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
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Neo-Nationalist Ideology

**A discourse theoretical approach
to the SNP and the CSU**

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Abstract

The concept of ideology's theory-building potential has been under-exploited in studies of contemporary nationalism. This study offers a novel approach to 'neo-nationalism' by defining it as an ideology, embedding it in a theory of discourse, and extending this framework to a methodology based on text analysis. Qualitative deconstruction of texts using the tools of literary theory is one of the research methods used, complemented by evidence from elite interviews and a survey of primary sources. In order to illustrate how neo-nationalism is discursively constructed, the core of the ideology is distinguished from its periphery. Furthermore, parties are characterised as ideologues in contemporary society and placed within the post-modern framework of discourse theory. Case studies of the Scottish National Party and the *Christlich-Soziale Union* in Bavaria examine their interpretations of nationalist ideology through analysis of the rhetoric used in recent election campaigns. The parties are of particular interest because they attempt to reconcile core nationalist goals with contemporary political issues, such as that of integration within the European Union. The SNP is an example of a neo-nationalist party in that it pursues its core, immutable goal of prioritising the nation by promoting Scottish autonomy within a larger European framework. The CSU, on the other hand, is neo-nationalist in that its policies and rhetorical appeals revolve around a national nodal point articulated in terms of the *Heimat*. It has sought to defend Bavarian autonomy by profiling itself as the archetypal Bavarian party with an important rôle to play in both the German and European political arenas. The case studies demonstrate that a nationalist party's support for European integration may reinforce rather than undermine its core commitment to self-determination. Moreover, the ideological constructs developed by neo-nationalist parties can usefully be characterised in terms of discourse theory. Both the CSU and the SNP seek to 'de-contest' their interpretations of the nation and achieve conceptual hegemony by establishing their ideology as 'common sense'. Post-modern theory thus not only provides the epistemological grounding of the study, but also paves the way for a methodological approach designed to analyse neo-nationalism in its specificity.

Introduction

“Politics is not merely – or even centrally – about power; it is also about meaning.”¹

In recent decades, all manner of minority, sub-state, terrorist, democratic, irredentist and post-Communist nationalisms have been used as evidence of a phenomenon generically termed ‘the rise of nationalism’. A few movements have grabbed the news headlines and others have arrested the attention of academics. However, the discipline of nationalism theory lacks a systematic investigation into nationalism’s contemporary manifestations, and this study makes a contribution to remedying that lack. Nationalism is notorious for its multi-faceted nature and the difficulty of describing its central component – the nation. Theorists now mostly agree on the pointlessness of trying to identify an objective ‘checklist’ of criteria of nationhood. Instead, Benedict Anderson’s characterisation of the nation as a subjectively ‘imagined community’ has gained almost universal acceptance.² A great deal of contemporary theorising thus centres on questions of identity and ethnicity. The present study, in contrast, proposes to analyse nationalism first and foremost as an ideology, with all the theoretical implications this entails.

One important aspect of nationalist movements today is that they often do not equate the political expression of nationhood with independent statehood, thus moving beyond the nineteenth-century assumption that created the term ‘nation-state’. Interpreting the principle of national self-determination to mean different degrees of autonomy can be seen as a pragmatic response to the development of multi-level governance.³ Furthermore, and parallel to Alan Milward’s thesis as to ‘the European rescue of the nation-state’, contemporary nationalist movements use the process of European integration to support their political projects. In his important book, Milward has shown the European Community to have been the “buttress [...] of the

¹ R. Poole Nation and Identity p.113.

² Anderson contends that the nation is imagined as a limited, finite, sovereign community. B. Anderson Imagined Communities p.7.

³ Cf. M. Mann ‘Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not Dying’ in G. Balakrishnan (ed.) Mapping the Nation.

nation-state's post-war construction".⁴ This study sets out to demonstrate that the European Union is also used by contemporary nationalists to undergird demands for greater autonomy from precisely those 'nation-states'. Although such movements have been acknowledged as representing a fundamentally different phenomenon to nineteenth-century nationalism, few scholars have set out to theorise them explicitly.⁵ There is clearly a need for a specially adapted theoretical and empirical approach to guide the student of contemporary nationalism. This piece of research develops the conceptual tools required for such an endeavour, before using them to interpret specific cases of neo-nationalist ideology.

I Cases of Neo-Nationalism

Within six months of each other, two very different party political broadcasts were shown on Bavarian and Scottish television respectively. The first opened with shots of beautiful young people picnicking and frolicking beside a lake. The typically attractive Bavarian countryside complemented the sun-kissed, colourful and carefree mood of the broadcast. This party evidently wanted to be associated with the good life. The second broadcast, on the other hand, had a down-to-earth feel. It offered images of politicians pressing the flesh under a characteristic Scottish drizzle, shots of Scotland's industrial landscape, and a portrait of a prominent party member fading into that of an old age pensioner. It conveyed the message that the party in question gave 'bread and butter' issues a high priority. The first broadcast, on the other hand, continued with shots of a child drawing a pretty picture of a bucolic scene, a combine harvester in a golden cornfield and a baker making typical Bavarian bread. This party wanted to show it was close to the ordinary people of Bavaria. The second broadcast, in contrast, included a sequence in which an office worker put down the telephone, picked up a framed photograph of prime minister Tony Blair, and dropped it into a wastepaper basket.

⁴ A. Milward The European Rescue of the Nation-State p.3.

⁵ Some prominent theorists of nationalisms' appraisals of neo-nationalism are summarised in D. McCrone The Sociology of Nationalism Ch. 7. Eric Hobsbawm, however, describes Eastern European nationalism in the 1990s as a product of the same dynamics as those responsible for nationalism's nineteenth-century variants. E. Hobsbawm Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality Ch. 6.

This stark symbolism made it clear that the party opposed the sitting UK government and everything it stood for. The first broadcast, in turn, included images of a scintillating cityscape, a high-tech office and a rocket flying through space. This party wanted to show that it knew how to keep up with the times. Finally, the second broadcast was interspersed with pictures of a crowd waving small paper saltires, of people singing and playing instruments in a traditional Scottish pub, and a shot of a Highland landscape. This party was identifying with typical Scottish symbols.

The maker of the first broadcast, shown during the campaign for elections to the Bavarian parliament in September 1998, was the Bavarian *Christlich-Soziale Union* (CSU). The Scottish National Party (SNP) made the second broadcast, which was used in the run-up to the first Scottish parliament election in May 1999. The imagery used in these campaign materials tells us a lot about the parties in question by visually summarising central aspects of their ideologies. Evidently, the SNP and the CSU are similar in that they emphasise the importance of a given territory to their identity. However, the way in which they characterise this identity is quite different; the CSU's rendering is more vivid and aesthetically pleasing, while the SNP's imagery has a grittier edge. In turn, the SNP pushes Scotland's social problems to the fore, whereas the CSU delivers its policy messages in a less forceful manner. This may partly be due to the fact that the CSU is a long-term governing party in Bavaria and that the SNP, on the contrary, has only ever been in opposition. Another substantial difference is that the parties have quite distinct policy orientations. In its broadcast, the CSU emphasised business and individual prosperity, in line with its right-of-centre political programme. The SNP, on the other hand, chose to highlight the plight of pensioners and the future of Scottish heavy industry, themes typical of its left-of-centre agenda. Not only do these broadcasts give us an idea of how each party imagines its respective nation, but they also offer a taste of the parties' blueprints for future action and the style in which they propose to implement their programmes. By stringing together a few minutes' worth of images, the parties have constructed a political discourse for us to interpret, something this study sets out to do in some detail.

When searching for an example or variant of contemporary nationalism, it is not enough to rely on self-ascription by movements, parties or ethnic groups. Not only would this scupper any attempt at a theoretical categorisation of nationalisms, but it would also risk overlooking 'nationalisms by another name'. Indeed, these may be pursuing a nationalist project more tenaciously and more successfully than avowedly nationalist movements, whilst enjoying the advantage of avoiding the stigma often associated with the 'ism'. Nevertheless, one of the things we first encounter in a party is its name. The Scottish National Party provides us with a seemingly straightforward statement of its identity and core political goal; it evidently wishes to put the Scottish nation at the forefront of its political programme. Doubts immediately arise, however, as to how the party defines 'Scottish' and what it means by 'national', questions which will be addressed throughout the present study. A somewhat more opaque mission statement is contained in the name *Christlich-Soziale Union*, or Christian Social Union. The party apparently wishes to express its commitment to a Christian code of ethics.⁶ Furthermore, the non-confessional nature of this religious influence is hinted at by the inclusion of the term *Union* in its name, which suggests not only a bridging of cleavages but also an aspiration to be a party of the masses. The CSU does not, however, associate the word *Sozial* with socialist ideology, interpreting it instead to mean support for a social market economy, as institutionalised in the German model.⁷ Although these components are revelatory of the CSU's world-view, this study will focus on what one might consider to be the crucial, or nodal elements of the party's ideology. For present purposes, then, the CSU will be compared to the Scottish National Party in terms of its identity as a Bavarian national party standing only in Bavaria.

This study will examine how the SNP and the CSU interpret nationalist ideology by analysing examples of their rhetoric. Nationalism will be characterised in terms of discourse at the theoretical level, and tackled conceptually as an ideology. At the

⁶ T. Waigel 'Die geistigen Grundlagen der Christlich-Sozialen Union' in B. Haneke & R. Höpfinger (eds.) *Geschichte einer Volkspartei - 50 Jahre CSU* p. 18.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 31.

empirical level, this will be translated into a concern with the way in which the chosen parties convey their ideological message through rhetoric. Analysis of texts will therefore be the principal research method used. The emphasis on parties derives from their role as ideologues in contemporary society; they are of interest here more as sources of ideological thinking than as subjects of study in their own right. However, the wide definition of discourse which will be adopted requires that attention be paid to the unique context which inevitably influences party thinking. The flexibility of party strategy and its relationship to the core of party ideology will be another focal point of the study. A specific example of this is the SNP and CSU's attempt to reconcile their nationalist principles with support for further European integration.

The existence of a tension between nationalist ideology and European integration is denied by the nationalists analysed in this study, and the question therefore arises as to where the seeming incompatibility originates.⁸ The answer lies precisely in the anachronistic image of all nationalists as separatist and isolationist, obsessed with having their own state and achieving absolute sovereignty, complete with its connotations of autarchy. Such a vision sits uneasily with the process of 'ever closer' European integration, which requires member states to surrender sovereignty in certain areas in the name of European security and economic co-operation. One of the novelties of contemporary nationalism is its attempt to question this dichotomy and unite these two apparently divergent strands of thought. Using Michael Freeden's theory of core and peripheral ideological principles, it will be argued that a pro-European stance may reinforce rather than undermine a party's core commitment to national self-determination.⁹ The parties' combination of two intuitively incompatible principles has turned a potential threat to their nationalist project into an opportunity to further it.

⁸ According to one SNP member of the Scottish parliament; "The question is a nineteenth century question [resulting from] thinking very much in the Thatcherite imperial mode." George Reid, in an interview with the author.

⁹ M. Freeden Ideology and Political Theory Ch. 2.

II Theoretical Considerations

Taking the distinction made by Tom Nairn between ‘old’ and ‘new’ nationalisms as a point of departure, my research focuses on ‘new’ or ‘neo’ nationalism.¹⁰ My concern to move beyond totalising theories and acknowledge the specificity of every neo-nationalist movement led me to consider a post-modern approach. Given this rejection of universal explanatory models, I did not set out to find either specific or general causal mechanisms to explain contemporary nationalism. Instead, I opted to interpret the movements themselves, rather than the reasons for their emergence. The aim was therefore to supplement existing explanatory theories with an interpretative framework which could be applied to a range of contemporary nationalisms. I felt that the ideological nature of nationalism was under-researched, and that the concept of ideology itself could be an important source of theoretical insights. The discipline of social psychology proved to be an unexpected source of inspiration in articulating this hunch.

The work of Michael Billig, who has written on nationalism, ideology and rhetoric, was important in shaping my approach, as was a manuscript by Stephen Reicher and Nick Hopkins, which came to my attention at the beginning of my research and appeared in book form at the end of it.¹¹ From their work, I gleaned four important propositions. Firstly, that despite its myriad manifestations, the ubiquity of nationalism makes it an important contemporary phenomenon worthy of study. Secondly, that “national identity is as much implicated in ‘banal nationalism’ as in ‘hot nationalism’”.¹² This led me to consider cases that are neither extreme nor violent, but are nevertheless

¹⁰ T. Nairn The Break-up of Britain p. 32. The distinction is discussed on p. 28 of the present study.

¹¹ M. Billig Ideology and social psychology; extremism, moderation and contradiction, Arguing and Thinking; a rhetorical approach to social psychology, Ideology and Opinions: Studies in Rhetorical Psychology and Banal Nationalism. S. Reicher & N. Hopkins Identity, Mobilisation and Nation; A Psychology of Mass Action and Self and Nation.

¹² S. Reicher & N. Hopkins Self and Nation p. 101. Here the authors play on the term ‘banal nationalism’ coined by Michael Billig.

expressions of nationalist ideology. The third proposition concerns the centrality of rhetoric to the study of nationalism, and its characterisation as the linguistic expression of ideology.¹³ The resulting focus on the qualitative analysis of texts enabled me to analyse nationalisms in their specificity. It also tallies well with a post-modern perspective, which allows for a crossover between political enquiry and literary theory in the deconstruction of texts. Finally, these authors use nationalism's ideological nature in order to access its meaning;

There is a case for saying that nationalism is, above all, an ideology of the first person plural. The crucial question relating to national identity is how the national 'we' is constructed and what is meant by such construction.¹⁴

My approach to nationalism draws on work from three academic disciplines. The work of Billig, Reicher and Hopkins was the first important source, and led me to structure my research around the guiding principle that nationalism is an ideology expressed through rhetoric. These propositions were all reconcilable with the general post-modern approach to ideology as all-pervasive, which could incorporate the ubiquity of 'banal nationalism'.¹⁵ The theory of ideology elaborated by Michael Freeden was my second source of inspiration. By answering the question posed in his article 'Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?' in the affirmative, Freeden confirmed that nationalism continues to be a distinct, determinate category of ideology in contemporary politics.¹⁶ His work also provides the basis for the distinction between core and peripheral ideological principles, which will be returned to time and again throughout this study. Freeden's understanding of ideology has been adopted here;

[Ideology] effects a decontestation of the political concepts it employs by means of a combination of logical and cultural proximities among

¹³ "We have replicated Billig's arguments about the importance of a rhetorical approach to all constructs of understanding." *Ibid.* p. 98.

¹⁴ M. Billig Banal Nationalism p. 70.

¹⁵ "The discourse of nationalism is the ultimate explanatory and legitimating framework in today's world." U. Özkirimli Theories of Nationalism p. 229.

¹⁶ M. Freeden Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology? p. 765.

them, which prioritize certain concepts over others, and certain meanings of each concept over other meanings. The external manifestation of this thought practice is a unique conceptual configuration that competes over its legitimacy with other conceptual configurations.¹⁷

The notion of conceptual configurations points towards the empirical study of ideology as a construct, and recalls Billig's deconstruction of the meaning of nationalism. It also incorporates a sense of rival ideologies competing to decontest the meaning of core concepts, which has parallels with the dynamics theorised about in some strands of post-modern thought.¹⁸

The concept of ideology contains elements which can embed the slippery notion of national identity within the wider framework of discourse. Itself a notoriously vague term, the concept of discourse has been not only clarified, but also reconciled with ideology in the third major source of inspiration for this study, 'Hegemony and Socialist Strategy' by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. The theory of discourse elaborated in this book provided the conceptual toolbox required to approach neo-nationalism from a post-modern perspective. It also placed many of Freeden and Billig's observations within a wider theoretical framework, such as Billig's discussion of the "syntax of hegemony".¹⁹ Furthermore, Aletta Norval has recently affirmed the fruitfulness of combining Freeden's work with that of Laclau and Mouffe.²⁰ For the purposes of this study, a particularly useful similarity is the overlap between Freeden's understanding of a core ideological principle and Laclau and Mouffe's definition of a nodal point of discourse. To posit the nation as nodal to nationalist ideology not only

¹⁷ M. Freeden Practising Ideology and Ideological Practices p. 307.

¹⁸ W. Gallie was the first to use the phrase 'essentially contested concepts'. W. Gallie 'Essentially Contested Concepts' in Black, M. (ed.) The Importance of Language. It is taken up by Michael Freeden in his book Ideology and Political Theory pp. 55-60. On the compatibility of Freeden's work with post-modern thought see A. Norval The Things we do with Words: Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis of Ideology.

¹⁹ "Right from its earliest times, nationalism used a 'syntax of hegemony', by which the part claimed to represent the whole. One form of speaking might claim to be the language of the whole nation." M. Billig Banal Nationalism p. 88.

²⁰ "There is a remarkable coincidence between the morphological approach to decontestation and contemporary attempts to develop a post-Marxian conception of ideology." A. Norval The Things we do with Words: Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis of Ideology p. 326.

provides an identificatory marker for case selection, but also situates the object of study within a rich discourse theoretical framework. In turn, the core principle of achieving national self-determination provides a reference point for the study of a nationalist movement's ideology and evolution.

The aim of the empirical part of this study is to show that contemporary nationalist ideology combines a flexible, active political strategy with its principled justification. Not only does discourse theory incorporate a concept of ideology, but it also lends itself well to theorising both the adaptability and the diversity of contemporary nationalist parties. These will be characterised as ideologues attempting to mobilise support behind an alternative national construct to that of the existing 'nation-state'. In the sense that neo-nationalist parties form part of a constant struggle to establish their ideology as dominant, or hegemonic, 'common sense' becomes an exciting object of study. It marks the moment at which an ideology triumphantly becomes 'banal', to be generally accepted by a given society until successfully challenged by another world-view. To quote Michael Freeden once more;

To analyse an ideology (as distinct from to participate in formulating one) is to categorise, elucidate and decode the ways in which collectivities in fact think about politics [...] The temporal and spatial attributes of ideologies become evident when they are explored as conceptual configurations, in which general concepts, often courting universal appeal, and shared by preponderant membership of an ideological family, are fleshed out by adjacent and peripheral concepts.²¹

Using this approach, the present study sets out to develop a novel theoretical framework for studying contemporary nationalist ideology.

III Chapter Overview

Case studies of parties, which attempt to reconcile their core goal of national self-determination with peripheral principles supporting European integration, will be used to illustrate how neo-

²¹ M. Freeden Practising Ideology and Ideological Practices pp. 304 & 306.

nationalist ideologies are discursively constructed. The empirical analysis of the SNP and the CSU serves to illustrate the first overall contention being made; namely that the huge variation in contemporary forms of nationalism can best be understood in terms of ideology, characterised as a combination of core and peripheral principles. The second contention of this study is that, despite their apparent diversity, contemporary nationalist parties all share the core principle of self-determination, and can thereby be identified as nationalist. The third contention is that discourse theory offers a useful means of analysing nationalist ideology. Not only does this framework provide an epistemological grounding for the present study, but it also paves the way for a methodological approach adapted to the intricacy and detail of ideological rhetoric. It is hoped that this study will contribute to the theoretical literature by characterising contemporary nationalism as an ideology, embedding it in a theory of discourse, and extending this framework to a methodology based on text analysis.

Chapters one and two offer a theoretical justification for using the concepts of ideology and discourse to analyse nationalism. In chapter one, it will be shown that the potential of ideology to illuminate and characterise nationalism has been under-exploited in the theoretical literature. A discussion of 'thick' and 'thin' ideologies and an examination of competing interpretations of the concept of ideology itself will contribute to filling this gap. As a prelude to the empirical case studies, parties will also be introduced into the theoretical framework. Chapter two seeks to resolve the ontological questions raised in chapter one by the definition of ideology as all-pervasive. As such, it widens the scope of the debate in order to place nationalist ideology in an epistemological context, namely that of discourse theory. The work of discourse theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe will be compared and contrasted to other approaches to discourse, before highlighting the relevance of their theory to a study concerned with nationalist ideology. Finally, rhetoric will be characterised as an expression of ideology, and thereby incorporated into the post-modern perspective. At this point, a conceptual framework incorporating nationalism, ideology and discourse will have been created, within which to embed the empirical data.

Chapters three and four provide the methodological and contextual underpinnings of the study respectively. Chapter three sets about linking the theoretical framework to the chosen research methods of text analysis and interviews. The purpose of the research design is not to achieve statistical replicability, but to apply the theory of nationalist ideology in a way which can be replicated in other case studies. Consequently, the focus on rhetoric is translated into a qualitative approach to the empirical data and the exploration of nationalist ideology through the analysis of texts. The reasons for focusing the research design on political parties, the rationale behind choosing to conduct two case studies, and the decision to undertake a limited number of text analyses are discussed. Finally, an overview of the sources consulted during fieldwork leads into chapter four, which begins with a review of the literature concerning the SNP and the CSU. A discussion of the devolution and federalism debates in Scotland and Bavaria serves to relate each party's interpretation of self-determination to the political arena in which it is being advanced. The role of parties as ideologues throughout their history is then placed in the context of contemporary party political competition, in order to provide a basis for the analysis of changing party strategies. This contextual account is designed to situate the text analyses to follow within their respective political cultures.

At this stage, the theoretical, methodological and contextual grounding for the empirical data is in place. Throughout the case studies of the SNP and CSU in chapters five and six, the presentation of data is framed by the theoretical framework which has been developed. In order to draw out each party's ideological understanding of national identity and European integration, the discussion revolves around typical examples of party rhetoric. Furthermore, in keeping with discourse theory's concern with context, each section begins by describing the specific political environments in which these texts were employed. Both chapters end with a section examining each party's construction of the nation in more detail. Identifying salient themes in party ideology using this qualitative method allows us to retain the richness of the data. It also provides an empirical

springboard from which to make connections between the parties' core understanding of their nationalist projects and the supporting, albeit peripheral, role played by their European policies in furthering these projects.

Chapters seven and eight compare the discursive constructions of SNP and CSU ideology. Chapter seven concentrates on the parties' European policy, using interview data to supplement the conclusions drawn from text analyses. Party policies on Europe are juxtaposed, before examining how these are reconciled with nationalist principles in party rhetoric. This leads to a discussion of the internal coherence of each party's nationalist ideology, and how European integration is constructed so as to underpin rather than undermine the parties' core goals. Chapter eight offers an explicit application of the study's discourse theoretical framework to the CSU and the SNP. It begins with a characterisation of the *Heimat* and the nation as nodal points of the parties' respective ideologies. It then investigates whether either of these nodal points has achieved conceptual hegemony in the corresponding political arena. Finally, each party's construction of national identity is analysed as an antagonistic practice using the notion of the 'Other'. The final chapter thus brings together theory and data from the chosen policy areas, in order to illustrate this study's central contention that contemporary nationalism can usefully be theorised using ideology and discourse. Suggestions as to how the theoretical framework might be applied to other cases of contemporary nationalism are made in the conclusion. Indeed, the CSU and SNP's unique brands of pro-European nationalism are two examples among many supporting the thesis that nationalism is best understood in terms of discourse in general and ideology in particular. This approach can successfully account for the great variety of contemporary European nationalisms.

The diversity of contemporary nationalist movements can be traced to their differing definitions of the nation and understandings of how it should best be expressed politically. However, all nationalisms are based on the same fundamental principle of politicising a feeling of national belonging. In a world constructed in terms of 'nation-states',

contemporary nationalist parties attempt to mobilise voters behind their alternative ideological interpretation of the nation. Neo-nationalists posit the existence of an 'imagined community', justified by means of 'invented tradition', and attempt to mobilise this identity in order to achieve national self-determination.²² The case studies of the CSU and SNP develop the theoretical discussion by examining two interpretations of nationalist ideology, thereby illustrating that nationalism may be all-pervasive, but is not an analytically useless concept for all that. In turn, the discussion of nationalist strategy and rhetoric illustrates the attempts made by political parties to enclose the elements of people, party and nation in a vicious circle or, more neutrally expressed, in a rhetorical triangle. Thus, ideology and its agent, the political party, form the lynchpin between the theory of discourse and the analysis of specific nationalist discourses. The two levels of analysis complement one another in a way which is succinctly expressed by Michael Billig;

The term 'nation' carries two interrelated meanings. There is the 'nation' as the nation-state, and there is the 'nation' as the people living within the state. The linkage of the two meanings reflects the ideology of nationalism.²³

²² "Whatever the historic or other continuities embedded in the modern concept of 'France' and 'the French' - and which nobody would seek to deny - these very concepts themselves must include a constructed or invented component." E. Hobsbawm in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.) The Invention of Tradition p.13.

²³ M. Billig Banal Nationalism p.24.

1 Neo-Nationalist Ideology

The overall aim of the following two chapters is to show that the concept of ideology and discourse theory together provide us with a useful framework for thinking about contemporary nationalism. Placing the data collected within concentric circles of nationalism, ideology and discourse theory sets up a clear theoretical framework for studying contemporary nationalisms. In the present chapter, a review of nationalism theory and different approaches to the concept of ideology will serve to delimit the scope and goals of the research. A critique of some of the leading theories of nationalism in the first section will serve to situate the analysis within this academic field. It should become clear that, contrary to this study, the classic debate between the modernist and primordialist schools of thought derives from a concern to explain nationalist phenomena causally and universally. Following on from this, a closer look at recent, empirically-based studies will highlight research being done into contemporary nationalism. The present study departs from the existing literature, however, in that it makes the ideological character of nationalism - implicit in all these authors' works - into a theoretical focal point. Despite the richness of the concept of ideology, its analytical potential has been under-exploited in the field of nationalism. Although scholars such as John Breuilly, Paul Brass and Kenneth Minogue have explored aspects of nationalism from this perspective, it has rarely been analysed using a theory of ideology as the point of departure.¹ One important exception is Michael Freeden's discussion of 'thick' and 'thin' ideologies in his article 'Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?' His approach will be adopted here in order to support the contention that nationalism is best analysed using the concept of ideology.

The second section of this chapter will set out Freeden's theory and demonstrate its applicability to contemporary nationalist variants.

¹ In the introduction to his book, Nationalism and the State, John Breuilly states his goal as follows; "The central task is to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state power [...] Only then should we go on to consider the contributions of culture, ideology, class and much else." p. 2.

Indeed, the capacity of the theory to account for both the adaptability and the diversity of today's nationalist movements will be highlighted. Furthermore, Freedden makes a distinction between core and peripheral ideological principles, which allows us to identify nationalist movements by their 'ineliminable' components.² His theory serves to identify and categorise contemporary nationalist movements and therefore forms an important part of the solution to the problem of how best to study contemporary nationalism. Any study of nationalist ideology also needs to identify ideologues. This leads us to the reasons why political parties can be characterised as agents of ideology. It will be shown that the adaptability of contemporary party policy chimes well with an analysis of ideology which distinguishes core and peripheral principles.

The final section of the chapter looks at ideology in more detail, in order to uncover the variety of mindsets informing definitions of the concept. To place ideology at the centre of an analysis of nationalism is not without pitfalls, as ideology is itself a highly contested concept. Defining ideology is an ideological activity, then, given that analysts' epistemological backgrounds will inevitably shape the way in which they approach the concept. An examination of the philosophical underpinnings of ideology's manifold definitions will reveal that the controversy surrounding it stems from incompatible world-views. It will be demonstrated that both Marxist and positivist approaches are unsatisfactory for the purposes of the present study, as they are more suited to universalising theories than to a differentiated understanding of contemporary nationalism. The conclusion to be drawn is that ideology, and nationalist ideology in particular, requires to be placed in an alternative epistemological context. Chapter two will go on to demonstrate how well discourse theory can fulfil this role.

² M. Freedden Ideology and Political Theory Ch. 2.

I Nationalism Theory

One of the principal debates within nationalism theory divides primordialist and modernist scholars. It confronts the claim that nations are rooted in some ancient *ethnie* with the contention that nationalism is a product of the last two centuries of modernisation.³ Another central debate juxtaposes ethnic and civic variants of nationalism, depicting them as irreconcilable opposites. In this case, a form of nationalism based on exclusive criteria of belonging such as language, religion or blood is contrasted with a nation defined according to state citizenship.⁴ These formulations, although having the merit of clarity, very much over-simplify possible approaches to explaining and classifying nationalisms. Consequently, the pairings should be seen as labels denoting end points of a spectrum rather than as strict dichotomies.⁵ For instance, in the celebrated debate entitled ‘Do nations have navels?’ which pitted the ‘primordialist’ Anthony Smith against the ‘modernist’ Ernest Gellner, each made considerable concessions to the other’s position.⁶ Indeed, most scholars would not situate themselves at either pole of these discussions. In order to evaluate their relevance to the goals of the present study, a closer look at some explanatory theories of nationalism will be followed by an overview of the primordialist literature, studies of nationalism focusing on ideology and selected accounts of neo-nationalism,

A variety of general theories attempt to account for the rise of nationalism, each emphasising different factors as crucial.⁷ Michael

³ For an example of such a debate, see C. Geertz *et al*, reproduced in J. Hutchinson & A.D. Smith (eds.) Ethnicity pp. 40-56. The term *ethnie* is used by A. D. Smith to mean “a named human population with myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories and one or more common elements of culture, including an association with a homeland, and some degree of solidarity, at least among elites.” Myths and Memories of the Nation p. 13.

⁴ A third, philosophical debate looks at nationalism and self-determination in the abstract. Cf. M. Canovan Nationhood and Political Theory, D. Millar On Nationality and Y. Tamir Liberal Nationalism.

⁵ D. Brown attributes the idea of a spectrum to A.D. Smith Are there good and bad nationalisms? p. 300 (footnote 5).

⁶ For a detailed account of the debate, see Gellner’s posthumously published book Nationalism Ch. 15.

⁷ These theories are discussed at greater length in J. Kellas The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, J. Hutchinson Modern Nationalism and U. Özkirimli Theories of Nationalism.

Mann, for instance, points to the importance of nationalism as a means of mobilising men to aliment the military machines of nineteenth-century states.⁸ Benedict Anderson highlights the influence of what he calls 'print capitalism', the ever-more rapid and wide dissemination of the printed word, in fostering a sense of shared national identity among the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie.⁹ Miroslav Hroch depicts intellectual elites as the force fuelling the growth of national consciousness. He divides the process of nationalist mobilisation into phases, in which first intellectuals, then the bourgeoisie and finally the masses throw their weight behind a political project.¹⁰ The best known modernist theorist is Ernest Gellner, however, who characterised nationalism as a response to the dislocation brought on by the uneven development of industrialisation and urbanisation.¹¹ He claimed that, by being uprooted from their homes and thrown together in unfamiliar urban surroundings, people were forced to reassess and recreate a sense of belonging by identifying with national constructs. Gellner's much-quoted aphorism, "every man is a clerk", referred to a concomitant spread of education in the vernacular, which fostered participation in these newly-configured societies.¹² Counter-nationalisms could be expected to develop, however, among those disappointed by the centre's promise of social mobility and equality.¹³ Eric Hobsbawm draws on both Hroch and Gellner in his historical account of nationalism since 1780.¹⁴ Finally, John Breuilly privileges a political explanation, putting state structures and their need for legitimation at the forefront of his account of nationalist movements. He comes closest to the approach of the present study when he says;

There is no valid explanatory theory of nationalism, only a number of ways of describing and comparing various forms nationalist politics have taken.¹⁵

⁸ M. Mann The Sources of Social Power: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914.

⁹ B. Anderson Imagined Communities.

¹⁰ M. Hroch Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe.

¹¹ E. Gellner Thought and Change, Nations and Nationalism, Encounters with Nationalism.

¹² E. Gellner Thought and Change p. 159.

¹³ *Ibid.* Ch. 7. For an earlier, functionalist approach to nationalism see K. Deutsch Nationalism and Social Communication.

¹⁴ E. Hobsbawm Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality

¹⁵ J. Breuilly Nationalism and the State p.338.

Elie Kedourie is also a modernist, as he demonstrates in his book 'Nationalism', first published in 1960. Contrary to Gellner, however, Kedourie concentrates on the history of nationalism as an idea. The first five chapters of his book offer a detailed account of the philosophical roots and the development of nationalism, whilst the final two chapters discuss its ideological links with left and right, with liberalism, democracy and civil rights. Kedourie also discusses the social standing of nationalist ideologues such as Herder and Mazzini and throws light on the professional frustration, political inexperience and intellectual idealism motivating their writing. He argues that such men initially shaped nationalist politics, but that figures such as Hitler, Stalin and Lenin were responsible for distorting and debasing sophisticated intellectual debates. However, although he claims to be able to trace the nationalist phenomenon to a set of ideas, Kedourie nowhere describes the reception and active application of these ideas across Europe. This seriously weakens the plausibility of a theory that purports to be explanatory, but does not support the exegesis of nationalist ideology with an account of how it was propagated and the reasons for its success.

Kedourie's derivation of fascist doctrine from Kant's thought is tendentious and highly normative.¹⁶ The archetype of nationalism used throughout the argument is a chauvinistic, German and ethnic form, one which regards other nations as having lesser cultural content. Kedourie goes on to tar all nationalisms with the same brush, eventually trapping himself within his own, overly narrow definition.¹⁷

¹⁶ Kedourie argues that Fichte, Kant's disciple, adapted the categorical imperative to a theory of self-realisation through the collective, giving rise to the paradox that the individual will is all important but that individual freedom can only be realised by subjecting oneself to the state; "[I]ndividuals, as such, are phantoms; they gain reality in so far as they have a place in the whole. Consequently, the freedom of the individual, which is his self-realisation, lies in identifying himself with the whole." E. Kedourie *Nationalism* p. 38.

¹⁷ Indeed, by the end of the book his definition is far more narrow than that offered in the first chapter. On p.9 Kedourie states; "Nationalism [...] pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organization of a society of states." On p. 74 he makes the following claim; "A British or American nationalist would have to define the British or the American nation in terms of language, race or religion, to require that all those who conform to the definition should belong to the British or American state, that all those who do

By chapter six, his argument is less rigorous and more influenced by his evident distaste for nationalism.¹⁸ The spurious distinction Kedourie makes between a Whig theory of nationality and nationalism, for instance, rests on the sweeping observation that the former ‘worked’ in the USA and Britain, whilst the latter led to Nazism. Arguably, Kedourie is suggesting thereby that it is not nationalist ideology itself but its implementation which is at fault; in other words, a relatively ‘benign’ application of nationalist principles should be called by another, less contentious name. Apart from anything else, this attempts to introduce an ontological distinction between chauvinism and patriotism, rather than recognise them as variants of nationalism. Although Kedourie approaches nationalism first and foremost as an ideology, the preceding critique has shown that his work is an unsuitable role model for the present study.

Despite the sophistication of the theories outlined above, they are for the most part deterministic, as they purport to find their favoured factors at the root of all nationalist movements.¹⁹ Although the likes of Anderson and Gellner did divide manifestations of nationalism into geographical and historical zones, these categories describe very general processes and are of limited applicability to specific cases.²⁰ Liah Greenfeld, for one, accuses Gellner of ignoring the historical contingency of many nationalist phenomena.²¹ She

not, should cease so to belong, and to demand that all British and American citizens should merge their will in the will of the community.”

¹⁸ For instance, note Kedourie’s argumentation between pages 107 and 109 of his book, which is based on an inductive method and a non-crucial, less than convincing case; “In any case national government and constitutional government *do not necessarily* go together [...] This *variant* exhibits with particular clarity the *fallacy* of associating national independence with efficient, humane, and just government [...] nationalism and liberalism are *antagonistic principles*.” (my emphasis).

¹⁹ For instance, Gellner asserts; “[A] homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism.” Nations and Nationalism p. 39.

²⁰ In Encounters with Nationalism, Gellner divided Europe into four historical time zones. He attempted to formulate a general model for the Atlantic sea coast zone, for instance, based on strong dynastic states. Anderson’s work, on the other hand, is not Euro-centric and makes some far-reaching claims, including that ‘print capitalism’ developed in South American ‘Creole’ states to create the first version of nationalism. B Anderson Imagined Communities Ch. 4.

²¹ L. Greenfeld Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. In her book, she charts the rise of English nationalism before the advent of industrialisation, on which Gellner bases his theory. Brendan O’Leary criticises Gellner’s general theory for being

herself recognises nationalism to be a political ideology and charts the changing meaning of its central concept, the nation, from medieval times onwards.²² However, despite acknowledging the huge variation in nationalist movements according to situational constraints, Greenfeld also proposes a universal explanatory model of nationalism based on an identity crisis, or anomie, of the relevant social actors.²³ In contrast, the aim of the present study is not to explain ‘the rise of nationalism’ as a single phenomenon, but to examine contemporary nationalisms according to an interpretative theoretical framework. Neither does it seek to attribute objective characteristics to the nation, something easily done when all are deemed to emanate from the same source. Given that I set out to analyse nations only as a product of the political ideology of nationalism, what Peter Alter calls the ‘simplest’ definition of the nation will suffice for present purposes; “[T]he nation is a politically-mobilised people.”²⁴ Linked to this definition is the point that neo-nationalisms go about mobilising people in a quite different environment to the predominantly nineteenth-century variants being discussed by Gellner and others of the modernist school.²⁵ This observation alone justifies the quest for an alternative approach to the study of contemporary nationalism.

Along with John Armstrong, Walker Connor and Josep Llobera, Anthony Smith is one of the leading members of a school of thought which emphasises the ‘primordial’ elements in nationalist movements.²⁶ Smith asserts the existence of pre-modern *ethnies* and contends that modern states have been built around ethnic communities. According to him, the development of a nation from an *ethnie* is equivalent to the transition from a passive community to an active, organised and assertive one;

teleological, ahistorical and apolitical in J. Hall & I. Jarvie (eds.) The Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner.

²² “The only foundation of nationalism as such, the only condition, that is, without which no nationalism is possible, is an idea; nationalism is a particular perspective or style of thought.” L. Greenfeld Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity p. 4.

²³ *Ibid.* pp. 14-17.

²⁴ P. Alter Nationalismus p. 16 (my translation).

²⁵ This is recognised by Gellner and Anderson themselves, who give contemporary nationalism short shrift. For a summary, see D. McCrone The Sociology of Nationalism pp. 125-126.

²⁶ J. Armstrong Nations before Nationalism, W. Connor Ethnonationalism - The Quest for Understanding and J. Llobera The God of Modernity.

We are not talking here about actual descent, much less about race, but about the *senses* of ancestry and identity that people possess.²⁷

Walker Connor's definition of the nation as "a group of people characterized by a myth of common descent" supports this view.²⁸ Primordialists do not dispute that nationalists make selective readings of the past, but are keen to make the point that the selection must take place within strict limits set by pre-existing myths, symbols, customs and memories.²⁹ Be that as it may, primordialist theorists offer little insight into how twenty-first century conditions impact on constructions of nationhood. They focus on the past as opposed to the present, and their approach is therefore of little relevance here.

Like Elie Kedourie, Paul Brass and John Breuilly emphasise nationalism's ideological character. Although they share the primordialists' interest in recognising the specificity of nationalism, they do so by highlighting the importance of elites in shaping and propagating ideas. In his book 'Ethnicity and Nationalism', Paul Brass argues that elite competition, rather than ethnic identity *per se*, constitutes the basic dynamic of ethnic conflict. He goes on to state that this theory is compatible with notions of invented tradition and constructed social realities.³⁰ Indeed, Brass underlines the importance of the political and economic environment in shaping the expression of ethnic identity and its politicised form, nationalism. Similarly, John Breuilly points to the central role of state authorities in manipulating nationalism as a mobilising force. This supports his thesis that nationalism is used in order to create an ideological link between the cultural and the political, or society and the state (actual or desired.) According to Breuilly, nationalism is a product of "the need to make sense of complex social and political arrangements", a task nationalists undertake by adopting a simple political project which presents them as spokesmen for the nation.³¹ Breuilly also points to the adaptability

²⁷ A.D. Smith The Ethnic Origins of Nations p.150 (emphasis in original). For a definition of *ethnie*, see footnote 3.

²⁸ W. Connor Ethnonationalism - The Quest for Understanding p. 75.

²⁹ A. D. Smith The Ethnic Origins of Nations p. 154.

³⁰ P. Brass Ethnicity and Nationalism pp. 13 –14.

³¹ J. Breuilly Nationalism and the State p. 343.

of nationalism as an important element in its appeal, and highlights the construction of stereotypes of the nation, its history and its enemies as crucial to the success of a nationalist party.³²

Similarly to Brass and Breuilly, Kenneth Minogue's definition of the nation as "something to be found largely in the aspirations of nationalists" and his emphasis on "legend-making", demonstrate his understanding of nationalism as a political construct.³³ Minogue's discussion of national symbols and "people who speak the same language" in a metaphorical sense, covers some of the same themes which Michael Billig would return to in his work on 'banal nationalism'.³⁴ Further, Minogue examines the interplay of nationalism with other ideologies such as liberalism and Marxism, thereby preparing the ground for Michael Freeden's theory of thick and thin ideologies. Finally, Minogue identifies both the power of nationalism to inspire political action and the fact that it is an ideology largely empty of content. He concludes;

Nationalism is a set of ideas, but as they travel from continent to continent, these ideas add up less to a theory than to a rhetoric, a form of self-expression by which a certain kind of political excitement can be communicated from an elite to the masses.³⁵

The work of Breuilly, Brass and Minogue offers important insights into nationalist ideology, which are highly relevant to understanding the make-up of its contemporary variants. Not only does Breuilly's account emphasise nationalism's ideological character, but it also identifies the closely related themes of rhetoric and discursive constructs. Minogue, in turn, defines nationalism as a flexible ideology open to much variation. He discusses it in terms of rhetoric, just as the empirical part of this study sets out to do. The present piece of research aims to build on this literature by offering a theoretical framework for studying contemporary nationalism based on the concepts of ideology, discourse and rhetoric.

³² *Ibid.* p. 344.

³³ K. Minogue *Nationalism* p. 31. Cf. p. 154; "The point we have had to emphasise about modern nationalism is that the politics come first, and the national culture is constructed later."

³⁴ *Ibid.* Ch. 5. M. Billig's book *Banal Nationalism* is discussed further in chapter two.

³⁵ K. Minogue *Nationalism* p. 153.

Paul Brass's work is useful in suggesting an approach to the empirical study of nationalist movements. Brass claims that symbols and myths are selected and manipulated instrumentally according to their political usefulness, leading him to the following conclusion;

The important goal for nationalist movements in this regard is exclusivity, the drive to become the sole political representative of the community. [Another] feature of the more effective nationalist movement is their ability to shape the identity of the groups they lead.³⁶

Such a reading chimes well with the emphasis of the present study on the techniques used by a nationalist party to construct a rhetorical elision between party and nation, to define the discursive boundaries of the nation, and to select the symbols which correspond most closely to its ideological interpretation of the nation. However, based on Brass's case study of Muslim nationalism in India, Francis Robinson takes issue with this stance, arguing that the influence of pre-existing Islamic ideas had a far greater limiting effect on elites and the form of political mobilisation they adopted than Brass allows for. Robinson is of the opinion that the influence of primordial factors on national movements should not be underestimated, as these shape not only "the range of legitimate actions for the elite [...] but also form their own apprehensions of what was possible and of what they ought to be trying to achieve".³⁷ He concludes that the primordial argument should be given greater consideration, and that the correct approach lies somewhere in between this and a constructivist theory.³⁸ Although the present study will examine national myths employed by parties, it

³⁶ P. Brass Ethnicity and Nationalism p. 49.

³⁷ F. Robinson 'Islam and Nationalism' in J. Hutchinson & A. D. Smith (eds.) Nationalism.

³⁸ In his critique of Brass, Robinson acknowledges that Brass does not dismiss the importance of primordial elements altogether. *Ibid.* p. 107. Indeed, both Breuilly and Brass also recognise that pre-existing factors do influence elites to a certain extent. For instance, Breuilly states; "[Elites] also begin with a fund of intellectual assumptions about what society is and how it is organised." Nationalism and the State p. 344. Cf. Liah Greenfeld's position; "The underlying ideas of nationality were shaped and modified in accordance with the situational constraints of the actors, and with the aspirations, frustrations and interests which these constraints generated [...] Such reinterpretation implied incorporation of pre-national modes of thought within the nascent national consciousness." Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity p. 15.

seeks to establish neither their antiquity nor their authenticity. Instead, it accepts Hobsbawm's view of traditions as invented, whatever the source and pedigree of the components used, and focuses on the contemporary products of this ideological process.³⁹

The preceding discussion has picked out some schools of thought in nationalism theory, all of which have helped to delimit the aims and scope of this research. To conclude, a view which proposes a synthesis of the primordialist and modernist positions emphasises cross-fertilisation over the confrontation of views within the discipline of nationalism theory. The deep-rooted nature of national loyalty and its strong mobilising potential have led Josep Llobera to entitle his book on nationalism 'The God of Modernity'. Given that Llobera distinguishes phases in national consciousness, the following quote demonstrates that the distance between the primordialist and modernist positions is not as great as might be expected,;

Nationalism *stricto sensu* is a relatively recent phenomenon, but a rudimentary and restricted national identity existed already in the medieval period [...] In modernity, the national sentiment is first of all a reaction against the cosmopolitan pretensions of the Enlightenment.⁴⁰

Moving beyond these periods in history, one could argue that a further stage has been reached in this process, heralded by the declining legitimacy of certain states.⁴¹ Although this could be rather glibly termed a 'post-modern' phase, to do so would be to make a sweeping generalisation of precisely the sort post-modern theory strives to distance itself from. Further, to describe this stage as a product of 'globalisation' would be to employ a term as vague as 'modernity'. Approaching contemporary nationalist movements in this way is, at best, unhelpful. Concentrating on the dynamics of state and sub-state

³⁹ "It is clear that plenty of political institutions, ideological movements and groups – not least in nationalism – were so unprecedented that even historic continuity had to be invented." E. Hobsbawm 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions' in E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (eds.) The Invention of Tradition p. 7.

⁴⁰ J. Llobera The God of Modernity pp. 220-221. Llobera might prefer to be called an 'ethno-symbolist' rather than a primordialist, the term A. D. Smith uses to describe his own position in Myths and Memories of the Nation.

⁴¹ For a detailed account of the social, economic and political context of contemporary sub-state nationalism see M. Keating Nations against the State Chs. 2 & 3.

mobilisation, however, is a more concrete project. By focusing on some of the actors involved, the dynamics of nationalist dissent can be charted;

Calls for national exclusivity are based on the configuration of contemporary politics and states which provides the template to which the rise of any specific nationalism is a response [...] Due to differences in, for example, national histories, intellectual foundations and contemporary economic and political circumstances, a precise ideological content, outside of a loyalty to the nation, for nationalism *per se* is impossible to establish.⁴²

Thus, attention shifts from attempts to explain nineteenth-century nationalism universally, to analysis of specific contemporary nationalisms within their political contexts.

Theories of Neo-Nationalism

The present study will focus on neo-nationalism at the sub-state level. Tom Nairn was one of the first to introduce a distinction between traditional and contemporary nationalisms.⁴³ He refers to old nationalism as the process of nineteenth-century European state-building which took place in the context of industrial revolution and the breakdown of agrarian society. As we have seen, theorists have variously sought to explain this phenomenon as a device used by elites to promote solidarity among citizens, as a consequence of modernisation, or as a result of the development of print capitalism. These conditions no longer obtain in contemporary European society and new theories have been developed to explain today's nationalist movements.

Tom Nairn's Marxian standpoint led him to link the varying responses of nationalist movements to the different stages of capitalist development of their respective nations. According to him, new nationalism is a product of relative deprivation in an already modern, industrialised environment. Without subscribing to the epistemological premises of this theory, Nairn's analysis is still an interesting starting

⁴² M. K Flynn Ideology, Mobilization and the Nation pp. 18 & 30.

⁴³ T. Nairn The Break-up of Britain Ch. 3.

point for a study of the neo-nationalist phenomenon. His account of uneven development emphasises the relevance of 'material circumstances' to political mobilisation, whilst acknowledging the importance of symbols in cementing national solidarity. These are themes which are reflected here both in the concern to place case studies in context and in the emphasis on rhetorical features when analysing texts. From Nairn we can glean the proposition that each new manifestation of nationalism is *sui generis* - a product of unique national circumstances - whilst retaining the core principles of nationalist ideology at its heart. In the words of Liah Greenfeld;

The idea which lies at the core of nationalism is the idea of the nation. [Nationalism is] a phenomenon whose nature [...] is determined not by the character of its elements, but by a certain organizing principle which makes these elements into a unity and imparts to them a special significance.⁴⁴

Consequently, it is essential to look at both the context of a nationalist movement and the manner in which its discourse is structured in order to understand how its ideology has evolved. Before going on to theorise the 'organising principle' of nationalism using the work of Michael Freedon, some alternative approaches to the study of contemporary minority nationalisms will be surveyed.

In his book 'Nations against the State', Michael Keating discusses the cases of Scotland, Catalonia and Quebec; three territories which have not integrated completely into a state. He links political mobilisation there to the fact that state power has been undermined by a revolution in governance.⁴⁵ His discussion of 'new nationalisms' depicts them as generally civic movements which incorporate a broad social base and are progressive in their discourse; that is, they accept both the concept of limited sovereignty and the existence of multiple identities. Contemporary minority nationalism is characterised as a mix of civic and ethnic markers, mobilised differently according to the

⁴⁴ L. Greenfeld Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity pp. 4 & 7.

⁴⁵ "[D]ependence has lessened as the states have lost their capacity for territorial management and the minority nations have become more self-assertive". M. Keating Nations against the State p. 268. However, Keating is not of the opinion that the state is generally in decline. Instead, he argues that it has been penetrated and destabilised by supra-state and sub-state factors. *Ibid.* p. 28.

changing constellations of power at state and international levels.⁴⁶ According to Keating, for such minority movements to be successful, evidence of their competence in economic matters is also of utmost importance. Furthermore, he emphasises the role of nationalism in articulating a new political arena and thereby providing a focus for collective action. Given declining loyalty to the 'nation-state' construct, sub-state territories are re-invented as centres of social, economic and political activity, as well as an alternative locus of identity. An account of the way in which conflicts between the sub-state group and its larger 'Other' are managed is therefore a central element of Keating's case studies. His characterisation of the factors influencing the programmes and strategies of contemporary nationalisms illustrates the effects of today's political environment on the dynamics of sub-state movements. The evidence presented supports the case for a fresh approach to contemporary nationalism. However, Keating recognises the ideological nature of nationalism but does not explore the ramifications of this observation.⁴⁷ This study aims to complement Keating's account by elaborating on this aspect of neo-nationalism.

Within the relatively limited literature incorporating case studies of contemporary nationalisms, the theoretical approach outlined in the introduction to Jenkins and Sofos' edited collection entitled 'Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe' most closely resembles the understanding of nationalism guiding the present study.⁴⁸ In it, the editors focus on nationalism as a political, historically specific ideology and, like Keating, highlight the importance of social negotiation in shaping the strategies and interests of collectivities. The nation emerges from their account as a

⁴⁶ "It is not the existence of language and culture policies which determine whether a nationalism is ethnic or civic, but the uses made of language and culture, whether to build a civic nation or to practise ethnic exclusion." *Ibid.* p. 12.

⁴⁷ "The nation-state is first of all an ideological construction." *Ibid.* p. 28.

⁴⁸ Another interesting source of literature on contemporary nationalism is the discipline of political geography. See, for instance, B. Giordano Italian regionalism or 'Padanian' nationalism – the political project of the Lega Nord in Italian politics, G. MacLeod In what sense a region? Place hybridity, symbolic shape and institutional formation in (post-) modern Scotland and R. Levy Finding a place in the world economy. Party strategy and party vote; the regionalisation of SNP and Plaid Cymru support 1979-92.

conceptual tool manipulated by nationalist movements in order to legitimate their political project. David McCrone's characterisation of neo-nationalism, which generally tallies with Keating's, also underlines its flexibility and context-dependency. For instance, he asserts that "different ideological elements are mixed and mobilised: right/left; ethnic/civic; past/future; local/global; corporatist/neo-liberal; separatist/autonomist".⁴⁹ This portrayal suggests that neo-nationalism must constantly evolve and be ready to adapt the way in which it articulates the link between the individual and the collective.

In his book, Peter Lynch deals specifically with the relationship between minority nationalisms and European integration. Echoing the thesis developed by Alan Milward, he relates a crisis in political legitimacy of many European 'nation-states' to their increased participation in international organisations such as the European Communities.⁵⁰ In turn, Lynch explores the effects of this on domestic constitutional reorganisation and the emergence of many minority nationalisms during the 1960s and 1970s, thus seeking to link the sub- and supra-state dynamics constraining state power.⁵¹ He then goes on to illustrate these links by means of case studies of Scottish, Welsh, Breton and Flemish nationalist parties and their European policies. Interestingly, Lynch opts to discuss minority nationalisms in terms of their goals, ideology and strategies, emphasising the heterogeneity of their approaches to European integration. Unfortunately, definitions of these terms are not offered, and they are not used to structure the case studies. Furthermore, Lynch does no more than state that a shared demand for autonomy differentiates his chosen case studies from other political traditions, and neglects to explore the common nationalist core of each party's ideology. The present study also sets out to look at the interplay between nationalists' European policies and their demands for autonomy. However, it does so by embedding its case studies in an explicit theoretical framework, which not only helps to structure the empirical analysis, but also ensures analytical replicability. A discussion of three further works on neo-nationalism

⁴⁹ D. McCrone The Sociology of Nationalism p. 129.

⁵⁰ A. Milward The European Rescue of the Nation-State. For a discussion, see pp. 3-4 of this study.

⁵¹ P. Lynch Minority Nationalism and European Integration Ch. 1.

will serve to demonstrate the originality of the theoretical approach adopted here.

Saul Newman, in his book 'Ethnoregional Conflict in Democracies', categorises five 'ethnoregional' parties according to a fourfold typology of ideologies. For instance, he describes SNP policy as an example of a 'classless-inclusive ideology'.⁵² Like Keating and Lynch, Newman emphasises the importance of "state regionalization policies in determining the path of ethnoregional conflict that emerges in their wake".⁵³ Using statistical data, he seeks to chart the development of party strategies as a result of this dynamic, thereby relating ethnic identity to political strategy. However, his operationalisation of ethnic mobilisation as a factor in late twentieth century 'conflictual modernisation', recalls the universalising theories developed to explain nineteenth-century nationalisms.⁵⁴ Consequently, although his elaboration of an explicit typology and his emphasis on party ideology, party interaction and other contextual factors make for well-structured and insightful case studies, Newman's theoretical approach is not a suitable model for the present study.

Montserrat Guibernau's latest book complements her previous research into the philosophical underpinnings of nationalism by elaborating a theoretical approach to contemporary 'Nations without States'.⁵⁵ In it, Guibernau examines the relationship between sub-state mobilisation and the changing global political order by focusing on the conceptual triad of state, nation and nationalism, the role of intellectuals in promoting nationalism, and the means used by

⁵² "A classless-inclusive ideology is one that does not attempt to mobilize individual socio-economic groups or organizations within the potential ethnoregional constituency through particularistic appeals. Instead it appeals simultaneously to all socio-economic groups and organizations [...] and downplays the importance of socio-economic differences within the ethnoregion." S. Newman Ethnoregional Conflict in Democracies p. 10.

⁵³ *Ibid.* p.221.

⁵⁴ "The conflictual modernization approach focuses attention on a set of economic, social and political variables that weakened old political attachments and politicized new ethnic identities. In so doing, the conflictual modernisation approach not only can explain the origins of these conflicts but also their direction." *Ibid.* p. 8.

⁵⁵ These are defined as "cultural communities sharing a common past, attached to a clearly demarcated territory, and wishing to decide upon their political future, which lack a state of their own." M. Guibernau Nations without States; political communities in a global age p. 1. Cf. Guibernau's earlier book entitled Nationalisms.

nationalist movements to achieve their aims.⁵⁶ Although illuminating, her analysis could have been rendered more cohesive by using nationalism's ideological character - which is acknowledged as "crucial" but not explicitly elaborated upon - as a unifying theme.⁵⁷ Underlining the competing, constructed nature of state and sub-state nationalist ideologies would have supported her analysis of the central role of intellectuals as ideologues dedicated to redefining nations as global actors. Further, to impute a "stable but dynamic core" to nationalist ideology rather than to a nation without a state, as if it were a monolithic bloc, might have been a more fruitful line of argument.⁵⁸ The following observation could then have been used to inform and organise the book's somewhat disjointed structure;

Intellectuals have the capacity to create ideologies which can contribute to legitimizing particular regimes or social structures, but they can also provide challenge and criticism to those regimes and structures.⁵⁹

All the authors reviewed agree that contemporary nationalisms must be approached differently to their nineteenth-century variants and that their strategic flexibility in the face of changing state, sub-state and supra-state relationships must be taken into account. Although this context has been well defined and discussed in the literature, Guibernau's work shows that the implications of nationalism's ideological character for theory-building have not been fully teased out.

Finally, David Brown's study entitled 'Contemporary Nationalism', represents a successful combination of unusual and illuminating case studies within an original and challenging theoretical

⁵⁶ These themes are discussed in chapters one, four and five respectively. Chapter two considers the role of the 'Other' in shaping a national movement's choice of an alternative option to the *status quo*, and chapter six analyses the flexibility of nationalist demands in the face of changing political structures, including EU structures. In the final two chapters of the present study, these issues will be subsumed into an ideology-based analysis of contemporary sub-state nationalism.

⁵⁷ "The political ideologies to which nationalism is attached are crucial to understanding the significance and character of nationalism in each particular case." M. Guibernau Nations without States p. 7.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* p. 17.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p. 98.

framework. The author states that the purpose of his book is to “unravel nationalism by isolating and examining its ideological components”.⁶⁰ His aim is thus very similar to that of the present study. Brown adopts what he calls a constructivist approach to nationalism, defining it as “an ideology offering a distorted perception of reality, containing selective simplifications and elements of myth”.⁶¹ He then goes on to distinguish civic, ethnocultural and multicultural nationalisms, arguing that the last has recently emerged from the ‘unravelling’ of the first two. However, Brown also highlights their inter-penetration. His attempt to systematise the confrontation between these three strands is a welcome addition to the literature, not least because the ideological character of nationalism guides Brown’s thought. The approach is original in that the focus of case studies is not “located primarily in the chronological examination of the causal impact of past events, but rather in the examination of the mythologisations of the past embodied in the competing ideologies of those conducting contemporary disputes”.⁶² Brown’s evocation of competing constructions of the nation and the ‘emotional-economic’ nature of contemporary movements identifies aspects of nationalism which will be elaborated upon here. In-depth analysis of concepts and themes crucial to nationalism will be privileged over a chronological account in the presentation of case studies.

Contemporary nationalist ideology *per se* remains an under-researched topic, as analysts often neglect the concept of ideology in their analyses of multi-level governance and identity politics. This study contributes to remedying this gap in the literature. It sets out to problematise nationalism in terms of ideology and to demonstrate the usefulness of the concept in understanding neo-nationalism. At the same time, it draws on work by Keating and Brown in order to identify the dynamics underlying contemporary nationalist movements and salient themes in their ideologies. Not only does the pragmatic element in the definition of ideology allow scope for analysing the dynamics of nationalist party strategy, but a study of the conceptual core of nationalism also provides a framework for identifying and classifying

⁶⁰ D. Brown *Contemporary Nationalism* p. 152.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 1.

⁶² *Ibid.* p. 152.

possible case studies. The concept of ideology thus contains within it the means of structuring an investigation of neo-nationalism, given that it can incorporate both flexible and immutable principles. It can thereby introduce some heuristic order into the seemingly endless diversity of nationalist movements. Michael Freeden, who has written widely on ideology, will guide our first foray into the complexity of nationalist ideology.

II Nationalist Ideology

How comprehensive must an ideology be to deserve the name? Must it offer a theory of history, an analysis of human nature and a set of beliefs regarding man's place in the universe before it can lay claim to the title? Very few writers offer so demanding a definition.⁶³ John Plamenatz prefers to differentiate between 'comprehensive' and 'partial' ideologies, or as Michael Freeden puts it, 'thick' and 'thin' ideologies.⁶⁴ The basic principle of prioritising the nation remains central to contemporary nationalism. The nation is its very *raison d'être*, even if neo-nationalism's manifold variants have different ways of making the nation politically relevant and of formulating the ultimate goal of self-determination. But at what point do these variations become so opportunistic as no longer to correspond to a directing ideology? Michael Freeden's account of 'thick' and 'thin' ideologies is useful in tackling this question, as it makes a clear distinction between core and peripheral ideological concepts. This distinction is used in the present study both to identify suitable cases for analysis and to dissect their ideologies, according to whether a principle is central or secondary to the movement in question.

Michael Freeden defines a thick ideology as one "containing particular interpretations and configurations of all the major political concepts attached to a general plan of public policy that a specific society requires".⁶⁵ A thick ideology, therefore, consists of a complete

⁶³ *Pace* Kenneth Minogue in 'On Identifying Ideology' in M. Cranston & P. Mair (eds.) Ideology and Politics

⁶⁴ Respectively, J. Plamenatz Ideology and M. Freeden Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?

⁶⁵ M. Freeden Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology? p. 750.

set of principles which can be applied to problem-solving in all policy areas, providing solutions which are recognisably in keeping with the world-view in question. For instance, free market or welfarist approaches to taxation are recognisable applications of liberal and socialist ideologies respectively. A thin-centred ideology, on the other hand, leaves some conceptual vacuums. It does not provide “chains of ideas [...] stretching from the general to the practical, from the core to the periphery”.⁶⁶ According to Freedon, nationalism is an example of a thin-centred ideology, as it has few immutable or ‘ineliminable’ characteristics beyond the prioritisation of the nation. He cites feminism and green thought as other examples of thin ideologies, since they have no inherent principles which extend and apply their core commitment to women’s rights and environmental protection respectively. These ideologies thus require peripheral policies - such as opposition to nuclear fuel, demands for limits to toxic emissions, or measures to promote sexual equality - in order to translate core goals into a practical strategy. Similarly, nationalists must translate their core goal of self-determination in a way suited to their political environment. Self-determination, therefore, has no precise, immutable form within nationalist ideology, as it is interpreted using a different set of peripheral principles by every nationalist movement. Despite their shared commitment to national self-determination, different movements interpret this core goal in different ways. This proposition helps to account for the huge variation in the strategies nationalists pursue. What is more, they supplement the nationalist core with very diverse peripheral principles. The SNP, for instance, understands self-determination as independence within Europe, whereas the CSU aims to preserve its autonomy within the German federal structure. Nonetheless, it will be shown that both parties are nationalist in that their policy programme is derived from the basic principle of prioritising the nation above all else.

The core of a thin-centred ideology such as nationalism must be supplemented with elements from other ideologies. Conversely, thin-centred ideologies can be used to supplement an otherwise ‘thick’ ideology lacking in one fundamental area. Examples of this are

⁶⁶ *Ibid.* p. 750.

parties' selection of a national arena in which to pursue their particular political project, and the implicit acceptance by most sitting governments of the current boundaries of the nation-state. Despite being conservative, liberal or socialist first and foremost, governments thereby incorporate the central element of nationalism into their 'thick' ideologies.⁶⁷ According to Freeden, then, core principles are the bare bones of a belief-system, which require to be fleshed out. Peripheral principles are a form of ideological padding, which is flexible in order to respond to changing social needs. These principles correspond to party strategy, which translates core ideological beliefs into a plan of action for making them a reality. Focusing on nationalist ideology will serve to illustrate this typology further.

Freeden describes nationalism as a thin-centred ideology with five core principles; first, the prioritisation of the nation as a key defining framework for human beings; second, the positive valorisation of the nation; third, the desire to give a political and institutional form to the nation; fourth, the importance of space and time in determining social identity and fifth, a sense of belonging closely bound up with emotion.⁶⁸ The first of these elements sums up the ideology's core commitment to national self-determination.⁶⁹ However, as Montserrat Guibernau rightly points out, nationalist ideology "does not indicate the direction to be taken or the methods which should be adopted to achieve [these goals]".⁷⁰ This makes it a thin-centred ideology in Freeden's terms, as it requires peripheral concepts to turn its abstract core into a political plan of action. That is, the core is interpreted differently depending on the circumstances; the SNP will evidently draw on different symbols of belonging than the CSU, which will have ways of defining Bavarian identity designed to appeal to its own national audience. Hence the 'chameleon-like' nature

⁶⁷ For a detailed discussion of these thick ideologies, see M. Freeden Ideology and Political Theory. The all-pervasiveness of the nation as an organising principle will be returned to in chapter two of this study.

⁶⁸ M. Freeden Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology? pp.751-752.

⁶⁹ Anthony Smith proposes his own analysis of the 'core doctrine' of nationalism, highlighting basic propositions such as the division of the world into nations, the nation as the source of all political and social power, and the need to identify with the nation as a means to self-realisation. A. D. Smith National Identity p. 74.

⁷⁰ M. Guibernau Nationalisms p.63.

of nationalism, a flexible ideology *par excellence*, capable of being moulded to fit every situation.

Supplementing nationalism with elements of fascist ideology can turn the nation into an exclusionary, ethnically defined one, so much so that to purify it of foreign elements can be considered the only way of prioritising the nation. Anti-colonial nationalism has sometimes been combined with Communist principles, or has merely sought to create national solidarity on the basis of opposition to the colonial oppressor. The former offers an elaborated means of creating a united nation (a thick ideology, in other words) whereas the latter relies exclusively on the core principles of positive valorisation and an emotional sense of belonging. Without a complete and coherent world-view, however, confusion and loss of direction are likely to occur if the short-term goal of independence is achieved. Finally, an inclusive form of nationalism is also possible, which makes its appeals on the basis of shared citizenship and supplements its wish for a politico-institutional expression of the nation with a whole gamut of peripheral principles covering all major political issues. These examples show how the myriad variations of nationalist ideology can be incorporated into Freedon's account. By characterising nationalism as a 'thin' ideology, Freedon adds another dimension to the following view;

Nationalism, political loyalty to a nation, is not an ideology itself, and only becomes one with elaboration by features that fill in the doctrinal spaces not necessarily articulated by a political nation's initial development. This accounts for the flexibility of nationalist ideologies in application and development, and the variations that can appear in reference to a single nation.⁷¹

In fact, the converse is being argued here. Nationalism is an ideology itself, but must be 'thickened' by peripheral concepts in order to be applicable to a specific context. The fact that all 'doctrinal spaces' are not filled does indeed account for the flexibility and the variations in nationalism, but does not demonstrate that nationalism is not an ideology. On the contrary, Freedon shows that nationalism *is* an ideology, albeit a thin one, which can incorporate the notion of

⁷¹ M.K. Flynn *Ideology, Mobilization and the Nation* p. 14.

flexibility by supplementing its core principles with any number of peripheral concepts.

Freeden's distinction between thick and thin ideologies goes beyond recognising the wide variation in contemporary nationalisms in order to place them within a theoretical framework which makes it possible to examine their similarities. Despite their apparent diversity, all contemporary nationalisms derive from the same core principle of prioritising the nation above all else. In turn, this preliminary conclusion provides a theoretical springboard from which to identify and categorise contemporary nationalisms. If the prioritisation of the nation can be identified as a core, guiding principle of a movement, then it is nationalist according to Freeden's typology. The first contention of this study has been demonstrated, namely that contemporary nationalist parties all share the same core principle of national self-determination. It forms the basis for exploring the second contention; that ideology, and its sub-division into thick and thin principles, is the most fruitful conceptual approach to contemporary nationalism. Before going on to look at the concept of ideology itself, it is important to address the suitability of studying parties as ideologues. It will become clear that, far from betraying a lack of ideological principle, the adaptability and diversity of contemporary nationalist parties provides evidence to support Freeden's theory that nationalism is a combination of core and peripheral elements.

Parties as Ideologues

The leap from general ideological currents such as liberalism, socialism and nationalism to those of specific organisations with limited influence and support is a large one to make. However, as Michael Freeden remarks;

Ideologies do not have to be grand narratives; they certainly do not have to be closed, doctrinaire and abstract systems. Ideologies are recurrent, action-oriented patterns of political argument.⁷²

⁷² M. Freeden The Ideology of New Labour p. 45.

Given that they are “action-oriented”, actors are central to any account of ideology, and political parties are one of the few entities to combine a thought-out world-view with a strategy for implementing it. Although the beliefs and values of all individuals contain ideological elements, very rarely can these be mapped as a complete, coherent ideology. In contrast, parties combine the philosophy and practice of ideology in their political programme and the strategies they adopt. Far from signalling a decline of ideology in the political arena, the adaptability of contemporary parties to changing social and economic circumstances, not to mention their quickness to respond to political opponents, demonstrate that ideologues must also be pragmatists.

Parties bring together the strategic, explanatory, justificatory, political, responsive and dynamic features of ideology in an explicit fashion. In doing so they represent what Karl Mannheim would call a ‘total’ ideology, as opposed to an individual’s ‘particular’ ideology.⁷³ In his book, entitled ‘Ideology and Utopia’, Mannheim stressed that a total ideology is not the sum of the particular ideologies of all group members. Parties offer instead a systematisation of an ideological trend such as nationalism. No nationalist party actually represents either an entire nation or the entire complexity of nationalism, although it might well claim to do so.⁷⁴ However, it does offer an interpretation of society and a political programme for action, making it an ideal subject for the analysis of nationalist ideology.

Closely related to the rapid evolution of party policy and organisation is the thesis that parties are becoming less ideological; that is, less guided by a logical set of principles and more by pragmatic power considerations. Increasing voter volatility, the rise of ‘catch-all’ parties and their keenness to appeal to ‘head over heart’ by campaigning on concrete economic issues, all seem to point towards a political arena no longer organised around ideological camps. There is

⁷³ K. Mannheim Ideology and Utopia Ch.5. The study of particular ideology would attempt to pick out the ideological fragments incorporated into an individual’s understanding of the world. For a social anthropologist’s view of particular nationalist ideology, see A. P. Cohen Personal Nationalism: A Scottish View of some Rites, Rights and Wrongs.

⁷⁴ “One form of speaking might claim to be the language of the whole nation.” M. Billig Banal Nationalism p. 88.

some doubt, therefore, as to whether today's political parties continue to be agents of ideology. However, in a study of the ideology of New Labour, Michael Freeden writes;

The age in which we live, far from being post-ideological, is one of ideological experimentation, of the resurrection of past principles combined with new attitudes.⁷⁵

According to this view, the adaptability of contemporary parties does not make them less ideological than those which stuck to their original principles, only to become obsolete. On the contrary, it is a sign of the ideological and strategic flexibility of parties that they have been able to adapt to the demands of an evolving society.⁷⁶ Furthermore, focusing on parties serves to illustrate the dynamic element of an ideology, which must be pragmatic, down-to-earth and regularly revised in order to reflect the needs of contemporary society.

Just as their mass party antecedents were born of the need to organise and explain a new system of universal suffrage, today's parties are still required to respond to the confusion and insecurity felt by many. In an attempt to fit an ideological framework to a globalising world, their ideologies have evolved in line with these changing demands. All voters are united in their desire for a better standard of living, and parties must respond to these wishes by promising to provide continued economic growth. At the same time, parties wishing to broaden their appeal beyond their traditional class or religious strongholds must successfully appeal to a wide spectrum of voters, without so diluting their message as to alienate their power base. Evidently, strategy and tactics play an increasing role in party politics. Changes in society have also prompted a change of tack when it comes to campaigning. As social mobility increases, education reaches more people and media exposure becomes ever more widespread, parties can no longer rely on traditional methods of appealing to specific

⁷⁵ M. Freeden The Ideology of New Labour p. 43. Cf. Andrew Vincent, who writes; "The new socialism [...] still sees itself as part of a socialist tradition, and there is a continuity of values and formal themes; but these are expressed in a form which brings them into line with changing circumstances". A. Vincent New Ideologies for Old? p. 52.

