

REFERENCE AND PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES:  
AN EXAMINATION OF SOME PROBLEMS

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## ABSTRACT OF THESIS

## Section I: STRAWSON, IDENTIFYING REFERENCE, AND STATEMENTS (p.1)

I argue that Strawson's claim that one cannot use the same expression to make identifying reference to an object and, at the same time, to state that such an object exists, is vitiated by a failure to distinguish the statement which a speaker makes from the information which he intends to convey.

## Section II: NEGATION AND TRUTH VALUE (9)

Considering the question whether definite descriptions which fail of reference result in falsity or a 'truth value gap', I explore some of the ways in which such a question might be of interest to philosophers. Some points about negation and the nature of logical analysis result from the discussion.

## Section III: ANALYSIS (25)

The question of analysis is continued. I argue that a notion of a statement, or a proposition, is needed for paraphrase and indirect quotation.

## Section IV: SOME PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES (53)

I argue that we should make careful distinctions among different kinds of propositional attitudes.

## Section V: DO PROPER NAMES HAVE SENSE? (58)

Against Ryle and Vendler, I argue that proper names have sense.

## Section VI: PROPER NAMES, A PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION, AND SOME REMARKS ABOUT CONTEXT (71)

Making use of a distinction between statement and assertion, I attempt to solve a problem of communication which arises from a doctrine of Russell's. The notion of the context of an utterance becomes important. I try to go some way towards clarifying this notion.

## Section VII: PARSING PROPER NAMES (88)

I argue that Quine ought to parse "Cerberus" not as "( $\exists x$ ) (x is-Cerberus)" but as something like "( $\exists x$ ) (x Cerberizes)", making a distinction between the proper name and what goes into predicate position in its analysis.

Section VIII: IS THE SENSE OF A PROPER NAME THAT OF A COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF ITS OBJECT? (91)

Against some attacks suggested by Searle, I defend the doctrine that the sense of a proper name is that of a complete description of its object.

Section IX: REFERENTIAL OCCURRENCE (103)

Returning to the subject of Section I, I attempt to develop a notion of reference which corresponds, in many respects, to Russell's denoting. This sort of reference is distinguished from what I call "Strawsonian reference". I give a preliminary definition of "referential occurrence".

Section X: LINSKY AND 'PURE REFERENCE' (128)

I argue that Linsky's attack on Quine is the result of a misunderstanding. The importance of Quine's expression, "not purely referential", is emphasized.

Section XI: SOME MORE ABOUT REFERENTIAL OCCURRENCE (139)

I go some way towards tightening up the definition of "referential occurrence" which was suggested in Section IX. I discuss both the referential occurrence of a proper name or definite description and the referential occurrence of a "that"-clause. I stress the importance of distinguishing among expressions whose occurrence is purely referential, expressions whose occurrence is referential but not purely referential, and expressions whose occurrence is not referential at all.

Section XII: THE LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE CRITERION OF PROPOSITIONAL IDENTITY (163)

I attempt to defend the logical equivalence criterion against some attackers. I argue that when we regard a "that"-clause as referring to a proposition, we must distinguish between the purely referential occurrence of a "that"-clause and the referential but not purely referential occurrence of a "that"-clause. I consider, in outline, two theories of belief; and I attempt to show how such theories may be made consistent with the logical equivalence criterion.

Section XIII: CONCLUDING REMARK (204)

I list a number of problems for future consideration.

BIBLIOGRAPHY (205)

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## PREFACE

I shall use double quotes in order to 'mention' expressions, (words, strings of words, sentences, strings of sentences, etc.), which serve as examples for the discussion at hand or which express the doctrines of other philosophers. Sometimes, when I am actually 'using' the words of some philosopher, I shall enclose these words within double quotes in order to make it clear that the words belong to the philosopher in question. Relatively long passages from other philosophers will not be put within quotes but will be single-spaced and set off from the text by triple-spacing. Within such passages, however, I shall impose my convention of using double quotes for 'mention'.

Relatively important expressions will often be set off from the text by triple-spacing and prefixed by numbers within parentheses. Such expressions will not be put within quotes. For example:

(1) The King of France in 1905 is bald.

I allow myself a good deal of freedom in my use of expressions of the form: "(n)". "(1)", for example, might, in some contexts, be used to refer to the proposition that the King of France in 1905 is bald; and the same expression might, in other contexts, be used to refer to the sentence: "The King of France in 1905 is bald". Generally, the context will clarify what I am referring to by means of such an expression. But sometimes, in cases where nice distinctions are apt to result in more complication than illumination, my use of such an expression will be intentionally ambiguous.

I shall use single quotes as scare quotes: in order to suggest that I feel a certain amount of uneasiness in my use of an expression.

My conventions for bibliographical references are stated at the beginning of my bibliography.

I declare that this thesis has been composed by me and that the work is my own.

SECTION I: STRAWSON, IDENTIFYING REFERENCE, AND  
STATEMENTS<sup>1</sup>

Consider the following well-worn questions:

(1) If someone, today, were to say: "The present King of France is bald", would that person be saying something false, or would he rather be saying something which has no truth value?

(2) If someone, today, were to say: "The present King of France is bald", would that person be stating, in part, that the present King of France exists? (I.e., would he be stating, in part, what I, in this Section, shall call an "existential-uniqueness proposition"?)

Russellians argue that, of the alternatives presented by question (1), the former is the correct one. They also argue that the answer to question (2) is "yes". I shall call these the "Russellian answers" to these questions.

Strawson, in "On Referring", maintained that the latter alternative presented by (1) is the correct one. He also maintained that the answer to question (2) is "no". I shall call these the "Strawsonian answers" to these questions.

In a more recent article, ("Identifying Reference and Truth-Values"), Strawson presents his new views on the matter. He now maintains, (p.106), that it is not important to come down on one side or the other in the dispute presented by (1). He says that the two sides emphasize different kinds of philosophical interests, and that "each has its own merits".

But he argues that it is important to disentangle (1) from (2). He says that regardless of the position which one takes on question (1), the Strawsonian position on question (2) "remains a decisive objection" to Russell's Theory of Descriptions, (p.107). There is

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1. This Section is a slightly altered version of my: "On Strawson's Revised Position on Identifying Reference".

at least the following truth in this: one can be a Strawsonian on question (2) and, not inconsistently, take either side on question (1).

Strawson further indicates, (p. 108), that if one takes the Russellian position on (2), one is bound to accept the Russellian position on (1). This is quite correct. If part of what one states when he says: "The present King of France is bald", is an existential-uniqueness proposition, then, if that existential-uniqueness proposition is false, he is making a false statement. But Strawson does not give much consideration to this way of being forced into agreeing with Russell. He rather maintains that question (2) is "uncontroversial", and that the Strawsonian answer to it is "undeniable".

It is my intention to bring question (2) into controversy by arguing that the Strawsonian answer to it is ill-founded. My aim is not to prove the Russellian position. It would be extremely difficult to prove that given that someone has produced a certain utterance he has made a certain statement. Such a proof would presuppose a quite sophisticated semantic theory which included a rigorous procedure for deciding what illocutionary act someone has performed on the basis of the utterance he has produced and the linguistic and extra-linguistic context in which he produced it. I am not prepared to present such a theory, for my aim is only the modest one of establishing that Strawson's argument in favour of his position on (2) is ill-founded.

Strawson's argument is contained in the following quotation:

Now one thing that is absolutely clear is that it can be no part of the speaker's intention in the case of such utterances [as "The King of France is bald"] to inform the audience of the existence of a particular item bearing the name or answering to the description and distinguished by that fact, or by that fact plus something else known

to the audience, from any other. On the contrary, the very task of identifying reference, as described, can be undertaken only by a speaker who knows or presumes his audience to be already in possession of such knowledge of existence and uniqueness as this. The task of identifying reference is defined in terms of a type of speaker-intention which rules out ascription to the speaker of the intention to impart the existence-and-uniqueness information in question.... Thus, that there exists a particular item to which the name or description is applicable and which, if not unique in this respect, satisfies some uniqueness-condition known to the hearer (and satisfies some uniqueness-condition known to the speaker) is no part of what the speaker asserts in an utterance in which the name or description is used to perform the function of identifying reference; it is, rather, a presupposition of his asserting what he asserts. (pp.101f.)

Now it should be noticed that Strawson makes use of the word, "asserts", in the above passage. In so doing, he makes his position sound slightly more plausible than it ought to sound by making (2) into a question not about whether certain propositions are stated in certain circumstances, but rather about whether these propositions are asserted in these circumstances. He does this, by the way, notwithstanding the fact that by the use of the expression, "falsity in statement", (p. 97), at the beginning of his article, he has introduced the question as a question about statements and not as a question about assertions. Although I think that, in the long run, Strawson's position is not made any stronger by the shift from statements to assertions, I think that it will make things less complicated if we delete assertion talk and insert statement talk in our formulation of his position.<sup>1</sup>

It should also be noticed that Strawson is being at least misleading in saying, "the task of identifying reference is defined in terms of a type of speaker-intention which rules out ascription to the speaker of the intention to impart the existence-and-uniqueness information in question." Actually, Strawson introduces the notion

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1. I shall, however, say something about "asserts" in the next footnote.



of identifying reference at the beginning of his article by defining it as "the sub-task of designating some particular historical item or items which the state of affairs [which is being reported] involves," (p. 96). And it is an open question whether identifying reference, so defined, rules out such a speaker-intention. Neither the question of the speaker's intentions nor the question of what it is that the speaker is stating is answered by the definition.

I think that the following are the main points in Strawson's argument:

(3) A speaker can use an expression like "The present King of France" to make identifying reference to an individual only if he knows or presumes that his audience already knows that the individual to which identifying reference is made exists, i.e., that a certain existential-uniqueness proposition,  $p$ , is true.

(4) If a speaker knows or presumes that his audience already knows that a certain proposition is true, it cannot be his intention to inform his audience of the truth of that proposition.

Therefore, (5) if a speaker uses an expression like "The present King of France" to make identifying reference to an individual,  $p$  can be no part of what the speaker states.

Now in the first place, as I shall show later by example, (3) is false. We can use expressions of the form, "the so-and-so", to make identifying references to individuals even when we know that our audience does not know that the relevant existential-uniqueness proposition is true. But let us, for the moment, assume the truth of (3) in order to get Strawson's argument off the ground.

(4) exhibits a conceptual truth, and we shall let it stand. Russellians believe that (5) is false. Although I shall not attempt to prove that it is false, I shall point out the flaw in the inference from (3) and (4) to (5), showing that there is one less reason for believing that (5) is true.

In the inference from (3) and (4) to (5), there is the suppressed premiss:

(6) If it is not the intention of a speaker to inform his audience that  $p$ , by the use of an expression,  $e$ , then he cannot, by the use of  $e$ , be stating that  $p$ .

(6) expresses a false assumption, often made by philosophers, that the statement which a speaker makes by the use of an expression is always a function of the information which the speaker intends to convey to his audience. But although the concept of what we state often coincides in extension with the concept of what information we intend to convey, the two concepts are different and must not be confused. Giving information is only one of several reasons for which one makes a statement. Others are: reminding, repeating for emphasis, stating for the record, telling someone something he already knows in order to bore or annoy him, (cf. my "Telling and Giving"), etc. Frequently, we intentionally make a false statement in order to convey true information. Speaking of someone under the influence of LSD, I might state the false proposition that he sees God in order to convey the true information that he is having a hallucinatory vision of God. And in sarcasm, sometimes, what we state is a contrary or the contradictory of the information we intend to convey.

Another purpose for which we sometimes make statements, and which is relevant here, is to let the audience know what entity some other statement is about, i.e., to perform the task of identifying reference for that other statement. Suppose that you and I both know that Britain has just one monarch. I might nonetheless have occasion to say to you, "There is one and only one monarch of Britain. She is a Windsor." In such a case, I use two sentences to make two statements. What I state by means of the second sentence happens to be identical with the information I intend to convey to you. In the case of the first sentence, however, I state something which I know

you already know, and so, do not intend to convey that information to you. My purpose, instead, is to let you know what entity the second statement is about.

If we transform the two sentences into one, i.e., "There is one and only one monarch of Britain, and she is a Windsor", the example can be used to make a related anti-Strawsonian point, namely, that we can use the same sentence-component to make identifying reference to an entity and, at the same time, to state that that entity exists. Here again, we tell someone something he already knows in order to perform the task of identifying reference.

It is a plausible suggestion that the same thing often happens when we say, "The so-and-so is such-and-such", to someone who we know already knows that there exists just one so-and-so. It is not unreasonable to think that in such cases we use one sentence to make two statements: first, by our use of "The so-and-so", telling someone something he already knows for the purpose of identifying reference, and then, by means of the rest of the sentence, making a second statement for the purpose of conveying information. I am not going to argue here for the truth of this suggestion, but it should now be perfectly clear that the suggestion is not vitiated by cases in which the speaker knows that the audience already knows that there exists just one so-and-so. Therefore, even if (3) is true, we have no good reason to believe that if someone says, "The present king of France is bald", he is not stating an existential-uniqueness proposition.

Let us now attack (3). As a matter of fact, we frequently use sentences of the form, "The so-and-so is such-and-such", in order not only to report some state of affairs but also to inform our audience of the existence of some entity which that state of affairs in-

volves. Suppose, for example, that you do not know that there are any Thaleans in existence nowadays. I happen to know that there are several, and that the foremost of them plays chess. I might say to you:

(7) The foremost living Thalean is a chess player,

reporting a state of affairs to you, and, at the same time, intentionally informing you of the existence of some item which that state of affairs essentially involves, and giving you this existential information in order to make identifying reference to that item. It follows from (4), which we are accepting, that it can be one's intention to inform someone that  $p$  only if he believes that that person does not already know that  $p$ . So (3) is false.<sup>1</sup>

Someone concerned to defend Russell on (2) might be tempted to make use of what has just been said to argue that since in some cases a sentence of the form: "The so-and-so is such-and-such", is used with the intent of informing one's audience of the truth of an existential-uniqueness proposition, in some cases, at least, such a sentence is used to state such a proposition. But since, as we have seen, the statement one makes does not always coincide with the information one intends to convey, this line of defense is not yet open. I am not denying that there is some important relationship

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1. Since someone might want to use "asserts" to mean something different from what I mean by "states", we ought to point out: that, if "what one asserts" is taken to mean "what information one intends to convey", then one can use sentence (7) to assert that the foremost living Thalean exists; and that, if "what one asserts" is taken to mean "what thought one is expressing", then, since, on an intuitive understanding of "the thought one is expressing", one can use sentence (7) to express the thought that the foremost living Thalean exists, it is reasonable to say that one can use sentence (7) to assert that the foremost living Thalean exists.

which connects a speaker's intention to inform, the sentence he uses, and the statement he makes. But so far as I know, this relationship has not yet been given an adequate explanation. A successful theory of how statements are made will give less importance to speakers' intentions to inform than philosophers have sometimes thought. We know this because, as I have pointed out, we sometimes intentionally convey something other than what we actually state, because we sometimes, when we give hints or clues, intentionally convey more than we actually state, and because we sometimes, as a result of slips of the tongue and lack of facility with the language, unintentionally fail to state what we intend to convey. Speakers' intentions, on the other hand, are not entirely unimportant. When someone uses an ambiguous sentence or a sentence containing an indexical expression and we want to know what proposition he is stating, and when the context fails to decide the issue, the speaker's intentions are the court of last resort. A theory which adequately accounts for these facts, plus many others, must be developed before we can reasonably take sides on question (2).

## SECTION II: NEGATION AND TRUTH VALUE

At the beginning of Section I, I asked the reader to consider two well-worn questions. Both of these had to do with the statement one would be making were he to utter a certain sentence. The first of these questions had to do with the truth value of the statement in question. The second was a question about what statement the statement in question would be. I spent some time arguing that the second question is not so easy a question to answer as it appears at first sight to be. Although it might appear that the second question can be answered simply by specifying the information which we would expect a user of the sentence in question to intend to convey, this is not, in fact, the right way to go about answering the question.

I shall be coming back to this second question again from time to time. But I should now like to say something about the first question, viz:

(1) If someone, today, were to say: "The present King of France is bald", would that person be saying something false, or would he rather be saying something which has no truth value?

The interesting thing about this question is that it is very difficult to see why philosophers should have ever found it interesting at all. In "Identifying Reference and Truth-Values", Strawson goes to great pains to argue that the side which one takes on question (1) will be a result of one's philosophical interests. But one wonders why Strawson should have gone to the trouble. Is not question (1) -- as is suggested by Russell, (cf., My Philosophical Development, p. 243), -- a purely verbal question? And is not the side which one takes on question (1) simply a reflection of one's choice of words, and no more than that? For suppose that someone says:

(2) The present King of France is bald.

There are three possible states of affairs which would be relevant to the evaluation of (2):

(3) France has just one King, and he is bald,

(4) France has just one King, and he is not bald,

(5) France has no King, or France has more than one King.

Now if a Russellian and a Strawsonian should be asked to evaluate the statement, (2), and if they should both happen to believe that (3) is the case, they will agree that (2) is true. Again, if they should both happen to believe that (4) is the case, they will agree that (2) is false. But if they should both happen to believe that (5) is the case, the Russellian will say that (2) is false while the Strawsonian will say that (2) lacks a truth value. Now it looks, prima facie, as if there were one important difference between the Russellian and Strawsonian replies. The Russellian uses the same expression, i.e., "false", to indicate his belief that (4) is the case as he uses to indicate his belief that (5) is the case. The Strawsonian, on the other hand, has two expressions: one, i.e., "false", for indicating his belief that (4) is the case, and another, i.e., "neither-true-nor-false", for indicating his belief that (5) is the case. So it appears that the Strawsonian's terminology is superior to the Russellian's in that when the Strawsonian evaluates a statement like (2) his terminology lets us know whether he believes that something like (4) is the case or whether he believes that something like (5) is the case. But this is no important advantage over the

Russellian.<sup>1</sup> The Russellian, if pressed, can simply state his reason for saying that the statement is false and, in so doing, let us know whether he believes that something like (4) or that something like (5) is the case. But if -- to stick to our example -- the Russellian and the Strawsonian both believe that (5) is the case, and if the Russellian says: "(2) is false because (5) is the case", and if the Strawsonian says: "(2) lacks a truth-value because (5) is the case", we shall be hard pressed to find any difference of cash value between what the Russellian says and what the Strawsonian says. They both might as well have just said that (5) is the case and have been done with it.

In general, if someone has made a statement of the form: "The so-and-so is such-and-such", and if two men who are asked to evaluate this statement both say that nothing is so-and-so, then we already have their opinions on the matter. If one man goes on to say: "The statement is false", and if the other man goes on to say: "The statement is neither-true-nor-false", neither of these men is really telling us any more than what he told us in the first place. Once one has indicated, in response to a request to evaluate a statement of the form in question, that he believes that nothing is so-and-so, all he adds by saying that the statement is false or -- as his wont may be -- lacking in truth value, is the information that he happens

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1. In fact, it may be a definite advantage to have just the one word, "false", for the two kinds of cases. If the Strawsonian and the Russellian are asked to evaluate the statement: "The present King of France has just bought a car with a rotary engine", and if neither the Strawsonian nor the Russellian knows how France is now governed, and if both the Strawsonian and the Russellian know that such cars have not yet been made available even for royal purchase, then the Russellian will be able to reply: "That's false", whereas the Strawsonian will not be able to decide whether to reply that the statement is false or that it lacks a truth value. In fact, he will not even know whether or not 'the question arises'.



to like Russell, or that he happens to like Strawson.

It would seem, now, that question (1) is a pretty silly question and that any further discussion of it can result in nothing but boredom. This may be the case. But I am going to say more about the question anyway. H.B. Hingert, who was my teacher at the University of Toronto, once remarked that although he did not know whether the medievals really disputed about the number of angels that could sit on the point of a pin, he suspected that if they had discussed that question, they might have made some interesting discoveries about space. I am going to say more about question (1) in the hope that my discussion will yield some interesting points in philosophical logic.

Let us have a look at what Quine has to say about this matter. He is a defender of the Strawsonian view on questions like (1). And he takes the distinction between the false and the neither-true-nor-false quite seriously. He says:

Sentences like "Mama sings" and "I saw the lion", which contain definite singular terms, may indeed be said to depend for their truth on the existence of objects named by those terms, but the difference is that they do not clearly become false (and their negations true) failing such objects. Failing objects of reference for their definite singular terms, such sentences are likely to be looked upon as neither true nor false but simply as uncalled for. (Word and Object, pp. 112f.)

And, a bit later on, he develops his position by saying:

Let it not be supposed that these various perplexities and complications issue merely from a pedantic distinction between what is false and what is neither true nor false. Nothing would be gained by pooling these two categories under the head of the false; for they are distinguished, under whatever names, in that the one category contains the negations of all its members while the other contains the negations of none of its members. (Word and Object, p.177)

I think Quine's view may be summed up as follows. Compare (2) with:

(6) The present President of the United States is bald.

Neither (2) nor (6) is true. It would seem that if something<sup>1</sup> is not true, then it must be false. But if something is false, then its negation must be true. Since (6) is false, its negation, i.e.:

(7) The present President of the United States is not bald,

is true. But the negation of (2), i.e.:

(8) The present King of France is not bald,

is not true. Neither (2) nor its negation is true. Therefore, (2) cannot be reckoned as false. But (2) is not true either. Therefore, (2) is neither-true-nor-false. (6), however, is clearly false. So the distinction between the false and the neither-true-nor-false, i.e., the distinction between things like (6) and things like (2), is more than pedantic.

One might take either of two lines of argument against Quine. Taking the first line, one might argue that it is not clear that (8) is not true. Quine apparently thinks that (8) is true just in case (4) is the case, i.e., just in case France has just one King and he is not bald. But, as Russell suggests, (cf. "On Denoting", p. 53), (8) may be understood in such a way that we should regard it as true in case it is false that there is an entity which is now King of France and is bald. This, one might argue, is how one ought to interpret (8); and one might conclude that Quine is just wrong when he suggests that the negation of (2), i.e., (8), is not true.

Taking the second line of argument, one might concede that (8) is not true -- i.e., deny that it may be understood in the way in

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1. I use "something" here in order to avoid getting enmeshed in complications over the fact that whereas for Strawson it is a statement which bears (or lacks) a truth value, for Quine such bearers and lackers are sentences. We shall have plenty of time for such complications in the following Section.

which I have indicated -- but argue that (8) is not the negation of (2). That is, one might argue that (2) has more than one negation: (8), which, given the present political situation in France, is not true, and:

(9) It is not the case that the present King of France is bald, which is true just in case either there is no French King at present, or there is more than one French King at present, or there is at present just one French King but he has a fine head of hair. One who takes this line of argument will refuse to admit the principle that if something is false, then its negation is true. He will say, instead, that if something is false, then its contradictory is true. And he will say that both (8) and (9) are negations of (2), but that, of the two, only (9) is the contradictory of (2). (8), he will say, is merely a contrary of (2).

Taking either line of argument, we may avoid Quine's suggestion that the distinction between the false and the neither-true-nor-false is more than pedantic.

We have now hit upon a reason why question (1) might be considered interesting. In discussing it, we are led to discuss negation. And negation is interesting. Or, at any rate, it is less boring than question (1) would be did it not lead us on to other questions. So let us say something about negation.

There is not much point in trying to defend the first of the two lines which I said one might want to take against Quine. This line of argument depends upon our being able to interpret statements expressed in the form: "The so-and-so is not such-and-such", as true in case it is false that there is an entity which is so-and-so and such-and-such. But a great many people insist that such

statements are true just in case there exists just one entity which is so-and-so and that entity is not such-and-such. Since it is pointless to quarrel over linguistic intuitions, we might as well just accept that such statements are true just in case there exists just one entity which is so-and-so and that entity is not such-and-such.

But the second line of argument seems unassailable. We grant Quine his interpretation of (8). But we still have (9) as a negation of (2). That (9) is a negation of (2) is something which no one would deny. We say that (9) is the contradictory of (2). And this again is something which no one would deny. Having granted Quine his interpretation of (8), we conclude that statements like (2) have at least two different kinds of negation.

That statements like (2) have more than one negation is a point which has been recognized by Russell, ("On Denoting", loc. cit.), and by Anscombe, (An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, pp. 35f., 62f.). Anscombe would call (8) an internal and (9) the external negation of (2). But the distinction between what Anscombe calls external and internal negation has, to my knowledge, been more often denied or neglected than recognized. To cite one example, Katz says:

The negation of a sentence can be formed in a number of ways. We can put the word not after the verb be, as in "The table is not an antique." We can put expressions such as "It is not the case that" in front of full sentences, as in the sentence, "It is not the case that the table is an antique." We can prefix the sentence by that and add is false to the end, as in "That it is so is false." We shall consider only the type of negativization in which the negation of a sentence is formed by adding not. Negations formed in other ways, by virtue of being actual sentence negations, are synonymous with the negations of the same sentences that are formed by adding not. ("Analyticity and Contradiction in Natural Language", pp. 534f.)

Such a view permits Katz to ignore external negation when treating

the semantics of negation. To cite another neglecter of the distinction, John Woods, (cf. "Fictionality and the Logic of Relations"), reasons that if: "Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street", is false, then some 'natural alternative', like: "He only stayed there occasional weekends", must be true. Woods, incidentally, shirks from a Strawsonian position on the truth value of: "Sherlock Holmes lived in Baker Street". He insists that this statement is true. This leads him into complications too labyrinthian to discuss here.

It might be of interest, now, to say something about this distinction which is so often neglected or denied. What I want to do is to point out what I think might, for some people, be a strong motivation for denying or neglecting this distinction. Consider such locutions as: "It is true that the President of the United States is bald", "It is the case that the President of the United States is bald", and "It is a fact that the President of the United States is bald". These locutions are meat for the metaphysician. For it is certainly likely that an untrained observer would think that the user of the first locution is saying that a philosophically interesting property, called "truth", belongs to some linguistic or cognitive entity whose name is: "that the President of the United States is bald". And it is equally likely that such observers would think that the users of the second and third locutions are saying something or other about such philosophically interesting entities as a case and a fact. But it is good counsel to avoid doing metaphysics whenever one can. And Ramsey has provided us with a way to stop the metaphysician from making meat of our examples. "There is no separate problem of truth", he says, "but merely a linguistic muddle", ("Facts and Propositions", p. 142). The users of our locutions appear to be saying things of philosophical

interest; but really they are not. "It is true that the President of the United States is bald", "It is the case that the President of the United States is bald", and "It is a fact that the President of the United States is bald", are merely stylistic variants of: "The President of the United States is bald". We thought we were talking about such lofty items as truth, a case, and a fact. But we were only talking about the American President and the state of his scalp.

We have just been expounding the doctrine that truth, cases, and facts, (or better: "is true", "is the case", and "is a fact"), are eliminable. This doctrine may be stated, in a loose way, as follows: Give me a sentence which contains the expression, "is true", the expression, "is the case", or the expression, "is a fact": I shall give you, in return, a sentence which has the same meaning but which contains none of these expressions.<sup>1</sup>

But, if "is true", "is the case", and "is a fact" are eliminable, then "is false", "is not the case", and "is not a fact" ought to be eliminable too. And it appears to be among Ramsey's claims that these latter expressions are eliminable. " "It is false that Caesar was murdered" ", Ramsey says, "means no more than that Caesar was not murdered". We may expect that a similar account should hold for "is not the case" and "is not a fact".

But let us take the technique which Ramsey applied to the sentence about Caesar and apply it to (9), i.e., to: "It is not the case that the present King of France is bald". What we get, of course, is (8), i.e., "The present King of France is not bald", of which we must claim (9) to be a mere stylistic variant. It now appears that

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1. And which contains no others -- like "is the way things are" or "characterizes reality" -- of equal philosophical interest.

if we accept the Ramsey eliminability thesis, then we must reject the distinction between (8) and (9): we must reject the distinction between internal and external negation. If we want to keep the distinction, it seems that we must deny that the eliminability thesis applies to negative sentences of (9)'s sort. But if we deny this, we must, it seems, admit that people sometimes talk about falsity and about failures to be the case and failures to be a fact. We appear forced to either keep our distinction and do metaphysics or avoid metaphysics and give up our distinction.

But perhaps there is a way out. No Ramseyan was ever so simple-minded as to claim that there is only one way to eliminate a philosophically puzzling expression. (8) is not the translation we want for (9). But let us follow Anscombe, (c.f. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p. 35), and try:

(10) Not: The present King of France is bald.

I find (10) pleasing to perfection; and I should be happy to stop right here. The eliminability thesis is right. The "is not the case" of (9) is eliminable. (8) is the wrong way to get rid of it. (10) is the right way. We have our distinction between external and internal negation. And we have avoided metaphysics. But there are people who would not accept this result. We must not ignore the ordinary language philosophers; and we can imagine their horrified exclamation: "I do not understand (10)! It is just not English! (9) is a piece of fairly ordinary English. (10) is a philosopher's construction. Surely no piece of fairly ordinary English is a mere stylistic variant of a philosopher's construction!" The answer to this is that one cannot please all of the people all of the time. But let us be conciliatory and see where it gets us. There is no

reason why the eliminationist's translation of (9) should be just a matter of pulling out "It is not the case that" and sticking "not" into the appropriate place. Let us use our intelligence and try:

(11) There is nothing which is both the present King of France and bald.

Surely the defenders of ordinary English can have no objection here.

(11) is not, perhaps, the sort of thing which one might hear in the queue at the greengrocer's. But, however Pickwickian it may look,

(11) does not deviate from English grammar. Perhaps (10) is syntactically strange. (11) is stilted at worst. So our troubles appear

to be over. We have saved the eliminability thesis, avoided metaphysics, and preserved the distinction between internal and external negation.

But now we come to an interesting point. (9), we said, is the contradictory of (2). (9), we are now saying, means the same as (11), i.e., (9) and (11) are one and the same statement.

But (11), clearly, is the contradictory of:

(12) There is something which is both the present King of France and bald.

Now we said that (9) and (11) are one and the same statement. Let us call this statement "S". Now surely if p is the contradictory of r and if q is the contradictory of r, then p must be the same statement as q. But (12) is the contradictory of S and (2) is the contradictory of S. Therefore, (12) and (2) are one and the same statement. But let us now recall question (2) of Section I, renumbered here as:

(13) If someone, today, were to say: "The present King of France is bald", would that person be stating, in part, that the present King of France exists?

Now one undeniable thing is that if someone, today, were to say:



"The present King of France is bald", then that person would be stating that the present King of France is bald, i.e., he would be stating (2). But since (2) is the same statement as (12), such a person would be stating (12). Anyone who states (12), however, states, in part:

(14) There is something which is the present King of France,  
which is surely a stylistic variant of:

(15) The present King of France exists.

So we have an answer to question (13). Yes, we may conclude, the Russellian of Section I is right.

One need not take this conclusion seriously if one does not feel like it. It is clear that one is not forced to take all of the steps which lead to it. But it might, for all that, be counted as an interesting dividend of our musings.

We are discussing ways in which question (1) might be considered interesting. Let us return to Quine, to say something about the relevance which the Strawsonian answer to question (1) has to his philosophy. It bears upon his theory of analysis.

In From a Logical Point of View (see pp. 5ff.), Quine condones Russell's Theory of Descriptions. Again, Russell's theory is, on the whole, endorsed in Word and Object. (See Sections 37-39) Singular descriptions of the form: "the F", are interpreted as: "the object x such that...x...", and this latter is written as " $(\exists x) (...x ...)$ ". (Word and Object, p. 164). " $---(\exists x) (...x...)---$ ", in turn, is regarded as an abbreviation of " $(\exists y) (y = (\exists x) (...x...) \text{ and } ---y---$ )", with " $---( )---$ " representing the rest of the sentence in which "The F" originally appeared, (p. 189), and with " $=(\exists x) (...x...)$ " equated with "...y... and y only", (p. 184). And (2), in consequence,

will get analyzed as:

(16)  $(\exists y) (y = (\exists x) (x \text{ is present King of France}) \text{ and } y \text{ is bald})$ .

This might be a cause for puzzlement. We observed that Quine takes the Strawsonian position on question (1). A present day user of sentence (2) would, according to Quine, be saying something neither-true-nor-false. But now we see that Quine analyzes (2) as (16). To state (16) is to state, in part, that the present King of France exists.<sup>1</sup> And this, apparently, is to take the Russellian position on question (13).<sup>2</sup> As we pointed out in Section I, the Russellian position on question (13) commits one to the Russellian position on question (1). If (16) is the analysis of (2), then, since (16) is clearly false, (2) must be false and not just innocent of truth value.

In a book by a non-Quinean, such a combination of doctrines would amount to inconsistency. But in Quine the inconsistency is only apparent. And its appearance lends a good deal of force to one of Quine's major claims. Although (16) is Quine's analysis of (2), Quine has his own view of analysis:

We do not claim to make clear and explicit what the users of the unclear expression had unconsciously in mind all along. We do not expose hidden meanings, as the words "analysis" and "explication" would suggest; we supply lacks. (Word and Object, p. 258)

Although (16) is Quine's analysis of (2), (16) is not, for Quine, an exposition of the 'hidden meaning' behind (2). Instead, it is a

1. " $(\exists y) (y = (\exists x) (...x...))$ ", " $(\exists y) (...y... \text{and } y \text{ only})$ ", " $(\exists y) (x) (...x... \text{if and only if } x = y)$ ", and " $(\exists x) (...x...) \text{ exists}$ " may all be equated. (cf. Word and Object, pp. 183f., 186ff.). A more usual way of analyzing (2) might be: " $(\exists x) ((y) ((y \text{ is King of France if and only if } y = x)) \text{ and } x \text{ is bald})$ ", or again: " $(\exists x) ((x \text{ is King of France}) \text{ and } ((y) (y \text{ is King of France only if } y = x)) \text{ and } x \text{ is bald})$ ." But I use the form of (16) for the sake of brevity.

2. I.e., on question (2) of Section I.

substitute, "clear and couched in terms to our liking", which fills just those functions of (2) which "make it worth troubling about". Those functions of (2) which are not worth troubling about are what Quine calls the "don't cares". And among the "don't cares" is (2)'s annoying truth-value gap, (cf. Word and Object, pp. 258f.). Closely associated with this view of analysis is Quine's view of synonymy. To say that (16) is an exposition of the 'hidden meaning' of (2) is just about to say that sentences (2) and (16) are synonymous, (or so it seems to appear to Quine). But according to Quine, "Synonymy, for sentences generally, is not a notion that we can readily make adequate sense of, " ( Word and Object , p. 159). Since there is no uncovering of 'hidden meanings', Quine can claim (16) as his analysis of (2) without thereby having to claim that (16) and (2) resemble one another in all the respects in which one might be interested. Quine 'doesn't care' about (2)'s failure to have a truth value; so he need not build such a feature into the analysis of (2). Still more, since Quine does not care to expose the 'hidden meanings' of the locutions of ordinary language, but is concerned instead with the construction of a "canonical idiom" for "the statement of one's scientific theory", (cf. Word and Object, p. 228), in which he will limn "the true and ultimate structure of reality", (cf. Word and Object, p. 221), he is pleased to produce an analysis which improves upon, rather than an analysis which faithfully reflects his analysis.

Thus Quine does not really take the Russellian position on question (13). He has no opinion on what statement a user of the sentence in question would be making. (This is a good place to note that it is not clear that what I call the "Russellian" position on (13) is really Russell's position. Russell says: "I was concerned

to find a more accurate and analyzed thought to replace the somewhat confused thoughts which most people at most times have in their heads," (My Philosophical Development, p. 243).)

The persuasive force which Quine gets from his claim that (2) and such like are lacking in truth value should now be evident. Quine has no opinion on what a user of the sentence in question would be stating. And it might seem that he need not bother to have any opinion as to whether or not the user of such a sentence would be saying something with a truth value. He does not, in fact, ever give us any good reasons for thinking that anything in particular is lacking in truth value. His claim that there are truth value gaps is just stated, never argued for.<sup>1</sup> But the rhetorical value of being able to say repeatedly that (2) and such like are lacking in truth value is enormous. As the logical analysis of (2), (16) is here to stay. The theory which recommends such an analysis is a paradigm of philosophy. What better way could there be to show that analysis does not uncover meanings than to be able to point out that the best logical analyses which it is likely that we shall ever get for (2) differs from its analysandum in such a fundamental respect?

Conversely, those of us who make bold to think that (16) does uncover something not very much unlike a 'hidden meaning' of (2)

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1. His statement: "Failing objects of reference for their definite singular terms, such sentences are likely to be looked upon as neither true nor false but simply as uncalled for", is not an argument. Quine would not, I am sure, claim that "A is B" follows from "We are likely to look upon A as being B". Quine does, as we have noted, argue for a distinction between the categories of the false and the neither-true-nor-false. But it does not follow from a distinction between categories that any objects fall in either category.

will profit by saying that (2) is false. In so doing, we shall nullify one of Quine's most frequently cited differences between analysans and analysandum. And, since there are no conclusive arguments either for or against the theory of truth value gaps, we may feel free to opt against it.

