field studies undertaken by Western scholars were not complete and comprehensive. For example, the famous Swedish art historian Osvald Sirén (1878-1966) was invited by Emperor Puyi (溥儀) (1906-67) to visit the Forbidden City and many other royal palaces and gardens. Sirén's international reputation was built on his first-hand investigations, but his researches were confined merely to Beijing's royal buildings and apparently too narrow to be called a representative study of Chinese architecture. The German architect Ernst Boerschmann (1873-1949) was probably the most important Western scholar collecting considerable materials on Chinese architecture in three years of field studies in China's hinterland. However, Boerschmann's main concern was mostly focussed on imperial buildings and Buddhist temples, and he did not offer a complete overview of the development of Chinese architecture in his writings. He also largely overlooked the technique part of Chinese building construction.⁷² Because of this limited scope of study, he could not provide a comprehensive overview and a historical panorama of Chinese classical architecture based on an exhaustive field study and a thorough literature research.

Compared to Western researchers, Japanese scholars have decisive advantages in competing with European sinologists. Japan had experienced Chinese influences for many centuries, not only in culture, religion and language, but also in architectural construction and style.⁷³ Due to these affinities with China, Japanese

⁷² Wen, '中國建築史學史初探 (*The Summary Reviews of Chinese Architecture History Studies during the 20TH Century*),' 30-31.

⁷³ Japanese architectural historian Ito Chuta also had mentions these research advantages in his book on Chinese architectural history. See Ito Chuta 伊東忠太, *中國建築史 (The History of Chinese Architecture)*, trans. Chen Qing-quan 陳清泉 (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1998), 12.

scholars quickly surpassed Western scholars in doing a more comprehensive study of Chinese architecture. However, their investigations also exposed some limitations. For example, Ito Chuta (伊東忠太) (1867-1954), the most important architectural historian in Japan, had visited China for architectural surveys since 1901. Although his investigations were among most extensive at that time, the purpose of the trip was to trace the origin of Japanese architecture rather than the history of Chinese architecture.⁷⁴ Only a particular period of Chinese history, starting from ancient Chinese to the Southern and Northern dynasties (南北朝) (420-589), in which China began to extend her cultural influence to Japan, was mentioned in his book *The History of Chinese Architecture* (中國建築史).⁷⁵ Other parts of history were entirely neglected. Moreover, Ito also displays his bias towards Chinese architecture in his writings. For example, Ito claims that the reason why Chinese buildings have to apply beautiful polychromy on the surface of wooden frames is that Chinese craftsmen were used to use low-grade materials to construct buildings. These rough timber structures needed to be decorated with colourful paintings for the final polish.⁷⁶

Compared to European and Japanese scholars, the Society had more

⁷⁴ The most ambitious architectural trip that Ito had taken was a three years long world architectural trip across the Eurasian continent dating from 1902. On the one hand, in order to search for the origin of Japanese Buddhist temples, India was one of the final destinations of the trip. On the other hand, in order to prove that Sir Banister Fletcher's view of Japanese architecture as a 'non-historical style' was wrong, Ito also visited the Middle East and the Southern Europe to find out the cultural and architectural affinities between the Greek-Roman lineage and Japan. Therefore, his trip to China was only part of the plan. See Cheng Da-hui 鄭大慧, '日本建築家伊東忠太與中國建築家梁思成之建築思想與作品比較研究 (A Comparative Study on Architectural Thoughts and works of Ito Chuta, a Japanese Architect and Liang Si-cheng, a Chinese Architect)' (MA Dissertation, Chung Yuan Christian University, 2006), 2-30 to 2-40.

⁷⁵ Ito Chuta, *中國建築史 (The History of Chinese Architecture)*, trans. Chen Qing-quan 陳清泉 (Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1998). Published in 1931, this book was one of the earliest books on Chinese architecture history.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.62. Lin Hui-yin, a Chinese architectural historian, disagreed with this argument. See Lin Hui-yin 林徽因, *林徽因的另面人生 (Lin Hui-yen's Life from Other Aspects: On Beauty of Chinese Architecture)* (Taipei: The Commercial Press, 2005), 17.

advantages in which to carry out in-depth investigations into Chinese architecture and building traditions. Through their constant efforts, after the 1930s, Chinese architectural studies gradually became an independent discipline with its own methodology and systematic knowledge. Before the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Society had made a series of architectural field studies covering most counties of China, and made a significant breakthrough in re-editing and deciphering intricate ancient construction manuals. They also began to develop a distinctive Chinese architectural historiography different from Western and Japanese scholars' perspectives.

3-3 Liang Si-cheng and Chinese Architectural Historiography

Within the Society, Liang was one of the most influential figures in twentieth century Chinese architecture due to his significant contributions to architectural history and education in China. Wilma Fairbank acclaims that Liang was the leader of the first generation of Chinese architectural historians.⁷⁷ Wu Liang-yong (吳良鏞) (1922-), a famous Chinese architectural and urban planning scholar, also states that Liang was the most important founder and pathfinder who completely changed the way of doing Chinese architectural studies in modern Chinese architectural academia.⁷⁸

Liang's architectural career began with his studying at the architectural

⁷⁷ Liang Si-cheng, *Chinese Architecture: a Pictorial History* (New York: Dover Publications, 1984), xv.

⁷⁸ Wu Liang-yong 吳良鏞, '前言(Preface),' in Liang Si-cheng 梁思成, *梁思成全集 (The Complete Work of Liang Si-cheng)*, vol. 1, (Beijing: China Building, 2001), 15-16.

School of the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia in 1924. The University at that time was an American stronghold of the Beaux-Arts tradition, conducted by a distinguished French architect Paul P. Cret (1876-1945). The Beaux-Arts training made Liang entirely focus on the world of Western classical architecture, but Liang recalled that it was also the University which made him begin to ponder the question of Chinese architectural history. In his sophomore year, Liang attended Professor Alfred Gumaer's lecture on architectural history and found that he was very interested in architectural history.⁷⁹ Later, Liang received the *Yingzao Fashi* sent by his father Liang Qi-chao. Liang Qi-chao wrote an accompanying letter with his comments on this book and acclaimed the *Yingzao Fashi* as a masterpiece, a glory to the culture of our nation.⁸⁰ However, when first reading the book, Liang Si-cheng admits that he could barely understand most of the content, due to lots of perplexing technique terms. Despite this, he knows that what his father had given him was an important gateway to the research of Chinese architectural history.⁸¹ After graduating from the University of Pennsylvania, Liang sent a PhD proposal to Harvard University. He said he would like to carry out a study on the history of Chinese imperial palaces. Harvard University quickly accepted his application, but a few months later, Liang recognised that the collection of Chinese architecture books in the University's libraries was barely enough for him to cope with this topic. He had to go back to China to further survey Chinese imperial buildings.⁸²

After Liang went back to China in 1928, he helped the National Northeastern University in Shenyang to establish an architectural school, which entirely adopted

⁷⁹ Fairbank, *Liang and Lin*, 25.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁸² Dou Zhong-ru 竇忠如, *梁思成傳 (Liang Si-cheng: A Biography)* (Tainjin: Baihua Literature and Art Publishing House, 2007), 45-46.

the Beaux-Arts training programme based on the Penn model. This school was the introduction of the American Beaux-Arts education system to China's architectural circle and quickly began to extend its influence.⁸³ Later, Zhu Qi-qian founded the Society for Research in Chinese Architecture in 1930 in Beijing. Liang was subsequently persuaded to join the Society to undertake research on Chinese architectural history. He had the enthusiasm to bring what he learned from the USA to the study of Chinese architecture by asking new questions that other researchers had disregarded.⁸⁴ Later, after he became one of leading members, Liang exerted an enormous influence on the Society. He set up a new standard for Chinese architectural history research through his precise and thorough examinations and descriptions of the buildings that he surveyed. This standard was later adopted by Chinese scholars who followed in his footsteps in further studies of Chinese heritage. There are two major contributions that Liang had made to the Society and to the research of the Chinese classical architecture:

(1) The scientific survey of Chinese classical buildings: as mentioned earlier, in the inaugural address of the Society, Zhu Qi-qian claimed that if China's research group would like to compete with current Western and Japanese scholars, the scientific approach must be introduced. After Liang and other young scholars had joined the Society, Zhu's vision was finally realised. In the preface of *The History of Chinese Architecture* (中國建築史), Liang also argues that it is necessary to examine historical materials and surviving buildings through the scientific method in order to reveal the nature and the 'principle' of Chinese architecture.⁸⁵ Therefore, he and

⁸³ Xing Ruan, 'Accidental Affinities: American Beaux-Arts in Twentieth-Century Chinese Architectural Education and Practices,' *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 61, no. 1 (March 2002), 32.

⁸⁴ Fairbank, *Liang and Lin*, 50.

⁸⁵ Liang Si-cheng 梁思成, *中國建築史* (*The History of Chinese Architecture*) (Tianjing: Baihu

other young scholars of the Society began to set up a systematic survey of existing traditional buildings throughout China. The first step was to measure whole buildings from main timber structures to the smallest construction units. Every object in the buildings must be recorded in its precise size. A series of modern architectural drawings, including plans, sections, façades and details, also needed to be made during the survey.⁸⁶ In addition, their field trips also covered various buildings constructed in different dynasties throughout China. The survey results helped to form a more complete picture of the development of Chinese classical architecture from the past to the present, and to do a comparison study between measurements of each construction unit to measurements cited in the old manuals. Their surveys also began to shed light on the puzzles of early timber construction and ancient building knowledge described in the rare books.⁸⁷ If some technical questions still remained unknown, interviews with old master craftsmen were starting to resolve missing areas of knowledge. Without their help, a number of intricate timber constructions and complicated jargon could not have been fully understood.⁸⁸

Literature and Art Publishing House, 1999), 7.

⁸⁶ More details about Liang's field trips and building surveys please see Lin, *中國營造學社史略 (The Brief History of the Society for Research in Chinese Architecture)*, 52-123.

⁸⁷ Fairbank, *Liang and Lin*, 56-7.

⁸⁸ Wen, '中國建築史學史初探 (*The Summary Reviews of Chinese Architecture History Studies during the 20TH Century*)', 72.




Fig. 3-9 The Survey Sketch on a Temple's Timber Structure.




Fig. 3-10 The Section of the Guan-yin Hall.

The first article that adopted the Liang's 'scientific method' was 'The Survey on the Dule Temple, the Guanyin Hall and the Gatehouse in Ji County (薊縣獨樂寺觀音閣山門考)' published in the *Bulletin* in 1932.⁸⁹ This article was viewed as the first scientific report on Chinese classical buildings, and served as pioneering research which largely influenced succeeding studies in the Society and in the Chinese architectural historical circle in general.⁹⁰ First of all, Liang briefly reviewed the history of the building and fully described its present situation and the environment around it. Secondly, Liang begins to depict the features of building construction, including the roof, the main timber structure, different types of bracket sets, beams, columns and decoration elements. All of those construction components were measured in metres. Architectural drawings, diagrams and photographs were also used to illustrate these complicated wooden frames: the building itself was the best

⁸⁹ Liang Si-cheng 梁思成, '薊縣獨樂寺觀音閣山門考 (The Survey on the Dule Temple, the Guanyin Hall, and the Gatehouse in Ji County),' *中國營造學社匯刊 (Bulletin of the Society for the Research in Chinese Architecture)* 3, no. 2 (June 1932): 7-90.

⁹⁰ Wen, '中國建築史學史初探 (The Summary Reviews of Chinese Architecture History Studies during the 20TH Century),' 75. Also see Lin, *中國營造學社史略 (The Brief History of the Society for Research in Chinese Architecture)*, 126-8.

example to elucidate the knowledge described in old construction manuals. These books helped to locate the date of construction of the building and to identify its characteristics among different buildings in other periods. Finally, after collecting this data, Liang used modern applied mechanics to calculate the loads of the building and to prove that Chinese timber construction completely conformed to the mechanical principle. His conclusion eliminated a long-lasting bias stemming from James Fergusson that Chinese timber structure was ‘unscientific’. As a result, there is no doubt that this original report fully represents that the Chinese research group, when compared to Western and Japanese scholars, also has the ability to produce high-quality papers on Chinese traditional architecture.⁹¹

(2) Introducing the Beaux-Arts aesthetics to the Society: like many other Chinese architects and architectural educators, Liang received a scholarship to be trained as an architect at the University of Pennsylvania.⁹² The Beaux-Arts training deeply influenced Liang’s thoughts on Chinese architectural aesthetics and history. After he joined the Society, Liang began to apply the consummate drawing skills to his investigations into Chinese classical architecture. In his reports in the *Bulletin*, Liang not only provided all necessary drawings of these buildings, but also attempted to find out the similarity between Chinese architecture and Western architecture. For example, in the report on the Dule Temple in Ji County, Liang draws a comparison between the Chinese architectural principle and the Western classical order. He considered that Chinese wooden bracket sets resting on the top of columns can be viewed as Western capitals. Liang claims that the status of the bracket set in Chinese building construction was the same as the capital in the

⁹¹ Wen, ‘中國建築史學史初探 (*The Summary Reviews of Chinese Architecture History Studies during the 20TH Century*)’, 74.

⁹² Ruan, ‘Accidental Affinities,’ 31.

Western architectural order.⁹³ According to Liang's measurements, the ratio between the diameter and the height of the column in the Gatehouse of the Dule temple was slightly smaller than that of the Ionic order in Roman architecture.⁹⁴ In addition, he argues that the Greek temple's entasis, an application of a slightly convex curve to a surface of columns whose diameter is decreased from the bottom upwards, can also be found in beams and columns of Chinese building construction.⁹⁵ As a result, the similarity between Chinese and Western architecture can be viewed as proof to support his argument that there are some general principles which can be found both in Chinese and Western architectural practices.⁹⁶ It is clear that Liang attempted to locate Chinese architecture in a global context to demonstrate that it should have the same status as other great architectural systems in the world.

⁹³ Liang, '薊縣獨樂寺觀音閣山門考 (The Survey on the Dule Temple, the Guanyin Hall, and the Gatehouse in Ji County),' 11.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 42.

⁹⁶ Lai De-lin 賴德霖, '梁思成、林徽因: 中國建築史寫作表微 (The Chinese Architectural Historical Writings of Liang Si-cheng and Lin Hui-yin),' *The Twenty-First Century* 64 (April 2000): 97.




Fig. 3-11 Comparison of Plan Shapes and Columniation of Timber-framed Halls.




Fig. 3-12 The Evolution of the General Appearance of Timber-framed Halls.

In addition, after Liang and the Society had undertaken wide-ranging case studies on Chinese classical architecture, Liang could confidently make a series of analogous drawings on the evolution of Chinese architecture. These drawings were also influenced by his Beaux-Arts training.⁹⁷ During Liang's student years, the extensive notes and sketches on Western classical architecture in different periods helped Liang to realise that understanding the evolution of architecture was vital to grasp the nature of architecture.⁹⁸ By comparing Western architectural plans, façades, sections and various details throughout different periods, the evolution of Western architecture inspired him to develop an idea on the evolution of Chinese architecture.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Fairbank, *Liang and Lin*, 26.

⁹⁸ The evolution of Western architecture was in the Paul P. Cret's curricula in the University. See *Ibid.*, 56.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 26.

In his book *Chinese Architectural: a Pictorial History*, Liang made his first attempt at outlining the evolution of Chinese architecture. By comparing the development of Chinese classical architecture from the Tang dynasty (618-907) to the Qing, Liang divides the development of the Chinese timber-framed system into three periods: the period of vigour, the period of elegance, and the period of rigidity. In the period of vigour, from the middle of the ninth century to the middle of the eleventh century, architecture is characterised by its robustness of proportion and construction with impressive timber bracket sets in the building façade. In the period of elegance, from the middle of the eleventh century to the end of the fourteenth century, the building feature is marked by its gracefulness in proportion and the refinement in details. In the period of rigidity, from the beginning of the fifteenth century to the end of nineteenth century, the architectural character is identified by its rigid proportion and the stagnation of creativity. The best example would be the delicate timber bracket sets which have degenerated from their original structural function to mere ornaments.¹⁰⁰ Liang argues that if we viewed the history of Chinese architecture as an organic body, it reached its adolescence in the Han dynasty, matured into full glory and vigour in the Tang dynasty, mellowed with grace elegance in the Sung dynasty and finally grew old and became feeble in the Ming and Qing dynasty.¹⁰¹

It is clear that Liang expanded on this analogy between an evolution of organic body and the development of Chinese architecture. This view apparently was influenced by the linear, progressive concept of history, developed by late Qing

¹⁰⁰ Liang, *Chinese Architecture*, 37.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

intellectuals who tended to explain Chinese history in the social Darwinist framework. As mentioned earlier, in order to search for a method to ensure China's survival and national independence in the competitive world, many late Qing historians attempted to remedy the deficiency of Chinese cultural traditions by introducing nationalist discourses to the new historiography. Liang Qi-chao, Liang Si-cheng's father, was one of the strong supporters of the new historiography. It is clear that Liang Qi-chao's perspective on Chinese history had a significant influence on his son's view of the evolution of Chinese architecture.¹⁰²

The evolution perspective of Chinese architectural history made Liang Si-cheng ponder a further question: after the decline of Qing architecture, what is the future of Chinese architecture? Influenced by both Chinese nationalist discourses and the Beaux-Arts training, Liang believed that the *rebirth* of a national architecture should adhere to the best principles of historical Chinese architecture. Liang argues that, like language, every nation's architectural system has its own 'grammar'. If the rules of 'grammar' could be fully understood, a new form of national architecture could be created.¹⁰³ Thus, the creation of new national architecture in China should follow the great tradition of Chinese classical architectural 'grammar' to revive the glory of national building traditions in the past.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² More details about the close relationship between Liang Qi-chao and Liang Si-cheng's historical perspective, see Li Shi-quao, 'Writing a Modern Chinese Architectural History: Liang Sicheng and Liang Qichao,' *Journal of Architectural Education* 56, no. 1, (September 2002): 35-45.

¹⁰³ Liang Si-cheng 梁思成, '我國偉大的建築傳統與遺產 (the Great Tradition and Legacy of Our Nation's Architecture),' *梁思成全集 (The Complete Work of Liang Si-cheng)*, vol. 5, (Beijing: China Building, 2001), 92-93.

¹⁰⁴ Liang Si-cheng 梁思成 and Lin Hui-yin 林徽因, '祖國的建築傳統與當前的建設問題 (The Architectural Tradition in Our Fatherland and Current Problems in Architectural Industry),' in Liang, *梁思成全集 (The Complete Work of Liang Si-cheng)*, vol. 5, 136.

However, such creation was not encouraged as a rigid imitation or a crude copy, but as an ingenious use of historical features and principles to form a new national style.¹⁰⁵ Liang sharply criticised foreign architects and missionaries who erected indigenous church buildings during the 1920s, and failed to create an innovative design which could successfully combine Western building technology with Chinese architectural traditions, because they did not gain a complete knowledge of Chinese architecture at the time.¹⁰⁶ To counter this, Liang compiled an authoritative designer reference handbook named *A Pictorial Reference book for the Chinese Architectural Design* (建築設計參考圖集) for Chinese architects to correctly make use of Chinese architectural elements in their designs without making the same mistakes that foreign architects and missionaries had made in the past.¹⁰⁷ In the preface, Liang encourages new Chinese architects to engage in the conscious creation of architecture, just like European architects who made a departure from the ‘drifting and unconscious craftsmanship’ of the medieval in the Renaissance era.¹⁰⁸ As a result, this designer reference handbook became the most important reference handbook in creating Chinese classical style in new architecture during the 1930s.

¹⁰⁵ Liang Si-cheng 梁思成, ‘今天學習祖國建築遺產的意義 (The Meaning of Learning our Fatherland’s Architectural Legacy Nowadays),’ in Liang, *梁思成全集 (The Complete Work of Liang Si-cheng)*, vol. 5, 242.

¹⁰⁶ Liang Si-cheng 梁思成, ‘建築的民族形式 (The National Form of Architecture),’ in Liang, *梁思成全集 (The Complete Work of Liang Si-cheng)*, vol. 5, 57-58.

¹⁰⁷ Liang Si-cheng 梁思成, ‘建築設計參考圖集序 (The Preface of A Pictorial Reference for the Chinese Architectural Design),’ *中國營造學社匯刊 (Bulletin of the Society for the Research in Chinese Architecture)* 6, no. 2 (December 1935): 78-79.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 74-75.

3-4 Searching for the 'Authentic' Chinese National Style

The Society and Liang Si-cheng's great contributions to Chinese architectural circles in providing an enormous historical resource of new architecture in the Chinese classical style had completely changed the development of modern Chinese architecture. Early foreign architects' and missionaries' achievements in exploring a suitable style for indigenous church buildings had been greatly surpassed by successive native Chinese designers. The rise of nationalism nudged these architects concerned about the future of their nation in the direction of searching for an 'authentic' national style to represent the nation's glorious past and present. The 1930s were the critical period for the development of Chinese nationalistic architecture. In the next five decades, nationalistic architecture kept exercising its power in the architectural developments in Communist China and in Taiwan. Before turning to a close scrutiny of Taiwan's nationalistic architectural development, three points should be considered:

(1) The rise of nationalism at the turn of the century: after the Qing court began to promote the Self-strengthening Movement in 1861, a new demand for Western construction was burgeoning. Western powers and entrepreneurs began to invest huge amounts of money in infrastructure, urban planning and architecture for promoting trade and business in the concession cities. A growing number of Western style buildings, like banks, office buildings, hotels and trade centres, appeared in China for the first time.¹⁰⁹ Although most of designers were foreign architects and engineers, some Chinese construction firms were entrusted to run their building

¹⁰⁹ Zhang Fu-he 張复合, *北京近代建築史 (The Modern Architecture History of Beijing from the End of 19th Century to 1930s)* (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2004), 14-15.

projects. While significant urban developments were taking place only in coastal cities, the Chinese began to learn Western construction techniques and to copy their architectural style.¹¹⁰ These native architects and engineers who advocated Western style architecture at that time belittled Chinese traditional buildings. They argued that traditional timber construction tended to decay, did not conform to scientific standards and could not satisfy the new functions and demands of modern housing.¹¹¹ Therefore, in the late Qing period, what Western style represented was not only the current development of the Chinese construction industry, but also China's commitment towards modernisation and Westernisation.

Not until a group of returned students, with Western architectural education, who started to contribute their learning from Western countries to Chinese architectural circles in the 1920s, could a new kind of architectural discourse fully gather momentum. Those students not only brought new architectural techniques and knowledge back to China, but also began to ponder the question of an 'authentic' Chinese national style. They were stimulated by nationalist discourse at that time to gain inspiration from their own rich building traditions instead of strictly looking to the West for models of architectural design. They believed that Chinese architects should create their own national style.¹¹² As a result, the making of a national style in China had made enormous progress by the 1930s. It symbolised the idea that the Chinese nation should not lose its voice on the road toward modernisation and Westernisation. However, what is the 'authentic' Chinese national style? How should it be applied to architectural design?

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 77.

¹¹¹ Lai De-lin 賴德霖, *中國近代建築史研究 (Studies in Modern Chinese Architectural History)* (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2007), 184-5.

¹¹² Fu, *中國古典式樣新建築 (New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style)*, 297-8.

(2) The Beaux-Arts aesthetics and the making of national style: it should be noticed that many returned students were trained as architects in the American Beaux-Arts universities. According to Xing Ruan's research, over 60 percent of active foreign-trained Chinese architects practising in China during the 1920s and 1930s were trained in the USA. Most of them graduated from the University of Pennsylvania.¹¹³ Except Liang Si-cheng, Yang Ting-bao (楊廷寶) (1901-1982), Lu Yan-zhi (呂彥直) (1894-1929), Guan Song-sheng (關頌聲) (1892-1960) and many other famous Chinese architects or architectural scholars, who were called the first generation of Chinese architects, also graduated from the American Beaux-Arts universities.¹¹⁴ They exerted a great influence upon Chinese architectural circles when they taught in China's universities and practised on the mainland.

The profound influence of Pennsylvania's curriculum on architectural education of China began in the 1920s. Although the first Architectural Department was founded in 1923 in the National Suzhou Polytechnic (蘇州理工) and based on the Japanese model, the Polytechnic was later merged into the National Central University (中央大學) in 1928 and was penetrated by the Beaux-Arts trained graduates.¹¹⁵ In addition, Liang Si-cheng also established an Architectural Department which copied Penn's model at the National Northeastern University in 1928. After the 1930s, except for a few colleges, most Architectural Departments in China's universities adopted the American Beaux-Arts education.¹¹⁶ The majority

¹¹³ Ruan, 'Accidental Affinities,' 31.

¹¹⁴ More details about the list of graduates please see Su Gin-djih 徐敬直, *Chinese Architecture: Past and Contemporary* (Hong Kong: the Sin Poh Amalgamated Limited, 1964), 133-4.

¹¹⁵ Xing, 'Accidental Affinities,' 32.

¹¹⁶ Only the Architectural Department at St. John's University established in 1942 in Shanghai had a strong Bauhaus influence. See *ibid.*, 32.

of the faculty members were also recruited from these Beaux-Arts graduates.¹¹⁷ In the following decades, among these universities the National Central University in Nanjing wielded the biggest influence on Chinese architectural circles. Yang Ting-bao, the head of Department, was not only a distinguished architect, but also a great educator who gave the American Beaux-Arts a foundation in China under his leadership and teaching.¹¹⁸

The American Beaux-Arts tradition also had great impact on the architectural industry in China during the 1930s. As discussed earlier, the American architect Henry K. Murphy, who conducted a number of indigenous church building projects in the early twentieth century, incorporated Beaux-Arts aesthetics in his designs. His architectural offices in New York and in Shanghai also trained many young Chinese architects who later followed Murphy's idea of the 'adaptive Chinese architectural renaissance' in their architectural projects. For example, Lu Yan-zhi was one of the Chinese employees who worked for Murphy's New York and Shanghai offices for a while. Later, he founded his own architecture firm and became famous for his design of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, which fully represented Murphy's idea of new Chinese architecture.¹¹⁹

Aside from Murphy and his followers, many Beaux-Arts trained native Chinese architects also seized the opportunity to show their ability to construct new

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 30-2.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹¹⁹ Rudolf G. Wagner, 'Ritual, Architectural, Politics, and Publicity during the Republic: Enshrining Sun Yat-sen,' in *Chinese Architecture and the Beaux-Arts*, ed. Cody, Steinhardt and Atkin, 239-40. In a letter that Lu wrote to Murphy after his resignation, he promises that he will follow Murphy's teaching and fight for these 'compradoric' architects whose designs has made Chinese cities and villages lose their identity. See Wang Jun-syong 王俊雄, '國民政府時期南京首都計畫之研究 (*On the Capital Plan of Nanking in the Nationalist Era of China, 1928-1937*)' (PhD Thesis, National Cheng Kung University, 2002), 100. More details about Lu and Murphy's contributions to the development of Chinese architecture please see the Chapter Six.

architecture. Yang Ting-bao, for example, who directed one of the biggest Chinese architectural firms, Kwan, Chu & Yang Architects and Engineers (基泰工程司), at that time also attempted to transform Beaux-Arts aesthetics into a Chinese style in his designs.¹²⁰ As Xing Ruan argues, the reason that these Chinese architects experienced little culture shock on the Beaux-Arts aesthetics was that a close affinity between the Beaux-Arts aesthetics and Chinese art traditions did exist.¹²¹ For example, the Beaux-Arts atelier system was similar to the traditional Chinese master-pupil relationship. The eclectic attitude to architectural style made it easier to add Chinese architectural elements to Western building constructions. In addition, most of the Beaux-Arts design principles, such as harmonious proportion, perfect balance between solidity and volume and coordination among different elements, could also be found in Chinese art forms.¹²² Most importantly, Liang Si-cheng and the Society's research results had provided these architects with the best resource to create a Chinese national style. As discussed earlier, Liang's research was deeply influenced by the Beaux-Arts aesthetics. Due to the common architectural language that they shared, Liang's reports and design reference handbooks made it easier for these architects to make use of Chinese architectural elements for their designs without encountering major problems.

(3) The influence of political power: in the 1930s, China had also entered a new era of politics. As Frederic Wakeman points out, the fall of the imperial government not only led the entire political order of China to a tremendous destruction, but also caused the collapse of classical traditions that had buttressed society for centuries. Successive governments consequently had to create a new past,

¹²⁰ Xing, 'Accidental Affinities,' 37-42.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 36.

a new history, to establish their claim to rule.¹²³ After the fall of the Qing Empire, the new Beiyang government tried to establish a sustainable democratic system with a two-chamber parliament under a new draft for a provisional constitution. But after the leader Yuan Shi-kai (袁世凱) (1859-1916) failed to expand its power to the whole of China, losing the trust of local political elites, gentry-literati and the majority of people themselves, the new political order could barely be maintained. After Yuan died, warlords whose main political concern was to consolidate their local regimes in different bases took control of Northern China.¹²⁴ In 1917, Sun Yat-sen's Guangzhou-based KMT government began to challenge the Beiyang government's legitimacy. Sun's follower, Chiang Kai-shek, launched a Northern Expedition in 1926-8 to wipe out all Beiyang warlords and to reunite China under the banner of the Republic of China.¹²⁵ Now the Nanjing Nationalist government led by Chiang and the KMT had to look for a new way to strengthen their political legitimacy from a wider social basis. Especially when Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, a new political order and discourse had to be constructed.

Not long after Sun's death, the construction of the myth of Sun Yat-senism (孫文主義) was undertaken by the KMT's propaganda apparatus. Sun was now hailed as the founding father of the Republic who had exclusively conducted the Chinese Republic revolution.¹²⁶ Dai Ji-tao (戴季陶) (1891-1949), an early KMT member and ideologue, promoted Sun Yat-senism based on his analyses and reinterpretations of Sun's books, especially *The Three Principles of the People* (三民主義). According to his exegesis, Sun had followed the path of traditional Confucian thought. A clear

¹²³ Wakeman, *The Fall of Imperial China*, 225.

¹²⁴ Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 275-88.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 341-60.

¹²⁶ It should be noticed that many historians deeply doubted that Sun's role in the Republic revolution was as important as the KMT's claim in their version of Chinese modern history. See Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 198-245 and Wakeman, *The Fall of Imperial China*, 242-4.

connection could be found in Sun's books that linked his ideal model of political order to the Confucian classics.¹²⁷ Sun even attempted to strengthen China's orthodox cultural and moral heritage to maintain Chinese political order. Dai concludes that the KMT had to follow Sun's teaching on the political and social reforms in order to succeed his unfinished task of saving the nation by reviving Chinese orthodox tradition.¹²⁸

After Sun Yat-senism was established, Chiang Kai-shek constantly reminded his people of his close personal and political relationship to Sun. He drew on Dai's analyses to produce his own political discourse and represented himself as a zealous disciple and the faithful guardian of Sun's thoughts in order to legitimate his regime.¹²⁹ In many speeches Chiang illustrated his concern about the issue of reconstructing Confucian orthodoxy in a modern Chinese society. The Confucian orthodoxy was viewed the core value of Confucianism inherited from ancient sage emperors, Confucian philosophers, all great thinkers in the past and national heroes. Chiang believed that Sun had completely succeeded in integrating this great orthodoxy of the past. He declared that he would follow Sun's footsteps and carry out his ideal of restoring China to the great nation it used to be.¹³⁰

Chiang's view was deeply influenced by nationalist discourses which considered history as a linear, progressive development. In Confucian orthodoxy, Chinese historical heroes and figures were carefully selected and tied together as a

¹²⁷ Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 410.

¹²⁸ Wang, '國民政府時期南京首都計畫之研究 (*On the Capital Plan of Nanking in the Nationalist Era of China, 1928-1937*)', 97.

¹²⁹ Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 410.

¹³⁰ Sie Jheng-yu 謝正諭, '蔣中正政治思想之研究: 以正統及憲政主義為中心的論述 (*Study of Chiang Kai-shek's Political Thought: Based on Orthodox Ideology and Constitutionalism*)' (PhD Thesis, National Chengchi University, 1998), 77-83.

continuous genealogical line to highlight the strong connection between the new regime and the nation's past.¹³¹ Through Sun Yat-senism the Nationalist government under Chiang's leadership had created such an image to strengthen its political foundation of legitimacy to rule China.¹³²

When the KMT decided to reconstruct Nanjing as a new capital city, Chinese classical style was considered the most suitable style to illustrate the great achievements that the KMT had fulfilled in the mission of national reunification and social reconstruction.¹³³ Many government buildings were clad with Chinese classical style to manifest the glory of Chinese traditions and culture. The most famous examples were the Cemetery Hall for Heroes of the Revolution (1928-35), the Main Building for Ministry of Transportation and Communications (1930-4), the National Central Stadium (1931), the Great Hall of the National Assembly (1935-6), the Exhibition Hall of KMT's History (1935-6), the National Central Museum (1937) and the Institute of Sociology in Academia Sinica (1947).¹³⁴ Most of them were designed by Beaux-Arts trained Chinese architects who brought the style to a new climax.

¹³¹ More details about the re-construction of the image of Chinese heroic genealogy and its connection to Chiang's regime please see the Chapter Four.

¹³² More details about the image-making of Sun Yat-sen and its visual representation please see the Chapter Seven.

¹³³ Wang, '國民政府時期南京首都計畫之研究 (*On the Capital Plan of Nanking in the Nationalist Era of China, 1928-1937*)', 188-90.

¹³⁴ More details about these buildings, see Fu, *中國古典式樣新建築 (New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style)*, 129-39.



Fig. 3-13 The Swimming Pool of the National Central Stadium, 1931.




Fig. 3-14 The Exhibition Hall of KMT's History, 1935-6.



Fig. 3-15 The Institute of Sociology in Academia Sinica, 1947.



Fig. 3-16 The National Central Museum, 1937.

Although many public works were forced to halt during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45), the post-war period saw the Chinese classical style still the dominant style at government level. However, the result of Chinese Civil War (1945-9) divided China into two: Communist China on the mainland and Free China in Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had raised doubts as to whether Chinese classical style could fully represent the socialist ideal of architectural form. After a series of debates and political struggles, Chinese classical style was still considered as the main style and continued to be adopted in the principal official buildings on the mainland. Not until Chinese economic reform was

launched in 1978 did this architectural discourse fundamentally change.¹³⁵ After Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT lost the war, the entire Nationalist government was forced to retreat to Taiwan. Around two million people, including officers, soldiers, scholars, professions and civilians, decided to move with the government. Many Beaux-Arts trained architects and their students, including Guan Song-sheng, Lu Yu-jun (盧毓駿) (1904-75), Huang Bao-yu (黃寶瑜) (1918-2000), Lin Jian-ye (林建業) and Siou Ze-lan (修澤蘭) (1925-), also followed the KMT to settle in Taiwan. Later, they contributed to another wave of Chinese classical style in Taiwan.

However, at the beginning, KMT's control over Taiwan was unstable. Although the result of the Second Sino-Japanese War ended Japan's fifty years of colonial rule, reintegration of the island was no simpler than decolonisation. After Chen Yi (陳儀) (1883-1950) took control of the Taiwan Provincial Administrative Executive Office, the Nationalists began to wrestle with the problems of post-war Taiwan that Japan had left.¹³⁶ As a result, Chen's coercive rule caused ethnic friction, cultural conflicts, economic chaos and social unrest for most of the latter half of the 1940s. The simmering tensions between the newly arrived government and local society finally exploded in what became known as the February 28 Incident, 1947. Military reinforcements from the mainland helped to suppress all opposition in Taiwan and ensured consolidation of Chen's rule. Thousands of protesters and political reformers were massacred. This disastrous result proved that KMT's early rule over Taiwan failed to reintegrate the island into a revised sense of a 'new China'. Two years after the Incident, the Nationalist government had entirely retreated to Taiwan. Now Chiang Kai-shek's regime had to develop a more effective

¹³⁵ Fu, *中國古典式樣新建築* (*New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style*), 165-224.

¹³⁶ More details about the Japanese colonial legacy and the KMT's policy will be fully discoursed in the Chapter 4.

method of domination if the party was to root its legitimacy in Taiwan in the long term.¹³⁷

Chiang also had another reason to tie Taiwan closer to his regime. In 1947, the US president Harry Truman (1884-1972) disagreed with American military planners' suggestion that Taiwan could be an important part of the island chain in the Far East to fence in the Communist camp. Truman was persuaded by another report suggesting that continued military assistance to Chiang's regime would waste American money and erode American prestige due to its corruption and incompetence.¹³⁸ At the same time, the Sino-Soviet alliance increased the possibility of the CCP forces launching an invasion across the strait.¹³⁹ Without US support, Chiang had to strengthen his control over the island and prepare to defend it for the survival of the regime. However, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 changed Truman's position on the Taiwan issue. The USA redrew its defensive perimeter to include Taiwan in the Pacific frontline island chain to ensure that the island would not be the weak link in the anti-Communist campaign. During the Cold War period, political and ideological antagonism between Communist China and Free China grew sharper. The position of Taiwan became part of the complex balance of power between the Communist camp (the Soviet Union and the PRC) and the Western camp (the USA and the ROC) in East Asia.¹⁴⁰ Ironically, the exigencies of the Communist threat now gave Chiang's regime a chance to prolong

¹³⁷ More details about the Incident see Steven Phillips, 'Between Assimilation and Independence: Taiwanese Political Aspirations under Nationalist Chinese Rule, 1945-1948,' in *Taiwan: A New History*, ed. Murray A. Rubinstein (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 275-319. Also see Denny Roy, *Taiwan: A Political History*, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 55-75.

¹³⁸ Roy, *Taiwan*, 108-9.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 111.

¹⁴⁰ More details about the Cold War situation of Taiwan see Christopher Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society* (London: Routledge, 1997), 16-17; Francis Pike, *Empires at War: A Short History of Modern Asia since World War II* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 280-4.

its totalitarian rule in Taiwan. In successive political campaigns, such as the White Terror and the ‘clearing of the villages’ (清鄉), the KMT embarked on authoritarian political campaigns to suppress all potential opposition that might threaten its rule in Taiwan in the name of anti-Communism.¹⁴¹

If the KMT wanted to strengthen its legitimacy to rule Taiwan, it was insufficient to gain large-scale social support from below by using military power as the sole method of rule. Therefore, a new nationalist discourse had to be created to bring the pre-1945 population of the island into the Chinese nation. During the Cold War period, the Nationalists attempted to reconstruct cultural, historical and ethnic relationships between Taiwan and China. They also tried to wipe out all traces of Japanese colonial heritage in Taiwan and to redirect social identification toward KMT’s version of Chinese traditions.¹⁴² As part of the KMT’s effort to continue the legacy of the Republic in the Nanjing period, the Nationalists began a series of cultural movements to nationalise Taiwan through education, media, social and political life. Chinese culture was now used to create a sense of national consciousness linking the mainland before 1949 to Taiwan thereafter.¹⁴³ The Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (中華文化復興運動) in 1966 was the most important cultural movement at that time. This Movement endeavoured to redefine the content of Chinese traditional culture and replant it in Taiwan by reconstructing orthodox Confucianism, promoting Chinese traditional values, preserving national treasures, propagating anti-Communism and advocating many other cultural and

¹⁴¹ More details about Chiang’s state control over the society see Roy, *Taiwan*, 88-94.

¹⁴² Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 26-30. Further discussion on this issue will be presented in the Chapter 4.