⁷⁶ Peter Mair's work on party systems confirms this view. Cf. P. Mair Party System Change Chs. 5 & 6.

social classes or informing them only through their party newspaper and affiliated organisations. This illustrates the changed context which requires contemporary variants of nationalism to be distinguished from older forms. However, it does not follow from this observation that today's nationalists are less ideologically driven than in the past. On the contrary, parties are ideally suited to a study of contemporary variants of nationalism because of their dynamism, pragmatism and policy programmes; all defining elements of the concept of ideology.

A final word is required on the empirical study of parties as vehicles of ideology. Putting his own theory into practice, Freedén's study of New Labour teases out the components in the party's manifesto and concludes that it displays conceptual flexibility within certain confines. He comments that;

What distinguishes New Labour ideology, as indeed any ideology, are the distinctive configurations it forms out of political concepts, the occasional new meanings it assigns to political words in common currency, and the innovative way in which it blends ideas both internal and external to its traditions.⁷⁷

These attributes also apply to contemporary nationalist ideologies, and will inform the empirical study of the CSU and SNP to follow. Each case will be examined in terms of the key principles which intertwine to form a unique ideological configuration. More specifically, the terms nation and *Heimat* will be analysed in depth, as the nature of the peripheral principles adopted is dependent on the meaning assigned to these core concepts. This will be illustrated using the peripheral principle of support for European integration, which is espoused by both parties. The parties thereby incorporate an external idea into their ideology in order to reinforce the core goal of that ideology. Party literature is a rich source of data in examining this process. However, any empirical study of nationalist ideology is best undertaken within an explicit theoretical framework. As a further step towards elaborating such a framework, the final section of the chapter sets out to examine the concept of ideology itself. This will lead us into the epistemological debate underlying the definition of the concept.

⁷⁷ M. Freedén The Ideology of New Labour p. 45.

III The Concept of Ideology

An ideology is a flexible, adaptable, but internally coherent belief system that offers a simple, interpretative explanation of society coupled with practical measures for maintaining or revolutionising the political *status quo*. Marxist ideology, for instance, offers an explanation of society in terms of class and advocates revolutionary activity as a means of realising its ideal of a classless society. Liberal ideology, on the other hand, structures its *Weltanschauung* around the individual, and defends free market exchange as the best means of bringing about individual freedom. Nationalist ideology, in turn, puts the good of the nation first, and has as its first principle the goal of prioritising the nation. Such a thumbnail sketch will already raise questions regarding the accuracy of the definitions just proffered and the huge range of ideological interpretations existing even within these belief-systems. Indeed, the concept of ideology itself does not go uncontested. In some theories of society, such as Marxist and Critical theory, ideology is defined as erroneous beliefs which serve to perpetuate the dominance of a social class. Positivists, on the other hand, contrast ideology to the rationality and objectivity of science, rejecting any claim that individuals in general, far less social researchers, might be unconsciously subject to insidious ideological influence.⁷⁸ Still others, who tend towards some form of relativism, doubt the possibility of verifiable truth and claim that the world-view of all, without exception, is ideological. In discussing these theories, I intend to highlight the different definitions of ideology from which each sets out. A survey of these views will enable me both to evaluate the usefulness of ideology to a study of contemporary nationalism and to elaborate my own definition of the concept.

⁷⁸ "Positivism privileges the study of things which really exist and can be observed. This approach posits that facts can exist independently of values and the possibility of eliminating all statements of a normative character from scientific explanation." R. Scruton A Dictionary of Political Thought p. 428.

Definitions of ideology are manifold, but can be broadly divided into the categories of 'neutral' and 'negative'.⁷⁹ The neutral view tends to stick closely to the semantic definition of ideology as the logic of an idea. The concept's pejorative connotations are said to originate from Napoleon's scorn of the French Enlightenment *Idéologues*, led by Destutt de Tracy, who was the first to use the word *idéologie*. Some of the best known proponents of the negative view of ideology are Karl Marx and Jürgen Habermas. The Marxist definition was only ever made explicit by Friedrich Engels in a letter written in 1893;

Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, it is true, but with a false consciousness. The real motive forces are unknown to him: otherwise it simply would not be an ideological process [...] He works with mere thought material, which he accepts without examination as the product of thought, and does not investigate further for a more remote source independent of thought.⁸⁰

This description raises many of the issues central to defining ideology, not least the question of false consciousness, the perception of ideology as a closed, self-sufficient *Weltanschauung* and the problem of identifying what is real. The following discussion will address each of these questions in turn.

Engels portrays ideology as a logical, coherent belief system, but one based on false premises. The "remote source" he refers to points to the central Marxist tenet that material conditions are what determine thought.⁸¹ This is linked to the proposition that bourgeois ideology oppresses the proletariat by perpetuating the illusion of fair exchange, and thus preserves its own interest in capital accumulation by the most insidious means of thought control. Critical theorists have gone further still in claiming that even science and technology - the

⁷⁹ The variation within these categories remains huge, however, as is exemplified by the range of views expressed by contributors to the book *Ideology and Politics*, edited by M. Cranston & P. Mair.

⁸⁰ Cited by L. Shapiro in 'The Concept of Ideology as evolved by Marx and adapted by Lenin' in M. Cranston & P. Mair (eds.) *Ideology and Politics* p.75.

⁸¹ Engels was later to qualify this statement somewhat by asserting that although the economic environment was 'decisive' in men's lives, other political and ideological factors could still have an influence. *Ibid.* p.76.

supposedly objective bastions of rationality with which ideology is often contrasted - are harbingers of bourgeois ideology. According to Jürgen Habermas, the seemingly unassailable belief in progress and objectivity is merely another means of perpetuating the accumulation of capital and maintaining the ruling class in power.⁸² Far from being the antithesis of ideology, Habermas portrays technocracy and rationality as its most subtle manifestations. This raises the question as to whether ideology can usefully be defined as the opposite of science, and will be returned to below.

The claims made by both Marxists and Critical theorists that they uncover the proletariat's true condition, lay them open to the accusation that they themselves are propounding an ideological belief system. In an article entitled 'Why an Ideology is always Right', Leszek Kolakowski points out that an ideology is unfalsifiable in that it can explain away any phenomenon in terms of its own *a priori* concepts.⁸³ Indeed, Marxist interpretations of history do just that. Facts which undermine the 'truth' of their ideology - such as the failure of class solidarity to overtake national solidarity and the failure of proletarian revolution to spread across the world - are explained within the Marxist belief system. Ultimately, nothing will ever be accepted by Marxists as disproving their beliefs. To define Marxism as an ideology, then, is to refute its claim to truth and to reject the possibility of historical materialists cutting through the false consciousness of individuals to divine their 'real interests'. Whether it be a *Führer* claiming to embody the true will of the people or a party advocating universal suffrage as the only true means of achieving national self-determination, their truth claims should be seen as relative to each ideology and not as absolute.

If the solution to every problem can indeed be formulated within the terms of an ideology, this suggests that it is not open to variation from a source outwith itself. It is but a small step from there to asserting that ideologies are not only principled but also necessarily rigid and dogmatic. Such a view mistakenly attributes a lack of

⁸² J. Habermas *The Structural Transformation of the Bourgeois Public Sphere* Ch. 1.

⁸³ L. Kolakowski 'Why an Ideology is always Right' in M. Cranston & P. Mair (eds.) *Ideology and Politics* p.124.

flexibility to ideology by failing to distinguish its immutable core from an adaptable, changing periphery. It has been shown above that Freedman's theory enables us to reconcile the defining principles of an ideology with the flexibility required to implement them. The CSU for instance, as a proponent of nationalist ideology, has always been concerned with preserving Bavarian autonomy vis-à-vis Germany and the European Union. However, the concrete policy expression of this goal has developed in line with the evolving discourse in each of these political arenas. If we remember that ideologies provide a justificatory basis for political action, it would simply not be expedient for political practitioners to stick rigidly to peripheral principles if these in no way furthered the attainment of their goals. For example, although the SNP has remained continually committed to independence for Scotland, it has interpreted this goal differently according to changing political discourse in Scotland and the UK. Without being as profound as a philosophy, ideologies do not rely primarily on faith as religions do. If an ideology can no longer explain, reassure and mobilise, it becomes anachronistic.

Some analysts are reluctant to restrict the definition of ideology to the political sphere.⁸⁴ However, given that the active element in ideology is undisputed, it is difficult to see how any ideological movement can be apolitical. Coups and revolutions, calls for anarchy, peaceful demonstrations and party political action within a democratic polity are all a reflection of attitudes to authority and the principles organising government and states, and therefore cannot fail to be political. Moreover, an ideology without activists would not be an ideology, but a philosophy or a dead letter. Ideology is therefore a particularly useful concept for analysing contemporary nationalist parties, given that it combines principle and practice in its definition. Not only does it subsume the study of nationalist party programmes, then, but it can also be used to examine a party's plan of action for achieving its goals. In addition, the concept of ideology serves to organise an investigation into contemporary variants of nationalism by

⁸⁴ Cf. K. Minogue 'On Identifying Ideology' in M. Cranston & P. Mair (eds.) *Ideology and Politics* p.76.

highlighting both the similarity of their core beliefs and the wide range of strategies they adopt.

Nevertheless, there are as many conservative ideologies as there are revolutionary ones, and it is at this point that Karl Mannheim's distinction between ideology and utopia becomes useful.⁸⁵ Mannheim defines an ideology as a set of ideas which transcends the existing order but can be pursued within it. An utopia, on the other hand, would necessarily shatter the existing order if put into practice. This distinction provides a means of getting to grips with the sometimes value-laden classification of movements into ideological and non-ideological. One example is provided by Kolakowski;

The social function of ideologies is to furnish an existing power system (or aspirations to power) a legitimacy which is based on the possession of absolute and all-encompassing truth.⁸⁶

This definition incorporates the characteristic claim to truth of ideology, as well as introducing the distinction - equivalent to Mannheim's ideology/utopia dichotomy - between existing power and aspiration to power. However, the reluctance of a great many social scientists to include the political *status quo* and far less their own value-systems in their understanding of ideology, stems from the concept's persistent negative connotations.

To Kolakowski, "typical examples of ideologies so conceived are [...] communism (in all its variants), nazism, fascism, panarabism, zionism, various aggressive nationalist or racial activities, as well as imperial or imperialist ideas".⁸⁷ With the partial exception of Zionism, all of these movements are widely regarded as either reprehensible or suspicious in some way. However, Kolakowski's next sentence reads; "conversely, the noun [ideology] seems less fitting when associated with adjectives like 'liberal', 'pacifist' and 'conservative'". No further explanation is given as to why the term ideology might be "less

⁸⁵ K. Mannheim *Ideology and Utopia* p. 195.

⁸⁶ L. Kolakowski 'Why an Ideology is always Right' in M. Cranston & P. Mair (eds.) *Ideology and Politics* p.124.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p.124.

fitting” in the latter cases. Given that no objective criteria are offered to justify this classification, the juxtaposition of ‘bad’ ideologies with what appear to be examples of ‘good’ alternatives, illustrates the difficulty of achieving a value-neutral categorisation.⁸⁸ Mannheim’s typology has the merit of explicitly drawing attention to this fact by choosing to call the ‘thought-style’ justifying the political *status quo* an ideology. This proposition flows from the assertion that no theorist, Marxist or otherwise, can free themselves from ideology and discover absolute truth. As such, it tallies with a basic contention of post-modern theory. In Mannheim’s terms, a post-modern approach would be equivalent to a ‘general’ view of ideology, as opposed to a ‘special’ one that would posit the researcher as an ideology-free observer.⁸⁹ Thus, ‘special’ value-judgements mould Kolakowski’s supposedly non-ideological definition in the same way as Robert Dahl’s ‘objective’ description of American politics could be said to hide presumptions and prejudices emanating from his personal belief-system.⁹⁰ The work of American pluralists provides an example of the positivistic approach to ideology.

The admission that the political *status quo* is ideologically shaped would rock the positivist perception of reality and objectivity on its very foundations.⁹¹ This brings us to the ‘end of ideology’ debate led by Daniel Bell, Raymond Aron and Seymour Martin Lipset in the United States during the 1960s.⁹² The debate itself was premised on an extremely negative view of ideology, which was primarily associated with fascism and Soviet Communism. Hence, the ‘end of ideology’ debate was predicting the demise of totalitarian regimes, and as such was a direct antecedent to Francis Fukuyama’s triumphant declaration that the ‘end of history’ had arrived when the Soviet

⁸⁸ Cf. P. Spencer & H. Wollman *Good and Bad Nationalisms: A Critique of Dualism*.

⁸⁹ K. Mannheim *Ideology and Utopia* Ch. 2. Although Mannheim’s ‘general’ view of ideology will be the one adopted here, for the sake of simplicity, his conception of utopia will be incorporated into my definition of ideology.

⁹⁰ R. Dahl *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*.

⁹¹ This is highlighted by the following extract from the ‘International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences’ published in 1968; “In so far as the social sciences have been genuinely intellectual pursuits, which have their own rules of judgement and observation and are open to criticism and revision, they are antipathetic to ideology.” Cited in D. McLennan *Ideology* p.55.

⁹² Cf. D. Bell *The End of Ideology*, R. Aron *L’Opium des Intellectuels* and S. M. Lipset *Political Man*.

system did eventually collapse.⁹³ However, the reasoning involved is of relevance even if a wider definition of ideology is adopted. For one, the approach to ideology was most definitely a 'special' one, which rejected the very idea that American society could have an ideological foundation.⁹⁴ In the understanding of many American social scientists, ideology was not applicable to mainstream, moderate politics.

One example of positivist reasoning is Robert Dahl's pluralist account of American society, in which he adopted what has subsequently been called a 'one-dimensional view' of political power.⁹⁵ In his book 'Who Governs?' Dahl analysed cases of conflict in order to see which group got the upper hand in competition for power and influence over policy-making. However, he did not consider cases in which power might have been exercised by preventing the conflict from arising in the first place. Consequently, pluralism could be seen to be supporting the political *status quo* and perpetuating the dominant role of elites by portraying surface competition as necessary and healthy, whilst omitting to ask why large sections of society are not involved in political decision-making. In terms of nationalist ideology, the constant nation-building efforts of a state are indicators of the dominant ideology, one invariably in conflict with the aspirations of sub-state nationalist movements.

Pluralists are reluctant to accept that their environment might be ideologically conditioned and hence less objectively real and describable. In the same way, Marxists and Habermasians cling to a belief in the correctness of their own interpretation of society. At the opposite end of the spectrum are those who float in the truth-vacuum of relativism. Mannheim's conception of 'general' ideology which recognised that all thought, including that of the observer, was socially determined, moved away from the possibility of truth. In an attempt to respond to charges of relativism, Mannheim redefined his approach as

⁹³ F. Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man.

⁹⁴ R. Poole cites the academic Michael Walzer as making a similar assumption; "Michael Walzer powerfully celebrates the various different ways in which it is possible to be American. However, he downplays the extent to which these differences are contained within a normative public culture". R. Poole Nation and Identity p. 35.

⁹⁵ See S. Lukes Power; a Radical View.

'relationism'. He saw each social analyst as contributing partial insights to 'knowledge, which would one day be amalgamated into a comprehensive, -supra-partisan science.'⁹⁶ However, I think one of Mannheim's own quotes serves to justify undertaking even a partial study for its own sake;

The existing order gives birth to utopias which in turn break the bonds of the existing order, leaving it free to develop in the direction of the next order of existence.⁹⁷

Not only does this image resemble the social dynamic described by discourse theory, but Mannheim's 'general' view of discourse theory is also compatible with a post-modern definition of ideology as all-pervasive. This is therefore a fitting point at which to widen the discussion of ideology in order to look at the epistemological framework of this study.

Conclusion

The review of theories of nationalism and neo-nationalism has demonstrated the originality of studying nationalism first and foremost as an ideology. What is more, the fruitfulness of applying Freeden's theory of ideology to contemporary nationalism has been outlined and its compatibility with a study of political parties has been illustrated. Freeden's theory of thick and thin ideologies serves to organise the complexity and diversity of contemporary nationalisms, thereby providing a means of structuring their empirical study and the interpretation of the results. Consequently, the distinction between core and peripheral principles will permeate the case studies. In turn, nationalist ideology is defined as linking an internally coherent, if simplified, interpretation of the world to a political plan of action for making its ideals a reality. According to the view of nationalism adopted here, the nation can neither be defined objectively, nor can neo-nationalism be explained in terms of universal causality. Instead, each ideology is portrayed as competing with alternative world-views, with none being able to lay claim to truth outside of its own conceptual

⁹⁶ K. Mannheim Ideology and Utopia Ch. 5.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.* p.179.

framework. Neither can individuals leave behind their ideological baggage in a quest for objectivity. Indeed, a refusal to discuss the all-pervasiveness of ideology makes any account of society incomplete.

The preceding discussion has shown that all definitions of ideology are embedded within a meta-theoretical framework. This study aims to incorporate ideology into a wider epistemology based on discourse theory. Not only does ideology find a place within the theory's conceptual armoury, but the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe provides us with a way of characterising the dynamics of neo-nationalism.⁹⁸ To pick a path which rejects both Marxism and positivism is to choose a rocky road indeed, for to accept the all-pervasiveness of ideology risks making the concept too general to retain any analytical purchase. Restricting the focus of the study to parties as proponents of ideology represents an important step towards solving this problem. Moreover, it will be shown that discourse theory helps to avoid this pitfall by making a valuable heuristic contribution to a study concerned with the interplay between ideology's immutable core principles and the flexibility of the strategies used to pursue them. It will be argued that only a post-modern framework can successfully incorporate the ramifications of the chosen definition of ideology, which should be placed within the theoretical context of all-pervasive ideologies and constructed, competing discourses. Such an approach makes a substantial contribution to solving the problem of how best to study neo-nationalism, and complements the approach to ideology developed in this chapter.

⁹⁸ E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.

2 Discourse Theory

Despite propounding very different philosophies, both Michel Foucault and Jürgen Habermas have contributed to heightening awareness of the study of language in social enquiry. In particular, Foucault's book 'The Archaeology of Knowledge' and Habermas' theory of communicative action highlight the relationship between language and power.¹ Although these authors theorise the link in very different ways, discourse theory nevertheless develops and draws on both schools of thought. It is at once avowedly post-Marxist and infused with Foucault's theory of discourse formations. Contrary to Foucault's definition of discourse, however, Laclau and Mouffe's concept incorporates that of ideology.² In turn, their attribution of a central role to words and their meanings as indicators of power relations informs this study's approach to neo-nationalism and its rhetorical expression. This chapter will begin discussing the value of using discourse theory to study contemporary nationalism by outlining the general debate surrounding the concept of discourse and its manifold meanings. The second section will discuss the work of Laclau and Mouffe, with particular reference to the influence of Gramsci on their theory of discourse. The relevance of discourse theory to a study of nationalist ideology will then be highlighted. It will be shown that the theory serves to embed a 'general' vision of ideology in a post-modern epistemology. At the same time, by developing the concepts of hegemony, articulation, antagonism and nodal points, it provides a useful way of thinking about the dynamics of nationalist movements. The section ends with a discussion of the applicability of these concepts to empirical study, leading into an examination of the post-modern approach to empirical research. More specifically, in the final part of the chapter, the concept of rhetoric will be introduced and its relationship to ideology and discourse clarified. Alvesson and Kärreman's observation that discourse can be used to designate both 'social reality' and 'social text' has repercussions on the capacity of discourse theory to bridge the gap between theory and

¹ Cf. M. Foucault The Archaeology of Knowledge and J. Habermas The Theory of Communicative Action, Vols. 1 & 2.

² E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Ch. 2.

method.³ It will be demonstrated that, within the ambit of post-modernism, rhetoric is the linguistic expression of ideology. Rhetoric thus serves as a conduit between the theoretical framework of this study and an application of its principles to an empirical analysis of contemporary nationalist ideology.

I The Concept of Discourse

Michel Foucault is an important figure in the development of post-modern thought in general and the concept of discourse in particular, as his rejection of totalising, positivistic theories spurred him to develop an alternative reading of history and politics based on 'discursive formations'.⁴ One of Foucault's first works, 'The Archaeology of Knowledge', set out to describe such formations as the Renaissance, the Classical age and modernity. Within a discursive formation, social agents perpetuate power through the knowledge (and 'truth') contained in the predominant discourse.⁵ Thus, Foucault approaches truth as a social construct. Consequently, governmental knowledge is portrayed in his work as the power to define the identity of others through discourse, giving rise to the famous Foucauldian aphorism; 'knowledge is power'.⁶ Foucault's analysis of power and society breaks the Enlightenment mould, in that it foregoes analysis of 'modern' concepts such as legitimacy and sovereignty in favour of a far more wide-ranging discussion of the 'micro' power relations permeating every sphere of society. This approach is summed up in his vow to 'cut off the king's head', by replacing the concept of sovereign power with that of 'capillary power'.⁷ Referred to as 'governmentality' in later work, this concept refers to the development of a philosophy of

³ M. Alvesson & D. Kärreman Varieties of discourse: On the study of organizations through discourse analysis p. 1126.

⁴ "[W]hen, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations) [...] we are dealing with a *discursive formation*." M. Foucault, cited in M. Barrett The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault p. 128 (emphasis in original).

⁵ Foucault demonstrates how the layers of government within society - the family, the household, the province - and the multitude of micro-hierarchies within the macro-hierarchy of the state are interlinked. M. Foucault 'Governmentality' in G. Burchell *et al* (eds.) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality.

⁶ Cf. M. Barrett The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault p. 142.

⁷ *Ibid.* p. 136.

governance based less on territorial administration and more on the management of every aspect of people's lives through successive 'discursive formations'.⁸

Foucault's definition of discourse is wide, and includes all the institutions, procedures and strategies which are involved in exercising governmental power. To him, discourse is an "open and doubtless indefinitely describable field of relationships" as opposed to "a general developmental stage of reason" or even "a slice of history".⁹ Clearly, he is arguing that all-pervasive discursive formations such as that of modernity can only be grasped by being broken down into smaller units. Foucault's work on the history of prisons and sexuality, for instance, set out to gauge the specific effects of the mentality of government by 'individualizing' discourses such as 'psychiatry,' 'medicine' and 'biology.' By his own account, his book 'The Order of Things' is a study of the correlation between the discursive formations of natural history, economics, grammar and the theory of representation.¹⁰ Foucault's penchant for detailed investigation of fragments is a useful way of pointing out previously neglected aspects of political power. However, he himself recognised that his approach involved "bracketing all the old forms of strained continuity".¹¹ Foucault's account of discursive formations thus gives us a sense of successive levels of discourse, a hierarchy which will now be defined more clearly.

The methodological and philosophical difficulties of linking macro and micro levels of discourse are exemplified by Foucault's juxtaposition of an archaeology of all-pervasive power with localised 'genealogies of power'.¹² In their discussion of different varieties of discourse, Alvesson and Karreman suggest using a capital letter in order to differentiate the forms of discourse concerned with analysing

⁸ Governmentality is defined as "on the one hand, the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, the development of a whole complex of *savoirs*." M. Foucault 'Governmentality' in G. Burchell *et al* (eds.) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality p.103.

⁹ M. Foucault 'Politics and the Study of Discourse' in G. Burchell *et al* (eds.) The Foucault Effect; Studies in Governmentality p.55.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* p.54.

¹¹ *Ibid.* p.56.

¹² M. Barrett The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault p. 132.

localised contexts, from the concept of Discourse used in long-range theory-building. According to the authors, these labels respectively correspond to “the study of the social text (talk and written text in its social action contexts) and the study of social reality as discursively constructed and maintained”.¹³ Further, they suggest a hierarchy of discourses in order to remedy some of the confusion surrounding the term. Within the category of social text, micro-discourse - the detailed study of language use in a specific context - is distinguished from meso-discourse, which goes beyond linguistic analysis in an attempt to find broader general patterns. The third and fourth levels, corresponding to the study of “social reality”, are labelled Grand Discourse and Mega Discourse respectively. The former is defined as “an assembly of discourses, ordered and presented as an integrated frame”, whereas the latter reflects a long-range interest in the macro-system context.¹⁴ Foucauldian discourse, for instance, is classified as an example of Mega Discourse, since “overall categories and standards tend to be privileged in the treatment of empirical material”.¹⁵

The preceding categorisation is useful for clarifying the level of analysis of the present study. The adoption of the Mannheimian concept of ‘general’ ideology situates the field of enquiry firmly within the range of Mega Discourse. However, once this meta-theoretical proposition has been established, it can be used as a springboard for more localised research. That is, in order to demonstrate the usefulness of characterising nationalist ideology in terms of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, it is necessary to descend to the level of Grand Discourse. Indeed, to reprise Alvesson and Karreman’s definition, the empirical part of this study aims to deconstruct the “integrated frame” of specific instances of neo-nationalism. The notion of concentric levels of discourse thus serves to situate the empirical component of the research within its theoretical framework. Furthermore, it helps to define the analytical work that the study of texts is designed to do.

¹³ M. Alvesson & D. Karreman Varieties of discourse: On the study of organizations through discourse analysis p. 1126.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p.1133.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* p.1134.

It is important to emphasise that Alvesson and Karreman's hierarchy of discourse does not suggest the incompatibility of the linguistic concerns of conversation or discourse analysis with the study of 'Discourse' as a wide-ranging body of ideas, concepts and institutions. Indeed, the empirical analysis of texts may well be employed within each category as a research method. However, the scope of the findings will be more or less wide depending on which level of discourse is being studied. Laclau and Mouffe make their position clear in this respect;

By discourse we do not mean a combination of speech and writing, but rather that speech and writing are themselves but internal components of discursive totalities.¹⁶

Hence, the conclusions drawn from the specific texts analysed in the present study will go beyond the immediate micro-context of the election campaigns for which they were produced. The textual analysis will feed into a conceptual framework which aims to theorise the dynamics of nationalism as 'Grand Discourse'. As has been argued from the outset, ideology is a crucial element in this framework, and its successful incorporation into discourse theory contrasts with Foucault's neglect of the concept.

Foucault uses the term 'discursive formations' to describe a mentality of government, but neglects either to designate any proponent of that mentality or to address the concept of ideology in his work. However, he does not thereby show that discourse can be analysed without a concept of ideology. Instead, he merely stops short of opening this theoretical can of worms. In an interview, Foucault explained his misgivings about the concept. First of all, he saw it as inevitably in opposition to some notion of truth, the existence of which he denied. He continued;

The second drawback is that the concept of ideology refers, I think necessarily, to something of the order of a subject. Third, ideology stands in a secondary position relative to something which functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant.¹⁷

¹⁶ E. Laclau & C. Mouffe *Post-Marxism without apologies* p. 4.

¹⁷ M. Foucault 'Truth and Power' in P. Rabinow (ed.) *The Foucault Reader* p. 60.

However, as Charles Taylor points out, to talk of strategy without strategists is more than unsatisfactory, it is inadmissible.¹⁸ The present study transcends Foucault's misgivings by demonstrating that it is quite possible to place both ideology and ideologues within a discursive framework which excludes the possibility of truth. Laclau and Mouffe, in their book 'Hegemony and Socialist Strategy', develop Foucault's contribution to post-modern theory by incorporating the concept of ideology into their analysis. Ideology supplements Foucault's formless, diffuse conception of power by giving it an indispensable reason, direction and agent.

II Discourse Theory

Laclau and Mouffe's theory of discourse develops a general model of social dynamics that is applicable, as I will go on to show, to the study of contemporary nationalism.¹⁹ If authority can be exercised by means of either coercion or consent, the more desirable long-term option is to manufacture consent by propagating and consolidating a form of 'Grand Discourse' legitimating the *status quo*. Power is always precarious and subject to challenge, however, a point underlined by discourse theorists' emphasis on the 'unfixity' of any dominant, or hegemonic discourse. Clearly, Laclau and Mouffe's concern with legitimacy marks a fundamental departure from Foucault's thought. According to them, power struggles reveal points of friction between rival political projects and ultimately, between antagonistic world-views. Furthermore, challenges to the received wisdom of a given society are depicted as sources of identity crises, in which notions generally accepted to be 'common sense' are re-evaluated. One sign of this phenomenon is contested, or controversial concepts, as the different meanings attributed to them are often highly suggestive of the conflicting beliefs and values fuelling a debate.

¹⁸ "Strategies without projects, this would be a good formula to describe Foucault's historiography." C. Taylor Foucault on Freedom and Truth p.168.

¹⁹ For a detailed secondary account of Laclau and Mouffe's thought, see A. M. Smith Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary.

In a world of competing discourses, ideology is an expression of the contingency of meaning. Paradoxically, however, ideology's ultimate ambition is to achieve banality;

Changing the terms of an argument is exceedingly difficult, since the dominant definition of the problem acquires, by repetition, and by the weight and credibility of those who propose or subscribe it, the warrant of 'common sense'.²⁰

Ideology aspires to be accepted as universal and to see its rhetoric go unquestioned. Norman Fairclough goes so far as to say that "ideology is the key mechanism of rule by consent".²¹ A crucial conclusion he draws from this observation is that if "ideology is pervasively present in language, that fact ought to mean that the ideological nature of language should be one of the major themes of modern social science".²² The importance of the linguistic battlefield in the struggle for power cannot be over-emphasised; "Language itself is a stake in social struggle as well as a site of social struggle".²³ Discourse theory applies the general principles of post-modern thought to political conflict and its linguistic expression. As such, it has great potential for a study of contemporary nationalism, which seeks to understand how nationalist parties articulate their ideologies.

The confrontation between the premises of positivist and post-modern research during the twentieth century constitutes a paradigmatic shift of Copernican dimensions in its questioning of the attainability of truth. Discourse theory can thus be placed in the context of Thomas Kuhn's meta-theoretical proposition that science undergoes periodic change, during which the established understanding of reality is revolutionised.²⁴ The approach of the discourse theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe is resolutely post-modern, as it attempts to go beyond essentialist political theory and classical Marxism in

²⁰ S. Hall 'The Rediscovery of 'Ideology'' in J. Rivkin & M. Ryan (eds.) Literary Theory: An Anthology p. 1062.

²¹ N. Fairclough Language and Power p.34.

²² *Ibid.* p. 3.

²³ *Ibid.* p. 88.

²⁴ T. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

particular.²⁵ Instead of positing the proletariat as the privileged social actor, they ascribe the potential to bring about social change to all groups, be it feminist or environmentalist lobbies, trade union activists or conventional political parties.²⁶ The contrast to Foucault's actorless approach is evident. A shared post-structuralist tendency can be discerned, however, in the fact that discourse theory subordinates the attributes of the actor to the role it plays in constructing a discursive reality.²⁷ Before examining this aspect of Laclau and Mouffe's work in more detail, it is important to place their theory of hegemony in the context of its Marxist antecedents.

In their book, Laclau and Mouffe trace the development of the concept of hegemony from the writings of Rosa Luxemburg, through Lenin, to Antonio Gramsci.²⁸ Gramsci's thought moved beyond classical Marxism and its insistence on economic mechanisms by introducing the concept of a 'collective will' embodied in intellectual and moral leadership.²⁹ According to Gramsci, the ideological ascendancy of a class was maintained by combining material power with a set of moral, political and cultural values, a practice he defined as 'hegemony'. Joseph Femia highlights the contrast in Gramsci's thought between consent-based hegemony, which "condemns [the proletariat] to perceive reality through the conceptual spectacles of the ruling class", and domination, or supremacy based on coercion.³⁰ However, Gramsci also distinguished 'superficial' consent to be governed from an 'embryonic' conception of the world belonging to the working class as a whole.³¹ To Gramsci, revolution consisted in overcoming this 'contradictory consciousness' by constructing a

²⁵ Discourse theory denies the *a priori* link between economics and politics posited by historical materialism, and points instead to the contingency of discursive practices. E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy pp. 120-122

²⁶ Their work was considered to be an important step in the theorisation of the new social movements which began to make their mark in the 1980s.

²⁷ Indeed, in a reference to Foucault's work, the first chapter of Laclau and Mouffe's book is entitled "Hegemony; the Genealogy of a Concept".

²⁸ Gramsci's Prison Notebooks are fragmentary and often written in opaque language, so that his work is subject to many different and sometimes conflicting interpretations. The aim here is to do no more than outline the aspects of his thought relevant to discourse theory.

²⁹ *Pace* J. Hoffman, who argues in The Gramscian Challenge that Gramsci's concept of hegemony is not substantially different from that of Lenin.

³⁰ J. Femia Gramsci's Political Thought p. 31.

³¹ *Ibid.* p. 43.

counter-hegemony in a prolonged ideological struggle based on political education and cultural renewal. Gramsci contended that the superficial attachment of the proletariat to hegemonic institutions, beliefs and values was responsible for inducing the passivity of the masses and perpetuating the legitimacy of the *status quo*.³² Thus, by introducing hegemony as a theoretical variable, Gramsci departed from the principle that proletarian revolution would be the necessary culmination of an inexorable historical process.

According to Gramsci, then, the 'collective will' is not purely economically determined, but is also a result of historical forces and human consciousness. Furthermore, Gramsci conceptualised ideology as the 'organic cement' holding together a 'historical bloc' by means of basic principles.³³ This innovative reading of ideology defined it as a relational whole, a force capable of constituting identities such as 'national-popular'. In fact, Gramsci saw ideology as a world-view which could be expressed implicitly in art, in law, in economics and all other aspects of the individual and collective life of a particular class.³⁴ He thereby created a link between subjective consciousness and a Marxist reading of production relations; if ideology could help to maintain and achieve hegemony, it could also provide the means of making a class aware of fundamental social conflicts.

Translated into the terminology of discourse theory, a historical bloc represents a relatively unified social and political space of related identities.³⁵ As such, it delimits the legitimate exercise of hegemonic power. Laclau and Mouffe update Gramsci's thought by equating such a bloc with a particular discursive formation. They criticise Gramsci for retaining the Marxist principle that every struggle is ultimately one between classes, and thereby failing to explore the full potential of the concept of hegemony. By characterising class as a cause, rather than a possible product of hegemonic articulations, Gramsci does not transcend the Marxist conception of the economy as necessarily outside the realm of ideology. Although he understands identities as

³² W. Adamson Hegemony and Revolution p. 170.

³³ E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p. 67.

³⁴ J. M. Piote La Pensée Politique de Gramsci p. 196.

³⁵ E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p. 67.

being to some extent constructed, they nevertheless remain essentially class-based in his eyes.³⁶ However, Laclau and Mouffe see scope for;

The expansion and determination of the social logic implicit in the concept of 'hegemony' - in a direction which goes far beyond Gramsci - [to] provide us with an *anchorage* in which contemporary social struggles are *thinkable* in their specificity.³⁷

That is, the possibility of a plurality of historical subjects must be built into the theory of hegemony.

Laclau and Mouffe's repudiation of historical materialism in favour of a post-modern approach lays them open to the charge that their adaptation of the concept of hegemony is in fact incompatible with any form of Marxism.³⁸ However, Laclau and Mouffe declare themselves to be 'post-Marxist without apologies', maintaining that their thought develops aspects of Marxism by drawing on advances in linguistics and psychoanalysis which nineteenth- and early twentieth-century philosophers did not yet have at their disposal.³⁹ This has led them to move beyond Marxism's grounding in traditional metaphysics, its conception of the social agent, and its restriction of the field of social conflict to class antagonisms. According to them, Gramsci's thought (which has itself been depicted as Marxist apostasy) provides the necessary theoretical hinge.⁴⁰ By their own account, Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory achieves a synthesis of post-Marxism and

³⁶ Roger Scruton interprets Gramsci's view of society as follows; "[A] powerful mechanism of consolidation exists within the social and political superstructure which helps to stabilize the ascendancy of a class at the limiting point of production compatible with its continuity". A Dictionary of Political Thought p.219.

³⁷ E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p.3 (emphasis in the original). Adamson interprets Gramsci's own concept of hegemony as already going far along this road when he says; "[Gramsci] recognized that hegemonic rule [...] is the 'normal' form of government, at least in industrial societies, and therefore almost infinite in its variety". W. Adamson Hegemony and Revolution p.173.

³⁸ Cf. N. Geras Post-Marxism?

³⁹ E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Post-Marxism without apologies p. 92.

⁴⁰ Gramsci's work has been interpreted as being an example of idealism, in the sense that the concept of hegemony makes the consciousness of a ruling class central to its exercise of power. Whether this 'voluntarist' aspect makes it incompatible with the materialism of Marxism has been the subject of much debate. Gramsci himself believed his thought was "materialism perfected by the work of idealist philosophy". J. Femia Gramsci's Political Thought p.113.

post-structuralism by “operating deconstructively within Marxist categories.”⁴¹

As we have seen, Laclau and Mouffe reject the view that discourse can be explained in terms of universalist theory. Rather, they argue that all societies are constructed according to contingent principles, which temporarily fix the identity of their constitutive elements;

Society and social agents lack any essence, and their regularities merely consist of the relative and precarious forms of fixation which accompany the establishment of a certain order [...] This radical unfixity makes it impossible to consider the political struggle as a game in which the identity of the opposing forces is constituted from the start.⁴²

Political struggle, then, involves asserting one form of discourse over another by “the construction of a new ‘common sense’ which changes the identity of the different groups”.⁴³ Building on Ferdinand de Saussure’s understanding of language as a structure of interrelated signifiers, Laclau and Mouffe define discourse as the means used to organise a society as a structured totality, in order to give it stability and meaning.⁴⁴

Discourse includes *all* social institutions, customs and practices as well as language, since meaning is fully relative to context.⁴⁵ Ideology can thus be characterised as one aspect of discourse; it is a network of interrelated concepts forming a subset of the world of discourse. Conversely, concepts can only be understood in terms of the complete social context of which they form a part. What emerges is a

⁴¹ E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p. 3.

⁴² *Ibid.* pp. 98 and 170.

⁴³ *Ibid.* p. 183.

⁴⁴ Saussure’s theory of linguistics was developed in lectures given in Geneva between 1906 and 1911. F. de Saussure Cours de Linguistique Générale

⁴⁵ Laclau has described discourse as a “meaningful totality which transcends the distinction between the linguistic and the extra-linguistic.” E. Laclau ‘Discourse’ in R. Goodin & P. Pettit (eds.) A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy p. 432. David Howarth, in turn, has termed institutions ‘sedimented discourses.’ ‘Discourse Theory’ in F. Marsh & G. Stoker (eds.) Theory and Methods in Political Science p. 132.

discursive ordering of elements in an ideological interpretation of reality.

“A discursive -structure [...] is an articulatory practice which constitutes and organises social relations.”⁴⁶

This definition of discourse flows indirectly from Saussure’s proposition that language finds its meaning in its structure and not in its substance. That is, the rules governing the combination and opposition of words constitute meaning; for instance ‘hot’ can only be understood when linked to ‘cold’. Laclau and Mouffe strongly emphasise that discourse is just such a system of differences, a proposition which highlights its vulnerability, contingency, historicity and openness to multiple identities. Although they follow Saussure’s proposition that the relationship between a word - or signifier - and the concept it signifies is arbitrary, they do not believe that this relationship is fixed. In Laclau’s view, to uphold the Saussurean claim as to the isomorphism of signifier and signified would be to render the two indistinguishable and thus deny the duality of the linguistic sign.⁴⁷

Structuralist theorists favoured a wider definition of discourse to that of Saussure, who saw it as the expression of the autonomous subject and thus unpredictable from one utterance to the next. Central to the structuralist critique of Saussurean linguistics was its proclamation of the ‘death of the subject’. Discourse was redefined as a “viewpoint from which it was possible to redescribe the totality of social life” and uncover the “basic regularities which govern the production of meaning in social life”.⁴⁸ Since then, however, this notion of a closed, describable totality has in turn been subverted. One of the most radical critics of structuralism has been Jacques Derrida, whose subversion of essentialist truth claims allowed for the infinite ‘deconstruction’ of ‘authorless texts’.⁴⁹ His work can be placed within

⁴⁶ E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p. 96. The authors define the term articulation as “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result”. *Ibid.* p. 105. The authors give Keynesianism and Thatcherism as examples of discursive structures.

⁴⁷ E. Laclau ‘Discourse’ in R. Goodin & P. Pettit (eds.) A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy p. 433.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* p. 433.

⁴⁹ See, for instance, J. Derrida Dissémination.

the French post-modern movement of the 1960s, which saw its most spectacular expression in the student uprisings of May 1968. Although not derived from linguistics, Foucault's thought can also be termed post-structuralist, in that it aims to denounce the power relations shaping social structures.⁵⁰ Finally, Laclau and Mouffe are post-structuralist insofar as they see discourse not as a closed totality, but as a concentration of floating signifiers, which actors compete to mould into meaningful configurations. They share Derrida's view of the infinite possible constructions of subject positions.⁵¹

According to Laclau and Mouffe, political parties were instrumental in a hegemonic articulation, or the reconfiguration of "a series of political, ideological and economic elements" by participating in the redefinition of social relations which took place following the Second World War.⁵² They evaluate the post-war situation as follows;

- It was in the context of the reorganization which took place after the Second World War that a series of changes occurred at the level of social relations and a new hegemonic formation was consolidated. The latter articulated modifications at the level of the labour process, the form of state and the dominant modes of cultural diffusion which were to bring about a profound transformation in the existing forms of social intercourse.⁵³

In Laclau and Mouffe's terminology, linguistic 'elements' become interdependent 'moments' once articulated within a discourse. Establishing new relationships between elements is, therefore, equivalent to redefining the dominant form of discourse. The relationship between moments of discourse can be more or less coherent, logical, rigid or constant, much depending on the form of ideology used to perpetuate them.⁵⁴ The centrality of context to the meaning of signs comes to the fore, for out of context signifiers can

⁵⁰ R. Scruton *A Dictionary of Political Thought* p. 535.

⁵¹ E. Laclau & C. Mouffe *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* p. 16.

⁵² D. Howarth 'Discourse Theory' in F. Marsh & G. Stoker (eds.) *Theory and Methods in Political Science* p. 120.

⁵³ E. Laclau & C. Mouffe *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* p.160.

⁵⁴ One may assume, for instance, that a totalitarian ideology is far less flexible, or open, concerning its conceptual framework than an ideology promoting democratic renewal. Consequently, the former is more prone to hegemonic articulation than the latter, which has a greater capacity to absorb the discursive development brought about by social change.

only 'float' until rearticulated into a moment of new discourse. This structural renewal is particularly important to the construction of identity, not least national identity. In the same way as the meaning of 'father' can only be understood relative to that of 'son' and 'daughter', a minority nationalist movement's definition of its cause can only be understood in the context of its problematic relationship to the current hegemonic 'nation-state'. In what follows, Laclau and Mouffe's armoury of abstract concepts will be applied to the study of nationalism, at both the theoretical and empirical levels.

Discourse and Neo-Nationalism

Laclau and Mouffe's theory of discourse can be used to describe a whole range of social dynamics, without making universalising or causal claims. As such, it is applicable to various levels of social interaction and different social actors, including contemporary nationalist parties. In the context of nationalism theory, the assertion that the nation is itself a discursive construct flows from the post-modern understanding of reality as constructed, malleable and therefore contingent. The proposition that ideology is all-pervasive enables us to explore the extent to which nationalism itself is all-pervasive and the consequences this has for sub-state nationalisms. After addressing these issues, the vocabulary of discourse theory will be applied to nationalisms propagating an alternative national construct to that embodied in the hegemonic discourse of 'nation-states'. Discourse theory characterises this conflict as antagonistic, and it will be shown that concepts such as these are useful in structuring an empirical study of nationalist parties. Both at the level of Mega Discourse and Grand Discourse, Laclau and Mouffe can make a substantial contribution to our understanding of contemporary nationalist ideology.

To indicate one's nationality as Italian, Nigerian, Brazilian, Australian or Japanese is to evoke a national construct. That it should be well-established does not make it unproblematic or somehow exempt it from being studied in terms of nationalism. Every nationalist variant, from terrorist Basque nationalists, through democratic

independence movements to the United States of America, pursues the political goal of embodying its interpretation of the nation in territory and institutions. Michael Freeden has shown that the differences between these examples are a result of how the nation is defined and appealed to, but that the focal point of national mobilisation remains the same.⁵⁵ This recalls Liah Greenfeld's statement that the nature of nationalism is determined by an organising principle which makes its constitutive elements, however these might vary, into a unity.⁵⁶ A world of 'nation-states', then, is the expression of the all-pervasiveness of 'thin' nationalism. This point is central to the subsequent discussion, as the 'nation-state' is the hegemonic nationalist construct to which neo-nationalist parties propose an alternative. That the existence of a given 'nation-state' should constitute undisputed 'common sense' makes this task all the more difficult. The more entrenched the discourse of a given historical bloc, the harder it will be to impose an alternative hegemonic project. Discourse theory thus places the role of minority nationalist parties in perspective; their aim is to revolutionise social reality by articulating an alternative national construct.

Every citizen of a 'nation-state' construct is subject at the very least to the 'banal nationalism' described and discussed by Michael Billig in his important book of the same name. Banal nationalism is expressed in the symbolic markers of belonging to a 'nation-state'; the limp flag (one being waved would be making an explicit statement), the emphasis of the media on 'home' news, singing the national anthem at football matches and the repeated use of the adjective 'national' to describe affairs of state. The term is shorthand for expressing the idea of nationalism as 'Mega Discourse'; our everyday 'social reality' is always discursively constructed around a concept of the nation which is taken for granted. To describe 'thin' nationalism as all-pervasive does not lead to the analytical redundancy of the concept, however. On the contrary, it permits a clearer and more dispassionate categorisation of its possible variants.

⁵⁵ M. Freeden Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology? Freeden's work is discussed in more detail in chapter one, section two.

⁵⁶ "[The nature of nationalism] is determined not by the character of its elements, but by a certain organizing principle which makes these elements into a unity and imparts to them a special significance." L. Greenfeld Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity p. 7.

[Nationalism] is the belief in the primacy of a particular nation, real or constructed [...] This is meant to be an omnibus definition [It] should not be linked to the idea that nationalism is in any absolute sense linked to separatism. Very much to the contrary, the spirit of nationalism can dominate established states.⁵⁷

Indeed, case studies of states can be particularly illuminating, as they embody successful nationalist mobilisation. In these cases, nationalist symbols, institutions and rhetoric have been identified with and internalised to such an extent that they constitute common sense, the ultimate goal of any movement pursuing a nationalist project. Minority nationalism challenges this common sense by arguing the need for an alternative national construct to the one in place. Discourse theory comes into its own in characterising the dynamics of this confrontation.

According to discourse theory, a democratic system is fuelled by competing attempts to hegemonise the principles organising a given society. However, the common sense understanding of the state is not necessarily revolutionised with every change of government. All political parties use ideology in an attempt to legitimate and consolidate their bids for power, but their political project is often less ambitious than a complete rearticulation of elements and their inter-relationships into a new hegemonic common sense. As has been indicated, however, nationalist ideology aims to rearticulate the meaning of a given political arena. It is therefore a hegemonic project through and through, one highly antagonistic to the existing 'nation-state' construct. Minority nationalist parties seek to create a dichotomous antagonism between the prevailing 'nation-state' and the alternative discourse of the nation they propound. Theirs is a revolutionary project in that it sets out to rearticulate the parameters of national discourse rather than simply bring about internal change;

A language has been jokingly defined as 'a dialect with an army and a navy', but this is a joke with a serious undercurrent. Modern armies and navies are a feature of the 'nation state' and so too is the linguistic

⁵⁷ J. Hall Nationalisms: Classified and Explained p. 2.

unification or 'standardization' of large politically defined territories which makes talk of 'English' or 'German' meaningful.⁵⁸

In the same way, talk of 'Scottish' and 'Bavarian' is meaningful in the context of nationalist parties attempting to rearticulate the common sense understanding of the 'nation'.⁵⁹ To quote Laclau and Mouffe; "political practice constructs the interests it represents".⁶⁰

In Laclau and Mouffe's terminology, 'antagonism' denotes the limit of a society, in other words the point of friction between discourses. The subversive nature of an antagonism means that it is often negative. Its presence brings the hegemonic order into question and therefore gives rise to an identity crisis.⁶¹ Given its opposition to objective totalities, discourse theory presupposes the impossibility of fixed identities. It therefore considers identity to be an illusion, for to posit the possibility of a closed, total identity would be to deny the contingency of discourse. Instead, Laclau and Mouffe define the relationship between discursive moments in terms of difference. Furthermore, they argue that this lack of fullness must eventually become apparent in the form of an identity crisis, its temporary solution lying in the act of subversion that is the next hegemonic articulation. Nationalist parties can be thought of as promoters of such identity crises.⁶² Indeed, they aim to mobilise voters by encouraging them to identify with an alternative discourse. At the same time, they wish to conceal the fundamental impermanence of any discourse by claiming there is no alternative to their world-view and that the total resolution of discursive antagonisms is possible;

⁵⁸ N. Fairclough Language and Power p.21.

⁵⁹ In order to transcend the conceptual confusion inherent in the term 'nation-state', the adjective 'national' will be used to refer to the Scottish and Bavarian political arenas rather than to the United Kingdom and German state constructs of which they form a part. The conventions adopted in the present study must not be confused with the terminology used by the parties themselves, in particular the CSU's definition of the nation, discussed in chapter six, section three.

⁶⁰ E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p.120.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* Ch. 3.

⁶² Gramsci's definition of intellectuals emphasises the role of parties and other social agents as transmitters of ideas and introduces a useful distinction between 'traditional' and 'organic' intellectuals. However, his concept remains too infused with the imagery of class struggle and unilateral affiliation to be adopted in a study which highlights the multiplicity of identities and the infinite malleability of discourse. Cf. J-M Piotte La Pensée Politique de Gramsci p.103.

The apparent emptying of the ideological content of discourses is, paradoxically, a fundamental ideological effect: Ideology works through disguising its nature.⁶³

Any other approach would undermine a party's own claim to truth. To quote Pierre Bourdieu's succinct phrase, nationalist parties aim for the "recognition of legitimacy through misrecognition of arbitrariness".⁶⁴

It is tempting to describe the discourse dominating the forms of conduct and meaning in a given social order as hegemonic.⁶⁵ Laclau and Mouffe, however, restrict their definition of hegemony to the dynamic of articulation itself and not to the period following a successful new articulation of concepts.⁶⁶ Instead, borrowing from Gramsci, they use the term 'historical bloc' to describe a relatively unified political space.⁶⁷ However, considering that a continuous dynamic, in the form of ideological maintenance work, is required to perpetuate the *status quo*, it is proposed here to extend the use of the word hegemony to describe a period of relative stability in the discursive fixing of meanings.⁶⁸ This usage runs parallel to Walter Adamson's claim that Gramsci's conception of hegemony can be divided into 'hegemony-maintenance' and 'hegemony-creation'.⁶⁹ It also corresponds to common understanding of the term and thus makes for conceptual simplicity.⁷⁰ Articulation will continue to designate a period of renewal in social identities.

⁶³ N. Fairclough Language and Power p. 93.

⁶⁴ Cited by N. Fairclough Language and Power p. 91.

⁶⁵ Cf. D. Howarth 'Discourse Theory' in F. Marsh & G. Stoker (eds.) Theory and Methods in Political Science. In Fairclough's terminology, a practice has become 'naturalized' if it appears universal or common-sensical. N. Fairclough Language and Power p. 33

⁶⁶ Cf. E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy pp. 134-145.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* p. 136.

⁶⁸ Laclau & Mouffe would find this usage problematic, as they posit the need for the hegemonic subject to be partially exterior to that which it articulates. This condition is no longer given once the articulation is generally accepted. Further, they stipulate the presence of "a vast area of floating elements and the possibility of their articulation to opposite camps" before a hegemonic practice can take place. *Ibid.* p. 136. Why the reappropriation of previously articulated moments is excluded is unclear. Contested concepts have rarely been previously totally apolitical elements of discourse, but see the account of the concept of *Heimat* in chapter six, section three.

⁶⁹ W. Adamson Hegemony and Revolution p. 174.

⁷⁰ Such a definition would enable us to term Margaret Thatcher's period in power as hegemonic, for instance. Cf. S. Hall The Hard Road to Renewal. In chapter two, his

Nationalist ideologies strive to gain acceptance as ‘common sense’ in their chosen territory by operating a successful articulation of concepts and thereby making their construction of the nation hegemonic.

Ideologies are closely linked to power [...] because they are a means of legitimizing existing social relations and differences of power, simply through the recurrence of ordinary, familiar ways of behaving which take these relations and power differences for granted.⁷¹

In the context of conventional political parties jockeying for position, successfully pushing through one interpretation of a contested concept over another is therefore an important achievement. The generally accepted definitions of ideologically charged concepts such as justice, equality and freedom, for instance, form the discursive premises of political debate in a given society. Campaigners forced to argue for a new interpretation of terms in common use are in a far more difficult position than ideologues who may assume that their understanding of concepts equates with common sense. Those supporting a ‘nation-state’ construct find themselves in the latter situation, having successfully decontested the concept of the nation to their advantage.

In Laclau and Mouffe’s terminology, the nation corresponds to a ‘nodal point’ of nationalist ideology, defined as a *privileged* discursive point of partial fixation.⁷² Not only does the nation specify the target constituency, but it is also crucial in bringing together the strands, or moments, of nationalist ideology to form a coherent worldview. As such, the nodal point of the nation corresponds to the core of nationalist ideology in Freeden’s terms. Laclau and Mouffe recognise autonomy as a constructed political space resulting from hegemonic articulation. The picture of nationalism elaborated using discourse theory tallies well with Freeden’s depiction of nationalism as a thin ideology with an immutable core;

analysis illustrates how Thatcher managed to rearticulate central concepts in the British political arena by redefining nodal points of discourse such as people, state and society.

⁷¹ N. Fairclough *Language and Power* p.2

⁷² E. Laclau & C. Mouffe *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* p. 112

Some unusual discursive formations may tend to be organized around a single and relatively stable nodal point – such as a nationalist discourse that has achieved an unusual degree of predominance and stability.⁷³

In turn, the definition of the nation will inevitably have repercussions on the articulation of peripheral ideological principles. A racist definition, for instance, will give rise to principles designed to preserve national purity, whereas an articulation of the nation based on citizenship will generate principles encouraging democratic participation.

The core principles of nationalism - the prioritisation of the nation, its positive valorisation, its institutional expression, its embodiment of territory and tradition and the emotional attachment it engenders - legitimate and perpetuate the current political division of the globe into states.⁷⁴ ‘Nation-building’ describes the nationalist project of states which aim to hold on to their conceptual hegemony over the nodal point ‘nation’.⁷⁵ All states aspire to be nations in order to legitimate their hegemonic construct.

Because in modernity national legitimation is the most prestigious form of relating people to the state, once the nationalist principle was unfurled, states had no alternative but to pursue policies of nation-building.⁷⁶

Sub-state challenges to the constitutional *status quo* use the same ideological principles, but adapt them to an alternative national construct. They attempt to break the common sense link embodied in the term ‘nation-state’ by bringing about what has been called a ‘crisis of the hyphen’.⁷⁷ This identity crisis is a sign of antagonistic

⁷³ A. M. Smith Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary p. 98.

⁷⁴ M. Freedon Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology? pp. 751-752.

⁷⁵ “With the concepts of the nation and the state thus hopelessly confused, it is perhaps not too surprising that *nationalism* should come to mean identification with the state rather than loyalty to the nation [...] Contrary to the nomenclature, the ‘nation-building’ school has in fact been dedicated to building viable states.” W. Connor Ethnonationalism -The Quest for Understanding pp. 40-41 (emphasis in original).

⁷⁶ J. Llobera The God of Modernity p. 106.

⁷⁷ B. Anderson, cited by D. McCrone in The Sociology of Nationalism p. 173

discourses battling to rearticulate the contested concept of 'nation'. The struggle is between what competing ideologies would have as the 'common sense' understanding of the nation. The prize is conceptual hegemony;

The battle for nationhood is a battle for hegemony, by which a part claims to speak for the whole nation and to represent the national essence.⁷⁸

The problem arises as to how to apply the concept of hegemony to an empirical study. Clearly, the term is often used much more loosely than it has been defined here. For Gramsci, hegemony corresponded to the consensual aspect of authority, whereas it is now widely construed to include coercive power too.⁷⁹ Laclau and Mouffe, on the other hand, see hegemonic power as representing the dominant form of conduct and meaning within a given social order. Their conception of discursive hegemony thus remains at the abstract level of partially fixed meaning. In his book 'City Politics: Hegemonic Projects and Discourse', Maarten Hajer defines a hegemonic project "as a political project which constitutes a general political-strategic programme at a specific political institutional level".⁸⁰ This understanding of hegemony fits well with the present study's focus on the ideas and dynamics fuelling the ambitions of nationalist parties to define the dominant discourse in a given territory. Further, Hajer has proposed a means of approaching the concept of hegemony empirically, based on the notions of discourse structuration and discourse institutionalisation. For these to obtain, a 'discursive space' must be dominated in two respects;

Central actors are persuaded by, or forced to accept, the rhetorical power of a new discourse (condition of discourse structuration); and this is reflected in the institutional practices of that political domain; that is, the actual policy process is conducted according to the ideas of a given discourse (condition of discourse institutionalisation).⁸¹

⁷⁸ M. Billig Banal Nationalism p.27

⁷⁹ Cf. R. Cox Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method p. 170.

⁸⁰ M. Hajer City Politics: Hegemonic Projects and Discourse p. 32.

⁸¹ M. Hajer 'Discourse Coalitions and the Institutionalization of Practice: The Case of Acid Rain in Britain' in F. Fischer & J. Forester (eds.) The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning pp. 47-48.

Applied to 'a national 'discursive space', then, an analysis of discourse structuration would involve looking at the extent to which discursive moments permeate the rhetoric of central actors, political parties in this case. The condition of discourse institutionalisation, on the other hand, is more concerned with the way in which policies are implemented than with their content. Given that the present study focuses on the construction of nationalist ideology, the notion of discourse structuration is of more relevance here than that of discourse institutionalisation.

Stuart Hall's article entitled 'The Rediscovery of 'Ideology'', is a further illuminating example of the theory of hegemony in practice.⁸² It uses an explicit discourse theoretical approach to look at the ideological content of the immigration debate in the UK. In his article, Hall quotes the following line from Gramsci's prison notebooks; "Every social stratum has its own 'common sense' and its own 'good sense', which are basically the most widespread conception of life and of men".⁸³ Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe, Hall goes on to argue that, once detached from the reference to class, the notion of 'common sense' is equivalent to a hegemonic discourse, or a plausible interpretation of reality generally accepted to be the truth.⁸⁴ He chooses to look at the way this dominant discursive formation finds its expression in the realm of immigration policy, and in so doing highlights how certain actors are disadvantaged in the 'struggle over meaning'. The race debate, in which the dominant problematic is articulated in terms of controlling the numbers of immigrants to Britain, is used as a specific illustration. Hall points out that opponents of the prevailing view are forced to reproduce the terms of the argument when stating their case, as common sense is exceedingly difficult to challenge. His analysis is worth quoting at length, as it

⁸² S. Hall 'The Rediscovery of 'Ideology'' in J. Rivkin & M. Ryan (eds.) Literary Theory: An Anthology.

⁸³ *Ibid.* p. 1055.

⁸⁴ "Discourse, in short had the effect of sustaining certain 'closures,' of establishing certain systems of equivalence between what could be assumed about the world and what could be said to be true. 'True' means credible, or at least capable of winning credibility as a statement of fact." *Ibid.* p. 1057.

describes the manifestation of conceptual hegemony and antagonistic practices at the empirical level.

There was also the struggle over access to the very means of signification: the difference between those accredited witnesses and spokesmen [...] whose statements carried the representativeness and authority which permitted them to establish the primary framework or terms of an argument; as contrasted to those [...] whose 'definitions' were always more partial, fragmentary, and delegitimated; and who, when they did gain access, had to *perform with the established terms of the problematic in play*.⁸⁵

The parallel with minority nationalist movements struggling against the hegemonic discourse of a nation-state is clear. Hall's application of discourse theory to the themes of immigration and Thatcherism, among others, shows the fruitfulness of the theory in empirical studies.⁸⁶

It has been shown that ideologies strive to make their interpretation of reality seem natural, taken-for-granted, common sense;

The battle for hegemony, which accompanies the creation of states, is reflected in the power to define language, or in [...] the power to 'make meaning stick'.⁸⁷

Until now, however, there has been no discussion of how ideologues go about this task. In order to examine the ideologies of parties, a means of critically analysing the language they use is required. Billig gives us a first clue as to a possible approach in his observation that; "the flagging of what is nationalism [...] is ingrained into the very rhetoric of common sense".⁸⁸ Indeed, rhetoric constitutes the crucial conceptual link binding the theoretical and methodological approaches used in this study. Before the next chapter goes on to look at the methodological considerations surrounding a rhetorical approach to the analysis of texts, the final section of this chapter proposes to place rhetoric within the theoretical framework of post-modernism.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* p. 1061 (emphasis in original).

⁸⁶ Cf. S. Hall *The Hard Road to Renewal*.

⁸⁷ M. Billig *Banal Nationalism* p. 32.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* p. 49.

III Discourse and Rhetoric

Discourse has been defined elsewhere as “sets of linguistic practices and rhetorical strategies embedded in a network of social relations” and as “the context of a prevailing set of political ideas”.⁸⁹ The first definition restricts the realm of discourse to language and communication, whereas the second adopts a wider view similar to Laclau and Mouffe’s understanding of the concept as all-encompassing. However, if one defines social discourse as “a network of social relations” or simply as “the context”, the concept of ideology is still required to complete the picture by describing “sets of linguistic practices and rhetorical strategies” and “a prevailing set of political ideas.” Discourse theorists consider ideas and their linguistic expression to be one aspect of the complex web of institutions, customs and practices, which together constitute a society. The question then arises as to how to design a piece of research adapted to the study of ideology within a world of discourse. If an ideology is defined as a belief-system in the abstract it is, of course, structured conceptually and expressed linguistically. In order to understand neo-nationalism, it must be unpacked, or deconstructed, to reveal its constitutive elements and internal tensions. In turn, discourse theory demands that a research design take account of context when interpreting the data collected. Further, a theory which rejects a view of ideologies as dogmatic or immutable requires research methods capable of rendering the subtleties of conceptual manipulation, the shifts and ambiguities in ideological meaning and their translation into rhetoric.⁹⁰ This takes us into the realm of literary criticism.

Post-structuralist theorists such as Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida have had a great deal of influence on the world of literary

⁸⁹ K. Litfin and P. Hall respectively, cited in M. Maier Three Images of Ideas in Political Science. Paper presented at European University Institute Workshop ‘Norms and Interests in International Relations’, November 20-21st 1998.

⁹⁰ Catherine Belsey compares this new approach to text and discourse with the conventions of nineteenth-century readers; “If they did not recognise the silence with which the work finally confronts its own ideological project, it was because they read from within the same ideological framework, shared the same repressions and took for granted the same silences”. Critical Practice p. 137.

criticism.⁹¹ Their work sets out to highlight the ideological nature of texts and their place in a discursively constructed society. From their assertion that the subject is itself a discursive construct flows an interest in examining how the various subject-positions are produced that make multiple identities possible.⁹² Deconstructionist readings aim to point out the contradictions, omissions and incoherence within texts which all tend towards closure in the form of an ending, happy or otherwise. The very nature of deconstruction therefore precludes a systematic methodology for reading.⁹³ Instead, possible meanings circulate between the reader, the text itself and the familiar discourse within which they are situated.⁹⁴ Thus, the techniques of literary criticism are oriented towards a new goal. The aim is no longer to uncover the essence of a text, its mirroring of 'reality' or the intention of the author, but to examine instead how text production corresponds to the production of an identity, a subject, a discursive 'whole';

The work of ideology is to present the subject as fixed and unchangeable, an element in a given system of differences which is human nature and the world of human experience.⁹⁵

The post-modern philosophical movement to which Derrida belongs is very much a political one. Derrida goes beyond the deconstruction of texts in his aim to subvert the very logic on which they are premised. According to Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, 'The Class of 1968', in which they also include writers such as Lyotard, Baudrillard, Kristeva and Foucault, shared the same motivation;

[They were] less interested in knowing how systems worked than in finding out how they might be undone, so that the energies and

⁹¹ For a critique, see N. Tredell 'Euphoria (Ltd.) – The Limitations of Post-structuralism and Deconstruction' in P. Barry (ed.) Issues in Contemporary Literary Theory.

⁹² Lacan calls the infant an 'hommelette'; in other words a potential subject yet to be given a sense of identity and unity by learning a language and thus finding a place within a social formation. C. Belsey Critical Practice Ch. 3.

⁹³ "Derrida always writes about particular texts, and the kind of writing which he practises and would like to inspire in others explores precisely the impossibility of comprehensive mastery, the impossibility of constructing a coherent and adequate theoretical system." J. Culler 'What is Deconstruction?' in P. Barry (ed.) Issues in Contemporary Literary Theory p. 83.

⁹⁴ C. Belsey Critical Practice Ch. 5.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 90.

potentials that they held in place might be liberated and used to construct an altogether different kind of society.⁹⁶

Terry Eagleton expands on this point by concluding his book on literary theory with a chapter entitled 'political criticism', in which he highlights the political nature of *all* literary criticism.⁹⁷

A similar observation is made in David Cooper's study of the relationship between rhetoric, literature and philosophy, which illustrates the blurring of interdisciplinary boundaries brought about by post-structuralism's emphasis on the ideological grounding of all texts;

The critical deconstruction that leads to the discovery of the literary, rhetorical nature of the philosophical claim to truth [...] cannot be refuted.⁹⁸

What Cooper calls the 'assimilationist thesis' is based on the argument that there is no truth to be found, only an ideological interpretation of the truth, and amounts to asserting that literary criticism can be applied to philosophy just as to any other text. According to this view, the persuasiveness of any text may be judged in terms of rhetoric rather than logic, since "it is impossible for philosophical writing to free itself from rhetoric".⁹⁹ A general category of the textual overtakes any rigid divisions between the literary and the non-literary, and strengthens the case for applying the techniques of literary criticism more widely.

If scientific texts express ideologies, then the language used may be evaluated according to how well they persuade us of the apparent 'truth' or correctness of their ideological interpretations of reality. In other words, the rhetorical skill displayed becomes worthy of study. Conversely, the rhetoric used is indicative of the ideology underlying it. This is the major conclusion to be drawn from the

⁹⁶ J. Rivkin & M. Ryan 'The Class of 1968' in J. Rivkin & M. Ryan (eds.) Literary Theory: An Anthology p. 334.

⁹⁷ "From Percy Bysshe Shelley to Norman N. Holland, literary theory has been indissociably bound up with political beliefs and ideological values." T. Eagleton Literary Theory: An Introduction p. 194.

⁹⁸ Paul de Man, quoted in D. Cooper 'Rhetoric, Literature and Philosophy' in R. Roberts & J. Good The Recovery of Rhetoric p. 193.

⁹⁹ D. Cooper 'Rhetoric, Literature and Philosophy' in R. Roberts & J. Good The Recovery of Rhetoric p. 195.

assimilationist thesis for the purposes of this study. Indeed, it has informed the choice of the empirical methods employed. Techniques once used only in literary criticism will be applied here with the aim of uncovering the ideological message of texts.

It can be assumed that the ways of thinking, which are created by and within ideology, are themselves inherently rhetorical. Similarly, the use of rhetoric will itself reflect the patternings of ideology.¹⁰⁰

The linguistic manifestation of a political ideology is an archetypally rhetorical one in that it aims to convince and convert. In keeping with the premises of discourse theory and post-modernism more generally, the eminently rhetorical expression of nationalist ideology will be a focus of this study.

To look at a text in terms of its rhetorical features is, according to Terry Eagleton “probably the oldest form of literary criticism in the world”.¹⁰¹ Although he does not make the case for a return to an Aristotelian form of critical analysis, the continued relevance of rhetoric to the study of discursive constructs, not least ideologies, is highlighted;

[Rhetoric] saw speaking and writing not merely as textual objects, but as forms of activity inseparable from the wider social relations between writers and readers, orators and audience, and as largely unintelligible outside the social purposes and conditions in which they were embedded.¹⁰²

Language constitutes the raw material from which an ideology is constructed, and rhetoric is the means used by ideologues to mould language into as pleasing, persuasive and effective a form as possible. As such, the study of rhetoric provides a means of accessing a text in its specificity, and therefore constitutes the hinge between the theory of discourse informing the present study and the methodology used to study individual nationalist ideologies.

¹⁰⁰ M. Billig Ideology and Opinions p. 3.

¹⁰¹ T. Eagleton Literary Theory: An Introduction p. 205.

¹⁰² *Ibid.* p. 206.

Conclusion

Laclau and Mouffe paint a picture of societies periodically reformed by a hegemonic rearticulation of the dominant discourse, the timing, content and protagonists of which are dependent on the particular social context and not on universal guiding principles. Consequently, no form of social organisation is ever complete or 'true' in a positivistic sense. Instead, notions of truth and values are deemed to be ideological constructs liable to be redefined. Although no social system is ever closed and safe from the possibility of hegemonic articulation, it may be a historical bloc; "a political space relatively unified through nodal points and tendentially relational identities".¹⁰³ In empirical studies, such a system of discursive moments can be analysed using conventional political science concepts such as power, justice, liberty and equality, as long as these terms are also understood to be defined ideologically. Further, it has been shown that, although all parties select a national arena in which to propagate their political programmes, neo-nationalists stand apart by making that choice into a core, immutable principle of their ideologies. Discourse theory is valuable in describing how their construction of the nation clashes with that of the existing 'nation-state' and how their ultimate goal is to achieve a hegemonic rearticulation of the national nodal point. Discourse theory's characterisation of ideology as all-pervasive also provides a springboard for the re-evaluation of text analysis. As the linguistic expression of ideology, rhetoric represents an ideal point of access to ideological constructs such as the nation, and will be used in analysing the case studies to follow.

The theoretical framework for this study of contemporary nationalism is now complete. It has been shown that nationalism is best approached as an ideology within the epistemological framework of discourse, not least because discourse theory provides a means of structuring an investigation into the dynamics of nationalist movements. Furthermore, the vocabulary of discourse theory can be applied to an empirical study concerned with the construction of a nationalist ideology and its hegemonic project. The theory's derivation

¹⁰³ E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy p.136.

from linguistics highlights the importance of language in the study of ideology, and makes it eminently compatible with an empirical focus on texts and their rhetorical analysis. The task of the researcher begins to gain some definition. Without the monolithic social agent of structuralism or the ineluctable processes of historical materialism to guide research, each struggle for conceptual hegemony must be examined in its specificity. Moreover, the actorless nature of Foucauldian analysis can be avoided by identifying political parties as the principal proponents of nationalist ideology. Finally, privileging the study of ideology within the wider framework of discourse can be translated into a research design centred on texts, whose richness and detail offer illuminating insights into the strategies, rhetoric and ultimate aims of contemporary nationalist ideologies. Chapter three begins by describing how the theoretical framework of the study informed the methodological choices made.

3 Research Methodology and Design

The present chapter sets out to do three things in order to show that;

The choice of countries, the formulation of concepts, and the adoption of a method are not independent, successive decisions; they are inextricably linked.¹

By translating the preceding theoretical discussion into a methodological approach to neo-nationalism, it aims to reinforce the link forged between discourse theory and the analysis of rhetoric. Given that the principal research method used will be text analysis, the relationship of this 'micro' level of discourse to the theoretical underpinnings of the study must be clarified. The first section of the chapter will begin with a definition of rhetoric and its relationship to texts. Drawing on the work of Norman Fairclough and Annette Hastings, the techniques used to analyse text will then be discussed in more detail.² The second aim of the chapter is to demonstrate that case studies lend themselves well to providing a 'thick' description of the case-specific factors influencing nationalist rhetoric. They thereby enable the reader to judge the implications of contextual idiosyncrasies for the theory.³ Section two of the chapter, therefore, addresses the question of research design, which is structured around two cases in the present study.

