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THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY BETWEEN THE ZANDS  
AND THE QAJARS, 1193-1209 A.H./1779-1794 A.D.:  
A SOCIETY IN TRANSITION

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1982



I dedicate this thesis to my father,  
Mr. Gholam Reza Shahnavaaz.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In writing my thesis I have benefited from the help of a number of people to whom I would like to express my gratitude.

First of all my supervisor, Professor L.P. Elwell-Sutton, who was always ready to listen to my ideas when they were taking shape and made a valuable contribution to their formation. His advice on the scope of my thesis and the arrangement of the material helped me greatly in my compilation of the work.

Dr. Carole Hillenbrand, with great kindness and patience, devoted her time and energy to reading through my work and corrected and improved the text and the layout. I am greatly indebted to her for the moral support and the assistance that she offered me in other areas which were in need of support.

My gratitude is due to my brother, Dr. Shahbaz Shahnavaaz, whose moral and financial support with his great encouragement made me all the more determined to overcome the numerous problems that I was faced with. Without his aid this work would never have been completed.

My thanks to my friends Mr. Feraidun Kuhi Kamali, who assisted me in the economic aspect of my studies, and Mr. Gordon Barbour, who read through my work and made intelligent comments on the contents.

I would like to express my gratitude to Mr. D.D. McMullen, Secretary to the Faculty of Arts Postgraduate Studies Committee, whose kindness and understanding enabled me to have enough time to finish my work. Miss Irene Crawford, the secretary of the Islamic Studies Department, merits my appreciation; she was always ready to help in any way she could. Miss Rosalind Sudlow kindly helped me in the proof-reading of my work.

Last but not least, I acknowledge the assistance of the staff of Edinburgh University Library, particularly the Inter-Library Loans and Special Collections departments.

## ABSTRACT

This work is an attempt to study the turbulent and dark period of late 18th century Persia. We begin with the death in 1193 A.H./1179 A.D. of the Vakil, Karim Khān Zand, after nearly twenty years of rule. Immediately thereafter the conflicts and contradictions inherent in a semi-feudal monarchy came to the surface, giving rise to the most violent and chaotic anarchy. The Vakil's own tribe, the Zands, failed to grasp their only chance of survival which was to remain unified against their rivals. Instead, one after another Zand prince usurped supreme power and killed his own kinsmen. In this process the country was destroyed and eventually witnessed the final downfall of the Zands in 1209/1794.

From the death of the Vakil, the Zand's most formidable rival, Āqā Mohāmmad Khān Qājār, was consolidating his power in the northern provinces of the kingdom. By careful planning and patience, he contributed to the weakening and eventual total annihilation of the Zand dynasty.

In this thesis we also attempt to clarify the underlying currents behind these events. The dynamics of the society and social and economic forces are studied in detail. This period of history is of particular importance as it marks the end of a semi-feudal regime based on tribal military support. Before the advent of the 19th century, which witnessed the sedentarization of nomadic tribes and the formation of a regular and disciplined army under the Qājārs.

In this study of an important, but little known, period of transition, particular emphasis is laid on socio-economic aspects such as trade, religious life and the structure of late 18th century Persian society.

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TABLE OF TRANSLITERATIONS

'	ء
b	ب
p	پ
t	ت
<u>s</u>	ث
j	ج
<u>ch</u>	چ
h	ح
<u>kh</u>	خ
d	د
<u>z</u>	ذ
r	ر
z	ز
<u>zh</u>	ژ
s	س
<u>sh</u>	ش
ṣ	ص
ẓ	ض
ṭ	ط
ẓ	ظ
<u>gh</u>	غ
c <sub>a</sub>	ق
f	ف
q	ک
k	گ
g	ل
l	م
m	ن
n	ه
h	و
v	ی
y	آ
ā	ای
ay	ای
īy	ای
al-	ال
-e	ا
va	و
-ye	ی

## ABBREVIATIONS OF THE SOURCES

- B.L.: British Library.
- D.K.: Dynasty of the Kajars by Sir Harford Jones Brydges.
- G.G.: Giti Goshāy by Mirzā Sādeq Mousavī Nāmi.
- G.M.: Golshan-e-Morād by A. Ghaffari.
- H.P.: The History of Persia by J. Malcolm.
- I.O.R.: India Office Records.
- LAJA: Life and Adventures of Joseph Amin by Joseph Amin.
- M.H.P.: Memoires historiques et politiques... by Ferrieres de Sauveboeuf.
- M.T.: Mojmal al-Tavārikh by A. Golestāneh.
- O.M.T.: Observations made on a Tour from Bengal, by William Francklin.
- R.M.M.: Ruznameh-Kalāntar-e-Fars by Mirzā Moḥammad.
- R.S.: Rożat al-Sāfā by Ali Qoli Hedāyat.
- R.T.: Rostam al-Tavārikh by Moḥammad Hāshem Rostam al-Hokama.
- TaTa: Tasliat al-Abrār va Tajrohat al-Ahrār by Maftun.
- T.M.: Tārikh-e-Moḥammadi by Moḥammad Taqi Sāra'i.
- T.S.: A Tour to Sheeraz by E. Scott Waring.
- T.Z.: Tarikh-e-Zandieh by Ebn Abdal Karim.

## INTRODUCTION

By the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th centuries, Safavid rule was drawing to its close and the invasion of the Afghāns accelerated the process. Maḥmud Qalzā'i (Qaljā'i) of a Sunni tribe of Qandehār, rebelled in 1134/1721, after his tribe had been subject to a long and agonising harassment. He marched on Kermān and Yazd and, having captured these places, advanced towards Esfāhān. He besieged the Safavid capital for a few months and eventually captured it. He established a short-lived dynasty in Persia, during which period the Safavid crown prince, Tahmāsb, made many attempts to topple it.<sup>1</sup> Afghān rule could not, however, withstand the military genius of Nāder and it collapsed in 1143/1730.

The impact of Afghān rule on Persia was devastating; many cities and towns were destroyed and others suffered massacres, famine and the epidemics which followed. Nāder overthrew the Afghāns and freed the Persian empire from the hands of two great powers, Ottoman Turkey to the west, and Russia to the north. In his spectacular victories in India, he brought back riches which were spent only on military expeditions or else deposited in his stronghold in Khorasān. He wished to establish an empire vaster than that of Timur or the Safavids, but in his ambition he ruined the country and denuded it of its resources.<sup>2</sup> He changed his capital to Mashad, which was strategically more important for his northern expansions.

Nāder attempted to undermine the remainder of the Safavid heritage by making it a condition of his acceptance of the throne of Persia, that he was authorised to substitute the Sunni faith

1. See Lockhart, The Fall of the Safavi. Dynasty, Cambridge 1958.

2. For further discussion see Lockhart, Nader Shah, London, 1938.

for Twelver Shi<sup>C</sup>ism. This met with resentment on the part of the clergy and the general public, but the notables present at the ceremony of coronation did not dare to oppose him.<sup>1</sup> Thus, he established himself in power and by confiscation of the Ouqāf, further aggravated the discontent of the <sup>C</sup>Olamā.

Nāder's military achievements did not bring back the unity of the Safavid era. Indeed, he was faced with numerous rebellions which erupted in different parts of the empire. These were crushed with fierceness and brutality.<sup>2</sup> All classes of the inhabitants were in constant dread of his harsh measures. Agriculture was greatly hampered by his ruthless conscription of the peasants to the army; the peasants left their villages and took refuge in the mountains to escape his extortions. The merchants were in straitened circumstances because of his impositions and the government officials viewed him with terror. The tribes suffered great hardships due to his policy of transplanting them to his newly acquired territories. From 1730 onwards, he transplanted many tribes, mostly to Khorasān to form a barrier against the inroads of the Ozbaks and Turkman\$. Tribal economy, which was based on animal breeding, was much reduced as a result of inclement cold and an unsuitable environment.

The cities and towns were left as ruinous wastes, as a result of the movement of large armies through them. In short, Nader's rule was a reign of terror for every group of the inhabitants. His army was divided into two hostile camps, that of the traditional Qezelbāsh, consisting of the Turkish tribes, such as Qājārs and Afshārs, and the other of the Sunni Ozbaks and Afghāns.<sup>3</sup>

This division resulted in his assassination in 1160/1747. Had

1. See Hanway, Jonas, An historical account of the British trade over the Caspian Sea, 2 vols., Dublin, 1754.

2. Arunova, M.R. & Ashrafian, K.Z., Doulat-e-Naderi, tr. Hamid Amin, Tehran, 1356.

3. Hanway, op. cit.

he been more inclined to establish his rule through a more rational and mild administration, his government could have <sup>ameliorated</sup> improved the evils of the Afghān invasions. He took measures to fight the corruption which had existed in the country over a long period. He introduced discipline into the army and punished deserters.<sup>1</sup> He attempted to weaken the position of the<sup>c</sup> Olamā in order to discourage excessive Shi<sup>c</sup> a fervour and, by forbidding the public from abusing the first three khalifs made an effort to reconcile the Shi<sup>c</sup> a and Sunni sects. These measures had no long lasting effect, however, and his death left the country an easy prey to a number of freebooters to divide his empire and inflict more calamities on the country.

The north east of the empire was won by an Afghān soldier, Aḥmad Khān, who established a dynasty in what is now known as modern Afghanistan. In the Afshārid Capital, Mashad, after many coups and counter coups, the feeble grandson of Nāder, Shāhrokh was a mere puppet, while his military chiefs held the real power. In the central plateau the vacuum was filled by a few chiefs, such as <sup>c</sup>Ali Mardān Khān Bakhtiāri, Fath <sup>c</sup>Ali Khān Afshār, Āzād Khān Afghān, Karim Khān Zand and Moḥammad Hasan Khān Qājār. These chiefs, in their ruthless struggle for power, destroyed what had survived the ravages of the Afghāns and the oppressions of Nāder Shāh. They were all destroyed by each other, until Karim Khān emerged as the ultimate victor.

Karim Khān was the chief of an obscure Lor/Lak tribe. He started his career in the army of Nāder Shāh, but did not achieve distinction as a military chief. After the death of Nāder (1160), he joined Nāder's nephew, Ebrāhim Khān, and fought in his army for a while and was apparently given the title of Khān by Ebrāhim. Soon afterwards, he set himself up

1. See Tajrohat al-Ahrār va Tasliat al-Ahrar, 2 vols, <sup>b</sup>Tahriz, 1349-50.

as an independent contestant for supreme power.<sup>1</sup> In his struggle for power he had three formidable rivals whom he managed to banish from the arena by tact and resilience. Indeed, on many occasions, Karim Khān was reduced to nothing, his army dispersed, his treasures were lost and even his kinsmen deserted him and his harim fell into the hands of his enemy. But on every occasion he re-emerged with greater spirit and zeal.

After he had secured his position in the central and southern provinces, he attempted to subdue the northern parts. This process took him seven years to achieve. When he eventually conquered the largest parts of the empire, he made no further attempt to extend his domain. He treated Afshārid rule in Khorāsān with respect and kept his good relations with Shāhrokh throughout his reign.<sup>2</sup> His last effort to capture Basra, apparently by the provocative conduct of the Pasha of Bagdad towards his subjects was a big mistake. He lost the best part of his army and regretted it until he died.

Karim Khān's successes over his rivals owed much to his good sense and prudence and to a greater extent to the mistake<sup>3</sup> of his rivals. In many instances he could have been totally annihilated but his foes failed to finish him off. Many accidents, which are generally termed good fortune, assisted him in his pursuit of power.

He ruled for nearly twenty years, for fourteen of which he stayed in Shirāz, his favourite city.<sup>3</sup> He took great pains to settle the affairs of state. He appointed governors and kalāntars to manage the administration in the various provinces and made them answerable to himself. Every year they had to present themselves at court in order to settle their accounts.<sup>4</sup> He pun-

1. See Mojmal al-Tavārikh, Tehran, 1344.

2. See Golshan-e-Morād, Abol Hasan Ghafari, Ms.

3. For further discussion see Ruznameh Mirzā Mohammad Kalāntar, Tehran, 1325.

4. Asef Mohammad Hāshem, Rostam al-Tavārikh, Tehran, 1348.

ished dishonesty and rewarded loyalty and honesty. He was mild and humane and avoided violence if there were other alternatives.

His death was universally regretted. His successors, with their rash and senseless conduct, ruined what he had built up with so much effort.

In his reign, trade and agriculture flourished and despite his illiteracy and total ignorance of arts and literature, he encouraged artists and rewarded men of literary ability. He was perhaps amongst one of the very few sovereigns, whose rule is remembered with admiration and esteem by the people.

This thesis is a history of the successors of Karim Khān, covering a period of sixteen years (1193-1209) from the death of the vakil to the final fall of the Zand house; and of the political and social impacts of that period. Although a number of works have been written on this period of history,<sup>1</sup> there are many interesting areas unexplored. I have attempted, as far as I have been able, to uncover these dark aspects. I have tried to demonstrate the importance of the social factors involved in determining the political climate. By investigating the conflicting interests of the urban and tribal elements in the society, I have tried to explain the impetus behind the political events.

Persian society at that time, rather like today, was a complex composition of diverse groups with different and conflicting interests and each strove to further its own cause. Thus the society was plagued with internal strife and for several decades the tribes increased their sphere of power and influence which over-shadowed the urban elite. The urban population in their struggle to gain supremacy over the tribes, knowing at the

1. Roshān Zamir, Die Zand dynastie, Hamburg, 1970. Khubnazar Hasan, Janeshinān-e-Karim Khān, Freiburg, 1974.



same time that they were no match for the tribes in battle, resorted to subterfuge and conspiracy in order to reduce their power.

In this attempt to assert themselves, the urban population abandoned their own differences in order to fight the common enemy; the reconciliation, however, was temporary and with out long lasting effects.

I have attempted to study the undercurrents, which in economic, religious and cultural life of the society as a whole contributed to the emergence of a new order: namely, the long and relatively peaceful reign of the Qājārs, which marked the end of the supremacy of the tribes in the political arena. The Qājārs, themselves of tribal background and aware of the power of the tribes in creating unrest and disorder, tried their best to reduce their power. Āqā Moḥammad Khān and Fath<sup>c</sup>Ali Shāh the first two monarchs of the Qājār dynasty, transplanted the tribes whose power they could not contain. Many of the tribal leaders were either killed or imprisoned and kept as hostages at the court. Almost all the attempts carried out to contest the Qājār sovereigns came from their own tribe and that clearly shows that the power of other tribes was broken. The Qājārs, by attempting to establish a regular army brought the tribal warriors under their direct control. Furthermore, they created an elaborate and powerful bureaucracy, which was in direct control of the administration, of military and civic affairs; thus they wished to strike the final blow to the supremacy of the tribes.

## CHAPTER 1

### NOTES ON THE SOURCES

#### General Introduction

The period under study in this thesis (1193-1209/1779-1796) is often reckoned to be a dark era, in which only anarchy and civil war prevailed.<sup>1</sup> This interregnum, which followed the fall of the Ṣafavids and the invasion of the Afghans, and lasted until the long reign of the Qājār dynasty, is, however, a period of great importance which has been very little studied by modern scholars. More recently, the career of Karim Khān Zand has been analysed in detail by Perry,<sup>2</sup> but only in his epilogue has he time to deal very briefly with the successors of the vakil. This neglect by scholars is regrettable, since the period under discussion is one of great importance, as it is a transitional era which brought about great changes in the social structure of Persian society. Indeed the 12th Century A.H./18th Century A.D. can be regarded as the last phase of the supremacy of the tribes over the sedentary classes of society. The neglect is not due to a lack of first-hand sources, as there are a great many histories written during or a little later than this period. The ignorance of the period stems far more from the fact that not many modern scholars have devoted any time to the study of this subject.<sup>3</sup>

1. C.f. the brief treatment accorded to this period in P. Avery, Modern Iran (London, 1965), p.23.

2. Perry, John: Karim Khān Zand (Chicago, 1979).

3. The modern studies on Zand history are as follows:

I. Radjābi, Parvis: Iran unter Karim Hān (1752-1779) (Göttingen, 1970).

II. Roschanzamir, Mehdi: Die Zand Dynastie (Hamburg, 1970).

III. Khūbnazar, Hasan: Janeshinan-e-Karim Khan-e-Zand (Friburg, 1974).

IV. Nava'i, Abdolhosain: Karim Khan va zaman-e-u (Tehran, 135 -

V. Hedāyati, Hādī: Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh (Tehran, 1335/1955).

At all events, the main purpose in this thesis will be, wherever possible, to study the social history of the time, rather than the account of wars and coups. This makes the task for the scholar even more difficult than it might already appear. Persian history books have a tradition of omitting events in which the masses are involved. In reality, the histories are merely the accounts of one or more monarchs. They record not even the events which occur in their patron's private life, but it is his court life which is communicated to us.

The social history is made even more inaccessible by the status of the writers of the histories themselves. The historian of the 12th Century/18th Century A.D. is a member of the elite; he is either a dignitary or a close relation of a notable. The author of Ruznāmeḥ, Mirzā Moḥammad Kalāntar, falls into the first category<sup>1</sup> - Ghaffāri, Golestāneh and Kuhmarre'i, are of the second category.<sup>2</sup> What really enabled them, and in some ways encouraged them, to write history books was not their love of history writing, but the fact that they were educated and had gained the necessary qualities of a Mirzā. They also had access to the government chanceries and, by being involved in political events, were eyewitnesses to those episodes which they relate. It is, however, unusual for an individual, who has not the chance of gaining information on the battles and other events, to attempt to write a history. Thus, even when an ordinary soldier in the army of Nāder Shah writes his memoirs, he relates those episodes in which he personally participated. This source is an exception to the rule, in that the writer is a commoner and has no connection with the local/provincial notables.

1. Mirzā Moḥammad was the kalāntar of Fārs during the reign of Karīm Khān. He enjoyed great power and influence and added to the family inheritance by purchasing many villages, wholly or in part.

2. Golestāneh was the nephew of Moḥammad Taqī Golestāneh, the rebellious governor of Kermānshāh. He was besieged together with his uncle, in the citadel of Kermānshāh by the Vakil, and was delegated to negotiate peace with the latter. Thus, his account of the event is probably the most accurate of all sources.

These historians can be divided into two groups: the professional historian, such as Nāmi<sup>1</sup>, who was paid to write his history for his patron; and secondly, the freelance amateur, such as Golestāneh, who clearly writes for his own amusement. But these two groups do not differ greatly from one another. The only material difference is that the latter writes for pleasure, with a view to presenting his work to a monarch<sup>2</sup> at some stage, whereas the former earns his livelihood. The freelance historian, however, is by no means impartial to a reigning monarch and his opponents. His personal inclination induces him to side with one or the other.<sup>3</sup> At all events, one thing is certain: that the freelance historian did not compose his work to gain any monetary reward, and that makes him more reliable than the professional one, who writes history from the information provided for him by his patron, and presents it in a way pleasing to that patron. Thus, he never ventures to question the authenticity of his so-called "facts", and does not dare to criticise that of which he disapproves. Even a historian, who dares to pass judgement on the conduct of his patron, does so only in a subtle, ironical manner, rather than by direct means.<sup>4</sup> Before we proceed to an assessment of individual sources and their value for the study of the history of the time, it may be useful to give a brief account of the style of writing in the 12th Century/18th Century. The literary style of

1. Nāmi was appointed by the order of Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān, to compose a history of the Zand dynasty. He attended the court and the material was provided for him by the minister, Mirzā Mohammad Hosein.

2. Golestāneh finished his work in India (and wished to present it to the Indian king).

3. The author of Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh, sides with the Qājārs all the way through his work and, only at the end, does he quote an ode, which shows that he is not greatly pleased with the barbarities committed by Āqā Mohammad Khān on his opponents:

The cupbearer of the world fills many of these cups  
empties the full and fills the empty cup.

4. Golshan-e-Morād on many occasions criticises the Zands and their mistakes. He ironically remarks that <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān was more happy about the arrival of his new bride, the daughter of Hedāyat Khān, than he was with the victory of his son in Māzandarān.

the period is for the most part unattractive and full of unnecessary simile and flattery.<sup>1</sup>

The sources of this period can be divided into two broad divisions:

1. Primary sources
2. Secondary sources

The primary sources can be further divided into Persian histories written in the Zand or early Qājār period, together with the contemporary accounts composed by European travellers. Special reference should be made here to the History of Persia written by Sir John Malcolm in 1808, which is, therefore, to be classified as a primary source. A very valuable collection of primary documents is to be found in the India Office Record and Library.

#### I. Persian Primary Sources:

Giti Goshāy, Mirzā Moḥammad Sādeq-e-Mūsavi Nāmi, et al. 12, edited by Sa'id Nafisi, Tehran, 1317/19.

Giti Goshāy is the main source on the history of the Zand dynasty. Although it is written by three different authors and some omissions are apparent, but it is the only detailed and complete history of the Zands and was written by three Monshis at the court of the Zand rulers during the period of our study. The authors' lives and careers have been given in Perry's

1. It was only with Āqā Moḥammad Khān Qājār that the fashion was altered. This ruler prevented his historians from composing their works in the prevailing style of writing. Ma'āser Soltāniyeh is a good example of these history books. The author clearly tries to use pure Persian words, rather than Arabic and Turkish substitutes; his composition is even pleasing in many aspects. Apart from these, only a few of the historical works of the period are written in a simple manner, and this may well be attributed to the author's lack of knowledge of the arts of the Mirzās. Mirzā Moḥammad Kalāntar follows a totally different pattern from the average monshis of the time. He frankly states that he did not study the sciences and the arts as well as he could have done. Op. cit., p.7.

book.<sup>1</sup> It would seem rather unnecessary to repeat what he has already written. There are, however, some points that have to be clarified here. Şādeq Musavi actually started his work as early as the reign of Karim Khān and he was not only the court poet, as Perry maintains, but also the historian of the Vakils. Rieu believes that the account given by the author of Fava'ed al-Safavieh is authentic, where he writes that Nāmi was severely rebuked by <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān (A.H. 1196-99) for the noble origin he had mendaciously assigned in his Tarikhi Zand-iyyeh to the Zand family, and was compelled to drink the water, in which his own copy of that history had been washed.<sup>2</sup> It appears that the displeasure of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān was due to the harsh and uncomplimentary account, which the author gives on <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān's character and conduct, rather than what Rieu believes to be the case.

Hedāyati assumes that he composed his history in the reign of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān.<sup>3</sup> This is, however, dubious. It would appear likely from the minute details provided in this source on the life and reign of Karim Khān, that it was written during his lifetime. The work contains accounts not mentioned in any other source.

The patron of Nāmi was the noble vazir, Mirzā Mohāmmad Hosein Farahāni, who communicated to him much of the information that the work contains. Maftun, who spent much of his youth in Shirāz as a hostage in the court, asserts that Nāmi was actually the chronicler of the Vakils.<sup>4</sup> His office may well have enabled him to gather the information for his composition.

His style is typical of his time. It is elaborate to such a degree that the reader has to go through a few pages before discovering anything of substance and importance. For in-

1. Perry, John: Karim Khan Zand (Chicago, 1979), pp.303-304.

2. There was the rough draft in existence, on the basis of which the author continued his composition.

3. Golshan-e-Morād, p.274.

4. Maftun, Abdol Razzāq: Negārestān-e-Dārā, (Tabriz, 1342), p.271.

stance, the reader has to read passage after passage in praise of spring and its description. It is, however, rewarding to find that his account is detailed and consistent in respect to historical events. Nāmi can, on occasion, be strongly biased in his support of the Zands, so much so that he is inclined to falsify the evidence and omit certain incriminating facts.<sup>1</sup>

Nāmi died in 1204/1789, apparently at an advanced age. His work was carried on by one of his disciples, who was charged with the task by the vazir, Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein. It appears that Nāmi stopped his work in 1200/1785, as <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Karim b. <sup>C</sup>Ali Reza Sharif resumed the narrative from that date onwards. The work was not completed by the second author, since he fell into the hands of the Qājār chief, Āqā Moḥammad Khān, as he himself asserts.<sup>2</sup> The last part of the work was composed by another disciple of Nāmi's, Moḥammad Rezā Shir-āzi. He brings the events up to the death of Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, and with a degree of satisfaction, relates the dire fate of Ḥāji Ebrāhim and his accomplices. Both of the Zails are broadly speaking in the same literary style as the main work, but less florid and elaborate. In fact, the last part is written in a much simpler style altogether.

The only published edition of the book, which was edited and amended by Sa <sup>C</sup>id Nafisi<sup>3</sup>, is full of spelling mistakes and

1. For example, Giti Goshay omits an event, which he deems highly embarrassing for his patron, namely, that Ja far Khān's brother, Farz Ali, defected from his service and joined his mortal enemy, the Qājārs; Nāmi makes no reference to the event at all. Again, in a riot which broke out in the city of Esfahan, when Ja far Khān was leaving it in great haste and confusion, Giti Goshay calls the rioters "Arāzel va Oubāsh" (rogues and scoundrels). In another source, we learn that the rioters were the artisans and shopkeepers, together with the Ṣufis. Nāmi, however, mentions that the private guards of the late king, <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khan, had a part in it.

2. G.G., p.372.

3. Ibid., Introduction, p.v.

confusing phrases. It appears that the editor had access to one erroneous and deficient copy, written by a number of ignorant copyists. Nevertheless, the published edition has been used in this thesis. The editor has added indices of names and places which facilitates the study of the book.

Golshan-e-Morād: Abol Ḥasan Ghaffāri, 1210. Ms. British Library, Or3592.

This manuscript was completed in 1210 by different copyists. The author wished to present it to his patron, Mirzā Moḥammad <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Khān Shirāzi, while he was in Kāshān. Although the style of writing is not congenial, but it is well executed and neat. It appears the author himself supervised the copyists, thus it is accurate and without mistakes. It has been used in this thesis; the copy in Malek Library has also been consulted.

For the biography of the author, we refer the reader to Perry again.<sup>1</sup> It is worth noticing here that Abol Ḥasan Ghaffāri stopped writing for a while, when he was in his native town, Kāshān, as he himself indicates. After the death of his father, he was summoned to Kāshān to attend to his family affairs; thus he was unable to continue his task. It was only when Mirzā Moḥammad <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Khān Shirāzi (Ḥāji Ebrāhim's brother) came to the town in the company of Moḥammad Khān, the Governor of Qum and Kāshān, that the author was encouraged and urged to finish his composition.<sup>2</sup> It is, however, curious that there would appear to be no mention of Moḥammad <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Khān being in Kāshān at any time. He was in Tehran, when he and his family were seized and blinded, or put to death.<sup>3</sup> There is no doubt that Moḥammad <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Khān Shirāzi is the person, under whose protection Golshan-e-Morād was completed. The author

1. Perry, J: Karim Khān Zand

2. G.M., p.250.

3. Ma'aser Soltānieh, p.74.



asserts that Mohammad <sup>c</sup>Ali Khān is a young man of great ability and is well informed of all the political events, and had even been an eyewitness to many of them.<sup>1</sup>

The author deserves praise for the intelligent remarks he makes on various subjects. For instance, he comments on the poor quality of the ammunition used by the Zand army against that used by the <sup>c</sup>Arab tribes resident in Khorasān, when the town of Yazd was besieged and the latter came to its aid. He also remarks on the change of attitude which the tribal warriors of Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān had adopted on the same occasion. He states that the tribes, who would never turn their back to the battlefield, were now acting contrary to their previous usage; like that of Gorgin Milād, they fled the battlefield.<sup>2</sup>

His style of composition is very similar to that of Nāmi, but less flattery is bestowed on his patron, <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān. Indeed, he is a true diplomat; he omits to mention the rebellion staged by Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān and goes as far as stating that the latter shed tears at the death of <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān, his half brother.<sup>3</sup> The author is evidently aware of the fact that, should he fall into the hands of the Qājārs, his fate would be a sad one; thus, he refrains from abusing Āqā Moḥammad Khān and, wherever that chief is mentioned, he bestows due respect upon him. The observations made by the author are mixed with irony; for instance, he mockingly observes that <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān was more thrilled at the arrival of his new bride, than at the victory of his son in Mazandarān against the Qājārs.<sup>4</sup> The work has not been published and there are a number of manuscripts in various libraries. The manuscript preserved in the Malek Library appears to be the original copy. The B.L. copy

1. G.M., p.459. Rieu Catalogue, Suppl ., p.45.

2. Ibid., p.418.

3. G.M., p.413.

4. Ibid., p.405.

was reproduced from it in 1887 for a foreign visitor, and presented to the Museum later.<sup>1</sup>

Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh: Ebn ʿAbdal-Karim ʿAli Rezā Shirāzi, 1215 AH/1800 A.D., ed. by E. Beer, Leiden, 1888.

A modern historian has confused Ebn ʿAbdal Karim ʿAli Reza with the author of the second part of Giti Goshāy ʿAbdal-Karim Ebn ʿAli Rezā, i.e. Hedayāti.<sup>2</sup> The confusion stems from two causes: first is the similarity of the names; indeed the only difference in the two is the order of Ebn, which could easily be a mistake on the part of the copyist, or a cover up adopted by the author for fear of the Qājārs. Secondly, the contents of the two books are so similar that one might assume that the works are written by one and the same person, or else, that one has copied the other.

At all events, there is no information available as to the life and profession of the author of Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh. In his introduction to the published edition, Beer suggests that he was a tribal city dweller; this may be deduced from the sympathy which he shows to the tribes, and from the fact that he tries to prove that the tribes were loyal to Lotf ʿAli Khān.<sup>3</sup> Whatever his origin may have been, the author is definitely a scribe, although his command of the Persian language does not imply that he was a learned Monshi. Yet he knows enough of the arts of Mirzās. His composition is clumsy and unattractive, but as Beer asserts, he tried to write in a simple manner and, in this respect, he is standing on the threshold of a new wave of modernism in Persian literary style.<sup>4</sup>

1. Rieu Catalogue, Suppl. p.45.

2. Hedayati, Hādi: Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh, Vol.I, p.46.

3. I.Z., Introduction, pp.1-24.

4. Ibid., pp.87,100.

In his work, Ebn<sup>C</sup> Abdal-Karim decidedly takes the side of the Qājārs and does not miss an opportunity to express his disapproval of the Zand family. There are, however, curious instances where he betrays his partiality for the cause of Lotf<sup>C</sup> Ali Khān, when he bitterly reprimands those who deserted the latter and accuses those, who captured him, of ingratitude.<sup>1</sup> Thus, one is apt to think that Ebn<sup>C</sup> Abdal-Karim shared the same admiration for Lotf<sup>C</sup> Ali Khān, as his worst enemies.

There is a mystery about the work that no modern historian has been able to solve. He does not mention a patron, nor does he give the source of his information, whereas it appears to be strangely accurate. Beer seems to be right in his assumption that the work was not composed for reward, nor was it because the author wanted to please a patron.<sup>2</sup> His motives, therefore, in writing the book with its obvious partiality to the house of the Qājārs remain unclear. Incidentally, Waring refers to a history written by the Mirzā to Moḥammad Khān, the son of Zaki Khān, as his source for the brief history, which he wrote, of the Zand reign.<sup>3</sup> It appears possible that he used Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh as his source, since there are many instances where the two works are identical.<sup>4</sup> If this assumption proves to be true, then the reason for the obscurity of the author might be clarified. That is to say, Moḥammad Khān Zand was one of the few Zand nobles, who fled and retired to India. He subsequently returned to Persia and staged a rebellion against Fath<sup>C</sup> Ali Shāh, but was defeated and fled again. This could clearly mean that the fear entertained by the author was because his old master was alive, and his associates were regarded with suspicion and apprehension by the Qājārs.

1. I.Z., p.100

2. Ibid., Introd., pp.1-24.

3. Waring, Edward Scott: A Tour to Sheeraz by the route of Kazesoon & Feerozahād (London, 1808), p.259.

4. Ibid., p.263.

The published edition of this work contains an introduction with notes and an index of geographical names, which add to the value of the history. This edition has been used in this thesis.

Mojmal al-Tavārikh:<sup>c</sup> Abol Ḥasan b. Moḥammad Amin Golestāneh, 1198-1199. Edited by Modarres Rażavi, Tehran, Ebn Sinā, 1344.

This work does not hold much importance for the period under study here. The author was a resident of Morshed Ābād in India, when Karim Khān established himself in power, and he gathered his information by letters he received from Persia, or else through personal interviews with the travellers arriving in India from his native country. Thus, he has made gross mistakes in his accounts of the political events; for instance, he relates that Ṣādeq Khān fled to Rasht and asked assistance from Hedāyat Khān, when his troops deserted him to join their families in Shiraz.<sup>1</sup> If it was not for the corrections that Kuhmarre'i added to the original work, Mojaml al-Tavārikh would be worthless for the period (1193-1209), which we are concerned with in our study.

At all events, the work has great importance for the study of the early Zand era and the power struggle between Karim Khān and his rivals. The author gives the most accurate account of the siege of Kermānshāh by Karim Khān, and its fall, as he was an eyewitness to the event. His uncle, Mirzā Moḥammad Taqi Golestāneh, was a zealous opponent of the Vakil; he, eventually, in his ambition for power lost his life at the hands of the Kurds.<sup>2</sup>

The author of the work was taken a hostage by the Zands, but managed to escape. He acted as a negotiator with the Vakil on

1. M.T., p.343.

2. Ibid., p.313.

behalf of his uncle, in order to conclude a peace treaty between the warring parties. He, however, forsook his native country after the death of his uncle. He first proceeded to the holy shrines in Ottoman<sup>c</sup> Eraq, where he discovered that his other uncle and his brother were living a comfortable life in India. He, therefore, left the Ottoman territories for India.<sup>1</sup> He arrived at Bengal in 1169 A.H./1755 with two of his younger brothers. He found his uncle, Mir Moḥammad Eshāq, in a poor state of health, and he died within six months.<sup>2</sup> The author stayed in India for the rest of his life. He was so incensed by the boastful and indifferent manners of the Indians, that he resolved to ignore them and isolate himself. His brother persuaded him to employ his time in composing a history of the events that he had experienced. The present book is the result of his endeavours.<sup>3</sup> There is a zail to the work, written by Zain-al-Ābedin Kuhmarre'i, who was the son of the governor of Kuhmarre'. The zail contains some first hand information which is not mentioned in other sources. For instance, the account of a meeting in the house of Ḥāji Ebrāhim, and attended by the notables of Fārs, held to discuss a formula agreeable to all present on the accession of Loṭf<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān. This has not been referred to by any other source, as it was convened in secret; but the author was present. The only other source is Fasa'i, whose grandfather was also present at the meeting, and he mentions it in his Fārsnāmeḥ.<sup>4</sup>

The Zail to Mojmal al-Tavārikh is brief and inadequate in its accounts, as it only deals with the events up to the year 1203<sup>5</sup>/1788, where the author stops his composition due to some unknown reason. For a detailed biography of both authors, the

1. M.T., p.3.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p.5.

4. Fasa'i, Ḥasan: Fārs Nāmeḥ, part 2, p.30.

5. Op. Cit., p.354.

reader is referred to Perry.<sup>1</sup>

The printed edition of the book contains a valuable introduction with notes and appendices, index of names, etc., which provides additional information to the reader. The editor also gives a detailed account on the political events subsequent to the fall of the Ṣafavids.

Rostam al Tavārikh: Moḥammad Hāshem Āsef, 1193-1247, edited by M. Moshiri, Tehran, Amir Kabir, 1348/1970.

This work has not been given the credit it deserves, as it is the only source which provides us with socio-economic data on late 18th Century Iran. After its publication, it gradually became known to scholars and even distinguished modern scholars, such as Lambton, give much credence to it,<sup>2</sup> although, in respect to historical accuracy, it is not by any means impressive. Facts are mixed with fantasies and one does not know what to believe. The fanciful anecdotes, however, can be treated as popular tales, which the ordinary people revelled in, as they were mostly about the ruling classes. It appears that the author's motive in writing this composition was to present it to the reigning monarch, Fath<sup>c</sup> Ali Shāh, and make some money.<sup>3</sup> This financial remuneration was never obtained; the author finished his work in 1247 and presented it to the heir apparent, <sup>c</sup>Abbās Mirzā, and his brothers.<sup>4</sup> But there is no mention of a monetary award.

1. Perry, op. cit., p.305.

2. Lambton, in her recent article: "The tribal resurgence and the decline of bureaucracy in 18th century Persia", bases her arguments wholly, if not totally, on Rostam's account. Neff, T. and Owen, R., Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History, London, 1977, pp.108-129.

3. R.I., p.63-6.

4. Ibid., pp.52-53.

The author does not give any information about his personal life and profession. According to his own account, he appears to be a Jack of all trades. He claims a respectable descent for himself, and relates that he was a school prefect and treated his unfortunate schoolmates with much brutality. He also mentions that he attended the same school as the sons of the Zand nobles and other dignitaries, which indicates that he came from an affluent family. He, however, asserts that he had connection with the lutis as well.<sup>1</sup>

The author, who assumes the title of Rostam al Ḥokama and claims that he was honoured by the title of Ṣamṣam al-Dolleh by Fath<sup>c</sup> Ali Shāh, attempts to write poetry, but the quality of his poems is poor and cannot be given merit. His literary style is vulgar and unsophisticated, but he claims that he aimed at simplicity, so that everyone may understand.<sup>2</sup> It can, however, be attributed to his lack of knowledge of literature.

As mentioned before, Rostam al-Tavārikh is the only source which contains information on the life and traditions of the general public. The author gives us the prices of foodstuffs and other articles of necessity, which, first of all, shows the standard of living at that period of time, and the products of the country. It also gives the names of the public women in Shiraz, the names of the famous Lutis, Pahlavāns. Thus, much of the information, relevant to the socio-economic conditions in this thesis, is based on Rostam al-Tavārikh.

Ruznāmeḥ-e-Mirzā Moḥammad Kalāntar: 1200/1785. Edited by A. Eqbāl, Tehran, Yadgār, 1325/1907.

Mirzā Moḥammad, like most of his contemporary amateur historians, composed his works as a pastime, or, rather, to forget

1. R.T., p.56.

2. Ibid., p.48.

his unhappy time spent in the camp of the Qājār chief, Āqā Moḥammad Khān.<sup>1</sup> He produces an account mostly related to the city of Shiraz after the fall of the Ṣafavids. He gives a general picture of the anarchy and the oppression, which the kingdom suffered before and during the reign of Nāder Shāh.<sup>2</sup> His account is based on his personal experience and it may be generally trusted as the authentic version of the events.

His family was one of the most renowned and respectable families of Shiraz. His uncle became the Kalānter and Ṣāḥeb Ekhtiār of the province of Fārs, as well as the Motevali of the shrine of Shāh Cherāq in the reign of Nāder Shāh.<sup>3</sup> His ancestors were all distinguished men of learning and rank. That is why he was so arrogant and resented most of his superiors, such as the Vazirs. He became the Kalāntar of Fārs when Karim Khān established himself in Shiraz, and remained so for the whole reign of the Vakil. He was constantly at odds with the three ministers who served the Zand rulers successively. All these men, Mirzā Ja<sup>C</sup>far, Mirzā Rabi<sup>C</sup> and Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein, were originally from Erāq-e<sup>C</sup>Ajam, and Mirzā Moḥammad, being a local zealot, criticised and abused them with fury. His numerous quarrels with the functionaries of lower rank, also shows that he did not get along with many people.<sup>4</sup> He had a bitter tongue and a more bitter pen, and invariably criticised everyone. He, however, admits that the Vakil had many virtues, with a few shortcomings. His judgements on people were purely personal and motivated by self-interest. He was proved wrong in his choice between the Qājārs and the Zand ruler, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, whom he calls a jackass. He bitterly regrets joining the camp of Āqā Moḥammad Khān; he tried very hard to gain his freedom to return to Shiraz,<sup>5</sup> but to no avail. He died in

1. R.M.M., p.(1).

2. Ibid., pp.5-29.

3. Ibid., p.23.

4. Ibid., pp.(1)-100.

5. Ibid., p.93.



Tehran alone and unhappy.

His style of writing is very simple yet confusing, as he uses colloquial expressions and slang, particularly common to the province of Fārs; he is also brief in his accounts. His work was published as a special edition to the Journal, Yadgār. The editor, ʿAbbās Eqbāl, has added valuable explanatory notes and indices. In the introduction, there are notes to clarify the obscure expressions.

Zendegāni-e-Hāzin: Moḥammad ʿAli Ḥāzin Lāhiji, 1155/1742, tr. by F.C. Belfour, London, 1830.

Hāzin was a poet, scholar and a great traveller.<sup>1</sup> He visited many of the provinces and towns after the ravages of the Afghān invasion. He gives a description of the life and miseries that the general populace experienced. Although he only covers the period immediately after the fall of the Ṣafavids, his account of the character and habit of the city dwellers, their courage and zeal in defending their honour and homes, is unique. His work is very important for the study of Afghan Persia. Ḥāzin was born into a devout family in 1103/1692, in the city of Esfāhān.<sup>2</sup> His family originated in Gilān, where they had a family inheritance. Hāzin's father repaired to Esfāhān and lived there until his death. Shaikh<sup>c</sup> Ali was educated with utmost care and under the most prominent contemporary scholars. He attained eminence in all departments of sciences as well as arts. He commenced his autobiography in the year 1155/1742, and wrote his memoirs until he left Persia for India, where he led the dullest life in the dullest place.<sup>3</sup> We have no information as to the latter part of his life; he died at the advanced age of 88, in the year 1193/1779.

1. Z.H., p.v.

2. Ibid., English edition, p.v.

3. Ibid., p.ix.

His work is a mixture of biography, geography and history. In his travels he provides the reader with a description of a place, its prominent men of learning and rank, together with the history of it. He gives an account of the events after he left Persia, but only as a residue to his memoirs. Apparently he harboured great animosity towards Nāder Shāh, and that was partly the reason why he fled from his native country. Nāder Shāh, however, went to India on his military expedition. The author changed his abode from Lāhore, where his brother lived, just before Nāder arrived.

Ḥazin was an industrious man; he wrote many treatises and discourses. He also wrote poetry, which ranked him among the best poets of his time. He appears to have been widely known in Persia, as wherever he travelled, the populace approached him and entreated him to stay. He associated with people of higher status, the same as he did with ordinary people. He had personal acquaintance with Shāh Tahmāsb, the last real king of the Safavid house; this may well be the cause of his hatred for Nāder.

His work has been translated into English with much elegance of style; Belfour translated the poetry of Ḥazin, with that of other poets quoted in Ḥazin's work, with great beauty and sweetness of expression.<sup>1</sup> The English edition is completed with explanatory notes on the content of the work.

**Ma'āser-e-Soltāniyeh:** <sup>c</sup>Abdol Razzāq b. Najaf Qoli Donboli, Maftun. Tehran, Ebn Sinā, 1351.

This work is the first Qājār history, written by the court historian of that dynasty. Maftun was the son of the chief of the Donboli tribe. He was kept in Shirāz as a hostage during the reign of Karim Khān.<sup>2</sup> After the fall of the Zands, he entered

1. Z.H., p.(1)-308.

2. TaTa, Vol.I, p.113.

the service of the Qājārs and became the private secretary to the heir apparent, ʿAbbās Mirzā, until he died at Tabriz in 1242<sup>1</sup>/1826. While in Shirāz, he spent his time in the pursuit of learning and scholarship. He gained knowledge of all aspects of arts and sciences. He was an industrious writer, as well as a prominent poet, and left many works behind in prose and poetry.

He commences his history of the Qājārs with the account of the invasion of the Afghans and the contribution of Fath ʿAli Khān Qājār in repelling their army. He further relates the life and achievements of Moḥammad Ḥasan Khān, the son of Fath ʿAli Khān. He brings his work up to the reign of Fath ʿAli Shāh. He finished his composition one year before he died in 1241<sup>2</sup>/1825. Although he spent much of his youth in the court of the Zands, and that experience must have enabled him to gather first-hand information about that dynasty, he does not contribute any original account of the power struggle between the Zands and the Qājārs. He does, however, relate interesting anecdotes about the Vakil in his other works, such as Tajrobat al-Ahrār va Tasliyat al-Abrār, which contains valuable information on the private life of Karim Khān. The fact that he does not elaborate on the Zand history in his official assignment, was not due to his hostility towards the Zands; indeed he asserts that he found the Vakil a sea of generosity.<sup>3</sup> It may be attributed to the fact that he was in the service of the Qājārs and did not wish to antagonise them.

Ma'āser-e-Soltāniyeh was first published in 1241/1825, that is, in the same year as its completion. A copy of it was presented to Sir Harford Jones by Fath ʿAli Shāh, and the former translated it into English and published it in 1815.<sup>4</sup> The translation

1. Majma' al-Fasahā, Vol.6, p.1007/Tārikh-Khoy, p.538.

2. Tazkerreh Delgoshā.

3. Tasliyat al-Ahrār va Tajorabat al-Abrār, Vol.I, p.126.

4. D.K., p.(1) Notice to the reader.

of the work is known as The Dynasty of the Kajars. The recent lithograph edition of the work, published in 1351 has been used in this thesis. It is written in a relatively simple style, but it is still verbose and florid.

Ahsan al-Tavārikh or Tārikh-e-Mohammadi, by Moḥammad Taqi Sāru'i, 1201-1211. Ms. Malek Library, no.3957.

This work is commonly known by its second name. The author was ordered by Āqā Moḥammad Khān to write a history of his family. Sāru'i commenced his composition in 1201 (it is also recorded as 1205<sup>1</sup>) and completed it in 1211, the same year as Āqā Moḥammad Khān was murdered. There are several copies of this work in Persia and abroad. The copy in the Malek Library is in beautiful Nasta<sup>c</sup>liq with a leather cover. It has 183 folios of a large size. It belonged to the private library of Prince Bahā' al-Douleh and was acquired for the Malek Library in 1272/1855, which indicates that it must have been written prior to that time. This copy was used in this thesis, but the copy preserved in the British Library has also been consulted. The content of the work is very similar to all the Qājār histories. The main goal of the author is to prove the right of the Qājārs to the throne of Persia, which was usurped by the Afshārs and the Zands. It is the first source which actually abuses the family of the Zands in the most outrageous terms. The style of composition is elaborate and full of flattery and unnecessary metaphors. The reader is lost in its complex verbosity. For instance, the author writes eleven pages in praise of his patron, using the most unattractive similes in his description.

Zinat al-Tavārikh: Mirzā Moḥammad Raḏi Tabrizi, 1218-1226. British Library Ms . Add.23.514.23.515 & 23.528.

This source is a general history of the East, especially Persia.

1. Tārikh-e-Mohammadi, Ms. no.3957, Malek Library. Tehran.

The author, Mirzā Rażi, the son of Moḥammad Shafi<sup>c</sup> Tabrizi, held the office of Mostoufi al-mamālek of Āzarbāyjān and was a favourite of Fath<sup>c</sup> Ali Shāh. In 1218/1803, he was ordered by his master to compile a general history, which would cover the reign of Fath<sup>c</sup> Ali Shāh. He was assisted in his massive work by several other scholars, such as <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Karim <sup>c</sup>Ali Reżā Shahāvāri, the author of the second Zail to Giti Goshay. Rieu believes that he was aided by Mirzā Ebrāhim Eshtehārdi too.<sup>1</sup> Tārikh-Khoy asserts that Maftun Donboli was another person who compiled a part of that enormous work.<sup>2</sup> Apparently the section on the history of the prophets was written by Mirzā Rażi, while the history of the kings was committed to <sup>c</sup>Abd al-Karim, who finished it in the space of one year.<sup>3</sup> The author, Mirzā Rażi, was a poet and his Takhalos was Bandeḥ (slave); he wrote in an excellent hand and was a learned man in all departments of knowledge.<sup>4</sup> Thus, he had acquired distinction as an administrator, as well as a literary man.

This work was used by Sir John Malcolm, as he makes numerous references to it. It is divided into two major divisions, named Pirāyeh, and is further subdivided into two Gunehs. The part relevant to the history of the Qājārs begins with the life and adventures of Fath<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān Qājār; then it comes down to his successors. The reign of Fath<sup>c</sup> Ali Shāh is given in the B.L.Msc. in chronological order, that is, year by year. The last event recorded is the advance of the Turkish Army into the Persian territories and its subsequent retreat in the year 1221/1806<sup>5</sup>. The reign of Karim Khan and his successors is dealt with in a summary form<sup>6</sup> There are many copies of this work in Persia

1. Rieu, Suppl. Catalogue of the Persian Manuscripts in the B.L., p.27

2. Āqāsi, M. Tārikh-Khoy, Tabriz. Dāneshkadeh Adabyāt, 1350., p.538.

3. Op. cit., Vol.I, p.135.

4. Shushtari, Mir<sup>c</sup> Abd al-Laṭif. Tohfāt-al-<sup>c</sup>Ālam Ms .

5. Rieu Catalogue, Vol.II, p.136.

6. Zinat al-Tavarikh Ms ., Tehran, n.p.

and abroad.

## II. Secondary Sources:

These are mainly historical works written in the later part of the 13th Century and by the order of the Qājārs. These works can be divided into two major categories:

1. the general histories.
2. Qājār histories, which can be further subdivided by local and national.

These sources contain little original information, as all of them are copied from the primary sources of the Zand era. Occasionally one finds fresh information in some of them; thus, they might be regarded as useful and complementary to the period under discussion.

Rożat al-Safa: Reżā Qoli Khān Hedāyat, Tehran, 1270.

This is a general history from the descent of Adam to earth and the account of the prophets and saints down to the reign of Nāṣṣer al-Din Shāh Qājār. The work was originally written by Mohammad Khāvand Shah of Balkh, known as Mir Khwānd, who executed the task of a general history by the order of the minister to the Timurids, Amir <sup>C</sup>Ali Shir Nava'i. He, however, did not finish his work and died in 903, where he left his history. His son, Khwānd Mir, added one more volume to the existing six volumes and brought it down to his own time, which was the reign of the Timurid<sup>1</sup> successors.

Mirzā Reżā Qoli Khān Hedāyat, a distinguished scholar, after his return from his mission to Khāras̄m, was appointed the dean of Dār-al-Funoun school. He was summoned by Nāṣṣer al-Din Shāh to his palace once, when the king communicated his

1. R.S., Vols.6-7, n.p.

wish to commission the scholar with the task of completing that history up to his own reign. The Shāh stated that he had been acquainted with Rożat al-Safā and that he had found three faults in it. First, it was a large composition and it was difficult for anyone to copy it; thus, it would not be as widely read as it ought to be. Secondly, the work had stopped in the tenth century and, although many histories had been written on the events subsequent to the rule of Timurids, there was no comprehensive source which would cover the span of 370 years which had elapsed. Thirdly, there was no index of the names and dates of the kings whose history was included in this work. It was extremely difficult for the reader to trace any of them. Our scholar was charged with the completion, publication and addition of indices to it.<sup>1</sup> Reżā Qoḷi Khān was not quite sure whether he would be able to do what he had been commanded to do. He reasoned that Mir Khwānd had taken thirty years to compose his work and that had been under the auspices of the distinguished minister, Amir<sup>C</sup> Ali Shir, whose patronage and bounty had enabled the author to execute his undertaking in comfort and repose. Still, he had died at the age of sixty, presumably because of his enormous effort. Thus, he was still contemplating the idea of his great endeavour, when he was summoned by the Qājār Shāh's minister, Mirzā Āqā Khān Nouri, who entreated him not to hesitate to obey the command of his master, and he would be supported and provided with necessary funds for his upkeep.

Reżā Qoḷi Khān set about gathering information for his work and added three more volumes to the original history. He stopped his composition in the year 1274/1857, and presented it to the reigning monarch, who wished it to be published.<sup>2</sup> This edition is a lithograph of the original manuscript, written in a beautiful hand with much elegance and neatness. The origin-

1. R.S., Introduction, n.p.

2. Ibid.

al volumes of the work were amended and a table of the names and dates of the monarchs was added to the first volume.

Reżā Qūli Khān begins his contribution with the establishment of the Ṣafavids. His next volume contains the fall of that dynasty and the subsequent events. The history of the Afshārids, Zands and the first monarchs of the Qājār dynasty, is related in this volume. The last volume contains the reign of Moḥammad Shāh and Nāser al-Din Shāh. His style is florid and full of flattery. Although it is a secondary source for the Zand history, it contains some fresh material on that era. For instance, the interview between Ḥāji Ebrāhim and Āqā Moḥammad Khān is unique and original in its content.<sup>1</sup> It cannot, however, be verified as to its authenticity.

**Nāsekh al-Tavārikh**: by Moḥammad Taqi Sepehr, Tehran, 1273.

This monumental work was written by the court historian of Nāser al-Din Shāh. Sepehr compiled his work single-handed and in fourteen volumes. It begins with the mythological past and goes from the fall of Adam to the Qorānic stories and down to the reign of his patron. His work is the first of its kind, in that it contains information on the foreign monarchs, religious leaders, scientists and prominent artists of the world. The author, fearful that his death might prevent him from completing his history, tries to make it as concise and brief as possible. It has been published many times and, recently, the two volumes on the Qājār dynasty have been reprinted as the history of the Qājārs.<sup>2</sup>

The author claims that he witnessed the advent of the Qājār house and asserts that he has seen four of its monarchs. Thus, he makes a claim to having been an eyewitness to many of the historical events.

1. Rieu, *op. cit.*, Vol.9, n.p.

2. Nāsekh al-Tavārikh, Qājārieh, Tehran,<sup>c</sup> Elmieh, 1354.



Local & National Histories:

Fārsnāmeḥ-e-Nāseri: by Moḥammad Ḥasan Fasā'i, Tehran, Sanā'i, 1340.

Mirzā Ḥasan was born into a distinguished family in 1237/1821. His uncle, Mirzā Jāni, was a dignitary of the Zand era. He sided, however, with the Qājārs and apparently was the master-mind behind the plot against Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān.<sup>1</sup> Mirzā Ḥasan grew up in Shirāz and spent his life in pursuit of learning and scholarship. He travelled to various places in order to further his knowledge. He was in charge of the family religious foundations and apparently lived by the revenues he obtained from his Ouqāf.<sup>2</sup> The death of a relation deprived him of part of that revenue; thus, he was involved in endless disputes with the usurpers of his rights. He managed, however, to recover his property not long before he died.

Fārsnāmeḥ consists of two parts: the historical section, which forms the major part of the work; and the second part, which is the geographical description of the province of Fārs. He had a splendid knowledge of geography; he endeavoured to execute two maps of that province, which he presented to Zell al-Soltān, the son of the reigning monarch, Nāser al-Din Shāh, and the governor of Fārs.<sup>3</sup> During the governorship of Farḥād Mirzā Mo<sup>C</sup>tamed al-Douleh, Fasā'i produced another map of the province of Fārs and presented it to the king with a petition about his lost property on the margin of the map. The petition was granted and Farḥād Mirzā did everything in his power to restore Mirzā Ḥasan's losses. It was by the order of Farḥād Mirzā that Fasā'i began his work.<sup>4</sup> His work was not completed

1. G.G., p.374.

2. F.N., Introduction, p.(1).

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

until the year 1305/1887. Although the author wished to bring the historical events down to 1311/1893, for some unknown reason, he stopped it at 1300/1882. This may well have been due to the fact that, by the time he finished the first volume, he was seventy years of age and blind. It is not known when he died, but he was still alive when his work was published for the first time in 1314<sup>1</sup>/1896.

The author had access to the wealth of official documents, as he had close connections with the dignitaries of the province and also had access to the works written prior to his time. The role played by his family in the last phases of the Zand rule, makes this work of some value to us, although he has very little original information, and in fact copies Ruznāmeḥ almost word for word on the history of the Zands.<sup>2</sup>

Events are given in yearly order, thus, they are brief and insufficient, as the work covers a large span of history. The scope of Fārsnāmeḥ is not by any means local and it tends to fit the province of Fārs into the general picture of the Empire under the Qājār rule. This work is a mixture of history, geography and biography and, in that sense, is typical of its kind. Hence, it is a good specimen of the knowledge and learning held by a 19th Century Persian scholar.

Fārsnāmeḥ was translated into English in part by Busse, and published in 1972. H. Busse only covers the historical section on the Qājārs, under the title: History of Persia Under Qājār Rule (Columbia University Press, New York).

Tāriḫ-e-Kermān: Ahmad <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān Vaziri Kermāni, 1291; ed. E. Bāstāni Pārizi, Tehran, Ketābhā-ye Irān, 1340/1961.

This work is one of the very few histories written on the

1. F.N., part 2, p.34.

2. Ibid., pp.207-227.

province of Kermān. The author was the grandson of the famous 18th Century merchant, Āqā <sup>C</sup>Ali, who played a major role in the accession of the Qājārs and the fall of the Zands. He was one of the major instigators of the resistance, which the city of Kermān showed to Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, in both attempts made by the latter to seize it. Āqā <sup>C</sup>Ali, however, fled to the camp of the Qājārs, when the city fell into the hands of the Zands.<sup>1</sup>

There is no information available, as to the author's date of birth. He was, however, educated in Kermān and showed no interest in the affairs of state. Thus, he dedicated his life to scholarship and agricultural activity.<sup>2</sup> He travelled to the capital Tehran in 1294/1877 for medical treatment. He died there a few months later. His pension was allocated to his son, who finished his work.

Aḥmad <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān began his work in 1291/1874 and managed to cover the historical events up to the year 1209, which coincides with the murder of Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān and the official accession of Āqā Moḥammad Khān to the throne.<sup>3</sup> He was still engaged in his composition in 1293/1876, but poor health and his trip prevented him from completing his work.<sup>4</sup>

His son, Āqā Khān managed to finish the work and presented it to the governor of Kermān, <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Hosein Mirzā Sālār-e-Lashgar. The work was thus named Tārikh-e-Sālāriyeh. Āqā Khān continued the task of his father and brought the events down to the rule of his patron, and even furthered it to the year 1317/1899.<sup>5</sup>

1. I.K., p.359.

2. Ibid., Introduction, p.2.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p.3.

5. Ibid.

Although Ahmad <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān held no official position, it appears that he had access to a large private library, which had manuscripts of the rarest books. He asserts that he had consulted upwards of a hundred books to establish some of his historical facts. The work is original in its section on the Zands and appears to be unique in many ways. For instance, on the occasion of Šādeq Khān's flight to Kermān.<sup>1</sup> Ahmad <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān also gives a unique account of the discord and division between the dignitaries of Kermān, when the city was besieged by Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān. It, thus, throws light on the darkest phases of the Zand rule.

The work was published in 1340/1961 for the first time, with an introduction and much additional information by the modern Kermāni scholar, Bāstāni Pārizi. The editor has added a valuable section on the sources for the study of the history of Kermān. Indices, photographs and an English introduction have added to the value of the book.

Tāriḫ-e-Molk Ārā: Mirzā Reżā Qoli, Malek Library no.4161 (1272)

This chronicle was written by a scholar in the service of the Qājār prince, Morteżā<sup>2</sup> Qoli Mirzā Molk Ārā. There is no information as to the life and career of the author. He was born in Māzandarān and apparently was murdered there, too. His body was recovered in a well.<sup>3</sup> He studied in Esfāhān and became the private secretary to the Qājār prince, his patron, at whose request he composed his work. The author begins his work with the contest between the Afshārs and the Qājārs. Although he is naturally partial to the cause of the Qājārs, his work is of importance as regards Zand history.

1. I.K., p.334.

2. His name is also given as Mohammad Qoli Mirzā.

3. Notes on the first page of the Manuscript in the Malek Library.

The manuscript in existence in the Malek Library is in a beautiful Nasta<sup>c</sup>liq hand with a leather cover. It entered a private collection in the year 1272/1855 A.D., which indicates that it must have been written prior to that date. The literary style is very much the same as other 19th Century history books.

### European and Other Sources:

These may be divided into two major groups: history, travel accounts and memoirs; and records and documents. The history books are only a few, the most important being the History of Persia.

History of Persia: John Malcolm, London, 1815.

John Malcolm was born in Scotland in 1769. He entered the E.I.C. service at an early age and climbed the ladder in military service quickly. He travelled to Iran three times and, on each occasion, stayed for a long period of time. His office as an envoy to the court of Persia and his military rank, played a major role in his acquiring influence and favour among one faction of the courtiers of the Qājār king, Fath<sup>c</sup>Ali Shāh.<sup>1</sup> His first mission was performed in 1800, just a few years after the fall of the Zands. On his second mission in 1808, he was strongly challenged by his counterpart, Sir Harford Jones, who had been sent as an envoy on the part of the English King, George (IV).<sup>2</sup> The arrival of Malcolm's mission caused great confusion and apprehension in the Persian court, since the Governor-General of Bengal, Lord Minto, had sent Malcolm on a hostile errand and had threatened to seize the island of Khārk.<sup>3</sup> It was also reported that a prince of the Zand family was in

1. Malcolm, J., Sketches of Persia, Vol.II, p.152; Kaye, J.W., Correspondence of Major General Sir John Malcolm, Vol.I, pp.133-4.

2. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.I, pp.127-9.

3. I.O.R. Miscellaneous Papers, Box 1A.1809. Letters from James Morries to India.

his suite and this only added to the frenzy. Thus, the governor of Shirāz turned out of the city all the Lak and Lor tribes; the act met with strong protest on the part of Sir Harford Jones.<sup>1</sup> The incident is significant in that it indicates that the shadow of the Zands was still looming over the kingdom, or at least the province of Fārs.

Malcolm gathered his information while he was on his missions, although he claims that:

"When I first had the opportunity of collecting the material which forms the basis of my present work, I neither enjoyed nor had any prospect of enjoying the necessary leisure for putting them into a form to meet the public eye."<sup>2</sup>

He was drawing the full salary of an envoy, with an army of secretaries and aids to assist him in putting his work together, plus a house for his residence. The Governor-General, Lord Minto, deemed the composition of a history of Persia useful and essential, since there was so little information available on the Persian Empire.<sup>3</sup> Malcolm, as he himself acknowledges in his introduction, had the good fortune of having a number of officers in his suite, who, out of zeal in their duties and personal regard for the author, provided him with first-hand information on the various provinces of Persia.<sup>4</sup> He had also formed a close friendship with the dignitaries in the court of the Qājārs and they in turn assisted him in his task.<sup>5</sup>

His work is in two volumes and divided into two sections. The first part covers the ancient history of Persia and its legend-

1. O.R. Box 1A.1809. Letter from James Morrier to Lord Minto.

2. Kaye, Vol. II, pp. 59-60.

3. Ibid., p. 60.

4. H.P. Introduction, Vol. I, p. xiv.

5. H.P., Vol. I, p. xiii.

ary past. In that part, he has entirely relied on the Eastern sources; his aim was to write a history the way the Eastern people saw it. Furthermore, he reasons that the European and Greek sources are at the disposal of those interested in the subject. This section is of no importance to our study, since there are many sources written on the ancient history of Persia, so that Malcolm's work has lost much of its value. The second part on the modern age, and especially the 18th and 19th Centuries, has great importance for our study. It starts with the events preceding the fall of the Şafavids and comes down to the reign of Fath<sup>h</sup> <sup>C</sup>Ali Shāh Qājār. Much of the second volume is taken up with observations, which he makes on the life and habits of the inhabitants of the Persian empire, as well as the monarch and his ministers. This part is of primary importance to our work. It provides much valuable and original material. On the period under study, he has very little original information. Indeed, he has copied a manuscript, which, according to Rieu, was the Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh of Ebn <sup>C</sup>Abdal-Karim.<sup>1</sup> His account, as expected, is biased against the Zands and reflects, as true, the version given by the opponents of that house. However, he occasionally makes his own personal remarks on the political events. As the book was published in 1815, when Malcolm had returned to England, his work can be considered as a first-hand source for the period under discussion.

One major drawback in Malcolm, is his hasty and rash judgements on the character of individuals and people in general. He admits in his sketches of Persia, that he likes to make up his mind quickly about people.<sup>2</sup> This leads him to judge a whole nation with sweeping generalizaion. He accuses the Persian people of forgetting the shortcomings that to his mind Lotf

1. Rieu, Catalogue, Vol.I, p.198.

2. Sketches of Persia, London, 1827, Vol.I 167 .

<sup>c</sup>Ali Khan had,<sup>1</sup> but he does exactly the same himself when it comes to people he favours. He bestows inordinate praise on Hāji Ebrāhim,<sup>2</sup> who, by all other accounts, was an ambitious, dishonest and ungrateful man. His judgement on Hāji Ebrāhim is strongly rejected by his countryman, Sir Harford Jones.<sup>3</sup> Malcolm calls the Persian people dishonest and false, but there are evidences of his own false and dishonest conduct, which throws light on his character<sup>4</sup> and discredits his rash judgements.

Dynasty of the kajars: Ma'āser Soltānieh, translated by Sir Harford Jones, with an introduction, London, 1833.

The reason why this work is mentioned in this section, although it is a Persian source, is that Sir Harford Jones added

1. H.P., Vol.II, p.201.

2. Ibid., p.275.

3. Mission to Persia, Vol.I, p.413.

4. There is a report sent from Sir Harford Jones to Mr. Adair, the Ambassador to the Ottoman court, which contains an interview between Sir Harford Jones and <sup>c</sup> Abbas Mirzā, the heir apparent to the throne of Persia. Mr. Morrier was present as Sir Harford's secretary. This would suffice to prove the point:

"His royal highness also desired Mr. Morrier to tell Mr. Adair, what general Malcolm had been doing. He said what sort of conduct is this? At the desire of the king's, I sent one of my own people for the express purpose of bringing up the money, which the envoy gave an order for, which I so much wanted; to enable me to carry on the war against our enemies. Instead of money, what is this tobacco and sugar that General Malcolm is sending me up? Am I to load my guns with tobacco and set fire to it, as if it were gunpowder; am I to fight the Russians by smoking kallioons? Why, if I were to issue an order to all my people to do nothing else than smoke, there is enough tobacco to last them all for five years, and if I were to get together all the confectioners of Espahan to make sweetmeats of this sugar, there would be enough to feast us all for the same length of time. What is all this? What does General Malcolm mean with his tobacco and sugar? All this he said in the pleasantest tone possible, but evidently in the greatest vexation in the disappointment he had suffered, as if he felt for the mortification which the subject must give to Sir Harford Jones. Sir Harford Jones said 'indeed I am much ashamed'. To this the Prince said if I was not persuaded of your attachment for me & that nothing of this could be attributed to you, I should include you in the blame, but I know it is no fault of yours."



an interesting introduction to the work, which is a primary source for our study. Ma'āser Soltānieh was written by<sup>C</sup>Abdal-Razzāq Donboli Maftun, and presented to Sir Harford Jones on his departure from Persia by Fath<sup>C</sup>Ali Shāh.<sup>1</sup> The original work is the official history of the Qājārs. It was later translated into English and published in England. The introduction, which the translator entitles "preliminary matters", contains the most valuable account on the last phases of the Zand and Qājār struggle. Its importance lies in the fact that Harford Jones played a part in the events and witnessed many of them.

Sir Harford Jones had travelled twice to Persia during the reign of the Zands. His first trip in 1787 was during the rule of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān; the second time, in 1791, he was invited to the court of Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān by his minister, Mirzā Moḥammad Hos-ein.<sup>2</sup> He became the envoy to the court of the Qājārs later. His acquaintance with the Zands was occasioned, while he was the joint factor of the E.I.C. in Basra. On both his trips to the Zand court, he was treated with much kindness and hospitality. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān gave him two audiences, in which Francklin was present and acted as his interpreter.<sup>3</sup> Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān received him in the most amiable atmosphere and regarded him as a friend until the end of his days. Thus, he had access to the last king of the Zand house and conversed with him freely. His honesty and genuine conduct gained the favour of Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, who placed so much trust in him, as to charge him with sale of his precious jewels.<sup>4</sup> He also asked for his advice and assistance in time of crisis. Harford Jones, in his turn, is infatuated by Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān. His manly beauty, invincible spirit and gallant disposition, had fascinated the Englishman. He speaks of him as a hero, a man whose composure and courage

1. D.K., p.(1)

2. Ibid., p.ix.

3. O.M.T. 77.

4. D.K., p.cxxv.

did not allow him to lament or complain.<sup>1</sup> He has great regard and respect for Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān's friendship and trust. His affection for Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān thus leads him to ignore his shortcomings which are affirmed by his close associates and friends.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, his hatred for Ḥāji Ebrāhim, induces Harford Jones to relate with a degree of pleasure the dire fate, which befell Ḥāji Ebrāhim and his family.<sup>3</sup> Thus, he clearly is not devoid of partiality in his writing.

Although brief in his account, Jones covers the whole span of Persian history in his introduction. He begins with the legendary history in a summary form, coming down to the reign of the Ṣafavids. He gives more detail on that epoch, but his personal experiences at the time of the Zand and Qājār power struggle is the most elaborate. He asserts that he lost his notes on the private interview with Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān in his last audience, and he relies completely on his memory when he attempts to write it down later.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, his memory appears to be very sound.

It would perhaps be useful here to give a brief account of Sir Harford Jones's life. He was born in Wales in 1764 and entered the service of the E.I.C. when he was very young. He served in the Basra establishment for many years until he was promoted to the rank of joint factor there. He resided for some years in India, where he learnt Persian, and he was able to improve his knowledge of the language later in Basra.<sup>5</sup> On his second trip to Persia, he was able to converse with Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān without the aid of an intermediary. As he asserts, he made the acquaintance of all classes of the Persian people,

1. D.K., p.clxxxv.

2. Ibid., p.cxlv.

3. Ibid., p.cxcī.

4. Ibid., p.clxv.

5. Mission to Persia, Vol.I, p.32.

from princes, ministers, merchants, down to agriculturalists.<sup>1</sup> His mission as an envoy to the Qājār court lasted about four years from 1807 to 1811. He was instrumental in the conclusion of the treaty between Persia and Britain, where he served his country with zeal. He indicates in a private letter:

"I prevented Persia from signing an armistice pact with Russia at a time when the effect of it would be detrimental to the Porte, our ally. I prevented Persia availing herself of the offers made to her both by Russia and the government at Bagdad to aggrandize her empire at the expence of Turkey & I negotiated the treaty of subsidy between England and Persia at £8000 per annum less than it was thought afterwards necessary to give."<sup>2</sup>

Although his actions were motivated by his love for his country and her interests, nevertheless he stood by his friend Lotf<sup>C</sup> Ali Khān and merits due praise for this.

His introduction to Ma'āser Soltānieh has been translated into Persian in recent years by John Gurney and Homā Nāteq, with additional notes and explanations.<sup>3</sup> The translation is at times uncongenial. Sir Harford Jones's translation of Ma'āser Soltānieh is excellent, in that the reader finds it fluent and less verbose than the original.

#### Memoires and Travel Books:

Observations made on a tour from Bengal to Persia in the year 1786-1787: William Francklin. London, 1789.

This work is the result of an eight month stay in Persia. In 1786, Francklin obtained a furlough from the E.I.C. establish-

1. D.K., p.ix.

2. B.L. Add.41.768 Letters and Papers of Sir Harford Jones 1799-1820.

3. Ākharin-Rozhāye Lotf<sup>C</sup> Ali Khān Zand, Tehran, Amīr-Kābir, 1353.

ment in Bengal, in order to improve his knowledge of the Persian language, as well as to gain information about the history and culture of the Persian nation.<sup>1</sup> He boarded a ship bound for the Persian Gulf on the 27th February, 1786, and arrived in Shiraz on the 29th March of that year.<sup>2</sup> His stay, although brief, was a fruitful one. He stayed with the natives and adopted all their manners; by this means he enjoyed his trip and learnt a lot about the country. He, therefore, recommends to all travellers to adopt the same approach.<sup>3</sup> His work is unique, in that he gives a detailed account of the customs and traditions of the country; for example, we have no account in existence of the mourning rituals during the month of Muharram in any of the contemporary sources. Nor is there a description anywhere else of the ceremony performed at the Qorbān festival (Cid). During his stay, Francklin, with much diligence and precision, observed the minutest aspects of life in Persia and, more specifically, in Shiraz. He also adds to his valuable observations a brief historical account of the period up to his departure from Persia.<sup>4</sup> He was an eyewitness to many of the events he relates and, thus, his work is of prime importance to our study.

While at Shiraz, Francklin made the acquaintance of Sir Harford Jones, who had travelled to Shiraz for the benefit of his health. He accompanied Harford Jones as the interpreter between Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān and the latter.<sup>5</sup> Most of his historical accounts are gathered from the military classes, who were still resident at Shiraz, and had served the Zands in many expeditions.<sup>6</sup> It is interesting to have the version given by these

1. O.M.I., Introd., p.(I).

2. Ibid., p.21.

3. Ibid., p.57.

4. Ibid., pp.112-142.

5. Ibid., p.77.

6. Ibid., p.126.

people, since most other historical sources have been written by members of the bureaucracy, and are thus hostile to the tribal elements, who formed the main core of the Persian army. Unlike Malcolm and Jones, who travelled to Persia on an official purpose and, hence, were entertained by the high ranking officials, Francklin was a solitary traveller and had to make do with whatever was at his disposal. Thus, he collected his information from the ordinary people and single-handed. Furthermore, he did not have a host of officers and scholars to assist him in his work as Malcolm did. This makes his work all the more original, as it is the result of his direct contacts and without any intermediary.<sup>1</sup>

Mémoires historiques, politiques et géographiques de voyages de comte Ferrieres Sauveboeuf, faits en Turquie, Perse et en Arabie. Paris, 1790.

This work was written between 1782-1789, when Count Sauveboeuf travelled to Ottoman Turkey and Persia in the capacity of an ambassador.<sup>2</sup> He spent some months in Persia, at various places, including Tehrān and Esfāhān. His mission was primarily to Constantinople. Thus, the greater part of the book is dedicated to the description of, and observations about, that Empire. He also provides a very interesting section on the province of Georgia, which had become the centre of much controversy at that time.<sup>3</sup> Catherine II, the Empress of Russia, in her thirst for expansion, had annexed the Kuban area and Crimea to her territories. These areas were previously part of Ottoman Turkey. Furthermore, she had made friendly overtures to the Prince of Georgia, Heraclius, in order to persuade him to throw off his allegiance to the Persian court, and become a

1. O.M.T., p.119.

2. M.H.P.G., Vol.I, pp.ij-iiij.

3. Ibid., Vol.II, pp.242-52.

protectorate of the Russian Empress. She had succeeded in her designs without much difficulty and, in 1783, a treaty was signed, according to which Georgia accepted the suzerainty of the Russian Empress, in exchange for military assistance.<sup>1</sup> The events had created great alarm in France. Louis XVI, the king of France, anxious to curtail the Russian expansions, appointed Sauveboeuf to the court of Turkey and Persia, to form a united front against the Russians.<sup>2</sup> The mission was, however, fruitless, since a short while after the arrival of the French envoy, <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān died and Sauveboeuf managed to leave Persia with great difficulty.<sup>3</sup> <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, however, was so busy with his internal problems, that he had no time for such ambitious exploits. During his reign, he felt that it sufficed to send a robe of honour to Heraclius and, thus, to demand tribute from him. His effort was futile, since by then the treaty had been ratified and the Georgian prince had decided to accept Russian protection. <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān did not live long enough to pursue the Georgian question any further.

Ferrieres' account on Persia is brief, yet he gathered information on various aspects of life in Persia, such as religion, agriculture and women. His observations are original and useful. Thus, his work is one of the major European sources on that era. It was published in Paris in two volumes in 1790.

A tour to Sheeraz: Edward Scott Waring, London, 1804.

Although this journey was undertaken in 1802, that is, a few years later than the period under study, yet it can nevertheless be considered as a primary source. The reason is that the city of Shirāz, which is the subject of the author's observations, had not greatly changed in its administration and social

1. H.P., Vol.I, p.214.

2. Ibid. Lang, The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy, N.Y. 1957, p.184.

3. M.H.P.G., Vol.I, p.78.

structure, although it had sustained ruthless ravages by the Qājārs, after it fell into their hands.<sup>1</sup> Waring is an observant and diligent traveller and scholar. He provides much information on the socio-economic features in the society of south Persia, such as trade, revenues, arts and classes. Although he had connection with the elite, and even the ruling prince entertained him frequently during his stay at Shirāz, yet he made intelligent observations on the lower classes of the citizenry, like the Luṭīs and the prostitutes.

Despite the assurances given by the author, that he has spared no pain to establish the accuracy of his information, and that he has advanced no statement upon doubtful or suspicious authority, his accounts are at times fanciful and incredible.<sup>2</sup> The historical section of his book contains a summary account of the events subsequent to the death of the Vakil until the murder of Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān. He asserts that his sources were mainly two manuscripts: one of them was written by a native of Shirāz from the time of Karim Khān to the fall of the Zands. This source can easily be identified as Tārikh-Giti Goshāy. The other source of his information was a manuscript written by an individual, who was personally involved in the political events. Waring asserts that this man was the secretary (Mirzā) to Moḥammad Khān, the son of Zaki Khān. Rieu believes that Waring used the Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh of Ebn<sup>c</sup>Abdal-Karim.<sup>3</sup> If this assumption proves to be true, the mystery of Ebn<sup>c</sup>Abdal-Karim's profession and his motives for his composition can be clarified. Waring asserts that he has tried to reconcile the opposing views of his sources, their being drastically opposed to one another.

1. Waring, p.33.

2. Ibid., p.263.

3. Rieu, Catalogue of..., Vol.I, p.198.

Life and adventures of Joseph Amin (1726-1809). Edited by Amy Apcar, Calcutta, 2nd. ed., 1918.

Joseph Amin was born in Hamadān of Armenian parents. His father, a merchant, left Persia during the reign of Nāder Shāh and settled in India. Joseph stayed in Persia with his grandfather until he was eighteen; he then proceeded to India and joined his family. He resolved to go to Europe in order to educate himself; thus, despite his father's opposition, he boarded a ship in 1751 and arrived in England six months later. He was at first taken charge of by an Armenian merchant in London, and lived comfortably until the latter turned Roman Catholic and, finding Joseph loyal to his faith, did everything in his power to harm him. Amin was left with no money and no friends; for some years he earned his living by undertaking menial employment.<sup>1</sup>

As he was on the verge of committing suicide his fortune rose, when he met a nobleman, who offered him assistance and protection. Joseph Amin was able to make the acquaintance of many exalted circles in London. He was even introduced to George IV, who took great interest in his adventures. With the help of his influential friends, he managed to resume his education in the academy of military sciences. He was obsessed with the idea of freeing his unfortunate countrymen, the Armenians, from the grip of the cruel Muslim rulers. While in Britain, he offered his services to Heraclius, the king of Georgia, and, although he received no response, he did not give up his ideas.<sup>2</sup> He made two attempts to reach Georgia; the first was doomed to failure, as he had no-one to protect him against the jealousy of the Turks. On his second trip, however, he was recommended to two of the great ministers in the court of Russia, and they provided him with passports and money to proceed to

1. L.A.J.A., Parts I-IV.

2. Ibid., Parts V-XXVIII-XXXI.



Georgia. He had a great many adventures on the way and eventually reached Teflis, the capital of Georgia in 1763. He stayed with Heraclius for nearly two years and became the commander of his forces in the skirmishes between the Georgian army and the Lasgis. Amin's attempts to persuade Heraclius to raise an army and attack the Turkish territories adjacent to Georgia, failed to make any impression on the mind of the Georgian prince. He even had Amin arrested and kept him under house arrest for a month. Amin was eventually freed and was sent back to Russia.<sup>1</sup> En route he changed his course and proceeded towards Persia. He arrived in Esfāhān in 1776, when<sup>c</sup> Ali Morād Khān had made himself master of that city, he was drafted into the latter's army and a small corpse of Georgians were under his command. His duty was to guard the Khān's private quarter. Amin was discharged of his services after a short while, apparently at the instigation of the Kalāntar of Julpha, Megerdich, who feared that Amin might take his place. Amin, however, stayed in Esfāhān for a long time and married there. He left Persia in 1783 with his eldest son, for Calcutta. His wife and his three other children joined him later.<sup>2</sup>

Joseph Amin was a fanatical Christian and a zealous nationalist. All his life, he tried in vain to encourage his fellow Armenians to throw off the yoke of servitude to the Muslims. His endeavours, however, were fruitful in that Heraclius sought the protection of the Russians and became a vassal to Catherine II, who gradually annexed a great part of Armenia to her territories. Apparently, she was greatly in favour of Amin's designs and wished him to enter her service; it was at her express command that he was sent to Georgia.<sup>3</sup>

Amin wrote his biography in English himself, and it was first

1. L.A.J.A., part XI-XVI.

2. Ibid., p.514.

3. Ibid., part XII, pp.191-192.

printed in London in 1792 and this was probably the copy used by Sir John Malcolm. His work is of great value to our study, as it contains much original information about the situation of the Armenians in Persia, during the reign of the Zands, and the state of Georgia at that time. His general observations about Persian politics are worthy of notice. The author died in Calcutta in 1809, and was buried there. This book was edited by one of his descendants with much additional information and footnotes. There is also a portrait of the author included in the 2nd editon.

French Consular Correspondances:

The French consular reports and documents relevant to Persia are preserved in the Archives National des Affaires Etrangeres, under the heading of La Perse, correspondance consulaires Bagdad et Bassorah. These are:

1. Bagdad (1742-1791)  
Tome I: Affaires etrangeres, BI 175  
Tome II: " " " 176  
Tome III: " " " 177
  
2. Bassorah (1743-1791) Affaires etrangeres  
BI 197

Much of the information in these records is concerned with the political rivalry of the French and British in the Ottoman territories and the Persian Gulf. There are, however, occasional references to the general state of the Empire in Persia, but only in respect to the trade routes and the safety of the roads. I was not, however, able to consult these reports due to some financial difficulties, which prevented me from travelling to France or obtaining the expensive microfilms of the relevant records.

Russian Consular Reports and Despatches:

The lucrative trade connections with the Empire of Persia and the semi-independent kingdoms across Caucasus, enabled the Russians to establish consular offices in Darband and Anzali. Their interests were not purely commercial, and they took every opportunity to acquire political power in those areas. Thus, they kept a close watch over the Persian territories and informed their government of all the developments regarding the political situation in those areas. As a result, there is a great repository of secret despatches and reports kept in the Soviet Union Archives. Unfortunately, these have not been thoroughly investigated by scholars and only a few articles have been published on the basis of these records. The bulk of these records are still kept in Leningrad, (Archiv Vneshney politiki Rossii - AVPR).

Despite my numerous attempts to obtain copies of these records, I was not able to do so, hence I have used the materials available in the above-mentioned articles.

India Office Record and Library:

These valuable records have been thoroughly investigated and widely used in this thesis. At times the I.O.R. records were the only source of information on the dark aspects of this period of history. For the description of the records see Perry.<sup>1</sup>

1. Perry, J., Karim Khan, pp.310-311.

SECTION I

THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY  
BETWEEN THE ZANDS AND THE QAJARS

## CHAPTER 2

### THE SUCCESSORS OF KARIM KHĀN

Contrasted with the prosperous and tranquil reign of Karim Khān, the events which ensued on his death and led to the succession of Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān, the last Zand ruler, can be regarded as a series of confused and bloody upheavals. Considering the dearth of material and the inadequacy of the sources on the causes and effects of these upheavals, we should regard ourselves fortunate in having access to the accounts given by observant travellers, such as E. Scott Waring and W. Francklin. From these sources we can deduce the driving forces and the political climate of the time, in the country in general and in the southern provinces in particular. Waring, in his many valuable observations, tries to clarify the reasons behind all these events in a country where, as he rightly observes, "The throne is the inheritance of the sword".<sup>1</sup>

When, after a long illness which lasted nearly a year, the Vakil died on the morning of 13th Safar 1193/3rd March 1779, there emerged chaos and violence which he had foreseen, but had no power to prevent. Indeed, it is curious that he did not attempt to secure the throne for his only son who was of mature age.<sup>2</sup> There had already formed two factions in the court, each supporting one of his sons, Abol Fath (1169/1755-1201/1786), and Moḥammad<sup>c</sup>Ali (1174/1760-?).<sup>3</sup> The third son, Ebrāhim, was a mere child and had no pretension to the throne. Apparently, there was a fourth son by the name of Ṣāleḥ Khān.

1. I.S., p.268.

2. G.M., p.220.

3. Ibid.

In the year 1189/1775, a young man appeared in the court of the Vakil, claiming to be his son. Although a number of courtiers were dubious about the truth of the assertion, but some others believed that he was a son of the Vakil. At all events, Karim Khān accepted him and treated him as a son. Sāleḥ Khān brought his mother and wife to the court.<sup>1</sup>

Karim Khān had no male offspring until he was well over the age of fifty. His favourite child was <sup>C</sup>Abd al-Rahim Khān<sup>2</sup> (1173/1759 -1191/1777), who died very young, two years before his father. It was a serious blow to the Vakil and he was so grieved that he had no wish to continue living.

This grief may well have been exacerbated by the fact that Abol Fath Khān, his eldest son, was a frivolous youth, whose habit of drinking and debauchery had often subjected him to severe punishment from his father and reprimands from his younger brother.<sup>3</sup> Mohammad <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, the second son, was born of a Jewish mother, and that had made his position on the question of succession rather precarious.<sup>4</sup> Thus, neither of the Vakil's sons was fit for the power, with which he was to be invested. Despite the obvious shortcomings of Abol Fath Khān, many of the notables were prepared to support him as the only rightful heir to the throne, which his father had secured him through good management and magnanimity. Apparently, Abol Fath Khān had allied himself with a few of the great Zand generals, like Nazar <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān and Kalb <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān. His major rival, his brother Mohammad <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, was supported by his father-in-law, Zaki Khān, and <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, the latter's nephew. Before the news of the Vakil's death was disseminated through the capital, Shirāz, Abol Fath Khān sent one of his

1. G.M., p.389.

2. G.G., pp.231-232.

3. G.M., p.220.

4. Ibid., p.215.

confidential servants to inform his supporters of the developments. The news was, however, leaked to the rival faction by one of the ladies in the ḥarim.<sup>1</sup>

Zaki Khān immediately sent word to some of the Zand nobles and the tribal chiefs to assemble at his house. He also summoned his nephew, ʿAli Morād Khān, who sided with him in his support for Moḥammad ʿAli Khān. As the Vakil had not yet died, while these events were taking place, Zaki Khān took the precaution of admitting his nephew to his house by a secret entrance, in case Karim Khān survived the night and Zaki Khān's preparations became known to him. The purpose of the assembly was to discuss the best line of action in securing the succession of Moḥammad ʿAli Khān to the throne.<sup>2</sup> Nazar ʿAli Khān, in the meantime, had sent a few of his adherents to the citadel, commonly known as the Ark, while he, himself, and his adherents, the sons of Shaikh ʿAli Khān, had established themselves in the latter's palace.<sup>3</sup>

Nazar ʿAli Khān was one of the most respected nobles of the Zand tribe, that is, a Rish Safid (white beard), whose advanced age and wisdom prevented him from rash conduct. He, thus, sent his son, Moḥammad ʿAli, to his opponent, Zaki Khān, to persuade him to visit Nazar ʿAli Khān and consult him on the question of accession to the throne, before the Vakil's death became known to the general populace.<sup>4</sup> Zaki Khān, dismissing the idea, invited all the Zand nobles to assemble in the royal seraglio, where the corpse of the Vakil lay, in order to arrange for the funeral and interment of the Vakil, and then to proceed with the affairs of state.<sup>5</sup>

1. Presumably the mother of ʿAli Morād Khān, who had married Ṣādeq Khān after the death of her first husband. G.M., p.215.

2. Ibid., p.219.

3. Ibid., p.216.

4. Ibid., p.219.

5. Ibid., p.216.

Nazar <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was well aware of the hostility, which existed between the sons of Shaikh <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, the Vakil's late cousin, and Zaki Khān. He was also sensible of the averse sentiments with which Zaki Khān regarded him. Hence, he sent word again that there was no cause for Zaki Khān's alarm, as there was no ill will towards him, and that it would be advisable to come to the house of Shaikh <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, where all the supporters of Abol Fath Khān were assembled.<sup>1</sup> His messenger returned disappointed for the second time. Zaki Khān set off with his forces to the Ark with <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān in his party. On entering the guard house of the royal apartment, some of the elders of the tribes, such as Māfi, joined forces with Zaki Khān, while Nazar <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān proceeded to the Ark with only a few of his adherents.<sup>2</sup> He entered the citadel, shut the gates, and then proclaimed his intention to give battle to Zaki Khān. His conduct was not, however, approved by his supporters. They argued that their number, wealth and popular support exceeded that of Zaki Khān and there was no reason for their placing themselves in a position which would only benefit Zaki Khān and his supporters.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, their protestations were logical and well founded. While they were confined in the Ark, Zaki Khān was able to gain the support of the Vakil's private guards, who had come to enquire about their late master.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, Zaki Khān had opened the royal treasures and distributed money among the soldiery to win their support. Apparently, Zaki Khan had amassed great wealth, which he did not hesitate to make use of in his aspirations.<sup>5</sup>

Nazar <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān had made a fatal mistake in leaving his personal guards, numbering about 2000 men, in the palace of Shaikh

1. G.M., p.216.

2. G.G., p.217/G.M., p.216.

3. G.M., p.216.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid./ O.M.T., p.126.



<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān. The Vakil's citadel was besieged by order of Zaki Khān and a fight broke out between the two factions which lasted twenty four hours.<sup>1</sup>

On Wednesday, the 14th of Ṣafar 1193/4th of March, 1779, Karim Khān's wife, and mother of <sup>C</sup>Abdāl Rahim Khān, the late son of the Vakil, arrived at the gates of the Ark.<sup>2</sup> She was admitted to the Ark, where she made representations to the effect that Zaki Khān wished to settle the matter in a peaceful manner, and she entreated the besieged Khāns to assemble at the house of her late son, <sup>C</sup>Abdāl Rahim Khān, to negotiate with the opposing faction.<sup>3</sup> This was apparently a ploy devised by Zaki Khān to come to an agreement with his opponents, as he was not sure of the outcome of the events.

Nazar <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān accepted his terms and came out of the Ark. Apparently, Zaki Khān had every intention of honouring his terms and was on his way to the meeting place agreed upon, when he was confronted by Esmā<sup>C</sup>il Khān Qashqā'i, who had been a resident of the court for some years and had gained great influence in the court.<sup>4</sup> He dissuaded Zaki Khān from attending the meeting, and argued that all the Khans opposed to him were of great military prowess and, should they wish to challenge him, they could do so with facility. Thus, it was advisable to send a representative to the meeting. Zaki Khān was only too willing to violate his promises, and decided to commission one of the lesser Khāns of the Zand tribe, Moḥammad Hosein Khān Hazāreh, to attend the meeting. This act greatly offended Nazar <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, who was about to leave the house, but he was assailed by a body of troops sent by Zaki Khān. There was a fierce battle, which terminated with the murder of

1. G.M., p.218.

2. Ibid.; <sup>C</sup>Abdāl Rahim Khān's wife was the daughter of Nazar <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān.

3. G.M., p.217.

4. Ibid., p.218.

Nazar <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān.<sup>1</sup>

It appears that some of the besieged Khāns had refused to leave the Ark, due to their mistrust and apprehension of a man like Zaki Khān.<sup>2</sup> At all events, on hearing of the developments, they prepared for battle. On the 15th of Şafar, 1193/5th March, 1779, another envoy arrived at the gates of the Ark, stating that the whole discord was settled now that Nazar <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān had been killed, and the Khāns should not fear to step out of the Ark.<sup>3</sup> They were promised a truce in return for their peaceful surrender. The Khāns, who had held their position for three days without food and water, gave themselves up and on entering the house of Zaki Khān, were all slaughtered. Their heads were then presented to Zaki Khān.<sup>4</sup>

There are contradictory accounts as to the number and the mode employed in their execution. One traveller asserts that they were torn to pieces by the Pahlevāns of Zaki Khān.<sup>5</sup> This is a significant detail about one of the roles assigned to urban elements as opposed to tribal ones in this period. Unfortunately, there is no other evidence to substantiate this allegation. Again the number of Khāns slain has been given as between 12-23 in different sources.<sup>6</sup> During the course of these events, the corpse of the noble Vakil had been left in the royal seraglio (ḥarim) and it was only when Zaki Khān had annihilated all his opponents, that he set about interring the body of Karim Khān.<sup>7</sup>

1. G.M., p.218.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.; I.Z., p.7.

4. G.G., p.218; G.M., p.218.

5. O.N.I., p.127.

6. I.Z. gives the number slain as 12; G.G.: 15-16 slain; and G.M.: 23 slain.

7. G.G., p.219; G.M., p.219.

It is essential at this point to study the causes of the dispute over the succession of the Vakil and also the elements involved in it. We have already stated that this dispute occurred mainly and primarily among the Zand nobles and particularly the military chiefs. We have no evidence as to the participation in this dispute of the city notables in charge of the civil administration in the capital, Shirāz. The kalāntar, Mirzā Mohamad, who enjoyed great power and influence in political affairs during the lifetime of the Vakil, seems to have been inactive in the contest. Nor was Mirzā Ja<sup>C</sup>far, the Vazir of the late monarch, involved in it. There is, however, mention of Mirzā Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khorāsāni, the minister to Nazar<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, who together with his master took refuge in the Ark and was subsequently killed.<sup>1</sup>

As was to be expected, the tribal elements were actively involved in the violence which ensued; the tribe of Māfi, for example, one of the original allies of Karim Khān, were instrumental in his gaining victory over his rivals.<sup>2</sup> At this stage they were acting as the fifth column, and were concerned only with their own gain, rather than the welfare of the state. They had received an immense sum of money from Zaki Khān to support his cause,<sup>3</sup> and were the murderers of the Zand nobles. The Qashqā'i tribe were also active in support of Zaki Khān. Esmā<sup>C</sup>il Khān was actually playing the role of the latter's henchman.<sup>4</sup> The conflict inherent in the semi-nomadic/urban monarchy found expression in the frays between the kalāntar and the Qashqā'i chief, during the reign of Zaki Khān.<sup>5</sup>

1. G.M., p.219.

2. This tribe was one of the Lak nomads residing in the province of Lorestan. Perry, Karim Khān, p. 279.

3. R.M.M., p.72.

4. G.M., p.219.

5. Loc. cit., pp.69-70.

Zaki Khān's next step was to bury the Vakil.<sup>1</sup> Then he set about appropriating the property and the effects of the deceased Khāns. He gathered immense wealth and did not spare Sādeq Khān's household, sending the Qashqā'i chief, Esmā<sup>c</sup> il Khān, to the latter's house and pillaged<sup>wi</sup> it with brutality.<sup>2</sup> He further summoned Sādeq Khān to the court, giving him a report of the Vakil's death at the same time.<sup>3</sup> It seems that, despite the execution of all the opposing faction, Zaki Khān still could not declare his son-in-law, Mohammad<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān, as the successor to the Vakil. As he elevated the eldest son to the throne, there is every reason to believe that there must have been resistance to the younger prince's accession. It was only after a few days that he dared to declare his intention of forming a dual kingship. Thus, he made Mohammad<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān the joint ruler.<sup>4</sup>

During this period, Zaki Khān was the sole administrator in the capital. The two princes were rulers in name only. After a short while, Mohammad<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān was cast aside and Abol Fath Khān became the king. But this did not last very long and again Mohammad<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān was put on the throne. Eventually, both princes were set aside and Zaki Khān took matters into his own hands.<sup>5</sup> <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān, who had sided with his uncle Zaki Khān,<sup>6</sup> was now showing signs of disaffection. He knew that he could not place confidence in a man who had betrayed his kinsmen and the cause of his late half-brother, Karim Khān.<sup>7</sup> <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān was fearful of his safety and

1. M.T. asserts that Karim Khān was buried before these events. Karim Khān was buried in a garden adjoining the Ark in a little house known as Kolāh Farangi (Frankish Hat).

2. G.M., p.219; G.G., p.219; R.M.M., p.71.

3. Ibid.

4. G.G., p.219. Ibid. R.M.M., p.69.

5. Ibid.

6. <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād's mother was Zaki Khān's sister and had married Sādeq Khān on the death of her first husband.

7. H.P., Vol.2, p.157.

life, thus he prevailed upon Abol Fath Khān to solicit Zaki Khān's permission to send <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān on a military expedition. Zaki Khān was reluctant at first to concede to this proposal, but he eventually agreed, apparently because of the successful exploits of Āqā Mohammad Khān in Māzandarān. <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād was sent at the head of an army to quell the revolt, which had erupted in the city of Esfāhān,<sup>1</sup> and then proceed to Tehran to show the Zand flag there.

Before we relate the events which occurred after the departure of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, we study the return of Ṣādeq Khān from Baṣra and subsequent developments. Ṣādeq Khān, on learning of the death of his brother, the Vakil, evacuated the city of Baṣra in great haste and set off for Shirāz. On his way,<sup>2</sup> he was informed of the murder of the Zand nobles and the accession of Abol Fath Khān to the throne.<sup>3</sup> He proceeded towards the city and halted outside the gates. Zaki Khān, fearful of Ṣādeq Khān's great military prowess, expressed his desire to meet him. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, the eldest son of Ṣādeq, was sent to the city to investigate the intentions of the usurper, Zaki Khān, and inform his father. On his return, he affirmed what Ṣādeq Khān had anticipated, that is, if he entered the city, he would meet with the same fate as his kinsmen.<sup>4</sup> Ṣādeq Khān determined to lay siege to the city, was preparing for the tactical engagement, when his soldiers, who numbered 2,000 men,<sup>5</sup> received letters sent out from Shirāz, warning them to leave their commander, Ṣādeq Khān, or else their families and wives would be given over to the soldiers.<sup>6</sup> The letters had the

1. G.G., p.222. I.Z., p.8.

2. He learnt of the developments in Duraq.

3. G.G., p.220. I.Z., p.8.

4. Ibid. Ṣādeq Khān didn't have more than 2,000 men with him, as we are informed by the E.I.C. Resident that he was expecting reinforcement, but it never arrived. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bushire, 26th May, 1779.