¹⁴³ Allen Chun, ‘From Nationalism to Nationalizing: Cultural Imagination and State Formation in Postwar Taiwan’, in Jonathan Unger, ed., *Chinese Nationalism* (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), 129-31.

political campaigns.¹⁴⁴

As a part of cultural reinvention, architecture was also considered one of the best symbols to manifest Chinese national culture. In the early part of the KMT's rule, many official buildings were clad with Chinese classical big roofs, splendid bracket sets and decorative elements made with modern construction materials such as concrete and steel, similar to what the KMT had requested from its Nanjing architectural designers. The notable cases were the National Palace Museum (1965), the National Assembly (1966), Martyrs' Shrines and Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall (1976). Many other private universities, churches, Buddhist temples and commercial buildings also adopted the Chinese classical style.¹⁴⁵ A new trend of Chinese classical style was created in post-war Taiwan.




Fig. 3-17 Taipei's National Palace Museum, 1965.



Fig. 3-18 The Chungshan Building, 1966.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 134-5. More details about the Movement will be further discussed in the Chapter 5 and 7.

¹⁴⁵ More details about these buildings see Fu, *中國古典式樣新建築 (New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style)*, 227-92.



Fig. 3-19 The Grand Hotel, 1961.



Fig. 3-20 The Chinese Culture University, Dai-ren Hall, 1961.

However, in architectural academia, Taiwan's modernist supporters held a questioning attitude toward this trend. From the late 1950s, KMT's discourses began to place an increasing emphasis on promoting economic growth in Taiwan. Chiang sided with economic reformers and accepted an offer from the American government to implement an early stage of free-market capitalism in Taiwan. The USA also assigned many consultants to Taiwan to carry out construction projects based on the modernist model. In addition, more and more returned students who were trained in American Bauhaus education were also in favour of modernist architecture. However, unlike West Germany or Japan, which embraced modernist architecture as a symbol of welcoming American liberalism and capitalism in the post-war period, Chiang still preferred conservative art forms rather than pure modernist expression. As a result, the trend of Chinese classical style continued taking root in Taiwan

However, this trend attracted a great deal of criticism from modernist advocates. They argued that the imitation of Chinese traditional architectural style might restrict the architect's freedom to design, and hinder the new development of

modern architecture. They claimed that modernism was the best architectural model to satisfy contemporary needs of architectural form and function for post-war Taiwan.¹⁴⁶ In the 1970s, Taiwan's enormous economic growth also enhanced the demands for modernist buildings. In the early 1980s, the Chinese classical style had almost been forgotten due to its rigid form and obsolete appearance. The Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall (1976) was the last significant official building clad with Chinese classical style. Beginning from the 1980s, postmodernism, regionalism and Taiwan's indigenous style inspired lots of architects and architectural theorists to search for a new style that could fully represent Taiwan's identity in the global era.

To conclude, Chinese classical style was the product of Chinese nationalism. It was originally developed by foreign missionaries and architects who were forced to change the way they promoted Christianity in China because of the rise of Chinese nationalism, and this reflected the change in architecture. But later Chinese successors who were also inspired by Chinese nationalism surpassed these early pioneers' achievements and carried out extensive and exhaustive surveys of Chinese traditional buildings to help native architects imitate these buildings correctly and completely. These architectural historians and designers found a perfect balance between modern construction technologies and Chinese classical style in the Beaux-Arts aesthetics. Under the lead of certain political elites, especially Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT, these architects began to serve politics in order to erect architecture which satisfied the requirements of their national imagination and political ideology in pre-1945 China and in post-war Taiwan. Although nationalistic architecture has now gradually lost its political influence, it left an irrefutable

¹⁴⁶ The issue of Taiwan's battles of style will be further discussed in the Chapter 6.

nationalist and totalitarian mark in the development of modern architecture in Taiwan.

Indeed, Chinese nationalism did have a strong ethnic orientation. Primarily, Chinese nationalists constantly searched for historical symbols to identify the continuity between the old empire in the past and the new nation in the modern era. On the other hand, political elites in China also played a key role in developing Chinese nationalist discourse. They not only reinterpreted Chinese culture and tradition to fit into the framework of the nationalist discourses, but also chose architecture as the most important visual symbol to represent the glory of national history and culture. Therefore, Anthony D. Smith's ethno-symbolist does provide a theoretical insight into the development of nationalistic architecture both in China and in Taiwan. In addition, Jonathan Hearn's framework of power / culture relationship also gives a satisfactory explanation for understanding the close relationship between political power, Chinese nationalism and the making of Chinese classical style.

Part II: The New Developments in Taiwan

Chapter Four: The Making of a National Holy Space

On 21st August 2009, a group of Taiwan's aborigines led by Gao Jin Su-mei (高金素梅), an incumbent legislator, went to Tokyo's Yasukuni shrine for the campaign to 'Return Our Ancestral Souls' (還我祖靈). This shrine is Japan's national holy space where the spirits of 'Japanese' soldiers who died for the empire in wartime are worshipped and consecrated. Gao Jin and the leaders of the group were representing the bereaved families of Taiwan's Takasago volunteer soldiers (高砂義勇軍). In World War II, around 2,000 Taiwanese volunteer soldiers died for the Japanese empire and are now enshrined in the Yasukuni. Gao Jin and her people requested official compensation from the Japanese government and the return of their ancestors' spirits. They wanted to worship these spirits in their own traditional way at home. However, their intrusion into the Yasukuni shrine quickly aroused a group of Japanese policemen to arrest them and deport them back to Taiwan.¹ The Yasukuni shrine still enshrines those colonial subjects who once were 'Japanese' and now lie among tens of thousands of Japanese departed souls commemorating their enduring dedication to the Japanese emperor and their nation.

This episode happens every year in front of the Yasukuni shrine in the post-war period. Since the 1970s, more and more bereaved families from former colonies (Taiwan and Korea) have gone to the Yasukuni shrine to ask for the return of their ancestors' spirits. They object to their ancestors being worshipped at the Yasukuni as 'Japanese' *kami*, divine beings or gods, especially when fourteen Class

¹ Mao Feng 毛峰, '高金素梅闖靖國神社背後 (The Story behind Gao Jin Su-mei's Intrusion into the Yasukuni Shrine),' *亞洲週刊 Asia Weekly*, 30 August 2009, accessed 10 February, 2012, http://www.yzzk.com/cfm/Content_Archive.cfm?Channel=aw&Path=227886981/34aw2.cfm.

A war criminals and around 2,000 Class B and C war criminals are also enshrined in the same place. The Yasukuni has consistently rejected all requests and argued that:

Since they were Japanese at the time of their death in battle, they do not stop being Japanese in death. They fought and died believing that they would be honoured through their enshrinement as Japanese soldiers when they died.²

The Yasukuni also argues that returning the ancestors' souls to their families does not conform to Japan's Shinto customs. These souls are like fire and are burning as a whole on a higher level in the shrine and cannot be separated or taken away individually.³ This stance does not satisfy the protestors. As Gao Jin has argued, it is the greatest humiliation for their ancestors to be tied so firmly with notorious Japanese war criminals in the Yasukuni shrine. This way of worshipping deeply offends them and confuses right and wrong between colonial victims and war criminals.⁴

The word Yasukuni means 'pacifying the country' in English. It is designed as a national holy space where the spirits of fallen soldiers could be transfigured into sacred divine beings, and the sorrow of bereaved families could sublimate into joyful pride that their losses in war were glorious sacrifices for the imperial state and the emperor.⁵ In fact, in the post-war era the Yasukuni shrine has never been the peaceful place it was planned to be. The diplomatic, religious and political rows

² Takahashi Tetsuya, *Can Philosophy Constitute Resistance?* (Tokyo: The University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy, 2008), 172.

³ Leo T. S. Ching, *Becoming 'Japanese': Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 2.

⁴ Mao, '高金素梅闖靖國神社背後 (The Story behind Gao Jin Su-mei's Intrusion into the Yasukuni Shrine).'

⁵ Takahashi, *Can Philosophy Constitute Resistance?* 175-6.

over the controversial issues evoked by the shrine will not end until the Yasukuni proposes a satisfactory solution with those ‘non-Japanese’ bereaved families.

The main focus of this chapter is Taiwan’s colonial shrines, KMT’s martyrs’ shrines and the making of the national holy space. In order to address these issues from a broader perspective, the notion of national identity, state ideology and political religion will also be explored. The research period of this chapter begins from construction of the Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine in 1869 to Taipei’s Martyrs’ Shrine in 1969. The origin of Japanese shrines and the birth of China’s martyrs’ shrine will also be discussed. Without fully examining these cultural, political and historical factors, this thesis believes shrines as an important national symbolic space cannot be fully understood.

4-1 Nationalism, Political Religion and Japanese Shinto Shrines in Colonial Taiwan

The Yasukuni shrine is not a conventional shrine. Originally, it was a shrine constructed after the Meiji Restoration started in 1868 to worship the spirits of those loyalists who had died during battles related to the Restoration.⁶ In 1871, traditional Shinto belief was established as the new state religion of Japan to serve the Meiji government. During that time, the government attempted to find a new way to strengthen Japanese national identity. Traditional Shinto belief was viewed as the best tool to fulfill this goal. Therefore, after the Meiji government was established, Shinto had quickly been nationalised and reconstructed as part of government

⁶ Brian Bocking, *A Popular Dictionary of Shinto* (Richmond: Curzon, 1997), 222.

institutions bringing the imperial cult into the state, forming a new spiritual foundation to unify the population into the cult.⁷ At that time, all shrines across the country were given official grades based on their relationship to the imperial family and placed under the administrative control of the government.⁸ As a result, Japan became a modern nation-state with a rigid state religion led by the emperor as its head priest.⁹ Among these shrines, the Yasukuni was one of the most important newly built shrines that served an essential political function in conducting national rites of worship for the spirits of those who died in war and fought for the Japanese empire during the wartime.¹⁰

As Takahashi Tetsuya has pointed out, the Yasukuni was one of Japan's trinity of war institutions used to create a sense of 'national morality' which required that the subjects offer their lives to protect the emperor and the nation in the 'holy wars'.¹¹ In addition, the Meiji government not only recruited the Japanese to join the growing expansion of the empire, but also mobilised many colonial subjects from Taiwan and Korea to fight for the nation. At the end of the Second World War, there were around 2,460,000 fallen soldiers which included 2,000 Taiwanese military volunteer soldiers enshrined in the Yasukuni as national 'heroic spirits'.¹² As a result, based on the Imperial System, State Shinto and the Yasukuni shrine were the most important war institutions and were meant to evoke a strong patriotic and loyal response from society.¹³ However, how did this national belief-system

⁷ Sokyo Ono, *Shinto: The Kami Way* (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1962), 72-73.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 72.

⁹ Ian Reader, Esben Andreasen and Finn Stefánsson, *Japanese Religions: Past and Present* (Sandgate: Japan Library, 1993), 165.

¹⁰ Ian Reader, *The Simple Guide to Shinto* (Folkestone: Global Books, 1998), 110.

¹¹ Takahashi, *Can Philosophy Constitute Resistance?* 165.

¹² Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), 669.

¹³ Toshiharu Shinichi, '日本天皇制與台灣皇民化 (Japan's Emperor System and Taiwan's Kominka Movement)' (MA dissertation, National Cheng-chi University, 1990), 5-7.

work? How did it help the government to mobilise the people?

In order to find out the answer to why some ethnic groups survive but others perish in modern society, and what the main factors are that help to sustain ethnic communities, Anthony D. Smith has framed a concept of 'political religion' to explain the formation of nationalism.¹⁴ Smith argues that in some cases nationalism does reinforce and politicise the old myths of ethnic communities to ensure that the communities can survive in the secular world.¹⁵ The foundations and resources of national identity can be dated back to earlier belief-systems. Nationalism is not a totally new ideological artifact created in modern society as modernists have claimed. In fact, nationalists drew many key elements of pre-modern religions to form a new belief-system. They even sharpened earlier ideas, sentiments, symbols and beliefs through the lens of nationalism to give them a new life with a solid modern political foundation.¹⁶ In pre-modern times, certain cultural markers appear in the myths, memories, symbols, values and traditions of ethnic communities as a distinctive indicator to prove that the members of the communities are ancestrally related and culturally distinct. Most importantly, a particular cult is required to help to transform the community into an ethno-religious communion. This cult allows the members to see themselves as a holy, unique 'chosen people' with certain moral laws which must be obeyed and loyalties pledged.¹⁷

Therefore, it is no accident that many modern national celebrations, ceremonies and monuments created for new political purpose are modelled on

¹⁴ Anthony D. Smith, *Chosen People* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), VII-IX.

¹⁵ Anthony D. Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 125.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹⁷ Smith, *Chosen People*, 32-33.

earlier traditions and older religious rituals.¹⁸ In addition, nationalists in the period of nation building also attempt to reinterpret the genealogy and the historical common ancestor of their community to relate themselves to the heroic past. Certain political elites manipulate these myths, memories, values and symbols to prolong the survival of the community and to legitimise the existence of the nation in the present.¹⁹ Therefore, the myths of ethnic election help to mobilise the community and give it a special aura to tie the members and link their present with the glorious past.²⁰

In the case of Japan, it is clear that Japan's traditional Shinto had been manipulated by nationalists to construct a new national religion for unification of the nation since the Meiji Restoration. Many pre-existing Shinto myths, traditions, rituals and symbols were carefully selected to ensure that the Japanese ethnic community could be sustained in the modern era. Those nationalists also strengthened the pre-modern Emperor System as the state's highest institution of ruling authority after state power had returned to the Meiji emperor (1852-1912).²¹ He was depicted as a Shinto deity whose ancestor was Amaterasu (天造大神), the Sun of Goddess, from whom the Japanese imperial lineage was believed to be descended.²² Venerated as a *kami*, the emperor became the dominant symbol of Japanese nationalism spreading the imperial cult all over the country. All Japan's shrines at the time were forced to join a national association led by the Grand Shrine of Ise (伊勢神宮), the most important imperial shrine, at the head. Japan was now described as a land of *kami* whose descendants were required to protect and defend

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹⁹ Smith, *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, 139.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 135.

²¹ Toshiharu, '日本天皇制與台灣皇民化 (Japan's Emperor System and Taiwan's' Kominka Movement)', 14.

²² Reader, Andreasen and Stefánsson, *Japanese Religions*, 65.

it in wartime.²³ As a result, State Shinto, the Emperor System and Japanese nationalism eventually paved the way towards the growth of imperialism in the nation.

However, in pre-modern times, traditional Shinto belief did not have a strong link with the government and the Emperor System. Shinto is considered to be the indigenous religion of Japan based on its distinctive myths, traditions, rituals and symbols. Traditionally, Japanese view *kami* as divine powers in nature where deities coexist with people's everyday life. It is also believed that the birth of Shinto can be dated back to a pre-historical age when Japanese mythological deities ruled the land.²⁴ Based on these myths, later Shinto evolved for thousands of years into an intensely local belief-system across the country.²⁵

Shrines are places where *kami* manifested themselves and made their dwelling. They are usually close to significant natural phenomena, such as a sacred mountain or a secluded land where the divine power is highly concentrated.²⁶ In order to sustain power, shrines in general are surrounded by a series of constructions, such as *torii* (gateway), *kaki* (fences), *honden* (main hall) and *haiden* (worship hall) to purify the holy spaces and to mark the sanctity of the places.²⁷ Shrines are also sites for Shinto's rituals, festivals and many other religious activities to summon *kami* at specific times for particular purposes.²⁸ Because the development of Shinto has a

²³ C. Scott Littleton, *Understanding Shinto* (London: Duncan Baird Publishers, 2002), 34.

²⁴ Ono, *Shinto*, 4-6.

²⁵ Helen Hardacre, *Shinto and the State* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 10.

²⁶ John Breen and Mark Teeuwen, 'Introduction: Shinto Past and Present,' in *Shinto in History: Ways of the Kami*, eds. John Breen and Mark Teeuwen (Richmond: Curzon, 2000), 2.

²⁷ David Young and Michiko Young, *Introduction to Japanese Architecture* (Singapore: Periplus, 2004), 34-35.

²⁸ John K. Nelson, *Enduring Identities: The Guise of Shinto in Contemporary Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), 54.

strong link to local communities, the shrines' venerated *kami*, form and style, festivals and worship calendars are all different from one region to another. However, not until the Shinto had been nationalised in the Meiji period had the regional boundaries been altered to suit the new imperial cult.²⁹

During the Japanese colonial period, more than 200 Japanese shrines were built in Taiwan. At the beginning, the colonial government did not use Shinto as a method to express colonial authority or to force the subjects to show their loyalty to the emperor. Shinto was mostly promoted by Japanese citizens. Some of them were built by settlers in Taiwan who wanted to keep their traditional belief and protect their enterprises in the colony.³⁰ However, when Japan was expanding its empire in Asia, religious policy faced enormous changes. The military expansion was well beyond Japan's capabilities and required more manpower and war materials from colonies to sustain the wars. Thus, Taiwan's colonial government began to conduct the *Kominka* Movement (皇民化運動) to mobilise colonial populations. The Religious Reform was high on the agenda of the *Kominka* Movement to impose State Shinto upon colonial Taiwan.³¹

Kominka means 'transforming the colonial people into imperial subjects' in English. It was considered that through these campaigns the *Kominka* Movement could actually achieve the primary and ultimate aim of turning the Taiwanese into 'true Japanese', especially given that Taiwan had been a former possession of the

²⁹ Reader, *The Simple Guide to Shinto*, 62.

³⁰ Huang Shih-chuan 黃士娟, '日治時期台灣宗教政策下之神社建築 (The Development of Jinja Architecture under the Influence of Religions Policy in Taiwan during the Japanese Colonisation)' (MA dissertation, Chung Yuan Christian University, 1998), 18-25.

³¹ Chou Wan-yao, 'The Kominka Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and Interpretations,' in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945*, eds., Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 45-48.

Qing empire for hundreds of years. The military tension between China and Japan in the Second Sino-Japanese War made the Japanese government reinforce the processes of assimilation in order to prevent its colonial subjects from betraying their suzerainty.³² As a result, during the wartime, the Japanese government changed its earlier religious policy and began to systematically promote State Shinto in Taiwan at the expense of Taiwan's indigenous religions.³³ State Shinto and shrines began to play a central role in the *Kominka* Movement. Not only was the relationship between the Taiwanese and the emperor strengthened, but also the lives of the islanders changed. The Taiwanese were forced to dedicate war materials and manpower for the empire during their lifetime. Even if they died in battle, their souls would be enshrined at Yasukuni to fulfill their enduring service to the emperor.

First of all, the *kami* that were worshipped in colonial shrines all had special meanings in politics. Amaterasu and the present emperor were the most general and important *kami* worshipped in Taiwan's shrines. They symbolised that the imperial lineage had a superior status in the Japanese nation and its colonies. It was expected that all Taiwanese should express the greatest reverence to these *kami* and prove their enthusiasm for being docile subjects.³⁴ In addition, Okuninushi (大国主) was a widespread *kami* enshrined in most colonial shrines. He is a mythical character, a guardian of territory and a god of nation-building who explored a new land for the nation.³⁵ In Taiwan, Okuninushi was viewed as the protective deity of Japan's

³² *Ibid.*, 41-42.

³³ Chen, 日據時期神道統制下的台灣宗教政策 (*Taiwan's Religion Policy under the Influence of Shinto during the Japanese Colonisation*), 91-92.

³⁴ Tsai Jung-jen 蔡榮任, '一種傳科權力技術的歷史性建構: 從台灣日治時期神社到戰後 (A Historical Construction from Foucault's Technology of Power: from Jin-ja during Japanese Colonial Period to Martyrs' Shrine after WW II in Taiwan)' (MA dissertation, National Cheng Kung University, 2001), 118-20. 122-8.

³⁵ Littleton, *Understanding Shinto*, 28-30.

colonial properties in Taiwan.³⁶ Prince Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa (北白川宮能久親王) (1847-1895) was another *kami* commonly worshipped in Taiwan. He was a major general in the Japanese Imperial Army who was appointed to suppress Taiwan's revolts at the beginning of Japan's colonial rule and who died in Tainan (台南) during the battle. Later, he was elevated as a *kami* and became one of the popular deities consecrated in Taiwan's shrines as a protector of Japanese rule.³⁷ Koxinga (鄭成功) (1624-1662) was special *kami* venerated in Taiwan. He was a military leader who resisted Qing's rule and defeated the Dutch colonial government in Taiwan in 1661. Because his mother was Japanese, his image was reconstructed as an outstandingly faithful Taiwanese hero who had Japanese 'blood'. Enshrining Koxinga as a Japanese *kami* had a symbolic meaning showing that the most popular Taiwanese hero had a deep ethnic lineage to the Japanese nation.

In addition, the location of shrines in Taiwan had been deliberately chosen by the colonisers attempting to strengthen the control of colonial cities and communities under their surveillance. Some important shrines were built on the top or the slope of hills with a panoramic view of cities. This location made these shrines significant landmarks and eye-catching spots of the cities. It also implied a symbolic relationship between colonial authority and its ruling cities.³⁸ Others were located in special sites coordinated with the City Renovation Plan (市區改正), a modern urban planning scheme for Taiwan with a rigid grid system introduced by the Japanese government. Parts of them were placed in city centre parks to fit in the new urban configuration. Others were built at the end of the urban axis with a

³⁶ Chen, *日據時期神道統制下的台灣宗教政策 (Taiwan's Religion Policy under the Influence of Shinto during the Japanese Colonisation)*, 157-9.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 164-9.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 79.

special road leading to the shrines.³⁹



Fig. 4-1 The Bird's-eye view of the Taiwan Grand Shrine.



Fig. 4-2 The Chokushi Road led to the Taiwan Grand Shrine.

For example, built in 1901, the Taiwan Grand Shrine was located on the top of Yuanshan (圓山) hill on the north side of Taipei city fringe. This shrine had a superior view of the whole of Taipei city. The colonial government constructed a new wide avenue called the Chokushi Road (敕使街道) to link the city centre to the shrine. The government even demolished the Qing's city wall for the avenue and drew up a new urban plan directing the urban development towards the north by following this avenue.⁴⁰ Moreover, the government particularly chose the Shimmei style (神明造) to build the shrine. This style was viewed as the vernacular architectural style of the Japanese nation which could only be used in the most important shrines like the Grand Shrine of Ise.⁴¹ Therefore, adopting the Shimmei style implied that the Taiwan Grand Shrine had the highest religious and political

³⁹ Huang, '日治時期台灣宗教政策下之神社建築 (The Development of Jinja Architecture under the Influence of Religions Policy in Taiwan during the Japanese Colonisation),' 83-95.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 39-40.

⁴¹ More details about the political significance and imperial authority please see William H. Coaldrake, *Architecture and Authority in Japan* (London: Routledge, 1996), 16-51.

status, representing Japanese colonial authority in Taiwan.⁴²

Finally, in the climax of the *Kominka* Movement, the Shinto belief-system began to exert its influence on every Taiwanese community and family. Numerous Shinto shrines, including 68 state-held shrines in the most important sites of main cities, auxiliary shrines (攝社) in towns, subordinate shrines (末社) on streets, honorific halls (奉安殿) in schools and Shinto altars in homes, had been built in the last decade of Japanese colonial rule. Without a doubt they were used as political apparatus to evoke patriotic sentiments in Taiwan's society in wartime.⁴³ Shrines became the centre of communities. All members of communities were asked to raise funds for building a local shrine and participate in Shinto ceremonies. Government employees, organisation members and school children were forced to make regular formal visits to worship in the main shrines of towns.⁴⁴

Secondly, shrines became the centre of *Kominka* education. Every school in Taiwan had to build a honorific hall in front of the main gate. When students passed by the hall, they were obliged to bow reverently to *kami* and the Imperial Rescript on Education (教育敕語), a guiding principle of education in the Japanese empire.

⁴² Shimmei style was viewed one of vernacular styles of Japanese architecture before Buddhism was introduced to Japan in the mid-sixth century and exerted a great influence on Japanese religious culture and architectural form. In the post-Buddhism era, others styles mixed with Chinese timber systems and Japanese building characters became more popular and replaced the status of Shimmei style in Japanese culture. However, after State Shinto was promoted in the Meiji period, Shimmei style was raised to be the highest architectural style that was only allowed to be used in the most important shrines in Japan and its colonies. More details about the historical development of style in the Shinto Shrine please see Sato Tasuku 佐藤佐, *日本神社建築史 (The History of Japanese Shinto Shrine)* (Osaka: Bunshudo Shoten, 1931), 13-41.

⁴³ It also called 'One Town Street One Shrine' campaign (一街庄一社), see Tsai, '一種傳科權力技術的歷史性建構: 從台灣日治時期神社到戰後 (A Historical Construction from Foucault's Technology of Power: from Jin-ja during Japanese Colonial Period to Martyrs' Shrine after WW II in Taiwan),' 106-117.

⁴⁴ For example, in the most important festival of the year, the colonial government was able to boast a record figure of approximately 150,000 visitors to the Taiwan Grand Shrine. See Chou, 'The *Kominka* Movement in Taiwan and Korea,' 45.

Students were also forced to take cleaning and maintenance jobs at local shrines to express their obeisance to *kami*. School textbooks also taught them stories of Japanese heroic history and loyalty to the present emperor and the Japanese nation.⁴⁵

Finally, shrines became the centre of religious life. The colonial government attempted to stamp out Taiwan's indigenous religions, including Buddhism, Taoism and many other folk beliefs, in order to pave a way for State Shinto.⁴⁶ Hundreds of temples were demolished; countless statues of Taiwanese deities were burnt.⁴⁷ The government also managed to remove all Taiwanese ancestors' altars from the living rooms of every house, replacing them with Japanese Shinto altars. Traditionally, ancestors' altars represented family roots and cultural identity for the Taiwanese. Replacing them with Japanese altars meant uprooting their identity and the genealogical lineages of the family.⁴⁸

As a result, many young Taiwanese had a strong response to Japan's assimilation policy. They were enthusiastic about the Military Volunteer Program which required sacrificing their lives for the Japanese empire and the emperor in the so called 'holy wars'. For these young men, the military was an ideal place where colonial subjects could truly compete with the ethnic Japanese and prove that the quality of their race was 'more Japanese than a Japanese'.⁴⁹ In addition, it was also considered that the highest honour for colonial subjects was to die in battle and be

⁴⁵ Chen, *日據時期神道統制下的台灣宗教政策 (Taiwan's Religion Policy under the Influence of Shinto during the Japanese Colonisation)*, 177.

⁴⁶ Chou, 'The Kominka Movement in Taiwan and Korea,' 46.

⁴⁷ Tsai Jin-tang 蔡錦堂, *戰爭體制下的台灣 (Taiwan under the War)* (Taipei: Rih-chuang-she Wun-hua, 2006), 40-45.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 35-40.

⁴⁹ Chou, 'The Kominka Movement in Taiwan and Korea,' 66.

enshrined at the Yasukuni shrine as *kami* perpetually protecting the Japanese nation and the emperor.

To sum up, it is clear that State Shinto was not a common religion. It was a political religion imposed upon colonial Taiwan with the purpose of assimilation and manifestation of Japanese authority. It was also utilised within Taiwanese society as a catalyst to promote Japanese identity and loyalty towards the nation and the emperor. The colonial government deliberately borrowed Japan's Shinto traditions, myths, symbols and ceremonies to achieve the goal of political and military mobilisation. In this context, Shinto shrines were widely built in the most important sites of cities and became the centre of local community and religious life in Taiwan. As a result, the construction of shrines fundamentally changed the cultural and urban landscape of Taiwan.

4-2 From Japanese Shinto Shrines to the KMT's Martyrs' Shrines

The result of the Second Sino-Japanese War ended Japan's fifty year colonial rule of Taiwan. The island once again became a possession of China. At the same time, the Chinese Civil War had broken out on the mainland. The government under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership was struggling against the Chinese Communist Party. The Civil War also threatened the stability of Chen Yi's rule in Taiwan and led him to adopt a more stringent method of domination to tie the island closer to the mainland. George H. Kerr, a US diplomat at the time, reported what he observed in the shift of national ceremonies in Taiwan in his book *Formosa Betrayed*,

The Formosans found many of the Party's ceremonial requirements much too similar to the ceremonial Emperor-worship of the Japanese State cult....For example, in the Japanese era a portrait of the reigning Emperor had to be placed in every school. It had to be treated with the utmost show of reverence. There were weekly services at which all government employees and school children had to bow reverently before the imperial portrait or toward the imperial palace at Tokyo, classed as 'worshiping from afar.' Now under the new Nationalist regime, portraits of Sun Yat-sen, the 'National Father' or of Chiang Kai-shek, the 'National Leader' had simply replaced the Japanese Emperor's portrait everywhere. On Monday morning in every week all Government offices, all military posts and all Party organizations were required to hold an hour-long Memorial Service. Participants were required to bow three times before Sun's portrait and before the flags of the nation and the Party. They were required to sing the National Anthem which was the Party Song. School children, Youth Corps members and many other groups were required to show the outward forms of respect to these symbols of Party, Army, and Government.⁵⁰

Kerr's observation of the shift of national ceremonies conducted by the KMT shows that the nature of the ruling power between Japanese colonial government and the KMT had no fundamental difference. Only the national symbols, rituals and myths changed. When the KMT took control over Taiwan, removing all Japanese colonial heritage was one of their primary missions.⁵¹ The Japanese emperor's portraits, Imperial Rescript on Education, military flags and many other symbols

⁵⁰ George H. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed* (Irvine, Calif.: Taiwan Publishing Company, 1992), 118-9.

⁵¹ This is one of Chiang Kai-shek's instructions in the anniversary speech on Taiwan's Retrocession Day. See Lien Chen-tung 連震東, *蔣總統與台灣省的光復重建 (President Chiang and the Reconstruction of Taiwan Province)*, vol. 1 (Taiwan: The Committee of President Chiang's Contributions to China and the World, 1967), 99.

hung on every school and public space were removed and replaced by Chinese national icons and pictures of political leaders. In addition, Shinto shrines were also viewed as the symbols of imperial Japan and as it was regarded as the Japanese national religion it had to be demolished in the first wave of the de-colonisation campaign.

After the KMT had entirely retreated to Taiwan, most of the colonial shrines were demolished. Few relics or ruins remain. Only one shrine, the Taoyuan shrine, is entirely preserved in its original state, but only due to it being used as the Taoyuan county Martyrs' shrine. Like this shrine, some important official shrines survived, but were refurbished as Martyrs' shrines for the new political purpose at that time. Among those demolished shrines which had been forgotten in the wilderness, there were three important official shrines which had been torn down for new functions which rate special attention here.



Fig. 4-3 The Kenkou Shrine.



Fig. 4-4 The former Central Library.

First of all, the *Kenkou* shrine (建功神社), Taiwan's Yasukuni shrine, was

refurbished as the Central Library in the post-war era. The *Kenkou* shrine was designed for worshipping the spirits of the Japanese who had joined the colonial conquest and died in Taiwan, and the Taiwanese who made great contributions to the Japanese colonial government.⁵² The designer was Ide Kaoru (井手薫), who worked for the Governor-General of Taiwan in the Building Department. Ide considered that adopting ‘progressive’ Western styles and Taiwanese local building elements to create a new type of shrine was also vital for redesigning colonial shrines. As a consequence, the *Kenkou* shrine was a unique ritual building constructed in concrete with a Western grand central dome, noticeable Taiwanese building elements and a series of worship spaces which conformed to Japanese Shinto traditions.⁵³

However, the *Kenkou* shrine belonged to the Yasukuni tradition of worship. It symbolised the highest status of national ritual in imperial Japan. Therefore, in the post-war period, the shrine was abandoned for a while before being converted into the Central Library.⁵⁴ Due to the budget constraints in building a new library, the shrine was not totally demolished. The main body of the shrine remained, but all Japanese decorative elements were removed and replaced by Chinese ones. The original dome remained, but clad with a Chinese conical roof. New reading rooms were added in front of the main hall and surrounded the courtyard. An impressive Chinese roof was also placed on the top of the gate hall building underlining the image of the Chinese building tradition. This building now shows no trace of its original shrine appearance.

⁵² Huang, ‘日治時期台灣宗教政策下之神社建築 (The Development of Jinja Architecture under the Influence of Religions Policy in Taiwan during the Japanese Colonisation),’ 118-20.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 132-3.

⁵⁴ The Central Library was one of important building in the project of Nanhai Academy. More details about the project see the Chapter Five.




Fig. 4-5 The Bird's-eye view of the Grand Hotel of Taipei.



Fig. 4-6 The Grand Hotel of Taipei.

The other important demolished shrine was the Taiwan Grand Shrine. This site is now used as an impressive hotel, the Grand Hotel of Taipei. As discussed earlier, the Taiwan Grand Shrine had the highest status of all State Shinto shrines in Taiwan during the colonial period. It also symbolised the supreme authority of Japan's colonial government. After Chiang Kai-shek's regime had retreated to Taiwan, this Shrine undoubtedly became one of the noticeable targets to be destroyed under the de-colonisation policy. In order to promote Taiwan to the world as the true heir of Chinese orthodox culture, building a splendid hotel embodying Chinese cultural elements for foreign tourists was an important task which had to be satisfied.⁵⁵

Located on the top of the Yuanshan Mountain, the Taiwan Grand Shrine occupied the best site in the city with a fantastic view of the urban landscape. This site certainly was ideally placed for establishing a new deluxe hotel. The architect

⁵⁵ Fu, *中國古典式樣新建築* (*New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style*), 243-4.

Yang Cho-cheng (楊卓成) was responsible for the architectural design. The main building was constructed in 1961. Yang attempted to build a high-rise hotel with the image of a Chinese Buddhist pagoda, meant to impress every traveller who visited Taipei for the first time.



Fig. 4-7 The Kaishan Shrine.



Fig. 4-8 The Yian-ping King Temple.

Finally, the *Kaishan* shrine (開山神社) was demolished to make way for the Yian-ping King Temple (延平郡王祠) in 1966. The *Kaishan* shrine was Taiwan's first official shrine established in 1896. It was also the first shrine in which Taiwan's most popular local deity Koxinga was worshipped.⁵⁶ The shrine was originally converted from a local temple which had enshrined Koxinga dating from 1662, a year after his death. In 1875, the Qing court accepted the local gentry's suggestion to raise the cult of Koxinga from a local belief to a part of the imperial ritual system.⁵⁷ During the Japanese colonial period, the Tainan governor recognised the importance of the cult. Similarly, like the Qing court, the colonial government decided to covert

⁵⁶ Huang, '日治時期台灣宗教政策下之神社建築 (The Development of Jinja Architecture under the Influence of Religions Policy in Taiwan during the Japanese Colonisation),' 25-31.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 25.

the Temple into a State Shinto shrine to worship Koxinga. However, the old Temple was not demolished, but was used as a Shinto main hall instead. A new worship hall, ablution pavilion and many other Shinto symbols, such as sacred ropes and *kami* altars, were added in the courtyard to make the shrine conform to Shinto worship rituals.

When the KMT took control of the island, this image of Koxinga once again was manipulated and reinterpreted by the new regime. Koxinga had defeated the Dutch colonial government. This was now viewed as a glorious deed bringing Taiwan back to the Chinese nation.⁵⁸ In order to highlight Koxinga's Chinese ethnic lineage, the architect He-chen Cih (賀陳詞) (1918-) decided to demolish the whole of the Minnan temple and the Japanese shrine and build a brand-new temple clad with the Chinese classical style to reflect a suitable style for Koxinga's new temple. He argued that Minnan's style was merely a southern Chinese local style, which could not represent the orthodoxy of the great Chinese architectural tradition. Only the Chinese classical style could signify Koxinga's heroic historical exploits to the nation.⁵⁹ A Japanese *Torii* (gateway arch) had its upper beam removed to make it look like a double ten, which symbolised the national birthday of the Republic, the tenth of October. The Nationalist Party's emblem also hung on the top the *Torii*. As a result, these symbols reinforced the idea that the Yina-ping King Temple and worship of Koxinga had a particular political purpose which conformed to KMT's ideology.

⁵⁸ Tsai, '一種傳科權力技術的歷史性建構：從台灣日治時期神社到戰後 (A Historical Construction from Foucault's Technology of Power: from Jin-ja during Japanese Colonial Period to Martyrs' Shrine after WW II in Taiwan),' 121.

⁵⁹ Fu, *中國古典式樣新建築 (New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style)*, 246.

Aside from demolishing Shinto shrines or utilising these buildings for other purposes, the Nationalist government also attempted to conduct a series of de-colonisation campaigns to get rid of the Japanese colonial influences. The ultimate aim of these campaigns was to convert the Taiwanese into 'true Chinese'.⁶⁰ From the KMT's view, the Taiwanese were seen as an ethnic group that had not awakened to their national consciousness.⁶¹ Therefore, the goal of re-sinicisation policies were intended to clean the 'toxins' of Japan's 'enslavement education', helping to pave the way for introducing orthodox Chinese culture to Taiwan.⁶² It was also necessary to re-educate the masses about their culture, language and history through schools and public media. In order to do this, the foundation of KMT's political ideology and China's traditional moral values were circulated to achieve a further social, cultural and political transformation.⁶³

Therefore, Chinese national rituals and religion were viewed as an effective method to promote Chinese nationalism and patriotic sentiments in Taiwan. The Yellow Emperor, a mythological character of China, was one of myths reintroduced by certain late Qing elites and politicians for a new political purpose.⁶⁴ The Yellow Emperor was now raised to the status of the common ancestor of the Chinese nation.⁶⁵ The Emperor became another main deity of the national religion

⁶⁰ He Yi-lin 何義麟, '光復初期台灣知識份子的日本觀 (Taiwan Intellectuals' Views of Japan in the Early Retrocession Period),' in *光復初期的台灣: 思想與文化的轉型 (Taiwan in the Early Retrocession Period: The Transformation of Thoughts and Culture)*, ed. Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑 (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2005), 197.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 182.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 184-5.

⁶³ More details about the KMT's early education policy in Taiwan see Zeng Jian-min 曾健民, '光復初期台灣的教育 (Taiwan's Education in the Early Post-war Period)' in *光復初期的台灣: 思想與文化的轉型 (Taiwan in the Early Retrocession Period: The Transformation of Thoughts and Culture)*, ed. Huang Chun-chieh 黃俊傑 (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 2005), 11-14 and 21-24.

⁶⁴ More details about the history please see the Chapter 2.

⁶⁵ Sehn, '我以我血薦軒轅: 黃帝神話與晚清國族建構 (The Myth of Yellow Emperor and the Construction of Chinese Nationhood in Late Qing),' 13.

consecrated by the government to symbolise a strong connection between the Republic and its cultural roots. The traditional Tomb Sweeping Day (清明節), a date when Chinese family members come to the grave sites to remember and honour their ancestors, was chosen to be a national holiday not only for ancestors of the general population, but also for the Yellow Emperor.⁶⁶ This new national holiday was later introduced to Taiwan, using Martyrs' shrines as national 'holy spaces' to conduct the special ritual.

Aside from the cult of the Yellow Emperor, traditional worship for military leaders who were loyal to Chinese emperors in the past was also integrated into national rituals. The cult of Chinese martyrs was divided into two systems: the imperial and local. In the imperial tradition, the martial temples (武廟) were the official sacred buildings which enshrined meritorious military officers who fought for the empire and died in battle. In the local system, the loyalty memorial (昭忠祠) or Guan-di temples (關帝廟) were centres used to worship famous local military leaders or historical heroes who had protected local communities or regions.⁶⁷ After the Republic was established, the government began to set up a new national worship system to amalgamate the imperial and local cults of war deaths.

⁶⁶ Jhou Jun-yu 周俊宇, '塑造黨國之民: 中華民國國定節日的歷史考察 (The Making of the National Citizens: A Historical Examination on the National Holiday of the Republic of China)' (M.A. dissertation, National Chengchi University, 2008), 138-9.

⁶⁷ Chou De-zai 仇德哉, 'The History of Yan-lin Country's Martyrs' Shrine (雲林縣忠烈祠之沿格及烈士),' *台灣文獻 Taiwan Historica*, March 1986, 19-33. Also see Huang Chin-shing 黃進興, *聖賢與聖徒: 歷史與宗教論文集 (Sages and Saints : Collected Essays on History and Religion)* (Taipei, Asia Culutre, 2001), 182-220.