The difficulty of generalising from case study data, or of achieving a degree of external validity, has often been pointed to as a major weakness of the design. However, this charge rests on the mistaken belief that the replicability of conclusions must be equivalent to the assumption in statistical analysis that a random sample has universal generalisability. In testing a theory of nationalism, this is

¹ M. Dogan & D. Pelassy How to Compare Nations p. 138.

² N. Fairclough Language and Power and A. Hastings Connecting Linguistic Structures and Social Practices: a Discursive Approach to Social Policy Analysis.

³ See J. Schofield 'Increasing the Generalisability of Qualitative Research' in M. Hammersley (ed.) Social Research: Philosophy, Politics and Practice. The term 'thick description' was coined by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz. C. Geertz The Interpretation of Cultures Ch. 1.

neither a desirable nor a feasible goal. Instead, the aim here is to achieve analytical as opposed to statistical replicability. Nonetheless, problems of comparison across cases do arise, and these will be addressed in the context of the debate on 'conceptual travelling'. The third aim of the chapter is to provide specific details of the empirical research undertaken. Consequently, section three will consist of an account of the sources available for consultation in both cases, including a survey of the primary data collected and an example of the content analysis that was carried out. This will lead into a discussion of the rationale behind the selection of four texts for in-depth analysis. The section will conclude with an overview of the interview techniques used and an appraisal of my research experience in Scotland and Bavaria. Throughout, the way in which both methods and methodology derive from the theoretical framework of the study will be emphasised. Consequently, the empirical analysis will be geared towards applying discourse theory and using the concepts of ideology and rhetoric in case studies.

I Methodology

Rhetoric

The definition of rhetoric has changed over the centuries, in line with dominant philosophical paradigms.⁴ In the writing of Aristotle, its meaning was closely bound to that of logic, and it remained an important philosopher's tool into medieval times. However, Descartes and his 'Discourse' marked a turning point in scientific method, and simultaneously heralded rhetoric's demotion from a systematic and scientific means of pursuing knowledge to the 'art' of presenting arguments persuasively and eloquently. Stanley Fish points out that rhetoric came to be defined in terms of the binary oppositions so central to modern philosophy. He remarks that, in the same way as ideology, rhetoric has since been associated with what

⁴ Thomas Kuhn's ground-breaking work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pointed out that modernism itself was nothing other than a rhetorical moment. "In short, the 'motor' by which science moves is not verification or falsification, but persuasion." S. Fish 'Rhetoric' in F. Lentricchia & T. McLaughlin (eds.) Literary Terms for Critical Study p. 211.

was perceived to be the negative element in pairings such as “deep/surface, essential/peripheral [...] realities/illusions, fact/opinion, neutral/partisan”.⁵ This illustrates the close link between ideology and its rhetorical expression. Explicit in the term post-modernism, and central to the work of Derrida and Foucault, is the desire to expose modernity as ideological and transcend the binary thinking characteristic of it.⁶ Indeed, Michael Billig refers to post-modernity’s repudiation of the premises of scientific modernity as “the rhetorical turn”.⁷

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were something of a low point in the history of rhetoric, as it came to be discredited both as a tool of scientific enquiry and as a method in the realm of aesthetics. Interestingly, the contemporary meaning of rhetoric recalls our understanding of the Classical Sophist school of thought. Almost nihilistic in their approach, the Sophists prided themselves on being able to argue convincingly for or against anything, and were therefore held in contempt by Socrates and other seekers of truth. Word of the Sophists has come down to us principally through Plato’s transcripts of Socratic dialogues such as the ‘Gorgias’, for the Sophists were orators and not writers.⁸ Their capacity not only to propose different solutions to a problem but also to perceive a problem in different ways, has distinct parallels with party competition in contemporary democracies. Eloquence is of primary importance to politicians intent on getting their ideological message across. This highlights the association of rhetoric with the oral tradition and therefore poses the problem of its suitability as a tool of textual analysis. A more precise definition of the concept’s contemporary meaning will allay any such doubts.

Jonathan Culler defines rhetorical analysis as “the study of the persuasive and expressive resources of language; the techniques of language and thought that can be used to construct effective

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 205.

⁶ “Deconstruction, that is to say, has grasped the point that the binary oppositions with which classical structuralism tends to work represent a way of seeing typical of ideologies.” T. Eagleton *Literary Theory: An Introduction* p. 133.

⁷ M. Billig *Ideology and Opinions* p. 2.

⁸ Plato *Gorgias*.

discourses”.⁹ Stripped of the assumptions and pejorative connotations attributed to it by the modernist paradigm, rhetoric can be defined as an organisational and presentational technique which aims to arrange arguments informatively and persuasively. To this end, all manner of stylistic tricks are employed in order to convince, move and win over an audience. Although some of these may be concerned with oral delivery - emphasis, pace, tone and so on – just as many involve the syntax and structure of texts, which also play a central role in expressing a speaker’s thought.¹⁰ From pathos to polemic, the mood of a speech can be gleaned from a written transcript. As has been traced by Paul Corcoran in a historical survey, rhetoric has moved from oral delivery in Classical times, through dependence on a printed version in the early modern period, to a contemporary fragmentation in which speeches reach most people distilled into soundbites or accompanied by visual images.¹¹ Indeed, the skills of the orator must adapt to contemporary appetites in order not to become obsolete. Consequently, the bulk of the analysis here will be devoted to rhetoric’s role as an informative and persuasive expression of ideology, conveyed in the style, form and content of the language employed.

Rhetoric is an art in that the attractiveness of a proposition matters more than its basic plausibility. But then again, the art of the rhetorician lies precisely in making his or her proposition appear eminently plausible. This dynamic illustrates the paradoxical nature of any ideological project, which aims to construct truth. Clearly, the choice of rhetoric as a focus of the analysis is closely bound up with a post-modern approach to the study of neo-nationalism. Both the ideologue and the researcher are concerned less with the pursuit of truth than with the way in which the desired effect is achieved.¹² In the world of ideology, manipulation trumps rigour, information finds itself on a par with insinuation, and both emotive and rational arguments are acceptable means to an end. Evidently, the conceptual tools of

⁹ J. Culler Literary Theory; a very short introduction p. 70.

¹⁰ Cf. E. Corbett Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student.

¹¹ P. Corcoran Political Language and Rhetoric Ch. 3.

¹² “In the late twentieth century rhetoric has been revived as the study of the structuring powers of discourse [...] Common sense in whatever form it happens to take is always a rhetorical –partial, partisan, interested – construction.” S. Fish ‘Rhetoric’ in F. Lentricchia & T. McLaughlin (eds.) Literary Terms for Critical Study pp. 211-214.

positivist social scientists would be of little use in such a context. Consequently, the choice of text analysis as a research method is dictated by the characteristics attributed to rhetoric, which in turn are informed by the understanding of ideology elaborated in this study.

Given that even the academic bastion of philosophy is being challenged by an ‘assimilationist’ thesis propounding the all-pervasiveness of ideology, the case for using rhetoric to analyse the content, style and persuasiveness of political texts is not a particularly controversial one to make.¹³ After all, the ideological character of these texts is in no way covert or disputed. The question arises, however, as to how to pinpoint the rhetorical features of a text. David Cooper discerns four of these;

(i) [T]he deployment of tropes, like metaphor and metonymy; (ii) the deployment of persuasive techniques other than ‘straight’ logical argument; (iii) unity of style and content, and what I shall call (iv) the deferral of reference [...] the strategy whereby an author’s or speaker’s reference to the real world is indirect, because refracted through an imaginary, or imaginatively presented one, which he sets up.¹⁴

The deployment of these rhetorical techniques serves to convince the reader of the correctness of an argument or the plausibility of a given world-view. Achieving such an effect will not depend on the rigour of a logical exposition or proof of its correspondence with reality, but on the skill of the rhetorician in making this *appear* to be the case.

Rhetorical figures such as metaphor, personification and metonymy, the structure of the text, its ethos and point of view, can all provide illuminating insights into a party’s ideology. Analysis of a text’s style and content enables conclusions to be drawn about the make-up of the ideology being articulated and the system of differences it represents. In the specific context of nationalist ideology, the real world is indeed, to reprise Cooper, “refracted through an imaginary, or imaginatively presented one”. This construct - called the

¹³ Cf. D. Cooper ‘Rhetoric, Literature and Philosophy’ in R. Roberts & J. Good The Recovery of Rhetoric, discussed in chapter two, section three of this study.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 198.

nation - its form, content and the style in which it is expressed, is nothing other than the rhetorical manifestation of the ideology underlying it. To quote Terry Eagleton;

Ideology seeks to convert culture into nature, and the 'natural' sign is one of its weapons. Saluting a flag, or agreeing that Western democracy represents the true meaning of the word 'freedom', become the most obvious, spontaneous responses in the world.¹⁵

Ideology masquerades as the truth, and rhetoric is its disguise. Analysing the meaning of rhetoric lays bare the components of an ideology.

Analysing Texts

Text analysis is the most suitable research method for the present study, as it can dissect concepts, trace arguments, evaluate standpoints and highlight nodal points in a way 'snapshot' survey data can do only superficially. Crucially, and contrary to the survey method, text analysis is intent on exploring the uniqueness of a single case rather than establishing relationships between many. Consequently, the choice of data should be governed by considerations of typicality and not statistical representativeness.¹⁶ The exhaustive analysis of one text is therefore to be preferred to the summary treatment of several, as this approach is better adapted to elucidating the conceptual links and layers of meaning which together constitute an ideology. For instance, nationalists may attempt to mobilise voters for their cause by operating a rhetorical elision between people and party through the ambiguous use of the word 'we', the incidence of which can only be charted through close reading of primary texts.¹⁷ Exploring ideology as a construct translates discourse theory's conception of discourse as a system of differences into a research design. Party propaganda is the most concrete and elaborate manifestation of party ideology, and as such deserves to play a privileged role in the present study.

¹⁵ T. Eagleton Literary Theory: An Introduction p. 135.

¹⁶ The notion of typicality will be discussed in section three below.

¹⁷ "This use of 'we' can be manipulative; it can claim a spurious solidarity, for instance when a politician uses it to convince people that she is 'one of them.'" N. Fairclough Language and Power p. 15.

This study examines the discursive construction of the nation and its relationship to European integration in two examples of neo-nationalist ideology, with the aim of understanding how core and peripheral ideological principles are combined in specific cases. In so doing, it focuses on “the detail of how language is used in particular settings or contexts”.¹⁸ In an article entitled ‘Connecting Linguistic Structures and Social Practices’, Annette Hastings observes that few researchers have applied the work of Foucault or other theorists of discourse to policy analysis, in order “to reveal how social policy is implicated in constructing and sustaining a ‘system of belief’”.¹⁹ Stepping into the breach, Hastings proposes that a ‘problem’ in social policy is defined through a process of selectivity and construction, an observation which can also be applied to political ideologies.²⁰ Her approach amounts to analysing micro-discourse in order to gain insights into other levels of the discourse hierarchy. In her article, she deconstructs the representation of ‘reality’ in a Conservative government document on urban poverty. Hastings demonstrates how the text creates a rhetorical link between urban decline, poverty and a ‘culture of dependency’ on the welfare state by analysing the language and structure of the opening three paragraphs of the document. The specific ‘reading strategy’ she employs is that of conventional literary criticism; attention is focused on the function of an introduction, narrative structure, grammar and word choice.²¹ Following Norman Fairclough, Hastings sets out to assess the role of these textual features “as ‘cues’ to the reader to assign a particular meaning to the excerpt”.²² Returning to the vocabulary of discourse theory, this analysis corresponds to identifying the moments of discourse which the text is using and manipulating. In a world constructed in terms of difference,

¹⁸ A. Hastings Connecting Linguistic Structures and Social Practices: a Discursive Approach to Social Policy Analysis p. 192.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* p.193.

²⁰ In his book, Chris Hart reproduces a list of rhetorical devices which was originally intended for students of economics, illustrating that analysis of rhetoric can be a method used across the social sciences; “Policy documents can be a major source of material, providing a subject for a thesis, as well as a technique of analysis. The toolbox of rhetorical terms [...] can be useful in identifying the argument authors and organizations propose as policy.” C. Hart Doing a Literature Review p. 159.

²¹ Cf. M. Hicks Literary Criticism; a practical guide for students.

²² A. Hastings Connecting Linguistic Structures and Social Practices: a Discursive Approach to Social Policy Analysis p. 199.

any impression of cohesion must be treated as suspect. It is a sign of 'ideological work', or the attempt to attribute a subject-position to the reader within an ultimately illusory common sense. Hastings points out that readers are encouraged to adopt this "persuasive version of reality" as their own.²³ Nowhere is this rhetorical goal more explicit than in neo-nationalist party propaganda.

Given that the deconstructivist approach offers no concrete 'reading strategy', and in keeping with the features of rhetoric discussed above, the tools of literary criticism will also be adopted here.²⁴ According to Fairclough, features to look out for in analysing rhetoric are the presence of contested concepts, the expressive values of words and the relationships established between them by means of listing or other classification. Lists, for instance, group words without making the relationship between them explicit, whereas extensive discussion of a theme signals the possible presence of contested concepts, the meaning of which cannot be taken for granted.²⁵ Elision, the use of the passive and nominalization are favourite ways of introducing ambiguity into a text, the use of the pronoun 'we' being one example which will be returned to. Positive and negative sentences are also often used to calculated effect, the SNP's emphasis on its positive message in order to mark itself off from its opponents being a case in point. Text deconstruction is used here to mean the dismantling of an ideology into its component parts in order to illustrate the way in which core and peripheral principles are reconciled. Unlike Derridean deconstruction, the aim is not to subvert, but instead to dissect the logic of an idea; an ideology.

Norman Fairclough's method successfully bridges the gap between macro- and micro-levels of discourse. According to him, "language connects with the social through being the primary domain

²³ *Ibid.* p. 209.

²⁴ If we read examples of Derrida and Lacan's work, it soon becomes clear that, despite the sometimes dense and often surprising nature of their critiques, they do not abandon analysis of a text's dominant themes, its syntax, use of metaphor and so on. Indeed, their critiques themselves often play with words in order to highlight unexpected or hitherto unarticulated associations. See, for instance J. Lacan *Écrits* and J. Derrida *Signéponge/Signsponge*.

²⁵ N. Fairclough *Language and Power* Ch.5.

of ideology”.²⁶ Fairclough situates the text between a process of production and a process of interpretation, both of which are inevitably influenced by the social conditions of the respective actors.²⁷ Those producing texts will attempt to target an ideal audience and will incorporate allusions and references, or ‘cues’, designed to strike a chord with those sharing a given background.²⁸ In the case of political parties, appeals are based on the assumption of a shared political culture, or discourse.²⁹ Fairclough notes;

The sense of coherence of a whole text is generated in a sort of chemical reaction which you get when you put together what’s in the text and what’s already ‘in’ the interpreter – that is, the common-sense assumptions and expectations of the interpreter.³⁰

This study focuses on how parties, as producers of text, imagine their target audience and what this reveals about their neo-nationalist ideology.³¹ More specifically, it will examine the way in which the nation is constructed and reconciled with the process of European integration in party rhetoric.

II Research Design

The research design adopted is similar to that of the ‘analytic narrative’ used in some historical studies to elaborate on a theoretical model.³² The aim is to illustrate a theory using a concrete example.³³

²⁶ *Ibid.* p.15.

²⁷ This is a reciprocal relationship, as the texts produced will in turn contribute to the evolution of the social context which gave rise to them.

²⁸ “Producers in mass communication thus have a rather effective means of manipulating audiences through attributing to their experience things which they want to get them to accept [...] producers must assume that their interpreters or likely interpreters are equipped with particular interpretive procedures.” N. Fairclough *Language and Power* p. 153.

²⁹ The term ‘political culture’ will be defined in section two below. Chapter four offers an account of elements of Scottish and Bavarian political culture relevant to this study of the SNP and the CSU.

³⁰ N. Fairclough *Language and Power* p.78.

³¹ This approach is in keeping with the focus on Mannheim’s definition of ‘total’ ideology, discussed in chapter one. Conversely, to highlight the process of text interpretation would involve a study of the reactions of individual readers, as influenced by their ‘particular’ ideologies.

³² Cf. R. Bates *et al* *Analytic Narratives*.

Consequently, the robustness of the inferences made is measurable in terms of analytical and not statistical replication;

The issue should be couched in terms of the generalisability of cases to theoretical propositions rather than to populations or universes.³⁴

Attempting to generalise statistically from case studies would defeat the purpose of the analysis. However, the theory's scope for incorporating case specificity makes it translatable to other cases. There is no attempt to present either the SNP or the CSU as typical cases of contemporary nationalist ideology. On the contrary, the empirical studies of party ideology and strategy will show that nationalist movements are heterogeneous, each being a product of specific circumstances. For this reason a restricted number of case studies is warranted, as it allows for a 'thick' description of some of the many factors influencing the unique expression of a particular neo-nationalist ideology. In turn, the diversity of neo-nationalism is accounted for theoretically by characterising ideology in terms of core and periphery and tracing party dynamics using discourse theory.

The Parallel Demonstration of Theory

A discussion of comparative history by Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers can be transposed to political enquiry in order to place case study design within its methodological setting.³⁵ The authors distinguish three forms of comparative history, namely macro-causal analysis, the contrast of contexts and the parallel demonstration of theory. The present study does not fit into the first category, which is likened in the article to multivariate hypothesis testing and thus demands a quasi-experimental research design. It has only a superficial relationship to the second, which aims to make divergent trends stand out by comparing very different cases. The contrast of contexts

³³ "A case is an instance of a more general category [...] A project turns into a case study only when it becomes clear what the study is a case of." R. Hague *et al* Comparative Government and Politics p. 276.

³⁴ Mitchell, cited by D. Silverman in Interpreting Qualitative Data at p.160. M. Dogan & D. Pelassy offer a succinct account of the two-case study, or what they call binary analysis, in How to Compare Nations Ch. 15.

³⁵ T. Skocpol & M. Somers The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry.

privileges the historical integrity of a case - or at least a thematic treatment - over explicit theorising. Such explicit theorising is a central component of the parallel demonstration of theory, however. In this last approach;

The reason for juxtaposing case histories is to persuade the reader that a given, explicitly delineated hypothesis or theory can repeatedly demonstrate its fruitfulness - its ability convincingly to order the evidence - when applied to a series of convincing historical trajectories.³⁶

The aim of the comparison is to show that cases are sufficiently similar to fit the theoretical argument proposed. Consequently, data is confronted with theory throughout the case studies, as the design is ultimately geared to theory demonstration rather than, say, quasi-anthropological description.

The methodological aims informing the present research design closely resemble those of the parallel demonstration of theory, since the case studies of the SNP and the CSU are designed to illustrate the flexibility of neo-nationalism in terms of ideology and discourse theory. The theory of neo-nationalism elaborated here makes it possible to pursue the seemingly divergent goals of establishing the uniqueness of each case whilst making theoretical generalisations. This is because case specificity is incorporated into the interpretation of the dynamics of competing hegemonic projects, the adaptability of party policy, the interplay of core and peripheral ideological principles and the importance accorded to context. The theory presented here does not attempt to identify the causal mechanisms responsible for contemporary nationalisms, but instead proposes a theoretical framework for observing these phenomena systematically. Adopting a clear theoretical standpoint ensures translatability, enabling the same approach to be used to understand other instances of neo-nationalism. Once the goal of explaining causality has been set aside, theory-building takes on an interpretative character. Cases are chosen for their value in rendering the specific contemporary phenomenon; they are intended to illustrate hypotheses and hence test the theory. This

³⁶ *Ibid.* p. 176.

methodology is complemented by the openness of case study research design to diverse sources of data, allowing for the incorporation of both text and interview evidence into the present study.

The analogy between the parallel demonstration of theory and the jurisprudence of a legal case is an illuminating one.³⁷ A case's *ratio decidendi* - or guiding principle - may set a precedent. However, although the legal reasoning might be argued to apply to a subsequent case, the judge may eventually distinguish it on its facts. Case study research orients itself towards a detailed description of the case and its context, whilst still searching for significance beyond it. In other words, an explicit theoretical framework is used to establish what it is a 'case of'. This framework is then applied to other cases by analogy, much as the *ratio decidendi* is applied to similar legal cases. Such an approach prioritises theory-building over data comparison in any statistical sense. This explicitly accepts the fact that description and interpretation will always be theory-laden, a theoretical framework being crucial to any structured assessment. The logic of the research design is made more transparent by highlighting the methodological rationale behind data collection.³⁸ If a case can be interpreted in terms of a theory and the similarities or deviancies of other cases are better interpreted in terms of that theory than any other, then the goal of the research will have been achieved.

Case Studies

The choice of a left-wing and a right-wing party, a secessionist and a non-secessionist party, a fervently pro-European and a more circumspectly pro-European party is a conscious one. Considerable differences inevitably exist between the parties and their environments. For instance, the effects of the Second World War had a hugely different psychological impact on Scotland and Bavaria, Allied and Axis members respectively. The CSU was instrumental in shoring up Bavarian identity after the *Punkt Null* of 1945, whereas the SNP could

³⁷ R. Hague *et al* Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction Ch.16.

³⁸ "Sometimes the general perspective is clearly stated, and sometimes it is implicit. But it must be present for the monograph to become a real case study." M. Dogan & D. Pelassy How to Compare Nations p. 108.

build on an uninterrupted and strong civil society in Scotland. Consequently, there is no assumption of homogeneity across cases. On the contrary, the theory must account for such variation in order to increase its internal validity and its replicability to other cases. Conversely, however, there is a degree of similarity between two parties which claim to represent territories enjoying some autonomy within concentric circles of state and EU governance. Most importantly, the parties share a core goal of self-determination, which classes them as neo-nationalist for the purposes of this study. The SNP was chosen for its combination of a pro-European strategy with an unwavering ideological commitment to independence. As one of the few parties in contemporary Europe interpreting national self-determination in this way, its strong core principle will provide a clear reference point from which to analyse the peripheral policy of support for European integration. The CSU, on the other hand, has only once before been characterised as a nationalist party.³⁹ It will be demonstrated, however, that the CSU's use of the concept of *Heimat* in its ideology is equivalent to the nodal point of the nation. To quote Dogan and Pelassy;

The task of the comparativist, at this level, is to pinpoint real functional equivalences in order to control and master distortions raised by inevitable contextual differences.⁴⁰

Not only do the CSU's core and peripheral principles accord with the theoretical framework proposed here, but its 'undercover nationalism', as it were, allows it to pursue its goals unhindered by nationalism's negative connotations.

The chosen parties incorporate a European agenda into their ideologies and thereby supplement their core commitment to national self-determination with a peripheral, pro-European policy. The aim of the empirical study is to look at how these are reconciled in practice. To this end, a comparison of recent national and European elections in

³⁹ P. Noack *Die CSU – nationalistisch oder was sonst?* However, the term was used here polemically to refer to the CSU's demand for 'national' (read 'West German') resistance in the face of the SPD's plans for a *rapprochement* with East Germany and other Communist states during the early 1970s.

⁴⁰ M. Dogan & D. Pelassy *How to Compare Nations* p. 60.

Scotland and Bavaria was chosen as a way of pinpointing the party rhetoric which corresponded to the themes of national identity and European policy. It was thought that the campaign literature would crystallise party thinking in these areas. The analysis of each party's rhetoric was therefore based on this literature, with discourse theory providing the unifying theoretical framework. The national elections in question took place nine months apart and were naturally oriented towards domestic political debates. Although 'bread and butter' issues inevitably play a major role in any campaign, the first ever election to the Scottish parliament promised to define the way in which the four-party-system of Scottish politics constituted a departure from the dynamics of UK elections. In turn, the fact that the Bavarian parliamentary election occurred only two weeks prior to the German federal election suggested that the two political arenas would be compared and contrasted in the campaign. As it was, the CSU's continued electoral dominance in Bavaria contrasted sharply with its sister party's fall from grace at the federal level. Given that the 1999 European election campaigns took place simultaneously in Scotland and Bavaria, it was possible to evaluate the parties' differing responses to the current stage of European integration. However, it soon became apparent that, to a greater or lesser extent, domestic concerns were also fuelling the European campaigns.

Personal bias being unavoidable, it is necessary at this point to set out the idiosyncratic reasons governing the selection of cases for this study. Like the thesis question itself, the choice of the SNP was motivated by my nationality, an interest in Scottish affairs and a desire to subject my own political leanings to critical scrutiny. The choice of the CSU resulted from a wish to move away from a comparison of Scottish nationalism with nationalist movements in Quebec, Catalonia and Italy, which had been undertaken before.⁴¹ Having studied German and lived in Germany several times during my university career, I was in a position both to identify Bavaria as a possible case and to analyse German-language data. A lack of in-depth knowledge of Bavarian history and political culture before embarking on half a year of

⁴¹ Cf. M. Keating Nations against the State, J. Newell The Scottish National Party and the Italian Lega Nord: A Lesson for their Rivals? and M. Urquhart Long or Short Game: The Italian Northern League and the Scottish National Party.

research in Munich enabled me to view party strategy and rhetoric with a fresh eye, and I was soon convinced that the CSU was a suitable case to be discussed in terms of nationalism. Further, my theoretical interest in underlining the pervasive influence of 'banal' nationalism made me particularly keen to demonstrate nationalist characteristics in a party which did not recognise itself as such. However, the crystallisation of the theoretical framework for the study occurred after data collection was complete, thus reducing the risk that the case was simply moulded to fit the theory.

My knowledge of the Scottish case was quite different. To quote Grant McCracken;

Deep and long-lived familiarity with the culture under study has, potentially, the grave effect of dulling the investigator's powers of observation and analysis. But it also has the advantage of giving the investigator and extraordinarily intimate acquaintance with the object of study.⁴²

A deeper understanding of the historical background, the cultural assumptions underlying rhetorical 'cues' and the symbolism employed by the SNP contrasted sharply with the danger of missing linguistic subtleties and allusions made by the CSU. This imbalance was partially remedied by a period of immersion in Bavarian political culture and a rigorous questioning of new notions and concepts. Furthermore, conducting research in Bavaria prior to Scotland provided a comparative framework within which to organise and re-evaluate my experience of Scottish politics, thus manufacturing a degree of distance. Finally, I decided to complement my analysis with a suitably 'thick' description of the Scottish and Bavarian contexts within which the parties have evolved. Without claiming to eliminate them completely, this approach was intended to minimise the risks of over-selectivity and biased reporting.

⁴² G. McCracken The Long Interview p. 32.

Comparing Concepts

Considerable time will be devoted in this study to exploring the CSU's rhetorical construction of the Bavarian *Heimat* and the SNP's understanding of Scottish 'Independence in Europe', as these are nodal points of the parties' respective ideologies. The question arises, however, as to whether these terms are comparable. Given the wide differences in political culture, language and history between the cases, is it legitimate to treat them both as examples of neo-nationalist ideology? Comparative politics always faces the problem of trying to apply conceptual tools across languages and cultures, when these may be defined differently according to the context. The opposite meanings attached to the words federalism and *Föderalismus* is one example which will be returned to, the myriad definitions of the nation is another.⁴³ For this reason, a thorough understanding of the political discourse of a country is vital. The survey of primary and secondary literature undertaken here was necessary in order to do justice to the idiosyncrasies of specific cases and thereby improve the accuracy of comparisons with other nationalist ideologies. Comparative studies based on close textual analysis are relatively rare. However, once the problem of conceptual travelling has been addressed, an approach based on close reading enriches understanding of the many diverse ways in which concepts such as that of the nation can be constructed and manipulated.⁴⁴

Giovanni Sartori was the first to highlight the problems of conceptual travelling, defined as applying a concept to a new case, and conceptual stretching, a term Sartori used to refer to the inappropriate use of a concept.⁴⁵ A study aspiring to any form of generalisability must develop a lexicon of generic concepts which are abstract enough to be of use across similar cases. However, the variety of contexts and meanings associated with specific concepts makes this a hazardous undertaking. In an example of conceptual travelling, Richard Rose makes a comparison between the British Conservative Party and the

⁴³ To quote Neil MacCormick; "The problem is that these words with common roots [have] different values and meanings in different cultures and contexts." Interview with the author.

⁴⁴ Cf. R. de Chillum *et al* The Discursive Construction of National Identities

⁴⁵ G. Sartori Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics

German CDU. The two parties are by no means identical, but are generally classed as equivalent due to their positions on the left/right scale of party politics.⁴⁶ The recent proliferation of terms such as ‘regional nationalism’ and ‘territorial nationalism’ also highlights the problems inherent in conceptual travelling. These attempt to delimit the range of study by means of clarificatory adjectives, but inevitably still run the risk of treating quite different phenomena as equivalent.⁴⁷ Finally, the slippery concept of political culture is a crucial contributor to the nature of political systems, and thus central to comparative studies. Dogan and Pelassy define it as “the set of political beliefs, feelings and values that prevail in a nation at a given time”.⁴⁸ The authors go on to quote Sidney Verba as saying; “political ideologies are affected by the cultural environment into which they are introduced”.⁴⁹ National identity, for instance, is relevant to the present study as an aspect of political culture. It can be characterised as an inchoate sense of belonging which nationalists attempt to manipulate and mobilise. At the same time, however, it cannot be divorced from the elements of political culture influencing its articulation, such as the existence of multiple identities and their relationship to the history, party politics and constitutional legitimacy of a given political arena;

Nationalism locates the source of individual identity within a ‘people’, which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity.⁵⁰

Given that discursive formations are a central concern of this study, the question of conceptual stretching is implicit in its research questions;

To understand how the political discourse varies across countries is not merely a preliminary to a comparative project; it is itself an underused form of comparative research.⁵¹

⁴⁶ R. Rose Comparing forms of comparative analysis

⁴⁷ Cf. M. Dogan & D. Pelassy How to Compare Nations Ch. 5.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* p. 58.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* p. 58 The *opus classicus* on political culture is G. Almond The Civic Culture, later updated by G. Almond and S. Verba (eds.) The Civic Culture Revisited.

⁵⁰ Liah Greenfeld Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity p. 160.

⁵¹ R. Hague *et al* Comparative Government and Politics p. 274.

The most palpable evidence of the theoretical approach permeating the case studies is the way in which concepts are defined. Consequently, it is especially important to demonstrate that the concept of the nation is not being 'stretched' to fit the CSU's interpretation of the Bavarian *Heimat*. For this reason, a detailed analysis of the term *Heimat* will seek to show that it plays a 'functionally equivalent' role to the concept of nation as an ideological focal point of political mobilisation. In a comparative study, the detailed examination of discourse comes into its own in illustrating the equivalent roles played by concepts within ideologies. As such, attentiveness is shown to context without abandoning a broader comparison of ideological constructs across cases.⁵²

The problems of conceptual travelling and stretching will be tackled head on in chapter four, in a discussion of the elements of Scottish and Bavarian political culture relevant to SNP and CSU ideology. The subsequent case studies will then focus on each party's construction of the nation and European integration as examples of core and peripheral ideological principles. Linking the research findings to the theoretical framework in this way creates a 'chain of evidence' from the presentation of data through interpretation to conclusions.⁵³ To quote Dogan and Pelassy once more;

Because each function is conceived of as a part of a living complex, even the most empirically oriented research eventually nourishes the theoretical framework.⁵⁴

This recalls the importance accorded by discourse theory to the social and political conditions of discourse. As a prelude to a discussion of these in chapter four, the final section of the present chapter will explain how the political culture informing party ideology was studied in practice. It will also detail the methods used to analyse the parties' ideologies, underlining their theoretical derivation.

⁵² D. Collier & J. Mahon Conceptual stretching revisited: adapting categories in comparative analysis.

⁵³ R. Yin Case Study Research Ch. 6.

⁵⁴ M. Dogan & D. Pelassy How to Compare Nations p. 33.

III Research Methods

The research methods used to collect the empirical data were detailed qualitative analysis of specific texts, interviews, and a survey of primary party literature, which was exhaustive for the election campaigns selected. Together, they provide a rounded view of the rhetorical manifestations of the parties' ideologies. The choice of methods was a response to Norman Fairclough's observation that the "analysis of ideology must be answerable to the detailed properties of texts".⁵⁵ In turn, the close reading of specific texts is informed not only by literary theory, but also by insights into 'social repertoires', gained from conducting interviews. Furthermore, the content analysis of primary literature is another method of data collection in its own right.⁵⁶ The fact that textual analysis will inevitably be biased by the analyst's experience can be partially remedied by as thorough and wide-ranging a survey of texts as possible. In order to preserve the linguistic subtleties of primary texts written in German, their English translation has been accompanied by its original version throughout.⁵⁷

The focus on the rhetoric used by parties is geared towards deconstructing their interpretation of the nation and European policy. To this end, all CSU and SNP campaign literature produced for the Scottish, Bavarian and European elections of 1988 and 1999 was gathered together and analysed. It consisted not only of manifestos, speeches, press releases and party papers, but also of flyers, leaflets, posters and party political broadcasts. This rich resource provided the basis for preliminary hypotheses regarding each party's interpretation of its core and peripheral principles and informed both the choice of texts for detailed analysis and the issues explored in interviews. The survey of primary party literature was not limited to recent campaigns, but spanned a period of over thirty years. Minutes, discussion papers and proceedings from every CSU party conference since the early

⁵⁵ N. Fairclough 'Linguistic and Intertextual Analysis within Discourse Analysis' in A. Jaworski & N. Coupland (eds.) *The Discourse Reader* p. 204. Fairclough uses linguistic analysis in the wide sense to include grammar, structure and word choice.

⁵⁶ Cf. C. Hart *Doing a Literature Review*.

⁵⁷ The original versions of the two extended texts analysed in chapter six are to be found in Appendix II. Quotes from secondary texts written in German have been translated.

1970s were checked for evidence of the party's interpretation of the Bavarian *Heimat* and of its role as a Bavarian party. In addition, the minutes of special conferences and committee meetings on European policy were examined over the same period.⁵⁸ The lack of a complete SNP archive rendered a parallel study in Scotland impossible. However, this was partly remedied by questioning interviewees on the development of relevant policies and cross-referencing the results in order to control for incompatible accounts.

All the documents served as historical artefacts as well as being examples of rhetoric which could be analysed for their ideological content. Having familiarised myself with the evolution of party rhetoric, I was in a position to pinpoint texts which were particularly relevant to my research questions. From the complete data set, four texts were chosen for their typicality. The main selection criterion was the text's representativeness of the themes, arguments and images used in the parties' most recent campaigns and in their rhetoric more generally. The selection process of the research design thus began with the choice of cases, continued with the identification of policy areas relevant to an exploration of core and peripheral ideological principles, and ended with the selection of texts from suitable election campaigns. The database drawn upon during the latter stages of this process will be described in some detail. For the purposes of illustrating the content analysis informing the choice of texts, the CSU's European policy will then be described, before discussing how interviews were used as a supplementary source of evidence.

Survey of Primary Documents

The extensive archive of the Hanns-Seidel trust, which is closely affiliated to the CSU, was my main source of documentation on the Bavarian party. The archive has complete sets of all conference and campaign materials delivered automatically from CSU headquarters, and several full-time members of staff catalogue the collection and assist those wishing to consult it. The SNP, on the other hand, has no

⁵⁸ These documents were consulted in the archive of the *Hanns-Seidel Stiftung* in Munich.

official party archive.⁵⁹ Neither is there any systematic logging of recent campaign materials as they are produced. Some pamphlets, leaflets and personal papers are stored in the National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh. However, they are largely unclassified and the collection is far from complete. Both parties have clear, easy-to-use and frequently updated web pages. That of the SNP includes an exhaustive record of press releases for the last five years and access to speeches, manifestos and some examples of campaign literature.⁶⁰ The CSU web page offers a complete set of policy statements as well as contributions to current political debates. Attending the SNP extraordinary conference on the party constitution held in Perth in May 2000 provided me with the opportunity to make contacts. I was also able to compare the SNP's strategy for the 2001 General Election – as outlined in a speech by soon-to-be leader John Swinney – with their approach to the 1999 campaigns. In Bavaria, I attended the 1999 CSU party conference in Nuremberg, which allowed me to familiarise myself with the party's leading politicians and their rhetoric at an early stage in my research, as well as make preliminary contacts with a view to conducting interviews. My period of research in Bavaria ended with a visit to the annual Ash Wednesday gathering of the CSU, which is renowned for the rousing rhetoric of the speeches delivered there.

CSU Sources

All of the literature produced by the CSU for both the 1998 Bavarian and 1999 European elections was gathered and evaluated. This included the complete set of cinema and television broadcasts prepared for the campaigns and a series of pamphlets published by the CSU, detailing their policy in areas such as education, law and order, European policy and the economy. The campaign literature also ranged from manifestos and speeches to a brochure presenting the updated party logo, colours and advertising materials. These documents were compared to a selection of the materials produced for the 1998 German federal election. An evaluation of the development of CSU European

⁵⁹ Former SNP MEP Allan Macartney's extensive personal library became inaccessible after his death.

⁶⁰ During the period of data collection for this study the SNP website, www.snp.org, incorporated a useful search engine which has since been de-activated. The CSU's web address is www.csu.de.

policy from the early 1970s to the present was also undertaken, using the written records of party conferences archived at the *Hanns-Seidel Stiftung*. These comprised all of the European manifestos published by the party, as well as discussion papers on themes as diverse as European identity and common foreign and security policy. A set of thirty-five speeches written for CSU party leaders and government ministers between 1985 and 1999 was consulted. Siegfried Müller, a senior speechwriter for CSU politicians, including Franz Josef Strauß himself, selected these as of possible interest to me. Each speech naturally gave insights into party rhetoric, but also included specific references to the Bavarian *Heimat* and basic party principles. Finally, taking part in a course offered by Munich University on Bavaria's post-war prime ministers gave me access to specialist literature on Bavarian and CSU history.⁶¹

All of the weekly editions of the CSU party paper, the *Bayernkurier*, dating from June 1988 to July 1999 were consulted. As well as containing transcripts of all major speeches by former party chairman Theo Waigel, Bavarian prime minister Edmund Stoiber and his ministers, these provided background information to the European, Bavarian and German election campaigns which took place during this period. A search of the *Hanns-Seidel Stiftung* library for all materials of relevance to my topic yielded several commentaries by prominent CSU politicians on European policy.⁶² Furthermore, I could benefit from free academic literature produced by a Bavarian government-funded centre for political education, the *Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung*.⁶³ Speeches detailing Edmund Stoiber's recent programmes for government and statements by the current Bavarian minister for European affairs were consulted, as was the *Europa-Kurier*, a newsletter detailing the activities of CSU MEPs. In addition, CD-ROM searches were conducted of the daily broad sheet newspaper, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, and the weekly news magazine, *der Spiegel*,

⁶¹ Cf. Staatliche Archive Bayerns *Die bayerischen Ministerpräsidenten von 1945 bis 1993*, K. Bosl *Bayerische Geschichte* and M. Treml *Politische Geschichte Bayerns*.

⁶² Cf. I. Friedrich *Zur Sache; Europa*, F. J. Strauß *Herausforderung und Antwort: Ein Programm für Europa* and T. Waigel (ed.) *Unsere Zukunft heißt Europa*.

⁶³ Cf. M. Treml *Geschichte des Modernen Bayern*, R. Roth *Freistaat Bayern: Politische Landeskunde* and R. Roth (ed.) *Freistaat Bayern: Die politische Wirklichkeit eines Landes der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*.

for the years 1998 and 1999. These were an important source of information and comment on Bavarian politics and more specifically, on the Bavarian and European election campaigns.

SNP Sources

A search of the National Library of Scotland yielded some primary SNP literature. Other than SNP general election manifestos, a selection of party pamphlets and flyers dating to as far back as 1944 were studied. These ranged from statements of principle and policy to early campaign leaflets. Strategy documents were tracked down for the 1997 general election and the 1999 European election, as was an almost complete set of 'Scotland's Voice', the daily newspaper produced during the last week of campaigning for the Scottish parliament election. The quarterly research bulletins published by the party were consulted for the period from 1991 to 1995 and included some important discussions and statements of European policy. Access to promotional material produced by candidates for party office in the run-up to the 1999 party conference allowed me to take stock of questions of strategy and policy being debated within the party in the aftermath of the Scottish and European elections. Relevant publications by the Scottish Centre for Economic and Social Research, the Saltire Papers and the Business for Scotland group were consulted.⁶⁴ SNP press releases made during 1998 and 1999 were downloaded from the party website, as were speeches by party office-holders to recent SNP party conferences. Finally, the 1997 and 1999 CD-ROM editions of 'The Scotsman' newspaper were searched for articles concerning the general, European and Scottish election campaigns.

The campaign materials collated for the 1999 SNP European election campaign included the manifesto, a campaign leaflet and flyers, target letters, a plan of campaign strategy and all party political broadcasts. Similarly, my database on the Scottish parliament election

⁶⁴ The Saltire papers are an occasional series of discussion papers published by the SNP. The Scottish Centre for Economic and Social Research produces discussion papers on issues associated with self-government, and is associated with the SNP (former party leader Alex Salmond is an honorary vice-president.) The Business for Scotland group is run from SNP headquarters.

contained radio and television broadcasts, the SNP's manifesto and youth manifesto, a brochure detailing the 'Penny for Scotland' initiative, the campaign newspaper and an internal party document entitled 'The Scotland we seek; the SNP's vision of Scotland for the 21st century'. A paper written by the SNP campaign manager Mike Russell after the election contained many reflections on the lessons to be learned from the campaign.⁶⁵ Concerning SNP policy more generally, a policy document detailing the party's plans for the parliament and constitution of an independent Scotland was of particular interest.⁶⁶ The book 'Scotland in Europe' by Paul Scott, written in an interview format, was an illuminating rehearsal of the arguments brought by Scottish nationalists to support the policy of 'Independence in Europe'. Finally, ex-party leader Gordon Wilson provided a complete list of SNP conference resolutions on European matters since 1971, which allowed me to trace the development of SNP policy in this area.

Content Analysis

Within each policy area chosen to illustrate the core and periphery of party ideology, one text was selected according to how typical it was of the rhetoric used by the party. That is, the factors used to assess the value of the document for analysis were its representativeness of the themes and the style of party literature. In order to identify typical texts, therefore, a content analysis was undertaken of all the data gathered. Content analysis is an unobtrusive fact-finding method which can be made explicit to the reader, thus rendering the process replicable and its conclusions verifiable.⁶⁷ Fairclough has illustrated the replicability of text analysis by re-interpreting texts analysed by other authors.⁶⁸ The overview of themes emerging from the content analysis can be used to judge the 'fittingness' of the texts chosen, or the degree to which they match the

⁶⁵ M. Russell Nothing more Difficult; a contribution to the debate on independence.

⁶⁶ Scottish National Party Citizens not Subjects. Cf. A. Macartney (ed.) Scotland's Government - The Transition to Independence.

⁶⁷ C. Marshall & G. Rossman Designing Qualitative Research pp. 85-86.

⁶⁸ N. Fairclough 'Linguistic and Intertextual Analysis within Discourse Analysis' in A. Jaworski & N. Coupland (eds.) The Discourse Reader.

rhetoric they are intended to represent.⁶⁹ The more the texts are common or ordinary in terms of CSU and SNP rhetoric, the more they can be said to be typical of that *kind* of rhetoric.⁷⁰ Typicality, then, is informed by the content analysis of a full range of primary sources and the understanding of context it provides. As an illustration of the method's replicability, the following content analysis of the CSU's European policy can be compared with the piece of CSU European campaign literature reproduced in chapter six. This will enable the reader to judge whether the text selected was indeed typical.

CSU European Policy

Two recurrent themes across the CSU's conferences on the theme of Europe were the need to integrate western Germany into an international framework and the knock-on effect this would have on the federal competencies of the German *Länder*.⁷¹ In 1987, following a conference of *Länder* representatives held in Munich, the important new concept of subsidiarity was added to the debate.⁷² The CSU's support for the principle of subsidiarity is often paired in its rhetoric with a demand that European Commission competencies should be delimited by treaty. Further, the need to preserve regional identity has been linked to the protection of Bavarian autonomy in the party's calls for the strict application of subsidiarity. This can be seen as a variation on Franz Josef Strauß's much-quoted appraisal of the European,

⁶⁹ The texts selected are specific instances of the parties' brand of neo-nationalist rhetoric. This does not amount to asserting that the texts chosen are typical of neo-nationalist ideology in general.

⁷⁰ J. Schofield 'Increasing the Generalisability of Qualitative Research' in M. Hammersley (ed.) *Social Research* p. 210.

⁷¹ From the 1950s onwards, the debate focused on the interpretation of Articles 23 and 24 of the German Basic Law. The question of centralising tendencies under cover of vague clauses in the Basic Law became an ever-more important theme, not only in the question of redistribution of income between centre and periphery and between *Länder* (one of the CSU's most prominent current policies), but also in the power of the federal government to hand over *Länder* competences to Europe. For a commentary on this debate, and Bavaria's role in it, see Fuhrmann-Mittlmeier *Die deutschen Länder im Prozeß der Europäischen Einigung* Ch. C (sic.). Cf. R. Meier-Walser & G. Hirscher (eds.) *Krise und Reform des Föderalismus*

⁷² At that conference, the prime ministers of the West German *Länder* adopted a resolution outlining their vision of future European integration. For the text, see M. Tremel *Geschichte des Modernen Bayern* p. 495. Franz Josef Strauß was particularly active in promoting the ten propositions it contained, and at the CSU party conference on 20th – 21st November 1987, Edmund Stoiber reported that they corresponded exactly to CSU party policy.

German and Bavarian tiers of government, reproduced in the CSU's 1994 European manifesto; "Bavaria is our Homeland, Germany is our *Vaterland*, Europe is our future". Another of the general principles guiding CSU policy today is that of *Einheit in Vielfalt*, or unity in diversity, which finds its expression in the concept of a 'Europe of the Regions'.⁷³ Strains of exclusionary rhetoric can be detected in the CSU's evocation of a shared western and Christian culture.⁷⁴ However, the juxtaposition of this notion of shared European values with a diversity of cultures, lifestyles and traditions is a potentially confusing one in CSU rhetoric.

Peace, security, and the fight against socialism are recurring themes over fifty years of CSU European policy.⁷⁵ All recent speeches and policy documents on Europe continue to contain a reference to Europe as a guarantor of peace, an image which has long been salient in CSU rhetoric. Another favourite CSU theme of *Bürgernahe*, or closeness to the people, is juxtaposed with the centralism and high levels of bureaucracy which are allegedly characteristic of both socialist and European government. Franz Josef Strauß was not shy of highlighting his own contribution to European integration in his speeches, a legacy recognised by his successors.⁷⁶ Max Streibl, Bavarian prime minister from 1988 to 1993, looked further back in time for a legitimisation of party policy, when he linked the party's duty to support European integration to well over one thousand years of Bavarian history.⁷⁷ Bavarian and German interests also find a prominent place in CSU rhetoric.⁷⁸ The image of a party rooted in Bavaria is frequently used in order to convey the impression that only the CSU can be trusted to represent the *Land* in Europe. However, connotations of provincialism in CSU rhetoric are balanced by an

⁷³ The first of the party's principles regarding Europe reads; "Europe's future; unity in diversity". ["Europa's Zukunft; Einheit in Vielfalt."]

[Http://www.csu.de/Europa/Leitsätze.htm](http://www.csu.de/Europa/Leitsätze.htm), consulted on 1st March 2000.

⁷⁴ This theme will be discussed in more detail in chapter seven.

⁷⁵ For instance, the title of the CSU's 1979 European Manifesto reads; "A free future. No to Socialism". ["Zukunft in Freiheit. Nein zum Sozialismus."]

⁷⁶ Strauß develops his vision of European politics and integration theory in his memoirs, *Die Erinnerungen*.

⁷⁷ Max Streibl, in a speech made to a party committee in Regensburg, on 17th February 1989.

⁷⁸ Cf. the introduction to the CSU's 1994 European manifesto and I. Friedrich *Zur Sache; Europa*.

evocation of the party's role in Germany-wide politics. The CSU claims that Germany and Bavaria must be the driving force of future integration. Finally, the CSU's 1989 European Manifesto highlights the three central factors driving the party's pro-European stance; tradition, conviction and political common sense. Not only are lofty visions of shared European goals and values to be found in CSU rhetoric, then, but also sober evaluations of what Bavaria has to gain from European co-operation.

Interviews

Case study research should properly be described as a design rather than a method, as it frames the process of data gathering rather than dictating how it should be carried out.⁷⁹ The full range of data collection methods remain available to the researcher, thereby facilitating data triangulation. As the control element in the research design, data triangulation serves to render the findings, interpretations and conclusions of the research as robust as possible.⁸⁰ By corroborating evidence from a variety of sources, the repeatability of an observation is verified. In the present study, interviews were used as a source of evidence in conjunction with a survey of primary sources and detailed text analysis, three methods being the optimum number for data triangulation. As well as complementing documentary analysis by providing further insights into party policy, interviews with party activists and politicians were used to control for correct interpretations. Highly structured interview schedules would not have furthered the aims of the research. In the event, interviews were tape-recorded and loosely structured around a set of pre-prepared questions, allowing both interviewer and interviewee to explore areas of interest as they emerged. The interviews with politicians elicited spontaneous reactions and new insights, which opened up avenues for further research. In turn, the inconsistencies often contained in spoken comment could be accounted for by analysing written text.

⁷⁹ Cf. R. Stake 'Case Studies' in Denzin, N & Lincoln, Y. (eds.) Handbook of Qualitative Research and R. Stoecker Evaluating and Rethinking the Case Study.

⁸⁰ F. Bechhofer & L. Paterson Principles of Research Design in the Social Sciences p. 57.

A total of twenty-six interviews were conducted with SNP and CSU party members, each lasting between half an hour and an hour. These included parliamentarians, speechwriters, policy advisors and other party employees. The selection of potential interviewees was guided by an interest in hearing different interpretations of the official 'party line'. Interviews with specialists clarified the development of specific party policies, strategies and slogans. The interview questions related to the general themes of European integration, party self-understanding and national identity, which were comparable across both cases. In addition, interviewees in Scotland were asked whether they felt the term 'nationalist' to be a help or a hindrance to their cause. I also tested my interpretation of the 'Penny for Scotland' campaign on some SNP strategists. Although this could be seen as a leading question, it was a concrete instance of using the control function of interviews in the research design. The question was always asked at the end of the interview, thus minimising any possible influence on other responses. The convention used throughout the study has been not to reference interview data in footnotes. Where no source is given for a citation, the reader is referred to appendix I, which lists the interviewees, relevant details regarding their occupation, and the date of the interview.

In a discussion of the long interview, Grant McCracken points out that the aims of qualitative research are often misunderstood by judging it according to quantitative standards.⁸¹ He goes on; "How many and what kinds of people hold these categories and assumptions is not, in fact, the compelling issue. It is the categories and assumptions, not those who hold them, that matter."⁸² Rather than attempt to cast case study research into a statistical mould, McCracken turns to the Humanities for a set of standards more adapted to qualitative data. His argument thus underlines the usefulness of using the terminology of literary criticism in text analysis. According to him, "the language of this critical tradition is strange to positivist ears. The language asks how 'illuminating', 'encompassing', and 'elegant' an

⁸¹ See, for instance, G. King, R. Keohane & S. Verba Designing Social Inquiry and D. Dion Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study.

⁸² G. McCracken The Long Interview p.17.

argument is".⁸³ McCracken argues that theory should be judged in terms of its heuristic usefulness rather than its explanatory force. This can be applied to the overall aims of the present research which, in turn, informed the choice of research methods. To quote Skocpol and Somers;

No matter how many cases are discussed, the historical analyses themselves do not validate the theory. They can only illustrate and clarify it – and, potentially, refine it.⁸⁴

Conclusion

This chapter has shown how the theoretical and methodological considerations of this piece of research are inextricably linked. Further, it has demonstrated the fruitfulness of using rhetoric as a means of accessing the ideological content of a text. To unpack a phrase is to uncover the full force of political rhetoric. The very fact that allusions remain implicit and subtleties escape a cursory reading constitutes its strength, for these underlying messages are nonetheless absorbed subconsciously until - through constant repetition - what was once a novel and perhaps dubious association appears logical, self-evident and unassailable. This process takes place in a world constructed through discourse. To quote Annette Hastings;

If discourse analysis can identify what kind of knowledge is promoted and how it is promoted through language use, then it provides the opportunity for discourses to be both scrutinised and challenged.⁸⁵

The importance of theory to the empirical study is also evident in the research design, which focuses on two case studies in order to provide a suitably 'thick' description of each. The methods of data collection employed complement this aim. Surveys of primary sources, detailed text analysis and interview evidence ensure data triangulation, as conclusions can be compared and controlled. Analysis of texts is

⁸³ *Ibid.* p.50.

⁸⁴ T. Skocpol & M. Somers The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry p. 192.

⁸⁵ A. Hastings Connecting Linguistic Structures and Social Practices: a Discursive Approach to Social Policy Analysis p. 209.

placed within a wide-ranging overview of primary sources, thus increasing the validity of the conclusions drawn. This is supplemented both by the control function of interviews and their value as a source of evidence in their own right. The data collection methods adopted within the research design naturally reflect the concern with qualitative analysis which permeates the theory of discourse.

As was highlighted in the discussion of conceptual travelling, an understanding of the political culture of a case is vital, as nationalist ideology will inevitably be embedded within it. Accordingly, chapter four discusses relevant aspects of the discursive background shared by each party with its target audience of voters. It aims to provide the references required to understand the allusions and 'cues' contained in the selected texts, and is thus an essential component of text analysis. Such an approach is best catered for by a research design based on case studies, which is geared towards analysing the parties within their unique contexts. In turn, the detailed text analyses included in chapters five and six efficiently present key aspects of discourse that were discovered through reading other primary sources and conducting interviews. Overall, the research design privileges the analytical replicability of the study. From the first, the aim has been to develop and test a theoretical framework for understanding neo-nationalism. This framework can be applied to any number of case studies designed to explore the concepts of discourse, ideology and rhetoric.

4 Putting the Parties into Context

Scotland and Bavaria are two sub-state polities that now enjoy a substantial degree of political and administrative devolution within the United Kingdom and Germany respectively. Scotland's five million inhabitants represent about one twelfth of the UK population. Not only is Scotland's political scene different to that of other parts of the UK, but it also retains a distinctive religion, education and legal system from its pre-Union existence as a sovereign state.¹ With a population of around twelve million, Bavaria is the second largest of the sixteen German federal states in terms of population, and by far the largest in terms of area.² As we shall go on to see, the presence of the CSU in the Bavarian political arena makes for a radically different political culture and party system to the rest of Germany. According to its erstwhile leader, Theo Waigel, the CSU is the most successful party in Europe. Indeed, it enjoys the consistent support of over half of the electorate in Bavaria, having attracted over fifty percent of the vote in every Bavarian election since 1970. But for a three-year break in the 1950s, the CSU has governed Bavaria continuously since 1946 and without coalition partners since 1966, having gained an absolute majority of seats in the Bavarian election of that year. The SNP's electoral fortunes have been less good and less consistent. A spectacular rise in support in the late 1960s and early 1970s culminated in the election of eleven members to the Westminster parliament on just over thirty percent of the Scottish vote in November 1974. However, its support subsequently plummeted, and this percentage share of votes was only equalled again at the first election to the Scottish parliament in 1999.

This chapter sets out to offer a flavour of the political discourse surrounding the SNP and the CSU. Overall, the aim is to provide the reader with the background necessary to understand better the principal themes covered in the following chapters. The focus will

¹ A union of crowns took place in 1603 when James VI of Scotland acceded to the English throne to become James I there. As a consequence, a measure of administrative centralisation in London had already taken place before the political union of 1707.

² A. Kappler & A. Grevel (eds.) Facts about Germany.

therefore be on aspects of Bavarian and Scottish political culture used by the parties - to target their 'national' audiences. The sphere of relevant discourse is thus delimited by the core and peripheral principles being studied; namely the ideological construction of the nation and the parties' European policy. Factors influencing the parties' core commitment to their nation will be highlighted here, whereas chapter seven will discuss domestic political debates concerning the European Union. In the first section of this chapter, the academic literature pertaining to the SNP and the CSU will be surveyed. This will underline the originality of the case comparison, timeframe and theoretical framework of the present study. Section two will trace the historical development of self-determination in each nation. This will help us to place the ramifications of both parties' core commitment to national autonomy in context, as their policies can be related to the degree of sovereignty actually enjoyed by Scotland and Bavaria in recent history. The texts to be studied in the following chapters illustrate the parties' attempts to identify with the nation. In order to evaluate the extent to which this strategy corresponds to the actual success of the parties, a survey of their electoral fortunes and their standing vis-à-vis the opposition will be offered in the section three. At the same time, this will give us an insight into the political dynamics influencing their policies, which will be returned to in the final chapter.

I Literature Review

A short review of the secondary literature on both parties will serve to situate the present study within the fields of CSU and SNP research. Various theories have been put forward in order to explain the SNP's cycles of success and decline from the 1960s onwards.³ In turn, the history of the CSU and the conjunctural, organisational and demographic reasons for its electoral success have been exhaustively treated.⁴ The present study does not propose to address these questions.

³ Cf. J. Brand The National Movement in Scotland, K. Webb The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland and M. Kauppi Scottish Nationalism; a conceptual approach.

⁴ Cf. A. Mintzel Besonderheiten der politischen Kultur Bayerns. Facetten und Etappen einer politisch-kulturellen Homogenisierung, A. Mintzel Regionale politische Traditionen und CSU-Hegemonie in Bayern and A. Mintzel Die Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern.

In both the cases of the CSU and the SNP, relatively little secondary literature is to be found which analyses recent party history, policy and organisation.⁵ Instead, there is a concentration of research into a specific period in each party's history. Most publications on the SNP date from the 1960s and 1970s and try to explain the party's upsurge in electoral support around that time.⁶ Major publications on the CSU, though published more recently, deal mainly with its post-war beginnings and troubled early history, particularly in relation to the electoral threat posed by the *Bayernpartei* during the 1950s. There is no research on either party resembling the approach and time frame of the present study, and the CSU and the SNP have never been compared before.

The SNP

A series of monographs deal with the historical development of Scottish nationalism. Michael Hechter's book 'Internal Colonialism', discusses 'the Celtic fringe in British national development' from the sixteenth century onwards.⁷ Hechter proposed that a colonial-type relationship existed between England and its 'Celtic periphery' which encouraged assimilation to the English 'core culture'.⁸ Although acknowledging that this alleged colonial relationship was less clear cut in relation to Scotland than to Wales and Ireland, the validity of Hechter's linkage between industrialisation, ethnic identity and institutionalised English racism is highly questionable. The model, the data used and the conclusions drawn have since been discredited, making the study of little use in pinpointing the root causes of Scottish nationalism. H. J. Hanham offers another historical account of the

⁵ The literature in French is even more sparse and dated than that in English or German. Cf. J-P. Drieux Le Scottish National Party and F. Labie La Christliche [sic.] Soziale Union (C.S.U.) Bavaroise: Contribution à la Théorie Générale des Partis Politiques.

⁶ Articles published in the 1980s include J. Agnew Models of Spatial Variation in Political Expression: The Case of the Scottish National Party, S. Grasmuck The Ideology of Ethnoregionalism: The Case of Scotland and J. Lutz Community Context in the Spread of Voter Support for the Scottish National Party.

⁷ M. Hechter Internal Colonialism; the Celtic fringe in British national development 1536-1966.

⁸ "From the seventeenth century on, English military and political control in the peripheral regions was buttressed by a racist ideology which held that Norman Anglo-Saxon culture was inherently superior to Celtic culture." *Ibid.* p. 342.

Scottish nationalist phenomenon, which ends with an evaluation of the SNP.⁹ In the late 1960s, when he was writing, the SNP was just beginning to undergo its transformation from a single-issue movement to a fully-fledged party. Hanham emphasised the principled nature of the SNP, just as Richard Finlay did in a study of the party and its antecedents, published twenty-five years later.¹⁰ By examining both the party's ideological core and its adaptable periphery, the present study also seeks to reconcile the pragmatism and adaptability of the SNP with the proposition that it was and remains a party of principle.

Within the body of literature which sets out to explain the improvement in the SNP's electoral fortunes during the 1960s and 1970s, we can cite the work of Keith Webb, Jack Brand and Mark Kauppi.¹¹ The authors identify this period as corresponding to the SNP's evolution from a single-issue movement to a party with a wide range of policies, to the discovery of North Sea oil and the economic boost this gave to the independence cause, and to the party's first real taste of power in local government and at Westminster. Keith Webb develops the theory that the SNP's initial success was a result of protest voting, which the party then successfully exploited by offering an alternative political identity to the traditional left/right and class cleavages.¹² He points to the attractiveness of the SNP as a small party, which could be used to register voter dissatisfaction with the sitting government without causing a major political upset. The SNP's varying success at exploiting a given economic, political and social context emerges as a central dynamic in Webb's analysis.

Similarly to Keith Webb, Mark Kauppi focuses on external economic problems and internal party organisation as factors crucial to

⁹ H. J. Hanham Scottish Nationalism. Christopher Harvie has also written a historical, if somewhat idiosyncratic account of Scottish nationalism; Scotland and Nationalism. Scottish Society and Politics 1707-1994.

¹⁰ Richard Finlay writes that in 1942 the party "determined that principle, and not expediency, would be their guiding light, come what may". Independent and Free p. 253.

¹¹ Tom Naim's theory of uneven development, which he develops in The Break-Up of Britain, has been discussed in the context of 'old' and 'new' nationalism in chapter one.

¹² K. Webb The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland.

the SNP's electoral success in the early 1970s.¹³ Again, the SNP is portrayed as an actor rather than as a passive benefactor from a fall in support for other parties. Kauppi places somewhat too much emphasis on the economic element in contemporary Scottish nationalism, however.¹⁴ By failing to acknowledge the contribution of SNP propaganda to its success, such as in its manipulation of an inchoate sense of Scottish identity, Kauppi fails to exploit the analytic potential of his own argument as to the importance of party strategy. Jack Brand characterises nationalist parties as actors who accept the conventions of political competition with a long-term view to changing the basic rules of the game.¹⁵ He discusses a number of factors conducive to the formation of a nationalist movement, such as economic deprivation, belief in a cause, precipitating events and mobilisation around a leader. However, the role of parties as ideologues remains under-developed once more, and treatment of the economic factors driving party dynamics is privileged throughout.

Two books published in the 1990s update empirical analysis of the SNP without straying too far from the analytic framework of their predecessors. Roger Levy highlights the importance of vested interests to party strategy.¹⁶ He pinpoints major factors responsible for the decline and then stagnation in SNP support during the 1980s, including a lack of voter loyalty and internal rivalries, as well as evident party inexperience in handling the devolution debate and exploiting 'emotional-economic' issues such as North Sea oil. As such, his analysis still has resonance over ten years later, when the SNP states that the 'professionalisation' of the party is one of its highest priorities.¹⁷ In his book entitled 'Strategies for Self-Government', James Mitchell uses an explicit theoretical framework in order to

¹³ M. Kauppi Scottish Nationalism; a Conceptual Approach.

¹⁴ "Modern nationalism is very much an economic movement [...] although historical symbols are used they are not central to the appeal of the party." *Ibid.* p. 170.

¹⁵ J. Brand The National Movement in Scotland. For his more recent work on the SNP, see J. Brand Defeat and Renewal. The Scottish National Party in the Eighties and J. Brand *et al* Social Constituency and Ideological Profile: Scottish Nationalism in the 1990s.

¹⁶ R. Levy Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads. Cf. The more wide-ranging collection of essays edited by T. Gallagher Nationalism in the Nineties.

¹⁷ Cf. M. Russell Nothing More Difficult; a contribution to the debate on independence.

understand how the SNP set about becoming an effective political force. He offers a contextual account of the SNP which emphasises that changing circumstances demand changing strategies. Mitchell then goes on to define the difference between political and cultural nationalism as one of strategy rather than ideological conviction. He thus applies the notion of 'invented' or 'remembered' tradition to a contemporary nationalist party by suggesting that cultural references are often manipulated.¹⁸ The theoretical frameworks of Levy and Mitchell's books bear a passing resemblance to that of the present study, insofar as they systematically conceptualise party policy and underline the pragmatism and adaptability of the SNP today. However, I believe that their analyses can be elaborated upon by a detailed examination of SNP ideology and its rhetorical expression, a central aim of this piece of research.

Moving away from works written for an academic audience, Andrew Marr provides a detailed account of certain episodes in SNP history which are also covered by Levy and Mitchell.¹⁹ His book is particularly successful at rendering the mutual influence of SNP and Labour policies on the parties' responses to the constitutional question, and depicts the figures and issues involved in a lively, journalistic style. Two further books written by journalists were particularly useful for putting the data analysis of recent SNP party campaigns into context.²⁰ Written to mark the first Scottish parliament election, they were a welcome exception to the relative dearth of literature, let alone social science literature, dealing with the SNP today.²¹ Murray Ritchie's book was invaluable for gathering insider information on the SNP's campaign. It includes candid comments from prominent party members as well as a day-by-day account of events and the immediate political and media context of the campaign. Brian Taylor's book covers the period leading up to the election, from the Constitutional

¹⁸ "A frequent distinction drawn by home rulers themselves is between cultural and political/economic nationalists. The distinction may have merit as a means of distinguishing between different strategies." J. Mitchell Strategies for Self-Government p. 24.

¹⁹ A. Marr The Battle for Scotland.

²⁰ M. Ritchie Scotland Reclaimed and B. Taylor The Scottish Parliament.

²¹ A short article dealing with SNP European policy, based on interview evidence, is A. Ichijo 'Scotland and Europe: Three Visions of Contemporary Scottish Nationalism' in K. Brehony & N. Rassool (eds.) Nationalisms Old and New.

Convention, through the Scotland bill to the referendum. Although not specifically focusing on the SNP and written in an anecdotal style, these books complemented the survey of primary literature as sources of background information on the period dealt with in the present study.

The CSU

There are very few analyses of contemporary CSU policy.²² However, in a bibliographical essay evaluating the literature dealing with the first thirty years of the party's history, Thomas Schlemmer makes some general remarks pertinent to the present study.²³ He points out, for instance, that little research exists into specific aspects of CSU policy. Education policy, one of the most important *Länder* competences, is well documented, but other areas such as European policy, are not. Schlemmer also emphasises the need for historians of the CSU to adopt some of the conceptual tools of social science in their research. It is hoped that the present study will make some contribution to both these gaps in the academic literature. Thomas Schlemmer has written one of the most thorough examinations of the CSU's early history.²⁴ In an investigation of party policy and organisation immediately after the Second World War, he focuses on the party's difficult early years and the confrontation with its then arch-rival, the *Bayernpartei*. Despite the detail in which the party itself is examined, some reviewers miss an adequate portrayal of the context in which the party evolved, and thus doubt the book's contribution to explaining why the CSU soon recovered its electoral dominance.²⁵

²² In this academic field, a great deal of importance is attached to basing research on the evaluation of original documentary sources. The thirty-year time lapse before certain CSU internal documents can be consulted may have influenced the fact that the bulk of studies of the party deal with the post-war period.

²³ T. Schlemmer Die aufsässige Schwester: Forschungen und Quellen zur Geschichte der Christlich-Sozialen Union 1945-1976 Other bibliographical essays are A. Mintzel Die CSU in Bayern als Forschungsobjekt and S. Immerfall & A. Mintzel Ergebnisse und Perspektiven der Forschung zur Parteienlandschaft in Bayern.

²⁴ T. Schlemmer Aufbruch, Krise und Erneuerung. Die Christlich- Soziale Union 1945-1955. Schlemmer collaborated with Alf Mintzel and Barbara Fait on a collection of party minutes and sources concerning the early history of the CSU. He now works for the *Münchener Institut für Zeitgeschichte*, a state-funded research institute.

²⁵ G. Hirscher Der Standort der Union p. 131.

Alf Mintzel's series of books and articles is the first port of call for any student of the party.²⁶ As the only recognised academic expert on the party, his work deserves to be considered in some detail. Published in 1975, his first, ground-breaking study of the party sought to characterise its internal reorganisation in the 1950s as a transformation from a 'party of notables' into a 'modern-style mass party organisation'.²⁷ The study is a work of social science with an explicit theoretical framework and not a historical monograph like most other works dealing with the CSU. It is the only general and wide-ranging study of the party published to date and is regarded as something of a classic in the field. In it, Mintzel also addresses the integrative function of the CSU in Bavaria by studying external factors such as industrialisation, religion and traditional political cleavages.²⁸ Less attention is paid to the role of party ideology, although other of his publications return to this aspect in more detail.²⁹

Since the 1970s, Mintzel has continued to pen a number of essays on various aspects of the CSU.³⁰ One of his most recent contributions to the literature updates and synthesises the wide range of themes which guide his research; namely the party's dual role at *Land* und federal levels, debates surrounding the possible expansion of the party beyond Bavaria, its consistently good election results despite political scandal, the question of party leadership, CSU domestic and European policy, and the nature of the Bavarian opposition.³¹ Another

²⁶ Alf Mintzel is a professor of social science at the University of Passau in Bavaria.

²⁷ My translation may not do justice to Mintzel's original terms of *Honoratorienpartei* and *Massen- und Apparatpartei Modernen Typs*, which were intended to replace terms such as *Volkspartei*, judged by the author to be too ideologically laden. Alf Mintzel *die CSU-Anatomie einer konservativen Partei* pp. 67-71.

²⁸ For instance, Mintzel was the first to chart the party's success at translating its inter-confessional stance into election victories. This piece of analysis is returned to in his contribution to B. Haneke & R. Höpfinger (eds.) *Geschichte einer Volkspartei*.

²⁹ A. Mintzel *Geschichte der CSU: Ein Überblick*.

³⁰ For instance, A. Mintzel *Besonderheiten der politischen Kultur Bayerns. Facetten und Etappen einer politisch-kulturellen Homogenisierung*, A. Mintzel *Die Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern* and A. Mintzel *CSU- Strategie gegen Gewichtsverlust*.

³¹ A. Mintzel *CSU*. His discussion of the CSU's role in the debate as to whether crucifixes should continue to hang in Bavarian state schools may seem to be of peripheral interest, but is in fact very indicative of their interpretation of Bavarian cultural identity.

cogent treatment of Bavarian political culture is to be found in Jürgen Gebhardt's essay 'Bayern, Deutschlands eigenwilliger Freistaat'.³² In it, Gebhardt seeks to analyse concepts such as *Heimat* as well as Bavarian stereotypes and their historical origins. He also asks whether a separate Bavarian political culture does in fact exist, and assesses the CSU's contribution to its creation. Although this is a political science work of academic standard, like most publications of the Bavarian centre for political education, it is not in the least critical of the CSU.³³ The party's role in bringing about Bavarian prosperity is acknowledged, but nothing is done to question the rosy view of Bavarian life and tradition it propagates.

