

DAVID HUME'S THEORY OF VALUE

by

PÁLL S. ÁRDAL

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE PH.D. DEGREE

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH

1961



TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Preface	ii
Introduction	1
The Passions are Simple Impressions	7
The Indirect Passions	17
Sympathy in the Treatise	40
The Sense of Virtue and Vice	53
The Calm Passions	85
Liberty	106
Judgment and Evaluation	124
Hume's Egoism	153
Approval and Disapproval are not a Species of Sympathy	168
The Natural Virtues and Sympathy	184
The Artificiality of Justice	204
Promises	247
A Concluding Remark	265
Bibliography	266

PREFACE

This thesis is neither a page to page commentary nor an assessment of Hume's place in the history of Philosophy. It mainly consists in an attempt at justifying a certain approach to the interpretation of his theory of value with special reference to morals.

The bibliography is composed on the principle that only those works to which I am conscious of a direct debt are included

Where abbreviations have been used to refer to works, these are given in brackets after the relevant entry in the bibliography.

Italics in passages quoted are here represented by underlining. Where underlining of words in a quotation is my own, this is stated in a footnote.

Page references are given in brackets after quotations. In the case of Hume's Treatise, reference is given to both the page in the Everyman edition and the page in the Selby-Bigge edition, in that order.

I have not used cross references. Thus I have been unable to avoid a certain amount of repetition.

INTRODUCTION

The study of a limited aspect of Hume's philosophy, such as his theory of value, must involve a grave risk of misrepresenting his thought. For the three books of the Treatise possess a singular unity in spite of the fact that commentators have found it easy to draw attention to certain apparent inconsistencies between doctrines in the different books. Thus in Book II, the impression of the self plays an indispensable part though Hume emphasizes the impossibility of finding such an impression in his discussion of personal identity in Book I (K.S., p.171). This is a notable example of Hume's alleged inconsistency, but many others could be cited. They have, indeed, been found to be of such gigantic proportions that it has been considered hard to say whether Hume "...Taught or did not teach, this or that particular doctrine". (S.B., p.VII)

Some later commentators have agreed with Selby-Bigge's estimate of the difficulty of interpreting Hume's works and have concluded that he taught different and incompatible doctrines in different parts of his philosophical writings (J.B. Passmore, Hume's Intentions). It is no part of my purpose openly to challenge the view that Hume's many intentions may have led to

inconsistencies in his published works. But too much emphasis on the lack of unity in his thought has its dangers. Passmore himself stresses that although Hume may have had many intentions in writing his Treatise "Yet there is a unity in his work; it is dominated by a single over-riding intention". (P., p.2) With this I agree. Hume's main aim in the Treatise is to establish the science of human nature on a firm foundation.

A modern reader, brought up in the cult that a philosopher must model his method upon the sciences by developing a strictly defined technical terminology, is not unlikely to consider Hume's use of language loose and unscientific. We must, however, remember that although he sought to introduce the "experimental method into Moral Sciences" he was essentially a man of letters, writing for the educated reader of his day and not a specialist addressing himself exclusively to other specialists. The style is varied according to the context; the same doctrine is expressed in many different ways. It is therefore essential to try to follow the drift of the argument rather than to take a forceful statement of doctrine out of context, assuming it to contain the essence of Hume's thought at the time of writing.

In this thesis the main emphasis will fall on Hume's doctrines as expressed in the Treatise. One obvious reason why it is undesirable to quote the Treatise and the Enquiry indiscriminately in dealing with Hume's theory of value is the change in style. One cannot assume that terms that bear a special technical sense in the Treatise have the same meaning in the Enquiry, for Hume retains little of his subtle psychological

analysis in the later and more popular work.

This would be of relatively small importance if his theory of value could be understood without reference to the psychological analysis. I hope in the sequel to show that this is not the case. This thesis can, indeed, be partly described as a reasoned plea for an approach to the study of Hume's moral theory as an aspect of the more general problem of man's emotional nature. There is no neat division between Hume's psychology and his moral theory. Unless this is realised it is quite natural to conclude with A.H. Basson that most of Hume's writings on morals are psychologically interesting but of no philosophical importance:

"It is assumed, then, that the only parts of Hume's moral philosophy that are of real importance are (i) his theory that moral judgments are a matter of feeling and not of rational conviction, and (ii) his belief that the doctrine of free will is irrelevant to morals. Hume's discussion of the particular virtues and vices is psychologically interesting but not philosophically important." (B., p.17)

If the view expressed in this quotation from A.H. Basson's book were accepted, all that the Treatise contains relevant to moral theory is to be found in the three first sections of Book II Part III and Part I of Book III. It is, I believe, often thought that Hume's moral theory can be mastered by reading these parts of the Treatise as a supplement to the Enquiry. My aim will have been achieved if I can convince the reader that Hume's constructive moral theory can only be understood if the second and third books of the Treatise are read as a unity. For the sub-title of the Treatise is to be taken seriously. He

is attempting to introduce "the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects". In the Abstract, where Hume is intending to give a simplified account of the main argument of the Treatise, he begins by making the point that

"it is at least worth while to try if the science of man will not admit of the same accuracy which several parts of natural philosophy are found susceptible of. There seems to be all the reason in the world to imagine that it may be carried to the greatest degree of exactness". (A., p.6)

In his book on Hume Passmore emphasizes the unity of the first two books of the Treatise, quoting Hume's words in the Advertisement that "the subject of the understanding and the passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves". But it is misleading to suggest that these two books had to be published together because these two topics are to be distinguished as a unity by "the fact that in both cases association is the source of order and complexity". (H. I., p.106) This does not provide us with an adequate reason for suggesting that the relation between Books II and III is not as close as the relation between the first two books. It is in fact unlikely that Passmore wanted to give this impression, for he emphasizes that Hume's main interest was in the "science of man" and describes this as "the science which concerns itself with the human mind and with human relationships in society". (H.I., p.104) This, indeed, describes admirably the subject matter of the last two books, whereas Passmore himself considers the first book to be largely concerned with methodological topics. "Without anachronism we can think of it (the first book) as

Hume's methodology of the social sciences." (H.I., p.6)
Though partly true this is of course an overstatement, for Hume discusses in Book I many topics that are not strictly speaking methodological, such as our knowledge of the external world and personal identity. In Books II and III the main doctrines of Book I are indeed presupposed but the two later books have a peculiar unity in that both deal with the active or 'passionate' side of human nature rather than the understanding.

It seems to me clear that though there is less explicit mention of the principles of association in Book III of the Treatise one is not justified in concluding that it plays no fundamentally important role in the argument. Book III is to be understood in the light of the arguments in the earlier books. I consider it a mistake to place too much importance upon Hume's statement in the Advertisement to Book III:

"I think it proper to inform the public that tho' this be a third volume of the Treatise of Human Nature, yet 'tis in some measure independent of the other two, and requires not that the reader should enter into all the abstract reasoning contain'd in them."

Notice first of all that Hume only claims for Book III "some measure" of independence and that it is not necessary to understand "all the abstract reasoning" in the earlier books. But the most important point to bear in mind is this. The first two books of the Treatise had already been badly received. All we may assume from Hume's words is that he is of course anxious that the prejudice against the earlier books will not

deter people from reading the book on morals. It is not unreasonable to see in the following words, quoted from the opening chapter of the book on morals, Hume's fear that people may prejudge it. A certain bitterness against the reading public can also be detected:

"What affects us, we conclude, can never be a chimera: and, as our passion is engaged on the one side or the other, we naturally think that the question lies within human comprehension: which, in other cases of this nature, we are apt to entertain some doubt of. Without this advantage, I never should have ventured upon a third volume of such abstruse philosophy, in an age wherein the greatest part of men seem agreed to convert reading into an amusement, and to reject everything that requires any considerable degree of attention to be comprehended." (T.H.N. III, pp.165-166: pp.455-456)

I have so far tried only to point out that it is prima facie not unplausible to suggest that Hume's discussion of the passions and emotions may be relevant to the understanding of his moral theory as expressed in the Treatise. What follows is not intended as a detailed commentary on Hume's discussion of the passions. The emphasis will throughout be placed on those aspects of Book II which seem to me to throw light upon Hume's views as to the nature of evaluation in general and moral evaluation in particular.

THE PASSIONS ARE SIMPLE IMPRESSIONS

It is important to clear up at the outset certain points regarding Hume's method in the two later books of the Treatise. A careful look at his initial classification and characterisation of the passions should convince us that a reductivist analysis of the passions is not to be expected. The point is important, for Hume is undoubtedly a naturalist, and yet there is a sense in which it is unplausible to foster on him a naturalistic theory of morals. If naturalism in morals is understood as the definition of moral concepts in terms of non-moral concepts Hume is not a naturalist, for no passions can be defined, at least not in Moore's sense of define, and moral approval and disapproval are in this respect no exceptions.

It may be recalled that to define is for Moore to analyse. After discarding several senses of 'define' as irrelevant to the sense in which he wants to emphasise that 'good' is indefinable, he says:

"We may mean that a certain object, which we all of us know, is composed in a certain manner: that it has four legs, a head, a heart, a liver, etc., etc., all of them arranged in definite relations to one another. It is in this sense that I deny good to be definable. I say that it is not composed of any parts, which we can substitute for it in our minds when we are thinking of it." (P.E., p.8).

Yellow and good are alike indefinable in that they are not composed of any parts. Hume would, I think, agree with

this. It will appear later in this thesis that he is not at all likely to argue that moral approval and disapproval are not different from all other emotions though very similar to some other passions. To quote Butler against him to the effect that "everything is what it is, and not another thing" is peculiarly irrelevant. Hume is, on the contrary, much inclined to maintain that for each meaningful term standing for passions there must be a different impression, and he nowhere tries to argue that "morally good and morally bad" do not derive their meaning from specific impressions, though they are not the impressions of qualities in the object evaluated (except in the case of self-valuing). In a similar way, we may recall, causal necessity is not derived from an impression discoverable in the object, between which the causal relation holds. } *double neg.*

In an introductory chapter Hume indicates certain principles of classification. Referring back to the distinction between impressions and ideas in Book I, the passions are obviously impressions, he tells us. But impressions were there distinguished into two kinds, impressions of sensation and impressions of reflection. Of the first kind are "all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: of the second are the passions and other emotions resembling them". (T.H.N. II, p.3; p.276).

The impressions of sensation are original in that they do not arise from other impressions or ideas. They make their appearance "without any introduction" (T.H.N. II, p.3; p.276).

This does not mean that they have no causes though they must be regarded as ultimate data from the point of view of the science of the mind. A causal explanation of these impressions would belong to "anatomy and natural philosophy". (T.H.N. II, p.3; p.276) Hume begs to be excused from tackling these subjects. He is concerned only with explaining the origin of those impressions which arise from other impressions or from ideas. His explanation is to be psychological and not physical or physiological.

Bodily pains and pleasures are not themselves passions as we have seen, though passions arise from them. We can, indeed, distinguish the passions into two kinds according to the way in which they arise. If they arise immediately from pleasure or pain they are called direct, whereas other qualities are needed in order to give rise to the so-called indirect passions. It goes without saying that the explanation of the indirect passions is more complicated and the first two parts of the book are concerned with this topic, whereas the direct passions are discussed much more briefly.

One further distinction is introduced by Hume. He points out that passions are either calm or violent. "The sense of beauty and deformity in action" are instanced as calm passions (T.H.N. II, p.4; p.276). The distinction between calm and violent passions is in important respects different from the distinction between direct and indirect passions. The latter distinction refers to the way in which the passions arise. No passion can on some occasions be direct and on others indirect.

This may sometimes appear otherwise, where an expression is used to cover a class of passions. Thus there are some grounds for thinking 'approval' denotes different passions when it is used of consequences of actions on the one hand and the agent responsible for these consequences on the other. On the other hand, the "fundamentum divisionis" between the calm and the violent is the intensity of the feeling involved. Thus a calm passion is distinguished by the fact that it involves on most occasions low emotional intensity. Hume's statement is quite explicit on this point. We shall have occasion to say more about calm and violent passions later on, but attention must be drawn to the fact that "the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition and external objects" is a passion according to Hume. From this it seems to follow that it arises either directly or indirectly from pleasure or pain. It is one among the passions. It is important to remember this, for many passions are pleasant or painful, though they can be considered neither as approval nor as disapproval.

Hume emphasizes the uniqueness of each different passion as a simple impression. Speaking of pride and humility he says "... it is impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions." (T.H.N. II, p.5; p.277) Thus a passion is a simple impression and can obviously not be constructed out of simpler elements. Passmore is therefore more than a little misleading when he says "the central psychological problem is to construct the more complicated 'indirect passions' out of

the direct passions, with the aid of the associative principles". (H.I., p.124) Direct and indirect passions are equally simple as the quotation of Hume's words above indicates. There is no analogy at all between the relation between these two classes of passions and the relation between simple and complex ideas. One can justify saying that complex ideas are constructed out of simple ideas.

But if we consider Passmore to be using the term "construct" in a somewhat extended sense, he can perhaps be acquitted of confusion. In the usual sense of "construct" that which we construct out of is part of the completed structure. Thus the timber out of which a building is constructed is part of the building itself. But in an extended sense we might want to say that x is constructed out of y if y cannot arise unless x is presupposed. An account of the origin of y would necessarily mention x as a pre-condition without which y could not have arisen.

Passmore's failure to appreciate that the passions are simple impressions can also be seen from the following quotation:

"He does not think that all the passions consist in the association of certain perceptions with pleasure or with pain."
(H.I., p.123)

The answer is of course that no passion consists in such an association, though we may have to appeal to the principles of association in order to give a causal explanation of a passion.

It is fairly obvious that Hume's contention that the passions are simple impressions determines the kind of 'analysis'

we can expect in the two later books of the Treatise where he is engaged in constructing his "science of man". The simple cannot be reductively analysed for such an analysis would be tantamount to the denial that the simple really is simple. The analysis given is indeed meant to be causal in nature and free appeal is made to the principles of association. Since, however, association cannot work unless simple impressions can be described as similar something must be said about the charge that similarity is inconsistent with simplicity, that the similarity of two perceptions is inconsistent with the simplicity of each of them. If this charge can be upheld it must be concluded that the whole of Hume's account of the passions is based upon a simple logical howler.

A simple perception cannot be analysed into distinct parts. Yet Hume thinks it can be characterized by pointing out its similarity to other simple perceptions or its difference from them. We can also state the conditions under which it is found to arise or, in other words, its causal conditions. Thus for Hume, a simple perception is not just something we can only point to and give a name. Many things may be predicated of it. We shall, indeed, emphasize that the bulk of the second book of the Treatise is concerned with stating the causal conditions for the emergence of simple impressions and indicating various similarities between them.

Hume first introduces this doctrine in a long footnote when discussing abstract ideas. The correct understanding of

Hume's view on this point is important for our purpose and consequently it seems justifiable to quote this footnote in full:

"It is evident, that even different simple ideas may have a similarity or resemblance to each other; nor is it necessary, that the point or circumstance of resemblance should be distinct or separable from that in which they differ. Blue and green are different simple ideas, but are more resembling than blue and scarlet; though their perfect simplicity excludes all possibility of separation or distinction. It is the same case with particular sounds, and tastes, and smells. These admit of infinite resemblances upon the general appearance and comparison, without having any common circumstance the same. And of this we may be certain, even from the very abstract terms simple idea. They comprehend all simple ideas under them. These resemble each other in their simplicity. And yet from their very nature, which excludes all composition, this circumstance, in which they resemble, is not distinguishable or separable from the rest. It is the same case with all the degrees in any quality. They are all resembling, and yet the quality, in any individual, is not distinct from the degree."
(T.H.N., p.28; p.637)

It will be argued later in this thesis that much of Hume's trouble arises from treating each passion as a simple impression of which he can give only a causal explanation and point out its similarity or similarities with other passions. At present, however, we are not concerned with a special application of this doctrine, but the theoretical plausibility of the doctrine as such, as a general thesis about simple perceptions.

Hume's view has met with severe criticism by a recent commentator, Professor J.A. Passmore. Passmore thinks Hume

should have concluded from the observation that all simple ideas resemble at least in being simple "that there are no simple ideas". His ground is that "the least which can possibly confront us would be something simple, vivid (or faint) and, for example blue, i.e. a complex idea". This does not seem to me a just criticism for we must remember that Hume's reason for treating particular tastes, sounds, smells, colours as simple is that they "exclude all composition". Would Professor Passmore then want to argue that the idea of a particular shade of blue is composed of vividness, blueness, and simplicity? If we use the word 'compose' here it would be manifestly different from the sense in which the complex idea of a horse would be composed of the ideas of its various parts in certain relations.

It seems to me that Professor Passmore is wrong when he asserts in criticism of Hume "that it is quite unintelligible to assert that an idea can have various distinguishable characteristics without any sacrifice of its simplicity...". The whole point rests on the assumption that to say x resembles y is to say that x and y have a certain characteristic in common. Since x and y are ex hypothesi different and also have a characteristic in common neither can be simple. Each would be split up into that quality which is the same in each and the quality which makes them different.

But is this assumption a just one? Hume obviously did not subscribe to it and I think his position perfectly defensible. Let us take the example of the colours. Hume

is surely right in claiming that it makes perfect sense to say that blue and green are more similar than blue and scarlet. Would it not be a bit annoying if we were not considered justified in making this statement unless we could point out that blue and green had something in common? Would we not rather say: "They have nothing in common. They are just similar."? The same situation would often be met with in dealing with smells. Some resemble more than others, but if we were asked what they had in common we should be puzzled.

It is perhaps not out of place to emphasize here that when we are not satisfied that we have conveyed to a person the idea of a certain smell, or colour for that matter, we point out the causal conditions, the circumstances within which it arises.

In the case of force or vividness it is not easy to see what it is that vivid olfactory, auditory and visual images have in common. If we use the same word here we presumably see a resemblance, though not a characteristic which is identically present in each. What of 'a cold colour', 'a warm colour'? It is not accidental that we use these phrases. But try to find an identical characteristic in a cold colour and a cold drink.

It seems to me clear that it is not absurd to suggest that simplicity may be consistent with similarity unless you want to define a simple idea as that which can only be named and not described in any sense of 'describe'. Hume does not use the term 'simple' in this way, and I see no very obvious reason for claiming that he ought to have done this. In fact he always

holds that you can 'describe' a simple idea in three ways: (1) by using a scale of intensity, (2) by pointing out its similarity or difference from other simple ideas, and (3) by describing the conditions under which it arises. It must be admitted that the notion of intensity, vividness or force is an obscure one. Hume recognizes this, but can do no better than appeal to the reader's experience. Sometimes emotions seem to involve a violent disturbance of our conscious state. We all know what it feels like to become violently angry. If we contrast this with the peaceful contemplation of a beautiful landscape we can see what Hume is driving at. The second emotion involves hardly any "disturbance in the soul".

THE INDIRECT PASSIONS

It has been maintained that Hume's discussion of the indirect passions in Book II of the Treatise is of little importance for his treatment of ethical problems. Thus Professor Kemp-Smith says:

"More than a third of Book II is employed in the treatment of four passions which have no very direct bearing upon Hume's ethical problems, and play indeed no really distinctive part in his system - pride and humility, love and hatred, viewed as operating in and through a complex double process of association."
(K.S., p.160)

Kemp-Smith seems to consider the discussion of the indirect passions as important only as illustrating Hume's attempt at proving that "the laws of association play a role in the mental world no less important than that of gravity in the physical world". (K.S., p.160). He therefore emphasises that there is here a connection with the account of causal inference in Book I, though he does not seem to think that the discussion of the indirect passions is important for Hume's ethical doctrines. This view may be challenged, and it will be argued hereafter that we can learn a great deal about Hume's views on the nature of evaluation from his discussion of the indirect passions.

Hume begins by drawing a distinction between the object of a passion and its cause. The object of both pride and humility is the self. There is really nothing very surprising

in this terminology, for Hume is thinking of the direction of our thought or attention when we feel proud or humble. Kemp-Smith's criticism of Hume's terminology is, I think, unfounded. He says:

"... Hume speaks of the self as being the 'object' of pride and humility: we should have expected him rather to say their 'subject'." (K.S., p.180).

? only when we have changed over to Kantian terms.

But we talk quite naturally of 'the object of our attention' or 'an object of thought'. We must furthermore remember that the object of love and hatred is, according to Hume, some other person, and these passions are in this respect contrasted with pride and humility, where the object is self. It is, it must be agreed, much more natural to talk of a person we love as 'the object of our love' rather than 'the subject of our love'. Hume's terminology seems well-suited to bring out the contrast he has in mind.

A syntactical point may perhaps further vindicate Hume's terminology. We can on most occasions use interchangeably the two verbal expressions 'I am proud of x because y' and 'x's possession of y makes me proud'. This seems to me to remove the only objection to Hume's terminology, since the oddity of calling self the object of the passion of pride seems to be derived from the fact that 'I' is the grammatical subject of the sentence 'I am proud of x'. The point may not seem of any great importance, but it is clear that Kemp-Smith's complaint might incline people to think that Hume is thinking of self as qualified by pride, whereas he is thinking

of self as the object of pride in a different sense.

We clearly must distinguish Hume's use of 'object' in this context from the use of 'object' when we talk of objects of our desires. The indirect passions we are concerned with are not desires and Hume suggests they only have objects in the sense that our attention is drawn to a particular object when they are aroused. This is mistaken in two ways.

(1) Pride and humility, love and hatred, are names for dispositional characteristics. These dispositions may be dispositions to feel in certain ways. But my love is directed at the object of my love even when I am not thinking of him or her. (2) When I do have the feeling, e.g. when I feel proud at the prize-giving ceremony at school because my child gets a prize, it is certainly not true to say that the pride has an object in that it makes me think of the object of it. This suggests the connection is looser than it is. Without its object I could not be proud at all. The object is, if you like, an essential aspect of the pride.

Simply because the self is the object of both pride and humility it cannot be their cause, for these two passions are opposites. If we have our own value enhanced and diminished in our own eyes at the same time by a cause equally suited to produce both, the effect of the cause would cancel itself out. The two opposed emotions would leave an equilibrium. The two contrary emotions would leave the mind indifferent.

The cause of these passions can be placed upon a great

variety of different subjects. Thus we may be proud because of some quality we possess ourselves but we may also be made proud by qualities of other persons or objects if they are closely enough related to us. Thus I might be proud of my skill in golf or dancing, but my garden or the exploits of my family might also arouse my pride. Nothing arouses pride in a person unless (it) is closely related to him. If we take the (subject) which arouses my pride to be my beautiful garden, we can distinguish between the object itself, the garden and the quality it possesses which arouses my pride, for unless the garden is thought by us to possess some valuable quality it would not arouse our pride. Thus we see that the object must have a close relation to a person and also be thought to possess some valuable quality if it is to arouse pride.

The fact that Hume talks of beauty as a quality in an object must not mislead us into thinking that he is contradicting his later refutation of objectivism or intuitionism. All he needs is the admission that an object does not make a man proud unless it is valued by him, and when asked why he values the object he would enumerate those qualities it possesses which make him value it. I talk here of valuing whereas Hume says the quality must be an independent source of pleasure. I do this to bring out the fact that Hume is thinking of the quality in question as a pleasing quality, and this is to attribute a positive value to the object.

Hume thinks he is giving the causal conditions for the

creation in our consciousness of an absolutely unique simple impression. The ultimate criterion for deciding whether a man is proud or not would be the presence or absence of this impression. This might be doubted, for we would often persist in our contention that a certain person is proud in face of his sincere claim that he is not. We would be considered justified in doing this, for it is accepted that a person is not always himself the best judge as to whether he is proud or not. It seems that Hume could not allow this for an impression is in its very nature such that one cannot be deceived as to its presence or absence. If this is admitted we should at least have to say that Hume has not given us the causal conditions for being proud. We might be forced to make the distinction between feeling proud and being proud. Hume, one might say, has stated the causal conditions for feeling proud, though admittedly some people are proud though they do not feel proud. The answer to this is that Hume most certainly did not draw this distinction. To be proud is for him to feel proud.

Although we may feel sceptical about Hume's argument considered as an account of the causal conditions for the emergence in consciousness of a special impression, it is quite admirable as a piece of conceptual analysis. It is certainly true that I could not claim to be proud of Sir Winston Churchill unless I stood in some special relation to him. If per impossibile I were his father, this relation

would certainly be close enough. Members of the same nation might be taken to be closely enough related to enable them to say that they are proud of any one member of that nation. It becomes a bit more doubtful whether an Icelander could claim to be proud of Churchill even though he is a member of the Icelandic Conservative Party. It is certainly the case that one cannot claim to be proud of a person simply because one thinks that person has valuable qualities, unless one stands in some special relation to that person. It is furthermore certainly correct that pride is in some sense directed towards oneself, for a man who is made proud is having his own value enhanced in his own estimation. The fault to be found with Hume's account is this. If we see a man enthusing about something which has special relations to him, such as his own garden or a member of his family, we feel justified in saying that he is proud of this thing or person. But we would be less inclined to think that we were stating that he was experiencing a special emotion or passion of a unique kind and that the statement was true or false according to whether this special emotion was experienced.

But Hume might retort to our argument that a simple impression, though it reveals itself just as it is in consciousness, does not entail that a person himself is always the best judge as to whether he is proud or not. Passions resemble one another, sometimes closely, and I might make a mistake in classifying a feeling as pride when it was in fact

a closely similar passion. To say that x is a simple impression involves that there are only two ways in which it can be characterised. (1) We can say that it is similar to certain other impressions, for similarity is not inconsistent with simplicity as the term is used by Hume. (2) We can describe the conditions or circumstances in which it arises. An observer may be more clearly aware of the attendant circumstances than the person himself and consequently could upon occasion point out that the person must be proud since all the conditions for pride are there.

Hume turns to an account of the principles that must be assumed to be at work in accounting for the creation of the impression of pride. It would be absurd to think that each object arousing pride was by nature suited to arouse this passion. We must attempt to find a common principle which would explain why pride arises in any of its occurrences. The principles of association are now appealed to. We are familiar with the association of ideas from the first book of the Treatise, but the association of impressions is here first introduced. The only relation by which this operates is resemblance, though noticing a resemblance is no part of the operation of the association. The relation here is a natural and not a philosophical relation. We notice reflectively that passions that resemble one another in a certain way follow one another in our experience.

If Hume thought the 'association' depended upon a reflective comparison it might be odd for him to talk of the "association of impressions". Such is not his meaning, for x would see its first appearance give rise to y even though y had not been previously experienced either. Hume states this principle thus:

"All resembling impressions are connected together, and no sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow. Grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, until the whole circle be completed." (T.H.N. II, p.10; p.283)

Taken literally this statement is obviously absurd, though it may be true that disappointment tends to make a person angry with anyone responsible for it, and an envious person might easily become malicious. But Hume is in real difficulty, for if the association of impressions operates by resemblance only it seems difficult to explain why any one of a number of resembling impressions should be aroused in any given case. Let us consider the way in which pride or humility arise. Hume says:

"When an idea produces an impression, which is connected with an idea related to the first idea, these two impressions must be in a manner inseparable, nor will the one in any case be unattended with the other. It is after this manner that the particular causes of pride and humility are determined." (T.H.N. II, p.16; p.289)

If thinking of x pleases me and x is related to me, then the pleasure gives rise to pride, which is related to pleasure by similarity. Pride in turn is naturally such as to make one think of self. We thus have a double association of ideas,

between self and the object related to self and pleasure and pride, which is itself a pleasant passion. This double association is conceived as a mechanism by which the passion is produced.

Hume talks as if the relation between pride and its object were purely contingent. We might have had the impression of pride and this might have been directed at others if we had been differently constituted. The thought of self and the passion of pride are just naturally connected. One always follows the other. One can only note this but not explain it. Association does not help us here at all. I want to suggest that what is here called a natural relation is in fact logical. This point has already been mentioned, but it may perhaps be made clearer if we consider the difference Hume thinks there is between joy and pride.

An object must be related to us to give us joy; in this it resembles pride. But a much closer relation is required for the production of pride. A feast may give us joy, but in most cases it would only make the host proud. On the occasions where merely being at a feast causes pride, this must be due to the fact that being there is seen as an indication of value in the people present. A feast at Buckingham Palace might be a case in point. But here we should be closely related to the feast in contrast with all the people who are left out. It is where the cause of joy is no more closely related to me than it is to a great number of other people that it may furnish no reason for pride. Return

to health gives rise to joy, but it is not very often that it is an occasion for pride, because it is shared with such vast numbers. Hume explains this as follows:

"The reason why pride is so much more delicate in this particular than joy, I take to be as follows. In order to excite pride, there are always two objects we must contemplate, viz. the cause, or that object which produces pleasure; and self, which is the real object of the passion. But joy has only one object necessary to its production, viz. that which gives pleasure; and though it be requisite that this bear some relation to self, yet that is only requisite to render it agreeable; nor is self, properly speaking, the object of this passion. Since, therefore, pride has, in a manner, two objects to which it directs our view, it follows, that where neither of them have any singularity, the passion must be more weakened upon that account than a passion which has only one object. Upon comparing ourselves with others, as we are every moment apt to do, we find we are not in the least distinguished; and, upon comparing the object we possess, we discover still the same unlucky circumstance. By two comparisons so disadvantageous, the passion must be entirely destroyed." (T.H.N., pp.18-19; p.292)

It is fairly obvious that Hume thinks of his account as an explanation of the origin of the passions of joy and pride respectively. Two unfavourable comparisons will weaken a passion more than only one, and may in fact destroy it. The passion is thought of as separable from its object and its cause. He is making a perfectly valid point in a misleading way because of his predisposition to state a logical point in causal terms. The difference between joy and pride Hume is drawing our attention to has surely to do with the justification

of pride, the attempt to meet the challenge, 'How can you be proud of x?' It is certainly the case that a man can be joyful though the source of his joy has no very close relation to him. But the challenge 'You have nothing to be proud of' cannot be met unless there is something special in the relation between the cause of pride and its object. Thus our return to health might justify pride if it were due to a certain exceptional courage or effort of our own. If this effort were no greater than could be expected, one could not be said to have justified one's pride in it. But, and this is an important point, unless the person thinks that there is a special relation between the cause and the object of pride, he simply cannot be proud of it. To be proud of x is, partly, to think there is a special relation between oneself and x. It is essential for pride that a special relation should be thought to exist. On the other hand I can quite legitimately claim to experience joy at the thought of objects I do not consider to have any special relation to me. Joy, but not pride, can logically arise from the contemplation of any purely imaginary objects.

The third limitation Hume mentions makes it clear that pride and humility are forms of self-valuing and an appeal is really made to the influence of sympathy, though this principle is not explicitly mentioned. The happiness of others tends to make us happy, and this is why the fact that the object is pleasing to others increases the happiness we derive from it.

"This circumstance like the two foregoing,
has an effect upon joy as well as pride.

"We fancy ourselves more happy, as well as more virtuous or beautiful, when we appear so to others; but are still more ostentatious of our virtues than of our pleasures." (T.H.N. II, p.19; p.292)

Happiness derived from sympathy with the happiness of others only becomes a form of valuation when it arouses a separate passion, in this case pride. This already suggests an analogy between evaluation in the form of moral and aesthetic judgments and the indirect passions. We shall later try to show how this analogy can help to clear up some puzzles in the interpretation of the function of sympathy in moral and aesthetic valuation.

The fourth point Hume makes refers to the fact that in order to arouse pride or humility the cause must have a certain degree of constancy. "What is casual and inconstant gives but little joy, and less pride." (T.H.N. II, p.19; p.293) We may here again think of Hume's insistence that a quality must be relatively constant in order to arouse moral approval. The following perhaps emphasizes still more how pride and humility are forms of valuation: "It seems ridiculous to infer an excellency in ourselves from an object which is of so much shorter duration, and attends us during so small a part of our existence." (ibid.) The implication seems to be that unless we can infer some excellency in ourselves we cannot be proud. But I do not think Hume really thinks the evaluation of oneself is an inference from the qualities observed in oneself or in objects closely related to us. The expression 'it would be ridiculous to infer...' seems to indicate that Hume is insisting

that one could not justify pride unless one could point out valuable qualities of a relatively constant kind. But I take this to be another instance where Hume is vaguely aware of what makes his observations plausible although he is still concerned to state the conditions under which pride arises, i.e. causal conditions. I think, indeed, that pride and humility are for him equivalent to feeling satisfied or dissatisfied with oneself. "... I observe that by pride I understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or power, makes us satisfied with ourselves; and that by humility I mean the opposite impression." (T.H.N. II, p.23; p.297) What gives rise to the evaluations of oneself gives rise to these passions, for they are the evaluations.

Hume's final observation regards the important concept of 'general rules' which have considerable influence on the passions. The fact he seems to have in mind is that people are sometimes proud of something which does not give them any sensible enjoyment. Hume's example is, however, curious, for it regards the esteem of the rich and powerful. We esteem a rich man because of his riches even though he does not derive any enjoyment from them. This is because our esteem is governed by the general rule that riches are a source of enjoyment to the possessor, even though the particular case in question may be an exception to the rule. But the same rule may be seen to apply in the case of the rich man himself. He

may be proud of his riches even though they no longer give him any enjoyment, for "custom and practise.... have settled the just value of everything: this must certainly contribute to the easy production of the passions, and guide us, by means of general established maxims, in the proportion we ought to observe in preferring one object to another". (T.H.N. II, p.20; p.294) We esteem the rich because riches are pleasing to the possessor. But though this is the ultimate source of the valuing of riches a rich man may still value his riches even though they no more furnish him with any enjoyment. His evaluation is governed by the general rule which determines the value of riches as such. We can only understand this as a reference to 'objective evaluation' which disregards the special point of view of the person evaluating. The rich man disregards the circumstance that in his own case riches are no source of pleasure to him personally.

If my suggestion for the interpretation of Hume's words here is accepted we may, at least partly, defend Hume against the charge that he is here admitting that pride may arise without any separate pleasure being produced by the cause of the passion of pride. If this is admitted, Hume would have to modify his view that a double association is necessary to produce that passion, for the association of impressions could not operate. But esteem is a pleasant passion and would still make that association possible. Whether this defence can be accepted as adequate may depend upon our interpretation of Hume's doctrine of evaluation. In what sense can we be

guided in our evaluation "by means of general established maxims"? If it is possible to evaluate from a settled habit without having a feeling of approval at all, our defence of Hume becomes questionable, although he could still claim that feelings of approval and disapproval must be presupposed if we are to understand how habitual approvals and disapprovals in the absence of the feelings could arise. The situation in which it is proper to claim that one is proud may be fixed by a general rule in a society. A man may use the expression 'I am proud of x' according to this general rule even though he no longer feels any sensible enjoyment from the 'cause'. Hume seems to think, though, that in the case where the cause has ceased to be separately pleasing the habit acquired may directly produce the pride.

In giving an account of the passions of love and hatred Hume again emphasizes that these, like other passions, are simple impressions and hence indefinable. They are rightly classed with pride and humility as indirect passions, because a double association of impressions and ideas is necessary for their production. Some important differences are to be noticed, however, for the object of love and hatred is always "some sensible being external to us". (T.H.N. II, p.51; p.329) But the object of pride and humility is always the person himself who is proud or humble. If it be objected that in self-love the object is surely the person himself, Hume's answer is that this is not properly speaking love at all. Substantiating this claim he simply appeals to introspection.

The sensation it (self-love) produces has not "anything in common with that tender emotion which is excited by a friend or mistress". (ibid.) The final distinguishing characteristic of a passion is the intrinsic quality of the feeling or emotion itself. This intrinsic quality cannot be the pleasantness, for this is common to the two passions under consideration, love and self-love.

The object of love and hatred is the same and consequently it cannot be identified with the cause, since these passions are opposites in the same way as pride and humility are opposite passions. The cause is in both cases a quality of the subject which arouses a separate pleasure and pain. The causes of the two pairs of passions are alike, but the difference lies in the object. The relation of the cause to oneself causes pride or humility, whereas if related to some other person it causes love or hatred. Hume points out that the connection between pride and vanity confirms this for the vain person desires the love and esteem of others and tries to gain this by exhibiting to them those qualities which are the cause of his pride. This procedure is deemed sensible, but would be completely irrational if the cause of pride and the cause of love and esteem were not the same. Any quality which, when we possess it, makes us proud, arouses love when it belongs to another.

But this is hardly the whole story, for people may win our love by pleasing us, though we might not be proud of the quality from which the pleasure arises if it were our own.

"Whoever can find the means, either by his services, his beauty, or his flattery, to render himself agreeable to us, is sure of our affections; as on the other hand, whoever harms or displeases us never fails to excite our anger or hatred." (T.H.N. II, p.67; p.348) This brings out the fact that a person who pays us compliments arouses our love or good will even though we might not be at all proud of our own characteristic as flatterers if we possessed it. Here it is the fact that the man pleases me rather than the fact that he possesses a pleasing characteristic that arouses my love. This is important, for it draws attention to the essentially biased nature of many of our passions. We find it difficult, not only to love our enemies, but to form an unbiased view of their qualities.

Perhaps pride, unlike love, is not so often or so obviously biased, for the proud man is laying a claim to be enhanced in value, and the cause of the pride must thus be obvious to others as a source of pleasure, as something valuable. In this connection Hume himself considers it necessary "that the pleasant or painful object be very discernible and obvious, and that not only to ourselves but to others also". (T.H.N. II, p.19) The biased nature of love and hatred is, indeed, very obvious. We do not love people in proportion to merit, for those more closely related to us arouse our love to a higher degree than strangers, even though we may be aware of the superior merit

of the latter. Thus love can lead to a biased evaluation or when this is not the case it may be aroused even though the object possesses no very obvious pleasing qualities. This is brought out clearly by the love of relations for "whoever is united to us by any connection is always sure of a share of our love, proportioned to the connection, without inquiring into his other qualities". (T.H.N. II, p.71; p.352)

The fact that a bare relation between two persons seems to be sufficient to produce love appears to contradict the doctrine that a double association of ideas and impressions is necessary. It does not seem to be necessary that the cause produces a separate pleasure or pain. Hume, however, tries to explain this by appealing to the enjoyment derived from company, the enjoyment of being closely related to others. This is hardly sufficient, for a man who only hears of the exploits of a son he has never seen and does not know would often be likely to overestimate these. One might, indeed, say that the lack of social relation might tend to increase the pride. It seems all the same that the quality of being closely related to a person may sometimes be sufficient to arouse a separate pleasure which could account for the emergence of love. No wonder therefore that the passion of love is not aroused in direct relation to merit, for contiguity in space or time, or the causal relation of kinship, are deemed irrelevant in deciding upon the merit of any object.