Fig. 4-9 The Gateway Arch of the Cemetery Hall for Heroes of the Revolution.



Fig. 4-10 The Worship Hall of the Cemetery Hall for Heroes of the Revolution.

In 1928 the Cemetery Hall for Heroes of the Revolution (國民革命軍陣亡將士公墓), the first of its type of dedicated space for fallen soldiers, was placed on the eastern side of Purple Mountain in Nanjing. The Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum was also located next to the hill. Chiang Kai-shek appointed the US architect Henry Murphy to conduct the building project. The purpose of establishing the Cemetery Hall was to commemorate those souls who had died during the battles related to the Northern Expedition (1926-8).⁶⁸ The worship hall was reconstructed from a thirteenth century brick arch hall of an old temple. Another building complex, including the gateway arch, the memorial hall and the memorial tower, was adopted in what Murphy called the ‘adaptive Chinese architectural renaissance’ style.

After the construction of the Cemetery Hall, the KMT attempted to build

⁶⁸ Tsai Jin-tang 蔡錦堂, *褒揚及忠烈祠祀榮典制度之研究 (A Study of the Regulation on Honoring Revolutionary Martyrs and Martyrs' Shrines)* (Taipei: Ministry of Interior, 2008), 21.

similar memorial buildings on the mainland. In 1933, during the Second Sino-Japanese War, a special bill had been passed to request local governments to build Martyrs' shrines for worshipping the spirits of those who had died in wars since the Republic had been established. Due to the limited budget, local governments were allowed to convert regional martial temples, loyalty memorial temples and Guan-di temples into Martyrs' shrines instead of building entirely new ones. Every year local governments were encouraged to formally revere war deaths with the participation of officers, school students, corporation members and citizens.⁶⁹

Converting old temples into new Martyrs' shrines did not encounter any major difficulty during wartime. Originally, Martyrs' shrines played a similar role to temples in local communities. The differences were the spirits that they worshipped and the hosts who conducted the national rituals. According to record, at the end of the War there were a total 766 local Martyrs' shrines established in China.⁷⁰ But what obsessed Chiang Kai-shek was the idea of constructing a Martyrs' shrine in the capital city for all Chinese war dead and their bereaved families; and since 1940 the KMT had begun to plan the capital Martyrs' shrine. However, because of the war, the capital city was moved from Nanjing to Chongqing, the biggest city in the south-west of China. Finding a suitable site for the shrine in Chongqing was more difficult than expected. In addition, economical inflation during the war made the building project prohibitively expensive. Finally, the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War made the project a daunting task.⁷¹ It was not until the Nationalist government completely retreated to Taiwan that the dream of constructing a grand capital

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 18-19.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 25-28.

Martyrs' shrine even became a possibility.

4-3 Creating a National Holy Space in Taiwan

Following traditional military worship and the cult of the Yellow Emperor, the Martyrs' shrine was constructed as a locus of 'political religion', designed as a spiritual foundation to reinforce patriotic sentiments and national loyalty. The Nationalist government endeavoured to continue the tradition of Chinese worship, giving it a new meaning for national cohesion in modern times. Now fallen soldiers and devoted officers who died for the nation were to be enshrined in the Martyrs' shrine and paid reverence by the incumbent president of the Republic. Therefore, the shrine is not only a sacred hall where the cultural and genealogical boundaries are identified through their distinctive myths, symbols and cults, but is also an important political institution to evoke a deep sense of national consciousness in the population.

In the early post-war period, the KMT used Shinto shrines as temporary Martyrs' shrines in Taiwan. The main reasons for adopting those colonial shrines for the Chinese war dead, instead of building new ones, were due to financial shortages in wartime. Therefore, it was a practical choice to make use of current Shinto shrines for the new regime's national rituals.

In addition, Martyrs' shrines and colonial shrines in Taiwan play a similar role in politics. As discussed earlier, Shinto shrines were the product of a 'political religion', particularly designed for conducting sacred ceremonies for Japanese

imperialism. Although the KMT ended Japanese rule in Taiwan after the War, the shrines still remained the main focus of the Nationalist government, attempting to treat these shrines as an important symbol of political authority allowing the KMT to perform National Government's national rituals. Because the location of Shinto shrines was also carefully selected by the colonial government, that made them ideal sites for the KMT to symbolise its superior status as rulers over the new Taiwan.



Fig. 4-11 The Worship Hall of the Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine.



Fig. 4-12 The Main Hall of the Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine.

However, the architectural space and the performance of worship in Shinto shrines and Martyrs' shrines still retained some differences. The core of shrine buildings is composed of two different parts: the main hall and the worship hall. The main hall is a shelter where *kami* are enshrined. Only the clergy are allowed to enter the hall. The hall is usually arranged at the end of building complex of the shrine. The worship hall is set on the front side of the main hall. It is a place where visitors pray and services are conducted.⁷² In China, Buddhist and Taoist temples do not

⁷² Yong, *Introduction to Japanese Architecture*, 34-35.

distinguish between the main hall and the worship hall. The worship hall is used as both the main and worship hall. When Shinto shrines were renovated into Martyrs' shrines, the main hall was usually discarded. All the altars and spirit tablets were relocated to an honoured position in the worship hall.



Fig. 4-13 The Torii and the Stone Lantern at Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine.



Fig. 4-14 The War Horse.

The Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine is a good example to illustrate how an existing Shinto shrine was converted to a Martyrs' shrine. The Taoyuan shrine is the only one that still preserves its original Shinto appearance. The shrine is located on the hillside of the Hutou Mountain with a fantastic view to Taoyuan city. The main architectural complex is still well preserved, but many Shinto symbols and decorative elements have been removed. The upper beam of the *Torii* was also removed and made to resemble the shape of a double ten. Stone lanterns still stand along the approach to the shrine, but all the Japanese characters have been scraped off. The Imperial Japanese army emblem carved on the sculpture of the war horse erected in the gateway was also replaced by the KMT's emblem. New symbols and icons of the regime were added to the building in order to make it look like a

Chinese temple containing plaques inscribing patriotic virtue, moral doctrine and maxims, as well as altars and fallen soldiers' spirit tablets. The space in the worship hall was rearranged to conform to the tradition of Chinese worship. The major deities enshrined in the main altar are Koxinga, Qiu Feng-jia (邱逢甲) (1864-1912) and Liu Yong-fu (劉永福) (1837-1917), who are considered the symbolic historical characters of anti-Japanese imperialism. Although the main structure of the building still retains some Japanese architectural characters, the old Shinto shrine space now is completely transformed into a fully functional Martyrs' shrine for the worship of Chinese war deaths and historical heroes.



Fig. 4-15 The Chinese Plaques Hung on the Worship Hall of the Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine.



Fig. 4-16 The Chinese Altars Placed in the Middle of the Worship Hall.

However, many other shrines did not have the same fortune as the Taoyuan shrine. According to the record, of among 204 shrines in total, 150 had been demolished and left ruined in the wilderness. 54 of them were torn down for other buildings, such as schools, temples and hospitals.⁷³ 21 of them had been renovated

⁷³ Tsai, '一種傳科權力技術的歷史性建構 (A Historical Construction from Foucault's Technology 161

into Martyrs' shrines. Among these, 13 of them were rebuilt. Two of them were also to be rebuilt but were later moved to other sites. The main and worship hall of one of them (the Chiayi shrine) was burned down in an accident in 1995. The Taoyaun shrine is the only one to keep its original Shinto building structure entirely in refurbishment as a Martyrs' shrine.



Fig. 4-17 The Worship Hall of the Tongshiao Martyrs' Shrine.



Fig. 4-18 The Demolished Main Hall.

Tongshiao and Yilan are the earliest cases of those 13 newly built Martyrs' shrines. Tongshiao shrine, for example, was reconstructed in 1948. Located on the top of the Hutou Mountain, Tongshiao shrine was the main religious centre of Tongshiao town during the Japanese colonial period. After the KMT took control over Taiwan, the shrine was to be renovated into a Martyrs' shrine. The mayor of Tongshiao led the building project and viewed the shrine as a type of local martial temple.⁷⁴ However, unlike other later newly built shrines, the Tongshiao Martyrs' shrine adopted a Minnan style as the main style for the building design. The main

of Power),' 45-51.

⁷⁴ Quo Jun-pei 郭俊沛, 苗栗縣通霄鎮「通霄神社-忠烈祠」修復工程工作報告書 (*The Building Conservation project of the Tong-siao Shinto Shrine / Martyrs' Shrine*) (Miao-li: The Culture Bureau of the Miao-li County, 2005), 87.

timber frame of the Shinto worship hall remained, but the Minnan style of curved roof and brick wall was added to the exterior of the shrine and made to look like a Minnan temple. The main hall sitting behind the worship hall had also been demolished. The KMT's emblem was also added on the top of the roof to mark out the political importance of the shrine.

It is reasonable to argue that the main reason that the Minnan style had been chosen for those two Martyrs' shrines was that the two cities are located on the periphery of Taipei's cultural and political authority. They attracted less attention from central government and mainstream architectural circles. In addition, local political leaders dominated the projects and projected their preferences onto the building designs. These shrines were the first ones chosen to be designed with cladding which reflected the island's distinct local architectural style. However, after those two shrines were built, the design of shrines in general underwent an enormous change. Chinese classical style later replaced the Minnan style and became the mainstream style adopted throughout most of Taiwan. The Chinese classical style was regarded as the most suitable style to fully represent the glory of the nation and the sanctity of the national 'holy space'. The establishment of the Taipei Martyrs' shrine was the key factor in shifting the direction of design in Taiwan.



Fig. 4-19 The Gateway Arch of the Taipei Martyrs' Shrine.



Fig. 4-20 The Worship Hall of the Taipei Martyrs' Shrine.

The Taipei Martyrs' shrine has the highest status of all shrines in Taiwan. It is the capital Martyr's shrine that Chiang Kai-shek did not have time to build on the mainland before the government retreated to Taiwan. After the regime had settled down on the island, the plan of constructing a capital Martyrs' shrine in Taipei was finally formulated. Before the shrine was constructed, the provisional government used the *Gokoku* shrine (台灣護國神社) as the capital shrine in Taipei. *Gokoku* means 'protecting the nation' in English. Built in 1942, the shrine was the second Yasukuni shrine in Taiwan and it sat on the western side of the Yuanshan Mountain just next to the Taiwan Grand Shrine.⁷⁵ After it had been converted to the Taipei Martyrs' shrine, the interior space was rearranged to reflect the need for a new form of worship.

In 1966, a new wave of architectural trends initiated by the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement had influenced the design of many governmental buildings. The Taipei Martyrs' shrine was one of those buildings that adopted the Chinese

⁷⁵ More details about the *Gokoku* shrine, see Huang, '日治時期台灣宗教政策下之神社建築 (The Development of Jinja Architecture under the Influence of Religions Policy in Taiwan during the Japanese Colonisation),' 152 and 158-60.

classical style to manifest the cultural tradition of China. In 1967, the central government conducted an architectural competition for the construction of a new shrine in Taipei. The winner of the competition was the architect Yao Yuan-jhong (姚元中). In his design, the Qing royal architectural style became the main reference. He argued that the Qing royal style was more resplendent than any other style in the history of China. Because of this, he believed that the style was the most suitable for the design of the Taipei Martyrs' shrine.⁷⁶

During the construction processes, Chiang Kai-shek met the architect and gave his opinions of the architectural design. Chiang also visited the building site several times to make sure the result would faithfully reflect his vision of a national 'holy space'.⁷⁷ In an interview on the design of the Taipei Martyrs' shrine, Yao particularly mentioned that the main reference that helped him to create the shrine was Liang Si-cheng's books on Qing structural regulations.⁷⁸ Although the building is made from concrete, all the structural and decorative elements, including the roof, bracket sets, beams and columns, imitate traditional Chinese timber framing. This makes the shrine look like an exact replica of a Qing royal palace. It also recalled Nanjing's new direction of Chinese modern architecture which took place in the

⁷⁶ Ma Yi-gong 馬以工, '訪姚元中 (Interview with Yao Yuan-jhong),' 建築師雜誌 *Taiwan Architect Magazine*, January and February 1979, 105.

⁷⁷ Anonymous, '石城建築師事務所的姚胖子: 姚元中建築師 (Introduction to the Architect Yao Yuan-jhong),' 房屋市場 (*Housing Market Monthly*), September 1973, 37. Also see Academia Historica, the Documents of the President Chiang Ching-kuo (國史館藏蔣經國總統文物), 國民黨中央評議委員何應欽呈總統蔣中正為臺北市圓山忠烈祠改建案約談建築師、及組成圓山忠烈祠改建委員會、建築師所繪正殿圖案請予核定等 (*Presenting the Architectural Design of the Taipei Martyrs' Shrine to the President Chiang Kai-shek and Arranging a Meeting with the Architect*), Archive Ref. no. 005-010202-00113-006 (02 May 1967); Academia Historica, the Documents of the President Chiang Kai-shek (國史館藏蔣中正總統文物), 總統蔣中正巡視忠烈祠擴建工程 (*The President Chiang Kai-shek Visiting the Building Site of the Taipei Martyrs' Shrine*), Archive Ref. no. 002-050101-00072-079, 25 December 1968.

⁷⁸ 'Yao Yuan-jhong on the Design of the Taipei Martyrs' Shrine (國民革命忠烈祠設計者---姚元中建築師),' 忠城烈事 (*The Martyrs' Shrine*), accessed 12 March, 2012, http://library.taiwanschoolnet.org/cyberfair2006/huigogo/index2/index2_3.html.

1930s. Due to the success of the design, many other local governments took it as a model when they began to plan their own regional Martyrs' shrines.



Fig. 4-21 The Worship Deities of the Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine.



Fig. 4-22 The Main Altar of the Taipei Martyrs' Shrine.

It should be noted that the Martyrs' shrines in Taiwan have three points that made them different from shrines on the mainland. First of all, the deities that they worshipped are different. Koxinga is the most common deity venerated in most of Taiwan's shrines. Not only does he symbolise an orthodox Chinese regime ending foreign occupation of Taiwan, but also signifies the KMT taking Taiwan as a stronghold to achieve its ultimate political goal of recovering its lost homeland. In addition, in order to manifest anti-Japanese imperialist ideology and erase the trace of Japanese influences in Taiwan, the KMT particularly emphasised Taiwan's anti-colonial campaigns. These warriors who fought against Japanese rule were now viewed as national heroes and embodied within the Martyrs' shrines. Chiang Kai-shek had given a special order individual room for these heroes to be made in the worship halls of shrines.⁷⁹ This illustrates that Chiang did pay a great deal of

⁷⁹ Academia Historica, the Documents of the President Chiang Kai-shek (國使館藏蔣中正總統文物), 蔣中正指示何應欽忠烈祠內日據時期臺灣抗日烈士神位另闢一室恭奉 (The President Chiang

attention to the Taiwanese history of resistance to Japanese rule.

Among these heroes, Lai He (賴和) (1894-31) serves as a good example to show that anti-Japanese imperialist ideology was enhanced through national rituals performed in the Martyrs' shrines. Lai He was a famous doctor living in Changhua (彰化), a town in the middle of Taiwan. He was also a poet who wrote classical Chinese poetry. Influenced by China's May Fourth Movement (1919), he started writing poetry and novels in modern Chinese mixed with Taiwanese. He was also a leader of anti-Japanese colonial associations and a supporter of Taiwan's socialist movements, which had a close relationship to the Taiwanese communist party.⁸⁰ Because of his political stance, Lai He became a very controversial figure in post-war Taiwan.

Due to his leadership of anti-Japanese campaigns, Lai He was among the first group of Taiwanese who were approved to be enshrined as national heroes in the Changhua Martyrs' shrine. Subsequently, the decision to consecrate Taiwanese into Martyrs' shrines had a highly symbolic meaning in politics. It conveyed a clear message that the KMT attempted to draw a boundary of political ideology in the issue of national holy spaces, by only allowing those that conformed to the KMT's ideology the privilege of being worshipped in a Martyrs' shrine as a Chinese national hero.

However, in 1958, Lai He was deprived of his title within the Martyrs' Shrine

Kai-shek Gave an Order to Make a Room for These Martyrs who Joined the Anti-colonial Campaigns in Martyrs' Shrines), Archive Ref. no. 002-010400-00035-025, 07 February 1969.

⁸⁰ More details about Lai He's life and his work see Lin Ruei-ming 林瑞明, *台灣文學與時代精神: 賴和研究論集* (*Taiwanese Literature and Zeitgeist: Essay Collection on Lai He*) (Taipei: Asia Culture, 1993).

because of the socialist trend of his writings and pro-communist activities in the colonial period. During the Cold War, the government viewed the Chinese Communist Party as the greatest threat to the freedom of Taiwan and its allies. The KMT attempted to eliminate any challenge related to communism that might overthrow its reign. Thus, removing Lai He's spirit tablet from the Martyrs' shrine indicated another boundary of political ideology: any person who might have a relationship to communism would not be allowed reverence in such a public icon.

Nowadays, the Cold War is over and Taiwan is a democratic country. The role of the Martyrs' shrines has also experienced a significant change. At present, any officer, policeman, or citizen who has demonstrated great contribution to the nation, and has been approved by the government, can also be enshrined. The Martyrs' shrine to some extent may have been secularised, but it is still a national holy space where the most significant worship takes place.



Fig. 4-23 The Spirit Tablets of the Revolutionary Army and the Yellow Emperor in the Altar of the Tainan County Martyr's Shrine.



Fig. 4-24 The Altar and Spirit Tablets of the Taipei Martyrs' Shrine.

Another difference between the shrines in Taiwan and in China is that the

shrines in Taiwan have brought the cult of the Yellow Emperor into worship there. During wartime on the mainland, a Martyrs' shrine venerated only military leaders and fallen soldiers. The rituals to pay reverence and offer sacrifice to the Yellow Emperor were normally held in other places and at other times.⁸¹ In Taiwan, however, the two rituals are combined and performed in shrines at the same time. Initiated by Chiang Kai-shek, the incumbent President of the ROC would officiate in the ritual in person. Many politicians, senior officers and bereaved families would also attend the ceremony.⁸²

In the worship halls of shrines in Taiwan, there are two main spirit tablets placed in the middle of the altar: one is the revolutionary army of the ROC, the other is the Yellow Emperor. It is significant in Taiwanese culture that the two tablets are placed in the same position in the hall. As mentioned earlier, according to the political discourse of Sun Yat-sen, the Chinese Republic revolution is seen as truly safeguarding the Confucian orthodoxy of China. Beginning from the Yellow Emperor, the orthodoxy is thought to be a political heritage continuously preserved by ancient sages, fought for by national heroes in previous dynasties and the founding of a new Republic, linked in an endless historical line. Therefore, the spirit tablet of the Yellow Emperor placed with that of the revolutionary army in the worship halls symbolises that a solid foundation of Chinese orthodoxy is being continuously built through ceremony. That ceremony, borrowed from Chinese religion, has also been used as a political apparatus to reconfirm the relationship

⁸¹ More details about the worship of the Yellow Emperor, see Jhou, '塑造黨國之民 (The Making of the National Citizens),' 113-43.

⁸² Academia Historica, the Documents of the President Chiang Kai-shek (國使館藏蔣中正總統文物), *國民政府主席蔣中正伉儷於圓山忠烈祠祭奠陣亡將士後離去 (The President Chiang Kai-shek and the first lady attended the worship ritual for fallen soldiers in the Taipei Martyrs' Shrines)*, Archive Ref. no. 002-050101-00007-272, 22 October 1946.

between the new regime and the old empire, and to serve as a perpetual reminder.

Finally, Chiang Kai-shek's unfinished dream of building a capital shrine had finally been fulfilled in Taipei. In mainland China, no new shrines were being built. Most of them were converted from martial temples or local loyalty memorial temples. However, after the establishment of the Taipei Martyrs' shrine, a new wave of constructing new spaces for the worship of national heroes occurred. Many old Shinto shrines were demolished and replaced by newly built specific national 'holy spaces'.

To conclude, nationalism and religion have a close relationship that can fully be demonstrated in the case of Japanese shrines and the KMT's use of Martyrs' shrines in Taiwan. Through the utilisation of a political religion, the Japanese colonial government introduced State Shinto to Taiwan with the purpose of strengthening the *Kominka* Movement and transforming the Taiwanese into 'true Japanese'. It also helped to foster strong patriotic responses in the populace to the Japanese empire and the emperor. Even now, there are still some Taiwanese who suffer from this colonial legacy. The 'Return Our Ancestral Souls' campaign launched in front of the Yasukuni shrine every year is a prime example revealing this still tangible trauma of colonisation.

In implanting a political religion for a changing Taiwanese identity, there was little fundamental difference in the nature of two regimes, the KMT and the Japanese colonial government. The Martyrs' shrine as a national 'holy space' was introduced to Taiwan with the same purpose by the colonial government. Both used a very visible and profound cultural foundation to promote their own political

ideology.

The cultural and political transformation of Taiwan can be embodied in the establishment of Japanese Shinto shrines and Chinese Martyrs' shrines. As the most important political and cultural symbol, either constructing a shrine or demolishing it conveys a clear political message. As a result, Martyrs' shrines replacing Shinto shrines as national holy spaces was meant to manifest the orthodoxy and legitimacy of Chinese nationalism in Taiwan. By specifically choosing sites, construction styles and deity worship, the use of architecture firmly tied Taiwan politically, historically and genealogically to the mainland and to its own identity. In the case of Taiwan's colonial and Martyrs' shrines, political leaders could exercise their influence on architecture as a profound representation of nationalism and political power, shaping national identity for future populations.

Chapter Five : Reshaping National Culture of Taiwan: the Nanhai

Academy and the National Palace Museum

In 2000, Benedict Anderson, the author of an influential book *Imagined Communities* which marked a turning point in nationalism studies, visited Taiwan and had a short discussion about the contemporary development of Taiwan's nationalism with Chen Wun-hsien (陳文茜), a former Taiwan legislator and TV commentator. Anderson argued that the National Palace Museum (故宮博物院) was the political legacy of the KMT's rule over Taiwan. In the post-war period, Chiang Kai-Shek took most of the Qing royal collections from Beijing's Forbidden City and preserved them in Taipei's National Palace Museum. Chiang treated these collections as 'national treasures' to demonstrate that he was the real heir of orthodox Chinese culture and the nation. However, after a successful process of democratisation had taken place in the post-martial law era of Taiwan, the KMT attempted to get rid of Chiang's legacy and its close connection with Chinese nationalism. To achieve this, Anderson suggested that returning all royal collections back to mainland China should be considered.

Anderson's suggestion has shown that museums, especially national museums, are not a neutral phenomenon. The material in museums is more than just collections. Museums imply a general process of political inheritance at work. It is a profoundly political concept of a nation that shapes museums and makes them possible. Anderson called it a form of political museumising.¹ In other words, museums, displaying particular objects that have been carefully selected, must be understood as

¹ Anderson, *Imagined Community*, 183.

political and cultural symbols that embody certain regimes' legitimacy of rule and privilege to represent the nation.

Indeed, a strong link does exist between Chinese nationalism and the National Palace Museum of Taipei. As Anderson has acutely pointed out, the Museum and its collections provided Chiang Kai-shek with secure and substantial support for his claim that he was still the legitimate ruler of all China, even if he and his regime had already retreated to Taiwan after 1949. The Museum had been given a political function and loaded with powerful political icons, including the sculpture of Sun Yat-sen in the exhibition hall, the sculpture of Chiang in the front square, the portrait of Chiang in the main hall. Sun's calligraphy 'All under Heaven Belong to the People' (天下為公) in the archway and the official name of the Museum, Chungshan Museum (中山博物院), was given by Chiang to highlight the close relationship between 'national treasures' and their legitimate successors. In addition, many building features in the Museum, such as the axial arrangement of the plane, the Qing royal palace-like façade, pseudo-Chinese classical decorations, and the mingtang (明堂) shape of spaces, exhibition and storage rooms, marked an explicit image of the Chinese nation and its imperial past. All the characteristics implied that the Museum was expected to be a cultural and political landmark to manifest the legitimacy of Chiang's regime and its strong connection with the history of the Chinese nation. Tu Cheng-sheng (杜正勝), the former curator of the Museum, has asserted that compared to other museums in the world, the National Palace Museum is probably the one with the largest number of political symbols and icons attached to it.²

² Tu Cheng-sheng 杜正勝, '藝術、政治與博物館 (Art, Politics, and Museums),' *故宮文物月刊 (The National Palace Museum Monthly of Chinese Art)*, December 2002, 24.

This chapter attempts to show the close relationship between the museum and the representation of the nation by looking at them through the theory of nationalism and new museology, an expanding academic subject of museum studies in recent years. Nationalism studies and the new museology are believed to offer a different analysis and a better understanding of the development of museums both in China and in Taiwan. By putting these museums into a historical context, the symbolic meanings of the 'national treasures' and the idea of constructing grand national museums for preserving them under different periods and political situations can help to reveal that museums have a political function bringing the imagination of the nation into a visible form. Thus, it is the power of nationalism that plays a central role in shaping the museums that we see today.

The main study period in this chapter begins from the opening day of the Beijing's National Palace Museum in 1925 to the establishment of the Taipei's National Palace Museum in 1966. Although the notion of 'museum' can date back to ancient Greece, not until the nineteenth century did the European begin to build the museums for their nations in modern senses. Therefore, these relative issues about the making of the museum will also be discussed in this chapter. As Anderson has argued, when museums become part of the institutions of power, the cultural landscape and the ways in which we imagine the nation are profoundly changed. The National Palace Museum and other national museums in early post-war Taiwan are the best examples to demonstrate this close relationship between nationalism and museums.

5-1 Museums and the New Museology

It is difficult to imagine a world without museums. In the second half of the twentieth century the numbers of museums have grown at an extraordinary rate. It is said that since World War II ninety-five per cent of existing museums have been founded throughout the world.³ These institutions, from local collections to national galleries, are so omnipresent and valuable they cannot be ignored. The reason why they are so important to our society is that they are not only dominant features in the cultural landscape of society, but they also frame our understanding of the past and of ourselves. In addition, museums are often likened to the idea of a treasure trove of knowledge. It is believed that visiting museums is like reading books. Visitors can learn and gain knowledge from what they see in museums, which are viewed as an authentic mirror of history without conflict or contradiction.⁴ In academia, museum theorists had held the same belief. A long-established attitude viewed museums as repositories of knowledge. However, in recent years a group of new theorists has started to question this attitude. As Jane C. Ju argues,

Museum studies have been limited to studying the practical side of the role and function of museums, and not the impact of museums in shaping knowledge, in defining identities and in representing culture.⁵

It is generally agreed that recent studies in new museology, or critical museum

³ Steven Hoelscher, 'Heritage,' in *A Companion to Museum Studies*, ed. Sharon Macdonald (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 201.

⁴ Janet Marstine, 'Introduction,' in *New Museum Theory and Practice*, ed. Janet Marstine (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 5.

⁵ Jane C. Ju, 'The Palace Museums as Representation of Culture: Exhibitions and Canons of Chinese Art History,' in *畫中有話: 近代中國的視覺表述與文化構圖 (When Images Speak: Visual Representation and Cultural Mapping in Modern China)*, ed. Huang Max Ke-wu 黃克武 (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 2004), 477.

theory, have introduced a broader sense of social and historical perspectives to museum studies, improving the way we view and understand them. The first scholar who used ‘the new museology’ as a term to describe this phenomenon is Peter Vergo.

⁶ In 1989, he edited a book with the title, ‘The New Museology’, and his book became an original source of research in this direction. In the introduction, Vergo separated ‘the new museology’ from the ‘the old’, defining his concept as: ‘a state of widespread dissatisfaction with the “old” museology...what is wrong with the “old” museology is that it is too much about museum *methods*, and too little about the purpose of museum’.⁷ Vergo continued,

Unless a radical re-examination of the role of museums within society – by which I do not mean measuring their ‘success’ merely in terms of criteria such as more money and more visitors – takes place, museums in his country, and possibly elsewhere, may likewise find themselves dubbed ‘living fossils’.⁸

The authors grouped together under the rubric of ‘the new museology’ all attempted to shift their focus on museums to a more theoretical and sociological perspective. They came to recognize that understanding museums requires moving beyond intra-disciplinary concerns to a wider social and political context. They all suggest that when we visit museums, a series of questions should be borne in mind: who decides on the objects being viewed here? What is the meaning of the objects represented?

These Foucauldian research questions reveal an important part of the new

⁶ Peter Vergo, ed., *The New Museology* (London: Reaktion Books, 1989).

⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

museological analysis: the close relationship between power and museums. As Eilean Hooper-Greenhill has pointed out in her book, *Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge*, Foucault offers new museologists a clear language and comprehensive structure in understanding the formation of museums. She further asks:

Do the rituals of power relationships that allow some objects to be valued and others to be rejected operate to control the parameters of knowledge in the same way as the timetabling rituals and the power of relationships of teachers, governors, pupils and the state operate to make some school subjects more valuable than others?⁹

In the following chapters, Hooper-Greenhill gives these questions a definite answer. She provides solid evidence in her book to show that, from pre-modern curiosity cabinets to modern museums, power and its relationships play an important role in framing and shaping museums and knowledge.

It is true that Foucault's ideas of power and knowledge have been particularly influential in museums studies since the 1980s, but Rhiannon Mason argues that many other theoretical resources, such as Post-modernism, Post-structuralism, Critical Theory and Cultural Studies, drawn from disciplines outside the traditional museum world, also have been adopted and used in new museological researches and practices.¹⁰ These theories provide sharp analytical tools to challenge the old orthodoxy of museum studies and to shake up the way in which we view museums. While the tenets of new museology are argued by a disparate group of researchers,

⁹ Eilean Hooper-Greenhill, *Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1992), 5.

¹⁰ Rhiannon Mason, 'Cultural Theory and Museum Studies,' in *A Companion to Museum Studies*, ed. Sharon Macdonald (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 17-32

common threads can be found in their work.

The first is a call to understand that ‘objects’ displayed in museums have been isolated from their original context. Objects are inserted into museums, new environments providing total protection against the decay of natural forces. Objects cease to perform their original function in daily usage and start to circulate in the world as private properties. Time is completely frozen in museums in order to preserve the objects on a long term basis or even in perpetuity for the purpose of collection, examination and exhibition. This change in use and ownership makes the objects become the collections of museums, conceived to be meaningful as the most important treasures of our society.

The second is recontextualisation. When objects have been put into museums, their life is different from their pre-collection existence. They enter a new stage and obtain a new status as authorised collection in museums. In addition, objects are labelled by their distinctive forms and levels of scarcity. In other words, the value of objects is not derived from their original context, but rather is given by curators and museum professionals who have the authority to judge the objects and place them in exhibition rooms. In other words, museums recontextualise objects and imply a set of power relationships which controls the way they are re-interpreted and exhibited.

The third concern is that only some particular objects are selected to be protected and displayed in museums. As Susan A. Crane has argued, the purpose of museums is to fix the past of our cultures and societies through objects by selecting what deserves to be kept, remembered and saved out of time.¹¹ As a result,

¹¹ Susan A. Crane, ‘Introduction: Of Museums and Memory,’ in *Museums and Memory*, ed. Susan A. 178

museums create a vision of the past and future based on contemporary needs. They also formulate an organisational principle to collect, arrange and preserve the objects for reconstructing the past. In addition, museums draw a boundary based on cultural, social and territorial differences. Thus it is the hierarchical distinction of society that decides which objects are included or excluded from the collections of museums.¹²

The fourth issue of the New Museology is ideology. For these new museum researchers, museums are not neutral spaces telling the 'real' stories of nature or human creations. As they have pointed out, objects in museums are not 'pure', 'authentic', or 'untouched since they had been found or had been made'. It is the effect of ideology which plays an important role in museums in framing the way in which we view the collections and experience the museum spaces. According to new museology, there are three types of ideology: evolutionary chronology, iconographic programme and nationalism.

(1) Evolutionary chronology is the first and the most frequently employed ideology employed as a form of classification in museums. Derived from Enlightenment thinkers in the early modern era, the idea of evolutionary chronology gradually became a new framework which raised consciousness of the phenomenon of change. European museums at that time started building and organising exhibitions and collections in an enlightenment mode. It helped to create a new rational order of things. It also helped to naturalise and neutralise the way in which we view objects in museums. As a consequence, objects are classified in chronological order. Each of them represents a particular period of progressive development in form and style to exemplify evolutionary changes in history. This

Crane (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 2-3.

¹² Sharon Macdonald, 'Collecting Practices,' in *A Companion to Museum Studies*, ed. Sharon Macdonald (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 88.

makes the experience of walking through museums like passing through time.

(2) The second ideology is the iconographic programme. Carol Duncan and Alan Wallach are the first scholars to use this term to explain that museums are a type of ceremonial architecture, sharing the same fundamental characteristics as many other traditional monuments, such as temples, churches and shrines.¹³ They suggest that museums should be seen as a kind of cultural shrine. The key function of these shrines is to impress visitors and make them believe that what they see in exhibitions are the most revered treasures of societies. The installations of exhibitions, layout of rooms and sequence of collections all create experiences that resemble traditional religious experiences. Like other ceremonial monuments, museums are complex architectural forms which organise visitors' spatial experiences as a script organises a performance. By following the script, visitors engage in a visual activity full of ritual meanings. Duncan and Wallach call this visual experience the iconographic programme. They further argue that even though we live in a secular age, and museums are deemed as secular institutions, the effect of older religious practices still retains its power to dominate visitors' visual experiences.¹⁴

Nothing will illustrate the contemporary iconographic programme better than the notion of object lessons in modern public museums. When works of art no longer serve as royal collections but are claimed as national treasures, they are used to show the wealth of nations to impress 'new visitors', usually citizens of the nation.

¹³ Carol Duncan and Alan Wallach, 'The Universal Survey Museum,' in *Museum Studies: An Anthology of Contexts*, ed. Bettina Messias Carbonell (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 52. Many other scholars also share the same idea with Duncan and Wallach. Please see Michaela Giebelhausen, 'Museum Architecture: A Brief History,' in *A Companion to Museum Studies*, ed. Sharon Macdonald (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), Jeffrey Abt, 'The Origins of the Public Museum,' in *A Companion to Museum Studies*, ed. Sharon Macdonald (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006) and Marstine, 'Introduction.'

¹⁴ Duncan and Wallach, 'The Universal Survey Museum,' 53.

Nowadays most national treasures belong to the public. Every citizen has an equal opportunity to view these treasures in public museums. Hence museums are given a new function providing the object lesson to the public with the intention of education.¹⁵ These citizens are given a lesson in museums about the history of their nation and their own roots. As a result, the object lesson becomes the most frequently practised form of iconographic programme in modern museums.

(3) The third ideology is nationalism. Like many other architectural types, museums provide a cultural underpinning for the development of the modern nation-state. When nationalism first emerged in nineteenth-century Europe, museums still maintained their power and influence but began to shift their focus to the idea of the nation and nationalism. When the old monarchies were replaced by new European nation-states, the states themselves came to assume the major responsibility for establishing national museums for their own nations. Throughout this development, the numbers of state-held museums in Europe grew at an incredible rate.¹⁶

After nationalism became mainstream ideology in the early modern age, museum objects were calculated as part of the wealth of the nation, and ‘rediscovered’ their unique national characteristics. New objects were chosen to be protected and displayed in museums, because they had distinctive features which could represent the nation. On the other hand, old collections could be reorganised to fit within new national ideological frameworks. Objects were given a new identity, different from their previous existence, as cultural and political symbols of

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 58-9.

¹⁶ Laura Hourston, ‘*Romantic Nationalism and Modernity as Competing Narratives of Identity in the Museum of Scotland, with reference to the Canadian Museum of Civilization and the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa*’ (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2001), 27.

the nation. The nation-states even monopolise interpretation of the objects. As a result, objects in museums are nationalised and codified as part of the visible evidence of the historical narrative of the nation.¹⁷ In other words, objects, whether new or old, all bring the imagination of the nation into a more visible form. They help to shape national identity and dominion culturally and politically.¹⁸

As new museologists have observed, these three ideologies, evolutionary chronology, iconographic programme and nationalism, have set up a new epistemological framework leading visitors to gain new spatial experiences in museums without being aware of the invisible parts of ideologies behind the exhibition rooms. In effect, museums are reconstructed as places of ‘neutrality’, ‘purity’ and ‘authenticity’, shaping perception as well as perspective.

It should be noticed that these three ideologies in museums do not work separately, but rather mutually.¹⁹ In fact, in most museums around the world we can find hints of the collaboration of these three ideologies. What these ideologies have changed is not only the means of classification and exhibition, but also the museum’s architectural design, form and style.

Objects do not directly and automatically transmit meaning to visitors. The meaning of objects depends on the context of other objects, the spatial design, the method of representation and the environment of museums. Museum architecture is of central importance to the visitor experience. One of the long-standing ways to envision museums is that museum architecture is a sacred space protecting national

¹⁷ Tony Bennett, *The Birth of the Museum* (London: Routledge, 1995), 36.

¹⁸ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 163-4.

¹⁹ Donald Preziosi, ‘Art History and Museology: Rendering the Visible Legible,’ in *A Companion to Museum Studies*, ed. Sharon Macdonald (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 50-1.

treasures from the outside world.²⁰ The architectural form of museums is expected to visualise the image of the cultural shrine that can give visitors a sense of privilege and an opportunity to catch a glimpse of the mysterious past. In order to create this ritual experience, grand gateways, impressive corridors, picturesque views, dramatic lighting, splendid ornaments and many other elements help bring the image of the sacred space into reality.

Although frequently compared to temples, churches and certain types of sacred spaces, museums as we know them today are closer in age to other building types such as prisons, stations or department stores.²¹ Museums are a relatively recent cultural phenomena which date back no further than the middle of the eighteenth century. Museums inherit the etymological origins of the ancient Greek penchant for cult sites devoted to the muses and the legend of the Mouseion of Alexandria. Because of this, the study of museum architecture should consider its cultural and political demands and long-term historical context.

It is generally agreed that the notion of 'museum' can be dated back to ancient Greece. The association of the 'museum' with systematic collecting and classification of specimens began with Aristotle's travelling and studying in the island of Lesbos around 340 BC, which led to the establishment of the Lyceum for his students and research.²² During the period of Roman expansion between 211 to 60 B.C., Greek art, statuary and paintings were looted from conquered lands and used to ornament the exteriors of new buildings and monuments throughout Rome.²³ Concepts of stewardship, now known as curatorship, were established to take care of

²⁰ Janet Marstine, 'Introduction,' 9-10.

²¹ Michaela Giebelhausen, 'The Architecture *Is* the Museum,' in *New Museum Theory and Practice*, ed. Janet Marstine (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 41-2.

²² Abt, 'The Origins of the Public Museum,' 115-6.

²³ *Ibid.*, 117.

these works of art. Later, the Greek art in Rome henceforth was considered as public property and used in the service of the state.²⁴

It is clear that politics had a strong influence on the development of 'the museum'. Although during the Renaissance era the idea of 'museum' changed, politics retained its power in shaping museums. One of the profound changes at that time was the discovery of the New World and European colonial expansion there. Many missionaries, colonial governors and explorers brought new specimens and indigenous artifacts back to Europe. Their findings quickly triggered a new wave of systematic research. New cabinets, cases, drawers and many other specialised furnishings and storage rooms were designed to accommodate these objects in the homes and workplaces of scholars and amateur collectors.²⁵

In order to broaden the range of collections, a number of scholars and collectors started seeking support from church leaders and royal societies.²⁶ Later, most European monarchs had their own collections. This transformation gradually led these collections to become symbols of status and tools of propaganda.²⁷ From the Renaissance through to the eighteenth century, royal collections were often housed in official reception rooms and served as a setting to impress a monarch's private audience, such as visiting monarchs, foreign ambassadors and local dignitaries.²⁸ In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the idea of the public museum was conceived. Many royal collections were opened to the public and preserved in

²⁴ Jerome J. Pollitt, 'The Impact of Greek Art on Rome,' *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 108 (1978): 165, emphasis in original, quoted from Abt, 'The Origins of the Public Museum,' 117.

