

**THE FREE SOUTH AFRICA MOVEMENT AND UNITED STATES POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF DOMESTIC PRESSURE ON FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR.**

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## ABSTRACT

The focus of this study is the triumph of the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) over the Reagan administration's Southern Africa policy - "constructive engagement". The central question this study provides answers to is: why is it that within two years of its inception, FSAM achieved what had eluded other Afro-American organisations for decades by bringing pressure to bear on an incumbent administration to reverse itself on a major foreign policy germane to Africa. Afro-Americans had shown both a continuing interest in Africa since the era of slavery and a desire to influence the direction of Africa policy of successive administrations. FSAM is therefore an important movement worth studying in view of its uniqueness in being the first anti-apartheid organisation through which Afro-Americans had achieved what had always eluded them.

This necessitated putting FSAM in its historical context with a view to establishing in what sense and ways this movement succeeded while others failed. It was this that led us to identify four determinants of Afro-American influence. These were the Cold War, Afro-American electoral significance or otherwise, the organisational tactics of Afro-Americans in running anti-apartheid campaigns, and events in South Africa. These four determinants produced three scenarios which accounted for at best non-durable influence, and at worst - which was quite often the case - failures on the part of Afro-Americans to influence the direction of Africa policy of successive administrations.

FSAM succeeded where others failed because it had learned from the mistakes of its predecessors and pursued a single issue by confining its attention to a single country - South Africa - which it rightly recognised as the sole beneficiary of the administration's "constructive engagement". Its predecessors were always pursuing multifarious causes covering the entire African continent or at least a region. FSAM also had a united Afro-American community unprepared to put up with four more years of "constructive engagement". This coupled with the fact that it was an era in which Afro-Americans were conscious of their potential electoral strength within the Democratic Party and in a balance of power situation, meant that FSAM was better placed to reap the wealth of experience emanating from previous numerous failed attempts.

Although TransAfrica, around which FSAM was woven, provided the organisational and institutional structure, it was FSAM's ability to carry the public along as a tactical device that made all the difference because the pressure which the public brought to bear on the administration to change its Southern Africa policy made it impossible for Congressmen as the representatives of the people to become passive spectators. The result was initiation of a Congressional response to the yearning of the people thereby isolating the President and his "constructive engagement".



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Last but not the least, I pay tribute to the members of my family for their sacrifices in seeing me through this most difficult but happily last phase of my life as a student. Nature shall bless and reward them.

This thesis has been composed by me and no portion of it has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification in this, or any other university, or other institute of learning.

Signed

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## List of Abbreviations.

ACOA - American Committee on Africa  
ANC - African National Congress.  
ANLCA - American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa.  
AZEC - American Zionist Emergency Council.  
ASAC - American Southern African Council.  
BLA - Black Local Authority.  
CAA - Council on African Affairs.  
CORE - Congress of Racial Equality.  
FCIA - Foreign Credit Insurance Association.  
FRELIMO - Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique.  
FOSATU - Federation of South African Trade Union.  
IMF - International Monetary Fund.  
MAAG - Military Assistance Advisory Group.  
MACWUSA - Motor Assemblers and Components Workers Union of South Africa.  
MNR - Mozambique National Resistance.  
MPLA - Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola.  
NAACP - National Association for the Advancement of Coloured Peoples.  
NAFCOC - National African Federated Chamber of Commerce.  
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.  
NCA - National Construction Association.  
NCPAC - National Conservative Political Action Committee.  
NSC - National Security Council.  
NSSM - National Security Study Memorandum.  
OIC - Opportunities Industrialisation Centre.  
PF - Patriotic Front.  
RACC - Rent Action Coordinating Committee.  
SAIC - South African Indian Congress.  
SASA - South African Sugar Association.  
SCLC - Southern Christian Leadership Conference.  
UDF - United Democratic Front.  
UDI - Unilateral Declaration of Independence.  
UNA - USA - United Nations Association of the United States of America.  
USIS - United States Information Service.

## INTRODUCTION.

The focus of this study is the triumph of the Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) over the Reagan administration's Southern Africa policy - "constructive engagement". The central question this study provides answers to is: why is it that within two years of its inception, FSAM achieved what had eluded other Afro-American organisations for decades by bringing pressure to bear on an incumbent administration to reverse itself on a major foreign policy germane to Africa. As pointed out in Chapter One, Afro-Americans had shown both a continuing interest in Africa since the era of slavery and a desire to influence the direction of Africa policy of successive administrations. FSAM is therefore an important movement worth studying in view of its uniqueness in being the first anti-apartheid organisation through which Afro-Americans had achieved what had always eluded them.

FSAM was founded in November 1984 by an Afro-American lobby TransAfrica, in close cooperation with the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) and the Washington Office on Africa (WOA), to deprive South Africa of the support it had received from the Reagan administration on the basis of "constructive engagement" since 1980. The movement united the existing but ineffectual civil rights forces of Organised Labour/White Liberal/Afro-American into a coalition for the specific purpose of sabotaging "constructive engagement". FSAM is neither an organic institution nor is it one with a precise membership. It simply united organisations and individuals opposed to the direction of the administration's Southern Africa policy. Its only known spokesman and coordinator was TransAfrica's Executive Director, Randall Robinson.

To achieve its aim, FSAM targeted South Africa and its apartheid policy, called for imposition of sanctions against that country and used the tactical device of mass mobilisation to turn public opinion against the administration's Southern Africa policy. It is with the tactics, strategy and the results arising from FSAM's efforts, within its historical context, that this study is concerned.

I originally set out to limit my study to FSAM itself, as a case study of interest group formation and influence in the field of foreign policy. This would have required extensive field-work in the United States to gather information about the anti-apartheid campaigns in the 1980s. I

could not do so because of financial difficulty. Rather what I have done is a study of FSAM in its historical context. I am comparing the fate of FSAM with its predecessors. What this led to was a problem with literature. I encountered an enormous amount of literature on most of what should be dealt with in the thesis except for the activity of FSAM itself. Thus I have tended to be selective in my use of the vast range of publication in the early chapters, and treated them mainly as sources from which to construct an account rather than as interpretations inviting criticism. In the case of the modest FSAM literature there is little apart from the work of Steven Metz that require critical analysis; his arguments are discussed in Chapters Five and Six.

The originality of my study is that I have put FSAM in its historical context by establishing in what way this movement succeeded while others failed. Broadly speaking, FSAM succeeded during the tenure of a “globalist” president, a condition under which its predecessors were guaranteed to fail. In the course of the study, four variables evinced themselves as determining factors for effectiveness or otherwise of Afro-Americans as a group capable of bringing influence to bear on the Africa policy of an administration. These were: the Cold War and its effect on foreign policy; electoral significance of Afro-Americans; the organisational capacity of Afro-Americans to run an effective anti-apartheid campaign; and events in South Africa. Each of these merit a brief discussion if only in outline to elucidate their importance.

(i) The Cold War. This has been the corner-stone of US foreign policy since the tenure of Harry Truman in 1945. The problem with the Cold War as a foreign policy determinant is that it ensures the primacy of globalists over regionalists in the policy formulation process. The Cold War is an adjunct of the struggle between the East and the West in the international scene; and by predicating US foreign policy on Cold War imperatives, successive administrations overlooked the regional peculiarities of the African environment. From the point of view of the regionalists and Afro-Americans, the situation was made worse by the fact that minority and colonial administrations in the continent were the comrade in arms of the US either in NATO alliance or by ideological affinity. Settler and colonial regimes in Southern Africa repeatedly took advantage of the US anti-communist obsession to secure Washington’s patronage to the disadvantage of their indigenous nationalist opponents on the ground. Afro-Americans were therefore torn between their concern for the independence of their “kith and kin” in the ancestral homeland and the demand of their own country for a national anti-communist consensus. For example, a prominent Afro-



American activist such as Dr. Max Yergan found himself supporting US anti-communist efforts in Africa during the last months of the Eisenhower administration even though it was evident to other Afro-Americans that the victims were nationalists such as Patrice Lumumba in the Congo.

Those Afro-Americans like Paul Robeson and W.E.B. Du Bois who refused to support the Cold War doctrine of “containment policy” in the Truman era had to do battle with both the administration and the main stream Afro-American leadership which had thrown in its lot with the administration in order to secure official support for civil rights.

The preeminent role of the Cold War as a determinant of US foreign policy was vividly illustrated in the Africa policies of Presidents John Kennedy in the early sixties and Jimmy Carter in the late seventies. While these two administrations briefly adopted policies that accorded recognition to Africa’s regional peculiarities, by recognising the yearning for independence by the indigenous African population, the outcry from the right wing in the US so influenced these administrations to the extent that by the time each of them left office, one could hardly put a label to the directions of their Africa policies. The Kennedy administration’s policy in the Portuguese colonies not only lost its bearings when Portugal’s NATO membership and possession of Azores bases became the clarion call of right wing opponents, but the administration became a passive spectator as if it had never formulated and adopted a policy position in the area in question. Support for the independence of the Portuguese colonies had to give way to Cold War imperatives.

In the case of the Carter administration, when Cold War protagonists within and without the administration overwhelmed its Southern Africa policy, the administration simply abandoned the preferences of its Afro-American supporters and joined the bandwagon to highlight the hostile designs of “communists” in Southern Africa. The Pretoria regime, which had impeccable anti-communist credentials, became the administration’s ally in the defence of western interests in the region.

(ii) Electoral significance: Although electoral importance may not be a counter to the Cold War as a foreign policy imperative, Afro-American insignificance as an electoral factor compounded their lack of influence in the formulation of foreign policy. Prior to the Voting Rights Act of 1968, this electoral insignificance owed much to the situation in the South whereby Afro-Americans were prohibited from registering to vote under real and imagined disqualification clauses. The result of this was Afro-Americans’ political powerlessness across the country. With

the passage of the Voting Rights Act, newly-voting Afro-Americans became overwhelmingly Democrats. The result was that they were without influence over Republican administrations. Even when they played a major role in the election of Democratic administrations such as Kennedy and Carter's, the administration's need to adhere to public opinion in order to receive the support of the wider American populace necessitated abandonment of Afro-Americans' concerns.

The implication of this was that successful exertion of influence over an administration entailed the ability to carry the American public along, an area in which Afro-American organisations (prior to FSAM) were grossly deficient.

(iii) Organisational and tactical factors of Afro-American leadership: The Cold War as foreign policy determinant and the electoral insignificance of Afro-Americans in relation to the entire populace, were enough handicaps in Afro-Americans' attempt to influence the Africa policy of an incumbent administration. Added to this was the lack of organisational capability of Afro-American leadership.

Because this leadership fell into the hands of affluent conservative pro-administration factions during World War II and the sixties, Afro-Americans had spoken with discordant voices on issues relating to Africa. While the conservatives favoured civil rights at home as the prime focus of Afro-Americans' struggle, others such as Paul Robeson and W.E.B. Du Bois of the Council for African Affairs (CAA) wanted a two-pronged struggle between Africa's independence and civil rights at home. Because the pro-administration faction received official acquiescence if not approval, it meant not only the consequential demise of the pro-Africa elements but an Afro-American community whose leadership followed official positions on issues relating to foreign policy. In the eyes of the Eisenhower administration, there was always the risk that Africa's nationalism and quest for independence might lead to alignment with the Soviet bloc rather than the West. Thus, the Afro-American leadership failed to create a pro-Africa constituency in the US to press for Africa's independence and to support nationalist movements in the continent. Afro-American revulsion at excesses of colonial and settler rule in the continent were a replication of US official positions. Perhaps it is worth pointing out that the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLCA), as an Afro-American organisation for discussing issues relating to Africa's well-being, came to an end in 1967 because the Afro-American leadership was not equipped to fight a two-pronged battle of civil rights at home and independence in Africa.

One began to see a revolt against the position of the Afro-American leadership from the mid-sixties with the emergence of different though uncoordinated movements. It became common to refer to the largest civil rights organisation, the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured Peoples (NAACP) as a “bourgeois” organisation.

Because the target of these new movements was the Afro-American leadership, the latter began to respond to African issues in order to remain as the spokesman of the Afro-American community. What emerged was a clear evidence of a disorganised Afro-American community with discordant voices on issues relating to Africa; resulting in further marginalisation of Afro-Americans as influential factors in the Africa policy of incumbent administrations. Two events symbolised this weakness of Afro-Americans. One was their failure to effectively pressure the Johnson administration into adopting a tougher stance against Rhodesia during that country’s illegal declaration of independence in 1965. Second was their failure to strongly argue in Congress for the termination of South Africa’s sugar allocation during the Nixon administration in 1971.

Even by the second half of the seventies when some changes in perception with respect to the role of Afro-Americans’ toward Africa policy had taken place, Afro-Americans were unable to have durable influence. For example, the sacrificing of Afro-American preferences over Southern Africa by the Carter administration, to save its political skin, was a reflection of the organisational incompetence of Afro-Americans in their failure to generate public support for Africa policies unfavourable to minority regimes.

(iv) Events in South Africa: All along, South Africa had been presented to the American public by its US sympathisers, as a reliable ally against communism. The intensity of the Cold War; the desire of American administrations to accept friendship from any quarters as part of the strategy to isolate communism and the Soviet Union; and above all Pretoria’s mastery of self-promotion as the last bastion against communism in the region, all worked in favour of South Africa. The effect of these was that South Africa was able to suppress internal dissent without much outcry from American administrations and the public for fear of weakening Pretoria’s anti-communist resolve.

Prior to the emergence of FSAM, earlier Afro-American efforts proved too poorly organised and coordinated to dispel the “positive” attributes of South Africa. Things began to fall apart from September 1983 when South Africa exploded threatening civil order. After years of

suppression, the non-whites of South Africa began what became an uncontrollable protest against both apartheid and the government's attempt at sustaining it through reform. The intensity of the unrest and the media attention it attracted meant Americans had to take notice of it. That was the point FSAM emerged.


These four variables as determinants of Afro-American influence produced three scenarios over the 1945-88 period. First, whenever Cold War protagonists such as Truman, Eisenhower and Nixon acceded to the presidency, globalists wielded total influence in the foreign policy making process. This when combined with public apathy to issues relating to Africa and Afro-Americans' organisational weaknesses produced from the executive arm a Southern Africa policy favourable to minority and colonial regimes - the Cold War allies in the region.

The second scenario was that when non-globalists like John Kennedy and Jimmy Carter emerged on the scene, the concerns of liberals coupled with changes at Afro-Americans' leadership level produced policy responses from the executive arm unfavourable to South Africa and other minority administrations. Such unfavourable policies to the Cold War allies in the region however had limited life span and effectiveness when confronted by opposition from right-wing critics.

The third scenario was that a globalist president formulated a pro-South Africa Cold War prone Southern Africa policy, but a combination of public mobilisation brought about by Afro-American organisational strength induced Congressional concern leading to the passage of anti-South Africa legislation, thus, by-passing the president's original policy.

The third is applicable to FSAM which accounted for its success while its predecessors oscillated between scenarios one and two resulting in their failures. FSAM embarked on a well-trodden path littered with past failures at worst, and at best qualified and brief successes, but it succeeded because it learnt from its predecessors and struggled to create or take advantage of favourable conditions. Otherwise with a "globalist" president and a policy that specifically incorporated the cooperation of Pretoria, FSAM would have gone down the way of its predecessors.

Fig 1: Scenarios arising from determinants of Afro-Americans' influence, 1945-88.



Sources of information and organisation of study.

This study has used both primary and secondary sources of information. Primary material came in the form of Congressional activities and official pronouncements by the executive arm of government, but more material came from the Congressional sources than the latter.

Two reasons accounted for this. First, major policy initiatives are the prerogative of the executive as opposed to Congress. Since Africa was low in the scale of priority of the executive arm, not much was directed at the continent except as part of the globalist approach to the Cold War. Public apathy to issues relating to Africa eased the path of the executive in this respect.

Secondly, no Afro-American has been given the mandate to an executive arm of

government, hence those who would have deemed Africa to be important have never acceded to the presidency. Where Afro-Americans had their impact was in or on Congress and that was why there were more information from Congressional sources than from the executive. In most cases, policy directions toward Africa were revealed in Congressional hearings initiated by Afro-Americans and their White liberal supporters.

Information from Congressional and executive sources would therefore not be enough to enable one to examine the effect of FSAM over the Reagan administration's Southern Africa policy, nor would one be able to acquaint oneself with Afro-American frustrations that led to the emergence of FSAM. It is here that secondary sources of information became useful. Whatever deficiencies from those sources were made up for by eye-witness accounts in Newspapers and television documentaries.

This study is organised in seven main chapters. The first discusses the early principles underlining US government policy toward Africa following the World Wars and the early interest, attachment to and efforts of Afro-Americans to improve the predicament of the peoples of colonial Africa. The finding was that while there was harmony between the Roosevelt administration and Afro-Americans on the need to terminate colonial rule, there were differences in emphasis. To the administration, colonial territories deserved independence because the rivalries between imperial powers arising therefrom, posed a threat to global peace. By contrast Afro-Americans had a long standing commitment to Africa as their ancestral homeland, therefore they pursued the issue on a "kith and kin" basis.

Chapter Two focuses on the position of the Truman administration toward decolonisation in Africa. The finding was a reflection of scenario one in the schema analysed above. Truman was a "globalist" president who pursued Cold War oriented foreign policy to which all Americans must subscribe. Public indifference to Africa policy coupled with support for official policy position by the Afro-American leadership enabled the administration to adopt a policy position favourable to Africa's colonial and minority administrations. The same factors account for the lack of influence of Afro-Americans on Africa policy despite Truman's sympathy to their demands in the domestic field.

Chapter Three discusses the Africa policies of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations in relation to Afro-Americans' role as an interested party capable of bringing influence to bear. The



Chapter clearly reveals how differing ideological inclination of leaders under different circumstances can produce different scenarios under our schema. During the tenure of Eisenhower, the administration's pursuit of Cold War imperatives coupled with the absence of a contrary opinion from the public resulted in scenario one. But when Kennedy acceded to the presidency, the pivotal role of Afro-Americans in his election and the ascendancy of liberals in the administration coupled with a clear vision of Afro-Americans about their role in the formulation of Africa policy, resulted in the adoption of a Southern Africa policy clearly unfavourable to South Africa and Portugal. But this was brief and had limited effect because the administration failed to pursue its policy in order to stem criticism from right-wing opponents. Kennedy's presidency was therefore a reflection of scenario two.

Chapter Four examines the ability of Afro-Americans to influence the direction of US policy toward Africa in the post-Kennedy era. Two case studies were used. One was the unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia in 1965; and the other was the battle to terminate South Africa's sugar allocation in Congress in 1971. During the first (UDI), the Johnson administration had relapsed into conservatism as epitomised by its reluctance to embrace the civil rights or African policy of its predecessor. This situation coupled with organisational weaknesses of Afro-American leadership and a polarised Afro-American community produced a replication of scenario one. The same was true of the sugar allocation issue.

Chapter Five is a continuation of the last chapter except that from 1971, Afro-Americans had become more assertive and forceful in their demand to have a say in the formulation of Africa policy. The emergence of the "Thursday Group" and the meeting in Puerto Rico by 27 Afro-Americans on the need to form a political party of their own which would forcefully address Africa policy were cases in point. The outcome of these efforts was that the Democratic Party took notice and responded by writing a Southern Africa policy into the party's manifesto for the 1972 election - the first time in the history of the party when such distinct recognition was accorded an African issue. When Jimmy Carter won the election in 1976 on the basis of support from Afro-Americans, his non-globalist instincts combined with the strength of Afro-Americans to produce a Southern Africa policy unfavourable to the region's minority regimes. But like Kennedy's this was limited as the administration later reversed itself in order to counter criticism from opponents. Chapter Five therefore produced scenario two.

Chapter Six is an examination of the Reagan administration's commitment to globalism in Southern Africa in a policy dubbed "constructive engagement". This policy virtually ignored apartheid in South Africa and rather committed itself to friendship with Pretoria in an effort to expel "communist" forces in Angola. Nor could Afro-Americans exert influence because of the inclination of the administration. But the eruption of violence in South Africa in late 1983 and Reagan's re-election in November 1984 galvanised the Afro-American lobby, TransAfrica, to launch FSAM. The tactics and strategies of FSAM are the subject matter of Chapter Seven. With the efficient use of public mobilisation against "constructive engagement" by FSAM, Congress became concerned resulting in the passage of anti-South Africa legislation over and above the head of the President, thus producing scenario three.

The conclusion reflects on the success of FSAM by reiterating the significance of this success in the context of past failures by Afro-Americans. It extends the discussion of FSAM's significance by considering the broader impact of its success on the policies pursued by the European Community and by a number of national governments in the late 1980s

## CHAPTER ONE

### PATTERNS OF UNITED STATES INTERESTS IN AFRICA PRIOR TO 1948.

The essence of this chapter is to analyse American interest, at government level, in Africa <sup>prior to</sup> and ~~during~~ World War II and to contrast it with the Afro-American interest in the continent to determine whether or not there was convergence of interests. This will give an insight into the pattern of interest about Africa prevalent in the US prior to the establishment of the UN and what role the US played with respect to the status of Africa.

Consequently, this chapter analyses two issues: (i) early principles underlining US government policy toward Africa; (ii) Afro-Americans' early interests, attachment to and their efforts to improve the predicament of the African continent as a colony of European powers. It then concludes with an identification of similarities or otherwise in the nature of interests of both the US government and America's African community towards Africa.

#### (i) The early principles of US government policy towards Africa:

To speak of reasons for the emergence of a FSAM in the United States presupposes that the latter plays an active role in the African scene. This needs careful analysis to identify the pattern of that role and its rationale in the continent. Since this section dwells <sup>on</sup> an era in which most of Africa was under colonial rule, emphasis will be on America's initiative on the colonial question.

Africa featured first in the agenda of the United States government as a colonial territory, hence, a subject for the self determination principle which constituted part of Woodrow Wilson's 14 points for global peace. Whatever interests the United States had as regards the need for self determination of people evaporated however with that country's relapse into isolationism following Congress' refusal of America's membership of the League

of Nations.

While Germany's use of submarine warfare and the Zimmerman note encouraging Mexico to attack the United States brought the latter out of an earlier isolationism, the idea of permanently remaining on the World stage as an actor with the European powers was an issue which law makers in Washington adamantly opposed. It was this that scuppered Wilson's vision of the post 1914-18 war World, and brought about the parting of ways between conflict prone Europe and isolationist United States at the level of international organisation.

Although commercial transactions between European countries and the United States continued unabated throughout the isolationist period, the more so as the Europeans were indebted to the former in the form of loans and war materials, there was no attempt at a joint action between them with a view to revamping the League. Whatever private murmuring there was by individuals in Congress and the administration about the need for America's involvement in the tottering League was necessitated by the United States' predicament, as opposed to either a genuine desire to jettison isolationism or to press ahead with the self determination issue on a global basis.

For by 1929, the United States had begun to suffer under the yoke of economic depression, so much so that between October 1931 and October 1932 - just a space of twelve months - unemployment jumped 60.3 per cent from 6,800,000 to 10,900,000.[1] Involvement in the League was seen as a means to gaining access to an enlarged market with an outlet for American produce. Franklin Roosevelt himself, though far from being a supporter of America's entry into the League favoured the idea of an enlarged market for American produce. But such was the distaste for involvement in anything European in the United States that all the prospective candidates for the Democratic Party nomination in the 1932 presidential election, including Franklin Roosevelt and Newton Baker, had to publicly reverse their position on the issue. Their Republican opponents would have had a field day, as they had done with earlier candidates, portraying them as disciples of Woodrow Wilson who would meddle in European affairs with consequential economic and human damage to the American people.[2]

Needless to say such charges had a debilitating effect on the Democratic Party as evidenced by the string of defeats which it suffered at the hands of the Republican Party after the exit of Woodrow Wilson. This was broken by Roosevelt's victory in 1932 on the expectation that he would rescue the country from economic ruin in the same way in which he

had New York as governor.

The issue of the predicament of dependent peoples came into sharp focus in Washington following a meeting which President Roosevelt had with Churchill in August 1940. The meeting ended with an eight point declaration which later came to be known as the Atlantic Charter, comprising issues that impinged upon the entire World. But the third point, which spoke of the inalienable right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they would live, [3] directly affected the colonial peoples under subjugation by the imperial powers.

Like President Wilson's fourteen points of the 1914-18 war, the Atlantic Charter was seen by seasoned nationalists in Asia - where the British had broken every promise for independence - and budding nationalists from continental Africa alike as a nail in the coffin of colonialism. The possibility that the Atlantic Charter might be a repeat of the abortive self determination principle of Woodrow Wilson fame was nullified by events which moved in favour of the nationalists.

One such event was the fact that these eight points were endorsed on January 1, 1942 by 26 nations as the nucleus of the principles of a future international organisation. In addition, unlike Wilson who set off for Europe to usher in the peace of his dreams without considering the possibility of hostility from the legislative arm, Roosevelt stayed at home to pile up the pressure on Congress and the populace at large. This pressure took the form of convincing public opinion and Congress of the undesirability of leaving global peace to the devices of imperial Europe. On July 23, 1942 Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull argued the need for the creation of "some international agency ...which can ...by force if necessary ...keep the peace among nations in the future"[4] Such advocacy was a clear recognition of the factors that led to the failure of the League. Chief of these was the League's attempt to ensure global peace by collective security without the necessary means of enforcement.

### Implications of United States' new initiative on colonialism

Since it was a United States president who in his meeting with an imperial power had in concert with the latter come out with a declaration on self determination, the colonial peoples

had every cause to be optimistic, especially as the events in Congress seemed to be in their favour.

The British however had great difficulties in understanding Roosevelt's position on colonialism. So much so that the British authorities had to reduce themselves to the position of determining the administration's position by gauging the tides and currents of an extremely mobile phenomenon like public opinion in the United States.[5] The justification for such an alarming degree of confusion on the part of the British administration was that President Roosevelt had given contradictory signal on colonialism by "favouring" on one breath the restoration of France's colonial possessions and on the other, by advancing the idea of an international trusteeship for territories ill-equipped for immediate independence.

The claim that there was a contradiction in America's position on colonialism was absurd for the simple reason that it was the American president who was repeatedly at loggerheads with Churchill over the colony of India. When the British took advantage of the polarisation in India to stall on the independence issue on the pretext that the British government would not shirk its responsibilities by abandoning colonial people to an uncertain future, it was Roosevelt who advised the Prime Minister to establish a broad based interim indigenous government. Such a government if established along the pattern of America's early independence era would in the president's opinion dissipate the animosity and disunity among the natives following the prolonged period of struggle against British rule.[6] The United States' interest in the independence struggle in India was a testimony to her stance on the issue of colonialism and called into question the idea of Washington's support for restoration of the empire of an extremely weak European country like France that had repeatedly failed to fend off attacks from a neighbouring Germany.

With respect to the idea of an international trusteeship, there is no denying the fact that President Roosevelt and the intellectuals surrounding him such as Professor Arthur N. Holcombe and Rupert Emerson mooted the idea. But this was neither intended to confuse imperial powers nor carve a place for the United States under the colonial sun. There were two reasons for this. First, the United States needed an expanded market for her produce. Such an idea was a function of the depression of the early 1930s and the need for such an enlarged market was taken care of by article eight of the Atlantic Charter. This article spoke of the need for an open door policy in the international commercial domain. The idea of American



participation in such an international trusteeship was partly to gain unfettered access to greater market facilities.

Secondly, the idea of an international trusteeship was America's reaction to the mockery which imperial Europe and Japan had made of the League's mandate. In spite of Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points and the conspicuous importance attached to the self-determination principle, empire hungry Europeans and pseudo-imperialists such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa actually turned up at Versailles with a shopping list of colonial peoples to possess. Before long the mandated territories they received from the League had been added to their colonial stock. America's intention to become a member of such a would-be international trusteeship would militate against such wholesale looting of colonial peoples.

The United States was therefore determined that such territories should be administered by international trusteeship until they were prepared to govern themselves instead of falling prey to an imperialist power. There is therefore nothing to suggest that there was ambiguity on the part of the United States administration on the issue of the right of self-determination of the colonial peoples. That Britain was not sure of Washington's stance on the issue was a self-inflicted confusion emanating from a determination not to let go of colonial peoples.

#### (ii) Early historical analysis of Afro-Americans interest on Africa.

The position of the Roosevelt administration on <sup>the</sup> colonial issue raises a number of pertinent questions, notably how harmonious was it with the position of Afro-Americans on the issue? This therefore calls for an analysis of early Afro-American interest in Africa

The issue of identification with Africa by America's African population is as old as the slave trade itself. The first serious and organised attempt at identification with Africa occurred from 1788 following the emergence of "Negro Unions" in various parts with the stated objective of repatriating willing Afro-Americans to the ancestral homeland. This was not brought about by a longing to retrace their steps the way they came. Rather it was an organised response to a number of catastrophes which had befallen them. First and foremost was their anger at the lumping together of freed (Manumission) slaves and serving slaves with the attendant curtailment of freedom associated with bondage. Such a situation arose because the

predominant white population would not recognise their former slaves as their equals.[7]

Second was the haggling and bargaining over the status of Afro-Americans which took place during the 1787 constitution drafting conference for the new sovereign state, following the end of the war of independence. Southern delegates, unwilling to dispense with slavery on account of the economic advantages inherent in it wanted to count slaves for the purpose of representation. Northern delegates sensing the prospect of being overwhelmed numerically by the slave swollen South should slaves be counted refused to give in. In the end, America's Diaspora Europeans made their peace at the expense of the Afro-Americans: the South allowed slaves to be counted as three-fifth of human beings for the purpose of representation in exchange for postponement of the abolition of slave trade to a date not later than 1808.[8] The enormity of this decision to the Afro-Americans can be appreciated when one realised that even as late as 1900, 92 per cent of the Afro-American population of 8, 833, 994 still lived in the South. Unlike Whites very few of whom were slaves, 90 per cent of Afro-Americans were slaves.[9]

This realisation that there was nothing for the Afro-American in a country which could not guarantee the freedom of all its citizens convinced Afro-Americans of their bleak future. This conviction was further buttressed by the lawlessness of the Ku Klux Klan with the tacit support of the responsible organs of the state in the South. The back to Africa option of the "Negro Unions" therefore became a more attractive choice to responsible Afro-Americans than resorting to the pre-independence tactics of insurrection that had plagued the American colonies between 1687 and 1770.[10]

As the disenchantment with the American system grew, so did the rise of Afro-American romanticism with Africa as a promised land. Although there was no exact figure of the number of Afro-Americans who resettled in Africa as the figure was quite often confused with those who accepted emigration under the auspices of the white-Americans sponsored Colonisation Society, the back to Africa option successfully built a strong and effective African consciousness in the minds of Afro-Americans.[11] So much so that between 1892 and 1914, Bishop Henry McNeal Turner of the African Methodist Episcopal Church proffered it as a solution to the race problem, following America's post civil war failure to rescue Afro-Americans from civil rights erosion and mob violence, in spite of their contribution to the war efforts during the civil war. For example, in 1892, while 162 Afro-Americans were lynched in

the South, only 69 European-Americans fell victims to the same fate.[12]

Such a grim ratio in favour of the predominant population group when seen on the basis that only some twenty per cent of the population in the South were Afro-Americans highlights the problem confronting the minority race. It also conferred respectability upon the Bishop's observation that not only was the US "the worst and meanest country", but there was "nothing for the Negro to attain unto" in the "barbarous condition of the United States and the low order of civilisation which controls its institutions." [13]

He was not without critics. Both Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois favoured Afro-Americans' assistance to Africa but they wanted their people to remain in the US and find solutions to their predicament. Washington ceaselessly stated in numerous conferences that the Afro-American owed a duty to assist in Africa's advancement because unlike the United States, Africa was his ancestral homeland. It was at one of such conferences at the Gammon Theological Seminary in Atlanta in 1895 that he led delegates in expressing their disgust at the pillaging of the Congo by King Leopold of Belgium without consideration for the welfare of the indigenous population. Washington was the Deputy-President of the Congo Reformed Society, a position he used in no small measure to lobby the administration of Theodore Roosevelt to bring influence to bear on Belgium to improve the condition of the indigenous population of the Congo. He played no less a role on issues relating to Liberia and even went as far as calling a conference on the Negroid race in 1912. It was in that conference in what read like a valedictory speech that he entrusted colonial Africa to the charge of Afro-Americans with the specific request that they play a pioneering role in training Africans in teaching and the vocational fields - a path he had already begun by dispatching volunteer students of Tuskegee to various parts of Africa to assist in vocational enterprise.[14]

The emergence of the Afro-Caribbean Marcus Garvey on the American scene between 1918 and 1923 to advocate the same back to Africa option coupled with Dr. Du Bois' efforts in organising a total of six Pan-African Congresses to bring together continental and Diaspora Africans to press for Africa's emancipation were eloquent testimonies to the importance of the continent to Afro-Americans.

Born in Jamaica in 1887, Marcus Garvey arrived in the US in 1916 and established the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) with the objective of effecting the repatriation of Diaspora Africans to freedom in the ancestral homeland. This objective was, no

doubt, inspired by the predicament of the African race in the New World but its significance lay in the strategy and tactics adopted by Garvey. He instilled racial pride and racial consciousness in the Diaspora African who, he argued, should count himself lucky for being the descendant of a noble race:

“When Europe was inhabited by a race of cannibals, a race of savages, naked men, heathens and pagans, Africa was peopled with a race of cultured black men, who were masters in art, science and literature; men who were cultured and refined; men, who it was said, were like the gods. Even the great poets of old sang in beautiful sonnets of the delight it afforded the gods to be in companionship with the Ethiopians..Negroes, teach your children they are direct descendants of the greatest and proudest race ever peopled the earth..”[15]

To attract that past greatness, the New World African must have confidence in himself and in his ability: “Why, then, should we lose hope? Black men you were once great; you shall be great again; Lose not courage, lose not faith, go forward. The thing to do is to get organised”. He returned to the same theme time and again as it were to drive home his point: “Up you mighty race, you can accomplish what you will... ” And why not, after all “down the line of history we come, Black, courtly, courageous and handsome. No fear have we today of any great man From Napoleon back to Genghis Khan.”[16]

This pattern of eulogising everything African especially their “glorious past” was no doubt designed to instil confidence in the Diaspora African with a view to giving him a sense of self-respect. But in the process, Garvey actually gave Africa to the New World Africans. He told them that they were Africans and that it was only in Africa that they were certain to find the peace of mind: “Men and women of the Negro race, rouse ye in the name of your posterity, summon your every sense, collect your every faculty, thrust the scales from your eyes and be converted to the cause of Negro advancement and dignity; Negro power and sovereignty; Negro freedom and integrity; thereby becoming the giants of your own destiny! Your posterity is crying out for you”. In case Europeans did not know that Africa belonged to Africans irrespective of their places of abode, Garvey spoke not as a leader of Diaspora Africans, but as an African. He saw no difference between one set of Africans and the others provided they all had the Negroid blood in their veins:

“We do not desire what has belonged to others, though others have always sought to deprive us of that which belonged to us....If Europe is for the Europeans, then Africa shall be for the black peoples of the world. We say it; we mean it....The other races

have countries of their own and it is time for the 400,000,000 Negroes to claim Africa for themselves..The Negroes of the world say, "We are striking homewards towards Africa to make her the big black Republic"....what is the barrier? The barrier is the white man...who now dominates Africa that it is to his interest to clear out of Africa now, because we are coming not as in the time of Father Abraham, 200,000 strong, but we are coming 400,000,000 strong, and we mean to retake every square inch of the 12,000,000 square miles of African territory belonging to us by right divine.." [17]

His strategy for ensuring that the New World Africans claimed the Africa that rightfully belonged to them was for them to be economically independent. Thus, commercial enterprises ranging from a maritime company - the Black Star Line - to hat making factories were established.

Although Garvey never set foot on Africa, his contribution went beyond mere development of interest in Africa. He made Africa not just the ancestral homeland but one that truly belonged to the New World African and which must be reclaimed by him. In the process, it was the grassroots as opposed to the elites that yearned for the Garvey solution to the predicament of the race. The UNIA therefore all but saw itself an embryonic indigenous African government in exile.

On the other hand, Du Bois wanted New World Africans to contribute to the improvement and freedom of continental Africans. Perhaps he opposed Marcus Garvey more strenuously than he did Bishop McNeal Turner because of the former's apparent success as a race leader with a solution to the problems of the race. Du Bois' efforts were therefore geared toward the liberation of Africans in the ancestral homeland. One visible effort in this direction was the persuasive power he brought to bear on Afro-Americans' to enlist in the US armed forces following World War 1. This was at a time when the Afro-American had no stake in the United States because of the prevailing racially motivated caste system in the country. It was Du Bois who used his editorship of the Crisis to establish a symbiotic relationship between Afro-Americans physical support for Allied victory in the war and an improvement in race relations at home and freedom for Africans in the ancestral homeland. He was influenced by Woodrow Wilson's 14 points especially the central plank which advocated self determination of peoples. It was chiefly on this basis that Du Bois set sail for Versailles, not so much to seek a solution to the race problem in the US but, to argue Africa's case at the conference. [18]

Du Bois' idealism clearly failed him on the two issues that made him support the allied cause. On the issue of civil rights, the Afro-American who took part in the war returned not



just to the bad old racist society but one whose racism had been intensified by Woodrow Wilson. Unlike the prewar era when segregation was virtually non-existence in federal offices, political exigency made Wilson to pacify the Southern voters by extending a purely Southern phenomenon to federal institutions. With it came an hardening of attitude on the part of the predominant population as the returning Afro-American soldiers and an influx of Southern Afro-Americans now competed for scarce housing facilities and jobs with the Whites. The result was that the racial tensions between Afro-Americans and white Americans in the South now became a national feature. The increase in rioting in 1919 (christened "Red Summer") was an eloquent testimony to the failure of Du Bois' strategy even for a reprieve of the Afro-American hopelessness in the American system much less the achievement of equality with the predominant race. Equally, he came away empty-handed on the issue of Africa's emancipation not for lack of trying, but because of the overwhelming presence of imperialists at the conference as earlier noted.[19]

Despite these strategic differences between Du Bois and Marcus Garvey their common interest in seeing the freedom of Africa should not be underestimated.

The fact that Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 raised an uproar among Afro-Americans [20] and no doubt contributed to their response for enlistment in the American Armed Forces in the 1938-45 war - in spite of the lack of improvement in their status - was a testament to their interest in Africa. It was this interest that continued to sustain the enthusiasm of Du Bois as evidenced by the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester in which in his own words:

"Africa was for the first time adequately represented. From the Gold Coast came Nkrumah....With him was Ashire Nikoi of the Cocoa Farmers Co-operation. From Kenya was Jomo Kenyatta; from Nigeria Chief Coker; from the West Indies came a number of trade union leaders; from South Africa the writer, Peter Abrahams acted as publicity director while George Padmore was general-director. It was interesting to learn that from the original Pan-African Congress the idea had spread so that nearly every African province now had its national congress.... There are now national congresses in South Africa, Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Tanganyika and Angola." [21]

No one doubts the fact that local conditions created the impetus for the independence movement in Africa, but the Diaspora Africans especially the Afro-Americans were the first to decry those conditions at the international level. It was perhaps in recognition of this effort on



the part of Diaspora Africans that some early revolts against colonial rule were sustained by the possibility of a helping hand by Afro-Americans across the Atlantic. Some of these were the revolt in colonial Nyasaland led by American trained John Chilembe during which it was prophesied that Afro-Americans would arrive in aircraft to bomb Europeans out of their country. This was also true of the religious uprising in Kimbangu in the Congo in the 1920s and an insurrection in Madagascar in 1947 in which the prospect of a rescue by Afro-Americans helped to sustain the natives in their endeavour. Indeed the Madagascar insurrection was spectacular in this regards because rumour circulated that Afro-Americans, armed to the teeth, had already landed to overwhelm the Europeans. The influence of these unfounded rumours was so effective that colonial authorities in parts of Africa thought it wise to suspect, in some cases accuse and censure missionaries of African descent in their jurisdiction for spreading subversive messages.[22]

In this respect, Dr. Du Bois was not simply boasting in saying that it was Diaspora Africans who pioneered and spearheaded the cause of Africa's emancipation until the emergence of continental Africans in the 1940s to continue the struggle in earnest to fruition. Several of the Africans who emerged to lead their states to independence in the 1950s and 60s were participants at the Manchester Congress of 1945 who became restless thereafter and went back home to confront colonial rule. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya were conspicuous in this regard. The inspirational nature of the Manchester conference was acknowledged by no less a participant than Nkrumah in the following words:

“Although this conference was the fifth [ Du Bois insisted it should be the sixth] of its kind that had taken place, it was quite distinct and different in tone, outlook and ideology from the four that had preceded it...As the preponderance of members attending the conference were African, its ideology became African nationalism - a revolt by African nationalism against colonialism, racialism and imperialism in Africa...And it was this Fifth Pan African Congress that provided the outlet for African nationalism and brought about the awakening of African political consciousness. It became, in fact, a mass movement of Africa for the Africans.”[23]

In this respect, Afro-Americans, if their interest in Africa had not waned, were bound to be elated by the interest which President Roosevelt was showing on the colonial question, the more so as he had the support of Congress. Whether or not Afro-Americans continued their attachment to Africa after the Roosevelt's presidency will become clear from the support they

gave to continental Africans in their struggle against colonial rule.

### Conclusion.

The pattern of interest in Africa between the administration of Roosevelt and Afro-Americans (including Afro-Caribbeans domiciled in the US) evinced a number of interesting features. Afro-Americans had shown a continuing interest in Africa and a long standing commitment to that continent. Hence they approached the issue from a kith and kin basis. By contrast, Africa featured in the calculation of the administration because of the recognition that colonial rivalry constituted two evils: a destabilising factor in the international scene, and a threat to global peace. The administration's effort was therefore geared towards the termination of colonial rule in the interest of international peace, but there was no uniform pattern for pressing the United Kingdom and France to decolonise. This however, need not be seen as the basis for the confusion of the United Kingdom government on the issue of decolonisation. Prime Minister Churchill had no intention of presiding over the liquidation of the British empire.[24]

The similarity, though <sup>with</sup> differences of emphasis, on the issue of decolonisation between Afro-Americans and the Roosevelt administration raises a number of questions. How did subsequent United States governments pursue the self determination policy inherited from the Roosevelt administration with respect to Africa? How active and emphatic were the Afro-Americans on the issue of Africa's independence? The answer to these questions therefore calls for an analysis of United States role on decolonisation in Africa with particular emphasis on issues appertaining to race in three stages: (1) Harry Truman's to Nixon/Ford administrations' policies; (2) the policy of Jimmy Carter's administration; (3) the Reagan Presidency and the Afro-American role in each of these periods.

## FOOTNOTES

1. See Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940. (The University Press at New Haven, Yale 1946) p.4.
2. Ibid. pp. 64-68.
3. See Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the coming of the War 1941, (Yale University Press at New Haven, 1948) p. 119; Congress and the Nation 1945-1964. (Congressional Quarterly Service, Washington 1965.) p. 93.
4. Congress and the Nation, Ibid.p. 93.
5. William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay 1941-1945, (Clarendon, Oxford 1977) pp. 147-151.
6. Ibid.
7. John Hope Franklyn, "A Brief History of the Negro in the United States", in John P. Davis, (ed), The American Negro Reference Book, (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1966.) pp. 1-20.
8. Ibid.
9. For an analysis of the population trend in the US, see Karl.E., and Alma.F. Tauber, "The Negro Population in the United States" in Ibid., pp. 96-108.
10. Some of these were the 1658 uprising in Hartford, the 1712's in New York; the Cato conspiracy in Carolina in 1723 with considerable loss of life and property. Only those riots planned in Virginia in 1687 and Boston in 1723 were successfully nipped in the bud by the authorities. In view of the calibre of persons involved in the "back to Africa" option such as Paul Cuffee and Martin Delany, it was understandable why this was preferred to taking the law into ones hands. See Robert Weisbord, Ebony Kinship, (Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut 1973) p. 15; Hollis R. Lynch, "Pan-Negro Nationalism in the New World Before 1862", in August Meier and Elliot Rudwick (eds.) The Making of Black America, vol. 1. (Atheneum, New York 1969) pp. 42-65.
11. Although actual records of Afro-Americans response to the "back to Africa" option were scanty, one can get a glimpse from: Christopher Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, (Oxford University Press, London 1962) pp. 112-122; George Salvador, Paul Cuffe, The Black Yankee, (Reynolds-De Walt, New Bedford 1969); D. Matijasie, "The African Colonisation Movement and Ohio's Protestant Community", Phylon, (Atlanta) vol. XLV1, No. 1. March 1985, pp. 16-24; John David Smith, "Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Robert Stein's 1904 "DRAFRICANISATION" Schema to "Hopeland", Ibid. pp. 1-15.
12. Thomas F. Gossett, Race, The History of An Idea in America, (Southern Methodist University Press, Dallas, 1963) pp. 268-9.
13. See Bishop H.M. Turner, "Will It Be Possible for the Negro to Attain, in this Country, Unto the American Type of Civilization?", in Adelaide Cromwell Hill and Martin Kilson, (eds.) Apropos of Africa: Sentiments of Negro American Leaders on Africa from the 1800s to 1950s,

(Frank Cass, London 1969) p. 47.

14. See William B. Helmreich, Afro-Americans and Africa, (Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1977) pp. xxi-xxii; Adelaide Cromwell and Martin Kilson, Op.cit. pp. 268-9; Peter Duignan and L.H. Gann, The United States and Africa, (The University Press, Cambridge 1984) pp. 270-1.

15. Garvey's life, thought and turbulent race movement have been systematically chronicled by F. David Cronon, The Black Moses: The Story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association, (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1955) pp. 176-177 for the quotation; For the latest analysis, see Judith Stein, The World of Marcus Garvey, (Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge and London, 1986.)

16. D. Cronon, Ibid.

17. Ibid. pp. 64-66 and 173.

18. In one of his editorial comments at the early phase of the 1914-18 war (prior to American involvement), he told his predominantly Afro-American readership that the chief cause of the war was the "wild quest of imperial expansion among coloured races by the European imperialist." He elaborated this theme later in the May 1915 edition of the Atlantic that there was hostility because Europeans were unable to keep clear of Africa. He argued that their tendency to carve up Africa into compartments for the sole purpose of spheres of influence and exploitation had created tensions resulting in a war. His solution to the problem was immediate termination of "imperialistic economic expansion over colonial peoples and the granting of independence to African states." He was particularly elated by Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points, hence he asked the Afro-Americans to enlist in the Armed Forces to contribute to Africa's liberation and easing of racial tension at home. For details see Francis Broderick, W.E.B. Du Bois, Negro Leader in Time of Crisis, (The University Press, Stanford, California 1959) pp. 26, 55, 107-109.

19. Whether or not Woodrow Wilson was qualified to embark upon the self determination crusade in view of the prevailing racial situation in his country and the presence of accomplished white supremacists like Louis Beer in his government is not the central theme of this section. However one may say, perhaps in passing, that Wilson was hardly equipped for the task not only because of the ease with which he was overwhelmed by the imperialists at the conference, but he himself had begun to doubt the validity of his principles. For example, no sooner had he arrived at Versailles than the President began to exhibit absolute indifference to the idealism he had earlier nurtured as vividly portrayed in his famous and often cited statement: "...the disposition of the German colonies was not vital to the life of the world in any respect. It was the determination of the pressing European question which was all important." German colonies were concentrated in Africa, hence his statement meant sacrificing the right of self-determination of the African people. It is worth pointing out that it was Louis Beer who as Head of the Colonial Division reminded President Wilson in a memorandum that "the Negro has shown no capacity for progressive development except under the tutelage of other peoples." See Pan-Africanism Reconsidered, (University of Berkeley 1962) p. 42; William Roger Louis, "The U.S. and African Peace Settlement of 1919: The Pilgrimage of George Louis Beer", Journal of African History, iv, 3/1963. p. 417.

20. For the anger of Diaspora Africans in general in the New World over the invasion of Ethiopia by Italy, see, R.S. Weisbord, Op.cit. especially chapter 3; Roi Ottley, New World-A Coming: Inside Black America, (Houghton Mifflin, Boston 1943) (The use of this reference is necessitated by its lucid analysis and originality); E.U. Essien-Udom, Black Nationalism - A

Search for an Identity in America, (Dell Publishing, New York 1964).

21. W.E.B. Du Bois, "The American Negro Intelligentsia", in A.C. Hill and M. Kilson (eds.), Op.cit. pp. 315-6.

22. Details could be gleaned from: George Shepperson, "Notes on Negro American Influences on the Emergence of African Nationalism", in Okon Edet Uya, (ed.) Black Brotherhood - Afro-Americans and Africa, (D.C. Heath, Lexington, Massachusetts 1971.) entire article is useful in this regard; R.G. Weisbord, Op.cit. pp. 164-167; J. Stein, Op. cit.

23. Kwame Nkrumah, The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, (Thomas Nelson and Sons, London, 1957) pp. 53-4.

24. For analyses regarding Churchill's reluctance to face the issue of decolonisation: Ronald Hyman, Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office 1905-1908, (The University Press, London 1968); Henri Grimal, Decolonising the British, Dutch Empires 1919-1963, (The University Press, London 1978)

## CHAPTER TWO.

### UNITED STATES POLICY IN AFRICA: THE TRUMAN ERA.

The analysis in Chapter One has shown that not only were Afro-Americans interested in the well-being of Africans but that the efforts of the Roosevelt administration toward decolonisation was a step in the right direction when viewed from the perspective of Afro-Americans. The essence of this chapter is therefore to determine what the Truman administration represented: did the Truman administration play an independent role by pressing for decolonisation in a pattern different from its predecessor? Did it integrate US policy toward Europe with that of Africa? If so which was subservient to the other and was Africa deemed important? Was there any thought to the Afro-Americans in the administration's pursuit of its policy toward Africa?

Consequently, this chapter is divided into two sections: (i) an analysis of the factors that determined the administration's policy towards decolonisation and their effect on the Africa policy being pursued by the administration; (ii) specific analysis of the administration's attitude toward the evolvement of a government dedicated to the policy of apartheid in South Africa as a barometer for determining the importance attached to Africa by the administration. These two sections are being analysed with the Afro-American factor in mind by contrasting the administration's attitude toward Africa with the attitude for other countries with vocal ethnic minorities in the US.

#### (a) The basis for US policy toward decolonisation.

In analysing factors that determine the administration's policy toward decolonisation, the central question is, was there continuity from the Roosevelt administration? Were there factors that brought about changes; if so how did they affect the administration's attitude toward decolonisation in Africa?

While America's determination for global peace crystallised into the formation of the



United Nations in 1945 with the trusteeship council as one of its main organs, Washington's resolve to put its anti-colonial stance into action coincided with the emergence of what was perceived as an ideological menace in the international scene.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States were allies against the Axis powers, but the termination of hostilities ushered in a frost in their relations. This hostility had been smouldering since the autumn of 1944 following the refusal of Soviet authorities to support a joint Anglo-American assistance to the Polish uprisings against Nazi occupation. American and British officials contend that the Soviets refusal was consequent upon their realisation that the Polish underground master-minding the resistance was sympathetic to the British-based Polish government in exile. The Soviet intention therefore was to allow the Nazis to flush out their potential adversaries in Poland.

America's own Ambassador to Moscow, Averel Harriman and the Military Attache there General John Deane, not only held this view as an article of faith, but went as far as preparing their government for possible confrontation with the Soviet Union over the Polish issue. This triggered a band wagon effect which Under-Secretary of State Joseph Grew, the Pentagon and the Assistant Secretary of State for European, Asian and African Affairs, James Dunn joined.[1]

This was brought about by the fact that these officials had one thing in common, namely, the fear of being accused of negligence in the event of another Pearl Harbor like attack. Japan's surprise attack on the American base in the Pacific and the acrimony it generated between General Short and Admiral Kimmel of the Pacific Command and the administration, amidst public outcry, meant officials were careful to avoid a repetition. No one wanted to be caught unawares, and none wanted to take responsibility for another catastrophe. So much so that Ambassador Harriman's possibly exaggerated notion of Soviet expansionist tendency in Eastern Europe jolted the newly sworn-in President Harry Truman to issue a warning of dire consequences to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. Meanwhile, Under-Secretary Grew's crude analysis of Soviet expansionist tendency as a means of power projection - based on no objective criterion beyond what emanated from Ambassador Harriman - made the administration accord priority attention to the needs of the Pentagon.

Truman's position in taking the issue too seriously was understandable. As a Senator, he was a key player in the Pearl Harbor debacle. It was he who, in an attempt to exonerate his master President Roosevelt of negligence, published an article in the influential Colliers

Magazine in August 1944. In it, he placed the blame for the Pearl Harbor disaster entirely on the shoulders of the Pacific Command. Attributing the story to a source he referred to as authentic information, the Senator inferred that there was a break down in communication between the two commanders - Admiral Kimmel and General Short because they were not on speaking terms. Hence there was no coordination between their various commands.[2]

There was hardly an iota of truth in the Senator's article as the official inquiry later exonerated the two officers. What was indisputable was that President Roosevelt was under fire from Congress on grounds that the administration did not only refuse to supply the required equipment to defend the fleet, but that even some of the vital weapons were withdrawn prior to the attack. This latter accusation aroused suspicion as to whether the administration deliberately baited the Japanese as a pretext to enter the war in order to save its friend, Winston Churchill, whose country had been disgraced by Japan in the Far-East and was virtually unable to defend its cities against German air raids.[3]

Senator Truman's enthusiasm in pointing accusing fingers at the military was brought about by the tension emanating from the Presidential campaign of 1944 in which the Democratic Party of which he was the Vice-Presidential candidate, was on the defensive. Truman was therefore in no position to treat the alleged Soviet wrong doing with levity, hence, the alarm which Ambassador Harriman triggered reverberated in both the White House and the Pentagon with intensity. Military chiefs now developed the desire to acquire bases all over the world, with attendant bloated budgets, with a view to defending adequately the United States from an impending Soviet attack. The fact that the State Department lent credibility to the Ambassador's story eased the difficulties the Pentagon would have encountered under normal circumstances. Not that the Pentagon did not have misgivings about the allegation, but the truth was that Pearl Harbor was still fresh in the minds of Americans.

So concerned was the US that before the end of the war in 1945, officials had articulated a vision of the post war world in which the Soviet Union was seen "as the greatest threat to the United States in the foreseeable future. United States policy should continually give consideration to our immediate capabilities for supporting our policies by arms if the occasion should demand." [4]

It also meant the shielding of vital security related information from the Soviets in spite of the fact that they were allied with the Americans in the struggle to defeat Nazism. Washington's refusal to share the atom bomb secret with Moscow and the attempt by the

administration to discourage the physicists of the Manhattan group involved in the project from going public with their work should be seen in this light. Hitler was the immediate enemy but the Soviet Union was the potential one.[5]

It was therefore not surprising that the United States chose to drop an atom bomb on an already defeated Japan that was merely holding out in anticipation of a favourable treatment for the Emperor. Policy makers in Washington reckoned that to continue with conventional warfare would lead to a Soviet foothold in the area beyond the Soviet borders. This would complicate matters for the American vision of the post-war World, the more so as Moscow had resumed its own attack against Japan. It was therefore imperative that Japan should abruptly be deprived of the will to continue the war.

Surprisingly, the enemy syndrome was not a one-sided affair, although one must confess that this study has had greater access to American sources than Soviet. The Soviet Union saw the United States not as a permanent ally but one of convenience necessitated by the need to preserve the territorial integrity of the country. When Truman revealed to Stalin America's ability to develop an atom bomb at their meeting at Potsdam in 1945, with a view to extracting concessions from the Soviet leader about the situation in Eastern Europe, Stalin was highly composed on the surface. He did not show emotion because his intelligence service had given him a detailed account of the American technological breakthrough. What was behind that silence however, was an alarming degree of fear at the slow pace of the Soviet's own atomic programme. According to Stalin's interpreter at Potsdam, supported by the then Ambassador to the US, Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet leadership was alarmed, not in terms of prestige, but that the Soviet Union would be the likely target of America's atomic might. This perceived threat was heightened by the dropping of the bomb on Japanese cities on grounds that the Soviet Union would be next. Such was the threat perception that Stalin personally called in the leader of the Soviet team of physicists on the atom programme to expedite action before the American leadership gave the green light for the destruction of the Soviet Union.[6]

As the Soviet authorities attempted to subjugate Iran to add to its East European dominion while simultaneously showing interest on Greece and Turkey, Washington became alarmed. With Prime Minister Churchill's call in March 1946 for the establishment of a joint Anglo-American effort to forestall the emergence of the Soviet Union as another aggressive Germany, the American leader stepped in to call the Soviet bluff by introducing the 'Truman doctrine', aimed at assisting countries fighting off communist encroachment. It was this

doctrine that crystallised into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1949. NATO was both a military and an ideological bloc against the Soviet Union and communism. Its members shared a common hatred and threat from the communist ideology.

Under the circumstances, the Truman administration became preoccupied with “rolling back” communism, so much so that issues such as the termination of colonial rule became a casualty to the anti-communist imperative especially as nationalism in parts of Asia was communist-led. Emphasis was on forestalling communist encroachment beyond Eastern Europe. Beyond its refusal to the French demand to extend NATO’s commitment to Mediterranean Africa where France had considerable settler interests, the United States considered the iniquities of colonial rule as marginal. It was not that the United States was repudiating the essence of self determination. Rather, officials in Washington were no longer sure of the urgency of the issue. All that was urgent enough to merit immediate attention was complaint about the communist menace. In this respect and at this period, Africa was largely excluded from the contagion. Washington’s attention was therefore focused on releasing Eastern Europe from the clutches of communism and insulating other countries from being infected than in clamouring for freedom in the African continent.

Moreover, the African countries were under the guardianship of America’s European allies in NATO. It was better to dominate them under western influence than to release them into the unknown and probably the embrace of communism. The United States which under Franklin Roosevelt spoke eloquently against colonialism began to doubt the wisdom of this cause of action with respect to Africa’s emancipation during the Truman Presidency.

What took place was that the Truman administration began to mince words on the independence issue by arguing that immediate independence for African countries could create weak states susceptible to communist take over. Such a development, according to the argument, would weaken NATO in a bipolar world in which a country was either for the West or the adversary, namely, the Soviet Union and communism. No effort was therefore expended towards encouraging independence in Africa whose potential allegiance and ability to withstand the lure of communism could not be guaranteed.[7]

Such ambivalence on the part of the Truman administration offered European colonial masters a fairly free hand in determining the pace of decolonisation. The situation was compounded by the presence of settler populations in some of the colonial territories. This accounted for the differences in the pattern in which independence was granted. While Britain

conceded the inevitability of independence to her West African colonies in response to nationalist pressure, it could not do the same in East and Southern Africa. The reason being that these areas had a sizable settler population and a high level of British investment. Though South Africa which Britain granted independence in 1910 under settler government was undoubtedly the African jewel in the British crown, other colonies like the Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland where the British toyed with the idea of a federation for ten years also harboured British investments.

One could not say the same of the West African colonies whose unfriendly terrain, lack of European settlers and limited British investments beyond a source of raw materials, made independence a non-contentious issue after 1950.

Britain's predicament in East and Southern Africa were a replica of France's dilemma in the African continent. While France was prepared to grant independence to her West African territories, she could not do the same in Algeria because of the immigrant community. Portugal was in a different category as her colonies were said to be an extension of the metropolis itself, hence, independence was not on the Portuguese agenda.

Because there was no external pressure upon the European countries, no African country except the Italian territory of Libya received independence at the zenith of the Cold War. Libya's independence itself was not only a Cold War imperative, but threw an insight into the working of the ideological divide.

At the inception of the UN, the organisation was unsure whether to turn over the territory to the trusteeship council or to turn it over to a European country for preparation for self government. The former was not encouraging in view of the track record of the British and the French in gobbling up territories handed over to them by the League as a sacred trust. What jolted the UN into immediate action was the fact that the USSR offered herself as a possible candidate for trusteeship purpose.

That was too much for the United States. Administration officials who earlier spoke of the benefit that would accrue to Western Europe in its post war rehabilitation effort by maintaining temporary suzerainty over Libya now turned round to thrust independence upon Tripoli instead of allowing Moscow to set foot on Africa and complicate matters.[8] So that unlike the Algerians who fought yard by yard for their independence, Libya was granted independence just to thwart Soviet intrusion.