## SECTION III: ANALYSIS

I want to say more, now, about this question of analysis. In recent pages, I have allowed myself to be fairly lax about the nice distinction between a sentence and its intensional counterpart. Un-remitting precision about which of these entities one is talking about results, more often than not, in fruitless complication. But these distinctions are important for what I now want to say. And I shall now try to be more precise. We pointed out earlier that whereas Strawson believes that statements bear and lack truth values, Quine believes that it is sentences which do this bearing and lacking. And when Quine does a piece of analysis, his materials are sentences. Quine would analyze the sentence:

(1) The present King of France is bald,

by 'substituting', for it, the sentence:

(2)  $(\exists y) (y = (ix) (x \text{ is present King of France}) \text{ and } y \text{ is bald.}$

This does not mean that he creeps around the Harvard University Library with a pair of scissors and a jar of paste, cutting out the sentences he does not like and substituting their canonical counterparts.<sup>1</sup> Quine's 'substitution' is rather a matter of constructing a new sentence and recommending it as one which will fill the worthwhile functions of the original sentence while, at the same time, being more "clear" and "couched" more "in terms to our liking", (cf. Word and Object, p. 259). But Quine would not claim that sentence (1) and sentence (2) are so related that the latter uncovers any 'hidden meaning'

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1. Nor does Quine analyze sentences in the way in which Moore suggests that an analysis of a verbal expression might go. (cf. "A Reply to my Critics", p. 661)

of the former. And one of Quine's reasons for not making such a claim would be that to say something like: "Sentence (2) has the same meaning as sentence (1), but sentence (2) shows its meaning more clearly", is, apparently, to commit oneself to the undesirable claim that sentences (1) and (2) are synonymous. But, according to Quine, "there is no synonymy," (Word and Object, p. 242).

It does seem pretty clear that, on at least one reasonable way of understanding "synonymy", even if there is such a relation, no two sentences bear it to one another. Let us say that two expressions are synonymous if, and only if, they are interchangeable everywhere, salva veritate. Let us then choose at random any semanticist who has a theory of synonymy, (e.g., Carnap and his "intensional isomorphism", (cf. Meaning and Necessity, Chapters 14 and 15), and suppose that it follows from this semanticist's theory that sentences: "S" and "T", are synonymous. But if there should happen to be a person, say, Mr M, of whom it is true to say:

(3) Mr M does not doubt that whoever believes that S believes that S,  
but of whom it is false to say:

(4) Mr M does not doubt that whoever believes that S believes that T,  
our semanticist's theory will be false.<sup>1</sup> Our semanticist might try either of two ways out. If he is dogmatic, he will say that since his theory of synonymy is the right one, nobody really doubts that

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1. This argument is essentially Mates's, (cf. "Synonymity", p. 215), but with a slight change. Mates's own argument depends upon the claim that nobody doubts that whoever believes that S believes that S. But since someone might be perverse enough to argue that someone might be perverse enough to doubt that whoever believes that S believes that S, I substitute "Mr M does not doubt" for "Nobody doubts".

whoever believes that S believes that T. Mr M may say that he has this doubt, but he does not really have it.<sup>1</sup> But this way out is indefensible. "Mr M" happens to be the name I use for Professor Mates. But surely, given Professor Mates's philosophical views, (see p. 26, footnote 1), there are no two sentences "S" and "T", for which it is impossible that (3) be true and (4) false.

If the semanticist should counter by saying that even Mates does not really doubt what he might say he doubts, we can point out that while:

- (5) Mr M. has argued that, while nobody doubts that whoever believes that S believes that S, someone might doubt that whoever believes that S believes that T,

is true, the following:

- (6) Mr M. has argued that while nobody doubts that whoever believes that S believes that T, someone might doubt that whoever believes that S believes that S,

is false. (This last argument is an adaptation of one of Linsky's. cf. Referring, p. 72)

The semanticist's other way out would be for him to argue that substitutivity everywhere is too strong a criterion for synonymy. (3), (4), (5), and (6) exemplify multiple iterations of oratio obliqua. Perhaps we should weaken the criterion to substitutivity in single oratio obliqua but not in iterated oratio obliqua. Or perhaps we should weaken it still further and just demand substitutivity in extensional and modal contexts, not bothering about oratio obliqua. But the trouble now is that the concept we are trying to explain is slipping through our fingers. We might have thought that we

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1. Of two sentences, "D" and "D'", which are ruled synonymous by Carnap's theory, Carnap says: "If somebody responds affirmatively to "D", but negatively to "D'", we shall merely conclude that one of his responses is non-indicative, perhaps due to his momentary confusion," (Meaning and Necessity, p. 231).



all had a concept of synonymy and that the only difficulty lay in explicating this concept. To use Mates's terminology, (cf. "Synonymy", p.215), substitutivity everywhere was the criterion for synonymy, while Carnap's intensional isomorphism was one of several competing explicata for synonymy. But if we throw out our criterion, we shall have no concept left to explicate.

This point aside, one who claims that analysis uncovers 'hidden meanings' need not even make the claim that the analysans sentence and the analysandum sentence are interchangeable in all extensional contexts. As it happens, (1) and (2) do appear to be interchangeable in all extensional contexts, but consider:

(7)  $(\exists y) (y = (ix) (x \text{ is King of France at Midnight, 2 July, 1969})$   
and  $y \text{ is bald})$ ,

which might very well be offered as an analysans for (1). Clearly these two sentences are not interchangeable salva veritate in all extensional contexts. Sentence (7), (or the statement one would be making by means of it), is false regardless of the time of utterance. Sentence (1), (or the statement one would be making by means of it), is true at some times, false at others. So the two sentences are not interchangeable, salva veritate, in all extensional contexts. If we take substitutivity, salva veritate, in all extensional contexts as a minimal necessary condition for synonymy, we need not argue with Quine's repeated assertion that analysis carries no synonymy claim. But this need not interfere with the view that analysis uncovers 'hidden meanings'. When we do a piece of analysis, we must always imagine our analysandum sentence as having been used in a particular context: at a particular time, in a particular place, and by a particular person. A believer in 'hidden meanings' need not hold -- as Quine seems to think that he

must hold -- that the two sentences have the same meaning in all contexts. He need only hold that the analysans sentence, in the context in which he is using it, has the meaning which the analysandum sentence has in the context in which he imagines it to be used.

Let us say that the meaning which a sentence has on a particular occasion of its use, the statement which one makes in using that sentence on a particular occasion, and the proposition which one uses that sentence to state on that particular occasion are one and the same thing.<sup>1</sup> One who claims that sentence (7) uncovers the 'hidden meaning' of sentence (1) will not claim that sentence (7) uncovers the meaning which sentence (1) will have on all occasions of its use; he will not claim that it expresses the proposition which sentence (1), always and everywhere, would be used to state; he does not claim that it expresses the statement which sentence (1), always and everywhere, would be used to make. What he claims is that sentence (7) uncovers the meaning which he imagines sentence (1) to have on a particular occasion of its use; that it expresses the proposition which he imagines sentence (7) as being used to state on a particular occasion; that it expresses the statement which he imagines sentence (1) as being used to make on a particular occasion.

My claim, that we may identify the meaning which a sentence has on a particular occasion of its use with the statement which one makes in using that sentence on that occasion and with the proposition which one uses that sentence to state on that occasion, appears to conflict with Strawson's claim:

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1. I restrict myself to sentences in the indicative.

The sentence may have a single meaning which is precisely what... allows it to be used to make different statements. So it will not do to identify the statement...with the meaning of the sentence. (Introduction to Logical Theory, p. 4; cf. Quine, Word and Object, p. 201, for a similar remark.)

But, in the first place, I do not identify a statement with the meaning of a sentence, I identify a statement with a meaning of a sentence.<sup>1</sup> In the second place, Strawson and I just happen to choose to associate the word, "meaning", with different things. There is, of course, some feature of the sentence, (2), which allows it to be used to make the many different statements which it may be used to make on different occasions. Strawson chooses to apply the expression, "meaning", to this feature of the sentence. I, on the other hand, prefer to associate "meaning" with particular utterances. Some philosophers, such as Fodor, (cf. Section V, below), give one the impression that they tend to think that one can understand a sentence perfectly well without knowing anything about the circumstances in which the sentence is actually being used. But I should prefer to associate "understanding", and hence "meaning", with what happens on a particular occasion of utterance. It is a consequence of my view that a sentence such as (2), or, to give a more obvious example: "This<sup>is</sup> red", is capable of having any of an extremely large number of meanings. But I see nothing paradoxical about this. We need not know about all of these meanings in order to understand the sentence. We need only be able to discover the meaning which the sentence has on the particular occasion on which it is used.

We may, for our purposes, regard (7) as a perfectly unambiguous

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1. For simplicity of exposition, I sometimes pretend that certain sentences are perfectly 'eternal' and unambiguous, and, hence, that such a sentence has just one meaning. But such a pretense does not commit me to the claim that any sentence actually has one and only one meaning.

sentence. Given that it is uttered with assertive intonation, there is just one statement that the speaker can make by means of it.

(1), on the other hand, contains the indicator word, "present", and, in consequence, is an ambiguous sentence. The statement one makes by means of it varies with the time of utterance. If there is an infinite number of possible times of utterance, then (1) has an infinite number of meanings. But the meaning which (1) has on a particular occasion of its use depends upon the context in which (1) is used. (1) is ambiguous only over time.<sup>1</sup> And in the case of (1) it is the time of its utterance which determines which meaning it has on that utterance. If (1) is uttered at Midnight, 2 July, 1969, then its meaning, on that occasion, is identical with the (only)<sup>2</sup> meaning of (7). If (1) is uttered at 2 P.M., 3 May, 1905, then its meaning, on that occasion, is identical with the (only) meaning of: " $(\exists y) (y = (1x) (x \text{ is King of France at 2 P.M., 3 May, 1905}) \text{ and } y \text{ is bald})$ ".

Since strong considerations have led us to doubt that, (on at least one reasonable way of understanding "synonymous", anyway), any two sentences are synonymous, we shall be reasonable to conclude that (1) and (2) are not synonymous. (1) and (2) do not have the same meaning simpliciter. They may not be substituted for one

1. Or at least this is what I assume here.

2. This "only" needs some qualification. My claim that (1) is ambiguous only over time and my claim that (7) has just one meaning depend upon some convenient pretexts. I ignore the possible ambiguity of the words: "King", "France", etc., and the possible ambiguity of the logical apparatus in (7). I also ignore all uses of these sentences other than statement-making ones where the sentence occurs on its own and not embedded within quotation marks or oratio obliqua.

another wherever one of them is found.<sup>1</sup> But just as there are many contexts in which (7) and (1) are interchangeable, (i.e., any extensional context at Midnight, 2 July, 1969), we may point out that (1) and (2) are interchangeable in many contexts, (i.e., in any extensional context in any year). Given any occurrence of (1) in an extensional context, if (2) had been used in that same context, then one would have been making the statement he made by means of (1). And we may say, on this basis, that although it is false that the meaning of (1) is identical with the meaning of (2), it is true that a meaning of (2) is identical with a meaning of (1). To borrow some of Katz's terminology, an *anlysans* sentence and an *analyandum* sentence need not be "fully synonymous". They need only be "synonymous on a reading". (cf. Katz, The Philosophy of Language, p. 171)

The interchangeability I am talking about now is not just interchangeability with preservation of truth value. It is interchangeability with preservation of statement. And this notion of a statement is, of course, just what now needs to be explained. Roughly speaking, a sentence is used to make a statement when that sentence is uttered with assertive intonation. I assume that "assertive intonation" can be defined by the phoneticists. One might, of course, utter a sentence with assertive intonation and be giving a command, giving a promise, or reciting his lines in a play. But I see nothing wrong with saying that we can, at one and the same time and by means of one and the same sentence, give a command and

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1. We may reinforce this point for (1) and (2) by pointing out that (1) may not be substituted, *salva veritate*, for (2) on its occurrence in: "Strawsonians argue that one can state that the present King of France is bald without stating that  $(\exists y) (y = (x) (x \text{ is present King of France}) \text{ and } y \text{ is bald})$ ".

make a statement, make a promise<sup>1</sup> and make a statement, or recite our line in a play and make a statement. According to the way in which I use the word, "statement", someone has made a statement whenever we may report that person's utterance by means of a locution of the form: "He said that...". Since it is clear that we may frequently use such a locution to report what is said when a command is given, when a promise is made, and when dramatic lines are recited, it is clear that the fact that someone is giving a command, making a promise, or reciting dramatic lines on a particular occasion is not sufficient to make it false that that person is making a statement on that occasion.

The most common and everyday way of reporting someone's statement is by means of the common and everyday device of embedding that person's words into an oratio obliqua sentence of the form: "He said that...". In the most simple case, we simply say: "He said that", and then we repeat the speaker's original sentence. But this simple technique cannot be performed with all sentences. If you utter the sentence: "I am hungry", I cannot give a true report of your statement by saying: "He said that I am hungry". But we shall restrict ourselves to the more simple kind of case, of which an utterance of (1) -- given a certain qualification -- would be an example. If John, say, utters (1), then I can give a true report of his statement by saying:

(8) John said that the present King of France is bald

The qualification, of course, is that John's original utterance must have taken place during, roughly speaking, the same epoch as my

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1. That one can, at one and the same time, and by means of one and the same sentence, make a statement and make a promise has been argued by P.S. 'Ardal, (cf. ""And That's a Promise"").

utterance of (8). In such a case, I give a true report of John's statement. But if John's utterance of (1) had taken place in, say, 1623, then my use of (8) would result in a false report of John's statement. The case is similar to that of your utterance of "I am hungry". The occurrence of the indicator word, "I", in your utterance lays down a restriction upon the use of your original sentence in an oratio obliqua report of your statement. Roughly speaking, your original sentence can be embedded without alteration into oratio obliqua in a report of your statement just in those cases where the context of the oratio obliqua report is sufficiently similar to the context of your original utterance. What makes for sufficient similarity in the case of the indicator word, "I", is identity of speaker. Supposing that your name is "Bill" and that you have uttered the sentence, "I am hungry", you can say: "Bill said that I am hungry", but I cannot. What makes for sufficient similarity of context in the case of the indicator word, "present", is identity of epoch. I leave "epoch" vague on purpose. For some cases, an epoch might be counted as a second, or perhaps as an even shorter period of time.

(8), I said, is a report of the statement which we are imagining John to have made by uttering sentence (1) during the present epoch. Now this should help, to some extent, to bring our talk about meanings, statements, and propositions down to earth. For to say that John uttered a sentence which, in the context of his utterance, meant that the present King of France is bald, to say that John made the statement that the present King of France is bald, and to say that John stated the proposition that the present King of France is bald, are all just to say that John said that the present King of France is bald.

With (8), we reported John's statement by just embedding his original sentence into oratio obliqua. But it is clear that often we must deviate from the speaker's original sentence in giving a report of his statement. And just as we often must deviate from his original sentence, often we may deviate from his original sentence. Given that John has recently uttered sentence (1) with assertive intonation, it is clear that either of the following sentences will do as well as (8) as a device for reporting John's statement:

(9) John said that the person who, at present, is King of France is bald,

(10) John said that France's present King is bald.

And I doubt that very many people will disagree if I say that if John's original utterance had taken place in 1969, and if we are writing or speaking in the 21st century or if we are writing something to be read by the people of the 21st century, there will be absolutely nothing wrong with our reporting John's statement by means of the sentence:

(11) John said that the King of France in 1969 is bald.

We have just seen that one is free to deviate from a speaker's original sentence in giving a report of his statement. But one is not completely free in this regard. I can report John's statement by means of sentences (8)-(11), but I cannot report his statement by means of sentence:

(12) John said that now is the time for all good men to come to the aid of their party.

And this raises an important question: What are the constraints upon our deviation from the speaker's original sentence when we give



an oratio obliqua report of his statement? But before we try to reply to this question, let us make one observation. The constraints upon our deviation from the speaker's original sentence when we give an oratio obliqua report of his statement are identical with the constraints upon our deviation from the speaker's original sentence when we give a philosophical analysis, or paraphrase of his statement. (This point is hinted at by Quine, cf. Word and Object, p. 208). We may use, say, (7), as a logical analysis for the statement which John made on a particular occasion, just in case we may make a true statement by saying:

(13) John said that  $(\exists y) (y = (\exists x) (x \text{ is King of France at Midnight, 2 July, 1969}) \text{ and } y \text{ is bald})$ .

In both cases, the condition for correctness is that (7) be such that an extensional use of it in present circumstances would result in our making the same statement which John made by means of his sentence in the circumstances in which he uttered his sentence.

Let us now say something about this question of constraints. There are many reasons we might have for deviating from our speaker's original words when we give a report of his statement. Sometimes, the speaker's use of an indicator word, like "I" or "present", forces us to deviate. Sometimes we have forgotten the speaker's original words and remember only the gist of his utterance.<sup>1</sup> Sometimes we wish to place special emphasis upon some aspect of the speaker's statement. Sometimes, as in (13), we wish to cast the statement into logical notation in order to facilitate logical deduction, and to make implications explicit. And sometimes, again as in

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1. A psycholinguist friend, Dr. J.C. Marshall, has pointed out to me that experimental evidence suggests that we retain the gist, or meaning, of sentences we hear much more easily than we retain the actual words.

(13), we deviate from the original in order to forestall metaphysical conclusions which some philosophers might be tempted to draw from the original.

"Paraphrase", as Quine says, "depends on what we are trying to prove or find out", (Word and Object, p. 183). There is no "unique right analysis" for any given statement, (cf. Word and Object, p. 260). For some purposes we rewrite a statement in one way. For other purposes we rewrite it in another way. We are not bound to any particular way of rewriting a statement. Even when we are working within one particular kind of enquiry -- say logical analysis -- we need not think there is one "unique right analysis". (7) is one logical analysis for John's statement. Another might be:

(14)  $(\exists w) (\exists x) ((w = (\exists y) (y = \text{France})) \text{ and } (x = (\exists z) (z \text{ is related to } w \text{ as King to Kingdom})) \text{ and } x \text{ is bald}).$

And another, if we should happen to wish to fit John's statement into an Aristotelian logic, might be:

(15) All which is the King of France is bald.

Any of these might be the 'right analysis', depending upon our purposes for doing the analysis.

But we must distinguish the claim that there is no unique right analysis of a given statement from the claim that when we are analysing or paraphrasing, there is no line to be drawn between what is a right analysis and what is not. "Surely", Quine says, "there is nothing approaching a fixed standard of how far indirect quotation may deviate from the direct", (Word and Object, p. 218). But surely there must be some standards in this area. (8), (9), (10), and, we might assume, (13), are all correct reports of the

statement John made when he uttered (1). (12) is an incorrect report of John's statement. "On page 218 of Word and Object, Quine said that there is nothing approaching a fixed standard of how far indirect quotation may deviate from the direct" is a correct report of Quine's statement. "On page 218 of Word and Object, Quine said that John Duns Scotus never committed a philosophical error" is an incorrect report of Quine's statement. Surely there must be some standard for distinguishing correct statement reports from incorrect statement reports.

Although Quine says that there is nothing approaching a fixed standard of how far indirect quotation may deviate from the direct, he does suggest what may be looked upon as guidelines for indirect quotation and paraphrase. Let us have a look at these guidelines.

Quine says:

...in indirect quotation we project ourselves into what, from his remarks and other indications, we imagine the speaker's state of mind to have been, and then we say what, in our language, is natural and relevant for us in the state thus feigned. (Word and Object, p. 219).

The guideline here is what is natural and relevant for us to say in what we imagine the speaker's state of mind to have been. Now the most natural way of interpreting what Quine says here is, it seems to me, as follows. Suppose that someone makes a statement and that you want to give an oratio obliqua report of what he said. Here is what you should do: 'project' yourself into what, from his remarks and other indications, you imagine his state of mind to have been; construct a sentence, S, which is natural and relevant for you in the state thus feigned; utter the expression: "He said that"; utter S. But suppose, now, that our speaker is Cardinal Heenan, who is quoted in the Guardian for 25 October, 1968, as having uttered the sentence:

(16) Priests are required in preaching, teaching, in the press, on radio, television, or public platforms, to refrain from opposing the teaching of the Pope in all matters of faith and morals.

But if we, who have been trained in the logic of such words as "all" and "any", were in the state of mind in which we may imagine Heenan to have been, the sentence we should have uttered would be:

(17) Priests are required in preaching, teaching, in the press, on radio, television, or public platforms, to refrain from opposing the teaching of the Pope in any matter of faith and morals.

So, according to Quine's guideline, we are entitled to say, of the Cardinal:

(18) He said that Priests are required in preaching, teaching, in the press, on radio, television, or public platforms, to refrain from opposing the teaching of the Pope in any matter of faith and morals.

But, although what (18) says the Cardinal said is what the Cardinal ought to have said, the Cardinal did not say what he ought to have said, and did not say what (18) says he said. The trouble here is that since, as a result of our logical training, we are better than the Cardinal is at manipulating such words as "all" and "any", the sentence we should use to express the Cardinal's state of mind better expresses his state of mind than does the sentence which the Cardinal, himself, used. We should have made the statement which the Cardinal ought to have made. But the Cardinal did not make the statement which he ought to have made.

A similar difficulty crops up with another of Quine's guidelines. Talking of the result, S', of paraphrasing a sentence, S, of ordinary language into logical symbols, Quine says:

Its relation to S is just that the particular business that the speaker was on that occasion trying to get on with, with help of S among other things, can be managed well enough to suit him by using S' instead of S. (Word and Object, p. 160)

But suppose, now, that you and I are examiners, discussing a student's paper. I want to give him a good mark. You want to give him a bad mark. You point to the sentence:

(19) The author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus published "On Denoting" in 1932,

in the student's paper. And you say: "Surely no one who wrote such a thing deserves a good mark". I reply by saying that what the student said may be correctly paraphrased into logical symbols as:

(20)  $(\exists y) (y = (ix) (x \text{ is author of the } \underline{\text{Principles of Mathematics}}) \text{ and } y \text{ published "On Denoting" in 1905}).$

If I am a Quinean, I may defend (2) as a paraphrase of (19) by simply pointing out that the particular business, i.e., getting a good mark on the examination, that the student was on that occasion trying to get on with, with help of (19) among other things, can be managed well enough to suit him by using (20) instead of (19).

It might be pointed out here that when a speaker utters a sentence, there are many correct answers to the question: "What particular business was he, on that occasion, trying to get on with?" The student was trying to get on with the particular business of getting a good mark. But he was also, on the same occasion, trying to get on with quite a few other particular pieces of business. We might, therefore, want to say that the medium of paraphrase is not the piece of business that the speaker was trying to get on with, but the relevant piece of business among the several pieces of business which the speaker was trying to get on with. But we now face the difficulty of specifying what we want to count as the relevant piece of business. Let us try some formulations.

We might say that the relation of S' to S is that the business, of effecting a response in his audience, that the speaker was, on that occasion, trying to get on with, with help of S among other things, can be managed well enough to suit him by using S' instead of S. But this will not do for several reasons. Our student was trying to get his examiners to respond by giving him a good mark. So, on this criterion, (20) will do as a paraphrase of (19). But we do not want this to happen. Also,<sup>1</sup> people often write and utter sentences without intending to effect any response in any audience -- for example, in a soliloquy, in a private notebook, or while delirious with fever -- but sentences so uttered or written are, nonetheless, apt for paraphrase in oratio obliqua reports and in logical analysis.

We might say that the relation of S' to S is that the business, of conveying a piece of information, that the speaker was, on that occasion, trying to get on with, with help of S among other things, can be managed well enough to suit him by using S' instead of S. But this is clearly useless. People often say things without intending to convey any information. And even when we say something in order to convey information, what we say often differs from what we intend to convey.

We might say that the relation of S' to S is that the business, of recording a piece of information, that the speaker was, on that occasion trying to get on with, with help of S among other things, can be managed well enough to suit him by using S' instead of S. Given a suitable interpretation of "recording", this is, to my mind, the best suggestion so far. If John, say, utters sentence (19) in a soliloquy or if he writes it in a private notebook, or if he utters it while delirious with fever, or, as in the case of the

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1. The point which follows is adapted for my purposes from Ziff's "On H.P. Grice's Account of Meaning".

examination, if he writes it for the eyes of someone whom he believes to already know that the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus published "On Denoting" in 1932, John will not be trying to convey any information. But we might say that he is, nonetheless, trying to 'record', (however momentarily), a piece of information. And we might say that any sentence, S', which, on the occasion on which John uttered (19), could have been used to 'record' the same piece of information which John was trying to 'record', may be used as a paraphrase of what John said. This suggestion gets us over the difficulties encountered by that of the preceding paragraph. But it is still not good enough. When John uttered (19), he may very well have been trying to 'record' the piece of information that the author of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus published "On Referring" in 1932. As a result of momentary confusion, he said "Logico-Philosophicus" instead of "Theologico-Politicus" and "Denoting" instead of "Referring". The sentence:

(21) The author of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus published "On Referring" in 1932,

could have been used, on the occasion on which John uttered (19), to 'record' the piece of information which John was trying to 'record'. But (21) will not do as a paraphrase of what John said.

We might very well say:

(22) John meant, (on that occasion), that the author of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus published "On Referring" in 1932,

but we may not say:

(23) John said, (on that occasion), that the author of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus published "On Referring" in 1932.

This illustrates an obvious but important point. One and the same utterance event may be reported in more than one way, and by means

of a different verb of propositional attitude in each case. We may report what John did by means of a sentence of the form: "John said that..."; but we may also report what John did on the same occasion by means of a sentence of the form: "John meant that..." The conditions for the truth of these different reports may very well be different.

We shall frequently return to points of this sort. But we are here concerned with indirect quotation and paraphrase of what people say. We have been trying formulations of the view that the medium of indirect quotation and paraphrase is the piece of business that the speaker was trying to get on with. We have not yet come up with a successful formulation. But I am not going to make any more attempts. Possibly some genius will, some day, come up with the formulation we have been seeking. But I have no idea of how the formulation ought to go. I am quite unable to see how what one says can be explained in terms of the piece of business which that person is trying to get on with.

Talking about the paraphrase of a 'non-eternal' sentence into an 'eternal' one, Quine says:

...the eternal sentence will be one that the speaker could have uttered in place of his original utterance in those original circumstances without detriment, so far as he could foresee, to the project he was bent on. I need hardly say that there is scope here for refinement, but let it not be supposed that acquiescence in talk of expressed propositions provides it. (Word and Object, p. 208).

My course is that of acquiescence in talk of propositions. I shall say that when a speaker has uttered a sentence, S, and when we use a sentence, S', as a paraphrase in philosophical analysis or as a clause following "that" in "He said that...", our paraphrase or oratio obliqua report will be correct just in case S' is such that



an assertive use of S' in the context in which we are using S' would be such as to state the proposition which S was used to state on the original speaker's use of S.<sup>1</sup> The proposition a speaker states, i.e., the statement he makes, will be regarded as an actual entity. I do not like aethereal entities any more than Quine, or anyone else, does. But I just do not know how to say the things I want to say without including a few of them in my ontology. At any rate, propositions are in a lot better shape than Quine's equally aethereal businesses and projects.

Talking about the proposition someone actually stated gets us around the problem of trying to give criteria for a correct report of what someone actually did in terms of what he was trying to do. Our concept of a proposition stated, i.e., a statement made, is that of something actually done. When someone writes a

1. Notice that the criterion is not that S' must be such that if the original speaker had used it in place of S, he would have stated the same proposition as he stated by means of S. You say: "I am hungry". I say: "He said that he was hungry". If you had uttered the sentence: "He was hungry", you would have stated a proposition different from the one which you stated when you uttered the sentence: "I am hungry". If, however, I had said: "He was hungry", in the same circumstances as those in which I said: "He said that he was hungry", then I should have stated the same proposition as you stated when you said: "I am hungry".

As it happens, though, if a speaker has uttered a 'non-eternal' sentence, like "I am hungry now", and if we give a correct paraphrase of what he said by means of an 'eternal sentence', like "Bill is hungry at time t", then the 'eternal sentence' will be such that if the original speaker had uttered it in place of his original sentence, then he would have made the same statement as he made by means of his original sentence. But to give this as a criterion for paraphrase would allow us to cover only those paraphrases where the new sentence is an 'eternal' one. My criterion allows me to cover both paraphrase into an 'eternal sentence' and paraphrase into a 'non-eternal' one.

My notion of 'circumstances' or 'context' is much more vague than I should like it to be. I am trying to be as precise as I can in speaking of it, but I fall very short of the precision I should like. The reader will find my most explicit treatment of context in the course of my discussion of proper names. (see Section VI) But I shall not, even there, be able to clear away very much of the fog.

book, he makes a number of statements. Because of the finitude of human intelligence, an author rarely makes just those statements which he would like to make. But what he puts on record is what he actually says. This point is, I think, recognized by (good) historians of philosophy. We do not say: "Hume's doctrine was...", and then recite what we think Hume would have said if he had been able to say what we think he really wanted to say. We say: "Hume's doctrine was...", and then recite what we think Hume actually said.

Whatever concept other philosophers may express by the words, "proposition" and "statement", my concept of a proposition stated, a statement made, is not a mentalistic concept. The proposition one states is the meaning which the sentence one uses has on the occasion on which one uses it. But the meaning which the sentence one uses has on the occasion on which one uses it need not be identical with what one means by the sentence he uses. One need not be able to 'project' oneself into the speaker's mind in order to find out what proposition he is stating. The proposition one states on a particular occasion can usually be identified by anyone who understands the language in which the proposition is stated and who knows the context of the utterance.<sup>1</sup> We make true oratio obliqua reports every day without looking into anyone's private mental goings on.

But we must now say something about the problem of identity for propositions. There are at least three questions involved here:

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1. Sometimes, indeed, the speaker's mind may be a factor in the context of the utterance. You might hear me say: "That was a good meal", and have no way of knowing what the referent is for "that" unless you find out what meal I am thinking about. But, in the usual case, the referent of an indexical expression is made clear by the observable circumstances of the utterance.

(24) How do we identify the proposition someone has stated on a particular occasion?

(25) How do we find out whether or not the proposition stated on one occasion is identical with the proposition stated on another occasion?

(26) When is the proposition stated on one occasion identical with the proposition stated on another occasion?

I take question (24) to be a question about how we actually go about discovering what proposition someone has stated on a particular occasion. This question admits of a short answer and a long answer. The short answer is simply this: We pay attention to the sentence which was uttered or written; we pay attention to the context in which the sentence was uttered or written; we ask ourselves: "What does that mean in that context?" After we take these steps, it usually happens that something which might be called a "process of understanding" takes place. As a result of this process, we know what proposition was stated. We may then give evidence that we have discovered what proposition was stated on that occasion by reciting some sentence, other than the original,<sup>1</sup> which expresses the same proposition, or by reciting a definite description, like: "the same proposition as that which was stated by means of the 856th sentence of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. ("A" Edition)".

I shall not attempt to give the long answer to this question. We want to know more about how this process of understanding takes

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1. If one does not have a photographic memory, then he may, sometimes, give evidence that he has identified the proposition stated by means of such-and-such a sentence simply by reciting that sentence, (without looking at it). For example, if I, who do not have a photographic memory, can recite the first few sentences of Hume's Treatise, then it is a pretty good bet that I know what propositions Hume stated by means of those sentences, i.e., that I understand what he said.

place. Just what, in detail, connects our observation of a sentence in its context with our ability to come up with another sentence which expresses the same proposition? In order to answer this question, we must take account of a great many factors. These include: the phonetic or orthographic structure of the sentence; the syntactic structure of the sentence; the set of meanings which the sentence is capable of having, (what Katz would call the set of "semantic readings" belonging to the sentence); the contextual factors which determine which member of this set of meanings is the meaning which the sentence has on the particular occasion in question; the relations which these factors bear to one another and to the workings of the brain; etc. I take the task of working out these details to be the job of the linguist and the psycholinguist, and not the job of the philosopher, (or at least not the present job of this philosopher).<sup>1</sup>

Whereas question (24) is a question about what, say, sentence S means, (I presuppose a particular context of utterance), question (25) is a question about how we find out whether or not what S means is identical with what, say, T means. Just as I can know that Scott is the author of Waverley and that Sir Walter is the author of Marmion without knowing that the author of Waverley is the author of Marmion and without knowing that Scott is Sir Walter, I can know that the meaning of S is the proposition that p and that the meaning of T is the proposition that q without knowing either that the proposition that p is the proposition that q or that the meaning of S is the meaning of T. For example, I

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1. Recent work in this area is available in Language, R.C. Oldfield and J.C. Marshall, eds.

can know that the sentence:

(27) The number of the apostles is  $7+5$ ,

means that the number of the apostles is twelve, and know that the sentence:

(28) The number of the apostles is the sum of the third and fourth prime numbers,

means that the number of the apostles is the sum of the fourth and third prime numbers, without knowing either that the proposition that the number of the apostles is 12 is the same as the proposition that the number of the apostles is the sum of the fourth and third prime numbers or that the meaning of (27) is the same as the meaning of (28).

The best procedure that I know of for finding out whether or not what, say, S means is identical with what, say, T means is the procedure which philosophers have been using for years. We think of what one says by means of sentence S, and we think of what one says by means of sentence T. We try to imagine a case in which what one says in one of the two cases is true while what one says in the other case is false. If we can imagine such a case, then we conclude that the two sentences mean different propositions. If we can imagine no such case, then we conclude that the two sentences mean the same proposition. (Or, being prudent philosophers, we conclude that it is not completely idiotic to put forward the tentative suggestion that it is fairly likely that the two sentences express the same proposition.)

The point of the parenthetical remark is that we do not have complete certitude in our judgements of propositional identity. If we can imagine no case in which the proposition meant

by S would have a different truth value from the proposition meant by T, we might conclude that the two sentences mean the same proposition. But, if someone with better powers of imagination should come along and describe a case in which the proposition meant by the one sentence has a truth value different from the proposition meant by the other sentence, then we shall have to admit that we were mistaken. To take just one example, it has often been thought that propositions expressed by sentences of the form:

(29) John knows that p,

were identical with propositions expressed by sentences of the form:

(30) John believes that p, and John is justified in believing that p, and p.

But people who thought this were refuted by Gettier, ("Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?"), who, with his superior powers of imagination, was able to construct examples in which propositions expressed by sentences of the form, (30), would be true, while propositions expressed by the corresponding sentences of the form, (29), would be false.

But the fact that we do not have complete certitude in these matters should not cause despair. We do not have complete certitude in our judgments about the identity of material objects either. I can err in thinking that the woman I see before me is my wife. But, both for propositions and material objects, our skill at making judgments of identity is sufficient to allow us to get along.

I can imagine no case in which the proposition which one would state by means of a present day use of sentence (1) would be false while the proposition which one would state by means of a present day use of sentence (2) would be true. Nor can I imagine

a case in which the former would be true and the latter false. I conclude that it is not completely idiotic to put forward the tentative suggestion that the two sentences express the same proposition. This suggestion will be adhered to throughout the rest of the present work. It will be assumed that one who states (1) states (2). The Russellian position on question (1) of Section I will, therefore, be adhered to. I cannot prove this position. But it seems to me to have nothing wrong with it. In Section I, I mentioned a hypothetical semantic theory which would provide a rigorous procedure for deciding what illocutionary act someone has performed on the basis of the utterance he has produced and the linguistic and extra-linguistic context in which he produced it. I do not know whether or not such a theory is possible, nor do I even know whether or not the idea of such a theory is coherent. But -- assuming the possibility of the theory and the coherence of the idea -- until we have such a theory we must rely upon our intuitive understanding of sentences and our powers of imagination when we make judgements of identity of statements and propositions.

We now turn to question (26). Let "p" represent the proposition stated by means of one sentence. Let "q" represent the proposition stated by means of another sentence. Under what conditions is p identical with q? It seems to me that we shall do best to take the most simple and obvious line on this question:

(31) p is identical with q just in case it is impossible for p to be true and q false and it is impossible for q to be true and p false.

(31) is based upon, but differs from, a statement of Lewis's. (See

Lewis and Langford, *Symbolic Logic*, p. 124). He<sup>1</sup> lays down the 'defining relation', (I use Lewis's numbering):

$$(11 \cdot 03) p = q. = : p \rightarrow q . q \rightarrow p$$

" $\rightarrow$ " is Lewis's sign for "strictly implies"; and "p strictly implies q" is defined by Lewis as: "It is false that it is possible that p should be true and q false". So Lewis's " $p \rightarrow q . q \rightarrow p$ " amounts to the same as the right hand side of my (31). But Lewis does not read " $p = q$ " as "p is identical with q". He reads it as "p and q are equivalent". Thus, Lewis does not make the disputable claim that: " $p \rightarrow q . q \rightarrow p$ ", states a necessary and sufficient condition for the identity of p and q.