²⁵ Hooper-Greenhill, *Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge*, 105-32.

²⁶ Part of the reason was that it was too expensive to buy the valuable objects from traders or explorers. See Abt, 'The Origins of the Public Museum,' 120.

²⁷ For example, in the early Renaissance era the Medici family's network of power and influence in Tuscan politics was not only constituted by economic power but also by the cultural field. See Hooper-Greenhill, *Museums and the Shaping of Knowledge*, 23-46.

²⁸ Duncan and Wallach, 'The Universal Survey Museum,' 55.

‘museums’, a new type of building particularly designed for protecting and displaying the collections.

In the nineteenth century, museum design quickly became a new profession. Jean-Nicolas-Louis Durand’s research on the systematisation of the museum building type had changed the way in which architects created an ideal exhibition space for the ‘cultural shrine’. He published a book called *Précis des leçons* which provided early nineteenth-century architects with a blueprint for museum design.²⁹ In Durand’s opinion, the ideal plan of a museum was composed of a Greek cross with four wings around a central rotunda. Each of the wings had a separate entrance marked by a splendid portico and a plinth-like podium. Four entrances were linked by a long corridor that made the shape of the plan an exact square. In addition, Durand viewed the museum as both a house of treasure and a repository of knowledge preserving and displaying different types of objects for audiences.³⁰ This idea could be linked to the traditional vision of a museum, that is, the museum as a sacred space or a cultural shrine protecting the treasures of our civilisation from the outside world. Durand’s ideal plan had a great influence on museum design across Europe. The most important examples at that time were Leo von Klenze’s *Glyptothek* (1815-30) in Munich, Karl Friedrich von Schinkel’s *Altes Museum* (1823-30) in Berlin and Sir Robert Smirke’s *British Museum* (1823-52) in London.

²⁹ Giebelhausen, ‘The Architecture *Is* the Museum,’ 44.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 45.




Fig. 5-1. Durand's museum layout.




Fig. 5-2. Sir Robert Smirke's design of the British Museum in 1852.

However, many innovative ideas of establishing a modern national museum for the public were derived from the Louvre in Paris. The Louvre can be viewed as the prototype of national museums, which restored multiple art works and anthological and archaeological objects viewed as national treasures. The Louvre is also the largest and most influential museum of its type.³¹ The contributions of the Louvre can be categorised into three points. Firstly, the royal collections no longer belonged to the monarch, but to the newly born nation.³² Secondly, the collections of museums also implied a new set of social relationships. When the former royal collections became the national patrimony, the state itself, as a guardian of civilisation took responsibility for protecting it. Citizens in this new relationship were taught that they inherited the spiritual wealth of the nation. They did not directly own the patrimony but owned it through the medium of the state. Thus, the Louvre was the site of a symbolic transaction between the citizens and the state. It shared the spiritual wealth of the nation with citizens and intensified national

³¹ Duncan and Wallach, 'The Universal Survey Museum,' 59.

³² *Ibid.*, 57.

attachment to them.³³

Finally, when visitors passed through the main entrance of the museum, the museum's iconographic programme began. Monumental halls, grand staircases, marvellous ceilings and many other architectural elements all led visitors to join a ceremonial procession of art in the museum. Beginning with the *Victory of Samothrace*, visitors faced a number of possible routes linking different halls that divided the art works into chronological order. Visitors had their paths confined by the general character of the architectural space. No matter which route they took, they all led to French art. This arrangement of space had a symbolic meaning: France was the true heir of Western classical civilisation.³⁴

The success of the Louvre attracted new nations to take it as a model for imitation. One of the largest in Asia was the Beijing National Palace Museum. After the Qing emperor was forced to move out of the Forbidden City in 1924, several politicians and cultural elites took the Louvre as example to support the establishment of the National Palace Museum in the Forbidden City. They suggested that the government should take the responsibility for protecting the royal treasures and exhibit them to the public.³⁵

However, the establishment of the National Palace Museum was more intricate than that of the Louvre. Soon after it was opened in 1925, the Second Sino-Japanese War took place. The Museum was forced to close due to the spread of the War in Northern China, with the national treasures retreating with the Nationalist

³³ *Ibid.*, 58-9.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 60-1.

³⁵ Tamara Hamlisch, 'Preserving the Palace: Museums and the making of Nationalism(s) in Twentieth-Century China,' *Museum Anthropology* 19, no. 2 (September 1995): 24.

government from North to Southwest of China. When the Chinese Communist party took control of China, the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan and carried most the important treasures with them. It took another forty years of waiting to witness Taipei's National Palace Museum opening in 1965. The changing political situation in these forty years reinforced the relationship between the National Palace Museum and Chinese nationalism in Taiwan. As a result, the Museum and its collections eventually became the most valuable source of political and cultural legitimacy of Chiang Kai-shek's regime over Taiwan.

5-2 The Early Development of National Museums in China and in Taiwan

On 10th October 1925, a ceremony was held to mark the official opening of Beijing's National Palace Museum. The date was not a usual one. It was the fourteenth anniversary of the National Founding Day of the Republic of China. It drew explicit symbolic connections between the founding of the nation and the founding of the Museum. As Huang Fu (黃郛) (1880-1936), one of the members of the museum council, mentioned in his inaugural speech:

The opening day of the Museum is the Double Ten Day (雙十節). From now on, this day will have two levels of meaning: the founding day of the nation and museum. Those who might attempt to loot the museum will also be viewed as looting the joyous festival of the nation's founding day. We must all share in its defense.³⁶

³⁶ Suo Yu-ming 索予明, '六十談往 (Memoirs of those Sixty Years),' *故宮文物月刊 (The National*

Huang's speech showed that the National Palace Museum had been given a prominent symbolic role in creating a sense of nationhood, although in the early development of China's museums, the concept of museum did not directly link to the idea of nationalism. Before the National Palace Museum was founded, several museums were established by foreign missionaries during the late nineteenth century. In 1868, China's first museum was founded by the French Catholic missionary Pierre Marie Heude (1836-1902) in Shanghai to display objects of natural history. Following his model, other missionaries began to build private missionary museums in China. The purpose of these museums was to correct Chinese people's misunderstandings about Western civilization, and to show new scientific achievements of the West to the Chinese.³⁷ As a result, Chinese visitors flocked to these museums for an opportunity to know Western culture and scientific knowledge. After witnessing the success of missionary museums, these Chinese visitors began to set up museums of their own in their hometowns to rival missionary museums.³⁸

After the founding of the Republic, the Beiyang government also embarked on establishing several national museums based on the Western model. In 1912, two minor royal palaces in Beijing were used to display the Qing royal family collections.³⁹ Later, another two state held museums were founded in the Forbidden City. One was the National History Museum (國立歷史博物館), which firstly used Guozijian (Imperial Academy) (國子監) as an exhibition space and later moved to the Meridian Gate (午門) of the City in 1918. The other was the Beijing Antique Exhibition Hall (北平古物陳列所) which occupied the Outer Court of the City in

Palace Museum Monthly of Chinese Art), October 1985, 144.

³⁷ Fitzgerald, *Awakening China*, 51.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 52.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 53.

1914.⁴⁰ Although these two museums were founded in the Outer Court of the City and opened to the public, Puyi (溥儀) (1906-1967), the last emperor of the Qing dynasty, his family and palace eunuchs still lived in the Inner Court, the residential area for the royal family in the City. They had continued to live in the Inner Court for thirteen years after Puyi's abdication in 1911. The reason that Puyi did not immediately move out of the City after his abdication was that he signed the 'Article of Favourable Treatment of the Emperor of the Great Qing' (清室退位優待條件) with the Beiyang government to retain his imperial title and to protect his right to live in the Inner Court during the interim period.

Feng Yu-xiang (馮玉祥) (1882-1948), however, launched the Beijing coup d'état in 1924 and forced Puyi to accept a change to the 'Article', expelling the royal family from the City.⁴¹ The government also claimed that all Qing property no longer belonged to the emperor, but to the Republic.⁴² The Qing royal family's art, books, antiquities and many other collections were now officially transferred to the government and became part of state property.

The government set up two committees to deal with these collections in preparation for a new grand museum, which became the Beijing National Palace Museum, constructed in both the Inner and the Outer Court of the Forbidden City.⁴³ The museum committee was comprised largely of university scholars who were

⁴⁰ Chau Mi 周密, '國立故宮博物院的建制與沿革 (*The Founding and Development of National Palace Museum*)' (MA Dissertation, Chinese Culture University, 1984), 23-4.

⁴¹ Yuan Shikai (袁世凱), the first President of the Republic of China, deployed large number of troops to keep the Qing royal family under surveillance, preventing Puyi's restoration of the dethroned monarch. Successive Presidents all followed this policy. However, Feng Yuxiang viewed these troops as a threat to his regime. Therefore, he decided to dismiss the troops and expelled Puyi and his people from the Forbidden City. Please see *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁴² Jhang Yu-fa 張玉法, *中國近代現代史 (The Modern History of China)* (Taipei: Tunghau, 1989), 242-3.

⁴³ The Committee of the National Palace Museum, *故宮跨世紀大事錄要第一冊 (Across Century Time lines of the National Palace Museum, vol. 1)* (Taipei: The National Palace Museum Press, 2000), 16-20.

charged with the task of cataloging the collections and protecting them from theft or looting.⁴⁴ Taking the Louvre as an example, most committee members advocated converting the imperial palace into a national museum. They believed that the Forbidden City and the royal collections were the witness of thousands of years of Chinese history and culture. Preserving them would benefit citizens, who would gain a great opportunity to know their nation, and academic researchers, who had access to primary materials for more studies on Chinese imperial history.⁴⁵ In addition, the government was also convinced that erecting an impressive national museum could help to foster a sense of Chinese national identity during the transition toward nationhood.⁴⁶ As a result, in 1925 the government decided to convert the entire Forbidden City into Beijing's National Palace Museum.

On 10th October 1925, a new tablet carved with the name of the museum was hung on the Gate of Divine Might (神武門) to mark the opening day of Beijing's National Palace Museum. Zhuang Yun-kuan (莊蘊寬) (1866-1932), the Beiyang government's minister of Audit, hosted the opening ceremony in front of the Palace of Heavenly Purity (乾清宮). Many prominent officials and personages, including Huang Fu, attended the ceremony and made a speech on stage. According to records, tickets were sold out on that day.⁴⁷ Crowds of visitors flocked into the Museum, and

⁴⁴ Hamlish, 'Preserving the Palace,' 24. However, some national treasures had been stolen or sold when Puyi was still living in the Palace after his abdication. Puyi took out a mortgage on the treasures in order to maintain royal family's living expenses. He bestowed the treasures upon his brother Pujie (溥傑) to carry out for sale. In addition, some treasures had been stolen by eunuchs who worked for the royal family. See Na Jih-liang 那志良, *典守故宮國寶七十年 (Guarding the National Treasures of National Palace Museum for Seventy Years)* (Beijing: The Forbidden City Press, 2004), 25-7.

⁴⁵ But some scholars and politicians challenged this idea. They argued that the Forbidden City and the collections were the symbol of China's corrupt past and should be abandoned. However, establishing a national museum based on the old grand palace was still mainstream opinion. See Hamlish, 'Preserving the Palace: Museums and the making of Nationalism(s) in Twentieth-Century China, in Twentieth-Century China', p. 24. Also see Fitzgerald, *Awakening China*, p.54-5 and Na, *典守故宮國寶七十年 (Guarding the National Treasures of National Palace Museum for Seventy Years)*, 51-4.

⁴⁶ Fitzgerald, *Awakening China*, 53.

⁴⁷ The Committee of the National Palace Museum, *故宮跨世紀大事錄要第一冊 (Across Century*

despite its huge size, the palace did not have enough space to accommodate so many. Some of them were stuck on the pathway to the ceremony stage for more than two hours. They could not wait to see the real scale of the Forbidden City, which had not been opened to the public for six hundred years since it was built in the Ming dynasty.⁴⁸



Fig. 5-3. The Gate of Divine Might in the Opening Day of the National Palace Museum in Beijing.




Fig. 5-4. The Porcelain Exhibition Room in the Chengqian Palace (承乾宮) of the Forbidden City.

Many palaces which used to be the emperor's offices, residences and study rooms in the Inner Court were now renovated for a new function: exhibition rooms of the Museum. In addition, because the Museum was directly built on the old palace, the effect of an iconographic programme was more powerful than in other museums in China. The collections not only provided the best object lesson for visitors, but also offered an unrivalled visual and spatial experience of pilgrimage to Chinese culture and history. In order to guide visitors to numerous exhibition halls in the Forbidden City, visiting routes were grouped into three lines: the west line, the

Time lines of the National Palace Museum, vol. 1), 36-7.

⁴⁸ Na, *典守故宮國寶七十年 (Guarding the National Treasures of National Palace Museum for Seventy Years)*, 36.

middle line and the east line.⁴⁹ At first the Museum was open for six days, two days for each line. Each line led visitors to different exhibition halls: the Ancient Artifacts and Art Exhibition Halls (古物書畫陳列室), the Library Exhibition Halls (圖書陳列室) and the Archive and Document Exhibition Halls (文獻陳列室).⁵⁰

The collections displayed in different Halls were now being recontextualised. Originally the Museum objects were scattered around the City as a part of interior settings, ornaments or articles of the royal family's daily life. However, in order to convert the whole imperial palace into the Museum, these collections were now removed from their original contexts and categorised as museum objects for display in exhibition rooms. For example, the most renowned treasure of the Museum is the Jadeite Cabbage with Insects (翠玉白菜). Initially it was placed in the Palace of Eternal Harmony (永和宮), the residence of Consort Jin (瑾妃) (1873-1924). It was thought to be a dowry gift for Jin, to symbolise her purity and to offer blessings for bearing many children for emperor Guangxu (光緒) (1871-1908). The Jadeite Cabbage was an inconspicuous item put into an enamel flowerpot with a Lingzhi mushroom around a corner. When the Jade Exhibition Hall was established, the Jadeite Cabbage was displayed in a new place. The curator decided to simply put it in a showcase without the distraction of other objects. This way of displaying it made the Jadeite Cabbage become the most outstanding and popular object in the Museum. As a result, other numerous paintings, ornaments and articles were recontextualised in the same way to transform the ordinary royal collections into

⁴⁹ Some said five lines: the west line, the outer west line, the east line, the outer east line, and the middle line. See *Ibid.*, 36 and Chau, '國立故宮博物院的建制與沿革 (*The Founding and Development of National Palace Museum*)', 16-20.

⁵⁰ The Committee of the National Palace Museum, *故宮跨世紀大事錄要第一冊 (Across Century Time lines of the National Palace Museum, vol. 1)*, 36-7.

works of art.⁵¹

From 1926 to 1928, Chiang Kai-shek and the National Revolutionary Army conducted the Northern Expedition (北伐) to reunify China under the KMT by ending the rule of the Beiyang government and local warlords in Northern China. After Chiang's Nationalist government took control over Beijing, the National Palace Museum was re-opened to the public. Chiang fully recognised the metaphorical meaning of the Museum and its collections for his rule. As a consequence, he immediately passed 'the Organic Act of the National Palace Museum' (故宮博物院組織法) to give the Museum a higher administrative position directly subordinate to the Nationalist government. He also established a new museum committee to set up a clear organisation for the Museum to develop a standard classification system and new enterprises such as publishing.⁵² It is clear that since the Museums had been established Chiang was the most powerful political figure to pay more attention to the image making of the Museum than any other politicians in the Republic. As a result, Chiang profoundly changed the orientation of the Museum and its strong link to Chinese nationalism.

However, not long after the Museum had re-opened, the Japanese army posed a serious threat to Northern China. In order to protect these national treasures from the threat of war, Chiang Kai-shek decided to remove the most important part of the collections to a safe place.⁵³ From 1931, these collections had begun their journey of

⁵¹ Na, *典守故宮國寶七十年 (Guarding the National Treasures of National Palace Museum for Seventy Years)*, 57-8.

⁵² The Committee of the National Palace Museum, *故宮跨世紀大事錄要第一冊 (Across Century Time lines of the National Palace Museum, vol. 1)*, 68-9. Chiang Kai-shek was also the member of the committee.

⁵³ However, some scholars and citizens of Beijing strongly opposed to Chiang's decision of moving of the collections from Beijing. More details about the agreements and decision see Chiang Fu-tung 蔣復璁, *中華文化復興運動與國立故宮博物院 (The Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement and*

retreat with the Nationalist government from Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Chongqing, and eventually to Taipei. Other museums and academic research institutes, such as Guozijian, the National History Museum and the Beijing Antique Exhibition Hall also crated their collections and joined the journey.

The act of evacuating the collections from the Museum in Beijing conformed to Chiang's political thought in the Nanjing Decade (1927-37). Since China had been reunited under the rule of the Nationalist government, Chiang went to great efforts to reconnect the new regime with the old nation.⁵⁴ He also viewed the royal collections as a source of cultural and political legitimacy, which would help to reinforce an image of an inherited relationship between his authority and the nation. There is no doubt that Chiang would do his utmost to prevent the collections from being destroyed by Japanese troops and to show his determination to protect China's national culture and treasures.⁵⁵ As a result, the survival of the Museum and its collections was strongly connected to the survival of the nation.⁵⁶ During the journey of retreat, the collections were also displayed for the public in Shanghai (1935), Nanjing (1937), Chongqing (1943-4), Gungzhou (1944) and Chengdu (1946). It was believed that these exhibitions could play an important role in boosting national morale. During the war period, the exhibitions also created an image of China's national culture and treasures still surviving under the full protection of the regime.

In 1934, the British Royal Academy of Arts invited the Museum's curator to

the National Palace Museum) (Taipei: The Commercial Press, 1977), 294.

⁵⁴ More details about Chiang's cultural policies see Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 414-5 and Arif Dirlik, 'The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in Counterrevolution,' *The Journal of Asian Studies* 34, no. 4 (August 1975): 945-80.

⁵⁵ Ju, 'The Palace Museums as Representation of Culture,' 486-7.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 487.

arrange an exhibition in London celebrating the thirty years anniversary of King George V's ascending the throne. The Nationalist government decided to loan the most valuable part of the collections to the London exhibition. In order to protect these national treasures on the way to Britain, the British government sent the Cruiser HMS Suffolk to transport them.⁵⁷ Undoubtedly, requesting help from the British navy to ship the collections reinforced the image that these treasures were so important to the Chinese nation that the government could not afford any risk of losing them. On 28th November 1935, the International Exhibition of Chinese Art was opened in London's Royal Academy of Arts. King George V and other European nobles and personages came to visit the exhibition, and Britain's main newspapers and magazines did special features to cover the event. More than twenty lectures relative to the exhibition were also held at the same time to introduce the beauty of Chinese Art to the British. During these three months, the exhibition attracted four hundred twenty thousand visitors.⁵⁸

The success of the London exhibition quickly gained an international reputation for the Museum. The exhibition was not only the first time that the Museum loaned its collections to a foreign country, but also marked a new method of promoting Chinese national culture to the West with diplomatic and political purposes.⁵⁹ As Chiang Fu-tung (蔣復璁) (1898-1990), the first curator of Taipei's National Palace Museum, has mentioned, the exhibition gave Western countries a direct channel to know the real Chinese culture. He goes on to argue that the primary way of knowing Eastern cultures in the West was by the dominance of Japanese scholars through introduction and publications. It gave Western people the narrow idea that Japanese

⁵⁷ The Committee of the National Palace Museum, *故宮跨世紀大事錄要第一冊 (Across Century Time lines of the National Palace Museum, vol. 1)*, 129.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 131-2.

⁵⁹ Ju, 'The Palace Museums as Representation of Culture,' 487-8.

culture was the mainstay culture of the whole of Asia, but after the success of the exhibition in London, he believed that this misleading idea would quickly be overturned. The exhibition offered evidence to prove that it was China, not Japan, that was the origin and stronghold of Eastern cultures. As such, it can also be said that the exhibition helped China to win the cultural conflict with Japan.⁶⁰

Although the short trip to London was enormously successful, the long retreat of the collections had only just begun. After the Chinese Civil War, the Chinese Communist Party took control of mainland China in 1949. Chiang Kai-shek and his regime were forced to retreat to Taiwan. The most valuable part of the collections was also brought to Taiwan with the government.⁶¹ Initially the collections did not immediately settle down in Taipei. Before the National Palace Museum was rebuilt, all packaged collections were temporarily housed in Beigoukou (北溝口), Taichung (台中).⁶² These objects were unpacked only for academic research on special request of related scholars. In 1957, the Asian Foundation, a US private organization with government affiliation, financed an exhibition room for displaying some collections for the public next to storehouses.⁶³ This small exhibition room attracted numerous sinologists, Chinese art historians and a great number of ordinary people. It took decades of waiting for the re-opening of the National Palace Museum in Taipei, and the Museum in crates, retreating on a long journey to Free China, quickly became a legend in the stories of the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War.

⁶⁰ Chiang, *中華文化復興運動與國立故宮博物院* (*The Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement and the National Palace Museum*), 57-8.

⁶¹ Due to time pressure, only around one fifth of special selected collections were moved to Taiwan. Please see The Committee of the National Palace Museum, *故宮跨世紀大事錄要第一冊* (*Across Century Time lines of the National Palace Museum, vol. 1*), 193.

⁶² Considering the dry climate, Taichung was viewed as the ideal place to preserve the collections. See Na, *典守故宮國寶七十年* (*Guarding the National Treasures of National Palace Museum for Seventy Years*), 149.

⁶³ Suo Yu-ming 索予明, '文物與國運 (The Cultural Artifacts and the Destiny of the Nation),' *故宮文物月刊* (*The National Palace Museum Monthly of Chinese Art*), April 1983, 10.

The humiliation of the war helped to strengthen the relationship between the royal collections and nationalism.

Before Taipei's National Palace Museum was re-opened in 1965, the KMT used the previous Japanese colonial government's exhibition spaces to display mainstream Chinese art. For example, the most important museum in Taiwan during the colonial era was the Museum of the Taiwan Governor's Office. Its Greek Revival style of façade and the objects that were collected by Japanese biological, archaeological and anthropological scholars completely represented the coloniser's authority and ambition to catalogue and analyse the constituents of the empire and her subjects.⁶⁴ In order to erase all traces of Japanese cultural influence, the Nationalist government made enormous changes to the Museum. The name of the Museum was changed to the Taiwan Provincial Museum. The main building survived, but the collections were evacuated to make room for Chinese cultural and historical relics.⁶⁵ It is clear that these changes reflected the KMT's regime attempt to shift Taiwan's cultural landscape by changing the exhibition content of museums to show the supremacy of Chinese culture.

The Nanhai Academy (南海學園) was among the first group of cultural and educational facilities constructed for the public by the KMT with a definite political purpose in post-war Taiwan. The idea of the Academy was the foundation of a Chinese museum acropolis in Taipei to preserve Chinese cultural relics and rare book collections that retreated with the government from mainland China. The acropolis also served the function of promoting the orthodox culture of China. The

⁶⁴ Edward Vickers, 'Re-writing Museums in Taiwan,' in *Re-writing Culture in Taiwan*, eds. Fang-long Shih, Stuart Thompson and Paul-Francois Tremlett (London: Routledge, 2009), 75.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 75-6.

Academy was located next to the Taipei Botanical Garden in the heart of Taipei's political district. In 1953, after Chiang Kai-shek visited the Garden, he asked Chang Chi-yun (張其昀) (1901-85), the minister of education, to build a series of public buildings which included the Central Library (1955), the National Taiwan Arts Education Centre (1956), the Confucius-Mencius Society of the Republic of China (1956), the National Taiwan Science Education Centre (1958), The National Museum of History (1956-64) and many other governmental institutes to promote cultural and educational affairs.

During the Japanese occupation, Taipei's Botanical Garden was also an important site for exhibitions. Originally the Garden itself served a role in displaying flora and fauna collected from different regions of the world. In 1916, based on the model of the Western Universal Exposition, the Japanese authorities used the Garden to host the Taiwan Industrial Exhibition to show the industrial progress and achievements of the island under Japanese rule to world-wide political and commercial leaders.⁶⁶ The reception hall later served as an exhibition hall for the colonial government to display Taiwan's industrial, agricultural and handicraft products to international investors. The Kenkou Shrine (建功神社), one of the most important shrines in Taiwan for worshipping martyrs who made significant contributions to the colonial government, Japanese historical heroes and divine beings, was also located in the heart of the Garden to mark the political importance of the site to colonial rulers.⁶⁷ Therefore, it was no surprise that Chiang Kai-shek

⁶⁶ Lu Shao-li 呂紹理, *展示台灣: 權力、空間、與殖民統治的形象表述 (Exhibiting Taiwan: Power, Space, and Image Representation of Japanese Colonial Rule)* (Taipei: Rye Field, 2005), 214-41.

⁶⁷ More details about the founding of the Kenkou Shrine see Huang, Shih-chuan 黃士娟, '日治時期台灣宗教政策下之神社建築 (The Development of Jinja Architecture under the Influence of Religions Policy in Taiwan during the Japanese Colonisation)' (MA Dissertation, Chung Yuan Christian University, 1998).

would choose the Garden as the site for the Academy.




Fig. 5-5. The Nanhai Academy. Source: Google Maps.

The first building founded in the Academy was the Central Library (中央圖書館).⁶⁸ Due to a limited budget, the government decided to adapt the old *Kenkou* Shrine instead of building a whole new library. The main structure of the Shrine remained, but Japanese roofs, decorations and the main gate were replaced by Chinese architectural decorative elements. A new courtyard was placed in front of the main building and surrounded by reading rooms extending from the main hall. A new gate hall building was also constructed in the Chinese classical style to mark a new entrance for the ‘cultural shrine’ of book collections. The Library’s appearance now showed no external hint of the original shrine. The magnificent decorations of the Library also expressed an attempt to compete with Beijing’s Central Library, the

⁶⁸ This building has been used for the National Academy for Educational Research since 1987.

first national library in China.

The second important building of the Academy was the National Taiwan Science Education Centre (國立科學教育館) designed by Lu Yu-chun (盧毓駿) (1904-75).⁶⁹ The aim of the Museum was to improve science education in Taiwan.⁷⁰ In 1954, Chiang Kai-shek announced that it was the year of ‘science developments’. Building a science museum for the public was one of the goals to strengthen the foundation of Taiwan’s science education.⁷¹ In doing so, the Education Centre was built as a distinctive cultural landmark located on one corner of the Garden as part of the Academy building complex. The upper half of the building was made in a cylinder shape based on a nonagon volume of construction. On lower floors, the core of the Centre was spiral staircases and ramps surrounded by different exhibition rooms. On upper floors, the ramps were conversely protruding and surrounding central exhibition spaces to echo the shape of the conical roof inspired by Beijing’s Temple of Heaven (天壇). The Centre shows an obvious Chinese building character on the outside, but Le Corbusier’s modernist architectural principles, such as spiral staircases, ramps and the open plan, were the inspiration for the inner spaces. It is

⁶⁹ The Museum had now moved to the other site. The building currently is empty. Graduated from one of the French civil engineering schools, Lu Yu-chun was deeply influenced by the French modernist architectural movement. He translated the first Chinese version of Le Corbusier’s famous book *City of To-morrow and Its Planning*. However, Lu also paid attention to a new direction of modern Chinese architecture. He extensively studied traditional Chinese architectural design philosophy, especially the ideal of the ming-tang space (明堂), a prototype of Chinese imperial space, and applied his research results to his design projects. Therefore, his work can be divided into two phases. In the early phase, he followed Le Corbusier’s model to build pure modernist architecture. In the later phase, he explored Chinese architectural principles and transformed them into modern architectural language. The National Taiwan Science Education Centre was one of the cases that fully represented Lu’s exploration of the new direction of Chinese architectural design.

⁷⁰ Chiang Kai-shek showed his deep concerns about science education and developments of China on many occasions. For example, one of the aims in the New Life Movement was to bring the idea of ‘Scientificisation’ to Chinese life. See Dirlik, ‘The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement,’ 972.

⁷¹ Ciou Mei-hong 邱美虹 and Liou Jun-geng 劉俊庚, ‘我國科學教育發展回顧與展望 (Review and Forecast of the Development of Our Country’s Science Education),’ in *我國百年教育回顧與展望 (Centennial Review and Forecast of Our Country’s Education)*, ed. The National Academy for Educational Research 國家教育研究院 (Taipei: The National Academy for Educational Research, 2011), 185.

clear that Lu tried to combine Chinese architectural design philosophy with Western modernist principles in this Centre. This attempt to reshape the new direction of Chinese modern architecture earned him a great reputation in architectural circles in post-war Taiwan.



Fig. 5-6. The Central Library.



Fig. 5-7. The National Taiwan Science Education Centre.




Fig. 5-8. The 3rd Floor of the National Taiwan Science Education Centre.




Fig. 5-9. The National Museum of History.

The National Museum of History was the earliest museum founded at the Academy. The Museum initially adapted Taipei's Commodity Exhibition Hall built by the Japanese colonial government as a main exhibition space to display Chinese

art.⁷² After Chiang Kai-shek renamed the Museum and reorientated its function, a series of new exhibition halls was gradually taking shape.⁷³ In 1964, the last main exhibition hall of the Museum was finished. The tall red walls of the façade and the curved saddle roofs were located on the top of main hall and clad with the Chinese classical style evoking a vivid image of Beijing's Forbidden City. It was an image that could totally represent the idea of a Chinese 'cultural shrine'. Before the National Palace Museum was re-opened, this museum was the most important cultural landmark in the centre of Taipei city.

In short, from the journey of protecting national treasures to early designs of Taiwan's national museums, Chinese nationalism played an important role in fostering a close relationship between museums and the nation. Since the royal collections had become national patrimony, the state shaped itself to protect national treasures as a guardian of civilisation. From the establishment of Beijing's National Palace Museum to Taipei's Nanhai Academy, it is clear that museums were constructed as 'cultural shrines' to glorify certain high culture of the nation, coupled with a particular political purpose. Thus, it is no surprise that Taiwan's early museums were given a political function to reconnect the link between Chinese nationalism and the Taiwanese inhabitants. We can see Chiang Kai-shek deeply committed to founding a museum as a method of creating an image of Chinese culture. In doing so, from museum design to the collections, Taiwan's early national museums became a visible vehicle for conveying a message that the cultural and political legitimacy of the nation had been firmly tied to the regime.

⁷² The initial exhibition collections of the Museum were derived from the He-nan Province Museum, which was also removed from mainland China with the National Palace Museum. See the Committee of the National Museum of History, ed., *國立歷史博物館沿革與發展 (the History and Developments of the National Museum of History)* (Taipei: The National Museum of History Press, 2002), 8.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 6-7.

5-3 The Making of Taipei's National Palace Museum

Although Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT lost the Chinese Civil War, they achieved partial victory in the cultural struggle. Taipei's National Palace Museum was a prime example to illustrate that it was Chiang's regime, not Mao Ze-dong's, that protected the core of Chinese national culture for China. In order to satisfy the need to promote national culture and to show that Chiang's regime and the Chinese nation's destiny had been firmly linked, in 1960 Chiang decided to build a grand museum to display Qing imperial collections after their long journey from the mainland that took seventeen years (1933-49).⁷⁴ Without doubt, apart from its exhibition and preservation purposes, this museum exemplified a political function that could comprehensively represent the political ideology of the regime from the outset. Furthermore, there are three points which should be highlighted in the explanation of the making of the museum:

(1) Sun Yat-senism and the legitimacy of the nation: as mentioned earlier, Sun Yat-senism was a sort of political ideology developed in the late 1920s. This ideology was promoted by Sun's followers who viewed him as a founding father of the Republic and the true heir of orthodox Confucianism. Chiang Kai-shek was one of the leading advocates of Sun Yat-senism. He not only propagated Sun's teaching in his speeches and political thought, but also implemented a plan to establish Sun's birthday as a national holiday. Every year on that day, the Nationalist government and the party would hold a grand official ceremony to commemorate Sun's contributions to the nation, including hanging national flags in main streets, paying

⁷⁴ The Committee of the National Palace Museum, *故宮跨世紀大事錄要第一冊 (Across-century Time lines of the National Palace Museum, vol. 1)*, 240.

respects to Sun in his Mausoleum or reciting his will in public.⁷⁵ Many important political campaigns were also launched on that day. Therefore, it was no surprise that in 1965, Chiang chose Sun's centennial birthday as the day for the re-opening of Taipei's National Palace Museum. It conveyed a clear message that the Museum was built to honour Sun who left a rich cultural and political legacy to the nation.

On the day of the re-opening, Chiang visited the Museum and made a famous speech to re-affirm that Sun was the true successor who had inherited the long-established Confucian tradition from previous cultural sages and national heroes. Chiang also denominated the Museum as the Chungshan Museum (中山博物院) in remembrance of Sun.⁷⁶ For Chiang, rebuilding the Museum in Taipei was one of the ideal ways to realise Sun's cultural and political thought.⁷⁷ It also showed that Chiang and the KMT would take the responsibility for protecting Chinese culture, whereas Mao and his Communist regime on the mainland were the destroyers of Chinese culture. As a result, through the promotion of Sun Yat-senism, the National Palace Museum was viewed not only as the most important symbol of Chinese culture, but also symbolised the regime's determination to guard the valuable treasures of the nation.

(2) Anti-Communist ideology and the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement:
as mentioned earlier, the beginning of the Cold War marked a turning point in US

⁷⁵ Zhou, '塑造黨國之民 (The Making of the National Citizens),' 403-12

⁷⁶ Chungshan is one of Sun's courtesy names. Most literature in Chinese use Chungshan as an official name of Sun Yat-san. But in English academia, Yat-san is more common than Chungshan. According to Chiang's idea, the official name of the Museum is the Chungshan Museum. The Museum is also called Taipei's National Palace Museum, because it currently accommodates the Qing royal collections. When Taiwan re-unites with mainland China, all the collections will return to Beijing, and Taipei's National Palace Museum will change back to its official name. See Chiang, *中華文化復興運動與國立故宮博物院 (The Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement and the National Palace Museum)*, 89.

⁷⁷ The Committee of the National Palace Museum, *故宮跨世紀大事錄要第一冊 (Across-century Time lines of the National Palace Museum, vol. 1)*, 272.

global strategy. Truman's government began to shift its support from Mao's Communist China to Chiang's Free China. It gave Taiwan sufficient financial aid to help the island develop its agricultural, industrial and cultural enterprises. For example, the construction fees of the Museum's first exhibition room in Beigoukou (北溝口) was subsidised by the Asian Foundation. Research funding and academic support for preserving and categorising the collections also came from the same source.⁷⁸ In addition, part of the funds for reconstructing the Museum in Taipei was also provided by American aid.⁷⁹

It was in the same period of time that Communist China closed itself off from the world. Researchers who were interested in Chinese culture and history had to come to Taiwan for their primary sources. Taipei's National Palace Museum was the only place that preserved the largest number of Chinese art and imperial documents outside mainland China. This made the Museum the most important site for Sinological studies in the world.⁸⁰ As a result, the Museum became one of the must-see attractions for foreign scholars and tourists who visited Taiwan for academic or diplomatic purposes. The tension between Communist China and Free China also created an opportunity for the Nationalist government to promote an image that it was Taiwan and not the mainland that was the true stronghold of Chinese culture.

In order to show the firm friendship between the US government and the Nationalist government, the Museum was invited to a tour exhibition in the US from 1961 to 1962. The success of the American exhibition tour in five major cities,

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 108. Also see Ju, 'The Palace Museums as Representation of Culture,' 503.

⁷⁹ The Committee of the National Palace Museum, *故宮跨世紀大事錄要第一冊 (Across-century Time lines of the National Palace Museum, vol. 1)*, 128-9.

⁸⁰ Ju, 'The Palace Museums as Representation of Culture,' 495.

Washington D.C., New York, Boston, Chicago and San Francisco, immediately earned a great international reputation for the Museum.⁸¹ Apart from its great impact on Chinese art and historical studies in American academia, the tour from the outset had a strong impact in politics and diplomacy. First of all, like the London tour of the Museum in 1935, the US government sent a naval ship to transport fine selected objects to America.⁸² The US Department of State also made a commitment to the Nationalist government that all the collections belonged to the ROC and would return to Taiwan at the end of the tour. The Communist government would have no right to claim ownership of the collections and seize them while they were in transit.⁸³ As a result, this tour showed a clear message that the United State's political stance at that time was to support the Nationalist government from the threat of Communism. It also presented a positive image that Chinese traditional culture during the Cold War period was well-preserved in Free China.

In 1966, the Chinese Communist Party launched the Cultural Revolution under the leadership of Mao. Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT viewed the Revolution as a threat to Chinese traditional culture. Chiang immediately launched the Chinese Culture Renaissance Movement to fight against the Revolution. The goal of the Movement was to revive Chinese traditional culture through the leadership of Chiang's cultural policies. The Movement attempted to strengthen the role of the National Palace Museum, instituting a political ideological mission, glorifying

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 496.

⁸² The Committee of the National Palace Museum, *故宮跨世紀大事錄要第一冊 (Across-century Time lines of the National Palace Museum, vol. 1)*, 241.

⁸³ Wu Shu-ying 吳淑瑛, '展覽、文物所有權與文化外交---以故宮 1961 年赴美展覽的交涉為例 (The Exhibition, the Ownership of the Collections, and the Cultural Diplomacy: A Study on the Negotiation of the 1961 US Exhibition Tour of the National Palace Museum),' *近代中國 (Modern China)* 155 (September 2003): 109.

nationalist spirit and patriotic sentiments.⁸⁴ As Chiang Fu-tsung (蔣復璁) mentioned, the aim of the Museum during the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement was to provide hard evidence to the public, that compared to other civilisations, China also had a long history and distinctive culture. This could easily be found in the Museum's enormous wide-ranging collection of thousands of years of bronze ware, porcelains, calligraphy and paintings. No other museum could compete with that.⁸⁵ Chiang goes on to argue that every visitor to the Museum is a witness of Chinese culture, who after viewing the collections, could testify to the glory of the national past.⁸⁶ We can see that through the visiting experience the Museum could help achieve the goal of the Movement by fostering a sense of nationalist identity and sentiment.

(3) Nationalism and the object lesson: Like other museums around the world, Taipei's National Palace Museum also had a function in education. The Museum's rich collections of Chinese culture could help the Taiwanese to understand the history of their motherland in a variety of ways, such as school visiting programmes and cultural lessons for the public specifically produced by the Museum. By this process it was argued that the Taiwanese would come to recognise that they were inseparable members of the Chinese nation.⁸⁷

As Duncan and Wallach have argued, museums and their collections worked as a symbolic transaction between visitors and the nation. Having object lessons in the museum, the experience of symbolic transaction would help older subjects of the

⁸⁴ Tu Cheng-sheng 杜正勝, '杜正勝院長談故宮角色 (Tu Cheng-sheng on the Role of the National Palace Museum),' *交流*, April 2003, 65.

⁸⁵ Chiang, *中華文化復興運動與國立故宮博物院 (The Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement and the National Palace Museum)*, 52-3.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 54.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 55-6.

empire turn into new citizens of the nation.⁸⁸ As a result, Taipei's National Palace Museum played an important role in providing these object lessons to the Taiwanese, achieving the governmental aim of decolonisation and re-sinification in the post-war era.