5. I.O.R. G/29/22. Bushire, 26th May, 1779.

6. M.T., p.345.



desired effect and in a short while all the troops left the unfortunate chief, heading for home.<sup>1</sup> Šādeq Khān had to take refuge in a place of safety, thus he fled towards the province of Kermān, where he had many friends and supporters.<sup>2</sup> Apparently, there were only three hundred men with him;<sup>3</sup> they had no relations in Shirāz and had no fear of Zaki Khān's atrocities. Moḥammad Hosein Khān Sistāni was among Šādeq Khān's devoted adherents, who remained with him and invited him to his principality.<sup>4</sup> An army was sent to pursue Šādeq Khān, at the head of which was placed Moḥammad Hosein Khān Zand; at the engagement which ensued, he was killed and the Shirāzis were forced to retreat to the city.<sup>5</sup> Šādeq Khān arrived in Bam safely, and garrisoned his few adherents, awaiting a better chance.

#### Revolt in Esfāhān:

Fath <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān Afshār, one of the warlords involved in the power struggle after the death of Nādir, was among the prominent figures kept as hostage in Shirāz, during the reign of Karim Khān. He, however, died in Shirāz and, as the illness of the Vakil worsened, he gave permission to Fath <sup>C</sup>Ali's sons to proceed to Esfāhān and take their families and households to Āzarbāyjān, the original abode of that chief.<sup>6</sup> As his sons, Jahāngir and Moḥammad Rāshid, reached Esfāhān, the news of Karim Khān's death spread and the Afshār tribes, who had

1. G.G., p.220. I.Z., p.9. M.I., p.343. I.O.R. G/29/27. Bussora. 26th May, 1779.

2. G.G., p.221. Ibid. R.M.M., p.71.

3. This chief was the governor of Bam and his family was to play a decisive role in the fate of the last Zand prince.

4. I.Z., p.9. E.I.C. resident gives his men as 700. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bushire, 27th May, 1779.

5. G.G., p.221. I.Z., p.9. I.O.R. G/29/17. A force of 1400 sent out to pursue him and was defeated.

6. G.G., p.222. G.M. asserts that <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān went to Esfāhān, but did not interfere with the revolt there. Op. cit., p.256.

been transferred to that city, persuaded the young chiefs to take the opportunity and attempt to capture the city of Esfāhān. Some of the inhabitants of the city, who are called by the official historian Alvāt va Arāzel (the rabble)<sup>1</sup>, allied themselves to the rebels and they forced the governor, Hāji Āqā Moḥammad, to take refuge in the citadel of Tabrak, in the vicinity of Esfāhān. The citadel was besieged by the rebels, and for about fifteen days the whole place was in a state of chaos and anarchy.<sup>2</sup>

The governor had informed the government at Shirāz of the revolt, and Zaki Khān appointed one of his ablest generals, Baṣṭām Khān, to quell the rebellion. On the arrival of the army, the revolt was crushed; nine of the major instigators were executed in the public square, Naqsh-e-Jahān. The Esfāhāni allies of the Afshār chiefs were captured and imprisoned.<sup>3</sup> This is an interesting instance of the citizens of Esfāhān staging a rebellion against the central government. The elements involved are given as the declasses and luti, but there is one significant feature in this event, that is, the official position of the leaders of the mob, who were Kakhodās and Bābās in the city.<sup>4</sup>

#### Āqā Moḥammad Khān and Qājār tribal alliance:

Moḥammad Ḥasan Khān Qājār, a formidable chief, whose gallant exploits in pursuit of power had been curtailed by his untimely death,<sup>5</sup> was another rival of Karim Khān. His sons were taken to Shirāz and Qazvin and kept as hostages in the former

1. G.G., p.222.

2. Ibid. I.Z., p.7.

3. G.G., p.223.

4. Ibid. Bābās appear to be equal to Rish-sefid. Toḥfat-al-<sup>C</sup>Alam asserts that the elders of Zurkhāneh were termed as Bābā.

5. He was killed by one of his own men in 1172/1758.

city after his death. One of them, Hosein Qoli, was later appointed as the governor of the town of Damghān. He had ambitious designs and, in pursuit of his claims to the throne, he rebelled.<sup>1</sup> However, he could not further his pretensions, as he was forced to live in exile in the province of Astarābād. From there, he revolted again and his troops were dispersed by an army sent from Shirāz. Hosein Qoli Khān then fled to Dasht-e-Qebchāq among the Turkman tribes of that area. His third attempt to attain power in the province of Mazandaran ended with his murder <sup>at</sup> by the hands of the Turkmans.<sup>2</sup> During all these events, Āqā Mohammad Khān was in Shiraz. Although he was fearful of the implications of his brother's conduct, he was on all occasions treated with kindness and clemency. Apparently he was granted permission to leave the city on hunting expeditions, because he was despised for being a eunuch and was not regarded as being as important as his youngest brothers.<sup>3</sup> On one occasion he had fled to the shrine of Shāh-e-Cherāgh, but the Vakil sent for him, with a robe of honour.<sup>4</sup> When the ailing Zand ruler was on the verge of death, Āqā Mohammad Khān decided to gain his freedom. Thus he set out on a hunting expedition with a few of his closest associates on the night before the Vakil died.<sup>5</sup> He was informed of the event through his aunt, a lady in the royal ḥarim. It appears that Āqā Mohammad Khān left Shirāz on the 12th Safar 1193/2nd March, 1779, with two of his younger brothers, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Qoli and Mehdi Qoli Khān.<sup>6</sup> He set off for Māzandarān and, en route, he stopped for a short while in Esfāhān and then proceeded to Tehran, where he recruited some of the Kurdish tribes

1. G.G., p.170.

2. Ibid.

3. R.T., p.359.

4. Fava'id-al-Safavih, Ms . B.L., pp.145-146.

5. G.G., p.246. G.M., p. I.Z., p.6.

6. M.S., p.10.



resident in the area of Esfāhān and Rāy.<sup>1</sup> In his schemes, he first tried to acquire financial resources; thus, he raided a caravan carrying valuable goods and cash from Esfāhān to Shirāz. Furthermore, he appropriated the treasures in Māzandarān. Favā'ed-al-Safavieh asserts that he extorted the amount of 1000 rupees from a merchant in Māzandarān.

He spent the first phase of his struggle for supremacy in conflict with his own brothers, and managed to assert himself by treachery and cunning over his rivals.<sup>2</sup> The first challenge from the Zands to his growing power in Māzandarān, came during the short-lived rule of Zaki Khān, who sent his nephew, <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, to show the Zand flag in Tehran. But since <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān had also entertained ambitious designs, he merely appointed Amir Guneh Khān Afshār to attack Āmol; he was, however, defeated and fled to Qazvin.<sup>3</sup>

Āqā Mohammad Khān gradually united the different branches of the Qājār tribe and that set him on the road for his attempt to gain the throne, which, according to the Qājār chroniclers, was usurped from his house by the Afshārs and the Zands. His efforts were, first and foremost, centered around the unification of the tribes, with whose assistance he could achieve what his father had failed to effect.

#### Sādeq Khān in Kermān:

There is very little information in the contemporary sources on the fate of the able Zand chief, Sādeq Khān, after he left for Kerman. What one is able to glean from them is contradictory and inaccurate. The only source, which gives a detailed account on the matter is Tārikh-e-Kermān, a work written much

1. Saruī, M.T., I.M., Msc. Tehran. He killed one of his brothers and blinded another.

2. Favā'ed-al-Safavieh, p.147.

3. G.G., p.247.

later than the period under study. However, according to the above mentioned history, Sādeq Khān, after having found himself deserted<sup>1</sup> by his troops, fled to the province of Kermān. The governor, Sayed Abolhasan Khān, and the principal notables of the city, came out to meet him, with presents and provisions. Among the welcomers was Āqā<sup>C</sup>Ali, a wealthy merchant, who owned immense riches and was to play a major role in the last episodes of Zand history. The Zand Khan was accommodated in the house of this merchant, since there was no suitable abode for a royal guest.<sup>2</sup> His retinue were quartered in the Ark built by Nazar<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, during his office as the governor of the place in the Vakil's rule.

Apparently, the Khān had a great amount of cash, that is, sixty thousand Gold Tomāns and Indian Rupees, which he distributed to the people of Kermān, to gain their support in pursuit of his cause. He managed to recruit about 1,000 contingents from the city and its dependencies. He conscripted troops from the neighbouring districts and, in a short while, gathered an army numbering 8,000 men.<sup>3</sup> The Khān proceeded from Gavāshir towards Shirāz. On the way to Shirāz, he learnt of the murder of Zaki Khān, and hastily advanced towards Shirāz.

Golshan-e-Morād, the only source which mentions the place in which he stayed, asserts that he was at Qal<sup>C</sup>e Āqā, a village in the vicinity of the town of Rafsanjān.<sup>4</sup> We have no information as to who owned this village, but Waring asserts that Sādeq Khān was advised by his minister, Mirzā Moḥammad Hossein, to repair to his property near Bam.<sup>5</sup> Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh also affirms that the Zand chief secured the Ark in Rafsanjān,

1. G.M., p. I.K., pp.342-343. I.O.R. G/29/17 Bussora, 26th May, 1779.

2. I.K., p.335.

3. Tahfat al-Ālām asserts that Sādeq Khān had gathered a great sum of money.

4. Jographiāye-Kerman, p.169.

5. I.S., p.263.

while he was in the area.

However, the activities of Ṣādeq Khān deserve special notice; as will be seen later, he was the main cause of friction and discord, which occurred between the young king, Abol Fath Khān, and Zaki Khān, and which eventually resulted in the former's abdication. Harford Jones states that the Vakil had appointed his brother, Ṣādeq, as the guardian of his sons.<sup>1</sup> Although none of the Persian sources endorse this allegation, it is quite clear that Abol Fath Khān was well disposed towards his uncle and wanted him to enter the capital when he returned from Basra.<sup>2</sup> The E.I.C. resident asserts that Abol Fath and his brothers were confined for 24 hours while Ṣādeq Khān was there. This widened the gap already in existence between the king and Zaki Khān. There were other causes for Abol Fath Khān's displeasure. He was simply tired of being king in name only, while Zaki Khān was ruling for him .

Zaki Khān seems to have been extremely apprehensive of a powerful rival such as Ṣādeq Khān. The account given by Mirzā Moḥammad, the kalāntar of Shirāz<sup>3</sup> bears evidence to the fears of a usurper, whose power was more than usually based on terror and menace. This fear was well founded, since Ṣādeq Khān did not lose time in gaining the support of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, a chief of rank and ability, to oppose his uncle, Zaki Khān, for the cause of the rightful heir, Abol Fath Khān. Ṣādeq Khān wrote letters to <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād soliciting his assistance to fight the usurper, Zaki Khan. Apparently,

"the appeal which Saduck Khan [sic] after his flight from Shiraz made to Aly Mōorād [sic] who was then at Tehran gave him the pretext that he desired, he assembled the officers of his army and demanded from them if it was not disgraceful to support any longer a chief who treated the son

1. D.K., p.cxiv. O.M.T.S., p.13.

2. I.Z., p.9.

3. R.M.M., p.70.

"and brother of Kureem Khan in the manner Zuckee Khan [sic] had done."<sup>1</sup>

Having attained the approbation of the army with no great effort, <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān made himself the master of Esfāhān and declared himself in favour of the young prince, Abol Fath Khān.<sup>2</sup> Enraged by the developments and aware of the seriousness of the threats, that is, having two formidable rivals, who had made themselves masters of two traditionally Zand jurisdictions, Zaki Khān decided to meet the challenge in person.<sup>3</sup>

As there was another major rebellion in the province of Khamseh and Hamadān, we will deal with that first and later relate the last phase of Zaki Khān's rule, which terminated with his murder by the very tribal warriors who had been instrumental in his atrocities committed towards the Zand nobles.

#### The Revolt of Zolfaqār Khān:

Zolfaqār Khān was a turbulent chief of the tribe of Afshār, resident in the area of Khamseh. He had rebelled several times during the reign of the Vakil. Each time he had been defeated but pardoned for his misconduct, due to the clemency of the Vakil.<sup>4</sup> The situation was totally different now, that is, Karim Khān was no more, and the country had been thrown into a state of turmoil and unrest. Zolfaqār Khān took the opportunity of trying his luck once more and established himself in the town of Qazvin, not without great difficulty. The event again involved the citizens of that town defending their rights and principles.

1. H.P., p.158. I.Z., p.10. G.G., p.224.

2. Ibid.

3. G.G., p.226. I.Z., p.10. R.M.M., p.71.

4. G.G., p.170. G.M., p. I.Z., p.13. Ia Ia, p.117.

As usual the soldiers of Zolfaqār Khān, once they were settled in the town, began many acts of outrage and excess towards the citizens. Their excesses went as far as violating the honour of the town's womenfolk. Highly incensed by such excesses, the citizens revolted against the newcomers. Many of the troops were slain, while Zolfaqār Khān was compelled to retire to the citadel. The Ark was besieged and barricades were erected in all the areas round the Safavid royal palace. The civil strife continued for some days until a certain Luṭi by the name of Mirzā Qazvini, together with a few of his followers, penetrated into the palace through the water canal of the Ark. This man helped Zolfaqār Khān to seize the barricades of the citizens and overpower them.<sup>1</sup> This was achieved, the rioters were captured and their property was confiscated.<sup>2</sup> This instance is another example of the courage and zeal of the citizens in defence of their rights against the tribal elements. It also indicates the involvement of the Lutis in uprisings and general disorder.

The province of Gilān was in chaos at this time, due to a general uprising. The populace had ousted the semi-hereditary governor, Hedāyat Khān, and had compelled him to send his family and effects away by sea, while he fled to <sup>C</sup>Eraq-e-<sup>C</sup>Ajam.<sup>3</sup> Incidentally, Hedāyat Khān seems to have been aware of the tension and dissatisfaction of his subjects, as we are informed by the Russian emissary, who had visited the governor in his magnificent palace at Rasht.

"Hedayat Khan asked that Gilyan [sic] province be placed under the Russian protection. Hedayat Khan had proposed this at his last meeting with Consul Bogolyubov. He had suggested that as soon as Karim Khan died Russia should send 3,000 men to Gilyan in addition to Hedayat Khan's 15,000 Hedayat Khan took upon himself the maintenance of the

1. G.M., p.271.

2. Ibid.

3. G.G., p.230.

"Russian force and promised to pay Russia what he had been paying Kerim Khan, 200,000 Rubles each year and 2,000 batmans - 700 poods of raw silk."<sup>1</sup>

The answer to the proposal from Petersburg was negative, due to the treaties of 1732 and 1735 and Russia's long friendship with Persia.<sup>2</sup> However, Hedāyat Khān was captured by Zolfaqār Khān and sent to Khamseh.<sup>3</sup> The next we hear about him is in the battle which took place between ʿAli Morād Khān and the Afshār chief, Zolfaqār Khān.<sup>4</sup> Zolfaqār Khān made himself master of the province with great ease, by appointing some of the local chiefs in charge of the administration. His next step was to return to his stronghold of Khamseh, where he could repel the challenge of the Zand army, with ʿAli Morād Khān at its head.

These actions covered several years. During this time the government at Shirāz had changed hands and, now, ʿAli Morād Khān was acting as the commander of the army in ʿEraq on behalf of Abol Fath Khān. We will relate these events in a later section.

We have mentioned that ʿAli Morād Khān openly rebelled against the rule of Zaki Khān. Apparently, his camp had attracted a great many warriors in Tehran. He then set off for Esfāhān and, on the way, he visited the shrine at Qum of Ma<sup>ʿ</sup>sumeh, the sister of the eighth Imam Moḥammad Ebn Musā-al Rezā. He vowed that he would fight until the rightful heir was reinstated. If he gained final victory over his rival he would present the shrine with a great sum of money to decorate and beautify it.<sup>5</sup>

1. L.V. Stroeve, "Russian Sources on the History of Iran, 1750-1800", Vestnik Leningrad skogo universiteta, no.20, 1974.

2. Ibid.

3. G.G., p.223.

4. G.M., p.276. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bussora, 4th Oct. 1779.

5. G.M., p.260.

During his stay at Qum, letters had arrived from the governor of Kāshān, together with a few decrees (Ta<sup>C</sup>liqe) addressing the chiefs in his army, informing them of the dismissal of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād as the commander of the Army in <sup>C</sup>Eraq. They also contained orders that the Amirs should present themselves in the capital, Shirāz. Fortunately, these Ta<sup>C</sup>liques had found their way into the hands of men partial to <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, otherwise they could have excited great alarm in the troops and may even have incited them to disperse.<sup>1</sup> On this occasion <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, with much alertness and promptitude, rescued his army from being thrown into tumult and confusion. He purged the chiefs, whose fidelity was not altogether certain, seized these men on the way to Kāshān, and delivered them to Kāshān's governor to be held in prison.<sup>2</sup> Among the purged officers was <sup>C</sup>Abdol Rahim Khān Shirazi, the leader of the infantry<sup>3</sup> and some of the tribal chiefs of Bajlān, Modānlu and Eslāmu. <sup>C</sup>Abdol Rahim Khān rightly deserved the suspicion that <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān manifested towards him. He was Hāji Ebrāhim's brother, who was later to become the Kalāntar of Shirāz. It was <sup>C</sup>Abdol Rahim Khān who had carried out the mutiny in the camp of Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān at the kalāntar's instigation.

However, <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān did not stay very long in Kāshān and he set off for Esfāhān, where he intended to make his power base. <sup>4</sup> Zaki Khān had regretted his own folly in sending such a potential rival out of his reach. He had contrived to eliminate all his opponents. Apparently having to rely on the assistance of his nephew, <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād, who seems to have been his only ally in the ruthless struggle for supremacy over the Zand nobles, he had refrained from taking action against <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān.

1. G.M., p.261.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. Apparently after his release he joined Sādeq Khān in Shirāz.

4. G.G., p.224 Loc. cit. I.Z., p.10.

Golshan-e-Morād asserts that it was during the time that <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān was in Tehran that he decided to oppose his uncle and "their friendship turned into hostility".<sup>1</sup> There is, however, reason to believe that, even while in Shirāz, <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān was entertaining resentment towards Zaki Khān.<sup>2</sup> At all events, Zaki Khān, determined to curtail the threat from <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād, prepared to leave the capital to challenge him. He ordered the citizens of Shirāz, of all ranks and descriptions, to leave the city within a few hours and gather in the shrine of Emām Zādeh Hamzeh outside the gates, including the <sup>C</sup>olama. Only a few shopkeepers and artisans were to remain in the city. The picture given by the author of Giti Goshay of the horror and confusion which this order created, although terrifying, can at times be amusing.

"Some of the great men and dignitaries had failed to inform their families while they had no proper footwear and could not procure horses and were on foot." <sup>3</sup>

Zaki Khān had been supervising the execution of his order, by sitting at one of the gates of Shirāz, to make sure that all the male inhabitants of any consequence would leave.<sup>4</sup> The inhabitants, unaware of his scheme, had gathered outside the gates, only to be taken along towards Esfāhān at short notice. Zaki Khān appointed his son, Akbar Khān, as the governor of the city in his absence and, taking along the unfortunate sons of the Vakil,<sup>5</sup> on the 20th Jomada I 1193/ 8th May, 1779, he marched in great haste to Esfāhān.

1. G.M., p. 259.

2. G.G., p.222.

3. Ibid., pp.225-226. G.M., p.262. I.S., p.267. I.Z., pp.10-11.

4. G.G., p.225-6. G.M., p.262.

5. Ibid. I.S., p.267.



On the way, he forbade his army to make any noise; that is, even the bells on the cattle had been removed. The Neqāreh Khāneh had been forbidden to produce any sound, in case the enemy were alerted of the approaching troops.

His troops stopped on the border of Fārs and <sup>C</sup>Eraq, in the small town of Yazdkhāst (or Eiyzad Khāst). It was here that Zaki Khān was killed. The events, which led to his death, are as follows: His adversary <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān had looted a caravan, which was carrying treasures to the capital from Esfāhān. The raid had taken place near Yazdkhāst and Zaki Khān, infuriated by the act, vented his anger on the local population for having failed to prevent it, and demanded reimbursement of 6000 Tomans,<sup>1</sup> the value of the stolen treasure, from them.

The wretched populace pleaded innocence and asserted that they knew nothing of the matter. Their representations met with the wrath of the Khān, who ordered his soldiers to take eighteen of the principal men of the town and throw them from a window, which was overlooking a cliff. (The window was shown to Malcolm in 1807 by the people). Apparently he had ordered them to be beaten before they were murdered.<sup>2</sup> Not satisfied with what he had done, he sent a holy man, a seyed, to be present. On entering the room, he accused the poor man of having appropriated and concealed the sum of money in question. The seyed's plea failed to create any impression on the mind of a man, whose wrath would only be appeased by acts of barbarity. He further commanded his soldiers to throw the holy man from the window. He was dashed to pieces, while his wife and daughters were given away to the lust of the soldiery.<sup>3</sup>

The tribal warriors, however callous and hostile to the citizens they may have been, beheld these actions with horror.<sup>3</sup>

1. H.P., Vol.II. Francklin states the amount as 3,000 Tomans; p.129.

2. G.G., p.227. G.M., p.264.

3. H.P., Vol.II, p.160.

They considered his last act a sacrilege and beyond what they could endure. They met secretly after the event and determined to kill Zaki Khān, vowing not to betray their cause. Apparently one of the conspirators had contrived to inform the Khān of the plot, probably out of fear or flattery. This treachery was discovered and the traitor was put to death by his associates.<sup>1</sup> However, at night, when the Khān had retired to his private tent, the elder of the tribe of Māfi, by the name of Khān Āli Khān, with a few others, approached his tent. Zaki Khān was alone in the tent with two girls, whom he had chosen to spend the night with.<sup>2</sup> He generally did not allow the guards to be around his tent,<sup>3</sup> and this made the task easier for the plotters. They drew near to the tent, Zaki Khān noticed the noise, got up and tried to reach his tent of audience,<sup>4</sup> where he could see light; but, before he could make a move, he was shot and the tent was thrown over his head by cutting the ropes.<sup>5</sup> He died on the 28th Jamada:II 1193/ 13th July, 1779.

Thus ended the life of a man, whose one hundred days of rule was truly a disastrous nightmare. It appears that the excesses of Zaki Khān in Yazdkhāst were not the only cause for his murder. As Golshan-e-Morād asserts, the Māfi tribal chiefs, who had been of great assistance to him after the death of the Vakil, were known for their bravery and dignity among the warriors. Zaki Khān had witnessed their bravery and capabilities in times of trouble. This had created apprehension in his mind and he had secretly turned away from them, waiting for a suitable opportunity to do away with them. They, for their part, had sensed his dangerous fears and were keen to finish him off before he took the initiative.<sup>6</sup> This assertion is

1. G.M., p.256. To the number of seventy.

2. Ibid.

3. R.M.M., p.72. G.G., p.227.

4. I.S., p.267.

5. G.M., p.265. D.K., p.cxiv.

6. G.M., p.264. G.G., p.227.

endorsed by the account given by the kalāntar, Mirzā Mohāmad, who also states that the tribal warriors openly expressed their dissatisfaction with his conduct, despite the enormous amount of money which he had given them.<sup>1</sup> Giti Goshāy describes the leader of the plot as a troublesome character, who feared for his safety. This work also asserts that Khān <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was allied with other tribes in this conspiracy.<sup>2</sup> There is an allegation, which involved Abol Fath Khān in the affair.<sup>3</sup> This is, however, doubted by some other authorities, who observe that this act is outwith his known character.<sup>4</sup> 7

Immediately after the murder, the assassins rushed to the prince's tent to inform him of the incident. All the troops then declared themselves in favour of Abol Fath Khān. On the following morning, the king, with all the notables and a great number of troops, set off for Shirāz. Sādeq Khān was informed of the event and he, too, hastened towards the capital.

To assess the impact of the short-lived rule of Zaki Khān, that is, a period of little more than three months, is a difficult task. Zaki Khān's time and energy were largely taken up at home, that is to say, with his attempt to annihilate ruthlessly the nobles of the Zand family, who were a potential threat to his reign of terror. This policy, in effect, deprived the Zands of the militarily capable generals, such as Nazar <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, who had achieved many spectacular victories over the Zand's opponents during the reign of the Vakil. Further, he had antagonised those tribal chiefs, on whose aid the rulers had to rely at the time of major unrest. For instance, it is significant that he was murdered by the Māfis, an indispensable element in the Zand army.

1. R.M.M., p.72.

2. G.G., p.227.

3. I.S., p.267.

4. H.P., Vol.II, p.161.

But we must give him some credit for his administration, although it was only through inciting fear and terror, that he carried out his measures. However, his management was so vigorous that no-one dared to disobey him.<sup>1</sup> One historian informs us that in his reign, the shopkeepers left their shops open and unattended, while reposing in their homes at nights, and no-one would touch the goods or approach the shops.<sup>2</sup> Mirzā Mohammad, Kalāntar of Shirāz, asserts that Zaki Khān was the only person, who could take the administration in hand after the death of the Vakil. One may assume that rivalries and strife were already in existence before the Vakil died. It is not, however, primarily by what the arrogant, bitter kalāntar affirms, that one comes to this conclusion. We learn from an interview between the Russian consul and Hedāyat Khān, the governor of Gilān, that

"Karim Khan is no longer popular with anyone, losing power over his army. With only 4000 men in his protection and a few strongholds. Tired with age he has remained in his fortress for three years, his guards disarming every one at the gates; Karim Khan prevented his Khans from revolting only because their wives and relatives were in Shiraz and Kazvin as hostages. He collected much money and gold in tax, from his poor people, for his frivolous sons."<sup>3</sup>

These accounts were endorsed by the kalāntar, who affirms that the manners the Vakil had adopted in the last year of his life were quite contrary to those he used to have. He would kill many people for a trifling offence; it was especially his avarice, which had been the cause of much criticism. The kalāntar further asserts that during his long illness, the provinces of Fārs and <sup>C</sup>Eraq were in constant terror and anxiety. Four or five times, the news of his death reached the inhabitants, and

1. G.M., p.261.

2. M.T., p.345.

3. Vestnik Leningradskogo... 1750-1800, AVPR, 1768, 77/7, 100, 6.

again it was denied from Shirāz.<sup>1</sup> The illness of the Vakil had caused a power vacuum and had created discontent and uncertainty among the public, more so in the tribal warriors who formed the army. As Golshan-e-Morād describes it:

"Karim Khan despite his serious condition was in such dread of a revolt that he used to force himself to attend the usual public audiences, on one occasion as he was mounting his horse to go to his private apartment (harim) weakness betook him and he fell off his horse, he was carried into the palace by the order of his son Abol Fath Khān who was immediately called to attend his father."<sup>2</sup>

This reminds one of the situation in the Ṣafavid period, that is during the reign of Soltān Moḥammad Ṣafavi, the Qezelbāsh Amirs, discontented with the weakness of the Shah and the power and influence of Maḥd-e-Olya, his wife, rushed into the ḥarim, slew her and many of her relations. They burst open the chests of treasures and plundered whatever they found.<sup>3</sup> The Vakil was afraid of an uprising among his own relations. The court had already polarized around his two sons, even the ladies in the ḥarim were divided in support of one against the other.

The citizens of Shirāz were in greater dread of unrest, as is indicated in the account given by Golshan-e-Morād.

"In an occasion before the Vakil died his conditions had worsened to a degree that there was no hope for his surviving the attack of the disease. The citizens of Shiraz set out to barricade their houses and their streets in order to defend themselves."

1. R.M.M., p.68

2. G.M., p.214.

3. Eskandarbeg, Alām Āraye Abbāsi, trans. E. arshāter, Vol.I, p.370.

It was only after his recovery was confirmed that the Shirāzis started their normal life.<sup>1</sup> This event is indicative of the tension already felt by the city populace. As to what they really feared, we do not know, but it is highly likely that what happened was a fraction of what would have happened had Zaki Khān not taken the lead. There are two possibilities: 1) The supporters of different factions amongst the citizens took to battle in order to establish their power. 2) The soldiers, who were mainly tribal, attacked civilians, plundered the houses and massacred the people. In either of the two cases, of which the latter seems the more likely, it would have involved much more bloodshed.

Tribal  
Means >

The kalāntar, who seems to be totally resigned and even hostile to the nobles of the Zand house, uses an expression which shows his disinclination to participate in any of the hostilities, that is: "let the head of the enemy be struck by the dagger of the enemy".<sup>2</sup> It is quite evident that he does not support either of the two factions, despite the fact that he is faithful to the wishes of his late master, the Vakil. As he constantly reprimands and curses Sādeq Khān, for having deprived Abol Fath Khān of his rights,<sup>3</sup> it is surprising that he sees nothing wrong with Zaki Khān's brutality. It was probably of the real civil strife that he, as well as the citizens of Shirāz, were most apprehensive. Although Francklin strongly believes that Zaki Khān had not a single good quality to counterbalance his vices, it seems that he prevented much more bloodshed during his rule, than he inflicted on the country.

#### Reign of Abol Fath Khān:

On the 29th Janada I 1193/ 15th June, 1779, that is, the day

1. G.M., p.214.

2. R.M.M., p.69.

3. Ibid., p.80.

after the murder of Zaki Khān, the prince, Abol Fath Khān, with all the courtiers who had unwillingly accompanied Zaki Khān to Esfāhān, advanced towards Shirāz.<sup>1</sup> Some of the notables, including Hāji Āqā Mohāmmad, the governor of Esfāhān, urged the prince to challenge the growing power of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān before he acquired greater influence and strength. But the prince was inclined to march to the capital as soon as he could to save the treasures and royal household. This was, in any case, a more advisable course of action, since he was not yet certain of the hostile sentiments of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān. This policy proved sound since, immediately after <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān learnt of Abol Fath Khān's accession to the throne, he declared himself in favour of the new sovereign and even sent great presents (pishkesh).<sup>2</sup> <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān was reaffirmed in his charge as the commander of the forces in <sup>C</sup>Eraq. The procession of the prince to the capital was indeed pompous and magnificent

"as no king had ever been welcomed in this manner, upward of 100,000 people had come out to greet him, about 50,000 Tomans were spent on the festivity for the occasion."<sup>3</sup>

Coins were struck in Abol Fath Khān's name and, for the second time, he ascended the throne, only to be removed again within a short space of time.

We have mentioned in the previous section, that the young prince was much inclined to drink and spend his time in the society of beautiful damsels.<sup>4</sup> He apparently had no intention of changing his habits now that he had become a king. He started his rule with drinking from dawn to dusk.<sup>5</sup> His court-

1. G.G., p.228. R.M.M., p.72. O.M.T.S., p.132. I.S., p.269.

2. O.M.T.S., p.131. I.S., p.269.

3. R.M.M., p.73.

4. G.G., p.230. Loc. cit.

5. Ibid., p.232. R.M.M., p.73. I.Z., p.12.

iers, who were in debt to his father for much of their wealth and social prestige, tried their best to dissuade him from the vile habit, but to no avail. He promised many times to refrain from drinking, but on every occasion he broke his word.<sup>1</sup> Joseph Amin asserts that he was drinking with his footmen and dancing girls were in his court all day long.<sup>2</sup> Sādeq Khān, who had placed himself in court as the guardian to the king, also reprimanded him and even used harsh words to shake up the drunkard king. This was of no use.<sup>3</sup>

There are, however, contradictory accounts on this point. Francklin asserts that Sādeq Khān

"upon hearing of his brother's decease he became ambitious of reigning alone and from that instant formed schemes for the destruction of his nephew."<sup>4</sup>

Francklin's views are not shared by any of the contemporary historians. There is only an indication in the Ruznameh of the kalāntar that, after the first few days, Sādeq Khān determined to cast his nephew aside and take charge of affairs.<sup>5</sup> Although the Kalāntar and the Zand chief, Sādeq, had a long history of animosity, the kalāntar is fair to the man and affirms that, at first, he had every intention of serving his frivolous nephew. The kalāntar even puts the blame on a few of the Zand nobles, Khodā Morād, Hushiār and Morād Khān, who influenced Sādeq Khān to set himself up as the sovereign.<sup>6</sup> Francklin fails to mention the drinking habit of the king and attributes his melancholy fate to his lenient disposition.<sup>7</sup> Although it is true

1. R.M.M., p.73.

2. L.A.J.A., p. 458.

3. G.G., p.232. I.Z., p.12. I.S., p.269.

4. O.M.I.S., p.131.

5. R.M.M., pp.56-57.

6. Ibid., p.73.

7. O.M.I.S., p.132.



that Abol Fath Khān was an innocent, kind and immature youth, there is every reason to believe that his weak character<sup>1</sup> and mismanagement had reduced the people to the severest distress,<sup>2</sup> as he had totally forsaken the responsibilities and duties of a ruler and had paid no attention to the warnings of the nobles and courtiers, that he should take measures against his enemies in the court.<sup>3</sup> It appears, however, that he was not absolutely devoid of ambitions, as he had tried on several occasions to interfere in political affairs, and this was strongly resented by his uncle.<sup>4</sup>

One of the main causes of discord between him and Sādeq Khān was the fate of Akbar Khān, the son of Zaki Khān. This individual had been peacefully stripped of his charge as the Beglarbegi of Fārs on the king's arrival at the capital. Abol Fath Khān wished to kill or mutilate Akbar Khān, while Sādeq Khān protected him throughout.<sup>5</sup> Apparently Akbar Khān attended the court, as it was customary for the nobles to do, but on every occasion, the mother of Ali Morād Khān, who later married Sādeq Khān, accompanied him in order to prevent his execution or mutilation.<sup>6</sup>

There is no mention as to the cause of the king's wishing to kill the unfortunate Akbar Khān. It could, however, be attributed to the humiliations, which the king had suffered at the hands of Zaki Khān, and his wishing to take his revenge on the latter's son. However, Golshan-e-Morād asserts that Akbar Khān also had insulted the young prince.<sup>7</sup> The gap between

1. I.S., p.269.

2. Ibid.

3. R.M.M., p.73.

4. I.Z., p.12.

5. I.S., p.269.

6. G.M., p.267.

7. Ibid., p.265.

the king and his uncle widened, to the extent that Abol Fath Khān kept Ṣādeq under house arrest for some time, until he was persuaded to summon him and make peace with him. Āzād Khān Afghān, another prominent hostage at the court of the Vakil, was to act as a mediator and attempt to bring Ṣādeq Khān back to the court. His mission failed since Ṣādeq Khān stated that, as long as the king was not willing to adopt his counsel and pay due respect to his old uncle, he was not prepared to attend the court.<sup>1</sup> It appears that Āzād Khān was not the only mediator. The kalāntar also, together with a few of the notables (six people whose names are not given), tried to convince Ṣādeq Khān of the detrimental effect of his antagonism towards his nephew. Ṣādeq Khān promised to heed their representations, but broke his promises.

The tribal chiefs were, as usual, very active in the whole affair. The kalāntar names Amir Guneḥ Khān Afshār, the military commander of the Vakil's army as the instigator of the disaffection of Ṣādeq Khān.<sup>2</sup> The tribes appear to have been tired of the division of power. They had, on many occasions, persuaded the king to give them leave to eliminate Ṣādeq Khān altogether, but the king had refused them permission.<sup>3</sup> There is an interesting account related by Golshan-e-Morād in this connection. The tribes had gathered at the great square (Maidān), demanding permission to deal with Ṣādeq Khān directly. The king, knowing that they were only looking for trouble, had appeared at the balcony of the royal palace to communicate with them. The tribes, finding the king immune to their persuasions, abused him and it very nearly turned into a mutiny, when Mohāmmad Zaman Khān Zand Ishak Āqāsi Bāshi ushered the king inside and advised him to leave, in order to prevent any serious unrest.<sup>4</sup> The tribes then assembled at the house of

1. G.M., p.268. This is the last time we hear of him; he died shortly after.

2. R.M.M., p.74.

3. Ibid., pp.74-75.

4. G.M., p.269.

Ṣādeq Khān and remained there.<sup>1</sup>

This account is substantiated by the kalāntar, who affirms that after the tribes were disappointed with the king, they gathered round Ṣādeq Khān and, consequently, the king was deprived of his throne. The Kalāntar also alleges that Ṣādeq Khān deceived his nephew by promising to give his daughter in marriage to him, and that was one of the reasons, why Abol Fath was not willing to harm his uncle.<sup>2</sup> This is not confirmed by any other source. Giti Goshāy completely justifies Ṣādeq Khān's conduct by stating that the king was under the influence of some of his entourage, who enticed him to kill his uncle.<sup>3</sup> Further, he asserts that the king was seized and put in confinement peacefully,<sup>4</sup> whereas a European historian states that it was after a harsh row, that this event took place.<sup>5</sup> Waring, the source of this allegation, is apt to fantasise in his account, apart from the fact that he gathered his information at a much later period, that is, 1802, and he does not even quote his sources.

However, on the 3rd Rabi<sup>C</sup> II 1193/ 21st. April, 1779, Ṣādeq Khān assumed the supreme power and his first step was to send his son, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, to Esfāhān in the capacity of governor.<sup>6</sup> The main goal was to recapture Esfāhān from <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān who, during the whole period of Abol Fath Khān's reign, was busy quelling the revolt by Zolfaqār Khān and subjugating the provinces in the west. It was in Kāshān that <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān learnt of Abol Fath Khān's fate.<sup>7</sup> He, subsequently, proclaimed himself a competitor for the throne. Ṣādeq Khān had tried, on

1. G.M., p.269. R.M.M., p.73.

2. Loc. cit.

3. G.G., p.232.

4. I.Z., p.12. G.G., p.233.

5. I.S., p.270.

6. G.M., p.278. I.Z., p.13.

7. G.G., p.277.

many occasions, to threaten his military chiefs by the usual methods, such as sending letters to the military chiefs to desert their leader.<sup>1</sup> These measures did not have the desired effect, as Āli Morād Khān appeared to be fairly popular with his army, because of his bounty and liberality of manners. We are informed by various historians, that he gave bonuses to his soldiers and was always ready to forgive the mistakes committed by his chiefs, even if they were disastrous for his cause.<sup>2</sup>

It is extraordinary that Ṣādeq Khān did not attempt to purge the civil administrators, as he was well aware of their adverse sentiments towards him; Mirzā Moḥammad kalāntar, who had done a great deal to prevent Ṣādeq Khān from assuming the reins of the kingdom, was confirmed in his charge, together with other notables.<sup>3</sup> He cast aside some of the tribal elements, who wished to interfere in state affairs, such as Ḥasan Khān Qashqā'i, the son of Esmā<sup>c</sup>il Khān.<sup>4</sup> The kalāntar remarks that the Zand tribal warriors, who had gathered around Ṣādeq Khān, eliminated all his opponents,<sup>5</sup> but he fails to mention who they were.

As the rule of Ṣādeq Khān will be related in a separate chapter, we here end this section with the account of the sad and melancholy end of Abol Fath Khān's rule. He ruled about two months and nine days.<sup>6</sup> It is not certain whether he was deprived of his eyesight, but, as Lotf Āli Khān states to Harford Jones, it appears that he suffered that cruel calamity.<sup>7</sup> His

1. G.M., p.292.

2. Ibid. R.T., p. 442.

3. R.M.M., p.77.

4. G.M., p.266. He had been killed by the order of Āli Morād Khān, when he presented himself at the latter's court in Esfāhān.

5. R.M.M., p.75. I.Z., pp.12-13.

6. Ibid., p.74.

7. D.K., p.clxvi-clxvii.

reign was too brief and turbulent to have contained any major events. It was merely a contest between two parties for power. The competitors were not in any sense compatible. Šādeq Khān was an experienced man in age and background, with supreme military talents and prowess against a young, inexperienced and, according to many of the sources, lenient, weak and unambitious youth.<sup>1</sup> As observed by a European sympathiser,

"he was of too mild a disposition for the turbulent time in which he lived, humane, just and generous, he was the delight of all who saw him and died universally regretted after lingering for the space of two years in a miserable prison overwhelmed by grief and vexation."<sup>2</sup>

Even if all these sympathetic qualities were true, his weakness and idleness were a great obstacle on his way to acquiring power. It was a losing battle for the unfortunate prince, as he was not fit for the power he was vested with. As for his death, we have no accurate information. Golshan-e-Morād gives the date of his death as 1201.<sup>3</sup> He appears to have been alive, when Shirāz was captured by <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, and was later flogged by Seid Morād Khān, the governor of Shirāz, for having concealed jewellery.<sup>4</sup> This was in 1196, which makes the space of time that he lived, after he was dethroned, nearly four years. Therefore, Francklin appears to be wrong in his statement about his death.

Golshan-e-Morād also asserts that he was seized and imprisoned on the 3rd. Rabi<sup>C</sup> II, 1193/ 21st. April, 1779, whereas Tārikh -e-Zandiyeh places it on the 9th Sha<sup>C</sup> ban/ 23rd August. This makes his rule two months and nine days, which is consistent with the assertion of the kalāntar of Shirāz.<sup>5</sup>

1. G.G., p.232. R.M.M., p.74.

2. O.M.I.S., p.132.

3. G.M., p.220.

4. R.M.M., p.74.

5. Ibid.

Sādeq Khān, the new sovereign:

Sādeq Khān, in his successful coup, arrived at the Ark with his sons and troops. He was admitted by the guards into the citadel. At that point, Abol Fath Khān and his brothers unsuspectingly set off to the entrance to greet him, whereupon they were seized and put into confinement on the spot.<sup>1</sup> We have already mentioned that Sādeq Khān had sent his eldest son, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, to Esfāhān to capture and bring it back under the suzerainty of Shirāz. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān made his entry into the city almost unopposed, since <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān was engaged in subjugating a revolt in the western provinces and his newly-appointed governor, Bāqer Khān, who had been promoted from the rank of Kadkhodā to the governorship of the Safavid capital,<sup>2</sup> did not offer a substantial resistance. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān was however forced to leave the city at the approach of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān.

Various reasons are given for Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's hasty departure. Golshan-e-Morād states that, as <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān was Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's half brother, he did not wish to enter into a hostile engagement with him. Giti Goshāy attributes his departure to the smallness of his army. It appears that the real cause was that Esfāhān had no fortifications, in which Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's army could take refuge if a siege should occur. Moreover, he was no match for <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān on an open field. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān took the governor with him and left the city in such confusion, that many of his soldiers were left behind.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān returned to Esfāhān. All the troops, who had been left behind by Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān joined his forces,<sup>4</sup> thus add-

1. G.M., p.269. G.G., p.233. I.Z., p.12. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bussora, 4th. Oct. 1779.

2. Ibid. <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān had raised Bāqer Khān Khoraskāni from the rank of a Kakhoda to that of the governor of Esfāhān.

3. R.M.M., p.75.

4. Ibid.

ing to his power. He is accused by some of the sources, of having extorted great sums of money from the inhabitants. The artisans and traders were the ones most pressed for contribution.<sup>1</sup> This was, however, not unusual. Any chief of pretensions levied a great sum of money on the inhabitants of a city or district, when he was preparing for a major military expedition. <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān then gathered a large force and sent one of his relations, Seid Morād Khān, at its head towards Fārs.<sup>2</sup> By this stage, Ṣādeq Khān had commissioned his son, <sup>C</sup>Ali Naqi Khān, to attack Yazd, a city of great importance for the Zand house, due to its industry and prosperous business activities, which brought considerable revenue to the treasury. The governor of the city, Taqi Khān, had made his submission known to <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, by sending letters of acknowledgement and the usual present (Pishkesh)<sup>3</sup>. Moreover, the governor of the province of Kermān, Abol Ḥasan Khān, had for some time past refused to pay his tribute to Shirāz and had shown partiality to <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān's cause.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>C</sup>Ali Naqi Khān managed with the assistance of Moḥammad Ḥossein Khān Sistāni, an old and devout supporter of his father, to subjugate the neighbourhood of Yazd, but the governor had resolved to resist the enemy. Taqi Khān Yazdi had requested assistance from <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, who at first sent Rezā Qoli Khān Qājār to Yazd, but for some unknown reason,<sup>5</sup> he recalled him to Esfāhān and ordered Moḥammad <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān Boqāyeri, another of his generals, to advance towards Yazd. This chief proceeded with the utmost speed to that quarter, and set about fortifying the town by whatever means he could. Moḥammad <sup>C</sup>Ali

1. G.G., p.234.

2. Ibid.

3. G.M., p.293.

4. G.M., pp.325 and 326.

5. I.M. asserts that he had betrayed <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād's cause. Ms Tehran.

Khān, on one occasion, had ventured to come out of the city and he severely defeated the vanguard forces of Āli Naqi Khān, which numbered 2000 men. He had gained a great amount of booty too.<sup>1</sup> This event had boosted the morale of the Yazdis who, in general, are un-warlike and timid. They were determined after this victory to defend their town with more resilience.<sup>2</sup>

It appears that Āli Naqi Khān had tried to reconcile the governor before he laid siege to the citadel. He had written a letter to him, in which he had entreated him to make peace with the government at Shirāz, but it had had no positive effect, since Taqi Khān had decided to side with Āli Morād Khān. Thus Āli Naqi Khān, having captured the old citadel of Yazd,<sup>3</sup> besieged the governor in the new Ark. The siege lasted more than twenty days. Eventually, Mohammad Hosein Khān Sistāni suggested entering the citadel and negotiating with the besieged. This was accepted and for a time the latter went to and fro, trying to make peace. This aroused suspicion in Āli Naqi Khān, who was not in a position to express his apprehension of a sell-out, fearing to antagonize a powerful ally as well as a good friend. Therefore, he found it more expedient to leave the town and return to Shirāz.<sup>4</sup>

Since he had tortured and beaten whoever he had the least suspicion of having any money, the unfortunate inhabitants of the old town were relieved when he left. It is asserted in some of the sources that he proceeded towards Kermān and was admitted into the citadel by Abol Hasan Khān, the governor.<sup>5</sup> This is not, however, mentioned in most of the contemporary

1. G.M., p.294.

2. Ibid., p.293.

3. Ibid. Yazd had two citadels.

4. Ibid., p.297.

5. Ibid., p.298. E.I.C. resident believes that Akbar Khan captured it. G/29/21, Bushire, 28th June, 1781.



sources and many of the histories are completely silent on this score. Thus, <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Naqi Khān came back to Shirāz. He was, however, then ordered to join his brother, Hasan Khān, in his camp at a place known as Kushk-e-Zard (Qasr-e-Zard). It was there that an engagement between the forces of Shirāz and <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Morād Khān's occurred, in which Seid Morād fled from the battlefield. As a result of his act, the whole of <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Morād's army lost its cohesion and his troops left the field in confusion. <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Morād Khān, enraged by the defeat of his forces, decided to fight the foe in person. He moved out of Esfāhān and encamped on its outskirts. It was at this time that his <sup>ᶜ</sup>Eraqi riflemen deserted him, heading homeward. Mohāmmad Reżā Khān, the chief of Farāhāni riflemen, having a grudge against <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Morād left his service. The rest of his troops soon followed suit and, completely helpless, he was forced to take refuge in Hamadān, where he had appointed a governor, after having captured the town on his last expedition.<sup>1</sup> The reason given for this incident, according to Joseph Amin, was that they were greatly disgusted by his conduct. He had been drinking constantly and, on one occasion, had stripped his clothes off and danced naked in the presence of his military chiefs.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Naqi Khān advanced to Esfāhān, while his brother returned to the capital, Shirāz. Apparently, <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Morād Khān was in such haste that he made the journey from his camp at Qasr-e-Zard to Esfāhān in 24 hours, while a usual trip would take at least three days.<sup>3</sup> <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Naqi Khān, a youth of great courage, had not the sense to follow his foe, while he was reduced to naught. Instead, he established himself in Esfāhān, and appointed Mohāmmad Zamān Khān Bigdeli as Vakil to manage the administration. He also reinstated the old governor, Hāji Āqā Mohāmmad, in his charge as the governor.<sup>4</sup> Ṣādeq Khān wrote a

1. G.M., p.310. G.G., p.235. I.Z., p.15.

2. L.A.J.A., p. 458.

3. G.M., p.310.

4. Ibid.

letter to his son

"to desire he would not lose a moment in improving the great advantage which fortune had given him but the idle youth intoxicated with his success thought of nothing but enjoying his victory."<sup>1</sup>

According to Joseph Amin, during the forty days that <sup>C</sup>Ali Naqi Khān stayed in Esfāhān, he committed many more cruelties and excesses towards the inhabitants. His officers, drunk, searched the houses of the citizens for young girls and whoever fell into their hands was dishonoured.<sup>2</sup> <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, in contrast to <sup>C</sup>Ali Naqi Khān, on entering Hamadān, endeavoured to gather forces in order to regain what he had lost. In the course of thirty to forty days, he gained the support of many tribal warriors and set off towards Esfāhān.<sup>3</sup> <sup>C</sup>Ali Naqi Khān, who had done nothing during his stay at Esfāhān except indulge in drinking and debauchery, was alarmed at the news of his enemy's approach. It was too late to organize his men and, defeated in battle, he fled to Shirāz.<sup>4</sup>

Here we should mention the long-standing hostility on the part of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān towards the Ṣufi saints. The situation had come about when <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān was leaving Esfāhān. At this point, apparently, some of the Jalāli<sup>5</sup> Darvishes had marched through the city, blowing their horns in rejoicing at <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān's grave prospects. This had infuriated the chief to such an extent that, when some zealous Muslims notified him of the Ṣufis' great influence in the place, he did not hesitate to

1. H.P., Vol.2, p.163.

2. Op. cit., p.

3. R.M.M., p.76. G.G., p.236. G.M., pp.311-12. I.O.R., G/29/17. Bussora, 5 Dec. 1780.

4. Tarā'eq, p.172.

5. Tarā'eq believes that Jalāli Sufis were the adherents of Jalāl-e-Bokhāri and were basically a Shi'a order from India; but whether they were different from the Jalālis of Anatolia is not known. Op. cit., Vol.II, p.525.

banish them from the city with much disrespect. ʿAli Morād Khān had shown partiality to the Sufis previously. He had allocated a Takiyeh (cloister) named after Faiz ʿAli Shāh to the latter and his disciples, and had even requested him to prepare a charm for him, so that he might be victorious over his enemies. This request had been granted him and he had been on good terms with the Sufis until the above mentioned incident occurred.<sup>1</sup> Apparently, on this occasion, a brother of Āqā Moḥammad Khān, who was imprisoned in Esfāhān, had been freed and the Sufis, along with some others, had gathered round his banner and had even declared him the king. This had infuriated ʿAli Morād Khān to such a degree, that he changed his amiable attitude towards the Sufis and became their bitter enemy.<sup>2</sup>

#### Sādeq Khān and the tribes:

Sādeq Khān had twice attempted to reduce to submission the turbulent tribes of Kohgiluyeh, but both expeditions had proved futile. On the first expedition, his son, Taqi Khān, had been sent to that area, but he had not effected a victory over these tribes.<sup>3</sup> On the second occasion, a few of the prominent Khāns, like ʿAli Khān of the tribe of Qara chorlu, Ḥaydar Khān Bakh-tiāri and Cherāgh Khān Faili, were sent to those parts to plunder the inhabitants, should they fail to comply with the demands of the government at Shirāz. The Kohgiluyeh tribes asked for assistance from ʿAli Morād Khān. He appointed Moḥammad Khān, the son of the Vali of Lorestān, known as Faili, with the son of Khosro Khān, the Vali of Ardalān. A shāmlu chief, Kāzem Khān, was also commissioned to challenge the army of Shirāz. On the latter's arrival, all the tribes in the Shirāz army joined his camp and Sādeq Khān's army was com-

1. Tara'eq, p.187. I.O.R. G/29/17. 1780.

2. G.M., p.

3. Ibid., p.298. I.O.R. G/29/17. 28th. June, 1781.

pletely routed.<sup>1</sup>

These events appear to have taken place before the defeat of another of Sādeq Khān's sons, <sup>C</sup>Ali Naqi Khān, and this victory greatly increased and heightened <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān's confidence. He had by this time established himself in possession of Kāshān, Hamadān, Brujerd, Kohgiluyeh and Esfāhān with many of Zand dependencies being tributary to him.<sup>2</sup>

At this stage we have to clarify the causes of Sādeq Khān's unpopularity with the tribes and the general public. The majority of the sources agree that the conduct of his sons and the extortions and harsh treatment of his officials, had incited great alarm and disaffection in the people.<sup>3</sup> Giti Goshāy asserts that the three sons, who were by a common woman from the district of Qir and Kārzin, had apparently been much influenced by their uncle, a notorious Luti, whose profligate disposition was proverbial. Thus, his nephews had taken after him, as is generally believed in Persian folklore, Owlad-e-halāl-be Khālush Miravad. The three sons of the monarch had each gathered a number of Lutis around themselves and had set about extorting money and riches from the poor inhabitants of Shirāz. Their conduct was so excessive, that even the Lak tribes had been disgusted with them and, secretly, had sided with <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, joining his camp one by one.<sup>4</sup>

Sādeq Khān appears to have had numerous offspring, amounting to forty.<sup>5</sup> The eldest, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, was a mild and sensible youth, who was much beloved by the late vakil. During his life, the vakil had bestowed great honour on him by ordering

1. G.M., p.298. I.O.R. G/29/17. 28th. June, 1781.

2. R.M.M., p.76.

3. Ibid., p.75. G.G., p.238.

4. R.M.M., p.75.

5. R.I., p.434. I.Z., p.19.

his courtiers to offer him the reverence, which was only due to his own sons.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, he had allocated a separate house, close to his residence, for Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, who was greatly incensed by the licentious conduct of his half-brothers.<sup>2</sup> The discord between Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān and his half-brothers was a cause of grief for his father, Ṣādeq Khān, whose efforts to mediate and put an end to the quarrels had on all occasions failed; Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān had even cut off relations with his father.<sup>3</sup> In short, the three sons had alienated everyone, from their own brother to the lowest of their subjects, thus seriously damaging the reputation and good name, which their father had established through the years. Furthermore, they had jeopardized the monarchy and the power of the Zand house. It appears that Ṣādeq Khān had no control over their activities, and he was in despair, because of their excesses.<sup>4</sup>

Waring suggests that even Akbar Khān (Zaki Khān's son), who was much in debt to Ṣādeq Khān for his safety, as he was nearly blinded or killed by Abol Fath Khān, had Ṣādeq Khān not intervened on his behalf, fled to Ēsfāhān to join Āli Morād Khān, only because he "resented the indignities they had offered him".<sup>5</sup> This view seems to be simplistic, since it could not be the sole cause of such a foolhardy act, that is, to escape in broad daylight despite the efforts of many soldiers to capture him.<sup>6</sup> It appears that he was fearful of being exposed to the same fate as the other Zand nobles. However, the outrageous conduct of Ṣādeq Khān's sons had even antagonised his own supporters, that is, Zand nobles like Morād Khān, Khodā Morād Khān and Hushiār Khān Zand, who had persuaded Ṣādeq

1. G.M., p.332.

2. G.G., p.238.

3. Ibid.

4. I.S., p.271.

5. Ibid.

6. R.M.M., p.76.

Khān to push the king, Abol Fath Khān, aside and usurp his throne. These nobles deserted <sup>C</sup>Ali Naqi Khān in the battlefield before the army of Shirāz met the forces of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān.<sup>1</sup>

As the kalāntar of Shirāz affirms, during these events two-thirds of the tribes had gathered round <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān's standard, with very few tribal warriors remaining in the city of Shirāz. Despite this assertion, Golshan-e-Morād states that the army sent to <sup>C</sup>Eraq to confront <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān numbered about 25,000;<sup>2</sup> this is probably greatly exaggerated. However, <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān stayed nearly a year at Esfāhān,<sup>3</sup> in which place he had established a real court, receiving presents from his vassals and appointing governors to the provinces, which had come under his sway. Šādeq Khān, however, was not prepared to tolerate another monarch in his kingdom. He, therefore, commissioned his son, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, to advance towards Kohgiluyeh and Behbahan and bring these areas back to his father's suzerainty. Incidentally, the cause given for appointing Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān to this task is, that Šādeq Khān was in the habit of consulting the latter on the affairs of state and placed great trust in his judgements. This was resented by his half-brothers, who began to backbite against him and went as far as accusing him of having secret communication with <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān.\* Whether the allegations were well-founded or not, we cannot decide, but as Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān joined <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād's camp later, one is apt to think that there must have been some truth in the matter.

However, Šādeq Khān does not seem to have taken these accusations seriously. If he had done, he would not have let Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān out of his reach. Thus, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān proceeded towards that quarter, with many prominent chiefs in his company,

1. R.M.M., p.75. I.S., p.271.

2. G.M., p.336. E.I.C. resident gives the number 12,000; I.O.R. G/29/17, Bushire, June, 1781. M.T., p.347.

3. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bussora, 14th Feb. 1780.

4. G.M., p.332. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bushire, 28th. June, 1781.

including Moḥammad A<sup>C</sup>zam Khān Afghān, who was to play a major role in the last episode of the Zand and Qājār content-  
ion. Among the chiefs, who accompanied Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, was a certain Kā'i Morād Khān, the chief of a local tribe of Kohgiluyeh, who had been kept in Shirāz as hostage due to his mischievous character.<sup>1</sup> At this stage he was released and became a confidential servant of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān. He had taken it upon himself to persuade the local tribes of Kohgiluyeh to abandon hostile sentiments towards the government at Shirāz and come to terms with it.<sup>2</sup> On arriving in the district, he went into the tribal areas and, instead of abiding by his promises, he set himself up as a warlord. He gathered a large force and actually defeated the force under the command of Moḥammad A<sup>C</sup>zam Khān. It was only when Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān opposed him in person, that he was defeated. These events took place in the year 1194-1195 A.H./1780-1781 A.D., before <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān advanced towards Shirāz for a decisive confrontation.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān summoned all his military chiefs, as well as his courtiers, to consult them about his next move and whether it was expedient to advance to Shirāz and topple a government, which was based on oppression and had deprived the sons of the late Vakil of their inheritance. This he believed to be his duty, since he was the only Zand noble capable of undertaking such a task. He claimed that, if he succeeded in his endeavour, he would withdraw from worldly affairs and would retire to a peaceful place.\* (As early as December, 1779, he had declared to Solaiman Pasha his intention to attack Shirāz.) This was, however, a ploy to gain the consent of his courtiers. As we shall see later, he had no intention of adopting this course of action. It appears that the courtiers unanimously approved

1. G.M., p.332. See the chapter on Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān.

2. Loc. cit.

3. I.O.R. G/29/17. Jan./Feb. 1780.

4. G.M., pp.323-324.

of his designs and he set about preparing his forces for the expedition. Apparently, the arrival of Akbar Khān, Zaki Khān's son, was a decisive and encouraging signal to <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān to execute his long-standing desire to become the sovereign,<sup>1</sup> despite his vociferous denial of having such designs. For nearly two years before his attack on Shirāz, he was virtually independent in the whole of <sup>C</sup>Eraq (1193-5/1779-81), with Esfāhān as his capital.

Once in Esfāhān, Akbar Khān took it upon himself to recruit troops to fight Ṣādeq Khān. After a short while, he gathered about 10,000 cavalry.<sup>2</sup> It took <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān two months to prepare for his military exploits and, in July 1781/Rabi<sup>C</sup> 1195, he encamped in Abraj.<sup>3</sup> At this stage, it is essential to relate the events, which happened in Shirāz while the news of the approaching army from Esfāhān reached the monarch and his courtiers. It appears that Ṣādeq Khān had taken proper measures to prevent his enemy's advance. He had commissioned his son, Taqi Khān, to be stationed in the vicinity of the town of Abādeh, to watch over the activities of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān. Ṣādeq Khān had also sent <sup>C</sup>Ali Naqi Khān, another of his sons, to the province of Kermān. We have no account of the occurrences there. It appears that the governor, despite his support for <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, admitted <sup>C</sup>Ali Naqi into the city and presented him with the usual tokens of acknowledgement, as is stated by Golshan-e-Morād.<sup>4</sup> Although this source seems to have confused the trips that <sup>C</sup>Ali Naqi Khān made to the south, and omits to mention that he returned to Shirāz after his expedition against Yazd, it is nevertheless the only source, which contains any information in this respect.

1. R.M.M., p.76. I.S., p.272. I.O.R., G/29/17, 20th Dec. 1779.

2. I.S., p.272.

3. R.M.M., p.76.

4. G.M., p.298.



<sup>c</sup>Ali Naqi Khān left Kermān, after having received an urgent summons from his father. He arrived in the capital after two of his brothers, Taqi Khān and Hasan Khān, who had been sent out of Shirāz to defend the city, had been defeated and Shirāz was under siege.<sup>1</sup> Apparently, Hasan Khān's army had been dispersed even before an engagement took place. The sources give various reasons for this event. Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh asserts that, on Friday, 20th Rajab, 1195/ 12th July, 1781, a fight broke out between the Lāri and Dashtestāni troops over the distribution of provisions and it led to the disorderly desertion of all the soldiery.<sup>2</sup> Malcolm, who takes much of his information from the above mentioned source, alleges the same reason for the incident. Golshan-e-Morād, however, greatly differs from these sources. It states that there had been a dispute between the Lirāvi and Mamasani tribes against the Lāris, in which Sādeq Khān had been the arbitrator. He had taken the side of the malefactors, the Lāris, by ruling that both parties were at fault. This unjust act had seriously displeased his tribal warriors. They were awaiting an opportunity to avenge the injustice done to them. Shortly afterwards, the Mamasanis were assigned to proceed towards Esfāhān, under the command of Hasan Khān. This gave them a good chance to show their disaffection. On arriving on the plain of Hazār Baižā, they deserted their chief and set off for their homes collectively. Hasan Khān had no option other than a hasty flight to Shirāz.<sup>3</sup>

This incident is clearly indicative of the rivalry and discord between the sedentary and nomadic elements, in the period under study. Indeed, it is a characteristic feature of Zand rule. Each faction sought greater influence and power, and keeping them at bay, or gratifying their greed, was the dilemma the rulers had to contend with. Many of the upheavals and tumults

1. R.M.M., p.77. I.Z., p.17. G.G., pp.237 and 241.

2. I.Z., p.17. H.P., Vol.2, p.164.

3. G.M., p.331.

had been caused by one or other of the factions. Thus, the rulers were, in fact, at the mercy of their own subjects, however much they appeared outwardly to be despotic, oppressive and cruel in their administration.

Ṣādeq Khān suddenly found himself in a serious predicament. Either he had to stop Ḥali Morād Khān's advance, or else his monarchy was lost. It appears that his apprehensions were so intense, that he intended to challenge the foe in person. We are informed of this by the E.I.C. resident.<sup>1</sup> This was, however, contrary to the policies he had hitherto adopted, that is to say, not to leave the city on military expeditions, probably on account of his advanced age, or else out of fear of leaving the administration in the hands of others. On the arrival of Ḥasan Khān at Shirāz, the monarch held a meeting, to which all the dignitaries were invited. This was to decide on the best line of resistance to the approaching threat of a siege. Mirzā Moḥammad Kalāntar expressed his views on this matter as follows:

"now that you have alienated the tribes and they would not be conciliated to your cause, it would be advisable to banish their families from the city altogether. As they would certainly attempt to conduct their families to a place of safety, they will leave Ḥali Morād's camp. Thus, Ḥali Morād Khān would be forced to leave his position near the city or else come to an agreement with the government at Shirāz."<sup>2</sup>

This course of action was adopted at first, and Ṣādeq Khān began fortifying the citadel, but he was warned that the tribes might not react the same way as they had anticipated. Therefore, he changed his mind and began to subject the families of the unhappy tribes to the most cruel treatment, charging

1. I.O.R. L/P&S/9/76. Box 10. 1810.

2. R.M.M., pp.77-78.

his henchmen to levy emergency taxes and heavy fines on them. Whoever refused or, indeed, could not pay the taxes, was beaten, tortured and even mutilated. These measures had the reverse effect. The tribes foresook their families altogether and showed great resilience in their support for <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān. This did not alter the sad fate of the tribes. Their clamour was a constant torment for the citizens,<sup>1</sup> to such an extent that the kalāntar, who never mentions the Lak tribes without a word of abuse, which signifies his hatred for the tribal elements, had to intervene on their behalf and release them from some of their misfortunes.<sup>2</sup>

The siege lasted nearly nine months,<sup>3</sup> during which period the inhabitants were harassed by numerous shortages, of which the first and foremost appears to have been the scarcity of fuel.<sup>4</sup> Again the kalāntar elaborates on the procession, in which *position* everything suitable for consuming as fuel had been burnt, from the trees of the orchards down to the doors and windows of the houses. As a result of the shortages, prices had risen to an astronomical height. A Man of Rogan (about seven and a half pounds of cooking oil) was sold for 2 Tomāns; a cow fetched 10-15 Tomāns,<sup>5</sup> as compared to the prices, which were fixed during the life-time of the Vakil, that is: one shāhi Man (15lbs) of Rogan was 800 Dinars,<sup>6</sup> and a cow was 1 Tomān.<sup>7</sup>

1. A quarter in Shirāz had been allocated to the Lak and Zand tribes, as Waring saw in 1803 it was destroyed by Āqā Mohammad Khān. It was probably near to the Kalāntar's residence. Vol.2, p.33.

2. R.M.M., p.78.

3. I.O.R. G/29/21. Bussora, 2nd Oct. 1781. Giti Goshay states it was about a year. Joseph Amin gives it as 13 months.

4. R.M.M., p.79.

5. Ibid. Francklin in 1789 states that one Tomān is equal to 10-15 Rups. See the table of foreign coins.

6. There was 1000 Dinars in a Tomān.

7. R.I., pp.315-316. The inflationary prices become more striking if compared to those of about forty years later, as given by Johnson. He states that at ... (Cont'd)

Despite all these complaints about the food shortage, the city seems to have been well supplied with provisions, since it was only after five months of the city being under siege that the shops were forced to close.<sup>1</sup> It should also be noted that during these five months, no caravan had been able to enter the city. This suggests that either the granaries, or the shops, were well-stocked before the siege started. At this stage, the notables, disgusted with the state of affairs and the obstinacy of the Khān, prevailed upon him to write to <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān and resolve their differences through peaceful means. The Khān did not yield to their representations. They even suggested that, if he reckoned this to be a sign of weakness and below his dignity, they would do it on his behalf. The Khān was unmoved, until the siege came to its sixth month. It was then, that two of the ministers set forth to find a solution, but it was too late. Up till then, about 6000-7000 people had died, or had been mutilated, either in the war or at the hands of the Khān's henchmen.<sup>2</sup>

There is no rational explanation for Ṣādeq Khān's obstinate resistance. He knew perfectly well that his own courtiers were not loyal to him. Indeed, on one occasion, a few of the courtiers: namely, Mirzā Jāni, a cousin of Mirzā Moḥammad Rabi<sup>C</sup>, the superintendent of the court (Nāẓer Divān), Mirzā Shafi<sup>C</sup> Afshār and Ḥaydar Mirzā, the last of the Ṣafavid princes (the son of Esmā<sup>C</sup> il III, who was kept in Shirāz), secretly wrote to <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, promising him their cooperation. They vowed that they would give away the gate under their charge should <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān approach it at a certain time. The plot was

Cont'd:... Esfāhān a cow, giving in one day a Shahi maund (sic) or 15lbs of milk, cost 24 Rupees; that is, about two Tomāns (p.123). The kalāntar gives the price of tobacco as 2 Tomāns (presumably for a Man); whereas, in 1856, Binning gives it as 1s. 6d. for two Mans (Vol.2, p.47) - One Tomān was equal to £2-10s.

1. R.I., pp.315-316.

2. R.M.M., p.79. The vazir was probably Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein.

discovered. Mirzā Jāni, rather naively, went to the Khān's audience with the letter, which he had received in reply, in his pocket. The Khān, having been previously informed of the conspiracy, questioned him as to the truth of it. Mirzā Jāni denied the charge. He was subsequently searched and the letter was found. At that point, the Khān ordered all the plotters to be executed.<sup>1</sup> This event is much regretted by the Kalāntar, who attributes the misfortune, which befell the family of Ṣādeq Khān, to this sacriligious act, that is, the killing of Haydar Mirzā. It appears that, after the discovery of the plot, Ṣādeq Khān intensified his severe treatment of the inhabitants, "murdering, strangling and mutilating the people occurred day and night".<sup>2</sup>

#### Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's alliance with <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād:

We have, in a previous section, mentioned that Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, being the eldest son of the monarch, was in constant discord with his half-brothers. This, in effect, had alienated him from his father, too. <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, having previous knowledge of the quarrel, found it an ideal pretext for wooing the support and alliance of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān. He wrote letters to him, acknowledging his right to the kingdom as a Zand prince and suggested that, in the case of victory over the government at Shirāz, he was prepared to give him a fair share of the kingdom. He also promised that Ṣādeq Khān and his sons would not be molested if Shirāz fell.<sup>3</sup> Apparently, <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān was in a state of terror that Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān would take sides with his father and attack him, while encamped on the outskirts of Shirāz.<sup>4</sup> Thus, he directed his efforts to winning the support of the latter. There is, however, another version of the story,

1. G.M., p.344. Loc. cit., p.78.

2. Loc. cit., p.78.

3. G.G., p.240.

4. Ibid., p.239.

which is that the chiefs of the forces accompanying Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān had conspired to seize Ja<sup>C</sup>far and deliver him to <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān,<sup>1</sup> and that this was the prime cause of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's joining the latter's camp.

However, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān set off from Behbehān, where he had been stationed for some time past, and advanced towards <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād's camp, the latter sending a few dignitaries to meet his half-brother and receiving him with every mark of distinction.<sup>2</sup> This event must have greatly weakened the position of Ṣādeq Khān and further damaged the strained relations with his son.

The distress within the capital encouraged the inhabitants, and especially some of the most confidential guards<sup>3</sup> of the Khān, to betray one of the gates to the city, known as Bāgh-e-Shāh.<sup>4</sup> They called in Akbar Khān, who was encamped in a position very close to the gates. He rushed in, but before he could secure his position, <sup>C</sup>Ali Naqi Khān was informed of the event, and with great gallantry, the latter fought the invaders, forcing them to retire. However, another of the gates was given away and this could not be remedied.<sup>5</sup> Ṣādeq Khān ordered his sons to retire to the Ark and secure the fortifications.<sup>6</sup>

When <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān entered the city on Tuesday, 18th Rabi<sup>C</sup>I 1195/3rd March, 1782, Ṣādeq Khān had taken refuge with his sons and ministers in the citadel. Golshan-e-Morād asserts that Ṣādeq Khān had taken two of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān's sons into the citadel and, in order to solicit the latter's pardon, he had bestowed robes of honour on them and sent them to the camp of

1. G.M., p.334.

2. Ibid., p.335.

3. E.I.C. Resident states that two Cauns delivered the city. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bussora, 29th March, 1782.

4. G.G., p.242. G.M., p. R.M.M., p.79. I.Z., p.19. O.M.T., p.133.

5. Ibid. I.S., p.273.

6. I.Z., p.19.

their father. <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, however, did not make any promises and only said that he would decide on the matter when he met Ṣādeq Khān.<sup>1</sup> Ṣādeq Khān, before stepping out of the citadel, asked <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād to take an oath on the Qur'an not to molest him; Akbar Khān took the oath on <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān's behalf and soon violated it. Eventually <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād granted amnesty to the besieged and they gave themselves up with promises of safety and security. As usual, the promise was violated and Ṣādeq Khān was deprived of his eyesight and his son, <sup>C</sup>Ali Naqi Khān suffered the same cruelty.<sup>2</sup> It is curious that Kalāntar believes he was killed, in concord with some other sources. *Q. 1000*

It appears that Ṣādeq Khān took his own life after this sad incident. There are various versions as to how he committed suicide. It is, however, most likely that he consumed an amount of opium and died as a result.<sup>3</sup>

He was a man of great valour and spirit, as is asserted by all the sources.<sup>4</sup> He was a distinguished soldier and a competent commander. The kalāntar, with his bitter pen, accuses him of vanity and boastfulness about his bravery,<sup>5</sup> but one is inclined to think that this accusation stems from the fact that Ṣādeq Khān never left Shirāz after he assumed the reins of government.

Ṣādeq Khān, in his career as a monarch, attempted to re-establish the power of the Zands in the areas lost to the kingdom. In the many expeditions, which his forces undertook to Esfāhān, Yazd, Kermān and the western provinces, such as Behbehān and Kohgiluyeh, he was relatively successful. In view

1. G.M., p.368.

2. G.G., p.243. I.S., p.273. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bussora, 25th April, 1782.

3. Ibid.

4. O.M.T.S., p. H.P., Vol.II, p.161. G.G., p.243.

5. R.M.M., p.79.

of the fact, however, that there was a more capable and evidently more popular pretender of the Zand dynasty, <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān, who had at different times brought these areas under his flag, Ṣādeq Khān's efforts proved futile. From the impression given by the resident of the E.I.C. in Bushehr,<sup>1</sup> he was just, condescending and liberal, but, of course, these qualities were totally lost, when he acquired the supreme power in his hands. He became avaricious, cruel and haughty.<sup>2</sup> As to his avarice, one may assume that he was faced with the same dilemma, as that which faced all the successors of the Vakil: namely, that the great expenses of military expeditions could not be provided for by the usual revenues, which came to the treasury, and he did not have any means of raising cash, except by squeezing the poor inhabitants of the capital or other cities, which were tributary to his government.

At one point, he had to devise a rather ingenious means to raise funds, as we learn from the E.I.C. resident:

"he had permitted Coja Yacoob your honour's broker to come to Bushire under a promise and security, however, that he will either return himself, or send his son to Shyras, at the expiration of two months. Sadoo Caun in a letter received by Coja Yacoob informed us that he had granted humbly indulgence in order to settle some accounts with us and some other affairs, but his real errand is to collect a sum of money to distribute among the Cauns and his ministers."<sup>3</sup>

"In order not only to obtain his own (Khajeh Ya<sup>c</sup> qub) release, but the release also of Shaikh Dewis's son and the rest of the principal people at Bussora who have been prisoners at Shyras <sup>[sic]</sup> since the capture of the town by the Persians."<sup>4</sup>

1. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bussora, 3rd Feb. 1779.

2. R.M.M., p.80.

3. I.O.R. G/29/17. Factory records, letter sent by Abraham and Latouch, Bussora 18th May, 1780.

4. I.O.R. G/29/17. Bussora, 18th May, 1780.



Besides these schemes, he was anxious to use his power to protect the trade of the country, since it was one of the sources of revenue. Again we are informed by the resident that, when Ra'is Bāqer of Tanqestān attacked and plundered Bushehr, Sādeq Khān ordered him to repair to Shirāz and restore to the merchants, whatever he had taken.<sup>1</sup> His sons also had a major part in his thirst for amassing wealth, that is, they probably, for their own ends, made use of their notorious lūṭis to mulct and extort money from the people. It was one of the main causes of the tribes' disenchantment with his administration. His rule lasted for more than two years and he died on 20th Rabi<sup>c</sup>I, 1196/5th March, 1782.<sup>2</sup>

Two of his sons, <sup>c</sup>Ali Naqi Khān and Taqi Khān were killed at the same time; the former was a gallant young man, who showed great resilience during the siege of Shirāz.<sup>3</sup> His third son, Ḥasan Khān died suddenly during the siege apparently from an unknown cause.<sup>4</sup> He had many other sons, who were infants at his death and were kept at the ḥarim in Shiraz.<sup>5</sup>

1. I.O.R. G/29/17. 28th August 1779.

2. R.M.M., p.79.

3. G.M., p.347.

4. Ibid. R.M.M., p.78.

5. Op. cit., p.374.

### CHAPTER 3

#### THE RULE OF ʿALI MORĀD KHĀN

ʿAli Morād Khān entered the city of Shirāz on Thursday, 22nd. Rabi<sup>c</sup> I, 1196/7th March, 1782. The festival of Nouruz was held with great pomp and magnificence, on Wednesday, 5th Rabi<sup>c</sup> II, 1196/19th March, 1782. The new sovereign appointed his confidential courtiers to appropriate the treasures belonging to Ṣādeq Khān.<sup>1</sup> Apparently, they were unimaguably immense.<sup>2</sup> It appears that ʿAli Morād Khān gave strict orders that the shops and houses should be secured as a safeguard against looting; but despite this, many of them were pillaged. Moreover, the merchants had to pay the sum of forty Tomāns each as a penalty and security for their property.<sup>3</sup>

Golshan-e-Morād states that ʿAli Morād Khān invited his courtiers to a meeting, in order to decide on the elevation of one of the late Vakil's sons to the throne. This was strongly disputed, as they all believed that the chaos and bloodshed, which had occurred, were due to the incompetence and ineptitude of these idle youths. The discussion over this issue went on for some time, until ʿAli Morād Khān yielded to the wishes of his courtiers; thus the unfortunate sons of the Vakil were blinded<sup>4</sup> and forever banished from the scene.

Mirzā Moḥammad, in his Ruznāmeḥ, asserts that they were immediately deprived of sight, and there was no such meeting.<sup>5</sup>

1. G.M., p.369.

2. Ibid., p.370.

3. R.I.p.440.G.G., p.248.

4. G.M., p.370.

5. R.M.M., p.81.

The EIC resident does not provide us with any information on this question. He says:

"It is not, however, known what has been the fate of two sons of Carim Caun under pretence of supporting whom Ally Morat Caun opposed Sadoo Caun, some say they are confined in the citadel, others, that they have been put to death."<sup>1</sup>

It is curious that Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān admits that his grandfather (Ṣādeq Khān) committed this act. It is quite possible, however, that he even did not know the true facts after all, and that they were deprived of sight by <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān's order.<sup>2</sup>

A month elapsed before the new sovereign pronounced his intention to transfer his court to Esfāhān.<sup>3</sup> Apparently, this sudden decision came about at the instigation of some courtiers, who were aware of his weakness of character and suspicion towards the notables of Shirāz. He had previously appointed Mirzā Mohāmmad as the Beglarbegi of Fārs and had received the presents made on such occasions, amounting to 6,000 Tomāns.<sup>4</sup> He set about extorting immense amounts of money from the inhabitants by fines and imposts. The instigators of the move were apparently six of the <sup>C</sup>Erāqi and Kāshāni courtiers, whose hostility towards the Shirāzis induced them to backbite against the notables of Fārs.<sup>5</sup> <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān thus ordered all the notables of Fars to prepare for departure. On the 2nd Jamada II, 1196/15th May, 1782,<sup>6</sup> the caravan set off for Esfāhān, and he, him-

1. I.O.R. G/29/21. Bussora, 25th April, 1782.

2. D.K., p. clxix.

3. G.M., p. 374.

4. R.M.M., p. 79.

5. Ibid. There is mention of a certain Mirzā Shafi<sup>C</sup> (R.M.M., 79) whose position is not known. It may have been a mistake on the part of the copyist and this person, in all probability, was the minister to <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, Mirzā Rabi<sup>C</sup>. The central parts of Persia was known as <sup>C</sup>Eraq-e-<sup>C</sup>Ajam.

6. R.M.M., p. 80.

self, followed it on the 29th/11th June, 1782.<sup>1</sup> It appears that he took the precaution of transferring all the Kalāntars, local magnates and Kadkhodās of the districts, as well as those from the city of Shirāz, to Esfāhān.<sup>2</sup> However, ʿAli Morād Khān freed all the hostages, who were kept in the court of Shirāz, including Ahmad Khān Donboli, the governor of Khoi and Solmās, together with a few of the chiefs of the same tribe. Khodādād Khān, the son of Najaf Qoli Khān, the Beglarbegi of Tabriz, was also released and appointed to replace his father, who was infirm and weak, as a result of old age.<sup>3</sup> Apparently, Najaf Qoli Khān had requested the release of his son.<sup>4</sup> Şeid Morād Khān was charged with the government of Shirāz, while Abol Fath Khān and his brothers, all the infant children of Şādeq Khān, and the ladies of his ḥarim, as well as the Vakil's, were left behind in Shirāz.<sup>5</sup>

ʿAli Morād Khān arrived in Esfāhān on the 7th Ramażan 1196/16th August, 1782. There was one guest at the court of Shirāz, that is Naşrollāh Mirzā, Shāhrokh Afshār's son, who had sought asylum in Shirāz after his misfortunes. He was taken along to Esfāhān, but, on the way, he managed to escape and with a few adherents headed for Khorasān. His escape was ignored by the monarch.

#### Akbar Khān and his melancholy fate:

This chief was the son of Zaki Khān, who had fled from Shirāz and joined ʿAli Morād Khān at Esfāhān. ʿAli Morād Khān, who was much indebted to him for many of his successes in different expeditions and, most of all, in the capture of Shirāz. It was thanks to Akbar Khān's courage, military prowess and perseverance, that the citadel fell and ʿAli Morād Khān became the

1. G.M., p.344. G.G., pp.243-4.

2. G.G., p.244. G.M., p.374.

3. G.M., p.374.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p.385.

master of the city. However, <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān had ample opportunity to witness this bravery and began to fear him, especially since Akbar Khān went about with a great many tribal warriors, who were his constant companions while he was at court.<sup>1</sup> The fact that Akbar Khān, rightly, attributed the fall of Shirāz to his own military skills, made <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān even more apprehensive.

Golshan-e-Morād believes that <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān's displeasure had been caused by the ruthless conduct and the indignities Akbar Khān had afforded to Ṣādeq Khān and his sons, without the sanction of the Khān, despite a solemn oath upon the Quran not to molest them.<sup>2</sup> This allegation appears to be unfounded, since <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān never took an oath to that effect. As a matter of fact, when Ṣādeq Khān had retired to the Ark of the city, he had given robes of honour to two of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān's sons, Shaikh Vais and Ahmad Morād Khān, and had sent them to the camp of their father, to solicit his pardon. <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān replied that he would decide on that point when they met. To this Ṣādeq Khān had agreed, on the condition that he took an oath not to harass him and his family. Again <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān had declined and Akbar Khān had sworn upon the Quran instead.<sup>3</sup> Evidently, <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān did not wish to have any part in the matter; thus, he had left open the option to his commander, Akbar Khān, to proceed at his own discretion. <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān was also prudent not to alienate Ja<sup>C</sup>ar Khan. However Akbar Khān was accused of having plotted against his master;<sup>4</sup> but the reality was that <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān was jealous of him. Franklin states that the proof of the design was clear.<sup>5</sup> This, however, contrasts with the doubtful view expressed by Mal-

1. G.M., p.372.

2. Ibid., p.368.

3. Ibid.

4. O.M.I.S., p.135. I.S., p.274.

5. O.M.I.S., p.333.

colm, who asserts that:

"It could not have been difficult to persuade Aly Moorad of the dangers he had to apprehend from his ambitious cousin, he believed or affected to believe, that he was guilty."<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, Akbar Khān appears to have been extremely ambitious. There is an instance which clearly indicates that he had set himself up as an able chief, who was not prepared to share the success of his gains.

During the siege of Shirāz by Āli Morād Khān's army, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān was on the verge of defeating the army of the city. Akbar Khān, fearing that Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān would benefit from his success, and thus deprive him of his share, withdrew and left Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān on his own. This encouraged Āli Naqi Khān to attack Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān fiercely. Although Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān managed to force the Shirāzi army to flee, he was very disappointed to miss such an opportunity of complete victory.<sup>2</sup> This incident also shows the element of rivalry and jealousy, which existed between the two chiefs. It is hardly surprising that Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān blinded and subsequently murdered Akbar Khān.

Akbar Khān was universally praised for his many talents. His death, thus, occasioned great regret on the part of many, who had come into contact with him and witnessed with admiration his unequalled bravery. It is regrettable that the fears of a despot did not spare the lives of the very person, who brought him into power.

#### Āli Morād Khān and his attempt to curtail the Qājārs:

While on the march towards Esfāhān, news arrived that the

1. H.P., Vol.II, p.166.

2. G.M., p.353.

Qājārs had attacked and captured Qazvin and had advanced towards Hamadān, Qalamro and Alishekar. Morād Khān Zand was commissioned to proceed to Qazvin and challenge the governor installed there by the Qājārs. Morād Khān, without even stopping in Qazvin, proceeded to Hamadān, where he was defeated in an engagement with the Qājārs. This was mainly due to the fact that his army, who had not had a chance to rest were exhausted and, therefore, unable to give of their best in combat. Morād Khān retired to Hamadān, while the Qājārs returned to Qazvin. At this stage, Āqā Moḥammad Khān was informed of the arrival of Āli Morād Khān in Esfāhān. He, therefore, ordered his brother, Ja<sup>c</sup>far Qoli Khān, and his army to evacuate Qazvin and retire to Māzandarān,<sup>1</sup> apparently to consolidate his power in the territories he had already conquered. Morād Khān entered Qazvin and, having manifested rebellious intentions, he was summoned to Esfāhān and deprived of his charge. On his arrival at the capital, he was blinded and imprisoned.<sup>2</sup>

The state of affairs in Shirāz has reached us through the kal-āntar, who received letters from his associates there. The governor of Shirāz, Seid Morād, had treated the inhabitants so cruelly, that many would have preferred the hardship of the siege, rather than the injustices of his office; while others had long since fled<sup>3</sup> to various parts of India and Turkey. This allegation is endorsed by the French ambassador, Ferrieres Sauveboeuf, who was commissioned to the court of Āli Morād Khān and witnessed the despair of the populace. He states:

"un grand nombre de Persans se sont refugies a Bagdad & a Bassora pour y oublier dans le repos d'heureux loisirs les fureurs de leurs compatriotes."<sup>4</sup>

1. G.M., p.388.

2. Ibid.

3. R.M.M., p.81.

4. H.P., Vol.I, p.76.

Seid Morād Khān appears to have extorted vast amounts of cash from the populace in Shirāz. He went as far as flogging poor Abol Fath Khān to recover the jewellery that he was supposed to have concealed.<sup>1</sup>

These measures are sharply contrasted with the policy adopted by Āli Morād Khān himself, who took great care to prevent injustice and extortions by officials. At one stage, some of his Kurdish soldiers of the Bābān tribe committed many acts of excess towards the inhabitants. This reached Āli Morād Khān's ears and he announced his decision to punish them. Yet he did not issue a decree to that effect, while one of his courtiers spread the news to the inhabitants. The people then took the matter into their own hands and attacked the soldiers, disarming and plundering all their effects. Āli Morād Khān, learning of the outrageous conduct of his subjects, ordered that all those, who had anything to do with the incident, should be severely punished. This measure caused many instances of injustice, since the ordinary passers-by in the Bāzār were also apprehended and punished.<sup>2</sup> Another example of his love for justice is manifested in the severe treatment of the son of Mirzā Rabi<sup>c</sup>, his own minister, as stated by Ferrieres Sauveboeuf:

"le fils de Mirsa Rabbi, premier ministre d'Ali Mourat-Khan, lui fut dénoncé pour avoir abusé par violence d'une jeune fille. Ce souverain ordonna sur-le-champ que lorsque Mirsa Rabbi seroit un conseil, son fils recevrait deux cent coups de bâtons à la porte de palais."<sup>3</sup>

1. Op. cit., p.74.

2. G.M., p.392.

3. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.52.



Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān and the emergence of hostility:

We have related in the previous chapter that Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān joined <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān's camp, only when he had been assured that his relations would not be molested, and also on the condition that he would be given a fair share in the government. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān was disappointed on both these accounts. Furthermore, he was rejected and subjected to constant harassment, due to the monarch's jealousy.<sup>1</sup> Apparently, he was forced to dismiss his personal guards and to manage with very few servants, merely to avert the apprehensions, which <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān harboured. <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān even tormented Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's associates. For instance,

"there was a man of high birth who had assumed the guise of Sufis and was much respected for his saintly benevolence and purity of manners. He, as a companion lived in the court of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khan."<sup>2</sup>

This Sufi saint, apparently Nur <sup>C</sup>Ali Shāh, was sought after by the dignitaries of Fārs and this, in effect, had made him dangerous, in case he was used as a link between Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān and the notables in a conspiracy. However, Nur <sup>C</sup>Ali Shāh and other of the Sufi Saints, were banished from Esfāhān with much indignity and insults.<sup>3</sup> The Mollas in the city had a share in this affair, as they had warned that the true faith was endangered.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, in his despair to find a means of severing the link between the Fārsi Notables and the tribes with Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, decided to commission him to undertake a military assignment. He was, therefore, sent to Kurdestān and Ardalān, in

1. G.G., p.245.

2. Ibid., p.345.

3. H.P., Vol.2, p.419. I.H., Vol.2, p.172.

4. H.P., p.v.2., p.419.

order to restore peace in those areas. The pretext for the assignment was that Khosro Khān, the Vāli of Ardalān, had for some time past refrained from acknowledging the government at Esfāhān and, even when <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān had sent him a robe of honour with presents, he had failed to pay the tribute and revenues demanded of him.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the chief of the Kurdish Bābān tribes had killed the governor of Sanqor and established himself in his position.<sup>2</sup> The expedition was, however, fruitless as Khosro Khān, learning of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khan's approach and finding out that his own brother had conspired against him, fled his governorate and reached Esfāhān without meeting the army sent to deal with him. He took refuge in the royal stables (Bast) and was subsequently pardoned.<sup>3</sup> Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, however, established himself in that area and began to entertain the idea of rebellion, when a suitable opportunity should arise.

#### The arrival of the Russian ambassador:

In the year 1197/1782-83, an Armenian, by the name of Ya<sup>C</sup>qub arrived at the court of Esfāhān, on behalf of the Russian Empress, Catherine II. The purpose of the embassy was that, as the two great powers, Russia and Ottoman Turkey had commenced hostile military operations, the Empress expected the Persian monarch to honour the articles of friendship treaty signed in 1733-35, and to allow Russian troops to pass through his dominion in their attack on Qārs and Arzrum. She also requested the Persian monarch to send a punitive detachment to reduce the Lazgis in Dāqestān, who caused much inconvenience to the Russian government with their inroads into their Empire. <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, with great diplomacy, declined the first request, stating that he was on friendly terms with the Ottoman solṭān, and that the treaties, which his predecessors had signed with

1. G.M., p.388.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p.389.

Turkey, were sacred to him. As to the second request, he replied that he would notify his Beglarbegi in the province of Dāgīstān to take the necessary measures against the Lazgis. He also sent an Ambassador, Mohammad Khān Mokri, to the Russian court, in company with the Russian embassy, with suitable presents.<sup>1</sup>

### ʿAli Morād Khān and religion:

Unlike most of the Zand rulers, ʿAli Morād Khān appears to have had great zeal for religion. On many occasions, he visited the shrine of Maṣūmeh,<sup>2</sup> and vowed to repair and redecorate it, if he won over his opponents. He also promised to present the shrines of Ottoman ʿErāq with enormous donations. In the year 1197/1782-83, he commissioned many of the best craftsmen to proceed to the ʿAtabāt, in order to renew the tile work of the tomb of ʿAli, together with many precious chandeliers and magnificent carpets made in the village of Jusheqān, plus the amount of 20,000 gold Tomāns (Tabrizi) for the renovation of the shrine. The sum of 12,000 gold Tomāns was allocated for the redecoration of the shrine of Hosein the third Emām; 8,000 for the shrine of his brother ʿAbbās, with fine carpets and a wooden sepulchre, inlaid with ivory, worked by the illustrious artisan, Rahim Najjār Bāshi.<sup>3</sup> The amount of money sent appears to be grossly exaggerated. Mirzā Moḥammad Kalāntar gives the sum as 20,000 total. He appointed Mirzā Aḥmad, the son of Mirzā Moḥammad ʿAli Sadr, to execute the work, if the money was sufficient to carry out the monarch's wishes to the best of his ability and if not, to inform him to send more. Were the

1. G.M., p.394. According to the Russian documents, which I have not been able to consult ʿAli Morād Khān had taken the initiative to establish friendly relations with the Empress of Russia, on condition that he would give the right to the Russians to trade in the north of Persia.

2. The sister of Emām Rezā, the Eighth Emām of the Shiʿa.

3. G.M., p.393.

donation to exceed the expenses, the remaining sum should be given to the Oṣuli Mojtahed, Moḥammad Bāqer Behbehāni to donate to the needy. The repair work was finished and a new mosque was also built, but Mirzā Ahmad died amidst it, and the mosque was never completed.<sup>1</sup> ʿAli Morād Khān appears to have acknowledged, with this act, the Oṣuli school, and its adherents, against the Akhbāris. His love for ʿAli was so excessive that, whenever ʿAli's name was mentioned, the tears flowed down his face.<sup>2</sup> He was also greatly superstitious and is reported to have requested Faiẓ ʿAli Shāh to prepare a charm (Telesm) for him to gain victory over his foes.<sup>3</sup> He was also known to have a strong belief in astrology.

#### The expedition against Māzandarān:

After the failure of Amir Guneḥ Khān in his expedition against Māzandarān, ʿAli Morād Khān was annoyed and dissatisfied with him, but he did not show his wrath. Amir Guneḥ Khān's sister was one of the ladies in his ḥarim and the company of the good lady compensated and arrested the wrath of the monarch for the defeat he had sustained.<sup>4</sup> Besides, he hoped that Āqā Moḥammad Khān would be satisfied with the two provinces of Māzandarān and Astarābād, which were his hereditary dominion.<sup>5</sup> However, Āqā Moḥammad Khān, in his attempt to expand his territories, attacked Qazvin, Hamadān and Gilān, with its dependencies and reduced all these areas into submission.<sup>6</sup> He further attempted to capture Tehran.<sup>7</sup> These acts of utter disregard for Zand suzerainty, induced ʿAli Morād Khān to curtail

1. G.M., pp.393-4.

2. R.M.M., p.82. G.M., p.393.

3. I.H., v.3, p.187.

4. G.M., p.400.

5. Ibid. p.400.

6. Ibid., p.247.

7. G.G., p.248. G.M., p.401.

the Qājār exploits by military expedition into Māzandarān.

The Zand monarch had received many letters from the inhabitants of Māzandarān, who had beseeched him to relieve them from the grip of the Qājārs.<sup>1</sup> Waring even asserts that a mission had come to the court of Esfāhān to represent the Māzandarānis' case. They had arrived in the year 1782/1196-97, and had communicated their grievances to the minister of the Monarch, to the effect that, when Āqā Moḥammad Khān had besieged the town of Sāri,

"the adherents of the family of the Zands had beheld the success of A Moohummud with envy, perhaps regret; and many of them had retired from this scene of mortification to Isphahan."

"The minister listened with attention to their remonstrances, and through him, they represented to the king, what the servility of his courtiers had never ventured to whisper; that his authority was unacknowledged on the borders of the Caspian sea, and that A Moohummud Khan, a Qajar, presumed to contend with him for the Persian throne."<sup>2</sup>

The men had further stated that the Qājār pretender was

"by no means formidable; and that if they were assisted with a small body of troops, and an experienced commander, they would reduce him to subjection."<sup>3</sup>

There is no evidence to endorse this allegation, although we are assured that the general populace were disgusted with the tyranny and avarice of the Qājār chief, and that they had written to Esfahan, requesting assistance to fight him.<sup>4</sup> This

1. R.M.M., p.83.

2. I.S., pp.277-8.

3. Ibid.

4. G.M., p.401.

is substantiated by the fact, that the cities and towns of Māzandarān succumbed to the rule of the Zands with joy.<sup>1</sup> However, ʿAli Morād Khān was determined to challenge the power of the Qājārs. He was so adamant in his decision, that he refused to heed the opinion of his courtiers, who opposed the idea.<sup>2</sup> He threatened that anyone, who attempted to stop him, would be dealt with as the enemy of his kingdom. Incidentally, perhaps the only reasonable explanation for his courtiers' opposition to this expedition, was the state of ʿAli Morād Khān's health, which had deteriorated because of heavy drinking.<sup>3</sup>

ʿAli Morād Khān took the precaution of trying to establish an alliance with the governor of Gilān, Hadāyat Khān, by sending an envoy, Mirzā ʿEnāyatollāh Esfāhāni, to ask for his daughter's hand in marriage.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, he made ample preparations for this expedition. Apparently, he recruited such forces that it took him a week to review them in Tehran.<sup>5</sup> The French ambassador states that his army numbered about 60,000;<sup>6</sup> this was the largest force that a Zand ruler had ever gathered after the death of the Vakil. Thus, ʿAli Morād Khān sent his young son, Shaikh Ovais (Vais) at the head of a force, under the command of Moḥammad Tāher Khān Zand,<sup>7</sup> a military general of great ability, to Māzandarān. Shaikh Vais was ordered to halt at Firuzkuh, until the monarch himself arrived in Tehran.<sup>8</sup> However, Shaikh Vais, who was a youth of 18 years,

1. R.M.M., p.83. G.G., p.249. G.M., p.400.

2. R.M.M., p.83.

3. Ibid., p.

4. Ibid., p.83. G.M., p.394.

5. G.M., p.403.

6. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.291. G.M., p.403.

7. G.G., p.249. G.M., pp.405-6. I.Z., p.21.

8. G.M., p.401.

advanced towards Māzandarān, and was met everywhere with a friendly welcome. He proceeded to Sāri without much difficulty, and stationed his army there.