Such an exclusively ideological interest meant two things to the African continent. (a)



The refusal of the European colonial masters to decolonise across the board. (b) Washington's uncaring attitude to issues appertaining to race in the continent.

(a) State of decolonisation

About a decade after the formal formation of NATO, the Sub-Saharan African continent consisted almost exclusively of European colonies with the exception of Ethiopia and Liberia. In South Africa, Britain had earlier granted independence under White rule without adequate protection for the African population. Although Britain and France later gave an undertaking to decolonise some of their colonies, Portugal hardly spoke of independence for her colonial territories of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. These three European colonial powers were members of NATO, hence under the protective umbrella thrown over their heads by the United States.

As a result, they were susceptible to pressure to decolonise had the United States chosen to wield influence in that direction. But this was not the preoccupation of the Truman administration as African independence had nothing to do with rolling back communism. Hence, the issue of granting independence to African states was left to the calculations of the colonial powers.

That these European colonial powers were susceptible to Washington's influence need not be a contentious issue. France and Britain would have been overwhelmed by the Axis powers had the United States withheld support from them. Indeed, for almost five years France ceased to be a sovereign country independent of Berlin. In addition the end of the war brought another problem to the European countries, namely, the fear of communism. Churchill's anti-communist appeal to the US was symptomatic of the weakness and impotence of continental Europeans to confront any adversary on their own. Washington's position of a saviour was amplified at the formation of NATO when as earlier noted, it successfully vetoed France's request to extend NATO's line of defence beyond the North Atlantic. France had on her side the support of heavyweight European empire builders like Britain, Holland and Belgium. Yet, the American refusal prevailed and the organisation was precluded from the responsibility of defending colonial interests.[9]

It therefore makes sense to argue that, had the Americans predicated the extension of



the security shield to the Europeans on the latter terminating their colonial burden by granting independence to those colonies under them, it is doubtful if they would not have agreed in view of their fear of the dangerous consequences of communist take-over of their countries (perhaps except Britain where the Communist Party was not all that powerful).

(b) United States low-keyed approach to Africa.

On the second and more important issue of America's uncaring disposition toward non-Cold War issues, one has to take a look at the attitude of Washington to the advent of Nationalist Party rule in South Africa in 1948.

At the 1948 elections in South Africa, the US predicted a landslide for Boer war leader and statesman General Jan Smuts over his opponents including Dr. D.F. Malan of the "purified" Nationalist Party (NP), whom they regarded as a xenophobic extremist. Such a prediction emanated purely from America's perception of the combatants as opposed to events in South Africa itself.

Smuts was an able lieutenant of Boer war leader Louis Botha - the first Prime Minister of independent South Africa. These two leaders not only favoured rapprochement between Britons and Boers after the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902, but they were moderates and supporters of South Africa's membership of the Commonwealth. They were also instrumental to South Africa's entry into the 1914-18 war on the part of the allied powers, a gesture that repeated itself under Smuts at the outbreak of the 1939-45 war in spite of intense opposition from extremist Afrikaners in both cases. To crown it all, it must be said that at the Versailles conference, Smuts received international acclaim for his role in the formulation of the mandate system.

For a one-time cabinet minister like D.F. Malan, whose only credential was the articulation of a jingoistic nationalism, to stand for an election against an incumbent government of Jan Smuts was to the Americans akin to pressing a self-destruct button. They gave him no chance of upsetting the political situation. Such was their confidence in their assessment of the South African political scene that on the eve of the election, American embassy officials in Pretoria not only spoke about the inevitability of Smuts' triumph but that Malan's Nationalists had recognised the folly of pitting themselves against a titan of the Prime Minister's calibre.[10]

But did the Americans make this prediction on the basis of their perception as opposed to the feelings of the South African electorate? One can only provide an answer by looking at the rationale of the Nationalist Party manifesto and its relationship with those who possessed the ballot.

The impetus for the National Party manifesto.

Neither a detailed analysis of the factors that gave rise to the emergence of the NP nor the divisions among Afrikaners on how to go forward nor the contradictions of their nationalism belong here. But suffice it to say that part of the contradictions had much to do with the following: differing perceptions about unity among the white community ( Britons and Afrikaners); relations between South Africa and Britain especially the former's membership of the Commonwealth; and above all, how to rescue the Afrikaners from economic weakness and redress the monopoly of the civil service by the Anglo-South Africans.

Those who were aggrieved that much was not being done to uplift the Afrikaners found a platform in the National Party when it came to office in 1924 under Prime Minister J.B.M. Hertzog. That this was the party of the aggrieved was attested to by the speed with which the government moved to rehabilitate disadvantaged Afrikaners: not only was the civilised labour policy introduced in 1924 but the Industrial Conciliation (IC) Act - a juridical constraint on the advancement of Africans at the work-place - was intensified in 1926. The Native Service Contract Act of 1932 and the abolition of the African Cape franchise in 1936 were all designed to rescue the Afrikaners from being overwhelmed by other races.[11]

Things began to fall apart when Hertzog started to talk the language of Jan Smuts - a Boer "renegade" - by seeking cooperation among the whites, among others, with a view to forming a united front against the other races. When Hertzog went as far as forming a coalition United Party (UP) government with Smuts in 1933, that was too much for the Afrikaner purists. Dr. D.F. Malan resigned and led other extremists to establish the "purified" National Party (NP) ostensibly to dramatise the adulterated nature of the other NP once led by an extremist nationalist - Hertzog. That Smuts ruled South Africa again from 1939-1948 had much to do with the rivalry in the extremist nationalist camp.

But this in itself might have been responsible for the nature of the campaign for the

1948 election. Sandwiched between a moderate Smuts and Hertzog's rump nationalist party, Malan's NP ran a racist campaign taking the incumbent administration to task for alleged relaxation of apartheid. Thus it set itself:

“...the task of preserving and safeguarding the racial identity of the white population of the country, of likewise preserving and safeguarding the identity of the indigenous people as separate racial groups, with opportunities to develop into self-governing national units; of fostering the inculcation of national consciousness, self esteem and mutual regard among the various races of the country”.[12]

This policy goal of the Nationalists was self explanatory, namely, intensification of the segregationist policy which was first set in motion by the 1913 Land Act and subsequently relaxed by the Smuts administration in the 1940s. In other words what the party was saying was that no amount of economic imperative should interfere with the racial segregationist concept. In presenting this manifesto, the party passionately appealed to the white electorate to realise that the “choice before us is one of two divergent courses: either that of integration, which would in the long run amount to national suicide on the part of whites; or that of apartheid”. This was the central plank of the National Party which was further elaborated in the following terms:

(a) “In general terms, our policy envisages segregating the most important ethnic groups and sub-groups in their own areas where every group would be enabled to develop into a self-sufficient unit.”

(b) “We endorse the general principle of territorial segregation of the Bantu and the Whites.”

(c) “The Bantu in the urban area should be regarded as migratory citizens not entitled to political or social rights equal to those of the whites. The process of detribalisation should be arrested.”

(d) “The interests and employment prospects of the white workers in the white areas will be protected.”[13]

By coming out with this type of manifesto, the NP were saying loud and clear that they had something for every white: the process of desegregation which the incumbent government had overlooked in deference to corporate interests would be rolled back; their employment prospect would be protected and they would be insulated from the suicidal course of integration.

The Americans might have had genuine reasons for dismissing Malan's party. The thrust of the manifesto showed that it was an ethnic as opposed to a national party. This meant

that it could not receive the confidence of the British South Africans who had a major stake in the economy. They after all were not averse to the creation of a favourable climate for extraction of profit even if that meant relaxation of apartheid. Mobility of labour without undue restriction on the basis of race was a step in the right direction which the NP were eager to assault.

Secondly it could well be that the Americans realised that Malan's party was long on rhetoric but short on strategy for generating wealth. Otherwise it could not have neglected the economic imperative of desegregation at the work-place. This meant that the party had not even gained access to or had completely neglected the findings of the Fagan report of 1940/41 which convinced the Smuts' government of the need to accede to corporate demand for relaxation of the colour bar and repeal of the pass law in order to continue to generate wealth.[14] A manifesto aimed at restricting generation of wealth such as the NP's would lead to a collapse of the economy because investors would take their capital elsewhere. This factor in particular helped to convince the Americans that Malan was incapable of ruling and that his party's apartheid manifesto was not feasible.[15]

The Americans were wrong. Malan targeted the 51 per cent of the all white electorate who were Afrikaners. By inundating them with rhetoric about the perfidy of renegade Boer politicians who preferred the symbols of empire to Republican status and accusing them of relaxing the colour bar in order to reduce "poor whites" to "sub-barbaric" level [16], Malan's party was in effect speaking the minds of the disaffected Boers. The bulk of the Afrikaners whom Malan's party targeted were rural based. It was their emotions that the Nationalists tinkered with and precipitated an upset in South Africa's political history by toppling Smuts. It won 70 seats to Smuts' 65, thus forming the first "purified" NP government with the help of nine seats from other Afrikaner splinter groups.

In sum therefore, one can say America's erroneous analysis and predictions of the 1948 election was based purely on criteria peculiar to the American political scene as opposed to South Africa's. The need to look at South Africa from that country's point of view was completely ignored.[17]

It remains to answer the question, how did the Americans react to the National Party victory in view of its apartheid programme?

#### United States reaction to the new development in South Africa.

As expected, Malan's victory was a shock to the American government, the business class and Afro-Americans alike. While the latter under the auspices of the National Association for the Advancement of the Coloured Peoples (NAACP) called on the administration to exert influence to forestall any attempt by Malan - whom it equated with Hitler - to implement his race programme, religious and conscientious liberals called for suspension of American business activities until the fall of the government. As for the administration, it was as skeptical as the groups mentioned above about the ability of the new administration in Pretoria to govern, a feeling reinforced by Carnegie Endowment's Whitney Shepardson's report on his return from South Africa. He went there on a fact finding mission for the Council on Foreign Relations and returned to write a report in which he confirmed all that was said about the "purified" NP before it came to office. Shepardson saw Malan's government as a temporary aberration on the political scene because it did not have a broad based support and had alienated the British South Africans whose control of the economy would enable them strangle the government very soon.[18]

What was baffling was the fact that in the midst of all this, the American Embassy officials who had earlier incorrectly predicted Smuts victory, now turned round to endorse the regime. It did so by persuading investors to continue their business ventures on grounds that the regime's apartheid policy, as Pretoria had argued, would benefit all the races in the country.[19]

This development, coming as it did from American officials on the ground, might have rescued the infant regime from a psychological blow which would have resulted from American withdrawal of business interests, irrespective of the fact that Britain was the major investor. It could have signalled the end because both the British South Africans, the business community and the defeated UP were unanimous in their perception of the NP as being unfit to govern. The irony of the situation was that in 1949 the very apartheid programme, which the US embassy officials endorsed, erupted in strikes, boycotts and civil disobedience by the non-whites culminating in the Defiance Campaign of 1952.[20]

The American officials were again wrong in their endorsement of apartheid as a viable instrument of racial harmony. If their previous incorrect prediction of the election was based on criteria unfamiliar to the South African scene, the endorsement of the apartheid programme



defied logic and common sense. Surely, the regime had not done anything to convince anyone of the viability of its programme to receive an endorsement. To say the least it was uncharacteristic of the diplomatic officials of a great power to do so.

The motivating factor for the action may never be known. But within The United States the ANC tactics in South Africa evoked a response from civil rights groups across the races and others of ecumenical persuasion including the Reverend George Houser, leading to the formation of a "South African Resistance" in 1952, out of which emerged the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) a year later.[21] Not only was this effort ignored, but the United States became the main backer of South Africa in the UN whenever the regime's racial policy came up for discussion in the General Assembly. This was done by emphasising the supremacy of the charter provision of non-interference in domestic affairs of member states over and above other provisions. Racial discrimination was argued to be an affair within the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign states alone. This ploy was put into good effect in December 1952 when the Truman administration abstained on a General Assembly resolution calling on the South African government to mend its ways in its racial policy. The fact that the same UN charter upheld human rights and obliged member states to refrain from discriminating against people on account of their race, religion or sex was immaterial to Washington. But the US had supported earlier motions unfavourable to Pretoria on the issue of treatment of South Africans of oriental descent during the Smuts' era.[22]

The question is, why the support for Pretoria at this time by a founding member of the UN which should be expected to uphold the integrity of the organisation?

The reason is not far fetched. The US and the USSR were still locked in their Cold War. As a result, the last thing the administration and its West European allies wanted was to spurn friendship from any quarter. The regime in Pretoria had demonstrated its reliability as a possible friend of the anti-communist camp by contributing an air crew to NATO's effort during the Berlin blockade in 1949. This gesture was repeated a year later during the Korean war with an unsolicited contribution of a fighter squadron. To the Americans, such visible manifestations of reliability in a war against the communist menace outweighed whatever short comings of the government in Pretoria in the implementation of its domestic policy. It was this that was responsible for the US re-interpretation of the provisions of the charter to shield South Africa's wrong doing from the watchful eyes of the world body.

It meant that by taking the side of Pretoria in a policy which victimised those with



whom America's own Africans felt ancestral affinity, the Truman administration was impervious to the feelings of both continental and Diaspora Africans. This is in contrast to US attitude to Israel and Poland which also had substantive sympathetic population living in the country. Poles and Jews had exerted influence on the basis of two essential factors they possessed. One was electoral and the other was a lobbying apparatus. These two yardsticks ought to be the means for measuring the capability or otherwise of Afro-Americans in this area. In other words, how electorally influential were the Afro-Americans and which lobbying apparatus did they have to bring influence to bear?

Following the coordination of efforts between the US and USSR as allies in the 1939-45 war, President Roosevelt all but conceded the whole of Eastern Europe as Soviet sphere of influence. Only the 1944 Presidential election, in which the Democrats were facing a two-pronged attack over Pearl Harbor and concessions to communist USSR in Eastern Europe, restrained the administration from endorsing the Kremlin. The Republican attack on the East European issue was designed to lure the Polish-Americans and by implication the Irish Catholic votes from their traditional Democratic Party. This would offer the Republicans a realistic chance of defeating the incumbent administration. The rationale for this strategy was predicated on the fact that much as the Poles abhorred Nazism, they were no more receptive to surrendering their independence to communist Russia. Moreover Catholicism - the national religion of both Poland and Ireland - equates communism with atheism.

Since Catholicism spanned both Poland and Ireland, the Republicans felt they could kill two birds with one stone by consistently attacking the Democrats on Poland. This could be done by creating a wedge between the Democratic Party and the Polish and Irish emigres. There were five million Polish emigres in the US, and the Republicans had every cause to vie for their attention as Charles Rozmarek, the leader of the Chicago Polish community had begun mobilising his people for pressure group purposes under the Polish-American Congress. The objective was to lobby policy makers for the restoration of Poland to its prewar independent status.

The prospect of the Republicans inheriting so many members of a disaffected ethnic minority was too much to accept, the more so as the Republican Party had opened a strong attack on alleged abandonment of American Catholics occasioned by the presence of communist sympathisers in the Democratic Party.[23] This was an indirect way of attacking the President who was the most prominent Democrat to favour Soviet supremacy in Eastern

Europe. Needless to say that the prospect of losing the Polish votes and those of their Irish Catholic sympathisers made Roosevelt change strategy by talking tough about communist designs in Poland, all of which helped to make not only communism into the most hated ideology in the US, but also ethnic concerns into vote winning issues.

If the Poles and Catholics established their credentials as forces to reckon with in elections in the Franklin Roosevelt era, Jews exerted their own clout in the Harry Truman Presidency. All along, Jews as an under-class had cast their lot with the Democratic Party, a bond reinforced by the fact that it was a Democratic President Roosevelt who led America into the 1939-45 war. A defeat of Nazi-Germany had the prospect of rescuing Jews from the state organised pogrom against them in Germany and Italy. For this purpose the Jews were solidly behind the Democratic Party.

The parting of ways threatened after the war under the Truman's Presidency. As a Senator of considerable experience before resuming his apprenticeship under President Roosevelt as a running mate in the 1944 election, Truman was adequately schooled in the art of government and diplomacy. Although he was not averse to the idea of the creation of a separate Zionist state out of Palestine, the President was confident of the ability of the mandate power - Britain - to resolve the issue amicably between the two ethnic groups, Arabs and Jews. It made sense because after all the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 pledged itself to a Jewish homeland in Palestine without abridging the civil rights of the Arab Palestinians.[24] Apparently, Truman's view about British impartiality was not the opinion of American-Jews who saw Britain's role as nothing more than an impediment to their dream of an independent homeland in Palestine. From synagogues across the country, most especially in New York, a Jewish lobby (local committees of the American Zionist Emergency Council - AZEC) had sprung up, well funded through the generosity of organisations of Jewish businessmen like the Sonneborn Institute, to wage war against British occupation of Palestine.

Two issues made Truman take adequate notice of the concerns of American Jews. First, the Republicans groping for an issue to overturn the string of defeats they had suffered since the emergence of Roosevelt in 1932 were poised to capitalise on Jewish dissatisfaction. With the Republicans eager to establish an anti-communist credential in the minds of Poles and Catholics, the last thing the Democrats wanted was to hand over an additional accolade of champions of Zionism to them.

Second and more importantly, was the influence of Jews in New York and its

potential disastrous consequences should they transfer allegiance to the rival party. This could trigger a band wagon effect as the Democratic Party had been dependent on a coalition of labour-liberal and ethnic minorities to ensure victory at the poll since Roosevelt. The Presidential election was scheduled for 1948, but the Congressional one was in 1946 while the municipal one was even nearer.

With these in mind, Democratic Party stalwarts, some of whom openly confessed their ignorance about the Palestinian issue overnight, not only become the champions of Zionism out of political expediency [25] but pressed Truman to do the same in order to save their political skins. This urgency was in part necessitated by the fact that Dewey, the Republican flag bearer, had already embarked on the offensive by trumpeting his consistency in supporting Jewish rights to a separate homeland in Palestine. The pressure brought to bear on the President was truly reflected by John Snetsinger:

“Truman, who was annoyed by the incessant Zionist efforts to obtain his endorsement, bluntly replied to Wagner ( Senator Robert Wagner of New York, ): “I know of no pressure except the pressure of the Jews, which has always been extensive and continuous.”[26]

The President's by-pass of diplomatic channels to request Britain to allow immediate passage of a hundred thousand Jews to Palestine, at an American Jewish festival - Yom Kippur - in October 1946, should be seen in the light of responding to an avalanche of pressure being brought to bear by a combination of Jews and politicians eager for Jewish votes. The Jewish homeland issue had become the second most important foreign policy issue outside communism to which politicians fell over each other with a view to reaping political benefits.

This also meant acquiescence on clandestine gun running and fund raising operations (mostly by the Sonneborn Institute and a host of dummy corporations such as the Machinery Processing and Converting Company established to purchase weapons from the War Assets Administration and other unknown sources) to support Jewish terrorists in their sabotage activities against Britain on the ground in Palestine. No American officials especially the Justice Department wanted the risk of bringing to trial Jews engaged in such activities and the consequences of being an impediment to a Jewish homeland. US uncharacteristic near-silence on the assassination in Palestine of Count Folk Bernadotte, the President of the Swedish Red Cross, by Jewish terrorists while on a UN assignment, should be seen in this light.

With the 1948 Presidential election looming, Truman threw caution to the wind and

openly blackmailed Britain by predicating congressional passage of the Marshall Plan on the creation of an independent Jewish state. This was contrary to the advice of his diplomats on the ground in Palestine. On May 14, 1948, apparently unable to convince the US and Jews of the desirability of orderly transition, and eager for the relief from the Marshall Plan, Britain abandoned Palestine without handing over power to anyone. Truman recognised the state of Israel within eleven minutes of the illegal declaration of independence by Jewish partisans. The President's explanation for this travesty of international norms was that he had a Jewish constituency in an election year.[27]

If Poles and Jews had exerted influence on American policies on issues relating to their ancestral homelands (assuming Israel is a homeland to Jews), what would one say of Afro-Americans in the light of Truman's policy in South Africa?

To speak of electoral influence presupposes the universality of electoral rights in the US. This was far from the truth. The issue of inequality of the races and the consequential denial of franchise to some on account of race is well documented.[28] Afro-Americans' franchise was confined to the North while in the South, they were largely unable to register to vote. This meant that their votes were of marginal importance. Afro-Americans' political irrelevance was brought home by the storm of protest from Southern Democrats following President Truman's appeal for a limited franchise for them in the South, which he later followed up in a civil rights bill to Congress in 1948. Congressman Cox of Georgia (Democrat) articulated the anger of the South when he complained: "Harlem is wielding more influence with the administration than the entire white South." [29] Such efforts, irrespective of the electoral price, were a function of the President's own moral standards as opposed to either electoral blackmail or exertion of influence by Afro-Americans. It was this adherence to moral standards that made the President use his prerogative of office (after his civil rights bill had failed in Congress) to end segregation in the military, barred discrimination in federal offices and compelled federal contractors to adopt a fair employment policy. Although he won the 1948 election, it was not without losing four key Southern states and a flight of some Southerners - the Dixiecrats.

On the strength of the above, it is therefore safe to conclude that unlike Jews and Poles who had a reservoir of votes to dangle before office seekers, Afro-Americans were not electorally equipped to strike a quid pro quo bargain as a means of influencing America's African policy.

In the absence of electoral clout, the issue of a lobbying apparatus becomes entirely academic. The absence of votes either to exchange or to trade in for a particular course of foreign policy formulation and implementation meant resort to symbolic gesture and appeal to public opinion. The formation of the "South African Resistance" was one such effort to draw public attention to the situation in South Africa.

Unfortunately, unlike the plight of the Jews and the Poles which evoked public sympathy and considerable attention from the Republican Party, the situation in South Africa could not evoke a similar response. This could not be explained in terms of economics as America's total trade with the whole of Southern Africa in 1948 stood at a paltry \$648 million. It is not substantial when compared with America's total foreign trade of \$20 billion.[30]

Under the circumstances, it would be logical to see the indifference of the American public to the situation in South Africa in the light of the predicament of Afro-Americans within the US especially in the South. Nothing attests to this more than the fact that the Republican Party casts its lot with the Southern Democrats in opposing the extension of franchise to Afro-Americans. This was so because the issue was not popular with the American populace and there was nothing to be gained by the Republican Party in backing a losing horse. This position was quite different from the stand of the party on the Polish-Catholic and Jewish issues which received public backing.

This in itself might have increased Afro-Americans' feeling of low esteem and helplessness about the situation in South Africa, especially when seen in the light of the electoral influence being wielded by other ethnic minorities with less population than them. Such low esteem was bound to be heightened by the fact that the importance attached to these ethnic minorities was not only reflected in the substantial assistance their ancestral homelands received from the American government, but that even Pretoria in spite of apartheid was a recipient of American aid. For example, the total gross value of aid which Israel and Poland received from the US government throughout the war to the post war year 1950 stood at \$48 million and \$465 million respectively. By comparison Egypt's \$20 million, Ethiopia's \$8 million and Liberia's \$21 million would highlight to Afro-Americans the limited importance US administrations attached to Africa. Israel did not exist as a sovereign state prior to 1948. Yet between her coming into being and 1950, the amount of aid Israel received from Washington was greater than that of either Egypt, Liberia or war-torn Ethiopia. These were the only non-settler ruled African countries which were able to register on Washington's foreign aid



package. To add salt to the wound, Pretoria received \$95 million dollars during the period.[31] Afro-Americans were bound to believe and rightly so that this was to enable Pretoria to implement apartheid for which it had already received a pat on the back from American diplomats.

### Conclusion.

One can therefore draw the conclusion that the Truman administration had no compelling interests in Africa as a whole let alone the South, beyond an ideological one. Whenever there was a conflict between any other issue and the anti-communist stance, the latter prevailed. This position was reinforced by the fact that the administration had neither the public opinion nor the electoral pressure to compel it to do otherwise. In other words, it meant the non-existence of African-Americans as wielders of influence.

In this respect, unlike Roosevelt who attempted to play an independent role by pressing for decolonisation, Truman saw US-African policy as subservient to its European policy. This meant that globalists shaped Africa policy. The handling of Africa policy by the European desk was no doubt inspired by the limited importance the administration attached to Africa as a continent independent of the colonial powers.

It therefore follows that the Truman administration left an anti-communist legacy as a determinant of American policy in Africa. To understand how subsequent administrations adhered to this policy determinant, one has to analyse their policies in the area.



## FOOTNOTES.

1. See Norman. A. Graebner, "Introduction : The sources of Post-war insecurity", in Norman. A. Graebner (ed.) The National Security: It's theory and Practice 1945-1960. (Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York 1986.) pp 3-5.
2. Charles. A.Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War. (Yale University Press, New Haven 1948) pp 273-6.
3. Ibid. Chapter X.
4. N.A.Graebner (ed.) Op.cit. pp 10-11.
5. "Nuclear Age", (Central Production) A documentary of Independent Television, Wednesday, 4-1-89.
6. Ibid.
7. See, Chester Bowles, Africa's Challenge to America. (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1956.) pp 95-100; Thomas. J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa. (Columbia University Press, Missouri, 1985) pp 15-16.
8. Ronald W. Pruessen, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power, (The Free Press, New York 1982)
9. Christopher Coker, NATO, the Warsaw Pact and Africa. (Macmillan, London, 1985) pp. 4-5.
10. T.J.Noer, op. cit. pp 20-1.
11. See, Herman Giliomee, "The National Party and the Afrikaner Broederbond", in Robert.M.Price and Carl.G.Rosberg (eds.) The Apartheid Regime (Institute of International Studies, University of California 1980) p. 17; Adam Heribert and Herman Giliomee, The Rise and Crisis of Afrikaner Power, (David Philip, Cape Town 1979.); Colin Bundy, "Land and liberation: The South African National Liberation Movements and the Agrarian question, 1920s-1960s", The Review of African Political Economy, No.29. 1984. pp 14-28; Leonard Thompson, The Mythology of Apartheid. (Yale University Press, New Haven,1985) p 33.
12. National Party manifesto quoted in Colin Legum, Africa: A Handbook to the Continent, (Anthony Blond, London, 1961.) pp. 376-7.
13. Ibid.
14. Alan Paton, Hofmeyr, (Oxford University Press, London 1964.) pp 130-144; David Welsh, "The Growth of Towns" in Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson (eds.) The Oxford History of South Africa, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1975) pp 172-242.
15. T.Noer, Op.Cit., p.20
16. H. Gilliomee, Op.cit. pp. 14-15.
17. For example, had the Americans been serious, the sentiments displayed by mostly rural

based Afrikaners at the centenary celebration of their defeat over the Zulu war-lord, Dingaan, and the mystical "great trek", would have constituted enough pointer to the future, to a keen observer of the South African political scene. For the elation of the Afrikaners at these "legendary" events, see, L.Thompson, Op.Cit., p. 39.

18. T. Noer, Op.Cit., p.20-21.

19. Ibid.

20. See Thomas Karis, "United States Policy towards South Africa" in Gwendolen M.Carter and Patrick O'Meara (eds.) Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis, (Indiana University Press, Bloomington and London, 1979) pp 320-1.

21. Gwendolen M.Carter, The Politics of Inequality: South Africa Since 1948 (Thames and Hudson, London 1958)

22. Ibid.

23. See, Martin Weil, "Can the Blacks do for Africa what the Jews did for Israel", Foreign Policy, (New York) vol. 15. 1974. p 112.

24. For analyses about the Balfour Declaration, see E.M.Robertson, "Race as a Factor in Mussolini's Policy in Africa and Europe", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 23. No.1, January 1988. pp. 42-3; John Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California 1974.) pp 3-4 and 62-65.

25. A typical example was Truman's Secretary of State, James.F.Byrnes who in an attempt to pressure Britain to grant a Zionist state admitted his ignorance about the Palestinian issue to British Ambassador Halifax in late 1945, saying: "Quite frankly, I am thinking about the New York City election....the President has to think about that." Quoted in Martin Weil, Op.cit.

26. Truman quoted in J. Snetsinger, p. 74.

27. See "Eyes on the prize", BBC2, (A Blackside Inc. Production.), 24-1-88. 7.15 p.m.

28. The following would suffice, John P. Davis (ed) The American Negro Reference Book (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliff, New Jersey, 1966); Karl.E; and Alma.F.Taeuber, "The Negro Population in the United States", in Ibid, pp 96-108; Edwin. S. Redley, Black Exodus (Yale University, New Haven and London 1969); Adelaide Cromwell and Martin Kilson, Apropos of Africa (Frank Cass, London 1966).

29. Congress and the Nation, (Congressional Quarterly Service, Washington, 1965.) pp 1597; Congressman Cox quoted in Ibid.p. 5.

30. Statistical Abstract of the United States 1951, (US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Washington D.C. 1951.) pp 846-851.

31. Ibid, pp. 819-821.

## CHAPTER THREE

### WASHINGTON'S SOUTH AFRICA POLICY 1952-63.

In the previous chapter, it was argued that opposition to communism was the primary determinant of America's policy in the whole of Africa, in the absence of domestic pressure. The regime in Pretoria had wormed its way into the heart of officials in Washington by expressing affinity with the struggle against communism in concrete terms. For this, Pretoria was able to count on the paternalistic protection of the US and allies.

The issue being addressed in this chapter is, to what extent did Truman's successors adhere to the pattern he established, bearing in mind the fact that he had a domestic audience unreceptive to issues relating to Africa as well as a politically handicapped Afro-American community. It is important to take such issues into consideration because one is trying to identify the factors which gave rise to an effective Afro-American pressure on South Africa from 1984.

The essence of dwelling on such early history is to show whether this pattern (what Truman established) recurs throughout the post-war period and its role in later events. In this respect, two questions are central to the analysis. Was there continuity in the pattern of American policy determinants as pioneered by Truman and were the conditions, namely public apathy and Afro-American powerlessness, constant?

### US African Policy in the Eisenhower Years .

When General Dwight Eisenhower took over the Presidency in 1953, he inherited not only the apparent need to look at Africa on the basis of a Cold War imperative, but he also brought into office his own peculiarly lukewarm attitude to Africa. This was a tendency to be

oblivious to and disdainful of the aspirations of both continental Africans and his own African community.

At the continental level, Eisenhower's emergence coincided with a period of rising expectations occasioned by an upsurge in nationalism. One might excuse Washington for not encouraging African nationalism as Africa was regarded as Europe's area of influence. What one could not justify however, was America's orchestrated campaign to talk Africans out of independence.

The reason was America's perception of the predatory habit of communism and its readiness to pounce on newly emerging states. This also implied supporting the regime in Pretoria which in spite of apartheid had not only exhibited its capacity to withstand communism, but had demonstrated the zeal and determination to take the war into the enemy's camp if need be.

It was against this background that the US obstructed the 1953 Human Rights Convention for fear that Pretoria's apartheid policy would be its focus of attack, thereby weakening an anti-communist regime. Otherwise apart from glaring racialism in the South and a subtler version in the form of segregated housing in the North, Washington had no concrete human rights violations of its own to cause it to fear the outcome of the commission's deliberations. The administration's obstruction, coming as it did after President Eisenhower had endorsed the Geneva conference by chastising, in his personal message to it, "totalitarian governments" for their "disregard of human rights", thereby fuelling "instability and discontent in the world", [1] showed the hypocrisy between words and deed. One might also add that it shows the primacy of America's national interests of fighting communism over any other consideration.

The South African government which the US was eager to protect had made many enemies within the UN, which commissioned the conference, over its relationship with its non-European population. This preceded the Eisenhower administration, and focused on the extension of discrimination against Asian South Africans.

In 1946 the Smuts' administration passed the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act. This law was not different in its effect from that on Africans of the Land Act of 1913 and the termination of the Cape franchise in 1936. The 1946 Act was designed to strip Asiatic South Africans of direct Parliamentary representation, save in Natal's provincial

council, and to confine their land and property owning rights to restricted zones.

That there was opposition from the Asian community was not entirely unexpected, but what came as more of a surprise was the fact that this piece of legislation could introduce an international dimension into South Africa's treatment of its non-white population. The South African Indian Congress (SAIC) which spearheaded the opposition to the law called for direct Indian intervention not only to impose sanctions against the South African government but to withdraw her High Commissioner in Pretoria and refer the matter to the UN.[2]

India did exactly that and thus heralded a voting pattern in the UN in which the Afro-Asian-communist states pitted themselves against the US, Britain and the older Commonwealth states in the General Assembly. The bone of contention being the right of the UN to discuss the issue without interfering in the domestic affairs of South Africa as advocated by the Afro-Asian-communist states.

With the civil disobedience campaign of 1949 in response to the Nationalist victory a year earlier, Pretoria's human rights violations became a permanent feature of UN General Assembly debates. So much so that in 1950, the Assembly brushed aside Western protestations of the domestic jurisdiction clause (Article 2:7) to pass a resolution equating racial segregation with racial discrimination. The implication of this was that segregation along racial lines was a violation of human rights, and the Assembly explicitly called upon the South African government to refrain from passing into law the Group Areas Act.[3]

The US quest to sabotage the UN human rights initiative to protect South Africa was the handiwork of none other than Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, whose obsession with the evil of communism had made him a firm supporter of colonial and settler rule in Africa as well as an opponent of independence and non-alignment. As far as he was concerned, non-alignment was "immoral", "shortsighted" and bad for the Western defence against communism and by implication for the peace of the globe, because it was tantamount to taking sides with the adversary in a bipolar world in which one could not be neutral.[4] This same harsh judgment was reserved for the non-whites engaged in the civil disobedience campaign in South Africa. Africa's colonial masters were not neutral but allies of the US, as were the minority administrations, which made their continuous subjugation of Africans more acceptable to the administration than releasing them into the warm embrace of communism. President Eisenhower's condemnation of African nationalism and the quest for independence



as “resembling a torrent overrunning everything in its path, including, frequently, the best interests of those concerned”, [5] should be seen in this light.

It meant that as far as the Americans were concerned, nationalism and non-alignment were twin evils which constitute an impediment to their anti-communist crusade. Such a position no doubt was inspired by the US strategy of alliance formation and securing base facilities abroad as twin pillars of containment of communism. Neither formation of alliances nor provision of base facilities could materialise without local consent. But by expressing a preference for a noncommittal stance in the Cold War, the African countries were invariably throwing into doubt the administration’s battle plan for countering communism. Hence to Dulles, neutralism was an elemental phase of communism with no prospect of resisting the temptation to graduate into full-fledge communist status. Equally bad was non-alignment’s concomitant by-product of quest for freedom which the Secretary of State claimed would “not produce independence but only transition to a captivity far worse than dependence.”[6]

Under the circumstances, granting of independence to African states and encouragement of majority rule became an unpalatable and undesirable threat to global peace as envisioned by the US. South Africa was not in this category as the regime was pro-US in the battle against communism. Hence, its anti-communist credentials were enough mitigating circumstances for any short-coming in its domestic policy. This was the reasoning behind the administration’s support of the Pretoria regime irrespective of the grumbling of Afro-Americans, African nationalists and liberal journalists and writers in the US.[7] Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Joseph Satterwaite minced no words when in March 1960 he asked the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations what it would profit the US to embark upon <sup>9</sup> collision course over apartheid with a worthy anti-communist ally: “U.S. capability of influencing directly a situation of this nature in a foreign country is limited...The Department doubts the propriety of requiring American businesses operating abroad to violate laws of the country where they are located or to go out of business. The problem arises as to what one government can do to counter racialism in another country with which it maintains diplomatic relations and whose foreign policy at least strongly support the U.S. in over-riding issues of our times...”[8]

Such a stance was in harmony with the views expressed publicly a year latter by Eisenhower’s one-time Ambassador to South Africa Philip Crowe, after he left office.[9]



Eisenhower's congratulatory message to South Africa's Ambassador to the US on his country's role in strengthening the free world through industrialisation and the assurances "that we share with you the desire that the traditional ties of friendship and understanding between us should be strengthened and maintained to our mutual benefit"[10] proved beyond doubt that the administration had cast its lot with a Pro-West administration in Pretoria. Such an endorsement from the highest quarters of the American administration no doubt brought two direct benefits to Pretoria. First, it conferred a clean bill of business health which carried greater investment opportunities from which the government could obtain the revenue to implement apartheid policy. Both the US Embassy in Pretoria and the Department of Commerce took a direct hand in promoting South Africa as an investment location. The Embassy printed pamphlets to guide would-be investors while the Commerce Department educated investors about the country. The race to give the British a run for their position on the top of the investment league table in South Africa began in the Eisenhower's presidency. Secondly, the President's endorsement of the regime could not have failed to influence the decision of the eleven US Banks in their announcement of a \$40 million revolving loan to South Africa in 1959.[11]

But by supporting racial supremacy and colonialism on the basis of fear of communism, the Eisenhower administration became at best a mere spectator of and at worst an inhibiting factor in Africa's quest for independence. The administration's failure to nudge the European colonial powers to decolonise in the manner in which its predecessor successfully twisted the arm of Britain to pave the way for the independence of Israel as aforementioned, is sufficient evidence of Washington's spectator role in the independence struggle. By its voting pattern in the UN on issues relating to decolonisation [12] and by evoking the spectre of communist take-over of newly independent African states as evidenced in the pronouncements of Eisenhower, Foster Dulles and Assistant Secretary of State George Allen, Washington deliberately impeded and undermined the independence struggle to the chagrin of its population of African ancestry.[13]

Such a policy stance no doubt was at an enormous cost in African distrust and ill will as well as of considerable dissatisfaction to Afro-Americans whose status did not experience any improvement despite such actions as the use of federal troops to protect Afro-American school children in Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957. Those African nationalists were in no way a



product of communism, but were thoroughly schooled and tutored in western democratic ideals and institutions. Their aspiration was to direct their energies to the upliftment of their peoples without being encumbered by a Cold War whose origin had nothing to do with them.

In this respect, US support of a UN General Assembly vote on October 30, 1958 requesting Pretoria to repudiate its apartheid policy should be attributed to a tendency to ameliorate the administration's anti-African image and placate the emerging nations. It was probably at the insistence of Vice-President Richard Nixon, who had an eye on the Afro-American votes should he run for the presidency in 1960, as opposed to being a genuine departure from tradition. Nothing attests to this more than the fact that the following year, the administration consolidated a 1957 bilateral agreement on atomic energy it had with Pretoria with a joint naval exercise involving the US and South Africa in conjunction with Africa's colonial powers - France, Britain and Portugal. Such an exercise, coupled with regular US naval visits at a time when the the victims of apartheid were looking to the international community for moral pressure on Pretoria to introduce reforms, indicated the side the US was <sup>on</sup> in the struggle against settler minority rule, and independence. That such fraternity with the regime would confer a certificate of respectability upon the latter while demoralising the victims of apartheid need not be debatable in view of the fact that Pretoria made public a NASA tracking stations agreement it signed with the US in September 1960 to rehabilitate its image and forestall the flight of investors following the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960.[14]

In sum, therefore, there was hardly any difference between the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations in their relations with South Africa in particular and Africa in general, in spite of the fact that Eisenhower's had the benefit of intelligence reports on Pretoria. The only explanation for this evident hostility to African nationalism and inability to understand African irritation at settler and colonial rule, while being supportive of the very settler and colonial rulers, was that it was the administration's world-wide response to what it perceived as the communist menace. This was a carry-over from the Truman administration. America's interests in Indo-China even prior to the outright involvement in the 1960s, the involvement in Korea as well as the refusal to allow mainland China to replace Taiwan in the Security Council prior to the 1970s were eloquent testimonies to Washington's tendency to throw its weight behind a reliable - anti-communist - status quo power. This is US classic counter-poise to the spread of communism.

The administration's sincerity in its support for the African status quo particularly in Southern Africa need not be in doubt. But what is surprising is the disinclination to support rapid transfer of power to nationalist parties supportive of links with the West. African agitators were nationalists as opposed to being communists. There was nothing concrete to indicate to Washington that popular indigenous governments would be the disciples of communism.

Why didn't the administration explore the possibility of popular regimes in place of the unpopular settler and colonial ones as the bulwark against communism?

There are two major explanations. First, Washington had very limited knowledge of Africa and lacked a coherent policy for the continent. It had no historical connection beyond Liberia and as a homeland for Afro-Americans, which meant absolutely nothing as the Afro-Americans themselves were not considered important in the US. Whatever opinion Washington had about Africa emanated to a large extent from the very perpetrators of colonial and settler rule. Mention had earlier been made about how the US predicted the outcome of the 1948 election in South Africa on the basis of their knowledge of Jan Smuts whom they met and were impressed with at the establishment of the League and the UN respectively. It meant that they were completely divorced from the views and aspirations of the indigenous Africans. Needless to say that it was not until 1958 that the US State Department had an autonomous Bureau for African Affairs; even then its first head, Joseph Satterwaite was a specialist in European Affairs. Ghana's independence in 1957 awoke the US to the necessity for an African Bureau.

Second and more important is the fact that the policy of the Eisenhower administration on issues relating to Africa was too rigid. This itself could be explained by the fact that it was a duplication of the administration's general strategy for combating communism all over the world. It was not adaptable to local conditions because its formulators had only a thorough grasp of the Euro-American-Far Eastern world vision without a corresponding knowledge of Africa and parts of Asia. Or Africa was not even considered important. The result was that what worked in Berlin and Korea encountered hostility in Africa. India's outspoken opposition to racial and colonial issues in the UN against the US stance attests to dissatisfaction as well in parts of Asia outside Washington's nuclear umbrella and military commitment.

Therefore, it makes sense to say that the unpopularity of the Eisenhower administration's Africa policy stemmed from two factors: its globalist orientation and ignorance

about the continent and its people.

### Kennedy and Africa.

The analysis on the pattern of Eisenhower's Africa policy raises a fundamental question: would it have been different had the Afro-Americans possessed effective voting rights across the country? The justification for this question is based on the fact that the administration had no separate Africa policy beyond the general policy for containing communism irrespective of the location, which in this case, was evidently unsuitable to the African theatre. One might infer that this in itself might have been due to the powerlessness of Afro-Americans who unlike the Poles or the Jews lacked electoral clout. As a result they could not make the abominable nature of apartheid the corner stone of the administration's South Africa "policy". This by implication meant failure to place the matter in the public domain to attract the sympathy which the Poles and the Jews had over communist rule in Poland and the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.

If this inference was correct, then, two salient ingredients were missing. These were the absence of Afro-American influence at the corridors of power in Washington and of public concern over the effect of apartheid on its victims.

Three events seemed to symbolise the fulfilment of these two conditions in the 1960s: (a) the victory of Democratic John F. Kennedy over incumbent Vice-President Richard Nixon of the Republican Party at the Presidential election in 1960; (b) the eruption of violence in the Congo six days after independence from Belgium in 1960; (c) Kennedy's effort to pay the political debt he owed his electors.

#### (a) Kennedy and the election.

With respect to the first issue, namely, the emergence of John Kennedy at the White House, was a dramatic event in the sense that the odds against the Democratic candidate

appeared insurmountable on the following grounds: (i) he was a Catholic; (ii) he belonged to the liberal wing of the Democratic Party; (iii) he did not have a monopoly of favouring independence and racial equality in Africa and civil rights at home.

Without losing the trend of the argument, each of these merit a brief analysis if possible in outline to elucidate their relevance.

(i) The Catholic factor: The US may have been a secular state with constitutional guarantees for freedom of worship, but this did not mean the absence of religious bigotry. At times such bigotry spilled-over into the political domain. This was particularly true of Alfred. E. Smith who won the 1928 Democratic ticket. But he was humiliated in the presidential election to the extent that even traditional Democratic states turned against him largely on account of his religion. Catholics constituted 16 per cent of the population at that time and that were the only guaranteed constituency of the candidate. Senator John Kennedy's failure to secure the Vice-Presidential nomination of the Democratic ticket in 1956 might have been inspired by antipathy to Catholicism. The dramatic manner in which Kennedy lost his lead in the contest spoke a lot about the difficulties the Senator could face in the future. For example, while at one point, Kennedy was in a strong position in the contest for the Vice-Presidential candidature with 648 out of 6861/2 votes required for nomination, the delegates quickly switched their votes to Kennedy's closest Protestant rival, Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee. In the end, not only did the latter walk away with the nomination but Kennedy's votes actually dropped to 589, thus, fuelling rumours about the Catholic connections.[15]

Opposition to his candidature in 1960 was so fierce and intense that by April, in the heat of the primaries, it became evident that Kennedy had to do something about his religion were he to avoid the fate of Alfred E. Smith. Not only were the votes polarised along denominational line as in the Wisconsin primaries, but that the same trend had manifested itself in straw polls in West Virginia where there was preference for Senator Hubert Humphrey on no other grounds than the electors detestation of a Catholic as a flag bearer. Considering the limited number of Catholics in relation to Protestants, Kennedy realised that he would be hurt more than Humphrey. This realisation brought about his speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington in April 1960 in which he took them to task for focusing the campaign on his religion. As if to prove beyond doubt where he stood on the issue, he told



them:

“There is only one legitimate question underlying all the rest: would you, as President of the United States, be responsive in any way to ecclesiastical pressures or obligations in any kind that might in any fashion influence or interfere with your conduct of that office in the national interest? I have answered that question many times. My answer was ....and still is...no.”[16]

But this was hardly enough to satisfy the electorate especially after his victory in the primaries as a proliferation of anti-Catholic hate literature continued to dog his path. Once again, the candidate had to appear to state his case to the public at large, this time through the venue of the Greater Ministerial Association in Houston on September 12, 1960 that he was a nominee of the Democratic Party as opposed to the Catholic faith. He declared:

I believe in an America where the separation of church and state is absolute...where no Catholic prelate would tell the President (should he be a catholic) how to act.....”[17]

This might have been the only occasion in recent times when an American presidential hopeful had to all but <sup>to</sup> denounce his denomination to pacify a resentful electorate.

(ii) The Liberal Connection: Added to Kennedy’s Catholic denomination was the liberal label pinned on him in an era when liberalism had acquired a bad reputation. In the wake of an alleged presence of communist sympathisers in key positions following the 1948 testimonies of Elizabeth Bentley and Whitaker Chambers coupled with the Alger Hiss case and the resultant hysteria, liberalism was still in 1960 easily portrayed as co-terminous with communism. One must emphasise that this was mostly the stock in trade of the Republican Party whenever they faced a crisis. For example, on October 6, 1958 the party held a meeting at the White House at the end of which they came out with a document warning voters of the likely effect of a Democratic majority in the forth-coming Congressional election. This the document said would lead the US “to go down the left lane which leads inseparably to socialism.”[18]

In reality, this was a panic response to the following Republican woes: (i) the victory of Democratic William Proxmire in the Wisconsin senate election of August 1957 brought about by the death of the famous Republican Senator Joseph R. McCarthy; (ii) the re-election

of Democratic Governor Robert Meyner of New Jersey with an increased bipartisan support in November 1957, signalling Republican hopelessness in that state; (iii) Democratic landslide victory in capturing the Governorship, a senate and two congressional seats in a traditional Republican Maine in the September 1958 elections; (iv) the inability of the Eisenhower administration to find a lasting solution to the problem in Formosa following the renewed shelling of Quemoy and Matsu. This coupled with Sputnik eroded voters confidence on the administration's defence programme; (v) most damaging of all was the opposition of organised labour to the Republican "right to work" laws who in a show of strength had galvanised their members to vote against Republican candidates.[19]

In this respect, the communist or socialist slur was a last ditch attempt by the Republicans to hold on to an electoral life support machine amidst a Democratic landslide in the impending 1958 Congressional election. Needless to say that the success of such a linkage between socialism and liberalism in public minds was responsible for the hostility of Southern businessmen to candidate Kennedy's pronouncements on minimum wage and monetary issues in the presidential election of 1960. Most businessmen from South Carolina, Mississippi and Texas were up in arms against the candidate on grounds that such heresies if translated in policy would amount to an introduction of centralised state control of the means of production. The drafting of the conservative Southern Democrat, Lyndon Johnson, to the ticket was a sagacious political act by the Kennedy camp to pacify big business and minimise the Democratic haemorrhage in the South.

Under the circumstances, the idea of being branded a liberal as Kennedy was, was fraught with electoral danger, the more so as Polish-Americans could not be relied upon, irrespective of Catholic solidarity, to support a candidate steeped in socialism - an interpretation Republicans had given to liberalism.

This in effect meant that the Democratic Party could no longer count on the undivided loyalty of the Catholics who constituted 22.8 per cent of the electorate in 1960.[20]

(iii) Support For Decolonisation: If liberalism had any benefit at the point in time, it was that it gave hope to Afro-Americans and their sympathisers in the sense that it could lead to civil rights at home and an understanding of the predicament of colonial peoples abroad. It could be beneficial to them at home because Afro-Americans were denied the full attributes of citizenship

in the US. The Afro-Americans also stood to benefit from a translation of the same policy abroad because only in Africa were there significant areas of colonial and settler rule.

If liberalism entailed expression of sympathy for down-trodden peoples, then the problem was that Kennedy no longer had a monopoly of the liberal mantle in the presidential election of 1960. Unlike Eisenhower, the incumbent Vice-President Richard Nixon had begun to show signs of exasperation with the lack of sympathy for dependent peoples in quest for freedom. The Suez crisis of 1956 offered the Vice-President the opportunity to establish his sympathy for such a category of people in which he was single-handedly responsible for calling on France and Britain to decolonise. This was a stance he reinforced in 1957 when as head of the US delegation to Ghana's independence celebrations he attacked colonialism and racial discrimination including that being practised in the United States as an impediment to the western effort against communism and called on his government to render economic assistance to newly independent countries.[21]

By so doing, Nixon had established his credentials as a President who would reach out to disaffected ethnic minorities. But unlike Kennedy, his liberalism was not such that could evoke the hostility of the conservative whites because genuine as it was, he was not a traditional liberal. His display of the new found liberal instinct in the electioneering campaign in 1960 might have emanated from the awareness that however bereft the Afro-Americans were electorally, their votes could come handy in the Northern and Western industrial states of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Chicago and Detroit. These were the traditional balance of power states in the North and West in any closely fought contest as it turned out to be in 1960.

Richard Nixon had every cause to expect a slice of the Afro-American votes because like every voting group, they were not so permanently wedded to the Democratic Party as to ignore others who chose to address issues that directly affect them. After all, after the civil war, Afro-Americans were solidly Republican and only began to change allegiance from the 1920s due to the party's insensitivity to civil rights issues.[22]

To the Democrats it meant a possible split of the minority votes in two directions - Polish and Afro-Americans. In such a volatile situation too close to call, a major event occurred to tilt the balance. In October 1960, Martin Luther King Jr., the civil rights leader of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was arrested in his home town of Atlanta

for taking part in a sit-in protest. Though released at the intervention of a Kennedy supporter, Mayor William Hartsfield of Alabama, who saw political dividends for his candidate in the act, King was immediately re-arrested and sentenced to four months imprisonment by Judge Oscar Mitchell for breaking an earlier probation.

Too frightened to condemn the sentence for fear of alienating Southern votes, Kennedy made a phone call to the prisoner's wife, Coretta King, to express his sympathy. That was all that it took to excite Afro-Americans, an excitement intensified by King's release after serving only two days of his sentence apparently as a result of his lawyer's efforts. Back in the Afro-American community, credit went to Kennedy, whose campaign team used it to good effect by distributing pamphlets to Afro-Americans outlining the candidate's concern at the event and Coretta King's gratitude, without a corresponding effort by candidate Nixon. This became an opportunity for stemming the tide of Nixon's popularity among Afro-Americans. Even King's father - a Baptist priest - confessed his preference for Nixon until Kennedy telephoned the family following the arrest of his son, which he declared with excitement:

"I will vote for him, even though I don't want a Catholic. But I will take a Catholic or the devil himself if he will wipe the tears from my daughter in law-eyes. I've got a suitcase full of votes - my whole church - for you to give to Senator Kennedy"[23]

Martin Luther King Jr. himself had never been a fan of Kennedy. At the Democratic convention, he like most civil rights activists preferred the experienced Adlai Stevenson as a more able flag bearer. Failing this, King had expressed preference for Richard Nixon. But in his moment of tribulation, there was no Nixon for fear of infuriating the South. Kennedy tried. The result was that he did not only win the crucial states of Illinois, Michigan, Texas, South Carolina and Louisiana with the help of Afro-American votes but walked away with the presidency with one per cent lead over the Republican candidate.

For once, Afro-American votes though largely confined to a section of the country had proved decisive in an evenly matched electoral contest. Though probably a one off situation, it was enough to whet the appetite of the Afro-Americans and to focus attention on them as potential king-makers in contests where no candidate had preponderance over the other. How Kennedy responded to the aspirations of Afro-Americans will now be analysed.

(b) The Congo crisis and the Kennedy Administration.

If Kennedy's victory over Richard Nixon on the basis of Afro-American votes was the beginning of the end of lack of interests on causes being pursued by America's own African community, the Congo crisis was equally important.

At the emergence of the Kennedy administration, Africa was becoming less remote to the American public. The independence of Ghana in 1957, the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960 and above all, the Congo debacle helped to bring Africa nearer to the door steps of the American people.

Perhaps the most dramatic of these was the Congo crisis. The factors which gave rise to it have been properly documented.[24] In a nutshell, when the Congo became independent on July 1, 1960, not only was the country bereft of capable indigenous manpower, but the abrupt pattern of the handing over six months before the originally agreed date, meant the withdrawal of the institutional restraints on the various ethnic and linguistic groups. These groups were brought together and held under duress as in other European colonies, for administrative purpose.

Nearly a century of Belgian monarchical and colonial rule never unified the indigenous people into thinking of themselves as Congolese. Rather they identified themselves with their ethnic groups. The only semblance of unity they had among them was their hatred for colonial rule. Once that common denominator was eliminated their differences became glaring. For example, Joseph Kasavubu earned the presidency of the Congo on the basis of his party, the Association of the Bakongo for the Unification, Conservation and Expansion of the Kikongo Language (ABAKO), as opposed to either electoral popularity or ability to unite the country as a fatherly figure. ABAKO was a tribal organisation dedicated to the cause of the Kikongo to the exclusion of other Congolese. Similarly, the Confederation of Association of Katanga (CONAKAT) drew support from Katanga and perhaps as later event showed, some affinity with neighbouring South Kasai. Only Patrice Lumumba's Movement National Congolais could claim a semblance of broad based representation, but this was fragile as encapsulated by its inability to command anything nearer a majority in Parliament.

Because none of the indigenous parties had a broad based representation outside their



ethnic base with the qualified exception of Lumumba, the central Congolese government was an amalgam of incompatible elements articulating their source of power, i.e, tribal origin. This was exacerbated by the ideological predilection of the combatants. Patrice Lumumba and his prominent supporters were Pan-Africanists, admirers of the Casablanca group and wanted close identification with neither the East nor West in foreign policy orientation. Because they were authentic African nationalists they wanted a strong Congo transcending ethnic loyalty. This one might interpret as a unitary state.

This was diametrically opposed to the position of the other key players in the government. By his antipathy to tribal loyalty without regards to their unpopularity on a national basis, Lumumba was in effect plotting to liquidate them politically and they loathed him for that. Instead, Kasavubu and Tshombe preferred a federal structure and close identification with the West.

The result was an absence of consensus politics among the parties that constituted the government. This meant disregard and disrespect for portfolios of office as the Prime Minister and the President jostled for the position of chief executive of the state. This later became glaring on two occasions when the drama had been played out. First, was the conflicting appeal of the President and the Prime Minister to different sources to repel the Belgian invasion and Tshombe's secession- differences which also reflected their disagreement over the scope of assistance being sought.[25] The second instance was President Kasavubu's announcement of the dismissal of the Prime Minister from office on September 5, 1960 without seeking the approval of Parliament, apparently on recognition of himself as the repository of executive authority.

It therefore followed that instead of a government representing a state, what happened in the Congo was the emergence of conflicting and antagonistic centres of loyalty at the expense of the state.

This was too tempting for the Eisenhower administration to ignore. First there were factions among the combatants. Second, there was utter confusion, which carried the risk of communist intervention if not already present through surrogates, and hence the need for US involvement to keep communism at bay. This could be achieved with little manipulation through the UN. The US therefore joined the fray under the canopy of the UN whose peace keeping force it virtually single-handedly financed.

That there were ideological differences (whether or not at the level of nationalism) meant to Washington that some would be anti-West. In this case, Prime Minister Lumumba and his associates with their non-alignment preference and friendliness with those Washington recognised as being radicals were immediately either affixed with the communist label or regarded as too prone to communist manipulation and infiltration, while President Kasavubu and his supporters were not only spared the wrath of Washington, but became the sole beneficiary of American patronage. It was such patronage that enabled the President to announce Lumumba's dismissal as aforementioned without due consultation with his Parliament. The President had the support of US intelligence officer, Andrew Cordier, disguised as Washington's representative in the UN peace keeping force in the Congo. This action which was undertaken with the knowledge of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold received a glowing tribute from President Eisenhower in his speech to the General Assembly on September 22, 1960.[26]

It was therefore obvious that the US used its sponsorship of the UN effort in the Congo to achieve its aim of neutralising a repugnant ideology as opposed to responding to the Congolese request of assistance to repel rebellion and foreign invasion. This was further supported by the fact that the UN was rather more interested in ensuring cohesion, namely, eliminating "communists" in the Congolese government than in either repelling the Belgian expeditionary force or in assisting the central government to crush the rebellion. Needless to say that even after Cordier's "coup" of eliminating Lumumba, the Eisenhower administration still failed to take decisive action to end the rebellion.

In this respect, Jackson's finding that "anti-communism, however, was not the sole motivation of the incipient American policy. It was not ideology but rather economics which imposed the decisive influence"[27], appears less convincing. True at the point in time, the Congo was rich in minerals accounting for nearly a tenth of copper production, 50 per cent of cobalt and about 70 per cent of industrial diamonds outside the non-communist bloc. Such mineral production when weighed against the background that other metals like uranium, radium and zinc were also found in the country highlights its importance to an advanced economy. For example, cobalt was used in advanced technology especially in the manufacture of high grade alloy without which jet engines, gas turbines and rocket nozzles, all useful items in space technology would not have been produced.[28]

But this in itself could not have made the Congo vital to the US unless one would say that the Congo had a monopoly of production of these items outside East Europe. The US was and still is not entirely bereft of these minerals. Any shortfall in these minerals could be compensated for with substitutes. It would even be easier for Washington to obtain a mineral like cobalt from Chile than from Africa. A testimony to the limited importance of the Congo was the fact that US direct investment at the time of the intervention was a paltry \$12 million as opposed to Belgian \$3.5 billion.[29]

If it was indeed true that Washington's interest in the Congo was purely economic, then, why didn't it align itself with Tshombe since most of these minerals were found in Katanga? The European allies were all behind Tshombe. The fact that this was not the case proved that America's interest in the Congo was primarily ideological, i.e. to insulate the whole of the Congo from communism. Only a Congo with a strong central authority could do this as opposed to a fractious one which would make the units an easy prey to the ideological menace of the East.

Consequently at the emergence of Kennedy at the White House, informed Americans were very much aware of the situation in the Congo especially as the Congo lobby received the patronage of Republican Senator Thomas Dodd of Connecticut.[30]

(c) Kennedy's attitude vis-a-vis the expectation of Afro-Americans.

When Kennedy acceded to the presidency in January 1961, he inherited three problems of particular concern to his Afro-American constituency. These were civil rights at home, apartheid in South Africa and anti-communist involvement in the Congo.

It remains to answer the question, how well did he tackle them?

i) The Civil Rights issue: The administration's task in this area entails the conferment of citizenship and its attributes, namely, unfettered voting rights, upon Afro-Americans across the entire country. This is not to say that there weren't Southern Afro-Americans who benefited from the Congressional Amendments between 1865 and 1870, but they were few and on the

main, Afro-Americans were unable to exercise their right to register and to vote in that part of the country.[31]

It was only in 1957, i.e, eighty-seven years after the 15th. Amendment and the Charles Sumner bill of 1870, that another civil rights bill reached Congress. This was sent by President Eisenhower, apparently not out of conviction, but probably out of sheer necessity to uphold the law following the Supreme Court's pronouncement of segregation as a travesty of the constitution in 1954. There are two examples which prove that the president's concern was with upholding the law as opposed to bringing relief to the largely disenfranchised Southern Afro-Americans. First, the most conspicuous plank of the bill, namely Title III dealt with conferment of powers upon the Attorney-General to desegregate schools, while in actual fact burying the salient issue of voting rights as if the administration did not know that segregation was brought about by the powerlessness of Afro-Americans.