Mintzel's latest book-length study is entitled 'Die CSU – Hegemonie in Bayern: Strategie und Erfolg'. Mintzel defines the CSU's *Hegemonie* as follows;

A form of dominance legitimated through democratic elections, which has strengthened over the last thirty-three years of non-coalition government into a politico-cultural hegemony.³⁴

It therefore refers first and foremost to electoral dominance and not - as in the present study - to conceptual hegemony within a discourse theory framework. The title of the book is misleading in that several chapters deal with other parties standing in Bavaria. Although this is to be welcomed as providing a more complete picture of the Bavarian political arena, there is little attempt to offer a synthesis of the inter-party dynamics of Bavarian politics. Overall, the book does not convey an impression of either unity or balance. This is certainly due to the fact that there is considerable reproduction of fragments of research published elsewhere by Mintzel. Although the final section does update his work in the light of the 1998 Bavarian and German

³² J. Gebhardt, 'Bayern, Deutschlands eigenwilliger Freistaat – Historisch-gesellschaftliche Aspekte der politischen Kultur in Bayern' in R. Roth (ed.) Freistaat Bayern.

³³ Indeed, this government department's role in consolidating the 'CSU-approved' image of Bavaria would constitute a subject of study in itself. Although a useful source of information, a lack of critical distance can often be discerned in the analyses and the conclusions contained in the work it publishes. See, for instance, 50 Jahre Bayerische Verfassung and Kulturstaat Bayern, both edited and published by the *Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit*.

³⁴ A. Mintzel Die CSU – Hegemonie in Bayern p. 12 (my translation).

election results, his over-reliance on research into early party history only underlines the fact that there are very few studies dealing in depth with the party today.

Two English language introductions to Bavarian politics should be noted. The first is Peter James' book 'The Politics of Bavaria', which devotes chapters to Bavaria's economy, history, constitution and party system, as well as to the Franz Josef Strauß 'phenomenon'.³⁵ It also offers a detailed description of crucial events of recent decades, such as German reunification and the death of the party's long-time leader Franz Josef Strauß. As such, it is a useful descriptive handbook, which highlights why Bavaria is an exception to the rule in German politics. In a strong, theoretically structured explanation of the Bavarian party system today, Alf Mintzel provides an English-language summary of Bavaria's post-war social and economic development. Some comparative material on other parties in Bavaria is also a welcome inclusion, and a series of maps illustrates the growth in CSU support.³⁶ The map illustrating the election results of the 1974 Bavarian election is particularly striking, as Bavaria appears as an almost entirely black silhouette (black is the colour associated with the CSU).³⁷ Mintzel concludes that "the conservative shaping of linguistic and figurative Bavarian state symbols" was facilitated by factors such as industrialisation, urbanisation and the development of the mass media, but was ultimately dependent on the political elite's interpretation of and middle-class reaction to these changes.³⁸ His article thereby identifies the phenomenon of CSU rhetoric which the present study sets out to analyse in detail.

Nowhere does Alf Mintzel discuss CSU rhetoric or ideology in depth, preferring to concentrate instead on the influence of structural factors on the CSU's electoral success. Herbert Riehl-Heyse does look specifically at CSU rhetoric, however, in his book 'CSU – die Partei, die das schöne Bayern erfunden hat'. Written by a journalist

³⁵ See also P. James Parties and Elections in Bavaria: A Special Case and C. Carl-Sime Bavaria, the CSU and the West German Party System.

³⁶ A. Mintzel Political and Socio-economic Developments in the Postwar Era: The Case of Bavaria 1945-1989.

³⁷ *Ibid.* p. 167.

³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 175.

sympathetic to the party, it is an anecdotal, eclectic and impressionistic attempt at pinpointing some of the ideological reasons for the CSU's enduring electoral success. The work is organised around specific themes relating to the party's image and its rhetoric. The subtext of several pieces of party literature is analysed, such as that of 'beautiful Bavaria', referred to in the title. Riehl-Heysel offers insightful pen-portraits of the subtle and not-so-subtle imagery accompanying important events such as the traditional Ash Wednesday rally. Given that the author is himself so steeped in the image of Bavaria that the CSU draws on and seeks to appropriate, his work is more of a good-natured celebration of the rhetorical symbiosis between party and *Land* than a critical evaluation. Although the present study also focuses on party rhetoric and symbolism, it does so within an explicit theoretical framework which serves to structure the analysis.

Aside from Alf Mintzel's work, two articles by Gerhard Hirscher represent the only recent research into contemporary CSU politics.³⁹ The first illustrates that it is now becoming the received wisdom to classify the CSU as hegemonic in Mintzel's sense of the term.⁴⁰ Hirscher's study distinguishes three possible analytical approaches to the CSU; as a Bavarian party, as a government coalition partner and as a member of the *Union* of Christian democrats in Germany (with particular reference to its independent presence in the German parliament.) This typology is a useful starting point for evaluating the way in which these spheres of CSU influence affect party policy, rhetoric and strategy. The present study, for instance, focuses on the CSU as a Bavarian party in order to examine its image and identity within Bavaria. In turn, references to its self-understanding as a partner at the federal level will highlight the party's construction of its role in each political arena.⁴¹ Hirscher's second article is a reappraisal of the CSU's position in German politics after

³⁹ Hirscher is a member of the *Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, a department of the *Hanns-Seidel Stiftung*, which is a trust closely affiliated to the CSU.

⁴⁰ G. Hirscher *Die CSU als Koalitionspartner*.

⁴¹ The relationship of the CSU to its sister party, the CDU, is usually discussed within a body of literature focusing primarily on the latter. Recent publications include H. Poller *Rechts oder Links? Niedergang und Erneuerung der CDU* and T. Dürr & R. Soldt (eds.) *Die CDU nach Kohl*.

the 1998 elections, which saw it poll under fifty percent at the federal level but still suffer markedly less than the CDU in the *Union's* overall defeat.⁴² Hirschler sets out to investigate whether this heralds a change in the German party landscape. The theoretical framework employed is more unwieldy than illuminating, however, and does not offer new insights into information already familiar to a student of the CSU.

Finally, an imposing, eight-hundred page tome published by the *Hanns-Seidel Stiftung* to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the CSU's creation must be singled out as the most wide-ranging, relatively recent study of the party. It contains articles on the CSU's history by academics, contributions by Bavarian prime minister Edmund Stoiber and ex-party chairman Theo Waigel, interviews with leading party figures of the past (and) a selection of historical documents, including fifty pages reproducing a series of campaign posters. As such, it is an invaluable introductory volume. The party, political contributions provide a welcome opportunity to analyse some primary sources in order to gain familiarity with CSU rhetoric. Party history is well covered, and aspects of contemporary policy such as foreign affairs, economic and social policy and the 'German question' are accorded articles of their own. As is to be expected, however, the tone of the articles is less than critical. Furthermore, historical surveys once again win the upper hand over analyses by social scientists. Nevertheless, the varied topics and the combination of primary and secondary sources make this a useful resource. The present study sets out to update and extend existing research into the CSU by examining its ideology in detail, something which has never before been undertaken within a social science framework. Analysis of strategy and rhetoric must be supplemented with a wider understanding of the dynamics shaping the political arena in which a party evolves, however. In the following section, the SNP and CSU will be placed within their respective political cultures.

⁴² G. Hirschler Die CSU nach den Wahlen 1998: Tendenzen zur 'lose verkoppelten Anarchie,' zur 'Cäsarisierung' und 'Bonapartisierung'.

II National Self-determination

Scottish Devolution

In his book, 'The Autonomy of Modern Scotland', Lindsay Paterson develops the controversial thesis that Scotland "has been at least as autonomous as other small European nations, for which the reality of politics has always been the negotiation of partial independence amid the rivalry of great powers".⁴³ Paterson acknowledges that he is arguing against the premises of the dominant discourse; "Unionist and nationalist rhetoric in the present debate about Scotland's future share an assumption that Scotland has not been independent since 1707".⁴⁴ Indeed, at the turn of the nineteenth century, Scotland had already experienced almost a century of incorporating union with its larger southern neighbour, England. In 1707, after passing the Act of Union, Scotland's parliament was adjourned indefinitely, thus marking the beginning of its membership of the United Kingdom. Scotland's separate legal and education systems were preserved and there was no attempt to replace Scottish Presbyterianism with Anglicanism. The English had no intention of colonising Scotland economically or culturally; they had little interest in its relatively backward economy, and their attitude to their northern neighbour was generally one of indifference.⁴⁵ However, sparked by the economic recession which came with the end of the Napoleonic wars, a sense of political injustice began to simmer in Scotland. The ratio of voters to inhabitants was much lower than in England and the sharp rise in population caused by industrialisation led to calls for a further increase in the number of MPs, but Scotland was dependent on political will in London to bring about reform.

Despite being a relative improvement, the rules linking suffrage to property ownership in the Reform Act of 1832 were such that few voters were added to the electoral roll, and Establishment control was

⁴³ L. Paterson The Autonomy of Modern Scotland p. 4.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* p. 1.

⁴⁵ Indeed, Scottish culture flourished quite independently from England in the eighteenth century, with the Scottish Enlightenment producing such philosophers as David Hume, Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson.

actually consolidated. Mid-nineteenth century movements such as the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights raised many of the same grievances that would be rehearsed by devolution campaigners well over a century later. These included the insufficient and ill-informed consideration given to Scottish bills at Westminster, the inadequacy of a standardised civil service oblivious to Scottish particularities, and a dearth of much needed funding for Scottish industries and universities. In response to pressure from landowners, MPs and the urban middle classes, the post of Scottish Secretary was created in 1885. The ministry's remit first included education, local government, roads and public health, but was gradually extended through the activism of certain incumbents and the incorporation of independent boards.⁴⁶ However, administrative autonomy stopped short of political devolution.⁴⁷

After the Second World War, Scotland invested heavily in the new welfare state in more ways than one. It was important as a political project which united Scottish civil society and at the same time emphasised the continued worth of UK membership.⁴⁸ In a rare period of consensus in British politics, the focus on policy implementation corresponded to the role of the Scottish Office. Increases in its remit helped to define Scotland as a separate political unit within the UK, and it was allowed considerable leeway in adapting policy to Scottish needs.⁴⁹ In the 1960s, for instance, regional policy went some way towards slowing the politically corrosive effect of

⁴⁶ These boards had been manifestations of Scottish civil society at the local government level, and oversaw increasing state involvement in many areas of social policy, including prisons, the police and development in the Highlands and Islands. A. Brown *et al* Politics and Society in Scotland p. 12.

⁴⁷ For a detailed account of the extent of Scottish autonomy see L. Paterson The Autonomy of Modern Scotland and J. Kellas Modern Scotland Ch. 7.

⁴⁸ Scottish support for the principle of the welfare state can be traced to the paternalistic and Presbyterian ethic of nineteenth-century middle-class Liberals, the strong Liberal influence on the Conservative party in Scotland after 1912, and the strength of the Labour party in Scotland from the 1920s on. A. Brown *et al* Politics and Society in Scotland p. 14.

⁴⁹ The Scottish Office gradually took over responsibility for poor relief and education provision (traditionally the responsibility of local parishes) trade, (long the preserve of the Scottish burghs) and roads and bridges, which had originally been maintained by landowners. *Ibid.* p. 5.

Scotland's declining industrial base and rising unemployment.⁵⁰ The Scottish Office's existence also helps justify the claim that Scotland has an independent civil society, a concept formulated by the Scottish sociologist Adam Ferguson in the eighteenth century to denote a network of social organisations. In turn, Scotland's status as a nation is accepted in UK political discourse, even if the nationalist project derived from this status is not.⁵¹

Throughout the twentieth century, the Scottish economy suffered from the fact that it was one of the first to industrialise in the early nineteenth century, leading to its shipbuilding, steel, coal and textile industries becoming steadily less competitive as time went on. Like the rest of the world, Scotland was hit by the global recession of the 1930s, and even the discovery of North Sea oil in the early 1970s did not shield it from the two major economic shocks of that decade. Diversification into areas such as tourism, services and electronics, coupled with increased inward investment, emphasised the Scottish economy's openness and reliance on exports, principally to Europe.⁵² However, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, Scottish voters became increasingly discontented with a political and - by extension - constitutional system which was not delivering prosperity. The rise in SNP support around this time is often interpreted as a protest vote against the *status quo*.⁵³ The economic situation was recognised to be too serious for yet another exercise in administrative tinkering. An elected assembly was proposed by the Labour government which came to office in 1974, and eventually called a Scottish referendum on its devolution bill in 1979.

⁵⁰ The Highlands and Islands Development Board was created in 1965 and the Scottish Development Agency in 1975.

⁵¹ Brown *et al* Politics and Society in Scotland p. 39.

⁵² In the 1990s, tourism was Scotland's largest industry in terms of employment and contributed £2.7 billion to the Scottish economy in 1997. Other high earners were exports of whisky, oil, gas and data processing equipment exports. Scottish Enterprise Network Tourism Action Plan.

⁵³ This is underlined by the fact that the decline in Conservative votes did not go to a single other party, benefiting first the SNP and then Labour, with certain bye-election victories going to the Liberals. Cf. R. Levy Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads p. 25.

Although the devolution referendum of 1979 had resulted in a narrow 'yes' vote, the so-called 'Cunningham amendment' stipulated that over forty percent of the electorate must declare itself in favour. Given that the actual outcome was 51.6% of votes cast 'for', corresponding to 32.9% of the electorate, the devolution project was abandoned.⁵⁴ As an indirect result of this outcome, a general election was called for October 1979. Margaret Thatcher and her Conservative Party came to power and, following a cobbled-together campaign, the SNP saw the number of its MPs fall from eleven to two. Thatcher's brand of 'conviction politics' and her pledge to 'roll back the state' did not go down well north of the border, however. Scotland's higher proportion of state employees and public housing compared to England meant that the existing system was close to many a Scottish heart.⁵⁵ The widespread sense of affront was further enhanced by the consonance of welfarism with a popular Scottish myth of egalitarianism, embodied in the idea of Jock Tamson's bairns and the lad o' pairts.⁵⁶ The Scottish Office was used increasingly as a means of imposing Conservative policies for which the majority of Scots had not voted. Scottish voting patterns were quite different to those in England, so much so that between 1987 and 1997 the Conservatives governed Scotland with only about one seventh of Scottish seats. The loss of all Scottish Conservative seats at the 1997 general election brought an end to what was perceived as an unfairly imposed government, which the incoming Labour government's promise of a devolved parliament guaranteed could never happen again.

⁵⁴ The poor voter turnout in the 1979 referendum was variously attributed to poor weather, disillusionment both with the project and the Labour government, and Scotland's bad performance in the Football World Cup! A. Marr The Battle for Scotland p. 159.

⁵⁵ McCrone and Bechhofer's comparison of voting patterns with the North of England (which has similar occupational and housing structures) suggests, however, that this is not enough to explain unique Scottish voting patterns. They allude to, but do not pinpoint, some extra, peculiarly Scottish dimension. D. McCrone & F. Bechhofer The Scotland-England Divide: Politics and Locality in Britain.

⁵⁶ For a discussion of the roots of this myth, see D. McCrone Understanding Scotland Ch.4. A concrete example is the widely canvassed view that Scottish peaceful opposition to the poll tax (as opposed to violent demonstrations in London) was based on its unfairness rather than on unwillingness to pay. D. McCrone Excessive and Unreasonable: The Politics of the Poll Tax in Scotland.

Building on the proposals of the Constitutional Convention, a Scotland bill was drafted by the new Labour government and passed through the Westminster parliament with remarkable alacrity.⁵⁷ A 74.3% 'yes' vote in the referendum of September 1997 paved the way for a parliament with far more powers than its abortive predecessor of 1979. Economic, defence and foreign policy (including European affairs), social security, consumer protection and immigration were some of the areas reserved to Westminster, with everything else being devolved to Edinburgh.⁵⁸ The first Scottish parliament election was conducted using the single transferable vote system, and the formation of a Labour and Liberal coalition government definitively marked Scottish politics off from the British political system of two-party competition and elections by plurality.⁵⁹ Scotland's voting system provides for a combination of directly and proportionally elected members of the Scottish parliament, resulting in a truer reflection of party political support in Scotland which nonetheless retains direct links between constituencies and their representatives. For instance, the Scottish Conservative vote is now translated into an equivalent proportion of seats, as is that of the SNP, whose fairly even spread of support across Scotland puts it at a marked disadvantage in gaining first-past-the-post seats.

The parliament joins a congeries of other distinctively Scottish institutions. The nation's education, local government and legal systems, its media, cultural institutions and the voluntary sector, the Scottish Office and the Presbyterian Church of Scotland all contribute to Scotland's unique political culture;

[T]he long-held assumption about the correspondence of state, society and nation, which removed Scotland as a conventional area for analysis and action, has been eroding. If we recover the idea that states

⁵⁷ The Scottish Constitutional Convention was formed in 1989 from most Scottish political parties (excepting the Conservatives and the SNP) as well as Churches, Trade Union and other representatives of Scottish civil society, with the aim of drawing up a blueprint for a Scottish parliament. For a detailed account of the Convention, see K. Wright *The People say Yes*.

⁵⁸ A full list of reserved powers is to be found in B. Taylor *The Scottish Parliament* p. 139. This set-up was a marked improvement on the 1979 proposals, which had exhaustively listed the Scottish Assembly's areas of competence instead.

⁵⁹ Scotland continues to vote according to the first-past-the-post system in UK general elections.

are essentially political entities with no necessary correspondence with civil societies, then Scotland's institutional autonomy within the British state takes on added relevance.⁶⁰

It can be concluded that Scotland has a distinctive political culture, one which inevitably influences the SNP's interpretation of nationalist ideology. The degree of political autonomy currently enjoyed by Scotland within the UK constitutes a benchmark against which to evaluate the SNP's vision of 'Independence in Europe'.

Bavaria and Federalism

Ignoring some peripheral alterations, Bavaria today is still the amalgam of principalities, dukedoms, towns and bishoprics brought together to form a kingdom in 1806.⁶¹ Awareness of historical regional identities remains high in official circles; CSU politicians are careful to ensure the proportional representation of politicians from the three regions of Swabia, Franconia and *Altbayern* within the Bavarian government. Regional boundaries are also an important marker of identity for individual Bavarians. Following the Second World War, the German population expelled from Czechoslovakia, which found refuge across the border, was declared by the Bavarian government to be the fourth Bavarian *Stamm*. The word *Stamm* is used by the CSU to mean a historical lineage, but is usually translated into English as 'tribe'. The need to mark the acceptance of the exiles as 'honorary Bavarians' using this symbolism illustrates to what extent the traditional zones remain important components of the *Land's* identity. However, it has been pointed out that these identities have been relegated to second, third or even fourth levels of importance by the development of a Bavaria-wide national identity, due in no small part to the CSU's homogenising ideology.⁶² The early nineteenth-century

⁶⁰ A. Brown *et al* Politics and Society in Scotland p. 36.

⁶¹ The Bavarian territory gained the former principality of Coburg in 1920, lost its territory in the Rhineland in 1945 and recovered the district of Lindau in 1956.

⁶² Alf Mintzel Die CSU - Anatomie einer Konservativen Partei 1945 - 72. Alf Mintzel is referring here to political identities, or the mobilisation of identity for electoral ends. However, CSU voters and politicians alike continue to identify themselves as Franconians or Swabians (or even more locally) first and foremost. CSU rhetoric recognises this in its vague use of the term *Heimat*. In the *Bayernkurier* of 21st July 1990, the then prime minister Max Streibl expressed himself thus; "It makes no difference whether they are 'Old Bavarians', Franks, Swabians or exiles

nation-building efforts of Count Montgelas - the Bavarian Metternich - and of Bavarian monarchs ably supported by civil servants, set an integrative process in motion which has been taken up and pursued by the CSU. This search for internal legitimacy is supplemented by a concern to preserve a degree of external sovereignty. But for the twelve years spent under Nazi dictatorship, the modern Bavarian state has always been a member of some form of federation. However, successive governments have continuously defended its autonomy against Prussian, Austro-Hungarian or European encroachment. Both as a kingdom and as a republic, Bavaria has consistently attempted to maximise its independence and promote a sense of Bavarian identity.

Montgelas' 'revolution from above' introduced a unitary legal system and administration with little respect for tradition.⁶³ Loyalty to the Wittelsbach kings was also an important integrating factor within Bavaria. However poorly adapted they seemed at the time, Montgelas' reforms nonetheless laid the foundations of the modern Bavarian state. The king and his civil service would provide a skeleton ready to be fleshed out by a growing national consciousness. Although Bismarck paid lip service to Bavarian autonomy, the decision to play a part in the German *Reich* was by no means a foregone conclusion in Bavaria.⁶⁴ Opposition from the 'Patriotic Party' had scuppered ratification of the union the first time and the final vote was only two votes over the required two-thirds majority.⁶⁵ Although retaining control of areas such as education, culture and policing, Bavaria found itself very much dominated by Prussia. The combination of a weak king uninterested in

from the *Sudetenland*, they lovingly and faithfully preserve the ways of their region, their own lineage or even their own small district. But at the same time they all proudly declare themselves to be Bavarians together". ["Ob das Altbayern, Franken, Schwaben oder Sudetendeutsche sind, das macht keinen Unterschied, sie bewahren mit Liebe und Treue ihre eigene Stammesart, ihren eigenen Stamm oder sogar ihren eigenen kleinen Gau. Aber sie bekennen sich gleichzeitig und stolz miteinander als Bayern ".]

⁶³ King Ludwig I would later reorganise Montgelas' districts to correspond to historical regions and decentralise the administration to allow local communities more autonomy.

⁶⁴ Bavaria was granted certain symbolic rights and allowed to retain control of its post and rail services, beer and spirits tax, matters of domicile and the military (although only in peacetime). M. Treml *Geschichte des Modernen Bayern* Ch. 1.

⁶⁵ However, Wilhelm was proclaimed emperor of the new German *Reich* in the palace of Versailles even before ratification was finally pushed through the Bavarian parliament.

exercising Bavaria's remaining rights (let alone in fighting for greater autonomy), an alternative focus of loyalty in the emperor, growing Germany-wide intercourse through trade and travel, urbanisation brought about by industrialisation, a single legal system and a central parliament, all helped to strengthen German identity within Bavaria.

The last king of Bavaria would be toppled in a bloodless revolution in 1918. Against a background of military defeat, growing shortages, and the successful Bolshevik revolution in Russia, Bavaria was declared a republic in November 1918, a status it retains to this day. The next year was chaotic. A reactionary white terror followed the Communist red terror as the military sought to regain control. This unique period in Bavarian history could only confirm a great many Bavarians in their distrust of and distaste for socialism. The lack of clear government leadership at this time also meant a missed opportunity to influence the content of the Weimar Constitution. By the time the *Bayerische Volkspartei* (BVP) managed to form a governing coalition of non-socialist parties in 1920, it was too late to prevent the loss of most of Bavaria's special rights and much of Germany's federal character.⁶⁶ Throughout the Weimar republic the Bavarian government sought to revise the constitution and achieve a measure of financial federalism at least, but succeeded only in creating more friction with the administration in Berlin. As the only regionally based party in Germany, the BVP had difficulty finding allies in other *Länder* to support its demands for greater policy autonomy and a more powerful *Bundesrat*. Then, as now, Bavaria was often a lonely defender of regional rights in Germany's federal system.⁶⁷

The generally anti-socialist atmosphere of the time was conducive to the development of right-wing groups such as Hitler's National Socialist Democratic and Workers Party.⁶⁸ Although right-

⁶⁶ Contrary to the CSU, the BVP did not manage to expand its support base far beyond southern Bavaria and the Catholic-conservative vote there. However, many BVP members joined the CSU after the war, ensuring personal continuity between the parties and strengthening the new party's conservative wing, grouped around Alois Hundhammer.

⁶⁷ Cf. U. Münch *Freistaat in Bundesstaat*

⁶⁸ The Bavarian government's attitude to Hitler remained ambivalent. Even after his attempted putsch in Munich in 1923, he was not severely punished and even managed to gain a great deal of public sympathy during his trial.

wing parties gained little over six percent of the vote in the Bavarian election of 1928, they benefited from the spiralling inflation and unemployment triggered by the Wall Street Crash of 1929. Public discontent was compounded by unpopular austerity measures and a lack of identification with, and hence legitimacy for, the Weimar republic. With the Nazi take-over in 1933 came the *Gleichschaltung*, or forcing into line, of the German *Länder* and the loss of any remaining Bavarian autonomy until the end of World War II. Following the capitulation of the German Army in southern Germany on 4th May 1945, Bavaria came under the administration of an American military government which declared the existence of a Bavarian state on 19th September of the same year. Unlike many others of the newly configured German *Länder*, Bavaria could look back on centuries of statehood, tradition and historical identity.⁶⁹ This was deemed to be an advantage by politicians keen to re-establish democracy and a semblance of normality in a traumatised country. From the first, the CSU was intent on guaranteeing Bavarian autonomy within a German federal state. This policy, which has been shown to have roots in the Bavarian state tradition, continues to be a cornerstone of the party's ideology.

Today, the 'Free State of Bavaria' has all the trappings of statehood, from a constitution and a constitutional court, through a government and a parliament, to a three-tier system of local government.⁷⁰ Yet it remains firmly embedded within the German

⁶⁹ The charismatic Franz Josef Strauß, chairman of the CSU for over twenty-five years and Bavarian prime minister from 1978 until his death in 1988, often referred condescendingly to other German *Länder* as '*Bindestrich-Staaten*', or hyphenated (and hence artificial) regions. "[Bavaria] is one of the oldest states in Europe there is. Bavaria is not a hyphenated region that was created after the military defeat as an artificial product of the occupying powers". "[Bayern] ist einer der ältesten Staaten Europas überhaupt. Bayern ist nicht ein Bindestrichstaat, der nach der militärischen Niederlage als künstliches Produkt der Besatzungspolitik geschaffen wurde".] Franz Josef Strauß, in a speech to the CSU party conference in Munich on 22nd November 1985.

⁷⁰ The parliament has 204 members. Its senate, the only one of its kind in Germany, was abolished in 2000. Bavaria also has its own hymn and coat of arms. The Bavarian constitution provides for Bavarian referenda, as well as including a provision, unique in Germany, guaranteeing the right of individuals to contest a Bavarian law as unconstitutional. The proposal for Bavaria to have its own president in order to represent Bavarian sovereignty abroad was defeated by a single vote in 1946. F. Höfer *Die politische Ordnung in Bayern* Ch. 4.

federal system, sending six government representatives to the *Bundesrat*, the second chamber of the federal government. Here, each state may only vote as a block, and *Länder* interests usually take precedence over party allegiances.⁷¹ *Bundesrat* approval is required for about half of all federal laws, in particular those concerning *Länder* competencies and constitutional questions. Otherwise, the *Bundesrat* may be overruled by a majority of the directly elected members of the German *Bundestag*. Voters in Bavarian elections each have two ballots; one vote goes to individual candidates, who are elected on a first-past-the-post basis, and the second vote goes to a party list. To this extent, the system is the same as that used in the first Scottish parliament election, and shares its advantage of combining proportionality with personalised mandates.⁷² A five percent hurdle keeps small parties out of the Bavarian parliament. European elections, on the other hand, are based on a closed party list. It is important to point out that, unlike in the UK, German parties receive state funding towards campaign costs, and the CSU is no exception.⁷³ In a parallel to the situation in the UK, however, recent scandals have led to greater transparency regarding the amount and provenance of private donations.

⁷¹ A. Kappler & A. Grevel (eds.) *Facts about Germany* p. 144. However, the fact that the majority party in the *Bundesrat* may be different from that in the *Bundestag* can cause problems for the federal government. During the 1970s, the role of the *Bundesrat* became much more party political, as the CDU/CSU majority there was accused of obstructing the governing SPD's legislative programme. M. Hancock *et al* *Politics in Western Europe* p. 250.

⁷² In Scotland, a fixed number of seventy-three seats are won by directly-elected candidates. The remaining fifty-six constituency members are deducted from list totals. However, there are fewer list members in the Scottish system than in that of Bavaria, making it less proportional overall. *Ibid.* pp. 282-283.

⁷³ All parties who poll over 0.5% of the second-ballot vote at general and European elections and over 1% at regional elections receive a state contribution per voter head to campaign costs. A. Kappler & A. Grevel *Facts about Germany* p. 160.

III Party Systems

The SNP

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the electoral dominance of the Whigs - succeeded by the Liberal Party - would go virtually unchallenged by the Conservatives in Scotland. However, the Scottish Labour party came into its own during the 1920s. After a period of strong competition from the Conservatives, it became the Scottish political establishment by the 1960s, a dominant position it has maintained to this day.⁷⁴ Nationalist support hovered at around one percent and under until the 1960s, when the SNP's fortunes began to improve. Today, Labour is the largest party in the Scottish parliament with fifty-six seats. The SNP has thirty-five seats, whilst the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives have seventeen and eighteen seats respectively.⁷⁵ The remaining three seats are taken up by a Green, a Socialist and an Independent MSP. The Scottish Executive is formed by a coalition between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, and the Labour first minister, Henry McLeish, leads the administration.⁷⁶ The SNP now forms the principal opposition in the Scottish parliament, a status which differs markedly from its relative insignificance at Westminster. A short account of the party's history will trace how it came to find itself in this position, and whether its claim to be 'Scotland's Party' finds a parallel in its electoral fortunes. A survey of developments in the party's strategy will provide an introduction to the detailed examination of its 'Independence in Europe' policy in the following chapter.

The SNP's predecessor, the National Party of Scotland, first contested elections in 1929. Its members were mostly intellectuals and students from across the political spectrum, who shared a belief in independence as a means of achieving a Scottish cultural revival. In

⁷⁴ Cf. S. Kendrick & D. McCrone Politics in a Cold Climate: The Conservative Decline in Scotland.

⁷⁵ Although the Conservatives found themselves in the minority opposing the devolution proposals, they now participate fully in the Scottish parliament.

⁷⁶ Two recently published works on Scottish politics since the creation of the Scottish parliament are P. Lynch Scottish Government and Politics and L. Paterson *et al* New Scotland, New Politics?

1934, the party merged with the Scottish Party to form the Scottish National Party. The creation of the SNP did not mean the end of divisions in the nationalist camp, however. This heterogeneity is underlined by the fact that the National Party of Scotland was itself the result of a merger between a movement advocating complete independence, to be achieved by electoral means, and a pressure group demanding further administrative devolution for Scotland. However, the stand-off between 'radicals' and 'moderates' continued to haunt the SNP. As such, the shared goal of Home Rule was less of a cohesive force and more a source of disputes. The aim of 'self-government for Scotland' was considered too vague to be meaningful and the lack of any electoral success prompted members to look to other forms of political activism or join other parties.⁷⁷

The year 1942 was a defining one for the SNP and its future ideology and strategy. It saw a major split between the 'fundamentalists', who favoured a policy of 'independence and nothing less', and those who preferred inter-party co-operation with the preliminary goal of home rule, or some form of devolution. This marked the SNP's official beginning as a party dedicated to gaining power by electoral means. When John MacCormick, who had dominated the SNP since its creation, left to set up a high-profile, but ultimately unsuccessful cross-party Convention for Home Rule, those nationalists remaining were free to develop a clear and lasting ideology. The party henceforth defined the nationalist principle of self-determination as independence, or full national sovereignty. Shifts in SNP strategy have since been subordinate to and directed towards the core commitment to independence, which has remained fixed since 1942.⁷⁸ Ideological purity did not lead to much electoral success, however, and the rump of around two hundred SNP hard-liners lived in the political wilderness throughout the 1950s. The SNP was an inexperienced party without a coherent electoral strategy in an era when nationalism had been thoroughly discredited by war. Unsurprisingly, the pressing issue of reconstruction eclipsed its own.

⁷⁷ For an account of the Scottish national movement before the Second World War, see R. Finlay *Independent and Free*.

⁷⁸ The fundamental principles printed on today's membership card are the same as those of the 1949 SNP Constitution.

In 1967, popular dissatisfaction with the *status quo*, successfully channelled by the SNP into demands for constitutional change, led to Winnie Ewing winning the Hamilton bye-election. The shock-waves of the SNP victory made the dominant parties wish they could bury the issue of self-government once again. They could not ignore the television and media coverage given to the victorious candidate, however, which helped to bridge what the SNP's erstwhile leader Robert McIntyre called the party's 'credibility gap'.⁷⁹ Labour and the Conservatives felt compelled to devise their own alternative policies on the constitutional question in order to undermine the sudden attractiveness of the SNP. The Conservative leader Edward Heath even promised Scottish home rule in 'the Declaration of Perth' of 1968, but did not honour his pledge when he came to office. By then, the SNP's electoral success had waned, and its opponents no longer considered the party such a threat.

The SNP's local election wins had been a baptism of fire, forcing it to supplement its core ideological principles with a whole range of peripheral policies. The party was aware that it had to present an attractive political alternative in order to overcome existing class and religious loyalties.⁸⁰ In late 1974, after a general election campaign which concentrated on making Scottish identity politically relevant, eleven SNP candidates were elected to Westminster.⁸¹ The SNP was to be an important player at the United Kingdom level during the next five years, since the minority Labour government was dependent on small

⁷⁹ W. Ewing Scotland v. Whitehall; Winifred Ewing's Black Book p. 3.

⁸⁰ Until the 1960s, a traditional link between the Protestant working class and the Conservatives and between Labour and Roman Catholics persisted in Scotland. A religious cleavage can no longer be discerned in the Scottish party system, although the SNP's support for the revocation of the Act of Settlement and some SNP campaigning in 1999 can be seen as directed at the Catholic vote. For instance, Salmond addressed the Catholic Teachers Association Conference a week before the Scottish election. Cf. J. Bradley Ethnic and Religious identity in Modern Scotland.

⁸¹ "'Scotland' was an ideological category in terms of which socio-political change could readily be interpreted [...] Crucially, the SNP was a political party which could more easily capture the Scottish label, because it was a taken-for-granted reference very like the 'national' identity implicitly assumed by the Conservative party in England." A. Brown *et al* Scottish Society and Politics p. 45. In an interview with the author, Gordon Wilson, a former leader of the SNP, commented; "The great change in the last forty years is the way Scottish identity has emerged as a primary source of appeal and loyalty".

parties to have legislation passed. Although independence is the one core principle uniting both groups under the same party banner, the internal tension between gradualists and fundamentalists endures. As a result, the party was unsure how to respond to the devolution issue. A further complication was (and is) the fact that, according to opinion polls, SNP voters do not necessarily support the independence policy.⁸²

During the 1970s, the swings in the SNP's policy on devolution from party conference to party conference had a negative impact on the electorate, suggesting indecision and lack of clarity. The party's initial pro-devolution stance did not achieve the desired effect of reassuring voters as to the risks of the radical independence option, and also carried the danger of disaffecting the fundamentalist party faithful.⁸³ In order to counter this threat, party policy had moved towards 'Independence-nothing less' by 1977. The importance of retaining member loyalty had been recognised, but at the expense of a contradictory policy which supported the Labour government until a vote of no confidence following the failed devolution referendum in 1979, but rejected Labour's Scotland bill on devolution as not going far enough. Tellingly, each SNP branch was left to decide whether to join the cross-party campaign for a 'yes' vote in the 1979 devolution referendum. Within the party, the unprecedented cohabitation of the SNP leadership with a large parliamentary group led to much bickering. For the first time, signs of complacency led to a lack of strategy for extending SNP support, whilst other parties were infused with a new dynamism to woo voters back. The party retained only two of its eleven seats in 1979, a serious blow from which the party was only to recover in the 1990s, after a decade of introspection and even more disappointing election results.⁸⁴

⁸² M. Keating Nations against the State p. 227.

⁸³ Cf. R. Levy The Search for a Rational Strategy: The Scottish National Party and Devolution 1974-79.

⁸⁴ In 1979 the SNP won 17.3% of the Scottish vote. This fell to 11.7% in the general election of 1983, rising to 14.1% in 1987. Jim Sillars' win of the Govan seat for the SNP in a 1988 bye-election marked a turning point in party fortunes. In the 1992 general election, the SNP won 21.5% of the vote, although this only corresponded to three seats at Westminster. S. Newman Ethnoregional Conflict in Democracies pp. 40-41.

A decisive swing towards the gradualists took place with the election of Alex Salmond to the chairmanship of the party in 1990. Salmond was once a member of the ‘‘79 group’, which believed that the SNP should acknowledge its socialist tendencies in order to offer the working class a viable alternative to Labour. Ostracised by the ‘born-again fundamentalism’ of the party in 1979, this approach would return to shape party strategy from the late 1980s onwards.⁸⁵ The party’s characteristic pragmatism dictated that a compromise solution was required with regard to the devolution option. Salmond is quoted as saying in 1992; ‘‘I can well foresee circumstances in which the SNP would vote for something less than Scottish independence’’.⁸⁶ In marked contrast to the indecision of the 1970s, Salmond led the party in a wholehearted endorsement of the 1997 devolution proposals, and often appeared on a podium with the Liberal and Labour leaders to support a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum.

The establishment of the Scottish parliament has heralded a period of change within the SNP. The party as an organisation has expanded and moved to larger, more modern headquarters. Alex Salmond stepped down as leader, to be replaced by John Swinney in September 2000, and the party’s thirty-five MSPs have been gathering experience as the principal party in the Scottish opposition. Despite the loss of one Westminster seat to the Conservatives in the 2001 general election, the SNP has ambitions to become Scotland’s largest party in the Scottish elections of 2003.⁸⁷ Even if pragmatism and flexibility is characteristic of its strategic thinking, keeping its ideological core intact has always been crucial to the very existence of the SNP. Only the unambiguous and oft-repeated long-term commitment to full independence can unite the gradualists and fundamentalists. These divisions have not been laid to rest with the advent of the Scottish parliament, as the party strives to balance its strong role in the devolved parliament with calls for full independence.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ In 1982, Gordon Wilson admitted that ‘‘civil war has been raging since 1979’’. Cited in R. Levy *Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads* p. 105.

⁸⁶ A. Marr *The Battle for Scotland* p. 221.

⁸⁷ Unlike Westminster elections, the date of which is chosen by the governing party, Scottish parliament elections will take place every four years.

⁸⁸ That SNP support for devolution contains an inherent ambiguity was evident in the criticism of its Scottish election campaign which came from both within and without

The CSU

The *Christlich-Soziale Union*, one of the first political parties to be authorised under the American occupation in January 1946, immediately set about promoting a sense of internal Bavarian unity and solidarity. In a prelude to a discussion of the CSU's interpretation of *Heimat* in chapter six, the following section will examine the aspects of Bavarian political culture appealed to by the party. As its name suggests, the CSU's founding members had envisaged a party which would bridge the religious divide between the predominantly Catholic south and the Lutheran Protestant north of Bavaria, thus overcoming the political fragmentation which had dogged the Weimar Republic. This religious *rapprochement* simultaneously addressed the question of strong regional identities within Bavaria; principally Franconian, Swabian and *Altbayerisch*, or 'old Bavarian'.⁸⁹ The CSU did not take part in the amalgamation of *Land*-based Christian Democratic parties into a federation in 1949. This was partly due to many of its members' strong belief in federalism and their reluctance for the party to be seen as a sub-group of the CDU. To this day, the CSU stands only in Bavaria and continues to present the preservation and propagation of its Bavarian identity as a central component of its ideology. Attempts to form a German-wide party or another sister party in the East-German *Länder* have been laid to rest, as any expansion would lead to a dilution of the CSU's Bavarian identity.

The CSU dominates institutional discourse by virtue of its absolute majority in the Bavarian parliament and being constantly in government. Privileged access to the media, control of state bureaucracy and the ability to set the agenda in Bavarian politics are some of the advantages this affords. Revealingly, the party's short

the party; "Salmond was immediately defensive when asked why the party had chosen to put its pledge to hold a referendum on independence at the bottom of the [manifesto pledge] card". *Scotland on Sunday*, 11th April 1999. Gordon Wilson observed; "There were some strategic errors in the last campaign that are now I think recognised.; the fact that we were going to argue purely on devolution and on the existing powers [...]".

⁸⁹ For an appraisal of the effect of religious and regional affiliation on the voting preferences of Bavarians today, see P. James *The Politics of Bavaria* Ch. 8. The chapter draws on a study of the 1990 Bavarian election conducted by *Forschungsgruppe Wahlen* for the *Hanns-Seidel Stiftung*.

period in opposition - from 1954 to 1957 - forced it to rethink a hitherto too heavy reliance on governmental structures. Despite remaining the largest party in parliament, four of its opponents formed a coalition to keep the CSU from power. The 1950s correspond to the only time in the party's history in which it suffered a major drop in support. This was brought on by the electoral success of the *Bayernpartei*, which fought for the same conservative vote as the CSU using more far more isolationist rhetoric.⁹⁰ As a result of its brief spell in opposition, the CSU reorganised completely (according to existing Bavarian administrative regions, which has both a pragmatic and symbolic logic) and is now established in over ninety percent of Bavarian municipalities. The party's subsequent consolidation of its electoral success has been attributed to this all-pervading presence.⁹¹ The SPD in Bavaria seems unable to compete with the CSU on this front, being represented in only about sixty percent of Bavarian municipalities. Over and above the tangible benefits of representation and influence at every level of Bavarian society, the CSU attempts to achieve *conceptual* hegemony in Bavaria by striving to have its ideology equated with 'common sense.' This task is made considerably easier by the Bavarian government's past success at making Bavaria a generally attractive place to live, work and invest.

The fact that predominantly agrarian Bavaria only began to industrialise after the Second World War meant that it could avoid much of the social dislocation suffered in Scotland. Successive Bavarian governments have actively promoted and funded a programme of modernisation. Indeed, the integration of over 1.6 million ethnic German refugees, principally those exiled from the Czech *Sudetenland* in 1945, was facilitated both by land reform and by their contribution to structural change in the Bavarian economy as

⁹⁰ M. Treml *Geschichte des Modernen Bayern* Ch. 3.

⁹¹ Cf. Alf Mintzel *Die CSU - Hegemonie in Bayern. Strategie und Erfolg*. The CSU also exploits this fact in its rhetoric; "The founding of the CSU was a movement supported by many groups from all parts of Bavaria. This corresponded to the diversity of our *Land* and contributed to the fact that the CSU was soon firmly rooted in all parts of Bavaria". ["Die Gründung der CSU war eine Bewegung, die von vielen Gruppierungen aus allen Teilen Bayerns getragen wurde. Das entsprach der Vielfalt unseres Landes und trug mit dazu bei, daß die CSU bald in allen Landesteilen fest verwurzelt war".] From a speech by Edmund Stoiber celebrating fifty years of the CSU in Regensburg on 11th October 1995.

workers and consumers. The fact that the *Land* was poor in raw materials, transport links and capital led to very high energy costs.⁹² One response to this was the construction of several nuclear reactors from the 1950s onwards. This represented one of the first investments in the high-technology industries for which Bavaria would become renowned.⁹³ The *Land* participated fully in Germany's post-war 'economic miracle'; Bavarian industry was circa seventy-four percent more productive in 1954 than before the war.⁹⁴ The resumption of trade to Eastern Europe in the 1990s was a welcome boost to the Bavarian economy, with many German companies locating in Bavaria in order to take advantage of its border with the Czech republic. From being a somewhat peripheral player in Western European trade, Bavaria now finds itself near to the geographical centre of Europe once more, with all the new business opportunities this affords.⁹⁵

Bavaria's post-war development from a backward agricultural economy to one of the richest *Länder* in Germany is inextricably linked to CSU policy and is extremely important to the party's image. Indeed, Bavaria is the only *Land* to have become a contributor to the system of financial redistribution between the German *Länder* after having been a recipient.⁹⁶ In addition, without the need for coalition partners, the CSU is free to implement its ideological action plan for the future. This is embodied in the 'big ideas' that the government has developed and promoted, particularly since the fall of the Iron Curtain. One of these is prime minister Edmund Stoiber's 'High-Tech Offensive', which plans to make Bavaria a centre for biological

⁹² In an interesting spin, the rhetoric of both Franz Josef Strauß and Edmund Stoiber has foregrounded the importance of Bavaria's 'Rohstoff Geist', or intellectual raw material.

⁹³ However, the Bavarian government has also invested in agriculture and the zones of traditional heavy industry, such as Nuremberg. This, in turn, is linked to a regional policy within Bavaria, designed to develop areas outside the high-tech capital, Munich.

⁹⁴ M. Tremml *Geschichte des Modernen Bayern* p. 427.

⁹⁵ Bavaria is now a centre of car manufacture, aeronautical and genetical engineering, electro-technology and optics. More than one in two employees works in the service sector, compared to under seven percent in agriculture. In addition, Bavaria's beautiful alpine scenery, its ski resorts and rich cultural heritage have led to the development of a large tourist industry.

⁹⁶ For a statistical table showing the development of Bavaria's receipts and contributions, see M. Tremml *Geschichte des Modernen Bayern* p. 493.

technology.⁹⁷ Finally, the importance of personal image in Bavarian politics cannot be over-emphasised. Indeed, analysts identify the dearth of charismatic SPD leaders in Bavaria as one of the reasons for its lack of success there.⁹⁸ Franz Josef Strauß, on the other hand, was a larger-than-life figure who moulded the CSU to his own image in over twenty years as party chairman and ten as Bavarian prime minister. Often regarded as dangerous and reactionary outside Bavaria, he was loved and respected within his native *Land*.⁹⁹

Following in Franz Josef Strauß's footsteps, Edmund Stoiber has carved out a niche in Bavarian politics independently of his party. A series of surveys published in the German daily, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, in the run-up to the 1998 Bavarian election, showed his popularity to be higher than that of his party as a whole.¹⁰⁰ The party has had its share of scandal, however, notably with the so-called 'Amigo' scandal which led to the resignation of then prime minister Max Streibl in 1993. Stoiber himself was implicated in the 'LWS' scandal in late 1999, but both he and his party seem to have emerged unscathed.¹⁰¹ In German politics, the CSU has managed to avoid the pitfalls of close association with the CDU, successfully dissociating itself from the anonymous donations scandal which rocked its coalition partner in early 2000. At the federal level, the CSU cultivates its image both as a united party firmly rooted in Bavaria and as a *Volkspartei*, in other words a mass party appealing to all sections of the electorate. Not afraid to criticise CDU policies or emphasise Bavarian autonomy, the

⁹⁷ Gambling on the development of certain industries in this way is not without risks, something admitted by Stoiber himself (Cf. his inaugural speech to parliament in 1998.) Alf Mintzel opines that the launch of this project contributed to the party's win in the 1998 Bavarian election, and that it will do a lot to perpetuate a sense of Bavarian identity in the longer term. A. Mintzel *CSU*.

⁹⁸ A. Mintzel *Die CSU-Hegemonie in Bayern* Ch. 5.

⁹⁹ The influential news magazine, *der Spiegel*, famously conducted a campaign against Franz Josef Strauß during the late 1960s. He was generally vilified in the German media and by the opposition, most vehemently during his unsuccessful bid to become German chancellor in 1980.

¹⁰⁰ For instance, survey results put CSU support at 46% and support for Stoiber at 61%, making him by far the most popular Bavarian politician. *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 25th May 1998.

¹⁰¹ The first scandal involved accusations of corruption at the highest level, whereas the second concerned the use of taxpayers' money for dubious building projects. However, in the European elections of 1994 and 1999, which were the next electoral polls after the Amigo and LWS scandals respectively, the party's share of the vote increased compared to the previous election.

CSU's predilection for a clear, uncompromising stance on everything from immigration to European policy has helped it to position itself to the right of its partner on the German political spectrum.¹⁰²

The CSU's official role as 'sister party' (*Schwesterpartei*) to the CDU remains a central component in its self-understanding. The relationship was described by Franz Josef Strauß as a loyal but critical partnership.¹⁰³ Co-operation between the parties is based on the understanding that neither will stand against the other, although the CSU has in the past considered breaking its links with the CDU in order to stand across Germany. This step was officially taken in 1976 under the tutelage of Franz Josef Strauß, only to be reversed after fierce opposition from sections of the party.¹⁰⁴ An important consideration motivating opposition was the fear of diluting the party's Bavarian identity and thereby undermining a central element in its appeal. Both at the federal and *Land* levels, CSU rhetoric uses concepts such as 'republic' and 'sovereignty' to canvass support for continued Bavarian autonomy in areas such as education, health, policing and industry. The CSU enjoys a great deal of influence at the federal level, both in government and in opposition.¹⁰⁵ In periods of opposition, for instance, the party's enviable results in Bavaria give it a

¹⁰² The CSU is also opposed to abortion, although its competence to legislate in this area has been struck down by the German constitutional court. "That means that there will continue to be clinics specifically for abortions in Bavaria. Now, as then, we believe this to be wrong." ["Das heißt, daß es auch in Bayern weiterhin reine Abtreibungskliniken geben wird. Das halten wir nach wie vor für falsch."] Edmund Stoiber, in a speech to the Bavarian parliament on 29th October 1998. The party also fought for crucifixes to continue hanging in Bavarian schools, a theme which in turn was linked to Bavarian identity and immigration issues by the CSU. A. Mintzel CSU point 6

¹⁰³ "Both in opposition and when participating in government the CSU has always worked together with the CDU critically but loyally". ["In Zeiten der Opposition wie in Zeiten der Regierungsbeteiligung hat die CSU immer in kritischer Loyalität mit der CDU zusammengearbeitet".] Franz Josef Strauß, in a speech to the CSU party conference in Munich on 22nd November 1985.

¹⁰⁴ The *Kreuther Beschluß*, as it was known, was commented on by Theo Waigel as follows; "That would have led to terrible conflict between the CDU and the CSU [...] The gains from the split would have been smaller than the losses caused by competition". ["Das hätte dazu geführt, daß CSU und CDU sich furchtbar bekämpft hätten [...] Der Trennungsgewinn wäre kleiner gewesen als der Konkurrenzverlust".]

¹⁰⁵ The CSU did expand in 1990, when German reunification changed the CDU-CSU relationship by reducing the CSU's percentage of the overall German vote, thus making the CDU the far stronger partner in the German parliament. However, the DSU, created by the CSU to fight elections in the new *Länder* and help redress the balance, was not a success.

strong support base from which to influence CDU and federal politics generally. Despite the overall defeat of the CDU/CSU coalition government in the federal election of 1998, the CSU still garnered 47.1% of the Bavarian vote at this election and was further boosted by a 52.1% win in the Bavarian election two weeks previously. Given Bavaria's large population and the scale of its support there, the CSU regularly emerges as the third largest party in Germany as a whole. Further, it forms a separate parliamentary group in Berlin, which allows it to maintain its policy independence and distance itself from CDU positions if strategy demands.

The main opposition party in Bavaria is the SPD, whose level of support hovers at around thirty percent of the vote. As already mentioned, it has failed to field charismatic candidates on a par with CSU politicians, and suffers from its image of being over-centralised at the German level. It remains strong in the large cities of Munich and Nuremberg, and is generally somewhat better represented in northern Bavaria. However, one of the CSU's success stories has been its largely successful attempt to woo the predominantly Protestant, federally-minded region of Franconia in the decades following the second World War. Support for green parties in Bavaria is somewhat lower than in the rest of Germany, and is currently running at just over five percent.¹⁰⁶ The German liberals, the FDP, so long crucial to government coalition-building at the federal level, are relatively insignificant in Bavaria, and the party has recently polled under the five percent hurdle governing parliamentary eligibility. The remnants of the *Bayernpartei*, a serious challenger to CSU power in the 1950s, typically attract about one percent the vote with its policy of Bavarian independence. Bavaria also has a home-grown far-right party, the *Republikaner*, formed when its volatile founder split from the CSU in the 1980s. Together with other far-right groups such as the NPD and DVU, the *Republikaner* contest elections across Germany, but typically fail to clear the five percent hurdle. However, a freak vote at the 1989 European election put their support in Bavaria at almost fifteen percent. As will be discussed in the following chapter, the CSU

¹⁰⁶ In the Bavarian elections of 1986, 1990, 1994 and 1998, the Greens won 7,5%, 6,4 %, 6,1% and 5,7% of the vote respectively.

went on to recover and better its level of support at the next two European elections, making the *Republikaner*'s success short-lived.

Conclusion

This chapter has considered more closely how the ideologies of the SNP and the CSU fit into their political environments. One of the most important characteristics of contemporary nationalists is their flexibility and adaptability to social and political change, and an understanding of the context in which they evolve is therefore vital. An analysis of the neo-nationalist rhetoric of each party complements the findings of academic research regarding party organisation, strategy and election campaigning. The Scottish devolution debate and Bavaria's history of federalism have contributed to shaping the parties' interpretation of self-determination. By highlighting the events influencing the development of each party's commitment to national autonomy, the preceding discussion has prepared the ground for a detailed examination of their ideologies. Although Scotland and Bavaria are only semi-states, they nevertheless provide the boundaries of a national discourse. This is perpetuated not only by the SNP and the CSU, but by all parties who address the Scottish and Bavarian electorates as distinct entities.¹⁰⁷ However, only nationalist parties make the nation into the nodal concept on which all other principles of their ideology are based. The SNP and CSU's construction of the nation and their role within it will provide the focus of discussion in the empirical studies to follow. This will be supplemented by an examination of their European policy, in order to investigate how each party goes about reconciling core and peripheral ideological principles. Nationalist ideology's central task is to politicise national identity in order to achieve a degree of political emancipation from a larger polity, erroneously termed a 'nation-state'. The rhetoric used by the SNP to pursue this goal will be the subject of the next chapter.

¹⁰⁷ "[T]he existence of competing nationalist paradigms is the rule, rather than the exception [...] groups of all sorts are likely to compete for the control of the nationalist space". J. Llobera *The God of Modernity* p. 199.

5 SNP Ideology

“The crucial question relating to national identity is how the national ‘we’ is constructed and what is meant by such construction.”¹

The ultimate aim of the Scottish National Party is ‘Independence in Europe’, a vision which juxtaposes the core nationalist goal of self-determination with a pro-European stance. But how does the SNP reconcile its interpretation of self-determination with a peripheral policy which has the potential to limit national autonomy? In other words, how can a quest for national sovereignty be compatible with the European integration process? As a first step towards understanding how the party goes about solving this potential tension in its position, the present chapter will focus on the SNP’s construction of the national “nodal point”. Analyses of texts will be used to show how the pursuit of an ideological goal is tackled in neo-nationalist rhetoric. In order to place these texts in context, a short overview of the SNP’s 1999 Scottish and European election campaigns will precede each transcript and its treatment. Similarly to the aspects of Scottish political culture discussed in chapter four, this will provide insights into the organisation and strategy underlying the rhetorical ‘cues’ used by the party in its attempts to mobilise support for independence. The first section of the chapter analyses a party political broadcast devised for the 1999 Scottish election campaign. It traces the rhetorical articulation of themes dominating SNP discourse; namely the Scottish nation and the SNP’s construction of its own role as the only truly Scottish party. In the second section, a text taken from the SNP’s European election campaign literature is used to highlight the relationship of European policy to the party’s core principles. That the SNP should also emphasise its commitment to prioritising the nation in its rhetoric on Europe illustrates the secondary importance of the EU in party ideology.

In order to render conclusions more robust, the methods of text analysis and a survey of primary sources are combined throughout the chapter, and are supplemented with interview evidence. The final section of the chapter elaborates on the conclusions drawn from the

¹ Michael Billig Banal Nationalism p.70.

texts in a discussion of the party's 'Independence in Europe' policy. Both the genesis of the slogan and the strategic thinking behind it are revealing of the relative importance of its component parts to SNP ideology. The section contributes to our understanding of how the SNP reconciles its core nationalist ideology with support for further European integration. It should become clear that the party attempts to embody a certain image of Scottishness by creating a rhetorical equivalence between itself as a Scottish party, the Scottish people and the Scottish nation. Although the European element is important to party strategy, it is principally used to undergird the party's Scottish focus and further its core ideological goal.

I SNP Rhetoric and Nationalist Ideology

The SNP's Scottish Election Campaign, 1999

The first Scottish parliament election, in which the SNP won thirty-five seats, took place on the 6th of May 1999. Campaigning difficulties undoubtedly contributed to an election result which, though putting the SNP at the forefront of parliamentary politics for the first time, did not live up to the expectations of a party which had been leading Labour in Scottish opinion polls during the summer of 1998.² Until the organisational changes set in motion by the election, the SNP was not particularly professional and organised in its approach to campaigning. In marked contrast to the one hundred or more additional staff now working for the party at the Scottish parliament, SNP headquarters continues to function with a nucleus of nine permanent employees.³ Although aided by six to ten extra staff, the group was not very efficient in its organisation of the Scottish election campaign.⁴

² Brian Taylor cites an internal source as saying that Salmond's Kosovo statement could have lost the party three or four seats. In it, Salmond called the NATO bombing of Serbia an 'unpardonable folly'. *The Scottish Parliament* p. 173. Mike Russell commented that, though the party had expected to do a little better, it had not expected to win and had concentrated instead on cementing the credibility of the party.

³ It is difficult to give an accurate estimate of numbers at the parliament, given that some are on short-term contracts and others are part-time personal assistants to MSPs.

⁴ For a candid appraisal of the 1999 SNP election campaign by its general manager, see M. Russell *Nothing more difficult; a contribution to the debate on independence*.

This was recognised by John Swinney, long one of the main party strategists and now leader of the SNP, when he insisted on the need to ‘professionalise’ the party in the run-up to the general election of 2001.⁵ During the 1999 campaigns, the party’s approach was somewhat *ad hoc*. For instance, focus groups were conducted by party members with expertise rather than by an outside body. As a result, and in contrast to the Labour party’s use of professional pollsters, the reporting of results was often informal or even anecdotal and never written up.⁶ The production of campaign literature and of party political broadcasts also took place in-house, the main reason for this being a financial one. Despite the 1999 Scottish election campaign being the most expensive in the party’s history, it could not match the expenditure of the Labour party. This was identified as a major source of problems in the campaign.⁷

As regards organisation and human and financial resources, the SNP’s election campaigning was far outdone by that of New Labour, which could mobilise experienced, professional staff from other parts of the UK.⁸ The SNP relied on only a small core of campaigners at head office to co-ordinate the Scottish election effort. Committed activists provided their services for free and a lot was expected of them. For instance, local volunteers carried out the distribution of the short-lived party paper, ‘Scotland’s Voice’.⁹ Mike Russell, the SNP campaign manager, identified the major problem not as a lack of staff but as lack of efficient task allocation and organisation in general. Communication between headquarters and local branches was found to be wanting. One instance was that activists were not briefed on how to

⁵ In a speech made to an extraordinary SNP conference in Perth in May 2000, Swinney introduced the party’s ‘new look’ and its action plan for the 2001 general election. On the party’s previous attempts to use more professional campaigning methods, see P. Lynch Professionalisation, New Technology and Change in a Small Party: The Case of the Scottish National Party.

⁶ Source; Peter Murrell.

⁷ Commenting on the Scottish parliament election, Kevin Pringle said; “I think the basic problem was a resource issue in the fact that we were out-resourced, particularly by the Labour party”. Cf. M. Russell Nothing more difficult; a contribution to the debate on independence p. 16.

⁸ Labour also did not hesitate to make use of civil servants from the Scottish Office, a practice roundly condemned by Murray Ritchie. Scotland Reclaimed p. 83.

⁹ This title is itself an example of the rhetorical technique which will be described and illustrated in the text analysis below.

deal with Alex Salmond's infamous statement on NATO intervention in Kosovo. Consequently, doorstep canvassing declined dramatically, as activists were unsure how to respond to voters' questions and criticisms.¹⁰ The SNP has no party paper, if one discounts the four page 'Scotland's Voice' published in the week before the Scottish election. The perceived hostility to the SNP of papers such as the 'Daily Record' and 'The Scotsman' was judged to be serious enough by the party for it to launch its own SNP-friendly alternative.¹¹ However, Labour considered 'The Herald', another Scottish daily broadsheet, to be particularly pro-Nationalist during the campaign, and denied it any revenue from Labour advertisements as a result. The 'Scots Independent' monthly newspaper, although openly supporting the SNP and independence, is not an officially affiliated party organ.

The fact that the war in Kosovo was raging in the spring of 1999 stole a lot of press attention from the issues being debated during the campaign, such as tuition fees, the parliament's tax powers, and private financing of school and hospital buildings. A speech made by the SNP's most famous supporter, the actor Sean Connery, was upstaged for newsworthiness by the murder of a popular television presenter on the same day. Further, it was felt among the press that the SNP leader Alex Salmond was not his usual, energetic self. Rumours of internal differences amongst the leadership were also the subject of intense media scrutiny. Used to being a relatively minor player in general elections, the SNP had never before experienced so much attention from press and opposition alike. They were taken aback by the Labour party's unremitting negative campaigning - known colloquially as 'Nat-bashing' - which was designed to 'engender fear' of the SNP in the electorate.¹² For instance, Labour was keen to portray independence as equivalent to divorce from the rest of the UK, with all the negative connotations this image entails.¹³ In general, the SNP's

¹⁰ Source; Peter Murrell

¹¹ Scottish press coverage of the election campaign is analysed in M. Ritchie Scotland reclaimed.

¹² The formulation of the strategic aim to 'engender fear' comes from a leaked Labour document, written by one of its chief strategists, Douglas Alexander. Published in The Observer newspaper in early 1999, it was seized upon by the SNP as indicative of negative Labour tactics.

¹³ Cf. P. Jones The 1999 Scottish Parliament Election: From Anti-Tory to Anti-Nationalist Politics.

performance at press conferences was less than polished, and its delay in publishing budget proposals was an easy target for Labour. Finally, the SNP seemed ill at ease arguing for devolution instead of its core goal of independence, fostering the impression in some prominent members that the party was not articulating its message clearly enough.¹⁴ In order to assess this claim, an examination of party ideology will be undertaken. This can best be tackled by looking to primary sources for typical examples of the rhetoric used by the SNP. What follows is a transcript of an SNP party political broadcast used during the Scottish election campaign.

“An ideology of the first person plural”¹⁵

1 If life is our most precious resource then we must take the
greatest care and have the deepest love for its nurture. Life
thrives where there is protection, it grows where there is
nourishment. These young lives should be allowed to express
5 themselves freely, to develop and grow with dignity, able to
fulfil the hope and the promise that is in each one of our
children. Their future is created by us.
So how do we create a legacy for ourselves and for our children
10 that we're proud of?
We took the first step by overwhelmingly voting for our own
parliament in Edinburgh. That is why this election is a defining
moment in our history, because for the first time in three
hundred years we are taking control of our lives. You know - if
15 we want something enough we can all make it happen. If the
focus for the dreams of people is for a better world, then let's
shape that world in our image, not in someone else's.
You know - our future is ours, it's there for the taking, it's there
for creating. We can be who we're meant to be in this world.

¹⁴ Gordon Wilson, former leader of the party and a self-confessed fundamentalist, compared the SNP strategy unfavourably to that of Labour; “They used divorce, repeated it, kept it simple, and had a very substantial impact whereas we were caught on the flanks because nobody was propounding the opposite case for independence”.

¹⁵ “If nationalism is an ideology of the first person plural, which tells ‘us’ who ‘we’ are, then it is also an ideology of the third person. There can be no ‘us’ without a ‘them’. M. Billig Banal Nationalism p.78.

20 We can make our choice. We can take our place in the list of
nations who have taken us forward in our evolution. We
deserve to make decisions, rightly or wrongly, for ourselves.
For too long other people have decided the course of our lives.
We can create for ourselves a new model of democracy in
25 Scotland, more open, less confrontational. We can create a
vibrant future for ourselves, we can be dynamic, in a
government that is ours. For we are shaping a new image of
ourselves, we are growing as a nation and we have so much to
offer.

30 So let's bring an honesty and freshness to political life, not
have a parliament that is controlled by any party that is in turn
controlled by Westminster. Let's not leave the real power in
Westminster, we must bring our democracy home. That is why
we voted for the existence of this parliament, so that we in
35 Scotland can actually have a say on vital issues that affect our
lives.

We can choose to refuse a penny cut in income tax because,
while hundreds of thousands of people in Scotland live below
the poverty line, we cannot afford to take it. We don't want that
40 penny, we want a Scots penny, where we give it back to
ourselves, to each other.

That penny means life to all of us, in health and education and
housing and social services. We choose to care. We choose to
shape our country's future with our hearts as well as our heads,
45 for we accept that compassion is a vital part of life. "What goes
around comes around" is as true of nations as it is of people.
We can choose to rid our country of the nuclear missiles that sit
on our waters and our soil. Why do we need the capability to
wipe out the entire planet?

50 It's ridiculous.

Scrap them and release billions of pounds into building a
society based on hope and love, not fear and greed and violence
and poverty. But instead, choose to build our country, make her
stronger, creating social justice for all of us. Building a quality
55 of life each of us can share, where we can be rightly confident
of our future.

Scotland is still the seventh richest country in the world.

So please don't sit on the fence in the creation of a new Scotland.

60 Be decisive, make your choice, it's a moment of self determination, think about it, and follow your heart, for with a little bit of love and a penny we can create a new Scotland for ourselves and our children.

Vote SNP.

The text above is a transcript of the voiceover - delivered by a male speaker with a pronounced Scottish accent - accompanying the SNP's party political broadcast of 20th April 1999.¹⁶ A first reading reveals that it uses highly emotive language throughout, thus belying claims that SNP appeals are predominantly economic and rational.¹⁷ The subject of the film heightens the sentimentality of the text. A succession of clips of schoolchildren playing, painting and dancing is shown. The film is shot in black and white and the overall effect is aesthetically attractive and sophisticated, in contrast to the rough, jarring images used by the Labour party for a campaign broadcast on the theme of divorce.¹⁸ Although the children are endearing, the fact that their voices are not heard makes them come across as symbols rather than as individuals. The effect is underlined by the voiceover, which invites the viewer to see them as "life [...] our most precious resource" (line 1) in need of nurture, love, care and protection (lines 2-3). An expression of concern for the children's future creates the rhetorical link between the moralising introduction and the party political message permeating the rest of the broadcast.

Although the import of the introduction is very general, it is directed at a specific audience, which is first addressed using the word "our" in line 1. In keeping with the optimistic, forward-looking tone of

¹⁶The text, together with some images from the broadcast, can be found at the following web address; <http://www.snp.org.uk/PPB/pb990421/>.

¹⁷ John Swinney commented; "There is absolutely no evidence of us being shy in using the emotional dimension to our message". This contradicts Jack Brand's, admittedly dated, analysis *The National Movement in Scotland* p. 23.

¹⁸ Broadcast on April 12th, 1999. Cf. M. Ritchie *Scotland Reclaimed*, p. 94.

the text, the children can be seen as personifications of the “vibrant future” (line 26), “the dreams of people [...] for a better world” (line 16) and the “honesty and freshness” (line 30) evoked during the broadcast. In turn, presenting these as characteristics of a future Scotland and the children as “our children” (line 7) specifies the national context. I use the word “future” advisedly, as “independence” is never used in the text. This has much to do with the thrust of the SNP Scottish election campaign, which played down the independence message in order to concentrate on specific policies and the party’s commitment to making the parliament work. As will become clear from the instances in which the first person plural is used, the pronouns *we*, *us* and *our* are intended to designate the Scottish electorate and by extension, the Scottish nation. This is formulated explicitly in line 11; “we took the first step by overwhelmingly voting for our own parliament in Edinburgh.” However, by not specifying who ‘we’ refers to in line 1, the party assumes that the national context is clear. It plays on the fact that this is a broadcast pertaining to a Scottish election by a party standing solely in Scotland, using rhetoric to create the impression of a ‘natural’ correspondence between people, party and nation.

By linking an ideal vision of Scotland to innocent, fragile children, the narrator seeks to forge an emotional bond with his audience in order to carry it with him through the piece of political rhetoric that follows. The future of a child one has watched at play is easier to identify with and feel responsible for than the future of an abstract nation, after all. Consequently, the moral responsibility to ensure the freedom, development and dignity (line 5) of one’s offspring is linked to a collective political project. In turn, the national arena in which it is to be implemented is used as a rhetorical hinge between these two ideas (lines 8-11). Setting the scene in this way effectively prepares the audience to transpose the concepts of love, care and nurture (line 2) from the realm of the family to the political arena.¹⁹ In turn, a parallel with the nation as an alternative – political –

¹⁹ Later on in the text, this transposition is made explicit in the evocation of the Scots’ allegedly compassionate and collectivist nature; “‘What goes around comes around’ is as true of nations as it is of people.” (lines 45-46). Cf. also; “This party is Scotland’s family, Scotland’s last community and Scotland’s best hope”. From a speech by Winnie Ewing to SNP conference on 25th September 1998.

family is being suggested. This is supported by the evocation of common values, communal solidarity, and a political project all can invest in (lines 24 & 45). The party's understanding of the Scottish nation is conveyed by means of these symbolic markers, avoiding the explicit use of the laden term 'nation'. Instead, liberal use of the first person plural forms the linguistic thread linking these elements to a collective. Moreover, the pronoun *we* explicitly includes the viewer in a way 'nation' does not, making the appeal more direct and personal.

The word *our* appears twenty-seven times in the text, variously linking the collective to a common future project (when used in conjunction with the words *lives, selves, future, image, evolution*), to a common political system (*parliament, government, democracy choice*), and to a common territory (*country, water, soil*). A shared past is evoked only once, in the phrase "that is why this election is a defining moment in our history" (lines 12-13). Otherwise, the rhetoric used to convey the party's understanding of the Scottish nation strongly supports the view that the SNP sets out to include all Scottish residents in its political project. Few will feel left out by an invitation to share in future prosperity (line 40), the evocation of solidarity born of compassion (line 45), and an expression of distaste for nuclear weapons (line 47).²⁰ The important point here is that SNP rhetoric does not limit its possible electoral constituency on ethnic or racial grounds. Its criterion for belonging to the Scottish nation is based on residence, its appeals are aspirational and solidarity in the present is emphasised without recourse to historical myths.²¹

The use of the first person plural throughout the text provides the key to the SNP's perception of its role in representing Scottish identity. When the identity of *we* is specified again in line 34 as "we in Scotland", the SNP is implicitly included as a 'body'. Indeed, in the immediate context of the broadcast, the "we" consists of the SNP – personified by the narrator – and his audience;

²⁰ Indeed, this last element may have been included in the text purely to achieve just such a rallying effect, as this long-standing SNP policy played next to no role in the rest of the campaign.

²¹ The SNP's requirements for citizenship in an independent Scotland are as follows; "The right of Scottish citizenship will belong to all those resident in Scotland on the date of Independence and to those who were born in Scotland but are resident elsewhere". SNP Citizens not Subjects p. 4.

'We' typically are not merely the speaker and the hearers: 'We' may be the party, the nation, all reasonable people and various other combinations.²²

Voter and party are portrayed as being able to achieve together a "vibrant future [...] in a government that is ours" (lines 26-27). Further, phrases such as "we want a Scots penny" (line 40) attempt to elide the distinction between Scots and the SNP in order to convey the impression that party and people are united in having the same values and desires. Indeed, in the phrase "a Scots penny", the SNP's agency disappears completely in the formation of a direct rhetorical bond between people and policy. Finally, the 'feel-good' factor contained in the text makes it very difficult not to identify with pledges formulated in terms of love, compassion and quality of life.²³

Blurring the distinction between party and people is an attempt to harness the power of inspiring rhetoric to the SNP's political project. Indeed, the phrase, "we are shaping a new image of ourselves" (lines 27-28), perhaps unwittingly provides the key to deciphering the entire text. The broadcast is an exercise in the manipulation of Scottish identity according to the SNP's world-view, an important element of which is the ambiguous use of the word *we*. In the broadcast, the process of political mobilisation is rendered rhetorically by encouraging the audience to identify in turn with youth, Scotland and finally the SNP. By politicising an inchoate Scottish identity in terms of nationalist ideology, the party is shaping an "image of ourselves" which corresponds to the Scottish people and 'their' party, the SNP.

To quote Michael Billig;

The imagining of 'our' community involves imagining either implicitly or explicitly, 'them', from whom 'we' are distinct.²⁴

²² M. Billig *Banal Nationalism* p. 106.