It was at this time that two of the Qājār chief's brothers came to the Zand camp and encouraged Shaikh Vais to attack Astarābād,<sup>1</sup> Āqā Moḥammad Khān's stronghold. Immediately, the whole province of Māzandarān came under Zand rule, as we are informed by the EIC resident.<sup>2</sup> Shaikh Vais Khān stayed in Sāri, while Moḥammad Tāher Khān, his commander, marched towards Astarābād. After having negotiated a difficult pass, he did not secure it by leaving a detachment there.<sup>3</sup> The Qājārs, aware of the importance of the pass, blocked it and, thus, prevented the Zand camp from receiving food and provisions. A serious famine broke out and the soldiers were reduced to eating the flesh of their pack animals. Many of them fled and the two Qājār chiefs in the Zand army also deserted Moḥammad Tāher Khān.<sup>4</sup> Finding his position untenable, he, too, retired with the remainder of his army, to the town of Sāri.<sup>5</sup>

While in Tehran, Āli Morād Khān summoned Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān to join his camp. The latter accordingly arrived in Tehran, only to be sent on another expedition.<sup>6</sup> On his return to the Western provinces, he resolved to rebel against Āli Morād Khān, probably having seen the monarch and assessed his desperate situation, in respect to his health. The retreating troops of Moḥammad Tāher Khān fell in with the Qājārs. Most of the troops were slain, while their commander was captured and taken before

1. G.M., p.406.

2. I.O.R., G/29/22. Bussora. 6th Nov. 1784.

3. G.G., p.249. G.M., p.407. I.Z., p.22.

4. G.M., p.407.

5. Ibid., p.408. I.Z., p.

6. G.G., pp.254-5. G.M., p.404.

Āqā Mohammad Khān, who had him put to the sword.<sup>1</sup> The mortifying news reached Shaikh Vais and his forces. Many of his military chiefs deserted him and fled to Tehran. The unfortunate youth hastily retired to Tehran too.<sup>2</sup> Apparently, Āli Morād Khan was so indignant that he ordered his son to be slain.<sup>3</sup> This command was, however, altered and he agreed to put to death the chiefs, who had deserted his son.<sup>4</sup>

Another detachment, under the command of Rostam Khān Zand, was sent to challenge the Qājār; this force was defeated also.<sup>5</sup> Āli Morād Khān stayed in Tehran more than seven months. He was afflicted by dropsy and his condition worsened, because of the unwholesome climate of Tehran.<sup>6</sup> Apparently his liver was infected and the physicians did all they could to bring back his failing health. Thus, they advised him to return to Esfāhān.<sup>7</sup> This view is expressed by his historian, the author of Gotshane-Morād, while the reality was that the news of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's rebellion had reached him and he was anxious to return to his capital.<sup>8</sup> He left his son as the governor in Tehran and proceeded towards Esfāhān. On the 22nd Rabi<sup>C</sup> II, 1196/5th March, 1785, Āli Morād Khān left Tehran. Five days later he arrived at Kāshān and, although the cold season had set in, he commenced his march after two days halt. Apparently he died on his way to Esfāhān, at a distance of one day's march from Kāshān, on the 30th of the month of Rabi<sup>C</sup> II/13th March.<sup>9</sup> His death was concealed from all, save a few of his wives, who were strictly forbidden from mourning until the pro-

1. G.G., p.250.

2. G.M., p.409. G.G., p.251. I.Z., p.23.

3. G.M., p.409.

4. G.G., p.251.

5. G.M., p.410.

6. Ibid., p.411.

7. Ibid.

8. G.G., p.256. I.O.R., G/29/22. Bussora, 26th Sept. 1784.

9. G.M., p.412.



cession reached Esfāhān.<sup>1</sup> The notables in his party were apprehensive that the news of his death would occasion a tumult in the army, and that the treasures would be plundered. This, however, did not occur, despite the event being known to everyone. The villages and towns on the way were pillaged, while the soldiers left their dead master to march homewards.<sup>2</sup> Ferrieres Sauveboeuf asserts that the treasures were plundered and even the ladies of the ḥarim were dishonoured by the soldiers, except the daughter of the Vakil (ʿAli Morād Khān's daughter-in-law) and his newly-wedded bride, Hedāyāt Khān's daughter, who was guarded by fifty Georgian guards.<sup>2</sup>

Before we relate the events, which took place in Esfāhān on the death of ʿAli Morād Khān, we will examine the causes and the results of the defeat, which the Zands sustained in Māzandarān. The preservation of the integrity and security of his domain was so crucial for ʿAli Morād Khān, that, for the first time in the rule of the Zands, he brought very large forces to the northern provinces, in order to curtail the exploits of the Qājārs. Indeed, Sir Harford Jones is absolutely right in his statement,

"in the year 1784, Aly Morad marched with such a force from Isfahan, that, had he lived to employ it as he intended, he would in all probability have reduced the Kajars to nearly the same state as that in which they were during the reign of the Vakil."<sup>3</sup>

However, the force, which ʿAli Morād Khān had assembled, was employed to an extent. Unfortunately, lack of familiarity with the geography and climate of Māzandarān, on the part of the commanders, and the fact that the soldiers had come from the

1. G.M., p.412.

2. Ibid. M.H.P., p.v.1.294.

3. D.K., p.cxv.

central areas of Iran and were not used to the humidity of the northern parts of the country, had made a victory difficult for them. Furthermore, the Zand forces were not used to the tactics of the Turkmans, who were, indeed, very effective in their hit and run night attacks.<sup>1</sup> Although the Zands themselves are known to have used such tactics, the size of their army on this occasion prevented them from any such enterprise. The army, once stationed in one place, lost all its discipline and took to all sorts of excesses, to the disgust of the inhabitants.<sup>2</sup> It was, therefore, very easy for the Qājārs to take full advantage of their disorder and contribute to the disintegration of their army. Apparently, the Qājār tribe and their neighbours, the Turkmans, waged constant attacks on the Zand army to the extent that the soldiers found their situation absolutely desperate.<sup>3</sup>

However, the defeat of such a force was the beginning of an era, in which the Qājārs became offensive and the Zands were pushed to be on the defensive. In fact, there was never a chance for the Zands to carry their arms into Māzandarān again, although the EIC resident informs us that Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān intended to do so.<sup>4</sup> The plan never materialized, however. Another cause of the disastrous defeat of the Zands was the condition of the Zand monarch, who was fatally ill; his courtiers and military chiefs were in constant dread of his death, in which case they would be placed in a precarious position. In an absolutist state, where the might of a monarch is the only check upon the very closest of his courtiers, once his grip is loosened, there is no limit to the lawless rapine and thirst for power of the ones, who have the means and power to try their luck.

1. R.M.M., p.87.

2. G.G., p.249. Zinat al-Javārikh. Ms Tehran. n.p.

3. G.H., p.408. G.G., p.250.

4. I.O.R. G/29/22. Part.2. Bussorah, 24th. Jan. 1789.

At all times, the Kalāntar of Fārs bitterly reproached <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān for his neglect of the war and his preoccupation with his new bride, the daughter of Hedāyat Khān.<sup>1</sup> It is also asserted by Golshan-e-Morād, in which the author ironically states that the monarch was more excited by the news of the arrival of his bride, than the news of the victory in Māzandarān!<sup>2</sup> Be that as it may, <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān's greatest negligence was in sending his young, inexperienced son to Māzandarān, as the latter had no control over his army, compared to that of his father. It is evident from the incident that, before the prince decided to vacate the town of Sāri, his Māfi and Nānkoli generals deserted him and fled to Tehran,<sup>3</sup> thus forcing the young prince to retreat. Had <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān carried out the expedition in person, the outcome would have been totally different. His poor health, however, had prevented him from such a venture.

<sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān was, however, the sole successor of the Vakil, who could challenge the growing power of the Qājārs. His administration had gained him the confidence of the people and had filled his treasury with the cash, of which all the Zand contenders appeared to be in need. The grandeur and extravagance of his court was indicative of affluence and magnanimity. At the festival of Nouruz, he always spent his treasures lavishly and, knowing the character of his army, he liberally donated money and presents to his generals and soldiers.<sup>4</sup>

To sum up the reign and character of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, one can assert that his rule was comparably peaceful and unchallenged. The Qājār pretender, Āqā Mohāmmad Khān, appears to have had great respect for him and did not venture to issue out of Māzandarān, as long as this capable monarch was alive. He had

1. G.M., p.406. R.H.M., p.83.

2. G.M., p.406.

3. Ibid., p.409.

4. Ibid., p.393. R.I., p.436.

said to those of his courtiers, who urged him to advance to <sup>C</sup>Eraq-e-<sup>C</sup>Ajam, that it would only be possible for him to capture <sup>C</sup>Eraq when the "respectable blind man" was dead.<sup>1</sup> The dominion, over which <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān ruled, was extended from Fārs to all the islands of the Gulf and the coast line, as far south as the mouth of Shatt-al <sup>C</sup>Arab. He received tribute from Kermān, Yazd, Hamadān, Ardālān, Gilān<sup>2</sup> and the whole of <sup>C</sup>Eraq-e-<sup>C</sup>Ajam. He was a capable commander, as well as a good administrator; his justice was harsh and indiscriminating; it went as far as punishing the young son of his much beloved minister, Mirzā Rabi<sup>C</sup>. Further, he even antagonized his soldier-ry to prevent his subjects from suffering their rapine and avarice.<sup>3</sup> He was generous and liberal to everyone, who served him, from an ordinary soldier to his minister. But there is a curious instance of avarice, which is related by Ferrieres Sauveboeuf, that:

"Ali Mourat Kan fit fouilles en plusieurs endroits du palais d'Hispanan, que Nadir Sha avoit habite, ou pretend meme qu'il n'avoit pas perdu ses peines."<sup>4</sup>

This account is further endorsed by Rostam, who acknowledges that <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān confiscated the house belonging to Mirzā Ja<sup>C</sup>far, Karim Khān's minister, where his brother, Mirzā Sādeq, was a resident. The house was searched for treasures and he found about 100,000 Tomāns gold coins and valuables hidden in a wall.<sup>5</sup>

He received ambassadors from a few foreign countries: France,

1. H.P., p.v.2. p.169. Kur-e-Moteshakhes; thus Āqā Mohammad Khān usually addressed <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān.
2. G.M., p.403.
3. R.T., p.436.
4. M.H.P., Vol.II, p.74.
5. G.M., p.392.

Russia, and Ottoman Turkey.<sup>1</sup> Incidentally, it is interesting to note that, although the Russians had entered into close alliance with the Qājārs, the Empress sent her envoy to the Zand court, which was an official acknowledgement of the Zands rather than their rival, the Qājārs. Had <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān lived longer, he would have revived the economy and established the Zand house in the same way as the Vakil had done. His death threw the country into fresh disturbances and subjected the miserable inhabitants to new calamities.<sup>2</sup>

The events subsequent to <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān's death:

On the arrival of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān's corpse in his capital, Bāqer Khān, a humble Kadkhodā, who had been promoted to the rank of governor of Esfāhān, having amassed a great wealth during his term of office, attempted to lay claim to the throne. He sent some troops out of the city to appropriate the royal treasures and, also, admitted the tribal warriors, who were wandering around the city, into the capital.<sup>3</sup> He lost no time in gaining their support, by way of handsome bonuses and, strangely enough, more than 6000 men of the Lak tribes gathered round his standard.<sup>4</sup>

It has been previously stated that Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān was summoned to the camp, while <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān was stationed in Tehran. Thus, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān marched to Tehran, only to be sent away again after a short stay, to the province of Khamseh.<sup>5</sup> There had been, for some time past, many rebellions, mainly carried out by a courageous and, at the same time, troublesome chief of Afshār origin, <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān Zāyerlu.<sup>6</sup> <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān also

1. R.T., p.441. G.M., p.396.

2. H.P., Vol.1, p.293.

3. G.G., p.258.

4. R.M.M., p.84.

5. G.G., p.255. G.M., p.404. I.Z., p.21.

6. G.M., p.400. G.G., p.255.

wanted to keep an eye on the province of Āzarbāyjān, where the local chiefs had only paid lip service to the Zands and had refused to pay the usual tributes.<sup>1</sup> However, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān proceeded to Khamseh, where he was admitted unopposed, since <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān had fled to Āzarbāyjān on his approach.<sup>2</sup> It was there that the former resolved to throw off the allegiance to his half-brother, and set himself up as a contender for the throne.<sup>3</sup> The news reached Āli Morād Khān and, despite his illness, he hurried towards his capital, at the same time issuing decrees to the chiefs of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's army, to desert him immediately. This order was obeyed, because of the close ties which existed between these chiefs and the monarch.

Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān was deserted, while on the outskirts of Hamadān, on his way to the capital, Esfāhān. He was denied entry into the town of Hamadān and he, therefore, headed for the district of Kazzāz. There, many of the soldiers, who had fled the Zand army in Māzandarān, after the disastrous defeat of that army, joined him.<sup>4</sup> Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān besieged the citadel in Kazzāz, where the governor had retired in order to repel him. The citadel was captured in a short time and the news disturbed the ailing <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān further. He proceeded from Kāshān in great haste and died en route to Esfāhān.<sup>5</sup> Giti Goshāy asserts that <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān was alive until he reached the gates of the city, and it was then that he perished, as a result of having been kept in the cold.<sup>6</sup> This allegation appears to be baseless, since he had probably died much before that, as the Kalāntar informs us.

1. G.G., p.256.

2. Ibid., p.255.

3. I.Z., p.23. G.G., p.256. R.M.M., p.83.

4. G.G., p.257.

5. I.Z., p.23. G.M., p.411. R.M.M., p.83.

6. G.G., p.258.

Some of the Zand chiefs left the dead monarch's party to join Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān and inform him of the incident.<sup>1</sup> He, thus, rushed to Esfāhān and within a short time reached its outskirts. Bāqer Khān apparently sent out his brother to challenge Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, but he did not effect a substantial resistance and, after two days, the tribes of Māfi, Zand and Bājelān staged a coup and attempted to capture Bāqer Khān.<sup>2</sup> The event, as related by Golshan-e-Morād deserves notice, since it is significant to note how the tribes could exert their power in time of emergency and, at the same time, how easy it was to buy them off. While Bāqer Khān was reviewing his army, these tribes gathered in a corner awaiting their turn. When their names were read out, they rushed towards Bāqer Khan, shooting their rifles in all directions.<sup>3</sup> Bāqer Khān, in his horror, managed to escape the attempt and took refuge in one of the towers. He resisted the enemy until night fell, when he climbed to the roofs of the royal palaces and, since they were connected with each other, he reached the gates and set off on foot for his village, Khorāskān.<sup>4</sup> Eventually, he got hold of horses and, with his brother and his son, effected his escape.<sup>5</sup>

On the following day, Saturday 19th February, 1785/8th Rabi<sup>C</sup> II 1199, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān entered the city of Esfāhān.<sup>6</sup> Bāqer Khān had ruled for a space of five to six days. He was, however, captured at some distance from the city and returned. His life was spared, although he was beaten and tortured to yield up his possessions. Apparently, about 100,000 Tomāns (Tabrizi) with an immense amount of jewellery and valuables were recovered from him and his relations.<sup>7</sup> Mirzā Rabi<sup>C</sup>, the minister to

1. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.294. G.G., pp.258-9.

2. R.M.M., p.85. I.Z., p.24. G.M., p. 413-4.

3. G.M., p.414.

4. G.G., p.290.

5. Ibid.

6. R.M.M., p. 85. I.O.R. P/D/72. Bussora, 1785.

7. G.M., p.414. R.M.M., p.86.

the deceased monarch, was reprimanded for not having opposed Bāqer Khān in his mad designs and all his wealth was confiscated. The minister, after being disgraced, applied to the new sovereign to allow him to retire to the holy shrines of Ottoman Turkey; his request was granted and he proceeded thither.<sup>1</sup> During all this time, the corpse of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān was lying at a Mosque outside Esfāhān. After establishing himself in Esfahan, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān sent his eldest son, Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān to bring the corpse into the city and buried it with due respect.<sup>2</sup> It appears that Mirzā Rabi<sup>C</sup>, with the assistance of a Kadkhodā, transferred the corpse to Najaf, to be interred in the shrine of <sup>C</sup>Ali, the first Emām (1202). This was confirmed by pilgrims who visited the shrine.<sup>3</sup>

#### Shaikh Vais Khān and his fate:

<sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān had ten children; his eldest son was Shaikh Vais, who was only 19 when his father died.<sup>4</sup> He was stationed in Tehran, by order of his father. At the death of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, his son vacated Tehran in terror, as is related by the French envoy, who happened to be still in Tehran at the time.

"Le fils aine d'Ali Mourat Kan, aupres de qui j'etois reste a Teyran, (sic) petrifie a la nouvelle de la mort de son pere, partir a la hate avec quelques domestiques pour se rendre a Hispahan ou il fut fait prisonnier par son oncle."<sup>5</sup>

Incidentally, the unfortunate ambassador was plundered of all his property in Tehran and the governor of the town took pity

1. G.M., p.414.
2. Ibid., p.415.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p.416.
5. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.294.



on him and gave him an escort to conduct him to Esfāhān, where he arrived on the 20th April, 1785/8th Jamādā II, 1199.<sup>1</sup> He left Persia after a few months as an Arab trader. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān took possession of the royal treasures and the household, and was enthroned two days after the late monarch was buried.<sup>2</sup> Shaikh Vais Khan was subsequently deprived of his eyesight. He appears to have no claim to the throne or rather no support in his claim; perhaps the courtiers, after their experience with Abol Fath Khān (an inexperienced youth) were disillusioned with the idea of supporting a young prince who, like Abol Fath Khān, was a drunkard too.

### Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's rule:

His first measure to establish his government was to appoint a capable minister. A meeting attended by all the notables was held and, there, Mirzā Moḥammad Ḥosein Farāhāni, the late Šādeq Khān's minister, was unanimously elected to the office. The position of Sadr was occupied by Mirzā Moḥammad Bāqer Gilāni.<sup>3</sup> Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān had been informed that Āqā Moḥammad Khān had left Sāri on the 3rd Rabi<sup>C</sup> II, 1200/3rd February, 1786, for <sup>C</sup>Eraq-e-<sup>C</sup>Ajam. He, therefore, set about recruiting an army to oppose him.<sup>4</sup>

Āqā Moḥammad Khān first approached the town of Tehran, where he met with stiff resistance from Ghafur Khān, the governor. Thereafter, the Qājār army proceeded towards Qum, which Najaf Khān, a kinsman of the new Zand king, had fortified in expectation of an enforcement sent from Esfāhān<sup>5</sup> and had settled himself there. The Qājār army surrounded the town of Qum, which did not have a citadel. Najaf Khān defended the place

1. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.296.

2. G.M., p.417.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p.418. R.M.M., pp.86-87.

5. G.M., p.418.

for nine days and, finding his efforts futile, fled the town. He arrived at the town of Kāshān, before proceeding towards Esfāhān.<sup>1</sup> Ahmad Khān, the son of Āzād Khān Afghān, had been sent to Kāshān at the head of a respectable number of troops, but his tribal warriors of the Māfi and other Lor elements deserted him on the battlefield, while he was engaged in a combat with the Qājārs.<sup>2</sup> This incident forced the Afghān chief to flee. The unfortunate inhabitants of the town of Kāshān, who were by no means warlike, and were mostly engaged in the silk weaving industry, appealed to Āqā Mohammad Khān to pardon them by sending their <sup>C</sup>Olamā to solicit amnesty.<sup>3</sup> Āqā Mohammad Khān had no time to spend on the Kāshānis; he, therefore, halted one night there and advanced to Esfāhān<sup>4</sup> on the following day.

Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān spent the festival of Nouruz, which occurred on Sunday, 8th Jomada I, 1200/9th March, 1786, in Esfāhān,<sup>5</sup> while these events were taking place. On the arrival of Ahmad Khān from Kāshān, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān had every intention of fighting his foe, the Qājārs. But he was persuaded by the notables of Fārs, who had been away from their homes for nearly three years, to march towards Shirāz, where the governor, Seid Morād Khān, had failed to acknowledge the new sovereign.<sup>6</sup> Besides, the treasures within the city of Esfāhān were so immense that it would have been unwise not to transport them to a place of safety.<sup>7</sup> Thus Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān set off for Shirāz, with all his courtiers in his company. He had made a terrible mistake

1. G.M., p.419.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p.420.

4. G.G., p.266. G.M., p.420.

5. G.M., p.419.

6. I.O.R. P/D/72. Bussorah, 12th Sept. 1785.

7. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.297.

in not having secured the citadel of Shirāz while he was at Esfāhān, despite numerous requests on the part of the kalāntar, Mirzā Moḥammad, that he should do so.<sup>1</sup> The kalāntar bitterly criticizes Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān and his minister, for not having listened to his advice. He describes the situation in Shirāz, remarking that Seid Morād Khān had actually antagonized all the the populace. He had not paid the salaries of the soldiers in the garrison in the city for three years. His avarice and maltreatment had dispersed a great number of the Fārsis all over the kingdom, as far afield as Basra.<sup>2</sup> These accounts lead one to the assumption that Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān did not see any need to send an army there, while the governor himself had done enough to leave no room for reconciliation with the inhabitants. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān had no doubt that Seid Morād Khān would submit to his rule, on his approach to the city.

The EIC resident, however, informs us that Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān had sent his eldest son, Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, with a detachment to capture Shirāz,<sup>3</sup> but this is not confirmed by any other source. The hasty departure of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān from Esfāhān occasioned great tumult in the city. The Luṭis, who had allied themselves with some Afshār tribal warriors and the late<sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān's personal guards, conspired to plunder the treasures, while the king was on the march.<sup>4</sup> Apparently, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān had distributed mules and other pack animals to his courtiers to prepare for the departure. Thus all the Gholāms (guards) had been sent out of the city to arrange for the march. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān did not sleep that night, as a result of the disturbances and confusions in the city. The following day, while 500 camels laden with the treasures left the city, a large number of rioters started shooting around the caravan, exciting great alarm in the

1. R.M.H., p.87.

2. Ibid., p.81.

3. I.O.R. P/D/72. Bussorah, 19th March, 1785.

4. G.G., p.266. I.Z., p.

procession.<sup>1</sup> The rioters, numbering about 2000 horsemen and infantry, blocked the roads and it was with great difficulty that Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān managed to find his way out of Esfāhān.<sup>2</sup> The camels were chased by the rabble and the muleteers, who were in league with them, loosened the reins of the animals and, consequently, a great part of the treasures was looted by the rioters.<sup>3</sup>

Who exactly the instigators of the incident were is not known, but we are informed that shopkeepers were involved in it and apparently, the sons of Hāji Mohamṡad <sup>C</sup>Ali <sup>C</sup>Allaf (wheat chandler), later to become the wealthiest family in Esfāhān and holding high stations as the governor of the city, were the main perpetrators of the crime. Darvishes were also involved in the affair,<sup>4</sup> but what order they belonged to is not known to us. The incident is illustrative of the potential trouble and turbulence the inhabitants of large cities concealed under a very peaceful facade; and it also shows that the rule of the Zands was challenged, even in their capital. It is curious that the Darvishes had taken part in the unrest, since Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān was on very good terms with them. Apparently, he had consulted a Sufi, as to the advisability of leaving Esfāhān, and had acted according to his recommendation.<sup>5</sup>

Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān was accused, more than once, of being a coward,<sup>6</sup> since on many occasions he refrained from meeting the foe in the battlefield, and fled in disgrace. This, however, was not solely due to his cowardice. In fact, he was wise enough to know that, in an extensive city like Esfāhān, without any

1. I.S., p.282. I.Z., p.27.

2. I.S., p.282.

3. G.G., p.268.

4. R.I., p.448.

5. Ibid., p.449.

6. R.M.M., pp.88 and 100.

means of defence (which traditionally was a wall or a citadel), he had very little chance of holding out against a large and formidable army, like that of the Qājārs.

Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān was, however, faced with another dilemma: the revolt of Seid Morād Khān in Shirāz. Apparently, Seid Morād Khān had been encouraged to challenge the power of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, when he learnt of his disgraceful flight from Esfāhān, as we are informed by Francklin:

"When intelligence of Jaafar Khan's distressed situation and approach first reached Seuid Morad Khan, that noble man began to entertain an idea of excluding him, and of assuming the government himself."<sup>1</sup>

The source of this allegation also affirms that the governor had abandoned his ambitious design, partly because he had no support among the soldiers in the garrison, and partly as a result of the minister, Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein's intercession with a promise of amnesty and safety.<sup>2</sup> This account is verified in that Seid Morād Khān had no chance of resistance, as we are informed by the EIC resident,<sup>3</sup> but whether it was due to the mediation of the minister cannot be proved. The EIC resident asserts that Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's eldest son was leading an army of six thousand to Shirāz.<sup>4</sup> The governor of Shirāz, Seid Morād Khān, opened the gates of the city to Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, who entered the city on 24th Jomada II, 1200/24th April, 1786. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān pardoned the impudent governor, after having received a handsome present from him.<sup>5</sup> Thus Seid Morād Khān was stripped of his office and a kalāntar was appointed

1. O.M.T.S., p.339.

2. G.M., p.386.

3. I.O.R. P/D/72. Bussorah, 19th March, 1785.

4. I.O.R., P/D/72. Bussorah, 19th March, 1785.

5. G.G., p.269.

to take charge of the civic affairs of Shirāz,<sup>1</sup> since the old kalāntar, Mirzā Moḥammad, was left behind at Esfāhān, or rather had decided to stay there, despite the strong protestations of his friends and colleagues.<sup>2</sup>

It appears that Mirzā Moḥammad, being totally disillusioned with the Zands, had resolved to join Āqā Moḥammad Khān, thinking that he would be of use in Āqā Moḥammad Khān's efforts to set himself up as a ruler, and thereby bring about peace and stability. The kalāntar was soon disappointed in his expectations. On many occasions he endeavoured to obtain his freedom to join the Zand king, but he was denied release.<sup>3</sup> This unhappy man died in Tehran shortly afterwards in 1200.<sup>4</sup> However, Hāji Ebrāhim was appointed as the kalāntar of Shirāz and the province of Fārs.

#### Āqā Moḥammad Khān conquers Esfāhān:

The Qājār army did not meet with any resistance in the city of Esfāhān, when they made their entry on the 2nd May, 1785<sup>5</sup> / 16th Rabi<sup>c</sup> II, 1199, within the space of one day of the Zand's departure. The French envoy gives an account of the event,

"toute son [Āqā Moḥammad's] armee se logea dans la ville qui fut impitoyablement saccagee; jamais elle n'avoit eprouve autant d'horreurs, meme lorsqu'elle fut pillée par les Aguhans (sic); les troupes dont il y en avoit beaucoup de Tartares, s'y livrerent a tous les exces d'une fureur barbare, & commirent toutes fortes d'atrocites."<sup>6</sup>

1. G.G., p.269. I.Z., p.26.

2. I.e. Hāji Ebrāhim, who had taken great pains to encourage the kalantar to accompany the king's party to Shirāz.

3. R.M.M., p.93.

4. Ibid., p.V. Introd.

5. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.297.

6. Ibid., pp.297-8. Malcolm states the date of Āqā Moḥammad's entry as 6th May (op. cit., Vol.II, p.170).

It is strange that the EIC resident's account of the occupation of Esfāhān is totally different from the envoy's, and speaks of the mild and clement treatment of the population.<sup>1</sup>

Āqā Moḥammad Khān stayed in the city for about forty days and then set off to meet the Bakhtiāris, who had gathered a large force against him. He reinstated Bāqer Khān, the ex-governor of the city, to his office.<sup>2</sup> Āqā Moḥammad Khān left Esfāhān on the 10th Ramaḥān, 1200/7th July, 1786. Mirzā Moḥammad kalāntar verifies the allegations of the French source. He asserts that Āqā Moḥammad Khān had nothing in mind except to collect riches and he spent every moment in torturing and mulcting unfortunate, innocent souls.<sup>3</sup> Giti Goshāy also affirms that he extorted a great amount of money from the inhabitants, apparently as the revenues for the past six months.<sup>4</sup> Some sources assert that Āqā Moḥammad Khān was encouraged to take possession of Esfāhān by some of the notables within the city.<sup>5</sup> Bāqer Khān Khorasāni seems to have been behind this, since he was released from prison before Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān departed. The latter had shown so much kindness to him, as to even conduct Bāqer Khān out of the city by an escort, since Bāqer Khān had many enemies, who were anxious to lay their hands on him. Apparently, Bāqer Khān sent his two sons out of the city to welcome the Qājār chief, and he had made ample preparations to welcome him.<sup>6</sup> Although Malcolm finds it unlikely that Āqā Moḥammad Khān had previous communications with the city notables,<sup>7</sup> the fact that Bāqer Khān was reinstated to his office, does not rule out this possibility. Bāqer Khān was, however,

1. I.O.R. P/D/72. Bushire, 12th Sept. 1785.

2. G.G., p.269.

3. R.M.M., p.92.

4. G.G., p.270.

5. Ibid., p.269.

6. Ibid.

7. H.P., Vol.II, p.170 (footnote).

forbidden to leave the royal palaces, due to his ambitious and troublesome character.<sup>1</sup> In order to secure his rule in Esfāhān, Āqā Moḥammad Khān expelled all the tribes partial to the cause of the Zands, including the Māfi and Chāhār Duly. The Māfi tribe changed their course to Māzandarān half way, and set off for their home in Kermānshāh.<sup>2</sup> Some of the tribes had left the city before the Qājārs arrived, probably knowing what lay in store for them.<sup>3</sup>

### Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān recaptures Esfāhān:

Esfāhān, a city of great extent and industrial bustle, was also an emporium of trade with the south, as well as the north of the kingdom. This made it essential for the Zands not to give it up easily. Thus Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān recruited an army of about 20,000 men by nearly going through the enormous treasury of his capital. Giti Goshāy asserts that it was only after Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān had spent immense riches, that the notables and military generals agreed to serve him.<sup>4</sup> He himself assumed the command of the army, left the city on the 1st of Ramazān, 1200/28th June, 1786, and encamped on its outskirts to observe the religious rituals.<sup>5</sup> His opponent, Āqā Moḥammad Khān, having fought with the Bakhtiāris, retired to the Qahiz Chaman (pasture land), in order to rest and prepare for fresh exploits.<sup>6</sup> Āqā Moḥammad Khān summoned Bāqer Khān, the governor of Esfāhān, to his camp, where he was dismissed from office, but was commissioned to make preparations for a siege should it occur.<sup>7</sup> Bāqer Khān was given the charge of a few lesser

1. G.G., pp.269-70.

2. Ibid., p.270.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p.272.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p.270.

7. Ibid., p.271.



towns, i.e. Qomsheh, Natanz, Ardastān and Qohpāyeh.<sup>1</sup>

Bāqer Khān, on his arrival in the city of Esfāhān, gathered provisions and placed them in the citadel of Tabrak, on the outskirts of the city. Furthermore, he transferred the canons placed in the great Maidān, Naqsh-e-Jahān to the gates of that citadel.<sup>2</sup> Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān commenced his march at the end of Ramazān. As he approached the town of Qomsheh, Bāqer Khān retired to Tabrak citadel. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān sent a detachment to besiege the citadel, while he proceeded to Esfāhān and entered it unopposed.<sup>3</sup> Bāqer Khān was besieged for about four months, during which time he defended himself with spirit and courage. He was in daily expectation of an enforcement from the Qājārs, but it never materialized.<sup>4</sup> Apparently, he had been entreated to give himself up in exchange for pardon and, although he was prepared to do so, on every occasion his associates had dissuaded him, until the gates were betrayed to the Zand army by his own men and the citadel fell.

Bāqer Khān was brought to the Zand camp and was executed on the spot.<sup>5</sup> It appears that Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, when departing from Esfāhān, released Bāqer Khān from prison and, in the great mosque, the Masjed Shāh, he condemned his ingratitude and treasonable conduct towards his late master, <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khan, and warned him that should he venture such acts once more, the consequences would be dire.<sup>6</sup> This, however, did not discourage the ambitious kadkhodā in his pursuit of power and his conduct met with the punishment it deserved. His unfortunate wives and children were sent to Shirāz, save two of his

1. G.G., p.271.

2. Ibid.

3. G.M., p.422. I.Z., p.31. I.O.R. G/29/22. Part.2, p.203. Bussora, 27th Oct. 1786.

4. R.M.M., p.85. G.G., p.273.

5. I.Z., p.32. G.G., p.274.

6. G.M., p.424.

sons, who had been taken as hostages along with the Qājār chief.<sup>1</sup> Āqā Mohāmmad Khān, after dispersing the Bakhtiāris, set off for Kermānshāh to subjugate the Māfi tribe, who had disobeyed his orders, as related previously. This large and gallant tribe not only defeated the Qājārs, but forced Āqā Mohāmmad to flee as a result of his troops' desertion.<sup>2</sup> The mortification caused by the news of the fall of Tabrak, was another blow to him. His army defected and many of his men joined his rival, the Zand ruler. He retreated to Tehran, planning to fortify it, should the Zands follow him to that area.<sup>3</sup> At this stage, the Qājār chief was much reduced in his power and, if the Zand ruler had had the courage, or rather the chance, of attacking him in Tehran, it would certainly have been the best opportunity to eliminate him once and for all. Āqā Mohāmmad Khān, in his battle with the Bakhtiāris, had sustained no less than 3000 dead, as well as many casualties. That is probably why the EIC resident expected Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān to advance to Māzandarān, but the latter unexpectedly returned to Shirāz.<sup>4</sup>

#### The Russian invasion of the Northern provinces:

Catherine II, the Empress of Russia, in pursuit of territorial expansions, had concluded a treaty with the Vāli of Georgia, Heraclius (Erkli), in 1783, according to which the Russian Empress recognized the latter's right to his dominion, while he became tributary to Russia, instead of the Persian government. The treaty was signed on the 24th July 1783<sup>5</sup>, at nearly the same time as the Russian delegation arrived at the court of<sup>c</sup> Ali Morād Khān. It appears that, since the Russians were preparing for a war with the Ottoman Empire, it was of crucial impor-

1. G.G., p.274. I.Z., p.30.

2. I.Z., p.30. G.G., p.275.

3. Ibid.

4. I.O.R., P/D/E Vol.72, 12th Sept. 1785. D.K., p.cxv. I.Z., p.34.

5. H.P., Vol.II, p.214, and Baddeley, The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, N.Y., 1908, pp.20-21.

tance for them to be at peace with their other neighbours and even to solicit alliances with them if possible. With this idea in mind, and at the same time aware of the internal unrest and division, which existed in the Persian Empire, Catherine sent about 6,000 troops to the province of Shirvān, as is reported by the French envoy.

"afin que les Persans occupés de leur guerres intestines, fussent moins attentifs a ce qui se passeroit du côté de la Georgie; plusieurs routes tracees depuis Astrakan jusqu'à Tifflis, & d'autres endroits du mont Caucase, prouvoient quelques intentions particulières ainsi que l'arrivee de six mille Russes, cantonnés dans la province de Chirwan."<sup>1</sup>

The EIC resident also asserts that he had heard rumours to that effect.

"The Russians have taken possession of Erivan, Ganja & Tauris & several other inferior places in the provinces of Erivan & Azarbjaun (sic)."

He goes on to say that there was no confirmation of this information.<sup>2</sup>

In fact, there had been a large Russian force arriving at Tafilis, in accordance with the treaty signed between Russia and Georgia, to which allusion has already been made. Erkli, the Vāli of Georgia, had long planned to annex Ganjeh to his dominion and indeed, in the treaty, the Russians had taken it upon themselves to assist him in his expansions.<sup>3</sup> The Russian force, which had arrived at Tafilis, was only to protect the territories of Georgia. They stayed there for about four years and then withdrew,<sup>4</sup> since the Empress needed to employ her army

1. M.H.P., Vol.I, pp.296-7.

2. I.O.R. P/D/72. Bushire, 12th Sept. 1785.

3. H.P., Vol.II, p.214.

4. Ibid.

elsewhere. It was then that Āqā Moḥammad Khān managed to attack Taflis and not only forced the Vāli to take shelter in the mountains, but also plundered the city and gave away the inhabitants as slaves to his soldiers.<sup>1</sup>

Intertribal contention: Esmā<sup>C</sup>il Khān Zand's revolt:

As related before, an Afshār chief, <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, had on many occasions thrown off his allegiance to the Zand rule and, each time, he had been pardoned. This time, <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, the turbulent chief, had allied himself to the Qājārs but, after the defeat of their army in Kermānshāh, he deserted them and went to his home town.<sup>2</sup> On his arrival in Esfāhān, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān commissioned Esmā<sup>C</sup>il Khān, a close kinsman of his, to proceed to Khamseh and to bring it back under Zand suzerainty. The latter marched to Qalamro with great determination.<sup>3</sup> On arriving at the village of Brujerd, he exacted and extorted money from the inhabitants, both rich and poor. He gathered about 200,000 Tomans in cash and valuables, thereby alienating the populace.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, he recruited some local insurgent elements into his service and pronounced himself opposed to his master. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān had prudently sent a few of his confidential servants along with Esmā<sup>C</sup>il Khān and was constantly aware of his activities. Esmā<sup>C</sup>il Khān had, however, discovered the plot and seized and put the informers to death.<sup>5</sup> He settled his troops in Hamadān, while he left Qorbān Khān, of the tribe of Bājelān, in Brujerd as its governor. Qorbān Khān had rebelled against the government at Shirāz, and Esmā<sup>C</sup>il Khān had been designated to subdue him, but instead, he made him the governor of Brujerd. Although it was in the depth of winter, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān

1. M.S., p.23.

2. I.Z., p.30.

3. G.G., p.279. I.Z., p.31.

4. I.Z., p.32. Fava'ed al-Safavieh, p.138.

5. G.M., p. 425.

addressed himself to subjugating these rebels. He proceeded towards Hamadān in the first half of the month of Rabi<sup>C</sup> I, 1200/ early January 1786. While Ja<sup>C</sup> far Khān left Esfāhān,<sup>1</sup> a garrison was left in the city to consolidate the Zand victory, and a governor was also appointed to the city. Mirzā Jāni Fasā'i, a figure who was to play a major role in the last phase of the Zand and Qājār power struggle, was the new Hāk-em. As was often the case, the insurgents who had gathered round Esmā<sup>C</sup> il Khān dispersed at the approach of a more powerful army. Ja<sup>C</sup> far Khān besieged Qorbān Khān in the citadel of Hādi Khān. The news of the desperate situation to which Esmā<sup>C</sup> il Khān had been reduced, reached the besieged force, they on their part captured their leader and delivered him up to Ja<sup>C</sup> far Khān.<sup>2</sup>

Khosro Khān, the Vāli of Ardalān, was another chief who had to be punished for his misconduct. It appears that he had taken a stance against Ja<sup>C</sup> far Khān from the beginning of his rule. The sovereign had sent him a robe of honour with decrees expressing the favour and friendly sentiments of the king towards him. Khosro Khān had not only ignored the implications of this mark of favour, that is, the demand for the usual tribute and customary presents, but he also excused himself from attending the court on some unacceptable pretexts.<sup>3</sup> Thus Ja<sup>C</sup> far Khān had sent him messages, which contained insult, and this had aggravated the resentment further. The strained relationship between Ja<sup>C</sup> far Khān and the Ardalān Vāli gained momentum, when Esmā<sup>C</sup> il Khān Zand fled to the territories of Ardalān and allied himself to Khosro Khān.<sup>4</sup> At this stage, Ja<sup>C</sup> far Khān resolved to march to Ardalān on a punitive expedition. Esmā<sup>C</sup> il Khān had also managed to form a confederation of

1. I.Z., p.32.

2. Ibid. G.M., p. 442.

3. G.M., p.425.

4. G.G., p.258. I.Z., p.33.

local chiefs in his attempt to gain independence from the government at Shirāz.<sup>1</sup> The ones who had joined his clique included Moḥammad Hosein Khān Garrusi, <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān Khamseh, and the Qaragozlu tribal warriors. Thus, he had formed a large army.

Khosro Khān, however, was not certain what would happen if the Zand army defeated him and his allies.<sup>2</sup> Hence, he declared his allegiance to the Zand rule, by sending an envoy to Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's camp, promising to pay his arrears and provide the king with cavalry if required; yet he abstained from attending the camp in person. The conduct of the Vāli, being contrary to practice in the kingdom, induced the king to give battle against the disobedient chief.<sup>3</sup> This, however, cost the Zands dearly; he was severely beaten by the Vāli and was forced to retire to Esfahan. The cause for the defeat of the Zand army is given by the court historian as being the intense cold, while most of the troops were from the Garmsir region and were not used to the inclement weather of the western provinces. They found it absolutely impossible to resist the severe cold and defected.<sup>4</sup> Although this could well have been one of the main reasons, there is also another contributory cause, that is, the desertion of the Turkish-speaking tribes from the Zand army, and their then joining the opposite faction.<sup>5</sup> Malcolm asserts that Khosro Khān had no intention of opposing the Zand, but the hostile conduct of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān forced him into it. On this occasion Malcolm says that Khosro Khān was in debt to the Qājār for his hereditary place, which had been usurped from him, and Moḥammad Hasan Khān returned it to him.<sup>6</sup> Khosro Khān captured a few towns, while Āqā Moḥammad Khān was

1. G.G., pp.283-4.

2. Ibid., pp.284-5.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p.287.

5. Ibid.

6. I.Z., p.34. G.G., p.288.

preparing to curtail his expansions. He thus left Esmā<sup>c</sup>il Khān to meet the Qājārs. He could not resist them and was defeated. Āqā Moḥammad Khān deemed the measure sufficient and returned to Gilān, but Khosro Khān had no choice except for alliance with the Qājārs, since he had antagonized the Zands.

During the whole course of the Zand rule, the pernicious event of tribes deserting, occurs so frequently that it appears to be the order of the day. An army is recruited and paid by one party, but there is no guarantee of the loyalty of the troops. In a section on the tribes,<sup>1</sup> we will discuss this question in some detail. However, more often than not the Zands had suffered from this malpractice. Although such behaviour appears senseless and spontaneous, it may be seen as an unavoidable consequence of the nature of an army composed of tribes.

#### Attempt to seize Esfāhān, the Khorasāni adventure (1200/1786):

The Zand rule was challenged from all sides and even the less important chiefs of the province of Khorasān ventured to make an assault on Esfāhān,<sup>2</sup> while Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān was busy in the west of the kingdom. Moḥammad Khān and Esmā<sup>c</sup>il Khān<sup>c</sup> Arab-e-<sup>c</sup>Āmeri, the chiefs of Jandaq, a little town on the periphery of the desert, needed the assistance of other local chiefs, to execute their designs. Thus, they wrote to Amir Moḥammad Khān the chief of the town of Ṭabas, and asked him to provide them with cavalry in exchange for payment of their arrears of two years. The idea of recovering two thousand Tomāns cash appealed to him and he, in turn, sent about 400-500 horsemen to Jandaq.<sup>3</sup> Moḥammad Hosein Khān had gathered upwards of 3000 men from his dependencies, i.e. Naṭanz, Ardestān and Qohpāyeh.<sup>4</sup>

1. See Chapter 8.

2. I.Z., p.34. G.G., p.288.

3. Ibid.

4. G.G., p.289.

With his troops he marched on Esfāhān; the news of the defeat which Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān had sustained at the hand of the Kurds further encouraged him in his exploit.

Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān immediately commissioned his brother, <sup>C</sup>Abdollah Khān, to advance to Esfāhān as a precautionary measure.<sup>1</sup> Also <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān, the chief of Kāzeroon, a man of great valour and gallantry, was sent to challenge the assailants in the battlefield. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān entered Esfāhān on the 12th Jomada II, 1200/12th April, 1786,<sup>2</sup> only a few days away from the new year's festival. He set about organizing his army, having contemplated a retributory attack on Hamadān and thereabouts. He was, however, disappointed in his schemes, since he was faced with another dilemma; that is, the revolt of <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān.<sup>3</sup> Having ably forced the joint Khorasāni forces to succumb, <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān had taken many of them prisoners. The captives had appealed to <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān to intercede on their behalf. When the procession reached Esfāhān, he had of his own account promised them amnesty.<sup>4</sup> Hence, when <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān heard that Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān had violated his word, he became highly offended and rushed to the king's presence. He reprimanded and reproached him for his action, but this apparently had the opposite effect, and Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān not only ordered the chief of the prisoners to be put to death, but denuded the soldiery of their armour and sent them home.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān, incensed by the disrespect afforded to him, ordered his followers to prepare for departure. This was readily conceded due to the length of their service. The Kāzeruni troops marched homeward without having been given permiss-

1. G.G., p.289.

2. G.M., p.429.

3. I.Z., p.35.

4. Ibid.

5. G.G., p.290.



ion.<sup>1</sup> Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān learnt of the event in the morning and sent word to all the governors and the chiefs en route to Kāzerun to prevent <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān from passing through their jurisdiction, and to capture him if possible. The decree served to disperse the adherents of the Kāzeruni chief, who retired to his territories.<sup>2</sup> Golshan-e-Morād asserts that the captives were plundered by a group sent by Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān.<sup>3</sup> It is, however, dubious whether it was Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's measures, which had caused <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān's defection. It appears that it was the usual practice for the overlord to disarm a force, which had been taken prisoner and to release them from service. There does not seem to be any reason for <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān's leaving the camp of the sovereign, unless we take the assertion of Giti Goshāy as valid. This source refers to the ambitious character of <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān and to his having harboured rebellious intentions in his mind.<sup>4</sup> He found a good pretext to execute his designs on the occurrence of this incident. This is, however, endorsed by the foreign traveller, Francklin, who happened to be in the country at the time.

"At this period, Ali Kouli Khan, Hakim (or governor) of the city of Kazeroon, a place situated between Abushehr and Shirauz and dependant on the latter, thought proper to throw off his allegiance to Jaafar Khan, to whom he had before submitted, and whose power he had acknowledged."<sup>5</sup>

Apparently Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān had tried to conciliate the chief, but he had failed; many courtiers had tried to mediate between the two with promises of amnesty, but to no avail.

1. G.G., p.290.
2. Ibid., p.291.
3. G.M., p.430.
4. G.G., p.290.
5. OMTS, p.138.

Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān spent the Nouruz festival in Esfāhān. This occurred in the month of Jomada I, 1200/May 1786. Then he set off for the capital, Shirāz.<sup>1</sup> There is good reason to believe that the king was apprehensive of the outcome of a powerful chief's defection and that was why he immediately left Esfāhān to return south. Moreover, Āqā Mohammad Khān had commenced his march to recapture Esfāhān.<sup>2</sup> Āli Qoli Khān, while in his own territories, allied himself to the Mamasani tribal warriors and even marched towards Shirāz.<sup>3</sup> Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān sent a detachment under the command of Reżā Qoli Khān Shāhsavan and Moḥammad Reżā Khān Bayāt, to march to Dasht-e-Arjan, where the Kāzerunis were stationed. The two Shirāzi commanders, having failed to secure their position, while encamped, were completely routed and pushed back to Shirāz.<sup>4</sup> There is a great difference between Giti Goshāy and Golshan-e-Morād on this point. The latter asserts that through the mediation of Shaikh Moḥammad Ārab, who was a Mojtahed, and the judge of the army (Qāzi Āsgar) and Mirzā Khalil Farāhāni, one of the Mostoufis of the court, Āli Qoli Khān yielded and returned to the court,<sup>5</sup> while Giti Goshāy informs us that Lotf Āli Khān was commissioned to attack the town of Kāzerun, should the chief fail to obey the advice of the courtiers sent to appease him. Āli Qoli Khān, thus unable to repel a large force, found it expedient to present himself at court.<sup>6</sup> He was, however, assured that his person and property would be safe. But after a short while had elapsed, he was captured and imprisoned.<sup>7</sup> Francklin even affirms that he was arrested on entry.

1. G.G., p.291.

2. I.Z., p.36. G.G., p.292.

3. G.M., p.440.

4. Ibid., p.441. M.I., p.350.

5. G.M., p.441.

6. OMTS, p.341. I.Z., p.31.

7. OMTS, p.341.

"On his arrival, he was seized, confined as a close prisoner in the citadel, and all his effects were confiscated. There is little probability of his enlargement (sic) unless a revolution in the government should happen."<sup>1</sup>

Francklin was too right in his anticipation. In fact, the prisoner brought about the revolution himself. <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān had arrived at the court of Shirāz by the end of the month of Sh<sup>C</sup>ab-an 1200/26th June 1786. He was imprisoned by 13th Ramāzān 1200/10th July, 1786.<sup>2</sup> Therefore he must have been at large for less than one month. Again the sources are at variance as to the cause of his imprisonment. Giti Goshāy accuses him of having plotted against the ruler,<sup>3</sup> whereas Golshan-e-Morād speaks of his arrogance and disrespectful behaviour towards his master, as well as the courtiers.<sup>4</sup> It appears that his rivals at the court contributed to his downfall. Yet again, another instance of the fierce battle between the two elements in the court, that is, the tribal nobility and the urban notables, struck another blow at the security of the kingdom.

#### Punitive expedition to the south:

The imprisonment of the governor of Kāzerun, <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān, was expected to occasion dissension in the region. Thus Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān wintered in Shirāz and at the beginning of March, his brother, Mohammad Khān, was commissioned to subdue the Mamasani tribes, which was achieved and the latter returned to camp. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān with a force set off for Kāzerun. His aim was to install the newly appointed governor, <sup>C</sup>Ali Hemat Khān Kolia'i, in his position and, also, to punish some of the local chiefs of the southern provinces, including the Shaikh of Bushehr,

1. OMTS, p.341.

2. G.M., p.441.

3. G.G., p.297.

4. G.M., p.441.

who had not paid his revenues for nearly two years.<sup>1</sup> Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān encamped at the town of Kāzerun, while his men proceeded to Bushehr, where the shaikh, as a matter of course, prepared to defend himself. This was fortunately avoided, since some of the courtiers mediated on his behalf and, with the payment of a large sum, he diverted the attention of the Zand ruler from the area which he governed.<sup>2</sup> The EIC resident asserts that Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān:

"has lately extorted a considerable sum of money from the inhabitants of Bushire & there are now a number of his people with the Chaub (sic) shaikh demanding tribute for their master."<sup>3</sup>

Apparently, Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān had also sent his forces to plunder the Bani Ka<sup>c</sup>b tribe, and they had been pillaged of their livestock to the number of 800 mules and 3000 sheep.<sup>4</sup>

Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān passed the new year's festival at Behbahan, where he received the tribute of Shaikh Qazban, the Bani Ka<sup>c</sup>b Shaikh. Having achieved these victories, Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān returned to Shirāz and encamped on its outskirts, to prepare for an expedition towards Kermān.<sup>5</sup> At this stage, he received the envoy from the governor of Kermān, Seyed Abolhasan, who acknowledged the Zand suzerainty with the usual presents. Having recruited a large army, and wishing to employ it, Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān planned to march on Yazd. The governor of Yazd had, for a long period, refrained from paying the Divāni taxes and duties on the pretext that the drought had damaged the crops (and by sending a small contribution to the Zand court, and the Qajar chief had pocketed the revenues demanded of him).<sup>6</sup> Taqi

1. OMTS, p.343. He had also offered help to Reza Qoli Khān Kāzerun (p.342).

2. Ibid. I.O.R. G/29/22. Bussora, 15th March, 1787.

3. Ibid.

4. G.M., p.442. G.G., p.299.

5. G.M., p.443.

6. Ibid., pp.443-4.

Khān, the cunning governor, had expected one of the contenders to attempt to subdue him, but that it would not happen yet.<sup>1</sup> Hence, Taqi Khān was taken by surprise and hurried into the nearby citadel, Nārin Qal<sup>C</sup>a, while Moḥammad Khān, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's brother, besieged him. Golshan-e-Morād states that he twice sent representations to the Zand camp to solicit pardon, with the promise of payment of the arrears, but it was not accepted; the second time one Mojtaḥid Mollā Moḥammad Aljeh'i with a few seyeds and Colamās.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, Taqi Khān asked assistance from the chief of Ṭabas, Amir Moḥammad Khān, and set about resisting the assault.<sup>3</sup>

The siege lasted for some time, while provisions became scarce in the Zand camp and the army was much reduced as a result. Although Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān had ordered Fārsis to provide him with food and fodder, it was not sufficient for such a large army.<sup>4</sup> Amir Moḥammad Khān, in the meantime, arrived at Yazd and entered the citadel. Apparently, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān was again betrayed by his troops, that is, the Lāri soldiers under their chief, Moḥammad Khān, the son of Naṣir Khān, deserted their post and the Zand ruler suddenly found himself with very few men. The rest of the army having fled, he subsequently retreated towards Shiraz.<sup>5</sup>

#### Seid Morād Khān arrested and imprisoned:

This incident is related under a separate heading, as it has great importance for the political situation. Seid Morād Khān was the man who, with the aid of a few other prisoners, assassinated Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān and actually usurped the throne for more

1. I.Z., p.38. G.G., p.301.

2. G.M., pp.444-5.

3. I.Z., p.38. G.G., p.301.

4. Op. cit.

5. G.M., p.447. G.G., p.302.

than two months. However, this will be related in due course. Before departing for Yazd, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān ordered the seizure of Seid Morād Khān and that he be put in chains.<sup>1</sup> It appears that he had planned the arrest for a long time. Hence, on the 23rd April, 1787/25th Jamada II, 1202:

"during the festivity of cheragoons, (a ceremony and festival made in honour of the second son of Jaafar Khan, at the time he underwent the operation of Sunnat, or circumcision, prescribed by Mahomed-an law), this unhappy nobleman, on his capture, was conveyed to the citadel, where he was severely beaten: his effects were taken from him, amounting to an immense sum, mostly the treasures of Kerim Khan, which had been confided to his care at the time of Ali Murad Khan's departure for Ispahan."<sup>2</sup>

The source of these assertions is Francklin, who actually witnessed the festival and most probably heard the inhabitants opinion on the subject. He further suggests that:

"the crime pretended to be alleged against him was a conspiracy against the government;<sup>3</sup> but the people at Shiraz generally supposed that his imprisonment was solely owing to his having formerly conceived an opposition to Jaafar Khan, who still kept it in his mind, and who was jealous of his remaining power, and perhaps tempted at the same time by his wealth."<sup>4</sup>

Although Francklin assures us that his account is authentic, it is not verified by other sources. Indeed, on the contrary, two of the first hand sources, Golshan-e-Morād and Giti Gosh-āy, affirm that there was a conspiracy, by which <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān and Seid Morād Khān attempted to eliminate the king.<sup>5</sup>

1. I.Z., p.37. OMTS, p.345.

2. OMTS, p.345.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. G.G., p.297. G.M., p. 449.

Hence, by means of secret intelligence, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān discovered the plot and that was why Seid Morād was confined in the citadel. Again, unlike what Francklin assumes to have been the case, the captive was not deprived of his eyesight.<sup>1</sup> However, it is interesting to note that Francklin asserts that:

"all transactions respecting state prisoners in Persia are dark & secret";<sup>2</sup>

and that could have been the cause of his mistake.

### The expedition against Lār: Lotf Āli Khān's first assignment:

Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān held Moḥammad Khān Lāri responsible for his defeat at Yazd. Thus, he sent his eldest son, Lotf Āli Khān, who by then was 19 years of age, on a mission to punish him and also to establish the power of the Zands in that area.<sup>3</sup> Lotf Āli Khān, on his arrival, besieged the citadel of Lār, while he discovered that the citadel was left to the charge of a relation of Moḥammad Khān, who was engaged in gathering troops in the neighbourhood of Lār. Encamped at the gates of the citadel, Lotf Āli Khān was attacked from two sides by the Lāri chief and his brother, Ābdollāh Khān. In the ensuing battle, the Zand prince gained a victory and returned to Shirāz with many of the local notables in his company.<sup>4</sup> As we are informed by the EIC resident, he

"demolished the fortifications of the place, some persons of distinction taken at the surrender of the place have been conducted prisoner to Sherauz."<sup>5</sup>

1. I.Z., p.37.

2. OMTS, p. 347.

3. G.G., pp.302-3.

4. Ibid.

5. I.O.R. Bombay, Secret and Political, Range D. Vol.75. Bussorah. 1787.

Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's brother defects:

On this subject, we have to rely solely and absolutely on the EIC and the I.O.R. records. There is no mention of this defect-  
ion in any of the Persian or European authorities. However, in  
the year 1787,<sup>1</sup> Farz<sup>C</sup> Ali Khān, a younger brother of Ja<sup>C</sup>far  
Khān:

"in consequence of some unkind behaviour towards  
him on the part of Jaafar Khan, deserted from his  
service and joined the party of his competitor,  
Mahomed Khan Cajar (sic). On the 27th. July he  
arrived at Maghil where the resident at present  
lives & claimed his protection."<sup>2</sup>

The resident, however, does not elaborate on what the unkind  
behaviour might have been, how long the man was in the serv-  
ice of the Qājār chief, or what caused him to defect from the  
Qajar's service and claim the EIC agent's protection.<sup>2</sup> However,  
it appears that Farz<sup>C</sup> Ali was received with much civility and,  
after a few days, was conducted to the government house on  
the invitation of the Motesalem of Basra.

"The Mussaleem with a view of giving credit to his  
government & to the guest of the resident received  
Firz Ally Khan (sic) to pay his respect to the  
Pasha and to say his prayer at Maschad All-  
ee (sic). Then to return to Bussora and subsequent-  
ly to endeavour to obtain pardon from Jaafar Khan  
through the friendly medium of the Pasha and the  
resident."<sup>3</sup>

Apparently, Farz<sup>C</sup> Ali Khān, after having performed his pilgrim-  
age to the holy shrines at Najaf and visiting the Pashā of Bag-  
dād, returned to Basra. He was able to visit the principal  
Mollā, who was presumably Mirzā Moḥammad Bāqer Behbehāni,

1. OMTS, p.348. M.T., p.352.

2. I.O.R. P/D/75. Bussorah, 14th August, 1788.

3. Ibid.



the founder of the new Osuli Shi<sup>C</sup>a school at Najaf. "He returned to Baṣra" on the 30th November and then he proceeded towards Hoveza in his return to Persia.

"The principal Moolla of Meschad Ally, has furnished Firz Ally Khan with his commands to Jaafar Khan in which he directs him to receive, to favor & pardon his partners. As Jaafar Khan must necessarily pay attention to the commands of the Moolla, the resident has ventured to address to the Khan a conciliatory letter on the subject of his brother's past impudent conduct."<sup>1</sup>

There is, however, no information as to whether the mediation of the resident and the commands of the Molla helped to procure the pardon for the unfortunate brother. We do not know if he even came back to the court of Shirāz. This event must have been a great embarrassment for the Zand ruler and that is probably why the court historian decided to ignore the incident altogether. We may assume by the account given of the mild disposition that Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān was known to have had, that he pardoned his brother.

### Second attempt to recapture Esfāhān:

Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān once more ventured to reduce Esfahan into submission. Āqā Moḥammad Khān, who for the first time appeared in the province of Fārs, intended to plunder the Qashqā<sup>C</sup>i tribe, but he was disappointed in his hopes. The Qashqā<sup>C</sup>is fled to the mountains and he encamped at the Gandomān pasture for a month, where the scarcity of provisions made him advance towards Shirāz. He encamped at a place known as Mashhad Omal-Nabi (Mother of Solomon).<sup>2</sup> Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān had no intention of fighting Āqā Moḥammad Khān, who waited for a while and then returned to Esfāhān. The Qājār chief left his brother,<sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli

1. I.O.R. Bombay, Secret and Political, Range E. Vol.1. 9th Jan. 1789.

2. G.G., p.307.

Khān Qājār, as the governor there.<sup>1</sup> From there he proceeded to Tehran.

This was the ideal opportunity for the Zands to regain Esfāhān.<sup>2</sup> Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān left Shirāz on 20th September, 1788/19thZel-hajje, 1202, and took Esfāhān on the 20th October, 1788/10th Muḥarram, 1203. The expedition was rather a bloodless one, since the Qājār governor fled the city and, without opposition, the Zand army entered Esfāhān. Āqā Moḥammad Khān, immediately after receiving information of the event, marched on the city and Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān left Esfāhān and returned to Shirāz. The EIC resident seems rather surprised at the sudden return of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān to his capital.<sup>3</sup> Giti Goshāy asserts that the Zand ruler held a meeting to consult his courtiers as to the advisability of staying and fighting the foe. He found all his people opposed to the idea and, knowing that they would not support him should he venture a battle, he vacated the city for Shirāz.<sup>4</sup> He arrived there at the end of Ṣafar 1203/30th November, 1788.

#### Second mission of Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān and the death of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān:

Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was again commissioned to reduce the rebellious elements in the southern parts of the kingdom. It appears that in the previous expedition, Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān had not been able to capture the sons of Naṣir Khān, Moḥammad Khān and Abdollāh Khān. Hence, he proceeded to Lār again. Moreover, the inhabitants of Gallehdār had not only refused to pay the tribute demanded of them, but had also slain the tax gatherers, who had been sent to their principality.<sup>5</sup> The populace of the port of Asaluyeh had assisted the Lāri rebels and Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān

1. G.G., p.307.

2. I.O.R. Bombay, Secret and Political, Range D. Vol.1. 9th Jan. 1789.

3. Ibid.

4. G.G., p.310. He left the city on 16th October, according to Giti Goshāy.

5. I.Z., p.45.

was first and foremost inclined to punish them.<sup>1</sup>

At his departure, which took place in the month of Rabi<sup>C</sup> I, 1203, his father, Ja<sup>C</sup> far Khān, became very ill, apparently as a result of poison mixed with his food.<sup>2</sup> For some days he did not leave his bed, at which time the prisoners in the Ark managed to bribe a Gholām and obtain means to cut their chains. During the night of 24th January, 1789/26th Rabi<sup>C</sup> II, 1203, they came out of the prison and crept into the king's private quarter, where only his mother was awake at his bedside.<sup>3</sup> She heard the noise and, in terror, screamed for help. Ja<sup>C</sup> far Khān, despite his illness, got up to fight the assailants and even wounded one or two of them; but he was overpowered and killed by Ebrāhim Khān, son of Esma<sup>C</sup> il Khān Zand, a youth of tender age.<sup>4</sup> His head was severed and thrown down from the Ark.

Seid Morād Khān immediately assumed the government and, by distributing money among the tribes, he gained their support.<sup>5</sup> The assassins were placed in key positions, in order to avoid further bloodshed. <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān became the commander of the forces in Fārs and managed to quell the Lor tribes in the city of Shirāz.<sup>6</sup> Apparently, the sons of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān were among the prisoners in the Ark, but they had no role in perpetrating the crime.<sup>7</sup> The main elements involved in the assassination of

1. I.Z., p.45.

2. Ibid., p.46.

3. G.M., p.458.

4. G.G., p.313. I.Z., p.47.

5. G.M., p.458. M.T., p.351.

6. G.M., p.458.

7. Both of them, that is Shaikh Vais and Ahmad Morād Khān, had been deprived of their eyesight a while before (G.M., p.449), during Ja<sup>C</sup> far Khān's last expedition to Behbehān. The reason, as given by Golshan-e-Morād, was that a few of the courtiers had conspired to appoint one of these princes to the nominal kingship and dispense with Ja<sup>C</sup> far Khān (G.M., p.450). The plot had been disclosed and the poor boys had been blinded so as to prevent them from any further attempt.

Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān were <sup>c</sup>Ali Qoli Khān, Seid Morād Khān and his brother Shāh Morād Khān.<sup>1</sup> Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān died on the 26th Rabi<sup>c</sup>II, 1203/24th January, 1789. His rule was for nearly four years and he was aged between 35 and 40 years when he died.<sup>2</sup>

The EIC and Karim Khān's successors:

The death of Karim Khān occasioned a lapse of a few years in the relationship between the court of the Zands and the EIC. At the death of the Vakil, Sādeq Khān, his brother, was at Basra. He had been commissioned for the second time to proceed to that city and take the administration in hand.<sup>3</sup> The Persian governor of the town, <sup>c</sup>Ali Moḥammad Khān, had been killed by the Arab tribes and his deputy had asked the Vakil to take proper measures to replace him.<sup>4</sup> Sādeq Khān, during his stay in the city of Basra, went out of his way to ease up the confusion of the people and revive trade. The EIC agent writes:

"So far he has succeeded in the former. Karim Khan had written a friendly letter to the president of the board and Sadeq Khan had also written letters since a report had been spread that the company wished its presidency at Basra to be withdrawn."<sup>5</sup>

He took care to settle all the accounts of the late governor with the Company.<sup>6</sup> <sup>c</sup>Ali Moḥammad Khān had purchased clothes to the value of 1500 Tomāns, which he had not paid for.<sup>7</sup> Sādeq Khān paid half of the amount in question by sending

1. G.M., p.450.

2. I.O.R. Bombay, Secret and Political, Range D, Vol.1, 24th March, 1789.

3. G.G., p.214. Zinat al-Tavārikh. Msc. Tehran. n.p.

4. Ibid.

5. I.O.R. G/22/18. Bussora. 3rd Feb. 1779.

6. Ibid. 26th May, 1779.

7. Ibid.

500 Crates of dates to the resident of the EIC. He further promised to honour the remittance when he arrived at Shirāz.<sup>1</sup> He never entered Shirāz while his rival Zaki Khān was alive, and it was only after the death of Zaki Khān, that Ṣādeq Khān placed himself as the guardian of Abol Fath Khān in the government. He released the prisoners from Basra, who were kept in Shirāz.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, when Bushehr was ransacked by a local chief, Raīs Bāqer, Ṣādeq Khān ordered him to return whatever had been taken from the inhabitants and to vacate the place immediately.<sup>3</sup> But he failed to pay the debt which he had promised.

The EIC. was expecting an opportunity to apply to his successor, ḌAli Morād Khān, but he reckoned it a waste of expense on the part of the Company and subsequently gave up the idea.<sup>4</sup> During this time trade was greatly reduced and this caused anxiety among the Company's directors. Thus, they assigned the task of investigating the causes of the decline to a certain Mr. Matcham, who was on his way to England from the Bengal establishment. In 1783, the resident at Bushehr received a letter from his superiors, acquainting him with the plan and ordering him to assist Mr. Matcham in his endeavour.<sup>5</sup> Mr. Matcham arrived a little after ḌAli Morād Khān had died, and we have a letter, dated 14th March, 1785, in which the resident informs his superior of the impossibility of the trip to Esfāhān and Shirāz, as was intended by Mr. Matcham.<sup>6</sup> Thus, he decided to wait in Baṣra until one of the contenders for the crown of Persia, that is Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān and Ṣeid Morād Khān, should emerge as victor.<sup>7</sup> However, the trip and the intended investigation

1. I.O.R. G/22/18. Bussorah, 26th May, 1779.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 28th August, 1779.

4. Ibid. Bussorah, 6th November, 1784.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid. P/D/72. Bushire, 15th March, 1785.

7. Ibid.

were never carried out, since the resident deemed the roads unsafe and the trip impossible.<sup>1</sup>

It was in 1786 that the EIC opened communication with the court of Shirāz. This had been occasioned by the arrival of two Englishmen at the camp of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān near Kāzerun. Thus, the resident received a letter from Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, dated Safar, 1201/December, 1786, to inform him of the arrival of two Englishmen at his camp and that he had sent a Mehmāndār (official host) to conduct them to Bushehr. The reason for their being sent to Bushehr was that they claimed to have come on the part of the king of England and were expecting an envoy from the court of Dehli to conclude a business treaty with the king of Persia.<sup>2</sup> Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, however, stated in his letter, that he was unaware of the nature of the business treaty and that, when he found out the purpose of it, he would give his answer.<sup>3</sup>

Major Morrison and a young officer in his company, by the name of Biggs, arrived in Bushehr, with a Persian, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Beg.<sup>4</sup> In a letter dated 27th December, 1786, the resident acknowledged the receipt of the Farmān from the court of Shirāz. He also stated that he knew nothing of the two gentlemen, who had arrived there. He did not know, on whose part they had come, and what their business was.<sup>5</sup> He did, however, have the courtesy to thank the Khān for his kindness towards his countrymen. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān had ordered Shaikh Nāser, the shaikh of Bushehr, to pay the resident for their expenses.<sup>6</sup> However, Major Morrison and his companion, Biggs excited great suspicion in the Company's circle, as they had no clue as to the purpose

1. I.O.R. P/D/72. Bushire, 15th March, 1785.

2. Ibid. P/D/74. Bushire, 5th Jan. 1787.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid. 27th December, 1786.

6. Ibid.

of the Major's mission. They were worried that he might be a French agent. Hence, the directors of the Company commanded their agents to keep an eye on his activities, and the resident dutifully promised to watch him and prevent him, with the utmost determination, from concluding any treaty with the king of Persia prejudicial to the Honourable Company's interest.<sup>1</sup>

The character and conduct of Major Morrison deserves particular notice. He was not sent, as he claimed, on behalf of the King of England, but was in the service of Shāh<sup>C</sup> Ālam, the Grand Mogul.<sup>2</sup> He had served the EIC for a while, and then had resigned from his post to enter the service of the king of Dehli. Apparently, he had persuaded Shāh<sup>C</sup> Ālam, to recruit British officers in his army and to enter into a treaty with the Company to provide him with modern arms and ammunition.<sup>3</sup> In England, Morrison had written to H. Dundas, the director of the EIC board, to obtain his approval of the plan. He then set off to the court of Persia, in order to persuade Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān to do the same as Shāh<sup>C</sup> Ālam. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān did not, however, seem enthusiastic about the plan. In a letter with no date, which Major Morrison wrote to Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, he promised to conquer all Persia for him in four years.

"If you will send two of your trusty people with about ten Lacks of Rupees to Bussora in order that they may proceed with me to Europe to engage such persons as are necessary, according to the enclosed list to purchase great guns & small arms & other articles of war which we shall return with." <sup>5</sup>

This list alluded to has unfortunately not survived, but the

1. I.O.R. P/D/74. Bushire, 5th Jan. 1787.

2. Ibid.

3. Melville Papers. Central Asian Society Journal, Vol.17, 1930, p.507.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

content of the letter is enough to lead one to the conclusion that Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān had talked about military situation with the Major and had asked him to purchase ammunition for him. Major Morrison waited in Baṣra for an answer to his letter, but we have no evidence that Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān replied to his letter, probably due to shortage of cash. Thus Major Morrison left for England.

Major Morrison, however, did not give up his plan. The next we hear of him is in England, where he arrived in February, 1788, bombarding Henry Dundas with a barrage of statistics and excerpts on the subject of how it would be profitable to the Company to enter into such contracts with the courts of Dehli and Shirāz.<sup>1</sup> The affair appears to have dragged on until much later and, on 3rd March, 1796, there is a letter written by H. Dundas to the chairman of the committee, about General Morrison's proposed treaty with Persia:

"which has for its object on this part (EIC) the cession of the principal ports in the Gulf, of supplying them with Tin, Copper & on our part (England) the furnishing them with officers & soldiers to instruct them in European discipline."<sup>2</sup>

This occasion made it possible for the court of Shirāz to enter into a friendly relationship with the agents of the Company in Bushehr and Baṣra. Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's minister, together with the Farmān of his master, wrote a letter to the resident, offering him assistance and his service.<sup>3</sup> The resident acknowledged his kindness, by reciprocating his offers of service to the minister and his master.<sup>4</sup> This was the prelude to a beneficial and constructive relationship with the

1. Melville Papers, J.C.A.S., Vol.17. 1930

2. I.O.R. G/29/21, p.449. 3rd March, 1796.

3. Ibid. P/D/74. 27th December, 1786.

4. Ibid.



court at Shirāz, which lasted as long as Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān lived.

Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān and the EIC:

Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān was aware of the profits that would accrue to his kingdom, from having a commercial relationship with the foreign companies. Thus, when Harford Jones, from the residency of Baṣra, came to Shirāz in the summer of 1787 for the benefit of his health, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān received him with much kindness and he was given an audience in the company of W. Francklin, who was then in Shirāz.<sup>1</sup> On that occasion, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān expressed his earnest desire to see the foreign merchants trading with his kingdom and assured them that they would meet with every assistance in his power. His minister, Mirzā Mohāmmad Hosein, who had made the acquaintance of Harford Jones, while he was in Basra (that is, in the capacity of minister to Ṣādeq Khān), also made ample manifestation of his friendship towards the EIC agents and even invited Harford Jones to visit Shirāz again as his own guest.<sup>2</sup> Hence, the resident at Bushehr wrote a letter to Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, thanking him for his hospitality towards the joint factor at Basra, Harford Jones. It was then, that Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān sent a Farmān to the resident, with a robe of honour.<sup>3</sup>

These proceedings induced the Company's directors to take advantage of these encouragements. The factory at Bushehr had for long been deemed as a useless expense to the Company. Its state had been worsened by the Shaikh of Bushehr's demanding the EIC to pay tax on the imports and exports made by the Company.<sup>4</sup> The Company had been exempt from such payments by the Farmān, which gave them the privilege of conducting

1. OMTS, p. 77.

2. D.K., p. cxxiv

3. I.O.R. P/D/75, p.299. 1788.

4. Ibid. Bombay, Secret and Political. Range D/ Vol.74, p.122, 1788.

their commercial transactions without any obstacles during the reign of Karim Khān. The above-mentioned Farmān had been lost and the resident could not convince the Shaikh of those privileges, or rather, it was not in the Shaikh's interest to accept them as valid.

At this stage, the directors of the EIC resolved to make representations to Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, in order to put the factory at Bush-ehr on a more favourable footing, similar to those that existed in Ottoman Turkey.<sup>1</sup> It appears that the Company's directors wrote a letter to Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān without acknowledging him as the sovereign of Persia. Thus, the agents of the Company were worried that the letter would not meet with a favourable response. Hence, it was taken back from the Shaikh of Bushehr, who was charged with the delivery of it, so that it could be altered.<sup>2</sup> However, as was rightly anticipated, the Khān readily complied with their representations; they were made exempt from payment of tax and even the <sup>✓</sup>poll tax (Rāhdāri) was removed from all the merchandize, which was imported to the kingdom. This Farmān was received by the resident at Bushehr, in January, 1788.<sup>3</sup> Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khan took the opportunity of accepting the resident's offers of his service and requested him to procure whatever rarities could be found in Baṣra, to be purchased for him and a bill of costs sent to him.<sup>4</sup>

7. toll.

#### The ban on the export of Kermāni wool:

Despite his boundless favour towards foreign merchants, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān was by no means prepared to sacrifice the trade and industry of his dominion for their sake.<sup>5</sup> Thus, knowing the im-

1. I.O.R. P/D/75., p.123, 1788.

2. Ibid., p.290.

3. Ibid. pp.124-5, 8th Rabi<sup>C</sup> II, 1202/8th January, 1788 (18th January).

4. Ibid., p.299.

5. Ibid. G/29/21. Report on the British Trade with Persia, 1791. See Appendix

portance of the export of the Kermāni wool, for the consumption of the factories in Britain, he imposed a ban on its export.<sup>1</sup> Incidentally, the resident at Bushehr states that the expenses for the upkeep of the factory in Bushehr were justified, as it could be used for the purchase of Kermāni wool and the drugs, which were the products of Persia. This shows a wide demand for these items. However, the ban not only made the purchase of wool difficult, but also made its price jump up. In a letter written by S. Manesty of the Basra residency, he orders the resident at Bushehr that the prices at which wool was purchased, should not exceed the fixed price which had been set by the directors of the Company in 1787.<sup>2</sup>

The ban was aimed at the protection of the Shawl industry set up in Kermān and, although the quality of that item was not as good as those of Kashmir, it provided for home consumption. This, in effect, discouraged the importation of Indian Shawls. It appears, however, that, despite the ban, the resident was able to procure a certain amount of wool every year.<sup>3</sup> Although the trade in wool had been hampered by this measure, trade in general was thriving. In the year 1788, the merchants of Bushehr made the largest ever importation from India.<sup>4</sup> The amount of this consignment is not available to us.

The dispute between the EIC agents and the Shaikh of Bushehr was not only on the issue of tax and rahdarī. It appears that the Shaikh was actively involved in the trade of the southern regions. Thus, induced by motives of self interest, the Shaikh,

"considered himself entitled on the arrival of vessels

1. I.O.R. G/29/21. Report on the British Trade with Persia, 1791. See Appendix

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. G/29/18 Part.1.ff.1.201. 1784-1792.

4. Ibid. G/29/21. Report on the British Trade, op. cit.

"& foreign merchants to a preference & to have the refusal of their importations."<sup>1</sup>

The Shaikh, however,

"uniformly invited the principal merchants of the place to take a share in the purchases which he made & therefore it was more severely felt by the British residents and the inferior order of the merchants."<sup>2</sup>

The above statement was written at a later period than when the dispute was going on and was also written by one, who was not involved in it. But the resident at Bushehr at the time was highly incensed by the conduct of the Shaikh and bitterly complained to his superiors about him. He asked for an application to be made to the Khān at Shirāz about his officer, Shaikh Nāser.<sup>3</sup> Apparently, the last straw was the Shaikh's

"refusing to, permit a pilot to go on board the Drake (ship), to carry that vessel out of the inner road at Bushire."<sup>4</sup>

This was, in the resident's opinion, unpardonable and disgraceful to the Company's factory there and consequently to the nation!<sup>5</sup> He thus reckoned it

"would infinitely more lend to the credit of both to withdraw the factory than to keep it on the present footing deprived of its consequences & insulted in its privileges."<sup>6</sup>

1. I.O.R. G/29/21 Report on the British Trade, op. cit.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. P/D/75. Bussorah, p.120. 1788.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

These maladies and the kind sentiment expressed by Ja<sup>C</sup> far Khān, induced the directors of the Company to apply to the Khān for an alteration in the terms, on which the factory had been established, and the Khān was on the verge of making these changes, when he was assassinated. According to Harford Jones and S. Manesty:

"the murder of the Zand king was the result of the serious dispute between Jaafar Khan and his vassal, the Shaikh of Bushehr."<sup>1</sup>

This allegation is not substantiated by any other source and, in fact, all the sources are completely silent on the subject. However, only one of the Persian sources remarks on the Shaikh being treated badly by Ja<sup>C</sup> far Khān.<sup>2</sup> Thus, the idea of holding the Shaikh responsible for the death of his master appears to be unfounded, unless the factory resident was in possession of some information to which we do not have access. There is no doubt that Ja<sup>C</sup> far Khān was partial to the Company's agents and their grievances and had actually taken their side in the dispute, which is clearly shown by the tenor of his Farmāns to the resident. But whether he was murdered as a result of that, is doubtful.

1. I.O.R. P/D/75. Bussorah, p.120. 1788.

2. H.P., Vol.II, p.352.

## CHAPTER 4

### JA<sup>C</sup>FAR KHĀN'S SUCCESSORS

After the murder of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, Seid Morād Khān declared himself the new sovereign and, according to the customary practice, informed all the governors and the Khāns of his accession. Coins were minted in his name. The notables, who were partial to his rule, set about serving him, whereas the dissident nobles accepted his supremacy with distaste.<sup>1</sup> Seid Morād, aware of the support, which the young, rightful heir, Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, enjoyed among his subjects, took the precaution of writing letters to the military chiefs in his company and acquainting them with the developments. He threatened them at the same time, that, if they did not leave Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān's service immediately, their families would not be spared the atrocities that would befall them. His threat had the desired effect and the army dispersed almost instantly.<sup>2</sup>

In the confusion and chaos which ensued after the news reached his camp, Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān managed to reach his horse and, accompanied only by his minister and a few adherents, he proceeded towards Bushehr. We are informed by the resident of the EIC that:

"Lutf Ally Khan the son of Jaafar Khan who at the time of his father's death was in the province of Kerman at the head of a large army, arrived in the night of 31st January with a few adherents at Bushire and has claimed the protection of Shaikh Nassir."<sup>3</sup>

1. I. Z., p.48.

2. G. G., p.315.

3. I. O. R., Bombay secret and political, range E, Vol.1, 1789.

On his arrival there, he was received with attention and hospitality, although we are informed by one of the sources, that the Shaikh of Bushehr had been badly treated by Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān.<sup>1</sup>

Seid Morād Khān, having learnt of his taking refuge in Bush-  
ehr, ordered the Shaikh to deliver him up to the government  
of Shirāz. The EIC resident at Bushehr writes in a letter that:

"Suid Morad Khan quitely rules Schyraus and that  
Shaikh Nassir has refused to comply with a request  
made by Suid Morad Khan for the delivery to him  
of Lutf Ally Khan."<sup>2</sup>

Unfortunately, the Shaikh, who was by this time more than  
eighty years of age, died after a short time: that is, on the  
11th April, 1789/5th Rajab, 1203. However, he charged his son,  
Shaikh Naṣr to assist Loṭf<sup>C</sup> Ali Khān in his attempt to gain the  
throne. As we are informed by the resident in Bushehr:

"Shaikh Nassir has proceeded to Scheraus with Lutf  
Ally Khan and has left his brother Shaikh AbduReh-  
im in command of Bushire."<sup>3</sup>

The new Shaikh of Bushehr was not the only aid to Loṭf<sup>C</sup> Ali  
Khān. The governor of Bandar Rig had also joined his forces  
and he, too, proceeded to Shirāz in his company.

Loṭf<sup>C</sup> Ali Khān was provided with a large force, mainly consist-  
ing of the<sup>C</sup> Arab tribes from the coast with the Fārsi riflemen.  
Prior to their departure towards Shirāz, the Shaikh had written  
to his friends in the city, encouraging them to make an effort  
to dislodge the usurper, Seid Morād Khān. The city notables,  
in the meantime, had allied themselves with the elements par-

1. M.T., p.352.

2. I.O.R., Factory Records, G/29/18, Pt.3, 1784-1792.

3. Ibid. Range E, Vol.1, Bushire, 1789.

tial to the cause of the young prince,<sup>1</sup> and they were at work to topple Seid Morād.

Giti Goshāy asserts that seven days after the death of the late Shaikh, that is, on the 26th Rajab, Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān departed from Bushehr on his march towards Shirāz.<sup>2</sup> The EIC resident also asserts that it was on 26th Rajab 1203/22nd April, 1789, that he set off. This date is accurate, as the resident was actually in Bushehr at the time.<sup>3</sup>

His information about the subsequent events also appears to be accurate. The number of the troops, who accompanied the Zand prince is not mentioned in other sources. We learn from the resident that:

"encouraged by invitations from Sheraus and by the assistance rendered to him by the principal people who govern the country in the vicinity of Bushire, Lutf Ally Khan marched from thence on the 22nd April with an army consisting of 6000 men."

It took him only a few days to achieve his objective, as we learn that:

"early in the month of May he obtained possession of Scherauz where he now rules."<sup>5</sup>

The resident, however, provides no information on the events which took place in Shirāz, and the plot to overpower Seid Morād Khān. The latter, who was expecting Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān to make an attack on Shirāz, recruited troops in order to stop his progress. Before Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān approached the city, he sent out an army, at the head of which he had placed his own brother,

1. I.Z., p.48.

2. G.G., p.317.

3. I.O.R. Factory Records, G/29/18. Pt.3 & Range E, Vol.1, 1789.

4. Ibid. Bombay secret & poiltical, Range E, Vol.1, Bushire, 1789.

5. Ibid., Factory Records G/29/18. Pt.3, 1789.



Shāh Morād Khān. Shāh Morād Khān marched towards Bushehr, and encamped at a distance of six farsangs from the camp of the prince near Dāleki.<sup>1</sup> Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān marched towards the camp of his opponent. On his way, he was joined by some of the Shirāzi troops, who informed him that the commander sent out from Shirāz to confront him, had been seized by the chief second in command, <sup>C</sup>Ali Hemat Khān-e-Koliā'i, and that the army had declared itself in favour of Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān.<sup>2</sup>

Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, delighted by the turn of events, hastened towards Shirāz. He proceeded as far as the town of Kāzerun, where he received the news of a conspiracy having been carried out in the capital, Shirāz. Mirzā Moḥammad Ḥosein had sent a messenger to inform him of the developments in the capital.<sup>3</sup>

The notables, like Mirzā Moḥammad Ḥosein, the minister, and Ḥāji Ebrāhim, the kalāntar of the city, had gained the support of the tribes in the city and, as a result of an uproar, Seid Morād Khān had been forced to take refuge in the Ark. The notables were awaiting the entry of the new sovereign into the capital. It appears that prior to the departure of the army, which was commissioned to halt the advance of Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, the notables had arranged with some of the military chiefs to capture their commander and inform the city notables of their success, so that they could execute their scheme within the city.<sup>4</sup>

On the 10th of Sha<sup>C</sup>ban, 1203/7th May, 1789, the city was secured by the supporters of Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān and, on the 11th Sha<sup>C</sup>ban,

1. I.O.R., Factory Records, G/29/18 Pt.3, 1789.

2. G.G., p.317.

3. Ibid., pp.317-18.

4. Ibid., p.318. I.Z., pp.49-50. M.T., p.352.

he arrived in Shirāz, covering the distance of many farsangs in twenty-four hours. The Ark was immediately besieged and, after a faint resistance, Seid Morād Khān gave himself up, and was blinded for his perfidy.<sup>1</sup> The resident in Bushehr writes:

"Lutf Ally Khan has severely punished in different ways all the khans concerned in the murder of his father except Ally Kouli Khan to whom from political motives he has granted a pardon."<sup>2</sup>

<sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān was a chief of considerable influence in the southern regions and Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was prudent not to antagonize him.

The events taking place in Shirāz had not passed unnoticed by the Qājār pretender, Āqā Mohāmmad Khān, who was expecting such events would essentially assist him in his pursuit of power. At the head of a large army, he advanced towards Shirāz. On the way, he learnt of the successful accession of Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān. This, however, did not discourage him from continuing on his course. He encamped at Baizā. The news of his arrival was reported to the Zand monarch in Shirāz, who gathered troops with great haste, in order to confront his enemy.<sup>3</sup>

#### Events Taking Place in Shirāz After the Murder of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān:

Mojmal-al-Tavārikh is the only source, which relates the pact concluded between the city notables, to the effect that they would unanimously support the cause of Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, as long as his conduct was mild and respectful towards them. Should he venture any act of reprisal on the murderers of his father, i.e. <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān Kāzeruni, who was the major element in the assassination, they would not have any obligation of loyalty

1. G.G., p.318. I.Z., pp.49-50. M.I., p.352.

2. I.O.R. Factory Records, G/29/18, Pt.3, 1789.

3. G.G., p.321.

towards him.<sup>1</sup> This pact between the notables had apparently taken place the day before Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān entered his capital. We do not have all the names of the notables, but there is, however, mention of the Mirzā Jāni Fasā'i, <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān, Hāji Ebrāhim Kalāntar, with the author of Mojmal-al-Tavārikh, who asserts that he was present at that meeting.<sup>2</sup> The notables present took an oath of fidelity to the new prince and, to make sure that <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān Kāzeruni would not violate his promise, Hāji Ebrāhim entreated him to take up his residence in the kalāntar's house.<sup>3</sup> It appears that the whole plot was designed to secure the safety of the Kāzeruni chief, <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān, who seems to have enjoyed great power and influence. Unfortunately, we cannot ascertain what was the source of his power. It could either have been his wealth, or else the support he enjoyed by the tribes of the south.

On the second day of Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān's arrival, the kalāntar, Hāji Ebrāhim, presented <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān to the prince. He was pardoned and was even bestowed with a mark of honour.<sup>4</sup>

Among those, who had been involved in Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's assassination, was an obscure character by the name of Mirzā Mehdi Lashgar Nevis. This person, as Harford Jones writes, was

"a Scoundrel who had formerly been disgraced for speculation with the loss of his ears; and who, when the head of the late unfortunate monarch lay in the square before the citadel, insulted by the rabble, cut from it the ears, in revenge for his own, justly forfeited. The pardon of this man had been obtained from Lutf Ally Khan, by assurances, from interested persons, that he had not been guilty of this foul act, though many persons had been

1. M.I., p.352.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p.353.

4. Ibid.

"witnesses of its perpetration."<sup>1</sup>

The interested persons, mentioned above, were Hāji Ebrāhim and his associates. Apparently the king had said that:

"If the accusations had been true, he freely forgave the Meerza from the consideration that he had for his mediator."<sup>2</sup>

In any case, the agreement mentioned by the author of Mojmal-al-tavārikh is not supported by other sources. This may be because the persons involved had taken the precaution of utmost secrecy in their activities, and of not letting anyone outside their circle be present. However, the subsequent treachery of Hāji Ebrāhim, and the very people who are supposed to have been present at that meeting, strongly supports the authenticity of the allegations by Mojmal-al-tavārikh. The event is, however, endorsed by Fasā'i's Fārsnāmeḥ, whose grandfather was one of the prominent figures present.<sup>3</sup>

#### The Causes of the Fall of Seid Morād Khān's Government:

Seid Morād had tried once before to establish himself as king. On this, his second attempt, the populace of Shirāz were well acquainted with his administration. As the kalāntar, Mirzā Mohāmmad, informs us:

"his avarice and cruelty was to the extent that people had forsaken their homes to be out of his reach and had dispersed all the quarters of the country. He had not paid the salary of the troops for three successive years and that was the main cause of his downfall."<sup>4</sup>

1. D.K., p.cxxi-cxxii.
2. H.P., Vol.II, p.181.
3. F.N., part II, p.30.
4. R.M.M., p.89.

Bearing this in mind, one wonders how this same man was able to establish himself in the government of Shirāz again. The only logical explanation would be, that the country was in a state of chaos. Furthermore, he gave over a great amount of royal treasures to gain the support of the tribes.<sup>1</sup>

However, Seid Morād Khān ruled the kingdom only for a brief period: only for two and a half months. There was, however, enough time for the EIC resident to make contact with him. We have a letter from the resident that states:

"in compliance with the command of the honorable the president, the resident had by letter announced to Said Morad Khan the present ruler of Sher-  
auz the event of the honorable the president having assumed the charge of the government of the western side of India and the desire which he entertains to strengthen the friendship which has so long subsisted between the English and Persian nations, in order however to enable the honorable president on future necessary occasions to write letters to the king of Persia in point of formality."<sup>2</sup>

The president's designs to establish friendly relations with Seid Morād Khān was curtailed by his overthrow, mainly at the hands of the city notables and the Zand nobles, i.e. the sons of Nazar <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, the former governor of Kermān.<sup>3</sup> The alleged involvement of Nazar <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān's sons is not supported by other sources; only Giti Goshāy assures us that they were the conspirators. This plot resulted in the capture of Shāh Morād Khān, the brother of the usurper and, consequently, brought about Seid Morād Khān's downfall.

The first confrontation with his Qājār rival, after Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān assumed power, resulted in the latter's defeat, partly be-

1. G.M., p. 458.

2. I.O.R., Bombay secret & political, Range E, Vol.1, 1789.

3. G.G., p.318.

cause he had not enough time to organize his troops. As we are informed by the official historian, his defeat was due to the treachery of his uncle, Moḥammad Khān, who had ambitious designs and was hoping that, by the defeat of his nephew, he would be able to promote his cause.<sup>1</sup>

The situation came about as follows: Āqā Moḥammad Khān encamped his troops in Baiẓā at the beginning of the month of Shavval 1203/27th June, 1789. He stayed there for about 30 to 40 days, while the Zand prince was preparing to meet him in the field. He gathered a force numbering up to 25,000, while his opponent was at the head of 60,000 men.<sup>2</sup>

Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān took the field in the middle of Z̄elqa<sup>C</sup>deh 1203/August, 1789. In the battle which ensued, Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān's uncle, Moḥammad Khān, deserted and marched towards the abode of the Mamasani tribes, who were related to him on his mother's side. This was a serious blow to the army of the Zands and the prince had no choice, except to retreat to the citadel.<sup>3</sup> Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān fortified the citadel as best he could. He moved the heavy artillery into the capital and placed them in strategic positions. He further divided his troops into divisions and allocated them to the charge of the towers and the gates.

Āqā Moḥammad Khān advanced to the outskirts of Shirāz, where he erected batteries and entrenched his forces.<sup>4</sup> A siege was laid on the city which lasted more than two months, during which time a force came out of the city to fight the besiegers daily. The scarcity of the provisions placed the Qājār army in a vulnerable position. Eventually, the Qājār chief found his

1. G.G., p.322.

2. I.Z., pp.50-51.

3. Ibid., p.51. G.G., p.323.

4. I.Z., p.52. G.G., p.324.

efforts futile and ordered his troops to retreat to Tehran,<sup>1</sup> in Zelhajjeh/September, 1789.

The Nouruz occurred on a Wednesday of the month of Rajab 1203/March 1789. The Zand king favoured his courtiers with bonuses and gifts on that occasion.<sup>2</sup> As the season for military expedition approached, that is, in May 1789/Shah<sup>C</sup>ban 1203, he received news of the arrival of the Qājār chief in the Gandom-ān pasture (Chamān). He thus set about preparing his army for an engagement.<sup>3</sup>

The Zand prince encamped outside the city, where he was joined by the military chiefs and his vassals; while Āqā Moḥammad Khān, having heard of a rebellion in Āzarbāyjan, found it more expedient to quell that first and have a free hand to pursue his plans to capture Shirāz.\* With the Qājārs having marched away from Fārs, Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān decided to employ his army in another exploit, since he had spent much time and money recruiting them. He had for some time intended to subdue Seyed Abol Ḥasan, the rebellious governor of the province of Kermān, who had refused to pay tribute to the government of Shirāz over a considerable period of time. Seyed Abol Ḥasan had further antagonized his colleague, Moḥammad Ḥosein Khān, the governor of Bam, and had caused him to complain to Shirāz. This event gave Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān a suitable pretext to march on Seyed Abol Ḥasan's territories.<sup>5</sup>

#### Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān's Expedition Against Kermān:

The character of the Kermāni governor merits a description at

1. G.G., p.324. I.Z., p.52.

2. G.G., p.325. I.Z., p.52.

3. Ibid.

4. I.Z., p.52.

5. Ibid., p.53.

this point. Seyed Abol Hasan was the spiritual leader of the sect of the Ismā<sup>c</sup>ili in Persia and India. He received great donations in cash and kind from his followers, and was even donated land and property in the country. Tārikh-e-Kermān assures us that he was an honest and righteous man, who spent his revenues on the constructive schemes of public utility,<sup>1</sup> but we have no evidence to support that. We do, however, know through the EIC resident that he had amassed great wealth, which he had deposited in the citadel, Shahr-e-Bābak.<sup>2</sup>

Lotf <sup>c</sup>Ali Khān set off for Kermān at the beginning of autumn. On his departure, he received an unexpected guest at his camp. The brother of his fierce enemy, Āqā Moḥammad Khān, Rezā Qoli Khān Qājār, who had once before defected the service of his brother, during the reign of <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān, and had joined Shaikh Vais Khān's camp, while at Māzandarān.<sup>3</sup> Lotf <sup>c</sup>Ali Khān left his younger brother in the capital as his viceroy, while Hāji Ebrāhim was appointed to the charge of civil administration in the capital. Two of the Zand nobles were commissioned to guard the citadel and the royal seraglio.

According to Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh, Lotf <sup>c</sup>Ali Khān left his capital at the start of the month of Ṣafar 1204/late October, 1789.<sup>4</sup> He spent a few days outside the city, in order to attend to certain unfinished business. On the point of departure, he received a delegation from Kermān, consisting of some notables. They brought the customary presents together with a letter, in which the Beglarbegi declared his allegiance, promising at the same time to pay his arrears, on the condition that the king called off his expedition.<sup>5</sup>

1. I.K., pp.332-333.

2. I.O.R., P/E/V.5.

3. G.G., p.326.

4. I.Z., p.53.

5. Ibid., pp.53-4. G.G. gives this event in a different manner; that is, when Lotf <sup>c</sup>Ali Khan besieged Kermān, the notables like Shaikh al-Eslām and Qāzi came out to the camp of the Zands with 20,000 Tomans as Pishkesh and the promise of allegiance.



Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān dismissed the idea of cancelling his trip. He insisted, however, that the governor should present himself at the royal camp personally.<sup>1</sup> Allowing, however, for reconciliation, should the governor change his mind and come to his camp, he promised that he would return to the capital immediately.<sup>2</sup>

Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān advanced towards the province of Kermān. On arriving at the town of Sirjān, the governor, Moḥammad Reżā Khān Korrāni, came out to meet him with suitable presents and provisions for his troops. Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān intended to take possession of Shahr-e-Bābak first and, then, proceed towards the seat of the governor of Kermān, Gavāshir. The Korrāni chief disagreed with this idea on the grounds that Shahr-e-Bābak had a very strong citadel, with a supply of ammunition, which could last the inhabitants as long as five years.<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, the citadel was defended by a close relation of the Beglarbegi, Mirzā Sādeq, whose relationship with his troops, the <sup>C</sup>AtāolTāhi tribes, was that of a Pir with his Morids (saint and disciples). The inhabitants also considered the Beglarbegi as their spiritual leader and would fight for him to the last gasp.<sup>4</sup>

The chief of Sirjān induced the king to assail the town of Gavāshir, which was a large place and its citadel had many loopholes, which could be easily penetrated by a well organised army.<sup>5</sup> Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh asserts that on his way to Gavāshir, Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān sent an envoy to the governor in order to persuade him to submit. While he was on the march, he received the governor's envoy together with some of the governor's relations. The envoy produced a letter which contained the acceptance of the king's terms, that is, to send his brother to the

1. I.Z., p.54.

2. Ibid.

3. I.K., pp.343-4.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

court as a hostage, the payment of the tribute demanded of him, on the condition that the king did not proceed further than Sirjān.<sup>1</sup>

Lotf Āli Khān received news, to the effect that the governor had arrested the people of high rank partial to the Zand rule and was preparing for a siege, should his request meet with an unfavourable response.<sup>2</sup>

There is great confusion in the order of the events in Tārikh-e-Kermān, since it is difficult to disentangle the two attempts made by the Zand prince to reduce Kermān. It appears that the author of Tārikh-e-Kermān took most of his information from other sources and confused them. The author of this book asserts that Lotf Āli Khān stayed about twenty days outside the town, and that a force came out of the citadel twice to fight him. On both occasions, the Kermānis were defeated, until the governor made a night raid on the Zands, raiding the cattle in their camp,<sup>3</sup> and thus discouraged him from further attacks. This event is not mentioned in other sources, and Tārikh-e-Kermān is deficient in its account, regarding the main reason for the Zand army's withdrawal from outside the citadel at Gavāshir.

