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The Rum Seljuqs (473-641/1081-1243):
Ideology, Mentality and Self-image

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Abstract

This thesis is a study of the ideology and ‘mentality’ of the Seljuqs of Rum 473-641/1081-1243. It focuses on this little-known branch of the Seljuqs, whose rule in Anatolia lasted considerably longer than the Great Seljuq state further east. This study uses the few available Rum Seljuq primary sources in Persian and Arabic, as well as contemporary oriental Christian chronicles; it also draws on the evidence of coins and monumental inscriptions, where possible.

Chapter one discusses the background of the Great Seljuqs, how they came into the Islamic world, bringing with them their centuries-old nomadic lifestyle and modes of thinking. This Chapter also analyses the way in which these Turkish nomadic chiefs were presented as Muslim rulers by the Arabic and Persian religious scholars and bureaucrats who served them. Chapter two discusses how the earliest Seljuq leaders in Anatolia from 473-500/1081-1107 conformed to traditional patterns of nomadic rule, and the period of interregnum and transition (500-551/1107-1156) during which the Seljuqs in Anatolia were dominated by the rival Turkish Dānishmendid principality.

Chapter three shows how the Rum Seljuq principality in Anatolia was transformed by the beginning of the thirteenth century into the Rum Seljuq sultanate. In chapter four the discussion focuses on the apogee of the dynasty under the rule of Kay Kāwūs I (608-616/1211-1220) and Kay Qubādh I (616-634/1220-1237) where it may be argued that these two Seljuq sultans could justifiably be viewed as model Perso-Islamic rulers, although elements from their Turkish nomadic past remained. The appendix contains an analysis of the crucial relationship between the Rum Seljuqs and their Byzantine neighbours during the period (473-576/1081-1180), arguing that a pattern of friendly co-existence was established between the Seljuq sultans and the Comneni emperors during these years.

The thesis shows how ideology rather than mere military success helped to shape this important dynasty into a fully-fledged sultanate.

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Comments on transliteration and translations

For the Arabic and Persian words a modified version of the Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd. edition transliteration system has been used except for widely used terms such as Saladin, jihad, Sunni, and Shi'i. The Turkish words are given in their modern Turkish spelling.

The translations from Arabic, Persian, German, and Turkish works given in this study have been done by the author when not listed in the references. However, all quotes are cited with the transliterations used by the respective authors.

To the loving memory of my grandfather Haydar Mecit,
who gave me the love for learning,
and
to my grandmother Zöhre Mecit,
who showed me how strong women can be.

Introduction

The Seljuqs arose in the fifth/eleventh century from nomadic chieftains to Muslim sultans ruling over the eastern and central Islamic lands as well as parts of the Byzantine Empire in Anatolia. While the main line of the Seljuq family established the Great Seljuq Empire ruling over Persia and Irak, several subordinate lines ruled over Kirman, Syria and most importantly Anatolia, which became the Rum Seljuq sultanate and outlived the main line for several decades. The Seljuqs were not the first Turks to enter the Muslim world, but they were the first Turkish leaders who, at the head of their followers and above all, as free people entered the Muslim world from its borders. Long before the Seljuqs, Turks had been brought into the Muslim world as reliable military slaves (*mamlūk*) and the Turkish Ghaznavid dynasty had sprung from Sebūktigin, one of the *mamlūk* of the Sāmānid rulers of Khurāsān. While the Ghaznavids took power from inside the Sāmānid State which had shaped their consciousness about leadership, the Seljuqs entered the Muslim World from outside as chieftains of tribally organised nomadic bands.

Thus the Great Seljuqs represent the first truly Turkish dynasty ruling over Muslim lands. The appearance of the Seljuqs marks significant changes not only in Muslim history but also in Byzantine/Christian history. Their incursion into the central Islamic lands and Byzantine Anatolia instigated an increased movement of nomads into these lands. In 431/1040 the grandsons of Seljuq, Tuğrul Bey and Çağrı Bey defeated the Ghaznavid ruler Mas'ūd at the famous battle of Dandānqān and in the same year took Nīshāpūr, the capital of Ghaznavid Khurāsān. Çağrı Bey stayed in the east where he established Marw as his base and was succeeded by his son Alp Arslan when he died in 452/1060. Tuğrul Bey at the same time expanded westwards and took Baghdad from the Shi'i Buyids in 447/1055, thus freeing the Abbasid caliph al-Qa'im from Shi'i tutelage. The caliph in turn proclaimed Tuğrul Bey as sultan and thus the Great Seljuq sultanate ruling over Iran and Iraq was founded. When in 455/1063 Tuğrul Bey died leaving no heirs behind, his nephew Alp Arslan succeeded him as sultan ruling over a united Seljuq realm.

With the foundation of the Great Seljuq sultanate, imperial rule with a standing slave (*ghulām*) army and Persian bureaucracy and monarchic traditions was

established. The architect behind the new government was Niẓām al-Mulk, arguably the greatest Seljuq vizier, who served under Alp Arslan and his son and successor Malik Shāh. Niẓām al-Mulk was a member of the Persian bureaucracy of Khurāsān who changed from Ghaznavid into Great Seljuq service. This bureaucracy had developed the Perso-Islamic concepts of government and kingship under the Ghaznavids and they refined it further under the Great Seljuqs. It was also Niẓām al-Mulk who formulated these concepts in his Book of Government (*Siyāsat-nāma*) composed by order of the Great Seljuq sultan Malikshāh. The official Great Seljuq ideology was based on a synthesis of Islamic religious ideals and ancient Persian ideals; it presented the Seljuqs as the military guardians of Sunni Islam which they had to defend against outsiders, especially against the Shi'i Fatimid rivals of the Abbasid caliphs in Cairo.

The new concept of government elevated the Seljuq leaders to the status of autocratic kings and was thus not accepted by their family members and Turkmen followers. According to the older Turkic conceptions of leadership, power was the shared property of the ruling family. The supreme leader was chosen according to the idea of seniorate among the members of the charismatic clan. Moreover his powers were limited and he was regarded as the *primus inter pares* whose main duty was to lead his followers to pasture and plunder. It is thus not surprising that several rebellions were launched against the Great Seljuq sultans. One year after the accession of Alp Arslan his uncle Kutalmıř b. Arslan Isrā'īl rebelled claiming the supreme leadership of the Seljuq family as he was its senior member. Kutalmıř was defeated and killed and his sons taken captive.

In order to pre-empt rebellions the Great Seljuqs encouraged their Turkmen followers, the force of their military success, together with rebellious family members to carry their raids for plunder westwards into Byzantium, Georgia, and Armenia and seek pasture there. The remarkable victory of the Great Seljuq sultan Alp Arslan over the Byzantine emperor Romanus Diogenes at the famous battle of Manzikert in 463/1071 left the the borders of the Byzantine empire undefended. The gates of Anatolia were thus wide open to nomadic Turkmen groups and all kinds of fugitives who wanted to escape the control of the central government of the Great Seljuq empire. Sulaymān, the son of Kutalmıř, escaped Great Seljuq captivity after

Alp Arslan's death in 465/1073 and came with his Turkmen followers to Anatolia. Aided by the internal strife following the Byzantine defeat at Manzikert Sulaymān seized Nicaea (İzник) in western Anatolia and established a principality. This Seljuq principality in Anatolia was to become the Rum Seljuq sultanate centered in Iconium (Konya). This rebellious branch of the Seljuq family had fallen from grace and had lost its dynastic rights. Hence, the descendants of Kutalmış b. Arslan Isrā'īl, in a sense started all over again as chiefs of nomadic Turkmen bands in Anatolia and established their own Perso-Islamic dynasty ruling over former Christian Byzantine territory. Moreover the foundation of the Rum-Seljuq Sultanate is the most visible and lasting effect of the coming of the Seljuqs into the Middle East as it presents the predecessor of the modern Republic of Turkey.

Thus one should expect that modern western scholarly interest in Seljuq history would be great, but this is not the case. Comprehensive histories of the Seljuqs in general or the Rum Seljuqs in particular do not exist. What can be found about Seljuq history are mainly chapters in general works about Islamic and Persian history. Among these it is worth mentioning in particular W. Barthold's *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*,¹ Edmund Bosworth's *The Ghaznavids*,² Ann K.S. Lambton's *Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government*³ and *The Cambridge History of Iran* edited by J.A. Boyle.⁴ The second edition of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* delivers the most up-to-date and profound information about Seljuq history in its articles. The first work devoted solely to the Rum Seljuqs was written by the Russian scholar Vladimir Gordlevski and published in Moscow in 1941. His book entitled *Gosudarstvo Seldzhukidov Maloi Azii*⁵ is not beneficial for the present study as it is not only outdated but more importantly because he the author's communist views are projected onto medieval history uncritically. To give but one example the author presents the Rum Seljuq sultans as feudal lords. Thus this work is not very fruitful for the present study. The French scholar Claude Cahen

¹ *Turkestan down to the Mongol invasion*, 3rd ed., London 1968, (hereafter cited as Barthold, *Turkestan*).

² Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids. Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran 994-1040*, Edinburgh 1963, (hereafter cited as Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*).

³ London 1980. Idem., *The Formation of Turkey*, Essex 2001, (Engl. tr. of the French edition of Pre-Ottoman Turkey), (hereafter cited as Cahen, *Formation*).

⁴ The Saljuq and Mongol periods, (Volume 5), Cambridge 1968.

⁵ Here the Turkish translation of this work will be used. Gordlevski, *Anadolu Selçuklu Devleti*, tr. Azer Yaran, Ankara 1988.

wrote several articles about the Great Seljuqs and Rum Seljuqs and also devoted a book to the Rum-Seljuqs entitled *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*.⁶ This work described by the author as “a provisional synthesis” suffers from many unanswered questions.⁷ The study of Speros Vryonis Jr. entitled, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century*⁸ concentrates on the Islamization and Turkification of Byzantine Anatolia. Tamara Talbot Rice also wrote a book about the Seljuqs, which is written in a popular manner and merely gives an uncritical narrative of the main events.⁹ More recently Gary Leiser¹⁰ has edited and published a series of essays on Rum Seljuq history and Carole Hillenbrand has published her book on the battle of Manzikert.¹¹

By far the largest contribution to Seljuq history is made by Turkish scholars; their work has been neglected by western scholars who, except for a small minority, do not know modern Turkish. Here is not the place to discuss all such Turkish works but it is important to note that the Turkish scholars were mainly committed to an ideological view of history.¹² They wrote their works in resistance to the attitude of Arab, Persian and western scholars according to which the Turks were only barbarians who brought about the decline of Islamic civilisation.¹³ The first Turkish scholar working on Seljuq history was M. Fuad Köprülü, who is regarded as the founder of modern Turkish historiography. The main research interest of Köprülü, however, was literary history. Among his works important for the present study is his article about the local sources for the Rum-Seljuqs.¹⁴ A complete history of the Rum Seljuqs in eight volumes was attempted by M. H. Yınanç but only one volume appeared.¹⁵

⁶ C. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey A general survey of the material and spiritual culture and history c. 1071-1330*, London 1968, (hereafter cited as Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*).

⁷ Ibid., p.xvii, Cahen had planned another work which did not appear.

⁸ Berkeley/Los Angeles/ London 1971, (hereafter cited as Vryonis, *Decline*).

⁹ Rice, *Die Seldschuken*, Köln 1963.

¹⁰ Leiser, ed, *Les Seldjoukides d'Anatolie*, Paris 2005, (hereafter cited as Leiser, *Seldjoukides*).

¹¹ C. Hillenbrand, *Turkish Myth and Muslim Symbol. The Battle of Manzikert*, Edinburgh 2007, (hereafter cited as C. Hillenbrand, *Manzikert*).

¹² Martin Strohmeier discusses in his work the Turkish historians and their view on Seljuq history in detail. *Seldschukische Geschichte und Türkische Geschichtswissenschaft. Die Seldschuken im Urteil moderner Türkischer Historiker*, Berlin 1984; there is also Aziz Başan's thesis which was completed recently.

¹³ Cf., EI2, Saldjūkids, (Bosworth), 937.

¹⁴ Köprülü, 'Anadolu Selçukluları tarihinin yerli kaynakları', in: *Belleten* 7 (1943), 379-522.

¹⁵ Yınanç, *Türkiye Tarihi Selçuklular devri. Anadolunun fethi*, İstanbul 1934.

Among the next generation of Turkish historians of Seljuq history, Osman Turan takes an important place as his editions made the sources for the Rum Seljuqs accessible.¹⁶ Faruk Sümer's main interest lay in pre-Seljuq history, the Oghuz clans. Mehmet Köymen, who worked on the Great Seljuqs, attempted a two-volume work about them, but only the second volume dealing with the period of the Great Seljuq sultan Sancar was published.¹⁷ Among Kafesoğlu's works his article on the Seljuqs in the *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* should be mentioned.¹⁸ The following generation was more concerned with the Seljuq subordinate lines. Erdoğan Merçil wrote about the Seljuqs of Kirman¹⁹ and Ali Sevim about the Seljuqs of Syria and Palestine.²⁰ A joint effort by Ali Sevim and Yaşar Yücel deals with the Rum Seljuqs in the framework of the history of Turkey.²¹ Their book is a chronologically organized narrative history of the Rum Seljuqs and the authors take on the nationalistic view of their predecessors. The majority of the current generation of Turkish historians remains committed to the nationalistic view of history and they continue to write narrative history.²²

All in all the Turkish works, as well as the main body of western works, are narrative histories.²³ A complete narrative of the events is of course the essential first step as Cahen rightly points out in his work *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, in which he writes that: "Much of the text will consist of what is now somewhat disparagingly called 'narrative history'. His defence for narrative history however is not convincing:

¹⁶ Turan's book on the Rum Seljuqs is to date used by Turkish historians as the basis for their works on the Seljuqs. O. Turan, *Selçuklular Zamanında Türkiye. Siyasi Tarih Alp Arslan'dan Osman Gazi'ye (1071-1318)*, İstanbul 1971, (hereafter cited as Turan, *Selçuklular*).

¹⁷ Köymen, *Büyük Selçuklu imparatorluğu tarihi II. İkinci imparatorluk devri*, Ankara 1954.

¹⁸ This article serving nationalistic ideas was criticized by Western scholars and led to a controversy between Kafesoğlu and Turan. It is remarkable that this article has been republished in 1972 by the Turkish Ministry of Culture in form of a simplified book and written in more modern Turkish in order to be better accessible to the younger generation. Gary Leiser has translated this article and the critique and counter-critique of Kafesoğlu and Turan into English. *A History of the Seljuks. Ibrahim Kafesoğlu's Interpretation and the Resulting Controversy*, Southern Illinois 1988.

¹⁹ Merçil, *Kirman Selçukluları*, İstanbul 1980.

²⁰ Sevim, *Suriye ve Filistin Selçukluları Tarihi*, Ankara 1983.

²¹ Yücel, *Türkiye Tarihi. Fetih, Selçuklu ve Beylikler dönemi*, Ankara 1989.

²² There are some scholars such as Kenan Çetin who have departed from writing just narrative history. Çetin, *Selçuklu Müesseseleri ve Medeniyeti Tarihi*, Erzurum 1992, (hereafter cited as Çetin, *Müesseseleri*). Yet, Turkish scholars seem reluctant to adopt new methods and concepts developed in the West.

²³ The interesting work of Anne Broadbridge which looks at the ideology of the Mamluks and the Mongols in the context of their diplomatic exchange shows how fruitful the application of the history of ideology can be. A.F. Broadbridge, *Kingship and Ideology in Islamic and Mongol Worlds*, Cambridge 2008.

“Masters are masters, and moreover they have had the support of the solid framework provided by their predecessors who established ‘narrative’ history; pupils are not necessarily all masters and they no longer always have the framework behind them. History is total, that is to say it combines together inextricably both ‘events’ and ‘structures’, and we have no theoretical right to separate them.”²⁴ To date, modern western historians as well as modern Turkish historians of the Seljuqs have mainly concentrated their efforts on political history and have attributed the extraordinary Seljuq success story to their military superiority, their religious fervour, and the political genius of their vizier Nizām al-Mulk. The rise of the descendants of Sulaymān b. Kutalmış from a principality in Anatolia to the Rum Seljuq state is seen as the result of the great Muslim victory at Manzikert against Byzantium and continuation of the *ghazw* or jihad against the Christian power led by the Seljuqs and Turkmen.²⁵ For modern Turkish historians the battle of Manzikert in 463/1071 marks the birth of Turkey. Rum Seljuq history is seen in the light of the modern Turkish ideology that the Turks led by the Seljuqs aimed to found a Turkish homeland.²⁶

Neither of these approaches to Seljuq history explains the transformation of the Seljuqs of Anatolia from leaders of nomadic bands to Perso-Islamic rulers. How were the Seljuqs in Anatolia able to develop from rulers of a small principality to sultans ruling over almost the whole of Anatolia? What were the factors which made the foundation of this state possible? To date historians have sought to explain this with political, economic, and demographic factors.²⁷ Even though these factors are

²⁴ Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, xviii.

²⁵ Paul Wittek argued in his works that the Muslim idea of the Byzantine territory as dar al-harb contributed to the Islamization of Anatolia. Cf. Wittek, ‘Von der byzantinischen zur türkischen Toponymie’, in: *Byzantion* 10 (1935), 11-64, (hereafter cited as Wittek, *Toponymie*); idem., *Das Fürstentum Mentesche. Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 13-15Jh.*, Amsterdam 1967. This idea to base the Turkish conquest of Anatolia by the Seljuqs and later Ottomans on jihad has been disputed for example by Lindner who argues that the ideology of the holy war was not behind the Ottoman conquest. Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*, Indiana 1983.

²⁶ The founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his ideologues formulated an ideology, referred to as the Kemalist ideology which used the battle of Manzikert as “the myth of national identity” for the new Nation State. For a discussion of the myth of Manzikert and the use of Rum Seljuq history by Atatürk and modern Turkish historians for nationalistic ends see the discussion of Carole Hillenbrand. Hillenbrand, *Manzikert*, 196-220.

²⁷ Khazanov has taken a different approach in his book on nomads and the state and he points out that the development of the Seljuq state, which according to him is a second-type nomad state was completed with the Rum-Seljuq sultanate and their successors the Ottoman State. See for this, Khazanov, *Nomads and the outside world*, 232 and 267.

important they do not suffice to explain the emergence of the Rum Seljuq state. It has so far not been recognised that ideology plays an important role in the formation of a state. Claessen and Oosten point out aptly: “There must exist an ideology, which explains and justifies a hierarchical administrative organization and socio-political inequality. If such an ideology does not exist, or emerges the formation of state becomes difficult, or even outright impossible.”²⁸

The present study aims to analyse the ideology and mentality of the Rum Seljuq family beginning with the rule of Sulaymān (473-478/1081-1086) and ending with the rule of Kay Khusraw II (634-644/1237-1246). It will be shown that during this period the transformation of the Rum Seljuqs from nomadic leaders to sultans took place over four distinctive phases, parallel to which the ideology and mentality evolved. For a better understanding of the evolution of the state ideology the analysis will start with a discussion of the Great Seljuq ideology. As Claessen and Skalník have stated, “a readily adaptable ideological background, be it religious, juridical or kinship, is a necessary condition for the emergence of the state.”²⁹ For the foundation of the Rum Seljuq ideology the Great Seljuq model and the dynastic connection to them plays an important role. The first chapter will thus give an outline of the state ideology formulated for the Great Seljuqs.

The second chapter discusses Kutalmış, the rebellious ancestor of the Rum Seljuqs and the foundation of the Seljuq principality in Nicaea by his son Sulaymān and grandson Kılıç Arslan I. In addition it looks at the reigns of Shāhānshāh and Mas‘ūd which represent a period of transition for the Seljuqs in Anatolia. This period is marked by important internal and external developments. First, the Seljuqs were forced to retreat to inner Anatolia, following the conquest of Nicaea by the armies of the First Crusade in 1097. Second, the internal strife among the Seljuqs led to the growth of power of their main Muslim rivals in Anatolia, the Dānismendids.

The third chapter focuses on the reigns of Kılıç Arslan II and his two sons and successors, Kay Khusraw I and Sulaymān Shāh II. The first part of this chapter will argue why Kılıç Arslan II is the real founder of the Rum Seljuq state and which factors played here a role here. First, the decline of the Great Seljuq Empire and the

²⁸ Claessen/ Oosten, (eds.), *Ideology and the Formation of Early States*, Leiden/New York/Köln 1996, 5.

²⁹ Claessen/ Skalník, (eds.), *The Study of the State*, The Hague 1981, 479.

rise of its successor states and especially the states of Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin whose power over Syria and Mesopotamia closed the way to the east for the Rum Seljuqs and thus confined them to inner Anatolia. Second, following the disintegration of the Great Seljuq sultanate the title of sultan was assumed by several rulers. In contrast to the Great Seljuq sultans who could claim to be supreme sultans of Sunni Islam the Rum Seljuq sultans had to compete with the successor states of the Great Seljuqs. As a result of these factors the Seljuqs in Anatolia established their own dynasty called the Rum Seljuq sultanate.

When Kılıç Arslan II abdicated at the end of his reign he divided his realm among his many sons according to the old Turkish steppe tradition, which regarded rule as the right of the family and internal strife ensued. Several external developments prevented the interference of their most powerful neighbours and thus the disintegration of the Rum Seljuq sultanate. These were on the one hand the decline of the Ayyubid state following the death of Saladin in 589/1193 and on the other the extinction of the Byzantine Empire following the conquest of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade in 1204. The second part of the third chapter focuses on the reigns of Kay Khusraw I and Sulaymān Shāh II who laid down the foundation for the apogee of the Rum Seljuq state. This part will thus discuss if the rise of the Rum Seljuq state to the strongest power in the region led to the re-formulation of the official state ideology.

The fourth chapter analyses the reigns of Kay Kāwūs I (1211-1219), Kay Kubādh I (1219-1237), and Kay Khusraw II (1237-1246). The reigns of these sultans represents the apogee of the Rum Seljuq state. Under these rulers the Rum Seljuq towns, especially Konya, were expanded into important Muslim centres. On the other hand the names chosen by these sultans indicate that they tried to connect themselves to the ideal Iranian kings as presented in the *Shāhnāme* of Firdawsī. Therefore the questions which will be tackled here are: was the Rum Seljuq state developed into a centralised autocratic state during this period and can we thus regard these sultans as truly Perso-Islamic rulers? How far can this be derived from the ideology formulated under these rulers?

The appendix contains an analysis of the crucial relationship between the Rum Seljuqs and their Byzantine neighbours during the period (473-576/1081-1180),

arguing that a pattern of friendly co-existence was established between the Seljuq sultans and the Comneni emperors during these years.

Methodology

The methodology employed here is thus historical as a comprehensive understanding of the ideology and mentality is only possible when set in the historical context. For this reason outlines of the Rum Seljuq history will be given in each chapter. It should be noted at the outset, however, that it is not the aim of this work to give a detailed chronological account of Rum Seljuq history. For the purpose of this work, it is more important to discuss the material the medieval authors chose to edit. Hence, we are more interested in the partiality of their accounts and in the ways in which they portray the Rum Seljuq sultans. Therefore the method of Hans-Werner Goetz called by him “*Vorstellungsgeschichte*” will be employed for the interpretation of the sources.³⁰

At the same time the concept of the history of mentality developed by the French historical school of *Annales*, or *Selbstverständnis* (self-image) the term used by German historians studying noble families³¹ has delivered good results.³² These methods, however, have not been applied to Muslim history in general or Seljuq history in particular.³³ It should be noted at the outset, however, that the work with the concept of the history of mentality carries implications with it. First it should be highlighted that the historians as so often is the case do not agree on terminology.

³⁰ Goetz, ‘Vorstellungsgeschichte: Menschliche Vorstellungen und Meinungen als Dimension der Vergangenheit’, in: *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 61 (1979), 255/256.

³¹ It is clear that Schmid’s concept of self-image of noble families should be employed with respect to the differences between Christian and Islamic Middle Ages. Important elements of the Christian Middle Ages as the nobility, the church, the theory of the Grace of the Lord and feudalism do not exist in the Muslim world.

³² Cf. K. Schmid, ‘Welfisches Selbstverständnis’, in: *Gebetsgedenken und adliges Selbstverständnis im Mittelalter. Ausgewählte Beiträge. Festgabe zu seinem sechzigsten Geburtstag*, Sigmaringen 1983, 424-453; Oexle, ‘Adliges Selbstverständnis und seine Verknüpfung mit dem liturgischen Gedenken – das Beispiel der Welfen’, in: *Zeitschrift für Geschichte des Oberrheins* 134 NF 95 (1986), 47-75.; Althoff, ‘Anlässe zur schriftlichen Fixierung adligen Selbstverständnisses’, in: *Zeitschrift für die Geschichte des Oberrheins* 134 NF 95 (1986), 34-46.

³³ Humphreys writes: “There is no general survey of ideology as such in the Seljukid period; that is, we have no broad study devoted not only to the political ideas of that age, but also to rhetoric, symbolism, and propaganda.” R.S. Humphreys, *Islamic History. A Framework for Inquiry*, London/New York 1991, 159, (hereafter cited as Humphreys, *Islamic History*).

The term mentality does not only carry different meanings in different languages. It also causes dispute among historians using the same language. In German, the term self-image³⁴ and in English the term attitudes³⁵ are used instead of the term mentality. Another subject of controversy is the question of how to distinguish between mentality and ideology, or to distinguish them at all because both terms are often seen as “the two sides of the same coin,”³⁶ which are difficult to isolate.³⁷ Mentality is understood here as the way of thought of a specific group, in this case the Seljuqs, in its specific time and place. Ideology is “a body of ideas characteristic of a particular social group”³⁸ and self-image is the way that a group regards itself. Thus mentality will be assumed in this work as the generic term for ideology and self-image, because it would not be productive for the present study to separate them.

Secondly, it is clear that mentality, ideology, and self-image can never be taken directly from the sources, especially in the case of Seljuq history, as their history is written by Arab and Persian officials or religious scholars in their own languages. We possess no texts written in Turkish in Anatolia during this period of inquiry. Thus all our literary sources are second-hand accounts about the Seljuqs and they deliver us first and foremost the view of Arab and Persian authors on the Seljuqs and their own mentality. Therefore we need to examine them with a critical eye in order to reconstruct the mentality of the Seljuqs. Furthermore, these authors cannot be described as court historians in the strict sense of the word since though all three authors lived in Anatolia and were partisans of the Rum Seljuq dynasty, they did not write their works under the supervision of the Rum Seljuq sultans.³⁹ This is

³⁴ Michael Borgolte illustrates in his essay “Selbstverständnis” und “Mentalität” that the term Selbstverständnis is in Germany often used instead of the term Mentalität used in France but that both terms do not have the same meaning. Borgolte, ‘Selbstverständnis und Mentalitäten. Bewußtsein, Verhalten und Handeln mittelalterlicher Menschen im Verständnis moderner Historiker’, in: *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 79 (1997), 190.

³⁵ Cf. Gerd Tellenbach, ‘Mentalität’, in: idem., *Ausgewählte Abhandlungen und Aufsätze*, vol. 1., Stuttgart 1998, 82-104, 83.

³⁶ J. Black/D.M. Macrailld, *Studying History*, London 1997, 151.

³⁷ Tellenbach states that mentality is psychologically and historically closely connected with behaviour on the one hand and ideas, theories, ideologies, and ethical teachings on the other so that it is almost impossible to study them separately. Cf. Tellenbach, ‘Mentalität’, 86.

³⁸ Eagleton, *Ideology. An introduction*, London 1991, 1. From the many definitions Eagleton lists here this is the most suitable. In this first chapter of his book he shows that there is a wide range of definitions.

³⁹ Muhammad b. Alī Rāwandī dedicated his work *Rāhat al-sudūr wa-āyat al-surūr dar ta’rīkh-i āl-i Saljūq to the Rum Seljuq sultan Kay Khusraw I* but the author sought the support of the Rum Seljuq sultan only because the Great Seljuq sultanate had perished. The work is a dynastic history of the

surprising, as there were past and contemporary examples of court historians, such as Bayhaqī who wrote for the Ghaznavid sultan Mas'ūd and Muhammad 'Imād al-Dīn al-Isfahānī who wrote for Saladin. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the earliest extant history of the Seljuqs was composed by 'Imād al-Dīn for Saladin.

Nevertheless, the Rum Seljuq author Ibn Bībī can be regarded as a court historian though he served under the protectorate of the Mongols. Ibn Bibi's parents served under the great Rum seljuq sultan Alā al-Dīn Kay Qubādh I and he represents the most prominent formulator of Rum Seljuq ideology. His work is strictly speaking not a chronicle and it contains Mirrors for Princes overtones. It is written in the tradition of the *Siyāsat-nāma* of the Great Seljuq vizier Niẓām al-Mulk. Ibn Bībī remarks that this famous work was read by the greatest of the Rum Seljuq sultans, 'Alā al-Dīn Kay Qubādh I⁴⁰. We also have a work written in the tradition of the *Siyāsat-nāma* by the Rum Seljuq author Ahmad b. Sa'd b. Mahdī b. 'Abd al-Samad al-'Uthman which was presented to 'Alā al-Dīn Kay Qubādh in 1227.⁴¹ These Mirrors for Princes do not contain factual data but aim to "show the nature of true kingship" to the present and future rulers by using anecdotes especially about exemplary Persian kings.⁴² Despite being stylised presentations of kingship these mirrors contain useful information on the ideology and mentality of the Rum Seljuqs. It is significant and revealing when and why they were introduced to Anatolia and they will be analysed in connection with the Rum Seljuq sultans under whom they appeared. Important to note also is that all Rum Seljuq authors adhered to the official Perso-Islamic idea of kingship reflecting the views of the Sunni ulama and that we do not have any sources representing independent perspectives. Nevertheless, there are some divergences of the ideas and theories of rulership formulated by the Rum

Great Seljuqs "with strong Mirror for Princes overtones" into which the author incorporated eulogies for his Rum Seljuq patron; cf. C. Hillenbrand, 'Byzantines and Crusaders in Non-Greek Sources 1025-1204', in: *Byzantines and Crusaders 1024-1204*, ed. M. Whitby, London 2007, (hereafter cited as C. Hillenbrand, *Non-Greek Sources*); See also J. Meisami Scott, *Persian Historiography. To the End of the Twelfth Century*, Edinburgh 1999, 237-256, (hereafter cited as Meisami, *Persian Historiography*); Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 256.

⁴⁰ Cf. Humphreys, *Islamic History*, 162.

⁴¹ This work is still in unpublished manuscript form (Süleymaniye Library, Aşir Efendi division ms. no 316) but has been translated into Turkish by H.H. Adalıoğlu, *Zencânî Sultana Öğütler. Alâeddin Keykubat'a Sunulan Siyasetnâme*, Istanbul 2005; İ. Fazlıoğlu, 'Sultan I. 'Alâuddin Keykubâd'a sunulan siyasetnâme: el-Letâifu 'l-'alâiyye fi'l-fedâili'-seniyye', in: *Dîvân İlmî Araştırmalar* 1 (1997), 225-239.

⁴² C. Hillenbrand, 'Some reflections on Seljuq historiography', in: *Eastern Approaches to Byzantium*, ed. A. Eastmond, Hampshire 2001, 75. (hereafter cited as C. Hillenbrand, *Seljuq historiography*)

Seljuq and other Muslim sources, which can help us to establish the particularities of the Rum Seljuq ideology. There are also several Byzantine sources which will be used though they are written from the point of view of the opponents of the Rum Seljuqs they are of great value as they are the only sources which contain some information on the beginning of their history.

In addition to these literary texts, coins and monumental inscriptions will be analysed as these give us evidence which is not only important because it complements the literary sources but also because it is in contrast to literary evidence contemporary and direct evidence.⁴³ They are the visual formulation of the ideology and mentality of the sultans as they were consciously chosen tools of propaganda aimed at a wider audience since the phrases used here were generally known and could be read by any marginally literate person. Generally, monumental inscriptions include the name of the ruler, his titles, verses from the Quran, as well as, epithets and slogans describing the ruler. Moreover, the architectural artefact itself conveys a message since monuments religious as well as secular ones were devices which indicated sovereign power and thus the time and circumstances in which they appear is relevant for the assessment of ideology. Epigraphic evidence too should be treated with caution, as Carole Hillenbrand writes there is “the danger of attributing too much historical value to inscriptions and to their highly stylised modes of expression.”⁴⁴ Keeping in mind, however that propaganda was a way to legitimise and stabilise the sultan’s position and that it cannot be taken as direct expression of ideology and mentality we can still extract important information from coins and epigraphy.

The literary sources, the Rum Seljuq sources as well as other Muslim sources, and the Byzantine sources have all been covered by Turkish and western historian for the political history of the Rum Seljuqs. But hitherto we have neither a systematic and comprehensive examination of these literary sources nor one for the epigraphic evidence. This is especially surprising as the epigraphy of several Rum Seljuq towns

⁴³ As Humphreys states: “Modern scholars have been slow to investigate the ideological elements in the art and architecture of medieval Islam, but there are some useful essays.” Cf. Humphreys, *Islamic History*, 152.

⁴⁴ C. Hillenbrand, ‘Jihad Propaganda in Syria from the Time of the First Crusade Until the death of Zengi: The evidence of Monumental Inscriptions’, in: *The Frankish Wars and their Influence on Palestine*, K. Athamina/ R. Heacock, eds., Birzeit University Press 1994, 62; Humphreys, *Islamic History*, 165.

has been collected early on and the *Répertoire chronologique d'épigraphie arabe*⁴⁵ published between 1936 and 1939 includes most of the Rum Seljuq epigraphy. Several works on Seljuq art and architecture exist, but the ideological dimension of the monuments and their epigraphy has so far been somewhat neglected.⁴⁶

Sources

Seljuq historiography is part of the “middle period historiography” in which a new Persian Muslim historiography emerged besides the Arabic Muslim historiography.⁴⁷ The term “Seljuq historiography” covers both the historiography of the Great Seljuqs as well as the historiography of the Rum-Seljuqs because the former, “provided the principal inspiration” for the latter.⁴⁸

The Arabic as well as the Persian historiography exists in the form of three genres: universal histories, regional histories and dynastic histories. While the universal histories and regional histories in Arabic are unpretentious in style and annalistic in format the dynastic histories are much more filled with rhetorical ornaments and exemplary tales.⁴⁹ The Persian historiographical tradition of “Mirrors for Princes” or *Fürstenspiegel* also has a didactic orientation. Through the time of the Sāmānids and the Ghaznavids, a neo-Sassanian culture flourished, and in showing the good old times, these Persian authors wanted to show contemporary and future rulers the nature of true kingship. Both historiographical traditions emphasize religion and in the case of the Persian works we find the old Sāsānian criteria of good rule combined with Islamic thought. According to these ideas, kings were chosen by God and obliged to religion. Thus the description of the Seljuqs given in both the Arabic and Persian works is mainly stereotypical and we need to examine them

⁴⁵ Combe/Sauvaget/Wiet, eds., *Répertoire chronologique d'épigraphie arabe*, 16 vols, Cairo 1931-1964; vol. 8-11, Cairo 1936-39, (hereafter cited as RCEA).

⁴⁶ Humphreys uses the early Great Seljuq history as a case study to discuss ideology and propaganda but this is only a brief survey. Cf. Humphreys, *Islamic History*, 148-168.

⁴⁷ Cf. Humphreys, *Islamic History*, 129.

⁴⁸ C. Hillenbrand, *Seljuq historiography*, 73.

⁴⁹ Cf. C. Hillenbrand, *Seljuq historiography*, 79; Humphreys, *Islamic History*, 129.

carefully to extract information from them with which we can draw the picture of the Seljuq mentality.

For the early history of the Seljuqs, the work of the Ghaznavid historian Abu al-Fadl Baihaqī (385-470/995-1077) is important, even though only a fragment of his Ghaznavid history covering the reign of Sultan Mas'ūd (421-433/1030-1041) is extant.⁵⁰ Baihaqī, who served the Ghaznavids, was the descendant of a Khurasanian landholding family and a member of the indigenous Persian social elite and thus a representative of the Middle Islamic type. He can thus be seen as a model example because many members of Khurasans Persian social elite later entered the service of the Seljuqs. The *Ta'rikhh-i Mas'ūdi* of Baihaqī, composed around 1060, is one of the most important monuments of early new Persian prose.⁵¹ Baihaqī was a prominent and well-connected bureaucrat and was therefore able to deliver reliable insightful information. He states himself: "I ... have placed upon myself the obligation that whatever I write should be from my own experience or from the true account of a reliable person"⁵². Baihaqī was committed to the neo-Sasanian and Muslim ideals of rulership and thus to the Perso-Islamic concept of rule. Humphreys summarizes Baihaqī's political thought as follows: "An autocratic political system could maintain itself only insofar as the ruler was able on instil awe and terror in the hearts of his courtiers and officials. Autocracy was based on submission and deference, and without fear, deference would soon evaporate."⁵³ And in Baihaqī's own words: "Know that the Lord Most High has given one power to the prophets and another power to kings; and He has made it incumbent upon the people of the earth that they should submit themselves to the two powers and should acknowledge the true way laid down by God."⁵⁴ This definition of the ideal kingship is the model by which Baihaqī and later chroniclers measure the Ghaznavids and the Seljuqs.

The anonymous *Maliknāma* takes an important place within the Seljuq histories. This work has been lost but parts are preserved in later works such as Ibn al-Athīr, Bar Hebraeus, Mīrkhwānd, and the *Akhbār al-dawla al-Saldjukiyya*. It is

⁵⁰ The work originally comprised thirty volumes with the title *Mujalladāt*. Cf. Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 10.

⁵¹ Cf. Humphreys, *Islamic History*, 137.

⁵² Meisami, *Persian Historiography*, 81.

⁵³ Humphreys, *Islamic History*, 141.

⁵⁴ As cited by Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 63.

most likely the first record of Seljuq history by a contemporary author and was probably written for Alp Arslan shortly after the death of his father Çağrı Bey in 451/1059.⁵⁵

The *Siyāsatnāma* of the Seljuq vizier Niẓām al-Mulk is not only the most important Persian source for the Seljuqs but also “the chief source for the study of the political structure of the Eastern Muslim states.”⁵⁶ Hasan ibn ‘Ali ibn Ishāq Tūsī (408-452/1018-1060) who was later called by the honorific title Niẓām al-Mulk came from the bureaucratic class of Khurasan. His father ‘Ali ibn Ishāq was the Ghaznavid revenue agent of Tus who left Khurasan after it was taken by the Seljuqs and went to Ghazna. Here Niẓām al-Mulk worked in the Ghaznavid administration and later returned to Khurasan to enter the service of the Seljuq Çağrı Beg who held Khurasan at that time. After Çağrı’s death in 451/1059, Nizam al-Mulk served his son Alp Arslan, who after the death of his uncle Sultan Tuğhril Bey 455/1063, succeeded as Seljuq sultan. Niẓām al-Mulk managed to oust Tuğrul’s vizier ‘Amīd al-Mulk Kundurī from his position and to become Seljuq vizier instead. He remained in this post under Alp Arslan’s son and successor Malik Shāh 465-85/1073-92 and thus not only dominated the Seljuq Empire for nearly thirty years but moreover can be seen as the founder of the empire.

Thus Niẓām al-Mulk was able to define the structure of the Seljuq rule and administration and his aim “was to model the new state as closely as possible on that of the Ghaznavids, in which he had been born and brought up.”⁵⁷ The concept he had in mind was the Perso-Islamic concept of rulership and not different from Baihaqī’s concept. Moreover, this concept persisted until Rum-Seljuq times and Niẓām al-Mulk’s work is acknowledged by Ibn Bībī who writes that the Rum Seljuq sultan Kay Qubādh read his book.⁵⁸ However, we should approach this work with caution as it represents the view of Niẓām al-Mulk himself and not of his Seljuq masters. Nevertheless we depend on this work and when used critically we can extract information about the Seljuq ideas of rule and statecraft. The Seljuq sultan Malik

⁵⁵ Cf. Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 219.

⁵⁶ Barthold, *Turkestan*, 25.

⁵⁷ EI2, Niẓām al-Mulk, (Bowen/ Bosworth), 71.

⁵⁸ H.W. Duda, *Die Seltschukengeschichte des Ibn Bībī*, Kopenhagen 1959, 100-101, (hereafter cited as Ibn Bībī, Duda).

Shāh himself ordered the composition of the work as it is stated in the prologue of the book:

“The Fortunate Sultan Malikshah (may Allah illumine his proof) in the year 479 gave orders to several of the nobles, elders and wise men, instructing each one of them to give thought to the condition of the country, ... The Sultan liked none of their compositions except that of the wazīr Nizam al-Mulk ...”⁵⁹

Nizām al-Mulk finished his book consisting of thirty-nine chapters in 1091 and added eleven chapters in the following year. The composition of Nizām al-Mulk belongs to the “Mirrors for Princes” genre and thus aims to give advice by using historical anecdotes. The supplementary eleven chapters deal with the heretic Isma’ilis, who were regarded as the greatest danger and threat to the empire. According to Bosworth Nizām al-Mulk’s *Siyasatnāma* “is in a sense a survey of what he had failed to accomplish.”⁶⁰ Luther however states that “the Book of Government is a record of what the Saljuqs were failing to do as rulers.”⁶¹ Judging by the tone of the book and the results of Nizām al-Mulk politics he was neither able to establish his ideals of rulership nor to teach them to the Seljuqs. He failed in both because he could only assure his ideal of true kingship for his lifetime because he was not able or more probably did not wish to assimilate the Seljuqs to the Perso-Islamic concept. Presumably Nizām al-Mulk did not encourage his masters to give the princes a good education and even the sons of Sultan Malik Shāh remained illiterate. Nizām al-Mulk bore the title *atabeg* (tutor) apparently just as an honorary title.⁶² Surprisingly, however, this question was never raised and discussed any detail.

The first dynastic histories for the Great Seljuqs, the *Seljuqnāma* of Zāhīr al-Dīn Nīshāpūrī (d. 582/1187) and the *Rāhat al-sudūr* of Muhammad b. Ali Rāwandī were written at the end of the Great Seljuq period. The second one depends mostly

⁵⁹ H. Burke, *The Book of Government or Rules for Kings The Siyāsat-nāma or Siyar al-Mulūk of Nizām al-Mulk*, London 1960, 1 and 2.

⁶⁰ EI2, Nizām al-Mulk, (Bowen/ Bosworth), 72.

⁶¹ K.A. Luther, *The history of the Seljuq Turks, from the Jāmi’ al-tawārīkh (an Ilkhānid adaptation of Zāhīr al-Dīn Nīshāpūrī)*, London 2001, (hereafter cited as Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther), 6.

⁶² According to Bosworth Nizām al-Mulk was the first person to receive the atabeg title. The title was given to him after he secured the succession of Malik Shāh. Cf. EI2, Nizām al-Mulk, (Bowen/ Bosworth), 70.

on the former as Rāwandī himself acknowledges.⁶³ Rāwandī also delivers us the only details we know about the life of Nīshāpūrī, according to which Nīshāpūrī was a relative of Rāwandī and was employed by the Seljuqs as tutor for princes Mas'ūd and Arslan.⁶⁴

Nīshāpūrī wrote the *Seljuqnāma* around 570/1175 because his narrative stops with the early months of the reign of Tuğrul the last Great Seljuq sultan⁶⁵. He starts his record with the appearance of the Seljuqs in Khurasan and leads it up to his own time where the Great Seljuq Sultanat was already in decline. Luther characterizes the *Seljuqnāma* “as a book of counsel and a kind of a political tract for royalty, as well as a source of historical information.”⁶⁶ Nīshāpūrī’s main aim was not to deliver historical facts but to take a retrospective view of the glorious past of the empire and to show temporary sultans the right principles of kingship.⁶⁷ “His dilemma was that of the highly educated Persian bureaucrat attempting to come to terms with the Turkish presence.”⁶⁸ Nevertheless Nīshāpūrī is not against the Seljuqs and accepts them as a ruling dynasty and, like the authors mentioned above, tries to squeeze them into the frame of the Perso-Islamic concept.⁶⁹ In his view they fulfil the important condition of a noble lineage in contrast with the Ghaznavids who do not qualify in his opinion. He emphasizes the importance for a king to have good advisers by his side and in this way speaks for Persian administrators like Nizām al-Mulk.

Rāwandī served at the court of Tuğrul III b. Arslan (571-590/1176-1194), the last Great Seljuq sultan and saw his death and the collapse of the Great Seljuq Empire. Thus he dedicated his work, which he completed around 601/1204 to the Rum Seljuq sultan, Kay Khusraw I. The only information we have about his life is from his own work, according to which, he was the member of a family of scholars from Rāwand and was a calligrapher and gilder who served at the court of the last Seljuq sultan Tuğrul in Hamadan⁷⁰. Like Nīshāpūrī, from whom Rāwandī took most of his material, history is not the prime aim and in this case the search for historical

⁶³ Cf. Meisami, *Persian Historiography*, 229.

⁶⁴ Cf. Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 6.

⁶⁵ Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 6.

⁶⁶ Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 12.

⁶⁷ Cf. Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 9.

⁶⁸ C. Hillenbrand, *Seljuq historiography*, 76.

⁶⁹ Cf. Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 8.

⁷⁰ EI2, Rāwandī, (Hillenbrand), 460.

facts is even less productive.⁷¹ The *Rāḥat al-ṣudūr* is thus a “compilation”⁷² and “it omits important events, adds episodes which sometimes defy credibility, is packed with quotations of all sorts, and contains a number of chapters on non-historical topics which form a sort of appendix to the history.”⁷³

Rāwandī shares the views of Nīshāpūrī and his main aim is to show the sultan, in this case the Rum-Seljuq sultan, how to rule in accordance with the Perso-Islamic ideals and to strengthen by this way his sultanate.⁷⁴

“so that the victorious Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn may read them; that they may be viewed kindly and become honoured by his most noble regard and receive his praise and approval; and that he may contemplate how, from all those excellent endeavours, and from that wealth and pelf, treasure stores and buried hoards, precious gems, horses and weapons, nothing has remained except the good deeds [of those kings].”⁷⁵

Noteworthy is that the pro-Seljuq Rāwandī lamenting the fall of the Great Seljuq *dawla* regards the Rum Seljuq sultanate as the continuation of it and addressing Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kayhusraw writes:

“heir to the Saljūq dawlat (‘May God help him to revive these customs, to put down the enmity between Hanafīs and Shāfi’īs ... and to repair the endowments and madrasas (built by) his ancestors, who attained rule because of their zeal for the faith and their patronage of the ‘ulamā.’”⁷⁶

The Arabic chronicle *Nuṣrat al-fatrah*, the result of the work of three authors, is the oldest history of the Great Seljuqs. The original work was the *Nuṣrat al-fatrah* of ‘Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī (519/1125-597/1201), a history of the Seljuqs which starts with their stay in Bukhara and is carried down to 579/1183 when the author completed his work.⁷⁷ ‘Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī incorporated in his composition the

⁷¹ Cf. C. Hillenbrand, *Seljuq historiography*, p.77.

⁷² Rāwandī himself described his work as such. Cf. Meisami, *Persian historiography*, 239.

⁷³ Meisami, *Persian historiography*, 238.

⁷⁴ Cf. C. Hillenbrand, *Seljuq historiography*, 78.

⁷⁵ Meisami, *Persian historiography*, 242.

⁷⁶ Meisami, *Persian historiography*, 242.

⁷⁷ Here the Turkish translation of the abridgement of the *Nuṣrat al-fatrah* of ‘Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī by al-Bundārī called *Zubdat al-nuṣra wa nukhbat* will be used. K. Burslan, *Irak ve Horasan Selçukluları Tarihi, İmad al-Din al-Katib al-İsfahanin'nin al-Bondari tarafından ihtisar edilen Zubdat al-Nusra ve Nuhbat al 'Usra adlı Kitabının tercümesi*, Istanbul, 1943, (hereafter cited as al-Bundārī, *Zubdat*, Burslan).

memoirs of the Seljuq vizier Anūshirwān bin Khālīd (d. 1138/9) written in Persian and covering the time 1072–1134 after translating them into Arabic. In 623/1226 al-Bundārī made an abridgment of this composition and gave it the title *Zubdat an-nuṣra wa nukhbat al-'usra* (Cream of the book Help and Selection from the book Refuge). Al-Iṣfahānī work survives in this abridged form which “is simpler in style but faithful in substance,”⁷⁸ but even in this edition “the book is very difficult to read, owing to the number of rhetorical figures, rare words, and turns of phraseology with which it is garnished, but it possess great importance as the fullest source (and for the history of events after 520 also the oldest) for the history of the Saljūq history.”⁷⁹

Anūshirwān (d 1138/39) was the vizier of the Abbasid caliph al-Mustarshid before he went to hold the same office for the Great Seljuq sultan Mas'ūd⁸⁰. According to 'Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī, Anūshirwān did not hold this office for long and could not bring about changes, which was not his fault but was due to the disordered state of affairs.⁸¹ Anūshirwān is another example of the Persian men of the pen who helped the Seljuqs to run the administration of their Empire. Isfahani takes the side of the Persian men of the pen and indicates that the Seljuq Empire declined because these men were not given the opportunity to put it in order. Anūshirwān and al-Iṣfahānī thus share the view of the previous authors that the Persian elite was very important for the functioning of the Seljuq Empire. On the other hand Isfahani also reveals the shortcomings of Anushirwan and writes that his book is an act of revenge against the officials of his time and a lamentation of his misfortune.⁸²

'Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī also belonged to the Persian elite but was not in the service of the Seljuqs like Anūshirwān. He served in Syria Nūr al-Din as *kātib* and after an interlude gained Saladin's favour by sending him a poem after he had invaded Syria and had taken Hims (652/1175). From then on he accompanied

⁷⁸ Cahen, 'The Historiography of the Seljuqid Period', in: *Historians of the Middle East*, Lewis/ Holt, (eds.), London 1952, 68, (hereafter cited as Cahen, *Historiography*).

⁷⁹ Barthold, *Turkestan*, 28.

⁸⁰ Cf. al-Bundārī, *Zubdat*, Burslan, xxiii.

⁸¹ Cf. al-Bundārī, *Zubdat*, Burslan, 167.

⁸² Cf. al-Bundārī, *Zubdat*, Burslan, 2.

Saladin on all his expeditions and gave up service after the death of Saladin (589/1193) to devote himself to literary pursuits⁸³. 'Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī wrote several works of importance including the *Nuṣrat al-fatra* but he is better known for his history of Saladin and the conquest of Jerusalem. One might expect that the view of 'Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī on Seljuq history is balanced because he was not in their service and wrote with a certain distance. This, however, is not necessarily the case. Al-Iṣfahānī had lived on Seljuq territory before he had to leave for Syria, and many of his relatives were still in Seljuq service and delivered him inside information⁸⁴.

Al-Bundārī the third author to work on the *Nuṣrat al-fatra*, was also a Persian scholar from Isfahan and like al-Iṣfahānī, he had moved to Syria where he served the Ayyubid prince Malik Muazzam to whom he dedicated his work. We do not possess more details about his life but as for his view on the Seljuqs, we can expect a similar view to that 'Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī, so that we can assume that he did not change the latter's work.

The only dynastic history of the Seljuqs in Arabic is the *Akhbār al-dawlat al-Saljūkiyya*.⁸⁵ The authorship and the exact circumstances of its emergence are still a controversy among scholars. The Akhbār is probably an abridged form of the *Zubdat al-tawārīkh* written by Sadr al-Din Abu'l Hasan Ali b. Nasir al-Husaynī, a native of Nishapur.⁸⁶ The author gives a complete history of the Great Seljuqs and though the material about the early Seljuq history is compact, the detailed account about the last period of the Great Seljuqs makes a contemporary author probable.⁸⁷ References at the end of the work verify that it was composed in 622/1225 but the narrative ends with the death of the last Great Seljuq sultan Tuğrul in 590/1193. For the period of 485/1092-547/1152 'Imād al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī's *Nuṣrat al-fatra* was nearly the only

⁸³ Cf. EI2, Imād al-Dīn, (Massé), 1157.

⁸⁴ al-Bundārī, *Zubdat*, Burslan, xxviii.

⁸⁵ M. Iqbal edited this work under the title *Akhbār al-dawlat al-Saljūkiyya* but in the text itself it is named *Zubdat al-tawārīkh*. Cf. Q. Ayaz, An unexploited source for the history of the Saljūqs: A translation of and critical commentary on the *Akhbār al-Dawlat al-Saljūqiyya*, 2 vols., unpubl. PhD thesis Edinburgh 1985, here vol.1, (hereafter cited as *Akhbār*, Ayaz).

⁸⁶ Cf. C. Hillenbrand, *Seljuq Historiography*, 79 fn. 27. Qıbla Ayaz comes to this conclusion in the introduction of his translation of the Akhbār.

⁸⁷ Cf. *Akhbār*, Ayaz, 16.

source for the *Akhhbār* where al-İşfahānī is acknowledged as a source but otherwise, it is an independent source.⁸⁸

The *Akhhbār* shares the pro-Seljuq view of the other sources and although we do not know details of the life of the author, we can assume that he also belonged to the group of learned men. The author either lived through the last period of the Great Seljuqs or shortly after it in a time where the memory of this time was still alive.

The Arabic universal history of İzz al-Dīn Abu'l Hasan Ali Ibn al-Athīr (555/1160-630/1233) entitled *al-Kāmil fi'l tar'ikh* must be mentioned here though it is not a Seljuq history it is "the most coherent account of the Great Seljuq sultans."⁸⁹ Moreover it deals with the subordinate lines of the Seljuqs including the Rum Seljuqs and thus makes this source even more valuable for the present work. Born in Jazirat al-Umar (modern Cizre) north of Mosul, Ibn al-Athīr spent most of his life in his hometown and Mosul with some breaks to Baghdad. Ibn al-Athīr wrote the *Kāmil* after the decline of the Great Seljuq Empire but he made use of a wide range of earlier sources, of which many including the *Maliknāma* are lost.⁹⁰ Modern scholars criticize Ibn al-Athīr for not naming his sources but emphasize at the same time the great importance of his work to the Muslim history. "His work is by no means a simple chronicle of external events; so far as the framework of his composition allows Ibn al-Athīr gives us a fair conception of the ideas and tendencies prevailing at different periods, and of the true character of historical figures ..."⁹¹ As we are more concerned with the ideas of the Seljuqs than with a correct reproduction of events, the *al-Kāmil* is valuable even though it is not possible to assess which sources the author had at his disposal.

Another important universal history written in Arabic is the *Mir'āt al-Zamān* of Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī Yūsuf b. Kizoḡlu (581/1185-654/1256). He was the son of a former Turkish slave and the daughter of the famous preacher and historian Ibn al-

⁸⁸ Cf. Cahen, *Historiography*, 69.

⁸⁹ C. Hillenbrand, *Seljuq historiography*, 79.

⁹⁰ For Ibn al-Athīr's sources for the Great Seljuq Period cf. D.S. Richards, *The Annals of the Saljuq Turks. Selections from al-Kāmil fi'l-Ta'rikh of 'İzz al-Dīn Ibn al-Athīr*, London 2002, 6-7, (hereafter cited as Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Annals*).

⁹¹ Barthold, *Turkestan*, 2.

Jawzī, who raised him after his father's death, and under whose name he was known as Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī.⁹² In 1201 when his grandfather died, Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī left Baghdad for Damascus where he served the Ayyubids.

Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī's work is valuable for his contemporary narrative and for preserving two important works from Baghdad from the 10th and 11th century in his work, the history of Hilal al-Sabi of which only a small part has come down to us, and the lost continuation of this work until the year 479/1086 by Hilal al-Sabi's son Ghars al-Ni'ma Muhammad. In this way an account of the early history of the Seljuqs written in Baghdad has survived and delivers good insights because Ghars al-Ni'ma served in the divan of the caliph and gives us some idea of Turkish traditions.⁹³

Muḥammad b. Amīr-khwāndshāh b. Maḥmūd Mīrkhwānd's (836-7/1433-34 - 903/1498) Persian universal history with the title *Rawḍat al-ṣafā' fī sīrat al-anbiyā' wa'l mulūk wa'l-khulafā'* is valuable although written much later. The work is divided in seven volumes, starting with the creation and going down to the author's lifetime, and incorporates in its fourth volume the history of the Great Seljuqs as well as brief histories of the Seljuqs of Kirman and the Rum-Seljuqs.⁹⁴ Mīrkhwānd used for his compilation many Arabic and Persian works which he names either in the preface or in the text but "it is difficult to say whether he had in his hands all the books that he mentions."⁹⁵ However, herein lays the value of this composition for our work because Mīrkhwānd acknowledges the lost *Maliknāma* as one of his sources.

Among the regional histories the works of Kamāl al-Dīn Abu'l Kāsim ibn al-Adīm (588/1192 – 660/1262) written in Arabic are of some value for the history of the Seljuqs. Ibn al-'Adīm was the son of a wealthy Arab family of which some members held important offices. He served in Aleppo as a vizier to the Ayyubids until the city was taken by the Mongols 658/1260 and went then to Cairo. Of the works of Ibn al-'Adīm which survived, the *Bughyat al-talab fī ta'rikh Halab* written

⁹² Cf. C. Hillenbrand, *Non-Greek Sources*, 317.

⁹³ Cf. A. Sevim, *Mir'âtü'z-Zeman fī Tarihi'l-Âyan*, Ankara 1968, vi, (hereafter cited as, Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, Sevim)

⁹⁴ The work was completed after the death of Mirkwand around 1502 by his grandson Khwandamir, who also completed the khatima an epilogue on geography attached to the work. Cf. EI2, Mīrkhwānd, (Beveridge/Manz), 127.

⁹⁵ Barthold, *Turkestan*, 57.

before 1242/43 is the most important.⁹⁶ Of the original forty volumes, only ten survived. This work is a biographical dictionary of important personalities connected with Aleppo and includes some data on the Seljuqs.

Ibn al-'Adīm's, *Zubdat al-halab fi ta'rih Halab* is a history of Aleppo which begins with the early times and goes down to 1243. Ibn al-'Adīm preserves in his work a great number of lost sources. He collected on his journeys manuscripts and had thus an extended library to hand.⁹⁷

The *Dīwān Lughāt al-Turk* of Mahmūd al-Kāshgharī composed in Baghdad in the years 454-76/1075-94 should be mentioned here although it is a lexicon and not a chronicle. Al-Kāshgharī, was the member of a noble Turkish family of the Kashghar region and travelled through many Turkish lands before he settled in Baghdad.⁹⁸ Here he came in contact with Arab and Persian scholars and noticing their interest in Turkish, he wrote two works of which one is lost and the other is the *Dīwān*, a Turkish-Arabic lexicon. This work deals mainly with the Qarluq dialect used by the Karakhanids but also deals with the dialects of the Ghuzz/Oğuz, the tribe of the Seljuqs, and the Kıpçaks. The work of al-Kāshgharī is not only important because it is the only work written by a Turk, but also because it is "not simply a dictionary but an anthology of ancient Turkish poetry and folklore."⁹⁹

For the history of the Rum Seljuqs we do not possess as many sources as for the Great Seljuqs, but the *al-Awāmir al-'Alā'iyya* of Ibn Bībī al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad written in Persian we possess is an extraordinary source for the Rum-Seljuq history. The only information we possess about the author's life are the details he gives us in his work. According to this, he was known as Ibn al-Bībī al-Munajjima (son of the noble woman astrologer). This was the title of his mother whose real name he does not tell us. That Ibn Bībī is known under the title of his mother shows that she held an important position. Indeed that Ibn Bībī parents came into Rum-Seljuq service was the result of her knowledge of astrology. She was a descendant of

⁹⁶ Cf. A. Sevim, *Kamāl al-Dīn Ibn al-'Adīm Bugyat at-Talab fi Tārih Halab. Selçuklularla İlgili Haltercümeler*, 17, (hereafter cited as Ibn al-'Adīm, Sevim).

⁹⁷ Cf. Ibn al-'Adīm, Sevim, 10.

⁹⁸ Cf. *EI2*, Al-Kāshgharī, (Hazai), 699.

⁹⁹ Humphreys, *Islamic History*, 15.

Nishapur's elite and stood with her husband in the service of the Khwārazmshāhs after whose defeat by the Mongols they went into the service of the Ayyubids and to Damascus. The Rum Seljuq sultan Kay Qubādh, who had heard of al-Bībī al-Munajjima's talent asked the Ayyubid to send the family to him and from then on (629-630/1231-32) they served this sultan.

Ibn Bībī's composition includes the history of the Rum Seljuq sultanate from 1192 to 1280 and was completed in 1281.¹⁰⁰ He was instructed to write a history of the Rum Seljuqs from their appearance in Asia Minor onwards.¹⁰¹ He states in the prologue of his work that he did not know enough about this early period and that the documentary sources were difficult to understand and the tales of the storytellers contradictory.¹⁰² He concludes that one should leave what one is incapable of and do what one is capable of.¹⁰³ He was obviously reluctant to write a full history of the Rum Seljuqs and was more interested in writing about times he knew from his own experience or of which he had heard from contemporaries. Thus Ibn Bībī's composition can be categorized as memoirs and it is of great value for the present study even though the author does not name his sources and, as Öztürk criticizes, does not name important personalities, and fails to include some important incidents or documents them inaccurately and makes chronological mistakes.¹⁰⁴ Ibn Bībī gives valuable information about the political system, the society, the administration, the economy and the cultural situation of the Rum Seljuq sultanate.¹⁰⁵

Ibn Bībī, like the authors we have discussed above, aimed to show off his rhetorical skills and his work includes many insertions such as poems, quotations from the Quran and Hadiths and speeches. Because of that, his composition was already epitomised during his lifetime around 1284/85 by a scholar from his own circle who is unknown to us.¹⁰⁶ Noteworthy is that the epitomizer, when stating the reasons for the new edition, informs us by whom such works were read and writes

¹⁰⁰ Ibn Bībī, Duda, 6; A more recent discussion of Ibn Bībī and his work is given by C. Melville, 'The Early Persian Historiography of Anatolia', in: *History and Historiography of Post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East*, ed. J. Pfeiffer/ S.A. Quinn/ E. Tucker, Wiesbaden 2006, 137-144, (hereafter cited as Melville, *Early Persian Historiography*).

¹⁰¹ M. Öztürk, *El Evamirü'l-Ala'ıye fi'l-Umuri'l-Ala'ıye (Selçuk Name)*, 2 vols., Ankara 1996, 28, (hereafter cited as Ibn Bībī, Öztürk)

¹⁰² Cf. Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, Bibi, 29. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 1.

¹⁰³ Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, 29.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, 4.

¹⁰⁵ Ibn Bībī, Duda, Bibi, 1.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 10-11.

that the *جماعت اخوان* (the union/circle of the friends/brothers) had made complaints about the books length.¹⁰⁷ This suggests that these works were mainly composed for the interested intellectual elite¹⁰⁸.

There are two other works written in Persian for the history of the Rum Seljuqs from a later period, which though also of lesser value, should be noted here. The *Musāmarat al-akhbār wa musāyarat al-akhyār* of Karīm al-Dīn Aksarayi written in 723/1323 for Çoban the Mongol governor of Anatolia.¹⁰⁹ We know only a few details of Aksarayi's life which he mentions in his work. From his name we can assume that he was a native of the town Aksaray but it is not clear if he was Persian or Turkish.¹¹⁰ He served probably only half-heartedly in the diwan of the Mongol overlords because he was accused of helping the rebellious Turkish emirs and it seems that he could not overcome the fact of the decline of the Rum Seljuq Sultanate.

The work is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is about the different types of calendars and the importance of chronology. The second chapter gives a short history of Islam, beginning with the prophet Muḥammad. The third chapter gives a brief history of the Seljuqs.¹¹¹ The fourth and longest chapter provides the history of the Mongol supremacy over the Rum Seljuq sultanate of which the author was a contemporary.¹¹² For the period of 681/1282-723/1323 this is the only source for the history of Anatolia.¹¹³ Thus this work is valuable for the present study for it completes Ibn Bībī's work and delivers the last period of Rum Seljuq history and gives us the chance to see which traces they left and how they were regarded after their decline. Aksarayi's work is further proof that the Perso-Islamic concept of rulership was transported to Anatolia for he seems to have been committed to this concept he is also pro-Seljuq and regards the Rum Seljuq Sultanate as the legitimate successor to the Great Seljuq Empire.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 16 and footnote d on the same page.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. C. Hillenbrand, *Seljuq historiography*, 75.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Melville, *Early Persian Historiography*, 145-150.

¹¹⁰ Cf. F. Işiltan, *Die Seltschuken-Geschichte des Akserāyī*, Leipzig 1943, 16, (hereafter cited as Aksarayi, Işiltan). Işiltan argues that Aksarayi must have been Turkish because the Türkish element was without doubt the main element in the Rum Seljuq state.

¹¹¹ Cf. Aksarayi, Işiltan, 9.

¹¹² Cf. Aksarayi, Işiltan, 18.

¹¹³ Cf. Aksarayi, Işiltan, 9-10.

The other source, written by an anonymous citizen of Konya¹¹⁴, delivers only a brief history of the Seljuqs starting with their early history and going down to the year 765/1364.

Beside the Muslim sources, there are some Christian sources which we have to consider. Especially the Rum Seljuqs attracted the interest of Christian writers for their sultanate was built on former Byzantine territory. Among these sources acquainted with Seljuq history, the universal history of Gerīghōr Abu'l-Faradj or Bar Hebraeus (1225/26 – 1286) and the Alexiad of Anna Comnena (1083-1153-55) are the most important.

Bar Hebraeus (Ibn al-'Ibrī), who became well-known under this nickname because of his father's Jewish descent was born in Melitene (Malatya), which was under Rum Seljuq rule, later lived in other Muslim towns such as Antioch (Antakya), where he studied medicine, rhetoric and theology, and Aleppo, where he held the office of the Metropolitan of the city. Later he was appointed head of the Jacobite church and travelled widely and visited also Baghdad.¹¹⁵ Bar Hebraeus knew Syriac, Hebrew and Arabic and was a tolerant and open personality, not only interested in Christian history but also in Muslim history. His universal history which he translated himself into Arabic under the title *Ta'rīkh mukhtaṣar al-duwal*, is although not free of mistakes, valuable in respect of the sources he used for the Seljuq history. "He was acquainted with the Maliknāma and Baghdādī sources which relate him partially to Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī (and thus perhaps to Ghars al-Ni'ma) for the Great Seljuqs; for subsequent events such of his work as is not drawn from Michael the Syrian appears to come from Ibn al-Athīr."¹¹⁶ More important is that Bar Hebraeus not only lived on Rum Seljuq territory but also was in contact with them.

¹¹⁴ Cf. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 57; cf. Melville, *Early Persian Historiography*, 150-153.

¹¹⁵ Cf., EI2, Ibn Al-Ibrī, (Segal), 804.

¹¹⁶ Cahen, *Historiography*, 78.

I. From nomadic chieftains to Muslim rulers

I.1. The Seljuq tradition of origin

The tradition of origin is the base of the self-image of a dynasty and Schmid rightly points out that it is the very element which produces the dynasty. Schmid suggests that the medieval tradition reveals a process which shows that the tradition of origin gradually developed into the self-image of the Welfs.¹¹⁷

At the time when the Seljuqs entered the Muslim world we find two trends of linking new dynasties to the past. On the one hand, the linking to the Arab past and the family of the Prophet which seemed to promise the best legitimation and prestige and on the other, the attachment to the Persian epic past. Here a comparison between the Ghaznavids and the Seljuqs, both of Turkish nomadic descent, makes sense. Sebüktegin, the founder of the former, was a military slave of the Sāmānids for whom, after he had overthrown his old masters, a genealogy was created which linked the Ghaznavid house to the Persian heroic past¹¹⁸. The Ghaznavids searched for attachment to the Persian past, whereas the Qarakhanids and Seljuqs did not, because they had not spent a formative period under a Persian dynasty. “Hence it was only natural that they should seek to derive their charisma of rule from the heroic Turkish past, and not from the indigenous traditions of their newly-acquired Iranian territories, where they for a long time felt aliens, as indeed they were.”¹¹⁹ According to Bosworth, the reason for this was that the Seljuqs, in contrast to the Ghaznavids with their professional standing army, were dependent on their nomad Turkish followers. This argument is convincing but needs further study because the Ghaznavids were not as much assimilated to Persian rulership and culture as is often claimed. Bosworth himself states: “On the other hand, Mahmūd of Ghazna was praised for his Turkish lineage; some oft-quoted verses of Badī’ az-Zamān al-Hamadhānī say that “The house of Bahrām [sc. the Sāmānids] has become subject to

¹¹⁷ Schmid, ‘Welfisches Selbstverständnis’, in: idem., *Gebetsgedenken und adliges Selbstverständnis im Mittelalter*, Sigmaringen 1983, 434.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Bosworth, ‘The Heritage of Rulership in early Islamic Iran’, in: idem. *The Medieval History of Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia*, London 1977, VII. 61.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 62.

the son of the Khāqān [sc. Maḥmūd]”, but it is true that this emphasis on the Sultan’s Turkishness comes from the early years of the dynasty.”¹²⁰

It is, however, difficult to trace from the sources the Turkish elements still alive in the Ghaznavid and Seljuq empires and modern scholars take the view of the Persian sources and state that the Seljuqs were also soon Persianized. The information about the origin of the Seljuqs is more or less identical and goes back to one and the same source, the lost *Maliknāma*. The account of the *Akhbār* reads as follows:

“(The name) Yuqaq in Turkish means an iron bow. Yuqaq was a perspicacious man who was endowed with good judgement and competence. The king of the Turks had placed the reins of his government in his hands and he was illuminated by the light of his judgement and resourcefulness. The name of the king of the Turks was Yabghu. It happened one day that he (Yabghu) mobilised his soldiers in order to set out towards the countries of Islam. Amīr Yuqaq stopped him from doing this but the king of the Turks would not listen. So Yuqaq behaved very arrogantly and slapped the king of the Turks on the face.”¹²¹

Ibn al-Athīr gives a similar report and writes:

“Duqaq, the meaning of which is ‘iron bow’, a brave man and a man of good sense and organisational skill, was leader of the Oghuz Turks. They turned to him for guidance, accepted his every word and never went beyond his orders. It happened one day that the ruler of the Turks, who was called Yabghu, assembled his troops, intending to attack Islamic territory. Duqaq forbade him to do so, and a long argument ensued between them. The ruler of the Turks used rough language to Duqaq who struck him and split his head open.”¹²²

The report of Bar Hebraeus resembles the reports above. Starting Seljuq history with Duqaq, he writes that Seljuq left the land of Turan for the land of Persia because the wife of the King of the Khazars incited him against Seljuq, whose behaviour became too overbearing.¹²³

Abū’l-‘Alā Ibn Hassūl, who wrote a short composition for Tuğrul glorifying his ancestors, connects the Seljuqs to the Khazars and writes that Seljuq b. Duqāq

¹²⁰ Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 40.

¹²¹ *Akhbār*, Ayaz, 52.

¹²² Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Annals*, 31. Mīrkhwānd also puts the Seljuqs near to the Khazars, a well known power at that time. J.A. Vullers, *Mirchond’s Geschichte der Seldschuken*, Giessen 1837, 1-2, (hereafter cited as Mīrkhwānd, Vullers). In Ibn al-Adīm’s account Seljuq b. Duqaq belonged also to the Khazars; cf. Ibn al-Adīm, *Sevim*, 28.

¹²³ E.A.W. Budge, *The chronography of Gregory Abu’l Faraj, the Hebrew physician, commonly known as Bar Hebraeus*, (vol.1 tr.), London 1932, 195, (hereafter cited as Bar Hebraeus, Budge).

attacked the King of the Khazars with the sword. He concludes the episode emphasising that only a free powerful person would have been able to do that and that therefore the Seljuq state started with Seljuq.¹²⁴ Ibn Hassūl also links the Seljuqs to Afrasiyab and thus the Persian epic tradition¹²⁵ but it is not clear if the Seljuqs regarded themselves as ‘Al-i Afrasiyab’.

All these accounts about the origin of the Seljuqs emphasize three elements, noble lineage, ruler qualities and religion, and they describe the Seljuqs as the “House of Seljuq”. Our authors start their narrative with Duqaq, not a historical figure; in order to stress the nobility of the Seljuqs they portray the historical ancestor Seljuq as an important personality who dared to oppose the leader of the Turks. According to Mīrkhwānd, Bar Hebraeus and Ibn Hassūl, this leader was the King of the Khazars, but the historical events later on prove the important position of Seljuq wrong. It was not until the time of his grandsons that the Seljuqs gained power. Even then they were no more than leaders of nomadic bands and did not have characteristics of a ruler, which our authors already attribute to Seljuq. A connection between the Seljuqs and the Khazars did not exist either and is used to link the Seljuqs, who were “at a particularly low social and cultural level, with a powerful and well-known group like the Khazars of South Russia.”¹²⁶

Our authors try to present the Seljuqs as good Muslims. According to the Akhbār, Duqaq (Tukak) opposed the Yabghu because he wanted to raid Muslim territory, “but this is clearly a later touch designed to show that the Seljuq family were already moved by the divine light before their formal adhesion to Islam.”¹²⁷ According to Barthold “the moral ideas of nomads are dependent to a greater degree than those of civilized peoples on religion. It is quite natural that the first Saljūqids and Qarā-Khānids were better Muslims than Maḥmūd and Mas‘ūd, just as Saint Vladimir was a better Christian than the Byzantine Emperors.” Hence the Islam of the Seljuqs was rather nominal than reasoned and strengthened. The sources do not provide the real motives of the Seljuqs in assuming the new religion and their understanding of it, giving only the common phrases of the time.