However difficult it may be to distinguish between the pleasant feeling of love and the independently produced pleasure, Hume still has to hold to the distinction in the interest of the theory that a double association of impressions and ideas is necessary for the production of the indirect passions. A certain uneasiness is betrayed on this point, as the following quotation shows:

"It is not so evident at first sight, that a relation of impressions is requisite to these passions, and that because in the transition the one impression is so much confounded with the other, that they become in a manner indistinguishable."

(T.H.N. II, p.53; p.331)

He is talking of love and hatred, but he has of course to go on to say that distinguishable they must be. But perhaps the reason why one does not seem to have to refer to the cause as a separate source of pleasure in the case of love is in no way connected with the difficulty of introspectively distinguishing between two emotions.

One might want to say that the reason why the cause of pride must be an independent source of pleasure lies in the fact that a man who says he is proud of *x* can always be called upon to justify his pride. The justification would consist in enumerating the valuable characteristics. In the case of love, on the other hand, this is only sometimes the case, for we may claim to love *x* though we are not claiming *x* to be in any respects lovable. Thus we can claim to love our children without having to meet the challenge that there is nothing lovable or valuable about them. But we cannot claim to be

proud of our children unless we are prepared to say that they have some valuable qualities. There is of course a sense in which I may be proud of my children considered as mere signs or indications or effects of a valuable quality in myself. Thus I might be proud of my family as showing my fruitfulness, irrespective of any quality they may possess. But this does not destroy the point I am making that love differs from pride in that one may claim to love without in any sense implying the existence of any valuable quality at all.

If Hume had not been so convinced that the passions are simple impressions, he might have seen that some of the difficulties he encounters are due to the fact that 'love' and 'hatred', 'pride' and 'humility' are complex concepts. Hume in fact comes near to realizing this when he says that "esteem and contempt, indeed, arise on some occasions instead of love and hatred; but these are, at the bottom, the same passions, only diversified by some causes..." (T.H.N. II, p.58; p.337) His confusion, however, is obvious in this passage for if the causes of esteem and contempt are different from the causes of love and hatred these passions are to some extent different. It is only his associationist scheme according to which there can in the end be only four indirect passions, which dictates to him that love must 'at the bottom' be the same passion as esteem, hatred the same as contempt. But it seems the neat scheme of passions as simple impressions is threatened, for esteem is only to be differentiated from

love in terms of the attendant circumstances, for 'at the bottom the same' could only, one would think, here refer to the impression, if they are 'only diversified by some causes'.

It might be argued that this is too uncharitable. The identification might only refer to the fact that the same associative principles explain the origin of both. 'To the feeling' there might still be differences though the similarity might be close. It might even be difficult to decide whether one was 'esteeming' or 'loving'. This, one might think, could only be decided by a closer attention to the impression according to Hume's principles. But we might also pay attention to the attendant circumstances, for there must be some difference here to indicate whether 'love' or 'esteem' is the passion aroused. Hume would still have to say that the two 'impressions' are slightly different, for though they might be closely similar they are yet specifically different to the feeling.

Two circumstances must be remembered when we are talking about the causes of love or hatred. (1) When we love someone for actions he has done our love is only aroused if the action was intentional and it is "by the intention we judge of the actions, and, according as that is good or bad, they become causes of love or hatred". (T.H.N. II, p.68; p.348) But this doctrine is soon modified, for in the case when a characteristic belongs permanently to a person our aversion is aroused even though the person did not intend to harm us.

This is the case with bodily deformity. But even in the case of an intentional action this arouses our love because the intention is a sign of a quality of character. It is only as a sign of a desirable quality of mind that the intentionality arouses our love.

(2) But there are also undoubtedly cases where an unintentional injury to us arouses our hatred, and it is only upon reflection that this may come to be modified. And even when a person's motives in injuring us are strictly honourable we may still feel antagonistic towards him although here also our antagonism or hatred may be modified upon reflection. Hume, indeed, makes an explicit reference to reasonable hatred as opposed to unreasonable hatred. This can only be understood as a reference to the fact that when we look upon the source of our hatred objectively, from a spectator's point of view, our feelings in the case may come to be modified.

"One that has a real design of harming us, proceeding not from hatred and ill-will, but from justice and equity, draws not upon him our anger, if we be in any degree reasonable; notwithstanding he is both the cause, and the knowing cause, of our sufferings." (T.H.N. II, p.70; p.350)

But of course we are not always reasonable. Our passions are not always modified by objective evaluations. Our approval of the characteristic in the person which is the source of the injury done to us may be too weak to destroy our hatred. The reference here seems to be to what is vulgarly called a conflict between reason and the passions, which Hume considers to be misdescribed in these terms. "We speak not strictly and

philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" (T.H.N. II, p.127; p.415). This is not an exceptionally extreme statement in Hume's philosophy but a general statement of his main thesis. For not only is it the case that an 'objective judgment' can only influence our attitudes by arousing a passion, but reference must be made to human passions in order to account for the fact that we take up an objective point of view at all. This cannot be explained without bringing in the notion of sympathy and its function in Hume's doctrine of evaluation.

SYMPATHY IN THE TREATISE

In this chapter the doctrine of sympathy will be considered only in relation to the Treatise. There are some grounds for thinking that this term has a different function in the Enquiry. The account given will have to be qualified and elaborated later. Let us for the time being concentrate on emphasising some of the more striking features of the principle of sympathy as it functions in Hume's associationist scheme.

It can be most emphatically stated that it is impossible to give an account of Hume's views on the nature of evaluation in the Treatise without introducing the principle of sympathy. An account has in actual fact been given of Hume's ethical theory without the word 'sympathy' being used even once. I am referring to the chapter on Hume in Broad's "Five Types of Ethical Theory". This is explained by Broad's view that "the best account of Hume's theory of ethics is to be found in his Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals" (C.D.B., p.84). It is true that Broad mentions "benevolence or humanity" but the first thing we must emphasise in explaining the concept of sympathy in the Treatise is its difference from benevolence. The two concepts are never treated as identical in that work.

Benevolence is defined by Hume as desire for the happiness or

aversion to the misery or unhappiness of someone. Anger is the opposite of this. These are passions that are naturally attached to love and hatred. In fact one of the things that distinguish love and hatred from pride and humility is this connection with desire for the happiness or misery of the person loved or hated. But Hume resists the temptation to identify love with the desire for the happiness of others. We may, he thinks, love another without giving any thought to his happiness or misery.

When I say benevolence is a passion I am using that word in Hume's sense. We must always bear in mind that 'passion' is used by him in a very extended sense when we compare it with its use in ordinary discourse today. But he is not using this word even in the way in which it was used in ordinary language of the 18th century, but giving it a special technical sense. This we can see clearly by looking at the way in which Reid attacked Hume for abusing language, but Reid was fond of appealing to common usage. Talking about "natural desires and affections" he says:

"When they are so calm as neither to produce any sensible effects upon the body, nor to darken the understanding and weaken the power of self-command, they are not called passions. But the same principle, when it becomes ~~to~~ violent as to produce these effects upon the body and upon the mind, is a passion, or, as Cicero very properly calls it, a perturbation". (T.R., p.272)

Thus it seems the 18th century use of 'passion' was not very different from our own. But even though Hume extends the use of the term greatly it does not on the whole include sympathy. There is no room for the passion of sympathy in his scheme of the passions at all.

There is a reason why one might feel inclined to think that Hume thought of sympathy as one of the passions. In talking about compassion Hume says:

"There remains only to take notice of a pretty remarkable phenomenon of this passion, which is, that the communicated passion of sympathy sometimes requires strength from the weakness of its original, and even arises from a transition from affections that have no existence". (T.H.N. II, p.87; 370)

He then goes on to argue that we rejoice more for a man who has met with great good fortune if he seems little preoccupied with it himself. And a man who meets great misfortune with equanimity arouses our compassion to a higher degree. But this need not be interpreted in such a way that we must find a place for sympathy as a special passion distinct from pity, compassion and admiration. Yet it shows that in some cases we are affected by the situation of others in our attitude towards them where there does not seem to be any passion to be communicated. Here we should have to appeal to the imagination as a necessary feature in arousing these passions. Yet sympathy is involved in this sense that if we were totally indifferent to the experiences and fates of other human beings no concern for others would be aroused in us from the knowledge of their good or ill fortune. If sympathy is a passion in the two cases enumerated it would in any case be equivalent to admiration in the one case and pity or compassion in the other and these are manifestly different passions.

Sympathy is the name of a principle in virtue of which the

passions are communicated between sensitive beings. Hume, indeed, talks about "the principle of sympathy or communication" (T.H.N. II, p.137; p.427). He thinks he can analyse the way in which sympathy operates by an appeal to the principle that an impression may infuse some of its liveliness into a related idea in such a way as to raise it to the status of an impression. This principle was appealed to by Hume when in the first book he was giving an account of belief engendered by causal inference and the doctrine obviously depends upon the view that the difference between an idea and an impression is a difference in force or vivacity or liveliness only. A thought of pain may become real pain simply by an increase in liveliness and force. There is no difference in kind between the impression and the idea.

The way in which Hume conceives the operation of sympathy is indicated in the following passage:

"The idea of ourselves is always intimately present to us, and conveys a sensible degree of vivacity to the idea of any other object to which we are related. This lively idea changes by degrees into a real impression; these two kinds of perception being in a great measure the same, and differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity". (T.H.N. II, p.73; p.354)

Earlier on Hume had talked of "the idea, or rather impression of ourselves" which he claims to be "always intimately present with us" (T.H.N. II, p.41; p.317). It is obvious that the perception of the self must be an impression if it is to have the enlivening influence already mentioned. We can then say that sympathy operates as follows. We have an idea of, or think of, a passion

in the mind of another being related to us. This idea or thought is raised to the status of an impression because of the enlivening influence of the impression of self.

It is not our present concern to discuss whether the appeal to an impression of the self as a constant factor in our experience is consistent with his denial in the first book of the Treatise that no such impression is to be found. But the following points must be noticed. A. To sympathise with X is to have X's "opinions and sentiments" communicated to us. It is to have X's opinions or sentiments because of a communication according to the principles of operation laid down. B. To sympathise with X is not as such to be motivated in any way unless I am sympathising with a motive in X. Thus to sympathise with X's hatred for Y is to come to feel this hatred and to have the consequent desire to hurt the hated object. C. The being with whose sentiments or opinions we sympathise must have some relation to us. We sympathise more easily and more completely with those who are closely related to us.

Let us reflect upon each of these points separately.

A: It is obvious that the expression "sympathise with X" is here used in a special technical sense. The criteria for its use seem to be (a) that a person has the same feeling or opinions as X and (b) that this feeling or opinion has come to be that person's feeling or opinion in a special way. The special way is of course the process already described as the operation of the principle of sympathy. This condition is absolutely necessary for the bare fact that I and a chap in

China both feel angry in no way indicates that I sympathise with his anger nor that he sympathises with mine.

The second point worth mentioning is that Hume says we may sympathise with another's opinions as well as with his sentiments, emotions, in fact his passions in the wide sense Hume gives to that term, and his bodily pleasures and pains. It seems strange to suggest that I may come to agree with another's opinion by the process of an idea being enlivened so as to become an impression. Perhaps Hume is using the term in a loose sense. It may be thought that he is just referring to another's approvals and disapprovals which in ordinary language would be called his moral opinions. But there is no need to suppose this to be the case and Hume's own words rather suggest that he is also referring to people's opinions as to matters of fact. The influence of sympathy "is not only conspicuous in children, who implicitly embrace every opinion proposed to them; but also in men of the greatest judgment and understanding, who find it very difficult to follow their own reason or inclination, in opposition to that of their friends and daily companions" (T.H.N. II, p.40; p.316). The expression "every opinion" rather suggests that the term is not being used in a restricted sense.

It must be admitted though that Hume's words are not unambiguous enough to necessitate the interpretation here given, although he goes on to say that "to this principle we ought to ascribe the humours and turn of thinking of those of the same nation" (T.H.N. II, p.40; p.316). But in a sense our view that the influence of sympathy stretches to opinions of matters of fact

is the more natural one. We know that certain opinions may be widely accepted in a community in such a way as to make it extremely difficult to convince a member of that community of their falsity. Let us take as an example the opinion that horsemeat is poisonous. This is to be distinguished from the disapproval of the eating of horsemeat though the belief that horsemeat is poisonous would almost certainly lead to the general disapproval of eating it. One would not consider it unnatural to expect that a person brought up to the belief that horsemeat is poisonous would adhere to this view in face of considerable evidence to the contrary, unless the opinion came to be questioned by other members of the community. The knowledge that the other members of his community were somewhat shaken in their opinion would tend to decrease the tenacity with which any one of the members would adhere to it. This we might ascribe to the influence of sympathy. Let us now apply Hume's analysis of the working of sympathy to the case. X, Y, Z, etc. all say to A: "Horsemeat is poisonous". In each case X, Y and Z are related to A and in each case A conceives horsemeat to have poisonous qualities. According to Hume the only difference between conceiving and believing is one of force and vivacity. Why should the conception in this case not tend to be enlivened into a belief if the thought is closely enough related to myself by my having thought of horsemeat as having poisonous qualities in the past? This would be in perfect harmony with the fact that frequent repetition tends to engender belief. And Hume in fact emphasises the enlivening effect of repetition "... we may feel sickness and

pain from the mere force of imagination and make a malady real by often thinking of it" (T.H.N. II, p.42; p.319).

Even though the suggested extension of the influence of sympathy may not have been intended by Hume we must still remember that sympathy may be at work even though it does not lead to an identity of sentiment or opinion, for it may only have the effect of making it difficult for men "to follow their own reason or inclination, in opposition to that of their friends and daily companions" (T.H.N. II, p.40). Sympathy in fact admits of degrees and may only succeed in creating in our mind a certain tension. The most conspicuous and perhaps the most important would be a conflict of motives engendered in this manner.

B. The fact that to sympathise is not necessarily to have a motive is of supreme importance. In this Hume's use of 'sympathy' differs from our own, for we should normally think that to sympathise with X is to have a motive for helping X in some way. This can be accepted only with considerable reservation. Expressions indicating motive may be used in order to explain actions that have taken place. We might perhaps call this the retrospective use of motive words. Thus we might ask the question "Why did he help the old woman accross the road?". The answer to this might be: "Out of sheer sympathy with her". If it is now asked: "But why did he sympathise with her?" the answer might be: "Because she was blind". The fact that she was blind indicates that it was possible for the man to be motivated by sympathy. "Because her eyesight was good" would be absurd and "because she was rich" would indicate that the motive was not sympathy. It is undoubtedly true that we often

accept "because he sympathised with X" as both a proper and an adequate explanation of an action, always providing that the agent thought he was in some way helping a person that needed help. But the proviso is not always necessary. "Why did you vote Conservative?" This question may be properly answered by the statement "Because I sympathise with the Conservative point of view". The answer would be proper even though I did not believe the Conservatives to be in a precarious position of any kind. This use of 'sympathise with' is similar to the use of 'agree with' though it commits one perhaps to rather less. This use of 'sympathise with' is obviously similar to Hume's use of that expression, as so far considered, since it indicates an identity of the opinions of different individuals. But here too we should be explaining actions by indicating a motive.

But let us now approach the question of motive from the point of view of commitment rather than retrospective explanation. Merely to state that you have a motive is very often not to commit yourself to any line of action at all. I might truly say that I have a motive for murdering a rich uncle without committing myself to any line of action which would tend to hasten his death. But reverting to the phrase 'sympathise with' it certainly is the case that 'I sympathise with X' quite often involves a practical commitment. One should feel justified in expecting a person who sympathises with X to assist X rather than to increase his suffering, if it is in his power to do so. But the commitment is not a very strong one, for one can often claim to sympathise without feeling committed to any very definite effort to assist X. One

would hardly question a person's sincerity in his claim that he sympathises with the coloured population of South Africa even though he has taken no actual steps to try to improve their lot. If one wanted to give a complete analysis of the expression 'sympathise with' much more would have to be said. It is sufficient for my purpose to point out that when 'to sympathise' is 'to be motivated in some way' it sometimes involves an inclination to assist the person sympathised with in some sense. In other cases no assistance may be needed. This is the case when 'to sympathise with' almost means the same as 'to agree with'. When it is taken to mean this no practical commitment is involved unless we are sympathising with another's motives, his attitudes, in fact the practical commitments of that other person.

One further point must be made. Mere agreement is not enough. An onlooker who knows that A and B have the same attitude to X would not be entitled to say that they sympathise with one another's attitude unless A knows of B's attitude and B knows of A's attitude. Hume's use of 'sympathise with' is similar to the one we have just described although he would make it a necessary condition that A's attitude has been causally influenced by B's if A is to be correctly described as sympathising with B. It is not clear to me whether ordinary usage lays this down as a necessary condition. Though this needs to be qualified later, we could say that sympathy for Hume is the principle in virtue of which a sentiment or opinion in X comes to cause an identical sentiment or opinion in Y. It may seem

unnecessary to press this home so much, but we shall soon see its importance, for it follows from this that to sympathise is not to approve or disapprove unless we are sympathising with another's approval or disapproval. Even this is not completely true for we must remember that we may be affected by sympathy even though a complete identity of sentiments or opinions is not achieved. I hope to show that the relation between sympathy and approval and disapproval has not always been rightly understood.

C. We have already had occasion to mention the biased nature of the passions. They tend to be strengthened by close relations in such a way as to be out of proportion to the 'real merit' of the object. The immediate effect of sympathy is by no means always such as to counteract this partiality. Relations (i.e. contiguity, causality and resemblance) are necessary in order that sympathy may work. We sympathise more easily with the sentiments of those who are closely related to us in space or time. In so far as sympathy with the good opinion of others strengthens our pride, the mere fact that the people who hold us in high regard are contemporaries and belong to the same community would facilitate the sympathy and thus increase the pride. The same can be said of causality. We tend to sympathise more easily with those who are related to us by blood, but blood relationship is an example Hume gives of a causal relation. The only relation which would explain our sympathy with any other human being is that of resemblance:

"Now, it is obvious that nature has preserved a great resemblance among all human creatures, and that we never remark any passion or principle in others, of which, in some degree or other, we may not find a parallel in

"ourselves. The case is the same with the fabric of the mind as with that of the body. However the parts may differ in shape or size, their structure and composition are in general the same. There is a very remarkable resemblance, which preserves itself among all their variety; and this resemblance must very much contribute to make us enter into the sentiments of others, and embrace them with facility and pleasure". (T.H.N. II, p.41; p.318)

But the closer the resemblance the easier and more complete is the sympathy for "where, beside the general resemblance of our natures, there is any peculiar similarity in our manners, or character, it facilitates the sympathy" (T.H.N. II, p.42; p.318). Approval and disapproval arise when we abstract from the special relations in which we stand to the person we approve or disapprove of. It is fairly obvious that sympathy does not have this effect as a matter of course. It is not in its very nature an unbiased principle though we must appeal to it when we are accounting for the origin of the habit we form of taking up an objective point of view.

It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the capacity for sympathy as such does not imply that a being possessed of this capacity possesses the sense of virtue and vice. We need only point out that the capacity for sympathy is shared by animals though they have no sense of virtue or vice. "It is evident that sympathy, or the communication of passions, takes place among animals, no less than among men" (T.H.N. II, p.112; p.398). It seems that some knowledge and understanding is necessary as well as sympathy in order to have the sense of virtue or vice. Talking of pride and humility in animals Hume says:

"The causes of these passions are likewise much



"the same in beasts as in us, making a just allowance for our superior knowledge and understanding. Thus animals have little or no sense of virtue or vice; they quickly lose sight of the relations of blood; and are incapable of that of right and property: for which reason the causes of their pride and humility must lie solely in the body, and can never be placed either in the mind or external objects" (T.H.N. II, p.49; p.326).

Since virtue for Hume is a quality of mind, it seems that the hesitation he appears to have in saying that animals have no sense of virtue or vice is unnecessary.

We have emphasised the way in which Hume thinks the passions are influenced by relations which would tend to make us feel more strongly about people closely related to us irrespective of merit. I have called this the biased nature of the passions and have pointed out that sympathy, since it is also facilitated by close relations would tend to increase rather than decrease this bias. We shall of course have to show how Hume thinks this bias is overcome, and examine the precise way in which we can justifiably talk of biased passions according to Hume's theory.

THE SENSE OF VIRTUE AND VICE

We can now turn our attention to the sense of virtue and vice and the function Hume allots to sympathy in accounting for the occurrence of approval and disapproval.

Before we can enter into a discussion of the origin of the sentiments of morality we must say a few words about their nature. It is important to distinguish the account given of the definition or analysis of approval and disapproval from the causal explanation of the emergence in human consciousness of these passions. Some commentators have failed to appreciate that Hume appeals to sympathy in accounting for the origin of the sentiments of morality, the conditions under which they arise, and does not define these sentiments in terms of 'sympathetic consciousness'. He never thinks that approval and disapproval are a species of sympathy. It would be much more plausible to suggest that he considers these sentiments - at least sometimes - as a species of the indirect passions. Approval and disapproval are at any rate passions and I hope to argue hereafter that the close relation Hume emphasises between the indirect passions and the moral sentiments may help to solve certain artificial problems in the interpretation of his moral theory.

I have already emphasised that Hume looks upon the passions

as simple impressions which are indefinable and unique although they may resemble one another. Something has already been said about the criticism that what resembles cannot be simple and there is no need for us to enter further into this controversy at this point. It is, therefore, sufficient to remind ourselves that Hume thought that resemblance between simple impressions was consistent with their simplicity. We need not be surprised, therefore, that Hume emphasises the unique nature of the sentiments of morality when specifically dealing with this topic in Chapter II, Book III of the Treatise.

The sentiments of morality are either pleasant or painful. When we are satisfied that "morality is more properly felt than judged of" (T.H.N III, p.178; p.470) it is not unreasonable to go on to ask "... of what nature are these impressions and after what manner do they operate upon us?" (T.H.N. III, p.178; p.470) and Hume appeals to our experience in support of the view that we "~~must pronounce~~ the impression arising from virtue to be agreeable, and that proceeding from vice to be uneasy" (T.H.N. III, p.178; p.470). We have now concluded "that the distinguishing impressions by which moral good or evil is known, are nothing but particular pains or pleasures" (T.H.N. III, p.179; p.471).

But we must be careful to remember that there are many pains and pleasures that are not of the peculiar nature which distinguishes the sentiments of approval and disapproval. "An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious; why? because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular

kind¹" (T.H.N. III, p.179; p.471). In the same paragraph Hume again stresses that here we are dealing with "a particular kind" of pleasure. "To have the sense of virtue is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character" (T.H.N. III, p.179; p.471). It must be strongly emphasised that Hume is here referring to the sentiments as impressions, as they appear in consciousness, though we can no doubt also differentiate this peculiar kind of pleasure from other pleasures in terms of the causes or attendant circumstances that arouse it.

For Hume goes on to say that perhaps people might object that since pleasure and pain determine approval and disapproval then any object that arouses pleasure could be thereby deemed vicious or virtuous. To this Hume gives an answer which is of the utmost importance:

"For first, it is evident that under the term pleasure, we comprehend sensations which are very different from each other, and which have only such a distant resemblance as is requisite to make them be expressed by the same abstract term". (T.H.N. III, pp.179-180; p.472)

The pleasure aroused by the contemplation of character is intrinsically different from the pleasure aroused by drinking good wine and the pleasure derived from listening to good music differs from both. But this is not all, for Hume goes on to say:

"Nor is every sentiment of pleasure or pain, which arises from characters and actions, of that peculiar² kind which makes us praise or condemn". (T.H.N. III, p.180; p.472)

1. My underlining.
2. My underlining.

I have quoted extensively from the text in order to show that it would be most unreasonable to suppose that Hume is merely guilty of a gross carelessness in insisting upon the peculiar character of the pleasure or pain which give rise to the moral sentiment. It is of course important to remember that approval is pleasant and disapproval painful, but it is equally important to bear in mind that they are simple impressions and consequently unanalysable, though we may describe those circumstances which occasion their occurrence and point out their similarity to other impressions.

In the chapter we are dealing with Hume goes on to point out "a still more important difference between our pains and pleasures" (T.H.N. III, p.180; p.473). The passage is difficult to interpret, but it refers to the close relation between the sense of virtue and vice and the indirect passions. We shall have occasion to stress this relation a good deal and may therefore be excused for quoting the passage in full:

"Pride and humility, love and hatred, are excited, when there is anything presented to us that both bears a relation to the object of the passion, and produces a separate sensation, related to the sensation of the passion. Now, virtue and vice are attended with these circumstances. They must necessarily be placed either in ourselves or others, and excite either pleasure or uneasiness; and therefore must give rise to one of these four passions, which clearly distinguishes them from inanimate objects, that often bear no relation to us; and this is, perhaps, the most considerable effect that virtue and vice have upon the human mind".
(T.H.N. III, pp.180-181; p.473)

We see here a reason why the sentiment aroused by virtue must be

pleasant and the sentiment aroused by vice unpleasant, for unless this were so Hume could not explain why virtue gives rise to pride and love and vice the contrary. The resemblance, which is necessary for the association of impressions to work, would otherwise be missing.

But perhaps the close relation between the moral sense and the indirect passions has not yet been fully appreciated. Again we must emphasise that Hume's statement here is no momentary aberration. The same point is repeated at the beginning of Book III, Part III, even more forcefully:

"We have already observed, that moral distinctions depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure, and that whatever mental quality in ourselves or others gives us a satisfaction, by the survey or reflection, is of course virtuous; as everything of this nature that gives uneasiness is vicious. Now since every quality in ourselves or others which gives pleasure, always causes pride or love, as everyone that produces uneasiness excites humility or hatred, it follows that these two particulars are to be considered as equivalent, with regard to our mental qualities, virtue and the power of producing love or pride, vice and the power of producing humility or hatred. In every case, therefore, we must judge the one by the other, and may pronounce any quality of the mind virtuous which causes love or pride, and any one vicious which causes hatred and humility." (T.H.N. III, pp.271-2; pp.574-575)

A little later we are told that "Actions themselves, not producing from any constant principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or humility; and consequently are never considered in morality" (T.H.N. III, p.272; p.575). Here again it is stressed that the causes of the indirect passions

and sentiments of morality or pleasure and pain of the peculiar kind which makes us praise and blame are the same. Perhaps the connection between the account of the origin of the indirect passions is more important for the understanding of Hume's moral theory than some commentators have maintained.

If Hume's account of the indirect passions has as little bearing upon his moral philosophy as Professor Kemp Smith appears to think, it seems strange that he should take such pains to emphasise in Book III of the Treatise the identity of causes of the indirect passions with virtue and vice, so much as to give as the reason why certain qualities are not taken account of in morality, that they fail to arouse the indirect passions. We can only make sense of Hume's statements in this connection if there is a strict parallelism between the principles accounting for the origin of the indirect passions and those accounting for the origin of approval and disapproval of persons. If we can show that this is the case by a direct appeal to Hume's own pronouncements we shall cease to think of his preoccupation with the indirect passions in Book II as a useless game instigated by his fondness for the principles of association but of no importance for his moral theory.

But is there any justification for thinking that the indirect passions are necessary in accounting for morality? The answer to this question is put beyond doubt if we pay attention to the following passage:

"The pain or pleasure which arises from the general survey or view of any action or

"quality of the mind¹, constitutes its vice or virtue, and gives rise to our approbation or blame, which is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred". (T.H.N. III, pp.306-307; p.214)

This passage, occurring towards the end of Book III furnishes us with a key to the understanding of Hume's moral theory when its implications are rightly understood.

The first observation that springs to mind at this point is that approval and disapproval (approbation and blame) are indirect passions, but before we come to investigate the implications of this view we must say a few words about the apparent identification of approval and disapproval with love and hatred. It might be felt that this supports the contention that Hume is a reductionist, also concerned to show that apparently different passions are really the same. This might seem to throw some doubt upon my view that each passion is a simple impression and consequently unanalysable and indefinable on that account.

This objection is, however, based on a mistake. We may here remind ourselves of the emphasis Hume puts upon the great variety of those feelings we include in the concept 'pleasure'. Pleasures are very varied and only related by resemblance to a sufficient extent to justify the use of the same abstract term. This in no way indicates that these feelings are not simple impressions the full, intrinsic nature of which is immediately revealed to an individual's consciousness. In a similar way Hume emphasises that an indirect passion, such as love,

1. My underlining.

"may show itself in the shape of tenderness, friendship, intimacy, esteem, good will, and in many other appearances; which at the bottom are the same affections, and arise from the same causes, though with small variation, which it is not necessary to give any particular account of. It is for this reason I have all along confined myself to the principal passion". (T.H.N. II, p.156; p.448)

Hume realises that it may be misleading to suggest that there are only four indirect passions. This number is dictated by the kinds of association which could give rise to such passions. Still some differences in the causes may be noticed though the associative principles are the same. Thus 'love' may be made to cover all those passions produced according to one general scheme of association and we may thus say that though there is variety among these passions they are at bottom the same. They are also related by resemblance to the feeling; their feeling is similar, though not identical. The minor differences in the causes may lead to a difference in the sentiment.

"It is easy to imagine how a different situation of the object, or a different turn of thought, may change even the sensation of a passion; and this may in general account for all the particular subdivisions of the other affections, as well as of fear". (T.H.N. II, p.156; p.448)

Thus it is perfectly in conformity with Hume's view here that the pleasure that is aroused by the contemplation of character from an 'objective' point of view may arouse in us a special kind of pleasure or pain which also make the resultant love or hatred, approval or disapproval different to the feeling.

We are now in a position to see why Hume should have

adhered to the strange doctrine that approval is always pleasant and disapproval unpleasant. The indirect passions operated through a double association and the association of impressions involved always referred to a similarity in pleasantness in the one case and unpleasantness in the other. It would have been impossible to make this scheme work unless the pairs of opposite passions involved pain and pleasure respectively. In so far as approval and disapproval are treated as a species of indirect passions they must consequently be opposites in precisely this hedonic sense.

It seems that Hume's fondness for his associationist scheme clouds his view of the facts. We know perfectly well that some people dote on disapprovals. When ladies, or members of staff of a university for that matter, meet for a cup of tea the time is thought to be most pleasantly passed in malicious gossip, dwelling on the less fortunate characteristics of colleagues and acquaintances. We can furthermore hardly say that approval is always pleasant. Is it not often painful when we find ourselves forced to approve grudgingly of the deeds and character of a person we intensely dislike? When Hume emphasises how difficult it is for us to allow justice to prevail in our estimate of enemies he ought to have become more suspicious about the influence of the similarity in hedonic quality in the origination of the indirect passions, approval and disapproval.

Even when we confine our view to love and hatred, pride and humility, it is not obvious that these passions are necessarily pairs of opposites as regards hedonic tone. What is more

painful than the love of an undeserving person or unrequited love? It is only when we think of a man as 'glowing with pride' that pride is necessarily pleasant. When 'pride' is used as a description of a character trait little is implied about the pleasantness or unpleasantness of the proud man's life. One can of course answer that Hume is not concerned with the latter sense of the term, but his account would undoubtedly have been more interesting if he had been less obsessed with the notion that terms such as pride and love could be treated as names of simple impressions. It also makes it difficult to understand how these passions thus understood can have an object. But at the same time as he thinks of them as simple impressions he treats them as forms of valuing and as such they must have an object, for to value must be to value something.

Approval and disapproval cannot be defined any more than the other indirect passions. We can only point out those circumstances from which they arise. Hume does not bother to do this with all the different species of indirect passions, deeming it "not necessary to give any particular account of them". But approval and disapproval are of such central importance in accounting for the nature of evaluation that a special examination of these passions is necessary. It is only when we take up an 'objective' point of view that they are aroused, even though we sometimes mistake the love and hatred aroused, because of a close relation of their object to ourselves, for the 'calmer' variety.

Some evidence has already been drawn from the Treatise in order to show that Hume thought there was a close analogy between

those approvals and disapprovals that make us call a person virtuous or vicious and the indirect passions of love and hatred. Sympathy may be appealed to in accounting for the origin of both, but Hume must somehow characterise those approvals and disapprovals properly described as evaluations of character in order to distinguish them from love and hatred in the ordinary sense of these terms.

We are told that approval and disapproval are love and hatred "which arise from mental qualities" and a warning is given that the enquiry will take us "pretty deep" and that we shall have to compare some principles which have been already examined and explained. We must appeal to these principles in order to discover "the true origin of morals". The discovery of the "origin of morals" is the main topic of the third book of the Treatise. It is therefore reasonable to presume that a discussion specially concerned with this topic is of central importance in understanding the principles in terms of which the origin and nature of morals are to be explained.

Hume begins by emphasising that sympathy is a principle which can be seen to operate universally in human nature. It is described as essentially a principle of communication of passions between human beings.

"As in strings equally wound up, the motion of one communicates itself to the rest, so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, and beget correspondent movements in every human creature". (T.H.N. III, p.272; p.576)

There is a sense in which it would seem logically impossible for us to have another's experience. But it is, Hume thinks, equally

impossible for us to observe directly another's experience. When I observe someone in pain I do not observe his pain. Behavioural signs are the only data we have for inferring what the nature of another's experience is. In Hume's view the signs lead us first of all to have an idea of the experience of another. It would seem, though this is not clear, that this idea must be vivid enough to constitute belief, for unless I believe that someone is in pain I am unlikely to be much affected. It is only if I believe in the reality of the pain that I treat the behavioural signs as its effects. This idea or belief is then enlivened into a real impression through the influence of the impression of the self. If I thought a person was merely pretending to be in pain my sympathy would certainly not be aroused. I might be made angry or scornful, but there certainly would be no feeling communicated. It must, however, be noted that in watching drama one is often profoundly affected by watching the actors portray emotions. It is not clear to me that there is any sense in which one must be said to believe the pleasures and the pains of the actors real. This raises a large issue which cannot be discussed here.

But it is the cause of what I sympathise with that I approve or disapprove of. The feeling sympathised with and the object of the passion are different and this is important when we come to consider the view that Hume thinks of approval and disapproval as a species of "sympathetic consciousness".

Talking of the causes that lead us to call objects beautiful or ugly, he emphasises that it is to a considerable extent the

tendency of objects to produce pleasures and pains that determines the aesthetic valuing of them. It is sympathy with the effects that leads to the valuing of the cause. The principles involved are the same in moral evaluation. This is perhaps most conspicuously true of our approval of the artificial virtues since they derive all their value from utility. The sympathy, however, in no way constitutes the evaluation, but "... produces our sentiment of morals" (T.H.N. III, p.274; p.577). Since we find that sympathy with the effects of justice upon happiness or misery is the sole productive agency in giving rise to our approval of justice and other artificial virtues, we may presume it to have some effect in the case of the other virtues. We find, indeed, that a great number of the natural virtues have a tendency to increase the happiness of society. This tendency would have no effect on our passions if it were not for the influence of sympathy. The difference between the natural and the artificial virtues lies in this, that the pleasures with which we may come to sympathise arise immediately from each individual act in the case of a natural virtue. The artificial virtues on the other hand only have pleasant results when a conventional system of behaviour is presupposed, and given the system we may find that an action considered without its relation to it may have no beneficial consequences at all.

But it soon appears that sympathy is not sufficient to account for the origin of morality, though it is indeed a necessary condition without which our sentiment of morals would be incomprehensible. Sympathy, as we have already insisted,

may be a universal principle in human nature, but varies with the closeness of relations. "We sympathise more with persons contiguous to us, than with persons remote from us, with our acquaintance than with strangers; with our countrymen than with foreigners" (T.H.N. III, p.277; p.581). As a result of this our love or hatred is strengthened or weakened according to the closeness of the relations. In fact I find that my love is much more lively and intense when the qualities arousing it belong to someone closely related to me than in the case of a person living in a distant time or age. The difficult point is that this variation in our passions is to a considerable extent accentuated by sympathy. Since, however, the closeness of relations is deemed irrelevant in pronouncing about the virtuous or vicious nature of a character, how on earth can we claim that a principle which contributes to a biased view of qualities of character can be said to be the foundation of morality? It is Hume's answer to this question which determines the fundamental nature of his moral theory and the precise way in which sympathy operates in producing that approval and disapproval which account for the distinction we draw between vice and virtue.

"Judgments of value" appear to be objective in some important sense in which love and hatred are not. Objectivity consists in taking into account only those features of a situation which would be common to any spectator. Hume's answer to the rationalists consists in his attempt to establish that we can show how the taking up of this objective point of view, the point of view of an impartial spectator, can be accounted for in terms of quite well

known human motives which are operative throughout human life, in our understanding as well as in practical affairs. There is no need to appeal to a special intuitive faculty of reason to account for this. In fact the motive behind judging of actions in the way required can be seen to belong to our passions as much as any other motive. "Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions." The 'ought' here is perhaps rhetorical, but the 'is' must be taken perfectly seriously.

To judge objectively of situations is an acquired habit. Let us now see how it is acquired. We find that our situation in regard to objects varies from time to time and our moods may also change the effect the same object has upon us at different times. We soon learn that changes in our situation change the appearances of things. An object looks small at a distance, but appears to become larger as I approach nearer to it. It is fairly obvious that if we tried to base our actions upon the momentary appearances of things we should be much more often thwarted in seeking the satisfaction of our needs and wants. A golfer deciding upon a club to play his shot to the pin will take a stronger club when he realises there is a dip in the fairway between his position and the flag, a dip he does not see. I may have had a drink of stagnant water when plagued with extreme thirst. Yet I might not be inclined to claim that such water was delicious because I realise that the unusual condition of my extreme thirst may have had something to do with the way the water tasted to me at the time.

The facts are familiar. The appearances of objects vary

according to our situation in regard to them and our own condition. Some changes in appearances seem to be most naturally explained by attributing the variation to a change in us or in our position. Differences in the apparent colours of objects come to be attributed to changes in the light or to a change in my sense organs as in jaundice. Thus with wide experience I come to distinguish in general between changes due to a change of qualities in the object and those changes due to my special situation or condition which is perhaps not shared by others. The motive for judging of things from a special point of view, distinguishing the subjective appearance from the objective reality, is simply convenience.