Intense cold and heavy snowfalls had blocked the roads and the army was faced with severe famine. As a result, a great number of the troops died of hunger, even if they survived the cold.<sup>4</sup> Eventually Lotf Āli Khān found the condition of his army precarious, as there was the danger of the whole force being dispersed. Thus, he left the province of Kermān and, in the month of Jamāda' I 1205/January, 1791, entered his capital.<sup>5</sup>

1. I.Z., pp.54-55.

2. Ibid., p.55.

3. I.K., p.344.

4. I.Z., p.56.

5. Ibid.

Giti Goshāy differs from Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh in the events, which took place during the siege. The former source states that, while the Zand army laid siege to the citadel, the governor sent out the Shaikhal-Eslām and the Qāzi of the city to proceed to Lotf Āli Khān's camp, entreating him to raise the siege and promising, on behalf of the governor, to meet his demands. They even suggested paying 20,000 Tomans for his return to Shirāz. Lotf Āli Khān did not accede to their terms on account of his excessive pride, and demanded that the governor should seek pardon in person for his insolent conduct.<sup>1</sup>

Fārsnāmeḥ-e-Nāseri states that the scarcity of food was such, that the soldiers had to eat the flesh of their horses and asses. When this was no longer possible, they decided to leave their posts. Lotf Āli Khān, finding himself in this predicament followed them and returned to Shiraz.<sup>2</sup>

Giti Goshāy asserts that he left a garrison in Sirjān with the eldest son of Moḥammad Hosein Khān Sistāni, Amir Saif-al Din.<sup>3</sup> This is contradicted by Tārikh-e-Kermān, which gives the town as Mashiz.<sup>4</sup>

Tārikh-e-Kermān also gives us information on the events that took place outside the citadel of Kerman. Apparently, the king, having found the siege more detrimental to his own cause, rather than the inhabitants of the city, requested assistance from the neighbouring chiefs, like Moḥammad A<sup>c</sup>zam Khān Afghān, the ruler of the areas adjoining Kermān, like Narmāshir, Khabis, etc.; but due to some disagreement between the Afghān chiefs at this time, the assistance never materialised. Lotf Āli Khān also demanded troops from Moḥammad Hosein Khān Sistāni,

1. G.G., pp.326-7.

2. F.N., p.232.

3. G.G., p.328.

4. T.K., p.345.f.n.

the governor of Bam. The governor also had some dispute with the inhabitants of his jurisdiction and was so much involved that he could not respond favourably to the summons of his master. He did, however, send two of his sons, Jahāngir Khān and Amir Moḥammad <sup>C</sup>Ali, at the head of 150 cavalry to the Zand camp.<sup>1</sup> This information is not given in other sources, but there is no particular reason to doubt the authenticity of this, as it is quite natural for a ruler to summon his vassals to his aid in time of emergency.

The events of the year 1205/1790-91 were of great importance for the Zand house, since Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān decided to make an expedition against the city of Eṣfāhān, which by now was completely in the hands of his Qājār rival. This event resulted in his being deprived of his throne and his subsequent murder by the Qājārs.

Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān spent the rest of the winter in Shirāz, preparing for his military expedition, while Āqā Moḥammad Khān was engaged in subjugating his brother, Morteżā Qoli Khān, and some minor revolts in the province of Māzandarān.<sup>2</sup>

Having achieved his objectives: that is, the crushing of the rebellions and the murdering of his brother, the Qājār chief set off for the province of Āzarbāyjān, where for some time earlier, a chief of the Shaqāqi tribe, Ṣādeq Khān, had thrown off allegiance to any government, declaring himself independent. He had, moreover, taken possession of the city of Tabriz.<sup>3</sup> This chief fled at the approach of the Qājār army and, with very little effort, Āqā Moḥammad Khān subdued all parts of Āzarbāyjān. This was due to strife and discord amongst the local chiefs, who did not offer any resistance to the supreme power

1. G.G., p.344.

2. Ibid., pp.332-3.

3. Ibid.

of a stronger chief.<sup>1</sup> Āqā Moḥammad Khān returned to Tehran, having left his nephew, Bābā Khān (later Fath Āli Shāh), in charge of the city of Eṣfāhān during his absence.<sup>2</sup>

At the end of the year 1789/1204, Mirzā Moḥammad Ḥosein, the minister to Lotf Āli Khān, left Shirāz on a pilgrimage to Mecca. On his trip back from there, he stayed in Basra, where he met with hospitality from the residents of the EIC, Mr. Manesty and Harford Jones. They took the opportunity of showing the minister the gratitude of the English community there, for the services which the minister had rendered them, during the siege and the capture of Basra by the Persian army.<sup>3</sup> The EIC resident at Basra states that in several interviews, which the minister had there, he

"expressed in the most polite terms & in the most forcible language, the general desire of the Khan /Lotf Āli Khān/ to cultivate the friendship of the British nation & to give the highest encouragement to such British traders as might visit Persia, on his own particular inclination to render kind and friendly services to them & in our last interview with him previous to his departure for Bagdad Meerza Mahomed Hossien declared the sentiments of the Khan on the subject of establishment of British factories in the kingdom of Persia in so full & so encouraging a manner that we ventured to mention to him our idea of a new modification of the Honble. Board."<sup>4</sup>

It appears that the minister was commissioned by Lotf Āli Khān to negotiate with the residents, but we have no information about the purpose of his visit to Bagdad. It could, however, have been a friendly gesture towards the Pasha of Bagdad,

1. G.G., p.332-3.

2. I.Z., p.57.

3. I.O.R. G/29/18, Bussora, 1789.

4. Ibid., Factory Records, Bushire, 1790.

aimed at establishing good relations with the neighbouring Pashalik. The friendly sentiments of the minister were further substantiated by the Farmāns, which Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān sent the resident at Bushehr, and which had convinced him that

"the Khan would consent to place a factory in Persia on the footing of the factory here [Basra] & to levy only trifling customs on British property landed at Bushire or conveyed to Schyraus, as for sale we beg leave respectfully to express the hope that you will comply with the wishes of Meerza Mahomed Hossien whose conduct towards us in all occasions demands our particular attention."<sup>1</sup>

The friendly overtures and encouragement made by Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān to the British, did not in any way alter the commercial stagnation, which had long since set in, in the Gulf region. As we see later on, the Khān had even gone as far as giving permission to the British to establish a new factory on the island of Khārg, but the scheme never materialized, partly because of the precarious position of Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān in his government. As it was stated by the resident:

"the present critical situation of the Khan, prevents our offering to your consideration our sentiments on the subject of the establishment in question."<sup>2</sup>

Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān had, however, good reasons to try and solicit the friendship of the resident, since he was hoping to get assistance from them in his contest with his Qājār rival for the kingdom.

Apparently, the request made by the resident in Baṣra had brought about the question of the establishment of the new factory. We have information on the subject from a letter, dated the 18th of December, 1790/11th Rabi<sup>C</sup> II, 1205.<sup>3</sup> The proceedings

1. I.O.R. G/29/18 Factory Records, Bushire, 1790. For the plan particularized on the factory in Persia, the reader is referred to the Report on the Commerce of Persia, included in the Appendix.

2. Ibid., Pt.4, Feb., 1792.

3. Ibid., G/29/21, Bussora, 18th Dec. 1790.

involved in giving the grant of the island of Khārg took Lotf Āli Khān two years to decide on. This was rather late, since shortly afterwards he lost possession of the island to the hostile Shaikh of Bushehr, who was not at all inclined to agree to such a proposition. The Khān was well aware of the fact that such a small kingdom, which had been left to him, could not provide him with the revenues he would need in his battles with the Qājār chief. By this time, he had collected such immense treasures, which enabled him to recruit armies of 60,000 men. We will relate in a later chapter that, while the Qājār chief besieged Gavāshir, he even built another city, beside the old one, for his troops to live in.<sup>1</sup>

The expeditions undertaken by Lotf Āli Khān were aimed primarily at increasing his revenues. Unfortunately, the period of anarchy and lawlessness had gone on for so long that none of the local chiefs were prepared to submit to a Zand, especially since the Qājār chief had actually conquered the whole empire, leaving only Fārs for his opponents to rule.<sup>2</sup> It was quite natural that the local chiefs were more in dread of the Qājārs rather than the Zands, whose power was greatly diminished. When Lotf Āli Khān failed to reduce the wealthy and powerful governor of Kermān, he thought of another means to raise money. He summoned the resident of the EIC in Basra to his court at Shirāz, in order to enter into business with him. He offered Harford Jones the opportunity to buy the famous jewels, which he had inherited from his ancestors. As he admitted: "These foolish things are of no use to me".<sup>3</sup> Indeed, this was true; what he really needed was ready cash, with which he could buy the fidelity of a mercenary army.

1. I.K., p.361. The footnotes relate this event from a copy of G.G., which I have not been able to trace.

2. Ibid., p.343.

3. D.K., p.clxxxii.

### Expedition Against Esfāhān:

Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān undertook another expedition, which resulted in a coup in his capital. One wonders whether the hopes that he entertained of a victory over his rival in Esfāhān, did not cause him to change his mind about the sale of his precious jewels, and caused him to call the deal off.

He was certain that he would return to Shiraz victorious, as he asked Harford Jones to remain in the city until he returned.<sup>1</sup> This shows how self-confident he was, when he left his capital. Alas, he never saw it again, as long as he lived.

The Zand prince had, however, taken the precaution of providing Harford Jones (who was in Shirāz) with Farmāns for the establishment of a factory on the island of Khārg,<sup>2</sup> lest his military exploits proved futile. The letters were written prior to his departure, which clearly shows his foresight to the profit, which he anticipated would accrue to his treasury and his kingdom as a whole, from the commerce with foreign firms, especially the British, who had by now become the sole European power in the Gulf.

Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was so deeply engrossed in his plan to make an attack on Esfāhān, that he failed to see that the Kalāntar, Hāji Ebrāhim, had organized a clique to overthrow his government and replace it with a confederacy of local chiefs, with himself as the ruler of Shirāz.<sup>3</sup> Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān made ample preparations for his expedition. He had recruited more than twenty thousand men for that purpose and, as on the previous occasion, had appointed the kalāntar, Hāji Ebrāhim, in charge of the civil administration of the capital, while two of his close

1. D.K., p.clxxxii.

2. Ibid., p.cl.

3. H.P., Vol.2, p.180.



kinsmen were placed in charge of the fortifications and the royal household (Ark and Ḥarīmkhāneh).<sup>1</sup> Barkhordār Khān, a distinguished general, whose courage and warlike spirit had gained him the favour of his master, despite the fact that the minister, Mirzā Hosein, found him weak<sup>2</sup> (probably due to some previous disagreement), was placed in charge of the citadel. While Lotf ʿAli Khān was absent, the Kalāntar and Barkhordār Khān had a clash over minor points of protocol on the previous expedition made by Lotf ʿAli Khān; Barkhordār Khān, being a member of the ruling family, expected due respect from the Kalāntar and the latter was not inclined to accede. At all events, the general had informed the prince of the event and had accused Hāji Ebrāhim of treachery. This time the conflict was still in existence.<sup>3</sup> Sir John Malcolm positively attributes the discord to the proud-spirit of Barkhordār Khān, while the official historian is completely silent on this point. We can only give credence to the allegations made by Malcolm, if we judge Barkhordār Khān by the opinion expressed by the minister, Mirzā Hosein, as mentioned above.

In any case, the royal seraglio was left to the charge of Moh-ammad ʿAli Khān Zand Ishakāqāsi bāshi. Prior to the prince's departure, Harford Jones, who had constant contact with Mirzā Mohāmmad Hosein, the minister, and had a few audiences with Lotf ʿAli Khān, observed that

"the minister had become thoughtful & melancholy, often absenting himself from supping in public."<sup>4</sup>

Furthermore, he urged his guest to finish his business in the capital and leave it as soon as he could.<sup>4</sup> This had perplexed

1. H.P., Vol.2, p.180.

2. D.K., p.cli.

3. H.P., Vol.II, pp.180-1.

4. D.K., p.cxl.

Harford Jones, as to why he had changed his manner. He was also aware of a change in the way Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān treated his favourite tutor (Laleh) and minister: "his majesty spoke but little to him".<sup>1</sup> It was after the coup had been executed that he discovered the cause of the minister's odd manner. Harford Jones also noticed the secrecy, which surrounded his dealings with the king's jeweller and the courtiers. This showed how little trust the king placed in his entourage.

However, Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, having finished his preparations, was ready to depart. "The summer was advancing, and with it the king's preparations for a campaign against the Kajars and Isfahan".<sup>2</sup> The Qājār army, with Bābā Khān at its head, had taken up a strategic position and was stationed in the Gandomān pastures, to protect the city of Esfāhān from the attack of the Zand prince. The king left his capital on the 14th of August, 1791/14th Zelhajeh, 1205, while Bābā Khān, on hearing of his departure, left his position at Gandomān and proceeded to Qomsheh, which had a citadel of some note.

"Lootf Alee Khan halted within a short distance of the enemy, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it would be most advisable to attack Baba Khan, or to avoid him, and proceed to his march to Isphanhan."<sup>3</sup>

It was in this place that the conspiracy of Hāji and his associates took place. The official historian asserts that the tribal warriors of Māfi and Nānkoli nomads rushed towards the tent of Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān in an uproar, firing their guns in all directions. The intention of the conspirators was that the brother of of the Hāji, (who was the commander of the infantry), should capture the prince and put him to death.<sup>4</sup> This was not

1. D.K., p.cxl.

2. Ibid., p.cxxxix.

3. Waring, A Tour to Shiraz, p.291.

4. D.K., p. cl.

effected, since everything did not go as smoothly as had been anticipated, partly because Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was alert and probably apprehensive of an event of that nature. It was also partly due to the confusion, which usually follows such incidents in a large camp. The EIC resident informs us of the event as follows:

"Lutf Ali Khan having marched from Scherauz on the 14th August with an army on an expedition against Isfahan, Hadjee Ibrahim Khan Beglarbegi of Fars who was left in Scherauz by Lutf Ali Khan rebelled on the 27th following; seized the city and confined Lutf Ali Khan's governor, in consequence of which event a commotion immediately took place in the army of so serious a nature as to force the Khan after making a feeble and fruitless attempt with a small remaining part of his army to intimidate Hadjee Ibrahim in to surrender to him of Scherauz, to seek safety in flight and with a few followers to claim the protection of Meer Ali Khan the governor of Bundereeg."<sup>1</sup>

This information seems to be confused. The best information that we have comes from Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān himself, in an interview with Harford Jones, where he relates the events as follows:

"the candles for the evening had scarcely been placed in my tent, before I heard a tumultuous noise in the camp, which seemed to be gradually bearing towards my quarter. I was in the khelwat or private tent; and before any one could be aware, I was outside the Pardahs."<sup>2</sup>

Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān then relates that, on approaching the quarter from which the noise was coming, he met some of his loyal adherents, who informed him that the mutineers had entered his tent and missed him. This is substantiated by the EIC resident who states:

1. I.O.R., Bombay political and secret, Range E, Vol.5, 1792.

2. D.K., p.clxxi.

"It is affirmed that the intentions of these conspirators who were in the camp [was] to assassinate Lutf Ali Khan, but that providentially he escaped the cruel fate intended him, by betaking himself timely to flight, and seeking an asylum with Meer Ali Khan at Bundereeg."<sup>1</sup>

### The Coup in Shirāz:

We will give the account as stated by the prince himself later. First we will return to the city of Shiraz and try to establish the facts about the events taking place there. The most reliable source of our information is Harford Jones, who was actually in the capital at the time. He asserts that:

"The king had left Shiraz about six days when an early morning I heard a noise of a multitude of people rushing along the streets; and very soon after my mehmandar, Hajy [sic] Muhammad Aly, arrived and informed me that Hajy Ibrahim had seized Barkordar Khan, the governor of the fortress, by orders, as he told the people, which he had received from the king."<sup>2</sup>

The EIC resident, however, gives a more detailed account of the events.

"Lutf Ali Khan had only left Sherauz a few days/ being advanced about half way to Ispahaun/ when the Hadjee Ibrahim the beglarbeg issued orders to have Barkhoudar Khan seized & confined pretending, having received intelligence from camp that a brother of Berkhoudar's had committed some capital crime against the prince. This was only however to deceive the inhabitants, Berkhoudar Khan being therefore seized without any opposition, Hadjee Ibrahim next gave orders for all the gates of the city to be secured giving out he had information that Lutf Ali Khan was missing in camp & that the army was divided in three parties in favor of three Khans, who had set themselves up as competitors for the government that such being the case he should not allow any one to enter the city until

1. I.O.R., P/E/V.5, Bushire 1792.

2. D.K., p.cxiii. G.G. does not support this account and simply states that Hāji Ebrāhīm had the kutval of the citadel (Barkhordār Khān) arrested and after fortifying the citadel (Qal'a) he informed his accomplices in the royal camp; p.344.

"it should appear which of the competitors would finally prevail."<sup>1</sup>

By securing the gates of the city, he firstly prevented any news from reaching the town, so that he could keep the people in ignorance, until he was well settled in his position. Also he prevented Lotf Ali Khān's friends from having communication with the camp.

This plot seems to have worked to the complete satisfaction of the kalāntar, as we are informed by Harford Jones that:

"the mehmandar [his host] had gone out to learn what he could of what was passing; & when he returned he told me, 'the people are tolerably quiet, because as yet, they consider what has been done to have been done by the king's order'."<sup>2</sup>

Hāji had insured his treacherous designs, by taking other measures. He had banished from the city, whoever was a potential threat to his rule. The EIC resident states that:

"all those whom the beglarbeg had the smallest reason to suspect to be averse to his measures, he immediately turned out of Sherauz together with their families and in particular those of the tribes termed as Lackerees [sic], who are all attached to Lutf Ali Khan, himself being of that tribe, of these alone the number amounts to ten or fifteen thousand."<sup>3</sup>

This allegation is further substantiated by the accounts of Harford Jones, which provide us with events within the capital. He relates:

1. I.O.R., P/E/V.5, Bushire, 1792.
2. D.K., p.cxl.ii.
3. I.O.R., P/E/V.5, Bushire, 1792.

"as the night closed in, I heard straggling shots in various parts of the city, & every now and then a thundering against the doors of my house with the bludgeon. This was replied to by the guard from the top of the house, sometimes by abuse, and sometimes by firing a musket in the air, to alarm the assailants. My mehmandar was a fine resolute old man, and a great humorist; and sometimes, on these occasions, went down himself to the door calling out: scoundrels, I tell you, the Fringee lives here, who has more fire arms in his house than you have hairs on your heads. Pena-ber khoda! if he should use them. When the morning came, it was known that some partial instances of the plunder of private individuals had taken place during the night; but that the greater part of the tumult we had heard had arisen from disarming and turning out of the city the few Lacks & Zands who had remained in it after the king's departure."<sup>1</sup>

Apparently, Harford Jones is mistaken as to the number of the Zands and Laks, who had been turned out of the city. We have information that the houses of ten thousand Laks, who inhabited Shirāz, were destroyed and they were actually seen by Waring in 1802.<sup>2</sup>

We now return to the king and relate the events, subsequent to the uproar in his camp.

"My first idea was that we had suffered a night surprize from the Kajars & in this persuasion, proceeding on foot to that part where the noise of voices was loudest & of musketry the quickest, I found myself in a crowd, in which I heard a voice calling out 'where is the king' this voice I soon recognised for that of Zal Khan [the governor of Khesht] & I heard him say to a person near 'the scoundrels have got in to the royal tent but they have missed their prize', hearing this I said 'what is the matter Zal Khan, are the Kajars come, is Mohammad the eunuch with them?' 'No please your majesty, Hajy Ibrahim has made himself master of Shiraz, the force under the command

1. D.K., p.cxl.iii.

2. I.S., p.33.

"of his brother has mutinied & proceeded towards the royal tent to seize your Majesty & the camp has become a scene of plunder and confusion.' I then said 'let us try to get at our horses, let us draw aside a little out of the camp & wait there until morning breaks, when we shall distinguish friends from foes & so be better able to judge in what manner to act'."<sup>1</sup>

In the darkness, Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān and his small party fell in with some fellow, who tried to assassinate him, but the assassin was slain on the spot, which indicates that the conspirators were following the prince to kill him. The prince continued:

"before we fell in with a small troop of horsemen, which, as we approached them, we heard talking of myself. One of them shortly after called out, 'stop scoundrels! where is the king?' it was my master of the horse, and knowing his voice, I answered, 'Ah, Haramzadeh!<sup>2</sup> here I am!' He immediately threw himself at my feet; crying 'fly, fly! mount, mount! all is lost, except Keraun! [horse] which he then brought forward. We then mounted; and rode to a little distance from the camp waiting there till the morning broke. The dawn enabled us to, discover that the army had dispersed; that several Feroshes were employed in packing up the royal tents, which I afterwards found much riddled with musket balls; and that there were stragglers, plundering where they could."<sup>3</sup>

Sir John Malcolm gives a totally different version of the events on that night. He maintains:

"the moment the first shot was fired, loud shouts followed from every quarter of the camp, and bodies of men began to move. The prince, equally astonished and enraged sent messenger after messenger to enquire the cause of uproar. These at last returned & advised him to mount his horse & escape, as his own troops had become his enemies.

1. D.K., p.clxxi.

2. An expression commonly used in Persia, although its meaning is not respectful.

3. D.K., pp.clxxii-clxxiii.

None of his principal officers would attend his summons: one chief alone and seventy men, continued with him."<sup>1</sup>

Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān does not indicate how many of his chiefs were in his party, but he affirms

"I soon collected from 3 to 400 men about me; made with them a short march towards Shiraz;<sup>2</sup> and the next day I was joined by several corps of the army, and by Lala & Mirza Bazurg. I then proceeded rapidly towards Shiraz; but on the way I was informed, by some fugitives, or rather exiles from the city, of Berkordar's folly in visiting Hajy Ibrahim, by which egregious mistake he had gotten possession of the citadel as well as the city. I had been joined on the way by the camel guns and these I determined should announce to the citizens of Shiraz my arrival in its neighbourhood. I dare say you heard the report of them."<sup>3</sup>

The sentiments and the general attitude of the Shirāzi populace have reached us through Harford Jones, who was present there. He asserts:

"The anxiety of everybody to learn what had happened in the king's camp, when the news of Hajy Ibrahim's treachery reached it, became intense; and the best informed in the city soon appeared convinced, that though much tumult and confusion had taken place the king had escaped safe."<sup>4</sup>

The same source informs us of the reaction of the people in the city, when they heard of Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān's arrival in the vicinity of Shirāz.

"I shall not easily forget the expression of joy

1. H.P., p.182. (Jamasp Khan Fylee).

2. G.G. supports part of this assertion, that Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was joined by many of troops who had been dispersed; p.344. I.Z., p.63.

3. D.K., p.clxxiii.

4. Ibid., p.cxliv.



"which ran through the city on hearing these guns; and yet there was no person left in it of sufficient consequence and courage to lead forth a band to seize the traitor."<sup>1</sup>

Harford Jones is right. There was indeed nobody who could mobilize the citizens to make a major effort and overthrow the Hāji. Moreover, Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān's expectations of receiving assistance from within the city were baseless. In fact one cannot easily explain the hope he had of regaining his lost throne, while he himself, by taking all persons of military and civil rank on his expedition, had emptied it of consequential persons.<sup>2</sup>

"I was for some time, in daily hopes that my friends within the walls would assist in opening me a way into the city; little knowing how carefully Hajy Ibrahim had contrived to deprive them of all means of doing so."<sup>3</sup>

The irony is that, once the government of Hāji was in a vulnerable position, a lot could be done within the walls of the city. All Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān's friends were outside it and, while the Hāji had made his grip tighter by disarming and expelling the tribal warriors from Shirāz, the influential adherents of Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān had returned to the city.

Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān encamped at a distance of one farsang from the city at Masjed Bardi and immediately laid siege to Shirāz.<sup>4</sup> He had been joined by many of his chiefs, who had dispersed after the event of the mutiny,<sup>5</sup> but he was in no position to make a decisive attack on the city. Indeed, he himself admitted that the siege had no major effect.

1. D.K., p.cxliv.

2. G.G., p.343.

3. D.K., p.clxxiii.

4. Ibid. G.G., p.344.

5. G.G., p.345. I.Z., p.63.

"Although I began to straiten the city in provisions, it was not to such extent as to produce a serious impression."<sup>1</sup>

It was at this time that Hājī Ebrāhim started writing letters to the chiefs in his party, threatening them with the usual menace of putting pressure on their families and property in the city. Should they persist in serving Lotf ʿAli Khān, he would inflict atrocities on them. At the same time, he promised them his bounty and kindness, should they desert Lotf ʿAli Khān and return to the city.<sup>2</sup>

Giti Goshāy bitterly condemns these chiefs, whose cowardice and selfishness induced them to respond to the Hājī's entreaty.<sup>3</sup> But Lotf ʿAli Khān was, on the contrary, understanding and composed, when he related the events to Harford Jones.

"They brought these letters to me; and candidly said, as it did not appear we were likely to regain the city at present, they could not think of subjecting their wives and children to the harsh & cruel treatment threatened by Hajy Ibrahim; at the same time declaring, that should an opportunity offer, they would serve me as faithfully as ever: and Lala and Mirza Bazurg refused to return into the city, until I absolutely forced them to leave me."<sup>4</sup>

Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh has another explanation for the chiefs leaving their master. "They were all city dwellers and for the past thirty or forty years had acquired wealth & purchased property in the city". As the author puts it, "they had grown roots in the soil of the city".<sup>5</sup> At all events, Lotf ʿAli Khān was deserted after two days by almost all of his party. After much hesit-

1. D.K., p. clxxiii.

2. G.G., pp.344-5. I.Z., p.64.

3. G.G., p.345.

4. D.K., pp.clxxiii-clxxiv.

5. I.Z., p.77.

ation, the chiefs entered the city on the 4th of the month of Moharram 1206/3rd September, 1791.<sup>1</sup>

There remained with Lotf <sup>Ḥ</sup>Ali Khān, about twelve of his servants and horsemen who had no home in the capital.<sup>2</sup> Of his military chiefs, only the governor of Khesht, Zāl Khān, who was his faithful adherent, remained with him till the end, together with his uncle, Moḥammad Khān Zand.<sup>3</sup> According to Tārīkh-e-Zandiyeh, Lotf <sup>Ḥ</sup>Ali Khān arrived at the outskirts of Shirāz on the 2nd of Moharram 1206/1st September, 1791. He was forced to leave his position on the 4th of that month, while the brothers of the Hājī and the rest of the mutineers arrived at Shirāz on the 5th.<sup>4</sup> We have no way of assessing the truth of this information, except by the account given by the EIC resident in Bushehr,

"the king arrived at that place [Bandar Reeg] the 10th. Sept. accompanied only by his second meerza & a few attendants, after undergoing infinite fatigue & running the most imminent danger of falling in to the hands of his enemies who were every where in pursuit of him."<sup>5</sup>

The most ingenious aspect of Hājī's ploy to secure his position was the method he employed for the disarmament and expulsion of the tribal warriors from the city. Giti Goshāy gives a detailed account of the atrocities that the Hājī committed towards the citizens of Shirāz, but he is quiet about the method used. Tārīkh-e-Zandiyeh states that the Hājī, fearing that the tribes might rise in revolt in favour of the prince, judging by the previous incident, which had resulted in the overthrow of Seid

1. I.Z., p.64.

2. Ibid., p.65.

3. G.G., p.345. I.O.R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, 1792.

4. I.Z., p.65.

5. I.O.R. P/E/75, 1792.

Morād Khān, decided to turn out of the city all the tribal elements.<sup>1</sup> The author does not, however, elaborate as to how the measure was effected. The only source, which gives a full account of this event, is Malcolm in his history of Persia. The plan, as it is given by the above-mentioned source, was incredibly well executed and astonishingly effective. To quote Malcolm,

"He took his measure with a precaution & promptitude which eluded all suspicion. Having given orders to secure the streets which communicated by a back road from the place of his residence to the gateway of the city, he sent notice to the military tribes to be ready at an appointed time, to receive a donation which he meant to give them. They assembled as directed, and one hundred were admitted at a time into the interior court of his mansion. From the height of the walls which surrounded it, those who were without could know nothing of what was passing within. The first party admitted found themselves surrounded, but were told no injury was intended to them if they resigned their arms; which they did: and while these were given to citizens, to increase the corps upon whom Hajee Ibrahim could depend, the unarmed soldiers were conducted, by the back road before mentioned, beyond the gates of the town."<sup>2</sup>

The account given by Malcolm throws light on two interesting points. Firstly, the Hāji had actually promised the troops in the party of the prince, that he would give donations to them if they deserted their master. In other words, he had bribed them to do so. This is supported by the assertions of Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh, to the effect that Hāji had bribed a large number of the citizens to gain their favour. For instance, he had given large sums of money to the musketeers in charge of the fortress. Any of the tribal warriors, who bowed to his rule, were given ample reward after having made sure of their fidelity.<sup>3</sup>

1. I.Z., p.67.

2. H.P., Vol.2, p.188.

3. I.Z., p.62.

Secondly, the Hāji had taken up his residence in the palace or Divān Khāneh. This is asserted by Harford Jones, who writes:

"I found him surrounded with guards & officers, pretty much in the same style as the king, sitting on the same nummud, and in the same part of the Hall of Audience as the king, and affecting the same state."<sup>1</sup>

This signifies the fact that the ambitious Hāji wished to usurp the place of his master rather than replace him with another, a Qājār.

The plans adopted by the Hāji were extremely well-calculated, allowing for no-one to venture a conspiracy against him. For example, he gave over the houses and the property of the tribal elements, who had been expelled from the city, to the magistrates and superintendants of the districts surrounding the city.<sup>2</sup> This measure had a double purpose. Firstly, it would bring these local notables into the sphere of Hāji's control, should they decide to side with Lotf Ali Khān, and it would also gain their support for the Hāji in response to his generosity.

Hāji Ebrāhim, then, set about mulcting and exacting money from the Zand nobles and, in this act, he went so far as to make many of them penny-less. Giti Goshāy is probably the most appropriate source to depict his atrocities.

"He extorted immense amount of precious stones, horses, bridles, & articles of luxury, to an extent that those who would be clad in the best silk dresses were in need of the coarsest clothing, those who slept on the finest satins were in need of a mat to lie on."<sup>3</sup>

1. D.K., p.cxlvi.

2. G.G., p.347.

3. Ibid.

At all events, Hāji amassed great wealth which enabled him to arm and equip the notorious luti (Alvat va Oubash<sup>1</sup>), that is, the rabble in the city, as the city militia. This event requires particular emphasis, since one major aspect of our study is to prove the role these elements played in the city life of Persia at that time, and how they participated in every riot and uprising, which occurred in the cities.

At this point, we return to the events which concern Lotf <sup>Ḥ</sup>Ali Khān and his misfortunes. While Lotf <sup>Ḥ</sup>Ali Khān was on his way to the coastal areas, Rezā Qoli Khān Kāzeruni, <sup>Ḥ</sup>Ali Qoli Khān's brother and one of the major figures in the conspiracy, found out Lotf <sup>Ḥ</sup>Ali Khān's situation and, knowing that he had few adherents, tried to halt his progress and even to capture him.<sup>2</sup> This was, however, futile, as he escaped the attempt with miraculous courage. The account of the incident has reached us from Lotf <sup>Ḥ</sup>Ali Khān himself:

"When the camp broke up, my intention was to proceed to Bushire, to pass a part of the winter there, and obtain what assistance I could from Shaikh Nassir. At each rahedaree [sic] myself and my servants had to fight through them, until we arrived in the plain of Kazeroon. Raza Kuli Khan, the governor, had pledged himself to Hajy Ibrahim either to capture or kill me; so that almost as soon as we were fairly got into the plain, we had a pretty smart affair with the Kazeroonees; & it would have been much more serious, had not Raza Kuli Khan been a famous coward. We were about 20, they were about 4 to 500; however to their great astonishment, instead of flying along the direct road, out of the plain of Kazeroon, where an ambush had been placed, we took a course direct for the abrupt and precipitous mountains with the plain to the eastward & southward. When we came to the foot of these, we were rather appalled at seeing nothing but perpendicular precipices before us; & I said, aie Bacheehees (i.e. Aye children) we must turn round and fight it out. Before our enemies, however, came up with us, we

1. G.G., p.347.

2. Ibid., p.345. I.Z., pp.65-66.

"discovered the path of a shotter [sic]; & dismounting, after stripping them of their nummuds, left all the horses behind us at the bottom of the mountain, except Keraun."<sup>1</sup>

Giti Goshāy gives an exaggerated account of this incident. It states that the number of the Kāzerunis, who were pursuing Lotf<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān, was above a thousand musketeers and horsemen. The king assailed them and killed many of them, but their superior number forced him to take shelter in the mountains. In the meantime, the riflemen of Khesht arrived and rescued him,<sup>2</sup> where as Lotf<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān himself asserts that,

"the Kazeroonees had not the courage to follow us on foot, & on horse back they had not the power: however, they took possession of 30 beautiful horses. After incredible fatigue, we got down into Dushtistan. Zal Khan, whilst I was encamped in the neighbourhood of Shirauz, had, by my desire, gone to his own government of Khest: as soon as he heard of my escape from the affray at Kazeroon, he sent men & horses to meet me; & with them I preceeded, where, as I told you before, I had hoped to find assistance."<sup>3</sup>

The account given here bears evidence to the fact that Lotf<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān had no information as to the involvement of the shaikh of Bushehr in the conspiracy. He was hopeful that the Shaikh, as he had done on a previous occasion, would assist him in his regaining the throne. The reason why the Shaikh turned away from Lotf<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān is not known, although the EIC resident assures us that:

"the Shaikh has done & is doing every thing in his power to thwart the Khan. It is conjectured he was privy to the conspiracy / having been at Sherauz just before the army marched and his conduct seems but too well to indicate the truth of such supposition - He publickly avows his allegiance to

1. D.K., pp.clxxiv-v. I.Z., p.66.

2. G.G., pp.345-6.

3. D.K., p.clxxv.

"the usurper." [Hāji Ebrāhim] <sup>1</sup>

This statement completely dismisses what J. Malcolm alleges in a private correspondence. Malcolm writes:

"Lutf Ali Khan when his father was murdered sought Shaikh Nassir's protection which was readily granted. The old man, however, died before he could fulfill his promises to the young prince. Leaving his govt. to his eldest son the present Shaikh Nasr, who following the intentions of his father marched immediately to Shirauz with Lutf Ali Khan whom in fact he seated on the throne, being soon disgusted with the violent proceedings of the prince he had so essentially served, which in one instance in particular was highly insulting to himself he quited Shirauz & returned to Abushehr."<sup>2</sup>

This allegation seems to be unfounded, as Malcolm tries desperately to find a good excuse for Hāji Ebrāhim and his accomplices' conduct. However, it is true that Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was placed on the throne by the assistance of Shaikh Nāser, and his downfall was the result of his failure to see that friends could turn into enemies. The resident of the company assures us that the Shaikh was in Shirāz before the king left it, therefore, there is no possibility of Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān's having insulted the Shaikh and not suspecting averse sentiments. That is exactly why he still hoped to find him hospitable and helpful.

There is another point which is worth mentioning here, as it is curiously illogical and inexplicable: namely, that the warning about the conspiracy, which Mirzā Mohāmmad Hosein gave to his master, was totally overlooked by Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān. The minister relates his endeavours to put Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān on his guard in this manner:

1. I.O.R., P/E/V.5, Bushire, June 1792. By then Āqā Mohāmmad Khān had not appeared on the scene.

2. Correspondence of J. Malcolm, B.L. add.13.707. 1800.



"I went to my knees to him, to seize Hajy Ibrahim without delay; but his high courage led him to slight my representation as well as the treachery."<sup>1</sup>

The minister also informed Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān of the involvement of the Shaikh of Bushehr in the plot, that is, if he told him exactly what he told Harford Jones:

"There has been for some time past a confederacy formed between Hajy Ibrahim, his brother<sup>2</sup> & several chiefs of Dustistan & germaseer [sic], particularly Raza Kuli Khan Kazeroonee & shaikh Nassir; the general purport of which is, to get rid of the king & then form amongst themselves a federative government, to which the Khan of Kerman, & others, should be invited to accede."<sup>3</sup>

The assertion of the minister is supported by Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān himself, who asserts that,

"before I marched towards Isfahan, Mirza Husain disclosed to me, in a manner I could not doubt, the designs of Hajy Ibrahim: he repeatedly begged of me to take measures for my own security: he pushed this so far, as to displease me: I neglected his advice; and at this moment the neglect of it has cost me the throne."<sup>4</sup>

He attributes the whole event to his ill fate, but the reality might be, that he did not think much of the advice he received from his minister, or else he did not think very much of the kalāntar and his capacity. His self-confidence and the pride which he is believed to have had, to which even his court historian<sup>5</sup> alludes, prevented him from averting such a deplorable calamity.

1. D.K., p.cli.

2. Abdal-Rahim Khān.

3. D.K., p.cl.

4. Ibid., pp.clxvi-vii.

5. G.G., p.327.

However, it appears that Lotf<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān was not hostile to the Shaikh of Bushehr, despite the fact that this Shaikh had done everything to harm him. He expressed his sentiments towards the Shaikh in conversation with Harford Jones,

"the old cow at Bushire (i.e. Shaikh Naṣer) was very near falling the other day, into my hands: if he had, I should have done him no harm; nor could I have forgotten the important service he once rendered me: but I should have said to him, 'Ai Ahmik! [sic] cannot you distinguish between the son of a king and the son of a Bekaul?' [sic] 7<sup>1</sup>

Lotf<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān treated the conspiracy too lightly; he regarded the conspirators with contempt, which was a feeling prevalent amongst the tribal element towards the city populace at the time and even much later, in the late 19th. century. This was his fatal mistake.

As the plot and its motivations are worthy of further discussion we shall study the elements involved in a later chapter.

1. D.K., p.clxx. Hāji Ebrāhīm was the son of a petty trader (Baḡāl).

## CHAPTER 5

### LOTF <sup>C</sup>ALI KHĀN IN THE SOUTH

In the previous section we left Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān in the plain of Khesht, where he was joined by Mir <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, a galant horseman and a faithful servant of his. As we are informed by Mirzā Moḥammad Ḥosein, his minister, Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān had set about recruiting soldiers in the south.

"As the king is now out of their power, & is collecting a force in the Dushtistan, Hajy Ibrahim has despatched persons to Aga Muhammad Khan, to assure him that he seized on Shiraz for the sole purpose of delivering it to him; and charged these persons with letters filled with lies & calumnies against his late noble & Royal master."<sup>1</sup>

This was indeed the case, as Hāji had never anticipated Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān's being able to resist the attacks on him by the Kāzerunis. He had therefore decided that the only power to stop his gaining power would be the Qājārs. Mirzā Moḥammad Ḥosein goes on to say:

"thus the scoundrel, balked in his plan of mad ambition, will, unless the king finds means to prevent it, deliver the wives and families of the inhabitants of Shiraz into the hands of their bitterest enemies, Kajars."<sup>2</sup>

The minister was, however, wrong in his predictions, as the Hāji had no intention of handing Shirāz on to the Qājārs, unless he was absolutely forced to do so, as it is rightly

1. D.K., preliminary matters, p.ci.

2. Ibid., p.cli.

observed by Harford Jones.<sup>1</sup>

Āqā Moḥammad Khān was well aware of this fact. In an interview which he had with the Ḥāji, when he had taken possession of Shirāz, he affirms that he had known the design of the traitor Hāji all along. This interview has reached us through the author of Rouzat-al-Safā, who states that Hāji Ebrāhim had related to someone the author<sup>2</sup> knew that:

"one evening after having been dismissed from the court Āqā Moḥammad Khān sent for me. I was greatly alarmed at the unexpected summons and on the way thither except for one of my old servants no-one had remained with me. As I entered his hall of audience and calmed down, Āqā Moḥammad Khān addressed me & said, 'I have a question to ask you, to see whether I have been right or wrong in my opinion'. I said that whatever he wished to ask me would be answered with honesty and truth. The Eunuch asked, 'when you revolted against the Zand prince and your brother dispersed his troops, you refused to let him into the capital and forced him to proceed to the coast areas. He was determined to capture Shiraz & destroy you. You feared him and devised a means of engaging us both in a combat so that you would be safe in the city and would rule there without the interference of either of us. Is this true or not?' I said that it was true."<sup>2</sup>

Although the source of this information was written at a much later date, yet there is every reason to give credence to it. Giti Goshāy asserts that in the original scheme devised by Ḥāji and his accomplices, he intended to be independent of any government and rule in Fārs.<sup>3</sup> This is supported by Harford Jones, who asserts that the Ḥāji would not let the Qājārs into Shirāz unless he was forced to. Thus Malcolm is proved wrong in his assertion about the Ḥāji's intentions.

1. D.K., p.cli.

2. Rozatal-Safa, Vol.9, no pagination.

3. G.G., pp.343 and 352.

At any event, Lotf <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Khān stayed a short while in the small town of Khesht, where he received Harford Jones in a humble tent.<sup>1</sup> Lotf <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Khān, who was anxious to find out about the events in the capital and what his prospects were of regaining the throne, had a most interesting interview with Harford Jones. Lotf <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Khān began the interview with an account of the events, which had occurred since he left the outskirts of Shirāz.

"the day before yesterday I ascended to Khesht, after giving the Dushtistānees a good thrashing. Zal Khān and I are now collecting a force, where with to return to Shiraz; and Raza Kuly Khan has placed troops in the Teng-e-Turkoon 'but maash-alla'! Here his majesty abruptly stopped; & I told him what had happened to us in the Teng-e-Turkoon, & also that I had not seen any troops at Kazeroon."<sup>2</sup>

This alleged absence of troops in the town of Kazerun encouraged Lotf <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Khān to make an attack on that place.

The Ḥāji, in the meantime, had gathered troops in order to stop the progress of Lotf <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Khān's forces towards Shirāz. He had placed Rezā Qoli Khān-e-Shāhsavan at the head of the force, which consisted of 3000 men.<sup>3</sup> This force proceeded towards the village of Borāzjān, a dependency of the district of Dashtestān. Shaikh Nāser, the governor of Bushehr, who had informed the government of Shirāz of Lotf <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Khān's arrival in the district of Khesht, had also collected a force of about 4000 men. He had further fortified the town of Bushehr and was waiting for assistance from Shirāz.<sup>4</sup>

1. D.K., preliminary matters, p.clxxvi.

2. Ibid., p.clxxx.

3. G.G., p.348.

4. I.Z., p.68.

The Shaikh learnt of the advance of the army sent out from the capital and joined it, leaving his government to his deputy. Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān had no more than 3000 men, which included the tribes who had been expelled from Shirāz and had been settled in the district around it under the supervision of the Zābet of those areas. These tribal warriors, although disarmed and deprived of their means of resistance, had left their stations to join the army of the Zands.<sup>1</sup> One of the distinguished Zand generals, with his adherents numbering about seventy men, escaped from Shirāz and also joined Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān.<sup>2</sup> This event is significant, in that it means that the notables of the Zand tribe had not been imprisoned; they were at large, but rather unable to take action against the Hāji unless they risked their lives.

Giti Goshāy relates that Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, before setting off for his expedition, summoned his troops, who being aware of their small number and the greatness of the opposite forces were apprehensive of the outcome. In his attempt to boost their morale, he encouraged them in their endeavours, stating that success did not always depend on the number of troops but, rather, on the zeal and courage of the men.<sup>3</sup> He set off for an engagement with the opposing army. Mir <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, who had joined him while halting at Khesht, was also in his company.<sup>4</sup>

The sources are at variance as to the place and time that the governor of Bandar-e-Rig joined Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān's party. Giti Goshāy states that Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān actually went as far as the port of Rig, where the governor set about serving his master.<sup>5</sup> This is, however, refuted by the account given by the prince

1. G.G., p.348.

2. Ibid.

3. I.Z., p.68.

4. G.G., p.348.

5. Ibid., p.346.

himself, who asserts that he "was soon joined by that brave fellow Mihr Aly Khan, from Bendereeg".<sup>1</sup> This must have happened before Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān descended to the plain of Khesht, as in a previous interview he had asked Harford Jones:

"are you acquainted with Mihr Ali Khan Bender Reeg-gee? I said yes; I had known him for long; & that after I left his majesty, I designed to embark from Bender Reeg for Bussorah, as the khan had promised to let me have one of his dows for that purpose. 'By God' (i.e. Wullah) said the king, 'he is a glorious suvar (horseman). It would have done your heart good to have seen him the other day, spitting on his spear, those pigs of fellows the Dushtistanees'."<sup>2</sup>

Thus, the governor of Rig must have joined Lotf Ali Khan on his way down south. Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh appears to be mistaken in saying that Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān actually went to Bushehr, but was denied entry by the Shaikh.<sup>3</sup> The mistake must have been caused by Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān's intention to go to that place, as he related himself:

"When the camp broke up, my intention was to proceed to Bushire, to pass a part of the winter there, and obtain what assistance I could from Shaikh Nassir."<sup>4</sup>

He was soon disillusioned about the prospect of the Shaikh's giving him assistance. When he was assailed by the Kāzerunis, he learnt that the Shaikh had pledged himself to the Hāji. He states:

"Shaikh Nassir, who had come out to make me cap-

1. D.K., preliminary matters, p.clxxv.

2. Ibid., p.clxx.

3. I.Z., p.66.

4. D.K., p.clxxiv.

"tive, was glad to escape with his life."<sup>1</sup>

### The Battle of Kāzerun:

In late October 1791/Rabi<sup>c</sup> I 1206, Lotf<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān advanced towards Kāzerun, where a battle ensued between him and the forces of Shirāz and the Kāzerunis. He fought with great resilience and gallantry, especially when 200 of the tribal warriors of the<sup>c</sup> Abdolmaleki nomads defected from the army of the Shirāzis and joined him. He forced the the Shirāz army to disperse, with the soldiers taking the road to Shirāz.<sup>2</sup> Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh states that Ḥāji Ebrāhim was not satisfied with the army, which had been sent out of Shirāz. Thus, he despatched another body of infantry to reinforce the calvalry, at the head of which he placed two local chiefs, Ra'is Qāsem KhānKuhmarre'i and Lotf<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān Firuzābādi. His aim was to uproot the forces of the Zand prince before he gained more power.<sup>3</sup>

It appears that the reinforcement was meant to assist the Shaikh of Bushehr. The above-mentioned source asserts that, before this force reached the port of Bushehr, Lotf<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān came out to meet it. As a result of a fierce battle, the tribal cavalry joined the opposing army and Reżā Qoli Khān Shāhsavan fled to Kāzerun, while the Shaikh of Bushehr took refuge in his own governorate. The chiefs, who were in charge of the infantry, also entered the town of Kāzerun, where a great force was assembled. The news of the defeat greatly alarmed the Ḥāji, who had not anticipated that Lotf<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān would be able to emerge victorious from such an unbalanced combat.<sup>4</sup>

Ḥāji Ebrāhim summoned his associates to the palace. These the

1. D.K., pp.clxxv-clxxvi.

2. G.G., p.349. I.Z., p.68.

3. G.G., p.349. I.Z., p.69.

4. G.G., p.350.



official historian calls the leaders of the lūtis (Sarān-e-Alvāt). The Hāji presented them with the outcome of the battle, stating

"when we attempted the coup we had planned for Loṭf Ali Khān to be put to death or else be forced to flee to India or Ottoman Turkey. But since all our predictions have proved wrong he is alive and determined to destroy us. What are we to do and how are we to get rid of him?"<sup>1</sup>

He then went on to say:

"There is only one way that Loṭf Ali Khān can be eliminated from the scene and that is with the assistance of the Qājār chief who is a most powerful man."<sup>2</sup>

From the account given by Giti Goshāy it appears that, even at this stage, Hāji was hoping that, by sending presents to Āqā Mohammad Khān and giving the royal household and seraglio to him, he could be left alone to rule Shirāz undisturbed.<sup>3</sup> His designs, however, proved naive, as the Qājār chief was after supreme power in the empire.

The conspirators, namely: the associates of the Hāji, terrified as they were, agreed to write to the Qājār chief. The Hāji wrote a letter to Āqā Mohammad Khān, stating that the notables who had betrayed the Zand cause were all ready to obey his commands. He begged pardon for his past conduct and beseeched him not to demand hostages of the citizens of Shirāz, stating at the same time, that the city populace were prepared to pay any amount of tribute required of them. In the letter, he asked the Qājār chief to send a body of force to ward off the Zand prince.<sup>4</sup> He despatched a messenger with 2000 of the

1. G.G., p.352.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., pp.352-3.

4. Ibid.

best horses bred in the Zand's herd.

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The envoy reached Āqā Moḥammad Khān, when he was encamped at Khamseh. Although he was well aware that the gallant exploits of Lotf Āli Khān had forced the Hāji to request assistance, Āqā Moḥammad Khān issued decrees, to the effect that he acknowledged the Hāji as the Beglarbegi of the province, and bestowed upon him the title of Khān. He despatched three of his trusted courtiers, at the same time, to take possession of the royal household and seraglio and transfer them to the province of Māzandarān.<sup>1</sup> Bābā Khān, the nephew of the Qājār chief, (later to become Fath Āli Shāh), was commissioned to deploy 4000 of his troops to advance towards Shirāz, under the command of Moṣṭafā Khān Qājār. His orders were carried out by Bābā Khān. Thus, the troops proceeded to Shirāz, but were ordered to halt at Ābādeh until their services were required by the Hāji.<sup>2</sup>

There is great confusion in the sources, as to the order of the events. For instance, Giti Goshāy places the letter written to Āqā Moḥammad Khān after the defeat suffered by the joint forces of Shirāzis. Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh, on the other hand, states that it was previous to that. Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein also states that the Hāji had written to the Qājār chief before Harford Jones left Shirāz, which had taken place by the end of October <sup>3</sup>1791/ Šafar 1206.

At any event, the Hāji seems to have requested assistance on a few occasions. Lotf Āli Khān, after having gained victory on that occasion, returned to the south and apparently went to the port of Rig, as we are informed by the EIC resident there, who states:

1. T.M., Ms n.p. G.G., p.352-3.

2. G.G., p.353.

3. D.K., p.clii.

"Lutf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was soon joined at Bundereeg by a considerable number of his adherents and with the assistance of Meer Ali Khan was enabled to take the field in November & proceed towards Scherauz to chastize his turbulent and rebellious subjects, having first encountered a body of two to three thousand men in Dashtistaun, under Shaikh Nassir who had the temerity to think of preventing his progress up the mountains & completely routed the whole & disarmed the greater part. He left Meer Ali Khan & pushed on with his own men to Khisht, governed by Zal Khan who had encouraged him to advance without loss of time."<sup>1</sup>

The resident seems to have mixed the order of the events, too, or perhaps, after all, Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān had gone to Bandar Rig. The EIC resident further states:

"From hence by this Khan's [Zal Khan] means he proceeded immediately to the important city of Kauzeroon, which he obtained possession of, & levied a large contribution from the inhabitants, in revenge for their disaffection to him."<sup>2</sup>

The resident of the company in fact is the only source, who informs us as to the strength of his troops:

"Luft Ali Khan's army had by this time increased to a very respectable force, and he was enabled here to give battle to an army of four thousand men sent against him from Scherauz and to obtain a complete victory over them."<sup>3</sup>

As the resident informs us, Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān on this occasion was so successful as to

"take several Khans prisoner, and amongst them Riza Kouli Khan the governor of Kauzeroon who was a principal actor in the former revolution and his son both of whom he deprived of their eyesight."<sup>4</sup>

1. I.O.R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, 10th June, 1792.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. G.G., p.354. I.Z., pp.69-70.

Rezā Qoli Khān, however, managed to escape the death penalty, which he deserved. We hear of him during the reign of Fath Ali Shāh, being still the governor of Kāzerun and not altogether discontented. Sir John Malcolm, who was in Persia in 1800, states that:

"Riza Kooli Khan, the governor of Kazeroon came to pay the Elchee (envoy) a visit. This old nobleman had a silk band over his eye-sockets, having had his eyes put out during the contest between the Zand and the Kajir families for the throne of Persia."<sup>1</sup>

Malcolm then relates the account given to him by the governor himself as

"'I had been too active a partisan', said Riza Kooli Khan, 'of the Kajir (sic) family, to expect much mercy when I fell into the hands of the rascally tribe of Zand. I looked for death, and was rather surprised at the lenity which only condemned me to lose my eyes'.<sup>2</sup>

The Qājārs, however, rewarded him for his support in the contentions and we learn from him:

"I was rewarded for my suffering in their cause. All my sons have been promoted, and I am the governor of this town and province. Here I am in affluence, and enjoying a repose, to which men who can see are in this country perfect strangers."<sup>3</sup>

He, unlike his close associate, Hājī Ebrāhim, was not harassed by the very family he elevated to power, presumably due to the fact that he was in so remote a province that he did not come into close contact with the royal family.

1. Malcolm, John, Sketches of Persia, Vol.I, p.90.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p.92.

After the decisive success in Kāzerun, Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān's prospects for an attack on the capital increased, his troops had more confidence in him and in their own abilities to gain a decisive victory. The EIC resident is so optimistic as to state:

"although we have not yet had the satisfaction to receive intelligence of that desirable event, we have reason to suppose that the Khan may already have regained possession of Scherauz, as he has had the good fortune to gain complete victories over such of his enemies as have dared to oppose him, in the field."<sup>1</sup>

The capture of the city was highly probable as Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān had laid siege to the city. He stationed his troops in the village of Javim at first and then advanced to a place known as Masjed-e-Bardi in the vicinity of Shirāz.<sup>2</sup> The news of his advance terrified the Hāji, who set about fortifying the citadel as best he could. He appointed his close relations in charge of the gates and towers. He further serviced the canons in the citadel and placed them in strategic positions.<sup>3</sup>

In the course of the few days that Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was stationed there, the tribal warriors, who had been expelled from the city and were wandering around in search of employment, joined his camp. The overwhelming number of these warriors compelled the prince to find a safe refuge for their families.<sup>4</sup> He there fore chose the citadel of Zarqān for that purpose and ordered his troops to lift up the siege and on early Rabi<sup>C</sup> II, 1206 proceeded there.<sup>5</sup> The inhabitants of Zarqān refused entry to him, so he took it by storm. He stayed there for some days, while he fortified it and then prepared to return to his former posit-

1. I.O.R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, 1972, pp.227-8.

2. G.G., pp.354-5.

3. Ibid., p.355.

4. I.Z., p.70.

5. I.Z., p.70.

ion. Hāji Ebrāhim sent one of his confidential servants to bring the Qājār army into the city. Moṣṭafā Khān marched towards the city and encamped on the outskirts.<sup>1</sup>

Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh relates the following event, which is not mentioned in other sources. When Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was moving towards the citadel of Zarqān by night, the Hāji despatched two of his chiefs, Hādi Khān Brujerdi and Bāqer Khān Gallehdāri, to make a surprise attack on the Zand prince.<sup>2</sup> Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was informed of the plot and he assailed them. As a result of this, one of the chiefs, Hādi Khān, was killed and their army dispersed with many of them captured and the rest fled to Shiraz.<sup>3</sup>

Giti Goshāy differs with the above-mentioned source, in that it states that the Hāji sent the two chiefs to assist the Zarqāni people. While the citadel was taken by the Zand prince, they encamped at a nearby place, where they were attacked by Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān and dispersed.<sup>4</sup>

Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh asserts that during this time, Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān had acquired great fame for his courage and gallantry. He had reduced many districts to submission and had gained the support of others, while his enemies had been set atremble at the mention of his name.<sup>5</sup> He returned to his former station and laid siege to the capital again. He blocked all the roads and prevented the city from receiving provisions. At this stage he sent a message to the Hāji, urging him to abandon his rebellious actions. If he did so, he would be pardoned. He stated that the innocent people were the ones who would suffer most

1. I.Z., p.70.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., pp.70-1.

4. G.G., p.356.

5. I.Z., p.71.

because of the siege. The lives of so many would be saved, if he either agreed to obey his master, or else agreed to send the families and the household of the Zand nobles out of the city. If the Hāji complied with this request, Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān agreed to depart and seek residence in some other quarters.<sup>1</sup> Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān also stated in his message:

"my ancestors & father tried their best to adorn and beautify the city of Shiraz in the hope that the inhabitants would be grateful and repay their efforts by their allegiance but alas they were wrong in their expectations."<sup>2</sup>

The Hāji remained deaf to these proposals, thus leaving no option except to continue the siege and capture of the city.<sup>3</sup> This message is only mentioned by the official historian, but since he received his information from sources close to the prince, it might be true<sup>4</sup> and considered authentic.

Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān had not only blocked the transportation of food and provisions. He had also routed the caravans laden with foodstuffs, which were on their way to the city. As a result of this measure, food became scarce in Shirāz, and the situation had been aggravated by the large numbers of the Qājār army, which had to be provided with food and fodder.<sup>5</sup> When a caravan was assailed by the Zand prince, the Qājār chief, Moṣṭafā Khān Qājār, pursued the assailants and, subsequently, a battle took place, which lasted the whole day. The two armies were fighting fiercely and, at some points, they were even attacking each other with knives and daggers.<sup>6</sup> A great number of the

1. G.G., p.357-8.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p.356.

5. I.Z., p.71.

6. Ibid., pp.71-2.

two parties fell to the ground until the Qājārs left the battle-field and fled to Shirāz.

After the victory of his troops, Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān returned to Zarqān, presumably to store the booty he had gained, and again returned to the vicinity of Shirāz, to a place called Qaşral-Dasht within one farsang of the city.<sup>1</sup> He fortified that village by erecting batteries and building a citadel round it. He often ventured to attack the neighbourhood of the city. While the besieged troops came out to meet the foe, on each occasion casualties were inflicted on both sides.<sup>2</sup> Until this time, the Hāji had refrained from admitting the Qājār army into the city, but now his terror of the outcome of the siege, induced him to invite the Qājārs into Shirāz.<sup>3</sup> He even wrote again to the Qājār eunuch, Āqā Moḥammad and reported the latest development. Āqā Moḥammad, having received the news, despatched two of his chieftains to join in with the forces already in Shirāz and finish off the Zand prince.<sup>4</sup>

These chiefs set off for Shirāz at the beginning of the month of Jamadā I 1206/late January, 1792. They reached the city in a short while and stayed for a few days, before they prepared for a battle.<sup>5</sup> Giti Goshāy informs us of a conspiracy having been arranged by Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān's supporters to let him into the city. He relates that after the departure of Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān for Zarqān, he received a letter sent by the citizens of Shirāz, to the effect that

"they had taken an oath to serve their king and

1. I.Z., p.72.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid. G.G., p.359.

4. G.G., p.362.

5. I.Z., p.73.



"should he approach a certain gate on a certain night they would admit him to the city."<sup>1</sup>

Loṭf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was delighted at the news and with three hundred of his choicest men set off towards that gate. He soon discovered that it was a ploy to kill him, as the troops inside attempted to shoot him. He immediately withdrew from the neighbourhood of the city and returned to his position.<sup>2</sup>

Harford Jones also remarks on a conspiracy, which had been formed, and by the events related in his account it seems to be the same one. He relates that:

"A part of this plan was, that the king should withdraw from his position in the vicinity of the city, in order that Hajy Ibrahim might therefore become less vigilant, & the conspirators possess greater facility of putting their plans into execution. His majesty, therefore, retired from the position he occupied. But the knowledge Hajy Ibrahim had now acquired of the temper & designs of the inhabitants of Shiraz convinced him that the execution of his original scheme of a federative government was impracticable; & that his own safety depended on the early arrival of the Kajar, to whom he basely determined to deliver the city."<sup>3</sup>

This account seems to be supported by the one given by Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh, which claims that:

"during the residence of Loṭf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān at Zarqān two or three times the citizens of Shiraz conspired to capture the city for his entry, some letters had also been exchanged between the prince and his supporters in which he had instructed them to take possession of the city, but on every occasion the plot was discovered and the traitors were seized and punished."<sup>4</sup>

1. G.G., p.359.
2. Ibid., p.360.
3. D.K., p.clxxxvii.
4. I.Z., p.75.

Thus, it is quite possible that there was a genuine plot in favour of the Zand prince, but it was discovered and the Ḥāji replaced the followers of Lotf ʿAli Khān with his own supporters and they attempted to shoot him.

Moṣṭafā Khān Qājār, having learnt that there were only a few men in Lotf ʿAli Khān's party, pursued him on his way back and he fell in with Soltān ʿAli Khān Zand, who had been stationed at some distance. In the fierce battle which occurred, Lotf ʿAli Khān, who was performing his prayer at some distance hastened to the battle field and surrounded the Qājār army. The troops tried to find a way out in great confusion, while many of them were slain on the spot. In this engagement, about 2000 men of the Qājārs were captured, and twenty notables in the army were taken and imprisoned but the soldiers were disarmed and freed.<sup>1</sup>

At this time, the troops of the Zand prince, according to the information given by the EIC resident, had increased to 12,000 men. The above-mentioned source predicts that

"something decisive must very shortly happen in favour of Lutf Ali Khan, as notwithstanding Hadji Ibrahim has repeatedly urged Aga Mahomed Khan the Kedjar (sic) to come and take possession of Sher-  
a-uz offering to acknowledge him for sovereign, there are yet no accounts of his approach. It is even reported that Aga Mahomed Khan is dead; & it is very probably the case, as there is no accounting satisfactorily for his non appearance & inactivity unless some thing very particular had befallen him. It is well known that not long ago his health was in a very precarious state."<sup>2</sup>

Indeed this was the case, as the Qajar contender had suffered

1. G.G., p.361.

2. I.O.R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, 10th June, 1972.

a serious stroke. He had lost his power of speech<sup>1</sup> and the courtiers were most anxious that he might not be able to regain it. He was for some days unable to move, until he recovered. The letter sent by the EIC resident is dated June, 1792, whereas the author of Tārikh-e-Mohammadi places the stroke on the 17th of the month of Rabi<sup>c</sup> II 1206/14th November, 1791.<sup>2</sup> This, however, can be attributed to the very slow system of communication; the EIC resident often learnt the news at a much later time than the actual event.

The EIC resident is right in stating that:

"If the death of Aga Mahomed Khan should actually have happened, there can be little doubt entertained of the ultimate success of Lutf Ali Khan. Hadji Ibrahim is said to be continually labouring under the most dreadful apprehensions of assassination or treachery, and it is highly probable he will fall victim of one or other, as such numbers have done before him in similar situations."<sup>3</sup>

The above-mentioned account indicates that the attempted conspiracies, alluded to by other sources, had taken place. However, none of the sources state the names of those involved, and how the plot was discovered, and these events, remain in darkness. Giti Goshāy speaks of another plot, in which the tribal warriors of Māfi and Nānkoli were involved. The Persian sources are at variance on the order of these events.

The EIC also fails to inform us about the battle, which took place between the joint Qājār Forces and the Zand prince. Giti Goshāy and Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh give ample accounts of this event. Giti Goshāy relates that, as the two chiefs sent to reinforce the army in Shirāz were approaching that city, the Zand tax collectors, who were dispersed in all directions, informed

1. I.M., Msc. Tehran, n.p.

2. Ibid.

3. I.O.R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, 10th June, 1792.

Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān of their movements and, thus, he gathered his generals to consult as to what measures should be taken to halt the Qājār progress.<sup>1</sup> The Zand generals all believed that the Qājār army should be attacked en route, but Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān did not accede to it, but reckoned it a sign of cowardice not to face his foe in direct combat; this his valour would not allow.<sup>2</sup>

At any event, the Qājārs arrived in Shirāz and, a few days later, advanced to the battle field outside the city. The two armies met and, again, the Zand prince forced them to take shelter behind the walls of Shirāz. The Zand warriors followed them, and many of them were captured. One of their chiefs, Reżā Qoli Khān Shāhsavan, was made a prisoner too.

The account given by Giti Goshāy is significant. He states that the Qājār army, who were desperately trying to enter the city, had crowded onto the drawbridge. The crowd was so great, that many of them fell into the ditch and filled it up to the ground level, a great number dying on that occasion.<sup>3</sup>

Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān returned to his entrenchment, while his men gathered a great number of horses with cover and bridles. After this disastrous defeat "no-one dared to peer out of the citadel, let alone venture to come out."<sup>4</sup> On this battle, Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh differs from Giti Goshāy, in that at first the Zand army was nearly forced to flee towards their position and it was only when they discovered that the Qājārs were busy plundering what was left behind, that they returned and fought the disorderly foe and defeated them.<sup>5</sup> Giti Goshāy does not admit

1. G.G., p.362.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p.365.
5. I.Z., pp.73-4.

the first withdrawal and interprets the move to the side as a ploy to confuse the foe.<sup>1</sup> This event discouraged the Hāji from trying a direct engagement with such an enemy that, despite being few in number, was successful in every instance.

Hāji ordered the Qājār chief, Moṣṭafā Khān, to leave the city and take up residence in Karbāl, where he could intercept the cārevāns of provisions to the camp of the Zands. This move resulted in Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān's leaving his position to return to the citadel of Zarqān, which was much safer for his troops.<sup>2</sup> This move could, however, be attributed to the fact that food had become so scarce in the city, that the Hāji could not afford to keep a large army there any longer. Whatever may have been the case, we have a reasonable explanation given to us by Giti Goshāy, as to the cause of famine in the city. The court historian states that, for more than four years, the grain harvest had been damaged by locusts, and that, even before the war had broken out, there was not a single grain to be found in some areas. The grain, which had been stored in the state warehouses (Anbārḥā ye Divāni), was limited. The Zand nobles, who had always relied on the generosity of Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān for their provisions, were in great distress, as the Hāji had sent his men to gather whatever could be found in other places as well.<sup>3</sup>

At any rate, as the siege lasted about four months, the poor were desperate. The Zands, and the other tribes in the service of the Zands, were famished. Thus, they were prepared to leave the city in search of food. The Hāji expelled many of them from Shirāz, those, who joined the camp of Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, putting a further burden on him. Moṣṭafā Khān Qājār, finding his position in Karbāl to be no effective threat to the Zand prince, again moved to the vicinity of Shirāz and established

1. G.G., p.364.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p.366.

himself in the gardens around the city.<sup>1</sup> It was at this point that the second conspiracy was discovered. Thus, the malefactors of the tribe of Māfi and Nānkoli were banished from the city, to the district of Baizā. As soon as they found themselves out of the city, however, they joined the Zand camp.

At this stage, Hāji Ebrāhim again wrote to Āqā Moḥammad Khān and reported the events to him. The Eunuch this time decided to come in person and meet his invincible foe in the field.<sup>2</sup> He ordered the Hāji to secure the city and prevent any attempt to betray Shirāz, until he could advance there. As it was nearing spring and Nouruz was on the way, Āqā Moḥammad Khān began to recruit troops to set off for his expedition after the New Year festival.<sup>3</sup>

During this period Lotf Āli Khān was stationed in the neighbourhood of Shirāz, as we are informed by the EIC resident:

"after having in the months of Feb., March, April & May held his station at the head of an increasing army in the vicinity of Sherauz during which period, his conduct uniformly able and heroic secured to his arms complete success in a variety of encounters. With the troops of Hadjee Ibrahim Khan added and assisted by large bodies of cavalries belonging to Mahomed Cawn (sic) Kajar sent down from Isphahan to Sherauz, at different times by that prince."<sup>4</sup>

The account given above is fully supported by other sources, as to the heroic conduct of the Zand prince and his growing popularity, which had gathered a great number of adherents around him. Unfortunately, these men were of no military use to him, as they had no arms and ammunition, and the prince

1. G.G., p.367.

2. Ibid.

3. I.M., Ms Tehran, no pagination.

4. I.O.R., P/E/V.5, Bushire, 1792.

must have had a hard time keeping up such a large and, at the same time, useless army. He had, however, subdued a large area and he never seems to have had trouble in feeding his troops, whereas that was almost always the case during the civil strife in Persia.

Āqā Moḥammad Khān left his seat of government in mid May and arrived at Abraj, at a distance of 14 Farsangs from Shirāz on the 14th Shavvāl 1206/6th June, 1792.<sup>1</sup> On his way there, he erected batteries at every place he stopped and fortified his station at each stage, which is significant, as it shows the dread he entertained of a surprise attack by his enemy. On his arrival at the above-mentioned place, he despatched one of his generals, Ebrāhim Khān Dāmghāni, with a battalion of Dāmghāni musketeers: known and admired for their skills and gallantry, to secure the passes between Abraj and Mā'in.<sup>2</sup>

The Zand prince, having learnt of the advance of his foe, left his position at Zarqān on the 13th Shavvāl/6th June, and established himself in Marvdasht. He left his treasures and the families of his warriors at a citadel called Rashmāijān, appointing a confidential servant to guard it.<sup>3</sup> He knew very well that he could not resist the superior numbers and well-armed army of the Qājārs in an open field. Therefore, he agreed to the opinion expressed by his generals as to the advisability of an unexpected attack. Although the author of Giti Goshāy states that the decision was not wise,<sup>4</sup> it seems to have been the only avenue open to Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān and, had he not been betrayed by a traitor, he would have gained a final victory over the Qājār chief.

1. I.M., Msc.

2. G.G., p.369. I.M., Msc.

3. G.G., p.369.

4. Ibid.

There is, however, confusion as to the number of the Qājār army. The EIC resident gives it as numbering about 50,000<sup>1</sup>, whereas Giti Goshāy, who often exaggerates the greatness of the foe, comes up with the modest figure of 20,000.<sup>2</sup> At any rate, one may assume that the account of the EIC is more reliable on that score. The EIC resident also provides us with the exact date that the Zand prince came upon his enemy:

"on the 12th. June Lutf Ali Khan found himself under the necessity of coming to a general engagement with Mahomed Cawn Kajar (sic)."<sup>3</sup>

But before the general engagement took place, Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān decided to attack the vanguards of the foe, who had been sent to secure the important passes near Persepolis (Estakhr).<sup>4</sup> He covered the distance of fifteen farsangs<sup>5</sup> in the space of seven hours, which seems incredible to the reader, but the ability of Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān for enduring fatigue has been remarked upon by all the historians, Persian as well as European.

It was at midnight that he reached the Dāmghāni vanguards of the Qājār army. They attempted to halt his advance, but they were completely defeated and their chief was captured and put to death.<sup>6</sup>

Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān divided his troops into three divisions. He appointed his two uncles at the head of two of them and he himself took charge of the third. He set off for the camp of the Qājārs, without even stopping to rest. Reaching the enemy's

1. I.O.R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, 1972.

2. G.G., p.368.

3. Op. cit. As usual there is a difference of 4 days in the actual event and the date recorded.

4. D.K., p.clxxviii.

5. A farsang is 4 English miles.

6. G.G., p.369.



camp, he sent forty of his best men to the camp, while he himself stayed to one side on alert.<sup>1</sup> The Zand's troops entered the camp from the Ordu Bazar (camp market), while the Qājārs were at supper. At the first assault, four thousand of them fled and the camp was thrown into confusion and panic.<sup>2</sup> As Harford Jones states:

"opposition to the victor had now nearly ceased & Aga Muhammad Khan was reported to have fled: in an moment, Mirza Faty Aly<sup>3</sup> approached his master, and besought him to rest on his arms until the day broke."<sup>4</sup>

It is, however, crucial to clarify why the advice of Abol Fath Khān Ardalān was accepted, and what the motives of this person were for his treachery. All the European sources agree that it was malice and treachery, which induced the man to do such a thing. Harford Jones asserts that he was a spy for the Qājār chief.<sup>5</sup> But curiously enough, the court historian attributes his actions to having been mistaken by the confusion and disorder in the Qājār camp.<sup>6</sup> This is significant, as the historian, according to his own account, had joined the camp of the Qājārs. The reason for his joining the Qājārs is unknown. He was possibly forced to present himself at Āqā Moḥammad's encampment. Whatever the reason may have been, he appears to have been grossly mistaken, as even J. Malcolm, who decidedly takes the side of the Qājārs in his account, states that this man was a traitor.<sup>7</sup>

Harford Jones relates an event that is not supported by other sources. He writes as follows:

1. G.G., pp.370-1.

2. Ibid., p.371.

3. The name is given wrongly; Abol Fath Khān Ardalān is correct.

4. D.K., p.clxxxviii.

5. Ibid., p.cxc.

6. G.G., p.371.

7. H.P., Vol.II, p.191.

"the striking up of the Kajar band and their salutation of victory, which principally deceived the unfortunate king as to his real position, was in consequence of a message conveyed to the Eunuch/Āqā Moḥammad to that effect, when the Mirza informed him the poisonous counsel which he had given his master, (Lotf Āli Khān) of resting on his arms until morning, had been adopted."<sup>1</sup>

The band was ordered to play the tune, which was the sign of the victory of one party over the other, in order to further deceive Lotf Āli Khān. Although we have no other information on that score, it is highly probable that the device was employed to substantiate the allegations made by Abol Fath Khān, and that prevented Lotf Āli Khān from questioning him further. However, Harford Jones positively believes that Abol Fath Khān was in communication with the Qājār chief.<sup>2</sup> The fate of Abol Fath Khān was as follows: After the event, he was taken to the presence of Āqā Moḥammad Khān. He was mutilated by having his tongue cut as penalty for having said to Lotf Āli Khān that the Qājār chief had fled. His eyes were also put out, as a further mark of the Qājār's gratitude.<sup>3</sup>

Sir John Malcolm believes that the king halted his progress, only when he was told that "he would not lose the wealth, he had so nobly won, by permitting his followers to plunder the jewels & treasures of an empire".<sup>4</sup> But this does not seem to be a good enough reason for Lotf Āli Khān's abandoning his daring exploit unfinished.

Harford Jones is the only source, who tries to find logic in the adoption of Abol Fath Khān's advice. He states:

"the king's forces, not recovered from six and thir-

1. D.K., p.cxc.
2. Ibid. He gives his name as Fath Āli Khān.
3. Rozat al Safa, Vol.9, n.p.
4. H.P., Vol.II, p.191.

"ty hours of unceasing fatigue either of march or battle, and bearing proportion to the enemy as one to twenty, were in no condition to renew the attack."<sup>1</sup>

This is, of course, after the troops had taken to plunder and had dispersed in all directions, as we are informed by the author of Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh:

"some of the common soldiers who had gathered great booty started to leave the camp and left the enemy unfinished."<sup>2</sup>

Incidentally, we learn from the EIC resident that, although the Zand troops never reached the Qājār chief's pavilion,<sup>3</sup> the booty they gained was so great that:

"Lutf Ali Khan's army however carried off their plunder unmolested, & as the value of the whole is said to be very great, this acquisition will be some recompense to the Khan for his disappointment."<sup>4</sup>

However, Lotf <sup>c</sup>Ali Khān was probably unable to gather his troops, once they had taken to plunder and were anxious to reach a place of safety. The EIC resident does not mention the traitor and his advice, but puts the blame solely on the soldiers of the Zand prince. He states:

"it is unanimously acknowledged that nothing could have prevented Aga Mahomed Khan from falling into Lutf Ali Khan's hands, had his men refrained from plundering & kept themselves collected."<sup>5</sup>

1. D.K., p.clxxxix.

2. I.Z., p.80.

3. Although J. Malcolm asserts that "almost the whole of Āqā Mohammad Khan's army had dispersed & the assailants had arrived at the Royal quarters". H.P., Vol.II, p.190.

4. I.O.R., P/E/V.5, Bushire, 27th July, 1792.

5. Ibid.

Only the daybreak announced that the Eunuch had never left his camp and was in his pavilion at the far end of the encampment. The Public Crier, summoning the faithful to prayer, made it known that Lotf<sup>C</sup> Ali Khān had made a fatal mistake and all he could do was to hurry out of the scene and save his life. Giti Goshāy draws a very impressive picture of the event; this source states that:

"when Āqā Moḥammad Khān learnt of the presence of the Zand prince in the camp only with a thousand men in his party, he set off to challenge Lotf<sup>C</sup> Ali Khān to a battle. Lotf<sup>C</sup> Ali Khān was on his horse standing at the side of the camp no one daring to draw near him. The Qājār chief ventured to go as near as to the side of the camp, but stopped there."<sup>1</sup>

Lotf<sup>C</sup> Ali Khān left Abraj in great disappointment. He set off towards Kermān with his remaining army. The Qājār chief stayed there a day and took back the things that his troops had stolen from each other and returned them to the owners.<sup>2</sup> Then they proceeded towards Shirāz.

Harford Jones refutes the account given by Giti Goshāy, as to the intentions of the Qājār chief to fight his enemy in person. He states that Āqā Moḥammad Khān prevented his troops from following the Zand prince by saying "never attack a hungry lion, when he is inclined to remove from you."<sup>3</sup> What he meant was that, at that moment, it would be more expedient to let the prince leave, since his camp was also in confusion; but we are assured by other sources that he sent troops to pursue the prince and capture him. The Qājār troops pursued the Zands for three farsangs, caught up with some soldiers, and put them to death, but they did not molest the prince himself.<sup>4</sup> The EIC

1. G.G., p.372.

2. Ibid. I.O.R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, 27th July, 1792.

3. D.K., p.clxxxix.

4. I.Z., p.82.

resident informs us that:

"the Khan it is said immediately proceeded to a fort in Kermaun called Sheher Baubek, which he fortunately got possession of by strategem. In this fort which is extremely strong is deposited, the whole immense treasures of the late governor of the province, a Seyid."<sup>1</sup>

Giti Goshāy is very brief in the events which befell the Zand prince after this disaster. This could be due to the fact that the author was in the service of the Qājārs. He, however, only mentions that Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān set off for Kermān and proceeded towards Khorāsān, but why and how he fails to relate.<sup>2</sup> Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh states that he established himself in Sirjān and was forced to leave his position, when the Qājār army advanced to that quarter.<sup>3</sup> From there he marched to Tabas, where he was received with kindness and sympathy. While on the way there, he suffered a great blow at the hand of a local chief, Moḥammad Khān Rāvāri, who wanted to seize him and deliver him to the Qājārs; Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān discovered his designs and left. This was when he had been unable to capture the capital of the province of Kermān, Gavāshir. While he had laid siege on that town, he was forced to ask for assistance from the chief of Lar; but, since by now many of the districts had declared themselves loyal to the Qājārs, he did not, therefore, dare to protect the Zand prince, for fear of the Qājārs.<sup>5</sup>

#### Shaikh Nāser and Coastal Expansions:

A detailed account of what took place at Shiraz, when the

1. I.O.R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, 27th July, 1792. The Seyed was Abol Hasan Kohaki.

2. G.G., p.377.

3. I.Z., p.83.

4. Ibid.

5. I.K., p.351

Qājārs entered it, will be given in another section. In this part, we may relate the events which occurred between the Shaikh of Bushehr and the close adherents of Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān. These events resulted in the death of Mir<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān, the most worthy of his supporters. These accounts have only reached us through the EIC records and no other source mentions them. However, since it is essential to know the fate of these figures, we will relate them in detail here.

It must be pointed out that the resident, Charles Watkins, is not very sure as to the veracity of the information he gathers. The reason as stated by him being:

"The Shaikh being jealously attached to the usurper [Aqā Moḥammad Khān], the people here (Bushehr) are afraid of propagating any intelligence which may tell? to the advantage of Lutf Ali Khan."<sup>1</sup>

One of the attempts carried out by the Shaikh of Bushehr was to deprive Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān of the territories which could be used as a safe refuge. As the EIC agent asserts, the Shaikh

"has lately taken the field to endeavour to establish his authority in the province of Dashtistaun & the neighbouring parts. Meer Ali Khan not being in a situation at present to resist, & being in a very weak state of health, the consequence of a terrible wound received some time ago in an action with a neighbouring enemy of Lutf Ali Khan & unable to act in person in the field has been necessitated to deliver up Bundereeg at the requisition of the Shaikh, and to retire to his ancient govt. of Genawa (Ganava) Meer Qunuos (?) the former governor of Bundereeg who was deprived of the government by Lutf Ali Khan has again been put in possession of it, in consequence by the Shaikh. Since this transaction an attack has been made on the island of Carrack (Khārk) which belongs to Meer Ali Khan, by a force of two or three hundred men from hence and Bundereeg, assisted by two or three armed boats at sea. The fort, which was constructed by the Dutch, being still very strong, &

"the person in command being a man of courage, there seems no great likelihood of its falling. Meer Ali Khan has been enabled to succour the besieged in spite of the enemy, so that there are men sufficient to defend the place against any attack of the besiegers, wholly unskilled in the act of conducting a siege Shaikh Nassir himself has lately commenced an attack upon Khisht defended by a small fort & governed by Zal Khan. The place being strongly situated, and its governor a man of approved courage & firmly attached to Lutf Ali Khan, there is little expectation of the Shaikh's success against it."<sup>1</sup>

These events were taking place during the period that the Zand prince was encamped in Zarqān, while he had laid siege to the city of Shirāz; as in the same letter we learn that:

"on the 3rd & the 4th ultimo (June) sudden intelligence being brought to Lutf Ali Khan at Zergoon (sic) of the near approach of Aga Mahomed Khan at the head of a very numerous army."<sup>2</sup>

Mir <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān apparently died of his wound, as we learn from the EIC resident that:

"Shaikh Nassir returned from Khisht the 27th ultimo has since by the death of Meer Ali Khan obtained possession of the island of Carrack."<sup>3</sup>

The death of Mir <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān must have been a serious blow to Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān for various reasons. First, because of the boundless devotion and support, which Mir <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān offered to the Zand cause. As it is asserted by Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān himself, in his interview with Harford Jones:

"I believe Mihr Ali Khan has given me even to his

1. I.O.R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, 10th June, 1792.
2. Ibid., 27th July, 1792.
3. Ibid.

"last horse & last Dinar and I should be glad to return his generosity one day or another."<sup>1</sup>

Apart from his generosity, Mir <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān had the power and influence in his governorate to recruit soldiers and ward off the local chiefs opposing the Zands. His sudden death strengthened the position of other chiefs in the district, like the Shaikh of Bushehr, who even took possession of the port of Rig. This was the only place left for Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān to establish himself, for the purpose of getting aid from the EIC and its agents, as it was proposed to him by Harford Jones.<sup>2</sup>

Incidentally, since Harford Jones claims that, for a long time, he had kept his communication with Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, it is probable that he wanted to adopt the scheme proposed to him by Harford Jones, but circumstances and the change of tide did not allow it.

However, it may be worth mentioning the plan here. It was to secure the port of Bushehr and fortify it, since it had only one opening to land, and three sides were surrounded by the sea. He suggested that:

"it appears to me, the first aim of your majesty should be, to fix on some place to which, in case of defeat, you can retire with security; where everything for a future trial may be prepared; where stores & ammunition may be collected & placed in safety; and where a rallying-point may be formed for your friends and those who continue faithful."<sup>3</sup>

Harford Jones continues:

"As long as your Majesty continues to possess the passes from Kohtel Peer-e-Zun to Dowlaki, the Kajar can not easily approach that town. I am

1. D.K., p.clxxv.

2. Ibid., p.clxxviii.

3. Ibid., p.clxxviii-clxxix.



"aware how essential it is to your interest that no time should be lost in punishing Raza Kuly Khan, & in obtaining possession of the passes of the Khotels of Dokhter and Peer-e-Zun; but that accomplished, I consider your Majesty will do better in retracing your steps and taking possession of Bushire, than proceeding in your present condition towards Shiraz."<sup>1</sup>

Lotf <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Khān was not inclined to waste his energy and time in fighting local chiefs like the Shaikh of Bushehr. After listening to the plan with great interest, Lotf <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Khān asked Harford Jones to take the valuable gems with him and sell them to raise money for his schemes. This was refused by Harford Jones, as he very rightly feared that, should anything happen to Lotf <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Khān, he would be in trouble. Jones suggested to Lotf <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Khān to establish himself at Bushehr:

"I will attend your Majesty there, on your return from Kazeroon; & I will from thence accompany to India any person you may appoint, either to pledge or sell such part of these jewels as you may direct; for it is quite certain, in the present state of things, no Persian merchant will venture to have anything to do with them."<sup>2</sup>

Lotf <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Khān agreed to this and said:

"at all events, I wish to get them out of Persia; for I cannot bear the idea of their becoming the property of the Kajars."<sup>3</sup>

Harford Jones promised Lotf <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Khān that he would join him in Bushehr, and then proceed to India with an agent that Lotf <sup>ᶜ</sup>Ali Khān might appoint.

"I see no reason why, at the end of six months, I

1. D.K., p.clxxxii-clxxxiii.

2. Ibid., p.clxxxiii.

3. Ibid., p.clxxxiv.

"might not rejoin your majesty with such stores and ammunitions as you may direct your agent or myself to purchase there."<sup>1</sup>

The king appears to have been satisfied with the plan as he said: "Wallah (By God), you counsel well".

"As soon as I have chastized Raza Kuly Khan, I will return to Bushire; & I desire of you to join me there as soon as you possibly can. Lose no time now at Bunder Reeg; settle all your affairs as soon as you can. You may tell Mihr Aly, in confidence, all that has passed between us in respect to Bushire; & that I expect he will be ready to give me such assistance as I may require, in the execution of the project."<sup>2</sup>

While this conversation was going on, Lotf<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān's dinner was brought in. He bid Harford Jones to take part, so that he would be in some sort of moral bond to him.

"after the meal was over, his Majesty said: 'My mind is much easier: yours is a rational scheme; and if I could get Lala [Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein] and Mirza Bazaung out of Shiraz, we shall still do well. Make all the haste you can to Bussorah: settle your affaires."<sup>3</sup>

But why, when he had accepted the plan as a rational one and declared his readiness to execute it, he acted contrary to it is not known. Instead of returning from Kāzerun to Bushehr, he hastened towards Shirāz and laid siege on the city. This, however, may have been caused by the unfavourable developments in the South, communicated to us by the EIC documents: that is, not only did he have no chance of capturing Bushehr, but he had lost Bandar Rig and its worthy governor, Mir<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān.<sup>4</sup>

1. D.K., p.clxxxiv.

2. Ibid., p.clxxxv.

3. Ibid.

4. I.O.R. P/E/V.5 10th June 1792.

The only other logical explanation for abandoning a rational scheme, which would certainly have enabled him to hold out for a few years until he could defeat his foe in the field, can be the victory that he gained over Reẓā Qoli Khān, the chief of Kāzerun, and his fellow Fārsi chiefs; that may have encouraged him to press on to Shirāz.

Lotf <sup>c</sup>Ali Khān was anxious to capture his capital, before the Qājārs laid their hands on it. He, therefore, hastened there and encamped at its outskirts; but during this period, there occurred events, which turned the course of his fortune, as given previously.

These were the prime causes for his leaving Fārs and setting off for Kermān, which will be related in due course. We now return to Shirāz and examine the events which took place there, when the Eunuch, Āqā Moḥammad Khān, entered it.

## CHAPTER 6

### SHIRĀZ AND THE QĀJĀRS

Āqā Mohammad Khān, after his undeserved victory, marched towards Shirāz: "the traitor [Hāji] met him at a distance presenting him with the keys to the gates and the fortress".<sup>1</sup> On arrival he committed the most atrocious crimes towards the family of the Zands, and he put to death many of the nobles. We are not sure as to the number but Tarikh-e-Zandiyeh puts it at between ten and twelve senior Zand nobles.<sup>2</sup>

The resident of the factory at Bushehr, C. Watkins states:

"Aga Mahomed Khan since his arrival at Sherauz has put to death or deprived of eyesight upward of twenty Khans of the first families in the place & it is said to be his intention to carry every person under the govt. of any consequence with him to Tehraun the usual seat of his govt. The Families of Lutf Ali Khan, of his predecessors & of Hodji Ibrahim have all been sent away from Sherauz in an ignominious manner already."<sup>3</sup>

We are not, however, informed of the fate of other conspirators and whether their families were sent away; but we learn from Sir John Malcolm that <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān Kazeruni, who had been in the service of the Qājārs for some time, had fled Shirāz when Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was still in possession of it. This event must have happened when he executed Mirzā Mehdi, accused of having severed the ears of the lifeless head of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, when

1. D.K., p.clxxxix.

2. I.Z., pp.82-3.

3. I.O.R. P/E/V5, Bushire, 27th. July, 1792.

it was thrown down from the walls of the citadel by the assassins.<sup>1</sup>

After the capture of Shirāz, Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān punished the perpetrators of the murder of his father by death and only <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān was spared due to some political motives. Mirzā Mehdi was also pardoned since the Kalāntar, Hāji Ebrāhim intervened on his behalf. The culprit had denied the accusation all along, "though many persons had been witnessed of its perpetration".<sup>2</sup> Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān had apparently said that he would have forgiven him, even if he had been guilty of such a foul act for the consideration he had for his mediators.

"several months subsequent, when the prince was distributing honorary dresses, one was given to Meerza Mehdy. This circumstance was reported to the mother of Looft Aly Khan, who sent for him, and asked, if it was not enough that he should be required to forgive the murderers of his father. 'Is it necessary', she added, 'that you should degrade yourself by bestowing mark of regard & favour upon a wretch who mutilated his remains'."<sup>3</sup>

Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, incensed by the reproach, sent for Mirzā Mehdi and demanded of him "what that man deserved who could behave ill to his sovereign & benefactor. To be burnt alive, was the reply. You are the man, said the prince".<sup>4</sup> In a rage Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān ordered him to be burnt alive.<sup>5</sup> This event had terrified <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān about his own safety and, thus, he fled the

1. The fate of Mirzā Mehdi deserves especial notice, as he was allegedly the cause of the friction and distrust, which arose between the king and his Kalāntar, Hāji Ebrāhim. We have already mentioned that during the reign of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, Mirzā Mehdi was a Lashgar Nevis: that is, a secretary of the army; but he was involved in some kind of embezzlement and received punishment according to Islamic laws and had his ears cut off (O.M.I., p.53). When Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's life was taken by the hands of Seid Morād Khān and <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān, "when the head of Jaafar Khan was thrown from the citadel, it had been exposed to a thousand indignities; and, according to popular rumour, Meerza Mehdy had revenged himself by cutting off the ears" (H.P., Vol.II, pp.180-181.

2. D.K., p.cxxii.

3. H.P., Vol.II, p.181.

4. H.P., Vol.II, p.181.

5. Ibid.

city of Shirāz and joined Āqā Moḥammad Khān. Hāji Ebrāhim, presumably alarmed at the implications of this act and feeling responsible for the pardon granted to both of them, began to entertain apprehension and mistrust towards Lotf Ali Khān. If this was the main cause of his fears, then the story of the assistance he is supposed to have given to Seid Morād Khān (the chief assassin) to usurp power can be given credibility, especially since Malcolm asserts that the Hāji himself had said that "he had ceased to expect anything but death".<sup>1</sup>

At all events, the Kāzeruni chief was not molested; but as for the Shaikh of Bushehr, he was not left unmolested. We have an account from the EIC resident, to the effect that

"Aga Mahomed Khan has lately been very importunate in his command to the Shaikh to repair to Sherauz, the Shaikh it is apparent wishes to decline going but it is not likely that Aga Mahomed Khan will admit of any excuse or evasion."<sup>2</sup>

Āqā Moḥammad Khān's brutality did not stop there. He burst open the grave of Karim Khān, taking along with him the remains of that magnanimous monarch, and transferring all the tribes partial to the cause of the Zands to the province of Māzandarān. He further ordered the marbles used in the hall of audience of the Zand palace to be dislodged and taken to his seat of government. According to Giti Goshāy, he carried off whatever he could, from stones to mirrors.<sup>3</sup> The resident of the factory informs us that:

"Aga Mahomed Khan advanced to Sherauz, was admitted into the city about the 10th of June and has since exercised the most refined cruelty on the family of Lutf Ali Khan. All the males have been either put to death, castrated, or deprived of their eyes, & the principal of females thereof have

1. H.P., Vol. II, p.182.

2. I.O.R. P/E/V.5. Bushire, 27th July, 1792.

3. G.G., p.373.

"been distributed amongst the troops of Aga Mahomed Khan."<sup>1</sup>

Incidentally, there seems to be a mistake in the date given by the EIC resident, as the battle at Giruj [Abraj] was reported on the 12th. June by the same source. Āqā Moḥammad Khān cannot possibly have entered the city two days before the battle. Tārīkh-e-Zandiyeh places it on the 18th Shavvāl 1206/ 9th June 1792.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, the battle must have taken place on the 8th June, since it took the Qājārs two days to arrive at the city.

The sources are also at variance as to the date on which Āqā Moḥammad Khān left the city of Shirāz. The EIC resident states that:

"Aga Mahomed Khan has left Sherauz, as he had fixed on the 14th of this moon [August] for his departure from thence. It is universally thought that Lutf Ali Khan will return to the former station near Shirauz, as soon as the Cajar quits the place & there even seems some probability of his getting possession of the govt. once more. Aga Mahommed Khan seems to be in great dread of him."<sup>3</sup>

Giti Goshāy states that Āqā Moḥammad Khān left Shirāz for the seat of his government on the 15th Moḥarram 1207/ 3rd Sept. 1792.<sup>4</sup>

But the author of Tārīkh-e-Zandiyeh asserts that the Qājār chief left Shirāz on the 11th Moḥarram, which is the 30th of August.<sup>5</sup>

1. Bombay political & secret. Range E, Vol.5, p.713, 1792.

2. I.Z., p.82; G.G., p.372.

3. I.O.R. Bombay political..., op. cit., Bushire, 1792.

4. G.G., p.372.

5. I.Z., p.84. There was always the difference of three or four days between the sources. It could stem from the fact that the chiefs usually quit the city but stayed at the outskirts for a few days. It was customary to do so.

Āqā Moḥammad Khān stayed in Shirāz nearly three months and, when he left, he charged the Hāji with the civic affairs of the city, acting as the beglarbegi. He took with him two of his brothers and one of his sons by the name of Asadollāh Khān, and departed for his capital, Tehran.<sup>1</sup>

He wintered in Tehran and it was during this time that he was informed of the plan devised by the Hāji of escaping from Shirāz and taking refuge in India. The accounts of this incident have been given in a previous section.<sup>2</sup>

After the festival of Nouruz, he issued decrees to Hāji Ebrāhim and other notables of Shirāz to present themselves at his encampment, which was due to arrive at the Āspās chaman on the 29th Ramaẓān 1207/ 11th May 1793.<sup>3</sup> Hāji Ebrāhim and his associates set off for his camp on the 23rd of the month and arrived on the 28th.

On arrival, Āqā Moḥammad Khān commissioned his generals to proceed to Shirāz and raze its citadel to the ground. It appears that he summoned the notables to his camp in order to carry out the destruction of the citadel and its fortifications without protest. In the course of the three months that he was in the Chaman of Qasre-Zard (Yellow Castle), the work of destroying the fortifications of Shirāz was completed.

The Qājār chief this time took one of Hāji Ebrāhim's wives and his youngest son and sent them to live in Qazvin.<sup>4</sup> This measure further supports the story related to us by the author of Giti Goshāy about the intention of Hāji to attempt to escape. Āqā Moḥammad Khān left the above-mentioned Chaman on the

1. G.G., p.2.

2. Ibid., pp.374-375.

3. Ibid., p.376; I.Z., p.84.

4. G.G., p.376. The woman was from Dashtestān and appears to be the same as had probably influenced the Hāji to escape.



14th. Moḥarram 1208<sup>1</sup>/22nd August 1793.

The EIC resident is completely silent about these events. He does, however, provide us with information on what happened to the Zand prince, when he approached Kermān. He states that:

"the inhabitants of Kerman as well are well inclined to Luft [sic] Ali Khan; & that the son of the late governor has paid his submissions to him, as has likewise the governor of the province of Seistan [sic]. It is reported that Lutf Ali Khan has again collected an army of ten or twelve thousand men, & that it may be expected he will not remain inactive long."<sup>2</sup>

His information is completely refuted by the account given by Tārīkh-e-Kermān which, although written at a much later date, is a local history and, at the same time, is the only source which provides ample information regarding the province of Kermān.