To avoid confusion, I shall always use " $=$ " to mean "is identical with". For brevity, I shall often use "p and q are logically equivalent" to mean " $p \rightarrow q . q \rightarrow p$ ". My claim, then, is that logical equivalence is a necessary and sufficient condition for propositional identity. And this is my answer to question (26). It should be noticed that the answer to (26) differs from the answer to (25). Although "(p and not q) is impossible" may, so far as I know, entail: "I am unable to imagine (p and not q)", the latter does not entail the former.

Although the criterion just given for propositional identity is obvious and uncomplicated, it is, as I said, disputable. One problem arises over the interpretation of the modal expression, "it is impossible". The notion of impossibility needed for an interpretation of " $\rightarrow$ " has got to be a notion of absolute impossibility, at least where propositional identity is concerned. The psycholo-

1. Lewis takes the responsibility for Chapters I-VII and Appendix II of the book. (cf. Symbolic Logic, "Preface")





gical impossibility of: "I am unable to imagine", will not do for a definition of propositional identity. But what is this absolute impossibility. Can: "It is not possible that p", be defined without recourse to any other modal expression? I choose to avoid this problem by ignoring it and assuming that there are modal 'indefinables'. I shall, however, take up some other problems. How, for example, can one accept a criterion of propositional identity which appears to conflict with the fairly widely accepted doctrine that: "p = q, and John believes that p" entails "John believes that q"? And how can one accept a criterion of propositional identity which commits one to the view that there is just one true proposition of logic? But, pressing as these problems are, we shall not be able to discuss them until we get to Section XII. In that Section, I shall try to go some way towards defending the logical equivalence criterion of propositional identity against some objections which have been put against it. But we shall not be prepared to discuss this question until we have learned a lot more about reference and propositional attitudes. In the meantime, I shall just assume that the logical equivalence criterion is correct.

## SECTION IV: SOME PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES

The importance of distinguishing the various things which go on when utterances take place cannot be too highly stressed. We saw, in Section I, how Strawson got into trouble over identifying reference by failing to distinguish properly between the statement one makes and the information one intends to convey. I now want to argue that it can be equally misleading to identify the statement one makes with the thought which one is expressing by means of his utterance. The thought expressed by the speaker can, I think, be identified with what the speaker has in mind when he speaks and with the assertion made by the speaker, (or the proposition asserted). It can also be identified with what the speaker means, in at least one standard sense of "meaning"; but it should not in general be identified with what the speaker's words mean on the use which the speaker is making of them. This is not to say that what the speaker means never coincides with what his words mean. "Snow is white" means that snow is white; and I can say: "Snow is white", and mean that snow is white. But I can also, by slip of the tongue, say, "Snow is white", and mean that snow is black. So we must say that this coincidence, when it takes place, exemplifies a contingent rather than a necessary identity. When we tell the truth, the thought we express is the same as the belief we express; so, if we were all saints, then we could always identify the thought which one is expressing with the belief which he is expressing. But this identity breaks down in the case of a lie. When one lies, we can often identify the thought he is expressing with the belief which he is trying to instill in

his audience. Lying should, I think, be characterized as intentionally making false statements. Not all cases of false statements made intentionally are cases of deceit. Poets, as Hume said, are "liars by profession," (A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 121); and we applaud those poets who skilfully practice their profession. Of course not everything said in poetry or other kinds of fiction is false. Historical novels constitute the standard example, and Sir Arthur Evans's discoveries constitute evidence for another example of true statements in works of fiction. Since we know that some statements in fiction are true, we might as well regard others as false.<sup>1</sup> This makes liars out of poets, but I think it is easier and more perspicuous to admit non-deceitful lying than to fish around for a new definition of lying. Not all cases of the deceitful use of language are cases of lying either. A skillful con man will insinuate false beliefs in the mind of his audience while being extremely careful to avoid saying anything false.

Getting back to the expression of thought, an example, already touched upon in Section III, will help to clarify the difference

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1. It is sometimes said that the works of Shakespeare contain false statements. This may be true of the Sonnets, but it is false of the plays. When he wrote his plays, Shakespeare wrote such things as: "Hamlet: To be or not to be, that is the question," i.e., he gave stage directions which resemble some commands in being neither true nor false. Richard Burton, however, makes statements with truth values when he plays Hamlet on the stage. When discussing commands, incidentally, we should not be misled by the fact that commands have no truth value into saying that when one gives a command he is saying nothing true or false. If I say: "You will come here immediately", as a command, then my command is neither true nor false; but I have also stated that you will come here immediately, and my statement is true if you will come here immediately and false otherwise. There is no reason whatsoever why one should not be able to perform two illocutionary acts at once: and this is just what often happens.

between the thought one is expressing and the statement he is making. The Guardian quoted Cardinal Heenan as saying: "Priests are required in preaching, teaching, in the press, on radio, television, or public platforms, to refrain from opposing the teaching of the Pope in all matters of faith and morals". Now it is clear, I think, that Heenan was expressing the thought, i.e., meant, that there is no matter of faith and morals concerning which priests may publicly oppose the Pope. But this is not what he actually stated. What he actually stated was that priests may not publicly oppose the Pope on all such matters. So we must distinguish what he actually stated from the thought he was expressing. This example also serves to reinforce our distinction between statement made and information conveyed. Let us call what Heenan stated "P" and the thought he expressed "Q". Now in the first place, every one of us who read and understood Heenan's statement received the information that Q whereas what he stated was not that Q but that P. In the second place, to take another turn of thought, all of us also received the information, R, that Heenan believes that priests ought to refrain from publicly opposing the Pope on any matter of faith and morals. Although some people might want to be dogmatic and maintain that Heenan was actually stating that R. A minority, however, will maintain a view similar to the one which says that Heenan was stating that R. They will say, (in hopes, I suspect, of solving Moore's 'paradox'), that when A states that p he is also stating that A believes that p. I once tried to argue against a member of this minority by pointing out that A, B and C can all state precisely the same proposition, (i.e., make the same statement), by saying "The cat is on the mat", but that on my opponent's hypothesis this would be impossible

because A, B and C would have to be stating different conjunctive propositions of the form, "The cat is on the mat and x believes that the cat is on the mat". But my opponent denied my premiss, insisting that even if two people use the same sentence in the same circumstances their statements must differ.

I can reply only by insisting dogmatically that what I state when I say, e.g., "Snow is white" must be identical to what is 'hypothesized' in entailment statements of the form: "Necessarily, if snow is white, then snow is not invisible". But it is not true that necessarily, if snow is white then F.J.L. has at least one true belief. But given my dogmatic doctrine, if what I state when I say: "Snow is white", is: "Snow is white and F.J.L. believes that snow is white" then it is true that necessarily, if snow is white then F.J.L. has at least one true belief. But since this conclusion is unacceptable, I cannot go along with my opponent. And I suggest that since when one says that p he is often giving the information that he believes that p, without actually stating that he believes that p, we have yet another example of divergence between what one states and the information he conveys. The reason why it is paradoxical to say: "p but I do not believe that p", is that when one says that p, although he is not stating that he believes that p, he often conveys the information that he believes that p; and when one says that he does not believe that p he is often both stating and conveying the information that he does not believe that p. So one can, by saying: "p and I do not believe that p", both convey the information that he believes that p and convey the information that he does not believe that p. When this happens we are presented with contradictory pieces of information, not with contradictory statements. We can imagine

cases where "p but I do not believe that p" is not paradoxical. These will be cases where saying that p does not convey the information that one believes that p. Suppose, for example, that an atheistic philosopher is hired by some small Ohio college whose charter contains a clause requiring that all new members of the philosophy staff must state, in the presence of the dean, that God exists. Fortunately, the dean is an enlightened fellow who is not concerned with his underlings' religious beliefs or lack thereof. Knowing full well that the philosopher is an atheist, he hires him but insists on the ceremony in order to avoid violating the regulations. The philosopher says: "God exists", and, immediately thereafter, says, "But I do not believe that God exists". In this case, since the dean already knew that the philosopher did not believe that God exists, the philosopher's stating that God exists did not convey to the dean the information that the philosopher believes that God exists, and no conflict of pieces of information arose.

## SECTION V: DO PROPER NAMES HAVE SENSE?

An advocate of the view that proper names have no sense, but only reference -- in his way of putting it they "denote" but do not "connote" -- is Gilbert Ryle. I shall quote quite a long passage in which Ryle puts forward his views on the matter. It seems to me that Ryle's theory is false. But I think that in discussing the ways in which Ryle went wrong we shall learn some important things about proper names.

Mill got a further important point right about these genuine proper names. He said that while most words and descriptive phrases both denote or name and connote, proper names only denote and do not connote. A dog may be called "Fido", but the word "Fido" conveys no information...about the dog's qualities, career or whereabouts, etc. There is, to enlarge this point, no question of the word "Fido" being paraphrased, or correctly or incorrectly translated into French. Dictionaries do not tell us what proper names mean -- for the simple reason that they do not mean anything. The word "Fido" names or denotes a particular dog, since it is what he is called. But there is no room for anyone who hears the word "Fido" to understand it or misunderstand it or fail to understand it. There is nothing for which he can require an elucidation or a definition. From the information that Sir Winston Churchill was Prime Minister, a number of consequences follow, such as that he was the leader of the majority party in Parliament. But from the fact that yonder dog is Fido, no other truth about him follows at all. No information is provided for anything to follow from. Using a proper name is not committing oneself to any further assertions whatsoever. Proper names are appellations and not descriptions; and descriptions are descriptions and not appellations....Descriptions carry truths or falsehoods and are not just arbitrary bestowals. Proper names are arbitrary bestowals, and convey nothing true and nothing false, for they convey nothing at all.

Chinese astronomers give the planets, stars and constellations names quite different from those we give. But it does not follow that a single proposition of Western astronomy is rejected by them, or that a single astronomical proposition rejected by us is accepted by them. Stellar nomenclature carries with it no astronomical truths or falsehoods. Calling a star by a certain name is not saying anything about it, and saying something true or false about a star is not naming it. Saying is not naming and naming is not saying.

("The Theory of Meaning", pp. 136f.)

Now in the first place, although there may -- so far as I know -- be no French translation of "Fido", there does not appear

to be any important difference between the differences between "Aristotle" and "Aristote", "Socrates" and "Socrate", "Plato" and "Platon" and "London" and "Londres", on the one hand, and the differences between "horse" and "cheval", "car" and "voiture", "house" and "maison" and "bird" and "oiseau", on the other, other than the fact that there is more morphological resemblance in the first case than in the second. But since quite strong morphological resemblance can be found between members of pairs of words, like "philosopher" and "philosophe", which are not proper names, and since pairs of proper names, like "Newfoundland" - "Terre-Neuve" and "The English Channel" - "La Manche", can be found which carry little morphological resemblance, this point counts for nought.

Zeno Vendler has tried to give some theoretical backing to this Rylean view that there is no translation of proper names by saying that " "Vienna" is the English version and not the English translation of the German name "Wien" ", (Linguistics in Philosophy, p. 38). Vendler does not explain just what he means by "version" as opposed to "translation"; but what he is trying to get at is perhaps suggested by his statement that proper names "do not require translation into another language". (The under-scoring is mine). What Vendler possibly has in mind is that although German-speakers usually say "Wien", and English-speakers usually say "Vienna" when they are talking about the Austrian capital, this is just a matter of regional preference and not a matter of difference of language. Vendler might say, on this basis, that: "Wien is in Austria", is a perfectly good English sentence.

I doubt, myself, that: "Wien is in Austria", is a good English sentence. And even if it is, it is unlikely that anyone who knows



German would say that: "Vienna ist in Österreich", is a good German sentence. But even if we grant that: "Wien is in Austria" is a good English sentence, this teaches us nothing about proper names. For if: "Wien is in Austria" is a good English sentence, then so are: "I ate a tournedos", "We had a rendez-vous" and "I don't like your Weltanschauung", all of which contain untranslated foreign expressions which are not proper names.

As long as we are discussing Vendler, we might as well take the opportunity at this point to discuss and dismiss Vendler's own reason for holding that proper names have no sense. According to Vendler, (*loc.cit.*), "proper names have no specific co-occurrence restrictions". He asks us to consider the following sentences:

- (1) I visited Providence,
- (2) \* I visited providence,

and he claims that the word, "providence", has co-occurrence restrictions which render (2) deviant. (The asterisk is a device used by grammarians to indicate that the author thinks there is something wrong with a sentence.) But since (1) is not deviant, Vendler suggests that something about the linguistic description of "providence" but nothing about the linguistic description of "Providence" prevents the word from going in the empty slot in: "I visited \_\_\_\_\_".

Not all philosophers, (and I hope not all linguists), will agree with Vendler's claim that (2) is linguistically deviant. But since a discussion of the matters, (e.g., categories), relevant to an adjudication of such a dispute would take us too far afield, let us grant credence to the intuitions which mark (2)

deviant and look at Vendler's elaboration of the point. He says: "Of course, our knowledge that Providence is, in fact, a city will impose other restrictions. This piece of knowledge, however, belongs to geography and not linguistics. That is to say, while it belongs to the understanding of the word "providence" that it cannot occur in sentences like (2), it is not the understanding of the name "Providence" that permits (1), but the knowledge that it happens to be the name of a city. From a linguistic point of view, proper names have no restrictions of occurrence beyond the broad grammatical constraints governing noun phrases in general", (Linguistics in Philosophy, pp. 38f.)

This all seems to be quite unfounded. Vendler says that since we know that Providence is a city we know that the name, "Providence", has certain constraints. Now the sort of intuitions which mark (2) deviant will, most likely, also mark the following sentence deviant: "Two plus Providence equals twenty-seven". Vendler would have to say that this sentence is deviant in virtue of geographical, rather than linguistic, considerations. But this claim -- even if Vendler can make it stick -- fails to point out any important differences between the deviance of my sentence and the deviance of Vendler's (2). For it can easily be argued that just as my sentence is geographically deviant, (2) is theologically or metaphysically deviant. Since we know that Providence is a city our intuitions balk at the occurrence of "Providence" in certain slots in certain strings. Similarly, since we know that providence is an abstract entity of a certain sort, or, perhaps not an entity at all, our intuitions balk at certain occurrences of "providence".

The main difficulty here is that Vendler relies upon an un-

spelled-out distinction between knowledge of a language and knowledge of, e.g., geography. I see no reason why we should not say that a man's knowledge of his language is, in many respects, a function of his knowledge of geography, history, metaphysics, mathematics, etc. The more history one knows, the better qualified he is to understand what is said with sentences containing the expression, "the King of France in 1628". The more metaphysics one knows, the better qualified he is to understand what is said with "cause", "entity", "relation", etc. And the more geography one knows, the better he is likely to understand what is said with sentences containing "Providence". A good indication of one's understanding a word is his ability to draw inferences from statements made with sentences in which that word occurs. And clearly one who knows his geography is much more likely than one who does not know geography to infer, from: "The population of Providence is 248,000", that, e.g., the capital of Rhode Island has 248,000 inhabitants, that at least one city on Narragansett Bay has more than 200,000 inhabitants, that if no city in New Mexico has more than 175,000 inhabitants, then at least one city in Rhode Island has more inhabitants than any city in New Mexico, etc.

This brings us back to another claim of Ryle's. Ryle says that "there is no room for anyone who hears the word "Fido" to understand it or misunderstand it or fail to understand it." In one sense of "understand", what Ryle says is clearly false. It is certainly possible for me to hear "Fido" but, because of bad acoustics, think I hear "Ryle" or "Mido", and so, misunderstand what I hear. (It might be objected that if someone says "Fido" and I think I hear "Mido" then, since "hear" is an 'achievement verb', whatever I hear, I do not hear "Fido". And this point could be

argued. But, since it is not an important point for our purposes, I shall not argue it.) Ryle is also wrong in a more important sense of "understand". One can hear sentences in which "Fido" occurs, know that what one is hearing is "Fido" and not "Mido", and still fail to understand what is being said. If the hearer understands the words in the sentence other than "Fido" and if he has no difficulty in grasping the syntax of the sentence, then we must say that the person fails to understand "Fido". If I own a dog named "Fido", and if my wife says to me: "Fido is barking", I shall most likely understand perfectly well what she is saying. I shall, for example, be able to infer that my dog is barking, that at least one dog in Edinburgh is barking, that a brown mammal is barking, etc. If Smith, however, does not know of any particular dogs named "Fido", he will fail to understand much that I succeed in understanding of my wife's statement. If he knows that "Fido" is usually the name of a dog, he will probably grasp that some dog is barking. (This case would be similar to the case of someone who hears: "This bottle contains aqua-ammoniae", does not understand "aqua-ammoniae" but knows that "aqua" usually occurs in expressions for things containing water, and, thanks to this etymological fortuity, has his guess that the bottle contains something which is part water rendered true.) If he knows that "Fido" is a name but not that it is usually a dog's name, he will probably grasp at least that something named "Fido" is barking. But he cannot be said to have a good understanding of what my wife said. If Jones, on the other hand, knows of only one dog named "Fido", namely his pekinese, it is likely that he will misunderstand what my wife said. For while I infer, say, that my chihuahua, out in the back garden, is barking, Jones is likely to infer, say, that his pekinese, out in the car, is

barking. If both Smith and Jones are clear about "is barking" and about the syntax of the sentence, then their short-comings must be said to be, respectively, a failure to understand and a misunderstanding of "Fido".

J.A. Fodor would deny my suggestion that one who knows Fido is better qualified to understand "Fido" than one who does not know Fido. Writing about the sentence: "Tom is a thief", Fodor says: "I, a speaker who does not know Tom ... am perfectly capable of grasping that sentence. It is clear what the story ought to be: I know that "Tom" is a name ... and I therefore know that the sentence "Tom is a thief" claims that someone named Tom is a thief", ("Could Meaning be an  $r_m$ ?", p. 240; I have deleted material applying to Mowrer's stimulus-response theory of meaning, which Fodor is attacking and which need not concern us here.).

I want to suggest that Fodor is thinking of cases where a sentence is written on a blackboard for consideration. One looks at the sentence; and, if he knows English, he knows that the sentence would most likely be used to state, of someone named "Tom", that he is a thief. This counts, I suppose, in one sense of "understanding a sentence", as understanding a sentence. But if the sentence is actually used to make a statement in Fodor's presence, Fodor will actually grasp very little of what is said. If he is lucky, his knowledge that "Tom" is usually the name of a male human might allow him to draw some tentative inferences. But, like Smith and Jones in regard to "Fido", he will be much less capable of grasping what is said than will someone who knows Tom.

We just allowed that "Tom is a thief" would most likely be

used to state, of someone named "Tom", that he is a thief. This does not entail the stronger position suggested by what Fodor says, namely, that if someone says: "Tom is a thief", he is stating that someone named "Tom" is a thief. But what about this stronger position? It is clear that, when someone says: "N is such-and-such", that someone named "N" is such-and-such cannot be all of what he is stating. A statement made by means of: "Aristotle owns airplanes", can be false while it is true that someone named "Aristotle" owns airplanes. But it can be more plausibly maintained that when someone says: "N is such and such", part of what he is stating is that someone named "N" is such-and-such. It is not clear, however, that this more plausible contention is true of all cases of "N is such-and-such". Suppose that a stranger comes into the neighbourhood bar, orders a rye, and drinks it. When his glass is empty, a generous drunk points to the stranger and says to the bartender: "Sam, here, is drinking rye. Give him one on me." The drunk is not mistaking the stranger for someone else named "Sam". He is just calling him "Sam". Now it seems plausible to maintain that it might be the case that what the drunk stated when he said, "Sam, here, is drinking rye", is true while it is false that someone named "Sam" is drinking rye. I am not sure what to say about this matter. But, at any rate, even if the contention in question is not true of all cases of "N is such-and-such", there seems to be no good reason to deny that it is true of the more likely cases of "N is such-and-such".

Let us return to Jones for a moment now. My wife said: "Fido is barking". I inferred that my chihuahua, out in the back garden, is barking. Jones inferred that his pekinese, out in the car, is barking. It is not unilluminating to say in such a case

that Jones took "Fido" in one sense of the word, that I took it in another sense, and that the sense in which I took it is the sense in which my wife was using it. According to this view, a proper name will be an ambiguous expression having as many senses as there are different objects which have the name. (cf. Searle: "Both "bark" and "John Smith" suffer from homonymy", "Proper Names and Descriptions", p.490).

If we adopt the view that I am arguing for, i.e., that proper names have senses and that most of them, being ambiguous, have more than one sense, it would be reasonable for us to expect dictionaries to list at least the most important of the proper names of the language and to specify the most important senses of each name. Ryle claims that "dictionaries do not tell us what proper names mean". But I suspect that Ryle's generalization is founded upon an inspection of British dictionaries, which, indeed, fail to list proper names. But a less insular inspection will reveal that American dictionaries do list proper names, and that their listing of various senses follows the same format as their listing of various senses for other ambiguous expressions. (See e.g., the entry for "Churchill, Winston" in Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, a standard reference work in the United States.) It is surprising, incidentally, that Vendler should agree with Ryle on this point, (Linguistics in Philosophy, p. 38). Although the Oxford English Dictionary is superior in many ways to every American dictionary, those who adopt the view for which I am arguing will have to maintain that the O.E.D. has at least one shortcoming.

I have discussed a case in which inferences are drawn from a statement containing a proper name. Are these inferences real

deductive inferences or are they just something like educated guesses? According to Ryle, "From the fact that yonder dog is Fido, no other truth about him follows at all". And since Ryle wants his view to apply to all statements involving proper names, ("Using a proper name is not committing oneself to any further assertions whatsoever"), we can dispense with any inconvenience presented by "yonder dog", and say that on his view, from the fact that this is Fido nothing further about this follows at all. Let us suppose that I have a brown chihuahua named "Fido", and that my wife tells me, truly, that this is Fido. (She is perhaps pointing at something which I barely see through the window). I make several inferences about this, namely, that he is brown, that he is a chihuahua, and that he is mine. Ryle would have to say that what I inferred does not follow from the fact that this is Fido; I say that it does. How can we adjudicate this dispute?

Let us consider the following argument:

(3) P, This is Fido  
Therefore, Q, This is a chihuahua.

Someone concerned to defend Ryle would probably say that the argument contains a suppressed premiss, R: "Fido is a chihuahua", and that only with this added premiss do we have a valid argument.

(P,R,Q would not be of any of the Aristotelian Forms; but few will deny that it is a valid argument.) I claim, on the other hand, that R is not a premiss added to P but an elucidation of what is already stated in P. I claim that (3) is like

(4) S, Yonder human is a bachelor.  
Therefore, T, Yonder human is unmarried.

Logicians, when they feel like being strict, will not admit (4) as a valid deduction. They will claim, -- rightly, I think -- that



there is no rule of inference which will allow one to derive T from S. In order to derive T from S, either we must add the premiss, U: "All bachelors are unmarried", or we must rewrite S as S': "Yonder human is male and yonder human is unmarried". But although such uses of U and S' add a more perspicuous logical form to the surface structure of the argument, few would claim that any content is added by U or S'. U merely elucidates the meaning of S, and S' is merely an alternative way of stating what is already stated by S. Now my claim is that R is to P in (3) as U is to S in (4).

Consider now another argument:

(5) V, Yonder human is the author of Waverley.

Therefore, W, Yonder human is the author of Ivanhoe.

There is clearly a suppressed premiss here. (5) needs the premiss, X: "The author of Waverley is the author of Ivanhoe". And there is no doubt about the status of X. X does more than contribute to the form of (5). It adds some content. To state V and X is certainly more than to state V alone, for X expresses a purely contingent truth. It could easily be the case that the author of Waverley did not write Ivanhoe. Now a defender of Ryle would claim that R is to P in (3) as X is to V in (5).

This is not an easy dispute to settle. The best I can offer are some metaphysical considerations which, if acceptable, will tend one towards the view that if not Q then at least some propositions expressed by means of sentences of the form: "This is F", must follow directly from: "This is Fido". I, who know Fido intimately, find it incredible that this could be Fido without being a chihuahua, brown, mine, etc. But let us suppose a pure Rylean

position. Nothing follows from the fact that this is Fido. This can be Fido without being mine, a chihuahua, brown: without having any particular property whatsoever. On this view, Fido, along with the rest of us bearers of proper names, will have to be a bare particular, a substance of the sort in which Locke, (and sometimes the 'early' Wittgenstein<sup>1</sup>), is said by some philosophers to have believed. Fido is just Fido. He may have some properties; but there are no particular properties which he must have, and no particular properties which he must fail to have in order to be Fido. He can be square, triangular, millepeded, the author of Waverley, the victor at Waterloo, the capital of Rhode Island, or anything else you please, and still be Fido. Such a theory sounds strange -- and even stranger when, say, "Gilbert Ryle" or "Winston Churchill" is substituted for "Fido" in the above context -- but such is the theory.

My metaphysical view is closer to one which is sometimes attributed to Aristotle. Fido and the rest of us are not bare particulars. There are certain properties which are essential to us.<sup>2</sup> This thing cannot be Winston Churchill without being a man; this thing cannot be Fido without being a chihuahua, and so on. The "cannot" is one of necessity. And because of my metaphysical view, I can say that although (3) needs its form adjusted a bit, no further content need be added to make it valid.

The trouble with using metaphysics to back up positions is

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1. See Irving M. Copi, "Objects, Properties, and Relations in the 'Tractatus'", and G.E.M. Anscombe, "Mr. Copi on Objects, Properties, and Relations in the Tractatus", for a more detailed discussion of bare particulars than I am giving here.
2. According to the 'Aristotelian' view there are other properties which are "accidental" to us. It will be seen later on that this latter point is one which I do not wholeheartedly adopt, (See Section VIII).

that once one has got down to such fundamentals there is little one can say in support of one's position. The theory of bare particulars is a respectable one; and the opposing theory is respectable too. I know of nothing one can say to support one theory and refute the other. All I can say is that I like my metaphysical view and I shall try to make my theory of language accord with it.

Let us climb down from the airy realm of metaphysics and look at the last paragraph in the quotation from Ryle. The interesting thing about this paragraph is that even if everything said in it is true, there is nothing in it to back up Ryle's view that proper names have no sense. Of course the fact that the Chinese use names different from those we use for the planets points out no disagreement in astronomy between them and us. But the fact that their predicate expressions differ from ours points out no disagreement either. And perhaps, as Ryle says, "saying is not naming and naming is not saying". Perhaps it can be maintained that, when the priest says: "I baptize thee "Parmenides"", (or something of that sort), he is not saying anything true or false. But, even if this could be maintained, it would not point out anything peculiar about proper names. For it could, equally well, be maintained that, when someone overtly coins a new expression of any sort, (or overtly gives an expression of any sort a new sense), he is not saying anything true or false either. Ryle's mistake seems to be that, after having formed the opinion that nothing is conveyed when something is given a certain name, he tried to generalize this point to illuminate all uses of proper names. And he ended up holding the false view that nothing is conveyed by a proper name in any context.

SECTION VI: PROPER NAMES, A PROBLEM OF COMMUNICATION, AND  
SOME REMARKS ABOUT CONTEXT

If we are moved by the consideration of Section V to hold that proper names have sense, then we shall be faced with the difficulty of deciding how to characterize the sense of a proper name. It would be natural to theorize that the sense of a proper name is whatever description happens to be in the mind of the speaker who uses the name. But true as it is that speakers generally have descriptions in mind when they use proper names, a problem of communication -- suggested by Russell -- arises if we identify the sense which a proper name has when a speaker is using it with the description in the mind of the speaker.

Let us say that the proposition which one asserts is a 'function' of what the speaker has in mind when he utters a sentence. This is a difficult matter to be precise about, but some examples will get us going. If I say: "Socrates is bearded", and if what I have in mind when uttering "Socrates" is the description: the inventor of the theory of forms, then the proposition which I am asserting is the proposition that the inventor of the theory of forms is bearded. If, however, the description which I have in mind is: the philosopher who drank the hemlock, then the proposition I am asserting by uttering that sentence is the proposition that the philosopher who drank the hemlock is bearded. Now I think it is quite clear, (if the reader will grant me this notion of 'what one has in mind'), that it often happens that two speakers have different descriptions in mind when they use the same proper name, in the same sentence, to refer to the same individual, and that, for this reason, two speakers can be asserting different

propositions while they are both using the same proper name, in the same sentence, to refer to the same individual and to say the same thing about him. And I also think it is clear that one person can use a sentence with a proper name in it to refer to an individual and to ascribe a certain predicate to him and another person can use the same sentence to deny the same predicate of the individual while what the first person asserts is neither the contradictory nor a contrary of what the second person asserts. Suppose that John thinks of Socrates as the inventor of the theory of forms, that Bill thinks of him as the philosopher who drank the hemlock, and that Sam thinks of him as the wisest Athenian, and that none of these men suspects that the descriptions in terms of which the others think of Socrates are true of Socrates. Suppose, now, that John, Bill, and Sam, respectively, utter the following sentences while having their respective descriptions in mind:

- (J) Socrates is bearded,
- (B) Socrates is bearded,
- (S) It is false that Socrates is bearded.

Now the problem of communication arises as follows. We should like to say that John and Bill are in agreement and that John and Sam are in disagreement. But how can this be the case? John asserted that the inventor of the theory of forms is bearded. But Bill, in asserting that the philosopher who drank the hemlock is bearded, failed to assert anything which either entails or is entailed by what John asserted. That the inventor of the theory of forms is the philosopher who drank the hemlock is surely a contingent fact. So it is hard to see how John can be construed as having expressed agreement with Bill. Sam, on the other hand,

asserted that it is false that the wisest Athenian is bearded. And, since what Sam asserted neither entails nor is entailed by the contradictory of what John asserted, it is hard to see how Sam and John can be in disagreement.

It is true, of course, that what John asserts is materially equivalent to what Bill asserts. But if asserting materially equivalent propositions were enough to get people into agreement, Bill may as well have agreed with John by asserting that snow is white.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, what Sam asserts is materially equivalent to the contradictory of what John asserts, but this is not enough to get a disagreement going either.

Russell tries to get communication going among users of proper names by saying, (in regard to "Bismarck"):

It would seem that, when we make a statement about something only known by description, we often intend to make our statement, not in the form involving the description, but about the actual thing described. That is to say, when we say anything about Bismarck, we should like, if we could, to make the judgement which Bismarck alone can make, namely the judgement of which he himself is a constituent. In this we are necessarily defeated, since the actual Bismarck is unknown to us. But we know that there is an object B called Bismarck, and that B was an astute diplomatist. We can thus describe the proposition we should like to affirm, namely, "B was an astute diplomatist", where B is the object which was Bismarck. What enables us to communicate in spite of the varying descriptions we employ is that we know there is a true proposition concerning the actual Bismarck, and that, however we may vary the description (so long as the description is correct), the proposition described is still the same. This proposition, which is described and is known to be true, is what interests us; but we are not acquainted with the proposition itself, and do not know it, though we know it is true. ("Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description", p. 205).

Linsky, (whose remarks on this topic led me to write the present Section), attacks Russell by saying:

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1. I use "is" tenselessly, and I assume that Socrates is bearded.

What I find incoherent in this is the idea of a proposition which we know to be true but which we cannot understand. This proposition is the one we 'intend to make'. How can we intend to make a proposition we cannot understand? How can we possibly know such a proposition to be true? (Referring, p.60).

I have no trouble, however, with the idea of a proposition which we know to be true but which we cannot understand. I know, for example, that someone, I know not who, was called: "the onlie begetter of these insuing sonnets, Mr W.H.". So I know that there is a true proposition which would be expressed by means of a sentence of the form: "X was called "the onlie begetter of these insuing sonnets, Mr W.H."", but since I do not know what proposition this is, I can hardly be said to understand it.

There is, however, another difficulty with Russell's theory. Russell, (if I understand him correctly), would say that we can get agreement and disagreement going among John, Bill, and Sam by having them say:

(J1) The proposition which Socrates would assert to the effect that he is bearded is true.

(B1) The proposition which Socrates would assert to the effect that he is bearded is true.

(S1) It is false that the proposition which Socrates would assert to the effect that he is bearded is true.

The difficulty with this solution is simply that the descriptions peculiar to each man's way of thinking of Socrates are not got rid of by the analysis. For what John, Bill, and Sam assert when they use the sentences: (J1), (B1), and (S1), will have to be:

(J2) The proposition which the inventor of the theory of forms would assert to the effect that he is bearded is true,

(B2) The proposition which the philosopher who drank the hemlock would assert to the effect that he is bearded is true,

(S2) It is false that the proposition which the wisest Athenian would assert to the effect that he is bearded is true.

But since (B2) neither entails nor is entailed by (J2), and since (S2) neither entails nor is entailed by the contradictory of (J2), this solution does not set John and Bill in agreement and John and Sam in disagreement.

I propose that we solve this problem by distinguishing what one asserts, when he utters a sentence, from what he states by means of that sentence. Although an assertion will be a private thing, dependent upon what one has in mind, a statement will be a public thing: the meaning of the sentence which one utters. There will be no agreement or disagreement among the assertions made by John, Bill, and Sam, but there will be agreement and disagreement among their statements.

We shall lead up to an application of this distinction to our problem by considering some other examples. Suppose that Tom, bemoaning the lack of facilities at our university, says: "Our university does not have a Wilson cloud chamber". James replies: "But our university has a Wilson cloud chamber". Now we may suppose that Tom, an aesthete quite ignorant of scientific matters, does not really know what a Wilson cloud chamber is, although he has a slight suspicion that it might have something to do with rain making. This fact gives us sufficient reason to say that Tom does not know what the expression, "Wilson cloud chamber", means. James, on the other hand, is a physicist who knows perfectly well what a Wilson cloud chamber is. He has a good understanding of the meaning of "Wilson cloud chamber". But, in spite of this difference between Tom's and James's understanding of "Wilson cloud chamber", we are not troubled in the way in which we were troubled by John, Bill, Sam and "Socrates". The reason for our lack of puzzlement in this case is that, although "Socrates" may



be regarded as highly ambiguous, having as many senses as there are things named "Socrates", we are confident that "Wilson cloud chamber" has only one sense in English. Since the expression has only one sense, what is going on in Tom's mind when he uses the expression can have no bearing on the contribution made by that expression to the statement he is making. This is not to deny that Tom can give the expression a new sense by stipulating that he is going to use "Wilson cloud chamber" to mean, say, what "rain making device invented by someone named "Wilson"" means. Were he to do so, he would be effecting a change in the semantics of a dialect of English, i.e., the dialect spoken by Tom. But before such a convention is decreed, Tom is working with English as it is. And the semantics of English, as it is, give only one sense to "Wilson cloud chamber". If the expression is used with any sense, then it must be used with this sense. So far as I can see, the only alternatives to the view that Tom was using the expression in its standard English sense are (1) that his use of the expression was senseless, and (2) that he was using the expression in the sense which he thought it had. The first alternative is untenable because it is clear that someone who does not know what "Wilson cloud chamber" means can, nonetheless, make a false statement by uttering: "Our university does not have a Wilson cloud chamber". The second alternative is untenable for the same reason. If someone were to say: "Our university does not have a Wilson cloud chamber", and if our university does have a Wilson cloud chamber, then this person would be making a false statement. If we discover that this person thinks that "Wilson cloud chamber" means "rain making device invented by someone named "Wilson", then we should not change our minds and decide that he made a true statement after all. We

should say that, because of the fact that he misunderstands "Wilson cloud chamber", he made a false statement. I do not deny, of course, that one can assert that our university does not have a rain making device invented by someone named "Wilson" by uttering the sentence: "Our university does not have a Wilson cloud chamber". What I am denying is that someone can state that our university does not have a rain making device invented by someone named "Wilson" by uttering the sentence: "Our university does not have a Wilson cloud chamber".