²³ One cannot help but wonder, however, whether the SNP is sensitive to another Scottish stereotype in its rhetoric; that Scots are slow to emote. It may be the case that this broadcast inspired ridicule and not confidence in some voters. Neil MacCormick commented; "In metaphysical Scotland you get a much better hearing for an argument than for an emote. An element in the culture".

²⁴ M. Billig *Banal Nationalism* p.66.

As if to strengthen the viewer's resolve to vote for change, nationalism's necessary 'Other' is indeed referred to and contrasted directly with the positive picture painted of a future Scotland. The text also grapples with who 'they' are, albeit using indirect language. The *status quo* is described as one in which the "real power" (line 32) lies in Westminster and others have long controlled the lives of Scots (lines 13-14). Although Westminster is mentioned as a shorthand for the British parliament, the reference to three hundred years of outside control identifies the 1707 Treaty of Union with England as the source of Scotland's woes. By implication, then, the linguistic net capturing the 'Other' must be thrown wider. The phrases "someone else's" (line 17) and "other people" (line 23) are examples of personification which are intended to connote everything associated with the British political system; the non-Scottish element of the electorate, the Westminster parliament, the government, British parties and British politicians. Consequently, the terms must needs include English voters and their representatives who, more numerous and consequently more influential than the Scots, "have decided the course of our lives" (line 23). For this reason, the rhetoric continues, the party does not simply want to bring down the government or reform parliament, it wants to be done with the 'Other' altogether. It wants to "bring our democracy home" (line 33) and "choose to shape our country's future" (line 43-44) by dissolving the union with England.

At this point in the text, the rhetorical separation of 'us' from 'them' is complete. The task is now to pad out the meaning of 'we' according to SNP ideology. The development of the argument has reached a stage at which "a party [...] controlled by Westminster" (lines 31-32) is automatically deemed to put voters from England before those in Scotland.²⁵ In turn, the rhetoric equates British parties with Westminster control, leading to the conclusion that the Scottish parliament can only fulfil its purpose if it is led by the only non-British party, the SNP. In a rather daring analogy, this is described as "bring[ing] our democracy home" (line 33). Contrary to what one might expect, this was allegedly not achieved by the 'yes' vote in the

²⁵ Although this is a superficially appealing argument, it is by no means logically watertight. However, the modification of Labour party strategy since the beginning of Tony Blair's leadership might give it at least the ring of truth.

referendum. Instead, it is asserted that Scottish parliamentary democracy will not be truly 'home-grown' without an independent Scottish government and, by extension, an SNP government. The elision of the SNP with "we in Scotland" (lines 34-35) is bolder still, suggesting that any other party in government will not really speak for Scots, or even that Scotland will not truly feel like 'home'. This corresponds to the final stage in mobilising a national identity for party political ends. Using the first person plural, the rhetorical equation of people and nation is supplemented by an elision of people and party.

Tellingly for its final broadcast before the Scottish Parliament election, the party chose to use rhetoric designed to inspire and encourage rather than to justify and explain. It is proof that, although modern campaigning favours debate of specific economic and social issues, the party does not under-estimate the electoral potential of somewhat vague, sentimental appeals to 'higher values.' In the broadcast, the party programme is discussed in terms of moral principles such as freedom of expression, human dignity, honesty, compassion, quality of life and social justice. This suggests that the SNP intends to stand not only for an election manifesto but also for values that voters can recognise as their own, providing further evidence of the rhetorical *rapprochement* being operated between people and party. Further, by introducing the nation into the equation, the party seeks to create the conceptual triad central to any neo-nationalist party strategy. In fact, the entire text of the broadcast is geared towards mobilising Scottish identity politically by linking it to the SNP and its neo-nationalist ideology.²⁶

The SNP's interpretation of independence as a process is conveyed in the tripartite structure of the text, each stage describing a step towards independence. "The first step" (line 11) is described explicitly as the 'Yes' vote in the referendum, and then interpreted as a sign that "we are taking control of our lives" (line 14). This inference is by no means beyond debate, as it mixes the personal and political spheres in its personification of the Scottish electorate as an entity

²⁶ Neil MacCormick commented; "Parties have to latch on to some aspect of people's perceived identity and work from that".

which acts as one, shares the same values and aspires to the same goals. This rhetorical technique serves to set up the second stage of the process, namely voter confidence-building. A selection of phrases follow which are intended to inspire and uplift, each introduced by “we can”. Repetition is used to drive home the point; the phrase is employed no less than eleven times between lines 19 and 62. Rather like a chant or a flag, it is used as shorthand for membership of a group, but might not be very meaningful in itself.²⁷ Nonetheless, the themes of creation and choice return repeatedly; the nationalist project is being presented in terms of building the future, not preserving the past.

In order to convey its political message, the text capitalises on the positivity generated by the themes of love and growth by linking optimistic words such as new, vibrant, and dynamic with democracy, future and government (lines 24-27). The beautiful, heart-warming images used in the broadcast encourage the viewer to feel optimistic about the future, and this effect is heightened by the vocabulary employed. The text is peppered with positively connoted nouns, such as dignity, hope and promise (lines 5-6), which are grouped together or juxtaposed with negative terms for maximum impact. A succession of verbs convey a sense of growth and dynamism to the text; nurture [...] thrives [...] develop [...] fulfil [...] grow [...] create” (lines 2-9). Further, phrases such as “defining moment [...] better world [...] new model [...] vibrant future [...] new image [and] vital issues” (lines 12-35) give a sense of the invigorating change for the better that a vote for independence would allegedly represent. Powerful, rousing rhetorical symbols such as life, country, hearts and future are also employed throughout the text. They inject a sense of solemnity and portentousness into the forthcoming vote, suggesting that this election can be life-changing and above all, life-enhancing.²⁸

The third, concluding stage of the argument is introduced with the call “So let’s” (line 30). This section of the text corresponds to the

²⁷ Indeed, the phrases are clichéd and sometimes nonsensical, i.e.; “We can take our place in the list of nations who have taken us forward in our evolution” (lines 20-21). Michael Billig discusses the notion of flagging the nation in *Banal Nationalism* Ch.1.

²⁸ The words life or lives appear eight times in the text. The effect is further underlined by the use of superlatives such as deepest and greatest (line 2).

'action plan' aspect of SNP ideology, and consists of three elements. "Democracy" must be brought "home" by voting for a party not beholden to Westminster (lines 32-35), the choice to care should be made by voting for a "Scots Penny" (line 40), and a society based on hope and love can begin to be built by voting to scrap nuclear weapons (line 51). Thus, spiritual values are appealed to once again before being translated into a concrete measure, namely a vote for the SNP. The party's political programme is being set out, and in this case it is emotive rhetoric that lubricates the ideological mechanism (lines 42-45).²⁹ The phrase "our hearts as well as our heads" (line 44) is self-legitimizing. It attempts to bring together the economic and emotive approaches to political debate which are usually deemed mutually exclusive. Indeed, like a reassuring footnote, in case the viewer has been left a little anxious by so much rousing rhetoric, the phrase "Scotland is still the seventh richest country in the world" (line 57) is inserted to flag the SNP's favourite economic argument.³⁰

The combination of emotional and economic rhetoric is highlighted in the following quote by Alex Salmond, which he repeated often during the campaign; "We are a rich country but not yet a rich society". The phrase 'economic-emotional' was first used in 1971, in an SNP report on the party campaign regarding North Sea oil revenues.³¹ It encapsulates the SNP's approach to mobilising votes; a combination of emotive symbolism and economic arguments designed to foster voter identification with basic principles of nationalist ideology. Inevitably, 'economic-emotional' rhetoric is linked to a sense of Scottishness in SNP rhetoric. Winnie Ewing recounts her dialogue with a Conservative MP, using Scottish dialect in her response to suggest that she is speaking as a Scot rather than as an individual;

[The Conservative said] 'I am Scottish Nationalist in my heart but not in my head'. I [Winnie Ewing] retorted, 'The heart's aye the pairt that makes us richt or wrang'.³²

²⁹ See also lines 61-62 of the text; "think about it, and follow your heart, for with a little bit of love and a penny [...]"

³⁰ From a speech to an SNP Special Conference on 13th March 1999. When speaking to the business community on 20th April 1999, Salmond even asserted; "Over a hundred years ago, Scotland was the richest country in the world".

³¹ Cited in R. Levy *Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads* p. 40.

³² From an address to SNP Conference on 25th September 1998.

Another prime example of this strategy was the ‘Penny for Scotland’ initiative. It represented a major theme of the 1999 Scottish election campaign, and was indicative of the close link between emotional and rational appeals in SNP rhetoric.

‘A Penny for Scotland’

As the relevant segment of the text illustrates, the ‘Penny for Scotland’ campaign presented an economic measure in the language of social conscience and Scottish solidarity (lines 37-45). The SNP’s pledge to reverse the penny reduction in income tax contained in Gordon Brown’s 1999 budget and spend it on public services, was an attempt to turn what other parties called a tax rise into a positive contribution to Scotland’s sense of community. At the same time, the party sought to vilify the Labour measure as being out of touch with Scotland’s needs and wants. By asserting that Scots were more interested in adequate public services than tax cuts, the SNP claimed to speak for a virtuous, caring nation. It thereby attempted to reinforce a sense of Scottish distinctiveness from the rest of the United Kingdom. In this way, the issue was subtly shifted away from a belief in private or public ownership, in state or private education and in high or low taxation, to be redefined as a question of national character and vision.³³ This is an example of eminently rational economic arguments being linked to an inchoate sense of Scottish belonging in order to mobilise voters behind the nationalist project.

As a fusion of the emotional and the rational, the ‘Penny for Scotland’ campaign sums up the neo-nationalist strategy adopted by the SNP in order to further its core ideological goal of prioritising the nation. It also sheds light on the party’s construction of Scottish identity, which amounts to telling voters that they have a natural,

³³ Addressing a fringe meeting of the Scottish Trade Union Congress on 19th April 1999, Alex Salmond said; “It is now completely clear on which side of the fence New Labour sit [...] It is the SNP who stand on the other side of that fence, the side on which are gathered the people of Scotland - young and old, employed and unemployed, sick and healthy, included and excluded. It is the SNP who are fighting for a penny to invest in our collective future - it is the SNP who dare to care. I believe that Scotland will dare to care too”.

national predisposition towards supporting ‘caring’ policies.³⁴ The flattering assertion that “we accept that compassion is a vital part of life” (line 43) is designed to be as attractive and inclusive as possible. Further, the claim that Scots are inherently compassionate can be supported using either invented tradition or opinion poll evidence.³⁵ After all, the aim is to make a maximum of voters believe and invest in this myth by translating a feeling of belonging into a vote for the party. Instinctively, anyone would want to belong to a group displaying such a commendable quality as compassion. In the text, the nation is also constructed by drawing the parallel between caring for one’s own children and caring for other members of the nation. The SNP is thereby defining an ‘imagined community’ for voters to identify with. This process of political mobilisation uses the nation as an identifier where others might use the proletariat, the environment, or Christian democratic values. The image of Scotland constructed by the SNP is the public face of a strategy which has the achievement of national self-determination as its core ideological goal.

The simple slogan ‘Scotland’s party’, employed during the SNP’s 1999 campaign, encapsulates nationalist party thinking.³⁶ Not only is the party depicted as representing the nation, but the nation is also deemed to possess the party. The simple phrase presents the two as closely intertwined, if not inextricably linked. If the party belongs to the nation, this suggests that it must have the nation’s best interests at heart. From there it is but a short step to asserting that party and nation are symbiotic, or even one and the same. The characterisation of the SNP as *the* only national party attempts to mobilise Scottish identity for the party’s own ideological ends. It can no longer be assumed,

³⁴ Although interviewees defended this myth, opinions differed as to the effectiveness of the campaign. Gordon Wilson criticised it for being introduced too hastily, whilst other accused it of targeting the conscience of the middle class rather than attempting to win over the working class.

³⁵ For an instance of the latter argument, note the response of George Reid when asked whether he personally believed the Scots to have a compassionate streak. He replied “Yes, I think so. My own constituency has a very, very full database. We’ve got over 60,000 entries and they go back over seven elections”.

³⁶ John Swinney remarked; “A lot of what has dominated my thinking in the last number of years in trying to redirect party strategy, certainly since the 1992 election, was about trying to get the party focused on how we had a mainstream Scotland agenda, a mainstream Scotland profile”.

however, that individuals will readily mobilise behind a nationalist project in contemporary politics, especially in peacetime. Consequently, the SNP has developed strategies in order to make the national identifier more attractive, adapting it to concrete domestic issues. Policies addressing everyday concerns such as health and education, for instance the 'Penny for Scotland' initiative, attempt to translate bread and butter issues into a matter of self-determination (line 60). Whether they happen to use emotional or rational rhetoric, however, such policies are all directed towards a core ideological goal; the channelling of an inchoate sense of national identity into a vote for independence. At the same time, they illustrate the adaptability of the SNP's neo-nationalist ideology to the demands of contemporary politics. A prime example of this is the party's European policy, which has been developed to complement and facilitate the party's nationalist project.

II SNP Rhetoric and European Integration

The SNP's European Election Campaign, 1999

The European election took place in the UK on June the 10th, 1999, barely a month after the Scottish parliament election.³⁷ Two candidates were elected from the SNP list.³⁸ A third candidate only narrowly missed being elected, a new system of proportional representation having been favourable to the relatively even spread of the SNP's vote across Scotland.³⁹ The SNP allocated little money to the European election. This was influenced by the fact that it came in the immediate aftermath of the party's most costly campaign ever and that it was deemed to be by far the less significant.⁴⁰ SNP accounts

³⁷ For an account of the election in the UK as a whole, see A. Teasdale The Politics of the 1999 European Elections.

³⁸ Winnie Ewing was the SNP's only MEP from 1974 until 1994, when she was joined by Allan McCartney.

³⁹ This system made all of Scotland a single constituency, ensuring a perfectly proportional division of the Scottish vote. The two incumbent SNP MEPs are Neil MacCormick and Ian Hudghton.

⁴⁰ Gordon Wilson, who was a candidate in the campaign, commented wryly; "I don't feel there was any SNP campaign at all [...] All the staff had gone to the new parliament. Headquarters had virtually become a sort of ghost town."

state that £496,594 was spent on the Scottish parliament election campaign and £90,409 on the European election campaign. However, the SNP made great play of being the only party to publish a European manifesto, and accused its political opponents of not taking the EU and the election seriously enough. The party's European campaign slogan of 'Stand up for Scotland' picked up the theme of boosting self-confidence, which was an important component of its rhetoric preceding the Scottish election.⁴¹ Although not mentioning the European context specifically, the accompanying 'Independence in Europe' slogan fulfilled this role. Given the abstract nature of the European Union to most of the Scottish electorate and the fact that domestic issues often predominate at European elections, this approach was to be expected. Although target letters pinpointed farmers, fishermen, small businesses and young voters as those most likely to show an interest in European elections, the content referred primarily to domestic matters. The letter to first time voters (the SNP enjoys high support among young people) attacked tuition fees in higher education and Labour's minimum wage proposals. The overall strategy, as with the CSU's European campaign, was to mobilise the party's core support and identify specific interest groups. Election fatigue of both campaigners and voters in the aftermath of the Scottish parliament election informed this approach, coupled with the fact that SNP supporters are more likely and Labour voters less likely to turn out for elections.⁴²

The SNP campaign was the brainchild of one man, Peter Murrell, who also took the step, unusual in the SNP at the time, of drafting an explicit strategy document.⁴³ The main aim was to repeat one clear slogan in order to avoid the mixed messages of the Scottish

⁴¹ The modified slogan 'We stand for Scotland' was used in the 2001 general election campaign.

⁴² Kevin Pringle remarked; "In such an election you can aspire to really challenge Labour for the top spot because SNP people are more inclined to turn out to vote in a European election and because of the nature of the SNP 'Scotland in Europe' theme".

⁴³ P. Murrell SNP 1999 European Election Strategy Document.

election campaign. There was relatively little consultation with colleagues, underlining the fact that the European election was a second order affair. Peter Murrell drafted the campaign radio broadcasts himself, for instance, a matter which required extensive consultation in the planning of the CSU's European election campaign. The approaches of both the CSU and the SNP to the European campaign were otherwise fairly similar. Target letters and leaflets were produced and an (artificial, given the voting system) allocation of each candidate to a region was opted for. This allowed the prospective MEPs in both Bavaria and Scotland to focus their campaigning by presenting themselves as local candidates. However, the SNP's approach to the European election broadcasts was typically *ad hoc* and pragmatic. Surprised that more of them had been allocated to the party than expected, a low budget, 'talking heads' style was opted for, involving *ad lib* contributions by the candidate Neil MacCormick. The broadcasts contained a sizeable amount of factual information, designed to address the public's generally poor knowledge of European institutions, and finished with an inspiring appeal to vote SNP. Interviews conducted with members of the public, soliciting their questions on aspects of the EU, were interspersed with responses from sitting and prospective MEPs. The arguments and the style of rhetoric used can be observed at first hand in the introduction to the SNP's 1999 European manifesto.

"Stand up for Scotland"

1 Scotland goes to the polls again on June 10th to elect its eight members of the European Parliament.

The eyes of the world have been on Scotland in recent weeks, witnessing the start of our new era of democracy. The SNP –
5 and Scotland - made massive strides forward in the Scottish Parliament elections. At the European Parliament elections on June 10th Scottish voters will have another opportunity to make their voices heard in the international community.

It is time to stand up for Scotland.

10 By voting SNP in these European elections you will help elect
Euro-MPs who will put Scotland's interests first. The SNP's
record in Europe speaks for itself.

Winnie Ewing has shown what can be achieved when
politicians make Scotland their top priority. For the last twenty-
15 five years Winnie has brought the needs of her Highland and
Islands constituency to international attention and has
championed Scottish interests in Europe.

Scotland's Party, the SNP, is part of the mainstream European
social democratic tradition. We believe that an enterprising and
20 dynamic economy goes hand-in-hand with high quality public
services.

The SNP knows it is possible to transform Scotland. We can
reverse the trend of job losses, public service cuts, and the
privatisation of essential services.

25 New Labour has let Scotland down by adopting old Tory
policies and neglecting the pressing needs of our communities.
But things don't have to be this way.

The SNP has a positive vision of the future. Now that the
Scottish Parliament is up and running, there is a greater need
30 than ever to seize the opportunities opening up for Scotland in
Europe. The SNP looks forward to the day when the people of
Scotland will be ready to move forward to Independence and
full membership of the European Union.

Voting SNP will send a strong signal that Scotland is preparing
35 to rejoin the nations of Europe as a full member of the
European Union.

As an independent member state, Scotland would enjoy a new
first-class status in Europe. We would have more influence, a
stronger voice, and greater access to the benefits. Voting SNP
40 moves Scotland another step closer to Independence - and you
can be sure that SNP Euro-MPs will put your interests first in
Europe.

**Stand up for yourself on June 10th. Stand up for Scotland.
Vote SNP.**

This introduction to the SNP's European manifesto is signed by its then leader, Alex Salmond. Despite the European context, only two paragraphs of the text are devoted specifically to EU matters. Instead, the preamble refers back to the recent Scottish parliament election, describing it as a momentous, world-class event (lines 3-4). What is more, the opportunity to equate Scotland with the SNP is not lost; it is asserted that "The SNP- and Scotland- made massive strides forward" (lines 4-5). Party and nation are depicted as moving forward together, suggesting a close link between the two, as well as providing an example of the party's predilection for evoking dynamism and progress in its rhetoric. In turn, the national focus is underlined by the paragraph linking SNP activity in Europe, which allegedly "speaks for itself" (line 12), with Scotland's interests as a whole. Although few readers will be aware of what was actually achieved, the paragraph is primarily intended to make a nationalist point. The evocation of the EU arena in the text is exclusively in terms of Scotland and its interests. Although voters are enjoined to vote, the appeals made centre on Scotland and not on the European parliament (lines 10-11, 41-42).⁴⁴ In turn, the reference to the importance of public services is designed to underline the party's social democratic credentials and not to laud, say, the Treaty on European Union's social chapter (line 20). If the party describes itself as "mainstream European" (line 18), this is in a bid to increase its credibility at home. There is no reference either to the guiding principles of European integration or to specific EU regulations. Evidently, political mobilisation, even in the context of a European election, takes place through the medium of the nation. At the European level, individual interests are a vanishing point, providing the party with an unparalleled opportunity to emphasise the nation as an alternative focus of voter identification.⁴⁵ Indeed, the word "Scotland" is used no less than sixteen times in the text.

⁴⁴ Kevin Pringle stated; "The information that we had put together suggested that the kind of campaign that was most likely to motivate people to turn out to vote in a European election where people are less inclined to vote is something that actually stressed the Scottish aspect if you like, ahead of the European aspect. You know, Scotland's interests have to be very strongly represented in Europe".

⁴⁵ This is underlined by Mike Russell's view that "people think about Scotland at a national, state level when thinking about Europe, and identify us as being the people who think that way too".

The party's desire to "transform Scotland" (line 22) leads it to employ some characteristically aspirational rhetoric in outlining its "positive vision of the future" (line 28). A dynamic is created using the phrases "up and running [...] seize [...] opening up [...] looks forward [...] move forward" (lines 29-32). This image is then contrasted to Labour's "old Tory policies" (lines 25-26) and its neglect of Scottish needs. The comparatives more, stronger and greater (lines 38-39) highlight the disadvantages of the *status quo*. By implication, Scotland's current position must be second class, since an independent "Scotland would enjoy a new first class status in Europe" (lines 37-38). However, the "positive vision" (line 28) makes no reference to the higher ideals of European integration, such as peace and solidarity, but instead to "the opportunities opening up for Scotland in Europe" (lines 30-31). According to the SNP, therefore, European integration is to be welcomed, not as a worthy end in itself, but insofar as it improves Scottish prospects for economic security and prosperity as an independent nation. The text makes it quite clear where the SNP's priorities lie. This neo-nationalist party's policy on Europe is peripheral, pragmatic and subordinate to its core ideological goal. The content of the text illustrates how Europe does little more than provide a backdrop to the political dramas being played out on the domestic stage. In the SNP's pursuit of national self-determination, the European dimension is simply instrumental.

The text encourages the individual to identify fully with the nation and vote to "put Scotland's interests first" (line 11) by electing SNP MEPs. The rhetoric of the argument is quite simple and by now familiar; voters are urged to "make their voices heard [...] to stand up for Scotland. By voting SNP [...]" (lines 7-10). Individuals are thereby called upon to translate a feeling of belonging to Scotland into a vote for the SNP. The party's rhetorical reliance on the force of national identification evidently assumes that the individual is still capable of prioritising the nation above all else. The text culminates in a strong appeal to people's sense of self-worth with the call to "Stand up for yourself on June 10th. Stand up for yourself" (line 43) written in bold type. The repetition in these juxtaposed phrases suggests the interchangeability of the words "yourself" and "Scotland", and the

voter's interest is thereby assumed to coincide with that of Scotland. In this rhetorical link, the self and Scotland are thus posited as symbiotic. The third element in the argument is added with the words "Vote SNP" (line 44). In another example of the creation of a correspondence between people, party and land, "yourself" is presented as the equivalent of "Scotland", and the logical consequence of this as being to vote for the SNP.

The campaign strategy document supports the view that the slogan has deliberately been left open to a number of interpretations.⁴⁶ For instance, a phrase brought to mind by the slogan 'Stand up for Scotland' is 'to take a stand'. This connotation sounds a more confrontational note and reinforces the images of action against threat or danger conjured up by the slogan. It is expressed in visual form by the manifesto's cover photograph of all the candidates standing together, looking up at the camera. The uplifted faces have an aspirational quality, and the tight group suggests a closely-knit team selected to represent a united Scottish nation. One has call to stand up for oneself when one is being browbeaten, undermined or even aggressed. The slogan thus begs the question; against what or whom should one stand up for oneself? By prudently neglecting to answer, the party sets about mobilising the nation against the 'Other' without giving it a name, thus harnessing the force of this tactic without explicitly making any enemies. In turn, the vagueness here can be used to advantage, as voters are free to interpret the 'Other' as being their most disliked European or British bogeyman.

The party's central slogan can also be interpreted as 'to stand up for Scotland's interests', thereby underlining the fact that SNP support for the EU is pragmatic, and that Scotland's interests come first. The malevolent 'Other' might conceivably be a rampant EU

⁴⁶ "The thematic strength of 'Stand up for Scotland' is that it can be used as a direct appeal to the committed SNP supporter in target letters but remains flexible enough to allow campaign literature and events to develop a limited number of key sub-themes, namely

- Stand up for Scotland - that's our promise.
- Stand up for Scotland - Labour don't
- Stand up for Scotland - other small nations stand up for themselves
- Stand up for Scotland - it's time we made the grade in Europe."

P. Murrell SNP 1999 European Election Strategy Document.

bureaucracy, or a disadvantageous common agricultural policy. However, no reservations are emitted about the European integration project in general or any aspect of it in particular. Conversely, the SNP's portrayal of the EU as a land of opportunity is not developed in any way. The EU is represented monolithically and positively, if superficially, as a component in the party's blueprint for future independence. Consequently, the SNP emerges as resolutely pro-European. We must look elsewhere for the malevolent 'Other'. Given the domestic focus of European elections in the United Kingdom and the greater prominence of demands for independence than support for European integration in the text, the 'Other' can quite easily be equated with the British state. Examples of harsh treatment of Scotland by British governments will spring more readily to the mind of a potential voter than instances of European Commission unfairness. This interpretation is fully supported by the content of the text, which lists the negative domestic trends the SNP pledges to reverse (lines 22-24). If the party aims to inspire, it must do so using appeals that will strike a chord with voters, a near impossibility in the distant, abstract world of European politics. Although the focus on domestic politics might seem out of place in the introduction to the party's European manifesto, it is an illustration of the peripheral role played by European issues in the SNP's neo-nationalist ideology.

There have been few, if any, detailed critiques from the media or the opposition of the SNP's vision of its future as an independent EU member state. Demurring voices have made themselves heard within the party, however. When the adoption of the 'Independence in Europe' policy was first considered in the early 1980s, forceful expressions of dissent came from then SNP office holders Steven Maxwell, Isobel Lindsay and Jim Fairlie. Their arguments have since been definitively sidelined, a fact which (a somewhat embittered) Isobel Lindsay feels did and does not bode well for the quality of European debate within and outside the party.⁴⁷ Although

⁴⁷ Isobel Lindsay observed; "I think the thing that was more disturbing in the late eighties was that there had to be no scepticism and by that I don't just mean the question of supporting membership or not supporting membership but there was a mood I think among some that you hadn't to raise criticisms or qualifications and that the storyline had to be; this is overwhelmingly good for Scotland [...] and I think that was rather unhealthy".

acknowledging the strategic attractiveness of the policy, which was welcomed by the media as a sign of the party modernising itself, Lindsay commented that more cautious party members were fobbed off with unrealistic promises.⁴⁸ The points made by what is now considered a quasi-defunct anti-European strand in the SNP nevertheless highlight some of the problems inherent in the party's stance. That opposition parties should have failed to pick up on these arguments is largely due to the unsophisticated nature of the European debate in Scotland and the UK in general. Criticisms of the SNP's ideological construction of the EU will be considered in the first part of the next section, before going on to look at the specific strategic benefits of the 'Independence in Europe' policy in furthering the party's core goal.

III 'Independence in Europe'

In an article published in 1991, Isobel Lindsay identified four forms of nationalist ideology;

The first is a romantic, sometimes semi-mystical concept of nationhood [...] The second is a small state nationalism as part of the process of decentralising state structures [...] The third is nationalism as "Left" politics [...] The fourth is nationalism as modernisation, as a response to uneven development.⁴⁹

In her view, only the third and fourth forms of nationalism are potentially compatible with European integration. However, her argument is based on two assumptions which are increasingly untenable today. Firstly, to describe European integration as "inherently federalist" is to ignore the strong intergovernmentalist dynamic in EU decision-making. Secondly, the inclusion of the subsidiarity principle in the Treaty of Maastricht goes some way towards countering the argument that "bringing control closer to

⁴⁸ Isobel Lindsay remarked; "The only argument to those who felt they were losing out in the EU context was, we will have a strong voice and we will be able to change things from the inside, in truth always a very questionable position".

⁴⁹ I. Lindsay 'The SNP and the lure of Europe' in T. Gallagher (ed.) Nationalism in the Nineties p.85.

people” is necessarily incompatible with “growing bureaucratic centralism”.⁵⁰

Particularly relevant to the core of SNP ideology is Lindsay’s discussion of the economic rationale of integration, the restrictions this would impose on an independent Scottish government, the minor role an independent Scotland would play in Europe, and “the theme of EC as escape”.⁵¹ Lindsay is right to ask whether it may be counter-productive for the SNP to bypass references to England in its rhetoric when the electorate is more psychologically receptive to comparisons with such an important neighbour.⁵² She also pinpoints a strategic problem that is particularly pertinent now a Scottish parliament exists;

For the anxious, a domestic legislature offers substantial change but greater reassurance, while for those psychologically or politically attracted to radical change, the addition of the EC factor at this stage may make little difference.⁵³

The article addresses seminal strategic and ideological questions which the SNP has still to answer, yet such a critique of the SNP’s policy on Europe is notable for its rarity.

A decade ago, Isobel Lindsay had already pointed out some of the less well-developed elements in the SNP’s position and articulated a series of arguments to undermine it, but the party’s European policy still remains largely unchanged. The fact that some interviewees, including John Swinney, gave very vague answers to questions on specific aspects of EU policy testifies to a lack of new or precise thinking in this area. The smoothness with which the SNP asserts the compatibility of independence and integration belies the philosophical

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* p.86.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* p.89. Some aspects of Lindsay’s argument are now obsolete. For instance, Lindsay devotes considerable time to refuting the fanciful proposition, apparently floated during the 1989 European election campaign, that a majority of votes in a European election would constitute a mandate for the SNP to negotiate independent member state status with supportive allies in Europe, and ignore any possible input or objections from the rest of the UK.

⁵² “You cannot both build it up as a threat, as the source of Scotland’s disadvantaged position, and then expect it to be psychologically plausible to argue that attention should be shifted from the Westminster relationship because of the greater importance of the European dimension.” *Ibid.* p.91.

⁵³ *Ibid.* p. 90.

and tactical problems inherent in its position. Its attempts to make the link between the two appear self-evident is, of course, a basic rhetorical device. The 'Independence in Europe' policy is designed to neutralise the unsettling notion of independence by placing it within the larger framework of the EU. However, the concept of Europe is undoubtedly secondary to that of independence in SNP ideology, even in the context of the European election campaign. Rather like a security blanket, the EU lies at the ready, waiting to put a damper on too many firebrand accusations from the opposition of isolationism and parochialism.⁵⁴

'Independence in Europe' combines the SNP's core ideological goal with a peripheral concept. The adoption of the policy in 1988 is testament to the anachronistic nature of the party's previous stance, which had led the party to oppose UK entry in the 1975 referendum on EEC membership. The SNP had argued that Westminster should not decide for or against Scottish membership without consulting the Scottish people separately. A pamphlet published in 1969 bore the title 'No Voice, No Entry' and the SNP slogan for the 1975 referendum was 'No-on anyone else's terms'. However, such a stance was easily misconstrued as opposition to the EEC itself and the message was eventually judged too complex and apparently contradictory to be conveyed effectively.⁵⁵

Although SNP policy towards EC membership had been reversed as early as 1983, the official launch in 1988 was an important step. The thinking of the policy's chief architect, Jim Sillars, points to its strategic underpinning.⁵⁶ During the early 1980s, influential members of the party set about reinterpreting the SNP's core goal of

⁵⁴ Gordon Wilson used the image of a safety-net to describe the European dimension. John Swinney's image of the umbrella is also a good rendering of the policy's role as a protective covering; "The European context provides an umbrella within which the transition to independence can be envisaged".

⁵⁵ Gordon Wilson maintains that the policy "was consistent with today's line to a degree, except that underlying that was a less favourable attitude of a lot of the party [to EEC membership]". Isobel Lindsay pointed out that it was "a more difficult position, a less simplistic position" than Independence in Europe.

⁵⁶ "Despite having faced the difficulties that the 'separatist' tag created between 1974 and 1979, the SNP has done little work on more closely defining what independence means in practical terms. It is time for some fundamental thinking on the concept of independence." J. Sillars Scotland: The Case for Optimism p. 182.

independence to respond to a new European political context and thereby achieve strategic advantage vis-à-vis the opposition.⁵⁷ 'Independence in Europe' had the advantage of providing economic safeguards and reassurance to Scots wary of 'going it alone'.⁵⁸ It also had the potential to reinforce a sense of Scottish distinctiveness from the rest of the UK. For instance, the SNP has explicitly "condemn[ed] the 'Little Englander' attitude of the British government".⁵⁹ Crucially, the party was able to use 'Independence in Europe' to counter accusations of separatism.⁶⁰ The connotations of isolationism associated with independence, much exploited by Labour, severely undermined the SNP's confidence-building efforts by evoking a regressive, introspective nationalism.⁶¹ The change of policy was a sign of the party's development from a crusading movement to an adaptable party sensitive to electoral strategy.⁶² Finally, the consistent intellectual support for European membership from the respected SNP member, constitutional lawyer and now MEP Neil MacCormick should also be mentioned.⁶³ In the final analysis, however, pragmatism

⁵⁷ Isobel Lindsay remarked; "I do think it was Jim [Sillars] and his conversion of Alex [Salmond] and the others, the other younger element on his grouping at the time, who made a decision to try to direct the party into an extremely euro-enthusiastic party".

⁵⁸ "The doubts held by our group of potential independence voters, who go along part of the way but hesitate about the final irrevocable steps, are not without validity." J. Sillars Scotland: The Case for Optimism p. 182.

⁵⁹ SNP European policy statement, April 1996. This underlines the party's eagerness to distance itself from Margaret Thatcher's euro-sceptic stance. Angus Robertson commented; "there isn't the same level of hostility to Brussels [in Scotland] as there has been traditionally with policy-making in London".

⁶⁰ Bruce Crawford observed; "The only problem we have is we get painted as being an organisation which is about division and separatism, which is not about an inclusive process of joining".

⁶¹ The Labour party continues to liken the SNP's plans to break-up and divorce; "[Dewar's] relentless attacks on 'divorce' have secured a record level of hostility to independence, with 48% of Scots saying they would vote against it and only 39% supporting the idea". Scotland on Sunday, 2nd May 1999. According to Isobel Lindsay, the isolationist argument will always be used "whether there's substance in it or not because it's seen as an effective emotive argument".

⁶² George Reid remarked; "The SNP in the 1970s was Poujadiste and populist and a movement rather than a party. So I think what Salmond has done is give the party a coherence it never had before".

⁶³ Cf. N. MacCormick Democracy, Subsidiarity and Citizenship in the European Commonwealth, Sovereignty: Myth and Reality, and What Place for Nationalism in the Modern World?

motivated this neo-nationalist interpretation of self-determination from the first.⁶⁴

The policy shift was typically neo-nationalist in recognising that global pressures have made complete sovereignty anachronistic, and that such an interpretation of independence was neither feasible nor desirable. Instead, the best way for the party to present a more moderate image was for it to couch its indubitably radical goal in European terms.⁶⁵ However, references in party rhetoric to other EU member states as 'normal' nations indicate that a 'nation-state' is still considered the ideal.⁶⁶ A traditional nationalist flavour thus persists in the idea that nation and state should coincide, and the SNP is one of the only parties in Europe to make such a radical constitutional demand.⁶⁷ Yet it nonetheless remains an archetypally neo-nationalist party in that it updates the nationalist principle of self-determination to fit in with the role of contemporary 'nation-states'. The national sovereignty aspired to is not absolute and autarchic, but voluntarily limited by treaty, allegedly in the national interest.⁶⁸ The SNP interprets self-determination using a European construct, which is at once subordinate to and supportive of its core ideological goal.

The 'Independence in Europe' policy has served as a springboard for the party's strategy of underlining the benefits of independence, building-up voter confidence and emphasising party credibility. A transition to independence operated within the European

⁶⁴ George Reid expressed this with candour; "If you look at Scots exports, we live on a pretty barren stump of rock. If we don't sell our goods we're not going to survive and where's the biggest market? The biggest market is in Europe".

⁶⁵ Alasdair Morgan made the following observation; "There's a limit to how many radical changes you can get people to vote for at the one time".

⁶⁶ "Far from being unusual, sovereign independence is the normal status for small countries, and the most successful of those are the ones which can combine confident individuality with co-operative participation in larger structures". Address by Alex Salmond to the London School of Economics on 25th February 1999. "Scotland will, in short, become a normal nation, playing a normal part in the world". SNP Citizens, not Subjects p. 6.

⁶⁷ Cf. P. Lynch Minority Nationalism and European Integration.

⁶⁸ The most sustained discussion of sovereignty is to be found in the work of Neil MacCormick. He commented; "The last chapter of my recent book is called 'New Unions for Old' and that's how I see it and I mean independence in that sense." Cf. N. MacCormick Questioning sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth.

Union framework can no longer be portrayed by opponents as such a leap in the dark. The party also contrasts its policy to the Conservatives' reluctance to open up to European developments. In turn, this approach is linked in party rhetoric to the myth that Scots are inherently more pro-European than the English, and that the Scots' historical experience of international co-operation will stand them in good stead during the process of European integration.⁶⁹ In its ideological interpretation of Scots identity, the SNP portrays a dual allegiance to Scotland and Europe as unproblematic (although the same cannot be said for a dual British and Scottish identity).⁷⁰

A pro-European Scottish identity is sometimes explicitly contrasted to a peculiarly English nostalgia for 'splendid isolation'. However, the party now generally avoids references to England in favour of comparisons with other small European countries.⁷¹ This is partly to avoid accusations of anti-Englishness, and partly to transcend the UK context in order to show how 'normal' nations prosper within the EU. The party's eagerness to promote the benefits which EU membership could bring to Scotland has also contributed to the party's pro-European stance, most recently expressed in strong support for Scottish participation in Economic and Monetary Union and, less vocally, for eastward enlargement of the EU.⁷² Whether such positions are truly in the interests of the Scottish economy and regional eligibility for EU structural funding is, quite literally, debatable. However, there has been no sign of any informed discussion of these issues within the party or the Scottish media. The party's unqualifiedly positive stance on the question of monetary union, a debate on which is just beginning to burgeon in the UK, illustrates that a more fully developed position is not deemed necessary. Given that European integration in the United Kingdom is still discussed in terms of support for or scepticism towards the project as a whole, it is sufficient for the

⁶⁹ This national myth will be discussed at greater length in chapter seven.

⁷⁰ On the construction of British and Scottish identity for the purposes of political mobilisation, see S. Reicher & N. Hopkins *Self and Nation* Ch. 3.

⁷¹ Angus Robertson commented; "It's not our place to compare the Scots as being better or worse than the English. What we are trying to do is increasingly to draw comparisons with elsewhere in Europe".

⁷² George Reid expressed surprise at how overwhelmingly supportive the SNP National Council had been of Salmond's pro-euro policy, as debated and passed in June 2000.

SNP to utter an all-encompassing ‘pro’ as its contribution to the debate. To quote Isobel Lindsay once more;

You cannot start to question this or to have a reasonably intelligent debate because it would suggest some criticism of the whole European project.

Conclusion

In the eyes of its own spokespeople, the SNP has undergone the transition from movement to party in the last thirty years. That is, it has progressed from being a group constituted around a single issue to an electoral machine ready to implement a full raft of policies if elected to govern. Despite the fact that the thrust of its core ideological goal remains unchanged, this has led to modifications in the way it presents its demand for independence. To portray independence as an absolute good is now considered anachronistic by the party. Simply to cry ‘freedom’ will rally few followers in Scotland’s contemporary political arena. This language belongs to cases of unbearable oppression, to uprisings and revolutions, and such connotations are unhelpful to the party’s moderate image. In contrast, ‘Independence in Europe’ is a reassuring policy, designed as a response to the “collective caution” of the Scottish electorate.⁷³ However, although the SNP has incorporated the European dimension into its flagship policy, it plays but a subordinate role in the independence message. The EU is little more than an expedient symbol used to counter the SNP’s separatist and isolationist image.⁷⁴ As such, it represents a peripheral component of the party’s neo-nationalist ideology, directed at achieving the core goal of independence. The ‘Independence in Europe’ policy as a whole is testament to the flexibility of a thin ideology which can surround its conceptual core with any number of thickening principles.

Another case in point is the party’s ‘Penny for Scotland’ campaign, which recast the question of public spending in terms of Scottish national identity. It illustrates the party’s attempt to suggest

⁷³ J. Sillars Scotland: The Case for Optimism p. 182.

⁷⁴ As Isobel Lindsay put it; “ a response requiring no analysis only image”. I. Lindsay ‘The SNP and the lure of Europe’ in T. Gallagher (ed.) Nationalism in the Nineties p.89.

the existence of a symbiotic bond between the Scottish people and 'Scotland's party'. Using this rhetorical construct, the party sets about politicising a feeling of national belonging. This is an important technique in neo-nationalist party strategy. It aims to establish the party's ideological construction of the nation as common sense within the territory in question, with a view to achieving conceptual hegemony.⁷⁵ This chapter has examined the SNP's interpretation of the Scottish nation through the rhetoric used in selected campaigns. It has gauged the compatibility of this construct with the party's pro-European stance, and found that both aspects are designed to further the party's core goal of self-determination. The following chapter will approach the CSU in the same way, evaluating the Bavarian party's neo-nationalist ideology through its rhetoric. It will become clear that the CSU propounds a world-view which revolves around the immutable core principle of prioritising the Bavarian nation.

⁷⁵ Chapter eight will discuss neo-nationalism in terms of discourse theory.

6 CSU Ideology

“The process of defining is itself an element of political debate. What nation, nation-state, nationalism and the national question might and should mean is a political struggle over concepts and as such a central subject of [...] investigation.”¹

The CSU prides itself on having been a supporter of European integration since the party's creation in 1945, and has more recently characterised itself as a primary player in the development of the concepts of subsidiarity and a 'Europe of the Regions'. At the same time, it has always championed Bavarian interests, often asserting that it is the only party capable of representing Bavaria competently both in Europe and at home. Implicit in this statement is the assumption that the party has a peculiarly Bavarian identity which gives it a special authority to speak for the nation. This chapter uses text analysis to examine how the CSU goes about reconciling its pursuit of Bavarian autonomy with support for further European integration. These principles will be characterised as respectively central and peripheral to the party's ideology. In order to put the party's rhetoric in context, each text will be prefaced with a short discussion of the campaigns for which they were written. In the first section, the analysis will build on the features of nationalist rhetoric identified in the previous chapter. Similarly to the SNP's case, it will be shown that a correspondence between party, people and nation is constructed rhetorically in the context of both national and European campaigning. This will be highlighted using an extract from a speech made by the Bavarian prime minister, Edmund Stoiber, in the weeks preceding the Bavarian parliament election of 13th September 1998.

Using a text from the CSU's 1999 European election campaign as another typical example of party rhetoric, the second section will discuss how the party has integrated a pro-European agenda into its resolutely Bavaria-oriented political programme. The final section of the chapter will examine the difficulties surrounding the use of the German term *Nation* in party rhetoric. The CSU's response to this has been to structure its ideology around the concept of *Heimat*, a term far

¹ F. Roth Die Idee der Nation im politischen Diskurs p.18.

less historically laden than *Nation*. It will be demonstrated that, by making Bavaria a focal point of political mobilisation, the party pursues a neo-nationalist strategy within the overarching structure of German federalism. Far from being a handicap, the choice of the alternative term *Heimat* to describe the Bavarian nation has proved to be a particularly effective means of pursuing the party's core ideological goal of national autonomy.

I CSU Rhetoric and Nationalist Ideology

The CSU's Bavarian Election Campaign, 1998

The CSU won 52.9% of the vote in the Bavarian parliament election, held two weeks before the governing CDU, CSU and FDP coalition lost the German federal election. The Bavarian election result suggests that some of those voters who wanted a change at the federal level still trusted the CSU to manage Bavarian affairs. Furthermore, the party polled 47.7% in the federal election, illustrating that even when the Christian-Democrats did badly in Germany as a whole, CSU support proved to be more resistant.² All the same, this was the CSU's worst result in a federal election since 1949. The fact that it polled well over 50% in the Bavarian parliament election was most reassuring for the party, however, as its Bavarian power base is what enables the CSU to exert influence at the German and European levels. The party's strategy in order to attract undecided voters was to emphasise its conservative identity using campaign themes such as law and order and calls for a tough immigration policy. This is indicative of the fact that the CSU has always seen more of a threat in its support 'fraying at the edges' than in direct confrontation with the SPD. In the run-up to the Bavarian election, the presence of the *Republikaner* and other small parties contributed to CSU opinion poll ratings of between forty-six and forty-eight percent in Bavaria, and prime minister Edmund Stoiber seemed genuinely nervous that the party would not achieve the much sought after fifty percent share of the vote.

² G. Hirscher quotes Edmund Stoiber as saying; "If Helmut Kohl wants to win the general election, then Bavaria needs to achieve an absolute majority for the CSU. Southern Germany must provide the majorities". Die CSU nach den Wahlen 1998 p.433.

The CSU's campaign was run from its headquarters in Munich. The party's fifty-five employees are organised into departments, each with its own remit. The press office alone consists of three employees and is complemented by a public relations department.³ In addition, the CSU has enjoyed the continuous back-up of Bavarian government structures and civil servants (for whom career moves between government posts and positions within the party are not uncommon) over the last fifty years. Like other German parties, the CSU also has its own affiliated trust, which devotes itself to political research and education, among other activities. The *Hanns-Seidel Stiftung* organises conferences and exhibitions and holds highly subsidised seminars in political education for members of the public. It also maintains its own academic research department, library and scholarly publication, and employs four highly-qualified, full-time archivists to administer the large CSU archive. The *Bayernkurier* is the party newspaper, published weekly and printing details of party events, speeches and policy as well as providing very partisan commentary of current affairs in Germany and abroad. Bavarian newspapers such as the *Münchener Merkur* have a rather conservative editorial stance, despite Munich being one of the few places in Bavaria with a socialist mayor. A major daily broadsheet, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, which is edited in Munich but read all over Germany, has a more liberal editorial stance and is not overly sympathetic to the CSU.⁴ Indeed, in a clever caricature published in late 1998, it lampooned many of the symbols employed in CSU rhetoric.⁵

The CSU had a professional approach to the Bavarian election campaign, which had a budget of eighteen million German marks.⁶ The

³ SNP press relations were until recently largely co-ordinated by one man, Kevin Pringle, with Angus Robertson responsible for foreign press relations at election time. Since the Scottish Parliament election, the number of press officers has risen to three.

⁴ The paper published an article on the eve of the Bavarian election listing reasons not to vote CSU. 'Es gibt Gründe, in Bayern nicht CSU zu wählen'. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12th September 1998.

⁵ Among the symbols identified were Alpine dairy maids, rural churches and brass bands, but also microchip factories, nuclear reactors and space travel. 'Das Streiflicht', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 20th December 1998.

⁶ This sum, roughly equivalent to six million pounds sterling, excludes district and local branch expenditure. Source; Josef Lindner.

size of the party machine makes forward planning indispensable and flexibility difficult, especially as outside agencies are often contracted. For instance, the graphics for the campaign were conceived by an advertising agency working to a detailed brief, and the party produced a brochure of campaign materials which were sent to local branches well in advance.⁷ A great deal of attention was paid to the target audience and the imagery used in the campaign. One example was the care taken not to include alpine scenery in the illustrations of Bavaria's countryside, in order not to alienate Franconian voters.⁸ In addition, different portraits of Edmund Stoiber were used on billboards in rural and urban constituencies. According to Markus Schiek, creative director of the campaign, the overall aim was to soften Stoiber's somewhat ascetic image in order to appeal to the urban and youth vote, whilst still conveying an impression of moral rectitude and trustworthiness in the more conservative, rural constituencies. In rural areas he was depicted in a formal pose, sitting behind a desk, wearing a suit and prominently displaying his wedding ring. In the cities he was pictured in a relaxed group setting, wearing an open-necked shirt and carrying his jacket over his shoulder. This last poster was illustrative of the party's attempt to foster a sense of approachability, in order to create the impression that the CSU is concerned with the everyday problems of all Bavarians. The image was consciously reinforced by the prime minister's bus tours of the *Land* during the campaign and the creation of opportunities for him to be approached by members of the public. Analysis of an address by Edmund Stoiber, published in the week before the Bavarian election, will shed light on how the party went about articulating its ideological message during the campaign.

⁷ The presentation of the party's logo, colours, and typeface in this pamphlet was itself a rhetorical *tour de force*; "Green expresses the love for our land and the CSU's attachment to the *Heimat*". ["Grün zeigt die Liebe zu unserem Land und die Heimatverbundenheit der CSU"] p. 13. "A clear, legible and simple typeface, which immediately makes our basic position clear; modern, forward-looking and self-confident". ["Eine klare, gut lesbare und schnörkellose Schrift, die auf den ersten Blick unsere politische Grundhaltung deutlich macht; modern, zukunftsorientiert und selbstbewußt".] p. 14.

⁸ Source; Markus Schiek.

'For Bavaria, with Hearts and Minds'

1 For Love of Bavaria and its People

For Bavaria, with hearts and minds. That is not only the slogan with which we are fighting the Bavarian election for the trust of citizens and for a clear majority. This slogan also describes the spirit in which the CSU and the Bavarian government work for Bavaria: It is love for Bavaria, for its great history, its rich culture, its scenic beauty, its lively variety of tradition and progress. We work for this unique *Land* with innermost conviction, for its people from the regions of *Altbayern*, Franconia and Swabia, which have also become the *Heimat* of those exiled. Because this land's unmistakeable originality/autonomy [*Eigenständigkeit*] is close to our hearts, we are doing everything to preserve the legacy of our diverse traditions, the beauty of nature and the human face of the [Bavarian] republic.

15 However, we also know that Bavaria today, in a world in which national borders are losing their meaning, must take on challenges and competitors. Therefore we continue to be committed to a future that 'speaks Bavarian'.

20 We are fighting with all our might so that Bavaria, with its historically developed cultural identity, remains on course for success and asserts its position in Germany and in an integrating Europe. We represent Bavarian interests against political opponents like the SPD, which sees Bavaria more as subordinate to the federation than as an independent state. It can offer no alternative for the sole reason that, from its competencies to its ability to push measures through, it lacks all capacity to be an advocate for Bavaria at national and international level.

30 Bavaria must remain in good and reliable hands. Our commitment in Bavaria and our success will at the same time be a signal in federal debates as to the future course to be taken

in Germany. The organiser of an insubstantial political show does not earn trust, those with achievements to show earn trust!

35 Bavaria has successfully taken up the challenges of our time. In a cross-Germany comparison, Bavaria has for years had the best labour market situation. Bavaria has an excellent infrastructure at its disposal, a highly-qualified workforce, economic growth, an exemplary welfare state and a high standard of living. These

40 successes are first and foremost to the credit of the hard work and determination of our citizens. But they are also the fruit of future-oriented, consistent government policies, which paved the way for the change from an agrarian land to the most modern of industrial states, with medium-sized business at its

45 heart. We have created economic and social progress and also ensured the preservation of historical, regional identity and the character of rural agriculture, which must remain the soul of our *Land* [...]

Therefore, in the years that lie before us, there is no

50 alternative to our policies – “For Bavaria, with hearts and minds”.

Edmund Stoiber’s address, published on the front page of the party paper, the *Bayernkurier*, shortly before the Bavarian election, is a typical example of CSU rhetoric.⁹ The title itself constructs a correspondence between party and *Land*; it invites the reader to draw the conclusion that anyone who wants the best for Bavaria should vote CSU (line 1). Although this is not yet explicit in the title, there is nonetheless a clear attempt to create a link between emotions such as love and fraternity and a vote for the party. In this way, an *a priori* neutral attachment to Bavaria becomes politically charged. A perception that the party is so rooted in Bavaria as to have become synonymous with it is also being played upon here.¹⁰ Given the territorial focus of mobilisation and the party’s aim to prioritise the autonomy of this community, its rhetoric can be characterised as the politicisation of national identity for nationalist ends.

⁹ *Bayernkurier*, 29th August 1998. The German original of this text is reproduced in Appendix II.

¹⁰ Cf. H. Riehl-Heyse CSU- Die Partei, die das schöne Bayern geschaffen hat.

Stoiber begins his address with the general slogan used in the Bavarian election campaign; "For Bavaria. With hearts and minds" (line 2). The juxtaposition of the irrational and the rational in the campaign slogan is a direct transposition of a neo-nationalist strategy into party rhetoric. It will become clear that, in a way similar to the SNP's 'emotional-economic' approach, the CSU targets both voters' hearts and minds with a mix of concrete policies and emotive appeals. The structure of Stoiber's address provides further evidence of this two-pronged strategy. His speeches almost invariably begin with a declaration of allegiance to the Bavarian *Heimat*, expressed through an evocation of its beauty, its traditions, its history and culture (lines 6-8). Setting the scene in this way provides a rhetorical springboard from which to elaborate a vision of future development. This particular speech begins with a heart-warming sketch of all that is worth loving about Bavaria. The introduction is bursting at the seams with 'feel-good' rhetoric and positive adjectives such as great, rich, lively, unique and diverse (lines 6-13). It is allegedly because Bavaria is close to the CSU's heart that it does everything in its power to protect the *Land's* traditions and natural beauty (lines 13-14). The party is thereby portrayed as having a natural affinity with Bavaria which, implicitly, other parties do not. This is articulated explicitly later on in the text with reference to the SPD (lines 23-25) and again in the conclusion (lines 49-50).

In an example of personification, the human attributes of heart, mind and spirit are ascribed to the CSU and the Bavarian government (lines 2,5). They are also described as feeling motivated by an "innermost conviction" (lines 8-9). This rhetoric is designed to elevate these 'bodies' to a higher plane than other parties, which merely jostle for power. They fight for trust (line 3), conjuring up images of crusaders engaged in a moral battle between right and wrong. Their work is also presented as a labour of love (line 6), and as such is equated rhetorically to a vocation. Furthermore, an organisation which is moved by an inner conviction to work for a cause has connotations of a charity engaged in good works rather than a calculating, strategically thinking political party. All of these images contribute to the forging of a rhetorical link between the party and the *Land*, one that

rises above petty politics and has an enduring, symbiotic quality. Should voters accept that the relationship between party and *Land* is as close and loving as Stoiber claims, another possible effect of the rhetoric is that the list of positive Bavarian attributes (lines 6-8) might come to be associated with the CSU in their minds.

As befits a Bavarian election address, the *Land* remains the focal point when the scope of the text is widened to Germany and Europe. In this context, the party watchword is that future progress must 'speak Bavarian' (line 19).¹¹ Paradoxically, Stoiber's metaphorical response to globalisation and international competition is to evoke a traditional dialect. The phrase '*Laptop und Lederhose*' expresses the juxtaposition of past and future in an even more succinct form.¹² New connotations are evidently being played upon here; a crossover is being operated from the image of Bavaria as a *Land* rich in tradition and culture to Bavaria as a model of innovation and dynamism. This is underlined in lines 20 to 23. An identity rooted in history is combined with contemporary success (lines 21-22), suggesting that these alleged Bavarian characteristics are not only compatible but also mutually dependent. Further, the concepts of tradition and progress recall an extremely well-known and oft-quoted phrase coined by Franz Josef Strauss; "To be Conservative means to march at the head of progress".¹³ The presence of the CSU in 'the Bavarian equation' is strongly emphasised. The party is portrayed as fighting with all its might (line 20) for Bavarian interests and the preservation of Bavarian identity (line 21).

The theme of the CSU's protective mission is extended to the issue of Bavarian autonomy. The party is depicted as being engaged in a struggle at a national and international level against the homogenising or centralising tendencies of federal Germany and the European Union respectively (lines 22-23). The SPD, as a Germany-

¹¹ This phrase is a reprise of an article entitled 'Der Fortschritt spricht bayerisch', published in the magazine *GEO* in 1986.

¹² The phrase was originally coined by former German president Roman Herzog and is often quoted with approval by those close to the CSU.

¹³ ["[Strauß] konnte zurecht sagen: Konservativ sein heißt an der Spitze des Fortschritts marschieren".] From a speech by Edmund Stoiber on the 10th anniversary of Franz Josef Strauß's death, 3rd October 1998.

wide party, is neatly equated with the evils of German centralism and roundly condemned as incapable of representing Bavaria (lines 24-25). At this stage, the syntax conveys a greater sense of dynamism than the more reflective evocation of Bavaria in the introduction. The use of descriptive adjectives makes way for a higher concentration of verbs. At the same time, the mood is somewhat aggressive, underlined by the use of words such as fighting, might, asserts, represent, opponents, advocate (lines 20-28). These successive moments of the argument represent the rhetorical translation of the themes of tradition and progress.

The CSU is presented as a champion of Bavarian sovereignty against opponents who place Bavaria in a subordinate position (line 25). In order to heighten the rhetorical effect, the contrast with a party which can be trusted to prioritise Bavarian interests is underlined; "Bavaria must remain in good and reliable hands" (line 30). This sentence signals a move away from the portrayal of Bavaria as the underdog, forced to defend its position against outside encroachment, to an assertion of its role as the trend-setter in German affairs (lines 32-33). A list of its enviable record in various policy areas is designed to establish the *Land's* good credentials. It also recalls the rhetorical technique of emphasising Bavaria's positive attributes which was used earlier in the text, supplementing the evocation of traditional aspects with progressive ones.

Throughout the text, traditional and modern aspects of Bavarian identity have been reconciled in CSU rhetoric. Furthermore, the CSU has been characterised as a uniquely capable and thus indispensable protector of this composite identity. The party has defined the nation according to its ideological principles, before proceeding to connect this construct with the electorate's inchoate sense of national identity. Political mobilisation along national lines is then linked to a vote for the party, characterised as the ideal representative of the national constituency. In the course of the text, a subtle elision of party and people takes place. Those responsible for Bavaria's economic and social achievements are identified first of all as its citizens, but in the second place as the Bavarian government

(lines 40-42). The word 'we' introducing the next sentence is thus ambiguous; it is unclear whether the CSU or the Bavarian population is the subject (line 45). This creates the illusion that all are working together towards the same goals. By this stage in the argument, the CSU's ideological principles of tradition and progress are shaping its description of the Bavarian *status quo* (lines 45-46). What is more, the text emphasises the role of the CSU in bringing about this state of affairs (line 42). Present-day Bavarian 'reality' is depicted as a successful fusion of economic and social progress and historical, regional identity. The CSU is thus presented as both mother and midwife of Bavarian prosperity.

Throughout the text, party policies are portrayed as part of Bavarian - and by extension CSU - tradition. Voters are to be left in no doubt that the CSU was responsible for making this vision of Bavaria a reality.¹ Later on in the text, Stoiber affirms that past CSU politicians made their future vision for Bavaria a reality "worth living".² Not content to hammer home the CSU's allegedly central role in moulding Bavaria in its image, Stoiber's address ends by projecting the party's ideological characterisation of Bavaria into the future (lines 49-50). To maintain that there is no alternative to the CSU's political ideology is a daring assertion. However, the symbiosis of party, *Land*, people and prosperity has been emphasised continuously throughout the text, and this statement simply summarises the argument. It restates that the CSU is the only truly Bavarian party, that it has contributed to the character of Bavaria and should continue to do so in the future. An image of Bavaria has been constructed which gives the impression that the party is an indispensable part of its make-up. Further, national identity has been politically mobilised by creating a correspondence between love for the *Heimat* and a vote for the CSU. The politicisation

¹ The same idea was formulated much more directly by Stoiber when he said that Bavaria's continuous positive development since the end of the war was thanks to the CSU. ["Bayern konnte seit Kriegsende eine kontinuierliche Entwicklung nehmen – und dank der CSU war es eine kontinuierliche Aufwärtsentwicklung."] From a speech by Edmund Stoiber on the 10th anniversary of Franz Josef Strauß's death, 3rd October 1998.

² ["All dies wurde erreicht, weil führende Persönlichkeiten in CSU und Staatsregierung [...] einen kühnen Zukunftsentwurf für den Freistaat mit Beharrlichkeit und Augenmaß lebenswerte Wirklichkeit werden ließen."] Edmund Stoiber in the *Bayernkurier*, 29th August 1998.

of national identity is a crucial element of neo-nationalist ideology. It is the rhetorical expression of the CSU's core commitment to Bavarian autonomy. The following section will examine how the party has incorporated the peripheral question of European integration into its ideology, beginning with an overview of its 1999 European election campaign.

II CSU Rhetoric and European Integration

The CSU's European Election Campaign, 1999

In the European election on June 13th 1999, the CSU polled sixty-four percent of the Bavarian vote – its best ever result – and sent ten MEPs to Brussels.³ This was two more than in 1994, and helped to reassert the party's hegemony in Bavaria after the Christian Democrats' disappointing loss of the German federal election to a coalition of the SPD and the Greens in 1998. As Bavarian prime minister and CSU party chairman, Edmund Stoiber is the figurehead of his party and an instantly recognisable politician in the *Land*. Consequently, the 1999 European election campaign focused on him, although he was not standing for election. Despite his strong views on the single currency, the campaign managed to profile the CSU leader as a committed supporter of integration. There was a conscious attempt to personalise the campaign in an effort to render European politics less abstract and remote. Consequently, each party candidate was allocated to a region within Bavaria. The party's strong Bavaria-specific identity allowed it to include a sub-Bavarian dimension without risking too much confusion over the term 'region'.⁴ Stoiber represented the Bavarian level which, it was emphasised, could only properly be represented in Europe by the CSU.⁵

³ For an account of the election in Germany as a whole, see L. Helms *Turning Indifference into a Minor Landslide: The 1999 European Elections in Germany*.

⁴ Although the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the federal German *Länder* is one of the highest in Europe, the influence they wield in EU organs such as the Committee of the Regions is simply on a par with other regional administrative units. However, Bavaria is acutely aware and defensive of its status as a *Freistaat*, or republic, and would regard the seven *Bezirke*, or districts within Bavaria, as regions proper.

⁵ According to the research body *Forschungsgruppe Wahlen*, which conducts research into German elections, this assertion resonates with the Bavarian electorate.

In line with the tendency, as prevalent in Germany as in the UK, to see European elections as a barometer of government popularity, the campaign also incorporated critiques of some of the German government's domestic measures. Other campaign themes stressed the need to increase European accountability and pare down Euro-bureaucracy, to strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the light of the Kosovo conflict, and to reduce German payments to EU coffers. The question of European monetary union had been a source of friction within the CSU for quite some time, with differences of opinion amongst the leadership tarnishing its image as a united party.⁶ The strategic reason for Stoiber's cautious stance is made clear by his somewhat over-dramatic words; "If the Euro-project doesn't work, then the CSU will slip under fifty percent. And that is the beginning of the end of the CSU".⁷ Another campaign theme underlined the importance accorded by the CSU to Bavarian autonomy; the party demanded that the European Commission's competences be defined by treaty. The CSU continues to be concerned that the *Länder* have been deprived of certain areas of authority in the creeping process of centralisation within the German federation. The party fears that the same could occur at the EU level and this informs its position on the regulation of the Commission's authority.

The CSU's budget for its European campaign was far higher than that of the SNP, although each lasted for about a month overall. The Bavarian party spent over six million German marks (approximately two million pounds sterling), excluding expenditure at the party's district and branch levels. Its campaign culminated in a small-scale party conference, which was designed to attract as much of the media's

In the context of the 1994 European election, they found that the CSU was well anchored in all social groups and considered by them to be the archetype of a Bavarian state party. ["Die bayerische Staatspartei schlechthin".] Cited in G. Hirscher Die CSU nach den Wahlen 1998 p. 425

⁶ Chapter seven discusses the stance taken by Stoiber in the debate surrounding the euro.

⁷ Cited by G. Hirscher Die CSU nach den Wahlen 1998 p.430.

attention as possible. Unusually, no CSU European party manifesto was published, only a series of European policy principles in April 1999. Prior to the beginning of the campaign, endless meetings were held in which the connotations of each frame and image of the European election broadcasts were discussed.²¹ Filming was entrusted to a professional company and four days of shooting were required. In addition to the public channel slots, broadcast time was booked on all private television channels (with the film being shown up to twenty-five times on some), and ran in almost all Bavarian cinemas. The radio broadcasts were played fifty times on all of forty-three Bavarian radio stations. The party identified women, pensioners, farmers and the fourth Bavarian *Stamm* of expellees as those most likely to vote. These groups were targeted through advertising in a total of forty-five papers, many of them with specialised readerships.²² A direct mailing signed by Edmund Stoiber to over three million Bavarian households complemented this. Such an approach emphasises that CSU campaigning was on a much larger scale than the SNP's effort. Although the CSU was also interested in mobilising loyal voters, its potential pool of support is much more extensive than that of the Scottish party. Nonetheless, analysis of a text produced for the campaign will reveal certain similarities to the SNP's rhetoric on Europe. The text, written by the candidate heading the party list, sets out the guiding principles of CSU European policy.

'The Champion of Bavarian Interests'

- 1 The CSU's Ten Points for Europe
 For the 13th of June the motto is; the CSU is the force that moves.
 We are the champion of Bavarian interests
- 5 We stand for a credible European policy, which successfully presents Bavarian interests to their best advantage. Bavaria needs a strong and experienced representative in Europe. In the

²¹ Source; Julia Hartmann.

²² For instance, the *Sudetendeutsche Zeitung*, the *Deutsch-Russische Zeitung* and the *Slesische Nachrichten* are all targeted at a readership of expellees, who might be expected to be particularly interested in the issue of EU enlargement.

future just as in the past we will be the guardians of Bavaria's interests and citizens in Europe.

10 **We stand for a Europe of Nations and Regions**

We need a Europe in which Bavaria and Germany can fulfil their roles. The regions and nations provide their citizens with identity and solidarity. They are also indispensable in the future as the carriers of European integration.

15 **We are fighting for a clean Europe**

After the resignation of the entire EU commission we will pay strict attention to ensure that only the most qualified public figures are appointed under the new commission president, Prodi. We support "quality not quotas". That also includes purging and

20 restructuring the EU commission. Citizens have the right to see their taxes used correctly.

We are the most competent party in European questions

No other party of Bavaria has acquired competence in the field of European policy to a degree comparable with that of the

25 CSU. Surveys show that a large majority of citizens trust the CSU the most to solve difficult European problems.

We want to give agriculture a fair chance

Farmers' revenue must be assured. We should preserve the agrarian structure of the family farming businesses typical of

30 Bavaria, which produce high quality food and cultivate our unique cultural landscape [*Kulturlandschaft*].

We are showing the red card to the red-green coalition's 'chaos politics' in Bonn

Chancellor Schröder came up with the motto: "Not all different, but a lot better". We now know that the federal government does everything worse. Instead of tackling necessary reforms it is bringing back the old, and it sells out on German interests in

40 Europe. This team facing relegation deserves only one thing on the 13th of June; the red card.

Eastern enlargement requires far-sightedness and perceptiveness

Eastern enlargement is in Bavaria, Germany and Europe's

45 political and economic interests. In order to avoid problems in agriculture and in the jobs market, especially in the border regions of Bavaria, a transitional period is required.

Western Christian values must remain the leading culture [Leitkultur]

50 We are opposed to the illusion of a multicultural society. Due to insufficient integration and homogeneity, it endangers stability and internal peace within Europe. Western Christian culture must remain the guiding culture in Europe.

We guarantee unified, coherent policies

55 The success of our modern policies in Bavaria and at the federal level show that we are right. Our conception of politics, which consists of expertise, closeness to the citizen and the linking of tradition with modernity, is a general model not only for Bavaria, but for all of Europe.

60 **The European parliament must become a counterweight in Europe**

Given the majority of socialists in the member state governments, we need the European parliament, which has become a co-legislator with equal rights, to be a Christian democrat, citizens'

65 counter-pole. That's only possible with a strong CSU.

This summary of CSU policy on the EU, published in the week preceding the European election, exemplifies the party's Bavaria-centred approach to questions of European integration.²³ The very first point makes this clear, with its pledge to make European policy subordinate to Bavarian interests (lines 5-6). The word choice - credible, successfully, strong and experienced (lines 5-7) - sums up the CSU's self-image. The party presents itself as a champion and guardian (line 4, line 8), reinforcing the image it seeks to create of itself as a trustworthy and competent Bavarian emissary to Europe. This theme continues with a more wide-ranging, but still resolutely self-centred appraisal of the European project in point two (line 10). National and regional rights are presented as potentially in conflict

²³ *Bayernkurier*, 5th June 1999. The German original of this text is reproduced in Appendix II.

with integration (lines 10-11). The solidarity referred to here is not European, but instead anchors the party unequivocally within the Bavarian and German contexts which are at the centre of its vision of the EU (lines 12-13). It seems that the protection of identity must guide and limit further integration above other economic or political considerations (lines 13-14). Readers are left in no doubt that the party's loyalty lies with them as Bavarians as opposed to with Europe. The text constructs a rhetorical binary of 'citizens versus Europe', somewhat surprising perhaps for an avowedly pro-European party.

As the third point illustrates, the CSU wishes to be seen as the party which can still voter anxieties regarding obscure European machinations (line 15). There is no hesitation to show the EU in a bad light by mentioning the Commission scandal so early in the text. The party does not identify with EU institutions but instead shows wariness of them (lines 16-17), thus replicating a common voter attitude towards the EU in general. This links up with the theme of the reliable and experienced champion of Bavarian interests which returns in point four. It is supplemented with the party's by now familiar assertion that there is no serious alternative to it in the political arena, whether it be that of Bavaria or the EU (lines 23-26). Point six backs up this claim with topical examples of alleged 'chaos politics' on the part of the German federal government. This alludes to the CSU's influential role in a third political arena (lines 32-33).

References to Gerhard Schröder, the federal government and topical political debates in Germany are not strictly relevant to the European context. However, the election is explicitly being presented here as an opinion poll on the German government's performance. The rhetoric used is populist and simplistic; the government's policies are simply characterised as chaotic (line 33), everything they do is portrayed as bad (line 36), and voters are urged to act in terms of football metaphors (lines 40-41). In general, however, the text does engage with a range of European issues, from the guiding principles for future integration, through reform of the Commission, to the question of eastern enlargement. It is also admitted that "difficult European problems" remain to be solved (line 26). Thus, the text is not a polemic

for or against the process of European integration as such. It is taken as read that the EU is a worthwhile project, and a pragmatic approach is favoured. The text's treatment of specific aspects of European policy does something to tackle the abstract nature of many EU issues to voters and to bolster the party's claim to have expertise in European matters.