¹²⁴ Ş. Yaltkaya, Ibni Hassul’ün Türkler Hakkında bir Eseri, in: *Belleten* 13 (1940), 265, (hereafter cited as Ibn Hassūl, Yaltkaya, 265).

¹²⁵ Ibn-Hassūl, Yaltkaya, 257.

¹²⁶ Bosworth, *Heritage of Rulership*, 62.

¹²⁷ Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 219.

Nevertheless, the idea of a noble lineage must have been not totally alien to the Seljuqs, though they probably were not that noble. The leaders in nomadic societies also had an aura of nobility around them, and were members of a noble family. Our sources describe the Seljuqs as the “House of Seljuq” and it seems that this was also their own view, at least at the time when the *Maliknāma* was composed. It is not clear if their tribe was important to them nor if they saw themselves within the tribe. According to Kashghāri, the Seljuqs belonged to the noble Qiniq tribe:

“oyuz A tribe of the Turks; the Turkmān. They consist of twenty-two branches, each of which has a distinctive brand ... on its animals by which it is known from the others. The chief of them is: QINIQ qiniq to which our present sultans belong; ...”¹²⁸

The Seljuq histories also state that they belonged to this tribe but later it is not mentioned again. “It was learned thus from historians and authors, that Saljuq b. Luqmān was from the Saljuq family of the Qiniq tribe. He was descended from Tuqshurmish, the son of Karakju Khwāja, who was tent-frame maker for the rulers of the Turks. Tughril Sultan was from the clan of Qiniq.”¹²⁹ The *Akhbār* names the Qiniq at the beginning of its narrative. “He went through the quarters and tents of this tribe which was known as Qiniq.”¹³⁰

Thus we can assume that the Seljuqs were regarded by their followers and the sedentary Persian and Arabs and by themselves as a family of leaders and that this changed after their instalment in Khurasan. They then regarded themselves as the “House of Seljuq”, instructed by their Persian officials. It would be fruitful to find out how the sedentary Muslim society understood ‘house’ (āl) and how the nomadic incomers such as the Seljuqs understood it.¹³¹ The Ghaznavids, for example, are regarded in our sources as the “House of Sebüktegin” and not Ghaznavids, which is an invention of modern historians.

¹²⁸ R. Dankoff/ J. Kelly, (eds.), *Maḥmūd al-Kāshgarī, Compendium of Turkish Dialects (Dīwān Lughāt at-Turk)*, Harvard 1982-1985, vol.1, 101.

¹²⁹ Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 29.

¹³⁰ Akhbār, Ayaz, 54.

¹³¹ This has been done for medieval Christian history but I do not know of works dealing with this question for medieval Muslim history. The question is only mentioned in passing. Already Barthold pointed out that the designation Qarakhanids and Il-Khanids is an invention of the nineteenth century Russian orientalist.

I.2. The ideology behind the Seljuq success

We have seen above that the authors of the Seljuq histories try to make us believe that the Seljuqs were of noble origin and already politically sophisticated when they entered the Muslim world. Our sources start the Seljuq history with the mythical ancestor Dukak and do not go further back. We do not have any evidence to assume that the Seljuqs had a memory of earlier Turkish empires such as the Gök Türk empire of the 8th century.¹³²

There is no evidence in our sources of a memory about these past empires. The account of the Seljuq origin of the *Maliknāma*, as it is quoted by Ibn al-Athīr, the *Akḥbār*, Bar Hebraeus and Mīrkhwand, contain no information of this kind and we can expect that it would have emerged if there had been such a memory, because it would have contributed to the glorification of the Seljuqs' origin. We have mentioned above that the Seljuqs depended on oral tales to pass their history to the next generation and it is thus very unlikely that the memory reached further down than a few generations.

Supposing that there was a memory of past empires, it would not have equipped them to deal with the tasks setting up a Muslim dynasty. Even the cultural and political state of the 10th century Oğuz confederation of which the Seljuqs were part was not sufficient in this respect. The Oğuz confederation had a nominal head, the Yabghu, which was not the highest rank among the steppe people as there was the more highly regarded title of Qaghan. Both the Yabghu and the Qaghan were only heads of loose confederations of different Turkish tribes. According to our sources, Seljuq held the office of *Sūbaşı* (military commander), before he fled with his followers to Jand on the lower Syr Darya. Within the Oğuz confederation, the office of Subashi was important and Seljuq most probably opposed the Yabghu and had to leave, which indicates that he was ambitious. Later, the descendants of the Yabghu became the bitter enemies of the Seljuqs and it seems that the Seljuq family assumed the Yabghu title in opposition to them. It seems, however, that the Seljuqs

¹³² "The chronological and geographical gap is too wide for any continuity to be traced, and the problems faced by the Seljuqs as they installed themselves in the ancient lands of Perso-Muslim civilisation were very different from those of earlier tribal chieftains assembling vast but ephemeral steppe empires." Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 266.

were later not interested in their old homelands and did not assume the Qaghan title, which was held by the Qarakhanids, who interestingly were content with Transoxania and did not go further into Muslim territory. This might be evidence that the later Seljuqs aimed towards a monarchy but this disinterest might also be born out of necessity, because the Qarakhanids held that position.

However, it is very unlikely that Seljuq was moved by the divine light when he left for Jand, as implied by our sources, or had a grand plan of conquest in order to domain the world, as suggested by Osman Turan. In his book *Türk Cihan Hâkimiyeti Mefkûresi Tarihi* and his article *The ideal of world domination among the medieval Turks*¹³³ he argues that there was a specific Turkish concept of world domination which, born out of steppe traditions, continued from the early Turkish empire of the Hioung-nu down to the Ottoman Empire. Certainly some elements of the steppe life remained until the end of Seljuq history, as we will see in the following chapters, but the assumption of such a continuation is unsafe in many ways and, as Humphreys states, Turan's "thesis [is] a doubtful one."¹³⁴ Firstly it is based on the controversial thesis that a "nation" has a specific character lasting throughout their history. Secondly, the very different formation and structure of steppe empires is not taken into account. Thirdly it is not taken into account that in illiterate societies the memory of the past cannot reach that far back. The evidence Turan presents for his view lacks *Quellenkritik* and is not convincing.

A dream which Seljuq, although a Muslim at that time, let a Turkish shaman interpret seems to point to the direction of world domination, but the way they later come to power and the course of the events does not point out a pre-planned Seljuq concept of world domination. "One night he had a dream that he was urinating a fire whose sparks cast light in both the eastern and western parts of the earth. He asked the interpreter of dreams who told him that he would give birth to maliks who would rule all over the world."¹³⁵ The phrase "sultan of the world," which seems to support such a view is only a topos, and is used for nearly all other Muslim dynasties as well as the Seljuqs. Ibn Hassûl in a passage of his epistle for Tuğrul connects the Seljuqs to the Persian epic past and states that Faridun ruled over the world and then divided

¹³³ 2 vols., İstanbul (Turan Neşriyat Yurdu), 1969; 'The ideal of world domination among the medieval Turks', in: *Studia Islamica* IV (1956), 77-90.

¹³⁴ Humphreys, *Islamic History*, 166.

¹³⁵ Akhbâr, Ayaz, 54.

this rule among his three sons named Iraj, Salm, and Tur suggesting that the latter is the Seljuqs' predecessor.¹³⁶ At a different place, however, Ibn Hassūl states that the Sasannians ruled over the world.¹³⁷

It is thus better to assume that the Seljuqs, when they entered the Muslim world, had no specific ideology or concept of rule and no political ties, and Khazanov's statement seems convincing when he writes that the Seljuq invasion "was neither premeditated, nor thought out and planned in advance. It was a chain reaction of events and the unexpected weakness of the Middle Eastern states which led to the creation of the Saljuq Empire."¹³⁸ It must be noted however that neither Khazanov nor other modern scholars who give similar statements deliver explanations for them. The nature of the Seljuq sources makes it very difficult to extract the ideas of the Seljuqs, for the authors are silent about them. Nonetheless, we should and can only proceed from these sources. Surely we need to ask the right questions and we need to make speculations, but we have to accept that we cannot find answers for all our questions which does not necessarily mean, that speculations can be turned into conclusions.

The Perso-Islamic concept of rule, however, cannot have been part of the Seljuq ideas and they definitely did not aim to set up a dynasty as we will see below. Only later did their attitude towards power change, but at this stage they were nomadic chieftains and war leaders and their only function was to lead their followers towards plunder and pasture. They were probably one of the leading families among their people but they were leaders in war who otherwise at the most were regarded as *primus inter pares*.

The Muslim Empire, once united and led by one caliphate, had disintegrated into the Sunni Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad, the Sunni Umayyad caliphate in Cordoba and the Shi'ite Fatimid caliphate in Cairo. Moreover the territories of the Abbasid caliphate itself were divided between local rulers, the Shi'i Buyids (932-1062) ruling over Iran then Iraq and occupying Baghdad, and the Sāmānids (874-1005), a dynasty of Persian origin, ruling over Transoxania and Khurasan. These local rulers, though only employing modest titles for themselves, such as the Amīr

¹³⁶ Ibn Hassūl, *Yaltkaya*, 256.

¹³⁷ Ibn Hassūl, *Yaltkaya*, 258.

¹³⁸ Khazanov, *Nomads and the outside world*, 264.

title, ruled quasi-independently from the Abbasid caliphate and recognised it only as a moral authority, for it was important for the legitimization of rule.

Transoxania, the most eastern Islamic territory, was under pressure from Turkish people, the Qarakhanids, and the Sāmānid Amīrs, unable to resist them, were defeated in 999 and had to leave Transoxania. The Sāmānid state was also weakened within by the Turkish military slaves Alptigin and Sebüktegin. The latter profiting from its decline took it over and the Ghaznavids (977-1186) or better the House of Sebüktegin emerged.

This disintegrated state of the Muslim world in general and its eastern part in particular opened for the Seljuqs, to some extent, the way when they appeared at its eastern border after the Qarakhanids. For it presented them with good opportunity to hire out their military service to the different parties fighting each other, which in turn enabled them to extend their power. The information about the early history of the Seljuqs as given by the Seljuq sources is sparse and confused and suggests that the authors did not know much about their early time and that their role at this time was not that important. Nevertheless they present us the early Seljuqs as rulers in their own right as Ibn al-Athīr reports:

“Saljuq heard a report of this, and with all his following and those who obeyed him migrated from the infidel lands to the abode of Islam. He received the blessing of true faith and the society of Muslims, and his position became more and more exalted and his power and the people’s loyalty to him grew. He lived in the region of Jand and from there he continually raided the pagan Turks. The ruler used to take tribute from the Muslims of those areas. Saljuq drove out his officials and the region passed fully to the Muslims.

Harun ibn Ilek Khan had seized part of the outlying territories of one of the Samanid rulers who sent to Saljuq asking for his aid. He sent his son, Arslan, with a company of his followers to help the Samanid. Through them the later defeated Harun and recovered his lost territory. Arslan then returned to his father.

Saljuq died in Jand when he was 107 years old, and was buried there. His children, amongst whom were Arslan, Mikha’il and Musa, remained there.”¹³⁹

Ibn al-Athīr describes the events in favour of the Seljuqs and presents Seljuq as a ruler with a residence, yet his narrative includes hints showing that the Seljuqs were only recognized as military auxiliaries by the local rulers. ‘Imād al-Dīn al Iṣfahānī states that the rulers did not chase the Seljuqs away so that they could make

¹³⁹ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Annals*, 31; Cf. Mīrkhwānd, Vullers, 5-6.

use of them when needed.¹⁴⁰ The pseudo-Nīshāpūrī also praises the Seljuqs as “worthy of principality” but reveals that they moved further because they needed new land for their animals:

“On account of their prevalence and inadequacy of grazing lands, they came from Turkestan to the province of Transoxania. In the winter their place was Nūr of Bukhara, and their summer quarters were Sughd of Samarqand.”¹⁴¹

The Seljuqs were successful as military auxiliaries, which increased the number of their followers and thus their military strength. It is typical of the structure of nomadic societies that different tribes follow successful leaders.¹⁴² However, it does not seem that their actions were pre-planned and that they took consciously a specific direction. The need of new grazing land and the changes of the alliances in the region determined their moves:

“Saljuq was a man known for his good character, blessed with renown. He had five sons, all of them lords, namely, Isrāʿīl, Mīkāʿīl, Mūsā Yabghū, Yūsuf, and Yūnus, each one worthy of a principality and deserving dominion. Each day their following and their companions were on the ascendent and increase ... Saljuq died. His sons became the leaders of the people. When Maḥmūd, son of Sabuktagīn, made peace with the Ilak Khān, the ruler of Turkestan and Samarkand, and Maḥmūd came to the banks of the Oxus, and they met with one another, concluded pacts and treaties, and the boundaries of their respective dominions were settled, the Ilak Khān began to fear the Saljuqs”¹⁴³.

The suggestion “each one worthy of a principality and deserving dominion” should not be interpreted as evidence that it was the aim of the Seljuqs to gain territorial power at this stage of their history. They were still tribally organized and had no clearly defined leadership. Although our authors designate one or the other of the family member as the supreme leader, their confusion indicates that the Seljuq family members were equal in status and that they led their bands separately acting only from time to time together. The author says on the one hand “His sons became the leaders of the people” and on the other hand “When the message and the

¹⁴⁰ al-Bundārī, *Zubdat*, Burslan, 2-3.

¹⁴¹ Pseudo-Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 29.

¹⁴² Cf. Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 226.

¹⁴³ Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 29.

ambassadors reached them, Isrā'īl, who was their leader, resolved to go to the Sultan with ten thousand chosen men and worthy horsemen.”¹⁴⁴

‘Imād al-Dīn al Iṣfahānī describes Mīkā’īl b. Seljuq as the leader and most respected eldest member and shows that the Seljuqs understood leadership as ownership of the family and that their moves were defined by grazing land for their animals.¹⁴⁵

The *Akhbār* although referring to the Seljuqs as Amīrs, describes the member who according to it was the leader as “the chief of this tribe, Amīr Mīkā’īl”, and speaks of quarters and tents, thus giving us another clue about their nomadic way of life:

“Amīr Saljūq died in Jand, leaving (his) sons behind him; They were Amīr Mīkā’īl, Amīr Mūsā and Amīr Yabghu Arslan who was called Isrā’īl. These Amīrs lived in a part of Transoxiana called Nūr Bukhārā.

Amīr Mīkā’īl b. Saljūq was in the service (?) of sultan Ghāzī Yamīn al-Dawla Abu’l-Qāsim Mahmūd b. Sebūk-Tegin, may Allāh cover him with His forgiveness. It happened that sultan Yamīn al-Dawla crossed the river Oxus on his way to Bukhārā to assist Qadīr Khān. He went through the quarters and tents of this tribe which was known as Qiniq. He saw how numerous their population was and that they had a lot of cattle. (As) he was afraid of opposition from them and feared that they would harm him, he summoned the chief of this tribe, Amīr Mīkā’īl b. Saljūq and ordered him to take his family and tribe to the province of Khurāsān. But Amīr Mīkā’īl was reluctant to move”¹⁴⁶.

In this passage Mīkā’īl is designated as the leader of all Seljuqs and on the other hand Arslan Isrā’īl is described as “a great leader of theirs”. It is most likely that Mīkā’īl is named as the leader because his sons became later successful leaders and in accordance with his understanding of kingship our author tries to construct a line of rulers going down from father to son. Ibn al-Athīr recognizes Arslan Isrā’īl as the leader of the Seljuqs and reports for the year 420 (1029):

“In this year Yamin al-Dawla [“The right hand of the State”, the honorific title of Mahmud of Ghazna, son of Sabuktegin] dealt severely with the Oghuz Turks and scattered them throughout his lands, because they had caused trouble there. These were the followers of

¹⁴⁴ Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 29-30.

¹⁴⁵ Al-Bundārī, *Zubdat*, Burslan, 2-3.

¹⁴⁶ Akhbār, Ayaz, 54.

Arslan ibn Saljuq the Turk, [also called Isrā'īl] who had been in the desert around Bukhara”¹⁴⁷.

Interestingly, later in his narrative he describes him not as leader but as the uncle of Dāwūd (Çağrı) and Tuğrul thus reflecting a transfer of power in the Seljuq family and he suggests also that the Seljuqs did not act as a united body, while Arslan Isrā'īl took part in the inner Qarakhanid struggle his nephews Tuğrul and Çağrı Bey remained in Bukhara:

“When the Samanid dynasty came to an end and Ilek Khan ruled in Bukhara, Arslan ibn Saljuq, the uncle of Da`ud and Tughril Beg, gained a high position in Transoxania. Alitegin, the brother of Ilek Khan, was imprisoned by Arslan Khan. He fled came to Bukhara and gained possession of the city. Upon his reaching an agreement with Arslan ibn Saljuq, they together held the city and became very powerful. Ilek, the brother of Arslan Khan, attacked them but they defeated him in battle and remained in Bukhara.”¹⁴⁸

Tuğrul and Çağrı certainly did not hold an important position at this time because they only bore the title Bey, but our sources tacitly draw attention to them following their later success. Despite the fact that Arslan Isrā'īl is identified as the leader and endowed with the Yabghu title, his sons seem not to have had a strong position within the family. It is not clear what they did exactly after the imprisonment and death of their father. According to pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Qutlumush (Kutalmış) went back to Bukhara to join his “paternal uncles” thus not Tuğrul and Çağrı who were his cousins.¹⁴⁹ We know that the followers of Arslan Isrā'īl did not join the other Seljuqs but asked Sultan Mahmud for permission to settle on the northern fringes of Khurasan and that they were later described as Iraqi Turkmen.

It is clear that each member of the Seljuq family led his group of followers separately and one of them had no control over the others. The remaining questions are, why did not Kutalmış lead these groups after the death of his father and why did he afterwards have only a subordinate position, even though his father seems to have played an important role? The success factor might have been one reason. Arslan Isrā'īl failed because he was not successful and was caught by Sultan Maḥmūd which then led to the disintegration of his followers, on whom Kutalmış was not able to

¹⁴⁷ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Annals*, 13.

¹⁴⁸ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Annals*, 32.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 33.

impose his authority. This, on the other hand, proves that the bands were only bound loosely to their Seljuq leaders who were seen as leaders in war. Only when they were able to lead the bands to successful booty they could then their power over them. Tuğrul and Çağrı were successful in the path they took as we will see below and were thus regarded as better leaders.

Thus military success was an important factor in the definition of the status of the Seljuq leaders since they did not inherit a title, which gave them automatically power over their nomadic followers. Our sources describe some of the Seljuqs as Yabghu, which, as it seems, was originally the title of the leader of the Turks, but it is not even clear which of the Seljuq family members was entitled to bear it, what it meant to them and which power exactly it gave to its holder. After the death of Arslan Isrāʿīl his brother Mūsā seems to have held the title yabghu.¹⁵⁰ This would mean that Mūsā as the next eldest would have succeeded but Ibn al-Athīr states that Yūsuf, the son of Mūsā held this title, which interestingly was allotted to him by the Qarakhanid Alitegin. Ibn al-Athīr describes the episode as follows:

“He sent to Yusuf ibn Musa ibn Saljuq, the cousin of Tughril Beg Muhammad and Chaghri Beg Da`ud, and promised him good treatment, did his utmost to win him over and eventually asked him to visit him, which he did. Alitegin entrusted to him the headship of all Turks who were within the lands he ruled and assigned him numerous grants of land and gave him the title Emir Inanj Yabghu.”¹⁵¹

Ibn al-Athīr names, however, one of the sons of Mīkāʿīl as Yabghu, assuming that this was a name and not a title:

“Mikhaʿil raided some territory of the infidel Turks, and in a battle, in which he personally engaged in combat, he met a martyr`s death ‘on the path of God’. He left the following children, Payghu, Tughril Beg Muhammad and Çağrı Beg Da’ud. Their clans obeyed them and submitted to their commands and prohibitions.”¹⁵²

According to Rashīd al-Dīn Nishapuri Mīkāʿīl had two sons called Çağrı and Tuğrul, “who became respected leaders of their tribe and kinsmen.”¹⁵³ It seems thus

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 40.

¹⁵¹ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Annals*, 34; Cf. Mīrkhwānd, Vullers, 16-17.

¹⁵² Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Annals*, 32. The *Akhhār* also names one of the sons of Mīkāʿīl, Yabghu. Cf. Akhhār, Ayaz, 56.

¹⁵³ Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 34.

that either Arslan Isrā'īl either assumed the title Yabghu in opposition to the real yabghu or that it was bestowed on him by a Qarakhanid. Kutalmış rebelled after the death of Tuğrul Bey claiming supreme leadership of the family and hence the the sultanate: "The sultanate comes to us, and our father, who was best and eldest of the tribe was killed in these circumstances."¹⁵⁴ Most probably these are the words of our author but noteworthy is the mix up in it. It claims that Arslan Isrā'īl was the "best" meaning the most experienced leader and eldest and describes him as leader of a "tribe" thus suggesting that the Seljuqs were a united body in the form of a tribe led by one leader who fought for kingship and that thus the sultanate belongs to Kutalmış.

We have shown above that Arslan Isrā'īl might have been the eldest but he was not successful and his followers were a separate group and his struggle was not for kingship. The authors themselves describe the Seljuqs as "leaders" in the passages cited above. That Kutalmış was able to mobilize troupes for a rebellion proves that the Seljuq followers were not led by one leader and that most of them did not accept supreme leadership and we have no reason to assume that the Seljuqs regarded themselves in a different way. There is no evidence in the sources that the early Seljuqs regarded themselves in a different way. Tuğrul and Çağrı were successful as military auxiliaries but at this time they seem not to have had the aim to set up a dynasty. Nevertheless Tuğrul later became sultan and the next section will discuss the factors which led to that.

I.3. Çağrı Bey and Tuğrul Bey

The Seljuq leaders Tuğrul and Çağrı were driven by necessity to go further westwards into Muslim territory, for surrounded by enemies they had no other choice. On one side of the Oxus were the Qarakhanids and one of those Alitigin, with whom their uncle Arslan Isrā'īl had been allied, turned against them and wanted to drive them away. Ibn al-Athīr writes interpreting the Seljuq situation in 421/1030 after the

¹⁵⁴ Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 45.

battle with Alitigin: “They were driven by necessity to cross over into Khurasan.”¹⁵⁵ On the other side of the Oxus was the Khwārazmshāh, Shāh Malik, an old enemy of the Seljuqs and the Ghaznavids who not necessarily welcomed them. According to the *Akhbār* Shāh Malik besieged the Khwārazmshāh who then fled to the Seljuqs. “Then he (Shāh Malik) made for Khwārazm and Ismā’īl b. Khwārazm-Shāh received him. They confronted each other in battle. ... Then Ismā’īl ran away and took refuge with the Saljūq Amīrs”¹⁵⁶. Ibn al-Athīr notes that the Khwārazmshāh Hārūn b. Altuntaş offered the Seljuqs his alliance but then set their old enemy Shāh Malik against them so that they asked the Ghaznavid Sultan Mas’ūd for help. They wanted security and would in return “attack the group that was causing disturbance in his territory, to drive them out and fight them, and to be his greatest helpers against them and against others.”¹⁵⁷ The Seljuqs recognised the Ghaznavid sultan and offered their service as military auxiliaries but the sultan sent his army against them and left himself for India:

“The scattered remnants of his army returned to Sultan Mas’ud when he was in Nishapur, and he was sorry he had spurned their offer of allegiance. He realised that awe of them had taken a firm hold on the hearts of his soldiers and that because of this defeat [he had suffered] the Saljuqs would be more ambitious and would dare to meet his royal troops in pitched battle, whereas before they had been greatly afraid.”¹⁵⁸

While the Seljuqs at the beginning of the struggle regarded their military strength as inferior to the sultan’s army and fought with their steppe hit and run tactic this changed with their success over the army of Sultan Mas’ūd. According to the *Akhbār*, Tuğrul Bey told his brother Çağrı Bey after their victory over the Ghaznavid sultan at Balkh:

“Today no peace nor apology can be facilitated with the sultan after blood had been shed and hatred is so deep-rooted in the hearts (of men). We have horsemen for whom the lands are small and the sultan has an army whose safety lies in running away.”¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁵ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Annals*, 34.

¹⁵⁶ *Akhbār*, Ayaz, 59.

¹⁵⁷ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Annals*, 35.

¹⁵⁸ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Annals*, 35. Ibn al-Athīr’s interpretation is convincing because it finds confirmation by the Ghaznavid source Baihaqī. Cf. Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 242.

¹⁵⁹ *Akhbār*, Ayaz, 66.

It is not surprising that with growing military success their ambitions grew but their attitude towards power had yet not changed. It seems that their main aim was not conquest, followed by political domain, but plunder and grazing land. Even the pro-Seljuq authors do not skate round this fact:

“After the defeat of the Amir of Khurasan the Saljuqs spread out in the province of Khurasan, and during this period of weakness, the Turkomans put their hands to tyranny, highway robbery, upheaval and discord, making the district of Khurasan disturbed and disordered.”¹⁶⁰

Interestingly the author changes the subject writing “the Saljuqs spread out” but “the Turkomans put their hands on tyranny,” attributing the misdeeds to the followers of the Seljuqs. The pseudo-Nīshāpūrī and ‘Imād al-Dīn al Iṣfahānī, most probably in an attempt to clear the name of Tuğrul, the later sultan, write that Chaghri wanted to plunder and that Tuğrul prevented him and the Turkmen followers from doing so:

“On the day of the festival they mounted up to plunder Nishapur. Tughrul Beg said, “It is the day of the festival. It is not fitting to make people miserable”. Chagrī Beg quarrelled with this and drew his dagger, saying, “If you let me plunder ... if not, I’ll kill myself”. Tughril was conciliatory and satisfied him with payment of a share of forty thousand dinars.”¹⁶¹

It is very unlikely that Tuğrul made such a statement full of Arabic words and religious explanation. Anyhow these passages show that the Seljuqs were after the riches they could get from the territories and not after the domination of them.

I. 4. The Turkmen followers of the Seljuqs

Another aspect emerges in the accounts of the plunder raids. The sources separate the Seljuq family members from their followers attributing the misdeeds to the second and portraying the first especially Tuğrul Bey, as ruler-like. The Seljuq followers are in the passages concerning the early history of the Seljuqs characterised as the tribe, kinsmen, and Oğuz but they are later described as Turkomans and

¹⁶⁰ Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 35.

¹⁶¹ Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 41. Cf. al-Bundārī, *Zubdat*, Burslan, 4, 5.

disregarded by our authors. The geographer al-Idrisi distinguishes between the Turkish leaders and their followers stating: “Their princes are warlike, provident, firm, just, and are distinguished by excellent qualities; the nation is cruel, wild, coarse, and ignorant.”¹⁶²

The Arab and Persian authors, living a settled way of life view the nomadic Turks who are feared but praised as military people free of decadence.¹⁶³ Ibn Hassūl, the former Buyid bureaucrat, writes in his epistle for Tuğrul Bey that the Turks as lion-like and proud people, who are not willing to work in the household like slaves but have “single minded desire to achieve military command.”¹⁶⁴

Ibn Hassūl thus seeks the favour of Tuğrul by glorifying all Turks, which suggest that Tuğrul did not distinguish between himself and his kinsmen and followers. It is evident that the epistle must have been written in a way to please Tuğrul because the author states in his work that it would be later translated for Tuğrul by al-Kunduri.¹⁶⁵ Ibn Hassūl gives us thus the important information that Tuğrul’s vizier al-Kunduri spoke Turkish. It can thus be deduced that the first Seljuqs did not regard themselves as despotic rulers but as chiefs of their followers, sharing the same way of life with them. A passage in the work of ‘Imād al-Dīn al-Işfahānī points also in this direction:

“They (the Seljuqs) are utterly destitute (*mutaṣa’likūn*) despite the vastness of their territories. They do not care whether they die or perish. Access to their routes with swords and arrows is difficult. They have horsemen who do not fear death (?), as if they are not human beings.”¹⁶⁶

Interestingly, describing their military strength, he indicates that they fought out of poverty. Baihaqī’s description of Tuğrul’s appearance when he entered Nishapur is another piece of evidence that the Seljuqs were not different from their followers even in their outlook. “He himself had a strung bow over his arm, with

¹⁶² Al-Idrisi as cited by Barthold, *Turkestan*, 305.

¹⁶³ Cf. Bosworth, *Barbarian Incursions*, in: *ibid.*, The medieval history of Iran Afghanistan and Central Asia, XXIII, p.6-7. The view of the Romans on the Teutons for example is not much different.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 7; see also Ibn Hassūl, *Yaltkaya*, 260.

¹⁶⁵ Ibn Hassūl, *Yaltkaya*, 262.

¹⁶⁶ al-Bundārī, *Zubdat*, Burslan, 62.

three wooden arrows fastened at his waist, and was fully armed. He wore a mulham tunic, a head-dress of Tawwazī cloth and felt boots.”¹⁶⁷

I.5. The Seljuqs and Khurasan

The effect of the plunder raids on the people and especially on the leading figures of Khurasan was in a way supportive for the Seljuqs. Khurasan with its capital Nishapur was a strategically important province of the Muslim world and had several times played a decisive role in the Islamic history.¹⁶⁸ The leading circles of Khurasan had already aided the Ghaznavids against the Sāmānids in order to preserve their special interests.

“The Ghaznavid connection had not been at the outset wholly an imposition by force majeure, for as the Sāmānids declined and then fell, the régime of Sebüktegin and Mahmūd had been supported by the landowners, merchants and notables of Khurasan as politically and economically useful. However, Mas‘ūd found it difficult to reconcile the claims of Khurasan with the temptations of expansion in India, and his military prestige was waning as the strength of the Turkmens grew. The loyalty of the people of Khurasan inevitably suffered when the Sultan became patently unable to provide protection; hence towards the end of his reign the tacit contract between the Ghaznavid dynasty and the people of Khurasan crumbled.”¹⁶⁹

It goes without saying that our sources do not explain the changes in power with political and economical factors. They interpret them in accordance with the Muslim and Persian theory of rulership, according to which a dynasty or ruler was replaced when the rulers did not fulfill their duties. ‘Imād al-Dīn al Iṣfahānī writes: “Every empire enjoys respect and after every brightness there is darkness. Every age has a nation and every era has a king.”¹⁷⁰

The pro-Seljuq sources as well as the Ghaznavid source Baihaqī make clear that Sultan Mas‘ūd did not fulfill his duties as ruler as he did not defend Khurasan adequately. Sultan Mas‘ūd had reacted too late against the Seljuqs and he tried to

¹⁶⁷ Baihaqī as cited by Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 256; Barthold, *Turkestan*, 306.

¹⁶⁸ Bosworth’s chapters “Khurasan under Ghaznavid rule” and “The social structure of Nishapur” deliver a good survey for Khurasan role at that time. p. 145-202.

¹⁶⁹ Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 258.

¹⁷⁰ Akhbār, Ayaz, 64.

take higher taxes from the Khurasanians, which caused more antipathy because Suri, the governor for Khurasan, had already taken all what they had.¹⁷¹ The *Akhhbār* describes the situation of the capital as follows:

“So Sü-Bashi passed through Nīshāpūr, but he did not find any provisions there for a day and a night. So he returned to Dihistān and left behind a certain person in Nīshāpūr who was called hājib Pākrūb. He was the one who swept Khurāsān clean with the broom of his confiscations and did not leave anyone with even a tenth portion of the crop.”¹⁷²

Ibn al-Athīr also points out the effects of the Seljuq-Ghaznavid conflict in Khurasan: “On account of the long stay in Khurasan of Subashi and his troops and of the Saljuqs too, the land was devastated and much blood shed, and supplies and provisions became short, especially for the regular army.”¹⁷³ Mas‘ūd’s army even started to behave like the barbarians, as they also begun to plunder on their way.¹⁷⁴ These caused even more aversion against the Ghaznavid administration and several towns of Khurasan started negotiations with the Seljuqs as the better solution. According to the *Akhhbār* the notables of Marw approached the Seljuqs: “Then the faqīhs of Marw sought asylum from the Saljuqs.”¹⁷⁵ A passage in the work of the pseudo-Nīshāpūrī also suggests that the cities surrendered peacefully to the Seljuqs. After their victory over the Ghaznavids at Dandanqan the Seljuqs wrote in a letter to the caliph:

“The authors of evil innovations were finding occasion for advantage and mischief, and the notables and well-known ones of Khurasan asked us to undertake to give them aid and assistance and protect them.”¹⁷⁶

These are most probably the words chosen by Khurasani notables, who most probably advised the Seljuqs to write a letter to the Abbasid caliph and to seek his recognition. However, when Khurasan fell to the Seljuqs, they were somewhat suddenly set in a different position. They were approached by the Khurasani notables as the protecting power of it but for their followers they remained chieftains with the

¹⁷¹ Cf. Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 87.

¹⁷² Akhhbār, Ayaz, 61.

¹⁷³ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Annals*, 37.

¹⁷⁴ Cf. Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 266.

¹⁷⁵ Akhhbār, Ayaz, 62.

¹⁷⁶ Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 39.

only function to lead them towards plunder and pasture. It is not clear how far the Seljuqs themselves were conscious about the new status and the dual position resulting from it and if they regarded themselves differently. Our sources are written in favour of the two brothers Çağrı Bey and Tuğrul Bey and try to mould especially the latter in their ideal of the Muslim ruler because he became sultan later. It is thus unclear if the first Seljuqs were conscious about their new role as rulers in Khurasan and if they were aware of the responsibilities, which came with it. Actually we can only proceed on the assumption that they had leadership qualities on the grounds of their later success.

Be that as it may, the Perso-Islamic concept of kingship was not only totally alien to their followers but also new and incomprehensible to Tuğrul and Çağrı. Although our sources regard the former as the supreme leader it is better to assume that the success in Khurasan did not bring sudden changes and the two brothers, were equal in status¹⁷⁷. We should note that they both still bore the same Turkish title Bey (chief, master) and the principle of autocratic rule was alien to them. Nonetheless, their qualities should not be underestimated and it seems certain that they were the most ambitious among their family members.

The information in our sources is contradictory but it should be noted that the *Maliknāma* was written for the son of Çağrı Bey which suggests that he was not less ambitious than his brother Tuğrul. However, we can expect that our sources, which used the *Maliknāma* favour Çağrı Bey. The *Akhbār* claims that in Marw the khuṭba was read in the name of Chaghri Bey but states on the other hand that Çağrı declared his brother Tuğrul sultan:

“So they (the faqīhs) read the khutba in the name of Chagrī Beg at Marw on the first Friday of Rajab in the year 428 ... The notables of Nīshāpūr received him and he rested there for a short time. He gave Toghri Beg the laqab of Sultan al-Mu‘azzam Rukn al-Dunyā wa’l-Dīn Abū Tālib.”¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁷ Cf. Bulliet, ‘Numismatic Evidence for the Relationship between Tughril Beg and Chaghri Beg’, in: *Near Eastern Numismatics, Iconography, Epigraphy and History*, D. K. Kouymjian, (ed.), Beirut 1974, 294-95. Bulliet concludes that Tuğrul and Çağrı must have been equal in status.

¹⁷⁸ *Akhbār*, Ayaz, 63.

The assumption of this title is clearly anticipated, as the following narrative of the *Akhhbār* informs us that the Seljuq family members fought at different front lines against sultan Mas'ūd. They were apparently regarded by Mas'ūd as separate leaders as the *Akhhbār* states that “envoys” were sent out. “Malik Chagrī Bey encamped at Shink al-'Abbādī. So the sultan came out to meet him, but malik Chagrī Bey retreated to Sarakhs. Sultan Toghrīl and Yabghu (also) joined him (there). Then the sultan sent them envoys on his behalf requesting them to make peace with him.”¹⁷⁹ It seems strange that sultan Mas'ūd approached Yabghu as the leader of the Seljuqs: “So Amīr Yabghu came to the presence of the sultan who bestowed upon him robes of honour which were dazzling to the eyes.”¹⁸⁰

Moreover, the *Akhhbār* gives us the following episode from the end of the Battle of Dandanqan:

“And when the calamities of (this) revolution (inqilāb) had passed, he (Chagrī Beg) entered the tent of sultan Mas'ūd b. Mahmūd b. Sebük-Tegin and sat down on his throne. He shared out the booty among his army and donated the kharāj of one year in his domains (wilāyas). (Moreover) he built villages and set prisoners free.”¹⁸¹

It is clear that there was no supreme leadership among the Seljuq family members and that they still acted in accordance with the steppe tradition, which understood power as the possession of the family. Pseudo Nīshāpūrī remarks that all the members of the Seljuq family assembled and agreed to support each other.¹⁸² The division of the conquered territories following their victory over the Ghaznavids reveals this:

“When they sent the letter, they divided the government, and each of the chiefs was named to a region. Chaghri Beg, the elder brother, made Marw the capital and made most of Khurasan his special preserve. Mūsā Yabghu was named to the government of Bust and the eastern lands, and the regions of Heart, Isfizār, Sistan and Khān Nashīn to the extent he could manage to hold them. Qāwurd, the elder son of Chaghri Beg, went to the province of Tabas, the districts of Kirman and the environs of Qūhistān. Tughril Beg came toward Iraq. Ibrāhīm Ināl, who was his brother on his mother's side, his nephew, the Amīr Yāqūtī, and his cousin Qutlumush b. Isrā'īl accompanied him. When they conquered the city of Rayy and the fortress of Tabarak fell into their hands, he made that place his capital. They sent Ibrāhīm Ināl to Hamadan and Yāqūtī to the town of Abhar and to Zanjān and the districts of

¹⁷⁹ *Akhhbār*, Ayaz, 65.

¹⁸⁰ *Akhhbār*, Ayaz, 65-66.

¹⁸¹ *Akhhbār*, Ayaz, 67-68. According to pseudo Nīshāpūrī it was Tuğrul, who made this symbolic move. Cf. Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 37.

¹⁸² Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 39.

Azerbaijan, and Qutlumush to the province of Jurjan and Dāmghān and the Rest of the province Qūmis. And Alp Arslan b. Chaghri Beg, his nephew, was with him.”¹⁸³

This account suggests that Tuğrul led this meeting but it seems that the decisions were taken by all family members and that not domains of territories but spheres of interest were fixed. Tuğrul later became sultan as a result of this agreement reached by the Seljuq family as a whole and not because he was a better leader than Çağrı or he had the aim to set up a sultanate. That Çağrı Bey took as his share the politically, strategically, and economically important province Khurasan speaks for him and it should be also noted that his son later succeeded Tuğrul, who had no offspring. It seems however to far reaching when the sources assert that Çağrı made Marw to his capital and Tuğrul Rayy. At this stage they could only have had a rudimentary court and it is more likely that these towns functioned as main bases at this stage and not as capitals. Their attitude towards cities is not clear as they still lived a nomadic way of life. Lambton argues that the Seljuqs were already familiar with the settled way of life but merely argues that the Seljuqs must have been more than leaders of a nomadic tribal group and familiar with urban life because “only the Saljuqs among the Ghuzz succeeded in establishing an empire.”¹⁸⁴

According to our sources, Tuğrul took direction for Iraq firstly to make more conquests and secondly because the Abbasid caliph al-Qāim invited him. It is not possible to ascertain the real motives of Tuğrul but it seems rather unlikely that he realised the new possibilities which lay now before him. That Tuğrul and Çağrı gained power over Khurasan must have changed their consciousness but we cannot infer from this that they became totally aware of the new form of power which would enable them to become Muslim rulers.

At this juncture another important factor came into play. The military success in Khurasan did not change the status of the first Seljuq leaders from chiefs of nomads to territorial rulers but also brought them in contact with the Persian notables and administrators. It was this group, which would direct them to make the best use of their new status. For an understanding of the Seljuq mentality, ideology and self-

¹⁸³ Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 40. The *Akhbār* gives a similar account of this episode. Cf. Akhbār, Ayaz, 74-75.

¹⁸⁴ Lambton, ‘Aspects of Seljūq-Ghuzz Settlement in Persia’, in: eadem. *Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government*, IX, 111.

image we thus need to take the views of these Persian men of the pen into consideration. These Persian men of the pen played an important role for the transformation of the Seljuqs from nomadic chieftains to Muslim sultans ruling over sedentary subjects. With the instalment of the Seljuqs in Nishapur a partnership between the Seljuqs and the Persian men of the pen started which would remain effective down to the Rum Seljuqs. Most of the administrators of the Seljuqs including those employed by the Rum Seljuqs came from Khurasan and thus were a factor of continuity from the Great Seljuq empire to the Rum Seljuq sultanate.

II. The first Seljuqs in Anatolia: rebels or sultans?

The situation of the first Rum Seljuq leaders was not very different from the situation of the first Great Seljuq leaders in the eastern frontiers of the Muslim world. Kutalmış' sons Sulaymān and Manşūr were kept under surveillance and only after the death of the Great Seljuq sultan Alp Arslan did they escape and come to the western frontier of the Great Seljuq realm.¹⁸⁵ Hence they came to the western frontiers of the Great Seljuq realm as refugees where they hired out their military services to the Byzantine factions competing for the throne in Constantinople.¹⁸⁶ Almost by chance Sulaymān came in 473/1081 into the possession of Nicaea (İznik), which he made his residence and established a principality. But he was merely the military overlord of Nicaea and its environs. Despite the breakdown of the Byzantine frontier defence great parts of Anatolia were still under the control of the Byzantine Empire and the population remained predominantly Christian (Greek and Armenian).¹⁸⁷ There was no Muslim administration in place which Sulaymān could take over like the first Great Seljuqs did in Khurasan to establish a Muslim state. It is also unlikely that Sulaymān as the son of a rebel and a fugitive should have had any high ranking administrators or ulama in his retinue. Nevertheless, modern historians,

¹⁸⁵ Attaliates and Bar Hebraeus confirm that Kutalmış' sons fled Great Seljuq captivity to Byzantine territory, though Bar Hebraeus confuses Kutalmış with his son. Attaliates, *Historia*, 226; Bar Hebraeus, *Budge*, 226.

¹⁸⁶ Cf. G. Ostrogorsky, *The History of the Byzantine State*, tr. J. Hussey, Oxford 1956, 307-308. Sulaymān was employed by Nicephorus Botaniates during his rebellion against Michael Ducas VII in 1078. Two years later in 1080 Sulaymān supported the rebel Nicephorus Mellisenus in Nicaea.

¹⁸⁷ Cf. P. Wittek, *Toponymie*, 11-16.

and especially Turkish historians, take over the *ex post facto* view of the medieval authors, who describe Sulaymān as the founder of the Rum Seljuq state and the first sultan of this state.¹⁸⁸ It has been noted that Sulaymān fled Great Seljuq captivity but little attention has been paid to the fact that he was the son of a rebel who fled to Anatolia and later died in conflict with the Great Seljuqs like his father Kutalmış.

This chapter will discuss the following questions. How did the rebellious ancestors of the Rum Seljuqs define their status within the Seljuq family? Did they employ an ideology of protest in opposition to the Perso-Islamic ideology of kingship adopted by their Great Seljuq cousins?

It should be noted beforehand that the nature of our sources makes it difficult to find answers to these questions. As already noted, there is no contemporary evidence, material or literary extant from the time of Sulaymān and his two successors. The first Rum Seljuq copper coins appear under his grandson Mas'ūd I (510-551/1107-1117), the first silver coins under the fifth Rum Seljuq ruler, Kılıç Arslan II (1156-1192), and the first gold coins under the latter's successor.¹⁸⁹ The extant Rum Seljuq and other Muslim chronicles have almost all been written by Persian and Arab authors living in later periods in the second half of the 13th and 14th centuries. The most important Rum Seljuq author Ibn Bībī who begins his work at the end of the reign of Kılıç Arslan II states that he could not find any works relating to the history of the first Rum Seljuq rulers. Other medieval Muslim authors describe the rebellion of Kutalmış, the ancestor of the Rum Seljuqs, and then go over to Sulaymān's conquest of Antioch but, other than that, they ignore the Rum Seljuqs. Anatolia was outside their sphere of interest and thus they only mention the Seljuqs of Anatolia when their eastward expansion brought them into Mesopotamia and Syria and thus within their sphere of interest. Besides at the time when these authors were composing their works, Kutalmış' descendants had established themselves as legitimate Perso-Islamic rulers in Anatolia. Thus these authors were faced with the dilemma of rehabilitating this rebellious branch of the Seljuq family.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. J. Laurent, 'Byzance et les origins du Soultanat Roum', in: *Mélanges Diehl* I (1930), 177.; P. Wittek, 'Deux chapitres de l'histoire des Turcs de Roum', in: *Byzantion* 11 (1936), 285.; *idem.*, 'Le Sultan de Rum', in: *Annuaire de l'Institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves* 6 (1938), 361.; C. Cahen, 'La première pénétration turque en Asie Mineure', in: *Byzantion* 18 (1948), 5.

¹⁸⁹ Tevhid, *Islamiyye kataloğu*, no 8205; I. Artuk/C. Artuk, *Islami Sikkeler*, no 1060; J.C. Hinrichs, 'Sultan und Kalif auf Münzen der Seltschuken Anatoliens', in: G. Leiser (ed.), *Les Seldjoukides d'Anatolie*, Paris 2006, 339.

II.1. Kutalmış b. Arslan Isrā'īl b. Seljuq

First, the accounts of Kutalmış' rebellion and the result it had for his son Sulaymān and his descendants will be analysed in detail. Among the Arabic authors writing on the Great Seljuqs it is worth quoting the whole account given by Ibn al-Athīr because, on the one hand, his universal history incorporates the "most coherent account of the Great Seljuq sultans."¹⁹⁰ On the other hand the work of Ibn al-Athīr contains more references to the Rum Seljuq sultans than any other work written in Arabic or Persian on Great Seljuq history. At the same time being a Syrian author writing for the Zengid dynasty, the Rum Seljuqs' eastern neighbours and rivals, he was better informed about this dynasty than other authors. Ibn al-Athīr writes:

"Alp Arslan heard that Shihab al-Dawla Qutalmish, also one of the Saljuq family, who is the ancestor of the princes who are in our present day the lords of Konya, Kaysari, Aqsaray, and Malatya, had rebelled against him, gathered large forces and marched to Rayy to seize control. Alp Arslan equipped a great army and sent them by the desert route to Rayy, which they reached before Qutalmish.

Alp Arslan left Nishapur on 1 Muharram of this year [25 December 1063]. When he reached Damghan he sent to Qutalmish deploring his action and ordering him not to carry out his plan but to abandon it. He himself would observe the ties of kinship towards him. Qutalmish gave him the reply of one mistakenly confident in the forces he had gathered. He sacked the villages around Rayy and flooded the Valley of Salt, which was a marchy area. It became impossible to cross it. Nizam al-Mulk said to [Alp Arslan], 'I have prepared an army for you out of Khurasan which will support you and not abandon you, and which to protect you, will shoot arrows that do not miss. These are the ulema and the ascetics. By liberality towards them I have made them some of your greatest helpers'.

The sultan drew near to Qutalmish. Nizam al-Mulk armed himself and arranged the squadrons. Both armies formed their battle lines. Qutalmish was knowledgeable in astrology. He halted and made his observations, and into saw that his star on that day was associated with evil influences. Taking this into consideration, he saw no [hope of] victory. His plan was to temporize. However, Alp Arslan found a route through the water and waded through the flood. The army followed him, and he and they emerged safely. They were now in contact with Qutalmish and battle was joined. Qutalmish's army did not stand firm against the sultan's, but fled immediately. He set out, defeated, towards the castle of Kurdkuh, one of his fortresses and strong-points. Death or capture overwhelmed his army. The sultan would have killed the prisoners, but Nizam al-Mulk interceded for them, so he pardoned and freed them.

When the dust had settled and the army made camp, Qutalmish was found dead, lying stretched on the ground, although no one knew how he had died. It is said that he died of terror, but God knows best. The sultan wept for his death, and held a session to mourn his loss, which he felt keenly."¹⁹¹

¹⁹⁰ C. Hillenbrand, *Seljuq historiography*, 79.

¹⁹¹ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Annals*, 151-152; Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī presents these events with a different chronology. Cf. Sibṭ Ibn al-Jawzī, *Sevim*, 110-111; al-Bundari's account is brief and he does not

Alp Arslan is presented here as the rightful heir as he is victorious which is regarded as a sign that God had chosen him to rule. Kutalmış on the other hand is defeated and therefore his claim to the throne is regarded as illegitimate. The most important point in Ibn al-Athīr's account is his assumption that these two members of the Seljuq family Alp Arslan and Kutalmış represented two different types of rulership. Alp Arslan with his professional army and the support of the Sunni ulama and administrators represented the new Seljuq centralised Perso-Islamic state¹⁹². Kutalmış on the other hand represented the old Turkish tradition of decentralised rulership with its principle of collective sovereignty and seniorate according to which the eldest member of the ruling family was to hold supreme control. Ibn al-Athīr presents Alp Arslan as the ruler who had all important elements of the Perso-Islamic state at his disposal, a very capable vizier in the person of Nizām al-Mulk, a professional army, and the support of the ulama. Kutalmış on the other hand is styled as a nomadic chief who "sacked the villages around Rayy" and planned his war strategy according to astrological observations. Kutalmış did not have a great vizier at his side and could not count on the support of the ulama, and he depended on Turkmen bands and did not have a standing army. Moreover, in his concluding sentences, Ibn al-Athīr reaffirms his suggestion that the Rum Seljuq branch of the Seljuq family had not assimilated into the new Perso-Islamic system but had kept alive ancient, non-Muslim traditions:

"It is remarkable that this Qutalmish understood astrology and had mastered it notwithstanding that he was a Turk. Besides this he knew other Turkish lore. His sons after him continued to seek this learning of the ancients and to attract its practioners. This was a blot that stained their reputation for religion."¹⁹³

mention the ancestors of Kutalmış, the Seljuqs of Rum at all. He writes that Kutalmış hoped to gain the sultanate not knowing that this would be his ruin and that he died in the ensuing war between him and Alp Arslan. He adds that Alp Arslan killed many Türkmen and confiscated their wealth. Cf. al-Bundārī, *Zubdat*, Burslan, 27; Rāwandī in his work *Rāhat al-sudūr*, which he dedicated to the Rum Seljuq sultan Kay Khusraw I, chooses to omit the rebellion of his benefactor's ancestor Kutalmış. He writes that Alp Arslan ascended the throne after he had put aside Sulaymān, Tughrul's little son but who in fact was Alp Arslan's younger brother who had been proclaimed sultan on the instigation of Tughrul's vizier al-Kundurī. Cf. Rāwandī, *Rāhat al-sudūr*, Burslan, 114.

¹⁹² Cf. Bosworth, 'The Internal Structure of the Saljuq Empire (A.D. 1000-1217)', in: *CHI*, vol. V, 58.

¹⁹³ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Annals*, 152.

These remarks made by Ibn al-Athīr must be evaluated in the context in which they were written. These suspicions about Kutalmış and his descendants were probably part of the religious propaganda used in the ideological warfare between the Zengids and the Rum Seljuqs. Nevertheless, the notion that Kutalmış represented the traditionalist branch of the Seljuq family is confirmed by al-Husaynī. He too emphasizes the role played by Nizām al-Mulk but gives a more detailed account of the course of the war between the two sides. Al-Husaynī gives a favourable description of Alp Arslan’s army but refers to Kutalmış’ army with disregard and describes the Turkmen bands employed by him as “rabble troops like scattered locusts.” Moreover, al-Husaynī seems to imply that Kutalmış acted like a Turkmen chief when he writes that he “devastated all the villages of Rayy and gave his soldiers a free hand in doing so.”¹⁹⁴ Al-Husaynī concludes his report stating that Alp Arslan wanted to kill the captives and that they were freed after Nizām al-Mulk asked the sultan to show mercy. The author refers to Kutalmış as the forefather of the maliks of Rum but does not specify if they were among the captives. He remarks latter in his narrative that Malik Shāh “captured Konya, Aqsarāyī, Kayseri and all the other towns and appointed malik Rukn al-Dīn Sulaymān b. Qutlumush b. Isrā’īl b. Saljūq over them. Then he conquered Antioch and entrusted it to him.”¹⁹⁵

Among the sources on the Great Seljuqs written in Persian, the *Saljūqnāma* written by pseudo-Nīshāpūrī is the most important as it was the *Urtext* for subsequent Seljuq histories written in Persian and also pre-dates all Arabic sources on the Seljuqs.¹⁹⁶ Rashīd al-Dīn in his adaptation of Nīshāpūrī gives the following account of the struggle between Alp Arslan and Kutalmış:

“The sultanate comes to us, and our father, who was best and eldest of the tribe was killed in these circumstances.” He brought an army and took the city of Rayy under siege. Suddenly he heard the news of the approach of Alp Arslan. He was afraid that, if he waited until his arrival, he would not be able to repel the enemy from two different directions. He went as far as Isfarāyīn. There his meeting with Alp Arslan took place and a great battle and much slaughter ensued. Finally Qutlumush’s horse slipped, and it appeared right to Alp Arslan. He was killed, and Alp Arslan wanted to kill all who were of his kinship and following. He ordered them to execute his son, Sulaymān Shāh, although he was small. The Vizier Nizām al-Mulk did not believe it was the right thing to do. He said, “Killing kinsmen may be an error and inasupicious”. Alp Arslan sent them to the border of the realm with the injunction

¹⁹⁴ Akhbār, Ayaz, 93.

¹⁹⁵ Akhbār, Ayaz, 153.

¹⁹⁶ Cf. C. Hillenbrand, *Seljuq historiography*, 76; eadem., *Non-Greek Sources*, 322.

that they settle on the borders of Islam and that they be relieved of the insignia of the amirate and the rank of *malik*, so that they be submissive and needy. Then they appointed Diyār Bakr and Ruhā for him, and Sulaymān Shāh is the father of the Sultans of Rūm.”¹⁹⁷

It is remarkable that the author begins his account with an alleged statement made by Kutalmış according to which he demanded the Seljuq throne because his father Arslan Isrā’īl had been the “eldest of the tribe” and had died in that function. The rebel based his claim to the Great Seljuq throne on the ancient Turkish tribal tradition of seniorate according to which the eldest member of the chosen family was to lead the tribe. The author reveals that Kutalmış the ancestor of the Rum Seljuq dynasty was a rebel. On the other hand he knows Kutalmış’ son Sulaymān is ‘the father of the sultans of Rum’ and makes somewhat contradictory statements to rehabilitate his descendants. He states that the Great Seljuq sultan following the advice of Nizām al-Mulk did not kill Kutalmış’ descendants but deprived them of their dynastic rights and titles and send them to the borders.¹⁹⁸ The author ends his report stating that Diyarbakır and al-Ruha were assigned to Sulaymān. This would mean that he was reinstated as Seljuq prince and governor of these frontier regions of the Great Seljuq Empire. It is important to observe, however, that the author does not expound *ghazw* and *jihad* against the Christian Byzantines. On the contrary, he stresses that the rebel’s descendants were sent to the frontier so that they would not be able to regain their dynastic rights, as they would be “submissive and needy.” The Great Seljuq authors are biased towards the Great Seljuqs and want to show that the Great Seljuq sultan was the legitimate and superior ruler who delegated power to other family members. All authors portray Kutalmış as a rebel and they recognise that he represented a different type of government but they do not elaborate this point. They construct a form of events which conforms to their understanding of history and their concept of kingship. Hence they claim that Sulaymān was reinstated by the Great Seljuq sultan and that his descendants became sultans ruling over Anatolia.

¹⁹⁷ Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 45-46. The *Akhbār* concludes his report of Kutalmış’ rebellion with the indication that Alp Arslan fulfilled his duty towards his uncle: “His coffin was brought to the tomb of sultan Rukn al-Dīn Toghril in Rayy.” *Akhbār*, Ayaz, 95.

¹⁹⁸ The Great Seljuq sultans sought to divert their nomadic followers away from their state towards the frontiers where they could continue their plunder raids. This policy might have been initiated by their vizier Nizām al-Mulk.

To sum up: a close examination of the accounts of Kutalmış' rebellion shows that the medieval authors agree that the Rum Seljuq dynasty represented the rebellious branch of the Seljuq family and that they lost their dynastic rights. At the same time all authors claim that Kutalmış' descendants were reinstated as Seljuq princes by their Great Seljuq cousins and allotted with frontier regions. By inventing a story of official bestowment our authors are side-stepping the question of rival ideologies based on other traditions than their ideal of Perso-Islamic kingship. It goes without saying that the medieval authors do not discuss the rebellion in the light of an ideology of protest but as the struggle between two throne pretenders. We can however find some clues in their accounts which reveal the real circumstances of the first Rum Seljuqs and give us some idea of the ideological challenges they faced.

II.2. Sulaymān I b. Kutalmış (473-478/1081-1086)

The Rum Seljuq writers composed their works in Persian and they did not use any of the Arabic sources quoted above but it is evident that Aksarayi derived his information on the rise of the Seljuqs from the *Saljūqnāma* of Nīshāpūrī.¹⁹⁹

“When Kutalmış heard of sultan Tuğrul's death he started a struggle for the succession of the sultanate. The sultanate belongs to us because our father died on this path. He was also the eldest of the Seljuq family. ... [Alp Arslan] wanted all his relatives who had taken Kutalmış' side to be killed. The still young son of Kutalmış was among these. He gave a *ferman* that all rebels should be killed. However, Nizam al-Mulk, who at that time was the vizier and was known for his good actions and administration, did not agree with this affair. ... Nizam al-Mulk considering that as long as they would be placed at the borders of the empire and were deprived of the titles of kingship (*shāh*) and emirate they would be forced to live in distress would not be able to do any harm and thus found it reasonable that they were placed in the area of Diyarbakır in a place between Birecik and Urfa [Edessa]. He sent Sulaymān Shāh together with his tribe there. Here they lived for sometime in great need.”²⁰⁰

It was the general practice for medieval Muslim authors to copy their sources almost verbatim but it is curious that Aksarayi did not choose here to re-construct the story of Kutalmış' rebellion. The Rum Seljuq author seems to agree that the ancestor

¹⁹⁹ Cf. Melville, *Early Persian Historiography*, 148.

²⁰⁰ N. Gençosman/ F. N. Uzluğ, *Selçukî Devletleri Tarihi*, Ankara 1943, 110-111, (hereafter cited as Aksarayi, Gençosman); The Iranian author Mīrkhwānd in his universal history repeats this information in a similar fashion with the difference that Alp Arslan agreeing to Nizām al-Mulk's advice ordered Sulaymān to conquer Syria. Cf. Mīrkhwānd, Vullers, 232-233.

of the Rum Seljuq dynasty was a rebel and that his son was deprived of his dynastic rights and sent with “his tribe” to the frontier so that he would not be able to threaten the Great Seljuq power. Aksarayi underlines this statement finishing his report that they lived in “great need” but does not specify their situation there. The Rum Seljuq author seems to have had not more information at his disposal than his source Nīshāpūrī with which he could furnish his narrative on the first Rum Seljuq ruler. The most striking point is that he does not even mention that Sulaymān had become the lord of the western Anatolian town İznik (Nicaea). It seems that this first episode of Rum Seljuq history was not remembered any more at the time of Aqsaraylı. Otherwise there is no reason why he does not exploit the ideological potential the conquest of a Byzantine town so close to Constantinople. The next information Aksarayi gives on Sulaymān is an account of his conquest of Antakya (Antioch) from its Christian ruler.

“He immediately sent an envoy to Malik Shāh to inform him that Antioch had been taken and that coins were struck in Malik Shāh’s name and that in the khutba his name was mentioned. Sulaymān Shāh also added that he would keep the town occupied until its final allotment would have been determined by a most high decree. He called himself neither malik nor emir.”²⁰¹

Aksarayi writes that Sulaymān reported his conquest immediately to Malik Shāh and underlines that he did neither assume the title “malik nor emir” in his correspondence. He thus claims that Sulaymān did not take any title as the Great Seljuq sultan Alp Arslan had dispossessed him of this right. At the same time the author suggests that Sulaymān used his conquest of Antakya as a chance to gain the favour of Malik Shāh the son and successor of Alp Arslan. Aksarayi’s main concern is to legitimise Sulaymān’s rule by presenting the conquest of Antakya as the event which led to the reconciliation of the two branches of the Seljuq family. He does not celebrate the re-conquest of Antakya as *jihad* or *ghazw* but continues his report stating that Sulaymān’s conquest brought him into conflict with Malik Shāh’s brother Tutuş and that he was killed during the ensuing warfare. He claims that Malik Shāh had in the meantime granted Antakya and Aleppo to Sulaymān and that he reproached his brother Tutuş for the death of the former.²⁰²

²⁰¹ Aksarayi, Gençosman, 114-115; Aksarayi, Işıltan, 33.

²⁰² Aksarayi, Gençosman, 114-115.

The anonymous Rum Seljuq author writing in the second half of the 14th century and thus the latest in date of the three Rum Seljuq chronicles gives a short but similar version of Kutalmış' rebellion. He begins his account on Alp Arslan stating:

“When Alp Arslan became sultan his uncle's son Kutalmış heard this news while he was in Kûhta and arose against him. The Turkmen soldiers joined him. They moved against Ray. When the warfare between them started Kutalmış' army was defeated and he tried to escape but fell from his horse and died.”²⁰³

In contrast to Aksarayi, the anonymous author omits any reason for why Kutalmış claimed the Great Seljuq throne. He mentions however that the Turkmen took the side of Kutalmış and that fortune was not with him. From this it can be surmised that he agrees that Kutalmış was the rebel who was supported by the unruly Turkmen bands and Alp Arslan was the legitimate heir to the throne. Like Aksarayi, the anonymous author claims that the Great Seljuq sultan Alp Arslan officially allotted territories to Sulaymān, who thus became his submissive suzerain. But he adds a different element to legitimise the latter success of the Rum Seljuq branch. He incorporates into his account Sulaymān's conquests in western Anatolia including İznik and presents them as the result of religious warfare.

“When Malik Shāh ascended the throne the caliphate was held by al-Mustazhir. Sayf al-Dawla Sadaqa b. Mazyad the ruler of Syria was killed by the sultan at a place between Baghdad and Vasiṭ. This occurred on 19 Rajab 471/1079. Sultan Alp Arslan had given Syria to his uncle's son Sulaymān Shāh b. Kutalmış. Syria and Diyarbakır were under his rule. The emirs of Syria made an alliance and wanted to kill him.

Sulaymān Shāh when he heard this took up fight against them. Five were killed during this quarrel. When this news reached Alp Arslan he killed many of those and swore to leave the remaining. But the Syrians again started to work against him in secret. Sulaymān Shāh, making precautions against the multitude of the soldiers of the allied Syrian emirs, prepared for war against Rum. Unexpected good luck showed itself and helped him. The Turkmen of Khurasan, begun to take his side. First he came to Antakya [Antioch]. However, because he could not conquer this place he headed towards Rum. Firstly he took Konya [Iconium] then he took the Martava Gustadan, Kāvala fortress from Romanus Makri. In a short period of time he took many fortresses in that region and made them the possession of the Muslim community. He took the treasures of the Roman ruler by force of the sword. The heart of the unbelievers filled with fear of him. Because of his courage he took the lands from Kegonye to İznik [Nicaea]. No army could oppose him. He brought tribute from the lands of the

²⁰³ F. N. Uzluk, *Anadolu Selçukluları Devleti Tarihi. III. Histoire des Seldjucides d'Asie Mineure par un anonyme*, Ankara 1952, 7, (hereafter cited as Anonymous, Uzluk)

unbelievers to Konya. The Roman rebels came and put their faces on the ground before him.”²⁰⁴

It is difficult to assess why the author chose to begin his narrative about Sulaymān and the Rum Seljuqs with information on the Mazyadid Sayf al-Dawla. The latter is described as the lord of Syria who was a rival of the Great Seljuq sultan and is mentioned by the author also in connection with the Great Seljuq sultan Muhammad I Tapar b. Malik Shāh (r. 498-511/1105-1118) earlier in the narrative.²⁰⁵ Leaving aside the chronological and factual mistakes the author makes important is his suggestion that the Great Seljuq sultan gave Sulaymān the rule over Syria because its Arab lord Sayf al-Dawla had revolted against the sultan. But he then continues his narrative stating that Alp Arslan allotted Syria and Diyarbakır to Sulaymān. The author claims that Sulaymān then conquered Byzantine territory as far as İznik as a result of his war against the unbelievers and that he made them his tributaries. The anonymous author seems to have had a source at his disposal containing information on İznik but he does not elaborate on how Sulaymān conquered the Byzantine territories. He presents Sulaymān’s conquests in Anatolia as driven by religious zeal but he does not use the term *jihād*. Ibn Bibi is the only author who designates Sulaymān as *ghazi*. He states that the Rum Seljuq dignitaries gave sultan Kılıç Arslan II the following reply after he had ordered them to recognise his youngest son Kay Khusraw as his successor:

“It is not outside the knowledge of the *padishah*, who is known for his greatness and who has made to his principle to listen that, our ancestors, the great sultan Malik Shāh ... after he chose them and gave with a farman the command for the conquest of the lands of Rum to your ancestor ghazi pasha prince Sulaymān they ... mounted their excellent horses ... With their sharp swords and their flying arrows they wounded the enemy so that with their blood the earth turned into a tulip garden. A long time passed since instead of the crosses and churches, *mihrab* and *minbar* were built.”²⁰⁶

The description of Sulaymān as *ghazi* should not be overemphasised as it is clearly a retrospective view to legitimise the rule of latter Rum Seljuq rulers.

²⁰⁴ Anonymous, *Uzluq*, 23-24.

²⁰⁵ Cf. Anonymous, *Uzluq*, 14-15. The author ends his report on sultan Muhammad Tapar’s reign stating that in the year 1108 during the warfare between Sayf al-Dawla Sadaqa b. Mazyad and the sultan the former was killed. Following this he writes the sultan “send his uncle’s son Sulaymān Shāh b. Kutalmış b. Isra’il b. Seljuq and his son to Syria the land of Sayf al-Dawla Sadaka b. Mazyad.”

²⁰⁶ Ibn Bībī, *Öztürk*, 37-38.

According to his own testimony Ibn Bībī did not have any information on the early Rum Seljuqs and he does not even mention in retrospect the great victory of Kılıç Arslan II over the Christian Byzantine emperor at Myriokephalon. In fact the passage quoted above is the only instance where Ibn Bībī makes a comment on early Rum Seljuq history. Ibn Bībī writes that Alp Arslan's son and successor Malik Shāh bestowed the rule of Anatolia on Sulaymān and gave him the command for further conquests. For Ibn Bībī, as for the previous authors, it is important that Sulaymān received his lands by official decree of the Great Seljuq sultan. Consequently Sulaymān is portrayed as Seljuq prince and a subordinate of the Great Seljuk sultan. All Muslim authors designate Sulaymān as malik (prince) and not as sultan. In fact only the Byzantine authors designate Sulaymān as sultan. "Sulayman, who commanded all the east, was actually encamped in the vicinity of Nicaea. His sultanate was in that city (we would call it his palace)."²⁰⁷ But the Byzantines wanted to build up an anti sultan against the powerful Great Seljuq sultan Malik Shāh. Sulaymān could have not received any kind of legitimisation from the Abbasid caliph since he was under the protection of the Great Seljuqs.²⁰⁸ Besides, Tutuş the brother of the Great Seljuq sultan Malik Shāh who had been officially installed with Syria carried only the title malik and when he died in 488/1095 his territories were divided between his two sons, Riḍwān at Aleppo and Dukak at Damascus continued to hold the status of maliks.²⁰⁹ It is possible that Sulaymān assumed the title sultan himself but we have no verifiable evidence for this. It seems unlikely that Sulaymān had a palace in İznik as Anna Comnena writes. He was the military overlord of the town and probably had a rudimentary court.²¹⁰ The course of events suggests that his aim was not to establish himself in the western Anatolia but that he was anxious to

²⁰⁷ E.R.A. Sewter, *The Alexiad of Anna Comnena*, Harmondsworth 1969, 129, (hereafter cited as Anna, Sewter); J.-B. Chabot, *Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, Paris 1899-1914, (vol III.), 175, (hereafter cited as Michael the Syrian, Chabot, III).

²⁰⁸ Cf. Cahen, *Formation*, 136; Turan accepts that the caliph was under the tutelage of Malik Shāh and could have not recognised Sulaymān as sultan. Nevertheless, he suggests that the Great Seljuq sultan could have recognised him in order to pre-empt a possible recognition of Sulaymān by the Fatimid caliph, his rival. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 63.

²⁰⁹ Cf. P.M. Holt, *Age of the Crusades. The Near East from the eleventh century to 1517*, London/ New York 1986, 67, (hereafter cited as Holt, *Crusades*)

²¹⁰ Jorga quoting Greek authors writes that Sulaymān did not reside within the town but in a 'palace' surrounded by gardens outside the town. He argues that contrary to Anna Comnena's comment Sulaymān did not establish a state and that he was called sultan because he was a member of the Seljuq family. N. Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, Gotha 1908-1913, vol. 1, 77.

keep a connection with the east. He probably did not feel secure enough in western Anatolia and wanted to be near the centre of Great Seljuq power.²¹¹

In any case the conquest of western Anatolia by Sulaymān did not leave a lasting memory in the Rum Seljuq state. All Muslim authors quoted above had no information on the first period of Rum Seljuq history and they invented a similar history to rehabilitate the descendants of the rebel Kutalmış. The portray Sulaymān as a vassal Seljuq prince who received territories in eastern Anatolia on the border of the Great Seljuq state. Yet, Sulaymān is not portrayed as leader of jihad against the Christian neighbours of the Great Seljuq state.

II.3. Kılıç Arslan I (485-500/ 1092-1107)

Kılıç Arslan I is regarded by modern western and Turkish historians as the second sultan of the Rum Seljuq dynasty and as the fighter of *ghazā* against the Byzantines and the Crusaders.²¹² The career of the second Seljuq leader is, however, in its general outlines a repetition of the career of his father Sulaymān. Like his father he came to Anatolia as a fugitive escaping Great Seljuq captivity, after the death of sultan Malik Shāh in 485/1092, he directed his military efforts mainly eastwards towards Syria and Great Seljuq Iran, and he died in the east following his rebellion against the Great Seljuq sultan Muhammad Tapar b. Malik Shāh.

The death of Malik Shāh was followed by a bitter succession struggle lasting twelve years until Muhammad Tapar b. Malik Shāh secured the throne in 498/1105

²¹¹ Cahen suggests that “he realized that to keep his new-found power he was too much at risk in the west, and must maintain his relations with the Turcomans of eastern Anatolia.” Cahen, *Formation*, 9; Holt, *Crusades*, 169.

²¹² The Turkish historian Işın Demirkent in the foreword of her book on Kılıç Arslan I summarizes his achievements as follows:

“His reign, filled with heroic deeds, was spent from the beginning to the end in struggles he endured for the sake of his country and nation. ... with his victories against the formidable Crusader armies which had come to Anatolia with the aim to uprooting the Turks and driving them out of Anatolia he managed to see to it that the state he had established continued, and the existence of the Turkish nation in Anatolia was secured”. Unfortunately Demirkent does not discuss Kılıç Arslan I’s reign critically but gives only a brief chronological account with military exploits at its centre. I. Demirkent, *Türkiye Selçuklu Hükümdarı Sultan I. Kılıç Arslan*, Ankara 1996, ix.

and remained sole ruler until his death in 511/1118.²¹³ Sulaymān's son Kılıç Arslan I, who had fled to Anatolia, and other Turkish leaders, used this as an opportunity to consolidate their power in Anatolia. Türkmen chiefs, who had infiltrated Anatolia with their bands in the aftermath of the battle of Manzikert, established themselves as territorial rulers in north-east Anatolia. Hence several principalities took shape in eastern Anatolia; the Saltukids in Erzurum, the Mengücekids in Erzincan, the Shāh Armanids of Sökmen's line in Akhlāt (west of Lake Van), the Artukids in Diyarbakır and the Dānishmendids in Ankara, Sivas, Amasya, Tokat, and Kayseri.²¹⁴ And farther east in northern Syria the Great Seljuq military commanders, taking advantage of the Great Seljuq internecine strife, emancipated themselves from their Great Seljuq masters and assumed independent rule. These eastern Anatolian and Syrian principalities, situated between Kılıç Arslan I's principality in Nicaea and the Great Seljuq territories, could cut off for him the routes leading there.²¹⁵ The most important of Kılıç Arslan's rivals in Anatolia was his immediate neighbour Danishmend, who controlled the important land route through Anatolia from Ankara to Kayseri.²¹⁶ Holt concluded in his book on the Crusades that: "The Danishmendids were first and last heads of a ghazi state, while the Seljukids quickly established an

²¹³ On the internal warfare following Malik Shāh's death and the reign of Muhammad Tapar cf. M.F. Sanallah, *The Decline of The Saljūqid Empire*, 82-132; Bosworth, *The Iranian World (A.D. 1000-1217)*, 102-118; A. Özaydın, *Selçuklu Tarihi Sultan Muhammad Tapar devri, (498-511/105-1118)*, Ankara 1990.