The city of Kermān (Gavāshir) was divided between two factions on the question of admitting the Zand prince into the city. One faction was headed by the Shaikh<sup>h</sup>al-Eslām and Emām-Jom<sup>c</sup> eh Mollā<sup>c</sup> Abdollāh, who urged the citizens to support the Zand prince; a number of the city notables were in agreement with him.<sup>3</sup> The most fierce of the Zand opponents in the city was a certain merchant, known as Āqā<sup>c</sup> Āli Kermāni. He was well disposed to the Qājār chief and, apparently, while Āqā<sup>c</sup> Moḥammad Khān was a hostage in Shirāz during the lifetime of the Vakil, he had visited the Qājār Eunuch and was in friendly communications with him. In his opposition to the Zand cause, Āqā<sup>c</sup> Āli enjoyed the support of the Sufi saints present in the city at

1. G.G., p.377. I.Z., p.85.

2. I.O.R., Bombay political..., op. cit., pp.577-8. Bushire, 27th July, 1792.

3. I.K., p.350.

the time. These were the famous dervishes, Moshtāq<sup>C</sup>Ali and Mozafar<sup>C</sup>Ali Shāh; the latter left the city in support of the Qājārs later.<sup>1</sup> It appears that the Ṣufi saints had made the acquaintance of Āqā Moḥammad Khān in Shiraz, as when Ha<sup>C</sup>sum<sup>C</sup>Ali Shāh and his disciples were banished from Esfāhān, Āqā Moḥammad Khān was informed; he paid the expenses of their passage to Mashad.<sup>2</sup> At this period the Ṣufi order of Ne<sup>C</sup>matollāhi had gained great power in the city of Kermān. We are informed that the murder of their saint Moshtāq<sup>C</sup>Ali Shāh was partly due to this excessive power and partly because of his adverse sentiments towards the Zand house; whatever the cause, Mollā<sup>C</sup>Abdollah, ordered the faithful congregation to stone him in the Grand mosque.<sup>3</sup>

However, the Beglarbegi of the province, who had refused to submit to the rule of the Zands in the year 1205/1790-1 and had caused great irritation to Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān,<sup>4</sup> had died in the meantime (1206) and his nephew, Mirzā Ṣādeq, had succeeded him for a brief period. On the latter's death, we are not informed as to who was in charge of Kerman.<sup>5</sup> However, the city notables were the decision-making body of the city and, being so divided amongst themselves, there was no chance of a peaceful entry on the part of the Zand prince.

There is no information as to whether the prince laid seige to the city, as there is great confusion in the order of events. The author of Tārīkh-e-Kermān has not distinguished the two

1. I.K., p.350.

2. M<sup>C</sup>asum<sup>C</sup>Ali Shāh, Tara'eqal-Haqaeq. Tehran. 1339. Vol.III, p.173.

3. I.K., p.349.

4. As a matter of fact, he was dubious about admitting him into the town. He invited the city notables to a meeting to discuss the situation. Āqā<sup>C</sup>Ali and his supporters argued that the Qājār had conquered all the areas in the north and centre, would defeat the Zands and soon capture Kermān too. Thus, it would be best to resist the Zand Khan since he had few adherents in his party; it would be easy to disperse his men. This was agreed upon and they resisted the attacks of the prince, who stayed about 20 days outside Gavāshir and asked for assistance from the Afghāni and Sistani chiefs, who did not effect substantial aid (I.K., p.343).

5. I.K., p.353.

attempts made by the Zand prince to capture the seat of the province of Kermān. Giti Goshāy gives the date of the first attempt on Ramazān of the year 1204/1789, which is when Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān was on the throne.<sup>1</sup>

The second attempt seems to have taken place in the year 1206-1207/1791-1792, although we cannot decide on the exact date. The author of Giti Goshāy is completely silent about this event; indeed there is a lapse of a few months in the events recorded by this work, caused presumably by the task of composition of Giti Goshāy changing hands: that is, the history was now written by another historian and not the original author.

Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh states that:

"when Āqā Moḥammad Khān was in the city of Shirāz he was informed that Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān had established himself in the town of Sirjān and was preparing for another battle. Moḥammad Vali Khān Qājār was appointed to make an attack on the prince and disperse his army. On their arrival to Sirjān, Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān left his position for Kermān where he was again denied entry and his adherents finding his fortune desperate, and seeing their own lives in jeopardy, deserted him. Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān, having found his situation hopeless, hastened towards Khorasān."<sup>2</sup>

If this account is to be taken as authentic, the attempt to capture Kermān must have been a short while after the battle of Abraj, apparently some time in the summer of 1206-1207.<sup>3</sup> Āqā Moḥammad Khān left Shirāz on the 11th Moharram 1207<sup>\*</sup>/29th August, 1792; therefore, these events must have happened in the course of the few months that the Qājār chief was in

1. G.G., p.326.

2. I.Z., p.83.

3. The year 1207 started on the 19th August, 1792.

4. I.Z., p.83.

Shirāz: that is, from 10th June to 29th August. During these three months, Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was unsuccessful in his attempt on Kermān and left for Khorasān, where he was received by the chief of Tabas, Amir Ḥasan Khān. He stayed there about fifty days and then, hearing of the destruction of the citadel of Shirāz, was encouraged to return to Fārs and to try to take possession of his capital.<sup>1</sup>

Amir Ḥasan Khān provided him with about 300 men, with whom he set off towards the town of Yazd. However, the governor of Yazd, Taqi Khān, who was determined to resist his attack, gathered an army composed of weavers, silk weavers and confectioners, and prepared to fight the Zand prince.<sup>2</sup>

Taqi Khān appointed his son, <sup>C</sup>Abdol raḥim Khān, to confront the prince outside the town. The armies met near to the village of Ardakān, but before an engagement took place, the unwarlike citizens of Yazd fled back to the town, even though their number was greatly superior to that of the Zands. Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān gained a large amount of booty as a result of their flight.<sup>3</sup>

He further marched on the town of Abarquh, of which he took possession with ease. He placed his uncle, Naṣrollāh Khān, in charge there and pushed on for Bavanāt to meet the army sent down by the Qājārs on early Rabi<sup>C</sup> I 1208\*/early Oct. 1793. According to the account given in Tārikh-e-Mohammadi, the Qājār commander marched straight to the fort of Abarquh and the Zand commander of the fort came out to challenge him. But, due to the superior number and condition of the Qājār army, Naṣrollāh Khān was forced to take shelter behind the walls of <sup>the fort?</sup> <sub>the fort?</sub>

1. G.G., pp.377-378.

2. I.K., pp.351-2.

3. Ibid., p.86. G.G., p.376.

4. G.G., pp.378-9. I.Z., p.87-8.

Mohammad Hosein Khān Qājār laid siege on the town, but in the meantime he was ordered to pursue the Zand prince and not to waste time on such a place, which was not of any consequence.<sup>1</sup> Tārīkh-e-Zandiyeh informs us that in the middle of the month of Safar, Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān captured the town of Abarquh. He established himself there, informing his supporters of his arrival. The tribal warriors, who had been wandering around inactive for some time now, hurried to join his service and, in the course of twenty days, he gathered a respectable force.<sup>2</sup>

At the beginning of the month of Rabi<sup>C</sup> I, he set off for Bavān-āt and from there he marched on Stahbanāt and Qir, two small forts, which were seized almost unopposed. The village of Nairiz put up stiff resistance but eventually he managed to take it too.<sup>3</sup> After a stay of nearly ten days, he marched on the fortress of Dārāb. Its governor denied him entry and, therefore, he laid siege to it.

He was at this stage informed of the approach of the Qājār army. He hastened to the fort of Roniz, fortified it and established his forces there. It appears that he left the fort of Dārāb without effecting a victory.<sup>4</sup>

The Qājār force advanced to a place within one farsakh of the fort. The Zand prince had planned a night attack on the Qājārs but, unfortunately, one of his own men, whose name is given in Tārīkh-e-Mohammadi as Faryādres Khān Zand, fled to the Qājār camp and informed them of the plot. Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, on his attack, found the enemy awake and prepared for a combat. His troops were taken by surprise and had no alternative but to retreat back to the fort. At dawn the Qājār commander

1. I.M.M.S., n.p.

2. I.Z., pp.86-7.

3. G.G., pp.378-9.

4. I.Z., p.88.

made a full scale attack on the fort and they were nearly defeated, when a batallion of Kurdish Bābān warriors came to their assistance. As a result, the Zand forces were forced to retreat to their entrenchments, while many fell captive to the Qājārs.<sup>1</sup>

The Khorāsāni soldiers, who had accompanied the Zand prince in all his expeditions, were now showing signs of disaffection and were inclined to return home. The prince also found it more expedient to leave his position. He therefore stayed the night there, but in the morning set off for Abarquh, where his forces joined him. He started his march back to Khorāsān with only the Khorāsāni cavalry in his company and only a few of his close relations. The rest of his warriors having deserted him <sup>e</sup> on route as they headed for Yazd or Esfāhān.<sup>2</sup>

Lotf Āli Khān returned to Ṭabas, where the governor met him outside the walls of the town with much attention and kindness.<sup>3</sup>

During his stay at Tabas, the chief was apprehensive that his hospitality would put him at odds with the Qājār chief, who by now had conquered most of the empire except for the province of Khorāsān. He therefore urged the prince to proceed to the dominion of Taimur Shāh, the Afghān monarch, and get assistance from him.<sup>4</sup> He even alleged that, while the prince was engaged in his exploit in the south, the Afghān monarch had sent an envoy to Ṭabas for the express purpose of inviting the Zand prince to his kingdom.<sup>5</sup> Lotf Āli Khān, convinced of

1. I.M., n.p.

2. I.Z., pp.84-90. G.G., p.381.

3. G.G., p.381.

4. H.P., Vol.II, pp.194-5.

5. G.G., p.381. I.Z., p.92.

the truth in his allegations, left Tabas to proceed to Afghānes-tān, but on the way he heard of the death of Taimur Shāh. He was in the district of Qa<sup>c</sup>in at this time, where its chief, Amir Āli Khān, received him kindly at his court.<sup>1</sup> It was there that he received the invitation of the Sistāni and Afghān chiefs of Sistān and Bam. Apparently he was also entreated to proceed to Kermān by the Shaikhal-Eslām<sup>2</sup> of Kermān. The chiefs of the two districts, Moḥammad Khān Afghān and Jahāngir Khān Sistāni, had promised to provide every assistance for the purpose of capturing the city of Kermān. They even went so far as to promise him to capture the whole kingdom.<sup>3</sup>

Before we relate the events, which happened at the approach of the Zand prince, we have to give a brief account of the Qājār's policy to subdue all the southern provinces and secure these areas to its power.

While Āqā Moḥammad Khān was encamped in the Chaman Āspās, he commissioned his nephew, Bābā Khān to advance to Kermān and seize it. He accordingly marched towards that quarter and on his approach to the city, some notables partial to the Qājārs came out to meet him, whereas the rest of the notables welcomed him rather reluctantly. Bābā Khān seized and imprisoned all the known advocates of the Zand cause.<sup>4</sup> He further sent a message to the Hākem of Korrān, Moḥammad Rezā Khān, who for some time past had refused to acknowledge any of the contending rivals and had not come up with the usual present (Pishkesh) to the Qājār camp. Moḥammad Rezā Khān, on the arrival of the messenger fled to the safety of the mountains.<sup>5</sup> This account is, however, refuted by the author of Tārīkh-e-

1. G.G., p.381. I.K., p.358. The name of the chief in Qa'in is given as Amir Hosein.

2. I.K., p.358

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p.354.

5. I.M., Ms . Tehran, n.p.

Kermān, who asserts that the Qājārs actually besieged the latter chief in his fort and it was after a few days, that the chief was seized and sent off to Tehran to be punished. His fort at Sirjān fell into the hands of the enemy with all his treasures that were supposed to be immense.<sup>1</sup>

Bābā Khān despatched troops to subdue the turbulent chiefs of Sistān and Bam, which he evidently did not effect, as in a short while we hear of them inviting the Zand prince to their principalities.<sup>2</sup>

The Qājār army, however, managed to establish their power in some minor areas and gathered the tributes customary for a supreme government. Bābā Khān appointed a governor to the province of Kermān, at the same time leaving a Qājār general to command the garrison stationed there.

It was after Bābā Khān left Kermān to join his uncle that the letters from the Shaikhal-Eslām of Gavāshir and the chiefs of Sistān and Bam arrived in Qa<sup>C</sup> in, where the Zand prince was entertained. He immediately set off for Sistān with three hundred cavalry in his company.<sup>3</sup> Before his arrival at Narmāshir, the Afghān chiefs made their submission known to him by sending presents and provisions with some troops to meet him outside their dependencies.<sup>4</sup>

Lotf Ali Khān made his entry into the town of Narmāshir with due ceremony. He was provided with 500 well-armed cavalymen by the chief Moḥammad Khān Afghān. He proceeded from thence to Bam, where Jahāngir Khān Sistāni received him outside the fort and also presented him with 500 well-armed cavalymen.<sup>5</sup> Lotf

1. I.K., p.354.

2. Ibid., p.357.

3. I.M., Ms. n.p.

4. G.G., p.382. I.Z., p.93.

5. G.G., p.382.



<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān advanced towards Kermān without loss of time and, on a night in the mid Sha<sup>C</sup>bān 1207/29th March, 1793, he prepared for a siege.

He devised a plan to capture the city with the least difficulty; this was to send his uncle, <sup>C</sup>Abdollah Khān, at the head of some troops to attack the city from one side, whereas he himself, with the greatest part of his troops, would assail the city from a different direction.<sup>1</sup> This scheme proved highly successful, as the troops garrisoned there, being occupied with the defence of the city on one side, failed to watch the other gates and from there the Zand prince penetrated the fortress. Although the Qājār garrison made a fierce resistance, the fort was taken by storm.

The governor appointed by the Qājārs, Moḥammad Hosein Khān Qaragozlu, and the commander of the garrison fled to the Ark, which had a secret opening to the plains outside the city. They held out for only a day and at night fled with all haste,<sup>2</sup> in order to save their lives and inform the Qājārs of the event. Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān's uncle, <sup>C</sup>Abdollah Khān, followed them for a good distance without success, but took possession of their effects, which they had left behind. In the meantime his nephew, Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, had established himself in the government palace and coins were struck in his name.<sup>3</sup>

During the course of these events, Āqā Moḥammad Khān was in Tehran, spending the spring in his capital (the festival of Norouz occurred on the 17th Sha<sup>C</sup>bān 1208/ 21st March, 1794). He received information on the developments and marched towards Kermān on Sunday, the 3rd of Shavvāl 1208/ 14th May, 1794.<sup>4</sup>

1. G.G., p.383. I.Z., p.93.

2. G.G., p.383. I.K., p.359. I.Z., p.93.

3. Ibid.

4. I.Z., p.95. I.M., Ms Tehran, n.p.

He had summoned Hāji Ebrāhim and notables of Shirāz to be at his court in Tehran; but they had been detained halfway, due to the heavy rains and the floods which had blocked the roads.<sup>1</sup> They joined his camp near Qum, on his way to Kermān, on the 6th Shavvāl/ 17th May. Heading towards Fārs, he encamped at Qasre-Zard for three days and then proceeded to Kermān by way of Bavānāt.<sup>2</sup>

Hosein Qoli Khān, a Qājār chieftain, had been sent ahead to lay siege to the city. He arrived at the outskirts in the middle of Zelhajjeh. Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān came out to meet him and during the engagement the Qājārs were defeated and forced to retreat. Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān returned to the city, preparing for a siege, which he suspected would follow shortly since the Qājār chief, Āqā Mohammad Khān, was on his way there.<sup>3</sup>

The latter arrived three days later and erected batteries on four sides of the fort, surrounding it with trenches and towers.<sup>4</sup> At this time, some coins of the Zand prince found their way to the camp of the Qājārs and eventually reached the hands of Āqā Mohammad Khān. At the sight of this, his wrath was aroused and he immediately sent messengers to Māzandarān to castrate the poor infant son of the Zand prince, who had been sent there.<sup>5</sup>

The events taking place in the city of Kermān have only reached us by the account given in Tārikh-e-Kermān. This source relates a peculiar story as to how the famine broke out there. Apparently the prince had been very harsh in his treatment of the notables, who were partial to the Qājār cause.<sup>6</sup> He confis-

1. I.Z., p.95. I.M., Ms . Tehran, n.p. G.G., p.385.

2. Ibid.

3. G.G., p.385. I.Z., p.95.

4. Ibid. Op. cit., p.96.

5. G.G., p.386.

6. I.K., p.359.

cated the effects of Āqā <sup>C</sup>Ali Kermāni, the most influential of the merchants of Kermān, who had gone to the court of Āqā Mohammad Khān, when the city was delivered to Bābā Khān. Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān seized and imprisoned his two sons, who were appointed to the government of two districts by the Qājārs.<sup>1</sup> Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān married one of the daughters of Āqā <sup>C</sup>Ali and another daughter was married off to his uncle, Naṣrollāh Khān.<sup>2</sup> His other uncle, <sup>C</sup>Abdollah Khān, was sent off to gather troops for the Zands. He recruited men from Bardsir and Eqta<sup>C</sup>, together with the chief of that town, who joined the Zand army.<sup>3</sup> He levied troops to the neighbourhood of the city and a great many troops joined his standard, including the <sup>C</sup>Atāollāhi musketeers, at the head of whom Morād <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān Khorāsāni Sirjāni was placed.<sup>4</sup> It is significant to note that the <sup>C</sup>Atāollāhi tribes, who were the devoted supporters of the ex-governor of Kermān, Seyed Abol Hasan Kohaki, totally changed their attitude towards the Zands after the death of their Emām (religious leader). Apparently, they were more opposed to the Qājārs than the Zands, as is indicated in Tārikh-e-Mohammadi.<sup>5</sup> Tārikh-e-Kermān asserts that it was at the instigation of Āqā <sup>C</sup>Ali Kermāni that the Qājār force was taken to Kermān.<sup>6</sup> It is, however, simplistic to give this as the only reason for Āqā Mohammad Khān's attack on Kermān, as he had spent much time and energy in putting himself on the throne of the kingdom. His only major rival was now involved in this combat, and he was probably hoping that this would be the final battle against his opponent.

1. I.K., p.359.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. I.M., Ms . Tehran. n.p.

6. I.K., p.360.

The above-mentioned source also asserts that although Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān had the time to harvest the grain and store it in the city, he failed to do so.<sup>1</sup> The famine, which subsequently broke out in the course of the siege, was a direct result of his lack of foresight. He punished whoever dared to mention the approach of the Qājārs, presumably to prevent alarm. He cut the ears off a few Bāzāris on this occasion. The populace did not, therefore, venture to gather in the grain and it was too late when the Qājārs reached the city on the 16th Zelḥajjeh 1208/15th July, 1794.<sup>2</sup> The punishment of the Bāzāris could have been attributed to Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān's fear of a general unrest, which was what the Bāzāris were in a position to cause.

The sources of the Qājār period assert that the Eunuch Āqā Mohammad, after ordering a siege, gathered about ten thousand masons, carpenters and bricklayers to construct another citadel around the existing one, and to build towers opposite to the town's fortifications, between which he dug a wide ditch in order to prevent the escape of the Zand troops. Thus, the enemy would have to contend with the guards placed in the towers.<sup>3</sup> Contemporary sources do not support this account and one may view the ploy with a degree of caution.<sup>4</sup>

The siege lasted more than four months and during this period, every day a group of the besieged came out of the city to fight the Qājār army.<sup>5</sup> The provisions had become scarce and the inhabitants were in great distress because of that. Furthermore the winter and the intense cold had aggravated the situation.<sup>6</sup> Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān banished 10,000 of the populace to ease

1. I.K., p.360.

2. Ibid.

3. I.M., Ms n.p.

4. I.Z., p.96. G.G., p.386.

5. Ibid.

6. I.K., p.361. I.M., n.p.

the distress and the scarcity of food. These evacuees were: the clergy, wives and children of the more unwarlike citizens, and invalids.<sup>1</sup> Among these was the Sufi Saint, Moḥammad Taqī Moḥafar<sup>c</sup> Ali Shāh, who came to the Qājār camp after his banishment and stayed with one of the followers of the Ne<sup>c</sup>matollāhi order, <sup>c</sup>Ali Khān Qarāchorlu.<sup>2</sup>

What Lotf <sup>c</sup>Ali Khān had not anticipated was that the Qājār chief would build houses for his troops and, therefore, that the winter would not affect him to the same extent as it would otherwise have done.

Lotf <sup>c</sup>Ali Khān positioned his generals in different quarters of the citadel. They were, however, newly recruited to his service. Tārīkh-e-Kermān asserts that the Zand army started to communicate with the Qājārs. Qāsem Khān Julbāri betrayed his post, but as a result of a mistake the Qājār army did not enter the city; the traitor, who had fled to the camp of the Qājārs, was captured and put to death.<sup>3</sup> The second attempt of betrayal was carried out by Najaf Qoli Khān Khorāsāni, who admitted a few thousand Qājārs into the citadel.<sup>4</sup> Tārīkh-e-Kermān attributes the act to the intense pressure on the soldiery for food and provisions. Apparently the people had been reduced to eating the seeds of dates, which they powdered to make bread. Sawdust was another material for baking bread and this was after having gone through all the cats and dogs.<sup>5</sup>

Giti Goshāy reverses the order of events and asserts that the first attempt to admit the Qājār troops into the citadel was carried out by Jubāri soldiers, who allowed about 3,000 infan-

1. I.K., p.361.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., pp.363-4.

4. G.G., p.386. I.Z., p.96.

5. I.K., p.362. I.Z., p.96. G.G., p.386.

try to penetrate the fortress. The prince was informed and rushed to the scene and with great difficulty forced the infantry to retreat. He regained all the positions lost to the enemy.<sup>1</sup> This time he appointed the Afshār chief, Mirzā Khān, to be in charge of the position given over to the enemy; he was also given the property of the traitors who had attempted to betray the fortress. The latter was, however, recovered and put to death.<sup>2</sup> The second attempt to surrender the citadel to the enemy was made by Najaf Qoli Khān and his troops of Jubārī and Māhāni musketeers.<sup>3</sup> On the 29th Rabi<sup>c</sup> I 1209/ 24th Oct. 1794, between 10-12,000 enemy troops were admitted to the city. Ahmad Khān Savād Kūhi, a general of the Qājār army, took possession of one of the towers and the gallant effort of the Zand prince to push them back proved futile.<sup>4</sup>

Lotf<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān, with his close relations and Jahāngir Khān Sīstāni, rushed towards the gate of Solṭānieh. He captured it after three hours fighting and waited until dark to set off for a place of safety. He put back the drawbridge and fought his way through the dense Qājār wall of troops, managing to get away having killed and wounded numerous opponents.<sup>5</sup> In the confusion and darkness he lost his companions and set off for Sīstān with only a few servants. He reached Bam after twenty-four hours ride, having covered a distance of 40 farsakhs/400 kilometres. He was welcomed by the chief, Moḥammad Khān Sīstāni, who was anxious to know what had become of his brother, Jahāngir Khān. The prince told him what had happened and assured him that he would arrive soon.<sup>6</sup> The chief accommodated the prince at the gate of the citadel and his retinue were

1. I.K., p.362. I.Z., p.96. G.G., p.386.

2. I.Z., p.97. G.G., p.386.

3. Ibid.

4. I.Z., pp.97-8. G.G., p.387.

5. Ibid.

6. G.G., p.388. I.Z., pp.99-100.

lodged outside. Moḥammad Khān was apprehensive that his brother had been captured by the Qājārs. After three days there was still no sign of Jahāngir Khān. This added to the suspicion that he had been taken prisoner by the Qājārs on his way out of Kermān.<sup>1</sup>

Lotf<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān was warned of the suspicious conduct of his host but as usual he neglected the warning due to his excessive pride. Then, on the 5th of Rabi<sup>c</sup> II 1209/ 30th Oct. 1794, the Sistānis assailed the prince.<sup>2</sup> He mounted his horse, but the troops wounded the horse and he fell. The assailants surrounded him and inflicted injuries on his arms and legs, none of them fatal.<sup>3</sup> Thus he was captured and sent off to Kermān. On the way he was met by the Qājār chief who had been appointed to pursue him.<sup>4</sup> Jahāngir Khān arrived while the prince was on his way to Kermān. He reprimanded Moḥammad Khān, his brother, but to no avail.<sup>5</sup>

The events which befell the prince are sad and melancholy. He was taken to the presence of his bitter enemy, where he spoke with dignity and truth.<sup>6</sup> The Eunuch ordered him first to be blinded; he was then subjected to the most cruel indignities and then sent off to Tehran.<sup>7</sup>

Apparently the Qājār wanted to keep him alive but the Ḥāji Ebrāhim was anxious to see him dead. He therefore incited the Qājār Eunuch to put him to death. Rożat al-Safa relates a

1. G.G., p.389-390.

2. Ibid., p.390. I.Z., pp.100-1.

3. D.K., p. cxci.

4. I.M., Ms n.p.

5. G.G., pp.390-1.

6. I.M., n.p. G.G., p.391.

7. Ibid.

rather peculiar story that "Āqā Moḥammad Khān bestowed on the prince a mark of honour while he was kept prisoner, and ordered him to be given one of his own robes. On seeing the Zand prince he was so displeased that he instantly ordered him to be slain."<sup>1</sup> There is no accurate date for his murder, but it appears that he was killed in the month of Rabi<sup>c</sup> II 1209/October 1794. This is totally insubstantial, since we are informed that the prince was put to death while Āqā Moḥammad Khān was at Shirāz.<sup>2</sup>

He was buried in Tehran in the shrine of Emāmzādeh Zaid. Thus ended the career of the last prince of the Zands, who ruled Persia for a period of more than forty years. The country experienced many cruelties at the hands of Āqā Moḥammad Khān, whose atrocities are too horrible to relate.

Āqā Moḥammad Khān ordered the inhabitants of Kermān to be massacred and a few thousand people were put to death instantly, while the surviving wretches were given over as slaves to his troops.<sup>3</sup> Apparently he made the governor appointed to Kermān promise that the province would never flourish. Only the houses of Āqā<sup>c</sup> Ali Kermāni were spared the ravages in recognition of his past services. 12,000 people had taken refuge there. The crowd was so great that five people were suffocated as a result. It was the day after the city was captured that the Qājār chief permitted the refugees in the house of Āqā<sup>c</sup> Ali to leave the city. He then ordered his troops to provide him with 20,000 eyes of the inhabitants.<sup>4</sup>

This account appears exaggerated, as Sir John Malcolm puts the number of those who were blinded at about 7,000. Whatever the

1. I.K., p.367.

2. I.Z., p.99.

3. Sykes, Percy: History of Persia, London, 1834, Vol.II, p.367.

4. H.P., vol.ii, p.198.



case may be, the same author states that he saw many of these victims in Shiraz, when he was there in 1800.

The primary Persian sources are brief and deficient on this question, presumably from dread of the fierce Qājār retribution. Tārīkh-e-Zandiyeh relates some of the atrocities towards the Kermanis.<sup>1</sup> All those who had helped the Zand prince were killed. Mirzā Khān Afshār, with one hundred of his troops, was put to death and Najaf Qoli Khān Khorāsāni met the same fate, together with his men, although he had betrayed the Zands and admitted the Qājār army into the city. Only ʿAbdollāh Khān, Lotf ʿAli Khān's uncle, was pardoned because he was married to the sister of Reżā Qoli Khān Kāzeruni, who intervened on his behalf; but apparently he was blinded.<sup>2</sup>

The inhabitants of Shahr-e-Bābak were all exiled to remote areas. The citadel and all the beautiful buildings in Kermān were demolished. About 700 of the ʿAtāollāhi tribe were transferred to Ray, while the citadel of Shahr-e-Bābak was razed to the ground.<sup>3</sup>

Āqā Moḥammad Khān, after having committed these barbarities, left Kermān at the end of the month of Rabi<sup>c</sup> I 1209/ September, 1794. He arrived at Shirāz, where he stayed for three months and, according to Tārīkh-e-Zandiyeh,<sup>4</sup> it was during his stay there, that he decided to eliminate Lotf ʿAli Khān. He therefore appointed Mirzā Moḥammad Khān Qājār to kill him.<sup>5</sup>

1. I.Z., p.99. Tārīkh-e-Saḥeb Qerāni, Msc. B.L. & Tehran, n.p.

2. I.M., Ms Tehran, Malek Library, n.p.

3. Ibid.,

4. I.Z., p.101.

5. Ibid.

SECTION II

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF LATE 18th CENTURY PERSIA

## INTRODUCTION

Persian society at that time was very much class oriented. The main division was that of rulers and ruled. The rulers formed a small proportion of the population; in every major city there was only a handful of government officials, like the Hākem (governor), Beglarbegi, Sardār (military general), a few official <sup>c</sup>olamā, tribal leaders and rich merchants. The ruled were composed of two major groups: The first was the middle class, who, as Rostam defines them, were half way between the rich and poor.<sup>1</sup> These were mainly traders, artisans, tribal warriors, muleteers, lesser government officials, and Mollās (clergy). These formed a minority in the society, since only industrial towns, like Yazd and Kāshān, had a large community of artisans. In other cities and towns, such as Shirāz, which was mainly a market town, the shopkeeper population exceeded that of the artisans. Shirāz differed in many ways from the traditional towns of 18th century Persia. It contained a large population of tribal warriors, who had been settled there by the Vakil. Apparently, their number amounted to more than 10,000.<sup>2</sup> A contemporary source asserts that 8,000 of them attended the levee of the Vakil every day.<sup>3</sup> The muleteers of Shirāz were another group, who had become numerous and extremely prosperous by the end of the 18th century, due to the lucrative trade traffic from Bushehr to the north. The transportation being completely reliant on pack animals, Sir Harford Jones met muleteers, who were richer than the merchants who employed them.<sup>4</sup>

1. R.I., p.287.

2. I.S., p.33.

3. F.N., p.219.

4. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.I, p.104.

The second group were the lower classes, also composed of many different groups. The largest proportion was that of the peasants and tribes, either nomadic or sedentary. These two elements were mainly resident in rural areas, although there were some agriculturalists among the urban population, who traditionally engaged in horticulture, in and around the cities and towns.<sup>1</sup> The urban lower classes were primarily engaged in the service industry. In the capital, Shirāz, a large number of people entered the great house as servants, retainers, entertainers and guards. In other towns, they attached themselves to the houses of grandees and local magnates.

Karim Khān, according to Rostam, believed that the ordinary people should be engaged in four professions, agriculture, trade, business and the service industry.<sup>2</sup> This accords exactly with what was actually the case. There is, however, no means of assessing the percentage of these four groups in the major cities and towns. It should be remembered that only a small proportion of the population was urbanised. Hambly maintains that, by the end of the 18th century, the urban population, including Herāt, did not exceed half a million.<sup>3</sup>

We will discuss the social classes in detail later. Here we will concentrate on a description of the general pattern and layout of the cities and towns in the period under discussion.

### Cities and Towns:

The cities were those, which had grown up during the Middle Ages. Their growth lay primarily in their strategic or commercial position. Only three cities were of religious significance: Mashad, Qum and Ardabil; the former enjoying strategic impor-

1. Kuznetsona, Urban Industry, p.310.

2. R.I., p.309.

3. Hambly, Gavin, "An Introduction to the economic organization of Early Qajar Iran", Journal of Persian Studies, 1964, p.70.

tance as well. The rest were either trade emporia like Shirāz, which lay on the transit route and was a thriving centre, although its industry had declined drastically. At one point, it boasted of having 500 weaving workshops, whereas in the period under study, the workshops did not exceed ten.<sup>1</sup> The manufacturing centres such as Yazd and Kāshān, lay out of the way of the main transit routes and, thus, did not suffer the ravages of military expeditions. Major market towns served to provide the neighbouring towns with foodstuffs as well as manufactured products.

The cities were generally walled, especially if they were located in open plains. The plan of the city was almost uniform in most areas. There was a great maidan in front of the citadel, usually the residence of the Hākem, Beglarbegi, <sup>C</sup>Olamā, tribal leaders and landowners.<sup>2</sup> Further along there was the great Friday Mosque, the Bazar adjoining the Mosque and the Caravanserai next to the Bazar. The city was built around the great maidan and divided into two quarters: that is, Ḥaydari and Ne<sup>C</sup>mati, and subdivided into wards (Maḥalleh), often named after the class of inhabitants.<sup>3</sup> In Shirāz, three wards were allocated to the Lak tribes. One of the quarters was allocated to the Jews and known as Maḥalleh-e-Kalimihā. The eleven Muslim wards were incorporated into two quarters, generally known as Ḥaydari and Ne<sup>C</sup>mati khāneh.<sup>4</sup> It appears that in the late 18th century, there was no class distinction within the area or the quarter in which a family resided. Both camps had rich as well as poor inhabitants. The city of Esfāhān consisted of twenty four wards, three being inhabited by the Lor tribes. These were also divided into Ḥaydari and Ne<sup>C</sup>mati camps.<sup>5</sup>

1. Binning, Two year travels in Persia, Vol.I, p.287.

2. Tohfāt-al <sup>C</sup>Ālam, Msc. Edinburgh, n.p.

3. Ibid.

4. R.M.M., pp.48, 50. F.N., part II, p.22.

5. R.I., p.254.

The choice of the capital was almost always according to the whim of despotic rulers. Nāder Shāh singled out the city of Mashad for his capital due to its strategic significance for his Eastern conquests. He thus settled many of the tribes inside and around that city, in order to guard his new acquisition. Shirāz was chosen as capital by the Vakil, because of the security and strength of its fortifications. Capper believes that Karim Khān being a usurper did not dare to reside in an open city like Esfāhān without fortifications.<sup>1</sup> One is inclined to think that the Vakil chose Shirāz for his capital out of great liking for the city, but he may well have chosen it for security reasons as well. He incorporated nineteen wards of the city into twelve and took great pains to beautify the city, so that it would be remembered by generations to come.

The monarchs of the Zand house were very little disposed to make concessions towards the citizenry and there are no instances of a city being exempted from the payment of taxes. The reason was due primarily to the fact that they relied totally on the tribes for military support. Indeed, in a document the tribes were exempted from the payment of taxes for three years.<sup>2</sup> Cities provided a very small quota to the army. Thus their sole contribution to the treasury was their taxes. This, however, does not mean that the Zands disregarded the welfare of the city dwellers. On the contrary, the Zands used their utmost efforts to provide comfort and justice in the towns. Carsten Niebuhr relates that Šādeq Khān, while governor of Shirāz, punished a butcher severely for having sold stale meat.<sup>3</sup> Again, Zaki Khān was so anxious to keep the artisan traders happy with his administration, that he took measures to secure their property, while they were sleeping in their houses with their shops open and unattended.<sup>4</sup>

1. Capper, James, Observation on the passage to India, through Egypt, also by Vienna through Constantinople to Aleppo, London, 1790, p.236.

2. Majles Library, Tehran.

3. Niebuhr, C., Travels, p.67.

4. M.T., p.345.

## CHAPTER 7

### THE URBAN POPULATION

As we have already mentioned, the society was generally stratified according to distinctions of class. The hierarchy was like a pyramid with the Shāh at the top, his highranking officials immediately below, and the affluent families under them. The social structure was not, however, as rigid as it might appear. In fact, there was a great degree of flexibility in the composition of the ruling classes. It was not uncommon for a man of humble origin to acquire high position in the government, nor was it difficult for him to amass wealth and become a member of the elite. On at least two occasions, Karim Khān and Āli Morād Khān are known to have appointed two men of humble background to the governorship of two major cities. Bāqer Khān Khorāskāni, a humble kadkhodā of his native village and apparently a Pahlavān, was charged with the governorship of the city of Esfāhān.<sup>1</sup> In the city of Hamadān, a certain Mirzā Ma<sup>c</sup>ṣum was appointed as governor. He, too, was of a poor family and a menial servant of the government.<sup>2</sup> This was, however, contrary to the general policy of the Vakil, who uniformly commissioned local magnates to the governorship of provinces.

Although humble men were able to climb the ladder of the governmental hierarchy, the traditional nobility always regarded them with contempt and scorn. Mirzā Moḥammad Kalāntar, who boasted of his noble descent, and asserted that his ancestors

1. R.I., pp.57-8. He amassed such an immense wealth that he dug holes in his private garden and buried boxes of treasures and planted trees on top of them. These treasures were, however, recovered by his successors. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.73.

2. G.M., p.306.

for many generations had been distinguished scholars and dignitaries, speaks of the governor of Shirāz, Taqī Khān, as the son of a Mirāb (water warden) and attributes his greatness to the favours bestowed on him by Nāder Shāh.<sup>1</sup> He often calls the menial officers of the government, such as Dāroughe, by the term Arāzēl<sup>2</sup> (scum). This view was not limited only to the elite themselves, since the general public also regarded the traditional nobility with respect and admiration. Shaikh<sup>c</sup> Ali Hazin, a member of the Gilāni landed gentry, was held in so much veneration, that he was asked by the general public to stay in their towns wherever he travelled.<sup>3</sup>

### RULING CLASSES

#### Government Officials:

The Zand state apparatus as Perry suggests had remained very much the same as in the Ṣafavid period.<sup>4</sup> The government administrative body functioned within the same framework, although it was not as elaborate as in the Ṣafavid era. Tazkerat al-Moluk has provided us with the most comprehensive manual of the governmental offices and their functions with the valuable commentary by Minorsky, which adds to the value of the work.<sup>5</sup> Here, we will merely state the differences, which appear to have occurred in the status and functions of the dignitaries of the Zand reign.

At least two offices had undergone major changes; that of prime minister and the kalāntar. Here we will study both in

1. R.M.M., p.15.

2. Ibid., p.27.

3. I.H., pp.153-166.

4. Perry, Karīm Khan, p. 214.

5. Tazkerat al-Moluk, ed. V. Minorsky, Gibb Memorial, 1943.



detail. Traditionally, the prime minister, who was honoured with the title of E<sup>C</sup>temād al-Dolleh or Şadr-e-A<sup>C</sup>zam, was placed at the top of the official hierarchy. He ratified the bills dealing with the accounts of the Divān; he endorsed the employment of all the government officials, and supervised the state machinery. There is, however, no comprehensive manual of the duties and sphere of power enjoyed by the prime minister at this time, and our knowledge is deficient.

But from the remarks made here and there in the sources, one could assume that the position had lost much of its prominence. Furthermore, the office appears to be ill defined. For example, the entertainment of foreign guests and ambassadors appears to have been performed by the kalāntar, rather than by the prime minister during the Vakil's reign. Whereas Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān appears to have placed this responsibility in the hands of his minister, Mirzā Moḥammad Ḥosein. Karim Khān, averse to the pomp and paraphernalia of the monarchy, affirmed on many instances that he was merely a Kadkhodā<sup>1</sup> and, as such, vested his kalāntar with vast power and ruled through him. In his tendency to dispense with the prime minister, he appears to have trodden the path of his predecessor, Nāder Shāh, who never appointed a prime minister. Thus, the Vakil's minister, Mirzā Ja<sup>C</sup>far Esfāhāni, did not enjoy the same influence and power as the Şafavid ministers, although he was inclined to assume such a role. Hence, he is accused of vanity and conceit.<sup>2</sup>

Mirzā Ja<sup>C</sup>far was a seyed of noble descent; he started his career in the daftar Khāneh of Nāder Shāh, as a sarreshtehdār of the army. During the short-lived rule of Āzād Khān in Esfāhān, he became the vakil of Esfāhān, and then was promoted to

1. Maftūn, Abdol Razzāq, Tasliat al Abrar va Tajrobat al Ahrar, Tabriz, University Press, 1350, Vol.II, p.31. Negarestan-e-Dārā, p.159.

2. Ibid. Vol.I, pp.131-2.

the governorship of that city. After the victory of Karim Khān over his rivals, as he was advancing to the province of Āzar-bayjan, he appointed Mirzā Ja<sup>C</sup>far as the Vazir of Divān.<sup>1</sup>

Apparently he accompanied the Vakil on his expeditions; on his return he was vested with the office of the first minister to the Vakil. There is no clear manual of the duties of the minister at this time. Mirzā Ja<sup>C</sup>far, however, appears to have presided in the divān khāneh every day. He attended the court levee regularly,<sup>2</sup> but the Vakil did not consult him over matters of great political importance.<sup>3</sup> Mirzā Ja<sup>C</sup>far retained his post as long as the Vakil lived. Perry asserts that Mirzā Moḥammad Ho-sein became the Vakil's minister for a short while. It is not known whether he was the minister to Abol Fath Khān on his two accessions to the throne. He is accused of having been instrumental in the coup against the unfortunate son of the Vakil and Mirzā Moḥammad kalāntar relates with pleasure that he was sent to hell for his ingratitude to his late master.<sup>4</sup> Mirzā Ja<sup>C</sup>far died, or rather was killed, a year after the death of Karim Khān. We cannot decide how he was killed, as Mirzā Moḥammad asserts. However, his property was confiscated by <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān.<sup>5</sup>

Sādeq Khān retained his old minister, Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein, who had accompanied him on his expedition to Baṣra (1181/1767).

1. Zinat al-Tavārikh, Ms. Tehran, n.p.

2. TaTa, Vol.I, p.132.

3. For instance, Karim Khān appointed Āqā Moḥammad Khān Qājār as governor of Dāghān, when a rebellion had erupted there. He had vested Āqā Moḥammad the Eunuch with a robe of honour and he was preparing to leave, when the minister arrived at the court. Mirzā Ja<sup>C</sup>far sarcastically remarked, "O, you are going, when will I see you again?" On hearing the remark, Karim Khān immediately sensed the danger inherent in the appointment and cancelled it. Rouzat al-Safā, n.p.

4. R.M.M., p.74.

5. R.T., p.436.

He appears to have placed more confidence in his minister, and thus less trust in the kalāntar, which was greatly resented by the latter.

The kalāntar believed that Ṣādeq Khān was ill advised and that, whatever calamity he suffered, was the direct result of his minister's counsel.<sup>1</sup> This is refuted by Lotf<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān, who, in his interview with Harford Jones, asserts that his grandfather, Ṣādeq Khān, did not heed his minister's good advice. He deprived Abol Fath Khān of his rights and usurped the power, despite the protests of his minister.<sup>2</sup> This could not, however, have stemmed from lack of trust, but rather the obstinate disposition of Ṣādeq Khān.<sup>3</sup> Although we cannot assert with any degree of certainty that Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein was not responsible for the devastating effects of the rule of Ṣādeq Khān, we can assume that had he been responsible for mismanagement, <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān would not have spared him. Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein was dismissed after the death of Ṣādeq Khān, because <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān had a minister, Mirzā Rabi<sup>c</sup> Esfāhāni.

Mirzā Rabi<sup>c</sup> appears to have been an astute man of a cunning and avaricious character. He was the major force behind the expulsion of the notables of Shirāz. The kalāntar who appears to have suffered grave indignities and losses attributes the act to his own refusal to comply with the wishes of <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān to mulct the citizens of Shirāz. Apparently, Mirzā Rabi<sup>c</sup> had been willing to ally himself with the kalāntar, but he rejected the proposal. Mirzā Rabi<sup>c</sup> had great influence on the mind of <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān, but this did not prevent the latter from disgracing his minister by flogging his son in the main square

1. R.M.M., p.87.

2. D.K., preliminary matters, p.clxix.

3. Since we know that he loved his learned and distinguished minister. On at least one occasion, Ṣādeq Khān paid the debts of his minister, who had spent all his money on his valuable library. D.K., p.clxix.

for an offence. Mirzā Rabi<sup>c</sup> had gathered such immense wealth that <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān's successor, Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān, finding a good pretext did not hesitate to confiscate it.<sup>1</sup> The minister himself was disgraced and retired to the holy shrines in Ottoman Turkey. During his term of office, he systematically directed his efforts towards amassing wealth and in this respect antagonised men of integrity and honesty. His animosity towards the kalāntar of Shirāz continued, even when Mirzā Moḥammad was virtually deprived of his office and was in exile in Esfāhān (1196-1199). It appears that the kalāntar of Esfāhān was in league with the minister in his animosity towards Mirzā Moḥammad.<sup>2</sup>

At the death of <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān and the usurpation of power by Bāqer Khān Khorāskāni, Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān held Mirzā Rabi<sup>c</sup> responsible and reprimanded him for his inactivity, despite his influence among the troops.<sup>3</sup> This is significant, since it indicates that the minister had been in a position to stop the governor, Bāqer Khān, if he had intervened, although the whole event was carried out by the tribal warriors and the civilians had no role in it. It would have probably been easy for the minister to effect a coup had he enjoyed the backing of other notables, but he appears to have been isolated.

Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān, having been away from Esfāhān and Shirāz on military expeditions, was left with the dilemma of appointing a minister to carry out his administration. Accordingly, for the first time in the realm of the Zands, the ruler held a meeting to discuss the question with his courtiers. With the unanimous votes of the notables, Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein was elected as the minister. The office of Ṣadr was given to Mirzā Bāqer-e-Shafti of Gilān.<sup>4</sup> The gesture was aimed at the reconciliation

1. G.M., p.414. Apparently, there were about 50,000 Tomāns worth of treasures recovered. R.M.M., p.86.

2. R.M.M., p.84.

3. G.M., pp.414-5.

4. Ibid. It seems that he was the same Mirzā Bāqer, who became one of the wealthiest and most powerful clergy in the 19th century. Qesasal-Ḥolama, pp.135-167.

of the numerous hostile factions in the Zand court. Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān, a liberal and kind man, did not wish to impose his own wish on his court, but his choice, however, coincided with theirs. Whether Mirzā Moḥammad, the kalāntar, was present at this meeting or not is not known. He never, however, became reconciled with Mirzā Moḥammad Ḥosein and presumably, that was one of the reasons for his decision to remain in Esfahan and to join the Qājār camp (1200).<sup>1</sup> The functions of the newly appointed minister was slightly different from the previous ministers. He totally overshadowed all other officials and managed the affairs with authority and competence.

Mirzā Moḥammad Ḥosein conducted negotiation with foreign visitors, entertained official guests, which was previously carried out by the kalāntar of Shirāz. This could have been a prime cause for the resentment of Ḥāji Ebrāhim, who felt that he was left out of the state affairs. Thus, he effected the coup to regain the prominence that his predecessor, Mirzā Moḥammad, had enjoyed.

#### Beglarbegis and Hākems:

These offices had not changed in essence. Only their number had decreased due to the loss of the great part of the empire during the Zands' rule. During the Zand period, there were only eight beglarbegis, whereas in the time of the Ṣafavids, their number had been thirteen. The Vālis of four major provinces had remained intact; these were the provinces of Arabistān, Ardalān, Georgia and Lorestān. These were semi-independent and, after the death of the Vakil, only paid lip-service to the Zand sovereigns. Each major town had a Ḥākem, whose power was very similar to that of beglarbegi. Small principalities had a zābeṭ, or a kalāntar, although it was not uncommon for a kadkhodā to rule over a district.

1. R.M.M., pp.90-91.

Generally, the beglarbegis and the Hākems were appointed by the central government, unless a family of the chief of a tribe was the hereditary ruling elite over a province, in which case the central government only reaffirmed the governor in his charge, by sending him a robe of honour and decree. Allāh Qoli Khān Zanganeh's father had been appointed to the governorship of Kermānshāh by Nāder Shāh. Thus his son was placed in his position and despite his frequent disaffections to the Zands, remained in his charge.<sup>1</sup> Hedāyat Khān, the governor of Gilān, was another example of these hereditary Hākems. He had been dismissed on several occasions and then reinstated in his charge.<sup>2</sup> Often the son of a governor succeeded him after his death. When Naṣir Khān Lāri died his two sons became the joint governors of Lār. One of them was a hostage in the court for six months, while the other governed the province. The other son, however, presented himself to the court for the second half of each year.<sup>3</sup>

It was only when a province was in constant rebellion that the Zands ventured to send a Zand noble to subdue it and act as governor. Astarabād was in constant tumult and, despite the Vakil's inclination to rule the province through the local nobility, he was forced to send his half-brother, Zaki Khān, to put an end to the unrest. Zaki Khān brought the area under control with the utmost cruelty towards the rebels and their families.<sup>4</sup> Kermān was another example of these chaotic and disturbed areas. Eventually the Vakil had to appoint Nazar <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān as his general to subdue it. Having achieved his objective, Nazar <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was instructed to leave Baṣṭām Khān Zand as the governor and proceed to Shirāz. It was not, however, until two local chiefs were appointed to share the governorship

1. G.M., p.306. R.T., p.450.

2. G.M., p.283.

3. Ibid., p. 447.

4. G.G., pp.109, 229-30, 294. R.T., pp.364-5.

that the unrest subsided.<sup>1</sup> But peace was restored, when a Ker-māni notable, Seyed Abol Hasan, was charged with the office.<sup>2</sup>

The Zands were generally inclined to conform with the wishes of the local notables. Karim Khān appointed Ma<sup>c</sup>sum Khān, a man of humble origin, to the governorship of Hamadān, at the request of the notables of that city,<sup>3</sup> who were opposed to the governor, Mo<sup>c</sup>men Khān. The former was reaffirmed in his charge by <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān, until he openly rebelled against the Zands and was captured and put to the sword.<sup>4</sup> The province of Fārs had a beglarbegi, only when the monarch was away. Karim Khān did not trust anyone except his own brother, Sādeq Khān, to hold this office. During his absence, Sādeq Khān was vested with absolute power. He punished culprits, sent tax collectors to various dependencies of the province.<sup>5</sup> This right was particularly given to the governors and beglarbegis, but even the closest relative of the Vakil could not demand tax from a province, without authorization. There is an instance to prove it. Shaikh <sup>c</sup>Ali Khān, the Vakil's cousin, had sent tax collectors (Moḥaṣṣels) to the districts captured by the Vakil in Āzarbayjān, of his own accord. This had greatly annoyed Karim Khān and he summoned him to his private quarter and deprived him of his eyesight. His wealth, which appears to have been great, was also confiscated. Later on, during the reign of <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān, when the capital was removed from Shiraz, a beglarbegi was appointed to the province of Fārs, who was also a member of the Zand family. Seid Morād Khān held the office during the whole course of <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān's reign.<sup>6</sup>

1. I.K., pp.329-30.

2. Ibid., p.331.

3. G.M., p.304.

4. Ibid., p.309.

5. R.M.M., pp.56-7.

6. Ibid., pp.81-9.

It appears that, as in the Safavid era, the beglarbegi had a number of Ḥākems under him. It is not known, whether he had the power to dismiss or replace them, but it is certain that the Hākem of minor towns were always appointed with the consent of the beglarbegi. Najaf Qoli Khān Donboli, the beglarbegi of Tabriz, was consulted about the appointment of his nephews to the governorship of Khoi and its dependencies, and it was approved by him.<sup>1</sup> Apart from a few Hākem, the beglarbegi had a host of officers under him, such as Mostoufi, who looked after the public revenues, Kalāntar, Kadkhodā, Dārughe and Żābet. These were answerable to the beglarbegi on any point of mismanagement or excess, although on matters of great importance, like a rebellion, the verdict was given by the monarch himself.

The officers such as kalāntars, Żābet̄s and Kadkhodās were always chosen from the local elite. It was not uncommon for a local family to retain an office for generations, unless a drastic change in the government deprived them of their inherited position. Even then, there was a chance of their being reinstated to their previous position.<sup>2</sup>

Karim Khān was particularly reluctant to change the governors and beglarbegis. In the case of Hāji Āqā Moḥammad Renāni, the governor of Esfāhān, this unwillingness is apparent. Hāji Āqā Moḥammad was a goldsmith (Zargar) in Esfāhān, who helped the vakil in his struggle against the rivals, by lending him 300 Tomāns in cash.<sup>3</sup> After the vakil had established himself in power, he appointed the above mentioned artisan to the governorship of Esfāhān. The governor, being an ignorant, uneducated man, had no regard for art, culture, or even indus-

1. IaIa, Vol.II, p.41. During the Safavid era, it seems that the beglarbegis had the power to dismiss and replace the Ḥākems independently of the central government (Rohrborn, K.M. Provinzen und Zentralgewalt Persiens. Tr. K. Djahandari, Tehran, 1978, pp.36-8).

2. G.M., p.283. Hedāyat Khān is a good example of the case.

3. Fava'ed al-Şafavieh, p.129.



try. He uniformly harassed the learned men, as well as the artisans and traders. His avarice was such that a number of men of literary distinction, together with the artisans and merchants went to Shirāz to complain to the Vakil. The Vakil was not able to forget the aid, which the governor had offered him at a critical time, and turned a deaf ear to the representations of the Esfāhāni delegation.<sup>1</sup> The citizens of Esfāhān, unable to challenge the power of the Vakil, endured the calamity with patience. Once Karim Khān was dead, they staged a fierce revolt against the governor, in which almost all classes of the populace were involved. They forced the governor to retire to the citadel of Tabrak and, for about fifteen days, the city was in turmoil.<sup>2</sup> Ḥāji Āqā Moḥammad, as might have been expected, was not tolerated by Āli Morād Khān, who dismissed him with much indignity. He was, however, restored to favour, but the old and frail Ḥāji requested to be permitted to retire to Ātabat. The extent of his wealth, as listed in Golshan-e-Morād, appears to be incredible. He bequeathed his vast property, consisting of houses, baths, gardens and other landed property, to religious institutions and made Āqā Moḥammad Rafi<sup>c</sup> Bidābādi his Motevali and Vasi (executor).<sup>3</sup> Gratitude appears to have been partly the reason why the Vakil did not take measures against Ḥāji Āqā Moḥammad, as in the case of another Ḥākem, that is, Taqi Khān Yazdi, the Vakil was prompt in dismissing him. The above mentioned, was governor before Karim Khān gained supreme power, and, in the contest between Āzād Khān and Moḥammad Ḥasan Khān Qājār against Karim Khān, Taqi Khān had been playing a double game, by shifting his allegiance to one against the other. Karim Khān, on his expedition to Tehran in 1172/1758, stopped in Yazd in order to punish the cunning governor. Thus, he was seized and imprisoned, and his wealth, amounting to 12,000 Tomāns, was confiscated. He

1. IaIa, Vol.II, p.271.

2. G.G., pp.222-3.

3. G.M., p.319.

was taken to Shirāz, but later was reinstated in his office. Taqi Khān, however, despite his outward religiosity, was dishonest and oppressive. The inhabitants of Yazd complained to the Vakil and he summoned Taqi Khān to Shirāz with his complainants. In Shirāz, the case was referred to the Shar<sup>C</sup>Court; the inhabitants claimed that he had extorted 40,000 Tomāns from them. They could only prove with evidence, 15,000 of that amount. The governor was forced to pay the amount and was also compelled to swear to God 8,000 times, that he was innocent of the remainder. He was kept in Shāh Cherāq for three days and three nights, and instead of food or water, swore to God that the Yazdis' claims were not true.<sup>1</sup>

It is appropriate here to study the sources of income and the causes of the governor's extortions. As is indicated in Tārikh-e-Kermān, the governors were generally responsible for the collection of taxes and, after the deduction of their expenses, they would send the fixed government taxes to the capital. Thus, a governor had a free hand to collect extortionate taxes from the inhabitants of his principality, whereas he never paid more than the tax already fixed on that province. Except for the occasional present (pishkesh) at the new year festival, he pocketed the rest. It was not uncommon for a local governor to refuse payment of his taxes to the central government, especially when there were various competitors involved, in which case, he could easily get away with that. Taqi Khān Yazdi held the office of governor of Yazd for nearly forty years and, many times, abstained from payment of taxes. He even defeated Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, who took his army against him.<sup>2</sup>

Often the governors and the beglarbegis had the audacity to make their own choice between the competitors for supreme power and, always, their choice was to serve their own inter-

1. G.G., pp.75-7.

2. Ibid., pp.301-2.

ests. It was not, however, uncommon for them to make a wrong choice and to find a powerful master too difficult to handle, in which case they often had to renege on their choice. This was not easy to do in some instances, as the Shaikh of Bush-ehr, after the coup against Lotf<sup>C</sup> Ali Khān, was not too pleased about the pressure exerted on him by Āqā Moḥammad Khān to proclaim his submission. He had, however, no choice except to concede.<sup>1</sup>

The governors and the beglarbegis were responsible for the payment of the troops garrisoned in their principality, and this furnished them with another source of income. Najaf Qoli Khān Donboli had 700 riflemen (Jazāyerchi) guarding his residence, plus a body of infantry.<sup>2</sup> Often the governors did not pay the army over a long period of time. Seid Morād Khān, the beglar-begi of Shirāz, did not pay the troops stationed there for three years and pocketed their salary.<sup>3</sup> At any rate, not all the cities had a garrison with a standing army. The town of Yazd did not have a garrison. Thus, the governor had to ask for assistance from neighbouring tribal chiefs, or else recruit troops from the unwarlike citizens, when the situation arose.<sup>4</sup> On at least two occasions, he recruited an army of the weavers and confectioners of Yazd. The result may easily be predicted. They fled at the first encounter with the enemy.<sup>5</sup>

When a tribal chief was the governor of a city or a province, he often dispensed with a standing army, as his followers looked to him as their leader and served him, when required. It was not uncommon for a nontribal governor to command fealty of tribal warriors, due to religious conviction. Seyed Abol

1. I.O.R. P/E/V.5, Bushire, 27th July, 1792.

2. Tāḥa, Vol. II, p. 220.

3. R.M.M., pp. 88-9.

4. G.G., p. 301. I.K., p. 326. G.M., p. 293.

5. I.K., p. 351.

Hasan Kohaki, the governor of Kermān and the leader of the Ḥasma<sup>C</sup> ili community, was worshipped by his followers and the ḤAtāollāhi warriors were so devoted to him, as to fight for his cause with zeal.<sup>1</sup>

### Kalāntar:

The position of Kalāntar deserves particular notice, as for the greater part of the Zand's rule, the capital was virtually administered by the kalāntar and the office gained exceptional prominence. We will, therefore, study the career of the two men who held this office in the capital. Mirzā Moḥammad, the first kalantar of Shirāz during the Vakil's rule, and Ḥāji Ebrāhim, the kalāntar of Shirāz in the reign of the last Zand, Lotf<sup>C</sup> Ali Khān.

Mirzā Moḥammad became the kalāntar, when his uncle, Mirzā Moḥammad Ḥosein Sharifi, died in the month of Safar 1160/1747, while Karim Khān was still busy establishing his power in the empire. For a few years, Mirzā Moḥammad, had to accompany him on his expeditions. He was on many occasions accused of plotting against the Zand rule and, each time, the Vakil ignored the accusations and retained him as his kalāntar. Although in some instances the Vakil was suspicious of his activities, he never carried it so far as to harm him. The kalāntar was so confident of the Vakil's support, that he even ventured to disagree with and antagonise Ṣādeq Khān, during his term of office as the beglarbegi of Fārs.<sup>2</sup>

Mirzā Moḥammad, a man of integrity and upright character, could not comply with the excessive demands of Ṣādeq Khān, the beglarbegi, who began to extort money from the inhabitants of Shirāz. He, therefore, stayed at home in protest, while

1. I.K., p.342.

2. R.M.M., pp.56-7.

Šādeq Khān was in office. The Vakil was informed of the discord and was very annoyed. After a few months, the Vakil sent Mirzā Moḥammad a robe of honour, with decrees declaring the kalāntar independent in his office and messages of abuse to his brother, Šādeq Khān. The dispute did not end here, and the kalāntar was harassed incessantly by the beglarbegi, who forbade people from associating with him. the quarrel was prolonged for a few months; the kalāntar became unable to function, left the city, and joined the camp of the Vakil in Tehran. Karim Khān sent him back to resume his duties and, this time, the beglarbegi changed his attitude and treated him with consideration and respect. On Karim Khān's return to his capital, Mirzā Moḥammad, depressed by his deafness, requested to be relieved of his charge and to be allowed to retire to the holy shrines of Ottoman Turkey. He bequeathed his vast property to the vakil, but the latter did not yield to his request and ordered him to remain in his office.<sup>1</sup>

Mirzā Moḥammad's zeal in defending the rights of his fellow Fārsis gave a good pretext to his enemies to poison the mind of the Vakil against him. Thus, the Vakil took him along on his second expedition to Āzarbāyjān. On at least two occasions, he nearly lost his life, as he had interceded on behalf of the Fārsis and the Vakil, incensed by his partiality towards his fellow Fārsis, accused him of taking the side of whoever was opposed to his rule.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, many of those who were protected by the kalāntar did not command his approval by their conduct. Although the Vakil's resentment at the excessive zeal of Mirzā Moḥammad remained all through his reign, he placed great trust in the kalāntar and charged him with duties far beyond the official functions of a mere kalāntar. Mirzā Moḥammad collected taxes, recruited troops, entertained foreign ambas-

1. R.M.M., pp.57-9.

2. Ibid., pp.59-61, 62.

sadors<sup>1</sup> and, in short, his office overshadowed that of the minister's.

The reason for his unusual power and influence may be found in Mirzā Moḥammad's three major attributes. First, he belonged to a respected family, whose ancestors were ranked amongst the notables of Shirāz. Secondly, he was an honest and trustworthy man and this he had proved to the vakil. Thirdly, he was competent and this gave him enormous pride and prevented him from abuse of power or intrigues. Mirzā Moḥammad's free hand in matters of administration was precisely what Hāji Ebrāhim wished to exercise and his level of power was that to which the Hāji also aspired. But lacking the above-mentioned attributes, Hāji Ebrāhim never achieved the degree of prominence enjoyed by his predecessor. This led him to intrigues and conspiracy and resulted in the downfall of the Zands.

Hāji Ebrāhim started off as a Pākār<sup>2</sup> in a Haydari quarter of Shirāz.<sup>3</sup> His father, Hāji Hāshem, was a trader and never went beyond the rank of a kadkhodā of the Haydari quarters in the city. His ancestors were known to have been Jews, who converted to Islam.<sup>4</sup> Hāji Hāshem was deprived of his eyesight by order of Nāder Shāh for some irregularity in his accounts (1160/1747).<sup>5</sup> He died shortly afterwards. When Sādeq Khān became the beglarbegi of Fārs, he elevated Hāji Ebrāhim to the rank of kadkhodā of Haydari Khāneh<sup>6</sup> and this set him on the road to his subsequent career as the kalāntar of Shirāz and the prime minister to the Qājārs.

1. R.M.M., p.65.

2. Pākār has been variously given as a menial tax-gatherer, or a menial servant of the government. Dehkhodā, <sup>c</sup>A.A, Loqhat Nāmeḥ, p.58.

3. G.G., p.339.

4. Ibid.

5. F.N., p.190.

6. G.G., p.339.

When Mirzā Moḥammad was taken to Esfāhān against his will by ʿAlī Morād Khān and, thus, deprived of his position, he entered the service of Divānkhāneh as a Mostoufi. Ḥāji Ebrāhim was one of his Moharrers (clerks). He, thus, learnt about the workings of government<sup>1</sup> and gained the confidence of Mirzā Moḥammad. He also established links with the notables of Fārs, such as Mirzā Jāni and ʿAlī Qoli Khān Kāzeruni.

Unlike Mirzā Moḥammad, Ḥāji Ebrāhim was dishonest and avaricious, and gained much of his wealth through dishonest transactions. Francklin, in 1786-87, states that the Kalāntar of Shirāz, who was also in charge of the custom house (Gomrok), extorted money from the merchants and they complained about him bitterly.<sup>2</sup> This wealth was later utilised in promoting his personal ambitions.

After the death of ʿAlī Morād Khān and the accession of Jaʿfar Khān, the latter returned to Shirāz as his seat of government. Mirzā Moḥammad, who was totally disgusted with the proceedings of the Zands, refused to accompany him and remained in Esfāhān. Ḥāji Ebrāhim was among those, who urged the kalāntar to return to Shirāz and resume his duties, but his efforts failed.<sup>3</sup> Thus, Jaʿfar Khān dispensed with a kalāntar for a while, probably in the hope that Mirzā Moḥammad would come back, but he was disappointed. Āqā Moḥammad Khān refused to give permission to the Mirzā to leave his camp. Mirzā Moḥammad died in Esfāhān in 1202<sup>4</sup> and it was then, that Jaʿfar Khān appointed Ḥāji Ebrāhim as the kalāntar of Shirāz.

While Jaʿfar Khān was alive, his minister, Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein, was entrusted with great power. He managed the civil

1. G.G., p.342.

2. OMTS, pp.149-50.

3. R.M.M., pp.90-1.

4. F.N., Part II, p.48.

administration, paid the army and acted as Mehmāndār to the king. The official decrees written by the king were also accompanied by letters from the minister. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān was, however, murdered in 1201/1789, by the notables he had imprisoned and a modern source suggests that Hājī Ebrāhīm assisted Seid Morād Khān, the chief assassin to usurp the throne and ruled in his name.<sup>1</sup> This is not indicated in contemporary sources, but one cannot rule out the possibility of this event, as he did not oppose the usurpation and, furthermore, the Hājī's associates in the later episode of the coup against Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, were exactly those, who had survived punishment for the assassination of the late Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān. The alleged discontent of Hājī had been occasioned by the punishment of an accomplice in the assassination, Mirzā Mehdi, by Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān.<sup>2</sup>

Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, with the assistance of the influential notables, primarily Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein, managed to topple the usurper, Seid Morād Khān, and assumed the reins in his hand. Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein still played a major role in the politics of the Zand realm. It was when he left Shirāz on a pilgrimage to Mecca, that the Hājī was offered a chance of direct intervention in the affairs of state. The return of the Minister removed the Hājī from the mainstream and relegated him to the background. He had, however, been able to establish links with the classes capable of exercising power in times of emergency, namely, the tribes and the notables. As kalāntar, he had the shopkeepers and middle classes under his sway, but it appears that it was at this stage that he made contacts with the local magnates, such as the Shaikh of Bushehr, and the chiefs of the Nānkoli and Māfi tribes.

1. I.Z., p.253.

2. H.P., Vol.II, p.181.



Dārughe:

Among the local officials, the position of Dārughe deserves particular notice. Although he was appointed by the government, he is not mentioned by Rostam among seven officials appointed by the vakil. He appears to have been chosen from the lower rank of the inhabitants. His appointment was based on his ability to handle the tough job of the chief of police. Mirzā Moḥammad Kalāntar's account of numerous Dārughes, who filled the position before the reign of the Vakil, certainly supports the assumption that they often set about harassing and mulcting people, instead of protecting their property and lives. Mirzā Moḥammad uniformly calls them Alvat and Arāzel, which substantiates the assumption.<sup>1</sup> The duties and proceedings of the Dārughe are given in Tazkerat al-Moluk and the reader is referred to that source.<sup>2</sup> It is noteworthy that the office was subject to scrutiny by higher authorities and, whenever a weak governor and kalantar was in charge, the Dārughe had a free had to exercise excesses.<sup>3</sup>

Karim Khān had taken care to appoint honest and virtuous men as the Dārughe in his capital and other major cities. Francklin assures us that during the whole reign of the Vakil, there was not one riot in the city of Shirāz which produced bloodshed,<sup>4</sup> whereas the same source asserts that, in the reign of Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān, civil riots were common and even small boys were fond of running to them to have a share in the fighting.<sup>5</sup> By the early 19th century, the office had been further degraded, since the Dārughe of Shirāz in 1802 was in the habit of taking bribes and the shopkeepers had to furnish him with whatever

1. R.M.M., pp.27, 42.

2. Tazkerat al-Moluk, p.90. It appears that in the Safavid time, the lesser Ḥākems were called Dārughe. These were appointed by beglarbegi (Rohrborn, K.M., Provinzen und Zentralgewalt Persien, p.38).

3. R.M.M., pp.41-2.

4. O.M.T., p.122.

5. Ibid.

he needed so as to secure his favour and protection.<sup>1</sup>

The Dārughe has a large establishment under his supervision. There were riflemen (Tofangchi) and Tābin, who acted as night guards and policemen to maintain peace and order in the city. He also had a body of horsemen, who would ride through the city to perform their duties day and night. The shopkeepers paid a small amount for the upkeep of the establishment.<sup>2</sup> Again, in the early 19th century, we learn that the Mir Shab, the head of the night guards was in league with the burglars and made sure that crime was outside the area under his protection, but should anyone steal anything within his jurisdiction, he knew where to look for them.<sup>3</sup> If the Dārughe recovered a criminal, the shopkeepers had to pay a nominal sum for his services. But should he fail to recover the lost property, he was entitled to pay the value of the lost property.<sup>4</sup>

In the period under study, the Dārughe was responsible for the prevention of crimes and violations of the law, and for the maintenance of public morale. He appears to have been charged with the task of preventing prostitution, although he did not attempt to stop the practice of fornication, which was accepted and widespread. Indeed, the Dārughe had the right to fine people who frequented brothels. At least in 1802, we have evidence of the Dārughe exercising his power to fine an Armenian for this offence.<sup>5</sup>

It appears that the Ordu Bāzār had a Dārughe, who supervised the activities of the traders who accompanied the army,<sup>6</sup> but

1. I.S., p.68-70.

2. Ibid. The sum was about two or three pence a month.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. R.M.M., p. 19.

whether he had the same power to inflict punishment on the culprits or not, is not known.

The Dārūghe acted as the judge for minor offences, such as theft, violation of the peace, drinking alcoholic beverages and so on; thus his sphere of influence was further extended.<sup>1</sup> He could give the verdict on the offence and carry out the punishment on the spot.<sup>2</sup> Often the culprits resorted to bribery and, thus, escaped their punishment. It appears that the fines, which the Dārūghe and his men recovered from offenders, were given direct to him and he could pocket the money, as his legal income. It appears that, if anyone was not satisfied with the verdict of the Dārūghe, he could apply to the Qāzi of Shar<sup>c</sup>, who was generally a mollā. But often the application to the Shar<sup>c</sup> court proved expensive and lengthy and, as asserted by Harford Jones, futile unless the offender had a supporter in high places, who could promote his claims.<sup>3</sup>

### The Merchants:

In the early 19th century, Malcolm found the merchants a numerous and affluent class.<sup>4</sup> These were for the most part the survivors of the Zand era. Harford Jones met all his old merchant friends in Bushehr in 1807.<sup>5</sup> Although they had no organised corporations, such as guilds, they had close ties with one another; they gathered in an assembly to discuss their problems and jealously guarded their interests. They appointed their own clerks to attend to their financial transactions. The better classes of merchants had a room in the main caravansarai,<sup>6</sup> which generally belonged to the monarch. In Shirāz, the

1. Kinnier, J.H., Geographical, p.31.

2. I.S., p p.67-70.

3. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.I, p.408.

4. H.P., Vol.II, p.582.

5. I.S., p.51. Brydges, op. cit., p.428.

6. I.S., p.51. D.K., preliminary matters, p.429.

best caravansarai belonged to the vakil and his successors.<sup>1</sup> There the merchants exhibited their merchandise, fixed the prices, made bargains and picked up news.<sup>2</sup> They spent most of their time there, whereas the poorer merchants actually resided in a caravansarai, for at least the duration of their residence in a town. They paid a sum of money for the rent of the room to the government, but they were not taxed on it.<sup>3</sup>

The only contribution, which was officially fixed for the merchants, was the Rāhdāri (toll tax); that is, any merchandise, which landed on the Gulf coast or, indeed, on the northern shores and was conveyed to the inner parts of the empire, was liable to a nominal sum, according to the load of merchandise and not the value. There were about nine toll taxes from Bush-ehr to Shirāz and, at every station, the caravans were stopped and taxed. Waring, in 1802, asserts that, although the amount of rāhdāri was trifling, the merchants, who wished to convey their goods to the northern parts of the kingdom, often paid as much as 30 percent rāhdāri<sup>4</sup> and this discouraged them from nationwide trade.

The goods entering and departing from the cities were also liable to custom duties (Gomrok); Francklin asserts that in Shirāz the kalāntar, or an officer of his establishment, was present at all times in the custom house, which was

"an apartment in the grand caravanserai, where himself or his assistant resides, who is called the GoomRook (sic), or custom master, and is always present on the arrival of the caravan. All goods are opened here, even to the meanest article, and

1. I.S., p.51. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.I, p.428.

2. I.S., p.51. D.K., preliminary matters, p.429.

3. H.P., Vol.II, pp.476-7.

4. I.S., pp.79-80.

"a duty is exacted upon everything foreign."<sup>1</sup>

The merchants, who traded in home produce, were exempt from payment of this tax. It is, however, curious that when Harford Jones was leaving Shirāz, together with a merchant from Bushehr, the Rāhdārs attempted to search his merchandise, despite his having obtained a passport from Hāji Ebrāhim, which was meant to exempt him from such procedures. But as the markets of the empire were opening to European commodities, there were few merchants, who were strictly limited to internal trade.

Those merchants, who engaged in external trade, often travelled to the countries, with which they had commercial dealings. Many had agents in those countries to transact their business for them.<sup>2</sup> In general, the merchants were intelligent, speculative and enterprising, and the majority of them were educated.<sup>3</sup> A typical merchant of the 18th and 19th century was Mirzā Nābi. He was the son of a bankrupt merchant of Bushehr. He started his career as a Mirzā (secretary) to Harford Jones. With the little salary that he earned, he supported his mother and his infant brothers and sisters. He, however, through his intelligence and amiable character, soon gained the favour and respect of the EIC agents in Baṣra. He soon became the agent of his brother-in-law, Hāji Khalil, a rich merchant of Bushehr. He thus gathered a small capital sum, with which he started his own business. In 1791 he had become so wealthy that he involved in a joint enterprise with the residents of the EIC and the Portuguese merchants.<sup>4</sup> He was, however, ruined when he attempted to utilize his wealth to gain social status and acceptance by the establishment.

1. O.M.I., pp.149-50.

2. I.S., p.77.

3. H.P., Vol.II, p.582.

4. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Transaction of His Majesty's Mission to Persia (London 1834), Vol.I, p.34.

The merchants, despite their nominal contribution to the treasury, were often mulcted and denuded of their wealth by the government, especially in times of general unrest. But the Zands generally cherished and protected the merchants and only <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān is known to have extorted money from the inhabitants of Shirāz and Esfāhān, mainly from the artisans and merchants.<sup>1</sup> Even he, however, was anxious to revive trade and encourage the merchants to carry on their traffic. The competition of various contenders for power, however, made the roads impassible and the traffic of merchandise hazardous. Thus, very few merchants ventured to risk and convey their goods to distant areas.

Merchants were subject to confiscation of their wealth by rulers and/or contenders for power. Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, on his arrival in the city of Gavāshir, confiscated the immense wealth of Āqā <sup>C</sup>Ali Kermāni, who had supported the Qājārs and had advised the governor of Kermān to deny entry to the Zand prince. He was, however, given back his effects, when Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was captured by the Qājārs.<sup>2</sup>

The existence of tribal settlements along the transit routes made the transportation of goods even more unsafe. Nomads often resorted to plundering the caravans passing through their area. Even Sir John Malcolm's retinue was plundered in Kurdistan and, with great effort, he managed to recover the stolen goods.<sup>3</sup>

Despite all these hazards, which were involved in trade, it was the merchants who were the least affected by civil unrest. Sir John Malcolm observes that generally the merchants were the most prosperous classes.<sup>4</sup> The evidence for this, as we

1. R.I., p.437. R.M.M., p.79.

2. I.K., pp.366-7.

3. Sketches of Persia, Vol.II, pp.268-71.

4. H.P., Vol.II, p.430.

have mentioned before, is that the merchants of the southern coast in the 19th century were almost all the survivors of the Zand era. Their ability to adapt to different situations, and the flexibility of their trading patterns, made them able to cope with the difficulties involved in their commercial activities. Waring, in 1802, affirms that many of the merchants had changed their line of business and had resorted to the ship-building industry, which they hired out to navigators.<sup>1</sup> They carefully avoided exciting the jealousy of the government officials and their fellow merchants. They hardly ever contested the power of the government and, if they did, it was in support of another feudal warlord, as in the case of Āqā ʿAli Kermāni. He opposed the Zands, but as a result of his attachment to the Qājārs. Although when government oppression went beyond a tolerable level, merchants were prepared to take to armed struggle. During the reign of Nāder Shāh, two merchants by the name of Ḥāji Šafar Qoli and Ḥāji Kousār in Hezār Jarib of Māz-daran, led a strong rebellion. They even attacked the army sent to quell the revolt, and in a fierce battle were defeated. The 6,000 rebels were mostly killed and the merchants were captured. This, however, was uncommon in the Zand era.<sup>2</sup>

Merchants often lived frugally, despite their enormous wealth. In 1791, Sir Harford Jones noticed that a wealthy jeweller of Lotf ʿAli Khān's drank his coffee in an ordinary cup and smoked a clay Qalyān, whereas he entertained his guest with a golden cup and a Qalyān mounted with jewels. Their houses were often large and luxurious, but nothing of that affluence could be detected from the exterior, as they carefully hid their wealth behind a plain and somewhat mean frontage.<sup>3</sup> They kept good relations with the government, in order to escape harassment. Ḥāji Ebrāhim Bushehri, the mehmandar to Harford Jones,

1. I.S., pp.77-8.

2. Mohammad Kāzem, ʿĀlam ʿĀrāye Nāderi, Vol.III, p.73.

3. D.K., preliminary matters, pp.cxxxiii-iv.

visited Hāji Ebrāhim Kalāntar to obtain a passport for his journey, despite his great dislike for that man.<sup>1</sup>

Buckingham, in the early 19th century, relates an interesting instance of the fears and also the risk, which the merchants were compelled to take in order to protect their goods.

"During our stay here (Bushehr) the governor was engaged in a war with some villages on the plain behind the town and was much in want of lead for musket balls; this want instead of increasing the demand for, and consequently the price of the article as it would naturally have done under any well regulated government, had actually the effect of stopping the supplies of this metal which was laid in expressly for the place. A vessel laying in the roads had on board hundred slabs of lead, supplied at Bombay for Bushire, but the owner of them fearing that if they were landed the government's agents would seize it for their master's use on the condition of long payment described, requested the captain not to land it here and paid additional freight to carry it to Bossorah where the uncertain market was better than the ruinous one here."<sup>2</sup>

Government oppression was not the only malady inflicting trade and the merchants. The outbreak of epidemics often prevented the caravans from travelling to and from the affected areas. In Tazkerreh Shushtar, we learn that, on the eruption of cholera in Baṣra, all the caravans of merchandise were refused admission to the town of Shushtar and kept outside the walls for a long period, until the danger of the disease spreading in Shushtar was completely removed.<sup>3</sup> In 1798, almost all the merchants in Baṣra had fled on account of the plague. This greatly hampered trade and sometimes ruined the merchants.

1. D.K., preliminary matters, pp.cxxxiii-iv.

2. Buckingham, Travels in Assyria, Vol.II, p118 The Shaikh took the merchandise he liked and paid for them in lieu of tax and custom.

3. Tazkerreh Shushtar, Msc., Edinburgh, n.p.



The merchants, being affluent and prosperous, had obligations towards their fellow citizens. They were expected to carry out construction schemes and contribute to the upkeep of religious establishments. Maftun refers to a merchant in Esfāhān, whose capital exceeded 100,000 Tomāns. Being a miser, however, he stayed aloof from his co-religionists and associated with the Jews and the Zoroastrians.<sup>1</sup> These expectations of the public were added to the demands for contribution of the government for major construction plans such as dams, mosques, etc. Many of the merchants, however, employed their wealth in these pursuits voluntarily. Hāji Āqā Moḥammad Renāni, the governor of Esfāhān and also a merchant, built many buildings of public utility in Esfāhān, such as Caravanserais, Baths and Bazaars.<sup>2</sup>

The richest merchants ranked among the higher strata of the society. Thus, they associated with the top-ranking officials and even the royal family. Often they established close links with high society by way of marriages. Karim Khān married the daughter of a rich merchant of Esfāhān. These links were beneficial to their trade and protected them from the oppression of the government. On the other hand, the government looked to the merchants for economic support in times of war. Top-ranking officials sought the merchants' company and entertained them in their houses. Harford Jones found the merchants entertained by Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein, the prime minister of Lotf Ali Khān, more pleasant than any other class present at his banquets.<sup>3</sup>

Here we will study the reasons why Persian merchants never reached the point of becoming capitalists in the Western sense of the word. Despite their wealth and power to do so, they never attempted to change the existing relations of production.

1. Negārestan-e-Dara, p.163.

2. G.M., p.319.

3. D.K., preliminary matters, p.cxlviii. H.P., Vol.II, p.583.

As we will study later, the artisans were totally dependent on the merchant to circulate their goods. Thus the merchants were able to bring the artisan under their direct control. By this measure, they could gain control of their production and the market, thus increasing their economic power. They would, therefore, be in a position to compete successfully with the foreign economic threat, which by the late 18th century, had become acute. This would have brought about a change, which occurred in Western Europe. In the interpretation put forward by Maurice Dobb in order to explain how the bourgeois revolution happened, there are two ways in which merchants may become industrial capitalists. The first is that the producer, i.e. the artisan, becomes the merchant; this is a really revolutionary way. Alternatively, the merchant gets possession of the direct means of production. This way serves historically as a mode of transition, an instance of which can be found in 17th century England, where the clothier brings the weaver under the former's control. The clothier sells wool to the weaver and buys the weaver's products from him.<sup>1</sup> This method, although it was unable to overthrow the old mode of production, enabled the clothier to manipulate the existing system to his advantage. This system, in comparison to the first way, in which the artisan becomes a capitalist, is only a half way transformation of feudalism. If the artisans were to become capitalists, they would come into conflict with the class of merchants. The interpretation by Dobb is primarily aimed at identifying the revolutionary way in which the small producer, e.g. artisans practising outside the guild system in the precinct of the towns during the Tudor era, become capitalists. The beginning of the 17th century witnessed the advent of

"an important shift in the centre of gravity: the rising predominance of a class of merchants-employers from the ranks of the craftsmen."<sup>2</sup>

1. Dobb, Maurice, Studies in the Development of Capitalism (London, 1946), p.130.

2. Marx, K. Capital, Vol.III, p.393.

In applying these two patterns to the merchant class of late 18th and early 19th century Persia, we find that, despite what we have stated before: that is, the ability of the merchant to control the artisans and the market, they failed to speculate on this direct control; instead they were absorbed more and more in the sale of foreign goods, which were brought into the market in great amounts. Thus, we can state that none of the patterns of development discussed by Dobb actually took place in Persia. Furthermore, the merchants, instead of mobilising their capital in the attainment of political power and bringing about a change in the mode of production, allied themselves to the semi-feudal ruling families and even attempted to become part of the establishment.<sup>1</sup> There is no evidence of the revolutionary way having been realized either: that is, a craftsman becoming a merchant and, thus, competing with the merchant, who did not control production in a direct manner. The case of Hāji Āqā Moḥammad Renāni, the artisan of Esfāhān, who became a merchant, was an exception to the general rule.<sup>2</sup> Had the craftsmen attempted to take their products directly to the market, they would have overcome the lack of liquid capital, which was their initial disadvantage. Since the artisans were directly involved in the process of production, it was in their interest to reduce the cost of production by improving their techniques. They would, therefore, be in a position to pose a threat to the merchants, by competing with them for control of the market.<sup>3</sup> The artisans of Persia, who had not achieved this degree of awareness, continued to be dependent on the merchants for the circulation of their goods and, thus, had to appease the former class. A merchant's decision on the viability of a commodity, decided the fortune of the artisans: that is to say, when a merchant refused to buy and transport merchandise, the artisan was either forced to go bankrupt, or else

1. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.I, pp.34-5.

2. G.G., p.112.

3. Dobb, M., Studies in the Development of Capitalism, p.135.

limit his production according to the local market for his goods. That is why most of the artisans were part time cultivators and opened their shops a few days a week.<sup>1</sup> Their aim in engaging in other activities was to subsidize their income and avoid bankruptcy. Niebuhr, in the mid 18th century, remarks on the excellence of the glass manufactured in Shirāz,<sup>2</sup> but another European traveller, in the mid 19th century, asserts that the commodity had ceased to maintain its excellent quality.<sup>3</sup> This was due solely to the preference of the merchant for trading in European glass, and the artisans, unable to compete with the foreign product, had closed their workshops. There were other instances to prove this point: namely, the Shawl industry in Kermān did not flourish, because Indian shawls of better quality monopolised the market in the 19th century.

#### Shopkeepers:

These were commonly known as Ahl-e-Kasb, or Kasabeh. They sold foodstuffs, hardware, fuel, textiles and other commodities. They, like the artisans, had a shop in the Bazar, where they displayed their goods and sold them. They were also organised in guilds (Aṣṇāf) and had their own elders or naqib. The only difference between the artisans and the shopkeepers, as far as the guild system was concerned, was that they did not have the religious ceremony of initiation into the craft. As we will see in the section on the guilds, this ritual involved solemn commitment to the craft, and bound the mastercraftsmen to strict moral principles.<sup>4</sup> The guilds of the shopkeepers served only as a convenient means for the government to collect taxes and deal with the traders in a uniform body. They were also compelled to abide by the rules set by the government, in

1. Kuznetsova, Urban Industry, p.310.

2. Niebuhr, C., Travels, p.70.

3. Binning, Two years travels in Persia, Vol.I, p.288.

4. Massignon, "Guilds", Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, p.215.

respect to prices and the weight and quality of their goods.<sup>1</sup>

The organisation of the guilds of shopkeepers was much the same as the artisans. They had to pay a certain amount of tax every year, which was allocated at the beginning of each year. Their naqibs were directly responsible to the Kalāntar, who kept the document of tax allocation (Ṭumār) for the regular payment of their quota (Bonicheh).<sup>2</sup> The Kasabeh, like the artisans, were the clients of the major merchants (Sodāgar) and bought their goods through them, often on credit.<sup>3</sup> They paid an annual rent for their shops in the bazar, which generally belonged to the monarch or his relations.<sup>4</sup> In a document in existence, the rent of the Qaiṣarieh, or the textile bazar, in Shirāz is given as forty Tomāns.<sup>5</sup>

For foodstuffs, the cities had to rely heavily on the villages in the neighbouring districts. Because of inadequate means of transportation, provisions were seldom carried to and from distant provinces. Hence, there existed a close relationship between the town and the rural areas. The army was often provided with provisions from other provinces, while it was on the march. Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān, in his attack on the town of Yazd, ordered the governors of Kermān and the neighbouring districts to send provisions to his camp, fearing that the province of Fārs could not meet the heavy demand.<sup>6</sup>

The Kasabeh generally had wage labourers (Ajir, Ruzmozd) to work for them. They could dismiss them at pleasure and without previous notice. As they were not members of the guilds,

1. I.S., pp.67-8.

2. For the detailed proceedings of tax collection, the reader is referred to Tazkerat al-Moluk, which provides ample information on the subject. Tazkerat al-Moluk, pp.80-81.

3. Wills, C.J., The Land of the Lion and the Sun (London, 1883), p.189.

4. I.O.R., Private Correspondence of J. Malcolm, Notes for a memorandum on the revenues of Persia, 1810.

5. Majles Library, Tehran.

6. G.G., p.301.

they did not enjoy the security and protection offered to the Aṣṇāf. They were paid reasonably well, as is indicated by Ros-tam.<sup>1</sup> The general practice was to employ very young children, between the ages of twelve and fifteen,<sup>2</sup> for that purpose and often the Kaseb's own children worked in their shops. Ḥāji Ḥāshem, the father of Ḥāji Ebrāhim, was a petty trader (Baq-āl) in the Bazar and his son also started off in the Bazar. Incidentally, none of the Ḥāji's brothers were Bazaris; indeed two of them had entered the army and gained the rank of infantry commanders.<sup>3</sup> It was not uncommon for the sons of Kasebs to aspire to higher status in society. The sons of Ḥāji Moḥammad Ḥāli Ḥāllaf (forage chandler), after having gained great wealth through plundering JaḤfar Khān's treasures, entered the service of the Qājārs and became ministers and governors in the Qājār period.<sup>4</sup>

The shopkeepers, unlike the artisans, did not suffer the hardships and distress caused by the civil strife and sieges, or at least not those of them who dealt with foodstuffs. The vakil made it a rule to stock a great amount of provisions in the government granaries,<sup>5</sup> in order to prevent famine and shortage of food. This practice, however, fell into disuse and, as the kalāntar of Shirāz clearly indicates, during the siege of Shirāz by Ḥāli Morād Khān, only the shopkeepers provided the public with provisions.<sup>6</sup> This gave a good opportunity to the chandlers to hoard provisions and sell them at violent profit in times of war. Especially since price controls were not vigorously exercised, many of the shopkeepers could derive great benefit when a siege occurred. Indeed, the prices given by Mirzā

1. R.I., p.309. He gives their average pay as 300 Dinars, that is one third of a Toman.

2. Kuznetsova, Urban Industry, p.316.

3. G.M., p.261 & 345.

4. R.I., p.448.

5. Ibid., p.421.

6. R.M.M., pp.78-9.

Moḥammad, as compared to the fixed prices of the reign of the Vakil, are grossly exorbitant.<sup>1</sup> Although after five months of siege the shops were forced to close, one may assume that they had made great profits while they were open.

A class of Kasabeh were the pedlars (Dourehgard); these formed the link between the city and the neighbouring villages and hamlets. They often traded their goods in exchange for food-stuffs such as eggs, dairy products, fruits and vegetables. Their business was a lucrative one. Due to poor transportation, many villages were completely cut off from the towns<sup>2</sup> and only a few pedlars provided them with their necessities. The tribal areas were also under the sway of pedlars, who also traded in kind, rather than cash.

The pedlars, not having a fixed shop in the bazar, could follow their own fortunes. They often joined the army and sold their goods to the soldiers in the ordu Bazar.<sup>3</sup> These were often extensive and profitable, especially when there was scarcity of food and provisions in the camp. Furthermore, the pedlars could not be taxed, as they did not belong to the guilds and the government had no means of locating them. It is true that in a chaotic state of affairs they often ran the risk of being plundered in the ordu Bazar or, indeed, on the roads, but by not paying the rent on a fixed shop together with the tax exemption, they were compensated for the inconveniences involved in their trade.

During this period, there appears to have existed another class of traders: namely, the brokers (Dallāl). These were often engaged in the sale of art articles, antiques, manuscripts of great value, property and land. The landlord of Francklin was

1. R.M.M., p.79.

2. Kinnier, J.M., A Geographical Memoir on the Persian Empire (London, 1813), p.43.

3. R.M.M., p.60.

a Dallāl, who offered Harford Jones a good bargain of an old Qorān, known to have been written by one of the Emāms of the Shi<sup>C</sup>ite sect.<sup>1</sup> Brokers received a commission and often made enormous profit on the purchase of such items by the merchants. There is no evidence to prove that the brokers had fixed shops and paid tax to the government.

There is, however, mention of the pawnbrokers (Sēmsār) being respectable members of the community and that one of them even became a kadkhodā of the Haydari quarters in the city of Shirāz.<sup>2</sup> Mirzā Moḥammad Kalāntar, however, relates rather sarcastically that, during the reign of Nāder Shāh, even the Sēmsārs were listed among the A<sup>C</sup>yān va Tojjār to meet the demand for 375,000 Tomāns in emergency taxes.<sup>3</sup> It appears that Sēmsārs were Muslims and often affluent, despite the fact that it was contrary to, and in violation of, the laws of Islam, as it involved a form of usury. At least the Sēmsār Kadkhodā of Shirāz was a certain Ḥāji Hāshem.<sup>4</sup>

Incidentally, usury appears to have been practised in various forms by the Kasabeh. There were money lenders in the Bazar, who charged their clients exorbitant rates. Also the currency broker (Ṣarrāf), who deducted a commission for his services. The bills of exchange (Barāts) were another form of gaining easy profit,<sup>5</sup> and this was often carried out by the merchants. This was especially detrimental to merchants engaged in foreign trade; often the merchants shipped their goods without receiving full payment. Instead, they received a Barāt, to be remitted at a specified date in the future.<sup>6</sup> At times, when the creditor would not honour his debt, the merchant was com-

1. D.K., preliminary matters, p.clviii.

2. R.M.M., p.48.

3. Ibid., pp.22, 26.

4. I.O.R. G/29/21, Report on the Commerce of Persia, 1791.

5. Ibid. G/29/23, Bagdad, 20th Nov. 1800.

6. T.S., p.8.



pelled to sell the Barāt at a discount to a debt collector.

However, the area of the Bazar contained many other vendors of small items, such as religious trinkets, beads, prayer rugs, candles and other items of little value. These petty traders were generally stationed at the entrance of the Bazar and near to the great Mosque, which was situated next to the Bazar.<sup>1</sup> A crowd of porters carrying merchandise to and fro and messengers, refreshment sellers completed the picture in the Bazars.

### Artisans

As the heading indicates, these were two distinct groups with different characters and often conflicting interests. The artisans were commonly known as Pishehvar or Ahl-e-Herfat. They were highly skilled craftsmen, working to order from the customer. They often had a workshop in the main Bazar and made their products and sold them in the same place. They were free in that they worked for their own benefit and following their own initiatives. They were, however, organised in guilds (Aṣṅāf) and had to abide by the rules set by the guilds in respect to the price of their commodities, the quality of material and workmanship.<sup>2</sup> We will study the Aṣṅāf in detail later. Here we would like to mention that artisans normally started off as an apprentice in the workshop of their father, or of another artisan. After the completion of their training, they were initiated as mastercraftsmen into the guilds. Seldom, a craftsman ventured to change his profession, as it was considered a disrespect to the skill, which their fathers had practised.<sup>3</sup> Often the quarters of the Bazar were named after the artisans practising in them, such as Mesgarān, Kāsehgarān,<sup>4</sup> etc. They

1. I.O.R., G/29/23, Bagdad, 20th Nov. 1800.

2. I.M., pp.76-7.

3. Kuznetsova, Urban Industry, pp.315-16.

4. I.S., p.32. Kinnier, op. cit., p.62.

paid rent for their shops. Apparently, there were two kinds of rents collected from their shops: If the shop belonged to the Shāh, which was often the case, the rent was paid at a rate considered to be proportionate to the gains derived from the shops. If the shop belonged to an individual, the artisans and shopkeepers paid twenty percent of their annual profit.<sup>1</sup>

It is not known, whether there was a group of craftsmen working exclusively for the court at this period, as was the case in the Safavid times. There is, however, mention in a document belonging to the Vakil's time, of a farrier providing horse shoes for the court,<sup>2</sup> and also a jeweller, who worked exclusively for Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān.<sup>3</sup> The practice was that these craftsmen, known as Darbasteh, worked in the workshops belonging to the court and were provided with food, lodging and clothing.

Almost all the masters had apprentices, who entered their service about the age of twelve to fifteen. When they had completed their training, they were admitted to the relevant Şenf, with a ceremony which has been thoroughly investigated by Massignon.<sup>4</sup> The mastercraftsmen or Ostādān had a Naqib, who supervised their activities and their morals. Disputes arising between the ostādān were always taken to the naqib, who adjudicated and carried out the penalty on the spot. The Aşnāf did not have a naqib at all times. In fact, the only mention of the ostādān-e-Bazar in the Ruznameh of Mirzā Moḥammad, bears evidence to the fact that, during the interregnum after the assassination of Nāder Shāh, the mastercraftsmen took matters into their own hands. It could, however, have been the case only in Shirāz, as the information on this matter is insufficient. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile mentioning an instance, in which

1. H.P., Vol.II, p.477.

2. Majles Library, Tehran.

3. D.K., preliminary matters, p.cxxvi.

4. Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, pp.214-16. See under Shadd, Encyclopedia of Islam. Vol.S-Z, p.245.

a dispute had arisen between the kalāntar and the ostādān-e-Bazar. Apparently, <sup>C</sup>Ali Mardān Khān Bakhtiāri, after having captured Shirāz, had set about extorting money from the inhabitants. Mirzā Moḥammad, acting on behalf of his uncle, then the kalāntar, unable to meet the demands had collected the sum of 750 Tomāns from the craftsmen of the Bazar, which he had paid to the latter chief. In the meantime, Mirzā Moḥammad Hoṣein, the kalāntar, had resigned as a protest at the extortions of the Bakhtiāris, and the Dārughe of the city had taken his place. <sup>C</sup>Ali Mardān Khān left Shirāz, after having inflicted enormous damage on its inhabitants. It was then that the ostādān-e-Bazar demanded their money back. They had allied themselves to the dārughe and the governor, and had coerced Mirzā Moḥammad into restoring the sum in question. Mirzā Moḥammad believed that the money was demanded of the inhabitants and not of his uncle, and that the above-mentioned officials had a hand in the dispute, aiming at disgracing Mirzā Moḥammad and his uncle, Mirzā Moḥammad Hoṣein.<sup>1</sup> Whether the allegation was true or not we cannot decide. Nevertheless, it is the only instance in which the ostādān acted independently and without the medium of their head, the naqib.