Secondly, the President neither effectively lobbied nor placed the matter in the public domain with the full weight of his office. This could have been done by appealing directly to the public over the head of the law makers before their consideration of the bill, as a guarantee against rejection and filibuster. Because the President's heart was not in the bill, he did nothing to salvage it from its guaranteed rejection in the Senate.[32]

In reality, the act of sending the bill to Congress without back-up support the way they did, makes one wonder if the key players in the administration were not merely indulging in mischief making with a view to compensating for their lack of interest on issues relating to civil rights. This becomes all the more plausible when one considers the fact that even the Commission on Civil Rights which the bill created was packed in such a way that Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans enjoyed an overwhelming preponderance. Giving their harmony of interests in their detestation of civil rights appertaining to Afro-Americans, it is no exaggeration to say that the Eisenhower administration neither meant nor anticipated an alteration in the existing political impotence of the Afro-Americans.

Of course, the fact that the civil rights section of the Justice Department was elevated to a Division need not be cited as indicative of the administration's sincerity in the face of hostility from Congress. The truth of the matter was that this, as well as another civil rights initiative in 1960 conferring greater authority upon the Justice Department to ensure exercise of voting rights by Afro-Americans, were more conspicuous by their dormancy than would

otherwise have been expected even by the standards of that administration on such issues. For example, the Attorney-General could bring an action in no more than ten cases for hampering Afro-American rights to vote, in spite of the fact that in Mississippi alone, authorities in no less than three-quarters ( 74 out of 82 ) of the counties deliberately impeded the right of qualified Afro-Americans to have their names in the voters register. The same situation repeated itself throughout the former Confederate states with variation in subterfuge, at times conniving either with employers of labour or the white supremacist organisation - the Ku Klux Klan - to intimidate Afro-Americans into abandoning their right to vote. So much so that there was no state in the South which registered more than 20 per cent of eligible Afro-Americans in the voter register.[33] The non-violent sit-in protests and the mushrooming of protest movements such as Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in 1960, in the wake of the Montgomery bus boycott of 1955/56 were indicative of the ineffectiveness of the efforts of the Eisenhower administration in the area of civil rights.

Admittedly, 1960 was not the 1920s, but Afro-Americans were with the exception of a negligible few unable to benefit from the franchise in the former confederate states. Kennedy's presidency was one in which Afro-Americans expected remedies for their predicament as a just compensation for their electoral support. Past administrations had catered exclusively to the interest of the dominant population, but to Afro-Americans who had by chance found themselves in the position of king makers, Kennedy's cautiousness in expressing a preference for limited attack against discrimination at the work place, housing and introduction of minimum wage by executive order was seen as a sell-out. Their preference was an enactment of a civil rights act which the President was not ready to risk given the likely coalition between Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans in opposing such an enterprise. Such a coalition was likely to defeat any counter-measure from the four Afro-American Congressmen and their likely supporters of liberal persuasion across the political spectrum. Moreover as a former Senator guilty of the sin of grandiose statements on civil rights issues on the floor of the Senate while being frugal with vote casting, the President was aware of the need to avoid excessive reliance on liberal Democrats on such issues.

It was this awareness that accounted for the testing of the Congressional mood in August 1962 - eighteen months after inauguration - with an innocuous bill outlawing the



payment of poll-tax as a prerequisite for exercising franchise. This was easily accepted by both Republicans and Southern Democrats because its effect was minimal given the fact that it would be applicable in less than a half of the Southern states without much difference to the electoral pattern. The bulk of Afro-Americans who could not vote were those who were either being intimidated, victimised, or manipulated by state officials under real and imagined disqualification clauses. And they were numerous. Only an act could erase these impediments by bestowing on every citizen the right to exercise the franchise.

Consequently, to the enlightened Afro-Americans especially those in the civil rights movement, this bill was a breach of faith on the part of the executive branch. The President had reneged on the election promise “to obtain consideration of the civil rights bill by the Senate early next session that will implement the pledges of the Democratic platform”. These pledges adopted amidst opposition by Southern Democrats, included federal assistance to school districts that desegregated voluntarily, re-affirmation of the Federal Fair Employment Practices, and conferment of authority on Justice Department to institute action against any attempts by persons or institutions denying civil rights to any citizen.[34]

This was not a baseless accusation on the part of the civil rights activists. The election was hardly over when the President to be instructed Senator Joseph Clark and Congressman Emmanuel Celler, both accomplished liberals, to prepare legislation on civil rights. This they did diligently with the introduction of no less than six bills in Congress by May 1961 only to find the President publicly dissociating himself from their efforts.[35]

But in fairness to him, the President’s action was neither a loss of faith on civil rights causes nor a change of heart over his campaign promises. Rather, it was a recognition of the composition of Congress. On assuming the presidency, he came face to face with the stark reality of racism across the US. Sending legislation to Congress in 1961 would only antagonise it without any fruitful outcome except hostility to his other bills whose passage was dependent to a considerable extent on the support of the Southern legislators. This accounted for his withdrawal of support from the initiative of Senator Clark and Congressman Celler in preference to executive action. That this was what the President considered as a better strategy could be gleaned from his response to a reporters enquiry on civil rights: “we have been considering what steps could be taken in the field of expanding civil rights by executive action, and I am hopeful that we will shortly conclude that analysis and have some statement to make

on it. It's not completed as yet." [36]

To the civil rights activists, the President was simply employing delaying tactics. But the opposition which the President encountered in 1962 in his attempt to terminate segregation in housing lent credence to the validity of his strategy of avoiding frontal attack against impediments to civil rights on the floor of Capitol Hill. Even Northern Democrats reputed for their bedrock of liberalism and more favourably disposed to termination of discrimination than Southern legislators broke rank to protest the President's intention on grounds that the dominant white population in the North, feared the prospect of being swamped by Afro-Americans in their housing estates. [37]

This was their understanding of the likely outcome of any executive order being issued by the President to blacklist financial institutions engaged in providing segregated housing schemes. Such an opposition from the predominant population was bound to affect the President's attempt to end segregation in housing - in his campaign word - "with a stroke of the pen." The President's difficulties were compounded by the readiness of the Republican Party to capitalise on the administration's possible alienation of the North in an era when even a minor swing in votes could alter the likely result of an election.

This proposal had all that it required to alienate the predominant population because the National Association of Home Builders also joined the fray in the summer of 1962 by announcing the result of a purported survey it carried out among its members. According to the result, an executive action on housing would hurt the housing industry by militating against expansion with considerable decline in America's gross national product. [38]

Although this result was later refuted, it never diminished the views of Home Builders that they stood to be hurt by any executive order on housing.

The President therefore had to weigh the feelings of Home Builders and Northern and Southern segregationists against the injustices being meted out to Afro-Americans. These were the factors to be taken into consideration because although at the 1960 convention, the Democratic Party platform recognised the housing industry as a purveyor of discrimination in the North, the President's move was triggered by the findings of the Civil Rights Commission. [39] Not only did the Commission confirm what was already in the public domain but concluded that segregation in housing was as much responsible for Afro-American inequality in the North as disenfranchisement was to them in the South. Equally important was

the prospect of massive unemployment which could result from possible contraction of the housing industry should the prediction of the Builders Association materialise. Because these competing interests and factors had to be satisfied, the scope of the executive action had to be narrowed down to cover only public housing scheme and without retrospective effect, thereby insulating the private financial institutions.[40]

This result as expected was met with dissatisfaction from Afro-Americans on grounds that their own interest had been sacrificed on an issue in which they were only seeking redress as opposed to privileges. In some quarters, there was outright infuriation without regard to the President's difficulties in trying to pacify diverse constituents. Such infuriation augmented by months of dashed high hopes arising from the dearth of legislation on civil rights, presented the traditional protest movements such as NAACP and SCLC with the massive problem of how to hold their restive supporters. The freedom rides from May 1961 protesting segregation at bus terminals and consequential violence in Montgomery and other cities of Alabama; the debacle over Meredith's admission into the University of Mississippi in September 1962; the mass demonstrations - not without unrest - which began in Birmingham in April 1963 culminating in a march on Washington later in the year, were all the outcome of Afro-American dissatisfaction at what they saw as the slow pace of civil rights reforms.[41]

Consequently, one can only surmise that the Kennedy presidency was one in which Afro-Americans expected salvation in the domain of civil rights. What they got was a responsive and sincere Chief of State who knew their heart beat but whose hands were tied from resolving their problem by a mere "stroke of the pen". This accounted for the considerable praise with which his Afro-American critics tempered their criticisms of the President's achievements on civil rights. For example, in spite of being one of his fiercest critics for failing to send a civil rights legislation to Congress, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., paid tribute to the administration's "energetic young men" who "had reached out more creatively.... conceived and launched some imaginative and bold forays." At the President's assassination, King gave credit to him for his "ability to respond to creative pressure...He frankly acknowledged that he was responding to mass demands and did so because he thought it was right to do so. This is the secret of the deep affection he evoked. He was responsive, sensitive, humble before the people, and bold on their behalf." This was in harmony with the views of NAACP's Roy Wilkins who although felt disappointed at the administration's non-legislative

approach to civil rights, nonetheless, lavished praise on the President for his concern for the predicament of Afro-Americans.[42]

One might doubt the popularity of the views of these establishment prone civil rights leaders in the wider Afro-American community bearing in mind their past failure to extract concessions on civil rights issues from previous administrations. But Charles Evers, a latter day protest leader thrust into the lime light following the assassination of his brother, Medgar Evers of the Mississippi chapter of NAACP by a white supremacist in May 1963, echoed the same view about the administration. In saying of the President's brother, Attorney-General Robert Kennedy: "He has done more for us personally than any other public official. Had it not been for him, there would have been many more murders and many more beatings than we have had in Mississippi in the last four years. Mr. Kennedy did more to help us get our rights as first class citizens than all other US Attorneys-General put together." [43]

From these voices of the people's opinion leaders, one can conclude that the issue was not that of not being responsive to the Afro-American wing of the President's electors, but that of the degree of responsiveness. This in itself was a novelty in an American presidency in the period in which disdain for Afro-American demands was the rule rather than the exception.

ii) The administration's attitude to the situation in the Congo, South Africa and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique:

(a) As regards the Congo, one has seen that the decision to intervene to preempt communist involvement was taken by the out-going Eisenhower administration. The Kennedy administration inherited not only an unstable Congo as the centre was no more stronger than the pre-UN involvement, but also a mounting chorus of support for Katangese secession in the US. By 1961, these supporters had formed the American Committee for Aid to Katanga Freedom Fighters to pressure the Kennedy administration into abandoning its policy of a united Congo with a view to ensuring Katanga's independence. Consisting of a coalition of investors with immediate and potential mineral interests in Katanga, anti-communists, conservative Republicans and Southern racists, their aim as contained in their paid advertisement in the New York Times of December 14, 1961 was to cultivate public support for Katanga, protest UN policy in the Congo and the use of US materials in operation against the rebels.[44]

This committee was helped by the propaganda material sent out daily by the Katanga publicity office in New York, under a professional Belgian public relations consultant, Michael Struelens. In its numerous and quite often unsolicited press releases, the publicity office eulogised the secessionist leader, Moise Tshombe as anti-communist, pro-West and capitalist oriented, determined to protect Westerners and their interests.[45] These claims were strenuously refuted by some Afro-Americans and other liberals across the racial divide who favoured a strong central authority as did the administration. But in an America used to anti-communist hysteria, the Committee for Aid to Katanga occupied a higher ground in the competition for public support.

This situation posed two major problems to Afro-Americans. First, because communism had been injected into the issue, Afro-Americans were divided in their support for and against Katanga. For example, the pro-Katanga lobby was headed by an Afro-American, Dr. Max Yergan, a former communist turned its most fervent persecutor. He like others of his race were there with Southern racists because of their hatred for communism. This meant that Afro-Americans would have to fight each other at a time when their energies could better be utilised in the struggle for civil rights. Second, was the realisation that unlike other Americans who could stay in the safety of their country to argue the merits or otherwise of Katangese secession, the Congolese who were suffering on the ground were the “kith and kin” of Afro-Americans. Speaking with discordant voices would therefore rob Afro-Americans of the opportunity to influence the US policy response to the crisis, thereby prolonging the suffering of the Congolese.

This realisation led A. Philip Randolph, President of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters to convene a three day meeting at Columbia University, New York from November 22, 1961 on “The Role of the American Negro Community in US Policy Toward Africa.”[46] It was attended by no less than 100 Afro-Americans representing labour, women and civil organisations. As the theme suggested, this conference discussed the immediate problems of instability in the Congo where a strong centre was favoured, and racism in South Africa. It called on the administration to support their position on these issues. This was instrumental in Under-Secretary of State George W. Ball’s statement in Los Angeles on December 19, 1961 in which he announced the administration’s support for the central Congolese government in the fight against secession.[47] Although more meetings followed out of which emerged in New



York in November 1962, the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLCA) as the Afro-American voice on the situation in the Congo, they had since the first conference neutralised the pressure being mounted on the Kennedy administration by the Katanga lobby.[48]

The administration's ability to withstand pressure for disentanglement from the Congo could not have been achieved without Afro-Americans' effort to speak with one voice on the issue. It was this voice that enabled the administration to see off its inherited problem of secession in the Congo as exemplified by the collapse of the Katangese rebellion in January 1963. In this respect, when Washington's UN Representative, Adlai Stevenson told the Subcommittee on International Organisation Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 13, 1963, that the administration's policy in the Congo as indeed other African states was "to help create states, safe from external aggression or subversion",[49] he was indeed trumpeting the government's success in an area where its predecessor failed. Such success was brought about by the administration's response to Afro-American concern in an area they considered important.

(b) As regards South Africa, the administration was on the whole spared intense lobbying by Afro-Americans at this time, except resolutions calling for support for the liberation movements. Two factors were responsible for their considering lobbying as an unnecessary course of action. (i) The Kennedy administration was post-Sharpeville in the sense that it came into office at a time when the outcry over the massacre of African protesters by the South African Police in March 1960 had abated. Emphasis was focused more on the Congo where there was a war on the ground. Moreover, the Kennedy administration had embarked upon the process of pursuing civil rights at home, thus Afro-Americans had no cause to expect such an administration to do the opposite in its foreign policy. (ii) The US representative at the UN, Adlai Stevenson and the Secretary of State for African affairs, Chester Bowles as well as his Deputy, Mennen-Williams were officials with whom Afro-Americans could feel at home. It should be recalled that Bowles was the liberal intellectual who was a <sup>thorn</sup> ~~horn~~ in the flesh of past administrations for their failure to take a tough stand against apartheid because of fear of communism. An avowed supporter of decolonisation and African nationalism, he was Kennedy's foreign policy adviser during the campaign, and as such could have been instrumental to the candidate's emphasis on Africa. By Arthur Schlesinger's

calculation, the candidate mentioned Africa 479 times during the 1960 presidential campaign.[50] Mennen-Williams and Stevenson had similar credentials and had both spoken out quite frequently on issues relating to Africa's decolonisation and civil rights in the US. Mennen-Williams was thrust into the limelight in this direction when as Governor of Michigan, he took part at an "African Freedom Day" rally in New York in 1959, during which he called on the US to take a leading role in the fight against apartheid.[51]

There were certain actions which the administration took at the international scene to justify Afro-Americans' confidence in the officials. Elected at a time of growing African disquiet at America's stance over African nationalism and the presence of minority and colonial administrations in the continent, the Kennedy administration found itself at the centre of growing African demands for stern action against the regime in Pretoria. Their favoured action was US imposition of sanctions against Pretoria. To the US, this meant embarking upon a collision course with a trustworthy anti-communist ally with whom it also had military cooperation. The administration could ill afford this in view of the intensity of the Cold War. South Africa had demonstrated her steadfastness as an ally by announcing during the 1960 presidential election, her intention to offer base facilities to the US for the installation of missile tracking and telecommunication devices.[52]

The choice before the administration was either to appease the African states from whom Washington had very little to gain in the light of their non-alignment policy or cast its lot with a trustworthy Pretoria. Realism could have dictated taking sides with the authorities in Pretoria, but Mennen Williams, Stevenson and Bowles had no illusion as to where US long-term interest laid. Writing to Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, in 1961, Bowles minced no words when he told him: "There are few who doubt that the Republic of South Africa will blow up in due course. When this occurs will we be able to say that we took every step or practical measure to prevent or temper the holocaust?"[53]

The issue is not the accuracy of Bowles' forecast, but the importance being attached to something which previous administrations would have dismissed with a mere wave of the hand. That at the point in time, the General Assembly had at the instigation of the African states passed a resolution requesting member states to sever diplomatic relations with South Africa is immaterial as the US as indeed every other developed country had responded to international issues on the basis of its national interest. But this was a situation in which officials of liberal

persuasion in the administration were interpreting US interest in terms of keeping South Africa at an arms length. Consequently, it came as no surprise that Bowles' urging for action against South Africa evoked a responsive chord from like-minded officials in the administration. It was Mennen Williams who recommended imposition of arms embargo as a form of action against Pretoria while Stevenson worked assiduously to sway the President with the argument that "It seems clear that we are approaching a decisive situation from which the Africans will draw conclusions about the long-run nature of our policies." [54]

US arms shipment to Pretoria may have been as little as \$2 million, as Coker estimates. The important issue is however that in spite of the opposition of the Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, Secretary Of State Dean Rusk, C.I.A. Director John McCone, and Waldemar Campbell of the State Department about possible damage to US security interests, especially the 1962 agreement to sell arms to Pretoria in exchange for the establishment of a military tracking station, the administration did unilaterally impose an arms embargo against South Africa in August 1963. [55]

That this remarkable feat (at some cost to the US) was achieved by the administration showed the wisdom of Afro-Americans in showing restraint toward lobbying the administration over South Africa. There were officials with liberal inclination who were fighting their corners in the administration and capable of ensuring pressure was put on Pretoria to institute reforms.

(c) With respect to the Portuguese colonies, unlike the Congo and South Africa which were inherited problems, the Kennedy administration was forced to articulate a policy following the eruption of rebellion in Angola and Mozambique in 1961/62.

Being a liberal himself, Kennedy's efforts to pressure Portugal to decolonise were hampered by that country's use of the Azores bases to blackmail the administration. In addition, Portugal was a member of NATO. Under normal circumstances, the prospect of losing the bases and embarking upon conflict with a NATO member would have been sufficient to force the administration into abandoning any abstract notion about African freedom it might have had. But not this administration in which supporters of African emancipation were involved at the level of policy formulation.

The administration's exasperation with Portugal on the issue made it attach importance to the liberation war effort as a legitimate means of easing Portugal out of Africa. The result of

this was that the Kennedy administration took a hand in secretly financing Roberto Holden's Uniao das Populacoes de Angola (UPA) and Eduardo Mondlane's Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO).[56] The administration followed up such support of the independence struggle in the Portuguese colonies by voting in favour of UN General Assembly resolutions on April 13, and in June 1961, both highly critical of Portugal's refusal to decolonise. This was not without opposition from the European specialists and the Defence analyst in the Departments of State and Defence.[57]

This is not to say that it was smooth sailing for the liberals in the administration. For example, the pro-African policy of the administration took a jolt when Portugal launched her own campaign for the support of the American public by dangling the Azores bases and an alleged communist connection with the liberation movements. The public criticism arising therefrom confused the administration as to what should be the way forward.[58] Yet, by June 1961, Bowles had commissioned a report on Portugal's colonialism in Africa, which recommended among others: soliciting the assistance of the Vatican, Brazil and France to talk Lisbon out of Africa; closure of the Azores bases to deprive Portugal of a potent instrument of blackmail; US termination of arms sales to Lisbon as well as its outright expulsion from NATO. The report was taken seriously by the President and only the intensification of the Cold War in Europe and Latin America that made the administration to favour diplomatic pressure to what under the circumstances had seemed the drastic recommendations of the report.[59]

In this respect, ANLCA's resolution of 1962 calling on the US to increase support to the liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique should be seen as Afro-Americans recognition of the efforts of the liberals in the administration for pursuing causes favourable to their interest. Such an administration deserved to be spared intense criticism (despite occasional liaison with Pretoria which Washington claimed it needed to influence change in South Africa.)

In sum, the President's policies in the Congo, South Africa and the Portuguese colonies were parallel both to the general shift on western policy toward South Africa in particular, and to those on the domestic scene - marked by the ability to respond to needs with caution without alienating those who favoured the status quo. This was true of South Africa in particular and Congo in general.

## Conclusion.

This chapter set out to investigate whether or not there had been a departure in policy to the one pursued by the Truman administration in terms of content and the societal factors which made such a policy possible. While one did not see any visible changes during the Eisenhower tenure, the situation took a different turn with the emergence of the Kennedy administration. This was due mainly to the fact that unlike the previous administrations, Kennedy sought, obtained and rode to office with the support of Afro-Americans. The result of this was a fundamental alteration of the political landscape of the US in which an hitherto voiceless and powerless community not only began to make demands, but such demands were being responded to in earnest. A few examples will suffice. The Department of Justice which had on the main remained toothless on civil rights issues, successfully brought about desegregation of schools in Atlanta, New Orleans, Memphis and Dallas in 1961 - the first year of Kennedy's tenure. In Virginia, where the local authorities sought to circumvent desegregation by closing down schools, the firmness of the Justice Department made them cave in. This "revolution" equally affected the domain of franchise and federal appointments. While between 1957 and 1960, the Justice Department could bring only ten cases of violations of the right of qualified Afro-Americans to vote despite staggering numbers of examples, that same Justice Department under the Kennedy administration prosecuted 42 cases between 1961 and July 1963. On employment, the administration appointed five Afro-American life-time judges as opposed to the three it inherited. It went out of its way to recruit Afro-Americans into the civil service to combat their virtual extinction in that area, appointed them into Ambassadorial posts in Europe, an hitherto forbidden area to them, and the President personally engineered the founding of the Federal City Club in his first year of office to rival the Metropolitan Club in protest at its discrimination against Afro-Americans.[60]

The Kennedy presidency therefore marked a watershed in American politics by heralding an era in which Afro-Americans could influence what they could only bemoan previously. The fact that Afro-Americans made demands, regarded what was given to them as inadequate and made more demands was an eloquent testimony to their arrival alongside the



Poles and the Jews who were there earlier. Whether this was an aberration or a permanent phenomenon will become clear in subsequent chapters.

## FOOTNOTES.

1. President Eisenhower's message to the UN Commission on Human Rights is reproduced in, American Foreign Policy 1941-1963. Vol. 1 ( Department of State, Washington 1971) pp 227-8.
2. For a fairly up to date discussion of this issue, see, B. Pachai, The International Aspect of the South African Indian Question 1860-1971. ( C. Struik (PTY) Cape Town 1971) pp 184-237.
3. Gwendolen. M. Carter, The Politics of Inequality, South Africa Since 1948 , (Thames and Hudson, London 1958) p. 397.
4. See, Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John foster Dulles. (Little Brown and Co. Boston and Toronto 1973) pp 286, 315-355 and 438; Melvin Gurtov, The United States Against Third World: Antinationalism and Intervention. (Praeger Publishers, New York and Washington 1974) pp 43-5.
5. Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-1961. (Double-Day, Garden City, New York 1965) pp. 572-84; Also quoted in Stephen. R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960-1964. (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London 1974) p. 46.
6. See, Rupert Emerson, Africa and United States Policy, (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, New Jersey 1967) p. 23.
7. The campaign against apartheid and US association with Pretoria was equally matched by that in support especially when cast in cold war term. Those against Pretoria include, New York Times, 5th April 1953, p. 22; Chester Bowles, Africa's challenge to America. (University of California, Berkeley, 1956); Chester Bowles, The New Dimensions of Peace (Harper and Row, New York, 1955); George W. Shepherd Jr., Anti-Apartheid: Trans-National Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of South Africa, (Greenwood Press, West Port, Connecticut, 1977.); Vernon Mckay, Africa in World Politics, (Harper and Row, New York 1963); Nation (New York) 26th December, 1953. pp. 559-62. Those in support include: A. Desmond Burridge, "Where the Whiteman is rich and scared", US News and Report, 21st May, 1954. pp 42-6.
8. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "United States Foreign Policy", Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Part 1, 16th March 1960, pp 131-135; C. Coker, The United States and South Africa: Constructive Engagement and its Critics, (Duke University Press, Durham 1986) p.4; Rupert Emerson, Op cit. p.100
9. Philip Crowe's ideas were embodied in "Diplomat's advice: Keep South Africa as Friend", U.S News and Report, December 18, 1961. pp. 87-8.
10. Quoted in Anthony Lake, Caution and Concern, The Making of American Policy Toward South Africa 1946-71, (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, Princeton University 1974) p.74
11. Thomas Karis, "United States Policy toward South Africa", in Gwendolen. M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara (eds). Southern Africa: The Continuing Crisis, (Indiana University Press, Bloomington and London 1979) p. 324.

12. US voting record on issues relating to racial discrimination and decolonisation in the UN has been meticulously analysed by G.M.Carter, Op cit. pp 380-406. Further critical evaluation of the record of the Eisenhower administration on this issue could be obtained by gleaning the following: Camille A. Bratton, "A Matter of Record: The History of the United States Voting Pattern in the United Nations Regarding Racism, Colonialism and Apartheid, 1946-1976", Freedomways, vol. 17. No. 3, 1977; Hubert Humphrey, "The U.S., Africa and the UN", Africa Today, vol. 5. Jan-Feb. 1958. George Houser, "US at the UN: Cause for Concern", Africa Today, vol.8. January 1961. Crisis, vol. 64. February 1957. p 99; Charles Diggs, "US Policy in Africa", Africa Today, vol. 6. Jan-Feb. 1959. pp 20-23.
13. For Washington's anti-nationalist and anti-independence statements about Africa, see Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa (Columbia University Press, Missouri 1985) p. 45; For Afro-Americans dissatisfaction with the administration's lack of support for African nationalism, see: Alfred O. Hero, "American Negroes and US Foreign Policy 1937-67", Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 13, June 1969. pp. 226-261; James Roark, "Black-American Leaders: The Response to Colonialism and the Cold War, 1943-1953", African Historical Studies, vol.2, 1971. pp 253-270; Clement. T. Keto, "Black American Involvement in South Africa's Race Issue", Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion, vol. iii. No.1 (Spring) 1973. pp 6-11; Dick Clark, "American Policy Towards South Africa" in Ibid, vol. vii. No. 1 (Spring) 1977. p.2.
14. T. Karis, Op cit. pp 324-5.
15. Congress and the Nation 1945-1964, (volume One), (Congressional Quarterly Service, Washington D.C. 20006, 1965) pp. 23-4.
16. On Kennedy's statements over the catholic controversy, see, Ibid p. 34.
17. Ibid; "Eyes on the Prize: The Story of America's Civil Rights Years", BBC 2 Documentary (A Blackside Inc. Production.) 24-1-88, 7.15pm
18. The so-called communist infiltration into higher echelon of the US was a major scandal involving officials across the political spectrum. The following studies focused on the issue: Earl Latham, The Communist Controversy in Washington: From New Deals to McCarthy, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1966) pp 184-194; John Chabot Smith, Alger Hiss: The True Story, (Holt, Line Haut and Winston, New York 1976); On the alleged linkage between liberalism and socialism as advanced by the Republican party document, see Congress and the Nation; Op cit. p 29.
19. Congress and the Nation; Ibid, pp 28-9.
20. Ibid. p. 34.
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22. For details about Afro-Americans desertion of the Republican party, see, William C. Barman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration, (The University Press, Ohio 1970) pp 2-7 and 59.
23. Carl. M. Brauer, John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction, (Columbia University Press, New York 1977) p. 48
24. Outstanding analyses include, Melvin Gurtov, Op Cit., especially pp. 56-68; F. Chidozie Ogene, Interest Groups and the Shaping of Foreign Policy: Four Case Studies of United States

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25. See Stephen R.Weissman, Op cit. p. 56.

26. M. Gurtov, Op Cit., pp. 50-8.

27. See Henry Jackson, Op cit. p. 32.

28. S. R. Weissman, Op Cit. , p. 28.

29. See Hearings before the House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-Committee on Africa, "Staff Memoranda on the Republic of the Congo.", 87th Congress, 1st. session, April 13, 1961. p. 48.

30. M. Gurtov. Op Cit., p. 53.

31. For a discussion of the factors which gave rise to Afro-Americans non-possession of the attributes of citizenship and the futile efforts to overcome such difficulties, see Thomas F. Gossett, Race, The History Of An Idea In America, (Southern Methodist University Press, Dallas, 1963) pp 254-5; Constance Baker Motley, "The Legal Status of the Negro in the United States", in John P. Davis (ed.), The American Negro Reference Book, (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1966) pp 484-489; John Hope Franklyn, "A Brief history of the Negro in the United States", Ibid, p. 50; See K.E.,and A.F. Tauber, "The Negro Population in the United States", Ibid, pp 96-108; James A Moss, "The Civil Rights Movement and American Foreign Policy" in George W. Shepherd Jr. (ed) Racial Influences on American Foreign Policy, (Basic books Inc. New York and London 1970) pp 79-99.

32. See Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, (Andre-Deutsch, London 1965) pp 709-791.

33. Ibid, p. 797.

34. Ibid, p. 792.

35. Henry Fairlie, The Kennedy Promise: The Politics of Expectation, (Doubleday and Co. Garden City, New York 1973) p. 249.

36. President Kennedy quoted in David Halberstam, The Kennedy Presidential Press Conferences, ( Heyden, London 1978)p. 15.

37. Carl. M. Brauer, Op. cit. p. 207.

38. Ibid, pp. 206-8.

39. A. M. Schlesinger, Op Cit., pp. 794-809.

40. Ibid.

41. These facts abound in numerous literature on modern American History. For a quick glance, see, Congress and the Nation 1945-1964, Op Cit., pp. 48 and 1600-1614.

42. A. M. Schlesinger, Op Cit., p. 801.

43. Ibid, p. 831.
44. F. C. Ogene, Op Cit., pp 22-32.
45. Ibid,
46. William Payne, "American Negroes Discuss Africa", Africa Report, December 1962. p.14.
47. See Under-Secretary of State, George W. Ball's statement in Los Angeles, 19th. December 1961, as reproduced in Africa Report, January 1962. pp 15-17.
48. See Philip V. White, "The Black-American Constituency for Southern Africa, 1940-1980" in Alfred. O. Hero Jr. and John Barratt (eds.) The American People and South Africa: Publics, Elites and Policy Making Process, (D.C. Heath, Lexington, Massachusetts 1981) p. 86.
49. Details about US cooperation with ONUC in the operation against Katanga as well as the statements of President Kennedy and other officials of the administration could be obtained directly from: American Foreign Policy 1963, (Department of State Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington D.C. 1967) pp. 641-670.; See statement by Adlai Stevenson, "Review of US participation in the UN", Hearing before Sub-Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 88th. Congress, 1st. session, March 13, 1963. pp 12-15.
50. H. Jackson, Op Cit., p.38; T. Noer, Op Cit., pp 58-60; A.M. Schlesinger, Op Cit., p. 483.
51. T. Noer, Op Cit., p. 53.
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53. Chester Bowles, Promise to Keep: My Years in Public Life, (Harper and Row, New York 1971) p. 260.
54. Quoted in A. Schlesinger Jr., Op Cit., p. 507.
55. See T. Noer, Op Cit., pp 64-5; C. Coker, Op Cit., pp 8-11; U.S. Congress, House, "Implementation of U.S. Arms Embargo", Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93rd. Congress, 1st. session 1973; U.S. Mission to the UN, Press Release No. 4233, August 2, 1963; Also see statement of US Permanent Representative to the UN, Adlai Stevenson in Press Release No. 4233, December 4, 1963.
56. For analyses of the evolvement of these liberation movements and US consequential clandestine involvement, see: Allen and Barbara Isaacman, Mozambique from Colonialism to Revolution 1900-1982; (Westview, Colorado, 1983); John. A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 54. No.3. April 1976. pp 406-8; John A. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of an Explosion, 1950-1962, ( M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1969) especially pp. 200-220, 258-61; John. A. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962-1976, (M.I.T.Press, Cambridge, 1978.); John. Bartlow Martin, Adlai Stevenson and the World: The Life of Adlai E. Stevenson, (Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1977) pp 617-8; Stephen Weissman, "The CIA and U.S.Policy in Zaire and Angola." in Rene Lamarchand (ed.) American Policy in Southern Africa: The Stakes and the Stance, (The University Press, Washington D.C. 1978) pp. 381-430; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1978) p. 562.
57. Details about the criticisms and the most vociferous characters such as Dean Acheson and the Republican Party machine and sympathisers responsible for them could be gleaned from:



John B. Martin, Op Cit., pp 616-7; John Burnham, "Image in What Mirror?" National Review, July 15, 1961. p.15. By contrast support came purely from the key players in the administration such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk who was left to defend the administration's position and the main stream civil rights organisations. The possible introduction of confusion into NATO by visible opposition of Portugal was a phenomenon that rarely cut any ice with an anti-communist obsessed United States. For analyses in support of the administration, see Africa Today, vol.8. May 1961. pp 4-5; Dean Rusk, "Coping with a World Plunged in Revolution", Business Week, March 25, 1961. pp 104-109, Commonweal, vol. 74. June 23, 1961. p. 317; Crisis, vol. 68. April 1961. p. 226; T. Noer, Op Cit., pp. 61-95.

58. The New York based Public Relations firm of Selvage and Lee were Portugal's image makers in the US at a reported fee of \$100,000 plus expenses every year. This firm employed every trick in the book in its attempt to win American public support for Portugal's colonialism in Africa. One such subterfuge was to harp repeatedly at America's obsession with communism by publishing fictitious letters from known anti-communist freedom fighters like Roberto Holden, eulogising the virtue of communism and how to intensify the terror campaign in Angola with a view to capturing the country as a staging post for Soviet leader Khrushchev's "war of national liberation". Others include the publishing of "captured documents" and "training manuals" outlining "Soviet game plan" to take over Africa through the liberation movements. To drive home its points, most of these allegedly captured documents ended with the phrase, "LONG LIVE COMMUNISM." To counter the effect of the civil rights organisations, Selvage and Lee also equipped themselves with a lobbying apparatus, Portuguese-American Committee on Foreign Affairs which not only penetrated Congress, but most disturbing of all, the Democratic Party machine as evidenced by Massachusetts long serving and highly respected Congressman "Tip" O'Neill's pro-Portugal speech in Congress. This speech coupled with another from Speaker John McCormick armed Selvage and Lee a public relations coup which they utilised to good effect by publishing them under the title "Friendly Relations Between America and Portugal" for mass circulation. They also solicited and developed cozy relations with Southerners opposed to civil rights at home to portray the Kennedy administration as one that had not only lost its way at home, but was also supporting communists in Africa. For details see, Russell Warren Howe and Sarah Hays Trott, The Power Peddlers: How Lobbyists Mold American Foreign Policy, (Doubleday, Garden City, New York 1977); U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Activities of Non-Diplomatic Representatives of Foreign Powers in the US" (Washington 1963); Daniel M. Friedenber, "The Public Relations of Colonialism: Salazar's Mouthpiece in the U.S", Africa Today, vol.9. April 1962. pp 4-16; Daniel M. Friedenber, "Public Relations for Portugal: The Angola Story as Told by Selvage and Lee." The New Republic, (Washington D.C.) April 2, 1962. pp 9-12.

59. See T. Noer, Op Cit., pp. 77-95.

60. See A.M. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House, Op Cit., pp. 794-809.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### INFLUENCE OF AFRO-AMERICANS ON AFRICA POLICY OF POST-KENNEDY ADMINISTRATIONS 1964-74.

The analysis of the pattern of US policy in Africa with particular reference to the Southern region has evinced a number of interesting features. One of these was that events in the international scene, i.e. the Cold War, were the primary determinant of Washington's Africa policy. Intensification of tension between the power blocs automatically meant support for any friendly African government irrespective of any legitimacy crisis it was facing in the domestic scene. As a result, the regime in Pretoria took advantage of Washington's anti-communist obsession to offer itself to the West as a bulwark against communism. This enabled it to earn Western respect and American patronage, in spite of its domestic problems occasioned by the adoption of apartheid as an official policy.

Second, part of Washington's interest in Southern Africa was the undermining of real and imagined communist influence and aspirations. This accounted for the intervention in the Congo. America's strategy in the sub-continent therefore was two pronged: support and reward for pro-West anti-communist regimes and officials at the expense of other considerations, and outright hostility with the possibility of liquidation for those regarded as non-conformists. The regime in South Africa was in the first category while Patrice Lumumba of the Congo was in the latter category. This therefore meant that America's Africa policy was not only made outside the African continent, but was also largely determined by global events and considerations rather than events in the continent. The contradictory responses to the Sharpeville massacre of March 1960 between officials of the State Department on the one hand and on the other, Secretary of State Christian Herter and President Eisenhower illustrate this assertion. On that occasion, some high ranking officials in the State Department, obviously without the approval of the Secretary of State or the President, issued a statement condemning the killings, only for the President and his Secretary of

State to publicly distance themselves from the statement.[1]

Thirdly and perhaps the most poignant observation, was the fact that anti-communism as the major determinant of America's Africa policy appeared to come to an end with the termination of the Eisenhower administration in January 1961. In the Kennedy era, anti-communism shared its preeminent position with America's traditional values of liberty and justice as well as the attitudes of America's own African community. Since these factors as co-determinants of US Africa policy were manifest in the policy of the Kennedy administration towards South Africa, Congo and the Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, this chapter intends to analyse the impact of Afro-Americans upon the Africa policy of successive administrations from the demise of John Kennedy to the enforced resignation of Richard Nixon.

The justification for focusing attention in this area is based on our earlier observation that unlike the Poles and the Jews who had an electoral clout to trade-in for policy stance favourable to their ancestral homelands, the Afro-Americans, though conscious of their origin, were handicapped by their limited possession of the franchise across the country, brought about by low levels of voter registration, even exclusion from registration in some Southern counties. As a result they were powerless to exert the pressure on politicians to achieve the result which other ethnic groups had taken for granted.

If John Kennedy was elected on the basis of Afro-American support and if his administration responded positively to their demands within its limits as earlier indicated, this would signal an end to the traditional disdain of Afro-Americans' demands by the executive arm. Thus we must now examine how far Afro-Americans were able to consolidate the flicker of influence they possessed under Kennedy.

### Afro-Americans and Post Kennedy US-Africa Policy

When Vice-President Lyndon Johnson stepped into the shoes of John Kennedy in 1963, he inherited not only unresolved foreign policy problems in South Africa, Congo, Angola and

Mozambique but also a bureaucratic conflict between Europeanists and Africanists in government on US stance over issues relating to those countries. While the Europeanists wanted the administration's Africa policy to be governed by consideration for NATO's well-being, the Africanists wanted Africa to be seen as an independent variable not tied to any apron string of European policy.

The Europeanists such as Satterthwaite (formerly of Africa Bureau, later US Ambassador to South Africa) argued as they had done under Kennedy, that any adverse action against a pro-West Pretoria on account of apartheid - a domestic affair - would lose that regime's friendship to the West in an era in which the Soviet bloc was not only bent on destruction of the West, but was equally determined to transport revolutions abroad. Regimes like Pretoria therefore were too precious to toy with, and Satterthwaite called for a western guarantee of white perpetuity in power in South Africa in exchange for a limited African franchise, pegged on educational and property qualifications. In other words a return to the pre-1936 Cape franchise. Such a strong argument though a reflection of Satterthwaite's anti-communist credentials, was partly designed to counter the representation of Africanists to the review committee of the NSC on Southern Africa in December 1963.

The Africanists' case as presented by Mennen Williams had not gone as far as the demands of the students of the "Liberation Committee For Africa", who were probably wholly or largely Afro-American and who in an open letter to President Kennedy in the New York Times of June 22, 1961, called on the administration to sever relations with and impose sanctions against South Africa.[2]

Although this could have been the ultimate objective of some of the the Africanists in the administration as evidenced by the later conduct of Chester Bowles, they only suggested the discouragement of new US investments in South Africa as the administration's portrayal of its abhorrence of apartheid. Two reasons were responsible for this. One was in recognition of the fact that the president had to fight the 1964 election in his own right as opposed to that of his predecessor. Hence he was vulnerable to possible attacks of softness on communism in Africa. Second, outright advocacy of an embargo on investments would not go down well with the business community in view of the "26 per cent return on their outlays" which they realised in the South African investment scene in 1963.[3] A pointer in this direction had been occasioned by the

refusal of American businessmen in Pretoria and Port Elizabeth to honour an invitation from their embassy to a multi-racial function - in contravention of apartheid regulation - to mark the 4th of July in 1963.[4] These factors necessitated the call for an embargo only on new investments.

As expected, when confronted with such conflicting suggestions, the administration borrowed a leaf from its predecessor by remaining completely silent on the issue. The result was the absence of the administration's initiative on South Africa beyond the floor of the UN where it was extremely extravagant with words and occasional casting of votes in condemnation of apartheid, yet frugal when it came to declaring the South African phenomenon as a threat to World peace. All that was left of the administration's South Africa policy was thus that bequeathed by its predecessor, i.e., the imposition of a mild arms embargo.

This phase of an impasse in the administration's South Africa policy was when one would have expected Afro-Americans to bring their influence to bear if they had any. Instead it was the regime in Pretoria that decided not only to call the bluff of both Africanists and Afro-Americans, but also to throw its weight around. Realising that the Johnson administration was unable to make up its mind what to do with South Africa, the regime in Pretoria immediately set out to challenge the arms embargo. By January 1964, it had renewed its original request to buy armaments from the US munition giant - Lockheed.

Since these items were to be supplied by a US private sector firm, South Africa merely instigated and stood aside for Lockheed to battle it out with the administration. And with this resurfaced the predictable duel between Africanists and Europeanists in the administration. Lockheed's argument of possible loss of contracts to European rivals such as Brequet Atlantique of France was not merely supported by the Departments of Defence and Commerce, but that support itself was enough to galvanise the Africanists into action. They countered Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges' concern over the possible effect on the balance of payments should South Africa look elsewhere for arms, with the well-trodden argument that approval of the sale would alienate Afro-Americans and liberals in the domestic scene, while attracting intense criticism from the Afro-Asian bloc in international forums. They were supported though for a different reason by the Secretaries of State and Defence (Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara) on grounds that the weapons being sought which included anti-submarine planes were not necessary for South Africa's defence needs. And it was this argument that might have given the President the opportunity to veto the



sale, as opposed to pressure from Afro-Americans since there was virtually none.[5]

In the midst of such raging battles between Africanists and Europeanists in the administration, very little input emanated from the Afro-Americans beyond ANLCA'S appeal to the President to show his abhorrence of apartheid by prohibiting future US investments in South Africa. This mild demand was not in keeping with the furore which the issue generated, and took place at a time when members of the African National Congress (ANC) arrested on treason charges were being sentenced to life imprisonment in South Africa. This should have been a propitious time to mount an effective lobby of law makers and the executive arm for stern action against a regime whose official policy of apartheid was a source of instability in a region in which the US did not want the communists to have a foothold. The Afro-American response was also not adequate to counter the impact of a combination of South Africa's propaganda network and the pro-Pretoria stance of corporate interests.[6]

The latter's stance was motivated by a desire to protect their commercial activities which might suffer should disinvestment become a government policy. At face value this would give the impression that South Africa was vital to the US business community. Yet this could hardly be so in view of the actual level of direct investments, income accruing therefrom and imports and exports as outlined in Tables 1, 2 and 3. US direct investments in Africa did not rise above four per cent of the value of total global investment, of which South Africa could manage only but a little above one per cent, throughout the Johnson Presidency. The same was true in terms of income accruing from investments. Neither South Africa's income receipts of less than two per cent on average nor Africa's overall eight per cent as indicated in Table 1, could place them at a priority position in Washington's ranking order of importance from the point of view of commerce. There was hardly any solace in the domain of imports and exports. It is however true that imports from South Africa included materials of importance to the US industrial machine. These include manganese, chromium and platinum group metals, whose economic and strategic importance to the US will feature in the analysis in Chapter Six.

More significant in influencing corporate attitudes to South Africa were its possession of a stable political leadership, and also an electorate steeped in an ideology conducive to free enterprise. Corporate interests fear instability and enforced public seizure of corporate property in the form of nationalisation. Hence it is the stability in South Africa that commends that regime to

corporate concerns irrespective of the methods employed in securing that stability. It was therefore not surprising that American business were so enamoured by the South Africa regime that in a 1968 survey, 60 per cent of them approve of the apartheid policy of the regime as a just solution to racial difficulties while 40 per cent went as far as expressing a preference for the regime were they entitled to the ballot. In the light of the reaction of American businessmen to the 4th of July celebration in 1963 as earlier indicated, neither this survey nor the revolving post-Sharpeville loan from the US consortium and the four million pound bail-out loan which the Deutsche Bank of Frankfurt raised from a syndicate in 1962 to stem the flow of currency out of the country over the incident, could come as a surprise.[7]

Why were Afro-Americans so silent? Two factors were significant: the effect of post-war reality on Afro-American leadership and the uni-dimensional nature of the American civil rights movement.

Afro-American identification with Africa experienced a transformation when in the inter-war years of 1938-45, (US entered the war in the early 40s) a new leadership emerged as the spokesman of Afro-Americans. This leadership consisted of the commercial class who had achieved success through entrepreneurship.

In a capitalist society, these men not only received the recognition of white-Americans but also elbowed aside, the traditional but quite often not so wealthy protest leaders. These traditional leaders, most of whom owed their leadership to their intellectual capability which enabled them to protest the injustices of the American system, had overnight become irrelevant as spokesmen of the Afro-American community. Dr. Du Bois, the most popular casualty of this latest development was reduced to complaining bitterly:

“By the time the second World War opened, American Negro leadership was in the hands of a new Negro bourgeoisie and had left the hands of teachers, writers and social workers. Professional men joined this black bourgeoisie and the Negro began to follow white American display of conspicuous expenditure. This new leadership had no interest in Africa. It was aggressively American. The Pan-African movement lost almost all support. It was only by my hard efforts that the last Congress in Britain in 1945 got American Negro notice. After that all interest failed.”[8]

That is the crux of the matter. The new Afro-American leadership was different in background and orientation. Because it was part of the respected segment of the society, it did not experience the frustration arising from non-realisation of the American dream, as its predecessors had. It made its mark in America and had imbibed the characteristics of individualism. Hence it was totally committed to America, and Africa became marginal and distant in their perspective. In addition, because the Afro-American leadership had a stake in the American system, it was committed to the preservation of the American society at all cost. Thus whatever that was perceived by the predominant race as a threat to the society was equally recognised by them as such. Since the end of the war coincided with a period of heightened obsession with the evil of communism, the affluent Afro-American leadership had no qualms in recognising this ideology as a global menace. The problem was that this awareness of the evil of communism coincided with the perception in US official circle of a link between communism and quest for independence in Africa.

Africa thus became distant to the Afro-American leadership because they had no grievances against the system either to warrant looking to an ancestral homeland or to be unduly concerned with Africa's emancipation. After all President Truman had addressed some of the issues of considerable importance to them such as the FEPC, racial integration of the armed forces and a commitment to termination of officially sanctioned racial discrimination, resulting in a legislative proposal to Congress in 1948 as aforementioned. Hence, there was a link between loyalty to America and the class and orientation of the Afro-American leadership, resulting in the latter's lukewarm attitude toward Africa's struggle for emancipation.

Also significant was the nature of the main stream civil right movement. NAACP, the main civil rights organisation, was established as a response of liberal whites to the predicament of Afro-Americans. Their outrage at the intensity of lynching of Afro-Americans in Springfield, Illinois - the birth place of Abraham Lincoln - made them merge with Dr. Du Bois' Niagara movement in 1909 to found the NAACP.

But it was an unequal partnership. Because the Niagara movement was virtually withering out of existence without being able to maintain even an headquarters, as a result of insufficiency of funds, NAACP was solely financed by the liberals. The result was that they also called the tune,

hence NAACP's focus was entirely on civil rights at home. The fact that NAACP occasionally spoke out against colonialism and even sent Du Bois to Versailles in 1919 to enable him argue Africa's case was due to the influence of the man himself. His editorship of the organisation's organ, the Crisis gave him a wide latitude to direct the attention of his readers to the situation in Africa without blurring the organisation's focus of quest for civil rights at home.

While NAACP dominated the civil rights landscape and even received if not official approval then acquiescence, organisations like the African-American Institute (AAI); American Committee on Africa (ACOA), amongst others which emerged in the fifties, were in no way different in terms of constituents and objective.[9]

The composition and the financing of NAACP meant that it was geared along the path that could best achieve the goal of civil rights at home. To the liberals of NAACP in the late forties and early fifties, that meant unswerving support to the Democratic Party in order to strengthen its civil rights plank. That could not be achieved without supporting Truman's foreign policy, the most popular and dearest to the administration's heart being the containment policy. This explains Arthur Schlesinger Jr's. statement to the NAACP convention of 1950 in which he drew an analogy between communism and slavery, on grounds that Afro-Americans had nothing to lose for supporting the containment policy because totalitarianism like slavery laid emphasis on the theory of the master race.[10]

That the prewar Afro-American concern for African affairs might conflict with an unreserved support for official anti-communist policy was readily dismissed by liberal whites who irrespective of the reality of the situation in the South believe fervently in a common American citizenship. This began as early as 1947 when Charles I. Glicksberg used the forum of Phylon to launch an attack on the renegade Afro-Americans who still harboured sentiments toward Africa. He warned them of the "retrogressive" nature of the "African craze", and advised them to abandon the idea. Agitation on behalf of Africa should be the stock in trade of "Paul Robeson". Like all devoted citizens, he urged every Afro-American "to regard himself primarily as an American, not a Negro; an American, not a descendant of Africa." [11]

Consequently Afro-Americans who perhaps on account of the hostility of the vast

majority of Southern whites found the Glicksberg type of analysis unconvincing and continued to protest the likely effect of the Truman doctrine on Africa's independence movements, were regarded by the mainstream civil rights movement as spoilers. In this respect, Du Bois was one and so was Paul Robeson.

In view of this, it was evident that the civil rights organisations of the period did not assume a multi-purpose function. They adhered mainly to the cause they emerged to champion, namely, the extension of civil rights to all Americans. The Afro-American leadership was perfectly satisfied with the focus of these organisations hence they were unable to take steps which could have brought about racial solidarity between Afro-Americans and continental Africans during the latter's struggle for independence. This explains the non-availability of an effective African constituency in the US to champion the cause of Africa outside the main stream civil rights movement until the late 1960's.

The fact that Africa received any mention, however subdued, from the offspring of the inter-and post-war civil rights movement as epitomised by ANLCA's activities during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations owed much to the efforts of a fringe organisation, the Council on African Affairs (CAA), in keeping alive Africa's independence issue during the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Consisting of non-mainstream Afro-Americans ('Leftists' in official and mainstream Afro-American jargon) such as Paul Robeson, Ralph. J. Bunche, Modesai W. Johnson and later W. Du Bois and Congressman Adam Clayton Powell Jr. as well as the liberal white-American scholar Raymond Leslie Buell, the organisation was founded in New York in 1937 for three purposes: (i) to assist in Africa's independence struggle irrespective of America's official stance; (ii) to disseminate authentic information about Africa and its peoples as opposed to the biased information in vogue; (iii) and to influence the US government into adopting policies favourable to Africa's interest.

In an effort to achieve the first objective, the CAA established contacts with Africa's independence movements for the purpose of making financial donations. Nigerian, Kenyan and South African movements were on record as having benefited. As regards the objective of influencing US policy towards Africa, perhaps, the most spectacular achievements were the establishment of a separate, but short-lived Division of African Affairs by the administration in January 1944 and the dispatching of Afro-American experts to Liberia and Ethiopia by the State



Department at the urging of the CAA. A strongly worded letter was also sent to the Roosevelt administration in March 1945 emphasising the need to take into account the welfare of the dependent African people in the establishment of the UN. They had in mind the necessity of pressuring European empire builders to relinquish control of their overseas possessions.[12] On the issue of publicising Africa's cause in the US, the fact that the subscription paying membership of the CAA rose to two thousand with nearly a four-fold increase in budget from \$11,000 to \$40,000 <sup>between</sup> ~~within~~ 1942 and 1946, attested to its success in this area.[13] Although Roosevelt's succession by a Cold War warrior and subsequent intimidation of un-American organisations under which the CAA was categorised following its opposition to containment policy, as well as in-fighting within itself led to its demise in 1955, it had by then built a realistic African consciousness in the minds of some Afro-American civil rights activists.

There may not be any ready evidence, but the fact that on December 10, 1957 - barely two years after its demise - a "Day of Protest" took place in New York to draw attention to the UN Declaration of Human Rights with a view to focusing public attention on South Africa's apartheid policy, must have owed much to the continuing influence of the CAA, in view of the tendency of the post-depression leaders to detach themselves from African affairs. The Afro-American participants, especially Martin Luther King Jr. of the SCLC, the joint leader of the demonstration, were more famous for their struggle for civil rights than building racial solidarity across national frontiers. But because the traditional focus of the post-depression civil rights movement in the US was domestic as opposed to one of racial solidarity with continental Africans as advocated by the defunct CAA, the effect of the civil rights message was modest. It also accounts for Martin Luther King's failure to testify to the evil of apartheid before the UN Committee on Apartheid when an invitation was extended to him to do so in 1962. He had to decline the offer on the grounds that he was preparing for the march on Washington, but it is equally likely that he refused because primarily as an American civil rights leader, he only had a rudimentary idea of apartheid irrespective of occasional flamboyant statements on the issue. He was therefore unequal to the task of blending the evils of apartheid with his pulpit oratory - as he had frequently done on civil rights issues to rouse his audience. The Costa Rican Chairman of the Committee who had extended the invitation might have thought that the civil rights leader's legendary oratory would boost the cause of the committee.[14]

One can only attribute such perfunctory knowledge to the effect of the direction of the Afro-American leadership since the late 1930s. NAACP's leader Roy Wilkins under-scored this, in the mid-1960s, when he spoke of the need to harness the abilities of Afro-Americans towards persuading the American government to aid the emerging peoples of Africa, while in the same breath he cautioned that "in developing this activity we should not relax our prime efforts to achieve our proper place in our own country...."[15]

The feeble response of Afro-Americans to the issue of the South African arms buying quest and the silence over the Johnson administration's assistance to Pretoria's nuclear project should thus be seen in the light of the primacy of civil rights at home over issues relating to racial solidarity across national frontiers. That ANLCA finally came to an end in 1967 was symptomatic of the fact that the mainstream civil rights movement was not equipped to fight a two-pronged war for civil rights at home as well as favourable US policy towards the continent of Africa.

It meant that Afro-Americans had neither a unified objective nor strategy on Africa and that the main stream civil rights movement could not be their sole representative in this regards. Hence in the mid-1960s, one saw the emergence of a diversity of organisations ranging from the Marxist oriented "Black Panthers" to the insurrection prone "Harlem Mau Mau" (youth in Harlem who preferred the Kenyan type of insurrection to the "bourgeois" civil rights movement of NAACP). Indeed, the eulogising of the "Mau Mau" insurrection and support for it was of long standing and went beyond the ghetto. Educated and elitist Afro-Americans like Paul Robeson as well as Afro-American newspapers railed at Britain for its unacceptable subjugation of continental Africans. "Mau Mau" was seen as a just struggle against British imperialism and colonialism. Others include the "African National Pioneer Movement".[16] The logical outcome of this development was the transformation of a traditional hitherto largely inert and apathetic Afro-American community on African issues to one which took pride in its heritage and saw its future as intertwined with events in Africa.[17] Since most of Africa had already been promised independence, Southern Africa became their focus of attention. The mid-1960s therefore was a turning point in Afro-Americans' identification with events in continental Africa.

But a fractious community in which mainstream civil right leaders like Wilkins were laying emphasis on civil rights at home while others (radicals) like Robeson were seeing a common destiny between continental and Diaspora Africans could not counter opponents in the corridors of

power in Washington and exercise direct influence on the executive, unless they could speak with one voice. To find out whether or not there was an improvement in this respect, and to what extent they were able to exert influence on issues of importance to them, one can focus attention on two events in the period under study: (i) US reaction to UDI in Rhodesia in 1965; (ii) the sugar-import quota the US conceded to South Africa in 1971.

#### (i) US Reaction to UDI

Like Kennedy whose tenure coincided with the outbreak of hostilities against colonial rule in Portuguese Africa and so had to articulate a US response, Johnson was in office for barely a year when he was confronted by similar problem in Rhodesia.

In November 1965, Ian Smith of the Rhodesian Front (RF) government unilaterally declared the Crown colony independent of Britain. That alone could not have warranted American interest. Rhodesia was land-locked, hence did not provide port facilities to visiting US vessels and personnel. It neither played host to US military installations and related facilities nor was it capable of adopting a high profile anti-communist stance to dangle before Washington for which Pretoria was adept. On the economic front, although the US was importing Rhodesia's chromium, the annual \$40 million worth of two way-trade between the two made Rhodesia infinitesimal to the US in this respect.

By declaring itself independent, Rhodesia was calling into question the authority of the British Crown and the legitimacy of its rule beyond the British Isles. The internationalisation of the problem, however, arose from the fact that by declaring UDI, Rhodesia had also terminated an on-going dispute with the British over the treatment of the majority African population. This did not augur well for the international community because of the possibility of armed struggle by the majority population as a means of liberating themselves from settler minority rule. To the US that meant instability and possibly a foothold for the "communists" in that part of the world. Mennen-Williams had this in mind when as early as 1962, he urged Secretary of State Dean Rusk to ensure that the administration brought to the attention of the British the need to refrain from abandoning the "rightless Africans" in Rhodesia to the mercy of the whites. Surprisingly, both the State Department and the NSC had concurred in their response to the stifling of African opposition by

Rhodesia's Prime Minister Edgar Whitehead, when they protested at the series of negotiations which the British entered into with the minority white population of the colony in 1961 to exchange the never-used British veto on legislative matters for the granting of limited political rights to the non-whites.[18]

The Rhodesian issue affected Washington in more ways than one because the US was and is still a microcosm of the world. It has a vast population whose constituents can identify with many parts of the globe. Afro-Americans had after earlier vacillation identified themselves with developments in Africa in general and in particular the struggle in Southern Africa. Being a post-Kennedy event meant that Rhodesia's UDI emerged at a time when Afro-Americans were not only increasingly vocal about the situation in the Southern States of their country but that they were ready to identify their predicament with issues of racial discrimination in their ancestral homeland. To them UDI was a reflection of the commonality of injustice being meted out to the African race by whites irrespective of geographical location.

It is not that Afro-Americans had any high opinions about British colonialism in Africa. Their antagonism towards the British over "Mau Mau" attests to that. But they realised that the potential loss of an all-be-it unused British veto over treatment of Africans in Rhodesia would be to relieve the white authorities of Rhodesia of the last obstacles in their drive for continued white rule. This was alarming to Afro-Americans, so much so that even the establishment prone NAACP was moved to adopt a strongly worded resolution two months after UDI in which it called on the Johnson administration to institute economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Although NAACP was not so generous over the use of American troops, ostensibly for fear of introducing super-power rivalry into the African continent, it supported American assistance to other countries which might intervene militarily to prevent the perpetuation of white rule in Rhodesia.[19]

This type of resolution was quite unexpected of NAACP especially since the departure of Du Bois as the editor of the Crisis. In an attempt to achieve its aim of civil rights at home NAACP had always embraced government policies on issues of this and on related nature; thus, its new position on Rhodesia might have been inspired by the mood of the non-main stream Afro-Americans.

However, since the various Afro-American organisations had virtually unanimously sent a message to the administration on an issue which they deemed important to them, it was incumbent

on the government to weigh this demand in conjunction with an opposing view if any in the light of America's national interest. In this respect, without prejudice to the New York based American African Affairs Association, [20] it is worth pointing out that at the inception of UDI when Afro-Americans made their position known on the issue, there was no known organised and sustained contrary opinion in support of Ian Smith of Rhodesia, because all that Britain demanded was political rights for all Rhodesians. The complaint from the business community that they were being penalised in favour of the British who were still supplying oil to Rhodesia through South Africa and the Portuguese colonies, as well as the challenge to America's observance of the UN embargoes against Salisbury by right wing elements in the US leading to the Byrd Amendment of 1971, were post-1968 events. These developments owed much to the fact that UDI survived to that time.[21] In early 1966, the Rhodesian issue did not pose a moral dilemma to the administration of forcing that territory back to a colonial status. This of course meant that Washington had a moral argument in its favour had it the political will to attempt to undermine UDI.