²¹⁴ The history of these principalities remains obscure, as most of them did not leave behind their own histories and were not of great interest for the medieval Muslim authors writing outside Asia Minor and the Rum Seljuq authors ignore them. Among these dynasties the Danishmendids present the most important dynasty as they were the main rivals of the Rum Seljuqs. The only work dealing exclusively with Danishmendid history is the *Dānishmendnāma* which is an epic romance about the exploits of the eponymous founder of the dynasty and thus cannot be used as a source for historical facts. Nevertheless, it is useful for the present work as it reflects the ideological concept employed by this principality to legitimise their rule. This work compiled by Mawlānā Ibn 'Alā' in 643/1245 survives in a 14th century adaptation. Irene Mélikoff edited and translated the *Dānishmendnāma* into French and also discussed Danishmend's reign. I. Mélikoff, *La Geste de Melik Dānişmend*, 2 vols., Paris 1960. More recently Necati Demir has edited and given a philological discussion of the *Dānishmendnāma*. N. Demir, *Dānişmend-Nāme*, Ankara 2004. However, modern western historians as well as Turkish historians have not shown great interest in the history of these smaller dynasties ruling in Anatolia during the Rum Seljuq period and many aspects of their history remain unexplored. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 112-147; A. Sevim/ Y. Yücel, *Türkiye Tarihi Fetih, Seçuklular ve Beylikler Dönemi*, Ankara 1989, 208-211; For the eastern Anatolian principalities cf. F. Sümer, *Selçuklular Devrinde Doğu Anadolu'da Türk Beylikleri*, Ankara 1990.

²¹⁵ Cf. EI2, *Kilidj Arslan I* (Cahen).

²¹⁶ Cahen states rightly that "the important factor was not, strictly speaking, a matter of territories, but of routes of penetration which everyone tried to extend, and of fortified places which controlled them". Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 83-84; EI2, *Saldjūkids* (Bosworth), 948.

Islamic monarchy on the pattern of the Great Seljukid sultanate.”²¹⁷ Here it will be argued that Kılıç Arslan’s circumstances were not very different from those of his Danishmendid rival. Both Turkish leaders had assumed power as warlords as a result of their personal enterprise and without any official authorization and had to find ways to legitimise their seizure of power. Kılıç Arslan’s career has to be evaluated in the context of these rivalries. An important question to raise here is which ideological concepts Kılıç Arslan used to legitimise his rule and to defend his position against his main rivals, Dānīshmend and the Great Seljuq sultan.

The death of Sulaymān was followed by an interregnum of about six years during which Sulaymān’s lieutenant Abu’l-Qāsim, whom he had left in charge in Iznik and other Turkish chiefs, filled the vacuum of power left behind in Anatolia. The earliest account about the arrival of the sons of Sulaymān in Anatolia is given by the Byzantine author Anna Comnena:

“... The Sultan of Chorasān who was murdered by Chasioi had previously held the two sons of the great Sulaymān; after his death they ran away from Chorasān and soon arrived in Nicaea. At the sight of them the people of Nicaea ran riot with joy and Poulchases gladly handed over the city to them, as if it were a family inheritance.”²¹⁸

According to this passage, Kılıç Arslan and his brother, whose name is not given here, escaped Great Seljuq captivity when Malik Shāh died and came directly to Nicaea where the officers of their father “gladly handed over the city”. Anna Comnena suggests that the Turkish officers voluntarily handed over the town “to them as if it were a family inheritance”. It is difficult to determine the exact reasons behind the alleged easy take-over of Nicaea by Sulaymān’s sons based on this description of events alone but two explanations are possible here.²¹⁹ Firstly, their military forces were probably stronger, as they seem to have been accompanied by Türkmen bands, which joined them during their journey back from Great Seljuq captivity to Anatolia. The Turkish officer holding the town had thus no other choice

²¹⁷ Holt, *Crusades*, 169; Cahen shares this view stating that, “Dānīshmend was purely a Turcoman chief”. He concedes, however, that: “The contrast must not be exaggerated, for Kiliç Arslan and his immediate successors, whatever their outlook may have been had no source of strength other than Turcoman”. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 89; Vryonis, *Decline*, 115.

²¹⁸ Anna, Sewter, 210.

²¹⁹ Cahen does not explain why Nicaea was handed over to Kılıç Arslan and writes: “He was somehow able to get himself acknowledged by most of his father’s former officers and to establish himself in Nicaea.” Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 81.

than to resign.²²⁰ Anna Comnena's note that Kılıç Arslan forced the governor of the town out of his post and appointed someone else confirms that Kılıç Arslan used his military strength to take his father's residence. Secondly, the Türkmen bands already in the town supported Kılıç Arslan I because he was a descendant of Arslan Isrā'īl b. Seljuq and thus a member of the branch of the Seljuq family which they regarded as their rightful leaders. Anna Comnena's comment that "the people of Nicaea ran riot with joy" implies that probably the inhabitants, who must have been mainly Greek, also regarded Kılıç Arslan as the rightful ruler of the town. What is important to keep in mind is that as a member of the Seljuq family Kılıç Arslan was thus regarded of noble lineage in contrast to the Turkish chiefs of humble origin. This gave him an ideological and political advantage which made it easier for him to win the loyalty of the Türkmen bands.

It seems, however, that the concept of noble lineage was not sufficient to legitimise Kılıç Arslan's assumption of power. The Rum Seljuq authors omit the period of the interregnum from their narratives and claim that after Sulaymān's death rule in Anatolia was transferred without a break to his son Kılıç Arslan. Aksaraylı hesitates to present Sulaymān's son as an independent ruler and repeats the claim of official recognition and writes:

"Sulaymān Shāh had two sons Kılıç Arslan and Kalan Arslan. Malik Shāh gave the rule over that region to Kılıç Arslan and sent him gifts."²²¹

The fact that the Rum Seljuq sources, writing after the decline of the Great Seljuq sultanate legitimise the rule of the Rum Seljuqs by claiming that they were officially bestowed with independent rule by their Great Seljuq cousins shows on one hand that the Great Seljuq sultanate, albeit weakened, was still regarded as the sole

²²⁰ Turan writes that according to Sibṭ b. al-Jawzī, Kılıç Arslan was accompanied by an army of *yabgu* Turkmen when he came to Anatolia. Cf. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 96. This indicates that there were still groups of Turkmen followers of Arslan Isrā'īl living in the Great Seljuq realm who were loyal to this branch of the Seljuq family. *Yabgu* was the title that originally designated the military leader of the Oghuz people but was used later by some Muslim authors to designate those Türkmen groups who represented the followers of the Rum Seljuq ancestor, Arslan Isrā'īl b. Seljuq, who had held the title *yabgu*. For the use of the title *yabgu* cf. Turan, *Selçuklular Tarihi ve Türk İslām Medeniyeti*, Ankara 1965, 120-123; Bosworth, *Ghaznavids*, 210, 217-222.

²²¹ O. Turan, *Müsâmeret ül-Ahbâr Moğollar zamanında Türkiye Selçukluları Tarihi*, Ankara 1944, 21, (hereafter cited as Aksarayı, ed. Turan); Aksarayı, Gençosman, 116; Aksarayı, Işıltan, 34; M. Öztürk, *Kerîmüddin Mahmud-i Aksarayî Müsâmeretü'l-Ahbâr*, Ankara 2000, 15, (hereafter cited as Aksarayı, Öztürk)

Seljuq sultanate. On the other hand it shows that the only way for the Rum Seljuqs to legitimise their rule was to forge a legitimate connection to the main branch of the Seljuq dynasty. The anonymous chronicler places Sulaymān already at Konya and writes, that Sulaymān arranged his succession before he went on his eastern campaign.

“He [Sulaymān] had appointed his son Kılıç Arslan as his successor before he left Konya. Kılıç Arslan became a great padishāh. All emirs of Rum obeyed him.”²²²

The conflicting claims made by these authors illustrate their difficulties in legitimising Kılıç Arslan’s rule in Anatolia. The earlier author Aksarayi is cautious and claims that Kılıç Arslan was appointed by the Great Seljuq sultan as governor over the lands previously held by his father. The anonymous author writing later claims that Kılıç Arslan was appointed by his father Sulaymān as his successor and thereby implies that the Rum Seljuq sultanate had been established by the latter as a dynastic succession. It is suspicious however, that the author does not refer to Kılıç Arslan as sultan but as *pādishāh*, a term used to describe the ruler in his time.²²³ The Turkish leaders are described as emirs thus it is implied that they were military commanders and subordinate to Kılıç Arslan. In reality Kılıç Arslan took over the leadership of what was not more than an infant principality and his power did not extend beyond Nicaea and its environs.²²⁴ Hence Kılıç Arslan was not in a position to take the title sultan or demand the submission of his rivals in Anatolia, who could counter that their loyalty was with the Great Seljuq sultan. Indeed, they seem to have sought to legitimise their seizure of power in Anatolia by connecting themselves to the Great Seljuq sultan Alp Arslan. They claimed that their ancestors were Alp Arslan’s military commanders, who were present at the battle of Manzikert and were afterwards appointed to remain in Anatolia and to conquer the Christian territories on behalf of the Great Seljuq sultan.²²⁵

“Then the sultan, together with the commanders Artuq, Saltuq, Mengüçük, Danişmend, Çavlı and Çavuldur, was equipped ready for battle with fifteen thousand cavalry and five

²²² N. Jalali, *Tārīx-e Āl-e Saljuq dar Ānāṭoli*, Tehran 1999, 79, (hereafter cited as Anonymous, ed. Jalali); Anonymous, Uzluk, 24.

²²³ Cf. EI2, *Pādishāh* (Bosworth).

²²⁴ M. Kesik, *Türkiye Selçuklu Devleti Tarihi Sultan I. Mesud Dönemi (1116-1155)*, Ankara 2003, 5.

²²⁵ Cf. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 83.

thousand veteran infantry. On Wednesday the sultan mounted a small hill with his above mentioned commanders ... Malik Muhammad Danişmend placed his head on the ground and said: 'A thought about faith in God in respect of Islam has occurred to this slave. ... Today is Wednesday. To attain good fortune, let us turn back today ... On Friday morning, after "Come to salvation", let us go with the assembly helped [by God] to the field of battle."²²⁶

It is not credible that Dānīshmend was present at the battle of Manzikert and that he established the principality with the permission of the sultan shortly after the battle.²²⁷ The fact, however, that Dānīshmend features prominently in the account of a 14th century Iranian historian suggests that the Dānīshmendid propaganda of *ghazā* had been successful. Most probably, the chaos following the battle of Manzikert and the breakdown of Byzantium's eastern border as the Byzantines had reduced the Armenian rulers of that region facilitated the incursion of Turkmen bands and made it easier for Dānīshmend to take Cappadocia.²²⁸ Dānīshmend was a Türkmen chief whose origin was obscure and his successors were in need to find other ways to legitimise their rule. A good ideological tool which presented itself was *ghazā*. In the *Dānīshmendnāma* a genealogy for Dānīshmend is constructed which links him to the epic hero Sayyid Battāl who was famous for leading the frontier warfare against the Byzantines.²²⁹ According to this tradition, the eponymous founder of the dynasty had

²²⁶ Rashīd al-Dīn as translated by C. Hillenbrand, *Manzikert*, 90-92; cf. Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 49; cf. Michael the Syrian, Chabot, III, 169, 172. Michael the Syrian also places Sulaymān at the battle of Manzikert.

²²⁷ Matthew of Edessa designates Dānīshmend as "the Persian emir". But his descriptions are not reliable. A.E. Dostourian, *Armenia and the Crusades. Tenth to Twelfth Centuries. The Chronicle of Matthew of Edessa*, New York/ London 1993, 176, (hereafter cited as Matthew of Edessa, Dostourian); Cahen merely states that "it is difficult to believe that a chief of Turcomans could be other than a Turcoman himself". Cahen, *Formation*, 11; We cannot ascertain the origin of Dānīshmend but it is certain is that he was respected by his followers as a wise man and that he therefore had received this title. Ibn al-Athīr writes that, "Gumushtakīn ibn al-Dānīshmand Tāylū, who was only called Ibn al-Dānīshmand because his father had been a 'teacher' of the Turkomans" and gives us also the personal name Tāylū. D.S. Richards, *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr for the Crusading Period from al-Kāmil fī'l-tārīkh, Part 1 The Years 491-541/1097-1146 The Coming of the Franks and The Muslim Response*, 2006, 32, (hereafter cited as Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Crusading Period I*).

²²⁸ Michael the Syrian writes that in 1085 Dānīshmend invaded Cappadocia: "A cette époque, en l'an 1396, un émir des Turcs, nommé Tanousman {Mohammed Quoumistekin ad-Danismend}, envahit le pays de Cappadoce et régna sur Sébaste, Césarée et les autres endroits de la contrée septentrionale". Michael the Syrian, Chabot, III, 173.

²²⁹ "And Battāl Ghāzi's son 'Alī had a son named Sultān Tūrasān and Emīr 'Omar had a daughter, they had given her to Mizrāb's son 'Alī, and she gave birth to a child, they name him Malik Ahmed, he was determined, intelligent and mature. They gave him the honorific Dānīshmend". I. Mélikoff, *Dānīshmend*, II, 9; Demir, *Dānīshmend-Nāme*, 61; In the last part of the *Dānīshmendnāma* the Dānīshmendids are also connected to the Rum Seljuqs claiming that Dānīshmend's son (Malik Amir Ghazi) was married to a sister of Sulaymān who gave birth to a son called Yaghi Basan. N. Demir, *Dānīshmend-Nāme*, 272-273; For the Dānīshmendid genealogy cf. Bosworth, *New Islamic Dynasties*, 215.

received the epithet *Dānīshmend* (wise/learned) because he was intelligent and always made every endeavour to educate himself.²³⁰ The *Dānīshmendid* conquests in Anatolia were thus justified as the continuation of the Muslim tradition of *ghazā* against Byzantium.

The first historically reliable information on *Dānīshmend* is for the year 1096-1097 when he appears on the scene during *Kılıç Arslan*'s siege of Malatya on the eve of the First Crusade.²³¹ Important to note here is that the claim that he had been commissioned by *Alp Arslan* to fight in the frontier regions against the Byzantines implies that the *Dānīshmendid*s regarded the Great Seljuqs as their overlords and not the Rum Seljuqs, even though the anonymous chronicler claims that all Anatolian emirs submitted to *Kılıç Arslan*.²³²

Aksarayi is evidently partial towards *Kılıç Arslan* and does not attempt to legitimise *Dānīshmend*'s assumption of power. At the end of his report of the battle of Manzikert he states that *Alp Arslan* sent his sons to Rum and he himself went back to his land and only in passing he notes. "At that time *Malik Dānīshmend* had taken Niksar, Tokat, Sivas, and Elbistan."²³³ There is no mention of how *Dānīshmend* came to Anatolia and no connection to *Alp Arslan* is made but the author designates him as *malik* (prince), a title which *Dānīshmend*'s successor received from the Great Seljuq sultan. It is surprising that *Aksarayi* remains silent about *Dānīshmend*'s low-born origin and does not choose to exploit this fact ideologically. This might be explained by the format of *Aksarayi*'s chronicle which is brief and not elaborative but he devotes more space to *Kılıç Arslan*'s rule than any other of the Rum Seljuq sultans. He devotes a long passage to *Kılıç Arslan* but he devotes only a few lines to the other Rum Seljuq sultans even to 'Alā' al-Dīn *Kay Qubādh I* (616-634/ 1220-1237), the most famous of them. It is also relevant to observe that the author puts the conflict between the 'Christian enemy' and *Kılıç Arslan* into the foreground of his account. *Kılıç Arslan* is given centre stage and

²³⁰ Cf. I. Mélikoff, *Dānīshmend*, II, 9. Cahen suggests that the name *Dānīshmend* "recalls the prestige of a 'wise man', the islamization of the ancient *baba* or shaman of their Central Asian ancestors." Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 83.

²³¹ Cf. Anna Comnena, *Alexiad*, Sewter, 210; EI2, *Dānīshmendid*s (Mélikoff).

²³² Anonymous, *Uzluq*, 24. Turan argues that *Kılıç Arslan* was regarded as an overlord by the other Turkish leaders but that those had become independent after the death of his father and therefore the former's power was in the beginning of his reign restricted to İznik. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 97.

²³³ *Aksarayi*, ed. Turan, 17; *Aksarayi*, Gençosman, 113; *Aksarayi*, Öztürk, 13.

though Dānīshmend is mentioned by name among the Muslim leaders who support him, he is discredited.

“At the time when Kılıç Arslan b. Sulaymān Shāh moved from summer to winter pastures in the region of Diyarbakır, Urfa, Birecik and on the banks of the Euphrates, the Roman emperor attacked the Muslim countries with an army of 120 thousand soldiers and excellent battle machinery. He first attacked Niksar, Sivas, Tokat, and Elbistan the lands of Malik Danishmend who ruled over that region. At this time Malik Danishmend, sent envoys to the Muslim territories of Mardin, Mayyāfāriqīn, Āmid, Harput, Erzincan, and Divriği urging the rulers, that: ‘A great army of the enemy is approaching Muslim lands and if we do not stand united against these unbelievers disorder will break out which cannot be halted and a fire will break out which will damage all Muslims and destroy and burn everything’.

In the same way Danishmend sent also an envoy to Kılıç Arslan: ‘If he would help him in this situation they would be victorious against the unbelievers and promised him that he would leave him one fifth of the spoils which could be gained and he would give him large tribute and give him his daughter to wife and cede Elbistan to him as her dowry’.

Kılıç Arslan agreed to this request and with other maliks and emirs of the region collected a 40.000 men strong army and, with the thought of defending the Muslims, set off for war against the infidel. Both armies came face to face near Sivas and God granted the Muslims victory. ... After this victory, Malik Danishmand sent Kılıç Arslan 100.000 dirham, but hesitated to hand over Elbistan. ... Kılıç Arslan was offended by Danishmand’s action and sent the money back with the message: ‘I came to rescue Muslim lands and not receive a reward. I do not need your money.’” Then he returned to his lands”.²³⁴

Kılıç Arslan, who is not referred to as sultan here, is described as a peaceful leader, who moved from “summer to winter pastures” within his territories. The Byzantine emperor is the agitator in this story who attacks Muslim territory and, as Aksarayı situates Kılıç Arslan in eastern Anatolia for the reason already discussed, the lands of Dānīshmend become his first target. Hence it is Dānīshmend who requests the support of his Muslim neighbours, among them Kılıç Arslan, against the Christian enemy. The enemy who invaded Muslim held territory were the armies of the First Crusade who in 1097 on their way to the Holy Land besieged Kılıç Arslan’s residence Nicaea. At that time Kılıç Arslan was in eastern Anatolia where he had laid siege to Malatya.²³⁵ Kılıç Arslan left Malatya, when he received the news that his residence was threatened but he arrived too late and had to leave Nicaea to its fate.²³⁶ The Crusaders handed over Nicaea to the Byzantine emperor who subsequently reconquered western Anatolia and thus forced the Seljuqs to retreat to central Anatolia. It was thus Kılıç Arslan I who asked Dānīshmend for help against the Crusader

²³⁴ Aksarayı, ed. Turan, 27-28; Aksarayı, Gençosman, 124-125, Aksarayı, Işıltan, 38; Aksarayı, Öztürk, 20-21.

²³⁵ Cf. Matthew of Edessa, Dostourian, 163 and 165-166.

²³⁶ Cf. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 99-100; Runciman, *Crusades I*, 178-179; Cahen, *Formation*, 12.

armies and both sides joined forces for the battle of Eskişehir (Dorylaeum) against them in 1097.²³⁷

Aksarayi's version of events is very confused and he makes no distinction between the Christian enemies coming from the west. The Crusader armies seem to have been regarded as part of the Byzantine army and not a distinctive group. Apparently the Crusades did not leave any lasting memory in Anatolia as they did in Syria and Palestine where Crusader states were established. For the Rum Seljuq author the Byzantine empire presented the Christian enemy and opponent of the Rum Seljuq rulers and his goal is not to give historically accurate information but to present Kılıç Arslan as champion of Islam. It is interesting, however, that Aksarayi chooses to include details of the agreement concluded by Dānismend and Kılıç Arslan and writes that the latter was promised money and a marriage alliance as well as Elbistan by the former in exchange for his help. This suggests that the alliance was not merely based on Kılıç Arslan's religious solidarity. Moreover, he states that Kılıç Arslan returned the money sent to him by Dānismend because the latter did not fulfil all his promises as he kept Elbistan. At the same time, however, Aksarayi claims that Kılıç Arslan organised the support of the Muslim rulers in eastern Anatolia and that he helped the Muslims to victory.

Aksarayi then gives the reply Kılıç Arslan allegedly sent to Dānismend, stating that he returned the latter's money because he was not interested in material gain but in the security of Islam. Curiously the author admits that Kılıç Arslan was annoyed because Dānismend did not fulfil his part of the agreement. But, on the other hand, he constructs his story in a way which is intended to prove that the Rum Seljuq ruler is the better champion of Islam. Later in his narrative Aksarayi strengthens his claim by presenting Kılıç Arslan as the leader of the Muslim rulers in Anatolia. The Byzantine emperor is again presented as the aggressor who attacks Muslim lands:

“Again the Roman Emperor with a force he had been collecting for a long time attacked Çankırı [Gangra] and Ankara [Ancyra]. At that time these two towns belonged to the Muslims and in each of them was a malik from the family of Alp Arslan. The emperor laid siege to both those towns. The Muslims were thus hard pressed and they sent messengers to the maliks of the region. The maliks of the region gathered around Kılıç Arslan to serve him. From there they went against the unbelievers. The emperor had already taken Çankırı and had

²³⁷ Turan, *Selçuklular*, 101-102; Runciman, *Crusades I*, 185-187; Holt, *Crusades*, 169.

made great pillages and massacres When the army of the Muslims arrived. Kılıç Arslan was victorious at the battle he fought together with the army of Islam and the army of the unbelievers was defeated. Kılıç Arslan marched on Ankara after he took Çankırı.”²³⁸

The author writes that the maliks of the region supported Kılıç Arslan but does not give any names. Kılıç Arslan is presented as the supreme ruler of the region and the princes of the region are just mere subordinates who support him against the Byzantines. He is the one who leads the army of Islam against the Christian enemy and the real champion of Islam who defends the Muslims and their territories. Aksarayi notes that the towns recaptured from the Christian Byzantines were Muslim towns held by princes from Alp Arslan’s line and alludes thereby to the noble lineage of Kılıç Arslan. The latter is thus put in line with Great Seljuq rulers going back to Alp Arslan, the great victor who defeated the Byzantine emperor Romanos Diogenes at Manzikert and took him captive. It is curious that Aksarayi, who does not even mention the battle of Myriokephalon, the most important Rum Seljuq victory over the Byzantines under Kılıç Arslan’s grandson Kılıç Arslan II, lays here much emphasis on the struggle against the ‘infidel’.

It can therefore be suggested that Aksarayi begins his chapter on the Rum Seljuqs with Kılıç Arslan and presents him as the champion of Islam in order to legitimise their usurpation of power. This explains why he omits Nicaea from his narrative and places Kılıç Arslan in eastern Anatolia, the territories allegedly granted to his father by the Great Seljuq sultan. The establishment of the Rum Seljuq sultanate is thus not the result of the incursion of Rum Seljuq rebels and Turkmen bands into Anatolia but the result of Kılıç Arslan’s struggle against the Christian Byzantine expansionist policies.²³⁹ It is also possible that Aksarayi portrays Kılıç

²³⁸ Aksarayi, ed. Turan, 28; Aksarayi, Öztürk, 21-22; Aksarayi, Gençosman, 125. The anonymous Rum Seljuq author presents Kılıç Arslan as the rightful ruler in the region, who is killed by the emirs ruling in Mesopotamia. Thereby he justifies his eastern campaign and glosses over the conflict between the two branches of the Seljuq family: “Kılıç Arslan became a great ruler. All Anatolian emirs obeyed him. At the beginning of his reign, he took Elbistan and then he conquered Malatya and Tiflis. He crossed the Euphrates and marched towards Syria. He took Simsat came to Diyarbakır and took Mayyāfāriqīn and Mardin. Emir Inal, the ruler of that region, received the news that Kılıç Arslan’s fame spread over the world and that he went out of Rum and took territories of the whole world and that he now wanted to take Mosul. The emirs were incapable of war and wanted Kılıç Arslan dead.” Anonymous, Uzluk, 24.

²³⁹ Ahmad of Niğde an Anatolian author writing in the first half of the 14th century goes even further to erase the rebellious past of the Rum Seljuqs. He constructs a new genealogy and omitting Kutalmış claims that Sulaymān, the founder of the sultanate was the son of the Great Seljuq sultan Muhammad

Arslan as the real champion of Islam because of the strength of his Dānishmendid rival. Kılıç Arslan had been weakened by the loss of his residence Nicaea and other territories as the Byzantine emperor re-conquered western Anatolian towns and the coastal regions in the wake of the First Crusade. Forced to retreat into inner Anatolia, Kılıç Arslan took residence in Konya (Iconium) and he was cut off by the Franks and Armenians from the Malatya route leading to the east. Dānishmend on the other hand had not suffered any losses and, exploiting his opponent's weakness, took possession of Malatya in 1100. Gabriel, the Armenian governor of the town, appealed to Bohemond the Crusader prince of Antioch for help but Dānishmend defeated them and took Bohemond captive and took him to his residence Niksar (Neocaesareia).²⁴⁰ Dānishmend thus gained some prominence as the opponent of the Christian enemy.²⁴¹

It is thus possible that in the episode quoted above Aksarayi again rewrites history to cut out Dānishmend from the picture and to enhance Kılıç Arslan's standing as a warrior against the Christian Byzantine enemy. The attack on Ankara and Çankırı was undertaken by Crusader armies of the Crusade of 1101. The pleas sent by the Crusaders in the east who had conquered Jerusalem in 1099 for help to defend the town led to the coming of another wave of Crusaders into Anatolia.²⁴² Having learnt in Constantinople that Bohemond had been taken captive, part of the leadership decided to take a different route from the one the armies of the Crusade in 1097 had taken and to go into Dānishmendid territory with the intention to reach Niksar and free Bohemond. On their way, the first forces of this Crusade took Ankara and handed it over to the Byzantines then they turned towards Çankırı, which they were not able to take. They then devastated Çankırı's environs and continued their way to Niksar but were routed en route by Dānishmend and his allies. Another group of Crusaders who had meanwhile entered Anatolia and was also defeated by

Tapar b. Malik Shāh. Cf. A.C.S. Peacock, Ahmad of Niğde's al-Walad al-Shafīq and the Seljuk past, in: *Anatolian Studies*, 54 (2004), 101-102.

²⁴⁰ Cf. Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, tr. Tritton, 74; Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 236-237.

²⁴¹ He was the first Muslim ruler who defeated an army of Frankish knights. Cf. Runciman, *Crusades*, II, 13-14.

²⁴² For the developments leading to the Crusade of 1101 see Cate, The Crusade of 1101, in: *A History of the Crusades*, K. Setton (ed.), Philadelphia 1955, 343-347.

Kılıç Arslan and his allies.²⁴³ Muslim authors outside of Anatolia celebrate Danishmend's exploits against the Crusaders. Ibn al-Athīr does not even mention Kılıç Arslan's involvement and presents Danishmend as the sole victor.²⁴⁴

"Its ruler had written to Bohemond and asked him to come. He came to his aid with 5,000 men. Ibn al-Dānishmand met them in battle and Bohemond was defeated and taken prisoner. Seven Frankish counts came by sea and aimed to free Bohemond. They came to a castle called Ankara, which they took, killing the Muslims there. They then proceeded to another castle in which was Ismā'īl ibn al-Dānishmand. They put it under siege but Ibn al-Dānishmand assembled a large force and confronted the Franks. He laid an ambush and engaged them. The ambushes came forth and not a single one of the 300,000 Franks escaped, apart from 3,000 who fled by night and escaped wounded.

Ibn al-Dānishmand went to Malatya and seized it, taking its lord captive. Later the Frankish army marched against him from Antioch. He met and broke them. These events occurred within just a few months."²⁴⁵

In any case Dānishmend was strengthened and he was finally able to take Malatya, as Ibn al-Athīr indicates at the end of his report. Consequently, Danishmend's seizure of Malatya led to open conflict between him and Kılıç Arslan and the latter probably used the question of the ransom of Bohemond as a pretext to interfere in his rival's affairs. Hence the real concern for both sides was to gain control over eastern Anatolia and not to lead jihad. Their long lasting conflict over the strategically important town Malatya, which both sides in turn tried to bring under their control, reveals that they were not driven by religious zeal but power politics. The question of the conditions for Bohemond's release reveals that all parties ignored confessional and ideological divisions for political ends if necessary. Danishmend did not accept the offer of ransom for Bohemond from the Byzantine

²⁴³ For a concise account of the advance of the armies of this Crusade through Anatolia see Cate, *The Crusade of 1101*, 354-361.

²⁴⁴ Ibn al-Qalānisī on the other hand recognises that Kılıç Arslan supported Dānishmend. His account, however, is confused as he blends three events into one and writes that in November 1100 Kılıç Arslan and Dānishmend defeated the Franks. H.A.R. Gibb, *The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades*, London 1932, 49-50, (hereafter cited as Ibn al-Qalānisī, Gibb). Bar Hebraeus also mixes up these events but he does not mention the coalition between Dānishmend and Kılıç Arslan; Anna Comnena, *Sewter*, 356. Anna Comnena's report of this events is very brief and she writes that the Turks defeated the Franks but she does not specify which Turkish rulers were involved and their alliance. Matthew of Edessa, *Dostourian*, 185-186

²⁴⁵ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Crusading Period, I*, 32. Later on in his narrative Ibn al-Athīr includes that a battle had taken place between Raymond of St. Gilles and Kılıç Arslan without noting that this took place during the warfare between the Franks and the Dānishmendid-Seljuq alliance. "[Raymond] St. Gilles (God curse him!) had met Qilij Arslān ibn Sulaymān ibn Qutlimish, the lord of Konya, when the former led 100,000 warriors and the latter was at the head of a small band. They fought and the Franks were defeated. Many were killed and many were taken captive. Qilij Arslān returned with booty and a victory which he had not reckoned on." *ibid.* 59.

emperor Alexius who was an enemy of Bohemond but an ally of the Rum Seljuqs. He agreed to ransom Bohemond to Baldwin of Edessa in exchange for an alliance against Kılıç Arslan. It has been suggested by some historians that it came to dispute between Kılıç Arslan and Danishmend because the former regarded the latter as his subordinate and thus thought that he was entitled to a share of it.²⁴⁶ It might well be that Kılıç Arslan as a member of the Seljuq family regarded himself as higher in rank than Danishmend but we have no evidence that he demanded the submission of the latter. Moreover, Aksarayi reveals in one passage that in real political practice Danishmend was the stronger party. He writes that Kılıç Arslan:

“did not stand back when an opportunity presented itself. When he received the news that Malik Dānīshmend had fallen ill he raised an army and occupied Elbistan and Zubaytra and moved against Malatya. When Dānīshmend recovered from his illness he decided to make war on Kılıç Arslan. Kılıç Arslan as soon as he heard that Dānīshmend was moving against him realised that he would not stand a chance against him and he retreated to his lands.”²⁴⁷

Aksarayi admits that Kılıç Arslan was only able to mount an attack on Danishmend when he received news of his rival's illness. However, as soon as he was informed of a possible counter-attack he withdrew because he knew that he “would not stand a chance.” Kılıç Arslan could demand to be of higher rank but the reality was that the Danishmendid principality was stronger. Nevertheless, Kılıç Arslan did not give up his plan to control the eastern Anatolia and in 1102-03 he seized Armenian held town Maraş (Germanicea) which lay on the route to Malatya.²⁴⁸ As a consequence the conflict between Kılıç Arslan and Danishmend ended in open warfare during which the former defeated the latter. When Danishmend died in 497/1104, Kılıç Arslan immediately seized Malatya and from there he tried to expand his authority further into the east. It is obvious that his main goal was to obtain control over eastern Anatolia and Syria in order to maintain the

²⁴⁶ Turan, without giving any evidence, concludes that Kılıç Arslan as sultan of Anatolia and because of his own enterprises regarding Malatya was affected by Danishmend's conquest and that this led to a break in the relations between the two sides. Cf. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 142-143; Cahen states that Kılıç Arslan “no doubt regarded Danişmend as his subordinate, claimed a part of the ransom.” Cahen, *Formation*, 13; Runciman goes further and states that Kılıç Arslan, “as official overlord of the Anatolian Turks, demanded half of any ransom.” Runciman, *Crusades, II*, 38.

²⁴⁷ Aksarayi, ed. Turan, 28; Aksarayi, Gençosman, 124-125; Aksarayi, Işıltan, 38; Aksarayi, Öztürk, 21.

²⁴⁸ Ibn al-Qalānisī, Gibb, 59.

connection with the Great Seljuq territories. Aksarayi links the information that the Great Seljuq state fell weak to his record of Kılıç Arslan's success over Byzantium and writes:

“He also took Ankara. From there he went to Konya [Iconium], he freed the town and sat there on the throne of the sultanate. At this time the state of the Seljuq dynasty in Iraq had become very weak, as we have related before, strife for the throne had started between the brothers and the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad was worried about these state of affairs. The caliph sent an envoy to Kılıç Arslan, that if he would come to Baghdad after he had secured Anatolia he would help him and even promised to give him the sultanate of the Seljuq dynasty in Iran. Kılıç Arslan, led on by these promises, collected an army, and took the road to Baghdad.”²⁴⁹

Aksarayi asserts that Kılıç Arslan's success over the Byzantine enemy justifies his assumption of the title sultan. Consequently, the establishment of the Rum Seljuq sultanate in Konya is emancipated from Great Seljuq recognition and based on Kılıç Arslan's exploits of *ghazā*. At the same time our author seems to infer that Kılıç Arslan was the only remaining capable member of the Seljuq family and was thus obliged to secure the Great Seljuq dynasty from extinction. The caliph in Baghdad, concerned about the weakened state of the Great Seljuq empire, invites Kılıç Arslan to take over the remains of the empire. Kılıç Arslan is thus presented as the founder of a new dynasty in Konya and on the other hand he is the rightful heir to the Great Seljuq empire.

Kılıç Arslan's expedition to Baghdad is halted by the Great Seljuq official whom Aksaraylı calls Jawli Sa'ūr around Diyarbakır in eastern Anatolia. This is further justification for Kılıç Arslan's bid for the throne. Aksarayi writes that instigated by Jawli and because of the sultan's (Kılıç Arslan) harshness and arrogance his emirs deserted him and drowned him in the river Khabur.²⁵⁰ In order to conceal the internal Seljuq conflict and the fact that Kılıç Arslan's assumption of the sultan title was a rebellious act, the Rum Seljuq author omits the Great Seljuq sultan Muhammad Tapar from his account. Kılıç Arslan's defeat is ascribed to the treachery of his own men and the powerful Great Seljuq emir. The author underlines the

²⁴⁹ Aksarayi, ed. Turan, 28; Aksarayi, Gençosman, 125; Aksarayi, Işıltan, 38; Aksarayi, Öztürk, 21. Mīrkhwānd gives a similar account of this episode: “Towards the end of his reign [Kılıç Arslan I] Sultan Mas'ūd became the King of Iraq and because the caliph in Baghdad was angry with Mas'ūd, he sent an envoy to Rum to grant him the rule over Iraq”. Mīrkhwānd, Vullers, 233-234.

²⁵⁰ Aksarayi, ed. Turan, 29; Aksarayi, Gençosman, 125-126; Aksarayi, Işıltan, 39; Aksarayi, Öztürk, 22.

weakness of the Great Seljuq empire as the reigns of the state are held by this powerful emir and not the Great Seljuq sultan himself. Thereby Aksarayi underlines his claim that Kılıç Arslan was the rightful heir to the Great Seljuq throne.

Yet, Muhammad Tapar regarded himself as supreme ruler and tried to assert his power, albeit without great success, over his emirs (local governors) as well as the Turkish warlords, who during the internal strife had assumed power for themselves. Several of the Great Seljuq governors in Syria and northern Mesopotamia resisted submission to the sultan's authority.²⁵¹ Their disobedience intensified the divisions of power in northern Syria and Mesopotamia and provided Kılıç Arslan with the opportunity to gain a foothold in the region. As usual in these cases the emirs found a solution in supporting a throne pretender whom they hoped they could influence in order to keep their status as semi-independent rulers. Kılıç Arslan exploited this to interfere in the affairs of his Great Seljuq cousin but he did not have a legal claim to the sultanate as the Rum Seljuq sources want to make us believe. The authors writing on the Great Seljuqs omit from their narratives that Muḥammad Tapar was unable to control his emirs and that he was challenged by Kılıç Arslan. They present Muḥammad Tapar as the last ruler who united the Great Seljuq empire and was dedicated to the war against the heretic *batinis* (Assassins).²⁵² Ibn al-Athīr however reveals the real political circumstances at the time of Kılıç Arslan's eastern enterprise:

“We have previously told that Jokermish's men wrote to Emir Sadaqa, Qasīm al-Dawla al-Bursuqī and Prince Qilij Arslān ibn Sulaymān ibn Qutlumish al-Saljūqī, the ruler of Anatolia, summoning each one with the promise to surrender the city to him. Sadaqa refused and decided to stay loyal to the sultan. Qilij Arslan, however, marched with his troops and when Jāwulī Saqāo heard that he had arrived at Nisibis, he withdrew from Mosul. ... The people of Mosul and Jokermish's men sent to Qilij Arslān, when he was at Nisibis, and asked him to take certain oaths, which he did. He then made them swear to be obedient and

²⁵¹ As Carole Hillenbrand rightly states, the Great Seljuq sultan Muhammad was not the strong sultan the sources want us make believe and he was not able to impose his authority over his emirs. C. Hillenbrand, *The Career of Najm al-Dīn Īl-Ghāzī*, in: *Der Islam* 58 (1981), 250-292, see especially 263-64. El-Azhari gives in his book 'The Saljūqs of Syria' an account of the events in Syria and Mesopotamia under the Seljuqs and the *atabegs* who took power over from them but his work is not critical and he does not include any information on the relations between the Rum Seljuqs and the Syrian rulers. T.A. El-Azhari, *The Saljūqs of Syria During the Crusades 463-549 A.H./ 1070-1154 A.D.*, Berlin 1997.

²⁵² Cf. Nīshāpūrī, *Saljuqnāma*, ed. Morton, 44-53; Pseudo Nīshāpūrī, *Luther*, 73-80; al-Bundarī, *Zubdat*, Burslan, 88-116; Al-Husaynī, *Akhbār*, tr. Ayaz, II, 250-258; Rāwandī, *Rāhat al-sudūr*, Ateş, 148-161.

loyal and set out with them for Mosul, which he took over on 25 Rajab [22 March 1107] and resided in al-Mu'riqa. Jokermish's son and his men came out to meet him and were given robes of honour. Qilij Arslān took his seat on the throne and dropped Sultan Muhammad's name from the khutbah and added his own after the caliph's. He was generous to the troops but took the citadel from Qizoghlu, Jokermish's mamluke, and placed a castellan of his own there. He abolished the duties that had been wickedly introduced and acted with justice and conciliation towards the populace. He proclaimed, 'Whoever informs on anyone I shall put to death,' so there were no false accusations made against anyone. He confirmed Abū Muhammad 'Abd Allāh ibn al-Qāsim ibn al-Shahrazūrī in the office of *cadi* for Mosul and appointed as headman Abū'l-Barakāt Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn Khamīs, who was the father of our teacher"²⁵³.

The most striking point of this account is that Ibn al-Athīr attributes to Kılıç Arslan the characteristics of a legitimate Muslim ruler. He points out that he "acted with justice" and filled the important government posts with capable officials. It is important that Ibn al-Athīr as an author who is not necessarily favourable towards the Rum Seljuqs recognises Kılıç Arslan's qualities as a ruler. However, because Kılıç Arslan was not successful, ultimately Ibn al-Athīr designates him as a rebel:

"When Qilij Arslān saw that his army was defeated, he understood that, if he were taken, he would be treated as an implacable enemy, especially as he had challenged the sultan in his lands and for the title of sultan. He therefore urged his mount into the River Khābūr and shot some arrows to defend himself from Jāwulī's men. His horse carried him downstream to deep water where he drowned ... Jāwulī then left Mosul and sent Malikshāh, Qilij Arslān's son, to Sultan Muhammad."²⁵⁴

The author therefore emphasises that Kılıç Arslan's conquest of Mosul and his assumption of the title sultan was a rebellious act against the Great Seljuq sultan and that he was aware of the consequences. Ultimately Jāwulī, the Great Seljuq emir and governor of Mossul, defeats Kılıç Arslan. In contrast to Aksarayi's version the Great Seljuq sultan Muhammad Tapar features in this version of events and Kılıç Arslan is not drowned by his own emir but he drowns while he tries to escape. Moreover Kılıç Arslan's son does not receive recognition as ruler of Rum from the caliph as Aksarayi claims but is sent to the Great Seljuq sultan.

It can thus be concluded that like his father and grandfather before him Kılıç Arslan's main goal was not to establish an independent sultanate in Anatolia but to

²⁵³ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Crusading Period, I*, 114; Bar Hebraeus gives a similar account of Muhammad's conflicts with his emirs and Kılıç Arslan. Bar Hebraeus, Budge, I, 239-243.

²⁵⁴ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Crusading Period, I*, 116-117.

take over the Great Seljuq throne. This on the other hand indicates that for the first three Rum Seljuq leaders in Anatolia the main goal was not to establish a sultanate in Anatolia but to take over the Great Seljuq sultanate. Consequently they did not formulate at this time an ideological concept to justify the establishment of a new state based in Anatolia, the Rum Seljuq sultanate. They were rebels who claimed to be rightful heirs to the Great Seljuq empire based in Iran and Iraq.

The Period of Transition

The history of the Seljuq principality in Anatolia from the death of Kılıç Arslan in 500/1107 to the death of Mas'ūd in 551/1156 is marked by a three-year interregnum and domination by the rival Turkish principality of the Dānismendids. Moreover, the whole period is one of turmoil and disorder in which many different players, the Seljuq princes and their guardians, the Dānismendids, the Byzantines, the Armenians, the Turkish and Crusader principalities in eastern Anatolia and northern Syria were involved in a race to secure their power in central and eastern Anatolia. The Rum Seljuq sources and other Muslim as well as Christian sources have only little to say about events in Anatolia and the snippets of information they do provide are confused and incoherent. It is therefore difficult, and in many cases impossible, to ascertain the course of events. We have also no epigraphic evidence for this period which would help us to fill the gaps as the Anatolian Seljuqs did not leave behind any monuments at this time. The first Seljuq coins appear only in the last years of the reign of Mas'ūd. Modern scholars have shown very little interest in the reigns of Shāhānshāh and Mas'ūd and have not analysed the information available in any detail.²⁵⁵ This section aims to analyse the accounts given by the Rum Seljuq sources and other sources, especially the chronicle by Bar Hebraeus, which

²⁵⁵ Turan, who gives the most comprehensive discussion, treats the medieval sources as sources of factual data and uses it to give a chronological account of the events during the period of these two rulers. Cf. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 148-196. A more recent study on Mas'ūd by the Turkish historian Muharrem Kesik is written in the same manner as the work of Turan. Kesik, *Türkiye Selçuklu Devleti Tarihi Sultan I. Mesud Dönemi (1116-1155)*, Ankara 2003, (hereafter cited as Kesik, Mesud); Cahen devotes only little space to this period and gives merely a chronological account of the main events reported by the sources. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 87-100; idem, *Formation*, 15-24.

contains the widest information on this period. By this way deductions of the ideology and mentality of the Seljuqs in Anatolia during this period will be made.

II.4. Shāhānshāh (Malik Shāh), (504-510/ 1110-1116)

The death of Kılıç Arslan after his failed rebellion against the Great Seljuq sultan Muḥammad Tapar revealed that the Rum Seljuq principality was not yet firmly established. Kılıç Arslan left behind four sons called Shāhānshāh (Malik Shāh), Mas'ūd, Tuğrul Arslan and Arab.²⁵⁶ According to the Rum Seljuq author Aksarayi, Kılıç Arslan had one son named Mas'ūd, whom he designated as his heir and left him in Konya before his campaign to the east.²⁵⁷ The anonymous author writes that Kılıç Arslan had two sons, Mas'ūd and Arab, and that the former was in Konya and the latter was with his father on the eastern expedition. This author informs us that Arab rebelled in order to obtain the throne but he died and that thus Mas'ūd succeeded to the throne.²⁵⁸ The anonymous author admits that there were two throne pretenders, but he too claims that an uninterrupted succession was in place. There is a possibility that these authors did not have any different information at their disposal but it seems more probable that they were anxious to legitimise Rum Seljuq rule through their claim that the dynasty was already established with an uninterrupted succession of Rum Seljuq sultans in place.

In reality, the death resulted in the captivity of one of his young sons and the division of his Anatolian realm among the remaining sons and their guardians. Matthew of Edessa, the earliest author to record these events, writes that Kılıç Arslan's realm was divided among his sons: "His four sons succeeded him, each

²⁵⁶ The lack of information from this period is revealed by the fact that the sources do not even agree on how many sons Kılıç Arslan had and what they were called. Ibn al-Athīr names one son and gives his name as Malik Shāh, Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Crusading Period*, I, 116; Michael the Syrian names the sons of Kılıç Arslan I as Shāhānshāh, Mas'ūd, Tuğrul Arslan, and Arab. Michael the Syrian, Chabot, III, 194; Bar Hebraeus gives also the four names given by Michael the Syrian but gives the name of Shāhānshāh like Ibn al-Athīr as Malik Shāh, Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 243; Most probably Shāhānshāh and Malik Shāh are the same person as Anna Comnena refers to him by both names Saisan (Shāhānshāh) and Malik Shāh. Anna, Sewter, 445, 447.

²⁵⁷ Cf. Aksarayi, Gençosman, 125.

²⁵⁸ Anonymous, Uzluk, 24.

ruling a portion of his father's land."²⁵⁹ The earliest Muslim account is given by the Syrian author Ibn al-Qalānisī:

"The son of Qilij had taken refuge in the city, and Jāwalī seized him and had him conveyed to the [Saljūqid] Sultan Muhammad, with whom he remained until he escaped from the camp at the beginning of the year 503 (began 31st July, 1109), and made his way back to his father's kingdom in Anatolia. It is said that when he arrived there, he formed a plot against his uncle's son and having killed him, firmly established himself in the kingdom in his stead."²⁶⁰

Ibn al-Qalānisī apparently did not have reliable information at his disposal, as he does not even give the name of the son he mentions. It seems that even in neighbouring Syria there was no information available on this period. Ibn al-Athīr who wrote later gives some more details and confirms that Kılıç Arslan's son was taken captive but does not relate anything about his return to Anatolia.

"When Qilij Arslan had secured Mosul, he departed to make war on Jāwalī Saqāo. He left his son Malikshāh, who was eleven years of age, in the government house with an emir to guide his affairs and a detachment of the army, consisting of 4,000 cavalry with full equipment and excellent mounts. ... Jāwalī then left for Mosul and sent Malikshāh, Qilij Arslān's son, to Sultan Muhammad."²⁶¹

The author's remark that Shāhānshāh ('Malikshāh'), the son of Kılıç Arslan who accompanied him on his campaign, was eleven years old indicates that this was the eldest son and the others were still minors. It was to this son that he left Mosul after he had conquered it. Interestingly, however, the author gives no indications as to whom Kılıç Arslan left his Anatolian territories, especially Konya. One possible explanation would be that Kılıç Arslan regarded as his heir this son Shāhānshāh whom he left in Mosul. Bar Hebraeus claims that he proclaimed this son 'king':

"And he set in the fortress of Māwṣil a man whose name was 'Bazmīsh'. And he left his son Mālik Shāh, being a boy eleven years old, in Māwṣil, and called him 'king', and the mother of the youth was also with him in the palace."²⁶²

Like Ibn al-Athīr, Bar Hebraeus writes then that after the death of Kılıç Arslan this 'Bazmīsh' (Bozmuş) went with the former's wife and all their people to Malatya, except for the son Shāhānshāh who had been handed over to the Great

²⁵⁹ Matthew of Edessa, Dostourian, 199.

²⁶⁰ Ibn al-Qalānisī, Gibb, 81.

²⁶¹ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Crusading Period I*, 116 and 117.

²⁶² Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 240.

Seljuq sultan.²⁶³ In a different passage Bar Hebraeus writes that in Malatya Bozmiş proclaimed Tuğrul Arslan, the little son of Kılıç Arslan king:

“Then Bazmîsh, having taken the wife of Kelej 'Arslân from Mâwsil and gone to Melitene, proclaimed king Tûghrel 'Arslân, the little son of Kelej 'Arslân. And there was there another Amîr whose name was 'Arslân, and the mother of the young man made an agreement with him and killed Bazmîsh²⁶⁴, and he took her to wife. And as he made the people of Melitene to endure many evil things in respect of the collecting of gold, the mother of the young man made an agreement with the young man her son, and they seized 'Arslân, and shut him up, and it was thought that he had been killed. And after a year they brought him out and sent him to the Sûltân Ghâyath ad-Dîn in Khôrâsân. And the Sûltân sent Mâlik Shâh, the son of Kelej 'Arslân, to Melitene, and he was proclaimed king. And he dismissed Tûghrel 'Arslân, his younger brother, and he shut up in prison his two other brothers, Mas'ûd and Arâb. And Mâlik Shâh, having remained for many years in Melitene, and being troubled by Bar Dânishmand, went to Alexis, the king of the Greeks, so that he might help him. And he was received joyfully, and much gold was given to him. And when he went forth Bar Dânishmand laid an ambush for him, and captured him, and he blinded his eyes. Then the Amîrs who were in Melitene brought out Mas'ûd from prison, and proclaimed him Sûltân.”²⁶⁵

It seems that in the state of confusion, following the death of Kılıç Arslan, the mother of his son Tuğrul Arslan took matters into her own hands and assumed power in Malatya in the name of her son. More significant is the question why Kılıç Arslan's wife and Bozmiş chose to stay in Malatya and did not try to take the main residence Konya. It is peculiar that the author does not mention Konya in this report. The mother of the prince secured power in Malatya by marrying Bozmiş and making him her son's *atabeg*. She then removed Bozmiş and marrying Ilarslan/Arslan, another Turkish chief, she promoted him to be her son's *atabeg*. According to Bar Hebraeus this Arslan mistreated the people of Malatya and was thus taken prisoner by Tuğrul Arslan and his mother and was later sent to sultan Ghiyâth al-Dîn in

²⁶³ Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 241.

²⁶⁴ This name of this Rum Seljuq *atabeg* is spelt differently by our chronicler and is written as Bozmiş in modern Turkish. We have no other information about this person except what is recorded in this passage. He was probably one of Kılıç Arslan's mamluk officers whom he chose as *atabeg* for his son.

²⁶⁵ Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 243; “Quand la nouvelle de la mort du sultan Kilidj-Arslan arriva, on établit à Melitene son plus jeune fils, qui s'y trouvait, nommé Togr[il]-Arslan. Son gouverneur était un homme âgé, appelé Pizmiş, et il y en avait un autre nommé Ilarslan. La mère du jeune homme fit un complot avec celui-ci, qui tua Phazmiş, et la prit pour femme. Il causa beaucoup de maux aux gens de la ville, par l'or qu'il amassa, et il chercha un prétexte pour s'en aller dans le Beit Roumayê. Quand sa femme s'en aperçut, elle fit un pacte avec son fils et s'empara de lui. On l'enferma et on laissa croire qu'il avait été tué. Au bout d'une année, on le fit sortir et on l'envoya au sultan”. Michael the Syrian, Chabot, III, 194.

Khôrâsân (Great Seljuq sultan Muḥammad Tapar). The mother of Tuğrul Arslan probably sent Arslan to the Great Seljuq sultan with the hope that the latter might recognise her son as ruler in Anatolia. However, the Great Seljuq sultan sent Shāhānshāh (Mâlik Shâh) to Malatya where he was proclaimed 'king'. Hence in 502/1109 Shāhānshāh came to Anatolia. Ibn al-Qalānisī confirms the date but states that he escaped Great Seljuq captivity and came to his 'father's kingdom' and killing his uncle's son took over rule.²⁶⁶ This author does not specify in which town Shāhānshāh was proclaimed ruler.

It is confusing that Bar Hebraeus on the one hand writes that Shāhānshāh dismissed his brother Tuğrul Arslan when he came to Malatya but on the other hand later on in his narrative he refers to Tuğrul Arslan as sultan of Malatya. He writes that in the year 1113 the mother of Tuğrul Arslan married the Artukid Balak and made him her son's atabeg to secure his support and maintain power over Malatya.²⁶⁷ Thus even though it is not possible to ascertain the course of events, it is evident that Malatya had become an independent Seljuq polity which continued to exist probably until 1119, as Bar Hebraeus reports under this year, that the sultan of Malatya subjugated Elbistan and other neighbouring territories.²⁶⁸

What is important to recognise for the context of the present study is that the Seljuq realm in Anatolia was divided into two polities, centred around Malatya and around Konya, where after an interregnum of three years the young 'sultan' Shāhānshāh assumed rule. The authors quoted above designate Shāhānshāh as king or sultan but it is curious that they do not note at all if he was officially recognised by the Abbasid caliph or the Great Seljuq sultan. Cahen merely remarks that when sultan Muḥammad freed Shāhānshāh he "no doubt induced his prisoner to acknowledge some kind of suzerainty."²⁶⁹ As the Great Seljuq sultan Muḥammad was the supreme ruler of the Seljuq family, Shāhānshāh could only be a subordinate

²⁶⁶ Ibn al-Qalānisī, Gibb, 81.

²⁶⁷ "And in the year fourteen hundred and twenty-four of the Greeks (A.D. 1113) the wife of Kelej 'Arslān, the Sūltān of Melitene, sallied forth, and went to Balāk, the lord of the fortress of Būlā. For she said [to him], 'I have on many occasions heard the Sūltān praising thee and saying, "Among all the Turkish Amīrs there is none so wise or so mighty a man as Bālāk", and therefore I wish that I and my sons may be protected by thy name.' And thus she was protected. And Balāk increased in power greatly, and he became the husband of the wife of the Sūltān. And when the Khâtōn herself returned she drove out the 'Ātābāg, and she and her son sat down in the Citadel of Melitene". Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 245.

²⁶⁸ Cf. Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 249.

²⁶⁹ Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 88.

Seljuq prince and governor of the territories in Anatolia. It is unlikely that he received the title sultan and probably he held the title *malik* with the meaning of prince and not king. What is surprising here is that there is no mention as to who accompanied the young prince to Anatolia if he was sent by the sultan or who helped him to escape if he escaped. Shāhānshāh, who was eleven years old when his father died according to our authors, must have been thirteen when he was proclaimed ruler in Anatolia. It is thus very unlikely that he could have assumed the title sultan or even led the government himself. But we can plausibly speculate that there was a group of people in Anatolia, who were probably officials of Kılıç Arslan who lent their support to this prince.

As quoted above, Bar Hebraeus writes that Shāhānshāh imprisoned his two brothers Arab and Mas'ūd but that his position remained unsecure as he was attacked by the Dānismendids. On the other hand, the Byzantines had used the weakness of the Seljuqs following the death of Kılıç Arslan as an opportunity to re-conquer the coastal regions, but Turkmen raids into Byzantine territory continued. The Byzantine emperor Alexius, who regarded the Franks as more dangerous enemies, concentrated his efforts to reduce their power in Syria. For this reason he united with the Dānismendid ruler against the Franks. However, after he had reached an agreement with the Frankish ruler Roger of Antioch in 1116, the emperor decided to launch a large expedition against the Seljuqs in Anatolia. It is not clear why the emperor gave up his friendly relations with the Seljuqs but both sides met on the battlefield in the same year but both sides shunning a decisive battle concluded a peace treaty.²⁷⁰ The Dānismendid Gümüştekin, using the peace between Shāhānshāh and Alexius as a pretext, interfered in Seljuq affairs and in the name of his son-in-law Mas'ūd, the brother of Shāhānshāh, deposed the latter. Shāhānshāh was strangled with a bow string according to the idea that a member of the nobility must be executed without spilling his blood.²⁷¹

²⁷⁰ These events and the relations between Alexius and Shāhānshāh will be discussed below, in the chapter on 'The Rum Seljuqs and Byzantium'.

²⁷¹ According to Köprülü this tradition goes back to the ancient shamanistic idea prevalent among the Oğuz Turks that the ruling family was sacred and that therefore members of the ruling family could only be executed without spilling their blood. For this reason members of the ruling family were killed with a bow-string. Köprülü, *Türk ve Moğol sülâlerinde hanedan azasının kan dökme memnuyeti*, in: *Türk Hukuk Tarihi Dergisi*, 1 (1944), 1-9.

II.5. Rukn al-Dīn Mas'ūd I (510-551/ 1116-1156)

The second Dānīshmendid ruler Gümüştekin thus helped his son-in-law Mas'ūd to take over Konya and thus made the Seljuq principality his protectorate. The Dānīshmendid principality remained the paramount Turkish power in Anatolia until the death of Gümüştekin son and successor Muḥammad in 536/1142 led to the division of the Dānīshmendid realm into three rival branches. As already noted, both Rum Seljuq authors omit from their narratives that Kılıç Arslan's son was taken captive by the Great Seljuq sultan, that his realm was divided and that his rivals the Dānīshmendids expanded their power. Aksarayi claims that Kılıç Arslan made his son Mas'ūd his designated and left Konya to him before he left for the campaign to the east. After the death of his father, Mas'ūd ascended the throne in Konya and was recognised by the caliph, who sent him the insignia of rule. Mas'ūd was a just ruler who expanded his realm and maintained friendly relations with his Danishmendid neighbours.²⁷² It is revealing that this author devotes less space to the reign of Mas'ūd than to the reign of Kılıç Arslan. The author claims that the former was on friendly terms with the Dānīshmendids without giving any further information. The anonymous author omits the Dānīshmendids from his account altogether:

“It was said that the deceased had two sons, one of them was called Malik Mas'ūd the other Malik Arab. Malik Mas'ūd was in Konya and Malik Arab was with his father. In 527/1133 they brought the coffin of the deceased to Mayfrakin. Malik Arab longed for the throne and made three times war on his brother. They made peace in the end and his brother gave Malik Arab a few of the fortresses. After some time the emirs plotted mischief and Malik Arab rebelled and asked the Roman King for troops and received them. Malik Arab died and following this, Mas'ūd came on the throne. ... Then he marched on Telbeşir and the Armenian emirs begged him and asked to have Telbeşir back. The sultan built seventy seven Muslim pulpits in that region for the khutba to be read there. The caliph sent him preachers and robes of honour.”²⁷³

What is striking about both accounts is that Mas'ūd is the first ruler to whom our Rum Seljuq authors attribute the characteristics of a Perso-Islamic ruler. Aksarayi claims that he was a just king whose rule was legitimised by the caliph and

²⁷² Aksarayi, Gençosman, 125-126; Aksarayi, Işıltan, 38-39.

²⁷³ Anonymous, Uzluk, 24. The anonymous Syriac chronicle confuses the Seljuqs and Dānīshmendids but reveals that the latter became the paramount Turkish power in Anatolia: “In Malatia ruled after the sons of Danishmand a man of the great family of the Turkish kings, and after his death his two little sons with their mother; Mas'ud his first-born ruled in Iconium and the interior towards the Greeks; Ghazi son of Danishmand ruled in Sebaste, Cæsarea, and Neocæsarea. He became proud, acted haughtily and set his face against Malatia”. Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, Tritton, 89.

the anonymous author emphasizes that he fulfilled his religious obligations by expanding the realm of Islam. The anonymous chronicler implies that Mas'ūd pursued a policy of Islamisation of the newly conquered Armenian Christian territory and therefore built Muslim pulpits there but the number of pulpits, seventy seven which he allegedly built, is suspicious. Moreover, there is no extant evidence for Rum Seljuq building activity at this time. The claim that Mas'ūd was driven by religious zeal seems somewhat odd as both authors do not exploit the warfare against the Crusaders to present him or his father Kılıç Arslan as jihad fighter. That both authors do not make use of jihad propaganda even though they were writing in the 14th century at a time after the counter crusade reveals that the objective of the expansion policy of these Seljuq leaders was not *ghazw* or holy war.

Aksarayi's claim that the caliph recognised Mas'ūd as sultan sending him the insignia of rule is not confirmed by other sources. Ibn al-Athīr designates Mas'ūd once as King Mas'ūd of Konya and Aksaray but elsewhere as prince who ruled over Konya and neighbouring lands in Anatolia²⁷⁴. The Byzantine author Kinnamos like Anna refers to the Seljuqs in Anatolia as sultans but he does not say if Mas'ūd was officially recognised as sultan. His remark, "the chieftain of Ikonion [Konya], whom the Turks, honoring him above the rest, call sultan,"²⁷⁵ suggest that all Turks in Anatolia regarded Mas'ūd as their overlord. Bar Hebraeus refers to Mas'ūd as sultan of Konya but does not state if this title was officially bestowed on him. Yet, he gives a detailed record of the investiture of the Dānishmendid ruler:

"And in the year the Khalifah sent to GHĀZĪ, the Amīr, the son of DĀNISHMAND, the lord of MELITENE, a collar of gold for his neck, a sign of subjection, and a staff of gold, and four black flags, and drums which were to be beaten before him. And GHĀZĪ was proclaimed Mālik. And when the envoys arrived they found him sick, and after some days he died. Then they fulfilled [the ceremonies] for his son MĀHAMMĀD, and went away."²⁷⁶

²⁷⁴ Cf. D.S. Richards, *The Chronicle of Ibn al-Athīr for the Crusading Period from al-Kāmil fī'l-ta'rīkh. Part 2 The Years 541-589/1146-1193 The Age of Nur al-Din and Saladin*, Aldershot 2007, 39, 80, and 157, (hereafter cited as Richards, Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Crusading Period II*).

²⁷⁵ C.M. Brand, *Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus by John Kinnamos*, New York 1976, 20, (hereafter cited as Kinnamos, Brand).

²⁷⁶ Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 258; Bar Hebraeus has taken this passage from Michael the Syrian who writes: "La même année, le khalife Bagdad et le sultan du Khorasan envoyèrent à l'émir Ghâzî, seigneur de Mélitene, quatre drapeaux noirs, des tambours qu'on frappait devant lui comme roi, un collier d'or pour être suspendu à son cou, et un sceptre d'or avec lequel il devait être frappé par les envoyés, en confirmation de la royauté qui lui était octroyée, à lui-même et à sa descendance après lui. Les envoyés, en arrivant, le trouvèrent malade. Ils restèrent en attendant ce qui arriverait. Quand sa mort arriva, il donna le pouvoir à son fils Mohammed. Les envoyés donnèrent donc l'investiture à

This detailed description of the insignia which were sent to the Dānishmendid ruler is evidence for its authenticity. That the same author remains silent about the investiture of Mas'ūd indicates that he was not recognised by the caliph at this time and that the Dānishmendid ruler was stronger than him. As already stated the Dānishmendid ruler used the death of Kılıç Arslan to expand his territories and by supporting Mas'ūd who was his son-in-law in the succession struggle he made the Seljuq state in Anatolia his protectorate. The Dānishmendids thus became the paramount Turkish power in Asia Minor, while Mas'ūd's influence did not extend further afield than Konya and its environs.²⁷⁷ Nevertheless, as a member of a noble ruling family, Mas'ūd was able to assume the title sultan for himself and at least nominally hold a higher status than the Dānishmendids. The changes in the composition of the polities in Asia Minor and in Syria, Iraq, and Iran during the second half of the 12th century enabled Mas'ūd not only to expand his power and to consolidate this power but also led him to re-define the place of his polity and his status.

The death of Gümüştekin, the father-in-law of Mas'ūd in 529/1134, and that of the latter's successor Muḥammad in 536/1142, led to the division of the Dānishmendid realm into three rival branches.²⁷⁸ Mas'ūd interfered in the internal struggle of the Dānishmendids and extended and secured his power in Anatolia and became the strongest Turkish power in Anatolia. Ibn al-Athīr remarks under miscellaneous events of the year 537/1142-43:

“Muhammad ibn Dānishmand, the ruler of Malatya and the Marches, died this year. His lands were conquered by Prince Mas'ūd ibn Qilij Arslān, the ruler of Konya and one of the Saljuqs [of Rūm].”²⁷⁹

Mohammed, et il fut proclamé Malik”. Michael the Syrian, Chabot, III, 237; The anonymous Syriac author confirms that the Dānishmendid ruler was invested with the title malik and adds that he was the most powerful Turkish ruler in Anatolia: “The caliph of Baghdad invested with sovereignty Ghazi, son of Dānishmand, lord of Cappadocia and Malatia, who was more powerful than all the Turkish princes in those parts”. Anonymous Syriac Chronicle, Tritton, 99.

²⁷⁷ Cf. Holt, *Crusades*, 170; The rise of the Dānishmendids to the paramount Turkish power in Anatolia is described in the following works: Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 91-96; idem. *Formation*, 18-20; Turan, *Selçuklular*, 112-180; Sevim/Yücel, *Türkiye Tarihi*, 123-125 and 208-211; M. Kesik, *Türkiye Selçuklu Devleti Tarihi Sultan I. Mesud Dönemi*, 35-42.

²⁷⁸ Cf. EI2, Dānishmendids, (Mélékoff), 111; Cahen, *Formation*, 21; Turan, *Selçuklular*, 178; Kesik, *Mesud*, 45.

²⁷⁹ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Crusading Period*, I, 367.

Mas'ūd was able to follow an expansionist policy following the division of the Dānishmendids, as there was no power to oppose him. The Byzantine empire, always anxious to keep a balance of power in Anatolia among the Turkish rulers was not in a state to oppose Mas'ūd. The emperor John had died and his son and successor Manuel needed first to secure his throne against his internal enemies. And for the time being there was no power in the east which could prevent Mas'ūd to fulfil his ambitions. In 1153 Sancar, the Great Seljuq sultan of the east, had been taken captive by the Oğuz tribesmen and this gave all players in the east a free hand to seek autonomous domains. The *atabegs* of the Seljuq princes and other emirs established principalities usurping the remains of the Great Seljuq empire, the Iraqi sultanate and Syria as warlords. The Abbasid caliph in Baghdad used this state of affairs to revive his own temporal power. For the Seljuqs in Anatolia these transformations in the east were relevant in three ways. First, the Great Seljuq throne was not any more an objective to strive for. As a consequence, Mas'ūd and his successors would not pursue a policy of expansion to the east to claim the lands of Seljuq dynasty but would concentrate their efforts on consolidating their power in Asia Minor. Second, the Abbasid caliphate became one of the polities in the contest for territorial rule but was still the only institution which could legitimise Muslim rule and thus use this advantage against the other territorial powers of the region. It is possible therefore that the caliph recognised Mas'ūd as sultan. Third, the *atabeg* principalities especially that of Zengi in Mosul and Aleppo, was to play a crucial role in Rum Seljuq history not only because Zengi²⁸⁰ who conquered in 539/1144 the Crusader state of Edessa became the eastern neighbour of Mas'ūd. The following decades were marked by political and ideological warfare between Zengi and his successors and the Rum Seljuq rulers. It can be suggested that it was the defence of the challenge presented by his new powerful neighbour Zengi that led Mas'ūd to assume the sultan title and to define and legitimise his rule.

All these changes opened for Mas'ūd the possibility to assume the title of sultan without any fear of Great Seljuq intervention.²⁸¹ Three copper coins from the

²⁸⁰ Cf. Bosworth, *New Islamic Dynasties*, 190-191.

²⁸¹ Hamdullah Qazwini indicates that Sanjar's imprisonment by the Oğuz gave Mas'ūd a free hand when he writes in the *Zafarnāma* that Mas'ūd sent every year tribute to Sancar but that he stopped

reign of Mas'ūd are the first known Rum Seljuq coins and evidence that he bore the title sultan. These coins copy the contemporary Byzantine folis with the imperial bust, probably of Alexius I Comnenus on the obverse and Mas'ūd's name with that of his father and his title, '*sultan al-mu'azzam*', "the exalted sultan," on the reverse.²⁸² The date on these coins is not legible, but, as already stated, Mas'ūd could only have taken this title in the last years of his reign and so they must have been minted during that time. Mas'ūd can thus be described as the first Seljuq leader in Anatolia who regarded himself as the head of a new dynasty and who established himself as a sedentary territorial sovereign²⁸³. While his predecessors led the life of nomadic war leaders on campaign, he laid in the last decade of his reign the foundation stone for the administrative structures for the new Seljuq dynasty in Anatolia which was to become the Rum Seljuq sultanate under his successors. Thus at the end of his reign Mas'ūd put in place the three elements which manifested a Muslim state. These were the sultan the head of state, the court comprising the military and civil leaders of the administration of the state, and the capital as the seat of the state. Mas'ūd started the development of Konya as the seat of the sultanate. This town which had been already seized by Sulaymān sometime between 1075 and 1081 was a well irrigated site on the southern route of Asia Minor. With the building of the great mosque Konya was marked out as a Muslim town.²⁸⁴

In order to ensure the continuation of his dynasty Mas'ūd arranged his succession and chose among his sons Kılıç Arslan as heir. This son had already

sending it when the latter was taken captive. See for this O. Turan, *Selçuklular Tarihi ve Türk İslam Medeniyeti*, 173.

²⁸² Cf. Kesik, *Mesud*, 121-22; H. Erkiletlioğlu/ O. Güler, *Türkiye Selçuklu Sultanları ve Sikkeleri*, 45-46 (hereafter cited as Güler, *Sikkeleri*); Aykut, *Türkiye Selçuklu Sikkeleri*, I, 187-189; Cahen states mistakenly that on one of his coins Mas'ūd describes himself as "king of all Anatolia and Romania", Cahen, *Formation*, 136.

²⁸³ Kesik writes in his book on Mas'ūd the following: "The Turks in central Anatolia were living a nomadic life as they did not feel secure enough and wanted to be able to retreat quickly in case of Byzantine attacks. After sultan Mas'ūd's victories over the Crusaders, Byzantines and Danişmendids they were no longer the defending side but became the offensive side and became consolidated in the region". Unfortunately this point is only mentioned in the last chapter of the book but Kesik does not discuss or pose any questions as to why Mas'ūd chose to become a sedentary ruler in contrast to his predecessors. Kesik, *Mesud*, 128. Turan merely states that Kılıç Arslan made Konya the capital after the fall of İznik during the First Crusade but that he did not find the time to live there as he was constantly on campaign. Therefore the town was only constructed during the reign of Mas'ūd. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 194; The most comprehensive work describing the Turkification and Islamisation of the formerly Christian Greek and Armenian territories is still the work of Vryonis, *Decline*.

²⁸⁴ Cf. J.H. Löytved, *Konia. Inschriften der Seldschukischen Bauten*, Berlin 1907, 21, (hereafter cited as Löytved, *Konia*); İ.H. Konyalı, *Abideleri ve Kitabeleri ile Konya Tarihi*, Konya 1964, 309-311; Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 201.

proved himself as a good military and political leader and had accompanied him on his campaigns and Mas'ūd might have hoped that he was the one who could defend his position as supreme leader against his brothers and other rivals. Aksarayi states that Mas'ūd designated Kılıç Arslan as his heir because among his sons he was one who possessed the best leadership qualities.²⁸⁵

To conclude, it seems safe to suggest that Mas'ūd at the end of his reign laid the foundations which transformed the Seljuq principality in Anatolia into the Seljuq sultanate of Konya.

III. The foundation of the Rum Seljuq sultanate

1. 'Izz al-Dīn Kılıç Arslan II (551-588/ 1156-1192)

Kılıç Arslan is regarded as one of the most important Rum Seljuq sultans because of his political and military success, and especially his great victory at Myriokephalon over the Byzantine emperor, Manuel Comnenus in 572/1176. Turkish historians argue that Kılıç Arslan consciously followed a grand strategy to make Anatolia a Turkish homeland and that the campaigns against his Turkish rivals and against the Byzantines were part of this plan. The battle at Myriokephalon almost a century after the battle at Manzikert is thus seen as the culmination of Kılıç Arslan II's strategy and the final victory against Byzantium which demonstrated clearly that Anatolia had become a Turkish country.²⁸⁶ Western scholars recognise Kılıç Arslan's political and

²⁸⁵ The anonymous author writes: "The sultan had three sons. One of them was complacent, the other was a house decorator and the third who was the intelligent one to him he gave the sultanate. He was named after his father." Anonymous, *Uzluq*, 25.

²⁸⁶ One of the first modern Turkish historians, İbrahim Kafesoğlu, wrote in his article on the Seljuqs in the Turkish Encyclopaedia of Islam (*İslam Ansiklopedisi*, İA) that the battle of Myriokephalon "confirmed that Anatolia, which until then had been regarded in the Christian world as a kind of "country under Turkish occupation," had become a truly Turkish homeland". İA, *Selçuklular*, 381. Kafesoğlu's article was first published in the İA in 1964-1965 but republished by Turkey's Ministry of Education as a book for educational purposes. For the English translation see Gary Leiser, *A History of the Seljuks İbrahim Kafesoğlu's interpretation and the Resulting controversy*, Southern Illinois University Press 1988, 71; A Turkish historian from the same generation, Osman Turan concluded that Kılıç Arslan II "after overcoming all his enemies established political unity and founded a secure Turkey". Turan, *Selçuklular*, 236; Cahen arrives at a similar view stating that: "This was, after an interval of a century, a replica of Manzikert, which showed that henceforward there existed a Turkey which could never be further assimilated". *EI 2*, Kılıdj Arslan II (Cahen).

military success and show interest especially in his victory at Myriokephalon.²⁸⁷ They compare Kılıç Arslan's victory at Myriokephalon with Alp Arslan's victory at Manzikert and regard them as decisive victories of the Muslim Turkish sultans over the Christian Byzantine emperors and hence as part of the 'Holy War' between Islam and Christendom.