Karim Khān appointed a naqib for all the cities. Such officers were paid by the government.<sup>2</sup> The kalāntar was directly responsible for the payment of Bonicheh (quota) of the artisans, which was fixed at the beginning of each year. The Vakil was inclined to control the prices of the commodities and every year pricelists were prepared and acted upon.<sup>3</sup> The ostādān could not exceed the prices fixed by the government, or violate the standard weight, and should anyone risk such offences, he would be severely punished.<sup>4</sup>

1. R.M.M., pp.44-46.

2. R.I., p.307.

3. Ibid., p.310.

4. I.S., p.69.

The artisans were the clients of the merchants, in that they supplied the latter with their products and the merchants transported them to other provinces and abroad to neighbouring countries.<sup>1</sup> Thus, they were anxious to keep their good relations with the merchants and had a vested interest in maintaining law and order in their immediate surroundings, as well as the kingdom in general. That is why, in times of unrest, the artisans formed the core of the city militia and defended the rights and honour of their fellow citizens. During the contest between the Afshār successors of Nāder Shāh, Ebrāhim Mirzā appointed a certain Mehdi Khān as governor of Tabriz. He set about oppressing the inhabitants and they, unable to tolerate his cruelty, decided to assassinate him. A few of the Lutis attacked his residence and killed him. His brother, who was the governor of Orumieh, brought his army to Tabriz in order to subdue the populace. The inhabitants asked for assistance from the neighbouring chiefs and, with 6,000 artisans (Ahl-e-herfat) and some peasants, prepared to repel the enemy. The chiefs of the local principalities fled at the first encounter and the infantry of artisans were completely massacred; about 5,000 of them lost their lives.<sup>2</sup>

The artisans, motivated by self-interest, were often divided in their support for a party or its adversary, as they deemed expedient. When Taqi Khān Dorrāni, a charcoal seller, staged a rebellion and captured the city of Kermān, he totally relied on the skill of two artisans, who provided him with guns and ammunitions. Qoli Tafangsāz (Gunsmith) made guns with such high power velocity, that Taqi Khān shot the Zand general, sent to besiege the city, at a distance of 1500 feet. Mollā Qoli Bārūḡkub (Gunpowder miller), also provided him with the best gunpowder. Both craftsmen were handsomely rewarded. On the other hand, the weaver population of the city, whose interest was to

1. Floor, W., "The Merchant (Tujjār) in Qajar Iran", ZDMG.126.1976, p.119.

2. IaIa, pp.490-93.

see the roads safe and trade undisturbed, conspired to admit the Zand army into the city. Thus, Jamal Shālbāf, their elder, with the assistance of other Kasabeh, betrayed one of the gates to the Zands and Taqi Khān was captured and sent to Shirāz.<sup>1</sup>

In times of general unrest, when the oppression of the government was beyond tolerance, the artisans closed their shops and even emigrated to other areas. For instance, when Ebrāhim Mirzā Afshār captured Āzarbāyjān, many of the artisans left the province and sought refuge in other quarters.<sup>2</sup> <sup>C</sup>Ali Mardān Khān Bakhtiāri's cruelty also forced the artisans of Shirāz to leave the city with their families.<sup>3</sup>

The artisan traders formed a large proportion of the urban population in big cities. In small industrial towns, such as Yazd and Kāshān, they constituted a majority. Hence, they bore the brunt of heavy taxes in times of civil war and internal unrest. All the European sources assert that the fixed taxes or Bonicheh of the artisans were light and by no means excessive, during the life time of the Vakil. The situation, however, changed drastically after his death. Many of the Zand territories constantly changed hands between the various competitors. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān gained possession of Esfāhān three times and lost it to the Qājārs.<sup>4</sup> On each occasion, the victor inflicted great damage to trade and industry, by demanding heavy fines and imposts. This was also the case in Shirāz. <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, after besieging Shirāz for nine months, demanded 40,000 Tomāns from the natives of Shirāz and this was after nine months of siege, which had reduced the inhabitants to serious distress. After five months of the siege, the Bazar was completely bare,<sup>5</sup> no

1. I.K., p.327.

2. IaIa, p.488.

3. R.M.M., p.43.

4. G.G., pp.256-310.

caravan entered the city and none left. Artisans suffered more than the others, since trade was at a standstill and nobody had the money to purchase their commodities.

Their miseries, however, did not end here. After the fall of the city, and despite strict orders by <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, the soldiery plundered the city.<sup>1</sup> The Bazar was always the prime target of looters. As a matter of fact, the majority of the soldiers joined the army in the hope of gaining booty and, thus, did not hesitate to pursue their goal when they had the chance.<sup>2</sup> A victorious army was not, however, the sole menace of the artisans. The Lūtis also took every opportunity to plunder the Bazar. For instance, when the Zand forces garrisoned in the city of Kermān were surprised by Taqi Dorrāni and took the road to Shirāz, the Lūtis looted the houses of the inhabitants and the Bazar. This was after the confiscation and extortions, which the populace had suffered by Taqi Khan's government.<sup>3</sup>

Even after the death of the Vakil, once the Zand administration was established in the city, the princes of that family took great pains to protect and cherish the Bazaris. Zaki Khān, despite his monstrous cruelties towards the Zand nobles, was anxious to provide safety and security to the Bazaris. Apparently, his zeal in this matter was such that the shops were left open at night and unattended and remained intact.<sup>4</sup> <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān is also known to have punished and dismissed his Babān Kurd troops, because they had harassed the Bazaris.<sup>5</sup> The police force established in Shirāz and elsewhere was mainly to guard the Bazars and private property, but often it was used as a means to mulct and harass the Bazaris. The police was the act-

1. O.M.T., p.133.

2. Kinnier, Geographical, pp.32, 34.

3. I.K., pp.236-237.

4. M.T., p.345.

5. G.M., p.392.

ing arm of the government to coerce the artisans and traders into contributing large sums of money for the decoration and illumination of the Bazar and for public entertainment. Francklin, in 1786-7, witnessed the great illumination and fireworks, provided by the Bazaris to mark the occasion of the second son of Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān undergoing the operation of circumcision. At least in the early Qājār era, the Dārughe of Shirāz was known to accept bribes and presents and was furnished with everything he needed by the Bazaris, so as to secure his favour and protection. But the Dārughe could impose fines on the Bazaris, either for violating the laws or according to his own whims.

### Guilds (Asnāf):

As mentioned in the section on artisans and craftsmen, such groups were organised into Asnāf. Islamic guilds have been thoroughly investigated by scholars. Suffice it to say that not all the guilds had a leader (naqib) at all times. Indeed, in the only instance, in which the artisans are directly mentioned by Mirzā Moḥammad, the kalāntar of Fārs during the interregnum after the death of Nāder Shāh, they seem to be acting independent of a naqib.<sup>1</sup>

Karim Khān appointed a naqib in Shirāz and elsewhere in the Empire.<sup>2</sup> For the duties and the sphere of power enjoyed by the naqib, the reader is referred to Tazkerat al-Moluk.<sup>3</sup> There is no information as to the number of the guilds in the various cities of Persia in the 18th century. Tazkerreh Shushtar gives a list of about eighty-four professions. Except for those engaged in entertainment such as Motrebs, Qavvals, Mollās and beggars, the rest must have been organised into asnāf.<sup>4</sup> Major

1. R.M.M., p.46. For a detailed study of the guilds, see Massignon, Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, Encyclopedia of Islam, Lewis Bernard, "Islamic Guilds in the Middle Ages", J.C.A.S., 27, 1940, part IV.

2. R.T., p.307.

3. Tazkerat al-Moluk, ed. V. Minorsky (London, 1943), pp.80-81.

4. Tazkerreh-Shushtar, Abdollah Shushtiari (Calcutta, 1934), pp.104-7.

5. I.S., p.47.

6. Ouseley, W., Travels, Vol.II, p.92.

cities like Shirāz, Esfāhān and Tabriz naturally boasted many more guilds. For example, Shirāz had a few bazars besides that of the Vakil, which were large and handsome,<sup>1</sup> and each one of them must have been occupied by artisans practising various crafts. The tendency was that each city provided for its own consumption and relied on its artisans for the commodities in demand locally. Waring, in 1802, remarks that the city of Shirāz exported a few swords and a nominal amount of wine to the northern provinces of the Empire.<sup>2</sup> The textile products of the cities of Yazd and Kāshān, however, were transported all over the empire. The city of Kāshān was especially famous for its copper ware. Sir William Ouseley, in the early 19th century, remarks that his retinue waited to reach Kāshān to purchase their kitchen utensils, which were celebrated for their excellent workmanship and reasonable price.<sup>3</sup>

The guilds were, to a large extent, independent in their internal affairs, in that they appointed their own leaders; they decided on the suitability of apprentices for the initiation into the craft, according to their skills. They allocated the taxes on each craftsman with respect to their earnings, and so on. The government cherished the guild system as a convenient means for tax collecting purposes.<sup>4</sup> At times even, the government received loans from the Aṣṇāf on credit (Mosa<sup>c</sup> deh). Indeed, the guilds, despite their independence, never achieved a power comparable with that enjoyed by the guilds in Western Europe. Many factors contributed to the political impotence, which characterises the guilds in Persia in the 18th century. Firstly, it is significant that the guilds' leaders were directly answerable to the kalāntar, who by this time was no longer representing the public but was, rather, an official with a strong police force under his control.<sup>5</sup> Apparently, in the late

1. I.S., p.32.

2. Ibid., p.47.

3. Ouseley, W., Travels, Vol.II, (Calcutta, 1924), p.92.

4. R.M.M., p.19.

5. I.S., pp.67-70.



18th century, the middle classes, i.e. artisans and shopkeepers, were closely watched by the police and nothing could escape the surveillance network established by the Zands in their dominion.<sup>1</sup> This, in effect, prevented the artisans from any act which would prejudice the security of the government. This was precisely why Ḥāji Ebrāhim, the Kalāntar, and not any other civilian, could venture a coup, because he had the assistance of the city militia and the police force at his disposal. The city militia was composed, for the most part, of shopkeepers,<sup>2</sup> but it is significant that they could not effect any political move without the sanction of the kalāntar. The shopkeepers, who were members of the guilds, were active participants in the urban disturbances after the death of the vakīl but, even on those occasions, they allied themselves with the local officials, such as kadkhodās and Bābās.<sup>3</sup> This evidence clearly indicates that the aṣṇāf were of no consequence, as far as political change was concerned, and that they were used, or at least manipulated, by government officials. Their aim in supporting the officials was primarily financial, and it did not go beyond immediate advantage to involve long-term political motives.

On the other hand, the guild system and its ethic restricted the activities of guild members. The well to do and respectable artisan would never endanger his reputation and good name, in order to protest against oppression. The only form of protest was the closure of the shops and to take refuge in a sanctuary. As Waring observes, artisans worked according to their reputation;<sup>4</sup> this reputation was not only a result of skill and mastery of their craft, but also of honesty and integrity, which gained the respect and confidence of the general public.

1. I.S., p.64.

2. H.P., Vol.II, p.185.

3. G.G., pp.222-3.

4. I.S., p.47.

For instance, if an artisan refused to accept his bonicheh (Quota), he was, first and foremost, reprimanded by his colleagues, who had to bear the burden of his share. Such conduct, in effect, antagonised his fellow artisans and the public at large. Again, if he decided to sell his products at a higher price and contrary to the rules of the guild, he ran the risk of being punished by his guild<sup>1</sup> and being regarded as avaricious and a dishonest man in the eyes of the citizens.

In this sense, the guild system not only did not offer protection and privilege to its members, but it also restricted their freedom and hindered their aspirations. This is exactly why we have no mention of the craftsmen's involvement in political activities and lawless acts. Well-respected artisans were expected to defend the honour of their fellow citizens in times of unrest and chaos. We have evidence of at least four famous Lutis being well-known artisans, but these were men of good character, who protected the weak and aided the poor.<sup>2</sup> It is sufficient to note that only men of good name could be initiated into the crafts and, unless a craftsman had proved his honesty, he would not be admitted to the guild for which he had been trained.

The position of the shopkeepers (Kasebs) was to a large extent different. Although they were members of guilds and had to abide by the rules imposed on them, they had no fear of rejection by the craft guilds. As long as they had the capital to set up their business, there was no impediment in their way. It is obvious that the well-established traders did not wish to jeopardise their positions as respected members of the community. Thus, they, too, were inclined to abide by the laws and rules of the guilds. There were, however, minor shopkeepers who had no such fears, and many traders had wage labourers (Ruzmozd)

1. Kuznetsova, Urban Industry, p.315.

2. R.I., p.411.

and message boys, who entered the service of the bazaris, in order to escape unemployment. It appears that, in this period, there was a flow of villagers to the cities and especially to the metropolis. Karim Khān employed 12,000 unskilled wage labourers in his construction schemes, only to assist them in earning a livelihood.<sup>1</sup> This indicates that the population of the cities had increased and, since most of the emigrants were unemployed, they sought jobs either as soldiers/retainers, or else in the bazar.

Another negative impact of the guild system on the artisans and traders was that by imposing restrictions on prices, the guilds prevented unrestricted accumulation of wealth. We have no evidence of an artisan having amassed wealth, unless he entered the government service like Hāji Āqā Moḥammad Renāni, the goldsmith, who became the governor of Esfāhān and, thus, accumulated great riches.<sup>2</sup> In such cases, the artisan naturally abandoned his craft and became a merchant, as the above-mentioned artisan did. This, however, did not apply to shopkeepers, who engaged in the sale of foodstuffs. These traders took every opportunity to promote their interests and the government often turned a blind eye to their activities. When a famine broke out, almost always the practice of hoarding was the order of the day. The government, unable to fight it, went so far as to legalise the theft of food, in order to ease the distress of the poverty-stricken citizens.<sup>3</sup> In that sense, the artisans had conflicting interests with the shopkeepers. Tazkerreh-Shushtar draws an impressive picture of the despair, to which the artisans were reduced, when a famine occurred in the city of Shushtar,<sup>4</sup> whereas the <sup>C</sup>Allāfs (grain chandlers) were amassing wealth by hoarding and selling provisions at violent profits.

1. O.M.I., p.122.

2. G.M., p.319. JaJa, Vol.II, p.217.

3. Tazkerreh-Shushtar, p.108.

4. Ibid., p.109.

The poor infrastructure created another major obstacle to the accumulation of wealth. The insecurity of roads and the poor condition of transportation limited the flow of commodities and, thus, closed the market to handicrafts. The artisans had to sell their goods locally with a few exceptional purchases for exportation. There were, however, other causes for the limited circulation of goods, primarily the toll tax system, which discouraged the merchants from engaging in nationwide trade. Waring, in 1802, asserts that there were many Toll stations on the transit road from Shirāz to Bushehr. At every Rāhdāri, the merchants had to pay a nominal tax, but often these trifling amounts at numerous stations amounted to thirty percent of the value of the merchandise.<sup>1</sup> That was probably why only a few caravans entered Shirāz and departed from it with goods. The internal unrest and frequent revolts created another obstacle in the transportation of goods. Often the rebels confiscated the goods of the merchants, thus leaving them with nothing, with which to carry on their business. Āqā Moḥammad Khān, in his attempt to gain power, confiscated the merchandise of a merchant caravan.<sup>2</sup> Esmā<sup>c</sup>il Khān Zand pursued this course of action over a long time and thus gained great riches.<sup>3</sup>

The despotic nature of the government was yet another cause of stagnation and lack of incentive in the artisan craftsmen community. Besides the constant oppression of the government, it also discouraged the artisans from achieving perfection in their crafts. The case of the gunsmith, alluded to by Waring, bears evidence to this fact.<sup>4</sup> The artisan felt that he achieved nothing by excellent craftsmanship and that, on the contrary, he was exploited by the government. Officials ordered them to produce goods without payment, or else they were paid much

1. I.S., pp.79-80.

2. Fava'ed al-Safavieh, B.L. Ms., p.146.

3. Ibid., p.138. G.G., p.279.

4. I.S., p.32.

less than they deserved. Thus, the artisans made no effort to maximise their output, improve their skill and perfect their products.

A major factor in the political impotence of the artisans' guilds was their division over conflicting interest. While it was beneficial for a gunsmith to provide for the diverse armies fighting each other, it was disastrous for other classes of artisans to be caught in internal warfare. Such disunity was not, however, exclusively due to conflicting self-interest. There were other factors at work, such as the factional rivalry between the Ḥaydari and Ne<sup>C</sup>mati factions in almost all the towns and cities in the empire. It is well known that the affiliation of an individual to one or other of the factions was only decided by his residence in a ward, which belonged to one of the factions.<sup>1</sup> It did not matter what guild he belonged to, and what craft he practised, but where his house was located in the division of quarters. Thus, members of the same guilds could be bitter enemies, because of their factional affiliations. Although we have no evidence of factional strifes amongst the Bazaris in the period under study, we have examples of such events taking place in the 19th century. Colonel Shiel, in 1835, asserts that the bazar of Sarāb, which mostly belonged to the Ḥaydaris was plundered by the other faction, the Ne<sup>C</sup>matīs.<sup>2</sup> There also existed ideological and religious differences among the artisans and the bazaris in general. Traditionally the bazar had close ties with the clergy and provided the Mojtaheds with an enormous amount of money as their Zakāt, Sahm-e-Emām; and so on. There were also artisans, who were devoted to Ṣufi saints and frequented Khānqāhs, rather than the mosques. These naturally had conflicts with the orthodox bazari community. The artisans with Ṣufi affiliations were those talented and educated craftsmen, who took pride in earning their livelihood by their

1. Shiel, Lady L., Glimpses of life and manners in Persia (London, 1856). p.323.

2. Ibid., p. 325.

skills. The renowned 18th century poet, <sup>c</sup>Asheq-e-Esfāhāni, was a tailor in the bazar of Esfāhān. He lived in poverty, but refused to accept help from his friends.<sup>1</sup> There are numerous artisans, who were poets and men of learning, working in various branches of manufacturing and trade.<sup>2</sup>

We should now speak of the most prominent obstacle, with which the guilds were faced in acquiring political power. This was a new phenomenon, characterising the reign of the Zands. Karim Khān, in his attempt to form a standing army within his capital and all the major cities, transferred a great number of the tribes to the city of Shirāz and Esfāhān. One source asserts that he settled about 90,000 tribal elements in and around the city of Shirāz.<sup>3</sup> It is easily imaginable that such a change in the composition of the population necessarily affected the balance of power within the city. The artisans, who previously were in charge of maintaining order and peace in their town in times of unrest, were no longer able to exercise this right. They were also deprived of their right to make decisions when their town and property were at stake. Almost always the tribes decided the course of events, when Shirāz was under siege by various armies. The tribes betrayed the city and admitted the enemy at their pleasure.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, when a rebellion erupted in the city of Kermān, as previously mentioned, the artisans and shopkeepers decided on the course of action and admitted the Zand army into the city.<sup>5</sup> This clearly indicates the degree to which the power of the bazar had diminished in Shirāz. The need for self-assertion was precisely the reason, which induced the kasabeh to support Hāji Ebrāhim in his coup against the Zands. His main objective was to banish

1. Shiel, *op. cit.*, p.229.

2. *Ibid.* Negarestan-e-Dzrā, pp.198, 229, 237, etc.

3. M.I., p.342.

4. G.G., p.243.

5. I.K., p.328.

the tribes from the city and free the city from their grip. The scheme was executed in the bazar and by the bazaris.<sup>1</sup> Apparently, the tribes had been admitted into the swordsmiths' quarter and disarmed and banished outside the walls of the city.

As we have discussed previously, the guilds never formed a coherent and united body, which could effect a political change. Indeed, the only instance of their participation in a political change, was the case of Ḥāji Ebrāhim's coup. One may ask what effect the change of one dynasty for another would have on the artisans and traders. This is, indeed, a perplexing dilemma, with which we are faced. The artisans and traders had two very good reasons for their support of the Ḥāji's coup: one was their need for self-determination, which they had been totally denied by the tribes; and secondly, the fact that the protection and concessions, which the Zands offered to foreign trade at the expense of home produce, had made the bazaris unable to compete with growing foreign imports. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān appears to have been the only Zand ruler, who was aware and apprehensive of the discontent occasioned by the flow of foreign goods. Thus, although he exempted foreign imports for payment of toll tax, at the same time he put a sanction on the exportation of Kermāni wool, which was the main commodity in demand by the EIC.<sup>2</sup> With this measure, he aimed at the protection of home industry, i.e. shawl weaving, which was one of the few products which had a nationwide market.

Now we will investigate whether the artisans and traders achieved their objectives. Although they managed to expel the tribes out of the city, and for the time being took control of affairs, the Qājārs had no intention of making concessions towards the city dwellers of Shirāz. Indeed, they transferred some tribes from Māzandarān into the city and these elements

1. F.N., p.235.

2. I.O.R. G/29/21 Report on the Commerce of Persia, 1791.

caused great discontent in the later stages of the 19th century.<sup>1</sup> Furthermore, by shifting the capital from Shirāz to Tehran, the former lost its position as the centre for commercial transactions and, thus, occupied a secondary position in that sphere. The flow of foreign goods increased drastically. The market was opened to European guns and ammunition and, thus, destroyed traditional gun manufacturing, which had flourished for a long period of time. By the mid-19th century, the remotest towns of the empire were stocked with foreign, and especially English, textiles and fabrics.<sup>2</sup>

### Haydari and Ne<sup>C</sup>mati Factions:

It was originally intended to discuss in this work the history and the origin of the Ḥaydari and Ne<sup>C</sup>mati factions, who continued their animosity until the late 19th, and even the early 20th, centuries. As an article on this topic had been written recently,<sup>3</sup> it suffices to make a few points clear. First of all, the author of this article, Mir Ja<sup>C</sup>fari, believes that the error made by the majority of the 19th century Persian scholars in the identity of the patron of the Haydari order, has come about by the fact that they have based their opinion on the information given in Habib al-siar. The author, Mir Kwānd, asserts that the patron of the Haydaris was Qoṭb al-din Ḥaydar Zāva'i,<sup>4</sup> whereas our modern author maintains that the Ḥaydaris were the followers of Solṭān Mir Ḥaydar Tunī, who died in 830/1426. He was born in Bakū, and for most of his life resided in Tabriz, where he gathered a great following and set up a cloister for his morids. He also built cloisters (Takiyyeh) in other towns and cities which he visited. Mir Ja<sup>C</sup>fari argues that Solṭān Mir Ḥaydar and Shāh Ne<sup>C</sup>matollāh Vali were contem-

1. F.N., p.296.

2. Abbot, "Geographical notes taken during a journey in Persia in 1849 & 1850, Geographical Journal, Vol.25, 1855. p.9.

3. Mir Ja<sup>C</sup>fari, The Haydari-Ni<sup>C</sup>mati conflict in Iran, I.S., Vol.XII, Nos.3-4. 1979, pp.135-162.

4. Mir Kwānd, Habib al-Siar, Tehran. 1333, Vol.2, p.332.



poraries, that the influence and power of the Sunni mystic, Ne<sup>c</sup>matollāh, was challenged by the Shi<sup>c</sup>a Mir Ḥaydar, and, thus, the origins of the frictions goes back as far as the 8th century/14th A.D.

Firstly, there is no reason to believe that the followers of the earlier Shaikh Ḥaydar were not called Haydaris; indeed, there is every possibility that they were. J.P. Brown, in the late 19th century, came across the followers of Qotb al-din Haydar Zave'i in Anatolia. He does not even mention the sect of Haydari, whose patron was Mir Ḥaydar Tuni. He gives information of their outfits and paraphernalia, whereas he makes no mention of Haydaris, who followed Mir Ḥaydar, despite the fact that Mir Haydar Tuni lived nearly two centuries later than Qotb al-din Ḥaydar. There is, however, no explanation for his omission, unless the order had totally vanished, at least in Anatolia.

We have no evidence to prove the pure conjecture of our modern scholar, that the fights started in the lifetime of the two above-mentioned Sufis, and not afterwards. The only evidence of the Haydaris as early as the 14th century is an undated letter written to Solṭān Bāyazid, the governor of Amāsieh, by Uzun Ḥasan, the King of the Aqqyunlu, in which the king informs the Ottoman Shāhzādeh, that he has taken possession of many of the interior areas of Persia and has restored peace and tranquility in his dominion by putting turbulent elements in their place. He mentions the Qalandari and Ḥaydari sects.<sup>1</sup> We have evidence that Mir Haydar was from the Qalandari order and that he had close ties with the Shi<sup>c</sup>a Qaraqoyunlu kings, Qara Yusef and Qara Eskandar. Apparently Qara Eskandar had great faith in him and there is an anecdote, which mentions the great magical power of this sufi, which added to the

1. Iacizade Celebi Monseat, ed. by N. Lugal and A. Arzi, Istanbul, 1956, p.28.

reverence and faith of Qara Eskandar towards him.<sup>1</sup>

Although these reasons could well have been the causes of the animosity of the Sunni Aq qoyunlu king towards the Shi<sup>C</sup>ite Ḥaydari Sufis, there is no evidence that the conflicts between the Ḥaydaris and Ne<sup>C</sup>matīs started as early as the Aq qoyunlu period. The first mention of the strife in European sources is in 1575, the 51st year of the rule of Shāh Ṭahmāsb I, by a Venetian envoy to his court, Vincentio D'Alessandri. He asserts that the city of Tabriz,

"is divided into two factions, one called Nausitai (sic), and the other Himicaivartu (sic), which comprehend the nine municipal districts, five in one and four in the other, and all the citizens about twelve thousand in number. These factions have always been at enmity, and slaughtered each other every day, nor could the king or any others put a stop to it, as the hatred between them had lasted more than thirty years."<sup>2</sup>

Thus Alessandri places the beginning of the conflicts at about 1540-45, that is in the reign of Shāh Ṭahmāsb I. Chardin, however, after mentioning the fights of the two factions, states that the factions, which divided all the cities in Persia, came into being in the fifteenth century.<sup>3</sup> But none of these sources go as far back as the 14th century. The first Persian source to mention the fights is an unnamed history, written by Mollā Monajjem Yazdi, the private astrologer of Shāh<sup>C</sup> Abbās I. He writes:

"on sunday the 19th of the month of Rabi<sup>C</sup> I of the year 1003/1594 the Shah arrived in Qazvin his<sup>C</sup> capital, in which he ordered the Haydari and Ne<sup>C</sup>mati fights to take place. On Tuesday, in the great square, Maidān-e-Sa<sup>C</sup>dat, the fight was again

1. Rozāt al-Janāt va Janāt al-Janān, p.13.

2. Travels of Venetians in Persia, Narrative of the most noble Vincentio D'alessandri Hakloyt Society, London, 1863, p.224.

3. Chardin, Travels, part.3, p.84.

"held. The Haydaris gained complete victory over their opponent."<sup>1</sup>

None of these primary sources provide us with an accurate date of the beginning of the factional strife. It would, however, be safe to assume that it started some time between early and mid-16th century.

There is, however, another perplexing question, concerning the way in which it came to be believed that Shaikh Haydar Safavi was the patron of the Ḥaydaris, which Mir Ja<sup>C</sup>fari has not attempted to clarify; how Krusinski, who provides the most accurate and detailed account of the frays, was mistaken on this point.<sup>2</sup> The answer may lie in the attempt made by Shāh<sup>C</sup>Abbās to falsify the truth and replace Mir Soltān Ḥaydar Tuni by his ancestor Shaikh Ḥaydar. He took a few effective measures towards this end. First, he demolished the cloister where Soltān Mir Haydar was buried in Tabriz and accused his followers of corruption and heresy.<sup>3</sup> Thus, he discouraged the public from supporting the Ṣufi Saint and contributed to the obscurity of his name. Secondly, he introduced the strife into other towns and cities, which were not acquainted with the strife, by transplanting colonies of non-Persian minorities, whose lifestyle and habits were at-variance with the original inhabitants. Mir Ja<sup>C</sup>fari dismisses the information by Krusinski as utterly unfounded, whereas there is evidence to support his assertions. Mir<sup>C</sup>Abdol Laṭif Shushtiari in Tohfāt al-<sup>C</sup>Alam, decidedly affirms that the factions were introduced to Shushtar, during the reign of Shāh<sup>C</sup>Abbās and, furthermore, he asserts that Shāh<sup>C</sup>Abbās garrisoned Gherkes (Circassian) soldiers in the citadel, who were known as Qezel Bāsh. These were eventually assimilated into the fabric of the city and resided the Karkar quarter of the

1. Monajjem Yazdi, Tārikh, Msc., Edinburgh, n.p.

2. Krusinski, The history of revolutions. pp.91-2.

3. Enb Karbalā'i Hāfiz Hosein, Rozāt al-Janān va Jannāt al-Janān, Tehran, 1344, p.596.

city, which was the Haydari Khāneh.<sup>1</sup>

One may ask why Shāh<sup>C</sup> Abbās wished to introduce these fights into other cities. The reason is given by Krusinski, who asserts that he wanted to keep up the spirit of internal differences and discord in his kingdom, so as to secure stability for his government. There is every reason to believe that, by the mass conversion to Shā<sup>C</sup>ism of the original inhabitants of Persia, there was no cause for religious difference. Furthermore, the Ne<sup>C</sup>matollāhi Ṣufis had become Shi<sup>C</sup>a and there was no further cause for conflict among the supporters of the two Ṣufi sects either. Thus, by bringing in groups of different ethnic origin, he kept alive the civil strife, which was ultimately to his benefit.

The fact that these fights were apparently patronised by Shāh<sup>C</sup> Abbās, indicates that they were not spontaneous and the Shāh must have had a vested interest in encouraging them. Almost all the sources assert that the fights were carried out by the permission of the government, and the "Grand Provost", as Chardin calls the kalāntar of Esfāhān, was present at the fights.<sup>2</sup>

There is, however, one source, which contradicts Krusinski and, thus, casts doubts on our theory. Kaempfer, who travelled to Persia in 1683-1685, asserts that there were Ḥaydari Ṣufis in the city of Esfāhān, and that they were the bitterest enemies of the Ne<sup>C</sup>matollāhis and it was in their support, that the whole country was divided into two camps of Ḥaydari and Ne<sup>C</sup>mati. Despite his description of the origin of the Ne<sup>C</sup>matollāhi sect and their patron, he fails to provide us with any information on the Ḥaydaris. He states that he cannot go into a long story; was it not because there was confusion about the

1. Tohfāt al Ālam, Ms Edinburgh, n.p.

2. Chardin, Travels, part.3, p.84.

identity of the Haydari's patron and he was not sure of the point in question. He does, however affirm that the animosity manifested itself in sportlike competitions, that it was after the competition and betting that the fights erupted, and that it was through the intervention of the darughe that the fights ended.<sup>1</sup>

There is, however, another source which supports our view. This work is a unique source for the beliefs and practices of the Şafavid supporters. It was written in the 19th century and a manuscript copy of it is in existence in the Melli Library in Tehran. Enqelāb-e-Eslām, this source asserts that the Haydaris who were to be found in Anatolia in the author's time, were Shi<sup>c</sup>a extremists, who carried their hatred of the Sunnis to excess; they wore a turban with seven slits, had a bag hanging down from their waistband and carried a cane. He further asserts that in their beliefs they were identical to the Jalālis, who were Shi<sup>c</sup>a and opposed to the rule of the Sunni Turks.<sup>2</sup> During the reign of Shāh Tahmāsb and Shāh<sup>c</sup> Abbas I, two large groups of these Jalāli people took refuge in Persia and were settled in Qazvin and Esfāhān. <sup>c</sup>Alam Ārā corroborates this account and also provides us with additional information on their identity. It affirms that Jalāli is the general appellation for anyone who is opposed to the Ottomans,<sup>3</sup> or rather as Enqelāb-e-Eslām puts it, the followers of the house of the Şafavids were known as Jalāli or Haydari in Anatolia.

This clarifies the assertion of the author of Enqelāb-e-Eslām that the people he saw were the same as the Haydaris, that is the supporters of the principles of Shaikh Haydar the Şafavid.

1. Keampfer, Engelbert, Amoentatium exoticarum, tr. by K. Jahandari, Tehran, Anjoman-e Asar Melli, 1350. p.138.

2. Mohammad<sup>c</sup> Aref Arzruni, Tārikh-e-Enqelāb-e-Eslām, Msc. Melli Library Tehran, no.1634 (1307).

3. Eskandar beg Monshi, Alam Ārā ye Abbāsi, tr. E. Yarshater, Boulder, 1978, Vol.II pp.960-73.

The account given in Enqelāb-e-Eslām in respect to Shaikh Haydar's views is consistent with the assertion of the author of Ālam Ārāye Amini, a source contemporary with Shaikh Haydar and greatly hostile to him because of his heretical ideas.<sup>1</sup>

There is also evidence that the Jalālis were still in existence in the later 19th century in Esfāhān, Tara'qe affirms that, when Āli Morād Khān left Esfāhān in disorder, the Jalāli darvishes were going round the city and blowing their horns in joy that Āli Morād Khān had departed the city.<sup>2</sup> Āli Morād Khān, however, returned to Esfāhān and remembering their behaviour, he determined to banish all the Ṣufi orders from his capital. His main goal was to undermine the influence of the Ṣufis in general, and especially of the Ne<sup>c</sup>matollāhis, who were in league with Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān, his half-brother and potential rival, and Āqā Moḥammad Khān Qājār, his deadly enemy. Therefore, we might assume the Ḥaydaris, who were described by Kaempfer, could have been the Jalālis, that is, the followers of Shaikh Ḥaydar Ṣafavid.<sup>3</sup>

Another question does, however, arise: If the Jalālis were still in Esfāhān in the late 18th century, how could Krusinski have failed to remark on their existence? The fact that Krusinski travelled and stayed in Persia during the reign of the last Ṣafavid, Shāh Solṭān Ḥosein, who, under the influence of the clergy, had set about annihilating the Ṣufis, (many of whom were killed and the rest fled Esfāhān), could be the reason why Krusinski fails to mention anything about the Ṣufis. Another explanation is that, after the fall of the Ṣafavids and during the reign of Karim Khān, the Ṣufis, who had fled to India, came back to Persia and expanded their sphere of act-

1. Konji, Ālam Ārāye Amini, ed. by V. Minorsky. Under the title, Persia in 1478-1490, p.67.
2. Tarā'eq, Tehran, p.13.
3. Ibid., Vol.III, p.173.
4. Krusinski, The History of Revolutions in Persia, p.91-98.

ivity. Krusinski asserts that the fights, which he saw, were triggered off by the discord and differences of the inhabitants as a whole, rather than out of support for one group of Şufis, as opposed to the other. What is more striking is that he mentions different names for the factions: namely, Pelenk and Felenk. This could, hence, come about by the prohibition of factional strife by Shāh Soltān Hosein. As a matter of fact, on his accession to the throne, Mollā Moḥammad Bāqer Mojlesi had asked him to place a ban on the conflicts and this had been acceded to. The ban had not, however, succeeded in putting an end to the practice, and the fights continued under a different pretext. The inhabitants of the cities, who were divided into factions like some other countries, namely Italy, on the grounds of political differences, continued to fight each other at intervals. This is endorsed by the account given by Hanway, who gives the same names with slight variations, Feleuk and Peleuk.<sup>1</sup> His account of their fights and animosity corroborates the accounts given by Chardin and Krusinski.<sup>2</sup> y1

During the whole course of the late 18th century, however, there is not a single source referring to Haydaris and Ne<sup>C</sup>mat-is under their original name, and even Francklin, who stayed in Shiraz for a long time, does not refer to these factions at all. This leads one to assume that the practice had fallen into disuse. He does, however, remark on the ferocity of manners which:

"introduced a strife, peculiar to the lower classes of inhabitants of Shiraz. When two people begin fighting, it always raises a great crowd, who generally separately take the part of one or the other in the contest, and the whole presently becomes a tumult and confusion, until the arrival of the Daroga, or the judge of the police, who puts an end to the fray. These riots are very frequent, and even the boys are fond of running to them, in

1. Hanway, Jonas, Travels, Vol.II, p.104.

2. Chardin, Travels. Part.3, p.84. Krusinski, pp.91-3.

"order to have a share in the contention."<sup>1</sup>

These fights were clearly different from those, which took place in the Ṣafavid era. It may, however, be assumed that the two people, who started the fights, were members of the two factions and that their supporters were drawn into the fights to show their spirit of solidarity.

After the fall of the Ṣafavids and the invasion of the Afghāns, the spirit of division and discord appears to have totally vanished, or at least in those areas, where the public was faced with a fiercer enemy than the opposite faction: namely, the Afghāns, who, after sacking Esfāhān, attempted to reduce other towns into submission. In almost every town and village, they were confronted with stiff resistance. In the town of Qazvin, after the Afghāns had established themselves in the government, the general populace resolved to surprise them and the unsuspecting Afghāns were surprised by an attack; after some hours of fierce battle, four thousand Afghāns were slain. In Lar, Khwānsār and many other townships, the same proceedings were carried out. Hazin, who travelled to all these areas after the fall of Esfāhān, remarks on the gallantry and courage shown by the general public (C a vā m va Sakaneh).<sup>2</sup> The situation of the western provinces was rather worse than the central parts. The Ottomans had attacked and captured cities and towns further into the country. In almost all the towns, which the Ottoman Turks attacked and established themselves, the general public, in unity and uniformity, set about fighting them. Hazin speaks of the spirit with which the citizens of LarKhwānsār, Qazvin, etc., took up arms in those areas and fought the Afghans until they all fell. In Hamadān and Tabriz, the populace barricaded the towns and, for many days, held out against the Ottomans; eventually they were overpowered by superior numbers and arms and all were killed, with only a few people

1. OMTS, p.67.

2. Z.H., p.44.



surviving.<sup>1</sup>

We have evidence that, before the Vakil came to power, the Haydari and Ne<sup>C</sup>mati factions still pursued their usual hostility, because of their differences, which led them to endanger their own safety and urban security as a whole. Although the source of our information was written in the 19th century, there is no particular reason to doubt its authenticity. Mir<sup>C</sup> Abdol Latif Shushtiari in Tohfāt al-<sup>C</sup>Ālam asserts that, when<sup>C</sup> Ali Mardān Khān Bakhtiāri was competing for supreme power, he attempted to capture the town of Shushtar. The Mar<sup>C</sup>ashi Sād-āt, who were the prominent inhabitants of the Ḥaydari Khāneh, allied themselves to the Bakhtiāris and admitted them through the gate of Karkar, which was in their charge into the city. The notables of the Ne<sup>C</sup>mati Khāneh, whose leader was Asadol-lāh Khān, the grandson of Seyed Ṣādeq, the Kalāntar, set about defending their wards against the army of the Bakhtiāris and their allies, the Ḥaydaris. The Haydaris directed the army to the roofs of the Ne<sup>C</sup>mati houses, the inhabitants of which, fought gallantly, slaying many of them, and forcing the remaining troops to retreat. It is noteworthy that, an Akhund of the Ne<sup>C</sup>mati Khāneh, Ḥāji<sup>C</sup> Abd al-Razzāq, fought for many hours in defence of his house. He was eventually overpowered by the enemy and deprived of his eyesight.<sup>2</sup>

As we approach the reign of Karim Khān, there is no mention of factional strife. Indeed, Francklin assures us that:

"by his excellent police and management there was not a single tumult or riot productive of bloodshed."<sup>3</sup>

Clearly, the Vakil discouraged urban riots and factional strife,

1. Z.H., p.141.

2. Tohfāt al-<sup>C</sup>Ālam, Ms Edinburgh, n.p.

3. O.M.I.p.122.

by means of close and constant surveillance of the urban community. At his death, however, there are numerous instances of riots and disturbances in various areas. Esfāhān experienced serious civil unrest at least three times, in two of which Sufi darvishes were involved. Still the sources carefully avoided mentioning Ḥaydari and Ne<sup>C</sup>mati factions, despite the fact that the two camps existed in the major cities. It is only in the 19th century, that the fights are again mentioned directly as the factional strife between Ḥaydari and Ne<sup>C</sup>mati camps. Malcolm, in 1800, was faced with the same phenomenon as Hanway described in the city of Qazvin. He writes:

"The division of the chief cities into wards, with the names of Hyderee and Neamuttee which one author, has described to the policy of Shah Abass the great, still exists, and continues to excite equal animosity to what it did at former periods. There is at all times a jealousy between these parties; but during the three last days of Mohurram they attack each other with violence. The object for which they contend appears to be merely the honour of triumph."<sup>1</sup>

It is curious that Francklin, who visited Shirāz about two decades before Malcolm, remarks on the skirmishes between the bands of youngsters, each representing the army of Yazid and the adherents of Emām Ḥosein, under their respective banners, which were usually of different colours. He also asserts that real battles took place, in which many people lost their lives.

"During these various processions much injury is often sustained, as the Persians are all frantic even to enthusiasm, and they believe uniformly that the souls of those slain during the Mohurram will infallibly go that instant into paradise; this, added to their frenzy, which for the time it lasts is such I never saw exceeded by any people, makes them despise and even court death."

1. H.P., Vol.II, p.593.

Francklin does not, however, even once refer to Ne<sup>c</sup>mati and Haydari elements involved in the processions and the subsequent fights. Was it because no-one wished to speak of them, or was there a conspiracy to conceal the real cause of the event.? We will never know. The fights, however, continued until the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, when the political parties and their differences took the place of these primitive divisions.

## CHAPTER 8

### THE TRIBES

The tribes formed a major social force in 18th century Persia. All the European sources of the early 19th century, believed that the nomadic population was equal to the sedentary ones. Some even suspect that it exceeded the latter. There were four major ethnic groupings: Persian, Arab, Baluchi and Turkish. The western part of the country was completely dominated by tribes of original Iranian stock: namely, Bakhtiāri, Lors (Faili) Kurds and a nameless group known as Lak. What exactly was the origin of the latter is not known. Lady Shiel observes that:

"the Leks are from the class of genuine Persian blood, such as the Loors, Bekhtiarees, &c. To them might be added the Koords, as members of the Persian family."<sup>1</sup>

Thus, according to her assertion, the Lak were not distinct from the Kurds or indeed the Lors. They themselves, however, did not share this view, as Lord Curzon, in assessing the origin of the Lors states:

"they appear to belong to the same ethnical group as the Kurds, their neighbours on the north; nor does their language, which is a dialect of Persian, differ materially from the Kurdish tongue. On the other hand, they themselves consider it an insult to be confounded with the Kurds whom they call Leks."<sup>2</sup>

1. Shiel, L., Glimpses on the life and manners in Persia (London, 1856), p.394.

2. Curzon, N., Persia and the Persian Question, (London, 1895), Vol.II, p.274.

It can, however, be safely assumed that the tribes of Lor, Kurd and Lak were all of the same origin: namely, the Aryan stock which preceded <sup>C</sup>Arabs, Turks and Tartars in the land.<sup>1</sup>

The <sup>C</sup>Arab tribes inhabited the south western areas, i.e. Khuzestān, the coastal areas of the Gulf as far as Bushehr, and the ports beyond. The Turks were spread in many parts. First of all, a great portion of the tribes of Turkish origin resided in Āzarbayjān, as far south as the borders of Māzandarān and Gilān. There were other Turkish tribes in the south, such as Qashqā'i, which was one of the most populous and powerful of these tribes. In Khorasān and the central plateau, Qazvin, Khamseh, etc., Turkish tribes predominated over other ethnic groups. The Baluchis were traditionally confined to the south east, which is now known as Baluchistān, although some of these nomads were transferred at various times to the northern provinces.

The province of Astarābād and the area towards the northern borders were overrun by another branch of Turkish tribes, namely the Turkmans, who were the traditional neighbours of the Qājārs in those parts.

There were, however, great overlappings in this arrangement; for instance, there were a great number of <sup>C</sup>Arab tribes in Khorasān, with Turkish and Kurdish tribes, who had been transferred there at different times.

The tribes were not all in a nomadic state. Indeed, a great part of them had been sedentarised in towns and villages and differed in no way from the sedentary population, except in their internal organization, which was identical to other tribes; that is, they paid allegiance to their tribal leader, paid him his dues and fought with him when the situation

1. Curzon, N., op. cit., Vol.II, p.274.

arose. Many of them cultivated the land, as Rawlinson remarks of the Mokri tribe in northern Kurdistan.<sup>1</sup> It appears, however, that the tribes in the south of that province retained their nomadic state as late as the 1830's. Rich observes:

"I had today confirmed by several of the best authorities what I had long suspected, that the peasantry in Koordistan are a totally different race from the tribes, who seldom cultivate the soil, while on the other hand the peasants are never soldiers."<sup>2</sup>

The tribes in a nomadic state migrated to cold and warm regions according to the season. Sometimes they covered hundreds of miles in their search for pasture. They often travelled along the well-defined routes which were known as Ilrāh. They were also given pasture on their entering into the country. For instance, when 3000 of the Turkmans of the Sāyen Khāni clan came to Esfāhān to pay their allegiance to ʿAli Morād Khān, they were given Yurt (pasture) in Astarābād.<sup>3</sup> Territorial disputes were common among the tribes and it led to full scale wars at times. Powerful tribes, like the Qashqā'is, were in a position to choose their pasture and the central government did not interfere in their choice.<sup>4</sup>

### Tribal Organisation:

The tribes (Ilāt) were divided into Tava<sup>c</sup>ef (clans) and further subdivided into Tirrehs (shafts). It was not uncommon for tribes of different origin to form a confederacy. The leader of the tribe was, however, always from the main tirrehs and the leadership seldom shifted from one family to another.<sup>5</sup> It was

1. Rawlinson, H.C., "A Journey to Tabriz", J.R.G.S., Vol.X, pp.34-5.

2. Rich, C.J., Narrative of a residence in Koordistan, Vol.I, p.88.

3. G.M., p.394.

4. Oberling, Pierre, op. cit., p.60. Shiel, L., op. cit. pp.398-99.

5. H.P., Vol.II, p.570.

not, however, uncommon for a ruling tirreh to be completely ruined and, thus, the leadership was shifted to another. Usually the leader was appointed by the consent of the elders (Rish-safids) of the tribes and the eldest son often succeeded him in his position.<sup>1</sup> The leader was expected to enjoy physical strength, excellent horsemanship and peerless marksmanship. The ability to adjudicate over the intertribal disputes and the power of establishing good relations with other tribes, were also of great importance. The central government rarely ventured to interfere in tribal affairs. Only when a chief was exceptionally unruly or old did the government step in and change the line of succession, or else replace the leader of a tribe.<sup>2</sup> The chief of a tribe enjoyed undisputed power within his own tribe. He was followed by his tribesmen in his military expeditions and obeyed without question.<sup>3</sup> He collected taxes from his tribe and received presents on special occasions such as Nouruz and so on. The tribes paid a nominal amount of tax to the government. According to a document of the Zand era, an item of tax is given as Chupānbegi, that is, the tax levied on the use of pasture.<sup>4</sup> Petroshevski believes that this due was identical to Marā'ī va Mavāshi, levied on the tribes in the time of the Āqqoyunlu (but in our documents they are mentioned as separate items). There is also a remark made about this tax by the kalāntar, Mirzā Mohammad, who asserts that he intended to farm the Chupānbegi of the livestock for the amount of 12,000 Tomāns.<sup>5</sup> This, however, appears to be the livestock belonging to the Zand tribe. The amount of this tax is not known to us, but, judging by the kalāntar's account, it must have been lucrative.

1. Kinnier, op. cit., p.45.

2. H.P., Vol.II, p.570.

3. Ibid., p.605.

4. Majles Library, uncatalogued documents, Tehran.

5. R.M.M., p.69. See Petroshevski, Monasebat-e-Arzi va Tr. Keshāvarz. Tehran. 1348.

Another kind of tax levied on the tribes was Yasāqkesh. This appears to have been a quota levied on foreigners in the Safavid time. It is mentioned in <sup>C</sup>Ālam Āray-e <sup>C</sup>Ābāssi as such.<sup>1</sup>

The tax levied on the lands belonging to the tribal chiefs or the tribal members was known as Esm va Rasm. The Tyul and Khālesseh were exempted from payment of this due. Sir John Malcolm speaks of a tax levied on the families of the tribes according to their wealth and the number of their livestock. This was collected by the chief or by those, whom he deputed to exercise his authority.<sup>2</sup>

Despite the numerous taxes that the tribes paid to the state, they contributed very little to the treasury; firstly, because the amount of taxes were small and, secondly, on account of the fact that, the tribes being powerful, the government had no means of coercing them into submission. The government, however, kept the leader of a tribe, or his children, as hostages at court in order to secure their good behaviour.<sup>3</sup> But often this did not prove effective. Almost all the Zand rulers after the death of the Vakil had to take measures against the unruly tribes. Sādeq Khān sent his son, Ja<sup>C</sup>far, to Kohgiluyeh to plunder the tribes resident in those areas. Again Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān had to resort to the same means with the Ka<sup>C</sup>b tribe.<sup>4</sup> A part of the tribal contribution to the state treasury was in the form of military support. That is, every family provided at least one mounted, armed soldier. Sometimes one family provided more than one. The poor tribesmen, who had not the means to do so, often shared the expenses with other families and paid a share towards it.<sup>5</sup>

1. <sup>C</sup>Ālam Āraye <sup>C</sup>Ābbāsi, Vol.1, p.139.

2. H.P., Vol.II, p.458.

3. Kinnier, op. cit., p.129.

4. G.G., p.299.

5. H.P., Vol.II, p.496.



Immediately after the chief or the leader of a tribe were the kalāntars of different clans, who were appointed by the chief. These had different names, according to the tribes. For instance, the kalāntars of Qashqā'i were called Kaikhā.<sup>1</sup> After the kalāntars were the kadkhodās. These officials collected taxes on behalf of their chief and settled disputes of minor consequence. They retained part of the taxes as commission for their services. A kalāntar could be promoted to the rank of a Khān, if he offered his master a significant service.

Tribal economy, land use, animal husbandry and handicrafts:

The land was not the major source of revenue for the tribe. Therefore, they made very little effort to cultivate it. The major investment of the tribal communities was in their flocks, although some of them, who were in a semi-nomadic state, tilled the land and engaged in agricultural activities.<sup>2</sup> For instance, a major branch of the Turkmans were mainly agriculturists. It appears that even nomads tilled the soil, during their stay in a region and left a few tribesmen to reap the harvest.

As stated before, the tribes were given arable lands by the government. It was always in the form of tyul or Eqta<sup>C</sup> in previous centuries. During the period under discussion, these grants were known as Yurt. Kinnier, in the early 19th century, remarks that the lands:

"granted first for a temporary purpose, is now from long and undisputed possession considered as the property of the different chiefs."<sup>3</sup>

1. Oberling, Pierre, Qashqā'i Nomads of Fārs, p.23.
2. H.P., Vol.II, p.119 "footnotes".
3. Kinnier, J.M., op. cit., p.44.

Indeed, it appears that sometimes these grants were extensive and covered a great area of fertile lands.

The government could, however, confiscate the lands allotted to the tribes. Nāder Shāh, after he transplanted many of the southern and western tribes into his newly acquired territories in Khorasān, confiscated their property. These were, however, reclaimed in the reign of the Vakil. There is a document in the possession of ~~the~~ Qashqā'i ruling family, in which the chiefs of that tribe requested the Vakil to return their hereditary territories. The Vakil complied with the request and re-allocated a vast area, covering many villages, to the Qashqā'i chiefs.<sup>1</sup> The tribal leaders had hereditary rights to these lands and could dispose of them at their pleasure. Some of the tribal chiefs leased their lands to the cultivators, or else allocated it to the members of their tribes. It often happened that the powerful tribes conquered lands by force, be it the property of a sedentary individual or a weaker tribal leader. The government seldom interfered in such disputes and, keeping the cause of dispute alive, benefited from the division of the tribal chiefs.<sup>2</sup>

Animal husbandry, <sup>however,</sup> was the major activity in the tribal economy.<sup>3</sup> Their flocks consisted of various kinds: mainly sheep, goats, cows and pack animals. Depending on the area of the tribal residence, camels were also used for transportation. The adoption of diverse herding was a measure of insurance against disease, famine and so on, as no disease would damage different animals in the same way and the kind of pasture, which suited one type of animal could secure the food for other kinds as well.

1. Oberling, Pierre, The Qashqa'i nomads, pp.37-8.

2. Kinnier, J.M., op. cit., p.45.

3. Ibid.

The tribes basically lived on their own products. They ate their own meat, milk and other dairy products, provided clothes and footwear<sup>1</sup> themselves and stood in need of the sedentary population for only a few items: i.e. tobacco, sugar, cloth and hardware, etc. They bartered their surplus with the sedentary population and had to keep good relations with their neighbouring villages. Large tribes such as Bakhtiāri and Qashqā'is provided major cities with mutton and their dairy products.<sup>2</sup> Not all the tribal families owned cattle. Indeed, many of the poor nomads did not have livestock at all. The largest herd belonged to the chief and his immediate family. They employed shepherds from outside or else expected their followers to tend their flocks. Carsten Niebuhr remarks on a Chupan working for a Turkish chief and he asserts that the payment of the shepherd was often in the form of livestock, rather than cash payment.<sup>3</sup> Among the Turkmans, the war captives and slaves were responsible for the flocks of their captors.<sup>4</sup>

Another major factor in the tribal economy was their manufacture of various items. They produced carpets, horse covers, tents, etc. Women were the major labour force in the tribal economy.<sup>5</sup> Children also contributed a great deal to the various activities involved in the tribal lifestyle. Men generally attended to matters of greater importance, such as preparation for emigration, wars, exchange of goods, etc.

The time of rest for the tribes was in the winter, when they were stationary and their flocks were not in need of constant attention. This was the time for other activities such as carpet weaving and industry.

1. Kinnier, J.M., op. cit., p.45.

2. H.P., Vol.II, p.605.

3. Ibid. Niebuhr, C., op. cit., p.57.

4. H.P., Vol.II, pp.127-8.

5. Niebuhr, C., op. cit., p.57.

Although, as stated before, the tribes contributed little to the treasury of the central government and were out of the way of oppression, as they resorted to the safety of the mountains when there was threat to their interests, they were extremely poor and lived in abject conditions. Abbott, in his geographical memoirs observes:

"The tribes in these parts (Fars) appear to be generally composed in great part of very poor families, they pay so little attention to agriculture that after their own immediate wants are supplied, produce derived from their flocks and herds, the remaining over will not keep them out of poverty."<sup>1</sup>

Their poverty was, however, one of the main causes of their predatory incursions into the cities and villages. If famine broke out as a result of drought, the tribes were the first to suffer from the miseries which followed. Their livestock died and they had no means of subsistence.

Forcible transplantation of the tribes often hindered their herding and damaged their economy. The Zand had suffered the inconveniences of this practice, but they resorted to this measure in order to subdue the turbulent tribes. <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān transferred about 3-4,000 of the Lors belonging to the various tribes from Kohgiluyeh to <sup>C</sup>Eraq-e-<sup>C</sup>Ajam. He even ventured to demand a written pledge that they would not leave their new abode. They were scattered, however, in the northern parts of their original residence in Malāyer, Brujerd, Nahāvand, Silākhor<sup>2</sup>, which did not differ greatly in respect to the climate and natural resources from Kohgiluyeh. Tribes were often transferred to areas with a totally different natural aspect from their own residence, in which case they could not adapt to the new environment and often their population and herds diminished drastically.

1. Abbott Geographical Journal, p. 170-1.

2. G.M., p.372.

### The Zand Tribe:

The Zand tribe had very limited resources, human and material, even before it suffered its disastrous transplantation in 1145/1732 to the province of Khorasān, by which their number diminished to about 30-40 households.<sup>1</sup> They earned their livelihood by robbery and raiding the neighbouring villages and towns.<sup>2</sup> This indicates that they had not sufficient material resources, such as flocks and livestock, on which they could subsist. However, when they returned from Darreh Gaz into their original homeland near Malāyer (1160/1747), they had very little hope of survival. Hence, when an enterprising and shrewd chief like Karim Khān set himself up to gain political power, the tribe hailed his successors with joy. All the warriors unanimously accepted his supremacy and fought for him with great zeal and courage.<sup>3</sup> As we will relate in the section on women, even the tribal women assisted him in many perilous situations.

With miraculous perseverance, Karim Khān established his rule over the greater part of the empire and, for the space of nearly fourteen years, enjoyed undisputed power.<sup>4</sup> However, his tribe and those allied to him took their residence in the city of Shirāz, leading a life of affluence and comfort.<sup>5</sup> The majority of them acquired landed property within and outside the city.<sup>6</sup> Whether they were given allotted property from the Khāsh or Divāni lands, is not known. But it is certain that their houses were built and given to them by Karim Khān,<sup>7</sup> whereas

1. M.I., p.147.

2. G.G., p.4. M.I., p.451.

3. G.G., p.7.

4. R.M.M., p.65.

5. I.Z., p.77.

6. Ibid.

7. R.I., p.339.

the great men, such as Shaikh <sup>Ḷ</sup>Ali Khān and Nazar <sup>Ḷ</sup>Ali Khān, built Arks for themselves, not much inferior to the royal Ark.<sup>1</sup> During this time, they were totally divorced from their habitual nomadic life, although we know that they kept large herds of horses and other livestock, and engaged in agriculture as well.<sup>2</sup> The urban lifestyle affected their nomadic taste to an extent that "they would not sleep even on satin and silk bedding."<sup>3</sup> In short, the Zands, having become the higher echelon of the society, enjoyed all the luxury and comfort that they had never dreamt of. Thus, self-interest and personal advantage superseded feelings of tribal hegemony and unity.

In the meantime, many of the old generation had died and there emerged a new generation, who had no experience of nomadic life. It was precisely this generation, who ruined the Zand house, as they had not experienced the poverty of nomadic life. Karim Khān, during his whole rule, was faced with only one revolt by a member of his own tribe, that of his half-brother, Zaki Khān;<sup>4</sup> whereas, in the space of sixteen years that his successors survived, every one of them had to deal with at least one. All the Zand rulers after the death of the Vakil, were put to death or else assassinated by the Zands themselves.<sup>5</sup> In most cases of Zand versus Zand, the rebels were among the most powerful or rich tribal chiefs. <sup>Ḷ</sup>Ali Morād Khān, before he became king, held court and at Nouruz bestowed more robes of honour to his entourage and military generals<sup>6</sup> than <sup>Ḷ</sup>Sādeq Khān could afford in Shirāz. The key to every political unrest was power and money. Power was required to incite fear in those who had the means to contest it

1. G.G., p.155. G.M., p.266.

2. R.T., p.406.

3. G.G., p.347.

4. Ibid.

5. R.M.M., p. 75, 81, etc.

6. G.M., p.393.

and money to buy off the services of the mercenary tribes. As will be observed in the section on the tribes allied to the cause of the Zands, it is amazing with what ease an army could be assembled. Bāqer Khān Khorāskāni, the governor of Esfāhān, managed to gather 6,000 men around his standard by way of donations to them.<sup>1</sup> Zolfaqār Khān Khamseh gave his soldiers one Tomān each to assist him in his military exploits.<sup>2</sup>

It has often been a matter of speculation, why Karim Khān did not nominate one of his sons as his successor. The reason lies in the fact that he had a thorough knowledge of his sons and their inability to assert their right to the throne. He also knew the nobles of his tribe. Qaffāri's observation that:

"the Vakil was so depressed after the death of his favourite son, <sup>C</sup>Abdol Rahim Khān that he only wished to die",<sup>3</sup>

bears evidence to the hopelessness of his situation. The Kalān-tar also remarks on his change of temperament:

"he had become mean and cruel to the extent that he did not hesitate to kill a few people for the slightest irregularity in the accounts of the Divan."<sup>4</sup>

Karim Khān could foresee what was going to happen, but he could not prevent it.

The issue of the succession polarized the court and the Zand nobles around two centres of power while the Vakil was ill; one was that of a respected elder of the tribe, Nazar <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān,

1. R.M.M., p.84.

2. G.M., p.413.

3. Ibid.

4. R.M.M., p.68.

and the other was that of Zaki Khān. Zaki Khān was in an absolute minority against his rivals in number of supporters and popularity.<sup>1</sup> Whether the division had been noticed by the ailing Vakil or not, is not known to us. He did, however, make a faint gesture to place his sons under the protection of his full brother, Ṣādeq Khān.<sup>2</sup> Apparently, the latter was opposed to Zaki Khān and favoured the rival faction.<sup>3</sup> It is striking how a weak rival could take advantage of a tactical mistake and annihilate almost all of his opponents with great facility. A blood feud had already divided the Zand tribe into two hostile camps.<sup>4</sup> The death of the Vakil unleashed the hostility, which only his power kept in check. In the initial phases of the intertribal struggles, more than twenty-three Zand military generals lost their lives, their possessions were confiscated, a great part of the treasury was spent on buying the tribal warriors of other tribes.<sup>5</sup> These, in effect, reduced the power of the Zands in warfare potential and drained the financial capacity of the treasury. Zaki Khān did not live to enjoy his success. Thus, Ṣādeq Khān, in his turn, purged and murdered whoever had assisted Zaki Khān in his pursuit of power.<sup>6</sup> One after the other, rulers came and went and with them the fortune of one party, as against another one, rose and fell. Ṣādeq Khān was killed together with his sons at the accession of Āli Morād Khān, who even murdered the very ones who brought him to power.<sup>7</sup>

Although this series of murders and assassinations appears totally senseless to the reader of the history of this period, an

1. G.G., pp.216-7.

2. D.K., preliminary matters, p.cxiv.

3. M.T., p.342. I.O.R. G/29/18 asserts that Abol Faḥ Khān was confined for 24 hours when his uncle was at the gates of the city, and D.K. states that Ṣādeq Khān was the guardian of the Vakil's sons.

4. G.G., p.217.

5. R.M.M., pp.71-2.

6. I.Z., pp.12-13.

7. G.M., p.



observant historian can detect the logic behind it all. In an absolutist state like that of Persia, where the power of the ruler was primarily based on force of arms and terrorization, there was no stability unless force was exercised. The monarch had no guarantee of the fidelity of his closest of kins, so he kept his potential rivals under close and constant control. The princes were in perpetual dread in case their activities incited suspicion in the mind of the despot. The least punishment for entertaining rebellious intentions was deprivation of eyesight; the severest was execution. That was the reason why the rebels concealed their intentions until they had left the capital, outside the sphere of the monarchs' power. <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān is an example of a rebellious prince. He managed to get away from Shirāz by instigating Abol Fath Khān to send him on a military expedition; as soon as he reached Tehran, he declared himself opposed to his uncle, Zaki Khān, and set himself up as the supporter of Abol Fath Khān's cause.<sup>1</sup> But, in his turn, he not only cast aside that prince, he also deprived him of his eyesight. <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān is a perfect example of an oriental despot, in that he even killed the very ones who brought him to power. Akbar Khān had rendered him invaluable services, while he was fighting Ṣādeq Khān and especially during the siege/of Shirāz.<sup>2</sup> Thus, when <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān established himself in Esfāhān, he gradually became more and more suspicious of Akbar Khān, since a large number of tribes had gathered around him and, even while attending the court, they were in his company.<sup>3</sup> This act greatly aroused the jealousy of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān and, eventually, resulted in the execution of one of the most courageous, gallant and able soldiers of the Zand house, Akbar Khān.<sup>4</sup> One might think that a weak and incompetent prince would be spared, but this was not the case; since

1. G.G., pp.222-4.

2. G.M., p.372.

3. Ibid.

4. I.Z., p.20. R.M.M., p.76.

Mohammad <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, the second son of the Vakil, was the best example of an inoffensive character, but this did not save him; he also was blinded. Even if the princes had no pretention to the rule of the monarch, time and again they were used by the courtiers to promote their own causes. Shaikh Vais Khān, the eldest son of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, an affable prince, joined Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān the moment he learnt of his father's death, in order to prevent any hostile action on the part of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān.<sup>1</sup> For a long time he lived in Shirāz in peace, until a few courtiers conspired to topple Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, while he was away, and set the young prince on the throne. Whether the prince was actually involved in the plot is not known, but it cost him his eyes when the conspiracy was discovered.<sup>2</sup> The despot, however mild and amiable like Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, was compelled to take drastic measures in order to secure his life and throne. There was absolutely no guarantee for any stability in his kingdom, unless he was firm and ruthless in his policy. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, having a mild and moderate disposition,<sup>3</sup> failed to see the simple logic behind the game of power. Moderation could be interpreted as weakness and would encourage the opponents to strike a blow. Şeid Morād Khān had once disputed Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān's rule and was pardoned. But, when he conspired against the Zand ruler for a second time, Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān arrested him and confiscated his vast wealth.<sup>4</sup> Although it was expected by almost every one that the ruler would deprive Şeid Morād of his eyesight,<sup>5</sup> it did not happen. The result was the brutal assassination of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān by the hands of his prisoners, Şeid Morād Khān and his brothers.

The most interesting phase of the Zand rule is the last years

1. M.H.P., Vol.II, p.294.

2. Ibid.

3. OMTS, p.348.

4. Ibid., p.345.

5. Ibid.

of that dynasty after the murder of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān and the reign of his son and successor, Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān. We have already indicated that, in the period after the death of the Vakil, much energy, money and lives were lost in useless internal wars, which could otherwise have been directed against the only mortal enemy of the Zand house, the Qājārs. What prevented the Zand nobles ~~to see~~<sup>to see</sup> the necessity for unity and solidarity or, rather, disregard the need, has already been made clear. Indeed, as observed by the EIC resident, the only means of survival was unity against the common enemy;<sup>1</sup> instead, they ruined their chances by endless disputes and wars. It was not the power of their rival, which ended the Zand rule, but sheer self-indulgence, avarice and thirst for power, which brought about revolutions and counter-revolutions, successively and without any interval of peace, resulting in their downfall.

What makes Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān's reign interesting, is that he was the inheritor of more than a decade of internecine wars; when he ascended the throne, there was not a single noble left in the Zand tribe, who could contest him; neither was there any to assist him in his difficult task of putting right numerous problems, which the Zand house was faced with, except his two uncles. First of all, many of the provinces traditionally tributary to the government at Shirāz, were now refusing to pay the usual dues.<sup>2</sup> Thus, the young prince had to carry his arms into those territories; one of these provinces was Kermān. It has often been wondered by the contemporary chroniclers, as well as modern historians, why Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān attempted to subdue Kermān with such unusual persistence. He has even been accused of being obstinate and proud of not accepting the terms offered to him, while he had besieged Kermān. Some fanciful writers have even attributed his conduct to his desire for self-assertion,<sup>3</sup> whereas none of these superficial outlooks appears

1. I.O.R. G/29/21. Bussora, 26th May, 1779.

2. I.Z., pp.52-3.

3. Danesh, S., Ebrāhim-e-Kalāntar, Tehran 1348, p.72.

to clarify his intentions. The reality was that Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was desperately in need of cash to carry out his struggle against the Qājārs. By then the treasury was empty, especially after his father was assassinated and a large part of the treasures had been given over to the tribes to quieten them.<sup>1</sup> Thus, Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān had to find some means to raise cash; as he himself observed, the jewels in his possession were of no use to him unless they were sold; that is exactly why he invited Sir Harford Jones to Shirāz to examine and value this jewelry.<sup>2</sup> The main reason behind the expedition towards Kermān was the immense wealth, which the governor, the Esmā<sup>C</sup>ili Emām, had gathered in his stronghold, Shahr-e-Bābak.<sup>3</sup> Seyed Abol Hasan Kohaki was appointed the governor of Kermān by the order of the late Vakil. While Karim Khān was alive the governor paid his tribute regularly.<sup>4</sup> Even when Sādeq Khān fled to Kermān, for fear of falling into the hands of Zaki Khān, he was welcomed and entertained by the governor.<sup>5</sup> On Sādeq Khān's accession to the throne, he sent all the hostages from Kermān and its dependencies, who had been kept in Shirāz, back to their respective homes and his son, Ali Naqi Khān was admitted to the city and entertained.<sup>6</sup> It was, however, when Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān assumed the reins, that the governor changed course.<sup>7</sup> Apparently, it was purely due to internal policies, that is, the religio-economic power struggle within the capital city of Kermān, Gavashir. This issue will be dealt with in another chapter;<sup>8</sup> suffice it to mention that the governor resolved to resist the Zand attack on Kermān. He, however, was forced to send out some

1. G.M., p.458.

2. D.K., preliminary matters, p.cxxv.

3. I.K., p.333.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., pp.334, 335.

6. G.G., p.241.

7. I.K., p.333.

8. See Chapter on Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, p.193.

of the notables, together with the Shaikh al-Eslām, to entreat Lotf Āli Khān to lift the siege in exchange for 20,000 Tomāns cash.<sup>1</sup> The offer was not enough. Seyed Abol Hasan received 20,000 Tomāns every year from his followers in India;<sup>2</sup> besides, he had not paid his arrears for a few successive years. Thus, the prince did not accede to the offer and the siege continued.<sup>3</sup> However, the intense cold compelled the Zand prince to quit Kermān and return to Shirāz.<sup>4</sup> From then on, he became bitter and impatient. Many historians, i.e. Ebn Ābdol Karim and Malcolm, have noticed the change of temperament in Lotf Āli Khān after his failure in Kermān.<sup>5</sup> The reality was that, without an enormous amount of money, he could never fight his foe, who by then had gained possession of the more prosperous and rich territories of the empire and could afford the expense of long-term warfare. Whereas the Zand prince had no means of raising cash, except for bringing back the territories traditionally tributary to the government at Shirāz. Another source of income would have been the trade with the EIC in the south; he tried very hard to encourage the company to expand their activities in the Gulf and even offered them the use of Khārk island, which previously contained the Dutch establishment.<sup>6</sup> His minister, Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein, specifically visited Basra to carry on negotiation with the agents of the company there. He readily complied with the request of the EIC agents to place the factory in Bushehr on a different footing from what it had been hitherto.<sup>7</sup>

None of these measures proved an immediate remedy for his

1. G.G., pp.326-7.

2. I.K., p.333.

3. G.G., p.327.

4. Ibid. I.Z., p.56.

5. I.Z., p.60. H.P., Vol.II, p. 178 and 180.

6. I.O.R., Report on the commerce of Arabia and Persia. G/29/21. 1790.

7. I.O.R. G/29/21.

desperate predicament; thus, he again resorted to armed struggle. He made preparation for an expedition to Esfāhān, once a rich and prosperous city. He was certain of his victory; so much so, that he invited Sir Harford Jones, then in Shirāz, to stay until he returned.<sup>1</sup> But this time the Zand's rule was contested, not by a tribal chief, but by a kadkhodā of the Haydari quarters of the city. Hāji Ebrāhim, as a wealthy merchant and the kalāntar, knew perfectly well that, once the territorial expansion was stopped, the attention of the prince would turn to the citizens of Shirāz and, more so, to the merchant classes, for money. They would be mulcted and denuded of their wealth in order to provide for the warfare expeditions. This was precisely what the Hāji tried to prevent, by staging his coup. Most historians appear to be mistaken, in stating that the kalāntar, Hāji Ebrāhim, wished to replace the Zands with the Qājārs, so that the empire would be in peace.<sup>2</sup> The Hāji had no intention of doing so, as he openly confessed to the Qājār chief, Āqā Moḥammad Khān.<sup>3</sup> The idea was to form a confederacy of local governors in the south, and not to submit to any overlord.<sup>4</sup> The idea, in itself, was progressive and would have worked was there not a formidable claimant for the universal power in the empire. Hāji had witnessed so many coups in the government and, by then, he knew all the keywords in the politics. His scheme was, even by today's standards, so well calculated, that had it not been for the incredible prowess of the Zand prince, Loṭf Āli Khān, who, despite adverse conditions, beat the Hāji's forces many times,<sup>5</sup> the Hāji would have succeeded in his plans with facility. Apparently, the scheme was not purely Hāji's; he had the assistance of many of the most

1. D.K., preliminary matters, p.cxl.

2. H.P., Vol.II, p.183. Skteches from Persia, Vol. II, p. 153.

3. R.S., Vol.9., n.p.

4. D.K., p.cl. G.G., p.343.

5. G.G., pp.346-56.

experienced bureaucrats, i.e. Mirzā Jāni Fasā'i; shrewd merchants like the Shaikh of Bushehr;<sup>1</sup> local governors and magnates, like <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān of Kāzerun; etc. Shaikh Nāṣer of Bush-ehr had combined the position of a ruler with that of a businessman; he had gathered enormous wealth by his active contribution in commerce.<sup>2</sup> This, in effect, had brought him into constant conflict with the EIC agents, and brought about disputes with the government at Shirāz.<sup>3</sup> His son, Shaikh Naṣr, was not so much involved in the commercial transaction, yet he had inherited his father's vast fortune,<sup>4</sup> and was inclined to retain and add to it. Hence, he had secretly allied himself to the Hājī and his accomplices, in dispensing with the monarchy and establishing a federative government, by which they would not pay tribute or dues to anyone.<sup>5</sup> Hājī Ebrāhim and his associates must have necessarily been encouraged to execute their plot by the failure, which Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān suffered in reducing the citadel of Kermān. Since, the citadel of Shirāz was much stronger and the Hājī had arranged for the expulsion of the tribes, resident in the city, so as to remove the threat from within the capital, Shirāz. Previous to the execution of his plan, he organised a city militia, mainly composed of Luti and shopkeepers, under his brother's supervision.<sup>6</sup> These were armed and clad with the amunition and treasures confiscated from the tribes, the Zand nobles and the general populace, who were opposed to the coup.<sup>7</sup> The historical events, which ensued, have been related in the proper section and here it suffices to say that what lay behind all these events, was primarily the need for money on the part of the Zand prince, and the

1. F.N., part II, p.30.

2. I.O.R. G/29/21.

3. I.O.R., Report on the commerce of Arabia and Persia.

4. Tārikh-e-Bushehr, p. 72.

5. D.K., p.cl. G.G.

6. H.P., Vol.II, p.188. I.Z., p. 62.

7. G.G., p.347.

resistance of the merchant class to part with their money. Hāji Ebrāhim, as the representative of the bourgeoisie and an active contributor in the political economy of the state, executed a plan, which marks the advent of a new era in the history of Persia: the emergence of the citizens of the major cities, as against the tribal rule, which had totally monopolized the arena for many centuries.<sup>1</sup> Why the bourgeoisie failed to become independent in its true sense has already been dealt with in the chapter on urban society.<sup>2</sup>

### The Tribes and the Zand Dynasty:

The tribes, as they relate to the Zand dynasty, form three major categories:

1. The tribes who were traditionally allied to the Zand house, such as the Lak, Lor and Kurdish tribes of the Zagros foothills, i.e. namely, Kalhor, Māfi, Zanganeh, Bājlān, and so on.
2. The non-allied tribes, who assisted the Zand house occasionally and on request from the Zand sovereigns, such as Qaraguzlu, Mokri, Qashqā'i, etc. These tribes were different from the first category, in that they retained their independence on all occasions, paid tribute and did not interfere with the politics of the central government.
3. The third group were hostile and rival tribes, who, by the nature of the claim they had to the throne, were never allied, or even participant, in Zand military expeditions. In this category, the Qājārs were the champions, although, on a few occasions, the Qājār chiefs (i.e. Āqā Moḥammad Khān's brothers, Rezā Qoli, Morteżā Qoli and Moḥstafā Qoli Khān) joined the camp of the Zand and actually entered into their service. But in all the instances

1. See general histories of Persia from the advent of the fifth century to the nineteenth century.

2. See Chapter 7, pp. 278ff.



the alliance did not last long and they turned their back on the Zands.

We will now examine the character and role of each group in the context of the Zand suzerainty

1. Tribes allied to the Zands:

As stated in the previous section on the Zand tribe, this was a very small tribe with very limited human resources. Indeed, when they returned from Khorasān on the assassination of their oppressor, Nāder Shāh (1160/1747), they numbered only forty households.<sup>1</sup> Thus Karim Khān, although he enjoyed the support of all the Zand warriors, had to rely heavily on the other tribes for military support. Hence, he gathered a number of tribes under his standard and they formed the core of his army. When he eventually established his supremacy all over the country, he returned to Shirāz and brought along with him the tribes, who had fought on his side.

We learn that he ordered his brother, Sādeq Khān, to build 10-20,000 houses in Shirāz for the tribal warriors in his company.<sup>2</sup> Waring, in 1802, saw these houses in ruin after the ravages of the Qājārs.<sup>3</sup> By settling these tribes in the city of Shirāz, Karim Khān first and foremost secured a standing army within the city, which could be mobilized at short notice. Furthermore, by establishing a sedentary life for these tribes, he made them dependent on himself. These measures proved highly profitable as long as he lived, but once he was no more, there was no guarantee of their loyalty, or even the participation of these tribes in any of the Zand military affairs.

1. I.Z., p.147.

2. R.I., p.339.

3. I.S., p.33.

Indeed, the tribes acted quite contrary to that. Immediately after the death of the Vakil, they threw their support behind Zaki Khān and enabled him to murder twenty-three of the ablest military generals of the Zand house. In fact, all of these men were by all accounts compared to the mythological warriors of ancient Persia, like Rostam, etc.<sup>1</sup> The Māfi tribes even acted as the instrument in Zaki Khān's hands and murdered these Zand noblemen for him. Zaki Khān was not satisfied by the killing of all these men. He also confiscated all their effects and, in order to retain the support of the tribal warriors, he distributed large sums of money amongst them.<sup>2</sup>

When ḌAli Morād Khān declared himself opposed to the rule of his uncle, Zaki Khān, he distributed more money to gather an army.<sup>3</sup> Apparently, Zaki Khān spent 100,000 Tomāns on mobilising 20,000 men.<sup>4</sup> That meant five Tomāns to each man. Considering that a family could live on two Tomāns for a year,<sup>5</sup> it is easy to form an opinion of the greed and avarice of the tribal warriors, which had been sharpened by these generous donations and had made them aware of the value of their support.

The same tribe (Māfi), who assassinated the Zand nobles, also assassinated Zaki Khān once they sensed danger to their own interests. It would appear that the Rishsafid of the Māfi tribe, Khān ḌAli Khān, had rendered too great a service to Zaki Khān to be overlooked, but at the same time, the Zand chief was apprehensive of men, who could exercise such power. Zaki Khān had entertained suspicious feelings towards Khān ḌAli Khān Māfi for some time and was awaiting a chance to eliminate him.<sup>6</sup>

1. I.Z., p.7. R.I., p.425. G.M., p.418.G.G., p.218.

2. G.M., p.216. G.G., p.219. R.M.M., pp.71-2.

3. R.I., p.

4. R.M.M., p.71.

5. R.I., p.436.

6. G.M., p.244.

This was, however, prevented by the assassination of Zaki Khan. The Māfi chief acted diplomatically: he, who had assisted the Zand chief, Zaki Khān, to usurp the throne and cast aside the rightful heir (Abol Fath Khān, the eldest son of the Vakil), rushed to the tent of the same Abol Fath Khān and informed him of the assassination;<sup>1</sup> and by this act, he secured more favour and financial gain for himself and his tribesmen. The support of the Lak and Kurdish tribes, resident in Shirāz, for Abol Fath Khān, did not last very long. They soon became dissatisfied with affairs, since Šādeq Khān had entered the arena and the young king and his uncle appeared to be at odds. It is significant to observe that when Šādeq Khān was told not to attend the court, some of the courtiers tried their best to mediate between the two factions. Āzād Khān Afghān was appointed to negotiate with Šādeq Khān and convince him of the detrimental implications of their dispute.<sup>2</sup> Šādeq Khān, however, refused to comply with the wishes of the courtiers and stated that, so long as Abol Fath Khān did not obey the usage of the realm and regarded his uncle with contempt, he would not attend the court.<sup>3</sup> The tribes staged a demonstration in protest to the mild and peaceful disposition of the king and gathered in the great Maidān and demanded that the king allow them to bring Šādeq Khān by force, and even eliminate him and his sons should it be necessary.<sup>4</sup> Abol Fath Khān knew well what they were after. As Ghāfāri suggests, these tribes were only anxious to stir troubles and every day found another cause for disturbance.<sup>5</sup> However, Abol Fath Khān was aware of their intentions, that is a political instability, which in effect enhanced their gains. Thus, he refrained from giving them leave to molest his uncle or his family. The tribes, therefore,

1. I.S., p.267.

2. R.M.M., pp.73-4.

3. G.M., p.267.

4. Ibid., p.268. R.M.M., pp.74-5.

5. Ibid.

abused the king and the protest was nearly turned into a riot, when the king was conducted inside and the tribes dispersed.<sup>1</sup> The incident did not end here, as the tribal warriors gathered around Ṣādeq Khān and instigated him to depose his nephew.<sup>2</sup> A coup followed, which was carried by the tribes: Ṣādeq Khān arrived at the gates of the royal residence; he was admitted; the tribal warriors in his party arrested and imprisoned Abol Fath Khān and his younger brothers; and, thus, Ṣādeq Khān ascended to the throne.<sup>3</sup>

These events are sufficient to indicate the crucial and detrimental effect of tribal interference. The representative of the traditional sedentary population: that is, the kalāntar, Mirzā Moḥammad, together with a few of his colleagues, tried very hard to prevent many of these disastrous events, but in vain.<sup>4</sup> The tribes appeared to be well in control of the situation. Mirzā Moḥammad laments bitterly of the tribes and the futile efforts which he made. Now let us examine why the tribes, who were the major element in the Zand victory, had become its worse enemy.

In fact, Ghafāri is the only historian, who remarks on the change of attitude which had appeared in the tribes. He states that the warriors, who had never turned their back to the battlefield, had become like Gorgin Milad.<sup>5</sup> What was the cause of this change, is the essence of the unrest and turbulence of the tribes. The main reason for the change can be cited as the fact that, for nearly fourteen years, Karim Khān did not quit his capital and his army was leading a life of idleness and leisure. In his attempt to capture the town of Baṣra, almost

1. G.M., p.269.

2. R.M.M., p.73. I.Z., p.12.

3. R.M.M., p.73. G.G., p.233. I.Z., p.12.

4. R.M.M., p.73.

5. G.M., p.418.

all of the troops were of the <sup>C</sup>Arab and Afghān tribes,<sup>1</sup> rather than the Laks and Kurds and Lors. It is no wonder that, when the Persian governor of Baṣra was killed in a war with some <sup>C</sup>Arab tribes of Baṣra, and Ṣādeq Khān was again sent to quell the revolt, he had only 2000 men with him and the reinforcement, that he was daily expecting, never arrived.<sup>2</sup> As is affirmed by the EIC resident, "the commands of the Vakil are but poorly obeyed".<sup>3</sup> The men with Ṣādeq Khān were mostly non-residents of the city of Shirāz and this saved him from falling into the hands of his mortal enemy, Zaki Khān. Zaki Khān had sent letters to the adherents of Ṣādeq Khān that, should they remain loyal to him, their families and wives would be given over to the lust of the muleteers.<sup>4</sup> This measure was effective, as the menial servants of the camp of Ṣādeq Khān deserted him in order to rescue their families, but only to the number of 700. He had upwards of 1300 troops with him, when he fled towards Kerman, and managed even to defeat the army sent out of the city to capture him.<sup>5</sup>

In short, the residence in the city and the urban life style had greatly diminished the warlike qualities of the tribes. Thus, they had become inclined to demand more and more reward for the minimum effort. Furthermore, they had lost a great deal of their independence, since they had been resident in the capital. All European sources have commented on the excellence of the police force in Shirāz.<sup>6</sup> The function of the police was primarily to secure the safety of the gates to the city and to control the activities of the citizens, rather than civic administration of Shirāz. We learn from Francklin that he was

1. I.O.R. G/29/18. Bushire, 1780. I.Z. states that soldiers were of the Sistāni tribes (p.6).
2. I.O.R. G/29/18, Bushire, 1780.
3. Ibid.
4. M.I., p.345.
5. Op. cit. I.Z., p.9. G.G., p.221. G.M., p.257-8.
6. O.M.I.S., pp.52-3. I.S., p.67.

stopped every day on his leaving the gates of the city, until he obtained a permission from the government, which enabled him to leave the city anytime he wished. The above-mentioned source also asserts that the guards were under four khāns, and should any one abnoxious to the government leave the place, the head of the guards was answerable for it.<sup>1</sup> These restrictions had limited the freedom of the tribal warriors to the degree where they were only allowed to quit Shirāz in the company of the sovereign or a military chieftain and, strictly speaking, on government military expeditions. Thus, they were deprived of entering the service of the highest bidder in the arena and were forced to accept the terms offered to them in Shirāz. Hence, it was in their interest to foment strife and competition among the Zand chiefs. This, however, did not mean that they would serve their sovereign with loyalty and fidelity. On the contrary, the moment the army quited the city and they found a good chance of deserting their commander, they did not hesitate to do so. Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān was deserted by part of his army on every occasion that he ventured to regain his lost territories.<sup>2</sup> It was not uncommon for the tribes to join the opposed faction in exchange for a share of booty. Another major obstacle for the tribe to fight with resilience and devotion to their master, was the fact that, over a period of thirty years, the tribes resident in the city of Shirāz had become, as Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh calls them, Khāneh Shahri: that is, city dwellers.<sup>3</sup> They had bought property and had gained roots in the urban life style. Thus when, for example, they went outside the city and the government, or whosoever in the city, threatened them that their property and families would be confiscated, or given over as captives, they had no option except to desert their commanders and enter the town.<sup>4</sup> Almost all of the Zand rulers

1. O.M.I.S., p.53.

2. G.G., pp.252-315.

3. I.Z., p.77.

4. G.G., pp.215-395.

had to resort to this measure at some stage. Zaki Khān wrote letters to the adherents of Sādeq Khān and ordered them to desert him.<sup>1</sup> Sādeq Khān, in his turn, sent decrees to the chiefs in the service of ʿAli Morād Khān to that effect.<sup>2</sup> Seid Morād Khān tried the same trick on Lotf ʿAli Khān and Hāji Ebrāhim also deprived Lotf ʿAli Khān of his supporters by similar means<sup>3</sup>.

In the chapter on urban society and its interrelation with the nomadic and sedentary tribal population, we examined the resentment and hatred, with which the traditional citizens of Shirāz regarded these tribes, and how Hāji Ebrāhim, as the champion of the bourgeois middle classes, staged his coup to assert the power of the citizens, as against the tribes. Here, suffice it to mention that Hāji Ebrāhim, after coercing the tribal warriors to enter the city, disarmed them and expelled upward of 12,000 from Shirāz.<sup>4</sup> The expulsion had many advantages for the weak and precarious rule of Hāji Ebrāhim. First, it secured him from threat, or a coup staged by the tribes; and further, by confiscation of the tribal property, he accumulated great wealth in cash and kind.<sup>5</sup> To quote Tārikh-e-Giti Goshāy:

"The treasures which he appropriated were so great that it is beyond imagination to conceive."<sup>6</sup>

The Hāji, in the execution of his bold scheme, needed an enormous amount of money. The treasury was empty, as Lotf ʿAli Khān's predecessors had lavishly spent it on either their military exploits or else had distributed it amongst the tribes.<sup>7</sup> For

1. I.Z., p.9. G.M., p. 260-61.

2. G.M., p.292.

3. G.G., p.344. I.Z., pp.64-5.

4. I.Z., pp.60-67. H.P., Vol.II, pp.187-8.

5. G.G., p.347.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid. G.M., p.458.

instance, when Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān was assassinated, Seid Morād Khān and his accomplices gave up the great part of the royal treasures, in order to quieten the tribes.<sup>1</sup> The expulsion of the tribal warriors had another advantage, as remarked on by Sir John Malcolm. The Hāji added to the military capacity of the city militia<sup>2</sup> as the arms and amunition of 12,000 men fell into his hands. However, it appears that the tribes, who had been amassing wealth for over thirty years, could not take any of it along with them, as the Hāji, knowing their avarice for money, declared his wish to give them a donation, and ordered them to gather in the centre of the town.<sup>3</sup> This ploy was effective and the tribes fell into his trap and were banished from the city, without any of their belongings; instead, the money that they had hoarded for so long, was used against them and their interests. These tribes gathered round Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān at different times, as Tārikh-e-Zandiyeh asserts, finding their only means of recovering their lost property in aiding the Zand prince,<sup>4</sup> although we have evidence of Lotf<sup>c</sup>Ali Khān's army having reached 12,000 men;<sup>5</sup> but he apparently never had enough men to an amount comparable with the Qājār force, and always had to rely on his courage and military genius.

## 2. The non-allied tribes:

The second category of the tribes were those, who had retained their independence from the government at Shirāz, residing in their habitual territories. These had invariably one or several hostages in the court at Shirāz, for the regular payment of their tribute and the good conduct of the tribesmen. The best example of these was the Qashqā'i, a large and powerful,

1. H.P., Vol.II, p.188. G.G., p.347.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. I.Z., p.77.

5. I.O.R. G/29/18, Bushire, 1792.



Turkish tribe whose chief, Esma<sup>C</sup>il Khān, was a permanent resident at Shirāz, and he had become a close and trusted companion to Karim Khān.<sup>1</sup> His status as a hostage did not deprive him of gaining and exercising power. Indeed, he was the main cause of Zaki Khān's massacre of the Zand Nobles.<sup>2</sup> The situation came about when Zaki Khān was preparing to meet the nobles Nāzar<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, Kabb<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, etc., who had taken refuge in the citadel and had only come out on the condition that Zaki Khān met them on neutral ground.<sup>3</sup> As he was leaving to attend the meeting, Esma<sup>C</sup>il Khān warned him, that each of these men was a great military general; thus, attending the meeting alone would be inexpedient, in case they attempted to kill him. Zaki Khān immediately changed his course and refused to go. He did, however, send one of the lesser Zand Khāns, Moḥammad Ḥosein Khān Hezāreh, to meet Nazār<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān and his supporters.<sup>4</sup> This act was considered as a great insult to the Zand elders and, as Nazār<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān was leaving to make preparation for a military engagement, he was assaulted by the Māfi soldiers who killed them all.<sup>5</sup> Esma<sup>C</sup>il Khān appears to have taken the side of Zaki Khān from the start. Whether this was due to some previous arrangement or not, is not known. It is, however, evident that he enjoyed great favour with Zaki Khān and set about extorting and mulcting the Shirāz non-tribal population.<sup>6</sup> He ventured to challenge the power of the kalāntar, Mirzā Moḥammad, but failed in his pursuit, as is related by the kalāntar himself.

"On the occasion of the payment of special levy (pish-kesh) of Shirāz and its dependencies, Esma<sup>C</sup>il

1. G.M., p.218.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p.214. G.G., p. 218.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. R.M.M., pp.69-70.

"Khān found a good pretext to manifest his hostility towards me. During the lifetime of the Vakil there had been a number of disputes between us and, on every occasion he had not succeeded. When Zaki Khān came into power he sent Hāji Ebrāhim to me and asked to be given a share of the Pishkesh. I had never given him a farthing and I was not prepared to do so now."<sup>1</sup>

The result was that the Qashqā'i chief went to Zaki Khān and accused the kalāntar of being in league with Sādeq Khān, and of keeping the Pishkesh until the latter arrived.<sup>2</sup> This had greatly annoyed Zaki Khān and it was with much difficulty, that the kalāntar convinced him of his innocence.<sup>3</sup> The Qashqā'i chief was also responsible for instigating Zaki Khān to kill his nephew, <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān; for this act he paid with his life, as <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān ordered him to be put to death.<sup>4</sup>

The tribal chief resorted to intrigues and slander once he was divorced from his habitual surroundings and deprived of his military power. The moment he returned to his tribe or his followers, he did not miss a chance to promote his cause through military actions. A good example of these chiefs are the sons of Fath <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān Afshār. Jahāngir Khān and Mohāmmad Rashid Khān were released from Shirāz, when Karim Khān was fatally ill. Thus, he had sent them to Esfāhān to gather their followers and return to Āzarbāyjān, the original abode of their tribe.<sup>5</sup> On their arrival at the city of Esfāhān, the news of the Vakil's death reached them. Their fellow tribesmen persuaded them to rebel and capture Esfāhān. They allied themselves to some other tribal elements and, together with some of the officials and the Lutis of the city, staged a revolt.<sup>6</sup> The govern-

1. R.M.M., p.70.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., pp.70-1.

4. G.M.p.266. R.M.M., p.71.

5. G.G., p.222. I.Z., p.7. G.M. p.255.

6. Ibid.

or of the city retired to the citadel in the vicinity of Esfāhān, and was besieged for the space of fifteen days.<sup>1</sup> The revolt was only quelled when a large detachment arrived from Shirāz. The two Afshār chiefs were executed with some of their allies, while the rioters of the city were imprisoned and fined heavily.<sup>2</sup> The non-allied tribes to the house of the Zands would readily grasp any opportunity, which relieved them from the payment of their dues. Khosro Khān, the Vāli of Ardalān, had refrained from payment of his arrears, since the death of the Vakil.<sup>3</sup> Āli Morād Khān, being a great administrator as well as a military commander, coerced him to take refuge in his stable by sending an army against him and, thus, brought him into submission.<sup>4</sup> At the death of Āli Morād Khān, the Ardalān chief again refused to honour his obligation. This time Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān carried his arm into the latter's territory. At first, Khosro Khān sent an envoy to the camp of the Zand ruler and promised to pay his arrears and provide the Zand army with troops. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, however, demanded that he attend the court in person. Khosro Khān resolved to fight the Zands and, indeed, defeated them on the battlefield with much disgrace.<sup>5</sup> The case of Bani Ka<sup>C</sup>b shaikh was very much the same, except that he was not able to defeat the Zands; thus, he declared his submission, but only after his cattle had been raided and many livestock were captured by the Zand troops.<sup>6</sup> It was not uncommon for the ruler to resort to raiding expeditions, as a punitive measure against the disobedient tribes and, presumably, when he was not inclined to enter into a serious warfare with a rebellious vassel.

1. G.G., p.223.

2. Ibid. Khātun ābādi, Vaqāyē al-Senin Zail, Tehran, 1352, p.578

3. G.M., p.388.

4. Ibid., p.389.

5. G.G., p.287. G.M., p.427-9. Z., p.33.

6. I.M., Ms. n.p. G.G., p.299.

Some of the powerful tribes though, such as the Bakhtiāris, often formed a large part of the Zand army, especially <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān's army. But they were never directly attached to the cause of the Zands. They were, however, strongly opposed to the Qājārs and, on one occasion, met Āqā Moḥammad Khān in the battlefield and inflicted great losses on his army. Unfortunately, they were defeated, but managed to retreat in good order.<sup>1</sup> Their flocks were plundered by the Qājārs and 80,000 livestock captured.<sup>2</sup> These predatory incursions greatly reduced the tribes, whose major source of revenue came from their livestock. Indeed, the tribes were constantly on the alert to avoid such events. Sir John Malcolm rightly observes:

"It is the usage of these tribes unless when very strong, to pitch their tents in the vicinity of a range of mountains, that their flocks and families may be in reach of a place of security on the occurrence of danger."<sup>3</sup>

Some of the Western tribes, such as Qaragozlu, threw their support behind the Qājārs, from the start of Āqā Moḥammad Khān's struggle for power. Their chief was appointed governor of Hamadān.<sup>4</sup> Whether the tribe of Qaragozlu was partial to the Qājārs or whether they decided it was a better bet to support the fresh and unexploited Qājār power, is not known. One thing was certain: that they were opposed to the Zand government at Shirāz. The Qaragozlu chief, Moḥammad Hosein Khān, even allied himself to a Zand rebel, Esma<sup>C</sup> il Khān, solely to oppose Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān.<sup>5</sup> The alliance did not last very long, as Esmā<sup>C</sup> il Khān was deserted by his ally and left to defend himself as best he could.<sup>6</sup>

1. I.O.R. P/D/72, Bushire, 1789.

2. I.M., Ms . . . n.p.

3. H.P., Vol.II, p.596.

4. G.G., p.282.

5. Ibid., p.293.

6. Ibid., p.303.

The Turkish, Kurdish and <sup>C</sup>Arab tribes resident in the provinces of Āzarbāyjān and Khorasān, had very little contact with the Zands. Although Āzarbāyjān was tributary to the Zands until the death of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, the tribal chiefs were so much engaged in their own internal wars, that they had no time or energy to interfere with Zand politics. Indeed, they were so weakened by their feuds that Āqā Mohammad Khān subdued them almost without effort.<sup>1</sup> The <sup>C</sup>Arab tribes of Khorasān, such as Shaibāni, Mishmast, Khozaimah, etc., also were busy fighting with their neighbours. Amir Mohammad Khān Tabasi of the Shai-bāni tribe was, however, an ambitious chief, who, on at least two occasions, challenged the Zand ruler. He assisted Taqi Khān, the governor of the town of Yazd, in his effort to repel the Zand army. He managed to defeat Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, apparently due to his access to modern amunition, compared to that of the Zand army.<sup>2</sup> He also sent a detachment to aid another <sup>C</sup>Arab chief of the Āmeri tribe, in his effort to capture Esfāhān. This expedition was futile, as the joint <sup>C</sup>Arab forces were defeated by the Zand general, <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān Kāzeruni, and fell into his hands. Amir Mohammad Khān never directly opposed the Zands; he did, however, capture Mashad and many of the surrounding townships. His death curtailed his ambitious plans for acquiring a vast territory.<sup>3</sup> His brother and successor, Amir Hasan Khān, did not pursue his schemes and even, unlike his brother, received and entertained the last Zand prince with much kindness in adversity. He even provided him with cavalry in the pursuit of regaining his domain.<sup>4</sup>

Afghān and Baluchi tribes in the East and Southern parts of the kingdom, remained on all occasions faithful to the Zand cause. Mohammad <sup>C</sup>Azam Khān, the chief of Narmāshir, Khabis,

1. G.G., p.334.

2. G.M., p. 445.

3. H.P., Vol.II, p. 222.

4. G.G., p.378. I.Z., p.86. H.P., Vol.II, p. 193 and 221.

who had come to the court of Shirāz, during the reign of the Vakil and had been appointed the governor of Narmāshir, had expanded his territories and captured more townships. He was of great assistance to Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān; his son and successor also assisted the Zand prince.<sup>1</sup> Moḥammad Hosein Khān Sistāni, the chief of Bam, was another of the Zand supporters, despite the general hostility towards the Zands, which prevailed in the province of Kermān and its dependencies. His sons fought with the last Zand with gallantry and resilience. But they also betrayed him to the Qājārs and brought about the final fall of the Zands.<sup>2</sup> Incidentally, the sons of Moḥammad Hosein Khān were, after a while, removed from their principality and even were deprived of their eyesight.<sup>3</sup> The sons of A<sup>C</sup>zam Khān, however, retained their government for a longer period, until Ebrāhim Khān Zāhiral-Dolleh was appointed as the governor of the provinces of Kermān and Baluchestān and, eventually, the rule of the Afghāns in those parts was terminated\* (1216/1800).