Consequently, one would have expected the administration to have a fair wind in any punitive action it intended to take to remove the instability which UDI posed. This should be all the more so because the US was abreast of events in Rhodesia and had occasionally engaged in threats to discourage Salisbury from unilaterally declaring itself independent of Britain. For example, when Ian Smith toppled Winston Field for alleged weakness towards Britain over Africans' political rights, Under-Secretary of State George Ball immediately alerted all the American Embassies in Africa and warned them of the consequences of UDI. He also called for a contingency plan for possible US response should London prove unequal to the task. In June 1965, the US Representative in the UN Adlai Stevenson expressed the administration's opposition to UDI in a statement to the Security Council. This was followed by a public proclamation by Secretary of State Dean Rusk later in the year, when he announced the administration's support for London in predicating Rhodesia's independence on majority rule. The administration, he affirmed, had no "intention to recognise an independent Rhodesian government which has declared its independence unilaterally and not acceptable to the majority of its people." [22]

As if the statements from the Under-Secretary and The UN Representative had not established where the administration stood on the issue, the Assistant Secretary of State, G. Mennen-Williams addressed the most forth-right statement to the aspiring rebels on June 15, 1965,



in order to “make our position crystal clear, so there will be no misunderstandings”. He pledged America’s unequivocal support for any action London might deem necessary to crush any rebellion in Rhodesia. While reiterating the administration’s belief that political, social and economic chaos would be attendant upon any UDI, the Assistant Secretary gave the British a blank cheque because “we believe wholeheartedly in the correctness and validity of the present British position and are prepared to support it to the extent requested.”[23]

These assurances of support to Britain over possible UDI in Rhodesia - something Britain should have been able to cope with if there was political will - may seem an attempt to kill a fly with a sledge hammer. But the principle is not flawed considering the main issue involved, namely, an attempt by minority whites to impose their will on the majority African population without due process, which carried seeds of instability. There were of course a number of precedents. In 1948 President Truman had provided assistance to Turkey and Greece to overcome armed minorities with ideological predilection to Moscow. This was a precedent regardless of Ian Smith’s ideological inclination. Secondly the rationale for intervention in the Congo in the Eisenhower presidency was based on the calculation that instability would provide an avenue for communism to breed. Unjust as it was, at least from the point of view of the British, the Rhodesian Africans, the Afro-Americans and the American administration, UDI would not make Rhodesia more stable. In this respect, by its pronouncements on the Rhodesian affair, the administration was not only occupying the high moral ground, but in pledging the assistance to Britain, Washington was following tradition in assisting a country faced with an armed minority eager to impose its will upon the majority - the consequence of which, even by the assessment of the Africanists, could further communist interests in the area.

The question is, how did the administration use this moral high ground it created and occupied when UDI was finally declared? In other words, what were the US options to UDI and how did the administration respond?

The fact that all the officials of the administration concerned with foreign policy had spoken out against UDI meant that the Rhodesian authorities could not now proceed with their plan without being seen to have challenged both the Crown government and the US. That meant that Salisbury could have proceeded only when it had assessed its vulnerability to either a British or an American response or both.

While the authorities in Salisbury could gamble on their British ancestry and the fact that the close contact between the Rhodesian whites and their families in mainland Britain would militate against a British armed expedition against them, they could not predict with any amount of accuracy America's likely response. Being landlocked meant that Rhodesia could only maintain contact with the outside world either through the Portuguese colony of Mozambique or South Africa. But these countries themselves were not free from US leverage should they show undue interest in aiding the rebellious regime. For example, the US-Portugal war of words across the floor of the UN and in their various capitals over colonial rule, which came to a head during the Kennedy Presidency, was only called off when the Johnson administration came into being in 1964. Experts have since shown that the Johnson administration not only resumed economic and military aid to Lisbon, but that it took a hand in the execution of the later's colonial war.[24] This therefore meant that Portugal would not be prepared to risk the new friendship with Washington by supporting Rhodesia should the White House take a position against it.

With respect to South Africa, its lack of enthusiasm for Rhodesia's drive toward illegal independence and the caricature which the South African press made of Ian Smith, was precisely because it was not in Pretoria's interest to have an international pariah at its door-step at a time when an understanding regime had emerged in Washington. Pretoria was angry with Ian Smith because should the international community use force to abort the rebellion, it would set a dangerous precedent for which South Africa would be the next target. The fact that South Africa's Prime Minister Verwoerd later gave unreserved support to Rhodesia was precisely because the danger of an international action had receded since Washington did not give any convincing impression of possessing the stomach for a fight.[25]

Apart from putting pressure on Rhodesia through its neighbours, the authorities in Salisbury could not have been unaware of the fact that Washington had a stranglehold on the economy should it decide to saturate the international tobacco market with its reserves with a view to depressing its value. Rhodesia, whose economy was then based overwhelmingly on earnings from tobacco could not survive such a punitive measure from the US. The fact that Mennen-Williams suggested the tobacco option after UDI, was indicative of Washington's awareness of its ability to knock sense into the rebellious regime in Salisbury should it have the political will to do so.

Amidst such an overwhelming leverage, one is bound to ask, why is it that greater pressure was not brought to bear on Rhodesia throughout the duration of the Johnson administration in view of the flamboyant statements made on the eve of UDI?

In finding an answer, one has to bear in mind that like most administrations since the Cold War, Johnson's was not bereft of officials who saw foreign policy issues from the perspective of overcoming the hostile designs of communism. The problem as earlier indicated was that, as opposed to the regionalists, some took their anti-communism so far that not only were they not opened to lobbying but they also failed to address regional peculiarities in their foreign policy analyses. Because communism had emerged in the Soviet Union - a European power - which had gobbled up Eastern Europe while threatening other European countries, globalists see Europe as the frontline of the communist menace and as such, the continent should be assisted. By foreign policy orientation, these globalists are therefore quite often also referred to as Europeanists because of the Europe first approach. In this chapter, the regionalists who see African issues from the perspective of Africa are quite often referred to as Africanists.

While Secretary of State Dean Rusk was not permanently wedded to either the regionalist or the Europeanist perspective, one could not say the same of his subordinates. George Ball and Mennen-Williams were globalist and regionalist respectively which carried with it the usual duel expected of officials of opposing ideological inclinations. Nothing attests to this more than the difference in flamboyance between the statements of Mennen-Williams and Ball on the consequences of UDI. Not only were Mennen-Williams' statements more emphatic in terms of America's unequivocal support to Britain, but he gave the impression that the US was adequately prepared to deal ruthlessly with UDI as soon as it was declared. On the other hand, Ball's statements were more subdued because the authorities in Rhodesia were not communists.

Ball went along with all the public rituals of declaring dire consequences that would follow UDI, but his heart was not in it. From the inception of the Africanists' excitement about possible UDI, he was doubtful about the wisdom of American involvement because for him as with most globalists, Africa was not deemed important. He felt that the crushing of the rebellion, if it was worth doing, should be left to the British. In truth however, the argument of a British exclusive responsibility was a classic Europeanist ploy to buy time for the infant rebellious "country". For as early as October 1962, the NSC had warned of the fact that the British had no strategy for

Rhodesia in the event of UDI. This, coupled with a State Department analysis three months earlier, had recognised the possibility of an alliance between Southern African minority and colonial regimes, which would pit them against the Africans of these territories. The resultant effect of such a development, according to the analysis, would be violence which would augur well for the communists.[26]

There was nothing to indicate that the situation had altered in 1965. Indeed the British were still as bereft of a master-plan for dealing with UDI as they were three years earlier. The Europeanists knew that since 1964, Prime Minister Harold Wilson had had a rough passage with a slim majority in Parliament which militated against a risk taking venture like a tough stand against a rebellious Rhodesia. Hence, their undue enthusiasm about placing Rhodesia in the domain of an handicapped British government, simply because they did not believe that a rebellious Rhodesia posed a threat to the anti-communist war of the West. If anything they preferred unfettered support to trustworthy regimes like Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal which could not only constitute a counter-poise to any communist incursion from the independent African states but would most certainly frustrate any communist designs in the region. The West was better off with them than working towards the downfall of Rhodesia which would constitute a prelude to the demise of South Africa and the Portuguese colonies.[27]

In advocating America's extrication from if not outright neutrality in the Rhodesian debacle, Ball as the spokesman of the Europeanists in the administration armed himself with an iron-cast defence: that of America's heavy involvement in Vietnam which could tax the patience of Congress should an additional obligation be undertaken in the colony of a Britain unsympathetic to the American war-effort. Britain was still trading with North Vietnam.

Needless to say the Europeanists used that argument to good effect against the counterattack from the Africanists that Washington's direct involvement would prevent an holocaust in Rhodesia. Not only did the Europeanists ridicule this argument as a ploy by Africanists to recover lost ground in South Africa and the Portuguese territories since the demise of the Kennedy administration, but the fact that they had the ear of the President was attested to by their victory over the Africanists in May 1965. At that time, the President accepted the argument of the Europeanists and vetoed a proposal for American assistance in the form of the building of a Tan-Zam rail line to link Zambia to Tanzania with a view to enabling land-locked Zambia to become

independent of the Rhodesian route as an outlet to the sea. Rhodesia had an effective communication network with the Portuguese ports in Mozambique through which Zambia moved her copper to the outside world. In taking this action, the President was ignoring the warning of the NSC that refusal to assist Lusaka would compel the Zambian government to turn to communist China - a repetition of the mistake which the Eisenhower administration made in Egypt. The proposal had earlier been ridiculed by the Europeanists in the State Department as \$500 million down the drain and for which they evoked the spectre of Congressional refusal in view of commitments in Vietnam.[28] It was therefore not surprising when the administration agreed to provide aid worth a mere half a million dollars to Zambia in December 1965 in response to the severe economic consequences which the country faced arising from UDI. The promise was made after repeated appeals, and its paltry nature in comparison with the magnitude of the problem was a response to the Europeanists opinion that Zambia was a British problem.

In taking such low-keyed action in relation to the Rhodesian problem, the President was not only alienating the committed Africanists in his administration but he was also showing disdain towards Afro-Americans. Unlike South Africa in 1964, the Afro-Americans in the Democratic Party had spoken with one voice on the need to bring down the rebellion in Rhodesia. They did not call for any unorthodox means for this. Sanctions were within the legal right of the US if only the political will was there.

Faced with the administration's reluctance to take realistic action against Rhodesia, Afro-American organisations offered four arguments as to why sanctions should be imposed on Rhodesia: (i) the need for the US to adhere to legality which precluded cooperation with an illegal regime; (ii) the need to adhere to the principle of majority rule which the Rhodesian authorities had violated; (iii) the need to stand behind the victims of discrimination in Rhodesia, who in any case might one day overcome their oppressors, hence the need for the US to invest goodwill with a view to securing access to chrome supplies there; (iv) the need to ensure friendly relations with the independent African countries.[29] They argued that UDI could collapse if the administration were to exert pressure on Rhodesia through imposition of effective sanctions. To drive home their point, they entered into a series of exchanges with the White House without being able to change the mind of the administration. It is therefore correct to say that the objective of Afro-Americans and allies with respect to Rhodesia was defeated by the Johnson administration rather than their right



wing opponents who were not as effective in the public domain as they later turned out to be during the tenure of Johnson's successor.

Any feelings of betrayal and irrelevance on the part of Afro-Americans could not have been mitigated by the air lift operation which the administration undertook in January 1966 to rescue Zambia from the effect of UDI because that decision - a turn around from an earlier position - was a direct result of a meeting which the President had with an embattled Prime Minister Harold Wilson on December 16, 1965. The latter was torn between a joint opposition by the Conservative Party and business community to any action against their "kith and kin" in Rhodesia and at the opposite spectrum, the members of the Commonwealth who wanted nothing short of an effective action by Her Majesty's Government to bring down a rebellion against the Crown. It was therefore the President's effort to throw a lifeline to a NATO partner whose government was placed in a position of facing either the devil or the rough rude sea as opposed to an action taken in deference to either Afro-Americans or Africanists in his administration.[30] The fact that the rescue went ahead when the President wanted was further testimony to the bankruptcy of the weapon of Congressional rebellion with which the Europeanists armed themselves to dismiss any pro-African proposal from the Africanists.

That the President was true to his Southern conservative background was responsible in no small measure for the series of victories the Europeanists scored against the Africanists over UDI. For example, in October 1965 after they had both threatened Rhodesia over UDI, Ball successfully used the predictable argument of America's heavy involvement in Vietnam, to neutralise a suggestion by Williams of the need to deprive Rhodesia of foreign exchange earnings from tobacco. The administration's refusal to give consideration to this option had broken the Africanists like Mennen-Williams. All along they regarded this option as the weapon of last resort to compel Ian Smith to go to the negotiating table with the British government. But the failure meant not only loss of momentum, but a drift from day to day without any visible means of influencing an administration bent on following the advice of its Europeanist elements of the need to refrain from taking centre-stage in Britain's "war" in Rhodesia. Mennen-Williams' exit in 1966 could not have come as a surprise even though the frustration of the Africanists in the administration was not publicly given as the reason.

Such an alarming degree of disunity and possible alienation of one faction within the administration could not have been lost on Rhodesia in view of the close cooperation it maintained with South Africa and Portugal. Both had information offices and lobbying apparatuses as well as good intelligence networks in the US. Moreover on November 2, 1965, the Post Dispatch of St. Louis ran an article outlining in detail not only the differences of opinion but the diametrically opposed views of both Williams and Ball on how to respond to UDI. The article so reflected the true situation in the administration that Noer concluded rightly that “the story created even more distrust of the Africanists in the government. It likely helped defeat Williams’ idea of a clear statement of U.S. intentions. Instead, the State Department issued a vague release that “hailed” Wilson’s efforts to avert “a tragic confrontation” in Rhodesia, denounced any UDI....The announcement made no mention of sanctions, embargoes, aid to Zambia, or any other specific actions suggested by the Africanists.”[31]

Further proof that the administration undermined its own publicly presented purpose in Rhodesia emanated from its reaction to UDI once it was declared. Fearing that the Africanists might limp back to a position of influence, Ball immediately sought their impotence if not permanent demise by manipulating by remote control the activities of the crisis committee convened in the wake of Smith’s declaration of independence. This he did by nominating and having appointed as chairman of the committee a right wing New York attorney called William Rogers with a view to curbing the zeal of the Africanists to recommend punitive measures against the illegal regime in Salisbury. This committee was constituted in such a way that in the event of a deadlock, the chairman had the deciding vote.[32]

In this respect, the administration’s feeble response of a halt to a rarely solicited sale of arms and related materials, suspension of financial transactions and the demand that Rhodesian travellers carry British travel documents, as well as the handing over of Rhodesian assets to Britain need not be seen as an attempt to appease the Africanists, but rather as a design by the Europeanists to ensure that the rebellion did not collapse. This was so because in taking these measures the administration had rejected the imposition of more punitive sanctions, in line with what Ball had always advocated. The most the administration did in that respect, between December 1965 and March 1966, was to appeal to US firms involved in business transaction with Rhodesia to observe

a voluntary ban on the importation of Rhodesian chrome, asbestos, lithium and tobacco, while agreeing to suspension of sugar imports for 1966 as the government's price for combating UDI.[33]

None of these was effective in forcing Ian Smith to the negotiating table, nor were they supposed to be, because the administration had made no secret of the fact that it expected Britain to bear the task of bringing down the rebellion however incapacitated its government might be. As a result, instead of collapsing, Rhodesia waxed stronger, not only to outlive the administration but also to be able to withstand the sanctions belatedly announced by the President in 1967 and 1968 at the urging of the British. For example, US private investments in Rhodesia which stood at \$65 million in 1965 as earlier indicated, dropped by a paltry 12 per cent to \$57 million in 1970. Yet Union Carbide and Foote Mineral which accounted for some \$50 million worth of the investments were unwilling to bear such minor losses as evidenced by the events in Congress over the issue as aforementioned.

Such belated action posed no threat to Salisbury simply because at the time that the infant regime was vulnerable, it had sympathisers like George Ball at high places in Washington. The Afro-Americans who were so concerned about the situation in Rhodesia on account of its effect on the Africans were bereft of influential sympathisers in the Johnson administration. Rather their concern was left unattended to effectively by a Democrat government in which they could rightly have hoped to have had a stake. What followed it was an hostile Republican administration sympathetic to UDI under which Afro-Americans and allies had to fight a series of losing battles against a rejuvenated pro-Rhodesia lobby.

#### (ii) The 1971 Sugar Allocation to South Africa.

The US produces no more than 60 per cent of its sugar requirements. For this purpose, the original Sugar Act of 1934, later replaced by the 1948 Sugar Act, authorised the government to import the difference between consumption and production from countries friendly to the US. This is the criterion for supplying the commodity. The responsibility for extending the Act depending on

the domestic production situation as determined by the executive arm was vested upon Congress. Under the existing 1965 extension, South Africa was among the friendly countries and supplied 60,003 tons, 1.25 per cent of the total external purchase.[34] In 1971, the White House was in no mood to ask Congress for further extension of the existing Act and only did so reluctantly in view of an impending renewal of international agreements, hence the need to have the authority to respond to any eventuality. But in doing so, the Department of Agriculture did not ask for any changes, which meant the continuous inclusion of South Africa as a supplier.

To discuss the role of Afro-Americans in the South African sugar allocation as a means of examining their role as wielders of influence presupposes that they played an active role. But in that year, it was doubtful if the Afro-Americans' led civil rights organisations (NAACP, CORE and SCLC) were equipped to mount another pro-Africa campaign against a Republican administration following their failure to influence the direction of the Democratic administration of Lyndon Johnson over UDI. Their failure to protest loudly at a review of Southern African policy carried out by the Nixon administration was a pointer in that direction. President Nixon personally gave the job of the policy review to the National Security Council (NSC), thereby bypassing the Department of State where there were Africanists.[35] This called for protest from the recognised leadership of Afro-Americans' interest because the exercise entailed either the elimination of input from knowledgeable sources within the relevant bureaucracies (in order to avoid bureaucratic infighting that regularly results in compromises) or it was designed to preclude any semblance of influence of interest groups in the formulation of Africa policy.[36]

This failure to react on the part of the Afro-American leadership was linked to the conflicting perception between it and the grass-roots as to where to draw the line on Afro-Americans external interest. Wilkins for one had never hidden his preference for civil rights and equal treatment at home as the primary objective of Afro-Americans as opposed to some of his followers who saw a symbiotic relationship between the struggle for equal treatment at home and the struggle for freedom by continental Africans, especially in the Southern part as aforementioned, hence both should be addressed with the same degree of vigour. This is not to say that it was the only area of disagreement between the Afro-American leadership and the rank and file. Mention has earlier been made of their disagreement over strategy for achieving even civil rights at home. However, <sup>if</sup> ~~if~~ the confusion over Afro-American involvement in the struggle in Africa contributed to

the failure vigorously to oppose the policy review process, then the outcome of the exercise helped in no small measure to create a challenge to the legitimacy of the recognised Afro-American leadership.

The “NSC report - NSSM 39 of 1969” - came up with five options for US policy in Southern Africa three of which involved some form of engagement with South Africa.[37] This report was thus unfavourable to the cause of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa and perhaps helped to bring about the spate of new Afro-American organisations speaking on behalf of the community. Such a development was not entirely unexpected, for it had been simmering since the demonstrations of 1966 against Chase Manhattan Bank for its loans to South Africa. Those were spearheaded not by NAACP or CORE, but by another multi-racial civil rights movement, ACOA, in concert with the World Student Christian Federation. Out of this effort emerged the Committee of Conscience Against Apartheid.[38] But since this was a single purpose ad-hoc organisation to put pressure on Banks to declare a moratorium if not outright rejection of loan applications from South Africa, it meant that the dissatisfaction with the direction of the leadership of the older civil rights organisations still remained and thus, the need for more permanent organisations not only to ensure an Afro-American presence in the formulation of Africa policy but to help in building an informed and durable constituency for Africa. New organisations were also needed to use a different approach from the establishment-prone leaders to promote the interest of the Afro-American community within the American society. Passage of civil rights legislation had not rescued the Afro-American from the bottom of the economic scale. Executive action was still needed to redress the imbalance. The emergence of new organisations in the late 1960s and early 1970s was therefore not entirely surprising. Among these new organisations were the Committee of Concerned Blacks, National Black Political Association, the Southern African Liberation Support Committee, the Washington Task Force on African Affairs and in the law making body, the Congressional Black Caucus. The membership of each of these organisations was more at home with the anti-establishment credentials of Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael and to some extent Representative Charles Diggs Jr. - especially when he later became the spokesman of Afro-Americans’ concern for Africa as exemplified by the numerous hearings on US policy toward Africa which he held as chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa - than the mainstream and perhaps stalled and exhausted leadership of Wilkins and others.[39]



Since these organisations emerged not necessarily to complement the efforts of NAACP, CORE and SCLC but to do a better job of what was evidently badly done, it meant that they were not only on collision course with the older movements but collectively, they lacked a common organisational and coherent strategy for confronting an issue of interest to their cause. For example, while the strategy of the Black Caucus was to lobby fellow members of Congress, the Liberation Committee was espousing a blend of Marxism that interpreted the struggle for equality both in the US and Southern Africa in terms of the inherently heinous nature of capitalism. To the older civil right movements, that meant the use of a strategy of tremendous increase in rhetoric against the target to fend off the challenge from the new organisations in order to remain at the forefront of the Afro-American cause. In this respect, while the Black Caucus was on the right path, one could not say the same of the fractious civil rights movement outside Congress whose duty ought to have been to convert the American public to their cause by weight of argument. Rhetoric and the use of Marxists-influenced jargon were more of an handicap than an instrument of persuasion in a conservative and capitalist US.

This was the situation when the South African sugar issues emerged. But that in itself meant there was no coordination between Afro-Americans and supporters of their cause in Congress and in the wider civil rights movement. Lack of a common strategy also meant the absence of a common pool of resources, resulting in the non-availability of an effective organisational base to facilitate the directing of resources to where they were best needed. That is if there were any resources. Under such circumstances, Afro-Americans could hardly be in a position to sell to the American public the essence of their opposition to the renewal of South Africa's sugar quota. Otherwise they had a case: by virtue of the wage structure brought about by direct government interference in the labour market relegates African workers to the status of forced labour. This was a contravention of American law, a point which Congressman Diggs Jr. repeatedly argued without being able to influence the thinking of the executive on the issue. Also, because the US provided a guaranteed market by virtue of its 40 per cent import dependence for which it paid \$290 million to \$342 million annually, any producing state favoured enough to merit America's allocation had therefore been insulated from the vagaries of the market place such as depression in price associated with over-production.[40] It is perhaps on this basis that the law specified that the allocation should go exclusively to friendly countries. If South Africa was

friendly enough to be given a quota, then that gesture was a tacit approval of the political system, namely, apartheid. This factor more than the forced labour strengthened the position of the anti-South Africa allocation.

For this to be effective, the message must be lucid and direct to the target: in this case, Congress and the American public. Congress had the authority to terminate the South African allocation while the American public could bring pressure to bear on the law-makers to act in a particular way in deference to their electorate. Afro-Americans had been armed with the issue but their response was grossly deficient in terms of presentation because they lacked the organisational structure to give weight to the issue so as to achieve the desired result.

True, ACOA embarked upon a campaign of lobbying the law-makers. For example, it asked anti-apartheid supporters to write to their Congressional representatives, and lobbied the assistants of those Congressmen directly connected with the Agricultural Committee of the House and the Finance Committee in the Senate - the relevant organs in which the issue was to be decided. In doing this it solicited and received the support of other anti-apartheid organisations like the Churches, the American Friends Service Committee and even the powerful United Auto Workers.[41] But there was no one to address the American public, which could exert pressure by sheer weight of numbers. Rather, while ACOA's message was clear to the law-makers, the American public was offered a garbled message of different voices from different civil rights organisations with emphasis on different reasons as to why South Africa did not deserve the sugar allocation. The inequities of capitalism to both Afro-Americans and victims of apartheid in South Africa were hardly a serious argument capable of achieving the desired results. Steven Metz's observation is a clear indictment of the inability of the civil rights movement to carry the public along in the quest to deprive South Africa of what they felt the country did not deserve:

“There was little media coverage of the issue: in a press conference held by Kennedy just before the floor vote of July 21, there were no representatives from the New York Times, the Washington Post, Time, Newsweek, ABC, or NBC.... the NAACP took a public stand in opposition to the quota, but spent little effort on public mobilization. Also, there often was poor coordination among the various elements of the anti-apartheid movement which were involved.”[42]

This unenviable situation when compared to the forces arrayed against Afro-Americans and

allies in their battle to terminate the South African allocation could enable one to almost predict the outcome. Support for South Africa's retention of the sugar quota was spear-headed by the South African government operating under the canopy of South African Sugar Association (SASA), the South African Foundation and American businessmen with investment interest in South Africa. These were forces that had operated in the US on behalf of South Africa for a long time. Their single objective was to make South Africa's domestic policy palatable in the US. The prominent role of the South African Foundation in this respect has been noted earlier. Their present task was to forestall an event capable of snowballing into an avalanche. Cancellation of the sugar allocation could offer opponents of US-South Africa relations, not least the Afro-American dominated civil rights movement, a precedent and a platform to attack South Africa's relations with the US. On this basis, the pro-South African forces were there to ensure that South Africa retained its allocation of the sugar supply with a view to stemming a possible domino effect. Added to the advantages of possessing a single objective were the availability of facilities such as the South African Embassy and ancillary institutions like the South African Information offices to coordinate the activities of the pro-South African forces. This endowed them with a unified command structure for efficient management of their campaign.

The pro-South Africa lobby could also count on support within the Nixon administration for two reasons. First, business interest was as avid an opponent of communism as the average American of 1971. The Republican Party had by nature and temperament been the sanctuary of big business, hence the earlier furore over the Eximbank issue during the Ford administration. This common anti-communist objective between the party and business always led them to support causes favourable to their stance. The support which the pro-Katanga lobby - an amalgam of anti-communist and pro-business sentiment - received from Republican Party machine was a case in point. Amongst its supporters then were former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Richard Nixon himself. If they supported the pro-Katanga cause because of communism and the interests of the business sector in the war-torn former Belgian territory, there was no reason to suppose that the same degree of support would not be forth-coming from an administration headed by Nixon himself. This was all the more so in view of the fact that the remnants of the pro-Katanga lobby immediately cast their lot with South Africa when the sugar allocation issue erupted in 1971. One might add as well that those liberals who were calling for the termination of the allocation to South

Africa were not strictly speaking the natural constituents of the Republican Party. True there were some Republicans with liberal inclinations such as Senator Javits of New York, but the bulk of those clamouring for action against South Africa were Democratic Party stalwarts and others with left of centre ideological inclination. Afro-Americans' in particular had bolted the Republican Party in droves. A Republican administration was therefore bound to have sympathy for the pro-South Africa forces which include right-wing anti-communists and the business class.

Secondly and perhaps more important was the fact that the incumbent administration included officials who had had commercial transactions with the Southern African region prior to their new engagement. For example, the President's adviser on Corporate Affairs, Peter Flanigan, had had long standing business ventures in South Africa, while Kenneth Rush who served the administration in various capacities from Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, Deputy Secretary of Defence and of State respectively was plucked from Union Carbide of the Byrd Amendment fame.[43] If Southern Africa was good enough for them to have commercial transactions with prior to their new positions, it would be naive to expect them to be anti-South Africa in the administration.

Added to the presence of sympathisers in the administration and the strategic and organisational advantages was the fact that the pro-South Africa forces allocated functions and executed them efficiently. For example, unlike their opponents who assumed the role of Jack of all trade and ended up mastering none, the pro-South Africa forces hired the services of the New York firm of Casey, Lane and Mittendorf to handle the professional task of presenting SASA's case to Congress, while the emotive ethical issue was left to the resurgent pro-Katanga lobby to fight it out with the civil rights organisations at the bar of public opinion.

It may well be true that South Africa engaged in corrupt practises as evidenced by the civil suit which the Justice Department filed against SASA in 1977 for giving expensive gifts to lawmakers during the sugar allocation debacle.[44] But the disparity in presentation and the factual content of the submission of the opposing factions both in Congress and to the public at large evidently weighed heavily in favour of the pro-South Africa forces. All that the anti-South Africa allocation rested their case on was to appeal to the ethical and moral impulses of the American public. This came out clearly in Senator Kennedy's argument in favour of termination of the South African quota when he asked legislators whether it was right "to continue a subsidy to a nation

whose basic policies are at war with the most important values of mankind.”[45]

This lesson in morality did not square with the issue at stake, namely the nutritional well-being of the American people. Sugar consumption was deemed important enough to the palate of the American people to necessitate a regular supply, enforced by law. On this basis, the argument of the anti-South Africa forces was that the Americans should put at risk their supplies of sugar. Yet, the message was not vividly put across to the American people. Rather the message of the opposing pro-Katanga lobby and the allies, the American Southern African Council (ASAC) in trumpeting the virtues of South Africa as the bastion of free enterprise, democracy, stability, anti-communism and strategic location amidst an increasing Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean, was more attuned to the American values than unsubstantiated moral argument.[46] The right wing lobby further argued that to accept the anti-South African request for cancellation of the sugar quota and possibly future severance of governmental and commercial relations with South Africa was tantamount to two things: first, an inability to recognise and encourage South Africa’s effort to find solution to racial problems - in the form then of a policy of granting independence to ‘African homelands’, notably Transkei - an area in which the US was hardly qualified to criticise others; second, severance of economic relations would be a deliberate attempt to subjugate the non-white population of South Africa to unmitigated perpetual poverty. Foreign investments offered employment opportunity to them to the extent that they “enjoy the highest standard of living in Africa.”[47]

The style of the pro-South Africa forces was too sophisticated for their opponents to match. Lawyer John Mahoney presented SASA to the Agriculture Committee of the House of Representatives (and later in a written statement to the Senate Finance Committee) as a dependable and reliable source of sugar supply to the US which had not only always met its quota but had increased supplies at short notice whenever the US encountered difficulties from other sources. Such difficulties were encountered in 1967, 1969, and 1970, which Congressmen were free to see from the record.[48]

In the end, it came as no surprise that South Africa retained its sugar allocation while the opposition had to rescue their prestige by the crumbs thrown at them by virtue of the 15,000 tons allocation which Congress made to Uganda.[49] The fact that there was no hue and cry from the public was a testimony to the disjointed and disorganised efforts of Afro-Americans over the South



African sugar allocation debacle. Afro-Americans would only have themselves to blame because apart from their preeminent position in the civil rights movement, they attached tremendous importance to the issue as a means of determining their strength towards severing South Africa's relations with the US. In the end not only were they found wanting but for once it exposed the fact that their impotence at influencing US policy direction toward Africa was partly a function of the absence of a competent institutional and organisational framework.

### Conclusion.

The essence of this chapter is to assess Afro-Americans' ability to influence the course of US policy in a favourable direction on issues of interest to them. While there was no shortage of such issues, yet they were gravely deficient when it came to exercise of influence. Nothing attests to this more than their failure over the issue of South African sugar allocation. Particularly disturbing was the evaporation of the discernible nucleus of influence they exerted during the Kennedy Presidency. One might expect consolidation of their position as wielders of influence in view of the fact that Kennedy's replacement was his Vice-President who pledged to continue on the lines of his predecessor. Why then were the Afro-Americans left out of such a promise?

One way of answering this is to look at the role of their votes in the Presidential elections of 1960, 1964 and 1968. Whereas a balance of power situation existed in 1960 which enabled Afro-Americans to play the role of a king-maker, there was no recurrence of the same factor in 1964 for three reasons. First, by nominating Barry Goldwater whose racist views were well known, the Republican Party had virtually conceded the Afro-American votes to Lyndon Johnson. This deliberate strategy of alienating the Afro-Americans was designed to appease the predominant white population, especially the Southern elements who were still smarting over the attention civil rights issues received under President Kennedy. Second, by making reckless statements over Vietnam, Goldwater did not come across as one who had a well thought out policy on the area. He alarmed the electorate by giving the impression that his election would lead to an escalation of US involvement in Vietnam. Finally, by similar tactless statements on domestic issues, he also alienated his own Republican businessmen who were largely based in the South. The result of was that the Republican candidate had left the Southern white electorate open to political courtship by

his Democratic opponent.

Under the circumstances, Chuck Stone observed that as early as November 3, 1964, Johnson had gathered enough support to the tune of 486 electoral total to Goldwater's 52, which also reflected the winning percentage of 61.1 to 38.5 in his favour. Afro-American votes could not have hurt Johnson even if they were withheld. The President could still have won by 324 to 214 electoral votes.[50]

The 1968 election was not different. Faced with a third choice, former governor George Wallace of Alabama whose racial bigotry was particularly appealing to "blue collar" workers, the Republican candidate Richard Nixon made Wallace's supporters his target. In the process, the Afro-American votes were left to the Democratic Hubert Humphrey whose lacklustre performance made no impact on the rest of the electorate, unlike Nixon's emphasis on law and order.

Since, then, in the elections of both Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, Afro-Americans contributed no crucial votes, the victorious candidates owed them nothing on that account. This helps to account for the reverses they suffered with respect to exertion of influence. Valid as such a conclusion may appear on an empirical basis, we may still ask why a community which was managing to exert influence should suffer reverses simply because it was not essential in the election of subsequent administrations. Afro-Americans were not alone in casting their lot with one of the numerous independent candidates and political parties. The Jews and the Poles equally cast theirs with the Democratic Party, but their feelings were never ignored by either a Democratic or a Republican administration when it came to adopting policies towards Israel and Poland.

Unfortunately, much as it appears unpalatable, the answer may have a lot to do with race. Race as a determinant of issues is almost as old as America itself and there was hardly any evidence of fundamental attitudinal alteration in the 1960s. Afro-Americans were still not deemed important let alone the equal of their Caucasian countrymen which accounted for the disdain shown to issues of interest to them by either a Democratic or a Republican administration. A few examples would suffice. During his tenure, an Afro-American civil rights activist Jimmy Lee Jackson and a white minister James Reeb were assassinated by white supremacists. President Johnson sent flowers and his condolences to the wife of James Reeb and even mentioned the name of the deceased while making a speech on civil rights. But in the words of Martin Luther King Jr:

“Somehow the President forgot to mention Jimmy, who died first. The parents and sister of Jimmy received no flowers from the President. The students felt this keenly. Not that they felt that the death of James Reeb was less than tragic, but because they felt that the failure to mention Jimmy Jackson only reinforced the impression that to White America the life of a Negro is insignificant and meaningless.”[51]

Such an attitude toward Afro-Americans appeared to be the stock in trade of President Johnson as occasioned by his failure to implement the Voting Rights Law whose signing he presented with fanfare as a portrayal of his interest in civil rights issues. Up to 1967, his administration failed to recruit the required number of registration officials and the law enforcement officers who would deter white supremacists to make the law meaningful. The result was frustration among Afro-Americans which partly accounted for the emergence of the militant “black power movement” during the 1960s.

Similar attitudes appeared to have been held by the Nixon administration as shown by its rudeness to President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia during his visit to the UN in 1970. The African leader wanted a meeting but was virtually ignored by the President who was busy campaigning for Republican candidates in a forthcoming election. The best President Nixon could do was to see Kaunda literally at the step of the General Assembly when the African leader was on his way to address the August body. Afro-Americans felt slighted by this action of the President because he could not have behaved in similar manner to the leader of either Israel, Ireland or any other country with whom an American ethnic group had identified itself, for fear amongst others of possible electoral repercussions.[52]

While the idiosyncrasies of officials especially the Chief of State no doubt have a bearing on their response to issues of concern to Afro-Americans, to blame them entirely is to say that governments operate outside the society at large. If Afro-Americans were not thorough in publicising the need to terminate South Africa’s sugar allocation in 1971, at least, Americans were conversant with issues relating to Africa like the Congo crisis, Rhodesia’s UDI and apartheid in South Africa. Africa was no longer a distant dark continent to the average American, otherwise, the campaign for or against Katanga's rebellion could not have generated as much heat as it did.

By the advent of the Nixon administration, Afro-Americans demands over the situation in

South Africa, ably supported by their allies in the Democratic Party were clear. Despite the occasional disagreement with respect to scope and strategy which will be discussed in the next chapter, their demands on the administration focused on abandonment of support to the regime in Pretoria irrespective of the anti-communist mantle it had wrapped around itself, and greater support to those fighting to dismantle apartheid and colonialism also in the Portuguese territories and Rhodesia. To them, refusal to initiate total diplomatic and economic isolation of Pretoria and its allies in the region amounted to tacit collusion.

But the lack of public support over the broader issues of racist minority and colonial rule in Southern Africa meant that the Johnson administration and its successor, had no cause to look over their shoulders in their interpretation of US short term interest as one of cooperation with these regimes. This explains why the Johnson administration called for a review of the Kennedy administration's policy toward South Africa with a view to tilting towards Pretoria and only failed to do so during its tenure because its UN Representative Joseph Palmer, who was supposed to come up with recommendations failed to do a proper job.[53] Johnson did not run for office in 1968, but his successor, Richard Nixon had to perform the task as evidenced by the NSSM 39 of 1969 which identified Washington more closely with Southern Africa's white governments.

Why the American public in general was so apathetic to racism and white minority rule in Southern Africa needs more detailed attention than this study can provide, the more so in view of the fact that it was sensitive to issues dealing with American Jews and the security of the State of Israel. The public apathy cannot be explained in terms of non-possession of the vote by Afro-Americans, because the franchise was no longer an issue in the 1970s. But one thing was certain: public indifference contributed to the direction of US policy in Southern Africa. This explains why in his testimony before the Congressional Sub-Committee on African Affairs in 1974, David Newsom's successor as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Donald Easum, abandoned protocol and appealed to the American public for support on grounds that "our own bureaucracy obviously depends very much upon public concern and awareness of major issues in the foreign policy field. There are many reasons for believing that now our relationships with Africa and particularly our relationships with Southern Africa will come more to the fore in the public mind and therefore must attract corresponding priority from the government and, of course, from the State Department." [54]

Three identifiable factors therefore conspired to rob Afro-Americans of the ability to wield influence over US policy towards Africa. The most important among these were the disdain in which Afro-Americans were held in the US and the apathy of the American public towards issues of concern to them. The absence of an overall Afro-Americans' organisational structure, though significant and a potential handicap, was secondary in this respect as a combination of a lukewarm attitude from the public and disdain from the administration would still have a frustrating effect on Afro-Americans, however organised they might be. The primary task before Afro-Americans therefore, was how to ensure they were taken seriously both by the administration and the predominantly white public. How far they succeeded will be the basis of the next chapter.



Table 1

**U.S. Direct Investments Abroad: Value and Income Receipts, 1964 - 68**  
(in Million Dollars)

Year	Total Value of U.S. Investments all Over the World	Total Value of U.S. Investments in Africa	Percentage of U.S. Investments in Africa in relation to the World Value	Total Value of U.S. Investments in South Africa	Percentage of U.S. investments in South Africa in relation to the African Value	Percentage of U.S. Investments in South Africa in relation to the world value.	Total Income Receipts from investments all over the world	Total receipts from African Investments	Percentage of receipts from African Investments in relation to the overall world investments	Total receipts from investments in South Africa	Percentage of receipts from South African Investments in comparison with overall value of African investments	Percentage of receipts from African investments in the light of receipts from overall global investments
1964	44,386	1,685	3.79	467	27.71	1.05	3,670	301	8.20	46	15.28	1.25
1965	49,474	1,918	3.87	529	27.58	1.06	3,963	327	8.25	78	23.85	1.96
1966	54,777	2,069	3.77	597	28.85	1.08	4,045	341	8.43	71	20.82	1.75
1967	59,486	2,273	3.82	666	29.30	1.11	4,518	361	7.99	80	22.16	1.77
1968	64,983	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	4,973	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

SOURCES: Extrapolated: Statistical Abstract of the United States, various editions, 1965-76. (US Department of Commerce; Social and Economic Statistics Administration; Bureau of Census, Washington D.C., different dates covering 1965-76); Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part 2. (US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Washington D.C. 1975) pp 868-872)

\* All percentages arrived at with the aid of a calculator.

TABLE 2

## LEAGUE TABLE OF US DIRECT INVESTMENTS ABROAD: VALUE AND

## INCOME RECEIPTS, 1965 (in \$million)

Total value of investments	Investment per region	Amount invested	Percentage in relation to total investment	Total value of income receipts on investments	Income receipts on investment per region	Percentage of regional income receipts in relation to overall receipts	Ranking order in terms of investment	Ranking order in terms of profit
49,474	Canada	15,318	30.96	3,963	703	19.15	1st.	4th.
ditto	Latin America	9,440	19.08	ditto	869	23.67	3rd.	2nd.
ditto	Other Western Hemisphere	1,445	2.92	ditto	126	3.43	8th	6th
ditto	Europe	13,985	28.26	ditto	768	20.92	2nd	3rd.
ditto	Africa	1,918	3.87	ditto	327	8.91	6th	5th
ditto	Asia	3,569	7.21	ditto	1,039	28.31	4th	1st
ditto	Oceania	1,813	3.66	ditto	62	1.68	7th	8th
ditto	International	1,985	4.01	ditto	69	1.88	5th	7th.

SOURCES: Extrapolated: Statistical Abstract of the United States, various editions, 1965-76. (US Department of Commerce; Social and Economic Statistics Administration; Bureau of Census, Washington D.C., different dates covering 1965-76); Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Part 2. (US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Washington D.C. 1975) pp 868-872)

\*Shipping companies operating under flags of convenience such as Panama and Liberia.

**TABLE 3**

**US IMPORTS AND EXPORTS IN RELATION TO SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1963-71 (\$million)**

Year	Total import World	Total import Africa	Percent age of Africa import in relation to World's	Total import South Africa	Percent age of South Africa's in relation to World	Total import Angola	Percent age of South Africa's in relation to Africa's	Total import Mozambique	Total export World	Total export Africa	Percent age of African export in relation to World's	Total export South Africa	Percent age of South African export in relation to World	Percent age of South African export in relation to Africa	Total export Angola	Total export Mozambique
1971	45,602	1,237	2.7	287	0.62	90	23.20	22	44,137	1,694	3.83	622	1.41	36.71	36	21
1970	39,952	1,113	2.78	290	0.72	68	26.05	18	43,224	1,580	3.65	563	1.30	35.63	38	22
1969	36,042	1,046	2.90	243	0.67	54	23.23	16	38,006	1,392	3.66	505	1.32	36.27	32	26
1968	33,226	1,122	3.37	256	0.77	77	22.81	18	34,636	1,269	3.66	456	1.31	35.93	37	15
1967	26,812	906	3.37	226	0.84	63	24.94	13	31,526	1,182	3.74	426	1.35	36.04	35	10
1966	25,542	979	3.83	251	0.98	53	25.63	10	30,320	1,349	4.44	401	1.32	29.72	17	14
1965	21,364	878	4.10	226	1.05	48	25.74	7	27,470	1,229	4.47	438	1.59	35.63	13	9
1964	18,684	914	4.89	249	1.33	55	27.24	7	26,508	1,259	4.74	393	1.48	31.21	11	7
1963	17,151	777	4.53	258	1.50	39	33.20	6	23,207	988	4.25	276	1.18	27.93	12	8.5

SOURCES: Extrapolated: Statistical Abstract of the United States, various editions, 1964-76. (US Department of Commerce; Social and Economic Statistics Administration; Bureau of Census, Washington D.C., different dates covering 1965-79);

\* All percentages arrived at with the aid of a calculator.

## FOOTNOTES.

1. George Noble, Christian Herter. (Cooper, New York 1970) p. 169
2. See their open letter to the President in New York Times, Thursday June 22, 1961. p14.
3. On the profit of corporate interests in the South African investment scene, see Vernon McKay, "South African Propaganda: Methods and Media", Africa Report, Vol. 11. No. 2. 1966. p. 45.
4. New York Times, 14 June 1963, p.12
5. In imposing the arms embargo which was meant to come into effect on 1st January 1964, President Kennedy did make an allowance to honour existing arms requisition from Pretoria and future request provided it would not be used to further the cause of apartheid. South Africa promptly ordered a number of high tech-arms most prominent of which were anti-submarine planes. These items no doubt could not be used against the non-white population in South Africa. But Kennedy postponed action. The fact that South Africa renewed the request soon after Kennedy's successor was sworn-in was clearly designed to bounce the administration into a hasty decision which could put in motion the unravelling of the arms embargo. This could be the likely effect because Pretoria had in reserve another shopping list. It is worth noting that although it was customary for both Africanists and Europeans to fight their corners before policy decisions were made, there was every indication that the response of the Commerce Department was prompted by Pretoria's blackmail as opposed to an attempt to score points against the Africanists. This is so because officials in Pretoria actually gave Lockheed representatives an ultimatum to either pressure the White House into granting approval for the sale or face the loss of the contract to the rival French firm. This would mean the loss of over \$560 million worth of contract including spare parts. Hence, Secretary of Commerce Luther Hodges argument that the US stood the risk of being supplanted by European munition industries who were not as encumbered by state restrictions as the US firms. It is no exaggeration to refer to the furore over the South Africa request for the arms sale as a battle when one realises that because Lockheed was based in California, legislators from that state joined the fray to pressure the White House into granting approval for the sale, ostensibly, to prove to their electors that they were fighting to save jobs. This meant that Pretoria successfully pitted Congressmen, the munition industries and the Europeanists against the Africanists, the Secretaries of State and Defence in the fight to have the ear of the White House. See Thomas Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968, (University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 1985) pp. 162-4.
6. An exhaustive study of the methods and effectiveness of Pretoria's propaganda had been carried out by various scholars; one of the most authoritative being the report by Julian Burgess, Esau du Plessis, Roger Murray, Peter Fraenkel, Rosanne Harvey, John Laurence, Peter Ripken and Barbara Rogers, The Great White Hoax: South Africa's International Propaganda Machine. (Africa Bureau London, 1977), especially pp 24-28 and 64-84. Information about the information offices and the Public Relations firms could be gleaned from The Foreign Agents Registration Files, (Department of Justice, Washington. D.C. Different dates but the updated 1934-71 version would suffice); and US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "Activities of Non-Diplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States", Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th Congress, 1st session, March 25th, 1963. p. 708; US Congress, House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, "US Business Involvement in Southern Africa", Hearings before the Sub-committee on Africa, 92nd Congress, 1st. session, May-December 1971, pp. 233, 485-8; Another detailed study is that of,

Blyden. B. Jackson, "Apartheid and Imperialism: A Study of US Corporate Involvement in South Africa", Africa Today, Vol.xvii No.5 (September-October) 1970. the entire edition especially pp. 15-39.

7. The result was carried out and published in the spring 1965 by the U.S. News and World Report, details of which are in B. B. Jackson, Ibid. For the efforts of big business to bail out South Africa after Sharpeville, see Rosanne Harvey, "The Broederbond Business Lobby", in The Great White Hoax, Op. cit., p. 30.

8. W.E.B. Du Bois, "The American Negro Intelligentsia" in A.C. Hill and M. Kilson (eds.) Apropos of Africa: Sentiments of Negro American Leaders on Africa From the 1800s to 1950s, (Frank Cass, London 1968) p. 320.

9. For an analysis of the marginal role of Afro-Americans in these organisations, see Philip V. White, "The Black American Constituency for Southern Africa, 1940-1980." in Alfred O. Hero Jr. and John Barratt (eds). The American Peoples and South Africa, Publics, Elites and Policy-Making Process, ( D.C. Heath, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1981.) pp. 85-6.

10. Crisis, 57 (August-September 1950) p. 515.

11. Charles I. Glicksberg, "Negro Americans and the African Dream," Phylon, 4th. October, 1947. pp. 323-329; Also quoted in James L. Roark, "Black American Leaders; The response to Colonialism and Cold War, 1943-1953", African Historical Studies, vol. 2. 1971. p. 269; For an analysis of Paul Robeson's interest in Africa, see Sterling Stuckey, "The Philosophy of Paul Robeson." Freedomways, (New York) vol.11 No.1. 1971. pp. 78-90.

12. See Hollis R. Lynch, Black American Radicals and the Liberation of Africa: The Council on African Affairs 1937-1955, (For African Studies and Research Centre by Cornell University, , New York 1978) pp. 23-42.

13. Ibid.

14. Thomas Noer, Op.cit. p. 51.

15. Roy Wilkins quoted in Henry F. Jackson, From Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Africa Since 1960, (William Morrow, New York 1982) pp 145-6.

16. See Robert. G. Weisbord, Ebony Kinship, (Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut 1973) pp 181-220.

17. In the 1920s and the 1930s, most Afro-Americans were ashamed of their African ancestry as a result of derogatory pictures being painted about that continent. One who fought hard to "dispel this regrettable and abysmal ignorance about the value of its own heritage in the Negro race itself" was Paul Robeson. It was therefore not surprising that the thrust of the CAA which he helped to found was partly geared toward dispelling jaundiced information about Africa. The reverberations from the efforts of the Garvey movement, Du Bois', coupled with the second class citizenship of Afro-Americans as well as the emergence of African States in the 1960s, no doubt helped to abort such lurid tales about Africa. In its place, the realisation that Africans had suffered the same fate and that they could raise the predicament of the race in the UN made Afro-Americans to identify themselves with the continent and its people. There is a wide volume of literature on this issue. For Paul Robeson's effort, see Freedomways, Vol. 11. No. 1. 1971, (the entire edition was about Robeson.); Paul Robeson, "African Culture", in A.C Hill and M.



Kilson (eds). Op. cit. pp 133-5. For Afro-Americans' reminiscences about previous acceptance of derogatory stories about Africa, the following would suffice: Era Bell Thompson, Africa, Land Of My Fathers, (Doubleday, Garden City, New York 1954) specifically p. 16; E.U. Essien-Udom, Black Nationalism: A Search For An Identity In America, (Dell Publishing, New York 1964) pp. 217-8; For some analyses of Afro-Americans' efforts to debunk the idea of Africans inferiority and dearth of African heritage, see George Breitman (ed.) Malcolm X Speaks - Selected Speeches And Statements, (Grove Press, New York 1966) especially p. 169; Same Author (ed.) By Any Means Necessary - Speeches, Interviews and a letter by Malcolm X, (Patfinder Press, New York 1970) pp. 104-5. For details about Afro-Americans' turn-around in favour of close association with continental Africans and their predicament, see Alfred O. Hero, Jr., "American Negroes and U.S. Foreign Policy", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13, 2, June 1969, pp. 220-251; John A. Davis, "Black Americans and U.S. Policy Towards Africa", Journal of International Affairs, 23, 2, 1969. pp. 236-249.

18. G. Mennen-Williams quoted in T. Noer, Op. cit., pp. 188-9.

19. Crisis, January 1966, p 52; R. Weisbord, Op.cit., p 23.

20. A word or two need be said about the American-African Affairs Association in view of its prominence during the Presidency of Richard Nixon. It emerged in 1965 with the stated objective of furthering knowledge about Africa in the US. But such knowledge was entirely pro-settlers and Portuguese colonialism because the organisation was made up of right wing conservatives engaged as usual in a war against communism. These settler and colonial regimes were seen as ideological allies in the fight against communism, and as such should be protected at all cost irrespective of the issues involved. The fact that the organisation emerged in 1965 is not to say that its origin is a function of UDI. On the contrary, it was an organisation in waiting for an opportunity to manifest itself. Its members were indeed the remnants of the old Katanga lobby who were in hibernation because there was nothing to shout about ever since they were seen off by the Kennedy administration over Congo. UDI gave them a cause to fight for and this they did with enthusiasm by quarrelling with the ineffectual anti-UDI pronouncements of the Johnson administration on the pages of their house journal Spotlight on Africa and "research" documents like Report from Rhodesia: Pointing the way to a Multi-racial Africa?, (1966) Others include Some American Comments on Southern Africa, (1967). This strategy of avoiding a frontal attack against the administration must have been adopted in response to the unpopularity of Rhodesia's cause in the US at the initial period of UDI. Coming at the heels of the Association in 1966 were the more extreme American Southern African Council (ASAC) and the friends of Rhodesia Independence. They were not different from the former in terms of objective and membership which overlap. The only difference was at the level of strategy. While the American-African Affairs Association tend to influence public opinion by subtle means through the intermediary of published work, the ASAC and its Rhodesia friends were vocal and certificated in adopting high profile strategy as exemplified by their conversion of the US Consulate in Rhodesia to "ASAC Information Office" in protest at its closure by the US administration in 1970. This dramatic gesture was one of the many high profile attempts to rally public opinion to Rhodesia's cause in the US. With respect to the American African Affairs Association, those pamphlets cited above were readily distributed to unsolicited academics and officials in the executive and legislative arms. Their theme irrespective of title was nothing other than over-labouring the communist menace and the need to be on friendly terms with regimes like Pretoria, Salisbury and Lisbon. See, American African Affairs Association Inc. 1969 Program Report: September 1965-December 1968, ( Published by the organisation, New York, 1968.); On ASAC see: US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "US sanctions Against Rhodesia-Chrome", Hearings before the Committee, 92nd Congress, 1st session, July 7-8, 1971, pp. 49-107; US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Sanctions as an Instrument of the United

Nations-Rhodesia as a Case Study”, Hearings Before the Sub-Committee on International Organisations and Movements, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 92nd Congress, 2nd session, June 13-19, 1972. p. 107; Vernon Mckay, “The Domino Theory of the Rhodesia Lobby”, Africa-Report, vol. xii, June 1966. pp 55-7; the following volumes of Liberty Letter should be consulted: no. 103, September 1969; no. 114, August 1970; no. 129, January 1972.

21. The Rhodesia issue especially the quest for termination of sanctions by the interested parties occupied the attention of Congress for the best part of 1970 and 1971. Details of the arguments and the resulting pieces of legislation are entailed in the following Congressional documents: US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Rhodesia and United States Foreign Policy”, Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 91st. Congress, 1st session, 17th. October 1969. pp 5-11, 22-58, 72-99; US Congress, “Economic Sanctions Against Rhodesia”, Hearings before the Sub-Committee on International Organisations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 92nd. Congress, 1st session, June 17-22, 1971. pp 2-8, 85, and 99; “Rhodesia and United States Foreign Policy”, Op. cit. pp. 5-11, 22-58; “UN Sanctions Against Rhodesian Chrome”, Op.cit., pp 49-107; US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, “Sanctions as an Instrumentality of the United Nations - Rhodesia as a Case Study”, Hearings before the Sub-Committee on International Organisations and Movements, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 92nd. Congress, 2nd. session, June 13-19, 1972. pp 81-97.

22. See, US Department of State, “Secretary Rusk’s News Conference of December 9”, Department of State Bulletin, hereinafter being referred to as DSB vol. 53, December 27, 1965; Statement by US Representative Adlai E. Stevenson at the UN, “US Expresses Views on Southern Rhodesia Independence in U.N. Committee of 24 and Security Council”, DSB, vol. 52, June 28, 1965. pp. 1061-6.

23. US Department of State, Address by G. Mennen-Williams, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Before the Chicago Chapter of the Federal Bar Association at Chicago Ill., June 15, 1965, “Southern Rhodesia Today”, DSB, vol. 53, July 12, 1965. pp. 75-6.

24. Not only did the US begin to abstain or openly vote against resolutions hostile to Portuguese colonialism, the Johnson administration also resumed military and economic assistance to Lisbon. Table 3 highlights the vast improvement in their trading transaction since the advent of the administration. For example, US imports from Angola and Mozambique which in 1963 stood at \$31 million and \$5.0 million respectively dramatically increased to \$64.4 million and \$16.1 million respectively. Such increases also reflect exports. What stood at \$14.4 million to Angola and \$8.5 million to Mozambique in 1963 had by five years later registered \$36. 2 million and \$11.7 million respectively. In addition, various scholars have shown how the administration’s assistance, especially the \$33 million military and the \$55 million economic aid to the Portuguese between 1964-1968 was used to bolster the regime against African liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies. For general analysis covering both military and economic cooperation: Mohamed. A. El-Khawas, “American involvement in Angola and Mozambique” in Mohamed. A. El-Khawas (ed). American-Southern African Relations: Bibliographical Essays, (Greenwood Press, West Port, Connecticut 1975) pp 10-11; Waldemar. A. Nielson, African Battleline: American Policy Choices in Southern Africa, (Harper and Row, New York 1965); William Minter, “Allies in Empire: US Military Involvement”, Africa Report, 17:4, 1970. pp 28-32. For specific information on the training of Portugal’s military personnel by American servicemen, see: Robert. A. Diamond and David. Fouquet, “Portugal and the United States: Atlantic Islands and European Strategy as Pawns in African Wars”, Africa Report, 15:5. 1970. pp. 15-17. For specific evidence of US war material being used against Liberation fighters by Portugal, see: John. A. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of An Explosion, 1950-1962, vol.1.

(M.I.T.Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1969); On grants: US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance for International Organisations: July 1, 1945-June 30, 1971, (Office of Statistics and Report, USAID, Washington, May 1972); Information and Guidance on Military Assistance, Grant Aid and Foreign Sales, 11th ed. (The US Airforce, 1968).

25. See James Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970, (Oxford University Press, London 1973) pp. 177-180.

26. See T. Noer, Op. cit. pp. 188-195.

27. Ibid; Harold Wilson had analysed the problems he faced during UDI in his book: The Labour Government 1964-1970: A Personal Record, (Weidenfield and Nicolson, London 1971); For an insight into British statements during the crisis, the former should be consulted in conjunction with Kenneth Young, Rhodesia and Independence: A Study in British Colonial Policy, (Eyre and Spottiswoode, London 1967)

28. See Richard Hall, The High Price Of Principles: Kaunda and the White South, ( Hodder and Stoughton, 1969) pp. 209-223; Anthony Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern Rhodesia, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1976) pp 77-8; Robert Good, UDI: The International Politics Of The Rhodesian Rebellion, (Faber and Faber, London 1973) p. 93.

29. See T. Noer, Op. cit. pp 204-207; More information on the issue could be obtained from different copies of the news letter ACOA Fact Sheet (it was a topical issue then) ; "Rhodesia and US foreign Policy", Op. cit. pp 71-99; The United States and Southern Africa, (ACOA, 1968)

30. The administration's aid package to Zambia following the Wilson-Johnson meeting include delivery of oil to Zambia, lifting of copper and provision of funds for a feasibility study on re-routing Zambian goods through Tanzania as opposed to Mozambican ports through Rhodesia. See US Department of State, "U.S. and Zambia Hold Talks on Rhodesian Situation: Joint Communique", DSB, 54, January 17, 1966. pp. 85-86.

31. T. Noer, Op. cit., pp. 195-6.

32. See A. Lake, Op. cit., pp. 82-6.

33. See, US Department of State, "Secretary Rusk's News Conference of December 9", Op.Cit., p. 1008.

34. Congress and the Nation 1969-72. vol.iii (Congressional Quarterly Inc, Washington D.C. 1973) pp 343-5.

35. See Richard Nixon's Report to Congress, February 18, 1970: "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace", DSB, March 9, 1970. pp. 121-282.

36. Ross K. Baker, "Towards a New Constituency for a More Active American Foreign Policy for Africa", Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 1973, pp. 12-19.

37. Christopher Coker, The United States and South Africa, 1968-1985, (Duke University, Durham 1986) pp. 15-28.

38. See Steven K. Metz, The Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Formulation of American Policy



Toward South Africa, 1969-1981. (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, The John Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, 1985) pp. 77-78.

39. See Philip V. White, "The Black American Constituency for Southern Africa, 1940-80", in Alfred O. Hero Jr., and John Barratt (eds.) The American Peoples and South Africa, Publics, Elites and Policy-Making Process. (D.C.Heath, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1981)

40. See Congress and the Nation, 1969-1972, Vol. III, (Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington D.C. 20006 1973) p. 345.

41. S.K.Metz, Op.Cit., pp. 168-170.

42. Ibid, p. 170.

43. F. Chidozie Ogene, Interest Groups and the Shaping of Foreign Policy: Four Case Studies of United States African Policy, (St. Martin's Press, New York 1983); See testimony of John Marcum, U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, "Resource Development in South Africa and U.S. Policy", Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food and Energy, 94th. Congress, 2nd. session, 1976. p. 6

44. S.Metz, Op. cit. p. 167; Jerry Laudauer, "U.S. Says South Africa Sugar lobby Gave Gifts to Some on House Farm Panel", Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, (Washington D.C.) September 2, 1978.