The argument gains added force when we consider the advantages of language, the value of which depends largely upon the ease with which it allows us to communicate with our fellow men. In order that communication may be achieved a general rule of usage must be observed by people talking the language. It must be objective in the sense that the various people talking the language must apply the rule more or less in the same way. What then more convenient than to abstract from all the most variable conditions that govern appearances? We then fix on some more or less definite standard or general rule. An object is red if it appears so to any spectator, given normal conditions of light and a normal state of a man's sense-organs. In judging of size we have standards of comparison that may be applied by those using the language. There is no suggestion that anyone has invented the standard

for the use of words. As in the case of the artificial virtues, experience teaches us the advantages of language and a tacit agreement to abide by the rules of language grows up. It is indeed natural to say that on Hume's view a correct use of language is one among the artificial virtues.

The case is precisely parallel in 'moral judgments'. We come to form the habit of looking upon a situation in which a certain character finds himself in such a way as to take into consideration only those characteristics which are independent of the special situation in which any one spectator may find himself with regard to it. The acquisition of this habit is convenient, for it eliminates the friction which arises in our arguments about the value of qualities of character which are due to our talking at cross purposes about them. It does not necessarily eliminate all disagreement about the value of objects, though as a matter of fact the habit of objective judgment will tend to decrease friction due to disagreement about value, because we are all more or less alike in being affected by the pleasure or pain of others through sympathy, though in somewhat unequal degrees. But although in many cases where our habit of objectively judging of a character may not determine our love or hatred it may still have an effect in modifying conduct, for the objective view will make us realise the causes of the strong love or hatred we bear to a person, and the objective view will raise in us a calm passion which is a species of love or hatred, that species which we call approval or disapproval. This may at least serve to regulate our language

and may to a certain extent counteract our biased passions in determining our will if a settled disposition points in the same direction as the calm passion and counteracts the violent passion in this particular case. In other cases the objective point of view may only suffice to direct our use of language, may make us pronounce a person vicious or virtuous even though we may still be determined to act by a violent passion which is inconsistent with this.

Thus Hume's theory is to have the merit of both explaining how we come to form 'objective moral judgments' or, indeed, judgments of value generally, while at the same time accounting for the fact that our actions very often go against our judgments. In some cases this happens even though we have looked at the situation objectively. We may not be able to control our bias in favour of our children or friends even though we know others to be more deserving.

Now there is also another case where we may be quite sincere in pronouncing a person vicious or virtuous where our moral valuation is still biased. This need not be due to the fact that we did not try to be impartial. We may have tried this, but due to the similarity between that love and that hatred which arises from objective reflection and the biased variety we may mistake the one for the other. We may think we really approve or disapprove when in fact we only dislike intensely or like, love or hate. Hume quite often mentions how we may mistake one passion for another which is similar, though at the same time a passion is a simple impression and thus revealed in consciousness

just as it is. The mistake in a case like this only consists in the association of the wrong verbal expression with the impression you have. Approval and disapproval can only be distinguished from other kinds of love and hatred by describing the circumstances in which it arises, and in this case it would seem that the special circumstance is that it arises from objective reflection or consideration of the case in question. That it is still a species of the class of passions we call generally love or hatred makes it possible for the one to be mistaken for the other. One can hardly doubt the psychological fact that we may in many cases genuinely think our feelings towards a man are righteous indignation when in fact we detest him for different reasons. I think it would be misleading in all such cases to say the man knows his feelings but only does not know how to describe them.

Hume is not out to deny that there is something special about approval and disapproval considered as an experience. Quite the contrary; for as we have seen he seems to insist upon this. At the risk of being charged with repetition, I should like to quote a passage towards the end of the chapter on the Natural Virtues:

"Now in judging of characters, the only interest or pleasure which appears the same to every spectator, is that of the person himself whose character is examined, or that of persons who have a connection with him. And, though such interests or pleasures touch us more faintly than our own, yet, being more constant and universal, they counterbalance the latter even in practise, and are alone admitted in speculation as the standard of virtue and morality. They alone produce that

"particular feeling or sentiment on which moral distinctions depend. As the good or ill deserts of virtue or vice, it is an evident consequence of the sentiments of pleasure or uneasiness. These sentiments produce love or hatred; and love or hatred by the original constitution of human passion, is attended with benevolence or anger; that is with a desire of making happy the person we love, and miserable the person we hate. We have treated of this more fully on another occasion". (T.H.N. III, p.286; p.591)

The other occasion referred to is of course the discussion of the passions in Book II, particularly the discussion of love and hatred and their connection with benevolence or anger. This is by no means a unique passage in its emphasis upon the importance of the discussion of the passions in Book II for Hume's moral theory.

One further point must be emphasised. When Hume refers to "extensive sympathy" and says that the sentiments of virtue depend upon it he is not referring to any form of benevolence or desire for the happiness of another. He is simply referring to "the principle of communication" we have mentioned so often and it is extensive, extends to all human beings, in that it operates by resemblance, which is the one relation which has any force at all when we take up an objective point of view. It operates in virtue of the fact that all human beings resemble one another, though the relation of causality (such as family relations) or that of contiguity in space or time are absent. Hume can still hold with absolute consistency that there is no such passion as "love or humanity merely as such" or desire for the happiness of every other human being. He is not making an appeal to altruism as an essential feature

in human nature, if by this we mean a desire for the happiness of human kind irrespective of their relation to us and their personal qualities. Extensive sympathy may serve to determine our approvals or disapprovals without determining our actions.

"Sentiments must touch the heart to make them control our passions: but they need not extend beyond the imagination to make them influence our tastes". (T.H.N. III, p.282; p.586)

Hume makes no sweeping assumptions as to the essentially egoistic or altruistic nature of man. He nowhere commits himself to more than to say that the benevolent tendencies in man generally outweigh the egoistic. But when he says this he is not intimating any altruism in human nature. Many of the benevolent tendencies would be of essentially limited scope and would involve on the whole a bias in favour of those closely related to us. If we think of an altruist as a person who devotes himself to the increase of happiness of human beings as such other than himself, Hume would consider such a saintly being highly exceptional.

Hume always emphasises the view that in so far as objects are valued for their utility it is not the actual consequences but their "seeming tendencies" that determine the mind to approve or disapprove. The reason for this is that in taking up an objective point of view we approve or disapprove of the object because of its causal properties and distinguish this from certain accidental circumstances which may prevent the effect from occurring on special occasions. This goes for all evaluation of the useful and not only that

peculiar evaluation we call moral. It is a misunderstanding of Hume's view to suggest that he holds that 'moral evaluation' is distinguished from other forms of valuation in being objective. Aesthetic valuation of inanimate objects is objective in exactly the same way. In distinguishing objective valuation from our subjective attitude Hume in fact takes as an example aesthetic 'judgment'.

It is perhaps worth while to point out that we must distinguish between approval of an object, such as a work of art and the approval of the artist as the originating cause of the work. It is possible that this may help us to see that what we call approval may sometimes refer to a direct and sometimes to an indirect passion. In so far as it has as its object a man as the source of pleasant effects it is a special kind of love, an indirect passion. If the object were oneself, it would be a species of pride. In so far as we approve or disapprove of the results, the painful and the pleasant, the passions arise immediately from pleasure or pain communicated by sympathy and are consequently direct ones.

Let us now turn our attention to a "remarkable circumstance" which is of the utmost importance for understanding the way in which sympathy helps to arouse the sentiments of morals.

In describing the way sympathy operates we talked as if the thought of somebody's pain or pleasure comes through sympathy to be enlivened in such a way as to pain or please us. It would thus seem that we can only sympathise with actual pains and pleasures, or at least pains and pleasures believed

to be actual. If therefore it is sympathy with the effects of qualities of mind that lead us to approve or disapprove it would seem that our approvals and disapprovals must be determined by the actual consequences of actions or at least by those consequences believed to be actual.

But virtue for Hume is a quality of mind or character. Surely this can remain unaltered even though circumstances prevent the beneficial effects this quality would normally have?

"Virtue in rags is still virtue; and the love it procures attends a man into a dungeon or desert, where the virtue can no longer be exerted in action, and is lost to all the world." (T.H.N. III, p.280; p.584)

Hume agrees that this appears *prima facie* an objection to his system for it appears to be the case that

"if sympathy were the source of our esteem for virtue, that sentiment of approbation could only take place where the virtue actually attained its end, and was beneficial to mankind". (T.H.N. III, p.280; p.584)

But we approve of a dwelling house that is well adapted to its purpose and value a fertile soil and a good climate even though the soil is uncultivated and the climate belongs to a desert island. We approve of the generosity of a pauper and the courage of an imprisoned hero. This is so because we judge of the character by reflection upon the beneficial effects these qualities would have if the normal effects of these qualities were not hindered. "It is sufficient if everything be complete in the object itself." (T.H.N. III, p.280; p.584)

In accounting for this Hume has to have recourse to the

imagination.

"The imagination has a set of passions belonging to it, upon which our sentiments of beauty much depend. These passions are moved by degrees of liveliness and strength, which are inferior to belief, and independent of the real existence of their objects."
(T.H.N. III, p.280; p.585)

It is thus the fittingness of the object to have beneficial effects that determines our evaluation of it. We are, that is to say, determined in our evaluation by the kind of effects the quality in question would have as a general rule and not by the actual effects of the characteristic in the particular case under consideration. It is instructive to see that Hume here talks of the ideas that move the passions as inferior to belief in strength and liveliness. He talks as if no belief is involved in our actual evaluations according to general rules. This is clearly not the case and Hume's statement depends upon a somewhat narrow conception of belief.

What I believe when my approval is determined by a general rule is that certain beneficial effects would follow if certain specifiable conditions were absent, such as a man's imprisonment or his poverty. It clearly has nothing to do with whether we think the beneficial effects will probably in fact occur for our approval is not determined by whether we think the man will be released from prison or meet with financial success. This important point is not clearly made by Hume and is in fact obscured by his talk of the imagination here as 'inferior' to belief in liveliness, that we are here only dealing with a "species of probability" as opposed to belief. The fact is that the belief in the hypothetical

proposition involved here is not just a weaker form of conviction as to the likely occurrence of something. Perhaps Hume wants to convey this by saying that the ideas of the imagination which affect our passions are in this case "independent of the real existence of their objects". Yet his talk in terms of determination by ideas of the imagination "inferior to belief" certainly is ill adapted to bringing out the point that the difference lies in being determined by a belief in a different proposition. If we believed that the absence of the restricting conditions would not tend to make the man behave in a way which would have beneficial effects we should no longer approve of him. If the imprisonment for example kills the hero's spirit we might pity him, but he would now no longer be a courageous man in our eyes.

But Hume is clearly right in emphasising that in judging of a man as virtuous or vicious we are talking about his disposition and abstract from the accidental circumstances that may hinder the deeds. We might count as equally generous the man who as a pauper can only give a cigarette to a friend and the wealthy man who gives millions to charities. It is perfectly true that Hume writes at some length about our esteem for the rich and the powerful. He certainly thinks the rich are valued more highly because of their riches. Yet I doubt if even Hume, who extends the notion of virtue more than most writers, would count 'being rich' a moral characteristic. It is, after all, not a 'quality of mind'.

It should now be clear that in so far as sympathy operates in accounting for approval and disapproval it is misleadingly described as a principle of communication, for we are affected by sympathy in cases where the pain or pleasure sympathised with is not actual.

"When I run over a book with my eye, I imagine I hear it all; and also, by the force of the imagination, enter into the uneasiness which the delivery of it would give the speaker¹. The uneasiness is not real." (T.H.N. III, p.281; pp.585-586)

We are, however, pained by the reading of the book because of the tendency the expressions used have to cause pain and consequently talk of the style as "harsh and disagreeable". These terms express disapproval and are a condemnation of the style and not just an expression of personal preference, for I am being determined in my evaluation by the effect the book would have as a general rule.

Sympathy we see to be involved in these evaluations but it is clear we cannot identify this principle with "limited generosity" or benevolence. These latter are motives in man that need not determine our actions even though sympathy has made us approve or disapprove of a particular object. It is clear that benevolence and sympathy cannot be identified when we consider the following passage:

"My sympathy with another may give me the sentiment of pain and disapprobation, when any object is presented that has a tendency to give him uneasiness; though I may not be willing to sacrifice anything of my own interest, or cross any of my passions, for his satisfaction. A house may displease me by being ill contrived for the convenience

1. My underlining.

"of the owner; and yet I may refuse to give a shilling towards the rebuilding of it. Sentiments must touch the heart to make them control our passions: but they need not extend beyond the imagination, to make them influence our taste." (T.H.N. III, pp.281-282; p.586)

This quotation may also serve to show why I think Mrs. Warnock more than a little misleading when she says:

"One of the differences between attitudes and even the calm passions seems to me to be that we do not necessarily act as a result of adopting some attitude". (P.A.S. (S.V.) p.48)

She goes on to emphasise that Hume thinks of the passions as motives. This is odd in view of the fact that none of the four indirect passions, pride, humility, love, hatred, is for Hume a motive.

The distinction drawn between taste and passions in this quotation may be thought to go against my view that approval and disapproval are passions. But one can hardly think this objection serious when one remembers that Hume has a little earlier, in talking about approval and disapproval, made reference to "a set of passions" belonging to the imagination. We may also remind ourselves that love and hatred are not motives as such. We may love someone as we may approve of him without giving any thought to his happiness. These passions are different from the desire for the happiness of another. This also makes it clear that Hume could not give an analysis of approval and disapproval in terms of a disposition to act in a particular way. The point is in some ways important for its bearing upon the problem of testing sincerity.

If a man disapproves of the racial policies of the South African government one has a certain uneasiness about the view that he cannot really disapprove unless he is willing to do something to ameliorate the lot of the negroes. Would this be conclusive evidence that the man was insincere? One may hesitate to accept this view because a man may through weakness of will fail to live up to his standards of value. The problem is complicated by the fact that we recognise both that a man may deceive himself as to what he values and that he may act against his 'better judgment'.

It thus seems we have deliberate deceit, self-deception and weakness of will. Our own way of defeating the presence of the first is the inconsistency between a man's avowed evaluations and his actual behaviour. If a man has a great deal to gain by evaluating in one way and behaving in another and tries to hide the inconsistency one would tend to suspect deliberate deceit. Yet in some such cases it is possible the man may be deceiving himself. He may believe that there are good grounds for his apparently inconsistent behaviour. Yet one often suspects such rationalisation of behaviour indicates a limited self-deception only. The case is often very similar to the case of a weakness of will. Yet in the case of weakness of will one would look for some evidence that the man makes some efforts to live up to his ideals, his avowed evaluations.

To convict a man of insincerity is, we can see, difficult and one would tend to say that only a fairly consistent

behaviour incompatible with the avowed evaluation would be conclusive. We need, of course, less behavioural evidence when a man acts against his evaluations when he seems subject to no temptation to do so. If a man in what he believes to be a secret ballot were known to vote against a government on a specific issue one would, it seems, have fairly conclusive evidence that he does not approve of this piece of policy. This course presumes that the man does not suspect that his vote may come to be known and that he in other respects knows what he is doing.

I must not be taken to deny that a man's behaviour is generally a better guide to what he values than his verbal pronouncements. This would be absurd for the simple reason that a man is not always the best judge himself as to how strongly he approves or disapproves. He cannot decide this by a simple introspection. He may have to be put to the test. He may genuinely believe he would be willing to make considerable sacrifices for the sake of his convictions, (that) he feels so strongly about (it.) Yet we may know his character better than he himself does and realise his approval or disapproval is half-hearted, merely academic as one might say.

These considerations show, I think, the weakness of construing approval and disapproval as occurrent feelings whose nature and strength a man can determine by attending to his state of mind. It is not, of course, obvious that Hume is committed to this view. The strength of our approval might be determined by the tendency of the "calm passions" to determine conduct rather than the violence of the emotion

involved. I would, on the other hand, hesitate to say that a man disapproved strongly of any form of racial persecution if he never got emotionally roused by glaring cases of injustice and racial murders, however consistently he worked for improved racial relations. There are other possible motives for such behaviour.

We must, I think, admit that we know what it feels like to approve or disapprove strongly about something in one sense and yet when the question as to the strength of our feelings arises we may accept behaviour as a test of this. If this is admitted we see that neither analysis in purely behavioural terms nor the construction of approval simply as a feeling can be counted as wholly satisfactory. We may perhaps again think that Hume oversimplifies the issue to a certain extent by construing passions such as approval as simple impressions and thinking of the motives connected with these passions as contingently connected with them, for this would make it possible that genuine approval or disapproval may be consistent with any behaviour. But though the criteria based on behaviour may not always or only in perhaps a few cases decide the issue, the fact that sometimes they are taken to be decisive would throw doubt upon the adequacy of this analysis.

We have already stressed that in so far as we approve or disapprove of people these passions can be construed as a species of love and hatred. It is emphasised by Hume that the peculiarly moral sentiments only arise from contemplation of tendencies of character, your own special position being disregarded. The pleasures derived from the objective

contemplation may

"touch us more faintly than our own, yet being more constant and universal, they counterbalance the latter even in practise, and are alone admitted in speculation as the standard of virtue and morality. They alone produce that particular feeling or sentiment on which moral distinctions depend." (T.H.N. III, p.286; p.591)

In this passage Hume is emphasising that we only have genuine cases of approval and disapproval when our feeling or sentiment arises from our adopting an objective point of view. Such approvals and disapprovals commonly involve less emotional tensity than love and hatred based on close connections with the agent. Yet the former may be stronger as motives. This is one of the facts that lead him to talk a great deal about calm passions. It is important to distinguish calmness from lack in motivating power. The concept of calmness in passions will be considered hereafter.

But when Hume considers the notion of desert we again meet with the close relation he considers to exist between approval and disapproval or persons and love and hatred as these passions were discussed in Book II. The pleasure or uneasiness that the contemplation of tendencies of actions produce lead us to love or hate (approve of or disapprove of) the agent. These passions are by nature attached to benevolence or anger and this is why we think virtue deserves happiness and vice deserves to be punished.

We may not be satisfied with this account of desert for we may think a crime deserves punishment, a man deserves

reward without desiring ourselves to reward or punish. There is a clear difference between thinking that a man deserves to be made happy and wanting to make him happy.

It is clear that Hume has in mind his discussion of the passions in writing the chapter containing the arguments we have been considering. We have seen how he tries to give account of desert by appealing to the natural connection between love and hatred on the one hand, benevolence and anger on the other. He does indeed conclude the short paragraph devoted to this topic and end the chapter by the observation "We have treated of this more fully on another occasion". (T.H.N. III, p.286; p.591)

THE CALM PASSIONS

Only a brief reference has so far been made to calm passions. Although it is no doubt true that the concept of calmness as applied to passions is of considerable importance in the Treatise I believe the point of the distinction between calm and violent passions has often been missed by commentators.

We have already drawn attention to the classification of passions contained in the first chapter of the Second Book of the Treatise. Let us now consider in more detail the distinction drawn between calm and violent passions which Hume states as follows:

"The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz. the calm and the violent. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. This division is far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly called passions, may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become in a manner imperceptible. But as, in general, the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity, these impressions have been commonly distinguished from each other. The subject of the human mind being so copious and various, I shall here take advantage of this vulgar and specious division, that I may proceed with the

"greater order; and having said all I thought necessary concerning our ideas, I shall now explain those violent emotions or passions, their nature, origin, causes and effects." (T.H.N. II, p.4; p.276)

The first two points I want to make about this can perhaps be called guesswork, but I hope not unreasonable guesswork. (1) The quotation we are discussing occurs in an introductory chapter where a short statement of key concepts is given. Such chapters are likely to be written after the bulk of the book has been completed, or at least carefully revised in the light of the main arguments in the book. If this is a reasonable contention one can, I think, assume that the main distinguishing characteristic of a calm passion is correctly stated here. (2) In a summary, a list of the members of a class may be taken as a means of illustrating a distinction. If there is in the rest of the book a longer list, we may therefore assume that the longer list is to be taken as a fuller, more complete account of the author's meaning. This point is important because Hume gives a longer list in another place and makes in fact a distinction between two kinds of calm passions.

As regards the quotation itself, we might want to make the following observations:

(1) The 'fundamentum divisionis' seems to be emotional intensity, the "disturbance in the soul" as Hume sometimes puts it. The term is used to describe the conscious state involved. It is analogous to the concept of "force and vivacity" in impressions and certain ideas.

(2) The division is not exact in this sense, that a passion classified as calm can upon occasion be violent. Witness the reference to the rapture of poetry and music. A calm passion is thus a passion which on most occasions involves low emotional intensity in the sense explained. Hume, indeed, emphasises the distinction between the violence and strength of a passion, calmness and weakness. Thus in criticising Hutcheson's *Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiaria* he writes to the author in November 1742:

"These Instincts you mention seem not always to be violent and impetuous, more than Self-love or Benevolence. There is a calm Ambition, a calm Anger or Hatred, which though calm may likewise be very strong and have the absolute command over the Mind." (L.H.Greig, p.19)

(3) Hume calls the distinction vulgar and specious and indicates that he uses it as a methodological device merely. The distinction can, indeed, be called 'vulgar and specious' in the sense that there is nothing very sophisticated about it as stated here and a similar distinction might well occur to common sense. I think Hume probably also wants to emphasise the fact that this is a rough and ready distinction since any passion may become violent and the calm ones are those which are so on most occasions. The distinction as such appears not of any very great importance. We know well from experience the difference between calmly enjoying something and being completely carried away, becoming animated, excited, possessed by a passion.

(4) The calm passions enumerated here seem to be evaluations and according to the interpretation given by Kemp Smith they inevitably are such. He says:

"... they can be identified as being the passions which we experience on the mere contemplation of beauty and deformity in action and may accordingly be further described as being modes of approval and disapproval¹". (P.O.H., p.167)

In a schematic representation of the division of passions he describes them "as proceeding from the contemplation of actions and external objects, viz. the moral and aesthetic sentiments".

Kemp Smith's characterisation of the calm passions as modes of approval and disapproval seems to gain added support from Hume's statements in T.III, Part III, Section 1. Our sentiments of praise and blame are as we have seen naturally biased as we take a much livelier interest in anything close at hand than far removed in space or time. We have also seen how experience teaches us that it is convenient to judge all objects from a common point of view, abstracting from the different locations in space and time and our personal interest. In this connection he says:

"Here we are contented with saying, that reason requires such an impartial conduct, but that it is seldom we can bring ourselves to it, and that our passions do not readily follow the determination of our judgment. This language will be easily understood, if we consider what we formerly said concerning that reason which is able to oppose our passions, founded on some distant view or reflection". (T.H.N. III, p.279; p.583)

The 'reason' referred to here is of course a certain calm passion and Hume is referring back to the chapter "Of the Influencing Motives of the Will" in Book II. It seems to be the case that Hume is indicating that approval or disapproval, the calm passion which arises from a distant view and

1. My underlining.

reflection, can lead to action and that this has lead the rationalists to think there can be a conflict between reason and passion. It is to be noticed, however, that the "sense of beauty and deformity in action" can be violent and in those cases when these passions, which are usually calm, are violent they certainly do not arise from a distant view and reflection. The reference to the raptures of poetry and music shows this clearly. Hume stresses here also that our approvals and disapprovals do not have as much influence upon our actions as might be supposed and this would explain that our value judgments have on the whole more consistency and uniformity than our actual actions.

Kemp Smith's characterisation is, however, vague on one important point. Is he making the same distinction as Hume makes in the opening chapter of Book II? In that case experiencing the raptures of music and poetry would be a calm passion. Is he saying that the calm passions are those only which are objective modes of approval and disapproval, arising from a distant view and reflection? In that case the calm passions are those only which we express by an objective judgment when for example we say "this is a good piece of music" where this passion would arise from a consideration of the piece in question, abstracting from our own personal point of view. (I might for example find I was biased in thinking the piece in question enjoyable by the fact that the composer happened to be my son.) It seems this latter is his view.

In so far as this is his view it is partial and perhaps

misleading as I shall try to show, for in the enumeration Hume gives of the members of the class of calm passions in the chapter on the Influencing Motives of the Will, he includes members in this class which cannot be taken to be forms of approval and disapproval at all. People often fail to notice this. Thus Mrs. Mary Warnock in a paper to the joint session of the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society makes the following statement:

"In general it (a calm passion) is a feeling inspired by the rational and detached consideration of some object, a feeling either pleasant or painful. An early example and indeed the only example that Hume gives is¹ "the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition and external objects"."
(P.A.S. (S.V.) 1957, p.44)

The following quotation from Hume is meant to show her mistake:

"Now it is certain that there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, though they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation. These desires are of two kinds; either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, considered merely as such."
(T.H.N. II, p.129; p.417)

It seems fairly clear that the fundamentum divisionis is still the same as the one we started off with. The calm passions are those which on the whole involve low emotional

1. My underlining.

intensity and this factor is decisive. It seems at least obvious that when we are motivated by a calm benevolence to children this need not be a passion arising from a distant view or reflection and is therefore not to be equated with approval or disapproval thus understood.

Kemp Smith notices the extension of the class of calm passions, but in classifying the passions schematically he puts these instinctive passions which do not arise from a previous experience of pleasure and pain into a separate class, which he calls primary passions. The secondary passions are then divided into direct and indirect according to whether they arise directly from pleasure or pain or through a conjunction of other qualities with this. The calm passions are then taken as a subdivision of the direct secondary passions. My point is that this is misleading because the division of passions into calm and violent cuts across this classification since certain primary passions are here classified by Hume as calm. The calmness or violence of a passion though determined by causes is independent of the mechanism which brings it about, whether direct, indirect, primary or secondary, though the primary passions and some of the secondary direct passions can be classified as calm since they on the whole involve little emotional disturbance.

As regards the "general appetite to good and aversion to evil", the context seems to make it plain that 'good' and 'evil' are here taken to mean pleasure and pain, for Hume here points out how a violent passion may overcome a calm one by drawing

our attention to the fact that we often prefer a nearer lesser good to a greater distant good and are thus made to act against our own best interest. In this case, the conflict is not between an 'approval' and a passion, if approval is taken to be moral approval. It is not the moral sentiment which is involved here at all, but rather a conflict between what we conceive to be prudent with a particular passion. This is, I consider, a valid reason for considering Kemp Smith's classification misleading.

Hume is in this chapter concerned to show that the distinction between a calm and a violent passion is entirely different from the distinction between a weak and a strong passion. The latter is a distinction in terms of strength of motivating power whereas the former refers to the intensity of the emotion considered as a feeling. In this sense a violent passion may prove weaker than a calm passion considered as a motive. This shows up the situation which makes it initially plausible to think that reason may be in direct opposition to passions.

When Kemp Smith classifies volition as a violent passion we must bear in mind that on the occasion when a calm passion determines the will there does not seem to be any reason to believe that the volition is a violent passion. It must be taken to be violent in the sense that it is so on most occasions. Consider Hume's definition of volition as "the internal impression we feel or are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind". (T.H.N. II, p.113; p.399) This

impression seems to accompany all voluntary acts, however motivated and if we are to call it a passion at all it seems on a different level with the other passions in question here since it does not appear to be a motive, but appears whether our motive is a calm or a violent passion.

Though Kemp Smith has textual justification for classifying volition among the direct passions it may be doubted whether this is strictly correct. Hume enumerates as direct passions "desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear" along with volition. But when he introduces the description of volition already quoted he prefixes the description by saying that volition is not properly speaking a passion. It seems important to realise this when we are talking of the passions as motives.

A similar mistake seems to be made by MacNabb with regard to sympathy which he calls "another calm, regular and general passion". For Hume sympathy is a principle which accounts for the fact that we come to feel pleasant or painful emotions at the thought of such emotions in others. It is not a separate passion on a level with the other passions. In fairness to MacNabb it is only right to point out that he does not treat sympathy in this manner throughout his interpretation of Hume. But even though this may be a mere slip, it is an unfortunate one. It will later become clearer how unfortunate it is for there is a tendency to think Hume considered approval and disapproval "a species of sympathy" and since approval and disapproval are undoubtedly passions it seems we must consider sympathy a passion too if this interpretation is accepted.

Let us now confine our attention exclusively to the calm passions of the second type, i.e. "the general appetite to good and aversion to evil, considered merely as such". Hume makes repeated references to the fact that we sometimes have a conflict between a particular violent passion and what we consider to be (1) our true interest or (2) the nature of the object as a source of pleasure generally. The second principle sometimes prevails, especially when we have developed a firm unshakeable disposition. Strength of character indicates that we are not swayed over much by particular violent passions.

In this connection it is perhaps not inappropriate to point out that Hutcheson makes a distinction between calm desires and particular passions in his "An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections". Hutcheson says:

"There is a distinction made between calm desires of Good and aversion to evil, either selfish or public as they appear to our Reason or Reflection and the particular Passions towards Objects immediately presented to some sense."
(S.B., p.399)

The similarity between this statement and the use Hume makes of the notion of "calm passions" as motives is obvious, though Hume, as we have seen, wants to emphasise that even such passions as anger may often be calm, though it must be counted as a violent passion because on most occasions anger involves "emotional disturbance". In both Hume and Hutcheson there seems to be here a denial of the doctrine which is apparently implied in Locke's Essay, Book II, Chapter XX:

"The uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of anything whose present enjoyment carried the idea of delight with it, is what we call "desire", which is greater or less as that uneasiness is more or less vehement."

If 'greater or less' means 'stronger or weaker as a motive', this is the very point Hume and presumably Hutcheson are concerned to deny.

In Hutcheson's account of calm desires there is a reference to these desires as arising from a reflection upon (1) what is to the interest of the agent, (2) what is for the public interest. He does not, however, say that when a passion leads me to actions that are prudent or in the public interest then the passion involved is calm. This is, however, the view attributed to Hume by Kydd in her book "Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise". Her view can, I think, be shown to be mistaken and based on a wrong reading of certain passages in Hume.

The calm passions, she thinks, are of four kinds:

"(1) Desires which accord with the real qualities of their objects independently of a special consideration of these objects. (2) Desires which accord with these qualities as the result of the agent forming an adequate conception of them. (3) Desires which accord with the real qualities of the object as constitutive of or a means to happiness without the agent considering them as such. (4) Desires which accord with these qualities as constitutive of or a means to happiness as the result of the agent forming an adequate idea of them in this relation." (R. and C., p.149)

The criterion for deciding whether a desire is calm is here not taken to be emotional intensity but rather the consideration whether or not the desire is such that it would

have arisen from an adequate consideration of the object giving rise to it. If we consider the first type of calm passions such an interpretation leads to some paradoxical results. Let us imagine that X falls passionately in love with a certain woman and that his passionate desires lead him to propose marriage, although he has given no clear thought to whether or not she would be a suitable wife. It would be rash to deny that this sometimes occurs and one has reason to believe that some marriages contracted in this way may be perfectly satisfactory. The man might later on decide that he had, indeed, acted in his own best interest and this might be the general opinion. But does this in any way incline one to think that the passionate desire which caused X to make a proposal of marriage was really a calm passion? We do most certainly not decide whether a passion is calm or not by considering whether the behaviour it leads us to has fortunate consequences. Hume most certainly would not consider the sexually inspired love leading to this fortunate action a calm passion.

Love is on the whole considered a violent passion. An adequate conception of its object might have the result of increasing it, making it rise to a higher pitch. This fact does not entitle us to say that it is therefore calm on this occasion. Kydd's mistake is to think that a calm passion is always preferable to a violent one, that this is so by definition. She is right in thinking that violent emotional disturbance often leads to rash behaviour because it hinders us in apprehending the real nature of the object

arousing our passion. This point is, indeed, emphasised by Hume. What she fails to realise is that Hume thinks also that our passions may become too calm and this is brought out in the next section where Hume discusses the causes of the violent passions. Hume there says:

"There is not, in my opinion, any other natural cause why security diminishes the passions, than because it diminishes that uncertainty which increases them. The mind, when left to itself, immediately languishes, and, in order to preserve its ardour, must be every moment supported by a new flow of passion. For the same reason, despair, though contrary to security, has a like influence." (T.H.N. III, p.133; pp.421-422)

I think the suggestion here obviously is that it is desirable that the mind should "preserve its ardour".

In the cases where the passion based on a calm consideration of self-interest opposes a particular violent passion it is certainly a false interpretation to suggest that the passion is not really calm unless the man has formed an adequate idea of his own interest, unless in fact his judgment is correct. The motive would be a calm passion opposed to a violent one in each case. Though violent passions may hinder true judgments of objects we may be mistaken about the true nature of objects for other reasons. We might for example have been given wrong information of some sort. This important fact is overlooked by Kydd because she is misled by the fact that Hume seems to emphasise in this chapter the cases where a calm passion is dependent upon correct judgments because he is showing in what precise way there can be a conflict of motives such as to mislead people into thinking there is a real opposition between

reason and passion. Consider the following passage:

"Men often act knowingly against their interest; for which reason, the view of the greatest possible good does not always influence them. Men often counteract a violent passion in prosecution of their interests and designs; it is not, therefore, the present uneasiness alone which determines them." (T.H.N. II, p.129; p.418)

The expression "the view of the greatest possible good" may be read in two ways according to whether you emphasise the word 'view' or 'greatest possible good'. Kydd would emphasise the latter and thus consider the calm passion must be based upon an adequate idea. I should want to emphasise 'view'. Consider the conclusion drawn at the end from the premiss that men "counteract a violent passion in prosecution of their interests and designs". This is taken to show that the present uneasiness does not always determine the direction of our will. Hume would have made his points even though the designs in question might be based upon a false estimate of the object.

But, one might now feel inclined to ask, does Hume not say strength of mind indicates a prevalence of calm passions over the violent? Does he not further say this is a virtue and deplore that people give too easily in to "the solicitations of passion and desire"? This is easily explained by the obvious fact (1) that great emotional disturbance often hinders us in forming an unbiased view of the objects of our desire and (2) we often find that violent desires are due to a biased view of the object. This can be admitted without making it a

defining characteristic of a calm passion that it arises from adequate knowledge or is in harmony with adequate knowledge of the objects desired. Such an interpretation gives an unduly rationalist bias to Hume's doctrine.

Kydd seems to see vaguely that Hume is serious when he distinguishes the calm from the violent passions in terms of emotional disturbance or intensity and she tries to show how this can be made to fit in with her interpretation. She says on page 147:

"... it is evident that when passions are calm in the sense that they are either conducive to or directed towards our greatest possible good they are co-ordinated with one another and cannot come into conflict. Such passions, since they do not conflict, cause no disorder in the soul, for it is only when our passions are not so co-ordinated by a single principle that they can cause a 'sensible emotion'."

Kydd gives no textual reference to substantiate this interpretation but it seems palpably false. It is true that a conflict of passions is taken by Hume to increase on the whole the predominant passion, to make it more violent, but a calm passion may be turned into a violent one by the simple expedient of bringing the object closer to the person. "The same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one." (T.H.N. II, p.131; p.419) ('Calm' and 'violent' here refer to emotional intensity on particular occasions. This must not be confused with the sense in which moral approval is a calm passion.) Hume further points out that if we want to change a man's attitude it is on the whole an expedient more likely to meet with success to work

upon his violent passions. It seems clear that we might often succeed in changing a man's attitude in this way for his own good, i.e. in such a way as to increase his true welfare. The desire might be fully in harmony with the real qualities of the object considered as a factor contributing to the agent's welfare though he does not himself view it in this light. According to Kydd's interpretation this could happen only if the passion was a calm one. The mere fact that the object in question is the object I ought to desire more than anything else at this point of my life would be a sufficient condition for saying the passion motivating me was a calm one. To press home the absurdity of saying that there is only a 'sensible emotion' produced when there is a conflict of passions, one could multiply instances. What about passionate sexual love mentioned earlier?

The upshot of what I have been saying in criticism of the treatment of the so called 'doctrine of calm passions' by commentators is that they have failed to take Hume's own words in the first section of the book on passions seriously enough. When he there draws the distinction in terms of emotional intensity and calls this distinction vulgar and specious he means what he is saying. Kemp Smith makes the mistake of thinking he is exclusively referring to approval and disapproval. Kydd on the other hand fails to realise that in dealing with the rationalists' claim that reason can be a motive to the will Hume simply refers to the fact that this is a mistake engendered by a failure to appreciate that the passion associated with a firm disposition may be a stronger motive than a violent passion

and further that when we reflect upon a situation objectively, abstract from our particular position in regard to an object, this arouses in us a passion directed towards this object which on the whole involves little emotional disturbance, although it is still a passion and may hinder a particular violent passion in leading to action. The rationalists think Reason is the motive here because there is hardly any felt emotion, but they are wrong because we may be in possession of all the facts, know the whole truth about the situation and the conflict might still remain.

Whether the calm passion or the violent one will determine our conduct depends entirely upon our situation and the habits we have developed. But we must remember that it is conceivable that we have contracted a firm habit based upon a mistaken view of our own interest and in this case we should have a calm passion in conflict with a violent one. Kydd mistakenly thinks Hume has a special doctrine of calm passions designed to replace the rationalist doctrine but essentially based upon rationalist premises. He in fact uses his distinction between calm and violent passions to explain how they come to make their mistake, but in so doing he was well aware of the fact that he was merely making use of a 'vulgar and specious' distinction.

It must be emphasised that it is no part of my intention to belittle the importance of the concept of calm passions in understanding Hume's views on evaluation. I merely want to stress the point that calmness is in one sense not the defining characteristic of approval or disapproval.

We must distinguish between 'calm passions' as a class name and as the characterisation of a passion occurring on a particular occasion. If we take the first interpretation the class includes more than approvals and disapprovals. If we take the second interpretation many passions, even those that are commonly the most violent, may be calm on a particular occasion although they do not arise from "a distant view and reflection", even though they do not arise from our adopting an objective point of view.

But Hume realises that there must be some appearances that seem to give support to the view that the moral conflict is to be described as a conflict between reason on the one hand and passions on the other. Unless there was an apparent difference in kind between the two 'parties' to the conflict it would be hard to explain why the mistake was so widespread, why it even seemed plausible to the unsophisticated. When one tries to control an incidental strong desire for something the emotion tending to oppose the desire appears to be almost indistinguishable from a mere opinion or belief. Hume takes this to be a fact that cannot be denied and hence there must be passions that involve so little emotional disturbance as to be hardly discernible if it is true, as he contends, that passion can only oppose another passion or desire in the directing of conduct.