Had the expression in question more than one sense, i.e., were it ambiguous, the matter would be different. To take an easy example, suppose that Tom, commenting on the lack of facilities in northern Alberta, says: "There are no banks in the Peace River Country". James, aghast, replies: "But there are banks in the Peace River Country". Tom is thinking of financial institutions. James is thinking of the banks of the Peace River. In this case, the word, "banks", has several senses in English. One of these senses, the one in which the word is a verb meaning a kind of aeronautical manoeuvre<sup>1</sup>, is ruled out by the sentential context: "There are (no)\_\_\_\_\_ in the Peace River Country". But, in the given sentential context, the word can have either the sense in which it means financial institutions of a certain kind or the sense in which it means banks of a river. Although the

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1. It might be held that a difference in syntactic description of the order of a difference between noun and verb marks a difference of words rather than a difference of senses of the same word. According to my usage, however, tokens, (both word and sentence), are assigned to types on the basis of phonological and orthographic descriptions. I realize that there are problems with this way of looking at things, but such is my present usage.

sentential context and the semantics of English restrict the number of senses in which the word can be used, these factors fail to determine which of the permitted senses is the one in which it is actually being used. The sense in which the word is actually being used is, in this case, determined by the state of mind of the speaker. Since Tom had financial institutions of a certain kind in mind, the word, "banks", in Tom's statement, meant financial institutions of a certain kind. Since James had river banks in mind, the word, "banks", in James's statement meant river banks. And, since the Peace River Country can have river banks without having financial institutions, and vice versa, James's statement does not contradict Tom's statement.

Let us now look at another case. Suppose that Tom and James are discussing Kant. Tom says: "The transcendental aesthetic is the science of all principles of a priori sensibility".<sup>1</sup> James says: "The transcendental aesthetic is not the science of all principles of a priori sensibility". There are several ambiguous words here, but we shall concentrate on just one, "sensibility", pretending that the rest are unambiguous. "Sensibility" has at least two senses in English. It can mean delicate sensitiveness of taste, or it can mean the power of sensation or perception. Now I think it is reasonable to say that even if Tom and James have no more than the crudest grasp of what "sensibility" means in the sense last indicated, and even if Tom and James understand this word in somewhat different ways, we can guarantee that these men are using the word in the same sense and that their statements contradict one another. What is required is that Tom and James understand the word along the same lines. It is hard to be precise about what is necessary

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1. The example is adapted from The Critique of Pure Reason, N. Kemp Smith, tr., A21, B35.

for two men to understand such a word as "sensibility" along the same lines, (we shall be able to be more precise about proper names). But we can, at least, give an example. Even if both Tom and James are first year students with only the foggiest notions of what Kant's philosophy can be about, if Tom and James intend to use this word in the sense, whatever it may be, which it has in Kantian philosophy, then I think this is sufficient for them to be using the word in the same sense. Now let us suppose that James happens to think that "sensibility" applies only to visual perception, and thinks, for some reason, that this word does not apply to tactile perception. Tom, (who is blind), happens to think that "sensibility" applies only to tactile perception, and has no idea that it applies to visual perception. Now it seems to me that even though Tom and James understand "sensibility" in quite different ways, the fact that they both intend to use the word in the sense which it has in Kantian philosophy is sufficient for them to understand it along the same lines, and for them to be using it in the same sense.

We have just seen that the following sort of thing can take place. Two speakers, A and B, use a word, w, with different things in mind; w is an ambiguous expression having a set, s, of senses. The linguistic context may restrict the senses in which the word can be used to some sub-set of s; but this sub-set is not a unit set. The fact that, although what A has in mind is not identical to what B has in mind, what A has in mind is along the same lines as what B has in mind ensures that A and B are using the word in the same sense, and that communication, (here statements which contradict one another), can arise.

We may now turn to "Socrates". "Socrates" is an ambiguous expression having an extremely large number of senses. It can mean

Socrates, i.e., the teacher of Plato, but it can also mean any of a large number of people, past, present and future, who have the name, "Socrates". It can even mean cats, dogs, cities, motorcars, or anything else which anyone might choose to call "Socrates". But when "Socrates" is used in a sentence to make a statement, it has just one of these senses. It may happen that the observable context will render one of these senses likely. For example, if I should happen to say: "Socrates did not invent the theory of forms, Plato did". The sentential context, "\_\_\_\_\_ did not invent the theory of forms, Plato did", will make it likely that I am using "Socrates" in the sense in which it means Socrates, i.e., the teacher of Plato. Again, if I should say: "Socrates was a fine fellow", while addressing a company of philosophers, although the sentential context: "\_\_\_\_\_ was a fine fellow", will not make it any more likely that I am using "Socrates" in the sense in which it means Socrates, i.e., the teacher of Plato, than that I am using it to mean Socrates, i.e., the Greek fisherman I met last Summer, the fact that I am addressing a company of philosophers will make it more likely that I am using the word to mean Socrates, i.e., the teacher of Plato, than that I am using it in any other sense. But since the context only renders a sense likely, but does not make one certain, the sense in which I use the word will depend upon what I have in mind. If what I have in mind is the description, the teacher of Plato, then I am using "Socrates" in the sense in which it means Socrates, i.e., the teacher of Plato. If what I have in mind is the description, the Greek fisherman whom I met last Summer, then I am using "Socrates" in the sense in which it means Socrates, i.e., the Greek fisherman whom I met last Summer.

This is not to deny that the observable context cannot render

it certain that one is using a proper name in some one sense. If I say: "Socrates, the teacher of Plato and inventor of the theory of forms, had a conversation one day with Parmenides", then I am using "Socrates" in the sense in which it means Socrates, i.e., the teacher of Plato. If I should, while uttering that sentence, happen to be thinking of Socrates, i.e., the Greek fisherman, then I think that this is just unfortunate for me. The sentential context: "\_\_\_\_\_, the teacher of Plato and inventor of the theory of forms, had a conversation with Parmenides", guarantees that I am using "Socrates" in the sense in which it means Socrates, i.e., the teacher of Plato. Since I have uttered "Socrates" in that context, the matter is no longer under the control of my mind.

Let us now go back to John, Bill, and Sam, who have uttered sentences: (J), (B), and (S):

- (J) Socrates is bearded,
- (B) Socrates is bearded,
- (S) It is false that Socrates is bearded.

We shall assume that these sentences have been uttered 'out of the blue'. Nothing in the observable context guarantees, or even makes it likely, that "Socrates" is being used in one sense rather than another. The sense, or senses, in which these men use "Socrates" will depend solely upon what they have in mind. Now if, when John uttered (J), he had been thinking of the Greek fisherman whom I met last Summer, and if, when Bill uttered (B), he had been thinking of the philosopher who drank the hemlock, then Bill and Sam would have been both asserting and stating different propositions. But let us assume that John, Bill, and Sam have in mind the descriptions which we mentioned before. John's description is: the inventor of the theory of forms. Bill's description is: the philosopher

who drank the hemlock. And Sam's description is: the wisest Athenian. In this case, I think we can say that, since all of these descriptions are along the same lines, John, Bill, and Sam are using "Socrates" in the same sense. Although what John asserts is different from what Bill asserts, John and Bill both state the same proposition. Although what Sam asserts does not contradict what John asserts, what Sam states does contradict what John states. In the case of a proper name, what is needed in order that what two speakers have in mind be along the same lines is that what the speakers have in mind be definite descriptions which happen to be satisfied by the same individual.

The relation between the sense and the reference of a proper name differs somewhat from the relation between the sense and the reference of a definite description. If I say: "The inventor of the theory of forms is bearded", the sense of "the inventor of the theory of forms" determines its reference, and the reference has nothing to do with determining the sense. The theory of forms may have been invented by Socrates, Plato, Thales, or anyone else; but the proposition which I state when I say: "The inventor of the theory of forms is bearded", remains the same. In the case of a proper name, however, there is a curious interchange between sense and reference. To anticipate a theory which will be discussed in Section VIII, let us assume that, when "Socrates" is used to refer to Socrates, i.e., the inventor of the theory of forms, the sense of "Socrates", on that occasion, is that of an expression of the form: " $(\exists x)(Sx)$ ", i.e., "the individual, x, which S's", where "S" is an abbreviated enumeration of all of Socrates's properties. Now "Socrates" will, on a particular use of this expression, come to have this sense as follows. If, when I say: "Socrates is bearded", the

the description I have in mind is: the inventor of the theory of forms, then, since Socrates = the inventor of the theory of forms, I am using "Socrates" to refer to Socrates. But, since I am using "Socrates" to refer to Socrates, "Socrates", on my use of it, comes to have a sense which is determined by the properties of Socrates, i.e., the sense of " $(\lambda x)(Sx)$ ". And, although what I assert is the proposition that the inventor of the theory of forms is bearded, what I state is the proposition that  $(\lambda x)(Sx)$  is bearded. If, however, it should happen that I say: "Socrates is bearded", while thinking of the Greek fisherman whom I met last Summer, then "Socrates", on my use of this expression, will come to have a sense, say that of " $(\lambda x)(Fx)$ ", which will be determined by the properties of that Greek fisherman. And the proposition I state will be the proposition that  $(\lambda x)(Fx)$  is bearded.

Before concluding this section, I want to say some more about context. We may split the context of an expression up into the speaker's mind, on the one hand, and the observable context on the other. The observable context will include the non-linguistic context and the linguistic context of the expression. The non-linguistic context of an expression will include the various things in the vicinity of the speaker. For example, if I say: "Bill, here, is a philosopher", and if Bill Jones is standing right next to me, then Bill Jones will form a part of the non-linguistic context of "Bill", serving to make it quite likely, if not certain, that I am



using "Bill" to refer to Bill Jones. The linguistic context will include, on the one hand, the sentential context, e.g., "\_\_\_\_\_ was a fine fellow", and, on the other hand, the rest of the words in the paragraph, page, book, 'discourse' or what-have-you, which surround the expression.

The minds of other speakers may also be relevant. Suppose that you and I both think of Socrates as the inventor of the theory of forms, and that I say: "Socrates is a good philosopher", and you say: "I agree, Socrates is a good philosopher". On the theory we hinted at above, we shall both be stating the proposition that  $(\exists x) Sx$  is a good philosopher. But now our friend, Ernest, comes into the room and says: "Socrates is not a good philosopher". Now, if Ernest has in mind some definite description which is satisfied by Socrates, e.g., the philosopher who drank the hemlock, Ernest will have stated the proposition that  $(\exists x) Sx$  is not a good philosopher. And he will have contradicted us. But suppose, now, that Ernest is thinking of Socrates, i.e., the Greek fisherman. In this case, although what we have in mind makes it likely that Ernest is stating the proposition that  $(\exists x) Sx$  is not a good philosopher, Ernest's mind overrides what we have in mind, and the proposition he states turns out to be the proposition that  $(\exists x) Fx$  is not a good philosopher; and Ernest is not contradicting us. But let us take another case. Ernest has no description in mind. He has no idea of who Socrates might be. He is just being contrary. In this case, I think we may say that, since what we have in mind makes it likely that Ernest is using "Socrates" in the sense in which it means Socrates, i.e., the teacher of Plato, and since Ernest's mind fails to supply a different sense, the sense which is made the most likely by our minds is the sense in which Ernest was using the ex-

pression. Ernest stated the proposition that  $(\exists x)(Sx)$  is not a good philosopher. And Ernest contradicted us. Let us try to state a general principle. If the observable context, (we may allow this to include the minds of other speakers), of an expression makes it likely that that expression is being used in a certain sense, then, if what the speaker, (or writer), has in mind is along the lines of one of the senses which the expression may have in that context, the speaker's mind can override the observable context. If, however, the speaker has nothing in mind, or if what the speaker has in mind is not along the lines of any of the senses which the expression can have, then the sense rendered most likely by the observable context is the sense in which the word is being used.

To take an example outside of the field of proper names, suppose that I say: "Plato is a realist". We shall assume that the sense of "Plato" is determinate, and concentrate upon "realist". This word may have either of at least two senses: the sense in which it means a philosopher who quantifies over universals, and the sense in which it means a hard headed fellow. The former sense is rendered the most likely by the sentential context: "Plato is a \_\_\_\_". But if, when I utter this sentence, what I have in mind is a hard headed fellow, then my mind overrides the observable context and determines that I am stating the proposition that Plato is a hard headed fellow. If, however, I recite the sentence without meaning anything by "realist" -- suppose that I am regurgitating this sentence in an examination -- then, since I have nothing in mind, I am using the expression in the sense which is rendered most likely by the observable context: I am stating the proposition that Plato is a philosopher who quantifies over universals. If, finally, I intend to shock my reader by claiming that Plato is a

nominalist, but I write "realist" by a slip of the pen, then -- assuming that I write nothing else to clarify my intentions -- since what I have in mind is not along the lines of any of the senses which "realist" is capable of having, the observable context takes over and, unfortunately for me, I state the proposition that Plato is a philosopher who quantifies over universals.

The importance of the speaker's mind may be illustrated by an example which I adapt from Bar-Hillel, ("A Demonstration of the Non-feasibility of Fully Automatic High Quality Translation"). For simplicity, let us assume, as does Bar-Hillel, that "pen" has just two senses in English: (1) a writing pen, and (2) a children's playpen. Now consider the sentence: "The box was in the pen", in the linguistic context: "Little John was looking for his toy box. Finally he found it. \_\_\_\_\_ John was very happy". Now the linguistic context makes it quite likely that the word, "pen", is being used in the second of its two senses. A reader with just the given information at his disposal will, in all likelihood, take "pen" in sense (2). But he might be wrong, as can be seen by supposing that the sentence and context quoted make up the first paragraph of the second volume of a series; and that the author has either written or intended to write a first volume in which he speaks of John having received a micro-miniature toy box and of John's brother having found, in a cereal box, a 'spaceman's' pen, equipped with a secret compartment for hiding things. (Such a pen would still be a writing pen). As soon as we see that the first volume need not actually have been written but may just be intended or imagined by the author, it becomes clear that when we say that the context renders a given sense likely, we should take "likely" literally, and not read it as "actual".

None of this is intended to detract either from Bar-Hillel's claim that:

What makes an intelligent human reader grasp this meaning [i.e., sense (2)] so unhesitatingly is... [primarily] his knowledge that the relative sizes of pens, in the sense of writing implements, toy boxes, and pens, in the sense of playpens, are such that when someone writes under ordinary circumstances and in something like the given context, "The box was in the pen", he almost certainly refers to a playpen and not to a writing pen. ("A Demonstration...", p. 176),

or from his claim, (loc. cit.), that "this knowledge is not at the disposal of the electronic computer." I wish only to emphasize the **trivial facts** that even the most intelligent human reader can take a word in a sense other than the one in which the writer or speaker is using it, that the sense in which a word is being used is often determined, simply, by the speaker's mind, and that even where the observable context renders a given sense likely, the speaker can often surprise us.

It is difficult to know how to draw the line between a case, like the one just discussed, where the observable context renders a given sense likely, and a case where the observable context makes it certain that a word is being used in a given sense. If the sentence: "Plato is a realist", is found in the middle of a technical and knowledgeable treatise on ontology, it can be certain that that sentence is being used to state the proposition that Plato is a philosopher who quantifies over universals. But it is hard to say what can account for this certitude.

Incidentally, when I speak of the observable context making it likely that an expression is being used in a given sense, the reason why I use "likely", rather than, say, "probable", is to avoid committing myself to any position on the question, (discussed in Bar-Hillel, Language and Information), of whether any kind of statistical method can be of any value in determining the relationship between sense and context.

## SECTION VII: PARSING PROPER NAMES

Quine suggests that we may translate proper names into the form: " $(\exists x) (Fx)$ ", and that, where, for example, "Socrates", or "Cerberus", is concerned, we need not hesitate to admit: "is-Socrates", or "is-Cerberus", as "the proper choice of "F", (Methods of Logic, p. 219). On this view, "Cerberus" will be 'parsed' as " $(\exists x) (x \text{ is-Cerberus})$ "; and "is-Cerberus" will be regarded as a predicate expression, a general term.

This suggestion of Quine's has led Geach to voice a quite justifiable complaint:

Now suppose somebody chooses to call her dog "Cerberus", and introduces him under that name: "this is Cerberus". A follower of Quine 'insists' on parsing "Cerberus" as a predicate. Later on, he says of another dog: "here is another Cerberus". On Quine's view, this would be merely a factual mistake, which the owner could suitably correct by saying "No, there's only one Cerberus". Would it not then be in place to ask the owner how she knows there is only one Cerberus? and is not this plainly a silly question, in fact? As the owner intended "Cerberus" to be used, such expressions as "here is another Cerberus" or "there are several Cerberuses" are not just false statements -- they are excluded altogether as moves in the language-game played with "Cerberus". (Mental Acts, pp. 67f.)

In spite of the vagueness of the expression, "moves in the language-game", and in spite of the doubts which one might have about the relevance of dog-owners' intentions to logic, Geach has a point here. There certainly is something logically odd about admitting the possibility of there being several Cerberuses. But, if "is-Cerberus" is a predicate expression, then there seems to be no a priori reason why there should not be several Cerberuses. But the objection is only a minor one, and holds only against treating "is-Cerberus" as a predicate, not against parsing "Cerberus" as an instance of " $(\exists x) (Fx)$ ". There is, in fact, something else obviously

wrong with allowing "is-Cerberus" as a value for "F" in " $(\exists x) (Fx)$ ". We are told to translate "Cerberus" in the manner of " $(\exists x) (Fx)$ ", and to plug "is-Cerberus" into the "F" slot. This results in " $(\exists x) (x \text{ is-Cerberus})$ ". But, since the doctrine requires us to translate "Cerberus" into the form: " $(\exists x) (Fx)$ ", we are required to translate the "Cerberus" in " $(\exists x) (x \text{ is-Cerberus})$ " into the form: " $(\exists x) (Fx)$ ", and on we go to infinity. But we may easily avoid the regress if our substituent for "F" is some predicate expression, such as "Cerberizes", which is clearly not identical in meaning to "is-Cerberus". (Quine does use "Pegasizes" sometimes.) This fairly simple move both avoids the regress and permits a Quinean to answer Geach's objection. Possibly more than one thing Cerberizes, (pace Leibnizian laws). But it will be logically impossible for more than one thing to be Cerberus. For to be Cerberus is to be  $(\exists x) (x \text{ Cerberizes})$ , i.e., the thing which Cerberizes. And, since: "a is  $(\exists x) (x \text{ Cerberizes})$ ", is just a short way of saying: " $(\exists x) (x \text{ Cerberizes}) \ \& \ ((y) (y \text{ Cerberizes}) \supset (y = x)) \ \& \ (a = x)$ ",<sup>1</sup> the statement that a is Cerberus and b is Cerberus and  $a \neq b$  is logically false.

In Word and Object, (p. 182), Quine proposes to deal with the "feeling that in reparsing the names as general terms we forfeit part of their meaning, viz. the purport of uniqueness," by suggesting that, just as the general term, "cousin", for example, obeys the law of symmetry, so the notion of uniqueness might be recognized to be implicit in the meaning of the general term, "Socrates". But

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1. In previous places where I have discussed Quine, I have followed his practice, of Word and Object, of using a good deal of 'English' in logical formulae. Since logical formulae will, from now on, appear a bit more frequently, it will help to save space if, wherever convenient, I use standard logical symbols.

this manoeuvre is, I think, rendered unnecessary if we recognize that, when we translate "Socrates", for example, as " $(\exists x) (Fx)$ ", we are not replacing "Socrates" just by "F", but by the whole expression: " $(\exists x) (Fx)$ ".

SECTION VIII: IS THE SENSE OF A PROPER NAME THAT OF A COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF ITS OBJECT?

According to John Searle:

If we try to present a complete description of the object as the sense of a proper name, odd consequences would ensue, e.g.:

(I) that any true statement about the object using the name as subject would be analytic,

(II) any false one self-contradictory,

(III) that the meaning of the name (and perhaps the identity of the object) would change every time there was any change at all in the object,

(IV) that the name would have different meanings for different people, etc. ("Proper Names", p. 157. I have inserted the Roman numerals.

Searle has enumerated four propositions which he says would follow "if we try to present a complete description of the object as the sense of a proper name", and which he says are odd. If anyone ever tried to present a complete description of an object, (at least of the sort of object to which proper names are usually given), he would probably be frustrated by the limitations of his intelligence and the finitude of his life-span; and theoretical consequences would not follow from such a try anyway. So I do not think that we should take Searle too literally here. I do think, however, that Searle has presented some strong objections to any theory which claims that the sense of a proper name is that of<sup>1</sup> a complete description of the object. And I doubt that it would be unfair to

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1. The point of my "that of" is that, whereas it does not seem to make sense to say that the sense of a name is a description, it does seem to make sense to say that the sense of a name, (on a particular use of it, of course), is the same sense as the sense of some description.



Searle to read him as claiming that consequences, (I)-(IV) are entailed by any theory which makes such a claim, and that consequences, (I)-(IV) are odd. I shall call any theory of the sort in question a "CD theory", (for "complete description theory"). Need a CD theory entail (I)-(IV)? And, of the consequences entailed by a CD theory, which are odd? I shall treat (I)-(IV) in the order: (IV), (III), (I), (II).

In one sense of "meaning", (IV) is odd, in another sense, it is not. (IV) is odd if it means that if I say: "Socrates is a philosopher"<sup>1</sup>, and you say: "Yes, I agree, Socrates is a philosopher", then you and I must have stated different propositions. (IV) is not odd if it means that, if I say: "Socrates is a philosopher", and if you say, "Yes, I agree, Socrates is a philosopher", you and I have a different set of Socratic properties<sup>2</sup> in mind. A CD theory need not entail the odd consequence. In fact, it seems to me that a major point in favour of a CD theory is that, by saying, for example, that the sense of "Socrates" is that of a complete description of Socrates, i.e., a description which enumerates all of Socrates's properties, it guarantees that when you say: "Socrates is a philosopher", you state the same proposition as I state

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1. Whenever a sentence occurs as an example, it is to be assumed that the sentence is actually being uttered by someone, on a particular occasion, to make a statement. When a proper name occurs in such a sentence, we shall assume that the user of that sentence is using that name to refer to the most famous person who bears the name. Thus, whenever "Socrates" occurs in an example, it is to be assumed that "Socrates" is being used by someone to refer to Socrates, i.e., to the philosopher who invented the theory of forms, taught Plato, made a nuisance of himself in Athens, and drank the hemlock.
2. I shall use "properties" indiscriminately for both properties and relations.

when I say: "Socrates is a philosopher", (assuming, of course, that you and I are using: "is a philosopher", in the same sense), regardless of whether or not you and I have different sub-sets of the set of Socrates's properties in mind, (or even, perhaps, a few odd properties which are not members of that set).

As for the not-odd interpretation of (IV), although a CD theory need not entail (IV), on this interpretation, it seems to me that a CD theorist would do well to build it into his theory. For it is quite a normal thing for two people to use the same proper name to refer to the same person, but to have different descriptions in mind when they use this name.

Considering (III) now, let us begin by ignoring the part which Searle has in parentheses, (we shall come back to it in a moment). (III) is a consequence of a CD theory only if (III) is built into the theory. If the CD theory says that, when "Socrates" is used at time,  $t$ , its sense is that of a description which enumerates all and only those properties which Socrates has at  $t$  or before  $t$ , then, if at a time,  $u$ , which is later than  $t$ , Socrates acquires a new property, "Socrates" will no longer have the sense which it had at  $t$ . But a CD theorist does not have to build (III) into his theory. We can say, instead, that the sense of "Socrates", at any time at which it is used, is that of a description which contains an extremely large list of 'eternalized' predicate expressions, e.g.: "invents the theory of forms at  $t$ ", "annoys Athenians at  $u$ ", "drinks hemlock at  $v$ ", etc. These 'eternalized' predicates will express all the properties which Socrates has, has had, or ever will have. (I see no reason why future properties should not be included.) Since the list of properties will be the same, regardless of the time at which "Socrates" is uttered,

we need not say that there will be a change in the meaning of "Socrates" every time there is a change in Socrates. It will be noticed that, on the way of looking at things just suggested, one could never, in practice, spell out the full sense of a proper name. But, accustomed as philosophers are to finding themselves unable to spell out the full sense of most of our everyday expressions, one should not find this consequence unsettling.

I find Searle's parenthetical remark hard to understand. But it might be based upon something like the following piece of contorted reasoning. According to the CD theory, when "Socrates" is used at time  $t$ , its sense is that of a description which tells us just what Socrates is doing at  $t$ . When "Socrates" is used at a later time,  $u$ , when Socrates is doing something else, then its sense is that of a description which tells us just what Socrates is doing at  $u$ . Since what Socrates does at  $u$  differs from what Socrates does at  $t$ , the sense of "Socrates" at  $u$  differs from the sense of "Socrates" at  $t$ . But since, by hypothesis, the sense of "Socrates" is always that of a complete description of its object, the sense of "Socrates" at  $t$  must be that of a complete description of its object and the sense of "Socrates" at  $u$  must be that of a complete description of its object. But since the sense of "Socrates" at  $t$  differs from the sense of "Socrates" at  $u$ , the objects described by the corresponding descriptions must be different. So Socrates at  $t$  must be a different object from Socrates at  $u$ .

Such is my best attempt at making sense of Searle's parenthetical remark. The idea that Socrates at one time is a different object from Socrates at another time does not seem to me to be particularly horrible. But a CD theorist does not need it anyway. If, as I suggested before, we say that the sense of "Socrates", at any

time at which it is used, is that of a description which contains a large list of 'eternalized' predicate expressions, expressing all the properties which Socrates has, had had, or ever will have, then we need not worry about the sense of "Socrates" changing, and so, need not worry about Socrates becoming a different object every time he undergoes change.

We shall, from now on, be concerned only with a CD theory which avoids claiming that the sense of "Socrates" changes every time Socrates changes. When I give examples of predicate expressions which would go into a complete description of Socrates, I shall, for the sake of brevity, not bother to include time references. But we shall assume that they are there.

Let us now turn to Searle's (I), i.e.: "that any true statement about the object using the name as subject would be analytic". In one sense of "analytic", (I) would be a harmless consequence of a CD theory. Consider the sentence:

(1) The pediatrician who loves her is a doctor who loves her.

Now obviously, the statement one would make by means of sentence, (1), is not necessarily true. If no pediatrician loves her, then it is false that the pediatrician who loves her is a doctor who loves her. And it is not a necessary truth that some pediatrician loves her. But there is no reason why we should have to say that, since (1) is contingent, (1) is not analytic. According to Katz, ("Analyticity and Contradiction in Natural Language", p. 531), (1) is analytic. But (1) is analytic only according to one sort of idea of analyticity. Analyticity, Katz says in his complicated fashion, "is the predicative vacuity that results from the failure of the path associated with the predicate to contribute semantic

elements to the path associated with the subject when these paths are amalgamated to produce a reading for the sentence," (loc. cit.). In more familiar terms, we might say that, since the concept expressed by the predicate of (1) is among the concepts expressed by the subject of (1), (1) is analytic.<sup>1</sup> But, although one may define "analyticity" any way he pleases, we have to recognize that, if we accept a Katz-like notion of analyticity, then we have to admit that something can be both analytic and contingent.<sup>2</sup>

Let us now turn to:

(2) Socrates philosophizes.

Given a Katz-like notion of analyticity, (2), on a CD theory of proper names, is undoubtedly analytic. What is expressed by "philosophizes" is already expressed by part of the description which corresponds to the sense of "Socrates". As Katz would have it, were he to accept a CD theory, philosophizes would be among the 'semantic markers' assigned to "Socrates". But what we have to ask is whether the statement which one makes by means of sentence (2) would, on a CD theory, turn out, if true, to be necessarily true. I do not think that a CD theory has to have this consequence.

Here is how a CD theorist might treat (2). In accordance with our treatment of "Cerberus" in Section VII, we treat "Socrates" as the description: " $(\exists x) (x \text{ Socratizes})$ ". (2), now, may be analyzed

1. Katz draws a parallel between his notion of analyticity and that of Kant, (cf. Katz, The Philosophy of Language, pp. 189ff.)
2. I find it hard to understand how it is that Katz takes himself to be providing an answer to Quine's scepticism over analyticity, (cf. "Analyticity and Contradiction in Natural Language", p. 519 and pp. 530ff.) Katz's criterion allows something to be both analytic and contingent. But it seems pretty clear that when Quine, in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", attacked the analytic-synthetic distinction, he was attacking a distinction between necessary and contingent truths.

as: " $(\exists x) ((x \text{ Socratizes}) \& ((y) (y \text{ Socratizes} \supset y = x)) \& x \text{ philosophizes})$ ", or, more briefly as:

(3)  $(\exists y) (y = (\exists x) (x \text{ Socratizes}) \& y \text{ philosophizes})$ .<sup>1</sup>

We now say that "x Socratizes" is an abbreviation for a complex predicate of the form: "Fx & Gx & Hx...etc.", where "F", "G", "H", etc., express all of Socrates's properties. Since philosophizes is one among Socrates's properties, (3), i.e., (2), becomes:

(4)  $(\exists y) (y = (\exists x) (Fx \& \dots \& x \text{ philosophizes}) \& y \text{ philosophizes})$ ,

with "Fx &..." as an abbreviation for an extremely long predicate expression, expressing all of Socrates's properties with the exception of that which is expressed by "x philosophizes". The upshot, now, is that although (2), as interpreted by a CD theory, might be regarded by some people as analytic, the statement which one makes by means of sentence (2) need not, on a CD theory, turn out to be a necessary truth. (4), the CD theorist's analysis of (2), contains the contingent existential conjunct:

(5)  $(\exists y) (y = (\exists x) (Fx \& \dots \& x \text{ philosophizes}))$ .

Although there may be at least as many CD theories of proper names as there are philosophers who wish to invent them, I shall, henceforth, refer to the theory which analyzes (2) as (4) as "the CD theory". Although it does follow from the CD theory that, if anything is Socrates, then it philosophizes, i.e., that:

(6)  $(y) (y = (\exists x) (Fx \& \dots \& x \text{ philosophizes})) \supset y \text{ philosophizes}$ ,

1. My motive for using (3) here, rather than the longer sentence which precedes it is just brevity. An even briefer way of expressing the same idea would, of course, be: " $(\exists x) (x \text{ Socratizes}) \text{ philosophizes}$ ". But (3) has the advantage of bringing the existential claim into prominence.

it does not follow from the CD theory that something is Socrates, i.e., that (5).

Although (4) does not express a necessary truth, it is a bit pleonastic. For (4), it appears, is logically equivalent to (5).<sup>1</sup> And, if (4) is the analysis of (2), then (2) is logically equivalent to (5). To say that Socrates philosophizes is just to say that Socrates exists. But sentence (2) does not turn out to be quite so pleonastic as sentence (4). Whereas the word, "philosophizes", has two explicit occurrences in sentence (4), it appears explicitly just once in sentence (2). The point of uttering sentence (2) might be to make explicit what is already implicit in the meaning of "Socrates". For example, if the set of properties which I have in mind when I think of Socrates includes philosophizes, and if the set of properties which you have in mind does not include philosophizes, then the point of my uttering: "Socrates philosophizes" in your presence might be to help you to learn more than you knew before about the meaning of "Socrates". In a similar way, the sentence: "All triangles have angles equal to 180 degrees", might be said to help us acquire information about the meaning of "triangle".

We need not think, however, that the CD theorist must say that the only point there can be in uttering (2) would be to help someone to improve his knowledge of the meaning of "Socrates". If you think of Socrates as, for example, the husband of Xanthippe, and do not know that the husband of Xanthippe philosophizes, then, if I say: "Socrates philosophizes", to you, although I shall say no more than I should have said had I uttered: "Socrates exists",

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1. cf. Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica, \*14.23:  
 $\vdash : E! (\exists x) (\phi x \cdot \psi x) \cdot \equiv \cdot \phi \{(\exists x) (\phi x \cdot \psi x)\}$ ."

I shall help you to acquire the information that the husband of Xanthippe philosophizes.

Let us turn now to Searle's (II). Does it turn out, on the CD theory, that any false statement, with "Socrates" as subject, is self-contradictory? The CD theorist might begin by arguing that, although it might be the case that some such statements are self-contradictory, it is not clear that all of them are. Let us suppose, for simplicity's sake, that Socrates has just three properties, those expressed by "F", "G", and "H". Let us suppose, moreover, that flies is not one among Socrates's properties. We should now analyze the falsehood:

(7) Socrates flies,

as:

(8)  $(\exists y) (y = (\exists x)(Fx \& Gx \& Hx) \& y \text{ flies})$ .

There is no contradiction here. By means of sentence (8), one states, of Socrates, that he has some property which, in fact, he does not happen to have. But by no part of sentence (8) does one state that he does not have that property. Although, by hypothesis, one who utters sentence (8) enumerates all of Socrates's properties, one does not state that these are all of Socrates's properties. So the statement one makes by means of sentence (8) is just false, not a contradiction.

Someone concerned to refute the CD theory might argue that, if flies is not one among Socrates's properties, then does not fly must be one among them. (7), if false, would turn out to be a contradiction on the CD theory. For one who utters (7) would state, in part, that something flies and does not fly.

The CD theorist might counter either by denying that there



are negative properties or by distinguishing between positive and negative properties and claiming that the only properties which are to be listed in a complete description of Socrates are his positive ones. His antagonist might then reply by insisting that there are negative properties and by challenging the CD theorist to come up with a general method for distinguishing between positive and negative properties.

But we shall not continue this imagined dispute. For to continue it is just to put off the inevitable. The CD theorist must admit that there are some statements, made by means of sentences with "Socrates" as subject, which many people would not regard as contradictory, but which, on the CD theory, are contradictory. For consider:

(9) Socrates does not philosophize,

which, on the CD theory, will become:

(10)  $(\exists y) (y = (\exists x) (Fx \& \dots \& x \text{ philosophizes}) \& \sim (y \text{ philosophizes}))$ .

Even if the CD theorist can avoid saying that (7) is contradictory, he must admit that (9) is contradictory. Moreover, since many philosophers would probably deny that (9) is contradictory, one must, I suppose, admit that the CD theory has at least one odd consequence.

But even if we admit that this consequence is odd, we still have to ask whether it is unacceptable. One reason why this consequence might seem unacceptable is that we have a feeling that Socrates might, had circumstances been different, taken up some profession other than the one for which he is famous, and that he might have never had a philosophical thought in his head. In other words, we have a feeling that:

(11) Possibly, Socrates does not philosophize,  
is true. So, since the CD theory seems to make (11) false, the CD theory appears unacceptable.

But let us see what the CD theorist can say in favour of his theory. In the first place, although when the CD theorist analyzes (9) as (10) he makes (9) out to be a contradiction, he does not have to claim that it is always contradictory to deny that Socrates philosophizes. When I said that (9), on the CD theory, would be analyzed as (10), I was assuming that "Socrates", in (9), has what Russell would call "primary occurrence". Since, as I suggested in Section II, most people would regard an expression such as "Socrates" as having primary occurrence in a sentence such as (9), it is best to swim with the current and to assume that "Socrates" has primary occurrence in (9). But uttering (9) is not the only way we have to deny that Socrates philosophizes. We may also say:

(12) Not: Socrates philosophizes,

or: "It is not the case that Socrates philosophizes". And (12), on the CD theory, becomes:

(13)  $\sim (\exists y) (y = (\exists x) (Fx \& \dots \& x \text{ philosophizes}) \& y \text{ philosophizes})$ .

And (13) is not a contradiction. The CD theorist, now, might just say that, although (11) is false,

(14) Possibly not: Socrates philosophizes.

is true. So one can, without contradiction, deny that Socrates philosophizes.

Someone concerned to refute the CD theory might reply that the CD theorist has missed the point. What is at issue is not whether or not one can, without contradiction, deny that Socrates philoso-

phizes. What is at issue is whether or not (11) is true, i.e., whether or not (9), with "Socrates" having primary occurrence, is a contradiction. And (9), so understood, (the antagonist will say), is obviously not a contradiction: Socrates might have never philosophized.

Faced with such an objection, the CD theorist can reply by challenging his antagonist to state just what he means by saying that (11) is true. What sort of possible world does he envisage, in which Socrates does not philosophize: Would it be a world in which the man who teaches philosophy to Plato does not philosophize? Obviously not. For how can anyone teach philosophy without philosophizing? Or would it be a possible world in which the man who invents the theory of forms does not philosophize? Obviously not, again. For how can anyone invent the theory of forms without philosophizing? Perhaps, then, the possible world which he envisages is one in which the man who is called "Socrates", who annoys Athenians, and who drinks hemlock does not philosophize. But, if this is the possible world envisaged by the CD theorist's antagonist, then what he must mean by (11) is that the following statement is not a contradiction:

(15)  $(\exists y) (y = (\exists x) (x \text{ is called "Socrates" \& } x \text{ annoys Athenians \& } x \text{ drinks hemlock}) \& \sim (y \text{ philosophizes}))$ .

But with this the CD theorist may agree. (15), obviously, is not a contradiction. But it does not follow from the CD theory that (15) is a contradiction. It just follows from the CD theory that (9) is a contradiction. Turning back to (11), now, the CD theorist will say that, although the statement which one makes by means of sentence (11) is false, what one means, or has in mind, when he makes this statement, may well be true.

