

FRACTURED LAND, HEALING NATIONS:
A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE
ROLE OF RELIGIOUS FAITH SODALITIES TOWARDS
PEACE-BUILDING IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

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PhD Thesis

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis constitutes my own research and writing. The thesis includes work not exceeding 10,000 words previously submitted to the University of Edinburgh for the MTh degree, as stipulated by the regulations for postgraduate study.

All quotations have been distinguished and the source of information acknowledged.

Some material included in the thesis has been published prior to submission with the permission of my supervisor, and is indicated in the bibliography.

Stephen R. Goodwin
January 2005

ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses the role of religion(s) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the wider context of the emergent states of the former Yugoslavia. The thesis argues that although religion has been used to promote nationalist ideologies and the cause of war, it also can be a positive force for building peace. The thesis further argues that the religious dimension includes the element of myth in the self-understanding of the Serbs, Bošnjaks and Croats, and seeks to account for the influence of their myths in creating ethno-religious conflict. The thesis will explore this hypothesis while recognising that the secular assumptions of most Western scholars either preclude the religious factor altogether or demythologise it in favour of a rationalist re-interpretation. By resisting the urge to demythologise the respective self-understandings, the thesis demonstrates that religion is intrinsic to the identities of the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that religio-mythical elements are essential in the process of nation-building.

The thesis argues that the Western structural and materialist approach to peace-building can be strengthened to address pressing inter-personal needs of society more effectively by engaging the moral and ethical resources that religion – with all its known difficulties in the region – has the potential to contribute. The thesis will offer a critical evaluation of interventionist efforts of the international community towards peace-building, taking account of the evidence that cessation of military hostilities is countered by modest results in restoring civil society. In light of this, the thesis examines the role of religious sodalities as locally-generated initiatives in peace-building that express the hopes of peoples of faith. It is argued that religion in this capacity complements, rather than substitutes, secular initiative.

The thesis therefore makes use of primary research data gathered from among religious leaders, women, and students from the Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant communities as evidence of why and how persons of religious faith contribute to peace-building and social restoration in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Theological reflection on the three elements of (mytho-)history, the sacred texts and the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina enables a contextual analysis of peace-building to emerge. The theological concept of 'restoration', which is derived from the primary research interviews, is framed with discussion of the creation and the eschaton in the sacred texts – the Bible and Qur'ān - as a comprehensive *Leitmotiv* for peace-building. Social expression of restoration transpires in the religious faith sodalities where authentic spirituality is exercised towards forgiveness and healing, and re-creates wholeness from fragmentation. The thesis demonstrates that in the religious faith sodalities the personal narrative of the individual believer, together with the meta-narratives of Christianity and Islam, effectively counter the ideological narratives of nationalism, and, when extensively shared with others, build peace across national boundaries.

The thesis is organised in three parts. Part One is the descriptive element focusing on the role of religion in shaping national identities, the interventionist efforts of the international community, and the holistic meaning of peace afforded by Christianity and Islam. Part Two is dedicated to the analysis of the grounded research among religious leaders, women and students from the religious communities. Part Three focuses on analysis and theological reflection generated from the context and the grounded research interviews.

*Wisdom is better than weapons of war,
But one bungler destroys much good.*

Ecclesiastes 9:18

Dedicated to the many people in Bosnia-Herzegovina
who have the courage to live in peaceful accord
with God and fellow humanity.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Ar.	Arabic.
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress. Reform movement renamed from the 1889 established Ottoman Society for Union and Progress and known in Europe as the 'Young Turks'.
ET	English Translation.
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
IDP	Internally Displaced Person.
IEBL	Internal Entity Boundary Line. The division between the Srpska Republika and the Federacija established by the Dayton Accord.
IVZ	<i>Islamska Vjera Zajednica</i> (Islamic Religious Community). Official organ of the Muslim community. After the adoption of a secular identity for the Bošnjaks in 1993 the organisation removed <i>Vjera</i> (Religious) from the title and became simply the IZ.
JMO	<i>Jugoslavensko muslimansko organizacija</i> (Yugoslav Muslim Organisation). Muslim political party founded after World War I in 1919.
JNA	<i>Jugoslavenska narodna armija</i> (Yugoslav National Army).
LXX	Septuagint.
MBO	<i>Muslimanska Bošnjačka Organizacija</i> (Bosnian Muslim Organisation). Political party founded by Adil Zulfikarpašić representing a non-religious Bosnian Muslim identity.
MNO	<i>Muslimanska Narodna Organizacija</i> (Muslim National Organisation). First Muslim political party in Bosnia-Herzegovina, established in 1906.
NGO	Non-Government Organisation.
NRSB	New Revised Standard Version.
NT	New Testament.

OT	Old Testament.
S/C/B	Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian (language dialects).
SDA	<i>Stranka Demokratske Akcije</i> (Party of Democratic Action). Predominantly Muslim political party formed after the dissolution of the Communist Party in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Alija Izetbegović was its leader from 1990-2000.
SOC	Serbian Orthodox Church.
Tk.	Turkish.

GUIDE TO PRONUNCIATION

Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian*

c	is pronounced like ts as in ‘cats’
ć	is pronounced like a soft ch , or like tu as in British ‘tune’
č	is pronounced like tch as in ‘watch’
đj (or đ)	is pronounced as in ‘adjure’
h	is pronounced as a guttural, as in the Scottish ‘loch’
j	is pronounced like y as in ‘yellow’
š	is pronounced like sh as in ‘show’
ž	is pronounced as in ‘leisure’

Turkish

â	is pronounced lightly aspirated, sometimes preceded by a faint y or h
c	is pronounced like j in ‘jam’
ç	is pronounced like tch in ‘watch’
ı	is pronounced as an unaccented vowel as in the French ‘deux’
ğ	is unpronounced and serves to lengthen the preceding vowel
ö	is pronounced like the ö in the German ‘hören’
ş	is pronounced like sh in ‘show’
ü	is pronounced like ü in the German ‘über’
v	is pronounced as a soft v , between v and w

* While linguistically considered one language with dialectic differences, recent nationalistic developments have insisted on treating Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian as distinct languages. The thesis will respect this newer convention and, where necessary, identify usage by the marker S/C/B (Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian) rather than the formerly accepted S-C (signifying Serbo-Croat).

GLOSSARY

(Words are listed according to Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian usage unless otherwise indicated.)

- ban* (Croatian). Medieval Bosnian land owner and ruler.
- baqa* (Ar., 'remaining' or 'existing'). A theological understanding especially in the Malamiyya Sufi order that Allah can mystically manifest himself in the life of the believer.
- beg* (Tk. 'bey'). A title meaning 'lord' of the higher of two levels of landowning nobility.
- Bektashiyya* Sunnite Sufi order although manifesting beliefs in the Shi'ite tradition. Founded by Hajji Bektash, who was born in the 13th century.
- Bogomil* Followers of the 10th century Bulgarian priest, Bogomil, meaning 'loved of God'. The sect is believed by some to have spread throughout the Balkans, including Serbia and Macedonia. Its doctrines were dualist and influenced by Manicheism and gnosticism. It was also iconoclastic and therefore opposed to Orthodox Christianity. Additionally, many Bošnjaks believe they are the heirs of the medieval sect.
- Bošnjak* Since 1993, the official and secular name of the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina apart from the religious connotations associated with the term 'Muslim'.
- bošnjaštvo* Bosnian 'Nationhood' marked by non-irridentism and inter-confessionality as developed during the Habsburg occupation.
- Cathari* A religious sect thought to be similar to the Bogomils found in medieval France.
- Četnik* Serbian right-wing nationalist, especially during the Second World War.
- cižje* or *jizja* (Ar. *jizya*). Poll tax collected from the non-Muslims during the Ottoman Empire in exchange for the sultan's protection.

<i>dervish</i>	(Persian). A person initiated in the rules of a Sufi order and who has taken a spiritual guide. In some orders, the term refers to one who has reached a higher rank in the order.
<i>devşirme</i>	(Tk., ‘tribute in blood’ or ‘boy tribute’). The taking of young Christian boys for training toward the Jannisary corps and service in the official posts of the Ottoman Empire.
<i>djimma</i>	(Ar. <i>dhimma</i>). Protection afforded by the Qur’ān for ‘peoples of the book’ (Jews and Christians).
<i>hakīm</i>	‘wise man’, related to <i>hikma</i> , ‘wisdom’, and based in divinely revealed knowledge and holiness.
<i>Jannisaries</i>	(Tk. <i>yeni-cheri</i> , ‘new troops’). Ottoman semi-religious infantry corps serving the sultan and consisting of young men trained through the system of <i>devşirme</i> .
<i>kmet</i>	Serf who was taxed a portion of the harvest by the landlord. They were predominantly Christian and rarely Muslim in the Ottoman Empire.
<i>Malamiyya</i>	A Sufi order emphasising inward devotion, originating in Khurasan and attributed to Hamdun al-Qassar (d. 884).
<i>Mawlawiyya</i>	A Sufi order well-established in both Bosnia (Sarajevo) and Herzegovina (Mostar). The order was noted for its humanism and tolerance.
<i>medressa</i>	(Ar. <i>madrassa</i>). A Muslim theological school.
<i>mekteb</i>	(Ar. <i>maktab</i> , ‘elementary school’). A religious primary school in which children learned to read the Qur’ān and write the Arabic alphabet.
<i>Mesnevija</i>	(Tk. <i>mesnevi</i> ; Ar. <i>Mathnawi</i>). An epic poem that comprised of rhyming verse common among certain Sufi orders.
<i>millet</i>	(Tk.); (Ar. <i>milla</i>). ‘People’ or ‘masses’. Distinguished by religious confession, the <i>millet</i> became the basis for determining a nation within the Ottoman Empire.
<i>Müsafirhana</i>	An inn belonging to a Sufi order where poor Muslim scholars, military personnel and travellers were accommodated <i>gratis</i> for up to three days.

<i>Osmanli</i>	A general reference to the Muslims of Anatolia, and distinct from the Slavic Muslims of the Balkans. The <i>Osmanli</i> were named after the clan that created the Ottoman dynasty.
<i>Patarin</i>	(Italian, <i>Patareni</i> or <i>Patarini</i>). A term used, in some instances, for the Bogomils of the Balkans, and, in other instances, to identify a distinct religious sect known only in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
<i>Paša</i>	(Tk.). Territorial governor under the Ottoman Turks.
<i>pravednik</i>	A righteous person. One who speaks prophetically into society, and is ostracised by one's own community for upholding justice.
<i>Sandžak</i>	(Tk. <i>sanjaq</i>). Originally, 'flag' or 'standard', and later applied to an administrative district of the Ottoman Empire.
<i>Tanzimat</i>	(Ar./Tk., 'regulation'). A series of internally generated political and social reforms of the 19 th century aimed at modernising the Ottoman Empire.
<i>taqwa</i>	(Ar.) Literally, 'to ward off', 'to guard against', or 'to preserve'. It possesses the meaning of righteousness rooted in the fear and awe of God.
<i>tariqat</i>	(Ar. <i>tariqa</i> , 'way', or 'path'). Sufi order or way.
<i>tawhīd</i>	(Ar.) Unity, often used in reference to God and, by extension, the created order. It is the foundational principle of the Islamic worldview.
<i>tekije</i>	(Tk. <i>tekke</i>); (Ar. <i>takiyya</i>). A lodge of a Sufi order.
<i>Turci</i>	Originally, a term referring to Balkan Muslims and distinguishing them from Anatolian Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. Now it is used as a derogatory term to designate the Bošnjaks of the Balkans.
<i>Turkuše</i>	A term referring to Anatolian Muslims and distinguishing them from Balkan Muslims in the Ottoman Empire.
<i>ulema</i>	(Ar., 'men of learning'). Reference to the educated and clergy class of Muslims trained in doctrine and law.
<i>umma</i>	The Muslim socio-religious community.
<i>Ustaša</i>	Croatian right-wing nationalists during the Second World War.

- vakuf* (Ar. *waqf*, 'pious bequest'). Endowment, or religious-charitable foundation holding religious property and using it in philanthropic ways for the benefit of the *umma*.
- Velikosrpsko* (Serbian, 'greater Serbia'). The nationalist idea that it was the divinely-ordained right for all Serbs to live in their own homogenous state.
- Vladika* (Serbian). The Prince-Bishop ruler of the theocratic province of Montenegro.
- wahdat al-wujud* (Ar.). The mystical state of 'Oneness of Being', based on the monistic doctrine of unity, describing the discovery of God's reality within the believer.
- zadruga* An extended family community organised along patriarchal kinship relationships in the Balkans.
- zajednica* a community, society or sodality, unofficially or loosely affiliated with larger institutional organisations.
- zavija* (Ar. *zawiya*). The complex of operations for a Sufi order, often comprising a mosque for worship and a lodge for the adherents of the order. The *zavija* served also as a welfare institution for the destitute and handicapped, and as a place of refuge for fugitives.
- zbor* meeting, gathering, assembly.
- župan* (Serbian) Term for a Slavic tribal chieftan.

CODING OF INTERVIEWS

The coding of the interviews allows the reader to recognised salient facts about the interviewee at a glance.

The first set of initials indicates the religious community with which the interviewee is associated:

MU. . . . = Muslim
PR. . . . = Protestant
SO. . . . = Serbian Orthodox
RC. . . . = Roman Catholic

The second set of initials indicates the group in the qualitative data analysis with which the interviewee is to be identified:

.RL. . . = Religious Leader
.SF. . . = Student Female
.SM. . . = Student Male
.WO. . . = Women

The third set of initials indicates the city in which the interviewee lives:

. . .BL. . = Banja Luka (Republika Srpska)
. . .ČA. . = Čapljina (Federacija)
. . .MO. . = Mostar (Federacija)
. . .OS. . = Osijek (Croatia)
. . .SA. . = Sarajevo
. . .ŠI. . = Šipovo (Republika Srpska)
. . .ZA. . = Zagreb (Croatia)

The numbers in the fourth set refer to the taped audio recordings of the interviews, aiding audio archival retrieval.

Example of coding reference:

A footnote reference to 'Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 10' refers to Entoni Šeperić, a Roman Catholic (RC) male student (SM) from Sarajevo (SA).

The number after the colon refers to the page number of the interview where the reference or citation in the thesis may be found. All of the interviews are in Appendix B.



THESIS INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction

An uncommon insight into peace comes from a military commander. Former US General Charles Boyd denies that the Dayton Accord stopped the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. “What it did...” he insists, “was freeze in place an uneasy cease-fire and prevent a resumption of hostilities.”¹ An 'uneasy cease-fire' is an apt description of the circumstances in Bosnia-Herzegovina today. Nearly a decade after the signing of the Dayton Accord, which was intended to end the violence and rebuild civil society, Bosnia-Herzegovina lives under the tension of many unresolved post-war issues, and gestures of peace and reconciliation are more symbolic than effective.

1.1 Factors of Instability and Fragmentation

Bosnia-Herzegovina's welfare is inherently linked to its geography and topography. The Balkan Peninsula has no natural protective borders, obliging it to become a 'traditional battleground of peoples, empires and cultures'.² The flatlands of the Transdanubian plain to the north of the Peninsula, and the seas at each of the other compass points, facilitate outside incursions. The interior of the Peninsula presents a contrasting picture. Steep, irregular mountains and non-navigable rivers afflict the Peninsula with internal isolation, particularism and fragmentation.³ Historically, these two factors have strongly influenced the security issues of the Balkans.

In his analysis Giannakos rejects the 'ancient hatreds' doctrine often peddled as the primary cause of Balkan conflicts, while still acknowledging long and recurring periods of strife traceable to the classical Greek period. He demonstrates that historical animosities are not causes, but symptoms of 'enduring geopolitical idiosyncrasies'⁴ related to specific geographic features of the region. In his view the Peninsula plays host to two geopolitically incompatible triangles. The North-South

¹ Boyd 1998: 43.

² Cited in Giannakos 2002: 48.

³ Stavrianos 1963: 2.

⁴ Giannakos 2002: 44.

triangle has its base points at Belgrade-Bucharest-Athens and stretches from the Transdanubian plain to the Mediterranean. Although this triangle is generally marked by internal solidarity and cohesion owing to common interests within the Balkan Peninsula, the area can also fall victim to isolation and fragmentation and manifold intra-regional squabbles.

The East-West triangle has its base points in Zagreb-Tiranë-Istanbul and stretches from the Adriatic to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits. Complex and often competing political authorities and interests mark this triangle, and cooperation is characterised by uneasy compromises of temporary expediency. Together these triangles create vertical and horizontal axes in the Balkans that are historically competitive and adversarial.⁵

Additionally, the regional pressure points of the Balkan Peninsula are acted upon by extra-regional pressure points.

Zagreb and Belgrade are influenced by the concerns of the Central European

Pressure Point, while Bucharest is historically pulled away from solidarity with Southeastern Europe by Eurasian concerns. Similarly, Tiranë is influenced by the pressure point of the Mediterranean, whereas Istanbul responds to concerns of the Near Eastern Pressure Point.

From this schema general historical trends of tranquillity and volatility emerge. Not infrequently the Peninsula has played host to conflicts between authoritarian powers external to the region along the East-West triangle. Intra-regional squabbles have historically led to intervention by an external force in the region that imposed itself




Figure 1. Regional and extra-regional pressure points acting on the Balkan Peninsula. (Diagram by Giannakos 2002: 45. Altered with permission.)

⁵ Giannakos 2002: 44, 45.

on the smaller actors of the Balkans to bring a degree of stability and unity.⁶ However, once the extra-regional power(s) waned, the Balkan region reverted to particularism and fragmentation.⁷

As with other states – medieval or modern – in the Balkan region, the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina is shaped by these stresses, at times enjoying relative peace and tranquillity, and at others falling into horrific violence and fragmentation. Even before the great migrations of the sixth to ninth centuries that would bring the Slavs to the Balkan Peninsula, the land today known as Bosnia-Herzegovina lay on the East-West fault line formally recognised by Roman emperor Theodosius (c. 346-395) in the 4th century. Its location between Northern Europe and Asia Minor, and on the periphery of competing empires, enriched medieval Bosnia and Hum (Herzegovina) with multiple expressions of culture, religion and tradition, and prevented any single religion or culture from laying exclusive claim to the area. It was and remains today “a border province permanently at the crossroads of opposing worlds and civilizations”.⁸ These factors may be observed in the most recent outbreak of war.

Causes of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1990s are many and diverse, but fall into one of two general categories. Some scholars emphasise political-economic factors,⁹ arguing that a declining economy resulted in Yugoslavia’s disintegration, and the end of the Cold War meant uncomfortable exposure in the new realignment of nations. But the large number of mosques and churches consciously targeted and destroyed - targets arguably of little strategic military or economic value - suggests another layer to the conflict. This leads other scholars to contend that the primary cause of the conflict was ethno-national,¹⁰ citing tensions that existed before the establishment of nationalism in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Attempts to single out one cause for the conflict risk obvious reductionism, and multiple factors may indeed be legitimately cited for the demise of Yugoslavia.¹¹

⁶ Giannakos 2002: 48.

⁷ Giannakos 2002: 48.

⁸ Lovrenović 2001: 108.

⁹ Malcolm 1994: xxi.

¹⁰ Mojzes 1994: 125.

¹¹ See the discussion by Ramet (2002: 392ff.) in which several causes are elaborated, including the following: Economic factors; declining strategic importance of YU in the post-Cold War world; the rise of Milošević and collaborators; the failure of the EC (now the EU) to secure peace by holding Yugoslavia together in the face of Slovene and Croatian

1.2. Factors of Stability and Restoration

However many causes for the break-up of Yugoslavia may be cited, resolution of the conflict must in some way transcend the problems associated with competing nationalisms in the wake of the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia. One effort addresses the ideological challenges of nationalism through structural reorganisation. Enormous investment of human and financial resources associated with democratisation, market reform and open society values of the West are seen as the panacea for the ills of the Balkans.

Another effort addresses the relational aspects of restoration and peace-building. Gotovska-Popova suggests that the challenges of nationalism are best addressed by creating a sense of identity in a group larger than the nation,¹² an idea embodied in the very concept of Yugoslavism, but which ultimately failed. Gotovska-Popova suggests that today the proper identity is in humanity in general, and in Europe specifically. The European Union offers both an ability to shape a supra-national identity and economic stability for the emerging nations of the former Yugoslavia.

Other scholars argue that the locus of relational change and resolution to conflict are potentially closer to hand. Stephen Hays contends that religious communities are able to craft an identity that transcends nationality, but that both Marxist and Western historians too readily discount this factor.¹³ Marxist historiography in the Balkan states presented the role of religion in society largely as an undesired agent of feudalism or capitalism. Similarly, secular Western historians play down the religious motives of rulers, preferring to interpret events in terms of political and economic motives.¹⁴ Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, professor at Sarajevo University and former Vice Premier of the government of Bosnian-Herzegovina in 1991-92, contests these arguments and supports Hays, stating that “the natural remedy would be for the various Balkan nationalisms to resolve their differences with the help of supra-national concepts: religion above all”.¹⁵ However, he recognises that the natural remedy, drawing foremost from religion, is hampered by the fact that religions have

independence initiatives; persistent ethnic conflict; the stirring up of memories from the bloodlettings of World War II; the post-World War II failure of political modernisation, and of communist nationalities policy; ancient hatreds; clash of civilizations; cultural similarity of Serbs and Croats; competing choices of military elites.

¹² Gotovska-Popova. 1993: 183.

¹³ Hays 1999: 198.

¹⁴ Hays 1999: 198.

¹⁵ Mahmutćehajić 2000: 14.

capitulated to nationalist interests. “The forms of supranationalism present in the Balkans,” states Mahmutćehajić, “are themselves in bitter conflict over issues of national borders”, and “each supports its own favoured nationalism, to which it is linked by tradition”.¹⁶ The religious communities, by virtue of their beliefs and long historical presence in the Balkans, could be agents of supra-nationality and advocates for peace. But the widespread support by religious actors of nationalist causes has created a credibility gap so large that the possibility of the major religious bodies becoming advocates towards peace-building and social restoration is virtually precluded.

Currently Bosnia-Herzegovina is again in a period of ‘imposed tranquillity’ by external forces - the international community with interests tied to the Central and Western European Pressure Point. Nationalism remains the strongest ideological force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it shows little sign of waning in the region.

2. Statement of Thesis

The thesis takes up these critical issues at this juncture. It will explore the degree to which religious communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina are forged by and fused with national identity, and analyse the degree to which the supra-national aspects of religious faith are able to transcend the conflict and contribute to peace-building and social restoration.

The thesis hypothesis argues that although religion has been used to promote nationalist ideologies and the cause of war, it also can be a positive force for building peace. The thesis further argues that the religious dimension includes the element of myth in the self-understanding of the Serbs, Bošnjaks and Croats, and seeks to account for the influence of their myths in creating ethno-religious conflict. The thesis will explore this hypothesis while recognising that the secular assumptions of most Western scholars either preclude the religious factor altogether or demythologise it in favour of a rationalist re-interpretation. By resisting the urge to demythologise the respective religious self-understandings, the thesis demonstrates that religion is intrinsic to the identities of the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that religio-mythical elements are essential in the process of nation-building.