As rightly mentioned by Sir John Malcolm, many of the tribes were still fluctuating between the Zand and the Qājār dynasties, even as late as the battle at Abraj and, had Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān gained a decisive victory over the Qājār Eunuch on that occasion, he might still have had the chance to regain his domain.<sup>5</sup>

The tribal elements though, saw their interest in fomenting internecine wars and political instability, as each of the rivals had to turn to them for military support. Thus, pouring a great amount of money into their pockets, as Sir John Malcolm rightly observes:

1. G.G., pp.381-2. I.K., p.358.

2. G.G., p.390. I.Z., pp.100-101.

3. Ibid., p.395.

4. I.K., p.373.

5. H.P., Vol.II, p.191.

"though the efforts to obtain the crown had been limited to the descendants of that prince, (Karim Khān) and their enemy, Aqa Mahomed Khan, the necessity which each pretender had in his turn experienced for the support of the chiefs of tribes, had elevated that class into a consequence much beyond what they had ever before possessed."<sup>1</sup>

Still, they would have preferred milder, or rather weaker overlord like the Zands, to the fierce and powerful Qājār chief, that was the essence of the fluctuation of the tribal support between the contestants. The tribal chief changed his master as it suited him.

### The third group of tribes:

The third category of tribes, who interacted with the Zands were those hostile to them. The most prominent tribe of this group was the Qājār, a numerous and powerful tribe settled in Astarābād. We will discuss this tribe, itself, with its internal feuds and rivalries and then proceed to investigate their interaction with other racial and linguistic tribal groups.

The origin and history of this tribe has been studied by a number of contemporary, as well as modern scholars.<sup>2</sup> The major branch of this tribe, which had been settled in Astarābād during the Šafavid rule, was split into two divisions, Ašhāqebāsh and Yokhāribāsh.<sup>3</sup> These were further split into subdivisions commonly known as tirreh. The ruling tirreh of Yokhāribāsh was named Davalu, which signified their pastoral habits and the type of their herd.<sup>4</sup> The ruling tirreh of Ašhāqebāsh was Qov-anlu or Qoyunlu. There was at all times great rivalry between these two tirrehs, and this had resulted in the failure of the

1. H.P., Vol.II, p.204.

2. See Tārīkh-e-Mohammadi.

3. R.S., Vol.9, n.p. H.P., Vol.II, p.127.

4. Ibid. Dava is a camel.

three Ashāqehbāsh pretenders to lay their hands on the crown of Persia. Fath<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān, Moḥammad Ḥasan Khān and his son, Hosein Qoli Khān, were all thwarted by the jealousies and hostilities of their domestic rivals and had been eventually murdered.

The Blood feuds had been in existence for many years and neither side were prepared to see the other's success. Moḥammad Ḥasan Khān, in his struggle against Karim Khān, had been deserted by the rival tribe in the most critical stages of his struggle.<sup>1</sup> When he had besieged Shirāz in 1171/1757, the Yokhāribāsh chiefs, fearful of his success and the subsequent harassment, which they could easily expect after he established himself in power, started to show signs of disaffection. Finding a good pretext: namely, the shortage of food and provisions, they deserted Moḥammad Ḥasan Khān outside the gates of Shirāz, while he blockaded the city and there was every possibility of his success.<sup>2</sup> He was, however, forced to escape with his life and with only fourteen attendants, headed for Māzandarān. There he contrived to eliminate all his major tribal rivals, by inviting the Yokhāribāsh chiefs to a meeting and massacring them all. But he did not live long to reap his success over them, since he was killed by order of the son of a murdered chief, while his horse was stuck in the mud in the forests of Māzandarān.<sup>3</sup>

His son, Hosein Qoli Khān, also in pursuit of power, established himself at Astarābād and avenged the murderers of his father. Again he was killed by Turkmans, who were hired to assassinate him by the rival tribe.<sup>4</sup> These events made a major impact on the success of Āqā Moḥammad Khān, since, when he

1. G.G., p.66.

2. R.S., Vol.9, n.p.

3. G.G., p.87. R.S., n.p.

4. R.S., n.p.



started his career, there was no person of any consequence to challenge his power, at least in the Yokhāribāsh branch of Qājārs. But he was faced with another dilemma.

When Āqā Moḥammad Khān effected his escape from Shirāz and returned to Māzandarān, he was by no means welcomed by his own brothers. Reżā Qoli Khān, his younger brother, had also escaped from Qazvin after hearing the news of the Vakil's death, and intended to set himself up as a competitor for supreme power<sup>1</sup> and could not accept Āqā Moḥammad Khān's claims to his father's inheritance. Āqā Moḥammad Khān was also resented and despised by his other half brothers, Morteza Qoli and Moṣṭafā Qoli Khān, born of legally married Qājār ladies.<sup>2</sup> Whereas his brothers born of concubines accepted his supremacy without question.

In the initial stages of Āqā Moḥammad Khān's struggle, he could hardly rely on his own tribe. Indeed, his initial allies were Kurdish tribes of minor importance, to whom he had allied himself on his way to Māzandarān.<sup>3</sup> He managed to raid a caravan carrying treasures to Shirāz, and also confiscated the Khazāneh deposited in the province of Māzandarān.<sup>4</sup> By his financial gains, he could recruit more troops and pursue his objectives. He wisely secured the citadel at Astarābād, where he could retire in time of emergency. The major setback in his career was his conflict with his brothers on various occasions. They deserted him, defeated him and even captured and imprisoned him. In one instance, he nearly lost his life at the hands of his own brothers.<sup>5</sup> It took him some years to overcome his kinsmen and, by murdering one and blinding the second, term-

1. R.S., n.p.

2. Ibid.

3. T.M.Ms. n.p.

4. Fava'id al-Safā'ieh, p.146.

5. T.M. Ms. n.p.

inated their careers. Reẓā Qoli Khān, the third of his rivals, after having joined ʿAli Morād Khān, defected from his service and allied himself to Ṣādeq Khān, the latter's adversary. He eventually took refuge in Russia and died there.<sup>1</sup>

We will now proceed to the study of the interaction of the Qājārs with the other tribal groups. As previously mentioned, Āqā Moḥammad Khān made alliances with some of the Kurdish tribes, who had been settled in Esfahan and Ray by the Vakil, such as Inānlu, Eslāmlu and Modānlu. He then proceeded to Māzandarān and spent the first years of his career in establishing his power in the provinces of Māzandarān and Gilān. It was only during the rule of ʿAli Morād Khān, that he left the northern provinces and captured Qazvin and Hamadān and, even then, he avoided a confrontation with the Zands. The defeat of the Zand army in Māzandarān encouraged him to make direct assaults on the Zand dynasty's domain, and he pursued this course until he ascended the throne<sup>2</sup> in 1209/1794.

The Qājār tribe lost much of its importance in the political arena after the death of Moḥammad Ḥasan Khān in 1171/1757. They led a quiet life in their settlements and had very little contact with the outside world. There is no reference to the Qājār warriors' participation in the wars and, thus, they had no chance of having contact with the other tribes. The Turkmans, however, were the traditional neighbours of the Qājārs and had always assisted the tribal chiefs in times of trouble. Moḥammad Ḥasan Khān was offered asylum, when he fled the punishment he deserved in rebelling against Nāder Shāh.<sup>3</sup> He stayed among the Turkmans as long as Nāder Shāh lived. It was after Nāder's assassination that the Qājār chief resumed the pursuit of his claim to the throne of Persia.<sup>4</sup> Again, when he was killed,

1. M.S., p.19.

2. Ibid., pp.14-23.

3. H.P., Vol.II, p.127. See also Hanway, Jonas, Transactions of the..., Vol.I, p.202.

4. H.P., Vol.II, p.128.

the Turkmans gave protection to his wives and children and they were kept until Āqā Moḥammad Khān, his eldest son, decided to give himself up to the Zands. Then he was kept as hostage in Shirāz and his mother and brothers in Qazvin.<sup>1</sup>

Despite all this, the Turkmans never formed an alliance with the Qājārs. Their alliances were temporary and spontaneous. They mostly, and primarily, were concerned with their own gain, rather than participation in dynastic struggles. It is true that the defeat sustained by the large army of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān in Māzandarān was largely due to the raids and tactics of the Turkmans,<sup>2</sup> but there is no evidence that they were actually in league with the Qājārs. They were, however, so out of the way of the central plateau, that they could not afford to take part in dynastic wars, unless they occurred in the vicinity of their areas. Āqā Moḥammad Khān, however, benefited from their tactics and managed to establish himself in an undisputed position in the northern provinces.

The major Kurdish tribes, such as Ardalān tribes, Mokri and so on, preferred to retain their independence and none of them ventured to challenge or, indeed, form an alliance with the Qājārs. Indeed, it was by force of arms that Āqā Moḥammad Khān managed to establish his power in Kurdistān.<sup>3</sup> The Lor tribes showed partiality to the Zand cause at all times and the tribe of Māfi challenged the Qājār chief to a battle and even defeated him with great losses. The Bakhtiāris also did not favour him and, although they were defeated by him, they inflicted great losses on his army too.<sup>4</sup>

The Turkish speaking tribes consisted of many diverse groups.

1. R.S., n.p.

2. G.M., pp.407-8. G.G., p.250.

3. G.G., p.293. I.M., n.p. M.S., p.

4. I.O.R. P/E/72, Bushire, 12th Sept. 1785.

The ones in the south, such as the Qashqā'i, carefully stayed out of the way of the Qājār and Zand contest. On one occasion, when the Qājārs intended to plunder their livestock, they retired to the safety of the mountains<sup>1</sup> and never came into contact with the Qājārs. But the Turkish tribes of Āzarbāyjān were in a totally different position. They were so divided among themselves and busy with their internal fights, that they had no time to take part in other conflicts.<sup>2</sup> That was why Āqā Moḥammad managed to subdue them all without exhausting his treasures, and they submitted to his supreme rule without dispute. Some of the major tribes of Āzarbāyjān: namely, Donboli, had a long-standing friendship with the Qājārs. Najaf Qoli Khān Donboli was appointed beglarbegi of Tabriz by Moḥammad Ḥasan Khān Qājār and was also appointed as tutor to the young Āqā Moḥammad Khān.<sup>3</sup> The Turkish tribes of Zanjān and Qazvin, such as Zāyerlu Afshār, Afshār Khamseh and so on, entered into alliance with the Qājārs in the initial stages of the struggle for supremacy. Āli Khān Khamseh once or twice joined forces with Āqā Moḥammad Khān, but for a short time and, immediately after the Qājār defeat, deserted him and went his way.<sup>4</sup>

The Afghān, Baluchi and Arab tribes of the south remained loyal to the house of Zand and even invited and supported Lotf Āli Khān at a time when even his kinsmen had turned away from him.<sup>5</sup> Thus they were hostile to the Qājārs.

It appears, however, that Āqā Moḥammad Khān was able to enjoy the support, or rather to buy the services, of many of the tribal groups, once he had reconciled his own tribe to his cause.

1. G.G., p.306.

2. JāTa, Vol.II, p.250. G.G., p.334.

3. JāTa, Vol.I, p.85.

4. I.Z., p.30. G.G., p.275.

5. I.K., p.358. M.S., p.22.

## CHAPTER 9

### THE RURAL AREAS

Persia, like most Middle Eastern countries, does not benefit from a major river passing through it. There are, however, a few rivers which provide irrigation in the large basin of the central and south western plains, such as the Zāyandehrud and Kārun. Along the banks of these rivers lie the most flourishing cultivations and the most prosperous villages. The vast tracks of barren land in the east and south east cannot provide food for either beast or human beings. The mountainous areas, however, provide ample pasturage for livestock breeding. A few areas are cultivated as Daym (dry cultivation). This system relies totally on the rainfall and often the crop is destroyed as a result of a drought. On the whole, as Sir Harford Jones observed in 1807-11, one third of the empire was uncultivated and probably uncultivable.<sup>1</sup> Lack of water and forest were the two major deficiencies of the country's natural environment.

The villages were generally built along the banks of the rivers or rivulets in the central plateau. The mountainous areas were generally dependent on springs. Along the periphery of the deserts, the agriculture was solely reliant on the subterranean water canals (Qanāt). This form of irrigation involved great effort, as its construction was a lengthy and complex process.

The means of agricultural production were primitive and backward and the peasants used the same instruments as their forefathers had done a thousand years before them. There is no

1. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.I, p.429.

explanation as to why these means never improved. Various scholars have attempted to establish why there was this lack of incentive in such a venture.<sup>1</sup> But one cannot state with any degree of certainty, that their interpretations are valid. There is, however, one point which is certain and that is the fact, that the peasantry did not own the land and that the vast tracts of land belonged to the government and the major land-owners. The peasant either tilled the land on a share-cropping basis, with the Divān or the landowner, and, as long as the harvest provided him with his basic needs, he did not make an effort to increase production.<sup>2</sup> Alternatively the peasant rented the land for ninety-nine years, which lease was renewable by paying the fine of a year's rent. The heavy taxes on the land and the agricultural instruments discouraged the Ra<sup>c</sup>iyat from purchasing land and improving his means of production. For instance, a watermill was liable to a heavy tax, which was the upkeep of one soldier for a year with his clothes and arms.<sup>3</sup>

There is, however, evidence of a Ra<sup>c</sup>iyat-e-Jokār (barley cultivator) in a village of Fārs, having owned land. He had become so wealthy that he ventured to enter the political arena.<sup>4</sup> But these cases are isolated and uncommon. It is, however, obvious that, after the land confiscations carried out by Nāder Shāh, private landownership increased. Mirzā Mohammad indicates that, during the Estifā of the Amlāk-e-Divāni, instances of embezzlement occurred.<sup>5</sup> Lambton also, without citing her source of information, states that many of the Ouqāf landholders, fearing to lose their land, did not come up with the documents pertaining to the state of their land. Therefore, private

1. Petroshevski, Keshāvarzi va monasebat-e-Arzi dar Iran, tr. Keshāvarz. Tehran, 1334; & Arunova, Ashrafian, Doulat-e-Nader Shah Afshar, tr. Hamid Amin, Tehran, 1348.

2. M.H.P., Vol.1, p. 77.

3. H.P., Vol.II, p.496.

4. R.M.M., pp.48-9.

5. Ibid., p.15.

individuals registered these properties in their own names.<sup>1</sup> This assertion is, however, supported by Tazkerreh Shushtar, which clearly states that many Ouqāf had been usurped by the people and, of a vast Vaqf which the Ṣafavid kings had allocated to the Mosque and Madreseh in Shushtar, only a few remnants of the original estate had survived.<sup>2</sup> It is, however, doubtful that ordinary people, or rather peasants, had taken possession of these lands. It is likely that the notables and men with the means to bribe officials, or the clergy, had taken possession of the Ouqāf.<sup>3</sup>

Mirzā Moḥammad Kalāntar of Shirāz was able to purchase a great number of villages wholly or in part, during the reign of the Vakil. This indicates that land was free for purchase in the market. Furthermore, according to Rostam, the price of property was cheap. That is, a Jarib of uncultivated land was 2,500 Dinārs, whereas a Jarib of an orchard was one Tomān. There can be no explanation for this, except that the availability of land in the market had decreased in price. There arises another question as to how this had happened. Malcolm asserts that, during the two revolutions subsequent to the fall of the Ṣafavids, and especially after the assassination of Nāder Shāh,

"almost all the principal families of Persia have perished and their estates fallen into the possession of the crown."<sup>5</sup>

This leads one to the assumption that the government was selling the lands in its possession, but unfortunately there is no

1. Lambton, Landlord and Peasants, p.130.

2. Tazkerreh Shushtar, Vol.III, p.110.

3. Kinnier, op. cit., p.31.

4. R.I., pp.316-17. See the Table of Coins, Appendix

5. H.P., Vol.II, p.471.

evidence to support this, although neither is there any particular reason to refute this possibility. In some official documents which have survived from the Zand period, there are indications that the lands, which were previously confiscated (Zabti Divān), were taxed according to previous assessments. These include many villages and hamlets (Mazra<sup>C</sup>eh) and watermills (Tāhuneh). In another document, numerous villages were transferred to the Divān (Enteqāli Divān) by a certain Āqā<sup>C</sup> Ali Akbar, son of Hāji Mehdi. Among these villages, a number are marked as having been Khalesseh previously. This supports our assumption that the Khalesseh had been sold and then transferred back to the government<sup>1</sup> (1192).

At any rate, landownership remained very much the same as in previous eras, that is, mainly in the hands of the ruling and upper middle classes. When Mirzā Moḥammad Kalāntar was in debt, he sold part of a village to Mollā Māndegar, the Kalāntar of the town of Kavār.<sup>2</sup> Almost all government officials appear to have invested part of their wealth in landed property: the members of the royal family, as well as the governors and kalāntars belonging to the local nobility. Shaikh<sup>C</sup> Ali Khān Zand had a vast estate (Amlāk va Jehāt) in the provinces of Fārs and<sup>C</sup> Erāq, the revenue of which amounted to sixty Tomāns a day. His property was, however, confiscated by the Vakil as a punishment for his excessive pride. Mollā Māndegar, the kalāntar of Kavār, appears to have been the major landowner in his principality. His revenue was so great that the Vakil asked him whether he had found treasures; Mollā Māndegar presented Karim Khān with the products of his property the next day and stated that his land and his cultivation were the treasures he had found.<sup>3</sup> The government was inclined to make concessions towards the major landowners; Mirzā Moḥammad's property was

1. Majles Library, uncatalogued documents of the Zand period.

2. R.M.M., p.57.

3. F.N., part II, p.262.



exempted from payment of dues for two years (1196-1198).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>c</sup>Olamā and Sādāt were another major group of landowners. Many of the Sādāt had retained their property during and after the reign of Nāder Shāh, which had all been given to them as <sup>c</sup>Eqta<sup>c</sup> during the Ṣafavid era. Nāder Shāh is also known to have given <sup>c</sup>Eqta<sup>c</sup> to a seyed.<sup>2</sup> Although some families, like Ḥazin Lahiji, had totally lost their hereditary estate, during the turbulent time of the Afghān invasion.<sup>3</sup> As mentioned before, Āqā Moḥammad Bidābādi, the renowned mollā of Esfāhān, owned land which he cultivated himself and gave part of his revenues to the needy.<sup>4</sup>

The merchants were particularly interested in acquiring landed property, as an investment against the uncertainty of their commercial activities. Āqā <sup>c</sup>Ali Kermāni bought property in the district of Eqta<sup>c</sup>. His property within the city of Gavāshir was so extensive that, when the city fell into the hands of the Qājārs, 12,000 people took refuge there.<sup>5</sup> As indicated previously, the artisans and shopkeepers formed a small proportion of the proprietors, who engaged in horticulture around the cities and towns, in order to subsidize their income.<sup>6</sup> These often had small fields, which were taxed heavily, on account of the profitability of the produce and the ample need for regular irrigation.

As Harford Jones rightly observes, there was no-one in Persia, who lived on the revenue or rent of his landed property. The

1. R.M.M., p.81.

2. Hanway, Vol.I, p.314. Eqta<sup>c</sup> was a form of service land-holding.

3. Z.H., p.12.

4. R.I., p.406-7. G.M., p.222.

5. I.K., pp.366-7.

6. Kuznetsova, op. cit., p.310.

majority of landowners attached themselves to the government for obtaining protection<sup>1</sup> and that was in cases, when they were not already in official positions. This protection was not, however, solely against the oppression of the government, but there were other factors which induced the landowners to seek subsidiary income. Among the most important of these factors was the turbulent state of affairs, which made all productive activities risky and unsettled. The landowners had to contend with various competitors, who were always in need of cash and provisions.<sup>2</sup> Sometimes they were reduced to despair, Mirzā Hos-ein Šāḥeb Ekhtiār Fārs could not afford to provide<sup>C</sup>Ali Mardān Khān Bakhtiāri with the grain demanded of him, on account of his Ra<sup>C</sup>iyats' flight to the mountains en masse. He was then forced to pay the price of the grain instead. This was, however, more difficult as he had no income.<sup>3</sup> Many families, as Malcolm observes, were totally ruined as a result of these proceedings.

It was not only the landlord who suffered these hardships. The peasants were beaten, tortured and burnt to give away their grains. When the oppression was unbearable, they retired to the safety of the mountains and their fields and plantations were destroyed.<sup>4</sup> Locusts, drought and epidemics were other maladies, which hampered agriculture. During the reign of Lotf<sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, the crops in the province of Fārs were ruined by locusts for five successive years. As a result of this event, famine broke out and many people lost their lives.<sup>5</sup> Buckingham, in the early 19th century, witnessed the great distress of the people in Fārs on account of drought.

1. H.P., Vol.I, p.498.

2. I.O.R. L/P & S/9, Box 1B, 1810.

3. R.M.M., p.44.

4. Niebuhr, Travels, p.48. Kinnier, op. cit., pp.37, 43.

5. G.G., pp.365-6.

"The want of rain had been so universally felt over the country that men were tempted to acts of desperation to supply the cravings of hunger."<sup>1</sup>

In these circumstances, raids and highway robbery were common occurrences. The tribes attacked and plundered the caravāns laden with grain, and cities were in distress for food. The landowner, who was generally a resident of the city, fleeced his peasant for his last grain and, after all this, the peasants suffered more than anyone. The conditions of the peasants were no better in times of peace. During the long and relatively tranquil reign of the Qājārs. Ferrier remarks that:

"the most unfortunate portion of the Persian population namely the labouring classes, are always the most ill treated and their complaints never reach the foot of the throne until they have been so transformed and falsified as to draw upon them fresh persecutions instead of procuring the justice they seek; finding it impossible to obtain this, they take the matter into their own hands, when opportunity offers and the thousand miseries which they bear in silence become at length so unsupportable that many a bloody episode is the result."<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, this was the case during the period under study. <sup>c</sup>Ali Mardān Khān Bakhtiāri, in his struggle against Karim Khān, captured Shiraz and sent his Mohaṣṣels to the various districts of the province. In all the villages, the peasants set about fighting his men and defeated and turned them all out.<sup>3</sup> This was not, however, without the gravest outrages committed against the peasants. In 1177, a peasant, Taqi Khān Dorāni, rebelled against the oppression of Khodā Morād Khān Zand, the governor of Kermān. He not only killed the governor, but established himself as the new governor. His fellow villagers joined his standard and, in no time, he formed an army of 1000 peas-

1. Buckingham, Travels, Vol.I, p.435.

2. Ferrier, J.P., Caravan journey and wanderings..., p.16.

3. R.M.M., p.43.

ants. He held out against the Zand army for more than a year. Eventually, he was betrayed by the citizens to the Zand army and was subsequently put to the sword.<sup>1</sup>

The peasants' revolts were, however, doomed to failure, as they were by no means organized and had no political aim in mind. What they wanted was to free themselves from the yoke of oppressive regimes. It would have been possible if they remained in their own village and refused to obey the central government. As Mirzā Mohammad Kalāntar remarks, there were villagers "who were not in the habit of paying Divāni dues" and the government had no control over them.<sup>2</sup> But the ambitious project, such as that of Taqi Khān, put the villagers against the citizens as well as the central government and the dual battle was hard to deal with.<sup>3</sup>

Perhaps it would be appropriate here to give a short account of the interaction of village and town and their relationship with the tribes.

The towns and villages in Persia were never so distinctly divided as they were in Western Europe, where the dissident artisan could take refuge in the villages, when he left his guild and workshop in the town. Thus, he could pursue his craft without the interference of the guild and the oppression of the town officials. On the other hand, the hardpressed villager, or rather peasant, fled to towns to relieve himself from the cruelty of his master. He sought employment and often settled in town permanently. There are, however, isolated cases in Persia of craftsmen taking their residence in the village, such as the potter encountered in the village Savānāt (Eṣṭahbānāt) by Sir William Ouseley in the early 19th century.<sup>4</sup> But these craftsmen were few and far between. Again, the villager in Persia re-

1. I.K., pp.322-29.

2. R.M.M., p.20. District of Sinigān in Fārs.

3. Dobb, Maurice, "From feudalism to capitalism", in Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism, ed. N. Hilton, 1978, p.168.

4. Ouseley, Sir William, Travels into various countries of the East particularly Persia, London 1818, Vol.II, p.165.

sorted to the town, when he lost all his belongings as a result of civil wars, but instead of seeking employment in towns, he often turned to banditry or else joined the army, which was much the same.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, the towns and villages of Western Europe developed independent of each other. The towns by increasing industrial production, dragged the villages behind them and this contributed to the improvement of village production. The town was a market for the surplus of the villages.<sup>2</sup> In Persia, the cities and the towns were totally dependent on the villages in their economic lives. Except for a few towns such as Esfahan, which could provide part of its food consumption in the fields and orchards around the city; the rest of the towns had to import every item of food from the villages. That is precisely why the famines were so common in Persia. Civil War, locusts, drought and other causes, which affected the village, necessarily affected the towns. This dependence did not, however, contribute to their unity and solidarity, but made them resentful towards each other. If the town dweller sensed a threat to his interest from the villager, he did not hesitate to ally himself with the oppressive government in order to ward off the villagers, as is indicated in the example mentioned above.

The villagers regarded the town with apprehension, since they associated it with the government and oppression. All the European travellers of the 18th century assert that the whole population of the villagers fled at the sight of a party coming from the town. Hanway, early in the century, affirms that, wherever he went, the villagers had fled from their houses, taking him and his retinue for "soldiers or robbers which were very much the same."<sup>3</sup> The other form of showing their resentment towards the townspeople was by fortifying their village and re-

1. Niebuhr, p.55.

2. Ibid.

3. Hanway, Vol.I, p.236.

fusing to admit the intruders to their village. Again, Hanway provides us with an example of such an occasion.

"We arrived at a village, the houses of which were built with stones and made so defensible, that we could not procure any entrance, till we prepared to take a house by scaling the walls."<sup>1</sup>

However, the attitude of the villagers towards the tribes was much more hostile. Although the tribes were the clients of the villagers for their necessities and, at the same time, sold their surplus dairy products, cattle, and handicrafts to the villages, relations were anything but friendly. The tribes looked at the villagers with contempt, as they were tied down to their houses and, thus, subject to the drudgery of the state, whereas the house of a nomad was his tent and he could move on at any time he pleased and free himself from oppression. But this did not cultivate sympathy for the peasant; on the contrary, the nomad did not miss the chance to add to the miseries of the peasants. Mirzā Moḥammad Kalāntar gives an account of how the tribes, who had been transferred to the northern provinces by Nāder Shāh, completely ruined all the villages on their way back to their original abode.<sup>2</sup> The frequent incursions of the Turkman tribes into the central areas, as far afield as Es-fāhān and Kāshān serves as a further example to prove the point. Sir John Malcolm asserts that not only the villages near the two cities mentioned above were plundered, but that all the inhabitants were taken captive and sold at a ransom.<sup>3</sup> It is not surprising, therefore, to find that almost all the villages in the central plateau and open plains were fortified with a Qal<sup>c</sup> a (citadel), where the inhabitants took refuge in time of crisis.

1. Hanway, Vol.I, p.236.

2. R.M.M., p.32.

3. Malcolm, J. Sketches of Persia, pp.14-15.

Thus, as Berar in the early 20th century observes, there were different wars between various elements in Persian society<sup>1</sup> and the dynamics of the whole explains the numerous revolutions and counter-revolutions, which afflicted the empire of Persia throughout successive centuries.

### Taxation System:

In this section we study yet another war between the peasantry and the state, which was by far the most destructive of all: that is, the state trying to exploit the peasant and the peasant's refusal to yield. In the early 19th century, Sir John Malcolm reckoned the tax on the land to constitute two thirds of the whole revenue gathered into the state treasury.<sup>2</sup> Kinnier a few years later, also asserts that the revenues did not exceed three million sterling and that two thirds was collected from the land.<sup>3</sup> Although Harford Jones appears to disagree with both sources and places the taxes at a much smaller amount, on the grounds that the accurate amount of taxes could not be ascertained, as the tax system was deficient and the records were unreliable.<sup>4</sup> It is, however, worth studying the method of tax collection and also the sources of the taxes on land. Again, as Malcolm observes, after the confiscation of the *Ouqāf* by Nāder Shāh, the crown land greatly increased. The arrangement was that, if the peasant or, indeed, the tenant provided the seeds, then the cultivator had to pay one third of the crop to the state, but, should the seed be provided by the government, the peasant had to give one half, and often two thirds, of the crop to the state.<sup>5</sup> Malcolm remarks on the arrangement in a different form. When the crop is being measured by the

1. Berar, Enqelabat-e-Iran, tr. Z. Dehshiri. Tehran, 1355, p.83.

2. I.O.R. L/P&S/9. Box 1B. Notes on a memorandum on the revenues of Persia. 1810.

3. Kinnier, J.M. Geographical..., p.47.

4. Mission to Persia, Vol.I, p.404.

5. I.O.R., L/P&S/9 Box 1B. 1810.

government official, presumably after the harvest, if the seed is supplied by the government, it is returned, and ten percent of the whole is next put aside for the reapers and threshers; after which the crop that remains is equally divided between the cultivator and the king. Lands that are the property of individuals pay according to their situation, in respect to water: When that is certain and obtained from a stream, they pay twenty percent of their produce, after deducting seed and the allowance, stated before, for reapers and threshers.<sup>1</sup> The rest of Malcolm's account is consistent with I.O.R. records. He further asserts, that the duty on estates is generally farmed by the owners,<sup>2</sup> which prevents trouble and vexatious interference by subordinate officers of the revenue, with the landowner. This point is contested by Harford Jones, who asserts that estates like these (privately owned) are generally farmed to the royal collector of the district, in which they happen to be situated or managed for the proprietor by an agent on the spot.<sup>3</sup> This latter account is also indicated by Lambton.

This was at least the case in the province of Fārs. The amount of taxes were not, however, so clear cut. There were many loopholes, which enabled officials to extort greater sums than their dues. Mirzā Moḥammad Kalāntar rented a village belonging to the crown, during the reign of Nāder Shāh. He had appointed a Mobāsher to manage affairs on his behalf. The governor, Taqi Khān, being hostile to Mirzā Moḥammad, demanded a lump sum of him on various pretexts. These are termed by Mirzā as Mobādelle Berenj va Shaltuk, Mosālese Gandom va Jo, va tafāvot Bazr for the hire of crown land (māhāl-e-Divāni).<sup>4</sup> Although he does not clarify the ways in which these taxes were exacted, they were certainly not the usual amount of

1. H.P., Vol.II, p.471.

2. Ibid.

3. Brydges, Mission, Vol.I, p.405.

4. R.M.M., pp.12-13.



taxes expected by Mirzā Moḥammad. The terms mean that the rice was to be exchanged for paddy. The crop of wheat and barley was to be divided by three, probably one share going to the government official, whereas the Kalāntar had provided the seed and, thus, the government had no right to demand one third of the grain. The difference between the price of the seed, which the tenant had provided, would also go to the governor; apparently the seed provided by the government was priced at a higher rate. The Mobāsher, who had acted as the middleman, washed his hands of the business and Mirzā Moḥammad, as the entrepreneur, had to meet the demand.<sup>1</sup>

Besides the shares, which the government appropriated as its ownership rights, it levied taxes on the produce of the peasant or the tenant, who cultivated the crown lands. There is, however, no information available on that point. In a document in existence from the Zand era, this tax is termed al Mālojehāt va Motevajahāt, which was exacted from all the lands, Arbābi or Ra<sup>c</sup>iyati, and even Ouqāf; but it does not apply to Khaless<sup>h</sup>eh and tyul. Private lands were liable to very high taxation, if they were watered without labour being involved: that is, irrigation by rivers or springs. These paid twenty percent of their produce. The land irrigated by Qanāt was liable to fifteen percent of the crop.<sup>2</sup> The dry cultivation, Daym, which relied completely on rainfall, paid ten percent. I.O.R. records attribute the relatively low percentage to the fact that the crop was scanty, and Malcolm also indicates this too; but the actual fact was that, often the crop was totally ruined by untimely rain, or else drought, which was more often the case. The harvest was, at times, abundant if there was no scarcity of water.<sup>3</sup> These arrangements were, however, relevant to grain cultivation, or rather as it was termed, Shatvi. The Saifi gen-

1. R.M.M., p.13.

2. I.O.R. L/P&S/9 Box 1B. 1810.

3. Kinnier, op. cit., p.54.

erally referred to cotton, rice and fruits such as melons. The peasant was often unable to furnish the seed as well as the labour, but, if he provided the seed, he would receive two thirds of the crop and the other share went to the proprietor of the land. If the latter furnished the seed, he would be entitled to two thirds of the crop. He also had to pay government dues as well.<sup>1</sup> As indicated above, private landownership was discouraged by heavy taxation. Only if the owner had the means to construct Qanāts, could he pay a smaller amount of tax to the government. Again Mirzā Mohammad, who owned many villages, informs us that he undertook the task of constructing a few Qanāts for his vast property and, thus, reaped great profits from his land.<sup>2</sup> The Ra<sup>c</sup>iyat, who could not do so and had to water his land by the rivers, paid as much as seventy percent of his crop in dues and shares. That is why, as Malcolm indicates, the government encouraged the peasants to cultivate waste land, as it involved a smaller amount of capital, which the Ra<sup>c</sup>iyat could afford and paid less tax on his produce.<sup>3</sup> The arrangement of taxation varied greatly according to various provinces, according to the climate and the type of crop produced. In areas, which were largely fruit producing, such as the environs of Esfāhān, the peasant paid tax on a number of trees he had in his orchard. Malcolm provides us with information on that point. He asserts that he gathered his information from an intelligent native of Shirāz. The following are the taxes on vineyards and fruit trees:

"Vineyard, Faryāb or certain water (i.e. river, etc.)	6 Dinars per tree
Vineyard, Bukhs, or uncertain water (Daym)	5 Dinars per tree
Apple, peach, pear &c.	20 Dinars per tree
Walnuts	100 Dinars per tree ." <sup>4</sup>

1. R.M.M., pp.66-7.

2. I.O.R. L/P&S/9 Box 1B. 1810.

3. H.P., Vol.II, p.475.

4. Ibid.

It is interesting to note that the tax decreased by the amount of labour and water involved in cultivation. Vineyards, which required regular attention and irrigation, paid less tax, whereas walnuts, which did not need labour and water, paid the highest amount.

Abbott, in the mid 19th century, asserts that the palm trees were taxed according to their bearing. This information, although relevant to a much later period, is significant in that the author asserts that:

"The people appear to have neglected the cultivation of this valuable tree (palm) for some time past at Dārāb. It is affirmed that 50 years since (1807) the number of date trees was 100,000 of which only 30,000 remain."<sup>1</sup>

Since we have given the taxes on land, we might speak of other kinds of taxes, which were collected from the peasants. The Ra<sup>C</sup>iyat had to provide the provisions for the army, if they halted at their village or a stage nearby. Often the peasant concealed his grain and, in such cases, the military chiefs did not hesitate to use force in order to obtain provisions. This was ruinous to the villagers, as we have mentioned before. Amir Guneh Khān Afshār, on his expedition to the coast of the Gulf, burnt the houses of the villages and took them along as captives. He, however, found the concealed grain in the holes dug underneath the huts and appropriated them.<sup>2</sup>

The Ra<sup>C</sup>iyat had to contribute to the upkeep of rider post (Asb-e-Chāpāri) and also the expenses of the passersby (Kharj-e-Moteradeddin). In a document of the Zand era, the peasants of the Khālesseh and Tyul are entitled to be given a receipt of

1. Abbott, Notes taken on a journey from Shiraz to Fassa and Darab, Geog. Journal. Vol.27, 1857, pp.158-9.

2. Niebuhr, Travels, p.48.

their contributions,<sup>1</sup> but whether it was deducted from their overall taxes is not known.

Again, there is another item mentioned in these documents, which is termed Vojuh-e-Marā<sup>C</sup>i va Mavāshi, that is, the tax allocated to livestock. This item appears to have been applied to the peasants of the Amlāk-e-Arbābi va Ra<sup>C</sup>iyatī,<sup>2</sup> although Minorsky believes it to be only limited to the tribes.<sup>3</sup> Chopan-begi is also allocated to the peasants as well as the tribes, which is again paid per head on the livestock.

It is not known whether Bigāri (forced labour) was still in use. In the mid 18th century, peasants were expected to perform bigāri, as is indicated by Hanway:

"the peasants were not only obliged to labour but to furnish materials. Many were compelled to leave the cultivation of their rice and silk, which is familiar to them, in order to take this laborious and ungrateful employment."<sup>1</sup>

This task alluded to, was shipbuilding in the northern provinces, undertaken by Nāder Shāh.

The contribution of the peasantry to the maintenance of the army was that each family provided one armed and mounted soldier, since the majority of the peasants were unwarlike and furthermore, they needed the labour force for their agricultural activities. They often paid the money for the upkeep of a soldier and he was then recruited from the tribal warriors. In the documents of the Zand era, there is mention of a sum, which was collected on Cherik (local contingent) and Yasaqkesh. This had been suspended for three years, but was due to resume after a lapse of three years. The villages, as well as towns

1. Hanway, transactions..., Vol.1, p.162.

and cities, generally had a militia, whose duty was to protect their homes in time of emergency. The expenses of this force were allocated to the peasants' households in equal shares.

CHAPTER 10

THE POSITION OF THE CLERGY  
IN 18th CENTURY PERSIAN SOCIETY

We have already indicated that the government apparatus of the Zand realm consisted of three major departments: administrative and financial, military, and religious. We have dealt with the other groups already. Here we will study the clergy as government functionaries and as a class in general.

The highest ranking religious position was that of Ṣadr-al-mamālek. Karim Khān dispensed with the office of Mollābāshi and, as was often the case in the Ṣafavid era, he amalgamated the offices of Ṣadr-al-Khāṣṣeh and Ṣadr-al-mamālek. For the duties and the power of Ṣadr, the reader is referred to Tazkerat-al-moluk.<sup>1</sup> Mirzā Moḥammad ḶAli Ṣadr was appointed to this post by Nāder Shāh and, apparently, he continued to serve the Zands. He followed the Vakil on his military expeditions and attended him at court. There is evidence that on the Vakil's expedition against the Bani Ka<sup>c</sup> b and Shaikh Salmān, their chief, the latter sent an emissary to the Ṣadr, requesting him to intercede on his behalf to prevent Karim Khān from further hostile operations. The Ṣadr presented the case to the Vakil and Karim Khān accepted the terms offered by Shaikh Salmān. Thus, he withdrew his army and returned to his capital.<sup>2</sup> There is no evidence as to whether Mirzā Moḥammad ḶAli held his office after the death of the Vakil. It appears that his son was a favourite of ḶAli Morād Khān and was sent to the ḶAtabāt to carry out the construction of a mosque and repair the holy

1. Tazkerat-al-Moluk, pp.2-4.

2. G.G., pp.134-5.

shrines.<sup>1</sup> Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, however, appointed a new Ṣadr for his administration. Mirzā Bāqer Shafti of Gilān was unanimously chosen to fill the post.<sup>2</sup> Apparently the Ṣadr had deputies (Nāyeb) to perform his duties in other towns and cities. There is mention of a certain Mirzā Moḥsen Navāb Ṣadr in Yazd, who was sent out of the town to present Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān with a token of submission on behalf of Taqi Khān, the governor.<sup>3</sup> The Ṣadr was responsible for the appointment of all religious functionaries in the Ṣafavid time. It is not, however, known whether he still enjoyed the same power in the Zand period. It appears that his position was purely administrative, as it is indicated by the sources that it was the Shaikh-al Eslām and the Qāzi, who performed the judicial and ecclesiastical duties relevant to the public.

The Shaikh-al Eslām was probably the most powerful of the Clergy, in respect to his influence on the people. Generally the position was hereditary, as was the case of the Shaikal-Eslām of Shirāz, Moḥammad Bāqer Tamāmi.<sup>4</sup> The position was generally filled by the most learned of the Clergy (Mojtahed), who led the public prayer in the grand Mosque and performed public ceremonies. He preached in the grand Mosque, settled disputes and attended official functions. Francklin asserts that the position was comparable to that of the Mofti in Ottoman Turkey. But the Shaikh al-Eslām was strictly forbidden to interfere in politics and had no power compared to his counterpart in Turkey.<sup>5</sup>

The Emām Jom<sup>C</sup>eh or Jamā<sup>C</sup>at was generally chosen by the congregation over which he preached. He led the Friday prayer and taught religious students. They were almost always chosen

1. G.M., p.394.

2. Ibid., p.417.

3. Ibid., p.444.

4. F.N., part II, p.28.

5. O.M.T.S., p.53.

from the renowned families of Sādāt. During the whole course of the 18th century, the Emām Jom<sup>C</sup>ehs of Shushtar were chosen from one family, that is, the decendants of Seyed Ne<sup>C</sup>matollāh Shushtari.<sup>1</sup> The smaller mosque usually had a Pishnamāz, who performed the same duties. They also led the prayer three times every day: in the morning, in the afternoon and in the evenings.<sup>2</sup>

The Safavids often appointed one person in charge of several positions. Seyed Ne<sup>C</sup>matollāh Shushtari was the Shaikh al-Eslām, Emām Jom<sup>C</sup>eh, Qāzi and Nāyeb-al Šadr of Shushtar. He also was the Motevalli of the holy shrines in the town.<sup>3</sup> His son inherited all these positions after his father's death. The Zands, however, were inclined to allocate each position to a different person and, thus, prevent the clergy from gaining unlimited power. Despite these measures, we have evidence of powerful clergy. The Emām Jom<sup>C</sup>eh of Shirāz appears to have been a very powerful man and he even ventured to check the activities of the notables of Fārs. Mirzā Moḥammad Kermāni, a respectable citizen of Shirāz, was strongly reprimanded for having invited the lutes and musicians to a banquet in his house. In a note that he wrote to Shaikh <sup>C</sup>Abdol Nabi, the Emām Jom<sup>C</sup>eh, he denied the charge and stated that the banquet took place by the order of the Vakil, with the usual guests. His fear of the Emām Jom<sup>C</sup>eh was so great, that he could not wait until the following morning to acquit himself. Instead he wrote the very night that he received the note.<sup>4</sup>

There is a curious incident, which shows that the vakil was not altogether pleased with his Emām Jom<sup>C</sup>eh, or rather, did not support him when his prestige was at stake. A certain

1. Tohfāt-al-<sup>C</sup>Ālam, Ms Edinburgh.

2. H.P., Vol.II, p.472.

3. Tohfāt-al-<sup>C</sup>Ālam. Ms.

4. R.M.M., pp.114-5.



Mollā Reżā Tabrizi, a highly learned and, at the same time, ambitious member of the clergy, came to Shirāz. In a short while, he attracted the attention of the citizens and many learned men attended his teaching circle and visited him regularly. The mollā, not content with popularity, sought position. Accordingly, he incited the Khāns and Amirs of Āzarbāyjān, and even Āzarbāyjāni artisans and traders in the Bazar, to assist him. They gathered one day in great number, took the mollā to the grand mosque, and spread his prayer rug in front of the alter. He usurped the position of Shaikh <sup>C</sup>Abdol Nabi for a while, whose supporters retired from the mosque, when faced with force majeure.<sup>1</sup> Karim Khān, despite the fact that he followed the shaikh in his prayer and, apparently, held the shaikh in great respect, did nothing to restore his post and his prestige. It was only when mollā Reżā requested to be appointed the judge of the army (Qāzi <sup>C</sup>Asgar), that shaikh <sup>C</sup>Abdol Nabi returned to his office.<sup>2</sup> The Vakil's refusal to interfere in the affair may be attributed to his love of peace and his regard for the wishes of the public. There is no information available to us about Shaikh <sup>C</sup>Abdol Nabi's affiliation to Oṣuli or Akhbāri factions. It could well have been the cause of the dispute. There is, however, evidence that Mollā Reżā, despite being a student of Mirzā Moḥammad Bāqer Behbehāni, was an Akhbāri. However, the descendants of Shaikh <sup>C</sup>Abdol Nabi held the position of Emām Jom<sup>C</sup>eh well into the 19th century, and that alone indicates that the position was hereditary, not by law, but by usage (<sup>C</sup>Orf).<sup>3</sup>

There is great confusion as to the duties of the Emām Jom<sup>C</sup>eh and the Shaikh al-Eslām. It appears that both of them performed the same duties; that is, settling disputes, preaching in the

1. IaIa, Vol.I, pp.186-7.

2. Ibid., p.188.

3. F.N., part II, p.61.

mosque, teaching and leading the congregation in the religious rituals. There is, however, one function for which the shaikh was responsible. He supervised the morals of the general public (Amr-e-be Ma<sup>C</sup>ruf va Nahyi az Monkar).<sup>1</sup> The shaikh also ratified title deeds and sanctioned business transactions. During the whole course of the Zand rule, there is no evidence of the top-ranking clergy disputing the rule of the Zands or, indeed, disagreeing with them. The clergy officials supported the Zands all along and, even when the power of the Zands had been greatly reduced and many of their adherents had turned away from them, the Emām Jom<sup>C</sup>eh of Kermān invited Lotf Āli Khān to Kermān and fought for his cause.<sup>2</sup> This does not mean that the clergy as a whole supported the Zands; indeed one may find the roots of the emergence of the Oṣuli school of thought directly connected with the political situation of the country. This will be discussed in detail later.

The position of the Qāzi was very much the same as in the Ṣafavid period. He presided over the daily session of the Maḥkam-eh, or the court of civil law, and settled disputes of a matrimonial nature, such as divorces and custody of children, and also took charge of the estates, belonging to orphan children, unclaimed estates and the inheritance of deceased persons without legatee. A great amount of revenue came into the hands of the Qāzi by way of making transactions on behalf of their infant clients.

The position of Qāzi Āsgar was that which existed in the Ṣafavid epoch. It had, however, lost much of its importance in the later stages of the Ṣafavid rule. Indeed, as the author of Tazkerat al-Moluk asserts, the duties of the Qāzi Āsgar had been limited to pursuing the claims of the soldiers for their salaries in the reign of Shāh Soltān Ḥosein. The office was revived and

1. Tazkerat al-Moluk, p.5.

2. I.K., p.358.

given much importance in the reign of the Vakil. He appointed Mollā Reżā Tabrizi, a forceful and ambitious mollā, to the post; he executed his duties with vigour and resilience. Apparently he used to flog the highest-ranking Amirs of the tribe of Zand, as well as other tribes, in the same way as commoners, if they ventured to show a lack of respect to the court or to abuse their opponents.<sup>1</sup> He dealt with the legal disputes of the military classes as far as the Shar<sup>C</sup> was concerned.

After the death of the Vakil, the mollā resolved to leave his country and reside in the holy shrines of Ottoman Turkey, and proceeded to that quarter during the rule of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān. Thus another mollā was appointed to his charge. This person, Shaikh Mohammad <sup>C</sup>Arab, a Mojtahed, was deputed on a peace mission by Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān. <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān Kāzeruni's defection alarmed the ruler so intensely that he sent his Qāzi <sup>C</sup>Asgar to appease <sup>C</sup>Ali Qoli Khān.<sup>2</sup> It appears that he achieved his objective. It was, however, customary for the Mojtaheds, irrespective of their official rank, to act as mediators in wars and disputes. Their degree of learning and popularity among the people were the criteria by which they were selected for such deputations.

Here we will discuss the clergy as a social group. It is perhaps wrong to categorize them as a class, since they are not an economically homogeneous stratum. They can, however, be categorized by their common interests and their common occupation. As indicated above, there was great diversity in the social status of the clergy. They ranged from members of the well-established landed gentry to the lowest and poorest of the mollās, reading the Qoran in the cemeteries. The social standing of a member of the clergy had a decisive effect on his career. Often members of wealthy families, who had become mollās, spent all their lives in pursuit of knowledge and learning, and

1. IaIa, Vol.I, p.188.

2. G.M., p.440.

their affluence made them independent of the state. Thus, they taught religious students and even assisted the needy from their own resources. Āqā Moḥammad Bidābādi was a good example of this kind of clergy. He owned land and cultivated it.<sup>1</sup> His revenues enabled him to donate a great amount of riches as alms.<sup>2</sup> The general public even believed that he turned copper into gold by his knowledge of Alchemy.<sup>3</sup> These popular myths, however, surrounded people who enjoyed the veneration of the public.

It was not uncommon for the members of the opulent religious class to be reduced to want by force of circumstances. Seyed Ābdollāh Shushtari, the descendant of the renowned clergy, Seyed Ne<sup>c</sup> matollāh Shushtari, was left destitute at the death of his father.<sup>4</sup> These high class clergy were not numerous. Indeed, the majority of the mollās came from poor families. A great many of them were sons of shopkeepers and artisans or villagers.<sup>5</sup> Among them, many were in constant want and half-starved, since the allowances of the students were below subsistence level, hardly sufficient to keep body and soul together. In the late 18th century, their situation worsened, as the allowance was totally cut and the religious students had to work for their living. Many were teaching children for a nominal pay and some were reduced to begging. It was not until a mollā attained a reputation for his learning and good character, that the people trusted him and charged him with the management of their religious donations. This entailed various functions, such as performing, on behalf of a person, the prayers which had been allowed to lapse, or the pilgrimage to Meccā, which a deceased individual had failed to perform, and so on. Only

1. R.I., p.407.

2. G.M., p.222.

3. R.I., pp.406, 408.

4. Tohfāt-al-Ālam, Ms n.p.

5. Tazkerreh Shushtar, pp.53, 125, 127, etc.

the great Mojtaheds were given charge of Ouqāf, the administration of charitable foundations, and also the distribution of funds allocated to the share of the Emām (Sahm-e-Emām) and other donations.

Some of the middle ranking clergy sought position in the household of grandees as tutor to their children and lived comfortably under their patronage. Mollā Sami<sup>C</sup> Māzandarāni was a good example of these clergy. He had sized up all the noble youths and among them had chosen Faẓl<sup>C</sup> Ali Beg, the son of Najaf Qoli Khān Donboli, the Beglarbegi of Tabriz. He gathered great wealth in the service of the Beglarbegi and was, thus, enabled to retire to the holy shrines of<sup>C</sup> Eraq-e-<sup>C</sup> Arab.<sup>1</sup> Some clergy travelled around and benefited from the generosity of the local magnates. Mollā Reẓā Tabrizi, the Vakil's Qāzi<sup>C</sup> Asgar, after his resignation from that post, spent some time in the court of the Pasha of Bagdad; then he travelled to Shushi and sought protection from Ebrāhim Khān Javānshir, its governor.<sup>2</sup>

At all events, the situation of the clergy was insecure and their means of livelihood solely depended on occasional charity and donations. The clergy had no means of coercing the public into payment of Zakat, and so on. Thus, by seeking employment, such as performing religious rituals, which again was occasional, they supplemented their income.

It was against this background that the new school of thought emerged. There were also other factors, which contributed to the formation of these ideas, which we will study in a later section in some detail.

1. IaIa, Vol.I, p.284.

2. Ibid., p.292.

### The emergence of the Osuli School:

Before we discuss the ideas and teachings of this school of thought, we should study the contributing factors, which resulted in its formation. The Shi<sup>c</sup>a clergy suffered two major blows in the course of the 18th century. Firstly, the invasion by the Sunni Afghāns, which put the position of Shi<sup>c</sup>a belief in serious jeopardy; and secondly, the emergence of Nāder Shāh and his drastic measures against the clergy and the Shi<sup>c</sup>a faith in general.

The disastrous defeat of the Ṣafavids by the motley Afghān army, was largely blamed on the clergy. The general public saw it as a direct result of Shāh Solṭān Ḥosein's involvement with religious matters and his neglect of the affairs of state. This view is clearly expressed by Rostam, a commoner, who writes as follows:

"the hypocrites with airs of piety and ass-like ascetics gained influence in the King's mind and diverted him from the path of rulership to perversion, he became beguiled and indoctrinated by their vain and useless tales and was ruined as a result."<sup>1</sup>

The fall of Esfāhān (1722/1135) and the subsequent ravages of the Afghāns were also the direct result of the intrigues and discord in the court and the mollās had a major part in the affair.<sup>2</sup>

The faint attempt by some clergy to resist the expansion of the Afghān rule was futile and disapproved of by the public. When Shaikh Mehdi Naṣābeh, the Shaikh al-Eslām of Shirāz, led an army of thugs against the governor sent by Maḥmud Qalzā'i,

1. R.I., p.98.

2. Lockhart, L., The fall of the Ṣafavi<sup>e</sup> Dynasty, Cambridge, 1958, p.155.

his action brought about fresh disasters on the people. The city of Shirāz was besieged for nine months and many of the inhabitants lost their lives and property. Thus, when the Shaikh was executed no resistance was offered.<sup>1</sup> During the reign of the Afghāns, the clergy had to fight a dual battle. On the one hand, they had to survive the pressure of the Sunni Afghāns, who were their deadly enemies. On the other hand, they had to face the public, who had become totally disillusioned with the clergy. One might say that the clergy were discredited and rejected by the weary nation, who had suffered such great calamities.

It was against this general background of discontent and resentment that Nāder could venture his direct attack on the Shi<sup>c</sup> a faith and its advocates. He openly expressed his wish to replace the Shi<sup>c</sup> a doctrine with the Sunni faith and, when the Mollā Bāshi privately reprimanded him for his usurpation of power, he executed him.<sup>2</sup> It is significant to note that Seyed<sup>c</sup> Abdollāh Shushtari, a member of one of the well-known clergy families, read a Khotbe with much eloquence at the inaugural speech at Moqān, and thus contributed to, and sanctified, the official coronation of the usurper.<sup>3</sup> Nāder's attack on the institution of religion was further carried out by the confiscation of the Ouqāf and Soyurghāls, thus depriving the clergy of their independence and means of livelihood. Seyed<sup>c</sup> Abdollah Shushtari remarks on the abject condition of the clergy by the end of Nāder's rule. "The mollās had scattered around in search of food."<sup>4</sup> This he attributes to their failure to appreciate the affluence and comfort they had enjoyed in the Safavid era.

Furthermore, Nāder took measures to undermine the grip of the

1. R.M.M., p.3.

2. Lockhart, Nader Shah, London, 1938, p.99.

3. Tohfāt-al-<sup>c</sup>Ālam, n.p.

4. Tazkerreh Shushtar, p.107.

mollās over the general public, by forbidding the practice of Shi<sup>c</sup> a mourning rituals. Apparently, when Nāder was in India, he arranged for the marriage of his son to the daughter of Moh-  
ammad Shāh, the Grand Mogol. The negotiations about the amount of presents given to the bride were undertaken on the tenth day of Moharram, <sup>c</sup>Ashura and the soldiers were strictly forbidden to mourn and to recite Nohe. The soldiers, who were camped far away from the royal tent and ventured to carry out Rozekkhāni, were severely punished. The marriage took place on the night of <sup>c</sup>Ashura and no-one dared to protest.<sup>1</sup>

By recruiting and garrisoning Sunni soldiers, such as Afghāns and Ozbaks, in the major towns, Nāder kept the threat on the Shi<sup>c</sup> a population ever present. Mirzā Mohammad Kalāntar, who had uttered words of abuse against the second Khalif <sup>c</sup>Omar, feared for his life, should the Afghāns discover him or Nāder be informed of the blasphemy.<sup>2</sup>

The reign of Nāder (1148-1160), although short and unsettled, made a drastic impact on society and certainly left the Shi<sup>c</sup> a doctrine shaken. In the interregnum after his assassination, the clergy had very little chance of revival, although many tried to regain their previous status, but with little success. The traditional holders of Ouqāf attempted to regain their losses. Mirzā Mohammad Hosein Sharifi Sāheb Ekhtiār managed to get back his Ouqāf property from Shāhrokh Mirzā,<sup>3</sup> but it is not known whether many were as fortunate as he was. Seyed <sup>c</sup>Abdollah Shushtari remarks on the Ouqāf property, which had been usurped by people. He writes that during the great famine which occurred in the town of Shushtar, old documents (Asnāds) were sold according to which great landed property had been donated to religious foundations.<sup>4</sup> But by the author's time,

1. Reżā Zadeh Shafaq, Nāder Shāh Aznazer Khāvar Shenāsān, Tehran, 1339, p.237.

2. R.M.M., pp.24-5.

3. Ibid., p.40. Minorsky believes that past endowments were restored to their previous owners by <sup>c</sup>Adīl Shāh. (Tazkerat al-Moluk, commentary, p.148).

4. Tohfāt-al-<sup>c</sup>Ālam, n.p.



very little of the original Ouqāf had remained intact. He also observes, with regret, that the time had passed for kings to donate Ouqāf to the clergy and to provide for their livelihood and social status.

Karim Khān's policy towards religion and the clergy was anything but complimentary. Although he built schools and cloisters for the clergy and the Ṣufis, and allocated funds for their maintenance, he was not prepared to make unnecessary concessions to them. He declared that he had no money to give to the tollāb and that everyone should work for his living.<sup>1</sup> Although he appointed a Ṣadr al-Mamālek, whose duty was to supervise the allocation of the Ouqāf to the clergy, there is no evidence that such proceedings were carried out. It is, however, interesting to note that official documents, existing in the Majles Library in Tehran, listing provincial taxes, there is a certain amount of money allocated to Sahm-e-Emām. This must definitely have been distributed to the mollās,<sup>2</sup> but it is not known to what class of them and how.

Maftun, a hostage in Shirāz, makes valuable observations regarding the character of the Vakil and his attitudes. He states that Karim Khān, being a hedonist, advocated pleasure to old and young and despised and snubbed those who pursued learning.<sup>3</sup> There are two good examples to prove his allegations. The first episode illustrates the fact that the Vakil never attached any importance to the discontent of the clergy with his administration. The governor of Esfāhān, Hāji Āqā Moḥammad Renāni, was by all accounts a cruel and greedy man, who antagonised every one from the lowest of the inhabitants to the higher ranking clergy of the time. His avarice was such, that Āqā Moḥammad Rafi<sup>c</sup> Bidābādi, the most prominent and revered

1. R.I., p.309.

2. Majles Library, Msc.

3. Ja'ā, Vol.II, p.179.

member of the clergy, had on few occasions sent messages of abuse to him and warned him against the outcome of his acts. The governor, being a favourite of the vakil's, did not attempt to modify his behaviour. The mollā, incensed and offended by his neglect, left the town with a party of his adherents in protest. The vakil knew about the discontent of the populace and especially of the mollā, but he took no measure to remedy the situation. Āqā Moḥammad Renāni continued to be the governor, despite frequent complaints of the inhabitants.<sup>1</sup> Strangely enough, the governor, after being disgraced by <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, asked to retire to the <sup>C</sup>Atabāt. On his departure, he made the above-mentioned mollā his executor for his vast property, which had a turnover of 8,000 Tomāns a year and probably, by this benevolent act, made peace with the clergy.<sup>2</sup>

The second instance shows Karim Khān's lack of concern and total disregard for the clergy and their credibility. The situation had come about like this. A shepherd, working for a local magnate of Dekhhārquān near Tabriz, wished to visit the <sup>C</sup>Atabāt. Being destitute and unable to perform the pilgrimage, one day after performing his prayer in the Moṣalā, he picked up a few pebbles, placed them in front of the alter and wished they were gold, so that he could make the journey with their aid. He dreamt of a few holy personages, who opened the doors to paradise for him, and poured the fruits of Eden into his lap. He related the dream to his friends and, in no time, it got around the village and many people rushed to see him and benefit from his divine blessing. His clothes were all torn and kept as sacred and, everyday, more people came to visit him from all over the province.<sup>3</sup> The Bazaris and lutis also gathered round him and, in no time, they fabricated stories about his divine inspiration and his power to heal maladies of all

1. Iaṭa, Vol.I, pp.270-1.

2. G.M., p.319.

3. Iaṭa, Vol.I, pp.196-7.

sorts. If a blind man came to be cured with his magic power and dared to say that he was still blind the followers of the shaikh molested him and forced him to assert the healing power of the old shepherd. Soon the shaikh even believed in his healing hands and visitors were pouring from distant areas, like Dāghestān, Darband, Kordestān, Ganje and <sup>C</sup>Eraq-e-<sup>C</sup>Ajam to see him and enjoy his blessings. Even his ignorant brothers were believed to have been favoured by divine spirit and, thus, the visitors came to their audience as well.<sup>1</sup> Soon the shaikh and his brothers gathered great wealth and, had they been more intelligent, they could have acquired political power too.

The shaikh, who had grudges against the secretary of the Shar<sup>C</sup> court, Mollā Sa<sup>C</sup>id, instigated his followers to harass the mollā and he was forced to flee the town and solicit the pardon of the shaikh. Another Mollā, Akhund Ebrāhim, a distinguished Faqih had expressed his doubts about the shaikh, although in private; but the followers of the shaikh had been informed. Thus, they rushed on him and, with great difficulty, he managed to escape with his life. Henceforth he kept quiet and repented of his remarks.<sup>2</sup>

The dispute between the clergy and the followers of the shaikh gained greater proportions, so that the Beglarbegi of Tabriz, Najaf Qoli Khān, had to intervene. He invited the shaikh into his palace and, with due respect, housed him in a quarter of his establishment and, thus, kept him under close watch.<sup>3</sup> The affair reached the ears of the Vakil and he suspected the Beglarbegi of being the mastermind of the plot, in order to further his influence and power.<sup>4</sup> However, after having been assured of his innocence, he left the Beglarbegi to deal with the false

1. IaIa, p.198-200.

2. Ibid., p.203.

3. Ibid., p.202.

4. Ibid., p.200.

shaikh, as best he could.

Evidently, the Vakil was solely concerned with the political implications of the event, rather than the threat, which such proceedings would pose to the clergy and their status. One may argue that, while Karim Khān adopted very harsh measures against the Ne<sup>C</sup>matollāhi Darvishes, why did he treat the incident of Shaikh Qāsem so lightly? The reason lay primarily in the type of following, which each respective group had gathered. The Ne<sup>C</sup>matollāhis had attracted the highest ranking members of the society, who were potentially capable of challenging the power of the Zands, whereas the followers of the Shepherd Shaikh were almost all from the lower class: from those who are called by Maftun, with so much contempt, "ahl-e-Suq va <sup>C</sup>avām".<sup>1</sup> This was the key to the contradiction, which one may find in the Vakil's attitude towards the Ṣufis,<sup>2</sup> although the view generally held by the historians was that Karim Khān reacted to the Ṣufi influence in Shirāz under pressure from the clergy, who warned him that the true faith was in danger. But this could have only been used as a good pretext for the Vakil to justify his action. Giti Goshāy is the only source, which refers to the political implications of the Ṣufis' influence on the notables. He clearly states that <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān was apprehensive that a Ṣufi saint might be used as a link between Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān and the notables of Fārs, and that was why he offered insults to the saint, Ma<sup>C</sup>ṣum <sup>C</sup>Ali Shāh, and his disciples and banished them from the city of Esfāhān.<sup>3</sup> The contribution of the mollās in this affair cannot, however, be denied. They for their part, sensed a serious threat to their remaining credibility and defended their own interests with zeal.

1. IaIa, Vol.I, pp.196-7.

2. Karim Khān banished Ma<sup>C</sup>ṣum <sup>C</sup>Ali Shāh Ne<sup>C</sup>matollāhi from Shirāz in 1192. The Darvish, with his disciples, retired to a village near Esfāhān, at the accession of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān to the throne; he was banished from Esfāhān with great indignities.

3. G.G., p.245.

To sum up the general situation of the clergy, one might say that they were poverty-stricken, despised and neglected. Furthermore, they lived in a society with many paradoxical practices which they either had to accept or reject. Either way, they did not gain what they sought: that is, power and influence over the society, of which they considered themselves to be moral custodians. By accepting the practices, which they deemed vile and immoral, they were accused of being compromising and, by rejecting them, they antagonised the state and alienated the public.

Still there are numerous instances of the compromise and even immorality of the clergy. Maftun relates an amusing story of his teacher, a mollā who could not resist the temptations of the beautiful courtesans, who even entered the school and kissed and cuddled the students. He married one of them (Mot<sup>c</sup>a) and totally left his teaching circle.<sup>1</sup>

Here we will study the life and career of Mollā Moḥammad Bāqer Behbehāni, the chief protagonist of the Oṣuli school of thought.

Mollā Moḥammad Bāqer (1176-1205) was born in Esfāhān into a clerical family. He was the grandson of Mollā Moḥammad Taqi Majlesi and the nephew of Mollā Moḥammad Bāqer Majlesi. He began his education under his father, Mollā Moḥammad Akmal, himself a member of the clergy, whose career is rather obscure.<sup>2</sup> Mollā Moḥammad Bāqer left his home town at an early age; he went to Hamadān to study and then retired to Behbehān, a major stronghold of the Akhbāris.<sup>3</sup> There is no evidence that he acquired any distinction in that city. Golshan-e-Morād states that, when Karim Khān besieged the town of Behbehān,

1. IaIa, Vol.II, p.182.

2. Davāni, <sup>c</sup>Ali, Vahid Behbehāni, Qum, n.d., pp.128-9.

3. G.M., p.221.

the mollā, together with other clergy, came out of the city to ask pardon for the past conduct of the inhabitants.<sup>1</sup> The Vakil lifted the siege and retired to his capital. A modern biographer of the mollā, <sup>C</sup>Ali Davāni, whose work is full of tiresome flattery, claims that Mohammad Bāqer was actually summoned to the town of Behbehān to replace a member of the clergy, who had died and happened to be his relation. The same author states that two wards of the town, Qanavāt and Behbehān, which were traditionally hostile to each other as a result of Ḥaydari and Ne<sup>C</sup>mati factional strife, fought over him. Each of the wards wanted him to preach in their mosque.<sup>2</sup> The mollā delighted with the rivalry, married the daughters of both Kadkhodās of the opposing wards, and benefited from their hospitality and hatred for each other. He stayed about two years in Behbehān, but left that town, after he discovered that the congregation attending his sermons were gathered by order of the kadkhodā of Behbehān, Khājeh <sup>C</sup>Aziz. He was greatly disappointed and left the town quietly for the <sup>C</sup>Atabāt.<sup>3</sup>

It appears that he formed his ideas, while he was in Behbehān. As mentioned before, the Akhbāris had full control of the place and the inhabitants were followers of Shaikh Yusef Bahraini, the prominent Akhbāri mollā.<sup>4</sup> Davāni states that, in Behbehān, the mollā started his opposition to the Akhbāris, but the author of Qeṣas al-<sup>C</sup>Olamā is silent on this point. After a short stay in Karbala, he found his financial conditions severely restricted. He therefore resolved to leave and seek his fortune elsewhere. It was then that he conveniently dreamt of his holy ancestors, who beseeched him to stay. This must have greatly helped him to establish his position amongst the faithful.<sup>5</sup>

1. G.M., p.221.

2. Davāni, op. cit., pp.140-1.

3. Tonekāboni, Mohammad, Qeṣas al-<sup>C</sup>Olamā, Tehran, <sup>C</sup>Elmieh, n.d., p.199.

4. Davāni, op. cit., p. 140.

Shaikh Yusef Bahreini commanded the largest attendance of tollāb in the <sup>C</sup>Atabāt, and had a great following. Mollā Moḥammad Bāqer was at first apprehensive of the influence of the Akhbāris. He, therefore, taught secretly in remote basements, but, after a while, apparently after he had gathered some followers, he began to teach oṣul (principles) openly and even ventured to forbid the tollāb of Shaikh Yusef to attend their teacher's circle.<sup>1</sup> Mollā Moḥammad Bāqer, from then on, directed his efforts towards fighting the Akhbāris and, although Shaikh Yusef had the power and means of disposing of an impudent newcomer, he bore with his antagonist with great tolerance and refused to fight him. There is no reason given in the sources for the resigned attitude of the Akhbāris towards him. It appears that, by blundering rhetoric, Mollā Moḥammad Bāqer harangued his audience and disarmed his opponents. His arguments with the Akhbāris, as given by his biographer, are hollow and polemical.<sup>2</sup>

Mollā Moḥammad Bāqer lived a long life and died in 1205/1793. He had two sons, who were also mollās: Āqā Moḥammad <sup>C</sup>Ali Behbehāni, his eldest son, became a powerful and wealthy mollā; his animosity towards the Ṣufis was proverbial and he was known as Ṣufikosh\* (Ṣufi slayer). It appears that H. Algar has confused Āqā Moḥammad <sup>C</sup>Ali with his father, as he asserts that Mollā Moḥammad Bāqer had a party of executioners in attendance to carry out his orders. This was definitely Āqā Moḥammad <sup>C</sup>Ali, who was by all accounts the most violent and fierce of the mollās in the early 19th century. The second son of the mollā, shaikh <sup>C</sup>Abdol Hosein, never achieved distinction among the clergy.<sup>3</sup>

1. Qeṣas al-<sup>C</sup>Olamā, p.201.

2. Davāni, op. cit., pp.148-152.

3. H. Algar gives the date of Mollā Moḥammad Bāqer's death as 1208/1803. First of all 1208 corresponds to 1773 and not 1803; and secondly, the date given is wrong.

4. Qeṣas al-<sup>C</sup>Olamā, p.199.

5. Algar, H., Religion and the State, Berkeley, 1969, pp.35-6.

Mollā Moḥammad Bāqer produced many students, who became the official clergy of the Qājār era. His most prominent tollāb were Seyed Mehdi Bahr al-<sup>C</sup>Olum, Shaikh Ja<sup>C</sup>far Najafi, Mirzā <sup>C</sup>Abol-qāsem Qomi, Mirzā Moḥammad Mehdi Shahrestāni, Mollā Mehdi Narāqi and Hāji Moḥammad Ebrāhim Kalbāsi. His sons and sons-in-law were also educated by him.<sup>1</sup>

The major points of difference between Oṣuli and Akhbāri schools:

A thorough study of both schools is not within the scope of this work. We will merely point out the major differences, which are relevant to our argument. Such differences have been given in various sources, as numbering between twenty-six and eighty-four; among these, however, there are five issues, which are of major importance to the status of the clergy in society and are the basis for the overall influence of the position of Mojtahed.<sup>2</sup>

1. The Oṣuli school believes that the sources of religious principles are four: that is, the Qoran, Sunnat,<sup>C</sup>Aql and Ejma<sup>C</sup>, whereas the Akhbāris maintain that only the holy book and the Sunnat are the basis of Islamic principles.
2. According to the Oṣuli school, the faithful should not follow a dead Mojtahed in his Ahkām and resālāt; the Akhbāris, however, believe that truth does not change by the death of a theologian.
3. The Oṣuli school maintains that Ejtehād is essential to society, Vājeb-e-<sup>C</sup>Aini. To Akhbāri theologians, this is unlawful (Harām) and should be dismissed as such.

1. Op. cit., p.202.

2. For a thorough study of the legal points in the dispute of the two schools the reader is referred to the article written by Scarcia, "Intorno alle controversie tra Ahbari e Ussuli presso gli Immamitidi Persia", R.S.O. XXXIII, 1958, 212, n.1.



4. Oṣuli theology is based on the idea that no-one except a Mojtahed is capable, or indeed qualified, to issue a Fetwā (Ruling), since the ordinary individual cannot comprehend the Hadīs. The Mojtahed must, therefore, be learned in sixteen sciences,<sup>1</sup> so that he can judge on any point of uncertainty for the general public. The Akhbāri doctrine is in total contrast to this view. They maintain that for the guidance of the Omma, only the Akhbār of Ahl-e-Bait is sufficient.
5. According to Oṣuli belief, where there is no access to <sup>C</sup>Elm (knowledge), the mere conjecture of the Mojtahed is sufficient, since it is based on scientific reasoning and also Āyāt va Akhbār of the Ahl-e-Bait can be qualified as <sup>C</sup>Elm. The Akhbāris disagree with this point categorically, and hold that the conjecture of the Mojtahed is only as good as that of anyone else and, in all points of uncertainty, one must attempt to achieve <sup>C</sup>Elm.

It was precisely by indoctrinating these principles into the minds of the people, that the clergy asserted their position as indispensable to the community. They had the privilege of interfering in every aspect of life in the community, and ventured to intervene in political affairs. A mollā went as far as declaring war on the Russian infidels.<sup>2</sup> Mollās coerced the public into paying enormous amounts of money to them as Khoms va Zakāt.<sup>3</sup> Some of them acquired so much wealth, that the Qājār monarch, Fath <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, looked to them for financial support;<sup>4</sup> although Sir Harford Jones, in the early 19th century, affirms that the mollās are proverbial jokes and, even in street puppet

1. These sciences are as follows: Loghat (Language); Ṣarf (Grammar); Nehv (Syntax); Kalām (Oration); Manteq (Logic); Osul (Principles); Tafsir (Exegesis); Hadīs (Tradition); Rejāl (Biography); Ma <sup>C</sup>āni (Semantics); Bayān (Rhetoric); Badi <sup>C</sup> (Eloquence); Hai'at (Astronomy); Teb (Medicine); Riāziyāt (Mathematics); Hendeseh (Arithmetic); Davāni, *op. cit.*, p.48.

2. *Qesas al-<sup>C</sup>Olamā*, pp.128-9.

3. *Ibid.*, pp.148-9.

4. *Ibid.*, pp.141, 142, 149.

shows, the mollās were the target of ridicule.<sup>1</sup> But the reality was that the Mojtahed was becoming more and more prominent in his role as the guide of the community, and, despite Harford Jones' assertion that the king could chop off the head of the mollā Bāshi and no-one would think anything about it,<sup>2</sup> no king ever dared to offer the slightest insult, or indeed punishment, for the perfidy of the mollās. There is an instance, which clearly illustrates the point. A mollā of the town of Yazd had incited the public into turning their governor out of the town. The mollā was taken to the presence of Fath<sup>c</sup>Ali Shāh and he asked him about the incident. The mollā admitted that he had been the cause of the uproar. The Shāh, in his efforts to hold other people responsible for the event and, thus, to release the mollā without further trouble, tried his best to persuade the mollā to state that he was not responsible. He was, however, adamant and refused to put the blame on anyone else. The Shāh, apprehensive of the consequences of flogging a mollā, eventually appealed to his minister to intercede and freed the mollā.<sup>3</sup>

The position of the local governors was even more significant. Amin al Douleḥ, the governor of Esfāhān, was so terrified of Shaikh Ja<sup>c</sup>far Najafi, an Oṣuli clergy, that he readily complied with any demands that he made, in order to avert the mollā's wrath.<sup>4</sup> It is evident that the clergy not only achieved the status, that they enjoyed in the Ṣafavid period, but that they surpassed it, and late 18th century developments certainly mark a turning point in the religious influence and the position of the clergy.

1. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.I, p.406.

2. Ibid.

3. Qeṣas: al'olamā pp101-2.

4. Ibid., pp.192-3.



1otf<sup>c</sup>ali khan's wife

## CHAPTER 11

### THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN LATE 18th CENTURY IRAN

#### Introduction:

Women in Iran, as in most Muslim societies, had a rather ambiguous position. Society, being hierarchical and distinctly divided into classes, women had differing status according to their class. In the lower classes, as the masses of the people are commonly termed, the women had the status of a labour unit. Assisting their parents, while only an infant, and participation in the household affairs was their expected duty. The upper classes, however, viewed women as mere objects of luxury and pleasure. The women in the royal seraglio and the grandees' private apartments (Anderūn) had a life of absolute idleness and leisure. Their duties were only to see to the management of the house and to order the servants about. They often had their musicians and dancers to entertain their guests. It was not uncommon for the Lutis to enter the royal household and the grandees' harims. The class distinction was not as rigid as it might appear. In fact, it was much more flexible than Western Europe and it has to be mentioned that people of humble origin could rise up the social ladder easily.

As mentioned above, Iranian society in the 18th century was class oriented. The pyramid was formed in this manner: The royal family were at the top of the pyramid; then came the government officials of high rank, like ministers, governors, military generals, top-ranking<sup>c</sup> Olamā like the Qāzi, Shaikh al-Eslām and wealthy merchants. After the two highest echelons, at a lower level came the lesser government officials, such as the district governors, kadkhodās, traders, artisans and minor

clergy. Below all these were the masses of commoners, who were of various professions and descriptions. This was the situation in the urban communities.

Among the rural population of villagers and peasants, there was very little evidence of class distinction. Except for a few families, like those of the kadkhodā and Mobāsher (superintendent), the peasants lived in very much the same conditions: that is, in abject poverty. The tribal communities were slightly different, in that the chiefs and their families generally lived in the metropolis, either as hostages or else for the sake of the luxury of urban life. They lived in grand style and mixed with the most affluent strata of society. The tribal chiefs attended the royal court regularly, established links with the urban upper classes by way of marriages, and sometimes even married into the royal family. Their women ranked among the top citizens and enjoyed a life of extravagance, whereas the ordinary tribesmen had limited resources and lived frugally.

(1) We begin our study by observing the manners and usages of the royal family and household.

In the royal seraglio there were three different categories of inmates. The legally-married wives, who were generally of the highest rank; and secondly, the concubines, who were admitted to the seraglio for the pleasure of the monarch and his sons. These women were almost always liable to be sent back to their families or given over to royal favourites. The third group were the slaves, who had been either purchased or else taken as prisoners in war. Sometimes the harim of the monarch was so extensive and crowded, that it was difficult to mobilize it in time of emergency. Ja<sup>c</sup>far Khān, while leaving Esfāhān in great haste, left behind his mother, his daughter and twenty-three of his concubines (Jāriyehs).<sup>1</sup> Although he had made

1. R.M.M., p.88.

ample preparation to transfer all his household, there were so many, that he had to return to Esfāhān to take them all.<sup>1</sup>

It was the practice that, after the death of a monarch, his harim, together with his treasures, were appropriated by his successor. It often happened that the women of the harim had no connection whatever with the new monarch. It was not uncommon for the king to distribute his concubines to other grandees or his kinsmen to keep. Also, the legally-married ladies were often given to their kinsmen to keep. Karim Khān's daughter was married to <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān and, after his death, she was given to Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān by his father.<sup>2</sup> In most cases, the youngest wife of a monarch was married to the new sovereign, although it was not uncommon to send back a lady of rank to her family. Hedāyat Khān, the governor of Gilān, gave his daughter to <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān in marriage. The death of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān en route to Esfāhān, occasioned a great tumult in the army and the unfortunate bride was saved from being dishonoured by the soldiery by her personal guards. Ferrieres Sauvebeouf relates the event in this manner:

"cinquante Georgiens formerent une barriere autout de la fille du prince du Guiland qui s'etait mise sous leur sauve-garde."<sup>3</sup>

She was subsequently returned to her parents.<sup>4</sup>

In some cases, the mother and daughters of the deceased or de-throned king, were treated with respect, but they were often given over to the lowest classes of the people.<sup>5</sup> Despite the

1. R.M.M., p.96.

2. G.M., p.220.

3. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.293.

4. G.M., p.440.

5. Fava'ed al-SafaVieh, Ms B.L. (add.16.698), p.150.

practice of exchanging women like objects, there was a special respect accorded to older women. Akbar Khān, the son of Zaki Khān, was greatly disliked by Abol Fath Khān, who had made up his mind to eliminate him. Akbar Khān, however, had resorted to a trick in order to protect his life. Every time he attended the court, he was in the company of Sādeq Khān's second wife, the mother of ḌAli Morād Khān and JaḌfar Khān. This can be attributed to the mild and gentle character of Abol Fath Khān, who refrained from aggression, out of respect for the presence of a woman.<sup>1</sup> The presence of the same lady did not, however, prevent JaḌfar Khān's assassins from murdering him, while his mother was at his bedside.<sup>2</sup>

Respect for one's mother was almost universal. All classes, from the king to the lowest individual, revered their mother. It was in reward for the sincere and genuine love of a mother for her children, that she enjoyed consideration and respect. Lotf ḌAli Khān, when reprimanded by his mother for having bestowed a mark of honour on those, who had heaped insults on the dead body of JaḌfar Khān, burnt the culprit, Mirzā Mehdi, alive in a fit of rage and indignation.<sup>3</sup>

The royal ḥarim was infested with intrigues and rivalries. In their attempts not to be mere objects, women were forced to enter into the political arena. It was not only for the favour of their husbands and masters, that they resorted to intrigues. Often the political supremacy of their sons and kinsmen, induced them to take part in the fierce struggles in the court. In almost all of the political upheavals, women played a decisive role. The events subsequent to the death of the Vakil occasioned great opportunity for the women to involve themselves in politics. Even before Karim Khān died, the court was polarized

1. G.M., p.267.

2. Ibid., p.450.

3. H.P., Vol.II, p.181.

around two centres of power. One was that of Abol Fath Khān, the eldest son of the Vakil, with his adherents, such as Nazar<sup>C</sup> Ali Khān. The other was that of Moḥammad<sup>C</sup> Ali Khān, the second son, and his supporter and father-in-law, Zaki Khān. Each party were constantly informed of the latest developments in ḥarim, where the ailing Vakil was dying. Two women of his royal ḥarim were the agents of the rival parties. Immediately after the Vakil died, they were ready to take action against each other and in favour of their candidates.<sup>1</sup> On another occasion, Āqā Moḥammad Khān was also rescued by a lady in the royal ḥarim: that is, his aunt. He was informed of the grave condition of Karim Khān and escaped before falling into the hands of his successors.<sup>2</sup>

Passing information was not the only way that women participated in politics. They also actively took part in the conspiracies against the government. The late Vakil's wife and mother of Abdol Rahim Khān, was used by Zaki Khān to bring her father out of the citadel. This led to his murder. Whether the lady knew what was going to happen is not known; it is likely that she did not. Either way, it certainly shows her lack of both judgement and maturity, that she placed trust in a monster and helped him to kill her own kin. Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān confiscated the wealth and ḥarim of Şeid Morād Khān, an ambitious and avaricious Zand chief.<sup>3</sup> He was advised by his minister to turn out of the royal ḥarim, all the women belonging to the latter.<sup>4</sup> Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, however, failed to see the inherent danger of keeping the women of an enemy in the house. The result was that these ladies poisoned Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān and paved the way for Şeid Morād and his accomplices to murder him, when he was much reduced in strength.<sup>5</sup>

1. G.M., p.215. Fava'ed al-Safavieh, Ms p. 146.

2. Haqa'eq al-Akhbār, Tehran, 1334, p.7. Malcolm states that she was his sister (op. cit., Vol.II, p.157).

3. R.M.M., p.81.

4. D.K., preliminary matters, p.clxix.

5. G.M., p.450.



Stealing valuable items for the competitors for power was also carried out by women of the royal harim. Sir Harford Jones Brydges brought a valuable diamond for Fath <sup>C</sup>Ali Shāh, which was originally stolen from Karim Khān's treasures and found its way to England.

Monarchs, or those who usurped their power, had to rely on the loyalty of their wives, but it was not uncommon for them to be betrayed in their trust. It is amazing how women could forget, or indeed forgive, the destroyer of their families. <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān killed all the sons of Sādeq Khān, who were of mature age. He, however, married his son to a daughter of the latter.<sup>1</sup> How he could rely on her loyalty is inexplicable. Again, Lotf <sup>C</sup>Ali Khān, after confiscating all the wealth of Āqā <sup>C</sup>Ali, the influential merchant of Kermān, married one of his daughters and gave another of his daughters to his uncle in marriage.<sup>2</sup>

In regard to women's education, the royal household did not differ greatly from the anderūns of the grandees. Women were often taught to read and write and, especially, reading the Quran was the focus of much attention. This did not, however, mean that they learnt Arabic, but, rather, they would read it with the aid of a translation and commentary, as is the case in most non-<sup>C</sup>Arab countries today. It was not uncommon for a princess to be learned and highly educated. One of Karim Khān's daughters was a lady of great talent; she wrote an excellent hand and also wrote poetry.

On the question of the ownership of landed property by the royal princesses, it appears that they inherited their father's or their husband's fortune. There is, however, no evidence to

1. Brydges, Mission, Vol.II, pp.13-14.

2. G.M., p.397.

3. I.K., p.359.

prove that they were given property as Tyul, as was practised in the Qājār period. Fath<sup>h</sup> Ali Shāh gave the city of Qum to his mother as her tyul.<sup>1</sup> The brides of the royal harim, if they were of high rank, brought a great amount of wealth with them. Hedāyat Khān's daughter, on joining her husband, <sup>C</sup>Ali Morad Khan, brought an immense amount of valuables with 20,000 Tomāns cash as a present (pishkesh) to her spouse.<sup>2</sup> The law of inheritance, like all other Muslim countries, was practised, although in an unsettled state, which characterizes this period of history, it seldom happened that a monarch died in his bed and his wealth was actually transferred to his offspring. Almost always, the sons of a deceased monarch, if they escaped execution, were imprisoned or kept in the court and closely watched. In this respect, women were in a better position; they were never executed and, almost always, were kept in the harim and eventually married to their kinsmen. Joseph Amin, however, asserts that <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān executed the women belonging to Šādeq Khan, and even his own mother. Whether this is true or not, is not proved by substantial evidence. But as mentioned before, women were occasionally married to the lower classes, as a sign of disrespect. Āqā Moḥammad Khān, when he became the master of Shirāz, gave a daughter of the Vakil to a muleteer, in retaliation for an insult, which that lady had offered to his sister, while he was captive in Shirāz.<sup>3</sup> It is surprising that the Zand women totally abandoned the tribal spirit, for which they were known. When Karim Khān was struggling for power, his womenfolk often participated in the warfare. In one instance, the Zand women not only freed their captive menfolk, but also provided them with arms and ammunition to fight their enemy.<sup>4</sup> The reason could easily be, that the contemporaries of the Vakil had all died and the new generation had no experience of the hardship involved in tribal

1. Sketches of Persia, Vol.II, p.33.

2. G.M., p.398. Fava'ed al-Safavieh, Ms. 129.

3. R.S., Vol.9, n.p. Ḥaqa'eq al-Akhbār Nāseri gives his name as Bābā Fāẓel (op. cit. p.9).

4. M.T., pp.281-2.

life; being completely cut off from that way of life and used to the comfort of the urban lifestyle.

The children born to Zand ladies, or other ladies of noble descent, were always treated with more respect and, at the same time, dread, whereas the commoners were treated with less regard. An example illustrating this, is the case of a young man, who appeared in the year 1191/1777 at the court of the Vakil and claimed that he was Karim Khān's son. Although there was no hard evidence to endorse the allegation, the Vakil accepted him as his son and treated him as such. The young man, Ṣāleḥ Khān, brought his mother to the court and lived in the court, as long as the Vakil lived. After the death of the latter, Ṣāleḥ Khān was still kept in the court, along with the other sons of the Vakil. It was, however, <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān, who deprived Karim Khān's sons of their eyesight, and only Ṣāleḥ Khān was permitted to be left unmolested.<sup>1</sup> Although this was a blessing for a child of humble birth, it could also deprive one of his claim to the throne. The only explanation for Ṣāleḥ Khān's freedom, was that he could not lay any claim to his father's throne, like the other three sons of the Vakil could. At any rate, there is no evidence for a woman ever being punished for a crime concerning the king or his relations, even, as mentioned in the case of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, where the crime was apparent.

As to how the ladies of the ḥarim passed their time, we have no information. Judging by the numerous intrigues and plots carried out by them, one is inclined to think that they had no other occupation. The monarch, and all the Zand nobles, always carried part of their harim with them, when at camp. Francklin, in 1787, describes the female quarter of the camp of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān.<sup>2</sup> Whenever the ladies were in the camp, or in

1. G.M., p.389.

2. O.M.T., p.79.

the palace, they were constantly and closely guarded by eunuchs and soldiers. Carsten Niebuhr, who visited Persia during the reign of the Vakil, states that no woman was allowed to leave the city after the sunset, for fear of political prisoners attempting to flee in women's guise. Although this could be one of the reasons for their permanent seclusion, the prime cause of it was the jealousy of the monarch of his harim being seen by anyone. Ferriere Sauvebeouf the French envoy managed, with great precaution, to get a glimpse of <sup>C</sup>Ali Morād Khān's harim, while they were passing his windows. He describes them as follows:

"elles étoient a cheval, ayants des bottes de maroquin noir proportionées à la grosseur de leurs pilliers artificiels; chacune avoit une petite veste de drap d'or avec un manteau d'écarlate; leur figures n'étoient pas voilées d'après le soin qu'avoient pris les Eunuques de faire fermer les boutiques, & de chasser à coups de massues les hommes qui se trouvoient dans les rues où ces dames devoient passer; & quoi que ce fût un spectacle plaisant de voir tout un sérail qui sembloit être à francetrier, car il y en avoit soixant dix si la mode leur eût été donnée de Londres comme de Chiras."<sup>1</sup>

There are, however, a few paintings in existence of the royal harim ladies, at which Carsten Niebuhr was astonished, since they were nearly naked. One painting is taken of the famous mistress of the Vakil, Shākh-e-Nabāt. This girl was a prostitute. The picture was probably painted from the live model, which indicates that the Zands were not all that jealous of ordinary women in their harim being seen by others. The women were, however, covered in a huge cloth, while outside the harim, which Ferrieres Sauvebeouf found, not without reason bizarre.<sup>2</sup>

1. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.60.

2. Ibid.

The harim, as mentioned before, was a community of various classes. The monarch married different women for different reasons and motives. Karim Khān married the daughter of a wealthy merchant of Esfāhāni origin,<sup>1</sup> apparently to establish friendly relations with that class of citizen. Again, he married Moḥammad Hasan Khān Qājār's sister, after the death of the latter.<sup>2</sup> This lady enjoyed great respect in the harim. Karim Khān was not scrupulous as to the religion of his wives. He married a Jewess, by whom he had his second son, Moḥammad<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān. His legal wives were all of a socially well-established background. There were, however, women of humble origin, who found their way into the royal seraglio. Shākh-e-Nabāt, a prostitute of uncommon beauty, was so beloved of the Vakil that, when she was taken ill, Karim Khān forced all his wives to gather by her bedside and walk round it so that her illness would be transferred to them and his mistress would be saved.<sup>3</sup> It was, apparently, a superstitious belief that the evil could be removed by this practice. How this woman entered the Vakil's ḥarim is not known, but we know for certain that she was a singer/dancer, attending with a band of musicians the banquets given at the houses of the grandees.<sup>4</sup>

The female slaves had a totally different status from that of the legal wives or concubines. They were either presented to the ruler, or taken as captives in war. Joseph Amin, in his biography, states that Karim Khān demanded Heraclius (Erkle), the prince of Georgia, to provide him with twelve beautiful Georgian virgins, not above twelve years of age. This was on top of demanding hostages, like the widow of Erkle's eldest son, his heir Gorgin Khān and his son-in-law, Prince David.<sup>5</sup>

1. G.M., p.220.

2. R.S., Vol.9, n.p.

3. TaTa, Vol.II, pp.56-8.

4. R.T., p.340.

5. L.A.J.A., p.209.

Amin speaks with distaste of the Georgian nobles, who competed with each other to send their daughters into the royal ḥarim. According to Chardin, during Ṣafavid times, the parents of the ladies sent to the harim received some kind of salary, as long as they remained there.<sup>1</sup> Whether this was the practice at the time of the Zands is not known, but one may safely assume that the nobles wished to present their daughters or relations to the Zand court for the financial gains, that they could derive from it. Almost always, the most beautiful slaves were married to the monarch. The rest acted as servants to the great ladies: that is, the legal wives of the ruler. The female slaves were often married to their own kind: that is, male slaves. Those who turned Muslim were married to their lord, as lawful wives.

Female hostages formed another category of the royal harim residents. They were mainly the daughters and wives of tribal chiefs, local governors and unruly vassals. Karim Khān kept a large number of these ladies in his ḥarim. If they were widowed, they were married to the monarch and, when they were married, they were kept as security for the good conduct of their kins. Moḥammad Hosein Khān Sistāni had a wife and one of his sons in Shirāz. They were sent back, when Ṣādeq Khān assumed power.<sup>2</sup>

#### Women of the upper strata in late 18th century Persian society:

As previously mentioned, the upper classes formed a small percentage of the inhabitants of the country, who immediately came below the royal family. This echelon covered a wide range of high ranking government officials: namely, Vazirs (ministers), Sardārs (military generals), Ḥākems (governors), Beglarbegis, wealthy merchants and influential clergy. These

1. Chardin, Travels, part.I, p.205.

2. I.K., p.336.

people often had a great establishment, very little inferior to the royal household, with many attendants and servants. They often married several wives, in order to ally themselves with other influential families. Some, however, married one wife and, as a result, were highly respected in the society. Mirzā Moḥammad Kalāntar of Fārs married one legal wife, but he had slaves in his house.<sup>1</sup> He also had connections with prostitutes and, as a result of that association, contracted a disease, which resulted, he believed, in the loss of his hearing.<sup>2</sup> Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein, the minister to many of the Zand rulers, also had one wife.

It appears that the merchant class were more inclined to marry several wives. This was, however, caused by the nature of their affluent life. The great merchants travelled extensively and, in each of the places they stayed, they established a home. Hāji Khalil, a rich merchant of Bushehr, married a Turkish woman in Basra. As he had large concerns in Basra, he often travelled and stayed there. The women of this class had more security in respect to their inheritance and status.

With the death or fall of a monarch, his wives and daughters were subjected to all sorts of indignities. This was, however, true of the families of high-ranking officials too. Bāqer Khān Khorāskāni, who rebelled against the Zands and sided with Āqā Moḥammad Khān Qājār, was not only executed for his treason, but his family were sent away to Shirāz, as captives.<sup>3</sup> Apart from such cases, the women could inherit legally from their fathers' and husbands' estates. Mirzā Moḥammad, the kalāntar of Fārs, even left his vast landed estate to his cousin, the daughter of Mirzā Moḥammad Hosein Ṣāheb Ekhtiār, despite hav-

1. R.M.M., p.94.

2. Ibid., p.59.

3. G.G., p.274.

ing four surviving infants.<sup>1</sup> He, however, left a will, in which he requested her to protect his children.<sup>2</sup> Although women could not take charge of their wealth independently, and there was always a man to manage the affairs of her property. They could assert their rights at times. Hāji Khalil, a Bushehr merchant, died in India in an affray between the India Sepoys and his attendants, when he was on a mission to the government in India on behalf of Fath<sup>c</sup> Ali Shāh. Mirzā Nabi, his nephew became the guardian of his children. The deceased's second wife in Baṣra, however, applied to the Turkish government to protect her interests. It was not until Mirzā Nabi married this lady, that the dispute was settled.<sup>3</sup>

The Mollās generally sided with the women in any legal dispute, not for their love for justice, but rather for their own interests. The majority of women, being secluded in the harim and uneducated, were more inclined to practice religious rituals and donate money to the clergy. Thus, the mollās exercised greater influence on them, than on the male section of the community. Sir John Malcolm was assured by an Indian gentleman, Ja<sup>c</sup> far<sup>c</sup> Ali Khān, who had married and settled in Persia, that:

"there is nothing, I can assure you sir, that these Moollahs like better than advocating the cause of our ladies."<sup>4</sup>

The women of this class had their rank and family as a form of security. Their relations protected their rights, if the husband was of an unruly disposition. Their interference often

1. Six of his children had died in his lifetime.

2. R.M.M., p.94.

3. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.I, p.37.

4. Sketches of Persia, Vol.II, pp.48-9.



drove the men to despair. This was, however, a great asset in a society, where the rights of female population were at the mercy of the male population, who often did not need an excuse to violate it at their pleasure.

As the disadvantages of the Islamic legal system for women are not within the scope of our study, we may now proceed to the situation of women in the middle and lower classes of the sedentary population. The women in the middle classes were very little more than slaves, as Francklin saw them in 1787.<sup>1</sup> They stayed at home attending to the housework and rearing children. They left the house twice or three times each year to visit their parents and close relations.<sup>2</sup> Whether they were allowed to attend the religious functions or not, is not known. Francklin gives a detailed description of Rožehkhāni and other rituals performed during the month of Moḥarram,<sup>3</sup> but he fails to inform us as to whether the women were present in the mosques. Malcolm asserts that women were forbidden from attending the mosque and were advised to offer their prayers at home.<sup>4</sup> It could have been only a practice particular to the rule of the Qājārs, but his view contradicts the accounts given by Qeṣas al-<sup>c</sup>Olamā, which asserts that almost all the congregation attending the sermons given by Shaikh Ja<sup>c</sup>far Najafi in the great mosque, were female.<sup>4</sup> There was, indeed, a long-standing tradition, which is kept even today, that women congregated at the mosques for mourning and other rituals. The first mention of it is by Ebn Battuta, who visited Persia in the 8th century. He relates that:

1. O.M.I., p.66.

2. Ibid., p.100.

3. H.P., Vol.II, p.333.

4. Qeṣas al-<sup>c</sup>Olamā, p.185.

"one of their strange customs is that they gather in the principal mosque every Monday, Thursday & Friday to listen to the preacher; some times one or two thousand of them (women) carrying fans in their hands with which they fan themselves on account of great heat, I have never seen in any land an assembly of women in such great number."<sup>1</sup>

Again, during the rule of the Şafavids, the Shi<sup>C</sup>a were known to have gathered with their women in the Takkiyas and perform religious rituals. This is asserted by the Turkish authorities, who were keeping an eye on the Shi<sup>C</sup>a population resident in<sup>C</sup> Erāq and Anātoli.<sup>2</sup>

The women of the middle classes appear to be less scrupulous, or rather less controlled in respect to their Hajāb or veil. Francklin, who lived in the house of a Seyed, found the women communicative and free in their manners.<sup>3</sup> Their husbands and relations did not prevent them from speaking to an infidel (as the Christians were termed), and they appeared without a veil in his presence; whereas no Muslim fellow countryman was allowed to see them. Education of the women in the middle classes was often carried out by their menfolk, especially among the religious classes. It was not uncommon for any women to reach the highest degree of learning. Moḥammad Bāqer Behbehāni, known as Vaḥid, the most prominent of the clergy in the late 18th century, was taught by his aunt, who was a learned woman of the time.<sup>4</sup>

Lower class women were often more liberated than the upper classes. Hanway, in 1743/1157, remarks on women working in shops in the town of Qazvin, while their men were absent.<sup>5</sup>

1. Ebn-Battuta, Travels, Vol.II, p.300.

2. Muḥim Defterleri, a collection of documents relating to the Shi<sup>C</sup>a's, Der Islam, 1979, pp.254-5.

3. O.M.I., p.66 Brydges, Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.I, p.432.

4. Qesas al-Ōlamā, p.150. It is also recorded that he studied with his mother.

5. Hanway, An historic account of the British trade over the Caspian Sea, London, 1753, Vol.I, p.234.

The usage was, however, unusual in Islamic society and can only be the result of mass conscription of the males into the army by Nāder Shāh. As Hanway only saw old women working, it could be attributed to the fact that their sons and supporters were doing military service and they were forced to run their shops themselves. However, as mentioned before, women had a totally different status among the lower classes and participated in economic production on a much larger scale. There is, again, no information as to the punishment of women for any crime. Hanway states that they used to put women in sacks as a form of torture. This practice has survived to the present day and is in use in Persia today.