45. See US Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, "Sugar Act Amendments of 1971", Hearings before the Committee on Finance, 92nd. Congress, 1st. session, June 19-17, 21-22, 1971. p. 202.

46. In presenting this argument, carefully tucked away from public purview was the fact that Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean was necessitated primarily by factors of proximity and security. The Soviet Union is separated from the Indian Ocean by Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and Iran. An aspiration to gain access to the Ocean predates the Cold War as evidenced by an unsigned secret protocol of 1940 between the Soviet Union, Germany and Italy. Perhaps the immediate factor for Soviet presence in the Ocean was the decision by the US in mid-1964 to deploy the A-3 Polaris missile submarine with a range of 2,500 nautical miles in the North-West Indian Ocean. Such deployment posed a military threat to industrial areas and Siberia in mainland Soviet Union. That there was a threat perception on the part of Moscow had been attested to by the fact that the USSR took the issue to the UN and secured verbal condemnation of the US and affirmation of the need to denuclearise the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. This author elaborated this issue in his, The Strategic Interests and Policies of the Superpowers in Southern Africa (Unpublished M.Litt thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1985) especially chapter three; T.B.Millar, The East-West Strategic Balance, (George Allen and Unwin, London 1981) p. 96; Geoffrey Jukes, "The Indian Ocean in Soviet Naval Policy", Adelphi Papers, (IISS, London) No. 87. May 1972. pp 4-11.

47. This line of argument first emerged in 1966 and has since become the stock in trade of the right-wing on issues relating to South Africa. See, US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "United States-South African Relations", Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Africa, 89th Congress, 2nd session, Parts 1 and 2, March 1966.

48. See testimony of Mr. Mahoney to the House, US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Agriculture, "Extension of the Sugar Act", Hearings before the Committee on

Agriculture, 92nd. Congress, 1st session, February-May 1971. pp 613-635; US Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, "Sugar Act Amendments of 1971", Hearings before the Committee on Finance, 92nd Congress, 1st. session, June 16-17, 21-22, 1971.

49. In Congress, the anti-South Africa coalition was unable to persuade either the Agriculture Committee of the House or the Finance Committee of the Senate. Rather, HR 8866 which set up the annual quotas recommended an increase in South Africa's allocation from that of its previous 60,003 tons to 60,300 tons. The situation was hardly different in the Senate which recommended 57,745 tons. In the end, South Africa's allocation stood at the figure prescribed by Senate. Opponents who had argued that South Africa's allocation should be given to other African countries like Malawi, Uganda and Swaziland who needed the subsidy anyway more than Pretoria came away with the paltry 15,000 tons allocation made to Uganda. See Congress and the Nation, Op. cit.; US Congress, Senate, "Sugar Act Amendments of 1971", Op. cit. p. 202.

50. Chuck Stone, Black Political Power in America, (Duell Publishing, New York, 1970) pp 48-57.

51. Martin Luther King Jr., Where Do We Go From Here, (Bantam Books, New York 1968) pp. 39-40.

52. R. G. Weisbord, Op. cit., pp. 215-217.

53. Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy, (Quartel Books, New York 1977) p.111.

54. See Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Donald Easum's testimony before the House, Subcommittee on African Affairs as reproduced in, US House of Representatives, "Review of State Department Trip Through Southern and Central Africa", Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Africa. 93rd Congress, 2nd session, 1974. p. 15.



## CHAPTER FIVE.

### NEW APPROACHES TO EXERTION OF INFLUENCE.

In analysing the efforts of Afro-Americans to influence Washington's policy towards Southern Africa in the previous chapter, one observed that they were ineffective both in policy formulation and execution.

This could not be blamed on Afro-Americans' timidity. On numerous occasions, they had called on the incumbent administration to take a hard line against apartheid in South Africa, Portuguese colonialism in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau and minority rule in Rhodesia.

The problem however, is at the level of exerting influence: how to ensure that the vision of Afro-Americans and their liberal allies on Southern Africa was adopted by the administrations in the formulation of foreign policy. In the absence of any major development in Southern Africa itself to compel policy makers in Washington to reconsider their stand, the Southern Africa policy of the US had normally been predicated primarily on NATO and anti-communist interests. Economic interests though present had never played a crucial role. These when posited against the humanitarian argument of Afro-Americans tipped the scale in favour of the former as far as successive administrations were concerned. US Southern Africa policy could therefore only acquire a different colouration if there was a fundamental alteration to Cold War considerations as the basis for US foreign policy or if major changes occurred in the Southern African region. This therefore called for a new approach and strategic alteration in Afro-Americans' tactics in exerting influence on the executive arm of government in order to ensure that their views were given adequate considerations in the formulation and implementation of Southern Africa policy.

This chapter concentrates on the period 1971-80, analysed in three stages. The first covers 1971 to 1976 and examines Afro-Americans' efforts to convey revulsion at their being excluded from the formulation of Africa policy, and how the incumbent administrations and those seeking electoral support for office responded. The inclusion of a distinct Southern African plank to the Democratic Party manifesto in deference to Afro-Americans in the 1972 presidential election, was an indication of their success. The second stage of analysis which covers 1976 to the emergence of

the Reagan administration analyses the strategy of Afro-Americans in consolidating their effort to make their revulsion felt, notably whether or not they were able to predicate their electoral support on implementation of specific policies by the beneficiary if successful at the poll.

Finally, the chapter will embark on an over-all assessment of the efforts of Afro-Americans to convince policy makers that they had not only an interest in the nature of Africa policy but that they should contribute to the policy formulation process. This will be done against the background of our observation in the last chapter that three factors undermined Afro-Americans' influence: disregard for Afro-Americans by the administrations, public apathy to external issues of concern to this group, and to some extent the non-availability of an institutional framework to make their revulsion felt.

(i) The turning point in Afro-American tactics and strategy of exerting influence: 1971-76.

It is not easy to pin-point when Afro-Americans realised the futility of their existing tactics. What was certain was that Afro-Americans especially those outside the mainstream were unhappy with their impotence from the dying days of the Kennedy administration to that of Johnson amidst the fruitless efforts of mainstream Afro-American leadership to effect changes by working through the system. It was perhaps on account of this that as early as Richard Nixon's first year in office, Representative Charles Diggs Jr. returned from a tour of Africa in his capacity as Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Africa to express dissatisfaction with the direction of the administration's policy in Southern Africa. This stemmed from what he observed as the contradiction between the administration policy in the area and the principle with which the US was associated with:

On the one hand, the United States, the most powerful symbol of democracy in the World, is committed to freedom and equality and opposed to tyranny and injustice. And on the other hand, America has made an immoral entangling alliance with one of the most tyrannical governments in the world, the Republic of South Africa.[1]

As an ameliorating measure, Diggs recommended four interim palliatives: (a) termination of South Africa's sugar allocation; (b) prohibition of further installation of NASA tracking facilities in

South Africa as well as the dismantling of existing ones; (c) incremental imposition of economic sanctions including disinvestment, contingent upon Pretoria's refusal to reform apartheid and to withdraw from Namibia; (d) finally, reciprocity in the issuing of visas to each others' nationals as a means of assaulting apartheid in the social area.[2]

Refusal to adopt these recommendations, he warned, would not only make South Africa unstable and susceptible to communist influence, but the situation if allowed to continue also carried domestic consequences in the US itself. These consequences were that Afro-Americans were "increasingly identifying with their cultural heritage.....(and)...are on the threshold of linking up with the goals of the African liberation movement"[3]

That such a view was prevalent in the Afro-American community (as opposed to being an attempt by Diggs to score cheap political points against the administration) was highlighted by a most unlikely person, Waldemar Nielson, President of the pro-administration Africa-America Institute. This organisation was accused of receiving funds from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and as such was sneered at by the non-mainstream Afro-Americans. When Nielson warned the administration in his testimony before Diggs Sub-Committee, that "whatever we do or fail to do with respect to Africa is going to have feedback and repercussion on our own society",[4] he was in fact expressing a popular feeling to which Diggs was but a forerunner.

If such views had been expressed either by a Republican think-tank or a different ethnic group in the manner in which the Afro-Americans did, perhaps one might have seen a difference in the administration's approach and attitude to the issue of Southern Africa. But since these had emanated from Afro-Americans who were completely bereft of clout over a Republican administration, the government had no compunction in holding fast to the Cold War theme, and intensifying its support for the status quo in Southern Africa, as evidenced by the adoption of Option Two of the NSSM 39 of 1969. Option Two was stated thus:

"The Whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists. We can, by selective relaxation of our stance toward the White regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies....our tangible interests formed a basis for our contacts in

the region, and these can be maintained at an acceptable cost.”[5]

Such a policy was flawed in two planks. First, its belief that reward for the beneficiaries of the Southern African system would make them feel secure, resulting in voluntary reform of the political system to accommodate the non-European majority, had no historical precedence in the region. The second flaw emanated from the fact that the Nixon administration was not and never attempted to be an impartial interlocutor between the oppressed and the oppressors of Southern Africa. One gets a glimpse of this from the address of his Assistant Secretary of State David Newsom to the Northwestern University on December 8, 1970, during which he totally rejected the idea of any discussions between the administration and the regional liberation movements.[6] Not that by doing so, the administration would either be breaking new ground or stepping on a mine field, for the Kennedy administration had had a conspicuous and sometimes stormy relationship with the liberation movements in the Portuguese territories. But in rejecting renewal of contact with the liberation movements, he formulated his own options for the region in which as expected he firmly endorsed “communication” with the regional regimes in line with the administration’s Option Two. While one might argue that he was expressing a personal opinion, his position in the administration meant that he was in fact articulating the administration’s stance on the issue. For example, the Nixon years at the White House saw the lowest levels of contact between the US and Southern Africa’s liberation movements since the War.

To the concerned Afro-Americans (non-mainstream), this implied adopting tactics of every measure that took their fancy with a view to making their revulsion felt at their inability to influence policy direction. Conspicuous in this regard was Congressman Diggs who used his position as the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa to hold hearings into the administration’s Africa policy to which interested persons both within and outside the government were invited to testify. Outside the Subcommittee Diggs also adopted the tactics of seeking opportunities to embarrass the administration over Southern Africa policy to complement the efforts of other Afro-Americans including the “Thursday Group” (discussed below), in the search for means of influencing Southern Africa policy of successive administrations.

(i) Afro-American initiatives both within and outside Congress.

During the early 1970s, initiatives were taken by several Afro-American individuals and a variety of organisations, a fact which led Steven Metz to interpret their activities as stemming from political rivalries (discussed below). The most influential Afro-American individual in this period was Congressman Charles Diggs Jr, who was able to use his position as chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa in the House, to collect evidence and identify defects in US policy toward Southern Africa, to publicise proposals for changes in policy and to attempt to bring together the numerous individuals and organisations concerned to bring about these changes. It is therefore with the action and influence of Diggs that this section would be most concerned.

Not until Diggs' Subcommittee instituted hearings into the administration's Africa policy in 1971 did it become public knowledge that the Nixon administration had taken sides with the Southern African regimes. The gradual lifting of the 1963 arms embargo in line with the "communication" policy of NSSM 39, had seen to this shift in the administration's policy. For example, in his testimony before the Sub-Committee on June 3, 1971, the Vice-President of the Export-Import Bank revealed that some services had been specifically set aside for South Africa under the existing guidelines - meaning under the Nixon administration.[7]

One might wonder whether or not South Africa availed itself of these facilities in view of the fact that a witness from the State Department told the Sub-Committee on May 20, 1970, that the Bank guarantees were confined to medium and short-term insurance, without any evidence of the Bank awarding loans or credit to Pretoria since 1959. That however need not be the issue because it was a deliberate ploy by the State Department to divert attention from the fact that South Africa had been accorded a most favoured nation state status by the administration. If these facilities were not potentially useful, then they would not have been made available to Pretoria and indeed evidence abounds of their utility. As of April 30, 1971, \$9,882,000 was authorised for South Africa through the FCIA while the Bank revealed to the Sub-Committee that it made further authorisation of \$20,246,000 medium term guarantees "without any disclosure as to whether it was for the US or South Africa." [8] In this respect, Diggs' observation that these guide lines to the Bank in respect of South Africa indicate "a change and relaxation of policy by this administration" [9] was a frugal summation of the administration's effort to become a committed



supporter of South Africa.

The rationale for the Sub-committee's hearings had much to do with the limitation of avenues open to an interest group to respond to an administration whose foreign policy had been adjudged unfavourable to that group's ancestral homeland. The Congressional Black Caucus later took up the issue in their meeting with President Nixon in March 1971, by recommending the termination of South Africa's sugar allocation, withdrawal of investments from that country and the establishment of a multi-Departmental task force to oversee Africa policy, only for the President to dismiss these suggestions. This attitude of the President did accord with the general impression of Afro-Americans about their worth in the estimation of their government and probably the public at large. In this respect the hearings in the House provided for a powerless Afro-American community a legislative opening to achieve two goals. The first of these was to serve as a vehicle for pouring scorn on and sending a message to the administration as to what, in the estimation of Afro-Americans, should be the direction of US policy toward Southern Africa. Examples of this abound. Diggs' denunciation of the administration's Southern Africa policy for its "immoral entangling alliances with one of the most tyrannical governments in the world" and his recommendations on policy improvement coupled with Waldemar Nielson's warning about failure to change policy direction over Southern Africa as aforementioned were all cases in point. Further examples were the testimony of Franklin Williams, Former Ambassador to Ghana and president of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, who offered racism as an explanation for the low priority being accorded Africa policy and recommended a revamp of the existing Southern Africa policy by unilateral disengagement from South Africa.[10] The second goal was to create an opportunity to Afro-Americans and others dissatisfied with the direction of the existing Africa policy to signal to the administration their determination to rectify the situation. Daniel G. Matthews, president of the Washington Task Force (one of the new Afro-American anti-establishment organisations) in his testimony before the Subcommittee made clear that one task of his organisation was "to ensure the presence of Black Americans in U.S. considerations of its Africa policy, and to assist in building an informed constituency for African affairs." [11]

In this respect, it is evident that the Subcommittee hearings did succeed in offering an opportunity to those whose views would never have been heard let alone been incorporated in policy formulation; and gave publicity to the direction of the Africa policy which they regarded as

being flawed, thereby embarrassing the administration.

The hearings could not have been possible had Diggs not been the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa. This position, coupled with the manner in which he used it to address an issue of importance to his community, made him not just a leader of his people but one whose actions and pronouncements on the issue were worthy of thorough examination to determine the pattern of thought prevalent in the Afro-American community. This is all the more so since Diggs' disapproval of the administration's Africa policy was not confined to the Congressional arena. It was he who in December 1971 published an "Action Manifesto" outlining recommendations for revising the Africa policy of the administration. Three days later, he intensified his position by dramatically withdrawing from the US delegation to the UN, announcing his decision first to a packed press conference in protest at the Nixon administration's Southern Africa policy. Particular mention was made of the massive infusion of financial support to Portugal, which he described as "partnership in the subjugation of the African people", and the tilt toward Pretoria without any compassion for the victims of apartheid, settler and colonial rule as vividly portrayed by the administration's refusal to donate toward the UN administered Trust Fund for this category of people.[12]

The timing of the publication of the "manifesto" was meant to achieve two objectives. First, as an expression of outrage at the catalogue of events in 1971 which were all unfavourable to the stance of Afro-Americans and the anti-apartheid movement on Southern Africa. For example, not only was the Byrd Amendment to the Military Procurement Bill defying the UN embargo on importation of Rhodesian chrome passed through Congress, but it was also the year in which the administration made enormous commitments to Portugal, all for the sake of the Azores bases. These commitments include:

- (a) \$15 million in P.L.480 agricultural commodities;
- (b) the loan of an hydraulic vessel at no cost;
- (c) \$1 million for educational development programs;
- (d) \$5 million in drawing rights for non-military excess equipment;
- (e) the waiver of support payments (\$350,000) for the MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group) to Lisbon;
- (f) \$400 million of Exim loans and guarantees for development projects." [13]

It was certain that an Afro-American community smarting over its exclusion in formulation

of policy, would be incensed at such a level of commitment to a country engaged in a colonial war in Africa. Of particular discomfort to Afro-Americans was the fact that the US was not only underwriting Portugal's annual deficit of \$500 million brought about by fighting a war to maintain an empire, but by providing military related (MAAG) facilities free of charge Washington was taking a direct hand in the war. [14]

The magnitude of the administration's aid to Portugal in 1971 becomes glaring when compared with commitments by its predecessors. Between 1946-1970, Lisbon received less than \$50 million through the Export-Import Bank as opposed to \$400 million in just two years of the Nixon administration, a period which saw no greater level of deterioration in East-West relations than in previous years. When Congressman Charles Diggs described the commitment to Portugal as "an unusual and anomalous one" and agonised over "why a small nation of 8.6 million people should receive such extra-ordinary treatment ..... Why Portugal should qualify for such special treatment..... If the administration cannot provide a statement of compelling reasons for making this agreement, it must be considered as admitting that it is the intention of the administration to directly assist Portugal in waging these wars against the peoples of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique", [15] he was venting the frustration of Afro-Americans in general at their inability to influence events.

Secondly, the timing of the publication of the "manifesto" was aimed at embarrassing the administration. For example, its recommendations ranged from the need for the administration to "end its complicity with apartheid" to "implement its pronouncements of adherence to the principle of self determination and of abhorrence of apartheid with concrete actions towards their realisation" specifically called on the executive arm to "cease its hypocrisy, dissimulation, and legal dishonesty, and recognise that the situation in Southern Africa is within the purview of Article 39 of the United Nations charter..... In order that the Security Council can get on with the task of considering appropriate measures to be taken, the United States must acknowledge that the situation in each of the minority ruled area of Africa - South Africa, Namibia, the Portuguese territories, and Southern Rhodesia - presents a threat to the peace." [16]

On South Africa, the "manifesto" endorsed the right of the oppressed majority to secure their rights by any means opened to them including armed struggle, and then called for a change in the contradictory policy of "pronouncement of abhorrence of apartheid on the one hand and co-

existence with, and even support of its adherents on the other". It then urged the administration to adopt a wide ranging number of policies from public acknowledgement of the illegal nature of the Bantustans and the right of all South Africans to participate in the government of their country, to abrogation of a September 1960 contract empowering NASA to establish facilities in South Africa. Other aspects of the document included a call on the administration to establish contact with the majority of South Africans by way of opening United States Information Services (USIS) offices in Soweto and other areas with a large concentration of non-whites; cessation of Export-Import Bank facilities and services to South Africa and termination of the Sugar allocation to that country; and an intensification of the arms embargo to include all sales to the South African military including spare parts, components, and light aircraft both for military and civilian purposes.[17]

It was evident that Diggs wrote his "manifesto" with the hindsight of information he was privy to during the Subcommittee's hearings into the administration's Africa policy which he chaired. For example, the recommendation for intensification of the arms embargo was no doubt inspired by the pattern of compulsory military training for white South Africans which could blur the difference between civilian and military aircraft. One could be converted for the other purpose in times of emergency. This fact was borne out by Jennifer Davis's argument before the House's Subcommittee on Africa in 1973:

"....flying is an all male sport in South Africa. The Air Commandos, ....can best be described as a flying militia. It is made up of volunteers who are not regular military forces, but are paid by the government when they fly as commando.....Their training entails radio cooperation with army and mobile police striking forces, reconnaissance, practice bombing with grenades, and general cooperation with the police in maintaining the security of South Africa and South West Africa. Many of these Commandos fly light planes, such as Piper Cubs and Cessnas." [18]

An additional reason for this demand was probably the upsurge in the supply of US manufactured aircraft to South Africa about which the then Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, David Newsom dropped a hint at his September 1971 address to the Council on Foreign Relations. During the occasion, he qualified the administration's intention to uphold the arms embargo against South Africa with the proviso that licences for the sale of small unarmed executive aircraft would be considered. It soon became evident that the administration had devised an ingenious means of circumventing the arms embargo by classifying almost all prohibited items sent

to South Africa as not duly covered by the 1963 embargo. Rauer H. Meyer of the Department of Commerce used this defence to rescue himself from close cross-examination when he appeared before the House Subcommittee on Africa in 1973. [19]

The "Action Manifesto" further enjoined the administration to ensure that American business ventures adhered to the following:

- "(a) Close the communications gap between United States headquarters and their subsidiaries and branch offices in South Africa;
- (b) Pay equal wages for equal work;
- (c) Get on with the task of training and whatever else is necessary so that blacks, coloureds and whites are performing equal work on a substantial scale;
- (d) Throw off local coloration and give respect to all employees.
- (e) In sum, to establish fair employment practices and to refuse to adhere to racial policies and practices." [20]

Two points have been made about the manifesto. One was Diggs' motive for publishing the manifesto and the other was the recommendation in the manifesto which expressed a preference for fair employment practices by US corporate operations in South Africa instead of imposition of sanctions against Pretoria. [21]

The first had misled some keen students of Afro-Americans' interest in Southern Africa to propound what this study will refer to as "a borrowed garb thesis". Simply put, this says that Congressman Diggs was a moderate who in an attempt to maintain legitimacy as a leader in a radicalised Afro-American community was simply trying to speak the language of radicals. His press conference to announce his withdrawal from the US delegation to the UN three days after the presentation of the Action Manifesto should thus be seen as the Congressman's attempt to repudiate his moderate image before Afro-American radicals with a view to stemming the rising tide of dissatisfaction with his moderation both within the Black Caucus and the community at large. Steven Metz has argued:

"In large part, however, Diggs' militancy was largely the result of politics within the black congressional group, and within the black community as a whole. A struggle was raging within the black community between the first generation of leadership - such as those associated with the NAACP and the Southern Christian leadership Association - and more radical leaders who were dissatisfied with the pace of change.....The result was that in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the "mainstream" black leadership - including most members of Congress were pulled toward the left by pressure within the black community. The contradiction was that this move to the left, which was necessary to retain legitimacy within



the black community, served at the same time to diminish this groups influence on the traditional political elite. Throughout the Nixon administration, Charles Diggs, who was by instinct, the most moderate member of the black caucus in Congress, felt the pressure from more radical representatives such as Dellums and Conyers.” [22]

It is not difficult to see the basis of Metz’s explanation in view of the upsurge in Afro-American extra-Congressional activism. For example, in 1972 (the year in which Diggs relinquished the chairmanship of the Congressional Caucus) 27 Afro-Americans met in Puerto Rico in February for the sole purpose of discussing strategies for the involvement of Afro-Americans in the formulation of US policy toward Africa. A meeting was held in Gary, Indiana the next month by the National Black Political Convention to explore the possibility of a “Black Political Party”. [23] These events occurred against the background of other pressures. For example, soon after the inception of the Nixon presidency, Afro-Americans serving in quasi-external affairs organisations (USAID and USIS) met in New York at the instance of C. Clyde Fergusson to found the “Thursday Group” with a view to demanding a definitive policy-making role for Afro-Americans in the formulation of Africa policy. [24] Secondly, in protesting against the treatment of President Kaunda by the administration during his visit to New York in 1970 as earlier indicated, Afro-Americans formed an ad hoc committee - Afro-Americans Concerned About US Policy in Africa - to demand, among other things imposition of sanctions against South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia. [25] All these activities could be explained in terms of factional differences among Afro-Americans. Nonetheless Diggs’ resignation from the Chairmanship of the Caucus was not a reflection of any on-going struggle between radicals and moderates in the Afro-American community. Rather the resignation of Diggs arose from a desire by the Congressman to become the chairman of the District of Columbia Committee. He achieved this ambition in 1973 when the post became vacant.

What the devotees of the “borrowed garb thesis” fail to realise was that all the acknowledged non-mainstream Afro-Americans were aggrieved by the non-inclusion of Afro-American voices in the formulation of Africa policy and the activities enumerated above were a reflection of their efforts to rectify a situation which they regarded as patently flawed. The fact that there were different efforts did not mean each action and organisation represented a rival. It was part of the transition from a conservative pro-administration stance to a new situation in which

Afro-Americans were eager to see concrete evidence of the incorporation of their views in the formulation of Africa policy. The fact that their efforts, though fragmented, were aimed at the same objective reflected the absence of a single over-all spokesman for the interest of Afro-Americans in Africa - the role that NAACP and SCLC had been able to play in the past decade. That all these initiatives had a common understanding of the situation in Southern Africa and a common policy goal was shown by the success of the African-American National Conference on Africa in Washington in May 1972. This conference was called by Congressman Diggs and the Congressional Caucus and was particularly remarkable by the absence of major divisions in policy. Thus, it was addressed by Senators George McGovern and Hubert Humphrey and also succeeded in formulating Afro-American preferences for US policy in Southern Africa to be recommended to the Democratic Party conference. Among these preferences were, the severance of diplomatic, commercial and military ties with the colonial and minority ruled states of Southern Africa.[26]

The success of the conference casts considerable doubt on arguments which relied on a conflict between "moderates" and "radicals". Moreover, the assertion by Metz that a tilt to the left (radicals) diminished the influence of elected representatives like Diggs (a moderate) with policy-makers is unsustainable because it fails to take into consideration the fact that neither the Congressional Black Caucus nor Afro-Americans had yet succeeded in influencing the Southern Africa policy of the administration, irrespective of the efforts of Diggs and his colleagues. While "moderates" like Diggs gained access to the White House and the State Department almost at will, they were unable to achieve their aim of effecting changes to the administration's policy toward Southern Africa. Metz confirmed this, and thus undermines his argument in attributing the ineffectiveness of the Black Caucus to two factors. Firstly, Congress was not all that interested in Africa: "African issues were not the sort that win votes in most Congressional districts, and like the American population as a whole, most Congressmen have very little knowledge of Africa. While the African Subcommittee in the House did play a major role in policy formulation under the leadership of Charles Diggs, the fact remains that the Senate was by far the greater power on matters of international relations." [27] Secondly, apart from exerting influence on the executive through personal contact and persuasion in which the Black Caucus had failed, Metz recognised the "appropriation process" as a viable means by which Congress could still bounce back to a position of influence over the executive. But the Black Caucus could not utilise this channel

because the US had no military commitment in Africa.[28]

How then does one justify the argument that the erosion of influence of Afro-American Congressional leaders like Diggs was due to their attempt to respond to the demands of radicals in their community? Surely the influence was not there all along? Both the State Department and the Africa Bureau, the two agencies through which Africanists had always exercised influence were down-graded with the advent of this administration, as one saw with respect to the primacy of the NSC in the formulation of NSSM 39. Metz cited his personal interview with the Nixon administration's first Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, David Newsom in support of his argument. Yet, Newsom elsewhere had made it clear that the State Department and the Africa Bureau lacked adequate influence over the administration's Africa policy:

“.....there are certain historical parts of the World which, of necessity, demand a considerable attention on the part of the executive branch...of necessity the involvement of the United States in Europe, the involvement certainly in the Far East, the closeness and attention of Latin America, and the continuing concern over the problems of the Middle East, push their way into the policy makers, perhaps to a greater extent than some of the problems of Africa.”[29]

Newsom's request to be relieved of his post in 1973 appeared to have been prompted by this lack of influence of the State Department and the Africa Bureau.[30] This point was also underscored by his successor who as earlier indicated in the previous chapter courted public interest on Africa as a means of influencing the administration's policy toward the continent. It is therefore difficult to see how Afro-American Congressional leaders could have acquired influence over the executive by taking to the war-path against “radicals” in their community.

In the light of this, how do we then explain Diggs' preference for fair employment practices as opposed to his previously held view of imposition of sanctions against South Africa? The change in position was a strategic calculation to harmonise his stance with what was likely to be adopted by a Democratic government. By virtue of his seniority in the Democratic Party and Congress, he had able to see by December 1971 an advance copy of the study on American policy toward Southern Africa which was undertaken by the United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA).

It was not commissioned by either the Democratic or Republican Party, but its members

were respected opinion leaders who had influence with the Democratic Party. Consisting mostly of liberal intellectuals and entrepreneurial elites interested in foreign policy analysis, the interest shown by such liberal scholars like Cyrus Vance and the publicly expressed view of the Association's chairman, William Roth, that Southern Africa had been "unduly neglected as a priority of the US government" were enough to have convinced Diggs that the outline of the report could be incorporated into the Democratic platform. For example, while affirming the limitation of the capacity of the US to effect changes in foreign countries, the report supported official discouragement of new investments in South Africa, a halt to Export-Import Bank guarantees and insurance to business transactions in South Africa. It repudiated the idea of a linkage between economic prosperity and the demise of apartheid - a favourite argument of the South African Foundation and US business with South African connections - as the report noted that two decades of economic prosperity had resulted in affluence for the whites without a corresponding improvement in the apartheid regulated life style of the non-whites. Indeed it all but linked foreign investments to the longevity of apartheid and spoke of the need to break this unholy alliance.[31]

It called for a profound change in the administration's approach to South Africa, and repudiated the possibility of communists fomenting conflict for the furtherance of their ideology, instead attributing any violence that might occur in that country to South Africa's white population. The latter were warned that the US should not be counted upon to rescue them from any upheaval which apartheid might precipitate. The report emphasised the need for the US to maintain its distance from South Africa on the grounds that "the South African government complicates our commitment to racial equality because they tend to develop an interest in the status quo." To avoid this situation, the report argued that "it is unwise for the U.S. to develop or maintain satellite tracking stations in South Africa." [32]

To underscore the importance of the region, the report called for the creation of a functional Inter-Departmental Task Force to regularly review policy towards the region - a proposal which the Black Caucus had earlier made to the Nixon administration and which was dismissed contemptuously by the President himself.

On Portugal, the report called for a complete arms embargo and described the Azores bases as "technologically dispensable and politically costly",[33] which in effect confirmed the position of Afro-Americans on the issue. Hence, although one might argue that the report did not go as far



as endorsing the entire Caucus' position on South Africa, there was broad agreement on the issue from which Afro-Americans could establish a foot-hold for further systematic assault on apartheid. Since an election was around the corner it was therefore not in the interest of Diggs to upset the situation by coming out with a manifesto diametrically opposed to the position of the UNA-USA report. This would rob the Democratic Party of the unity it needed to present to the electorate. Consequently the action manifesto was greatly influenced by the report of the Policy Panel - a fact which Diggs himself made clear by urging the administration to take appropriate action on it. What has been seen as the dictate of factional intrigue in the Afro-American community was therefore in effect an attempt to harmonise the position of Afro-Americans' with what was likely to be adopted by a Democratic government. That this was so will become clearer when one analyses what took place during the 1972 campaign.

If Afro-Americans realised the futility of the existing pattern of exerting influence and if there were no differences in their objective as epitomised by the unqualified success of the 1972 conference on Africa, then what changes were effected with a view to realising their objective?

Definitive results of Afro-American demands: The policy consensus arrived at the Washington conference armed Diggs - who was the brain behind the event - with a mandate to continue the struggle to effect changes in US policy toward Southern Africa. But the Action Manifesto had proved that his intention was to work within the framework of the Democratic Party. Thus, one saw the publication in June 1972 of the "Black Bill of Rights" by the Congressional Caucus, which included a call on the Democratic nominee for the November Presidential election to take steps to sever every link between the US and South Africa. This meant the imposition of comprehensive sanctions.

Under normal circumstances, one would have expected the Afro-Americans to be less vocal on the issue for fear of provoking a white backlash against the Democratic Party. But the situation, at least as perceived by the Caucus and the community at large, was such that caution was hardly an issue. Most Afro-Americans had taken a stance on Southern Africa as a result of the events of 1971 and the recalcitrance of the Nixon administration. Their emphasis was to bring about a reversal of the administration's policy which they felt had strengthened apartheid and minority rule. Surprisingly they received unanimous broad support from all the Democratic contenders, irrespective of differences in detail, over the right of liberation movements to utilise every weapon



at their disposal and the extent of sanctions. But there was agreement that the Nixon policy should be reversed.[34] All the candidates endorsed the UNA-USA report of 1971 on which Diggs tailored his Action Manifesto, as the basis of their policy towards the Southern African region. Hubert Humphrey read the report and “found it most comprehensive. In fact, I would recommend it as a useful tool in developing American foreign policy toward Southern African States and liberation movements.”

Humphrey went on to launch an attack on the Nixon administration’s Southern African policy which he said was in “desperate need of repair”. The Nixon doctrine on South Africa “has meant abnegations of an active role in promoting policies to assist in the achievement of basic human rights, particularly in the area of American investments”. He was no less restrained in his criticism of the administration’s policy in other areas of the region. He chastised it for its cozy relations with Portugal because it “means that we should fortify Portugal, as a member of NATO, through military-assistance programs and be forgetful of the fact that Portugal uses this assistance in her efforts to squelch independence movements and assertions of political justice in the territories of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau.” This pattern of thinking was equally evident with respect to Zimbabwe where the candidate regretted that “our government has remained silent as the grave racial unrest and injustice in Rhodesia become more and more apparent. The record is alarming.....” But the record had been no less alarming in 1968 when after a meeting with President Kaunda in Lusaka, Humphrey came out to dismiss his host’s prediction of racial conflagration in the region should America fail to act, as an exaggeration. When asked by Africa Report if he still held the same view, Candidate Humphrey evaded the question as much as he could, while being relentless in his attack on the Nixon administration’s policy in the region.

As if there was prior agreement between the candidates, all of them took great delight in launching an attack on the administration’s record in the region. Even neo-conservative Henry Jackson regretted “that the Nixon administration has not recognised that our national interest cannot be served by the perpetuation of regimes of this sort. [South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal]....In the case of Portugal, I recognise the problems raised by participation in the Western security system. But American programs which enhance Portugal’s defense capabilities serve our interests only when they are used for the common NATO defense effort and are not diverted to suppression of the independence movements in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea. If the

Portuguese government does not respect this basic position, our military assistance program must be adjusted accordingly.”

The administration’s policy did not find favour also with New York’s Mayor John V. Lindsay because it “strikes me as grossly inappropriate. South Africa’s racial policies are a disgrace to civilised man.” Neither Eugene J. McCarthy, Edmund Muskie nor George McGovern had anything positive to say about the administration in this respect.

The significance of this development was that the candidates, most of whom were not hitherto known opponents of the administration’s Africa policy, were paying attention to the issue probably not out of conviction but most certainly of the need to obtain Afro-Americans’ support. This meant that in the 1972 Presidential elections, Afro-Americans were for the first time able to trade in their votes for an anticipated foreign policy objective. And that the Democratic Party realised this accounted for the writing of a distinct Southern African plank, independent of civil rights issues, into the 1972 Democratic platform - the first time in the history of the party. It reads:

“The United States should make clear its opposition to the racial totalitarianism of South Africa. The United States government should act firmly to press US business in South Africa to take measures for the fullest possible justice for their black employees. Blacks should be assigned at all levels to United States offices in South Africa, and throughout Africa. The South African sugar quota should be withdrawn..... No US company or its subsidiary should be given unlimited state tax credits for taxes paid to a white minority ruled countries of Africa.[35]

That the party leaned more towards Diggs’ “Action Manifesto” than an outright imposition of sanctions is irrelevant at this stage. But that the party had elevated the issue into its election manifesto without fear of alienating the majority white electorate was a testament not only to the pragmatism of the party’s elites and their intention to retain Afro-American electoral support, but also the determination, tenacity and enthusiasm of the Afro-Americans themselves. The Southern African problem was at the top of the priorities of Afro-Americans and their unanimity on the need to effect changes to the existing Southern Africa policy was responsible for its elevation into the Democratic Party manifesto.

This importance was recognised by the Party’s nominee, George McGovern, who in no time after the confirmation of his nomination, appointed an eight member Africa Policy Committee

comprising liberal intellectuals such as Herschelle Challenor, Ronald Walters and John Marcum with the responsibility of charting the candidate's Southern Africa policy in anticipation of victory at the poll.

That Richard Nixon won the 1972 election is an historical fact. But did the Democratic candidate fail as a result of the party's Southern African plank? This question is necessary in view of the newness of the Southern African stance on the party's agenda. The nearest the party had previously come to addressing Africa was in the Presidential elections of 1948 and 1960. In 1948, Truman not only lost some key Southern States on account of the attention he paid to civil rights but also saw the bolting of the party by some Dixiecrats. Kennedy's enthusiasm over Africa, especially the liberation struggle in the South of that continent was abandoned by his successor, who also recoiled from embracing civil rights for fear of alienating the South as aforementioned. None of these candidates went as far as the Democratic Party in 1972, hence the need to wonder if Southern Africa helped lose the party the elections.

While acknowledging the difficulty of assessing the contribution of a single issue to the outcome of an election, one is lucky in the sense that the Congressional election of that year can serve as a pointer. In that election, liberals favourably disposed to African issues increased their position in Congress by eight more members - five in the House and the remainder in the Senate.[36] Indeed no one blamed the party's electoral defeat on its African stance, for there was a consensus of opinion that the Nixon administration had been too sympathetic to the Southern African regimes - admittedly a consensus that could not have come about without the efforts of Afro-Americans. Rather, the party's misfortune was blamed on candidate McGovern's lacklustre campaign and the fact that he was squeezed virtually out of the race by Nixon and Wallace respectively.

However the re-emergence of Nixon meant that although Afro-Americans had succeeded in placing Southern Africa on the agenda of the opposition party, there could be no changes to the administration's stance on the issue. The fact that Congressman Diggs continued to harangue officials of the Defence Department over NASA facilities in South Africa, resulting in the announcement that the facilities would be closed in 1973, meant that the opponents of the Southern African regimes were equally unprepared to let the matter rest.[37]

The early departure of Richard Nixon marked no difference as his successor Gerald Ford

also inherited the NSC's adviser, Henry Kissinger, who became the new Secretary of State. Although Afro-Americans in Congress and their sympathisers tried to embarrass the administration during Kissinger's confirmation hearing, they watched helplessly as the administration followed the footsteps of its predecessor in expressing its disdain for Afro-American sensibilities over Southern Africa. For example when the Afro-Asian group in the UN sponsored a resolution to impose economic and military sanctions against South Africa on May 22, 1973, it was the US delegation which led the British to the rescue of Pretoria by vetoing the resolution. This faithful service was once more rendered to South Africa on September 27, 1974 following the refusal of the credentials committee to accord recognition to the delegation from Pretoria. The US followed up its stewardship to the floor of the Security Council where it also cast a veto when the issue was referred there by the Assembly.[38]

All that Afro-Americans could do was either to grumble aloud or to protest to the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, as Congressman Diggs did on the grounds that "the prospect of US veto or abstention on the issue of South African expulsion from the United Nations" was tantamount to encouraging "revolution in South Africa." [39] Such protests were no match for the propaganda efforts of America's UN Representative John Scarli who, in spite of describing apartheid as "evil" and "ugly" for the benefit of the mass media, had no qualms in defending the US position. This was an attempt to avoid the exclusion of any member which would infringe the universality of membership of the World body and relieve Pretoria of the pressure which member states would bring to bear on it to reform apartheid.[40] The only ray of hope came in 1974 when the Ford administration signalled its intention to repeal the Byrd Amendment. But any elation arising therefrom fizzled out rapidly when it became apparent that the administration was being compelled more by legal difficulties arising from implementation, as opposed to any attempt to placate Afro-Americans.[41]

However, events in Southern Africa soon brought about what at first looked like a meeting of minds between the administration and Afro-Americans. In 1974, battle weary officers in Portugal's colonial wars overthrew their government in a coup and promised independence to the colonies. This development had made a mockery of the central plank of Option Two of NSSM 39 of 1969 if Portugal was relinquishing control of its territories.

The manner in which Portugal went about its abandonment of what former Prime Minister

Salazar, <sup>during his tenure,</sup> frequently referred to at the height of imperial grandeur as “Portugal overseas” was even pathetic. Unable to bring about unity among Angola’s liberation movements it once fought in the bush, Lisbon simply lowered the Portuguese flag and departed without handing over government to a responsible authority. In the resultant outbreak of war between the liberation movements, the super-powers and their allies - Cuba and South Africa - backed the opposing combatants. The FNLA and UNITA which the US backed, not only lost at the battle field to the Soviet backed MPLA, but Washington also became highly unpopular in Africa on account of South Africa’s role at its apparent behest. While this might simply have signalled the degree to which South Africa was loathed in the continent, the irony was that even leaders like Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia who were well aware of and even approved the American planned South African intervention in order to prevent the emergence of a communist backed regime in Angola, simply turned round to criticise the US as an impediment to African liberation.[42]

The administration, as expected, received support from Americans with conservative inclinations across the political divide who argued the need to anchor South Africa to the West, on account to the country’s economic importance and anti-communist stance. This was the first time Pretoria’s economic importance shared the limelight with its anti-communist credentials. Before then, the economic factor had always been subsumed by geopolitical cum ideological considerations as no administration could justify maintaining interests in an area simply for the benefit of big business.

However, the US economic stake in South Africa especially with respect to direct investment had by now risen sharply to \$2.3 billion, a level that was maintained up to early 1983. In addition, US loans to Pretoria stood at no less than \$3.7 billion while trade between the two countries was as high as \$6 billion. Needless to say that the US also had more multi-national corporations <sup>in South Africa</sup> than any other country at the point in time.[43] The Republicans as the party of big business could not therefore be expected to abandon its constituents.

Buffeted by these conflicting demands, the administration could afford to ignore the Afro-Americans as was customary, but it could not do the same to the business community. However, the classic anti-communist strategy of supporting friendly regimes in sensitive areas of the world needed a rethink in the Southern African context if the edifice around Pretoria was crumbling. The Portuguese empire had fallen, and worst of all to the “communists”, while the liberation



movements in Zimbabwe and Namibia were also being supported either by Soviet or Chinese communists. Thus, to a seasoned Cold War proponent like Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, this was the time for laying the groundwork to change the direction of the administration's Southern Africa policy with the backing of supporters and foes alike.

It was easier to appease supporters as their cardinal objective was the prevention of South Africa from falling into the "warm embrace of communism" - a phrase Verwoerd frequently used to dramatise South Africa's importance to the West. The problem was how to appease the foes - the Afro-Americans - hence one saw the occurrence of two events to act as incentives. One was the resignation in July 1975, of the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Nathaniel Davis whose appointment seven months earlier (January 1975) as a replacement for the popular Donald Easum had raised protests from Afro-Americans.[44] One of the reasons (or so it seemed from the outcry against his appointment) was the fact that he was US Ambassador to Chile when Marxist Salvador Allende was overthrown. To Afro-Americans, Davis' appointment was inspired by the threatening triumph of liberation movements in Angola and Mozambique. His Chilean experience, they maintained was the qualification for the job, and the Congressional Caucus supported by ACOA and WOA attempted unsuccessfully to scuttle the appointment.[45] Southern Africa articulated the view of Afro-Americans when it protested vehemently against the "Latin Americanisation" of Africa.[46]

The second event occurred between November and December 1975. Far from casting a veto, the US - notorious for its support of the Southern African regimes in the UN General Assembly and the Security Council - voted in favour of sports boycott of South Africa and even supported another resolution calling upon Pretoria to free political prisoners whose guilt was opposition to apartheid.[47]

Since years of protest had made Afro-Americans and the Congressional Caucus adroit in detecting platitudes, it took them no time to realise that far from having a change of heart, the administration's effort was to secure domestic consensus to ease its path in its attempt to thwart an alleged Soviet hegemony in Southern Africa. This meant that there was still no meeting of minds between the administration and Afro-Americans as one was concerned with the evils of communism and the other the oppression of the majority by the minority in Southern Africa.

On the whole, 1971 was a watershed in Afro-Americans' concern with Southern Africa in

the sense that it galvanised them into rethinking their strategy for achieving changes in the administration's policy for the region. All along, Presidential candidates soliciting Afro-American votes had sought to address the domestic civil rights issue as if it were the only area of concern to this segment of the American society. Even where Africa was addressed as Truman did in 1948, it was not with seriousness as no mention was made of a different line of policy to be adopted. It was only designed to capture the Afro-Americans' votes in the North, hence on that occasion, the South African government whose apartheid policy was the subject of criticism sneered at his remarks as an unfortunate by-product of electioneering.[48]

The idea of an international dimension to Afro-American demands had never been seriously addressed by Presidential hopefuls either on the campaign trail or in the administration of successive candidates, except in the brief interlude of the Kennedy Presidency as discussed in Chapter Three. That there could be a link between the interests and desires of Afro-Americans and the foreign policy of an administration was never contemplated in the history of electioneering campaign prior to 1972. This was because the respected segment of the Afro-American leadership whose views could attract the attention of the authorities were themselves preoccupied with the domestic issue of civil rights. As a result, they were unable to elevate issues affecting Africa to the same significance as the Poles and the Irish had successfully made of their homelands or settlement as in the case of the Jews. But in pressing the Democratic Party to include a Southern African plank independent of civil rights as they did in 1972, Afro-Americans had successfully taken a tentative step toward imposing a reciprocal mandate upon those who sought their vote. Similarly the softening of the level of disdain, occasioned by the feelers being put across to Afro-Americans by the Ford administration could not but be inspired by the emergence of a new assertive Afro-American leadership not eager to kowtow in the name of working within the system to achieve an objective. Further testimony to this was the meeting which Kissinger granted Afro-Americans in late 1975 just to discuss Africa. [49] Was the administration now seeing Afro-Americans as constituents to be carried along if there should be an effective response to the developments in Southern Africa? If so how did the Afro-Americans respond? The answer to these questions constitute the bulk of the analysis in the next section.

(ii) Afro-Americans and US African Policy, 1976-80

If Afro-Americans moved from a period of disdain and powerlessness to demand definitive foreign policy stance from the Democratic Party in 1972 and were subsequently granted an audience by the Ford administration to discuss Africa, then the analysis in this section would have to concentrate on the consolidation of this nucleus of influence. But an analysis of the role of Afro-Americans in influencing the direction of U.S. policy in that region from 1976 to 1980 can only take place within the context of two key events of 1976. One was the victory of the Soviet-Cuban backed MPLA in Angola over then pro-Western UNITA and FNLA movements, the other the US presidential election of 1976 and its outcome.

The victory of a Soviet backed movement brought about an increase in interest over Southern Africa both in Congress and the media. At issue was the renewed importance of South Africa to the US in the light of the "communist take-over" of Angola and Mozambique. To Senators John Tower of Texas, Barry Goldwater of Arizona, Jesse Helms of Northern Carolina, Sparkman of Alabama and Garn of Utah among others, the time had come to anchor South Africa in the Western orbit with a view to protecting her from communist encroachment. The administration's policy of neutrality on the issue of US business involvement in South Africa - which Afro-Americans derided as succour to minority rule - was seen to be inadequate because it had failed to take adequate notice of South Africa's importance as the last anti-communist bastion in the region. Apart from the familiar ideological and economic virtues of South Africa, there was now offered an added advantage in securing the country for the West: that of strategic location especially the Cape route which came in handy during the 1973/74 oil crisis. Fuelled by an alleged Soviet build-up in the Indian Ocean, the note of caution voiced by C.I.A. Director, William Casey in his testimony before Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee in July 1974, that Soviet expansionism was in response to US activities in the Indian Ocean, was drowned out by the pro-Pretoria argument. The Director was speaking in response to a \$32 million allocation for improving the military facilities in Diego Garcia which the executive asked for in the 1974 budget.[50]

As far as the Senators and like-minded Republicans were concerned, the administration's policy was therefore shortsighted because it did not encourage US business to flourish in South Africa. This view was reinforced by the administration's inability to be as imaginative as its predecessor as evidenced by its failure to act on the policy of "communication" which would have

allowed South African importers of American goods to gain unfettered access to Eximbank loans.[51] Sixteen Senators, including the ones mentioned above, wrote to the administration in early 1976 emphasising that the Eximbank prohibition against South Africa was “detrimental to the U.S. not only in our balance of payments but also in the acquisition of advanced technology in the energy field.” [52] They had in mind South Africa’s intention to construct a coal gasification project, probably SASOL II which the US high technology conglomerate Fluor Inc. wanted to exploit. Metz suggests that the Senators action was triggered by the lobbying activities of National Constructors Association (NCA) in response to a complaint about Eximbank restriction difficulties by Fluor Inc.[53]

Whether or not this was true, given the ideological predilection of those involved, they were capable of taking the initiative in view of the window of opportunity opened by the situation in Angola and Mozambique. They were not alone. South Africa which for years had construed any domestic opposition as communist inspired while describing intensification of apartheid as an attempt to protect itself from the “grabbing hands of communism”, saw the latest concern about communism in the former Portuguese territories as a windfall to which all its spokesmen working in either information offices or the South African Foundation brought their skill to bear. The tour of South Africa by 39 Congressmen amidst a well publicised visit to military facilities including Simonstown in early 1976 was the consequence. The high profile visit to the US by South Africa’s Information Minister Connie Mulder, during which he visited Congressional leaders and also engaged in delivering lectures all aimed at emphasising his country’s importance to the West from the point of view of security, [54] was also part of Pretoria’s offensive to cash in on the debate in the US. Perhaps the most audacious act was exposed by the revelation that Illinois’s Congressman Philip Crane’s eloquent speech on the floor of the House in August 1976 on the need for the US to recognise the so-called “Republic of Transkei” was written for him by a South African agent called Donald de Kieffer. The Congressman’s protestation of innocence on grounds that he thought it was written by the Republican Study Committee rang hollow in view of his friendship with the South Africa Foundation - an arm of Pretoria’s propaganda machine - and a well publicised trip to South Africa during which he and his entourage of fellow Congressmen emphasised the need for closer security cooperation between the US and Pretoria.[55]

Even at the best of times, criticism of an incumbent administration on Southern Africa was

never one-sided. On this occasion, the Angolan misadventure had added urgency to the criticism. To Afro-Americans and their supporters in the anti-apartheid movement, whose stance appeared to have been vindicated, the lesson from the Angolan fracas was that the US had no credible policy in the region. One which would align itself with the majority African population was needed in place of the discredited "communication" policy because in addition to its inadequacy in bolstering up repressive tottering regimes, it had succeeded in conferring upon the US a pariah status in Africa and all over the world where there were African sympathisers. Senator Edward Kennedy's taunting of the administration on its Angolan adventure while prescribing termination of military cooperation and other tacit support to South Africa with a view to playing a constructive role in the self determination of the peoples of the region should be seen in this light.[56]

The fact that 1976 was an election year meant that it was the most inappropriate period for the Democratic Party either to ignore or pay lip service to an area of interest to Afro-Americans. This particular year was hardly the one to give succour to one's opponents. With the Republican Party demoralised by the trauma of Watergate and President Ford playing a second fiddle to Henry Kissinger in order to conceal his inadequacy in foreign affairs, this was the time to unite the party. Focusing on Southern Africa was advantageous to the party on two counts. First it emphasised the party's commitment to issues of concern to Afro-Americans irrespective of ideological label. Second, in the light of the Angolan development, Southern Africa policy was of considerable discomfort to the Republican Party. The Democrats could not therefore be expected to ignore an opportunity to embarrass their opponents.

The result was that for the first time since 1969 when dissatisfaction with main-stream Afro-American leadership spilled over into Congress with the emergence of the Black Caucus, one saw Southern Africa as an area of interest to influential and powerful members of the Democratic Party. Lobbying for support was no longer a headache as Congressmen and the party heavyweights, some with an eye on Afro-American electoral support, joined the fray. This accounted for the over-kill response to the Eximbank loan restriction. While on that occasion only 16 Senators wrote to the President for the lifting of the Eximbank prohibition, a total of 49 legislators - 41 in House and 8 in the Senate including Republican Javits of New York - wrote a counter letter to the President urging retention. Sandwiched between Republican Hawks and mainly Democratic Doves, President Ford uncharacteristically bowed to the latter by retaining the



prohibition. This was the first real as opposed to symbolic victory for the anti-apartheid front.[57]

To the Republicans, the administration's Eximbank decision was a betrayal of the business community, and would be politically suicidal to the president and perhaps economically disastrous to the country. In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1976, Eximbank's Vice-President, Stephen. M. Minikes brought this factor home when he painted a symbiotic relationship between the termination of the loan restriction on his Bank and an increase in US exports to South Africa. The benefit which would result from this, he argued, would be an improvement in the balance of payments. He indicated that political upheaval as a product of social and economic disequilibrium had made the going too tough for American corporate interests to operate in the developing world without support of the type being provided by Eximbank.[58] The implication in his testimony was that without Eximbank facilities, US corporations would be at a decided disadvantage in the South African market when faced with stiff competition from European consortia who could count on their governments to guarantee sources of financial support.

President Ford's challenger for the Republican nomination, Ronald Reagan, had declared himself opposed to the administration's stance on the Eximbank controversy and had launched a scathing attack on the White House for its ambivalence towards South Africa in spite of the "communist" threat at its doorsteps. In his speech at The Alamo, San Antonio, Texas on April 30, 1976, the challenger invidiously emphasised South Africa's acceptability by asking: "how then do we explain our ignoring the plight of the enslaved millions in the Soviet Union and other communist countries?"[59]

Under the circumstances, the President could not secure his party's nomination much less the presidency in the November elections without a dramatic initiative to steal the limelight from Reagan. Thus one saw two dramatic developments in April 1976, aimed at appeasing the business lobby and the Republican Party as well as the country. One was that US corporate interests, especially Fluor Inc. got from the Private Export Funding Corporation - a consortium of commercial and investment banks and corporations - the backing which Eximbank was compelled to deny them. Second was the gradual unfolding of a new strategy for arriving at the objective of Option Two of NSSM of 1969 as indicated above. The erosion of the Portuguese presence in the region and the threat to the settler administration in Rhodesia amidst low level insurgency in Namibia called into question the wisdom in predicating a policy on the longevity of minority rule.

As such, the administration especially its foreign policy ideologue, Henry Kissinger had realised that to shore up western influence in the region with a view to combating the “communist” gains in Angola and Mozambique, reliance must be placed on the region’s trust-worthy indigenous moderates as opposed to settlers. If this could be achieved in stages, first in Rhodesia and then in Namibia, massive infusions of US funds would compel those moderate leaders to open a dialogue with Pretoria with a view to forming a formidable front which would include Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Zaire, against further Soviet-Cuban encroachment. This was the essence of Kissinger’s whirlwind tour of Southern Africa in April 1976, in which he committed the US to majority rule in the region and repeated the often-made but never implemented promise to repeal the Byrd Amendment without telling his audience what Washington intended to reap from such reversal of policy.[60]

The trip attracted hostile comments. Reagan saw it as “an impulsive reaction in a potentially explosive situation.....The great issue of racial justice is as vital here at home as it is in Africa and it would be well to make sure our own house is in order before we fly off to other lands to attempt to dictate policies to them.” [61] To perennial enemies such as the Afro-Americans, the trip was self-serving if not an exercise in outright demagoguery. They complained to the Secretary of State:

“The perception of your general indifference to Africa and relative inaccessibility to the African diplomatic community in Washington, except when there is a public relations advantage to be gained, has created scepticism about the timing and substance of your visit, particularly during this election year.” [62]

But there was no connection between the criticism of Reagan and Afro-Americans. The latter were incensed that in spite of their efforts to alter the direction of the administration’s Southern African policy, it had to take a crisis of the magnitude in Angola for the White House to realise that a change of policy was needed. As a result, they were skeptical of the administration’s commitment to work toward genuine majority rule in the region - a scepticism confirmed by Kissinger’s unpreparedness to tamper with the status quo in South Africa itself. One has in mind the protest marches which the Pan-African Students Organisation organised on grounds that the tour was designed to protect corporate interests in the region and the adverse testimonies of Congressman Andrew Young and Career Diplomat Donald McHenry before the Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations in 1976.[63]

On the other hand, Ronald Reagan's criticism was inspired by his concern for the effect of a reversal of policy on America's effort to combat communism. Majority rule should not be achieved at the expense of weakening the anti-communist allies in the region because what posed a threat to humanity was communism and that alone. This accounted for his outburst at the administration's indication of interest to repeal the Byrd Amendment:

"He said (Kissinger) the administration will ask Congress to repeal the legislation which permits us to buy chrome from Rhodesia. There is only one other major source of chrome in the World, the Soviet Union. Chrome is absolutely essential to American industries and to the production of military hardware. In 1967 through 1971, we obeyed U.N sanctions and did buy our chrome from Russia. Russia doubled the price. Now Secretary Kissinger would make us once more totally dependent upon the Soviet Union at a time when they are intent on out-building us militarily. [64]

The good news for the administration was that apart from Reagan's fiery criticism, the realisation of possible defeat in an election in which they had very little to cheer about, made the Republican Party less belligerent towards the White House. But this was of partial comfort as the Democrats intensified their criticism of the administration's Southern African policy. Since the Afro-Americans now had no problem convincing doubting "Thomases" within the Democratic Party, they had no qualms in flexing their muscles further. Thus, one saw the convening of what became known as a "Caucus of Black Democrats" in Charlotte, North Carolina in April 1976 by the Congressional Caucus to put the Democratic hopefuls to the test, about their knowledge of Southern African. This was a follow-up of the strategy of reciprocal mandate which Afro-Americans first tried in 1972 to extract a commitment from the Democratic Party on Southern Africa policy.

Afro-Americans' endorsement was crucial and indeed sought by each of the four candidates. This accounted not only for their attempt to outdo each other but the effort and the seriousness the contenders put into it to impress and convince Afro-Americans of their understanding of the issue. This becomes glaring when one compares Senator Frank Church's statement that he knew "of no agency in government that has less black influence than the State Department, and that's why we're in trouble in Africa", [65] with Jimmy Carter's speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs on March 15, 1976 when he regretted the fact that "we have

either ignored them (developing world) or treated them as pawns in the big power chess game.” Such “attitude of neglect and disrespect toward the developing nations of the world is predicated in part in a sense of superiority towards others - a form of racism.”[66]

The observation one can make from these statements is that the candidates were displaying their ability to feel the pulse of Afro-Americans. It was dissatisfaction with the perennial dearth of Afro-Americans and Afro-American influence at the level of policy formulation which galvanised Afro-Americans into seeking an active role in policy towards Africa. By stating in no uncertain terms their intention to incorporate Afro-Americans and their views into the policy making process, all the four prospective Democratic nominees were responding positively to the concern of America’s African community. Since Afro-Americans were suspicious of Kissinger’s motives in Southern Africa, all the Democratic hopefuls embarked upon the familiar process of tailoring their speeches along the path of assailing the administration on the issue. Thus, Frank Church found Angola of “no strategic or national interest to us” and frowned upon any attempt to counter the Soviet-Cuban presence there. Rather the US, he cautioned, should side with liberation movements in quest of freedom from colonial rule.[67] Jimmy Carter lamented the missed “opportunity to be a positive and creative force for good in Angola during the years that we supported Portuguese colonialism. We should also realise that the Russian and Cuban presence in Angola, while regrettable and counter-productive of peace, need not constitute a threat to United States interests; nor does that presence mean the existence of a communist satellite on the continent.”[68]

The candidates views appear to have been wrested from the mouths of Afro-Americans which indicated a convergence of views between them and the Afro-Americans and as such a positive development, but they also proved beyond doubt that the Democratic Party was now the spokesman for Afro-American concern on Southern Africa. While conceding that the interest of the Democratic Party could have been inspired more by the need to garner Afro-Americans’ support and to embarrass the administration over Angola, than by conviction, it should be emphasised that there was direct correlation between the importance of Afro-American support in a closely fought race and the interests shown by the candidates over Southern Africa. For example, no contender for the Democratic Party’s nomination in the 1976 race could have been expected to carry Michigan without the endorsement of Congressman Charles Diggs. The price tag for an endorsement could not have been anything less than an enthusiastic commitment to the cause of Afro-Americans in



Southern Africa, bearing in mind the fact that it was an era in which Afro-Americans' external interests had eclipsed domestic concerns like civil rights.