## SECTION IX: REFERENTIAL OCCURRENCE

In Section I, I made the claim that we can use the same sentence-component to make identifying reference to an entity and to state that that entity exists. This claim conflicts with the frequently held opinion that there is such an essential difference between referring and stating that one cannot use the same expression to do both at once. In the present section, I shall say some things which I hope will serve to indicate that my claim is the trivial and innocuous claim which I think it is. My remarks will lead to a general discussion of reference. We begin by considering the expression:

(1) The President of the United States,

and reciting some points of common knowledge. (1) is an expression of the sort which philosophers have called denoting phrases, or definite descriptions, or definite singular terms, or referring expressions. One of its most frequently noted features is that it may be used to perform the task of what Strawson calls identifying reference. We might use a sentence like:

(2) The President of the United States is a Republican,

in order to perform the task of reporting the state of affairs that the President of the United States is a Republican. And, in performing this task, we may be using the expression, (1) to perform the sub-task of designating some particular historical item, i.e., the President of the United States, which the state of affairs which is being reported involves, and which we are going to use the rest of the sentence to say something about.

Let us now consider the expression:

(3) Blah.

"A rose", so Juliet's theory of meaning goes, "by any other name would smell as sweet". The President of the United States, by any other referring expression, may be just as easily designated. There is no reason in logic -- or anywhere else, for that matter -- why there should not exist a community of English speakers, somewhere, whose dialect differs from ours only in that they use (3) in precisely the same way as we use (1). In the sentence: "Blah is a Republican", uttered by one of those speakers, (3) would be used to designate the President of the United States, and the rest of the sentence would be used to say that he is a Republican.

Consider now the expression:

(4) OneandonlyonethingisPresidentoftheUnitedStatesandthatthing.

Again, the President of the United States, by any other referring expression, may be just as easily designated. Just as there may exist a community of speakers who use (3) as we use (1), a community of speakers, somewhere, might very well use (4) as we use (1).

If a member of that community were to say:

(5) OneandonlyonethingisPresidentoftheUnitedStatesandthatthing is a Republican,

he would be using (4) to designate the President of the United States, and he would be using the rest of the sentence to say something about him.

I doubt that anyone will dispute anything I have said so far.

But now consider the expression:

(6) One and only one thing is President of the United States and that thing.

Again, the President of the United States, by any other referring

expression, may be just as easily designated. Just as there may be a community of speakers who use (4) as we use (1), there may be a community of speakers who use (6) as we use (1). If a member of that community were to say:

(7) One and only thing is President of the United States and that thing is a Republican,

he would be using (6) to designate the President of the United States, and he would be using the rest of the sentence to say something about him.

I still doubt that anyone will dispute anything I have said so far. But I do suspect that some philosophers might want to try to remind me of something which they might think that I might have overlooked. "While I agree", such a philosopher might say, "that there may exist a community of speakers who use (6) as we use (1), the use which the members of this community would make of (6) would be quite different from the use which we should normally make of (6). If a member of your imaginary community uttered sentence (7), he would be using (6) to refer to an entity. But if we were to make a normal use of sentence (7), we should be using (6) to say that there is something which satisfies a certain description. There is an essential difference between referring to something and stating that something has such-and-such characteristics. So, while I agree that if a speaker of some imaginary dialect were to utter (7), he would be using (6) as we use (1), I warn you not to draw the conclusion that a speaker of our dialect could make a normal use of sentence (7) and be using (6) as we use (1)."

But that is the conclusion which I intend to draw. The

dialect spoken by the members of the community of speakers who use (6) as we use (1) is the only imaginary dialect which will interest us from now on. So, when I speak of "the (or this) Dialect", I shall be referring to the dialect spoken by the members of that imaginary community. (I am not concerned, in the present work, to explain the use I make of "referring" in the preceding sentence.)<sup>1</sup>

It is clear that our imaginary community's use of (6) would, in some respects, be different from our use of (6). Since we use (1) as a definite singular term, and since the speakers of this Dialect use (6) as a definite singular term. Using (6) as a definite singular term, the speakers of this Dialect may manipulate (6) in the way in which definite singular terms may be manipulated. Appealing to the symmetry of identity, for example, a speaker of this Dialect might well say:

(8) If one and only one thing is President of the United States and that thing is identical with Nixon, then Nixon is identical with one and only one thing is President of the United States and that thing.

But if one of us were to utter (8), we should be speaking nonsense.

It is clear that the speakers of this Dialect use (6) in a different way from the way in which we use (6). But what is not clear to me is that the use which a speaker of this Dialect would make of (6) in uttering (7) is in any substantial way different from the use which we should make of (6) in uttering (7). That is

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1. But I shall comment briefly on that use. Sometimes, when we say, "I am referring to A", we are not saying that there is an object, i.e., A, to which we are referring. We are saying that we are using such-and-such an expression in such and such a sense. If I say: "Russell's treatment of Cantorian numbers is interesting. I am referring, of course, to transfinite numbers", I am not saying that there exist transfinite numbers to which I am referring. I may very well be a finitist. I am saying that I am using the expression, "Cantorian numbers", in a sense which is elucidated by the expression, "transfinite numbers".

to say, I fail to see how the use which we should make of (6) as a component of (7) is in any substantial way different from the use which we should make of (1) as a component of (2).

Strawson says:

So the wholly important distinction we are required to draw is between (1) using an expression to make a unique reference; and (2) asserting that there is one and only one individual which has certain characteristics...This is, in other words, the distinction between (1) sentences containing an expression used to indicate or mention or refer to a particular person or thing; and (2) uniquely existential sentences. ("On Referring", p. 180).

But to argue that if one is using an expression to make a unique reference, then he is not stating that one and only one individual has certain characteristics is like arguing, for example, that if one is using a sentence to perform the act of underwriting someone's statement, then one is not using that sentence to state that that person's statement has a certain property. It might be concluded from such an argument that if someone says: "John's statement is true", he is not ascribing a property to John's statement: he is rather performing the act of underwriting John's statement. But if some philosopher, who believed, say, that truth is reflection of the mind of God, were to say: "John's statement has the property of reflecting the mind of God", this philosopher would both underwrite John's statement and ascribe a property to it. Similarly, it neither follows from the fact that one is using an expression to make a unique reference that he is not stating that one and only one individual has certain characteristics, nor does it follow from the fact that one is stating that one and only one individual has certain characteristics that he is not using an expression to make a unique reference. Just as our imaginary philosopher would be underwriting John's statement by stating that his



statement has a certain property, we may very well make a unique reference by stating that one and only one individual has certain characteristics.

"Referring" is both an expression of everyday speech and a philosopher's expression. To the best of my knowledge, the sense which this expression most frequently has in everyday speech is the sense which I made a stab at elucidating in the last footnote. But I confess that the experience on which the best of my knowledge is based is not as broad as I should like it to be. At any rate, the sense of this expression with which philosophers appear to me to be most frequently concerned is not the sense which I was concerned to elucidate in the last footnote. But I am not going to try to specify the sense of this expression with which philosophers appear to me to be most frequently concerned. When one reads a piece of philosophical writing, it is often difficult or impossible to distinguish the remarks which serve to indicate the concept about which the philosopher will theorize from the remarks which serve to express the philosopher's theories about the concept. This may be due to the fact that the remarks which serve to express the philosopher's theories about the concept may also serve to construct the concept about which the philosopher is theorizing.

Two senses of "referring" interest me here. I think I can pin the first sense on Strawson. The second sense -- which is the sense in which I am most interested -- also has affinities with Strawson; but it is more closely connected with Russell's "denoting". In both of these senses of "referring", one who made a normal use of the sentence (7) can both be using expression (6) to state that one and only one thing has certain characteristics and be using expression (6) to refer to the thing which has these cha-

racteristics, i.e., to the President of the United States.

The first sense of "referring" is the sense in which to refer to something is to draw one's audience's attention to the thing about which one is going to say something. To refer to something, in this sense, is to perform the task of forestalling the question: "What (who, which one) are you talking about?" (cf. Strawson, "On Referring", p. 181) We may speak of referring, in this sense, as "Strawsonian referring".

Now it seems to me to be so obvious as to be hardly worth arguing that one can, on a normal use of (7), be using (6) to refer Strawsonianly to the President of the United States. If I were to utter (7), and if someone were to say to me: "I know that you are saying that something is a Republican. But I do not know what thing you are saying this about. What (who, which one) are you talking about?", I should simply repeat (7) over again. For I think that it is perfectly clear that, by my use of (6) as a component of (7), I have done everything I need to do to let my audience know what entity I am talking about. My use of (6) as a component of (7) forestalls the question: "What (who, which one) are you talking about?".

Similarly, it needs no arguing that one who makes a normal use of (2) can be using (1), as a component of (2), to refer Strawsonianly to the President of the United States. So insofar as the use which we should normally make of (1), as a component of (2), can be to refer Strawsonianly to the President of the United States, and insofar as the use which we should normally make of (6), as a component of (7), can be to refer Strawsonianly to the President of the United States, the use which we should normally make of (6), as a component of (7), can be the same as the use which we

should normally make of (1) as a component of (2).

We now turn to the second of the two senses of "referring." We shall use a passage from Strawson to get us under way. This sense of "referring" is hinted at in his definition of "identifying reference" as "the sub-task of designating some particular historical item or items which the state of affairs [which is being reported] involves," ("Identifying Reference and Truth-Value", p. 96). I say that the sense which concerns me is hinted at here. The definition, (if it is a definition), does not provide much in the way of clarification. Since "designating" either means the same as or is no more clear than "referring", the definition, (if it is one), does not help to explain referring. But what the definition, (if I may call it one), suggests to me is something like this: We use a sentence to report a state of affairs. The state of affairs which we report involves some particular item. There is some special relationship between the sentence component which plays a referring role and the fact that that particular item is involved in the state of affairs which we are reporting.

I doubt that the reader has found that particularly pellucid. But I think that we may have begun to go some way towards understanding referring in this second sense, (henceforth just "referring"). If someone were to utter (2), he would -- or at least it is likely that he would -- be reporting a state of affairs. I shall, (although perhaps not everyone does), interpret "state of affairs" as "fact". Someone who uttered (2) would be reporting the fact that the President of the United States is a Republican. We shall say that the fact that the President of the United States is a Republican 'involves' the President of the United States. The

way in which a fact 'involves' a thing is not all that clear. Since a fact is not a bunch of things in the sense in which a pile of potatoes is a bunch of things, facts do not 'involve' things in the way in which piles of potatoes 'involve' potatoes. But, if we are careful, our use of "involve" will not get us into too much trouble.

But now look at sentence:

(9) The President of the United States is a Scottish Nationalist.

Just as (1) is used in (2) to refer to the President of the United States, (1) is used in (9) to refer to the President of the United States. But we cannot explicate the referential use of (1) in (9) by saying that the fact which one reports by means of (9) 'involves' the President of the United States. There is no fact that the President of the United States is a Scottish Nationalist. So one would report no fact by uttering (9). But (2) and (9) do have this in common: if, on a normal use of either of these sentences, one is reporting a fact, then one is reporting a fact which 'involves' the President of the United States.

We may speak of a fact 'making' a statement true. Just what constitutes this 'making true' is unclear. But insofar as it makes sense to say: "That statement is true because it is a fact that p", it makes sense to say: "The fact that p makes that statement true". Speaking in this vein, we may say that the statements which one would make by means of sentences (2) and (9) are such that if they are true, then they are 'made true' by facts which 'involve' the President of the United States.

But compare (2) and (9), now, with:

(10) The Governor of New York is a Republican.

Speaking in the manner in which we are allowing ourselves to speak,

we may say that the statement which one would normally make by means of sentence (10) is such that, if it is true, then the fact which makes it true is the fact that the Governor of New York is a Republican. Now whereas this fact, if it is a fact, involves the Governor of New York, the facts, if they are facts, which make statements (2) and (9) true involve the President of the United States. This points out an important difference between statement (10), on the one hand, and statements (2) and (9) on the other. If they are true, then they are made true by facts involving different entities.

It is reasonable to suppose that what makes this difference between these statements is simply this: Where expression (1) is used in (2) and (9), expression:

(11) The Governor of New York,

is used in (10). Because expression (11) is used in the way in which it is used in sentence (10), the statement one makes by means of sentence (10) is such that, if it is true, then the fact which makes it true involves the Governor of New York. Because expression (1) is used in the way in which it is used in sentence (2), the statement one makes by means of sentence (2) is such that, if it is true, then the fact which makes it true involves the President of the United States.

This suggests a preliminary definition of what it means to say that an expression is being used to refer to something:

(12) Expression "e", in sentence "S", is being used to refer to X just in case the statement one makes by means of sentence "S" is such that it cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves X; and the statement one makes by means of "S" is such that it cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves X because of the way in which "e" is being used in "S".

But now consider our old friends, the expression:

(13) The present King of France,

and the sentence:

(14) The present King of France is bald.

We shall suppose that (14) is being used, today, to make a statement. Are we to say that (13) is being used, in (14), to refer to the present King of France? According to (12), it seems, we must say that (13) is being used in (14) to refer to the present King of France. But how can we say that someone is using an expression to refer to the present King of France when there is no present King of France to refer to?

This question calls for a distinction. We must distinguish between an expression's having a referring use and an expression's actually referring. An expression can have a referring use, i.e., one can use that expression to refer, without that expression's actually referring, i.e., without one's being successful in his referential use of the expression. I think we can say, without getting into trouble, that an expression, "e", is being used to refer to X, even if X does not exist, if we make it clear that we are talking about how the speaker is using the expression rather than about the speaker's success in using the expression. Just as we might truthfully say: "Newton looked for the philosopher's stone", even though the philosopher's stone never existed, we may truthfully say:

(15) John is using expression (13) in sentence (14) to refer to the present King of France,

even though the present King of France does not exist. But just as we cannot truthfully say: "Newton found the philosopher's stone", unless the philosopher's stone exists or has existed, we cannot truth-

fully say:

(16) By means of expression (13) in sentence (14), John is referring to the present King of France,

or:

(17) Expression (13) in sentence (14) refers to the present King of France,

unless the present King of France exists. When we use sentence (16) or sentence (17), we **are** using expression (13) to refer to the present King of France. But when we use sentence (15), we are not using expression (13) to refer to the present King of France.

Our preliminary definition, (12), tells us when an expression is being used to refer to X. We may say that someone is referring to X just in case he is using an expression to refer to X and X exists. We may say that an expression refers to X just in case someone is using that expression to refer to X and X exists.

To save the reader some page-turning, I shall repeat some of our examples:

- (1) The President of the United States,
- (2) The President of the United States is a Republican,
- (6) One and only one thing is President of the United States and that thing,
- (7) One and only one thing is President of the United States and that thing is a Republican.

We were asking whether the use which we should normally make of expression (6) as a component of sentence (7) is, in any substantial way, different from the use which we should normally make of expression (1) in sentence (2). We saw earlier that just as one can use expression (1) in sentence (2) to refer Strawsonianly to the President of the United States, one can use expression (6) in

sentence (7) to refer Strawsonianly to the President of the United States. I shall now point out that, in the sense of "referring" which (12) is an attempt to capture, just as, on a normal use of sentence (2), one would be using expression (1) to refer to the President of the United States, on a normal use of sentence (7), one would be using expression (6) to refer to the President of the United States. The statement one makes by means of sentence (7) is such that it cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves the President of the United States; and the statement one makes by means of sentence (7) is such that it cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves the President of the United States because of the way in which expression (6) is used in sentence (7).

It might be objected here that:

(18) The fact that the President of the United States is a Republican,

if it is a fact, is a different fact from:

(19) The fact that one and only one thing is President of the United States and that thing is a Republican,

if it is a fact. If some philosopher wants to set up his criterion for factual identity in such a way that (18) and (19) turn out to be different facts, there is nothing I can say against this philosopher. But it seems to me that the most reasonable criterion for factual identity is simply this: The fact that p is identical to the fact that q just in case: it is a fact that p, and it is a fact that q, and it cannot be a fact that p unless it is a fact that q, and it cannot be a fact that q unless it is a fact that p. (The affinity between this criterion and the criterion for propositional identity which will be discussed in Section XII should be evident.)



On this criterion, (18) is the same fact as (19), (assuming that they are facts), and whatever (18) involves, (19) involves as well.

I drew the distinction between an expression's being used to refer and an expression's actually referring in an attempt to capture the distinction Russell drew between a denoting phrase and a phrase which denotes something. "The present King of England" and "The present King of France" are both denoting phrases. But only the former, (assuming that it is 1905), denotes something. (cf. "On Denoting", p. 41) Russell says, (loc. cit.), that "a phrase is denoting solely in virtue of its form". The context of this passage makes it look as if Russell were saying that a phrase is denoting solely in virtue of its grammatical form. But it is clear that although (1) in (2) is denoting, i.e., used to refer, not every phrase which has the grammatical appearance of (1) is, in every context, denoting. (1) is not denoting, for example, in:

(20) John believes that the President of the United States is a Republican.<sup>1</sup>

But I do not intend this point to be an objection against Russell. By "solely in virtue of its form", it is not clear that Russell meant: "solely in virtue of its grammatical form". He may have been using "form" in the way in which we might expect him to use it if he were to say that:

(21) He is hungry only if he is hungry,

is true solely in virtue of its form. What would be meant here is not that every statement made by means of a sentence having the grammatical form of (21) is true. Clearly sentence (21) can be

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1. Or at least I would not call (1) denoting in (20). Russell, perhaps, would.

used to make a false statement. What is meant is that the statement which one is imagining (21) as being used to make is true regardless of what the facts may be. Expression (1) in sentence (2) may be denoting, i.e., used to refer, regardless of what the facts may be. That expression denotes something, i.e., actually refers to something, however, only if it is denoting and a certain fact -- the fact that the President of the United States exists -- obtains.

This leads to the question: since grammatical form does not always give us evidence as to whether or not an expression is denoting, i.e., used to refer, how can we tell whether or not an expression is denoting?<sup>1</sup> (12) is a (preliminary) attempt to answer that question.

It is possible to allow expressions like "standing-for" to introduce confusion into accounts of Russell's Theory of Descriptions. When Miss Anscombe says that Russell's "analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions and other 'denoting phrases' excludes these from the class of signs that contribute to the meaning of sentences in which they occur by standing for their bearers," (An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p. 44), she is quite right if what she means is that according to Russell a denoting phrase need not actually denote anything in order for the sentence in which it occurs to have a meaning. But she goes on to say: "The denoting phrases disappear, and only the predicates (and proper names, if any) used in their construction play a part in the result

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1. This question is suggested by Linsky, (cf. Referring, pp. 62f.) But Linsky's account of the matter involves too many complications for me to try to sort out. He apparently treats "denoting phrase" as synonymous with "definite description", even though Russell includes "a man", "some man", etc., in his list of denoting phrases. This leads him to wonder what it means to say that a phrase is a definite description and not, say, a name, solely in virtue of its form.

of the analysis. In consequence, 'standing-for' is shewn to be attributable only to simple signs." In saying this, she is wrong if she means that, according to Russell, only simple signs, (predicates and proper names), denote. Although a denoting phrase need not denote in order for this sentence to be meaningful, and although not all denoting phrases denote, some denoting phrases do denote. "The present King of England" denotes a certain man, ("On Denoting", p. 41), and "Scott is the denotation of "the author of Waverley"" ("On Denoting", p. 51). She is right, however, if what she means is that, according to Russell, denoting phrases may not be regarded as "standing for genuine constituents of the propositions in whose verbal expression they occur," ("On Denoting", p.45). Although "the present King of England" denotes the present King of England, (we are assuming it is 1905), the present King of England is not a genuine constituent of the proposition in whose verbal expression "the present King of England" occurs. Whatever the Russellian propositions of 1905 may have been, they were such that "in every proposition that we can apprehend...all the constituents are really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance," ("On Denoting", p. 56). We need not, Russell would say, have 'immediate acquaintance' with what a denoting phrase denotes, (nor need the denoting phrase actually denote), in order for us to 'apprehend' the proposition in whose verbal expression the denoting phrase occurs. But we cannot 'apprehend' the proposition unless all of its "constituents are really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance". These 'constituents' are "expressed by the several words of the denoting phrase," ("On Denoting", pp. 55f., underscoring mine). I think we may conclude that the notions of standing for and expressing, as these notions are used in "On Denoting",

differ from the notion of denoting, as this notion is used in "On Denoting".

I see no reason to think that Anscombe actually is wrong. But I found the passage from Anscombe handy as a vehicle for refuting an interpretation of Russell which many philosophers are inclined to give. These philosophers seem unaware of the fact that Russell was concerned to explain how it is that we know about things -- such as other people's minds and the centre of mass of the solar system at the first instant of the twentieth century -- with which we have no 'acquaintance'. His explanation was that "what we know about them is obtained through denoting", ("On Denoting", p. 42). We "reach" these things "by means of denoting phrases," ("On Denoting", p. 41).

I find it hard to decide just what to say about Strawson's interpretation of Russell. He says, in Introduction to Logical Theory, (p. 188):

We have detected already the belief, underlying the Theory of Definite Descriptions, that a genuine logical subject, a true referring expression, can have a meaning only if there exists an object to which it applies. "The King of France", which failed to satisfy this condition, was degraded from the status of referring expression.

It is clear, of course, that Russell did not demote "the present King of France" from the status of denoting phrases. It is among the examples of denoting phrases which he gives on page 41 of "On Denoting". It is also clear that Russell would not have denied that, if there were a king of France, at present, then "the present King of France" would denote him. So what does Strawson mean when he says that "the King of France" was degraded from the status of referring expression? If all he means to say is that, according to Russell, "the King of France" does not stand for a genuine constituent of the proposition expressed by such a sentence as: "The King

of France is bald", then Strawson is giving a correct interpretation of Russell. If, on the other hand, he means that, according to Russell, "the King of France" is not the sort of expression which, even if there were a king of France, could refer, or be used to refer, to the King of France, (in Strawson's sense of "refer"), then I am unable to understand why Strawson would want to say such a thing. For I have never been able to find, in Russell's writings, anything which should lead anyone to believe that, in any sense of "refer" which I have ever discovered in Strawson's writings, Russell would have denied that "the King of France" is the sort of expression which, were there a king of France, could refer, or be used to refer, to the King of France.

To return to (12) now, I said that it is a preliminary definition of what it means to say that an expression is being used to denote, or refer to, something. It seems to go some way towards handling definite descriptions. But what about indefinite ones? Russell says that "a man", "some man", "any man", "every man", and "all men" are denoting phrases. I shall content myself with some brief comments on the first two. Consider the expression:

(22) a man,

in the sentence:

(23) I met a man.

The statement one makes by means of (23) cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves a man. That is to say, this statement cannot be true unless the statement:

(24) It is a fact that I met  $x$ , and  $x$  is a man,

is true, for some value of  $x$ . And this seems to be because of the use

which is made of (22) in (23). So (12) allows us to say that (22) is used, in (23), to refer to a man. But what man is (22) being used to refer to? Not an indefinite or ambiguous man, surely! If the statement I make is true, then we may very well say that I am using (22) to refer to the man I met. But if the statement I make is false, then, in the first place, there is no man for me to succeed in referring to, and, in the second place, there is no man for me to be using the expression to refer to. Clearly, we need not be puzzled by the fact that there is no man for me to succeed in referring to. We often fail in our attempts at referring. But should we be bothered by the fact that there is no man for me to use the expression to refer to? I think not. Just as:

(25) I am looking for an honest man,

does not entail that there is an honest man for whom I am looking,

(26) I am using the expression to refer to a man,

does not entail that there is a man to whom I am using the expression to refer.

If the statement I make by means of (23) is true, there is a man whom I met. I may not know his name, but there will be such a man, nonetheless. But now consider:

(27) Every woman loves a man.

Assuming that "every woman", in (27), has existential import, the statement one makes by means of (27) cannot be true unless it is a fact that, say, Mary loves Sam and Alice loves Bill and Betty loves Horace and so forth. Since Sam is a man and Bill is a man and Horace is a man, (27) cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves a man. So it appears that (22) is used to refer in (27).

And it appears that, if (27) is true, then (22), in (27), refers to a man. Miss Anscombe would disagree with this conclusion. She uses an example, similar to (27), to reject a suggestion of Professor Flew's that "somebody" refers to somebody. (An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p. 85). Presented with (27), and my claim that (22) refers to a man there, she would ask: "Who is this man whom every woman loves?"

I think the right thing to say is that not every expression which is used to refer acts in the same way as every other expression which is used to refer. It follows from (23) that there is a man whom I met. It does not follow from (27) that there is a man whom every woman loves. This only points out that "a man" does funny things in some of the contexts in which it refers, not that it does not refer in those contexts or that it never refers at all.

We shall not, unfortunately, have the time to investigate indefinite descriptions much further. It is definite descriptions and proper names that we are most concerned with in the present work, and I think that -- while noting that there are problems -- we may ignore indefinite descriptions. One of the things to which we are, at present, building up is a discussion of the principle which is known as "Leibniz's Law" or "The Principle of Substitutivity". This principle, as Quine puts it, "provides that given a true statement of identity, one of its two terms may be substituted for the other in any true statement and the result will be true", (From a Logical Point of View, p. 139). This principle, as we soon shall see, causes philosophical headaches in non-extensional contexts. But it is clear that, no matter how extensional the context, indefinite descriptions do not obey Leibniz's Law. For consider:

(28) Socrates is identical with some man,

which appears to be true, and:

(29) Some man wrote Waverley,

which also appears to be true. But if indefinite descriptions obeyed Leibniz's Law, then we could substitute "Socrates" for "Some man", in (29), and prove that Socrates wrote Waverley.

It ought to be noted that Leibniz's Law is not the only principle of identity which breaks down when "is identical with" governs an indefinite description. For consider transitivity. Can we argue from (28) and:

(30) Some man is identical with Parmenides,

that Socrates is identical with Parmenides? Perhaps what we should be saying here is that either (28) and (30) are 'bad English' or "is identical with" in (28) and (30) does not mean what logicians usually mean by "=". Since analogous considerations apply to "something", this would have the consequence of our not being allowed to read: " $(\exists x) (x = a)$ " as: "Something is identical with a". Having given myself permission to ignore indefinite descriptions, I shall not follow up this train of thought.

A special feature which definite descriptions and proper names have is that, if we know that an expression of either sort is being used to refer, then we can find out what it is being used to refer to by simply pulling the quotation marks off of the expression. If "The King of France" is used to refer, then it is used to refer to the King of France. If "Cicero" is used to refer, then it is used to refer to Cicero. Someone may, of course, use "Cicero", in certain circumstances, to refer Strawsonianly to the lamp post instead of to Cicero. But it is not Strawsonian reference which we are



talking about here. Expressions like (6), i.e.,

(6) One and only one thing is President of the United States and that thing,

however, lack this special feature which belongs to definite descriptions and proper names. It does not make sense to say:

(31) He is using the expression, "One and only one thing is President of the United States and that thing", to refer to one and only one thing is President of the United States and that thing.

But since we are now going to focus our interest on definite descriptions and proper names, and ignore indefinite descriptions and expressions like (6), perhaps this special feature will help us to tighten up (12). We are getting ready to talk about the referential occurrence of an expression. To say that an expression has referential occurrence is just to say that it is used to refer, full stop. (12) only tells us when an expression is used to refer to such-and-such. But since, when definite descriptions and proper names are used to refer, we may find out what they are used to refer to by pulling off their quotes, we may, I think, take a stab at defining referential occurrence for such expressions as follows:

(32) Expression, "e", occurs referentially in sentence, "S", just in case the statement one makes by means of "S" is such that it cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves e; and the statement one makes by means of "S" is such that it cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves e because of the way in which "e" is being used in "S".

Thus, since the statement one makes by means of: "The President of the United States is a Republican" cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves the President of the United States, and since the reason why this statement cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves the President of the United States is that the expression, "The President of the United

States", is used in the way it is used in the sentence used to make the statement, we may say that the expression, "The President of the United States, occurs referentially in that sentence on that occasion.

[Even if the reader is willing to tolerate my talk about 'the fact which makes it true' and my unexplained use of "because" in (32), he may well want to object: How are we to understand "'e'", "'S'", and "e" in (32)? Are they variables? If so, how do you propose to bind them? If not, they apply only to the expression, "e", (is that an expression?), the sentence, "S", (is that a sentence?), and the object, e, (who is that?), and (32) does not permit you to say anything at all about any other expressions, sentences, or objects.<sup>1</sup>

If we are pressed with such questions, then we may just drop (32) and switch to:

(33) The statement the author is making by means of A is such that it cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves B; and the statement the author is making by means of C is such that it cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves D because of the way in which the author is using E in F.

(33) is a device for testing whether or not a given expression, (definite description or proper name), occurs referentially in a given sentence on a particular occasion. The device may be operated as follows. Suppose that you read a sentence in a book, and that you want to find out whether or not an expression, (definite description of proper name), which occurs in that sentence occurs

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1. The reader might wonder why I bother to use quotes at all in (32) and (12). The reason is that (32) is, at least, a crude generalization of the idea that to say that "Cicero" occurs referentially is to say that "Cicero" is used to refer to Cicero. Without the use of quotes, (32) would have no hope of conveying such an idea. I use quotes in (12) only to preserve a resemblance between it and (32).

referentially, i.e., whether or not the author of the book is using the expression to refer. Here is what you do. Get a copy of the present work and look up (33). Erase "A". Write the sentence, within quotes, in the place of "A". Erase "B". Write the expression, without quotes, in the place of "B". Erase "C". Write the sentence, within quotes, in the place of "C". Erase "D". Write the expression, without quotes, in the place of "D". Erase "E". Write the expression, within quotes, in place of "E". Erase "F". Write the sentence, within quotes, in place of "F". Read the result. Recite it aloud. Ask yourself whether or not you are making a true statement. If you are making a true statement, then the expression occurs referentially, the author is using the expression to refer. If you are making a false statement, then the expression does not occur referentially, the author is not using the expression to refer. Prospective users of this device are advised that certain difficulties may be avoided if they secure a powerful microscope and a very fine pen.

Feeling confident that we may switch to (33) and such like in case of objections, I see no reason why we should not go on making use of (32) and such like, or why we should not speak loosely of them as "definitions" or "criteria".]

I have no reason to expect the reader to be particularly tolerant of my talk about 'the fact which makes it true' and my unexplained use of "because". According to Russell, "the process of sound philosophizing ... consists mainly in passing from those obvious, vague, ambiguous things, that we feel quite sure of, to something precise, clear, definite, which by reflection and analysis we find is involved in the vague thing that we start from....,"

("The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", pp. 179f.). (32), my preliminary definition of "referential occurrence", seems to me to be correct. And it seems to me that it serves to express the intuitive idea which I connect with such expressions as "reference" and "referential occurrence". But it is vague, and it ought to be made more precise. In Section XI, I shall present the results of my best attempt, so far, at giving some precision to this idea.

## SECTION X: LINSKY AND 'PURE REFERENCE'

At the beginning of Chapter VIII, ("Reference and Modality"), of From a Logical Point of View, Quine says:

One of the fundamental principles governing identity is that of substitutivity -- or, as it might well be called, that of indiscernibility of identicals. It provides that, given a true statement of identity, one of its two terms may be substituted for the other in any true statement and the result will be true. (p. 139)

He then says: "It is easy to find cases contrary to this principle".

Of the recalcitrant cases, Quine says:

The principle of substitutivity should not be extended to contexts in which the name to be supplanted occurs without referring simply to the object. Failure of substitutivity reveals merely that the occurrence to be supplanted is not purely referential, that is, that the statement depends not only on the object but on the form of the name. (p. 140)

Linsky devotes Chapter VII, ("Pure Reference") of Referring to an attempt to discredit Quine. He begins by saying: "Quine, Frege, and Russell approach problems connected with oratio obliqua constructions determined to defend Leibniz's Law<sup>1</sup>, the principle of substitutivity....," (Referring, p. 100). Following Quine's own procedure, Linsky then cites a couple of examples which show how easy it is to find cases contrary to this principle. He then says:

According to Quine, positions in sentences for which the principle of substitutivity is not a valid mode of inference are 'referentially opaque' ones. They are positions such that expressions occupying them do not succeed in referring to anything, although the very same expressions will refer in other, referentially open, positions. (Referring, p. 101)

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1. I shall sometimes follow Linsky in his use of the expression "Leibniz's Law" to refer to what Quine calls the principle of "substitutivity". I voice no opinion as to whether or not the principle which Quine states faithfully reflects any doctrine ever held by Leibniz.

He then suggests that Quine has not shown that Leibniz's Law has no exceptions; and he suggests that Quine has only "given a characterization of the exceptions". And he goes on to say:

If he insists, nevertheless, that the principle of substitutivity admits of no exceptions he must be defending it not as it is formulated above, but in another version which goes as follows: "Given a true statement of identity, one of its two terms may be substituted for the other at any referentially open position in a true statement, salva veritate." (loc. cit.)

He then points out that the only criterion we have for the referential opacity of a position "is just that the principle of substitutivity in its first (unamended) form fails to be a valid mode of inference with respect to that position". And he goes on to say:

The principle in its revised form is just the principle in its original form with the addition of a clause, which in effect tells us that counter-examples do not count. Clearly there are no counter examples to this principle. (loc. cit.)

Linsky then says:

Let us accept, for the present, the ideas of pure reference and impure reference as sufficiently clear for our purposes. Let us suppose that is, that in virtue of our understanding of our language we possess the ability to distinguish cases in which terms perform their purely referential function from cases in which they fail to do so. (Referring, p. 102)

Armed with these intuitive ideas of pure and impure reference, Linsky goes on to present a number of examples which are intended to show that "Failure of substitutivity is therefore neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for non-pure reference," (Referring, p. 104).

I doubt that Quine will be troubled by Linsky's attack. It is based upon a number of confusions. In the first place, it is not clear that Quine ever considered himself to be engaged in a defense of the principle of substitutivity. He does begin Chapter VIII of

From a Logical Point of View by saying: "One of the fundamental principles governing identity is that of substitutivity". But once he states the principle, he says: "It is easy to find cases contrary to this principle". If he had said: "It is easy to find cases which appear to go contrary to this principle", we might have understood him to be out to defend the principle. But since he says what he does say, we can hardly understand him to be out to defend the principle. In fact, it becomes quite clear in Word and Object that Quine is not one of those philosophers who "approach problems connected with oratio obliqua constructions determined to defend Leibniz's Law". He says:

Failures of substitutivity of identity, moreover, were in Frege's view unallowable; so he nominally rectified them by decreeing that when a sentence or term occurs within a construction of propositional attitude or the like it ceases to name a truth value, class, or individual and comes to name a proposition, attribute, or "individual concept". (In some ways this account better fits Church, who has sharpened and elaborated the doctrine.) I make none of these moves. I do not disallow failure of substitutivity, but only take it as evidence of non-referential position; nor do I envisage shifts of reference under opaque constructions. (Word and Object, p. 151)

And his practice in Word and Object is clearly that of someone concerned to elucidate the functions which words have in various 'positions' rather than that of someone who is out to defend a principle. (See, e.g., his treatment of "The commissioner is looking for the chairman of the hospital board", Word and Object, p. 142). This seems no less true of "Reference and Modality", where he clearly refers to substitutivity as a "criterion of referential occurrence," (From a Logical Point of View, p. 141), and where his practice is to apply this criterion to various terms in order to see what kind of occurrence they have. If Quine is concerned to do anything in "Reference and Modality", he is concerned to cause trouble for

quantified modal logic. Failure of substitutivity reveals referential opacity. Referential opacity shows "symptoms in connection with quantification as well as in connection with singular terms," (From a Logical Point of View, p. 145). "Quantifiers outside a referentially opaque construction need have no bearing on variables inside it," (p. 150). Modal contexts, such as "Necessarily..." and "Possibly ..." are "found referentially opaque...by consideration of the failure of substitutivity of identity as applied to singular terms," (p. 149). The same contexts are found to lead to nonsense when we attempt to quantify 'into' them, (pp. 148ff.). Hence, there are difficulties for quantified modal logic. Quine's concern is clearly to show the ways in which terms behave in certain kinds of contexts: not to defend Leibniz's Law.

Not that the first sentence of Chapter VIII of From a Logical Point of View is not misleading. Quine was criticized on grounds strikingly similar to Linsky's by Strawson in "Singular Terms, Ontology and Identity," p. 453. But although Strawson, writing back in 1956, did not have the benefit of Quine's clarification of his position in Word and Object, Linsky, (who, curiously, includes Word and Object in his bibliography but makes no easily discoverable mention of it in his text), did.