¹⁶ Mahmutćehajić 2000: 14.

Further, the thesis argues that the Western structural and materialist approach to peace-building can be strengthened to address pressing inter-personal needs of society more effectively by engaging the moral and ethical resources that religion – with all its known difficulties in the region – has the potential to contribute. Placing focus on this side of the equation brings a different set of variables to the peace-building task.

3. Relevant Literature

Many resources have aided in the research of this thesis, of which the following are of particular importance for their contributions in the field. For a general study of the Balkans, Stavrianos¹⁷ is still of great use, as verified by the recent reprint of a book originally published more than forty years ago. This older text is now supplemented by that of another Greek scholar, Stoianovich,¹⁸ who is acutely aware both of the similarities and differences of Balkan peoples to those of Western Europe. Yet another Greek scholar, Giannakos,¹⁹ provides a relatively new contribution to understanding the nature of conflict on the Balkan Peninsula both among the Balkan peoples, and external powers. Additionally, the two volume work by Jelanovic,²⁰ covering the period of the eighteenth through the twentieth centuries, is now a standard work. These constitute useful emic resources for the general Balkan context.

Ramet's many works encompass the whole of the European post-communist lands,²¹ and her multiple versions focusing on Yugoslavia²² are especially helpful because of the comprehensive nature of the material presented. Other recent and insightful works that focus specifically on Yugoslavia and its emergent states are Allcock²³ and Malcolm.²⁴

Several sources are needed to gain a full appreciation of the national groups in

¹⁷ Stavrianos 2000 (1958).

¹⁸ Stoianovich 1994.

¹⁹ Giannakos 2002.

²⁰ Jelanović 1983.

²¹ Notable among them is Ramet 1989; 1992b.

²² Ramet 1992a; 1996; 1999; 2002.

²³ Allcock 2000.

²⁴ Malcolm 1996.

Yugoslavia. Banac²⁵ is still indispensable for understanding national issues, and its *ante bellum* publication date reveals the centrality of the national question that ultimately led to war. Judah²⁶ chronicles a noteworthy Serbian history, and Bremer²⁷ has edited a work that aids understanding of the Serbian perspective. Lovrenović²⁸ provides a very good cultural history of Bosnia-Herzegovina from a Croatian perspective. Two sources from Balić²⁹ provide cultural and historical background of the Bošnjak community, and Friedman's work³⁰ on the Bošnjaks is indispensable.

A useful source by Silber and Little³¹ covers the events of the war and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. By contrast, the peace-building literature is geographically disparate with few sources focusing on Yugoslavia and its successor states. Nevertheless, the wide experience in peace-building that Lederach³² brings to his work is also useful for the post-Yugoslav context. Abu-Nimer's recent monograph³³ provides essential insight into the Islamic perspective on justice and peace-building. Two other volumes that focus on reconciliation, rather than peace-building, are worthy of note. Schreiter³⁴ sees reconciliation both as a spirituality and strategy for addressing conflict, and Volf's³⁵ contribution arises out of the context of the early conflict in Croatia.

As a rule, most resources overlook the importance of religion in the Yugoslav situation. Exceptionally, two works of Mojzes³⁶ link the role of religion and the events leading to conflict. Velikonja³⁷ and Perica³⁸ are recent contributions in this area, and complement the earlier standard work by Alexander,³⁹ which does not

²⁵ Banac 1984.

²⁶ Judah 2000.

²⁷ Bremer 1998. See also the other valuable edited works by Bremer (1992; 1994; 1996).

²⁸ Lovrenović 2001.

²⁹ Balić 1992; 1994.

³⁰ Friedman 1996. She uses the term 'Bosnian Muslim'.

³¹ Silber and Little 1996.

³² Lederach 1997.

³³ Abu-Nimer 2003.

³⁴ Schreiter 1998.

³⁵ Volf 1996.

³⁶ Mojzes 1995; 1998.

³⁷ Velikonja 2003.

³⁸ Perica 2002.

³⁹ Alexander 1979.

include the Islamic community. Appleby⁴⁰ gives attention to the interaction between peace-building and religion while noting the ambiguous role that religious actors sometimes play. He regularly references Bosnia-Herzegovina in this context. Another publication specifically focuses on reconciliation and the religious communities in two states that emerged from Yugoslavia. Edited by Mojzes, Swidler and Justenhoven,⁴¹ it is a collaborative effort that explores the theology and variety of religious resources that can be applied towards reconciliation and peace-building in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

None of these resources undertakes grounded research using the method of qualitative data analysis in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Additionally, none of the works considers in any depth the growing Protestant community in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the contributions they make to peace-building and social restoration. This thesis thus makes an original contribution to the body of academic literature, and - it is hoped - to the social situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4. Empirical Research

The research is both library-based and empirical. Library and internet based research provided the background material for a proper historical and contemporary understanding of the Balkans in general, and of Bosnia-Herzegovina specifically. The empirical study allows an understanding of religion as voiced by people.

Personal acquaintance with the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and foundational discussions with individuals from the four religious communities represented in the thesis served as the basis for the construction of the qualitative data research questions. The questions centre on the core issues faced by religious persons living in Bosnia-Herzegovina today.⁴² Each question addresses one immediate concern, yet is sufficiently open-ended to allow the interviewee the opportunity to address related concerns.

The thesis consciously focuses less on the conflict and more on the nature of peace-building, and interviewees were selected accordingly. From the outset it was clear

⁴⁰ Appleby 1999.

⁴¹ Mojzes, Swidler, Justenhoven 2003. This book was also published in journal form as Mojzes, Swidler, Justenhoven 2002.

⁴² The one exception is the issue of mandatory religious education in the schools, which was still largely unsettled at the time of undertaking the research.

that a thesis focused on the religious and theological dimension needed to include interviews with clerics. In addition, narratives from religious non-clerics engaged in peace-building broaden the context and allows for input from a greater cross-section of society. From preliminary observation it seemed clear that women were playing an understated and under-recognised role in social restoration. They showed a particular awareness of relational issues in contrast to the structural issues that preoccupied their male counterparts. This aspect, coupled with their high degree of voluntarism, makes a special contribution in the study.

Students were chosen as a group for study largely because they will shape the contours of the future, guided less by the communist past and more by the encounter of the 'other' in the university or the competitive marketplace. How institutional religion and personal faith shape their thinking and motivate them to act is of paramount importance for the thesis.

A different set of research questions were posed to clergy and laity. Clerics interacted on the theological, philosophical and ideological level of discourse, while women and students answered questions relating to their personal experience and perceptions befitting their life circumstance. The research questions for each study group may be found in Appendix A.

Most of the interviews were conducted in English. Two research assistants were engaged to translate interviewees wanting to communicate in the local language(s). In most cases a man translated male interviewees, and a woman translated female interviewees in order to retain the gender dynamics. This was especially sensible for the fifth chapter where women are the focus. Both translators are from Sarajevo, which interviewees would have detected through regional dialect. However, this did not divulge their ethnic background since Sarajevo remains multi-national. Additionally, the translators' full names remained undisclosed in order to avoid revealing their ethnicity, which otherwise might have influenced the discussion.

The taped interviews were subsequently reduced to an English language transcript, edited only for grammatical corrections necessary for a readable narrative. The transcripts were then coded into more than 120 nodes and trees using Envivo[®] Qualitative Data Analysis software, which enabled various matrix comparisons along ethnic, religious, gender, and group affiliations. From this data the most important issues emerged, which contributed to the formulation of thesis research questions.

5. Thesis Research Questions

Once the Qualitative Data Analysis was available, the research questions relating to the thesis could be developed. This set of Research Questions frames the investigation of the thesis. These questions are of three types – foundational, empirical, and theological – and guide the kind of investigation undertaken in the three parts of the thesis. Each research question opens an area of investigation, and provides a focus for analysis in a relevant chapter. The following constitute the research questions of the thesis:

Part One: Foundational Questions

- ◆ What contribution has religion made to the formation of mythic national identities in the former Yugoslavia?
- ◆ What are the successes and failures of post-war initiatives by the international community to restore civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
- ◆ What resources for peace-building do the religions of Bosnia-Herzegovina have in respect to their theological and ethical teachings?

Part Two: Empirical Questions

- ◆ What empirical evidence is there of religious leaders engaging in peace-building on the basis of their theological and ethical teachings?
- ◆ What empirical evidence is there of women having a special role in peace-building on the basis of their religious convictions?
- ◆ What empirical evidence is there of students engaging in peace-building on the basis of their religious convictions?

Part Three: Theological Questions

- ◆ What issues emerge from the grounded research that may contribute to the theological and ethical understanding of peace-building?
- ◆ Does the grounded research provide evidence of ways in which theological and ethical concerns are being implemented in practical initiatives towards peace-building?

6. Delimitation of the Thesis

The following points serve to set the parameters of the thesis. First, in various parts of the world today emerging nation-states suffer from the politics of ethnic

differentiation and exclusion. Each of them can potentially inform other regions of conflict to some peace-building good. Parallels to the Balkan conflicts are found in the ethnic violence of Rwanda, for example, and the well-established effort by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa can inform the Commission in Bosnia-Herzegovina of the same name. However, these and similar ethnic conflicts are also substantively different from the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and drawing parallels to them invites reductionism and artificiality. This thesis will not embark upon a comparison between Bosnia-Herzegovina and other parts of the world, and thus the peace efforts of the other conflicted regions necessarily remain outside the scope of this thesis. Further, in order to reasonably limit its size, this study focuses on the conflict of Bosnia-Herzegovina proper. Although events in Bosnia-Herzegovina are intrinsically linked to events and actors in the other regions of the former Yugoslavia, the thesis engages them only insofar as they have bearing on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Second, this study focuses on the peace-building views and efforts of local nationals of the former Yugoslavia and not on the many foreign humanitarian aid and peace-building NGOs working in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although many national bodies have direct contact with international agencies and are indirectly affected by those bodies, the initiatives of those agencies lie outside of the parameters of the thesis.

Third, this thesis is not intended to be comprehensive in scope, and consequently certain limitations are placed on the research. A comprehensive study would necessarily include the Jewish community, various Sufi organisations, and other religious groups within Bosnia-Herzegovina. These may serve as the basis for further study. However, this research and analysis focuses on peace-building within the Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant communities. The first three religious communities constitute the major faith expressions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Protestants are included in the thesis for reasons explicated below.⁴³

Fourth, it is the conviction of this researcher that the Christian scriptures are authoritative, can speak with relevance to today's world, and can be normative in the life of the believer. Moreover, the Christian scriptures can also act prophetically as a

⁴³ See the reasons for this, and the background information for the Protestants, under '8. Researcher's Perspective' in this Introduction.

moral corrective to political and religious excesses that disrupt the cosmogonic intentions of the creator God. It is with this understanding that the study employs the use of the Christian scriptures when discussing theological issues in Part Three.

Although the researcher is neither a Muslim nor trained in Islamic Studies, he will make appropriate reference to the Qur'ān as the sacred scriptures of the Muslims. Use of both texts does not ignore differences between Christianity and Islam, and no attempt will be made here to minimise the deep and abiding theological and historical differences between the two. The thesis allows the various voices to speak distinctly, and accepts that each community – when properly heard – makes a contribution to the discussion. Differing narratives offer the listener insight into the points of continuity and discontinuity, and are the basis for enhanced understanding.

7. Editorial Remarks

Use of the term 'religion' in this thesis reflects the seven dimensions that are outlined by Ninian Smart:⁴⁴ 1) the practical and ritual dimension; 2) the experiential and emotional dimension; 3) the narrative or mythical dimension; 4) the doctrinal and philosophical dimension; 5) the ethical and legal dimension; 6) the social and institutional dimension; and 7) the material dimension.⁴⁵ Of special importance for peace-building are the narrative or mythical dimension, and the social and institutional dimension. The interviews will also focus attention on the experiential and emotional dimension of religion as persons relate their first-person narrative accounts.

The thesis recognises different schools of thought regarding the term and concept of 'nationalism', and makes no attempt to decide for the *primordialist* or *modernist* view, or any moderating views between them. The thesis is interested in viewing nationalism as a phenomenon and motivating ideology in the context. One analysis distinguishes between *ethno-cultural nationalism*, which may be characterised as insular, aggressive and intolerant, and *civic nationalism*, which is more open, democratic, and pluralistic.⁴⁶ Because the former predominates in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the term 'nationalism' in this thesis reflects the meaning of ethno-

⁴⁴ Smart 1989. This is a refinement from an earlier work (Smart 1969: 15-25) in which six dimensions – the ritual, mythological, doctrinal, ethical, social and experiential – are enumerated.

⁴⁵ Smart 1989: 10-21.

⁴⁶ Cited in Powers 1998: 225.

cultural nationalism. The thesis is also interested in how nationalism functions in the capacity of *ersatz* religion.⁴⁷ Because modern nationalism embodies many of the same dimensions as religion, such as the ritual, emotional, narrative, ethical, social, institutional and material dimensions, it is, as Smart relates, “reasonable to treat modern nationalism in the same terms as religion”.⁴⁸ The thesis uses the term ‘nationalism’ from this perspective, rather than engaging in the debate about the term’s origins and definition.

The term ‘restoration’ has many meanings, and it is therefore imperative to clarify its use in the thesis in order to avoid confusion. ‘Restoration’ is not used with reference to *temporality*, as in the return to a period of time, or former regime or empire.⁴⁹ A restoration of this nature is neither possible nor desirable. It refers rather to a *state of being or becoming*; of ‘making whole again’ that which was damaged. In terms of structures, ‘restoration’ is used to mean making sound again. In terms of organisms, ‘restoration’ is meant to have a therapeutic aspect, as in “a returning to a normal or healthy condition”⁵⁰ or “the restoration of friendship between enemies; the restoration of peace after war”.⁵¹ The term ‘restoration’ in this thesis is the central domain of the language complex that includes ‘reconciliation’, ‘restitution’, ‘reparation’, ‘renewal’, and ‘revival’.⁵² The term will be explicated further, and a rationale will be given for its use - especially with reference to religion - as the empirical data of the thesis is unfolded.⁵³

Language is part of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and is used as a tool for marking territory and setting barriers. However, the thesis does not use language with this intention, and spelling choices reflect linguistic consistency, not ideological partisanship. Thus, no statement of solidarity with any particular national group should be construed from the choice of spelling. So, for instance, the thesis will refer to ‘Kosovo’ (Bošnjak/Croatian/Serbian) instead of ‘Kosova’ or ‘Kosovë’ (Albanian variants); ‘Bošnjak’ instead of the anglicised variants ‘Bošniak’, ‘Bosniak’ or

⁴⁷ Tillich uses the term “quasi-religion” indicating a “genuine similarity”, and not “pseudo-religion”, which has an “intended, but deceptive similarity” (Tillich 1963: 5, 6).

⁴⁸ Smart 1989: 24.

⁴⁹ See, for instance, the use of the term in this sense in the reference to “the Ottoman restoration, the cherished dream of most Muslims” in Banac (1984: 363).

⁵⁰ MWMD 2002: n.p.

⁵¹ WRUD 1998: n.p.

⁵² WRUD 1998: n.p.

⁵³ See especially Chapter Seven.

‘Bosniac’. However, reflecting official English language usage, ‘Bosnia’ is here used instead of ‘Bosna’ (B/C/S), and ‘Herzegovina’ instead of ‘Hercegovina’ (B/C/S). Similarly, the Latin equivalent of the Cyrillic will be used to facilitate comprehension for an English language readership, and not to make a statement of national preference.

The term ‘Bosnia’ in this thesis refers to a specific geographical region apart from Herzegovina and is not a shortened reference to the political state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The thesis recognises Herzegovina as a distinct area with its own discrete, sometimes anomalous, situations. The term ‘Bosnian’ is generally avoided in the thesis because of its ethnic-laden identity in the Republika Srpska with Bošnjak nationhood. When used, the term ‘Bosnian’ is restricted to the geographic region of Bosnia proper (distinct from Herzegovina), and has no reference to the Bošnjaks of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In most cases the thesis uses the term ‘Bošnjak’ and not ‘Bosnian Muslim’, except when it is anachronistic to do so, particularly during the socialist period of Yugoslavia. The terms ‘Balkan’ and ‘Balkans’ in this study designate the peninsula in Southeastern Europe and are meant to have denotative meaning; the terms do not carry connotative and pejorative meaning. Although the official country name in the English language is ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina’, the thesis will use a hyphen in place of a conjunction to join the two, thereby avoiding syntactical misunderstanding. The term ‘Serb’ is used as a substantive, referring to a person of Serbian ethnic extraction, and the term ‘Serbian’ is used as a modifier. Neither term is used to distinguish a degree of commitment to nationalist causes.

Explanation of specific foreign words may be found in the glossary at the beginning of the thesis on page xvi. The coding summary following the names of interviewees in the footnotes is intended to enable the reader to distinguish salient detail about the person at a glance. The first two letters refer to the religious community to which the person belongs. The second two letters, separated by a full stop from the first two, indicate the category of Religious Leader, Women, or Students with which they should be identified. The third two letters indicate the city of residence of the person. A detailed explanation to the coding of the interviewees can be found on page xx.

8. Researcher's Perspective

Several years of personal experience in post-communist lands of Central Europe⁵⁴ provide the background of the researcher's interest in this topic. He worked extensively with the Protestant communities in the Balkan region following the implementation of the Dayton Accord in 1996. Their multi-national character and interest in rebuilding society in Bosnia-Herzegovina created the initial impetus for the thesis, which then was expanded to include the three major religious communities in order to gain wider contextual understanding. Because little is known about the Protestant community, and because they constitute a major part in the study, the following background serves as introduction of the community for the thesis.

8.1. The Protestant Communities

Owing to their small size, the Protestant communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina are easy to overlook or dismiss as inconsequential for social transformation.⁵⁵ This study will make a different case. The Protestant communities are making contributions disproportionate to their size, and, because of their multi-national character, have much to offer all of the national communities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some elaboration of their identity is here presented.

8.1.1. Historical Background

Protestants have had a long and continuous presence in the area that was Yugoslavia since the Reformation. Steele outlines their arrival in three distinct waves. The first wave came in the sixteenth century when both Reformed and Lutheran movements gained a foothold in Slovenia, Croatia, Dalmatia, Istria, Slavonia⁵⁶ and Hungary.⁵⁷ However, the Counter-Reformation largely annihilated the Protestant presence, especially during the harsh persecution known as the 'Decade of Sorrows' (1671-1681).⁵⁸

⁵⁴ The researcher lived in the former East Germany, Poland and Hungary from 1991.

⁵⁵ Yugoslav émigré Paul Mojzes, a Protestant of the Methodist tradition, is among those who believe the Protestants are too small to make a significant contribution (Mojzes 1994: 43). Similarly, Franciscan Marko Oršolić is aware of the Protestant presence and work in the northern part of the former Yugoslavia, in Slavonia and Vojvodina, but claims that there is no such presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that Protestants in general are not "sufficiently open to Judaism and Islam" (Oršolić 1998: 263).

⁵⁶ Today the regions of Croatia, Dalmatia, Istria and Slavonia are all part of the Republic of Croatia.

⁵⁷ Steele 1995: 30.

⁵⁸ Steele 1995: 30.

The second wave of Protestants came through ethnic migration. Hungarians (mostly Reformed, some Lutherans), Germans and Slovaks (both Lutheran) settled territory abandoned by Ottoman Turks in their retreat from northern Balkan territories. At a time of persistent persecution,⁵⁹ the Tolerance Dictum of 1781 granted by Josef II under Habsburg hegemony permitted Protestants and Orthodox Christians to worship freely and construct churches.⁶⁰ They settled on the fertile flatlands of Vojvodina (northern Serbia), Slovenia, and Slavonia (northern Croatia) and portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These historic Protestant Churches remain part of the religious mosaic in Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro today, with the largest representation coming from the Slovak Lutheran churches, numbering about 51,000 members.⁶¹ However, a concerted act of 'ethnic cleansing' following World War II severely reduced the German Lutheran presence, leaving a small, ethnic-oriented remnant in northern portions of the former Yugoslavia (Slavonia and Vojvodina).⁶² The Lutheran architectural legacy in Bosnia is the massive church structure built in the late nineteenth century along the Miljecka river in Sarajevo, now housing Sarajevo University's Faculty of Arts. German Lutherans today number approximately 550 persons with two church buildings.⁶³ In the absence of a *Pfarrer*, a Baptist pastor performs some of their religious functions.⁶⁴

The third wave of Protestants came in the mid- and late nineteenth century and twentieth century with the arrival of the 'free churches', that is to say, congregations not tied to any particular historic or hierarchal body or ethnic group. These churches were the fruits of Western missionary efforts from the United States, Germany, Switzerland, Britain and Sweden, representing several Protestant denominations, including Congregational, Methodist, Nazarene, Baptist, Pentecostal, Seventh Day Adventist and Church of the Brethren.⁶⁵ Most of the free churches are pietistic in character, hold to a high view of scripture, stress the need for personal conversion, and cultivate a life of prayer.

Strong opposition to the free churches came from the Orthodox community in the

⁵⁹ Kovács 2003: 16-19.

⁶⁰ Steele 1995: 31.

⁶¹ Steele 1995: 31.

⁶² Steele 1995: 31.

⁶³ Barrett 2001: 125.

⁶⁴ Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 3.

⁶⁵ Steele 1995: 32.

first part of the twentieth century. In Macedonia Protestant church buildings were burned, pastors were imprisoned, tortured and killed.⁶⁶ Of the free churches only the Baptists, who had established a presence in Sarajevo near the Baščaršija (central market) in the old town c.1855 and recorded their first baptism in 1869,⁶⁷ were recognised by the Yugoslav Constitution of 1939.⁶⁸ This gave them the right to own church property, but denied the same right to other free churches.⁶⁹ Methodists circumvented the property restriction by negotiating their deeds with the German Lutherans. However, when the Germans were forcibly expelled after the Second World War, Methodists in Vojvodina also lost their property.⁷⁰

Pentecostals arrived c.1920 and founded churches in all areas of the former Yugoslavia except Montenegro. As a result of the break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the Pentecostal churches are now registered within their respective republics. In the 1980s the Pentecostal Church in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina began the process of formally changing its name to the *Evangelical Church of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina*. The body had two churches in Bosnia-Herzegovina, both in what is now the Federacija (Croat and Bošnjak entity). The Evangelical Church in Bosnia-Herzegovina (*Evandeoska Crkva u Bosna i Hercegovina*) is today independent from the Croatian body and counts ten pastors for more than a dozen churches and preaching points in all of the major cities of the Federacija, and one in Banja Luka in the Republika Srpska. The Pentecostal Union of Serbia-Montenegro (*Savez pentekostnich crkva*) has a presence in the Republika Srpska (Serb-dominant entity), with churches and preaching points in Brčko, Bijeljina, Doboj, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Banja Luka and Bratunac.⁷¹

Although now organisationally independent, the two bodies in Bosnia-Herzegovina share a similar theology and carry out comparable programmes of ministry. The churches continue a long tradition of pietistic theology and practice, and place a strong emphasis on prayer, regular corporate worship, evangelism and discipleship, and church planting. Both of these bodies maintain dynamic social programmes of

⁶⁶ Steele 1995: 35.