In this respect, the surge in extra-Congressional Afro-American action in the wake of the Soweto rising in South Africa in June 1976, such as NAACP's end of year resolution urging the US to intensify its opposition to the "racist policies of the South African regime and the barbaric treatment of its non-White citizens", and Jesse Jackson's challenge to the administration to take moral and public positions "against the recent massacre of blacks in South Africa", should be seen as exerting pressure on both the administration and the Democratic Party.[69] On the latter to remind it of the need to intensify its efforts as spokesman for Afro-American concern on Southern Africa; and on the administration because far from being contemptuous of Afro-Americans' demands, its position on the Eximbank controversy showed that it was amenable to persuasion by opposing parties to an argument. This no doubt accounted for the balancing act the administration indulged in on the issue relating to the events in Soweto. For example, the US supported a Security Council resolution of June 19, 1976, condemning Pretoria's massacre of school children in the Soweto riots, but stopped short of seeing the event as a threat to world peace, [70] which could have led to the evocation of Chapter Seven of the charter. In a worse case scenario such development could have had the opposite effect of introducing communist troops into South Africa under the canopy of UN intervention. This accounted for the administration's effort to pacify its two opposing domestic critics irrespective of whether or not either was pacified. The July 30, 1976 abstention in the Security Council on a raid on Zambia by South African forces and the August 2, 1976 address to the Urban League in Boston by the Secretary of State, as well as his speech at Leon Sullivan's government funded Opportunities Industrialisation Centre (OIC) later in the month, while at the same time rejecting the Afro-Americans' demand for severance of relations with South Africa [71] should be seen in the light of playing a balancing role.

This pattern of taking turns to appease opposing factions was a novelty in the administration's response to such issues. Its predecessor all but ignored Afro-Americans' pressure on Southern Africa throughout its tenure. Why then should the Ford administration depart from the course of its predecessor given that there was nothing to be gained electorally?

There are two basic though related explanations for this. First, during the tenure of Richard Nixon, public apathy on African issues meant that they could conveniently be relegated to a non-



priority position. The administration was therefore free from the constraints which could have been imposed by public interests and expectations. It was this that gave the administration a free hand to pursue its Southern Africa policy and overwhelmed Afro-Americans' concern on the area. Second and equally important was the fact that the administration did not witness any dramatic development in the region which could have roused the American public from their deep slumber.

Neither was true for the Ford administration, which necessitated the different reaction from it. The administration's policy of trying to please everyone should therefore be seen as a consequence of its being a prisoner of competing and vocal interest groups on Southern Africa in the light of escalating events on the ground in the region.

### The Aftermath of the 1976 Election and the Response to Afro-Americans' Interest in Southern Africa.

How then did the Afro-Americans fare in their attempt to exert influence on US-Southern African policy in the aftermath of the 1976 presidential election? In other words how important was the Afro-American vote in the election and did the new administration respond to Afro-Americans' concern on Southern Africa?

At the election, the Democratic nominee, Jimmy Carter, won the presidency with the support of the Afro-American vote. Just as a balance of power situation enable Afro-Americans to play a crucial role in the election of John Kennedy in 1960, by the time of the 1976 election, the margin between the Democratic contender and the incumbent Gerald Ford was too close to call. The Afro-American tilt in favour of Jimmy Carter took him to the White House.

The Afro-Americans' strategy of reciprocal mandate, as earlier indicated, did not end with merely sounding out the opinion of the Democratic presidential nominees at the North Carolina's "Caucus of Black Democrats" in April 1976. By September 1976, a "Black leadership Conference" had produced an 11 point African-American Manifesto on Southern Africa. The points ranged from demand for US government's unreserved support to the liberation struggles in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa to imposition of sanctions against an intransigent South Africa, as well as request to the president to "institute a program of tax disincentives to US corporations operating in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. And should those corporations remain unprepared to use

their leverage to bring about concrete steps towards economic and political justice in South Africa, and to operate there, in Namibia and in Zimbabwe on the basis of fair and non-discriminatory employment practices, humane working conditions and just compensation for the exploitation of African resources, they should withdraw.” [72] To oversee the implementation of these demands, a Washington lobby was formed.[73] This appears to have been the nucleus of TransAfrica which in 1977 emerged as the lobbying apparatus of Afro-Americans.[74]

Thus President Carter was immediately confronted with a set of demands on Southern Africa by part of his constituents whose support he had publicly acknowledged as being responsible for his election.[75] They were armed with their lobbying apparatus to ensure fulfilment. In talking about the President’s response to these demands on Southern Africa, there are three issues worth addressing: how did the President perceive the problems of the region; what strategy did he adopt and finally how harmonious were his perception and strategy with the position and expectations of Afro-Americans on the issue.

(a) The President’s perception of the problems of Southern Africa: Jimmy Carter acceded to the presidency during a period of turmoil in Southern Africa: Angolan troops facing the South African Defence Force (SADF) in combat formation along the Namibian-Angolan border, Mozambique’s FRELIMO troops in a state of combat readiness against possible attacks from Rhodesian Selous Scouts; escalating liberation wars in varying degrees in Rhodesia and Namibia and above all, intermittent uprisings in major townships of South Africa, the most intense being Soweto.

The president’s perception of the region was that the indigenous populations had been wronged and their dignity violated by settler, minority and colonial regimes. It was this abnormality that posed a threat to US interests in the region because the struggle for human rights by the majority population had provided the rationale for the involvement of hostile powers. The main threat to the interests of the US therefore, was the existence of gross social and economic disequilibrium among the races.

Needless to say that such perception while diametrically opposed to the position of pre-1974 administrations was in accord with the position of Afro-Americans on the issue.

(b) The President's Strategy: The new government's ability to manoeuvre with a view to correcting what it recognised as gross injustice had been circumscribed by its predecessor's belated change of strategy - as opposed to conviction - in the region. In embarking upon his Southern African tour of April 1976, the then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger committed the US to majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia without any attempt to advocate the same in South Africa itself. Hence, there had been some movement on both Rhodesia and Namibia before the advent of the Carter administration. For example, in September 1976, Ian Smith committed himself to relinquishing political power to the majority population within two years pending which an interim council of ministers of equal number of Africans and Whites would administer the territory. Ian Smith's assertion that the arrangement received the blessing of Whitehall, which was duly confirmed by the British government White paper in September 1977, indicates that it was part of the Kissinger's initiative. Under it, Britain was to assume its colonial obligation to supervise the emergence of a new majority-ruled Zimbabwe. Thereafter a joint concerted international campaign by the US and UK coupled with infusion of economic aid and guarantee of pension rights for the White civil servants, sanctions would be lifted against Zimbabwe.[76] Although the Frontline States and Zimbabwe's two main liberation movements, ZAPU and ZANU, under the umbrella of the Patriotic Front (PF) later repudiated the arrangement on grounds that it left key ministerial portfolios in the hands of Whites, it meant that the Carter administration had inherited a pattern of solving Zimbabwe's problem which entailed coopting South Africa and the UK as co-adjudicators.

But the approach of the administration was different without totally ignoring the efforts of its predecessor. While the Ford administration approached the regional issues on a case by case basis and accorded priority according to its whims, the Carter approach was a three-pronged strategy which focused on Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Namibia and South Africa simultaneously.

On Zimbabwe where some effort had been made, the administration took cognizance of this by liaising with Britain to formulate a new initiative to solve the impasse which had developed there. Impasse it undoubtedly was because, while the Frontline States and the PF rejected the first phase of the Kissinger plan, they went along with the British sponsored Geneva Conference of October 1976, only for Ian Smith to reject the outcome of the deliberations. His preference was the Kissinger plan which his own opponents had earlier rejected. To break the deadlock, the administration's Permanent Representative to the UN, Mr. Andrew Young in conjunction with the

British Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen presented a new Anglo-American plan to Ian Smith on September 1, 1977 which was not much different from the one earlier rejected except that a British resident Commissioner was to govern Zimbabwe pending independence in six months. Smith also rejected it out of hand. Instead he proceeded with his own internal settlement, for which he signed an agreement with Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chirau in March 1978.

The administration's response was to distance itself from Smith's gamble while being vocal on the need for a negotiated settlement. The US also declined to use its power of veto in the UN and abstained on a Security Council resolution of March 14, 1978 rejecting the new development, thus ensuring its success as no Eastern bloc country would support Ian Smith. Instead, the administration continued to support the Anglo-American initiative as epitomised by the Malta conference between Andrew Young, David Owen and the joint leaders of the PF on January 30 and 31, 1978. Washington took the line that any settlement without the participation of the PF was tantamount to rejection by the majority of the Zimbabwean peoples. It was this position that made the President announce later in the year the convening of an All-Party Conference on Zimbabwe, a pointer to which was the flurry of shuttle diplomacy by the US and British Secretaries of State to Southern Africa, to confer with the parties involved. That the conference did not take place was a consequence of the internal contradictions within and among the parties to the conflict. Some of these were the acrimony arising from the secret meeting between Ian Smith and Joshua Nkomo without the knowledge of the other leader of the PF, Robert Mugabe, and the shooting down of a Zimbabwe passenger plane by partisans of the ZAPU wing of the PF in August 1978.[77]

The administration's resolve was put to the test in October 1978 after an earlier unsuccessful attempt by Abel Muzorewa to convince US officials of the need to lift sanctions against Zimbabwe. This time, Smith accompanied by his partners in the internal settlement, Muzorewa, Sithole and the entire Executive Council travelled to the US to convince officials of the validity of the new arrangement. They were there at the invitation of Republican Senators who called themselves members of the "American Security Council". Except a brief meeting with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the visitors did not succeed in their mission because the administration did not see any merit in lifting the 1968 sanctions against Zimbabwe. Nor would the President meet with them. The UN Representative, Andrew Young articulated the view of the

administration when he dismissed Ian Smith's internal arrangement as a viable alternative to an all-party conference on the future of Zimbabwe:

"We just don't think that he had much of a case. His claim that the US support would ensure his government's success just does not bear up under either our political judgment or our intelligence information. You have some 30,000 to 50,000 armed men in Rhodesia, Zambia and Mozambique, and they are not going to go away." [78]

But by holding out against the internal settlement, the administration incurred the anger of the Republican establishment and probably some Democrats in view of the fact that Ian Smith's effort had support within the US. It was this support which was translated into tremendous pressure on the administration to grant travelling permit to the visitors. While in the US, the delegation also had an audience with important establishments including Senate's Foreign Relations Committee.

The fact that Smith appeared to be letting go his racial group's stranglehold on power in favour of majority rule in the interest of peace in Zimbabwe fitted with Jimmy Carter's justice and human rights crusade, and this made the administration's objection questionable in the estimation of some sections of the American populace. Kissinger articulated this view when he publicly voiced his resentment on October 13, 1978, at what appeared to be the administration's obduracy: "I am not saying that we should support the internal settlement. All I am saying is that we should give his approach an opportunity [to be tested.]" [79] That was the dilemma of the administration: how to reconcile support for a faction intent on achieving its aim by armed insurrection when another had accepted peaceful means of achieving the same aim. By objecting to Ian Smith's proposal on the basis of non-inclusion of the PF, would seem that the administration was not committed to a peaceful transition in Zimbabwe. This would make a mockery of the protestation of Andrew Young when he said in an address in Lagos on August 25, 1977:

"I don't believe in violence. I fought violence in my own country. I am determined that the UN continue as one institution that is devoted to peaceful change. And yet, I have never condemned another man's right to take up arms in pursuit of his freedom. Too often, however, the armed struggle is advocated most vigorously by those who are thousands of miles away and whose only contribution to the struggle is the rhetoric of bitterness and frustration." [80]



The explanation for the administration's position was based on the fact that while the Republicans were going public with their exertion of pressure to recognise the Smith proposal, there was an under-current of Afro-American counter-pressure spearheaded by TransAfrica. The Afro-American reaction was based on their perception that the indigenous parties to the internal settlement were puppets of the government they intended to replace.[81] TransAfrica's Executive Director, Randall Robinson, subsequently claimed that its pressure had been a significant factor in the administration's position:

“Without our work, the United States would have lifted the economic sanctions on trade with Rhodesia long before this year, and the London conference would not have happened. When he was Prime Minister, Muzorewa tried to get Washington to lift the sanctions as a step toward recognising his regime; we were able to stop that from happening.”[82]

In this context, Senator Edward Kennedy's criticism of the administration for its failure to achieve a settlement in Zimbabwe which Margaret Thatcher did within seven months in office did not take cognizance of the conflicting pressures on the administration and the fact that Washington did not want to upstage the British over Zimbabwe. If the administration had recognised the Abel Muzorewa government, then the British conservative government would hardly have reopened the issue in 1979, because when the party was in opposition it sent out a team of observers under Viscount Boyd. The team returned with a positive report on the Bishop's accession to the Prime Ministership of Zimbabwe.[83] The criticism should therefore be seen as part of the on-going storm of protest from Congress and the Republican establishment over SALT II, Iran, Nicaragua and Southern Africa.

Kissinger's Lusaka speech of 1976 had also meant majority rule in Namibia to which South Africa had responded by making a statement to the UN in August 1976 promising independence to the territory by December 1978. However it became clear that this statement was meant to divert attention from Pretoria's occupation as no concrete effort was made to ensure its materialisation. Kissinger did not speak of majority rule in South Africa.

Here, the authorities' answer to the yearnings of the non-white masses was intensification of apartheid with pressure on the African “homelands” to declare themselves independent

“Bantustans”. The declaration of “Transkei” as an “independent country” took place before the end of the Ford administration. The task before the Carter administration was how to walk a tightrope between support for the status quo in South Africa as advocated by conservatives in the light of “communist gains” in Angola and Mozambique, and the demand of Afro-Americans for the withdrawal of support from that status quo. Added to this was the third factor of the president’s personal idiosyncrasy of basing foreign policy on the basis of human rights, which complemented the Afro-Americans’ position on the issue. The fact that in April 1977 the Contact Group under US Ambassador Don McHenry succeeded in talking Pretoria into accepting the basic tenet of UN resolution 385 in addition to the warning which Vice-President Walter Mondale issued to Pretoria against reliance on Washington over apartheid induced difficulties during a meeting in Vienna in the same year, appeared to be a tilt toward Afro-Americans’ position on the issue. This is all the more so when weighed against the background that the administration carried along the European powers with extensive economic interests in South Africa in voting in favour of a UN mandatory arms embargo against Pretoria in the same year.[84]

The result of this favourable development from the administration was an upsurge in demand for corporate disinvestment from South Africa by elements within the larger multi-racial anti-apartheid movement of which Afro-Americans have always played a pivotal role. ACOA’s role in spearheading the picketing of Banks which gave loans to South Africa was a case in point. University students across the racial divide, famous for their anti-apartheid activities, joined the fray in calling on their university authorities to sell their stock in corporations with South African connections. From their University premises, students demonstrated and offered themselves to be arrested to dramatise their case while the Interfaith Centre On Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) provided them with the back-up support, mostly in the form of information on share holdings and in publicising their case.[85] So deafening and persistent were the protests that some corporate interests with university holdings had to seek sanctuary in signing the Sullivan principle - a corporate code of conduct on employment by US firms operating in South Africa - while Minnesota, Illinois and Wisconsin Universities amongst others had to act to pacify their restive students. For example, Wisconsin thought it wise to divest itself of its shares in corporations with South African connections, Illinois placed a moratorium on investments while Minnesota gave corporations with South African connections the breathing space to sign up the Sullivan

principle.[86] ACOA's part of the protest also yielded dividends as the threat of withdrawal of business, duly supported by the powerful United Auto Workers Union, forced some Banks such as Chase Manhattan to announce a moratorium on further loans to South Africa.[87] The aftermath of the oil crisis of the mid-1970s had caused a dislocation of the South African economy to the extent that continuous prosperity was contingent upon the advancement of credit from overseas financial institutions among which the US Banks played a major role. [88]

If there were expressions of elation at the progressive stance of the administration on issues relating to Southern Africa, they were short-lived. By 1978, the administration's progressive and from all indications, pro-Afro-American outlook in its Southern African policy had suffered reverses. Although the catalyst seemed to be the May 1978 attempted invasion of Shaba province by Zairean refugees based in Angola, the real problem was the conflicting positions of officials who had considerable input in foreign policy. These were the President, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Ambassador Andrew Young and the NSC adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski. While the President, Vance and Young shared liberal instincts on issues of foreign policy, the NSC adviser was far to the right especially where the issues involved the Soviet Union and communism, such as Angola. As far as Brzezinski was concerned, recognition of the MPLA government should be predicated on the international conduct of Moscow. Africa was being seen within the spectrum of the bipolar world view in which the US must tailor its policy to deter Soviet hegemonic intentions in any part of the world.[89]

This tendency to posit a symbiotic relationship between Soviet conduct and US policy in all parts of the world was not shared by Andrew Young, Vance or the President. The President had expressed his view on the issue during the campaigns of 1976 as aforementioned. This had been reinforced by Andrew Young in 1979 when he described the Cuban troops in the region as a positive force in stemming the rising tide of warfare and balkanisation in Angola. But by failing to assert his authority effectively, the President contributed in no small measure to the tension between the regionalists and globalists in his administration which later deteriorated to almost the level of personal animosity between Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance.[90]

The implication in this was that in spite of his personal idiosyncrasies, the President was bound to be inundated with conflicting advice from officials. Unfortunately for Andrew Young, Brzezinski's articulation of the globalist perspective coincided with the buffeting of the

administration's policy in Southern Africa by a storm of protest within the US and in South Africa. The latter's popular entrepreneur, Harry Oppenheimer ridiculed the administration's insistence on the principle of one-man-one-vote as a basis for reforms in his country, while the Republican establishment led by former president Gerald Ford trained their big guns on the incumbent's Africa policy. Ford's appeal for closer business co-operation with South Africa when viewed within the spectrum that it was a former Democratic Assistant Secretary of State George Ball, who in 1977 ridiculed the existing Africa policy as a mixture of emotion and naivete for pandering to domestic pressure without recognising the US' limited leverage on Pretoria, called into question the collision course the administration had embarked upon with South Africa.[91]

Opponents claimed the administration was sacrificing tangible American economic and strategic interests in a region under communist threat, just to pacify the vocal domestic anti-apartheid lobby. Thus South Carolina's Governor James Edwards returned from a sponsored trip to South Africa in early August 1977 to say that it was Afro-Americans' influence on the executive which was preventing the "White South African government from getting its fair share of sympathy and understanding" in the United States.[92]

With Andrew Young out of the way over an incident which infuriated the Jewish lobby, Congress increasingly becoming hostile across the political divide as epitomised by the criticism over Zimbabwe as earlier indicated, amidst increasingly hostile editorials and articles in the Washington Post and Times, [93] and with Brzezinski becoming bolder as evidenced by the meeting between his aide and CIA Director Stanfield Turner in May 1978 to resume covert aid to UNITA, the Carter administration found it unappealing to continue its new chapter of US-Southern Africa policy with the same degree of commitment and enthusiasm.

With its own officials divided amidst growing criticism from without, the administration could not afford to appear weak or kowtowing to communism in Africa. This made South Africa and its Cape route as important to the Democratic administration as the Republicans had always insisted. An indication of how tough the administration had become manifested itself on May 30, 1978, during a NATO summit meeting in Washington when the President strongly protested the attempted Shaba invasion earlier in the month. He complained to his guests:

"The activities of the Soviet Union and Cuba in Africa are preventing individual nations

from determining their own future. As members of the World's greatest alliance, we cannot be indifferent to these events because of what they mean for Africa and because of their effect on the long term interests of the alliance itself." [94]

This view was diametrically opposed to his statement on the issue when he was a candidate in 1976. Furthermore Cuba had a legitimate presence in Angola as attested to by the overwhelming endorsement the MPLA government of Angola received from African countries and beyond after the defeat of the American sponsored South African invasion as aforementioned. Andrew Young was therefore justified in seeing Cuba as playing a stabilising role in Africa.

There is also hardly any justification for the administration to pick on the attempted Shaba invasion to launch its reversal of policy on Southern Africa. That invasion can be seen as part of an on-going antagonism between the central government in Zaire and the remnants of the Katangese rebellion in the 1960s. Not only did they take refuge in Angola after the collapse of their venture but they had since formed themselves into a closely knit unit under the political umbrella of Front pour la Liberation Nationale du Congo. They had not abandoned their ambitions to their own nationhood. Besides this, they had no commitment to either Cuba or the MPLA government of Angola as evidence abounds of their being recruited by the Portuguese to fight the indigenous liberation movements during the colonial war. [95] The invasion of 1978 was to all intents and purposes inspired by the desire to capture lost territory as opposed to acting under the direct instrumentality of either Cuba or Angola. It is quite unlikely that the President was unaware of these facts. Indeed, not only did the CIA fail to produce evidence of communists or Cuba's involvement, but the Cuban President had earlier called in the American diplomat in Havana to explain his country's innocence. Yet, President Carter went on to provide political and logistical support to a joint Franco-Belgian intervention force to "rescue" Zaire from an alleged communist sponsored invasion. He was resorting to the post-war American politics of obsession with communism - something he had earlier played down - as a means of mobilising public support for his failing political fortunes.

Thus, in an attempt to project a tough image, the administration had to compromise on its earlier stance on Southern Africa. A virtual declaration of war against injustice in the region had to be scaled down in the interest of political exigency. The result was that Afro-Americans' interests



and their preferences in the Southern African region had to become the greatest casualty of the new phase of US-Southern African policy. Their call for sanctions by means of the recall of the US Ambassador in Pretoria and down-grading of the embassy including cancellation of the position of attaches, prohibition of Eximbank facilities to South African bound exports and the cancellation of tax credits to that country which the Congressional Caucus had advocated and spear-headed, became a non-issue. The administration even failed to take advantage of South Africa's dependence on foreign loans to back up its policy at the early period of its inception. South Africa was indebted to US banks by as much as \$42 billion.[96], brought about mostly by the effect of the oil crisis of 1973/4. An executive order prohibiting rescheduling, would have made Pretoria realise that the administration was serious in its intention to see some visible movement in the direction of change which Vice-President Mondale spoke about in the Vienna meeting with Vorster. Instead the administration sank deeper into pursuing a Southern Africa policy of stopping perceived Soviet interests in the region. Not only did the administration refrain from recognising the government in Angola irrespective of the fact that American oil prospecting firms were engaged in lucrative business there, but South Africa became a comrade in the defence of Western interests against Soviet encroachment. For example, the US led Britain and France to abstain in the Security Council resolution condemning South Africa's invasion of Southern Angola in June 1980.[97]

The administration lowered the final curtain on the incorporation of Afro-American views in US-Southern Africa policy and their role as wielders of influence when protests at the resignation (sacking it seems) of Andrew Young failed to yield any encouraging reassurance in spite of the fact that the Black Leadership Conference convoked for the occasion received a wide response from the community.[98] The frustration being felt by Afro-Americans at the direction of the administration's Southern Africa policy was encapsulated in Congressman Diggs' statement in 1978 in support of the Maguire bill prohibiting Eximbank facilities to South Africa. In it, he told Congress that in view of the "White House seeming ambivalence toward adopting measures regarding South Africa that go beyond mere verbal condemnation and support for the mandatory United Nations arms embargo against Pretoria, it is up to the Congress to move decisively to give concrete expression to our policy pronouncements".[99] And yet it was the administration which protested Congressional attempts to predicate South Africa's access to Eximbank facilities on improvement of Pretoria's human rights record. The Carter administration protested that the

amendment (Paul Tsongas proffered it to pacify opponents), which conferred upon it the right to determine the degree of relaxation of apartheid and to respond accordingly by gradual lifting of the ban on Eximbank facilities, would impair its relations with Pretoria.[100] Although the House ignored this in approving the bill,[101] the administration's protest contributed to the stiff opposition which the bill encountered in Senate. At its hearing in May 1978, the Senate Committee on Banking bluntly refused to be pacified by an amendment similar to that of Paul Tsongas in the House, because to the pro-South Africa Senators it was iniquitous and inimical to America's global interests to proscribe South Africa while communist countries could gain access to Eximbank facilities.[102]

In the end, South Africa's massive crackdown on dissent including the death of Steve Biko in a Police cell under mysterious circumstances enabled the supporters of the bill to occupy a high moral ground by portraying their effort as an attempt to register disapproval of apartheid.[103] This tactic coupled with the series of amendments and alterations to pacify and accommodate the views of opponents led to the passage of a watered-down version of the bill in June 1978 prohibiting Eximbank support for sale of items to South Africa which could be deemed supportive of apartheid; that any support from the Bank should be contingent on progress on racial issues and certification by the administration that clients of the Bank with South African connection had signed the corporate code of conduct on employment known as the Sullivan principles.[104]

For an administration eager to establish its anti-communist credentials, the implementation of the bill would be self defeating. Even the arms embargo against South Africa which it elaborated at its inception and promised to implement studiously[105] was no longer a priority as arms traffickers were having a field day circumventing the rule. The best the administration could do in that direction was to placate Afro-American critics by randomly apprehending arms traffickers, such as the Olin Corporation in early 1978.[106] No one in the Congressional Caucus or the Afro-American community in general regarded that incident as a portrayal of the administration's resolve however, because the bulk of the traffickers were small time crooks taking advantage of official apathy.

Perhaps the most vivid illustration of the administration's lack of interest in taking measures against South Africa was the pathetic picture it cut over the Kalahari nuclear controversy of August 1977. This was the Soviet Union's revelation to the US that South Africa had exploded

a nuclear device in the Kalahari. We can perhaps overlook the question of whether the US did not indeed know of South Africa's explosion of nuclear device or the construction of a test site in the Kalahari desert prior to its being informed by the Soviet Union. So also could the conflicting statements from the President that he had secured an assurance from Prime Minister John Vorster that South Africa would not explode nuclear devices, only for the said Prime Minister to publicly contradict the President on grounds that he did not remember to have ever given such an assurance.[107] But what could not be ignored was the fact that South Africa had not signed the Non-Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NNPT), and hence was unqualified to receive U.S. support on issues relating to the development of nuclear capability even for peaceful purposes. Yet as late as 1979, the administration was unflinching in its effort to supply nuclear fuel to South Africa on the flimsy excuse that to do otherwise would compel Pretoria to either seek the supply elsewhere or develop its own materials.[108]

### Conclusion

One can make the following observations about the policy of the Carter administration in the light of Afro-Americans' attempt to influence the formulation and implementation of Africa policy.

(1) What started on a note of optimism ended in frustration and disenchantment as a result of the administration's inability to match its campaign promises and rhetoric with deeds. The issue had nothing to do with the absence of a blue-print for policy formulation and implementation at the inception of the administration as evidenced by the steadfastness and determination over Zimbabwe. This proved the viability of the pluralistic method of foreign policy formulation which the administration adopted because it prevented the frustration and acrimony that could have arisen between the NSC and the Department of State as one saw during the Nixon presidency. In this respect, the administration had its heart in the right place.

(2) But Jimmy Carter was a weak president who panicked at the sight of crises as evidenced by his inability to curb the feud between his officials, the sacking of Young to silence the Jewish lobby and above all, the ease with which he switched from the human rights/regionalist

perspective to the globalist vision in an attempt to stem the erosion of his political base. A more determined Chief of State would have stood by his policy while making every effort to convince the American public of the justice and merit of his case. Instead one witnessed a switch in rhetoric, as Pretoria whose apartheid policy and refusal to grant independence to Namibia was originally the focus of condemnation by the administration now became an ally in the fight against Russo-Cuban activities in Africa. While this development signified harmony in perception between Pretoria and the administration, it could not conceal the fact it was a negation of all that the president professed as a candidate in 1976, especially when compared to his speech to the Chicago Foreign Relations Committee in March 1976.

(3) The logical outcome of this was a feeling of betrayal on the part of Afro-Americans as the administration appeared to have cast its lot with the previous target of its criticism at the expense of all that they stood and worked for. Preston Greene expressed this feeling in guarded language when he insisted that Afro-Americans were not bent on monopolising US policy toward Africa but that the “multi-ethnic character of America can be a tremendous asset when positively or constructively utilised.”[109] That the administration failed to achieve its aims in South Africa and Namibia was because these aims and objectives became blurred at the later stage. This meant that apart from the initial euphoria which was not matched by deeds, the advent of the Carter administration marked no improvement in the aspirations of Afro-Americans with respect to US-Southern African relations irrespective of their efforts to commit the administration to a particular foreign policy stance.

(4) Afro-Americans had the issue and an organisational structure (TransAfrica) to drive home their point of view. Yet, a combination of public apathy and deliberate neglect from the executive arm made their efforts ineffectual.

## FOOTNOTES

1. See U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report of the Special Mission to Southern Africa, August 10-30, 1969. (microfiche), 91st. Congress, 1st. session, 1969. p.3.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. pp. 3-10.

4. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Policy Toward Africa for the Seventies", hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa, 91st Congress, 1st. session, 1970. p.3

5. Further information about NSSM 39, see Mohamed. A. EL-Khawas and Barry Cohen, (eds.), The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa: National Security Study Memorandum 39, (Lawrence Hill, Westport: Connecticut 1976); Steven. k. Metz, The Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Formulation of American Policy Toward South Africa, (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, Johns Hopkins University, Washington. D.C. 1985.) pp. 97-136; Roger Morris, Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy.(Harper and Row, New York 1977) pp. 106-120.

6. See, David D. Newsom, "United States Options in Southern Africa, an address at Northwestern University, December 8, 1970", Department of State Bulletin, (hereinafter referred to as DSB), January 18, 1971, pp. 80-84.

7. These were stated inter alia:

"Short - term FCIA (Foreign Credit Insurance Association) insurance  
Medium-term FCIA insurance.

Guarantees of loan by United States financial institutions to South African purchasers of United States goods and services.

Guarantees of loans by non United States financial institutions to South African purchasers of United States goods or services.

Exim discount loans to South African purchasers.

The facilities of the Foreign Credit Insurance Association for insuring political risks in South Africa.

The Export Expansion Facility for insuring higher risks transactions.

Guarantees of non United States loans to cover local costs related to the United States purchases.

The re-lending credit program.

The provisions by Exim staff of guidance and information to South African importers and United States exporters to South Africa."

For details, see, Charles C. Diggs Jr. "Action Manifesto", Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion, vol. ii, No. 1. Spring 1972. p. 53-55; For an overview of the globalist orientation of the Nixon administration's policy toward Southern Africa, see, Ronald Walters, "The Globalist Context of United States Foreign Policy Toward Southern Africa", Africa Today, vol. 19. No. 3. Summer 1972. pp. 13-28.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid

10. US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Policy Toward Africa for



the Seventies”, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa, 91st. Congress, 2nd. session, 1970. p. 11.

11. *Ibid* p.33; Metz. Op. cit, pp. 150-156.

12. See: Terrence Smith, “Rep. Diggs Resigns as a U.N. Delegate”, New York Times, December 18, 1971 pp. 1-2; Paul Delany, “Soft-Spoken Black Congressman Charles Coles Diggs Jr.” *Ibid*. p. 2; Anthony Lake, Caution and Concern: The Making of American Policy Toward South Africa, 1946-1971. (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Princeton University 1974) pp. 398-399.

13. C. Diggs Jr., Op. cit, p. 59; Tad Szulc, The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years (Viking Press, New York. 1978) pp. 461-462.

14. The Johnson administration was a forerunner in this respect except that the scale of assistance to Portugal was not as substantial as appears to be with the advent of the Nixon administration. To acquaint oneself with the involvement of the Johnson administration in Portugal’s empire wars, see: Mohamed A. El-Khawas and Francis A. Kornegay Jr., (eds.), American-Southern African Relations: Bibliographical Essays, (Greenwood Press, West Port, Connecticut 1975) pp. 10-11.

15. C. Diggs Jr., Op. cit. pp. 59-60.

16. *Ibid*, p. 58.

17. *Ibid* .

18. See testimony of Jennifer Davis, before the House, Committee on African Affairs, Hearings, Subcommittee on Africa, 20-22 March 1973 (Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1973) p. 78.

19. See Assistant Secretary of State, David D. Newsom, “The United Nations, the United States and Africa, an address to the Council on Foreign Relations, Chicago, September 17, 1970”, DSB, October 12, 1970. pp. 419-424; Michael Klare, “Evading the Embargo: How the U.S. Arms South Africa and Rhodesia” Issue: A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion, vol. 1/2, Spring/Summer, 1979. pp. 42-46.; Bruce Oudes, Testimony before the House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings, Subcommittee on Africa, 20-22 March 1973 (Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 1973) p. 5; Testimony of Judge William. H. Booth, President of ACOA, *Ibid*, p. 78; Testimony of Rauer. H. Meyer, Department of Commerce, *Ibid*, p. 27.

20. C. Diggs Jr., Op. cit, pp. 55-7.

21. John Joseph Seiler, The Formulation of U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, 1957-1976: the Failure of Good Intention, (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Connecticut, 1976.) pp. 278-286.

22. Steven K. Metz, The Anti-Apartheid Movement and the Formulation of American Policy Toward Southern Africa, (Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, John Hopkins University, 1985) pp. 152-3.

23. See Francis A. Kornegay, Jr., “Black Americans and U.S. Southern African Relations”, in the author and Mohamed El-Khawas (eds.) Op. cit, pp. 155-158; U.S. Congress, House, “U.S. Business Involvement in South Africa”, Part 1, pp. 87 and 213.; Charles C. Diggs, Jr., “My Visit to South Africa”, Africa Report , November 1971, p. 17.; Jim Hoagland, South Africa: Civilisations in Conflict, (Houghton Mifflin,

London, 1972) particularly chapter six.

24. Henry Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto, (William Morrow, New York 1985) pp. 150-153.

25. Robert. G. Weisbord, Ebony Kinship, (Greenwood st Port, Connecticut, 1973) p. 216.

26. John Seiler, Op.cit, pp. 302-303; Philip White, Op.cit, p. 91.

27. S. Metz, Op.cit, p. 145.

28. Ibid, p. 148.

29. See David Newsom's testimony, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Policy Toward Africa in the Seventies", Op.cit. p. 171.

30. S. Metz, Op.cit, p. 153; Southern Africa, June-July 1973. p. 32.

31. Bruce Oudes, "A New U.S. Southern African Policy?", Africa Report, v ol. 17. No.1 January 1972. p. 9; Southern Africa: Proposals for Americans. A report of a National Policy Panel, Established by the United Nations Association of the United States of America. (UN Association, New York 1971.)

32. The Report, Ibid. pp. 53-54.

33. Ibid. p. 23.

34. They were responding to the questionnaire submitted by the editorial board of Africa Report to the Democratic hopefuls for the Party's nomination for the 1972 presidential elections. See "Project: Election 72", Africa Report, March, 1972. pp. 22-33.

35. See the Democratic Party Platform for the 1972 Elections; Bruce Oudes, "After the Democratic Convention: A Real Choice on Southern Africa", Africa Report, July-August 1972. p.8.

36. Southern Africa, February-March, 1973. pp. 19-20.

37. S. Metz, Op.cit, pp. 198-200; Southern Africa, August 1972. p. 35.

38. See UN Documents, A/Res/3207 (xxix) 1974.

39. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, "Review of State Department Trip Through Southern and Central Africa", Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa, 93rd. Congress, 2nd. session, 1974. p. 2.

40. Department of State, "U.S. Challenges Ruling To Exclude South Africa From General Assembly", Ambassador John Scarli's statement to the General assembly on 12th. November 1974, DSB, December 9, 1974. pp. 775-7; Bruce Oudes, "Southern Africa Policy Watershed", Africa Report, November-December 1974. pp. 46-50; Tom Wicker, "The New Majority", New York Times, December 15th. 1974. p. 17.

41. Bruce Oudes, "New Agenda For African Policy", Africa Report, September-October 1974. p. 54.

42. Perhaps some of the most detailed studies on the issue are those of Arthur J. Klinghoffer, The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World (Westview, Boulder Colorado 1980); "C.I.A.'s Secret War in Angola", Intelligence Report, (Centre for National Security Studies), vol. 1. No. 1. 1975.
43. See U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "South Africa", Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, 94th Congress, 2nd. session, 1976. pp. 258 and 529.
44. Bruce Oudes, "Kissinger Confronts Africa", Africa Report, March-April, 1975. p. 46; Bruce Oudes, "The Sacking of the Secretary", Africa Report, January-February, 1975. pp. 17-19; Richard Bissell, South Africa and the United States: The Erosion of an Influence Relationship, (Praeger Publishers, New York 1982.)p. 27.
45. Edgar Lockwood, "The Kissinger Team for Africa: Destabilisation Revisited", Southern Africa, April 1975. p. 5.
46. Southern Africa, March, 1975. p. 26.
48. U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Discusses Human Rights in South Africa", Representative Clarence M. Mitchell's Statement to the Plenary Session of the General Assembly, November 28, 1975. DSB, December 29, 1975. pp. 935-944.
48. Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, (Columbia University Press, Missouri, 1985) p. 22.
49. This was the first meeting between a Foreign Secretary and Congressional Afro-Americans just for the purpose of discussing Africa. See F. Kornagay, Jr., "Kissinger and Africa", Africa Report, November-December 1975. p. 39; J. Seiler, Op. cit., pp. 288-289.
50. David Johnson, "Indian Ocean: Troubled Waters for the U.S. Navy", Africa Report, January-February 1975. p. 10; Bob Wilson, "Congressional Attitudes", in Patrick Wall (ed.) The Southern Oceans and the Security of the Free World. (Stacey Int. London 1977) pp 141-143.
51. Maxine Isaacs Burns, "Tilting Toward South Africa", Africa Report, March-April 1976. p. 7.
52. Ibid. pp. 7-8; S. Metz, Op. cit. pp. 265-6.
53. S. Metz, Ibid.; For an insight into the influence of Fluor Inc. in Washington as well as its activities in Pretoria's energy development efforts, see, Fluor: Building Energy Self-Sufficiency in South Africa, (Africa Fund, New York 1979); For an overview of Pretoria's propaganda efforts in the US, see, Peter H. Stone, "Muldergate on Madison Avenue", The Nation, vol. 14. April 1979; Barbara Rogers, "Sunny South Africa: A World-wide Propaganda Machine", Africa Report, September-October 1977; Barbara Rogers, "South Africa's Fifth Column in the United States", Africa Report, November-December 1977.
54. Southern Africa, May 1975. p. 35.
55. See, House Resolution 1509, Congressional Record, August 31, 1976. p. 28534 and also of September 20, 1979. pp. 31586-7; Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, "Smog Can Blind Maverick", Washington Post, October 5, 1976. p. B17; Walter Pincus, "South Africa's Lobby", Washington Post, January 29, 1977. A1 and A16.

56. Congressional Record, March 23, 1976. pp. 7603.

57. Austin Scott, "Liberals Urge Ford to keep Ban on Loans to South Africa", Washington Post, March 10, 1976. p. A2; J. Seiler, Op. cit., p. 512; U.S. Congress, House, "Resource Development in South Africa and U.S. Policy", Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food and Energy, 94th. Congress, 2nd. session, 1976; The issue of combating attempts by the administration to grant licences to munition industries to sell nuclear related and high technology equipment to South Africa is a long standing one. What made the GEC situation unique was because it was the first time the administration had withheld a licence as a result of pressure from Afro-Americans in particular and the anti-apartheid movement in general. Moreover not only was the sale approved by the administration's Deputy- Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, James Blake, but that the amount of about \$2 billion involved was substantive in an era of recession. The resentment of right-wing Republicans was therefore understandable. For further details, see, testimonies of Myron .B. Kratzer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, International Environment and Scientific Affairs; and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, James Blake respectively, "U.S. Policy Toward Africa", Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, Arms Control, International Organisations and Security Agreements, 94th Congress, 2nd. session, 1976. (Pages missing in both).

58. It makes an interesting reading to go through the testimony of Stephen Minikes, Vice-President of the Export-Import Bank, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "South Africa", hearings before the subcommittee on African Affairs, 94th. Congress, 2nd. session, 1976. pp. 559-60.

59. "Governor Ronald Reagan's Southern African Policy, Excerpts of Remarks made at the Alamo, San Antonio, Texas, April 30, 1976", Africa Report, July-August 1976. p. 15.

60. Colin Legum, "International Rivalries in Southern African Conflict." Op. cit. For the text of the speech, see, "Kissinger Speaks: U.S. Policy on Rhodesia and on Namibia", address delivered at Lusaka, Zambia, April 27, 1976.

61. "Governor R. Reagan...." Op. cit.

62. Quoted in Franklin. H. Williams, "Towards an African Policy", Africa Report, July-August 1976. p. 2.

63. See testimonies of Congressman Andrew Young and Donald McHenry respectively before the Senate's Committee on Foreign Relations, "South Africa", hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, 94th Congress, 2nd. session, 1976. pp. 140 and 193 respectively.

64. "Governor R. Reagan, Op. cit., p. 15.

65. Francis Kornegay Jr., "Africa and Presidential Politics", Africa-Report, July-August, 1976. p. 8.

66. Ibid.

67. "Senator Frank Church's Africa Policy", Africa Report, July-August 1976. p. 13.

68. "Governor Jimmy Carter on Angola: Text of an Interview in May-June 1976", Africa Report. July-August 1976. p. 17.



69. Austin Scott, "Rhodesia Pact Questioned by Group of US Blacks", Washington Post, September 20, 1976. p.A12; U.S Department of State, "The Search for Peace in Southern Africa", a statement by Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, William D. Rogers before the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, September 30, 1976", DSB, October 25, 1976. p. 530.; For Jesse Jackson's concern: Washington Post, July 2, 1976; For NAACP's concern: "Reclaiming a Heritage" (NAACP) p. 59; New York Times, August 24, 1976.

70. U.S Department of State, "U.S. Joins Security Council Consensus on Resolutions on South Africa", Statements by U.S. Representative Albert W. Sherer, Jr. in the Security Council, June 19, 1976", DSB, July 12, 1976. pp. 59-60.

71. U.S. Department of State, "Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Philadelphia, August 31, 1976", DSB, September 20, 1976. p. 360; Henry A. Kissinger, South Africa: An American Perspective", Africa Report, September-October 1976. pp. 17-20.

72. For the full text: "Black Leadership Conference: African-American Manifesto on Southern Africa", Africa Report, November-December 1976. pp. 24-27; Also in The Black Scholar, January-February 1977.

73. Ibid.

74. Henry F. Jackson was probably of the same opinion when he indicated that the "new lobby grew out of a meeting of 130 Blacks summoned by Charles Diggs Jr. and Andrew Young to challenge Secretary Kissinger's policy on Rhodesia." See H.F. Jackson, Op.cit, p. 124.

75. Ibid. p. 154; also see "94 0/0 of Blacks' Vote Went to Carter: Study Reports", Washington Post, 11 November 1976, p.A22; Herschelle S. Challenor, "The Influence of Black Americans on US Policy Toward Africa", in Abdul Said, (ed.) Ethnicity and US Foreign Policy, ( Praeger, New York, 1977) pp. 139-65.

76. See Garrick Uttley, "Globalism or Regionalism?: United States Policy Toward Southern Africa." Adelphi Papers, No. 154. 1979/80. pp 20-22.

77. See The Annual Register: A Record of World Events (Longmans: London) Vol. 220. 1978. pp.245-250; Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London) hereinafter referred to as KCA, Vol. xxiv, 1st. September, 1978. pp. 29173-8.

78. KCA, February 9, 1979. p. 29439.

79. Ibid.

80. Andrew Young quoted in Bruce Oudes, "The United States Year in Africa: Reinventing the Wheel." ACR, vol. 10. 1977-78. pp. A69-70.

81. KCA, Op.cit, pp. 29437-8.

82. Quoted in Henry F. Jackson, Op .cit, p. 125.

83. See interview granted Richard Deutsch by Senator Edward Kennedy, Africa Report, Vol. 25. No.3. May-June 1980. p. 22. For the Zimbabwe election, See Miles Hudson, "The Rhodesian election : A basis for the Future", The World Today, Vol. 35. No. 8. August 1979. pp. 324-331.



84. There was harmony in the position of Afro-Americans and the administration on the issue of South Africa was attested to by the fact that during their meeting in Vienna, Vice-President Walter Mondale did not only warn of possible deterioration in the relations between the two countries, but he actually threatened diplomatic sanctions against Pretoria if it failed to dismantle apartheid. See U.S. Department of State, "Vice President Mondale Visits Europe and Meets with South African Prime Minister Vorster, News Conference in Vienna, May 20, 1977. DSB, June 20, 1977. pp. 661-666; For the full text of the encounter, see "Policy Statement by Vice-President Walter Mondale After Meeting with John Vorster in Vienna, 20th May 1977", ACR, Vol. x, 1977/78. pp. 027-030; Jim Hoagland, "U.S. Warns South Africa on Race Bias", Washington Post, May 21, 1977. pp. A1-A7. For the action in the UN, see: U.S. Department of State, "U.N. Security Council Condemns South Africa's Apartheid Policy and Imposes a Mandatory Arms Embargo, Statement by U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young in the Security Council, October 31, 1977 and November 4, 1977", DSB, December 12, 1977. pp. 859-865.

85. See, David Hauck, Meg Voorhes, and Glenn Goldbergs, Two Decades of Debate: The Controversy Over U.S. Companies in South Africa, (Investor Responsibility Research Centre, Washington D.C. 1983) pp 4-11; Desaix Myers, III, U.S. Business in South Africa: the Economical, Political and Moral Issues, (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1980.) pp. 13-14; Herman Nickel, "The Case for Doing Business in South Africa", Fortune, June 19, 1978. p. 60; Sell the Stock: The Divestiture Struggle at Northwestern University and Building the Anti-Imperialist Movement, (For the Chicago Committee For a Free Africa By Peoples College Press, Chicago 1978).

86. Myers III, Ibid, pp. 4-13; Steven Metz, Op.cit pp. 365-9; Dominique Colon and Dunn Truman, South Africa: Taking Stock of Divestment, (ACOA, New York 1979).

87. Jack Egan, "Chase to Curb some Loans to South Africa", Washington Post, April 20, 1977. p. D11.

88. R. Bissell, Op.cit, p.80.

89. H.F. Jackson, Op.cit, pp. 78-9.

90. For an insight into the the feud, see, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of National Security Council Adviser, 1977-81. (Wiedenfield and Nicolson, London 1983) pp. 36-8; David Ottaway, "Africa: U.S. Policy in Eclipse", Foreign Affairs, No.58, Vol. 3. 1979. p. 637.

91. Bruce Oudes with Michael Clough, "The United States Year in Africa: From Confidence to Caution," ACR, Vol. xi, 1978-79. pp. A86-7.; George Ball, "Asking For Trouble in South Africa", The Atlantic, October 1977. pp. 43-51.

92. Jan Stucker, "Governor Edwards Stands by South African Remarks", Washington Post, August 9, 1977; Kevin Danaher, In Whose Interest? A Guide to U.S. - South Africa Relations, (Institute for Policy Studies, Washington, D.C. 1984) p. 126.

93. See Washington Post, June 2, 9 and August 9, 1977; New York Times, August 22, 1977; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Op. cit, p. 3.

94. Carter quoted in Bruce Oudes with Michael Clough, Op. cit, p. A87; For more information on the President's resort to Cold War: Richard J. Payne, "The Soviet-Cuban Factor in the New United states Policy Toward Southern Africa", Africa Today, vol. 25. No. 2. April/June 1978; D. Ottaway, Op.cit; Hunt Davis Jr. "U.S. Policy

Toward South Africa: A Dissenting View" in Rene Lemarchand (ed), American Policy in Southern Africa, (The University Press, Washington D.C. 1981) pp. 320-23; Donald G. Baker, "South African Policy and US Responses", International Affairs Bulletin, vol. 13. No. 2. September 1979; Barry Cohen, The Black and White Minstrel Show: Carter, Young and Africa (Spokesman Book, Nottingham 1977).

95. For details, see Tilden. J. Lemelle, "Whither US-African Policy?", Africa Today, (Denver, Colorado) Vol. 25. No.2. April/June 1978. pp. 5-6; Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State, ( the University Press, Madison, Wisconsin 1985) pp. 188, 388-389; Crawford Young, Ideology and Development in Africa, ( Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982) p. 291; For an analysis of the innocence of Cuba and communists in the invasion of Shaba I and Shaba II, see in addition to the above literature, The New York Times, 11-7-78.

96. R. Bissell, Op cit, p.80.

97. Henry Jackson, Op cit p. 82-3.

98. For a general perception of Afro-Americans view at the sacking of Andrew Young and the need for their active involvement in policy toward Africa, see, Preston Greene, "Lesson's of Young's Departure", New York Times , August 28, 1979; H.F. Jackson, Op.cit, pp. 160-168.

99. See Congressman Diggs written testimony to the House, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, "Export-Import Bank and Trade with Africa", Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy, 95th. Congress, 2nd. session, 1978. p. 28. To appreciate the issue at stake, it is necessary to see this reference in conjunction with Senator Dick Clark's recommendation on Eximbank facilities to South Africa at the end of his fact finding tour of Africa in 1978: U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "U.S. Corporate Interests in Africa", a report by Senator Dick Clark, Chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, 95th Congress, 1st. session, 1978; Also see Dick Clark, "Against Financing Apartheid", New York Times, Feb. 21, 1978. p. 31

100. See John .M. Goshki, "Hill Panel votes to Bar Ex-Im Bank in Transactions involving South Africa", Washington Post, April 14, 1978, p. A2; New York Times, April 27, 1978. p. 7.

101. See John M. Goshki, "Attempt to Block Rebuff to South Africa Loses", Washington Post, April 21, 1978. p. A6; -"Curb Voted on South African Trade", Washington Post, May 2, 1978. p. 7

102. John M. Goshki, "Senate's Panel Sets Back Efforts to Curb Exim-Bank's Programs in South Africa", Washington Post, May 5, 1978. p.A7

103. Not only was the bill cast in terms of voting for or against evil but the three Democratic Congressmen behind the effort - Andrew Maguire of New Jersey, Thomas Downey of New York and Edward Markey of Montana - used the occasion to form an hoc committee involving other law-makers to monitor the treatment of detainees by the authorities in Pretoria. For details, see: Congressman Tom Downey, "Congressional Ad Hoc Group on Southern Africa", Journal of Southern African Affairs, vol. 5. No. 2. April 1980.

104. Mary Russell, "Ex-Im Bank Curb for South Africa Voted", Washington Post, June 3, 1978. p. A6; Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, August 5, 1978. pp 31-35.

105. The administration promised to tighten any loop-holes in the existing arms embargo and included the prohibition of exports of equipment of dual purpose which Henry Kissinger created to circumvent the embargo. See US Congress, House, Testimony of William H. Lewis, Director of the Office of Inter-African Affairs, "U.S.Arms Embargo Against South Africa", Before the House Committee on International Relations, July 20, 1977, DSB, September 5, 1977. pp. 320-322.

106. Of the multitude of arms traffickers to South Africa, it was the Olin Corporation that was indicted with conspiring to ship arms to Pretoria by filing fictitious destination with the State Department. It was fined \$500,000 which the administration duly touted to its anti-apartheid critics as an eloquent testimony to make good its promise on arms embargo. For details about the issue, see, New York Times, March 15, 1978.

107. For details see, Murray Marder, "Carter Says South Africa Had Pledged It Will not Develop Nuclear Explosives", Washington Post, August 24, 1977. p. A1; Richard Bissell, Op.cit. p.111

108. See U.S Department of States, "Secretary Vance's Question and Answer session in Gainesville, Florida, October 26", DSB, December 1979. pp. 23-24.

109. Preston Greene, "Why Only Whisper?" New York Times, July 17, 1978; Also quoted in H.F.Jackson, Op.cit., p. 162.

## CHAPTER SIX

### US POLICY TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA IN THE EARLY 1980s IN THE LIGHT OF AFRO-AMERICANS' EFFORTS TO EXERT INFLUENCE.

The previous Chapter has revealed that Afro-Americans did not succeed in having durable influence over the Africa policy of the Carter administration because the latter was unable to prove itself different from previous administrations when it came under pressure from right wing elements within and without. Afro-Americans' weak position stemmed from the fact that the general pattern of Cold War consideration and their lack of electoral significance, except in a balance of power situation, had always prevented them from having significant impact on Africa policy. If the Carter administration adopted an Africa policy that was deemed unfavourable to the stance of Afro-Americans, then there was still less reason to suppose that a Republican administration would adopt a favourable policy.

This chapter concentrates on the first Reagan administration 1980-84, analysing the Africa policy of the administration (which Afro-Americans found unfavourable) and Afro-Americans efforts to thwart and transform that policy. In sharp contrast to the second Reagan presidency and for familiar reasons, they were unsuccessful.

#### The Administration's Africa Policy

Unlike Carter, whom he defeated in the 1980 Presidential election, Reagan left no one in doubt as to the direction of his Southern African policy. As a candidate, he told a campaign rally in 1979 that pro-communist changes in Africa such as the victory of MPLA and FRELIMO and probably that of ZAPU-PF in Zimbabwe were losses to the U.S. for which the ineptitude of the

Carter administration should be blamed.[1]

His nominee for Secretary of State, Alexander Haig Jr. returned to this theme at his confirmation hearing in early 1981 when he expressed concern over the presence of 20,000 Cuban troops in Angola. He blamed the Clark Amendment for restricting the ability of the Ford administration to effectively forestall communist take-over of a region vital to the interest of the U.S. "Several years ago", he said, "I felt that we could have done something to prevent the outcome that confronted us there (Angola)". But there was still cause for optimism because according to him "UNITA elements are still going strong and are functioning." [2] He also went out of his way to endorse Pretoria's procrastination over Namibia's independence on grounds that it should come about in a manner which would not jeopardise Western interests in that territory in particular and the region in general. Presumably, Pretoria's activities were designed to bring this about.[3]

To complete the equation, Haig nominated Chester Crocker, an academic with a similar perspective on the region as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Unlike his immediate predecessor, Crocker had a specialised scholarly knowledge on Africa sharing only the globalist perspective with the administration he had been called upon to serve. In May 1981 Crocker outlined the administration's policy as unequivocal support to friendly administrations with a view to ensuring unfettered access to mineral resources and to defeat subversion and to promote security in the area to which he added another objective, a desire for a negotiated settlement of the conflict in the region, a month later.[4]

Before long, it became obvious that the Reagan administration's regional policy would have four inter-related facets: (i) withdrawal or expulsion of communist forces in the region; (ii) settlement of Namibia's independent issue conditional upon the success of the first; (iii) the existence of regional security and consequential peaceful co-existence between a minority ruled South Africa and the other states in the region; (iv) South Africa to respond to these developments by carrying out its choice of reform of apartheid. A combination of these four facets constitute what Crocker dubbed "constructive engagement" - the code name for the Reagan administration's strategy in Southern Africa which he was appointed to implement.

First signs of how the administration intended to implement its "constructive engagement" emerged from leaked State Department papers in 1981. The strategy was to concentrate first on



securing Pretoria's cooperation. To obtain that cooperation, the administration chose to substitute coercion and moral indignation over apartheid with pragmatism, contact and private pressure on Botha's government. Thus one saw resumption of sale of military equipment not deemed combat-related by the administration, training of SADF personnel, relaxation of export control regulations and the exchange of military personnel between the two states.[5]

No one could fault the minority regime for accepting the Crocker plan in view of the numerous advantages inherent in it. First, in predicating Namibia's independence on the withdrawal of Cuban troops, the American administration was echoing South Africa's own position on the issue. Pretoria had never ruled out Namibia's independence, but it did not want a government headed by SWAPO in view of the close relations between it and the Soviet bloc. Pretoria's antagonism toward the independence package worked out by the UN Contact Group, the procrastination and delay tactics amidst hosting of conferences and a visible bias toward the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) should be seen in the light of efforts to find an alternative to SWAPO. To allow the latter in Windhoek would bring the Soviet bloc too close to South Africa with the likely result of an upsurge in revolt against apartheid in the domestic scene. In this respect, "constructive engagement" had cast its lot with Pretoria because both it and the Reagan administration viewed the Cuban role in Southern Africa as none other than a relay point for the transmission of Soviet hegemony throughout the sub-continent. Crocker vividly illustrated this when he described the presence of Cuban troops in Angola as: "a major impediment to progress on Namibia. It is a situation which allows the Soviet Union and Cuba to foment disorder: to keep the pot boiling... and to prevent development of regional cohesion." [6]

Pretoria stood to gain immensely from the American initiative for two reasons: (i) the promotion of regional security as intended by Washington would help to minimise the tempo of the liberation struggle inside South Africa and Namibia, legitimise apartheid and improve the image of its practitioners from their pariah status in Africa and the UN. This would be the logical outcome of any understanding of peaceful co-existence the regional states might enter into with Pretoria as they would not be prepared to continue to offer sanctuary to the liberation movement without violating the agreement. This would mean acceptance of the status quo in South Africa in violation of the stance of the OAU and the aspirations of the vast majority of the non-white South Africans unless Pretoria willingly made concessions to the latter. Such concessions could not be guaranteed to be

substantive; (ii) the Crocker plan for ensuring regional security would enable Pretoria to achieve its vision of a “constellation of states” involving it and the other regional states. This idea owed much to Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy of 1976. That Pretoria still favoured its materialisation was attested to by Foreign Minister Pik Botha’s secret discussion with Crocker as outlined in the leaked State Department documents in 1981. Pretoria’s fascination is understandable in view of the fact that experts had reckoned that continuous growth in the economy would depend upon the availability of new markets and investment outlets to supplement the narrow domestic market, made so by the limited purchasing power of the vast majority of the population as a result of the rigidity of apartheid.[7]

Since South Africa was the focus of the regional economy brought about by the colonial pattern of communication which linked the regional States to South Africa, the regime in Pretoria was therefore in a position to use the carrot to compensate subservient states and the stick against opponents of apartheid. Pretoria experimented with this possibility when it used the stick against Mozambique and Zimbabwe in 1981. On Mozambique, it took the form of abrupt suspension of traffic between the two countries on the flimsy excuse that wagons sent to Mozambique were delayed on their return journey. The truth of the matter was that the ANC had a functional operating base in Maputo which Pretoria suspected of master-minding the increased guerrilla activities within its borders. Although Maputo responded by returning the wagons hurriedly, the authorities in Pretoria refused to allow any peace. Rather South Africa stepped up its direct intervention and the sponsorship of a puppet organisation called Mozambican National Resistance (MNR) to destabilise the country. Major manifestations of direct intervention were the Matola massacre of 1981 and the attack on Maputo in 1983 in retaliation for bomb explosions in Pretoria for which the ANC claimed responsibility. Pretoria’s justification was that the freedom fighters had their base in Mozambique from which they undertook the journey.[8] That such explosions were a direct result of apartheid after years of persuading the regime to abandon the system was lost on Pretoria, nor was Washington ready to drive home this point to the South African regime. The emphasis was on ensuring a communist free Southern Africa as opposed an apartheid free region.

Zimbabwe and Angola did not fare better. In the former, apart from the fact that South Africa offered to train at independence 5000 men of the former auxiliaries of Bishop Muzorewa with a view to infiltrating them back to overthrow the government in Harare, there were also

visible signs of direct intervention: in addition to intermittent destruction of expensive military equipment and bombing of ANC offices, a unit of Zimbabwe's armed forces intercepted an armed South African column in the Sengwe area on August 18, 1982 at a time when "constructive engagement" had matured.[9] Previous manifestations of the pressure had taken the form of withdrawal of 25 locomotives on loan to Harare, followed by an announcement to withdraw a further 200 wagons also on loan to the same source. Pretoria had earlier abruptly terminated a 1966 Trade Agreement between the two countries in such a manner that would have compelled Harare to pay a heavy sum in arrears on previously unlevied tariffs and goods exported to South Africa. These moves were unnecessary except that they were designed to hurt the fledgling government of Robert Mugabe at a time it was facing a domestic crisis with its war-time ally, ZAPU-PF. Needless to say that that was exactly what Pretoria achieved when the difficulties created by the withdrawal of the equipment restricted Zimbabwe's capacity to meet export orders of about 100,000 tons of maize and over 50,000 tons of sugar. [10]

South Africa was also involved in frequent incursions into Angola where it gave considerable military and financial support to UNITA, in the hope of reducing the country to political and economic ruin.[11] Without the continuous support of Cuba and the Soviet bloc, the activities of the Pretoria regime would indeed have resulted in the collapse of Angola.

But the fact that the American initiative did not specify the gravity and scope of reform expected from the South African authorities meant that they could realise these advantages while brandishing a token political reform. This therefore raises the question: how did South Africa fulfil its own part of the bargain and how did the Afro-Americans respond to the latter in particular and "constructive engagement" in general?


#### Pretoria's response to "constructive engagement".

Since the Crocker plan did not specify the nature of the reform expected of the authorities in Pretoria, one expected "constructive engagement" to have a fair wind. In April 1981, the regime showed its eagerness to address the issue of "liberalisation of political process" by proposing voting rights for some sections of the disenfranchised majority. These were those of Asian descent

and the mixed race population known as “coloured”. No similar arrangement was made for the indigenous Africans. But even those with the new found favour had little to cheer about as the authorities balked at the idea of repealing such legal instruments of apartheid as the Group Areas Act which enforces racial segregation and the Internal Security Act which violates civil liberties and the rule of law in the country.[12]

There was other evidence to support the contention that the reform was a mere subterfuge to ensure continuous white domination. It envisioned three separate Parliaments, for whites, Asians and the so-called “coloureds”. Each Parliament was to make laws on its own racial affairs, while the three Houses in which Whites enjoy a clear majority jointly legislate on issues affecting the entire country irrespective of the fact that the total number of the participating groups was still less than thirty per cent of the South African population. Fig 2 illustrates the disparity in population between the racial groups in South Africa.