Fig. 5-10. Wang Da-hong's design of the National Palace Museum.




Fig. 5-11. Wang Da-hong's design of the National Palace Museum, the Ground Floor Plan.

When Chiang Kai-shek decided to build a grand museum to house the royal collects in Taipei, a closed architectural design competition for the Museum was held by the museum committee in 1961. The five important architects at that time, including Guan Song-sheng (關頌聲), Yang Jhuo-cheng (1892-1960) (楊卓成) (1914-2006), Wu Wen-xi (吳文喜) and Wang Da-hong (王大閔) (1918-), were invited to the competition.⁸⁹ As a result, Wang Da-hong was the winner of the competition.

Wang is a famous architect who gained a great reputation for his creative

⁸⁸ Duncan and Wallach, 'The Universal Survey Museum,' 58-9

⁸⁹ Shyu Ming-song (徐明松), '華人庭園與合院的現代性詮釋 (Wang Da-hong: A Modernist Interpretation of Chinese Gardens and Quadrangles)' (A Speech at the Eslite Forum 誠品講堂, Taipei, August 5, 2015). More details about the history of the competition please see Shyu Ming-song 徐明松, 王大閔: 永恆的建築師人 (A Guide to Wang Da Hong's Architecture) (Taipei: Mu-ma Wen-hau, 2007).

designs in transforming Chinese traditional architectural form into a modernist language. A graduate of Cambridge and Harvard University, Wang was heavily influenced by a modernist architectural education.⁹⁰ The new design wave of Chinese classical style spreading from the mainland to post-war Taiwan architectural circles did not wholly convince him. He also disapproved of Taiwanese architects who directly copied the model of Western modernist architecture in their work.⁹¹ He was looking for an alternative direction of architectural expression based on pure modernist architectural principles without losing a traditional Chinese character. The design of the Museum was one of Wang's early attempts.

In this design, the main body of the Museum is a modernist rectangular box topped with three reverse umbrella-shaped roofs. The curve indicates the outline of Chinese traditional building roofs, but was made in a pure modernist form and with new concrete technology. The window grid in the ground floor also referred to Chinese classical window patterns. This design showed that Wang attempted to combine the creative structure system and simple modernist form with Chinese classical architectural motifs to express a new image of modern Chinese architecture. It also fully represented early experiments of Taiwanese architects, who insisted on adopting the modernist architectural approach to express Chinese cultural tradition in their designs in the 1960s.

Although Wang won the competition, his design did not actually carry out. When Wang Shi-jie (王世杰) (1891-1981), the chairman of the museum committee, presented Wang's entry to Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang was very dissatisfied with the

⁹⁰ Wong was one of Walter Gropius's students at Harvard University. Philip Johnson and I. M. Pei, the giants of modernism in American architectural circles, were his classmates.

⁹¹ Li Jun-ren 李俊仁, '訪王大閔 (Wang Da-hong: An Interview),' *建築師 (Taiwan Architect Magazine)*, January / February 1979, 74.

result. He thought that the design did not fulfil his vision of the Museum which planned to display the most important national treasures of China. So Chiang asked Wang to alter his design and added more explicit Chinese elements to the building. But Wang rejected to do that.⁹² As a result, the museum committee finally decided to transfer the project to Huang Bao-yu (黃寶瑜) (1918-2000), a famous Chinese architectural historian and an active architect in post-war Taiwan. In an interview, Huang also revealed some of the reasons that Chiang disapproved of Wang Da-hong's design:

A general consensus on the construction of a national museum for preserving national treasures was that the museum should adopt a pure Chinese classical style.⁹³

That is to say, what Chiang and the committee expected was not an abstract, implicit, or modernist style of building, but rather an explicit, straightforward and revivalist style of museum. In the final project, Huang presented a grand museum clad with palace-like roofs and Chinese classical building decorations. His design directly conformed to the museum committee's imagination of an impressive museum for housing the most important national treasures of the nation.

⁹² Shyu Ming-song (徐明松), '華人庭園與合院的現代性詮釋(Wang Da-hong: A Modernist Interpretation of Chinese Gardens and Quadrangles).' Shyu Ming-song is one of important Taiwanese architectural historian who conducts several researches on Wang's works. But he has not yet published the history about the disputes among the museum committee, Chiang and Wang over the entry of the Taipei' National Palace Museum. In order to find out more details about the competition, this thesis continually wrote letters to the Museum and asked for a visit to view the files and documents that may preserved in the archive. Unfortunately, the Museum declined all the requests. Only when one day these files and documents are open to the public, a detailed research on the design competition can be conducted.

⁹³ Fu, *中國古典式樣新建築 (New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style)*, 234.



Fig. 5-12. Huang Bao-yu's Design of the National Palace Museum.

From Wang Da-hong's unfulfilled project to Huang Bao-yu's design, the building of the National Palace Museum highlights that in the 1960s the modernist approach to architectural form was not widely adopted in most official buildings, especially with the highly politicised buildings. The result of the competition also conveyed the clear message that museums to some extent were cultural and political icons helping to express the nation's cultural authority and political legitimacy. As Tamara Hamlish has argued, what the state preserves in the museum is not the collections themselves but their symbolic significance as a sign of political authority and legitimacy.⁹⁴ The design of Taipei's National Palace Museum shows the intention for museums to be some of the most significant cultural and political representations expressing the might of nationhood, by creating an image of a splendid national cultural shrine.

Huang Bao-yu and Wang Da-hong had very different educational backgrounds. Huang graduated from the National Central University, a stronghold of Chinese

⁹⁴ Hamlish 'Global Culture, Modern Heritage: Remembering the Chinese Imperial Collections,' in *Museums and Memory*, ed. Susan A. Crane (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 158.

Beaux-Art training colleges. Following his famous teacher Liu Dun-zhen (劉敦楨) (1897-1968), Huang joined the Society for Research in Chinese Architecture and obtained his masters degree from the University of Pennsylvania. When the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan, he was one of the members of the Society who decided to go with the government.⁹⁵ Due to his relationship with the Society and his knowledge of Chinese architectural history, he was the author of Taiwan's first textbook on Chinese architectural history.⁹⁶ It is no surprise that his design of the Museum would reproduce the Chinese classical style that once prevailed in Nanjing during the 1930s. In the design, there are three important points that should be considered.

(1) The axis, monumentality and impregnability: Taipei's National Palace Museum is located in a scenic area of Waishuagxi (外雙溪), a suburb of Taipei near to the Yangming Mountain (陽明山) and Shilin (士林). Many foreign embassies are located in that area. The Mountain and the nearby Tianmu (天母) are also the popular residential districts for foreigners, where large numbers of them would spend a great deal of their time exploring the area and its cultural heritage.

⁹⁵ Yan Yue-jhuang 嚴月粧, '黃寶瑜: 山林中的隱者 (Huang Bao-yu: A Recluse in the Mountain),' *房屋市場 (Housing Market Monthly)*, September 1975, 70.

⁹⁶ Anonymous, '黃寶瑜 (Huang Bao-yu),' *中外雜誌 (The Kaleidoscope)*, January 2001, 73.




Fig. 5-13. Taipei's National Palace Museum.



Fig. 5-14. The Museum's storage space inside the mountain.

Therefore, one of the main reasons that the Museum was chosen to be built here was that it was an easily accessible location for foreigners.⁹⁷ In addition, many other Chinese political and cultural elites lived near Waishuangxi. Chiang Kai-shek also had a residence close to Shilin. When the Museum was reopened, Chiang visited the Museum more often than before.⁹⁸ The advantage of the location marked the site as the best place for the Museum to promote the Nationalist government's political and cultural ideology to foreign and domestic tourists.

Huang Boa-yu's design placed a long, horizontal axis to welcome visitors from the gateway arch through the Museum main building to the mountain behind the Museum. Like most Chinese imperial palaces, the axis started from the gateway arch highlighting the monumentality of the Museum. The axis was an elaborate design of the iconography programme used to impress visitors with a sense of imperial China. The gateway arch also symbolised the beginning of the journey taking visitors

⁹⁷ Promoting tourism in Taiwan was one of main reasons to build the Museum. According to the record, most early visitors of the Museum were foreign tourists. Ju, 'Chinese Art, the National Palace Museum, and Cold War Politics,' 126-7.

⁹⁸ Suo Yu-ming 索予明, '總統 蔣公與故宮博物 (The President Chiang and the National Palace Museum),' *故宮文物月刊 (The National Palace Museum Monthly of Chinese Art)*, October 1986, 19-20.

through a time tunnel from the present day to the ancient past.⁹⁹ Here, they prepared themselves to leave the secular world behind, to face the sacred shrine in front of them. Following the axis, architects placed a long and vast square, magnificent outdoor staircase. The grand museum main hall and its storage tunnel lay hidden in the mountain as a sequence of spatial experiences. The climax of the axis was the Museum's top floor, a mingtang space (明堂), also known as the prototype of Chinese imperial building in the ancient era. This space dominated the axis visually from the beginning to the main entrance of the Museum, indicating that the Museum had a strong spatial link to its imperial past.

The end of the axis was a mountain, an ideal place to preserve national treasures. The architects dug a huge tunnel inside the mountain as storage space for the collections. The tunnel was well-built for its purpose, meeting the highest standards of safety, preserving the treasures from theft, looting, or destruction by natural disasters and war. The tunnel could even be used as a fortress to protect the president and important politicians during wartime.¹⁰⁰ Hidden in the mountain, this tunnel created an image of impregnability to express the determination that the government would do whatever it took to protect the treasure from the outside world.

⁹⁹ The gateway arch was built in 1967. see The Committee of the National Palace Museum, *故宮跨世紀大事錄要第一冊 (Across-century Time lines of the National Palace Museum, vol. 1)*, 290.

¹⁰⁰ Wang Guang-cih, '總統避難 首選故宮、台大醫地下室 (President's First Choice of Refuge: the National Palace Museum and the Basement of the National Taiwan University Hospital),' *聯合報 (United Daily News)*, 01 October 2009.




Fig. 5-15. The Illustration of the Chushih (衢室) in Yao's Era.




Fig. 5-16. The Illustration of the Shihshih (世室).

(2) The traditional mingtang space: in Huang's design, the arrangement of the exhibition halls was composed of four square rooms surrounding a tall central lobby in the middle. This sort of design referred to the traditional mingtang space. According to Lu Yu-chun's research, the mingtang space was the place that represented the ideal model of the highest level of political space in ancient China. The space was also viewed as the origin of China's imperial buildings. The mingtang space might have different names, such as chushih or shihshih, but all had similar structures in common. Originally, it was an open, empty square hall, built on a raised ground floor surrounded by four other rooms in four directions without intervention by walls or windows. Like the Greek Agora or Roman Forum, the space was used for people to share their ideas of politics and public affairs in ancient Chinese society.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ More details about the ming-tang space, see Lu Yu-chun 盧毓駿, *盧毓駿教授文集 (The Essay Collection of Dr. Lu Yu-chun)* (Taipei: Chinese Cultural University Press, 1988), 102-31.




Fig. 5-17. The Site Plan of the National Palace Museum.




Fig. 5-18. The Ground Floor of the National Palace Museum.




Fig. 5-19. The Perspective of the National Palace Museum.




Fig. 5-20. The Section of the National Palace Museum.

Huang's design attempted to reconstruct a mingtang space in the Museum. In the layout, a tall central lobby was surrounded by four square exhibition rooms in four directions. This layout clearly referred to the original idea of the mingtang space. On the top floor above the lobby to welcome every visitor, Huang also rebuilt a mingtang shaped hall surrounded by a winding corridor. This hall was called the

Sanxi Hall (三希堂), named after Emperor Qianlong's favorite study room in Beijing's Forbidden City.¹⁰² The Hall was the apogee of the axis that led every tourist to the Museum from the outside. Inside, no matter which routes or exhibition rooms that tourists chose to visit first, they would all finally be guided to the same hall, the Sanxi Hall on the top floor. Therefore, the Sanxi Hall was the centre of the iconographic programme which dominated visitors' visual and spatial experiences from the outside and the inside. Not only did the name of the Hall imply that the collections in the Museum recalled a memory of the golden age of Qianlong's Pax Sinica, but also the shape of the Hall indicated that the Museum's architectural style had a strong link with the Chinese imperial building tradition.¹⁰³

In the exhibition spaces of the Museum, all the collections were grouped by their types; bronze ornaments, paintings, calligraphy and porcelains, all displayed in separate rooms. The objects of each group were arranged in chronological order from the ancient era to the Qing dynasty. This order implied an evolutionary view of history displaying the national past in a modern form of classification. Emphasised by spotlights from above, the objects were placed individually in glass showcases with plenty of space. The old Emperors' collections now were treated as an 'art' preserved by cutting edge technology in a modern museum. Ju Jane C. calls this new way of exhibition and conservation the formation of 'canons of Chinese art'.¹⁰⁴ In other words, the process of recontextualisation now gives the collections a new life. They no longer are the property of the royal family, but state-owned art work

¹⁰² Sanxi means three rare treasures in English. In the Sanxi Hall of Beijing's Forbidden City, Emperor Qianlong stored three fine works of Chinese calligraphy drawn by Wang Xi-zhi, Wang Xian-zhi, and Wang Xun, the most famous calligraphers in the history of China. That was the name which the room came from.

¹⁰³ More details about emperor Qianlong's Pax Sinica, see Tu Cheng-sheng 杜正勝, '關於「乾隆盛世」的另一視野 (Another View of the Emperor Qian-long's Pax Sinica),' in *乾隆皇帝的文化大業 (Emperor Ch'ien-lung's Grand Cultural Enterprise)*, ed. Fong Ming-jhu 馮明珠 (Taipei: The National Palace Museum Press, 2002), 209-10.

¹⁰⁴ Ju 'The Palace Museums as Representation of Culture,' 489.

exhibited in the national museum for the public.



Fig. 5-21. Chiang Kai-shek visiting the Museum.



Fig. 5-22. The sculpture of Sun Yat-sen in the main hall of the Museum.

(3) Political symbols: apart from the axis, architectural style, layouts and ways of exhibiting, there are many other political symbols attached to the Museum. First of all, Sun Yat-sen's favorite maxim and original calligraphy 'All under Heaven belongs to the People' was inscribed on the gateway arch. This phrase came from one of the Chinese five classics of the Confucian canon, the *Words of the Great Unity* (大同), in the *Book of Rites* (禮記). Sun quotes this phrase in his book *The Three Principles of the People*, asserting that this phrase fully represents the ideal model of Confucian political thought that should be introduced to modern society in order to reconstruct China's contemporary political order.¹⁰⁵ In addition, the full text of the *Words of the Great Unity* was inscribed on the wall next to the side entrance, and these inscriptions were to keep reminding visitors of Sun's political legacy and its relationship to the Museum.

¹⁰⁵ Wang Sheng, *The Thought of Dr. Sun Yat-sen* (Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise), p. 29-30.

Statues and portraits of Chinese political figures are also displayed in the Museum. The most famous statue among them is Sun Yat-sen's statue standing in the middle of the central lobby. The statue was a copy of French sculptor Paul Landowski's original work, ordered by the Nationalist government for Nanjing's Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum.¹⁰⁶ Chiang Kai-shek's portraits also hung in the central lobby next to the statue and near the front gate.¹⁰⁷ These statues and portraits made certain that the Museum reflected an element of political atmosphere. Thus it is no wonder that Tu Cheng-sheng, the former curator of the Museum, asserts that Taipei's National Palace Museum is the museum that has perhaps the largest number of political icons in the world.¹⁰⁸

In fact, the political influences upon the Museum were more than what could be seen from the outside. As mentioned earlier, Chiang Kai-shek held the authority to overturn the final result of the Museum's architectural competition, and he also expressed his opinions to architect Huang Boa-yu's about the design of the Museum several times. According to Huang, Chiang was very satisfied with the design, which coincided with his vision of modern Chinese architecture. After that, Chiang invited him to design more buildings for the government and the party, and to be consultant in engineering problems in other projects, such as the Chung-shan

¹⁰⁶ The Committee of the National Palace Museum, *故宮跨世紀大事錄要第一冊 (Across-century Time lines of the National Palace Museum, vol. 1)*, 273. When the Democratic Progressive Party became the ruling party (2000-8), this statue was removed from the central lobby for the policy of 'De-politicalisation' of the Museum in 2004. However, after the KMT regained power in 2008, current president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) decided to move the statues back to the central lobby to symbolise that Sun Yat-senism was still the mainstream political thought of the KMT. See Chen Wan-cian, '杜正勝移走 國父銅像重回故宮 (Removed by Tu Cheng-sheng, Sun Yat-sen's Statue Is moving back to the National Palace Museum),' *聯合報 (United Daily News)*, 01 February 2010.

¹⁰⁷ This portrait now is hung on the library of the Museum. It was also removed by Tu Cheng-sheng due to his policy of 'De-politicalisation' of the Museum. See Tu, '藝術、政治與博物館 (Art, Politics, and Museums),' 22-24.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 24.

Building for the National Assembly.¹⁰⁹ Chiang visited the Museum frequently after it was opened to the public. He gave opinions to the curator on improving the service, including the condition of exhibition rooms, English guides, the reception of foreign guests and uniforms.¹¹⁰ In addition, Chiang appointed his people to work for the Museum.¹¹¹ From this it is clear that the construction of the Museum was very important to Chiang.

To conclude, Taipei's National Palace Museum is one of the greatest museums preserving the most important treasures of Chinese art, rare books and royal documents. In the early years, China's national museums were simply considered to be one of many representations of the national past. Not until Beijing's National Palace Museum opened to the public, did the Museum begin to take on a more essential symbolic role in defining national identity. After a long retreat to Taiwan during the wars, Chiang Kai-shek and the government recognised that the Museum and its collections were a very useful tool for political propaganda. Reconstructing a grand museum with a splendid Chinese classical architectural style in Taipei was one of the most important political missions in the post-war period to demonstrate that only Free China had the ability to rebuild and revive Chinese traditional culture. Therefore, Taipei's National Palace Museum is not a neutral space preserving national treasures as objective truths of the past, but a cultural shrine creating a vision of the past based on certain political needs.

¹⁰⁹ Yan, '黃寶瑜 (Huang Bao-yu),' 71-72.

¹¹⁰ Chiang Fu-tsung 蔣復璁, '雜憶故宮博物院 (The Memories of the National Palace Museum),' 大成 (*Dai Cheng*), August 1988, 7-8.

¹¹¹ The first curator of the Museum Chiang Fu-tsung was Chiang Kai-shek's teacher's nephew. The second curator Cin Siao-yi (秦孝儀) (1921-2007) was one of Chiang's secretaries. He had worked for Chiang for 25 years. See Lin, Sing-yue 林惺嶽 and Tu, Cheng-sheng 杜正勝, '林惺嶽 v.s. 杜正勝: 政權和平轉移下的文化行政轉型 (Lin Sing-yue v.s. Tu Cheng-sheng: The Transformation of Art and Cultural Administration after the Party Transition),' 典藏古美術 (*Art and Collection*), August 2000, 26.

In 2000, Tu Cheng-sheng was appointed as the third curator of Taipei's National Palace Museum. Due to his pro-independent political stance, he attempted to institute big changes in the museum. He argued that the imperial collections in the Museum could not totally represent Chinese national culture. They only reflected the aesthetic tastes of China's nobles and gentry-literati. In addition, the Museum leaves no room for folk art or local cultures, with even the concept of 'China' and 'Chinese culture' being problematic. It was developed by the KMT and had been tied firmly to the image-construction of the Museum.¹¹² Therefore, Tu attempted to introduce the idea of an 'Asia Museum' and 'Indigenisation' to the Museum, in order to eliminate the influence of the KMT's nationalist ideology.¹¹³ Although Tu's new policy provoked a series of political debates between pro-independent and pro-united camps, he still could not loosen the ideological tie knotted by certain political figures who were involved in the construction of the Museum and who directed its initial purpose.

Perhaps Benedict Anderson's suggestion of returning all the imperial collections to Beijing is not practical in the near future. But it seems reasonable to conclude that in the coming years, different political leaders may try to exert their influence upon the Museum in various ways. If this is the case then it is necessary to put the museum into a broader historical and theatrical context to gain a better insight into identifying the power and knowledge relationship that works in the background, dominating the way in which we view the museum and its collections.

¹¹² Tu Cheng-sheng 杜正勝, '典藏, 展覽與歷史解釋(Collecting, Presenting, and Interpreting)' (paper presented at the The Conference of the Object Collection, Cultural Heritages and the Interpretation of the History, Taipei's National Palace Museum, 03 April 2004).

¹¹³ Tu, '藝術、政治與博物館 (Art, Politics, and Museums)', 22-7.

Chapter Six: The Chungshan Building and the Construction of Democratic Spaces

In 1994 a brawl broke out in Taiwan's National Assembly (國民大會) when a ruling party assemblywoman, Guo Su-chun (郭素春), addressed the main hall of the Chungshan Building and was slapped by Su Jih-yang (蘇治洋), a female colleague in the opposition party. This unexpected attack quickly provoked a parliamentary riot in the debating room and more representatives were later involved in the riot. Although it was not the first legislative violence to occur in Taiwan, the attack still shocked the island. The television footage was replayed throughout the day on TV news, and the incident also attracted international media, reporting the news as a political scandal in Taiwan. This video still can be found on youtube.¹

In the post-martial law era, under the leadership of former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) (1923-), Taiwan has gradually advanced toward a democracy based on bicameralism. However, the legacy of Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship still obstructs the process of full democratization on the island. These brawls that arose both in the Legislative Yuan (立法院) and in the National Assembly are a snapshot of Taiwan's political transformation. As a grand parliament building commissioned by Chiang Kai-shek, the Chungshan Building, where the National Assembly was held, is a constant reminder that reflects both the significant achievements and negative facts of political reforms in Taiwan.

From the perspective of China's parliament building history, the Chungshan Building is a unique case. In mainland China, the first group of parliament

¹ Anonymous, 'B%#ch Slap- Taipei- Taiwan Parliament,' video posted 06 June 2007, accessed 18 April 2012, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=78gSpUYB7-E>.

buildings was erected in the late Qing era. Unlike the Chungshan Building, many of them were designed by foreign architects, adopting Western architectural styles and semi-circular chambers to host political meetings. During that time, the Qing court attempted to make use of these buildings to show its commitment to China's political reforms. In the early Republic period, these buildings also served as important sites for policy-making and cabinet meetings. However, the political chaos created by President Yuan Shi-kai (袁世凱) and his followers barely allowed the parliamentary system in China to function. Not until the Nanjing decade were the political assemblies once again restored by the Nationalist government. A brand-new parliament building was constructed in the Nanjing city centre in 1936. It was also used for cinema and theatre performances, serving as multi-functional architecture. In the proposal for the capital plan of Nanjing, a grand assembly hall clad with a Chinese classical style was also planned for the building complex of the central government district. However, the whole project was halted due to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. It was not until the Nationalist government had retreated to Taiwan did Chiang Kai-shek and his regime have the opportunity to create a splendid parliament building based on his political vision.

Built in 1966, the Chungshan Building symbolised an attempt by the new government to carry out Sun Yat-sen's political thought on the island. Sun's philosophy was seen as an ideal political blueprint for China. He attempted to apply Western political philosophers, modern state bureaucracy and parliamentary systems to China without losing its Confucian tradition. In order to show that he was Sun's faithful follower, Chiang paid great attention to the construction of the parliament building named after Sun. He intended to erect iconic architecture to reflect Sun's political doctrine. As a result, the Chungshan Building was built to

illustrate a strong connection between the Republic's parliamentary democracy in the present with the nation's past political legitimacy.

The main focus of this chapter is the development of parliament buildings in Taiwan. The brief history of China's assembly halls will also be explored. The study period of this chapter starts from China's the establishment of early National and Provincial Assemblies in the late Qing to Taiwan's Chungshan Building in 1966. Although China and Taiwan are not countries that created democracy or parliament building types, their unique political developments have generated a special form of democratic architecture different from its Western origin. Therefore, in order to gain a better understanding of the creation of democratic spaces in Taiwan, it is necessary to put the Chungshan Building in a broader historical and political context.

6-1 Early Parliament Buildings in China

Western traditions of democracy, based on the classical ideal of political practice, stem from the ancient Greeks and later the Roman Republic. Classical democracy not only influenced the formation of later constitutions, but also created an architectural legacy which inspired many designers who constructed parliament buildings down to the present day. Traditionally, in Ancient Greece every citizen was encouraged to directly participate in public affairs and debates in a specific place designed for political assembly.² The Pnyx in Athens was one of the first places where political meetings and debates took place. All Athenian citizens had

² Deyan Sudjic and Helen Jones, *Architecture and Democracy* (London: Laurence King Publishing, 1999), 12-13.

equal opportunity to speak in the assembly on a large flat platform stage surrounded by a semi-circular hillside.³ Like the Greeks, the Romans also held regular assemblies based on citizenry and representation. Senators discussed political affairs in the Curia, located on the west side of the Forum. In the rectangular shaped chamber, the senators sat in straight and parallel lines on either side of the building, ensuring a clear sight of presenters.⁴ Political institutions established by the Athenian city-state and later adopted and modified by the Roman Republic undoubtedly had a great impact on many European countries. These legacies acted as physical reminders and are still reflected in many government and parliament buildings, indicating their strong connection to the classical origin of parliamentary democracy.⁵

In Medieval Europe, administration and legislative assembly primarily took place in the palaces of emperors or kings. In North and Central Italy, however, some towns had achieved a measure of independence and built their own government buildings and town halls. As a consequence, this new type of architecture began to flourish and develop. The oldest of these government buildings, called the Palazzo del Broletto, was built in 1215 in Como. The ground floor was an open space with arcades serving as an extension of the market held in front of the building. The upper floor was the town hall and law court. This design quickly became a standard model adopted by many other towns in Italy and some other European countries.⁶ Town halls, market halls, law courts and government offices were now all placed on the same site as a multi-functional building.⁷ In seventeenth century Netherlands, Amsterdam town hall was the grandest of all

³ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 16-17.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁶ Nikolaus Pevsner, *A History of Building Types* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976), 27.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 29-30.

town halls. A splendid council hall was placed in the middle of a symmetrical plan separated by two courtyards and flanked by different rooms and offices.⁸ This unique design clearly foresaw the arrival of parliament buildings in the eighteenth century.

The Irish Parliament House is among the first specifically designed parliament buildings. It was designed for a bicameral congress with a circular shape for the House of Commons and a rectangular chamber for the House of Lords.⁹ A shallow dome of a Pantheon was added to the top of the House of Commons to underline its importance. Classical architectural language was adopted on the façade. Two short wings and ornate interior designs conveyed a clear message that this new parliament was greatly influenced by ancient Greek and Roman architectural and political legacies.¹⁰

This influence can also be seen in the design of the US Capitol building. The semi-circular shape of a chamber was regarded as an ideal model for political congress in the Capitol. Two chambers were separated by a splendid Pantheon dome with sumptuous sculptural decorations at the centre of the block.¹¹ This neoclassical design explored and ultimately echoed Greek and Roman architectural and democratic heritage.

Like the US Capitol, the Houses of Parliament in the United Kingdom also experienced different stages of designs by different architects. Gothic Revival was viewed as the best style that could match the preceding architectural details, and

⁸ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁹ Sudjic and Jones, *Architecture and Democracy*, 22.

¹⁰ Pevsner, *A History of Building Types*, 35.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 36-39.

represent the aspiration of the British nation.¹² Both the House of Commons and the House of Lords had an oblong chamber. This shape was seen as the most suitable form for debates and legislative meetings.¹³ The success of this parliament design made it the ‘Mother of Parliaments,’ going on to be adopted elsewhere in the Commonwealth and in many other states.¹⁴

As shown above, in these parliament designs there are three characters to which special attention should be paid. First of all, the assembly hall was the core of the parliament. It was designed to provide a forum or a stage set for political debates. Secondly, the shape of assembly hall can be divided into three different types: the oblong, semi-circular and classroom-like chambers. The oblong chamber was mostly adopted by the UK and the Commonwealth nations. The semi-circular chamber was popular in European countries and in newly formed democracies. Russia and other Eastern European states preferred the classroom-like arrangement of chambers where the cabinet was seated behind the podium facing the representatives.¹⁵ Finally, the notion that classical architectural elements symbolised the ideal model of democracy had continually influenced early parliament designs. Many architects attempted to search for historical legitimacy for younger states by constructing their own democratic spaces through traditional building forms and style. As Deyan Sudjic argues, culture and architecture have been used at the service of political and national ambition in parliament buildings, becoming monuments of those nations, reflecting the way these countries see themselves and their aspiration of democracy.¹⁶

¹² *Ibid.*, 41. Also see Sudjic and Jones, *Architecture and Democracy*, 43.

¹³ After severe bomb damage, Winston Churchill opened a debate on the reconstruction of the House of Commons in 1943. Churchill succeeded in his wish to re-build the chamber in its original form. See Sudjic and Jones, *Architecture and Democracy*, 8.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 43.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 43.

Before the Chinese parliament had been built, like most European monarchies, Chinese emperors conducted the work of government and meetings with courtiers in the royal palace. In the Forbidden City, three front halls, perhaps the most splendid building complex in the Outer Court, were used for political and ritual purposes. In the Qing dynasty, the Hall of Supreme Harmony (太和殿), the largest hall of the City, served as a ceremonial centre of imperial power. Set in the middle of the Hall, the emperor presided over royal ceremonies and received homage from high-ranking offices and foreign ambassadors.¹⁷ Located in the middle of the Three Front Halls, the Hall of Middle Harmony (中和殿) was used by the emperor to prepare announcements to be read in the ceremonies.¹⁸ The Hall of Preserving Harmony (保和殿), the last hall of the Three Front Halls, was where rehearsal of the ceremonies and the final stages of imperial examination were conducted.¹⁹

In the Inner Court, the Hall of Mental Cultivation (養心殿) originally served as a place for the emperor to rest, but was later used as a reading room and a residential office. In the late Qing dynasty, the Hall became the most important building in the Forbidden City. The emperor spent most of his time here to discuss affairs of the empire with the highest officials and closest advisers.²⁰ The imperial decrees and documentary records were also kept in the Hall for study and consultation in the context of policy-making.²¹ In addition, the Emperor Qianlong's favourite study room, the Sanxi Hall (三希堂), was located at the West

¹⁷ Gilles Béguin and Gominique Morel, *The Forbidden City: Heart of Imperial China* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1997), 46.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 46.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 49.

²⁰ Geremie R. Barmé, *The Forbidden City* (London: Profile Books, 2008), 43-44.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 82.

corner of the Hall.²² The Office of Military Intelligence (軍機處), the imperial ‘war cabinet’, sat just next to the Hall. A private alley hidden behind the office screen connected the Hall with emperor’s residential area.²³ These features demonstrate that the Hall of Mental Cultivation was the hub of imperial power directing the work of the empire in the Forbidden City.

However, this symbiosis of power and architecture for the royal family obviously could not adapt to the rapid changes of the new international political order emerging in the nineteenth century. As discussed earlier, after the Opium Wars, many late Qing intellectuals recognised that the traditional perspective of the *tian-xia* system in Imperial China faced an enormous challenge by Western powers. It was necessary to establish a new political order in China to save the nation from being destroyed by foreign invaders. For example, Wang Tao (王韜) (1842-1922) believed that in the modern world, the *tian-xia* system was no longer a suitable ideology to sustain the power of the empire. China had to face a new stage of history and share the rest of the world with other countries. A fundamental change of its political system was necessary to bring new life to the old nation.²⁴ Zheng Guan-ying (鄭觀應) (1828-97) also pointed out that if China wanted to avert further catastrophes caused by Western powers, an essential change of its traditional form of government and political system should be taken into consideration.²⁵ Tang Zhen (湯震) (1856-1917), a conservative reformer in the Qing court, suggested that China should establish a parliament and adopt the Western democratic model, forming an open communication between the gentry and the throne.²⁶

²² The Sanxi Hall has a close relationship with the design of Taipei’s National Palace Museum. For further discussion please see the Chapter 5.

²³ *Ibid.*, 44.

²⁴ Wakeman, *The Fall of Imperial China*, 209.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 209.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 210.

Adopting the parliamentary system in the Chinese empire was still a radical political idea for imperial authority at that time. Therefore, in order to ingratiate himself with the conservative officials in the Qing court, Kang You-wei attempted to reinterpret the Confucian classics to gain legitimacy from history for his new plan of political reforms. With help from Weng Tong-he (翁同龢) (1830-1904), the emperor's closest adviser, the Guangxu read Kang's reform memorial and recognised that his reforms, based on the Western parliamentary model, could actually strengthen the throne.²⁷ As a consequence, the Hundred Days of Reform was launched in 1898 to carry out a series of economic, military and political reforms in China. One of the most far reaching changes was to initiate a constitutional monarchy and to establish a National Assembly to replace the old imperial cabinet.

However, the more conservative officials in the Qing court viewed the Reform as a threat to their power and position. They strongly opposed the Reform and came to see the Empress Dowager Cixi with a request that she should take back the reins of power before it was too late. Cixi changed her attitude and immediately launched a coup d'état to end the Reform.²⁸ This short-lived reform proved that Cixi and her followers were the true power holders of the empire in the late Qing period. It was also these dignitaries that brought the dynasty to its final end.

Two years after the coup d'état, due to the catastrophic result of the Boxer Rebellion, Cixi finally recognised that it would be difficult for her to regain foreign

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 211.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 214-6.

esteem and domestic respect unless she showed some sincere intention for real political reform.²⁹ Therefore, under the endorsement of Cixi, the New System Reform (晚清新政) was launched in the last decade of the dynasty. The series of institutional and political changes that Cixi attempted to implement to the government went even further than Kang You-wei and Emperor Guangxu's proposals.³⁰ For Sun Yat-sen and other revolutionaries, these changes were too little and too late. Although the Qing court had held an election for Provincial Assemblies (諮議局) in 21 provinces in 1909 and convened the first National Assembly (資政院) in Beijing in 1910, most assemblymen and fervent constitutionalists were still deeply dissatisfied with the outcome of the Qing court's political reform.³¹ The frustration among intellectuals and the population at an incompetent government finally gave the revolutionaries a chance to overturn the dynasty in 1911.

The Qing court had left the new Republic with the political and architectural legacy of twenty-one provincial assemblies across the empire and an unfinished parliament building in Beijing. According to the original plan of the political scheme, the Qing court would adopt the model of constitutional monarchy as a new foundation for its political reforms. A new constitution was promised to change the political and bureaucratic system of the empire. In addition, a National Assembly with bicameralism at the apex of the system would plan to convene in Beijing in 1917.³² Therefore, it was necessary to construct a new parliament building outside the Forbidden City to accommodate the House of Councillors and the House of Representatives.

²⁹ Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, 408.

³⁰ Wakeman, *The Fall of Imperial China*, 221.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 246-7.

³² *Ibid.*, 235. Also see Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 246.

The members of the House of Councillors were selected by the emperor. These included members of the royal family, Manchu noblemen and Han senior Confucius gentries, a specific term to denote the scholarly class most associated with the philosophical tenets of Confucius. The members of the House of Representatives were elected from the provincial assemblymen who were picked by local elections held by the twenty-one Provincial Assemblies.³³ However, it should be noted that although this new parliamentary system was thought to provide a direct channel to the central government with connections to the populace, from the dynasty's point of view, these assemblies were ultimately designed to build national unity without losing the dynasty's power.³⁴



Fig. 6-1 The Perspective of the National Assembly.




Fig. 6-2 The Plan of the National Assembly.

³³ Jhang Peng-yuan 張朋園, *中國民主政治的困境 1909-1949 (The Poverty of the Chinese Democratic Politics, 1909-1949)* (Changchun: Jiling Publishing, 2007), 61-63.

³⁴ Wakeman, *The Fall of Imperial China*, 236.




Fig. 6-3 The Section of the National Assembly.



Fig. 6-4 The Unfinished Site of the National Assembly Building.

In 1907, the Qing court began to search for an ideal site for the construction of the parliament building in Beijing. As a result, the abandoned Beijing examination hall of the Royal Academy (北京貢院) was chosen to be the site for this future national democratic space. In 1905, due to the Qing's New System Reform, the traditional imperial examination system for the state's bureaucracy had been abolished. Examination halls across the empire had now suddenly become redundant architecture. Re-using these places for new political purposes conveyed a significant symbolic meaning: a transformation from former imperial examination sites to democratic election spaces with the same aim at selecting political elites for the government.³⁵

German architect Curt Rothkegel (1876-1946) was commissioned to draw up a new plan for the first parliament building of the empire. Similar to the US Capitol, Rothkegel proposed an ambitious project with a grand dominant cupola located in the centre of the building to separate the House of Councillors and the House of Representatives. Offices, meeting rooms, archives and many other subsidiary spaces were arranged around these two chambers. Both chambers

³⁵ Zhang, Fu-he 張复合, *北京近代建築史 (The Modern Architectural History of Beijing from the End of 19th Century to 1930s)* (Beijing: Tsinghua University Press, 2004), 112.

adopted the semi-circular shape and were designed to contain 1550 seats in each, 1200 seats for assemblymen on the ground floor and 350 seats for auditors on the upper floor. Moreover, the building was designed in the style of German Renaissance structures, sharing some similarities to the Reichstag in Berlin, although the size of this building was apparently much bigger.³⁶

The project began in 1910. Because the parliament was still under construction, the first interim national assembly was held in Beijing's Law College.³⁷ Later, the whole building project was forced to be suspended due to the outbreak of the Republic Revolution in 1911. After the new Republic took control of China, the new government had no intention of continuing this extravagant building project. As a result, three years later a new reasonably sized parliament was built for the young state, to replace this unfinished assembly hall.³⁸



Fig. 6-5 The Jilin Provincial Assembly.



Fig. 6-6 The Guangdong Provincial Assembly.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 113-4.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 113.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 186-9.




Fig. 6-7 The Chamber of the Fujian Provincial Assembly.



Fig. 6-8 The Chamber of the Guangdong Provincial Assembly.

According to the Qing's planned parliamentary system, apart from the national assemblymen, twenty-two provinces also needed to elect their own local delegates to administer regional affairs and have a voice in the chamber of the House of Representatives. The establishment of the Provincial Assemblies was also announced by the Qing court when the project of National Assembly was still underway. In 1909, apart from Xinjiang province, twenty-one provinces had begun to build their own assembly halls for the first local election in the history of China.³⁹

The Qing court advised leaders of each province that either re-using existing architecture or constructing new ones for the Provincial Assembly were all acceptable, but if the local government decided to build a new one, the Western parliament building type was the best model to follow.⁴⁰ The Qing court also suggested that the semi-circular shaped chamber was the best choice to ensure that all assemblymen could be seen and their speeches could be heard in assembly halls

³⁹ Jhang, *中國民主政治的困境 1909-1949 (The Poverty of the Chinese Democratic Politics, 1909-1949)*, 50-61.

⁴⁰ The Committee of Chinese Architectural History 中國建築史編譯委員會, ed., *中國建築簡史第二冊 (The Brief History of Chinese Architecture, vol. 2)* (Beijing: China Building, 1962), 71.

at all times.⁴¹ As a result, like the Beijing National Assembly, many provincial assembly buildings adopted Western architectural styles to conduct local political meetings. In addition, most assembly halls also chose to build on the sites of redundant regional examination halls of the Royal Academy.⁴²



Fig. 6-9 The Hubei Provincial Assembly.




Fig. 6-10 The Plan of the Hubei Provincial Assembly.




Fig. 6-11 The Section of the Hubei Provincial Assembly.



Fig. 6-12 The Chamber of the Hubei Provincial Assembly.