I think it is also possible to maintain that Hume thinks one of the causes of the widespread belief in free will is derived from the same source. A violent desire may seem to necessitate conduct. If all our actions were thus

motivated one might not have come to believe in freedom of the will. It is because we often act contrary to violent desires that we think of the actions as having no cause. When further the desire has abated and we reflect upon the situation it seems we can imagine ourselves as easily having done the one thing as the other. This is not the case while the violent desire is determining our conduct.

There is the further important point that though approval and disapproval are emotions or passions for Hume, he sees that when we calmly evaluate and are not ourselves vitally involved in the issue our state of mind seems often to involve little detectable emotion. When we look at the facts the calmness of our mind may lead us to think of our evaluation as a conclusion inferred from the facts, whereas an evaluation is determined by and not inferred from the facts as we see them. The following quotation states clearly the main point of Hume's distinction between calm and violent passions:

"What we commonly mean by passion is a violent and sensible emotion of mind, when any good or evil is presented, or any object, which, by the original formation of our faculties, is fitted to excite an appetite. By reason we mean affections of the very same kind with the former, but such as operate more calmly and cause no disorder in the temper: which tranquillity leads us into a mistake concerning them, and causes us to regard them as conclusions only of our intellectual faculties."
(T.H.N. II, p.147; p.437)

Though the fact that a calm passion often arises when we do reflect may be an added reason for taking reason to be our motive, reflection is not a necessary condition for the passion being calm. This can be clearly seen from the fact that

Hume goes on to say:

"Generally speaking the violent passions have a more powerful influence: though it is often found that the calm ones, when corroborated by reflection and seconded by resolution¹, are able to control them in their most furious movements." (T.H.N. II, p.147; pp.437-438)

Thus it appears that reflection may add strength to a passion already calm without making it violent. But violence must of course not be equated with strength for then 'reason' would always be the loser. A calm passion can be made violent either by a change of temper, a change in the situation of the object or a passion attending the calm one in our mind may change its force. It can be seen that Hume is here talking of a particular passion as being thus changed without it changing its identity from the fact that he talks of the passion as "borrowing force from any attendant passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination". (T.H.N. II, p.147; p.438)

It is also to be emphasised that what we wrongly take to be the dictate of reason as opposed to passions may vary between people according to their dispositions and tempers and in the case of the same man at different times. He therefore concludes the chapter from which I have been quoting by saying that:

"Philosophy can only account for a few of the greater and more sensible events of this war; but must leave all the smaller and more delicate revolutions, as dependent on principles too fine and minute for her comprehension". (T.H.N. II, p.147; p.438)

1. My underlining.

Passions that are evaluations are distinguished by their qualitative character due to the fact that they arise from special causes and have peculiar objects. They may vary in calmness or violence in the same way as an idea may vary in force and vivacity. These ways of characterising 'experiences' (using experience to cover ideas) are parallel. Since approvals and disapprovals arise in large measure from the imagination we need have no surprise that they are on most occasions calm.

LIBERTY

It has often been maintained that it is in principle impossible to give a satisfactory causal explanation of all human actions. Some human actions at least are free and to say that they are free entails that they are not causally determined. In so far therefore as a science of human nature seeks causal explanations it cannot give a satisfactory account of free human behaviour. Since it is in particular this aspect of man's life with which moral theory is preoccupied, the whole of Hume's attempt to establish a science of man must be doomed to failure unless he can show that freedom and the causal necessity presupposed by this science are compatible, that the same actions can at once be free and causally determined.

Another great eighteenth century scientific optimist, Immanuel Kant, agreed with Hume that one could not divide actions into two mutually exclusive classes, the free and the determined. He too thought all actions must be causally determined, that the problem was to see how any action could at the same time be free. To classify either of these thinkers as determinists is more misleading than helpful. They both thought that there was a perfectly good sense in which some human

actions are free and others are not free. Hume attempts in fact to show that the freedom possessed by human beings is in no way incompatible with the causal necessity presupposed by science.

Hume then does not deny that the word 'will' has a meaning. There certainly is such an idea. As in the case of all other ideas, he hunts for the impression from which it is derived.

"I desire it may be observed, that, by the will, I mean nothing but the internal impression we feel, and are conscious of when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind".
(T.H.N. II, p.113; p.399)

Hume adds that this impression is, like pride and humility, indefinable. He also seems to think that any further description of this impression is unnecessary. The reader is supposed to be capable of identifying this 'internal impression' easily enough. In picking up the book in front of me I have the experience which enables me to understand what the will is. There is supposed to be something common between all those actions we describe as knowingly doing something whether this is performing an overt action, thinking of something or looking at something. It would seem that the decisive factor is whether one thinks one is doing something. The truth of what one thinks would seem to be irrelevant. If I think I am moving my leg, though it is paralysed, I have an impression of volition. My freedom is restricted in this case, but it seems one would quite frequently have an impression of volition when this is the case.

It is fairly obvious why Hume should on the whole not wish to call the will a passion, though he classifies it as a direct passion at least once. The direct passions arise immediately from pleasure and pain. We knowingly seek what promises pleasure and avoid what threatens pain. Since the will is present whenever we knowingly exert ourselves, one can see the temptation to think of it as a direct passion. But the slightest reflection will suffice to convince us that there is something odd about this, for we may knowingly do this, that and the other from a number of different motives. Thus hatred may lead me to cause deliberate harm to an enemy and love make me help a friend. There is no emotion, no one passion that seems to be present in these two cases, yet in both cases we have the impression we refer to in talking about the will.

According to the definition of will given above, we must thus conclude that 'will' does not name a passion. If there is will there must be an impression of volition to which the word refers. To talk of the will as a faculty, a hidden power in man to choose to do or not to do an action, is to indulge in the meaningless talk of mystics. Yet Hume himself sometimes talks of the will as a faculty. It "exerts itself when either the good or the evil may be attained by any action of the mind or body". (T.H.N. II, p.148; p.439)

How is this passage to be interpreted? May we not take it as a further elucidation of the situation in which we have the impression of volition? We desire many things we see no chance of obtaining, or desire to avoid things we know no effort

of ours will enable us to get rid of. In some cases our desires can be fulfilled by our own effort and when, as a result of the desire, this effort is made, we have a case of volition. The faculty language is misleading. Yet we find this passage illuminating in that we normally identify the will with the effort or rather the power to make the effort to attain what we desire. By power we don't mean physical power, but rather the mental power to keep to a set course in spite of hindrances in the shape of temptations and the opposition of others.

In spite of the fact that Hume sometimes talks of the will as a power of choice or a faculty that enables us to make choices, we must bear in mind that he is anxious to account for the facts without an appeal to hidden faculties or powers. He even goes so far as to deny that we have any idea of power. Attacking the view that there is real power in matter which does not lie in any of its discoverable qualities, he says:

"All ideas are derived from and represent impressions. We never have any impression that contains any power or efficacy. We never therefore have any idea of power."
(T.H.N. I, p.159; p.161)

Hume is in this passage concerned with refuting the belief that there is necessary connection discoverable between objects. One object is said to have a native power to produce another. All we discover is an invariable succession and this goes for the relation between mental events and actions in the physical world.

"The motions of our body, and the thoughts and sentiments of our mind, (say they)

"obey the will; nor do we seek any further to acquire a just notion of force or power." (T.H.N. I, p.159; Appendix p.632)

But the relation between what we call a volition and the action is no more intelligible than any other causal succession.

Hume could hardly deny that the word 'power' has real use and a proper use. What he in fact does is to give an analysis of it which would fit in with his notion of causal necessity.

"... there is but one kind of necessity, as there is but one kind of cause, and the common distinction between moral and physical necessity is without any foundation in nature."
(T.H.N. I, p.168; p.171)

and he adds:

"The distinction which we often make between power and the exercise of it is equally without foundation".
(T.H.N. I, p.169; p.171)

Hume, indeed, appears to be denying an obvious distinction, for do we not often truly say that a man makes an improper use of his power and that another, although he has the power to do something, in fact refrains from doing it? Hume insists that, if we speak philosophically, the fact that a man does not in fact harm me shows that he had no power to do so. There must have been some motive determining his conduct and this motive must have been more powerful than any faint desire a person may have had to harm me. On this interpretation it is impossible to draw a distinction between having power and exerting it. Hume emphasises that "... the person never had any power of harming me, since he did not exert any". (T.H.N.

II, p.38; p.313).

We must not be too eager to conclude from the account of power so far given that Hume does not realise that there is a sense in which we may be scared of or pleased with a power which has not been exercised. Although

"the distinction we sometimes make betwixt a power and the exercise of it, is entirely frivolous, and that neither man nor any other being ought ever to be thought possesst of any ability, unless it be exerted and put in action. But tho' this be strictly true in a just and philosophical way of thinking, 'tis certain it is not the philosophy of our passions; but that many things operate upon them by means of the idea and suppositions of power independent of its actual exercise". (T.H.N. II, p.36; p.312)

The long passage just quoted leads one to wonder how one could have an idea of power as opposed to the exercise of it on Hume's principles. It is not entirely surprising to find him attempting an analysis of power in terms of probability and possibility. We deem an action possible when there is no very strong motive hindering the man from doing the action, and probable when on the basis of experience we conclude the occurrence of the action is likely.

The significant feature of this analysis of power is the absence of any reference to the power of choice. There are choices open to a rich man that a poor man does not have. Most ordinary people would, I think, insist when pressed that this is what they mean when they say he has a power to do X, Y or Z. In having this power he also has the power to refrain from doing the actions.

Hume, indeed, moves very far from common conceptions in his

account of power. This can be well shown in the following passage:

"I do not think I have fallen into my enemies' power, when I see him pass me in the streets with a sword by his side, while I am unprovided of any weapon. I know that the fear of the civil magistrate is as strong a restraint as any of iron, and that I am in as perfect safety as if he were chained or imprison'd. (T.H.N. II, p.36; p.312)

It is perfectly true that we would not think we had fallen into our enemies' power in this situation, if we think he is not going to attack us in spite of his fear of the civil magistrates. But this is the point. We think he can kill me if he so chooses whereas if he were chained or imprisoned there is no sense at all in which he can do me harm.

To this Hume would no doubt retort - But can he choose? Choices are determined by motives and in the example given the fear of the magistrates makes the action of harming me impossible. There is but one kind of necessity relevant in these situations, causal necessity, and this operates as much in the case of the actions of the mind as in determining the movements of bodies. This conception is at the very heart of Hume's philosophy upon which presupposition a science of man must be founded.

Let us now look a bit more closely at the arguments in the first two sections of ^{Book II, PART III.} ~~Book III.~~

Hume recalls his own analysis of causal necessity:

"Here then are two particulars, which we are to consider as essential to necessity, viz. the constant union and the inference of the mind; and wherever we discover

"these we must acknowledge necessity."
(T.H.N. II, p.114; p.400)

He then sets out to "prove from experience, that our actions have a constant union with our motives, tempers, and circumstances..." (T.H.N. II, p.114; p.401). Hume, needless to say, does not prove any such thing. It would, indeed, be a tough order. It may be the case that the different sexes differ in their emotional makeup, but such a difference is surely not a clear-cut one. There will be men close in emotional character to women and vice versa. The same applies to all the other examples. Hume would find it difficult to point to a constant conjunction. He himself in fact modifies his claim:

"Necessity is regular and certain.
Human conduct is irregular and
uncertain. The one, therefore,
proceeds not from the other."
(T.H.N. II, p.117; S.B., p.403)

In answer to this objection he appeals to the fact

"that there are many inferior degrees
of evidence and probability, nor does
one single contrariety of experiment
entirely destroy all our reasoning".
(T.H.N. II, p.117; p.403)

Hume here makes use of the challenge that the sciences concerned with the study of material objects are in no better position than the science of man. We must acknowledge that many of the inferences we make about material objects are not based upon a hundred per cent regular sequences. We need be in no sense apologetic or embarrassed about the fact that human actions show certain irregularities. In answer to the charge that human actions are irregular and uncertain he says:

"To this I reply, that in judging of the actions of men we must proceed upon the same maxims as when we reason concerning external objects. When any phenomena are constantly and invariably conjoined together, they acquire such a connection in the imagination, that it passes from one to the other without any doubt or hesitation. But below this there are many inferior degrees of evidence and probability, nor does one single contrariety of experiment entirely destroy all our reasoning. The mind balances the contrary experiments, and, deducting the inferior from the superior, proceeds with that degree of assurance or evidence which remains." (T.H.N. II, p.117; p.403)

Hume thus only claims that we make inferences about human behaviour on the basis of past regularities. Though the regularity may not be a hundred per cent regularity, this is no objection against the view that human actions are causally determined, for precisely the same applies in the case of many of our inferences about the behaviour of inanimate objects. He even goes so far as to emphasise that we do not abandon the belief that events or actions are causally determined though the evidence for and against an occurrence is equal.

"Even when these contrary experiments are entirely equal, we remove not the notion of causes and necessity; but supposing that the usual contrariety proceeds from the operation of contrary and concealed causes, we conclude that the chance or indifference lies only in our judgment on account of our imperfect knowledge, not in the things themselves, which are in every case equally necessary, though, in appearance, not equally constant or certain." (T.H.N. II, p.117; pp.403-404)

There is not time to go into Hume's account of causality in detail and the difficulty of accounting for concealed causes on his view. Here, however, he seems merely to be insisting

that we proceed as if there are causes even when we do not know what they are, and that this is the case whether we are dealing with human actions or inanimate objects.

The regularity of sequence is all that is insisted on and it turns out that this need not be so very regular. The comparison with non-human changes is all along emphasised.

"But are the products of Guienne and of Champagne more regularly different than the sentiments, actions and passions of the two sexes, of which the one are distinguished by their force and maturity, the other by their delicacy and softness."
(T.H.N. II, p.115; p.401)

We see here that in both cases we are quite likely to meet with exceptions. There are too many variables that are ignored in these generalisations. Yet his point is made if the same type of reasoning is involved in both and evidence of inferior kind is accepted alike in our arguments about human actions and non-human change.

If regularity is the essence of necessity, if we exclude the feelings of an observer, then it seems irregularity would be the essence of liberty. Yet this is not so. We do not think an action free just because it is unexpected on the basis of past experience. Some madmen, Hume points out, behave in the most surprising and erratic fashion. Yet we do not ascribe to them more freedom than we attribute to a man who consistently acts in a perfectly rational manner.

We constantly make use of moral evidence.

"Now moral evidence is nothing but a conclusion concerning the actions of men, derived from the consideration of their motives, temper and situation."
(T.H.N. II, p.118; p.405)

All our inferences from books on history are based on our faith in human veracity, and whenever we give orders to a waiter we have no doubt that he will carry them out.

"Now, I assert that whoever reasons after this manner, does ipso facto believe the actions of the will to arise from necessity, and that he knows not what he means when he denies it." (T.H.N. II, p.118; p.405)

All our insight into the operations of mind as well as of matter is simply derived from observed regularities. To drive home the point that the evidence is of precisely the same kind, Hume mentions that we "cement together" natural and moral evidence in many chains of arguments. He takes the example of a prisoner who infers his impossibility of escape from the thickness of the walls and the stubbornness and incorruptibility of the gaoler. His death he foresees from the operations of the guillotine as a mechanism and the "constancy and fidelity of the guards".

We may conclude then that Hume's kind of determinism is of the methodological kind and is based on the contention that it is born out by our practice that we think human actions causally determined no less than inanimate objects. When we remember that all the necessity involved in the causal relation belongs to the mind thinking about or observing sequences one may see that for Hume it would not appear in any sense that causal necessity restricted human freedom. It is because people have held erroneous views about necessity that they have failed to realise this. The error stems from confusing liberty of spontaneity and liberty of indifference.

The first has as its opposite violence, the second has as its opposite necessity and causes.

Hume does not explain the liberty of spontaneity very adequately in the Treatise. A better statement is furnished in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, where the arguments on Liberty and Necessity in the second book of the Treatise are reproduced with minor alterations. In the Enquiry Hume says:

"By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then, is no subject of dispute." (E.H.U., p.95)

Though the statement in the Enquiry is fuller than the account given in the Treatise, it still does not make explicit whether the only violence which could destroy the liberty of spontaneity is external force. The last sentence of the quotation above would seem to imply that this is Hume's meaning. Yet he also seems to define liberty in such a way as to allow for the fact that a kleptomaniac would not have the liberty of spontaneity. We should commonly say that he is to be distinguished from the common thief by the fact that his actions could not follow the determination of his will. If this is allowed, the freedom of spontaneity does not just refer to the feeling we have when we do not consider ourselves compelled to do something.

We may now be in a position to understand his reference to a false sensation or experience even of the liberty of

indifference, which is regarded as an argument for its real existence. We only need to remind ourselves that necessity does not refer to a quality in the agent but to a feeling in an observer, to see why one could not possibly prove one's independence of causal necessity from one's feelings when doing something. The similarity between Hume and Kant on this head is obvious. Kant is equally derisive of the argument that we are free because we feel free.

One of the main reasons why we consider that we were free to do what we did in fact not do is that we can easily imagine ourselves doing it. We may, indeed, attempt to prove that we could have done it by now proceeding to do it. But this does not of course prove the point because the situation has altered. There is now a new motive, a desire to show our liberty. A spectator could just as easily have predicted this action from knowledge of motives and circumstances as any other. This is all that is meant by necessity.

MacNabb is right in saying that Hume is here touching upon a point that has been made use of since to show that human actions are "unpredictable in principle in a way that physical events are not, and dependent on human thoughts in a way that physical events are not". (MacNabb, p.201). He adds, however, that "these facts do nothing to show that our actions and our thoughts do not take place according to causal laws". (Ibid.) If this is accepted, Hume would here have pointed to a fact that would make his own position entirely untenable. It depends upon there being no difference in principle between human actions and other events in this respect. The argument runs

thus: Since human actions are affected by thoughts, the thought that my action has been predicted may affect my behaviour. I may deliberately decide to falsify the prediction. This may be granted. If one wants to predict someone's behaviour, it may be relevant to know whether that someone does or does not know that the prediction is made. This, however, does not show that the action is not predictable, for we may know the man's character. He might be a chap who is always inclined to be difficult, trying to prove people wrong. I might in fact make him aware of the prediction in order to modify his behaviour. It is because I think he will falsify the prediction I make him aware of, that I am confident in making another prediction. The father says to his son "I am sure you will fail your exam.". This he says in order to put the boy's back up and his knowledge of the boy's character and ability may make him confident that the boy will pass. It may be argued that the statement made to the boy is not a prediction, since one does not expect it to come true. Yet it may plausibly be said that it is a conditional prediction (it will certainly fail in its effect unless it is taken to be a genuine prediction by the boy) and in some cases the curious situation may arise that the condition necessary to falsify it may be the making of the prediction and allowing it to be known to the person about whose behaviour it is made. The reason why the behaviour of inanimate objects and animals differs from that of human beings lies in the simple fact that only human beings are able to understand a prediction. It follows that therefore the

knowledge that a prediction has been made can in the case of human beings alone be a causal factor in determining behaviour. It may be the case that it is difficult to predict what effect this will in fact have though not impossible at least in some cases, as I have suggested. But it may still be true that in the cases where we are unsuccessful this is simply due to the fact that we do not know enough about the character, abilities and the situation of the agent. Remembering the very weak form of determinism held by Hume, one may see why he should not be unduly worried by the peculiarity of the case we are considering. Maybe he should be more worried. It depends on whether one wants to emphasise the difference between causal determination and determination by reasons. For Hume the latter is just a special case of the former. Speaking entirely from the point of view of a spectator it is easy to see why this should be so. Any conditions that lead to a prediction on the basis of previous experience of regularities are causal conditions.

"We may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves; but a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition. Now this is the very essence of necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine." (T.H.N. II, p.121; pp.408-409)

It is obvious, then, that the actions we say are done for reasons are in Hume's sense as causally determined as any others.

Hume quite properly rejects the criticism that his views are dangerous to religion and morality. The question is whether they are true or not. Yet he thinks the criticism based on a mistake and maintains his own doctrine is in fact "advantageous to religion and morality". (T.H.N. II, p.122; p.409) Is it not the case that all laws are based upon the presupposition that hope of reward and fear of punishment influence people's conduct? This, according to Hume, would be enough to show that we presuppose that human actions are subject to causes. Remember he has, he thinks, got rid of the idea of a power in matter that somehow forces the effect to occur.

"I do not ascribe to the will that unintelligible necessity, which is supposed to lie in matter. But I ascribe to matter, that intelligible quality, call it necessity or not, which the most rigorous orthodoxy must allow to belong to the will. I change, therefore, nothing in the received system with regard to the will, but only with regard to material objects." (T.H.N. II, pp. 122-123; p.410)

Necessity consists in nothing but either "the constant union" and conjunction of like objects, or in the inference of the mind from the one to the other.

There is a further reason why the doctrine of liberty is inconsistent with the religious hypothesis and our moral notions. Hume reiterates his previous doctrine that the object of love or hatred is always a person or another being endowed with thought and consciousness. Unless the cause of these passions is closely related to the object they are found not to be aroused. Unless the cause of the actions were to be found in the

character or disposition of the agent, the action would be no more closely related to the person than to any other. That he did it would be in a manner accidental. Though the action be blameable, this would in no sense make the agent blameable. Yet this is a necessary condition for all our moral evaluations of character. It is also presupposed by rewards and punishment that the action should follow from something relatively permanent in the agent.

"It is only upon the principle of necessity, that a person acquires any merit or demerit from his actions, however the common opinion may incline to the contrary." (T.H.N. II, p.124; p.411)

Thus it is the case that when people do an evil deed in ignorance, we do not blame them. When we act hastily or unpremeditatedly, we are blamed less than when the same actions are deliberate. The reason for this is, according to Hume, that the actions we blame a man for we only blame him for in so far as they seem to indicate something relatively permanent in the agent. Thus

"Actions render a person criminal, merely as they are proofs of criminal passions or principles in the mind; and when by any alteration of these principles, they cease to be just proofs, they likewise cease to be criminal. But according to the doctrine of liberty or chance, they never were just proofs, and consequently never were criminal". (T.H.N. II, p.124; p.412)

Thus Hume turns the charge against his opponents. To him the libertarian must be holding that free actions take place by chance. It seems this doctrine is subject to the criticisms mentioned and that Hume's own view is not. The whole case

against Hume would have to rest upon the contention that there is a distinction to be drawn between rational behaviour, determinable by reasons, and other kinds of causal determination in Hume's sense.

But Hume himself distinguishes as we have seen between the cases where an agent knowingly does something and the cases where he is compelled or restrained by external forces. I have also pointed out that there are grounds for thinking that he would deny freedom of spontaneity to such actions as the actions of a kleptomaniac. He does not explicitly use the paradigm case argument but he certainly points to a sense of 'free' in which he thinks we are sometimes free, and claims that this has been confused with 'uncaused'. It can thus be said with some justification that his position is best described as a way of reconciling freedom with determinism. To say that he comes down on the side of determinists is misleading, because the only libertarians he refutes are those who equate freedom with chance. It ought at any rate to be clear that Basson's contention that Hume thinks "the doctrine of free will is irrelevant to morals" (see p.3 of this thesis) cannot be defended. Hume on the contrary emphasises that the libertarian view is incompatible with moral notions.

JUDGMENT AND EVALUATION

Hume is sometimes accused of reducing Ethics to Psychology. This is in a sense true, although it would be fairer to say that once the nature of evaluation has been established, there is no room for a normative science of Ethics as distinct from an empirical enquiry into the principles in accordance with which people evaluate. Thus we might say with some justification that for him a science of Ethics is only possible as a branch of Psychology, depending for its data upon history and knowledge of man's social behaviour. It must of course be borne in mind that much of Hume's 'psychology' is of great interest when understood as conceptual analysis. I have, indeed, earlier in this thesis emphasised this.

It is of the utmost importance to understand precisely in what sense Hume reduced Ethics to Psychology, for it is not uncommon to attribute to him the doctrine that evaluative expressions are descriptions of psychological facts. I shall attempt to show that the general trend of Hume's arguments is entirely at variance with such an interpretation and that it would, indeed, make many of his arguments look somewhat silly.

Professor C.D. Broad, discussing Hume's view on "the meaning

and analysis of ethical predicates and propositions" gives the following interpretation of his view:

"There is a certain specific kind of emotion which nearly all human beings feel from time to time. This is the emotion of approval or disapproval. It is called forth by the contemplation of certain objects, and it is directed towards those objects. Now for Hume the statement "X is good" means the same as the statement "X is such that the contemplation of it would call forth an emotion of approval towards it in all or most men" (Broad, p.84).

The definition of "X is bad" would be the same, with "disapproval" substituted for "approval". The interpretation is plain enough, though it is vague on one point. The statement "X is such that it would call forth an emotion of approval towards it in all or most men" is, one presumes, to be amplified by "when people think of X or meet with X in life". The value-judgment is then taken to state what the feelings of people would be when confronted with X in thought or experience. It would thus claim to be a statement of fact and would be verified or falsified by examining what people in fact feel when confronted with X.

Hume's doctrine would on this interpretation be a perfect example of the naturalism which G.E. Moore attacks in his *Principia Ethica*. One would not have been surprised if Broad had felt tempted to ask whether it is a mere tautology to say that what all or most people approve of is good. Taking the expression as it stands this would obviously not be the case, for we do at least think it logically possible that the minority may be correct about the evaluation of certain things, but this would indicate that we entertain the possibility that what most people approve of might be bad; but the expression of such a

doubt would be self-contradictory, if the definition of 'X is good' is accepted. We would, indeed, be claiming that what is approved of by most people might not be approved of by most people.

Even if we take the more plausible interpretation and leave out the reservation from 'all or most people' we can see immediately that Hume's position would be extremely unpalatable, for 'X is good' would now mean 'X is such that all people approve of X'. The reason why this is unpalatable is simply this, that the statement seems to be a general statement about people's evaluations, but is not a value statement itself. 'X is good' is a value statement, expresses an evaluation. It seems obvious that when people approve of X they might express this approval by the statement 'X is good'. But if Broad's interpretation is correct, it would be possible for a person to approve of X and at the same time believe that X is not good. This would be the case because in believing that X is good, I am believing the truth of a proposition about other people's approvals as well as my own. The proposed analysis would make it impossible to approve of X, knowing or believing that one is not concurring with other people's evaluations, since to think that X is good or to approve of X is to believe a proposition about everyone's emotions.

The result is startling if we think it makes no material difference to our interpretation whether we analyse 'X is good' as 'all people approve of X' or 'most people approve of X'. For now I could believe that 'X is good' in the sense that most people approve of him, and yet believe that he is not good on

the ground that I know at least one person who does not approve of him. The paradox is further complicated if I am the one person who I know not to approve of X. If one takes 'approving of X' as 'thinking X good', one has the absurd situation that approving of X is consistent with thinking X good and not good.

But the expression 'all or most people' is probably best understood as meaning 'at least most people'. It certainly cannot express an indecision, as if Hume were not quite sure which interpretation to give.

A special difficulty arises about the extension of the class of people. It may either mean those who have lived up to the present, or it may include all future generations. According to the first interpretation the expression 'X is good' would be a historical statement and its truth would be entirely determined by what is the case or has been the case, as opposed to what will be the case. This would make the status of the moral teacher, the innovator, a peculiar one. He would be a man who discovers something about the past and present rather than a man who lays down the law for the future. He would, indeed, be in the same position as any other historian making a discovery about the past.

If we include future generations in the class of people it would follow that we could never know the 'truth' of the statement 'X is good'. The explanation for this would not be that people have different ideas of what constitutes goodness. This would be easily understandable and is most likely true. The reason why we cannot discover the truth of such a statement is that we can never know that we have in fact examined all

people or even most people. We may have a hundred per cent agreement now. All the cases in the future might turn out to be unfavourable. This entirely misrepresents the doubt when we doubt whether someone is or is not a good man. It would at least be misleading to suggest that what I doubt is whether all other people feel the same way as I do about the person, though this may be relevant.

It should now be clear that the interpretation of Hume's view we have been considering would be extremely paradoxical, and even if we take the view that to approve or disapprove is not to evaluate, it would be odd, to say the least, to maintain the general statements of fact about approvals and disapprovals would be evaluations. Would this in any case not be a fact discoverable by reason in its empirical capacity? Would not this mean that the question 'Is X good?' would be a question about empirical facts? If this were the case, reason would discover goodness to us, and Broad, basing his interpretation upon the Enquiry, would have to argue that Hume has made a complete volte face between the writings of the third book of the Treatise and the Enquiry.

A close study of the Treatise will reveal that Hume's doctrine there is that to evaluate is to have a certain feeling of approval when confronted with something or when thinking of it.

"We do not infer a character to be virtuous because it pleases; but in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous¹. The case

1. My underlining.

"is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations. Our approbation is implied in the immediate pleasure they convey to us" (T.H.N. III, p.179; p.471).

Is it not plain that Hume is here maintaining that a man who feels that X is virtuous is in effect 'judging' X to be good? (The fact is, of course, that my view is that for Hume 'X is good', in so far as it expresses an evaluation, is not a judgment in the usual sense of the word.) Would a man who feels in the manner described by Hume not be justified in making the verbal statement 'X is good' on the basis of this alone? How else should he verbally give vent to the feeling that X is virtuous?

It is my belief that there is no conclusive evidence to show that Hume radically changes his views on this point between writing the Treatise and the Enquiry, but there are admittedly passages in the Enquiry that seem to justify Broad's interpretation to a certain extent. It must be shown that they do not necessitate that interpretation.

The following footnote seems damning to my criticism of Broad:

"It is the nature and, indeed, the definition of virtue¹, that it is a quality of the mind agreeable to or approved of by everyone who considers or contemplates it. But some qualities produce pleasure, because they are useful to society, or useful or agreeable to the person himself; others produce it more immediately, which is the case with the class of virtues here considered" (E.P.M., p.261, footnote).

1. My underlining.

The first point to notice about this 'definition' is that Hume does not say the definition of 'virtue' is 'that it is a quality of the mind agreeable to or approved of by everyone who considers or contemplates it'. He does not say that when people say that 'X is virtuous' they are in effect saying that he possesses a quality of mind that is either immediately pleasing to an observer or useful. For a true understanding of Hume's pronouncement here one must consider the context in which he makes this statement. The great bulk of the Enquiry is concerned with an empirical investigation which is meant to bring out what is common to what people approve of and what they disapprove of respectively. This for Hume is an investigation into causal relationships and the conclusion would be that human nature is such that people approve of or deem virtuous (since this is the topic here) mental qualities that affect themselves or others in a particular manner.

I consider the definition of virtue proposed is to be understood as meaning just this and no more, that when you count as virtuous something which there is a general agreement among men to deem vicious, there is a sense in which you will 'be thought to be wrong'. Your evaluation will be wrong, not because you have made a false statement about the evaluations of the generality of men. You will, however, have the majority against you, and since Hume's underlying assumption is that the principles determining human behaviour and human feelings are much the same in all times and places, the presumption is that an exceptional evaluation, assuming that

no mistake has been made about the facts of the case, will be thought due to an aberration, some sort of disease in one's emotional makeup.

So long as our evaluations are in complete harmony with the principles which hitherto have been found to operate throughout the species, we are not likely to land in conflicts with others unless human nature were radically changed. This, of course, is always possible; it is a contingent fact that the laws governing evaluation are what they are.

It follows directly from Hume's view that all the perceptions of the human mind are loose and separate that the feelings of approval might have had other causes than in fact we find them to have. This would be so if the constitution of the human mind should undergo a radical change. If this should happen it would of course be absurd to claim that what we now approve ought to be approved after the change occurs, for there is no appeal beyond human nature and human nature is what we find it to be if we methodically study the causal laws and principles of its working. A statement asserting that people agree in approving of a certain quality of mind forms part of this enquiry into the principles of human nature, but as such it is an empirical statement of fact and not an evaluation. Hume makes statements of this kind as an investigator of human nature, but in the empirical science which he wanted to instigate there is to be no room for evaluations, only statements about evaluations.

To think that Hume considers 'morally approving of X' and 'believing X good' (M.S., p.47) significantly different is quite an untenable interpretation of his words, and it is quite

impossible to make sense of his pronouncements on this interpretation, and D. Daiches Raphael seems to be too kind to Broad when he charges him with oversimplifying Hume's view. Broad's is not an oversimplification but a radical misunderstanding of the very basis of Hume's ethical theory. I hope to be able to show that Raphael, though his interpretation is superior to that given by Broad, is himself wrong in saying:

"In fact Hume combines both the view attributed to him by Professor Broad and Mr. Ayer, and the view of Mr. Ayer himself" (M.S., p.76).

Hume on this view considers the statement 'X is virtuous' sometimes as a statement of fact and at other times as the expression of emotion:

"His theory is therefore more complex than is usually assumed, and is able to escape many of the usual objections brought against it since it can have recourse to one or other of the two analyses as is convenient" (Ibid., p.76).

It is, indeed, the great advantage of Hume's theory as opposed to Ayer's that Hume does attempt to give an account of the objectivity of moral judgments, but his account does not, as we have seen, take the form of holding that they sometimes are objective and sometimes not, depending upon the meaning the person evaluating gives to the words expressing his evaluation.

It may be the case that on Raphael's interpretation Hume can escape some of the criticisms advanced of this theory, but it would be open to an objection which, I think, would be completely damning. It would involve the absurdity that a man could morally approve of X, which is equivalent to thinking X virtuous, and at the same time admit the falsity of the

statement that all or most people approve of X, which is equivalent to believing that X is not virtuous. This is a hopeless position, for it is certainly the case that one cannot morally approve of something and admit 'at the same time' that the person approved of is not virtuous if, as most certainly seems to be the case, 'to approve morally' is equivalent to 'to think virtuous'.

It may of course be said that Hume is pointing out that there are two ways in which we evaluate by use of the expression 'X is good' or 'X is virtuous'. This would invalidate the criticism of Raphael contained in the preceding paragraph. It can, indeed, be argued that there are occasions when to say 'X is good' may be treated as equivalent to giving the information that people in a certain society generally approve of X. I might be studying a certain culture and be interested in finding out what people in society S thought good. I might try to get the information by asking questions of the form 'Is X good?'. If Mr. Obu, to whom I am talking, understands what I am after he may answer 'Yes', even in a case when he himself disagrees with the majority. It must be agreed, however, that the sense in which 'X is good' means 'most people approve of X' cannot be considered the primary evaluative sense of the expression. We might even want to say that Mr. Obu ought to have said 'Most people here think X is good but I don't agree'.

The main point to be emphasised is, of course, that Hume never accepts 'all or most people approve of X' as a justification of the truth of the statement 'X is virtuous' on the ground that to say 'X is virtuous' is to say that all or most people approve

of X. Knowledge of what people approve of is all the same very relevant to our own approvals and disapprovals, not as evidence, but as a causal factor which may operate through sympathy. One has to remember that Books II and III of the Treatise are part and parcel of the one science of human nature and once this is realised it will, I think, be seen that his breach with the Rationalists is more fundamental and of a much more radical kind than commentators generally recognise.

It is now requisite to consider Hume's anti-rationalist arguments, but only in so far as this is necessary in order to give substance to the view hinted at above, that for Hume 'value judgments' are neither assertions about the relation of ideas nor assertions of a matter of fact. There is little disagreement among commentators about his denial of the first of these views, but I have already shown that there is a tendency to think he did not entirely want to deny the second view. Broad and Ayer think he always considered moral judgments to be judgments of fact, and Raphael thinks he sometimes did.

The first section of part I of the third book of the Treatise is entitled "Moral Distinctions not Derived from Reason". It is, as this heading suggests, polemical in nature, containing arguments against the rationalist position of his time. It was a common practice of moral philosophers in the 18th century to develop their own positive view in the course of a polemic against an alternative standpoint. Thus Samuel Clarke propounds his views through an attack upon Hobbes, and Hutcheson in his Inquiry develops his moral sense theory through a concerted attack on psychological egoism. It is therefore

not strange that Hume's polemic against the rationalists should contain the best clue to the nature of his fundamental position. He wants here to indicate once and for all that an evaluation is neither to be understood as the apprehension of an a priori truth, nor is it the implicit or explicit assertion of a matter of fact. This involves a radical distinction between the questioning of the truth of an assertion and the questioning of the correctness of an evaluation. An evaluation can only improperly be called true or false. To see this is to realise that sentences expressing evaluations have a radically different logical status from statements claiming to assert empirical facts and a priori statements. A consideration of Hume's attack will, I hope, justify this interpretation, though I shall make no attempt in this thesis to estimate Hume's relation to his rationalist predecessors.

Hume's argument from the inertness of reason is a curious one, and appears at first sight to beg the question. As the argument is stated here, Hume takes it for granted that reason has been proved to be inert, incapable of influencing action in Book II, Part III, section 3.

The position Hume wants to establish in this chapter is

- 1) that reason alone can never be a motive to the will, and
- 2) that reason and passion or desire can never be in conflict as motives. The reservation introduced by the word 'alone' is important, for Hume not only admits, but insists that reason plays an important part in the practical life.

Hume here uses the terms 'reason' and 'understanding' as

synonyms, and in the following quotation one may therefore read 'reason' for 'understanding':

"The understanding exerts itself after two different ways, as it judges from demonstration or probability; as it regards the abstract relation of our ideas, or those relations of objects of which experience only gives us information" (T.H.N. II, p.125; p.413).

Though Hume goes on to talk about "the first species of reasoning" it is decidedly unfair of Broad to suggest that he tacitly "reduces Reason to Ratiocination". By 'ratiocination' Broad here means "the drawing of inferences, demonstrative or problematical, from premises" (Broad, p.106). Even a cursory glance at Hume's argument shows that his main point is that knowing that a proposition is true never influences actions unless we presuppose interest, or a desire for some end. Thus his example of the way in which mathematical reasoning may have practical importance for us will also serve to indicate the value knowing the truth of an individual mathematical proposition may have for us.

It may be helpful to put Hume's point bluntly as the denial that there is a special function of reason which may be called practical reason. Reason for him deals exclusively in the truth or falsity of propositions. A judgment of reason is always either a judgment of fact or a judgment of the relation of ideas, analytic judgments. So-called moral judgments are practical and we can never explain how they can be practical unless we take into account the emotional side of our nature. Reason has no special function in practical matters. In so far as Reason affects practice it is in virtue of the same function

it performs in judging of matters of fact or relations of ideas. There are no propositions at all, the truth of which implies that people ought to behave in one way rather than another. The link between the truth of any proposition and practice is always a causal link between belief in its truth and practice and never a logical link.

The above is a bold statement, obviously in need of justification. Let us now look at the arguments in search of support.