Fig 2: Population Distribution of South Africa



Source: Annual Survey of Race Relations 1986  
(Institute of Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1986)

It was into such “power sharing” arrangement that but 20 per cent of the registered Indian electorate and 30 per cent of the so called “coloureds” voted “representatives” in August 1984 amidst protests, rioting and boycott by the majority of these population groups and others who

opposed the scheme.[13] While this arrangement seemed to have been intended by the regime to build a solid minority solidarity against the majority Africans, the government's bad faith in securing undue advantages for the whites scuppered the intended objective. Instead, the elections roused the non-white population to confront the regime. The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) by nearly 400 organisations spanning all races in August 1983, was designed to coordinate their opposition to the new constitution as a whole. It was the UDF that organised the boycott campaign which led to the dismal turn-out in the September elections.[14].

Far from being the only problem to confront Pretoria, 1984 onward saw a wave of rent boycotts by township residents.[15] It began in Sebokong, Sharpeville, Evaston, Boipatong and Bophelong in September 1984 only to spread to Kwa Thandeka, KwaZanele and Ethandukukhanya in the Eastern Transvaal the following year. Seeing that the state had failed to nip the protest in the bud, other township residents followed suit; each with its own mechanism for enforcing compliance with the protest. For example, in the Rand district, townships such as Alexandra, Soweto, Tembisa and Tsakanne which joined the boycott in 1986 were not only equipped with self appointed boycott committees, they also held regular "judicial trials" against suspected non-conformists. The mushrooming of Rent Action Coordinating Committees (RACC) by activists of the anti-apartheid struggle, to complement the existing civic associations, was no doubt instrumental to the widespread<sup>194+ur2</sup> of the boycotts. The fact that in early 1987, the government gave the figure of 178 million Rand as the arrears arising from the rent boycotts attests to its success.

Why was the government confronted with this latest crisis when it had barely recovered from the poor response to its Parliamentary reform initiative? The answer has everything to do with the conflicting positions of the government on the one hand, and its opponents to the left, as to what an ideal South Africa should look like. While the government sought to tinker with the system of apartheid by means of adjusting its framework without destroying its structure its opponents, emboldened by decades of struggling against the system, were just as determined to destroy apartheid. Since the late 1970s, Pretoria had accepted the need to restructure its urban policy by relaxing influx control (as a step toward pacifying big business over labour mobility) and to reform local government. But just as the tricameral Parliamentary structure was meant to perpetuate white autonomy at the central governmental level, Pretoria's "generosity" in ceding



authority at the local level had nothing to do with terminating apartheid. Rather it was designed to rescue the central government from the burden of providing a subsidy for local services. The white run Administrative Boards which had hitherto administered local affairs had failed to operate along commercial lines by limiting their expenditure to the amount of income generated from within. For example, as at the 1982-83 fiscal year, the Boards had accumulated on the average deficits of 32 million Rand. These Boards could not do otherwise because some residents had responded to rent increases simply by squatting on unoccupied land in make-shift houses. The government felt that it would be easier for local officials elected directly by the people to undertake unpopular measures like raising rents and transport fares to balance the books. White officials could precipitate township revolts by adopting an unpopular line of action in an effort to reduce expenditure. It was on this logic of absolving central authorities from paying for township consumption that direct elections were held into the Community Councils between 1976 and 1980 by virtue of the Community Council Act of 1977.

By 1982, a new bill known as the Black Local Authority Act had increased the powers and responsibilities of the Councils to include allocation of housing and business premises and administration of schools and student bursaries. Totally ignored by Pretoria was the inadequacy of fiscal resources to enable the BLA's to finance the enlarged responsibilities from internally raised revenues as the government insisted. Rather, in an era of "constructive engagement" in which Pretoria was required to reform itself voluntarily, the government was too busy trumpeting to a largely inattentive international audience these increased responsibilities to local authorities as part of the dispensation for the Africans. This was an attempt by the government to deflect the attention of the international community from the tricameral structure which totally excluded the indigenous Africans. Hidden out of sight was the motif.

Within South Africa, the anti-apartheid front (under the canopy of the UDF) opposed to separate dispensation along racial lines promptly called a boycott of elections into the BLA's. Moreover, the non-representation of Africans at the centre meant it was a paternalistic system aimed at presenting apartheid in an acceptable guise. The success of this boycott was duly attested to by the 12 per cent turn-out on average in the 1983 local elections. Some of those who boycotted the election did so because of dissatisfaction with the quality of services being provided. But since the BLA's were the creation of the government, the "elected" representatives, irrespective of their

lack of legitimacy still assumed their positions. This of course meant the creation of animosity against the officials of the local authorities by the anti-apartheid and dissatisfied elements within the community. The BLA officials added to their unpopularity by their conspicuous corruption and ostentatious living while local services were evidently deteriorating on account of non-availability of funds. True, the central government had either withdrawn or sharply reduced subsidy in line with the basis for handing over local responsibilities to Africans, but had the Councillors been prudent in their conduct, they could at least have carried the sympathy of the communities. After all, the limited avenues for raising revenues such as liquor licences were not enough to cope with providing services to communities with rising population. Instead the corrupt practices of the officials made them to form a common cause with the government in the eyes of the communities they were “elected” to serve. Consequently, the hatred which Africans had for the government on account of apartheid was immediately extended to the local officials. Since these officials live within the community, they provided an easy target to the enemies of the government. It was in such a tense situation that the BLA’s decided to take a number of measures to compensate for dwindling revenues in order to keep deficits at manageable levels. These measures included raising of rents on the average by 15 per cent without consideration of the high unemployment rate, eviction of rent defaulters, demolition of illegally constructed hovels without regards to the limited number of council houses and increasing transport fares - these were the dirty work for which the government granted the expanded responsibilities. It was these actions that set in train the protest that first manifested itself in the form of rent boycotts.

It was understandable that those implacably opposed to apartheid would not allow this moment to pass by. They had an axe to grind with the officials of the BLA’s whose elections they boycotted but who were still imposed on them by the government. The situation was made worse by the fact that it coincided with the inauguration of the tricameral Parliament. The ease with which the boycott spread equipped with coordinating committees meant that even without the rent increases, some other event could still have ignited an already tensed situation. In this respect, South Africa’s Minister of Law and Order, Louis Le Grande had a centrifugal perspective of the events when he expressed doubts whether the rent increases were the “real reason” for the unrest: “..there are individuals and organisations clearly behind what has happened in the Vaal Triangle.”

Were he not a Minister of the apartheid system, he could have been aware that by

embarking on an overseas tour soon after increasing house rents and by sending in the bull-dozers to demolish shacks when there was an acute shortage of council houses, the Lekoa Councillors were clearly asking for trouble. The Tjaert van der Walt Commission of Inquiry into the unrest, indicated this in its report when it said, "No resident I spoke to had a good word for the Lekoa Municipality." [16] The rent increases were the immediate cause because the revolt started at the grass-roots among people devoid of ideological inclination. Some of them could not afford the new rents and service charges nor could they turn to their shacks which had been demolished by the council bull-dozers. The Minister could have been more convincing had he identified apartheid, corrupt and inefficient apartheid created Councils and the insensitive nature of the rent increases by these apartheid Councillors as reasons for the explosion.

The admissions of Mayors Sam Buti of Alexandria and Khumalo of Katlehong also cast doubt on the Minister's prognosis. Buti's assessment that the rent increases "would throttle our people. It would be absurd if the development of Alexandra were to become a threat to our people. The uprisings in black townships are tied to these same issue", when compared with Khumalo's confession that "our people had turned against us because they had lost confidence in us", show that the immediate cause of the unrest had nothing to do with incitement of local people by individuals and organisations bent on causing chaos. Rather, it was a local response by local people to a local situation. National anti-apartheid agitators clambered aboard and brought their influence to bear because the opportunity had presented itself. It was through this means that the rent boycotts transformed themselves from being a local issue to one of political mobilisations at local level for a national political objective, namely the creation of an apartheid free South Africa. That was why the protesters were not content with merely attacking council officials but even when these Councillors had resigned en masse or even been killed, the protests still continued with demands for dialogue between imprisoned leaders and the government; and the unbanning of political organisations. It took no time for internationally famous figures such as Archbishop Tutu and the Reverend Boesak to become involved and lend credibility to the agitation. [17]

Since opposition to the government involved some 80 per cent of South Africa's 30 million people, the probability of this latest phase of protest degenerating into violence was quite high unless skillfully handled by the government. This became a reality when opponents of apartheid turned their anger against officials of local authorities whom they had all along identified as

collaborators. In some cases respected members of the community were either shunned or shunted aside for not doing enough to resist apartheid, while imprisoned leaders became greatly revered and admired as the symbol of resistance. Others no doubt used the occasion to settle old scores. On their part, the Police and the military apparatus unused to controlling crowds by peaceful means used force in an attempt to quell the protest. In other cases, inexperienced young conscripts (military service is compulsory to whites only) either panicked at large crowds by opening fire, or deliberately responded to stone throwing youths with live bullets. In some cases, funeral processions of victims of Police brutality were themselves fired-upon by the security force while in other cases, security personnel simply lured stone throwing teenagers by concealing themselves in camouflaged areas of their vehicles only to open fire when they felt enough youth had responded to their bait. These moving scenes were shown on televisions across the world.[18] Table 4 highlights the pattern of killings at the point in time.

Between January and September 1985, at least 800 unarmed protesters were killed by the security forces while the government took further steps to legitimise its repression by declaring a state of emergency under which the Police could detain citizens indefinitely irrespective of the nature of their crime. By mid-September 1985, more than three thousand protesters had been locked behind bars amidst reports of torture, intimidation and blackmail. That the regime felt confident that the friendly administration in Washington would not lift a finger against it was attested to on August 15, 1985 when instead of crossing the "Rubicon", P.W.Botha told critics that "I am not prepared to lead White South Africans and other minority groups on a road to abdication and suicide." [19].

The South African President need not be faulted for this, after all he had received the public support of Washington when on October 23, 1984, out of the 15 member nations, the US cast the lone abstention in the Security Council on Resolution 556 (1984). This resolution expressed alarm at the "wanton killing and the maiming of defenceless demonstrators and workers on strike as well as the imposition of virtual martial law...to facilitate the brutal repression of the black population...."; commended the "Asian and coloured communities in South Africa for their large-scale boycott of the recent "elections" which constituted a clear rejection of the so-called new constitution". It then reaffirmed "the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa for the full exercise of the right to self determination and the establishment of a non-racial

democratic society in an unfragmented South Africa.”[20]

(ii) Afro-American response to events in South Africa and “constructive engagement” in general.

In outlining the Afro-Americans response it will be necessary first of all to devote attention to the impression of the administration about the situation in South Africa. This is necessary because the creation of the tricameral Parliamentary structure owed much to Pretoria’s attempt to fulfil the requirement of “constructive engagement” the only way it saw fit.

For an administration willing to trust Pretoria to institute reform, it is difficult to determine the lower and upper limits of its expectations. But one way of gauging its opinion is by its response to public reaction to the reform in South Africa.

From the inception of the idea of a tricameral Parliamentary structure, African opposition was almost unanimous inside and outside Africa. They also saw “constructive engagement” as supportive of the minority regime in South Africa.[21] Under the circumstances, one would have expected the Reagan administration to clarify its preference for an orderly transition to an apartheid free South Africa. Instead Chester Crocker engaged in serious negotiations with Pretoria on how to bring about what TransAfrica’s Executive Director, Randall Robinson, referred to as a “de facto alliance that was to be developed between the United States and South Africa.”[22] At no time did Crocker confer with any non-white political leader all through the frequent visits he paid to the country for fear of alienating the regime whose cooperation was needed in the Cold War confrontation in the region.[23]

Other public statements made in Washington on the situation in South Africa, amounted to an endorsement of the regime in Pretoria and its political “reform”. For example, in a long and rambling speech to the National Conference of Editorial Writers in San Francisco on June 23, 1983, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lawrence Eagleburger expanded his presentation to cover the entire region as opposed to the specific political dispensation in South Africa. While giving the impression of America’s neutrality, submerged in the maze of words was the clear endorsement of Pretoria’s divide and rule tricameral Parliamentary tactics when he said:



“Politically, Prime Minister Botha put his own political base in jeopardy with his proposal to extend a limited and ethnically-based franchise to the coloured and Asian communities..... I do not see it as our business to enter into this debate or to endorse the constitutional proposals now under consideration for South Africa. Nor do we offer tactical advice to any of the interested parties. Yet the indisputable fact which we must recognise is that the South African government has taken the first step toward extending national political rights beyond the white minority.”[24]

Such an admission of faith in the South African regime at a period of heightened tension attendant upon the throwing of crumbs at the disenfranchised majority highlights the limited importance Washington attached to the degree and scope of reform required of Pretoria.

President Reagan himself had no compunction in blaming the victims of apartheid as opposed to the perpetrators in his reaction to the killings at Uitenhage on March 21, 1985 at the 25th anniversary of Sharpeville massacre of 1960. Crowds of mourners on their way to the cemetery to bury 13 people killed by the Police at an earlier shooting disobeyed Police orders to disperse, apparently after taunting them and making “provocative” signals and remarks, such as the clenched fist salute and chanting “a luta continua” and “viva FRELIMO”. The Police opened fire resulting in the killings of 19 mourners and wounding 36 others. President Reagan’s reaction was to lament the fact that: “There is an element in South Africa that ....wants trouble in the streets.”[25]

That the Reagan administration could go down this path, need not be surprising in view of the fact that they came into office with an articulated view of Southern Africa, namely, the need to confront both the Soviets and the Cubans in the region irrespective of the issues involved. Helping to shape this view was the administration’s perception of the Carter’s practice. This was seen as one of abandoning old friends at moments of need (Samoza, or the Shah of Iran) and giving too great importance to human rights as a foreign policy criterion as in Southern Africa. Those who helped to articulate this view for the administration include Republican Senator Jesse Helms, Vice-President George Bush and Ronald Reagan himself.[26] Bush interviewed while still a presidential candidate, reiterated that human rights would be a factor but so also would strategic minerals.[27]

Reagan assumed office with three stated foreign policy objectives: (i) a commitment not to abandon friendly regimes despite the nature of their rule; (ii) to confront the Soviets in any arena that is of interest to the US irrespective of regional peculiarities; (iii) to demonstrate to the world

that the US could transform itself from psychological defeat in Vietnam and the low morale of the Carter years to strength and effectiveness through an efficient and strong leadership. Southern Africa provided an arena for the administration to achieve its articulated objectives. First, the Pretoria regime is friendly to the West but was “abandoned” and “isolated” by the previous administration - a gross miscalculation in Republican eyes. There were communist bloc forces in the region, hence the need for the US to protect its interests.

How then did Afro-Americans’ respond to these developments in the region in the light of “constructive engagement”?

All along, Afro-Americans had watched with despair the administration’s inability to recognise that the chaotic situation in Southern Africa was the outcome of a white minority clinging on to power by force of arms as opposed to an attempt by the communist bloc to take over a region adjudged immensely important to the West. By adopting a policy of “constructive engagement” that laid more stress on the expulsion of communist forces than on internal political reform, the administration was discounting what amounted to a state of war within South Africa and between the latter and the Frontline States. South Africa’s massive crackdown on internal dissent and destabilisation effort in neighbouring states were necessitated by the need to preserve apartheid as opposed to an attempt to stem the rising tide of communist take-over of the region.

Thus, Afro-Americans’ reaction was not different from that of Tutu who decried reconciliation between the US and the government in Pretoria as a negation of the efforts of the non-white South Africans to achieve their rights in their country, and bluntly warned Washington that a “decision to align itself with the South African government would be an unmitigated disaster for both South Africa and the United States.”[28] Their reaction was therefore part of the over-all disappointment they had about the thrust of “constructive engagement”, namely that in a blind effort to contain communist interests in Southern Africa, the Reagan administration had formed a de facto alliance with Pretoria. Not only had this alliance conferred a certificate of respectability upon South Africa but it had also encouraged the regime to commit acts of aggression within its borders and against the neighbouring states. Robinson vividly brought this factor home:

“The South Africans knew how to read the signs. They moved with renewed vigor.....to step up repression. They began to step up invasion into neighbouring states, to participate in assassination schemes against members of the African National Congress (ANC) and to

move to the right at home. Things worsened when the new constitution was proposed - a constitution that continues to disallow blacks the vote and makes Indians and Coloureds junior partners in apartheid by bringing them into the Parliament and at the same time rendering them powerless..."[29].

Afro-Americans could only grimace as opposed to taking action because as with previous Republican administrations they had no electoral clout over the Reagan administration.

Perhaps a greater handicap was the fact that America had relapsed into conservatism in the 1980s. This phenomenon owed much to Jimmy Carter's ideological turn-around after the initial period of his administration in response to public mood. For example, a 1979 survey on US policy in South Africa conducted for the Council on Foreign Relations by William Foltz found profound dissatisfaction with the Carter administration's policy in that country. The respondents (confined to the members of the Council and affiliated committees) saw no need for the administration to embark on a collision course with the white minority regime, even though they recognised the merit of African nationalism.[30]

Carter's turn-around implied that the liberal stance with which he had been associated was incapable of protecting the US against predictable and ever present Soviet hostile designs, thus identifying conservatism with patriotism. That Carter was voted out of office in favour of a Republican in 1980 meant that the American voters did not believe him as a natural ally of the conservative creed.

Herein arises the problem: Carter did not fall alone. He took along in his plunge some of the most outspoken and courageous liberal allies of Afro-Americans at Capitol Hill. While the fulcrum of Afro-American concern on Africa in Congress, Congressman Charles Diggs Jr., became politically impotent from 1980 after an unsuccessful appeal against conviction for fraud, Congressman Andrew Maguire of New Jersey lost his seat in 1978. Paul Tsongas survived and later went on to the Senate, but then resigned in 1984. In the Senate, the casualty list included well-known liberals like Dick Clark and George McGovern. As a Senator, Clark was a champion of African freedom as exemplified by his amendment restricting further US assistance to UNITA rebels in Angola and his highly publicised recommendation that tough measures be taken against Pretoria as earlier noted. It was therefore not surprising that the term "senator from Africa" became

the battle cry of his opponents, the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) in the election. This was a means of emphasising Clark's liberal credentials - a discredited phenomenon in conservative America. The dramatic decrease if not outright extinction of anti-apartheid efforts at Capitol Hill in the early 1980s should be seen as lack of enthusiasm on the part of Legislators to risk their career on what was evidently an unpopular course. This will also explain the ease with which "constructive engagement" was pursued without much criticism from outside the Afro-American circle.

With "constructive engagement" being overseen by Reagan, Haig (later George Shultz who brought no new style) and Crocker, coupled with the virtual dearth of anti-apartheid enthusiasm in Congress and public indifference, the odds were stacked against any attempt to orchestrate the isolation of Pretoria reminiscent of the early years of the Carter presidency.

It was this realisation that made TransAfrica adopt a strategy of selected leaks of the administration's secret arrangements for improving relations with South Africa, with a view to rekindling Congressional interest on Southern Africa and focusing public anger at the nature of the administration's policy. That the leaks were considered serious by the administration was attested to by Haig:

"Let me suggest that the leaks were atrocious and appalling to me. It has sometimes seem to me inconceivable that public officers on the public payroll feel they have a right to protect their constituted leadership from itself because leaks just don't happen: they are in many instances executed in order to set up backwashes and to prevent policy decisions".[31]

Since no dramatic development occurred between 1981 and early 1984, the tactic was not successful. This no doubt was due to the absence of an effective means to influence the conservative "mood" of the American people and the administration's indifference. As a result the administration was free from domestic constraints in the pursuit of its Southern Africa policy, which Afro-Americans adjudged to be favourable to Pretoria. This was encapsulated in the complaint of TransAfrica's Robinson, that the situation in South Africa had "worsened altogether" since the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 because not only had the "South African white regime..felt that it can do anything it wants to do with impunity because it has an ally in the White House" but that on its part:

“The administration has rescinded many past restrictions on the export of technical data to the South African military police...this administration allowed over \$100 million in military-use items - computers, image intensifiers, light aircraft - to go to South Africa. ...support for \$1.1 billion International Monetary Fund loan to South Africans and an overall growth in U.S. investment. In addition a 20-year-old policy that discouraged meetings between South African military personnel and high American policymakers ... was reversed.[32]

What inspired TransAfrica with enough confidence to embark upon a frontal attack were none other than events in South Africa itself. As the unfolding chaos following the 1983 “reform” was beamed into the living rooms of Americans by the news media, TransAfrica as the lobbying arm of Afro-Americans realised the need to cultivate public support to dislodge the administration from its pro-Pretoria stance. This was possible because it had become clear to the American television viewers that the casualties of police brutality and repression in South Africa were neither communists nor likely sympathisers of that ideology. Some were clerics, others were children too young to have witnessed Sharpeville let alone to remember anything about it. These were children who had had no contact with the exiled ANC. They were fighting oppression the way they know how, only to be confronted with massive state repression they were too young to cope with. Gunning down children could not be defended in the estimate of the American people as an attempt to defend the Republic of South Africa against communist encroachment. The role of the television in this regard was acknowledged by Robinson:

“Americans have the impression something doesn’t exist unless it’s on television....a good deal of the concern about South Africa, now, has been the result of electronic media attention.”[33]

Under the circumstances, South Africa’s image as a trusted ally in the struggle against communism in the region became threadbare. TransAfrica was now in a position to take advantage of the public revulsion at the events in South Africa to evoke the humanitarian impulse and sensibilities of the American people to create an avalanche of pressure too great for the administration to ignore. The result would be the distancing of the administration from Pretoria, a



dramatic turn-around in favour of the oppressed peoples of Southern Africa. TransAfrica's response to the township revolt in South Africa, therefore, was to launch a new public protest and involve itself in the creation of a new organisation uniting the efforts of the existing anti-apartheid forces. It was this that crystallised into FSAM.

In this respect, it is quite obvious that when Randall Robinson visited the South African embassy in Washington on November 21, 1984 to protest the detention of labour leaders in South Africa, he had up his sleeve a plan for circumventing the administration's unequivocal support for the regime in Pretoria. His arrest at the embassy and the prompt and dramatic manner in which Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) with the close cooperation of ACOA and WOA came into being on that very day suggested that not only had elaborate planning gone into the making of the organisation but that the arrest was a dramatic by-product as opposed to the basis of the emergence of FSAM.

Consequently, while FSAM was TransAfrica's and Afro-Americans' means of relieving Pretoria of the unequivocal support and patronage of the Reagan administration, its remote motivating factors were Afro-American frustrations arising from decades of official cynicism at worst, and at best non-durable concern, on foreign policy issues of interests to them.

Steven Metz has dismissed such a connection between the emergence of FSAM and Afro-Americans' concern over US-Southern African policy. To Metz, FSAM emerged for the purpose of rejuvenating Afro-Americans' morale and "activism" and to win back their support following Jesse Jackson's disastrous bid for the Democratic presidential nomination and Ronald Reagan's re-election in 1984. South Africa featured in the campaign of the FSAM because its policy of racial discrimination evokes emotion among Afro-Americans', allowing the use of the apartheid ploy to unify the black electorate.[34]

What Metz was emphasising was that the founders of FSAM were more concerned with their domestic political power and the need to ensure its coherence than with America's policy in South Africa and racial discrimination in that country. The psychologist, Don Beck, echoed the same view in a rather cruder fashion: "How else can they excite the news media, act like saviours of South Africa, present such a strong and united image to the American public and be identified with world-wide black causes." [35]

There are some anomalies in this argument. First by asserting that Afro-American

campaigners used the anti-South African plank to rehabilitate themselves, it tends to ignore nearly a century of efforts of Diaspora Africans to identify themselves with continental Africa. The emergence of the Negro Unions in Philadelphia and other settlements of the American colony, the activities of Bishop Henry McNeal Turner, Marcus Garvey's Pan-Negroism, Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois and Henry Sylvester's Pan-Africanism are too well known to necessitate repetition in this section. Recent efforts in that direction have been analysed in the previous chapters. That Afro-Americans' interest in Africa has been sustained if not intensified has been brought home in a recent study conducted about the same time that Metz and Beck published their articles. Using the key informant methodology in a study on the significance of the ethnic factor in America's relations with Africa, Masipula Sithole found that in spite of disappointment with some African leaders, all respondents attached importance to the continent as a result of its being their ancestral homeland. Most respondents emphasised the need to emulate international Jewry by not forgetting Africa as the Jews had not Israel. In addition, internal squabbles within various African countries such as the break-up of the ZANU-ZAPU-PF alliance and general economic decline in the continent were all major concerns to Afro-Americans as one would expect of continental Africans.[36] Appendix I illustrates the wide spread nature of Afro-Americans' identification with the South African issue.

Another possible anomaly in the position of Metz was the importance he attached to Jesse Jackson's unsuccessful bid for the Democratic nomination in 1984. Jackson was not the only person in that position, Senators John Glenn and Gary Hart among others dropped out of the race at one stage or another. Afro-Americans were too intelligent to believe that Jackson's effort in 1984 could take him to the White House. His was a protest candidacy determined to drive home to the Democratic establishment that the Afro-American vote was not there for the asking, but that it must be accompanied with a price tag. Newsweek was on target when it said:

"For one thing, as even his sharpest critics are now inclined to concede, Jackson is not seeking the vice-presidency or any other official position for himself.....What he really wants, and what other black politicians want passionately as well, is simply to demonstrate that the Democratic Party can no longer take black America for granted - that black votes count, that they may indeed be critical to the party's survival, and that black allegiance at the polls no longer comes cost-free. The best way to prove the point, as Jackson clearly saw, was simply to run a credible presidential campaign - a strategy that simultaneously denied black votes to the white contenders and brought black enthusiasm for presidential politics to a fever pitch." [37]

That Afro-Americans had no illusions about Jesse Jackson's chances for the Democratic nomination, much less the presidency was attested to by the support Walter Mondale received from some establishment prone Afro-Americans.[38]

True, Afro-Americans passionately supported Jesse Jackson, but even the most zealous realised that his effort was at best a foundation laying exercise for national recognition in anticipation of a more spirited performance in future. That was why Jackson was universally greeted with chants of "run Jesse run" in the campaign trails in 1984.[39] It was only in 1988 when he had become a more credible candidate that this was changed to "win Jesse win".

To say that those Afro-Americans who were involved in FSAM capitalised on the misfortune of the non-white population of South Africa to further their own interests following a disastrous attempt by Jackson in 1984 is unconvincing. The truth of the matter was that events in South Africa had increased the frustrations of Afro-Americans to an extent that they were unwilling to put up with four more years of the same Southern Africa policy. Robinson brought this factor home when he said: "If there was a single precipitating event that caused this frustration to spill over, it was the lone refusal of the United States in the Security Council in October (1984) to support a resolution of moderate condemnation of South Africa".[40] That makes sense in view of the fact that FSAM emerged in November 1984 soon after Ronald Reagan's election to a second four year term in office. Whether or not FSAM was capable of succeeding as a panacea to the frustrations of Afro-Americans on foreign policy issues of concern to them will only be determined when one has analysed the tactics, strategy and objectives of the organisation.

### Conclusion

While this as with the previous Chapter set out to explore Afro-Americans' ability to institute new methods for exerting influence on Washington's Southern Africa policy, the finding is that except for a brief period in the Carter presidency, they were in the main unsuccessful and ineffectual. The reasons are two-fold. First, they were not deemed electorally important by the Republican Party and as such no effort was made to solicit their votes. The result was that they were unable to influence Republican administrations especially when they chose to interpret US

interests in terms that favoured Pretoria.

A second reason for Afro-American ineffectiveness was the fact that they had not built a solid foundation with a wide base of support encompassing the racial divide, to create pressure and wield influence. As a result, their interests become subordinated to those of others. Nothing attests to this more than the way President Carter abandoned them by sacrificing their interests in Southern Africa in order to save his political career. This and the subsequent defeat of Senator Clark among others would suggest that Afro-Americans had too narrow a political base. Whether or not it would be in their interest to rectify the situation by entering into coalition with other interests groups would be addressed in the concluding chapter.

Steven Metz has advanced three further reasons for the lack of influence of anti-apartheid efforts on the relevant organs of the state. Two of these are common to a wide variety of foreign policy questions including Southern Africa: the US tendency to pay exclusive attention to priority issues, which he called "crisis diplomacy" and of which apartheid is not a part, and the tendency of policy-makers to do nothing when policy positions conflict. More important from our point of view is the third reason. According to him, the ineffectiveness of the anti-apartheid efforts stemmed from their tactics: a high profile public mobilisation publicity prone approach as opposed to a down to earth strategy of persistent quiet lobbying, and negotiating with foreign policy formulators in order to achieve the desired results. Mass mobilisation and excessive dependence on populism, he argues, are outmoded tactics of the civil rights era which are ill suited to influencing modern foreign policy makers, though better suited to domestic issues:

"...the anti-apartheid movement has often relied on ineffective methods of influence. Rather than exclusively pursuing what Nelson Polsby has labelled "inside strategies" of influence which utilised compromise, bargaining and structural power to gain results within the "standard operating procedure" of the pertinent unit of government, the anti-apartheid movement has frequently resorted to "outside" strategies of influence stressing publicity and public mobilisation... Outside strategies of influence are usually less successful on foreign policy issues than on domestic ones." [41]

Metz sees too close a parallel in the activities of the civil rights movement and those of the anti-apartheid movement. True, like the civil rights organisation the anti-apartheid movement also use mass mobilisation but it is not the choice that led to the failure of the latter. The issue is not so

much the strategy for exerting influence, but the existence or the non-existence of durable influence itself. It was not a refusal to adopt “inside strategies” of bargaining within the pertinent units of government that robbed either the wider anti-apartheid coalition of liberal/labour/Afro-Americans or the Afro-Americans themselves of influence.

Perhaps one can illustrate with the Carter period. Accomplished liberals like Andrew Young, Cyrus Vance, Walter Mondale and Jimmy Carter himself exerted considerable influence over Southern African issues on the Carter administration. The fact that this influence was not durable as we saw in the text had more to do with the strength of the anti-apartheid lobby and its constituents than with the nature of its strategy for exerting influence. If it had had a wide following, then it would have been in a position to trade in its numerical strength for certain concessions on policy from the executive arm of government. This meant that the larger the size, the greater the political clout unless a different arrangement had been made to compensate for the lack of numbers.

The capacity of the anti-apartheid elements to exert influence at the inception of the Carter administration arose mostly from their electoral contribution, and not because of an intrinsically wide following or numerical strength but as a result of an existing balance of power situation in the 1976 presidential election. While in early September 1976 opinion polls gave Jimmy Carter a 16 per cent lead over his opponent Gerald Ford, most probably due to disunity among the Republicans, the challenger’s lead was cut to 8 per cent before the end of the month only to be reduced further to a mere 2 per cent by early October. Thereafter, the difference was virtually non-existent.[42] Under such highly balanced and unpredictable circumstances, it was possible for any minority group to throw its weight in support of either combatants at the expense of the other. Afro-Americans did exactly that in favour of Jimmy Carter, which took him to the White House in January 1977.

His early get tough approach to the anomalies in Southern Africa was to a considerable extent a function of the pressure which Afro-Americans in particular and the anti-apartheid lobby in general were exerting on account of their electoral investment. It had nothing to do with “inside” or “outside” strategies. But because the chorus of dissent over the administration’s Southern Africa policy was more than the electoral gain inherent in adhering to the existing policy, the administration had no qualms in changing track in order to save its political skin. This brought



about the abrupt official perception of a communist threat to western interests in Southern Africa. Until then the administration had seen no threat in the region, which meant that Cold War as a factor in determining US policy towards Southern Africa had more to do with the idiosyncrasies of the ruling elites than what was put across to the public. The balance of power position is therefore a precarious one for any minority group to rely upon because its impact will always be dependent on equilibrium in the system. The moment there is a disequilibrium, it ceases to be a king maker. The minority group therefore becomes an hostage to other peoples' political preferences.

What exacerbated the decline of Afro-Americans as wielders of influence was the fact that although the anti-apartheid lobby cut across the racial divide, only they were passionately committed to anti-apartheid causes, at least up till 1984. White Americans had to balance their liberal goals against the interests of their constituents who in most cases were not only Whites but *were* frightened by the bellicose pronouncements of some Afro-Americans in the wider anti-apartheid movement. Afro-Americans had no such inhibitions as they approached the issue from a "kith and kin" point of view irrespective of the prize. What this meant is that narrowly based as it was, the anti-apartheid movement was further marginalised by fragmented perception and limited commitment which in turn could militate against the broadening of that narrow base.

Whether or not FSAM would adopt a different approach including the much criticised "outside strategies" to overcome these difficulties in order to expand the base of support of anti-apartheid causes, will become clear in the next chapter.

**Table 4**

**Casualty Figures in South Africa's Unrest - September 1984 - July 1985**

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>MONTH</u>	<u>DEATHS</u>	<u>INJURIES</u>	<u>NATURE OF UNREST</u>
1984	September	56	900	Fire-bombing and riots by blacks over municipal elections and rent hike. Deputy-Mayor Dlamini was one of the deaths. Worst areas of unrest were Sharpeville and the black townships near Johannesburg.
ditto	October	44	600	Members of the non-white National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) went on strike only to be confronted by Police resulting in the casualties.
ditto	November	60	Unknown	Violence resulting from anti-apartheid strike by 500,000 black workers who were joined by 300,000 students near Johannesburg. The strike was in part in response to Police and military raids on black townships leading to arrests. Two Unions, Federation of South African Trade Union (FOSATU) and Council of Union of South Africa (CUSA) were involved in the strike and had their leaders arrested under section 29 of the Internal Security Act. Altogether 21 labour leaders were arrested. This was the issue that sparked off the anti-apartheid demonstrations in the United States when TransAfrica's Randall Robinson and two others protested at the South African Embassy in Washington. Their arrest at the Embassy set the scene for the emergence of FSAM in the United States.
1985	February	18	230	Clash between Police and residence of the squatter town Crossroad over government's attempt to demolish it. Most were shot at the back by the Police as duly confirmed by a white physician, Dr. Diana Hewitson, who treated the injured. On the basis of the clash, eight UDF members were rounded up and charged with high treason.

ditto	March	60 bringing the total in the last six months to 234	Unknown	13 were killed by the Police for demonstrating against apartheid. eight were killed in gasoline bomb attack in the black township of Kwanobuhle. Between 29 and 36 people were killed when Police fired upon funeral procession of 13 people killed nine days earlier by Police. Police While defending themselves that they responded to attacks from the crowd, it soon transpired that the attack was nothing more than defiance in the form of provoking gesture like clenched-fist salute and shouting of "a luta continua". Even the Police autopsy disclosed that 17 of those killed were shot in the back while 10 received bullet wounds in their heads..
ditto	March	67	Unknown	36 charred bodies were found in Langa and Kwanobuhle townships, ostensibly from communal fighting among blacks. Also Councillor Thamsanqua Kinikini and his two children were killed while the Councillor's body was set ablaze for being a "stooge" of apartheid. Other deaths include one white youth caught by mobs near Uitenhage and was set ablaze. Five people were killed by a joint Police/Military patrols while two people were hacked and burnt to death. Within two weeks, 17 others were killed in the Eastern Cape in revenge killings for the murder of alleged government informants.
ditto	May	1 bringing the figure to 400	1	A white woman was dragged out of her car and beaten to death by black mobs while the injured was a black rioter who was deliberately shot at by a white who had earlier drove his car over the victim.
ditto	June	1	Unknown	Killed at Daveyton township in protest against South Africa's raid on Botswana.

ditto	July	14 but bringing the total deaths since the unrest to 500 compelling Prime Minister Botha to declare a state of emergency	Unknown	Four were killed by their own explosions at Duduza apparently designed to be used in attacks against government "stooges". Six killed by Police for allegedly attacking the home of a black Policeman in the Kwa Thema township near Johannesburg, although Township residents claimed the six were killed while fleeing from Police raid at a protest meeting in a local movie theatre. The position of the bullet holes on the corpses tend to back up the account of the local residence. Four leader of the UDF were killed at Duduza and Cradock in Eastern Cape. Death squads sponsored by the Police were suspected inspite of Police denial supported by another incident a few days later when Police sponsored masked death squads lured youths to the streets of Duduza with ANC slogans and songs only for the waiting Police to fall on them. Apart from all this, before the month ran out, seven persons were killed by the Police in Duduza and Soweto. In another development, a black woman was beaten to death by a township mob and the corpse burnt to ashes at Nonzwakazi for the simple offence of purchasing grocery from a white-owned shop in defiance of black boycott of white business ventures. Numerous others who defied the ban suffered various degrees of injuries. .
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SOURCES: Extrapolated; Daily Press briefing by the South African Information Bureau, Newspapers and electronic media reports.

## FOOTNOTES.

1. See Richard Deutsch, "The Republican Challenge on Africa," Africa Report, May/June 1979. p. 55.
2. See U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, "The Nomination of Alexander Haig Jr. to be Secretary of State", 97th. Congress, 1st. session, 1981. p. 147-8; Richard Deutsch, "Africa From a Strategic Perspective", Africa Report, March-April, 1981. pp. 42-48.
3. Ibid.
4. Richard Deutsch, "Building an African Policy", Africa Report, July-August 1981. pp. 44-5; Chester Crocker, "The United States and Africa", Africa-Report, September-October 1981, pp. 6-7.
5. "Secret State Department Documents" reproduced in Covert Action, no. 13. July-August 1981. pp. 37-41; David B. Abernathy, The Major Foreign Policy Position of the Reagan Administration: Implications for United States-South African Relations", International Affairs Bulletin (Johannesburg) vol. 5. No. 2. 1981. pp. 18-44.
6. For Crocker's statement, see, Chester. A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, "U.S. Interests in Africa: Address Before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City on October 5, 1981", DSB, vol. 82. January 1982. p. 23; Further evidence of the administration's position could be gleaned from the statements of Crocker and Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, Walter J. Stoessel during their meeting with UNITA's Jonas Savimbi in Washington during the latter's visit in December 1981. The two officials were reported to have told the guerrilla chieftain about "our wish to see all Cuban and other forces leave Angola and our belief that this must take place if a necessary climate of security is to return to the region." See, "Angola: Department Statements", DSB, vol. 82. March 1982. p. 34; For general reference: Barry Streek, "South Africa's Stakes in the Border War", Africa Report, March-April 1984. pp 54-60; Robert Fatton, "The Reagan Foreign Policy Toward South Africa: The Ideology of the Cold War", African Studies Review, vol. 27 (March) 1984. pp. 51-9; George W. Shepherd, Jr. "The United States' South Africa Policy: The Failure of Constructive Engagement", Africa Today, vol. 31. No. 2. 1984. pp. 15-35. For Crocker's statement, see, Chester. A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, "U.S. Interests in Africa: Address Before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City on October 5, 1981", DSB, vol. 82. January 1982. p. 23.
7. Crocker re-iterated the regional security aspect of his "constructive engagement" when he told the Baltimore Council on Foreign Relations in October 1982 in terms expected of a South African minister seeking respectability for apartheid rather than a high ranking official of the US. Said he: "Until there develops a structure of understanding - some reciprocally understood basis for coexistence - between South Africa and its neighbours, this situation (Pretoria's aggression in Frontline States) will remain a major source of instability and could result in growing violence across borders." See Chester A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Address Before the Baltimore Council on Foreign Relations on October 28, 1982, "U.S. Response to the Challenge of Regional Security", DSB, 82, December 1982. p. 22; On the importance of new markets and investment outlets to South Africa, see, Ann and Neva Seidman, South Africa and U.S. Multinational Corporations, (Tanzania Publishing, Dar 1974), p. 137.
8. See President Samora Machel's address to the 7th Summit of the Non-aligned Movement in New Delhi, on March 12, 1983. Reproduced in Sechaba, May 8, 1983. pp. 13-14.



9. See Prime Minister (now President) Robert Mugabe's speech to Ecclesiastical leaders on April 5, 1983; Policy Statement No. 11, (Ministry of Information, Post and Telecommunication, Harare, April 1983) p. 3.
10. Southern Africa , vol. xiv. Jan-Feb. 1981. p. 8
11. See President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos Statement in Brazzaville at the 23rd Anniversary of Independence of the Republic of Congo, August 15, 1983 (Angop, Luanda 1983)
12. William Gutteridge, "South Africa's Strategy for Survival", Conflict Studies, No. 131, June 1981. pp. 25-6; Details about the new political initiative could be obtained from L.J.Boulle, Constitutionalism and Control in South Africa, (St. Martin's, New York 1984); Gail Hovey, Apartheid's New Clothes, (The Africa Fund, New York 1983).
13. Mark Whitaker, Peter Youngusband and Zufia Sommuz, "South Africa's Bloody Return to Sharpeville", Newsweek , September 17. 1984. p. 17.
14. See Sanford J. Ungar and Peter Vale, "South Africa: Why Constructive Engagement Failed", Foreign Affairs, (New York) Vol. 64. No. 2. Winter 1985/86. pp. 234-245.
15. In writing the following account, I have relied heavily on the following: Mathew Chaskalson, Karen Jochelson and Jeremy Seekings, "Rent Boycotts and the Urban Political Economy", in Glenn Moss and Ingrid Obery (eds). The South African Review 4, (For the South African Research Service (SARS) by Ravan Press, Johannesburg 1987) pp. 53-4; Jeremy Seekings, "The Origins of Political Mobilisation in the PWV Townships, 1980-84", in William Cobbett and Robin Cohen, (eds.), Popular Struggle in South Africa, (Africa World Press, Trenton, New Jersey, 1988) pp. 59-72; Mark Swilling, "Introduction: The Politics of Stalemate", in Philip Frankel, Noam Pines and Mark Swilling, (eds.), State, Resistance and Change in South Africa, (Croom Helm, London 1988) pp. 1-18; Martin Murray, South Africa, Time of Agony, Time of Destiny, (VERSO, London 1987) pp. 239-306.
16. For the quotations, see, Jeremy Seekings, "Origins of Political Mobilisation in the PWV Townships, 1980-84", Ibid, pp. 69-70; For an analytical essay, see, Jeremy Seekings, "Political Mobilisation in the Black Townships of the Transvaal" in Philip Frankel, et al, Op.Cit., pp. 197-228.
17. M. Murray, Op. cit.
18. These scenes were on television screens on all channels of British television between August 1984 and September 1985 and no doubt helped to move public sympathy in the direction of the anti-Pretoria forces. The tapes are available at the BBC and the ITV.
19. Michael Holman and Jim Jones, "Hopes of Southern African Reform dashed by Cautious Botha", Financial Times, Friday August 16, 1985. p. 1; BBC-TV News Bulletin, 21.00 hrs, August 15 and 16, 1985; Harry Anderson and Peter Youngusband, "Can South Africa Save Itself?" Newsweek , August 19, 1985. pp 7-13; It must be indicated that in a section such as this which required eye-witness account, one cannot dispense with journalistic sources. This is the justification for using this and similar sources of information.
20. See "United Nations Security Council Further Condemnation of Apartheid", The United States and South Africa: U.S. Public Statements and Related Documents, 1977-1985. Document 142

(Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington. D.C. 1985) p. 262.

21. See Stanford Ungar and Peter Vale, op. Cit. , pp. 244-5.

22. See interview he granted Dianne Weathers, "We Have Not Really Begun", Newsweek , April 1, 1985. p. 52.

23. S.J.Ungar and P. Vale, Op.Cit. , p. 245.

24. See address by the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Eagleburger) Before the National Conference of Editorial Writers, San Francisco, June 23, 1983, "Southern Africa: America's Responsibility for Peace and Change", Document 115, The United States and South Africa: U.S. Public Statements and Related Documents, 1977-1985. (Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington. D.C. 1985) pp. 193-5.

25. Reagan quoted in Nancy Cooper and Peter Youngusband, "South Africa: A Bloody Anniversary", Newsweek , April 1, 1985. p. 17.

26. Richard Deutsch, "Reagan and Africa" Africa Report , vol. 26. No. 1. January-February 1981. pp. 4-6.

27. See interview granted Richard Deutsch by George Bush, Africa Report, Vol. 25, No. 3. May-June 1980. pp. 39-41.

28. Bishop Tutu quoted in Stanford Ungar and Peter Vale, op. cit.

29. See, Interview: Randall Robinson: "We have Not Really Begun", Newsweek, April 1, 1985. p. 52

30. William J. Foltz, Elite Opinion on United States Policy Toward Africa: A Survey of Members of the Council on Foreign Relations and its affiliated Regional Committees( Council on Foreign Relations Inc. New York 1979.)

31. See "Remarks by the Secretary of State (Haig) Before the National Foreign Policy Conference For U.S. Editors and Broadcasters, Washington, June 2, 1981." Document 3. op. Cit. p. 74; For the leaks, see TransAfrica News Report (Washington) Vol. 1. No.10. (special edition), August 1981; New York Times, May 30, 1981. p. 4.

32. Interview: Randall Robinson, Op. cit.

33. New York Times, 3 November 1985.

34. Steven Metz, "The Anti-apartheid Movement and the Populist Instinct in American Politics", Political Science Quarterly , hereinafter referred to as PSQ, (New York) No. 3. 1986. pp. 380-386.

35. Don Edward Beck, "Psychological Recipe' to South Africa", South Africa Forum, (Pretoria) vol. 8. No.3. 1985. no. page. This was one of the carefully edited items sent to me by the South African Embassy in London, as a result the pages either conflict or have been omitted in an attempt to cut out unfavourable pieces. Beck's article was favourable and the omission might have been inadvertent.

36. Masipula Sithole, "Black Americans and U.S. Policy Towards Africa", African Affairs (London) vol.85. No. 340. July 1986. pp. 326-338.
37. Tom Morganthau, Sylvester Monroe, Nikki Finke Greenberg, Margaret Garrard Warner, Howard Fineman and Gloria Berger, "What Does Jesse Jackson Want?", Newsweek, May 7, 1984. pp. 184-185.
38. Interview: Walter Mondale, "View From the Front", Newsweek, May 7, 1984. p. 39.
39. T. Morganthau, et al , Op. Cit.
40. Interview: Randall Robinson, Op. cit.
41. S. Metz, "The Anti-apartheid Movement...", Op. cit.
42. R. J. Payne and E. Ganaway, Op. Cit.; Francis Kornegay, "Africa and Presidential Politics", Op.Cit.; William Rasberry, "The Mystery of Carter's Support Among Blacks", Washington Post May 28, 1976. p. A21; Chuck Stone, "Black Political Power in the Carter Era", The Black Scholar: Journal of Black Studies and Research, vol. 8. No. 4. January-February, 1977. pp. 7; The Black Vote: Election '76 (Joint Centre for Policy Studies, Washington. D.C. 1977).

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### FSAM'S TACTICS AND STRATEGY.

The preceding chapter has shown that FSAM's primary purpose was to deprive South Africa of the patronage of the Reagan administration. Afro-Americans in general and TransAfrica in particular (the two principal actors in FSAM) regarded this patronage as an essential factor in encouraging Pretoria to intensify repression at home and destabilisation in the Frontline States.

To achieve this objective, TransAfrica renewed the old Afro-American demands for imposition of comprehensive sanctions. Once again they called for the tightening of the arms embargo to prevent the export of dual purpose equipment. In addition, they demanded the prohibition of new investments and the withdrawal of existing ones. This presupposed a connection between the activities of foreign multinationals in South Africa and that country's ability to maintain apartheid, such that severance of this connection might undermine apartheid. The likely impact on South Africa of US sanctions has been the subject of passionate debate on and off since the imposition of the arms embargo in the early 1960s as earlier indicated. Simply put, imposition of sanctions entails the use of an economic weapon against a state to bring about the desired behaviour in its political activities. Within the South African context, the understanding was that imposition of sanctions could bring about an abandonment of the policy of apartheid by the authorities in Pretoria. This study will not rehearse the numerous arguments for or against sanctions; these are well documented.[1] Rather, this study will discuss three questions: the factors that made FSAM choose a particular line of action in its attempt to create a rupture in the relations between the Reagan administration and South Africa; how it went about it; and the results.

This chapter is organised in two sections. Firstly, it gives two main reasons why FSAM preferred imposition of sanctions, as opposed to some other strategies, as the means for severing the relations between South Africa and the Reagan administration. These are: (i) FSAM saw the resumption in the export of equipment with obvious military capability and the increase in transactions in the economic domain between the Reagan administration and South Africa as a factor in the sustenance of apartheid and Pretoria's aggression abroad; (ii) it was one area in which international consensus was necessary because of the dependence of South Africa's economy on

the international community and at this point, such a consensus became possible for the first time. The second section of the chapter is devoted to an analysis of the tactics and strategies chosen by FSAM to achieve its objective. This calls for answers to three questions: what did FSAM do, how did the public and the law makers respond and finally what was the outcome?

### Reasons for FSAM's Call For Sanctions

As identified in Chapter Six, the justification for the emergence of FSAM had much to do with the perception of TransAfrica and the wider Afro-American community that the South Africa policy of the Reagan administration made a direct contribution to the chaos in South Africa. TransAfrica's Robinson said in no uncertain terms that the policy of the Reagan administration had emboldened Pretoria to intensify repression at home, to attempt to co-opt the Asians and the "coloureds" as "junior partners" in apartheid, and to continue the policy of destabilisation in the Frontline States.

Even granting that these activities of Pretoria were a direct result of the Reagan administration's South Africa policy, they alone could not justify the advocacy of sanctions as the means for severing the relations between Washington and Pretoria. Why not some other means? Why call for sanctions? One answer could be that Afro-Americans were used to advocating imposition of sanctions against South Africa; as such, they were better off doing what they knew best. This answer is not convincing in view of the fact that their success in this area was patchy. Neither the Kennedy nor the Carter administrations, in whose elections they played a pivotal role, responded to the call for sanctions against South Africa with absolutely satisfactory results. They all achieved qualified successes.

It might also be tempting to seek explanations for FSAM's position in the call for sanctions by Winnie Mandela and the South African Council of Churches (SACC). Mrs. Mandela's view that American investments were "...a shoulder to the wheel moving apartheid forward"[2] could be seen as a compelling reason. Clearly the fact that the ANC was asking for sanctions mattered. But FSAM stressed sanctions at this time because there were two compelling contemporary trends. One



was that the goal of undermining the South Africa regime seemed best tackled through sanctions. Secondly, the situation in South Africa allowed sanctions to seem much more feasible at the international level.[3] Neither the general trend in South Africa, nor demands for sanctions are enough in themselves to explain FSAM's choice.

i) Increase in Commercial and Military Related Activities Between Washington and Pretoria:

The Carter administration could be accused of a lukewarm attitude to the activities of arms suppliers, and even of direct cooperation with South Africa in the area of nuclear weapons. The emergence of Ronald Reagan, however, recorded a tremendous increase in the relations between the two countries in the area of conventional arms. As early as March 1982, the administration paved the way to reverse the Carter administration's strict adherence to arms embargo against South Africa. Thus, munition industries were granted two sets of licences - general and validated ones. Those who were granted general licence were required to supply innocuous, non-military related, items to South Africa. Hence, they were in the main free from the bureaucratic difficulties associated with obtaining approval for exports. Only those who were granted the validated licence were required to satisfy the Commerce Department that their exports would neither contribute to nor augment South Africa's military capabilities. Yet, the interpretations of what could enhance South Africa's military strength were made in such a manner that Pretoria received items that it could not have gained access to had the arms embargo been strictly enforced. Some of these were assorted computers including the Cyber 170/750, the Amdhal and the MV/8000. Other items included a fleet of reconnaissance aircraft, the Super King 200C, and air ambulances.[4]

These computers had a military capability because they could be put into use in two military related areas. One of these was their ability to break coded messages, with relative ease. Perhaps the other is of more deadly proportions. Because of the sophistication of these computers, they could enable Pretoria to set accurately the trajectory of big field guns like the Howitzers, which were successfully used in Southern Angola on numerous occasions. As for the reconnaissance aircraft and the air ambulances, they were some of the equipment South Africa was starved off throughout the tenure of the Carter administration because of its adherence to the arms embargo.

What the Reagan administration had done was to create a loop-hole for South Africa to remedy its obvious deficiency in arms acquisition. Nothing attests to this more than the leeway given to the licensees: no restrictions were placed on third parties exporting US military components to South Africa. This meant an American multinational could export arms to its subsidiary in a foreign country only for the firm to re-route the items to South Africa. By so doing, the parent company in the US could not be held responsible for the activities of its subsidiary with a different name in a different country. It was this process that accounted for the \$28 million worth of arms and military related equipment which Pretoria bought from US munition industries within the first three years of the Reagan presidency.[5] Further, the Commerce Department, which was supposed to ensure adherence to the restrictions, actually issued a blanket directive in September 1982 allowing munition industries, which had sold military equipment to Pretoria, to supply service manuals without application for a licence.[6]

This period of rapid augmentation of South Africa's military capability by the Reagan administration coincided with a surge in new US loans to the same regime. TransAfrica's Randall Robinson observed that what had come down to a mere \$350 million in 1980 from \$1.2 billion when Carter took office rose dramatically to \$623 million within two years of the Reagan presidency.[7] The period also witnessed the approval of South Africa's application for a \$1 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund, (IMF) without the elaborate scrutiny for which the institution was famous. Other African and South American applicants had to adhere to stringent conditions, such as imposition of austerity measures in their domestic policy including the streamlining of the bureaucracy, in a manner that enabled the IMF to virtually assume a supranational role. South Africa was spared that indignity. For example, no attempt was made to ascertain whether the conditions that had brought about the request for the loan had anything to do with the impact of apartheid in labour mobility in the country's productive sector. This was an area in which South Africa was vulnerable in view of influx control, the restriction of some sections of the populace from skilled employment, the Pass Law and Group Areas Acts which amongst others confined employees to hostels without the comfort of their families - an obvious impediment to productivity.

While the US Treasury and the State Departments denied any involvement in the decision of the IMF to grant the loan, one wonders if such conduct in awarding a loan by an institution as

meticulous as the IMF could have taken place except in deference to the White House. Being the major contributor to the organisation as well as being its chairman, the US has twenty per cent of the vote in the IMF, thus virtually guaranteeing support to any application supported by Washington. It is obvious too that South Africa's military purchases from US munition industries at the point in time might have necessitated or at least added urgency to the loan. For example, in his analysis, Christopher Coker observed that the contract for the air ambulances alone amounted to \$15 million.[8]

That these efforts coupled with the clandestine activities of arms suppliers in the developed world would bolster Pretoria's military capability, and help it to maintain apartheid at home and embark upon aggression abroad, are apparent when we examine South Africa's set backs in the battle-field. On December 6, 1983, the SADF launched an ambitious military operation with the intention of over-running Angola and installing Jonas Savimbi and UNITA in power. What was supposed to be a routine military operation ended in disarray as the SADF had to retreat when it confronted an unexpectedly stiff resistance from the Angolan regular forces without the support of their regular mentors, the Cubans. The SADF's hasty and undisciplined pattern of retreat after losing two troop carriers and 21 soldiers even before the commencement of real battle was brought about by South Africa's deficiency in equipment for aerial warfare. While the Soviet military advisers were able to monitor the advance of the SADF from afar as early as November 1983 with the aid of satellite reconnaissance equipment, the South Africans had nothing else to rely upon except their hardware on the ground. As a result, when they encountered a band of SWAPO insurgents at the Angolan border, they failed to realise that this was a bait only for the Angolans to fall upon them when their attention was focused on what they regarded as an easy military target.[9] The SADF's position was untenable because apart from the disparity in sophisticated military equipment, the South Africans had lost the initiative in the sky. They had all along relied on the international sanctions busters to counter the then US imposed arms embargo. Had Reagan been in office during the four years Carter was there perhaps South Africa would then have been able to make up for the deficiencies.

South Africa's "self sufficiency" in arms through the establishment of ARMSCOR is thus much exaggerated. Pretoria had never produced any sophisticated armament that was not a copy of other peoples products, bought in the "black market" or illegally smuggled in by arms suppliers.

Hardly is this an exaggeration in view of the findings of an international seminar on UN embargo against South Africa in London in May 1986:

“...Armcor’s capabilities are restricted by the limited technological base of South Africa’s domestic industry as a whole and its subsidiaries remain dependent on components and technology imported from other countries. While it has managed to provide SADF with some of its basic arms requirements, largely as a result of licensing arrangements with western countries during the 1960s and 1970s, Armcor is unable to assemble or manufacture more sophisticated military equipment, leading to serious shortages, especially in the airforce.” [10]

The implication of the Reagan administration’s South Africa policy in the area of arms export meant that Pretoria could overcome these difficulties with relative ease, thus paving the way to its utilisation of the strongarm tactics against opponents within and without. That was a key reason why FSAM sought to disrupt the relations between Washington and Pretoria.

#### ii) Possibility of International Consensus over Sanctions:

The analysis above need not imply that FSAM’s advocacy of sanctions was necessitated purely by the comfort South Africa received from the Reagan administration in the area of arms procurement. The administration of apartheid needs money and this is where South Africa’s international connection plays a part. In the modern world, no semi-industrialised country of the type of South Africa (whose industrial base was built by foreign multinationals)[11] can survive on its own without transactions with others. South Africa realises its funds from foreign investments, loans from the international financial institutions and international trade between it and the international community. The US plays a major part in this regard as epitomised by the statistics on US financial involvement in South Africa as indicated in Chapter Five. In a study in 1985, Ann Seidman estimated that as at 1983, total US financial involvement in South Africa stood at \$14.6 billion. Apart from loans and direct investments as indicated earlier, US investors held \$8 billion worth of shares in South African business ventures and accounted for nearly 60 per cent of the shares for mining in the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. This no doubt had taken into account the reported 13 per cent increase in US investments since the advent of the Reagan administration.

Only Britain surpassed the US as an investor, highlighting the importance of the US to the South African economy and the likely impact of divestment to Pretoria should Washington decide to utilise that line of action.[12]

While increase in investments may generate revenue for government coffers, it was precisely because of the earlier presence of foreign investment that some of the legislation prohibiting Africans from skilled jobs at the work-place were enacted as noted in Chapter Two. Corporate concerns complied with these apartheid laws for decades, reaped super-profits arising from cheap pliable non-white labour and only complained when a shortage of skilled labour threatened the efficiency of their expanded operations and their profit margins.[13]

The higher profit margins of foreign multinationals in the South African investment scene in comparison with other parts of the globe had much to do with the presence of a cheap and (until the 1970s) non-unionised pliant non-white work-force. The law regulating the movement of the virtually landless Africans not only depressed the price of their labour but guaranteed a pool of labour at the beck and call of employers. In addition, two other factors also helped to lure multinationals to the South African investment scene. One were generous tax incentives from the government. Second, the colonial pattern of communication in the region tied the regional states to South Africa, thereby creating a large potential market for the output of the manufacturing sector. The formation of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was aimed precisely at breaking out of this colonial pattern.[14] The international commercial connection is therefore important to South Africa as noted by its Minister of Finance, Senator Owen Horwood, in his budget speech for fiscal year 1983-84: "Exports are of vital importance to the economy of any country especially.....South Africa. An increase in exports is the best and soundest way to finance the country's necessary imports. Besides this, rising exports enable a country to exploit its domestic resources more effectively for increase prosperity." [15]

FSAM therefore sought to reverse South Africa's connection with international commerce on the grounds that it was essential to enabling Pretoria to maintain the system of apartheid. In this respect, Congressman William Gray's assertion before the House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Supervision, Regulation and Insurance on June 8, 1983 that South Africa was engaged on refurbishing its image in the US, with the aid of law firms, [16] did not come as a surprise in view of the importance it attached to its reputation at the international market place.