Continuing to illustrate that the CSU does not shy away from contemporary European issues, point five tackles the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (lines 27-31). The relatively prominent position given to the issue of agriculture is motivated by primarily domestic and not European considerations, however. Indeed, it is intended to reassure farmers, an important Bavarian interest group and a traditional source of CSU support, that European integration will not endanger their livelihoods. The treatment of the theme of agriculture, then, is more symbolic than informative; the party's proposals for reform of the CAP are not even alluded to. Instead, the text emphasises the importance of the sector as representative of Bavaria's cultural landscape (line 31). The farming community is a small but vocal minority in Bavarian politics and also the archetype of Bavarian Catholic conservatism. Consequently, rural life is a marker of traditional Bavarian identity and a potent symbol for neo-nationalists to exploit strategically. This is vividly portrayed in the concept of *Kulturlandschaft*, which also often accompanies evocations of the *Heimat* in party rhetoric. This term conjures up images of the *Land's* uniqueness and the breadth of its culture, embodied in the beauty of the Bavarian countryside. Point seven, which addresses eastern enlargement, has a similar domestic focus (lines 42-47). These points illustrate the instrumentality of the CSU's pro-European stance to its neo-nationalist ideology. Prime minister Stoiber's rapid image transformation from EMU-sceptic to a committed supporter of European integration for the purposes of the election campaign is another case in point.²⁴

Points eight and nine seek to apply the party's ideological interpretation of Bavarian and German society to Europe in general,

²⁴ See chapter seven for a fuller discussion of this point.

prompting the rather implausible assertion that European society is not multicultural. In fact, point eight introduces another domestic issue disguised as a European question. The references to homogeneity, stability and internal peace should accordingly be understood in terms of the German immigration debate, which will be discussed further in section three below. The CSU considers that to accept Germany's multicultural nature would endanger social peace, and sets its requirements for the naturalisation of immigrants accordingly. In order that the German 'leading culture' remain undiluted, it holds the view that the acceptance of German constitutional principles, a grasp of the German language and active participation in German society should be preconditions for the acquisition of citizenship. Despite inherent difficulties, the text introduces the concept of 'leading culture' into the European arena (line 48). This immediately raises the question as to how a shared western, Christian culture can be reconciled with the party's defence of European diversity, emphasised in point two of the text. Returning to the original German case, only the idea of shared constitutional principles can plausibly be transposed to the European arena.²⁵ The EU's requirement that its member states be democratic springs to mind as an example. The concept of *Leitkultur* is used here to assert that a certain degree of European homogeneity must be preserved. To be sure, the terms 'western' and 'Christian' are at least as exclusive as inclusive; Muslim, Arab and other non-European cultures are explicitly excluded.

The CSU asserts the existence of a set of fundamental principles and values, however exclusive, which transcend the individuality of member states. This amounts to an expression of party support for a form of integration which goes beyond economic cooperation. In turn, the European project must be formulated in terms that are compatible with the nationalist core of CSU ideology. This is made explicit in point nine of the text, in which the CSU confidently states that its *Weltanschauung*, the 'correctness' of which has been vouched for by Bavarian voters, should be applied generally at the European level (lines 55-59). Coupled to the pragmatic principles of

²⁵ Interviewees also cited the rule of law and respect for human rights as components in the CSU's concept of western Christian culture, but the import of these principles is far from fixed.

expertise and closeness to the citizen is the party's trademark combination of tradition and modernity (line 58). Its ideology is deemed to be worthy of export if only to save the EU from left-wing control, completing the CSU's transformation from a protector of the ordinary citizen to a beacon of conservative values in Europe (lines 62-65). A confrontational tone can thus once again be detected in the portrayal of the European Union as a den of socialists (due to the currently high proportion of member states with left-of-centre governments.)

Franz Josef Strauß's oft-repeated interpretation of integration as the guarantor of European freedom and peace remains a basic principle of CSU policy today.²⁶ Strauß was at pains to contrast this vision with Eastern European socialism. The title of the 1979 European manifesto, for instance, read; "A free future, no to socialism".²⁷ Although this aspect has been toned down somewhat since the end of the Cold War, point ten shows how the underlying confrontation between a socialist and conservative *Weltanschauung* was adapted and revived in the 1999 election campaign. The vote itself is presented in the text as a choice between a socialist and a Christian democratic vision of Europe (lines 64-65).²⁸ In general, the favourite CSU theme of *Bürgernahe*, or closeness to the people, was juxtaposed to the centralism and high levels of bureaucracy allegedly characteristic of socialist government.²⁹ This is mentioned in point nine of the text (line 57), and constituted an important theme in the European campaign as a whole. European parliamentary candidate Alexander Radwan summed up the tone of the

²⁶ "Europe's essence is freedom, Europe's task is peace!" ["Europas Wesen ist die Freiheit, Europas Aufgabe ist der Friede!"] From a speech by Franz Josef Strauß to a CSU European congress, 19th May 1984.

²⁷ ["Zukunft in Freiheit, Nein zum Sozialismus."] References to "collectivist false doctrine, totalitarian ideologies and false doctrines of salvation" ["kollektivistische Irrlehren [...] totalitäre Ideologien [und] falsche Heilslehren"] crop up frequently in the body of the manifesto. *CSU European Manifesto*, 1979.

²⁸ A brochure published by CSU MEPs in February 1999 described a vote for the CSU in the European election as a decision against a left-wing Europe. ["Richtungentschied gegen linkes Europa".]

²⁹ In his European election campaign leaflet, the CSU candidate Bernd Posselt declared himself to be in favour of a free and Christian Europe and against the predominance of socialism; ["Für ein freies und christliches Europa, gegen ein sozialistisches Übergewicht".]

rhetoric in his election leaflet; “I am for a Europe of citizens, not for a Europe of bureaucrats”.³⁰

‘A strong Bavaria for Europe’

The party’s overall slogan for the European elections was ‘*Bayern stark für Europa*’ translated as ‘A strong Bavaria for Europe’. In a similar way to points nine and ten of the text, it exudes self-confidence in its affirmation that Bavaria’s strength can be put to good use in furthering the European project. The juxtaposition of Bavaria with the attribute of strength is one which permeates much of CSU rhetoric. This is underlined by the subtitle to the CSU logo which was to be found on all European campaign materials and in line 2 of the text; ‘*CSU - die Kraft, die bewegt*’, translated as ‘CSU - the force that moves’. Although the verb - which has the same range of meaning in both English and German - refers primarily to the ability to get things done, the alternative sense of something that is emotionally moving should not be neglected. Indeed, the slogan succinctly renders the ‘emotional-economic’ character of CSU rhetoric. As ‘the force that moves’, the CSU pledges to continue working for the *Land*, reinforcing the idea of progress which is prominent in its rhetoric.

The European campaign slogan “A strong Bavaria for Europe” uses the word *for* to convey a spiritual appeal. Indeed, *for* can be interpreted to mean ‘for the European cause’, thereby suggesting that Bavaria’s strength has a purpose. In turn, this can be linked to the party’s understanding of the European project as a means of achieving peace in Europe. The slogan presents Bavaria as a protector of the EU and its ideals in a way which may be out of proportion to the *Land*’s actual influence, but serves the rhetorical purpose of making the voter feel at once secure and empowered in European affairs. A measure of self-importance flows from the self-confidence permeating the party’s rhetoric. In keeping with this, the European project is presented as an inspiring higher goal in which all can share. The slogan also plays on the idiomatic German phrase ‘*sich für etwas stark machen*’, which means to promote something enthusiastically. In an attempt to overcome apathy towards European matters, voters - addressed as a

³⁰ [“Ich bin für ein Europa der Bürger und nicht der Bürokraten”.]

nation- are urged to invest in the European cause. The link to the forward-looking phrase '*sich stark machen*' imbues the slogan with a constructive dynamism which complements the positive portrayal of Bavaria as strong. Finally, the European campaign slogan is nationalist in that it assumes the reader will identify with Bavaria and feel spoken to directly as a member of the nation. Bavaria, portrayed as a strong, united entity, is used as shorthand for the electorate and for its participation in the national mobilisation *for* Europe.

If the dual themes of tradition and progress attempt to situate the CSU's strategy in time, then its ideological interpretations of Bavaria and Europe can be seen as the spatial counterpart. The core principle of CSU ideology focuses on Bavarian self-determination, whereas the EU emerges as a peripheral principle gravitating around the prioritisation of Bavarian interests. Both are portrayed as complementary aspects of CSU ideology rather than as irreconcilable opposites. Strauß's rendering of the relationship was that; "Politics *for* Bavaria does not mean the same as politics *in* Bavaria".³¹ Despite a generally positive attitude towards the EU, CSU rhetoric becomes defensive when the preservation of Bavarian culture and autonomy is at stake. What is more, the party is not afraid to criticise certain aspects of the integration process. This illustrates to what extent the party's strategy vis-à-vis Europe is ultimately subordinate to its core ideological goal of preserving Bavarian *Eigenstaatlichkeit*, literally translated into English as 'sovereignty'. Sharing sovereignty in certain areas is found to be expedient by the party, but it actively demands the retention of many of its existing competencies. The CSU articulates this goal in terms of the Bavarian *Heimat*. However, it remains to be seen to what extent the party's understanding of the term *Heimat* can be equated to a nationalist interpretation of the nation. In order to answer this question, the next section will examine the history of the concept and its usage in CSU rhetoric.

³¹ ["Politik *für* Bayern ist nicht gleichbedeutend mit Politik *in* Bayern."] Franz Josef Strauß, quoted by Edmund Stoiber in a speech commemorating the 10th anniversary of Strauß's death on 3rd October 1998.

III The Bavarian Heimat

By rhetorically relating the CSU to the *Land* of Bavaria, the party is attempting to make the ideological linkage of a politically neutral Bavarian identity and a vote for the party appear common sense. For instance, a great deal of CSU rhetoric hinges on an appeal to love for the Bavarian *Heimat*.³² Further, the economic strength of the *Land* is underlined, and linked to fifty years of CSU government. This consolidates the illusion that these aspects of Bavarian society and the CSU's place within it form a logical, durable whole as opposed to an ideologically shaped, temporary formation open to question and change. Further, it will be shown that the prioritisation and politicisation of the *Heimat* much resembles the strategy employed by nationalist ideologues. The concept is symbolic of the party's ideological vision of Bavaria, and can thus be construed as shorthand for its core goal of preserving Bavarian autonomy. In turn, this core is combined with a range of peripheral principles with which it might at first seem incompatible, such as support for European integration.³³ Another apparent contradiction is the coupling of traditional and modernising elements in the CSU's ideology by means of references both to love for Bavarian traditions and an innovative economic programme. This combination of conservatism and progress is undoubtedly facilitated by the concept of *Heimat* which, as Alon Confino has demonstrated in his historical survey of the term's meaning, at once "glorified the past and celebrated modernity".³⁴ Confino goes on to point out that by the turn of the twentieth century, the *Heimat* was portrayed visually as an idealised combination of cityscape and landscape, thus emphasising "the coexistence of local and national identities and the reciprocity between tradition and modernity".³⁵ The preceding text analyses can be cited as evidence that the CSU interprets the concept of the *Heimat* in the same way.

³² Cf. C. Sutherland Nation, Heimat, Vaterland: The Reinvention of Concepts by the Bavarian CSU Party.

³³ "At first sight, one might think that Europeanisation and regionalisation were opposing, even contradictory developments." E. Huber in T. Waigel (ed.) Unsere Zukunft heißt Europa p. 100.

³⁴ A. Confino Nation as a Local Metaphor p. 121.

³⁵ *Ibid.* p. 122.

In his book entitled 'Nation as a Local Metaphor', Confino identifies the need for a study tracing the process of 'imagining' a nation.³⁶ Based on an exegesis of printed texts and images produced in Germany between 1871 and 1914, his own study achieves this aim by charting how the definition of the term *Heimat* was gradually widened to mean not only the locality, but also the nation. From being a mediating concept between local life and the abstract nation, Confino demonstrates that the *Heimat* came to symbolise Germany as a whole, until the conception of *deutsche Heimat* became corrupted by Nazi ideology. However, Celia Applegate points out that the concept was "pulled out of the rubble of the Nazi *Reich* as a victim, not a perpetrator" and came to embody once more the local patriotism which had been discouraged by Nazism.³⁷ Both authors are of the view that the *Heimat*, as a symbolic haven of peace and thus the antithesis of war, was an apolitical focus of solidarity.³⁸ As such, it became a vehicle for "speaking the unspeakable" horror of the Third Reich in order to transcend it.³⁹ The following section aims to build on these studies by illustrating the way in which the CSU then appropriated the concept of *Heimat* for its own political ends. The party's articulation of the term sets out to equate the *Heimat* with a national construct in much the same way as Confino shows to have been the case before the First World War. However, in the CSU's case, the national construct in question is more localised than Germany as a whole. Indeed, it will be shown that the CSU has interpreted the *Heimat* to correspond to Bavaria and politicised the concept in order to further its core goal of Bavarian autonomy. To quote Alon Confino once more; "What makes the *Heimat* idea so interesting is that it reveals the profundity of the national idea".⁴⁰

The CSU has attempted to present the twelve years of Nazi rule as a tragic hiatus in Bavarian state tradition and continue a process of

³⁶ Cf. B. Anderson *Imagined Communities*.

³⁷ C. Applegate *Heimat; A Nation of Provincials* p. 228.

³⁸ "The *Heimat* idea was not connected to one political party [...] it was open to appropriations by various political movements. Its political message was implicit and ambiguous". A. Confino *Nation as a Local Metaphor* p. 187.

³⁹ C. Applegate *Heimat; A Nation of Provincials* p. 228.

⁴⁰ A. Confino *Nation as a Local Metaphor* p. 214.

nation-building which began with the creation of the Bavarian Monarchy in 1806.⁴¹ The party derives its vision of Bavaria from a historical myth of statehood, territorial continuity and a democratic state of law which also recognises internal diversity. Particularly important to it is the preservation of Bavaria's long-standing, though limited, legislative sovereignty and administrative autonomy.⁴² The CSU chooses to express this politically not in demands for full independence, but by making its presence felt within the federal republic of Germany. Indeed, in government the party follows a Bavarian historical trend in its spirited defence of the rights of the German *Länder*. Without ever demanding independence, the CSU has sought to preserve the maximum degree of state sovereignty possible. In this sense it can be considered a contemporary nationalist party, for to describe only movements demanding a sovereign state as nationalist is anachronistic.⁴³ The history of the CSU is closely intertwined with post-war Bavaria. Indeed, in CSU rhetoric, the party itself is used to symbolise a sense of Bavarian belonging. It even imputes recognition of its Bavarian character and achievements to voters for other parties.⁴⁴ A comparison with the integrative function of identifying with a monarch would not be exaggerated. The late Franz Josef Strauß, long-time leader of the CSU and probably the man who most influenced the party's direction and image, was mourned in a spectacular ceremony to

⁴¹ "The period of Nazi rule did not fully sever our people from its history and its traditions". ["Die NS-Zeit [...] hat unser Volk [...] nicht völlig von seiner Geschichte und seinen Traditionen getrennt".] From a speech by Franz Josef Strauß celebrating forty years of the CSU in Munich on 19th September 1985.

⁴² "Bavarian sovereignty is the political protector of the Bavarian way of life [...] Bavaria, the oldest German state and one of the oldest states in Europe, should never be allowed to sink to the level of a mere administrative province". ["Den politischen Schutz und Schirm für dieses bayerische Leben bildet die bayerische Eigenstaatlichkeit [...] Bayern, der älteste deutsche Staat und einer der ältesten Staaten Europas darf niemals zu einer bloßen Verwaltungsprovinz absinken".] From a speech by Max Streibl in Munich on 6th July 1990.

⁴³ Many neo-nationalist movements, in Catalonia and Wales for instance, campaign for a degree of autonomy more suited to current regionalising and globalising tendencies.

⁴⁴ In the run-up to the 1999 European election, Stoiber reported the results of a survey in which it was asked which party protects Bavaria's cultural traditions and autonomy in an integrating Europe. Allegedly, more than 80% replied that it was the CSU, including 77% of SPD voters. The question is indeed highly suggestive of the answer; as a conservative party the CSU is generally associated with the preservation of tradition and Bavarian autonomy.

rival that of King Ludwig II of Bavaria in its display of pomp and public grief.⁴⁵

The CSU asserts the existence of a Bavarian 'imagined community', and uses historical myths to back up this claim in its rhetoric. The Bavarian constitution refers to one thousand years of history, but this has since been overtaken by more impressive party estimates; CSU politicians now talk of one thousand five hundred or even two thousand years of historical continuity.⁴⁶ However, this alludes to what is known as *Altbayern*, or old Bavaria. Ruled by the Wittelsbach princes since the twelfth century, it is historically less fragmented than the regions of Franconia to the north and Swabia to the west, which also belong to the modern Bavarian state. In this way, certain elements of history are selectively 'forgotten' and others 'remembered' with an ideological goal in mind. As the scholar of nationalism Ernest Gellner concluded, the answer to his playful question "Do nations have navels?" was in fact immaterial, since the characteristics of a nation necessarily depend on the modern reinterpretation of history.⁴⁷ In this way, the CSU politically mobilises some aspects of Bavarian history over others, such as Bavaria's experience of soviet rule! What makes the party's ideology nationalist, however, is that Bavaria remains its central organising principle. The CSU rhetorically expresses love for the Bavarian *Heimat* and the need to preserve and defend it in much the same way as nationalists prioritise the nation. An examination of the difficulty of articulating the concept of *Nation* in Germany will clarify the CSU's reasons for privileging *Heimat* as a focus for political mobilisation.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Further, Franz Josef Strauß's reputation outside Bavaria is an indicator of his success in bringing Bavarians together. An uncommonly popular politician and prime minister in his homeland, he was regarded as dangerous and reactionary by many in the rest of Germany.

⁴⁶ "Next year we will celebrate 1500 years of Bavarian statehood [...] We are one of the oldest states in Europe and we will self-confidently make our voice heard in Bonn and in Europe". ["Wir feiern im nächsten Jahr 1500 Jahre bayerische Staatlichkeit [...] Wir sind einer der ältesten Staaten in Europa, und wir werden selbstbewußt unsere Stimme erheben in Bonn und in Europa".] From a speech by Max Streibl on Ash Wednesday 1992, printed in the *Bayernkurier*, 14th March 1992.

⁴⁷ E. Gellner *Nationalism* Ch. 15.

⁴⁸ For a reading of the term *Heimat* from the perspective of cultural studies see D. Morley & K. Robins 'No place like *Heimat*: Images of Home(land) in European Culture' and J. Peck 'Rac(e)ing the Nation: Is there a German 'Home?'' in G. Eley & R. Suny (eds.) *Becoming National: A Reader*.

Although the CSU is termed nationalist for the purposes of the present theoretical discussion, in terms of the party's own ideology, Bavaria is not a nation and the CSU is not a nationalist party. When we consider the degree of disrepute into which the terms *Nation* and *Vaterland* had fallen by 1945, it is evident that any attempt to rehabilitate or redefine them would have been counterproductive, at least in the short term. An attempt by German writers, academics and politicians to do just that in 1971 revealed to what extent pejorative connotations continued to cling to the concepts.⁴⁹ According to Friedrich Roth;

The disavowal of one's own national tradition, the delegitimation of nationalism as a result of one's own history were also fundamental. It goes without saying that National Socialism, interpreted as a lesson on the inhuman results extreme nationalism can lead to, is being alluded to here.⁵⁰

Klaus Weigelt, editor of a book of texts arguing for the rehabilitation of the concept of patriotism in Germany, refers to *Vaterland* and *Nation* as "sullied concepts."⁵¹ He proposes a return to pre-Nazi interpretations which differ sharply from connotations of superiority, hatred and conquest.⁵² Even in this academic context, however, the term *Nationalismus* is considered to be irrevocably associated with power and expansion. The gist of the argument is to compare and contrast it with a positive, healthy patriotism, which in turn is linked to the relatively unencumbered concept of *Heimat*.

Patriotism grows from the smaller unit, from the family, the *Heimat*, the region [...] Nationalism has a fixation for size, it wants the greater nation, the powerful state, a wide *Lebensraum* [...] Patriotism has more to do with having one's heart at peace.⁵³

⁴⁹ The transcript of the discussion, in which well-known writers such as Heinrich Böll and Günter Grass participated, is published in A. Mischerlich & K. Kalow (eds.) Hauptworte- Hauptsache. Heimat, Nation.

⁵⁰ F. Roth Die Idee der Nation im politischen Diskurs p.21.

⁵¹ K. Weigelt (ed.) Patriotismus in Europa p. 4.

⁵² Cf. "Cosmopolitanism and patriotism are not opposites. He who is at home and rooted in his own land will understand and respect his neighbour's patriotism". R. von Weizsäcker, cited in K. Waigelt (ed.) Patriotismus in Europa p. 10.

⁵³ *Ibid.* p. 13

Trübners German dictionary, published during the Third Reich, clearly separates the definitions of *Heimat* and *Vaterland* as they were then understood;

[*Heimat*] differs from the more recent word *Vaterland* to the extent that it has no political meaning [...] *Heimat* can therefore be employed in relation to animals and even plants.⁵⁴

A definition of *Heimat*, taken from a dictionary published in 1959, begins as follows;

Heimat in its original, non-figurative sense is anywhere where people favour a small world, albeit one representing a complete way of life [*Lebensganzheit*], over all others and experience all other worlds as more or less foreign.⁵⁵

The entry then goes on to mention Bavaria expressly, but only to exclude it from the definition of *Heimat*. Bavaria is described as a polity created through human agency, to which an apolitical concept such as *Heimat* cannot be linked. Instead, *Heimat* is associated with a more organic presence, a symbiosis of land and people independent of historical power-games. It can be concluded that the concept of *Heimat* was a politically unarticulated element in German both before and after the Second World War. By the 1950s, however, the CSU had already appropriated the term for its own ideological purposes.

The Concept of *Nation*

The word *Nation* did not disappear from German political culture following the Second World War, although a glance at titles of books written on the subject suffices to illustrate the difficult relationship of Germans to the concept.⁵⁶ Both the CDU and CSU derived their understanding of the *Nation* from a state-nation modelled on Bismarck's Reich. They believed that cultural criteria were

⁵⁴ Cited in A. Mischerlich & K. Kalow (eds.) Hauptworte-Hauptsache. Heimat, Nation

⁵⁵ Staatslexikon der Görres - Gesellschaft. Cited in A. Mischerlich & K. Kalow (eds.) Hauptworte-Hauptsache. Heimat, Nation The current definition of *Heimat* to be found in the Duden dictionary is also apolitical.

⁵⁶ For instance; H-J. Maaz The Fallen People, A. Peisl & A. Mohler (eds.) The German Neurosis and B. Ortmeier Arguments against the German National Anthem (my translations).

insufficient markers of nationhood and that a nation had to be encapsulated in a state. For this reason, the CSU could not and would not support any recognition of Germany's division and took legal steps to ensure that the political realisation of a united nation remained possible.⁵⁷ In 1973 the party, then in opposition, took a stand to defend what it considered to be an attack on its articulation of the concept of *Nation*. As a consequence of German chancellor Willi Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, the government was in the process of negotiating bilateral treaties with Eastern Bloc countries, including the DDR. The CSU feared that recognition of East German sovereignty would seal the division of Germany and dash hopes of eventual reunification, or the restoration of the state to the German nation. The Bavarian government, on Franz Josef Strauß's insistence, took the case to the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe.⁵⁸ The Constitutional Court supported the CSU's interpretation in its declaration that *deutsche Nation* should be a synonym for *deutsche Staatsvolk*. According to the court, to regard the German nation as merely a linguistic and cultural community would be detrimental to the constitutional goal of the political reunification of Germany. Consequently, Brandt's treaty was judged to be constitutional only if interpreted according to these principles.

The belief in the need for state and nation to coincide also forms the official basis of the CSU's policy on immigration. At the same time, however, the recent debate in Germany surrounding the question of dual citizenship highlights the fact that the criterion of descent still constitutes a national marker as important as language, culture and subjective feelings of belonging.⁵⁹ This interpretation of national membership is shared by the CSU, as is borne out by a

⁵⁷ "We will never accept the nonsensical theory of two German states". ["Wir werden nie der Unfug der Theorie von zwei deutschen Staaten annehmen".] From a speech by Franz Josef Strauß to the CSU Europa-Forum in Munich on 6th April 1979.

⁵⁸ At the time, the CSU was not supported by the CDU in this. However, the continuing existence of a single German citizenship came into its own with the fall of the Berlin Wall by allowing the rapid legal integration of East Germans into West Germany and thus precipitating German reunification in 1990. For a fuller account of the CDU/CSU and the SPD's diverging theoretical understandings of the German nation, see F. Roth *Die Idee der Nation im politischen Diskurs*.

⁵⁹ Rogers Brubaker traces the development of the ethnic concept of citizenship in Germany, where CSU policy finds its roots, from the nineteenth century onwards. R. Brubaker *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*.

comparison of its attitude towards the ethnic Germans who arrived *en masse* in Bavaria from Czechoslovakia at the end of the Second World War, and its policy on the acquisition of German citizenship by foreign immigrants. The former, as well as ethnic German immigrants who continue to come to Germany from Eastern Europe, are deemed to possess a right of residence by virtue of their descent. However, chancellor Gerhard Schröder's plan to introduce automatic dual citizenship for children born in Germany of foreign parents triggered a petition by the CDU/CSU against this measure in 1999.⁶⁰ The party's justification for this stance is revealing. Dual citizenship for immigrants is deemed unacceptable as it can only encourage divided loyalties, suggesting that the CSU's understanding of national loyalty is of a deep-rooted, quasi-religious feeling of belonging, rather than the mere exercise of citizenship rights.

One cannot see why somebody who happens to live here for eight years, somebody who doesn't even speak the German language properly, should immediately become German and concurrently retain his old citizenship as well [...] Just as I cannot be Protestant and Catholic at once, neither can I as a rule have two loyalties concurrently.⁶¹

According to the CSU, citizenship must be deserved, hurdles must be crossed and the candidate will be deemed worthy according to his or her readiness to leave past loyalties behind. Ghettoisation is presented as the only alternative to this form of assimilation.

The CSU insists that foreigners should integrate fully into German society by recognising its fundamental constitutional

⁶⁰ The petition was a success, gathering over five million signatures in the first few months of 1999. The law was eventually modified and children who acquire dual nationality thus are now required to opt for one or the other by their twenty-third birthday. Cf. S. Green *Beyond Ethnoculturalism? German Citizenship in the New Millennium*.

⁶¹ ["Es ist daher nicht einzusehen, daß jemand, der hier zufällig acht Jahre lebt, daß jemand, der nicht einmal die deutsche Sprache vernünftig spricht, gleich Deutscher werden und zudem gleichzeitig seine alte Staatsbürgerschaft behalten soll [...] Genausowenig wie ich evangelisch und katholisch sein kann, genausowenig kann ich generell gleichzeitig doppelte Loyalitäten haben".] From a speech by Stoiber on 17th February 1999, Ash Wednesday of that year. For historical reasons, speeches made at the party rally held on this day traditionally use more direct and simple rhetoric than conventional political debate. They are thus a good gauge of the CSU's fundamental beliefs.

principles, mastering the language and actively participating in community activities.⁶² Thus, the party resists the idea of multiculturalism, expressed in their repeated denial that Germany is an *Einwanderungsland*, or country of immigration.⁶³ This term represents the antithesis of the relatively homogeneous nation-state which the CSU wishes to preserve, at least in its rhetoric. Germany actually has a high proportion of foreign residents and its multicultural character, particularly in the big cities, is hard to ignore. The party's fundamental distaste for a multicultural Germany is justified officially with reference to constitutional principles which clearly make the link between preserving German national identity and limiting immigration.⁶⁴ Edmund Stoiber has expressed himself thus;

Talk of a multicultural society tears up the very roots of our national and cultural identity, developed over centuries.⁶⁵

Consequently, the CSU's understanding of belonging to the German nation is quite different to the model of 'constitutional patriotism' developed by the left-wing German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, for instance.⁶⁶ However, the debate surrounding this question has been

⁶² "To be German means to identify with our historically developed society, our culture and system of values. This cannot be achieved with divided loyalty to two states. And this cannot be achieved without identifying with history, culture and values. Our policy is as follows; citizenship cannot be given away, citizenship must be internally acquired". ["Deutscher zu sein, das heißt, sich mit unserer geschichtlich gewachsenen Gesellschaft, unserer Kultur und Wertordnung zu identifizieren. Dies kann nicht erreicht werden bei geteilten Loyalitäten zu zwei Staaten. Und dies kann nicht erreicht werden ohne Identifikation mit Geschichte, Kultur und Werten. Unsere Position ist: Staatsangehörigkeit kann man nicht verschenken, Staatsangehörigkeit muß man innerlich erwerben".] From Stoiber's inaugural speech to the Bavarian parliament on 29th October 1998.

⁶³ Multiculturalism has been defined as follows; "The foreigners retain their cultural and national identity [...] There is only partial assimilation in the cognitive and social spheres as well as in social status; identificatory assimilation does not take place". G. Schwertfeder, cited in F. Roth *Die Idee der Nation im politischen Diskurs* p.327.

⁶⁴ As a result of a "constitutional responsibility towards the German nation" Germany cannot "due to its history and the way it regards itself be or become a country of immigration". Extract from a 1982 resolution of the CSU/CDU parliamentary group, cited in F. Roth *Die Idee der Nation im politischen Diskurs* p. 324.

⁶⁵ Printed in *die Welt* of 25th February 1989. Cited in F. Roth *Die Idee der Nation im politischen Diskurs* p. 330.

⁶⁶ This model posits a high degree of democratic interaction and influence on social affairs by a diversity of actors who may only have the basic 'rules of the game' in common. Unsurprisingly, this is considered too risky an approach by a conservative party intent on preserving society's traditions and identity from dilution through multiculturalism. Cf. J. Habermas 'The European Nation-State – Its Achievements and Its Limits' in G. Balakrishnan (ed.) *Mapping the Nation*.

deliberately non-emotive. It emphasises instead the danger of friction and racism caused by too much immigration. Even measured appeals to national patriotism, a legitimate tool of political rhetoric, would have triggered accusations of racism and allusions to Germany's Nazi past.⁶⁷

The Concept of *Heimat*

The tendency in CSU rhetoric to put Germany's existence as a state before that as a community is illustrated by the categorisation of the *Nation* and the *Heimat*. The relationship to Germany is presented as a pragmatic one. Contrary to love for the *Heimat*, the CSU attempts to link the German *Vaterland* to a sense of responsibility. *Vaterland* is often substituted for *Nation* as a somewhat less loaded term, in that it does not immediately conjure up associations with extreme right-wing nationalism. This sense of duty is conveyed using rational as opposed to emotional rhetoric. It corresponds to the party's understanding of its place in German politics; showing reliability in coalition and solidarity towards other *Länder*, but single-mindedness in its defence of Bavarian interests.⁶⁸ When the CSU refers to the German *Vaterland*, then, it is in a context denuded of emotional or rousing rhetoric. Edmund Stoiber continues to recognise Germany as his nation but no love, rhetorical or otherwise, is lost between him and it. Instead, these feelings are reserved for appeals to the Bavarian *Heimat*.⁶⁹ The mood in CSU rhetoric vis-à-vis the German construct is one of pragmatic acceptance, as long as the continued autonomy of the Bavarian state is guaranteed;

⁶⁷ Roth reports that a comment of Stoiber's regarding multiculturalism made at a press conference in 1988 had to be withdrawn because the terms used - "durchmischt and durchraßt" - smacked of vocabulary used during the Third Reich. F. Roth *Die Idee der Nation im politischen Diskurs* p. 332.

⁶⁸ "The CSU must retain its unmistakable features in the party structure of the German federal republic as a Bavarian regional party with Germany-wide responsibility and European objectives!" ["Die Christlich-Soziale Union muß im Parteiengefüge der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ihr unverwechselbares Gesicht als bayerische Landespartei mit bundesweiter Verantwortung und mit europäischer Zielsetzung behalten!"] From a speech by Franz Josef Strauß celebrating forty years of the CSU in Munich on 22nd November 1985.

⁶⁹ This has long been the case in CSU rhetoric. Treml quotes the CSU politician and then Bavarian prime minister William Hoegner as saying in 1945; "Our reason says Germany, but our heart belongs to Bavaria". In 1949, then prime minister Ehard rejected the German Basic Law for not being federal enough with the words "No to the Basic Law, Yes to Germany". M. Treml *Geschichte des Modernen Bayern* pp. 392 & 419.

There are sixteen regional capital cities - but Berlin is certainly first among equals. Were I no longer to accept this, then I would no longer accept the nation. The nation will play an important role for an indefinite period in my opinion [...] My nation is called Germany. I am not Basque, I am not Quebecois. Federalism is not separatism.⁷⁰

Further, Stoiber describes the relationship between the German *Länder* as one of “noble competition”.⁷¹ This refers in particular to the question of redistribution of funds between the *Länder*. In November 1999 the German Constitutional Court, in a case brought by Bavaria and two other ‘paying’ *Länder*, declared the current system of solidarity payments to be unconstitutional. Although the existence of solidarity among the *Länder* (particularly towards the new federal states in the East) is regularly affirmed, the Bavarian government continues to take a line which prioritises its own interests.⁷² Thus, the recognition of responsibility towards the German *Vaterland* in CSU rhetoric conveys the impression* of a pragmatic, rational approach to German-wide affairs.

Bavaria’s constant experience of subordination to some higher power, whether it be Holy Roman Empire, Rhine Federation, German Empire or Federal Republic, has led to a political culture not overly fixated with the concept of undivided sovereignty.⁷³ Bavarian *Eigenstaatlichkeit*, or sovereignty, is an important marker of identity, but is understood to be limited to certain policy areas. Similarly,

⁷⁰ [“Es gibt sechszehn Landeshauptstädte – aber Berlin ist sicherlich Primus inter Pares. Wenn ich das nicht mehr akzeptieren würde, dann würde ich ja die Nation nicht mehr akzeptieren. Die Nation wird für mich auf unabsehbare Zeit eine wichtige Rolle spielen [...] Meine Nation heißt Deutschland. Ich bin kein Baske, ich bin kein Quebecois. Föderalismus ist kein Separatismus”.] From an interview with Edmund Stoiber entitled ‘Berlin muß bayerischer werden’ in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 13th November 1999.

⁷¹ “Financial redistribution in its present form is materially unconstitutional [...] My approach is that a higher degree of self-responsibility and noble competition between the *Länder* strengthens all of Germany”. [“Der Finanzausgleich in seiner heutigen Form ist materiell verfassungswidrig [...] Mein Ansatz ist, dass ein höheres Maß an Eigenverantwortung und ein edler Wettstreit der Länder ganz Deutschland stärkt”.] *Ibid.*

⁷² “The goal of our petition was not to opt out of solidarity [payments,] especially vis-à-vis the East German *Länder*”. [“Das Ziel unserer Klage war nicht der Ausstieg aus der Solidarität, gerade auch gegenüber den neuen Ländern”.] *Ibid.*

⁷³ “Federalism corresponds to Bavarians’ understanding of themselves”. [“Föderalismus entspricht dem Selbstverständnis der Bayern”.] From a speech by Edmund Stoiber, published in the *Bayernkurier*, 4th July 1998.

Bavaria's identity as a *Freistaat*, (literally translated 'Free State' but in fact the German translation of 'Republic'), is understood to be a subordinate one. Consequently, nuanced appeals to a multiplicity of identities are not particularly new or difficult to grasp for Bavarians. However, although the CSU defines Germany as a nation, connotations of national pride, love and belonging are almost solely associated with Bavaria.⁷⁴ In party rhetoric, this is primarily expressed through references to the beauty of the *Land* and its economic success.⁷⁵ As such, patriotism is not expressed in terms of national solidarity, far less nationalism, but in terms of the concept of *Heimat*.

Not only does the CSU want to come across as the best party to represent Bavarian interests in Germany and Europe, but it also wants to style itself as the only truly Bavarian party. To this end, it has created a rhetorical correspondence between the party and the *Land*, which is most effective in getting its ideological message across. For instance, Edmund Stoiber ended his speech to the CSU party conference in 1998 with the words "I will do everything in my power to ensure that Bavaria and the CSU continue to belong together". He used even more direct rhetoric at a party conference in 1995; "[T]hat is the CSU, and the CSU is Bavaria".⁷⁶ Given all but continuous CSU rule in Bavaria since 1946, the almost universal association of the party with the Bavarian government is to be expected. This further facilitates the construction of an equivalence of party and *Land* in CSU rhetoric. The conceptual merging of the two is also promoted through the party's choice of symbols. For instance, the party logo consists of a

⁷⁴ Cf. "The historic self-understanding of Bavaria, which has always proudly recognised its place in European history". ["Das historische Selbstverständnis Bayerns, das sich immer voller Stolz zu seinem Platz in der Geschichte Europas bekannt hat".] *CSU European manifesto 1979*. "Few regions in Europe can claim to possess something similar to Bavarian consciousness of its *Heimat* and state tradition". ["Dem bayerischen Heimat- und Staatsbewußtsein haben nur wenige Regionen Europas Vergleichbares an die Seite zu stellen".] From a speech by Edmund Stoiber in Bad Kohlgrub on 5th July 1998.

⁷⁵ "We love this uniquely beautiful *Heimat* with all our heart". ["Dieses einmalig schöne Heimatland lieben wir mit allen Fasern unseres Herzes".] From a speech by Max Streibl in Garmisch-Patenkirchen on 11th August 1991.

lion and a blue diamond. These symbols originate from the Bavarian coat of arms and the Bavarian flag respectively, but have now become so associated with the CSU that they are often reproduced without the party name.

Lion and diamond belong the CSU like people to their country [...] The lion, our heraldic animal, is an expression of our strength.⁷⁷

Moreover, the word 'we' is used interchangeably in CSU rhetoric to designate the party and the Bavarian people;

The CSU has been in government in Bavaria for the last forty years and has helped to shape this land. It has shaped it together with you, ladies and gentlemen [...] Why? Because we love our *Heimat*.⁷⁸

Party, people and *Land* are collapsed into one through the ambiguous use of the pronoun. In this way, politically neutral territorial markers are politicised in order to convey the impression that the CSU is the only truly Bavarian party and that it, quite literally, embodies Bavaria.

CSU rhetoric articulates a stable and regular linguistic structure, clearly ranking the concepts of *Heimat*, *Nation* and *Vaterland* both territorially and according to their role in party ideology. Nonetheless, a degree of ambiguity remains in the CSU's concept of the *Heimat*. Therein lies the strength of its emotional appeal. To quote Montserrat Guibernau;

It is important to emphasize that symbols are effective because they are imprecise. Symbols transform difference into the appearance of similarity, thus allowing people to invest the 'community' with ideological integrity.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ ["Ich werde alles tun, daß Bayern und CSU weiterhin zusammengehören"; "[D]as ist die CSU, und die CSU ist Bayern".]

⁷⁷ ["'Löwe und Raute' gehören zur CSU wie die Menschen zu ihrem Land [...] Der Löwe, unser Wappentier, ist Ausdruck für unsere Stärke".] From a pamphlet of CSU campaign materials prepared for the 1998 elections p. 4.

⁷⁸ [In Bayern ist vierzig Jahre lang die CSU mit an der Regierung und hat dieses Land mitgeprägt. Mit Ihnen zusammen geprägt, meine Damen und Herren [...] Warum? Weil wir unsere Heimat lieben".] From a speech by Max Streibl on Ash Wednesday 1990, published in the *Bayernkurier*, 10th March 1990.

⁷⁹ M. Guibernau Nationalism and Intellectuals in Nations without States: the Catalan Case p. 1003.

Party rhetoric invites the voter to ponder his or her own experience of Bavaria and realise the importance of preserving local tradition whilst investing in progress. The appeal remains ambivalent; voters may feel that they are being addressed as Swabians, Franconians or *Altbayer*, or even in terms of the overriding Bavarian-wide identity constructed by the party;

The Bavarian party to represent Bavaria's interests is only the CSU [...] In almost two hundred years a living symbiosis has come about here between the regions of Bavaria.⁸⁰

The CSU's appeals in the name of the Bavarian *Heimat* can thus be understood on different levels. *Heimat* is generally understood as the smaller entity but varies according to context. Just as a native of Nuremberg might identify him- or herself as a Franconian in Bavaria, a Bavarian in Germany and a German in Europe, the party acknowledges local identities while at the same time affirming an undifferentiated Bavarian identity.⁸¹ Overall, CSU rhetoric conveys a sense of superimposed, onion-skin-like identities surrounding the conceptual core of the Bavarian *Heimat*.

Conclusion

CSU rhetoric seeks to encourage voters to take the consonance of *Heimat* and Bavaria for granted. In turn, the party aims to mobilise this identity politically in its calls for voters to support the CSU out of love for the Bavarian *Heimat*;

Thanks to a policy which has not wavered over decades, we have put the conviction through to people from Aschaffenburg to Berchtesgaden and from Hof to Lindau that Bavaria is their *Heimat* within the German *Vaterland*.⁸²

⁸⁰ ["Die bayerische Partei, die die Interessen Bayerns vertritt, ist nur die CSU [...] In den fast zweihundert Jahren ist hier aus diesen Teilen Bayerns eine lebendige Symbiose geworden".] From a speech by Edmund Stoiber to the CSU party conference in Munich on 28th August 1998.

⁸¹ The existence of multiple identities within Bavaria was recognised by all ten party workers and politicians I interviewed in January and February 2000.

⁸² ["Durch eine jahrzehntelange beharrliche Politik haben wir den Menschen von Aschaffenburg bis Berchtesgaden, von Hof bis Lindau die Überzeugung vermittelt, daß Bayern ihre Heimat im deutschen Vaterland ist".] From a speech by Franz Josef Strauß in Würzburg on 1st December 1985.

The *Heimat* serves as a vehicle for the expression of the self-esteem and self-confidence of a community. Further, the malleability of the concept allows ambiguity to be exploited for nation-building purposes. The required 'imagined community' is infinitely easier to define positively in terms of *Heimat* than *Nation*, as both Bavaria's close associations with the rise of National Socialism and the fascist use of the word *Heimat* have proved less difficult to overcome than memories of Nazi crimes committed in the name of nationalism and for the glory of the German *Nation*.⁸³ In the German-speaking world, the concept of *Nation* cannot be purified totally of historical pollution. However, the CSU has found in *Heimat* a means of avoiding the pitfalls of playing with the past whilst retaining the emotional pull and rhetorical force of a concept emphasising belonging and solidarity.

The CSU has changed the label describing the core of its nationalist ideology in order to make it less objectionable and above all, less contestable. Yet, regardless of whether one refers to Bavaria rhetorically as a nation or as the *Heimat*, the party's underlying ideology follows the basic nationalist principle of prioritising Bavarian identity and interests above all else. The party has gone about reconciling the dualism of nationalism and pro-Europeanism in an equally confident fashion. It has established its European credentials without being afraid to privilege the preservation of Bavarian sovereignty and criticise aspects of the integration process. This strategy exemplifies the combination of core and peripheral principles in CSU ideology. European integration can be reconciled with contemporary nationalism if interpreted in a way that subordinates it to the immutable core goal of national self-determination. The following chapter examines how the CSU and SNP have constructed the European Union in a way that complements their neo-nationalist ideologies.

⁸³ The NSDAP was founded and built up in Munich, where Hitler's unsuccessful putsch took place in 1923. Nuremberg during the Third Reich will forever be associated with the Nazi rallies which took place there. Bavaria was also promoted as a favourite holiday resort by the Nazis and Hitler himself owned a mountain-top retreat in Berchtesgaden, close to the border with Austria.

7 The European Dimension

In order to illustrate the way in which the CSU and the SNP reconcile support for further European integration with their core nationalist principles, the present chapter focuses on their respective interpretations of the EU and its internal dynamics. It will be shown that the parties' generally pro-European stance is a peripheral component of their neo-nationalist ideologies. In much the same way as Europe 'rescued' the 'nation-state', the European construct rescues the principle of self-determination from anachronism by adapting it to fit in with contemporary politics.¹ As such, it is used strategically by the parties to further national autonomy, which clearly takes priority in their rhetoric. In this way, both parties have turned integration, which might have been construed as a threat to their core principles, into an opportunity. For this transformation to be successful, the complexity of the European Union must naturally be interpreted according to nationalist ideology. The first section of the chapter examines the parties' construction of the European integration process, and the way in which it is presented as not only compatible with but also conducive to self-determination. The second section examines in more detail the proposition that European policy is peripheral to CSU and SNP ideology. Building on the conclusions drawn, the focus of the final section will then shift towards how EU is used to further the core nationalist goal.

A closer look at the SNP's interpretation of the EU will uncover the symbolic and instrumental aspects of the party's European policy, as dictated by the demands of domestic politics. The CSU's extensive first-hand experience of European mechanisms as a party of government, on the other hand, points to a more pragmatic policy regarding institutional change. The emphasis will be on the macro-level analysis of institutions and the role of member states within the European Union, rather than on specific policy areas. Interviews with SNP and CSU parliamentarians and employees will be used to provide evidence of each party's overall vision of Europe. It will become clear that, despite contextual differences, a similar strategy can be discerned

¹ Cf. A. Milward The European Rescue of the Nation-State.

in the parties' approach to EU institutions and their dynamics. The term 'European Institutions' refers collectively to the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Council. Commissioners are nominated by member states but are presumed to act in the best interests of the EU. The Commission's role is to develop policy, propose legislation, issue secondary legislation, mediate with outside bodies and monitor compliance with European law. The Council of Ministers, on the other hand, is made up of a government minister from each of the member states and meets to take policy and legislative decisions. The role of the European Parliament, now directly elected by citizens of the member states, was substantially enhanced in the Treaty on European Union of 1992. In addition to its required approval of the EU budget and its importance in holding the Commission to account, the legislative procedure of co-decision gives the parliament an important say in the shaping of EU law. ECJ judges are each nominated by a member state to apply and interpret European law. Finally, the European Council consists of heads of member states, who meet to agree on the broad lines of future integration.²

The complex reality of the European Union today has traditionally been viewed through two contrasting theoretical lenses. Indeed, the debate surrounding the process of European integration has long been characterised by an often intransigent stand-off between two main schools of thought, which have only recently begun to combine to form a clearer picture of the EU.³ The neo-functional school maintains that EU institutions play the more important role in controlling the union and its development, whereas intergovernmentalist theorists claim that member states remain 'Masters of the Treaties' and their interpretation.⁴ European integration theories are explanatory of the integration *process* rather than interpretative of the *status quo*. However, in practice, a theoretical bias towards neo-functionalism or intergovernmentalism underpins

² See N. Nugent The Government and Politics of the European Union Part 2.

³ Cf. W. Sandholtz & A. Stone Sweet (eds.) European Integration and Supranational Governance and W. Wallace The Dynamics of European Integration.

⁴ Cf. G. Garrett & G. Tsebelis An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism and W. Wessels An Ever Closer Fusion? A Dynamic Macropolitical View on Integration Processes.

accounts of European institutions and dynamics in the academic literature.⁵ As is to be expected, party political visions of the EU are similarly embedded in a particular world-view. Moreover, neo-nationalist parties construct the EU in a way which is not only compatible with their ideologies, but which also furthers their core goals. Nevertheless the roles, if not the relative clout, of the principal European actors are treaty-based and therefore clearly defined. These can be compared to the party political interpretations of integration devised by the CSU and the SNP.

I Party Policy on Europe

Scotland in Europe

The SNP considers a confederal Europe to be the ideal end point of integration. By a confederation, it means an association of member states which pool sovereignty in certain areas but do not surrender overall control to a central, or federal, authority. Significantly, the SNP supports the retention of the power of veto over European legislation if a vital national interest is at stake. The image of a 'seat at the top table' is repeatedly used to convey the party's ambition for Scotland to be a full member state of the European Union. The SNP aspires to make Scotland what it calls a 'normal nation'; that is, one with no more or fewer of the trappings of statehood than other member states.⁶ Thus, the party continues to espouse the nineteenth-century nationalist view that 'nation' should coincide with 'state', whilst pragmatically limiting its demand for sovereignty to the partial form which is the lot of contemporary states. The pooling of sovereignty which EU membership entails is not likened to its surrender, as a zero sum analysis would suggest. To quote John

⁵ Cf. S. Schmidt Only an agenda-setter? and K. Alter Who are the 'Masters of the Treaty?' It has been pointed out that the vocabulary employed to describe the EU is itself highly theoretically charged. The neofunctionalist resonance of terms such as *l'engrenage*, *l'acquis communautaire* and *spill-over* has now been overtaken by terms with an intergovernmentalist flavour, such as *subsidiarity*, *proportionality*, *opting out* and *sustainable convergence*. G. Marks *et al* Governance in the European Union p.133.

⁶ Bruce Crawford observed; "There is also the issue of Scotland becoming a normal place in this world, having the simple dignity of being accorded the same status as the Danes, the Dutch or the Irish".

Swinney; “Independence is a relative concept in terms of the way in which other institutions are structured”. Angus Robertson noted; “The idea that you pool [sovereignty] does not mean that you’ve lost it”. By being placed within the EU, the goal of independence is relativised in order to counter the argument that it is a revolutionary, isolationist goal.⁷ The party’s expedient manipulation of concepts adapted to contemporary politics is underlined by the following comment from Neil MacCormick;

Independence, freedom, sovereignty. All names, all labels. The SNP is part of a long, wide, movement for self-government, autonomy. Now that in my definition would mean autonomy in whatever overall context of governance is sensible, constructive, forward-looking and also expressive of solidarity.

In the present-day context, the SNP has seen the strategic advantage of placing its core goal of independence within a European Union construct.

The European Union, as a treaty voluntarily entered into, is interpreted by the SNP as an enhancement, rather than as a limitation of sovereignty. The stock argument brought to counter claims that independence in Europe would merely substitute Brussels’ influence for Westminster control, is to point out the difference between the two forms of Union. Kevin Pringle stated;

The UK is a unitary state, whereas the European Union is a union of pooled and shared sovereignty, where the members decide issues on a common agreed basis and that’s not the case as far as the UK is concerned [...] So you’re leaving a very unequal union to participate fully in an equal union.⁸

The party emphasises that an independent Scotland within the European Union would be able to exert equal influence to other small member states, thereby underlining the alleged contrast to England and

⁷ George Reid remarked; “I hear Jordi Pujol [leader of Catalanian CiU coalition] speaking the same language and I listen to Alex Salmond; I don’t think the gap between them is that big”.

⁸ Only Gordon Wilson hinted at a possible parallel; “One thing I do worry about is seeing replicated in Europe the problems which Scotland has had in being a minor part in an imperial England”.

Scotland's skewed relationship within the UK.⁹ George Kerevan summed up the SNP's approach as follows;

It is inconceivable to me in the twenty-first century that you would not co-operate, i.e. share your sovereignty. But you have to have it in order to share it.

The EU is therefore presented as a badge of equal status to existing sovereign states and an affirmation of independence of action in opposition to the barrier represented by Westminster.

Official party support for the integrative step of economic and monetary union (EMU) does not extend to fiscal harmonisation. The SNP recognises that such a step would very much undermine its conception of Scottish independence. John Swinney commented;

The minute you go down the route of fiscal harmony - tax harmonisation - I think you're down the route towards a federal state because you're effectively removing one of the last areas of discretion that an individual member state would actually have.

Dissenting voices within the SNP point out that this partial approach may not be economically viable, however. They suggest that the party is skating over complex debates for the sake of presenting a policy that is clearly different to the Labour and Conservative parties' cautious stance on EMU.¹⁰ In other less prominent areas of integration, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Swinney was less clear about a possible end point. This lends substance to Neil MacCormick's opinion that the party contains "a variety of shades of opinion as to

⁹ Mike Russell put it thus; "There's something very, very different in every sense between being a member of a confederal union and being a member of an incorporating union". Bruce Crawford developed the argument; "We need to release our full potential. We're not able to do that within a framework that doesn't suit us, which is geared much more to the south east of England [...] Westminster is where the real barrier is".

¹⁰ George Kerevan took the following view; "Speaking as an economist [...] the single currency must mean a common monetary and fiscal policy and therefore, some kind of common government. It doesn't work otherwise [...] All I'm saying is I think there's room for that sort of debate beginning to flower in the SNP". This view recalls the reservations expressed by Isobel Lindsay on the party's adoption of the Independence in Europe policy. Cf. chapter five, section three.

how far the integration process should go”.¹¹ However, as is evident from the positive tone of party rhetoric, MacCormick’s characterisation of the SNP as “integration sceptic” in the sense that it would want to “take a critical look at each move towards further integration, step by step”, has not been translated into the public face of the party.¹² Were the SNP indeed to adopt a more nuanced approach, its strategy would resemble that of the CSU more closely than its current tendency to present an overwhelmingly pro-European image.¹³ In terms of a macro-level view of the European institutions, however, the parties share a broadly intergovernmentalist vision of Europe.

Bavaria in Europe

Since the beginning of Edmund Stoiber’s prime ministership of Bavaria in 1993, the CSU’s attitude towards the EU has been less one of enthusiasm and more one of realistic but critical acceptance. The party calls for a federal, decentralised Europe, in which decisions are taken as close to citizens as possible. Among other policies, the party supports political union, a further strengthening of the European parliament’s role in decision-making, and eastern enlargement of the EU.¹⁴ The CSU makes it clear that its blueprint for the Europe of the future is a *Staatenverbund*, not a *Bundesstaat*; in other words a

¹¹ Alasdair Morgan, for one, was of the view that the party should slow down and take stock of the integration achieved so far. Mike Russell commented; “I think we’re all sadder and wiser and have seen some of the difficulties of it [integration]”.

¹² Cf. chapter five, section two. Angus Robertson pointed out that a sceptical stance “doesn’t necessarily have to be euro-sceptic in the brand that one sees in England, which is very emotional and irrational”. However, other interviewees voiced individual concerns about integration, for a variety of idiosyncratic reasons. For instance, Gordon Wilson said; “I think there still are delusions of grandeur buried inside the European psyche and I fear that it might take on an imperial role if too much power is concentrated in the central institutions [...] I do not want an integrated Union because Europe itself might become aggressive”.

¹³ The party’s rhetoric and public image as a whole must be distinguished from the work of individual MEPs, which may or may not be critical of specific Commission initiatives.

¹⁴ This last policy is not only argued to be beneficial to Bavaria economically, putting it once again at the centre of European trade flows, but also ties in with the CSU’s spirited defence of the rights of exiled *Sudetendeutschen*. Cf. The CSU European Manifesto, 1989. The SNP also supports enlargement, although much less vocally than the CSU, and emphasises the economic benefits the larger market will bring to Scotland. See the SNP European Manifesto, 1999.

confederation rather than a federal state. Similarly to that of the SNP, this approach is clearly intergovernmentalist; “In a confederation, the parts decide what competencies the centre enjoys”.¹⁵ However, this does not stop the CSU stating its preferred guiding principles for integration to be ‘*Föderalismus und Subsidiarität*’. These can be combined felicitously within Bavarian political culture, given that “the German version [of federalism] is a version involving the decentralised exercise of state power”.¹⁶ The concept of federalism has opposite meanings in English and German. These were succinctly summarised by one interviewee as denoting centripetal government in English and centrifugal government in German.¹⁷ Federalism is thus a concept which does not ‘travel’ well.¹⁸ However, despite the misleading differences in terminology, it can be concluded that, like the SNP, the CSU envisages an EU in which the member states are stronger than the central authority.

The CSU’s 1999 European election campaign made clear which level of governance the party prefers. The slogan ‘Bayern stark für Europa’ leaves the voter in no doubt that the impetus for integration should not lie at the European level.¹⁹ Josef Lindner stated;

We have to decide how this Europe should be structured and that is where Bavaria says subsidiarity and competition among regions, not centralism and levelling-down.²⁰

¹⁵ [“In einen Staatenverbund bestimmen die Teile darüber, welche Zuständigkeiten die Zentrale hat.”] Although a civil servant with the European ministry of the Bavarian government and not a CSU spokesman, Jörg Vogel’s definition of the concept corresponds to its usage in CSU policy and Bavarian political culture more generally.

¹⁶ [“Die deutsche Version ist eine Version der dezentralen Ausübung staatlicher Gewalt”.] Gerd Müller

¹⁷ [“die Wortbedeutung heißt; das hat eine zentrifugale Wirkung, also weg vom Zentrum, möglichst hin zum nachgeordneten Ebenen und im Englischen hat es eine zentripetale Bedeutung; es geht ins Zentrum”.] Jörg Vogel. Cf. note 15.

¹⁸ Chapter three, section two discusses the notion of conceptual travelling.

¹⁹ This sentiment was repeated in the personal campaign leaflets of candidates. For instance, Emilia Müller demanded that Bavarian economic and agricultural interests be taken into account, and Ingo Friedrich emphasised the need for powerful representation of Bavarian interests.

²⁰ [“Jetzt müssen wir uns entscheiden, welche Struktur dieses Europa haben soll und da sagt eben Bayern Subsidiarität, Wettbewerb der Regionen und nicht Zentralismus und Gleichmacherei”.]

In turn, socialism has long been linked to European bureaucracy in CSU rhetoric, and is often contrasted to the themes of regional diversity and healthy competition in CSU rhetoric.²¹ As is evident from his rhetoric, Edmund Stoiber has never been one to underestimate the potential influence of the Bavarian government in European affairs. During the debate surrounding EMU, he gave the impression that his reluctance to support German entry might have a bearing on its eventual introduction.²² Conversely, Stoiber also emphasises the centrality of the European Union to domestic politics. He placed the Bavarian government's European ministry directly under his control in 1998 and insisted that Klaus Kinkel, Chancellor Kohl's foreign minister, rethink his ministry's organisation in order to give greater prominence to European affairs.²³ Further, Stoiber has repeatedly quoted the statistic that fifty percent of laws applied in Bavaria originate in the EU and was keen to drive this point home during the 1999 European election campaign.²⁴ The EU thus plays a relatively prominent role in CSU rhetoric, even if Bavaria's actual role in European decision-making is not as important as the party would like to suggest.

As a European region, Bavaria must focus on influencing European affairs through the European parliament and the Committee of the Regions, as well as through issue-linked *Länder* representation

²¹ "The CSU does not want an EU that is governed centrally and bureaucratically. We are against dreary socialist levelling-down". ["Die CSU will kein Europa, das zentralistisch und bürokratisch regiert wird. Wir sind gegen öde sozialistische Gleichmacherei".] *CSU European Manifesto*, 1979. The CSU recently attempted to revive the spectre of socialism in the European context by presenting the 1999 election as a choice between a socialist and a conservative Europe.

²² When asked the question 'are you still a Euro-sceptic?' Stoiber replied, "What does it mean to be a sceptic in this case? I want an optimum guarantee of the permanence of the Euro". ["Was heißt hier Skeptiker? Ich will eine optimale Bestandsgarantie für den Euro".] *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 28th February 1998.

²³ Cf. *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 13th May 1998, where Kinkel is quoted as saying; "The CSU shouldn't be allowed to sacrifice our [Germany's] reputation and our responsibility in Europe on the altar of the Bavarian election". ["Die CSU darf unser Ansehen und unsere Verantwortung in Europa nicht auf dem bayerischen Wahlkampfaltar opfern".]

²⁴ One of the election slogans sought to justify his ever-presence during the campaign and at the same time underline the vote's importance by saying that in Bavaria, European affairs were a leadership responsibility. ["In Bayern ist Europa Chefsache".] Stoiber also emphasised the importance of voting by appearing on individual candidate's flyers, accompanied by a signed endorsement.

on the Council of Ministers. Consequently, the CSU's blueprint for organising the tiers of European governance is somewhat more developed than that of the SNP, which does not extend far beyond a call for full Scottish member status. This is reflected in the primary role of subsidiarity in CSU European policy. Indeed, along with federalism, subsidiarity is the basic principle guiding the party's vision of future integration. This test of effectiveness, as laid down in Article 3B of the Treaty on European Union, is designed to create a tiered structure of government, with European, state and sub-state levels each retaining responsibility for the tasks they are best qualified and equipped for. In the CSU's rhetorical translation of this test, European-level control is presented negatively, as a final recourse when no alternative exists. This approach to European governance tallies with the party's core goal of preserving Bavarian autonomy. Furthermore, in order to avoid the European Commission's gradual encroachment on state or sub-state affairs, the CSU has based its demand that the EU's competencies be clearly defined on the principle of subsidiarity.²⁵ The principle is thus evoked when the party expresses reservations regarding European initiatives which endanger Bavarian interests or, even more crucially, Bavarian autonomy. On the other hand, subsidiarity is also used by the party as evidence of its support for European integration. For instance, CSU rhetoric regularly refers to former prime minister Max Streibl's influence in drawing former Commission president Jacques Delors' attention to the subsidiarity principle, and the Bavarian government's role in lobbying to have it incorporated into the Maastricht treaty.²⁶ Party support for the subsidiarity principle and its interpretation of federalism show that the CSU shares the SNP's intergovernmentalist vision of the European Union.

²⁵ Gerd Müller stated; "In concrete terms, there must be a delimitation of competences at the next conference of member state governments". ["Konkret muß bei der nächsten Regierungskonferenz es zu einer Abgrenzung der Kompetenzen kommen".]

²⁶ This assertion is based on a meeting of *Länder* representatives held in Munich in late 1990. They issued a joint declaration to the effect that federalism and subsidiarity should be guiding principles of future European integration. For the text of the declaration, see M. Treml *Geschichte des Modernen Bayern* p. 495.

II Reconciling Autonomy with Integration

The SNP – ‘Hands across the Ocean?’

SNP rhetoric reconciles the nationalist core with the pro-European periphery of party ideology by elaborating a myth of Scottish identity. Complementing that of the compassionate Scot used to promote domestic integration, it amounts to asserting that Scots are inherently more European-minded than the English.²⁷ Neil MacCormick was of the opinion that “it is easier for Scotland to see a context of identity-securing in the European framework than an identity threat [...] whereas English identity was more in opposition to Europe”.²⁸ This idea contrasts sharply with Gordon Wilson’s reading of the general mood in previous decades;

In the 1960s and 1970s Scotland was still contaminated by British imperial attitudes as a matter of public opinion [...] and there were members who felt they didn’t have anything in common with Europe. And there was hostility to the metric system.

Interestingly, this statement also supports the myth of Scots’ openness to Europe in that it attributes negative attitudes to ‘imperial contamination’. The myth of “hands across the ocean” Scots, as Bruce Crawford put it, was corroborated by all the SNP members interviewed, although many different justifications were proffered to explain this view.²⁹ These ranged from the Scottish experience of emigration and immigration and resulting family ties in other parts of the world, through intellectual and trading exchanges, to a psycho-

²⁷ Although some interviewees were careful to avoid drawing any normative conclusions from this assertion, the comparison with England was always explicit. For instance, George Kerevan commented; “I’m just trying to say structurally there are differences [...] I think there were also elements of a European culture that lingered on in Scotland, which made it easier under the Thatcher years to adopt this kind of European identity”.

²⁸ Bruce Crawford stated; “To suggest that in some way Scotland could become independent and be a Norway or another country of that ilk would I think go against the grain of what the Scottish people feel about themselves and what they feel about the rest of the world”.

²⁹ The exception proving the rule was Isobel Lindsay who is, it will be remembered, opposed to the party’s European policy. However, she acknowledged the strategic strength of being “able to project this outward going image [...] it made the SNP position much more attractive, I think”. Cf. chapter five, section three.

historical account.³⁰ Kevin Pringle was more pragmatic and offered an explanation in terms of greater trade, tourism and inward investment flows between Scotland and Europe compared to the UK as a whole.

The myth of the pro-European Scot is a self-justifying ‘invention of tradition’ designed to undergird the SNP’s current European policy.³¹ In contrast, the Scottish political climate during the 1970s, shaped by the prevalence of the oil and fisheries questions, Norway’s anti-EEC stance and the personal opinions of many office holders, favoured a cool if not a hostile party position on European integration. Gordon Wilson’s appraisal of public opinion in those days clarifies the interest politics motivating the party’s myth-making at the time;

I think the view was [...] very unappreciative of Europe generally [...] Don’t forget, Europe was a long way away and anything it did seemed to disturb people and upset their ways of working, and none of the money that came from Europe had started to come through.

Further, Gordon Wilson pointed out that these myths are not shared by the mass of the population, but are being attributed to Scots by the SNP leadership. For instance, in a prime example of a rhetorical elision between the SNP and the Scottish nation, Winnie Ewing has stated; “We in Scotland are not Euro-sceptics, we are UK-sceptics”.³² Characterising the national psyche in such a way is central to the strategy of the SNP, although this sometimes leads to implausible interpretations of Scottish public opinion in party rhetoric. For example, consider the following quote by Alex Salmond;

Public opinion in Scotland is now running in favour of the Euro. The latest poll gave 40% to those in favour, and 40% to those against. A

³⁰ John Swinney remarked; “We’ve not been in control of our destiny [...] So I think in a sense Scots are a bit more ready to see changing and evolving constitutional structures as something that’s much more easy to handle [...] People in England have been accustomed to being in the driving seat, to being in control and not feeling as though there was anybody limiting what they were able to do. That’s a huge element of their psyche”.

³¹ On the use of Scottish stereotypes to further party political ends, see S. Reicher & N. Hopkins *Self and Nation* Ch. 5.

³² From a speech by Winnie Ewing to SNP conference on 25th September 1998.

sustained information campaign would tip the balance decisively in favour of entry.³³

This assertion is somewhat bold, given the statistics on which it is based. However, it shows that regardless of poll results, the SNP is continuing to elaborate a historical myth of Scots as enthusiastic Europeans. As will be shown below, an equivalent myth is propounded by the CSU. By attributing constant and long-standing European credentials to their respective nations, the parties aim to show that European integration and national autonomy are compatible in terms of identity politics as well as in institutional terms.

The SNP is less forthcoming than the CSU, however, on the question of a pan-European identity. In fact this theme is of little significance to the SNP, contrary to the CSU's emphasis on 'unity in diversity', which will be discussed further below. As was made clear during the SNP's 1999 European election campaign, the dominant theme is one of interest politics.³⁴ The party pays lip service to the idea of European cultural diversity, but does not elaborate on the question in a way comparable to the CSU. Although a sense of European unity is acknowledged, its content is restricted to shared civic values such as respect for human rights, the rule of law and democratic principles.³⁵ There is hardly a mention of common cultural roots and religious rhetoric is quite foreign to the party.³⁶ The SNP's 1999 European manifesto contains only a short paragraph on European cultural policy. This is limited to quoting the provision on cultural heritage contained in the Maastricht Treaty and pledging to back European cultural initiatives. To quote John Swinney,

³³ Alex Salmond, in an address to the London School of Economics on 25th February 1999. Peter Murrell provides another example; "I think they [the Scots] are more open to Europe. The opinion poll now is suggesting that's not the case but I feel that does not accord with what I find talking to people".

³⁴ Cf. Chapter five, section two.

³⁵ Only George Reid elaborated, rather idiosyncratically, on the cultural aspect; "[The EU] is based on institutions, it's based on the values of life. Food, music, literature, artistic values being part of life which you wouldn't find in North America; slight revulsion from conspicuous consumerism that marks American society, a belief in solidarity, *communauté solidaire*, which you would never hear Americans speaking about."

³⁶ Angus Robertson thought that a Muslim member state would be a positive inclusion in the EU. Doubts as to the desirability of Turkish membership were limited to its human rights record.

I don't think [a European state] is sustainable in a cultural sense because there is such a vested cultural pride and cultural enthusiasm in different parts of Europe. So I think, in a sense, what we are witnessing is a coming-together of shared interests.

It is interesting to note that this response to the cultural question is expressed in terms of shared interests, and does not allude to the importance of preserving Scottish culture as integration progresses. Neither was this issue highlighted by any of the other interviewees close to the SNP. Given that party rhetoric depicts the Scottish nation less vividly than the CSU does the *Heimat*, it was to be expected that the idea of a European community would also be less developed. As a policy peripheral to the parties' core goals, it only reflects the ideology being articulated by them at the domestic level.

The role of SNP MEPs within the party has been, by their own admission, singularly symbolic. This is typified by Winnie Ewing's unofficial title of 'Madame Ecosse'. In a conference address, she described her role as an MEP thus; "I tried to prepare a place for Scotland in the hearts and minds of our Euro-colleagues".³⁷ Winnie Ewing represented Scottish interests unstintingly during her twenty-five years as an MEP, from 1974 to 1999, and her affectionate moniker recognises this. However, few of her or her colleagues' European activities are ever reported, fuelling the impression that Europe is a political outpost rather than a political arena with day-to-day relevance to Scots. In the first six months of the year 2000, the SNP issued over five hundred press releases, but only six of them dealt with European issues. The substance of SNP European policy also supports the impression that the party has done little to develop its view of the EU since the general, strategically-motivated endorsement embodied in the 'Independence in Europe' slogan.³⁸ Although the party claims its

³⁷ From an address by Winnie Ewing to the SNP party conference on 25th September 1998. However, Isobel Lindsay remembers that Winnie Ewing was once firmly against EU membership; "She was very hostile but once she was elected she went native! So she was quite an influential voice in that sense".

³⁸ "I believe there is a solid strategic and tactical value for the SNP in making a candid statement of policy to the effect that our advocacy of independence is defined within the permanent framework of the European Community". J. Sillars Scotland: The Case for Optimism p. 190.

MEPs made more speeches to the European parliament during its 1994 to 1999 session than all other Scottish MEPs put together, progress regarding the policy proposals included in its European manifesto is not highlighted by the party itself, let alone the Scottish press.³⁹

Detailed SNP policy concentrates on Scotland-specific issues such as fishing and whisky exports, a tactic which is at once a strength and a disadvantage. Informed by the fact that Scotland is currently represented in Europe as part of the UK, this policy focus is directed towards influencing the British position where Scottish interests are particularly strong or widely diverging from those of the rest of the country.⁴⁰ That the current system should revolve around Whitehall severely limits the party's scope for developing a distinctively Scottish position in all fields of European policy, as the SNP itself naturally never tires of pointing out. However, from the point of view of party image, this approach is somewhat unsatisfactory. For the SNP to leave other policy areas to the 'big players' is both an admission of powerlessness and a lost opportunity to become a vocal advocate for change. Furthermore, it is not effective party communications which seem to be lacking in some policy areas, but the substance of policy itself. The following comment by Neil MacCormick is indicative of this;

One of the things I'd like to make sure we do in the next year or so is have a more serious debate about our stance on the intergovernmental conference in Nice [...] That's the trouble. We haven't had a debate on that question for quite a while.

This does nothing to bolster the SNP's credibility as a potential party of government, capable of making 'Independence in Europe' a reality. In short, the party has not so far set its European policies to work for 'Independence in Europe', despite the prominence of the European element in its flagship slogan.

³⁹ SNP European Manifesto, 1999 p. 2.

⁴⁰ Ian Hudghton finds it very frustrating that authority over agriculture and fishing has now been devolved to the Scottish parliament, but that it still has to negotiate with ministries in Whitehall in order "to accommodate our view again within the UK position. And it doesn't always work".

The SNP interprets European integration as pragmatic co-operation in certain areas, with member states remaining the primary motors of progress.⁴¹ However, the party neglects the theme of sub-Scottish governance in the European context as it struggles to rid Scotland of the label 'region' and instead argue the case for equal member status. Correspondingly, the theme of subsidiarity is acknowledged but not developed. Unlike the CSU, the SNP has its sights set first and foremost on a 'seat at the top table' of the Council of Ministers, and subsidiarity is not a strategically useful principle in this context. Overall, the SNP's evocation of the European Union is aimed at the abstract, somewhat superficial level of the European debate in the UK, beyond which few Scottish voters or politicians care to probe.

The SNP's support for continued use of the member state veto points to the primarily symbolic power of the European dimension in its rhetoric. It is aimed at reassuring voters that, were 'Independence in Europe' to be achieved, Scottish autonomy would not thereafter begin to flow inexorably towards some form of federal super-state.⁴² However, Isobel Lindsay made the following cogent point;

Now anyone who actually knew about the use of the veto by a single small nation [would know it was] not a viable mainstream answer to the question of accepting EU policies and their implementation.

Much is made of the clout of small nations in an EU allegedly weighted in their favour.⁴³ However, evidence to justify this interpretation of EU structures is not offered. One must assume that the SNP is referring to the disproportionate amount of small member state

⁴¹ Kevin Pringle stated; "The basic building blocks of the EU are the member states and that's the way it should stay". Neil MacCormick said; "We are reasonably satisfied with the broad look of the institutions as they are now".

⁴² To quote Neil MacCormick; "The scope of the veto should be taken down to genuinely constitutional issues. So I would extend QMV [qualified majority voting] but not on constitutional issues".