The rural community, as it formed a great sector of the population, deserves particular attention, in that the female played a major role in production. They assisted their menfolk in the process of cultivating the land. They also engaged in carpet and rug weaving during the winter months. These were in addition to their tending the livestock and making dairy products, such as butter, yoghurt and rogan. They shared the miseries of their menfolk too. The burden of different imposts and demands of the government or local khans was also laid on women. Mirzā Mohammad Kalāntar gives an account of villagers being beaten, tortured and cauterised by Āli Mardān Khān Bakh-tiāri, when he was competing for supreme power with Karim Khān.<sup>1</sup> The kalāntar states that there were no women, who had not suffered the calamity. Women were imprisoned along with the men, when they could not meet the demands of the central government, their houses burnt and left with no resources. The life of the peasant women was a tale of misery and degradation. Amir Guneh Khān Afshār, the Zand general, in his mission to the south of Fārs, burnt down the villages, which had not provided him with provisions. He transferred the inhabitants

1. R.M.M., p.43.

to other places and left only a mosque and shrine standing.<sup>1</sup> The houses, which had been burnt had a cellar, which contained grain. The sardar confiscated it with great satisfaction.<sup>2</sup> The fate of the villagers in Māzandarān was more horrible. Zaki Khān, in his expedition to that province killed the men in Chāhārdah Kalāteh and violated the honour of the women in public.<sup>3</sup> It was not uncommon to carry off the women of a village as captives to another place. The rural female shared the same fate as her urban counterpart. Zaki Khān, when he arrived in the town of Yazdkhāst, gave the wife and the daughters of a holy Seyed to his soldiers as captives.<sup>4</sup>

Another class of the female population of Persia were the prostitutes. In Persia, like many of the Middle Eastern countries, e.g. Syria and Egypt, prostitution was practised. Although it was contrary to the orthodox and traditional laws of Islam, the government acknowledged it as a profession and, thus, levied taxes on the women engaged in that profession. During the Ṣafavid era, there was an official name for the brothel, Baitalotf, which provided a lucrative revenue for the government. Their practice was, however, banned at times, due to the religiosity of some monarchs. There is an inscription in the province of Māzandarān, in which Shāh Ṭahmāsb orders his officials to prevent its practice. Thus, the taxes were abolished. It is not known whether the order was carried out or not, but there is another instance of Shāh Solṭān Ḥosein, forbidding the women to practise prostitution. It appears that it never was completely abandoned, as Karim Khān would not have ventured to introduce it into the country again. Although he did not pay much attention to the clergy, it appears that he only continued what was already in existence.

1. Niebuhr, op. cit., p.47.

2. Ibid., p.48.

3. R.T.P., p.365.

4. O.M.T., p.129. H.P., Vol.II, p.160. G.G., p.227.

Rostam states that the Vakil brought above 5-6,000 prostitutes into the city of Shirāz and allocated a quarter of the city for their residence.<sup>1</sup> The mahalleh was named Khail (a quarter for public women).<sup>2</sup> Maftūn Donboli affirms that these women were housed in streets and quarters, which were previously the abode of the respectable citizens. Waring, also in 1802, implies that there was such a quarter in Shirāz.<sup>3</sup> Rostam's account leads one to assume that the Vakil actually started the practice in Shirāz, so as to keep his turbulent subjects busy and, thus, retain the peace in the city. This, however, is unlikely, since it would certainly have upset the clergy and antagonised them. The mollās, however, turned a blind eye to it and only ventured to check the activities of respectable citizens, in order to prevent their association with that class. There is a letter in existence addressed to the Shaikh al-Eslām of Shirāz, Shaikh <sup>C</sup>Abdol Nabi, which is in reply to a note he had written to the notables of Shirāz. In the letter, Mirzā Moḥammad Kermāni denies the accusations made against him, of having invited the Aḥl-e-ṭarab va Alvāṭ to a banquet held in his house. He states that the banquet was given in honour of No<sup>C</sup>man Chalabi, the Turkish envoy, by the order of the Vakil, and the guests were the usual crowd of notables invited to all the official functions.<sup>4</sup> Incidentally, among the guests were two Akhūnds, which, if the accusations were well-founded, is of great significance. There is another point, which is interesting, in the letter: that is, the Aḥl-e-Ṭarab va Alvāṭ (plural for Lūṭi) are used synonymously, which supports Waring's account, that the prostitutes, dancers, singers and musicians were members of a broad group known as the Lutis.<sup>5</sup>

1. R.M.M., pp.339-40.

2. Dekhoda, Loghat nameh, Letter kl. pp.1012-13.

3. I.S., p.80.

4. R.M.M., p.114.

5. I.S., p.55.

There is no doubt that the majority of the prostitutes were singers/dancers. Rostam asserts that almost all of them danced and sang with much beauty and skill. Some of these women even knew a considerable number of odes from the well-known poets and improvised according to the circumstances.<sup>1</sup> Many of them them played music and attended the grandees' *anderūns* and the royal *ḥarim* too. It appears that women singers/dancers performed in public as well. Francklin, in 1786-7, witnessed the *Cheragūn* (illumination)

"in honour of the second son of Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān undergoing the operation of circumcision."

On that occasion, women danced in the *Bāzārs* and streets of Shirāz for several days.<sup>2</sup> This again indicates that the clergy did not oppose, at least openly, such unorthodox practices. Rostam relates an amusing anecdote. The Shaikh al-Eslām of Shirāz was passing through a street in the city, when he was confronted with a band of *Lūtīs* and a prostitute drinking in public and, thus, blocking the way. Shaikh<sup>C</sup> Abdol Nabi, unable to make his way, reprimanded the woman to repent of her sinful behaviour, but the woman replied to the shaikh with an ode from Hafez:<sup>3</sup>

گر تو نمی پسندی فیرده قصه را

در کوی نیلای ما را گذرند ازین

Incidentally, drinking in public is also mentioned by Francklin, who maintains that almost all the Persians drink, some in public, and all in private.<sup>4</sup> This is another contradiction in late 18th century Persian society, with which again, the religious classes had to contend.

1. R.I., p.342.

2. O.M.I., p.50.

3. R.I., p.344. The ode reads: In the quarter of good repute, we were not admitted. If you are not pleased (with the decree) change the destiny.

4. O.M.I., p.70.

In order to understand how the mollās could come to terms with these contradictions, one has to discuss the prevailing attitude towards prostitution and such practices. As is well known, the majority of Persians, being of the Shi<sup>C</sup>a persuasion, held Mot<sup>C</sup>a (marriage by contract) legal; despite the ban put on it by the second Khalif<sup>C</sup>Omar.<sup>1</sup> The practice did not materially differ from prostitution, only in the duration of the contract, which could be from an hour to ninety-nine years. This fact is attested by contemporary Shi<sup>C</sup>a scholars, who maintain that the purpose of it was to protect the institution of the family, as some men could not be satisfied with the marital relationship.<sup>2</sup> Ferrieres Sauvebeouf in the 18th century categorizes it, as identical with prostitution in his statement:

"le metier de courtesanne n'est point meprise en Perse; l'usage est de faire marche avec une femme; a raison de tant par mois; alors elle se pique de fidelite & le menage est tranquille: dans l'autre cas, les etrangers se pourvoient a la passade, comme en Europe & cela ne leur fait point des-honneur."<sup>3</sup>

The account, given by Malcolm, of the proceedings of the contract is exactly consistent with what is given by a contemporary member of the clergy.<sup>4</sup> Malcolm states that the two parties involved have a ceremony in the presence of a mollā. The contract can be for any length of time. The man accepts to pay the woman a certain amount of money at the expiration of the contract. He can declare the contract null and void at his pleasure, but he has to pay the money agreed upon. Should a man die within the period of the contract, the woman has no right to claim inheritance. She is liable, however, to receive her money from the deceased heirs to the inheritance. Should the woman become pregnant in that period, she has no claim

1. Tabātabā<sup>C</sup>i, Mohammad Hosein, Shi<sup>C</sup>ite Eslaw, p.227.

2. Ibid., p.229.

3. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.60.

4. Tabātabā<sup>C</sup>i, Hosein, Reseleh Tozih al-Masā'el, Tehran, 1332. p386.

to alimony (Nafaqa). There is, however, a curious contradiction in that the children born of such contracts, inherit from their father's estate. The status of these women was different from that of slaves in that, although they were turned out of the household at the death of their master, or else he would dispose of them at leisure, they were free and could not be sold. Slaves had a worse position, as stated by Sir John Malcolm, from the "sweeper of his house, and the partner of his bed are alike to be sold again if they have been purchased."<sup>1</sup> At any rate, it often happened that the Mot<sup>c</sup> as of a notable, along with his lawfully married wives, were confiscated by the monarch, or that, when a warlord was defeated, all his harim was appropriated by the victor. When Hedāyat Khān Gilāni was shot, his wives and daughters were confiscated by Āqā Moḥammad Khān and transferred to Māzandarān.<sup>2</sup> These women were often kept by their new owner, if they were young and beautiful. What became of the women, who were not so young and beautiful, is not known; most probably, they led a life of abject poverty.

The question of the class affiliation of the prostitutes cannot be decided with any degree of certainty. It is, however, more likely that they were of the lower classes. Rostam states that the prostitutes were all of the Indian tribe, which Bahrām, the Sassānid king, brought to Iran.<sup>3</sup> It seems unlikely that, even if such a tribe was brought into the country, they remained intact. Through the centuries they must have intermarried with the Persians and become Muslims as well, as Rostam indicates. There was a certain woman, by the name of Fāṭemeh, who was very much admired for her beauty and wit.<sup>4</sup> This woman was once reprimanded by a mollā and told to leave her sinful path

1. H.P., Vol.II, p.591.

2. G.M., p. 439.

3. R.T., p.340. He has based his information on Shahnameh.

4. Funnily enough, she was known as mollā Fāṭemeh.



and lead an honourable life. To this, she replied that she was a good Muslim, as she performed all the rituals of the religion and, as for her intercourse with men she was barren, through taking some kind of herbal drug. Thus, there was no legal impediment to restrict a woman in that state from having intercourse with men.<sup>1</sup>

Again, all the names of prostitutes in Shirāz, who are listed in Rostam's book, are Persian rather than Indian, Jewish or Armenian.<sup>2</sup> This again proves that the majority of them were Muslims. It was not uncommon for a lady of high rank to stoop to the state of a prostitute, considering the unsettled state of the country and the practices of dishonouring the ladies of the royal ḥarim and grandees' anderūns, as a result of political change.

As can easily be seen, the practice of marriage by contract and prostitution, was only for the convenience and the pleasure of the upper classes. The ordinary people married one wife and had no part in these activities. The only class of lower status, who had links with prostitutes, were the Lūtis.<sup>3</sup> They acted as pimps and agents for the troupes of entertainers.

The close ties of the Lūtis with the bands of musicians, dancers/singers are clearly indicated in the letter previously alluded, which was written to the Shaikh al-Eslām. These Lūtis had a vast network of criminal subculture at their disposal and officials of the government turned a blind eye to their activities, since they were the main clients of these troupes of entertainers. Waring relates that the Dārughe of Shirāz arrested an Armenian, who visited a brothel and fined him a large sum of money:

1. R.I., p.348.

2. Ibid., p.341.

3. Ibid., p. 343.

"fifty toomuns (guineas) he thought (the Daroghe) he conferred a favour on him, at allowing him to escape at so easy a rate."<sup>1</sup>

There arises yet another contradiction, in that, if the government levied taxes on prostitutes, why did the Dārughe fine their clients? As Waring states:

"The description of people who pay the heaviest tax to the government are the female dancers and votaries of pleasure. They exercise their profession under the immediate patronage of the governor. Their names, ages, etc. are carefully registered & if one should die or marry, another instantly supplies her place."<sup>2</sup>

The only explanation for fining the client could be, that it was to discourage the general public from having any association with these women. As is clearly indicated by Waring,

"The Daroghe of the Bazar likewise superintends the morals of the people & if he detects any of them drinking wine or in the society of Courtezans he compels them to purchase his connivance at no small expense."<sup>3</sup>

According to the above-mentioned traveller, the prostitutes were

"divided to classes agreeably to their merits and estimation they are held in; each class inhabits separate street so that you may descend from doo (two) toomunees to the pooli seeahs without any chance of making mistakes."<sup>4</sup>

This indicates also that the government officials found a source of income for themselves, by setting a dual standard, that is

1. I.S., p.68.

2. Ibid., p.80.

3. Ibid., p.67.

4. Ibid., p.80.



shākh-e-nabāt

as long as one was not caught, one could indulge in the practice. It is, however, peculiar that the social status of the citizens were taken into account even in such cases.

Women from religious minorities in Persia:

Persian society was composed of many ethno-religious groups, including Armenians, Jews, Hindus and Zoroastrians. During the reign of the Vakil, these minorities were encouraged to return to Persia and settle there. Carsten Niebuhr was accompanied on his trip from Bushehr to Shirāz by a group of Armenians, who had returned to Persia.<sup>1</sup> The Jews were also invited to settle in the country. The above-mentioned traveller asserts Karim Khān had built a caravanserai in the city of Shirāz for the Jews,<sup>2</sup> to transact their commercial affairs without harassment. After the death of the Vakil, however, the situation greatly altered. The Armenians and the Jews were constantly harassed and oppressed. <sup>c</sup>Ali Morād Khān tortured the patriarch of Julpha, along with his fellow priests, until they revealed the hiding place of the church's valuable ornaments. Thus, they were taken away and melted in order to strike coins. The Armenian population had drastically decreased. Joseph Amin informs us that:

"the fine suburb of Julpha once inhabited by 12,000 rich families, contains at present hardly 500 houses, and may soon be deserted and left for the Muslims of Ispahan."<sup>2</sup>

The Jews had also left the country, due to the turbulent state of affairs. Buckingham reckoned that there were a few Jews left in Shirāz in the early 19th century.<sup>3</sup>

1. Niebuhr, Travels, p.58.

2. L.A.J.A., p.467.

3. Buckingham, Travels, Vol.II, pp.42-3.

At all events, the minorities managed to survive and keep their identity despite the pressure exerted on them in hostile surroundings. Although the reign of Karim Khān was marked by liberality and tolerance towards the religio-social groups, and there is no evidence of molestation and oppression exercised on the minorities, the minorities had to abide by the prevalent customs and traditions of a Muslim society. Niebuhr asserts that his fellow travellers, Armenian women, had covered their faces carefully and, in their appearance, they did not differ from the Muslim women.<sup>1</sup> Joseph Amin also remarks on the crowd of veiled women, who welcomed him to the city of Tāflis.<sup>2</sup> Still more striking, were their religious practices, which had taken the form of the Muslim rituals. Niebuhr, on visiting the church in Shirāz, remarks that the Armenians, who entered the church, fell on the ground and, in exactly the same way as the Muslims, pressed their forehead to the threshold.<sup>3</sup>

The situation of the female portion of the minorities did not differ greatly from that of the Muslim women. Although they may not have been treated as slaves within their own community, they were constantly subject to the atrocities of the government officials. Joseph Amin relates the miseries of the Armenian community during the short-lived rule of Āli Naqi Khān in Esfāhān.

"In Aly Naky (sic) Khan's miserable reign of forty days in Ispahan a dozen of the worst sort of them (officials), who are called catkhas (sic) or burgh masters, by express orders from Aly Nacky and to their great joy (as they are always glad of an opportunity to ruin the poor) were joined to Aly Naky Khan's Mahomedan (sic) officers in a commission to search for two young women. They got drunk together, and began at night to break open almost all the doors in Julpha, in order to discover the concealed females, to gratify their abomin-

1. Niebuhr, C., Travels, p.61.

2. L.A.J.A., p.205.

3. Niebuhr, op. cit., p.157.

"able covetousness, and at the same time satisfy the diabolic officers, in a place where there are no more rich merchants left. It was proved that they had exacted the sum of 15000 rupees from carpenters, weavers, butchers, shoemakers, cobblers and even of blind beggars."<sup>1</sup>

It is significant that the above-mentioned officials were Armenians themselves and had no scruples in ruining their female folk. The Armenian community, however, suffered little in comparison to the Muslims, as there were about 400 Muslim girls, who had been violated against two Armenians. Joseph Amin attributes this to the fact that the Armenian women "were not so handsome as the Persians."<sup>2</sup> It is striking to note that one of these unfortunate girls was dragged out of a nunnery and the other from the house of a secular priest.<sup>3</sup>

Despite all these cruelties, there existed a peculiar tolerance of the Armenian ceremonies and rituals. Amin observes that this was the reason why many of the rich merchants came to Julpha to marry and settle there. Apparently,

"by the standing law of Shah Abbas the first, the Armenians (who are superstitiously fond of ecclesiastical ceremonies) have been allowed to have their weddings and christenings in public, their priests singing or rather bawling out hymns, with the congregation coming out of the church and going through the streets, or when the bridegroom and the bride enter the house with a pompous procession."<sup>4</sup>

He further asserts that the Armenians dared not do the same in any part of Turkey.

1. L.A.J.A., p.465.

2. Ibid., p.459.

3. Ibid., p.460. It appears that there were two different kinds of priests: one was the official order, who could not marry, but the second group were like community leaders.

4. Ibid., p.466.

"This stupid formality is an inducement for the foreign Armenian merchants who are subject to the Turks to come and settle there. They are even glad to agree with the inhabitants, according to their circumstances to pay a reasonable tax, but the destructive system soon disgusts them. No sooner are they married, than an officer is sent by the Catkhada to demand the tax money, though they dare not come near unmarried merchants in Isfahan."<sup>1</sup>

This was probably the reason for the tolerance towards the Armenians, so that they would be induced to settle in Jolfa, thus providing the government with a fresh source of revenues.

The freedom of the minorities to practise their rituals and ceremonies was extended to the Hindus too. Ferrieres Sauveboeuf witnessed two cremations rituals of the Hindus, in which the wives of the deceased were burnt alive with them, and the French visitor was relieved to observe that the Hindus were not so many as to make rules.<sup>2</sup> There is no evidence that similar tolerance was shown to the Jewish and Zoroastrian communities. Indeed J. Malcolm asserts that they could not perform their rituals in public. We know, however, that they were free to choose their spouses. Harford Jones gives an account of a Zoroastrian girl, who had been living with an Englishman, Mr. Douglas.<sup>3</sup> She had a daughter by that gentleman, who was sent to England to be educated. After Mr. Douglas was transferred, she was persuaded to turn Muslim and marry a well-to-do merchant in Bushehr. She accordingly became a Muslim and married Āqā Kuchak, by whom she had many children. Moḥammad Nabi Khān, a rich merchant of Bushehr, and later the governor of Shiraz, was her son.<sup>4</sup> This is a curious instance of tolerance: how a woman could be integrated into the society the

1. L.A.J.A., p.466.

2. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.65.

3. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, p.33.

4. Ibid.

moment she became a Muslim. Her past and previous religion did not create any impediment in her marriage and was not considered a point of dishonour to her offspring. This could, however, be attributed to the fact that conversion of an infidel was universally regarded as an act of benevolence and was accorded the respect it merited.

The Jewish community was probably treated with the same attitude. Karim Khān legally married a Jewish girl and she enjoyed the same privileges as his other wives.<sup>1</sup> It was always, however, regarded as a disadvantage to be born of a Christian or Jewish mother in the matter of accession to the throne. Mohāmmad Āli Khān, the son of the Vakil by that Jewish woman, was, however, accepted as the joint ruler for a brief span of time.<sup>2</sup> The Jews were generally despised and disliked much more than the Christians and Zoroastrians by the general populace. All the foreign travellers assert that they lived in abject misery and that their number greatly decreased after the death of the Vakil.<sup>3</sup> They were confined to their own quarter in Shirāz and strictly forbidden from participating in official functions, civil or military. They were not admitted to the army, whereas the Christians, or at least the Georgians, were easily accepted as recruits. Āli Morād Khān had a private body-guard of fifty Armenians and Georgians.<sup>4</sup>

1. G.M., p.220.

2. R.M.M., p.69. I.Z., p.6.

3. O.M.T., p.60. Niebuhr, Travels, p.157. M.H.P., Vol.I, p.64. Buckingham, Travels in Assyria, Vol.II, p.75.

4. M.H.P., Vol.II, p.293. L.A.J.A., p.461.



## CHAPTER 12

### A COMMENT ON THE REPORT ON THE COMMERCE OF PERSIA 1792

This report is a valuable source of information on the economy and trade of Persia during the period under consideration, not least because such documents are relatively scarce. But the report is also of historical interest in regard to new arguments put forward to justify new economic policies of free trade at a time, when British industry had developed into the world's leading manufacturing power, and also with respect to the weakening economic position of Persia at a particular stage of Western infiltration into her economy. In fact, a proper understanding of the economic scene in Persia, as seen in the report, requires three elements. Firstly, an understanding of the economic doctrines emerging at the turn of the 19th Century to justify free trade and attack mercantilist views, which were influential in the policies of the East India Company. Secondly, the links which connected the trade of the European metropolitan economies with those of the Orient and various stages of this relationship during the 18th and 19th centuries. Only with these two aspects of the problem clearly stated can we go on to examine the third element, which is putting together different issues raised in the text of the report on the subject of trade with Persia.

#### Mercantilist Economic Theory:

With the emergence of European imperialist powers in the 16th century, we notice the appearance of a set of economic arguments, mainly on trade policies, commonly referred to as mercantilism. Mercantilism was not a well articulated school of thought, as was the classical school of Smith and Ricardo, and

many of their arguments and emphasis changed with the advance of international trade and the development of modern industry in the 17th and 18th centuries. Yet there is a common set of assumptions and views on matters of state economic policy regarding trade, which justifies the term mercantilism. Among such views, the most important, particularly in the context of our discussion, was the argument that a nation acquires wealth through external trade, the source being the excess revenue from exports over expenditure on imports. For example, D'Avenant believed that, in domestic trade, a nation became no richer; the only change was in the relative amount of individual wealth. However, foreign trade made a net addition to national wealth.<sup>1</sup> Again, Becher argued that it is always better to sell goods to others than to buy goods from them.<sup>2</sup>

There are, however, some important differences between the early and the late mercantilists. The early mercantilists (or bullionists as they were called) of the 17th century, thought of wealth in terms of money and gold. The late mercantilist proper had a broader notion of wealth, which included material resources and commodities as well. Nonetheless, both placed a high importance on the economic benefits of bullion. The most important representative of bullionism was Malynes, who firmly believed that expansion of foreign trade depended on the availability of excess treasures.<sup>3</sup> This led to an attack on usury for big financiers and money lenders, who by charging high interest rates, reduced the profit margins of the trading merchants and thus discouraged trade. Here we have the apparent contradiction of mercantilist thought: the high regard for money yet the attack on usury. The main direction of bullionist state policy was monetarist: that is, they tried to control internation-

1. Roll, E, History of Economic Thought, London, 1950, p.66.

2. Ibid. p.70.

3. Ibid.

al trade by seeking state prohibition on the export of gold and silver. When we come to the mercantilist proper, we see the bullionist argument: that expansion of trade depended on surplus of treasure.

The amount of treasure depended on the expansion of trade, in particular on the amount of excess exports over imports. This change of emphasis was to some extent reflected by Misselden and Thomas Mun, both merchant economists. Misselden, of The Merchant Adventurers, the E.I.C.'s main rival, favoured the confinement of trade to "Christendom", as he called it, because in such trade Britain always secured a surplus. He was particularly in favour of trade with Portugal because of her treasures. He blamed the trade depression on the East India Company's Oriental trade, because it drained Britain's wealth<sup>1</sup> (the E.I.C. was allowed to take out a certain quantity of bullion on each Oriental voyage according to its 1660 charter, mainly because they bought more goods from the Orient than they sold to them.<sup>2</sup>)

IN response, Thomas Mun, the father of mercantilist thought and the director of the East India Company from 1615 to 1641, argued that the re-export of Oriental goods enabled the company to make a net gain of species.<sup>3</sup> In the course of time it was the latter's arguments that won and the prohibition on the export of gold and silver was abolished in 1663.<sup>4</sup> The direction of economic policy by the mercantilist proper was in the direction of trade balance, emphasising state policies for the promotion of manufacturing exports. The surplus in foreign trade depended on domestic industry, which the government was anxious to protect. When we come to Child, who was also closely

1. Roll, op. cit., p.65.

2. Ibid., p.70.

3. Ibid., p.77.

4. Viner, Jacob, "Theories of foreign trade before Adam Smith", Journal of Political Economy, Vol.XXXVIII, Feb. Dec. 1930, part II, pp.407-8.

associated with the E.I.C., we find that he thinks the value of the colonies depended on their ability to act as an exclusive market for the manufactured products of the mother country and to supply the latter with raw materials and cheap labour.<sup>1</sup> In political terms, the shift of emphasis reflects the shift of political power from big merchant financiers to merchants turned industrialists, who controlled domestic production by subcontracting work to independent farmers and artisans working at home.

This shift of emphasis on the role of trade was eventually changed by regarding production, not trade, as the main source of wealth. This final change was the work of free trade supporters, who were opponents of monopoly advantages and export prohibition on bullion. It was one of the main achievements of the free trade school, particularly of William Petty, to show that money is only a means to trade, not its aim. Moreover, trade itself was seen as a means of expanding domestic industry. Petty argued that, if a country had too much money, it should melt it down, export it as a commodity where there is a demand for it, or lend it out at a high interest rate.<sup>2</sup> In other words, anything in excess of requirements for trade was nothing more than an ordinary commodity and should be treated as such. As Cantillon, an important free trade advocate, argued, if a country has an export surplus for any considerable time and drawing specie from other countries, circulation will become more considerable. Money will then become more plentiful relative to land and labour. The cost of production and labour will then increase, the export surplus will decline, and trade will balance.<sup>3</sup> Such beliefs led Petty and other important free trade predecessors of Adam Smith to reject all measures of fixing exchanges by law, as advocated by bullionists, and turned them into determined opponents of mer-

1. Roll, op. cit., p.82.

2. Ibid., p.110.

3. Ibid., p.122.

cantilist prohibition of bullion.

### The Commerce of Persia with Britain:

The above section on mercantilist economic thought helps to clarify two fundamental features of the commercial relationship between Persia and Britain during the second half of the 18th century. The first relates to the economic doctrine of the late mercantilist period, which helps us to understand Britain's motives in trading with Persia and what she hoped to achieve from the relationship. We have seen that the underlying concern was in securing a surplus in the balance of payments. There is a new emphasis on ways and means of increasing the role of British manufactures abroad as the main source of earning from foreign trade. This emphasis reflects the growing importance of industry and production as the principle source of wealth. Thus Britain was no longer content with a trade deficit in her "spice trade" with the Orient to be financed out of her trade surplus elsewhere. Britain's industry had then reached a stage, where she was seeking to secure a trade surplus with the Orient by means of promoting the export of her manufactured goods.

This brings us to the second feature of the period, that in the late 18th century we are only observing the beginning of the change of emphasis. This, as we have seen, was due to the peculiar position of Asian trade with Europe, which distinguishes it from the rest of the non-European world. These peculiarities were continual trade surplus in favour of the Asian countries and relatively little impact of the trade with Europe on their internal economic structure. In addition, the capacity of the British manufacturing industry in taking over the world export market was still limited. Keeping these two points in mind helps to understand the main issues involved in the trade between Britain and Persia during the late 18th century.

In studying the trade of Persia with foreign countries, we have to bear in mind two major aspects. Firstly, the empire of Persia was self-sufficient in its economy. There were only a few items of food, which were imported into the country: sugar, coffee and spices, and even those were not of crucial necessity to the diet of the inhabitants. As is indicated in the report on commerce, Persia only imported items of luxury, such as woollen textiles, which only catered for a very limited proportion of the population. Thus there arises a question as to how important was the trade with the European countries for Persia and to what degree the country was dependent on this trade. Furthermore, internal trade was extensive, as is once more asserted by the agents of the E.I.C.:

"the extension of the Persian empire occasions a considerable commerce as the different provinces mutually stand in need of the productions of each other."<sup>1</sup>

There are other indications of a prosperous internal commerce. Although, as observed by the compilers of the report, the merchants engaged in foreign trade were worse off than those under British protection, but, those dealing with internal trade appear to have been doing quite well. They paid little tax and took less risk in their business transactions. The same appears to be true of the muleteers, that is, they carried out a lucrative transportation business. Sir Harford Jones remarks that there were muleteers, who were richer than the merchants who employed them.<sup>2</sup> Thus, we may easily conclude that however extensive the scope of external trade may have been, it had as yet made little impact on the internal economic structure of the empire at that stage.

The merchants, who were engaged in foreign trade, did not,

1. Report.

2. Brydges, Sir Harford Jones, Mission to Persia, Vol.I, p.104.

however, make profit due to the competition of the Armenian and Mohammedan (Indian) merchants, who enjoyed the protection of the British.<sup>1</sup> But the reality was that they had larger capital and the extent of their activities in respect to trade enabled them to be more enterprising than the others. All the sources agree that these were men of extensive wealth and great influence.<sup>2</sup> Their sheer wealth gave them the advantage of getting involved in the importation of bullion into Persia, a lucrative trade, which must have compensated for their loss of trade in other commodities. This reflects the declining position of Persia as an exporter of manufactured goods, i.e. carpets, silk and cotton textiles, and so on. This must have greatly reduced the earning of foreign gold and silver. A good evidence of this decline is the ban put on the export of Kermān wool by Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān, in order to protect the raw material sources for the shawl industry of Kermān.<sup>3</sup> The silk textiles of Yazd and Kāshān, which were previously exported, had also lost their market, and thus Persia had only become a source of raw materials for the E.I.C., whereas she only imported manufactured goods, such as textiles. A glance at the table of goods imported into Persia in 1789 shows that many of them were produced in the country;<sup>4</sup> for instance, the chintz manufactured in Shushtar was, at all times, considered to be of good texture and fast colour.<sup>5</sup> By this time, only very little chintz was exported to neighbouring countries. The other major item imported to Persia was various kinds of metals, e.g. lead, copper and iron. These were also abundant within the country, but the importation monopolized the market had hampered the incentive for working the mines of these metals, although the Persians had already opened their mines of lead and copper.

1. I.O.R., Report.

2. Ibid.

3. The EIC agents were by no means pleased with the ban, as the export of Kermān wool had decreased to only 3000 Mans a year. They feared that the ban might increase the price of the wool and thus they were hoping that they could convince the Khan that the importation of shawls from India would be more profitable to his treasury, since he received custom and toll tax on the foreign imports. I.O.R. G/29/18, pt.3, received by the Court of Directors. 1788.

4. I.O.R. G/29/21, Bushire, 15th Nov. 1789.

5. I.O.R., Report.

However, there are three major points, which help to understand and determine approximately at what stage this transition occurred between the two stages mentioned above. It is clear that the penetration of foreign manufactured goods into Persia had not reached an advanced stage. Firstly, because at this point the importation was limited to items of luxury and Persia was still exporting textiles. In other words, the import of manufactured goods was primarily intended to compete with Persian industry, but had not yet managed to turn Persia into an exporter of raw material and importer of manufactured goods which characterises stage II. As a matter of fact, the country had succeeded in discouraging the importation of goods, which she produced, such as carpets, velvets, embossed clothes, brocade and different kinds of European silk. As the report indicates, during the period of its compilation, the company had stopped the importation of these items. Secondly, it is evident from the recommendations of the EIC agents, that they are content with providing luxury manufactured textiles for the consumption of limited upper and middle classes of Persians, as the report terms them: "the Persian gentlemen".<sup>1</sup> This clearly shows that the scope of this trade could not have been very extensive. Finally, the ban on Kermān wool by Ja<sup>C</sup>far Khān shows that the competition with foreign trade was confined to the control of the sources of raw material and had not yet extended to textile manufacture, since the prohibition is only on the wool and not the importation of textiles.

Thus Persia, at this point, was in a transitional period between the two stages, though moving rapidly towards the second stage. The country is still self-sufficient; it is losing its export market and is faced with the export of manufactured goods at an increasing rate, but the tendency is at its initial stage.

1. I.O.R., Report.



The chief manifestation of this tendency is reflected in the acute shortage of species in Persia, a point of crucial importance in the analysis of the economic situation in that country in the report. This we also make a principal issue in our study.

We may start with an apparent contradiction in the report on the commerce of Persia. The importation of a limited amount of textiles could not have caused a significant drain of gold and silver, and make the money shortage a main obstacle in commercial transactions. The explanation for this contradiction may be found in a remark in the report:

"The Persian merchant is obliged to make greatest part of his returns to India and of his advances sent thither for the purchase of goods in species, which confines the exports made from Bushire to India to an inconsiderable quantity of old copper, drugs, rose water, dried fruits and species exported from Bushire to India consists of Venetian sequines and different sorts of Persian silver coins, but as the exchange varies very much & often proves severely disadvantageous to the exporter he frequently prefers to export gold and silver in bars, the remaining exports made at Bushire are confined, to Muscat and Bussora being made to the former in raw silk, cotton, drugs and dried fruits, to the latter inconsiderable quantities of grain and dried fruits."<sup>1</sup>

This point is also observed by Waring in 1802,

"they (merchants) often undertake long journeys, frequently to Cashmire, where they supply themselves with shawl, besides the danger of the journey, they can seldom hope to receive the returns of their money before the expiration of three years, from which it is easy to form a notion of their profit and the present state of trade in Persia."<sup>2</sup>

1. I.O.R. Report.

2. I.S., p.77.

A possible interpretation for the preference of the merchants for exporting gold and silver could be the link between the passage of the decline of manufacturing and the fall in the export earning of Persia. A greater volume of export would have meant a greater demand for Persian currency by foreign purchasers of Persian goods. It could have exceeded the supply available of Persian currency, which would in effect increase the value of that currency as against other currencies. Thus, the foreign buyer would have to pay the difference in specie.

This would give the Persian currency a higher exchange rate and bring into the country a surplus of bullion. Whether Persia had such a surplus in earlier periods when the trade of the kingdom was thriving, is not known. It is, however, possible to imagine that there was such a surplus in the treasury of the government, as it hoarded silver and gold at all times. The fact is, however, that the volume of exportation even at the time of rapid decline in her traditional industry, indicates that it was so in the period under study. In contrast to the above-mentioned case, the decline in exportation of manufactured goods as a result of foreign competition would lead to a fall in demand for the currency; that is, the limited amount of purchase by foreign merchants would require limited quantities of currency to pay for the goods. The result would necessarily be that the demand for Persian currency would be below its supply, leading to the depreciation in the value of Persian money, in relation to other currencies, i.e. the exchange rate falls in addition to the outflow of bullion. The reference made in the report to "the exchange varies very much and is severely disadvantageous to the exports," is the essence of the inclination of the merchant to turn to gold and silver for his trade due to the relative stability of its value.<sup>1</sup>

It is true that Persia paid for all her importation, especially

1. I.O.R., Report.

to India in cash, as the commodities produced in that country did not suit the market in India. The British merchants, therefore, were finding it difficult to continue their trade from India to Persia and they had stopped their commerce altogether for a few years prior to the compilation of the report. The drain of specie was due to a fundamental cause: the decline in manufacture. The Vakil, apprehensive about the drain of gold and silver, had issued a decree:

"forbidding the exportation of specie in which after enumerating the disadvantages which much ever arise to the nation, which exports species for the purpose of purchasing foreign manufactures, he points out the many commercial advantages which Persia possesses in consequence of her natural productions and enforce the necessity of his subjects who may be engaged in foreign commerce availing themselves of a circumstance which under proper management must prove so beneficial to their country. This edict although it was carried into execution to the full extent of the Khan's wishes proved, nevertheless, highly serviceable to the commercial interests of the kingdom & there is good reason to believe that the balance of trade between Persia, India & Turkey was at that period much more favourable to the former than ever it has been since."<sup>1</sup>

Incidentally, the Company's agents were quite unhappy about the edict issued by Karim Khān, as indicated in a letter; the resident in Basra complains that on the

"trade of Persia, Carem Caun says he does not want it & it only impoverishes his dominions. That no species shall be exported but goods shall be taken in exchange for goods."<sup>2</sup>

It is interesting to note the different factors which the report, at various points, puts forward as the explanation of the scar-

1. I.O.R. Report.

2. I.O.R., E/4/458, Bussora 19th May, 1768.

city of species in Persia, for it shows the depth of mercantilist ideas underlying the report, despite some otherwise free trade notions in the offers of solutions to the problem to be examined later. All the factors mentioned in the report as responsible for the country's shortage of gold and silver derives from the bullionist ideas, discussed previously. Shortage of money results in the decline of the volume of trade: the withdrawal of the Dutch factory from Khark deprived the Persian government of an important source of revenue, and the death of the Vakil also gave rise to a state of uncertainty and anarchy, regarding the government treatment of merchants and the taxation of their goods.<sup>1</sup> Elsewhere, another factor is added to the list, namely the pilgrimage to the holy shrines in Ottoman Turkey such as Karbala, Mecca, by the Persians creating a drain of 200,000 piasters<sup>2</sup> per annum.

Despite these factors mentioned in the report, the decline in Persia's balance of trade was fundamentally due to the penetration of European manufactures into her internal trade market and the resulting fall in export earnings. This was not, however, particularly a Persian phenomenon, as it would appear to be the case according to the report since all the explanations put forward are specific to Persia. Rather, this was a characteristic feature of the stage reached by the world system of mercantile capitalism, especially in relation to the oriental countries. This is not to deny the depressive effects that the state of political instability or the drain of gold by way of pilgrimage can have on reducing the amount of gold and the state revenue.

But there were factors which aggravated the more fundamental underlying trend, a trend which was to be even more pronounced in subsequent periods, even during the relatively stable

1. I.O.R. Report.

2. Ibid.

reign of the Qājārs. Yet, in citing another cause of the depression, the report seems to be inspired by anti-mercantilist ideas. The practice of over-rating British goods destined for foreign markets is deemed another obstacle in the way of larger sale. As the report informs us, in the year 1788, the consignment made for the Persian market had to be sent back to England because the invoice was so high that it was bound to bring about a loss.<sup>1</sup> It was one of the practices of the mercantilist doctrine to overrate the export so as to acquire more profit, but evidently at this stage, it was not practical in the Persian market.

The solutions suggested by the report shows a greater influence of anti-mercantilist, more specifically, free trade ideas. By far the most important suggestion is that of direct barter of British and Indian goods for Persian products:

"in the present impoverished state of Persia, it will be necessary in order to increase the demand for consumption of British manufacture, to advert to what advantages may be gained by bartering the commodities of Great Britain for those of Persia, upon this plan, it is presumed the merchants will often be induced to make very considerable purchase at times when they might be even unable and unwilling to conclude them for species."<sup>2</sup>

The idea of bartering rather than cash dealings has thrown overboard the most sacred principle of the mercantilist thought, that foreign trade enriches the exporting nations only if it brings gold and silver. Once the free trade idea of trade surplus as a positive thing in itself is accepted, then it is a short step to argue in favour of excess trade, even by means of direct barter. The suggestion seems to be influenced by the Smithian attack on mercantilism. Smith's classic Wealth of

1. I.O.R. Report.

2. Ibid.

Nations was published in 1776,<sup>1</sup> some fourteen years prior to the date of the compilation of the report (1790). We do not have to assume that the compilers of the report were acquainted with Smith's doctrine, who together with other free trade writers, such as Petty and Child even believed that colonial markets were an outlet for British manufactures. Such ideas were prevalent at the time of the compilation of the report and clearly signalled the rise of industrial capitalism in Britain.

To replace the mercantilist doctrine with free trade ideas would have required major changes in the existing practices; indeed as the second report suggests, the directors of the EIC should have expected competition from other European companies. This was another blow to the doctrine hitherto pursued by the company wherever they established their trading posts, that always insisted on having monopoly of the market and with this aim used all their power to prevent other nations penetration into their markets. These changes of policies would have brought about a new phase in the trade carried out by the EIC. But the time had not yet come for the adoption of the new school of economic thought. As the report and the suggestions put forward by the EIC agents did not meet with the approbation of the company directors, they rejected these ideas as totally impracticable and went as far as suggesting that the factory at Bushehr should be withdrawn as an unnecessary expense to the company. The second report, dated 11th January, 1792, reflects the speculations of the members of the committee to the effect that the upkeep of the two residencies in Bushehr and Basra is an expense which added to the losses sustained does not justify their keeping.<sup>2</sup> According to this report, the annual sale at Bushehr amounted to

£2,608

the annual loss resulting therefrom was

£123

Besides which the expenses of the factory at Bushehr

amounts to

1,375

Annual total loss

£1,498

1. Smith, Adam, The origin of the wealth of the nations, London, 1776.

2. B.L. Parliamentary papers, report on the commerce of Persia, 1792.

The same story goes for Basra, that is a large annual loss was expected. They did, however, assert that, should they be

"asked why the company supports establishments at such a heavy and certain expense the answer will amount to a complete justification of the liberal principles of the company and refute the opinion the lordships have been pleased to suggest."<sup>1</sup>

Apparently, the opinion expressed by the court of directors was that

"the company are deprived of the means of establishment on the borders of the Red sea from the want of protection and in consequence of expense which would arise much beyond the present object, they are satisfied with the settlement at Bussora and at Bushire, notwithstanding the great loss they have sustained for many years and which may probably continue for many more."<sup>2</sup>

To this the company submit on the mere possibility that Arabia, the interior parts of Turkey or Persia, may at length fall under a well regulated government. However there are indications that the rejection of the proposals of the agent of the company might only have been marginally related to its unorthodox economic context. Indeed, it reflects a mistrust on the part of the directors towards their agents, since many of these agents were privately involved in trade and many defrauded the company for their own gains. The fact that the directors rejected the plans of extending the establishment of the company in the dominion of Persia and granting the right to the agents to travel around the country and stay in Shirāz as he deemed necessary<sup>3</sup> might have been caused by the very statement made in the report that the practice of smuggling merchandise into Ottoman Turkey and Persia was prevalent. Furthermore, the accounts of

1. B.L. Parliamentary papers, Report, 1792.

2. Ibid.

3. I.O.R. Report.

the customhouse in most of the ports in the Persian Gulf were not clear, since these illicit transactions were not recorded and made the work of compilation of an accurate account of the merchandise arriving at these ports impossible. As Sutherland states as early as 1727, orders had been sent to the agents of the company in Madras, forbidding them from taking presents or rather bribes from the merchants, with whom the company had dealings. The chief problem of the company was the quarrels of its own servants among themselves and the instances of corruption among them occasionally came to its notice.<sup>1</sup> The fact that Manesty and Harford Jones were actively involved in the trade of the Gulf and both were making a good profit from it, might have induced the directors that their insistence on the expansion of the company's activities and maintaining the factories of Bushehr and Basra, stemmed from self interest rather than the welfare of the company.

Besides the recommendation on the direct barter, there are three other suggestions made in the report, of which two show again that the aim was to gain control of the internal market of Persia for the British commodities. Firstly, the promotion of the sale of British goods, by way of careful selection of the consignments destined for a specific market, i.e. Persia. To price the goods and the invoices at a reasonable rate so that they could be met by the merchants.<sup>2</sup>

Secondly, the expansion of political as well as economic influence of the company by way of setting up new establishments in various parts of the East, i.e. Sind. Giving the residents the privilege of travelling to the different parts of the East and increasing the number of the company's servants in Bush-ehr in order to have a free hand in further investigation into the demands of those markets within the borders of Persia.<sup>3</sup> Thirdly, the Company would increase its revenues by charging

1. Sutherland, L., The East India Company in 18th century politics, p.47.

2. I.O.R. Report.

3. Ibid.



a consulage on the ships which travelled under the company's protection. This was especially aimed at charging consulage on the Armenian and Muslim merchants of India whose property was secured under the colour of the Company. We will study these suggestions and how they could be beneficial to the EIC.

In the first instance, the consignments made for the Persian markets were made in England and by people who did not have a clue about the taste or indeed the type of clothing worn in the country. They were often of such colours that no-one would think of wearing them, whereas a careful selection of the garments best suited to the climate and taste of the buyers would have greatly improved the sale of textiles.<sup>1</sup> Also, as the report asserts, the bulk of merchandise landed in Bushehr were not actually destined for that market and the only reason for landing them there was to defraud the Turkish government of their duties, this practice could be hardly profitable to the company.<sup>2</sup>

On the second point, we must bear it in mind that the company was still in a phase of non-involvement in politics. Their ambition was to act as intermediaries in the local disputes and gain popular support among the inhabitants. There was, as indicated in the second report a secondary use for the factories established in Bushehr and Basra, which were

"well situated for obtaining information, as well as for improving every favourable circumstance which eventually may arise."<sup>3</sup>

This marks a new era in the EIC activities and marks the beginning of their political expansions in the Gulf of Persia.

1. I.O.R. Report.

2. Ibid.

3. B.L. Parliamentary papers, Report, 1792.

Conclusion:

In summing up the discussions in this chapter, we may conclude that this period was a transitional one, in which the mercantilist and free trade capitalist notions are mixed. This was, however, to be expected in a period, in which the company was undergoing rapid changes. While the explanation of the bullion shortage in the report is bullionist in that the causes mentioned for trade depression are those which had resulted in the shortage of money, suggestions for increasing trade with Persia contain significant anti-mercantilist, free trade ideas. The shortage of money was mainly due to the reasons we have mentioned, rather than those given by the report. The idea of barter and particularly the sale of gold as a means of increasing the sale of products shows the extent of free trade and industrial capitalist influence over foreign trade at this time. As for the internal market of Persia, the country was at a transitional period between the exporting of manufacturing goods and being the importer of European commodities, thus losing the control over her markets. Persia at this stage was rapidly losing ground on her export market and this was the main aim of the EIC, that is the control of markets by promoting the sale of goods. In achieving this goal they had to penetrate the internal market as well as the external, or as the report puts it:

"to erect our flag in the interior parts of Persia."<sup>2</sup>

1. I.O.R., Report on the Commerce of Persia.
2. B.L. Parliamentary papers, Report, 1792.

APPENDIX I

REPORT ON THE COMMERCE OF PERSIA

Karim Khan though deficient in accomplishment of literature and politeness possessed a manly & vigorous understanding alike capable of perceiving the most minute circumstances which might lend to the advantage of Persia & embracing & comprehending the most complicated & extensive schemes for its prosperity. After declining the invidious title of shah he at length found himself in some measures under the necessity from the general voice of the people of accepting the inferior one of Vakeel, to which however, he took care to annex every useful prerogative of royalty.

The Vakeel early perceived that in the desolate state to which Persia had been reduced, by the long period of civil war & by the expensive campaigns of Nader Shah the necessary expenses of the government wants, far exceeds the revenues collected & that the only effectual means of increasing the receipt of the royal treasury were to encourage & invite merchants from all parts to settle in his dominion to endeavour to revive every branch of manufacture to invariably protect the peasantry who had a long struggle under misery & oppression. Possessed of sentiments like that, it could not long escape the penetration of the Vakeel how highly injurious the withdrawing of the different European factories formerly established in Persia had proved to the government commercial interest, thereof & as the country round Gambreon had not yet completely submitted to his authority, he urged Shaikh Sadoon the governor of Bushire to make repeated application to the chief at Bussora for the establishment of an English factory at that port. The applications of the Shaikh met with success & the then government of Bombay directed Mr. Price a member of their own board who was

proceeding to Bussora with the appointment of chief of factory at that place to touch at Bushire & to treat with Shaikh Sadoon on that subject. Mr. Price found no difficulty in executing the object of his instructions & Mr. Jervis, a servant of the Honble. Company was left in charge of their affairs at that place with the appointment of resident.

Notwithstanding the residency at Bushire was so regulated, by the orders of the Honble president & council at Bombay <sup>As to</sup> be subordinate to the chiefship of Bussora, yet the information which is to be obtained from the records of the chiefship in regard to the transactions of the subordinate is scanty & incomplete, from what little it has been possible to glean from them, it appears that Mr. Jervis occasionally made large sales of woollens, velvets & on the Honble. Company's account, that the commerce carried on by private merchants residing there daily increased & that Bushire soon after the establishment of the English residency became a port of importance.

The violence offered by the Turkish governor of Bussora to Baron Kniphausen, the chief of the Dutch factory at that place, gave birth to the establishment of a Dutch factory on the Island of Carrack. Karim Khan was too anxious to see the European's factories again established in Persia to refuse the governor general of Batavia for an unconditionable grant of the little Island of Carrack & Baron Kniphausen to whose care the infant settlement was entrusted, soon erected a fort of no mean strength, lodgings for the different servants of the Dutch company, warehouses for their goods & barracks for the troops stationed there for the defence of the island.

The Dutch imports at Carrack consisted mostly of the same commodities which they had formerly imported at Bussora but their returns were being made partly in pearl, mules, the wine of Schyras & the drugs produced in different parts of Persia. To this establishment of the Dutch factory at Carrack the little

port of Bunderreeg situated on the Persian shore nearly opposite to the island of Carrack became indebted for many advantages, the port of Bushire & Bunderreeg though situated much the same distance by water from the island of Carrack differed materially in respect to their situation to Schyras, the market for which the greatest parts of the Dutch imports were designed. A Coffle departing from the former of the ports, for Schyras,\* generally performed the journey in twelve to fourteen days, whilst those which proceeded from the latter, required no more than seven to eight days on the road. This difference in the expence of the journey & the Dutch for the conveyance of the goods sent to Schyras either on account of private merchants uniformly preferred to land them at Bunderreeg rather than at Bushire, fortunately, however, for the port of Bushire the governor of Bunderreeg was a character but little entitled to the confidence of the merchants, the greatest part of them residing at Bushire made frequent commercial trips from thence to Carrack & concluded large purchases there of spices & sugar which on their return to Bushire were despatched from thence to Schyras. The port of Bunderreeg depending entirely upon the settlement at Carrack for its commercial importance relapsed naturally into its former obscurity, on the Dutch withdrawing themselves from that island. The Island of Bahreen situated on the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulph was at this time annexed to the government of Bushire but the court of Schyras did not draw so much advantage from the possession thereof as might have been expected considering the rich pearl fishery in its neighbourhood. The other petty towns of Persia situated on the shore of the Gulph were then still less known to Europeans, than they are at present but they neither then nor now were or are of consequence enough to entitle them even to be mentioned in this report.

The anxiety & solicitude which the Vakeel manifested for the

\* Shirāz is written differently in different parts.

extension of the commerce of Persia met with their proper reward & he had the pleasure in the course of a few years to find that he had in great measure restored order & regularity throughout the extent of his dominion, the vigor or languor of commerce in Persia depends entirely upon the degree of confidence which the merchants profess in regard to the government & the monthly receipt of the custom house at Schyras arising from the moderate duty of two percent is perhaps the best proof which can be produced of the confidence which the merchants reposed in that of the Vakeel, incredible almost as it may appear there is sufficient authority for advancing, that they amounted to the sum of tumauns six thousand, the most skillful workmen in all the different branches of the manufactures of Persia were attracted to Schyras, by the liberality of the Vakeel, the fine carpets of Khorasaun found their way in abundance to Constantinople & from thence to Europe. The drugs the natural produce of some Persian provinces were exported in considerable quantities to Aleppo & India & the duties to be received by the government on the silk produce in the province of Ghilan alone, were farmed to an American ( Armenian\*) merchant for the sum of Tumauns Four thousands.

It has been before mentioned that the deficiency of the records relating to the transactions of the factory does not allow of the amount of the sales made annually at that place, during that period being mentioned in this report, but there is good reason to suppose that they were more various and extensive than they have ever been since, amongst the articles which the Honorable Company then imported at Bushire are to be found beside their woollens, carpets, velvets, metals embossed clothes, brocades & different kind of European silks.

It must not be deemed foreign to the subject in hand, to mention that upon the records of the Honble company at Bussora

\* It must be an Armenian.

there stands a singular instance of the attention which Karim Khan paid to & of the insight which he required into the true interest of the commerce of Persia. The instance alluded to is a fermaun established by the prince forbidding the exportation of species in which after enumerating the disadvantages which muchever arise to a nation, which exports spicies for the purpose of purchasing foreign manufactures he pointes out the many commercial advantages which Persia possesses in consequence of her natural productions & enforces the necessity of his subjects who may be engaged in foreign commerce availing themselves of a circumstance which under proper management must prove so beneficial to their country, this edict although it was carried into execution to the full extent of the Khan's wishes proved nevertheless highly serviceble to the commercial interests of the kingdom & there is good reason to assert that the balance of trade between Persia, India and Turkey was at that period much more favourable to the former than ever it has been since.

As we approach to present period the commerce of Persia will be found visibly to have declined & although for want of the proper documents, to procure which no pains have been spared the exact proportions of its declension can not be ascertained, yet the true leading circumstances which operated the cause thereof, are obviously perceptible for it can not for a moment be doubted that the withdrawing of the Dutch settlement from the island of Carrack tended materially to its decrease & that the death of Vakeel by throwing the empire into confusion, gave it still more fatal blow upon this latter event the most wealthy merchants who had during the lifetime of the Vakeel resided at Schyras & transacted their business in perfect security finding themselves suddenly exposed to every species of extortion & rapine from the different competitors who immediately sprang up for the government, embraced in consequence thereof the earliest opportunity of abandoning a country in which they with reason conceived neither their person nor their property

to be any longer secure.

Although the death of Karim Khan took place early in the year 1779 yet the confusion caused thereby had not in any degree subsided in the southern provinces of the empire until Jaffer Khan assumed the government of Schyras & its dependencies in the year 1784. Political struggles especially in those countries are always unfavourable both to the merchants & the mercantile affaires but both perhaps suffered as little as the nature of things would admit, during the contest for empire between Jaffer Khan and his opponent Akau Mohammed Khan, Since they mutually agreed to permit caflas of merchandise to pass in safety, in the districts of the empire of which each was ~~a~~ might be in possession. /<sub>er</sub>

Had providence designed to Jaffer Khan a longer life, had he been fortunate enough to have established himself in the government of Persia, there is but little doubt that he would have trodden the foot steps of his uncle the Vakeel, at the time of his assassination which happened in the month of January 1789. The merchants residing in the different cities subject to his authority appeared to have considerable confidence in the stability & equity of his government which appears to be well attested from the amounts of imports from India in the year 1788, which was more considerable than any which have been made from the death of the Vakeel to that period, under his government the manufactures of the country would have revived & under the sanction of his Firmauns, the Honble company might once more have erected their flag in the interior parts of Persia with security & advantage. It has been judged necessary to close at this period the account of the past state of the commerce of Persia & in the relation of its present state an opportunity will be taken of speaking of the advantages of the manufactures & of the natural productions of the kingdom.

In entering upon this part of the report a serious difficulty of



performing it with accuracy immediately presents itself for although it is possible to ascertain with some degree of precision the annual imports made in to Persia by way of Bushire or Bus-sora not in regard to those which are made in to that kingdom from Aleppo by way of Bagdad & from Russia by way of Rashdt & other places bordering on the Caspian sea, the best information which it has been possible to collect appears to be imperfect & defective. The degree of commercial intercourse which subsists between the north eastern provinces of Persia and Usbec Tartary as a branch of Persian commerce, still further excluded from the possibility of accurate investigation than those already mentioned but as this report would appear incomplete without touching in some degree upon these subjects what will be hereafter offered thereon is the account offered by the most intelligent people of this country & as such it is submitted with all confidence to the inspection of the British government in India. ✓

The extinction of the commerce formerly carried on at the port of Gambroon has been already remarked as well as the consequent rise of the commercial importance of the port of Bushire, so that in regard to the former it is only necessary to observe that its present exports are confined to a small quantity of dried & wet fruits and tobacco to the port of Muscat from whence it imports rice, coffee, coarse Bengal & Surat goods, sufficient for the consumption of the town itself & of the inhabitants of the country within a few miles of its neighbourhood.

The road from Gambroon to Ispahaun has been for many years & continues still to be unsafe for caravans, that it has fallen totally in disuse. The island of Ormus is not now frequented by European vessels, it is governed by an Arab Shaikh & considerable quantities of Brimstone & Rock salt are annually exported from thence in boats to Muscat.

The port of Bushire is now the only one of importance on the

Persian shore of the Persian Gulph, its government partakes more of the Arabian than the Persian form & nature. The Shaikh governor is induced by motives of self interest to favor & respect the persons & property as well the resident merchants as the strangers that frequent this port & this protection was during the life time of the late Shaikh Nasser & Jaffar Khan extended to such a degree as to involve the Shaikh in very serious disputes with the government of Schyraus from which nothing but the unfortunate assassination of Jaffar Khan could have extricated with impunity. The duties levied at Bushire on importations are very moderate but it is impossible to state them with precision since they are frequently varied according to the commercial importance of the imports & according to the peaceful & confused state of the interior parts of the empire.

During the Government of the late Shaikh Nasser the freedom of the market suffered some degree of restraint, for the Shaikh himself being engaged in commerce considered himself entitled on the arrival of vessels & foreign merchants to a preference & to have the refusal of their importations. This evil was however, in some measures alleviated by the Shaikh's uniformly inviting the principal merchants of the place to take share in the purchases which he made & therefore was only felt more severely by the British residents & the inferior order of the merchants, the present Shaikh Nasser, who succeeded his father in the government of Bushire in the month of April 1789, has not yet engaged in commerce but it is possible that the advice of his confidential servant may early induce him to tread in the footsteps of his father. The principal importation from India made at Bushire consists of the chints, manufacture of the coast of Coromandel, but this branch of commerce seems to be much upon the decline from a cause which will be hereafter mentioned for the residual of which it will appear very difficult to suggest any adequate means, the greatest part of the Bengal goods imported at Bushire are suited to & designed for the Bussora,

Bagdat, Aleppo and other southern markets & the only possible reason which can be assigned for proprietors landing them at that place is to wait for a favourable opportunity of defrauding the Bussora government of its import customs. The importation of several goods made at Bushire are inconsiderable, but it appears that the merchants have in the course of this & last year given more attention to the Surat trade than they were formerly accustomed to do.

The commercial intercourse which subsists between Bushire & Muscat by boats affords large importation to the latter of sugar, sugar candy, spices of various sorts, coffee, metals of different sorts & a variety of different petty articles, the sugar, sugar candy, spices & metals are imported at Bushire by boats from the latter in Dutch & French vessels, the merchant vessels also which annually leave Bengal for the Persian Gulph generally dispose of part of their gruff freight consisting of sugar candy, iron, speants, laden on board on account of the owners at Bushire; China & glass ware is often imported at Bushire from Bombay on the cruisers of the Honble Company & the demand for Indigo is supplied from Massulipatnam, by the arrival of the annual merchant vessels touching at that port. It is necessary to remark for the information of the British government in India that the spirit of mercantile adventure in the merchants of Bushire will always rise or fall in proportion to the stability or instability of the government at Schyrause the Persian merchant is obliged to make greatest part of his returns to India & of his advances send thither for the purchase of goods in specie which confines the exports made from Bushire to India to an inconsiderable quantity of old copper, drugs, rose water, dried fruits & specie exported from Bushire to India consists of Venetian sequines & different sorts Persian silver coins, but as the exchange varies very much & often proves severely disadvantageous to the exporter he frequently prefers to export Gold & Silver in bars, the remaining exports made at Bushire are confined to Muscat & Bussora being made

to the former in raw silk, Cotton, drugs and dried fruits to the latter inconsiderable quantities of grain & dried fruits.

Bushire holds mutual exchange of the different necessary articles of life, with a variety of petty towns situated on the Persian shore of the Persian Gulph, but it is conceived that however, these may lend to the advantage of the merchants residing at that place, they are too insignificant to merit the attention of the British Government in India, since the capture of the Island of Bahreen by the Arabs of the tribe Benuotabba but little intercourse has subsisted between the inhabitants of the opposite shore of the Persian Gulph.

The port of Bunderreeg is distant from Bushire about Six hours sail but at present it is not frequented by any of the merchant vessels bound up the Gulph.

The Bandar of Carrack only retains the ruins of the fort erected there by the Dutch & is not at present of the smallest commercial importance.

Shushtar is a city of considerable importance in regard to the commercial intercourse which subsists between it & Bussora & on account of its manufacture of chintz which as will be here after observed has within these last two years met with peculiar encouragement of the government of the city of Shushtar, is nominally in the hands of a Khan who secure in his situation, has for some years past but slightly acknowledged the superiority of the government at Schyrause but his independence retained at home by the authority possessed by the elders of the city who are always watchful to prevent his abuse of power.

By the junction of different rivers ~~their~~ remains only two days <sup>hours?</sup> journey to be performed by land between Bussora & Shushtar so the communication is frequent & uninterrupted.

Bussora exports to Shushtar coffee, pepper, sugar, cotton, iron, Tin, steel, lead, Tumeric, ginger, Muggadooties & Indian piece goods & imports from thence coarse chints, coarse cotton clothes & a variety of the trifling articles, the duties paid to the government at Shushtar are very moderate.

It will now be necessary to present such information as has been collected in regard to the conveyance of the merchandise into the interior parts of the Persian Empire, in the performance of which it is sent into three grand division namely the Eastern, Western & Middle parts of the empire.

To begin therefore from the Eastern part of the empire which is supposed to include the provinces of Mekran, Sigestans & the more southern provinces are in such a state of barbarian & so exposed to the predatory excursions of the Baluchis that no merchant is willing to send thither property to any considerable amount, the very few foreign articles which the poverty of the inhabitants permits them to purchase, can only find their way thither by occasional consequences from Kerman, the southern parts of Khorasan are supplied with such foreign articles as are in demand there from Muscat by means of the Indies & the northern parts of this province are sometimes supplied from the same place, when impediments occur to its communication with Ispahan on the Northern & Eastern parts of Hindostan, want of opportunity has prevented any intelligence being obtained in regard to the expense of transporting merchandise from Muscat to the Southern parts of the province of Khorasan.

In speaking of the means by which merchandise is conveyed from the port of Bushire to the middle division of the Persian Empire, it is to be supposed that such division, contains the entire province of Farsistan, Kerman, Iraq Agime & ports of the provinces bordering thereon, whenever the road between Bushire and Schyrause is publikly secure scarcely a week passes without the arrival to that place of a caravan or caffle from

Schyrause which returns hither after a rest of two three days.

With such goods as the merchants at Bushire judged proper for the market of Ispahan & Schyrause in these times, the goods designed for Ispahan are transported thither after their arrival at Sherause, in small coflas at different periods where the communications between Bushire & Sherause is rendered unsafe by the Khans of the districts through which the road lies. Having rebelled against the government at Sherause or by any other circumstances the merchants send such goods they propose to vend at Ispahan, part to Shushtar & part to Yazd from thence to be conveyed to the place of their destination in such an event too, specially when this impediment continues for any length of time, they keep up an intercourse with Sherause, by means of Yazd but as this is expensive, it is never practised but in cases of necessity, the communication between Bushire & Yazd is seldom or ever interrupted & the communication between Shushtar & Ispahan tho' always hazardous is seldom impracticable.

The very large coflas, which in peaceable times go between Bushire & Ispahan sets out laden with wet & dried fruits, with an intention of disposing of them at Sherause on its arrival there, these articles are chiefly purchased by the muleteers of Sherause who immediately proceed with them to Bushire, where after disposing of their merchandize, they find ready for them a more valuable loading which they return to Sherause. On their arrival on that city the caravan belonging to Ispahan prepares for the departure & return to Ispahann with such goods as the merchants at Schyrause & Bushire may be judged proper for that market; the space of time which all of these journeys require for their performance seldom exceeds fifty two days.

The merchandizes received at Ispahaun by these caravans are conveyed from thence according to the demands they may be in

to the different provinces bordering on the Caspian sea where they are generally bartered for raw silk, drugs & the productions of the consigned. From Bushire to Sherause, there are two different direct roads. The one passing through Kazeroon the other thro' Firouzabad. The merchants as well as the Chehrvaders of the caravans give the preference to the former of these routes as abounding less with difficult passes amongst the mountains & with greater plenty of forage for the cattle of the caravan, the expence attending the transportation from Bushire to Schrause of bales of merchandize to the weight forty maunds Tabreze or the load of a mule varies from Bushire Rupees  $22\frac{1}{4}$  to BR.  $23\frac{1}{2}$  & of bales of merchandize to the weight of 60 maunds Tabreze or the load of a camel varies from Bushire Rupees  $26\frac{1}{2}$  although no correct information has or can be obtained in respect to the expence attending the transportation of merchandize from Ispahaun to Tauris, Reshd or any other places in the Persian empire yet the framers of the report can assert with some degree of confidence that the expence of land carriage all over Persia is moderate & reasonable & that taking the amount charges, as above stated between Bushire & Sherause & supposing to the distance between the two places to be 200 Miles it will afford no bad datum, for the calculation of the expence of transporting merchandize from one city to another throughout the whole of the Persian dominions.

The Western provinces of Persia are supplied with such goods as they stand in need of, from India by the routes of Shushtar & Bagdat, in the preceeding part of this report it has been found necessary to speak of the commercial intercourse subsisting between Bussora & Shushtar & to specify the different articles of merchandize exported from the former to the latter.

The greatest part of which are sent from thence to different cities in the province of Louristan & the more western part of the province or Irake Agime. The parts of the Persian empire which receives importations from Bagdat are so situated in respect to

climate, as to require but very small supplies of the manufactures of India, although they receive from thence considerable ones of English & French woollens, Venice ware, etc.

Caravans proceed from Bagdat to Ispahaun by the route of Kermanshah & Marridas? but they neither frequent nor are they ever considered as free from very eminent risque.

According to the most correct information which it has been possible to procure, the commercial intercourse between the Persian provinces bordering upon the Caspian sea & the city of Astrachan is but small & it appears that the importations of woollen into Persia by that route has of late years been but inconsiderable. The extension of the Persian Empire occasions a considerable inland commerce as the different provinces mutually stand in need of the productions of each other & since it is not practicable exactly to specify the nature of this commerce, it has been judged proper for the information of the British government in India to ~~re~~numerate such of the natural productions & manufactures of Persia as have come to the knowledge of the framers of this report. The province of Khorasan is generally esteemed the richest, in its natural productions which consist in a variety of valuable drugs, mines of Iron & copper & abundance of different kinds of fruits, which when dried make a considerable branch of commerce. The principal manufacture of Khorasan is that of carpets which for the brightness of their colors & elegance of their workmanship are deservedly in high estimation all over the world. Though this province is introduced into Persia the fine rhubarb which formerly being conveyed to Europe by way of the Levant, falsely acquired the name of the Turkish Rhubarb. The province of Khorasan as well as the adjacent parts of Usbek Tartary & of the province of Mazandaran produce great quantities of sheep. The chief advantage of which proceeds from the skin of their lambs, which being dressed in a particular manner become exceedingly beautiful & are in high estimation both in Persia & Bussora. The pro-



ductions of the province of Mazandaran are but little varied from those already described as belonging to Khorasaun.

The wealth of the province of Ghilan consists of silk, Irak Agime has to boast of a variety of valuable natural productions as Indigo, Tobacco & etc. of the manufactures of steel which are carried on at Kerman & of silk & brocade which are executed at Cashan. The articles of growth of Farsistan which appear most worthy of remark are considerable quantities of very fine cotton & the poppy of the vale<sup>1</sup>y of Kazeroon, from which at present but little opium is extracted for foreign exportation, this opium made at Kazeroon is esteemed by the judges of that drug to be superior to every other sort produced in Asia & whenever the political affairs of Persia shall resume a settled appearance, the manufactures in all probability be extended. The manufactures of glass, sword blades, spear heads, gun barrels &c carried on at Sherause deserve to be mentioned since it is from thence, that the different places in the Gulph are supplied with those articles. The city, Yazd situated in that part of the province of Farsistan which borders upon Kerman is famous for its manufactures of brocades, carpets & a fine kind of felt called by the Persians Nummets. The wool of a certain breed of sheep peculiar to the province of Kerman, has long been an article very much esteemed in Europe. The Honble, president & council at Bombay agreeably to their desire had in the year 1788 full information given them by the framers of this report to the possibility of procuring for the Honble Company such quantities of this wool, as they might from time to time require, from which it appeared that in consequence of the thriving state of the shual manufactures & of the prohibition which was laid on the exportation thereof by Jaffar Khan that it was by certain means only practicable annually to procure the weight of Tabreze Maunds Three thousands, these means will be stated in that part of the report which contains the ideas of the framers of this report. Upon the subjects of the measures be calculated to promote an extension & produce

a revival of the British commerce in the Persian Empire.

The city of Shushtar in the province of Lauristan is remarkable for its manufactures of Chintz & coarse cloths. The province of Mekran & Sagistan are two provinces of which no exact information either of their manufactures or productions has been obtained & the chief wealth of the province of Lauristan consists in grain, the variety of wines produced in Persia in the hands of an industrious people protected by a well regulated government would become a great source of wealth both to the individual & to the state & in the hands of such people & under such a government she would certainly reap more advantages than she does at present from the exportation of Tobacco, dried fruits, Rose water & ather of Roses. The mountains of Persia abound in Quarries of fine marble freestones & mines both of Gold & Silver though not rich enough to defray the expence of working them, are to be found in many of the provinces.

An account of a new branch of commerce which has been opened within these two years past, by several merchants residing at Bushire will now be laid before the British Government in India & the framers of this report in a subsequent part of it will offer to them their ideas in regard to the advantage which might accrue to the Honble Company by their engaging therein.

The merchants before alluded to dispatched factors in charge of adventures, to a considerable amount consisting chiefly of woollen Bengal piece goods, Mosulipatnam Chintz, European fire arms & etc. to Gandahar & Cabool. The factors were directed to proceed from Bushire to Muscat to take a favourable opportunity of transporting themselves & the merchandize committed to their care to Scindy & to take advantage of the stream of the Indus, as far as the city of Moultan from whence it was supposed, they would find caravans frequently departing for Gandahar, some of these factors have lately returned & the information which they give in regard to the object of their mission,

is highly favourable & flattering they mention that in their arrival at Candahar they were treated with every sort of indulgence by the government & that in an audience to which they were admitted with Timuor Shah. He professed himself highly pleased at their arrival in his dominions, enquired much after many different sorts of European manufactures & repeatedly declared that he would uniformly & on all occasions shew the utmost favour & grant the most liberal protection to all merchants who might be induced to visit his country for the sake of commerce, they likewise mention having disposed of the adventures in their charge for a considerable profit & it is imagined, that the articles in which they made their returns consisting of shauls, Jewels & drugs must have yielded a still further profit to their employers, the purchases of Shauls made at Gandahar by the factors aforementioned prove that a communication between the place & the province of Cashmire is open & the framers of this report have sufficient reason to believe that caravans also frequently pass between that place & the cities of Balk & Sumarcand. The climate of Tartary obliges its inhabitants to cloth themselves in warm garments, the poor are & must be content with their own coarse stuffs & the skins of their flocks but the rich seek for the more elegant attire of European woollens, according to the best information, the wants of these latter in this respect are supplied from Russia & Tartar merchants residing at Astrachan, it is conceived that the woollens are different articles so supplied by Russia to the kingdom of Karasm\* are to be large annual amount, it is presumed that as the extension of the sale of their woollens has always been recommended by the Honble Company any measures for the promotion thereof void of imminent risks are not unworthy of their notice, upon these grounds in the subsequent part of this report will be insisted such as appear to have at least a probability of throwing the supply of woollens required as aforementioned into the hands of the Honble Company.

\*Kharazm.

As it appears sufficiently obvious from the proceeding part of this report, that the sole cause to which the decline of the commerce of Persia can be justly imputed, is the confusion in which for some years past the government has been involved, it has been therefore judged unnecessary to give a detail of this decline, under a separate head or division. The following sentiments & ideas are now offered to the inspection of the British Government in India with diffidence & respect, some of them upon the information obtained from the most intelligent merchants residing at Bushire & Bussora.

There appears at present to exist several serious obstacles to any very great extension of the sale of British manufactures in the kingdoms of Persia & in Bengal, to those country merchants will never fail to import supplies equal to the demands of the market but it may be reasonably supposed that the commerce which the Honble Company carry on to Persia may be put upon a footing more advantageous to them than the one which it stands at present & that of the measure hereafter pointed out, for that purpose should be carried in to execution, they will tend to infuse a more advantageous & active spirit of commerce, amongst the private Persian merchants.

It has been already mentioned how inimical to commerce, the different revolutions in the Persian government have always proved but as the country possesses great internal sources of wealth a few years of a mild & regular administration might not only prevent the present decline but even raise its commerce to its former importance. The languishing state of the Honble Company's commerce, at the port of Bushire has for some times past given occasion to the framers of this report to form an opinion that the factory there either ought to be placed upon a different establishment to the present one, or ought to be withdrawn as a useless expence to the Honble Company.

The framers of this report are however more inclined to favour the former of these opinions than the latter & humbly conceive that the establishment of a factory at the port of Bushire upon the plan hereafter mentioned would prove a measure of much public utility. In the present impoverished state of Persia, it will be necessary in order to increase the demand consumption of British manufacture, to advert to what advantages may be gained by bartering the commodities of Great Britain for those of Persian, upon this plan it is presumed the merchants will often be induced to make very considerable purchases at times when they might be even unable & unwilling to conclude them for species.

The framers of this report in the year 1788, furnished the government at Bombay with some necessary hints on the subject of drugs, the produce of Persia & of the country adjacent thereto & they are of opinion that a commerce of the most beneficial nature to the Honble Company, might be prosecuted by an exchange of different European articles for the article of medicinal drugs. It is obvious that the several drugs procurable in Persia would reach the British hospitals in India, in a much higher state of preservation than those which are at present received by way of Aleppo, Smyrna & Constantinople. The liberal policy observed by the Honble. Company on all occasions has ever induced them to pay particular attention to every possible & probable means for the preservation of the health of their troops & of different persons engaged in their employ, it is therefore presumed that the possibility of procuring a constant supply of fresh medicinal drugs in a climate in which even the freshest soon lose some thing of their natural virtue, is an object worthy of their attention. It is humbly conceived that in case it shall hereafter be found practicable to extend a commerce of this nature to a certain extent it will be productive of public utility.

The Honble Company's hospitals in India will as has been

before mentioned reap considerable advantage. The Honble Company will be enabled to export annually large quantities both of the manufactures & natural productions of Great Britain than they do at present & it may reasonably be supposed now the passage from India to Europe is reduced to a certainty that they will be able to send many articles, the produce of Persia to the different markets in Europe at a much cheaper rate than they can be brought there from any other quarter with a view of promoting a scheme apparently so beneficial in its consequence.

The framers of this report beg leave to submit to the consideration of the British Government in India the means which in their opinion seems best calculated to promote the success both of it & of the wishes which the Honble Company have expressed to receive an annual supply of Carmania wool. It is presumed that the first step necessary to be taken for the purpose is for the British Government at Bombay, to order one of the civil servants upon that establishment to proceed into Persia without loss of time & to give him instructions to penetrate into the different provinces of the Empire as far as the situation of affairs will admit to inform himself as minutely as possible of the natural productions of each province, of the species of our manufactures of which it may stand most in need of, the probable annual amount of the consumption of the same & of the present state of its government, by these means, indents which it will be necessary to transmit to Europe will be framed with a great degree of precision, correspondencies will be formed with the different principal merchants at each place, the necessary forms will be adjusted with government & the gentlemen to whose care the management of the Honble Company's affairs in Persia may be entrusted will be furnished with authentic materials for the conduct & measures which it may be necessary for them to pursue, a commission of this nature or of one similar to it is performed with fidelity & accurateness will prove a task of no small difficulty & it will be indispensibly necessary

in case the sentiments thereon above expressed, are meant to be carried in to execution that person so sent, to a competent knowledge of the Persian language should also join a knowledge of the manners & customs of the people with whom in the course of this commission he may have to negotiate or of whom he may be obliged to seek for information with every possible advantage on his side it is conceived from experience that he must & will have greater reason to solicit the indulgent receptions of the fruits of his enquiries than to hope they will produce him any addition of fame. Another measure which appears to the framers of this report to be a necessary one & which they accordingly with respect, recommend to be adopted by the British Government in India in alteration in the present establishment of the subordinate of Bushire, the framers of this report conceive that not only in respect to the prosecution of the plan before mentioned but in respect to the Honble Company in Persia it would be adviseable to give the title of the Honble Company's resident in Persia with an authority to reside occasionally as he may judge most proper either at Sherause or Bushire to the gentleman to whom the management of their affairs in that country may be entrusted & also to increase the establishment of covenanted servants in Persia by appointing to the assistance of the president a writer always to remain at Bushire & a surgeon well skilled in the qualities of medicinal drugs for the purpose of inspecting those which the resident may wish to procure on account of the Honble Company on its present establishment. The Honble Company in the opinion of the framers of this report, do not derive any or if any, very little advantage from the factory at Bushire, on the plan above mentioned altho the expenses of establishment must necessarily be increased, there is a great probability that the Honble Company will receive advantages more than adequate thereto.

The late & present government of Sherause was & is according to the Firmauns received by the resident at Bussora very anxious for the extension of British commerce in Persia in the year

1787 when Mr. Jones visited Sherauze for the benefit of his health, Jaafar Khan repeatedly in the several audiences to which that gentleman was admitted expressed his desire of seeing Europeans settled at Sherauze & if the matters had not been misinterpreted, he was at the time of his assassination on the point of causing applications to be made to Bombay for an alteration of the establishment of the factory at Bushire. A Firm-aun from Lutf Ully Khan the present ruler at Sherauze to the resident at Bussora in the month of June last contains a passage sufficiently striking to justify its insertion in this report: "And in as much as our late royal father of happy memory whose habitation is now in paradize, formerly made known to you his favourable intentions in regard to such of your nation as might enter his dominions on a design of commerce, we also think it necessary to mention that our good will & regard for your nation exceeds that of our late royal father & that we earnestly desire to see the curious merchandize of Europe brought to Sherause for sale & we faithfully promise to behave in all respects to your people according to former usages & customs & to grant & secure to them every privilege & indulgence which they enjoyed at Bussora."

As the importation to England of raw silk from Persia has long since, it is presumed, ceased to be an object of attention to Honble Company, the framers of this report will therefore confine what further they have to observe in the subject before them to stating the different articles of produce & manufactures of Great Britain, which in their opinion may be vended in Persia, & to the expression of such a sentiments as they have formed relative to the prosecution of a commerce with the Eastern & Northern provinces of Persia with advantage to the Honble Company. It is necessary, however to premise & to acquaint the British Government in India that Persia at present is an exhausted kingdom, that the great influx of wealth which it received by the expedition of Nader Shah against Delhi has nearly reverted to India & that the following circumstances



with more or less always tend to increase the scarcity of specie in that kingdom. Nine tenth of the imports from India into Persia, are at present purchases with specie of which not the smallest part ever return into the country, not less than ten thousand Persians annually leave the different parts of Persia to make pilgrimages to kerbella & Mecca, if it is computed therefore that each of these pilgrims at the time of his entering the Turkish dominions is furnished with the moderate sum of Piasters twenty for the necessary expenses of his journey, it will be found that this single circumstance alone drains the kingdom annually of two hundred thousand Piasters. The Princes of the house of Siffi were sensible how detrimental these pilgrimages were to the interests of Persia & successively endeavoured to, as much as possible, to lessen their repute, if at that time they were found to be detrimental, it may be reasonably supposed that at the present period they must be much more so. The kingdom then enjoyed the blessing of internal peace & well established government & the pilgrim often to the advantage of the state carried with him instead of specie, such of the manufactures or produce of his country as were in demand in the countries through which he had to pass, the arrival in those days at Bagdat of the great caravan of Persian pilgrims produced in that city for some days all the hurry & business of a fair. The Turkish merchants of Bagdat were ready to purchase the raw silk, the drugs, the carpets, the Shauls & every other specie of merchandize which the pilgrims might have brought with them & the different European firms established at Aleppo, Smyrna & etc. on the arrival of these articles at those places purchased them for the different markets of Europe. In the present time from the intestine wars which have so long desolated Persia as well as from the change which has taken place on the commerce of Levant, the Persian pilgrim has no other mode of defraying the expenses of his pilgrimage than that of bringing along with him a sufficient quantity of specie.

The framers of this report in speaking of the articles of the manufactures & produce of Great Britain, which in their opinion are suited to the demands of the markets of Persia flatter themselves that such part of their sentiments thereon as are founded on speculation will meet an indulgent & lenient reception, since not withstanding, they may have arisen from circumstances & information apparently the most undesirable & correct; many accidents which no humane foresight can preconceive \* may in a country situated like Persia, in case the British Government in India should be inclined to carry any of them into execution tend to a failure of success. It is presumed in regard to promoting the demand for woollens in Persia that two points are essentially necessary to be observed, the first of which is that, as the assortments for the Gulph markets are made up in England, the strictest care be taken that no other colors are admitted, therein than those which may be mentioned in the indents, framed by the servants of the Honble Company residing in Persia & secondly that the present mode of sending an assortment of all the different kinds of woollen, be changed for that of sending only those best adopted to the markets of Persia, the superstitions of the Persian is already generally known & it may be easily conceived how detrimental an idea of many of the colors of which it is composed being unfortunate must prove to the disposal of an assortment of woollen, many of the colors of the assortment of woollens sent by the Honble Company to Persia are in the opinion of the persians so outrageously outre, that no one thinks of wearing them, they being as little adopted to their taste for their upper garments, as a bright yellow would be to that of an Englishman, local observation induces Mr. Jones to suppose that the spotted and stripped cloths would be very vendible in Persia.

The winter dress of a Persian gentleman requires many of the manufactures of Europe, his upper garment is of velvet or fine

\* The text is not at all understandable.

cloths his under ones of Sattin, his cap is partly composed of velvet & partly of cloths, his Chuckchoors which he wears in the place of stuckings are of cloth & if he is a man of any rank the dress is not complete without the addition of Brocade, upon these grounds the framers of this report conceive that a proper assortment of Velvet, Sattins, Silks & Brocades might be annually disposed of in Persia. Notwithstanding the pattern of Norwich & Manchester manufactures, sent to the factories at Bussora & Bushire by the Honble the president in Council at Bombay in the year 1788 were returned to that residency with an opinion from both factions that they would not answer the Gulph markets, it is conceived that for want of an opportunity of laying them open, to the inspection of the merchants at Sher-auze such an opinion may hereafter be found to have been a very erroneous one, in respect to India. From the information given to the framers of this report by Mr. Jones, there were many of the patterns, the qualities & colors of such were exceedingly well adapted to the taste of Persians & the only doubt which they entertain of their not being vendible in Persia is the price at which it could be afforded to invoice them & it is therefore, farther conceived that a small consignment of these articles might be made to the factory at Bushire. The most sanguin opinion is entertained in regard to the possibility of disposing of large quantities of hardware & the universal esteem which the Persians have for glass of all sorts affords room for an opinion that this branch of British manufactures would meet with good encouragement in Persia.

It will probably be found upon experiment that a proper assortment of the different kinds of carpets manufactured in England would meet with a favourable reception in Persia provided the original price of them was moderate, an idea is also entertained that a careful inquiry after the different dyes made use of in the manufacturing carpets in Khorasaun would be productive of much benefit to our own.

The Wilton & Axminster carpets are superior to the finest in Persia in point of arrangement of pattern & at first & for some short times, afterwards, in point of colors lose their brightness, on the other hand, the carpets manufactured in Persia from the superior quality, it is imagined of the dye, preserve to the very last their brilliancy of colour.

Little doubt can be entertained if the British Government in India make the commerce to Persia an object of their attention but a very considerable quantity of the different metals annually exported from England by the Honble Company would meet an advantageous & ready sale in that kingdom & that several other articles of commerce which mentioned separately might appear trivial, would be demanded, since the Persians are a people much inclined to luxury & shews.

The framers of this report have not touched upon the imports of commerce of India to Persia because they are well convinced that the merchants of Persia themselves will always carry it on to as great an extent as it will bear & because they can not conceive that the British Govt. in India can by any act of theirs tend to its encrease, so any thing will advantageously affect this branch of Persian commerce. The framers of this report conceive nothing to be more likely to do so, than the establishment of a factory in the manner mentioned in the proceeding part of this report.

In the event of the Brit. Govt. in India coming to determination to prove how far it would accord with the interests of the Honble Co. to attempt to throw in a supply of woollens to factory.

The framers of this report offer them their ideas of the means by which it is probable, it may be performed with the least risk the hopes of advantage to the Honble Co. The old factory at Scindy with some repair will be ready to receive a resident,

a writer & a proper consignment of woollens & metals to these gentlemen, should be added a third, so he should proceed to Moulton with the hopes of being able to meet therewith merchants ready to contract for the goods lying at the factory at Scindy but in the event of these hopes being frustrated he should have it in his instructions to proceed even to Gandahar, it is imagined he could hardly fail of being able to effect the purpose of his mission, by these means no risk whatever would arise to the Honble Co. since the merchandize of which the adventure might be composed would be paid for & delivered by the resident at Scindy, the gentlemen dispatched to Moulton & Gandahar would have an opportunity of procuring correct information in regard to the extent & advantages of a commerce of this kind & in the event of its not answering such expectations, as might be formed of it nothing further would remain but to order the servants at Scindy to return to the presidency of Bombay. It is supposed that the Govt. at Bombay have a better opportunity than the framers of this report of becoming acquainted with the actual state of the government of Scindy but according to the information they have had an opportunity to collect, it appears to be secure as well as favourable to mercantile designs.

Remarks applicable to the trade of Arabia & Persia:

The following remarks are submitted with respect to the consideration of the British Government in India.

In obedience to the commands of the British Government in India, considerable exertions have been made to collect the information necessary for the formation of exact list of the annual importations, made during the last seven years at the different parts of the Persian Gulph & the Red Sea & of the exportations made from thence to India in that period. The intelligence collected on the subject has proved, however, extremely partial, incorrect & unsatisfactory & it has been found impos-

ible to obtain the object of pursuit. The difficulty of procuring information relative to the commerce of the Red sea, the incorrectness of the custom house account at most of the ports in the Persian Gulph, the practice of smuggling prevailing at those ports & the inhabitants of some of the governors of those ports to afford the required communications are causes which have operated to prevent the desired success.

The desire entertained by the British Government in India to increase the commercial intercourse between the country & the Persian Gulph & the Red Sea will necessarily urge the servants of the Honble Company now stationed & those that may in future be stationed there to exert themselves strenuously for the beneficial accomplishments thereof. It is however, conceived that the Honble Company's future consignments to Bussora can only consist of the articles already particularized & that the residency of Bushire cannot possibly on its present plans prove an advantageous establishment. It may not be improper to remark that a very serious obstacle to the increase of the British Government commercial intercourse between India & the Persian Gulph is occasioned by the unwearied attention of the merchants of those countries to their own interest, as losses arise on all remittances made from the Persian Gulph to India, the commerce between them might even depend on the state of the market of the former which are generally overstocked with Indian commercial articles & as the merchants before mentioned are active, industrious, speculative & well informed & have not any other mode of employing their fortunes than in commercial disputes, they are careful to profit by every opportunity of conveying to the Gulph the merchandize that may be in demand there. It has been remarked in this report that a loss has arisen on all the remittances latterly made from the Persian Gulph to India & it may therefore naturally be concluded that the Honble Company's remittances to India in the event of the commerce being there increased will labour under disadvantage, if however, their remittances are made to the residency of Bom-

bay on the vessels belonging to them, which are annually sent from thence to Bussora whether they consist of treasures or of the gruff articles of merchandize, they will not be liable to the charge of freight & in that respect, the Honble Company will have the advantage of private traders.

It is understood that Honble Company suffer a very considerable loss in the remittances made by the British Government in Bengal, to the presidency of Bombay for the purpose of defraying the expences of the establishment. If the produce of such consignments as may be hereafter made to Bussora on the public account is ordered to be remitted to Bombay on the vessels belonging to the Honble Company, which are annually sent from thence to Bussora. The loss in question will be avoided & a loss avoided may fairly be considered as gain.

It is conceived that the Honble Company might with propriety derive an advantage from the commercial intercourse carried on between India & the Persian Gulph, by means of vessels under British coulors, of which they have hitherto generously declined to avail themselves.

From the year 1780 to the present period the British individuals resident in India, a few instances only excepted, have ceased to engage in the commerce of the Persian Gulph & the trade carried on between those countries by means of vessels under British coulors has therefore, been principally cultivated by the Armenians & Muslim merchants resident in the British settlement in India, under the protection of the government, in vessels principally, their property furnished with British passes & navigated by British captains & officers.

It has long been customary in virtue of the resident at Bussora being in possession of a consulary Barik\* for the representatives of the Honble Company at the ports of Bussora & Bushire

\*Barque.

to collect the consulage of 2 percent on all imports, the property of the British individuals made there, which consulage formerly amounted to a considerable annual sum.

Until the year 1784, the consulage collected at each of those ports was equally divided between the Honble the president at Bombay & the resident there. The consulage since collected which in consequence of the trade carried on between India & the Persian Gulph, having been principally cultivated by the Armenians & Moslim merchants has dwindled to mere trifles, has in obedience to the commands of the Honble Company been divided into equal shares, one of which has been uniformly carried to their credits.

The security which the property of the Armenian & Moslim merchants before mentioned derives from its conveyance in vessels of the foregoing description & the dangers to the interests of the Honble Company in the Persian Gulph & the difficulties to their servants stationed there which generally attend & which during the late revolutions in the government of Bussora have so very particularly attended, the protection to the vessels are considerations of so serious a nature as to establish an opinion that all property imported at Bussora & Bushire in vessels under British colors should in justice be subject to the payment to the representative of the Honble Company. At those ports of the 2 percent consulage in question the British Government in India will judge of the propriety of issuing the necessary orders for that purpose. The value of the imports made in the year 1787, at the port of Bussora & Bushire in vessels under British colors amounted to near 20 Lacks of Rupees\* & it is to be supposed that when peace takes place between the Ottoman Empire & his European enemies & the present troubles in the government of Persia begin to subside the annual imports at Bussora & Bushire in vessels under British color will exceed in value the before mentioned sum. The share of the consulage thereon which in the event of orders being issued by

\* 100,000 Tomāns



the British Government in India for its collections would become the property of the Honble Company would amount to the sum worthy of their attention & the remaining share thereof if allowed by the British Government in India to become the property of the residents at Bussora & Bushire would prove to them very acceptable emoluments & enable them with more facility to support in a becoming stile, the expensive establishment of their respective stations & the payment of 3 percent Company's duties & 2 percent consulage by British subjects on all their importations made at Bussora to the representative at that place of the Honble Company has been already mentioned as a disadvantage attending the British commerce in that quarter & it is conceived that the 83 paragraph of the Honble Company's general letter to Bombay of the 6th. April 1763 must mean to justify in certain cases the non collection of the customs in question at the ports of Bussora & Bushire.

The following is a paragraph above mentioned. It appears but equitable that all goods which have paid duties to us at Tellichery or any other of our factories should be excused paying the same over again when imported afterwards to Bombay or other of our settlements the property of such goods is not altered but if the customs of the place to which the goods are exported exceed the customs first paid them the full duties are to be charged to the owner & the only allowed to draw back the sum collected from the importer at the factory where they were first sold & this we apprehend to have been the general practice heretofore, particularly for goods bought at Bombay sent to Surat & sold there, the case is quite different when the property is changed, for then the customs at the last port must be collected in full from the importer without having any regard to what may have been done before he bought or become possessed of the same goods & no draw backs must be allowed without producing certificates of the customs having been paid at the port where they were sold. The navigation of the Persian Gulph is plain & easy & although the strong northerly

winds which generally prevail in it in the months of June & July render the passage from Muscat to any other of the ports both boisterous & tedious & the violence of the southwest Monsoon prevents during the months of June, July, August & September direct passages being made from the ports of India to Muscat. Yet by perseverance & skill, a passage may be made in a well found European vessel, may with propriety sail from Bussora on a vessel to any port in India, in any day in the year. In the navigation of the Persian Gulph some danger is justified to be apprehended from pirates, in former times some English vessels have been taken by them & therefore, although the Persian Gulph is now on a tolerably settled & peaceable state & the British flag is there treated with great respect, a weak unarmed British vessel ought not to be suffered to undertake a voyage from any of the ports in India to Bussora.

The Dows & gallivats belonging to the different ports in the Persian Gulph are vessels of very considerable force & many of the crews particularly those who navigate the Dows belonging to the islands & coast, in the vicinity of Ormus are rapacious & inclined to the commission of unjustifiable acts of violence on falling in with them a power of self defence is the best security that the commander of an English vessel can have for their good behaviour.

The framers of the present report have in the course of it respectfully ventured to give it as their opinion that the establishment of British factories at the ports of Mocha & Muscat might prove measures beneficial to the commercial interests of the Honble Company & that a new modification of the residency at Bushire might tend materially to the encrease of the British commercial intercourse with the kingdom of Persia. It is a remark equally applicable both to Persia & Arabia that the merchants of those countries are pleased at the establishment therein of European factories conceiving the heads of them to be eligible mediators between themselves & the government in the times of

difficulty & distress.

The framers of this report beg leave previous to its conclusion to give it as their decided opinion that the success of the British general commercial intercourse with Arabia & Persia & of the particular plans for its increase which they have pointed out must ever principally depend on the propriety of the conduct of the gentlemen under whose management they may be prosecuted & to express a hope that as the duties of their stations must necessarily often place them in situations replete by delicacy & difficulty their Honble employers will fix their intentions not their success, as the criterion by which to judge of their merits in order to facilitate the transactions of commercial affaires at those places where English factories are or may in future be established, the servants of the Honble Company must uniformly be steady, temperate & by cautious measures endeavour to acquire sufficient influence with the people of the government to secure their constant & defectual support & favour by a mild & easy mode of managing business strive to give encouragement to such merchants as may wish to have dealings with them, who might by contrary conduct be deterred from making offers advantageous to the Honble Company & in order to secure a peaceable & safe navigation of the Persian Gulph to British vessels must uniformly observe a wary & moderate conduct, they must be prepared for defence & caution not to offend wanton acts of hospitality & negligent security are equally dangerous imprudencies.

Bussora, 15th. August 1790.

Signed: S. Manesty & Harford Jones.

APPENDIX II

TABLES OF COINS

PERSIAN COINS

Tomān	Dinar	Mahmudi	Shāhi	Gaz
Tomān <sup>1</sup> Gold	1000	100		
Shāhi small silver coin		2		
Abbasi			2	
Gaz			10	
Pool-e-siah				2
Mahmudi	10			

Sources: Waring, E., A Tour to Sheeraz; Ricks, Thomas, Trade and Politics of South Persia, Appendix E, based on the F.R. Gambrun, IV-XII. The date of this appendix is 1760 but there was no source for the particular years under study. Therefore, we have compared the information prior and after that period of time.

1. The value of the Tomān was greatly depreciated in the early 19th century. Harford Jones states that one Tomān was equal to one Sterling ( Mission, Vol.I, p.377). In 1787 it was equal to £2.10s. Malcolm also states that there were 500 Dinars in an English shilling (op. cit., Vol.II, p.475).

TABLE OF FOREIGN COINS

	Tomān	Dinār	Mahmudi	Shāhi	Abbasi
Dutch Ducat		30			
Doobooti		33			
Foondooki		20			
Zar Mah-boob		15			
Reeal		11	33	66	
Piaster Qoroosh	5-13 <sup>1</sup> 10 <sup>3</sup> -16	7	5½		
Bombay Rupee <sup>5</sup>	13 <sup>2</sup> 10 <sup>4</sup> -15	3	6	10	
Sterling	£2-10s		1d	3d	1/-
German Crown		11	15		
Sequin Venetian			31-33		


This table is based on the information provided by Scott Waring in his travel book and also from a memorandum from M. Gilliers Basra, n.d. in the Archives Nationale, colonies, F2810, Commerce avec la Perse, 1686-1786. As there is no material precisely relevant to the period under study.

1. One rupee is equal to one piaster, Francklin, p.19.
2. Recorded by W. Francklin, p.19.
3. Sir Harford Jones gives each £ Sterling equal to 15-16 piasters.
4. Sir Harford Jones gives 100 tomāns equal to 1000 rupees in his introduction to The Dynasty of the Kajars, Persian translation, p.42.
5. Francklin states that 30-40 tomans equals 500 rupees. These were apparently Persian rupees not Bombay rupees. (1878, p.133).

APPENDIX III

GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF THE ZANDS

ZAND BAGLE



1. His name is variously given, Mohammad Rahim Khān, G.M., p.220.

2. One of them was married to Ali Morād Khān, another to his son, Ahmad Morād Khān. G.M., p.220.

3. Their names are given as Garshāseb and Gohar Tāj, G.M., p.416.

4. She was married to Shaikh Vais Khān, Ali Morād Khān's son, G.M., p.398.




## APPENDIX IV

### MAPS

1-Persia

2-Färs

of  
SIA,  
COUNTRIES,  
*Halobius*  
PERSIA.





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