The most important type of reasoning based upon the apprehension of the relation between ideas is mathematical reasoning, arithmetic and algebra. Such reasoning influences conduct.

"Mathematics, indeed, are useful in all mechanical operations, and arithmetic in almost every art and profession: but it is not of themselves they have any influence" (T.H.N. II, p.126; p.413).

The influence of such reasoning upon conduct always presupposes "some designed end or purpose". It is furthermore always indirect in that it only influences conduct in so far as it "directs our judgment concerning causes and effects". It is thus only judgments of fact that directly influence conduct, but they only have such influence if we presuppose "some designed end or purpose". Hume takes the example of a merchant's accounts with a particular person. This may be useful to him in enabling him to decide what total amount of money will have the same effect in paying his debts as paying each individual item and receiving payment for each individual item in the business transactions with that person. The ability to add and subtract may be useful to us

in deciding particular matters of fact. Thus, if I own an apple tree jointly with some person, my share of the apples being one third, knowledge of how to find one third of nine apples on the tree may help me to decide that there are three apples on it belonging to me. The purely mathematical judgment $9 \times \frac{1}{3} = 3$ is of no practical interest at all.

In the case of causal reasoning or judgments of fact, it is of no practical importance to know true propositions asserting causal connection "if both the causes and effects be indifferent to us". As already indicated, the function of reason is exhausted in discovering a causal connection in this field, and since it is only in some cases that the discovery of such a connection influences our conduct, this influence cannot be due to reason. Reason functions equally in judgments that do and do not influence conduct.

Any practical conflict, involving tendencies to do different things, must be a conflict of motives and the judgment that a certain proposition is true and another false never as such furnishes a motive for anything at all. Consequently there must be something wrong with talking about the conflict between reason and desire or reason and passion, but it had been common

"to talk of the combat of passion and reason, to give the preference to reason, and to assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates" (T.H.N. II, p.125; p.413).

It is in this connection that Hume makes the important pronouncement that

"Reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" (T.H.N. II, p.127; p.415).

He realises this is a somewhat startling pronouncement and consequently goes on to explain and support it. Here we get a great insight into his real view.

A judgment asserts an agreement between ideas, taken as copies with those objects they are intended to represent. Since a passion is in no way representative it can never be taken to contradict reason. It claims nothing at all beyond itself and thus is neither true nor false. It cannot contradict anything because it does not assert anything. It is neither true nor false. It follows from this that a passion can never be contrary to reason, though a judgment or an opinion accompanying the passion may be contrary to reason. Such judgments may assert the existence of objects that do not exist or may assert a causal connection between objects that are not causally connected. This latter is important when we want to decide upon the means towards an end we have set ourselves. We can thus only say that a motive is contrary to reason in the sense that it may be dependent for its existence or efficacy in affecting the will upon a false judgment of fact. When the falsity of the judgment is brought home to the agent the motive would disappear.

"I may desire any fruit as of excellent relish; but whenever you convince me of my mistake, my longing ceases. I may will the performance of certain actions as means of obtaining any desired good; but as my willing of these goods is only secondary, and founded on the supposition that they are causes of the proposed effect; as soon as I discover the falsehood of that supposition, they must become indifferent to me" (T.H.N. II, p.128; pp.416-417).

The point Hume makes here is similar to Kant's hypothetical imperatives, with one important difference. Kant's point is a logical one. You are logically committed to willing the means to an end so long as you will the end. Hume, on the other hand, talks in terms of causality. If you will A as a means to B, and only because A is a means to B, you will no longer desire A when you discover that it is not a means to B. Hume is concerned to show how judgments may causally affect our conduct and is not pointing out a possible contradiction in the will. The judgment may reveal a state of affairs that is indifferent to us, arouses no passion or desire.

So long as we think of a passion as motive simply as an impression, complete in itself, it seems the only thing that could make a difference in the strength of motives intelligible would be the relative intensity of the passions. Hume, as we have seen, denies the truth of this and since one of the calm passions he enumerates is "the general appetite to good and aversion to evil" it becomes apparent that the upshot of his argument is among other things an emphatic assertion of the fundamental logical difference between an evaluation and a statement of fact or a statement asserting a relation between ideas. There can never be a contradiction between an evaluation and a judgment of fact, for example, simply because the former simply is a fact, an expression of a passion which, as such, does not represent anything, does not assert anything, and consequently cannot contradict. It is thus not only the case that we cannot decide what is right and what is wrong by the application of the law of non-contradiction, for no empirical

investigation could do this except indirectly by causally changing our attitudes.

The whole question of the relation of reason to the passions in Hume's theory cannot be adequately treated in this thesis. The fact that I say so little about it must not be taken to mean that I consider the topic unimportant.

Was Hume simply an 'anatomist'? There is hardly much doubt that this is the function he himself thought he was performing in his grand conception of a science of human nature. He nevertheless, upon occasion, seemed to take up the position of preacher, appearing to apply the principle of utility to decide between true and false morality. This attitude is strikingly revealed in the discussion of the monkish virtues in the Enquiry.

Though in the Treatise there is little evidence to support the view that Hume is trying to establish a fundamental principle of morals which can be applied as a criterion to decide deductively whether particular virtues are genuine we must note the following. There is the same tension in Hume's attitude in the first book of the Treatise where his attempt to explain all human knowledge in terms of associationist psychology seems to clash with his attempt to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate belief, for it does not appear to be sufficient to distinguish truth from superstition on the grounds that the latter does not have such a firm hold over people's minds.

It is tempting to say that Hume cannot have thought that the words 'X is good' expressed a feeling or sentiment except in the sense in which 'to express a feeling' is to state that

one has it or that one has had it. It is, one might want to suggest, a flagrant anachronism to maintain that Hume can have held that to evaluate is not to judge. A judgment is expressed in a proposition and a proposition must, by definition, be either true or false. Since therefore, Hume certainly did not think that 'good' was a predicate which named a quality judged to belong to the object we call good, he must have held that it named a quality of the agent judging, i.e. the feeling we have in contemplating certain objects. The truth or falsity of an evaluation must hence depend upon whether or not the person evaluating had or had not the feeling which the term 'good' names. According to this, one must hold that to evaluate is to judge, that the judgment is expressed in a proposition. The verbal form 'X is good', since it is undoubtedly used as an evaluative expression, must hence be thought of as either true or false.

It is easy to find confirmation of the above interpretation in Hume's words. He certainly talks repeatedly of moral judgments and some of his statements seem to be intelligible only if we consider him to have believed that 'good' names a quality of the person contemplating the allegedly good thing, and that vice in the same way names a contrary quality.

"The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You can never find it till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action" (T.H.N. III, p.177; pp.468-469).

It seems that Hume is saying here that vice is the name of 'a sentiment of disapprobation', that we literally find the

vice in our own breast when we introspect. If the vice must be somewhere, there is nowhere else for it to be, since it is not a quality of external objects. This view seems to make all evaluations into introspective judgments. But introspection seems to presuppose that there is something to introspect. In this case it seems we must approve and disapprove before we can introspect that we approve or disapprove. If we construe approval and disapproval as feelings or sentiments it seems absurd to suggest that to feel or to have a sentiment is to introspect anything at all. The reason why this is absurd is perhaps that 'introspection' is the name of a method of knowing. We need no introspection in order to feel things, though some people might suggest we come to know what we feel by introspection.

We are not concerned here with the merits or demerits of this alleged method by which we know facts about our feelings and conscious states in general. All I want to emphasise is that if a value judgment consists in an introspective judgment of what we feel on some specific occasions then approvals and disapprovals construed as feelings or sentiments are not evaluations. To suggest that Hume did not think that to approve or to disapprove are ways of evaluating would certainly be paradoxical, and it seems queer, to say the least, if we can evaluate (approve or disapprove) within ourselves, in our minds, but have no way of evaluating in words, for to make statements about our evaluations is to assert a proposition which is true if we evaluated in the way stated, but can certainly not be challenged on the grounds that there was something wrong with the evaluation itself.

To justify a factual statement about an evaluation is

different from justifying an evaluation. Hume is, indeed, quite emphatic in denying that to approve or disapprove is to judge that we have a feeling, as the following quotation indicates:

"To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. We go no further; nor do we inquire into the cause of the satisfaction. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases; but in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations. Our approbation is implied in the immediate pleasure they convey to us" (T.H.N. III, p.179; p.471).

I take Hume to mean the same by the expression 'is implied in' and 'constitutes'. It is in any case clear that our approval is a feeling and not a judgment. It may of course be ill-founded in the sense that upon a more adequate judgment of the character of a person or the nature of the action we may find that this feeling is no longer aroused in us, but the feeling is as such neither true nor false. Since the approval is said to be constituted by the feeling it can obviously not be equated with the judgment that we have the feeling. In fact it seems that Hume here holds that approval and disapproval are not judgments even though they are aroused on the basis of judgments of fact. If therefore we can express our approvals and disapprovals in words, it seems the verbal form cannot be taken to express a proposition.

In so far as approval and disapproval are evaluations, they are neither true nor false. These terms are logically

inappropriate. It is only right to point out that the first of the quotations we gave was taken from the chapter in which Hume is attacking the rationalists. He is in that chapter most anxious to point out that the evaluative terms 'virtue' and 'vice' cannot be taken to be names of qualities that can be 'observed' to belong to the objects we call virtuous and vicious. The reason why we find use for these terms is to be found in the fact that we feel differently about things. Certain things please us and other things displease us. Unless, therefore, we turn out attention to our own feelings we can never understand why we should use these terms at all. In stating his case he perhaps overstates it in suggesting that the virtue and the vice are subjective qualities in the person judging, judging about actions and characters. But this is hardly the whole story, for he seems to be genuinely confused by the analogy with secondary qualities, an analogy which had already been used by Hutcheson.

People had previously thought that secondary qualities belonged to objects. The doctrine of secondary qualities seemed to show that they really only existed in the consciousness of persons who mistakenly take them for qualities in the objects themselves. In the same way people had thought virtue and vice really were qualities in the objects we call virtuous and vicious. There are good grounds for thinking that this is a mistake. These qualities are mind-dependent just like secondary qualities and hence we conclude on the analogy that they are qualities in the mind of the person judging. This analogy may go some way towards explaining Hume's curious way of speaking

about virtue and vice as discoverable by introspection. But the puzzle does not end here, for Hume's high praise of the doctrine of secondary qualities in this connection is somewhat strange when we remember that in the first book of the Treatise he is a very stern critic of this doctrine indeed.

It is perhaps not inappropriate to quote side by side his panegyric in the third book and his condemnation in the first.

"Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to sounds, colours, heat, and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind: and this discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences: though like that too, it has little or no influence on practice" (T.H.N. III, p.177; p.469).

The doctrine which is here called "a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences" is described in the following terms in the first book:

"I believe many objections might be made to this system; but at present I shall confine myself to one which is, in my opinion, very decisive. I assert, that instead of explaining the operations of external objects by its means, we utterly annihilate all these objects, and reduce ourselves to the opinions of the most extravagant scepticism concerning them. If colours, sounds, tastes and smells be merely perceptions, nothing, we can conceive, is possessed of a real, continued, and independent existence; not even motion, extension, and solidity, which are the primary qualities chiefly insisted on" (T.H.N. I, p.218; pp.227-228).

There can hardly be much doubt as to which of these quotations represents Hume's real view as to the tenability of the doctrine of secondary qualities. It would make nonsense of his most cherished doctrines about our knowledge of the

external world if we took his eulogy of this doctrine in Book III to be an expression of his real considered opinion. The fact of the matter appears to be that Hume is here using an 'argumentum ad hominem'. If you can admit that colours and sounds are nothing but perceptions in the mind, there is certainly no objection in principle to considering virtue and vice to be in the same boat. He may here have Locke's doctrine in mind. But the cases are not really parallel, for Hume is arguing that virtue and vice are 'mind dependent' in a sense in which the secondary qualities are not.

For when you approve or disapprove of an agent you take his actions as signs of certain motives or dispositions. Among these signs there certainly are very often secondary qualities. These are qualities you can discover by scrutinising the object. They are discoverable by observation. Virtue and vice, on the other hand, are not natural qualities like colours that can be discovered by observation. No scrutiny of external objects will reveal such qualities. Even the mental qualities we infer will not contain the quality virtue or the quality vice.

"In whichever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts" (T.H.N. III, p.177; p.468).

But would this really be the case if we take Hume to think virtue and vice are qualities? For he thinks that evaluations can move us to action:

"Men are often governed by their duties, and are deterred from some actions by the opinion of injustice, and impelled to others by that of obligation" (T.H.N. III, p.167; p.457).

If, therefore, one of the motives we may infer from the outward signs can in certain cases be an evaluation, it seems we must be

able to discover virtue and vice by contemplating an action if we take these words to be names for the feelings of approval and disapproval. This is, however, the very thing Hume seems to be vigorously denying and it seems we must take him seriously when he says that morality is 'more properly felt than judged of'. If 'X is good' means the same as 'I have a feeling of approval when I contemplate X', it seems we must conclude that A and B agree that X is good when A judges that he has this feeling and B judges that A has this feeling. The only alternative to this paradoxical conclusion is that 'X is good' cannot have the same meaning when used by two different speakers because this is always a judgment about the speaker.

There is a way out of the difficulties mentioned above if we take Hume to be maintaining that an evaluation is not a judgment at all. Is this view too sophisticated for a writer in the 18th century? A consideration of the way in which a contemporary understood Hume may throw some light upon this question. Let us therefore turn our attention to the interpretation given by Thomas Reid of Hume's view on this point.

In his *Essays on the Active Powers of Man*, Reid criticises Hume's moral theory at length. That part of his discussion which concerns us here is contained in a chapter headed "That Moral Approbation Implies a Real Judgment". Reid emphasises that Hume holds that moral approbation and disapprobation are not judgments but feelings:

"... moral approbation and disapprobation are not judgments, which must be true or false, but barely agreeable and uneasy Feelings or Sensations" (R.E., p.671).

The most important point at issue seems to be whether

approvals and disapprovals can be said to be true or false. It is obvious that Reid takes Hume to be denying that evaluations are either true or false, that they are judgments that would be expressed in a proposition.

"For it (feeling) implies neither affirmation nor negation; and therefore cannot have the qualities of true or false, which distinguish propositions from all other forms of speech and judgments from all other acts of the mind" (R.E., p.671).

In language we express a feeling either by a word or by an expression which can be the subject or the predicate of a proposition, but since a feeling implies as such neither affirmation nor negation it cannot be expressed by a proposition. From this it seems to follow that we must distinguish approval and disapproval which are feelings from the judgment that we have this feeling, for this can be either true or false, is the affirmation of the truth of a proposition.

Words may express a feeling but not a proposition, and an instance of this is given by the terms 'toothache' and 'headache'. Though Reid says it would be ridiculous to suggest that these words express a proposition, this is plainly not the case, and it was indeed well known in the 18th century that one word could express a proposition. Forgetting the rather curious identification of a sentence with a proposition, it certainly is the case that a single word or even a single letter may on certain occasions express a proposition. This point is made by Beattie in his "The Theory of Language". He says:

"A single word may stand for a sentence, and imply an affirmation. One asks, 'Is Virgil or Lucan the better poet?'. I answer 'Virgil'. And this word

"thus connected comprehends an entire affirmative sentence: 'Virgil is the better poet'." (B.T.L., p.365).

Many other instances are given and it is pointed out that when a question is asked about letters, such as which letter in English is most offensive to foreigners, the answer may take the form of uttering just one letter, such as S or A or B, etc. In the same way one may ask a person 'What do you feel about X?'. The answer might be 'approval' and this would be a proper answer, indicating that the assertion 'I feel approval of X' is true. But Reid ignores this sense for he seems concerned to show that Hume cannot hold both that an approval is a judgment and that it is a feeling, and that if it is a feeling it cannot be properly expressed in a proposition.

The foregoing is perhaps too onesided an interpretation of Reid's words, for he seems to be confused on this issue when he takes the two following expressions to be identical in meaning according to Hume's doctrine:

- 1) "Such a man did well and worthily, his conduct is highly approvable", and
- 2) "The man's conduct gave me a very agreeable feeling" (R.E., p.673).

In both cases we have a judgment, a proposition, which can be true or false and Reid consequently points out that the propositions expressed in the two cases are not the same.

"If we suppose, on the other hand, that moral approbation is nothing more than an agreeable feeling, occasioned by the contemplation of an action, the second speech, above mentioned, has a distinct meaning and expresses all that is meant by moral approbation" (R.E., p.673).

It is not absolutely clear what is to be understood by

'expresses all that is meant by moral approbation'. Is the analysis attributed to Hume a way of morally approving or a statement as to what moral approval is? If the former, then Hume does indeed think that moral approval is a judgment. If the latter, then it is not a statement which can be equivalent to 'X is good' when this is used to express approval by a man who is morally approving of X.

We may answer the question 'Why do you call him good?' by enumerating all those characteristics he possesses which gave us the feeling of approval. But we may also answer by saying that his conduct gave us a feeling of approval. The first would be a justification of the evaluation, whereas the second would justify our use of the word 'good' or another term of moral praise of the case. The question of justification must be distinguished from the question of analysis. The predicative phrase 'is good' may have come to be associated in my mind with a certain feeling aroused in me in a special manner, and indeed the concept of the purely descriptive qualities of the agent evaluated may call forth the appropriate expression in the absence of a noticeable feeling. But it is sheer prejudice to suppose that 'is good' must therefore be attributing a special characteristic to me, or indeed to anything. To agree about the goodness of X is to agree in feeling the same way about him, and not to accept the truth of a proposition about the feelings of the person judging. Hume unfortunately is not clear in this very important issue about the proper analysis of statements expressing evaluations. Nor is Reid clear on this point, for as I have tried to show, he sometimes speaks as if Hume

illegitimately contends that evaluations are neither true nor false, are not judgments, and hence not expressed in propositions, whereas at other times he seems to be contending that Hume is wrong because he confuses two different judgments, mistakenly thinks that an evaluation is a judgment about one's own feelings. In so far as this latter interpretation of Hume's doctrine is accepted, one has little difficulty in finding faults with it, for if an evaluation is a judgment, its truth or falsity is most certainly not ascertained by introspection as I have tried to point out.

HUME'S EGOISM

It may perhaps be permissible to use the expression 'psychological egoism' for the hedonistic variety of that doctrine and 'ethical egoism' for the hedonistic type of the corresponding ethical doctrine. This would enable us to avoid the repetition of a somewhat clumsy and inelegant expression and should lead to no confusion. Let us begin by confining our attention to the psychological doctrine.

It has been a bone of contention among commentators whether Hume is or is not a psychological egoist. T.H.Green attributes this doctrine to Hume in no uncertain terms (Introduction to the Moral Part of the Treatise). F.C.Sharp (Mind, Vol. XXX, 1921), E.B. McGilvary (P.R., Vol.12, 1903) and N.K. Smith (The Philosophy of David Hume) have been equally emphatic in denying the legitimacy of this interpretation of Hume's work. It must be obvious to readers of Hume that an interpretation of him as a psychological egoist must be primarily based on the Treatise. It is possible to take the view that this is one of the issues on which the two works differ. But if we can defend Hume against the charge that he is a

psychological egoist by consideration of his views in the Treatise this will, it must be admitted, strengthen our case.

By 'psychological egoism' will be understood the doctrine that all human actions are motivated by a desire for the agent's own future pleasure or a desire for the continuation of a pleasurable experience the agent is experiencing.

U.S. vol. 0, 5

Another form of egoistic motivation would be the desire to get rid of an unpleasant experience. Thus we might hold that desire is an uneasiness and the motive is correctly analysed as the tendency to get rid of this unpleasant experience. The ultimate end would, in the latter case, be the elimination of an unpleasant experience in the agent. If Hume can be shown to have held one or the other of these views we could say he was a psychological egoist.

A distinction must be drawn between the cause of a desire and the object of a desire. We have seen that psychological egoism is a doctrine about the object of a desire. Although we may come to the conclusion that Hume believes that pleasure or pain are always the cause or the part-cause of a desire, we will not thereby have shown that he is a psychological hedonist. (The distinction drawn here is a well-known one. It is to be found in N.K.S., McGilvary, G.E. Moore and others.) Let us first consider whether Hume thinks pleasure or the avoidance of pain are always the ultimate objects of a desire. We might perhaps state the question more simply as 'Are all objects desired merely as means to the agent's own pleasure or the avoidance of his pain?'

We may recall that Hume's discussion of the passions is an attempt to account for their origin. He seeks a causal

explanation and since each passion is a simple impression, there is a sense in which we cannot expect from him an analysis of it. Some passions arise from pleasure and pain in conjunction with other qualities, whereas others arise immediately from pleasure or pain. Since the first of these have a more complex origin Hume obviously devotes more attention to them. The passions are in this book not differentiated so much according to their importance in the explanation of morality as according to the difficulty of accounting for their origin. We can admit this without abandoning the view already stated that these passions are not entirely irrelevant to the explanation of morality. We have already seen that 'I am proud of X' may be construed as a form of self valuing, and emphasised the close connection between the indirect passions and evaluations.

It need not, therefore, occasion any surprise that so much space is allotted to pride and humility, though these passions are not properly speaking motives, but "pure emotions in the soul". For even love and hatred are perhaps not motives, for one of Hume's reasons for distinguishing these passions from pride and humility as 'pure emotions' is the fact that

"The passions of love and hatred are followed by, or rather conjoined with, benevolence and anger. It is this conjunction which chiefly distinguishes these affections from pride and humility" (T.H.N. II, p.84; p.367).

Hume in fact criticises those who consider:

"that love and hatred have not only a cause which excites them, viz. pleasure and pain, and an object to which they are directed, viz. a

"person or thinking being, but likewise an end which they endeavour to attain, viz. the happiness or misery of the person beloved or hated; all which views, mixed together, make only one passion. According to this system, love is nothing but the desire of happiness to another person, and hatred that of misery. The desire and aversion constitute the very nature of love and hatred. They are not only inseparable, but the same" (T.H.N. II, p.85; p.367).

Hume thinks this view "contrary to experience". We may love or hate persons without thinking of their happiness or unhappiness, though in most cases we do desire the happiness of those we love and the unhappiness of those we hate, the passion and the desire are not inseparable, and there is no logical connection between them, but only a de facto connection.

"We may therefore infer, that benevolence and anger are passions different from love and hatred, and only conjoined with them by the original constitution of the mind" (T.H.N. II, p.85; p.368).

These impressions are loose and separable, and we are told

"Love and hatred might have been unattended with any such desires, or their particular connection might have been entirely reversed" (Ibid.).

Thus the emotion of love might have been connected with a desire for the misery of the person loved. We here again see the tendency in Hume of treating of the passions as simple impressions and it is only a contingent fact that certain desires for the most part follow from any particular passion.

It is, I think, fairly obvious that this is contrary to our normal way of looking at these emotions. Let us imagine we found people sincerely claiming to love someone and yet

having, on this and other occasions when they make such a claim, shown a propensity to harm the people they love. Let us further assume that the contrary is the case when they claim to hate someone. Whenever they say they hate someone they have the same tendency to be kind to them as we have now to be kind to those we love. I think in a case of this kind we should feel inclined to say that these people were using 'love' and 'hate' in a different way from the way we use these terms. Hume, however, is using the terms 'love' and 'hate' in such a way as to make it impossible to decide by consideration of any behavioural signs whether the emotion which is followed by benevolence is really 'love' or not. Only the ^{? benevolence?} presumption that human nature is more or less the same makes us infer that other people are really having the emotion we should have if we claimed to love someone. There is thus a sense in which we cannot in the nature of the case know whether some people are not constituted in such a way that their benevolence follows upon their hatred. ^{benevolence?}

Confining our attention to love and benevolence, we might perhaps notice the following points in the account given above.

- 1) Hume differentiates between the object of a passion and the end of a desire. Only the latter is something we endeavour to attain.
- 2) The end of benevolence is said to be the happiness of another person.
- 3) The desire arises from love but there is no suggestion at all that the end of this desire is not the ultimate end of the desire, that it can be further analysed. ?

The account gives us no reason to believe that the desire for the happiness of another is not ultimate, that it can be shown to be desired only as a means to your own happiness or pleasure. We can only say that human nature is such that desire for another's happiness is on most occasions the accompaniment of love.

It is clear that Hume distinguishes quite clearly between the cause of a passion and the end of a desire. Let us now inquire whether the causes of a passion may be such that Hume is committed to saying that only the agent's own pleasure is ever desired as an ultimate end.

In tackling this question we may perhaps be allowed to refer to the interpretation given by MacNabb, a recent commentator on Hume, who seems to accept the view that the mechanism of sympathy is such that it makes Hume's account egoistic. It is true that MacNabb is dealing with Hume's account of the origin of approval and disapproval, but it seems plain that he is guilty of a confusion between the end of a desire and the cause of a desire. He says:

"My second criticism is that Hume is unnecessarily egoistic. Let us allow that pleasure and pain form 'the chief spring or actuating principle of the human mind'. Very well, then it must be pleasure and pain, or the thought of pleasure and pain, which produce moral approval and disapproval, just as they produce desire and aversion, hope and joy, grief and fear. But why should it be only my own pleasure or the thought of it which can arouse a direct passion? Why should not Hume say that pleasure and pain when thought of, not as our own, but as anybody's, arouse direct feelings of approbation and disapprobation? Plainly he thought that this was not true. It seems to him self-evident that

"only what is pleasant or painful to me can arouse in me a passion for or against it¹. Therefore it seemed to him that the thought of another's pleasure or pain must be converted in my mind by the mechanism of sympathy into an actual pleasure or pain of mine, before it can move my passions and actuate my will" (MacNabb, pp.187-188).

MacNabb appears to think that Hume's view that desire and aversion, approval and disapproval may be aroused through the conversion of another's pain into our own somehow makes Hume's account egoistic. This would only be the case if the aversion was made an aversion to my pain, the desire a desire for my pleasure, the approval not justified unless my pleasure was aroused and justified in direct proportion to the pleasure involved. MacNabb's statement suffers somewhat from the fact that he does not make clear whether Hume is being charged with psychological or ethical egoism. It seems that in so far as the causal explanation of approval and disapproval through sympathy is thereby made egoistic, the charge is one of ethical egoism. On the other hand, the reference to the necessity of my own pleasure being aroused in order to determine the will at all, seems to be an indication that Hume is a psychological egoist.

It is possible that MacNabb may have thought that we could by the same argument decide that sympathy is 'egoistic' in that pain and pleasure must be aroused in us to determine approval and disapproval and that there is no disinterested benevolence. One is led to believe this by the fact that he tends to talk as if benevolence (a passion which has an end) and sympathy are the same. But we must remember that when

1. My underlining.

sympathy arouses approval and disapproval, these passions are not motives as such, though naturally attached to benevolence and anger.

But let us reflect upon these charges. Let us assume that A and B both want to alleviate the suffering of C, but whereas A sympathises with C in the sense that he is brought to feel with him, C's sadness is communicated to him, B only knows that C is suffering, but is in no way distressed. Who would want to say that A's desire to help C was more egoistic than B's? This would of course only be the case if he wanted to alleviate C's suffering in order to alleviate his own. The fact of the matter is that it is only in so far as the end of the desire is changed by the mechanism which brings it about that this mechanism is relevant in deciding whether the desire is egoistic or not. MacNabb simply seems to be assuming that the causal conditions laid down by Hume do have such an effect though he does not support this interpretation by any quotation from the text. It seems rather that Hume believes that people's capacity for literally feeling with one another is much greater than MacNabb thinks, but to say that he is committed to any form of egoism on that account seems unjustifiable.

In spite of the fact that I am not convinced that MacNabb has shown Hume's account to imply some sort of egoistic doctrine, there is real point in his criticism. Hume here depends upon his doctrine that ideas - as opposed to impressions - never determine the will directly, and that moral distinctions are derived from impressions. He therefore

considers it incomprehensible that a man should be determined to act by having simply the idea of another's misery. The idea is too faint, has too little force to affect the will. But what if the idea amounts to a belief? If one takes seriously his doctrine that belief is just a more lively or powerful idea, why should we not be determined by the belief that another is in pain, though the belief has not achieved the vividness of a real pain?

But there is a problem here which would still make reference to the self necessary. I never have an experience of the conjunction of the outward signs of pain and the pain of another. These two impressions cannot in the nature of the case succeed each other in my experience. The idea of pain of another I have must be derived from the impression of my own pain. There must thus be some impression in me that gives the mere thought of, or conception of, another's pain the added liveliness that raises it to the status of belief. There does not in the nature of the case seem to be any reason at all why Hume, with his mechanical conception of the origination of belief, should not have conceived it to be possible to be determined by belief, if the difference between this and an impression is one of degree only. Yet the fundamental aspect of belief as he conceives it is expectation when he talks of it as involving an attitude of mind, and an expectation is different from a practical determination. If, as Hume tends to think, practical determination is causal determination, it is naturally thought of as a determination by antecedents, and the expectation must thus lead to some further occurrence which will push us into action, since expectation is entirely consistent with passively

waiting for something to occur. We should thus still have to account for the step between belief and the practical determination. If this must be a passion, one has to see how the less lively (belief) comes to raise in us a real impression. It is in order to account for this that Hume postulates a principle of sympathy. This would not be necessary if we could admit that reason can determine action directly. Hume is unwilling to do this even though reason be conceived only as the belief that something is the case, or will be the case.

One might want to admit that nothing could convince us that pain was bad if we have never experienced pain, simply because we could not understand what pain was, but admitting this, one still finds it paradoxical to argue that on no occasion may one abstain from something simply because one believes that doing it would involve pain for another. The belief and the practical attitude are distinguished, but for Hume they must be distinguished as two experiences because of his tendency to think of all passions and all motives as occurrences in a similar way to the occurrence of a particular pain. No passions, approval and disapproval included, are therefore to be thought of as simply attitudes. To approve is not to express an attitude.

It must further be remembered that sympathetic pleasure and pain in Hume's account are efficient causes in arousing certain passions, but are never referred to as the objects or the end of the passions aroused. Let us see how sympathetic pleasure and pain may function in the causal account of benevolence, the

desire for the happiness of another. John possesses certain qualities that please me through sympathy with the pleasures of those affected by these qualities. This arouses in me love which has John as its object. But so far is it from being the case that any motive which may lead from this love would be conditioned by the continuation of my pleasure as its ultimate end, that it leads me to feel benevolence towards John, a desire to make him happy. Similarly we must remember that the enlivening by the impression of the self which accounts for the thought of John's pleasure being converted into the pleasure itself in no way changes its content. The thought of John's pleasure is merely enlivened. It becomes in no way more closely connected with me than the thought was. Thus there is no suggestion that sympathy with John is the conversion of the thought of his pleasure as a means to my own, and a consequent approval or love or benevolence arising therefrom. The causal conditions of love or benevolence neither determine the object of love which is determined by an inexplicable natural connection nor the end of benevolence, which is equally ultimate as far as Hume is concerned. MacNabb may have been influenced by the tendency to think of Hume as a reductive analyst, the tendency to think, in this case, that since sympathy is the conversion of another's pain into our own, any passion arising as a result has thereby been reduced to self-love.

It must be emphasised once again that Hume considers himself to be primarily giving an account of the causes of passions. He does not claim to be able to explain why pride

has self as object, nor why love leads to a desire which has the happiness of another as its end. These for him are just ultimate facts inexplicable by association.

There is little reason to believe that the influence of sympathy upon approval and disapproval commit Hume to ethical egoism, for Hume appeals to this principle in order to account for the fact that we approve of valuable qualities in others, even though we know that we shall never benefit from them.

In taking up an objective point of view we are looking upon a situation as if we were any other human being. In such a situation our approval would be determined only through sympathy with the pleasant or painful tendencies of the qualities of character determining our approval or disapproval, as the case may be. Hume thinks that unless in this case we were pleasantly or painfully affected we should not take up any special attitude but any change this may involve in our emotional state does not involve that the resultant benevolence or anger are directed at the object of this only as means to the continuation of my pleasant consciousness (approval) or avoidance of the painful consciousness (disapproval). It seems that if we genuinely take up an objective point of view, our being pleased (approving) and our being pained (disapproving) are both purely disinterested.

But one might feel inclined to say: How then are we to understand Hume's view that pleasure and pain are "the chief actuating principles of the mind"? The first thing to notice is that Hume's statement is a qualified one and as far as I have been able to ascertain the Treatise contains no passages which

lead one to believe that the qualification was not intended. In dealing with the direct passions that arise immediately from pleasure or pain according to Hume's classification in the introduction to Book II, Hume makes the following statement:

"Besides good and evil, or, in other words, pain and pleasure, the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable. Of this kind is the desire of punishment to our enemies, and of happiness to our friends; hunger, lust, and a few other bodily appetites. These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections."
(T.H.N. II, pp.148-149; p.439).

This statement is at first a little curious, for has Hume not already said that the desire of happiness to our friends and of unhappiness to our enemies is connected with love and hatred in the shape of anger and benevolence? Do not love and hatred proceed from pleasure and pain like the other indirect passions? This is, I consider, perfectly correct. Why then does Hume single these particular passions out as productive of pleasure and pain, though they do not proceed from them? The answer is, I think, as follows. The desires in question are both equally pleasant or equally painful as the case may be, whereas love, he considers, is pleasant and hatred painful. The association of passions only takes place through resemblance, and therefore Hume can only notice the coincidence of love with benevolence and hatred with anger. There is no general principle to which we can appeal to account for this coincidence.

It is a mistake to quote this passage in order to show that

these passions are disinterested in a way in which the passions arising from pleasure and pain are not. The question of the disinterestedness of passions or otherwise is not at issue here at all, but their causal explanation. But we can still appeal to Hume's account here in support of our interpretation of him as an opponent of psychological egoism. Hume's statement quoted shows, it is true, that there are motives to action that do not depend in any way for their occurrence upon the thought of or occurrence of pleasure and pain. But it does not follow that the direct passions that depend upon the thought or impression of pleasure and pain for their occurrence are necessarily interested or selfish. Hume's words could only give this impression if we forget all he has said about sympathy. Describing the object of the direct passions in the chapter we are considering he says:

"The mind, by an original instinct, tends to unite itself with the good, and to avoid the evil, though they be conceived merely in idea, and be considered as to exist in any future period of time"
(T.H.N. II, p.148; p.438).

The direct passions mentioned are not all motives directed to a future object. Desire, aversion, hope, fear and volition might be thus considered, but grief and joy do not seem to have a reference to a future pleasure. Joy may arise from the anticipation of a certain pleasure, but grief seems to be caused by a present or a past misfortune. But notice the very general way in which Hume states the object of direct passions and the complete absence of any specific reference to the pleasure or pain of the person who is actuated

by one or the other of these passions. The reason for this is that any other human being's pleasure or pain may arouse in us these passions through the operation of sympathy. Another's pain may arouse my sorrow, his pleasure my joy.

Though all the direct passions which have as their object an anticipated pleasure may be said to imply the obvious fact that we may desire pleasure, sympathy makes it possible for this pleasure to be that of any other human being. The object or end of those passions that proceed not from good or evil is not necessarily essentially different from the object or end of the direct passions that proceed from pleasure and pain, since private benevolence and anger are a desire for pain and a desire for pleasure respectively. But they produce rather than proceed from pleasure in this sense, that sympathy is not needed to account for the fact that it is not the agent's own pleasure, but someone else's which is the object. The agent's own pleasure is produced by their satisfaction, but cannot in the nature of the case be their original object.

As regards hunger, lust and a few other bodily appetites, we need only stress that the existence of these makes it quite obvious that Hume already in the Treatise would have accepted Butler's refutation of psychological hedonism, a theory of motivation, though this doctrine is much more thoroughly discussed in the Enquiry.

APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL ARE NOT A SPECIES OF SYMPATHY

I hope to show how my interpretation of the nature of approval and disapproval and the way Hume thinks he can account for their occurrence help to make it intelligible how sympathy can assist in the explanation of our approval of the useful virtues. It is curious that one of the accepted versions of Hume's view of the nature of approval and disapproval completely fail to give a satisfactory account of this.

Let us remember that the indirect passions have an object which is not an end to be achieved. The object is that which I am proud of or what I love because of certain qualities belonging to or closely related to that object. In a similar way I approve of a person possessed of certain qualities of character when these please me in a special way. It is requisite that I should have the capacity for taking this pleasure in the contemplation of a character. The pleasures thus derived may differ, and this difference gives rise to differences in our approval. This is indicated by the different terms, 'love', 'respect', 'esteem'. Though these arise according to the same principles and may in a sense involve the approval of a character, their feeling is yet different. Sympathy enters in here in our explanation of the way in which qualities of character come to please us or displease us. My sympathy with the pleasure or pain of those affected by

a quality of character is not my approval or disapproval but enters in as a causal element. In the same way my sympathy with the pleasure a rich man derives from his wealth is not my esteem of him. But commentators seem to find it difficult to see this obvious fact because they think that Hume is reducing the moral sense to a species of sympathy, and get troubled by the obvious fact that Hume's account of the function of sympathy as a principle of communication, and his appeal to the imagination make this reduction impossible.

Hedenius insists that Hume's attempt to "reduce the moral sense to a more general principle, that of sympathy, inevitably leads to an interpretation of all sympathy as moral approval and disapproval" (Hed., p.461). This is repeated again and again as an indubitable Humean doctrine. We are told that "he is not unfamiliar with the idea that sympathy is the same as moral consciousness, and that sympathy as such is moral approval and censure" (Hed., p.460). And again we are told that not only is he committed to the view "that consciousness of something as a virtue or a vice is a sympathetic consciousness of the pleasure or pain of others, but that the sympathetic consciousness constitutes also necessarily moral approval or censure" (Hed., p.461). It is not to be wondered at that he goes on to complain "that the valuation of the majority of virtues, and indeed the most important ones, cannot be a sympathetic consciousness at all" (Ibid.).

What is Hedenius' evidence for his view that Hume identifies approval and disapproval with 'sympathetic consciousness'? Needless to say he draws all his evidence from passages in the Enquiry. This is unfortunate for several reasons. 1) It could

only claim to be an authoritative account of Hume's view in his later work and it may well be that the term 'sympathy' does not always bear the same sense in the Enquiry as in the Treatise. 2) Hume omits in the Enquiry to explain in any detail the causes of our passions including approval and disapproval. 3) All the same it is obvious that his doctrine in the Enquiry is that we approve or disapprove of persons on account of their qualities of mind. 4) Pleasure is the cause of approval and disapproval according to the Enquiry, and is distinguished from the object, which is a person approved of because of a certain quality of mind. 5) If therefore approval is sympathy with the pleasures of others and disapproval the contrary, it seems we would be at a loss to explain how we could approve of anything but pleasure itself, since to approve is to feel a sympathetic pleasure. Is it possible that Hume could have been guilty of accepting such a highly paradoxical view? Let us look at the passages that are taken to justify the doctrine that to morally approve is 'to sympathise'.