To sever these links with the international scene will not only cause a dislocation of South Africa's economy, but might even cause it to collapse. In this respect, not only is South Africa vulnerable to sanctions, but it is one area in which it might be possible to create international consensus irrespective of the Reagan administration's belief in South Africa's importance to the West. Without prejudice to the importance of the South Africa's investment scene to Western multinationals [17] and its contribution to Western requirement of chromium, manganese and vanadium - minerals of considerable importance to the developed economies - [18] South Africa is by no means vital as it does not possess a monopoly of the production of these minerals. This therefore robs it of any meaningful retaliatory measures against the international community in the event of comprehensive sanctions arising from that source. Sanctions therefore matter to South Africa because of the dependence of its economy on the international community.[19]

In this respect, FSAM's advocacy of sanctions was partly inspired by the damage which South Africa might experience in the event of an international consensus on the issue. What was the likelihood of an international consensus on the issue of imposition of sanctions against South Africa? In part, what were the prospects of support from the administration?

#### The Administration's Likely Reaction to FSAM's Call For Sanctions Against South Africa By the International community:

Unlike previous administrations which saw Africa as of peripheral importance, or ceded the predominant role to Africa's former colonial rulers, and which had only offered political support to Pretoria on the basis of anti-communist solidarity without any binding commitment, Reagan fought the 1980 election on a manifesto that committed himself to support for friendly regimes and confronting the Soviet-Cuban presence in Southern Africa. In this respect, when Reagan spoke about South Africa's friendship and importance to the West from military and strategic points of view, he was indeed emphasising his endorsement of the regime and thereby serving notice on those who would seek to influence his perception on account of opposition to the domestic policy of Pretoria. One saw an inkling of this in the administration's reaction to the Congressional rider by Representative Steve Solarz to the State Department's Authorisation bill for fiscal year 1984-85. This rider tied US firms to a mandatory observance of the Sullivan principles; and prohibited new

US investments and importation of Kruggerands.

Opposing these restrictions before the Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Wisner, enumerated the positive contributions of corporate firms to the lot of the non-white population of South Africa. He told the Committee that 330 US firms and affiliates operating in South Africa had a work-force of 127,000 South African employees. 178 of them adhered to the Sullivan code, and employed 90,000 people. Of those that did not adhere, the US had no controlling interest in 19; and the remaining 133 firms employed 17,000 persons. He argued that to impose legislation on corporate interests to comply with the Sullivan principles would amount to interference in the fair employment policy of US ventures and a failure to recognise the effort of the signatory firms to improve the lot of their employees. For example, they spent \$3.3 million on training their employees in 1982; sixty per cent of the beneficiaries were non-whites. In addition the signatory firms had contributed \$10,500,000 to various projects to assist "disadvantaged black, colored, and Asian communities in South Africa.....In short, US firms are acting as catalysts for change in South Africa, not only in terms of fair employment practices, but across the board in all aspects of community life. The Sullivan code deserves most of the credit for being the engine which is driving this corporate force away from apartheid and discriminatory employment practices." [20]

True, the signatory firms to the Sullivan code employed 127,000 persons, but they were no more than one and a half per cent of the South African work-force. Wisner also failed to mention that a high proportion of these workers were whites already protected by the apartheid system. For example, in her study in 1983, Elizabeth Schmidt found that the non-whites who work for the signatory firms numbered only about 50,000.[21] Nor did the Assistant Secretary address the deficiency in monitoring adherence to the Sullivan principles by the signatory firms. For example, Arthur. D. Little Co. who were responsible for monitoring reported in 1982 that only 93 signatory firms responded to their questionnaires while 29 ignored them. It was on the basis of the response to the questionnaires that Arthur D. Little Co. identified 32 signatory firms as having made "good progress" and classified them "category 1". 38 other firms were in "category II" on grounds that they were "making progress", and at the rear were 37 firms in "category III" who were required to improve their adherence to the code. Thus only a little over half the firms could be identified as "making progress"; and before long it emerged that one of the criteria for Arthur Little's

categorisation was a mere willingness on the part of a signatory firm, to underline its commitment to the code, by taking membership in the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce (NAFCOC)[22]

Such a monitoring mechanism of voluntary response to a questionnaire without either the means for verification or enforcement was open to abuse. Thus it was not surprising that there were disparities between what workers in South Africa thought about the efforts of their employers and the reputation which some firms enjoyed in the US for their adherence to the code. For example, during an official tour of South Africa in the summer of 1984, Stephen Weissman, a staff consultant of the Subcommittee on Africa, asked for confirmation of Colgate-Palmolive's reputation as a prime example of corporate compliance with the Sullivan principles. The answer indicated the inadequacy of reliance on voluntary application of the code as the means for eliminating discrimination at the work place. He was told by Dusty Ngwane of the Chemical Workers Industrial Union and the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU):

“They provide video games to the community - free Pacman! You remember in 1980 they maintained separate locker rooms for whites and blacks. Later, management said the white change room was really for monthly paid workers. We said, what if you paid all workers on a monthly basis. They replied that it would then be a change room for “skilled” workers. Blacks still don't use that change room. They have a program to train supervisors, but at the end only two African workers and four whites were picked up and the whites were from outside the company.”[23]

This pattern of dissatisfaction with the code was common among non-white workers in South Africa, the people for whose benefit it was allegedly formulated. In 1982, the Motor Assemblers and Components Workers Union of South Africa (MACWUSA) made a six point counter submission to the Ford Motor Company to counter the firm's “highest rating” in the US for adherence to the Sullivan code.[24]

In spite of these deficiencies in the monitoring of the Sullivan principles the failure of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State to point out that the contributions by the signatory firms to the advancement of the non-whites constituted a mere two per cent of their profits for the period called into question his sincerity as an advocate of corporate responsibility. Nor did he indicate that the “training facilities” equipped their recipients merely with a basic knowledge of vocational-

commercial training, which would confine them to a peripheral role in a modern economy.[25] It is not the victims of apartheid that benefit from from foreign investment, but the apartheid state and the investors. Archbishop Tutu put this argument succinctly and vividly in 1985:

“ Foreign companies in South Africa should stop kidding themselves by saying they are there for our benefit. That’s baloney. Whether they like it or not, they are buttressing an evil system. The Sullivan principles... are there to make apartheid more acceptable, more comfortable; and we do not want apartheid made more comfortable, we want apartheid dismantled. These principles are saying nothing more than the kinds of things a good employer ought to be doing in any case.”[26]

The argument by the Reagan administration in defence of the facilities that sustain the regime in Pretoria, meant that FSAM had a fight in its hands in advocating the imposition of sanctions against South Africa. An administration which opposed legislative backing for corporate firms to adhere to the Sullivan code ( a domestic decision) would not go out of its way to initiate an international action to isolate South Africa. FSAM’s choice of tactics and strategy would, therefore, have to take into account strong opposition from the Reagan administration.

### Choice of tactics and strategies.

The Reagan administration was thus likely to continue to attach importance to its friendship with South Africa irrespective of FSAM’s objection. How then would the anti-apartheid movement persuade the administration to do what it would not normally have done, namely the imposition of sanctions against Pretoria?

The generally friendly and harmonious relations between the Reagan administration and South Africa meant that the situation in South Africa received the approval of Washington, or there was no one in the administration to argue effectively against Pretoria’s domestic policy and its stance towards the Frontline States. Both appear plausible if one looks at the perception of South Africa and the Southern African region by the three main formulators and executors of US foreign

policy toward the region. President Reagan's pro-South African stance in order to counter perceived Soviet and communist hostile designs, analysed at length in the previous chapters, was supported by Secretary of State Alexander Haig (and by his successor). Despite his far greater knowledge of the region and the sophistication of his analysis and policy recommendation, the same holds for the last of the trio, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker.

Before his appointment as Assistant Secretary, Crocker had argued strongly before Steven Solarz's Subcommittee on Africa in the House in 1980 against imposition of a statutory obligation on corporate concerns with South African interests to adhere to the Sullivan principles.[27] Crocker's opposition to the Sullivan principles compares sharply with that expressed by Afro-Americans, since his position was based upon a neoclassical laissez faire stance of not imposing a political burden upon corporate concerns. By contrast, Afro-American criticism stemmed from the weakness of the principles' impact. Not even the principles' author, the Reverend Leon Sullivan ever deluded himself into thinking that his efforts were a panacea for apartheid in South Africa. Indeed, he himself argued before the Solarz panel that the principles he formulated were designed to help in minimising the effect of undiluted apartheid at the work-place in South Africa: "They can help produce change, they cannot end apartheid by themselves... in order to totally eliminate apartheid, help must come from churches, unions, educational institutions, governments, and world-wide public opinion." [28]

Although there were isolated pockets of approval of the Sullivan principles as generally expected, this time from share-holders and board members of corporations with South African interests,[29] the popular view among Afro-Americans was that the Sullivan principles were a "smokescreen" and a publicity stunt for concealing the immorality in making profits at the South African market-place.[30] Even the moderate NAACP, whose Task Force on Africa had recommended imposition of punitive sanctions against South Africa including total disinvestment, was no less scathing in its attack of the Sullivan principles, while advocating a severe interim anti-apartheid measure at the work-place pending total withdrawal from the South African scene.[31] Thus, Afro-Americans' objection stemmed from their antipathy to apartheid and the fact that the principles only offered an escape route to corporate interests with South African connections, as opposed to Crocker's that they interfered with corporate freedom.



The harmony on Southern Africa between the President, his Secretary of State and his Assistant Secretary for African Affairs made unlikely any occurrence of policy differences within the administration arising from conflicting perceptions (as one saw with respect to the Carter administration after 1977). The prospect of utilising the “inside” strategy of exerting influence was thus poor. While perseverance may also be necessary, the prerequisite for successful utilisation of the “inside” strategy is possession of influence on or nearness to the powers that be (or both).

In the case of Afro-Americans, Reagan neither solicited nor received their votes in his bid for the presidency. He therefore owed no allegiance to them, and they in turn were not close enough to his administration to establish contact let alone pull strings. Rather his allegiance was to the larger American public whose right-wing fervour brought him into office. The administration’s pro-Pretoria but anti-Angola and anti-Namibian independence stance was seen as part of an on-going battle to defeat communism and assuage American fears. Thus, the administration was fulfilling its electoral promise to the American people to see off Soviet “gains” in Southern Africa. The support for an anti-communist Pretoria through thick and thin could therefore be presented to the American people as fulfilling a necessary function.[32]

The absence of conflicting regionalist/globalist perceptions on foreign policy issues within the Reagan administration meant there was no window of opportunity for Afro-Americans to exploit. Had there been one, they might have capitalised on this avenue as the Republicans did to the Carter administration, to force a change in policy stance on Southern Africa. But there was to be no replay of the difficulties of the Carter years. If the “inside” strategy was outside the reach of FSAM, then what options were available?

FSAM’s identification of targets and utilisation of tactics and strategies : Thus, FSAM’s adopted strategy was to attempt to achieve three things simultaneously: by-passing the executive arm; cultivating goodwill in Congress; and above all an appeal to the public at large by means of political mobilisation.

Laying emphasis on Congress and the American public was a step in the right direction. In 1980, at the height of the conservatism fervour, the House Subcommittee on Africa nonetheless had sought to minimise the effect of apartheid on its victims through imposition of the Sullivan principles on American multinationals. The refusal of Afro-Americans to cooperate should not

obscure the efforts of the Solarz Committee. What that Congressional initiative meant was that, unlike the executive arm, there was still support for the cause being pursued by FSAM. This support was dormant because of the prevailing mood in the country.

That FSAM was aware that the American public possessed the capability to alter the administration's Southern Africa policy was visibly portrayed in its tactics. Instead of haranguing the administration, which would have made it the perennial Afro-American irritant, FSAM carefully and deliberately made its desire the concern of the public at large. What FSAM did was to mobilise sympathisers for a sustained and illegal demonstration in front of the South African Embassy in Washington with effect from November 1984. To attract public attention, numerous prominent Americans (with anti-apartheid sympathies) offered themselves for arrest. Simon Jenkins' description of the events was a true reflection of FSAM's tactics:

“Each afternoon for the past four months, demonstrators have gathered in the cold outside the South African embassy in Washington's Massachusetts Avenue. They have unfurled their banners and struck up a familiar mantra: “Apartheid out, out!”. A prearranged number then break away, walk and offer themselves for arrest. It is a symbolic act of trespass. Charges are not pursued. It is a painless and convenient way of publicising a currently very popular act of commitment. To date, more than 2000 Americans have been arrested outside South African premises as part of the “Free South Africa Movement”. It began on November 21st last.... with a sit-in by three black leaders.... Their action revived the dormant anti-apartheid movement... The American apartheid issue now has a life of its own..”[33]

Some of those arrested or demonstrating in anticipation of arrest such as Robert Kennedy's youngest son, 17 year old Douglas Harriman Kennedy, were not formally charged and brought before the Courts for trespass, but their presence made for good publicity thereby furthering the cause of the organisers. Part of the effect of this tactic was that soon arrest at the South African embassy premises while protesting against apartheid became a Congressional status symbol. Among those arrested were 18 Congressmen and the Republican Senator Lowell Weicker of Connecticut, who made history by being the first sitting Senator to be arrested for a breach of the peace. Others such as Jesse Jackson and Gary Hart, already well known for their implacable hatred for apartheid, and under pressure in view of their ambition for 1988, demonstrated repeatedly in

front of the embassy in an unsuccessful attempt to be arrested. They were veterans of the anti-apartheid crusade, but on this occasion, they like numerous others were responding to the bandwagon effect created by FSAM. The Embassy demonstrations had developed a momentum of their own.

The outcome of this was the restoration of the morale and enthusiasm of the Afro-American/White Liberal/organised labour coalition of the civil rights movement, including its anti-war component, which in turn continued to sustain the demonstrations. Before long, the campus demonstrations for which the anti-war faction was famous also became a prominent feature of the strategy of the FSAM. It took no time for the demonstrations to move beyond the confines of Washington. Soon every American city that harboured a South African Consulate was being picketed by students and other concerned Americans aroused by their memory of the civil rights demonstrations of the 1960s. And with it came the grand-standing and oratory of practising and prospective politicians in front of the television cameras, emphasising their abhorrence of apartheid as a practice against American values, and the need for an American administration to move against its practitioners. They were endorsing calls for the imposition of sanctions against Pretoria. Congressman Walter Fauntroy's visit to Alabama was characteristic of this type of media induced demonstration. Leading a band of demonstrators on what they called the "Southern wave" of protest, they sang, knelt and prayed to God in an attempt to wean South Africa from the patronage of the Reagan administration. Fauntroy defended the tactic on these grounds:

"We must correct (apartheid) not only because it is morally reprehensive but because it threatens American jobs. While jobs are being lost in the Birmingham steel mills, they are being opened up in South Africa by American firms attracted by the slave market there...It's a policy (constructive engagement) really of all carrot and no stick. The (United States) problem is not colored people on welfare but rich people who have been investing in a racist country." [34]

In the process corporate interests with South African connections became the easiest targets of criticism, while Universities with stock in such corporate concerns became the most vulnerable to the demonstrators. Their path was eased by the previous action on campuses over this issue, especially the war of attrition which demonstrators fought with Polaroid. For example, between 1977-79, the Board of Trustees of five Universities - Antioch, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio and

Wisconsin - had sold their stock in corporate interests with South African connections while 26 other Universities had also taken partial steps in that direction. Nor were the state and local authorities immune from the debate. Between 1977 and 1983, 23 states had passed various pieces of anti-apartheid legislation prohibiting the use of their pension and operating funds in investing in South Africa related business ventures. Of these, California, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and Wisconsin had totally withheld their deposits from Banks with South African connections while Indiana, Iowa, Maryland and Oregon had embarked on more limited action.[35]

Yet others like Governor George Wallace of Alabama, plagued and tarnished by a record of opposition to integration in the South, now used the occasion to try to rehabilitate their image. That is the most reasonable explanation for the dramatic and unreserved support for an anti-apartheid cause in far-flung South Africa expressed by Wallace, who was not known to have atoned adequately for his past misdeeds in the civil rights era. He first won the governorship of Alabama in 1962 on an anti-integrationist platform, fulfilling his campaign promises by standing at the door of the University of Alabama in 1963, in a futile attempt to prevent integration; and then empowered the Alabama state's Police Chief, Bull Connor, to confront anti-segregation demonstrators in Birmingham and other cities of Alabama with police dogs. Wallace subsequently attained notoriety throughout the US and beyond as the most articulate spokesman of segregation in the South. What role these racist credentials played in his governorship victory in 1982, twenty years after he had first won the office is not wholly clear.[36]

Yet not only did Wallace publicly endorse the campaign of the FSAM, but he displayed his enthusiasm by conferring on Congressman Fauntroy, who led the protest to Mobile, Alabama, the twin title of honorary citizenship of the city and the honorary lieutenant-colonel of the state militia.[37]

Helped by the continuing violence in South Africa as shown on home television screens, by December 1984 FSAM had all but succeeded in mustering enough public support across the political spectrum to make the issue of imposition of sanctions against South Africa take on a non-partisan tone on Capitol Hill and expand the base of support for such measures beyond that of Liberal Legislators. The most vivid evidence of this was the ultimatum which 35 Republican Congressmen issued to the South African Ambassador on December 5, 1984. It states:

“Events of recent weeks in South Africa have raised serious questions about your government’s willingness to move more progressively and aggressively toward real human rights reforms. With this letter we wish to make clear that we view the violence in your country and the questions raised by it with alarm. Further more, we want you to know that we are prepared to pursue policy changes relative to South Africa’s relationship with the United States if the situation does not improve. If “constructive engagement” becomes in your view an excuse for maintaining the unacceptable status quo, it will quickly become an approach that can engender no meaningful support among American policy makers.....[and we] are prepared to recommend that the US government take the following two steps: 1) Curtailment of new American investments in South unless current economic and civil rights guarantees are in place. 2) Organize international diplomatic and economic sanctions against South Africa.[38]

This was unexpected to anyone familiar with the attitudes of conservative Republicans to South Africa. It had always been portrayed as a pro-Western country with a western oriented administration worth protecting. Any dissatisfaction with the regime had always been about the apartheid labour regulations which the right-wing regarded as an impediment to free enterprise and trade. There had never been a sustained attack on the political dimension of apartheid by so many right-wing Republicans since the legal introduction of apartheid in South Africa in 1948. This reversal of an earlier position was a reflection on the part of the Republican law-makers, especially the younger ones, that they ought to identify the party with issues relating to civil and human rights. Republican Congressman Vin Webber explained the rationale for the action in no ambiguous terms:

“It is important that the next generation of Conservative leadership send a signal to SA. If we are to become the majority party we have to change the perception of conservatives on civil rights. There is a consensus in the country on civil and human rights and need to chuck the baggage of an ugly strain of American conservatism in the past, the baggage of racism.”[39]

In this respect, FSAM’s strategy of coopting the public and the law-makers to its cause through the tactic of continuous demonstration had yielded dividends. But that still left unanswered FSAM’s demand for imposition of sanctions against South Africa. What then was the significance of this



support for FSAM?

Results of FSAM's tactics and strategy: Republican Congressmen had publicly put pressure on South Africa, and the administration itself was not immune from their wrath. A few weeks before the Congressional ultimatum two Republican Senators, Richard Lugar, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and Nancy Kassebaum, had urged the President to condemn Pretoria on its human rights record. The smallness of the number of Senators involved in this exercise is mitigated by their ideological stance and their nearness to the President. Unlike some Republicans who occasionally identify themselves with liberal causes, these were Senators with unwavering right wing inclinations. Kassebaum in particular like most Republicans saw the need for Pretoria's stranglehold on power in order to keep communism at bay in a vital area of US interests, as enunciated by the administration.

For the President, however, open criticism of Pretoria held uncertain consequences, not least the possibility of opening a Pandora's box which could herald the demise of the only friendly state and last bastion of anti-communism in the region. The urgent meeting the President held with Chester Crocker on the issue on December 3, 1984 and which led to an impromptu decision to meet with Bishop Tutu three days later rather than to a public condemnation of Pretoria, highlight the anguish the White House was facing over developments at Capitol Hill.

Because the decision to meet with Tutu was a mere damage limitation exercise to fend-off Republican anger for not doing enough over South Africa, it took no time for the President to disagree with the Bishop, who was speaking from a wealth of experience on the ground in South Africa. Responding to his charges that the administration's South Africa policy had worsened the plight of the victims of apartheid, the President insisted before White House correspondents that "constructive engagement" was a step in the right direction: "I have to disagree with him on the fact that the situation has worsened. It has not. We have made sizable progress there in expressing our repugnance for apartheid and in persuading the South African government to make changes. And we're going to continue with that policy." [40] While this response was no doubt inspired by the ingrained suspicion of the unforeseeable consequences of radical change, the President had failed to realise that FSAM's protest was eroding his popularity even among the conservative Republicans on the issue of sanctions against South Africa. The substance of his response to Tutu

was not borne out by the intensity of violence and Police repression in South Africa shown daily on their televisions.

Although the President then tried to repair the rupture in Republican consensus over South Africa by criticising Pretoria's human rights record on December 10, 1984 the action was too modest and it came too late to improve his fortunes. Congressmen and Senators across the political divide entered 1985 aware that "constructive engagement" had achieved no tangible results which would eliminate the need to send a clear message to Pretoria about their repugnance for apartheid and the crisis it had precipitated. Although the argument that imposition of sanctions would threaten the jobs of the non-whites had been countered by the argument that apartheid was basically a creation of a political system and that the chaos in South Africa was in response to the repugnance being felt by the majority of the people of that country, the problem was the strength of signal which legislators could send to Pretoria.

Legislators as the representatives of the people had to formulate a means of responding to the public mood on the issue because not only had the campaign for divestment and disinvestment been intensified, but it had begun to yield dividends. According to the Investor Responsibility Centre, 40 US firms wound up operations in South Africa in 1985 followed by 48 more in 1986. These firms either packed up their bags and left, sold to South African managements, or "planned to involve blacks as shareholders in new structures to distribute their products in South Africa after disinvesting." [41] Irrespective of the method, the exercise involved firms famous at the South African market place. They included Carnation, Coca Cola, Eastman Kodak, Exxon, General Motors, IBM and Pepsico. New US investments had by then largely dried up. In addition, 10 states, about 30 cities and an additional 40 Universities (to bring to 80 the number that had responded to divestment) had taken action in 1985 to withdraw their funds in firms engaged in business in South Africa. Among the Universities which had completely severed links, as opposed to the previous limited actions, were famous names like Harvard, Yale, New York and Dartmouth, which brought the total from sale of Universities' shares in South Africa related firms to \$292 million since the advent of the campus protest in 1978. [42] States which responded to the protests in 1985-86 included California which authorised the sale of its South African stock of R2.5 billion. Hesitations over divestment of so much stock had been softened by the experience of the states that took action earlier. According to its Governor, Michael Dukakis, Massachusetts was "the first state

in the nation to sell from our public pension fund portfolio all those investments in firms doing business in South Africa. It has been our experience that divestiture makes not only strong moral statement against apartheid but divestiture had proven to have had no significant impact on our pension earnings.”[43]

In addition, the campaign had moved beyond institutions to individuals involved in dealings with South Africa, with some encouraging results. While the demonstrations were intensifying in front of the Embassy and the four Consulates across the country, some activists had targeted the eight South Africa “honorary” consuls scattered across the country. These are US citizens appointed by South Africa to represent its interests on the strength of their contact with the country. In December 1984 the honorary consul in Boston announced his intention to resign his office after repeated visits by protesters. His counterpart in Seattle, Joseph M. Swing, indicated the scale of pressure he was under when he said: “They have been coming every Saturday since September, but the numbers have increased significantly since the demonstrations at the embassy in Washington.”[44]

In Mobile, Alabama, the decision of South Africa’s honorary consul, John H. van Aken to keep his office under lock and key to frustrate demonstrators attracted prolonged singing of “Negro spirituals” and civil rights anthems such as “We shall overcome”, and prayers, amidst promises of further visits. One of the leaders of the protesters, Dr. Joseph E. Lowery, President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) summed up the groups’ attempt:

“We have made our statement to this community and we’ll be back....If he has a conscience, [ like his counter-part in Boston] he must be at least a little uneasy at what he is doing....He may flee from us but he can’t flee from the wrath of God.”[45]

Such efforts on the part of FSAM meant that it was not only ahead of the law-makers but that it had made it imperative for the latter to take action to demonstrate their recognition of public concern and anxiety over apartheid in South Africa. It was against this background, and amidst the unresolved issue of how far to go in signalling disapproval of apartheid, that the legislators embarked upon the process of drafting an acceptable sanctions bill. First to offer one in March 1985 was Democratic Congressman William Gray III of Pennsylvania. With considerable input

from Senator Edward Kennedy, this effort which became known as the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985 addressed four issues: the banning of US bank loans and of further investments by US firms until the institution of genuine reforms by Pretoria; and prohibition of the sale of computers to Pretoria and of importation of Kruggerands into the US.

While the Gray-Kennedy initiative did not go down well with some Republican Congressmen, it is necessary to realise that their opposition stemmed from its narrowness. To them, the bill confined itself to South Africa without including communist dictatorships which the Republicans felt were equally as bad. This was clearly evident in the counter-proposal of Republican Congressman Robert Walker of Pennsylvania which called for repeal of the Clark Amendment of 1976, banning aid to anti-government rebels in Angola, and the denial of favourable trade status to states that support international terrorism. But the rest of the Walker proposals were specifically directed at South Africa. These were prohibitions of government support to US firms in South Africa which failed to adhere to the Sullivan principles unless sufficient reform had been instituted by Pretoria to nullify them; a ban on loans to apartheid states and an imposition of restrictions on the amount of goods the US could import from countries that use force labour in the production process. These moves showed that the Republicans like the Democrats were equally concerned about the developments in South Africa. The Walker initiative should also be viewed in the light of the argument of some Republicans that the Gray initiative stood the risk of being vetoed by the President. It was therefore a means for circumventing a possible Presidential veto.

Nonetheless four of the ten Republicans in the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted with the Democrats to approve the Gray proposal by 29 to 6 on May 2, 1985. This was indicative of the willingness of Congress to embark on a confrontation course with the President on an issue in which, they felt, the executive was at variance with the line already taken by the American public. This became clear when the President was warned against the use of the veto by his own Republican Congressmen following the approval of the bill. The administration's wrongly timed imposition of trade sanctions against Nicaragua on May 1, 1985 may also have encouraged the Congressmen to back the Gray proposal. But the enthusiasm to do something about South Africa preceded the imposition of sanctions against Managua, and was a function of FSAM's successful mobilisation of the American public against "constructive engagement". Congressmen were only

responding to public concern, as the Staff Director of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Africa pointed out:

“The peoples’ elected representatives will not act unless a situation is so critical that it impinges on U.S. interests in a harmful way, which in turn prompts the citizenry to appeal for Congressional action. Until recently, developments in Southern Africa have not been perceived by the general American public as interfering with its civic well-being. If the larger public interest does not force a Congressional reaction, then the executive branch looks to coopt legislative support for its traditional “crisis management” policy response. The Reagan administration since 1981 has taken this approach regarding South Africa and implemented it as a policy formula termed “constructive engagement”. However as events in Southern Africa escalated into violence and destabilisation, the Congress, under direct pressure from the nongovernmental wing of the Africa constituency,[FSAM] has sought to alter America’s policy direction. This has been especially true since the beginning of 1983.”[46]

In this respect, the significance of the Nicaraguan misadventure lay in its ability to undermine the administration’s opposition to Congressional imposition of sanctions against South Africa. The imposition of sanctions against the Sandinistas was apparently inspired by the need to bring democracy to Managua; yet South Africa was no more democratic than Nicaragua. Congressman Steven Solarz brought home this point when he argued: “How can the US stand for democracy and pluralism in Central America while we stand for racism in Southern Africa?”[47] This perhaps accounted for the Congressional cynicism which greeted the repeated assertions of Chester Crocker, George Shultz and the President himself about the threat which sanctions against South Africa would pose to the means of livelihood of the non-white population. The Congressional view was encapsulated once again by Solarz: “Can anyone seriously doubt that it is far worse to live today as a Black man or woman in South Africa than as an opponent of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua?.....If total sanctions are justified against Nicaragua, can we really say that partial sanctions are not justified against South Africa?”[48]

When the full House met on June 6, 56 Republicans - about a third of their strength in the House - had no qualms in voting with the Democrats to approve the Gray bill by 295-127. The situation in the Senate - which started its own proposal at the same time as the House - saw no marked difference as its legislation on economic sanctions against South Africa was carried overwhelmingly by 80-12. This was the first attempt at sanctions against South Africa by the 1982-86 Senate.



This consensus in the two chambers compelled the President not only to go against his better judgment and instinct, but also to retract his previous pronouncements. He then imposed milder sanctions against South Africa, as a preemptive measure. The Executive Order on September 9 barred transactions with South Africa on almost all Bank loans, export of computers and related materials that could be used in the furtherance of apartheid as well as almost all nuclear related exports, and prohibited the importation of South African arms and related materials like military vehicles from South Africa as well as Kruggerands. The administration also pledged government support to US firms in South Africa which had not adhered to the Sullivan principles, provided they had employed at least twenty-five persons.[49]

This was too little for Congress as Senator Joe Biden made clear late in July 1986 during a hearing of Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee on the administration's "constructive engagement" policy: "These people [South Africans] are being crushed. And we're sitting here with the same kind of rhetoric [of civil rights era]. We heard, "Go slow. We have to take care of the problem afterwards"... I hate to hear an administration and a Secretary of State [George Schultz] refusing to act on a morally abhorrent point."[50]

By this time, various pieces of sanctions legislation were queuing up both in the House and Senate. Congressman William Gray's bill, whose enactment was preempted by the President's limited sanctions of September 1985, had been overtaken by a tougher one proposed by Black Caucus activist, Ron Dellums. Among its provisions was one compelling US firms to withdraw from South Africa within 180 days after the enactment of the proposal into law. In the Senate, exasperation at the President's failure to provide leadership on the anti-apartheid issue had compelled Senator Lugar to propose a bill imposing sanctions against South Africa, which was duly accepted on August 15, 1986. It was on the strength of the need to avoid a floor fight on an issue now deemed so vital to the honour and dignity of the US that both the Senate and the House accepted the Lugar proposal on September 12, 1986 by 308 votes to 77. This became the 1986 Anti-Apartheid Act aimed at pressing South Africa into abandoning apartheid with a view to ushering in a multi-racial society. The bill's economic features were:

- prohibitions on importation of South African uranium ore and oxide, coal, iron and steel as well as all agricultural products from South Africa. Only certain strategic minerals and all existing contracts on all facets of economic relations were exempt for the first twelve months from

the enactment of the law. Obviously, this was an assault on the so-called importance of South Africa from a mineral point of view.

- prohibition of loans (unless for humanitarian purpose on a non-discriminatory basis) and a ban on sale of computers to the South African government or agencies.

- prohibitions on importation of Kruggerands and on nuclear cooperation with South Africa without the latter's accession to the Non-nuclear Proliferation Treaty.

- termination of all air links and sale of petroleum products to South Africa, except to honour existing contracts on petroleum related affairs.

On the political front, the Act called for:

- the release of political prisoners including Mandela and resumption of meaningful negotiation between Pretoria and its opponents and full participation in political activities by all South Africans.

- definite time table for abrogating all pieces of apartheid legislation and cessation of incursions into Frontline States.

- conferment of authority on the US President to relax some of these measures in the event of concrete evidence of change on the part of Pretoria, including the repeal of the Group Areas Act of 1966 and Population Registration Act of 1950.

- authorisation of Congress to impose additional measures should Pretoria refuse to show willingness to abandon apartheid within 12 months of coming into force of the Act.[51]

The refusal of the law-makers to accede to the President's demand to waive their Act in preference for one he had in mind and the margin of their over-ride of the Presidential veto of September 26, 1986 by 313 to 83 in the House and 78 to 21 in the Senate,[52] should be seen as a

confirmation of the will of the legislative arm to respond to the public mood. *Appendix 2 illustrates the non-partisan response of the members of Congress to the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986*

The implication in this was that the administration had summarily lost control of its Southern African policy to a legislative arm determined to act in accordance with the public pulse, which in this case was being generated and sustained by FSAM.

### Conclusion.

This chapter attempted to identify the objective of FSAM and the means to ensure its materialisation. While FSAM's cardinal objective was to wean South Africa from the patronage of the Reagan administration by advocating the imposition of sanctions including the severance of US commercial activities, the realisation of this was complicated by President Reagan's assessment of the importance of South Africa to the Western alliance.

Lacking any direct influence over the administration, FSAM overcame this daunting handicap by an adroit use of mass mobilisation as a tactical and strategic device. The initial outcome from this effort was FSAM's success in setting the public and the law-makers against the President's South Africa policy. The pressure arising from this harmony in objective between FSAM, Capitol Hill and public opinion, placed the President in a politically difficult situation because of the apparent erosion of his popular political base. It was this situation that compelled the administration to cave in to the will of public opinion and Congress, resulting in the triumph of FSAM.

In this respect, the need to rely on mass mobilisation (public appeal ) is not a liability in the American system if its devotees can muster the necessary support. Unlike the "inside" strategy, which is a weapon of the powerful and the financial patron of politicians, mass mobilisation is the weapon of the individually weak. It exercises influence over governments by evoking societal factors, chief of which is public opinion, to compel policy makers to do what they would not have done. It is therefore not an "outmoded strategy of the civil rights era"; rather it is as current and capable of yielding results as it did in the civil rights era.

## FOOTNOTES

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## GENERAL CONCLUSIONS: INFLUENCE OF FSAM.

The objective of the study was to analyse the triumph of FSAM over the administration Southern Africa policy known as “constructive engagement”. The central intriguing question the study had to answer was why was it that unlike previous Afro-American efforts, FSAM succeeded in bringing about the reversal of Southern Africa policy of an incumbent and “globalist” administration?

This necessitated putting FSAM in its historical context with a view to establishing in what sense and ways this movement succeeded while others failed. It was this that led us to identify four determinants of Afro-American influence. These were the Cold War, Afro-American electoral significance or otherwise, the organisational tactics of Afro-Americans in running anti-apartheid campaigns, and events in South Africa. These four determinants produced three scenarios which accounted for at best non-durable influence and at worst and quite often the case, failures on the part of Afro-Americans to influence the direction of Africa policy of successive administrations. The first of these scenarios was that the emergence of a globalist president amidst public apathy to Africa issues and weaknesses in Afro-Americans’ ability to organise themselves effectively to lobby for policies favourable to independence and liberation struggle in Southern Africa, always resulted in adoption of Southern Africa policies by the executive which were favourable to Pretoria and other colonial minority regimes in the region. This was particularly true of the administrations of Truman, Eisenhower and Nixon.

The second scenario was that whenever non-globalist presidents emerged, a combination of liberal concerns and to some extent public interests coupled with changes in Afro-American organisational structure (such as changes at leadership level or challenge to the latter) resulted in the adoption of official policies unfavourable to minority and colonial (if applicable) administrations in the region. But this was always a short-lived phenomenon as the same administrations were

notorious for their failure to carry through their policies whenever they encountered sustained criticism from their right-wing opponents. The administrations of John Kennedy and Jimmy Carter offered object lessons in this respect. The third scenario was that even if there was a globalist president articulating a Cold War prone Southern Africa policy, a well organised and effective Afro-American movement aided by events in South Africa could use mass mobilisation to register disapproval of the president's policy to such an extent as to provoke substantial Congressional concern. This could lead to enactment of a policy contrary to that of the president's. This was an unusual scenario and thus far, FSAM has been its first beneficiary.

FSAM succeeded where others failed because it had learned from the mistakes of its predecessors and pursued a single issue by confining its attention to a single country - South Africa - which it rightly recognised as the sole beneficiary of the administration's "constructive engagement". Its predecessors were always pursuing multifarious causes covering the entire African continent or at least a region. FSAM also had a united Afro-American community unprepared to put up with four more years of "constructive engagement". This coupled with the fact that it was an era in which Afro-Americans were conscious of their potential electoral strength within the Democratic Party and in a balance of power situation, meant that FSAM was better placed to reap the wealth of experience emanating from previous numerous failed attempts had it the organisational and institutional framework and viable tactical and strategic devices to pursue its cause. Although the organisational and institutional structure were provided by TransAfrica around which FSAM was woven, and the movement was operating in an atmosphere devoid of rancour and conflicting ideas of the way forward for which Afro-Americans were noted, it was by no means certain that FSAM would escape the fate of its predecessors. Tactics and strategies were essential to success or failure; and this was where Randall Robinson's experience as an Executive Director of TransAfrica and former Congressional assistant to Diggs came handy. The ability to carry the public along as a tactical device made all the difference because the pressure which the public brought to bear on the administration to change its Southern Africa policy made it impossible for Congressmen as the representatives of the people to become passive spectators. The result was initiation of a Congressional response to the yearning of the people thereby isolating the President and his "constructive engagement".

## Achievements of FSAM

FSAM's success seemed remarkable when one considers the fact that it was during the tenure of a globalist president who specifically made "constructive engagement" and the need to cultivate Pretoria a major foreign policy objective. Afro-Americans were not natural constituents of the President's party, nor would one say that Afro-Americans (unlike the Jewish lobby) had the financial capability to compensate for limited numerical strength or to wield influence. All Afro-Americans were armed with were their recognition of Africa as their ancestral homeland which as such should be accorded as much attention as Ireland, Israel and Poland; and their tenacity and determination to have a say in the direction of Africa policy. FSAM's success in bringing to an end decades of Afro-American frustration at their inability to influence the Africa policies of successive administrations becomes illuminating in view of the fact that the continent was important in the calculation of US foreign policy only as an adjunct of Washington's world-wide response to communism.

The achievement of FSAM can only be measured against the target it sets for itself. This was to alter the direction of the Reagan administration's Southern Africa policy and undermine South Africa's most favoured nation state stance in its implementation. This in turn would isolate Pretoria and increase the cost to it of its apartheid at home and aggression abroad.

This being the case, FSAM can only be deemed to have succeeded if the policy was altered as a result of its actions and if there was visible effect of this on South Africa. Within the context of US Southern Africa policy, the changing of direction as evident by the administration's imposition of sanctions against South Africa and the Congressional imposition of tougher sanctions over the head of the President could not have come about if FSAM did not bring the issue to the public notice and addressed it the way it did. The Afro-Americans' lobby-group, TransAfrica, as the fulcrum of FSAM lacked the numerical strength to pose an electoral threat, but by forging an alliance of all American people against "constructive engagement" and apartheid, it was able to use the American public and Congress to exercise influence over the administration. The public and the



law-makers were therefore the resources in the hands of FSAM for exerting influence.

What effect had this on the South African government? This calls for an assessment of the external dimension of FSAM's achievement.

The international implication for South Africa of FSAM's achievement: By orchestrating a campaign to make identification with South Africa politically unpopular, FSAM succeeded in depriving Pretoria of the political and economic succour it would otherwise have received during the upheaval arising from the internal unrest. One can understand the rationale behind this argument by comparing US reaction to the township unrest of 1984-86 to its attitude during the Sharpeville massacre of 1960. At that time, neither the Eisenhower administration nor the American public nor Congress withheld support from Pretoria beyond verbal condemnation. As a result, the flight of capital that followed the incident was a temporary phenomenon as more money flowed into the country thereafter following the effort of big business to raise loans to rescue Pretoria from economic collapse. In addition, the furore did not jeopardise South Africa's ability to raise private and public loans in the US as aforementioned.

But during the eruption in the mid-1980's, the situation altered fundamentally. Not only had the American administration been deprived of the ability to give political support to Pretoria without an uproar in Congress and the public in general, but the private Banks were in no position to embark on such a cause. US sources had virtually dried up in the heat of FSAM's campaign. Most private Banks including Citibank and First National Bank of Boston had all placed a moratorium on loans to South Africa in response to the campaign to withdraw funds from firms engaged in business transaction with South Africa.[1]

South Africa's dependence on international Banks was amply demonstrated in a 1985 study for the World Council of Churches (WCC). The study identified a total of 202 Banks from 18 countries which had provided varying amounts of loans to South Africa totalling \$4244.1 million between 1982 and 1984.[2] True, US Banks accounted for only 27 per cent of sources of loans to South Africa, but the reverberations which the issue was generating in the US could not have escaped the international community. For example, in spite of the administration's resistance to imposition of sanctions against Pretoria, the intensity of the anti-apartheid campaign was such

that it immediately hit a responsive chord in the wider international community. The European Community (EC) which since July 1985 has been poised to take action (as evident by its withdrawal of its ambassadors from South Africa for consultation) had by the next month prohibited importation of iron and steel products from South Africa while deferring a decision on importation of coal in deference to the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal who opposed the idea. Even the British government renowned for its opposition to sanctions against Pretoria ( ten per cent of British overseas direct investments worth £5 billion were located in South Africa as at 1982) responded to the reverberations from the US.[3] This it did by re-affirming in August 1985 (as a preemptive measure against responding to any action by the Reagan administration which judging by the unpopularity of its Southern African policy might impose a tougher measure) the existing restrictions of:

- observance of the mandatory UN arms embargo, military cooperation and sporting links with South Africa.

- a ban on new loans, sale of oil and discouragement of all cultural and scientific links.

As an additional measure, the government imposed a voluntary ban on promotion of tourism, new investments and a commitment to honour any decision of the EEC on importation of South African coal, iron and steel. Meanwhile, tired of devoting hours of its board room deliberations to its South African operations which was hurting its reputation in its world-wide operations, Barclay's Bank of UK simply moved beyond the government by selling its South African operation.[4]

By September 1986, Canada had imposed a voluntary ban on loans to the South African government; on sale of Krugerrands, crude oil as well as an embargo on air links between the two countries. In addition, the Canadian government placed on their import list all South African agricultural products, uranium, coal, iron and steel with a promise by its Secretary for External Affairs, Joe Clark that no permit would be granted for importation of these items. This was followed by a moratorium on visas to South African nationals to visit Canada.[5]

Perhaps one of the most surprising aspects of this domino-effect was that in spite of its penchant for profit, Japan put at risk its lucrative South African market by banning importation of South African iron and steel; placed a moratorium on tourist visas to its nationals wishing to visit

South Africa; banned computer sales to the South African military and reduced its diplomatic presence in South Africa to consular level.[6]

It might be argued that these countries only paid lip service to the sanctions issue by adopting measures that would not hurt their economies; Japan for example, failed to place a moratorium on the importation of South African mineral ores vital to its economy. The fact remains that they were registering in concrete terms their disapproval of the domestic policies of the regime in Pretoria, as opposed to the platitudes during the Sharpeville massacre of 1960. The responsibility for these concrete actions and the urgency being attached to them was at least shared by the mass protest being engineered by FSAM in the US. Anti-South Africa feeling in the US was such that countries which had a common economic destiny with America found it difficult to do normal business with South Africa.

FSAM had thus not only robbed Pretoria of its traditional political and economic support from the US, but South Africa could no longer count on support even from the international community to mitigate the effect of the domestic unrest on its economy. There could not therefore be a recurrence of the post-Sharpeville investment revival. This was played out in August 1985 when South Africa's reputable credit rating in the international financial circle suffered a severe setback. Following Pretoria's inability to lend a helping hand to its international backers for its own benefit by announcing major reforms, as expected from President Botha in his speech on August 15, 1985, the exchange rate for the rand plunged to an all time low of \$0.34, forcing the Johannesburg exchange to close down on the 27th of the month. Investors were engaged in a panic selling of rands to buy dollars to diversify their business transaction because South Africa had all of a sudden become bad for business. This financial woe was the culmination of numerous difficulties that had afflicted South Africa following the intensification of township revolts from within and FSAM's campaign in the US. The sliding rand had a knock on effect on the economy, resulting in the government's inability to honour its financial obligations. It therefore came as no surprise that the government had to renege on repayment of capital on its short term loans of about \$14 billion by declaring a four month moratorium.[7]

In the past, South Africa's reputation as the last bastion against communist onslaught in Southern Africa and as a lucrative market for investments would have been enough to see it

through the difficulties, but things had changed. Evidence of this changing relations between the international financial sector, their governments and South Africa was demonstrated in late August 1985 when Pretoria's Reserve Bank's Governor, Dr. Gerhard De Koch undertook an hasty visit to London and Washington to arrange special credits. That the mission failed in its objective could be explained as a function of South Africa's insolvency which was by no means peculiar to that country. But the curious development was that Washington and London chose to deal with South Africa through an intermediary - Dr. Fritz Leutwiler, former President of Central Bank of Switzerland - because it was not politically suitable under the existing political climate to be seemed to be negotiating with South Africa over an issue as emotive as finance, even if it was for servicing a current loan which their financial institutions gave to Pretoria.[8] This was due to the reluctance of the South African government to accept the fact that the difficulties were more political - the refusal to institute genuine reforms - than economic.

The implication in this development was that business operations especially those involved in mineral extraction would face difficulties in raising loans to finance their activities to yield the profits that motivated their involvement in South Africa in the first place. That big business would not pay the price of Pretoria's refusal to reform apartheid became manifest on the eve of the speech when Jan Steyn, Executive Chairman of the pro-business lobby, Urban Foundation of South Africa, urged the President "to recognise the gravity of the situation and rally to the cause of rapid, peaceful, fundamental reforms." To bring this about, he felt negotiations on power sharing should be on an equal footing between whites and blacks. In the interim, he wanted an end to enforced repatriation as required by the Group Areas Act and also called for the abolition of influx control.[9] But when the President failed to give any clear indication of a desire to institute genuine reform, the business community had had enough. The pro-business Business Day of Johannesburg roundly condemned the President Botha's August 15th speech and went on to call for his resignation if not demise in no uncertain terms, saying that if he could not perform better, "then we believe the time has come for him to depart." [10]

That the business sector would make sacrifices to maintain their South African operations was not altogether surprising in view of their effort in persuading the government to recognise black trade unions, which was duly achieved in 1979. But by calling for Botha's resignation if he



could not do more to introduce genuine reform, the business sector was signalling its intention to terminate the unwritten grand alliance it had maintained with apartheid over the decades. It meant that unlike the white government of South Africa, the country's big business was ready to respond to the international anti-apartheid climate by jettisoning the system under which it had prospered for decades. The boldness of the captains of industries in visiting Lusaka to confer with the exiled ANC leadership amidst the continuing financial squeeze on South Africa should be seen not only in this light, but also an affirmation by big business that it could operate in any climate irrespective of the political complexion.

The implication of this situation to the South African government was that not only did it have to cope with an on-going internal insurrection already made worse by a prolonged campaign against its domestic policies in the US, but these problems had been compounded by the opposition from the business sector.

All of this would have been far less possible had FSAM not mobilised, politicised, enlightened and educated the American public and by implication the international non-communist world to the reality of the situation in South Africa. FSAM had no force at its disposal to repeal "constructive engagement", but by using the American people and their law makers, its achievements went beyond that. One of these was that by making South Africa and its system so reprehensible for it to be unjust not to do something about it, FSAM prepared Western governments for action against Pretoria. The spate of actions which the Western World took against South Africa were eloquent testimonies. For example, at a Security Council resolution calling for voluntary imposition of sanctions against South Africa in July 1985, not even the US and Britain were bold enough to exercise their veto power. Compare that to 1983 when 16 States cast a negative vote on a similar resolution in the General Assembly and (at the rudimentary stage of FSAM) in 1984 when two states did exactly that with ten abstaining.[11] The different voting pattern in 1985 had more to do with the fact that FSAM was at the zenith of its mobilising crusade which made it embarrassing to Western governments to appear to be friendly with Pretoria than a voluntary change of heart on the part of Pretoria's traditional supporters. In this respect one can also say that FSAM succeeded in boosting the morale of the protesters in South Africa while demoralising the resolve of the government and the white minority to retain the system under



which they had secured their privileges. The duration of the insurrection in comparison with Sharpeville in 1960 and the effort of the business community and white liberals not only to think of the unthinkable but to act on it prove the point being made.

### Concluding Reflections.

The fact that FSAM was able to witness not merely an imposition of sanctions against South Africa by the legislative arm, but also one by no less a person than the President is intriguing in view of Reagan's ability to convince the American public to give him a second mandate in a resounding electoral victory over his Democratic rival in the 1984 Presidential election. One is bound to ask: what went wrong with the "great communicator"?

The answer has much to do with the conflicting perception of "constructive engagement" and South Africa's required contribution to its success between President P.W. Botha of South Africa, Crocker and President Reagan himself. While Reagan set the pace as a Presidential candidate in the 1980 election with his remarks about South Africa's importance to the West, Crocker though sharing the same view expected Pretoria to contribute to the realisation of the targets of "constructive engagement" by relaxation of the most offensive aspects of apartheid as a trade in for its rescue from its "pole-cat" status, the achievement of regional peace in the form of "non-aggression pacts" with the regional states, expulsion of communist troops in Angola in exchange for Namibia's independence and above all, reversal of the Carter administration's South Africa policy. But neither Crocker nor the administration he represented thought it wise to predetermine the scope of reform expected from South Africa. Emphasis was on good faith.

Herein arises the mistake which later not only handed FSAM the public relations coup with which to beat the administration but also robbed the latter of public goodwill. By making South Africa the sole determinant of the scope and pace of reform, Washington ignored the fact that South Africa's sole objective since 1910 and probably earlier irrespective of the inclination of the administration in office, had been the preservation of White power. After all it was not the

Nationalist administration of Dr. Malan that introduced the Land Act of 1913, the Master-Servant Act, the Job Reservation arrangements or the termination of the African franchise at the Cape. South Africa's international relations either at the UN and affiliated organs or in manipulating Western fears about the Cold War are replete with a variety of subterfuges aimed at ensuring continuity of white rule. The frequently touted but unsubstantiated claim of communist encirclement and the ever-present "grabbing hands of communism" which the administration of Verwoerd took great pride in trumpeting to the delight of Cold War apologists in the West should be seen in this light.

By giving the South African government lee-way to determine its own scope of reform, Crocker had handed Pretoria a golden opportunity which was used to good effect by extracting all the benefits inherent in "constructive engagement" without making any notable concessions in return. P.W. Botha's whistle tour of Europe in 1984, the first since he assumed the mantle of leadership of his country, should be seen as South Africa's effort to use the platform of "constructive engagement" to rehabilitate its pariah image. All that South Africa was willing to pay for the numerous carrots of "constructive engagement" - export of US computers and evidently military related equipment, exchange of visits by military personnel, training of South African military officers and nuclear scientists in the US, increase in bank loans and direct investments and above all visible high level-contact as a negation of the Carter administration's South Africa policy - was to embark on a number of publicised but minor relaxations of apartheid. These were combined with reforms in the institutions of apartheid with a view to strengthening as opposed to weakening it. An example of this was the tricameral Parliamentary structure in which the joint Houses would legislate on issues that affect the entire country. Yet, Whites enjoyed such a preponderant majority that they could have their way even on issues in which both Asians and "Coloured" legislators jointly opposed. Pretoria's exercise was therefore nothing short of "modernising racial domination", to borrow Heribert Adam's phrase.

Surely elections into tricameral Parliamentary structure with all the trappings of apartheid, relaxation of apartheid at beaches and Post Office queuing and introduction of direct elections at local government level could not have been worthy concessions commensurate with the benefits of "constructive engagement"? Nor did the victims of apartheid feel any substantial changes to their

predicament as evidenced by the chaos in South Africa. Under the circumstances, one would have expected the administration to speak with one voice in pressing Pretoria for substantial concessions. Instead what emerged from Washington was to say the least garbled, muffled and conflicting. While Crocker and the President's Assistant on National Security Affairs, Robert Mcfarlane were urging further concessions from Pretoria as evidenced by Mcfarlane's meeting in Vienna with officials from Pretoria on the need to rescue the President from the embarrassment of a possible Congressional veto, Reagan was making clear his satisfaction with the outcome of his Southern Africa policy: "the result we've had in this constructive engagement with South Africa justifies our continuing on that score." [12]

This adoption of a hardline stance when compared to his behaviour in blaming the victims of the Police massacre in Uitenhage in March 1985 as earlier indicated was not only an endorsement of Pretoria's stance but virtually akin to the position of the South African regime. The President compounded the situation when on July 22, 1986, he ignored the advice of his Secretary of State, his Chief of Staff and Republican Senators Kassebaum and Lugar amongst others, that he should stem the rising public and legislative criticisms by registering disapproval of apartheid with an announcement of withdrawal of landing rights to South African planes, with a view to ensuring Presidential control of Southern African policy. Instead, the President thought it wise to deliver a speech that contained something for both the South African regime and its critics. While beginning the speech with what later turned out to be a pious statement that "America's view of apartheid has been and remains, clear. Apartheid is morally wrong and politically unacceptable", he defended the "reformist" credentials of the P.W. Botha regime and its right to crack down on dissent, which the President identified as communist inspired. He then launched a scathing attack on proponents of sanctions against South Africa on grounds that capitalism would be a device for facilitating the destruction of apartheid. Perhaps to answer his critics, he reminded them that there were more motor vehicles owned by non-whites in South Africa than the entire quantity of cars in the Soviet Union. [13]

This all too predictable presidential trifling of the struggle for freedom in South Africa attracted a chorus of criticism including his Republican Senators whose advice he had ignored. While Kassebaum was "deeply disappointed", Lugar was visibly angry at the President's

failure to provide leadership. More surprising was the apparent defiance of Secretary of State Shultz who at his testimony before Senate's Foreign Relations Committee less than twenty-four hours after the speech, announced that the State Department would meet with the ANC for discussion - a proposition which the President in all but discounted by his recognition of the "long arm of communism" in the activities of that organisation. Presenting it as a clarification of the President's speech, the Secretary of State left no one in doubt about the exasperation of the State Department when he bluntly refused a suggestion from Senator Jesse Helms that in line with the President's position, the meeting with the ANC be delayed until that organisation renounced violence.[14]

That the President's speech was diametrically at odds with the events on the ground in South Africa was encapsulated by Archbishop Tutu's anger at the "nauseating" speech, accusing the President of behaving "like the great, big white chief of old...The West for my part can go to hell", he announced defiantly.[15]

The truth however was that the President had taken the side of his Chief Speech Writer and Communications Director, Pat Buchanan who together with National Security Adviser John Poindexter and CIA Director William Casey warned against abandonment of South Africa in a communist infested region, a concern he was equally obsessed with.

In this respect, one might be forgiven for wondering if the President understood "constructive engagement" other than as a device for fighting communism in Southern Africa. His utterances about Pretoria's anti-communist credentials and importance to the security of the West point in this direction. Consequently, he succeeded in giving P.W.Botha the opportunity to defy American public opinion as vividly illustrated in the latter's speech on August 15, 1985, as noted earlier. A follow-up speech in January 1986 which was advertised prior to its being made as an improvement on the previous one contained no surprises except that he would incorporate Africans into a "Consultative Council", an issue on which he refused to give details. Instead he chose to defy his international audience by telling them that South Africa was not a country of "jellyfish" and that they were prepared to go it alone if need be instead of succumbing to foreign influence. In a world-wide live broadcast, the South African leader made his speech in his characteristic pose accompanied by the piercing side-ways glances and the wagging of the smallest finger of his right

hand at his audience, which on the television screen appeared to be not only a challenge to the international community and all those who were concerned about the violence in that country but a rebuke at them for meddling in the affairs of his country. As if he was doing a favour to those who wanted him to institute reform, he asked: "If I release Mandela on humanitarian grounds, will the Soviet Union also set free Scharansky?" This no doubt was a ploy to do nothing as Scharansky did not come from South Africa nor did Mandela from the Soviet Union for the two countries either to do prisoner swap or undertake reciprocal action. So unsatisfactory was Botha's speech (in August 1985) that Mcfarlane who had earlier met officials from Pretoria in Vienna expressed his disappointment at the difference between what was announced by Botha and what he was given to expect during the meeting.[16] Nor was the situation improved by Botha's second attempt at crossing the "Rubicon".

This type of behaviour, though not entirely uncharacteristic of South Africa, was occasioned in the immediate post-Carter era by President Reagan's attitude and paternalism towards Pretoria. The South African authorities which felt isolated in the early years of the Carter administration, now had every cause to defy international and American opinion by pocketing the advantages of "constructive engagement" without giving anything tangible in return. It was therefore a combination of President Reagan's attitude, his understanding of America's Southern Africa policy and South Africa's correct interpretation and reaction to those attitude and understanding that undermined both Chester Crocker and his "constructive engagement".

The President was sincere in his anti-communist crusade in Southern Africa and was fervently committed to it. As a result he failed to recognise the scale of public opinion which FSAM had mustered against his Southern Africa policy. Apartheid portrayed and seen as an affront to human dignity had not only drowned out South Africa's familiar but unsubstantiated reputation of being the last bastion against communism which the President was still clinging to, but that identification with that country in any way or form had also become an electoral liability. It was this that necessitated the abandonment of the administration's Southern Africa policy even by some Republican law-makers. In the end, the President was forced to do what was expected of every military General without sufficient foot-soldiers, namely, to surrender to the opposing force in order to avoid carnage. Yet, in the President's own case, the impact of the anti-administration



Southern Africa policy which FSAM had generated was so great that the honour he tried to salvage from his predicament - as evidenced by the limited sanctions he imposed upon South Africa - was deemed insufficient by the law-makers. They refused to know peace until they had overridden his veto in a last show of force. FSAM had therefore succeeded in influencing - one might also say sabotaging - the direction of the administration's Southern Africa policy.

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2. "NUCLEAR AGE", (Central Production) A documentary of Independent Television, Wednesday, 4-1-89.(The first of twelve documentary programmes tracing the forty year history of the Nuclear Age).

3. "THE MARRIAGE OF INCONVENIENCE", (Barraclough Larcy Production), 15/16- 8-90.

## APPENDIX ONE

### ATTITUDE OF AFRO-AMERICANS TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA.

1. SUPPORT FOR SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS ON RACIAL BASIS: Afro-Americans 85 per cent; White Americans 59 per cent.
2. SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE ACTION AGAINST PRETORIA: Afro-Americans 74 per cent; White Americans 42 per cent.
3. SUPPORT FOR SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS ON PARTY BASIS: Democrats 73 per cent; Republicans 52 per cent.

Source: George Gallup Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1985, (Scholarly Resources Inc., Wilmington, Delaware 1986.) pp. 244-247.

True, every revolution in this world has been led by the elites. FSAM was no exception. But if 85 per cent of Afro-Americans identified themselves with the predicament of the black population of South Africa in 1985, then it goes without saying that the FSAM campaign was a popular mass movement in the Afro-American community. Not only is this in consonance with the analysis in the thesis - that Afro-Americans had always identified with African causes - but it also explains why the Embassy demonstration was prolonged and sustained. The 73 per cent support for the South African blacks by the Democratic Party, as the poll found, has more to do with the presence of an overwhelming number of Afro-Americans in that party than in the Republican Party. Steven Metz and Don Beck were therefore not on a firmer ground when they inferred, as outlined in pages 196-7 in the thesis, that Afro-American elites used the South African issue for their own political advantage.

APPENDIX TWO

ACCEPTANCE BY BOTH HOUSES OF THE SENATOR LUGAR PROPOSAL  
RESULTING IN THE ANTI-APARTHEID ACT OF 1986.

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>POSITIVE VOTES</u>	<u>NEGATIVE VOTES</u>
REPUBLICANS	90	73
DEMOCRATS	218	4
TOTAL	308	77

CONGRESSIONAL OVER-RIDE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VETO OF  
SEPTEMBER 26, 1986.

<u>HOUSE</u>			<u>SENATE</u>		
<u>PARTY</u>	<u>YES VOTES</u>	<u>NO VOTES</u>	<u>PARTY</u>	<u>YES VOTES</u>	<u>NO VOTES</u>
REPUBLICANS	81	79	REPUBLICANS	31	21
DEMOCRATS	232	4	DEMOCRATS	47	0
TOTAL	313	83	TOTAL	78	21

SOURCES: CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY , 99th Congress, 2nd. session 1986.  
pp. 18-C; 100-110h.

The essence of the above was to illustrate the response of Congress to the anti-apartheid initiatives as outlined in pages 231-2 in the thesis. The significance of the voting pattern was based on the fact that more than 55 per cent of the Republican law makers, present and voting, were prepared to turn their back on their president on the issue of South Africa. This is intriguing, not only in view of the anti-party of the Republican Party to issues relating to civil rights in America but the popularity of the President with his party and the American public at large. No one would have expected a revolt from the Republican Party against their President who was elected on a crest of right wing fervour. Rather what one saw was a sizable number of Republicans voting with the Democrats to embarrass the President both in imposing punitive action against Pretoria and in the over-ride of his veto.



The explanation for this was that the law makers were reacting to the public mood, in this case, as generated and sustained by FSAM.