⁴¹ Zhang, Fu-he 張复合, ‘中國第一代大會堂建築: 清末資政院大廈與民國國會議場 (The First Generation of China’s Parliament Buildings),’ *建築學報 (Architectural Journal)* 5 (1995 May): 47.

⁴² Anonymous, ‘舉行諮議局選舉, 各省一律開辦 (The Provincial Assembly Elections Were Launched in Every Province),’ *東方雜誌 (Eastern Miscellany)* 6, no.4 (March 1909): 180-1. It should be noted that currently the National and Provincial Assembly buildings lack completed and extensive researches. Until now, only two academic articles and few books have explored this topic. Limited information can be found online with sketchy introduction and few photos. Therefore, a whole picture of the development of Chinese parliament buildings still needs to be examined until more sources are found.

The Hubei Provincial Assembly (湖北諮議會局) is one of the best-preserved provincial assemblies in China at present. Designed by the Japanese architect Fukui Fusaichi (福井房一) (1869-1937), the whole building was composed of red brick and wooden frame cladding with succinct Western classical architectural decorations. Like most British colonial architecture in China and in South Asia, two superimposed colonnaded verandas were erected around much of the façade. A pedimented portico and a tall bell tower were used to emphasise the main entrance. Assemblymen's offices were arranged on both sides of the tower. Behind this, an oblong-shaped chamber was placed in the middle, surrounded by other small meeting rooms and offices. Unlike other Provincial Assemblies' chambers in China, this chamber was closer to a theatre or classroom than a debating room, and the Chairman and important officers were seated on a raised stage directly facing the assemblymen.⁴³




Fig. 6-13 The Façade of the Jiangsu Provincial Assembly.




Fig. 6-14 The Plan of the Jiangsu Provincial Assembly.

⁴³ Li De-xi 李德喜, '湖北省諮議局建築 (A Study on the Hubei Provincial Assembly),' in 第三次中國近代建築史研討會論文集 (*The Essay Collection of the 3rd Conference of China's Modern Architectural Historical Researches*), ed. Wang Tan 汪坦 (Beijing: China Building, 1991), 14-18.

The Jiangsu Provincial Assembly (江蘇省諮議局) is another provincial assembly which has been well-protected by the local government. This building was designed by the famous Chinese architect Sun Zhi-xia (孫支廈) (1882-1975), who was viewed one of the first generation of modern Chinese architects. In 1909, in order to learn the skills of building an outstanding assembly hall, Sun went to Japan for further investigation of the Japanese parliament building.⁴⁴ After the trip, Sun decided to build a French Renaissance style of assembly to stress the importance of the new democratic space in Jiangsu. The semi-circular shape of chamber also illustrated an attempt to reflect the Western tradition of the parliamentary debating room. In the layout, Sun placed the chamber in the centre of the building surrounded by courtyards with four-directional corridors linked to offices and meeting rooms in four wings. Like many other governmental building designs, Sun also chose a symmetrical plan to show monumentality with a tall bell tower at the front. As a result, this Assembly became one of the most important parliament buildings of the early Chinese fledgling democracy.

In short, in the early twentieth century, election systems and parliamentary democracy were brand-new ideas introduced to China by the Qing court to prolong its dynasty. Although in the concession territories within China, foreign powers had built their own consulate buildings and town halls with basic governmental and parliamentary functions, the Qing's National and Provincial Assemblies were still the earliest of their kind.

Having briefly reviewed the development of Western parliament architecture and the establishment of China's early parliamentary system, the three following

⁴⁴ '中國國民黨中央黨部 (The Headquarters of the KMT),' 南京民國建築網 (Nanjing Republican Architectural Website), accessed 10 June 2012, <http://www.jllib.cn/njmgjz.cn/xzjz/b219>.

points must be noted. First of all, no matter if they were the National or Provincial Assemblies in China, most were designed in a Western classical architectural style. Unlike parliament building types in Western democratic countries, the style was not used to declare their intention to seek historical legitimacy from Greek and Roman traditions. Rather, it was utilised to show aspiration for westernisation and modernised political reform. For the Qing court, Chinese classical architectural styles could not totally fulfill this political need.

In addition, in the history of Chinese architecture, China did not develop a form of assembly hall or parliament building as most European countries did. In the late Qing period, most imperial cabinet meetings were conducted in the emperor's residential office, but not in the open-mode of an assembly hall. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that adopting the Western design of chambers was a rational choice for the fledgling democracy to begin its path towards modern political reform, but it should be noted that the British oblong chamber did not appear to be a very popular choice for the empire, and the semi-circular chamber was the commonest model used in early Chinese parliament design.

Finally, these Qing parliament buildings continued to be used as the political debating halls or government offices in the Republican era. The New System Reform in the late Qing period was a short-lived social and political reform. Although the Qing court had held elections for the provincial assemblies in most provinces in 1909, and convened a national assembly in Beijing in 1910, most assemblymen and fervent constitutionalists were still deeply dissatisfied with the slow processes of the Reform. What disappointed them the most was the fact that the emperor still maintained almost total power over the new parliament

structure.⁴⁵ Therefore, in 1911, when a strong mood of nationalism had grown in China, the revolutionaries seized the opportunity to completely overthrow the dynasty and establish a new Republic. But these parliament buildings constructed by the Qing court still represented a powerful symbol and played an important role in the next stage of China's modern political history.

6-2 New Developments, New Style

Although the National and Provincial Assemblies were mostly constructed by the Qing court in the late period, they swiftly moved to an important position for the future of the constitutional government. Many local political elites who advocated the parliamentary system took advantage of the buildings, cementing their own positions from a very visible platform.

In 1911, in response to growing discontent with the New System Reform among the population and local elites, the Qing court authorised the National Assembly to draft a new constitution and elected Yuan Shi-kai as China's first premier. A form of democratic legitimacy was later conferred on Yuan's rule.⁴⁶ However, this earliest cabinet in modern Chinese history did not last very long. The outbreak of the anti-Manchu revolution occurred in Wuchang (武昌), the most important industrial and commercial town in Hubei province, triggering a chain reaction, spreading all over China. At that moment, many Hubei assemblymen supported the local military government under the leadership of Li Yuan-hong (黎元洪) (1864-1928). The Hubei Provincial Assembly Hall was temporarily used to

⁴⁵ Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 248.

⁴⁶ Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 277.

house the military government and became a new centre of political gravity in China.⁴⁷ With inspiration from Hubei's success, the revolution eventually led the nation to overthrow the Qing throne. The Emperor eventually agreed to relinquish his power to the new Republic.

At the outset, most provinces in the south joined the newly established Republic. The revolutionaries and their allies came to Nanjing and convened the provisional House of Councillors to elect a new leader who was able to harness the new political order at that time. Located in Nanjing city centre, the Jiangsu Provincial Assembly Hall was certainly the best place to hold the meetings and the election. As a result, in 1912, Sun Yat-sen was elected as China's provisional president, heading the government in Nanjing until the following March.⁴⁸ The Nanjing and Jiangsu Provincial Assembly Halls became the heart of China's politics in the early Republican era.

In order to reunite the nation under the same flag, Sun kept his promise of ratifying Yuan Shi-kai's election to the presidency in Beijing. When Yuan made his ascent to the top of the regime, a new parliamentary system based on the latest draft of a provisional constitution was established. According to this new constitution, there were to be two chambers in the parliament. The House of Councillors would comprise 274 seats chosen by the provincial assemblies with ten members from each province. The House of Representatives would have 594 members elected from the population on a basis of one delegate for every 800,000 people.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 204-5.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 209.

⁴⁹ Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 279.




Fig. 6-15 The Layout of the House of Representatives and the Beijing Financial Collage.




Fig. 6-16 The Ground Floor of the House of the Representatives.



Fig. 6-17 The Current Look of the House of the Representatives.

This new government, also called Beiyang government, had no intention of continuing the construction of the National Assembly Hall that the Qing court had planned. The main reason was that the increasing financial difficulties made it impossible to afford this highly ambitious building project.⁵⁰ Therefore, the House

⁵⁰ Zhang, *北京近代建築史 (The Modern Architectural History of Beijing from the End of 19th Century to 1930s)*, 115.

of Councillors temporarily made use of the Beijing Law College as offices and meeting places. The House of Representatives then occupied the Beijing Financial College to serve local delegates. Later, a temporary parliament building and the presidential office were planned on the open ground at the west side of the Financial College.

The German architect Curt Rothkegel, the designer of the Qing's National Assembly Hall, was once again commissioned to design this building. Rothkegel re-used the layout of the chamber that he had drawn, reducing the size to contain the smaller congress, and topping the design with simple timber trusses. On the ground floor, a total of 674 seats reserved for the assemblymen were arranged in a semi-circular order. Auditor rooms were placed on the first floor and divided into East, South and West sections with 314 seats. The president's office was situated behind the podium of the chamber with pathways linked to the main building and other offices surrounding the building. On the façade, a bare pediment was placed on top of the main entry with simple string courses and minimal decorations.⁵¹

This simple design revealed that due to a restricted building site, limited time and budget, the new government had no choice but to yield to this practical arrangement. Unlike the Qing court, the government also had no intention of showing its aspiration towards democracy through the construction of a splendid parliament building. In addition, the symbolic link between a Chinese classical style of architecture and political authority had not yet been created. Provincial assemblies still played an important role in connecting local powers to the central core as a direct channel to lead the policy-making of the government.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 186-9.

However, having an initial development of parliamentary democracy and a constitutional government built upon it did not guarantee that the whole political system was secure. What China had experienced in the first decade of its republican era was tireless strife, scandals, disruption and corruption.⁵² For example, the Beiyang government had convened two national assemblies in 1913 and in 1918 in Beijing. Many political elites tried to maintain a basic form of parliamentary democracy in assemblies, but as it turned out neither of the two cabinets lasted very long.

Primarily, in northern China, a wide range of land was controlled by warlords, a rising power based on local military forces.⁵³ These warlords attempted to seize more power to sustain their local interests rather than to maintain the authority of the new Republic. In southern China, Sun Yat-sen managed to persuade 225 members of the former parliament to meet in Guangdong and proceed to the presidential election. Sun was later elected as an extraordinary President in the Guangdong Provincial Assembly Hall and devoted himself to his project for national unification.⁵⁴ Even so, Sun's power base in the south was not stable enough to fight against southern warlords. It was not until Chiang Kai-shek gathered sufficient forces to launch the Northern Expedition from Guangdong in 1926 that China was united as a whole.

⁵² Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 281-8.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 288-94.

⁵⁴ Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 296-7.



Fig. 6-18 The Hall of Supreme Harmony.




Fig. 6-19 The Plan for the Reconstruction of the Hall of Supreme Harmony for the National Assembly.

In 1923, ten years after the Assembly was first convened, Wu Jing-lian (吳景濂) (1873-1944) the head of the House of Councillors, and his counterpart in the House of Representatives, Wang Jia-xiang (王家襄) (1872-1928), proposed a new plan for the parliament to move into the Three Front Halls of the Forbidden City. During that time, the abdicated Qing Emperor Puyi still lived in the Inner Court of the City. The main reason for formulating this plan was that Rothkegel's design was thought too crude to be a decent place for national ceremonies. The royal palaces, especially the grand Three Front Halls in the City, were an ideal place to satisfy political needs. In addition, refitting these Halls for parliament also prevented the defunct emperor or other ambitious politicians from restoring the throne.⁵⁵

The Swedish architect Albin Stark (1885-1960) was commissioned to redesign the Three Front Halls for this new purpose. In his original plan, Stark proposed that a new chamber be constructed within the existing Hall of Supreme Harmony with two extended rooms built on both flanks as reception halls for visiting dignitaries.

⁵⁵ Sang Ye and Geremie R. Barmé, 'A Beijing That Isn't,' *China Heritage Quarterly* 2 (June 2008), accessed 20 June 2012, http://chinaheritageneWSletter.anu.edu.au/features.php?searchterm=014_BeijingThatWasnt.inc&issue=014

This refitting consisted of 1200 seats placed in the middle of the Hall with a semi-circular seating arrangement. The other two Halls sited behind the Hall of Supreme Harmony on the same axis would be refurbished as offices serving the new parliament.⁵⁶

It is reasonable to argue that this redesigned plan conveyed a clear message: the symbolic centre of defunct imperial power would be replaced by the centre of Republican parliamentary power. Operating on the same site, this new parliament would represent the nation's ruling legitimacy inherited from the old Chinese empire by the new-born state. However, Wu Pei-fu (吳佩孚) (1874-1939), a powerful northern warlord whose power base was in Beijing, fiercely opposed this building project. He argued that if the Three Front Halls were refitted or worse, demolished, for the parliament, China would lose its most magnificent ancient monument forever. Due to Wu's strong objection to this project, Stark's plans had no chance of leaving the drawing board. However, this project was the first to attempt to transform previous political legitimacy into the new state's parliament building. This attempt also repeatedly appeared in later arguments and shifted the direction of parliament design in China.

When Nanjing was selected to be the new capital in 1928 under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, urban planning was used as an important visual tool to represent the glory of the Chinese nation. Erecting impressive governmental buildings in the city became the major focus of Nanjing's reconstruction, although this form of city reconstruction had begun in Guangzhou's city plan. In 1918, Sun Yat-sen had mentioned the importance of the state-oriented city and territorial

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

planning in his book *the International Development of China* (實業計畫) (1920).⁵⁷ Sun Ke, the son of Sun Yat-sen, also published an article in an urban planning magazine to support his father's idea.⁵⁸ Sun Ke showed his early interest in urban planning when he was the mayor of Guangzhou. In 1922, he noticed Henry Murphy's designs in the Christian communities and invited him to give advice on Guangzhou's city plan.⁵⁹ That was the first time that Murphy extended his influence outside the Christian communities.

In Guangzhou's city plan, Murphy introduced the Western radial road system to reconstruct Guangzhou's city fabrication. Murphy attempted to echo the westernised reforms advocated by the Nationalist government throughout his design. He tried to keep the traditional features of the city by decorating public buildings with a Chinese classical style. He placed these buildings on the climax of new urban axis to highlight the importance of these buildings.⁶⁰ It was the first time that Murphy brought his idea of an 'adaptive Chinese architectural renaissance' to urban design, although the plan faltered due to the subsequent military rebellion in Guangzhou.⁶¹ However, through the relationship with Sun Ke and the experience of Guangzhou urban planning, Murphy was hired as chief architectural adviser to the Nationalist government for the Nanjing capital plan in 1928.⁶² It was a great opportunity for Murphy to show his ability to create a new vision of a Chinese modern city.

It should be noted that the fact the Nationalist government chose Nanjing as a

⁵⁷ Wang, '國民政府時期南京首都計畫之研究 (*On the Capital Plan of Nanjing in the Nationalist Era of China, 1928-1937*)', 75-9.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 80

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 90-91.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 91.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 90.

⁶² Jeffery W. Cody, 'American Planning in Republican China, 1911-1937,' *Planning Perspectives* 11, no. 4 (October 1996): 355.

new capital had multiple symbolic meanings. First of all, Nanjing had been a capital in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) from 1368 to 1421. The capital was then moved to Beijing until the Qing Dynasty came into existence. Selecting Nanjing to replace Beijing as capital had symbolised that it was Ming, but not Qing, who fully represented the Confucian orthodoxy of the Han national culture, since it was the Manchu empire who had occupied the mainland of Han and who had contaminated the pure Han culture for hundreds of years.⁶³ Reconstructing Nanjing as a capital revealed the aspiration that the government wished to revive Han orthodoxy and reconnect the link between a new modern state and the nation's glorious past. In addition, Sun Yat-sen, the most important political master of the KMT, was elected as Republic's first president in Nanjing. Choosing Nanjing as a capital also indicated that the party would follow the teaching of Sun and continue his political legacy. The practical reason for this decision, however, was that the government did not have a stable power base in northern China. For the Nationalist government, Nanjing was a better choice than Beijing, in order to keep a capital with a strong connection with the south.⁶⁴

⁶³ Charles D. Musgrove, 'Monumentality in Nanjing's Sun Yat-sen Memorial Park,' *Southeast Review of Asian Studies* 29 (January 2007): 4.

⁶⁴ Wang, '國民政府時期南京首都計畫之研究 (On the Capital Plan of Nanking in the Nationalist Era of China, 1928-1937),' 135-6.



Fig. 6-20 Murphy's Plan for the Reconstruction of Nanjing, 1929.

In 1929, Murphy presented his plan for the reconstruction of Nanjing as a capital city to the Nationalist government. Inspired by Pierre Charles L'Enfant's urban design for Washington DC, Murphy brought his vision of a modern Chinese capital to Nanjing.⁶⁵ Following the suggestion that the committee of capital design had made, Murphy placed the district of central government at the foot of Purple Mountain. There are two main reasons for this choice. First of all, the distance between Purple Mountain and center of Nanjing allowed the city enough land for future expansion. Compared to the crowded old town, suburban areas also made it easier for designers to initiate new urban development.⁶⁶ In addition, the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum was located on the hillside of the Purple Mountain. Establishing the central government district directly under the Mausoleum symbolised that the doctrine of Sun Yat-sen still led the party and the government.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Cody, *Building in China*, 17-19.

⁶⁶ Wang, '國民政府時期南京首都計畫之研究 (*On the Capital Plan of Nanjing in the Nationalist Era of China, 1928-1937*)', 156.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 182.



Fig. 6-21 Murphy's Drawing of Nanjing's District of Central Government, 1929.

In his proposal, Murphy placed the headquarters of the KMT in the first part of the building complex on top of the axis linked to the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum. The headquarters was not only the tallest building in this district, but also contained a huge meeting hall comprised of 3000 seats for party members. The middle group of buildings contained the president's offices and residential area, including a 1500 seat meeting room and a vast banquet hall. The third part of the building complex was a series of governmental houses. Offices and other service spaces were arranged around these houses and linked by pathways with plenty of open spaces.⁶⁸

Following the pattern of Guangzhou's urban design, Murphy also attempted to apply his principles of a modern Chinese city and architecture to Nanjing's reconstruction projects. He created a vivid image of China's new capital through classical form and style to establish an explicit connection with the Imperial past. In addition, it is important to note that Murphy arranged these buildings with a clear hierarchical system conforming to party ideology. The axis with the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum dominated the whole arrangement of these buildings. The headquarters of the KMT was placed under the Mausoleum, and the governmental

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 180-1

buildings were placed under the headquarters. This set of relationships conveyed a clear message that the KMT and its political doctrine played a decisive role in leading the nation towards a promising future. Although Murphy's plan was eventually not accepted by the Nationalist government, his design still enormously influenced other proposals presented after him.




Fig. 6-22 Huang Yu-yu and Zhu Shen-kang's Design of Nanjing's District of Central Government




Fig. 6-23 Sun Ke's Design of Nanjing's District of Central Government

In order to find a better plan, the committee of capital design held a competition in 1929. As a result, Huang Yu-yu and Zhu Shen-kang's designs were favoured by the juries. Also influenced by L'Enfant's capital design, Huang and Zhu drew up a plan combining Beaux-Art aesthetics and Chinese classical styles for Nanjing's urban reconstruction. Like Murphy, the headquarters of the KMT were still placed on top of the axis dominating the whole plan. A wide avenue along the axis was created to link the headquarters, a central monument and other

governmental buildings.⁶⁹ This avenue also highlighted the monumentality of the capital, with Nanjing being represented as the most important city of the nation.

Under the instruction of Chiang Kai-shek, however, the central government district was to move back to the Ming old town.⁷⁰ Several proposals based on this new decision were then presented to the government by different designers, including Lu Yan-zhi and Sun Ke, and their designs to some extent, still showed the influence of Murphy's original plan.⁷¹ Due to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, not all of these plans had the chance to be implemented, although many public and party buildings constructed before the War had already followed the principle formulated by these plans.⁷² As it turned out, more and more architects paid special attention to visualising the nation through their plans. Chinese classical styles gradually became more nationally symbolic and were widely adopted in many of Nanjing's party and governmental buildings, reflecting a new trend in architecture in a more modern China.



Fig. 6-24 The Grand Hall of the National Assembly.



Fig. 6-25 The Meeting Hall.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 183.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 222.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 256

⁷² *Ibid.*, 210.



Fig. 6-26 The First National Assembly in Nanjing.




Fig. 6-27 The First National Assembly in Nanjing.

Among these buildings, the Great Hall of the National Assembly was the one which fully represented the new development of architectural design in Nanjing. In 1935, the Nationalist Government ratified a new constitution and planned to hold a new election for the National Assembly. According to the new constitution based on Sun Yat-sen's political philosophy, the government still adopted a bicameral system, but the role of the National Assembly had been changed. The Legislative Yuan was now a general parliament giving delegates an authority to enact bills. The National Assembly was a special parliament mainly designed for electing the president and for amending the constitution.⁷³

In 1935, in order to house the National Assembly, a design competition was held to select the best plan for the new parliament. In the brief for the competition, the committee primarily asked every participant to produce a design showing explicit Chinese architectural features on the façade. In addition, the building was not to be confined only to political usage. Initially planned to be a multiple functional architecture, other performances, such as music and theatre were also to

⁷³ Wu Siou-ling 吳秀玲, '國民大會的憲政原理與實際運作 (the Constitutional Principle and Practices of the National Assembly),' *Journal of Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall* 16 (November 2005): 37-56.

be allowed on the stage.⁷⁴

The final winner of the competition was the architect Si Fu-quan (奚福泉) (1903-83). Si successfully combined the merit of refined Western design methods with the features of Chinese architectural traditions to create an impressive parliament space. In this symmetrical layout, Si arranged a classroom-like meeting hall set behind a small but imposing lobby. The meeting hall consisted of 2500 seats for the assemblymen on the ground and first floor. Many cutting-edge facilities, such as air conditioners, fire-fighting equipment and new election counting systems were installed in the building, making it possible to satisfy demands for both political meetings and entertainment performances.⁷⁵

When the building was completed in 1936, it was immediately used for the meeting of the new National Assembly. However, during the Second Sino-Japanese War, Nanjing was under Japanese occupation. The building would not function as a parliament again until the nationalist government reclaimed the city.

Undoubtedly, Si Fu-quan's design was one of the best representative examples of the parliament building type in modern Chinese architecture. Although the Nationalist government was forced to retreat to Taiwan after 1949, Chiang Kai-shek continued to seek a suitable building design which could fully reflect his aspiration of restoring parliamentary democracy and Chinese nationalism in Taiwan under his leadership. In this context, Taiwan's Chungshan Building was expected to surpass the success of Nanjing's grand hall of national assembly in the

⁷⁴ Zhu Ming 朱明, '國民大會堂 (The Great Hall of the National Assembly),' *鍾山風雨 (Zhong Shan Feng Yu)*, December 2002, 55. Also see Du Xing 杜興, '南京國民大會堂---夭折的憲政夢 (The Nanjing Great Hall of the National Assembly and the Shatter of Constitutional Dream),' *國家歷史 (National History)*, September 2008, 29.

⁷⁵ Zhu Ming 朱明, '國民大會堂 (The Great Hall of the National Assembly),' 55.

post-war era.

6-3 The Making of the Chungshan Building

Of China's parliament building types, the Chungshan Building is one of the most important and distinctive cases. This building shows the great potential for the adaptation of the Chinese classical style on new building types. With Chiang Kai-shek's instructions and alterations, architect Siou Ze-lan (修澤蘭) (1925-) thoroughly embodied Chiang's vision of Chinese national imagination through her design. Architecture became one of the best tools for certain ambitious politicians to visualise their political ideology and will in physical form.

Not long after the retreat to Taiwan, the Nationalist government expropriated most public buildings constructed by the Japanese colonial regime. Although well designed for the needs of administration, numerous financial difficulties meant that the government was left with no choice but to re-use these buildings. It was not until the Nanhai Academy had been established, the first district specially reserved for large cultural and educational facilities, did new development of Taiwan's governmental architecture occur.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ More details about the Nanhai Academy please see the Chapter 5.



Fig. 6-28 The full View of the Taiwan Provincial Consultative Council Hall.



Fig. 6-29 The Square in Front of the Hall.



Fig. 6-30 The Chamber under the Centre Dome.



Fig. 6-31 The Main Entrance.

The earliest assembly hall that built in Taiwan under Chiang regime was the Council Hall for the Taiwan Provincial Consultative Council in 1957. The Council belonged to the Taiwan Provincial Government, and originally adopts the Taiwan Education Association Building as offices and an assembly hall. After the Government completely moved to the Zhongxing New Village (中興新村), a new planned town in the midst of Taiwan, the new Council Hall was decided to locate in Wufeng (霧峰), a small town close to the Village. In the design, the architect Lin Bo-nian (林柏年) attempted to create a new form of democratic space placing the chamber in the middle of the building under a huge dome. The image of the centre dome associate to the classical design of Palladio's *Villa La Rotonda*. As Raymond Quek has pointed out, during the Neoclassical period Palladianism exists in many

countries from Britain, America, Brazil, Finland to Singapore. As a popular form usually adopted by the most important civic architecture, Palladianism represents a civic space led to an association of statehood and nationhood.⁷⁷

Except the Palladian dome, the Council Hall was also cladding with the Chinese classical style by a simplified manner. On the façade, a row of white columns formed a long corridor in the front that made the bright red timber doors become the main focus of the entrance. The doors was decorated with Chinese traditional patterns which were usually adopted to the traditional main doors. It was no doubt that this Council Hall was an early attempt of Taiwan' parliament building design to connect China's classical traditions with some notable Western features for expressing the determination of the government towards parliamentary democracy through a visual form.

However, the plan to find the permanent places for central government's bicameral system had encountered some difficulties. Initially, the Legislative Yuan occupied Taipei City Hall (中山堂), a meeting place especially designed for Taipei's public assemblies during the colonial era. Later, it moved to the auditorium of the Taipei Municipal Girls High School (中山女高) and other buildings near that area, to form the new political district in Taipei city centre. Although these spaces were a little bit tight, they still could accommodate all members of the Legislative Yuan and their assistants. However the other parliament, the National Assembly, did not find a permanent place to house the delegates' offices and regular meetings until the issue of constructing a grand hall for nationwide assemblies was raised.

⁷⁷ Raymond Quek, 'Nationalism and Architecture: An Introduction,' in *Nationalism and Architecture*, ed. Raymond Quek, Darren Deane and Sarah Butler (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 8.

In 1957, several generals in the Institute for Defense (國防研究院) commissioned the architect Siou Ze-lan to design a two-storey residence on the Yangming Mountain for Chiang Kai-shek, as a gift for his birthday. When Chiang saw the design, he summoned Siou and asked her to change it from a presidential residence to a grand hall for political assemblies and a reception hall for foreign dignitaries.⁷⁸ Chiang believed that what the nation currently needed was an impressive hall for political meetings that would exhibit the beauty of Chinese traditional culture and architecture for diplomatic purposes.⁷⁹ However, Chiang's idea was not implemented due to financial problems in the early ruling period. Not until 1965, eight years after Chiang came up with the idea, did he call on the architect once again with a request to continue this building project.⁸⁰

There are two main reasons that explain why Chiang wanted to continue this building project at that time. First of all, in order to commemorate Sun Yat-sen's centenary birthday in 1966 and his political achievements for modern China, Chiang decided to erect a splendid monumental building named after him.⁸¹ Chiang believed that only by following the cultural and political legacy that Sun had left to his generation could Confucian orthodoxy and Republican legitimacy be maintained. Constructing a building named after Sun showed that Chiang had committed himself to the accomplishment of Sun's political thoughts.⁸² In addition, in 1965, Mao Ze-dong (1893-1976), the leader of Communist China, had just

⁷⁸ Siou Ze-lan 修澤蘭, '中山樓設計 (The Design of the Chung-shan Building)' (An address for the anniversary of the inauguration of the Chungshan Building, the Chungshan Building, Taipei, 20 May 1998).

⁷⁹ Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石, '中山樓中華文化堂落成紀念文 (An Article for the Inauguration of the Chungshan Building's Chinese Cultural Hall),' *中華文化復興月刊 (Chinese Cultural Renaissance Monthly)*, March 1968, 143.

⁸⁰ Siou, '中山樓設計 (The Design of the Chung-shan Building).'

⁸¹ Sun Yat-sen's courtesy name is Chung-shan. Therefore, the official name of the building would be the Chungshan Building.

⁸² Chiang, '中山樓中華文化堂落成紀念文 (An Article for the Inauguration of the Chungshan Building's Chinese Cultural Hall),' 3.

launched the Cultural Revolution on the mainland. In Chiang's view, this Revolution was a vicious campaign which would lead the nation to the catastrophic end of its own traditional culture and society. Before Chinese national culture was completely destroyed, Chiang claimed that it was necessary to fight against the Revolution with the aim of reviving Chinese national culture in Free China.⁸³ Erecting a marvellous building as a cultural showcase to display the beauty of Chinese national culture became a pivotal task to show Chiang's promotion of the anti-Communist cultural policy.




Fig. 6-32 The Full View of the Chung-shan Building.

Located on the hillside of the Youngming Mountain, the Chungshan Building was built behind the Institute of Revolutionary Practice (革命實踐研究院). Initiated as the Party's think tank with Chiang's full support, this Institute was a political organisation aimed at fostering a new generation of political elites.⁸⁴ Therefore,

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁸⁴ ‘革命實踐研究院 (The Institute of Revolutionary Practice),’ 中華百科全書 (Chinese Encyclopedia), 260

placing the Institute and the Building on the same slope of the Mountain was an ideal choice to form a new political hub in Taipei's suburban area. However, there was a natural environmental problem on this site which needed to be overcome before the building project was approved. An active sulfurous vent linked to the dead volcano of the Mountain was situated at the heart of the site. This vent became an unpredictable engineering challenge for the architect building any construction on top of it.

Despite this challenge, Chiang had a strong reason for persisting in constructing his ideal parliament building on this site, even though the natural conditions were so harsh. According to Di De-yin (狄德蔭), the current curator of the Chungshan Building, Chiang was very superstitious about *Fung-shui*, a Chinese traditional system of geomantic beliefs. This site was believed to be an auspicious landscape with a high mountain at the back, two hills on both flanks and a valley in front to give visitors a bird's-eye view of Taipei city centre. Di also claims that there is an imperial axis connecting the Building itself, the Shilin Official Residence and the Grand Hotel on Yuanshan Mountain to the Office of the President in Taipei city centre. This important symbolic axis was claimed to bolster Chiang's regime in Taiwan and assure his dream of the re-unification of the Chinese nation in the future.⁸⁵

Therefore, Chiang paid special attention to the construction of the building to ensure that this building would be erected exactly in the way that he expected. In an interview, the architect Siou Ze-lan confirmed that Chiang not only summoned

Encyclopedia Online), accessed 31 July 2012, http://ap6.pccu.edu.tw/encyclopedia_media/main-h.asp?id=2587.

⁸⁵ Phoenix TV, 'The Chungshan Building and the Imperial Axis,' video posted 11 January 2011, accessed 31 July 2012, <http://v.ifeng.com/his/201101/638af26b-1ed7-41c8-9b0f-7ceb16496e.shtml>

her many times to the presidential residence to discuss the design concept, but also directly altered the design by drawing on the blueprint three times. Chiang used different coloured pens to highlight the areas that he thought needed to be altered and wrote down his opinions.⁸⁶ Chiang expressly requested that the building should have explicit Chinese features. In addition, the grand meeting hall should consist of 1200 seats with a vast restaurant serving at least 2000 people. Chiang also pointed out that a new staircase needed to be added to the corridor which linked the lobby to the main hall, and some unnecessary decorations should be reduced in size to save more space for the restaurant.⁸⁷ As well as Chiang, Soong May-ling (宋美齡) (1898-2003), Chiang's wife, offered her advice on the interior design. She selected furniture for meeting rooms and the president's living rooms, and spent a great deal of time confirming the final decoration work on the whole building.⁸⁸ During the process of architectural design, Siou faithfully altered her design to follow Chiang and Soong's ideas and requirements. In the end, the final result revealed that Siou had completed not only an impressive assembly hall, but a symbolic statement which combined Chiang's vision of an ideal parliament building with Chinese traditional architectural elements serving his own political needs.

⁸⁶ Jhou Tian-ruei 周天瑞, '中山樓從藍圖到營建完工完全出自蔣公精心設計 (From blueprint to completion, the construction of the Chungshan Building was entirely led by Chiang's marvelous ideas),' *中國時報 (China Times)*, 14 April 1975. However, the original blueprint had been burned by accident. See Siou, '中山樓設計 (The Design of the Chungshan Building).'

⁸⁷ Jhou, '中山樓從藍圖到營建完工完全出自蔣公精心設計 (From the blueprint to completion, the construction of the Chung-shan Building was entirely led by Chiang's marvelous ideas).'

⁸⁸ Siou, '中山樓設計 (The Design of the Chung-shan Building).'



Fig. 6-33 The Main Entrance.



Fig. 6-34 The Courtyard.



Fig. 6-35 The Round Reception Room.



Fig. 6-36 The Staircase.

Graduating from the National Central University, one of the strongholds of China's Beaux-Arts training schools, there is no doubt that Siou Ze-lan was familiar with the design skills of using new architectural materials and technology to express Chinese classical architectural features in modern building design. In the Chungshan Building, Siou fully showed her outstanding ability in constructing a totally modern functional building clad with remarkable Chinese characters. In order to gain inspiration, Siou went to the Taipei's National Palace Museum to examine their collection of Chinese antiquities and furniture. Later she applied her studies to the building design. For example, the unique Chinese traditional patterns of animals that Siou learned from the ancient ritual bronzes made in the Shang

Dynasty (1600 B.C.-1046 B.C.) were carved on the bright red wooden main doors to welcome the visitors. The other famous furniture was the palace lanterns.⁸⁹ Designed by Siou, more than 400 handcrafted lanterns hang in the pillars, ceilings and walls decorated the whole building in a lavish way. But perhaps the most well-known design was the longevity stairway. In order to celebrate Sun Yat-sen's centenary birthday, Siou designed the stairway which had exact one hundred steps wound up the hillside to lead visitors going up from the gateway entrance, the Chinese style arch to the grand lobby of the Building. Looking down from above, the stairway was in an exact shape of Chinese calligraphy of 'longevity'.

In the layout, Siou divided the whole building complex into two parts and linked these with wide corridors and courtyards, which in turn were surrounded by small meeting rooms and offices. The main reason for doing this was that the building was built on a site with two different geological conditions. The front part of the ground was full of sandstone and mudstone; the rear part was based on a hard rock stratum. The differential settlement might cause a severe damage to the building, if the structural design failed to consider the uneven sinking rate. Therefore, dividing construction into two parts was a practical way to erect building on this base. As a result, Siou placed a low building volume in the front with tall in the rear. Her tactics not only made the building comply with the specific geological condition, but also echoed the hillside of the Youngming maintain.

On the ground floor of the front part, an anteroom and a meeting room were used to receive important guests and foreign dignitaries to the nation. The second floor was Chiang's personal living room and secret office. Only the highest

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

officials and closest advisers were allowed to meet Chiang in this room.⁹⁰ The third floor was a reception room emulating the style of the Temple of Heaven in Beijing. The façade of this room was a prominent structure with a round layout and a conical roof to highlight the entrance of the building.



Fig. 6-37 The Grand Meeting Hall.



Fig. 6-38 The Restaurant.




Fig. 6-39 The Layout of the Grand Meeting Hall.

The ground floor in the rear part of the building was a vast meeting hall

⁹⁰ It is said that the Chiang's personal living room was decorated with Chinese antique furniture and ornaments selected by Soony May-ling. The secret office was used as a cabinet for Chiang and his trust officers and high-ranking generals to hold meetings discussing the plan to recover mainland China during the Cold War period. However, currently these rooms are not open to the public. So the anecdotes cannot be confirmed.

consisting of 1800 seats. The classroom-like layout was adopted for the arrangement of the seats in the same direction facing the podium. Above the hall was a huge restaurant which could serve 2000 guests dining at the same time. Both the meeting hall and the restaurant were lavishly adorned with Chinese royal decorations. A massive 14 metre tall roof constructed using a steel frame and enveloped by Chinese green tiles was placed on the top dominating the whole building complex. The roof was also visually the highest spot which gave an unimpeded view from the main gate outwards.

To fight against the sulfurous gas and hot springs coming up from the vent, the architect Siou and the other engineers conceived a new method to overcome this problem. Because the stage of the grand hall was built directly on the top of the vent, the whole building foundation had to have total protection to strengthen its structure. First of all, drainpipes were set up on the vent to channel most of the gas and hot springs off the building site. The vent was also covered by a huge amount of concrete to protect the building base. This method considerably reduced the chance that the chemicals would permeate through the base to the building in the first place. To this day the sulfurous concentration in the building can still be controlled to tolerable levels.⁹¹ In addition, in order to prevent the steel rebars in the foundation from being eroded by sulfur, Siou developed a method of wrapping these rebars in different layers of asphalt felt and aluminum foil before being anchored into the concrete. This new method proved successful in protecting the rebars from being destroyed by the toxic chemical.⁹² As it turned out, the Chungshan Building became the only construction in the world built directly above a sulfurous vent.

⁹¹ Siou, '中山樓設計 (The Design of the Chung-shan Building).'

⁹² *Ibid.*



Fig. 6-40 Chiang Kai-shek Oversaw the Construction Site with Architect Siou.



Fig. 6-41 Chiang Kai-shek Reading the Blueprint with Engineer Fu Ji-Kuan.

The inauguration date of the building in 1966 was chosen to coincide with the commemoration of Sun Yat-sen's centenary birthday. There were only thirteen months left for the architect, engineers and builders to carry out the whole building project before the date arrived. At least twice a week, Chiang Kai-shek would visit the construction site and oversee progress to ensure that this building was constructed exactly following his requests.⁹³ As a result, the Chungshan Building became a renowned parliament building that faithfully conveyed the political message that Chiang meant to deliver in visual form during the Cold War period. Its distinguishing characteristics and classical interior design also gave the visitors a strong sense of 'Chinese-ness'.

After the inauguration, the Chungshan Building drew lavish praise from the public. Most of comments focused on how the architect successfully translated

⁹³ *Ibid.*

Chinese traditional architectural principles into modern building form without conflict and discord. However, Siou's design also revealed some limitations about the application of Chinese classical styles to modern usage. As Fu Chao-ching points out, the arrangement of space in the building was largely restricted by the colossal roof. The proportion of the roof also diminished the balance of building forms that Chinese traditional craftsmen would value.⁹⁴ It is also true that the increasing role played by certain political leaders in the work of art left little room for artistic creation. However, even though this Building had such defects, it did not hinder it from being claimed as one of the most outstanding buildings in post-war Taiwan.

It is also important to note that the inauguration date of the Building was also the starting date of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement. In the inauguration address, Chiang announced that the Movement had officially begun. A serial of cultural policies implemented in the Nanjing Decade now continued to be promoted in Taiwan. As Lin Guo-sian argues, Chiang attempted to censor the content of art works, such as literature, music, plays and films, to reflect new political needs in the period of national restoration in Taiwan.⁹⁵ Chiang also emphasised that the government under his rule was the true inheritor of Chinese Confucian orthodoxy. For Chiang, protecting Chinese culture from being destroyed by the Chinese Communist Party was one of the most important missions in his political career.⁹⁶ It implied that the legitimacy of China's national culture and politics would be tightly held by Chiang and his regime through leadership of the

⁹⁴ Fu, *中國古典式樣新建築 (New Architecture in the Chinese Classical Style)*, 273-4.

⁹⁵ Lin Guo-sian 林果顯, '中華文化復興運動推行委員會之研究 (1966-1975) (The study of the committee of the Chinese cultural renaissance movement)' (MA dissertation, National Chengchi University, 2001), 30.

⁹⁶ Chiang, '中山樓中華文化堂落成紀念文 (An article for the inauguration of the Chungshan Building's Chinese cultural hall)', 3.