Let us consider Hedenius' evidence taken from the Enquiry. He first of all refers to a passage in the chapter entitled "Why Utility Pleases". Here, according to him, Hume is anxious to "identify sympathy and moral valuation", that he wishes to say that "humanity is the same thing as moral consciousness". Hume's words make it perfectly clear that the conclusion Hedenius draws from them is inadmissible. Hume says: "If any man from a cold insensibility, or narrow selfishness of temper, is unaffected with the images of human happiness or misery, he must be equally indifferent to the images of vice and virtue".

It is not clear that the images of human happiness or misery, communicated by sympathy, are not identical with the images of virtue or vice which are 'images' of qualities of character causally related to human happiness or misery. Hume's words only justify the interpretation that a man devoid of the capacity for sympathy would neither approve nor disapprove of the useful virtues, that the possession of the sense of the morality of these virtues is causally dependent upon sympathy. This is undoubtedly Hume's doctrine both in the Treatise and in the Enquiry, whereas an identification of sympathising with approving or disapproving could only be accepted as an interpretation of Hume's pronouncements if no other construction could be put upon his words. If the writer does not state a doctrine unambiguously or clearly, his words should be understood in the light of his pronouncements elsewhere.

But Hedenius claims that Hume does, indeed, state the view he attributes to him in an explicit and unambiguous fashion. Here again I do not think his inference from Hume's words is the most obvious one. Hume is emphasising that morality is not based on self-love. He points out that however selfish a man may be, there must still be a basis for a choice between what is useful and what is pernicious, even though his interests are in no way involved. And he goes on to say:

"Now this distinction is the same in all its parts, with the moral distinction, whose foundation has been so often, and so much in vain, enquired after. The same endowments of the mind, in every circumstance, are agreeable to the sentiments of morals and to that of humanity; the same temper is susceptible

"of high degrees of the one sentiment and of the other; and the same alteration in the objects by their nearer approach or by connexions, enlivens the one and the other. By all the rules of philosophy, therefore, we must conclude that these sentiments are originally the same; since in each particular, even the most minute, they are governed by the same laws, and are moved by the same objects" (E.P.M., pp.235-236).

It is to be noticed that the word 'sympathy' is not used by Hume in this quotation. The question inevitably arises whether Hume uses the term 'humanity' in exactly the same sense in which he uses the term 'sympathy'. In very many places in the Enquiry 'sympathy' is used in the sense it bears in the Treatise for the communication of sentiments, though we must remember that the mere thought of the pleasures or pains that tend to follow from a quality of character may arouse in us painful or pleasant feelings by sympathy. But whereas in the Treatise this capacity of the human mind is sharply distinguished from love and hatred, and these again from benevolence, this terminological distinction is not so consistently observed in the Enquiry, perhaps because Hume did not want to become involved in the somewhat complicated psychological enquiry upon which these distinctions depend in the earlier work.

In the sense in which sympathy is "the sympathetic consciousness of the pleasures or pains of others" it is not a special kind of sentiment. In the quotation before us there is a reference to degrees of the two sentiments in question, that of humanity and that of morality. This should make us suspicious, not least because on the previous page Hume seems to be distinguishing sympathy from humanity, though perhaps not as

clearly as one might wish. "The ideas of happiness, joy, triumph, prosperity, are connected with every circumstance of his character, and diffuse over our minds a pleasing sentiment of sympathy and humanity" (E.P.M., p.234). This quotation might be taken to go against my interpretation because the word 'sentiment' is used in the singular. But then again Hume does not say 'sympathy or humanity' but 'sympathy and humanity'.

I believe that he is really referring to two distinct concepts. Just before the passage quoted he points out that when we contemplate the character of a man whose "natural talents and acquired abilities give us the prospect of elevation, advancement, a figure in life, prosperous success, a steady command over fortune, and the execution of great or advantageous undertaking, we are struck with such agreeable images, and feel a complacency and regard immediately arise towards him". Here the feeling of 'complacency and regard' is distinguished from the agreeable images and arises as a consequence of those images, communicated to us by sympathy. And in a footnote to this page Hume talks about the way in which sympathy, "a feeling of the imagination" serves to excite sentiments of complacency or censure.

Though the appearance of happiness does give pleasure (presumably by sympathy) this need not arouse any active benevolence though it may arouse approval. It seems to me clear that Hume is not using the term 'sympathy' here in any such sense as might make it equivalent to 'approval or disapproval'. 'Humanity', on the other hand, is often used by Hume to include

more than the mere consciousness of happiness or misery. In the passage we are discussing it seems obvious that this term is used to cover more, for Hume talks of "endowments of the mind" as being agreeable to humanity and the sentiment of morals. It seems fairly clear that the term is used in a sense much nearer to the sense in which 'love' is used in the Treatise. We seem to be dealing with a specific sentiment which varies according to the closeness of relations. This interpretation would have the merit of removing the paradoxical result which the identification of 'sympathetic consciousness' with approval and disapproval would involve, for love and hatred are directed towards the cause of happiness or misery in a sense in which sympathy is not, since it consists in the mere consciousness of the happiness or misery of another. This would also be in complete harmony with the passage quoted from the Treatise where 'approbation and blame' are taken to be ultimately a species of love and hatred.

It must be admitted that the suggested interpretation of the passage that is taken to prove that Hume identifies sympathetic consciousness with approval and disapproval is by no means obviously implied by Hume's words. But if we can show that in the chapter from which the quotation is taken there are repeated utterances which distinguish sympathy from approval and disapproval, this must make it more likely that in this isolated passage humanity refers to a sentiment which arises as the result of sympathising with the pleasures and pains of others, and is not taken to refer to just this 'sympathetic consciousness'.

At the very beginning of the chapter "Why Utility Pleases"

Hume points out how the utility of objects, their "fitness for a useful purpose" is commonly appealed to in justification of ascribing beauty to them. He goes on to say:

"What wonder then, that a man, whose habits and conduct are hurtful to society, and dangerous or pernicious to every one who has an intercourse with him, should, on that account be an object of disapprobation, and communicate to every spectator the strongest sentiment of disgust and hatred" (E.P.M., p.213, footnote).

It seems obvious that it is only in so far as the sentiments communicated by sympathy are disgust and hatred of the person in question that an identification of sympathy with the moral disapproval and hatred is plausible. In so far as the man's character causes other painful feelings in those who are affected by his actions, our sympathy with those is not identical with, but gives rise to our 'disgust and hatred'.

The footnote appended to the passage we are considering puts this beyond doubt. It is obvious that we may sympathise with the pleasures or pains of others whatever the cause of these pleasures or pains may be. But Hume warns us that we must not draw from this the conclusion that any object which is the source of pleasure or pain is therefore virtuous or vicious. His reason for holding this is instructive. He points out that "there are a numerous set of passions and sentiments, of which thinking rational beings are, by the original constitution of nature, the only proper objects". Unless the qualities which are the cause of pleasure or pain are placed upon an object which is a proper object of the passion, the passion is not aroused. We are familiar with this view from the account of

the indirect passions in the Treatise, and a clearer distinction between sympathetic consciousness and the resultant passions could hardly be drawn.

The parallel with the indirect passion of love becomes still more explicit when Hume refers in the following manner to the distinguishing characteristics of that sentiment which is aroused by utility when the cause of pleasure and pain is some characteristic of a person:

"The sentiments, excited by utility, are, in the two cases, very different; and the one is mixed with affection, esteem, approbation, etc., and not the other. In like manner, an inanimate object may have good colour and proportions as well as a human figure. But can we ever be in love with the former?" (E.P.M., p. 213, footnote).

Thus we see that the pleasures or pains sympathised with might be the same although the passions aroused thereby may be different. The difference is due to the different objects upon which the qualities causing pleasure or pain are placed. Only in those cases where this object is a proper object of love or hatred are the special sentiments of approval or disapproval aroused. When the object is inanimate we would still approve of it because of its utility. Perhaps we should call it beautiful if it seems peculiarly well fitted to serve as an instrument which might lead to pleasant experiences. But here the sentiment would be different and could not be approval or disapproval, love or hatred, for these passions have by nature human beings as their object. This doctrine, that passions have by nature special objects, we have repeatedly insisted upon and may remind ourselves that, talking of pride and humility in Book

II, Hume says:

"It is evident, in the first place, that these passions are determined to have self for their object, not only by a natural but also by an original property" (T.H.N. II, pp.7-8).

There is something missing in the situation where we sympathise with the pleasures or pains of others caused by inanimate objects which makes it impossible for moral approval and disapproval to arise. "A very small variation of the object, even when the same qualities are preserved, will destroy a sentiment" (E.P.M., p.213, footnote).

There are several other passages in the chapter "Why Utility Pleases" which indicate that sympathy is appealed to as the principle which helps to explain the origin of approval or disapproval. The horror at the prospect of misery is distinguished from "antipathy against its author" (E.P.M., p.221). The principles of sympathy and humanity are said to "excite¹ the strongest censure and applause" (E.P.M., p.231). Our sympathy with the characters in a play is shown in "anxiety and concern" when they are made unhappy. "But where their sufferings proceed from the treachery, cruelty, or tyranny of an enemy, our breasts are affected with the liveliest resentment against the author of these calamities¹" (E.P.M., p.222). Here our sympathy is clearly distinguished from the resultant approval or disapproval. This need in no way surprise us, for the doctrine of the Treatise undoubtedly is that approval and disapproval are passions "founded on pleasure and pain¹".

1. My underlining.

The approval of virtue merely as such may be a direct passion arising from the sympathy which results from contemplating the tendencies of certain qualities of character in general. When these qualities belong to a definite person, the approval or disapproval appear to be indirect passions with a person as their object. If we do not accept this interpretation, our account of the way in which Hume comes to think of the various sources of virtue becomes unintelligible, for it is only in the case of virtues immediately pleasing to the person himself that we could, with any degree of plausibility, identify the sympathy with pleasure with approval, for here a person's mirth, for example, seems to be the quality sympathised with and also the object approved of. But even this would not do, for it is the durable quality of mind we approve of, the man's tendency to be cheerful and not his actual cheerfulness, though our sentiments would be strengthened if we had a close relation to a cheerful person and associated directly with him on many occasions of his cheerful moods.

But Hume cannot be wholly absolved from responsibility for the misrepresentation of his doctrine by some commentators. The way in which he uses such terms as 'humanity' in the Enquiry is certainly not quite as consistent as those might wish who expect a philosopher to have a clearly defined terminology strictly adhered to. 'Humanity' is sometimes used as equivalent to 'sympathy' in the sense in which sympathy is a principle of communication, but at other times it seems to be made to cover benevolence or concern for another person's welfare. Thus we get a reference to a person's "generous

humanity" where 'benevolence' could apparently be substituted without loss of meaning. In another place it is enumerated as one of the social virtues in a list which mentions generosity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy and moderation but not benevolence. In yet another place we get a vague reference to the "benevolent principle" and "the natural sentiment of benevolence" where 'humanity' could apparently serve equally well. In a similar way Hume sometimes uses 'sympathy' in a manner which seems to make it inclusive of benevolence. Thus the fact that Hume says the sentiment of humanity is originally the same as the sentiment of morals need not mean that to approve or disapprove is identical with the "consciousness of the happiness or misery of another". All Hume need mean is that our capacity for being sympathetically conscious of the pleasures or pains of another arouses in us approval and disapproval and benevolence towards those approved or disapproved of, and since these are always livelier and fainter *pari passu* with change in qualities or with a change in the closeness of relations we may say that these two sentiments are at bottom the same. But Hume does not even say they are 'at bottom the same', but that they are 'originally the same'. This leaves open the possibility that the sentiments talked of are not identical as they appear in our consciousness, but that the same principle or characteristic of our nature gives rise to both. This interpretation may be strengthened by the analogy Hume draws with the explanation of bodies falling and the fact that the stars are kept in their orbit in terms of "the same force of gravity". Here there is no suggestion that bodies

falling and the stars are identical, but the principle which explains the two occurrences is identical. Thus we might think that he is merely pointing out that the capacity for sympathising with the pleasures and pains of others and the variations in the intensity of this sympathetic consciousness equally explains our benevolence or concern for the welfare of others and our approval and disapproval of qualities of character.

All I have wanted to establish is that the interpretation Hedenius considers an inevitable consequence of Hume's words is by no means inevitable and must be considered somewhat unpalatable since it makes it difficult to make sense of Hume's account of sympathy with the pleasure or pain which tend to result from qualities of character as the source of our approval of those qualities. One must most emphatically reject the view that the main conclusion of Hume's philosophy is "that moral consciousness is a form of sympathy".

Hedenius considers that Vaughan's interpretation of Hume's view as to the object of approval and disapproval follows logically from Hume's view that approval and disapproval "are sympathy" and that the object of approval and disapproval is always a motive. From this Vaughan seems to draw the conclusion that Hume is in no sense a utilitarian, for reflection upon the hedonic consequences of actions does not determine our approval or disapproval. It seems that in judging of our own actions our approval or disapproval simply is sympathy with the feelings of others about us, whereas in judging of others our approval or disapproval consist in sympathising with their motives.

Hedenius points out that Vaughan's interpretation seems to fit Adam Smith's theory better than Hume's, and in this he seems to be perfectly correct. Vaughan refers a great deal to the Treatise, but it seems that according to the concept of sympathy as it functions in that work we could only call approval or disapproval sympathy with motives if the motives in question were in fact these passions. This would, however, only account for the fact that we might agree with another in approving of something, but would not account for our approval of that other person. If we think of approval and disapproval as any pleasant motive communicated by sympathy, we should not be much better off for the pleasantness of such a motive as benevolence is only one of the sources of the approval of this virtue and not the most potent one. It is very difficult to make out what exactly Vaughan's interpretation amounts to, but it seems that he makes far too much of Hume's doctrine that approval and disapproval are always of motives.

It is perfectly true that "we are never to consider any single action in our inquiries concerning the origin of morals, but only the quality of character from which the action proceeded". But Hume's reason for holding this to be the case is not that the motive considered as occurring in consciousness, a desire or a passion, is the man's conscious motivation we either approve of or sympathise with, but rather that the quality of character from which the action proceeded is durable enough to affect our sentiments concerning the person. An action considered merely as such is not closely enough related to the person acting unless it is seen to be a legitimate sign of a motive or quality of

character in him. The character or qualities of mind of another person are only known from experience and thus we would say of a person who had shown consistent benevolence in his past actions that an action which led to an increase in unhappiness performed by such a person did not justify the inference that malice was the motive. As a consequence of this, such incidental actions out of character do not determine our love or hatred, approval or disapproval of the person.

In showing why intentionality is important in determining love and hatred Hume's arguments follow a similar course. "By the intention we judge of the actions; and, according as that is good or bad, they become causes of love or hatred" (T.H.N. II, p.68). Now it is not the intentionality as such which causes love or hatred, for in many cases where the quality in a person which pleases or displeases us is very constant, love may be aroused though there is no intention. The intention becomes important in dealing with individual actions because "an intention shows certain qualities, remaining after the action is performed". It is as a sign of some qualities of character that the intentionality becomes important for it gives a closer relation between the agent and his actions. If we look upon a motive as something occurring in an agent's mind, some state of his consciousness, we might with equal justice say that Hume thought actions always judged by the intention as that the motive decided the merit of an agent.

Hume makes it quite clear that when an action is accidental the relation between the person as its 'immediate'

cause is too loose. But he is equally clear that no conscious design or purpose need be present in the person's mind in order that love or hatred may be aroused as a result of an action. It is not sympathy with the agent's conscious state in acting which constitutes our approval or disapproval, whether this is concerned as a motive or an intention, though sympathy with the pleasure or pain arising in an agent from a quality of character may contribute to the creation of love or hatred, approval or disapproval. But it is perhaps sufficient to mention that motives that are unpleasant may be approved of in order to refute the notion that Hume thinks approval constituted by a sympathy with a motive. "Anger and hatred are passions inherent in our very frame or constitution. The want of them on some occasions may even be a proof of weakness and imbecility" (T.H.N. III, p.299). It is clear that here we may disapprove of a character because the absence of an essentially unpleasant motive may be an indication of a characteristic which tends not to have felicitous results. We are most certainly not committed to disapproving of other people's disapprovals, though this passion is an unpleasant one. This is easily intelligible when we remember that such disapprovals may be signs of a quality of mind or character which tends to have beneficial results.

THE NATURAL VIRTUES AND SYMPATHY

In our treatment of all virtues, natural and artificial, we must keep firmly in mind that "the imagination adheres to the general views of things, and distinguishes the feelings they produce from those which arise from our particular and momentary situation" (T.H.N. III, p.282; p.587).

When people sing the praises of "great men" it is, Hume thinks, found that most of the qualities in virtue of which we approve of them are either such that they benefit society or the person possessed of the virtue. To the first class belong generosity and humanity, and to the second prudence, temperance, frugality, industry, assiduity, enterprise, dexterity. All the virtues here enumerated are natural virtues and we shall reserve the artificial virtues for separate treatment. Let us call the two classes of natural virtues we have distinguished social and self-regarding.

It must not be forgotten that Hume thinks the self-regarding virtues furnish the best evidence for his contention that sympathy is needed to explain evaluations. In the case of social virtues there is always the possibility we might be taken to approve of them because of the benefit we derive from society. In cases where the person we judge of is the member of another society or belongs to a past age, we might be taken

to approve of him because of the benefit we imagine we should have received if we had been members of that society. Although we may here have to appeal to the imagination it is not absolutely clear that we need to appeal to a principle of sympathy, though Hume is confident that

" were nothing esteemed virtue but what were beneficial to society, I am persuaded that the foregoing explication of the moral sense ought still to be received, and that upon sufficient evidence" (T.H.N. III, p.283; p.588).

But when we consider that we approve of a person because he possesses qualities that "have a tendency to promote his interest and satisfaction" it seems the end these qualities are "fit to produce" must somehow "be agreeable to me". How can this be the case if the man is to me "a total stranger" to whom I am under no obligation and who is not likely to be of any service to me in virtue of those qualities that have a tendency to serve his interests? It seems to Hume obvious that only sympathy with the happiness of the person in question could explain why I approve of him because of his possession of self-regarding virtues. It is for this reason alone that the tendency these virtues have to serve the possessor of them "have an agreeable effect upon my imagination and command my love and esteem" (T.H.N. III, p.284; p.589).

It is not only that cool self-love or enlightened self-interest would be unable to account for our approval of these self-regarding virtues. We are now also in a position to see why the same qualities of mind give rise to pride and love on the one hand, humility and hatred on the other. A man will have a high opinion of himself in virtue of possessing the very same

qualities that would lead him to have a high opinion of another if they belonged to that other person. Without the appeal to sympathy one might perhaps understand why a man could be proud of qualities that serve his own purposes, but it would be more difficult to see why others should love him because of them. Though the objects of love and pride are different the qualities that determine our 'evaluation' are the same:

"This theory may serve to explain why the same qualities, in all cases, produce both pride and love, humility and hatred; and the same man is always virtuous or vicious, accomplished or despicable to others, who is so to himself." (T.H.N. III, p.284; p.589)

It seems that Hume is making a false factual claim at this point. Surely a man may have a low opinion of himself though others have a high opinion of him. Many a proud man is surely disapproved of by others. Hume certainly does not overlook this obvious fact, for the next section of the Treatise, "Of Greatness of Mind", is among other things concerned with explaining how pride comes to be disapproved of by others. Pride is often a vice. There must thus be another explanation for the way Hume expresses himself in the quotation we are considering.

Hume is, I believe, mainly concerned to show how the self-regarding virtues can only be made intelligible if we appeal to the principle of sympathy. When he talks of the indirect passions in this connection he is referring to the unbiased variety of these passions, proper evaluations. This becomes I think clear when we notice that he maintains that a man "whose character is only dangerous and disagreeable to others,

can never be satisfied with himself, as long as he is sensible of that disadvantage" (T.H.N. III, p.284; p.589).

The trouble with the man whose pride is greater than his qualities merit lies just in this, that he is insensitive to the fact that his pride is disagreeable to others. When pride is a vice it comes under the heading of those qualities immediately disagreeable to others. The fact that qualities of mind are immediately disagreeable to others when known to us may make us "displeased with a quality commodious to us, merely because it displeases others; though perhaps we can never have any interest in rendering ourselves agreeable to them" (T.H.N. III, p.284; p.589).

To be displeased with yourself because you cause others displeasure is one thing. To be displeased with yourself because other people's displeasure will hinder you in your own designs and purposes is another.

Hume insists in the Treatise that our approval of the qualities of mind immediately pleasing to the person himself or to others can only be explained if we appeal to sympathy. We tend to approve of a man who is prone to the pleasant rather than the unpleasant passions. This we could only do if we were not entirely unaffected by the man's pains and pleasures. Hume's distinction into four categories of virtues depends upon the fact that in each case we should approve of the virtue even though the three other sources of pleasure were absent. This is not meant to imply that if a man's pleasant passions had undesirable consequences we should still approve of the man.

In the case of qualities immediately agreeable to others

we must appeal to sympathy because we judge these virtues by their seeming tendencies. The following quotation makes Hume's meaning perfectly clear:

"But, however, directly the distinction of vice and virtue may seem to flow from the immediate pleasure and uneasiness, which particular qualities cause to ourselves and others, it is easy to observe that it has also a considerable dependence on the principle of sympathy so often insisted on. We approve of a person possessed of qualities immediately agreeable to those with whom he has any commerce, though perhaps we ourselves never reap any pleasure from them. We also approve of one who is possessed of qualities that are immediately agreeable to himself, though they be of no service to any mortal. To account for this, we must have recourse to the foregoing principles" (T.H.N. III, p.285; p.590).

It is, as Hume points out, only those qualities that give pleasure and pain "from the mere survey" that are denominated virtues and vices, and this we can only explain if we have recourse to the function of the imagination and that sympathy which is operative when men fix on a "common point of view, from which they might survey their object, and which might cause it to appear the same to all of them" (T.H.N. III, p.286; p.591).

It is very important to remind ourselves that approval and disapproval cannot be equated with just any pleasure and pain. The feelings or sentiment upon which moral distinctions depend are of a particular kind. Only those interests and pleasures that arise from our adopting the standpoint of an impartial spectator counterbalance those that naturally arise in us in our particular situation in life:

"And, though such interests and pleasures

"touch us more faintly than our own, yet, being more constant and universal, they counterbalance the latter even in practice, and are alone admitted in speculation as the standard of virtue and morality. They alone produce that particular feeling or sentiment on which moral distinctions depend".
(T.H.N. III, p.286; p.591)

It is thus obvious that Hume claims in the Treatise that the approval of all virtues depends upon our taking up an objective standpoint, that the imagination is involved and thus sympathy with the effect the quality of mind in question would tend to have.

It has been argued that sympathy need only be appealed to in explaining some of the virtues. I shall try to show that from Hume's standpoint and his insistence that approval and disapproval are passions of a special kind one can avoid the conclusion that his system involves a radical incoherence.

Both in the Treatise and in the Enquiry Hume distinguishes four sources of the merit of qualities of mind. Such qualities may be deemed virtuous because they are immediately agreeable to the person himself, immediately agreeable to others, useful to the person himself or useful to others. It is to be remembered, however, that although we thus get four different classes of virtuous qualities these classes are not mutually exclusive. The same quality of mind may be both agreeable and useful and an explanation of its virtue would have to mention both these characteristics.

(1) Qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves. There are certain passions which are inherently disagreeable. Hume mentions the following in a footnote in the Enquiry: fear,

anger, dejection, grief, melancholy, anxiety. These are all 'passions' which most human beings will have experienced from time to time. A man is not vicious just because he is stricken with grief at the loss of a close friend, nor is an angry person necessarily bad. It is in fact not the disagreeable passions themselves which are vicious but rather the propensity to these passions. A person's character becomes disagreeable to us if he has a propensity to these passions simply because these passions are communicated to us by sympathy. It is possible to suggest that the list of passions given above could be regarded as a list of motives. Moods and emotions are sometimes regarded as motives. But the important point about this class of virtuous qualities is that they are not approved of as motives. The word 'motive' belongs to the vocabulary of explanation of actions. When we say "He beat his wife because he was angry" we are explaining a person's actions and only in so far as this is my purpose can this be counted as an explanation in terms of motive. If I condemn this motive and say that a person ought not to be motivated by anger I am not condemning the feeling as such but only claiming that he should control himself, should not let anger lead him into beating his wife and other undesirable behaviour. But Hume's main point is that this is not our only reason for condemning or disapproving of an irascible man. We do not only disapprove of him because he is prone to act in a mischievous way but also simply because it is disagreeable for the man himself to be angry. We disapprove because the emotion or mood is disagreeable as such and not just because it

is a bad motive¹. This is because we may sympathise with the feelings of the man whose character we are judging as well as with the feelings of those who are affected by his actions. It may be the case that there is no virtue approved of merely because it is agreeable to the possessor, but this is one of the causes of approval even of such virtues as benevolence, which undoubtedly derives much of its merit from the fact that it leads to behaviour which on the whole increases the pleasure of others.

(2) In the case of qualities immediately agreeable to others it seems that these are approved of immediately and do not seem to need sympathy to be perfectly intelligible to us. Among the chief of these virtues we may mention good manners, wit and ingenuity. The witty person pleases us immediately and the reason why is not that he is pleased himself. It is not through sympathy with his pleasure that we come to approve in so far as this is a virtue immediately pleasing to others. But part of our approval is surely derived from the consideration that this quality causes pleasure in other people than the person judging. This is perfectly true. But wit would still be immediately pleasing to an individual without this consideration and would thus be valued.

But there is an ambiguity in the term 'value' here, for even though we may not need sympathy to explain the fact that we value a witty acquaintance, seek his company on account of his wit and would not want to be deprived of it, we do need

1. It must be stressed that I am not myself willing to subscribe to the view that moods are motives.

sympathy in order to explain that in another sense of 'value' we count as equally valuable the wit of an acquaintance and the wit of a person wholly unknown to us. But as regards this source of value we can see again that we do not just value persons on account of their motives, for neither wit nor politeness would normally be classified as motives.

(3) When we come to the class of virtues useful to the possessor Hume is again quite explicit that we are not talking specifically about motives but habits and qualities of character.

"It seems evident, that where a quality or habit is subjected to our examination, if it appear in any respect prejudicial to the person possessed of it, or such as incapacitates him for business and action, it is instantly blamed, and ranked among his faults and imperfections" (E.P.M., p.233).

Thus even intelligence is esteemed a virtue on this account and no-one would suggest that intelligence is a motive.

(4) In the case of virtues useful to others Hume emphasises that this usefulness to others is a very common source of merit. Many of those virtues which are useful to the agent or immediately pleasing to the agent may also be useful to others. The merit of virtues may be drawn from more than one source. There is, however, one class of virtues that are peculiar in that they derive all their merit from their usefulness to others. This is the class of artificial virtues, such as justice and chastity. A person may form a settled disposition to be just or chaste from more than one motive,

but whichever the motive such a disposition is approved. We shall have to discuss the artificial virtues with some thoroughness in a separate chapter, but we may notice here that the source of the value of these virtues is obviously to be explained by an appeal to the principle of sympathy, for unless we were affected through this principle by the happiness or unhappiness of others considerations of utility would in no way affect us. It is because of our sympathy with the happiness of others that we approve.

It has been suggested that Hume is inconsistent in his appeal to sympathy in order to furnish a common principle which will explain our valuations based on the various sources of merit already mentioned. I believe this criticism to be mistaken. Hedenius claims that "... those virtues which are immediately agreeable to other persons are outside the general scheme of Hume's ethics" (Hed., p.398). His reasons for this are simple for he claims that

"the definition implies that they are virtues, because they are qualities that are approved of, but such a definition must for Hume imply pure tautology: they are virtues because they are virtues, qualities approved of because they are qualities that are approved of" (Hed., p.398).

If Hedenius is right it is obviously superfluous to appeal to sympathy in order to explain why the presence of these qualities elicits approval and this would be the same as to explain why they are virtues. The assumption upon which this criticism is based is simply that to be pleased by the wit of a person is to consider the wit a virtue, to 'morally' approve of it. This is so because Hume is alleged to teach that a

pleasurable consciousness of X is the approval of X. But a careful reading of the chapter in which Hume discusses this topic reveals that he distinguishes between the explanation of why the qualities under consideration are immediately agreeable to others and the explanation of our approval of those qualities.

In the case of wit it might be impossible to explain by the help of psychological concepts why the behaviour or conversation of the witty person gives immediate pleasure to others. But when we come to explain the fact that wit is counted a virtue and not just liked by those who enjoy the company of the witty person we must appeal to the principle of sympathy. The final paragraph of the chapter makes this clear:

"We approve of another, because of his wit, politeness, modesty, decency, or any agreeable quality he possesses; although he be not of our acquaintance, nor has ever given us any entertainment by means of these accomplishments. The idea, which we form of their effect on his acquaintance has an agreeable influence on our imagination and gives us the sentiment of approbation. This principle enters into all¹ the judgments which we form concerning manners and characters" (E.P.M., p.267).

Is it not obvious that the words 'this principle' refer to sympathy and could Hume be more explicit than he is when he says that this enters into all our approvals of the qualities under consideration? Hedenius' confusion is perhaps caused by a failure to see that we may be 'spectators' in two different ways. We may be pleased as spectators of the antics of a clown or when we see a polite person's behaviour. But when Hume talks of our taking up the position

1. My underlining.

of a spectator he is thinking of a judgment of a particular quality as a source of pleasure generally. We have not taken up an unbiased view unless we do this. Here sympathy with the pleasure of others inevitably comes into the picture and influences our feelings of approval or disapproval. Thus although the immediate pleasures derived from the company of the witty and the polite are undoubtedly the source of the virtuous character of wit and politeness we must understand the term 'source' in the sense in which a causal factor is a source of its effect.

When Hume just before the passage quoted above mentions the fact that certain people seem to possess a certain indefinable something which "catches our affection" in an inexplicable manner, it is to be noticed that he does not say "commands our approval". Sympathy cannot explain why these characteristics catch our affection but this is very different from saying that we may come to approve of this characteristic without the assistance of the principle of sympathy.

Hume thinks that pride, when justified, is a most valuable asset. It helps us to achieve our purposes and is generally found in people we call great men. In spite of this it is the case that expressions of pride are thought to indicate bad breeding. In order to explain this we must refer to the fact that people generally have a tendency to think more highly of themselves than seems to be justified. An expression of pride operates upon others through the principle of comparison, and this has an effect opposite to that of sympathy. Our knowledge of the high opinion someone else has of himself makes

us see ourselves as more insignificant by contrast. This pains us and it is for this reason that the general rule is formed that pride, even when justified, is not to be allowed full and unhindered expression.

"... we establish the rules of good breeding, in order to prevent the opposition of men's pride, and render conversation agreeable and inoffensive" (T.H.N. III, p.292; p.597).

There is no doubt that the explanation Hume gives of the fact that we dislike a boastful man has a lot of truth in it. He also makes some rather interesting observations on the difference between occasions where sympathy operates from the occasions where we are affected by comparison. Let us imagine our feelings during a bad storm when we come to know of a boat in distress. If we are at a relatively safe distance this may raise in us a feeling of satisfaction with our own lot by comparison. If on the other hand we are on the sea shore actually seeing the men falling overboard and the panic on their faces, we are likely to be affected by sympathy with their plight and gripped by pity or compassion. This observation may be sound, but it raises the question whether it is possible to give any general rule for deciding when our knowledge of others' suffering would influence us by comparison as opposed to sympathy. When we remember that specifically moral approvals arise when we take up a relatively detached attitude one should perhaps have expected that our knowledge of the suffering of others would make us more satisfied with our lot rather than that it should pain us through sympathy. But perhaps one ought not to talk here in terms of exclusive alternatives. Perhaps our satisfaction

with our own situation as contrasted with the lot of the unfortunate people affected by the deeds of an evildoer strengthens still more our disapproval of him.

Hume makes it quite clear that certain virtues only achieve this status by being combined with benevolence. Such things as courage and ambition, judgment and other such virtues are only valuable when combined with benevolence:

"Courage and ambition when not regulated by benevolence, are fit only to make a tyrant and public robber. It is the same case with judgment and capacity, and all the qualities of that kind. They are indifferent in themselves to the interests of society, and have a tendency to the good or ill of mankind, according as they are directed by these other passions" (T.H.N., III, p.297; p.604).

Thus for Hume the benevolent and tender passions are of peculiar importance. It is indeed the case that there is nothing which is more lovable than "any instance of extraordinary delicacy in love or friendship". This is not because of the general public utility of these passions. It is rather that the passion communicated by sympathy is love itself and this need only change its object, so to speak, and it comes to be directed to the loving people. Since any mental quality which excites love is a virtue, we need thus not be surprised that the tendency to this passion should be much admired. Hume does not always distinguish between valuing in the sense in which to love a man is to value him and the valuing which would be properly expressed by saying he is a good or a virtuous man. The reason no doubt is that since approval is only a more imperceptible love this is made more violent and becomes what

we normally call love when you are in fact acquainted with the loved one. In these cases you are quite often also conscious that your love is determined by merit and not by the fact that you are closely related to the people whose propensity to the tender passions you so much admire.

Though Hume rates the 'tender passions' so highly we must never forget that all 'angry passions' are vicious:

"Anger and hatred are passions inherent in our very frame and constitution. The want of them, on some occasions, may even be a proof of weakness and imbecility" (T.H.N. III, p.299; p.605).

It must all the same not be forgotten that when these passions rise to cruelty we have an example of the most abominable of vices.

Though Hume places main emphasis on the tender virtues and the artificial virtues, we must not forget that he is willing to count as a virtue such a thing as a good judgment or wit. These do not excite approval of quite the same kind, however.

"Good sense and genius beget esteem; wit and humour excite love" (T.H.N. III, p.301; p.608).

Apart from the strangeness of calling these qualities virtues it is important to note that Hume realises that we feel differently about the various things we value under the name virtue. Different qualities affect our emotions differently. The following footnote shows what is common and what is different in the evaluations implied in loving and esteeming:

"Love and esteem are at the bottom the same passions, and arise from like causes. The qualities that produce both are agreeable and give pleasure. But when this pleasure is severe and serious; or where its object is great,

"and makes a strong impression; or where it produces any degree of humility or awe; in all these cases, the passion which arises from the pleasure is more properly denominated esteem than love. Benevolence attends both; but is connected with love in a more eminent degree" (T.H.N. III, p.301; footnote; p.608).

Since there can only be four indirect passions according to Hume's psychological story, it should be obvious to us why love and esteem must be thought at bottom the same. What is interesting here is the relation between awe or humility and esteem or respect. In a case where by contrast we tend to feel small and insignificant in relation to the object, it would be proper to say we esteem or respect the object. Love does not seem to have in it this element of 'looking up to', though as Hume points out, it tends to be more closely connected with benevolence. We tend to be more solicitous for the welfare of persons we love than for those we esteem or respect. We tend to call great what commands our esteem and good what commands our love.

But is Hume not guilty of a gross confusion between the moral and non-moral qualities a man may have? He is well aware of the fact that he is extending the scope of the term 'virtue' but he thinks he can show that there are good grounds for emphasising the similarities between virtues and talents, moral and non-moral qualities in general. Hume points out that people in fact seem to value their intellectual capacities as much as what we normally call their moral virtues. They might become more angry if called fools than if they were called knaves. It is furthermore undeniable that natural abilities

"give a new lustre to the other virtues;
and that a man possessed of them is much
more entitled to our good will and
services than one entirely void of them"
(T.H.N. III, p.300; p.607).

It is, I think, undeniable that we do not estimate a man's virtue simply by his intention. A man who forms his intentions, however benevolent, on the basis of unrealistic assessment of his abilities would perhaps be described as kind but foolish. The 'but' may be taken to indicate a reservation in our praise. But this is not the only way in which the possession of natural abilities may increase our admiration for a man's moral stature. Who would want to claim that we could count Albert Schweizer's intellectual abilities as irrelevant in assessing the value of his life as a moral agent?

We have already seen that different virtues inspire different kinds of feeling. It would thus be quite possible that what we call natural abilities may inspire different kinds of emotions from other virtues, we might feel differently about them. This is not, however, sufficient to justify us in thinking them of an entirely different kind, since the same holds for different qualities admitted to be virtues, e.g. the awe-inspiring and the lovable.

Since it is the pleasurable characteristics that arise from the contemplation of personal characteristics that determine approval and disapproval, we can easily see that such consequences may result from non-voluntary characteristics. This would thus not furnish an adequate criterion for distinguishing virtues from talents. As regards the criterion that virtues are the result of free activities whereas talents are not, Hume points to his discussion of freedom, according to which the

'voluntary' is not necessarily 'free'.

Hume does all the same recognise that the distinction between the voluntary and the involuntary can explain to us why moralists have invented the notion of moral virtue:

"Men have observed, that, though natural abilities and moral qualities be in the main on the same footing, there is, however, this difference betwixt them, that the former are almost invariable by any art of industry; while the latter, or at least the actions that proceed from them, may be changed by the motives of rewards and punishment, praise and blame. Hence legislators and divines and moralists have principally applied themselves to the regulating of these voluntary actions, and have endeavoured to produce additional motives for being virtuous in that particular. They knew, that to punish a man for folly, or exhort him to be prudent and sagacious would have but little effect; though the same punishments and exhortations, with regard to justice and injustice, might have a considerable influence" (T.H.N. III, p.302; p.609).

Nowell-Smith tries to distinguish moral from non-moral qualities or characteristics in terms of amenability to praise and blame:

"Both he (the weak-willed) and the wicked man differ from the addict or compulsive in that the latter will respond neither to threats nor to encouragement" (Ethics, p.306).

The trouble with this is that the really hardened criminal, the person who is beyond redemption, does no more respond to threats or encouragements than the addict. We yet distinguish between them, but on this theory there seems no ground for this.