The next piece of confusion in Linsky's account comes out when he says: "According to Quine, positions in sentences for which the principle of substitutivity is not a valid mode of inference are 'referentially opaque' ones. They are positions such that expressions occupying them do not succeed in referring to anything..." This is a misrepresentation of Quine. According to Quine: "The principle of substitutivity should not be extended to contexts in which the name to be supplanted occurs without referring simply to



the object. Failure of substitutivity reveals merely that the occurrence to be supplanted is not purely referential, that is, that the statement depends not only on the object but on the form of the name,"<sup>1</sup> (From a Logical Point of View, pp. 139f.) The expressions to which substitutivity does not apply need not be expressions which "do not succeed in referring to anything". Quine never denies that they may be expressions which refer to an object but which do not

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1. In fairness to Linsky, it should be said that Quine might have made himself more clear if he had said: "Failure of substitutivity reveals that the occurrence to be supplanted is not purely referential, that is, that the statement either (I) depends not on the object but only on the name, or (II) depends not only on the object but also on the form of the name". "'Cicero" contains six letters", which, according to Quine, "is not a statement about the person Cicero but simply about the word "Cicero", (From a Logical Point of View, p. 139), is an example of the first sort. "Giorgione was so-called because of his size", (cf. (4) below), is an example of the second sort. In neither example is the occurrence of the name, ("Cicero" or "Giorgione"), purely referential. But we might well say that, in the first example, the occurrence of the name, "Cicero" is not purely referential because not referential at all, and that, in the second example, the occurrence of the name, "Giorgione", is referential but not purely referential. What Linsky does not appreciate is that when Quine says that an occurrence of an expression is "not purely referential", he gives no indication that he means to deny that the occurrence is referential. (cf: "Hence my cautious phrase "not purely referential", designed to apply to all such cases and to affirm no distinction among them," (Word and Object, p.142). Among the cases to which the cautious phrase will apply are those in which an expression "implicitly plays two roles, a referential one and a non-referential one," (Word and Object, p.153).) A man whose ancestry is not purely Aryan may be either a man whose ancestry is not Aryan at all, (e.g., a pure-bred Australian aborigine), or a man whose ancestry is somewhat, but not completely, Aryan, (e.g., a German).

Quine's expression, "referentially opaque", also seems to play a role in Linsky's confusion. And Quine is, perhaps, somewhat at fault. The expression carries the suggestion of "not referential at all"; but Quine does not make it very clear whether he intends it to carry this suggestion or whether he intends it to mean the same as "not purely referential".

refer simply to the object, expressions occurring referentially but not purely referentially.

Let us now look at the examples which Linsky intends to show that failure of substitutivity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for "non-pure reference". He gives four examples to show that failure of substitutivity is not a necessary condition for "non-pure reference", and one example to show that failure of substitutivity is not a sufficient condition for "non-pure reference". We shall consider the latter example first. Linsky asks us to suppose that Lyndon B. Johnson is the chairman of the Harvard Philosophy Department. On this supposition:

(1) The person who holds the office of president of the United States = the person who holds the office of chairman of the Harvard Philosophy Department,

is a true statement of identity. It is also true, Linsky says, that:

(2) The person who holds the office of president of the United States was administered the oath of the latter office by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

Linsky now says:

Surely, if there is such a thing as a relation of pure reference at all, the term "the person who holds the office of president of the United States" stands in [(2)]<sup>1</sup> in that relation to Lyndon B. Johnson.

But, he points out, if we substitute into (2) on the basis of (1), then we get the false statement:

(3) The person who holds the office of chairman of the Harvard Philosophy Department was administered the oath of the latter office by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

And Linsky concludes: "Here we have failure of substitutivity to-

1. My numbers do not coincide with Linsky's.

gether with pure reference," (Referring, p. 104).

Linsky's misunderstanding of Quine is betrayed when he says that if there is such a relation as pure reference at all, "the person who holds the office of president of the United States" stands in (2) in that relation to Lyndon B. Johnson. Linsky seems to think that, according to Quine, a term has pure reference just in case it succeeds in referring to something, and 'impure reference' just in case it fails to refer to anything.<sup>1</sup> Linsky does not appreciate that when Quine says that an occurrence of a term is "not purely referential" he does not mean to deny that the term succeeds in referring to an object; he means only to suggest that both the object and the "form of the name" may be at issue, (cf. From a Logical Point of View, p. 140). The occurrence of "The person who holds the office of President of the United States", in (2), is just the sort of occurrence which Quine would call "not purely referential". In fact, for all (2)'s appearance of originality, there is no interesting difference between (2) and Quine's example:

(4) Giorgione was so-called because of his size.

(4), Quine says, "is a statement about a man and not merely about his name," (loc. cit.). But since we may not substitute "Barbarelli" for "Giorgione" in (4) on the basis of the identity:

"Giorgione = Barbarelli", Quine concludes that "the failure of substitutivity shows that the occurrence of the personal name in [(4)] is not purely referential," (loc. cit., italics Quine's).

(4) is an example which Linsky does not mention.

Let us now look at the examples which are intended to show that failure of substitutivity is not a necessary condition for

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1. "Impure reference" appears to be an expression of Linsky's invention.

non-pure reference. Linsky cites Quine's statement in "Three Grades of Modal Involvement" that "Quotation is the referentially opaque context par excellence", and reasons that since "Cicero" appears within quotes in:

(5) "Cicero" is a designation for Cicero,

"Cicero" does not have pure reference in that occurrence," (Referring, p. 103). He then points out that since substitution in (5) on the basis of "Cicero is Tully" produces the true statement: "Tully" is a designation for Cicero," "Cicero" is open to substitutivity in (5). And he concludes: "Failure of substitutivity, then, is not a necessary condition for the non-purely referential occurrence of a term," (Referring, p. 103). Linsky's mistake is in taking Quine to be saying that whenever a term occurs within quotes its occurrence is not purely referential. His quotation from "Three Grades of Modal Involvement" tends to give the reader the impression that this is Quine's doctrine. But he would not have been able to give the reader this impression if he had bothered to mention Quine's own use of the following examples in From a Logical Point of View:

(6) "Giorgione played chess" is true,

(7) "Giorgione" named a chess player.

Each of these, Quine points out, "is true or false according as the quotationless statement:

(8) Giorgione played chess,

is true or false," (From a Logical Point of View, p. 141).

And Quine goes on to say:

Our criterion of referential occurrence makes the occurrence of the name "Giorgione" in (8) referential, and must make the occurrences of "Giorgione" in (6) and (7) referential by the same token, despite the presence of single quotes in (6) and (7). The point about quotation is not that it must destroy referential occurrence, but that it can (and ordinarily does) destroy referential occurrence. The examples (6) and (7) are exceptional in that the special predicates "is true" and "named" have the effect of undoing the single quotes -- as is evident on comparison of (6) and (7) with (8). (loc. cit.)

Of the three remaining examples which Linsky intends to show that failure of substitutivity is not a necessary condition for the non-purely referential occurrence of a term, one, (cf. Referring, p. 103), need not detain us for long. It depends upon the assumption that:

(9) The king of France = the most frequently cited example of a non-existent object,

is a "true identity". Perhaps it can be argued, (pace Russell, cf. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, p. 102), that an expression of the form, "the so-and-so", can be a term in a true identity statement when the so-and-so does not exist. But since Linsky assumes this doctrine without, so far as I can tell, trying to produce an argument in favour of it, I see no point in trying to produce an argument against it.

We now turn to two ingenious examples. Consider:

(10) "Cicero"  $\neq$  Cicero.

Linsky says that "Cicero", in (10), "may be replaced in its first occurrence in the true statement [(10)] by any term at all salva veritate. Yet "Cicero" paradigmatically lacks pure reference in this occurrence," (Referring, p. 103). Again consider:

(11)  $\sim N (9 \not> 7)$ ,

i.e., "it is not a necessary truth that 9 is not greater than 7".

"9", Linsky points out, lacks pure reference in (11). But (11) is true, and remains true "under every replacement of "9" by any other designation for 9". "So here," Linsky says, "we have a case of impure reference unaccompanied by failure of substitutivity," (Referring, p. 104).

These last two examples do seem to prove that 'impure reference' is not a sufficient condition for failure of substitutivity. It is doubtful that even Quine would want to say that the first occurrence of "Cicero" in (10) and the occurrence of "9" in (11) are purely referential. And it is clear that these expressions, in these occurrences, are open to substitutivity <sup>t</sup><sub>A</sub> salva veritate.

But now one starts to wonder what the point of these examples can be. Let us pretend, with Linsky, that Quine is determined to defend Leibniz's Law. Let us further imagine that Quine holds the following doctrine:

(12) Given a true statement<sup>of</sup> identity, one of its two terms may be substituted for the other at any purely referential position in a true statement, salva veritate,<sup>1</sup>

with "purely referential position", in (12), given some definition which does not render (12) circular. Now there would be some point in trying to refute Quine by arguing that failure of substitutivity is not a sufficient condition for the not purely referential occurrence of a term, i.e., that substitutivity can fail to apply to a term whose occurrence is purely referential. But what

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1. (12) is modeled on Linsky's "principle in its revised form", (cf. Referring, p. 101). Since we are working with an abundance of technical expressions already, ("purely referential", "pure reference", "not purely referential", "impure reference", "referential opacity", etc.), I substitute "purely referential" for "referentially open". I propose that, at the next International Congress of Philosophy, philosophers be made to sign an agreement to drop some of these expressions from their vocabulary.

is the point in arguing that failure of substitutivity is not a necessary condition for the not purely referential occurrence of a term, i.e., that there are terms whose occurrence is not purely referential but for which the substitution of 'identicals' will go through salva veritate? The doctrine stated in (12) only says that all purely referential positions are open to substitutivity. It does not say that all and only purely referential positions are open to substitutivity. So even the imaginary Quine who is "determined to defend Leibniz's Law" cannot be refuted by examples which show that failure of substitutivity is not a necessary condition for the not purely referential occurrence of a term.

The only example which Linsky offers to show that failure of substitutivity is not a sufficient condition for the not purely referential occurrence of a term is (2). And we need not even appeal to substitutivity to make it clear that the occurrence of "The person who holds the office of president of the United States" in (2) is not purely referential in Quine's sense of "not purely referential". "The statement depends not only on the object but on the form of the name," (From a Logical Point of View, p. 140 ), or, to quote from Word and Object, (pp. 152f.), "a sentence whose single grammatical subject implicitly plays two roles, a referential one and a non-referential one": these descriptions clearly apply to (2), whose grammatical subject serves not only to refer to the President, but also to determine a sense for the expression: "the latter office".

Not only has Linsky failed to understand the real Quine. He has also failed to refute a respectable imaginary Quine.

## SECTION XI: SOME MORE ABOUT REFERENTIAL OCCURRENCE

Although Linsky's attack on Quine is flawed, an interesting point comes to mind when one reads it. Quine never -- so far as I can tell -- gives us a criterion which will allow us to mark the difference between an expression whose occurrence, in a given sentence, is referential, and an expression whose occurrence, in a given sentence, is not referential. The principle of substitutivity, if it applies to an expression, reveals that the occurrence of that expression is purely referential. But if that principle fails to apply to a given expression, all we learn is that the occurrence is not purely referential: we do not discover whether or not the occurrence is referential. Quine's other criterion, existential generalization, (cf. From a Logical Point of View, p. 145), fares similarly. Since, from the sentence: "Cicero denounced Catiline," we may infer: " $(\exists x) (x \text{ denounced Catiline})$ ", we know that the occurrence of "Cicero", in the first sentence, is purely referential. When we try to apply this principle to "Giorgione" in "Giorgione was so-called because of his size", we get: " $(\exists x) (x \text{ was so-called because of his size})$ ", which, according to Quine, "is clearly meaningless", (loc. cit.). But all we discover here, (Quine's misleading use of "irreferential", (loc. cit.), notwithstanding), is that the occurrence of "Giorgione", in "Giorgione was so-called because of his size", is not purely referential. We have no idea whether or not this occurrence is referential.

In Section IX, I attempted to explain referential occurrence by giving definitions of:



(1) Expression "e" occurs referentially in sentence "S",

and:

(2) Expression "e", in sentence "S", is being used to refer to X.

I stated my definitions in a deliberately vague manner. I shall now attempt to make these definitions more precise, and to give some relatively precise definitions of some related notions. We begin with (1). My vague definition was:

(3) Expression "e" occurs referentially in sentence "S", just in case the statement one makes by means of "S" is such that it cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves e; and the statement one makes by means of "S" is such that it cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves e because of the way in which "e" is being used in "S".

As we noted in Section IX, what I choose to call "definitions" invite trouble over quantification. We also noted that such trouble can be avoided by switching to a 'device' for testing whether or not an expression has a certain function in a given sentence on a particular occasion. Since such 'devices' are fairly easy to construct, I shall not usually bother to construct them, but shall stick to what I call "definitions". In the case of (37) below, however, since the appropriate device is a little more difficult than usual to construct, I shall present it to the reader.

(3) states an equivalence with a conjunction for its right hand side. We shall do well to take things one at a time. We shall start by focusing our attention on the first conjunct:

(4) The statement one makes by means of "S" is such that it cannot be true unless the fact which makes it true involves e.

And we shall assume, for the time being, that we have an intuitive understanding of the "because" in the second conjunct.

As my first step, now, in making (3) precise, I suggest:

(5) Expression "e" occurs referentially in sentence "S", just in case the statement one makes by means of "S" entails that e exists; and the statement one makes by means of "S" entails that e exists because of the way in which "e" is being used in "S".

Assuming an understanding of the "because" in the second conjunct of the right hand side of the equivalence, and restricting the use of "expression" to cover only definite descriptions and proper names, I find (5) quite satisfactory. (5), with "exists" understood tenselessly marks just the distinction we should like to mark between the occurrences of "Cicero", for example, in:

(6) Cicero denounced Catiline,

on the one hand, and:

(7) "Cicero" has six letters,

and:

(8) Philip believes that Cicero denounced Catiline,

on the other. (5), moreover, helps us to preserve the distinction which Russell drew, in "On Denoting", between the 'primary' and the 'secondary' occurrence of an expression in a negative sentence. If a user of sentence:

(9) The present King of France is not bald,

is making a statement which can be true only if the present King of France exists, then we may say that he is using the expression, "the present King of France", to refer, (however unsuccessfully), to the present King of France, and to say something, (i.e., that he is not bald), about him. In this case, "the present King of France" would have what Russell would call a "primary occurrence" in (9). If, on the other hand, a user of sentence (9) is making

a statement which can be true even if the present King of France does not exist, then he is not using the expression to refer, (even unsuccessfully), to anything. In this latter case, "the present King of France" would have what Russell would call a "secondary occurrence" in (9).<sup>1</sup>

(5), moreover, gives "Cicero" the place I think it deserves in a sentence like:

(10) Philip knows that Cicero denounced Catiline.

Whereas (10) resembles (8) in that both statements are about Philip's mental life, (10) differs from (8) in being about Cicero as well.

(10) also forces us to draw a Quine-like distinction between the purely referential occurrence of an expression and the referential-but-not-purely-referential occurrence of an expression. "Cicero" occurs referentially in (6) and the truth of:

(11) Cicero = Tully,

allows us to deduce:

(12) Tully denounced Catiline,

from (6). But, although "Cicero" also occurs referentially in (10), the truth of (11) does not permit us to deduce:

(13) Philip knows that Tully denounced Catiline,

from (10). "Cicero", we may say, has a purely referential occurrence in (6) and a referential, but not purely referential, occurrence in (10). Taking a hint from Quine, who talks about a single expression which "implicitly plays two roles, a referential one and

1. Although I do not have the time to follow this point up, one might hazard the guess that future historians of philosophy will discover a strong connection, (although not an identity of extension), between Russell's concept of primary occurrence and Quine's concept of referential occurrence.

a non-referential one", (Word and Object, pp. 152f.), we may suggest that since "Cicero" occurs referentially, but not purely referentially, in (10), "Cicero" is used, in (10), both to refer to Cicero and to do something else. The question now suggests itself: what else is "Cicero" used to do in (10)? We may reply by taking another hint from Quine. Considering:

(14) Giorgione was so-called because of his size,

Quine says: "It is easy in fact to translate [(14)] into another statement which contains two occurrences of the name, one purely referential and the other not," (From a Logical Point of View, p. 140; cf. Word and Object, p. 153). Quine's translation is:

(15) Giorgione was called "Giorgione" because of his size.

Given Quine's views concerning synonymy and analysis, we cannot expect Quine to have been completely serious in his talk of translation. But, since I do not share Quine's views on these subjects, I shall be more serious myself. My hypothesis is this: if, by my definition, (5), an expression occurs referentially in a given sentence, and if the principle of substitutivity fails to apply to that expression, (i.e., if its occurrence, in that sentence, is referential, but not purely referential), then it is possible to construct another sentence, which expresses the same proposition as the original sentence, and in which the expression occurs at least twice: once purely referentially and once not referentially at all. The several occurrences of the expression, in the new sentence, will serve to illuminate the several roles which are played by that expression in the old sentence.<sup>1</sup> In (14), we may

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1. This hypothesis will appear again as (13) of Section XII.

now say, "Giorgione" does double duty. It is used to refer to Giorgione, and it is also used in the way in which it is used in its second occurrence in (15), i.e. in the way in which expressions are used when they occur within quotes.

Returning now to (10), an analysis which comes to mind is:

(16) Philip believes that Cicero denounced Catiline, and Philip's belief is justified, and Cicero denounced Catiline.

Assuming that (16) expresses the same proposition as (10)<sup>1</sup>, we may say that it reveals the two roles which "Cicero" plays in (10).

The first occurrence of "Cicero" in (16) is non-referential. Philip can believe that Cicero denounced Catiline even if Cicero does not exist. Here, "Cicero" plays the same role as it plays in (8). But the second occurrence of "Cicero" in (16) is purely referential. Here, "Cicero" plays the same role as it plays in (6). In (10), we now see, "Cicero" does double duty. At one and the same time, it plays the role which it plays in (6), a purely referential role, and the role which it plays in (8), the role which a singular term plays when it occurs in a phrase in oratio obliqua governed by the verb, "to believe".

Analyzing (14) as (15) and (10) as (16) helps us to make some sense of what Quine calls "the basis of the principle of substitutivity"; "whatever can be said about the person Cicero (or Giorgione) should be equally true of the person Tully (or Barba-relli), this being the same person," (From a Logical Point of View, p. 139). When we analyze (14) as (15), (or (10) as (16)), we see

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1. Not that this assumption is right. (cf. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?"). But I find it right enough for my present purposes. The second conjunct of (16) is probably either wrong or inadequate. But the first and third conjuncts ought, on any account, to go into an analysis of (10). Of the three conjuncts, only the first and third are of interest to us here.

just what is being said by means of (14), (or (10)), about Giorgione, (or Cicero). If Barbarelli is the same person as Giorgione, then if what is said of Giorgione by means of sentence (14) is true of Giorgione, then this is also true of Barbarelli. In (15), we are shown what is said of Giorgione by means of sentence (14). By means of sentence (14), one says, of Giorgione, that he was called "Giorgione" because of his size. If this is true of Giorgione, then, since Barbarelli is the same person as Giorgione, this is also true of Barbarelli. Barbarelli was called "Giorgione" because of his size. Correspondingly, (16) shows just what is said of Cicero by means of sentence (10). When one utters sentence (10), all he says of Cicero is that he denounced Catiline. If this is true of Cicero, then, since Tully is the same person as Cicero, this is also true of Tully. Tully denounced Catiline. In (16), where the roles are clear, we may, of course, apply the principle of substitutivity to the purely referential occurrence of "Cicero" and, together with (11), deduce:

(17) Philip believes that Cicero denounced Catiline and Philip's belief is justified and Tully denounced Catiline.

The idea behind Quine's talk of the basis of the principle of substitutivity is roughly the same idea as that which lies behind Linsky's talk of the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. Linsky, quite rightly<sup>1</sup>, calls the principle of substitutivity a false principle. But he is more friendly towards the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. "This principle", Linsky says, "states that if  $x = y$ , then any property of  $x$  is a property of  $y$ , and conversely," (Referring, p. 79). Adapting ourselves to Linsky's way of talking, we might suggest that sentences (15) and (16) reveal just what properties are ascribed to Giorgione and

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1. That is, it is right to say that the principle, as a general principle, is false. This is not to deny that the principle may be applied to particular occurrences of particular expressions.

Cicero by means of sentences (14) and (10): the property of having been called "Giorgione" because of one's size and the property of having denounced Catiline. But I do not intend to try to follow up this suggestion.<sup>1</sup>

Let us return to (5) now. I said that, assuming an understanding of the "because" in the second conjunct of the right hand side of the equivalence, and restricting our use of "expression" to cover only definite descriptions and proper names, I find (5) quite satisfactory. In later pages of this Section, I shall be able to go some way towards making the "because" more precise. But I am unhappy with the restriction to definite descriptions and proper names. I want to be able to talk about intensional entities. I have hopes of working up an account of reference which will help us to make sense of the claim that in (8), for example, the expression:

(18) that Cicero denounced Catiline,

refers to (the proposition) that Cicero denounced Catiline. In

1. I should like to take the opportunity to point out an error in the interpretation which Linsky gives of Russell on the page of Referring to which I just referred. Having quoted Russell's statement:

If a is identical with b, whatever is true of the one is true of the other, and either may be substituted for the other in any proposition without altering the truth or falsehood of that proposition, ("On Denoting", p. 47),

Linsky says that there is a "use-mention confusion in this formulation" because "what we substitute in a proposition is not a for b (or conversely) but names (or other designations) for a and b". What Linsky does not take account of is that, whatever the Russellian propositions of 1905 may have been, they were things in which entities could be constituents, (cf. "On Denoting", p.56). Assuming that Russell's use of the word "proposition" makes sense, it makes sense to say that we can substitute entities in propositions. (One cannot reply that Russell was misusing the word "proposition". "Proposition" is a philosophers' word, and, provided that he does not contradict himself, a philosopher may use the word in any way he pleases.) No doubt there is confusion in Russell's formulation. But the confusion is not confusion of use and mention.

other words, I want an account of reference which will do duty not only for definite descriptions and proper names, but also for expressions like (18). But talk about the entailment of existence will not help me to make sense of the idea that expression (18), in sentence (8) refers to (the proposition) that Cicero denounced Catiline. In the present work, I understand "entails" to mean "strictly implies". But, although in this sense of "entails" one might well say:

(19) The statement one makes by means of sentence (8) entails that (the proposition) that Cicero denounced Catiline exists,

we may also say, in this sense of "entails", that every statement entails that (the proposition) that Cicero denounced Catiline exists. If propositions exist at all, then they exist necessarily, and any statement that such-and-such a proposition exists is entailed by any statement whatever. So, although (19) is true, we cannot say that it is because of the way in which expression (18) is used in sentence (8) that the statement one makes by means of (8) entails that (the proposition) that Cicero denounced Catiline exists. To anticipate an explication of "because" which will be developed later on, if we take any expression, e.g.:

(30) that Scott wrote Waverley,

which is such that, when it is substituted for (18) in (8), results in a grammatical sentence, the resulting sentence:

(21) Philip believes that Scott wrote Waverley,

will be such that the statement one makes by means of it also entails that (the proposition) that Cicero denounced Catiline exists.



So (5) does not help us to say that (18) occurs referentially in (8). I think, therefore, that there is something quite wrong with the idea of trying to explain the referential occurrence of (18) in (8) in terms of the entailment of existence.<sup>1</sup>

I shall not deny that some alternative definition of "entails" can be given which will allow us to assert (19) without committing ourselves to the view that the existence of the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline is entailed by any statement whatever. The fact of the matter is that I do not yet know my way around the subjects of entailment and the ontology of propositions well enough to make any pronouncements on this matter.

I am unable to produce a general account of referential occurrence which will be more precise than (3) and which will cover both definite descriptions and proper names, on the one hand, and expressions such as (18) on the other. But since (3), although vague, does cover expressions of both sorts, my course will be to let (3) stand as my general account of "referential occurrence" and to recognize that a precise account -- if such is possible -- of how expressions such as (18) refer must take a different form from a precise account of how definite descriptions and proper names refer. With (5), I took a first step towards a precise definition of

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1. Against the view that someone who admits that propositions exist must admit that they exist necessarily, it might be argued that, since the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline is just a meaning of the sentence (6), i.e.: "Cicero denounced Catiline", (and of the many other sentences which mean that proposition), and, since sentences do not exist necessarily, the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline does not exist necessarily: if there were no sentences, then there would be no propositions. But to argue in this way is to ignore the point that propositions are what are either true or false. Even if there were no sentences, the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline would still be either true or false; so, even if there were no sentences, the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline would still exist.

"referential occurrence" for definite descriptions and proper names. I shall start to take some more steps in a moment. But first, I want to say a bit more about (3) and such expressions as (18).

Although I admit that (3) is vague, I do not think that it is completely unilluminating. Those who accept propositions in their ontology will probably not have very much trouble making some intuitive sense of the idea that, if the statement which one makes by means of (8) is true, then the fact which makes it true, (i.e., the fact which one reports by means of that sentence), involves (the proposition) that Cicero denounced Catiline. If Philip believes that Cicero denounced Catiline, then (the proposition) that Cicero denounced Catiline is, somehow, involved in a fact. But how do propositions get involved in facts? I think that the best way to find out how propositions get involved in facts is to investigate the phenomena which we are concerned to report when we use sentences containing verbs of propositional attitude. We find out how a proposition is involved in the fact that Philip believes that Cicero denounced Catiline, by investigating belief. We find out how a proposition is involved in the fact that Philip said that Cicero denounced Catiline by investigating statement making. By carrying out such investigations, we can go some way towards understanding what it is to say that when one utters such sentences as: "Philip believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and: "Philip said that Cicero denounced Catiline", one uses expression (18) to refer to (the proposition) that Cicero denounced Catiline. Although I shall not be able to give any further clarification to the notion of reference to propositions by means of general definitions, I shall attempt, in Section XII, to clarify this notion by focusing my

attention upon belief, statement making, and related phenomena.

For the remainder of this Section, we shall ignore reference to propositions, and we shall use "expression" to cover only definite descriptions and proper names. We may, therefore, forget about (3) and focus our attention on (5), which is my first step towards a precise definition of "referential occurrence". We still must try to explain the "because" in the second conjunct of the right hand side of the equivalence. It might be thought that we have no need of "because", and that an adequate definition of "referential occurrence" would be:

(22) Expression "e" occurs referentially in sentence "S", just in case "e" occurs in "S" and the statement one makes by means of "S" entails that e exists.

But consider the sentence:

(23) One and only one thing is President of the United States and Bill believes that the President of the United States is balding.

According to (22), "the President of the United States" occurs referentially in sentence (23). But this is a consequence I prefer not to accept. We need the idea that it is because of the use of "e" in "S" that the statement one makes by means of "S" entails that e exists. The statement one makes by means of (23) entails that the President of the United States exists. But the use of "the President of the United States" in (23) has nothing to do with this entailment. Here is my first attempt at capturing the "because":

(24) Expression "e" occurs referentially in sentence "S", just in case:

- (I) "e" occurs in "S", and
- (II) the statement one makes by means of "S" entails that e exists, and
- (III) there is an expression, "f", such that the substitution of "f" for "e" in "S" results in a grammatical sentence, "T", and the statement one makes by means of "T" does not entail that e exists.

Applying (24) to "the President of the United States" in sentence (23), we find, to our satisfaction, that this expression does not occur referentially in (23). For it does appear that no matter what expression, (say "the present King of France"), we substitute for "the President of the United States" in (23), we get a sentence, (such as:

(25) One and only one thing is President of the United States and Bill believes that the present King of France is balding,

for example), the statement one makes by means of which does entail that the President of the United States exists. The reader may verify that the application of (24) to the occurrences of "Cicero" in such sentences as (7) and (8) happily fails to mark these occurrences as referential, and that the application of (24) to the occurrences of "Cicero" in such sentences as (6) and (12) happily marks these occurrences as referential.

Now we must face such sentences as:

(15) Giorgione was called "Giorgione" because of his size,

and:

(26) The President of the United States believes that the President of the United States is a good fellow,

where the expression which interests us happens to occur more than once. (24) may be extended to cover such cases by means of a slight

alteration which I shall mark by underscoring in the following revision of (24):

(27) Expression "e" occurs referentially in sentence "S", just in case:

(I) "e" occurs in "S", and

(II) the statement one makes by means of "S" entails that e exists, and

(III) there is an expression, "f", such that the substitution of "f" for every occurrence of "e" in "S" results in a grammatical sentence, "T", and the statement one makes by means of "T" does not entail that e exists.

As the reader may verify, the application of (27) to "Giorgione in (15) and to "the President of the United States" in (26) leads us to say, quite rightly, that these expressions occur referentially in these sentences. The reader may take (27) as my official definition of "expression "e" occurs referentially in sentence "S", i.e., of (1).<sup>1</sup> We have got rid of the vague talk of facts and of the vague use of "because" which bothered us in (3) and (5). As I have already remarked, I am happy to interpret "entails" as "strictly implies".

There is, however, (not so much a defect as) a limitation to (27). It tells us that "Giorgione" and "the President of the United States" occur referentially in (15) and (26). But it does not tell us which of the two occurrences which each of these expressions has in its respective sentence is referential and which is not. In order to handle this problem, we introduce the expression, "e(n)", which we define as "the n-th occurrence of expression,

1. I use the expression, "official definition", to distinguish the best definition I have yet been able to come up with for a certain notion from definitions which are merely preliminary and which I include for the sake of the exposition.

"e"<sup>m</sup>, (counting from left to right in a sentence). In sentence (15), for example, "Giorgione (2)" is the occurrence of "Giorgione" within quotes. We now give the following official definition:

(28) "e(n)" is referential in sentence "S", just in case:

(I) By (27), expression "e" occurs referentially in sentence "S", and

(II) There is no expression, "g", which is such that the substitution of "g" for every "e (m ≠ n)", (i.e., for every occurrence of "e" other than "e(n)"), in "S" results in a grammatical sentence, "U", such that the statement one makes by means of "U" does not entail that e exists.

Suppose, now, that we want to find out whether or not "Giorgione (1)" in (15) is referential. Since "Giorgione", by (27), occurs referentially in (15), (28) (I) is satisfied. Since the result of substituting any expression you please for every "Giorgione (m ≠ 1)" in (15), i.e., for "Giorgione (2)", will be a sentence, like:

(29) Giorgione was called "the capital of Rhode Island" because of his size,

which is such that the statement one makes by means of it entails that Giorgione exists, (28) (II) is satisfied. We conclude that "Giorgione (1)" is referential in sentence (15). Turning now to "Giorgione (2)", we find that (28) (I) is satisfied. But we are able to find the expression, "the present King of France", which is such that, if we substitute it for every "Giorgione (m ≠ 2)" in (15), i.e. for "Giorgione (1)", the result will be the grammatical sentence:

(30) The present King of France was called "Giorgione" because of his size,

which is such that the statement one makes by means of it does not entail that Giorgione exists. We have failed, in this case, to satisfy (28) (II). And we conclude that "Giorgione (2)" is not referential in sentence (15). Similar exercises will reveal that "the President of the United States (1)" is referential in sentence (27), that "the President of the United States (2)" is not referential in sentence (27), and that both occurrences of "the President of the United States" are referential in the following sentence:

(31) The President of the United States is a good friend of the President of the United States.

We have been discussing whether or not certain expressions occur referentially. Now we shall discuss what they are used to refer to. By a slight revision of (27), we may give an official definition of "expression "e", in sentence "S", is being used to refer to X ", i.e., of (2).

(32) Expression "e", in sentence "S", is being used to refer to X, just in case:

(I) "e" occurs in "S", and

(II) the statement one makes by means of "S" entails that X exists, and

(III) there is an expression, "f", such that the substitution of "f" for every occurrence of "e" in "S" results in a grammatical sentence, "T", and the statement one makes by means of "T" does not entail that X exists.

We find, by (32), that in the sentence:

(33) Bill believes that the President of the United States is balding,

"the President of the United States" is not being used to refer to

the President of the United States. We find that in:

(34) The President of the United States is balding,

"the President of the United States" is being used to refer to the President of the United States. We also discover that, in (34), both "the United States" and "the President of the United States" are being used to refer to the United States. It is also of interest that one who held that there could be no president of the United States unless there existed such a thing as politics would find help from (32) in maintaining that "the President of the United States", in (34), is being used to refer to politics.

If we wish to extend our use of "expression", in (32), to cover such words as "balding", we might want to use (32) to argue that, in (34), the expression, "balding", is being used to refer to hair. If we wish to extend our use of "expression", in (32), to cover such strings of words as "one and only one thing is King of France and that thing", we might want to use (32) to argue that, in:

(35) One and only one thing is King of France, and that thing is bald,

the expression, "one and only one thing is King of France and that thing" is being used to refer to the King of France. To avoid complication in what follows, however, we shall continue to restrict our use of "expression" to cover only definite descriptions and proper names.

We have been talking about an expression's being used to refer to something. We now turn our attention to the idea of an expression's being used, successfully, to refer to something, of an



expression's actually referring to something. The following official definition is my attempt to capture that idea:

(36) Expression "e", in sentence "S", refers to Y just in case:

(I) By (32), expression, "e", in sentence "S", is being used to refer to X, and

(II) X exists, and

(III)  $X = Y^1$

Since the 'device' which goes with (36) is a little more difficult to construct than are the devices which go with the previous definitions of this Section, I present this 'device' to the reader:

(37)  $A = B$ ; and the statement the author is making by means of C can be true only if B exists; and it can be true that D even if B does not exist.

If you want to know whether or not a given expression, in a given sentence, on a particular occasion, refers to a given object, you may use (37). Here are the five rules for its operation:

Rule 1: Find out whether or not the object exists. If it does not exist, then give up. No expression can refer to an object which does not exist.

Rule 2: If the object does exist, then find out its name, or some definite description which it satisfies. Erase "A" and write that name or description, without quotes, in place of "A".

Rule 3: Erase "C", and write the sentence which interests you, within quotes, in place of "C".

Rule 4: Erase "D", and write the sentence which interests you, without quotes, in place of "D". Now, in the inscription which you have just produced, erase every instance of the expression which interests you. Write the letter "E", without quotes, in each of the blank spaces.

1. Since " $X = Y$ " entails "X exists", (II) is redundant. But I put (II) in for the sake of clarity.

We ought to pause for examples now. Suppose that you want to know whether or not the expression, "the President of the United States", in sentences (33) and (34) refers to Richard Nixon. Following rules 1 - 4, we get:

(38) Richard Nixon = B; and the statement the author is making by means of "Bill believes that the President of the United States is balding" can be true only if B exists; and it can be true that Bill believes that E is balding even if B does not exist.

and:

(39) Richard Nixon = B; and the statement the author is making by means of "The President of the United States is balding" can be true only if B exists; and it can be true that E is balding even if B does not exist.

We now turn to:

Rule 5: Try to find a pair of expressions,  $\langle x,y \rangle$ , which is such that  $y$  is not the same expression as the one which interests you, ( $x$  may or may not be the same expression as the one which interests you), and which is such that, if you go to the string of words which you have just produced and erase every occurrence of "B" and write  $x$ , without quotes, in the resulting blank spaces, and if you erase "E" and write " $y$ ", without quotes, in the resulting blank space, then the result will be a grammatical sentence such that, if you read it aloud, then you will be making a true statement. If the language contains such a pair of expressions, then the expression which interests you, in the sentence which interests you, refers to the object which interests you. If the language contains no such pair of expressions, then the expression which interests you, in the sentence which interests you, does not refer to the object which interests you.

Assuming that Bill is not the same person as Richard Nixon, there is no appropriate pair of expressions to substitute for "B" and "E" in (38). So we conclude that "the President of the United States", in (33), does not refer to Richard Nixon. There is, however, a pair of expressions whose substitution for "B" and "E" in (39) results in:

(40) Richard Nixon = the President of the United States; and the statement the author is making by means of "The President of the United States is balding" can be true only if the President of the United States exists; and it can be true that the present King of France is balding even if the President of the United States does not exist.

If we recite (40) aloud, then we shall make a true statement. So we conclude that "the President of the United States", in (34), refers to Richard Nixon. Similar reasoning will show that "the President of the United States", in (34), refers to the President of the United States, to the man who was Vice-President under Eisenhower, and to the United States. Similar reasoning will also show that the expression, "the man who came in second in the 1968 Presidential Election", in:

(41) The man who came in second in the 1968 Presidential Election is now on holiday,

refers both to the man who came in second in the 1968 Presidential Election, (i.e., to Hubert Humphrey), and to the object which came in first in the 1968 Presidential Election, (i.e., to Richard Nixon). No man can come in second unless something comes in first. This conclusion may seem paradoxical to those who hold the view that a statement which is made by means of a sentence like (41) is true just in case the entity referred to by the grammatical subject of the sentence has the property expressed by the grammatical predicate of the sentence. We can avoid this appearance of paradox by distinguishing, among the entities to which an expression refers, the entity to which it mainly refers. We give the following official definition:

(42) Expression "e", in sentence "S", refers mainly to X, just in case:

(I) By (27), expression "e" occurs referentially in sentence "S", and

(II) e exists, and

(III) e = X.