Neither of these evaluations, however, is an appropriate presentation of this Seljuq leader in Anatolia. Both assumptions imply that Kılıç Arslan had a coherent political programme which he was determined to push through. Yet it is not possible to determine if Kılıç Arslan was thinking beyond the immediate campaign he was following at any one time. It seems more probable that his ambitions grew with his diplomatic and military successes against his Byzantine neighbours and especially against his Muslim neighbours in Anatolia and northern Syria, the most important of the latter being the Danishmendids and the so called 'Counter Crusaders' Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin. In fact, the greatest part of his reign was marked by the conflict with his Muslim neighbours in eastern Anatolia. The battle of Myriokephalon was a late attempt by the Byzantine emperor to contain Kılıç Arslan and was enforced on him by the former. Kılıç Arslan II showed little interest in pursuing jihad against the Byzantines or the Franks as will be discussed below.

It will be argued here that the important aspect which distinguishes Kılıç Arslan is that during his reign the ideological bases for the Seljuq sultanate in Anatolia were laid down and that thereby the Seljuq principality in Anatolia was transformed into the Seljuq sultanate of Rum. The first part of this chapter will discuss the accession of Kılıç Arslan and the question of dynastic succession. The second part will analyse the epigraphic and chronological evidence to draw a picture of the ideology of the Rum Seljuq sultanate as it was laid down under Kılıç Arslan. The questions to be asked here are which ideological concepts were available to Kılıç Arslan, which of these concepts were adopted and why. This part attempts also to highlight the gap

²⁸⁷ Cf. Runciman, *Crusades*, II, 412-413; C. M. Brand, *Byzantium confronts the West 1180-1204*, Harvard 1968, 16; Vryonis, *Decline*, 120-129; P. Magdalino, *The empire of Manuel I Komnenos 1143-1180*, Cambridge 1993, 96-99, (hereafter cited as Magdalino, *Manuel*); M. Angold, *The Byzantine empire 1025-1204. A political history*, London/New York 1984, 223, (hereafter cited as Angold, *Byzantine Empire*); R.-J. Lilie, Die Schlacht von Myriokephalon (1176). Auswirkungen auf das byzantinische Reich im ausgehenden 12. Jahrhundert, in: *REB* 35 (1977), 257-275; The most recent and best analysis of the battle of Manzikert with a very useful chapter on the battle of Myriokephalon is given by Carole Hillenbrand, *Manzikert*, 153-166.

between the ideology which was employed to justify and legitimise Kılıç Arslan's authority and the political realities of his rule. The third part will discuss the relationship between Kılıç Arslan and his main rivals Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin and concentrate especially on the ideological warfare between these rulers.

Consolidation of the dynasty

The Muslim sources contain almost no data on Kılıç Arslan's reign and thus we depend on Christian authors, especially Michael the Syrian (d. 1199), the Armenian author Gregory the Priest (d. 1162), and the Byzantine author Nicetas Choniates (d. 1215/16) for information on this ruler. All three chroniclers were contemporaries of Kılıç Arslan and the first two resided within the Rum Seljuq realm. Therefore their accounts, though written from the point of view of outsiders, give us valuable insights into the workings of the Seljuq polity in Anatolia. Gregory the Priest describes the events before and immediately after Mas'ūd's death as follows:

“Falling sick the sultan summoned his son Kiliç Arslan and, descending from the throne, prostrated himself before his son in the presence of the important personages of his court. He placed his crown on Kiliç Arslan's head and then expired, leaving his son all his vast territories. This occurred in the year 604 of the Armenian era [1155-1156]. The [deceased] sultan also had two other sons, one of whom was generous to all and had a more comely face than his brother the sultan. The sultan began to think that perhaps this brother did not agree with him, and so he feared him; moreover his brother's body had a stronger build than his. Encouraged by certain people, one night during a time of feasting and merriment, the sultan strangled and killed his brother. His youngest brother for a time submitted to him like a beloved son but [later], out of fear of him, fled to his own fortified towns of Gangra and Ankara and never again saw his brother. Not only did Kiliç Arslan kill his brother, but also many of the important personages of his court, as well as some emirs, his father's chief minister Paghtain, and his father's khati.”²⁸⁸

This passage is the earliest extant account describing a dynastic succession and ceremony under the Seljuqs in Anatolia. For the establishment and continuous rule of a dynasty the power structure had to be clarified so that authority could be transmitted easily from one generation to another. Mas'ūd seems to have been the first Seljuq leader in Anatolia who aimed to establish dynastic continuity as he determined his heir in his lifetime. Gregory the Priest indicates that the reigning

²⁸⁸ Matthew of Edessa, Continuation by Gregory the Priest, Dostourian, 265.

sultan Mas'ūd had three sons but without giving any explanation he writes that he chose Kılıç Arslan as his successor. Kılıç Arslan seems to have been the eldest son but the reason why he was chosen was most probably because his father saw in him the most able candidate.²⁸⁹ According to our author, Mas'ūd prostrated himself before his son Kılıç Arslan in the presence of his court and crowned him. We are not informed if this was the general procedure of succession under the Seljuqs in Anatolia and we have no confirmation in the Muslim sources that such a ceremony took place or any other independent evidence that Mas'ūd had a throne and a crown. As the author does not describe the throne and crown in any detail it seems more likely that he uses these terms as paraphrases for the ruler's authority. It seems unlikely that the Rum Seljuqs had a throne or crown at this time.²⁹⁰ What is important to note is that the author emphasises that the "important personages of his court" were present which shows that the officials played an important role in the election of the new sultan and could not be ignored. The author does not state if the officials took the oath of allegiance but he implies that the sultan demonstrated his allegiance to his chosen heir and thus obliged his officials to accept his decision.

It is evident from Gregory's account that different factions existed when he writes that Kılıç Arslan especially feared one of his brothers because of his physical beauty and strength. The author implies that Kılıç Arslan did not possess these qualities and furthermore that his brother was also more popular among the people as he was "generous to all." For these reasons the author argues that Kılıç Arslan "encouraged by certain people" did kill his brother and his important courtiers, as well as his father's vizier and the *qādī*. The courtiers in Konya apparently did not approve of Kılıç Arslan as sultan, probably because they feared that they could not

²⁸⁹ Kılıç Arslan held the town Elbistan as appanage and had accompanied his father on his campaigns and had proven to be a good political and military leader. Michael the Syrian notes: "A cette époque Josselin, dans un esprit détestable, se montra l'allié de Kildj-Arclan, fils de Mas'oud, qui était seigneur d'Ablaistain [Elbistan] et du pays. Celui-ci fit venir son père, et ils mirent le siège contre Mar'as, après avoir pillé la région". Michael the Syrian, Chabot, III, 290.

²⁹⁰ Even Ibn Bībī, the Rum Seljuq chronicler who usually indulges in long descriptions eulogising the Rum Seljuq sultans, does not give detailed descriptions of throne and crown and uses them mainly as paraphrases for authority. See K. Erdmann, *Ibn Bībī als Kunsthistorische Quelle*, İstanbul 1962, 5-6. Hitherto neither Turkish nor western historians have paid much attention to such questions as to the role of symbols of power. Cahen made merely the following general assumption about throne and crown, without giving any specific details as to their physical constructions or when they were introduced by the Rum Seljuqs: "The sovereign had a throne, which was slightly elevated. For special ceremonies he had a kind of crown, but ordinarily wore a large turban." Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 220.

exert influence on him and therefore conspired with his brother's officials and were killed. The drastic measures taken by Kılıç Arslan show that the Rum Seljuq officials, the military administrators, as well as the religious authorities, played a decisive role as sultan makers and that they exerted great influence on the government in general. The reason why officials could win such great influence is connected with the Seljuq concept of rule.

The ancient Turkish concept of familial sovereignty which the Great Seljuqs were not able to ignore and which eventually led to the disintegration of their empire still persisted under the Rum Seljuqs. This tradition of rule by the family rather than by an individual monarch facilitated the fragmentation of power as each male member of the royal family was granted a province as appanage. Gregory writes that Mas'ūd left all his vast territories to Kılıç Arslan but at the same time it is evident that the realm had been divided among his sons when he notes that Kılıç Arslan's youngest brother "fled to his own fortified towns." The Byzantine author Choniates writes:

"As he was about to depart this life and go on to the tortures of the next because of his impiety, he distributed among some of his sons the cities and provinces as their paternal inheritance; the metropolis of Ikonion and all that was subject to it he assigned to his son Kilij Arslan. To his son-in-law Yaghi-Basan, he allotted Amaseia, Ankara, the fertile province of Cappadocia, and all the adjacent lands of these cities; and to his son-in-law Dhū'l Nūn, he portioned out the great and prosperous cities of Kaisereia and Sebasteia."²⁹¹

Choniates confirms that a division of the realm took place, but what is interesting is that Mas'ūd's rivals the Danishmendid princes, as son-in-laws, were also granted appanages. It is not unusual that Seljuq son-in-laws were granted provinces but the Dānismendid princes were not suzerains of Mas'ūd as they had inherited these territories from their ancestor and did not regard the Rum Seljuq ruler as their overlord. Both accounts imply that a succession regulation was in place and that there was no succession struggle. The accounts given by Michael the Syrian and Ibn al-Qalānisī reveal that Kılıç Arslan's accession was immediately followed by a succession struggle and warfare with the Dānismendid princes.²⁹² Moreover, the

²⁹¹ H.J. Magoulias, *O City of Byzantium Annals of Niketas Choniates*, Detroit 1984, 66, (hereafter cited as Choniates, Magoulias).

²⁹² Ibn al-Qalānisī was not well informed about these events as he confuses the Seljuq princes with the Danishmendid princes but the following passage reveals that Kılıç Arslan II was opposed by his

question of family rule was never resolved and hence the Seljuqs in Anatolia like their Great Seljuq cousins were never able to regulate the succession. At the death of each ruler, therefore, the succession had to be decided anew.

The Christian authors assume that a rule existed probably because they reflect their own traditions onto the Rum Seljuqs. In this respect it is interesting that Choniates underlines that Kılıç Arslan, who was designated as sultan was bestowed with the “metropolis Ikonion [Konya]”. For the Byzantines who regarded their state as the Empire of Rome the capital Constantinople, the ‘New Rome’, was synonymous with the empire and whoever held the capital was emperor.²⁹³ Thus it is not surprising that the Byzantine author Choniates points out that the heir to the throne received the capital Konya. However at this time Konya was not yet the ‘metropolis’ it would become later and it was never to play a role like Constantinople. Nevertheless, it is evident that at the beginning of Kılıç Arslan’s reign Konya had become the centre of the realm and that the member of the Rum Seljuq family who held the town was regarded as the ‘sultan’ who was the nominal overlord of the other members of the family who ruled over their respective provinces semi-independently.

It can thus be concluded that when Kılıç Arslan took over power, the Seljuqs in Anatolia had evolved from a principality into a ‘state’ with a developed court and capital. Konya was regarded as the seat of a new dynasty, the dynasty of the Rum Seljuqs or ‘the House’ of Sulaymān b. Kutalmış b. Arslan Isrā’īl b. Seljuq.

At the time when Kılıç Arslan came to power, the dominant ideological concepts for rulership were the Perso-Islamic ideology and the jihad ideology. Kılıç Arslan did not commission a treatise where his ideology is elaborated but we have a

brothers and the Danishmendids: “In the month aforementioned, news arrived from Aleppo of the outbreak of strife between the sons of the king Mas ‘ud [son of Qilij Arslān] after this death, the sons of Qutulmish, and the sons of Qilij Arslān, and that al-Malik al- ‘Adil Nūr al-Dīn, lord of Damascus and Aleppo, intervened between them in order to promote peace and reconciliation and to warn them against a dispute which would strengthen their Greek and Frankish enemies and embolden them to attack the Muslim fortress. Ibn al- Qalānīsī, Gibb, 324. Michael the Syrian writes: “En l’année 1466 {1154}, mourut Mas’oud, sultan d’Iconium, et il eut pour successeur son fils Kilidj-Arslān. Comme celui-ci pouvait à peine défendre son pays contre les princes de la famille de Danišmend, et surtout contre Ya’qoub-Arslan, Nour ed-Dīn marcha sur Pharzaman et ‘Aintab, et il s’empara de ces villes sans combat”. Michael the Syrian, Chabot, III, 312.

²⁹³ See Cyril Mango, *Byzantium. The Empire of New Rome*, London 1980. Mango’s work is the best account of the Byzantine attitude and ideology to date.

couple of monumental inscriptions and a series of coins containing his titulature from which the ideological concept can be deduced. The first of the inscriptions can be found on the pulpit (*minbar*) commissioned by Mas'ūd but set up by Kılıç Arslan. It includes dedicatory inscriptions to both rulers. This carved wooden *minbar* is the earliest known Rum Seljuq work of art and according to the foundation inscription it was finished in 550/1155.²⁹⁴ It was most probably constructed for the mosque of Mas'ūd and was placed later in the Alā al-Dīn Kay Kubad mosque which was built in the same place but some sixty-four years later in 616/1219.²⁹⁵ Kılıç Arslan's inscription is not dated and there are no indications in the literary sources as to when his inscription was added and where the *minbar* was located during his reign but it was added probably soon after his accession.

The *minbar* was a central piece in the mosque from which the *khatībs* delivered the Friday sermon, the *khutba*. An integral part of the *khutba* was the formal mention of the ruler's name and thus it was a public statement that demonstrated the position and authority of the ruler. The *minbar* and the mosque itself were important if not the most essential symbols of sovereignty for a Muslim ruler in this period.²⁹⁶ Hence the *minbar* with its inscriptions served as an instrument of propaganda, as every male Muslim of the area would have attended the Friday sermon. The *minbar* was built for the mosque in Konya and hence the audiences targeted were the administrative classes within the Rum Seljuq sultanate who were literate. It could, however, also reach a wider audience as the phrases generally used in the epigraphy were well-known so that every remotely literate worshipper would have been able to understand them. The existence of Mas'ūd's *minbar* with its inscriptions proves that the Seljuqs in Anatolia had reached a point where they regarded themselves as Muslim sovereigns.

It should be noted here, however, that Kılıç Arslan II's inscription comprises several lines more and is far more ambitious than the inscription of his father who

²⁹⁴ Cf. Löytved, *Konia*, 23; *RCEA*, No. 3200, vol. VIII, 37; O. Aslanapa, *Turkish Art and Architecture*, New York/ Washington, 1971, 107.

²⁹⁵ Cf. Löytved, *Konia*, 22; Aslanapa, *Turkish Art and Architecture*, 109.

²⁹⁶ The symbolic function of the *minbar* has so far not received much scholarly attention, except for two works dealing with the Umayyad period Carl H. Becker, *Vom Werden und Wesen der islamischen Welt*, Leipzig 1924, 450-471; Jean Sauvaget, *La Mosquée omeyyade de Médine*, Paris 1947, 139-144; For a brief outline see R. Hillenbrand, *Islamic Architecture*, Edinburgh 1994, 46-48.

had commissioned the monument in the first place. Kılıç Arslan II is styled in the inscription as follows:

“The mighty sultan, the greatest King of Kings, lord of the sultans of the Arabs and Persians, possessor of the neck of the nations, glory of the world and religion, pillar of Islam and the Muslims, pride of kings and sultans, helper of the truth by proofs, killer of the infidels and the polytheists, aid of the warriors of *jihād*, guardian of the lands of God, protector of the servants of God, supporter of the caliph of God, sultan of the countries of Rum, Armenia, the Franks and Syria, Abu’l-Fath Qilij Arslan b. Mas’ūd, son of Qilij Arslan, helper of the Commander of the Faithful, may God make his rule endure and his power doubled”²⁹⁷.

This inscription can be described as a compact formulation of Kılıç Arslan’s ideology and image. Three points spring out immediately, first the Perso-Islamic orientation expressed through the Muslim and Persian titles of sovereignty, second the absence of Turkish titles except for the Turkish name of the sultan, and third the inclusion of a range of *jihad* titles. Kılıç Arslan was using the ideology employed under the Great Seljuqs and the ideology of his main Muslim opponent Nūr al-Dīn to legitimise his rule. A series of titles expressing the ruler’s sovereignty and legitimacy used by the Great Seljuqs are adopted in Kılıç Arslan’s inscription. The first titles claimed are mighty sultan, *sultan al-mu’azzam* and king of kings, *shāhānshāh*. The Persian idea of supreme kingship expressed by the title *shāhānshāh* had been introduced by the Buyids and was taken over by the Great Seljuqs but the Arabic title sultan bestowed by the Abbasid caliph on the Great Seljuqs was the more accepted term expressing supreme rule.²⁹⁸ However, the title *shāhānshāh* remained in use as part of the sultan’s honorifics and was also used as a proper name. The claim to overlordship is then reinforced through the claims that the Rum Seljuq is the “lord of the sultans of the Arabs and Persians” and the “pride of the kings and sultans.” With the death of the Great Seljuq sultan Malik Shāh the title sultan receded in importance, as it was assumed by several rulers at the same time. The titles used in this inscription imply that a hierarchy of Muslim sultans was in place and that Kılıç Arslan II was the supreme sultan. The adjective ‘mighty’ is probably used to elevate the status of the Rum Seljuq sultan over that of his rivals, especially his Turkish rivals in Anatolia and northern Syria. These rulers were reluctant to accept the Rum

²⁹⁷ As translated by Hillenbrand, *Manzikert*, 161; see also German translation by Löytved, *Konia*, 23.

²⁹⁸ See L. Richter-Bernburg, Amīr-Malik-Shāhānshāh: ‘Adud Ad-Daula’s Titulature Re-examined, in: *Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies*, 18 (1980), 83.

Seljuqs as heirs to the Great Seljuqs and the transfer of supreme leadership of the Great Seljuqs to the Rum Seljuqs. Even the principalities in Anatolia, such as the Saltukids of Erzurum, for example, preferred to recognise what had remained of the Great Seljuqs in Iran as their overlords expressing their allegiance to those on their coins.²⁹⁹ The purpose for the employment of the titles used previously by the Great Seljuqs was to demonstrate that the imperial status, held up to then by the Great Seljuq sultans, was transferred to the Rum Seljuq sultan Kılıç Arslan even though there was still a Seljuq who reigned in Iran.³⁰⁰ The inscriptions on Kılıç Arslan's coins propagate the same image of the great Muslim sultan. The title on the couple of dinars and several dirhams extant is *sulṭān al-mu'azzam*.³⁰¹ It might be accident of survival but the earliest coin of Kılıç Arslan II is a dirham minted in Konya in 571/1175 and a dinar from the year 573/1178, one year after the battle of Myriokephalon. On both of these coins Kılıç Arslan is styled as the great sultan and on the dinar the name of the caliph al-Mustadī' (r. 566-575/1170-1180) is added.³⁰² There is no extant evidence of an investiture by the caliph which can help us to ascertain the date when exactly Kılıç Arslan was recognised officially as sultan. It seems probable that the title was first self-assumed and that he was probably invested with the title after 1175 but which territories were officially recognised as under his rule is not clear. Muslim authors designate him as the prince ruling over towns or regions of Rum, Anatolia.

The titles "protector of the dar al-Islam" and helper of the "caliph" are used to present Kılıç Arslan as loyal supporter of the Abbasid caliph who in theory remained the supreme ruler of all Muslims. Thus the idea of the sultan as the guardian of Islam who lends military support to the caliph formulated under the Great Seljuqs was taken over by the Rum Seljuqs as the role of the caliph as guarantor of legitimacy was still significant. In addition to this, might of force is plainly used to legitimise power through the designation of Kılıç Arslan as

²⁹⁹ Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 107.

³⁰⁰ Tughril III b. Arslan (Shāh), (571-590/ 1176-94)

³⁰¹ Güler, *Selçuklu Sikkeleri*, 49-52.

³⁰² See Güler, *Selçuklu Sikkeleri*, 50; Aykut, *Selçuklu Sikkeleri*, 190-191.

“possessor of the neck of nations” and the *Abu’l-fath*, father of conquest. Strangely, however, Kılıç Arslan does not seem to have used this on his coins.³⁰³

These titles are the same as those employed by the Great Seljuq sultans, however, the territories claimed to be under Rum Seljuq rule are different and the addition of jihad titles is new. The main rivals for the Great Seljuq sultans were two Shi’i dynasties, the Buyids and Fatimids and thus a central claim in Great Seljuq ideology was that they were the supreme rulers and defenders of Sunni Islam. This was expressed especially through the title bestowed on them by the Sunni Abbasid caliph expressing the claim that they were kings of the east and west, *malik al-mashriq wa al-maghrib*.³⁰⁴ Thus, without an explicit reference to the Great Seljuqs, a dynastic connection with the Great Seljuq house is implied to emphasize the noble lineage of the Rum Seljuqs.

The territorial aspirations of Kılıç Arslan are listed and include the towns of “Rum, Armenia, the Franks, and Syria.” This claim is striking in two respects, one the inclusion of all Christian territories of the region, though the Byzantine Empire is not referred to directly. The use of the term Rum attests that from Kılıç Arslan’s reign onwards the Seljuqs in Anatolia regarded themselves as the Rum Seljuqs and hence claimed to be successors to the Byzantine Empire. Second, the specific mention of “the Franks” and the inclusion of Syria, which was mainly ruled by Kılıç Arslan’s Muslim rivals Nūr al-Dīn and then Saladin expresses a territorial and ideological supremacy over these rulers. In reality, however, neither Nūr al-Dīn nor Saladin regarded Kılıç Arslan as their suzerain but contested his claims, as will be shown below. Therefore the use of jihad epithets was most probably part of the ideological warfare among them rather than Kılıç Arslan’s warfare against the Franks. Another point which can be derived from the ambitious claims made by Kılıç Arslan is that his inscription might have been placed on the *minbar* after he had firmly established himself in Anatolia and was contesting power in Syria against Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin.

³⁰³ The title appears however nearly always on coins of Kılıç Arslan II’s successors. J.-C. Hinrichs, ‘Sultan und Kalif auf Münzen der Seldschuken Anatoliens’, in: *Les Seldjoukides d’Anatolie*, G. Leiser (ed.), Paris 2006, 346.

³⁰⁴ *RCEA*, VII, 247 (inscription no 2775).

The second inscription for Kılıç Arslan can be found on the mausoleum which he built to commemorate his father.³⁰⁵ According to Ibn Bībī it included the tombs of Kılıç Arslan II, his father Mas'ūd I and of his successors Kay Khusraw I and Sulayman II.

“It has been commanded by the Great Sultan, Glory of the world and the Religion and the Pillar of Islam and the Muslims, Glory of the kings and the sultans, destroyer of the unbelievers, Sultan of the lands of Rum and Syria, the victorious Kılıç Arslan, son of Mas'ūd, son of Kılıç Arslan, the Helper of the Caliph. God has promised him ...”³⁰⁶

In contrast to the first inscription here, it is not the title *shāhānshāh* which is used to claim supreme leadership but the title “Great Sultan of the world”, and among the lands under the sultan’s overlordship Armenia and the Frankish territories are not mentioned. The mausoleum is the only extant monument commissioned by Kılıç Arslan and there is no evidence that he commissioned any other secular or religious buildings. We can only speculate why he did not have a more extensive building project. He might have regarded such a project only as secondary to his military campaigns he undertook to expand and consolidate his power. Be that as it may, the building of the mausoleum is significant. So far, scholars have not discussed in any detail what role the mausoleum played under the Turks but a hypothesis which could be drawn here is that it was the rendition of a princely Turkish tent and in the case of the Seljuqs it seems to have been regarded as the symbol of subjugating territory.³⁰⁷ Kılıç Arslan initiated construction of Konya as capital and that the development of Konya into the administrative and fiscal centre was started under his rule.

³⁰⁵ The Mausoleum is part of the complex in Konya including the tower, which had originally been a Byzantine church, the Ala ad-Dīn mosque, the mausoleum, the *masjid*, and the castle tower. For a drawing of the complex see Löytved, *Konya*, 21. According to the inscription on the *masjid* regarding the building of the *masjid* and mausoleum, they were built in 616/1219. However, as Löytved suggests, most probably there was an original mausoleum built by Kılıç Arslan II and the later one from 1219 was built at its place. Löytved, *Konya*, 27.

³⁰⁶ Löytved, *Konya*, 28.

³⁰⁷ The origins, role, and forms of the mausoleum in Islam are discussed by R. Hillenbrand, *Islamic Architecture*, 254-307.

When we compare the way how Kılıç Arslan II is presented by the Rum Seljuq authors, Aksarayi and the anonymous author, who both wrote under the Mongol protectorate in the 14 th century, then the gap between ideology and political reality becomes evident. The narratives of these authors indicate that Kılıç Arslan II's main goal was not the foundation of a Perso-Islamic state or to wage *jihad* but to unite all Turkish held territories in Anatolia under his leadership. For this reason Kılıç Arslan first secured his position internally and then turned his attention to his main Turkish rivals, the Dānīshmendids. The Rum Seljuq chronicler Aksarayi aptly reveals Kılıç Arslan's policy of aggression towards the Dānīshmendids. Even though this author devotes more space to Kılıç Arslan II's reign than to the reigns of the other Rum Seljuq rulers, he does not present the sultan as ideal Muslim ruler and most strikingly he does not even mention his great victory over the Christian Byzantines at Myriocephalon. Our author sees no need to justify the attack on the fellow Muslim and admits even that Kılıç Arslan II specifically for the conquest of Dānīshmendid towns fortified Aksaray³⁰⁸.

"The weakness of the dynasty of the Danishmendids increased Izz al-Dīn Kılıç Arslan's desire to seize their realm. He succeeded in taking Kayseri and Sivas and forced Yağıbasan's grandson from his daughter malik Dhu'l-Nūn, who was ill and paralyzed, to flee to Niksar. Dhu'l-Nūn sent an envoy to his father-in-law malik Adil Nur al-Dīn asking him for help. Nur al-Dīn send with his emir Fahrūddīn Abdulmasīh 3000 men and the Syrians re-conquered Kayseri and Sivas. Fahrūddīn Abdulmasīh had been ordered to stay in Sivas until Kılıç Arslan turned back. He stayed there till the death of malik Adil. Kılıç Arslan however did not give up his plan to annex the land of the Danishmend and because of this wish he founded Aksaray where he remained for a long time. Fahrūddīn Abdulmasīh turned back to Syria when hearing about malik Nur al-Dīn's death and Kılıç Arslan immediately attacked Kayseri from Aksaray and took this place. Malik Dhu'l-Nūn fell ill because of this and fleeing to Niksar died there.

When Dhu'l-Nūn died his son Ismail succeeded him but he was only a minor with a weak mind. Kılıç Arslan making promises to the Danishmendid emirs won them over and led them to kill Ismail and thus he annexed the Danishmendid state and extended the realm of the Seljuqs"³⁰⁹.

This account shows how the inter-Muslim struggle dominated the actions of Kılıç Arslan II and his Muslim Turkish neighbours. The author states that Nūr al-Dīn the ruler over Syria interfered and forced Kılıç Arslan to retreat from Dānīshmendid

³⁰⁸ The Turkish historian Osman Turan states that Kılıç Arslan built Aksaray also as a base for *jihad* and that therefore bad people as well as Greeks and Armenians were not allowed into the town. However, he gives no other evidence to prove his thesis. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 233.

³⁰⁹ Aksarayi, Gençosman, 126-127; Aksarayi, İşıltan, 39-40.

territory and underlines that despite this setback the Seljuq leader did not give up his plan. After the death of the Dānismendid prince he subdued his territories. Aksarayi mentions here only the main incidents of the prolonged warfare between the Rum Seljuq ruler and his Dānishmendid counterparts but it seems that Kılıç Arslan II's reign was dominated by the struggle with the Dānishmendids in Anatolia and the counter crusaders in northern Syria. The Byzantine author Choniates confirms Kılıç Arslan's preoccupation with the Dānishmendids when he remarks that he did not even recoil to attack a coreligionist:

“Nor did he hold back from Melitene. Determined to depose its emir, he disregarded the fact that he was a coreligionist, and having no charge of injury to bring against the man, he openly contrived an accusation after which the emir was indicated and expelled”³¹⁰.

The pattern of Kılıç Arslan's expansions confirms that his aim was to control the Turkish held territories in central and eastern Anatolia and to expand eastwards into Syria. The foundation of the fortress of Aksaray and probably a caravansaray a short distance from it supports this suggestion³¹¹. Kılıç Arslan's constant efforts to acquire the strategically important town Malatya reveal that territorial and economic interests dominated his policies. The same is true for the other Muslim rulers as well as the Christian rulers of the region. Kılıç Arslan, the Dānishmendids, Nūr al-Dīn, and Saladin, on one hand and the Byzantines and the Franks on the other were anxious to establish themselves in urban centres and especially to extend their power over those towns lying on important trade routes. In fact all players were involved in a game of power politics which is confirmed by the pattern of alliances established in this period as for all parties the defence of territorial and economic interests played a greater part in policy making than the defence of religion. Most of the alliances concluded during this period were ephemeral and pragmatic alliances across the religious divide.

³¹⁰ Choniates, Magoulias, 69.

³¹¹ There are no remains extant of this caravansaray but it is mentioned in Ibn Bibi's work. See Turan, Selçuk Kervansarayları, in: *Belleter* 39 (1946), 476; In his report on the warfare between Rukn al-Din Kılıç Arslan and Izz al-Din Kay Kawus Ibn Bibi mentions a place he describes as the sultan's caravansaray and caravansaray of Kılıç Arslan. Ibn Bibi, Duda, 256; Ibn Bibi, Öztürk, II, 123. Öztürk translates the sentence in question wrongly as “They came to the side of sultan Kılıç Arslan”; K. Erdmann/H. Erdmann, *Das Anatolische Karavansaray Zweiter und Dritter Teil*, Berlin 1976, 115.

In contrast to Aksarayi the anonymous author claims that Kılıç Arslan was an exemplary Muslim ruler from the beginning of his reign and changes the chronology of events accordingly.

“At the beginning of his reign Kılıç Arslan founded Aksaray, karavansarays and market places. The tyranny of malik Dhu’l-Nūn in Kayseri had extended all bounds, he spent his time with drinking wine. The sultan marched with his army against Zunun and in 560 took Kayseri from him and seized all the fortresses of that province and put them under the command of his emirs”³¹².

The anonymous author claims that Kılıç Arslan founded the fortress Aksaray as well as caravansarais and market places already at the beginning of his reign. The fortification of Aksaray is presented as part of the sultan’s building project and divorced from his plan to conquer the Danishmendid territories. Furthermore the author claims that this conquest by Kılıç Arslan had a Muslim justification as the Danishmendid prince had stepped outside Islam. This is a retrospective legitimisation of the seizure of Muslim territory. Kılıç Arslan II was therefore only fulfilling his duties as a Perso-Islamic ruler. For this reason probably the anonymous author includes an account on the battle of Myriokephalon between the Byzantine Emperor Manuel and Kılıç Arslan into his narrative. Yet, the account is very brief and the author does not exploit the ideological potential of the battle³¹³.

“In 572/1177 the sultan received at Caesarea news that the Roman emperor Manuel wanted to attack the Muslim lands and that he was approaching him with his army at a distance of only a day from him. And that he had an infantry of seventy thousand archers, who had opened trenches at every stage and meeting no resistance took the way of ten miles and came to Iconium. The sultan selected 1700 cavalryman and struck the drums of war in the first night attacked the enemy. The infidels were routed till the morning and the sultan cut off the retreat route for the enemy. Left without hope Manuel sent Michael for intercession to the sultan and asked for mercy. Manuel left for his land after he obliged himself to a tribute of 100 thousand gold, 100 thousand silver dirhams, horses, broadcloth and et cetera. In the year 573/1178 on a Tuesday he [Kılıç Arslan] left for Malatya. The son of Dhu’l-Karnayn did not get on with his father. They surrendered the town to the *padishah* before he had reached it and the sultan entered Malatya. The Artukids in Diyarbakır read the *khutba* in the name of the sultan and the rulers of Amid from the house of the Nisanids came to kiss the sultan’s hand. The rulers of Erzurum and Erzincan submitted to the sultan. In short he dominated all regions. After thirty-nine years he left the dominion to his son Qutb al-Dīn and making him heir apparent sent him to Konya”³¹⁴.

³¹² Anonymous, Jalali, 81-82; Anonymous, Uzluk, 25.

³¹³ Cf. Hillenbrand, *Manzikert*, 155.

³¹⁴ Anonymous, Jalali, 82-83; Anonymous, Uzluk, 25-26.

The author's tone is sober without any triumphalism and Kılıç Arslan is not portrayed as *jihad* warrior. Most striking is that he does not even draw a comparison between the battle of Myriokephalon and the battle of Manzikert to connect Kılıç Arslan to the Great Seljuq sultan Alp Arslan and hence to underline his noble lineage. The author does not even use the battle as a specific occasion to celebrate Kılıç Arslan as a great warrior of *jihad* against the Christian Byzantine enemy. He merely states that Kılıç Arslan was attacked by the Byzantine emperor but that he was victorious and made the latter his tributary. This might be explained by the fact that this chronicle is brief and only lists the events known to the author for each sultan's reign without any elaborative characterisations of them or ideological concerns. On the other hand it seems more probable that the battle of Myriokephalon left no memory in Rum Seljuq history as the author did not have any detailed information on the battle and does not even mention Myriokephalon, the place of the decisive battle. Moreover, the anonymous Rum Seljuq chronicle is the only extant Muslim source which mentions the battle of Myriokephalon³¹⁵.

In this respect it is noteworthy that even Ibn Bibi, the author of the most extensive Rum Seljuq chronicle who starts his narrative with the year of Kılıç Arslan's death in 588/1092 does not include past events from the Great Seljuq history or the Rum Seljuq history to glorify the Rum Seljuq sultans even though he is fully aware of the importance of noble lineage. At some point in his work he links the Rum Seljuqs to their Great Seljuq ancestors Alp Arslan and Malik Shah but he fails to mention the battle of Manzikert or Myriokephalon. He puts the following words into the mouth of Kay Khusraw I said to the Byzantine emperor during his refuge in Constantinople: "You know that I am the son of Kılıç Arslan and that I am descendant from the house of Alp Arslan and Malik Shāh"³¹⁶. Medieval Muslim chroniclers writing outside Anatolia ignore the battle of Myriokephalon even those who celebrate the battle of Manzikert as a great Muslim victory against the Christian Byzantines³¹⁷. Ibn al-Athīr, who has some information on the Rum Seljuqs and is

³¹⁵ Cf. Hillenbrand, *Manzikert*, 154.

³¹⁶ Ibn Bibi, Duda, 28; Ibn Bibi, Öztürk, I, 71.

³¹⁷ For a complete list of the Muslim accounts on the battle of Manzikert from the twelfth up to the fifteenth century see Hillenbrand, *Manzikert*, 26-78.

usually well informed about events in the Muslim world in general and even beyond it, seems not to have had any information on this battle at his disposal³¹⁸. In any case the Muslim authors overlook Myriokephalon and do not draw a comparison between the two Seljuq victories which their Christian Byzantine counterparts on the other hand drew³¹⁹. The Muslim authors probably neglect Myriokephalon because as Carole Hillenbrand states, “the ongoing struggle between Islam and Christianity was a drama that, in their view, was now being played out not in distant Anatolia, as at Manzikert, but on Syrian, Egyptian and Palestinian soil against the Franks rather than the Byzantines”³²⁰.

The important question here is in how far Kılıç Arslan himself exploited his victory at Myriokephalon ideologically. It is difficult to give an answer however as there is only a single indication in the narrative sources that he used his victory for propagandistic ends. Michael the Syrian writes that Kılıç Arslan send out letters to the *amirs*, the caliph in Baghdad and the sultan of Khurasan to inform them of his victory over the Byzantines.

“Le sultan envoya à tous les émirs, au khalife de Bagdad et au sultan du Khorasan des esclaves, des servantes, des armes, et les têtes des Grecs et leurs chevelures au bout des lances, et ils les promenaient par les rues sur la croupe de leurs chevaux, en se réjouissant. Telle fut l’issue malheureuse de l’expédition de l’empereur des Grecs. Et qui ne confesserait rien n’arrive sur la terre sans le consentement d’en haut, selon des desseins impénétrables?”³²¹.

The usual procedure was that victories against the Christian enemy were reported to neighbouring rulers to demonstrate superiority and to the Abbasid caliph to gain his favour and legitimisation for the rule of newly conquered territories or those already acquired. These communications of victories to the caliph in Baghdad through *fath namahs* was a good opportunity to propagate the ruler’s status and

³¹⁸ This is particularly surprising since Ibn al-Athīr records the short warfare between Manuel and Kılıç Arslan II under the year 1173-1174, Miscellaneous events, which probably refers to Manuel’s attack following the rapprochement between Kılıç Arslan II and Nūr al-Dīn in 1173. “During this year the emperor of Byzantium crossed the Bosphorus and invaded the land of Qilij Arslān. Warfare ensued in which the Muslims were victorious. When the emperor saw his weakness, he returned home, after a large number of his army had been either killed or taken prisoner”. Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Crusading Period II*, 228.

³¹⁹ The view of the Byzantine sources will be discussed below in the chapter on the relations between the Rum Seljuqs and Byzantium.

³²⁰ C. Hillenbrand, *Manzikert*, 157.

³²¹ Michael the Syrian, Chabot, III, 372.

power. It would be surprising if Kılıç Arslan did not use his great victory over the Christian emperor to present himself as supreme ruler and *jihad* warrior despite the fact that during his reign the ideological warfare between him and his Muslim neighbours was at its height. But, Kılıç Arslan did not lead any major campaigns against Byzantium and in fact regarded the Byzantines as allies and concluded peace treaties with them. Kılıç Arslan's visit to Constantinople in 1162 is an often quoted example for his diplomatic genius to secure peace with Byzantium. The raids undertaken against Byzantine territory in western Anatolia and the coastal regions were undertaken by Turkmen bands which mainly operated independently.

It seems therefore safe to suggest that Kılıç Arslan might have not exploited his victory against the Byzantine emperor extensively because he had no interest in waging *jihad* against the latter. The war was enforced on him by the Byzantine emperor he had no interest in continuing warfare in the west against the Christians and wanted a free hand to turn his attention back towards the east. It is telling in this context that the anonymous author continues his narrative stating that the sultan took Malatya and that his Muslim neighbours regarded him as their overlord. He emphasises that the Artukids of Diyarbakır read the *khutba* in his name and that the rulers of Amid came to kiss the sultan's hand. The author reveals thereby that the submission of Muslim neighbours was far more important for Kılıç Arslan II than the struggle against the Christian enemy. It is evident that *jihad* was not a cornerstone of Kılıç Arslan's ideology and that political and economic concerns played a more decisive role as the next part of this chapter will confirm

Kılıç Arslan II and the 'Counter Crusaders'

Kılıç Arslan's seizure of Dānīshmendid territory in eastern Anatolia and his schemes for territories further east in Mesopotamia and northern Syria brought him into conflict with the so-called 'Counter Crusaders' Nūr al-Dīn and later Saladin. As the 'Counter Crusaders' for their part also had schemes for Mesopotamia and northern Syria it was inevitable that both sides would collide. The military warfare for supremacy between them was accompanied by an ideological warfare, as both sides

needed to legitimise their actions against each other. The following chapter will not concentrate on the military warfare between Kılıç Arslan and Nūr al-Dīn and later Saladin but on the ideological warfare. At the same time it is important to discuss which ideological concepts these rulers employed and why as this question has so far not been posed and discussed in any detail.³²²

Kılıç Arslan was the descendant of the rebellious line of the Great Seljuq dynasty which had usurped power in Anatolia as warlords. Hence the Rum Seljuq leader was in reality a warlord like the ‘Counter Crusaders’ but he was a member of the ‘House of Seljuq’ and hence of noble lineage. He was thus in a position to employ two ideological concepts, his noble lineage, and *jihad*. Because of his lineage he was able to claim to be a rightful Perso-Islamic ruler and heir to the Great Seljuq dynasty. Moreover, as direct neighbour of the Christian Byzantine enemy who had conquered new territory for Islam, Kılıç Arslan could claim to be a frontier warrior who safeguarded the *Dar al-Islam* from the Christian enemy. Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin in contrast were upstarts, the former was the son of the Zengi, a military slave commander of the Great Seljuqs and the latter was the nephew of Shirkuh, Nūr al-Dīn’s Kurdish lieutenant. Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin were aware of their lack of genealogy and thus an alternative ideology to legitimise their rule was formulated by their mainly Persian advisers. The most characteristic feature of this alternative ideology was the use of *jihad* which allegedly transformed these fierce war lords into champions of Sunni Islam and ‘Counter Crusaders’. Medieval Muslim chroniclers present both these rulers as military warlords who changed to pious Muslim rulers and thereby sidestep the question of their lineage.³²³ For the ‘Counter Crusaders’ *jihad* was very important as it was the only concept they could employ to legitimise

³²² Cahen in his work on the Rum Seljuqs, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, only very briefly narrates the conflict between the two Muslim rulers. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 105, 113-114; Lyons and Jackson in their book on Saladin and Köhler in his book *Allianzen und Verträge* mention in passing Kılıç Arslan in connection with Saladin’s *jihad* propaganda. Lyons/Jackson, *Saladin. The Politics of the Holy War*, Cambridge 1982, 144, 148, (hereafter cited as Lyons/Jackson, *Saladin*); M.A. Köhler, *Allianzen und Verträge zwischen fränkischen und islamischen Herrschern im Vorderen Orient Eine Studie über das zwischenstaatliche Zusammenleben vom 12. bis ins 13. Jahrhundert*, Berlin/ New York 1991, 318-320, (hereafter cited as Köhler, *Allianzen*); Modern Turkish scholars do not share the theory of *jihad* propaganda as related by modern western scholars and thus do not discuss this question. Turan in his book on the Rum Seljuqs briefly relates the warfare between Saladin and Kılıç Arslan II and concludes his assessment on the latter’s religious views stating that he was regarded by the Muslims as a fighter for Islam and a reformer of religion. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 211-213, 235.

³²³ Cf. C. Hillenbrand, *The Crusades Islamic Perspectives*, Edinburgh 1999, 134-145, 194, (hereafter cited as C. Hillenbrand, *Crusades*); EI2, Salāh al-Dīn, 910.

their usurpation of power. At the same time it was an instrument to mobilise Syrian troops and unite them under their leadership. For Kılıç Arslan, on the other hand, it was easier to legitimise his rule as a member of the Seljuq dynasty, who had conquered Christian territory and not Muslim territory. Besides, the influx of more and more Türkmen bands into Anatolia made it easier for him recruit soldiers. With the prerogative of imperial lineage on his side Kılıç Arslan had an ideological advantage and was in a position to denigrate the claims of his rivals Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin using their lack of genealogy against them.

The fact that the source material for Kılıç Arslan is not nearly as rich as for Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin makes it difficult to assess how far he used his ideological advantages against his Muslim rivals. Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin in turn employed 'Imād al-Dīn al-Işfāhānī (d. 597/ 1201), an important Persian scholar who served both rulers as scribe and adviser and also composed chronicles and a biography for Saladin.³²⁴ Saladin's adviser Bahā' al-Dīn ibn Shaddād (d. 632/ 1234) also wrote a biography of Saladin.³²⁵ Moreover, Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630/1233) covers not only the reigns of Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin in his universal history but also composed a dynastic history of the Zengids.³²⁶ Biographical accounts are "a most rare historiographical occurrence up to this period"³²⁷ and it is debatable how far they were initiated by Saladin himself. Nevertheless, it seems safe to suggest that Saladin, as well as Nūr al-Dīn, consciously supported the compilation of these works. That both rulers sponsored an extensive *jihād* literature and religious institutions and buildings indicates that *jihād* was a cornerstone of their ideology. Kılıç Arslan, in contrast to his rivals, neither sponsored any *jihād* literature nor extensive building projects presenting him as *jihād* warrior. Moreover, there are no works of history composed later which eulogize Kılıç Arslan: this shows that he was most probably not remembered as an important *jihād* fighter.

Two points have to be therefore considered here. First, the richness of the source material for Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin but the lack of source material for Kılıç Arslan implies that *jihād* was not an integral part of his ideology and mentality. Second, it should be kept in mind that the sources for the Counter Crusaders are

³²⁴ Cf. C. Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, 171; eadem., *Non-Greek Sources*, 313-314, 334.

³²⁵ Cf. C. Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, 171; eadem., *Non-Greek Sources*, 331.

³²⁶ Cf. C. Hillenbrand, *Non-Greek Sources*, 315-316.

³²⁷ C. Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, 171.

highly partisan and thus should be used with caution in respect to the information they give on Kılıç Arslan. The lack of documents of diplomatic exchange that were composed for these rulers makes it difficult to double check the information provided in these biased sources.

As has been discussed above, Kılıç Arslan concentrated his military efforts on the submission of the Anatolian territories held by fellow-Muslim Turkish rulers and the consolidation of his power over Anatolia. He was not much concerned with leading jihad against Byzantium or supporting the *jihad* against the Crusaders and Frankish rulers and he maintained for the greatest part of his reign good relations with Byzantium. Kılıç Arslan did not use his great victory over Manuel at Myriokephalon to crush the weakened Byzantine empire. Indeed it seems that Kılıç Arslan, not only showed little interest in fighting the Christians but, he also did not see any great need for jihad propaganda. This is surprising when one considers that he was the direct neighbour of the Christians and that a precedent for such propaganda existed. Already under the Hamdanids *jihad* propaganda had been used to encourage the Muslims against the Christian Byzantines. But, as Carole Hillenbrand points out, *jihad* propaganda in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries became focused on Syria, the main battlefield against the Crusaders.³²⁸

Zengi, and not the Rum Seljuqs, was the first Muslim ruler to use jihad propaganda in the war against the Crusaders.³²⁹ Nur al-Dīn, the son and successor of Zengi continued his father's legacy and established an extensive propaganda machine. Both rulers sponsored extensive building projects with many inscriptions sometimes of colossal size placed on them to promote their official ideology.³³⁰ Here the personal religious piety of Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin is emphasized describing them as ascetic and pious *mujahid* warriors on the one hand and as just legitimate rulers on the other hand. Furthermore, in order to establish himself as the 'just king', Nūr al-Dīn introduced a new institution, the *Dār al-'adl* or Palace of Justice here he sat in

³²⁸ Cf. C. Hillenbrand, 'Jihad Propaganda in Syria from the Time of the First Crusade until the death of Zengi: The Evidence of Monumental Inscriptions', in: *The Frankish wars and their Influence on Palestine*, K. Athamina/ R. Heacock (eds.), 1994, 63.

³²⁹ See C. Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, 101,103. In an inscription at Aleppo dated 537/August 11142 Zengi is called 'tamer of the infidels and the polytheists, leader of those who fight the Holy War, helper of the armies, protector of the territory of the Muslims'. C. Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, 111.

³³⁰ Monuments such as the high towering minarets sponsored by Nūr al-Dīn for example carried a message. They demonstrated the triumph of Islam over Christianity; cf. C. Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, 129.

person with Muslim jurists and judges to listen to the petitions of his subjects.³³¹ In the first years of his reign Nūr al-Dīn build the *Dār al-'adl* in Aleppo and one in Damascus in 1163. Accordingly, the titles used by Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin emphasised their dedication to *jihad*, their affirmation of Sunni orthodoxy and their establishment of justice.³³²

Kılıç Arslan II and Nūr al-Dīn

Kılıç Arslan's accession was accompanied by the usual Seljuq succession struggle but he had been appointed by his father as he was obviously the strongest candidate and ruthlessly wiped out the internal opposition immediately. He could, however, not easily rid himself of the external opposition of the Dānīshmendid ruler Yağbasan and his supporter Nūr al-Dīn. Both these rulers regarded the prospect of a strong Seljuq ruler in Anatolia as a threat to their power. Kılıç Arslan's objective in bringing all Turkish-held Anatolian territories under his control threatened the very existence of the Dānīshmendid polity. On the other, hand it would inevitably lead to a clash with Nūr al-Dīn who aimed to bring the Syrian territories under his control.³³³ Hence the northern Syrian territories were disputed territories between Kılıç Arslan and Nūr al-Dīn alike and the Euphrates became the natural frontier between the two powers.

When Kılıç Arslan acceded to the throne, Nūr al-Dīn was already in office for a decade. He had established his power over most of Syria and now possessed great military strength. More importantly, Nūr al-Dīn had extended the propaganda machine founded under his father and he claimed to be the real champion of Islam and warrior for the faith, despite the fact that he had up to then mainly directed his military activities against fellow-Muslims, and not the Franks or Byzantines. He justified his actions against fellow-Muslims by claiming that he had to force union on

³³¹ Cf. Holt, *Crusades*, 73; cf. C. Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, 127f.

³³² For a discussion of Nūr al-Dīn's titulature see Y. Tabbaa, 'Monuments with a Message: Propagation of Jihād under Nūr al-Dīn (1146-1174)', in: *The Meeting of Two Worlds Cultural exchange between East and West during the Period of the Crusades*, ed. V.P. Goss, Michigan 1986, 223-240.

³³³ Cf. *EI2*, Nūr al-Dīn Mahmūd b. Zankī (Elisséeff).

the unwilling princes of Syria for the jihad against the Franks. The main objective for both sides seems to have been to secure their power over Muslim territories, Kılıç Arslan in Anatolia and Nūr al-Dīn in Syria. Thus they used every opportunity to interfere in the affairs of the other in order to expand their territories and to extend their sphere of influence. Each side was even prepared to ally with Christians against the other. Nūr al-Dīn renewed his treaty with the Crusader state of Jerusalem and concluded another with Antioch to have a free hand and to make use of the dispute between Kılıç Arslan and Yağribasan. Under the pretext of protecting the latter against the former he invaded Seljuq territories in eastern Anatolia and northern Syria. The Syrian chronicler Ibn al-Qalānisī reports the clash between Kılıç Arslan and Nūr al-Dīn under the year 550/1155-56 stating first the following:

“In the month aforementioned, news arrived from Aleppo of the outbreak of strife between the sons of the king Mas‘ud [son of Qilij Arslān] after this death, the sons of Qutulmish, and the sons of Qilij Arslān, and that al-Malik al-‘Ādil Nūr al-Dīn, lord of Damascus and Aleppo, intervened between them in order to promote peace and reconciliation and to warn them against a dispute which would strengthen their Greek and Frankish enemies and embolden them to attack the Muslim fortress. He put out all his efforts to this end with admirable mediation and lavish gifts and gratifications, and peace was restored between them.”³³⁴

Our author is obviously partial towards Nūr al-Dīn and claims that he acted as mediator between the Seljuqs in Anatolia in order to avoid a Christian attack on the Muslims. Despite the presentation of Nūr al-Dīn as the defender of Islam who sought reconciliation between the Muslim powers the author continues his report stating that he attacked Kılıç Arslan’s territories:

“In the month of Ramadān (began 9th October), further news arrived that al-Malik al-‘Ādil Nūr al-Dīn had descended with his ‘askar upon the territories belonging to the King Qilij Arslān, son of the King Mas‘ud [b. Qilij-Arslān] b. Sulaimān b. Qutulmish, king of Qūniya and the neighbouring lands, and had captured a number of its castles and fortresses by the sword and by capitulation. ... The king Qilij Arslān and his two brothers, Dhu’l-Nūn and Dūlāb (?), were engaged in warfare with the sons of al-Dānishmand”. “It fell out that the sons of the King Mas‘ūd were sustained with Divine aid against the sons of al-Dānishmand and granted victory over their forces in a battle fought near a place known as Āqsarā in Sha‘bān 550 (began 30th September). When Qilij Arslān returned and learned of the action of al-Malik al-‘Ādil Nūr al-Dīn in his lands, he considered it a detestable outrage in view of the treaty terms, truce, and marriage relations which existed between them, and wrote letters to him in a tone of censure, reprobation, menaces and threats. Nūr al-Dīn replied to him with

³³⁴ Ibn al-Qalānisī, Gibb, 324.

polite excuses and smooth words, and the situation between them remained unchanged on this footing.”³³⁵

The second part of the report seems to be a more realistic version of the events and is confirmed by the Anatolian Christian authors Michael the Syrian and Gregory the Priest. While Ibn al-Qalānisī fails to mention the alliances both Muslim rulers concluded with the Christians Gregory the Priest does include this aspect to demonstrate the corrupt character of the Muslim rulers. He writes that Kılıç Arslan II while on the campaign against the Dānishmendids was informed of the invasion of Nūr al-Dīn and returned to his lands and,

“deliberated with the high officials of his court about strengthening the peace he had made with the Franks and Armenians. Obtaining their assent in this matter the sultan once again sent his trusted envoys to Jerusalem, Antioch and to T’oros in order to conclude an unqualified peace treaty consented to by both sides. All this was not the result of the natural inclinations of the sultan’s heart, for what has Christ in common with Belial? Now the reason [for the sultan’s actions] was [to gain support against] the son of Zengi, who was the lord of Aleppo and the husband of his sister. After Sultan Mas’ūd’s death, the son of Zengi, scorning the son whom the late sultan had elevated to the throne of his realm, seized the territories of the Christians and, crossing over the frontiers established by Mas’ūd, was able to capture the impregnable fortress-towns of Aintab and P’arzman, together with all their surrounding villages. The sultan Kilij Arslan wrote him many times saying: “Cease acting unjustly and return the territory which belongs to me and which my father established to serve as the border between me and you.”³³⁶

Under a different passage Gregory the Priest repeats himself and adds that Nūr al-Dīn for his part sought the alliance of the Christians so that he could concentrate his efforts against Kılıç Arslan II:

“At the beginning of the year 604 [1155-1156] the son of Zengi bribing the king of Jerusalem and the lord of Antioch with large amounts of money, induced them to accede to his evil designs and made an alliance with them. The two rulers consented to his invading those Christian territories which formerly had belonged to the Franks. So the son of Zengi arrived before the renowned and great city of Aintab with a large number of troops and laid siege to it without delay.”³³⁷

³³⁵ Ibn al-Qalānisī, Gibb, 324-325.

³³⁶ Matthew of Edessa, Dostourian, 269-270. Michael the Syrian, without mentioning the alliances, gives a brief account of the encounter between Kılıç Arslan and Nūr al-Dīn: “En l’année 1466 {1154}, mourut Mas’oud, sultan d’Iconium, et il eut pour successeur son fils Kilidj-Arslân. Comme celui-ci pouvait à peine défendre son pays contre les princes de la famille de Danišmend, et surtout contre Ya’qoub-Arslan, Nour ed-Dīn marcha sur Pharzaman et ‘Aintab, et il s’empara de ces villes sans combat”. Michael the Syrian, Chabot, 312. Cf. Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 281.

³³⁷ Matthew of Edessa, Dostourian, 271.

We cannot be sure that Gregory the Priest had an exact knowledge of Kılıç Arslan's correspondence as he claims in the previously quoted passage. Yet, it confirms the vague information of Ibn al- Qalānisī about the content of the letters from Kılıç Arslan and gives us an important clue of the diplomatic exchange between these rulers. We can see that both sides used diplomacy and ideology as a tool to outbid each other. According to these authors, Kılıç Arslan accused his rival of injustice and breach of the treaties that he had concluded with his father. What is important to note here is that neither side seems to have used jihad as a means to discredit the other at this stage, as even Ibn al- Qalānisī does not include any concern for jihad in the information he gives on the letters.

Indeed Kılıç Arslan and Nūr al-Dīn continued their policy of consolidating their power over Muslim neighbours while the war against the Christians remained a secondary concern. In the year 555/1160 while Kılıç Arslan was still trying to subdue the Danishmendids, Nūr al-Dīn again took this as an opportunity to invade eastern Anatolia. Gregory the Priest informs us that Nūr al-Dīn had concluded treaties with the Byzantine emperor and the Frankish king of Jerusalem in order to attack the Muslim territories.³³⁸ Ibn al-Athīr wrongly records the conflict under the year 560/1164-65 and seems to have had little information about the relationship between the two rulers at his disposal.

“This year there was a deep estrangement between Nūr al-Dīn Mahmūd ibn Zankī, lord of Syria, and Qilij Arslān ibn Mas'ūd ibn Qilij Arslān, lord of Anatolia, which led to warfare and mutual grudges. When news of this reached Egypt, the vizier of the Egyptian caliph, al-

³³⁸ “However, the lord of Aleppo, a torchbearer of his people, freed from the fear of a war and influenced by his evil brother and the Greeks who were in agreement with him, sent to the king of Jerusalem, requesting from him a four-month treaty of peace. Having bribed the king, [who was] an avaricious man, with a large amount of money and having outwitted him in every way, the lord of Aleppo went towards Harran, which he previously had turned over to his brother Miran. At this point there were certain slanderers who said that, when he was sick, his brother wanted to kill him. The lord of Aleppo, believing these treacherous individuals, went against Harran with a formidable army. After remaining there for two months, he captured it by assault, together with the neighbouring territories of Raqqa and Edessa; moreover he brought under his control all the places which had formerly shaken off his yoke. He came to the territory of Raban, which at this time belonged to the sultan, and captured it by assault. Then he went to Marash and captured this place also. Now when the emir who was the lord of Kesoun learned of the victorious successes of this despot, fearing that the lord of Aleppo might take his town also, he abandoned the sultan. Recognizing the suzerainty of the lord of Aleppo, the emir came to him while he was at Raban, and the two marched together against Marash and Behesni”. Matthew of Edessa, *Dostourian*, 276-277.

Sālih ibn Ruzzīk, wrote to Qilij Arslān, forbidding this and ordering him to come to an agreement with Nūr al-Dīn.³³⁹

It is noteworthy however that Ibn al-Athīr remarks that the Fatimid vizier urged Kılıç Arslan to stop the internal conflict for the sake of *jihād* against the Franks. As a pro-Zengid chronicler he tries to put the blame for the inter-Muslim conflict on Kılıç Arslan claiming, that the Fatimid vizier addressed him rather than Ibn al-Athīr. Abū Shāma who wrote his work a few years later than Ibn al-Athīr is also partial towards the Zengid ruler but concedes that the Fatimid vizier appealed to Nūr al-Dīn to engage in *jihād* against the Franks.³⁴⁰ The fact that the extant sources favour Nūr al-Dīn makes it difficult to give a complete picture of the ideological warfare between him and Kılıç Arslan. For the same reason we can also only speculate how the latter was viewed by his contemporaries. It seems that Nūr al-Dīn was more prominent as fighter of *jihād* than Kılıç Arslan.

Nūr al-Dīn used *jihād* propaganda against Kılıç Arslan when he saw the need to intervene in Anatolian affairs. The death of Yağıbasan and the weakness of the remaining Danishmendid princes enabled Kılıç Arslan to continue the annexation of the Danishmendid territories. The prospect of Kılıç Arslan controlling Malatya and thus the routes into northern Syria threatened Nūr al-Dīn and he did not hesitate to respond when the Dānishmendid prince of Sivas (Sebastia) appealed for help against Kılıç Arslan. In 568/1173 Nūr al-Dīn sent a large army to Anatolia which recaptured Sivas and Maraş.³⁴¹ However, neither side wanted to continue the warfare too far, because Kılıç Arslan was anxious not to overstretch his military strength and he preferred to reach a diplomatic solution especially as an agreement was concluded which did not weaken his position.³⁴² Nūr al-Dīn, on the other hand, was anxious not to lose the contact with his base in Syria which would have given Saladin an opportunity to proclaim himself as independent ruler. Another factor was that Nūr al-Dīn received news of the arrival of a new wave of Crusaders and therefore agreed to

³³⁹ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Crusading Period, II*, 157-158. Ibn al-Athīr records these events wrongly under the year 560 (1164-1165).

³⁴⁰ Köhler writes that the Fatimid vizier reproached both, Kılıç Arslan and Nūr al-Dīn in the year 1160 for fighting each and not the Franks but he does not give any proof for this. Köhler's main aim is to prove that Nūr al-Dīn used *jihād* propaganda for his political ends to unite Syria and establish his supremacy in Egypt and thus he is not concerned to analyse the relationship between the two Muslim rulers in any detail. Köhler, *Allianzen*, 225, 237-239. C. Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, 137-141.

³⁴¹ Cf. Lyons/ Jackson, *Saladin*, 63.

³⁴² Cf. Holt, *Crusades*, 171.

peace. Noteworthy is that Nūr al-Dīn accused Kılıç Arslan of religious laxity and he was suspected of following the doctrines of the philosophers and of having abandoned the “Holy War” against the Byzantines.³⁴³

Ibn al-Athīr emphasizes that Nūr al-Dīn agreed to peace because he wanted to settle the matter without hostilities, indicating that he wanted to avoid warfare between Muslims, and goes on saying that Nūr al-Dīn had received news about the Frankish advance. Nūr al-Dīn allegedly wrote to Kılıç Arslan:

“You are a neighbour of the Byzantines but you do not raid them. Your lands are a large part of the lands of Islam. You must wage jihad with me’. He agreed to that and that Sivas should remain as it was in the hands of Nūr al-Dīn’s lieutenants, while belonging to Dhū’l-Nūn.”³⁴⁴

That Nūr al-Dīn expressed resentment at the friendly relations of Kılıç Arslan with the Byzantines and invited him to join the “Holy War” against the Christians shows how he used *jihad* to justify his actions against fellow Muslims. We have no record of the reply from Kılıç Arslan and can thus only speculate on how far he also used *jihad* propaganda. He could certainly counter that Nūr al-Dīn himself had also concluded alliances with the Christians and had abandoned the jihad. What is clear is how important the question of legitimisation for these rulers was and that they laid great importance on symbolic demonstration of the legitimacy of their “usurped” power. The fact that they sought the approval of the Abbasid caliph underlines this. Ibn al-Athīr writes, for example, that Nūr al-Dīn received from the caliph a diploma granting him the following:

“While Nūr al-Dīn was on his expedition, his envoy Kamāl al-Dīn Abū’l-Fadl Muhammad ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Shahrazūrī came to him from Baghdad, bringing with him a diploma from the caliph, granting him Mosul, the Jazīra, Irbil, Khilāt, Syria, the lands of Qilij Arslān and Egypt.”³⁴⁵

Here Nūr al-Dīn’s territorial ambitions are clearly demonstrated and most curiously the lands of Kılıç Arslan are included in the list. We have no evidence about the dealings of Kılıç Arslan with the caliph but it is possible that he for his part

³⁴³ Cf. Lyons/ Jackson, *Saladin*, 64.

³⁴⁴ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Crusading Period II*, 213.

³⁴⁵ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Crusading Period II*, 213; Ibn al-Athīr then writes under ‘Miscellaneous events for the year’ that Nūr al-Dīn sent this envoy with a message “which contained his duty to the caliph and an account of his efforts in the Jihad against the infidels and of his conquests and an request for a diploma for the lands he held ...”. 215-216.

asked the caliph for a diploma. As collections of these official documents were not made in the Muslim world, it is not possible to verify the claim made by Ibn al-Athīr or to determine with certainty which of these rulers received which diploma from the caliph. We can be certain however that Ibn al-Athīr is guilty here of exaggerating the status of his Zengid masters. It is very unlikely that the caliph would have had any interest in alienating the Rum Seljuq ruler. Nevertheless, Ibn al-Athīr's claims indicate that Nūr al-Dīn presented himself as a legitimate Perso-Islamic ruler and real champion of Islam. The title he used confirms this suggestion. Nūr al-Dīn dropped the title "atabeg" designating his position as guardian of Great Seljuq princes which his father Zengi had always used. It was the status as guardian of Seljuq princes that Zengi had come to power. By dropping this title Nūr al-Dīn claimed to be independent from the Great Seljuqs.³⁴⁶ Moreover, the inclusion of "Mosul, the Jazīra, Irbil, Khilāt, Syria, the lands of Qilij Arslān and Egypt" in the alleged investiture by the caliph demonstrates his independence from the rest of his family, presenting him as overlord of Saladin in Egypt and Kılıç Arslan in Anatolia. Nūr al-Dīn thereby presented himself as the strongest ruler in the Muslim world.

Kılıç Arslan II and Saladin

The death of Nūr al-Dīn deprived the Dānishmendids of their protector and gave Kılıç Arslan a free hand against them. Kılıç Arslan finalized the annexation of Dānishmendid territories in 573/1178 by taking Malatya, the last Dānishmendid stronghold. Meanwhile, following the death of Nūr al-Dīn, his lieutenant Saladin had started his campaign to establish himself as his former master's successor in a complicated diplomatic and military conflict with his master's family members, emirs, and the minor princes of Syria.

Both rulers did not have a legal base for their rule and were usurpers of power and were therefore in need of justifying and legitimising their power. For Saladin it was even more difficult than for Nūr al-Dīn as he was just a military commander of a

³⁴⁶ Cf. D.L. Patton, *A History of the Atabegs of Mosul and their relations with the Ulama A.H. 521-660/A.D. 1127-1262*, (New York University PhD 1982), 333-334.

master who himself had no right to kingship. He could be described as an upstart without a noble lineage to compete with Kılıç Arslan. It could be argued that Saladin therefore extended the *jihad* ideology and propaganda to establish himself as warrior of *jihad* and hence rightful heir to Nūr al-Dīn. Saladin claimed that his main aim was not personal gain but the unification of the Muslim territories for the *jihad* against the Franks. In the reply Saladin sent back with the envoy of Kılıç Arslan he reveals his standpoint by stating that,

“he would not permit mutual warfare between Muslim princes instead of uniting in the *jihad*, and that this own friendship or hostility depended upon their attitude towards the cause of God.”³⁴⁷

Before or during his attack on Malatya, Kılıç Arslan had sent an envoy to Saladin to ensure that he would not intervene in favour of the Dānismendid prince, as Nūr al-Dīn had done. The attack of Kılıç Arslan on the Dānismendid prince had no Muslim justification and was simply part of his expansionist policy. The motive behind Saladin’s opposition was not entirely religious. Kılıç Arslan’s expansion towards upper Mesopotamia was a threat to Saladin’s power but he used *jihad* ideology to express his opposition to the warfare of Kılıç Arslan against a fellow-Muslim. Saladin himself was at that time not predominantly engaged in *jihad* but was fighting fellow Muslims in Syria to secure his position using the same *jihad* ideology there.³⁴⁸

After Kılıç Arslan had secured Malatya, he directed his attention further east and demanded in 574/1179-80 that the fortress Ra‘bān should be restored to him. According to ‘Imād al- Dīn Işfahānī, Kılıç Arslan argued that Nūr al-Dīn had taken the fortress without his permission and that now the latter’s son, al-Sālīh agreed to give it back.³⁴⁹ This put Saladin in a difficult position as there was no legal base to refute the claim made by Kılıç Arslan and he resorted to force and responded by

³⁴⁷ As quoted by Gibb, *The Life of Saladin*, 35 footnote 1. Lyons and Jackson write that Kılıç Arslan sent an envoy but they do not make the connection between the conquest of Malatya. Lyons/Jackson, *Saladin*, 137.

³⁴⁸ Cf. C. Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, 185; Köhler, *Allianzen*, 320.

³⁴⁹ Cf. R. Şeşen, ‘İmād Al-Dīn Al-Kâtib Al-İsfahânî`nin Eserlerindeki Anadolu Tarihiyle İlgili Bahiseler’, in: *SAD*, 3 (1971), 266, (hereafter cited as İmād al-Dīn Işfahānī, Şeşen).

sending an army against him.³⁵⁰ Kılıç Arslan's army at Ra'bān was decisively beaten by Saladin's forces.³⁵¹ At the outset this was a dispute over a fortress but there was more at stake than this, as both rulers were fighting for influence over the whole region of eastern Anatolia and northern Syria. What is important to observe here is that Kılıç Arslan was a strong rival whom Saladin could not ignore. So far this has not been recognised by scholars because of the later fame of Saladin. Kılıç Arslan not only had territorial and military power but he also possessed ideological advantages which posed a threat to Saladin. Saladin's reaction to the expansion of Kılıç Arslan towards the east reveals that he regarded the latter as an equal opponent.

Saladin risked losing his credibility as a warrior of jihad and losing control in Syria and Egypt for a campaign in upper Mesopotamia where there was no substantial territorial gain to be made. It is not convincing that Saladin did not want to abandon the Artuqid ruler who asked for his help and it seems more likely that he feared the ambitious expansionist policy of Kılıç Arslan. The possession of Malatya had clearly strengthened the position of Kılıç Arslan. Moreover, Saladin had most probably been informed about the victory of Kılıç Arslan against Byzantium at Myriokephalon and that Kılıç Arslan knew that he had a free hand to expand into Saladin's territory if he could win over the Mesopotamian and Syrian princes. It is surprising therefore that Saladin, at a time when his position was far from secured, claimed superiority over Kılıç Arslan claiming with this statement that it was within his capability to conquer the latter's lands. Kılıç Arslan in contrast was in a position from where he was able to better negotiate better. With his victory against the Byzantine emperor at Myriokephalon and with the subjugation of the Dānismendid principality he had become the ruler of most of Anatolia.

In 576/1180 Saladin led an expedition in person towards the Euphrates against Kılıç Arslan despite other more pressing matters as his own official, al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil, remarked at the time.³⁵² The way, Saladin's biographers relate or chose not to relate this episode in upper Mesopotamia reveals the power struggle between the

³⁵⁰ Lyons and Jackson write that "there is no recorded attempt to refute" Kılıç Arslan's claim. Lyons/Jackson, *Saladin*, 137.

³⁵¹ Cf. Imād al-Dīn Işfahānī, *Şeşen*, 267; Michael the Syrian, Chabot, III, 382; Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 309; Gibb, *Saladin*, 574; Turan, *Selçuklular*, 212; Lyons/Jackson, *Saladin*, 138.

³⁵² Saladin's administrator al-Qāḍī al-Fāḍil criticising him directly in a letter for not taking Sidon stated that it was "meaningless to concern himself with war against his fellow Muslims." As quoted by Lyons/Jackson, *Saladin*, 139.

two sultans. Saladin's personal adviser and biographer 'Imād al- Dīn Işfahānī writes, that the Artuqid ruler Nūr al-Dīn Muhammad b. Kara Arslan (r. 562-581/1167-1185) had married the daughter of Kılıç Arslan but that he neglected her in favour of a singing girl. But this daughter, he emphasizes, is from the 'House of Seljuq and the line of the sultanate'. This behaviour on the part of his son-in-law angered Kılıç Arslan, who sent out envoys with letters to threaten him. The Artuqid ruler sent Saladin letters asking for his help and affirming his innocence. Saladin asked Kılıç Arslan to restrain from his threats against the Artuqid prince but the former sent a reply full of threats with a list of his son-in-laws faults. 'Imād al- Dīn Işfahānī continues:

"In this letter Kılıç Arslan said: 'If you are the mediator between him and me then surely he has to pay me his debt. When I concluded the alliance with him I gave him a part of my territories as my daughter's dowry. If he does not agree with my condition then he has to return the places belonging to me'. We replied: 'You cannot touch him as we have made an agreement with him and we will not deter from the promise we have made'. ... Kara Arslan's son feared his father-in-law [Kılıç Arslan] because his territories were near his lands. He could not find anyone who would help him and envoys and letters reached us one after the other. [Nūr al-Dīn's] neighbours, members of the Artukid family and others he knew did not want to help him. Our sultan [Saladin] was loyal and decided to come to his aid."³⁵³

In a somewhat apologetic manner 'Imād al- Dīn Işfahānī inserts the information that Saladin concluded a peace treaty with the Franks, because they had asked for the treaty and they were prepared to fulfil Saladin's conditions. He writes that Saladin, finally "securing Syria", marched to the north and pitched his military camp at the Göksu.³⁵⁴ It is remarkable how this author glosses over the fact that Saladin concluded a treaty with the Christian enemy to lead an expedition against a fellow-Muslim. Obviously there was no Muslim justification for this campaign. Kılıç Arslan, however, could justify to some extent the attack on his Artuqid neighbour Nūr al-Dīn by claiming that he was protecting his daughter and that he had a right to force him to keep to the terms of the marriage alliance. Saladin, on the other hand, had nothing to counter this claim. This might explain why the author avoids the use of jihad propaganda to justify Saladin's actions against Kılıç Arslan. However, Saladin must have been aware that he had to justify his actions against his fellow-Muslim especially since he had promised the caliph the conquest of Jerusalem and

³⁵³ Imād al-Dīn Işfahānī, Şeşen, 268.