Hume is entirely clear about the difference between the sense in which you can decide to approve or disapprove with a

view to altering people's behaviour and the other more fundamental sense in which you find yourself approving or disapproving as you find yourself loving or hating someone. This latter sense is for him the primary sense of moral evaluation and is to be distinguished from the use moral language can be put to in encouraging or discouraging behaviour. The following quotation from Nowell-Smith can only be defended if by 'appraising', 'praising' and 'blaming' we mean doing something overtly.

"Appraising, praising, and blaming are things that men do and can only be understood on the assumption that they do them for a purpose and use means adapted to their purpose" (Ethics, p.301).

According to Hume, and in this I think he is right, we cannot choose to evaluate in one way rather than another, though we may choose to use evaluative language for the purpose of encouraging certain behaviour and discouraging other. It is for the above reason that I think Nowell-Smith is misleading in his account of this matter in a way in which Hume is not. He says:

"Moral approval and disapproval play the same role (as rewards and punishments). It is not just an accident that they please and hurt and that they are used only in cases in which something is to be gained by pleasing or hurting" (Ethics, p.304).

In the basic sense of 'approve' or 'disapprove' we cannot use our approvals or disapprovals in the sense in which we may use bad language. If we want to express in language our approval or disapproval we need have no special reason for

doing so other than the fact that we approve or disapprove. This is not to deny the fact that we may also express our approval or disapproval in order to modify people's conduct.

Hume widens the concept of virtue but not in such a way as to want to justify punishments for lack in certain abilities or talents. He is primarily interested in the ways in which we evaluate human character and he is perhaps right in thinking that no clear-cut criterion to distinguish the specifically moral is in use by ordinary people. We do not, for example, enquire whether a man's courage is native to him before we call it a virtue. This is not at all to deny that it is only reasonable to use moral language for exhortations where we think they may modify conduct.

THE ARTIFICIALITY OF JUSTICE

The word 'artificial' is often used in opposition to 'real' although 'real' has of course many other opposites. Thus we talk about the real and the imaginary, and the distinction between the real and the apparent, appearance and reality, is perhaps the best known distinction to be found in the history of philosophy. But when Hume calls justice an artificial virtue, he is not distinguishing it from real virtue. He is certainly not saying that it appears to be a virtue but really is no virtue at all, nor is he even wanting to imply that it is an inferior kind of virtue. It is important to remember this, for sometimes the word 'artificial' is used in such a way as to throw doubt upon the value of an object. It is used as the opposite to 'genuine'. "The stone in her ring is merely artificial." This the ladies at the party whisper to one another. They take care she does not hear this unless they deliberately intend to insult her.

As used by Hume, 'artificial' has neither 'real' nor 'genuine' as its opposite. It is not a value term at all, but has a purely descriptive force. An 'artificial' virtue is contrasted with 'natural' virtue, both these terms to be taken

in a strictly descriptive sense. Thus we must not confuse this contrast with that between natural and unnatural. For to describe a passion as unnatural would, I think, involve a condemnation or a disapproval of it. Hume's use of 'artificial' in the context we are considering is not unlike the use of this term in 'artificial silk', where the word is used to indicate that the silk is not a natural product but is produced by human inventiveness. But the analogy is perhaps not as close as it may seem, for 'artificial silk' is sometimes distinguished from 'real silk' and here the use of 'real' indicates that this kind of silk is somehow better or at least more truly entitled to be called silk than the artificial variety, which is not really silk though it masquerades as such. We must at the outset rid ourselves of the inclination to think that Hume, by calling some virtues artificial, wanted to indicate that they were less valuable or less entitled to the name 'virtue' than the natural variety.

Hume entitles the second part of Book III of the Treatise "Of Justice and Injustice". This is slightly misleading, for he treats under this general heading other virtues such as allegiance and chastity and modesty. In general one might say that this part of the Treatise is concerned with artificial virtues as distinct from natural virtues, but of these justice is considered by Hume to be the most important. It is further to be remembered that the second part of the book is the longest and the third part is entitled "Of the Other Virtues and Vices" and contains only a relatively short chapter on the origin of the natural virtues. This may serve to indicate that Hume

considered his discussion of justice and injustice of great importance. This chapter will only contain some observations about Hume's general arguments for the artificiality of justice. A representation of the subtlety of the detail of Hume's arguments would take too long. It must in particular be remembered that I do not intend to discuss the bearing of his doctrine of the artificiality of justice upon his political theory.

Hume rejects, without reservation, the view that we can explain why any particular conduct is a sign of virtue by simply appealing to a moral sense. This would hardly be an explanation. It is rather an expression of our inability to explain. A simple appeal to an original instinct

"is not conformable to the usual maxims by which nature is conducted, where a few principles produce all that variety we observe in the universe, and everything is carried on in the easiest and most simple manner".

We explain by showing how various apparently diverse occurrences were to be expected because of the presence of one property in all. The model is that of scientific explanation or a special kind of scientific explanation. Hume would have endorsed completely the following remarks made by Bentham:

"One man says he has a thing made on purpose to tell him what is right and what is wrong; and that it is called a moral sense; and then he goes to work at his ease, and says, 'such a thing is right, and such a thing is wrong - why? because my moral sense tells me it is'
(P.M.L., p.17, footnote).

Such an explanation would, indeed, be like saying that a drug puts you to sleep because it possesses a 'virtus dormitiva'.

Where are we to look for the common principle which would explain particular approvals and disapprovals? Are these principles to be found in nature? Hume's answer to this question is instructive. He distinguishes various senses of 'natural' and considers the answer in terms of each. In so far as we oppose the natural to the miraculous, we can anticipate his answer, for everything that happens is natural, Hume contends, though he adds with the tongue in his cheek "excepting those miracles on which our religion is founded" (T.H.N. III, p.181; p.474). In the sense in which we contrast the natural and the unusual we find that the boundary between these concepts is not very sharply defined. We may all the same affirm that the 'sentiments of morality' are in this sense natural, for

"there never was any nation of the world, nor any single person in any nation, who was utterly deprived of them, and who never, in any instance, showed the least approbation or dislike of manners" (T.H.N. III, p.182; p.474).

Here the mere fact that people approve and disapprove of actions is taken as evidence that they have a moral sense. It seems we can know that a man possesses moral sense without knowing what he approves and disapproves of. It is a contingent fact about human nature that the passions we call approval and disapproval have the 'causes' Hume ascribes to them.

From one point of view things that arise from 'artifice' are entirely natural:

"We readily forget that the designs, and projects, and views of men are principles as necessary in their operation as heat and cold, moist and dry; but, taking them to be free and entirely our own, it is

"usual for us to set them in opposition to the other principles of nature" (T.H.N. III, p.182; p.474).

There is thus a sense in which an artifice is to be expected from man.

"Mankind is an inventive species; and where the invention is obvious and absolutely necessary, it may as properly be said to be natural as anything that proceeds immediately from original principles, without the intervention of thought and reflection" (T.H.N. III, p.190. p.484).

Hume even thinks there are good grounds for calling the rules of justice Laws of Nature, for he thinks some such rules "inseparable from the species".

One can certainly not distinguish vice from virtue by saying that virtue is natural and vice is unnatural. Hume is decidedly not concerned to advocate that we should follow nature on the ground that vice is contrary to nature. Vice is as natural as virtue, and we are as moral philosophers concerned with the problem of explaining "why any action or sentiment, upon the general view or survey, gives a certain satisfaction or uneasiness".

Hume stresses the view that we always approve of the 'motives that produce' actions (T.H.N. III, p.184; p.477). The external action has no value or merit unless it is taken as a sign of a motive at work in the agent. His doctrine appears to be that we always morally evaluate motives, that actions derive their moral character from the motives that give rise to them. This contention is supported by the argument that in a situation where we consider a man actuated by a certain motive we approve of, we do not think any the less of him even though

external circumstances hinder him from performing the action.

"If we find, upon inquiry, that the virtuous motive was still powerful over his breast, though checked in its operation by some circumstances unknown to us, we retract our blame, and have the same esteem for him, as if he actually performed the action which we require of him" (T.H.N. III, p.184; pp.477-478).

It is by no means obvious that the statement quoted supports Hume's contention. It seems to depend upon the meaning we ascribe to the term 'motive'.

The 19th century Utilitarians, such as Bentham and John Stuart Mill, insisted that any motive could lead to both right and wrong conduct, although certain motives were more likely to lead to right conduct than others. Certain motives are more or less universal throughout the species. Sexual desire would be an example of these. We do not praise or blame a man for his sexual desires. But a man may have formed a disposition to attempt to gratify these in ways and upon occasions that are considered socially injurious. In the case of such a man we should be inclined to call his motive 'lust', a word which indicates our disapproval. A man who has, on the other hand, developed a disposition to attempt to satisfy his desire in lawful ways, e.g. in marriage only, is not disapproved of. In his case we might even call his motive 'love' to indicate our approval.

Hume can only claim that his argument is plausible if 'motive' is used in such a way as to indicate an inclination or a disposition to perform a kind of action which could be known to be good or bad if the motive is known. This must be

so if we think the same approval due to the person "as if he had actually performed the action which we require of him". We must think of the motive as involving an inclination or a disposition to perform a special kind of action, for the value of the motive depends largely upon the pleasurable consequences the type of action has upon those who are affected by it.

But motives cannot be identified with a disposition to act in a particular way. Hume talks about the constant union between certain motives and actions. It is, I think, clear that he is not merely wanting to emphasise the fairly obvious point that a disposition to do an action of type A and the doing of an action of this kind tend to go together. There is more to a motive than this. I think Hume considers that there is an occurrent impression of some sort whenever one is influenced by a certain motive. Some virtues consist in the tendency to be influenced by certain motives. If different motives tend to lead to specifically different types of behaviour, the doctrine as to the nature of virtue is similar to the view expressed by Nowell-Smith when he says "Virtues and vices are dispositions to behave in certain ways" (Ethics, p.248). It must be remembered, however, that this would only fit some virtues according to Hume. If wit is a virtue it could not be characterised in this way.

Since utility enters into the explanation of the value of every social virtue, it is odd to find Hume saying "Were not affection a duty, the care of children could not be a duty" (T.H.N. III, p.185; p.478). He seems here to be indicating

that we only approve of the care of children because the motive which leads to this conduct is already approved of for independent reasons, a most un-utilitarian argument. This may incline people to think that approval is indeed for Hume to be equated with an immediate sympathy with the motive to an action, and that this decides the value of the action. This would clearly be inconsistent with the account given in this thesis of the relation between sympathy and moral approval and disapproval.

Perhaps we can solve this difficulty in the following manner. Hume thinks that the object of moral approval is always a quality of mind or character. When therefore we consider an action to be done in spite of a man's character, and thus do not consider it a just or legitimate sign of a disposition in him, we should not approve of the action 'morally' however much pleasure results from it for others. It would not be closely enough related to the agent to arouse love towards him.

If I have been right in the emphasis I have placed upon the analogy between approval and disapproval on the one hand and the indirect passions on the other, one can understand why Hume should demand a close connection between the agent and a quality that makes us approve of him. The point is still more easily understood if one remembers that agents rather than actions are the natural objects of approval and disapproval in so far as these passions are analogous to the indirect passions.

Whatever we may think of this view, it has at least the merit of avoiding the charge that an action could be called

morally right just because it has lucky results. Later Utilitarians were somewhat embarrassed by this criticism, for it seemed they had to say an action was right if it contributed more to happiness than other alternatives open to the agent. Since, however, we should not morally approve of these actions where the beneficial consequences were purely accidental, it was claimed that the rightness of an action depended upon the intention rather than the actual consequences. The doctrine that pleasure and the absence of pain are the sole intrinsic goods seems to imply the first sense of 'right', if 'right' is to be defined in terms of 'good', and 19th century utilitarian doctrines seem to be teleological in this way. They were therefore saddled with two senses of 'right' in their attempts to account for morality. In Hume's philosophy, on the other hand, actions are never to be judged solely by reference to an end. In so far as they are morally evaluated they are always conceived as signs of a quality of mind or character.

It therefore follows from Hume's doctrine that when we approve of a man's care for his children, we are only justified in doing so because we consider his action a sign of a disposition or inclination in him. In this case we are dealing with a disposition or inclination which we do not think dependent upon the agent's concern for the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness of what he is doing. If we thought that a man's care for his children was dependent upon his feeling in some way constrained to do it, we should

consider this a sign of weakness in him, a sign that he was somewhat lacking in parental affection and thus not as virtuous as he might be. We cannot therefore say that the motive to these actions is the sense of their morality. A natural motive is presupposed, for it is only in virtue of his possessing such a motive or disposition that we may attribute the virtue to the man.

But it can hardly be denied that Hume seems to be putting the cart before the horse when he says:

"We blame a father for neglecting his child. Why? because it shows a want of natural affection, which is the duty of every parent¹. Were not natural affection a duty, the care of children could not be a duty; and it were impossible we could have the duty in our eye in the attention we give to our offspring. In this case, therefore, all men suppose a motive to the action distinct from a sense of duty" (T.H.N. III, p.185; p.478).

It is obvious that Hume appears to be maintaining that 1) it is our duty to be moved by certain motives and 2) that the actions the motive naturally lead to would not be a duty unless having the tendency or disposition (understanding motive to involve this) to do that kind of action were also considered a duty. This view is in sharp contrast with the doctrine put forward by Sir David Ross, who maintains that it is always our duty 1) to do something (The Right and The Good) or 2) to set ourselves to do something (The Foundations of Ethics). His view mainly depends upon the contention that whatever is our duty must be subject to our voluntary control. This, indeed, explains his change of doctrine in The Foundations

1. My underlining.

of Ethics, for he came to see that whereas it sometimes is the case that our actions are hindered by circumstances beyond our control we can always if we so choose set ourselves to do an action. It is for this reason as well that he considers we can never be under an obligation to do an action from some particular motive. Our motives are not under our voluntary control. The motive has nothing to do with the rightness of an action, nor with whether you have done your duty. It is only relevant in deciding the action's goodness. If it is right to give to charity, it is right to do so from a self-interested motive. Your action would, however, be better if your motive was concern for other people's welfare.

It is possible to attack Ross' views on the relation between motives and duty in two ways. 1) One can deny that our motives are beyond our voluntary control and 2) one can deny that only those things that do lie under our control are duties. The first of these alternatives may seem initially the more promising. (We think it makes sense for a mother to try to love an unwanted child.) Hume, however, takes the latter. He refuses to talk of the rightness of actions in abstraction from the motive which would make it legitimate to take the action as a sign of a quality of mind or character. He is primarily interested in the value of human character and in this he is rather like Kant. But we must remember two things in interpreting this chapter. 1) Hume thinks we approve as much of a man who is by external circumstances prevented from doing benevolent deeds as we do of the person who has the opportunity to exercise his benevolence. So long as we think the motive prevails the actual consequences do not

make a difference to our approval. 2) He thinks that when the presence of X pleases us in a certain way, we say the thing is virtuous; when its absence pains us we say it is a duty. Consider now the contention that love of children is a duty. It would pain us to know that someone was lacking in parental affection. Unless this were so, our disapproval of a man who neglects his children would not be moral. I might be an emotional person who got enraged because he saw a father beat up his child. But my anger would not be righteous indignation unless I would have felt the emotion because of my mere knowledge that the man had a disposition to beat the child. If physical restraint of the man would entirely remove my emotion and leave me unaffected, I cannot have been disapproving though I may have been pained by seeing the child beaten. My passion in this situation might have been pity or compassion.

Hume would not be much impressed by the contention that only those things under our direct control could be duties. The feelings of a spectator determine what is and what is not a duty. Lack in parental affection pains us. That settles the matter. We must in any case remember Hume's brand of determinism. We are certainly not compelled to have the feelings we have. They are thus undoubtedly free in the sense in which freedom is opposed to compulsion.

Hume's insistence that we can only talk about the virtuous character of an action if we consider it as determined by a certain motive which would tie it to human character makes it absurd to say that regard to the morality of an action can be the first motive to its performance. There must be a natural

motive which the action is a sign of and which makes the action a virtuous one. He therefore takes it as

"an undoubted maxim, that no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there is in human nature some motive to produce it distinct from the sense of its morality" (T.H.N. III, p.185; p.479).

Sir David Ross agrees with Hume in this that he does not think it can be our duty to act from a sense of duty. Such a doctrine would, he thinks, lead to an infinite regress. But since Hume thinks it our duty to act from a motive he draws the conclusion from this argument that if it is our duty to do a certain deed, there must be a natural motive to do the deed. The point can be compared with what Nowell-Smith has to say in his Ethics, though he seems to distinguish the 'rightness' of an action from its goodness in a way which would not have been acceptable to Hume.

"Now the motive for adopting a rule cannot have been the sense of duty, since the sense of duty is the desire to do whatever is laid down by the moral rules we have adopted. A man who acts from a sense of duty pays his debts because he thinks it right to do so; he must therefore have some reason for thinking it right other than the fact that his sense of duty bids him do it" (Nowell-Smith, Ethics, p.256),

and

"There must have been some motive for establishing the rule in the first place..." (Ibid., p.256).

The similarity between the view stated in these passages and Hume's doctrine is obvious, and if we are right in thinking that Hume means here by a 'natural motive' any motive other than the sense of the morality of an action, he is pressing home a philosophical point which the adherents of the Kantian

analysis of moral value will find it difficult to answer.

The doctrine of subjective duty would not have been accepted by Hume. This lays it down that it is always a man's duty only to do what he thinks his duty on the ground that ought implies can, and I can only perform a duty as my duty if I think it is my duty. He is of course not denying that conscientiousness or the sense of duty may be the motive of an action. He indeed insists that a person who finds himself lacking in the inclination (motives) to virtuous behaviour may still perform actions which the truly virtuous man would have a natural motive to perform. He may do this either in order to acquire the virtuous motives through habit or in order to disguise to himself his own lack in true virtue. (Compare Nowell-Smith's Ethics, p.259: "The sense of duty is a useful device for helping men to do what a really good man would do without a sense of duty.")

We may even praise such conduct, and quite rightly, for a large measure of the value of actions is derived from their consequences, their effect upon the happiness of others. In these cases we attribute some virtue to conscientious behaviour because our attention is fixed upon the signs and we approve those actions which on the whole, on most occasions, are a sign of a virtuous motive. There is in fact nothing strange in this doctrine, for although conscientiousness may be a substitute for natural goodness as a motive, we still don't think the substitute superior to the original.

If a person were asked why he should return a sum of money he has borrowed, the obvious answer would be "because it

is just to do so". But this answer will only satisfy a person who uses the term 'just' as a term of praise. It presupposes that justice is already admitted to be a virtue. But the problem we are interested in is precisely why it is a virtue, so the answer begs the question.

Given the accepted sense of 'borrow' and 'lend' there is an air of paradox about suggesting that one ought perhaps not to repay what one has borrowed unless special reasons are given. But if we do not presuppose a system of rules for just dealings between people there is no paradox involved. What now needs reasons is why it would be virtuous to repay the money. Hume makes this philosophical point by the use of a hypothetical case, where this rule has not been accepted as a moral rule:

"But in his rude and more natural condition, if you are pleased to call such a condition natural, this answer would be rejected as perfectly unintelligible and sophistical. For one in that situation would immediately ask you, wherein consists this honesty and justice, which you find in restoring a loan, and abstaining from the property of others?"
(T.H.N. III, p.186; pp.479-480).

Hume's problem is to explain what 'reasons or motives' could have lead to the acceptance of the rules of justice in the first place. There would be a natural reason why we act justly if 1) we behave in this way by instinct, 2) if this is in our interest and 3) if it benefits those connected with us. It is extremely implausible to suggest that justice is the result of instinct. Where we accept such an explanation there is a general uniformity in the phenomena thus explained.

The rules of justice are in contrast to this extremely varied. They resemble more the effects of reason than the effects of instinct.

"All birds of the same species in every age and country, built their nests alike: in this we see the force of instinct. Men, in different times and places, frame their houses differently: here we perceive the influence of reason and custom. A like inference may be drawn from comparing the instinct of generation and the institution of property" (E.P.M., p.202).

In the case of 2) and 3) above there would not just be a reason why people act justly, people would have a reason for so acting.

We undoubtedly approve of just conduct, but considering any particular instance of 'just conduct' abstracting from the system of justice there does not seem to be any reason at all why we should engage in it, for just actions sometimes seem to be contrary to our own interest and even contrary to the public interest when taken in isolation. But even in these cases we feel under an obligation to act justly, but as we have already seen we cannot appeal to this feeling of obligation in order to account for the obligatory nature of justice without circularity. It is absurd to suggest that a conscientious motive is the source of our allegiance to justice, since it presupposes that just behaviour is antecedently believed to be virtuous.

We may now consider some possible answers to Hume's problem. It is tempting to say that the source of justice is self-love. But this is somewhat paradoxical, for we

consider self-love a great source of all manner of injustice.

But could it then be that "regard to public interest" is the reason for just conduct? This answer is also rejected by Hume on the grounds that the public interest is not necessarily served by attachment to behaviour in conformity to the rules of justice. It is only attached to these rules if we presuppose a convention. The point really is that unless there is a general adherence to 'just' conduct such conduct on the part of an individual need not be to the advantage of the public at all.

In cases where the transaction between the people is secret and its fulfilment only has effects upon the people concerned in the transaction, the public has no interest in the matter and the obligation ought, according to the hypothesis, to be removed. This we find not to be the case. It is furthermore to be observed that people on the whole can hardly be said to keep the public interest in mind whenever they repay a loan or keep their promises. This last point does not of course show that the public interest may not ultimately be the source of the obligation to be just.

The problem we are concerned with here is this. Why do people in actual fact adhere to rules of justice? It is assumed that the answer must take the form of showing that it naturally follows from a certain motive. The suggested motives are rejected as adequate explanations because they would quite often lead to conduct contrary to justice, would lead to 'unjust' conduct. But could we not say the same of a natural motive such as benevolence? It certainly is true that a

benevolent action does not always lead to consequences that increase the welfare of the person we intend to benefit. But it follows all the same that if this were known to the person before the act he would refrain from performing it if his motive truly is benevolence. On the other hand, we may know that a just action does not as such benefit anyone and thus the motive of benevolence would not prompt us to do it. The fact remains that we still think it ought to be done and that in a case where we cannot see any benefit accruing to ourselves from it either.

The upshot of Hume's argument then is that given an established code of justice none of our natural motives can explain the obligation we find constraining us to act justly and refrain from injustice. The only explanation we seem to be able to give of a just man's adherence to justice in spite of contrary inclinations of benevolence or self-love is conscientiousness or 'a sense of duty'. But this motive cannot be appealed to in explanation of this unless we presuppose that justice is known to be virtuous, unless we presuppose a system of justice accepted as imposing obligations upon us. Hume's problem then is - could we give an intelligible account of the origination of these rules of conduct in the first place, without circularity, by appealing to natural motives only in our explanation?

Hume's problem is a real one, for even though justice is useful and benefits human beings generally, Hume cannot maintain that extensive benevolence is the original motive to justice. He cannot appeal to such a natural principle simply because he

has denied its existence. Human passions are naturally biased in favour of self and those closely related to us. In the same way love is influenced by merit in such a way as to clash on occasions with the attitude dictated by strict equity. It is important to bear this point in mind, a point Hume emphatically stresses in the following passage:

"In general, it may be affirmed, that there is no such passion in human minds as the love of mankind, merely as such, independent of personal qualities, services, or of relation to ourself. It is true, there is no human, and indeed no sensible creature, whose happiness or misery does not, in some measure, affect us, when brought near to us, and represented in lively colours: but this proceeds merely from sympathy, and is no proof of such a universal affection to mankind, since this concern extends itself beyond our own species" (T.H.N. III, p.187-188; p.481).

The only benevolence which is natural to human beings is 'biased' because it is accounted for by an appeal to the principle of sympathy which varies with the nature and closeness of relations. This principle furthermore influences our conduct towards animals as well as men. It cannot therefore be the foundation of justice which only relates to our dealings with human beings. We can be unkind to animals but not unjust, Hume seems to be implying. The reason for this is that animals cannot enter into the kind of convention that leads to justice. It certainly cannot be put down to their lack of sympathy, for

"It is evident that sympathy, or the communication of passions, takes place among animals, no less than among men" (T.H.N. II, p.112; p.398).

It is similarly their incapacity for objective judgment which explains why they are capable of the indirect passions and yet cannot morally approve and disapprove.

Private benevolence or 'regard to the interests' of the party concerned would quite often prompt behaviour contrary to justice.

"For what if he be my enemy, and has given me just cause to hate him? What if he be a vicious man and deserves the hatred of all mankind? What if he be a miser, and can make no use of what I would deprive him of? What if he be a profligate debaucher, and would rather receive harm than benefit from large possessions? What if I be in necessity, and have urgent motives to acquire something to my family? In all these cases, the original motive to justice would fail; and consequently the justice itself, and along with it all property, right and obligation" (T.H.N. III, pp.188-189; p.482).

Thus we see that we can neither explain why people have come to behave justly nor can we account for the emergence of the obligations to just acts by treating it as a natural result of a motive we already approve of. It appears therefore we must conclude that the only motive to justice is conscientiousness or the sense of duty. Since we have already seen that this motive can only be effective if we presuppose that justice has been accepted as virtuous, we seem to be committed to accepting the circular argument already referred to.

"From all this it follows, that we have no real or universal motive for observing the laws of equity, but the very equity and merit of that observance; and as no action can be equitable or meritorious, where it cannot arise from some separate motive, there is here an evident sophistry and reasoning in a circle" (T.H.N. III, p.189; p.483).

The only solution to the problem seems to be that the sense of justice arises "artificially though necessarily from

education and human conventions" (T.H.N. III, p.189; p.483).

Hume has to explain how people's natural motives come to establish the convention that gives rise to justice. He thinks he must use different arguments to show why justice comes to be regarded as a virtue, why the term becomes a term of praise and its contrary 'injustice' a term of condemnation. Let us discuss the two problems in the order in which Hume himself tackles them.

In explaining the pattern of human actions it is not enough to point to men's motives alone. We must take into account the situation in which men find themselves and their ability to satisfy their interests in that situation.

Hume points out that the physical endowments of human beings seem strikingly inadequate to satisfy their many needs. It is not surprising that men should come to cooperate in societies, for this seems the most efficient method for securing the satisfaction of man's needs in spite of the infirmities of each individual taken separately.

"By the conjunction of forces, our power is augmented; by the partition of employments, our ability increases; and by mutual succour, we are less exposed to fortune and accidents. It is by this additional force, ability, and security, that society becomes advantageous" (T.H.N. III, pp.191-2; p.485).

Hume, however, is careful to remember that utility alone will not explain the origin of society. People might never have discovered the utility. He therefore emphasises that there is a primitive instinct drawing people together, the sexual instinct. He sees in the family the seed of larger

society. The human child must be cared for through a long period of development if it is to survive at all. Hume believes parents have a natural inclination to protect their offspring and prepare it for independence.

But, granting these social inclinations that are limited in extent in any case, Hume is full well aware that there are features in human nature which would seem at first sight to stand in the way of effective cooperation. The chief of these is the selfishness of man.

I have already argued that Hume is not a psychological egoist, but he always stresses the 'biased' nature of even our benevolent natural inclinations. This would be as great a hindrance to an effective cooperation in society as narrow selfishness, though the anti-social tendency of these motives would become much more obvious as the society grows larger.

"For while each person loves himself better than any other single person, and in his love to others bears the greatest affection to his relations and acquaintances, this must necessarily produce an opposition of passions, and a consequent opposition of actions, which cannot but be dangerous to the new-established union" (T.H.N. III, p.193; p.487).

The motives just mentioned become most anti-social in the case of goods that are transferable in such a way that one individual or group can take them from another, leaving them with less. In the sense in which I can transfer to another my enjoyment it is in no way decreased. My physical advantages cannot be transferred from me to another. Only external goods can be transferred in the way mentioned and it is consequently with regard to these that friction is most likely to arise.

Hume does not mention here the obvious fact that we may be tempted to impair another's physical endowments in order to make him incapable of acquiring or defending goods we desire. Thus it would seem the rules of justice could be looked upon as relating to physical violence as well as the violation of property rights in the narrower sense. Hume would of course entirely reject any notion that we have a natural property in our body and the labour theory of property rights founded upon it by Locke. (Locke: Second Treatise of Civil Government) But it is entirely consistent with his view that there should be a convention established to refrain from impairing your fellow-man's physical capacities. There is no reason at all why this should not count as part of justice.

At this point we might remind ourselves of the fact that the natural passions, essentially biased, are not corrected by our evaluation of them. Our approval of them on the contrary depends upon their being biased in this way. Thus we think greater concern due to friends and family than to strangers. We blame a man for neglecting these completely in favour of a total stranger, though we should also blame a man who "centres all his affections in his family". Here we seem to have a reference to a due mean in our affections so much insisted upon by Adam Smith.

The important point to remember here is that we cannot just appeal to 'natural morality' as the agency which corrects the bias which justice must overcome.

"The remedy, then, is not derived from nature, but from artifice; or, more properly speaking, nature provides a remedy, in the judgments and understanding, for what is irregular and

"incommodious in the affections"
(T.H.N. III, p.194; p.489).

It is obvious from the way in which Hume goes on to explain his meaning at this point, that the judgment or understanding do not give rise to any new motive which opposes and can be contrasted with the passions. The understanding only changes the direction of the passions. By a change in direction is simply meant that the same passions or motives come to give rise to different actions. The passions are the same and set the same end. We only come to see that there are more efficient means of satisfying them. Thus reason still furnishes no motive to the will, and Hume is in no way constrained to change his view that all the ends of human actions are set by the desires and passions. Thus reason is still only the 'slave' of the passions.

Our selfishness and limited benevolence seem to be the greatest obstacles to the establishment of society and justice. Yet it is these very same motives that can be seen to give rise to the convention through which justice is established. This comes about when people see that they can best serve their own interests and those of their friends by having some rules regarding the possession of property. This is seen to be essential because of the unstable nature of material goods already referred to and the relative scarcity of some of them. People soon see

"that the principal disturbance in society arises from those goods, which we call external, and from their looseness and easy transition from one person to another..."
(T.H.N. III, p.195).

People therefore

"seek for a remedy by putting these goods as far as possible, on the same footing with the fixed and constant advantages of the mind and body" (Ibid.).

It is because of the fact that he thinks the sexual instinct is as old as man, leading to people's living together at least for a period, that he considers it fanciful to assume a state of nature preceding society, a state of nature where justice would be unknown. We should only have reason to presume that such a state of nature must have existed if we can give reasons for believing that at some stage in the past history of man there was such a plenty that division of goods was unnecessary. Perhaps in extreme scarcity of goods each man would be exclusively ruled by the motive of self-preservation, assuming the principle that each individual loves himself more than he does any other one individual. Even here one might feel that factions would tend to arise because of our limited generosity if it were not completely swamped. There would thus be little likelihood we have ever had a state of affairs that could legitimately be described as the war of all against all.

It could of course also happen that we might have had a state of nature preceding justice if human nature had radically changed, if we could assume that at some distant time in the past our ancestors had possessed complete and universal benevolence. But we should only be justified in believing this if we had some empirical evidence in support of that belief. Hume does not seem to think there is any such evidence. He takes human nature as he thinks it is and asks

'Could we on the basis of our knowledge of human motives explain why people have come to invent rules of justice?'

It is not altogether clear that justice would not be established if man were wholly egoistic. At first sight it would seem to necessitate a war of all against all. Perhaps as long as we consider intelligence as part of our nature, a certain amount of foresight in man, we might still see how justice would arise from prudence. But it would not be at all obvious that it would arise necessarily in the family. The male, being the stronger, might restrain the wife by force and might even welcome some friction among the children in order to make a combined attack upon himself less likely. He might find that prudence would dictate for him the well known policy 'divide et impera'.

Perhaps one might say that Hume does not give enough weight in his account to the possibility of the love for power standing in the way of the establishment of justice. Perhaps he would say that a tyrant must at any rate have rules regulating what others can do with regard to him with impunity and that here we should have rules of justice inevitably coming in. But in such a state these rules would certainly not be established by a mutual compact of the nature Hume proceeds to describe, for the simple reason that mutual restraint of the passions would not be involved.

In his account of the nature of the contract that gives rise to justice Hume is most insistent that we are not to understand that people consider themselves bound by the contract because it is of the nature of a promise. We cannot understand the contract in this way for the simple reason that promise-keeping

is itself an artificial virtue. To fail to keep a promise is vicious because it is a violation of a rule established by an artificial convention.

The contract is rather to be understood to involve a tacit understanding between people to behave in a certain way in regard to each other, not from the motive of duty, but simply in order to satisfy limited benevolence and self-interest. There is, we might say, a natural obligation but not a moral obligation to justice, and this state of affairs might conceivably persist even after a system of rules of justice has been firmly established. These natural motives come gradually to bind us to just conduct "by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it".

Hume compares the establishment of justice with the way in which human conventions gradually give rise to language. There is no reason to believe that we come to use a common system of signs in communicating with each other by any explicit mutual promise. Similarly we see no reason to assume that the motive leading to the establishment of language has been anything but self-interest, awareness of the convenience of this method of communication for satisfying our needs and interests. Above all we may not assume that because of the immense general utility of language the motive leading to the emergence of languages must have been general benevolence. ? + sympathy

Let us now assume that we have an established system of rules concerning the stability and transference of property. We can now give sense to the concept of right which is to be defined in terms of the rules. We can now give sense to the concept of property which involves in its definition the concept of right.

We can now give sense to the concept of obligation, for this too would be defined in terms of the rules established by the convention.

The sense of 'obligation' in this context seems to be different from the sense of duty referred to earlier in this chapter and again in our discussion of promises. Obligation is specifically, it seems, tied to the artificial virtues. Since Hume maintains it is possible from a sense of duty to do the actions a benevolent man would naturally do, we can see that this is not tied to the performance of actions in conformity with the artificial virtues. One of the faults of Hume's moral theory is that he does not give a clear enough analysis of the concepts of duty and of obligation.

We can now see why Hume thinks it a mistake to define justice in terms of property. We can make no sense of the notion of property unless we already have the notion of justice and right in terms of which we must define it. The relation a man has to his property is not a natural but a 'moral' relation. It is what he has a 'right' to and what others are obliged to allow him to dispose of according to his will. The rules established by the convention give rise to property and justice together. There is another reason why one cannot 'define' justice in terms of property. There are other conventions that lead to the emergence of justice than the convention regarding property, e.g. the convention which leads to promises.

But it does not seem at all obvious that the convention, as we have so far considered it, gives rise to the concepts of 'right' and 'obligation' in a moral sense. We still do not know

why 'respecting' property rights is a virtue. Hume himself has indicated that a separate explanation must be given of our reasons for calling justice a virtue. We should also have to explain why obligation considered as a motive should be attached to justice by the mere existence of a convention. Can Hume here be referring to the natural obligation to justice, i.e. self-interest and limited benevolence? This is possible but hardly plausible, because there seems no reason to believe that obligation in this sense is unintelligible without presupposing the convention. It seems more plausible to assume that the terms 'right' and 'obligation' are considered here as legal terms. They are here both defined in terms of the laws of society, written or unwritten, established by the convention.

If the preceding account is correct, we still have to account for the way in which we come to consider ourselves under a moral obligation to be just. We still have not explained how there arises in man a separate motive to adhere to justice which is capable of overriding the strongest natural inclinations of self-love and limited benevolence.

Hume at this stage only argues that avarice, the strongest enemy of justice, can only be restrained by itself. Here we might understand by 'avarice' desire for things for ourselves and those closely related to us. There is no other 'natural' motive strong enough to keep us steadfast in the path of justice. Since we are dealing with a natural motive that can either lead to desirable or undesirable conduct according to the adequacy of the factual judgments which direct the course of the actions it leads to, it would obviously serve no useful purpose to call it either wicked or good as such. We nowhere get a clearer indication of

Hume's view that self-interest is not necessarily a vicious motive. He most emphatically rejects the view, apparently held by Hutcheson, that benevolence is the only good motive. Nor would it seem can one defend those commentators who think that Hume only deems virtuous those actions that issue from a limited class of motives we might call social.

We have emphasised that the natural motive to justice is self-interest and limited benevolence, but Hume insists that the connection of the rules of justice with self-interest is "somewhat singular, and is different from what may be observed on other occasions". Even when we have come to identify our own interest with the public interest through enlightened 'self-love' we must still observe that a single individual act of justice may neither serve the public interest nor need it benefit the agent himself.

"When a man of merit, of a beneficent disposition, restores a great fortune to a miser, or a seditious bigot, he has acted justly and laudably, but the public is a real sufferer" (T.H.N. III, pp.201-2; p.497).

Hume, however, seems to think that were our self-interest enlightened enough we should see good prudential reasons for adhering scrupulously to justice even in these cases. If we only become sufficiently aware of the fact that without rules of justice strictly adhered to there could be no effective cooperation in society, we should see that the alternative is less attractive.

"And even every individual person must find himself a gainer on balancing the account; since, without justice, society must immediately dissolve¹,

1. My underlining.

"and everyone must face into that savage and solitary condition, which is infinitely worse than the worst situation that can possibly be supposed in society" (T.H.N. III, p.202; p.497).

Hume's argument here is not altogether convincing, for there is little reason to believe that the alternatives are as clear cut as he seems to think. When one sacrifices justice for the welfare of the public in an individual case, one has not thereby chosen the dissolution of justice altogether. We need only remind ourselves that unjust actions are in fact frequent and yet we have not sunk into that 'savage and solitary condition' which Hume speaks of. If in fact unjust actions had only the natural consequence of making cooperation more difficult if it became widespread, our temptation to act unjustly would be much greater than it actually is. Many people are not kept on the straight and narrow path of justice by these 'natural' considerations but rather because of the sanctions attached to injustice by the law.

The reason why Hume does not mention this incentive to just behaviour is obvious. He is explaining the origin of justice through the workings of 'natural' motives and the 'natural' condition in which man finds himself. In showing the possibility of the contract being formed he cannot therefore assume as incentives any consequences which follow injustice only in an established society with an orderly system of laws and punishment. If he did this he would be begging the question, since 'punishment' for injustice presupposes that justice has already been established.

Must we then say that the 'natural' motives that Hume appeals to are insufficient to account for the convention being

formed? The first thing to notice is that Hume need not commit himself to the view that these natural motives will secure that the parties to the convention will universally and always act justly. It is enough if individuals can intelligibly become conscious of the advantage of having some fixed rules about property which it is to the interest of both parties to adhere to. One can then see how the following of this line of conduct may come to be associated in a man's mind with his own interests so as to furnish a countermotive to the immediate satisfaction of a short-term interest.