We now see that although "the man who came in second in the 1968 Presidential Election", in sentence (41), refers to quite a few things, that expression refers mainly only to the man who came in second in the 1968 Presidential Election, (i.e., only to Hubert Humphrey).

It will be noticed that if an expression, by (42), refers mainly to a given object, then that same expression, by (36), refers to that object. But it does not follow from the fact that an expression, by (36), refers to a given object that that expression, by (42), refers mainly to that object.

The statement one makes by means of sentence (41), we now may say, is true just in case the entity mainly referred to by the grammatical subject of the sentence has the property expressed by the grammatical predicate of the sentence.

For the sake of the present paragraph alone, let us call the kind of reference defined by (36) "subsidiary reference", and let us call the kind of reference defined by (42) "main reference". It might be thought that, when one talks about reference, he must always be explicit about whether he means main or subsidiary reference. But this is not necessary. We may talk about subsidiary reference by saying: "'e' refers to X" or "X is a referent of 'e'". And we may talk about main reference by saying: "the referent of 'e' is X", "X is the thing to which he is referring by means

of "e", etc.

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I shall have to conclude this Section by noting some problems which my account of referential occurrence is unable to handle.

Consider the occurrence of the expression, "Cicero", in the sentence:

(43) Either Cicero denounced Catiline or snow is white.

Obviously, the principle of substitutivity applies to "Cicero" in (43). From (43) and the identity:

(11) Cicero = Tully,

we may deduce:

(44) Either Tully denounced Catiline or snow is white.

But, by (27), "Cicero" does not occur referentially in (43). We might make either of two responses to this situation. Both of them will require a notion of a "molecular compound", which we may define, in a rough-and-ready fashion, as a sentence which is constructed from other sentences by means of such logical words as: "or", "if...then", "and", etc. We might, then, insist that "Cicero" does not occur referentially in (43), but say that it does occur referentially in the left hand disjunct of (43). We might then say that, if an expression, "e", occurs in a sentence, "T", which is a molecular compound of sentences in one of which "e", (by (27)), occurs referentially, then the principle of substitutivity applies to "e" in "T". On the other hand, we might just extend the notion of referential occurrence by saying that if an ex-

pression, "e", (by (27)), occurs referentially in a sentence, "S", and if a sentence, "T", is a molecular compound of "S", then "e" occurs referentially in "T".<sup>1</sup>

The second of the two alternatives might be the more preferable. For consider the occurrence of the expression, "the President of the United States", in the sentence:

(45) The President of the United States is balding and one and only one thing is President of the United States.

We should want to say that "the President of the United States" occurs referentially in (45). Yet, by (27), "the President of the United States" does not occur referentially in (45). It would seem that we can make that expression occur referentially in (45) only if we extend the notion of referential occurrence in the way just outlined.

I hesitate, however, to take either of the lines which I have just mentioned. My reason is simply that I find it hard to see how I can say, for example, that "Cicero" occurs referentially in the left hand disjunct of (43). Suppose that someone actually utters (43) to make a statement. In uttering (43), he will utter its left hand disjunct:

(46) Cicero denounced Catiline.

But I cannot say that the statement which the person makes by means of (46) entails that Cicero exists. He does not make a statement by means of (46). He makes a statement by means of the whole molecular compound, (43). And the statement he makes does not, of course,

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1. If we were to take this line, we should have to change the "just in case" in (27) to "if".

entail that Cicero exists.

Another difficulty with my account involves such indicator words as "I". Suppose that you utter the sentence:

(47) I am hungry.

Following (27), I must say that the expression, "I", occurs referentially in (47) just in case the statement you make by means of (47) entails that I exist. But this, of course, is absurd.

SECTION XII: THE LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE CRITERION OF  
PROPOSITIONAL IDENTITY

In Sections X and XI, we had occasion to notice three ways in which an expression, (definite description or proper name), can occur in a sentence. In:

(1) Cicero denounced Catiline,

the occurrence of "Cicero" is purely referential. In (1), "Cicero" is being used to refer to Cicero, and the principle of substitutivity applies to "Cicero". In:

(2) Philip knows that Cicero denounced Catiline,

however, the occurrence of "Cicero" is referential, but not purely referential. In (2), "Cicero" is being used to refer to Cicero; but the principle of substitutivity does not apply to "Cicero". And in:

(3) Philip believes that Cicero denounced Catiline,

finally, the occurrence of "Cicero" is not referential at all. "Cicero" is not being used to refer to Cicero. We should not, of course, deny that the substitution of 'identicals' will ever go through (3) salva veritate. It might so happen that:

(4) Cicero = Tully,

is true, and that:

(5) Philip believes that Tully denounced Catiline,

is also true. But the truth of (5) does not follow from that of



(4) and (3).<sup>1</sup>

Let us extend our use of "expression", now, to cover such strings of words as:

(6) that Cicero denounced Catiline.

As we said in Section XI, expressions such as (6) can be used to refer to propositions. It is natural, I think, to say that an expression like (6) is, just like "Cicero", capable of occurring in sentences in at least three different ways. There might, for example, be sentences of the form:

(7) Philip...that Cicero denounced Catiline,

in which the occurrence of (6) would be purely referential. (6) would be used to refer to the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline. And the principle of substitutivity would apply to (6). Given any other expression which refers to the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline, we should be able to substitute that expression for (6), in (7), salva veritate. If:

(8) Philip PR that Cicero denounced Catiline,

is such a sentence, and if it is true that:

(9) The proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline = the proposition that Cicero and Catiline are related as denouncer to denounced,

1. I do not mean to deny that "believes" can ever have what Quine, (cf. Word and Object, p. 145), would call a "transparent sense". I just do not happen to use the word in that sense. I ought also to make it clear, here, that when, later on in the present Section, I call a verb a "PR verb of propositional attitude", I shall not be talking about what Quine talks about when he talks about a verb of propositional attitude "taken transparently". I shall be talking about pure reference to a proposition, not pure reference to an object of the more mundane sort.

then, if the statement one makes by means of sentence (8) is true, then it is also true that:

(10) Philip PR that Cicero and Catiline are related as denouncer to denounced.

There might, on the other hand, be sentences of the form, (7), in which the occurrence of (6) is referential, but not purely referential. (6), in such a sentence, would be used to refer to the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline. But the occurrence of (6), in that sentence, would not be subject to the principle of substitutivity. If:

(11) Philip RBNPR that Cicero denounced Catiline

is such a sentence, then, even if (9) is true, we cannot deduce:

(12) Philip RBNPR that Cicero and Catiline are related as denouncer to denounced,

from the statement which one makes by means of sentence (11).

I put forward the following hypothesis in Section XI:

(13) If an expression occurs referentially in a given sentence, and if the principle of substitutivity fails to apply to that expression, (i.e., if its occurrence, in that sentence, is referential, but not purely referential), then it is possible to construct another sentence, which expresses the same proposition as the original sentence, and in which the expression occurs at least twice: once purely referentially and once not referentially at all. The several occurrences of the expression, in the new sentence, will serve to illuminate the several roles which are played by that expression in the old sentence.

According to such an hypothesis, there will be such an analysis for (11): an analysis in which (6) has at least one occurrence which is subject to the principle of substitutivity. We shall come back to this hypothesis later.

There might, finally, be sentences of the form, (7), in which the occurrence of (6) is not referential at all. (6), in such a sentence, would not be used to refer to the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline. It is easy to think of an example of such a sentence. Just imagine a nominalist saying:

(14) There is no such thing as the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline,

or:

(15) The proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline does not exist.

In Section X, I complained about the abundance of technical expressions to be found in writings on reference. With apologies to the reader, I must introduce some new jargon myself. Let us call a verb of propositional attitude a "PR verb of propositional attitude" just in case the occurrence of a "that"-clause which follows it is purely referential. Let us call a verb of propositional attitude a "RBNPR verb of propositional attitude" just in case the occurrence of a "that"-clause which follows it is referential, but not purely referential. There is, I think, a tendency among philosophers to think that, if there is such a thing as reference to propositions, then all reference to propositions is pure reference, i.e., that all verbs of propositional attitude are PR verbs of propositional attitude. On page 169 of Word and Object, Quine gives one the impression that he thinks this. No philosopher has, to my knowledge, ever drawn a distinction between PR verbs of propositional attitude

and RBNPR verbs of propositional attitude.<sup>1</sup> It seems to me, however, that, if we draw this distinction, then we can go some way towards showing that logical equivalence, as a criterion for propositional identity, is not so horrible an idea as one might think.

One of the most frightening consequences of the view that, if  $p$  and  $q$  are logically equivalent, then 'they' are the same proposition, is that there is just one necessary proposition and just one impossible one. Mathematics becomes, (to borrow Russell's words), "only the art of saying the same thing in different words," (The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, 1944-1967), (Vol. III), p. 222). And true mathematical propositions will differ from false mathematical propositions only in that the former will all be identical with the necessary proposition while the latter will all be identical with the impossible proposition. Faced with this consequence of the logical equivalence criterion, one may either accept the consequence, like Russell, or find it too frightening to accept. If,

1. From a Fregean point of view, (cf. "On Sense and Reference"), (1), by itself, refers to the True. (1), in (3), refers to the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline. And (1), in: "John believes that Philip believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" would refer to the sense which (1) has in (3). But, in none of these cases do we have, on the Fregean theory, what I should call reference but not pure reference to the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline. In "John believes that Philip believes that Cicero denounced Catiline", nothing refers to the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline. In (3), although Frege would say that (1) refers to the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline, he would, I think, allow us to substitute, for (1), in (3), any other expression which has the same 'customary sense' as (1). So we do not have a case of reference but not pure reference here either.

The reader may have noticed that, with my usage, I should say that, in (3), for example, it is (6) which refers to the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline. Frege, however, would say that it is (1) which plays this role. Actually, I think that my usage is preferable in an enquiry such as the present one. With my usage, I can, if I wish, talk about the meaning of (1) without bothering to tell the reader that I am imagining (1) to be used in an extensional context.

however, one does not want to hold that mathematics is only the art of saying the same thing in different ways, one need not disown the logical equivalence criterion completely. One might, instead, choose to apply this criterion only to contingent propositions and to think up some new criterion for necessary and impossible ones. This manoeuvre<sup>1</sup> would make out a fundamental difference between contingent propositions, on the one hand, and necessary and impossible ones on the other. The difference would be great enough to render the expression, "proposition", ambiguous. For would a difference in kinds of entity, (in some quite strong sense of "kinds"), not have to result from a difference in identity conditions? Those who feel that there is a great difference between contingent and non-contingent propositions would acclaim this manoeuvre. Those who

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1. Discussing the question of synonymy and equipollence, (which, since it is not a question about the identity of objects, is a different question from the question of propositional identity), Lewis took a similar line. "We shall be in conformity with good usage", he says, "if we say that two expressions are synonymous or equipollent, (1) if they have the same intension and that intension is neither zero nor universal, or (2) if, their intension being either zero or universal, they are equivalent in analytic meaning," ("The Modes of Meaning", p. 246). Carnap replied by saying: "He applies this stronger relation [i.e., equivalence in analytic meaning], only to the two extreme cases of intension, for example, in the field of sentences, only to L-determinate and not to factual sentences. This discrimination seems to me somewhat arbitrary and inadvisable," (Meaning and Necessity, p. 61). Carnap then asks us to consider the sentences: (i) "Two is an even prime number", (ii) "Two is between one and three", (iii) "The number of books on this table is an even prime number", and (iv) "The number of books on this table is between one and three". He then says: "The sentences (i) and (ii) have the same intension but are not equivalent in analytic meaning (intensionally isomorphic). The same holds for (iii) and (iv). Now, according to Lewis' definition, (i) and (ii) are not synonymous because they are L-true, analytic; while (iii) and (iv) are synonymous because they are factual, synthetic. It seems to me that it would be more natural to regard (iii) and (iv) also as nonsynonymous, since the difference between them is essentially the same as that between (i) and (ii). The logical operation which leads from (i) to (ii) is the same as that which leads from (iii) to (iv); it is the transformation of "n is an even prime number" into "n is (a cardinal number) between one and three".

feel that the edges between the two classes of propositions should be blurred will oppose this manoeuvre. But this is a manoeuvre which I shall not explore in any more detail. My purpose in this Section is, instead, to see how far the logical equivalence criterion of propositional identity -- as a criterion which prescribes the same identity conditions for all propositions -- can be defended against some of the objections which have been made against it. The objections which I have been able to discover are of two sorts: the old sort, which turns on the unargued-for assumption that "believes" and "knows" are PR verbs of propositional attitude, and the new and more interesting sort, put forward recently by L.R. Reinhardt.<sup>1</sup>

As a representative objector of the old sort, we shall consider Arthur Pap. But let me lead up to his objections by saying some more things about PR and RBNPR. The lead-up will run for several pages. In the present work, I use the following verbs as PR verbs of propositional attitude, (and I happen to use them all with the same meaning): "said (that)", "made the statement (that)", "stated the proposition (that)", "stated (that)".<sup>2</sup> Thus, if a statement of the form:

(16) A said that p,

is used to make a true statement, and if I happen to think that the proposition that p = the proposition that q, then I shall consider myself justified in saying:

(17) A said that q;

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1. I shall consider Reinhardt's views towards the end of this Section.
  2. I take the liberty of extending the use of the expression "verb", to cover expressions of more than one word.

and this no matter how much A should protest to the contrary. To say that p is to utter a sentence which, in the context in which one utters it, means that p. It is the sentence which does the meaning, not the speaker. And, in a report of someone's statement, it is the meaning of his sentence, i.e., the proposition which he stated, which is at issue. I do not, of course, wish to prohibit other philosophers from using the verbs which I just mentioned as RBNPR verbs of propositional attitude, or, for that matter, from using these verbs in any other way which should happen to please them.

A good example of a RBNPR verb of propositional attitude is "said explicitly (that)". The truth of a statement made by means of a sentence of the form:

(18) A said explicitly that p,

together with the identity of the proposition that p and the proposition that q does not allow us to deduce:

(19) A said explicitly that q.

If Philip said that Cicero denounced Catiline, then, by (9), Philip said that Cicero and Catiline are related as denouncer to denounced. But, even granting (9), Philip may have said explicitly that Cicero denounced Catiline without ever having said explicitly that Cicero and Catiline are related as denouncer to denounced.

What, now, of my hypothesis, (13)? It seems to me that a perspicuous analysis of:

(20) Philip said explicitly that Cicero denounced Catiline,

would be:

(21) Philip uttered the sentence: "Cicero denounced Catiline", in a context in which that sentence meant that Cicero denounced Catiline.

If (21) is taken as the analysis of (20), then my hypothesis, (13), will be seen to have broken down a bit. But let us ignore, for the moment, the part of my hypothesis which breaks down and concentrate upon the part which we may regard as confirmed in the case of (20). Whereas the occurrence of the expression, (6), i.e., "that Cicero denounced Catiline", in the sentence, (20), is referential but not purely referential, the occurrence of (6) in (21) is purely referential. From the truth of the statement which one makes by means of sentence, (21), together with the truth of the identity, (9), we may deduce:

(22) Philip uttered the sentence: "Cicero denounced Catiline", in a context in which that sentence meant that Cicero and Catiline are related as denouncer to denounced.

(Also, since the proposition expressed by (21) is, by hypothesis, identical to the proposition expressed by (20), (22) follows from (20) and (9).)

It might be thought that no mention of a proposition is needed in the analysis of (20), that (20) may be analyzed as:

(23) Philip uttered the sentence: "Cicero denounced Catiline".

But this is wrong. In order for the statement I make, in present circumstances, by means of sentence (20), to be true, Philip must have uttered sentence, (1), (i.e., "Cicero denounced Catiline"), in circumstances in which (1) had the meaning which it would have, (i.e., meant the proposition which it would mean), if (1) were to be uttered in present circumstances. An example will make this clear. Suppose that the Secret Service uses "Cicero" as a code name for Mr Nixon and



"Catiline" as a code name for Ho Chi Minh. If Philip, a Secret Service agent, has uttered the sentence, (1), while talking to one of his comrades in the course of their daily business, then I may, in any circumstances<sup>1</sup>, use sentence (23) to make a true statement. But, unless I take special steps to indicate a special meaning for the words "Cicero" and "Catiline", the truth of (23) will not allow me to make a true statement by means of sentence (20) in the presence of a group of Latin scholars who are going about their daily business. In order for me to make a true statement by means of sentence, (20), the context of my utterance must be such as to make the "that"-clause in (20) refer to the proposition which was meant by sentence (1) when Philip uttered (1). This is why I think that reference to a proposition is needed in the analysis of (20).

These considerations lead to the view that reference to a proposition is also needed in the analysis of:

(24) Philip said that Cicero denounced Catiline,

and:

(3) Philip believes that Cicero denounced Catiline.

What I say, in present circumstances, by means of sentence, (24), cannot be true unless Philip has uttered some sentence, S, in circumstances in which S had the meaning which (1) would have, (i.e., meant the proposition which (1) would mean), were (1) uttered in

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1. I ignore the ambiguity of the word "Philip", the possible ambiguity of "uttered", "the", and "sentence", and the possibility of a convention according to which "'Cicero denounced Catiline'" would be used to refer to some sentence other than "Cicero denounced Catiline".

present circumstances. As for (3), even if we adopt one of the simplest theories of belief imaginable -- that for Philip to believe that Cicero denounced Catiline is for him to have performed a physical or mental 'nodding of his head' towards the sentence, (1) -- we must say, nonetheless, that for the statement I make, by means of sentence (3), in present circumstances, to be true, Philip must have performed this piece of head-nodding in circumstances where (1) had the meaning which (1) would have in present circumstances.

Quine -- whose motive is 'regimentation of theory', rather than such a simple theory of belief as the one just outlined -- suggests that we analyze a sentence like (3) as a sentence like:

(25) Philip believes-true "Cicero denounced Catiline",

a sentence which expresses a relation between a man and a sentence, (cf. Word and Object, p. 212). Quine would get rid of problems of ambiguity by 'eternalizing' the quoted sentence in (25), (cf. Word and Object, Section 40). We might add a time reference to "denounced", and we might replace "Cicero" and "Catiline" with detailed definite descriptions.<sup>1</sup> But there still remains the possibility that the quoted sentence, as Quine says, makes "sense in another language, and sense other than we intend," (Word and Object, p.213) A natural response to this difficulty, (cf. Word and Object, loc. cit.), would be to amend (25), (with the quoted sentence imagined as 'eternalized'), to:

(26) Philip believes-true in English "Cicero denounced Catiline".

But Quine would find this unsatisfactory. He says:

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1. For some purposes, "Philip" and "believes-true" might also be 'eternalized'.

The underlying form of...[a sentence such as (26)] is "w believes-true s in l", relating a man, a linguistic form, and a language. What are languages, and when do they count as identical or distinct? Clearly such questions should be unconnected with the propositional attitudes. It would be better to refer here not to a language l but to a speaker z, thus: "w believes-true s in z's sense". We have then an irreducibly triadic relative term "...believes-true...in... 's sense", relating a man, a linguistic form, and a man...In practice of course the appropriate substitute for "z" will regularly be the indicator word "me", since "that" clauses are always given in our own language, (Word and Object, p. 214).

But the new analysis:

(27) Philip believes-true "Cicero denounced Catiline" in my sense, makes just that reference to a proposition for which I have been arguing. For what is a sense of a sentence if it isn't a meaning of a sentence, i.e., a proposition? To say that the relative term is "irreducibly triadic" is, I think, to obscure this point.<sup>1</sup>

Let us now see how my hypothesis, (13), fails to get confirmed by my analysis of (20) as (21). I repeat these sentences for easy reference:

(20) Philip said explicitly that Cicero denounced Catiline

(21) Philip uttered the sentence: "Cicero denounced Catiline" in a context in which that sentence meant that Cicero denounced Catiline.

The expression which interests us here is (6), i.e.:

(6) that Cicero denounced Catiline.

Although (13) is partially confirmed by the fact that (6) has one

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1. In fairness to Quine, it must be said that the suggestion, quoted above, is not his official view. He makes the suggestion in the course of considering various ways of handling the ontology of propositional attitudes. But he eventually decides to ban reports of propositional attitudes altogether from the language of science. "If we are limning the true and ultimate structure of reality, the canonical scheme for us is the austere scheme that knows no quotation but direct quotation and no propositional attitudes but only the physical constitution and behavior of organisms," (Word and Object, p. 221).

purely referential occurrence in (21), (13) breaks down because, since (6)'s only occurrence in (21) is purely referential, (6) has no occurrence in (21) which is not referential at all. This is, however, just a technical difficulty. Something very much like (6), i.e.:

(1) Cicero denounced Catiline,

occurs in (21) without being used to refer to the proposition that Cicero denounced Catiline. And we may say that the occurrence of (1) in (21) illuminates one of the two roles which (6) plays in (20). So the spirit, if not the letter, of (13) is here confirmed. An idea for making (13) technically air tight comes to mind. We might say that the 'expression' which interests us in (20) is not the "that"-clause, (6), but the sentence, (1). We might then restrict our talk of the reference of a sentence to talk of reference to intensional entities, (we should refuse to say that a sentence in an extensional context refers at all). We could then say that (1) occurs referentially, but not purely referentially, in (20), and that it has two occurrences in (21): one purely referential and one not referential at all. We should then be able to say that the analysis of (20) as (21) confirms both the spirit and the letter of (13). But this tactic is in vain. For there is something wrong with its underlying assumption, i.e., that all sentences of the form:

(18) A said explicitly that p,

are to be analyzed on the model of (21), i.e., in the form:

(28) A uttered the sentence: "p", in a context in which that sentence meant that p.

Surely a statement made by means of the sentence:

(29) Hoover said explicitly that I am a Communist,

is not to be taken as entailing that Hoover uttered the sentence:

"I am a Communist"! A more likely analysis of (29) would be something like:

(30) Hoover uttered a sentence of the form: "(Singular Term) is a Communist", which, in the context in which he uttered it, meant that I am a Communist.

At a time like this, one must decide whether his goal is technical precision or elucidation of his subject matter. I choose the latter goal. Where definite descriptions and proper names are all that concern us, we may, I think, keep (13). But for cases where our interest is in "that"-clauses, I propose the following rough-and-ready emendation of (13):

(31) If an expression, (i.e., a "that"-clause), occurs referentially in a given sentence, and if the principle of substitutivity fails to apply to that expression, (i.e., if the occurrence is referential, but not purely referential), then it is possible to construct another sentence which expresses the same proposition as the original sentence, and which has the following properties: (I) it contains at least one purely referential occurrence of the expression in question, and: (II) it contains a string of words which bears an interesting resemblance to the expression in question.

The new sentence will serve to elucidate the roles which the expression plays in the original sentence. The role which this expression has of referring to its object, (in the case of a "that"-clause, the object will, of course, be a proposition), will be elucidated by the purely referential occurrence of the expression in the new sentence. The other role will be elucidated by the string of words which bears an interesting resemblance to the expression in question.

Thus, in (30), the string of words:

(32) uttered a sentence of the form: "(Singular Term) is a Communist,"

helps to show that one of the roles of:

(33) that I am a Communist,

in (29), is to help to make it clear that, instead of saying something like: "He is an advocate or supporter of an economic theory or system of the ownership of all property by the community as a whole," Hoover actually applied the expression, "is a Communist", to me. The other role which (33) has in (29) is, of course, to refer to the proposition that I am a Communist.

This has been a long, but unavoidable, digression from the main issue of this Section: attacks which have been made on the logical equivalence criterion of propositional identity. We are now ready to return to it. Consider Pap's attack. He begins with logically necessary statements, with which, he suggests, the logical equivalence criterion cannot cope:

For, an obvious criterion of adequacy which an explication of "proposition" (via the explication of synonymy of declarative sentences) should satisfy is that "A believes that p, and  $p = q$ " should entail "A believes that q". Yet, any two logically necessary statements are L-equivalent, but it could hardly be maintained that, where "p" and "q" are logically necessary, "A believes that p" entails "A believes that q". For example, anybody with a rudimentary knowledge of the propositional calculus will believe a simple tautology like " $((p \supset q) \& \sim q) \supset \sim p$ ", yet there are tautologies with respect to which he could profess neither belief nor disbelief because he does not recognize them as tautologies. In general, it is surely possible that, being familiar with the semantic and syntactic rules for the symbols of a logical system, one understands the sentences of the system, i.e., knows what propositions they express, yet does not know whether the propositions expressed are logically necessary. We all understand the sentence "for n greater than 2, there are no solutions for the equation:  $x^n + y^n = z^n$ ", i.e., know what proposition it expresses, but according to my information it is not yet known whether the proposition is logically necessary. But according to the L-equivalence criterion of propositional identity, we already believe this proposition if it is logically necessary! ("Belief and Propositions", p. 125)

But this objection clearly depends upon the view that "believes" is

a PR verb of propositional attitude. Assuming that the sentence about the equation expresses a truth of mathematics, and that the sentence in propositional calculus expresses a truth of logic, it follows from the logical equivalence criterion that:

(34) The proposition that  $((p \supset q) \& \sim q) \supset \sim p$  = the proposition that, for  $n$  greater than 2, there are no solutions for the equation:  $x^n + y^n = z^n$ .

But:

(35) Bill believes that for  $n$  greater than 2 there are no solutions for the equation  $x^n + y^n = z^n$ .

may be said to follow from (34) and:

(36) Bill believes that  $((p \supset q) \& \sim q) \supset \sim p$ ,

only if we accept the dogma<sup>1</sup> that "A believes that  $p$ , and  $p = q$ "

1. An interesting example of how much of a dogma this has been, (here as applied to "knows"), is C. Lewy's article, "Equivalence and Identity". This article is filled with a host of cautious turns of phrase, e.g.: "it seems to me that it is not incorrect...", "that all this is true I feel reasonably certain", "I feel inclined to say", etc. But I feel reasonably certain that it is not incorrect to say that one of the most confident remarks to be found in the article is: "The only thing that does seem to me to be quite certain is that it would be wrong to deny the premiss that it is definitely incorrect so to use the sentence "p and q are one and the same proposition" that what is expressed by it does not entail "Anybody who knows that p must know that q and anybody who knows that q must know that p", (pp. 229f.).

One person who did not accept this dogma was Carnap, who clearly distinguished the problem of synonymy from the problem of propositional identity. I am inclined to think that his statement that "the whole belief-sentence ["John believes that ..."] is neither extensional nor intensional with respect to the subsentence "...", (Meaning and Necessity, p. 53), was an attempt to get at the same idea as that at which I am trying to get when I say that "believes" is a RBNPR verb of propositional attitude. One of the ways in which I differ from Carnap is that whereas Carnap says: "Consequently, an interpretation of belief-sentences as referring either to sentences or to propositions is not quite satisfactory," (loc. cit.), I avail myself of a Quine-like notion of a referential, but not purely referential, occurrence of an expression and say that "that"-clauses in belief-sentences refer to propositions but do something else as well.

entails "A believes that q", i.e., that "believes is a PR verb of propositional attitude. If we reject this dogma, we may reject Pap's statement that "according to the L-equivalence criterion of propositional identity, we already believe this proposition".

My view, that "believes" is a RBNPR verb of propositional attitude, allows me to accept the logical equivalence criterion without accepting the frightful consequence which Pap draws from it. But, according to my hypothesis, (31), I am required to suggest an analysis for a sentence such as (36) which will illuminate the roles played by the "that"-clause in such a sentence. I shall respond to this requirement before too long. In the meantime, I want to say some more about some of Pap's remarks.

In the passage I quoted from Pap, there is a turn of phrase which is likely to mislead. He says: "one understands the sentences of the system, i.e., knows what propositions they express ...," and again he says: "We all understand the sentence...,i.e., know what proposition it expresses". Now although I should not deny that to understand a sentence, (as it is being used on a particular occasion, of course), is to know what proposition it expresses, or, in my more usual terminology, means, (on that occasion), the following argument is a bad one:

(37) Bill knows what proposition is expressed by the sentence, "p", and  
 Bill knows what proposition is expressed by the sentence, "q", and  
 The proposition expressed by "p" = the proposition expressed by "q".  
Therefore, Bill knows that the proposition expressed by "p" = the proposition expressed by "q".

A similarly bad argument will help us to bring out the flaw in (37).



(38) George IV knows what man Scott is, and George IV knows what man the author of Waverley is, and Scott = the author of Waverley.

Therefore, George IV knows that Scott is the author of Waverley.

Supposing that George IV has never received an answer to his famous question, the premisses of (38) may be true nonetheless. George IV knows what man Scott is: he knows that he is Sir Walter, that he is the Scottish nobleman who wears shepherd's plaid, and that he is the man who organized the King's visit to Edinburgh in 1822. Similarly, he knows what man the author of Waverley is: he knows, let us suppose, that he is the author of Marmion, that he is the author of The Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border, and that he is the man who caused a stir in Edinburgh by publishing an anonymous novel on July 7th, 1814.<sup>1</sup> But the King does not know enough about Scott to know that he is the author of Waverley. Nor does he know enough about the author of Waverley to know that he is Scott. The point is that one can know what man the so-and-so is without knowing everything there is to know about him. For us sub-angelic creatures, to know someone is not to know him perfectly.

The case is similar with propositions. I know what proposition is expressed by the sentence:

(39)  $((p \supset q) \ \& \sim q) \supset \sim p$ .

1. In fact, since it was already known on July 7th 1814, that Scott was the author of Marmion and The Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border, if George IV had known all these things about the author of Waverley, he would have guessed the identity. But I fabricate the example for my purposes. My authority for the definite descriptions is Janet R. Glover, The Story of Scotland, London, Faber and Faber, 1960.

Incidentally, I use "A knows something about B" in such a way that A can know something about B without knowing anything about C even though A = C. That is to say, in "A knows something about B", the occurrence of "B" is not purely referential.

It is the proposition that if  $p$  is true only if  $q$  is true, and if  $q$  is false, then  $p$  is false. I also know what proposition is expressed by the sentence:

(40) For  $n$  greater than 2, there are no solutions for the equation:  
 $x^n + y^n = z^n$ .

It is the proposition that  $\sim ((\exists n) (\exists x) (\exists y) (\exists z) ((n > 2) \& (x^n + y^n = z^n)))$ . But I do not know enough about the proposition expressed by (39) to know whether or not it is identical to the proposition expressed by (40). Nor do I know enough about the proposition expressed by (40) to know whether or not it is identical to the proposition expressed by (39). For us sub-angelic creatures, to understand a sentence is not to understand it completely. As Pap says: "Nobody, for example, would seriously doubt the identity of Scott and the author of Waverley just because a king some time ago was doubtful of this identity while being perfectly certain of Scott's self-identity," ("Belief and Propositions", pp. 124f.). Similarly, it does not follow from the fact that I do not know whether or not the proposition expressed by (39) is the proposition expressed by (40), ('while being perfectly certain of their self-identity'), that the proposition expressed by (39) is not the proposition expressed by (40).

One can understand a sentence without understanding it completely. Understanding comes in degrees.<sup>1</sup> We can apply this point

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1. This point may be applied to the theory of proper names discussed in Section VIII. According to this theory, the meaning, or sense, of "Socrates", is that of a description of Socrates which enumerates all of his properties. But it does not follow from this theory that I cannot understand "Socrates" without knowing everything there is to know about Socrates. I cannot have perfect understanding of "Socrates" unless I know everything there is to know about Socrates. But perfect understanding is not what counts, in everyday life, as understanding.

to the 'paradox of analysis'. This paradox has been given many different formulations. But I shall concentrate on Quine's. As he puts it:

how can a correct analysis be informative, since to understand it we must already know the meanings of its terms and hence already know that the terms which it equates are synonymous? (Word and Object, p. 259).

As we saw in Section III, analysis need not carry a synonymy claim. But it ought to carry a claim of propositional identity. Here is an example of a piece of analysis:

(41) The proposition that the present King of France does not exist = the proposition that  $\sim(\exists y) (y = (\lambda x) (x \text{ is present King of France}))$ .

But, to rephrase Quine's question, how can (41), if true, be informative, since to understand it we must already know what proposition is expressed by:

(42) The present King of France does not exist.

and what proposition is expressed by:

(43)  $\sim(\exists y) (y = (\lambda x) (x \text{ is present King of France}))$ ,

and hence already know what (41) is supposed to tell us? The answer is that I can understand (42) and (43), i.e., know what they express, without understanding them completely, i.e., without knowing everything there is to know about what they express. (41) is informative in that it may help one to increase his knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. One can have enough understanding of the sentence, (42), for example, to react appropriately to it in an everyday situation without knowing that the statement one makes by means of it can be

true if there is no such thing as the present King of France. (41)  
 helps one to acquire this piece of knowledge, it helps one to a  
 better understanding of the sentence.

After having, in the passage we quoted, considered the truths  
 of mathematics and logic, Pap turns to contingent propositions,  
 saying:

The L-equivalence criterion does not seem to be satisfied by con-  
 tingent propositions either. This can again be shown in terms of  
 the evident requirement that "A believes that p, and  $p = q$ " should  
 entail "A believes that q". It will surely be granted that it is  
 impossible to have a propositional attitude, whether belief or dis-  
 belief or doubt or any other, towards a proposition some of whose  
 constituent concepts one does not "have". A man who does not under-  
 stand the meanings of color predicates, e.g., cannot have a propositional  
 attitude towards a proposition containing a color concept. ("Belief  
 and Propositions", p. 125).

Pap then lays down a criterion for whether or not a concept is a  
 "genuine constituent" of the proposition expressed by a sentence.  
 His criterion is in terms of whether or not the word which expres-  
 ses the concept occurs "essentially" in the sentence. (I shall  
 not go into the details of 'essential occurrence'.) He then says:

"x is orange" is logically equivalent to "x is intermediate-in-  
 colour between Red and Yellow", but all the descriptive terms occur  
 essentially, hence we can argue that a man having a propositional  
 attitude towards the proposition expressed by the first sentence  
 might fail to have a propositional attitude towards the proposition  
 expressed by the second sentence, since he might, say, have a con-  
 cept of the color Orange without having a concept of the color Red:  
 for the latter concept is a genuine constituent of the proposition  
 expressed by the second sentence. ("Belief and Propositions", p.126)

Pap would argue that although the proposition that this is orange  
 is logically equivalent to the proposition that this is intermediate  
 in color between red and yellow, these propositions are not identi-  
 cal. And he would back up his argument by saying that if A has the  
 concept of orange and does not have the concept of red, then:

(44) A believes that this is orange,

and:

(45) A believes that this is intermediate in color between red and yellow,

can differ in truth value. This argument against the logical equivalence criterion of propositional identity depends upon the dogma that "believes" is a PR verb of propositional attitude, and it may be dismissed for this reason. I have another reason, however, for quoting these new passages from Pap: the very idea that propositions should contain concepts as 'constituents'! If someone wants to use the word, "proposition", in such a way as to make a proposition a mental container for concepts, then he has every right to do so. But this use of "proposition" is not forced upon us.<sup>1</sup> We do not have to treat propositions as mental entities. If someone insists upon talking about concepts, it seems to me that a reasonable line to take would be the following one. First, we follow Geach in defining a "concept" as a mental capacity belonging to a particular person. It will be a sufficient condition for one's having a certain concept that he should have mastered the intelligent use of a word for that concept in some language, (cf. Mental Acts, p. 12). Next, we say that to believe is to do something or other with one's concepts. We might say that concepts are exercised in "acts of judgment", which acts take place at least as often

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1. I see no reason to think that Wittgenstein, to whose Tractatus 5.141 Lewy attributes the logical equivalence criterion of propositional identity, (cf. "Equivalence and Identity", p. 223), ever thought that a Satz was a container of concepts. Yet, when discussing this criterion, Lewy constantly talks of propositions as things which contain concepts.

as one makes up his mind how to answer a question, (cf. Mental Acts, p. 9). We could -- this is to depart a bit from Geach -- say that to believe that p is to have recently judged that p, or to be ready to judge that p, or to be disposed to judge that p. For simplicity's sake, however, we can just use "judge" in the present tense and treat "A judges that p" as equivalent to "A believes that p". This will allow us to drop "judges" and stick to "believes". Next, we say that to believe is to exercise one's concepts in such-and-such a way. (cf. Mental Acts, Chapter 14). Thus, a man who believes what A is said to believe in (44) would exercise his concepts: this, is, and orange. And a man who believes what A is said to believe in (45) would exercise his concepts: this, is, intermediate, in, colour, between, red, and, and yellow. Thus, assuming that:

(46) Philip believes that this is orange,

and:

(47) Bill believes that this is intermediate in colour between red and yellow,

we find Philip and Bill exercising different sets of concepts. Next, to leave Geach finally, we introduce a new verb of propositional attitude: "is committed to the truth of the proposition (that)". This verb has five important properties. First, it is a PR verb of propositional attitude. That is to say, if  $p = q$ , then A is committed to the truth of the proposition that p just in case A is committed to the truth of the proposition that q. Second, it is a sufficient, although not a necessary condition for one's being committed to the truth of the proposition that p that one should believe that p. Third, it is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for one to be committed to the truth of the pro-

position that p that he should have a belief which entails, (i.e., strictly implies), the proposition that p. That is to say, if A believes that q, and if the proposition that q entails the proposition that p, then A is committed to the truth of the proposition that p; and if A is committed to the truth of the proposition that p, then some statement made by means of a sentence of the form: "A believes that q", such that the proposition that q entails the proposition that p, is true.<sup>1</sup> Fourth, (this follows from the third, but I put it in for clarity), it is a sufficient condition for one's being committed to the truth of the proposition that p that one should have a belief which is logically equivalent to the proposition that p. Fifth, one who is committed to the truth of the proposition that p satisfies the intuitive notion of being committed to the truth of a proposition which I think is conveyed by the words: "is committed to the truth of the proposition that p".