⁶⁷ Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 17.

⁶⁸ Bjelajać 1998: 40.

⁶⁹ Steele 1995: 35.

⁷⁰ Steele 1995: 35.

⁷¹ Bjelajać 1998: 43.

outreach that respond to the needs of society without becoming directly involved in political activity, except as is necessary to secure their rights as religious organisations. The humanitarian aid arm of the Evangelical Church in the Federacija is named *Agape*, while the Pentecostal churches in the Republika Srpska work with *Hleb Života (Bread of Life)*, the Christian aid agency with headquarters in Belgrade. Both aid agencies co-ordinate their relief work through the local governments to reach the neediest persons in the local community irrespective of nationality or confession, and without requiring recipients to attend religious services.⁷²

8.1.2. Legitimation for Inclusion in the Thesis

The thesis interacts with the Protestants of the third wave, and the term 'Protestant' refers specifically to the Baptist, Pentecostal and Evangelical Churches in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The churches of these bodies in Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to the war in 1992 numbered no more than two or three, and regular church attendance numbered about 150.⁷³ Today they count approximately 1200 regular church adherents⁷⁴ in more than thirty churches and preaching points throughout the Federacija and Republika Srpska. The Baptists and the Evangelical Church also each operate a theological training centre.

In spite of their small size, the Protestant communities make noticeable contributions to peace-building and restoration in Bosnia-Herzegovina. First, the many metric tonnes of humanitarian aid which they distributed to the neediest at a critical hour during and subsequent to the war was vastly disproportionate to their size. European, British and American aid agencies channelled food, medical supplies and building materials through the Protestant communities in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia (including Kosovo) to assist in alleviating the great needs caused by the conflicts. Some of the aid efforts continue today, although most have made a transition to development and micro-enterprise in order to address the high unemployment associated with the continuing refugee/IDP problem.

Second, the disproportionate size of the Protestant community vis-à-vis traditional religious communities is no longer a factor when issues of peace-building and restoration are considered. As this thesis makes clear, no large-scale multi-national

⁷² Bjelajać 1998: 42.

⁷³ Johnstone and Mandryk 2001: 115, 116.

⁷⁴ One source that includes other independent groups puts the total at ca. 3000 adherents (Johnstone and Mandryk 2001: 115, 116).

peace-building effort is extant among the nationalised religious communities or political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Multi-national peace-building initiatives are found among small sodalities that counter the larger political and religious institutions that polarise their own communities along national lines. To dismiss the Protestants solely on the basis of size would distort the research into the nature of their peace-building and multi-national initiatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Third, unlike other religious communities, the Protestants are multi-national in their composition and non-nationalistic in their orientation. This warrants greater examination in terms of their contribution to peace-building. Scholars focus on national 'tribal gods',⁷⁵ or the betrayal of an assumed tradition.⁷⁶ As yet, there has been no scientific examination of the dynamics of the multi-national Protestant communities to see what contributions they make to peace-building and social restoration. Perica commits a few paragraphs to the Protestants and permits a glimpse into this under-reported area. He points to one study that makes the following observation about the minority religious communities in Yugoslavia during the decade of the 1980s, a period of heightened nationalistic awareness tied to religion:

The minor Christian religious communities seem to be spared from the tensions along ethnic lines that are growing in our society.... Their congregations are multiethnic and believers who, although they declare their ethnic background without hesitation, have abandoned the familial tradition of religious identification.... Members of the minor religious communities cannot even imagine that their religious organization could be a progenitor or pillar of a nation and see no reason to get involved in current disputes among the ethnic nations and mainstream religious organizations.⁷⁷

Perica singles out the work of scholar and activist Peter Kuzmić at the *Evangelical Theological Faculty* in Osijek, Croatia, and former president of the *Evangelical Church in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Kuzmić is well-known throughout the Balkan and Eastern Central European scene, and travels and lectures widely. In 1994

⁷⁵ See, for example, Cohen 1998.

⁷⁶ See, for example, Donia and Fine 1994; Sells 1996b.

⁷⁷ Cited in Perica 2002: 14, 251, n. 51. The survey reviewed the following registered religious organisations in Croatia at the time: The Baptist Church; the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (Mormon); the Evangelical Church; the Croatian Catholic Church; the Jewish Community in Zagreb; the Christian Adventist Church; the Church of Christ; the Christ Church of Bethany; the Christ Church of Brethren; the Christ Spiritual Church; the Christ Spiritual Church of the Baptized; the Pentecostal Church of Christ; the Christian Reform Church; the Christian Community of Jehovah's Witnesses in the SFRY; the Reform Movement of Seventh-Day Adventists; the Free Catholic Church.

Kuzmić began a course of study on 'Christian Peace-Making' at the seminary⁷⁸ and founded the relief agency, *Agape*. Perica notes Kuzmić's friendship with the Catholic Church and participation in ecumenical efforts, which gave him credibility with that community to warn against the Church's "uncritical equation of Catholicism, national identity and patriotism".⁷⁹ The seminary under Kuzmić's leadership also plays host to a number of guest lecturers from pacifist and just war traditions, and course instruction on themes of conflict and peace brings critical insight to bear upon both the nature of the conflict and the peace-building process. The seminary's graduates have roots in all parts of the former Yugoslavia,⁸⁰ and maintain fraternal relationships with other Protestants of various traditions throughout the newly independent republics.

Other persons from outside and within the former Yugoslavia note the contributions that Protestants can make in the reconciling process. One of those is David Steele, a scholar and fellow with the *United States Institute for Peace*, who acknowledged "the unique role of ethnic bridging on the part of evangelical Protestants".⁸¹ A former associate of Steele, Vjekoslav Šaje, now Director of the *Centar za Religijski Dijalog* (Centre for Religious Dialogue), continues to organise similar seminars throughout the former Yugoslav republics. He finds that Protestants have a unique role to play in peace-building because of their non-national orientation.⁸² Further, Miroslav Volf, Henry B. Wright Professor of Systematic Theology at Yale University, has influenced many on issues of violence and reconciliation with his critically acclaimed book *Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness and Reconciliation*,⁸³ which has its origins in the Yugoslav conflict.

The Protestant communities have clearly established themselves as bodies contributing to peace and the welfare of all persons in the former Yugoslav republics. They therefore earn a legitimate place in this thesis, and in terms of peace-building, are treated as an equal partner with the other religious communities in the research.

⁷⁸ Perica 2002: 179.

⁷⁹ Perica 2002: 193.

⁸⁰ The seminary also has international students from Eastern and Central Europe, and in the socialist era had students from non-aligned states in Africa.

⁸¹ Shenk and Steele 1993: 60.

⁸² Šaje [RC.RL.SA.03]: 14, 15.

⁸³ Volf 1996b.

9. Chapter Outline

The thesis is developed in three parts. Part One frames the descriptive element, analysing the nature of the conflict and religion as an agent of national identity formation. Part Two comprises the empirical element of the research, incorporating the data gathered by qualitative data analysis into the thesis. Part Three offers the theological analysis, engaging the narratives from Part Two with the received texts of Christianity and Islam.

Chapter One examines the nature of the Orthodox, Muslim, and Catholic religious communities. Specifically, the chapter examines each community's self-acclaimed ethno-genesis and the integral relationship between religion and national identity. The chapter makes the case that religious elites were primary actors in the conflict, not merely co-opted victims of stronger nationalist political forces.

Chapter Two examines the approach of the Western international community to social restoration and peace-building, focussing on military and civil initiatives towards restoration in the country within the *General Framework Agreement for Peace*, commonly known as the *Dayton Accord*. The chapter argues that the military successes enacted through the Dayton Accord are not matched in the effort to rebuild civil society. The chapter makes the case that a relational approach, which acknowledges the role of religion in society, is necessary to fashion long-term stability.

Chapter Three investigates the resources that Christianity and Islam can contribute to peace-building and social restoration, based on an analysis of Biblical and Qur'anic understandings of 'peace' as a place of sanctuary and hope. The chapter also investigates the resources that these religions bring in terms of a moral framework for human interaction, providing the basis for human rights, which increasingly is an important area of international diplomacy.

Part Two is the core of the thesis, and reports the findings of the qualitative data analysis conducted through interviews. Chapter Four analyses the views of Religious Leaders from all four religious communities and probes the nature of peace-building based on theological and ethical teachings.

Chapter Five examines the role women play in society, especially in the post-war period of recovery, and explores the evidence of whether women play a special role in peace-building on the basis of their religious convictions.

The social situation of young people and students in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina sets the context for Chapter Six. Students figure prominently in the study and warrant their own chapter because they are increasingly the bridge to the future. The chapter focuses on the views of four students, one from each of the Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant communities and probes the evidence for students having a role in peace-building on the basis of their religious convictions.

Part Three moves to the element of theological reflection based on the case studies of Part Two. Chapter Seven focuses on four theological elements that emerge from the research: 1) The claims each religious community makes to authentic religious faith and how it relates to peace-building; 2) power, powerlessness, and peace-building; 3) overcoming adversity through diversity; and 4) restoration as an appropriate *Leitmotiv* for multi-dimensional peace-building.

Chapter Eight builds on the analysis of Chapter Seven by examining initiatives in which theological and ethical concerns are implemented in the context towards building peace. The chapter specifically analyses the resources that informal, non-institutional religious communities, or sodalities, have at their disposal and employ in their efforts to rebuild civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The chapter is especially concerned to address the difficult issue of the disparate and competing narratives of previous conflicts that perpetuate the cycle of violence in the region. Drawing from the interview data, the chapter analyses the limitations to the Western approach of demythologisation, and offers an alternative response based on the interplay of memory and healing to break the cycle of violence.

The thesis concludes by distilling the salient points of the chapters and their descriptive, empirical and theological initiatives, and assesses them against the hypothesis of the thesis as presented earlier in this introduction.

PART ONE

**A FOUNDATIONAL INVESTIGATION OF
THE RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGION TO
NATION-BUILDING AND PEACE-BUILDING**

CHAPTER ONE

RELIGION'S ROLE IN THE FORMATION OF THE BOŠNJAK, SERBIAN AND CROATIAN NATIONAL NARRATIVES

1. Introduction

This chapter analyses the intrinsic nature of religion for the Serbian, Bošnjak, and Croatian national identities, focusing on their respective historical narratives. Specifically, the chapter focuses on the first Research Question, “What contribution has religion made to the formation of mythic national identities in the former Yugoslavia?” The chapter takes the position that the religious dimension includes the element of myth in the self-understanding of the Serbs, Bošnjaks, and Croats, and seeks to account for the influence of their myths in creating ethno-religious conflict. The chapter aims to demonstrate that religion is intrinsic to the identities of the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that religio-mythical elements are essential in the process of nation building. In a correlative manner, the chapter demonstrates that religious leaders were willing participants in nationalist causes and not merely co-opted by powerful political elites. Taken together, the religious history, institutions and leaders contributed to the collapse of Yugoslavia.

The chapter is divided into three parts, considering first the Serbian national narrative, followed by the Bošnjak account, and concluding with the Croatian national narrative.

2. Religion and the Serbian National Narrative

Several components comprise Serbian national identity, including language, ethnicity, territory, religion and written history. Pre-eminent among them is religion,

and the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), which became the sole guardian of national identity in the absence of an emperor.

The Serbian nation was birthed in and nurtured by Byzantine neo-platonic mysticism, and its influence is evident in the formation of the Serbian national collective conscience in both word and image. The national narrative follows a discourse from a Golden Age to victimisation at the hands of other national powers to a Serbian renaissance, or in mythico-religious terms, from creation to affliction, and crucifixion to resurrection. The theme of suffering is especially dominant in the national memory to the point where virtually any action today is justified in view of the nation's past victimisation.

This section first describes historical events shaping the Serbian national history, focusing on how these events are interpreted in moral and religious mythological terms. Second, it shows how the Serbian self-understanding, formulated on the basis of ethno-religious exclusivity, conflicts with the ethno-religious national identity of Bošnjaks. Third, it demonstrates how modern nationalism arising in the nineteenth century has combined with state and clerical forces to confront the ethnic animosity of the Serbs and Bošnjaks.

2.1. Heavenly Serbia: Religion and Serbian National Identity

2.1.1. The Two Hands of God

From the time Emperor Justinian (527-565) codified ecclesiastical law, Byzantium ordered the world according to the two divinely-ordained authorities of the priesthood (*sacerdotium*) and the imperial (*imperium*).¹ The two authorities exercised power equally in a harmonious diarchy. The 'two hands of God' working in *symphonia* married church and state powers in the Byzantine Empire and its successor nation-states.

2.1.2. St Sava and the *Sacerdotium*

The tribes of Slavs, which had settled in the southern Balkan peninsula in the 6th and 7th centuries, came quickly under the influence of Byzantium's Orthodoxy. Serbia's nationhood is rooted in the Nemjanić family dynasty, beginning in the mid-twelfth century. Originally baptised Roman Catholic, Stefan Nemanja (1132-1199 or 1200) was re-baptised Orthodox after witnessing the splendour of Constantinople. He built several royal churches and monasteries in Serbia, Hum (Herzegovina) and Raška

¹ Ware 1997: 41.

(Kosovo) and unified surrounding tribes into medieval Serbia. In 1197 he took holy orders, became a monk with his youngest son, Rastko, better known by the monastic name of Sava, and retired to Mount Athos, leaving the administration of the family and its holdings to his son, Stefan II.

Keenly aware of the enmity between Rome and Constantinople following the sacking of Constantinople by Crusaders (1204), Sava sent an emissary to Pope Honorius III in 1217, asking for his blessing for Serbia, and “the royal wreath for his brother, Stefan”.² Two years later Sava visited the exiled Byzantine emperor Theodore I and the Orthodox Patriarch Manuel Saranten Hariopoulos in Nicaea. Leveraging the recognition he received from the pope, Sava gained autocephaly for the Serbian Church, fusing Serbian nationhood with Orthodoxy.

2.1.3. Stefan Dušan and the *Imperium*

The Serbian Empire reached its territorial zenith under Stefan Dušan (1331-1355) who wrested power from his father, Stefan Dečani. Dušan launched a campaign of territorial enlargement, taking advantage of Byzantium’s weakness and internal strife. To the south he acquired territory in Macedonia, Epirus and Thessaly. In the north he took land as far as the Belgrade, and claimed portions of Bosnia.

In 1346 he appointed his own patriarch in order to be crowned Emperor of the Greeks and Serbs. This brought him into direct conflict with Byzantium’s emperor, Cantacuzenus VI (1347-54), whose daughter was married to Orhan I (1326-1359), the Ottoman sultan. It also led to a schism with the Orthodox authorities in Constantinople. Dušan’s death in 1355 ended his military campaign against Constantinople aimed to replace the Byzantine Empire with a new Serbo-Greek empire.³ At the time of his death, the Serbian empire extended from the Danube to Peloponnesia.⁴ Dušan is remembered today through the gilded veneer of history, and his empire as the apex of Serbian dynastic glory. Owing to his suspected role in his father’s death, and the antagonism he caused with Church authorities in Constantinople, he was never canonised. His legacy is seen in the territory he acquired, which was canonised “Serbia”.

² Judah 2000: 20.

³ Anzulovic 1999: 37

⁴ Except for key city-states of Salonika, Ragusa (Dubrovnik) and Dyrrachium (Dürres).

2.1.4. The Creation the Image

Serbian leaders began early to create an image of a nation with a heavenly destiny. Sava's contribution went beyond autocephaly to instituting the divine right, assuring a dynasty in the Nemjanić line. In his later writings he associated his father, Stefan Nemjanić, with the biblical patriarch Abraham, and Serbia as the 'New Israel'.⁵ Serbia's belief in its divine destiny was augmented by Dušan's expansion of the terrestrial kingdom.

In the nineteenth century Dušan's empire became archetypal for the ideology of *Velikosrpsko*, or 'Greater Serbia', the divinely-ordained expansionist right for all Serbs to live in one (great) state. The claim that wherever Serbian bones were buried was Serbian territory and holy ground brought Serbs into direct conflict with the Ottoman dynasty, and transformed the image of 'Heavenly Serbia'.

2.1.5. The Battlefield and the Bazaar: Encounter with the Turks

The presence of the Turks on 'Serbian' soil presented a religious, ideological and territorial challenge to the Serbs, and defeat to the Turks on the battlefield became the basis for a new, mythicised national awareness epitomised by the Battle of Kosovo. The Serbs rehearsed and nourished this national narrative with every conflict from the mid-nineteenth century, and it is of paramount importance for understanding today's Balkan antipathies.

2.1.6. The Battle of Kosovo and its Mythological Significance

According to some historians,⁶ the battle that took place on the plain of Kosovo on June 28th, 1389 was militarily indecisive. It nevertheless became the mythic centrepiece of Serbian national identity and the primary motivational image for Serbian national independence. The myth extracts moral victory from military defeat, preserves a glorious Serbian past, and provides a utopian vision of the future.

Prince Lazar, the leader of the Serbian people in the fateful battle, is the focus of especially strong religious imagery. In the best-known epic poem of the battle, *The Downfall of the Kingdom of Serbia*, Prince Lazar receives a visitation from Saint Elias (Elijah), the prophet, in the form of a grey falcon. Saint Elias presents Lazar the choice of an earthly or heavenly kingdom. If he chose the earthly kingdom, Lazar's army would defeat the Turks, but the inherited kingdom would be

⁵ Judah 2000: 20.

⁶ See, for instance, Malcolm 1999: 58ff.

ephemeral. If he chose the heavenly kingdom, Lazar and the Serbian army would perish at the hands of the Turks but gain an eternal and heavenly kingdom for the Serbian nation. Lazar chose the heavenly kingdom, fating his army to defeat, and Serbia to Turkish subjugation, but preserved the Serbian soul to rise again another day.

2.1.7. Conversion and *Djimma* Under Turkish *Herrschaft*

Serbs and other Western Europeans have characterised the Turkish conquest on European soil as a heinous evil. In her magnum opus, Rebecca West writes, “The night fell for four centuries, limbo became Hell, and manifested the anarchy that is Hell’s essential character.”⁷ Other narratives present a different picture, however. First, the Serbian Empire had already begun to disintegrate after Dušan’s death in 1355 apart from any Turkish incursions. Further, a lesser-known battle at Marica in 1371 was more decisive before the armies faced each other at Kosovo Polje. The Turkish victory at Marica brought vassalage to some Serbian areas, requiring Serbs to fight with the sultan’s troops against fellow Serbs in the battle of Kosovo. And before the end of the century Serbs and Turks fought together to fend off the last significant crusade from the Catholic West in 1396.⁸

Second, the greater threat to Serbian national existence came from Catholic Hungarians, not the Turks. For this reason Lazar’s widow chose vassalage under the Sultan rather than annihilation from Hungary.⁹

Third, Serbian national identity stabilised under Ottoman rule. The Qur’ānic principle of *djimma* (Ar. *dhimma*) assured protection for Christians and Jews under Islamic law. Early Ottoman rule of the Balkans permitted the building of churches and monasteries, important symbols of Serbian identity. The Serbian Patriarchate first established under Dušan was re-established in Peć in 1557, assuring a continuation of Serbian identity. Subsequent Ottoman conquests brought migrations of Orthodox peoples, and expanded the territory of Serb settlement into Bosnia and Croatia.¹⁰

⁷ West 1994: 840.

⁸ Judah 2000: 33.

⁹ Judah 2000: 32.

¹⁰ Malcolm 1994: 70-81.

The Serbian Orthodox Church enjoyed significant favour with the Sultan because Orthodox peoples were similarly threatened by Roman Catholic incursions from the West.¹¹ Because the Ottoman *millet*¹² system recognised national leadership of its subjugated peoples by religious confession, Orthodox clergy were rewarded with greater authority over their own people once the power of the emperor was dismantled. As a result, Serbian identity became directly linked to the Orthodox Church.

2.1.8. Preserving the Image

Although the Ottomans reduced to vassalage the Serbian nation already in its twilight, historical realities do not substantiate an image of ruthless terror forced upon an unwilling people. With the earthly kingdom lost, the Heavenly Kingdom was now completely entrusted into the hands of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which sought to portray the Serbian nation as morally righteous in the face of material defeat.

The SOC also attempted to preserve the earthly kingdom by building and preserving churches and monasteries. It then consecrated this territory, canonised its kings and martyrs, and glorified the national image through iconography in its holy places. These territorial claims resurfaced in the nineteenth century with the advent of modern nation-state building and the renaissance of a Serbian national consciousness.

2.2. Insurrection and Resurrection: The Emergence of a Modern Serbian Identity

2.2.1. Church-Nation and Language-Nation Antipathies

German Romanticism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries inspired a new national self-consciousness based on a shared cultural-linguistic heritage in contrast to imperial power, religion or dynastic influences.¹³ The concept of the nation-state made its way through the centres of learning in Europe, eventually reaching the Ottoman capital. By this time abuse and incompetence from Topkapı palace fuelled a movement for reform that called for the dismantling of the sultanate. Nations long subjugated to the sultan began to emerge with a national self-

¹¹ Malcolm 1998: 109

¹² Tk. 'people', or 'nation'.

¹³ Jelavich 1983: 172, 3).

consciousness and took advantage of Ottoman weakness to carve out their own identity.

Cultural nationalism encouraged nation building by reinvigorating indigenous folklore and challenged the centralised authorities of the sultanate and the Ecumenical Patriarchate. During this period Serbian epic poetry designed to resurrect a national consciousness focused on the person of Marko Kraljević (d. 1389). Kraljević fought both for and against the Sultan and became a literary figure of mediation between the declining Serb nation and the powerful Turks. Serb nationalists of the nineteenth century abandoned conciliatory depiction for a polarised image of Lazar and the Battle of Kosovo.¹⁴

2.2.2. Christoslavism and the Heavenly Mandate

Serbian nationalism is marked by *Christoslavism*,¹⁵ an essentialist view that all Slavs are racially Christian. The implication of this view is that those who speak a Slavic tongue but are not Christian are traitors of their faith and nation; they are not true Slavs.¹⁶ Accordingly, those who are Slavic Muslims are ‘Turks’, have polluted the Slavic race and are responsible for the death of the Christ-Prince Lazar at the Serbian Golgotha, the Battle of Kosovo.¹⁷ Because the *territorium* of the Slavs is holy, the land must be cleansed of its impurity, the non-Christians and the non-Slavs. This is accomplished by one of three methods: reconversion to Christianity, expulsion from the land, or annihilation.

2.2.3. Prince Lazar and Serbia as Christ Figures

Christoslavism fuses Serbian national mythology and religious typology. Lazar’s death at the Battle of Kosovo is juxtaposed to the crucifixion of Christ and represents the death of the Serbian nation.¹⁸ The Turks in the story are the Christ killers who unwittingly fulfil the prophecy of Elias. In the narrative Vuk Branković (d. 14th century) represents the Judas figure. Branković betrayed Prince Lazar by revealing the battle plans to the Turks and then failed to guard Lazar’s flank in the fateful

¹⁴ Sells 1996b: 37.