³⁵⁴ A river in upper Mesopotamia which flows into the Fırat/Euphrates about 50 km north of al-Bīra.

was under pressure to deliver.³⁵⁵ Most probably this was the reason why he sought the caliph's consent in a letter arguing that his financial situation did not allow him to fight the Franks and Kılıç Arslan at the same time and that he was thus forced to conclude a truce with the Franks.³⁵⁶ Saladin continued to use jihad propaganda to justify his actions in upper Mesopotamia, claiming in the same letter that Kılıç Arslan had "broken the staff of Islam."³⁵⁷ He maintained that "all our efforts are exerted to incline everyone to the Holy War."³⁵⁸ Yet, the only justification 'Imād al-Dīn Işfahānī gives in his account is that Saladin could not abandon someone who had asked for his support. Nonetheless, this author writes that after Saladin's conquest of the coastal towns in Palestine, Kılıç Arslan sent an embassy to offer an alliance with him. The leader of this embassy was Ikhtiyar al-Dīn Hasān b. Gufrās'i, and according to 'Imād al-Dīn Işfahānī, he was the most powerful Rum Seljuq official who had great influence over his master. Here Saladin's adviser wants to denigrate the status of Kılıç Arslan as sultan claiming that this official who acted like a sovereign was the real holder of power over the Rum Seljuq realm.³⁵⁹

There is a hint in the report of 'Imād al-Dīn Işfahānī, which reveals that the real motive behind the whole conflict had to do with power politics and that Saladin feared Kılıç Arslan. The remark that the Artuqid prince Nūr al-Dīn feared his father-in-law because his lands were adjacent to the latter's implies that it was the expansionist policy of the Rum Seljuq sultan towards the east that lay at the heart of the conflict. The author does not mention the sultan's conquest of Malatya but it is clear that the Artuqid prince suspected that he would be the next target. Moreover, that he appealed to Saladin for help because no one in the region was prepared to help him indicates that the neighbouring rulers might have been under the influence of Kılıç Arslan. At a time when Saladin's position was far from secured, Kılıç Arslan had defeated the Byzantine emperor decisively in 572/1176 at Myriokephalon and with the conquest of the last Dānishmendid principality had become the ruler of most of Anatolia. Moreover, Saladin had most probably been informed about the Seljuq victory against Byzantium and knew that he would have a free hand to expand into

³⁵⁵ Cf. Köhler, *Allianzen*, 303.

³⁵⁶ Cf. Lyons/ Jackson, *Saladin*, 144; Köhler, *Allianzen*, 304-305, 320.

³⁵⁷ As quoted by Lyons/Jackson, *Saladin*, 144.

³⁵⁸ Lyons/ Jackson, *Saladin*, 137.

³⁵⁹ Cf. Imād al-Dīn al-Isfahānī, Şeşen, 345.

Saladin's territory if he could win over the Mesopotamian and Syrian princes. It is not possible to determine what role the battle of Myriokephalon played but it is clear that the Rum Seljuq expansion of power did not just alarm the Artuqid ruler but also Saladin.

The Artuqid principality represented an important buffer zone between Kılıç Arslan and Saladin and thus the loyalty of its ruler and other princes in the region had become crucial. That Saladin received Nūr al-Dīn and his brother at his camp and "called them brother" and presented them with rich gifts worth 100.000 dinars as 'Imād al- Dīn Işfahānī testifies, shows how important the loyalty of these princes was. With this the author wants to demonstrate Saladin's superiority, but it is striking that he avoids any comparison between the two sultans and does not mention Kılıç Arslan again. Then, without any further explanation the author writes that finally the delegation led by the emir Ihtiyar al-Dīn Hasān b. Gufrās'i finally came and that a treaty he had written was concluded between them and Saladin and that thus the dispute was resolved.³⁶⁰ In an attempt to connect this episode to jihad, the author continues his narrative stating that they then turned against the Armenians who had mistreated the Muslims.

Ibn Shaddād, Saladin's second biographer, omits the episode of 576/1180 altogether, according to Lyons and Jackson he does this because of the lack of any Muslim justification.³⁶¹ Another motive might have been that the author did not want to reveal that his master Saladin felt threatened by Kılıç Arslan. For this reason, Ibn Shaddād puts the events into a chronology which fits his master's jihad ideology claiming that the Armenians were the reason behind Saladin's expedition to upper Mesopotamia:

"He then learnt of the disorder in Syria and determined to return here, which return was for warfare against the Franks. Envoys of Qilij [Kılıç Arslan II] came to him, requesting a treaty with the sultan and asking him for aid against the Armenians. The sultan planned to move towards the territory of the son of Leon to help Qilij Arslan against him. He camped at Qarā Hisār and the troops of Aleppo under his command, because he made that condition when peace was made. They assembled at the Blue River [Göksu] between Bahasnā and Mansūr's Fort [Adıyaman]. From there he crossed the Black River [Karasu] and raided the territory of the son of Leon, taking from the enemy a fort which he destroyed. They offered him [return of] prisoners and sued for peace, whereupon he withdrew.

³⁶⁰ Imād al-Dīn Işfahānī, Şeşen, 269-270.

³⁶¹ Cf. Lyons/Jackson, *Saladin*, 148.

Then Qilij Arslān made overtures concerning a general peace treaty for all the eastern princes. Peace was concluded and the sultan took an oath on 10 Jumādā I 576 [1 October 1180]. The peace treaty covered Qilij Arslān and the rulers of Mosul and Diyār Bakr.”³⁶²

According to this version of events, Kılıç Arslan asked Saladin for a treaty and help against the Armenians and therefore Saladin, who had returned to Syria to fight the Franks, undertook the military expedition as far as the Göksu. Kılıç Arslan is thus presented as one of the inferior ‘princes’ who depends on the help of sultan Saladin. Not surprisingly, the author refers to the Rum Seljuq sultan just by his personal names and neither lists his honorifics nor his ancestry. This is no doubt because that would show that Kılıç Arslan was a rival sultan, who was moreover, the descendant of the Great Seljuq sultans whereas his master was an upstart. Nevertheless, Ibn Shaddād attests the real motive behind the expedition. He finishes his report stating that a peace treaty was concluded with Kılıç Arslan and the rulers of Mosul and Diyarbakır and in a follow-up account about Saladin’s return to Egypt he repeats that “peace had been made through Qilij Arslan.” The terms of this treaty are not given by ‘Imād al- Dīn Iṣfahānī and Ibn Shaddād, except for the latter’s remark that the sultan took an oath. It is, however, evident that Saladin could not have assumed supremacy over Kılıç Arslan though his biographers and even Ibn al-Athīr suggest this. It is thus worth quoting here Ibn al-Athīr’s version of the events which he recounts in some detail under the year 576/1180-81:

“Messengers went to and from between them but there was no settlement of the matter. Saladin made a truce with the Franks and marched out with his troops. Al-Malik al-Sālih Ismā‘īl ibn Nūr al-Dīn Mahmūd was ruling in Aleppo, so he left it on his left hand and marched by Tel Bāshir to Ra‘bān, where Nūr al-Dīn Muhammad came and joined him. When Qilij Arslān heard that he was close by, he sent his senior emir to him, saying, ‘This man had done such-and-such to my daughter. It is imperative to attack his lands and teach him his position.’ After the envoy had arrived, he met with Saladin and delivered his message. Saladin became furiously angry and said to the envoy, ‘Say to your master, “By God, besides whom there is no other god, if he does not retire, I shall set out for Malatya, which is two days’ march away, and only when I am in the town shall I dismount from my horse. Then I shall attack all his lands and take them from him.’ The envoy recognized a serious situation. He rose and left Saladin. He had seen his army, its strength and brave array, the quantity of its weapons and mounts and such like. He had nothing to match it. He realized that, if Saladin attacked them, he would take their lands. The next day he asked for a meeting. He was summoned and said to Saladin, ‘I wish to say something on my own initiative, which is not a communication from my master.’ ‘Speak,’ said Saladin. He went on, ‘My lord, is it not bad for such as you, one of the greatest and most powerful of sultans,

³⁶² D.S. Richards, *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, Aldershot 2002, 55.

that people should hear it said of you that you have made peace with the Franks, abandoned the holy war and the interests of the kingdom, turned away from everything in which lies salvation for you, your subjects and the Muslims at large, gathered troops from regions far and near, taken the field and spent vast sums, both you and your troops, for the sake of a harlot singing girl? What will be your excuse before God Almighty, the caliph, the princes of Islam and all the world? Grant that no one is confronting you with this, but do they not know that this is how the matter is? Suppose that Qilij Arslān had died and that it is his daughter who has sent to you asking for protection and requesting you to procure her justice from her husband. If she did so, the expectation is that you would not reject her.’

Saladin said, ‘By God, the truth is with you. The matter is as you say, but this man came to me, relied on me and it is bad for me to desert him. You meet him and settle the situation between you as you wish.’³⁶³

Thus the pro-Zengid author Ibn al-Athīr in contrast to Saladin’s two contemporary biographers includes concerns for *jihad* in his account of the expedition in 576/1180. Through this alleged statement made by Kılıç Arslan’s envoy he voices his critique of Saladin. He doubts Saladin’s commitment to *jihad* and regards the efforts put into the expedition in the north to support the Artuqid ruler against Kılıç Arslan as disproportionate especially in the face of financial problems in Syria. Ibn al-Athīr claims that the Rum Seljuq envoy reproached Saladin because he “abandoned the holy war and the interests of the kingdom” and “spent vast sums” when they were needed elsewhere. Moreover, the envoy goes so far as to ask Saladin how he will be able to justify before the caliph and God that he fought a fellow-Muslim instead of the infidels.³⁶⁴ Despite his criticism, however, Ibn al-Athīr too “sees Saladin as being full of zeal for waging jihad.”³⁶⁵ Indeed, he implies that Saladin was the stronger party in this conflict, stating that he was confident enough to threaten Kılıç Arslan that “if he does not retire, I shall set out for Malatya, which is two days’ march away.” The author implies that Saladin’s military might made the Rum Seljuq envoy realise that “he would take their lands” if he wanted and therefore he managed to reach an agreement.

A further example which indicates that the relationship between Saladin and Kılıç Arslan was dominated by power political concerns is shown by their conduct during the Third Crusade. This crusade led amongst others by the German Emperor Frederick Barbarossa gave Saladin the opportunity to voice his claim to be the real

³⁶³ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Crusading Period*, II, 271-272.

³⁶⁴ Cf. Köhler, *Alianzen und Verträge*, 318. Köhler states that Kilic Arslan made this statement through his envoy.

³⁶⁵ C. Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, 182. For a complete discussion of the medieval Muslim sources on Saladin and jihad see *ibid.* 180-183.

champion of Islam and Holy War, as Kılıç Arslan was in diplomatic contact with the German Emperor.³⁶⁶ Kılıç Arslan had asked Saladin in 586/1190 for help against the Crusaders but he had probably already promised Frederick Barbarossa free passage through his lands. The conflict between the Crusaders and the sultan's eldest son in Konya together with his Türkmen was his son's fault. Indeed in his later years he was dominated by his son Qutb al-Dīn Malikshāh.³⁶⁷

To sum up this discussion, it is evident that all extant Muslim sources are partial to Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin rather than Kılıç Arslan and they misrepresent the power balance between the two rulers. Nevertheless, from the information they give it can be easily gleaned that the Counter-Crusaders regarded Kılıç Arslan as an equally powerful, if not stronger rival. There is no extant record of the letters written and the envoys sent in the name of the Rum Seljuq sultan but it seems safe to assume that he used jihad propaganda, at least to some extent, to counter Saladin's claims. It has to be conceded, however, that he never established a propaganda machine as Saladin had established and that he was indifferent to the situation in Syria. The *jihad* against the Franks in Syria or indeed the *jihad* against the Byzantines does not seem to have been high on his agenda. In fact the evidence available suggests that he did not even fully use his 'great' victory against the Byzantine emperor Manuel in 572/1176 at Myriokephalon for *jihad* propaganda.

III.2. Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay Khusraw I

(588-593/1192-1197 and 601-608/1205-1211)

Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay Khusraw came twice to the throne and reigned each time for about five years. Hence, he did not reign for a long period but his reign is important for the later apogee of the Rum Seljuq sultanate. It was during his reign that all the influences, the Persian, Byzantine, and Turkish which affected the development of the Rum Seljuq sultanate became evident. At the same time the structures of Rum Seljuq government and how it was run and who actually were the people who run it

³⁶⁶ Cf. Holt, *Crusades*, 171-172.

³⁶⁷ Cf. Imād al-Dīn Işfahānī, *Şeşen*, 350.

became evident. These structures would remain the same under the rule of the two sons of Kay Khusraw, Kay Kāwūs and Kay Qubādh, who ruled after him in turn and whose reigns mark the zenith of Rum Seljuq power. The most striking feature of the Rum Seljuq sultanate is the extent of power exercised by the Rum Seljuq officials. It seems safe to assume therefore that even though the medieval authors, especially by Ibn Bībī, present the sultans as Perso-Islamic monarchs, who ruled over a united sultanate, they were not autocratic rulers. Thus the Rum Seljuq sultanate at the time of Kay Khusraw can still be regarded as a confederation of provinces. The uc (border regions), especially the former territories of the Danishmendid principality, were dominated by the descendants of that dynasty and they interfered successfully in state affairs. Moreover, the emirs and notables of all towns, especially the capital Konya and Kayseri, not only seem to have played a decisive role in the running of the Rum Seljuq state but they also acted as sultan makers. This chapter aims to reconstruct, as far as the sources allow, how the above mentioned influences manifested themselves in the ideology formulated under Kay Khusraw.

The first reign of Kay Khusraw (588-593/1192-1197) was overshadowed by the succession struggle which had started already during the last years of the reign of Kılıç Arslan. Kay Khusraw was the youngest son of Kılıç Arslan and had been assigned the western province Burğlu (Uluborlu/ Sozopolis) on the border with the Byzantine empire. Cahen suggests that he was allotted these lands probably because he had a Christian Byzantine mother.³⁶⁸ Kılıç Arslan, who had been expelled from Konya by his son Qutb al-Dīn Malik Shāh who held Sivas and Aksaray as appanage, went from one son to the other until he found refuge with his youngest son Kay Khusraw. The latter supported his father against his brother and tried to reinstate him in his capital Konya, and probably in return for this support Kılıç Arslan designated Kay Khusraw as his heir to the throne. Ibn Bībī omits these events and starts his narrative stating that Kılıç Arslan chose Kay Khusraw as his successor even though he was the youngest because he regarded him as worthy for kingship.³⁶⁹ According

³⁶⁸ Cf. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 114.

³⁶⁹ Cf. Ibn Bībī, *Duda*, 17-18. The internal strife and the wandering life of Kılıç Arslan are described by the Christian authors Michael the Syrian and Bar Hebraeus. See Michael the Syrian, *Chabot*, III, 405, 410; Bar Hebraeus, *Budge*, 341. Among the Muslim sources al-İşfahānī for whom Kılıç Arslan was the rival of his master Saladin mentions the internal strife. 'Imād al-Dīn al-İşfahānī, *Şeşen*, 360-361.

to Ibn Bībī, Kılıç Arslan left the throne to his son Kay Khusraw before he died and made his officials take the oath of allegiance. But al-Işfahānī writes that Kılıç Arslan died while Kay Khusraw with the help of the uc Turkmen was trying to reinstate him in Konya and was attacking Aksaray. This author states that Kay Khusraw entered Konya after his father died and asked the notables to recognise him as the new sultan.³⁷⁰

Kay Khusraw, however, was not capable to get his supremacy recognised by his brothers who contested his succession. The struggle for the throne continued and when Qutb al-Dīn died in 593/1197 Rukn al-Dīn Sulaymān Shāh seized the Rum Seljuq throne and Kay Khusraw first retreated to his territories in Uluborlu but was then forced to flee. Ibn Bībī describes at length the exile of Kay Khusraw and how he finally found refuge in Constantinople and after the city was taken by the armies of the Fourth Crusade he found refuge with the Byzantine lord Maurozomos.³⁷¹ What is important to observe here is that Kay Khusraw, whose own territories bordered Byzantium, most probably maintained close relations with the Byzantines and at the same time with the uc Türkmen. Hence it seems safe to assume that he must have been under the influence of both sides and that Byzantine Christians as well as Türkmen emirs played an important role.³⁷²

Indeed that the uc Turkmen and the descendants of Dānīshmend played a decisive role in the return of Kay Khusraw to the Rum Seljuq throne demonstrates that the Turkish element was still effective within the Rum Seljuq State.³⁷³ Ibn Bībī writes that after the death of Sulaymān the emirs Nūh Alp, Mende, and Tornik who had come from Tokat to serve the sultan, put his little son Kılıç Arslan III on the throne and acted as his regents. He then states that Muẓaffar al-Dīn Maḥmūd, Zāhir al-Dīn Īlī, and Badr al-Dīn Yūsuf, the sons of Yağıbasan, did not agree with the accession of Kılıç Arslan III, the son of Sulaymān because they were friends of Kay Khusraw. These three brothers were the commanders of the troops of the uc and they

³⁷⁰ Ibid., 361.

³⁷¹ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 23-31.

³⁷² The refuge of Kay Khusraw in Constantinople and his relations with the Byzantines and Christians in general will be discussed within the chapter, The Rum Seljuqs and Byzantium.

³⁷³ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 37; Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, 97; Bar Hebraeus writes: "And one of the Amīrs of ÎUG [uc], a great country of the TURKOMANS which was on the border of the GREEKS, sent and had brought to him GHĀYATH AD-DĪN KAI KESRŪ, who was a fugitive to the GREEKS. And many troops were gathered together to him and they went and encamped against ICONIUM." Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 360. Wittek, *Toponymie*, 23-24.

won over the other emirs of the region through oaths and written treaties and then sent the chamberlain Zakariyyā' to bring Kay Khusraw back from his Byzantine exile.³⁷⁴ Obviously the descendants of the Dānishmendid dynasty still held power over the territories which were formerly part of the realm of their dynasty as emirs serving under the Seljuqs. Hence the question of succession reveals that it was the high-ranking emirs who in fact held the reins in their hands and were able to act as sultan makers in order to realize their own goals. Moreover, the emirs did not just act out of personal interest when they decided who should become sultan but they were considering what would be good for their respective provinces. It seems that independent from them the provinces had established local interest and that therefore it can be argued that the Rum Seljuq sultanate remained a confederation rather than a centrally organised state.

The fact that the population of Konya resisted the entry of Kay Khusraw into the town indicates that the town, or better its notables, were in a position to negotiate their interests with a throne pretender. It is interesting that Ibn Bībī admits that Kay Khusraw destroyed the fields surrounding the town and that he killed the qadi when he finally entered the town.³⁷⁵ The author explains that the sultan blamed the qadi for the town's rebellion because he had expressed in a *fatwa* that Kay Khusraw was not worthy to become sultan, as he had maintained friendly relations with unbelievers (Byzantines) and had violated religious commands.³⁷⁶ These episodes imply that Kay Khusraw was ruthless like his father Kılıç Arslan and also arouse doubt about his religious conviction. At different places in his report on the reign of Kay Khusraw, Ibn Bībī presents him as an ideal Perso-Islamic ruler who was pious and just. It is striking, however, that the author does not give a portrait of Kay Khusraw but he praises his education and piety when he writes that Rukn al-Dīn Sulaymān Shāh at first defended his father's decision to make Kay Khusraw heir to the throne even though he was young as he had mastered the Quran and also put his religious learning into praxis.³⁷⁷ Ibn Bībī quotes a long poem Kay Khusraw allegedly composed for his tutor and friend *shaykh* Majd al-Dīn Ishāq to call him back from

³⁷⁴ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 37. Ibn Bībī does not give any other details about the chamberlain Zakariyyā'.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., 39-40, 43.

³⁷⁶ Ibid., Ibn Bībī, Duda, 43.

³⁷⁷ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 20.

exile.³⁷⁸ He also writes that Kay Khusraw spoke with his courtiers in Persian and it might well be that he had received a Persian and Arabic education but it is difficult to assess how far this sultan was influenced by Iranian ideals of kingship. The Persian scholar Rāwandī dedicated his history of the Seljuqs named *Rāḥat al-ṣudūr* to Kay Khusraw because as he himself states in his work there was no Great Seljuq sultan anymore. In contrast to Ibn Bībī, Rāwandī is a contemporary but the nature of his work makes it difficult to deduce from it to what extent Rum Seljuq Anatolia at the time of Kay Khusraw was Persianised.³⁷⁹ There is almost no historical data on Kay Khusraw to be found in the work of Rāwandī. Throughout his work the author gives panegyrics to this ruler and it is clear that for him the Rum Seljuqs were the heirs to the Great Seljuqs and “the new champions of Sunni Islam, and Konya the centre for the continuation of Persian scholarly traditions”.³⁸⁰ The titles Rāwandī accords to Kay Khusraw and his presentation of the conquest of Antalya are evidence for this.³⁸¹

It is difficult therefore to deduce from these highly partisan sources what image and ideology Kay Khusraw used to legitimize his rule. The epigraphic evidence for the reign of this ruler is sparse but an analysis of what is extant is a welcome addition to draw a more complete picture. A close look at the coinage extant from the first reign of Kay Khusraw and from his second reign reveals that they have a few differences which expose the political realities of this sultan’s rule. Kay Khusraw began to strike his first coins already during the first year of his first reign. All dirhams from this period which have come down to us were minted in Konya and are in accordance with Muslim models and thus just Arabic inscriptions. The earliest of these silver coins dates from 589/1193 and the latest from 594/1198³⁸² and there are also several which are not dated.³⁸³ These dirhams from the first reign bear on the front the name of the caliph al-Nāṣir and on the reverse the titulature of

³⁷⁸ Ibid., 41-42.

³⁷⁹ The work has “strong Mirror for Princes overtones, written in rhetorical style.” C. Hillenbrand, *Non-Greek Sources*, 323. See also eadem., *Seljuq historiography*, 78.

³⁸⁰ C. Hillenbrand, *Seljuq historiography*, 77.

³⁸¹ Among others Rāwandī designates Kay Khusraw as “the shelter of Islam and Muslims” See Rāwandī, *Ateş*, 19, 62, 133-134. The author even goes so far as to claim that because of the empire established by the Seljuqs the Byzantine emperors converted to Islam. Idem., 134.

³⁸² Cf. Güler, *Selçuklu Sikkeleri*, 66; Aykut, *Selçuklu Sikkeleri*, 275-281. Aykut lists four dated silver coins and three undated ones whereby the last is dated 594/1198 and Güler lists five and has as last date 595/1199.

³⁸³ Cf. Aykut, *Selçuklu Sikkeleri*, 282-288; Güler, *Selçuklu Sikkeleri*, 67.

the sultan, “al-sultan al-muazzam Kay Khusraw b. Kılıç Arslan.” During the second reign of Kay Khusraw more coins seem to have been struck and they stem not just from Konya but also Kayseri and Malatya and they date from the 601-607/ 1205-1211.³⁸⁴ The silver coins from the second reign also contain only Arabic inscriptions. The titulature of the sultan on these coins is the same with the only addition of the title *Abu'l-fath*. It seems safe to suggest therefore that during his first reign Kay Khusraw was more or less only the lord over Konya and his authority was not recognised by his brothers who held the other provinces. At the same time coins were struck in Konya in his name even after he lost the throne and was exiled by his brother Sulaymān, indicating that the town even after the latter’s accession held to Kay Khusraw. From this it can be concluded that the different regions of the Rum Seljuq sultanate still acted independently from each other.

During his second reign however Kay Khusraw was able to strike coins not just in Konya but also in the important towns Malatya and Kayseri. It is important to note in this context that Kayseri and Malatya as mentioned above were still dominated by members of the Dānishmendid dynasty and other emirs of the Rum Seljuqs. At the same time it should be noted that immediately after his second accession to the throne Kay Khusraw allotted Kayseri and Malatya as appanages to his sons. Ibn Bībī states that ‘Izz al-Dīn Kay Kāwūs received Malatya and ‘Alā al-Dīn Kay Qubādh received the country of the Dānishmendids with the borderlands (uc).³⁸⁵ Wittek claims, however, that this was not another division of the realm, as the sons of Kay Khusraw were only holding the position of province-governors and that the fact that the sultan minted coins in Malatya, the capital of his eldest son, already proves this.³⁸⁶ The coins are actually evidence that he minted coins in the provinces of both of his sons but this not conclusive evidence that Kay Khusraw had or aimed to have direct control over all the dominions which were in theory under his authority.

³⁸⁴ Cf. Aykut, *Selçuklu Sikkeleri*, 326-379; Güler, *Selçuklu Sikkeleri*, 77-84.

³⁸⁵ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 41.

³⁸⁶ Cf. Wittek, *Toponymie*, 31. The Turkish historians Kafesoğlu and Turan share this view. Kafesoğlu writes in his article on the Seljuqs in the IA, without going into any detail, that “Kai-Khusraw sought to strengthen the unity established in Anatolia by Sulaimān-Shāh.” Kafesoğlu as translated by Leiser, *A History of the Seljuks*, 72. Turan states that after the reign of Kılıç Arslan II, the Rum Seljuq princes were not more than governors but does not elaborate on this point. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 293-294.

Significant for the context of the present work is the question if Kay Khusraw aimed to establish himself as autocratic ruler and if he can be described as the first truly Perso-Islamic sultan of the Seljuq dynasty in Anatolia. In all probability he did not have an extensive building project and there are no elaborate and ambitious inscriptions extant from his reign. These points suggest that it was not his main concern to present himself as an ideal Persian king, though he was named after one of the mythical ancient Persian rulers and is likened to him by the chroniclers.

The Çifte Madrasa in Kayseri which is the first Seljuq madrasa in Anatolia is probably the only monument which was founded by Kay Khusraw. This construction includes a medical school and a hospital which was built on behalf of Kawhar Nasība, the sister of Kay Khusraw.³⁸⁷ The foundation inscription dated 602/1206 reads as follows:

“During the reign of the great sultan Ghiyāth al-Dunyā wa‘l-Dīn Kay Khusraw b. Kılıç Arslan, may his rule be perpetual, this hospital was constructed following the will of the queen ‘İsmat al-Dunyā wa‘l-Dīn Kawhar Nasība b. Kılıç Arslan, may God be content with them.”³⁸⁸

This inscription is especially important because it is the only inscription where we can be sure that Kay Khusraw might have decided the formulation of it. It is striking that the titulature included in this inscription is simple and only includes the title great sultan and the honorific and name of the sultan. This inscription predates the conquest of Antalya in 601/1207 but it is still surprising that the sultan is not at least described as the protector of the faith or fighter against the infidel.³⁸⁹ The other inscriptions dedicated to Kay Khusraw can be found on monuments commissioned by emirs in his service and they are not different from the above quoted one. An inscription of the Ulu Cami (Great Mosque) built by the

³⁸⁷ See Aslanapa, *Turkish Art and Architecture*, 129; Turan, *Selçuklular*, 292. Turan writes that Kawhar Nasība was the nurse of Kay Khusraw but the foundation inscription states that she was the daughter of Kılıç Arslan which proves that she was his sister. Çetin states that Kawhar Nasība, the sister of Kay Khusraw, died at the age of 26 or 27 of tuberculosis and that he therefore ordered the building of this complex. The author does not give any references, however, as to where he got this information from. Çetin, *Selçuklulu Müesseseleri ve Medeniyeti Tarihi*, 294.

³⁸⁸ RCEA, no.3616, vol. X, 9-10; For a Turkish translation of this inscription see, Çetin, *Selçuklulu Müesseseleri ve Medeniyeti Tarihi*, 295.

³⁸⁹ See Wittek, *Toponymie*, 30; Wittek, *Fürstentum Montesche*, 8. Wittek writes that Kay Khusraw after he had ascended the throne with the help of the Turkmen built a shrine for the hero of the frontier fighters Battāl Ghāzī.

Danishmendid emir Muẓaffar al-Dīn Maḥmūd in Kayseri in 602/1205³⁹⁰ states the following:

“During the reign of the great sultan Kay Khusraw b. Kılıç Arslan, to strengthen and support his life, this was constructed by Muẓaffar al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Yağibasan, in the year 602/1206.”³⁹¹

The emir Jamāl al-Dīn Ishāq built a *masjid* in Konya, named after him which contains the following titlature for Kay Khusraw:

“During the rule of the great sultan Ghiyāth al-Dunyā wa‘l-Dīn *abu’l-faḥ* Kay Khusraw, this *masjid* was built by Jamāl al-Dīn Ishāq, the son of the emir Ali in the year 607/1210.”³⁹²

The only addition we can find in these inscriptions is the title *Abu’l-faḥ*, which is most probably used here to celebrate the sultan’s conquest of Antalya. But here too any *jihad* related titles are missing.

It is true that for a great part of his reign Kay Khusraw maintained friendly relations with Byzantium and that behind the conquest of Antalya in 601/1207 were economic rather than religious considerations. In fact he might have realised the importance of maritime power because of his contacts with the Byzantines. The most obvious piece of evidence of the Byzantine influence can be seen on his copper coins which were most probably used for circulation among Christian subjects. These coins include images copied from Byzantine tradition, a seating ruler and a rider and thus were used to propagate the sultan’s status to his Christian subjects.³⁹³ Nevertheless, as has been shown in the chapter on Kılıç Arslan II and the Counter Crusaders, despite friendly relations with the Christians, Muslim rulers still presented themselves as *jihad* warriors. Moreover, the Muslim neighbours of Kay Khusraw

³⁹⁰ Aslanapa writes “that this is merely a renovation inscription and the first mosque would naturally be connected with Yağibasan himself in the middle of the 12th century.” Schöttler suggests also that the Ulu Cami in Kayseri might have been built at the place of an earlier Danismendid construction dating from 1140. Schöttler, *Rumseldschuken*, 54. However both authors do neither give any further explanations nor references for this building.

³⁹¹ *RCEA*, X, 9 (inscription no. 3615).

³⁹² *RCEA*, X, 48 (inscription no.3666); cf. also Löytved, *Konia*, 28.

³⁹³ For the copper coins see Aykut, *Selçuklu Sikkeleri*, 288-291 (first reign), 380-396 (second reign). It should be noted here that most of the coins minted during the second reign bear the title *Abu’l-faḥ*, whereas the coins from the first reign do not have this additional title. Hinrichs, writes that it would be wrong to assume a connection of the title *Abu’l-faḥ* with the second reign as there are also coins not bearing this title; cf. Hinrichs, *Sultan und Kalif auf Münzen der Seldschuken Anatoliens*, 345.

such as the Artuqids and Ayyubids have left behind very ambitious inscriptions which also include *jihad* titles.³⁹⁴ Ibn Bībī describes the conquest of Antalya in retrospect as *jihad* and it is most probably true that he founded *minbars* and *mihirabs* in Antalya but it is curious that he did not commission any monument as to mark his conquest as a great victory for Islam.³⁹⁵ Kay Khusraw was killed in 608/1211 during the battle at Alaşehir against the Byzantines where his army was victorious but took flight when he died. He was posthumously designated as martyr (*shahīd*) as the inscription of his son ‘Izz al-Dīn Kay Kāwūs shows. This indicates that *jihad* propaganda was still an important tool in the ideological warfare between the Muslim rulers but that it was despite this not used by Kay Khusraw.

The deductions we may draw from these evidence with some certainty are that the ideological concepts employed by Kay Khusraw are not stated in an inscription, which is surprising when we consider the growing Persian influence. This is even more noticeable as an ideological concept was formulated under his father Kılıç Arslan and later under his sons as their inscriptions show. In addition it is almost safe to suggest that *jihad* was not part of the ideology Kay Khusraw even though he did undertake several expeditions against the Byzantines and he could have propagated himself as the defender of the frontiers especially as this concept was employed by his Muslim opponents.

III.3. Rukn al-Dīn Sulaymān Shāh II (593-600/1197-1204)

The reigns of Sulaymān Shāh II and Kay Khusraw I represent an important turning point in the history of the Rum Seljuqs. During their more or less a century-long presence in Anatolia, from the establishment of the principality of Nicaea by Sulaymān I in 473/1081 to the death of Kılıç Arslan II in 588/1192, the Seljuqs had not even founded one single mosque, the main symbol of a Muslim state. Indeed, as already stated the first coins appeared in the second half of the 12th century. The

³⁹⁴ The Ayyubid rival of Kay Khusraw, al-Malik al-Adil in an inscription on the citadel of Damascus dated 606/ 1209, is accorded among other grandiose secular and religious titles “slaughterer of the infidel and polytheists”. RCEA, (no. 3651), vol. X, 37.

³⁹⁵ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 47.

influence of Iranian Muslim advisers and Byzantine nobles on the Rum Seljuqs which seems to have started during the last decade of the reign of Mas'ūd was intensified. Following events occurring in the eastern Islamic territories in Khurasan, the rise to power of the Khwārazmshāhs and then the Mongol invasions, the number of Persian officials and Türkemen groups migrating westward towards Anatolia increased and influenced developments in the Rum Seljuq polity.³⁹⁶ The Muslim and Christian sources do not connect events in Anatolia to the events in Khurasan but give us some snippets of information on the Türkmen migrations.³⁹⁷ Already the last years of the reign of Kılıç Arslan were marked by problems raised by the increasing number of Türkmen coming into Anatolia.

On one hand, the Persian element and on the other hand however the Turkish element grew during the reigns of Sulaymān Shāh II and Kay Khusraw I, and their successors. With the incursion of Türkmen tribes the nomadic element in Anatolia intensified and this not only led to social unrest in Rum Seljuq Anatolia, especially in the border regions, but also influenced the ruling classes.³⁹⁸ The situation arising from the Türkmen invasion almost replicates the situation in Anatolia a century earlier when the first waves of Türkmen bands infiltrated Anatolia. At that time the Türkmen bands were recruited by the Byzantines in their internal struggle for the throne and in this case the Rum Seljuqs deployed them in their internal struggle for the throne. It seems reasonable to suggest that the Türkmen bands did not just serve as a reservoir of manpower for the Seljuq ruling family but that many Türkmen were

³⁹⁶ For the history of the Khwārazm Shāhs in this period, cf., *EI2*, Khwārazm Shāhs (.Bosworth).

³⁹⁷ The problems raised by the movement of more and more Turcoman tribes from Khurasan westward into Azerbaijan, Syria and eastern Anatolia are evident in the following passages. Ibn al-Athīr under the year 581/1185-1186 writes that disputes arose between them and the Kurdish tribes who lived in those regions. According to Ibn al-Athīr the strife between the Türkmen and Kurds in the Jazīra and Mosul started because of a minor dispute between the two groups. Yet his account reveals the wider impact of the Turcoman expansion whose causes lay in the conflicts caused by the Khwārazmians in Khurasan.

“During this year there was the beginning of the strife between the Türkmen and the Kurds in the Jazīra, Mosul, Diyār Bakr, Khilat, Syria, Sharazūr and Azerbaijan. Because of it a multitude beyond counting were killed. It lasted several years. Roads were made impassable, property plundered and much blood spilt.”

Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Crusading Period*, II, 310. Bar Hebraeus includes this information give by Ibn al-Athīr in his chronicle and adds that the Armenian and Syriac Christians in eastern Anatolia were killed or enslaved by the Türkmen. Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 321-322.

³⁹⁸ Bar Hebraeus informs us for example of Türkmen uprising in Cilicia in 583/ 1187: “And in that year a certain Turkoman shepherd whose name was RŪSTĀM collected five thousand horsemen of the TURKOMANS, and a very large number of foot-soldiers, and went into CILICIA to loot and plunder the country”. Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 328.

employed as emirs. As all our sources are written by Persian administrators who are anxious to mould the Seljuq rulers into the Perso-Islamic model of kingship they do not give us any information on how far their lifestyle and thinking remained Turkish. Only some casual references reveal the continued existence of Turkish traditions. One obvious demonstration of this is that Kılıç Arslan divided his realm according to the old Turkish tradition of family rule. Cahen states that Kılıç Arslan might have also considered the unrest of the Türkmen bands in Anatolia who could be controlled more easily by independently ruled strong provinces.³⁹⁹ It would be probably better to suggest that the real reason behind the division was the Turkish concept of familial sovereignty, even though it seems to contradict the fact that Kılıç Arslan put much effort into uniting the Anatolian territories under his authority.

At any rate it is difficult to assess to what extent the Rum Seljuq sultans maintained a Turkish lifestyle but it seems safe to suggest that it remained an important part of their self-image up to the end. Hence the information given to us by Ibn Bībī, one of the immigrant Persian men of the pen and at the same time the most important chronicler of the Rum Seljuq sultanate, will be used with caution. Ibn Bībī begins his narrative with the death of Kılıç Arslan and gives detailed portraits of the Rum Seljuq sultans reigning from that time onwards. Herein he uses the ideal of kingship as described by Firdausi in his *Shāhnāma* as a criterion to evaluate the reigns of the Rum Seljuq sultans.⁴⁰⁰ This author and other Muslim as well as Christian authors however do not discuss the Turkish and the Byzantine influence on the sultans.

The Persian and Muslim influence is most evident in the names Kılıç Arslan gave his sons. Ibn Bībī, the most important Rum Seljuq author, begins his narrative with the death of Kılıç Arslan and gives the following list of the division of his realm among his sons:

“Rukn al-Dīn Sulaymān Shāh governed Tokat [Dokeia] and its environs, Naşr al-Dīn Barqyaruk Shāh governed Niksar [Neocaesarea] with its environs, Mughīth al-Dīn Tughrul Shāh governed Elbistan [Ablastha], Nūr al-Dīn Sultan Shāh governed Kayseri [Caesarea], Qutb al-Dīn Malik Shāh governed Sivas [Sebastea] and Aksaray [Colonia Archelais], Mu’izz

³⁹⁹ See Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 111. Unfortunately Cahen does not give any references for his statement and does not elaborate how he reached the conclusion that Kılıç Arslan divided his realm because of the Turcoman threat.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibn Bībī describes Firdausi as the leader of learned men of the Iranians and Arabs. Cf. Ibn Bībī, *Öztürk*, I, 92.

al-Dīn Qaysar Shāh governed Malatya [Melitene], Sanjar Shāh governed Ereğli [Herakleia Kybistra], Arslan Shāh governed Niğde [Antigu], Nizām al-Dīn Argun Shāh governed Amasya [Amesea], Muhyī al-Dīn Mas'ūd Shāh governed Ankara [Ancyra], and Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay Khusraw governed Burğlu [Uluborlu/ Sozopolis]. They did not depend in any aspect on the divan of their father's sultanate for the governance of their territories. ... They came once a year to their father's court and left for their lands after they had reached their intentions."⁴⁰¹

The Seljuq princes mentioned here all have an Islamic honorific with *dīn* (religion) prefixed to their personal names which are taken from Arabic, Turkish, and Persian. All personal names are suffixed by the Persian title *shāh*, king and some of them contain the Arabic title *malik* (king). The names of the Seljuq princes is another indication that Kılıç Arslan was under the influence of Muslim Persian advisers and that he was prepared to adopt the Perso-Islamic ideology at least in outlook. The Rum Seljuq sultanate was in reality not more than a confederation of principalities, which resisted attempts by the supreme sultans to impose a more centralised authority. Ibn Bībī states clearly that the sons ruled their respective provinces independently from the 'central government' of their father in Konya but seems to suggest that the divided polity was still a centralised Perso-Islamic state as he understood it. It will be argued here that the growing Iranian influence during the reigns of Sulaymān Shāh II and Kay Khusraw I spurred the development of the Rum Seljuq polity into a powerful Muslim state but that the Turkish and Byzantine influence also played a role.

The reign of Sulaymān lasted only seven years but he is one of the most important sultans of the Rum Seljuq dynasty. His importance has however so far not been recognised and even Cahen devotes just half of a page to the reign of this sultan⁴⁰². It was Sulaymān established the unity of the Rum Seljuq realm which had been compromised by the division undertaken by his father Kılıç Arslan. He put a halt to the internal quarrels and established himself as supreme ruler and secured the sultanate internally and externally and thus made possible that it reached its apogee

⁴⁰¹ Ibn Bībī, Duda, 19; see also Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, 41. Kılıç Arslan's division of his realm among his sons as stated by Ibn Bībī is confirmed by Michael the Syrian, and Ibn al-Athīr, both authors contemporaries to the events, and also Choniates. Even though the list of the Rum Seljuq princes in these sources is not identical with the list given by Ibn Bībī, the latter's list of eleven sons and their respective territories seems accurate because, as Wittek writes, they are also confirmed by coins and inscriptions. Wittek, *Toponymie*, 15. Choniates, Magoulias, 286; Michael the Syrian, Chabot, III, 410; For the list given by Ibn al-Athīr see Wittek, *Toponymie*, 16; Choniates, Magoulias, 286.

⁴⁰² Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 115; idem, *Formation*, 42.

under Kay Qubādh (616-634/1220-1237). It will be shown here that the Persian and Byzantine influence increased but that the mentality of Sulaymān was very similar to that of his father. He united the Rum Seljuq dominions with the same determination and ruthlessness as his father had done at the beginning of his reign.

Sulaymān continued his father's expansionist policies and it seems that for him as for his father the subjugation of Turkish rivals was the main concern. After he had taken the Turkish-held territories in Anatolia under his control he tried to expand into Christian-held territories, especially Georgia. As a scribe Ibn Bībī is not interested very much in political or military details of the reign of Sulaymān. He also glosses over the circumstances of how Sulaymān subjugated his brothers to gain supreme rule. The Christian authors Choniates and Bar Hebraeus give us some information on how Sulaymān put aside his brothers to gain supreme rule.

“When Qutb al-Dīn departed this life, Rukn al-Dīn, who held sway over Dokeia, and Mas'ūd, the ruler of Ankara, contended hotly over this satrapy. Rukn al-Dīn, who was more clever by nature and exulted exceedingly in warfare, outdistanced his brother and rival and carried off the victory. Since Mas'ūd submitted and agreed to a covenant of friendship, the more powerful Rukn al-Dīn took possession of only a portion of Mas'ūd's toparchy and allowed him to govern there as before. He was especially maddened, however, by Kayhusraw and suffered a burning passion for Ikonion, the paternal seat of government ... Through envoys he advised Kaykhusraw to withdraw from Ikonion and remove himself from all power if he wished to perform a good service and spare the cities and the individuals and nations therein from the horrors of war. Thus did the barbarian boast, unsurpassed in his arrogance, his eyebrows raised above the clouds in scorn, as he poured out and scattered his deadly venom in many directions.”⁴⁰³

This Byzantine author recognises that Sulaymān was a clever ruler and an excellent military leader; this helped him to force his rivals into submission. According to Bar Hebraeus, Sulaymān even went so far as to kill one of his brothers, who, it seems, was powerful and not prepared to submit to his authority.

“And in this year Sūltān RŪKN AD-DĪN, the lord of MELITENE and ICONIUM, took the city of ANCYRA from his brother, after he had warred against it for years, for it was very strong. And he brought out from it his brother and the two sons which he had, and he gave to them a fortress in the Outer Marches. And whilst they were going there he sent an army against them as if they had been highway robbers and killed them. Five days after his brother and his sons were killed, a disease of the colon attacked him and he died quickly. And there rose after him a young son which he had whose name was KELEJ 'ARSLĀN.”⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰³ Choniates, Magoulias, 286.

⁴⁰⁴ Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 360.

These passages demonstrate that like his father Kılıç Arslan, Sulaymān was a ruthless and determined military leader and that his main aim was to bring all Turkish-held territories under his control. Ibn Bībī claims that ‘Alā al-Dīn from the house of Saltuk,⁴⁰⁵ the lord of Erzurum, tried to evade the sultan’s orders and was reluctant to take part in the campaign against Christian Georgia and that therefore the sultan deposed him as ruler and assigned his lands to his brother Mugīth al-Dīn Tuğrul Shāh⁴⁰⁶. It is not possible to determine if Sulaymān had greater political vision than his father Kılıç Arslan and if he aimed to establish a strong central Perso-Islamic government and therefore strove to establish unity. The course of events indicates that he acted tactically to reach his goal. Nevertheless, what he really achieved was nominal overlordship as several of his brothers and other Turkish lords ruled over their own semi-independent provinces but recognised him as their overlord. It is also not clear how he would have regulated his succession if he had lived longer and had not left behind just an infant son. There is no conclusive evidence that he wanted to abolish the Turkish tradition of family rule and establish himself as an autocratic king in accordance with the Persian ideal of kingship.⁴⁰⁷ It is noteworthy that the son he left behind had the Turkish names of his father, Kılıç Arslan and that he did not found any religious monuments. We can assume that in all probability Sulaymān adhered to almost the same ideological concept as was formulated under his father.

⁴⁰⁵ For the Turcoman dynasty of the Saltuk Oğuları see *EI2*, Saltuk Oghullari (Leiser).

⁴⁰⁶ Ibn Bībī, *Duda*, 35; Ibn Bībī, *Öztürk*, I, 93. The version of events given by Bar Hebraeus proves, however, that it was the aim of Sulaymān to prevent any opposition by his Turkish rivals: “And in the year, when MŪ‘IZ AD-DĪN KAISAR SHĀH was reigning in MELITENE, his brother RUKN AD-DĪN, Sūltān, the son of KELEJ ‘ARSLĀN, attacked him, and he made war on the country and took it from him in the month of HAZĪRĀN (June) of the year fifteen hundred and eleven of the GREEKS (A.D. 1200). And MŪ‘IZ AD-DĪN KAISAR SHĀH fled from before his brother to MĀLIK ‘ĀDIL, his father-in-law; and ‘ĀDIL sent and made him to dwell in EDESSA and supplied him with provisions. And from there RUKN AD-DĪN went to ‘ARZĀN AR-RŪM. And there was in it a son of MĀLIK MĀHAMĀD, the son of SALTĀK; now they belonged to a very old family (or, house), and had ruled over ‘ARZĀN AR-RŪM for a very long time. And when its lord went forth to RUKN AD-DĪN in a kindly and humble manner, he seized him and shut him up in prison and took his city. And he also took ICONIUM from GHĀYATH AD-DĪN KAI KESRŪ, his brother”. Bar Hebraeus, *Budge*, 350.

⁴⁰⁷ Osman Turan claims that Sulaymān abolished the ancient feudal Turkish tradition of collective sovereignty, which had been a factor of division in all previous Turkish states and that it never reappeared. This, he states, was the model for centralised government for the Ottoman Empire. As it will be shown in the following chapters, the Turkish tradition did persist and it was only the luck of circumstances which enabled the successors of Sulaymān to be sole rulers. See Turan, *Selçuklular*, 264.

Unfortunately, however, the only inscription of Sulaymān which has come down to us and can be found on the citadel in Niksar is not as extensive as the inscription of Kılıç Arslan. A direct comparison is thus not possible. This inscription is dated *muharram* 594 (November/ December 1197) and was most probably commissioned when he was the prince regent of the province. It is not completely legible but it contains the following titulature:

“[lacuna] the subjugator (*al-qāhir*), pillar of state and religion (*Rukn al-Dawla wa'l-Dīn*), Abu Muẓaffar Sulaymān b. Kılıç Arslan.”⁴⁰⁸

This inscription only includes the honorific of Sulaymān and the title *al-qāhir* which he already used as prince and which he continued to use when he became sultan, as his coinage shows. The coins of Sulaymān bear the following titles:

“The sultan the subjugator (*al-qāhir*), father of conquest (*Abu'l-faṭḥ*), Sulaymān b. Kılıç Arslan, Protector of the Commander of the Faithful (*Nāṣir Amīr al-Mu'minīn*).”⁴⁰⁹

From this we can see that Sulaymān continued the use of the title *Abu'l-faṭḥ* employed by his father and that it goes without saying that he too presented himself as the supporter of the Abbasid caliph. In contrast to his father, however, Sulaymān did not need to present himself as a jihad warrior. His father's great rival Saladin died shortly after the former and none of his successors reached the power he had. It seems to have been more important for Sulaymān to demonstrate to his internal rivals his military might with the title *al-qāhir*. It is noteworthy in this respect that his brother, Mas'ūd who challenged his authority and was eventually killed also bore the title *al-qāhir*. An inscription in the name of Mas'ūd in Ankara dated *saḡar* 594 (December/ January 1197-1198) reads:

“The prince the subjugator (*al-malik al-qāhir*), the reviver of state and religion (*Muhyi al-Dawla wa'l-Dīn*), the prince of Rum and the Greeks, Abu Nasr Mas'ūd b. Kılıç Arslan”⁴¹⁰.

⁴⁰⁸ RCEA, VIII, 218 (inscription no 3511).

⁴⁰⁹ For the coinage of Sulaymān see Aykut, *Selçuklu Sikkeleri*, 292-325; Güler, *Selçuklu Sikkeleri*, 69-74. Both these works list the inscriptions and images to be found on the coins and give also photographs of the coins but do not discuss them at all.

⁴¹⁰ RCEA, VIII, 217-218 (inscription no 3509).

Mas‘ūd quite evidently challenged the central government with the ambitious claim that he was the prince/king of Rum and the Greeks. Besides he used the same title as Sulaymān which explains why Sulaymān later regarded this brother as a threat to his authority and did not tolerate him. This is however not enough evidence to prove that this ruler aimed to become an autocratic Perso-Islamic sultan. The information we can gather from the chronicles is not conclusive.

Ibn Bībī is anxious to mould Sulaymān into his ideal of ancient Iranian kingship and portrays him in the following lines:

“The mighty sultan Rukn al-Dīn Sulaymān Shāh was such a ruler about whom the following is valid: A high tree such as had not risen in the garden of power of the children of Kılıç Arslan, probably even not in the garden of power of the descendants of Seljuq; he was in possession of a great fighting club (spirit), a great clemency towards the subjects, an immeasurable virtue, an infinite piety and morality ... shining in the different sciences and thirsty and thirsting for the wish to accumulate knowledge.”⁴¹¹

According to our Persian author, Sulaymān was an exceptional ruler even in the line of all sultans descended from Seljuq, which implies that he was better than the Great Seljuq sultans Alp Arslan and Malik Shāh. This underlines the sultan’s noble lineage and puts him at the same time above the two greatest rulers from the dynasty. Ibn Bībī accords the important qualities of an ideal Persian king, right religion, martial ability, clemency, and knowledge. To demonstrate how learned Sulaymān was the author quotes a quatrain he allegedly wrote for his brother whom he killed and adds that those lines show his whole character.

“O Qutb (pole), like the heaven I do not turn my head from you,
Until I have pulled you into the circle like the dots.
Be the skin of my body stretched over the drum,
If I do not pull your head from your forelock.”⁴¹²

What is remarkable here is that the content of these lines seems to reflect the spirit of a Turkish warlord. The dots pulled into a circle, the body stretched over the drum, and pulling the head from the forelock are all elements from ancient Turkish traditions. Additionally to underline the sultan’s love of learning, Ibn Bībī states that he sponsored poets and learned men and gave vast amounts of money to famous

⁴¹¹ Ibn Bībī, Duda, 31-32; Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 77-78.

⁴¹² Ibn Bībī, Duda, 32.

poets who devoted poems to him.⁴¹³ Then, to complete his panegyric he uses anecdotes to demonstrate the generosity and justice of the sultan.⁴¹⁴ Bar Hebraeus makes in his work a comment which puts a shadow on the description of Sulaymān given by Ibn Bībī.

“Concerning this Sūltān RŪKN AD-DĪN it is said that he was very astute, and methodical (or, orderly) in his actions. He inclined to the opinions (or, teaching) of the foreign philosophers, and though he observed the form, he did not publish it openly”⁴¹⁵.

The accounts given by the other Rum Seljuq chroniclers are very brief and descriptive. Aksarayi writes that Sulaymān received three times the insignia of kingship, baldachin, and banner, from the Abbasid caliph and that he was officially recognised as sultan. The author continues that following his success in his lands the sultan attacked Georgia but he does not specify the internal achievements. He then took Erzurum and gave it to his brother Muġīth al-Dīn Tuġrul Shāh. The sultan then undertook with 20.000 soldiers another campaign against Georgia but was defeated and returned to Rum and died before he could take revenge for this setback.⁴¹⁶ The anonymous author does not devote a separate heading to the reign of Sulaymān but includes his reign in the end of his record on Kılıç Arslan. Moreover the chronology and the details of the information he gives is confused and not in accordance with the records given by the other sources. Our author claims that Kılıç Arslan designated Qutb al-Dīn as his heir and sent him to Konya where he went and ascended the throne in Ramadan 585/1189. He then continues that after seven months the Franks took Konya but that the sultan defeated the Franks in 586/1190. Finally, he writes the sultan was poisoned by a certain Ibn Awariz.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹³ Ibn Bībī, Duda, 32; Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 80.

⁴¹⁴ See Ibn Bībī, Duda, 32-33; Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 79-84.

⁴¹⁵ Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 360.

⁴¹⁶ Cf. Aksarayi, Öztürk, 24; Aksarayli, Gençosman, 128. According to Gençosman's translation the nöbet was sounded three times for Sulaymān Shāh in Konya and he received the insignia of rule from the caliph once.

⁴¹⁷ Cf. Anonymous, ed. Jalali, 83; Anonymous, Uzluk, 26.

IV. The apogee of the Rum Seljuq State

Kay Kāwūs and his brother Kay Qubādh ruled after the death of their father Kay Khusraw in turn from 608/1211 until 634/1237. Arguably, these two brothers are the ‘greatest’ Rum Seljuq sultans and the period of their reigns represents the zenith of Rum Seljuq power. Yet, as already indicated in the previous chapter, these two rulers owed their powerful status to the achievements of their predecessors, their uncle Sulaymān Shāh and their father Kay Khusraw. More significantly, drastic transformations in the political landscape contributed to their success. On the one hand the Crusaders had turned against Christian Byzantium and the armies of the Fourth Crusade conquered Constantinople in 1204. On the other hand, the ‘Counter Crusade’ had lost its momentum and the Ayyubid state was divided among Saladin’s successors. In the power vacuum that developed the Rum Seljuq state was transformed into a maritime state and the strongest power in Anatolia. The division of the remainder of the Byzantine Empire into two rival polities, the ‘Empire’ of Nicaea and the ‘Empire’ of Trebizond, contributed to the Rum Seljuq conquest of the important sea outlets of Attaleia (Antalya) in 603 (1207), Sinope (Sinop) in 611 (1214) and Kalon-Oros (‘Alā’iyya, modern Alanya) in 620 (1223).⁴¹⁸ With the seizure of Sinop from the ‘Empire’ of Trebizond and the re-conquest of Antalya which had been recaptured by the Christians under Kay Kāwūs the Rum Seljuq sultanate was able to control all important trade routes. This led to the economic expansion of the Rum Seljuq state and made it the wealthiest power in the region. Two Latin authors writing in the second half of the 13th century at a time when the Rum Seljuq sultanate was under Mongol control and in decline have left us descriptions of the great wealth of the sultanate and its highly developed towns and

⁴¹⁸ Without giving any evidence Vryonis puts forward that:

“The disintegration of the maritime provinces was well underway by the end of the twelfth century, and it is quite likely that the Turkish conquest of the coastal regions might have taken place one century earlier than it actually did had it not been for the events attendant upon the Fourth Crusade. By the marshalling of their forces in Anatolia, the Byzantines halted the Turkish penetration after it had attained Attaleia (1207) in the south and Sinope (1214) in the north.” Vryonis, *Decline*, 132. Holt writes that: “The capture of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade and the establishment of the Latin empire (1204) paradoxically strengthened the Byzantines against the Seljukids.” Holt, *Crusades*, 172. That the conquest of Constantinople necessarily led the Byzantines to concentrate on their Anatolian territories is true but there are no indications in the sources that the Rum Seljuq rulers were able or made it their priority to seize sea ports in the 12th century. Turkmen nomads were raiding the coastal regions already in that period but they were personal enterprises of these groups.

hinterland. Jean de Joinville writes: “At the time of our arrival in Cyprus the Sultan of Iconium [Konya] was the richest ruler in all the pagan world.”⁴¹⁹ Simon de St Quentin states: “Erat quidem illud Turquie regnum nobilissimum et opulentissimum. Ibi civitates fere .C. exceptis castris et villis et casalibus.”⁴²⁰

The political and economic transformations were accompanied by the transformation of Rum Seljuq culture. The number of Iranian bureaucrats, scholars, poets, Sufis and craftsmen from Persian territories especially Khurasan, who fleeing before the Mongol invasions sought refuge in Anatolia, grew substantially during this period. It was also during this period that the real development of the Rum Seljuq state took place, cities, especially the capital Konya, were developed and mosques, *madrasas* and *caravanserais* constructed. At this time the development of literature written in Persian began in Anatolia and was supported by the sultans themselves. The most important results of these developments were the further Persianisation and Islamization of the Rum Seljuq sultanate and thus the constitution of the sultanate as a Muslim state. As will be shown below both Kay Kāwūs and Kay Qubādh were anxious to maintain good relations with the Abbasid caliph al-Nāṣir.

It has to be conceded, however, that the power structures remained fundamentally the same during the reigns of these two sultans. The leading emirs of the sultanate held the reins of the central as well as local governments in their hands. It is noteworthy that both Kay Kāwūs and Kay Qubādh owed their succession to the emirs who chose them to be sultans and thus cannot in the strict sense of the word be regarded as autocratic rulers. Ibn Bībī, whose work is the main narrative source for the reigns of these two rulers, is highly partisan and presents these two sultans, and especially Kay Qubādh, as exemplary Perso-Islamic kings. As already noted, this author belongs to the group of the Persian men of the pen. His work represents first and foremost his attitude and his ideas of kingship and therefore must be read with special caution. Nevertheless, his work is of great value, as he was a member of the Rum Seljuq elite and the image of these rulers projected in his work is the officially propagated image. Besides, the author is not completely biased and includes in his

⁴¹⁹ Jean de Joinville, tr. M. Shaw as *The Life of Saint Louis*, Harmondsworth 1984, 199.

⁴²⁰ Simon de St Quentin ed. J. Richard as *Histoire des Tartares*, Paris 1965, 66.

narrative some information which exposes the political realities of the period and some of the real characteristics of the sultans. There is also some information in the Christian sources, such as Bar Hebraeus which helps us to confirm the information given by Ibn Bībī. The epigraphic source material for Kay Kāwūs and Kay Qubādh is much richer than for their predecessors and thus we have more contemporary evidence which helps us to confirm the narrative sources written in retrospect and to draw a more complete picture of the self-image and ideology of these rulers. However, a first survey of the inscriptions reveals that they also should be handled with caution, as they were most probably formulated by men sharing the same ideas as Ibn Bībī.

The purpose of the following two chapters is to discuss if the development of the Rum Seljuq sultanate into the strongest power in the region led these two rulers to adopt a different ideology from that of their predecessors. How were the significant changes in the political landscape accommodated in the Rum Seljuq ideology formulated under these rulers? Did they have a different self-image from that of their predecessors as they were rulers of a powerful state? Did they try to cut back the power of the emirs and assume autocratic kingship in accordance with the newly won power of their state?

IV.1. ‘Izz al-Dīn Kay Kāwūs I (608-616/ 1211-1220)

That the question of succession following the sudden death of Kay Khusraw in battle was decided by the emirs shows the extent of their power. Kay Khusraw had allotted to each of his three sons one of the important towns of the Rum Seljuq realm. Kay Kāwūs held Malatya, Kay Qubādh held Tokat, and the third son Kay Farīdūn about whom not much is known was probably in Antalya. There are no indications that Kay Khusraw designated one among his three sons as his heir. The report of the succession given by Ibn Bībī unveils that the emirs held the reins of power in their hands and acted as sultan makers.⁴²¹ Three episodes described by Ibn Bībī in connection with the succession dispute between Kay Kāwūs and Kay Qubādh

⁴²¹ For the report of the succession dispute see Ibn Bībī, Duda, 51-54.

illustrate this clearly. The first of these is the report of how the heir to the throne was chosen by emirs of high rank. Ibn Bībī writes that the emirs of the sultanate, after they conferred about which of the three princes they should choose, agreed on Kay Kāwūs, who was the eldest son and at the time was in his province Malatya. Here Ibn Bībī names only one of the emirs, Nuṣrat al-Dīn al-Ḥasan b. Ibrāhīm the lord of Maraş, who apparently had the deciding vote and determined that Kay Kāwūs should be the next sultan.⁴²² He writes that the emirs went immediately from Konya to Kayseri and that within five days Kay Kāwūs was brought from Malatya to Kayseri where he was crowned sultan.

The second son Kay Qubādh, however, had won over his uncle Mughīth al-Dīn of Erzurum, the Dānishmendid Ḍāhir al-Dīn Ilī, who controlled the border regions (*uc*), and Leo of Armenia and laid siege on Kayseri. Kay Kāwūs then suggested that he should leave with his army and try to take Konya with the help of the emirs and troops of the *uc*. Jalal al-Dīn Qaysar, the governor of Kayseri, however, approached the sultan stating that he had a plan which would lead them to victory without engaging in combat. He won over Ḍāhir al-Dīn Ilī and Leo, the allies of Kay Qubādh, and the latter was forced to flee to Ankara. Kay Kāwūs was thus raised to the throne by one faction of the emirs of the Rum Seljuq sultanate and owed his victory over his brother to them. In return for their support Kay Kāwūs granted the emirs who had supported him high offices and governorship of important towns. Ibn Bībī states that Jalal al-Dīn Qaysar was raised to the office of the *pervāne*⁴²³ and that the other emirs received each a town, Zayn al-Dīn Bishāra, Niğde, Ḥusām al-Dīn Yūsuf, Malatya, and Mubāriz al-Dīn Chawly, Elbistan.⁴²⁴ Kay Kāwūs then went to the capital Konya where he was received by the important personages of the town and crowned as sultan.

The towns, it seems, independently from the governors who ruled over them, acted in their own right as the third episode in the succession struggle shows. Kay

⁴²² It is interesting to note that Ibn Bībī accords the qualities of Persian king to Nuṣrat al-Dīn and likens him to the ancient kings Farīdūn and Khusraw. The Persian author thereby indicates his approval that the choice of ruler should lie with the advisers of the kingdom. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 50; In the original panegyric of Ibn Bībī it is even written that not even rulers and sultans possessed the fame that Nuṣrat al-Dīn had won in this world. See for this Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 133.

⁴²³ This is a title derived from the Persian term for butterfly. The *pervāne* held a powerful office as the personal assistant of the sultan who conveyed his messages and distributed the favours. This office increased in importance during the Mongol protectorate. See Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 221-222.

⁴²⁴ Ibn Bībī, Duda, 54-55.

Qubādh who had entrenched himself in Ankara presented a threat to Kay Kāwūs, who, as Ibn Bībī writes, was aware of this and thus ordered the emirs of the regions and commanders of the troops to assemble for the siege of Ankara. What is curious is that the town resisted for a whole year and that when they run out of provisions the townspeople started negotiations with the camp of Kay Kāwūs. It is important to note that the emir Sayf al-Dīn Aybe led the negotiations with the townspeople, who only after receiving a written contract ensuring their demands, handed over the town. They had asked to be pardoned for their resistance and that Kay Qubādh should not be killed but taken into confinement.⁴²⁵

From these descriptions given by Ibn Bībī it can be deduced that the power of the sultan was limited by the emirs employed in the central government as well as the emirs who acted as local governors of the Rum Seljuq realm. The Rum Seljuq sultanate in this period can still be described as a confederation of provinces led by emirs who acted quasi-independently and determined the fate of the Rum Seljuq sultan. In theory, the emirs were serving the sultan but in reality they acted as local autonomous rulers. In reality, however, these emirs possessed great economic and military power derived from the provinces they held as hereditary *iqtas*.⁴²⁶ It is also important to note here that Turkish emirs holding command over the Turkmen troops in the border regions (*uc*) as ever played a crucial role. It is therefore legitimate to infer that the Turkish element must have had some effect on the image and ideology of these rulers but our sources are silent about this.

Ibn Bībī presents Kay Kāwūs as an autocratic Persian king and in a panegyric portrayal accords several characteristics of an ideal ruler to him. He includes in this list that the sultan was very generous, intelligent, that he possessed physical beauty, that he was an excellent archer, that he was a great patron of poets and learned men, and that the Rum Seljuq sultanate prospered under him and the people were happy.⁴²⁷ The ultimate praise the author confers on Kay Kāwūs is that:

⁴²⁵ Ibn Bībī, Duda, 58-61; Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 154-161.

⁴²⁶ It is very telling in this respect that Ibn Bībī includes in his portrayal of Kay Kāwūs that the *iqtas* allotted by the *divan* of this sultan were not changed or reduced in size and that when the holder of the *iqta* died it was inherited by his family. This passage is left out by the *muhtasar* but appears in the original work see Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 150.

⁴²⁷ The *muhtasar* gives a shortened version of this portrait than the original work which includes the poem composed for the sultan by the daughter of the commander Ḥusām al-Dīn and sent to him from Mosul, and the poem composed by Niẓām al-Dīn Erzincani. The original work also includes several

“His mind was as complete as the religion of Islam and his justice was like the shadow of the white cloud that pours showers over high and low.”⁴²⁸

The author concludes by stating that the sultan had been dressed with the robe of the *futuwwa* and that he had drunk from the cup of the *muruwwa*, thus claiming that he possessed the qualities of both the young and the mature man. According to Ibn Bībī, Kay Kāwūs was an ideal Persian king and a Muslim ruler who was officially recognised by the Abbasid caliph al-Nāṣir to whose reformed *futuwwa* he adhered⁴²⁹. In retrospect Ibn Bībī tries to mould this ruler into the Perso-Islamic model of kingship. But the author also criticises this sultan who he claims in the last year of his reign lost God’s favour, as will be discussed below. Within his report of the Syrian campaign the author notes an incident which reveals a dark side of the character of Kay Kāwūs. He writes that during the campaign against Aleppo following the capture of Tel Bashir the sultan was informed that the grave of Zāhir al-Dīn Īlī was in that vicinity.

“The sultan ordered that his grave should be rummaged and his crumbled bones taken out of the earth, thrown into fire and the ashes left to the wind. Through this the sultan cooled his anger.”⁴³⁰

A look into the inscriptions dedicated to Kay Kāwūs reveals that the ideological concept adopted during his reign is strikingly similar to that used by Ibn Bībī writing in retrospect. Therefore we can only draw a picture of the self-image and ideology which Kay Kāwūs wanted to articulate to the public to legitimise his rule. A wide range of inscriptions carved during the reign of Kay Kāwūs on different buildings in some of the major cities of the Rum Seljuq sultanate, such as Sinop, Antalya, Konya, Sivas, and Maraş, convey the official ideology and image of the sultan. The inscriptions on the city walls of the newly acquired towns of Sinop and

more lines praising the sultan’s justice, generosity, and achievements in respect to the prosperity of the state. See Ibn Bībī, Duda, 55-57; Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 141-151.

⁴²⁸ Ibn Bībī, Duda, 56; Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 141.

⁴²⁹ The caliph al-Nāṣir in his attempt to institutionalise the *futuwwa* in order to achieve the unification of the central Islamic lands under his authority, his moral authority at least, tried to win over all Muslim rulers for his cause. Kay Kāwūs for his part was happy to accept the *futuwwa* in return for the caliph’s official recognition. For a discussion of al-Nāṣir and the *futuwwa* see A. Hartmann, *an-Nāṣir li-Dīn Allāh (180-1225) Politik, Religion, Kultur in der späten ‘Abbāsidenzeit*, Berlin/ New York 1975; EI2, *Futuwwa*, (Cahen/ Taeschner).

⁴³⁰ Ibn Bībī, Duda, 84.

Antalya are particularly interesting in this respect. Following the conquest of Sinop the sultan ordered the emirs to repair its walls and they in turn commissioned inscriptions to be inserted on the walls to record their respective contributions. Of the fifteen inscriptions preserved, thirteen are dedicated to the Rum Seljuq emirs and are dated 612 (August 1215).⁴³¹ It is surprising that the sultan did not commission himself an inscription to commemorate his victory. However, all thirteen inscriptions of the emirs mention first the name of the sultan with his titles and then the name of the emir the town he governed and sometimes the office he held. Not all of these inscriptions are of the same length and the two longest among these are the most interesting as they include almost the complete protocol of the sultan, and it is thus worth quoting them in full here. The first of these inscriptions gives the following titulature for the sultan:

“The victorious sultan, the king of the east and the west, the master of the kings of the world, the ruler of the Arabs and the Persians, ‘Izz al-Dunyā wa’l-Dīn, the refuge of Islam and the Muslims, the sultan of the land and the sea *Abu’l-faḥ* Kay Kāwūs b. Kay Khusraw, the proof of the Commander of the Faithful.”⁴³²

The second of these inscriptions was commissioned by the emir of Malatya:

“The construction of this tower ... with the blessing and order, with the permission of the victorious sultan, the greatest King of Kings (Shāhanshāh), possessors of the neck of the nations, ‘Izz al-Dunyā wa’l-Dīn, the pillar of Islam and the Muslims, killer of the infidels and the polytheists, the pride of kings and sultans, sultan of the lands of God, guardian of the worshippers of God, supporter of the caliph of God, the sultan of the countries of Rum, Syria, Armenia, of the land and of the sea, *Abu’l-Faḥ* Kay Kāwūs b. Kay Khusraw, the proof of the Commander of the Faithful, ... the emir the sipahsalar Husām al-Dīn Yūsuf al-Sultānī, ... Malatya.”⁴³³

Special emphasis is laid here on attributes of legitimacy and sovereignty derived from ancient Persian titles of sovereignty and from Muslim titles received by the caliph. The integral parts of the ideology formulated under Kay Kāwūs are not very different from those formulated under his grandfather Kılıç Arslan II and are expressed through almost identical phrases. The first significant element is the claim

⁴³¹ Cahen writes that the inscriptions of fifteen emirs are recorded but he gives no reference whatsoever for this statement. For a list of the Sinop inscriptions see the 10th volume of the RCEA, (inscription no 3760 to 3774), 113-122. Here fifteen inscriptions are listed but the first of these (inscription no 3760, 113) is the dedication inscription of the architect.

⁴³² RCEA, X, 114 (inscription no 3761).

⁴³³ RCEA, X, 118 (inscription no 3767).

to supreme kingship expressed in the second quoted inscription with the titles used by Kılıç Arslan II, “King of Kings” and “possessor of the necks of nations.” In the first inscription the title “king of the east and west” which had been accorded by the Abbasid caliph to the first Great Seljuq sultan Tuğrul reappears and in addition the title “master of the kings of the world” is used to reinforce the overlordship of the Rum Seljuq sultan. Unfortunately we cannot trace back why the engraver adopted certain titles. It is not possible to assess if they were just taken from a repertoire of titles and phrases generally used without any specific consideration on the part of the artist, or if in this case the sultan or emirs gave instructions as to which titles should be used. In either case the titles employed are very ambitious and exaggerate the extent of the authority of Kay Kāwūs.

The question is to whom was this propaganda targeted? The population of Sinop at the time of the conquest was pre-dominantly Christian Greek and would thus not have been able to read these inscriptions. That despite the extensive territorial ambitions the specifications are made that Kay Kāwūs is the ruler of the Arabs and the Persians and the sultan of the territories of Rum, Armenia, and Syria indicates that the audience to whom these inscriptions were addressed were in the first instance his Muslim rivals. Sinop, a town on the Black Sea, lay far from any of his Muslim neighbours, but it was part of the propaganda to demonstrate the sultan’s authority, especially in recently acquired frontier territories. In this way the extent of the sultan’s realm and power was demonstrated to his rivals. In addition, a new title “the sultan of the land and the sea” is adopted. Thereby the Rum Seljuq sultan assumes an imperial status and the extent of the Rum Seljuq realm and his superiority over his Muslim neighbours are underlined. The territories claimed to be under the rule of Kay Kāwūs reveal that the same territorial claims are made as under his predecessors and that the Rum Seljuq interest was directed towards the east and hence Armenia and Syria. These last mentioned territories were contested by his Muslim rivals, as will be discussed below in connection with the campaign Kay Kāwūs led against Syria.

The second integral element of the ideology is the role of the sultan as the guardian of Islam and the helper of the Abbasid caliph. In all inscriptions the role of Kay Kāwūs as the supporter of the caliph is included. Moreover, when analysing the

coins issued by Kay Kāwūs, it is striking that pictorial images are omitted and that the name of the caliph appears on all of them, even on the copper coins.⁴³⁴ It may well be that the sultan did this to impress the caliph and win his favour. During this period the best way to win the favour of the current Abbasid caliph al-Nāṣir was to join his reformed *futuwwa*. Ibn Bībī writes that Kay Kāwūs send the shaykh Majd al-Dīn Ishāq to Baghdad with the message of the conquest of Sinop and to request the trousers of the *futuwwa* for him.⁴³⁵ The author remarks that now that Kay Kāwūs had conquered Sinop and thereby strengthened Islam he used this as an opportunity to send an envoy with this news and gifts to the caliph. The rivalry among the Muslim rulers is exposed here again, as the author begins his report with the remark that in those days the sultan received the news that al-Malik al-Ashraf, the Ayyubid ruler of Mayyāfāriqīn, sent precious gifts to the caliph and in return received many favours.⁴³⁶ Köprülü argues, however, that Kay Kāwūs must have sent the envoy to the caliph shortly after he ascended the throne in Konya.⁴³⁷ In the context of this study the question of when exactly the envoys were exchanged or in how far Kay Kāwūs really adhered to the *futuwwa* cannot be discussed here.⁴³⁸ What is important to note here is that both sides seem to have been anxious to maintain good relations. The caliph al-Nāṣir send back an envoy to Kay Kāwūs with the trousers and an investiture letter for the *futuwwa*⁴³⁹. Together with this the sultan received an

⁴³⁴ According to the list given by Artuk the following coins are extant: fifteen *dirhams* issued in Konya between 607(8)-615/1211-1219; eleven *dirhams* issued in Sivas between 610-616/1213-1220; one *dirham* issued in Kayseri in 608/1211; one *dirham* issued in Tokat in 610/1213; twenty-seven copper coins of which only three contain the issue, date and place, Sivas between 610-614/1213-1218. See Aykut, *Selçuklu Sikkeleri*, 397-491. See also Güler, *Selçuklu Sikkeleri*, 85-89.