Movement in Taiwan. In this political context, the Chungshan Building became an essential metaphor connecting prescribed meanings of culture with a selected national past in certain desired ways. After the success of the Chungshan Building, a series of new public buildings, such as Taipei's National Palace Museum, were also erected and used to strengthen the image of Taiwan as a liberalised island, one which could completely represent the 'authentic' national culture of China.⁹⁷

Aside from being used as propaganda to support Chiang's cultural policies, the Chungshan Building also served as a reception hall to receive foreign presidents, diplomats and politicians. For example, the World League for Freedom and Democracy, founded by Chiang in 1966, held regular meetings in the Building.⁹⁸ The KMT's National Congress and the plenary session of the central committee also routinely took place in the Building.⁹⁹ In 1971, the government decided to move the National Assembly from the Taipei city hall to the Chungshan Building permanently.¹⁰⁰ The Chungshan Building became one of the most highly politicalised spaces, holding president elections and constitutional amendments, and where the presidents of the ROC conducted inauguration ceremonies and state dinners.¹⁰¹ It was these cultural policies and political events which made the Building the most important parliament house in Taiwan at that time. Ironically, under the control of martial law and the one-party system established by the KMT, real parliamentary democracy in the Western sense did not actually appear in this

⁹⁷ More details about the relationship between the National Palace Museum and the Chinese culture renaissance movement please see Chapter 5.

⁹⁸ Kao Chin-ming 高金明, '陽明山中山樓策略定位之研究 (The Study of the Strategic Positioning of Cultural Heritage in Taipei: an Analysis of the Chung Shang Hall on Yaming Shan)' (MA dissertation, National Taipei University, 2008), 56-60.

⁹⁹ Anonymous, '國民黨第十次全國大表大會今天將在中山樓揭幕 (The 10th KMT National Congress will Be held in the Chungshan Building),' *聯合報 (United Daily News)*, 29 March 1969.

¹⁰⁰ Anonymous, '陽明山中山樓將作國大議場 (The National Assembly will move to the Chungshan Building),' *聯合報 (United Daily News)*, 06 December 1971.

¹⁰¹ Anonymous, '總統副總統明宣示就職 (Chiang Kai-shek will swear in as President tomorrow in the Chungshan Building),' *中國時報 (China Times)*, 19 May 1972.

Building.¹⁰²

It is no surprise that in the post-martial law era when Taiwan gradually advanced on the road to true democracy, the Chungshan Building was viewed as the symbol of Chiang and the KMT's authoritarian rule. As Charles Musgrove has noted, the message of the monuments will experience an enormous change after the designers and builders are finished with them. An unintentional result will be to shift the original prescribed meanings of the monuments.¹⁰³ In other words, when the construction work was finished, the original symbolic meaning of the Chungshan Building would inevitably encounter challenges from different interpretations. For example, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the biggest opposition party in Taiwan, used the Chungshan Building as one of the main stages for its political protests against the KMT, and in the first decade of the post martial law era, the KMT gradually lost its power to dominate the cultural landscape created by its early dictatorial rule.

In 1989, the DDP strongly urged that the Chungshan Building should be opened up equally to other parties, to hold their plenary sessions like the KMT did. The government and the DDP, however, had disagreements about the arrangement of certain political symbols, such as Sun Yat-sen's and Chiang Kai-shek's portraits and statues, the national flag and emblem. In the end, they came to an acceptable compromise that the party flag and the national flag could hang on the stage together. Most slogans coined during the totalitarian period which were decorated the walls could be covered temporarily. The DDP insisted on omitting the general

¹⁰² Roy, *Taiwan*, 81-88.

¹⁰³ For example, the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C., began as a monument to symbolise that the United States' racial problems had been resolved. But the site unintentionally turned into a perfect stage for continued social protests. See Musgrove, 'Monumentality in Nanjing's Sun Yat-sen Memorial Park,' 13.

meeting practices introduced by the KMT, that every person in the meeting hall should pay tribute to Sun Yat-sen's portrait and sing the national anthem.¹⁰⁴ This gesture indicated that the DDP were unwilling to submit themselves to the national identity and ideology constructed by Chiang and his party, and occupying the Chungshan Building was viewed a radical challenge to the political doctrines established by the KMT.

Starting from the late 1970s, Chiang's cultural policies could hardly serve as a panacea for the erosion of national symbols in the new international situation. More and more countries recognised the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, not Chiang's regime in Taiwan.¹⁰⁵ The rise of Taiwanese consciousness in the island also challenged Chiang's administration, despite attempts to maintain its undemocratic rule by upholding its national and political mythology.¹⁰⁶ The main sticking point was that the nationalist government's weak link with the Chinese nation was maintained by the idea of legitimate succession. The constitution adopted in Taiwan at that time was enacted in Nanjing in 1946. The representatives who had been elected on the basis of this constitution on the mainland continued in office in Taiwan. Under the protection of the temporary provisions effected during the period of communist rebellion, these veteran members could occupy their seats and enjoy privilege for life until the ROC reunited with China in the future and held elections on the mainland.¹⁰⁷ In this regard, it can hardly be said that these assemblymen totally represented the population who were born in Taiwan.

¹⁰⁴ He Syu-chu 何旭初, '民進黨借用中山樓獲准, 國旗與黨旗將配合插掛 (DPP's request to use the Chungshan Building had been approved; the National flag and the party flag will hang on the hall as required),' *聯合報 (United Daily News)*, 27 July 1989. More details about the general meeting practices see the Chapter 7.

¹⁰⁵ Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 35.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 37

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 38 and 56-57.

In 1990, the members of the National Assembly sought to consolidate and expand their own powers and privileges. Their actions immediately led to an unprecedented chain of public protests. Following the model of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, these protesters, mainly students, organised sit-ins and strikes in the square of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall to show their support for real constitutional reform.¹⁰⁸ This wave of protests led to more large-scale demonstrations spreading all the way to the Chungshan Building. The main avenue that linked the Taipei city centre to the Yangming Mountain was blocked because of the demonstration. To show their support for constitutional reform, the DDP assemblymen broke the windows and as a means of protest overthrew the tables at the state dinner, which was prepared for these delegates who would vote for the next president the following month.¹⁰⁹ Although the presidential election was held as scheduled and Lee Teng-hui was appointed as the first Taiwanese president in history, the legislative violence had by then become part of Taiwan's political environment. The political status of the Chungshan Building and its relationship to the image of nationhood and the political arena was also challenged by these parliamentary riots.

Today, the National Assembly has been dissolved. Taiwan currently adopts unicameralism, and the Chungshan Building is no longer used as the parliament building. In 1999, the Building was listed as one of Taipei's historical buildings and is now open to the public as a tourist attraction. The meeting hall and the vast restaurant can be rented for private activities. After Soong May-ling's death in 2003, there was a wave of public interest in Chiang Kai-shek and his family's

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 58.

¹⁰⁹ Syu Lyu-bing 徐履冰, '李總統背著手最後一個離開中山樓 (President Lee Teng-hui was the last person who left the Chungshan Building),' 聯合報 (*United Daily News*), 20 February 1990.

legend, and the Building became a major nostalgic tourist attraction in Taipei.¹¹⁰ The splendid Chinese classical decorations in the building now serve as a reminder of its political and cultural history to a new generation.

To conclude, many dictators, such as Hitler and Stalin, made use of architecture to serve political will and ambition, particularly for propaganda purposes. For them, architecture was one of the best visual means of creating monumental spaces in the name of nation-building. In the history of modern Chinese architecture, many governmental buildings were used by politicians who attempted to maintain their regimes by producing prescribed political and cultural icons. Parliament buildings are a good example to illustrate that the processes and practices of political transformation in modern China were gathered and shaped in concrete and physical form. From the first parliament building constructed by the Qing court to the construction of the Chungshan building in Taiwan, architecture had become inseparable from the political arena.

What distinguishes the Chungshan Building was that it not only achieved a remarkably clear expression of an inherited relationship with Chinese national culture in form and style, but that Chiang Kai-shek was also involved in the design process. Even in the Qing dynasty, when the architects who were appointed to construct the parliament buildings for central and local governments were asked to adopt Western architectural styles, the design process was not directly interfered with by politicians. In the grand hall of the National Assembly in Nanjing, the architects were asked to follow the design principle that the Nanjing Capital Plan had established, but some spaces were still left for them to develop their own

¹¹⁰ Taylor, 'Qujianghua: Disposing of and Re-appraising the Remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Reign on Taiwan,' 193-4.

concepts. However, in the case of the Chungshan Building, from the outset Chiang Kai-shek directed the design process. The styles of the building were to conform to artistic principles of the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement, and the meeting hall was to be arranged in the classroom-like chamber preferred by a number of Leninist inspired political parties.¹¹¹

It is no surprise that in the post-martial law era, the Chungshan building, erected as iconic architecture under Chiang's totalitarian rule, would symbolically become one of the main battlefields in Taiwan's democratic reform. The ebb of Chinese nationalism in Taiwan transformed the Building from its role as an important parliament building and a significant cultural landmark to a nostalgic tourist spot. Ironically, it was only when the Building stopped being used as a parliament that the true parliamentary democracy that Chiang promised to implement in a free China arrived.

¹¹¹ As mentioned earlier, Russia and other Eastern European states preferred the class-room like chamber where the cabinet is seated behind the podium facing the delegates. This form of design reveals the nature of the KMT as a Leninist party. See Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 334-9.

Chapter Seven: In Remembrance of ‘National Saviours’: the Mausoleums, Monuments and the Memorial Halls

Before the presidential election in 2008 under the Democratic Progressive Party’s supervision, the *Qu-Jiang-hua* (去蔣化) campaign had reached a new climax. As discussed earlier, in a forum of the sixtieth anniversary of the 288 Incident, the previous President, Chen Shui-bian, accused Chiang Kai-shek of being the ‘true murderer,’ who should take full responsibility for the bloody military crackdown launched on 28 February 1949 in Taiwan. Chen also announced a plan to demolish the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, an impressive monumental building erected in honour of Chiang in Taipei city centre. He claimed that the name of the building should also be changed to the Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall. On 1st March 2007, the former premier of the Executive Yuan, Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌) (1947-), announced a project to tear down the perimeter wall of the Memorial Hall. In a number of years, the newly developed *Qu-Jiang-hua* campaign had intensified and threatened the survival of the Memorial Hall.

The *Qu-Jiang-hua* roughly translates as ‘de-Chiang-Kai-shek-ification’ in English. It was a term used to describe a political campaign aimed at removing references to the cult of Chiang Kai-shek in the Taiwanese landscape, and altering objects or sites that had been built to commemorate Chiang in the early years of his rule in Taiwan.¹ The earliest action of the campaign could be traced back to 1996 when Chen Shui-bian was the mayor of Taipei. Chen renamed the most notable road, *Jie-shou* Road (介壽路) which runs between the KMT headquarters

¹ Taylor, ‘*QuJianghua*: Disposing of and re-appraising the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek’s reign on Taiwan,’ 182.

to the Office of the President, as *Ketagalan* Boulevard (凱達格蘭大道).² As the new government attempted to tackle this political legacy left by Chiang's regime step by step, the *Qu-Jiang-hua* campaign would inevitably affect the most significant landmark of the cult of Chiang, the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall.

The Memorial Hall was built in honour of Chiang and his great contributions to the nation. He was seen as the national saviour and guardian of Free China. The building itself was the last and the most important one that adopted the Chinese classical style to serve the particular political ideology promoted by the Nationalist government in Taiwan. Like early Western monuments, many Chinese monumental buildings stemmed from grand mausoleums of great men or religious sacred places. Among the first which have modern architectural concepts is Nanjing's Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, designed by Lu Yan-zhi (呂彥直) (1894-1929) in 1925. Lu's design for Sun's mausoleum is a good example to illustrate that monumentality changed at the time that a new political culture was gradually taking shape. This Mausoleum combined Chinese imperial tomb traditions with a new emphasis on visual elements. Following the success of the Mausoleum, a series of new national ceremonies and cults were established with the aim of creating particular cultural and political codes in a Republican China.

In Taiwan, the government first built the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall under Chiang Kai-shek's supervision, and then constructed the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall after his death. Lu Yan-zhi's modern Chinese monumentality was first challenged by Wong Da-hong (王大閔) (1918-) who designed the Dr Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall, and was later succeeded by Yang Jhuo-cheng (楊卓成) (1914-2006) who designed the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. In the 1980s,

² *Jie-shou* road means 'the road for Chiang Kai-shek's longevity' in English; *Ketagalan* was the name of Taiwanese aborigines originally living in the Taipei area. See *Ibid.*, 187.

economic and social transformations helped to form a new force to undermine the unquestionable authority of the government and its representations in architecture. Chinese nationalism was no longer a dominant political ideology supporting the regime. Challenged by Taiwanese nationalism and growing political forces, the role of monumental buildings as part of the political struggles in Taiwan had experienced considerable change.

A series of questions has arisen as to how new perceptions of monumentality have emerged in Taiwan? How are these cultural and political codes produced? How to maintain them? What is their relationship to Chinese nationalism and modern Chinese monumentality? Why has their role changed, and which factors caused these changes?

In order to answer these questions, the establishment of Nanjing's Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall, Taipei's Dr Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall and the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall will be examined in this chapter. The issues of monumentality, the image-making of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek and national heroes will also be explored. The study period of this chapter starts from Sun's death in 1925 to the completion of Taipei's Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in the 1980s. Through the study, this thesis believes a close relationship between the construction of national saviours and its expressions in visual forms in postwar Taiwan will be fully presented.

7-1 Constructing a Grand Mausoleum for the National Saviour

Sun Yat-sen died shortly after arriving in Beijing on 12 March 1925. Sun

returned to Beijing with the purpose of unifying, pacifying and rebuilding the divided nation.³ Unfortunately, before he fulfilled this task, he was diagnosed with terminal cancer of the liver and later died in hospital.⁴ The public response to Sun's death was enormous. When his coffin was moved from the hospital to Beijing's Central Park for the funeral ceremony, there were around 700,000 individuals and representatives from over 1,000 organisations to pay homage to him.⁵ Small-scale polls conducted by Beijing's two universities revealed that of all Chinese contemporary politicians Sun Yat-sen was the most popular leader.⁶ People most admired Sun for raising and managing vast funds for the revolution, but he died with no personal fortune at all. Compared to his rivals and other warlords, Sun's honesty at a time of corruption made him an object of worship as a great man of the nation.⁷

Sun's followers also witnessed this degree of popular emotion at his funeral. It is no surprise that many politicians at that time appealed to the closeness of their political relationship with Sun to strengthen their power. Many KMT leaders tried to make use of his image and aura to claim that they were the true political heirs of Sun. Ironically, before his death, Sun was a symbolic figure for only a segment of the population, though the large procession that followed his funeral made him a new national icon.⁸

As Sun was a Christian, his family insisted on holding a Christian service in

³ Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 396-7.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 405.

⁵ Li Gong-zhong 李恭忠, '黨葬孫中山: 現代中國的儀式與政治 (The Party Funeral of Sun Yat-sen: Ritual and Politics in Early Twentieth Century of China),' *Journal of Tsinghua University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)* 21, no. 3 (May 2006): 63.

⁶ Pan Kuang-ceh 潘光哲, '國父形象的歷史形成 (The Making of the Image of China's National Founding Father),' paper presented at the Sixth Symposium on Dr. Sun Yat-sen and Modern China, Taipei 2003, 189.

⁷ Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 406.

⁸ Henrietta Harrison, *The Making of the Republican Citizen: Political Ceremonies and Symbols in China 1911-1929* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 146.

the hospital.⁹ For the KMT, this form of ceremony was not enough to illustrate Sun's contributions to the nation. His funeral had to conform to his political status as the founder of the new Republic. Therefore Sun's second funeral ceremony was held in Beijing Central Park. His coffin was placed in the centre of a provisional sacrificial hall for the public to honour him.¹⁰ During the ceremony, the crowd shouted slogans: 'Down with the warlords!' 'Down with imperialism!' A recording of Sun's previous speeches was played from loudspeakers, and movie projectors showed documentary footage of his activities.¹¹

During and after the funeral service, the KMT, with keen foresight, encouraged a mass national mourning phase so that people could 'receive tutelage from the dead.' This form of ceremony quickly spread all over the country. Other major cities in China copied Beijing's model to run their own ceremonies in remembrance of Sun, all under the KMT's supervision.¹² For three weeks the public filed past the body in homage as it lay in state, and then Sun's remains were moved to the Azure Clouds Temple (碧雲寺) in Beijing's suburbs.¹³

On his deathbed, Sun instructed the Party to place his remains on display like Lenin's and locate his tomb at Purple Mountain in Nanjing.¹⁴ The reason that Sun chose to be buried at the Purple Mountain was that the Mountain and the city had deep metaphorical meanings. First of all, Sun's tomb was to lie within the vast area of the first Ming Emperor's tomb. Zhu Yuan-zhang (朱元璋) (1328-98) was the founder of the Ming dynasty who had reclaimed the homeland of Han from the

⁹ Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 407.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 407.

¹¹ Harrison, *The Making of the Republican Citizen*, 142.

¹² *Ibid.*, 144-6.

¹³ Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 408.

¹⁴ Lai De-lin, 'Searching for a Modern Chinese Monument: The Design of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum in Nanjing,' *Journal of Society of Architectural Historians* 64, no. 1 (March 2005): 24.

rule of the Mongolian Yuan dynasty (1271-1368). In 1912, when the new Republic was established in Nanjing, Sun came to pay his respects at Zhu's tomb for his great achievement in the restoration of the Han race. Sun's worship symbolised that the Han race had finally reclaimed lost territory from a foreign dynasty once again. Sun attempted to make use of the historical and geographical link with the founder of the Ming to arouse the sentiments of Han nationalism.

Nanjing was also the capital that Sun had chosen for the new Republic. Nanjing was the capital of the Ming Empire from 1368 to 1421. During the rule of the Qing dynasty, the city had been a symbol of ethnic resistance. The Qing court forbade commoners from venturing near Zhu's tomb in order to prevent it from becoming a symbolic centre of revolt. But for Sun, Beijing was a Manchu city. When the new Republic was established, Sun was elected as the first president of the Republic, and Nanjing should replace the status of Beijing as China's new capital. Therefore, Nanjing was the ideal city to immortalise Sun's role as a founding father of the nation.

As Kees Terlouw argues, in order to legitimatise their rule, a new or established regime tends to build a link with particular heritage sites where important national events took place in the past.¹⁵ For that reason, choosing to be buried at Purple Mountain in Nanjing was the last and wisest decision made by Sun, who had always been expert at managing his public image.¹⁶ As a result of this, the KMT came to mobilise the symbolic power of the whole Mountain site, including Zhu's tomb and Sun's future mausoleum, to glorify Sun and to place him as the central figure of the nation.

¹⁵ Kees Terlouw, 'Charisma and Space,' *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 10, no. 3 (December 2010): 339-40.

¹⁶ Harrison, *The Making of the Republican Citizen*, 208.

One month after Sun's death, a committee composed mainly of KMT's leaders organised the construction of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum at Purple Mountain. An international architectural competition was launched to search for the best design for entombing Sun.¹⁷ The committee decided to build a larger and taller mausoleum than the Ming imperial tomb to express Sun's great achievements. It was believed that his achievements for the newborn nation had largely surpassed previous dynasties.¹⁸ No longer serving Chinese emperors, the mausoleum was now intended to be the ceremonial site of the nation.

According to competition guidelines, the design of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum should keep Chinese classical styles with distinctive monumental features. Some basic spatial principles of the Chinese traditional Imperial tomb, such as the sacrificial hall, the tomb and a long north-south axis, were to be followed, to highlight its traditional Chinese monumentality. The main structure was to use solid stone and reinforced concrete instead of traditional fragile brick and wood that were commonly used in imperial tombs. In front of the sacrificial hall, there was to be an open space large enough to hold a ceremonial service for 50,000 people.¹⁹ This request intended to make the Mausoleum a vast monumental space open to public access, not another imperial tomb only serving royal family members and high officials. The KMT attempted to extend the boundary of traditional ceremony to a countrywide mass audience who were

¹⁷ Chen Ge-li 陳格理, '中山陵建築競圖之史料介紹(The Introduction to the Historical Materials of the Architectural Competition for the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum),' *建築師 Taiwan Architect Magazine*, March 1981, 26.

¹⁸ Li Gong-zhong 李恭忠, '開放的紀念性: 中山陵建築精神的表達與實踐(The Open Monumentality: The Presentation and Realization of the Architectural Spirit of Sun Yat-sen's Mausoleum),' *Journal of Nanjing University (Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences)* 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 91.

¹⁹ Chen, '中山陵建築競圖之史料介紹(The Introduction to the Historical Materials of the Architectural Competition for the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum),' 27.

included in the family of the nation.²⁰




Fig. 7-1 Lu Yan-zhi,'s Design of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum.

As a result, the winning entry designed by the Chinese architect Lu Yan-zhi met the competition jury's expectation. A graduate of Cornell University, an American Beaux-Arts training school at that time, Lu worked at Henry Murphy's office as a draftsman for two years. It is almost certain that Lu acquired his knowledge of Chinese traditional architecture, and learned the approach to adaptive architecture from his years with Murphy.²¹ This experience was crucial to his career when he later became the most influential Chinese architect in the 1920s. When most Western competitors resorted to the concept of the pagoda, Lu shifted his focus to the principles of modern Western monumental spaces and re-interpreted them through Chinese building elements.²²

²⁰ Musgrove, 'Monumentality in Nanjing's Sun Yat-sen Memorial Park,' 11-12.

²¹ Lai, 'Searching for a Modern Chinese Monument,' 42.

²² *Ibid.*, 38.




Fig. 7-2 The Worship Hall of the Mausoleum.




Fig. 7-3 The Site Plan of the Mausoleum.




Fig. 7-4 The Plan of Worship Hall and Sun's Tomb.




Fig. 7-5 The Section of Worship Hall and Sun's Tomb.

Lu Yan-zhi successfully created a grand mausoleum on top of a peak on the southern slope of the Mountain. An impressive sacrificial hall was placed on a massive staircase leading visitors from the gateway arch at the foot of the Mountain to the hall with an unimpeded view. Looking down from above, the vast staircase is in an exact bell shape. Lu intended the bell to remind visitors that it

was Sun who had awakened the modern consciousness of the Chinese nation by his revolutionary career.²³

The worship hall had an enormous blue Chinese roof on top and white walls enveloped around it. These features made the hall a salient landmark on Purple Mountain. Lu adopted classical Chinese architectural elements, including the archway, the pillars, the hall and the long stairway, that could also be found in the Ming and Qing's imperial tombs, to give Sun's Mausoleum a more consecrated aura. However, the design of the worship hall also reflected the deep influence of the Beaux-Arts aesthetics that he learned from the American university and Murphy's architectural firm. In order to express Sun's contributions to the nation, Lu imitated the space of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C. Sun's testament and important writings were inscribed on the surrounding walls of the hall. A seated statue of him was placed in the middle of the hall. The visitors could actually see the statue through three arch entrances inscribed with the characters of nationalism, democracy and the livelihood of the people, taken from Sun's famous piece *Three Principles of the People*.²⁴ A series of scenes inspired by Sun's life were also carved on the base of the statue.

Sun's tomb, a sarcophagus enclosed by a round burial mound, was at the back of the worship hall. Sun's remains were permanently preserved here. Lu followed the model of Napoleon's Tomb in Paris and Grant's Tomb in New York to form a round sunken crypt which allowed the visitors to view Sun's sarcophagus from the ground floor.²⁵

²³ Harrison, *The Making of the Republican Citizen*, 208.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 42-43.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 43.

From the gateway arch, along the vast staircase to the worship hall and to the tomb, Lu created a sequence of solemn spaces along the hillside to provide a vast public space to hold national ceremonies for Sun. It should be noted that the Mausoleum also included in its elaborate construction, building material gathered from different provinces of China. The entrance was built of Fujian granite. The steps were made by Suzhou stone. Hong Kong provided its stone for the walls of the worship hall. Yunnan offered its marble to pave the floor. The columns of black granite were hewn from Qingdao.²⁶ Thus, as the collective contributions of Chinese people were symbolically shown on the building, the Mausoleum could claim to be the shrine of the nation.

The great new Chungshan road (中山路), named after Sun's courtesy name, was designed to connect the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum to Nanjing city centre. Almost all the major buildings of the city, including the Jiangsu Provincial Assembly, the Gingling University, the Ming City Gate, the new central government district, the Ming Imperial Tombs and the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum lay along it.²⁷ That is to say, through the Chungshan road, Sun Yat-sen and his story and political legacy are closely interwoven with the fabric of the city.

Indeed, in his design, Lu Yan-zhi successfully combined traditional Chinese architectural features with new emphases on the visual representation of power. He used solid, physical symbolic elements to make abstract feelings of nationhood feel more real.²⁸ After the mid-1920s, an increasing number of Chinese architects shared the same vision as Lu in a quest for a more modern Chinese architecture by fusing Western and Chinese building traditions. A new trend of architectural

²⁶ Harrison, *The Making of the Republican Citizen*, 210.

²⁷ Harrison, *The Making of the Republican Citizen*, 211-2.

²⁸ Musgrove, 'Monumentality in Nanjing's Sun Yat-sen Memorial Park,' 2.

design began to form in Nanjing and was later widely adopted in many other civil and governmental buildings across the country.²⁹

In 1929, the first phase of construction of the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum had finished in time for Sun's burial ceremony in Nanjing. The KMT had already developed a new set of regular ceremonies to honour Sun. Parts of the ceremonies borrowed from the imperial rituals, but skipped some undesirable customs, such as kowtow, to make it closer to modern life. However, the key differences between these new ceremonies and the ancestral rituals were the people who performed them and who comprised the audience. When the KMT performed the new ceremonies in remembrance of Sun, the audience was the nation. Through the power of mass media, the ceremonies would spread all over the country and include the audience in the extended family of the nation.³⁰

In 1929, a specially designed train preceded Sun's hearse on its journey to Nanjing. The train would stop temporarily in every major city and town for local ceremonies, which attracted large crowds to pay homage to Sun.³¹ In the KMT's Nanjing headquarters, Sun's remains, dressed in the new national costume, were covered by the party flag. Over ten thousand people took part in the long procession following the hearse on the way to the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum. Those participants who came from groups controlled by the party were arranged in a particular order to show that the party's legitimate descent derived from different sections of society.³² The most important politicians of the Republic and Sun's friends and relatives took their places in the worship hall and Chiang Kai-shek acted as the chief sacrificant to conduct the final burial ceremony. It was this

²⁹ Fu, *中國古典建築新式樣* (*New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style*), 113-38.

³⁰ Musgrove, 'Monumentality in Nanjing's Sun Yat-sen Memorial Park,' 11-12.

³¹ Harrison, *The Making of the Republican Citizen*, 215-7.

³² *Ibid.*, 220-9.

ceremony that made Chiang symbolically the political heir of Sun Yat-sen and the political leader of the nation and the party.³³

What the KMT needed at that time was a great revolutionary leader and a founding father of the Republic to secure the historical legitimacy of the party, and Sun was exactly the person that the party wanted. Although Sun did conduct early anti-Manchu revolutions, his relationship with the 1911 Wuchang revolution was not as close as the KMT's depiction.³⁴ However, after his death, it was important to construct a political myth to re-affirm Sun's legitimacy and authority.³⁵ In KMT propaganda, Sun was described as a leader and national saviour who conducted a coherent revolutionary group to overthrow the Qing throne.³⁶ This new national narrative later constantly appeared in school textbooks, party propaganda and national ceremonies.³⁷ It was also used as a powerful tool to consolidate the Nationalist government and to strengthen monumentality of his mausoleum.

7-2 The New Memorial Hall in Taiwan

In the 1920s, Celebrations and commemorations of Sun's life at that time took on an almost religious fervour. Sun's courtesy name Chungshan soon became very popular in China. Many roads, parks, buildings and even numerous commercial goods were named after him.³⁸ The government designated the anniversary of his birth and death were as national holidays. His words and

³³ *Ibid.*, 231.

³⁴ Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 201.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 409.

³⁶ Harrison, *The Making of the Republican Citizen*, 154.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 151-60.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 147-8.

writings, were widely circulated among the people and treated as sacred texts. Behind these phenomena, to a great degree, it was the Nationalist propaganda writers who created and promoted the cult of Sun Yat-sen to society.³⁹ As Henrietta Harrison argues, rituals and ceremonies are an important part of the process through which a sense of national identity is constructed. When the new political culture was arising during the early twentieth century in China, rituals and ceremonies relating to the feeling of nationhood gradually became a dominant force in everyday lives.⁴⁰ The cult of Sun Yat-sen, through the KMT, led the new political culture and began to generate a number of national symbols which were gradually taking their root in different social spectrums in China.⁴¹ When the KMT had taken control of Taiwan in 1945, this set of ceremonies and symbols was also introduced to the island, forming the basis for political legitimacy and authority.

Although Chiang Kai-shek had lost the mainland, he still continued to make use of the national ceremonies and symbols to consolidate and strengthen his position in Taiwan. In order to clean the ‘toxins’ of Japan’s ‘enslavement education’, the portrait of Japanese emperor was replaced with that of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek. The new regime also forced every Taiwanese person to participate in the weekly mass meetings of their work places, schools and communities. The standard model of ceremonies that had been set up in the mainland was then continuously performed in Taiwan.⁴² Constantly studying Sun’s writings, Chiang’s instructions and Chinese history were viewed as the most expedient way to make the Taiwanese aware of their Chinese ethnic roots.⁴³

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 148-9.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁴¹ Pan, ‘國父形象的歷史形成 (The Making of the Image of China’s National Founding Father),’ 193.

⁴² Shi Zhi-hui 施志輝, ‘中華文化復興運動之研究 (A Study of the Cultural Renaissance Movement),’ (MA dissertation, National Taiwan Normal University, 1995), 128-9.

⁴³ Jhou, ‘塑造黨國之民 (The Making of the National Citizens),’ 241-2.

1965 was the year of Sun Yat-sen's centennial birthday. Chiang Kai-shek grasped the opportunity to glorify Sun and align himself with Sun in order to reinforce the legitimate base of his rule in Taiwan. In 1963, preparations for Sun Yat-sen's centennial birthday were established to organise celebration activities and cultural events, which included music concerts, play performances, film-making, and academic conferences, to honour Sun during the entire year.⁴⁴ The Chinese Renaissance Movement was the biggest and the most influential cultural campaigns. The construction of the memorial hall for Sun Yat-sen was the most important events in the campaign. This memorial hall was to form a new ritual centre for Sun in Taiwan, to show the government's continued commitment towards Sun's political and national ideals.

In 1964, the committee announced the architectural competition for the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall. Twelve of the more famous of Taiwan's architects were invited to take part in the competition.⁴⁵ The Memorial hall was expected to be a solemn and sublime building representing Sun's devotion to the modern Chinese nation. Furthermore, the competition guidelines requested all participants to formulate a building proposal that could combine Chinese traditional building elements with merits of Western architecture and construction technology.⁴⁶ A huge assembly hall comprising 3,000 seats was requested to provide sufficient space for political meetings, speeches, national music and opera and other cultural activities. In addition, the exhibition spaces were required to display Sun's writings, manuscripts, documents and items that he had used. A special library was needed to store the collections of literature and publications relating to Sun's

⁴⁴ The Committee of the Preparation of Sun Yat-sen's Centennial Birthday 國父百年誕辰紀念實錄編輯小組, *國父百年誕辰紀念實錄(The Records of the Sun Yat-sen's Centennial Birthday)* (Taipei: The Committee of the Preparation of Sun Yat-sen's Centennial Birthday Press, 1966), 1-15

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 180-1.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 177.

life and political thoughts. Several small meeting rooms were necessary to offer plenty of space for academic conferences and local cultural events.⁴⁷

Among these competition entries, Wang Da-hong's design for the Memorial Hall was one of the best in matching the committee's demands.⁴⁸ Wang Da-hong was famous for his modernist approach to architecture. His later reputation, however, was built on his unique modernist interpretation of Chinese classical architectural principles in his work. The turning point was the closed competition for Taipei's National Palace Museum that he joined in 1961. After the museum competition, Wang Da-hong began to make a minor change to his design strategy in order to win the next competition for public works.⁴⁹ The Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall became one of the well known cases in Wang's career that showed his compromise between his modernist ideal and Chinese revival style. What Wang Da-hong presented to the committee was a memorial hall with clearer characteristics of Chinese architectural styles. Wang still insisted on his modernist position, but emphasised Chinese features in the building appearance. Unlike many other Beaux-Arts trained architects, in his student life Wang did not do any systematic research on Chinese traditional architecture. In fact, what he knew about Chinese buildings were the images that came from his childhood in Suzhou and in Shanghai. Wang argued that if Chinese architects did more than just try to imitate Western architecture in their work, then their design to some degree would naturally contain Chinese spirit.⁵⁰ The inspiration of Wang's designs of modern Chinese buildings came from the simple, austere principles of Chinese architecture hidden behind its ornate appearance. He never directly applied the

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 176.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 193-4.

⁴⁹ More details about the history please see the Chapter 5.

⁵⁰ Zeng Guang-zong 曾光宗, '中國近代歷史主義建築發展之研究 (A Study of the Developments of Modern Chinese Historic Architecture)' (MA dissertation, Tunghai University, 1988), 89.

Chinese building elements to his designs, but rather translated them into modernist forms and then adopted them in the building.⁵¹ He deeply opposed the Chinese revival style created by those architects who blindly imitated ancient Chinese buildings with no innovation.⁵²




Fig. 7-6 The Original Design of the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall.




Fig. 7-7 The Ground Floor.

Wang Da-hong admits that the most difficult part of designing a monumental building like the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall is how to use architectural form to express the greatness of the person. According to Wang's understanding, Sun Yat-sen was a relatively simple, amiable and honest man. Therefore, in his design, Wang chose simple forms and materials to represent Sun's personality traits.⁵³ This form, without a doubt, was also close to the modernist form. The whole Memorial Hall was built in an exact square to symbolise Sun's image. In China, the square is normally used to represent an upright person. It also indicates the

⁵¹ Mao Yu 毛羽, '藝術家風格的建築師---專訪王大閔(Artist as an Architect: Interview with Dahong Wang),' *建築 Dialogue*, May 1998, 81.

⁵² Chiang Ya-chun 蔣雅君, '屋翼起翹上揚姿態之創新與協議(Conception and Compromise in the Gesture),' in *國父紀念館建館始末---王大閔的妥協與磨難 (Insights of Establishment of National Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall: Compromise and Agony of Da-hong Wang)*, ed. Shyu Ming-song 徐明松 (Taipei: National Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall Press, 2007), 43.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 49.

Chinese world view: ‘the celestial circle and the terrestrial square’ (天圓地方).⁵⁴ The huge, tall assembly hall was placed in the middle of the building with a worship hall in front. Sun’s seated statue would be located in the worship hall for visitors to pay their respects. The lower spaces, such as meeting rooms, exhibition rooms and the library, were arranged to surround the central assembly hall. The periphery of the building was enveloped by open corridors designed for public activities. This spatial arrangement would not only highlight the monumentality of the central tall structure, but also be kept at human scale in the peripheral spaces. Wang covered the different height of spaces between the tall assembly hall and the lower spaces surrounding it with two smooth, graceful curved roofs. With a little flavour of the Chinese traditional curved roof, they were enveloped by modern ceramic, not traditional, roof tiles. Moreover, no additional decoration was used in the building structure. The columns and beams were not painted with ornate traditional polychrome with added fake bracket sets beneath them as many other revival buildings had.⁵⁵



Fig. 7-8 The Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall.




Fig. 7-9 The Main Entrance.

⁵⁴ Liang Ming-kang 梁銘剛, ‘設計的轉折與堅持(Alteration and Persistence in Design),’ in *國父紀念館建館始末---王大閔的妥協與磨難(Insights of Establishment of National Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall: Compromise and Agony of Da-hong Wang)*, ed. Shyu Ming-song 徐明松 (Taipei: National Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall Press, 2007), 18.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 19.



Fig. 7-10 Details of the Curved Roof.



Fig. 7-11 The Worship Hall.

Wang Da-hong successfully created an alternative modernist approach to the Chinese classical style. However, for Chiang Kai-shek and some members of the committee, Wang's design was still not 'Chinese enough'. After the committee had announced the winner of the competition, Wang presented his design to Chiang in the Office of the President. At that moment, Chiang nodded his approval of the building proposal, but viewed it as pure modernist architecture.⁵⁶ Two days after the presentation, Wang received a phone call from Chiang's secretary asking for design alterations. Chiang asked him to add more Chinese building elements to his design to make it become a more 'Chinese-looking' building.⁵⁷ In Chiang's opinion, the building that could most represent China was the Hall of Supreme Harmony in the Forbidden City.⁵⁸ However, this time Wang insisted that he did not want to alter the Memorial Hall into another Qing style building. He argued that Sun Yat-sen was a revolutionary who overthrew the Qing throne, that it was wrong to commemorate him and his great achievements by constructing a Qing style memorial hall. Wang further stated that for a great man like Sun such a conservative style definitely did not match his pioneering image.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁵⁸ Mao, '藝術家風格的建築師---專訪王大閔(Artist as an Architect: Interview with Dahong Wang),' 81.

⁵⁹ Liang, '設計的轉折與堅持(Alteration and Persistence in Design),' 17.

Wang's arguments drew a great deal of support from Sun Ke, son of Sun Yat-sen, and the other committee members.⁶⁰ At this point, Chiang finally gave his agreement to Wang's proposal.⁶¹ As a result, based on the original plan, Wang slightly altered the roof design to accede to Chiang's request for a more 'Chinese-looking' building. He covered the building with four pieces of roof stretching from the centre, where the tall assembly hall was located, down in four directions. Wang also lifted a part of the roof at the front side of the building to highlight the main entrance. Through this alteration, visitors could actually see Sun's seated statue in the middle of the sacrificial hall through the main door outside the building.

After one year and eight months of struggling between Chiang's ideal and seven years in construction, the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall was finally completed, becoming one of Wang's masterpieces. In political circles, Wang's approach to modern Chinese architecture was gradually accepted by the government. After the completion of the Memorial Hall, he won more public building design cases, and his designs also earned him a great reputation in architectural circles. Fu Chao-ching, a famous historian of Taiwanese architecture, praised the design of the Memorial Hall as a successful exploration for modernist re-interpretation of Chinese classical styles. Han Pao-teh (漢寶德) (1934-), also a famous architectural historian in Taiwan, claims that Wang certainly created new possibilities for the formation of a modern Chinese style.⁶²

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 16.

⁶¹ Mao, '藝術家風格的建築師---專訪王大閔(Artist as an Architect: Interview with Dahong Wang),' 81.

⁶² Han Pao-teh 漢寶德, '文化的象徵? 談國家劇院與音樂廳的建築 (The Symbol of Culture? On the Design of the National Theater and Concert Halls),' 文星 *Wun Sing*, August 1987, 54.

Although the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall was the result of a compromise in design between Chiang Kai-shek and the architect, it did not change the fact that Chiang attempted to make use of this building as the centre of the cult of Sun Yat-sen. In post-war Taiwan, Sun's figure was already engraved in many official buildings, such as the National Palace Museum and the Chungshan Building, but the Memorial Hall was certainly the most important one dedicated to him. Every year in the Memorial Hall a magnificent ceremony would be held to commemorate Sun. For most Nationalists, although they lost the opportunity to pay their homage to Sun in his Nanjing Mausoleum, the construction of the Memorial Hall in Taiwan to some degree assuaged their deep regret.