¹⁵ There are various expressions of *Christoslavism* and as a phenomenon, it is not unique to Serbia. Sells (1996b: 92-114) also notes a Croatian expression of Christoslavism, and Velikonja (1999: 15-32) demonstrates that there is also a Slovenian expression of Christoslavism. Both of the Croatian and Slovenian forms link national heroes and martyrs to Roman Catholicism.

¹⁶ Velikonja 1999: 17.

¹⁷ Sells 1996b: xv.

¹⁸ Sells 1996b: 31.

battle, bringing death to the Prince. In the 19th century nationalist revival of the myth, Slavs who had converted to Islam were cast in the role of Judas and the Christ killers. Their destruction is thus justified from an ethno-religious moralism steeped in nationalist mythology. The most ardent of the nationalist poets, Prince-Bishop Petar Njegoš, inflamed a nationalistic hatred of Slavic Muslims that would sanction racial bloodletting for generations to come.

2.2.4. The Religious Ethos of Prince-Bishop Njegoš

Serbs and Montenegrins herald Prince-Bishop Petar II Petrović-Njegoš (1813-1851) as ‘Serbia’s Shakespeare’ for his literary genius. He would be less exaggeratedly described as the ‘Serbian Milton’ for his nationalist contributions in philosophy, theology and epic poetry.¹⁹ He was born in an area of Montenegro controlled by the Ottoman Empire although officially independent and unconquered. At the age of twenty he became leader of the province that Orthodox bishops theocratically governed since its founding in 1697. His primary task was to unite and modernise into a civilised state the independent mountain clans obsessed and paralysed by internal blood feuds. Although possessing only modest education and no formal theological training, Njegoš created a national identity for both Serbs and Montenegrins through his nationalistic epic-poem *Gorski Vijenac*, (*The Mountain Wreath*), published in 1847.²⁰ Anzulovic assesses the importance of the poem thus:

[*The Mountain Wreath*’s] influence is comparable to that of the Bible in Protestant countries or the Qur’an in the Islamic world, but its message is very different. Through the authority of its author and the appeal of its verse, the immensely popular poem sanctioned and reinforced the endemic violence from which it sprang.²¹

Serbian Archimandrite Justin Popović (1894-1979) relates Njegoš’s epic poem with Serbs in the following way:

The greatness of our people consists in the fact that they have, through Saint Sava, adopted evangelic justice and transformed it into their own. In the course of centuries they have developed such an affinity with this justice that it became their everyday, customary gospel. Only this can explain why our people have in all fateful moments of their history always preferred the heavenly to the earthly, the immortal to the mortal, the eternal to the transitory.²²

¹⁹ Prvulović 1984: ix.

²⁰ The wreath refers to that small, circular area in the mountains of Montenegro that remained unconquered either by Ottomans or Habsburgs. Montenegrin independence remains a source of great national pride.

²¹ Anzulovic 1999: 61.

²² Cited in Anzulovic 1999: 13.

Only two elements of this defining poem can here be analysed.

2.2.5. The Sacrament of Blood and Ethno-Religious Purity

The Mountain Wreath begins by decrying the oppression under the sultans. Its call to liberation advocates tyrannicide, justifying it through reference to the legendary hero of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, Miloš Obilić. Through cunning, Obilić is able to gain audience with sultan Murad (1362-89), whose troops have already championed the Serbs and killed Prince Lazar in the famous battle. Obilić draws a hidden knife and slays the sultan, exacting retribution from the Turks. The poem at once glorifies the act of vengeance and vilifies the Turks, and inspired a nationalistic uprising against Ottoman domination.

The poem also weds religious symbolism and acts of vengeance. In the drama the *Vladika* (Prince-Bishop) and his compatriots celebrate the Christmas holy-day by 'cleansing' (*čistiti*)²³ the land of the stench and pollution of the 'Turks', those of Serbian tongue but Islamic faith.²⁴ Upon learning of the Montenegrin plan for them, the Muslims offer ceremonial reconciliation afforded under the contract of blood vengeance to end clan fighting.²⁵ The Montenegrins reject reconciliation and offer in return only baptism by water or baptism by blood.

At first the Abbot mistakes the smoke from Muslim villages as the burning of the Yule log, symbol of good fortune for the New Year. The smoke is from 'a whole people being sacrificed',²⁶ announcing to the Montenegrins the massacre of the Muslims. The *Vladika*, emerges from the Church with the others after the Christmas Day service, and receives the news:

Though broad enough Cetinje's Plain,
No single seeing, no tongue of Turk,
Escap'd to tell his tale another day!
We put them all unto the sword,
All those who would not be baptiz'd.
....

We put to fire the Turkish houses,

²³ This is the first time ethnicity and 'cleansing' are related together in Balkan history.

²⁴ According to the linguistic criteria established by Vuk Karadžić (1787-1864), renowned Serbian language reformer and compiler of Serbian folk tales, those who spoke Serbian were Serb. Nationalists contended, however, that the Bošnjaks had changed their racial identity through conversion. They were not in any sense Turks from Turkey (Anatolia), and the term was used with derogatory intention.

²⁵ Sells 1996b: 42.

²⁶ Njegoš 1930: 208.

That there might be nor stick nor trace
 Of these true servants of the Devil!
 From Cetinje to Tcheklitche we hied,
 There in full flight the Turks espied;
 A certain number were by us mow'd down,
 And all their houses we did set ablaze;
 Of all their mosques both great and small
 We left but one accursed heap,
 For passing folk to cast their glance of scorn.²⁷

The Vladika is overjoyed with the massacre, which he relates to national liberation:

Great gladness this for me, my falcons,
 Great joy for me! Heroic liberty
 Has resurrection morn to-day,
 From every tomb of our ancestors dear!²⁸

Customarily, the taking of life in blood vengeance was an act of defilement, requiring confession and absolution before partaking of Holy Communion. But the joyous Abbot releases the perpetrators from fasting and confession, and then serves them the Holy Communion. With this scene Njegoš indicates that those who killed Muslims committed no sin. Instead, the shedding of Muslim blood was itself sacred, an act through which the killers received full forgiveness of their sins.²⁹ The Cup of Holy Communion served by the Abbot was a sign of their purity and worthiness in the eyes of the Church.

2.2.6. Avenging Kosovo

Njegoš's *The Mountain Wreath* resurrected the cult of Lazar and the Kosovo myth and infused it with Serbian nationalism. Lazar's feast day, which never before had been celebrated as a holy day, took on symbolic meaning of its own for the growing nationalist cause. In the 1860s it was combined with the feast day of Vid on June 28, thus commemorating each year the Battle of Kosovo. Serbs observed the 500th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1889 with a huge national celebration, and in 1892 Vidovdan (June 28th) became an official Church holiday.

In the twentieth century the day would have increased significance and serve as a barometer of the nationalistic climate. Acting in the Obilić figure in the Kosovo mythology, Bosnian Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip, who had memorised Njegoš's *The Mountain Wreath*, assassinated the Habsburg Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo on Vidovdan in 1914. Parliament signed the ill-fated Vidovdan Constitution in

²⁷ Njegoš 1930: 209.

²⁸ Njegoš 1930: 209, 210.

²⁹ Sells 1996b: 43.

1921, inaugurating the first Yugoslavia. Non-Serbs viewed the constitution as a Serbian nationalist construct, and Serbs celebrated the signing as the day the empire was restored to them.³⁰ The ill will it created with Croats would have genocidal repercussions during the ethnic and nationalist infighting of Yugoslavia from 1941-45.

The 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo will be remembered as the day Slobodan Milošević rose to mythological stature among Serb nationalists. Milošević, whose father was a Serbian Orthodox priest in Montenegro, became acquainted with the religio-historical mythology of the Serbs early in life.³¹ The commemoration on June 28, 1989 took place at the famed battle site, home then to an ethnically troubled province whose Albanian-Muslim presence constituted more than 90% of the population. Two years prior to the anniversary, the SOC began parading the remains of Lazar throughout Serbian areas of Yugoslavia, evoking strong nationalist sentiment wherever the remains were displayed.³² At the event on the historic battlefield Milošević was portrayed as the Lazar/Christ figure with a nationalist messianic mission, and posters of Milošević and Lazar together were ubiquitous among the crowd exceeding a million people. Although he never used the term *velikosrpsko* (Greater Serbia) in his speech, Milošević clearly indicated that it was time for Serbs to avenge Kosovo and reclaim their entitlement to the earthly kingdom. After extolling the virtues of the Serbian people, he suggested that the nationalist cause could become violent.³³ Exactly twelve years later, after his words had taken on a tragic bloody reality throughout the Balkans, the day of Lazar's feast would have one more historic moment. When the Western powers whisked Milošević away to The Hague on Vidovdan 2001, it was the end of a ghastly nightmare for the Bošnjaks of former Yugoslavia. But for Serbian nationalists, the West's intervention and seizure of Milošević on this special day served only to

³⁰ Judah 2000: 109.

³¹ Ramet 1999: 299, 300.

³² Judah 2000: 39.

³³ Judah records the pertinent portion of Milošević's speech as follows: "Serbs in their history have never conquered or exploited others. Through the world wars, they have liberated themselves and, when they could, they also helped others to liberate themselves.... The Kosovo heroism does not allow us to forget that, at one time, we were brave and dignified and one of the few who went into battle undefeated.... Six centuries later, again we are in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles, though such things should not be excluded yet..." (2000: 163, 4).

confirm the potency of the Battle's myth, and demonstrated the victimisation of the righteous people.³⁴

2.2.7. The Complicity of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Ethnic Cleansing
SOC attempts to prevent the violence were at best perfunctory. On the one hand, there are occasions in which leaders of the SOC have called for the end to the violence.³⁵ SOC leadership supported peace initiatives and generally urged political leaders involved in the war campaigns to do the same. They also engaged with Bošnjak leaders in an attempt to bring their clerical positions to bear upon the warring factions.³⁶

On the other hand, there is strong evidence of complicity with the nationalist effort. Through Ss. Sava and Lazar they created an ideological basis for the fusion of the heavenly and earthly, religious and political realms. The words of one bishop are here indicative:

Prince Lazar and Kosovo Serbs primarily created a heavenly Serbia, which by today surely grew into the greatest heavenly state. If only we count the victims of the last war, millions upon millions of Serb men and women, children and the infirm were killed and tortured in greatest torment or hurled into the pits and caves by ustaša criminals, then we can imagine how large the Serb kingdom is in heaven.³⁷

SOC assertions of Serbian ethno-religious priority fostered ideas of racial superiority and Serbian expectations of entitlement. At the same time they denied Bošnjak territorial claims.³⁸

In the open letter of the 1987 Bishops conference, the SOC was the first to use the term 'genocide' in the post-Tito era, relating the term to the plight of Serbs in

³⁴ Steven Erlanger also sees symbolic importance in the event transpiring on Vidovdan. He states, "...[F]or many Serbs, Mr. Milošević's transfer will only underline his reputation as their defender, who is suffering martyrdom for the beleaguered nation as other heroes have done" (2001: n.p.).

³⁵ See, for instance, the joint statement by Patriarch Pavle of Serbia and Franjo Cardinal Kuharić of Zagreb in their September 1992 meeting in Geneva (1992: 50-2).

³⁶ Before the outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Patriarch Pavle met with the Mufti of Belgrade and a Muslim delegation headed by Haji Hamdia efendi Jusufspahić, and a month later with Alija Izetbegović. Together they appealed against the misuse of religion for political purposes (Radić 1998b: 171). See also the representation of Bishop Irinej of Bačka for Patriarch Pavle at the signing of the March 1995 Vienna Declaration, Appeal of Conscious Conflict Resolution Conference (Declaration 1995: 41-3).

³⁷ Letter by Bishop Jovan of Šabac-Valjevo at the occasion of the entry of St Lazar's remains into the Gračanica monastery for the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo (cited in Radić 1998a: 189; 1998b:167, 8).

³⁸ Sells 1996b: 84.

Muslim-dominant Kosovo.³⁹ The use of the term in that context is alarmist, and positioned the Kosovo imagery at the centre of the SOC nationalist campaign. The slogan “Само Слога Србина Спашава”⁴⁰ and its symbol of Serbian religious nationalism, the Greek cross with the quadruple C, stress the unity and indivisibility of the Serbian nation. The implication is that the Serbian people, now distributed beyond Serbia proper to Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, would be united under one territorial ‘Greater Serbia’ by redrawing borders and expelling ‘non-Christians’.

SOC complicity extends beyond the ideological underpinnings of the nationalist movement, however. Ample documentation records SOC denial of large-scale atrocities,⁴¹ accompanied by clergy attempts to obfuscate the realities through reversal of perpetrators and victims in the conflict.⁴² SOC declarations and statements generally echoed the 1986 Serbian Arts and Sciences *Memorandum*,⁴³ which claims exploitation of the Serbian Republic and people by other Yugoslav

³⁹ Radić 1998a: 187.

⁴⁰ “Само Слога Србина Спашава” stands for “Only Unity Saves the Serb”. The four Cyrillic Cs represent the beginning letters of the slogan, and are integrally placed around the Orthodox cross.

⁴¹ Anzulovic 1999: 123. Also, Sells (1996b: 84) states that the SOC denied large-scale violence in the form of killing camps, organised rape and systematic destruction of mosques. While the issues of the camps and destruction of mosques is undisputed, the number of rapes committed by Serb and Bosnian Serb soldiers remains a heated topic. Verifiability of such events is difficult owing to the nature of the crime and the unwillingness of the victims to come forward to testify. See, for instance, Allcock (2000: 402-6) for more on this topic. Evidence given at the war crimes tribunal by unnamed victims, and the subsequent conviction of the perpetrators for rape as a war crime leaves no doubt that concerted, ethnically motivated crimes of hatred were committed through rape. See also the report by Amnesty International (2001: n.p.).

⁴² The Holy Synod of bishops claimed victimisation through genocidal initiatives in its session of May 18, 1995. In part it reads, “We are witnesses that the Orthodox Serbs of the Diocese of Slavonia, their bishop, their clergy, their churches, monasteries and villages in Western Slavonia ... fell victim to genocide, a continuation and completion of the genocide begun in 1941 in the same regions, inflicted upon the same population” (SOC 1995: 39-40). The statement makes a concerted effort to link this violence to the events of the Second World War. It fails to link it to the direct conflict, however. The retaliatory military action by the Croats in 1995 was taken to recapture Croatian territory seized by the Serbs as part of their 1991-2 offensive to create a Greater Serbia.

⁴³ Patriarch Pavle and four bishops of the SOC signed the April 1997 document, *Declaration Against the Genocide of the Serbian People*. It overlooks the genocidal initiatives of Serb offensives and claims victimisation in the conflict. It states in part that “The history of the Serbian lands... is full of instances of genocide against the Serbs and of exoduses to which they were exposed. Processes of annihilation of Serbs in the most diverse and brutal ways have been continuous. Throughout their history they have faced the fiercest forms of genocides and exoduses that have jeopardized their existence, yet they have always been self-defenders of their own existence, spirituality, culture, and democratic convictions” (cited in Andulovic 1999: 124).

republics during the time of communism. The *Memorandum* calls for direct action to amend the injustice.⁴⁴ SOC leadership also offered direct support to Serb paramilitary leaders,⁴⁵ and the SOC relationship to Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić is also exceptionally close.⁴⁶ Some SOC clergy were direct participants of ethnic cleansing,⁴⁷ while others made public racist statements, suggesting acts of genocide against the Muslims would earn spiritual favour.⁴⁸ SOC support for Milošević waned only after he distanced himself from the Bosnian Serb leadership and the campaign for a Greater Serbia foundered.⁴⁹

Other Orthodox circles levied criticism on SOC actions. The SOC Metropolitan of Zagreb, Ljubljana and Italy, Jovan (Pavlović) criticised the SOC's support of the *Memorandum*. The ideology of Greater Serbia also came under their scrutiny and criticism:

With your proposals [for territorial and border issues] you have drawn the church even more into politics. You have made the proper work of the church more difficult. The flirting with the [nationalist] opposition has brought the church onto thin ice.⁵⁰

Other Orthodox leaders, including Bishop Kallistos Ware of Dioklea (Oxford), Professor Olivier Clement (France), Professor Nicholas Lossky (France) and James Forest (USA), Secretary of the *Orthodox Peace Fellowship*, encouraged the SOC to take a strong stand against the violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁵¹ The SOC met

⁴⁴ Beljo 1993: 61-80.

⁴⁵ Radić 1998a: 196, 7. The notorious paramilitary leader Željko Ražnatović, better known as 'Arkan', claimed that "er der größte Liebling des Patriarchats sei und daß Patriarch Pavle persönlich sein Oberkommandant sei." SOC Bishop Lukijan in Dalj also baptised his military troop, the 'Tigers' before going into battle against the Muslims (Radić 1998a: 196, n.1).

⁴⁶ Karadžić claimed that "Unsere Priester sind in allen unseren Überlegungen und Entscheidungen präsent, und auf die Stimme der Kirche wird als Stimme der höchsten Autorität gehört" (Radić 1998a: 199).

⁴⁷ In Trebinje an Orthodox priest led others in expelling a Muslim family from their home. The 500 year old mosque was destroyed immediately following the celebrations of the feast of St Sava. The area was then 'ethnically cleansed' and renamed Srbinje, or 'place of the Serbs'. Bishop Atanasije, perhaps the most nationalistic of the Orthodox clergy, condoned the expulsion of Muslims from Trebinje and attacked anyone who criticised the action (Sells 1996b: 80, 83).

⁴⁸ Vasilje, Bishop of Zvornik-Tuzla, is cited as saying that "the more unbelievers [Bosnian Serbs] kill, the closer they get to heaven (interview in *Evropske Novosti*, 4 March 1993, 10, as cited in Cigar 1995: 66).

⁴⁹ Anzulovic 1999: 123.

⁵⁰ Cited in Andulovic 1999: 118.

⁵¹ Sells 1996b: 85.

these critiques with simple denial in their nationalist effort to achieve a Greater Serbia.

2.3. Conclusion to the Serbian National Identity Section

Through the inspiration of Prince-Bishop Njegoš,⁵² incipient national sentiment, fuelled by pseudo-Christian imagery and a Balkan ethic of blood vengeance, inflamed a cosmic cause of national righteousness.

Some observers suggest that ruthless and manipulative political leaders co-opted the SOC to root out the Bošnjaks,⁵³ much as the Catholic Church fell victim to political leaders. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise. The SOC was the guardian of the national dream and identity, especially when there was no Serbian state. Theirs was a conscious clericalism and willing participation in the nationalist agenda, which clerics had defined and first articulated. Ethno-religious nationalism became a plausibility structure for ethnic cleansing and genocide, the repercussions of which are felt still today.

3. Religion and the Bošnjak National Narrative

The Balkan conflicts have reinvigorated and internationalised the ‘national question’ of the Bošnjak community in the post-communist period. Complicating the issue are competing ethno-genetic narratives that others ascribe to them. Nationalist-minded Serbs portray them as interloping ‘Turks’ whose presence in the Balkans is a defilement of sacred Christian territory. Nationalist-minded Croats portray them as apostate Catholics. For a time, the Western international community viewed Bošnjaks as militant, religious ‘fundamentalists’ who, if armed, would only escalate the violence in the Balkans.

⁵² Njegoš was by no means the only writer who conjured anti-Muslim sentiment through his writings. Bosnia’s Pulitzer Prize novelist Ivo Andrić demonstrates strong anti-Muslim sentiment. In more recent times Radovan Karadžić, who is Montenegrin born and memorized Njegoš’s *The Mountain Wreath*, is the author of several volumes of poetry, including one for children. He is wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for war crimes. Vuk Drašković, leader of a nationalist party in Serbia-Montenegro, is a novelist committed to the concept of Greater Serbia. His popular novel *Nož* (The Knife) evokes images of ethnic atrocity in the same anti-Muslim genre of Andrić and Njegoš. Nikola Koljević, a high-ranking Bosnian Serb official, was a poet and an expert on Shakespeare. The novelists Dobrica Ćović and Antonije Isaković were both authors of the *Memorandum*. In 1992 Ćović became the president of the third Yugoslavia (see Andulovic 1999: 128-9).

⁵³ Sells (1996b: 79) puts forward this idea when he says, “In Bosnia, the Serb Orthodox Church made the same mistake the Catholic Church made in Croatia during World War II; it became a servant of religious nationalist militancy.”

Bošnjaks also make identity claims that are far from univocal, as Ramet reveals with the following:

Today in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are Muslims who consider themselves primarily 'Muslim Croats', those who consider themselves 'Bosnian Muslims' (i.e. 'Muslims in the ethnic sense'), and those who, in the spirit of [Izetbegović's] 'Islamic Declaration', see themselves simply as 'Muslims'. In addition, there are those Muslims who in the 1981 census declared themselves 'Yugoslavs'. This already complex picture is made more so by the presence of persons like Fuad Muhić, who describe themselves as 'atheist Muslims', and who therefore completely divorce religion from nationality.⁵⁴

This mosaic reflects a diverse community in transition. It is a community with a long history of living according to the concept of *Mitmenschlichkeit* characterised by a multi-national, multi-religious co-existence. These are values many Bošnjaks today desire to retain.

3.1. Religion's Part in the Bošnjak Ethno-Genetic Narrative

The shared history, culture, and language found among the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina serve to blend identities, not distinguish them. Bošnjak identity narratives thus benefit from both modernist and primordialist interpretive schemas.

Modernists seek to define Bošnjaks in terms of nation-state formation derived from Western European models. Secular Bošnjaks identify with this narrative and distance themselves from their religious history and from the foreign influence of politicised Islam now present in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. The modern, secular Bošnjak readily accepts the values and structures of secular Western Europe, and nation-state building.

Primordialists discern a historically continuous ethnicity, or 'primordial ethnicity'⁵⁵ both distinct from and pre-existent to other *ethnoi* of the Balkans. They acknowledge an Islamic religious heritage without making it the primary factor of identity.

Bošnjaks of both views see themselves as the 'old indigenous element'⁵⁶ in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and claim a pre-Ottoman ethno-genesis distinct from Orthodoxy and Catholicism. They also argue for the integrity of a Bosnian state and assert their national right to the land as the legitimate heirs to the medieval kingdoms. These

⁵⁴ Norris 1993: 8.

⁵⁵ The term is used by Sabrina P. Ramet, as cited in Norris 1993: 7, n. 4.

⁵⁶ Balić 1994a: 4.

claims counter Serbian and Croatian historicist assertions that the Bošnjaks are Islamicised Serbs or Croats. According to this narrative, religion is the primary distinguishing feature among Serbs, Croats and Bošnjaks from the medieval period,⁵⁷ and is a claim deserving closer examination.