⁴³⁵ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 68-69; Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 175-180.

⁴³⁶ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 68; Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 175.

⁴³⁷ Köprülü writes that a passage in the *Ānīs al-Kulūb* written by al-Anawī proves that the envoy had been sent to the caliph, on the occasion of the accession to the throne. Köprülü, 'Anadolu Selçukluları Tarihi'nin Yerli Kaynakları', in: *Belleten* xxvii (1943), 484. See also Turan, *Selçuklular*, 298-299. Hartmann writes that in a letter the caliph confirmed that Kay Kāwūs had asked him to be invested with the insignia of the *futuwwa* already in the year 608 (1212). Hartmann, *an-Nāṣir li-Dīn Allāh*, 108.

⁴³⁸ The question of the *futuwwa* (Turkish *fütüvvet*) under the Seljuqs in Anatolia has not been dealt with at any length by historians of the Seljuqs. Cahen writes that Kay Kāwūs "remained faithful to the *futuwwa* as reshaped by al-Nāṣir and, although it is impossible to determine by what means, it can be accepted that as a result the organization of the *futuwwa* in Anatolia was stimulated, on lines possibly conforming more nearly with the Caliph's wishes than they did in the ancient towns where too rigid a tradition was dominant." Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 196; Turan in his work on the Seljuqs and Islam just makes passing remarks about how the caliph al-Nāṣir used this institution to extend his authority. Turan, *Selçuklular Tarihi ve Turk-Islam Medeniyeti*, 186-187, 225-226.

⁴³⁹ The *muhtasar* of Ibn Bībī only states that the sultan received the investiture letter, *kitāb-i futuwwa*, whereas in the original work the letter written in Arabic is reproduced. See Ibn Bībī, Duda, 69. In the endnote 37 Duda mentions how the caliph addressed Kay Kāwūs in this letter. According to this the

investiture patent for his sultanate in which he was cautioned to execute the punishment instructions given by the Sharī‘a law⁴⁴⁰. This warning might be an indication that a laxity in the execution of the religious law in the Rum Seljuq sultanate existed. It is, however, not possible to derive from the information given by Ibn Bībī and the phrases used in the inscription the religious zeal of Kay Kāwūs. It was important for his public image to receive the official recognition of the caliph but his policies were not dominated by religious concerns.

Ibn Bībī describes the conquest of Sinop as a victory for Islam but his report of the seizure of the town reveals that it was motivated by economic considerations rather than the expansion of the territory of Islam. The battle at Alaşehir in 608/1211 in which Kay Khusraw died was the last serious military conflict between the Byzantines and the Rum Seljuqs. Moreover, Kay Kāwūs concluded a peace treaty with Lascaris the ‘Emperor’ of Nicaea that was to last for half a century except for the raids undertaken by the independent Turcomans who dwelt on the frontiers. Kay Kāwūs had no interest in destroying the empire of Nicaea and expanding the realm of Islam.⁴⁴¹ As for the other Christian principalities, the Empire of Trebizond, Georgia, and Cilician Armenia, the main aim of Kay Kāwūs was to be recognized as suzerain and thus secure his grasp over Anatolia, but not to wage jihad. Besides, the campaigns against the Armenians of Cilicia were undertaken in favour of the Frankish prince Bohemond IV and al-Zāhir the Ayyūbid prince of Aleppo who was one of the allies of Kay Kāwūs. Hence the expansionist policy of this Rum Seljuq sultan was led by power-political concerns and trade interests and the religious divide was easily overcome by Christians as well as Muslims. As in the time of Kılıç Arslan and the ‘Counter Crusaders’, in most cases for the Muslim as well as the Christian rulers the main enemies were co-religionists who were greater rivals. Trade interests were more often than not the deciding factor, and not the question of

sultan was designated as, “Izz al-Dīn the King (*Malik*) of Anatolia (Bilād ar-Rūm), Abu’l-Muẓaffar Kay Kāwūs b. Kay Khusraw b. Kılıç Arslan” and as “Izz al-Dīn *Amīr al-Umarā’*, King of Kings (*Malik Mulūk*) ... (*al-Khawāṣṣ*) Inanj Beg Aga Beg”. It is noteworthy that the caliph alludes to the Turkish descent of Kay Kāwūs and assigns Turkish titles to him which he most probably did not use, at least not in public, as there is no epigraphic evidence for them. Öztürk translates the investiture letter for the *futuwwa* but he leaves out the second listed titulature. Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 178.

⁴⁴⁰ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 69; Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 179.

⁴⁴¹ Cf. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 121.

confession.⁴⁴² Kay Kāwūs was happy to conclude trade treaties with the Cypriots and the Venetians guaranteeing them favourable conditions.⁴⁴³

The conquest of Sinop from the Great Comneni of Trebizond, who were rivals of the emperors of Nicaea, did not disturb the peace between Nicaea and Konya. The acquisition of Sinop as outlet to the Black Sea was the logical next step after the acquisition of Antalya, as it was only the possession of outlets to both seas would enable the Rum Seljuqs to control the trade passing through Anatolia. Concerns for trade are not mentioned by Ibn Bībī who writes that the campaign was initiated by the attacks of the Byzantine ruler of Trebizond Alexius I Comnenos on the territories of the sultan. But he does not use phraseology describing Muslim – Christian animosity or *jihād* in connection with this campaign. Furthermore, the author states that, after the town was taken friendly relations were assumed between Alexius I Comnenos and Kay Kāwūs, although he underlines that the Byzantine was inferior in status.⁴⁴⁴ After the conquest of Sinop the churches were converted into mosques but this of course was the general procedure following the conquest of new territory to demonstrate Muslim domination and is not proof of the religious zeal of Kay Kāwūs. Thus the superiority of the Rum Seljuq sultan is emphasized but the conquest of Sinop is not elaborated at any length in the inscriptions or in the narrative of Ibn Bībī as a great victory of Islam over Christianity. From the thirteen inscriptions only the inscription of the emir of Malatya employs the ideological concept of *jihād* using the epithet “killer of the infidels and the polytheists.”

In contrast to the Sinop inscriptions, in the Antalya inscription *jihād* is a central element. Following the rebellion of the Christian townspeople of Antalya and the re-conquest of the city by the Rum Seljuqs an exceptionally long inscription was placed on its walls. This inscription comprises thirty-eight lines. Another striking

⁴⁴² As Cahen writes “The difficulty was that, in the Syro-Cilician political manoeuvres, Seljukids and Cypriots supported opposing sides. However, correspondence exchanged from 1213 to 1216 in increasingly specific terms made it possible to separate the problems and to ensure favourable conditions for trade between the two countries, while leaving each of them free to support or resist Leo I or his enemy Bohemond IV of Antioch, helped by the Ayyūbids of Aleppo.” Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 122.

⁴⁴³ For a discussion of the relationship between Kay Kāwūs and Hugo, the ruler of Cyprus and the Venetians, see Turan, *Türkiye Selçukluları Hakkında Resmi Vesikalar*, 108-137. A Turkish translation of four letters exchanged between Kay Kāwūs and Hugo is given in *ibid* 139-143.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibn Bībī claims that Alexius I Comnenos prostrated himself before the sultan and kissed the ground of humiliation and subjugation and that he stood at the stirrup of the sultan but that the sultan treated him in accordance with his standing as he assigned a seat to him higher than that of all of his emirs. Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 65, 67.

point is that the Christian Greek inhabitants are addressed directly, though they would not have been able to read the Arabic inscription. In a self-laudatory fashion the victory of Kay Kāwūs over the Christians is described and his full protocol is given:

“the shadow of God on the two horizons ... the great *Shāhānshāh*, the sovereign of the necks of the nations, the master of the Arab and Persian sultans, the king of the kings of the world, *‘Izz al-Dunyā w’l-Dīn*, the refuge of Islam and the Muslims, the pillar of the triumphant empire (*dawla*), the glorifier of the eminent community, the rescuer of the flourishing nation, the sultan of the two seas, *Abu’l-Faṭḥ* Kay Kāwūs the son of the martyr (*shahid*) sultan Kay Khusraw, the son of the most happy sultan Kılıç Arslan, the proof of the Commander of the Faithful.”⁴⁴⁵

The purpose of this inscription was to demonstrate the sovereignty and power of the Rum Seljuq sultan to the Christians and to warn them not to rebel again. At the same time, however, it is also a demonstration of the power of the Rum Seljuqs to the rival Muslim rulers. The Rum Seljuq sultan presents himself not only as an exemplary Muslim ruler but the epithet pillar of the empire seems to suggest that he is the supreme ruler of the Muslim Empire, hence of the whole of the Sunni Muslim lands. This imperial ideology is further strengthened by the assumption of the title “the sultan of the two seas (*al-bahrayn*)” alluding to the maritime power of the Rum Seljuq state. The epithet *al-bahrayn* was also used in the inscriptions on monuments built in the inner Anatolian strongholds of the Rum Seljuqs such as in Sivas, “the sultan of the land and the sea”⁴⁴⁶, and in Konya the Alā al-Dīn mosque has “the sultan of the land and the two seas.”⁴⁴⁷ It seems that after the Rum Seljuq sultanate had been transformed into the strongest Muslim power in the region Kay Kāwūs thought to assume a role in accordance with this and to present himself as an autocratic king. On the dinar issued in Sivas in 615/1219 the titulature of Kay Kāwūs is extended to,

“the sultan, through the favour of God, the victorious through the command of God *‘Izz al-Dīn* Kay Kāwūs.”⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴⁵ *RCEA*, X, 109-112 (inscription no 3757).

⁴⁴⁶ *RCEA*, X, 146-147 (inscription no 3809).

⁴⁴⁷ *RCEA*, X, 163 (inscription no 3835). See for this also Löytved, *Konia*, 32.

⁴⁴⁸ For the liege of this coin see Aykut, *Selçuklu Sikkeleri*, 397-398; For the German translation see Hinrichs, *Sultan und Kalif*, 345.

It is curious that even though Kay Kāwūs was anxious to win the caliph's favour, as stated above, here the latter is taken out of the equation. The sultan claims here that his power is immediately derived from God without the caliph as intermediary to legitimise it. The claims made by this title seem to reflect the ancient Iranian tradition that, "the sultan [king] is the Shadow of God on Earth."⁴⁴⁹ The use of these titles here is extraordinary, and since they only appear on this single dinar it is difficult to assess their meaning. As this coin was issued in 615 (1219) after the conquest of Sinop and re-conquest of Antalya we can be certain that its purpose was to demonstrate the superiority of the Rum Seljuq sultan. In the old strongholds of Konya and Sivas, and especially in the newly acquired towns Sinop and Antalya the imperial ideology of supreme kingship was symbolised and propagated to internal and external audiences through architectural monuments and inscriptions.

The invocation of jihad in the inscription of Antalya seems somewhat inappropriate and superficial, because the re-conquest of the town was crucial for the trade of the Rum Seljuq sultanate. As already noted in connection with the conquest of Sinop, the main motive of the Rum Seljuqs was not to wage *jihad* against the Christians and defend the Muslims but to secure the important sea outlets. It is thus surprising that, whereas in the inscriptions of Sinop only a *jihad* epithet was used once, now jihad epithets are adopted and Kay Khusraw is referred to as *shahid*. Hereby it is implied that Kay Khusraw, the father of Kay Kāwūs, died waging 'holy war' against the Christians and that the latter is continuing the 'holy war'. Kay Khusraw is designated as *shahid* in all subsequent inscriptions. Yet for Kay Kāwūs as for his predecessors the control of Anatolia and influence over Muslim neighbours in the east played a greater role than the seizure of Christian territories. He continued the traditional Rum Seljuq policy of expansion towards the east. Like his predecessors he sought the alliance of his immediate neighbours in Anatolia in order to receive support against the Ayyūbids ruling in Mesopotamia and northern Syria. For this reason most probably he concluded a matrimonial alliance with the

⁴⁴⁹ As cited from the *Naṣīhat al-mulūk* of pseudo - al-Ghazālī by Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam*, 121. Al-Ghazālī was one of the Muslim scholars who incorporated Iranian ideas into Muslim tradition.

Mengüçük dynasty and married the daughter of Dāwūd II Bahrām Shāh, the ruler of Erzincan before his campaign into Syria.⁴⁵⁰

When al-Ẓāhir Ghazi of Aleppo died in 613/1216 he left as his heir a minor son, whose mother acted as regent. Kay Kāwūs used this as an opportunity to interfere in Ayyubid affairs and seize some of their territories and thereby put a halt to the growing power of his main Muslim rival the Ayyūbid al-Ashraf. The titles claimed by al-Ashraf in his inscriptions reveal that he contested the power of the Rum Seljuq sultan.⁴⁵¹ Kay Kāwūs approached al-Afḍal the Ayyūbid who was in exile in Samosata for support in a campaign against the principality of Aleppo and the territories of al-Ashraf. They agreed that al-Afḍal would receive Aleppo and continue to recognise Kay Kāwūs as his suzerain and that in return the latter would receive any lands that they would conquer east of the Euphrates.⁴⁵²

Ibn Bībī devotes several pages to the Syrian campaign of Kay Kāwūs and according to him it was the sultan's decision to take advantage of the weakness of Aleppo. It will be useful here to first summarise some of the relevant features of this account. The author starts by stating that the sultan desired the kingdom of Aleppo which in the past had belonged to his uncles on his father's side and that he approached for their advice the great emirs of his realm, Ṣāḥib Majd al-Dīn Ānī, Malik al-Umarā' Sayf al-Dīn Ajbe,⁴⁵³ Zayn al-Dīn Bishāra, and Mubāriz al-Dīn Chawly. According to the version of events given by Ibn Bībī, the emirs recommended that an attack on Aleppo would not be advisable because of several reasons. They pointed out that it would be a break of friendship because of the

⁴⁵⁰ Ibn Bībī naturally does not give the political background of this marriage alliance but it is interesting that he argues that the sultan wanted to marry the daughter of the Mengüçük ruler because of her noble lineage as she was "of the brilliant descent of the sultan Kılıç Arslan and root of Selçuk". Ibn Bībī, Duda, 77.

⁴⁵¹ For example in the inscription on the minaret in Mayyāfāriqīn al-Ashraf assumes almost the same protocol: "the sultan al-Malik al-Ashraf, the learned, the just, the champion of the faith, the defender of the frontiers, Muẓaffar *al-Dunyā w'l-Dīn*, the pillar of Islam and the Muslims, the lord of the nations, the King of the Arabs and the Persians, the *Shāh* of the Armenians, *Abu'l-Faḥ* Mūsā, the defender of the Commander of the Faithful, during the reign of our master the Imam Abu'l-Ma'ālī Aḥmad al-Nāṣir li-Dīn Allah." Not only does al-Ashraf claim here to be the sultan ruling over Arabs, Persians and Armenians as Kay Kāwūs claimed but implies that he is the real defender of Islam. To underline his religious zeal the Abbasid caliph is mentioned by his name. *RCEA*, X, 76-77 (inscription no 3709).

⁴⁵² Cf. Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols: The Ayyubids of Damascus, 1193-1260*, New York 1977, 159.

⁴⁵³ This was most probably a Turkish name and according to the spelling given by Öztürk it should be Ayaba (Turkish ay: moon). Cf. Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 201.

previously friendly relations between the Ayyūbid rulers of Aleppo and the Rum Seljuqs, that the child had been recognised by the neighbouring rulers, and that his mother was the daughter of the Ayyūbid sultan al-‘Ādil and would certainly ask her brothers for support.⁴⁵⁴ Bar Hebraeus on the other hand states that the emirs advised the sultan that an attack on Syria was possible and that the sultan could use as a pretext the defence of the rights of the exiled Ayyubid al-Afḍal.⁴⁵⁵ Ibn Bībī then writes that the sultan sent *farmāns* to emir Nuṣrat al-Dīn al-Ḥasan b. Ibrāhīm, the lord of Maraṣ, the emirs of Malatya and Sivas as well as to the emirs of the uc to prepare their forces for the campaign and to assemble at Elbistan. The troops of the sultan annexed without any difficulty the fortresses Raban and Tell Bāshir, where he appointed as governors the son-in-law and the brother of emir Nuṣrat al-Dīn respectively.⁴⁵⁶ When the sultan was at Elbistan spies within his camp informed the *malika* and her *nā’ib* Jamal al-Dīn Lu’Lu’ that he was attacking Syria. They pleaded for help to al-Malik al-Ashraf, the brother of the *malika*, who came to Aleppo with many troops.⁴⁵⁷ In the meantime, the *malika* also resorted to a ruse against the Rum Seljuqid sultan and it is particularly interesting what kind of trick was used according to our author. In order to create distrust between the sultan and his emirs the *malika* fetched a Rum Seljuq subject who was well informed about the names of all emirs. Then letters were composed which allegedly were replies to letters sent to Syria by the Rum Seljuq emirs and hidden somewhere, only to be found and brought to the sultan. The latter was furious but ordered that this incident should be concealed for the time being. On the following day Ibn Bībī writes that the vanguard of the sultan’s army was defeated by al-Ashraf and several emirs were taken captive. It seems the sultan was undecided, not knowing if he should retreat or stay. The comment that Ibn

⁴⁵⁴ See Ibn Bībī, Duda, 81-82. The *muhtasar* of Ibn Bībī omits the argument that the *malika* could receive support from her brothers but it is included in the original work. For this see Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 201-202.

⁴⁵⁵ “And in the year Sūltān ‘IZZ AD-DĪN KAI KĀŪS, the lord of BĒTH RHŌMĀYĒ, eagerly desired to reign over ALEPPO, for he saw that it was lacking a lord, and that a sucking child was proclaimed in it. And his nobles advised him that this could easily take place, ‘if thou wilt take with thee this MĀLIK ‘AFDĀL, the son of ṢALĀḤ AD-DĪN, the lord of SAMOSATA, and wilt pretend that thou art jealous on account of him who is wronged by his brothers, and wilt restore to him the kingdom of his father because he is the eldest son of ṢALĀḤ AD-DĪN’.” Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 372.

⁴⁵⁶ See Ibn Bībī, Duda, 84; Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 205-206.

⁴⁵⁷ Al-Malik al-Ashraf I Mūsā b. al-‘Ādil I Muḥammad the ruler of the Ayyubid line in Diyarbakır (Mayyāfārqīn and Jabal Sinjār). Cf. Bosworth, *New Islamic Dynasties*, 72. According to Humphreys Shihab al-Dīn Tuḡrul, the *atabeg* of Aleppo called on al-‘Ādil the sultan of Egypt for help but the latter sent his son al-Malik al-Ashraf I. Cf. Humphreys, *From Saladin to the Mongols*, 160.

Bībī makes in this context is very telling. Al-Ashraf said at this point that the sultan probably wanted to continue the fight but that the emirs were probably holding him back.

Without any further explanation the author concludes that Kay Kāwūs left and came to Elbistan. When the brother and son-in-law of emir Nuṣrat al-Dīn handed over Raban and Tell Bāshir to al-Ashraf and came to Elbistan, Kay Kāwūs ordered all emirs to assemble in the reception room as he was still angry about the letters. These letters were then presented to the emirs who protested their innocence but he ordered that they should be killed in a fire. Ibn Bībī writes that the sultan was reproached by the hidden world of dreams and that he regretted the killing of the emirs. Because of that error he was afflicted by the hectic fever and he eventually died⁴⁵⁸. Ibn Bībī concludes his report stating that it can only be hoped that the sultan's good deeds in the beginning of his life will erase the sins committed in the last part of his life.

Two relevant deductions can be drawn from this account. First is the author's indirect indication of the power struggle between the sultan and the emirs and second is the unveiled criticism of Kay Kāwūs. As already noted, the emirs ruled their respective provinces almost independently and it is again clear from this report that the sultan depended on their support for his campaigns. Even though the author emphasises the innocence of the emirs he gives at the same time some clues that they did not agree with the sultan's decisions. The emirs were probably not prepared to risk great losses and continue the campaign when they realised that the army of al-Ashraf was stronger. Despite the great power held by the emirs in this instance the sultan demonstrated his superiority by giving them the ultimate punishment. The author is partisan towards the emirs and criticises the sultan for killing them without previous counselling and hence for his disregard of a 'good king's' duty to listen to his advisers or learned men. Thus the author uses this as an exemplary warning for present and future kings and claims that the sultan died from a terrible illness because of his reckless decision and in this way punished by God. For this reason probably the author omits the fact that Kay Kāwūs actually fell ill latter on the

⁴⁵⁸ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 89-90.

revenge campaign he led against al-Ashraf and died.⁴⁵⁹ Hence Ibn Bībī indicates here that the sultan whom he at first praised as an exemplary king had lost his right to rule.

In conclusion, it can be said that the significant changes in the political landscape led to a re-formulation of the official ideology propagated under Kay Kāwūs. The significant changes in the political landscape which transformed the Rum Seljuq sultanate into a strong maritime power during the reign of this sultan were accommodated into this ideology. The analysis of inscriptions reveals that an imperial status for the Rum Seljuq sultan was assumed claiming kingship over Muslims and Christians. Furthermore, he was presented as the supreme Muslim ruler. At the same time a discussion of the narrative of the Syrian campaign given by Ibn Bībī has revealed that Kay Kāwūs wanted to cut back the power of the emirs and probably wanted to establish a more centralised government. Thus it could be argued that the rise of the power of the Rum Seljuq sultanate led this sultan to assume in real political practice the role of an autocratic Perso-Islamic ruler which in theory was already claimed for his dynasty.

IV.2. 'Alā' al-Dīn Kay Qubādh I (616-634/ 1220-1237)

Ibn Bībī who devotes a great part of his work to Kay Qubādh regards him as the 'greatest' sultan not only of the Rum Seljuq sultans but of the whole Seljuq dynasty. Kay Qubādh is presented as the most exemplary Perso-Islamic king who ruled over a powerful state and as the supreme Muslim ruler who aimed to subdue the whole world. This image constructed by the medieval Persian author has been taken over uncritically by modern historians of Seljuq history. Cahen writes that Kay Qubādh was the most distinguished of the sultans of Rum but recognises at the same time that: "This glorious reputation he probably owed in part to the fact that he was the last of the Seljukids to die in independence, but also to the indisputable success of his policy and to his outstanding personality."⁴⁶⁰ However, Cahen neither discusses the

⁴⁵⁹ See Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 375. Bar Hebraeus writes that when the sultan reached Malatya on his way to wage war against al-Ashraf he fell ill and died of tuberculosis.

⁴⁶⁰ Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 124; Cahen, *The Formation*, 52-65.

policy of Kay Qubādh nor his personality and merely analyses his military exploits. Moreover, he glosses over important aspects such as the fact that Kay Qubādh was the only Seljuq sultan who in the fashion of Byzantine emperors named a town after himself and erected a series of monuments including a palace also named after him, Kayqubādiyya. It is true that Kay Qubādh was lucky to die before the Mongol invasion and was therefore remembered as the 'greatest' Rum Seljuq sultan. The success of the sultan's policy and personality are, however, disputable. First because, as already noted, the basis for the apogee of the sultanate had been laid down under his predecessors and second because the seeds of the downfall of the sultanate were sown during his reign.

The Turkish historian Emine Uyumaz has written her thesis on Kay Qubādh and the political history of his time which is the longest and latest analysis of the reign of this sultan.⁴⁶¹ The book is short but uncritical and does not add more information to what has been provided by Osman Turan in his book on the Seljuqs of Rum whose account of the reign of Kay Qubādh follows very closely the narrative of Ibn Bībī without analysing the material critically.⁴⁶² Moreover, the methodological and ideological approach taken by Uyumaz to the history of the Seljuqs is very similar to that of Turan, as she shares his anachronistic nationalistic concerns.⁴⁶³ Thus, to date, modern historians have provided accounts of the political history of the reign of Kay Qubādh whom they recognise as the most important Rum Seljuq sultan. None of the modern scholars have discussed, however, what singles out this ruler and nor have they questioned the ideology and mentality of this ruler. Moreover, modern historians have so far exploited the account provided by Ibn Bībī for the reign of Kay Qubādh only as a source of political history and have hardly made any use of the epigraphic evidence. In respect of Kay Qubādh the work of Ibn Bībī has to be read with even greater caution, as his account of this sultan's reign is unequivocally panegyric. It should be also highlighted here again that both parents of the author

⁴⁶¹ Uyumaz, *Sultan I Alâeddîn Keykubad Devri Türkiye Selçuklu Devleti Siyasî Tarihi (1220-1237)*, Ankara 2003. It was not possible for me to look into the original thesis of Dr. Uyumaz and the copy at my disposal is the popularized form of the thesis which does not include any references.

⁴⁶² Turan, *Selçuklular Zamanında Türkiye*, İstanbul 1971, 325-402.

⁴⁶³ Uyumaz concludes her book stating that her research based on the source material shows that 'Alā' al-Dīn Kay Qubādh I followed during his reign a consistent policy and that the matter he regarded as most important was to secure the continued existence of an independent Seljuq state of Turkey in the region and to take as much of the income of the international trade obtained on the trade-routes going through Anatolia. Cf. Uyumaz, *Sultan I Alâeddîn Keykubad*, 101.

were employed by Kay Qubādh and that he was a member of the Persian administration of the Rum Seljuq state. Besides, he composed his chronicle after the Mongol occupation and he looks back at the period of Kay Qubādh as the lost golden age. He does not aim to give an account of events wanting instead the sultans of his time who were powerless puppets dominated by the Mongols and their equally incompetent advisers to learn from the example of Kay Qubādh.

This chapter aims to give an analysis of the ideological concepts formulated under this ruler. The questions to be asked here are: Is Kay Qubādh the most famous Rum Seljuq sultan because he established himself as a supreme ruler in Anatolia? Did he consciously aim to become an autocratic Perso-Islamic king or was this the propagandistic image formulated for him by his Persian officials?

Ibn Bībī dedicates the most elaborate and glorifying of his sultan portrayals to Kay Qubādh, which reads like a eulogy that credits him with all qualities expected of an ideal Perso-Islamic king. The author claims that Kay Qubādh possessed exemplary religious zeal, justice, good character, courage, warlike qualities, physical beauty and that he was learned and well versed in the arts and sciences.⁴⁶⁴ This eulogy goes over several pages and is written in the author's usual bombastic style, but the following part of it is the most telling.⁴⁶⁵

““They ask you about Du’l-Qarnain [Alexander the Great]. Say, ‘I will tell you something about him.’”⁴⁶⁶ ... from the extreme east to the extreme west the banners of Islam have not shaded a ruler like Sultan ‘Ala al-Dīn Kay Qubādh b. Kay Khusraw b. Kılıç Arslan b. Mas‘ūd b. Kılıç Arslan b. Sulaymān b. Kutalmış b. Arslan Isrā’īl b. Seljuq. “Truly, the banner of Islam shaded no other Sultan, who was better suited through personal achievement, and through inheritance and who was better in matters of religion and sincere in strong faith, with wider knowledge, with immeasurable wealth, with greater power ... more sublime in kingship and rule, more severe with sword and lance, who was a greater protector of Islam and its followers and a greater opponent of polytheism and its professors than him”⁴⁶⁷. His rank had risen to such heights that the Kings of the lands of the Believers and Unbelievers, from the farthest Abhāz to the Regions of the Hijaz ... from the Steppes of the Qipchaq to the Lands of Iraq, especially the Kings of Syria, regarded themselves as his chessmen and acknowledged his name in the *khuṭba* and on their coins.”⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶⁴ Ibn Bībī thereby follows the example of Nizām al-Mulk who composed for the Great Seljuq sultan Malik Shāh the *Siyasatnāma* where he credited his master with all the qualities expected of a Muslim sovereign. See Rosenthal, *Political Thought*, 82.

⁴⁶⁵ See Ibn Bībī, Duda, 98-101. For the original version of the author cf. Ibn Bībī, *Öztürk*, I, 239-247.

⁴⁶⁶ Quran, 18, 82.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibn Bībī writes that he has taken this quote from al-Utbī (d. 1036 or 1040).

⁴⁶⁸ Ibn Bībī, Duda, 98-99.

Ibn Bībī continues his panegyric by praising the justice of Kay Qubādh and then adds a eulogy given by the emir Jalal al-Dīn Karatay which will be discussed below. According to Ibn Bībī, Karatay ends making the absurdly grandiose claim that the Prophet Muḥammad was the seal of prophecy and Kay Qubādh the seal of kings.⁴⁶⁹ Hence Ibn Bībī not only compares Kay Qubādh to Alexander the Great and claims that he was the greatest ruler of Islam but also indicates that no great ruler will follow him. Despite the exaggerations of the Rum Seljuq author it seems safe to suggest that Kay Qubādh was remembered as an exemplary ruler, as the Christian author Bar Hebraeus states:

“was one by himself among the kings of his generation. He was alert in appearance, and perfect in mind, and pure in body. For he was exalted above all the foul passions wherewith the kings of the Arabs are accustomed to pollute themselves. He was fierce towards offenders, and in judgements just. He brought into subjection to his dominion many cities and fortified towns (or, citadels), and he made his power to spread abroad.”⁴⁷⁰

This is especially noteworthy since Bar Hebraeus praises no other Seljuq sultan in this way. However, it is important to see which ideological concepts Ibn Bībī threads into this picture drawn in retrospect. First, the author highlights the noble lineage of the sultan by listing his descent down to Seljuq, the founder of the dynasty and stating that he was king also by right of inheritance. Second, Kay Qubādh is presented as the greatest protector of Islam and the Muslims and this claim is strengthened through the description of his exemplary piety. Third, Kay Qubādh is described as the supreme king who has subjugated all neighbouring rulers, Muslim and Christian.

In fact it should be remembered that Kay Qubādh owed his power to the great emirs of the sultanate and the great success of his policies to the fact that the foundations for them had already been laid down before his reign. The course of action taken by the high-ranking officials of the sultanate following the death of Kay Kāwūs reveals clearly that they were running the affairs of the sultanate. Kay Kāwūs does not seem to have made any arrangements for his succession. He was still young

⁴⁶⁹ Ibn Bībī, Duda, 101.

⁴⁷⁰ Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 402.

when he died and left behind only minor sons the decision of the succession lay with the emirs alone.⁴⁷¹ Ibn Bībī writes that immediately after the death of the sultan,

“the emirs of the state such as [chashnigir] Sayf al-Dīn Ajbe (Ay-aba), Sharaf al-Dīn Muḥammad Parwāna, Mubāriz al-Dīn Chawly, [emir-i majlis] Mubāriz al-Dīn Bahrām Shāh, and [emir-i ahur] Zayn al-Dīn Bishāra concealed the death of the sultan and they conferred with Şāhib Majd al-Dīn Ānī⁴⁷² ...They also conferred with the following personages as to whom they should put on the throne: Shams al-Dīn Ḥamza b. al-Mu‘ajjad al-Tugra’i⁴⁷³ ... who in the art of circumspect writing and composition of poems had reached great heights... and with the king of the noble lords Niẓām al-Dīn Aḥmad, the Amīr-i ‘Āriḍ⁴⁷⁴, known under the name son of the vizier Maḥmūd, who was a second Firdausī in the composition of *matnawīs* ... and with Şāhib Shams al-Dīn-i Isfahani ...”⁴⁷⁵

That the death of a ruler was kept secret was an ancient strategy employed by the nobility within a state to ensure the succession favourable for them and also to forestall internal strife. The speed with which the emirs acted in order not to leak the information of the death of the sultan until they had their candidate recognised is striking. The continuity of the administration of the Rum Seljuq state was a factor which strengthened the notables, as the same personages who were already serving under Kay Khusraw are mentioned here. These emirs continued to act as powerful semi-independent local rulers jealous to keep that power. It is also important to observe that the civil and the military administration of the Rum Seljuq state conferred before a decision was reached, as some of the emirs mentioned were civil administrators serving in Konya. Ibn Bībī writes that some of the emirs suggested that Kay Farīdūn who was held captive in Koylu Hisar and was the youngest brother of Kay Kāwūs should be the next sultan. It seems, however, that the deciding vote

⁴⁷¹ Bar Hebraeus writes that the Rum Seljuq emirs took Kay Qubādh from his captivity in the fortress Masara and made him king over themselves. He also notes however that Kay Kāwūs might have designated his brother as his heir. “Some say that Sūltān ‘IZZ AD-DĪN himself before he died sent and brought him out of prison and made the nobles swear fealty to him, because he had no son who was of any use of the kingdom.” Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 375. Turan writes that there were rumours that Kay Kāwūs had wished that his brother should succeed him and gives as reference Bar Hebraeus but does not elaborate this point. He only adds without specifying which, that some Arab sources state that the succession of Kay Qubādh was disputed by his uncle Tuğrul Shāh but that this without any doubt is a confusion of the latter’s involvement in the previous succession dispute. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 326, note 4. Neither of these questions can be resolved as there are no indications of such a testament by Kay Kāwūs or any proof for the involvement of Tuğrul Shāh.

⁴⁷² Şāhib is the title by which the vizier was designated. See Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı devleti teşkilâtına medhal*, İstanbul 1941, 95-96.

⁴⁷³ The tugra’i was the head of the chancery. See Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı devleti teşkilâtına medhal*, 105-106.

⁴⁷⁴ The amīr-i ‘āriḍ was the army commander. See Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı devleti teşkilâtına medhal*, 105.

⁴⁷⁵ Ibn Bībī, Duda, 90-92; See also Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 218-220.

lay with the two emirs Mubārīz al-Dīn Bahrām Shāh and Sayf al-Dīn Ajbe (Ayaba),⁴⁷⁶ and especially the latter asserted influence on the other emirs, and he nominated Kay Qubādh, even though he had fallen out with him previously. Ayaba told the other emirs that he wanted to bring Kay Qubādh the good news of his election as sultan and to use this as an opportunity to be reconciled with him, because during the succession dispute between Kay Kāwūs and Kay Qubādh he had taken the side of the former. Some of the emirs who had served Kay Qubādh when he was the governor of Tokat objected to his election. Ibn Bībī states that Şāhib Majd al-Dīn and Sharaf al-Dīn Muḥammad Parwāna protested that Kay Qubādh was malicious, furious, jealous, and coarse.⁴⁷⁷ Ibn Bībī implies that the election of the new sultan by the emirs was the right procedure as the emirs were competent long-serving men who knew how to run state affairs. Moreover, he even praises those emirs among them who were members of his own class and civil administrators as distinguished men of learning.

The power of the local governors and towns can also be inferred from the account Ibn Bībī gives of the itinerary of Kay Qubādh following his liberation from captivity and proclamation as sultan. He describes in some detail the elaborate receptions and proclamation ceremonies that took place at several stops. In Sivas the dignitaries and imams came to kiss the sultan's hand and then they all went to the mosque where they took the oath of alliance to him⁴⁷⁸. He was first brought to Sivas where he was inaugurated, then he went to Kayseri where the *subashi* of the town, Sayf al-Dīn 'Abū Bakr the son of Hoqabāz had prepared the reception and finally Konya.⁴⁷⁹

Moreover, the frontier provinces (*uc*) dominated by Türkmen played a significant role in the period of Kay Qubādh. Ibn Bībī informs us that following his accession to the throne in Sivas the sultan set out for Konya. On his way to the capital he sent Mubārīz al-Dīn, the *emir-i majlis*, back to Sivas with the instruction to put the affairs of the *uc* in order.⁴⁸⁰ Moreover already one day after his entry into Konya, Kay Qubādh called the high-ranking emirs to his private chamber and said:

⁴⁷⁶ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 92-93.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibn Bībī, Duda, 92.

⁴⁷⁸ See Ibn Bībī, Duda, 95.

⁴⁷⁹ See Ibn Bībī, Duda, 95-96.

⁴⁸⁰ See Ibn Bībī, Duda, 95-98.

“It is necessary to send to the emirs of the frontier regions forceful orders and to notify them about the entry of our banner and rule in Konya, about the ascendancy of our royal dignity to the throne, and with a friendly and encouraging order for them to come quickly to the seat of the sultanate.”⁴⁸¹

On the one hand, this indicates that the sultan depended on the military power of the Türkmen and on the other hand, it indicates that the Turkish element still played a role.

The topos of world dominion was part of the Iranian model of kingship, hence Ibn Bībī claims that Kay Qubādh aimed to conquer the world. A great part of his report of the reign of Kay Qubādh is made up of an enumeration of military campaigns, led by the sultan or his emirs. He writes that the sultan began the conquest of the world with the conquest of Kalon-Oros (‘Alā’iyya). The real reason behind the conquest of this fortress was however that it was next to Antalya and that its possession for the Rum Seljuq sultanate was therefore important. It is revealing that Ibn Bībī first states that the sultan said one day that “in accordance with the law of rulership warfare should be started.” He then remarks however that the great emirs, the *Kondestabl* Asad al-Dīn⁴⁸², known under the name Ājās-i Majnūn and Mubārīz al-Dīn Ertokuş, governor of Antalya, suggested that Kalon-Oros should be conquered.⁴⁸³ As the governor of Antalya Ertokuş was aware of the importance of controlling the whole region and drawing the sultan’s attention to the town initiated the campaign. Moreover, the fortress was only taken after two months of unsuccessful siege following an agreement between Kir Farid⁴⁸⁴, the Greek lord of the town, and the sultan. The negotiations were led by Ertokuş who in the past maintained friendly relations with Kir Farid. Kir Farid gave up the town in exchange for an iqta allotted to him by the sultan in 620 (1223).⁴⁸⁵ To underline the sultan’s superiority Ibn Bībī writes that Kir Farid requested this in a letter giving the alleged

⁴⁸¹ Ibn Bībī, Duda, 98; See also Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 238.

⁴⁸² The *Kondestabl* was in charge of foreign mercenaries of the Seljuq army.

⁴⁸³ The names of the emirs are not given by the *muhtasar* but appear in the original. See Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, 254.

⁴⁸⁴ Kir (κύρ) is a Greek title meaning master or lord but the name Farid according to Vryonis might come from the Armenian Vartan or Byzantine Bardas. Vryonis, *Decline*, 232, n 533; Ibn Bībī, Duda, 106, n a.

⁴⁸⁵ According to Ibn Bībī, Kir Farid was appointed emir of Akşehir near Konya and allotted also the income of several villages there. See Ibn Bībī, Duda, 108; Vryonis, *Decline*, 230.

statement that the town had never been conquered in the time of Darius, Hosheng, Alexander, and Caesar.⁴⁸⁶

The main motive behind the campaign was to secure economic interests. That the protection of trade was at the heart of the expansion policy is shown by the subsequent conquest of the fortress of Alara and the building of the *tersane* (shipyard) in Alanya as well as the Alara Han by Kay Qubādh near Alanya on the Antalya – Konya road.⁴⁸⁷ Moreover, the fortifications of Alanya were extended and a citadel built. According to Ibn Bībī, Kay Qubādh built the citadel to demonstrate his gratitude to God for granting him the conquest and established with an honourable connection to himself he gave it his *laqab* (honorific name ‘Alā’iyya from ‘Alā’ al-Dīn).⁴⁸⁸

Generally, the protocol for Kay Qubādh given in the inscriptions mirrors the ideological concepts employed by Ibn Bībī. Among these the inscription inserted on the Kızıl Kale (Red Tower) of Ala’iyya (Alanya) dated Rabī‘ 623/April 1226 is of special interest:

“[Alā al-Dunyā wa’l-Dīn] the shadow of God in the lands, the splendour of the victorious empire, the helper of the flourishing community ...⁴⁸⁹ the enlivener of justice in the two world, the sultan of the land and the two seas, the holder of the two horizons, the crown of the house of Seljuq, the master of king and sultans, *Abu’l-Faṭh* Kay Qubādh b. Kay Khusraw b. Kılıç Arslan, the proof of the Commander of the Faithful – may God make his reign last eternally ...”⁴⁹⁰

One title appears here for the first time which designates Kay Qubādh as “the crown of the house of Seljuq.” This affirms the noble lineage of the sultan and at the same time puts him above all members of that house, including their Great Seljuq rivals. The expansionist ambitions expressed under Kay Kāwūs are exaggerated further and seem to have no limits. We may infer that Kay Qubādh who maintained cordial relations with the caliph, as will be discussed below, claimed to derive his power directly from God. What is surprising is that jihad epithets are missing in this

⁴⁸⁶ See Ibn Bībī, Duda, 108.

⁴⁸⁷ Descriptions of the *tersane* of Alanya and the Alara Han are given by Schöttler, *Rumseldschuken*, 79, 229.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibn Bībī, Duda, 109.

⁴⁸⁹ This phrase is indecipherable.

⁴⁹⁰ *RCEA*, X, 240-241 (inscription no 3957); R.M. Riefstahl, *Turkish Architecture in Southwestern Anatolia*, Cambridge 1931, 96.

inscription. As not all inscriptions are preserved we cannot be sure if there existed any with jihad epithets but it should be noted that even though the town was taken from Christians Ibn Bībī does not describe it as part of jihad. The ideological concept of jihad was employed by other Muslim rulers as the inscription of Mawdūd b. Maḥmūd (r. 619-29/1222-1232) the Artuqid ruler of Amid shows.⁴⁹¹

Kay Qubādh maintained friendly relations with the Abbasid caliph and several envoys were exchanged as we are informed. What is interesting to note is that probably the caliph took the first step and within a short period of time sent two envoys to Anatolia and seems to have been anxious to maintain good relations with the sultan. This was probably the reason why he sent his 'chief propagandist' the shaykh al-Suhrawardī⁴⁹² in order to win over the sultan and dignitaries in Anatolia. Ibn Bībī writes that when the news of the accession of Kay Qubādh reached the caliph he sent with al-Suhrawardī the sultan the diploma for the lands of Rum and the insignia of rule.⁴⁹³ The relationship between Kay Qubādh and the Abbasid caliph al-Nāṣir must be seen against the background of the Mongol invasions. In 618/1221/22 shortly after the accession of Kay Qubādh, the Mongols were launching an attack on Iraq but they changed their direction and Baghdad was saved for the time being. The caliph sent a second envoy to Anatolia asking Kay Qubādh for military support against the Mongols. In a private audience with the sultan the envoy presented the caliph's message that the Mongols had defeated the Khwārazmshāh and were advancing towards Baghdad.⁴⁹⁴ Kay Qubādh replied that he would send the troops the caliph asked for. However after the envoy left he called his emirs together and said:

⁴⁹¹ *RCEA*, X, 205-206 (inscription no 3900).

⁴⁹² The renowned Sufi of Sunni Islam, al-Suhrawardī (539-632/ 1145-1234), designated as the sheikh of sheikhs, was a very influential personality who played an important role in propagating the *futuwwa* of the caliph al-Nāṣir. See Hartmann, *an-Nāṣir li-Dīn Allāh*, 240-254; EI2, al-Suhrawardī (Hartmann).

⁴⁹³ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 101.

⁴⁹⁴ For the relationship between the caliph al-Nāṣir and the Mongols see Hartmann, *an-Nāṣir li-Dīn Allāh*, 83-85. Hartmann does not mention the envoy sent to Anatolia and only evaluates the relationship of the caliph with the Mongols in connection with the conflict between the Khwārazmshāh Mengübirte and the caliph.

“Truly we expected the Commander of the Faithful to have better insight. An army with new strength and luck which is like a waterfall which pulls down dams and which is like a sea of fire that rages and blazes one can only approach with servility.”⁴⁹⁵

For this reason the sultan thought it would have been better if the caliph had ordered all lands to send their best envoys, together with gifts to the Mongols, to seek their friendship. Yet if one did not send the troops to the caliph he would regard this as a sign of weakness and refusal of support. Therefore, not a thousand soldiers as had been requested, but five thousand soldiers with provisions for a year should be sent to the caliph.⁴⁹⁶ As there is no information about in other sources it is not possible to confirm what Ibn Bībī writes here. Nevertheless, his report reveals significant aspects of the relationship between the sultan and the caliph on one hand and use of envoys to propagate ideology on the other hand. The author indirectly indicates that the relationship between the caliph and Kay Qubādh was not based entirely on mutual friendship and understanding. The sultan criticises the caliph’s policy regarding the Mongols and despite this he wants to send an even larger contingent than he had asked for. The way in which according to Kay Qubādh the Mongols should be approached contradicts the image of the strong supreme ruler. It seems that the sultan regarded the Mongols as invincible and was happy to submit to them.

The detailed orders the sultan gave as to which troops should be sent and how they should be equipped are a good example of how the sultan wanted to demonstrate his power to his Muslim neighbours and the caliph. According to Ibn Bībī the well equipped army had the desired effect on the neighbours of the sultan:

“When the princes of the regions, Harput, Āmid, Mardin, and Mosul saw that splendour, the greatness of the sultan filled their hearts with respect, and they presented gifts and received them with great hospitality.”⁴⁹⁷

As for Ibn Bībī, Kay Qubādh is the ideal Persian king, it is only understandable that he accords to him also the qualities of being a great builder. Moreover, he claims that the sultan was an architect himself, as he determined the form of the buildings and gave detailed instructions to the architects. Hence Ibn Bībī

⁴⁹⁵ Ibn Bībī, Duda, 113; Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 278.

⁴⁹⁶ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 113-114; Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 278-279.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibn Bībī, Duda, 114.

gives detailed reports of his building activity but it is difficult to assess the extent of the sultan's knowledge of architecture and involvement as it is not attested in the extant inscriptions though we should bear in mind that not all inscriptions have been preserved. It has to be recognised however that Kay Qubādh, in contrast to his predecessors, did have a substantial building project which comprised fortifications and religious as well as secular foundations. After his report of the conquests of the fortresses Kalon-Oros ('Alā'iyya) and Alara, Ibn Bībī inserts in his narrative that Kay Qubādh one day while he was riding outside Konya said that it was an error that such a famous and beautiful town should not have securing walls around it. He decided that Konya and Sivas should be fortified and commanded that master builders and planners should be brought to him. Then Ibn Bībī writes, that the sultan rode together with his emirs around the town and gave instructions where the towers, gates, and curtain walls should be placed. He then ordered that four gates and parts of the walls should be paid for by the treasury and the rest of the expenses should be divided among the emirs and that a *farmān* should be sent to the *emir-i majlis* in Sivas saying that with the support of the emirs of that region Sivas should be fortified.⁴⁹⁸

The building of fortifications is not peculiar to Kay Qubādh, as his brother and father before him had commissioned the building of fortifications in Sinop and Antalya. Moreover, Kay Qubādh, like his predecessors, burdened the emirs with expenses of the fortifications. The inscriptions inserted on the city walls erected during this period and the report of Ibn Bībī concerning the fortification of Konya and Sivas is evidence for this.⁴⁹⁹ In theory fortifications were the responsibility of the state and hence the sultan was directly responsible, but in practice it was the Rum Seljuq emirs who had to pay and oversee the erection of fortifications. It is thus surprising that Ibn Bībī notes that Kay Qubādh ordered that the building of four gates and parts of the walls should be paid for by the treasury to underline the sultan's generosity when it was his duty in the first place. Moreover, the fortification of Konya and Sivas, two towns in the centre of the sultanate, seems somewhat surprising. While the towns fortified under the Seljuqs in Anatolia before were Sinop

⁴⁹⁸ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 110-111; Ibn Bībī, Öztürk, I, 271-273.

⁴⁹⁹ Cf. Rogers, *Patronage in Seljuk Anatolia, 1200-1300*, unpubl. PhD thesis University of Oxford 1972, 310.

and Antalya two sea ports which were open to attack these towns were situated in inner Anatolia. However, the reason behind the fortification building was not the sultan's special interest in building, but the desire to have a defence system against the Mongol threat.⁵⁰⁰

We can only speculate on how far Kay Qubādh embodied the qualities of the Persian king but it is certain that he was the only Seljuq sultan who took an active part in the building of a town and palace named after him, Kayqubādiyya, built near Kayseri. This palace became one of his favourite residences besides Antalya and Alanya. He received here the submission of the Mengüçük ruler of Erzincan, Dāwūd Shāh, in 625/1228 and he died there in 634/1237. His son Kay Khusraw II was proclaimed sultan there.⁵⁰¹ While his predecessors up to the time of his father followed a lifestyle not very different from the lifestyle of a nomadic leader, Kay Qubādh seems to have had a sedentary lifestyle.

Ibn Bībī adds to his portrait an eye-witness account by Jalal al-Dīn Karatay to demonstrate that Kay Qubādh was very knowledgeable. He first writes that Karatay “was the pole of the religious nobles and the example for the pious.”⁵⁰² According to Karatay, Kay Qubādh studied historical works about the kings and the exemplary way of past rulers. From among the sultans of Islam he especially regarded as models the Ghaznavid ruler Maḥmūd b. Sebūktigin⁵⁰³ and Qābūs b. Wushmgīr.⁵⁰⁴ He always read the book ‘Kīmiyā as-sa’āda⁵⁰⁵ and the book ‘The life of Kings’ by Niẓām al-Mulk.

⁵⁰⁰ Turan remarks that at the time when Kay Qubādh ascended the throne the Mongol assaults had Asia and Eastern Europe and that thus it was only natural that a ruler as great and capable as him would begin his operations by taking political and military pre-cautions. Kay Qubādh sought friendly relations with the Ayyubids who after the seizure of Artukid territories had become his immediate neighbours. Turan also notes that the sultan begun his defence policies with the fortification of Konya but then goes on reproducing the narrative given by Ibn Bībī without any evaluation his remarks. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 331.

⁵⁰¹ Cf. *EI2*, *Kayqubādiyya* (Busse)

⁵⁰² Ibn Bībī, Duda, 100.

⁵⁰³ Ghaznavid ruler (388-421/ 998-1030). See Bosworth, *New Islamic Dynasties*, 296.

⁵⁰⁴ Ziyārid ruler of Gurgān (367-371/978-997 and 387-402/997-1012). Cf. Bosworth, *New Islamic Dynasties*, 166.

⁵⁰⁵ The Persian adaptation of the *Ihja ulum al-Dīn* written by al-Ghazālī (d. 1111).

IV.3. Kay Khusraw II (634-644/ 1237-1246)

During the reign of Kay Khusraw the Rum Seljuq sultanate ceased to be an independent state, as his army was defeated by the Mongol army at Köse Dağ on 6 Muḥarram 641/ 26 June 1243. It is this crushing defeat by which Kay Khusraw is judged by the medieval sources and modern historians alike. He is described as a self-indulgent ruler who neglected his duties and under whom therefore the sultanate descended into internal strife and was ill prepared for the Mongol attack. Ibn Bībī does not even honour Kay Khusraw with a portrait. While he dedicates a panegyric portrait to his father Kay Qubādh and presents him as the ideal king, he implies that Kay Khusraw was the opposite of that ideal. The most crucial shortcoming of the young sultan was that he did not pay attention to the long-serving and able notables of the state but was controlled by the evil emir Köpek. The latter is presented as a very ambitious and malicious character who managed to get the important emirs killed. The state thus deprived of its pillars, fell into chaos. It seems that Ibn Bībī is anxious to put all the blame for the decline of the Rum Seljuq sultanate on the emir Köpek so that any suspicion of bad rulership is diverted from Kay Qubādh. Thereby the author also avoids direct criticism of Kay Khusraw, the son and successor of Kay Qubādh.

Modern scholars, however, have not discussed the motives of Ibn Bībī and, as in the case of Kay Qubādh, the account of the reign of Kay Khusraw given by Ibn Bībī is taken over uncritically. Turan recognises that Kay Khusraw could have been only sixteen years old when he ascended the throne and that the emir Köpek had great influence over him.⁵⁰⁶ Nevertheless, in his account of Kay Khusraw's reign which closely follows Ibn Bībī, he, like the medieval author regards the sultan as an under-age and inadequate ruler whose mistakes led to the disastrous defeat at Köse Dağ which changed the course of the history of Turkey.⁵⁰⁷ Cahen does not even mention that Kay Khusraw was very young when he came to the throne and he begins his chapter of the reign of this sultan stating: "Kay-kubādh had three sons, 'Izz al-Dīn, Rukn al-Dīn and Kaykhusraw. The first two were the sons of his

⁵⁰⁶ Cf. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 404.

⁵⁰⁷ Cf. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 435.

Ayyūbid wife, and it was to 'Izz al-Dīn that Kay Qubādh had caused an oath of allegiance to be sworn. But Kaykhusraw was the eldest, and it was to him that the great emirs rallied, since he was the most powerful."⁵⁰⁸ Cahen writes also that the policy of Kay Khusraw "was inspired by Köpek"⁵⁰⁹ but assumes that the young sultan made his own decisions and led the government. Cahen then enumerates briefly the events which took place during the reign of Kay Khusraw following closely the narrative of Ibn Bībī.

This section aims to give a brief analysis of the information given in the sources about Kay Khusraw and concentrate on the question if and how the official ideology was changed as a result of the decisive political changes which took place in this period.

According to Ibn Bībī, Kay Qubādh assigned Erzincan again to Kay Khusraw and appointed the Çaçnigir Shams al-Dīn Altunaba as his *atabeg*. As his successor for the throne of Rum, however, he designated 'Izz al-Dīn Kılıç Arslan, one of his two sons from his Ayyubid wife, and that obliged all emirs to take the oath of allegiance in this son's name. The author notes that some of the emirs agreed willingly but others out of fear.⁵¹⁰ After the death of Kay Qubādh, however, his son Kay Khusraw who was informed of this immediately send messengers to the great emirs of the sultanate and making them great promises asked them to support him. The Çaçnigir Shams al-Dīn Altunaba, the *Parwāna* Tāj al-Dīn b. Qadi Sharaf al-Dīn, the Ustād al-Dār Jamāl al-Dīn Farruh, Sa'd al-Dīn Köpek, and Zāhir al-Dīn, the son of the Georgian were willing to support him.⁵¹¹ Kamal al-Dīn Kamyar, Ḥusām al-Dīn Kaymeri and Ḥusām al-Dīn Kayır Han who had not heard the news about the death of the sultan saw Kay Khusraw together with the emirs who had taken his side hurrying from the direction of Kayqubādiyya to Kayseri. Here Shams al-Dīn Altunaba and Jamāl al-Dīn Farruh took Kay Khusraw by the hand and led him on the throne. Ḥusām al-Dīn Kaymeri and Ḥusām al-Dīn Kayır Han stated that the rightful heir 'Izz al-Dīn who was in Kayqubādiyya and the army were with them and that they should keep their agreement with the deceased sultan Kay Qubādh and help him to the throne. Kamal al-Dīn Kamyar, however, was undecided and when he was sent

⁵⁰⁸ Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 133.

⁵⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 133.

⁵¹⁰ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 197; Ibn Bībī, *Öztürk*, I, 454.

⁵¹¹ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 199; Ibn Bībī, *Öztürk*, II, 23.

a letter from Kayseri stating that the question of succession was already clear he as well as Kaymeri and Kayır Han decided to accept this and they kissed the hand of Kay Khusraw and took the oath of allegiance.

The important points to be noted here are as follows. First, in contrast to the succession of the previous sultans, in this case the emirs did not confer to decide the succession. Ibn Bībī writes that it was Kay Khusraw, who took the initiative and asked the emirs to take his side, but taking into account his age at the time this seems quite unlikely. The author also remarks, however, that Kay Khusraw was informed of the death of his father without specifying who sent him the news. Thus it is more likely that his *atabeg* Altunaba wanted to put him on the throne and that he won over the other emirs. Among the emirs Ibn Bībī names Altunaba, who seems to have been the longest-serving one and the *atabeg* of Kay Khusraw had probably power to assert some influence over the other emirs mentioned by Ibn Bībī as the group of emirs attached to this prince. Second, it can be inferred from this succession account that there were dissensions among the Rum Seljuq emirs. Ibn Bībī does not include in this account, like he did for his other accounts of succession, how the emirs assembled or planned together a strategy to bring their candidate to the throne. He does not directly state that there was a division between the Khwārazmians and the other emirs, but names Ḥusām al-Dīn Kaymeri as the main opponent of Kay Khusraw. Kayır Han was the leader of the Khwārazmian army who had been appointed by Kay Qubādh as emir and whose troops were included in the Rum Seljuq army and settled in Rum following his victory over the Khwārazmshāh Mengübirtī. It may well be that the Khwārazmians were not accepted by the already established Rum Seljuq officials and that therefore rivalries existed between them. Ibn Bībī states that Köpek regarded Kayır Han as a rival and he continues his narrative stating that the former denounced the latter to the sultan to get rid of him.

Without giving any explanation as to how Köpek managed to gain great influence over the young sultan, Ibn Bībī starts his account stating that Köpek out of bad character and bad mind began to do mischief. It is not possible to determine how Köpek, who was not a very powerful emir until the accession of Kay Khusraw, managed to become the right hand man of the young sultan, as the chronicle of Ibn

Bībī gives us the only information available on him.⁵¹² Usually it was the *atabeg* of a Seljuq prince who was closest to him and thus could exert the greatest influence on him and thus on the other emirs. It seems that this was not the case here and that Köpek was able to push aside Shams al-Dīn Altunaba, the *atabeg* of Kay Khusraw, as well as the other emirs, and to gain the sultan's favour. Yet, the influence Köpek was able to assert on the young sultan alone does not explain the fact that he was able to push aside all other emirs to become then the de facto 'ruler' of the sultanate. One plausible explanation for this is that the emirs did not work as well together as they did before. As it has been shown in previous chapters usually the great emirs assembled and conferred when important decisions on the succession to the throne or military campaigns had to be reached. At the time when Kay Khusraw ascended the throne, however, the rivalries among the great emirs were such that they did not cooperate but worked against each other.

Köpek denounced first Kayır Han telling the sultan that the latter would leave the sultan's service and that he would use then his knowledge of the Rum Seljuq army to incite the enemies of the sultan against him. Kayır Han was imprisoned and the Khwārazmian contingent fled stating that they did not feel safe because of this. The fact that Köpek then managed to put even Shams al-Dīn Altunaba aside shows that he had a free rein. However, when Köpek continued his attacks against the emirs and had also Kamyar killed, Kay Khusraw "either of his own volition or at the suggestion of some disquieted emirs, decided that enough was enough."⁵¹³ Cahen's second explanation seems more likely and it seems that finally a group of emirs were able to come together to stop Köpek who then himself was put to death. It is not possible to prove why the cooperation among the Rum Seljuq emirs broke down. Important to note here is that until the time of Kay Qubādh the Rum Seljuq state functioned as a confederation of provinces governed by emirs who for most of the time supported each other so that the central government in Konya and hence the sultan was not able to reduce their power. This co-operative system of the emirs

⁵¹² Aksarayi's account on Kay Khusraw is very brief and thus it is not surprising that Köpek is not mentioned and the account for the reign of Kay Khusraw given in the anonymous chronicle concentrates on the Mongol invasion and does not contain information for the first years of the reign. However, it is surprising that Bar Hebraeus does not mention Köpek at all even though he informs us of events taking place in the first years of the reign of Kay Khusraw. Cf. Aksarayi, *Gençosman*, 130; Anonymous, *Uzluq*, 31-32; Bar Hebraeus, *Budge*, 403.

⁵¹³ Cahen, *Formation*, 67.

broke down during the reign of Kay Khusraw and weakened the Rum Seljuq state as a whole.

At the same time the Rum Seljuq state was weakened by a revolt of disaffected Turkmen led by the popular preacher Bābā Ishāq. According to Ibn Bībī the revolt was the result of the propaganda of this misguided preacher who called himself prophet. As we depend for our information for these events almost entirely on Ibn Bībī it is not possible to infer the factors leading to the revolt.⁵¹⁴ Most probably a range of factors, such as the influx of nomadic Turkmen fleeing the Mongol invasions, the settlement of Khwārazmians within the Rum Seljuq realm, economic reasons coupled with religious reasons were behind it. Important to note here is that the Rum Seljuq government suppressed the revolt only with great difficulty (ca. 638-641/1240-1243) which exhausted the Rum Seljuq army.

Thus when the Mongols under Baiju attacked the Rum Seljuq state and took Erzurum, Kay Khusraw at the head of the Rum Seljuq army reinforced by contingents from his allies and former enemies went out against the Mongols. The Rum Seljuq army was decisively defeated at Kösedağ near Erzincan and the Rum Seljuq sultanate lost its independence. Kay Khusraw fled to Ankara, while his vizier Muhadhdhab al-Dīn started negotiations with the Mongols and persuaded them not to seize the whole sultanate and take it under their direct control but to make it a vassal state. Ibn Bībī criticises Kay Khusraw and indicates that the vizier saved the sultanate.⁵¹⁵ He writes that when the Mongols reached Kayseri after their victory over the Rum Seljuq army he suggested that one has to go to the Mongols and ask for peace to put the affairs of the sultanate right after the disaster caused by the sultan's youth and ignorance.⁵¹⁶ However, while Ibn Bībī makes clear that Kay Khusraw was not fit for rule the inscriptions commissioned during his reign present him as an ideal ruler just as his predecessors had been presented:

The foundation inscription over the entrance of the Sırçalı Medrese in Konya dated 640/1242 declares:

⁵¹⁴ Cf. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 136-137.

⁵¹⁵ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 231-233.

⁵¹⁶ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 231.

“The building of this blessed madrasa was ordered during the reign of the greatest sultan, the shadow of God on Earth, Ghiyāth al-Dunyā wa’l-Dīn, the height of Islam and the Muslims, the victorious Kay Khusraw b. Kay Qubādh, the co-regent of the Commander of the Faithful
...⁵¹⁷
...

Kay Khusraw is not only allotted the same titles as his predecessors but an inscription on the city walls of Antalya dated 642/1244 and hence after his defeat at Köseadağ praises him as follows:

The construction of this blessed tower was ordered by the great sultan the great king of kings, the possessor of the necks of the nations, the sultan of the sultans of the world, the one who is close to the kings of the Arabs and the Persians, the guardian of the horizons, Ghiyāth al-Dunyā wa’l-Dīn, the height of Islam and the Muslims, the shadow of God in the lands, Abu’l-Fath Kay Khusraw b. Kay Qubādh, the co-regent of the Commander of the Faithful
...⁵¹⁸
...

The titles claimed for Kay Khusraw in this inscription formulated after the independence of the Rum Seljuqs was lost reveals that more ambitious titles were assumed with the loss of actual power as if to compensate for it.

However, the most important aspect for the purpose of the present study revealed in the account Ibn Bībī gives for the reign of Kay Khusraw is that the Seljuq dynasty was regarded as the only legitimate rulers in Anatolia. The author underlines that only a member of the Seljuq family was able to claim the sultanate. This is evident in two episodes described by the author. The first is that the emir Köpek was not content with being the right hand of the sultan but aspired to become sultan himself. He therefore claimed to be the illegitimate son of Kay Qubādh.⁵¹⁹ In the second instance the vizier Muhadhhiab al-Dīn convinces the Mongols not to take Anatolia under their direct control but to leave the Rum Seljuq sultans on the throne stating that:

“The rule of Rum can only be connected to the sultans from the House of Seljuq, and only the obedience to them calms the hearts of the subjects.”⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁷ RCEA, XI, 140-141 (inscription no 4211); Löytved, *Konia*, 43.

⁵¹⁸ RCEA, XI, 158-159 (inscription no 4238).

⁵¹⁹ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 205.

⁵²⁰ Ibn Bībī, Duda, 232.

It is not possible to ascertain how far the population at large accepted the Seljuqs as their rulers. This statement might be the actual statement of the vizier, or what would be more probable is that it was made by Ibn Bībī himself. In either case the important aspect revealed in this statement is that the class of the Persian men of the pen who first formulated the ideology of the Great Seljuqs were successful in thus shaping the idea of the 'House of Seljuq' as the legitimate dynasty to rule over Muslim territory. It is true that faced with the prospect of the rule of the Mongols the rule of the established dynasty of the Seljuqs was preferable. Yet, it seems safe to suggest that ideology was an important factor in the foundation and continued existence of the Seljuq states.

Conclusion

To conclude the study of the Rum Seljuq dynasty from the perspective of the 'history of mentality' has revealed several important points. First, the history of the early Great Seljuqs, who entered the Islamic world as chiefs of nomads and their presentation as ideal Muslim rulers with a matching 'tradition of origin', is significant for the subsequent history of the Rum Seljuqs. The Rum Seljuqs were able to formulate their official state ideology based on the dynastic connection to the Great Seljuqs available to them.

A close scrutiny of the source material on the first Seljuq leaders in Anatolia ruling from 473-500/1081-1107 conformed to traditional patterns of nomadic rule. Hence Sulaymān and Kılıç Arslan, regarded as the first Rum Seljuq sultans, were in reality not different from nomadic chiefs and represented the rebellious branch of the Seljuq family. This branch of the Seljuq family in a sense started all over again as chiefs of nomadic Turkmen bands in Anatolia and their Arabic and Persian advisers coming from the same class of religious scholars and bureaucrats from Khurāsān formulated an official ideology for them based on the Perso-Islamic ideology their predecessors had formulated for the Great Seljuqs. However, it has been shown that this ideology was not unchangeable but was re-formulated and extended with time. Thus, while the rule of the Great Seljuqs was legitimised by claiming that they were

champions of Sunni Islam against the rival Shi'i caliphs in Cairo, the rule of the Rum Seljuqs was legitimised by presenting them too as champions of Sunni Islam but the rivals had changed.

It has been argued here that the Rum Seljuq ideology evolved over four distinctive phases. The first phase is marked by the traditional Turkish ideas of the first Seljuq leaders in Anatolia who rebelled against their Great Seljuq cousins claiming supreme leadership based on nomadic Turkish traditions of leadership. This phase is also marked by a period of transition during which the Seljuq principality started to concentrate their efforts on establishing territorial rule in Anatolia rather than overthrowing the Great Seljuqs. The second phase is defined by the period of interregnum and transition (500-551/1107-1156) during which the Seljuqs in Anatolia were dominated by the rival Turkish Dānismendid principality.

It was only during the third phase comprising the period from 500/1156 to 600/1204 that the Rum Seljuq principality in Anatolia was transformed into the Rum Seljuq sultanate. The study of this period has shown how the Rum Seljuq ideology was developed as defence against rival ideological claims of the 'Counter Crusaders', Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin, who employed the ideology of jihad to legitimise their rule. The last phase covers the apogee of the dynasty under the rule of Kay Kāwūs I (608-616/1211-1220) and Kay Qubādh I (616-634/1220-1237) and it has been argued that these two Seljuq sultans could justifiably be viewed as model Perso-Islamic rulers. It has been pointed out that, although elements from their Turkish nomadic past remained, these rulers followed a sedentary way of life imitating the example of the ideal of Iranian kings. Hence this period marks the final step in the development of the Perso-Islamic concept of rule which was to remain the dominant concept under the Seljuq successor states.

To the research of the ideology and mentality of the Rum Seljuqs an appendix discussing the crucial relationship between the Rum Seljuqs and their Byzantine neighbours during the period (473-576/1081-1180) has been added. Here it has been argued that a pattern of friendly co-existence was established between the Seljuq sultans and the Comneni emperors during these years.

It has been shown that ideology and mentality rather than mere military success helped to shape this important dynasty into a fully-fledged sultanate.

However, this thesis is only a modest attempt at producing a study of the Rum Seljuq dynasty. There is still much work to be done in the area of the 'history of mentality', as well as in the areas of political, economic, and religious history of Anatolia in general during this period of Seljuq rule.

Appendix

The Rum Seljuqs and Byzantium (473-576/1081-1180)

As already stated in the introduction to the present work, in this appendix the relationship between the Rum Seljuqs and their powerful Byzantine neighbours during the period (473-576/1081-1180) will be analysed, as this relationship was important for the development of the Rum Seljuq state. It will be argued here that during this period a pattern of friendly co-existence was established between the Seljuq sultans and the Comneni emperors which was crucial for the survival of both states. However this appendix presents only a first step and will form the basis of future research of the author.

Two crushing defeats of the Byzantines by the Seljuqs are fixed as the corner stones of the Rum Seljuq and Byzantine relations. The defeat of the Byzantine emperor Romanos Diogenes by the Great Seljuq sultan Alp Arslan in 463/1071 at Manzikert is marked as the starting point of the Turkish conquest of Anatolia. The defeat of Manuel I Comnenus by the Rum Seljuq Sultan Kılıç Arslan II on the other hand is marked as the finalisation of this conquest. The medieval chroniclers and following them the modern scholars thus present the relationship between the Rum Seljuqs and the Byzantines as a constant struggle of conquest and reconquest between the Muslim Rum Seljuq rulers and the Christian Byzantine rulers.⁵²¹ Some more recent western scholarship has recognised that the Rum Seljuqs and Byzantines despite more or less continues frontier warfare accepted each other's right to exist

⁵²¹ Vryonis concentrates in his work on the reasons for the Turcification and Islamisation of Asia Minor and interprets the Rum Seljuq and Byzantine relations as a struggle for Asia Minor. S. Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamisation from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century*, Los Angeles/ London, 1971, (hereafter cited as Vryonis, Decline); idem., *Byzantium: its internal history and relations with the Muslim world*, London 1971; idem., *Studies on Byzantium Seljuks, and Ottomans*, Malibu 1981. In his monographic treatment of Rum Seljuq history Cahen does not devote much space to the relations between the Rum Seljuqs and Byzantium. He also presents the relations as the struggle for Asia Minor. C. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, London 1968, (hereafter cited as Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey); idem. *Formation*. The works of Vryonis and Cahen present the background for consecutive western historian dealing with Byzantine history and or Turkish history. The most important Turkish work on Rum Seljuq history is the work of Turan, which still serves as the background work for Turkish historians. O. Turan, *Selçuklular Zamanında Türkiye*, Istanbul 1971, (hereafter cited as Turan, Selçuklular).

and maintained a relationship of coexistence and cultural and economic exchange.⁵²² Yet, western scholarship has concentrated on the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine Empire has been regarded as the superior power because it is generally assumed, that the culturally advanced ancient Byzantine Empire with its sophisticated state apparatus must have been the dominant side in the relations between Rum Seljuqs and Byzantines.

A close examination of the sources reveals, however, that this is a view resulting from the ideological pretensions of the medieval sources and that there is a substantial gap between the ideological presentation and the real political practices. The following chapters will therefore analyse the personal relations between the Rum Seljuq sultans and the Byzantine emperors and the personal relations between the Rum Seljuq and Byzantine aristocracy considering their respective ideologies. The most important period is the period from 1081 to 1185, because during this period the pattern of the relations between the Rum Seljuqs and Byzantium was established by the emperors of the Comnenian dynasty and the first 'sultans' of the Rum Seljuq dynasty. For this reason, the personal relations between sultan and emperor will be discussed, as will the personal encounters at times of conflict and at times of peace.

The concentration on the Byzantine side when discussing the Rum Seljuq and Byzantine relations is also the result of the nature of the source material. We have only very little information in the Rum Seljuq and Muslim sources in general on the Rum Seljuqs and Byzantines. The period of the Comnenian Dynasty, on the other hand, is well reported by three Byzantine historians Anna Comnena, John Kinnamos and Nicetas Choniates, all three of which contain valuable information on Rum Seljuq and Byzantine relations.⁵²³ Thus when we analyse these Byzantine sources by keeping in mind the ideological views of the authors there are several clues we can find which can help us reconstruct a picture of the Rum Seljuq and Byzantine relations.

⁵²² Cf. Lilie, 'Twelfth-Century Byzantine and Turkish States', in: *Byzantinische Forschungen* 16 (1991), 38; M. Balivet, 'Entre Byzance et Konya: L'intercirculation des idées et des hommes au temps des Seldjoukides', in: G. Leiser (ed.), *Les Seljoukides d'Anatolie*, Paris 2005, 170-207.

⁵²³ These works will be used here in the following translations: *The Alexiad of Anna Comnena*, tr. by E.R.A. Sewter, Harmondsworth 1969, (hereafter cited as Anna, Sewter); *Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus by John Kinnamos*, trans. by C.M. Brand, New York 1976, (hereafter cited as Kinnamos, Brand); *O City of Byzantium Annals of Nicetas Choniates*, tr. H.J. Magoulias, Detroit 1984, (hereafter cited as Choniates, Magoulias).

The Rum Seljuq Ideology

After the descendants of Sulaymān b. Kutalmış had firmly established themselves as rulers in Anatolia, an official ideology to legitimise this rule was formulated for them. This ideology claimed that their cousins, the Great Seljuq sultans, officially assigned these lands to them. Thus they were linked to the Great Seljuq Empire and took over its Perso-Islamic concept of rule. Consequently they were heirs to the Muslim imperial ideology and thus they could not recognise the authority of the Byzantines.⁵²⁴ However, there was an important difference between their state and the Great Seljuq Empire, which is expressed in its name, the Rum Seljuq State. Rum was the term used by Muslims to describe Byzantium or Rome.⁵²⁵ The Seljuqs in Asia Minor, it seems certain, used the epithet Rum to describe themselves and their sultanate. We do not have any formal documents to prove this but the Rum Seljuq sources as well as other Muslim sources refer to the Seljuqs of Anatolia as the *Saldjūkiyān-i Rūm*.⁵²⁶ They were also regarded as such by the other Muslim powers and are described as the Seljuqs of Rum in Arabic and Persian Muslim sources.⁵²⁷ The Rum Seljuqs were thus, as Bosworth states, “in some measure conceiving of themselves as heirs to the Byzantines in south-central Anatolia.”⁵²⁸ At the same time, following the Muslim Arab tradition,⁵²⁹ the Rum Seljuqs accepted Byzantium’s claim to be heirs of the Roman Empire. Rum Seljuq

⁵²⁴ This is expressed in later inscriptions, for example on the doors of ‘Alā al-Dīn Kay Kubādh’s (1220-1237) mosque, Kılıç Arslan II is described as: “The great sultan, greatest Shāh of the Shāhs, lord of the Arab and Persian sultans ... the Pillar of Islam and of the Muslims ... destroyer of the infidel and idol worshippers ... Sultan of the lands of Rum, Armenia, the Franks and Syria”. J.H.D. Löytved, *Konia Inschriften der Seldschukischen Bauten*, Berlin 1907, 23.