⁴³ A section of the 1999 European manifesto entitled 'A Europe of small nations' claims that; "[S]maller nations like Scotland, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Luxembourg - they all punch well above their weight within the institutions of the European Union. That is because there are measures in place to counterbalance the dominance of the larger nations". Kevin Pringle put it thus; "And of course, the structures and institutions of the EU are specifically weighted to give preference to the small countries".

votes in the Council of Ministers relative to population, or their power to invoke the veto. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the fact that large member states, with even more votes, are in a stronger position to have their way. Much like the rationale behind the 'Independence in Europe' policy, it seems that this strand in SNP rhetoric is designed to reassure voters that an independent Scotland would not be an insignificant member of the EU, rather than provide an accurate reflection of the dynamics of EU decision-making.

SNP rhetoric is anachronistic in the importance it attaches to the veto and the influence of small member states.⁴⁴ It thereby offers a somewhat distorted view of European decision-making which is compatible with its core ideological commitment to prioritising the nation. Further, the 1999 SNP European manifesto declares that an independent Scotland would have its own Commissioner, although the allocation of Commissioners to countries is not an officially recognised practice. It states that independence would cause the number of Scottish members of the European parliament to double (to be on a par with comparably populated Denmark), and secure the much sought after seat on the Council of Ministers.⁴⁵ However, the current uncertainty as to the number of Commissioners after enlargement and the upper limit imposed on the number of European parliament members by the Treaty of Amsterdam cast doubt on these assertions. The party also claims to have won the argument as to whether Scotland would automatically become an EU member on secession or whether it would have to reapply as a newly sovereign state. Yet a lack of precedent and some scholarly opinion makes this a less clear-cut case than the party maintains.⁴⁶ Parallel to its emphasis on the allegedly disproportionate powers of small nations in the EU, the party's rhetoric

⁴⁴ "The Luxembourg Compromise is now mainly symbolic for domestic consumption". G. Marks *et al* European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v. Multi-level Governance p.363. Paradoxically, attempts to avoid invoking the Luxembourg compromise in the Council of Ministers laid the foundations for a consensual style of politics which still persists, despite contrary qualified majority voting provisions.

⁴⁵ SNP European Manifesto, 1999 p. 3.

⁴⁶ See M. Happold Independence: in or out of Europe? An independent Scotland and the European Union.

on these matters is optimistic, if not misleading.⁴⁷ That these claims should go largely uncontested is an indication of the uninformed nature of the European debate in Scotland and the UK more generally.

The fact that the SNP takes some liberties in its ideological construction of the EU testifies to the fact that its European policy is instrumental to the party's core neo-nationalist agenda. Aspects of European integration which are unhelpful or of little relevance to this core goal, such as the actual use of veto powers or the principle of subsidiarity, are played down. Furthermore, the SNP is not shy of making confident assertions as to the role and rights of a putatively independent Scotland within the EU, which would be the subject of considerable debate among experts and academics. Finally, the party employs a myth of Scottish openness towards all things European in order to suggest an inherent tendency for Scots to support European integration. This is perhaps the most explicit example in the evidence discussed of ideological manipulation designed to further a political project. It illustrates the party's attempt to harness the EU to its nationalist cause by politicising national identity. The SNP constructs a stereotype of the Scottish mentality to complement its interpretation of the EU, which in turn is favourable to the party's understanding of 'Independence in Europe'. Such a strategy is indicative of a larger-scale dynamic, which sees neo-nationalist parties interpreting European integration as a phenomenon compatible and not conflicting with the core of their ideologies.

The CSU - 'Euro-sceptic?'

The CSU goes about resolving the tension between its support for European integration and its love for the *Heimat* in an explicit manner. It derives its pro-European stance from the history of the party on the one hand and the history of Bavaria on the other. For instance, Theo Waigel, concurrently German finance minister and CSU party chairman from 1989 until 1998, felt that his support for EMU flowed from the policies of his predecessors in the party;

⁴⁷ Similarly, when the debate over the 'Independence in Europe' policy took place in the late 1980s, the leadership was fond of asserting that an independent Scotland could negotiate derogations from aspects of the Treaties it did not want to endorse.

I said back then, before 1997 or 1998, that I would immediately resign from my office as party chairman and finance minister, were a Bavarian cabinet to reject the Treaty of Maastricht, because I saw myself as following in the tradition of Dr. Josef Müller, of Hans Ehard and of Franz Josef Strauß.⁴⁸

The possibility he alludes to was a very real one during the debate concerning economic and monetary union, the timetable for which was contained in the Maastricht Treaty, as Edmund Stoiber was vocal in doubting the wisdom of German participation. Given that this opinionated stance was outwith his mandate and in opposition to Theo Waigel, it was widely interpreted as a piece of populist posturing by the Bavarian prime minister, designed to win support at home.⁴⁹ Stoiber was positioning himself as sympathetic to the attachment of Bavarians to the *Deutschmark*.⁵⁰ He was also underlining the policy independence of his party - and by implication the Bavaria it represents - vis-à-vis the German federation, regardless of the fact that the minister representing the federation in this case was the CSU chairman! Theo Waigel made the following comment;

Every level [of government] had to decide for itself, and it can sometimes have been the case that the Bavarian level emphasised other points than the federal level. And sometimes there were also conflicting goals.⁵¹

Stoiber's eventual climbdown was interpreted as humiliating by the opposition - SPD placards showed Waigel and Stoiber boxing - but was spun as an exercise in political realism and praiseworthy caution

⁴⁸ ["Ich habe damals vor 1997, 1998 erklärt, ich werde am selben Tag, wo ein bayerisches Kabinett den Vertrag von Maastricht ablehnt, von meinem Amt als Parteivorsitzender und als Finanzminister zurücktreten, weil ich mich da in der Tradition von Dr. Josef Müller, von Hans Ehard, von Franz Josef Strauss, gesehen habe".]

⁴⁹ Cf. The *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 9th March 1998.

⁵⁰ The *Deutschmark* is linked to the spectacular post war economic recovery of West Germany - the *Wirtschaftswunder* - and is considered an apolitical identifier. An exhibition on the history of the currency, mounted in Munich during the winter of 1999, was so popular that it was extended.

⁵¹ ["Jede Ebene müßte für sich entscheiden, und da hat es schon mal sein können, daß die bayerische Ebene andere Akzente gesetzt hat als die Bundesebene. Und da gab es auch manchmal einen Zielkonflikt".]

by the party itself.⁵² The contrast with Stoiber's image as an enthusiastic and committed politician at the European level during the 1999 European election campaign illustrates the instrumental nature of the CSU's European policy. Indeed, Julia Hartmann admitted that there were doubts among the planners of the campaign as to whether this image-change would be acceptable to voters.⁵³ The party portrays its pragmatism and readiness to express opposition to certain aspects of integration as a virtue. This is reconciled rhetorically with its pro-European stance as follows;

The CSU pursues European politics with clear contours and a sense of realism, but also with a readiness to compromise which a community of twelve nations requires.⁵⁴

The party will emphasise positive or negative aspects of integration as its commitment to Bavarian self-determination dictates, proof that the EU is used strategically to underpin the CSU's core goal of preserving Bavarian autonomy.

The other main strand of the CSU's rhetoric on the EU is its recasting of Bavaria's history in European terms. This is explicitly stated in a speech by former prime minister Max Streibl, in which he linked the party's duty to support European integration to well over a millennium of Bavarian history;

Bavaria has served a great European purpose over the last one thousand four hundred years. We must make it clear that the CSU is a guarantor that the utmost will be done to maintain this continuity for the good of all our Bavarian *Heimat* [...] It's about Europe, but it's also about our inherent interests, about our Bavarian interests.⁵⁵

⁵² Several of those interviewed maintained that there had never actually been a difference of opinion between the CSU leaders. (Cf. the commitment to strict compliance with the convergence criteria included in the party's 1994 European manifesto).

⁵³ These proved to be unfounded, given the CSU's best-ever result at that election.

⁵⁴ ["Die CSU betreibt Europapolitik mit klaren Konturen und mit Realitätssinn, aber auch mit jener Kompromißbereitschaft, die eine Gemeinschaft von zwölf Nationen voraussetzt".] CSU European Manifesto, 1989.

⁵⁵ ["Bayern hat über 1400 Jahre eine große europäische Aufgabe erfüllt. Wir müssen klarmachen, die CSU ist der Garant dafür, daß diese Kontinuität mit aller Kraft fortgesetzt wird zum Wohle unserer gesamten bayerischen Heimat [...] Es geht um Europa, aber auch um unsere ureigensten Interessen, um unsere bayerischen Interessen".] From a speech in Regensburg on 17th February 1989.

This rhetoric links the myth of the Bavarian nation's longevity to the *Land's* European character and depicts current CSU policy as a continuation of Bavaria's allegedly central role as a European player. The notion of inherent (*ureigensten*) interests conveys a sense that this continuity is long-standing and organic through the use of the superlative form and the prefix 'ur'. Alongside the lofty commitment to a "great European purpose", the importance of Bavarian interests is emphasised. Once again, the evocation of Europe is subordinated to the prioritisation of Bavaria.

Although the party may stress continuity in some contexts, the CSU's remembered history is also the springboard for other, sometimes diverging, strategic goals. This is an illustration of the adaptability of the party's European message depending on the Bavarian interests at stake.⁵⁶ For instance, Bavaria's long history of autonomy is called upon to justify the CSU's reticence to subscribe to certain aspects of European integration. Indeed, party opposition to specific European initiatives is ascribed rhetorically to the self-confidence born of a solid, historically-grounded identity.

Bavarian history is the history of integration [...] Regarding the cultivation and preservation of a specific regional identity, Bavaria is one of the most advanced in Europe.⁵⁷

Voters are thereby invited to draw the conclusion that Bavaria does not need EU legitimation in the same way as other German *Länder* - which do not have the same historical continuity - and can therefore be more openly critical of the EU. The presumption here is that the '*Bindestrich-Länder*' born of Allied occupation, to use Franz Josef Strauß's telling phrase, do not have the self-confidence to take a stand

⁵⁶ Jeffery and Collins make a similar point in relation to the CSU's policy on EU enlargement; "While at one level these recommendations for reform may be seen as positive contributions to the wider debate about enlargement [...] they also concretely reflect at another Bavaria's 'Euro-sceptical' attitudes about the European integration process." C. Jeffery & S. Collins *The German Länder and EU Enlargement: Between Apple Pie and Issue Linkage* at p. 96.

⁵⁷["Die Bayerische Geschichte ist eine Geschichte der Integration [...] Bayern ist, was Ausbildung und Pflege einer spezifischen regionalen Identität betrifft, in Europa mit am weitesten fortgeschritten".] From a speech by Edmund Stoiber in Bad Kohlgrub on 5th July 1998.

against integrative steps.⁵⁸ However, this aspect of CSU rhetoric, employed only in opposition to specific EU policies, should not be equated with an ambivalent attitude to the EU *per se*. The CSU, unlike a large proportion of the British Conservative party, never criticises the EU project as a whole. Indeed, in the words of Theo Waigel; “There is no rational alternative to the process of European unification”.⁵⁹

The CSU and Edmund Stoiber in particular, are often portrayed by the media as being Euro-sceptic, although the claim is hotly disputed by party spokesmen.⁶⁰ One must also be careful not to ‘stretch’ the concept by equating it with the connotations it has in Britain.⁶¹ For one, Germany’s Nazi past dictates that none but the most radical can deny the importance of the European project to Germany. Not only did it help to rehabilitate the country as a respected international player in the decades following the Second World War, but it also assuaged fears in Europe of an over-powerful reunited Germany following the collapse of the Berlin Wall. In Germany as a whole, pronounced anti-EU views are most often associated with extreme right-wing parties. Like all the mainstream parties in Germany, the CSU recognises the basic value and purpose of the EU as a *Friedensgemeinschaft*, or peace community, and regularly repeats its commitment to the European project. For a CSU politician to do otherwise would be to go against the grain of over fifty years of party policy and, importantly, risk betraying the memory of Franz Josef Strauß.⁶² However, the CSU claims to have gone a step further in the European debate than its opponents, whom it accuses of being unable

⁵⁸ Cf. Chapter four, note sixty-six.

⁵⁹ [“Zum europäischen Einigungsprozeß gibt es keine vernünftige Alternative.”] From the foreword to the *CSU European Manifesto*, 1989.

⁶⁰ Those interviewed preferred the term ‘Euro-critical.’ Alfons Zeller commented; “I always say that when someone questions something and observes it in a critical light, it’s not negative. Having a critical attitude is a long way from being an opponent”. [“Ich sage immer, wenn jemand hinterfragt, kritisch etwas beäugt und beleuchtet, daß es nicht negativ ist. Eine kritische Haltung heißt noch längst nicht ich bin ein Gegner”.]

⁶¹ Cf. Chapter three, section two for a discussion of conceptual stretching.

⁶² “Beside Konrad Adenauer and other great European statesmen, Franz Josef Strauß drove forward reconciliation and co-operation in Europe. The CSU sees its European purpose as the continuation of his life’s work”. [“Franz Josef Strauß hat an der Seite von Konrad Adenauer und anderen großen europäischen Staatsmännern die Aussöhnung und Zusammenarbeit in Europa vorangetrieben. Ihr europäische Aufgabe sieht die CSU auch als Fortführung seines Lebenswerkes”.] *CSU European Manifesto*, 1989.

to distinguish between the principle and the practice of European politics. In contrast, the CSU presents its European outlook as nuanced, sophisticated and openly critical of specific policies which appear unnecessary or incoherent. Markus Ferber summed up the argument as follows;

It's no longer about the fateful question, yes or no to Europe. It's about the fateful question, should Europe concern itself with something, yes or no.⁶³

Linked to this is the party's emphasis on its pragmatic, professional approach. The EU is treated without undue reverence by the party, as a political arena to be scrutinised and criticised in the same way as domestic affairs.⁶⁴

The CSU regards Europe as a further badge of identity over and above its well-entrenched Bavarian identity. In a variation on a by-now familiar theme, former prime minister Streibl described the party's overall European policy aim as "to preserve our *Heimat* and to shape Europe".⁶⁵ Although pro-European feeling is regarded as complementary and not antagonistic to Bavarian identity, the party makes clear that the preservation of local identity should both guide and trump attempts at further integration. Consequently, the importance of preserving and defending regional identity as the building blocks of further European integration is often aggressively emphasised;

Diversity [...] is Europe's wealth [...] Bavarian sovereignty, which has developed in over a thousand years of history, must also have

⁶³ ["Da geht es nicht mehr um die Schicksalsfrage ja oder nein zu Europa, sondern es geht um die Schicksalsfrage, muß sich Europa darum kümmern ja oder nein".]

⁶⁴ Markus Ferber noted; "When we say that we see things a little differently to the Commission, we're immediately called anti-European. I think we are the ones who take the European question most seriously, because we deal with it so intensively". ["Wenn wir sagen, daß sehen wir ein bißchen anders als die Kommission, dann werden wir sofort Europagegner genannt. Ich denke wir gehen am seriösesten mit dem Thema Europa um, weil wir uns so sehr intensiv damit beschäftigen".]

⁶⁵ ["unsere Heimat bewahren, Europa gestalten."] From a speech in Regensburg on 18th February 1989.

influence/ prestige [*Geltung*] in a united Europe. It must be accepted that whatever Bavaria can do better is not a job for Brussels!⁶⁶

Such confrontational rhetoric could be likened to a Bavarian David squaring up to the European Goliath, since the influence of individual *Länder* on European decision-making is actually exercised, as in Scotland, either through the German state apparatus or by means of lobbying in Brussels.

Although Bavaria is well represented in both the Committee of the Regions and the European parliament, the former is a purely consultative body and the latter is a political party forum and not a regional one. In practice, the Bavarian government is very effective at ensuring that information flows between Munich and Brussels are as rapid as possible.⁶⁷ Furthermore, the CSU government was active in pushing through the constitutional amendment to Article 23 of the German Basic Law, forbidding the German federal government to cede *Länder* competencies to the EU without the approval of the *Bundesrat*. It also lobbied for the *Länder* to be represented in those Council of Minister meetings which concerned their competencies. These achievements are more indicative of the Bavarian government's clout within Germany than at the European level, where it is only directly represented in the Committee of the Regions. Notwithstanding, CSU rhetoric styles the party as being just as powerful as the biblical David, capable of bringing Bavarian demands onto the agenda by bypassing state mechanisms in its lobbying and influencing even Jacques Delors' vision of integration.⁶⁸

Another important aspect of CSU rhetoric on Europe is that of *Einheit in Vielfalt* or 'unity in diversity', an image which underlines

⁶⁶ ["Die Vielfalt [...] ist Europas Reichtum [...] Bayerische Eigenstaatlichkeit, gewachsen in einer über tausend-jährigen Geschichte, muß auch in einem geeinten Europa Geltung haben. Es muß gelten: was Bayern besser kann, ist keine Aufgabe für Brüssel! "] *CSU European Manifesto*, 1989.

⁶⁷ The access of the Bavarian government to European decision-making structures is generally recognised to be one of the best amongst the German *Länder*. See C. Jeffery & S. Collins *The German Länder and EU Enlargement: Between Apple Pie and Issue Linkage* at p. 89.

⁶⁸ The meeting of German *Länder* presided over in Munich by Max Streibl in late 1990 is claimed by the CSU to have given the impetus for the inclusion of the subsidiarity principle in the Maastricht Treaty. Cf. note 26.

that the party interprets European integration in a way compatible with the preservation of Bavarian particularity. The phrase is principally taken to mean the protection of existing national and regional cultures and is therefore usually used in conjunction with the concepts of subsidiarity and a Europe of the Regions. Strains of exclusionary rhetoric come to the fore, however, in the party's evocation of a shared western and Christian culture linking Europeans above and beyond their diversity. According to those interviewed, this construct stands for a community of values which includes democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the welfare state. A historical argument extending this community to the cultural and metaphysical realms is developed in the following statement;

Europe cannot be merely an economic community of interests. Europe needs a spiritual bond [...] Europe is founded on the ancient philosophy of the Greeks and the statecraft of the Romans, on the great creative achievements of different peoples in antiquity, the Middle Ages and modernity. Christianity has been a fundamental pillar of European culture and civilisation for two thousand years.⁶⁹

The community of values construct is used to justify the CSU's opposition to Turkish membership of the EU.⁷⁰ This line of argument runs parallel to CSU immigration policy, which posits a Western 'leading culture' that immigrants (principally Turkish Muslims) are expected to accept, respect and share to the extent of learning the language and assimilating German constitutional culture. The religious aspect of these policies was usually flagged as noteworthy by interviewees, although its controversial nature was acknowledged. Jörg Vogel gave his non-partisan view of the debate;

⁶⁹ ["Europa darf nicht nur eine wirtschaftliche Interessengemeinschaft sein. Europa braucht auch ein geistiges Band [...] Europa gründet auf der antiken Philosophie der Griechen und der Staatskunst der Römer, auf den großen schöpferischen Leistungen der verschiedenen Völker in Altertum, Mittelalter und Neuzeit. Ein tragender Pfeiler der europäischen Kultur und Zivilisation ist seit 2000 Jahren das Christentum".] From a speech by then Bavarian government minister Mathilde Berghofer-Weichner in Kloster Polling on 11th January 1989.

⁷⁰ Gerd Müller mentioned the important role of the family, the equality of women, tolerance and democratic values as characteristic of a western Christian culture. With reference to the possibility of Islamic EU member states, he continued; "These are basic values for me, which are, of course, judged differently in the Islamic world, a fact which in itself would lead to fundamental problems". ["Das sind für mich grundlegende Werte, die natürlich in der islamischen Welt anders gewertet werden, und dies wurde schon zu fundamentalen Problemen führen".]

At the moment it is very controversial, especially in the light of the Turkish question, to what extent religious considerations play a part in this European culture.⁷¹

Evidently, domestic immigration debates have influenced the CSU's construction of the EU as a western, Christian community of values, since the notions of shared values and 'unity in diversity' at the European level correspond to the party's interpretation of a German 'leading culture'.

The CSU asserts that its policies are infused with Christian morality. It defines this as a belief in human dignity, freedom and responsibility before God, principles which it also identifies as influencing the German basic law.⁷² The party remains officially open to people with other *Weltanschauungen*, to the extent that these are compatible with its own.⁷³ However, the CSU's emphasis on the Bavarian *Stämme* and their homogeneity, its strict policies on the integration of immigrants and its vocal opposition to multiculturalism, all suggest that this Christian outlook may be less than favourably disposed towards other religions.⁷⁴ According to the CSU, Bavaria's alleged homogeneity must thus be protected on two fronts; against the faceless bureaucratic centralism of Europe on the one hand, and against internal dilution by large numbers of foreign immigrants on the other. A clear qualitative difference is made in CSU rhetoric between fellow members of the European Union and immigrants. For instance, the party states that; "A Europe 'without barriers' is an important step

⁷¹ ["Es ist im Augenblick gerade vor dem Hintergrund der Türkei sehr umstritten in wie weit in diese Europäische Kultur auch religiöse Erwägungen mit einfließen".]

⁷² T. Waigel, 'Die geistigen Grundlagen der Christlich-Sozialen Union' in B. Haneke & R. Höpfinger (eds.) *Geschichte einer Volkspartei - 50 Jahre CSU* at p. 21.

⁷³ *Ibid.* p. 19.

⁷⁴ "Nobody has to be a Christian in Bavaria. But whoever lives in Bavaria as a follower of another religion or non-denominationally should kindly take note of one thing; namely that Christian roots in Bavaria reach back to Roman times and that Christian culture has shaped this *Land* and its people for almost two thousand years". ["In Bayern muß niemand Christ sein. Aber wer in Bayern als Andersgläubiger oder Konfessionsloser lebt, der möge bitte wohlwollend eines zur Kenntnis nehmen: Daß nämlich in Bayern die christlichen Wurzeln bis in die Römerzeit zurückreichen und die christliche Kultur dieses Landes und seine Menschen seit bald zwei Tausend Jahren geformt hat".] From a speech by Edmund Stoiber in Bad Kohlgrub on 5th September 1998.

towards a Europe in which a new sense of community can develop”.⁷⁵ This idealistic, quasi-functionalist vision of integration based on shared values is sharply contrasted to the ‘exploitation’ of EU member states by economic refugees. The CSU believes Germany should not be allowed to become a land of immigration for economic asylum seekers, and expresses concern that too few barriers within Europe could aggravate the problem.

Uncontrolled immigration can only be solved at the European level [...] There must be an end to Germany being required to carry a heavier burden in this domain than all other European member states put together.⁷⁶

Although the CSU manipulates European policy to further its core goals, it supports the fundamental process of European integration. As a neo-nationalist party, it acknowledges the necessity of a European framework without ever losing sight of the nationalist ideology motivating its pro-European stance. Indeed, the CSU’s ultimate goal is to defend Bavarian autonomy against too great an encroachment of European regulations. However, a universally Euro-sceptical strategy, similar to that of branches of the British Conservative Party, is not suited to the German political arena. Instead, the CSU condones the general German consensus in favour of the EU and points to the excellence of the party’s pro-European credentials from its genesis onwards.⁷⁷ Rhetorically, it underlines its well-established Bavarian identity and from this, in turn, flows the assertion that there is no party better qualified to speak for and defend Bavaria. It alleges that no other party can combine the CSU’s experience of European matters and its empathy with Bavaria and its people. The rhetorical link to its political project can be observed in the party’s creation of a correspondence between the *Land* and ‘its’ party. The CSU’s ideological myth-making depicts Bavaria as a united, long-

⁷⁵ [“Ein Europa ‘ohne Schlagbäume’ ist ein wichtiger Schritt zu einem Europa, in dem sich ein neues Gemeinschaftsbewußtsein entwickeln kann”.] CSU European Manifesto, 1989.

⁷⁶ [“Die unkontrollierte Zuwanderung ist nur auf europäischer Ebene zu lösen [...] Es muß Schluß damit sein, daß Deutschland in diesem Bereich mehr Lasten zu tragen hat als alle anderen EU-Mitglieder zusammen”.] CSU European Manifesto, 1994.

⁷⁷ As early as 1946 one of the CSU’s founding members, Josef Müller, pointed to the need for monetary union to help prevent another European war. Cf. T. Schlemmer Aufbruch, Krise und Erneuerung. Die Christlich- Soziale Union 1945-1955.

standing, Europe-oriented nation in an attempt to imbue the party with the same unique presence.

III Nationalist Core and European Periphery

The CSU and the SNP share a similar vision of future integration, despite the fact that they use the terms federalism and confederalism respectively to describe it. As has already been noted, the German word *Föderalismus* does not have the same centralising connotations as the English-language concept, and the same tendency can be observed in each party's rhetoric. Neil Walker offers a legal definition of federalism which shows that the root of these diverging political interpretations lies in opposing views of which level of government will gain the upper hand in the distribution of authority;

[L]egal authority under a federal constitutional order is distributed in separate parcels between central (federal) legislatures and governments on the one hand and provincial (state) authorities on the other, and in such a manner that neither sphere of authority is (entirely) free to trespass upon, override or remove the competence of the other.⁷⁸

The CSU stresses the sub-state aspect of federalism, combining its demand for more decentralised democracy with the concept of subsidiarity. The term *Subsidiarität* is used more widely in Bavarian political culture than the concept of subsidiarity in Scotland. The Conservative government's state-centric interpretation of subsidiarity during the debate surrounding the ratification of the Treaty on European Union is the only time the concept has had a high public profile in the UK. Bavarians are more familiar with the term due to their experience of German federalism and of the Catholic teachings from which it originally derives.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, the SNP has incorporated subsidiarity into its European manifesto. Although it is given low prominence, in keeping with its incomplete integration into Scottish political vocabulary, the emphasis on decentralisation is

⁷⁸ N. Walker *Beyond the Unitary Conception of the United Kingdom Constitution* p. 390.

⁷⁹ For an account of the concept's origins and its German usage see H. Lecheler *Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip*.

similar to the CSU's interpretation of the concept.⁸⁰ Such a definition tallies well with neo-nationalist ideology. Despite exploiting the strategic potential of the European dimension differently depending on their domestic requirements, the parties share the same overall vision of an ideal European Union. That is, a confederal polity organised according to the principle of subsidiarity and functioning according to an intergovernmental dynamic.

The SNP's detailed blueprint for future European integration remains somewhat vague, and interviewees were often unable or reluctant to elaborate on it. However, achieving Scottish equality with other small nations within the European Union was articulated as the ultimate goal. A primary concern to influence the form and quality of European institutions was not expressed.⁸¹ Peter Murrell formulated the Scottish focus of the party's European policy as follows;

The thing the SNP has to do is perpetually push expectations forward. We do that by providing examples of what other member states have done and how they're in a better position than we currently are to do things [...] It's about equality.

The CSU, on the other hand, has translated its core goal of preserving and prioritising national autonomy into the language of EU politics; namely a demand for the Commission's competencies to be strictly defined. The party considers that the present state of affairs - in which the limits of EU jurisdiction remain vague and can thus be extended through Commission initiatives and favourable European Court of Justice rulings - poses a serious threat to Bavarian sovereignty. This, in turn, is linked to the party's avowed distaste of what it sees as a bloated European bureaucracy.⁸² In general, the SNP's European

⁸⁰ "In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity there ought to be extensive and effective decentralization of decision-making to local levels. Every political decision affecting individuals, localities and communities should be taken as close to home as is compatible with securing practical results". *SNP European Manifesto*, 1999 p. 11.

⁸¹ Asked about the concept of European confederalism, Gordon Wilson commented sardonically "People don't really know what they mean when they talk about that".

⁸² Gerd Müller commented; "When we hand over this bit of sovereignty in these areas of jurisdiction, it does not mean that we want to give away this competence to an anonymous European bureaucracy of civil servants". ["Wenn wir dieses Stück Souveränität in der Gesetzgebung in diesen Bereichen abgeben heißt es auch nicht, daß wir die Kompetenz an eine anonyme, europäische Beamtenbürokratie abgeben wollen".]

vision is substantially less developed than that of the CSU. This has the advantage of presenting a simple message and a united front with no apparent divisions for the opposition to exploit.⁸³ It is important, however, not to ignore cracks in the rhetorical facade, for the first sustained and relatively sophisticated attack on the party's European policy will reveal how easily a construct without strong intellectual or party support can crumble. The question of EMU is a case in point.⁸⁴ In contrast, the CSU's practical experience of lobbying in Brussels permeates its European policy. This contributes to the image it presents of itself as an experienced, reliable champion of Bavarian interests, which can be trusted to pick its way confidently and effectively through the complex world of European politics. The result of the 1999 European election in Bavaria points to the fact that this image has found favour with the electorate, as the CSU attracted over twelve percent more votes than its average results in Bavarian elections.⁸⁵

As was discussed in chapter five, the prominent position the SNP gives to the European dimension in its 'Independence in Europe' policy is part of a long-term strategy.⁸⁶ Attitudes towards the EU in the United Kingdom are very different to the German general consensus in favour. In fact, the media and the Conservative Party are for the most part hostile, the Labour party is cautious on the increasingly prominent issue of EMU, and single-issue anti-European Union parties have had some electoral success.⁸⁷ In contrast, the SNP comes across as quite

⁸³ Isobel Lindsay suggests that at the 1988 SNP party conference, during which the 'Independence in Europe' policy was adopted, only minor amendments were accepted which "did not represent the main thrust of the critical amendments because they [the leadership] wanted a polarisation of the debate into simply unconditional acceptance or rejection".

⁸⁴ Gordon Wilson warned of the dangers inherent in the party's policy on EMU; "You should never ever go and support something whose terms are undefined. Do we join at the current level of the pound? That would be a disaster".

⁸⁵ Markus Ferber opined; "The great majority of Bavaria's population, independently of who they eventually vote for, say that if anyone can represent Bavarian interests in Europe, then it is the CSU". ["Und da sagt die große Mehrheit der Bevölkerung in Bayern, unabhängig davon, was sie am Ende wählen, wenn jemand bayerische Interessen in Europa vertreten kann, dann ist es die CSU".]

⁸⁶ Ian Hudghton said; "It's our duty as would-be leaders of our community to try and lead public opinion too on major issues rather than do a 'William Hague' and follow it [...] I think it is incumbent on us to try and push public opinion forward in a reasonable and rational way".

⁸⁷ The SNP is well aware of these factors and their effect on party strategy. Ian Hudghton remarked; "I think that the extent of euro-scepticism on the part of the

unreservedly pro-European; “Euro-enthusiasts in an increasingly euro-sceptic world” as Mike Russell put it. As one of the SNP’s most senior strategists, his appraisal of SNP European policy is worth quoting at length;

I’m not sure we have a particularly well developed vision of Europe. I mean, I think that’s one of the problems. I think we have a pretty well-developed view of why we regard the European Union as a good thing and a good thing for us because the context in which we argue the case for independence is much easier to explain and understand [...] It’s the contextualising of the case for independence, the fact that Scotland could become independent and remain a member of the European Union and adjust its relationships with all the other members including England comparatively easily [...] To some extent, therefore, the European Union is a convenience for us.

The prominence of the European element in the SNP’s flagship slogan is therefore potentially misleading. George Reid pointed out that “it was hardly a burning issue on the doorsteps” and the European campaign was a low-key affair for a party which prides itself on success at European elections. Had its European profile been really important to the party, it would undoubtedly have put more effort into having a third MP elected.⁸⁸ The ‘Independence in Europe’ policy is predicated more on the requirements of the party’s nationalist ideology than on an interest in the form and substance of future European integration.

Kevin Pringle also made it abundantly clear that the SNP’s European policy is instrumental to its nationalist ideology;

Europe comes in centre-stage for the SNP within the context of the independence campaign. It defines the nature of independence [...] So people are still focusing and reacting towards the SNP on the basis of what we say about Scotland, not on what we say about Europe.

media has been fed by our political opponents and has not been helpful”. Alasdair Morgan commented; “I think the relentless [media] campaign has obviously had an effect on Scotland as well although I suspect there’s still a differential between the Scottish opinion and the English opinion”.

⁸⁸ The lukewarm commitment to the European election campaign can be compared with the importance attached to a bye-election held soon afterwards in the constituency of Ayr. About £24,000 was spent on campaigning for that single seat, compared to about £90,000 for the European election in Scotland as a whole.

This eminently pragmatic strategy skirts an apparent ideological contradiction between independence and integration in order to reap the benefits of placing Scottish self-determination within a European framework. Indeed, George Reid commented that “instead of any conflict, it would seem profoundly sensible to have this dualism”. A thin ideology like nationalism admits of such a strategy. However, the SNP never loses sight of the Scottish interest and its core goal of independence. The words ‘in Europe’ are merely an instrumental addition to this core nationalist principle, designed to make the pursuit of independence more palatable to the Scottish voter.

A parallel can be drawn between the SNP’s focus on independence and the CSU’s ongoing struggle to preserve a degree of sovereignty within a federal Germany. Bavaria’s defence of its federal tradition is a familiar theme of CSU rhetoric.⁸⁹ Although the CSU supports a federal European Union, its experience of German federalism provides it with an example not to be followed, rather than a model for European integration.⁹⁰ Indeed, experience of the centralising tendencies of the German federation can only have strengthened the party’s resolve to safeguard regional autonomy within the European Union.⁹¹ However, in principle, a federal structure goes hand in hand with subsidiarity at the European level. The need for subsidiarity is also explained using the example of German federalism.⁹²

⁸⁹ “Especially in Europe, our federal tradition gives Bavarian politics its unmistakable character and its outlook”. [“Unsere föderale Tradition gibt der bayerischen Politik gerade in Europa ihren unverwechselbaren Charakter und ihre Blickrichtung”.] Theo Waigel, in a foreword to the *CSU European Manifesto*, 1989.

⁹⁰ Josef Lindner stated; “In its current state German federalism is [...]not a model for the EU”. [“Der bundesrepublikanische Föderalismus ist in seinem gegenwärtigen Stand [...] kein Vorbild für die EU”].

⁹¹ “We want to stop the creeping reduction in *Länder* competences and by winning back legislative competences, right the shift in the balance of powers between the *Bund* and the *Länder*”. [“Wir wollen die schleichende Auszehrung der Länderkompetenzen stoppen und durch die Rückgewinnung von Kompetenzen in der Gesetzgebung das verschobene Kräfteverhältnis zwischen Bund und Ländern wieder ins Gleichgewicht bringen”]. Edmund Stoiber, in a speech to the *Bundesrat* on 26th August 1994.

⁹² [“Denn die einzelnen *Länder* können Vieles effizienter, schneller, einfacher und besser regeln, als dies in dem oft mühsamen Abstimmungsprozeß auf Bundesebene

Individual *Länder* can resolve many things more efficiently, quickly and easily than is possible in the often laborious voting procedure at federal level. That is also precisely the meaning of the subsidiarity principle.

In turn, European unity is presented as being in both German and Bavarian interests. Finally, the party implies that it alone, as the only party rooted in Bavaria and standing exclusively in Bavaria, is capable of understanding and representing Bavarian needs. Together with the idea of *Bürgernahe*, these basic elements of the CSU's European policy are mixed and matched in party rhetoric.⁹³

The CSU emphasises that it is no longer a question of the need for European integration, but rather a matter of how best to fashion it. Consequently, the Bavarian government is quite prepared to cede a strictly limited amount of sovereignty in areas where progress demands it, such as trade and environmental policy;

European integration naturally leads to a loss of sovereignty in certain areas. One can accept a limited loss of competence in limited, specific jurisdictions because at the same time one can say that the profit in terms of shaping policy is thereby enhanced.⁹⁴

However, integration is not to be seen as an end in itself, as the party's emphasis on subsidiarity makes clear.⁹⁵ The CSU argues that progress should be sectoral and subjected to the test of whether an issue really is

möglich ist. Das ist ja auch der Sinn des Subsidiaritätsprinzips".] Edmund Stoiber in a speech to the *Bundesrat* on 26th August 1994.

⁹³ For instance, European parliamentary candidate Angelika Niebler's campaign flyer read; "I support a federal Europe, because only a Europe of that sort is close to its citizens". ["Ich setze mich ein [...] für ein föderales Europa, weil nur ein solche Europa bürgernah ist".] The party's 1979 manifesto contains the sentence; "For the CSU as a resolutely federalist party, a united Europe can only be a Europe of diversity". ["Für die CSU als eine überzeugt föderalistische Partei kann ein geeintes Europa nur ein Europa der Vielfalt [...] sein".]

⁹⁴ ["Die europäische Integration führt natürlich in bestimmten Bereichen zu einem Souveränitätsverlust. In diesen begrenzten Einzelzuständigkeiten akzeptiert man einen begrenzten Zuständigkeitsverlust weil man gleichzeitig sagt, daß der Politikgestaltungsgewinn dadurch größer ist".] Jörg Vogel.

⁹⁵ Gerd Müller put it thus; "Integration for its own sake is not really an end in itself. If I can solve a problem better in Munich, than that's where it should take place". ["Integration nur um der Integration Willen ist eigentlich kein Selbstzweck. Wenn ich in München ein Problem besser lösen kann [...] dann soll es in München passieren".]

better dealt with at a higher level of governance. In turn, subsidiarity is given a human face by emphasising citizens' rights to have decisions taken as close to them as is feasible, in order to enhance the transparency of governance. One of the 1999 European campaign slogans '*Bürger Nähe statt [instead of] Bürokratie*', neatly sums up this argument.

The CSU's theme of unity in diversity within a Europe of nations and regions seems a somewhat contradictory element in its rhetoric. The party is arguing for an interpretation of the EU which includes a moral identification with shared European values that goes beyond interest politics and economically-driven integration. At the same time, however, it upholds a vision of cultural diversity. The theme of unity in diversity thus tackles the question of multiple identities head on. By professing more than a purely rationally motivated loyalty to the European project, the CSU purports to supplement and enrich Bavarian identity rather than undermine it. It supports a three-tier system of government and celebrates each corresponding level of identity in its rhetoric.⁹⁶ The CSU European parliamentary candidate Bernd Posselt addressed this dialectic in his campaign flyer;

I support a Europe which takes also the features of our unique *Heimat* into consideration, which does not only reach the heads, but also the hearts.⁹⁷

To the CSU, even a European Union which goes beyond economic and political co-operation into the realms of morality and identity-building is compatible with the party's core commitment to preserving Bavarian sovereignty, as long as it complements and does not threaten to overtake Bavarian identity. Not only is a limited *loss* of sovereignty deemed to *enhance* Bavarian influence in certain policy

⁹⁶ Josef Lindner said; "As a state – Bavaria sees itself as a state within the German federal republic – Bavaria does not want to lose its statehood [...] That is the reason for Bavaria's commitment to strengthening the regions within the EU". ["Bayern will sozusagen als Staat - Bayern versteht sich als Staat innerhalb der Bundesrepublik - seine Staatlichkeit nicht verlieren [...] Deswegen auch der Einsatz Bayerns für die Stärkung der Regionen innerhalb der EU".]

⁹⁷ ["Ich bin für ein Europa [...] das auch auf die Besonderheiten unserer einzigartigen Heimat Rücksicht nimmt [...] das nicht nur die Köpfe, sondern auch die Herzen erreicht".]

areas, but parallel to this, party rhetoric includes a European component in its construction of Bavarian identity. Similarly, the SNP's elaboration of the myth that Scots are particularly open to European influence is designed to bolster the party's politically and economically motivated support for integration with an element of emotional identification. The CSU and the SNP both go about reconciling nationalist ideology with support for European integration using rhetoric which ranges from the pragmatic and interest-driven to the construction of national stereotypes. As a whole, both parties' European policy is designed to undergird a strong national identity rather than introduce any element of competition with the EU as an alternative 'nation-state' construct. Characterising independence as the core and integration as the periphery illustrates the relative importance of these elements to each party's neo-nationalist ideology.

Conclusion

The focus of this chapter has been the SNP and the CSU's interpretations of European integration and their compatibility with each party's core principles. Neither the CSU nor the SNP believe that support for both national autonomy and European integration are ideologically incompatible. This is because both reject European institution-driven integration and instead support a confederation of member states. Their chosen interpretation of integration is thus not irreconcilable with national self-determination within the EU.

Sovereignty and European integration would represent a contradiction if the goal were the creation of a European state and indeed, a centralised European state. But that is not our goal.⁹⁸

The CSU's vision of future integration is more structured than that of the SNP, and it has developed a blueprint for a strict division of competencies at different government levels. Although the CSU describes its policy as a federal solution, it understands this to mean

⁹⁸ ["Die Eigenstaatlichkeit und die europäische Integration wären dann ein Widerspruch, wenn das Ziel die Schaffung eines europäischen Staates wäre und zwar eines europäischen Zentralstaates. Aber das ist nicht unser Ziel".] Although Jörg Vogel is referring here to the goal of the Bavarian government and not that of the CSU as such, the two are equivalent insofar as the government implements CSU policy.

decision-making at the most local level that is feasible, rather than a polity structured around a central European authority. The SNP's emphasis on the subsidiarity principle is less strong than in CSU rhetoric, given that it does not accept Scotland's current status as a region and aspires to participate in decision-making as a member state. It presents the EU as an alternative to Westminster government and describes it as a qualitatively different form of union from that of the United Kingdom.

Both parties stress the importance of national interests in shaping their approach to the EU. However, the CSU supplements this rhetoric with a theme of Europe as a community of values. The historical importance of the European project to post-war Germany is also a factor here. Theo Waigel, for instance, understands the EU as a symbol of peace and an opportunity for Bavaria and Germany to regain sovereignty and respect. He therefore sees no contradiction between these goals and a strong Bavarian identity, given that the EEC provided the framework for a rearticulation of this identity after the Second World War. Markus Ferber put this strand of CSU rhetoric succinctly when he said; "a peace community is more than a common market".⁹⁹ The SNP, however, does not go down this road in its rhetoric and emphasises instead that Scotland can benefit economically from the EU, which it characterises as a community of shared interests. Overall, however, the parties share broadly similar constructions of the institutions and dynamics involved in European integration. Both see the European Union as a vehicle for furthering core ideological goals. The incorporation of the European dimension into their ideologies is thus neo-nationalist insofar as it updates nationalist principles to correspond to contemporary politics.

⁹⁹ ["Eine Friedensgemeinschaft ist mehr als einen Binnenmarkt."]

8 Discourse Theory and Neo-Nationalism

This chapter sets out to analyse the ideologies of the SNP and the CSU using an explicit discourse theoretical framework. In exploring the ideological tension between nationalism and European integration, the last three chapters have focused on the rhetorical manifestation of neo-nationalism in specific cases of political party propaganda. In the present chapter, attention shifts away from the parties' pro-European periphery to their construction of the nationalist core. Further evidence of party rhetoric will be brought to illustrate the more general dynamics shaping party ideology and strategy, which will be described using Laclau and Mouffe's terminology. Tapping away at the public face of a party in this way is rather like cracking open an egg; the outer shell of rhetoric reveals the substance of strategy, which surrounds the ideological centre. In terms of discourse theory, the core of an ideology, which has repeatedly been the subject of discussion since Michael Freeden's distinction between core and peripheral ideological principles was introduced in chapter one, can be equated to a nodal point of discourse. In turn, this nodal point corresponds to the nation in nationalist ideology. Indeed, the concept of the nation is a privileged point of partial fixation of discursive elements, given that it informs the organisation of nationalist ideology, the prioritisation of its principles and the shaping of its strategy.

It will be remembered that, according to discourse theory, ideology is a form of discourse geared towards decontesting concepts in order to create the illusion that social structures are unified and thus 'real'.¹ The system of interrelated differences constructed by ideology is presented as fixed and immutable in order to hide its contingency and vulnerability to being superseded by a competing hegemonic project.² Nationalist ideologies differ, however, depending both on how parties interpret the nation and how they combine emotional and rational appeals strategically in order to attract support. Parties will go

¹ "Instances of assertions such as 'this is what liberty means', and 'that is what justice means' are attempts to limit the essential contestability of political terms". A. Norval The Things we do with Words: Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis of Ideology p. 323.

² "National identity is always a project, the success of which depends upon being seen as an essence". S. Reicher & N. Hopkins Self and Nation p. 222.

about articulating concepts in different ways according to the context in which they evolve. One instance is the nature of the antagonism created by ideological friction between different world-views. It will be shown that discourse theory provides an illuminating framework within which to present empirical data.³

The first section of the chapter will apply Laclau and Mouffe's conception of the nodal point to the SNP's construction of the Scottish nation and the CSU's interpretation of the Bavarian *Heimat*. Section two will look at the parties' quest for conceptual hegemony. The dominant role enjoyed by the CSU's articulation of the *Heimat* in Bavaria will be contrasted to the SNP's attempt to gain wider acceptance for its construction of Scottish national identity. The final section will return to the dynamics of antagonism in discourse theory. Conflicting articulations of concepts and the identity crises to which they give rise will be discussed in terms of the presence of the 'Other' in party rhetoric. Once again, party literature and interviews conducted with party workers and parliamentarians will form the basis of the discussion. Interview data is an important source of evidence of the neo-nationalist ideologies being propagated and provides illuminating insights into the thinking behind party strategy. Investigating how the SNP and CSU seek to link a politically neutral sense of national belonging to support for their political programmes is particularly interesting in an age when the multiple identities of voters must be considered. It will become clear, for instance, that the immediate 'Other' can be incorporated or repudiated in a neo-nationalist world-view. A discussion in terms of discourse theory will serve to clarify the way in which concepts are manipulated in the parties' bid for ideological hegemony. The ultimate 'unfixity' of identity construction can effectively be approached from a post-modern perspective, one which recognises the contingency of discourse and the instability of meaning.

³ Chapter two, section two offers a more detailed discussion of discourse theory and its applicability to studies of neo-nationalist ideology.

I The Articulation of the National Nodal Point

The Scottish nation as a nodal point

The attempt to mobilise national loyalty for the SNP's ends can be traced through all of its campaigns, but is most obvious in the 1999 Scottish election slogan; 'The SNP - Scotland's Party'. The party's creation of this link between party and nation associates support for the SNP with a feeling of Scottish belonging, thereby politicising national identity. In Laclau and Mouffe's terminology, this national identifier corresponds to a nodal point, as all principles of SNP ideology are organised around the prioritisation of the Scottish nation, first and foremost. This is expressed in the following appraisal of self-determination, which was quoted with approval at the SNP's 1998 annual conference;

Self-determination is not some single-issue campaign. Everything that matters politically is contained within it.⁴

Party ideology is thus structured around the nodal point of the nation and the pursuit of self-determination, just as the CSU makes the concept of *Heimat* central to its own political programme. However, as examples of SNP rhetoric illustrate, the imagery used by the party to convey its message is somewhat more inclusive than that employed by the Bavarian party, pointing to a very different *articulation* of the national identifier in each case.

An SNP leaflet aimed at 'New Scots' (defined as "people from any nation who have come to live in Scotland, and who see their future in Scotland") uses upbeat and aspirational rhetoric to clarify their role in an independent Scotland. Explicitly targetted as potential SNP supporters, they are urged to "play a part in building a New Scotland". Instead of offering a vision of a nation steeped in tradition, the leaflet ends with the words; "It's where we are all going to that's important". The imagery used thus recalls that of the 'American dream'

⁴ Ian Bell, quoted by Margaret Ewing MP in a speech to SNP Conference on 24th September 1998.

underpinning United States nationhood, according to which all citizens share a future if not a past. More generally, Salmond has stated;

The achievement of independence relies on the people of Scotland - and by that I mean all those who live in Scotland - to embrace a new future and to work for it.⁵

This vague but forward-looking vision contrasts with the CSU's more vivid rendering of the Bavarian *Heimat's* unique character and the need for traditional markers of identity to be cherished. Although the CSU pays equal attention to the theme of progress, this aspect of its rhetoric remains embedded within the concept of *Heimat*, which is defined using markedly ethnic criteria.⁶ The SNP also constructs a national Scottish stereotype in order to mobilise an *a priori* neutral sense of Scottish identity for its political project.

For the SNP these policies have to be founded in the Scottish mainstream, in the reawakening of the themes of enterprise, compassion and democracy which are the three pillars of Scottish identity and Scotland's sense of self worth.⁷

However, this message is conveyed using inclusive, 'catch-all' rhetoric, such as the myth of Scots having an inherent tendency to support social justice.⁸ Although the CSU and the SNP both have the nation as the nodal point of their ideologies, it is constructed very differently. The SNP uses a different "narrative strategy" to the CSU in its rhetoric.⁹

Those reading the SNP's 1997 general election manifesto were asked to believe that, after independence, "Scotland will become a

⁵ From a speech to the London School of Economics on 24th February 1999.

⁶ For a discussion of the traditional and progressive components in the apolitical meaning of the *Heimat* concept, see chapter six, part three.

⁷ Alex Salmond, from a speech to the London School of Economics on 24th February 1999.

⁸ "The social conscience, the community spirit, the idea of the common weal has never been lost in Scotland. And Scotland's party will use these principles in our actions". Margaret Ewing MP, in a speech to SNP special conference, 13th March 1999. See chapter five, section one for a fuller discussion of this myth in the context of the 'Penny for Scotland' campaign.

⁹ H. Bhabha 'DissemiNation' in H. Bhabha (ed.) *Narrating the Nation* p.292.

wealthier, freer nation”.¹⁰ This is a prime example of a truth assertion that is justifiable within the system of differences constructed by nationalist ideology, but is contested by every other major party ideology in Scotland. The SNP goes about structuring its ideology around the nodal point of the nation by asserting a relationship between Scottish independence, wealth and freedom. In keeping with their articulation within a system of differences, these identities are defined in contrast to others. The following statement is an example of the rhetoric used by the party;

Scotland today is being held back by the Union with England. An independent Scotland will be a magnet for investment and our ‘Bill of Rights’ will protect every citizen from government interference—something that Britain does not do—and establish social justice in our land.¹¹

The initial speculative statement is justified so as to appeal to as wide an audience as possible. First of all, the Union is blamed, a reminder of the SNP’s core ideological commitment to independence. Further, the phrase “something that Britain does not do” invites the juxtaposition with “something that Scotland does”. However, it is actually contrasted with an SNP policy, thereby subtly eliding Scotland and the SNP. This correspondence is further reinforced by the ambivalent use of the first person plural; “our Bill of Rights” refers to that drawn up by the SNP, but “our land” is evidently meant to mean that of the Scottish people. As was demonstrated in chapter five, SNP ideology is thus attributed to Scotland as a whole. The party attempts to delimit and define the Scottish nation by characterising it as hemmed in by the Union, as in opposition to the UK government and as having a different mentality to the rest of Britain. In the system of differences the SNP constructs, voters are encouraged to identify with the nodal point of the Scottish nation as an alternative to the UK.

The piece of SNP rhetoric reproduced above contains something that almost every potential voter can identify with positively. Portraying Scotland as a magnet for investment should reassure businessmen. The promise of social justice should appeal to

¹⁰ SNP General Election Manifesto, 1997 p.5.

¹¹ *Ibid.* p.5.

those on the left of the political spectrum, while more conservative readers will be satisfied with the promise of freedom from government interference. Crucially, the national nodal point is not evoked rhetorically using ethnic markers of belonging. In this way, the core commitment to independence is supplemented by a 'catch-all' strategy; no stone that might hide a potential voter is left unturned. Such an approach is also symptomatic of an age in which multiple identities are the norm. In the space of a single sentence, voters are variously appealed to as Scots, as non-Britons, as entrepreneurs and as lovers of both social justice and individual freedom. This is indicative of the flexibility that the thinness of nationalist ideology allows, and also illustrates that ideological constructions of identities are unstable and adaptable. It is important to note, however, that a British identity is not deemed compatible with the SNP's interpretation of self-determination. Whereas the CSU pursues national autonomy within a larger polity and accordingly incorporates a German element in its articulation of Bavarian identity, the SNP constructs a dual Scottish and European identity instead.

The party's definition of the nation and its vision of an independent Scotland are mutually dependent. John Swinney commented;

Of course we are proud about what we are but not in a conservative sense of wanting to maintain something against changes. We actually want to do something better.

The party's criteria of belonging are not based on ethnicity, but rather on voluntaristic participation in a multicultural society.¹² Consequently, the net for membership of the Scottish nation is thrown wide to include anyone resident.¹³ The party also points to affiliated organisations such as Asian Scots for Independence and New Scots for Independence, which are used to deflect accusations of racism and anti-Englishness respectively. Kevin Pringle pointed out that;

¹² Kevin Pringle commented; "We stand for the whole nation, nobody's excluded [...] Everybody's in, basically, and we can all look forward together".

¹³ "The right of Scottish citizenship will belong to all those resident in Scotland on the date of Independence and to those who were born in Scotland but are resident elsewhere". SNP Citizens not Subjects.

We're all Scots and some of the most passionate Scots are those who are recent incomers into the country, many of whom are active in the SNP whether they're from the rest of the UK or the Indian subcontinent.

This recognition of Scottish multiculturalism confirms that the SNP's national nodal point is constructed differently to that of the CSU, whose *Heimat* concept is articulated in opposition to multiculturalism. Unlike the *Heimat* concept, which is primarily targetted towards members of the Bavarian *Stämme*, the SNP's depiction of Scottish belonging has few connotations of birth or tradition, since it is presented in terms of voluntaristic attachment rather than as a historical artefact. Neil MacCormick made the following comment;

The growing concept of Scots has I think always been essentially a civic concept; you work within and pay your allegiance to these institutions, this place, then you belong. There's also of course the ancestral element but in that sense it's true that the Fortes [Scottish entrepreneurs of Italian extraction] are as ancestrally Scottish as the Mackays in America [...] The exciting thing about multicultural cultures is that they have a place for all of them.

An examination of the CSU's articulation of the nation will compare and contrast it with the Scottish case.

The Bavarian *Heimat* as a nodal point

The central role of the *Heimat* in CSU rhetoric corresponds to its articulation as a nodal point of nationalist ideology. Indeed, from it emanates the ideological justification for many party policies. Environmental policy and city planning are presented in terms of protecting the *Heimat*. The CSU's position on Europe is argued to be in the best interests of the *Heimat*. Crucially, emphasis on the fact that the party stands only in Bavaria suggests that it best understands the Bavarian mentality, even to the point of embodying the *Heimatland*. The concept of *Heimat* is central in articulating the identity of the party as Bavarian. As an ideological nodal point, it provides the springboard from which to create a rhetorical correspondence between party, people and *Land*. By asserting such a close relationship between party

and *Land*, the CSU is attempting to make a highly ideological conceptual link appear 'common sense' - namely that between a politically neutral Bavarian identity and a vote for the party.¹⁴ This corresponds to an "attempt to establish a definitive suture and to deny the radically open character of the social".¹⁵ A recent example of party literature provides a graphic representation of the way the CSU depicts the *Heimat* as rooted in the permanence of the Bavarian landscape.

The CSU's manifesto for the 1998 Bavarian elections contained statements of party policy in areas such as education, unemployment, security and industry. Other than the campaign slogan, no general principles emphasising the CSU's commitment to Bavaria were included. Instead, subtle visual imagery was opted for. The entire manifesto was printed on paper depicting a bucolic scene in pastel colours, thus rendering in pictorial form the beauty of the Bavarian landscape and, by extension, of the *Heimat* it symbolises. In this way the national theme was, literally, always in the background of the manifesto, without being explicitly formulated. As an inchoate message appealing to aesthetic sensibilities, it was designed to be attractive to potential voters in much the same way as the concept of *Heimat* is repeatedly used in party rhetoric to evoke a positive sense of Bavarian belonging. Such an image aims for conceptual hegemony at a level more subliminal than general statements of principle. Furthermore, it shows the party decontesting a concept with no *a priori* political content to its own advantage. The highly politically charged concept of the *Nation*, on the other hand, is used to designate the wider German context. It has been treated rhetorically with greater reserve, despite strong undercurrents of party loyalty to a traditional, ethnic understanding of the nation.¹⁶ By reinventing *Heimat* and *Nation* in a way acceptable to Bavarian and German sensibilities, the CSU adapts its articulation of the national nodal point to Bavarian society. An

¹⁴ In advertising circles Bavaria, its government and the CSU are referred to as 'the Holy Trinity'. Team 70, an advertising company which worked on CSU campaigns for over twenty-five years, was particularly successful at expressing this ideological sleight of hand visually. Cf. the CSU posters reprinted in B. Haneke & R. Höpfinger (eds.) *Geschichte einer Volkspartei - 50 Jahre CSU* pp. 769-816.

¹⁵ E. Laclau & C. Mouffe *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* p. 187.

¹⁶ See chapter six, section three for a discussion of the concept of *Nation* in CSU rhetoric.

important element of party strategy is to portray the CSU itself as a component of the *Heimat* construct.

In chapter six, it was discussed to what extent the party equates itself rhetorically with the national nodal point. This refers to much more than the fact that it is unique in standing exclusively in Bavaria. The CSU's influence in the economic development of the *Land* since the Second World War, its half-century of agenda-setting in government and its protection of Bavarian tradition are all highlighted. The contribution of the CSU's non-confessional stance to overcoming the religious cleavages which characterised Bavarian politics is also underlined. Further, the party's articulation of Bavarian identity is presented as all-encompassing enough to be attractive to all the Bavarian *Stämme*, including the ethnic German exiles from Eastern Europe. For instance, emphasis on the party's federal role is likely to appeal to Franconians, who have a historically greater affinity with the German state than the south. Finally, charismatic figures such as Franz Josef Strauß and Edmund Stoiber are styled as representative of a world-view attractive to many Bavarian voters.¹⁷ By extension, the CSU seeks to embody a collective Bavarian identity (*gesamtbayerische Identität*). The successful integration of these sources of dissent and difference into its ideology cements the party's link to the idealised *Heimat* depicted in its rhetoric.

Charles Westen summed up the CSU's Bavarian identity as follows;

[It consists] in its strong rootedness, together with the people in this *Land*, in the landscape, also in the Bavarian culture which has evolved and the self-confidence that goes along with that. [Also] one and a half

¹⁷ Siegfried Müller commented; "Franz Josef Strauß was the one who, let's say, embodied Bavaria politically. Edmund Stoiber has achieved recognition among the entire Bavaria population as the representative of Bavaria and he is greatly endorsed as a person, even substantially more than his party is". ["Franz Josef Strauß [war] derjenige der, sagen wir, Bayern politisch verkörpert hat [Edmund Stoiber] ist es gelungen in der gesamten bayerischen Bevölkerung als Repräsentant Bayerns anerkannt zu werden und er hat eine ungeheuer Zustimmung zu seiner Person, auch wesentlich höher noch als zur Partei".]

thousand years of independence as opposed to *Baden-Württemberg*, a product of the post-war period.¹⁸

As such, the CSU itself seeks to be a symbol with an integrative function, which it portrays rhetorically as a complicity between party and *Land* so complete as to be symbiotic. Its resistance to accepting the multiculturalism of Bavarian society only consolidates the homogeneous picture it paints of the *Heimat*. The CSU's appeal to ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe as the fourth Bavarian *Stamm*, in contrast to its refusal to describe Germany or Bavaria as an *Einwanderungsland*, supports the view that the party's *Heimat* construct has an important ethnic component.¹⁹ The CSU has done something to offset this aspect of its rhetoric by appropriating a myth depicting Bavarians as a hospitable and open people, using the slogan, 'live and let live'.²⁰ However, this rhetorical strand is used primarily in connection with the party's conception of liberalism and social justice, and is by no means as strongly emphasised as the *Heimat* construct.²¹

CSU rhetoric applies the principle of unity in *limited* diversity to the national, state and European political arenas with the same ideological aim; the preservation of Bavarian autonomy and the defence of its interests both within Europe and the Federal Republic of Germany. The party's attempt to provide a general national identifier

¹⁸ ["[Es besteht] aus der starken Verwurzelung mit den Menschen in diesem Land, aus der Landschaft, auch aus der gewachsenen Kultur Bayerns und das Selbstbewußtsein, das damit einhergeht. [Auch] anderthalb Tausend Jahre Eigenstaatlichkeit im Unterschied zu Baden-Württemberg, ein Produkt der Nachkriegszeit".]

¹⁹ In the late 1990s, the CSU politician Peter Gauweiler repeatedly called for the principle that Bavaria is not a land of immigration to be enshrined in the Bavarian constitution. Jeffrey Peck notes that if *Heimat* can be defined in contrast to all that is foreign or distant, "then those outsiders desiring Germany as a *Heimat* can never hope to achieve this status." J. Peck 'Rac(e)ing the Nation: Is there a German 'Home?'' in G. Eley & R. Suny (eds.) *Becoming National: A Reader* at p. 483.

²⁰ Jörg Vogel, a source outwith the CSU, noted the existence of this myth in Bavarian political culture; "In general it is the case that the Bavarians are assumed to be a liberal people. There is, after all, the Bavarian motto 'live and let live'". ["Das ist insgesamt so, daß den Bayern nahegelegt wird, daß sie ein liberales Volk sind. Es gibt ja das bayerische Motto 'leben und leben lassen'".]

²¹ A CSU campaign flyer produced for the Bavarian election of 1998 included the sentence; "Our basic principles are *liberalitas bavariae*, or live and let live, but solidarity with those who need our support". ["Unsere Grundsätze lauten; *liberalitas bavariae*, also leben und leben lassen, aber Solidarität mit denjenigen, die unsere Unterstützung brauchen".] Note how the phrase '*leben und leben lassen*' is also given in its Latin form so as to lend a veneer of age-old tradition to the myth.

at the domestic level is the rhetorical translation of this core ideological goal.²² Its strategy of rhetorically relating the elements of people, party and land revolves around the nodal point of the *Heimat*. The myth of Bavaria's historical rootedness and unity serves to perpetuate the illusion that the CSU's interpretation of the *Land* as *Heimat* is not a contingent ideological construct. This prioritisation and politicisation of the national nodal point much resembles the strategy employed by the SNP with reference to the Scottish nation.

The SNP and the CSU articulate their nationalist ideologies around the nodal point of the nation and the *Heimat* respectively. In each case, the ideological role of these concepts is the same, although the meaning attributed to them in party rhetoric is quite different. Both concepts have an organising, referential function within an ideological system of differences. In turn, the construction of national stereotypes derived from them is highly strategic. By being as inclusive as possible in its rhetoric, the SNP is making a bid for conceptual hegemony in a way adapted to political culture in Scotland. The articulation of 'Britain' as the undesirable 'Other' is intended to promote negative feelings towards the *status quo* and encourage identification with Scottish independence as an alternative. Moreover, rhetorical devices are used to blur the distinction between Scotland and the SNP, in order to make this conceptual linkage appear uncontested common sense. The CSU uses the same rhetorical techniques, but is less inclusive in its appeals to the Bavarian *Heimat*. On the other hand, its articulation of the concept contains a German element. The flexibility of neo-nationalist parties in the construction of national identities is indicative of the many interpretations of self-determination by contemporary nationalist parties. It shows that independence is rarely constructed as an absolute in neo-nationalist ideology, but is combined with other levels of governance instead. Based on Maarten Hajer's definition of hegemony, discussed in chapter two, the following section will

²² "In this way it is only consistent that the CSU should continue its attempts to represent peculiarly *Länder* interests as a regional party, to cultivate a style typical of the *Land* and at the same time as a federal force, to influence political decision-making which affects national (sic.) and international politics". G. Hirscher *Die CSU nach den Wahlen 1998* p. 440 (my translation).

compare the parties' relative success at persuading central actors to accept the rhetorical power of the national nodal point.²³

II Conceptual Hegemony

The SNP

The fact that the SNP stands only in Scotland makes it a Scottish party, but the intuitively plausible extension of its identity to 'Scotland's party' is in fact highly ideologically charged. Peter Murrell points to the SNP's advantage in trying to mobilise Scottish identity, although he somewhat overstates its strength by suggesting that the correspondence between party and nation is taken for granted by the Scottish public.²⁴ In fact, spirited contestation of this linkage means that it has by no means become hegemonic in Scottish political discourse.²⁵ To return to Hajer's definition of the condition of discourse structuration, central actors have not been persuaded by, or forced to accept, the rhetorical power of new discourse. In the run-up to the Scottish parliament election, the tendency "to think that, because it is Scotland, you should vote SNP" was hotly disputed by the SNP's political opponents.²⁶ Donald Dewar, then leader of the Scottish Labour party, expressed himself thus;

I object to the arrogance of saying they [the SNP] are Scotland's party and the very clear implication of much of their propaganda that those that don't accept their political ideology are somehow betraying Scotland or are not true Scots. I think I am every bit as legitimate an

²³ Maarten Hajer defines discourse structuration as the condition whereby "central actors are persuaded by, or forced to accept, the rhetorical power of a new discourse". *City Politics: Hegemonic Projects and Discourse* p. 47. Cf. chapter two, section three for a discussion of Hajer and Hall's respective applications of the concept of hegemony to empirical studies.

²⁴ Peter Murrell commented; "The SNP has that credibility anyway. If you asked the question, do you think the SNP puts Scottish interests first, then the obvious answer would be yes [...] It's taken for granted, really, by the Scottish public".

²⁵ Maarten Hajer defines a hegemonic project "as a political project which constitutes a general political-strategic programme at a specific political institutional level." *City Politics: Hegemonic Projects and Discourse* p. 32.

²⁶ This was a response by a member of a focus group conducted by *The Scotsman* on the subject of attitudes to Scottish political parties, the results of which were published in the newspaper on 4th May 1999. This view was not shared by all other focus group members, one of whom even expressed fear of the SNP.

interpreter of Scottish opinions as Mr Salmond or any of his colleagues.²⁷

This illustrates that the party has not achieved the discourse structuration which Hajer points to as a condition of conceptual hegemony.²⁸ Thus, the SNP's bid for hegemony is still a project, geared towards making its ideological interpretation of the Scottish nation not only acceptable but also dominant within Scottish political culture. Despite the SNP's attempts to profile its neo-nationalist ideology in overwhelmingly positive terms, this construction has been effectively contested by opposition parties, who use the rhetoric of divorce, isolationism and separatism to undermine the party's independence project. This demonstrates what Laclau and Mouffe term an antagonism; ideological friction which a hegemonic articulation attempts to overcome by establishing a relatively stable, uncontested system of meaning.²⁹ Some of the most contested areas in Scottish political discourse and the SNP's contribution to these debates are discussed below.

The nationalist label can be something of a handicap to the SNP, as its eagerness to differentiate itself from other parties as non-British can easily be spun by opponents as evidence of anti-English rhetoric. Neil MacCormick commented that;

The trouble is we always have to say that we're more 'X' than somebody else and it is usually more 'X' than the English.

Therefore, the party is keen to push its project for Scotland to the fore in order to detract attention from comparisons with its southern

²⁷ Quoted in The Scotsman, 4th April 1999. During the same campaign, prime minister Tony Blair gave his own interpretation of the image the SNP were trying to convey; "We are called the Scottish Nationalists therefore we are for Scotland' [...] But the people who are most patriotic are the people who have the best policies for Scotland. I think all the way through what the SNP want to do is avoid the difficult piercing questions and say 'we are more Scottish than you'". Quoted in The Scotsman, 9th April 1999.

²⁸ "Depending on the way in which a national identity is defined, it can be used to mobilize the population to any end, not only those which envisage a separate national state". S. Reicher & N. Hopkins Self and Nation p. 217.

²⁹ E. Laclau & C. Mouffe Hegemony and Socialist Strategy Ch. 3.

neighbour.³⁰ For instance, parallels with other small nations are pointed to in preference to contrasts with England. Further, by profiling itself as a purely political movement, the SNP has always sought to distance itself from literary, romantic or cultural nationalism. Undoubtedly, the party fears that too much of an emphasis on tradition will lay it open to accusations of exclusive nationalism, parochialism, out-datedness and so on.³¹ Those SNP members interviewed recognised that the negative connotations of nationalism could not be ignored and, as John Swinney put it, that the party had to “attempt to find ways to make [its] message more acceptable”.³² One instance of this is the party’s current worry that it articulates its message too aggressively and thereby alienates female voters in particular.³³ In constructing a system of differential identities around the nodal point of the nation, the party has been unable to surmount opposition to its rhetorical presentation of nationalism and have it generally accepted in the Scottish political arena.

As a means of distancing the party both from the negative campaigning of the opposition and the negative connotations of nationalism, the general consensus among those interviewed was that the rhetoric used by the SNP should be ‘aspirational’. This has become a central component in the party’s characterisation of itself as positive and forward-looking.³⁴ It is expressed in party rhetoric as a

³⁰ “So let us lay it on the line. This party doesn’t blame the English or anyone else for the state of Scotland. At each and every election we have the ability to vote ourselves into independence”. Alex Salmond, in an address to SNP conference on 25th September 1998.

³¹ Mike Russell commented; “I used to be astonished by Michael Forsyth [former Conservative secretary of state for Scotland] getting away with the rhetoric he had because we would never have got away with it”. Peter Murrell noted; “We’re very careful about how to promote ourselves, that we don’t let [our opponents] pigeon-hole us”.

³² Alasdair Morgan was of the opinion that the party would be better off without the word ‘national’ in its name. Neil MacCormick was careful to point out that the SNP was a ‘national’ as opposed to a ‘nationalist’ party, presumably in order to distance the party from the fascist connotations of nationalism.

³³ John Swinney associated “the disparity between male and female support for the SNP” with “the very hard edge with which we articulate our message sometimes”.

³⁴ The aspirational element is illustrated in this example of rather high-flown rhetoric; “Our vision is, to touch that Scottish horizon of national freedom [...] Let us inspire the people - all the people - with our vision and with our sense of excitement and infinite possibility. Let us help all of Scotland to touch, to grasp, to reach that Scottish horizon”. Alex Salmond, in a speech to SNP Conference on 25th September 1998.

combination of emotional and rational arguments for Scottish independence, perhaps best summed up in Alex Salmond's evocation of an independent Scotland as 'a rich country' and 'a rich society'.³⁵ All the party representatives interviewed were quite sanguine about the need for emotional appeals in politics. Kevin Pringle stated;

I think you always have to pursue a kind of heart and head campaign and I think, though the logical arguments for independence must always be put, there's always a case, of course, for mobilising people's attachment and sense of loyalty to Scotland.

This appraisal of SNP strategy is an illustration of Andreas Geier's point that "it is precisely the combination of the most diverging levels of identification and loyalty that guarantees the permanence of the national hegemonic project".³⁶ Despite the fact that its rhetoric rests on a coherent and - above all - costed ideology, the SNP nevertheless demands a leap of faith from its voters. George Kerevan summed up the required blend of emotion and rationality which characterises the party;

The rhetoric of nationalism now is very much a kind of modernist, economic balance-sheet. It always amuses me because it is a highly emotional party. The party is still charged with this 'we-are-Scottish-thing' and is genuinely desperate not to be anti-English.³⁷

Although the rhetorical presentation of the SNP's message may have been made 'softer' and more nuanced, its core ideological goal has not changed. When asked to state the central message of the party, Bruce Crawford replied;

Well, we are Scotland's party. I mean, we may talk about the economy and social justice, but I mean primarily we are there to stand up for Scotland.

³⁵ Alex Salmond in a speech to an SNP special conference in Aberdeen on 13th March 1999. Cf. "While Scotland is a rich country we are not yet a rich society nor will we be until we fundamentally change some of our priorities". Alex Salmond, in a debate with Donald Dewar on 4th February 1999, published in the Scotsman on 5th February 1999.

³⁶ A. Geier Hegemonie der Nation p. 191.

³⁷ Kerevan went on to point out that many senior economists are quite open to the prospect of independence but would never consider joining the SNP, concluding; "You can't not have some emotional commitment to independence if you're going to join".

However, the SNP's articulation of the national nodal point has not gained as wide an acceptance in Scottish political culture as the CSU's construction of the *Heimat*, which has achieved conceptual hegemony in Bavaria. As has been shown, the crucial conceptual linkage the SNP seeks to create between people and party is very much contested by its political opponents. Its rhetorical construction of a symbiotic bond between the two in the phrase 'Scotland's party' has not become dominant in the same way as the CSU is accepted as the archetypal Bavarian party.