3.2. The Defining Role of Religion in Medieval Bosnia and Hum

The Bošnjak ethno-genesis is a complicated issue involving disparate and competing claims. A common view in circulation claims roots to the Bosnian Church (*Crkva Bosanska*), which, according to traditional accounts, was a sectarian religious group unrelated to Catholicism and Orthodoxy.⁵⁸ But no consensus exists about the Bosnian Church. Lovrenović appropriately describes the current state of scholarship on the Bosnian Church thus:

In the whole history of mediaeval Bosnia there is nothing that has become so entangled in various theories, romantic ideas, controversy and mystification as the Bosnian Church and the supposed 'Bogomil' heresy of its adherents. Ever since the middle of the nineteenth century the Bosnian Church has been a constant preoccupation of scholars (both serious and less serious), politicians, writers and poets. Ideological motives have lain behind much of this interest, which has been used to support various current political and national ideas. This, of course, has complicated any critical approach to a complex and obscure subject.⁵⁹

This account links the Bosnian Church and the Bogomils, a sect with Bulgarian origins and Manicheist inclinations. Sonyel describes their doctrines and practices thus:

[The Bogomils] did not believe that Jesus was crucified, and they rejected all forms of Christian monasticism, as well as the mediation of priests between man and God. They allowed no idols or icons in their temples, nor did they tolerate crosses, bells, alcohol or anything likely to distract man from direct communion with God.⁶⁰

More recently scholars depart from this classic view and show that no link between the Bosnian Church and the Bogomils ever existed. The founder of Bosnian Church studies, Croatian Franjo Rački (1828-94), created the link as a symbol to mark Bosnia's sovereignty.⁶¹ The link was perpetuated by the joint finance minister during the period of Austro-Hungarian rule, Benjamin Kállay, who was a proponent of a Bosnian nationhood (*bošnjaštvo*) based on non-irridentist, inter-confessional

⁵⁷ Donia and Fine 1994: 9.

⁵⁸ Sonyel 1994; Koštović 2001: 18, 19.

⁵⁹ Lovrenović 2001: 51.

⁶⁰ Sonyel 1994: 14.

⁶¹ Velikonja 2003: 28.

identity.⁶² Speculation over the nature and beliefs of this unique Church is sure to continue in the absence of supporting documentation. What is known with certainty is that the Bosnian Church died out under the Islamisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3.3. The Islamisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Several factors contributed to the gradual islamisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. First, the cohesion and security of Ottoman society contrasted the fragmented existence under feuding bans and župans. Neither Orthodoxy nor Catholicism offered strong organisational assistance to peasants in the way that Ottoman society could.

Second, medieval Bosnia bears few marks of strong internalisation of Catholicism or Orthodoxy, and new religious expressions were able to gain a foothold and a following because of their weakness. Friedman describes pre-conquest Bosnia this way:

Common people must have felt spiritually adrift without an effective alternative church organization to guide them, thus increasing their vulnerability to the blandishments of Islam.... Unquestionably, the general ignorance about religion and ritual contributed to the ease with which Bosnians accepted Islam.⁶³

Third, Ottoman Islam was clearly more tolerant than Hungarian Catholicism that wished to root out religious non-conformity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By contrast the Sultan's representatives were compelled to protect the Christian and Jewish minorities under his sovereignty. The Ottoman *millet* system allowed the non-Muslim communities a high degree of autonomy, and preserved an ethno-religious community that later served as a basis for national identity.⁶⁴

⁶² Recent scholars disavowing a relationship between the Bosnian Church and/or the Bogomils and neo-Manicheism are the following: Fine (1996: 7, 8); Donia and Fine 1994: 23ff.; Velikonja (2003: 27ff.); Malcolm (1994: 27-42); Lovrenović 2001: 51-55. Other scholars link the Bosnian Church to the Cathari of southern France or with the Patareni (or Patarini) referred to in documents in Ragusa (Dubrovnik) and Italy. Still other scholars suggest the Bosnian Church retained basic beliefs and practices of Roman Catholicism (Banac 1984: 40; Balić 1994a: 4). There is no compelling reason today to link the Bosnian Church either with the Bogomils or neo-Manicheism. Even a cursory examination of the more than 50,000 *stecci* – carved burial stones bearing reliefs of mixed-gender dancing framed by grape bunches, the domestication of horses (signifying land ownership), and clothing displaying festive adornment – argues against this group being ascetic adherents of dualistic Manicheism.

⁶³ Friedman 1996: 19, 20.

⁶⁴ The system distinguished nations by means of their religious confession and recognised the highest ranking religious cleric as the individual chiefly responsible for the needs of that people. Thus, the titular leader of Orthodox Christians in the Balkans, the Rum (Rome) millet, was the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople (Poulton 1997: 17).

Fourth, ambitious persons seeking social advancement readily converted to Islam since the Ottoman political elite opened its doors only to Muslims.⁶⁵ Istanbul required military service only of Muslims, who were then generously rewarded with a land grant for meritorious service to the Empire. Military service thus became both a means by which *kmets* (serfs) could become landowners, and a factor for conversion. Other levels of society and greater civil liberties, status and influence also came with conversion. The peasant class received tax breaks and rent benefits when they converted to Islam since only non-Muslims paid the *cižje* (poll tax).

Fifth, in multi-religious Bosnia, Ottoman overlordship was welcome sanctuary from the expansionist ambitions of Byzantium and Rome. The unchallenged hegemony of Istanbul in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries established relative tranquillity and permitted Islam to flourish.

3.4. The Impact of Sufism on the Bošnjak Identity

One of the primary channels of Islamisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina came through Sufi Islam. Travelling dervishes from Persia and Central Asia melded their teachings with ecstatic expressions of Turkic shamanism⁶⁶ and spread their orders westward through the Ottoman Empire to the valleys of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Sufi orders found a permanent home. The Bektashiyya, Qadiriyya, Mawlawiyya, Malamiyya and Naqshadbadīyya tariqat came to the Balkans from the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries. Each founded a *zavija*⁶⁷ in Sarajevo, from where their respective teachings significantly influenced the social, ethical and religious life of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Sufi orders infused observance of religious duties of orthodoxy with a direct and personal apprehension of God. This created a tension with other branches of Islam over issues relating to theology and, in some instances, observance of Islamic law.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Friedman 1996: 18. One fitting example is the third son of Herceg Stefan of Hum (Herzegovina) who served in the sultan's court under the principle of *devşirme*. Once in Istanbul he converted to Islam, took the name of Ahmed, and married a daughter of Mehmed II. He served three successive sultans and rose to the position of Grand vizier (Heywood 1996: 33).

⁶⁶ Norris 1993: 86.

⁶⁷ A *zavija* (Ar. *zawiyah*) is the complex of operations for a Sufi *tariqah*. Often it comprises a mosque as a place of worship and a lodge for the adherents of the *tariqah*. The *zavija* served also as a welfare institution for the destitute and handicapped, and as a place of refuge for fugitives. See Kane 1995: 370-3.

⁶⁸ Of particular note is the conflict between the Sunni *ulema* in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bosnian born Shaykh Hamza of the Malamiyya order. Shaykh Hamza's followers disseminated his teachings through the craft guild. They maintained an inward and secretive

Sufism took root in Bosnia-Herzegovina because it found sympathy with a people already predisposed to pluralist religious expressions, although mainstream Sunni leaders considered the Sufi orders to be deviant. The dervishes left a rich legacy in Bosnia-Herzegovina through teaching and preaching, spiritual example, and especially through written word in poetry and epic folk songs that continues even today. Sufism's proclivity to embrace the religiously novel and avoid institutionalisation allowed it to permeate the culture and society and adjust to changes within Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3.5. Reforms and the Shift Towards Secular Nationalism

By the late eighteenth century the Ottoman caliphate showed unhealthy signs of nepotism, corruption, abuse of power and administrative incompetence, signalling the need for reform.⁶⁹ The *Tanzimat* (Tk. 'regulation') political and social reforms attempted to modernise the empire in order to preserve it. The reforms fall into three identifiable periods. The first period of reform began under Hatt-ı Hümayun of Gülhane (1839), led by Raşid Paşa, the Minister of Foreign Affairs,⁷⁰ and the rise of the Young Ottomans marks the beginning of the second period (c.1860-1876).⁷¹ The third reform period is marked by the formation of the Committee of Ottoman

religious expression, believing outward expressions of religiosity were susceptible to ostentation. The *ulema* considered the order heretical for their belief in *baqa* (remaining/existing), in the sense that God could mystically manifest himself in an individual member of the *tariqat*. Hamza's opponents also accused him of theological pantheism, teaching against work and effort, and countered his opposition to the practice of deriving meaning from dreams. Some argue that he had a high view of Isa (Jesus) that superseded the Prophet Muhammed. Hamza's execution at the hands of zealous Sunnis in 1561 was meant to extinguish the order and extirpate his teachings, but served only to elevate him to martyr status and spread his message farther (Norris 1993: 115-117).

⁶⁹ Shaw 1995: 273-4.

⁷⁰ The charter established at this time limited the control of the sultanate by redistributing power to a higher bureaucracy (Mardin 1995a: 183-6). The charter also limited the influence of the *ulema*, whose control over civil affairs was based on Islamic law. In 1856 the Islâhat Fermanı (Edict of Reforms) established equal rights and responsibilities of Muslims and non-Muslims throughout the empire. The reorganisation of the non-Muslim millets attempted to consolidate power according to 'Ottomanism' (Davison 1973: 115). The edict greatly reduced the power and authority of Christian hierarchs who had grown accustomed to their privileged position and autonomy within their own millet. Thus, Muslim and non-Muslim clerics alike resisted the reforms.

⁷¹ The Young Ottomans had direct contact with Westerners and more modern ways. They accused the ruling elite of using westernisation to modernise the empire at the expense of Islamic values and sought to replace absolute with constitutional rule. They advocated reform through constitutionalism and parliamentary forms of government (Mardin 1995b: 357), which resulted in the Constitution of 1876.

Union (1889), which became the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), and was known in Europe as the 'Young Turks'.⁷²

Transformation at the Empire's centre had little initial effect in Bosnia-Herzegovina, however. Muslim leadership in the Balkan Peninsula had always enjoyed a degree of independence from the Sultan, and resisted the modernising reforms.⁷³ External events impacting the Sultanate brought bigger changes to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Russia's defeat of the Ottomans (1877) and the Congress of Berlin (1878) meant that Habsburg rule supplanted Islamic law, bringing separation of religion and state to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Catholic Croats, smallest of three nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, now received privileged status from their co-religionist benefactors in Vienna, much as the Muslims had enjoyed under the Sultan.

The Ottoman-Habsburg acrimony reached crisis level in 1899 when a young Muslim woman fled her home in Mostar to avoid an arranged marriage, converted to Catholicism and received sanctuary in a monastery on the Croatian coast. Under Islamic law, conversion to another religion was punishable by banishment or possibly death.⁷⁴ The Muslim community appealed to Vienna for the return of the girl and the dismissal of the priests responsible for harbouring her. The Austrians refused, contending that, according to the Conversion Ordinance of 1891, the woman was of legal age and had therefore left on her own accord, and claimed that church matters were the jurisdiction of Rome, not Vienna. Angered by their refusal to intervene, the Muslim leadership charged the Austrians with threatening the integrity of the Muslim community.⁷⁵

Some scholars regard this conversion incident as the beginning of the Bošnjak nationalist movement.⁷⁶ Even before annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908,

⁷² These reformers opposed the reinstatement of autocratic rule by Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1908). In 1908 they forced the restoration of the 1876 Constitution, which the Sultan had abandoned in 1878. The CUP had two ideological elements within it, the Unionists and the Islamists. The Islamists saw a place for Islam as part of Ottomanism, and the Unionists believed that religion should be a private matter of conscience. The Unionists proposed a separation of religion and state, subordinating Islamic legal issues to secular governance. When the Turkish Republic was established in 1923, Atatürk adopted the Unionist position, and the state operated with a policy of secularisation (Ahmad 1995: 359).

⁷³ McCarthy 1996: 74-78.

⁷⁴ Pinson 1996: 99.

⁷⁵ Pinsen 1996: 100

⁷⁶ Donia 1981: xi.

Bošnjak orientation in legal matters had effectively swung from Istanbul to Vienna, and a new *modus vivendi* with the Habsburg authorities became necessary. Istanbul could no longer protect the interests of Bosnia's Muslims, and the formation of a political party along Western lines was the only viable alternative.

3.6. The Muslim National Question and Legislated Injustice

The appointment of Muftis to lead both the MNO⁷⁷ (1906) and JMO⁷⁸ (1919) political parties reveals the growing incongruence of competing worldviews. Secular structures and frameworks increasingly marginalized the *ulema*. Party leaders failed to negotiate sweeping land reforms of the early Serb-dominated monarchy in 1919, resulting in a sudden reversal of land ownership that was meant to dispossess and humiliate the Bošnjaks.⁷⁹

Objectification of the Bošnjak nation continued in the inter-war period. The JMO recognised the difficulties inherent in nationalisation, but acquiesced in order to leverage their interests against the larger Serb and Croat legislative bodies.⁸⁰ Preserving the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina was of primary importance since partition would mean the demise of the Bošnjak nation through a conscious plan of 'social deislamisation', or exogamous assimilation among the Croats and Serbs.⁸¹ The legislative body further reduced the *umma* by forcing the national question. If the Bošnjaks were genuinely Slav, then they had to be either Serb or Croat, and should therefore declare themselves as one or the other. Bošnjaks asserted their own *sui generis* identity, however, and were able to avert the issue through the interwar period.

During World War II Bošnjaks fought for both Partisan and Ustaša forces against the Četniks,⁸² which positively influenced their circumstance in the post-war period when the national question was again taken up. Initial post-war proposals differed in kind, but not in degree. In the first Yugoslavia, the Bošnjaks were recognised as Slavs but not as Muslims. In the second Yugoslavia they were more commonly

⁷⁷ The abbreviation stands for *Muslimanska narodna organizacija* (Muslim National Organisation).

⁷⁸ The abbreviation stands for *Jugoslavensko muslimansko organizacija* (Yugoslav Muslim Organisation.)

⁷⁹ Zulfikarpašić 1998: 14-15.

⁸⁰ Banac 1984: 374.

⁸¹ Banac 1984: 372-4.

⁸² Friedman 1996: 124-130.

recognised as Muslims but not as Slavs. They were instead Turks and therefore not truly Yugo-Slav,⁸³ or South Slav. In both manifestations of Yugoslavia, Serb- and Croat-dominated regimes viewed the Bošnjak *umma* as foreign interlopers with no natural claim to the state as a homeland.

3.7. Religion in the Communist Period

In the initial years after World War II the communists expanded their power base by controlling the religious communities.⁸⁴ While the restrictions affected all of the religious groups, they were not equally distributed. Persecution was most noticeable among the Muslim *umma* since it still functioned as a community.⁸⁵ The communists sought to restrict the religious communities in all aspects of communal life.⁸⁶ The *Young Muslims* also fell victim to the government's sweeping reforms, and several of their outspoken members, including the Sarajevan lawyer, Alija Izetbegović, were put on trial in 1946. Three years later the government executed four of its members. Simultaneously the communist state authorities aggressively rooted out Muslims who opposed the regime and courted the formal officials of the Islamic Community, fostering a high level of trust and co-operation between the two bodies. This was so for two reasons. First, the office of *Reis-ul-ulema* was appointed by the state, which chose to reward those loyal to the Partisan cause and who fought against the Četniks

⁸³ The situation was further complicated by the Muslim use of the term '*Turci*', which distinguished Balkan Muslims from Anatolian Muslims ('*Osmanli*' or '*Turkuše*') (Banac 1984: 41; Malcolm 1994: 54, 264). The terms served more to confuse and accuse than clarify.

⁸⁴ Balić 1968: 126.

⁸⁵ The communists placed their own functionaries in positions of leadership in the Bošnjak community. Publication of contemporary books on Islam was forbidden until 1964. In 1946 the regime abolished Islamic law and dismantled the legal apparatus of the Shariat judicial system. The regime severely restricted sources of revenue channelled through the vakuf system. The government systematically took claim of properties owned by the religious communities, including Bošnjak-owned land, and turned them into communal properties. Especially reprehensible was the large number of exhumations undertaken in order to erect public buildings or parks on the expropriated property. Alone in 1949, the government forced the closure of 214 mosques and many fell victim to decay. In several places in Herzegovina no religious practice existed (Balić 1968: 128ff.).

⁸⁶ Social and religious mores were proscribed, including the ritual observance of circumcision, although it was privately carried out. The military provided no special meal packets for Muslims. Religious festivals were forbidden in public. The communists encouraged inter-faith marriages, the number of which was then published weekly in the capital city newspaper, *Oslobodjenje*. They closed religious clubs and unions established to provide benevolence for the poor, alcoholics, handcraft workers and youth. Only the party-sanctioned newspaper operated and the Islamic publishing house was placed in government ownership. As a singular concession, the government granted the freedom to build mosques. This in turn the government used as propaganda internationally to favourably portray Yugoslavia's policies of religious freedom and tolerance (Balić 1968: 130ff.).

and Ustaše forces during World War II. Thus, in 1947 the government formalised ties to the *Islamska Zajednica Vjernika (IZV)* (Islamic Religious Community) with headquarters in Sarajevo.⁸⁷ Second, officials within the IZV stood behind the socialist “Brotherhood and Unity” ideals of Tito’s Yugoslavia.⁸⁸ As a diverse minority throughout Yugoslavia, the Muslim communities had more to gain through participation than through opposition.

The socialist Yugoslav government granted formal recognition of the Muslims as a nation in 1968,⁸⁹ which had the effect of fostering nascent nationalism directly related to religion. National recognition in point of fact limited the autonomy of the Muslim community.⁹⁰ Status as ‘Muslim in the national sense’ (*Muslimani u smislu narodnosti*) without the concomitant religio-social liberties required by a faith community was a half-measure and denial of full rights. Moreover, it placed the *umma* in political jeopardy in that the Muslims now competed directly with the Serbs and Croats for the same resources and power.⁹¹

⁸⁷ Velikonja 2003: 219.

⁸⁸ Perica 2002: 80.

⁸⁹ The term ‘Muslim in the ethnic sense’ first appeared in the 1961 census. The 1963 constitution recognised the Muslims in its preamble along with the Serbs and Croats, but offered no national status. The Bosnian Central Committee officially recognised the Muslims as a nation in May 1968, which was subsequently ratified by the Yugoslav central government. The term ‘Muslim in the sense of nation’ (in which an upper case ‘M’ designated the national term, and a lower case ‘m’ designated the religious believer) appeared first in the 1971 census, and was again documented in the 1974 constitution. See Malcolm 1994: 198, 9.

⁹⁰ National recognition also strengthened Tito’s hand on three fronts. First, he used national recognition to court Arab states, which strengthened his authority as leader among the non-aligned nations during the Cold War era. Second, national recognition of Muslims mitigated challenges to his personal authority at home from Serbs and Croats. Third, national recognition brought Muslim indemnification, handing Tito virtual control within Bosnia-Herzegovina (Banac 1996: 145).

⁹¹ Co-operation with the state and minimising the efforts of ‘reactionaries’ that opposed the government won the Islamic Community greater autonomy in both religious and secular affairs. The Islamic Community experienced greater liberties in the press, which was generally less antagonistic to the regime than the Catholic and Orthodox press (Velikonja 2003: 219). The Islamic Community built more than 900 mosques during the socialist period, including the controversial mosque in Zagreb, third largest in Europe, under the management of Mustafa Cerić (Perica 2002: 81). The IZ reopened Islamic schools and founded the Islamic Theological Faculty in Sarajevo in 1977 (Velikonja 2003:220). Tito leveraged the openness shown to the Muslims with several Muslim-oriented nations inclined to his non-aligned states policy. The IZ in Yugoslavia had strong ties with the Islamic world, and received donations from Islamic countries interested in supporting the development of Islam, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Iraq and Sudan. Muslim students also studied abroad in Muslim countries, including Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Sudan (Velikonja 2003: 220).

By the late 1980s the leadership of the IZ⁹² that remained partial to the ideals of Tito could no longer contain the anti-communist voices among their clergy. These voices spoke not only against communism, but also raised the alarm to growing hostility from a strong Serbian nationalism, and began to listen to those within their own ranks promoting a religious nationalism.⁹³

The new constitution of 1990 consolidated power in the Supreme Assembly and lessened the power of the *Reis-ul-ulema*, and mandated a separation between the Islamic Community and the state. The state's weakened hold on the IZ afforded the Islamic Community the opportunity to reinstate public festivals and holidays, signalling "the transfer of power from the communists into the hands of ethnic nationalists".⁹⁴ Islam was now a commodity like Orthodoxy and Catholicism in the ideological marketplace where competition for the attention of voters was of paramount importance for national survival.

In 1991 the Islamic Community also elected a new *Reis-ul-ulema*, Jakub Selimoski, a moderate from Macedonia who was meant to both mitigate the 'hawkish' element led by Omer Behmen and Izetbegović - comrades together from the earlier days of the *Young Muslims* - and Mustafa Cerić,⁹⁵ and to quiet increasingly strident Serbian nationalist voices accusing the Bošnjaks of religious fundamentalism.⁹⁶

By the time of the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, religio-ideological issues had already divided the Bošnjak community.⁹⁷ Izetbegović prevailed and won the

⁹² In the 1969 constitution the IZV (*Islamska zajednica vjernika*) simplified its name to *Islamska Zajednica (IZ)*, leaving out the term 'religion' (literally, 'faith') from their name, signifying a more secular and political and thus less religious emphasis to their identity. At the same time they saw greater freedom in both religious and secular spheres.

⁹³ The protesting *ulema* sought full autonomy for the *Ilmija* (the local term for *ulema*) clerical association, and severed the ties between the Islamic Community and the government, including the removal of the pro-government *Reis-ul-ulema*, Hasan Mujić. They further pressed for an improvement of imams' living and working conditions, and stronger application of Islamic norms in Muslim every day life. The protests culminated in the July 1989 announcement of the early departure of the *Reis-ul-ulema*, and a promise to revise the Islamic Community's constitution (Perica 2002: 83).

⁹⁴ Perica 2002: 85.

⁹⁵ Perica 2002: 85; Zulfikarpašić 1998: 135ff.

⁹⁶ Živomir Stanković declared, "The Sarajevo movement of imams is dominated by Islamic extremists and is under the influence of the international Islamic factor." Cited in Perica 2002: 84.

⁹⁷ Initially Izetbegović and Zulfikarpašić campaigned together for the newly-created Party of Democratic Action (SDA). Once a communist and part of Tito's inner circle, Zulfikarpašić left socialist Yugoslavia and became a successful businessman and philanthropist who had lived several decades in Western Europe. As a secular Muslim he

presidency, and the SDA took the majority of seats in the parliament on a ticket emphasising Bošnjak nationalism with a strong Islamic religious dimension.