⁵²⁵ For the usage of Rum in Arabic literature see EI2, Rūm (Bosworth/ El Cheikh); N.M. El Cheikh, *Byzantium Viewed by the Arabs*, Harvard 2004, 22ff. See also: J. Laurent, *Byzance et les origines du Soudan Roum*, Mélanges Diehl I, Paris 1930, 177ff.; P. Wittek, ‘Deux chapitres de l’histoire des Turcs de Roum’, in: *Byzantion* 2 (1936), 285ff.; idem, ‘Le Sultan de Rūm’, in: *Annuaire de l’Institut de philologie et d’histoire orientales et slaves* 6 (1938), 361ff.; Cahen, ‘La première pénétration turque en Asie Mineure’, in: *Byzantion* 18 (1948), 5ff.

⁵²⁶ Ibn Bībī writes for example in the introduction to his work that Ata Malik commissioned him to write the history of the Seljuqs of Rum and throughout his work he describes the Seljuq state as the Rum Seljuq state, Ibn Bībī, Duda, 120, 211 and to the Rum Seljuq officials as emirs of Rum, 249 or *beglerbeg* of Rum, 245.

⁵²⁷ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Crusading Period*, 114 as Ruler of Anatolia; Nīshāpūrī, Luther, 46 as Sultans of Rum; Rāwandī in his *Rāḥat al-ṣudūr* emphasises several times that the Seljuqs subjected Rum to their rule, Rāwandī, Ateş, 11, 14, 18, 25, 54, 11.

⁵²⁸ EI2, Rūm (Bosworth), 606.

⁵²⁹ Cf. El Cheikh, *Byzantium*, 22.

sources as well as other Muslim sources, refer to the Byzantine Emperor as the Roman Emperor or Basileus⁵³⁰ and to the Christians within the Rum Seljuq realm as Romans.⁵³¹

The Byzantine Ideology

The Byzantines did not refer to the Seljuq Turks and their followers in Asia Minor as the Rum Seljuqs or as Turks but as Persians, Saracens, Agarenes or barbarians⁵³². They make, however, a distinction between the Seljuq dynasty and their nomadic followers, though the term barbarian is sometimes applied to the Seljuq sultans, their noble descent is recognised but their Türkmen followers are always described as barbarians.⁵³³ Byzantine Imperial ideology demanded that the Byzantine Empire was the only rightful heir to the Roman Empire and thus the term Roman could not be applied to any other power.

⁵³⁰ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, description of the emperor as basileus (faslius) 27, 28, 30; Rāwandī, Ateş, 134, 146, 167, 291; and as emperor (Malik ar-Rum), 58, 92, 282, 283, 284; Rāwandī, Ateş, 117; The anonymous history of the Rum Seljuqs describes Manuel I Komnenos as the Roman Emperor Kir Manuel, Anonymous, Gençosman, 25; Later the Rum Seljuqs regarded the emperors of Nicaea as the rightful heirs of Byzantium and described them as malik, qaysar or fasilius like the emperors of Constantinople. The emperors of Trebizond, in contrast, are described as takwur (Armenian title for king), like the King of Cilician Armenia. See for this D. Korobeinikov, *Byzantium and the Turks in the Thirteenth Century*, (unpubl. thesis), Oxford 2004, 78-79, (hereafter cited as: Korobeinikov, Byzantium); Ibn Bībī, Duda, 64-68, Ibn Bībī describes here the first emperor of Trebizond Alexios I Komnenos as Kīr Aleks, the Tekvur the Ğānīt (the lord Alexios, takwur of the Pontos).

⁵³¹ Cf. Ibn Bībī, Duda, 28, 49, 62, 114, 119.

⁵³² All Greek Sources use one or more of these terms to describe the Rum Seljuq sultans and Great Seljuq sultans, however the term mainly used is Persian, which shows that the Byzantines regarded the Seljuqs as heirs of the Persian Empire. Hereby, transferring the Byzantine and Iranian idea of the family of rulers on the Muslim rulers, the Great Seljuqs are regarded as of higher rank than the Rum Seljuqs. Great Seljuqs as Persians: Anna, Sewter, 31; Great Seljuq sultan Malik Shāh as Persian Sultan: Anna, Sewter, 207 and Malik Shāh as great sultan: Anna, Sweter, 199; Great Seljuq realm as Persia: Anna, Sewter, 33, 208; Rum Seljuq sultan Kılıç Arslan II as the Persians' sultan: Kinnamos, Brand, 134; For the titles of the Seljuq rulers in Byzantine sources see also G. Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica II Sprachreste der Türkvölker in den Byzantinischen Quellen*, Berlin 1958, 286-287, (hereafter cited as Byzantinoturcica II). In some cases the term Ismaelites is used to refer to the Turks: Anna, Sewter, 307, 309, 310, 429, 439; Choniates, Magoulias, 211, 228, 229, 238, 291.

⁵³³ This distinction is also expressed by the application of the term Turcomans to the Seljuq followers. Cf. Anna, Sewter, 456; Kinnamos, Brand, 158.

The Byzantines described their country as Romania and the inhabitants as Romaioi or just as Christians.⁵³⁴ According to Byzantine imperial ideology, their Empire was the sole legitimate Empire and heir to the Roman Empire, which continued in Constantinople, the New Rome perfected through Christianity⁵³⁵. The model, to which the Byzantine imperial ideology was tailored, was that of the Empire of Constantine, Theodosius, and Justinian.⁵³⁶ This ideal, however, did not even then correspond with political reality and even less since the seventh century, when the empire lost most of its territories in Egypt, Africa, Syria, Palestine, the northern Balkans, and northern Italy. In the 11th century with the coming of the Normans from the west and the Seljuq Turks from the east not only was the ideal of Byzantine authority but its very existence threatened externally. The first emperor of the Comnenian dynasty, Alexius Comnenus saved the empire and, despite the substantial reduction of the empire's real political authority, the imperial ideology was continued. The claim of Byzantine supremacy was continued through the fiction that the Byzantine Emperor still held the position of the overlord. Thus, the enforcement of the formal recognition of their imperial authority became an important element of Comnenian foreign policy.

Alexius started the revival of the empire, the imperial ideology stayed in place and his descendants followed his example and the claim to be the sole legitimate empire and supreme to all other powers remained. Hence, Rum Seljuqs and all other people including Latin Christians were regarded as barbarians and inferior to the Byzantines or better 'Romans' and this meant that, "it was the barbarians who had to conform."⁵³⁷ The formula of dealing with barbarians was traditional: moral virtue, of the kind that all men respect, and gold, which barbarians can never resist."⁵³⁸ The Byzantine State had developed an extensive ceremonial as a

⁵³⁴ Cf. C. Mango, *Byzantium. The Empire of New Rome*, London 1980, 1, (hereafter cited as Mango, Byzantium). The term Byzantium is not a self-description and came into use from the Renaissance onwards.

⁵³⁵ For the Byzantine Imperial Ideology see H. Ahrweiler, *L'Idéologie politique de l'empire byzantin*, Paris 1975; A.P.Kazhdan/ G. Constable: *People and Power in Byzantium: An Introduction to Modern Byzantine Studies*, Washington 1982; S. Vryonis, 'Byzantine Imperial Authority: Theory and Practice in the Eleventh Century', in: G. Makdisi/ D. Sourdel/ J. Sourdel-Thmine (eds.), *La notion d'autorité au Moyen Age Islam, Byzance, Occident*, Paris 1982, 141-161.

⁵³⁶ According to Mango, this was the main reason for the backward-looking nature of Byzantine civilisation. Mango, *Byzantium*, 4-5.

⁵³⁷ P. Magdalino, *Manuel*, 33; see also Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 29-30.

⁵³⁸ Magdalino, *Manuel*, 28.

way to communicate its ideology to the inner and wider circles of the empire. The Games, triumph processions, receptions of envoys, literary works and art were part of this extensive ceremonial. In the *Muses* written for his son and successor John, Alexius aimed to leave his son advice on how to handle his imperial position. However in this treatise Alexius does not give his son practical advice on how to deal with intruders like the Rum Seljuqs but displays the traditional idea of meeting them with moral virtue and gold:

“One thing and one alone can save: Virtue ... If you have this as your breastplate, helmet, and great protecting shield, this is the armour which the Celt fears; this is the armour on seeing which the Norman sails away trembling; at this the Persian, the population of the Scyths, the Arabian peoples, the Abasgian, the Celtiberian, the Indian race and the Maurousian army all take fright.”⁵³⁹

Alexius describes here the Seljuq Turks as Persians and the Petchenegs as Scyths and implies thereby that their real character is not important and they are all just barbarians. Moreover, he lists the Indians among the peoples the empire had to deal with which is far from the truth but it claims that the power of the Byzantine empire was still universal. Alexius advised his son to keep the treasury in Constantinople filled at all times, “so that with these you may satisfy the greed of the nations, should these once more, as formerly, be on the move, gaping horribly and trying to devour, in their great numbers, this coveted city.”⁵⁴⁰ This statement by Alexius is a good description of the Byzantine policy of gold. Alexius also reveals here the special position of Constantinople as the “coveted city. Constantinople was for the Byzantines the identification of the Byzantine Empire and its security was thus the most important aim of Byzantine foreign policy.”⁵⁴¹

⁵³⁹ Ed. P. Maas as *Die Musen des Kaisers Alexios I*, in: *BZ*, 22 (1913), 351-52 as translated by Magdalino, *Manuel*, 27.

⁵⁴⁰ Magdalino, *Manuel*, 28.

⁵⁴¹ Cf. Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 12 and 31.

V.1. Sulaymān I and Alexius I Comnenus

The first involvement of Sulaymān with the Comneni was during the revolt of Nicephoros Botaniates against the emperor Michael Ducas. The future emperor Nicephoros Botaniates had hired Sulaymān's services when he rebelled against Michael VII Doukas (r. 1071-1078) in 1077/78. On his way to Constantinople Nicephoros Botaniates asked Sulaymān to leave Turkish garrisons on the route in western Anatolia so that places were secured for him.⁵⁴² However, Sulaymān seized this opportunity to take these places for himself, and shortly after Botaniates had reached Constantinople Sulaymān made Nicaea his residence.⁵⁴³ The first encounter between the Comneni and the Seljuqs in Anatolia took place, when they, like other Byzantine throne pretenders sought Turkish help. Here we can see that Alexius' attitude towards the Turks differed in real praxis from his attitude towards "barbarian" as it was described by his muses.

"John was rather fortunate at this stage, for as he set out he met some Turks who had recently crossed the River Euros. He reined in his horse and asked from where they journeyed and what was their destination. He also promised to give them much money and grant them all sorts of favours if they would join him on the march to Comnenus. The Turks agreed there and then, and John, wishing to confirm the arrangement, required their leaders to take an oath. At once they swore an oath, after their own fashion, to fight with great enthusiasm on the side of Alexius. Thus John went on his way accompanied by these Turks."⁵⁴⁴

According to Anna, it just so happened that her uncle, John, met these Turks on his way but more credible is that he asked the Turks to send him re-inforcements. Alexius did not disregard the Turkish "barbarians" but welcomed their military support during his revolt to gain the imperial throne. "My father, most of all, could not contain himself for joy."⁵⁴⁵ Anna's first record about Sulaymān after the accession of Alexius reveals important aspects of the relations between the two sides:

⁵⁴² Cf. Vryonis, *Decline*, 113; Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 95-96; B.G. Spiridonakis, *Grecs, Occidentaux et Turcs de 1054 à 1453 Quatre siècles d'histoire de relations internationales*, Thessaloniki 1990, 193.

⁵⁴³ Cf. Vryonis, *Decline*, 105-106; Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 96 and 102.

⁵⁴⁴ Anna, Sewter, 89.

⁵⁴⁵ Anna, Sewter, 89.

“Alexius made preparations to deal with the immediate and pressing danger which threatened him from the east. Meanwhile he remained in the capital, examining every means of counteracting the enemies before his very eyes. As I have said in a previous chapter, the godless Turks were in sight, living in the Propontis area, and Sulayman, who commanded all the east, was actually encamped in the vicinity of Nicaea. His sultanate was in that city (we would call it his palace). The whole countryside of Bithynia and Thynia was increasingly exposed to Sulayman’s foragers; marauding parties on horseback and on foot were raiding as far as the town now called Damalis on the Bosphorus itself; they carried off much booty and all but tried to leap over the very sea.”⁵⁴⁶

Anna emphasises that Sulaymān and his Turkish bands had reached Nicaea, which had become his capital. Yet, she does not mention how the Turks had come as far as Nicaea though usually she goes back to past events to explain the present situation. In this case, she prefers to omit the fact that support for the rebels Nicepheros Botaniates and then Nicepheros Melisenus had enabled Sulaymān to take western Anatolian towns. The position of Sulaymān in western Anatolia was not secure enough to attempt the conquest of Constantinople.⁵⁴⁷ Thus, Anna’s remark that the Turks threatened to “leap over the very sea” is one of her exaggerations. Sulaymān’s residence Nicaea was only a hundred kilometres away from the imperial city thus it was easy for his bands to raid as far as the Bosphorus but he did not possess a fleet to threaten it seriously. Moreover, Sulaymān had reached the status of a territorial ruler by chance and had not yet the administrative structure to establish a state. Still, Anna describes Sulaymān as sultan and exaggerates the power held by him stating that he “commanded all the east”. Sulaymān belonged to a branch of the Great Seljuq dynasty but he was in no position to assume the sultan title. His Great Seljuq cousin, sultan Malik Shāh, was too powerful to accept anyone contesting his claim of sole leadership⁵⁴⁸. Besides, the Abbasid caliph, the only power which could have granted Sulaymān such a title was at the time under the control of Malik Shāh.⁵⁴⁹ Sulaymān had the advantage of being a member of the ruling dynasty and

⁵⁴⁶ Anna, Sewter, 129.

⁵⁴⁷ Cahen states that: “Süleyman must nevertheless have realized that to keep his new-found power he was too much at risk in the west, and must maintain his relations with the Turcomans of western Anatolia.” Cahen, *Formation*, 9.

⁵⁴⁸ According to Bar Hebraeus Malik Shāh even sent an army to Anatolia and an envoy to Constantinople to return of Kutlumush’s sons Sulaymān and Mansūr to the Great Seljuq realm. Bar Hebraeus, *Budge*, 227; Turan, *Selçuklular*, 58; Cahen, *Formation*, 9.

⁵⁴⁹ Cf. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 75-76. There is also no evidence that Sulaymān assumed the title sultan. There are no coins, existent from his time and the Muslim sources describe him as malik and amir not as sultan. For the coins see, K. Çetin, *Selçuklu Müesseseleri ve Medeniyeti Tarihi*, Erzurum 1992, 34.

was thus able to command the respect of some Turkish bands but not of all of them and his real power did not extend that of the other Turkish chiefs operating in Asia Minor. Most of these Turkish chiefs did not recognise any overlord and were acting for their own benefit and therefore Sulaymān did not command the whole of Asia Minor as Anna writes.

However Anna reveals here an important Byzantine policy towards the Rum Seljuqs which the first Comnenian ruler Alexius established and which his successors continued to apply after him. The Byzantines elevated Sulaymān's status for two reasons. Firstly, they wanted to build him up as the sole leader of the Turks in Asia Minor, as it seemed easier to put an end to the raids and incursions of the Turkish bands when they were brought under the control of one leader.⁵⁵⁰ Secondly, Alexius was prepared to build up Sulaymān as a rival sultan ruling over the Turks in Anatolia in order to establish a balance of power against the more dangerous Great Seljuq sultan further east. Alexius, it seems, supported consciously the establishment of a Seljuq state within Asia Minor. The memory of the battle of Manzikert, where Malik Shāh's father, Alp Arslan, had defeated the emperor Romanos IV Diogenes, no doubt played a role here. Thus, in real praxis Alexius' aim was not the expulsion of the Turks from Asia Minor. Despite propagandistic claims voiced in Alexius' eulogies and in Anna's work, Alexius did not regard the Seljuqs as just barbarians with whom it was easy to deal. Therefore, his real aim was to keep the Seljuqs and the Turkish bands in general away from Constantinople and the economically important coastal regions:

“Comnenus not only drove the enemy far away from the Bosphorus and the places by the sea, but chased them from the districts of Bithynia and Thynia altogether, not to mention the borders of Nicomedia, and the sultan was constrained to make the most urgent pleas for an armistice. Alexius gladly accepted the offer of negotiations. He had reliable information from many sources about Robert's unlimited ambitions and he knew that enormous forces had been gathered; Robert was already hurrying to the Lombardy coast. ... By various means he had driven the Turks from Damalis and the coastal districts near it; at the same time he had won their friendship with gifts; he had compelled them to accept a treaty of peace. The River Drakon was now made the border between them, with the proviso that the Turks were absolutely forbidden to cross it and under no circumstances to invade the frontiers of Bithynia.”⁵⁵¹

⁵⁵⁰ Cf. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 77; Cahen, *Formation*, 9.

⁵⁵¹ Anna, Sewter, 130.

Anna emphasises here Alexius' success in driving the Turks away from the coastal regions and presents Sulaymān as the weaker party, who made "the most urgent pleas for an armistice." The emperor consented only because he had information that the Normans were launching an expedition against the empire. Anna is anxious to present the emperor as the superior party in his dealings with the Turks and does not reveal the exact course of the warfare between Sulaymān and Alexius preceding the treaty. However, Alexius was not in a superior position. He was under threat of internal enemies, Byzantine aristocrats who were waiting for an opportunity to seize the imperial throne, external enemies, Normans and Petchenegs in the west and Seljuqs and other Turkish chiefs in the east, who used every opportunity to raid Byzantine territory. Moreover, the whole situation was worsened by the empire's chronic lack of manpower. Thus a war on two fronts was impossible and weighing up the threat posed by the Seljuqs in the east and the Normans in the west the emperor decided to deal with the latter as they had the power to take the imperial city. A peace treaty with Sulaymān not only enabled him to withdraw his troops from the east but it meant also that he would gain an ally, whom he could ask for reinforcements against the Normans.⁵⁵² We can not be certain of Alexius' attitude towards Sulaymān as Anna omits the articles of the treaty. She reveals, however, that the River Drakon⁵⁵³ was set as the boundary between the two realms.⁵⁵⁴ That Alexius was prepared for a boundary to be set seems to prove that he accepted the loss of Asia Minor and recognised Sulaymān as a territorial ruler and sought to win him as an ally. Anna tries to uphold the Byzantine claim of superiority stating that the emperor set the terms of the treaty and won the Turks "friendship with gifts."

The lack of contemporary Rum Seljuq sources makes it difficult to determine Sulaymān's attitude towards the emperor. However, the fact that he consented to the

⁵⁵² Anna writes: "Alexius saw the magnitude of his task and was afraid. He knew that his own forces were vastly outnumbered by the Latins and decided that he must call on the Turks from the east. There and then he made his views known to the sultan. He also asked the Venetians for help, with promises and bribes." Anna, *Sewter*, 137; see also Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 112.

⁵⁵³ The location of the River Drakon has not been established. Ramsay located it at the stream called in modern Turkish Kirkgeçit. W. Ramsay, *The Historical Geography of Asia Minor*, 205; Chalandon, *Alexis*, 72, 75; Turan thought that with Drakon the hill called Orhan and a stream there must have been meant following the suggestion of Michael the Syrian that Izmit was also under Seljuq control, Turan, *Selçuklular*, 62, n. 50.

⁵⁵⁴ Cf. Dölger, *Regesten*, II, 24; J. Laurent, *Byzance et les origines du Sultanat de Roum*, Paris 1930, 181-182, (hereafter cited as Laurent, *Sultanat de Roum*); idem., *Byzance et les Turcs Seldjoucides*, Nancy 1913, 8, 11, 94, (hereafter cited as Laurent, *Seldjoucides*); Vryonis, *Decline*, 114; Sevim/Yücel, *Türkiye Tarihi*, 102.

treaty at Drakon suggests that he had no intention to continue his expansions towards the west. He had taken several places during the Byzantine internal strife but had not consolidated his power in Anatolia yet. There were other Turkish chiefs in Anatolia contesting his power. They did not recognise him or anyone for that matter as their overlord. Moreover, the Great Seljuq Sultan Malik Shāh regarded his cousin Sulaymān as a threat and interfered several times in his and his successor's affairs to prevent the establishment of a rival Seljuq state in Asia Minor. Sulaymān agreed to conclude a treaty with the Byzantine emperor because he won thus a powerful ally in the west and could then concentrate his efforts on consolidating his power towards eastern Anatolia.

Thus, both rulers, Sulaymān as well as Alexius, concluded the treaty of Drakon out of similar considerations. They both had to free their hands to defend their position. Thus, in real political praxis the Byzantine emperor Alexius could not demand to have a higher rank than the Rum Seljuq 'sultan' Sulaymān. Anna's attempt to excuse the emperor's decision to conclude the Drakon treaty reveals this:

"... Robert was already hurrying to the Lombardy coast. After all, if Hercules could not fight two opponents at once, as the proverb says, how much more was it true of a young general who had but recently acquired a corrupted empire, slowly perishing over a long period and now at its last gasp, without armies and without money?"⁵⁵⁵

Anna admits that the Byzantine Empire had lost its former greatness and that it was at "its last gasp." Thus, Alexius confronted with the prospect to lose Constantinople to the Norman ruler Robert had to conclude peace with Sulaymān to defend Constantinople.⁵⁵⁶ The defence of the imperial city was paramount, as for the Byzantines the city was synonymous with the empire. Yet, according to imperial ideology, the Treaty of Drakon could not be regarded as an agreement reached between two parties equal in rank. Hence in theory, Sulaymān must have been regarded as a subordinate of the emperor to whom he had delegated the rule of the territories held by him.⁵⁵⁷ However, we have no evidence, which reveals how the

⁵⁵⁵ Anna, Sewter, 130.

⁵⁵⁶ Anna states that Robert Guiscard's attack on Dyrrachium "was merely the first round" in his aim to take "the throne of the Roman Empire." Anna, Sewter, 136.

⁵⁵⁷ Cf. Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, 357. Similarly to the situation with the Serbs in the first half of the eleventh century were the fiction was maintained according to which the emperor allowed the Serbs to be ruled by their own princes. See also Harris, *Byzantium confronts the West*, 24.

relation between Alexius and Sulaymān were formally regulated, though two incidents seem to support the conclusion that Sulaymān became a subordinate of the Byzantine emperor. Firstly, the fact that Abu'l Qāsim, whom Sulaymān had left in Nicaea as his deputy was invited to Constantinople and received the title "sebastos"⁵⁵⁸ implies that Sulaymān might have received a similar title.⁵⁵⁹

Secondly, Sulayman's conquest of Antioch. After the conclusion of the treaty of Dracon, Sulaymān turned towards the east and in 1086 reached Syria where he took Antioch without difficulty from Philaretus.⁵⁶⁰ Philaretus, an Armenian who had been in Byzantine service, had during the turmoil after the battle of Manzikert, seized control over Antioch in 1078 and established a principality in northern Syria. Anna writes that Philaretus "organized a rebellion and seized power for himself in Antioch"⁵⁶¹ and then continues:

"As the Turks plundered the area round the city every day and there was not respite at all, Philaretos decided to join them and offered himself for circumcision, according to their custom. His son violently opposed this ridiculous impulse, but his good advice went unheeded. After a journey of eight days, he arrived in a state of extreme distress at Nicaea and approached the Emir Sulayman, who had just been promoted to the rank of sultan. He urged him to besiege Antioch and prosecute the war against his father. Sulayman agreed and as he was about to leave for Antioch appointed Abul-Kasim governor of Nicaea with overriding authority over all other military commanders. After a march of twelve nights (with rest by day) Sulayman and Philaretos' son reached Antioch without been seen and took it at the first assault."⁵⁶²

Anna presents the conquest of Antioch by Sulaymān in an unusually descriptive way without lamenting the fact that the town came under Turkish Muslim

⁵⁵⁸ Anna reports: "When the fortress was finished and his aim achieved, Alexius presented the Turk with more gifts, honoured him with the title *sebastos*, confirmed their agreement in greater detail and sent him with every sign of courtesy back over the sea." Anna, Sewter, 204.

⁵⁵⁹ Western scholars conclude that Sulaymān was a vassal of Alexius. Cf. Laurent, *Sultanat de Roum*, 181-182; idem., *Seldjoudes*, 96-98; Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, 357; Cahen shares this view stating that, Sulaymān "turned back to the east, there also aided by his more or less clear new position as deputy for the Byzantines". Cahen, *Formation*, 9. Turkish scholars on the other hand reject this view regarding it as a result of western orientalism. According to Turan and subsequent Turkish historians the incursion of the Turks into Asia Minor and the establishment of the Rum Seljuq state were part of a grand Seljuq or Turkish plan of conquest and pre-planned. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 62-66.

⁵⁶⁰ The collapse of Byzantine administration in Asia Minor following the battle of Manzikert, left especially the eastern Anatolian borders and regions unguarded. The Armenian chiefs making use of this situation established principalities in these regions. Philaretus was an Armenian with Byzantine religious affiliation and had served as governor in eastern Anatolia during the reign of Romanos Diogenes. Cf. Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 100-101; Vryonis, *Decline*, 108-109; Runciman, *Crusades*, I, 73.

⁵⁶¹ Anna, Sewter, 198.

⁵⁶² Anna, Sewter, 198-199.

control. That she connects the two events in her narrative implies that she regarded Sulaymān's conquest as a necessary outcome caused by Philaretus himself. It was certainly in the interest of Alexius that Sulaymān was engaged in the east rather than in the west and that Philaretus, who had in the past supported his rivals, was defeated. However, we cannot discern if an agreement between Alexius and Sulaymān existed which appointed the latter to take Antioch⁵⁶³. The Comneni, like their predecessors, regarded local Greek as well as Armenian leaders as a threat to the imperial central authority and Turkish chiefs were regarded as allies to fight those, though it is surprising that Alexius would have left such an important city like Antioch to the Turks. More so, since Alexius and his successors later, when the city was taken by the armies of the First Crusade, insisted vehemently on bringing it back under the empire's control.

The information of the Muslim sources on the conquest of Antioch is not conclusive either. On the one hand, it implies, that Sulaymān might have been regarded as a Byzantine deputy, on the other hand it implies that he regarded himself as the subordinate of the Great Seljuq sultan:

"... Sharaf al-Dawla Muslim ibn Quraysh sent to him demanding the tribute that Philaretus used to pay him and portraying the dread results of rebelling against the sultan. He replied, 'Obedience to the sultan is my watchword and my cloak. His name is in the khutbah and on the coinage in my lands. I have already written to him to announce which lands and infidel territory God has conquered at my hand and through his felicity. As for the tribute that the lord of Antioch paid previously, well, he was an infidel and paid his and his men's poll-tax. I, praise be to God, am a believer and I shall deliver nothing.'⁵⁶⁴

According to Ibn al-Athīr, the emir of Aleppo demanded from Sulaymān the tribute paid by Philaretus and threatened to call for the Great Seljuq sultan Malik Shāh, "portraying the dread results of rebelling against the sultan". Sulaymān answered that he was obedient towards the sultan and that as a Muslim he did not have to pay the poll-tax. This supposed statement of Sulaymān is anachronistic and certainly the words of the author himself. Still it reflects the later Rum Seljuq ideology that the Great Seljuq sultan formally bestowed on them the rule of Asia Minor and that they were Perso-Islamic rulers. The Great Seljuq sultan Malik Shāh

⁵⁶³ Cf. Cahen, *Formation*, 9; idem., *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 77.

⁵⁶⁴ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, 218.

and his brother Tutuş to whom he had given the rule over Syria, certainly did not regard Sulaymān as an obedient vassal but as a threat and he was killed in war and his sons were sent as captives to Malik Shāh.⁵⁶⁵ However, even if the Great Seljuq sultan did not regard Sulaymān as his vassal, he was still regarded as a Muslim ruler and as such he could not be the vassal of the Christian Byzantine emperor. Moreover, according to the Islamic State ideology a Muslim ruler could not be at peace with its Christian neighbour for a long period of time.⁵⁶⁶

To conclude, the treaty of Drakon and the conquest of Antioch reveal the following elements which make up a pattern of the relations between sultan and emperor. Sultan and emperor regarded each other as allies. Both sides came to accept each other's existence and did not aim to destroy the other side. Moreover, the emperor built up Sulaymān as anti-sultan against the Great Seljuq sultan.⁵⁶⁷ The emperor's aim was thus to keep a balance of power and not to expel the Turks from Anatolia. The main concern of the sultan was the consolidation of his power in the east and the main concern of the emperor was the defence of Constantinople and the coastal areas.

V.2. Kılıç Arslan I and Alexius I Comnenus

The first aim of Kılıç Arslan I, like that of his father Sulaymān was to establish his powerbase in eastern Anatolia. Anna describes in the following passage how he and his brother escaped Great Seljuq captivity and came to Nicaea and took over his father's realm⁵⁶⁸.

"... the Sultan of Chorasān who was murdered by Chasioi had previously held the two sons of the great Sulaymān; after his death they ran away from Chorasān and soon arrived in

⁵⁶⁵ Cf. Anna, Sewter, 199.

⁵⁶⁶ Kinnamos reports for example that Kılıç Arslan in 1173 explained his break of the alliance with the emperor as follows: "The other said ... that their caliph, the high priest among them, was angry at him for having agreed to such an extent of friendship with the Romans." Kinnamos, Brand, 216.

⁵⁶⁷ Anna reports that after the death of Sulaymān Malik Shāh wrote to Alexius offering him to hand him over all Anatolian territories held by the Turks if he agreed to a marriage alliance between his son and a Byzantine princess. Alexius, however, supported Sulaymān's deputy Abu'l Kasim against Malik Shāh's general. Anna, Sewter, 207.

⁵⁶⁸ Cf. I. Demirkent, *Türkiye Selçuklu Hükümdarı Sultan I. Kılıç Arslan*, Ankara 1996, 15.

Nicaea. At the sight of them the people of Nicaea ran riot with joy and Poulchases gladly handed over the city to them, as if it were a family inheritance. The elder son, Kiliç by name, received the title sultan. He sent for the wives and children of the soldiers present in Nicaea and they set up home there; the city became what one might call the official residence of the sultans. After arranging the affairs of Nicaea thus, Kiliç Arslan forced Poulchases to resign his governorship, promoted Muhammad archisatrap, left him behind in the vicinity of Nicaea and himself went off to attack Melitene.⁵⁶⁹

Kiliç Arslan's interest in Malatya (Melitene) signals his intention to secure important routes⁵⁷⁰ in eastern Anatolia leading to Upper Mesopotamia, Syria and the Great Seljuq Empire. Thus, like his father Sulaymān before him, Kiliç Arslan showed no intention to attack Constantinople. The ambitious Turkish chief Çaka acquired a fleet and aspired, the conquest of Constantinople but this was an independent enterprise. Kiliç Arslan married Çaka's daughter after he returned to Nicaea probably in order to gain the alliance of this important Turkish leader but there is no indication that the latter accepted the former as an overlord.⁵⁷¹ Anna gives us the only information about Çaka's life and quoting him writes:

“Tzachas, addressing Dalassenus by name, began the conversation: ‘Let me introduce myself. I am the young man who in the old days made incursions into Asia. I fought with great spirit, but because of my inexperience I was deceived and captured by the famous Alexander Kabalika. He offered me as a prisoner of war to the Emperor Nicephorus Botaniates. I was at once honoured with the title of protonobilissimus and after being rewarded with liberal gifts I promised obedience to him.’⁵⁷²

According to this statement, Çaka was one of the Turkish chiefs who led raids into Anatolia and was taken captive by the Byzantines and brought to Constantinople. He therefore not only knew the Byzantine admiral by name but was also able to speak to him in Greek addressing him personally. Moreover, he claims during this conversation that he had received the title *protonobilissimus* from the

⁵⁶⁹ Anna, Sewter, 210; Bar Hebraeus confirms Kiliç Arslan's attack on Melitene and dates it to 1095 writes: “Kelej Arslân, the son of Sûlaimân, the Sûltân of Iconium, came and encamped against Melitene, and made war upon it.” Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 233.

⁵⁷⁰ For this it was important to hold the cities on the major routes: “the Royal Road that ran from Symrna and Sardis, by way of Ancyra and Caesarea, to Melitene; the road connecting Constantinople to Ancyra by way of Dorylaeum; and the southern road that extended from Ephesus to Laodicea, Antioch in Pisidia, Iconium, Tyana and through the Cilician Gates, to Tarsus and Antioch in Syria.” Mango, *Byzantium*, 17.

⁵⁷¹ Cf. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 97; Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 81.

⁵⁷² Anna, Sewter, 236. According to Angold the title *protonobilissimus* was one of the composite Byzantine titles, invented during the inflation of titles in the 11th century. Cf. Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 72.

emperor Nicephorus Botaniates (r. 1078-1081) and in exchange promised obedience. It is surprising that Çaka was immediately honoured with a Byzantine title after he was handed over to the emperor and indicates that he might have already been familiar with Greek and Byzantine internal structures. Anna does not inform us when exactly he was taken captive but it seems improbable that he should have gathered so much insight and knowledge about Byzantium during the short reign of Nicephorus Botaniates, who had employed him⁵⁷³. According to Anna Çaka even claimed to have knowledge of Greek classics: “Tzachas gave the impression that he was quoting Homer’s line, ‘Night is already upon us: it is good to heed the night.’”⁵⁷⁴ Be that as it may, it is certain that Çaka realised that he needed a fleet to challenge Byzantium seriously. After Alexius acceded to the throne Çaka who probably was then in Constantinople and was not, it seems, honoured by the new emperor as his predecessor had done and thus he left and became an enemy of the new emperor. “But ever since Alexius Comnenus seized power, everything has gone wrong for me. That is why I have come now in person to explain the reason for my enmity.”⁵⁷⁵ Probably because the new emperor did not honour Çaka and he left Constantinople and then took Smyrna, where he took residence and established a maritime principality:⁵⁷⁶

“At this moment Tzachas, being informed of the emperor’s manifold difficulties in the west and of his frequent encounters with the Patzinaks, decided that he must have a fleet – the omens were propitious. He met a certain man from Smyrna who had considerable experience in such matters and to him he entrusted the business of constructing pirate vessels. Somewhere near Smyrna a large fleet was equipped. In addition to the pirate vessels there were forty decked ships and on the crews of efficient sailors.”⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁷³ Turan writes that Çaka “making use of his Byzantine experience and his relations with Romans prepared a fleet with the craftsmen he got hold of.” Turan, *Selçuklular*, 89. However, he does not give any references as to sources and names; Sevim and Yücel write that Çaka left Constantinople after Alexius came to power and went to Smyrna which he conquered easily and that he then “thanks to the experience he won in Byzantium brought together a strong fleet”. Sevim/Yücel, *Türkiye Tarihi*, 217; Ostrogorsky just acknowledges that. “He had once been a prisoner at the court of Nicephorus Botaniates, and being familiar with the tactics of Byzantine warfare he rightly recognised that the decisive blow against the imperial city must come from the sea.” Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, 360; Magadalino writes in passing that “he had spent time in Byzantine service.” in: Mango (ed.), *Oxford History of Byzantium*, Oxford 2002, 185. Cahen and Vryonis do not elaborate on this. Cf. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 81/85; Vryonis, *Decline*, 115.

⁵⁷⁴ Anna, Sewter, 237.

⁵⁷⁵ Anna, Sewter, 236.

⁵⁷⁶ At the peak of his power Çaka controlled the Aegean towns of Smyrna, Clazomenae, Phocaea, Mitylene and the Aegean islands Samos and Chios. Cf. Vryonis, *Decline*, 115.

⁵⁷⁷ Anna, Sewter, 233.

It is surprising that Çaka, the former war prisoner, was able to find the financial and constructive aid to acquire such a strong fleet. Anna writes that “a certain man” helped Çaka but does not specify who that person was and how he was paid. Obviously, Anna does not want to admit that Greeks supported Çaka in his enterprise but it is quite obvious that they did. Çaka’s ambitions seemed limitless as he aimed for the imperial city itself and was not even daunted by setbacks. He tried to reach his goal by an alliance with the Pechenegs, whom he asked to take Gallipoli so that he could attack Constantinople.⁵⁷⁸ Anna informs us about the great danger posed by the Petchenegs (Scyths) and Çaka:

“But the unchecked violence of the Scyths had such an overwhelming effect that would-be pilgrims dared not even open the gates of Byzantium because of these frequent assaults. Such were the terrible disasters which fell upon the emperor in the west; on the sea, too, there was no freedom from trouble, for Tzachas had acquired a new fleet and was overrunning all the coastline. The situation was extremely dangerous, and these blows coming from all directions caused Alexius deep concern. He was vexed and harassed everywhere. The news came that Tzachas’ fleet, recruited from the maritime districts, was bigger than ever; the rest of the islands previously taken by him had been sacked; he planned to attack the western provinces and his envoys advised the Scyths to occupy the Chersonese. Worse still, he would not let the mercenary force (the Turks from the east who had come to the emperor’s aid) keep their treaty with Alexius inviolate. To make them desert him and come over to his own side, Tzachas promised fine rewards once he had his hands on the loot.”⁵⁷⁹

It might also be that Çaka approached Abu’l Qāsim for an alliance in order to have support from that direction as well and thus to encircle the imperial city. Anna does not mention any alliance between him and Abu l’Kasim, who was at that time an ally of the emperor. She states, however, that Çaka approached the Turkish mercenaries, most probably sent by Abu’l Qāsim to desert to him. However, Anna does not give us any information about, what happened then between the Petchenegs and Çaka but the alliance led to nothing and Alexius defeated the former with the help of the Cumans. Hence, Çaka did not give up his plans:

⁵⁷⁸ For the alliance with the Petchenegs cf. Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 110; Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, 360. For the alliance with Abu’l Qāsim see Sevim/Yücel, *Türkiye Tarihi*, 218, who state that Çaka started, around the same time of his alliance with the Pechenegs, negotiations with Abu l’Kasim and then that: “Byzantium was thus pressed and threatened by the Pechenegs in Thrace, by the Seljuqs of Turkey form the Sea of Marmara, and by Çaka in İzmir (Smyrna) and its surroundings.” Unfortunately, the authors do not give any references and information about the nature of this alliance between Abu’l Qāsim and Çaka.

⁵⁷⁹ Anna, Sewter, 251-52.

“Soon after he had come back news arrived of Tzachas. It was reported that defeat by land and sea had not diverted him from his previous intentions: he was wearing the imperial insignia, calling himself emperor and living at Smyrna as though it were an imperial residence. A fleet was being equipped to ravage the island afresh, for Tzachas hoped to reach Byzantium itself and attain supreme power, if that were possible”⁵⁸⁰.

Despite a setback and the defeat of his Petcheneg allies Çaka did not lose heart and, overbearing as ever, assumed “imperial insignia”, aimed to “attain supreme power” and copied the life of the Byzantine emperor at his residence in Smyrna⁵⁸¹. Çaka’s aim was thus not to take Constantinople and convert it into a Muslim imperial city and to become a Muslim “emperor” but to become an emperor in the Byzantine tradition. Sulaymān and Kılıç Arslan in contrast regarded themselves as rightful members of the Great Seljuq dynasty and their ultimate goal was, it seems, to become rulers of that “empire”. Kılıç Arslan did not support his father-in-law Çaka in his plans against Byzantium and Alexius managed to alienate Çaka and Kılıç Arslan with the following words:

“It would also be expedient, Alexius thought, to stir up trouble for him with the sultan. A letter was therefore sent, reading as follows: ‘Most Illustrious Sultan Kiliç Arslan, you know that the dignity of sultan is yours by right of inheritance. But your kinsman Tzachas, although apparently preparing for war against the Roman Empire (for he calls himself emperor) is in reality using this as a pretext – an obvious pretext, for he is a man of experience and he knows perfectly well that the Roman Empire is not for him: it would be absolutely beyond his power to seize a throne so exalted. The whole mischievous plan is directed against you. If you are wise, therefore, you will not endure this. There is no need for despair however, but rather for vigilance; otherwise you will be driven from your sultanate. For my part, I will with God’s help expel him from Roman territory and as I care for your interests, I would advise you to consider your own authority and power, and quickly bring him to heel, by peaceful means or, if he refuses, by the sword.’”⁵⁸²

We can see here that Alexius continued his policy of elevating the status of the Seljuq ruler by addressing him as “Most illustrious Sultan”. The emperor alluded to the noble birth of the Seljuq Kılıç Arslan I, setting it in contrast to the descent of his lowborn kinsman, Çaka by indicating, “the dignity of sultan is yours by right of inheritance”. Obviously, Alexius wanted to flatter Kılıç Arslan to win him over. On

⁵⁸⁰ Anna, Sewter, 269.

⁵⁸¹ Cf. Chalandon, *Alexis*, 125-127, 147, 195-196; A. Kurat, *Çaka ortazamanda İzmir ve yakınındaki Türk hakimi*, İstanbul 1936; Vryonis, *Decline*, 115.

⁵⁸² Anna, Sewter, 274-5.

the other hand, Anna makes throughout her work a distinction between the Seljuq dynasty and its nomadic following. It thus seems certain that the emperor recognised the sultan's noble lineage and thus his right for leadership over the Turks. The idea of noble birth did indeed compile with Turkish tradition and also with the Byzantine concept of the 12th century where the imperial family "for the first time, became an effective 'blood royal'".⁵⁸³

Alexius exaggerates the power of his "Roman Empire" and claims propagandistically that it is "absolutely beyond his power to seize a throne so exalted" even though Çaka had been able to threaten the empire seriously several times. The emperor wanted to demonstrate his power to the Seljuq ruler and make him suspicious of Çaka's motives, claiming that the latter was after the realm of the 'sultan'. Kılıç Arslan must have been aware of the emperor's empty propaganda, but on the other hand, he had reason to be suspicious of Çaka's intentions since he could have become a rival. Therefore, Kılıç Arslan regarded Çaka, his kinsman and father-in-law, as a far more dangerous enemy than Alexius, as the former could threaten his position. Hence, according to Anna, Kılıç Arslan invited Çaka to a banquet where he killed him himself and "then made overtures to the emperor for peace in the future and his proposals met with success, for Alexius consented and a treaty was concluded in the normal way. Thus peace was restored to the maritime provinces."⁵⁸⁴ Again, Anna omits the terms of the treaty reached and claims that Kılıç Arslan I sought the peace and Alexius consented, even though the latter was in no position to make demands. Nevertheless, Alexius and the new Rum Seljuq leader Kılıç Arslan I became allies.

Kılıç Arslan I, Alexius I Comnenus and the First Crusade

Yet, in 1095 Alexius is believed to have sent an embassy to pope Urban II to appeal for help against the Turks. Turkmen raids into Byzantine coastal regions had not ceased with the death of Çaka, as other Turkish chiefs took his place.⁵⁸⁵ However, none of those was a great danger to the Byzantine Empire, as Anna states

⁵⁸³ Magdalino, *Manuel*, 312.

⁵⁸⁴ Anna, Sewter, 275; Dölger, *Regesten* II, p. 41 no. 1169.

⁵⁸⁵ Cf. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 81.

in the above quoted passage, and the “maritime provinces” were at peace. Moreover, Kılıç Arslan himself had left Nicaea for the east where he had laid siege on Malatya. He seems to have had no interest in the maritime provinces of the Byzantine state or Constantinople. Even though such Byzantine appeals for military support to the west were not new it is not clear why Alexius sent one at this time as his situation was not hopeless any more.⁵⁸⁶

He had forced the Normans out of the Balkans in 1083 and defeated the Petchenegs in 1091 and Çaka had been killed the following year, so that by 1095 the Empire was not under threat any more.⁵⁸⁷ The questions as to why Alexius sent out an appeal despite his improved situation, and why he alluded to the religious sentiments of the Western Christians in this appeal have been widely discussed by modern scholars.⁵⁸⁸ They have reached the assumption that Alexius, despite his improved situation, still asked for help, because he was in need of manpower for an expedition of reconquest directed against the Seljuqs.⁵⁸⁹ It is believed that he alluded to the Holy Land and Holy Sepulchre because he thought this would mobilise the western leaders to supply him with mercenaries.⁵⁹⁰

While it is right that the Byzantine Empire suffered a shortage of manpower, the suggestion that he was planning an expedition against the Seljuqs cannot be supported. In this context, modern scholars have not paid enough attention to the nature of the relations between Rum Seljuqs and Byzantines. As has been shown above, Alexius accepted the presence of the Turks in Anatolia, as long the coastal regions and Constantinople were secure. Thus, what he needed were mercenaries to support the defence of these not to launch an offensive against the Rum Seljuq leader, who at that time was his ally. Besides, Alexius might have used religious

⁵⁸⁶ Cf. Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, 361; Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 137; Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire*, 25.

⁵⁸⁷ Cf. J. Shephard, ‘Cross-purposes: Alexius Comnenus and the First Crusade’, in: J. Philipps (ed.), *The First Crusade*, Manchester 1997, 114.

⁵⁸⁸ The centre of discussions are a letter which Alexius seems to have sent in 1091 or 1092 to Robert of Flanders, who had a few years passed through Constantinople on his way back from the Holy Land and the envoy he sent in 1095 to the council of Piacenza to ask the Western Christian leaders for help against the Turks. In the letter to Robert of Flanders Alexius describes the situation “of the most Holy Empire of the Greek Christians which is oppressed by the Patzinaks and Turks.” as quoted by Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire*, 26. See for the discussion of the authenticity of the letter *ibid.*, 27-28.

⁵⁸⁹ Cf. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire*, 47; Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, 361; C. Mango, *The Oxford History of Byzantium*, Oxford 2002, 190; Harris, *Byzantium confronts the West*, 47.

⁵⁹⁰ Cf. J. Shephard, *Cross-purposes*, 118; Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 137; Runciman, *Crusades I*, 104.

terms in his appeal but the Byzantines regarded the struggle against the Seljuq Turks not as a religious struggle, and neither did the latter.

There are no contemporary Rum Seljuq sources extant which deal with the First Crusade. The Rum Seljuq chroniclers writing later, Aksarayi as well as the anonymous author, totally ignore the First Crusade. The *Dānīshmendnāma*, the epic work written for the rivals of the Rum Seljuqs, the Dānīshmendids, mentions briefly wars fought by the Muslims against Christians in Asia Minor but it does not differentiate and relates to Christians in general not specifically the Crusaders.⁵⁹¹ The Syrian historian Ibn al-Qalānisī mentions the Rum Seljuqs briefly, but his statements cannot be used to recreate the attitude of the Rum Seljuqs towards the Crusades. He had no connection to the Rum Seljuqs and his work reflects a retrospective Muslim view on the Crusades, written around 1160, at a time when the Crusader States had been established.⁵⁹² Yet, the indifference of the Rum Seljuq sources towards the First Crusade suggests that the Rum Seljuqs did not regard the appearance of the Crusader armies as something out of the ordinary and a special movement with a religious mission targeted at them. As far as Kılıç Arslan was concerned he was at peace with Byzantium and did not expect any attack from the west.

Among Byzantine authors, only John Zonaras and Anna Comnena write about the First Crusade. The work of Zonaras, however, “is so brief as to be almost useless, and contains demonstrable errors.”⁵⁹³ Anna Comnena’s record on the First Crusade is, despite its faults, very useful as it reflects the attitudes and views of the Byzantines on the First Crusade.⁵⁹⁴ According to Anna, the emperor too was surprised by the appearance of the Crusader armies. He was building a defence against the Türkmen raids on the coastal region of Bithynia, when the news reached him:

“After a brief rest from his many labours the emperor discovered that the Turks were engaged in general plunder, overrunning the interior of Bithynia. On the other side the affairs of the west claimed his attention, but he was more concerned with the Turks (the trouble there was more urgent). To deal with them he conceived a project of really major importance, worthy of his genius: the plan was to protect Bithynia against their incursions by

⁵⁹¹ Cf. Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 84.

⁵⁹² The chronicles of Ibn al-Qalanisi and al-Azimi, also written around 1160 are the oldest surviving Muslim works on the First Crusade. Cf. C. Hillenbrand, *Crusades*, 32.

⁵⁹³ J. Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, London/New York 2003, 55.

⁵⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 56.

a canal ... Naturally Alexius wished to check such raids and prevent the devastation; above all he wanted to ensure the safety of Nicomedia ... It was typical of Alexius: he thought deeply about a project and then worked with tremendous energy to complete it. Such were the events of the emperor's reign up to the ... indiction of ... year. He had no time to relax before he heard a rumour that countless Frankish armies were approaching."⁵⁹⁵

The attacks of the Turkish raiders were troublesome but not threatening as she describes them as "general plunder" and not an attempt of conquest. The reaction of the emperor was to secure Bithynia and especially Nicomedia from the devastation caused by the raids. Alexius wanted to "check such raids" and he put much energy in the construction of a canal to achieve this but there is nothing which suggests that he was planning an expedition for the reconquest of Asia Minor. Alexius' first and foremost aim and duty was the defence of Bithynia and thus Constantinople, and as his troops were insufficient, he needed mercenaries. Anna writes from a later point of view but it seems certain that almost immediately the Byzantines viewed the Crusaders, or Franks, with suspicion and did not regard them as the allies they had asked to come to their rescue:

"The simpler folk were in very truth led on by a desire to worship at Our Lord's tomb and visit the holy places, but the more villainous characters (in particular Bohemond and his like) had an ulterior purpose, for they hoped on their journey to seize the capital itself, looking upon its capture as a natural consequence of the expedition"⁵⁹⁶.

At no stage does Anna mention any Byzantine appeal for help against the Turks. Moreover, according to her, the expedition of the Franks was initiated by the preachings of Peter the Hermit and from the start directed towards the liberation of Jerusalem, not the liberation of Byzantium from the Turks.⁵⁹⁷ Alexius' conduct

⁵⁹⁵ Anna, Sewter, 307-308.

⁵⁹⁶ Anna, Sewter, 311 and see also 319, where she repeats this claim. Fulcher of Chartres, the Frankish historian of the First Crusade who accompanied one of the Crusaders armies confirms Anna's claim and writes which precautions were taken by the emperor: "But we did not try to enter the city because it was not agreeable to the emperor (for he feared that we would plot some harm to him). Therefore it was necessary for us to buy our daily supplies outside the walls. These supplies the citizens brought to us by order of the emperor. We were not allowed to enter the city except at the rate of five or six each hour." Fulcher of Chartres, tr. F.R. Ryan, *A History of the expedition to Jerusalem*, Knoxville 1969, 78, (hereafter cited as Fulcher, Ryan).

⁵⁹⁷ "He decided to preach in all the Latin countries ... that all should depart from their homes, set out to worship at the Holy Shrine and with all their soul and might strive to liberate Jerusalem from the Agarenes". Anna, Sewter, 309. Fulcher's account of Urban's speech at Clermont contradicts this. According to this, the purpose of the expedition was the liberation of the Byzantines from the Turks: "For the Turks, a Persian people, have attacked them, as many of you already know, and have advanced as far into Roman territory as that part of the Mediterranean which is called the Arm of St.

during the course of the First Crusade proves that his appeal had been sent to attract mercenaries to push the Turks away from the capital and not to launch a great expedition. Alexius viewed the Crusader armies as mercenaries and sought to employ their military strength to regain some territory for his empire. He seems to have had no interest in an enterprise of 'Holy War' against the Turks:

"He had sent many Romans to help them against the Turks, for two reasons: first, to save them from massacre at the hands of their enemies (for he was concerned for their welfare as Christians) and secondly, that they, being organised by us, might destroy the cities of the Ishmaelites or force them to make terms with the Roman sovereigns and thus extend the bounds of Roman territory."⁵⁹⁸

In this assessment of the emperor's actions during the First Crusade, Anna wants to justify the Byzantine position. She writes that the safety of the Crusaders was the emperor's first concern as they were Christians but she makes a clear distinction between the Byzantines and the Crusaders, referring to the latter as "them" and "they". The view and the motives of the emperor are clearly revealed. He did not share in the Crusaders goal, they had appeared in his realm without his asking but once there he wanted to organise them to force the Turks "to make terms" with him and "thus extend the bounds of Roman territory". Therefore directed by Alexius, Nicaea became the first target for the Crusaders⁵⁹⁹. He stayed in Pelekanum which lay between Constantinople and Nicaea in order to stay in control over Constantinople and at the same time, interfere in the progress of the Crusade. Again, it is clear that Alexius's main concern was the safety of Constantinople. He wanted to make use of the Crusader's manpower against the Rum Seljuqs but regarded the former as the bigger threat.⁶⁰⁰ Therefore, Alexius was anxious that the town was taken over by his officials not the Crusaders.

George. They have seized more and more of the Lands of the Christians, have already defeated them in seven times as many battles, killed or captured many people, have destroyed churches, and have devastated the kingdom of God". Fulcher, Ryan, 66. Fulcher does not mention that Alexius sent an appeal to Piacenza but Urban's speech implies that he must have received an appeal.

⁵⁹⁸ Anna, Sewter, 439.

⁵⁹⁹ Nicaea could have been bypassed even though it was on the old Byzantine military road as "there was an alternative route passing a little further to the east." Runciman, *Crusades I*, 175.

⁶⁰⁰ Anna states that: "Alexius would have liked to share in the expedition against the barbarians, too, but he feared the enormous numbers of the Kelts." Anna, Sewter, 330.

“When a favourable opportunity arose, he planned to capture Nicaea himself; that would be preferable to receiving it from the Kelts (according to the agreement already made with them). Nevertheless he kept the idea to himself. Whatever dispositions he made, and the reasons for them, were known to himself alone, although he did entrust this task to Boutoumites (his sole confidant). Boutoumites was instructed to suborn the barbarians in Nicaea by all kinds of guarantees and the promise of a complete amnesty, but also by holding over them the prospect of this or that retribution – even massacre – if the Kelts took the city.”⁶⁰¹

With the attack on the Rum Seljuq residence the peace between Alexius and Kılıç Arslan, who at that time was at Malatya, was broken off.⁶⁰² Yet, both sides would rather have dealt with each than with the Crusaders. Therefore, a line of communication, between Alexius and Kılıç Arslan, was maintained. The latter hearing about the attack on Nicaea had come to its rescue but recognising the strength of the siege, he left the city to its fate. This decision was probably made easier for him because, “He already knew that they preferred to deliver up the city to Alexius than to become prisoners of the Kelts.”⁶⁰³ Anna does not write what was exchanged between Alexius and Kılıç Arslan but she admits that the former betrayed the Crusaders:

“With confidence in the emperor’s promises the inhabitants allowed Boutoumites to enter the city. At once he sent a message to Taticius: ‘The quarry is now in our hands. Preparations must be made for an assault on the walls. The Kelts must be given that task too, but leave nothing to them except the wall-fighting round the ramparts. Invest the city at all points, as necessary, and make the attempt at sunrise.’ This was in fact a trick to make the Kelts believe that the city had been captured by Boutoumites in fighting; the drama of betrayal carefully planned by Alexius was to be concealed, for it was his wish that the negotiations conducted by Boutoumites should not be divulged to the Kelts.”⁶⁰⁴

Thus, the First Crusade brought about territorial changes in Asia Minor but did not change the relation between Kılıç Arslan and Alexius considerably. The loss of Nicaea and western Anatolian territories to the Byzantines was not very important for the Rum Seljuqs. That the Crusaders took Edessa and Antioch did not concern Kılıç Arslan I much as they were under the suzerainty of the Great Seljuqs. Later, a

⁶⁰¹ Anna, Sewter, 330-31.

⁶⁰² Matthew of Edessa has a different version of events but informs us that Kılıç Arslan was at Malatya: “Assaulting Nicaea, they captured the town by the sword and slaughtered all the infidels [within its walls]. After this the Muslims, heavy with grief, went to the sultan Kiliç Arslan, who at that time was besieging the city of Melitene, and informed him of all this”. Matthew of Edessa, Dostourian, 167-68; see also Runciman, *Crusades* I, 177.

⁶⁰³ Anna, Sewter, 335.

⁶⁰⁴ Anna, Sewter, 337.

half-hearted claim of defence of Muslim compatriots was made but this was mainly just ideological propaganda in order to exploit the change of attitude of the Muslims towards the Crusaders for their political ends.

The attitude of the Byzantines and Rum Seljuqs towards each other was not altered by the First Crusade. They regarded each other as allies and it can be said that the First Crusade brought them only closer together. As before the First Crusade, the religious aspect did not play a great role in Rum Seljuq and Byzantine relations. Moreover, the Byzantines did not regard the Crusaders as their co-religionists but as the “Latin” enemy, who to them was a far more dangerous enemy than the Rum Seljuqs. After the First Crusade, sultan and emperor resumed their friendly relations and the latter asked the former for help against Bohemond. Bohemond, one of the leaders of the First Crusade, had returned to the west and was mounting an expedition against Alexius:

“The emperor sent to Qilij Arslān ibn Sulaymān, the ruler of Konya, Aqsarāy and other lands, asking for his aid. He provided a detachment of his army. This strengthened the emperor, who marched against Bohemond.”⁶⁰⁵

The Byzantines did not regard the Muslim Rum Seljuqs but the Latin Christians as their rivals. On the other hand, the Rum Seljuqs did not regard the Christian Byzantines but their Muslim Dānishmendid kinsmen as rivals. An alliance between the Rum Seljuqs and the Dānishmendids for the battle of Dorylaeum against the Crusaders was only short lived.

V.3. Shāhānshāh and Alexius I Comnenus

Kılıç Arslan used the death of Dānishmend in 497/1104 as an opportunity to attack Melitene and from there he went further east to interfere in the Great Seljuq Empire. The pretext for Kılıç Arslan I to do so was an appeal of the amirs of the Great Seljuq sultan Muhammad but he was killed in the ensuing battle in 1107 and his son Shāhānshāh was taken captive.⁶⁰⁶ Alexius on the other hand was first

⁶⁰⁵ Ibn al-Athīr, Richards, *Crusading Period*, 114.

⁶⁰⁶ Cf. Cahen, *Formation*, 13.

occupied in the west against Bohemond and then in the east against the Crusader State of Antioch.⁶⁰⁷ According to Anna, during this time the new Rum Seljuq 'sultan' Shāhanshāh "had once more come from the east and was already threatening Philadelphia and the maritime provinces."⁶⁰⁸ Shāhānshāh and some Turkish chiefs under his directive used the emperor's absence for raids into Byzantine territory.⁶⁰⁹ This led to confrontation between sultan and emperor and, according to Anna, both sides launched large expeditions against each other:

"The Sultan Sulayman planned to ravage Asia once more. In order to put up a brave resistance against the emperor forces were summoned from Chorasān and Chalep. Alexius had already been fully informed of the enemy's plan and decided to march himself as far as Iconium (on the borders of Kiliç Arslan's sultanate) and launch a full scale war."⁶¹⁰

This statement suggests that animosity had grown between Rum Seljuqs and Byzantines and that both sides were seeking a definite solution. However, this was not the case. The Rum Seljuq ruler Shāhānshāh did not want to risk a decisive battle and met Alexius halfway to reach an agreement and the latter was happy to receive him. What is remarkable here is that Anna gives us the first description of a personal meeting between a Rum Seljuq sultan and a Byzantine emperor:

"The sultan then approached with his subordinate satraps, led by Manalugh (who in age, experience and bravery surpassed all the Turks in Asia). He met the emperor on the plain between Augustopolis and Akronion. The satraps, seeing Alexius some way off, dismounted and made obeisance normally reserved for kings, but although the sultan made several attempts to dismount the emperor would not let him. Nevertheless he quickly leapt to the ground and kissed Alexius' foot. The latter gave him his hand, bidding him mount one of the nobles' horses. On horseback again he rode close beside Alexius, when suddenly the emperor loosed the cloak he was wearing and threw it round the Turk's shoulders. Then, after a brief pause, he made a speech, explaining his decision in full. 'If you are willing,' he said, 'to yield to the authority of Rome and to put an end to your raids on the Christians, you will enjoy favours and honour, living in freedom for the rest of your lives on lands set aside for you. I refer to the lands where you used to dwell before Romanus Diogenes became emperor and before he met the sultan in battle – an unfortunate and notorious clash which

⁶⁰⁷ Alexius had hired mercenaries from Kiliç Arslan to fight Bohemond in the Balkans whom he defeated thanks to the superiority of his navy and enforced the treaty of Devol on him. Cf. Runciman, *Crusades*, II, 46-51.

⁶⁰⁸ Anna, Sewter, 445. Anna's record of the Rum Seljuq actions during this period is confused and she does not seem to have had information on the last years of Kiliç Arslan's reign and the succession after his death. She names the successor of Kiliç Arslan on this page Saisan (Shāhanshāh) and later in her narrative Sulaymān, Kiliç Arslan and Malik Shāh.

⁶⁰⁹ Cf. Anna, Sewter, 453-458; Cahen, *Formation*, 16.

⁶¹⁰ Anna, Sewter, 471. Anna confuses here Shāhanshāh with his grandfather Sulaymān and by Chalep, she means Aleppo.

ended in the Roman's defeat and capture. It would be wise, therefore, to choose peace rather than war, to refrain from crossing the frontiers of the Empire and to be content with your own territories. The advice I give is in your interest and if you listen to it you will never be sorry; in fact, you will receive liberal gifts. On the other hand, if you reject it, you can be sure of this: I will exterminate your race.' The sultan and his satraps rapidly accepted these terms. 'We would not have come here of our own free will,' they said 'if we had not chosen to welcome peace with your Majesty.' ... At the appointed time, then, the treaty was concluded with the sultan (whose name was Saisan) in the usual way. Huge sums of money were presented to him and the satraps were also rewarded generously. They departed well pleased."⁶¹¹

The propaganda purpose of Anna's report is obvious. She claims that Shāhanshāh and his officials were servile towards the emperor. Shāhanshāh not only dismounted and was raised back by the emperor according to custom but also "kissed Alexius' foot". The emperor is thus presented as the overlord and the Seljuq leader as a submissive 'vassal'. On the other hand however, the emperor showed Shāhanshāh respect as Anna herself writes he, "loosed the cloak he was wearing and threw it around the Turk's shoulders." Thus, it can be said that there was mutual respect between emperor and sultan and that the emperor did not have a superior status.⁶¹² Despite this, however, it was Alexius, according to Anna, who set the terms and conditions for peace. Yet, he was not in a position to demand unrealisable terms asking Shāhanshāh to retreat from Byzantine territory back behind the frontier as it existed before the battle of Manzikert. This was not only impossible to ask, because it denied actually the existence of the Rum Seljuq state, but also because the Seljuqs were not the only Turkish rulers in Asia Minor and Shāhanshāh did not have the position to control other Turkish rulers most importantly the Dānishmendids. Alexius, who had required great military effort to fight someone like Çaka, and who knew about the growing power of the Dānishmendids, was well aware of this. Yet, during this conversation he addressed Shāhanshāh as the sole Turkish leader in Anatolia, asking him to withdraw.

What Alexius in reality wanted was to build up the Seljuq ruler as sole Turkish leader and thus with his help to divert the Turkish bands from the western

⁶¹¹ Anna, Sewter, 487-88.

⁶¹² Cahen writes that, "Shāhanshāh came with Monolykes and to pay some kind of homage to Alexis." Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 92; and "not only did his 'satraps' and Monolykes 'worship' the emperor, but also Shāhanshāh himself leapt from his steed as a sign of respect". Cahen, *Formation*, 17. However, even though Anna writes that the satraps "dismounted and made obeisance" this was not an extraordinary act of reverence towards an emperor. Anna presents it as such in order to demonstrate the Byzantine emperor's supremacy.

part of Anatolia especially the coastal towns. Anna does not record the terms on which both sides agreed and how the relationship between the two rulers was defined formally. She only remarks that the treaty was concluded “in the usual way” and western scholars follow Anna’s remarks and conclude then that Shāhānshāh “became a federate of the Byzantine emperor.”⁶¹³ However, we cannot say with certainty that Shāhānshāh regarded the emperor as his overlord. There are no other sources, which confirm the information as presented by Anna, and more importantly no contemporary Rum Seljuq sources of these events exist. Hence, we do not have the point of view of Shāhānshāh but modern scholars have reached their conclusion without paying much attention to this fact.⁶¹⁴

It seems that Shāhānshāh and his satraps wanted an audience with the emperor and even though Anna exaggerates, it might be right that they received the emperor with respect, but this was not necessarily because they regarded him as their suzerain. If we look at the circumstances in which this event was set and subsequent events then we can at least partly reconstruct the Rum Seljuq view. First of all, Shāhānshāh and his satraps could have approached the emperor for peace negotiations not out of military and ideological inferiority. An analysis of the political circumstances reveals that they could have had other reasons than to pay homage to the emperor. Anna gives us actually an important clue continuing her record with the following incident:

“Meanwhile news arrived that the bastard brother of Malik-Shah, Mas‘ud, jealous of his power, had plotted to murder him at the instigation of certain satraps – the kind of things that usually happens. Alexius advised the sultan to wait a little until he had more definite information about the plot; thus he would leave in full possession of the facts and on his guard. But Malik-Shah disregarded this advice; filled with self-confidence he clung to his original scheme. The emperor naturally did not wish to give the impression that he was forcibly detaining the sultan (who had come to him voluntarily) and thereby incur reproach. He bowed to the Turk’s wishes. ‘It would be well,’ he said, ‘to wait a little, but since you have decided to go, you must do the next best thing, as they say, and take with you a reasonable number of our heavily-armed soldiers to escort you in safety as far as Iconium.’ The barbarian would not even agree to this; it was typical of his race, for the Turks are an

⁶¹³ Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 143.

⁶¹⁴ Cf. Dölger, *Regesten*, II, 55. Dölger writes here that a peace treaty was concluded and that the sultan recognised the frontiers of both states as they were at the time before the battle of Mantzikert in exchange of abundant gifts. Dölger, quoting Chalandon, notes that this was an exaggeration of Anna as already at the beginning of John Komnenos’ reign the Turks attacked Laodicia on the Maeander.

arrogant people, with their heads almost in the clouds. Anyway he took his leave of the emperor and set out on his homeward path with his great sums of money.”⁶¹⁵

According to this statement, Shāhānshāh received news that his brother Mas‘ūd was rebelling, after the treaty was concluded with the emperor. It is also possible, that Shāhānshāh heard about the rebellion and therefore asked the emperor for peace. The sequence of events cannot be reconstructed with any certainty, yet modern scholars have derived definite conclusions. Turan determines that Shāhānshāh first heard the news about his brother’s rebellion and therefore offered the emperor peace despite being in a victorious situation.⁶¹⁶ Turan does not discuss the treaty and the question of suzerainty. He concludes following Anna’s and Michael the Syrian’s records that Mas‘ūd with the help of his father-in-law Amīr Ghāzī, the son and successor of Dānishmend, rebelled against his brother Shāhānshāh.⁶¹⁷ Cahen, on the other hand, writes that Shāhānshāh first asked the emperor for peace and that then the rebellion by Mas‘ūd followed as a reaction to this. He concludes that the Turkmens were against the agreement with which Shāhānshāh accepted Byzantine suzerainty and peace and therefore, during “Shāhānshāh’s absence a revolt brought his brother Mas‘ūd to power.”⁶¹⁸ This conclusion, however, follows the presupposition that the emperor could demand superiority. Yet, as has been shown above, the emperor was in no position to make demands. Both sides wanted to stop the conflict and Byzantine claims of superiority are verbal propaganda and do not correspond with the political realities.

If we look beyond the ideological claims and consider the internal political situation of both states, then we can see that both sultan and emperor wanted to resume friendly relations. The division within the Seljuq State was imminent before the expedition of Shāhānshāh against Alexius. Both Seljuq brothers were young and not in a situation to demand authority and achieve unity. On the other hand, the Dānishmendid ruler had accumulated power and tried now to extend his powerbase into Seljuq territory. He allied with Shāhānshāh’s brother Mas‘ūd by marrying him to

⁶¹⁵ Anna, Sewter, 488-489.

⁶¹⁶ Turan, *Selçuklular*, 158. Turan writes here that it seems strange that Shāhānshāh offered peace to Alexius at a time when the latter was in a difficult situation. “But if Sultan Mas‘ūd’s move to gain the throne of Konya would be considered than the reason for this attempt would become self-evident.” See also Sevim/Yücel, *Türkiye Tarihi*, 120.

⁶¹⁷ Cf. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 158-159.

⁶¹⁸ Cf. Cahen, *Formation*, 17; idem., *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 92; Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 143.

his daughter. The absence of Shāhanshāh was an opportunity for Amīr Ghāzī to bring his candidate, Mas'ūd, to the Rum Seljuq throne. Anna mentions in passing that during the encounter between Shāhānshāh and Alexius, “another invasion from the more northerly regions was on its way and the rumour spread rapidly throughout Asia.”⁶¹⁹ She does not specify, who was invading from the northerly regions, but we can be sure that she means the Dānishmendids. This indicates that Alexius as well as Shāhānshāh were aware of Dānishmendid movement before their agreement. It would certainly explain why Shāhānshāh somewhat suddenly asked for peace.

Alexius, on the other hand, was more than happy to accept a treaty but he was in no position to make demands. Military as well as political considerations forced the emperor to stop the conflict with the sultan, rather than to seek a decisive battle. The emperor had a professional army, which was better structured and equipped than the nomadic Türkmen bands of the sultan but his army was still no match for the sultan's army, as Anna claims. Two factors in particular are important. Firstly, Byzantium's lack of manpower and thus employment of large numbers of mercenaries, whose loyalty to the emperor was vague. Secondly its lack of archers to combat the excellent Turkish archery. Anna includes in her record of the conflict between emperor and sultan a detailed account to describe a new battle-formation invented by the emperor especially against the Turks.⁶²⁰ Moreover, Anna admits that the emperor was reluctant to meet the sultan in a pitched battle: “We are courageous in war against men whom we can beat; against men too strong for us, being unable to make a frontal assault we change our tactics and seek to conquer without bloodshed.”⁶²¹

Anna herself points out that the emperor was under the threat of internal enemies during the conflict with the sultan. She states, that the presence of the empress was required during the campaign because “he feared the domestic enemies in his entourage”⁶²² as those eagerly awaited his failure so that they could assume power.

⁶¹⁹ Anna, Sewter, 481.

⁶²⁰ Anna, Sewter, 477-80.

⁶²¹ Anna, Sewter, 477.

⁶²² Anna, Sewter, 473. Anna continues here that “Her loving care and watchful eye were both required.” The emperor wanted his wife to be present because he feared attacks on his life and she was also able to keep together the family connections, which were important for the Comnenian rule.

“his enemies were rejoicing over the emperor’s failure to achieve his object. There were reproaches and soft whispers everywhere that after such grand preparations against the Turks and the concentration of such huge forces he had won no great success, but had retired to Nicomedia. These things, moreover, were being muttered not only in dark corners, but quite brazenly in squares, on highways and at cross-roads.”⁶²³

Therefore, it is unlikely that the emperor’s original plan was to lead his campaign as far as Konya as Anna claims and then tries to justify why he changed this plan. She states that the emperor decided to confront the Seljuq army led by Manalugh at Philomelion after an inquiry to God.⁶²⁴ Anna’s explanation for the emperor’s change of plan is somewhat peculiar and another indication that Alexius’ intention was not an expedition of reconquest. Anna’s account of the warfare between the armies of Alexius and Manalugh reflects that both sides shunned a decisive pitched battle, engaging only in small-scale encounters.⁶²⁵ Anna claims, however, that a pitched battle was not undertaken because the Rum Seljuq general Manalugh feared Alexius:

“At this stage the Sultan Malik-Shah himself arrived. He was astounded at the excellent discipline of the Roman army, but in a young man’s way poked fun at old Manalugh because he deferred the struggle with the emperor. ‘I have put off coming to grips with him up till now, because I am old – or cowardly,’ said Manalugh, ‘but if you have the courage, here’s your chance: try it yourself. You’ll learn by experience.’ The other made an immediate attack on our rearguard, while other satraps were to make a frontal assault; others again were ordered to charge against either flank.”⁶²⁶

However, this account of the dialogue between the sultan and his general Manalugh reveals that both sides, Alexius and Manalugh, hesitated to bring about a military decision. The emperor and his experienced counterpart, the Rum Seljuq general, knew not to seek direct combat. The sultan “made an immediate attack”

Alexius sent her back to Constantinople once warfare was resumed so that his enemies would not be able to take advantage of his absence.

⁶²³ Anna, Sewter, 476. Anna explains the emperor’s intentions: “hoping that the enemy would imagine the danger was past and return to their old homes; thereafter with renewed courage they would disperse for plunder, in the usual Turkish way, and the sultan himself would resume his former plan.”

⁶²⁴ Anna writes that he emperor “decided to do something, which was both prudent and daring – to inquire of God whether he should follow the road to Iconium, or attack the enemy in the area of Philomelion. He wrote his questions on two pieces of paper and placed them on the Holy Altar. ... At dawn the priest went in; taking up one of the papers from the Altar he opened it in the presence of all and read aloud that Alexius should choose rather the road to Philomelion.” Anna, Sewter, 481-82.