We now find that whereas Philip and Bill, in (46) and (47) exercise different sets of concepts, they commit themselves to the truth of the same proposition. The upshot is that whereas a concept is a mental entity -- or "capacity" as Geach would have it -- a proposition is not a mental thing but is what one commits oneself to the truth of by exercising one's concepts.

I now want to suggest how someone who likes to talk about concepts might respond to my hypothesis, (31). (46) and (47) will get analyzed as:

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1. The notion of being committed to the truth of the proposition that p might be extended in such a way that someone who says that q but who does not believe that q would, if the proposition that p is entailed by the proposition that q, become committed to the truth of the proposition that p. Were the notion extended in this way, it would no longer be a necessary, but only a sufficient condition for one's being committed to the truth of the proposition that p that he should have a belief which entails the proposition that p. But I shall not bother, here, to extend the notion in this way.

(48) Philip is committed to the truth of the proposition that this is orange by his exercise of the concepts: this, is, and orange.

(49) Bill is committed to the truth of the proposition that this is intermediate in colour between red and yellow by his exercise of the concepts: this, is, intermediate, in, colour, between, red, and, and yellow.

Such analyses would confirm (31). The expressions:

(50) that this is orange,

and:

(51) that this is intermediate in colour between red and yellow,

occur referentially, but not purely referentially, in (46) and (47). But, since "is committed to the truth of the proposition (that)" is a PR verb of propositional attitude, these expressions have purely referential occurrences in (48) and (49). In (46) and (47), these expressions play two roles at once. One role is the role of referring to a proposition. The other role is illuminated by strings of words, in (48) and (49), which bear interesting resemblances to the expressions, (50) and (51). This is the role of indicating the concepts by the exercise of which Philip and Bill commit themselves to the truth of this proposition, the concepts in terms of which their beliefs are framed.

Since, by the logical equivalence criterion, the proposition that this is orange = the proposition that this is intermediate in colour between red and yellow<sup>1</sup>, and since "is committed to the truth of the proposition (that)" is PR verb of propositional attitude, we may deduce, from (48) and (49), that:

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1. I assume, of course, a unique reference for "this".



(52) Philip is committed to the truth of the proposition that this is intermediate in colour between red and yellow by his exercise of the concepts: this, is, and orange,

and that:

(53) Bill is committed to the truth of the proposition that this is orange by his exercise of the concepts: this, is, intermediate, in colour, between, red, and, and yellow.

If (48) and (49) are correct analyses of (46) and (47), then, of course, (52) and (53) follow from (46) and (47) together with the appropriate statement of propositional identity. Incidentally, by the third property of "is committed to the truth of the proposition (that)", we may deduce from (48) and (49) that:

(54) Philip and Bill are committed to the truth of the proposition that this is coloured.

Assuming that (48) and (49) are correct analyses of (46) and (47), (54), of course, follows from (46) and (47). On an intuitive understanding of "believes" and "is committed to the truth of the proposition (that)", I think that all these entailments ought to be welcome.

We can give similar treatment, I think, to sentences of mathematics and logic.

(36) Bill believes that  $((p \supset q) \ \& \ \sim q) \supset \sim p$ ,

would get analyzed as:

(55) Bill is committed to the truth of the proposition that  $((p \supset q) \ \& \ \sim q) \supset \sim p$  by his exercise of the concepts: left hand bracket twice, propositional variable "p" twice, horseshoe twice, propositional variable "q" twice, right hand bracket twice, ampersand once, and tilde twice.

We need not balk at the idea of a concept of left hand bracket, for example, if we remember that we are following Geach in saying that

a concept is a mental capacity. Here we have the mental capacity to use and to react appropriately to a left hand bracket.

Given the logical equivalence criterion, we have the identity:

(56) The proposition that  $((p \supset q) \& \sim q) \supset \sim p =$  the proposition that  $\sim(p \& \sim p)$ .

And, since "is committed to the truth of the proposition (that)" is a PR verb of propositional attitude, it follows from (55) and (56) that:

(57) Bill is committed to the truth of the proposition that  $\sim(p \& \sim p)$  by his exercise of the concepts: left hand bracket twice, propositional variable "p" twice, horseshoe twice, propositional variable "q" twice, right hand bracket twice, ampersand once, and tilde twice.

And, assuming that (55) is a correct analysis of (36),

(57) follows from (36) and (56). Similarly, we could deduce from:

(58) Bill believes that some object is both red all over and green all over,

and:

(59) The proposition that some object is both red all over and green all over = the proposition that  $p \& \sim p$ ,

that:

(60) Bill is committed to the truth of the proposition that  $p \& \sim p$  by his exercise of the concepts: some once, object once, is once, both once, red once, all twice, over twice, and once, and green once.

It will be noticed that anyone who has any belief whatever will be committed to the truth of the necessary proposition, (although he need not believe it). Also, we should try to avoid believing contradictions. Anyone who believes a contradiction is

committed to the truth of the impossible proposition, the necessary proposition, and all the contingent propositions there are.

Given an intuitive understanding of "believes" and "is committed to the truth of the proposition (that)", these conclusions should be welcome. But a problem arises with this way of approaching things. Given the identity:

(61) The proposition that  $((p \supset q) \& \sim q) \supset \sim p$  = the proposition that  $\sim \sim ((p \supset q) \& p) \supset q$ ,

and the assumption that (55) is the correct analysis of (36), we may deduce, from (36):

(62) Bill is committed to the truth of the proposition that  $\sim \sim ((p \supset q) \& p) \supset q$  by his exercise of the concepts: left hand bracket twice, propositional variable "p" twice, horseshoe twice, propositional variable "q" twice, right hand bracket twice, ampersand once, and tilde twice.

But (62) would be the analysis of:

(63) Bill believes that  $\sim \sim ((p \supset q) \& p) \supset q$ .

This turn of events would be unwelcome to someone who held that it is possible, (for, say, a student who is just starting to learn the propositional calculus), to believe that  $((p \supset q) \& \sim q) \supset \sim p$  without believing that  $\sim \sim ((p \supset q) \& p) \supset q$ . We could try to salvage this approach by introducing the notion of order into the list of concepts in the analysis of a belief sentence. Perhaps something along the lines of Chapter 14 of Geach's Mental Acts would be appropriate. But I shall not explore this any further. I have merely been trying to indicate the sort of approach which might be taken by someone who likes to talk about concepts.

An alternative way of approaching belief would be along the

lines of the simple minded theory which I hinted at, several pages back, by suggesting that for Philip to believe that Cicero denounced Catiline is for him to have performed a physical or mental 'nodding of his head' towards the sentence: "Cicero denounced Catiline".

We could make this theory a bit more sophisticated by saying that to believe is to have performed, to be ready to perform, or to be disposed to perform a judgment, and that to judge is to mentally or physically 'nod one's head' towards a seen, heard, or imagined sentence.<sup>1</sup> Then, using "performs a judgment", for simplicity's sake, in the present tense -- we should analyze (46), i.e.:

(46) Bill believes that this is orange,

as:

(64) Bill, who performs a judgment involving the sentence: "This is orange", is committed to the truth of the proposition that this is orange.

It will go without saying that, in order for (46) to be true, Bill must perform his judgment in a context in which the sentence, "This is orange", means that this is orange.<sup>2</sup>

1. If we read "to nod one's head" as "to have a feeling of belief", this theory would be not unlike the one offered by Russell in Lecture XII of The Analysis of Mind. Among the ways in which the theories differ, however, is in that, whereas on the theory we are considering, we nod our heads only to sentences, Russell's belief-feelings exist in relation to "contents", which "may consist of words only, or of images only, or of a mixture of the two, or of either or both together with one or more sensations," (The Analysis of Mind, p. 236). On the theory we are considering, though, one might allow images and sensations to enter into the context of the sentence towards which one nods his head.

2. The reader may imagine me to be pointing towards something on my desk when I write the word, "this" without quotes, in (46), (64), and the marked sentence.

Again, my hypothesis, (31), would be confirmed. (64) would show that, in (46), the expression, "that this is orange", plays two roles. One of its roles is to refer to the proposition that this is orange. And the other role is to indicate the words in terms of which Bill's belief is formed.

On the theory we are now considering, "believes" is treated much in the way in which we treated "said explicitly". Similar playing-around with indicator words will be appropriate. For example:

(65) Hoover believes that I am a Communist,

will be analyzed, not as:

(66) Hoover, who performs a judgment involving the sentence: "I am a Communist", is committed to the truth of the proposition that I am a Communist,

but as:

(67) Hoover, who performs a judgment involving a sentence of the form: "(Singular Term) is a Communist", is committed to the truth of the proposition that I am a Communist.

This is not, of course, to deny that Hoover could come to believe that I am a Communist by nodding his head towards the sentence, "I am a Communist", while that sentence is uttered by me.

This theory would have what some would count as an advantage over the one which talks of concepts.

(36) Bill believes that  $((p \supset q) \ \& \ \sim q) \supset \sim p$ ,

would become:

(68) Bill, who performs a judgment involving the sentence: " $((p \supset q) \ \& \ \sim q) \supset \sim p$ ", is committed to the truth of the proposition that  $((p \supset q) \ \& \ \sim q) \supset \sim p$ ,

which, together with (61), would allow us to deduce:

(69) Bill, who performs a judgment involving the sentence: " $((p \supset q) \& \sim q) \supset \sim p$ ", is committed to the truth of the proposition that  $\sim \sim ((p \supset q) \& p) \supset q$ .

But, since (69) is not the analysis of (63), we should avoid the conclusion that one cannot believe that  $((p \supset q) \& \sim q) \supset \sim p$  without believing that  $\sim \sim ((p \supset q) \& p) \supset q$ , without bothering to introduce the idea of order among concepts.

Another problem of order would also be affected. One who believes that John loves Mary would, on the concept theory, exercise the concepts: John, loves, and Mary. But then, so would someone who believes that Mary loves John. How can we ~~make~~ out the difference between believing that John loves Mary and believing that Mary loves John? Geach, (cf. Mental Acts, Chapter 14), proposes to solve such a problem by introducing a special relation among one's 'exercises' of his concepts. But, on the theory we are now considering, we need no such special relation. A man who believes that John loves Mary nods his head towards the sentence: "John loves Mary". A man who believes that Mary loves John nods his head towards the sentence: "Mary loves John". The question of how the sentence: "John loves Mary", gets to mean that John loves Mary, and how the sentence: "Mary loves John", gets to mean that Mary loves John becomes a part of the general question of how any sentence ever gets to mean anything. But, since the problem of the meaning of sentences will exist no matter what theory of belief we adopt, and since the theory of belief which talks of concepts leads to the problem of order among concepts, the theory of belief which talks of sentences has the advantage of leading to fewer problems.

Someone who wants to hold that:

(7)) Bill believes that Hume is the precursor of modern empiricism,

can be true while:

(71) Bill believes that Hume is the forerunner of modern empiricism,

is false, might also find the present theory preferable to the one which talks of concepts. For, presumably, the concept precursor is identical to the concept forerunner. On the other hand, though, a concept theorist might want to emphasize Geach's talk of subjective mental capacities, and to say that, whereas my concept precursor might be identical to my concept forerunner, Bill's concept precursor might not be identical to Bill's concept forerunner.

Let us now see how the theory which talks of sentences runs into trouble.

(72) The Pope believes that God exists,

will become:

(73) The Pope, who performs a judgment involving the sentence: "God exists", is committed to the truth of the proposition that God exists.

But, if the Pope does not understand English, then it is hard to see how (73) can be true. So we reach the conclusion that, if the Pope does not understand English, then he is an agnostic.<sup>1</sup> We could avoid this conclusion by introducing some kind of translation relation, R, (perhaps something along the lines of Carnap's "intensional

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1. cf. Church, Review of Quine's "Notes on Existence and Necessity," for a similar point.

isomorphism", cf. Meaning and Necessity, Chapter 14, would be in order), which would allow us to treat (72) as something like:

(74) The Pope, who performs a judgment involving some sentence which bears R to the English sentence, "God exists", is committed to the truth of the proposition that God exists.

This would allow us to avoid the conclusion that Popes who do not speak English are agnostics. But we should have another problem. It would be difficult to think up a translation relation which holds between, say, "Deus est", and "God exists", but which does not hold between the two English sentences: "Hume is the precursor of modern empiricism" and "Hume is the forerunner of modern empiricism".<sup>1</sup> So, if we take the approach exhibited by (74), we shall have to give up saying that (70) and (71) can differ in truth value.

I am not going to come down in favour of either of the theories of belief which we have been considering. The important point is what they have in common: that in a sentence of the form: "A believes that p", what is at issue is not just the proposition that p. It is both the proposition that p and the features of A's mental life in terms of which his belief is formed.

To just touch upon some more verbs of propositional attitude, whereas I treat "says" and "is committed to the truth of the proposition (that)" as PR verbs of propositional attitude, I should

1. The relation of 'intensional isomorphism', as amended by Putnam, (cf. "Synonymity and the Analysis of Belief Sentences"), would not hold between: "Bill believes that Hume is the precursor of modern empiricism, but Bill does not believe that Hume is the forerunner of modern empiricism" and: "Bill believes that Hume is the precursor of modern empiricism, but Bill does not believe that Hume is the precursor of modern empiricism". But it would hold between: "Hume is the precursor of modern empiricism" and: "Hume is the forerunner of modern empiricism". Most people would, I think, just deny that (71) and (70) can differ in truth value. But I find this difficult to deny.



think that "asserts", "expresses the thought", and "intends" to convey the information"<sup>would</sup> be RBNPR verbs of propositional attitude, and apt for analysis roughly along the lines of "believes". In general, if a verb of propositional attitude has to do only with the meaning of a sentence, then it is a PR verb of propositional attitude. But if it has also to do with what is meant by, or what is thought by, or what words are actually used by the person who has the propositional attitude, then it is a RBNPR verb of propositional attitude.

I now want to say something about L.R. Reinhardt's attack on the logical equivalence criterion of propositional identity. I think it goes wrong in an interesting way. Reinhardt asks us to consider:

(75) Edinburgh is north of London,

and:

(76) London is south of Edinburgh.

Then, reviving an argument of John Anderson's<sup>1</sup>, Reinhardt says:

[(75) and (76)] entail each other. And, because of that, it will often be natural to say that people who say them are saying the same thing....Anderson points out reasons for regarding two such assertions as different. First of all, it is clear, to speak Fregean, that the propositions are the results of assigning different values to two different propositional functions, viz. "x is North of London" and "x is South of Edinburgh". It is obvious that the ranges of these functions are not identical, which is only to say that some cities north of London are not south of Edinburgh and some cities south of Edinburgh are not north of London. ("Propositions and Speech Acts", p. 177)

This argument, if I understand it correctly, is not enough to prove

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1. Reinhardt's source is "Relational Arguments", pp. 148-161 of John Anderson, Studies in Empirical Philosophy, Sydney, Angus and Robertson, Ltd., 1963.

that the proposition expressed by sentence (75) is not identical to the proposition expressed by sentence (76). In the first place, Reinhardt begs the question by using "propositions" in the plural. But let us ignore this point. On the only interpretation which I can give to Reinhardt's argument, which does not make it out to be a piece of question-begging, he is arguing that since the proposition, (75), is a result of assigning the value, Edinburgh,<sup>1</sup> to the function:

(77) x is north of London,

and since the proposition, (76), is a result of assigning the value, London, to the function:

(78) x is south of Edinburgh,

(75) and (76)<sup>2</sup> are different propositions. The principle seems to be that one proposition cannot be a value of two different functions. But, by parity of reasoning, I can argue that since the proposition:

(79) John loves Mary,

is a result of assigning the value, John, to the function:

(80) x loves Mary,

and since the proposition:

(81) John loves Mary,

1. I am following Quine's convention of calling entities "values". Hence the absence of quotes around "Edinburgh".
2. I lapse, here, into my practice of sometimes using "(n)" to mean "the proposition which, I imagine, sentence (n) expresses".

is a result of assigning the value, Mary, to the function:

(82) John loves x,

(79) and (81) are different propositions.

Perhaps, though, the following argument would be more in Reinhardt's spirit. Since the proposition:

(83) Bill loves Mary,

is a result of assigning the value, Bill, to the function:

(84) x loves Mary,

and since the proposition:

(85) Mary is loved by Bill,

is a result of assigning the value, Mary, to the function:

(86) x is loved by Bill,

(83) and (85) are different propositions. Now many of us should consider this argument to be just as preposterous as the argument about (79) and (81). Obviously, we should say, the proposition that Bill loves Mary is the same proposition as the proposition that Mary is loved by Bill. But consider what Reinhardt goes on to say about (75) and (76):

Anderson goes on to say that the two assertions "raise the quite distinct question of what is north of London and what is south of Edinburgh". This point is more significant than it might look. For it means that the two logically equivalent assertions will normally be made in two different contexts of inquiry...This may seem obscure; for just what is a context of inquiry?....If functions are to be kept down to earth and not to become as troublesome as universals have been, I think it must be necessary to introduce some notion such as a context of inquiry, a human activity

of some kind. The questions to which "London is south of Edinburgh" and "Edinburgh is north of London" would be the answers, would arise in different situations, out of different concerns and interests. ...("Propositions and Speech Acts", pp. 177f.)

As a refutation of the view that (75) and (76) are the same proposition, this argument is as bad as the one we quoted earlier. For we may simply reply by saying that it is not impossible for the same proposition to be asserted now in one 'context of inquiry', now in another. But I did not quote Reinhardt in order to have the pleasure of refuting him. I have had to take the reader through these refutations in order to clear the way for a point which Reinhardt suggests, and which, I think, he should be making. Although, as I should say, the proposition that Edinburgh is north of London is identical to the proposition that London is south of Edinburgh, the sentences, (75) and (76) are likely to be used in different circumstances. To use an example different from Reinhardt's, if we are asked: "Where is Edinburgh?", it is more likely that we should utter sentence (75) than that we should utter sentence (76). Similarly, it might be said that, if we are interested in Bill's love life, then we are more likely to utter sentence (83) than we are to utter sentence (85), and that, if we are interested in what admirers Mary has, then we are more likely to utter sentence (85) than we are to utter sentence (83). And, similarly again, I have heard it argued by linguists that, if we utter sentence:

(87) John did not kill Tom,

with phonetic stress on the first word, then we are likely to be suggesting that, although Tom was killed, it was not John who killed him. If, however, we put the stress on the fourth word,

then we are likely to be suggesting that, although John did harm to Tom, he did not kill him. If, finally, we put the stress on the fifth word, we are likely to be suggesting that, although John killed someone, he killed someone other than Tom. Now, assuming that all these statements of empirical linguistics are true, the conclusion I should draw is not that we have a lot more propositions than we thought we had, but that the stating of propositions, although important, is a very small part of our use of language. I see no reason why we should not say that, although, if I utter (87) with stress on one word, then I am suggesting one thing, and, if I utter (87) with stress on another word, then I am suggesting another thing, in either case I am stating the same proposition. This is not to denigrate the role of phonetic stress in communication, (as my remarks would do were I to argue that the stating of propositions is all that is important in language). I am merely arguing for a careful distinction between the proposition one states and the many other things which one does by means of the sounds he makes when he states that proposition. To return to (75) and (76), to say that these sentences express the same proposition is not to play down Reinhardt's 'contexts of inquiry' and 'human activities'. It is rather, (to assume an intuitive understanding of Reinhardt's expressions), to distinguish the question: "What proposition is he stating by means of that sentence?" from the question: "Within what context of inquiry, (or human activity), is he using that sentence to state that proposition?".

Let us now turn to the truths of mathematics. Reinhardt asks us to consider:

(88) The first even prime number is less than 5,

and:

(89) The sum of 1 plus 1 is less than 5,

and he says:

Now why should we say that both of these say the same thing or express the same proposition? They are likely to occur in quite different mathematical inquiries and the aims and interests of the inquiries are likely to be different. ("Propositions and Speech Acts", p. 176)

It seems to me that one reason which one might have for adopting the logical equivalence criterion of propositional identity would be to emphasize the importance of what Reinhardt would call the "aims and interests" of a mathematical or logical inquiry. Consider:

(75) Edinburgh is north of London,

again, and

(90) Inverness is north of Edinburgh.

The logical equivalence criterion marks a big difference between sentence (75) and sentence (90). According to the logical equivalence criterion, people who utter these sentences state different propositions. For this reason, one might well be tempted to think that, in this case, the difference of propositions stated is, among the differences between the sentences, the most important one. But, in the case of (88) and (89), there will be no such temptation. According to the logical equivalence criterion, people who utter (88), (89), and, for that matter:

(91)  $\sim(p \ \& \ \sim p)$ ,

all state the same proposition. So one who holds the logical equivalence criterion, and who wants to find out what point there can be in uttering such sentences as (88), (89), and (91) will lose interest in the proposition stated and will be forced to look elsewhere for an answer. (88), (89), and (91) just do not differ in the salient way in which (75) and (90) differ. They differ in some other way. But what other way? It seems reasonable to say that we ought to look for an answer in terms of what Reinhardt would call the "aims and interests" of the inquiries in the course of which we utter these sentences. And, once our attention has been drawn to "aims and interests", we shall be tempted to undertake an inquiry into the "aims and interests" of people who utter such contingent sentences as (75) and (90). (Perhaps some considerations such as these were what led Wittgenstein to do some of his later work.)

Having adopted Reinhardt's talk of "aims and interests", I now have a duty to embark upon a general discussion of aims and interests, to tell the reader, for example, what are the aims and interests of people who utter the sentences of logic and mathematics. But I cannot respond to this duty just now. I have been trying to get the reader to have some kindly feelings towards the idea that we ought to distinguish the proposition one states from the many other things which go on when one utters a sentence, and the proposition one commits oneself to the truth of from the many other things which go on when one has a belief. But to explain in more detail what these other things are would require work of the sort which I,

at present, am only in a position to think about beginning. I hasten to add that I have not made an explicit statement of what I mean by "proposition" either. But perhaps some of my remarks will have served to give the reader and myself a rough idea of what I mean by that expression.



## Section XIII: CONCLUDING REMARK

Although the preceding pages contain a number of flaws, I am of the opinion that the work there embodied constitutes a foundation for future work on problems of great importance. In order that the reader may know the direction in which I consider this work to lead, I shall list a number of these problems. They are all problems which, had I not written the preceding pages, I should not have been able to begin to consider.

What sort of thing, ontologically speaking, is a proposition? What about the Strawson-Quine controversy concerning whether there can be a language which has no singular terms? What would happen to the theory of proper names, outlined in Section VIII, if, perchance, there existed two things, each of which having all of Socrates's properties? What sort of 'world view' should be adopted by one who accepts this theory of proper names? What are properties? What, aside from stating the necessary proposition or the impossible proposition, do we do when we utter a sentence of logic or mathematics? What is it which gives a word its meaning? What of the alternatives which have been offered to strict implication as an explication of entailment? Are there two senses of "follows from": a logical one and an epistemological one? What of Quine's refutation of two dogmas of empiricism? What of Quine's doctrine of the "indeterminacy of translation"? Does talk about the 'nodding of one's head' or the having of a 'belief-feeling' provide the best explanation of the difference between believing that  $p$  and merely considering what someone says when he says that  $p$ ?

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APPENDIX: PUBLISHED PAPERS.

## TELLING AND GIVING

By FRANK J. LEAVITT

VIRGIL C. ALDRICH asks whether 'telling you something you already know [is] like giving you something you don't need or, rather, like going through the motions of giving you something that already belongs to you' ('Telling, Acknowledging and Asserting', ANALYSIS, 27.2). He concludes that it is like the latter, and that in cases where the listener already has the information, the effort goes into 'going through the motions, not into the illocutionary act of telling'.

But he has begged the question by assuming that telling is like giving. Telling appears to be like giving because in many, (but, as we shall see, not in all) cases where we say that someone *told* something, (that p, to do A, how to do A, *etc.*) to someone, we can equally well say that someone *gave* something, (some information, an order, some instructions, *etc.*) to someone.

But this should not lead us to ignore the differences between the two activities. In the first place, giving material objects, like Volkswagens, is quite different from giving more ethereal things like information orders, and instructions. A necessary condition for my giving you a material object is that this object be mine to give. I cannot give you the Brooklyn Bridge. But I can give orders or instructions in cases where it makes no sense to speak of these 'objects' being mine, and I can give information in cases (as when I relay a message written in a code which I do not understand, or when I unwittingly tip you off to the answer to a problem) where I do not possess this information myself.

As Aldrich rightly points out, a necessary condition for the giving of a material object is that the recipient does not already possess the object. But this does not hold true for 'objects' like orders and instructions. Hitler repeated several times the order to burn Paris. We surely can't allow our theories to force us to say here that the successive orders were not the same order or that none but the first were orders at all.

Where the 'object' is a piece of information, however, Aldrich's principle holds good. It is impossible to give someone a piece of information which he already has. But this is just what illuminates the difference between telling someone that p and giving someone information to the effect that p. Your knowing that my home team is better than yours need not stop me (logically or otherwise) from bombarding you with this fact by *telling* it to you day after day. But only if you are not aware of it already can I *give* you this information. Telling is certainly going on. But no information is given.

*University of Edinburgh*

## DISCUSSIONS

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### *On Strawson's revised position on identifying reference*<sup>1</sup>

By Frank J. Leavitt (University of Edinburgh)

Consider the following well-worn questions:

(1) If someone, today, were to say, "The king of France is bald", would that person be saying something false, or would he rather be saying something which has no truth-value?

(2) If someone, today, were to say, "The king of France is bald", would that person be stating that there exists at least and no more than one entity which is king of France? (i.e., would he be stating what I shall call an "existential-uniqueness proposition"?)

Russellians argue that of the alternatives presented by question (1), the former is the correct one. They also argue that the answer to question (2) is "yes". I shall call these the "Russellian answers" to these questions.

Strawson, in "On Referring", (*Mind*, 1950), maintained that the latter alternative presented by (1) is the correct one. He also maintained that the answer to question (2) is "no". I shall call these the "Strawsonian answers" to these questions.

In a more recent article, ("Identifying Reference and Truth-Values", *Theoria*, XXX, 1964), Strawson presents his new views on the matter. He now maintains, (p. 106), that it is not important to come down on one side or the other in the dispute presented by (1). He says that both sides emphasize different kinds of philosophical interests, and that "each has its own merits".

But he argues that it is important to disentangle (1) from (2). He says that regardless of the position which one takes on ques-

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<sup>1</sup> I am indebted to Mr. Ian Wilson for helpful criticism of the first draft of this essay.



tion (1), the Strawsonian position on question (2) "remains a decisive objection" to Russell's Theory of Description, (p. 107). There is at least the following truth in this: one can be a Strawsonian on question (2) and, not inconsistently, take either side on question (1).

Strawson further indicates, (p. 108), that if one takes the Russellian position on (2), one is bound to accept the Russellian position on (1). This is quite correct. If part of what one states when he says, "The king of France is bald", is an existential-uniqueness position, then if that existential-uniqueness proposition is false, he is making a false statement. But Strawson does not give much consideration to this way of being forced into agreeing with Russell. He rather maintains that question (2) is "uncontroversial", and that the Strawsonian answer to it is "undeniable".

It is my intention to bring question (2) into controversy by arguing that the Strawsonian answer to it is ill-founded. My aim is not to prove the Russellian position. It would be extremely difficult to prove that given that someone has produced a certain utterance he has made a certain statement. Such a proof would presuppose a quite sophisticated semantic theory which included a rigorous procedure for deciding what illocutionary act someone has performed on the basis of the utterance he has produced and the linguistic and extra-linguistic context in which he produced it. I am not prepared to present such a theory, for my aim is only the modest one of establishing that Strawson's argument in favour of his position on (2) is ill-founded.

Strawson's argument is contained in the following quotation:

Now one thing that is absolutely clear is that it can be no part of the speaker's intention in the case of such utterances [as "The king of France is bald"] to *inform* the audience of the *existence* of a particular item bearing the name or answering to the description and distinguished by that fact, or by that fact plus something else known to the audience, from any other. On the contrary, the very task of identifying reference, as described, can be undertaken only by a speaker who knows or presumes his audience's existence and uniqueness as this. The task of identifying reference is *defined* in terms of a type of speaker-intention which rules out ascription to the speaker of the intention to impart the

existence-and-uniqueness information in question . . . Thus, that there exists a particular item to which the name or description is applicable and which, if not unique in this respect, satisfies some uniqueness-condition known to the hearer (*and* satisfies some uniqueness-condition known to the speaker) is no part of what the speaker *asserts* in an utterance in which the name or description is used to perform the function of identifying reference; it is, rather, a *presupposition* of his asserting what he asserts. (pp. 101 f.)

Now it should be noticed that Strawson makes use of the word, "asserts", in the above quotation. In so doing, he makes his position sound slightly more plausible than it ought to sound by making (2) into a question not about whether certain propositions are *stated* in certain circumstances, but rather about whether these propositions are *asserted* in these circumstances. He does this, by the way, notwithstanding the fact that by the use of the expression, "falsity in statement", (p. 97), at the beginning of his article, he has introduced the question as a question about statements and not as a question about assertions. Although I think that, in the long run, Strawson's position is not made any stronger by the shift from statements to assertions, I think that it will make things less complicated if we delete assertion talk and insert statement talk in our formulation of his position.

It should also be noticed that Strawson is being at least misleading in saying, "the task of identifying reference is *defined* in terms of a type of speaker-intention which rules out ascription to the speaker of the intention to impart the existence-and-uniqueness information in question." Actually, Strawson introduces the notion of identifying reference at the beginning of his article by defining it as "the sub-task of designating some particular historical item or items which the state of affairs [which is being reported] involves", (p. 96). And it is an open question whether identifying reference, so defined, rules out such a speaker-intention. Neither the question of the speaker's intentions nor the question of what it is that the speaker is *stating* is answered by the definition.

I think that the following are the main points in Strawson's argument:

(3) *A speaker can use an expression like "The king of France" to make identifying reference to an individual only if he knows or presumes that his audience already knows that the individual to which identifying reference is made exists, i.e., that a certain existential-uniqueness proposition,  $p$ , is true.*

(4) *If a speaker knows or presumes that his audience already knows that a certain proposition is true, it cannot be his intention to inform his audience of the truth of that proposition.*

Therefore, (5), *if a speaker uses an expression like "The king of France" to make identifying reference to an individual,  $p$  can be no part of what the speaker states.*

Now in the first place, as I shall show later by example, (3) is false. We can use expressions of the form, "the so-and-so", to make identifying reference to individuals even when we know that our audience does not know that the relevant existential-uniqueness proposition is true. But let us, for the moment, assume the truth of (3) in order to get Strawson's argument off the ground.

(4) exhibits a conceptual truth, and we shall let it stand. Russellians believe that (5) is false. I shall not attempt to prove that it is false, but I shall point out the flaw in the inference from (3) and (4) to (5), showing that there is one less reason for believing that (5) is true.

In the inference from (3) and (4) to (5), there is the suppressed premiss.

(6) *If it is not the intention of a speaker to inform his audience that  $p$ , by the use of an expression,  $e$ , then he cannot, by the use of  $e$ , be stating that  $p$ .*

(6) expresses a false assumption, often made by philosophers, that the *statement* which a speaker makes by the use of an expression is always a function of the *information* which the speaker intends to convey to his audience. But although the concept of *what we state* often coincides in extension with the concept of *what information we intend to convey*, the two concepts are

different and must not be confused. Giving information is only one of several reasons for which one makes a statement. Others are: reminding, repeating for emphasis, stating for the record, telling someone something he already knows in order to bore or annoy him, (cf. my "Telling and Giving", *Analysis*, June, 1967), etc. Frequently, we intentionally make a false statement in order to convey true information. Speaking of someone under the influence of LSD, I might state the false proposition that he sees God in order to convey the true information that he is having a hallucinatory vision of God. And in sarcasm, sometimes, what we state is a contrary or the contradictory of the information we intend to convey.

Another purpose for which we sometimes make statements, and which is relevant here, is to let the audience know what entity some other statement is about, i.e., to perform the task of identifying reference for that other statement. Suppose that you and I both know that Britain has just one monarch. I might nonetheless have occasion to say to you, "There is one and only one monarch of Britain. She is a Windsor." In such a case, I use two sentences to make two statements. What I state by means of the second sentence happens to be identical with the information I intend to convey to you. In the case of the first sentence, however, I state something which I know you already know, and so, do not intend to convey that information to you. My purpose, instead, is to let you know what entity the second statement is about.

If we transform the two sentences into one, i.e., "There is one and only one monarch of Britain, and she is a Windsor", the example can be used to make a related anti-Strawsonian point, namely, that we can use the same sentence-component to make identifying reference to an entity and, at the same time, to state that that entity exists. Here again, we tell someone something he already knows in order to perform the task of identifying reference.

It is a plausible suggestion that the same thing often happens when we say, "The so-and-so is such-and-such", to someone who we know already knows that there exists just one so and so. It is

not unreasonable to think that in such cases we use one sentence to make two statements: first, by our use of "The so-and-so", as a part of the sentence, telling someone something he already knows for the purpose of identifying reference, and then, by means of the rest of the sentence, making a second statement for the purpose of conveying information. I am not going to argue here for the truth of this suggestion, but it should now be perfectly clear that the suggestion is not vitiated by cases in which the speaker knows that the audience already knows that there exists just one so-and-so. Therefore, even if (3) is true, we have no good reason to believe that if someone says, "The king of France is bald", he is not stating an existential-uniqueness proposition.

Let us now attack (3). As a matter of fact, we frequently use sentences of the form, "The so-and-so is such-and-such", in order not only to report some state of affairs but also to inform our audience of the existence of some entity which that state of affairs involves. Suppose, for example, that you do not know that there are any Thaleans in existence nowadays. I happen to know that there are several and that the foremost of them plays chess. I might say to you,

(7) *"The foremost living Thalean is a chess player."*, reporting a state of affairs to you, and, at the same time, intentionally informing you of the existence of some item which that state of affairs essentially involves, and giving you this existential information in order to make identifying reference to that item. It follows from (4), which we are accepting, that it can be one's intention to inform someone that p only if he believes that that person does not already know that p. So (3) is false.

Someone concerned to defend Russell on (2) might be tempted to make use of what has just been said to argue that since in some cases a sentence of the form, "The so-and-so is such-and-such", is used with the intent of informing one's audience of the truth of an existential-uniqueness proposition, in some cases, at least, such a sentence is used to state such a proposition. But since, as we have seen, the statement one makes does not always

coincide with the information one intends to convey, this line of defense is not yet open. I am not denying that there is some important relationship which connects a speaker's intention to inform, the sentence he uses, and the statement he makes. But so far as I know, this relationship has not yet been given an adequate explanation. A successful theory of how statements are made will give less importance to speakers' intentions to inform than philosophers have sometimes thought. We know this because, as I have pointed out, we sometimes intentionally convey something other than what we actually state, because we sometimes, when we give hints or clues, intentionally convey more than we actually state, and because we sometimes, as a result of slips of the tongue and lack of facility with the language, unintentionally fail to state what we intend to convey. Speakers' intentions, on the other hand, are not entirely unimportant. When someone uses an ambiguous sentence or a sentence containing an indexical expression and we want to know what proposition he is stating, and when the context fails to decide the issue, the speaker's intentions are the court of last resort. A theory which adequately accounts for these facts, plus many others, must be developed before we can reasonably take sides on question (2).

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