In his inaugural speech as new party chairman, Izetbegović emphasised full religious freedom. The SDA also released a declaration in which religious pluralism and tolerance were seen as “fundamental pre-conditions for the success of the new democratic Bosnia and Herzegovina”.⁹⁸ However, the presidency of Izetbegović is marked by controversy and conflict that followed him to the grave. He did little to shake his image shaped by his past political activism and his controversial *tractatus*, the *Islamska Deklaracija (Islamic Declaration)*.⁹⁹ Assessments of Izetbegović would always be coloured by the *Deklaracija* and it had far-reaching personal and political consequences for him.¹⁰⁰

As President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Izetbegović steered a course favouring the Bošnjak community, and politicised Islam to make it the primary feature of national identity differentiation. Already high tensions with Serbs and Croats were only exacerbated, and the war served to polarise factions and strengthen the hand of hardliners. Muslim freedom fighters from stricter Islamic countries appeared in Bosnia-Herzegovina to train Bošnjaks both in the art of warfare and in more rigid Islamic religious practice.¹⁰¹ On the day of his funeral in October 2003 the

reinvigorated the term Bošnjak as a national term for Slavic Muslims, believing that religion is not an appropriate basis for nationhood. He and Sarajevan professor Muhammed Filipović were the voices of moderation in a party increasingly polarised by nationalist clerics driving a politicised Islamic agenda. As chairman of the SDA, Izetbegović sought to be a moderator between the religio-nationalist and moderate wings. Eventually the ideological cleavage was too great for a single party. Zulfikarpašić and Filipović split from the SDA and hastily cobbled together their own moderate party, the MBO (*Muslimanska Bošnjačka Organizacija*) shortly before the election. The MBO saw little public exposure and failed to create meaningful symbols to capture the imagination of an electorate galvanised by nationalism. At the polls the MBO garnered only two seats in parliament.

⁹⁸ Perica 2002: 87.

⁹⁹ Written in the socialist period of openness to the Muslim Community in 1970, the *Deklaracija* called for an Islamic renaissance focused on “a two-fold revolution – moral and social, but where religious renewal has clear priority” (Izetbegović 1990: 51). The *Deklaracija* did not see wide distribution at the time and was published first in 1990, after the collapse of communism.

¹⁰⁰ His larger and more moderate work, *Islam Between East and West* (1993), in which he presents Islam as the ideological fulcrum between East and West and the Religious and Materialist worldviews, received little attention and achieved virtually no popular appeal.

¹⁰¹ The 7th Bosnian Muslim Brigade, headquartered in Zenica and loyal to Izetbegović, consisted of both foreign and local Muslim fighters and attained a similar level of notoriety for ruthlessness and reverse-ethnic cleansing as Arkan’s paramilitary Tigers.

International Court revealed that Izetbegović had been under investigation for war crimes.

The Izetbegović government also saw transition in Muslim clerical leadership during the war. In 1993 the moderate *Reis-ul-ulema*, Selimoski, was removed from office and replaced by the more outspoken Mustafa Cerić, who displays in the reception room of the *Reis* headquarters a portrait of Izetbegović during his period of arrest. Cerić intones a less strident and more co-operative tenor now in the post-war period. He is quick to defend Bošnjaks as Western leaning, indigenous Europeans.¹⁰² At the same time he utilises an Islamic worldview to portray the relationship of Bošnjaks to the European international community. In 2000 he described the relationship thus:

Let me say, also, as an European that I believe that Europe is not *dâr al-Islâm*, (the House of Islam), but is not *dâr al-harb* (the House of War) either. I believe that Europe is *dâr al-sulh* (the House of Contract). It is not *dâr al-Islâm* because Muslim Law cannot be fully implemented. And it is not *dâr al-harb* because some aspects of the Muslim Law can be implemented. Therefore, the land of Europe is *dâr al-sulh* because it is possible to live in accordance to Islam in the context of the Social Contract.¹⁰³

Cerić contrasts the concepts of *sulh* (peace, [re]conciliation, settlement) and *harb* (war, warfare, fight, etc.) and suggests that Islam embodies the idea of “peace with God, with His messenger, and with the rule of law”.¹⁰⁴ Accepting the theory of Contract as Islamic doctrine and substantiated from history, he then admits the challenge of applying the concept of *dâr al-sulh* in the European context:

Our difficulty lies, nevertheless, in the lack of a genuine concept of *dâr al-sulh* that could be applied in the context of an European environment that would guarantee the decent status of Islam as a way of life and of Muslims as citizens of Europe.¹⁰⁵

Distance and misunderstanding originate with both Muslims and Europeans, or the West in general, he insists, but have different manifestations. Europeans have more knowledge of Muslims, but less willingness to accept them, while Muslims have a willingness to accept Europe without understanding the political, social and cultural environment of Europe that would effect them and change their status in European society.¹⁰⁶ Viewing Europe as the House of Contract opens the way for sincere

¹⁰² See the interview with Cerić in Appendix B.

¹⁰³ Cerić 2001: 183.

¹⁰⁴ Cerić 2001: 184.

¹⁰⁵ Cerić 2001: 184.

¹⁰⁶ Cerić, 2001: 183, 4.

dialogue (*hiwâr*), both with Christians and with Europe (or Western) society.¹⁰⁷ Finally, Cerić likens the common space shared by humanity to Noah's Ark and asks more than forty questions, some of which provocatively reference direct (in)action of the European community to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some of the questions find resonance with the thesis and are repeated in the interview with Cerić, and bear out both the nature of the conflict and the need for resolution and social restoration:

Can the argument of the Might of big nations be replaced by the Right of small nations? Can the argument of historical Myth be replaced by the argument of historical responsibility?

(...)

Can the argument of sinful behaviour be replaced by the argument of Adam's humble repentance? Can the argument of falsehood be replaced by the argument of Abraham's truth? Can the argument of revenge be replaced by the argument of Jesus' love?... Can the argument of injustice be replaced by the argument of Muhammed's justice?

(...)

Do we not agree that the crime in the name of religion is the crime against the same religion?... Do we not know that politics is too important to be left to the politicians alone, and do we not want to know that faith in God is too significant for all of us to be left to the theologians alone?

(...)

Is it not time that we all share the responsibility for our common future with sincere faith in God and with honest commitment to good deeds?¹⁰⁸

3.8. Conclusion to the Bošnjak National Identity Section

The Bošnjak community today seeks to find a means of living among Serbs and Croats without becoming assimilated by them or isolated from them. To maintain this position as their own nation, religion will continue to be the key determinant of identity, even as it has served this purpose for them in the past. It is an inescapable factor without which they could no longer exist as a nation. Their success at survival is dependent upon shaping the Social Contract referred to by Cerić in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Western Europe.

4. Religion and the Croatian National Narratives

Croatian national narratives since the middle of the nineteenth century follow two competing trajectories. The first supports the ethos of a shared history and political unity of the Balkan South Slavs. The second supports a Croatian identity discrete from both Slav and non-Slav peoples, and distinct especially from the Serbs. Each of these national ideologies relies upon religious intellectuals and religious figures in support of their positions.

¹⁰⁷ Cerić, 2001: 183.

¹⁰⁸ Cerić 2001: 185, 6.

4.1. Language as a Basis of National Identity

The first national narrative, known as the 'Illyrian' movement, gained currency as a cultural expression in the 1830s and 1840s from the Croatian poet Ljudevit Gaj. Educated as a law student in Habsburg and Hungarian centres of Graz and Budapest, Gaj proposed diacritical markings to the Latin alphabet to correspond with the phonetic requirements of the Slavic languages, and attempted to bring together the peoples of the Štokavian, Čakavian and Kajkavian dialects of the southern Slavs. He asserted that the Croats, Serbs and Slovenes were descendants of the ancient Illyrians, and claimed a linguistic and historical bond that transcended other ethnic distinctions. He also proposed that those peoples who could identify with these linguistic markers had a right to national sovereignty and statehood, thereby placing lingo-statist distance between the South Slavs, and the Austrians and Hungarians who dominated the political scene.¹⁰⁹

Illyrianism evolved into a predominantly political and national movement after 1841 under the guidance of two Catholic clergymen, Bishop Josip Strossmayer (1815-1905) and Franjo Rački (1828-1894). Strossmayer rejected the term 'Illyrian' as foreign and proposed instead the term 'Yugoslav', meaning 'south Slav'.

Strossmayer founded the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb with the aim of bringing Serbs and Croats to a new national intellectual consciousness by mirroring the well-established intellectual bodies of Austria, Hungary and Italy.¹¹⁰

Rački saw Yugoslavism as a supra-national ideology that transcended all ethnic, religious and political differences of the South Slavs, and sought to build upon their shared origins and cultural ties. Rački attempted to address in both romanticised and pragmatic ways the differences the South Slav peoples faced living as peoples under the dominion of stronger powers - the Austrians and Hungarians for the Croats, and the Ottomans for the Serbs.

However, both the Catholic and Orthodox clergy rejected the initiatives of Strossmayer and Rački. Croat nationalists of the time were more interested in carving out their own identity apart from Vienna and Budapest than in building bonds with Serbs. Catholic clerics regarded Strossmayer as too progressive for their

¹⁰⁹ Bellamy 2003: 44.

¹¹⁰ Bellamy 2003: 44.

company,¹¹¹ and the Orthodox clergy saw Strossmayer as an articulate but partisan spokesperson for the Vatican. Serb ambitions sought to wrest control of their future from Ottoman hands, which from the early nineteenth century appeared achievable. The Serbs also conceived of a different state, laying stress on a 'Greater Serbia', not a confederation of South Slav peoples envisioned by Strossmayer. Further, Strossmayer would not rule out the future possibility and right to statehood for Croatia. Ultimately no Yugoslav state was born in Strossmayer's lifetime, but his movement was able to catalyse a common vision across Croatian regions then under Habsburg hegemony¹¹² of a 'Greater Croatia'. Only after the cataclysmic changes of the First World War would Strossmayer's vision become the premier narrative for the Slavs of Southeastern Europe.

4.2. The Historical Statehood Narrative

The second narrative of Croatian nationhood envisions a state separate from neighbouring non-Slavic nations that once controlled Croatian regions, and from the Serbian nation. This view gained prominence in reaction to the Vidovdan Constitution (1929), seen by Croats to favour Serbs, and the creation of Serbian hegemony in the first Yugoslavia. The ideological and cultural rift was a source of deep internal division during the Second World War in which ultra-nationalist Croats were able to create an independent and fascist Croatian state. More recently it is the prevailing nationalist sentiment arising out of a weakened socialism after the death of Tito (1980) and the collapse of the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia in 1991.

The inspiration and visionary for the new nationalism was Franjo Tudjman. He achieved fame fighting for the Partisans during the World War II, and was a central figure in the Croatian Spring nationalist movement of 1970-71 that Tito quelled only by threat of force. In 1990 Tudjman founded the HDZ (Croatian Democratic Community), a nationalist-oriented political party, and became the president of

¹¹¹ Strossmayer conducted the liturgy in the vernacular rather than Latin, installed no iron partition between the clergy and the laity in the cathedral he built, and celebrated the mass facing the people. Strossmayer also addressed the cleavage between the Eastern and Western Churches that separated Serbs and Croats. The hallmark of these efforts is the cathedral he designed in Djakovo. The exterior of the cathedral is marked by Western neo-Gothic and Eastern Byzantine architectural elements, while the interior is decorated with frescoes depicting scenes from both Eastern and Western Church history. The unique edifice is a celebrated testimonial to Strossmayer and his life-long ambition to create a common identity of South Slavs.

¹¹² At the time these areas were Zagreb, Slavonia, Istria, Dalmatia, and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Croatia in the first elections following the collapse of Yugoslavia. Tudjman effectively achieved a personality of cult status in Croatia fed by an uncritical press. His megalomania in Croatia paralleled that of early Milošević in Serbia, and he assessed his own achievements by stating “History shall place me abreast of Franco as a savior of Western civilization.”¹¹³

This national narrative under Tudjman is Croatia-centred, and claims an uninterrupted existence of a Croatian state for more than a millennium, a myth which is now enshrined in the current Croatian constitution since 1991.¹¹⁴ The narratives complained of great suffering of the Croatian people under ‘Serboslavia’, and “servitude under both monarchist and socialist Yugoslavia”.¹¹⁵ The homogenisation of popular opinion was critical to the consolidation of power, and is typified by the following statement by a Tudjman sympathiser:

The Croatian individual must be liberated from communist totalitarianism, the fallacy of Yugoslavism, the practice of Serbian pillage, and venality and corruption inherited from an Ottoman way of thinking in the sense of ‘don’t worry, we’ll do it tomorrow,’ as well as our new slavery to Western European currency.¹¹⁶

Tudjman had clear plans to annex the portions of Bosnia-Herzegovina that were predominantly or partially settled by Croats. He asserted in 1995 that Bosnia-Herzegovina was a “creation of Ottoman invasion of Europe” and that “Croatia accepts the task of Europeanizing Bosnian Muslims” whom he considered of Croatian ethnicity.¹¹⁷ Past military and religious symbols were re-employed for the

¹¹³ Velikonja 2003: 251.

¹¹⁴ Specifically, the Constitution claims “the millennial national identity of the Croatian nation and the continuity of its statehood, confirmed by the course of its entire historical experience in various statal forms and by the perpetuation and growth of the idea of one’s own state, based on the Croatian nation’s historical right to full sovereignty” (Bellamy 2003: 32).

¹¹⁵ Velikonja 2003: 250.

¹¹⁶ Nikica Mihalhević, cited in Velikonja 2003: 250.

¹¹⁷ Already in July 1993 a break-away Croatian ethnic faction proclaimed the formation of a separatist Croatian state of Herzeg-Bosna within the borders of Herzegovina, electing their own president, Mate Boban. At the same time the military offensive of the Croatian Defense Council (Hrvatsko vijeće obrane - HVO) mounted against the Bošnjaks of Mostar and the surrounding area was meant to drive out the Bošnjaks, secure the borders of the newly created state, and anticipate the influx of ethnic Croats from Central Bosnia who had been forced out by Serbian offences. Military campaigns attacked non-combatants of non-Croat ethnicity and carried out an iconoclastic campaign to destroy religious and cultural symbols of non-Croats, including the four hundred year old Stari Most (Old Bridge) in Mostar, iconic symbol of ethnic tolerance and co-existence (Velikonja 2003: 250ff.).

campaign for Croatian national sovereignty in Bosnia-Herzegovina, awaking the dormant past by invoking the memories of previous conflicts.

4.3. The Church's Role Through the Communist Period

While Tujman was the central figure of Croatian nationalism, he would not have been successful without the support, activity and moral advocacy of the Catholic clergy. The Church's nationalist-oriented activities before Tujman's presidential bid are well established, and run a parallel course with other political activists. The new openness afforded religious bodies by the socialist Yugoslav state in the 1960s gradually reawakened national consciences that reached its apex in the socialist period with the Croatian Spring from 1967-1972. When Tito put a halt to the political side of the movement and turned the 'Croatian Spring' into the 'Croatian Silence', the Church effectively bore the weight of the nationalist movement. The Church officially and shrewdly distanced itself from the political movement while simultaneously drawing a link between Catholicism and Croatian identity.¹¹⁸

The Church took its effort to the people through a Catholic lay movement that sparked growth in religious life. Spiritual panels, catechism for adults and worship services attracted students and intellectuals. Sunday sermons engaged people with the social issues that touched them.

The Catholic Church also utilised representative and symbolic imagery to establish the links between Catholicism and nationalism. From 1937-1941 the Croatian Catholic episcopate commemorated the Grand Jubilee of 1300 years of the evangelisation of the Croats (641), a certain sign of resistance to Serbian domination in the first Yugoslav state. The jubilee was inaugurated by a "Croatian pilgrimage" to Jerusalem by Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, who would become identified with Croat nationalism during the Second World War and early socialist period of persecution.¹¹⁹ Stepinac (1898-1960) is the typological antithesis of Strossmayer and

¹¹⁸ Perica 2002: 56-8.

¹¹⁹ The complicated history of Second World War, and the collusion between religious clerics from the Orthodox, Muslim and Catholic communities lies beyond the scope of this work. The level of the unresolved dispute is evident in the wide variance in the separate charges in which Serbs contend that 300,000 to 700,000 Serbs were slaughtered at Jasenovac and by the Ustaše regime, with one source citing the absurd figure of more than one million (See Ramet 2002: 53). Croat revisionism maintains a figure around 28,000 to 40,000, and virtually reverses these figures for atrocities committed by Serbs at Bleiburg. For further information, see the following sources: Mojzes 1995: 47; Judah 2000: 126; Sells 1996b: 61; Perica 2002: 150, 151.

the controversial icon of Croatian national identity. Serbs and socialists identify him with the fascist Ustaša regime and link him to some of the worst atrocities of the NDH during this particularly dark period of Yugoslav history.¹²⁰ But Stepinac refused to comply with the regime's demands to break ties with the Vatican and form a Croatian Catholic Church, which would have given Belgrade more leverage and control. Consequently, the socialist regime arrested and tried Stepinac in 1946,¹²¹ and sentenced him to sixteen years of hard labour.¹²²

The inability of the socialists to co-opt Stepinac ultimately served to increase ties between nationalists and the Catholic Church, as Perica indicates:

...[T]he myth of Stepinac's martyrdom was created in the West during the anticommunist momentum of the 1950s. Pope Pius XII contributed to this myth by making Stepinac a cardinal in 1953, after which Belgrade broke off diplomatic ties with the Vatican.¹²³

Diplomatic ties with the Vatican were restored during the 1960s when Church-State relationships improved under the less acerbic period of rapprochement, provided that the religious communities exercised their duties without "support of nationalism and chauvinism, and was not overtly antisocialist".¹²⁴ In 1970 and during the time of the 'Croatian Spring' Cardinal Kuharić of Zagreb inaugurated the public commemoration of Archbishop Alojzije Cardinal Stepinac, which in the next decade witnessed a wide following, and was recognised as an unofficial Croatian holiday, or Cardinal Stepinac Day.¹²⁵

¹²⁰ These accusations include the killing of 217 priests and 3 bishops, and another 334 priests expelled from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia. The regime destroyed between 350-400 Orthodox churches, and forcibly baptised into Catholicism thousands of Orthodox Serbs. However, Croats accuse the socialists of manipulating the Catholic Church and using Stepinac as the scapegoat for NDH crimes. Many of the Catholic clergy were indeed strong supporters of the Ustaša regime who saw the NDH as a legitimate Croatian nation-state. The archbishop of Sarajevo, Ivan Šarić, was an outspoken proponent of the fusion of Roman Catholicism and the ideology of the NDH, and the bishop of Banja Luka, Josip Garić, was a member of the Ustaša organisation. See Perica 2002: 24, 5; Ramet 2002: 83.

¹²¹ The prosecution acting on behalf of the socialist state in the show trial ignored evidence that Stepinac had actually condemned some of the worst atrocities of the NDH during the war, spoken out against racism, and worked for the release of Orthodox believers from prison (Ramet 2002: 83, 84).

¹²² Stepinac actually served five years in prison and was not forced to do hard labour. His cell was double-sized and customised to accommodate a small chapel for him (Ramet 2002: 88, 89).

¹²³ Perica 2002: 27.

¹²⁴ Perica 2002: 36.

¹²⁵ Perica 2002: 59. In a highly publicised and controversial move, Pope John Paul II beatified Stepinac on October 3, 1998, at the National Marian Center in Marija Bistrica.

The Church also reinvigorated the cult of Virgin Mary as the major religious and *national* symbol of Catholic Croatia.¹²⁶ When Franciscan Karlo Balić proposed that the Marian shrine be recognised as the ‘national’ shrine of Croatia, he invoked an idea already proposed by Stepinac in 1939 in consultation with the newly established Independent State of Croatia under the Pavelić government.¹²⁷ The support for the initiative from the Bishops’ Conference in Yugoslavia was organised under the theme of ‘The Virgin Mary, Queen of the Croats’.¹²⁸ At the commemoration services coordinated with the day of Assumption of Mary on August 15, 1971, Archbishop Kuharić remarked that “the Marian congress reasserted Croatian Catholic identity and unity”. These commemorations were impetus to other celebrations on this day in the Croatian cities of Rijeka, Nin and Sinj, the last of which was convened under the *parole* of “Let Our People Not Lose Their Identity”.

The following year (1972) Catholic theologian Tomislav Janko Šagi-Bunić wrote a series of articles in *Glas koncila* addressing the role of the Catholic Church in the formation of the nation of Croatia, stating the following:

The Church and the Croatian nation are inseparable, and nothing can sever that connection. Catholicism cannot be deleted from the people’s collective memory or the Croatian national identity, either by theoretical persuasion and propaganda or by a revolutionary act. The Catholic Church in our country has done nothing bad or harmful in recent years, no moves or gestures that could have possibly hampered the development of the Croatian people or that have been at the expense of any other nationality in Yugoslavia.¹²⁹

In the same year the Croatian Spring escalated into violence, requiring the direct intervention of Tito, who rounded up and imprisoned leading Croatian nationalists,

The Pope came to Croatia with a message of reconciliation, but the central place he gave to Stepinac provoked only more antipathy. According to Cardinal Bozanić, Kuharić’s successor and a recognised moderate in favour of multi-nationalism, Stepinac’s beatification was an “acknowledgment of the Croat nation” (Velikonja 2003: 276).

¹²⁶ The “Mariological and Marian Congress” was inaugurated in Zagreb and highlighted the nearby shrine of Mary in Marija Bistrica. The opening homily of Kuharić entitled “The Tribulations of Croatia and the Virgin Mary” struck a chord for Croatian nationalism by stating that “small, oppressed nations worship the cult of Mary with an extraordinary piety” (Perica 2002: 59, 60).

¹²⁷ Perica 2002: 60.

¹²⁸ Croatia chose the Black Madonna similar to the one in Częstochowa, Poland, which is believed to have exercised special powers to fend off attack by Muslims in Constantinople, and later to have saved the Polish people from attack by Tartars and Russians. The Croatian Black Madonna was named ‘Queen of the Croats’ and the ‘*advocata fidelissima Croatiae*’ and was believed to have saved Croatia from Turkish raids (Perica 2002: 60ff.).

¹²⁹ Cited in Perica 2002: 62.

and further outbreaks of violence were avoided only with the threat of military intervention. In this volatile political situation the Catholic Church took up the Croatian nationalist cause. The 'Great Novena', a nine year jubilee conceived for both liturgical and pastoral renewal under the direction of Archbishop Franić of Split, now also included a course in national and Church history.¹³⁰ The Catholic clergy consistently reinterpreted historical figures, events and places from the past as symbols for their cause and asserted an unbroken Croatian and Catholic heritage of 1300 years. In 1978 the Church celebrated the nine hundredth anniversary of the founding of the basilica of King Zvonimir in Biskupija.¹³¹ In anticipation of the celebration, Šagi-Bunić wrote about the historic consequences of Zvonimir's choice of Roman Catholicism and rejection of Byzantium, moulding Croatia as a distinctively Western nation.¹³² These statements and the ceremonies, attended by over 30,000 pilgrims, were particularly provocative in what was now the Serbian Orthodox stronghold in Croatia. In a symbolic statement, the interior of the basilica was draped in the national flag of Croatia without the red star of the socialist state.¹³³

The Catholic Church's commemoration of Prince Branimir the following year was also contentious. Šagi-Bunić heralded Branimir (reigned 879-887) as the ruler who brought the Croatian Church and the Croatian people back into the West.¹³⁴ This inflamed the civic and religious pride of the Orthodox because Branimir executed his rival, Duke Sedeslav (reigned 878-879), who favoured Byzantium and the Orthodox Church. Sedeslav is thus recognised by the Serbs as a martyr at the hands of the murderous Branimir.¹³⁵

The regime in Belgrade took careful notice of the growing power of the Catholic Church as the main event of the Great Novena concluded with the National Eucharistic Congress in 1984. The estimated crowd of over 400,000 pilgrims witnessed the events broadcast in both Zagreb and at the shrine of Mary in Marija Bistrica. A broadcast through Radio Vatican brought a special message from the

¹³⁰ Perica 2002: 64.