On 5 April 1975, three years after the memorial hall was completed, Chiang Kai-shek suffered a major heart attack and died in Taipei.⁶³ In his will, he still encouraged his comrades and countrymen to fulfill the ideal of the *Three Principles of the People* and recover the mainland under Sun Yat-sen's political blueprint.⁶⁴ Therefore, it is no surprise that the Nationalist government would choose the Memorial Hall to hold a solemn, peaceful public funeral for Chiang. Chiang's remains were moved to the assembly hall of the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall for the public ceremony. During the whole week around two and a half million visitors reportedly came to see Chiang's body lying in state and to pay their last respects.⁶⁵ The Nationalist government attempted to make use of Chiang's funeral rituals to consolidate the strength of the nation. Choosing the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall as a site to conduct the service illustrated that the current ruler would continuously uphold the political legitimacy that Sun had left

⁶³ Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* (London: Harvard University Press, 2009), 584-5.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 585.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 586. Also see Anonymous, '全民無盡的哀思(Endless Grief of the Nation),' *中央月刊 Central Monthly*, May 1975, 169-84.

to the government during the Republican era.



Fig. 7-12 Chiang's Hearse in Front of the Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall.



Fig. 7-13 Yang Jhuo-cheng's Design of the Cihu Residence.



Fig. 7-14 The Courtyard.



Fig. 7-15 Chiang's Casket in the Main Hall.

The last stage of Chiang's national funeral began on the 18th of April, when his hearse took its journey toward a temporary burial site in a small town called Daxi (大溪), sixty miles from Taipei. The hearse was covered with yellow chrysanthemums, with the Party emblem and the Christian cross in the front. A motorcade escorted the hearse with a crowd of people forming a long procession on the way to Daxi.⁶⁶ Most of them wore mourning dress and held banners with

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 587.

slogans to commemorate the great leader of the nation.⁶⁷ The final destination was Cihu residence (慈湖官邸), one of Chiang's favourite retreats located near Daxi and a lake also called Cihu. Cihu literally means 'benevolent lake' in English. Chiang gave the lake and the residence the name because the scenery here reminded him of his benevolent mother and his home town.⁶⁸ The residence was built in 1959 by the architect Yang Jhuo-cheng (楊卓成) (1914-2006), and Chiang used the place every year as a summer resort. Yang Jhuo-cheng used the model of a siheyuan, the Chinese quadrangle with a courtyard in the middle surrounded by four attached houses, to construct the residence in order to console Chiang's nostalgia for home. In the end, it was also Yang who was commissioned to design a grand memorial hall dedicated to Chiang.

7-3 The Last Paradigm

For a long time, monumental buildings designed for conducting special ceremonies and rituals were the ideal places for certain political and religious needs. These buildings were normally built with solid, durable materials in order to emphasise their immortality and monumentality. Even if the great men had been dead for centuries, the buildings dedicated to them still stood firmly and were more permanent than the houses for the living. This is the reason why the oldest buildings in the world often have a close relationship to the death of particular great men in history.⁶⁹ In the process, a link between the buildings and their audiences is established that energises the buildings and prevents them from

⁶⁷ Anonymous, '全民無盡的哀思(Endless Grief of the Nation),' 179-88.

⁶⁸ Liou Ben-yan, '慈湖有靈伴偉人(Cihu and the Great Man),' *中央月刊 Central Monthly*, May 1975, 228.

⁶⁹ Edwin Heathcote, *Monument Builders: Modern Architecture and Death* (Chichester: Academy Editions, 1999), 8.

being forgotten by the men that worship in the buildings. Thus, monumental buildings must have a clear architectural style connected to a particular history to generate an emotional impact in the populace. In the cases of Nanjing's Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum and Taipei's Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall, from the outset the construction committees established explicit goals for the architectural competitions. What they were looking for was a permanent building clad with a classical Chinese style to commemorate Sun and to hold special ceremonies that could help to unify the nation and direct its people towards particular aims of national development. After the death of Chiang Kai-shek, the Memorial Hall built for him was to be utilised in the same way.

After Chiang's national funeral, the construction committee of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall announced an architectural competition similar to the others mentioned earlier. A park located in the heart of Taipei city centre in the political district was chosen to be the building site, with the Office of the President just a few blocks away. The Memorial Hall included a worship hall with Chiang's seated statue in the middle for regular ceremonies. Again a music concert hall and theatre were required to provide plenty space for entertainment and cultural activities. However, the whole architectural complex occupied only a small part of the building site, with most of the land reserved for the park and a huge square.⁷⁰

Like the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum and the Memorial Hall, the design of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall was to express the spirit of traditional Chinese culture in form and style. New building technology and materials were also

⁷⁰ Liou Li-mei 劉麗梅, '台北市中正紀念堂設計競圖報導 (The Report of the Architectural Competition of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Taipei),' *建築師 Taiwan Architect Magazine*, August 1976, 2.

necessary to construct an enduring building which could satisfy the needs of modern usage.⁷¹ As a result, Yang Jhuo-cheng's design won first place and the commission of the Memorial Hall from the government.

During the competition and construction process, an idealised image of Chiang Kai-shek reached a new climax as the government had begun to promote his mythology. In Chiang's early rule, he also started to align himself with Sun in order to consolidate his power in Taiwan. Portraits of Chiang and Sun were required to hang in every classroom and government office. The Taiwanese were instructed to express their loyalty to the Chinese nation and its great leaders. Chinese history and geography were the core lessons taught in schools with the aim of giving children more knowledge about their motherland.⁷² Chiang's image and speeches appeared repeatedly on television broadcasts, newspapers, magazines and different media. His portrait was also printed on notes, stamps and many other objects which had been infused into Taiwanese's daily life.⁷³ After Chiang's death, his birthday officially became a national holiday.⁷⁴ The traditional Qingming Festival, an annual festival to remember and honour ancestors at grave sites, was moved to the anniversary of Chiang's death. On that day, the present President and important officers would come to the Cihu residence and pay homage to Chiang.⁷⁵ Many other memorial ceremonies and activities which imitated the model of the cult of Sun Yat-sen were also established by the government.⁷⁶

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷² Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 29.

⁷³ Taylor, 'QuJianghua,' 185.

⁷⁴ Jhou, '一人有慶, 兆民賴之 (The Benediction of Longevity and the Image-making of the Leader during the Period of Chiang Kai-shek's Rule),' 124.

⁷⁵ Jhou, '塑造黨國之民 (The Making of the National Citizens),' 478-81.

⁷⁶ Taylor, 'QuJianghua,' 186.

New instances of commemoration of Chiang Kai-shek began to slow down after 1980. The turning point was President Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, who started to adopt the American economic model and undertake a series of economic reforms in the 1970s. Those reforms helped Taiwan change its original mode of economy from an agricultural to an export-oriented economy. Taiwan later became the world's sixteenth largest export country.⁷⁷ Following economic growth, architectural design and industry continued its path towards Modernism. From the 1970s onwards, the Chinese classical style of building and its influence all but disappeared.⁷⁸

However, the older political elites did not completely transfer their powers to the Taiwanese.⁷⁹ After Chiang's death, the authority of the government was still held by members of Chiang's family and political elites who originally came from the mainland. It was also those people who continuously upheld the national ideology established by Chiang Kai-shek. The result of the competition of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall illustrated that Chiang's family still had control over the style of the Memorial Hall. According to interviews with Chen Mai (陳邁) (1930-), one of the competition participants, and Wang Ji-kun (王紀鯤), a famous architect who was invited to offer his advice on the competition, it was Soong May-ling, Chiang's wife, who exercised her power in changing the final result of the competition. In the first phase of the competition, only Yang Jhuo-cheng had adopted the Chinese classical style in his proposal. All the other architects showed their interest in exploring possibilities of developing a modernist style to express modern Chinese monumental architecture. Yang's design provoked a debate on

⁷⁷ Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism*, 48-49.

⁷⁸ Fu, *中國古典式樣新建築 (New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style)*, 291-2.

⁷⁹ Steven Phillips, 'Between Assimilation and Independence: Taiwanese Political Aspirations under Nationalist Chinese Rule, 1945-1948,' in *Taiwan: A New History*, ed. Murray A. Rubinstein (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 302.

whether or not the classical style was the only one that could fully represent modern Chinese monumental architecture. When Soong came to view the five entries selected by the judges, she expressed her favour for the classical style, and the dispute ended.⁸⁰



Fig. 7-16 Yang Jhuo-cheng's Entry.




Fig. 7-17 The Original Design of the Worship Hall.




Fig. 7-18 The Façade of the Worship Hall.

In Yang Jhuo-cheng's design, he stuck firmly to the modern Chinese monumentality that had been explored by Lu Yan-zhi in creating his vision of a memorial hall for Chiang. A tall worship hall was built in a square, topped with a

⁸⁰ Shu Guo-hun 石國宏 '戰後台灣建築競圖中中國式樣與文化表徵關係之研究---以公共建築為例 (A Study of the Relationship between Architectural Styles and Surface Features in Architectural Competition of Postwar Taiwan---as the Public Works an Example)' (MA dissertation, Chung Yuan Christian University, 2001), 63-64.

steep pointed roof, with the hall placed on three levels of base layers, and with a long stairway starting from the ground level. The end of the stairs was the entrance to the worship hall, and the huge statue of Chiang Kai-shek was situated in the middle of the hall for people to pay homage to him. The ceiling was composed of a vast dome painted with the national emblem and decorated by bracket sets. The square layout of the hall and the round dome on top symbolised the traditional concept of ‘the celestial circle and the terrestrial square.’ The square also signified Chiang’s courtesy name of Jhong-jheng (中正). Three levels of base layers implied that Sun’s *Three Principles of the People* was the foundation of Chiang’s political philosophy. Beneath the worship hall, several exhibition rooms were designed to display Chiang’s stories, manuscripts, documents, photographs, the clothes that he wore and objects that he used. The whole worship hall was built in white marble, topped with blue roof tiles to indicate the blue sky and white sun in the national emblem. Although the main structure was steel-framed, the exterior of the building was covered by splendid Chinese classical architectural elements.



Fig. 7-19 The Worship Hall.



Fig. 7-20 Chiang’s Statue in the Worship Hall.



Fig. 7-21 The Ceiling on the Worship Hall.



Fig. 7-22 The Exhibition Room under the Worship Hall.

The worship hall was located at the end of an axis. The axis started from a huge archway entrance and a vast square which was planned to accommodate large gatherings of about 50,000 people. Four big Chinese characters *Da-Jhong-Jhih-Jheng* (大中至正) were hung on the archway entrance. *Da-Jhong-Jhih-Jheng* means ‘great centrality and perfect uprightness’ in English. These characters were believed to be the ideal phrase to symbolise Chiang’s life and thoughts.⁸¹ The concert hall and the theatre were placed on both flanks of the square, where the most important performances of the nation would be presented. Although the concert hall and the theatre were built in the Qing style, interior spaces completely conformed to modern Western standards of performance requirements.

⁸¹ Anonymous, ‘大中至正、忠孝之門---中國道統具體化之中正紀念堂 (The Doors for Da-Jhong-Jhih-Jheng and Jhong-Siao: The Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and the Reification of the Chinese Confucian Orthodoxy),’ *復興季刊 Fushing Quarterly*, October 2008, 55-64.



Fig. 7-23 The Archway Entrance.



Fig. 7-24 The National Theatre.



Fig. 7-25 The National Concert Hall.



Fig. 7-26 Details of the Roofs.

When the committee announced that Yang Jhuo-cheng's entry had won first place, it immediately provoked serious disputes in Taiwan's architectural and art circles. Many architects and scholars criticised Yang's design, viewing it as a sign of regression in Taiwanese architectural design. Han Pao-the stated that Yang's design was a crude imitation of the Chinese classical style with no innovation.⁸² The architect Jhong Ze-hai (仲澤還) claimed that the rigid form of the Chinese big roof heavily restricted the development of interior spaces and stifled the creativity that national monumental architecture should have.⁸³

⁸² Han, '文化的象徵? 談國家劇院與音樂廳的建築 (The Symbol of Culture? On the Design of the National Theatre and Concert Halls),' 56.

⁸³ Fu, *中國古典式樣新建築 (New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style)*, 290.




Fig. 7-27 The Caricature in the Louver Window Magazine.

In fact, Taiwan's early debates on revivalism and modernism began in the 1960s. When the first group of government buildings, such as the Nan-hai Academy, was clad with classical Chinese styles, some modernist architects and architectural scholars expressed their discontent.⁸⁴ In the drawing, the architect Lu Yu-jun was described as a shallow designer who believed that adding a Chinese big roof and traditional decorative elements to a modern construction made the building become more Chinese. This caricature questions the revivalist architect who not only misunderstood the principles of Chinese traditions, but also misused the form of modernism in his work. As the architectural scholar Hua Yi-chang (華宜昌) has pointed out, the revivalist approach would limit the development of Taiwan's architecture and lead it down a narrow path in the future. In the end, Taiwan's architecture would gradually lose its ability to adapt to the changing world.⁸⁵ However, these criticisms by modernists did not fundamentally change the fact that the Chinese classical style was still thriving under the early rule of the KMT.

Constructing a monument as a political symbol was much easier than

⁸⁴ Anonymous, '牽強附會集 (The Forced Analogy),' *百葉窗 (Louver Window)*, May 1960, 16.

⁸⁵ Hua Yi-chang 華宜昌, '仿古式建築及其在臺灣 (上) (The Revivalist Architecture and Its Development in Taiwan, Part I),' *建築雙月刊 Architecture Bimonthly*, October 1962, 10.

controlling its use and meanings, especially when the building was designed to worship a controversial historical figure like Chiang. In 1980, the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall was completed and opened to the public. During that time, Taiwan had gradually paved its way towards social and political liberation. Although the Memorial Hall was not intended to become a place for questioning authority, it had gained a status as an iconic building, and unexpected events began taking place.

Firstly, diversified civic activities started to occupy the square and the open spaces of the Memorial Hall. The beautiful park and nostalgic scenery of the hall made it an ideal spot for taking wedding pictures.⁸⁶ The wide exterior corridors of the concert hall and the theatre attracted growing numbers of young people to hang out and take part in hip-hop dance.⁸⁷ The Memorial Hall was slowly and quietly transforming into an ideal site for public recreation, and only a few tourists and the older generation came to commemorate Chiang.⁸⁸

Secondly, anti-KMT and anti-Chiang Kai-shek campaigns began to flourish in the late Chiang Ching-kuo ruling period.⁸⁹ The authority of the Memorial Hall and the Chinese national ideology was challenged by democratisation. After the abolition of martial law in 1987, it was very difficult for the KMT to maintain the mythologised cult of Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan. Moreover, the square in front of the Memorial Hall became the biggest open space in the political district of the

⁸⁶ Lin Bai-syun 林柏勳 and Jhang Jin-e 張金鶚, '街舞! 對抗? 中正紀念堂---人、活動與公共關係之探討 (Hip-hop Dances! Resistance? and the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall: A Study of the Relation among People, Activities and Public Spaces),' *Journal of City and Planning* 29, no. 1 (May 2002): 120.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 123-36.

⁸⁸ Huang Jia-ci 黃嘉琪, '都市公共空間的歷史轉化---台北市中正紀念堂的分析 (The Transformation of Urban Public Space: An Analysis of Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall),' (MA dissertation, Shih Hsin University, 2004), 81-104.

⁸⁹ More details about Taiwan's political struggles under Chiang Ching-kuo's rule please see Roy, *Taiwan*, the Chapter Six.

Taipei city centre, and since the 1990s, the Memorial Hall was the ideal place for political demonstrations.

In 1994, the Democratic Progressive Party won the Taipei mayoral election. When Chen Shui-bian took office as the mayor in Taipei, the city was full of sites associated with Chiang Kai-shek, monuments which commemorated him and institutions, roads and places named in his honour. Chen began to carry out a series of projects to purge the cult of Chiang Kai-shek.⁹⁰ In 2000, the KMT lost the presidential election. It was a great opportunity for the DDP, a new ruling party, to tackle the political legacy left by the KMT during the totalitarian period. Numerous Chiang Kai-shek statues were torn down as soon as the *Qu-Jiang-hua* campaign was launched. The Chiang Kai-shek International Airport was renamed the Taoyuan International Airport. Two of Chiang's former residences, the Shihlin Residence and the Grass Mountain Chateau were now opened to the public, offering an opportunity for visitors to see the private life of the generalissimo.⁹¹



Fig. 7-28 The 'Kites of Freedom' Hung on the Worship Hall.



Fig.7-29 The Removal of *Da-Jhong-Jhjh-Jheng*.

⁹⁰ Taylor, '*QuJianghua*,' 187.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 187-90.

Chen Shui-bian finally shifted the focus to the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. He renamed the Memorial Hall as the Taiwan Democracy Memorial Hall on May 2007.⁹² The four big characters *Da-Jhong-Jhih-Jheng* that hung on the archway entrance were later replaced by *Zih-You-Guang-Chang* (自由廣場).⁹³ Artists were allowed to hang their designs and their ‘Kites of Freedom’ in the worship hall to symbolise liberation of the *secret spaces*.⁹⁴ This action immediately led to serious political friction between KMT’s and DPP’s supporters, but Chen still viewed it as a symbol of success for the *Qu-Jiang-hua* campaign.

Arguably, three decades after his death, Chiang Kai-shek was simply not as prominent on the island as he had been. The campaign of removal of Chiang’s cult from the streets continued relatively smoothly because it had already lost the presence it once had in people’s daily life.⁹⁵ Today, the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall was no longer a sacred, solemn place. It has been transformed into one of Taipei’s most popular places for music concerts, exhibitions and civic activities. Due to the transformation of Taiwan’s politics and society, the meaning of monumentality has also experienced considerable change. No party, including the KMT and the DPP, now has the ability to monopolise collective memory and the interpretation of history to serve political ideology through monumental buildings. The Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall is a primary example illustrating that the public spaces in Taiwan will no longer be dominated by single, dictatorial rule from above. It can now only be activated by multiple voices from below. The Taiwanese may no longer be forced to commemorate Chiang at the Memorial Hall, but the purge of Chiang, even the threat to demolish the Memorial Hall, had

⁹² ‘扁: 大中至正改自由廣場 (Chen: *Da-Jhong-Jhih-Jheng* renamed *Zih-You-Guang-Chang*),’ United Daily News, 20 May 2007.

⁹³ *Zih-You-Guang-Chang* means ‘Liberty Square’ in English.

⁹⁴ ‘300 風箏圍繞 蔣銅像出「關」 (300 Kites Surrounding Chiang’s Statue),’ United Daily News, 02 January 2008.

⁹⁵ Taylor, ‘*QuJianghua*,’ 195-6.

already achieved a consensus as a way to forget him.

Conclusion

When Premier Su Tseng-chang announced a plan to demolish the perimeter wall of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall on 1st of March 2007, the Taipei city government immediately had a meeting about putting the Memorial Hall on the list of Taipei's historical buildings.¹ During that time, Hau Lung-pin (郝龍斌) (1952-), the rising political star in the KMT, was the mayor of Taipei with sufficient political strength to question the policy made by the central government. In this controversial demolition issue, Hau strongly opposed the plan, viewing it as a threat to the most important site of the cult of Chiang Kai-shek. In order to protect the building from being destroyed, Hau's strategy was to designate the Memorial Hall and its surrounding walls a Taipei city historical building. In doing so, according to city ordinances, no authority, including the DPP central government, could carry out any alterations to the structure. However, Hau's response to the issue also provoked a series of debates: did the 27-year-old monument qualify to be a historical building? Should politics be involved in the process of architectural conservation decision-making?

In order to compete with the Taipei city government on the issue of building conservation, the central government began to speed up the process for designating the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall as a national heritage site.² The DPP government later announced that the Memorial Hall, its surrounding park and buildings were the new premier national heritage sites of Taiwan. The central government took full control of the Memorial Hall and began to make alterations

¹ 'The Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall and its surrounding walls are now designated a temporary historical site,' *United Daily News*, 06 March 2007.

² 'The DPP Took control of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall,' *China Times*, 07 November 2007.

to the building's name and the plaque *Da-Jhong-Jhih-Jheng* (大中至正) that hung on the archway entrance. According to the ordinances, the administrative power of national heritage sites belonged to the central government and the Taipei city council did not have the legal power to stop the plan. Under such circumstances, the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall became the main focus of political struggles between the two parties in the presidential election year.

It is no surprise that after the KMT regained political power in 2008, the new President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) (1950-) immediately announced that any alteration made by the DPP to the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall would be restored under his administration.³ The name of the monument and the old inscription on the archway entrance would revert to its original state. Ma's action after the presidential election revealed that political forces in Taiwan have never stopped attempting to make use of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall as a clear political statement for their party supporters, even though Chiang Kai-shek had been dead for more than three decades.

The fight over the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in contemporary Taiwan is a good example to show that nationalism and certain types of buildings do have a close, metaphorical relationship. In the age of nation-building, nationalists not only created a new set of national narratives to re-construct and re-interpret their national past, but also resorted to visual forms of emotive symbols to embody basic concepts of nationalism. Aided by certain architects, a new form of architecture was being developed to express their idea of a nation, and these buildings usually clearly connected national history and culture.

³ 'Chiang Kai-shek plaque to return to the Memorial Hall,' *Taipei Times*, 22 January 2009.

Architecture, in this context, was used as a powerful political tool to create a sense of community and national identity in a visual way. However, when social, political and cultural circumstances changed, these buildings became controversial icons attracting different polarised groups to come to the sites and fight for what they believed. When the cult of Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese nationalism could no longer maintain its power, this is exactly what happened to the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall.

The Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall is the last of the nationalistic architecture in Taiwan. Although nowadays the authority of the building has been challenged, it is still the most important landmark in Taipei city centre. It is also important to notice that the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall is not a building *ex nihilo*. Its form and style date back to the 1920s when pioneer architects began to explore a Chinese national style in mainland China. Foreign missionaries were the earliest group of people who recognised the importance of reflecting some deference to Chinese contexts in building styles to help promote church businesses in China. Henry Murphy was one of the earliest architects who systemically examined Chinese building traditions and applied this research to his church building designs. Although these designs were initially encouraged in China's Christian community, due to limited investigations into real Chinese traditional architecture and the language difficulty in fully understanding ancient texts about Chinese building craftsmanship, the results of their designs were not quite convincing. It was not until Chinese successors began exploring building traditions in the 1930s that the development of nationalistic architecture in China achieved a significant breakthrough.

The reason that Chinese native architects attained such achievements in creating their own nationalistic architecture was that scholars had carried out extensive and detailed research on Chinese traditional buildings. The Society for Research in Chinese Architecture had established a new set of research methods for examining traditional architecture based on a thorough understanding of the ancient Chinese construction manuals and extensive field studies. One of these scholars, Liang Si-cheng, not only set up a new standard for the research of Chinese architectural history through his precise and detailed examination of the buildings and ancient texts that he surveyed, but also mapped out a contour of Chinese architectural history, which was clearly influenced by the linear progressive concept of historiography. Graduating from the University of Pennsylvania, Liang applied what he learned from America to his research on Chinese traditional architecture. His publications, such as *a Pictorial Reference Book for Chinese Architectural Design*, later became well-known reference books circulating among Chinese native architects who were creating nationalistic architecture.

Aside from Liang Si-cheng, many American Beaux-Arts trained Chinese architects began to exert their influence in their homeland. Through the similarity between Beaux-Arts design principles and Chinese building traditions, these architects finally found a new path for the course of modern Chinese architecture. In the 1930s, the Nanjing Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT was looking for a new form to consolidate its political legitimacy from a wider social basis, and these native architects came to help them to establish a legitimate image of China's new regime through the creation of a national style of

architecture. The development of nationalistic architecture reached its climax in Nanjing, the new capital of the nation. At that time, leaders of the KMT viewed these buildings as a visual form of propaganda that could fully serve their political ideology. Among these buildings, Lu Yan-zhi's design for Sun Yat-sen's Mausoleum and Henry Murphy's proposal for Nanjing capital plan were the most influential projects. Without their devotion to the search for a national style, these nationalistic buildings would not have been built.

When the KMT lost power in China in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek and his regime were forced to retreat to Taiwan. Chinese architects also moved with the government and settled on the island, introducing Chinese nationalistic architecture to Taiwan for the first time and continuing new developments. In order to reconstruct cultural, historical and ethnic relationships between Taiwan and China, the new rulers began to wipe out all traces of Japanese colonial heritage and re-direct social identification toward the KMT's version of Chinese traditions. Chinese culture was now used to create a sense of national consciousness linking the mainland before 1949 to Taiwan thereafter. Architecture was seen as one of the main tools manifesting Chinese national culture, and in the early period of the KMT's rule, many governmental buildings were clad with the Chinese classical big roofs and other traditional building elements that had been used in Nanjing.

In order to awaken the national consciousness of the Taiwanese and convert them into 'true Chinese', the new rulers had set up a goal of re-sinicisation policies intended to clean the 'toxins' of Japan's colonial enslavement education. Based on State Shinto, Japanese colonial shrines in Taiwan were viewed as the

centre of the *Kominka* Movement and the symbol of Imperial Japan that definitely needed to be purged after the new regime was established. Therefore most of the official Shinto shrines were temporarily used as national holy spaces for revolutionary fallen soldiers and the common ancestor, the Yellow Emperor, and later torn down for use as official Martyr shrines. These Martyr shrines not only served as sacred halls where the cultural and genealogical boundaries were identified through distinctive myths, symbols and cults of the nation, they were also used as important political institutions to evoke a deep sense of national consciousness in the population. The Taiwanese who were qualified to be enshrined in the Martyr shrines were also seen as converts who had finally been recognised as representatives of the 'true Chinese'. Clad with the Chinese classical style, Taipei's Martyr shrines were the most splendid buildings which reflected Chiang Kai-shek's desire for the construction of a national holy space in the capital. These shrines also revealed that political leaders exercised their influence on shaping national identity by creating a new religious space for the nation and its population.

During the Cold War period, the US supported Chiang Kai-shek's totalitarian regime and viewed Taiwan as the most important ally and security cordon of the West Pacific Ocean. The position of Taiwan became a complex balance of power created by the antagonism of the Communist and Western camps. At the time, the tensions between Communist China and Free China also offered an opportunity for Chiang's regime to promote an image that it was Taiwan not the mainland that was the true stronghold of Chinese culture. Therefore, it is no surprise that Chiang would launch the Culture Renaissance Movement in 1966 to strengthen his superior status as the heir of orthodox Chinese culture in Taiwan. In

the movement, Chiang attempted to promote numerous social and cultural activities to reflect current political needs, and convey a clear political message through visual forms.

Taipei's National Palace Museum was one of these buildings erected to symbolise the glory of Chinese national history and culture. During the design process, the architect Huang Boa-yu was asked to use explicit, straightforward revivalist styles to demonstrate that the National Palace Museum was a cultural shrine of the Chinese nation. Huang's design conformed completely to the authority's vision of an impressive museum housing the most important national treasures of the nation. Huang also carefully arranged the iconography programme that totally dominated the visitor experience. Object lessons were carefully organised by museum professionals and nationalists with the aim of turning the Taiwanese into new citizens of the Chinese nation. For Chiang Kai-shek, the museum was a useful political tool which could help boost national morale to strengthen his regime's cultural authority and political legitimacy during wartime. This is why Chiang insisted that these national treasures move from Beijing to Taipei and a new national museum be built for displaying the more important art collections. These collections were no longer the property of the royal family, but state-owned art works exhibited in the museum for the public. The government also utilised the museum to acclaim themselves as the true protectors and heirs of Chinese national culture.

The Chung-shan building was another governmental building constructed for the Chinese cultural renaissance movement. The building was a famous parliament building that conveyed the political message that Chiang Kai-shek

meant to deliver in visual form during the Cold War. Like most European monarchies, China did not have a parliament building, but used the emperor's office where the work of government and meetings with courtiers were conducted. When the Qing court decided to implement modern political reform, the central and local governments began to construct different parliament buildings, such as the National Assembly and twenty-one other Provincial Assemblies. These buildings directly adopted a Western style to show the aspiration of the Qing court toward Westernisation and modernisation in political reforms. It was not until the Nationalist government took control of China and established the new capital in Nanjing, did the Chinese classical style begin to become a symbol of the nation, widely adopted in many party and governmental buildings, including the Great Hall of the National Assembly. But Chiang's ideal of a splendid parliament building based on his political schemes was not fully achieved until the whole nationalist government retreated to Taiwan. In order to fulfill Sun Yat-sen's political ideology in Taiwan and to express a strong determination to protect Chinese culture in Free China, Chiang grasped the opportunity to erect a remarkable iconic architecture clad with Chinese classical styles on the Youngming Mountain. This building is the best example to illustrate that the processes and practices of political transformation in modern China under Chiang's leadership were gathered and shaped into concrete and physical form to satisfy certain political needs.

It should be noted that the image of Sun Yat-sen was very important to Chiang Kai-shek and his regime. After Sun died in 1925, a new political order was needed. Sun's political thoughts were viewed as the modern version of the Confucian orthodoxy that should be revived in Chinese society. When Sun

Yat-senism was established, Chiang Kai-shek constantly reminded his people of his close personal and political relationship to Sun to legitimise his regime. The Confucian orthodoxy was re-introduced and seen as a core value of 'Chineseness' inherited from ancient sage emperors, philosophers, great thinkers and national heroes. After the 1920s, a new political culture that placed the cult of Sun Yat-senism in the centre of nationalist reinvention began taking shape. The KMT not only re-made Sun's image and aura, but also developed a new set of regular ceremonies to honour Sun and to strengthen the relationship between the nation and its population. Among these ceremonies, Sun's national funeral was the most important ritual, performed by the highest authority. It is clear that Chiang's regime attempted to make use of Sun's funeral and Nanjing capital's historical and geographical links to arouse the sentiment of Chinese nationalism. By opening the central funeral rituals to public view through different media, the government intended to extend the ethnic boundary to a countrywide mass audience who were now included in the family of the nation.

The construction of the Sun Yat-sen mausoleum on Nanjing's Purple Mountain was a turning point in the development of a Chinese classical style. Designed by Lu Yan-zhi (1894-1929), this Mausoleum successfully combined traditional Chinese architectural features with a new modern interpretation of monumentality. It also led to a new trend of architectural design, first in Nanjing's official buildings and later spreading across the country. When the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan, these national rituals and the modern Chinese monumentality created by Lu were also introduced to the island. The architect Wong Da-hong (1917-) attempted to challenge this monumentality when he was commissioned to design the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Memorial Hall in Taipei, and later

Yang Jhuo-cheng (1914-2006) gained inspiration from Lu's work for his design of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall. Built in late-1970s, the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall was the last nationalistic architecture erected to honour Chiang, the great leader of the nation. Although a great deal of criticism from modernist advocates targeted Chinese classical styles, it did not change the fact that it was the most popular style adopted in most governmental buildings in Taiwan. However, after the 1980s, the style had almost been forgotten due to enormous economic and social change. The anti-KMT and anti-Chiang Kai-shek campaigns began to flourish during the 1980s, challenging the political status of the Memorial Hall and Chinese nationalism in general. The square in front of the Memorial Hall became an ideal space for political demonstrations, and the whole area was also slowly and quietly transforming into a site for public recreation. Only a few tourists and the older generation came to the Memorial Hall to worship Chiang.

It is clear that in all of the martyr shrines, museums, parliament buildings and memorial halls built at this time, Chiang Kai-shek had taken part in the design process. For example, the style of the Taipei Martyr shrines totally reflected Chiang's favour for the Qing imperial building form. From the establishment of an official organisation, the movement of national treasures to the construction of a new national museum in Taipei, Chiang also intervened in the policy-making of the National Palace Museum. The Chung-shan building is probably the best known case to illustrate how Chiang altered the original design to conform to his ideal of a Chinese modern parliament building. The competition result of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall was also decided by Soong May-ling, Chiang's wife. Clearly, behind the construction of the nationalistic architecture in Taiwan,

the elite of the day played an important role in shaping the visible forms of the Chinese nation.

Through analysis of reinvented Chinese nationalistic architecture, this current study proves that these buildings could not have been produced without a foundation formed by particular political, social and cultural circumstances in China and in Taiwan. During the period of nation-building, nationalists accompanied by architects tended to adopt cultural and traditional symbols from the past to create a sense of community and national identity in a visual way. The unique developments of modern Chinese politics led to a narrative of Chinese nationalism emphasising humiliation in war and national salvation. Influenced by Social Darwinism, these nationalists firmly believed that only when the Chinese empire successfully transformed its old system into a modern form of a nation-state, would the nation prevent itself from being eliminated by foreign powers. Many traditional myths and ethnic symbols were reconstructed and reinterpreted in order to fit into modern national myth-making, helping to consolidate the nation as a whole to fight against foreign influence. In addition, Confucianism, represented as a core value of China's traditional cultural and political order, was used as a source to legitimise the nation's current regime. Architecture, in this regard, was also an important part of national symbolism, demonstrating visually the idea of a Chinese nation by borrowing traditional elements from history.

As Anthony D. Smith has pointed out, it is impossible to grasp the idea of nationalism without exploring its cultural matrix based on pre-existing ethnicity. Compared to modernism and prehistory, ethno-symbolism emphasises that the

influences of historical and cultural factors can indeed provide a better framework to explain Chinese nationalism. In Smith's theory, a nation stems from its pre-existing ethnic roots and requires memories, myths and traditions. These symbols help the nation to create a cultural boundary and homeland identity in modern circumstances. In the early formation of the Chinese nation, in order to develop Chinese identity, many political elites searched for national symbols from the past to reconnect the old ethnicity with the new nation. Architecture as a powerful contributor of national symbolism, therefore, is created by those who are eager to forge the nation and fulfill their political blueprint through image-making and particular visual languages.

Thus, this thesis argues that Anthony D. Smith's ethno-symbolist approach does provide a convincing explanation in the close relationship between nationalism and architecture during the nation-formation. In recent years the modernist account of nationalism has been one of the most dominant approaches to nationalism study. However, modernism tends to pay much attention to the transformation of social structure, but little to the cultural and symbolic factors that may play a more important role in shaping nations and nationalism. Ethno-symbolism, on the other hand, re-connects ethnicity with nationality to seek for a better account of nations and nationalism. Based on this approach, the current study claims that only when a broader cultural and historical circumstance have been carefully examined, could nationalistic architecture and its relations be fully understood. In his new book *The Nation Made Real: Art and National Identity in Western Europe 1600-1850*, Smith conducts a research placing the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Western European visual culture into a wider social and historical context to deal with the subject of creating a national

image by means of art form in the era of nation-building. His works shed light on a great potential for a cross-disciplinary research in connecting nationalism studies to the subject of art and its relevance.

From this perspective, this thesis is an attempt to respond to Smith's ethno-symbolism in architectural discipline. As mentioned before, the studies on nationalistic architecture in the past have given too much weight to stylistic analysis to cataloguing these buildings. They tend to view the style as *a priori* evolved from time immemorial, but overlook a further discussion on a wider social, cultural and historical perspective of architecture related to nationalism. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce ethno-symbolism as an interdisciplinary method the explanation on the development of nationalistic architecture in post-war Taiwan.

However, Smith's perspective may encounter some theoretical problems. For example, in order to carry out a broader analysis of the historical background and cultural setting, Smith fails to pay enough attention to the political factors that may also play an important part in formation and shape of national ideology. John Hutchinson, also an active ethno-symbolist, on the other hand, is aware of the problem and argues that, in the study of nationalism, politics takes a special place distributing and controlling culture as a necessary resource frequently conceiving conflicts in a territory of a nation.⁴ Therefore, this thesis suggests that the discussions of nationalism cannot by-pass the question of political power. It is inadequate to define nation and nationalism primarily in terms of cultural and

⁴ More details about the argument please see John Hutchinson, *Nations as Zones of Conflict* (London: Sage, 2005).

historical symbolic systems. It needs to place them into a network of power in order to quest for a better understanding.

Built on this perspective, this thesis argues that nationalism is a particular use of cultural artifacts produced by a group of people tends to sustain their distinctive identity and ethnic continuity through a series of symbols in a country. Culture in nationalism is a matter of consensus determined by some leading elites who attempt to use it as an essential conceptual tool for carrying out certain political programmes during nationhood building. Architecture is one of the best examples to show that national cultural can be embodied by distinct visual languages to serve the need of power. Especially in the era of nation-formation, nationalists accompanied by architects, as myth-makers, are apt to adopt national identity in a visual way. The current study believes that through the close examinations on Taiwan's nationalistic architecture, suffice it to say at this point that it can provide a satisfactory account for the topic of the metaphorical relationship between nationalism and architecture. It is also the major contribution of this thesis to the nationalism studies and architectural discipline.

In recent years, the issue of nationalism related to architecture draws a special attention from scholarship. For example, a new edited book *nationalism and architecture* collects many article wrote by different scholars from architectural historians to theorists. Numerous cases presented in the book show a common phenomenon occurred in many countries that nationalists accompanied by architects use architecture as a political tool to reinforce identity during the nation-building. Here, a foundational and interdisciplinary theory is needed to link the recent nationalism studies in decades to the discussions on nationalistic

architecture. The purpose of this thesis is attempt to span the theatrical gap between nationalism and architecture.

This thesis divides Taiwan's nationalistic architecture into four different building types: the martyr shrine, the museum, the parliament building and the memorial hall. Although these buildings are the most representative examples to sufficiently explain the close relationship between the idea of nationalism and its visual representations, the current thesis was limited by the number of cases supporting the main argument. Only are the major official buildings which manipulated by national elites with aim to transform their political ideology into architectural forms in Taiwan presented in this thesis. This is not to deny the importance of other subordinate building types, such as educational institutes, religious architecture and commercial buildings. But these non-official buildings to some extent have little different architectural expressions in responds to the Chinese classical style. For example, although the main buildings in the campus of the Chinese Culture University are cladding with the Chinese palace style, the main references to the style and special arrangement are largely derived from *I Ching* philosophy (Book of Changes) and *Bagua* (eight symbols). Tainan's China Town is another example showing that the architect attempt to give the commercial space a sense of great Chinese national nostalgia. Similar expressions also appear to other cases like hotels, hospitals, community centres, etc. These buildings apparently influence by Chinese nationalism, but not completely follow the rigid rules of Chinese traditional architecture.⁵ During the 80s, the idea of post-modernism also introduced to Taiwan and created a trend to enlarge,

⁵ More details about the buildings please see Fu, *中國古典式樣新建築 (New Architecture in Chinese Classical Style)*, .

exaggerate or distort Chinese architecture elements on the building façades. Here, the architects tend to pay more attention on relaxation of the Chinese classical building principle, but less on its political and national meanings.

These buildings require another theoretical framework to seek for a better explanation. That is to say, the current study mainly emphasises the analysis of the top-down approach to the rise of Chinese nationalism and its effects on architecture. It may overlook people's responses and reactions to these buildings from below. Although Anthony D. Smith has correctly pointed out that such micro-analysis indeed pays as little or no regard to historical background as the top-down approach did in their accounts, these bottom-up approaches still can offer partial explanations in people's perspectives on established national ideology and these nationalistic buildings.⁶ Therefore, everyday aspects of nationhood and its effects on nationalistic architecture in Taiwan are other topics requiring further exploration in the future.

Most importantly, Taiwanese nationalism is a rising political agenda which has challenged the idea of Chinese nationalism in the post-martial law era. This current thesis focuses only on the developments of Chinese nationalism and nationalistic architecture in Taiwan. Taiwanese nationalism and certain visual forms that are closely associated with the concept have not been examined. This may also be worth further exploration in the future.

By singling out the significance of symbolic and visual elements in the formation and development of nations and nationalism, the current study offers an

⁶ Smith, *Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism*, 134.

approach that bridges the theoretical gulf between nationalism studies and architecture. The rise of Chinese nationalism did stimulate a number of architects who were eager to search for a national style to fully represent the nation and national identity constructed by certain elites. Through the study of nationalistic architecture, this thesis argues that a more complete and nuanced account of the formation of nations may be advanced in future studies of nationalism.

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