We have already observed how Hume considers the growth of a society as having its origin in a small group, that the first trace of social life can be seen in a family unit. In a small group of men it is much easier to see how cooperation is essential in order to derive the benefits of being a member of the group. It is much easier to see how an individual can come to look upon his own interests as dependent upon successful cooperation. The alternative is to be left alone, to be banished from the group. This is perhaps why Hume thinks in terms of the alternative of abiding by the convention or alternatively "fall into a savage and solitary condition". He probably had a small group in mind when he wrote this. In such a small group it is therefore intelligible how the natural obligation to justice may have sufficed to keep people on the whole from violating the conventional rules. It may perhaps be further noticed here that the influence of the 'confined benevolence' which Hume takes to belong to our nature would be much greater here and would make us more sensitive to the

interests of other members of the group. There would be no 'total strangers'. We should be more affected by the pleasures and pains of others through sympathy.

We must, I think, imagine that we are dealing with a society of this kind, a small group, when considering how justice comes to be considered a virtue. The moral approval of the just man's behaviour is supposed to depend upon the utility of justice. This utility is much more easily seen in a small society though the natural motives may be less obviously in need of moral incentives in order that the system may be upheld.

If we have in mind a tacit agreement between people to behave in a certain way, we see that a failure to do so will cause disappointment in the other parties to the agreement who have come to count upon our behaviour. Thus injustice comes to have an injurious consequence in virtue of the convention having been formed. Combine with this an awareness that the rules of justice generally make social life safer and more 'commodious'. Though this may be more easily overlooked in a large society we cannot avoid noticing the ill effects of suffering injustice when we ourselves or those close to us are the sufferers. We thus come to think of unjust actions as the causes of unpleasantness and pain. We sympathise with those who are adversely affected by it and come to dislike the cause of it, ultimately the agent. This dislike becomes moral disapproval when we look upon the case of injustice abstracting from our personal point of view, when we look upon it as impartial spectators. It may be noticed that this account makes it much more obvious why we

should disapprove of injustice than approve of justice, since the utility of the latter is not so easily seen as the ill effects of the former. This may not be thought a grave fault in the theory, for we find in fact that justice needs to be exceptional for it to be warmly approved of, whereas we disapprove of all manner of injustice. The reason for this may well be that a fair standard of justice is required of us. It is only when the minimum requirement is surpassed that justice is considered a virtue in a man.

We have seen that our approval of justice and disapproval of injustice arise out of our contemplation of the actions of others. We extend it, however, to cover our own case and approve of justice in ourselves and disapprove of our injustice.

"The general rule reaches beyond those instances from which it arose; while at the same time, we naturally sympathise with others in the sentiments they entertain of us" (T.H.N. III, p.204; p.499).

Hume insists in this chapter that a full account of the reasons why we approve of justice and disapprove of injustice cannot be given before the natural virtues have been examined. This is because he has not yet given an account of objectivity in evaluations, the way in which we come to evaluate actions and characters from an impartial point of view. Hume's order of exposition is unfortunate and has given more plausibility to a wrong interpretation of his statement here.

When he explains how our sympathy with the judgments others form of us help to make us approve and disapprove of ourselves, it seems that this approval or disapproval stem from a desire to be well thought of. It seems that we are describing the

outlook of a man who wants to be respectable. Thus the feeling lingers that this would be no genuine moral disapproval. This however is too onesided an interpretation, for we must understand Hume's statements here in the light of his doctrines as expressed in Book III, Part III, Section 1. There is no reason to believe that sympathy with the unfortunates who suffer from our own injustice has nothing to do with our disapproval of injustice in ourselves. When we look upon ourselves with approval or disapproval we in fact view ourselves as if we were any other person.

It might further be pointed out that when Hume uses the phrase 'sympathise with others in the sentiments they entertain of us' he may just mean 'agree with others in their condemnation or praise of our actions'. If theirs is a genuine approval or disapproval based upon the same factual judgments of the case as we ourselves have, we would in fact naturally sympathise with their judgments of us.

Hume is here concerned to show how our motives to justice come to be strengthened so as to explain why we so often act justly even against our own and even the public interest. He emphasises and that rightly that once justice comes to be considered a virtue, politicians and educators may strengthen people's allegiance to just conduct through utilising the evaluative force of the term. He can also quite legitimately point out that people's desire for respectability may be used for this purpose. Parents may see that a just man gets on better in the world than an unjust one and consequently indoctrinate their children in such a way as to make them see that it is prudent to be just. It would be rash to deny that these

motives are powerful in counteracting the force of temptations to behave in unjust ways.

We come here up against a real difficulty in Hume's account. Sympathy with the general utility of justice may be enough to account for our approval of the just man. But Hume cannot consistently with his view of the biased nature of benevolence maintain that public benevolence is the motive which keeps people to the path of justice, even in a case where this motive opposes strong self-interest or confined benevolence. This is why he has to search for additional influences which may help to explain the just man's steadfast adherence to the rules of justice. We must in any case remember that in society most people would probably not be fully aware of the public utility of justice and would thus not be able to value it for the right reasons.

But when justice is classified with the natural virtues, the same word is attached to both, people generally come to have the same outlook towards it, strengthened by the propaganda of politicians in their quest for an orderly society, and the influence of parents who desire the welfare of their children. But this propaganda presupposes, is parasitic upon, our natural moral sentiments:

"Any artifice of politicians may assist nature in the producing of those sentiments, which she suggests to us, and may even on some occasions produce alone an approbation or esteem for any particular action; but it is impossible it should be the sole cause of the distinction we make betwixt vice and virtue. For if nature did not aid us in this particular, it would be in vain for politicians to talk of honourable or dishonourable, praiseworthy or blameable. These words would be perfectly unintelligible, and would no more have any idea annexed to them,

"than if they were of a tongue perfectly unknown to us. The utmost politicians can perform, is to extend the natural sentiments beyond their original bounds; but still nature must furnish the materials, and give us some notion of moral distinctions" (T.H.N. III, p.204; p.500).

This is in harmony with Hume's general associationist scheme. The word comes to call up a certain idea which may be enlivened into a real impression, a passion. But this association could not be formed without a previous impression of which the idea is a copy. This explains the inability of politicians to give meaning to words of praise in the first place. This presupposes real approval and disapproval, these being passions of a special sort with which the terms come to be associated. A word is not a natural cause but acquires its causal efficacy by convention through its association with some experience, some perception.

The concepts of duty and obligation do not play a prominent part in Hume's philosophy. He can of course not admit that actions can be seen to possess a characteristic which may be called their 'obligatoriness'. Yet we here seem to be faced with the difficulty that regard for the morality of an action may be a motive to perform it. Furthermore it is the motive of the just man. If then the moral characteristic of an action derives from the nature of the motive, it seems that some actions derive their morality from regard for their morality. This reasoning appears to be circular and is taken by Hume to be so. In fact this is the dilemma he states as setting his problem about the artificial virtues.

We eventually conclude that public utility is the ultimate

reason why justice is approved of as a virtue. But has Hume not denied that there is any such principle as public benevolence? How then can the consciousness of the public utility of justice come to furnish a motive to just conduct?

It must be firmly kept in mind that Hume nowhere maintains that a 'just act' in one sense is always performed from the same motive. It would indeed be absurd if he did maintain this. Let us imagine a man repaying a loan. This is undoubtedly an action in conformity with established rules of justice. It would be thought unjust not to pay. Yet it is obvious that the motive might not be a sense of duty at all, but the thought that the person needed the money and a consequent desire for his happiness might lead to the action. The point is of course that benevolence may often lead to behaviour we should describe as just. On other occasions self-love might be the motive. We might want to enhance our reputation, or our intention might be to secure the possibility of another loan from the same source later on. There is thus an obvious sense in which it is untrue to say that the only motive to conduct called just is a sense of duty.

But we must remember that in the cases listed above we should not describe the agent as just if we inferred his motive to be self-love or benevolence. We should call him prudent or benevolent, as the case might be. In what circumstances would the man be described as just, if we distinguish one virtue from another by a difference in motive and Hume has denied that there is a special natural motive to just conduct?

It is here that the problem of the motive of duty intrudes itself and it is assumed that justice is distinguished from the

other virtues in that the just man is motivated by a 'sense of duty' as distinct from benevolence or self-interest. The just man is the man who adheres steadfastly to the rules of justice even when benevolence and self interest may seem to prompt to different behaviour. He is able to do this because the motive of duty has come to be so highly developed. We have seen that if this motive were supposed to result from the realisation of the utility of justice its strength could not be accounted for. Propaganda and education help to create a situation where the non-performance of just actions comes to be firmly associated with pain in our minds. This helps to strengthen the behavioural pattern we call just behaviour. So long as we think of the 'sense of the morality' of an action as benevolence resulting from moral approval, Hume cannot be made consistent. By 'sense of duty' we must understand 'being pained at the thought of the absence of an action or character'.

But Hume has put forward two apparently incompatible views.

- 1) That no virtue has the sense of duty as its motive and
- 2) That this is the characteristic motive of the just man.

Perhaps it is due to awareness of this that he sometimes seems to insist that properly enlightened self-interest would suffice to keep a man to the path of justice. This would, however, reduce justice to prudence. When the just man would be acting from a sense of duty this would be an indication of a lack of this virtue of prudence. He would be doing what the prudent man would do.

I cannot see that the difficulty mentioned in the previous paragraph is ever fully resolved by Hume. There is a sense in which a virtue whose characteristic motive is the sense of duty

is impossible on his theory. Yet we must remember that even though our sense of duty may be partly impressed upon us through an appeal to self-interest and our limited benevolence, this does not necessarily entail that when we come to achieve objectivity in our attitude our feelings of duty are entirely non-moral. Do we not in fact recommend the virtuous life to our children very largely through an appeal to one or other of these motives?

The doctrine of artificial virtues is not propounded in the same form in the Enquiry. This may have been due to a dissatisfaction with the theory of the Treatise, or Hume may merely have wanted to leave out this rather difficult doctrine. Hume in any case only attempts in the Enquiry to show 1) that justice derives all its value from its utility and 2) that this utility presupposes a convention, i.e. the useful consequences do not follow each act by nature. In both versions, however, the doctrine is essentially utilitarian. It may for example be remembered that justice is in both works distinguished from superstition on grounds of utility.

It has been recently maintained that all virtues are artificial. Nowell-Smith in his Ethics points out that

"the phrase 'natural virtue' is in fact ambiguous. It can either mean 'mode of conduct which is natural and also praised' or it can mean 'mode of conduct which is naturally praised'" (Ethics, p.249).

He uses the expression in the second of these senses and argues that in that sense all virtues are artificial. His reason is that it is a maxim to be accepted in philosophy not to assume that anything is part of the original constitution of human nature if we can assign a cause to it.

"There is an obvious connexion between the modes of conduct that men believe to bring about consequences towards which they already have a pro-attitude" (Ethics, p.249).

It seems to me that in so far as it has been made out that sympathy enters into the approval of all virtues Hume would endorse Nowell-Smith's view. The normal effects of qualities of mind always determine our approval.

Hume denies that justice 'admits of degrees' in the way in which natural virtues do. These run insensibly into vice. You become less and less benevolent until your lack of benevolence has become a vice. We must not understand this to mean that a man cannot be more or less just as he can be more or less benevolent. The man who is more just follows the rules of justice more often, breaks these rules more rarely. But an individual act, and this is Hume's point, must be either just or unjust. A man's action may be more or less benevolent, but there is no such sliding scale in the case of justice. The main reason for this is to be found in the fact that property admits of no degrees. Either you own something or you do not. Once we remember how closely Hume ties justice to property we can partly see the reason for his views on this point. Even so, he admits that proprietary claims to a thing may by an arbitrator be deemed so equal that a division in property is called for. It remains that Hume thinks in terms of inflexible rules which the just man is obliged to follow.

"Were men, therefore, to take the liberty of acting with regard to the laws of society, as they do in every other affair, they would conduct themselves, on most occasions, by particular judgments, and would take into consideration the

"characters and circumstances of the persons, as well as the general nature of the question. But it is easy to observe, that this would produce an infinite confusion into human society, and that the avidity and partiality of men would quickly bring disorder into the world, if not restrained by some general and inflexible principles" (T.H.N. III, pp.233-234; p.532).

I agree with MacNabb that Hume's view is open to the interpretation that the rules are not only inflexible but our observance of them should be inflexible. According to MacNabb a principle may have many qualifying clauses indicating conditions where it would not apply and yet be inflexible. Given these exceptions there is no further latitude. He takes the example of a friend who falls ill in his house. The telephone wires are broken and the roads blocked. A bottle of medicine is in the house which would save his friend's life. MacNabb now asks:

"Is it theft to use the medicine, however valuable? Surely not; the principles of private property tacitly provide for such exceptions. And if the owner of the medicine subsequently sued me at law, it would be open to the judge to mark a technical offence, but dismiss the charge as trifling under the probation of offenders act" (MacNabb, p.184).

I think Hume would be bound to say that in the legal sense it was indeed theft to take the medicine. Hume seems primarily to have in mind the legal sense of 'justice' in writing the passage quoted above. It is, as MacNabb says, a 'technical offence'.

Let us remember that if the person in MacNabb's story refrains from taking the medicine on the ground that it is not

his property, he could not be charged with injustice. We might, however, condemn this behaviour as inhuman. This might be one occasion where we should not approve of behaviour in accordance with the rules of justice. It is the benevolent man of whom we should approve in this situation.

We now see, perhaps, one further reason why Hume should be inclined to talk as if the just man must follow the rules of justice inflexibly. Justice must involve a disposition to behave in a particular way. Where humanity (benevolence) or self-interest bids us act contrary to these rules there may be individual occasions where we should approve of these exceptions. We still cannot say that it is in virtue of a man's justice rather than his possession of the natural virtues, prudence or benevolence, that he makes the exception, gives his friend the medicine in MacNabb's example.

Hume maintains that promises ought sometimes to be broken because keeping them in certain situations would generally be against public utility. But it is not in virtue of our dependability that we do this. This being understood, it must be granted that there is no very obvious reason why, because of the general inutility of the sanctity of property in certain cases, it might not be understood that the general rules governing property do not apply.

Though it may be undeniable that you have given a promise to a robber, it may still be the case that you are under no obligation to keep it. The inutility of promise-keeping in

this kind of case is tacitly recognised as justifying you in ignoring the fact that you made the promise. The rule that one ought to keep promises may still be 'inflexible' in this sense, that the exception would extend to all similar cases. It is because the situation is of a particular kind that you are not under an obligation to fulfil your promise on this occasion.

PROMISES

I shall not be concerned in this thesis with Hume's political theory. The following discussion of promises will therefore be limited to the arguments contained in the section of the third book of the Treatise which Hume entitles "Of the Obligation of Promises". No mention will be made of the social contract nor of the relation of promises to political obligation in general.

Stated in his own words, Hume wants to show "that the rule of morality which enjoins the performance of promises, is not natural..." (T.H.N. III, p.219; p.516). This he proceeds to establish by 'proving' (1) "that a promise would not be intelligible before human conventions had established it" (ibid.) and (2) "that even if it were intelligible, it would not be attended with any moral obligation" (ibid.).

Let us begin by looking at the way in which Hume attempts to 'prove' the first of these propositions.

Hume uses the method of presuming what would have to be the case "if promises be natural and intelligible" (ibid.). The following is Hume's statement of the condition without which this could not be the case:

"... there must be some act of the mind attending these words, I promise; and on this act of the mind must the obligation depend". (T.H.N. III, p.219; p.516)

Hume considers, and in this Prichard and Melden later followed him, that in promising we place ourselves under an obligation to do or refrain from doing something. This is a new obligation in that it arises from the promise. We now want to examine whether there is an act of mind from which the obligation could follow. If, as is the case, the obligation is an obligation to keep a promise, then there cannot be any such obligation unless a promise has been made. Since making a promise is the very thing that gives rise to the obligation we can be said to be considering whether a promise is a mental act.

Before proceeding any further we must draw a distinction between the use of the verb 'promise' in making a promise and in talking about a promise. When I say to my dentist "I promise you I will keep my appointment this time" I am making a rash promise but a promise nevertheless. I might tell my wife about this by saying when I come home "I promised the dentist I would keep my appointment". This is a statement about a promise but in making the statement I am not promising anyone anything at all. Such expressions as 'he has promised', 'I shall promise' and indeed all other uses of the verb than the first person present tense indicative use are of this second kind. Similar observations may be made about the verbs 'approve' and 'disapprove'. It is now accepted usage to call the first person indicative use of such verbs as 'promise' a performatory use of such verbs

when these are used to do something rather than say that something is done, will be done, or has been done. Professor Austin, in his "Other Minds" calls this use "ritualistic". He is justified in using this expression by the fact that there is something rather solemn about making a promise by saying "I promise you".

But one can make promises without using the verb 'promise'. A man who is trying to establish that he did not promise to do something has not made out his case even though he may succeed in proving to everyone's satisfaction that he did not use the expression "I promise". "I will without fail", "You can count on me" and other expressions are sometimes used to make a promise. The point is a minor one but the quotation from Hume above does not make it clear that he is investigating not only whether there is an act of mind "attending these words, I promise", but whether such an act attends the verbal expression used to make a promise whatever that expression may be.

A promise then, according to the view we are considering, is a mental act. This mental act is such as to impose upon the person an obligation. If I could intuit such a mental act in you without the use of language or any conventional system of symbols, I could know that you were binding yourself to the performance of an action by promising to do so. The expression "I promise" or an equivalent expression constitutes no part of the promise but only indicates that a promise is taking place. It would seem that the expression would not be performatory but rather used to state a fact, i.e. the fact that the person is promising.

The candidates for the honour of being the act of promising are limited to three. 1) A resolution, 2) A desire and 3) An act of will.

1) One cannot equate promising with a resolution, Hume thinks, for the simple reason that a resolution does not alone impose an obligation upon the person to do what he resolves to do. The term 'alone' is important here, for it clearly is the case that people may consider it morally obligatory to hold steadfastly to their resolutions. It is of course not the case that we think that a man ought to stick to any resolution. If he has resolved to do something wrong, he clearly ought not to do this. But the same applies to promises. It seems we ought not to keep a promise if we have promised to do something wrong. If I promise to murder an innocent man and think better of it, it seems absurd to say I am obliged to keep my promise. d

There is a sense in which for Hume a promise does not alone impose an obligation, in that one must presuppose a convention and the obligation depends upon the social situation in which the promise is made. But here he is examining a view he takes to imply that the obligation follows from an act of mind quite irrespective of human conventions and social situations. He is thus justified in denying that the act of mind which constitutes a promise can be a resolution. This is not to deny that there may be an intimate connection between the concept of 'resolving' and the concept of 'promising'.

2) To promise cannot be to desire to do what is promised. It is, indeed, singularly unplausible to suggest that this is the case, for the fact that I do not desire to do X may be, and often

is, a reason why I am made to promise to do X. I promise my wife not to have too much beer. If I did not like beer and this was known to my wife, there would be no point in promising not to overindulge. I promise to do what I don't desire to do and my aversion may, as Hume says, be "declared and avowed". (T.H.N. III, p.219; p.516). A man might only give in to his wife after a long argument and the eventual promise may simply be due to the fact that he has become fed up with her nagging. One wants to say the husband is obliged even though he may have neither a desire nor an intention of doing what he promises.

3) Is a promise "the willing of the action which we promise to perform"? (T.H.N. III, p.219; p.516). The reason why this cannot be the case is as follows. When we promise something, what we promise is always in the future. If A wants B to do something now, he would not seek a promise from him. To will to do something is by Hume taken to have an effect on the present. It "has an influence only on present actions". (ibid.) From this it follows that 'to will' and 'to promise' must be different.

Whatever one may think of the notion of will as a kind of cause which must have its effect immediately one must agree that given this concept of 'will' Hume is entirely correct in rejecting the view that 'to promise' can be equated with willing in this sense. If we treat 'willing' as an act of mind distinguished from 'resolving' then it seems not unreasonable to give it the interpretation Hume here presents us with. One must remember that he is investigating whether a promise can be

said to be a natural act of mind.

Hume concludes from the fact that none of the candidates considered can be said to produce the obligation which attaches to a promise that "it must necessarily be the willing of that obligation which arises from the promise". He invokes ordinary ways of speaking in support of this conclusion. We say "we are bound by our consent, and that the obligation arises from our mere will and pleasure" (T.H.N. III, pp.219-220; p.517).

The problem now facing us is whether an obligation can arise from a volition. Prichard, who certainly did not agree with Hume about the nature of moral obligation, denied that this could occur. In his "The Obligation to Keep a Promise" he says:

"In fact, the difference between doing something and promising to do it seems just to be that while in the one case we bring something into existence, in the other we bring into existence the obligation to bring it into existence. Yet an obligation seems a fact of a kind impossible to create or bring into existence. There are, no doubt, certain facts which we do seem able to create. If e.g. I make someone angry, I appear to bring into existence the fact that he is angry. But the fact that I am bound to do some action seems no more one of these than does the fact that the square of three is odd." (M.O., p.169)

Prichard may, I think, be criticised here for suggesting that (a) doing something is always bringing something into existence, and (b) when you promise you always promise to do something.

It may be the case that whenever you do something you

always bring into existence the fact that you have done it. What else have you brought into existence when you run a mile in under four minutes? Prichard seems misled by the example he has in mind i.e. making someone angry, when it seems proper to say you have brought the man's anger into existence.

As regards the question whether to promise is always to promise to do something, one must be careful to note that this is only true if 'to do something' is used in such a way as to make it true to say that when you refrain from doing something you are in fact doing something. Prichard is most likely aware of this, but he fails to make his meaning clear.

The reason why Prichard thinks an obligation cannot be created by an act of will is that as an objectivist he thinks that obligations are 'discovered'. The analogy he draws with mathematics is instructive. We may choose to promise and thus bind ourselves, but we cannot choose that the square of three be even. This, he would most likely say, we discover. We can no more choose to change our moral obligations than we can choose to change the truths of mathematics. This, however, seems precisely to take place in promising. This creates the problem for the objectivist.

Returning now to Hume, we find a different kind of argument. The reason why an obligation cannot arise from a volition is that volitions cannot give rise to new feelings. The argument presupposes Hume's view on the nature of obligation:

"All morality depends upon our sentiments;
and when any action or quality of the

"mind pleases us after a certain manner, we say it is virtuous; and when the neglect or non-performance of it displeases us after a like manner, we say that we lie under an obligation to perform it." (T.H.N. III, p.220; p.517)

Several points can be made about this passage.

1. Hume italicises the expressions that make it clear that it is not the case that any pleasure arising from the contemplation of a mental quality that constitutes approval. This is in conformity with the interpretation of Hume given in this thesis.
2. He writes in the first person. He seems in fact to be analysing the situation in which we should say that we lie under an obligation. This we do when the non-performance of an action displeases us.

One may suggest that there is at least this much truth in Hume's contention that we should not say we were obliged to do something if it were the case that the performance of the action pleased us, but we should not have been displeased at its non-performance. It seems to me that Hume need not be understood to be only giving an account of the circumstances in which the agent would say of himself that he was obliged. We can equally say of another person that what he did pleases us and we think him truly virtuous though we don't think it his duty, we should not have been displeased if the person had not done the deed.

Though there may be a close relation between 'being pleased' and 'approving', 'being displeased' and 'disapproving', it would not be true to say that 'to be pleased with' is

equivalent to 'to approve of' and 'to be displeased with' equivalent to 'to disapprove of'. This is strictly speaking incorrect. I can approve or disapprove of anyone but I can only be pleased with or displeased with the performances of people closely connected with me, or my own. It would not be odd for me to say I was displeased with my daughter's behaviour, but I could not say I was displeased with the behaviour of Mao's daughter, if he has a daughter.

Hume does not think we can arouse new sentiments at will. Since we only say we are obliged when a special sentiment is aroused under certain circumstances a new obligation cannot arise from the will. Is it the case then, that it is a purely contingent matter that one cannot will an obligation? Is it the case that people might gain such power over their emotions as to be able to change them at will and would this mean that Hume's argument would fall flat? Prichard's reason for the same conclusion seemed to be such that no change in the world could alter the situation. To suggest an obligation might be created immediately through man's will would involve a logical absurdity.

But it turns out we are wrong in thinking that for Hume it just happens to be the case that man is incapable of willing an obligation. He puts the question thus:

"The only question then is, whether there is not a manifest absurdity in supposing this act of the mind, and such an absurdity as no man would fall into, whose ideas are not confounded with prejudice and the fallacious use of language". (T.H.N. III, p.220; p.517)

To talk of willing a new obligation is, in that it

involves willing a 'new sentiment', it seems, to talk nonsense. It is to say something 'unintelligible'. Yet it must be said that Hume is not at all clear as to the kind of absurdity involved in this for he later talks as if it were possible to 'feign' an act of mind we call willing an obligation. If this is so it seems it must be possible to understand what is involved in such an act though it may in fact be such as to be impossible to the powers of man.

There is, however, a further point that might be made clearer than Hume makes it. When we have made a promise we are from then on under an obligation to perform the action though we ourselves may not happen to feel pained at the non-performance of it. We may not feel obliged. Here it would be whether the spectators of our actions would feel disapproval at the non-performance of our action which would determine whether we were said to be under an obligation to perform it. We should thus have to be able to will a change in the feelings of others if our obligation were to follow from the promise.

One might also want to make the point that what one wills on this account would be a possible future feeling. Since this feeling does not arise as I promise, whereas the obligation does, Hume's contention that the will can only make a change to the present would be valid against the possibility of willing an obligation, given his account of this concept.

But Hume does not think the case hinges upon his special views on obligation. He tries in a long footnote to show that even though we thought obligation consisted in relations an obligation could not arise from a volition.

1. If it is the case that the obligation to keep promises arises from a volition without any change in the universe taking place, this is inconsistent with morality consisting in relations since without a change in objects no new relation could arise. On this view there could thus be no natural obligation to keep promises.

2. If the act of will is itself a new object and therefore a new relation may result from it, we are no better off.

Hume puts the point as follows:

"Should it be said that this act of the will, being in effect a new object, produces new relations and new duties; I would answer, that this is a pure sophism, which may be detected by a very moderate share of accuracy and exactness. To will a new obligation is to will a new relation of objects; and therefore, if this new relation of objects were formed by the volition itself, we should, in effect, will the volition, which is plainly absurd and impossible. The will has here no object to which it could tend, but must return upon itself in infinitem."
(T.H.N. III, p.220, footnote; pp. 517-518)

It is not easy to see what precisely this argument amounts to. The difficulty arises from the interpretation of the expression 'is formed by the volition itself'. I take this to mean that the volition is supposed to form one of the terms between which the relation, which is supposed to constitute the obligation, holds. This new relation is supposed to be at the same time what you will, since you will the obligation. But in any such case the same volition cannot be at the same time part of its own content. If then the obligation which arises is supposed to consist in the volition

and something else, you always need to presuppose a volition which is the willing of the obligation, which consists in turn in a volition in relation to some other object. You are hence forced into an infinite regress of volitions. If you therefore try in this way to account for the obligation to keep promises, you always need to presuppose another promise to account for the obligation to keep any promise you may choose. (See Melden p.51 for a different interpretation of this argument).

We have been looking at Hume's attempt at proving the first of the propositions listed at the beginning of this chapter. We have in fact found that an answer has been given to both. "The will never creates new sentiments", therefore no new obligations. But Hume adds an argument he has already made use of in the discussion of justice. There can be no natural virtues nor any 'natural obligations' unless there is a motive in man that leads to their performance. It is our duty to look after our children, but we are also inclined to do this. But for this inclination there would be no obligation. The keeping of promises is different. Hume says:

"But as there is naturally no inclination to observe promises distinct from a sense of their obligation, it follows that fidelity is no natural virtue, and that promises have no force antecedent to human conventions." (T.H.N. III, p.221; p.519)

What Hume says in this passage is, I think, essentially sound whatever one may think of his account of the obligation attaching to natural virtues. What we now want to know is the original motive leading to the making of promises.

Hume points out that where we have cases of the exchange of goods or the return of service rendered, it is quite often the case that when the deal is made, delivery has to be delayed. Similarly it may be to our mutual benefit that I should help you with the harvest of your corn in return for a similar service from you. We can understand how these things come about because the individuals concerned find these arrangements useful.

But this self-interested 'commerce of men' must, Hume thinks, be distinguished from the cases where I help a man because I want to, return a service because I am grateful.

"In order, therefore, to distinguish these two different sorts of commerce, the interested and the disinterested, there is a certain form of word invented for the former, by which we bind ourselves to the performance of any action. This form of word constitutes what we call a promise, which is the sanction of the interested commerce of mankind." (T.H.N. III, p.224; pp.521-522)

If I think you will, out of the goodness of your heart, help me if I should need help, it would be pointless for me to try to get you to promise to do this. Only in this sense is the form of words used in promising a way of distinguishing the interested from the disinterested 'commerce of men'.

In certain cases 'I promise you' is used to make a threat. "I promise you I shall not forget this insult in a hurry". But in the case of genuine promises it seems the promisee is always thought to have something to gain from the promise being kept. Once the form of words used to make a promise has come to be generally accepted, a man is in fact staking his reputation as

trustworthy person if he fails to keep his promise. So long as he has something to gain from being thought trustworthy, he has a certain motive to keep his promises even before it comes to be thought a man's duty to do so.

We have now explained how the convention of promises came to be established without making any reference to the fact that fidelity to promises is thought a virtue.

The case is entirely comparable with that of justice and the reason why fidelity to promises is considered a virtue is the same as the reason why justice comes to be approved of. "Public interest, education, and the artifices of politicians have the same effect in both cases." (T.H.N. III, p.225; p.523)

In a promise the promisee has a right to assume that the promise expresses a resolution in all normal cases. But since no obligation is in such cases attached naturally to resolutions, there seems to be a problem about a mere form of words making all the difference in the case.

"Here, therefore, we feign a new act of the mind, which we call the willing of an obligation; and on this we suppose the morality to depend." (T.H.N., III, p.225; p.523)

The 'feigning' Hume talks of is by Melden called a "remarkable bit of self-deception" (Melden, p.52) because Hume has already maintained that it does not make sense to talk of 'willing an obligation'. He compares it with the feigning that leads us to believe in the continued and independent existence of objects external to us and in our self-identity. One might get the impression from reading Melden that he is reporting a comparison drawn by Hume. This is not the case.

Hume does not compare the act of feigning that leads us to believe we can will an obligation with the other cases.

I think the answer to this problem is to be set out on the following lines. A distinction is implicit between the philosopher and the vulgar, the general public. A philosopher will, indeed, understand what is involved in a promise. He will, in so far as he has mastered the true Humean view, know that there is no such act as willing yourself to be under an obligation with the magical power of binding yourself to a promise. But in so far as this is understood, he will have no use for feigning anything at all. We don't have here any remarkable feat of self-deception on his part. But the general public, in so far as they are unable to see why 'a certain form of words' should bind them, will feign an act of volition in that they come to think that the obligation belongs to promises because of the act of binding yourself to them. This is, in fact, a natural error to fall into if we remember that we can of course choose to make or not to make a promise. If we choose not to do so, we in effect choose to avoid the obligation. We fail to realise that this does not mean that if we make a promise the keeping of the promise is only obligatory because we have willed it to be so. We don't choose the obligatory nature of the promise.

If the preceding explanation is accepted it is not strictly analogous to the case of continued independent existence of external objects and personal identity. In the case of these latter, the 'self-deception' is inevitable and

cannot be dispelled by any philosophical analysis whatever its result. To believe in promises being obligatory because of an act of mind is in no sense a 'natural belief'.

The will which is supposed to lead to an obligation must be expressed by certain signs if it is to bind a man to a promise. The expression then comes to be thought of as "the principal part of the promise" (T.H.N. III, p.225; p.523). A man is no less under an obligation though he does not intend to keep his promise, though he has not resolved to try to do so and has in fact no intention of binding himself to it. Here the form of words is taken to constitute the promise.

Hume thinks that although it is the case that the form of words constitutes the promise on most occasions, there are exceptions. a) If he does not know the meaning of the phrase he uses and does not intend to promise, he is not bound by "I promise to X" or any equivalent expression. b) Even if he does know the meaning, but talks in jest and makes it obvious that he is doing so, the words don't bind him.

We must not think that in all cases where a person does not intend to keep his promise in uttering the words 'I promise' or an equivalent expression he is not obliged to do so. If we granted this a deceitful promise would not oblige. This is absurd. Even in cases where we know the promise to be deceitful because we are alive to the signs that indicate deceit, this does not absolve from responsibility.

If we look upon the obligation attaching to promises as a human convention, we can easily explain why it is that in some cases the actual expression and in other cases the man's intention

should be counted as the principal part of a promise. These differences in the case are determined by considerations of utility. It appears indeed a mystery how an obligation can arise from the will. It is in this similar to baptism or communion or holy orders. But whereas in these latter cases the sacrament is destroyed if the priest withholds his intention one cannot be absolved from a promise by simply withholding one's intention to perform it. Terrible consequences may follow from this but Hume thinks it has less effect because men are less concerned about their future state than this one. The explanation here offered is hardly convincing in that it seems one would have to accept the whole thing as a mere human convention if one were to accept that the words alone quite apart from the intention with which they were uttered made the whole of the sacrament in these cases. There is also nothing comparable to the authority of the priest in the case of promises.

Hume's account also seems to make it possible to explain why a certain kind of force should invalidate contracts. The concluding remarks of the chapter put the point well:

"If we consider aright of the matter, force is not essentially different from any other motive of hope or fear, which may induce us to engage our word, and lay ourselves under any obligation. A man, dangerously wounded, who promises a competent sum to a surgeon to cure him, would certainly be bound to performance; though the case be not so different from that of one who promises a sum to a robber, as to produce so great a difference in our sentiments of morality, if these sentiments were not

"built entirely on public interest and convenience." (T.H.N. III, p.227; p.525)

In the case of the robber we have, indeed, a promise which is not considered binding. We should not nevertheless want to say that no promise was made to the robber. This is a case where it is justifiable to break a promise. Here then, we see that it cannot be correct to say that a promise consists in placing yourself under an obligation.

It is also important to note that there is a tremendous difference in the importance of promises. The obligatory nature of the promise is closely related to whether what was promised was or was not trivial. Hume does not discuss this, but there is no reason to think he believes that one ought always to keep one's promises irrespective of what is promised.

I think, indeed, that Melden grossly overestimates the strength of the obligation to keep promises in saying "I can be indifferent to my promise only by being indifferent to my own moral status" (Melden, p.65). It is certainly not the case that our whole moral status is on trial in the case of every promise, however trivial it may be.

A CONCLUDING REMARK

I should like to conclude by emphasising one particular aspect of the argument of this thesis.

In treating of evaluation as a special aspect of our emotional nature, Hume has in fact drawn our attention to the great variety of emotion concepts that either are forms of evaluation or can throw light upon the nature of evaluation. These concepts are of interest to the philosopher, and Hume has in fact something interesting to say about a number of them.

We may want to reject Hume's apparent atomism, that each passion is a simple impression. But we must remember that if passions differ there must be a difference in the attendant circumstances of their occurrence. Hume's account of these circumstances is often illuminating. Thus when Hume describes pride, he in fact states the necessary conditions for pride. These coincide with the logical limits of this concept as I tried to argue in talking of the indirect passions.

The associationist psychology may be out of favour with the psychologists. We err if we infer from this that a philosopher has nothing to learn from Hume's attempt at applying its principles to the active and passionate side of our nature.

Hume, David	Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals Ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge, M.A. (abbr. 'S.B.')	2nd Ed. 1902 Oxford at the Clarendon Press
" "	Essays and Treatises In two Volumes	Edinburgh 1825
" "	The Letters of David Hume Ed. L.H.Greig (abbr. 'L.H.Greig')	Oxford 1932
Hutcheson, Francis	An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections Ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge Vol. I British Moralists	1897 Oxford at the Clarendon Press
Kant, Immanuel	Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics Translation by T.K.Abbott	1878 Reprinted 1948
Kruse, Fr. Vinding	Hume's Philosophy in his principal work, A Treatise of Human Nature and in His Essays	1939 Oxford University Press
Kydd, Rachael	Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise (abbr. 'R. and C.')	1946 Oxford University Press
Laird, John	Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature	London 1932 Methuen & Co.Ltd.
Locke, John	An Essay Concerning Human Understanding An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government (Second Treatise on Civil Government) in "Social Contract"	George Routledge & Sons Ltd. London The World's Classics
MacNabb, D.G.C.	David Hume, his Theory of Knowledge and Morality (abbr. 'MacNabb')	1951 Hutchinson's University Library.
McGilvary, E.B.	Altruism in Hume's Treatise In Philosophical Review, N.Y. Vol.12 pp. 272-298	
Melden, A.I.	On Promising In Mind, N.S. Vol.65	1956
Mill, J.S.	Utilitarianism	Everyman's Library, London
Moore, G.E.	Principia Ethica (abbr. 'P.E.')	Cambridge 1903 Reprinted 1922

Mossner, E.C.	The Life of David Hume	Nelson 1954
Nowell-Smith, P.H.	Ethics	Pelican 1954
Passmore, J.A.	Hume's Intentions (abbr. 'P. and H.I.')	1952 Cambridge University Press
Prichard, H.A.	Moral Obligation pp.169-180, The Obligation to Keep a Promise (abbr. 'M.O.')	Oxford 1949 Clarendon Press
Raphael, D.D.	The Moral Sense	1947 Oxford University Press
Reid, Thomas	Essays on the Active Powers of Man in the Works of Thomas Reid, D.D. Ed. Sir William Hamilton, Bart., Eighth. (abbr. 'T.R.')	Edinburgh James Thin MDCCCXCV
Ross, Sir W.D.	Foundations of Ethics	Oxford 1939 Clarendon Press
" "	The Right and the Good	Oxford 1930 Clarendon Press
Sharp, F.C.	Hume's Ethical Theory and its Critics In Mind, N.S. Vol.30, pp.40-56 and 151-171	1921
Smith, Adam	The Theory of Moral Sentiments	London 1792
Smith, N.K.	The Philosophy of David Hume (abbr. 'K.S. and P.O.H.')	London 1949 Macmillan & Co. Ltd.
Stevenson, C.L.	Ethics and Language	1945 Yale University Press Reprinted 1958