¹³¹ During Zvonimir's reign (1075-1089) Pope Gregory VII (1073-85) became the protector and patron of Croatia, and the king swore allegiance and obedience to the Pope, moved the seat of the bishopric to Knin and built the basilica dedicated to Mary (Velikonja 2002: 43).

¹³² Perica 2002: 65.

¹³³ Perica 2002: 65.

¹³⁴ Perica 2002: 65.

¹³⁵ Perica 2002: 67.

Pope to the audience. The Church used the occasion to release “a new history of the Croatian Church and people from 641 to 1984”¹³⁶ written by the Catholic historian, Josip Turčinović. This historiography portrays Croatian achievements positively, and those of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Bošnjaks negatively.¹³⁷ At the commemoration Archbishop Franić drew a direct parallel between Poland - then under military law in response to the strong Catholic-led movement, *Solidarność* - and Croatia. He noted that Catholic Slavic peoples stood in the first line of defence of the Catholic West against the Orthodox East, and then stated, “God rendered to us Catholic Croats this land in which we have lived for a thousand and three hundred years, and we will not let anyone else rule over us in our own land.”¹³⁸ The parallel with Poland, and the excitement that the Novena’s finale generated, was not lost on the state press. The *Komunist* recorded the following about the events of nearly a decade:

[The Great Novena was] carefully designed to make a synthesis of the nationalist and religious agendas through the manipulation of symbols, themes, and dates from Church and national history, in order to penetrate popular consciousness with both of two themes, religion and ethnic nationalism, fused and merged into a single whole.... The Great Novena simply means the clerical exploitation of ethnicity, folklore, history, and Croatian cultural heritage, coupled with the transformation of national history and myth. The Church’s objective is to reinvigorate the reactionary consciousness, which, in this multinational country, may produce destructive outcomes.¹³⁹

4.4. The Church’s Role in the Post-Communist Period

The new freedom after the collapse of socialism in the early 1990s presented the religious bodies with even greater opportunity and power. Although Kuharić in 1990 denounced any form of ‘caesaro-papism’ and consciously placed distance between the Church and the state,¹⁴⁰ Catholic bishops, lower level clergy and laity regularly drew links between national and religious identity.¹⁴¹ One Catholic

¹³⁶ Perica 2002: 68.

¹³⁷ There is no account of the atrocities during the Second World War at the hands of the Ustaše, and Stepinac is presented as a saint and martyr, while the Great Migration (1691) of Serbs to the Krajina is portrayed as an invasion of Croatian territory. In actual fact, the Great Migration resulted from a failed Serb uprising against Turkish rule, sending the Serbs into exile. They migrated to the Krajina at the invitation of the Habsburgs, and effectively created a new military frontier (*vojna krajina*) and buffer zone for the Habsburg Empire as the first line of defence against Turkish forces (Perica 2002: 69).

¹³⁸ Perica 2002: 69, 70.

¹³⁹ Cited in Perica 2002: 67, 68.

¹⁴⁰ Velikonja 2003: 269.

¹⁴¹ Mojzes 1995: 131.

publication, *Veritas*, published in 1992 the following paragraph indicating an intentional connexion between the Catholic Church and the state:

The cross of Christ stands next to the Croatian flag, [and the] Croatian bishop next to the Croatian minister of state. Croatian priests and teachers are together again in the schools.... The Church is glad for the return of its people 'from the twofold' slavery: Serbian and Communist.¹⁴²

Once the task of bringing the HDZ into power was accomplished in Croatia, the Catholic bishops turned their attention to Bosnia-Herzegovina where a party by the same name and ideology vied for votes among the Croat minority. Although law in Bosnia-Herzegovina explicitly forbade the formation of political parties along national or confessional lines, each of the nations did precisely this. The Catholic Church suggested this stipulation be abolished, and the bishops were the first to initiate the process of forming a national party, and the other ethno-religious groups followed suit.¹⁴³ Petar Anđelović, the superior of the Franciscan province of Bosna Srebrena and located in Sarajevo, notes that the Catholic Church initially supported the HDZ. Once its chauvinist tendencies and militarism became apparent, the Church removed its support. Indeed, several high ranking official Church leaders spoke out against strong association with the HDZ, condemned crimes committed in the name of religious nationalism and supported a multi-cultural, multi-religious state in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Anđelović is joined by Cardinal Puljić,¹⁴⁴ Bishop Franjo Komarica, who ultimately spent eight months under house arrest in Banja Luka, and Friars Ivo Marković and Marko Oršolić, in standing against Catholic nationalists. Regrettably they were the exception. Other lower level clergy were fully engaged in the violence, and added their moral support to the nationalist cause. This was particularly the case in Herzegovina where Croat separatists represented a majority, and were intent on carving out their own self-declared independent territory of Herzeg-Bosna, free of Serbs and Bošnjaks. Some hardline Catholic clergy and Franciscans alike were intent on making the 'Shrine of the Queen of Peace' at Međugorje and the veneration of Mary the defining symbol of the region and of the nationalist ideology. The area has a long and rich religious tradition, and

¹⁴² Cited in Velikonja 2003: 270.

¹⁴³ Mojzes 1995: 132.

¹⁴⁴ Puljić changed his multi-national stance in the latter half of the 1990s largely as a result of the failure of the international community to secure the rights of Bosnia's Catholic Croats (Perica 2002: caption facing page 89). By the time this research was conducted, Puljić represented a separatist position. His official representative for inter-religious affairs, Mato Zovkić, who was interviewed for this research, maintains a moderate position.

historically attracted pre-Christian residents, Turks, Serbs and Bošnjaks, as well as pious Catholics. The apparitions of the Virgin Mary in 1981 saw a growth of pilgrims to the area to around 70,000, a number that by 1991 would swell to more than 18 million per year.¹⁴⁵ Now Međugorje was to become the definitive symbol of Catholic Croat nationalism.¹⁴⁶

4.5. Conclusion to the Croatian National Identity Section

It is clear from the foregoing that the Catholic Church played a central role in shaping the Croatian nation, especially as an expression of opposition to stronger regimes and ideological forces. Tujman stated that the Croatian (!) Catholic Church was the only institution to consistently resist the communist authorities, and that by doing so, “the Church was responsible for nurturing Croatian national identity during the dark period of communist rule”.¹⁴⁷ Some Western sources overlook the role of the Catholic Church while others misinterpret sociological phenomena because of a lack of awareness of the religious dynamics. Thus, for instance, in comparing the Croatian and Serbian nationalist movements, Silber and Little state the following:

Years after Serb nationalism had taken hold in Belgrade and propelled Milošević to power, the behaviour of Croat nationalists was still muted, manifesting how effective the suppression of Croatian nationalism had been. The vast Serb processions and mass rallies, teeming with Serbian imagery and symbolism of domination, were often to be seen, but, as late as 1990, the Croatian counterpart was cowed and furtive.¹⁴⁸

This statement recognises the suppression that Croatian nationalists underwent from the regime following the ‘Croatian Spring’ uprisings, but it fails to grasp how the nationalist movement tactically shifted its energies under the aegis of the Catholic Church. It also misses the socio-political importance of de-secularisation and increase in church attendance of the 1980s in Yugoslavia as a whole and in Croatia particularly. The increase cannot legitimately be construed in terms of spiritual awakening, and had manifestly political implications, as Perica makes clear:

...[T]his mobilization was in its essence nationalistic and religious only in form. The spiritual impact was definitely weaker than the political. Fighting modernization, secularization, communism, the Yugoslav multinational state, and the rival faiths, the Church worshiped itself and

¹⁴⁵ Velikonja 2003: 211.

¹⁴⁶ Velikonja 2003: 272.

¹⁴⁷ Cited in Bellamy 2003: 156.

¹⁴⁸ Silber and Little 1995: 83.

consecrated new ethnic and ecclesiastical histories as part of the making of the new Croatian nation.¹⁴⁹

Historians Eric Hobsbawm and Peter Sugar recognise the central role of religion in nation building in Yugoslavia and suggest that unpopular native fascist regimes, such as that in Croatia, would not have been able to establish and legitimise their government without the decisive role of the local Catholic churches.¹⁵⁰

The natural antipathies inherent in the nationalist cause are certain to sustain tensions with other national communities in the complicated ethnic composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ideological position of many clerics in the Catholic Church is patently anti-catholic and a denial of the Church's true self. Whether and how members within that Church can transcend the current situation to promote social restoration and peace-building is the topic of succeeding chapters.

5. Conclusion

During periods of fluid power structures, 'cumulative tradition'¹⁵¹ provided the crucial interpretative framework for ethnic conflict in the Balkans. Religion is both a defining and driving force in tradition and plays an intrinsic role in shaping ethnic identity and nationhood in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is most evident in the Serbian national narrative, and recognised by Ramet, who writes, "The Serbian Church views itself as identical with the Serbian Nation, since it considers that religion is the foundation of nationality."¹⁵² The Serbs are not alone in using religion in this capacity, however. The Bošnjak nation also has shaped an identity based pre-eminently on religion. Both in its ethno-genesis related to the Bosnian Church, and in more recent history in which the Bosnian Muslims received national recognition under Tito's Yugoslavia, religion has served as the central feature of national identification. Croatian clergymen and the Catholic Church have been instrumental in defining both the 'Yugoslav' narrative and the 'Croatian' national narrative in different eras of nation-state development. Two figures respectively, Strossmayer and Stepinac, are today iconically linked to the movements that they influenced. Moreover, the Catholic Church served as a platform and voice for Croatian national

¹⁴⁹ Perica 2002: 73.

¹⁵⁰ Perica 2002: 24.

¹⁵¹ W. C. Smith defines 'cumulative tradition' as "the entire mass of overt objective data that constitute the historical deposit... of the past religious life of the community in question" (1964: 141).

¹⁵² Ramet 2002: 114.

development at a time when the socialist regime effectively silenced political factions promoting the Croatian cause. In each case, religion and religious figures contributed to the formation of mythic national identities that shaped discrete narratives in Yugoslavia. Moreover, because religion served as the pre-eminent tool of ethnic differentiation, the clergy were well positioned to manipulate the religious element to nationalistic advantage, and their conscious involvement abetted the conflict that eventually led to war. Nationalism, strengthened by religio-mythical accretions, shaped distinct historical narratives, and created authoritative worldviews that motivated whole communities. To varying degrees, each of the religious communities shaped a narrative that defended their cause and legitimised their actions. Because the religious dimension is intrinsic to the identities of the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is an important element contributing to the ideological conflict that remains in the land. If interventionist efforts are to meaningfully address the ideological dimension of the conflict, they must engage with the religious dimension that is central to the national narratives. The nature of the interventionist efforts from the international community is the focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

THE LIMITATIONS OF WESTERN INTERVENTION TOWARDS PEACE-BUILDING AND SOCIAL RESTORATION

1. Introduction

This chapter examines the international community's efforts to bring stability and recovery to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Specifically, it directs its inquiry to the research question, "What are the successes and failures of post-war initiatives by the international community to restore civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina?" It first traces the events that brought international involvement to the Balkans, and then examines specific initiatives of the peace effort for their effectiveness on the ground. To this end focus is placed on the *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (GFAP) because it is the primary means of establishing long-term stability in the country.

Several arguments will be tested during the course of the chapter. It first will be argued that an external force alone cannot resolve the difficulties intrinsic to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that instead of fostering peace, some efforts of the international community effectively do the opposite. It then will be argued that social harmony has not been restored through mechanistic political and economic overtures alone, and that these structural efforts need to be complemented with informal social and cultural initiatives.

Further, although the international community recognises the need for a values-based recovery effort that includes social and psychological elements, their ability to effectively address this area is limited. Lastly, it will be argued that the values-based

social realm of peace-building falls within sphere of religion and the religious communities, and suggests that they can make significant contributions to peace-building and social restoration.

2. Contextual Background to International Intervention

Western intervention came reluctantly and belatedly to Bosnia-Herzegovina and only after the media spotlight forced the hand of policy makers to end the conflagration. Initial efforts employing UN peacekeepers to halt the conflict proved a debacle of grand proportions and an international embarrassment. Warring factions on the ground casually ignored more than a score of cease-fire agreements signed outside the theatre of conflict. Only the deployment of NATO forces created sufficient diplomatic leverage to initiate lasting peace negotiations with all three parties at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio.

The presence of the international community invited derision during the war, and remained contentious in the post-war period on both sides of the Inter Entity Boundary Line (IEBL).¹ Promised aid for rebuilding was contingent upon compliance with Western demands as outlined in the Dayton Accord. Non-compliance by leadership in the Republika Srpska meant that ninety-eight percent of aid from the international community went to the Federacija² in the initial post-war recovery period. Consequently the two entities now bear a rich and poor disparity that will not easily be erased.³ The failure of the West's carrot and stick approach to bring reform in the Republika Srpska has served to heighten tensions and to cast the West as the scapegoat for the ills of the Republika Srpska. Residents in the Republika Srpska no longer view the poor standard of living as direct consequences of the Serbian and Croatian military campaigns that destroyed most of the infrastructure, but as the result of the West's refusal to come through with the promised funding for rebuilding.

¹ The Dayton Accord created the Inter Entity Boundary Line effectively separating the warring factions into two near-equal parts. The *Republika Srpska* is home to Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina while the *Federacija* is home to both Croats and Bošnjaks. See the map on page xxi.

² Boyd 1998: 46.

³ The minimum monthly wage in the Federacija is three times higher (KM200=US\$100) than in the Republika Srpska (KM65= US\$32). Neither of these wages represents a sufficient standard of living, however (USDoS 2001: np).

Criticism of the international community has been no less vocal in the Croat-Bošnjak entity, although the Federacija has received vastly the greater preportion of governmental and NGO resources. When initial expectations for a prosperous, rebuilt Bosnia-Herzegovina did not materialise, local actors blamed the international community. Some of their criticism was justly lodged. The High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Paddy Ashdown, is also critical of excessive spending on duplicate structures and administrations.⁴ NGOs employing their own people and imposing their own methods in Bosnia-Herzegovina produced predictably irrelevant outcomes, and the host peoples increasingly received their efforts with cynicism.⁵

The extraordinary and sweeping powers of the High Representative are necessary to contain residual nationalism in the land, but they have fostered dependence⁶ and a correspondent entitlement mentality. Once victims of powerful local warlords, immobilised citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina now feel fated to live by the dictates of the Western powers. However, the authority vested in the High Representative has thus far failed to interdict rampant corruption on either side of the IEHL. Well-connected individuals steering a parallel economic structure through patron-client networks take advantage of the absence of law and inability to prosecute to prosper in the grey economy. Corruption is so pervasive that legitimate civil society cannot be built without significant changes that will necessarily involve the High Representative. However, the entitlement mentality expects the High Representative alone to put an end to the corruption. Recovery from its current malaise requires nothing less than a comprehensive overhaul of Bosnia-Herzegovina society, the provision for which is laid out in the Dayton Accord.

3. The Dayton Accord and its Implementation

The centrepiece for recovery and renewal in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the comprehensive *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, commonly referred to as the Dayton Accord, initialed by the parties of dispute in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December of the same year. From the outset the Dayton Accord was meant to be more than a peace document. Seeking to avoid another Cyprus situation in which a nation remained divided with

⁴ Ashdown 2002: np.

⁵ Belloni 2001: 169.

⁶ Belloni 2001: 178.

UN troops serving as guarantors of the peace, Richard Holbrooke, the chief architect of the Dayton Accord, crafted an agreement that was comprehensive in nature and powers. Dayton thus addresses the military aspects of the conflict and endeavours to rebuild civil society.⁷ Because the Accord is so central to the recovery scheme in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it must also constitute the framework from which any valid assessment can be given. Six of the eleven annexes are analysed, namely, Annex 1: Military Aspects; Annex 2: Inter-Entity Boundary; Annex 4: Constitution; Annex 3: Elections; Annex 7: Refugees and Displaced Persons; and Annex 6: Human Rights.⁸

3.1. Annex 1: Military Aspects

The primary achievement of the Dayton Accord is, in its own words, the “durable cessation of hostilities”.⁹ A week following the signing of the Dayton Accord in Paris, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1035, creating the UN Mission on Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The UN Mission’s mandate was to implement the Dayton Accord on the ground, effectively separating the warring factions. This in turn brought sufficient stability for governmental agencies of war recovery and NGOs to set up operations. The initial phase of implementation under IFOR (Implementation FORce) became a phase of stabilisation under SFOR (Stabilisation FORce) and completed its mandate on 31 December 2002. On 1 January 2003 the European Union Police Mission (EUPM), strongly aided by the International Police Task Force provided for by Annex 11 of the Dayton Accord, assumed the duties of monitoring the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The military aspect remains the singular outstanding achievement of the negotiations in Dayton. Implementation of the civil aspects of the Accord reveals a less promising achievement. Now, nine years after the signing of the Dayton Accord, it is difficult to claim achievement of widespread peace and reconciliation in Bosnia-

⁷ Holbrooke 1999: 133, 233.

⁸ The remaining annexes include Annex 5: Arbitration; Annex 8: Commission to Preserve National Monuments; Annex 9: Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations; Annex 10: Civilian Implementation; Annex 11: International Police Task Force. The Annexes are presented here in a different order for the purpose of logical discussion and analysis.

⁹ GFAP, Article I, 2, a.

Herzegovina. A closer look at the civilian implementation¹⁰ of the Dayton Accord reveals a society deeply divided by ideology and in constant turmoil.

3.2. Annex 2: Inter-Entity Boundary

The Inter Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) is a delicately negotiated demarcation of territory meant to assure some parity between the warring nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbs, who once controlled seventy percent of the territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina, retain forty nine percent after the negotiations. The Croat-Bošnjak contingent share the remaining fifty one percent of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The creation of the internal border separated the warring parties and forced the removal of artillery from forward positions still threatening to the opposing sides.

The IEBL was meant to be a temporary measure but has subsequently ossified into semi-permanent status, allowing the Republika Srpska to develop into a para-state orientated towards Belgrade. The Dayton-created IEBL permitted a homogenous Serb entity virtually free of Bošnjaks and Croats, which was the explicit goal of the Serb forces during the war. What the Serb contingent failed to accomplish on the battlefield they effectively achieved with the peace settlement.

The Bošnjak negotiating team recognised this potential pitfall during the Dayton negotiations.¹¹ The international military coalition would be overseeing a divided land rather than protecting the integrity of a united multi-national Bosnia-Herzegovina. Within weeks of Dayton's implementation, the Republika Srpska had adopted the Yugoslav (Serbian) Dinar as its street currency, and restructured its telephone system using Serbia's dialling codes.

The signatories of the Dayton Accord agreed to a unified state, but with those leaders now out of the positions of power,¹² there is little political muscle to effect the necessary changes. Furthermore, while many in the Federacija consider a multi-cultural, multi-national state necessary for political viability, few in the Republika Srpska agree. The Serbs of the Republika Srpska prefer to retain the partition, and

¹⁰ "Civilian Implementation" is an official term from Annex 10 of the Dayton Accord in which the position of High Representative was created to oversee all of the non-military aspects of the Accord. It is also a general term commonly used with reference to the Dayton Accord's mandate towards rebuilding society.

¹¹ Holbrooke 1999: 131.

¹² Tudjman and Izetbegović have both since died. Milošević remains on trial at the Hague.

foster a ‘one state, two entities’ policy. Thus, the IEBL contributed to the ethnic differentiation and permitted a *de facto* ‘Greater Serbia’ to remain intact, two objectives Dayton intended to dismantle.

3.3. Annex 4: Constitution

The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina created by the Dayton Accord gives deference to many conventions of international law guaranteeing individual human rights. Article II specifically cites the *European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols* and applies this convention and its protocols “directly to Bosnia and Herzegovina”, giving it “priority over all other law”.¹³ This entry contrasts with the general references to other international conventions recognised in the Preamble to the Constitution¹⁴ and specifically sanctions individual citizenship as the foundation for a legal and political framework.

At the same time the Constitution enshrines in subsequent articles the two divided entities and their respective national identities as the operative legal and political framework in the land. The Constitution outlines a framework whereby the Croat, Bošnjak and Serb nations form the bicameral parliament (Article IV), the three-member Presidency (Article V) and the Constitutional Court (Article VI).¹⁵

By legitimising two standards, the Constitution embraces a contradiction. On the one hand the Constitution sets the hallmark of primary identity and rights on individual citizens. On the other, it places the primacy of decision-making with the three national bodies. As a result the Constitution vacillates between two ideological forces, one which seeks to integrate Bosnia-Herzegovina into Western Europe and its standards, and another which facilitates nationalist partisanship. By allowing the Constitution to be part of the peace negotiations, the Dayton Accord retained the essence and structure of the conflict in the republic’s most foundational document, assuring the arena of conflict would continue on an internal, political plane.

The Constitution is a by-product of compromise between parties in conflict seeking to protect their own national self-interests, the result of which is the continuation of

¹³ GFAP, Annex 4, Article II, 11. International Standards.

¹⁴ See below under Annex 6: Human Rights.

¹⁵ The addition of “others” was added later to include citizens of non-Bošnjak, non-Croat and non-Serb origin in the political process.

ethnic hostilities. It is impossible to promote the international, and specifically European, standards of citizenship when the idiosyncratic expressions of nationalist partisanship prevails in the course of affairs. As one scholar notes:

The most pronounced trend in governmental bodies in the 1990s... is the exponential increase in functionaries with loyalty to a particular national political formation. On any given day, many of these officials probably spend more time obstructing the functioning of central institutions than in strengthening them.... The Dayton Constitution has left Bosnia and Hercegovina with a surfeit of governments but no real state.¹⁶

These difficulties are evident in the election results where political parties are established along national lines.

3.4. Annex 3: Elections

Each of the elections since 1996 has demonstrated the strength of ethno-religious partisanship, and no party - nationalist or moderate - enjoys support in both the Federacija and Republika Srpska. The Serbian SDS¹⁷ party sees no real opposition in the Republika Srpska. Partisanship is prevalent in the Federacija as well. The SDA¹⁸ and HDZ,¹⁹ the Bošnjak and Croat nationalist parties respectively, also endeavour to secure the interests of their own ethno-religious group.

The “Alliance for Change”, a coalition made up of members from ten smaller parties and established after the November 2000 general elections, ultimately failed in their goal to mount a challenge to nationalist-based parties. Despite substantial funding assistance from the international community and technical training through the OSCE, optimistic predictions of significant gains towards multi-national politics proved disappointing. Election results in October 2002 reversed any positive gains achieved in the 2000 elections, and no substantive shifts from previous ethno-religious partisanship are noticeable. Politicians focused on their own entity continually invoke Dayton’s “vital interests” clause in order to defeat legislation

¹⁶ Donia 2000: np.

¹⁷ SDS stands for *Srpska Demokratska Stranka* (Serbian Democratic Party).

¹⁸ SDA stands for *Stranka Demokratske Akcije* (Party for Democratic Action).