The CSU

The CSU's hegemonic project is exemplified in this quote, taken from the CSU's 1994 manifesto for the Bavarian parliament elections;

The Republic of Bavaria – that is not just a label, that was and is a political manifesto.³⁸

This is an explicit expression of the party's wish to mould Bavaria into a reflection of its ideology. The CSU uses a typical nationalist technique in that it 'forgets' historical episodes unhelpful to its cause, such as the revolutionary origins of Bavaria's *Freistaat* status, as proclaimed during a short-lived Bavarian soviet republic following the First World War. Instead, the party attaches a new meaning to a symbol of national sovereignty by linking the label to its own political project, leaving behind any connotations of a Communist one! In terms of discourse theory, this can be characterised as the CSU's rearticulation of the concept of Bavaria into a nodal moment of its ideology.³⁹ What concerns us here is the success of the CSU's bid for discursive hegemony over the concept of Bavaria as *Heimat*.

³⁸ ["Freistaat Bayern- das ist nicht nur ein Etikett, das war und ist politisches Programm".]

³⁹ It will be remembered that Laclau and Mouffe define moments as differential positions articulated within a discourse, and elements as differences yet to be discursively articulated. *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* p. 105

The CSU has rearticulated concepts such as *Nation* and *Heimat* from the discursive formation of Nazism to moments of post-war discourse. However, the difficult relationship of Germans to the concept of *Nation* was discussed in chapter six. Attempts to rehabilitate it continue, most recently in the debate surrounding a 'leading' German culture (*Leitkultur*) which, according to CDU politicians at least, demands a re-evaluation of the word *Vaterland*.⁴⁰ Most interesting for our purposes is that, within these high-profile party political debates, the concept of *Heimat* remains uncontested.⁴¹ A book of discussion papers published in 1984 by the *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung*, entitled 'Heimat und Nation', set out to contribute to the debate on German identity in the context of the division of Germany and the process of European integration. Notwithstanding the book's title, the concept of *Heimat* was defined apolitically and thereafter mentioned only fleetingly, signalling its neglect as a tool of political debate.⁴² In this context, the CSU's political articulation of the concept in Bavaria is quite remarkable.⁴³ Consider, for instance, Jeffrey Peck's view that;

⁴⁰ See the BBC news online article, [German CDU says immigrants must 'conform'](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1010000/1010281.stm), 6th November 2000, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1010000/1010281.stm, consulted on 8th April 2001. The question of national pride continues to be a vexed one. The German environment minister Jürgen Trittin caused a great deal of controversy in March 2001 by likening a CDU politician's expression of pride in his nationality to a remark one might expect from a skinhead. See [President not 'proud' to be German](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/monitoring/media_reports/newsid_1229000/1229754.stm), 20th March 2001 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/monitoring/media_reports/newsid_1229000/1229754.stm, consulted on 8th April 2001.

⁴¹ In academic circles, the concept of *Heimat* is discussed primarily within the discipline of cultural studies. See, for instance, Morley and Robins' discussion of the *Heimatfilm* genre and E. Reitz's acclaimed documentary entitled *Heimat*. D. Morley & K. Robins 'No place like *Heimat*: Images of Home(land) in European Culture' in G. Eley & R. Suny (eds.) [Becoming National: A Reader](#). C. Graf von Krochow in [Heimat. Erfahrungen mit einem deutschen Thema](#), discusses the concept in terms of the ethnic German *Aussiedler* exiled from Eastern Europe following the Second World War. Although this event has political ramifications to this day, both studies define the concept of *Heimat* in apolitical terms as a homeland, a territory and memory of origin, replete with identity-building connotations of childhood, belonging and security.

⁴² "People in the federal republic of Germany identify the concept of *Heimat* either primarily with a place of personal security or with where their first social orientation in life took place". 'Introduction' to K. Weigelt (ed.) [Heimat und Nation](#) p. 15. The *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung* is a trust affiliated to the CDU.

⁴³ J. Peck 'Rac(e)ing the Nation: Is there a German 'Home?'' in G. Eley & R. Suny (eds.) [Becoming National: A Reader](#) at p. 489.

[W]holeness, totality and harmony is very much a romantic, utopian notion not realizable in the political entities people use as reference points for defining themselves [...] *Heimat*, the territorial vision of such an ideology, also remains unattainable.

The CSU finds itself in the situation of having successfully decontested the concept of the *Heimat* to its advantage. Opposition parties have been unable to forge their own peculiarly Bavarian identity attractive to voters. An illustration of this is the SPD's failed attempt to present itself as 'the other Bavaria' (*das andere Bayern*) in a 1970s campaign. The slogan does not attempt to subvert or even challenge the CSU's ideological interpretation of Bavaria as *Heimat*. Indeed, its proposed alternative is explicitly derived from the CSU's world-view and thus confirms that central actors have been forced to accept the rhetorical power of CSU discourse.⁴⁴

The SPD can dream on about the 'other Bavaria'. It knows nothing of the *real* Bavaria.⁴⁵

The failure of SPD campaigns to mobilise alternative national myths was more than a temporary setback for the opposition in Bavaria. Rather, it was proof that the CSU's ideological penetration of the political arena is practically complete, given that even its strongest political opponents cannot successfully contest its concepts. Alf Mintzel points out the tendency for even SPD voters to identify with certain symbols of Bavarian identity, such as traditionalism and conservatism, which do not seem to tally with their party political orientation.⁴⁶ The CSU thus fulfils Hajer's condition of discourse

⁴⁴ Another example of an SPD slogan which backfired is commented by Max Streibl as follows; "The SPD has chosen 'Let's preserve Bavaria' as its campaign slogan. What can this mean, then? It can only mean that Bavaria should remain the way it is. And let me add; the way it has become under the CSU! Is there really any better way to acknowledge our politics?" ["Die SPD hat das Wahlkampfmotto gewählt 'Bayern bewahren.' Ja was kann das denn wohl heißen? Das kann doch wohl nichts anderes heißen, als daß Bayern so bleiben soll, wie es ist. Und ich füge hinzu: wie es unter der CSU geworden ist! Gibt es eigentlich eine bessere Bestätigung für unsere Politik?"] From a speech published in the *Bayernkurier* on 21st July 1990, in the run-up to regional elections.

⁴⁵ ["Die SPD mag weiter von dem 'anderen Bayern' träumen. Vom *wirklichen* Bayern weiß sie nichts".] (emphasis in original transcript.) From a speech by Edmund Stoiber in Munich on 21st October 1995.

⁴⁶ A. Mintzel *Die CSU - Hegemonie in Bayern* Ch. 5. To quote Claus Mueller; "The manipulation of language was stronger than their convictions". C. Mueller *The Politics of Communication* p. 58.

structuration. The SPD, to quote Stuart Hall, had to “perform with the established terms of the problematic in play”.⁴⁷

That the party is clear on the rhetorical strategy required to propagate its ideology is illustrated in the following quote from Franz Josef Strauß;

The danger is the gradual transformation of our society, from the violation of language and the distortion of concepts through the narrowing of consciousness to the transformation of reality. We, the CSU, must take up the fight for language again and win the battle over concepts if we want to change political reality.⁴⁸

This statement is quite consonant with discourse theory, which portrays ideological competition in terms of a “battle over concepts”. Strauß recognises that the “fight for language” leads to the power to change political reality, or in Hajer’s terms, to achieve the condition of discourse institutionalisation.⁴⁹ Ultimately, Strauß aspires to achieve a hegemonic articulation by redefining the meaning of concepts to correspond to a new “political reality”. He was speaking in 1979, when Germany was governed by a socialist-liberal coalition and the CSU/CDU was in opposition at the federal level. However, at *Land* level, the CSU has achieved just such a hegemonic articulation. Within Bavaria, it has constructed a sophisticated system of discursive differences around the *Heimat*, in which different levels of identity are related both to party affinities and national symbols.

The phrase “Bavaria is our *Heimat*, Germany is our *Vaterland* and Europe is our future” is often repeated by party members to

⁴⁷ S. Hall ‘The Rediscovery of ‘Ideology’’ in J. Rivkin & M. Ryan (eds.) *Literary Theory: An Anthology* p. 1061

⁴⁸ [“Die Gefahr ist die schrittweise Veränderung unserer Gesellschaft, durch die Vergewaltigung der Sprache und der Verfälschung der Begriffe über die Verengung des Bewußtseins bis zur Veränderung der Wirklichkeit. Wir, die Christlich-Sozialen, müssen wieder den Kampf um die Sprache aufnehmen, und die Schlacht um die Begriffe gewinnen, wenn wir die politische Wirklichkeit ändern wollen”.] From a speech printed in the *Bayernkurier* on 14th April 1979.

⁴⁹ “[T]he actual policy process is conducted according to the ideas of a given discourse (condition of discourse institutionalisation)”. M. Hajer *City Politics: Hegemonic Projects and Discourse* p.48.

explain the party's differentiated understanding of Bavarian identity.⁵⁰ When taken in conjunction with another favourite slogan linking the concepts of *Heimat* to love, duty to Germany and responsibility to Europe, the levels of affinity become clear. Yet another variant is '*Wir wollen gute Europäer werden, Deutsche sein und Bayern bleiben*', translated as 'We want to become good Europeans, be Germans and remain Bavarians'. The verb *bleiben* has connotations of rootedness and longevity which *sein* does not convey.⁵¹ These multiple identities correspond to the CSU's dual role in German politics, which has involved carving out a niche at the federal level as the CDU's indispensable acolyte, whilst retaining a uniquely Bavarian character. As the only important German regional party and as a coalition partner of its sister party, the CSU finds itself in the peculiar situation of having to make its presence felt in two political arenas. The rhetorical separation of the Bavarian *Heimat* from the German *Vaterland* helps to prevent confusion and illustrates the different levels of identity being articulated by the party. In particular, any emotional affinity to the German nation is underplayed in CSU rhetoric. Emotional appeals are reserved for the Bavarian *Heimat* instead, in relation to which pride and love can be freely expressed without fear of soliciting unwanted comparisons with Nazi rhetoric. Articulating the *Land's* identity in such a way also strengthens a Bavarian-wide feeling of solidarity by underlining where primary loyalties lie; the CSU has always presented itself as a champion of Bavarian interests in Germany.

Although the concept of the *Nation* is important to CSU ideology, it plays a relatively minor role in mobilising the Bavarian electorate behind the CSU's hegemonic project. Instead, the party constructs the Bavarian *Heimat* as a national nodal point and the primary focus of loyalty. The CSU's achievement of conceptual hegemony in Bavaria has not been emulated by the SNP, whose construction of the nation does not fulfil Hajer's condition of discourse

⁵⁰ ["Bayern ist unsere Heimat, Deutschland ist unser Vaterland und Europa ist unsere Zukunft".] Although this phrase was coined by none other than Franz Josef Strauß, it is interesting to note that Ingo Friedrich described it as a Bavarian saying; ["Es gibt ein Spruch hier in Bayern..."]

⁵¹ From a speech by Max Streibl delivered on Ash Wednesday 1992, printed in the *Bayernkurier* on 14th March 1992.

structuration within the Scottish political arena. The relationship between conceptual hegemony and the relative electoral dominance of the parties would be the subject of another study. What has been examined here is the effectiveness with which the concepts at each party's disposal have been appropriated and articulated in the service of their neo-nationalist ideologies. Building on the preceding discussion, the next section examines the interaction of the antagonistic practices inherent in these parties' ideologies with their discursive environments.

III Antagonism in Nationalist Ideology

Nationalist ideology is by its very nature deeply antagonistic towards the *status quo*, as it aspires to rearticulate the common sense understanding of a national construct, and thus revolutionise the discourse of a given historical bloc.⁵² In a "world-system of nation-states", minority nationalist movements will inevitably cause friction with the relatively unified social and political space which they seek to transcend.⁵³ According to Laclau and Mouffe, identity crises are the product of antagonistic ideologies struggling to rearticulate the meaning of contested concepts. In the context of nationalist ideology, the crisis revolves around the vexed question of national identity. Within a system of differences, the antagonism with the national 'Other' is constitutive of identity and must therefore be resolved. By seeking to reconcile potentially antagonistic identities, parties respond to other ideologies competing to achieve conceptual hegemony. The European dimension of this process has been highlighted in previous chapters. In what follows, the state identities peripheral to the nodal national point - namely British and German identity - will be discussed.

The neo-nationalist tendency to incorporate multiple levels of identity into their ideologies is a sign of flexibility in engaging with constructs in opposition to theirs.⁵⁴ For instance, the CSU's ideological

⁵² For a theoretical discussion of the concepts of antagonism and historical bloc in Laclau and Mouffe's thought, see chapter two, section two.

⁵³ C. Calhoun *Nationalism* Ch. 6.

⁵⁴ Elsewhere, I have characterised neo-nationalist ideology in terms of a choice between the exit and voice options, as theorised in Albert Hirschman's typology.

combination of Bavarian and German identities is the rhetorical translation of its pursuit of Bavarian autonomy within the German federal structure. All other mainstream German parties support federalism and, by extension, a degree of *Länder* autonomy. However, their interpretation of Bavaria's role within the federation is very different and there is necessarily friction with other ideological constructions of this differential identity. The SNP, on the other hand, presents the ideal Scottish nation as independent of the United Kingdom construct, and thus plays down the Scottish experience of British identity. The following discussion will examine its rhetoric in more detail.

The SNP

According to Alex Salmond, the Scots have had to contend with an inferiority complex since the Act of Union in 1707;

It is hard to under-estimate the importance of self-confidence. For much of the last three hundred years Scotland has been told that it is too small, too distant, too poor, or too stupid to govern itself.⁵⁵

The perceived effect of such claims on the Scottish electorate is intimately linked to the party's attempts to encourage self-confidence. Despite the use of the passive, Salmond's reference to the time of the Act of Union makes it clear that England is both the subject of comparison and the source of criticism. In terms of discourse theory, SNP rhetoric aims to overcome an alleged antagonism between Scottish and British identity. The question of the economic viability of an independent Scotland, for instance, highlights the unavoidable presence of the English 'Other' in SNP rhetoric. The SNP is intent on demonstrating that Scotland is able to manage its own affairs without the help or support of its English neighbour. Unsurprisingly, this

Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organisations and States.
Cf. C. Sutherland Regional Nationalism in a Global Context; Exit, Voice and Loyalty from a National Perspective.

⁵⁵ From an address by Alex Salmond to the London School of Economics on 24th February 1999. A comment by Winnie Ewing is also worth noting; "Now that people have opened their eyes to Scotland's future, they do not let the old myths cloud their vision. They no longer believe Scotland is a poor country". From a speech to SNP conference on 25th September 1998.

assertion is contested by the party's political opponents who claim that Scotland's relatively high level of social spending in the UK is subsidised by English tax-payers' money.⁵⁶ The SNP's 'Penny for Scotland' campaign is an illustration of how the SNP seeks to resolve such an ideological antagonism by recourse to its articulation of the Scottish nation.⁵⁷ Its ultimate aim is not to reconcile British and Scottish identity, a dualism that is the accepted norm for many Scots.⁵⁸ Instead, slogans such as 'Scotland's party' show that the SNP's ideological response to these antagonistic identities is simply to focus on one and discard the other. The party translates its wish to end the Union into an exclusive rhetorical appeal to the Scottish identifier. In turn, it confronts unionist parties who combine Scottish and British identities with the claim that it is somehow 'more Scottish' than them.

In much the same way as the CSU sums up its vision for Bavaria as a combination of tradition and progress, SNP rhetoric centres on;

The themes of enterprise, compassion and democracy which are the three pillars of Scottish identity and Scotland's sense of self worth.⁵⁹

The link made in this piece of rhetoric between the SNP's interpretation of Scottish identity and its strategy of boosting voters' self-confidence could hardly be more explicit. Salmond elaborated on these pillars of identity during his address to the party conference in 1998;

Enterprise because no one in this world owes us a living [...]
Compassion because Scotland will flourish not only because its

⁵⁶ Cf. J. Mitchell The Myth of Dependency.

⁵⁷ For a more detailed discussion of the SNP's 'Penny for Scotland' campaign, see chapter five, section one.

⁵⁸ In an article on national identity published in The Scotsman on 16th April 1999, Tom Little commented; "Scots are, on the whole, perfectly comfortable with something which others might see as a dilemma. For most of us, there is nothing incompatible with being both Scottish and British". This appraisal is borne out in statistical surveys. The 'Moreno question,' which asks respondents if they feel Scottish, more Scottish than British, equally Scottish and British, more British than Scottish or British, invariably has a majority opting for one of the central three categories. Cf. A. Brown *et al* The Scottish Electorate p. 62.

⁵⁹ From an address by Alex Salmond to the London School of Economics on 24th February 1999.

economy will do well, but also because we shall be a just nation. [...] Democracy because self-government for Scotland is not an event but a process. It is a process in which every institution is empowered by the democratic intellect.⁶⁰

In this exposition of the benefits of choosing the Scottish national construct over the British one, the 'Other' is implicit in the statement that no one owes Scotland a living. In turn, the theme of Scottish responsibility for its own destiny recalls aspects of the economic debate on independence, as a counterweight to the emotive tone of the piece. The economic argument is then intertwined with the Scots' alleged predisposition towards social justice, thus tempering an evocation of material interests with moral considerations. These strands of argument are all employed by the SNP to tackle the Scottish constitutional question, and they all tend towards the same conclusion; the alleged superiority of an ideology prioritising the Scottish nation as opposed to the United Kingdom.

In the following remark, Alex Salmond sums up the rhetorical link between party and nation which is so central to any nationalist project. The phrase "secure identity" underlines how the SNP aims to present its ideological construct as fixed and 'true';

And so we have a secure identity as Scotland's Party based on our ideals of enterprise, compassion and democracy. However we also have something that is now very, very rare in politics. We have a vision of a new Scotland that transcends our experience.⁶¹

The 'unknown' of independence is being spun here as inspiring, unique and exciting, in marked contrast to the images of darkness and insecurity favoured by the opposition.⁶² The general positivity of party rhetoric marks a move away from the more negative tone which was characteristic of past SNP campaigns. For instance, the party suffered negative fallout from the slogan 'It's Scotland's Oil' in the 1970s,

⁶⁰ Alex Salmond, in a speech to SNP conference in Inverness on 25th September 1998.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² "Even the same phrases and sayings can be used to mean fundamentally different things, to suggest fundamentally opposed notions of social relations as central to the national identity, and to mobilise support for fundamentally incompatible political parties and projects". S. Reicher & N. Hopkins Self and Nation p. 130.

which came to be associated with Scottish selfishness and money-grabbing vis-à-vis England.⁶³ The SNP is now eager to appear more upbeat, partly to distance itself from the backbiting associated with Westminster politics, and partly to foster a sense of optimism and confidence which it feels could persuade ‘canny’ Scots to support the party.⁶⁴ This is succinctly expressed in the encouragingly titled 1997 general election manifesto; ‘YES WE CAN win the best for Scotland’. It is also evident in the confidence with which the party asserts that a vote for the SNP would bring about the full realisation of Scottish nationhood. Through such assertions, the SNP wishes to establish its interpretation of the independence project as more plausible than those of the political opposition. In terms of discourse theory, the contested meaning of ‘independence’ is symptomatic of ideological antagonism. One way the SNP goes about undermining other parties’ rhetoric is to label it ‘scaremongering’. Peter Murrell pinpointed the task at hand for neo-nationalists;

We just have to find a mechanism to communicate the message beyond the scaremongering, because that’s all it is. There’s nothing wrong with the [SNP’s] core vision.

Indeed, the “core vision” has played a leading role in recent party campaigns.

The slogan ‘Scotland’s Party’ permeated the 1999 Scottish election campaign. Although it focuses on the fact that the SNP, by standing only in Scotland, has neither had to adapt nor adopt policies originating in England, the suggestion of a special spiritual relationship between the party and the Scottish people can also be inferred.⁶⁵ John Swinney commented;

What ‘Scotland’s Party’ set out to do was align us with the common interest of people within Scotland.

⁶³ See R. Levy Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads p. 40

⁶⁴ On conflicting party political interpretations of the myth of Scots as canny, or cautious, see S. Reicher & N. Hopkins Self and Nation Ch. 3.

⁶⁵ Alex Salmond made this clear in his address to the party conference on 25th September 1998. “First to our identity as Scotland’s Party. Every other party to a greater or lesser extent still takes its orders from London”. Kevin Pringle stated; “Basically, we are Scotland’s party because we are the only party that is actually based in Scotland”.

The party officially claims that Scottishness is not exclusive to the SNP. However, the implications of the slogan are clearly otherwise.⁶⁶ By asserting a direct link between the SNP and Scotland, the party implies that its political opponents are somehow less Scottish. Mike Russell, who coined the phrase, commented;

What it's designed to say is that we're the people who identify most closely with Scotland and Scotland should identify most closely with us. That's what it means [...] Whereas if you're Tories or Labour or Liberals your loyalty's going to be partially elsewhere at Westminster. We belong to you. I think that's what it says.

Despite the fact that 'Scotland's Party' creates a distinction between parties and not nations, at least one party worker was unhappy with the message.⁶⁷

In setting out to transcend British identity rather than reconcile it with Scottish identity, the SNP's brand of neo-nationalism lays itself open to attack. The party has great difficulty in shaking off its obvious 'Other', particularly the equation of its desire to end the Union with a dislike for the English. An ideology that has no place for British identity is construed by its opponents to be hostile to that identity and, by extension, to those who adopt it. One of the SNP's responses to the charge of exclusivity, or 'narrow nationalism' has been to define Scottish identity very widely.⁶⁸

When Alex Salmond asked whether Labour's understanding of Scottishness might contain a whiff of ethnic nationalism, he emphasised the SNP's predominantly civic interpretation of the nation at the same time;

⁶⁶ This was recognised by Neil MacCormick but not by Kevin Pringle, who propounds the official party line; "We'd always argue that we don't have a monopoly on Scottishness and we'd never claim to do so. It's perfectly possible and valid to be Scottish and be a Labour voter".

⁶⁷ Peter Murrell quoted a focus group member who interpreted the slogan to mean that the SNP exist to put Scotland first. He then commented; "That's what we are trying to communicate but I'm not sure those two words communicate that message effectively [...] It doesn't in itself explain what we are trying to say and we shouldn't expect voters to finish it for us".

⁶⁸ Alasdair Morgan referred to "narrow nationalism, though they [the SNP's opponents] never define what wide nationalism would be!"

Donald [Dewar] was very keen to stress where he was born. He doesn't seem to understand that in the new Scotland it doesn't matter where you were born or where you are from. Our journey in Scotland is not about our past - its about the future. It's about where we are going to that matters - and going together. When you are confident about your nationhood you don't have to prove how Scottish you are. And when you are confident about your party you don't have to prove how Scottish it is.⁶⁹

By suggesting that Dewar has simply not understood the 'truth' about Scotland, Salmond wishes to equate his own ideological view with common sense. The implication is that the SNP's Scottishness is inherent and self-evident, unlike that of the opposition, which has to prove its national credentials. The SNP is thereby trying to demonstrate that Labour has not successfully incorporated Scottish identity into its ideology. SNP rhetoric portrays Labour not only as having difficulty in reconciling Scottish and British identities, but also in articulating Scottish identity. In contrast, the SNP is depicted as having resolved these antagonisms by articulating a unique but inclusive nodal national identifier.

Distinguishing parties and issues using national markers is a unilateral SNP initiative, best conveyed in the 'Penny for Scotland' rhetoric. It is a potent one, however, and the Labour party has taken up the challenge by attempting to portray itself as more Scottish than the SNP.⁷⁰ Further, the Conservatives in Scotland have suffered badly from being seen to be an English party out of touch with Scottish needs, an image the SNP has exploited and sought to reinforce in its

⁶⁹ From an address to SNP conference on 25th September 1998. Elsewhere, in an analysis of a piece of Donald Dewar's rhetoric, I examine its ethnic nationalist content at greater length. C. Sutherland Nationalist Ideology from a Rhetorical Perspective. Paper presented to the History of Concepts Group Annual Conference, 28th-30th June 2001, Tampere, Finland.

⁷⁰ Kevin Pringle opined; "There's no doubt the Labour party was very aware [the "Scotland's Party" slogan] worked as well because it was something they were very sensitive about, a thing they were always very keen to attack because they were only too aware of how important that message was". The Labour politician George Robertson is quoted as saying; "The Scottish Labour Party; the real national party of Scotland". S. Reicher & N. Hopkins Identity, Mobilisation and Nation: A Psychology of Mass Action p. 159.

campaigning.⁷¹ SNP rhetoric thus sets up a seemingly necessary conflict of British and Scottish interests and, by extension, of identities.⁷² This is summed up in the party's pejorative labelling of all other parties standing in Scotland as 'London parties'.⁷³ Despite the dual British and Scottish identities of many Scots, the party depicts anything British as being not (read anti-) Scottish. A dual identity is thus portrayed as an advantage when it comes to the Scottish/European combination, but the British/Scottish variant cannot be countenanced by the SNP.⁷⁴ The party rejects the Scottish tradition of Unionist nationalism completely.⁷⁵ For instance, the party officially distanced itself from the view expressed publicly by the MSP Andrew Welsh that British identity could play a part in the makeup of an independent Scotland.⁷⁶ It has been shown that the debate surrounding the concept of the Scottish nation is a hotbed of ideological friction because of the conflicting political projects it expresses. The SNP has chosen to solve the antagonism between Scottish and British levels of identity by focusing its rhetoric exclusively on Scotland in order to further its core goal of national self-determination. As will be discussed below, the CSU approaches the antagonism between German and Bavarian identities in quite a different way.

⁷¹ Alasdair Morgan commented; "There was a negative strand in the sense that particularly the Conservatives were seen to be and were certainly being portrayed by us as being very anti-Scottish [...] But I think the more positive side of it was to try to tap into any feeling of Scottish identity [...] It was to try to tap into almost a more emotional appeal".

⁷² Gordon Wilson interpreted the 'Scotland's Party' slogan thus; "I think it's set out as a contrast to the other parties which were England's parties" and Peter Murrell said "it's Scotland's party because they're not".

⁷³ An SNP flyer produced for the 1999 Scottish election campaign made the contrast clear in its slogan; "Scotland's Party or London Labour".

⁷⁴ As was discussed in chapter seven, a dual Scottish-European identity is positively interpreted by the party, and is explicitly contrasted with English attitudes. George Reid highlighted which dual identity the party preferred; "It's significantly easier because of the three hundred years of Scots dual identity for Scots to move to a Scots-European position than for people in England".

⁷⁵ G. Morton Unionist-nationalism: the historical construction of Scottish national identity, 1830-1860.

⁷⁶ The prominent SNP politician Roseanna Cunningham delivered a lecture series in which she asserted that Britain had not existed as a nation since the end of World War II, and that it was time to move on and adopt new identities. See 'Being British is a Thing of the Past' in The Scotsman of 13th February 1999.

The CSU

In the late 1970s, then chancellor Willy Brandt used the phrase “the clocks work differently in Bavaria” (*in Bayern gehen die Uhren anders*), to indicate that the *Land* was widely perceived as being different to the rest of Germany. This judgement, somewhat condescendingly delivered by an SPD politician, was hotly debated in academic, political and media circles alike.⁷⁷ It expresses the stereotypical German view of Bavarians, summed up in Josef Lindner’s sarcastic comment as “a sort of exotic mountain people, to put it quite starkly, [...] who still want to feed their cows on the mountain pastures of their province.”⁷⁸ However, Brandt’s phrase was soon taken up by Franz Josef Strauß and turned into a positive expression of pride in Bavaria’s particularity.⁷⁹ An important component of CSU strategy has been to overcome the alleged superiority complex of Northern Germans vis-à-vis Bavaria by presenting Bavarian identity as something overwhelmingly positive. In terms of discourse theory, this corresponds to tackling the identity crisis symptomatic of ideological antagonism.

The party’s attempt to foster a self-confident image for Bavaria is evident in the link it makes between Bavaria and beauty. This, in turn, can be subdivided into three elements; the prettiness of the countryside, the moral probity of the people and the *Land’s* economic prosperity. As was pointed out in section one of this chapter, the idea of ‘*das schöne Bayern*’ is illustrated throughout the CSU’s latest manifesto. The title of Riehl-Heyse’s book, which translates as “the party which invented beautiful Bavaria”, in itself underlines that the CSU created the rhetorical construct.⁸⁰ The evocation in party rhetoric

⁷⁷ For a commentary and bibliography of the academic debate, see Alf Mintzel ‘Bayern und die CSU’ in B. Haneke & R. Höpfinger (eds.) *Gechichte einer Volkspartei - 50 Jahre CSU* at p. 198

⁷⁸ [“eine Art exotisches Bergvolk, um es mal ganz krass darzustellen [...] die wollen dann in ihrer Provinz auf den Almen noch ihre Kühe füttern”.]

⁷⁹ “It is often said, that in Bavaria the clocks work differently. That is true – and in our opinion they work correctly!” [“Es heißt dann oft, in Bayern gingen die Uhren anders. Das stimmt – und nach unserer Meinung gehen sie richtig!”] Franz Josef Strauß, in a speech to the CSU party conference in Munich on 22nd November 1985.

⁸⁰ H. Riehl- Heyse *CSU- Die Partei, die das schöne Bayern erfunden hat*. The slogan used in the poster campaign for the 1998 Bavarian election - “schön, in Bayern zu leben”- was a variation on the same theme.

of fertile fields, majestic mountains, pure waters (and even beer) has a symbolic function.⁸¹ Tellingly, the party regularly exploits the linkage of the words ‘culture’ and ‘countryside’ in the composite German noun *Kulturlandschaft*, which means land cultivated by man, but can also be used in the figurative sense of cultural landscape.⁸² This conveys the image that the purity of Bavarian pastures is mirrored in the values and the rootedness (*Bodenständigkeit*) of its citizens. The *Land* is represented by the CSU as, quite literally, a moral high ground. In turn, the party employs this rhetoric without appearing anachronistic by supplementing it with industrialisation and modernisation policies.

Alfons Zeller recognised the strategic challenge of combining the themes of tradition and progress when he said;

That is always something difficult for the CSU. To preserve Bavarian identity on the one hand and on the other not to be labelled as hillbillies.⁸³

The CSU wishes to affirm the particularity and value of its national construct vis-à-vis the rest of Germany. Its emphasis on Bavaria’s achievements, embodied in slogans such as “Bavaria’s out in front” (*Bayern vorn*), expresses the party’s attempt to overcome the articulation of Bavaria as inferior. Literally, the CSU aims to leave behind the ‘Other’ implicit in this slogan. A leaflet produced for the German federal election of 1999 confirmed that this strategy is expressed most explicitly when Bavaria’s important standing in the German political arena is being underlined. Using superlatives throughout, a total of eleven policy areas were listed in which Bavaria was ‘out in front’ compared to the rest of Germany, including levels of

⁸¹ Josef Lindner put the sentiment thus; “As a Bavarian I naturally like the mountains and the lakes and Bavarian beer and Bavarian bread and have an emotional bond there, so to speak”. [“Ich natürlich als Bayer mag die Berge und die Seen und das bayerische Bier und die bayerische Brezn und da sozusagen eine emotionale Bindung habe”.]

⁸² See, for instance, the text reproduced in chapter six, section two.

⁸³ [“Das ist immer ein schwerer Gang der CSU. Auf der einen Seite bayerische Identität zu wahren und umgekehrt nicht als hinterwäldlerisch abgestempelt zu werden”.]

long-term unemployment, foreign investment, debt stock and research and development.⁸⁴

The evocation of economic prosperity in CSU rhetoric is particularly important to its confidence-building strategy. Frequent references to Bavaria's rapid post-war development from a relatively backward agrarian *Land* to one of the richest in Germany are designed to inspire pride within Bavaria and respect outside it. In this case, the 'Other' against which identity is being measured is not Germany or the EU, but other *Länder*. As has been noted, one of the CSU's favourite ways of projecting a positive image of Bavaria is by listing the areas in which it has a top ranking within Germany. For instance, recent party rhetoric makes unfavourable comparisons to the *Land* of Lower Saxony, where Gerhard Schröder was prime minister before becoming German chancellor. This line of argument fulfils a variety of functions. Not only does Edmund Stoiber use statistics in order to allege the ineptitude of Schröder, his government and the SPD's ideology in general, but he also aims to illustrate the *Land* of Bavaria's superiority in various policy areas.⁸⁵ The statistics selected by the CSU do more than recall Bavaria's economic turnaround, they also suggest that Bavaria has a certain moral advantage over other *Länder*;

One has the feeling that many things here in Bavaria are still in good order, at the state level, in the municipalities, in families.⁸⁶

CSU rhetoric invites one to infer from good exam results, for example, not only that the Bavarian school system is more effective but also that Bavarian schoolchildren are more intelligent. In a similar vein, Edmund Stoiber regularly quotes Strauß's saying that Bavaria's most

⁸⁴ ["Bayern hat bundesweit den niedrigsten Anteil an Langzeitarbeitslosen [...] Bayern ist der gefragteste Standort für ausländische Investoren. Bayern hat die geringste Pro-Kopf Verschuldung aller Länder. Bayern gehört zu den forschungsintensivsten Standorten der Welt".]

⁸⁵ "In Bavaria there is no open drug scene or lawless areas as in the 'days of chaos' in the Lower Saxony of SPD chancellor candidate Schröder". ["In Bayern gibt es keine offene Drogenszene oder rechtsfreie Räume wie bei 'Chaostagen' im Niedersachsen des SPD-Kanzlerkandidaten Schröder".] From an address by Edmund Stoiber published in the *Bayernkurier* on 29th September 1998.

⁸⁶ ["Man spürt, daß hier in Bayern viele Dinge noch in Ordnung sind, im Staat, in den Gemeinden, in den Familien".] From a speech by Edmund Stoiber in Bad Kohlgrub on 5th July 1998.

precious raw material is *Geist*, or intellect.⁸⁷ Further, Stoiber's emphasis on certain crime statistics, which are low compared to the rest of Germany, insinuates that the *Land* remains more morally upright than its neighbours.⁸⁸ At the very least, the figures contain a 'feel good' factor in the form of reassurance that nothing is rotten in the state of Bavaria. Gerd Müller summed up this sentiment;

It gives us a measure of self-confidence, an incentive, when we observe the economic statistics. Then we are proud in Bavaria to have the lowest unemployment, the lowest crime levels. That gives us a good measure of self-confidence, also within the German state.⁸⁹

The CSU aims to resolve the ideological antagonism between the Bavarian and German national constructs by focusing on the Bavarian *Heimat* as a positive concept that voters will want to invest in emotionally and politically. Linking Bavaria with beauty, wealth and morality highlights the common endeavour of party and people in the creation and preservation of the nation. At the same time, it presents the political solution for a similarly prosperous future as self-evident; a vote for the CSU.

In the same way as the SNP links party political rivalry to territorial identifiers such as London, England or the UK, it has been shown that the CSU links the SPD variously to German centralism or to other *Länder*. However, the 'Other' in CSU rhetoric is represented not only by the SPD, but also by the CDU. In turn, the contrast

⁸⁷ ["Wir pflegen den 'Rohstoff Geist'".] Edmund Stoiber, in his inaugural speech to the Bavarian parliament on 12th October 1999.

⁸⁸ Siegfried Müller, a senior speechwriter for CSU politicians, explained the imagery used; "Appeals are sometimes made on the basis that Bavaria is, let's say, in a moral sense even more steadfast, more stable than in some other regions [...] It is said that a certain system of values is perhaps more strongly present in Bavaria [...] People are respectable, moral and so on. One seeks to emphasise, then, that things are allegedly better here in Bavaria than elsewhere". ["Es wird manchmal auch appelliert daran, daß Bayern, sagen wir, in moralischer Hinsicht noch gefestigter, stabiler ist als manche andere Regionen [...] Man sagt, eine gewisse Wertorientierung ist in Bayern vielleicht stärker vorhanden [...] Die Leute sind anständig, moralisch und so weiter. Das versucht man also etwas herauszustellen, daß das in Bayern angeblich besser ist als anderswo".]

⁸⁹ ["Es gibt uns ein Stück Selbstbewußtsein, Ansporn, wenn wir die wirtschaftlichen Kenndaten betrachten, dann sind wir stolz in Bayern, die niedrigsten Arbeitslosigkeit zu haben, die niedrigste Kriminalität zu haben. Das gibt uns ein Stück weit Selbstbewußtsein, auch innerhalb der Staatlichkeit Deutschlands".]

between parties is often used as shorthand for pointing out the differences between Bavaria and the rest of Germany. For instance, the CSU's emphasis on Bavaria's national autonomy and particularity - politically, socially and geographically - is reflected in its characterisation of itself as the 'the party which articulates clearly' (*Partei der deutlichen Aussprache*). This is an attempt by the party to distance itself from the CDU, which it criticises for being indecisive and lacking in focus.⁹⁰ Charles Westen commented;

One needn't take coalition partners into consideration here [in Bavaria] and we can support 'pure doctrine', so to speak.⁹¹

This rhetoric is also a general attack on German-wide parties standing in Bavaria, which are portrayed as less able to articulate a specifically Bavarian programme.⁹² In contrast, the CSU professes to speak its mind and thus formulate what the Bavarian electorate 'really thinks'. The importance accorded by the CSU to retaining crucifixes in school classrooms and its strict stance on abortion not only appeal to conservative sensibilities but also serve to demarcate Bavaria as a *Land* with a primarily Catholic population and a strong Catholic tradition, as opposed to the predominantly Lutheran religious influence in the rest of Germany.⁹³ Moreover, the CSU's policy position is often to the right of the CDU on the political spectrum. Franz Josef Strauß' dictum - that there should be no party to the right of the CSU - continues to be followed by the party.⁹⁴ This strategy is evident in its hard line on law

⁹⁰ Siegfried Müller stated; "That is a core principle of the CSU's self-understanding. Where the CDU remains a little uncertain, the CSU expresses itself clearly and plainly". ["Das ist ein Kernsatz des Selbstverständnisses der CSU. Wo die CDU doch ein Stück unbestimmt bleibt, da äußert die CSU ganz klar und eindeutig."] Siegfried Müller

⁹¹ ["Hier muss man keine Rücksicht auf Koalitionspartner nehmen und kann sozusagen 'die reine Lehre' vertreten".]

⁹² Markus Ferber commented; "Of course people realise that a party like the SPD, which has a national [sic.] structure, always has to make compromises between individual regions or individual *Länder* and individual strands in the party". ["Die Menschen merken natürlich schon, daß eine Partei wie die SPD, die eine nationale Struktur ja hat, immer ein Kompromiß schon mal schließen muß zwischen einzelnen Regionen oder einzelnen Bundesländern und einzelnen Parteiströmungen".]

⁹³ On the abortion issue, see Edmund Stoiber's inaugural speech to the Bavarian parliament on 29th October 1998. On the question of crucifixes in state schools, see A. Mintzel CSU.

⁹⁴ "Franz Josef Strauß was right to warn that no democratic party should be allowed to emerge to the right of the CSU". ["Franz Josef Strauß hat zu Recht davor gewarnt,

and order and immigration policy, to the extent that far-right parties felt it unnecessary to stand in the last Bavarian election.⁹⁵ Alfons Zeller commented on Edmund Stoiber's critical stance towards the current level of immigration to Germany as follows;

Stoiber disapproved of this politically quite heavily and he is thereby the one who, in quotation marks, is still keeping our Bavaria clean. Stoiber played that politically very well, I'm saying quite deliberately that he played it politically. He achieved great popularity because of that.⁹⁶

Despite Zeller's use of 'scare-quotes', the notion of keeping Bavaria clean is clearly racist. However, it is not indicative of CSU rhetoric as a whole, which is careful to avoid such polemical images. The fact that strategic thinking lies behind Stoiber's rhetoric is conveyed in Zeller's phrase "he played it politically".

These aspects of CSU rhetoric all contribute to delimiting Bavaria as an alternative national construct to Germany. By representing the *Heimat* as a unified identity, the CSU is rearticulating the parameters of nationalist discourse around Bavaria as a nodal point. At the same time, the articulation of Germany as *Nation* illustrates that the CSU is firmly committed to German federalism. It will be remembered that CSU leaders such as Edmund Stoiber fully acknowledge their German identity and attach a great deal of weight to the party's institutional dual role (*institutionelle Doppelrolle*). Indeed, at a time when Germany was still divided into East and West, Franz Josef Strauß stated that he would defend his conviction that Germany

daß rechts von der CSU keine demokratische Partei entstehen darf".] From a speech by Edmund Stoiber in Munich on 11th October 1995.

⁹⁵ "The far-right DVU - the German People's Union - is not bothering to field any candidates in the Bavarian election. Its spokesman Bernhard Droese explains why: 'Here in Bavaria, there's little to gain for the right. The CSU have used all our policies in their manifesto and we're quite happy with that, we can't see any point in fielding our own candidates'". Anti-Foreigner Campaigning in Bavaria, 13th September 1998.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/special_report/1998/09/98/german_elections/newsid_169000/169484.stm#top, consulted on 8th April 2001.

⁹⁶ ["Das hat Stoiber ganz massiv politisch abgelehnt und damit [ist er der,] der unser Bayern noch, in Anführungszeichen, sauber hält [...] Das hat Stoiber sehr gut politisch gespielt, ich sage ganz bewußt politisch gespielt. Damit hat er eine große Popularität bekommen".]

was one nation, even if it meant 'being the last Prussian'. This is a strong formulation for a Bavarian such as he, and shows the depth of his commitment to the CSU's vision of German nationhood.⁹⁷ The CSU thus delimits the Bavarian discursive space as the *Heimat* within the larger German construct of *Nation*, emphasising Bavarian particularity and sovereignty without arguing for independence from the federation. This constitutes the party's ideological resolution of the antagonistic tension between Bavarian and German identities. The SNP, in contrast, proposes a radical alternative to the United Kingdom, namely its dissolution and the creation of a Scottish state. Both parties, however, seek to resolve the antagonistic tension between state and sub-state levels of identity by adapting their core commitment to national self-determination to the contemporary political arena.

Conclusion

Discourse theory has been applied to CSU and SNP ideology in order to situate the variants of neo-nationalism propounded by the parties within an explicit theoretical framework. This theory views society as a contingent construct in which relationships between concepts are formed, propagated and maintained by means of institutions, language, customs and practices. Taken together to mean discourse, they form the supporting framework which serves temporarily to fix social identities, thereby providing an illusion of certainty and stability. Political parties play an important role in interpreting, channelling and adapting discourse to further their own ideological projects. Following the Second World War, the CSU was sensitive to the particularly loaded significance of certain German concepts. Intent on operating a hegemonic rearticulation in Bavaria, its focus on *Heimat* as a nodal point of its rhetoric enabled it to indulge in emotional appeals to Bavarian solidarity, whilst avoiding National

⁹⁷ "[Strauß] was miles away from any form of separatism, but instead was proud to call himself a 'German patriot'. This attitude culminated in his statement that Bavarians would have to be the last Prussians if need be, if the unity of Germany demanded it". ["[Strauß] war meilenweit von jedem Separatismus entfernt, sondern bezeichnete sich stolz als 'deutscher Patriot'. Diese Haltung gipfelte in seinem Ausspruch, daß notfalls die Bayern die letzten Preußen sein mußten, wenn die Einheit Deutschlands es erforderte".] Edmund Stoiber, in a speech commemorating ten years of Franz Josef Strauß's death in Munich on 3rd October 1998.

Socialist connotations.⁹⁸ This is equivalent to applying typical nation-building methods which, in turn, became self-perpetuating as the equation of party, *Land* and people became more thoroughly entrenched through the party's economic and electoral success.

The SNP's ideology, on the other hand, can be described as antagonistic to the current dominant discourse, which continues to centre on the United Kingdom construct as the focus of 'national' politics. Yet institutionally as well as rhetorically, the advent of the Scottish parliament has begun to undermine the common sense notion of the UK as a nodal point of political discourse. Ultimately, the SNP's aim is to make its interpretation of Scottish nationhood the crucial identifier of a new political arena, and achieve conceptual hegemony by successfully articulating an alternative to the existing 'nation-state' construct. However, although the SNP's claim to be the only 'truly' Scottish party is intuitively strong, it continues to be vigorously and effectively contested in the rhetoric of the political opposition. In its own rhetoric, the evocation of a shared history and a sense of belonging is treated gingerly by a party careful to avoid accusations of making exclusionary, ethnic appeals. The CSU, on the other hand, has neatly sidestepped the negative connotations of the word *Nation* and enjoys conceptual hegemony within Bavaria. The chapter has shown that discourse theory provides us with a fruitful and illuminating framework for studying neo-nationalist ideologies. The dynamics of nodal articulation, conceptual hegemony and antagonistic practices structure investigation into and comparison of nationalist variants, whilst retaining the richness of data which allows them to be appreciated in their specificity.

⁹⁸ Siegfried Müller noted; "In general there is hardly a federal politician who will talk about Germany in the same way as Bavarian politicians talk about Bavaria [...] That is simply a problem that arose as a consequence of National Socialism". ["Es wird insgesamt so gut wie keinen Bundespolitiker geben, der in dieser Weise sich über Deutschland äußert, so wie meinetwegen bayerische Politiker sich über Bayern äußern [...] Das ist einfach das Problem, daß sich in der Folge des Nationalsozialismus ergeben hat".]

Conclusion

- *“In politics, each opposing party or political force tries to win general acceptance for its own discourse type [...] The stake is more than ‘mere words’; it is controlling the contours of the political world.”¹*

A study of nationalist ideology from a post-modern perspective presupposes “the impossible unity of the nation as a symbolic force”.² It approaches the nation as a discursively constructed space, thereby questioning the very possibility of an unmediated reality. Such a study does not look for truth but seeks to understand the nature of ideological constructs instead. In other words, discourse theory structures an investigation into how the nation is ‘narrated’.³ Each nationalist variant can be characterised as a specific articulation of concepts around the nodal point of the nation, corresponding to nationalism’s ideological core. In turn, to describe an ideology in terms of core and peripheral principles is to engage in dissecting the structure of meaning it represents. Discourse theory frames and enriches this analysis of the particular by revealing the contingency and hence the adaptability of neo-nationalism. In tracing the dynamics of conflicting ideologies, it pushes us to question “the world-system of nation-states” and to reassess the coherence of discursive constructs that appear to be common sense.⁴ A world in flux leaves everything open to debate. Indeed, asserting the all-pervasiveness of ideology underlines the need to deconstruct those *Weltanschauungen* which offer to make sense of our world. An insight into the mechanism of meaning creation can only enhance our understanding of the way in which nationalist ideology functions. Consequently;

To understand nationalism, we have to understand the practical uses of the category ‘nation’, the ways it can come to structure perception, to inform thought and experience, to organize discourse and political action.⁵

¹ N. Fairclough Language and Power p. 90.

² H. Bhabha ‘Introduction’ to H. Bhabha (ed.) Narrating the Nation p. 1.

³ Cf. H. Bhabha (ed.) Narrating the Nation.

⁴ C. Calhoun Nationalism Ch. 6.

⁵ R. Brubaker Nationalism Reframed p. 7.

Discourse theory provides us with just such a means of understanding nationalism. Within its framework, the ramifications of nationalism as an ideology and the way in which it structures perception can be fully explored.

In repudiating the possibility of fixed identity, a post-modern perspective requires instead that each variant of nationalist ideology be studied in its specificity. Discourse theory provides an interpretative theoretical framework which can be applied to empirical analyses of neo-nationalist movements. It theorises diversity as the articulation of elements into moments of a unique discourse. Moreover, theories of discourse and ideology complement each other in identifying the nation as the nodal point of nationalism, thereby locating the object of study among myriad political movements. Despite the flexibility of neo-nationalism, this immutable core continues to identify it as simply a contemporary form of nationalism. However, to quote Craig Calhoun;

As a discursive formation, nationalism shapes the form of representation, not its precise contents or level of inclusion.⁶

The relationship of nationalist ideology's changing periphery to its core can be understood as the intertwining of concepts into an internally coherent, if ultimately unstable world-view. In turn, the friction between ideologies competing to achieve conceptual hegemony becomes manifest through contested concepts.

Laclau and Mouffe's notion of antagonism conceptualises the debate over meaning in the political arena. A study of nationalist ideology based on discourse theory thus translates into a methodological concern with rhetoric. To return to Brubaker's quote above, the empirical study of nationalist ideology examines "the practical uses of the category 'nation'". In order to understand how ideologies achieve conceptual hegemony and the illusion of truth, it analyses how rhetoric is used to articulate concepts in as persuasive and convincing a manner as possible. Rhetoric thereby becomes an 'artefact' of ideology. An account of the way in which concepts

⁶ C. Calhoun Nationalism p. 124.

motivate political action and strategic planning pays heed to the pragmatic component of ideology.⁷ In turn, the analysis of texts renders nationalisms in their specificity by illustrating how core and peripheral principles dovetail, how concepts are constructed by and for their unique contexts, and how the collective is imagined in practice. Pro-European nationalism can only be understood as a result of such a detailed investigation. Whether the European periphery can be reconciled with the national core depends in every case on the nature of each ideological construct. Qualitative analysis is therefore the only means of assessing their compatibility. In the present study, text analysis and discourse theory provided a unified methodological and theoretical approach to case studies analysing the internal coherence of SNP and CSU ideologies.

Keith Webb has characterised the SNP's interpretation of nationalism as follows;

In spite of very great change there remains a thread of ideological continuity, although this is not reflected in the organisational disturbances that have afflicted the movement.⁸

The "organisational disturbances" which Webb refers to are signs of shifts in SNP strategy. However disruptive these may be in the short term, they are vital if a party wishes to adapt its programme to the changing political context. Nevertheless, core ideological aims continue to dictate which peripheral principles will be selected in campaign planning. This strategic adaptability, combined with "ideological continuity", is what justifies attaching the prefix 'neo' to contemporary nationalist parties. These parties characteristically respond to contemporary social and political developments, such as opposition party tactics, by attempting to make a national identity politically relevant. In order to create a rhetorical link between the nationalist principle of self-determination and a vote for the party, appeals are made to an alternative national loyalty to that of the existing 'nation-state'. The party's construction of national identity is

⁷ "The birth of nationalist movements indicates the formulation of ideologies, for an ideology links action and fundamental belief". M. Flynn Ideology, Mobilization and the Nation p. 34.

⁸ K. Webb The Growth of Nationalism in Scotland p. 108.

translated into 'emotional-economic' rhetoric, which mixes emotive and rational appeals in order to further core nationalist goals. If nationalism is viewed as a thin ideology capable of being supplemented with a variety of strategies, then it is not incompatible with support for European integration. The case studies examined and confirmed this proposition. According to Neil MacCormick, a "balancing of values" is possible. George Reid commented;

I don't see any tension between identity and the political as long as you don't ask nineteenth century questions where identity, state and citizenship must all be inside the same box.

Another achievement of the case studies was to explore neo-nationalism's construction of "identity, state and citizenship" in terms of discourse theory. With reference to a wide range of primary sources, two neo-nationalist ideologies were shown to be antagonistic to a hegemonic 'nation-state' construct. Their relative effectiveness in bringing about a 'crisis of the hyphen' by redefining the nation as the nodal point of an alternative discursive formation was discussed.

This study has examined two neo-nationalist parties' construction of national identity and their support for European integration, in order to illustrate the unique combination of ideological coherence and political expediency represented by their policies. The SNP is an example of a neo-nationalist party in that it pursues its core, immutable goal of prioritising the nation by promoting Scottish autonomy within a larger European framework. Detailed textual analysis was used to show this strategy at work. The party couches its chosen interpretation of the nation in aspirational rhetoric in order to channel identification with a national construct into votes. By styling itself as 'Scotland's Party', it aims to embody the nation and thereby politicise an inchoate sense of loyalty to Scotland. However, the SNP has not been as effective at translating this strategy into votes as the CSU. In the words of the current SNP leader John Swinney himself; "the CSU has managed, of all the German *Länder*, to establish that identity linkage".

The CSU has sought to defend Bavarian autonomy by profiling itself as an archetypally Bavarian party with an important role to play in both the German and European political arenas. It is neo-nationalist in that its policies and rhetorical appeals revolve around a national nodal point articulated in terms of the *Heimat*. Both parties pursue the same core goal of prioritising their respective nations, even if the rhetoric each uses differs greatly. The national constructs they have developed can usefully be characterised in terms of discourse theory, which underlines both the centrality of contextual factors and the importance of the ideological manipulation of concepts to a party's role in a given political arena. Both parties seek to 'de-contest' their interpretations of the nation and achieve conceptual hegemony by establishing their ideology as equivalent to common sense in Bavaria or Scotland. Bavarian political debate is indeed infused with the CSU's articulation of concepts, whereas the SNP still finds itself propagating a discourse antagonistic to the *status quo*.

To use Edmund Stoiber's own term, the CSU aims to be a 'trademark' of Bavaria with its own integrative function.⁹ The party is concerned to preserve internal unity and combat the impression that *Altbayern* and its capital, Munich, are more than first among equals within Bavaria. Consequently, the concept of *Heimat* is articulated vaguely enough to mean the local, regional or national levels *within* Bavaria. However, the SNP's rhetorical construction of the nation is somewhat more inclusive than that of the CSU, which targets those who can link a feeling of belonging to the Bavarian landscape and its culture to their family or childhood roots. Rhetorically, the CSU presents Bavarian history as an important source of identity, the strength of which is styled as proportional to the length of time Bavaria has been a recognised entity. In turn, it is keen to reconcile a united, apparently homogeneous Bavarian identity with both German and European identity. The party integrates the European dimension into its

⁹ "It is not the case in any other *Land* of the German federal republic, that a party is also the trademark of the *Land*. Bavaria without the CSU would be like Bavaria without the Zugspitze [Germany's highest mountain] without the Chiemsee [Bavaria's largest lake...]. ["Das gibt es für kein anderes Land in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, daß eine Partei auch ein Markenzeichen eines Landes ist. Bayern ohne CSU, das wäre wie Bayern ohne Zugspitze, ohne Chiemsee [...]]."] From a speech by Edmund Stoiber to the CSU party conference in Munich on 28th August 1998.

ideological construction of the *Heimat* by presenting it as another long-standing, and therefore complementary, level of Bavarian identity. It is thus rendered compatible with CSU ideology, but remains subordinate to the party's core goal of preserving national autonomy. The party's effective incorporation of issues such as European integration into its ideology, without losing sight of its commitment to the *Heimat*, suggests that the end of its conceptual hegemony in Bavaria is not in sight.

The SNP's 'Independence in Europe' policy plays an important symbolic role in the party's ideology. It provides a backdrop to the party's strategy of winning both the hearts and minds of voters by wooing them with a combination of concrete economic policies and arguments which link a vote for the SNP to an exercise in self-assertiveness after centuries of 'remote control'. The economic aspect of the strategy serves not only to enhance party credibility but also to 'sell' the alleged benefits of independence to the individual. In turn, the more personal appeals to Scottish identity and self-worth are designed to tackle the party's own perception of Scots as too cautious or lacking in self-confidence to vote SNP. Central themes of the party's neo-nationalist ideology resurface in the European context. This points to the party's strategy of using the European Union to support, rather than undermine, its core aim of independence. It thereby confirms a central conclusion of the empirical study, namely that neo-nationalist parties adapt their strategy to contemporary circumstances in order to achieve a core ideological goal. The SNP's 'Independence in Europe' slogan illustrates that nationalist party rhetoric can be adaptable without losing its nationalist character for all that. Indeed, it is a succinct expression of the ideological core ('Independence') and its relationship ('within') to the strategic periphery ('Europe'). The phenomenon of European integration is not necessarily incompatible with a neo-nationalist party's understanding of self-determination.

Analysing contemporary nationalist ideology using the conceptual tools of discourse theory helps us better to relate the strategies employed by neo-nationalists to their core principles. The

theoretical framework elaborated in this study is analytically replicable, providing scope for its conclusions to be tested in other cases. For instance, the terminology of discourse theory comes into its own in characterising the fortunes of parties such as the *Volksunie* (VU) and the *Parti Québécois* (PQ). Both parties began to make their mark in the 1960s and represented a direct threat to the majority parties in Flanders and Quebec respectively. They were similar in emphasising their territorial identities through the constitutional issue, although their articulations of self-determination differed.¹⁰ An analysis using discourse theory would illuminate how each respectively engaged with Belgium's move towards federalism and the question of Québécois sovereignty. During the 1970s the VU, its core goals co-opted or undermined by participating in government coalitions, initially distanced itself from its progressive policies and then stayed out of government in order to regain a clear ideological profile.¹¹ However, its attempts to contrast its policies with those of the breakaway *Vlaams Blok* sent it back into the ideological terrain of other political opponents, leading to further strategic confusion. Two 'Others' effectively articulated progressive and right-wing alternatives to the VU's core goal of strong Flemish autonomy within a federal Belgium. This fatally undermined VU strategy and prevented it from linking its interpretation of Flemish identity to its construction of federalism.¹²

Founded in 1968, the *Parti Québécois* enjoyed a rapid rise in popularity in Quebec. In marked contrast to a Québécois identity that had long been articulated in linguistic and religious terms by those in power, the PQ offered a definition of national belonging based more on domicile and identification with institutions.¹³ Although self-

¹⁰ "Support for federalism was the centre-piece of the VU programme, expressed through its definition of *volksnationalisme* and rejection of the 'nationalism of the state'". P. Lynch *Minority Nationalism and European Integration* p. 113.

¹¹ The VU participated in the Belgian government coalition formed in 1987, but subsequently resigned (thereby bringing down the government,) a sign that it was not prepared to be identified too closely with a government and thereby endanger its ideological profile.

¹² "As a party founded to turn Belgium into a federal state, the process of federalization has brought the party to a position of programmatic fulfilment". P. Lynch *Minority Nationalism and European Integration* p. 109.

¹³ However, the French language continued to be a central element of PQ policy, as it was inherently linked to the occupational divisions in Quebec and therefore to the

determination remained the core of PQ ideology, it propounded different interpretations of the concept in two failed referenda on the question. The antagonistic 'Other' has made itself felt in Quebec politics in the past, particularly in the guise of former Canadian prime minister Pierre Trudeau's strongly articulated federal alternative to Québécois sovereignty. However, the PQ's ideology has been instrumental in replacing Canada with Quebec as the primary focus of citizens' identity there. Its articulation of the nation as the nodal point of Québécois political discourse is generally accepted as common sense, even if the party's electoral strategy is yet to bring about self-determination;

[N]ationalism in its various forms has become a hegemonic set of ideas in Quebec. That is not to say that all Québécois are separatist, far from it; but that issues are debated largely within the context of Quebec and appraised by their impact on Quebec. All parties are thus forced to play on the nationalist field.¹⁴

Keating's appraisal illustrates how political discourse in Quebec is now constructed in national terms. The concept of Quebec has been decontested in the nationalists' favour; ideological antagonism has been resolved to give the nationalist interpretation conceptual hegemony within the territory.

The achievement of conceptual hegemony is an important sign of the rhetorical force of an ideology. It is pursued by neo-nationalists in order to further their core goal of self-determination. Indeed, this is the unifying characteristic of all contemporary nationalisms, no matter how diverse the "narrative strategies" surrounding the core principle might be.¹⁵ Both the SNP and the CSU build their ideologies around the national nodal point. They aim to construct a rhetorical edifice so strong as to make the link between party, people and nation appear self-evident. Support for European integration is an element underpinning their quest for national autonomy, and future research might examine the relationship of self-determination to other

party's modernising policies. Surveys also show that, despite official PQ ideology, 98% of those supporting independence are francophone. M. Keating Nations against the State p. 100.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 93.

¹⁵ H. Bhabha 'DissemiNation' in H. Bhabha (ed.) Narrating the Nation p. 292.

peripheral principles. The theories of ideology and discourse offer a bright future for the study of neo-nationalism. They provide a structure for analysis which unifies the subject of study whilst differentiating between its variants. By approaching neo-nationalism qualitatively, this theoretical structure avoids ahistoricity. By placing neo-nationalism within discourse theory, it respects its specificity. And by focusing on neo-nationalism as an ideology, it sidesteps indeterminacy.

Appendix I:

List of Interviewees

The following list states interviewees' current and, where relevant, previous employment, their relationship to either the SNP or the CSU, and the date on which they were interviewed.¹

Scotland

John Swinney MSP: Leader of the SNP since September 2000. Previously vice-chairman of the party. MP from 1997 to 2001. Interviewed on 6th June 2000.

Gordon Wilson: Solicitor. Leader of the SNP from 1980 to 1990. Interviewed on 6th July 2000.

Mike Russell MSP: Senior party strategist and manager of the 1999 SNP Scottish election campaign. Interviewed on 13th July 2000.

George Reid MSP: Deputy presiding officer of the Scottish parliament. MP from 1974 to 1979. Interviewed on 7th June 2000.

Bruce Crawford MSP: SNP group leader in the Scottish parliament. Previously a member of the Scottish parliament's European committee. Interviewed on 22nd May 2000.

Alasdair Morgan MSP: MP from 1987 to 2001. Interviewed on 8th June 2000.

Neil MacCormick QC, MEP: Constitutional lawyer and academic. Elected to the European parliament in 1999. SNP spokesman for constitutional affairs. Interviewed on 13th May 2000.

Ian Hudghton MEP: Leader of the SNP's list of candidates for the 1999 European election. Interviewed on 8th July 2000.

Kevin Pringle: SNP Communications Manager. Interviewed on 7th July 2000.

Angus Robertson: SNP Policy Adviser, responsible for international liaison. Interviewed on 2nd June 2000.

¹ The abbreviations used are: MP; Member of the United Kingdom Parliament, MSP; Member of the Scottish Parliament, MdL; Member of the Bavarian Parliament, MdB; Member of the German Parliament, MEP; Member of the European Parliament.

Peter Murrell: SNP permanent staff member, responsible for the party's 1999 European election campaign. Interviewed on 13th June 2000.

George Kerevan: Economics lecturer and journalist. SNP member. Interviewed on 6th June 2000.

Isobel Lindsay: Sociology lecturer. SNP party member and office holder until 1989, when she left the party in protest at its refusal to join the Constitutional Convention. Interviewed on 10th July 2000.

Bavaria

Theo Waigel MdB: Chairman of the CSU from 1988-1999. German minister of finance from 1989 to 1998. Interviewed on 13th March 2000.

Thomas Goppel: General Secretary of the CSU. Interviewed on 2nd March 2000.

Gerd Müller MdB: Member of the German parliamentary committee for European affairs. Interviewed on 1st February 2000.

Alfons Zeller MdL: Chairman of the Bavarian parliamentary committee for European and federal Affairs. Interviewed on 18th January 2000.

Markus Ferber MEP: Chairman of CSU members of the European parliament since June 1999. Interviewed on 14th January 2000.

Ingo Friedrich MEP: Leader of the CSU's list of candidates for the 1999 European election. Vice-president of the European parliament since 1999. Interviewed on 7th February 2000.

Charles Westen: CSU consultant in European, Foreign and Security Affairs. Interviewed (together with Josef Lindner) on 19th January 2000.

Josef Lindner: Strategist in the planning department of the CSU general secretary. Interviewed (together with Charles Westen) on 19th January 2000.

Julia Hartmann: CSU press officer, directly involved in the planning and organisation of the CSU's 1999 European election campaign. Interviewed on 16th February 2000.

Wilfried Scharnagl: Editor of the CSU party paper, the *Bayernkurier*, from 1977 to March 2001. Interviewed on 6th March 2000.

Siegfried Müller: Civil servant in the education ministry of the Bavarian government. Senior speechwriter for CSU politicians. Interviewed on 13th January 2000.

Jörg Vogel: Civil servant in the European affairs ministry of the Bavarian government. Interviewed on 25th January 2000.

Markus Schiek: Creative director with the CONTOP advertising agency. Director of the CSU's Bavarian and European election advertising campaigns. Interviewed on 14th February 2000.

Appendix II:

German originals of texts reproduced in chapter six

Aus Liebe zu Bayern und seinen Menschen¹

„Für Bayern. Mit Herz und Verstand.“ Das ist nicht nur das Motto, unter dem wir für die Landtagswahl um das Vertrauen der Bürgerinnen und Bürger und um eine klare Mehrheit kämpfen. Dieses Motto beschreibt zugleich, aus welchem Geist CSU und Staatsregierung für Bayern arbeiten: Es ist die Liebe zu Bayern, zu seiner großen Geschichte, seiner reichen Kultur, seiner landschaftlichen Schönheit, seiner lebendigen Vielfalt aus Tradition und Fortschritt. Aus innerster Überzeugung arbeiten wir für dieses einzigartige Land, für seine Menschen aus den Regionen Altbayern, Franken und Schwaben, die auch zur Heimat der Vertriebenen geworden sind. Weil uns dieses Land in seiner unverwechselbaren Eigenständigkeit am Herzen liegt, tun wir alles, um das Erbe unserer vielfältigen Traditionen, die Schönheit der Natur und das menschliche Gesicht des Freistaates zu bewahren.

Wir wissen aber auch, daß sich Bayern heute in einer Welt, in der die nationalen Grenzen ihre Bedeutung verlieren, den Herausforderungen und dem Wettbewerb stellen muß. Darum setzen wir uns weiter dafür ein, daß der Fortschritt „bayerisch spricht“.

Mit aller Kraft kämpfen wir dafür, daß Bayern mit seiner geschichtlich gewachsenen kulturellen Identität als Land der Tradition und des Fortschritts auf Erfolgskurs bleibt und seine Stellung in Deutschland und einem zusammenwachsenden Europa behauptet. Wir vertreten die bayerischen Interessen gegen politische Gegner wie die

SPD, die Bayern mehr als Dependence des Bundes denn als eigenständiges Land betrachtet. Sie hat allein deshalb keine Alternative zu bieten, weil ihr von Kompetenz bis Durchsetzungsvermögen jede Fähigkeit abgeht, ein Anwalt Bayerns auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene zu sein.

Bayern muß in guten und bewährten Händen bleiben. Unser Einsatz in Bayern und unser Erfolg wird zugleich ein Signal in der bundespolitischen Auseinandersetzung um den künftigen Kurs in Deutschland sein. Vertrauen verdient nicht der Veranstalter einer inhaltsarmen Politshow, Vertrauen verdient, wer Leistung vorzuweisen hat!

Bayern hat sich den Herausforderungen unserer Zeit mit Erfolg gestellt. Bayern hat im bundesweiten Vergleich seit Jahren die beste Arbeitsmarktbilanz. Bayern verfügt über eine ausgezeichnete Infrastruktur, hochqualifizierte Arbeitskräfte, wirtschaftliche Wachstumsdynamik, ein vorbildliches soziales Niveau und eine hohe Lebensqualität. Diese Erfolge sind zu allererst Verdienst von Fleiß und Zielstrebigkeit unserer Bürgerinnen und Bürger. Sie sind aber auch die Früchte einer zukunftsorientierten, konsequenten Regierungspolitik, die den Weg gebahnt hat für den Wandel vom Agrarland zum modernsten Industriestaat, mit dem Herzstück seiner mittelständischen Wirtschaft. Wir haben wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Fortschritt geschaffen und zugleich für den Erhalt der historischen, regionalen Identität und der Prägung durch eine bäuerliche Landwirtschaft gesorgt, die die Seele unseres Landes bleiben muß [...]

Deshalb gilt auch für die vor uns liegenden Jahre: Es gibt keine Alternative zu unserer Politik - „Für Bayern. Mit Herz und Verstand“.

¹ Transcript of a speech by Edmund Stoiber, published in the *Bayernkurier* of 29th August, 1998.

Zehn CSU- Punkte für Europa²

Für den 13. Juni gilt: Die CSU ist die Kraft, die bewegt.

Wir sind der Anwalt der bayerischen Interessen

Wir stehen für eine glaubwürdige Europapolitik, die die bayerischen Interessen erfolgreich zur Geltung bringt. Bayern braucht in Europa eine kraftvolle und erfahrene Vertretung. Wie in der Vergangenheit werden wir auch in Zukunft die Hüter der Interessen Bayerns und seiner Bürgerinnen und Bürger in Europa sein.

Wir stehen für ein Europa der Nationen und Regionen

Wie brauchen ein Europa, in dem Bayern und Deutschland ihrer Rolle gerecht werden können. Die Regionen und Nationen stiften Identität und Solidarität ihrer Bürgerinnen und Bürger. Sie sind auch in Zukunft als Träger der europäischen Integration unverzichtbar.

Wir kämpfen für ein sauberes Europa

Wir werden nach dem Rücktritt der gesamten EU-Kommission streng darauf achten, daß unter dem neuen Kommissionspräsidenten Prodi nur die qualifiziersten Persönlichkeiten benannt werden. Wir setzen auf „Qualität statt Quote“. Dazu gehört auch eine Entschlackung und Umstrukturierung der EU-Kommission. Die Bürgerinnen und Bürger haben ein Recht darauf, daß ihr Steuermittel korrekt verwendet werden.

Wir sind die kompetenteste Partei in Europafragen

² Published in the *Bayernkurier* of 5th June, 1999.

Keine andere Partei Bayerns hat auf den Feldern der Europapolitik eine vergleichbar hohe Kompetenz wie die CSU erworben. Umfragen belegen, daß die Bürger der CSU mit großem Abstand am meisten zutrauen, die schwierigen europäischen Probleme zu lösen.

Wir wollen der Landwirtschaft eine faire Chance geben

Die bäuerlichen Einkommen müssen gesichert bleiben. Wir sollen die für Bayern typische Agrarstruktur mit bäuerlichen Familienbetrieben erhalten, die hochwertige Lebensmittel erzeugen und unsere einzigartige Kulturlandschaft pflegen.

Der rot-grünen Chaos-Politik in Bonn zeigen wir die rote Karte

Bundeskanzler Schröder hatte als Motto ausgegeben: „Nicht alles anderes, aber vieles besser“. Wir wissen jetzt: Die Bundesregierung macht alles schlechter. Anstatt notwendige Reformen anzupacken, dreht sie alte zurück – und sie verkauft die deutschen Interessen in Europa. Diese Absteigermannschaft verdient am 13. Juni nur eines: Die rote Karte.

Die Osterweiterung braucht Weitsicht und Augenmaß

Die Osterweiterung liegt im politischen und wirtschaftlichen Interesse Bayerns, Deutschlands und Europas. Zur Vermeidung von Problemen, insbesondere in den bayerischen Grenzregionen, in der Landwirtschaft und auf dem Arbeitsmarkt sind Übergangsfristen erforderlich.

Die christlich-abendländischen Werte müssen Leitkultur bleiben

Wir wenden uns gegen die Illusion einer multikulturellen Gesellschaft. Wegen mangelnder Integration und Homogenität gefährdet sie die Stabilität und den inneren Frieden in Europa.

Die christlich-abendländische Kultur muß die Leitkultur in Europa bleiben.

Wir sind Garanten für eine Politik aus einem Guß

Der Erfolg unserer modernen Politik in Bayern und im Bund gibt uns Recht. Unser Politikkonzept, das aus Sachverstand, Bürgernähe und der Verbindung von Tradition und Moderne besteht, ist ein durchgängiges Modell nicht nur für Bayern, sondern für ganz Europa.

Das Europäische Parlament muß zu einem Gegengewicht in Europa werden

Angesichts der sozialistischen Mehrheit in der Regierungen der Mitgliedstaaten brauchen wir im europäischen Parlament, das sich zu einem gleichberechtigten Mitgesetzgeber entwickelt hat, einen bürgerlichen, einen christdemokratischen Gegenpol. Das geht nur mit einer starken CSU.

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