⁶²⁵ Anna describes how deserters went from one side to the other. Cf. Anna, Sewter, 486.

⁶²⁶ Anna, Sewter, 485.

because of his youth and inexperience.⁶²⁷ Thus even though Anna continues to claim that the emperor was the stronger party this was not the case:

“A terrible and bitter fight awaited them there, for the sultan, drawing together his forces again and surrounding our army, attacked fiercely from all sides. Nevertheless he was not strong enough to disrupt the tight formation of the Romans and after assailing what appeared to be walls of steel, he was repulsed with nothing achieved. That night (a sleepless one) he spent in gloomy thought. At last in desperation he took counsel with Manalugh and the other satraps, and with their unanimous approval at dawn he asked the emperor for terms of peace. The emperor did not reject him – far from it. The call to halt was sounded at once, but the whole army was instructed to stay where it was ... The emperor had his reasons for this: he was obviating confusion, with the subsequent break-up of the column, in which case they would probably all be captured; he was also afraid of the Turks, who greatly outnumbered his own men and whose attacks were coming from all quarters.”⁶²⁸

Anna claims that Shāhānshāh in “desperation” sought his official’s advice and then asked “the emperor for terms of peace” but reveals at the same time that Alexius was “afraid of the Turks” and thus accepted. It seems safe to suggest that neither side followed a plan to destroy the other. The peace between sultan and emperor was restored and even though both rulers died not long after this the peace was broken, though Turkmen raids continued.

V.4. Mas‘ūd I and John II Comnenus and Manuel Comnenus

On his way back to his lands, Shāhānshāh was killed in 510/1116. However, as stated before, this was not the result of Shāhānshāh’s peace treaty with Alexius, but the result of the Danishmendid expansionist policy. Amīr Ghāzī brought his son-in-law Mas‘ūd to the Rum Seljuq throne and thus gained influence over the Rum Seljuq realm. A little later Alexius died and his son John ascended the throne. Thus, two new rulers confronted each other. However, the pattern of friendly relations, established under the first Comnenian emperor Alexius and the first Rum Seljuq ruler Sulaymān, was continued. Furthermore, the policy of alliance intensified, as

⁶²⁷ According to Turan, a conversation between Shāhānshāh and Manalugh, reported by Ibn al-Athīr, shows that the former was very young. Shāhānshāh was only eleven years old when his father died and twenty-one years old when he died not long after he concluded the treaty with Alexius. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 160.

⁶²⁸ Anna, Sewter, 487.

two developments show. Firstly, the fact that Mas'ūd fled to Constantinople seeking the help of John after he fell out with his father-in-law Amīr Ghāzī. Secondly, the fact that John supported the Seljuq ruler against the Danishmendids even though this helped the Rum Seljuqs to expand their power and was contrary to the traditional Byzantine policy of divide and rule.⁶²⁹

The situation under the new rulers was not different from the situation under their predecessors. John's main concerns were internal affairs and the west and the main concerns of Mas'ūd were internal affairs and the east.⁶³⁰ Mas'ūd, Amīr Ghāzī, and various other Turkish chiefs as well as the rulers of the Crusader states, were engaged in a struggle of power over eastern Anatolia and Syria. The Türkmen bands resumed their raids into Byzantine territory but they were not under the command of Mas'ūd, who stayed in the east even after John attacked several fortresses held by the Turks and succeeded in taking three of them. "The emperor, seeing that the Turks were violating their treaties with his father in great numbers overrunning the cities throughout Phrygia and along the Maeander, with the coming of spring marched against them."⁶³¹ The real motive behind John's action against the Turks was to divert them from the Byzantine borders. John's aim was not to continue his father's plan of war against the Turks⁶³². As has been shown above, Alexius himself did not show any determination to pursue his alleged plan to attack Konya. John was merely seeking to secure important places such as Laodicea and Sozopolis on the Maeander valley in order to secure the safety of the capital. Choniates regards the Turkish raids as a breach of the treaty but this does not mean that Mas'ūd ordered these raids as Turkmens never felt bound by any treaty and acted according to their own will.

Mas'ūd did not even react after John took over Turkish fortresses because matters in the east were more important to him, he did not seek further conquests

⁶²⁹ Cf. Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 28.

⁶³⁰ For John's campaigns see Choniates, *Magoulias*, 11-12; Kinnamos, *Brand*, 16-19; Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, 377-78; Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 153-54. For the eastern campaigns of Mas'ūd and Amīr Ghāzī see Turan, *Selçuklular*, 161-167.

⁶³¹ Choniates, *Magoulias*, 9. According to Choniates John took Laodikeia from its Turkish governor Alp-qara in 1119 and one year later Sozopolis and many other fortresses; Kinnamos does not mention the treaty but confirms the events as narrated by Choniates. Kinnamos, *Brand*, 14ff.; Bar Hebraeus writes that John "took three fortresses from the Turks". Bar Hebraeus, *Budge*, 249.

⁶³² Turan and Angold claim that John was pursuing his father's plan when attacking these places. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 160; Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 153.

towards the west.⁶³³ Thus, both rulers kept their friendly relations intact. Mas'ūd took Malatya from his brother, Tuğrul Arslan and handed it over to Amīr Ghāzī. Malik 'Arab, another brother of Mas'ūd, who ruled over Ankara and Kastamonu, used this as a pretext to revolt against him. According to Turan, the former was taking advantage of the fact that the latter's protector, Amir Ghazi b. Dānīshmend was at war with the Artuqids. Mas'ūd was defeated and fled to Constantinople to ask John for support.⁶³⁴ The anonymous history of the Rum Seljuqs does not mention the Dānīshmendids but writes that, "the Emirs started mischief and Malik 'Arab rebelled [against his brothers Mas'ūd] and asked the Roman Emperor for troops and that he gave them to him."⁶³⁵ Bar Hebraeus gives further information on the reaction of John:

"And Mālik 'Arāb collected an army and attacked his brother Mas'ūd, the Sūltān of Iconium, because he had made agreement with Dānīshmand. Then Mas'ūd fled to Constantinople, and he was received joyfully by 'Īwanī, the king of the Greeks. And he gave him an army, and much gold, and he went forth and came to Ghāzī, and the two of them attacked Mālik 'Arāb. Then 'Arāb fled to Tōrōs (Theodorus?), the Armenian, the governor of Cilicia."⁶³⁶

The most notable aspect here is that the sultan, confronted by internal opposition, seeks the help of the emperor, who on the other hand, receives the sultan "joyfully" and gives him the means to regain his throne. Choniates and Kinnamos do not mention Mas'ūd's refuge in Constantinople, thus we can not be sure of the emperor's motives. Yet, it is clear that John continued his father's policy of alliance with the sultan. The sultan, on the other hand, regarded the emperor as a friend he sought help from against his own brother. This is the first example of the flight of a

⁶³³ Turan regards the Turkmen raids as part of Seljuq/Turkish policy of conquest. Cf. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 160. Yet, the Türkmen raids were in most cases, not ordered by the Seljuqs, as many of the Türkmen groups did not accept their authority. Cahen sees them also as part of the Seljuq policy and states that Mas'ūd did not react to John's counter-attack as he "like his predecessors, avoided clashes with armed forces." However, as has been shown above, the Byzantines were not much less than the Seljuqs avoiding decisive clashes. Cahen, *Formation*, 17.

⁶³⁴ Cf. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 168-169. Turan suggests that Malik Arab was either angry with Mas'ūd because he gave up a town which had belonged to his father or used this just as a pretext. See also Sevim/Yücel, *Türkiye Tarihi*, 123. Cahen shares this view and writes that "Mas'ūd's brother, 'Arab accused him of treason to their family, and revolted against him." Cahen, *Formation*, 18.

⁶³⁵ Anonymous, *Uzluğ*, 24. Aksarayi's record about the reign of Mas'ūd is very brief and does not even mention that he had brothers. Aksarayi, *Gençosman*, 126.

⁶³⁶ Bar Hebraeus, *Budge*, 252. Choniates and Kinnamos' narratives on the reign of John II is kept short as they state themselves in their introductions, yet it is surprising that they do not mention that Mas'ūd fled to Constantinople and asked for help.

sultan to Constantinople, several others followed. On the other hand, there were also Byzantine royals who sought refuge in Konya as will be discussed below. Hence, there was not a division between Rum Seljuqs and Byzantines but interdependence. The sultans often regarded family members and other Muslim rulers, as more dangerous enemies than the emperors and vice versa. Therefore, John, like his father Alexius, was not following a policy of reconquest. He did not confront the Rum Seljuqs as long as the coastal areas and the routes leading to Constantinople were secure. John's campaign to take Kastamonu from the Dānismendids was part of this defensive policy, even though it was celebrated as a great offensive against the Turks, John taking advantage of the Turkish internal struggles merely tried to secure this important town, since from here the Dānismendids were able to reach out to the coastal towns of the Black Sea.⁶³⁷ In the same way John tried to take advantage of the dispute ensuing between Mas'ūd and Muḥammad, who after the death of his father Amīr Ghāzī became Dānismendid ruler:

“When the emperor arrived there, he found that Dānismend had departed from the world of men and that a certain Muhammad, an enemy of Mas'ūd, the ruler of Ikonion, was now in control of Kastamonu. Taking advantage of the opportunity to promote his own cause, the emperor made peace with Mas'ūd [end of 1134]; he entered into an alliance with him and marched against Muhammad. The latter, realizing that he was unable to combat a double-edged attack by both armies, secretly contacted his fellow countryman Mas'ūd and proposed in his letters, among other things, that they should set aside their enmity, contending that if they should not be reconciled and Mas'ūd defect to the emperor of the Romans, the cause of the Turks would be seriously damaged. He convinced the Ikonion Mas'ūd to break with the emperor, to join forces with him and dissolve the alliance. Not long after this event, the Turkish troops dispatched by the sultan to fight as allies of the emperor, departed by night, and henceforth the Romans met with little success in this campaign.”⁶³⁸

According to Choniates, John approached Mas'ūd for an alliance against Muḥammad “to promote his own cause.” In retrospect it seems surprising that John did not realise that this would actually make his cause more difficult, as the defeat of

⁶³⁷ Kinnamos writes that the Turks in Kastamonu, “used to raid the adjacent area, which was subject to the emperor, and continually maltreated the Romans there. Stunning them by the magnitude of his preparation for war, he constrained them to yield the city and themselves to the Romans.” These remarks indicate that the Turks were expanding their raids towards the sea and that the town fell without great difficulty to the emperor. Kinnamos, Brand, 20; Bar Hebraeus who is not reliable event states that John took Kastamonu “from the Turks peaceably.” Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 257. See for this also, Turan, *Selçuklular*, 169.

⁶³⁸ Choniates, Magoulias, 13. Dölger confuses the parties of this agreement enlisting it under the end of 1134/ beginning 1135 as an agreement between John and Muhammad of Kastamonu against Mas'ūd.; Dölger, *Regesten* II, p. 60, no. 1308.

the Dānīshmendīd Muḥammad would increase the power of Mas'ūd. It might be that John regarded the Dānīshmendīds at that point as more dangerous and thus sought the alliance with the Rum Seljuq sultan only as a temporary solution.⁶³⁹ The fact that he put much energy in the recovery of Kastamonu, the Dānīshmendīd stronghold, seems to confirm this assumption. Be that as it may, what this again proves is that the defence of the coastal regions was important to the emperors. The Dānīshmendīds were more powerful at this stage and already threatened the coastal regions and were therefore regarded as the greater threat to the empire. The emperor and sultan regarded each other as allies, even though Choniates claims that the sultan broke the alliance with the emperor out of patriotic feelings towards his kinsman Muḥammad.⁶⁴⁰

As mentioned above, the sultan had previously sought the emperor's alliance against his own brother. It is more likely, therefore, that this interpretation of Mas'ūd's change of heart is the personal interpretation of Choniates, as he himself reveals that Muḥammad was led by strategic motives, because he knew that "he was unable to combat a double-edged attack" by Mas'ūd and the emperor.⁶⁴¹ It is more likely, however that Mas'ūd changed sides because Muhammad made concessions to him and because he did not want the emperor to gain a foothold in Asia Minor. He acted out self-interest and not because he wanted to support a common 'Turkish cause,' as Choniates and Kinnamos suggest.

Mas'ūd used the leadership contest, following the death of the Dānīshmendīd ruler Muḥammad in 536/1142, to extend his power. Muḥammad's realm was divided

⁶³⁹ Angold argues that John viewed the Danishmendids as a threat, because "In recognition of their success the caliph of Baghdad was in the process of granting the title of Malik or king to their chief Gümüshtegin. This was a direct challenge to the rights of overlordship claimed by the Byzantines emperor over the lands of Anatolia." Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 155. This is however somewhat contradictory as the Rum Seljuq leader had as sultan a higher rank, which the Byzantines themselves recognised. Moreover, the sultan did not recognise the Byzantine claim of overlordship and must have been then the target of John's enmity. Besides, we have no evidence that at this stage John knew about the caliph's grant of the title Malik to Gümüshtegin.

⁶⁴⁰ We do not have any confirmation for Choniates' statement on the reasons as to why the two Turkish rulers agreed since Aksarayi and the Anonymous Rum Seljuq history do not mention this event at all. Chalandon, *Alexis*, 89-90; Turan states that after the death of Amīr Ghāzī "thanks to an agreement with Mas'ūd the Byzantines attacked Çankırı (Gangra)". Turan, *Selçuklular*, 173. Cahen also comments briefly: "At one point he even won over Mas'ūd, whose followers however abandoned him." Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 95.

⁶⁴¹ Kinnamos confirms this when he writes that Muhammad "perceived that he was not equal in battle to the emperor and knew that he had to win over the sultan, who likewise related to him by descent." Kinnamos, Brand, 21. Naturally the Comnenian partisan Kinnamos states that the emperor's power alone threatened the Dānīshmendīd Muhammad.

between his son, Dhu'l-Nūn and his brothers Yağıbasan and Ayn al-Dawla.⁶⁴² Mas'ūd sought the alliance with one or the other of the Dānismendids to take over their territories, especially Malatya.⁶⁴³ At this stage, Mas'ūd wanted to extend his power in Asia Minor by incorporating the Dānismendid territories into his realm. It seems that the alliance between John and Mas'ūd stayed intact and therefore probably the latter did not protest against Manuel's intrusion of his territory. Manuel after the death of his father John during the expedition to Cilicia was in such a hurry to get back to Constantinople to secure the imperial throne that he did not ask Mas'ūd for permission.⁶⁴⁴ On the way Manuel's brother and the latter's son-in-law were captured by some Türkmen and taken to Mas'ūd. He freed them not immediately but later "without paying ransom."⁶⁴⁵ This friendly gesture of Mas'ūd indicates that he was anxious to keep the peace with the new emperor Manuel Comnenus.

Mas'ūd and Manuel had no interest in breaking up friendly relations. Both had other interests. The former's aim was to take the Danishmendid territories under his control and the latter's first and foremost interest was the submission of Antioch to his authority.⁶⁴⁶ In 1146, Manuel mounted an expedition against Mas'ūd but this was not "a systematic war of reconquest" but a "small-scale, punitive expedition in retaliation for repeated frontier violations."⁶⁴⁷ Manuel himself states in a letter preserved by Kinnamos the reason for his attack on Mas'ūd:

⁶⁴² Dhu'l-Nūn resided in Kayseri (Caesarea), the capital of his father Muhammad. Yağıbasan, who ruled over Sivas (Sebastea), married Muhammad's widow and assumed leadership proclaiming himself Amir. Ayn al-Dawla on the other hand secured Melitene and Albistan. Bar Hebraeus names Yağıbasan as Ya'kūb Arslan. See also, Michael the Syrian, Chabot, 253; Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 267; Turan, *Selçuklular*, 178; Vryonis, *Decline*, 119-120; Cahen, *Formation*, 21.

⁶⁴³ Cf. Cahen, *Formation*, 20.

⁶⁴⁴ Manuel was proclaimed emperor by the army at Cilicia but his elder brother Isaac was in Constantinople and the acclamation in the capital was crucial for the succession of a Byzantine emperor. Vryonis, *Byzantine Imperial Authority*, 141-161; Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 161.

⁶⁴⁵ Choniates, Magoulias, 30. Turan states that Manuel was braver than his father to enter Rum Seljuq territory without permission and that he anxious to reach Constantinople did not even stop when his relatives were taken captive. However, he does not mention that they were freed without ransom and concludes without further explanation that, "Mas'ūd regarding this situation as opportune thought it better to return to the east to profit from Danishmendid inheritance [dissemsion]." Turan, *Selçuklular*, 179; Cahen, *Formation*, 21.

⁶⁴⁶ After the Turkmen chief Zengi took Edessa at the end of 1144 an attack on Antioch became imminent and thus Raymond was forced to ask Manuel for help. Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 162.

⁶⁴⁷ Magdalino, *Manuel*, 42.

“The Turks, who had meanwhile prepared a great expedition, fell upon the Thrakesians’ land ... When the emperor heard of this, he was unable to restrain himself. After he had quickly made ready, he set out at full speed for Ikonion, once he had informed the sultan [Mas’ūd] of this by letter. The letter ran thus: “We wish you to know that you have undertaken things which provoke our attack on you. You yourself have robbed us of Prakana, which did not belong to you, and you lately assailed the Romans’ land. You also did not desist from fighting in some fashion with Yaghi-Basan [ibn Dānīshmend], who is the Romans’ ally, and with many other chieftains there. You who are an intelligent man must understand that the Romans would never permit themselves to overlook this, and it remains, with God’s aid, that you should pay the penalty for this many times over. Either abstain from irrationalities, or be ready to resist the Romans at once”. In such terms was the letter. After he [the sultan] had read the letter when it was brought to him, he responded thus: “We have received your letter, mighty emperor. And we have prepared as you commanded. Then you should order your advance, not delay us by lengthy communications. The rest, as to how matters go, will be God’s concern, and ours. Let this Philomilion [Philomelion, modern Akşehir] be the place for our encounter, where we are presently encamped.”⁶⁴⁸

Manuel explained in this letter the reason for his expedition against Mas’ūd stating that the latter had attacked Byzantine territories and the territories of his allies the Dānīshmendids as well as other Turkish chiefs. What is remarkable here is the fact that Manuel switched alliances. Whereas up to then the sultan was the traditional ally for the emperor now the Danishmendids are regarded as such. Yet, this is not a drastic change of Byzantine policy Manuel merely tried to put the balance of power in Anatolia right. Interesting to note is that the Byzantine emperor poses here as the defender of the rights of the Turkish chiefs.

The most important aspect revealed in this letters, however, is the attitude of the rulers towards each other. We can see here that sultan and emperor regarded each other as equals. The emperor threatened the sultan in his letter but addresses him with due respect and Kinnamos describes him as sultan. The sultan confidently not only mocked the emperor but also challenged him to a direct combat. This was a war of words and the claims made here did not correspond to reality. Mas’ūd had not the power to meet the Byzantine army in a pitched battle, and Manuel did not have the power to attack Konya. Nonetheless, we can see that the third Rum Seljuq leader had enough confidence to challenge the Byzantine emperor. It is therefore not likely that the sultan would have accepted the Byzantine claim of superiority. Despite this Kinnamos is anxious to present Mas’ūd as the weaker side:

⁶⁴⁸ Kinnamos, Brand, 39-40.

“In such terms the sultan very vulgarly responded to the emperor; he [the sultan] remained with the greatest part of the Turks’ army there at Philomilion where he had first been camped, but detaching a portion of them, he sent them to intercept the advancing Romans. Near the city Akrounos ... they suffered a severe defeat and returned as fugitives to the sultan ... The other [the sultan], stricken in spirit at the disaster, did not remain in the place to prepare anything nor attend to anything necessary, but departed in flight from there. Learning of these things, the emperor intended to mock him for both his previous rashness and immoderate trepidation thereafter, and wrote him as follows: “You noble sir, must understand this well, that however shameful cowardice is, it becomes more shameful when bravado preceded it; nor should it be uncorrected by others in battle. Since, as if entirely forgetful of your earlier pride, and making no account of what you recently wrote to our empire [Byzantine form for Majesty], you fled I know not where, behold, we offer you a reminder thereof. If you will not await our coming at Philomilion, as you formerly announced to us, it yet remains that your noble and generous self should quickly overcome your base cowardice.”⁶⁴⁹

Manuel in his next letter threw Mas’ūd’s pride as empty in his face and claimed the moral high ground for himself, keeping thus the rule of moral virtue as described by his grandfather Alexius in his *muses*. On the other hand he describes Mas’ūd as coward but still keeps a respectful tone towards him addressing him as “noble sir” and “noble and generous self.” Still, Kinnamos claims that Mas’ūd fled and “coming in disorder to Ikonion, he rushed within his walls” and that he “did not at all dare remain within, lest, being shut up by the besieging Romans.”⁶⁵⁰ At the same time Kinnamos recognises that there was some good strategic thinking behind the sultan’s next step of dividing his army, leaving one part in Ikonion and taking the other outside to fortify himself in a place “protected by the mountain which extend between Ikonion and the fortress Kaballa.”⁶⁵¹ Manuel had been able to defeat some of Mas’ūd’s forces and therefore advanced as far as Konya but his army was not much stronger than the army of Mas’ūd. We can glean from some passages given by Kinnamos that the emperor was experiencing some difficulties on his campaign against the Seljuqs. He writes that the emperor held the following speech to motivate his army:

“Romans, do not let barbarian trickery turn your shrewdness to fear: while there is a lack of standards in the army visible in front of us, you should not imagine that they are elsewhere

⁶⁴⁹ Kinnamos, Brand, 40.

⁶⁵⁰ Kinnamos, Brand, 41.

⁶⁵¹ Kinnamos, Brand, 41. For Kaballa see Ramsay, *Historical Geography*, 359 and Cahen, *Formation*, 22 according to whom it is the modern Çigil.

with another force ... Be not astonished at the barbarian for his number, but rather despise his weakness.”⁶⁵²

This illustrates that the Byzantine army was not superior to the Seljuq army but scared by its sheer multitude. Manuel was not able to overcome Mas'ūd and had to resort to trickery to keep his forces together, which Kinnamos in the fashion of Anna Comnena praises as a leadership quality:

“He summoned one of the soldiers ... and ordered him to remove the helmet from his head and with his hand to wave it around in every direction in the air, to proclaim the sultan's seeming capture to the army. When this was done the Roman [force] at once recovered courage and thrust back the foe who were strongly pressing them.”⁶⁵³

Kinnamos conceals the outcome of this battle and tries to justify the emperor's actions, stating:

“As night then came swiftly on, they camped there; setting out from there at dawn, he camped at Ikonion. Making a circuit around it, he [Manuel] perceived that it was inaccessible. Also there increased daily a rumor which warned that the nations to the west, rebelling by ancestral custom, would invade the Romans' land in full force. So he gave up the siege, thinking he required more time and greater preparation than [he had] at that moment.”⁶⁵⁴

This indicates that this enterprise was not aimed at Konya from the start and that only success on the way had brought the emperor so far.⁶⁵⁵

“The emperor reached the outskirts of Ikonion and surrounded the walls with his troops ... he turned back without further ado. As he withdrew, the enemy, which had set up ambushes and occupied the heavily wooded terrain, engaged him in greater battles than had heretofore erupted. Fighting his way through with difficulty, Manuel returned to the queen of cities [1146].”⁶⁵⁶

Choniates admits that the Seljuq army engaged Manuel in “greater battles” and that he made his way back out of Rum Seljuq territory only with difficulty.

⁶⁵² Kinnamos, Brand, 42.

⁶⁵³ Kinnamos, Brand, 43.

⁶⁵⁴ Kinnamos, Brand, 43.

⁶⁵⁵ Vryonis states that it was Manuel's aim to “attack Iconium itself” but gives no references for this. Vryonis, *Decline*, 120; Angold on the other hand states, that “borne along by success Manuel pressed on to Konya (Iconium)”. Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 162.

⁶⁵⁶ Choniates, Magoulias, 31-32.

Kinnamos still claims, however, that Manuel threatened Mas'ūd sending him a message, with one of the Turks chasing him, after he had reached safe ground:

“Report this to your sultan. ‘The great emperor communicates this through me. We have come up to Ikonion itself. We have scoured your land since we particularly desired to prosecute your crime against our empire [i.e., Our Majesty]. You, however, fled continually, like runaway slaves, shifting from one place to another and heretofore not remaining to oppose us face to face. Therefore we are departing to our own land, but you must get ready, knowing well that when spring comes we shall again return to you with greater preparation” ... When the sultan heard this, he dispatched envoys a little later to ask about peace.”⁶⁵⁷

Even though the emperor was forced to retreat, because he had not come prepared and as cited above rumours about an invasion from the west became loud Kinnamos claims that it was the sultan who made an offer for peace. It seems strange that Manuel, who as Kinnamos and Choniates reveal, was frightened by the army of Mas'ūd and only escaped with difficulty should now threaten the latter. It seems also strange that, Mas'ūd, who had challenged Manuel and must have realised the latter's weakness, now asked for peace. This does not necessarily mean that Mas'ūd had changed his attitude. Turan suggests that because of the approach of the Second Crusade Mas'ūd might have thought that it would be better to have Manuel as an ally.⁶⁵⁸ According to Kinnamos, the sultan sent an embassy and a treaty was concluded between emperor and sultan:

“The purpose of the embassy was as follows: they restored Prakana to the emperor and whatever else had previously been taken from the Romans. So they agreed there would be peace in the future between Turks and Romans. Accepting these [terms], the emperor concluded the war and returned to Byzantion.”⁶⁵⁹

Mas'ūd wanted to restore peace with Manuel and for this was prepared to give up Prakana and other places, which Kinnamos does not specify. Manuel, on the other hand, was more than happy to accept the terms, which seem to have been set by the sultan. The prospect of the invasion from the west brought sultan and emperor together. Even the Crusaders regarded emperor and sultan as allies who were united

⁶⁵⁷ Kinnamos, Brand, 52-53.

⁶⁵⁸ Cf. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 182.

⁶⁵⁹ Kinnamos, Brand, 58; Dölger, *Regesten*, II, p.65, no.1352; Chalandon, II, 1, 257.

against them.⁶⁶⁰ The Byzantines regarded the Second Crusade like the First Crusade not as a religious enterprise but as an enterprise directed against Constantinople. Manuel thus followed the example of his grandfather Alexius and demanded that the leaders of the Second Crusade recognised his imperial authority. However, the leaders of the Second Crusade were not just Frankish nobles but the French King Louis and more importantly the German Emperor Conrad, who contested the Byzantine claim of sole imperial sovereignty and resisted to pay homage to Manuel.⁶⁶¹ The German Emperor was a far more formidable enemy than the Rum Seljuq Sultan as the former was a threat to the Byzantine ideological claim to be the sole and superior empire of Christendom. It seems that for Manuel the prospect that the German Emperor could become the protector of the Crusader States was a greater threat than the continued existence of the Rum Seljuq sultanate.

However, it has been argued that Manuel followed a different policy than his predecessors had followed. In the course of his reign, friendly relations with the western Christians “Latins” became paramount, which led to a change of Byzantine foreign policy. In parallel, it might be assumed that the development of an ideology of jihad and ‘Counter Crusade’ under Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin led Mas‘ūd to take a different direction in his foreign policy. Consequently, the relation between the Rum Seljuqs and Byzantium must have changed. Yet, the established pattern of friendly relations between emperor and sultan were maintained. Moreover, during the last years of the reign of Mas‘ūd, emperor and sultan probably were allied against Thoros, the Armenian prince of Cilicia.⁶⁶²

⁶⁶⁰ The Crusaders were suspicious of the emperor who contrary to their expectations was not at war with the Seljuqs but had concluded peace with them. They blamed the emperor for the hardship they endured in Anatolia and claimed that the emperor had incited the Turks to fight against them. Cf. Magdalino, *Manuel*, 51-52.

⁶⁶¹ Manuel had reason to believe that Conrad had taken the Cross, to enhance his imperial status. In the letters exchanged between Manuel and Conrad regarding the marriage between the former and the German princess, Bertha von Sulzbach, Conrad had addressed Manuel as king of the Greeks and described himself as August Emperor of the Romans. Cf. Magdalino, *Manuel*, 48; Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 164; Ostrogorsky, *Byzantine State*, 384.

⁶⁶² In 1154 the emperor probably bribed Mas‘ūd to attack Thoros and the sultan thus invaded Cilicia together with his son Kılıç Arslan. Cf. Magdalino, *Manuel*, 67; Cahen, *Formation*, 24; Turan, *Selçuklular*, 191; Kinnamos and Bar Hebraeus do not mention such an alliance between sultan and emperor against Toros but Gregory’s account of these events implies such an alliance. Kinnamos, Brand, 96; Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 281. This incident resembles Sulaymān’s attack on the Armenian Philaretus in Antioch and shows again that the Byzantine emperor’s preferred the rule of the Rum Seljuqs to that of the Armenians, regarding them as their allies.

V.5. Kılıç Arslan II and Manuel Comnenus

The campaign Mas'ūd led against Cilicia was unsuccessful and he had to retreat and died shortly after that in 551/1156. He had left his throne in Konya to his son Kılıç Arslan II, but in traditional Turkish fashion had divided his realm among all his sons and other relatives including the Dānismendids.⁶⁶³ This led to internal strife in the Rum Seljuq sultanate which Manuel saw as an opportunity to intervene to put the power balance in Asia Minor right by limiting Rum Seljuq power. Manuel conspired with Shāhanshāh and the Dānismendid Yağıbasan to put a halt to the expansion of power of Kılıç Arslan.⁶⁶⁴

“Presently, the sultan of Ikonion jealously eyed the toparch of Cappadocia and plotted a pernicious and violent deed against him, while the latter, in his turn, cast a deadly glance at the sultan. They did not keep secret and in the dark these wicked schemes against one another but revealed them to the emperor. Manuel, elated desired that they should not merely reach a point of disaffection, alienation, and he parting of the ways, but that they should suffer utter destruction by taking up arms in opposing camps, so that while he reposed in tranquility he might exult in the evil works of these impious foreigners. Secretly sending envoys to both sides, he led them into war. Manuel presented Yaghi-Basan with gifts, making it evident that he supported him in the hostility. ... Trusting in the emperor, Yaghi-Basan made war on the sultan. The latter, in turn, marched out against him, and they clashed in battle frequently [1155-60]. After much blood was shed by both armies, victory smiled on Yaghi-Basan, and both adversaries laid down their arms for time being [1161]. Yaghi-Basan remained in his province, but the sultan went directly to the imperial city when he returned from the western regions and appealed to the emperor for help [spring 1162]. Receiving him graciously, the emperor heaped honours upon him so that he was gladdened at the lavishness of hospitality.”⁶⁶⁵

The intervention of Manuel was part of the defensive Comnenian policy towards the Rum Seljuqs and according to Choniates, the internal opponents of Kılıç Arslan asked the emperor for support. Like his father Mas'ūd, Kılıç Arslan, when faced with internal opposition, sought help from the Byzantine Emperor. Manuel had instigated his internal opponents against him and allied with the Dānismendid Yağıbasan in order to re-establish a balance of power in Anatolia. Kılıç Arslan,

⁶⁶³ Cf. Choniates, *Magoulias*, 66.

⁶⁶⁴ Cf. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 210; Cahen, *Formation*, 25.

⁶⁶⁵ Choniates, *Magoulias*, 67; Kinnamos writes: “The sultan learned of this, and since he was incapable of opposing either of those who had been roused against him by the emperor, he yielded his claim to many cities, especially ones recently acquired by him with great effort, in favor of those who lived near his own land. He wrote to the emperor and requested pardon.” Kinnamos, *Brand*, 151-152; See also, Bar Hebraeus, *Budge*, 287.

opposed from two sides, was not able to resist and was defeated in 1160 and in 1161 by the Byzantine army. He therefore decided to go to Constantinople.⁶⁶⁶

“About this time [1162], also, the sultan Kılıç Arslan [II] voluntarily came to Byzantium to petition the emperor regarding matters beneficial to him, something tremendous and wonderfully extraordinary, such as I know never happened to the Romans before. Of the very magnificent [emperors], who is not outdone, that a man who rules so much land and lords it over so many tribes should appear at the emperor of the Romans’ court in the guise of a servant?”⁶⁶⁷

Kinnamos claims that Kılıç Arslan came to “the emperor of the Romans’ court in the guise of a servant.” On the other hand, he states that this was extraordinary, as Kılıç Arslan himself was ruler “over so much land and lords.” Kinnamos exaggerates the status then held by Kılıç Arslan in order to evaluate the status of the emperor at whose court he appeared as servant. He knew that Kılıç Arslan had to share the rule in Anatolia with his brothers and the Dānismendids and was not lord over them but threatened by them. Kılıç Arslan thus appeared in person before the emperor but he was not servile towards him. This was a visit to seek an alliance with the emperor, not to submit to him, and it was thus a clever tactical move. Kılıç Arslan hoped probably that an alliance with the emperor would neutralise the main conspirator, and that he thus would get a free hand against his internal enemies. Manuel on the other hand received the sultan “graciously” thinking that an agreement with him would be of advantage for the empire. “Manuel had high hopes of satisfactorily disposing of the issues in the East, thanks to the sultan’s presence, and of charming the money-loving barbarian with gratifying entertainment, but he also believed that this circumstance would bring glory to the empire.”⁶⁶⁸ The visit of Kılıç Arslan was used by Manuel to demonstrate his power and might to the Seljuq. Kinnamos describes the lavish reception for which a special throne for the emperor was prepared:

⁶⁶⁶ Turan writes that Kılıç Arslan decided to go to Constantinople to break the alliance built against him, and that he was lavishly entertained by the emperor for eighty days, and returned after he reached his goal concluding an agreement with the emperor. Cf. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 201-202; Vryonis writes in the same manner that Kılıç Arslan went to Constantinople and “succeeded in putting an end to the Byzantine diplomatic intrigues.” Vryonis, *Decline*, 122; Sevim/Yücel, *Türkiye Tarihi*, 131; Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, 101. However, neither of these historians discusses the relationship between the two rulers.

⁶⁶⁷ Kinnamos, Brand, 156.

⁶⁶⁸ Choniates, Magoulias, 67.

“The whole was made of gold, but a great quantity of ruby and sapphire stones were fastened on at slight intervals: they were perfectly englobed, and gleamed whiter than snow. The throne abounded in such brilliances. ... A purple robe, a wonderful thing, enveloped him. From top to bottom it was afire with rubies and illuminated with pearls ... I deem it excessive to write about the adornment on his head. ... When Kılıdij Arslan reached their midst, he was full of astonishment. Although the emperor urged him to be seated, he at first very firmly declined, but because he saw the emperor still pressed him to be seated, he sat down on a low stool, very humble alongside the lofty throne.”⁶⁶⁹

According to Kinnamos, Kılıç Arslan was so overwhelmed by the reception that he stood astonished before the emperor. He was then seated beside the emperor on a “low stool” “and very humble” In order to demonstrate his magnitude the emperor intended to hold a triumph procession:

“Glorying in the magnitude of his success, the emperor made preparation for a triumphal procession from the citadel itself to the famed church of Hagia Sophia, so as to march in procession with him; yet he did not accomplish what he had intended. For [the patriarch] Loukas’ who was then in charge of ecclesiastical matters was opposed to the action, saying that impious men must not pass by consecrated furnishings and priestly adornments. The Byzantines, deeming that Loukas’ counsels had been transgressed, declared that the undertaking was contrary to God’s will. For men naturally pay attention to matters close at hand, without inquiring about anything more remote.”⁶⁷⁰

He wanted to demonstrate to his people that he had gained a great victory in Asia Minor and that he had submitted an important enemy. In reality, he had just intervened successfully in Turkish affairs and thus been able to encircle Kılıç Arslan together with the latter’s internal enemies. As stated above, the formal recognition of the emperor’s authority had become the main goal for Comnenian foreign policy. The extensive imperial ceremonial was for the Comnenian rulers the solution to demonstrate the revival of Byzantine imperial authority and to hold on to their claim of supremacy.⁶⁷¹ Magdalino therefore concludes that the formal recognition of

⁶⁶⁹ Kinnamos, Brand, 156-157.

⁶⁷⁰ Kinnamos, Brand, 157; Choniates describes this incident similar to Kinnamos: “But as the emperor, with members of the bodyguard, the nobility, the imperial retinue, and the sultan, was about to make his appearance before the citizens to receive their applause, God annulled the splendours of that day. The earth shook and many splendid dwelling collapsed ...” Choniates, Magoulias, 67.

⁶⁷¹ Manuel’s father John celebrated his victory over the Danishmendids at Kastamonu with a splendid triumph even though, it was just a minor success. “John proclaimed a triumph in celebration of the enemy’s defeat [1133] and gave instructions that a silverplated chariot be constructed; and the chariot, adorned with semi-precious jewels, was a wonder to behold. When the day designated for the procession had arrived, all manner of gold-embroidered purple clothes decorated the streets ... The emperor did not himself mount the chariot but instead mounted upon it the icon of the Mother of God, in whom he exulted and entrusted his soul. To her as the unconquerable fellow general he attributed

imperial supremacy was so important to Manuel that he not only regarded it just as a “formal prelude” but also “as the substance of his political victory.”⁶⁷² Despite the opposition of Patriarch and people, who did not want the ‘infidel’ sultan to take part in the Christian procession the emperor did not cancel it. Thus, an earthquake during the triumph was regarded as a sign of God against it. Choniates concludes therefore that, “the triumph was thoughtlessly conceived, and neither did the emperor himself pay adequate attention to it, nor was proper regard paid to custom.”⁶⁷³ Nevertheless, the emperor remained anxious to impress the sultan:

“Conducting him to the palace south [sic] of the city, the emperor received him with magnificent banquets and entertained him in entire amity. Then he charmed him with horseraces, and according to custom set alight some boats and skiffs with liquid fire, and absolutely gorged the man with spectacles in the hipodrome ...”⁶⁷⁴

At the same time Manuel offered Kılıç Arslan rich gifts using the established Byzantine policy of gold to demonstrate to the “barbarian”, his empires, and his capitals special status.⁶⁷⁵

“Manuel, who knew that no barbarian is able to resist the temptation of gain, wished to magnify himself and to astound Kiliç Arslan with the immense riches of the treasuries which overflowed on all sides of the Roman empire, and thus he displayed all the gifts which he proposed to offer the sultan in one of the palace’s splendid men’s apartments. These consisted of gold and silver coins, luxuriant raiment, silver beakers, golden Theriklean [Therikles was a famous Corinthian potter] vessels, linens of the finest weave, and other choice ornaments which were easily procured by the Romans but rare among the barbarians and hardly ever seen by them. On entering the men’s apartments to which he had summoned the sultan, the inquired if he wished to receive as gifts the contents of the treasury at hand. When the sultan replied that the would take whatever the emperor offered him, the emperor posed a second question, asking if any of the enemies of the Romans could possibly withstand their assault should he pour such treasures on mercenary and native troops. Seized with wonder, and answering that were he the master of such vast sum of money he would have subjugated his enemies long ago ... The sultan was delighted and astonished at the

his victories ...” Choniates, Magoulias, 12; Kinnamos writes, evoking the golden age of Byzantine imperial supremacy: “something I think they had not previously witnessed since the Herakleians and Justinians guided the Romans’ realm.” Kinnamos, Brand, 20.

⁶⁷² Magdalino, *Manuel*, 69. The ceremonial followed at Manuel’s reconciliation with Reynald and his triumphal entry into Antioch which Kinnamos states was celebrated “in the way in which he usually did one at Byzantion” are examples underlying this thesis. Kinnamos, Brand, 142-143. The Byzantines following the example of Constantine VII (913-959) thought that, “through ceremonies the power of the empire was made manifest and that the sight of it would incline foreigners to better behaviour.” Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 28.

⁶⁷³ Choniates, Magoulias, 67.

⁶⁷⁴ Kinnamos, Brand, 157; According to Bar Hebraeus Kılıç Arslan stayed eighty days in Constantinople, Bar Hebraeus, Budge, 287.

⁶⁷⁵ Cf. Harris, *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 26.

outpouring of money and, blinded by the desire of gain, promised to hand over Sebasteia and its lands to the emperor.”⁶⁷⁶

Manuel employed the ‘policy of gold’ to demonstrate his power to the sultan and to threaten him, implying that with such wealth at his disposal he could defeat any enemy. Choniates concludes that the sultan, as it was typical for “barbarian,” “blinded by the desire of gain, promised to hand over Sebasteia” and agreed to a treaty:

“After he had passed sufficient time in Byzantion and had confirmed his prior agreements with additional oaths, he returned to his own land. The terms of the agreement went thus: throughout his life to be hostile to those who cherished enmity against the emperor, but to be friendly to those who, on the contrary, were settled in his favor. Of the cities which he had won, he would give the greater and more notable to the emperor. It was not allowed for him to make peace with any of the enemy unless the emperor directed. He would fight as ally with the Romans on request, and come with his entire force whether the conflict was an eastern or western one. Nor would he allow those who lay beneath his authority, but who are clever at living by thefts and customarily are called Turkomans, to do any harm whatsoever to the Romans’ land, unpunished. He agreed to these things, those of the grandees who attended him [pledged] that, should he be unmindful of them, with all their strength they would hinder the attempt.”⁶⁷⁷

It has been argued that Kılıç Arslan’s visit to Constantinople and the ratification of this treaty show that he accepted the emperor as his overlord.⁶⁷⁸ The terms of the treaty seem to indicate that Kılıç Arslan became a vassal of the emperor as he practically agreed to take no step without the emperor’s consent. However, as Magdalino concludes the “narrative sources, including Kinnamos, present the treaty of 1161 in terms of alliance.”⁶⁷⁹ Kinnamos’ report reveals that Manuel continued the policies established by his grandfather and regarded the Rum Seljuq sultan as an ally.

⁶⁷⁶ Choniates, *Magoulias*, 68-69; Bar Hebraeus confirms that the sultan and his companions received gifts: “And on the last day, when the king and the Sultan reclined at the same table, all the vessels and the table decorations were given to the Sultan, together with the other gifts which were given to him and to the one thousand Turks who were with him.” Bar Hebraeus, *Budge*, 287.

⁶⁷⁷ Kinnamos, *Brand*, 157-158 and for the prior agreement see *idem.*, 152-153.

⁶⁷⁸ Angold writes that the sultan was “brought firmly within the Byzantine orbit.” Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 191; Korobeinikov states that “the Emperor Manuel I Komnenos (1143-1180) constrained the Sultan Kilic Arslan II (1156-1192) to sign the peace treaty by which the Sultanate became subordinated to the Empire”. Korobeinikov, *Byzantium*, 124; Gregory writes in his continuation of Matthew of Edessa that Kılıç Arslan agreed with the treaty to be Manuel’s suzerain until his own death: “In this same year the sultan Kilij Arslan went to the Greek emperor Manuel, accompanied by the emir Miran, the brother of Nūr ad-Dīn. After having received many gifts from the emperor and having concluded a treaty with him whereby he promised to remain subject to Manuel until his own death ...” Matthew of Edessa, *Dostourian*, 279.

⁶⁷⁹ Magdalino, *Manuel*, 77.

Thus, as before, the status of the Rum Seljuq ruler was elevated, as he was addressed as leader of all Turks in Asia Minor. Manuel hoped that a strong sultan would be able to put an end to the Turkmen raids and that the sultan would support him to take the possessions of the Dānismendids. Secondly, Manuel, like his predecessors, was in need of manpower and hoped that the sultan would furnish his army with troops he could employ against his other enemies.

There is also another factor which should be considered in connection with this treaty between emperor and sultan and their agreement prior to it. As cited above one of the conditions asked by the emperor in the treaty was that the sultan had to “fight as ally with the Romans”, “whether the conflict was an eastern or western one.” In the agreement, before the sultan came to Constantinople, he had promised that “he would hinder any treachery from whatsoever source it arose.”⁶⁸⁰ Thus, Manuel might have sought the alliance with the sultan as an assurance against a possible attack from the German Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa.⁶⁸¹ The rumours of a German attack were false but, as Kinnamos remarks⁶⁸², the break between the two emperors was imminent in 1161⁶⁸³ and thus Manuel’s situation was not better than the sultan’s. Hence, Manuel was in no position to demand from Kılıç Arslan to submit to his authority though such a claim is made by the Greek sources:

“Kilij Arslan had become very powerful. He showed no deference to the emperor, and forgetting the court he had paid when he had been assailed by difficulties, he now required the emperor to pay court to him. Changing with the season in the fashion of barbarians, when in need he was inordinately humble but he was high-flying whenever Fortune tipped the

⁶⁸⁰ Kinnamos, Brand, 152.

⁶⁸¹ Dölger remarks that the treaty between Manuel and Kılıç Arslan concluded before the later came to Constantinople was possibly connected to a letter Manuel’s, which he according to the German imperial notary Buchard sent to the kings of Turkey, Babylon, Persia and Comania. In this letter Manuel allegedly claimed that Frederick I intended to his lands and then theirs after he had taken Milan. Cf. Dölger, *Regesten*, II, p.75, no. 1443 and p. 76, no. 1444. According to Magdalino Buchard’s statement and the statement of Kinnamos, that “a rumor was current that Frederick, king of the Germans, was setting his whole nation in motion to attack the Romans’ land” indicate that the Byzantines feared that Frederick planned a great eastern crusade. Kinnamos, Brand, 154 and see also Magdalino, *Manuel*, 64.

⁶⁸² Cf. Kinnamos, Brand, 154.

⁶⁸³ It is not clear when exactly the ‘cold war’ between the two emperors started but Manuel viewed Frederick’s expansionist policy in Italy with suspicion. Both emperors also supported different candidates in the papal schism ensuing after the death of Pope Hadrian IV in 1159 and in 1160 Manuel’s German wife Eirene, who was the “strongest effective bond” between the two empires died. Moreover, Frederick contested Manuel’s claim to be the sole emperor of Christendom, addressing him not as Roman Emperor but as the King of the Greeks. For this see Magdalino, *Manuel*, 64-65; Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 178-181.

scales in his favor. At times, he resorted to unctuous flattery to mollify the emperor and rendered him the esteem due a father; then the emperor, instead of treating him as if he were a wild beast in need of surveillance, honored him by adopting him as a son. In the letters which they exchanged, the emperor was addressed as father and the sultan as son.”⁶⁸⁴

In this letter Manuel described Kılıç Arslan as “child of our empire”, which implies that the emperor regarded the sultan as member of the hypothetical Byzantine family of rulers. Within this family of rulers, the Byzantine emperor had the highest rank as the overlord or ‘father’, who delegated power to other rulers, his subordinates, or ‘sons’⁶⁸⁵. Kinnamos also suggests that already Mas’ūd had become Manuel’s subordinate as he addressed him as son in a letter sent to his wife: “We wish you to know that the child of our empire, the sultan, lives and still survives, since he has fled the forces of war.”⁶⁸⁶ According to Magdalino, an encomium composed for the visit of Kılıç Arslan confirms that the sultan became a subordinate of the emperor, stating “that the sultan swore to serve the emperor, who made him his adopted son and enrolled him among the imperial retainers (*oikeioi, oiketai*).”⁶⁸⁷ It seems strange, however, that these sources suggest that the Christian emperor adopted the Muslim sultan. The lack of documentary sources in this period makes it impossible to give definite answers. There is also no evidence in the Rum Seljuq sources, which supports this claim⁶⁸⁸ though it has to be taken into account that in theory the Muslim sultan could not be presented as the vassal of the Christian emperor. Moreover, the following passage in the work of Choniates indicates that Byzantine ceremonial and wealth failed to lead the sultan to submit to the emperor:

“The sultan remarked to his intimates sarcastically that the more injuries he inflicted on the Romans, the more treasures he received from the emperor. “It is customary,” he said, “for

⁶⁸⁴ Choniates, *Magoulias*, 70.

⁶⁸⁵ For the Byzantine idea of the family of rulers, see Vryonis, *Byzantine Imperial Authority*, 142; Mango *Byzantium*, 220; Dölger, ‘Die Familie der Könige im Mittelalter’, in: *Byzanz und die europäische Staatenwelt*, Ettal 1953, 34-69; Ostrogorsky, ‘Die byzantinische Staatenhierarchie’, in: *Seminarum Kondakovianum*, VIII (1936), 41-61.

⁶⁸⁶ Kinnamos, *Brand*, 44.

⁶⁸⁷ Magdalino, *Manuel*, 77.

⁶⁸⁸ Magdalino states that, “To some extent, this followed the precedent of Yağıbasan, the Danishmendid emir of Sivas (Sebasteia), who in 1143-6 issued seals displaying on the obverse the bust of Christ Emmanuel, and on the reverse a Greek inscription describing himself as the emperor’s *doulos*”. Magdalino, *Manuel*, 77. However, there are no inscriptions on Rum Seljuq coins, which use any such description. For the Rum Seljuq coins see K. Çetin, *Selçuklu Müesseseleri ve Medeniyeti Tarihi*, *Erzurum* 1992, 34ff; Ş.N. Aykut, *Türkiye Seçuklu Sikkeleri*, I, İstanbul, 2000, 187ff.; Cahen, *Formation*, 97-98.

gifts to be gladly given to conquerors so that they should not desire to advance their conquests, just as festering diseases require numerous treatments so that they should not spread and increase further.”⁶⁸⁹

This statement by Choniates is one of the occasions where he criticises the Comenian rulers, who did not realise that the ‘policy of gold’ was not effective any more.⁶⁹⁰ The analogy between the combat of conquerors and diseases shows that these are the words of the author and not Kılıç Arslan. Still this is a further indication that Kılıç Arslan was aware of the weakness of Manuel and did not recognise his claim of supremacy. Therefore, it seems more probable that Kılıç Arslan agreed to the treaty because he received in return rich subsidies from Manuel and the assurance of peace on his western frontiers.⁶⁹¹ Kılıç Arslan and Manuel renewed the policy of alliance to turn their attention towards the east and west respectively. Manuel’s main concerns during this time were the defence of the Byzantine territories in the west and the contest with the German Emperor Frederick over supreme authority. Kılıç Arslan’s main concern was to consolidate his power in eastern Anatolia and to include territories held by other Turkish rulers, especially the Dānismendids, into his realm⁶⁹² and to defend his power against his eastern neighbours, especially Nūr al-Dīn.

Sultan and emperor had accepted each other’s right to exist and their main concern was not the conflict against each other but against other enemies. As has been shown above, neither had the sultans launched great expeditions of conquest against Constantinople nor had the emperors, launched great expeditions of reconquest against Konya. However, this pattern of generally friendly co-existence seems to have been ended by Manuel and Kılıç Arslan with the conflict, which started in 1174 and ended in 1176 with the overwhelming defeat of the Byzantine army at Myriokephalon. Moreover, modern scholarship regards the battle of Myriokephalon as the second decisive turning point of Seljuq and Byzantine

⁶⁸⁹ Choniates, *Magoulias*, 70-71.

⁶⁹⁰ On another occasion Choniates states, that the Byzantine ceremonial demonstration of wealth did not impress the Germans. “The Germans have neither need of such spectacles, nor do they wish to become worshipers of ornaments and garments ... The time has now come to take off effeminate garments and brooches and to put on iron instead of gold.” Choniates, *Magoulias*, 262.

⁶⁹¹ Cf. Cahen, *Formation*, 26.

⁶⁹² Cf. Choniates, *Magoulias*, 69; Bar Hebraeus, *Budge*, 289; Turan, *Selçuklular*, 203; Cahen, *Formation*, 28-30; Vryonis, *Decline*, 122-123.

relations. The conclusion has been reached that the battle of Manzikert in 1071 opened the Turkish conquest of Anatolia and that the battle of Myriokephalon in 1176 sealed it, thus, putting an end to any Byzantine hopes of reconquest⁶⁹³. Indeed, according to Choniates, Manuel himself compared his defeat to the defeat of Romanos Diogenes at Manzikert.⁶⁹⁴ Hence, it is generally assumed that Myriokephalon was the culmination of the ongoing Rum Seljuq and Byzantine conflict of conquest and reconquest. Yet, as has been stated, sultan and emperor had come to accept each other's right to exist and regarded each other as allies and thus, Myriokephalon presents an exception in their relations. Thus, the battle of Myriokephalon must be examined with the following questions in mind. Was the battle of Myriokephalon the expression of a change in Rum Seljuq and Byzantine relations and if so what caused this change and did it result in a dramatic change of their attitude towards each other?

First of all, we should look at the Rum Seljuq perspective. A look into the Rum Seljuq sources reveals that the battle of Myriokephalon was not recognised as an important or extraordinary event. The only Rum Seljuq source to mention the battle is the anonymous history of the Rum Seljuqs and here the events are described as follows.⁶⁹⁵

“In 572/1177 the sultan received at Caesarea news that the Roman emperor Manuel wanted to attack the Muslim lands and that he was approaching him with his army at a distance of only a day from him. And that he had an infantry of 70 thousand archers, who had opened trenches at every stage and meeting no resistance took the way of ten miles and came to Iconium. The sultan selected 1700 cavalryman and beating the war drums in the first night attacked the enemy. The infidels were routed till the morning and the sultan cut off the retreat route for the enemy. Manuel hopeless sent Michael for intercession to the sultan and asked for mercy. Manuel left for his land after he obliged himself to a tribute of 100 thousand gold, 100 thousand silver dirhams, horses, broadcloth and et cetera.”⁶⁹⁶

⁶⁹³ See Turan, *Selçuklular*, 207; R.-J. Lilie, 'Die Schlacht von Myriokephalon (1176) Auswirkungen auf das Byzantinische Reich im ausgehenden 12. Jahrhundert', in: *Revue des Études Byzantines*, 35 (1977), 268, (hereafter cited as Lilie, Myriokephalon).

⁶⁹⁴ “Messengers were sent on ahead by the emperor to relate the events that had taken place to the Constantinopolitans describing the emperor as one who had suffered the same fate as Romanos Diogenēs.” Choniates, *Magoulias*, 108.

⁶⁹⁵ It is interesting to note that Ibn Bībī starts his narrative at the end of Kılıç Arslan II in 1192 does not start it earlier to include this victory in his account. This suggests that the victory at Myriokephalon left no lasting memory. Aksarayi, who does cover the reign of Kılıç Arslan, informs us about the latter set his heart on taking the Danishmendid lands but does not mention any conflict with Manuel. Cf. Aksarayi, *Gençosman*, 126-127.

⁶⁹⁶ Anonymous, *Uzluq*, 25.

According to this information, the Byzantine emperor was the aggressor of the conflict leading to Myriokephalon and the Rum Seljuq Sultan only defended himself. The passage does not include any details of the warfare but states that the sultan made the emperor his tributary after he had routed his army and left him no way to escape. The anonymous author uses terms such as infidel and Muslim lands but the religious aspect is not emphasised. The author points out that the emperor became a tributary of the sultan but he fails to explain why the latter did not exploit his victory further and does not inform us of the terms that were reached. It might be that the event is not presented as a very important conflict because in retrospect it was clear that the sultan failed to make use of his great victory. However, it is clear that at the time the sultan was not surprised by the emperor's attack and was quick to gather his troops for war because he was aware that his expansionist policy in the east would provoke some kind of reaction by the emperor. The author does not connect the two events with each other but his report on Myriokephalon is preceded by his report of the sultan's fortification of Aksaray and the conquest of the Dānishmendid town Caesarea.

Yet, it seems certain that the sultan had not been planning a large enterprise against the emperor, as he was quick to accept peace rather than to exploit his victory and then turned his attention to the east again. Choniates remarks that the sultan "regretted setting the prey that was in hand."⁶⁹⁷ The anonymous author continues his narrative stating that in 1178 the sultan went off to attack Malatya. All in all this extract does not suffice to establish with certainty the sultan's exact policy and attitude towards the emperor at the time. Nonetheless, considering also subsequent events we can state with some certainty that his policy and attitude towards the emperor had not changed.

In contrast to the Rum Seljuq sources the Greek sources Kinnamos and Choniates devote several pages to the battle of Myriokephalon and the events leading up to it.⁶⁹⁸ The narratives of these two authors confirm that Manuel was the aggressor in this conflict and that he had planned the enterprise against Kılıç Arslan beforehand. "Because Manuel wanted to rebuild Dorylaion, he provoked the

⁶⁹⁷ Choniates, Magoulias, 108.

⁶⁹⁸ Cf. Choniates, Magoulias, 99-108; Kinnamos, Brand, 218-224. The history of Kinnamos breaks off with Manuel's departure for siege of Iconium.

barbarian to give battle.”⁶⁹⁹ Both historians state that Manuel’s aim was not only to set Kılıç Arslan boundaries but to take Konya itself and destroy his sultanate:

“Numbering his troops in the tens of thousands, he set out intent on destroying the Turkish nation, and on taking by storm Ikonion and her walls, and on holding captive the sultan whose neck he would trample as a footstool when he prostrated himself ... The emperor set out from the queen of cities [summer 1176].”⁷⁰⁰

Choniates describes the intention of Manuel with an extreme choice of words and states that he intended to destroy “the Turkish nation” and to hold captive the sultan “whose neck he would trample as a footstool”. This signals a radical change in Manuel’s policy and attitude towards Kılıç Arslan. Up to then the emperor had regarded the sultan as his ally and he had honoured him by enrolling him among his retainers but now he seems to have developed a personal animosity towards him. However, Kinnamos’ report does not support the hatred expressed by Choniates and it also does not lay great emphasis on the expulsion of the Rum Seljuqs or Turks from Anatolia. Kinnamos confirms the conquest of Konya as the aim of the expedition: “Thus the emperor journeyed through Laodekeia and the regions adjoining the Maeander, having in mind to settle down with his whole force for the siege of Ikonion.”⁷⁰¹ Manuel’s departure from the established Comnenian policy towards the Rum Seljuq Sultans is puzzling because “direct gains that the Byzantines might expect from the conquest of Konya were small.”⁷⁰² Moreover, the experienced advisers of the emperor did not share his change of policy and attitude towards the sultan and cautioned him to accept the sultan’s offer for peace:

“Because of these events, the sultan gave heed to war and drew upon substantial numbers of allied troops from Mesopotamia and from among the barbarians of the same race from the north. He also dispatched an embassy to the emperor to ask for a peace treaty ... All those who were experienced in warfare, especially in Turkish combat, and who were advanced in age, entreated Manuel to receive the embassy with open arms rather than to place all hopes on the die of battle. They begged him to keep in view how prodigious the contest would be, that the terrain was not easily passable but beset with ambushes, and that he should neither overlook the excellent Turkish horse at peak strength nor ignore the sickness that afflicted the army. Manuel paid not heed whatsoever to the words of the older men but

⁶⁹⁹ Choniates, *Magoulias*, 99.

⁷⁰⁰ Choniates, *Magoulias*, 100.

⁷⁰¹ Kinnamos, *Brand*, 224.

⁷⁰² Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 193.

instead gave ear to his blood relations, especially those who had never heard the sound of the war trumpet ...”⁷⁰³

The sultan had received troops from his allies and had all advantages on his side, despite this he asked the emperor for peace. Angold’s argument that “Both sides were eager for war and they were not willing to use any diplomatic means to prevent it” is therefore not right.⁷⁰⁴ The sultan’s policy and attitude towards the emperor had not changed. On the other hand, that the emperor’s advisers urged him not to pursue to “die of battle” warning him “how prodigious the contest would be” indicates that normal Byzantine policy was to keep the status quo with the Rum Seljuqs. They did not think that the Byzantine army was stronger than the Rum Seljuq army and especially respected the strength of its archery. Why then did the emperor insist on a decisive battle and aimed to destroy the Rum Seljuq state? Choniates gives the following explanation:

“The emperor charged the sultan with ingratitude towards his benefactor and with unmindfulness of the emperor’s previous acts of kindness, of his manifold assistance in establishing the sultan in his rule over his own people; the sultan blamed the emperor for his offhanded breaking of faith, for forsaking friendship, for abruptly violating the established articles of peace ...”⁷⁰⁵

According to this, sultan and emperor accused each other with the breach of the treaty of 1161. The emperor also charged the sultan “with ingratitude towards his benefactor” and it is clear that he was angered by the fact that his policy to support the sultan against the Dānishmendids had the reverse effect of what he had desired. Manuel had hoped to regain some territory in Asia Minor by taking the side of the sultan. The death of the ruler of Aleppo, Nūr al-Dīn in 1174, however, deprived the Dānishmendids of their protector, and one of them, Dhu’l-Nūn together with Kılıç Arslan’s brother Shāhanshāh, fled to Constantinople.⁷⁰⁶ Thus, Kılıç Arslan, encountering no resistance, took several Danishmendid towns in Cappadocia.⁷⁰⁷ Consequently, the balance of power in eastern Anatolia was upset in favour of Kılıç

⁷⁰³ Choniates, *Magoulias*, 101.

⁷⁰⁴ Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 191.

⁷⁰⁵ Choniates, *Magoulias*, 100.

⁷⁰⁶ Cf. Choniates, *Magoulias*, 69-70; Michael the Syrian, Chabot, 357.

⁷⁰⁷ According to Aksarayi, Kılıç Arslan took the towns of Neocaesarea (Niksar), and Sebastea (Sivas). Aksarayi, *Gençosman*, 126. According to Michael the Syrian he also took Comana and other towns and fortresses. Michael the Syrian, Chabot, 357.

Arslan, who became the strongest Turkish power in Anatolia. The emperor demanded that the sultan handed over to him the towns he had taken as he had promised to do in the treaty of 1161 but the sultan failed to do so⁷⁰⁸. Kinnamos states that following this violation of their agreement the emperor prepared the enterprise against the sultan:

“Neither did he render to the emperor any of the cities of which he had become possessed, nor did he desire to fulfill any of the other things to which he had previously agreed. ... Considering this, the emperor was at first angered and indignant at the matter; but as he was drawn away from this things by western affairs, he did not at all wish to stir up those of Asia. When no other war from anywhere in the west appeared in the future, since he had been successful in everything, he assembled a sufficient army and determined to cross over.”⁷⁰⁹

No doubt, Manuel was displeased that Kılıç Arslan seized Dānishmendid towns and refused to reinstate the Dānishmendids or to deliver the towns to the emperor. Yet, Kılıç Arslan neither had the means nor showed any intention to break through to the coastal regions. Thus, he did not pose a great threat to the empire. Hence, the breach of the treaty and Kılıç Arslan’s rise in power does not explain why Manuel risked a decisive battle when there was not much to be gained but all could be lost. Angold writes that Manuel thought that: “Now there was nothing to prevent Kılıç Arslan from seeking to emancipate himself from his tutelage to the Byzantine emperor.”⁷¹⁰ However, as has been shown above, the sultan did not necessarily accept the emperor’s overlordship but to the outside world, the Byzantine propaganda machine still continued propagating the emperor as the supreme authority.

It is right that the recognition of Byzantine imperial authority was the leading factor of the Byzantine foreign policy. The only ruler who contested the emperor’s claim to the title and heritage of the Roman Empire was the German emperor. Therefore, Magdalino’s assumption that the reason for Manuel’s expedition against Kılıç Arslan was closely connected to events in the Crusader states and in the German Empire explains Manuel’s policy better: “Thus, in 1175, Manuel faced the prospect that Frederick Barbarossa would become the effective protector of the crusader states, and this at a time when the German emperor was not only recovering

⁷⁰⁸ Cf. Kinnamos, Brand, 218-219, 222; Michael the Syrian, Chabot, 369.

⁷⁰⁹ Kinnamos, Brand, 218.

⁷¹⁰ Angold, *Byzantine Empire*, 191.

his power in Italy, but also establishing diplomatic contact with Saladin, and also, perhaps with Kilic Arslan.”⁷¹¹ The German Emperor, if successful, could have displaced the Byzantine Emperor as the sole rightful emperor and protector of Christendom. Magdalino states that Manuel responded by organizing a Crusade against the Rum Seljuqs.⁷¹² However, that Manuel propagated the expedition against Kiliç Arslan as a crusade does not mean that Byzantium embraced the idea of the ‘Holy War’. As already stated the warfare between emperor and sultan are hardly ever presented as a religious struggle. The histories of Choniates and Kinnamos do not reflect the idea of ‘Holy War’ and crusade in the connection with the fortification of Dorylaion and Soublaion or Myriokephalon. Manuel’s Crusade propaganda was directed towards the west and Latin east. Manuel did not aim to reconquer Asia Minor or lead a ‘Holy War’ against the infidel sultan. He wanted to re-establish the land route leading through Asia Minor to the Holy Land and bring the Crusader States under his authority. It seems therefore safe to suggest that the enterprise leading to Myriokephalon was part of the ideological warfare between the two Christian emperors and did not necessarily aim to eliminate the Rum Seljuq sultanate. Thus, Myriokephalon does not represent a change of the emperor’s policy or attitude towards the sultan.

On the other hand, that Kiliç Arslan failed to exploit his great victory over Manuel indicates that his policy towards the emperor did not change. Kiliç Arslan’s main enemy was not the emperor and his main concern not conquest or war against the infidel emperor but the consolidation of his power in eastern Anatolia.⁷¹³ He was content with the re-establishment of the status quo and only demanded from the emperor to demolish the fortresses Dorylaion and Soublaion. Moreover, Kiliç Arslan sent an envoy with gifts to conclude a peace treaty.

“The sultan dispatched Gabras, the most honored and esteemed of his officials, to the emperor. Henceforth, the Turks, by command and esteemed of his officials, to the emperor.

⁷¹¹ Magdalino, *Manuel*, 95. See also Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire*, 79; Brand, *Byzantium confronts the West*, 18; Lilie, *Myriokephalon*, 258.

⁷¹² Magdalino states that, “Byzantine texts which celebrate the rebuilding of Dorylaion and Soublaion show that Manuel advertised this as the start of holy war of reconquest in which he declared himself willing to lay down his life.” Magdalino, *Manuel*, 96; Lilie gives a similar argument and writes “Manuel proposed a crusade and declared publicly that he intended to come to the aid of the crusaders”. Lilie, *Twelfth-Century*, 40.

⁷¹³ Cf. Lilie, *Twelfth-Century*, 41; Cahen, *Formation*, 31.

Henceforth, the Turks, by command, ceased their attacks from all sides, and the Romans ended their sallies. On being received by the emperor, Gabras rendered a profound obeisance in the barbarian fashion, and at the same time presented as a gift from the sultan a Nisaeon horse with silver-mounted bridle from among those horses kept at rack and manger for use in solemn processions, and he also presented a long two-edged sword. ... Time would not permit certain articles to be spelled out precisely, but it was stipulated that the fortresses of Dorylaion and Souvleon were to be demolished.”⁷¹⁴

Choniates seems to hesitate to reveal the terms of this treaty, which indicates that the terms were not all in favour of Manuel.⁷¹⁵ Manuel razed Souvleon but not Dorylaion thus Kılıç Arslan sent him an embassy and when the former still resisted, he dispatched a force to invade the Byzantine frontiers along the Maeander, which however was defeated by the force Manuel had sent against it.⁷¹⁶ In 1179-80, Manuel undertook a campaign into Rum Seljuq territory to relieve the fortress of Claudiopolis, which Choniates hails as a great success.⁷¹⁷ He thus gives no details of the warfare and does not mention that a peace treaty was concluded between emperor and sultan.⁷¹⁸ However, it is clear that emperor and sultan wanted to go back to the status quo. Thus, Myriokephalon had not been a great disaster for Byzantium and the boundaries in Asia Minor remained nearly the same as before the battle. Except these attacks and counterattacks to secure their position they did not undertake any great expeditions against each other. The status quo was maintained and sultan and emperor returned to friendly relations, turning their attention to their enemies in the west and the east. Choniates' following statement shows that Manuel had undertaken the expedition in Anatolia to defend his status against the German emperor.

“... he contended that it was permissible to lead on the barbarians in the East, to buy their friendship with money and to convince them by feats of arms not to pour over his borders. But the Western nations which were scattered over many places he viewed with suspicion, for these men were boastful, undaunted in spirit, lacking all humility, and trained to be ever bloodthirsty. ... they also nurtured an unsleeping hostility against the Romans, a perpetual, raving, hatred as they looked askance at them ... Time and again he armed the Italians against Frederick, the king of Germany. ... Frederick attempted several times to enter the

⁷¹⁴ Choniates, Brand, 106-107.

⁷¹⁵ Turan suggests that an article regarding indemnity must have been included as Manuel sent gifts and gold to Kılıç Arslan. Cf. Turan, *Selçuklular*, 209.

⁷¹⁶ Cf. Choniates, Magoulias, 108-112.

⁷¹⁷ Choniates exaggerates the effect of this expedition on the sultan's forces: “The barbarians positioned about Claudiopolis caught sith of him as he approached, first aware of his arrival from the military standards of his divisions and the radiant splendor of their arms, and forthwith took flight.” Choniates, Magoulias, 112.

⁷¹⁸ Cf. Magdalino, *Manuel*, 100.

elder Rome to be crowned, but Manuel thwarted the move by writing to the pope [1167-68].”⁷¹⁹

The emperor had accepted the loss of Anatolia as long as the Turks did not “pour over his borders.” Choniates does not mention that the emperor claimed overlordship. He continues to use the term “barbarians” to refer to the sultan but at the same time reveals that the emperor was content to buy the sultan’s friendship. The author continues his narrative with the Western nations and reveals clearly that Manuel’s main concern was to influence the Italians and the Pope and prevent the coronation of Frederick as emperor. Furthermore, the “Western nations” and especially the “king of Germany” were not only rivals. According to Choniates they fostered “hostility” and “perpetual, raving, hatred against” the Byzantines. Choniates describes here, actually, how the Byzantines felt about the “Western nations” or Latins. The animosity between Byzantines and Latins was mutual. Choniates and other Byzantine authors make similar statements repeatedly.⁷²⁰ The Rum Seljuqs in contrast are never described with hatred though such clichés as barbarian and infidel are employed.⁷²¹ The nomadic ways of the Türkmen bands are described with contempt, but even they are not described with such intense hatred. The expedition leading to Myriokephalon was first and foremost aimed at the west and Frederick not against the east and Kılıç Arslan and in this context it was not an exception to the pattern of Rum Seljuq- Byzantine relations. Hence, Manuel’s crushing defeat did not change the status quo between sultan and emperor substantially but between emperor and the west. Moreover, the antagonism between Byzantium and the west increased after Manuel died and in the end, the armies of the Fourth Crusade, who took Constantinople in 1204 and deposed the Byzantine emperor. To conclude, the relations between the Rum Seljuq sultans and the Comnenian emperors were not characterised by antagonism or strong animosity but by mutual respect and co-existence, and this was not only so because they had no other choice.⁷²²

⁷¹⁹ Choniates, *Magoulias*, 113.

⁷²⁰ Cf. Lilie, *Twelfth-Century*, 36.

⁷²¹ Choniates laments for example: “O Lord of vengeance, thy taking revenge? How long shall these calamities follow one another and the descendants of the bondwoman Agar continue to subjugate those of us who are free and destroy and kill thy holy nation which above every name called upon thine?” Choniates, *Magoulias*, 66.

⁷²² Lilie’s following conclusion therefore is more a reflection of the Greek-Turkish antagonism of the 19th century than of Rum Seljuq-Byzantine relations: “This is not to say that in principle the emperors were no longer interested in retrieving all of Asia Minor, and that the Seljuqs would not have thrown

It seems thus safe to suggest that it was this pattern of friendly co-existence established under the Rum Seljuq rulers and the Comnenian rulers until the death of Manuel Comnenus in 1180 that was continued during the period of upheaval following the disaster of 1204. Moreover this was also this pattern of friendly relations which was continued between the Nicaean empire in exile and the Rum Seljuqs.

For the purpose of this study it was not necessary to cover this period which has been now analysed by Dimitri Korobeinikov in his PhD thesis which was completed during the composition of the present work. However, Korobeinikov argues that the Rum Seljuq sultans were regarded by the Comnenian emperors as subordinate vassals and that this was the reason why the Nicaean empire in exile managed to survive and even dominate them during the second half of the 13th century.⁷²³

the Greeks into the sea, had they been able to do so. But as long as this was impossible, each had to come to terms with the other." Lilie, *Twelfth-Century*, 50.

⁷²³ Cf. D. Korobeinikov, *Byzantium and the Turks in the Thirteenth Century*, unpubl. PhD thesis, Oxford 2004. especially 21-22, 24.

Bibliography

List of Abbreviations

AKM	Atatürk Kültür Merkezi
BJRL	Bulletin of the John Rylands Library
BMGS	Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies
BSOAS	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
BZ	Byzantinische Zeitschrift
DOP	Dumbarton Oaks Papers
EI ²	Encyclopaedia of Islam (New Edition).
İA	İslam Ansiklopedisi
IJMES	International Journal of Middle East Studies
JNES	Journal of Near Eastern Studies (Per..492Heb)
JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Per 9 Roy)
RCEA	Répertoire chronologique d'épigraphie arabe
REB	Revue des études byzantines
REI	Revue des Etudes Islamiques
SAD	Selçuklu Araştırmaları Dergisi
SI	Studia Islamica
TOEM	Tarih-i Osmanî Encümeni Mecmuası
TTEM	Türk Tarihi Enjümeni Mecmuası
TTK	Türk Tarih Kurumu yayınları
UAJ	Ural-Altische Jahrbücher
WZKM	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes
ZDMG	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft

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