¹⁹ HDZ stands for *Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica* (Croatian Democratic Union). It is a party with a filial relationship to the party of the same name in Croatia, but remains technically a separate organisation.

aimed at unifying Bosnia-Herzegovina.²⁰ Consequently, the weak central government frequently fails to agree to and pass legislation.

Partisan politics steered by nationalists is not a new development resulting from the war, however. During the socialist era national considerations were frequently at the heart of politics, and nations were played off against other nations. In this way the Bošnjaks of Bosnia-Herzegovina played a key role. The trend continued following the collapse of socialism, as the first multi-party election in 1990 revealed. Further, each of the parties constructed elaborate extra-constitutional patronage systems in order to circumvent ineffective institutions still encumbered by vestigial socialist practices. The SDS patronage network had strong cultural and commercial links beyond Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia, as did the HDZ network to Croatia.²¹ Beginning in 1991 nationalist agendas became increasingly one-sided and confrontational. Governmental bodies were paralysed, and the patronage networks became critical in protecting the national interests of their constituent peoples.

Additionally, after the elections in 1990, an "Inter-Party" Agreement²² between nationalist parties came into force, achieving two significant things. First, it kept the socialists - rebranded as Social Democrats - from governmental positions and power sharing. Second, the Inter-Party Agreement reinforced the arbitration of disputes in such ways as to maintain the balance of power.²³ Eventually the Agreement worked well enough that it became a nationality formula implemented throughout all levels of the government.

Party politics continue today in a similar nationalist framework, although with one significant change. In pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina the nationalist parties worked together to defeat the socialists, but in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina the national parties work to defeat each other. By protecting only their own interests, they have managed to defeat efforts to build a constructive central government or unified state.

²⁰ Originally intended as a measure of checks and balances protecting any single nation from the "destructive" (as the Accord has it) intentions of the other two, the vital interests clause has been used regularly to stymie legislation.

²¹ Donia 2000: np.

²² The Inter-Party Agreement provided the party with the most votes to designate the President of the Presidency. The party with second most votes named the President of the Assembly, and the party with the third most votes chose the President of the Government. The Agreement proportionately divided appointments according to a 5-4-3 formula and was applied at the level of each municipality. It provided term limits for some offices and an order of succession on a rotating basis (Donia 2000: np).

²³ Donia 2000: np.

High Representatives have intervened to remove nationalists from office and support moderate candidates. Over the long term, this approach has demonstrated two negative effects. First, without much experience in a democratic environment, moderates showed similar proclivities of those of ultra-nationalists. Even with the extraordinary favour and tutelage from the international community, moderates failed to bring the kind of reform necessary to change the profile of politics. “Sloga” Party²⁴ representatives under international community favourite Milorad Dodik, had a similar voting record to the (ultra)nationalist Serb SDS party.²⁵ A critical issue for this fledgling party was the return of ethnic minorities to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite increases, minority returns did not correspond with the Sloga party areas of control, and Dodik’s minister responsible for refugee returns was forced to resign for obstructing the return process.²⁶

Second, continual intervention by the international community retarded the ability of locally elected officials to take on the responsibility necessary to resolve their own conflicts. Regularly the High Representatives unilaterally passed laws, removed persons from power or otherwise contravened basic democratic principles in order to interdict developments deemed contrary to the intentions of the Dayton Accord.²⁷

One assessment reports favourable advance in the elimination of single-party patronage networks operating through extra-constitutional channels.²⁸ The character of the patronage groups has indeed changed, owing to regime changes in both Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro. However, the patronage networks metamorphosed and became part of the bloated political system supporting 1200 judges and prosecutors, 760 legislators, 180 ministers, four separate levels of government and three armies for fewer than four million people. The cost of supporting this unwieldy

²⁴ The moderate Sloga (or Unity) Party was formed from representatives of smaller political parties soon after the signing of the Dayton Accord, and was multi-national. The international community gave a great deal of media attention and financial support to the party, which ultimately was viewed as the West’s party, and its leadership as lackeys of the West’s multi-cultural agenda.

²⁵ ESI 2001: 11.

²⁶ ESI 2001: 11.

²⁷ The Dayton Accord forbids persons indicted by the ICTY from standing or holding office. The Accord also allows the High Representative to remove from office nationalist leaders inhibiting the integration process of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1996 the High Representative removed SDS leader, Radovan Karadžić. In 1998, Nikola Poplasić, the elected successor to convicted war crimes offender Biljana Plavšić, was removed from office by the High Representative for promoting nationalist activities.

²⁸ ESI 2001: 5, 6.

government is €920 million, and does not include the governmental services such as health, education and pensions.²⁹ The Dayton Accord contributed to this trend by creating more municipalities in the Republika Srpska. In the April 2000 elections voting was held in 185 municipalities throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, an increase of 70% over the 1990 elections.³⁰

In other instances reform drove the patronage networks underground where they are now part of the growing crisis of corruption in Bosnia-Herzegovina. To assert that the patronage system has largely disappeared or has been significantly weakened³¹ fails to recognise its transformation and integration into the structures created by the international community. A truer picture comes by viewing the people movements through the lens of a different Dayton Accord annex, the Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons.

3.5. Annex 7: The Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons

The Dayton Accord established the free right of return to the homes of origin for all refugees and displaced persons, and for the restoration or compensation for deprivation of property.³² The Accord states that “the early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina”.³³

Successful resettlement is encumbered with enormous technical problems, including inadequate housing, lack of community infrastructure, high unemployment, and lack of appropriate schooling opportunities for children. The most obvious hurdle for returnees is the need to rebuild after whole towns and villages were reduced to rubble in the calculated military campaigns. Refugees returning to vote in the first post-war election in September 1996 found their homes completely uninhabitable and returned

²⁹ Ashdown 2002: np.

³⁰ Donia 2000: np.

³¹ ESI 2001: 18.

³² Specifically, the Accord reads as follows: “All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their home of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them. The early return of refugees and displaced persons is an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Parties confirm that they will accept the return of such persons who have left their territory, including those who have been accorded temporary protection by third countries.” (GFAP, *Annex 7, Art. I: Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons*, 28).

³³ Annex 7, Art.1.

to their temporary residences in host countries rather than resettle in Bosnia-Herzegovina. But while the international community addressed the issues of infrastructure, most refugees refused to return for fear of their safety.³⁴ Rebuilding of homes would take place only when the prerequisites for a community infrastructure were in place, and this was clearly predicated on there being sufficient security to sustain the minority community. In the initial years following the Dayton Accord international donorship for returning refugees and rebuilding homes was high, but the collapsed infrastructure hindered return and resettlement. When the pace of refugee returns later accelerated and demand for financial support for rebuilding was high, donorship funds shifted to Kosovo and other crisis areas that demanded urgent attention of both government and non-government organisations.³⁵ Many refugees return now only to sell or exchange their property, and then move to a location where they are among the majority,³⁶ continuing the segregation process throughout the land. Also, the elderly constitute a disproportionate number of returnees. They return to die and be buried on native soil, too old to rebuild a new life in unfamiliar surroundings.³⁷

Resettlement of refugees and displaced persons as minorities in both entities remains a major obstacle to reintegration in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina. Returns to these areas were particularly slow until 2000, when the then UN High Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, implemented the property law which sought to evict occupants from homes not their own. Additionally, international organisations such as OHR, UNHCR and OSCE combined efforts to put in place the Property Law Implementation Programme (PLIP).³⁸ Returns to minority areas were over 67,000 in 2000 and exceeded 90,000 both in 2001 and 2002.³⁹

The greater difficulty is with Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). At the end of 2001 the UNHCR estimated that there remained a greater number of IDPs than refugees.⁴⁰ Statistics from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Ministry of Refugees and

³⁴ HCHR 2002: np.

³⁵ Kovać 2000: np.

³⁶ HCHR 2002: np.

³⁷ HCHR 2002: np.

³⁸ Kevo 2001: np.

³⁹ UNHCR 2002a: np.

⁴⁰ UNHCR 2002b: 5. The source cites estimates of 426,000 unreturned refugees compared with 438,000 IDPs.

Displaced Persons show that about 650,000 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina are settled in foreign countries as refugees and that about 700,000 remain as displaced persons within the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴¹ The issue of refugees and IDPs remains one of the greatest challenges for social restoration and, according to one human rights source, is “the main destabilizing factor in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.⁴²

3.6. Annex 6: Human Rights

The Dayton Accord guarantees international standards for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons in Bosnia-Herzegovina and lists no fewer than sixteen Human Rights agreements in the appendix to Annex 6. Notable among these is the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the 1949 Geneva Conventions I-IV on the Protection of the Victims of War, and the 1977 Geneva Protocols I-II thereto, the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination, and the 1994 Framework Convention for the protection of National Minorities.⁴³ The Accord makes provision for the investigation, hearing and judgment of abuse claims through the Commission on Human Rights, composed of a Human Rights Ombudsman and a Human Rights Chamber (court). The inclusion of so many human rights accords is meant to stress the importance of the right to protection and security for all peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Despite these provisions and the presence of UN and OSCE inspectors, Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrates alarming and continuing human rights abuses, completely overwhelming the Human Rights Commission. The limited number of persons to deal responsibly with the case load coupled with the lengthy process necessary to

⁴¹ HCHR 2002: np.

⁴² HCHR 2002: np.

⁴³ The other human rights agreements include the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the Protocols thereto; the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1966 Protocol thereto; the 1957 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women; the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness; the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1966 and 1989 Optional Protocols thereto; the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women; the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the 1987 European Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child; the 1990 Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families; the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (GFAP 1995: Annex 6, Article VI, Appendix: Human Rights Agreements).

bring a decision conspire to hinder the Commission's effectiveness. However, this is not the primary source of the problem. The overload is indicative of the magnitude of the tensions in Bosnia-Herzegovina that were carried over from the battlefield to the neighbourhood.

The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a reputable independent monitor of activities in the Balkans, concluded that in 2002, "no progress was made in the area of protection of human rights and freedoms in Bosnia and Herzegovina" and cited several factors that contributed to a "worsening of the overall social climate".⁴⁴ Human rights abuses were documented in almost all areas. The US Department of State reported some progress in human rights in four areas,⁴⁵ but stated that much more needed to be done to come up to the international standard of human rights.⁴⁶

Regular and flagrant attacks on returning minority refugees occurred in both the Republika Srpska and Federacija, although twice as many cases were reported in the Republika Srpska,⁴⁷ especially the eastern portion. Also, more severe instances of abuse occurred in the Republika Srpska. Reported instances of abuse in the Federacija amounted to verbal attack and property damage while physical attacks, shootings, use of explosives and violent demonstrations were common in the Republika Srpska.⁴⁸ Attacks against officials aiding the return of refugees also took place. Public ceremonies commemorating the rebuilding of destroyed religious places of worship became scenes of mob violence. Most notable among these was the attempt to lay the cornerstone of the historic religious and cultural monument, the Ferhadija mosque in the Banja Luka city centre in May 2001. The ensuing violence halted the ceremonies and resulted in one Bošnjak death.⁴⁹ Similarly, in the Croatian stronghold of Herzegovina, Catholic officials opposed the reconstruction of the mosque in Stolac. Even sporting events meant to show increasing national harmony

⁴⁴ HCHR 2002: np.

⁴⁵ These areas were the freedom of movement, instances of police brutality, arbitrary arrest and detention, facilitation of refugee returns.

⁴⁶ USDoS 2002: np.

⁴⁷ USDoS 2002: np.

⁴⁸ USDoS 2002: np.

⁴⁹ HCHR 2002: np.

demonstrated the opposite, becoming venues for continued provocation and violence off the pitch.⁵⁰

The reports also cite regular complicity of officials in the racist discrimination and violence. One report states that the Bosnian government's record in this area remained poor and was a serious problem.⁵¹ The record shows officials involved in various kinds of abuse, including *inter alia*: obstruction of the Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY); harassment of returning minorities and failure of the police to secure their safety; restriction of religious practice; unlawful beating and prolonged detention of suspects during arrest; obstruction of justice by means of a judicial system that is strongly influenced by political parties; non-cooperation with NGOs vested with the task of investigating cases of human rights abuse,⁵² and discrimination in employment and bribe taking to accelerate the return and resettlement of minority refugees.⁵³ Officials involved in corruption and organised crime is a growing problem, especially in the trafficking of women. One report states that “some police and judicial authorities tacitly accept or actively facilitate trafficking....” and that “trafficking is tolerated, if not accepted, at all levels of society and is regarded as a 'victimless crime' or as a phenomenon that only effects foreign nationals”.⁵⁴ In at least one instance police took advantage of the services of prostitutes in exchange for warnings of impending raids.⁵⁵ In an effort to clean up the policing body specifically commissioned to uphold the mandate of the Dayton Accord as provided in Annex 11, sixty-nine police officers were removed from the International Police Task Force (IPTF) in the year 2001 for serious breaches of conduct. Many of them were dismissed for pledging allegiance to the Croat HDZ self-government effort, a clear breach of the Dayton Accord. Others were removed

⁵⁰ Sectarian provocation and violence was evident on all sides. During a match between the Sarajevo *Zeljeznica* football club, supported mostly by Bošnjaks, and the *Borac* (tr. ‘fighter’ or ‘soldier’) club in Banja Luka, a huge banner hung over the stadium with the words, “Knife, Wire, Srebrenica.” Fighting broke out between Croats and Bošnjaks at a football match in Orašje with some players taking part. In a separate incident, Croat fans displayed swastikas and a poster of World War II Croatian pro-Nazi fascist leader Ante Pavelic, provoking stone and lighted torch throwing during a game between the Mostar first division, Croat-supported team *Zrinjski* and the Bošnjak-supported *Velez* team (HCHR 2002: np).

⁵¹ USDoS 2002: np.

⁵² USDoS 2002: np.

⁵³ HCHR 2002: np.

⁵⁴ USDoS 2002: np.

⁵⁵ USDoS 2002: np.

for direct involvement in criminal offences. Still others were removed for serving in paramilitary organisations during the war and were subsequently tried for war crimes.⁵⁶ However, removal from the IPTF did not end the duty of an officer. Unless the local police brought charges against the offending officer, he was generally shifted to a job in which he exercised no policing responsibilities. Only in rare instances was he charged or removed without pressure from the IPTF.⁵⁷

3.7. Assessing the Dayton Accord and its Implementation

An assessment of the Dayton Accord highlights two main issues. First, the Accord recognises and attempts to make provision for anticipated injustices that linger in the post-war recovery period. Although the laws and provisions are in place to address these injustices, there is inadequate provision for implementation of the laws. This points out the intractable and residual nature of the animosities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and is not a difficulty with the Accord itself.

Second, the Accord comes into more direct criticism for the difficulties it creates and the means used for implementation. One analyst, Robert Belloni, finds the building programmes under the auspices of the Accord and the U.N. High Representative ineffective. The international community views civil society largely as a technical task, which “differs dramatically from the actual conditions in which Bosnian civic groups and organizations function”.⁵⁸ “Bosnian citizens...” says Belloni, “often perceive civil society building programs... as bizarre and alien efforts that do not take into account Bosnian history and society.”⁵⁹ Belloni argues that the intervention of the international community fosters dependence and rewards the strongly partisan ethnic elite running Bosnia-Herzegovina through patron-client relationships. This, combined with an idealistic understanding of civil society building which side-steps deeply embedded ethno-political issues, casts real doubt on the prospects of achieving “peace based on a genuine reconciliation”.⁶⁰

Further difficulties focus on the convoluted structure of the government and Constitution that virtually preclude success in overcoming the difficulties on the ground. These inherent difficulties in the Accord are directly attributable to the fact

⁵⁶ USDoS 2002: np.

⁵⁷ USDoS 2002: np.

⁵⁸ Belloni 2001: 163.

⁵⁹ Belloni 2001: 169.

⁶⁰ Belloni 2001: 178.

that the Dayton negotiations involved the chief parties of dispute equally, without first declaring a victor or loser in the war, as is convention in peace agreements. Consequently the Accord shows signs of compromise that serve only to perpetuate the conflict without real hope or empowerment for resolution.

Ultimately, the rebuilding process languishes not only because the Dayton Accord uses a technical and institutional approach to rebuilding civil society. Nor can it be assumed that local actors have little ability to shape a democratic state without significant external assistance. While it is the case that the post-communist lands are inexperienced at practicing democracy, this factor alone cannot fully account for the whole situation. A significant cause for slow progress lies not with internal persons, but with the assumptions of the external actors implementing the Dayton Accord. As one analyst indicates, “Democracy assistance providers operate as though it is possible to change the basic functioning of key institutions... without grappling with the deep-seated interests of the actors involved.”⁶¹ Rebuilding civil society must entail the agencies of society already in place not because they can better implement the Dayton Accord. Rather, including them brings to the rebuilding process *necessary* dimensions that the crafters of the Dayton Accord, operating from a rationalist, secularist approach, have failed to recognise. Crucially, religion – and its potential contribution in morals and ethics - is one of those necessary dimensions they overlook. This is so even as the international community realises a need for greater emphasis on shaping the values of society that contribute to the democratisation process. This process - and the failures encountered in it - has led to a re-evaluation of the way international intervention is carried out, and an ideological shift.

4. The Ideological Shift in International Intervention

Despite its flaws, the Dayton Accord remains an extraordinary document because it reflects a substantive ideological shift in diplomatic initiatives. Before the Balkan conflicts, Western analysts foresaw the gradual demise of religion and its moral influence in world matters. Their rationalist views led them to believe that the vestigial remains of religion would be tolerant, ecumenical, and concessive, “capable of breeding little more than indifference”.⁶² American foreign policy specialist,

⁶¹ Cited in Chandler 1999: 163.

⁶² Marty and Appleby 1997: 7.

Edward Luttwak, found the Enlightenment prejudice to be “astonishingly persistent” in foreign affairs:

Policy makers, diplomats, journalists, and scholars who are ready to overinterpret economic causality, who are apt to dissect social differentiations most finely, and who will minutely categorize political affiliations are still in the habit of disregarding the rôle of religion, religious institutions, and religious motivations in explaining politics and conflict.⁶³

Instead of the gradual disappearance of religion, the twentieth century witnessed the demise of totalitarian regimes hostile to religion in the Eastern Bloc and a global resurgence of religion, demonstrating that it remains a powerful force in world politics. Cold War diplomacy based on *Realpolitik* sought both to contain communism and establish democracy, measured by relatively straightforward elements. These included regular and free elections, equality under the rule of law, and promotion of a sense of citizenship.⁶⁴ The post-Cold War situation required a reassessment of these simple standards by which analysts measured democracy. By these standards the new democracies of Eastern and Central Europe are as equally democratic as Western European nations⁶⁵ in that they operate with new constitutions, have restructured governments, have established the rule of law and hold free and fair elections. However, because these new democracies are immature, they remain relatively unstable. Thus, *democratisation*, with focus on the process of developing the values and culture of society, has replaced *democracy*, with its focus on institutional level of elections and government processes, as the key political initiative of post-Cold War politics. The sustainability of democratic institutions, rather than the event and measure of free and fair elections, is now the focus of international efforts in post-communist lands.⁶⁶ The primary framer of the Dayton Accord, Richard Holbrooke, realised the effort to end the animosities in Bosnia-Herzegovina had to embrace the security and societal elements as a comprehensive whole. As a result, Dayton consciously moves beyond the terms of a traditional peace treaty to lay out a far-reaching plan for rebuilding civil society, incorporating a strong sense of ‘oughtness’ and morality in political discourse supported by contemporary human rights conventions. This conscious shift to values-based

⁶³ Luttwak 1994: 9.

⁶⁴ Chandler 1999: 15.

⁶⁵ Cited in Chandler 1999: 14.

⁶⁶ See Chandler (1999) for a detailed assessment of these efforts, the ideological struggles they engender, and the mechanisms in place in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

diplomacy demonstrates an important but largely overlooked transformation in international policy.

Democratisation and peace-building are now global enterprises through which policy makers disseminate an expected norm in morals and ethics. The Balkan analyst David Chandler asserts that this is “a remarkable, but fairly unquestioned, shift in approach to international security” concerned less with nuclear and conventional arsenals and more with the treatment of minorities in civil society.⁶⁷ “Democracy,” says Chandler, “has become a moral as opposed to a political category and democratisation now concerns societal values and attitudes rather than political processes”.⁶⁸ While this is a global process engaging the international organisations to which many non-Western nations belong, the views, values and policies remain quintessentially Western and are promulgated by Westerners and non-Western political elites educated in Western universities throughout Europe and the United States. By all appearances liberal democracy and the democratisation process are becoming a new quasi-religion with its own prescribed dogmas, rules of conduct, judicial body and global mission. The effort to democratise transitioning societies - including Bosnia-Herzegovina - is a confirmation of this development, and warrants closer examination.

4.1. Democratisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The international community entrusted much of the recovery and transformation of civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Organisation for Security and Communication in Europe (OSCE), a large, regional security agency active in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. OSCE employs more than 800 staff members in Bosnia-Herzegovina “to facilitate political processes, prevent or settle conflicts, and promote civil society and the rule of law”.⁶⁹ Early in its effort the OSCE recognised deficiencies found in the traumatised post-war environment that would preclude the establishment of a functioning democracy. They subsequently set up a Democratisation Branch (DB) to address the social-psychological elements of the deficiencies. However, OSCE-DB soon found that they were ill-equipped to address the social and psychological deficiencies and restructured to favour more orthodox roles relating to politics and

⁶⁷ Chandler 1999: 23.

⁶⁸ Chandler 1999: 28.

⁶⁹ OSCEBiH 2004a: np.

democratisation. The effort now continues under the Democratisation Department, working with institutions and structures.⁷⁰

4.2. Limitations of International Intervention

The OSCE recognised the limitations of an external interventionist organisation in addressing the social and psychological needs in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. These difficulties in the OSCE effort are elaborated by Dr. Ralph Roloff, who holds the position of *Wissenschaftler Assistent am Forschungsinstitut für Politische Wissenschaft und Europäische Fragen* at the University of Cologne and has worked extensively in the Balkans with the OSCE. At a special meeting of scholars and clergymen examining the role of religion and nation in the war, Roloff provided a startling insight regarding the work of the OSCE in the Balkans. Roloff believes the experience of the last years has demonstrated the difficulties – even impossibilities – of multilateral conflict resolution, leading him to conclude that “the OSCE offers no possibilities for conflict resolution”.⁷¹ He places the fault not with the lack of instruments and mechanisms available for the task, but with failures in the ‘human dimension’, citing especially the disunity, power politics and non-cooperation of member states. This is a sobering self-critique of the flagship organisation entrusted by the United Nations and the High Representative with overseeing peace initiatives in the Balkans. Roloff then addressed the Orthodox and Catholic religious leaders present⁷² and asserted that they have important roles to play in conflict resolution. The religious leaders are capable of creating the necessary conditions for social restoration, namely, a climate of tolerance and fairness, especially with regard to minorities living within the territory of a hostile host nation. Only in such a climate, says Roloff, is it possible to establish the norms of the everyday life of the pluralistic society.⁷³

⁷⁰ The following description of their enterprise is taken from the OSCE website: “A key priority of the OSCE Democratization Department is to transform institutions from formal to functioning democratic structures, to develop a participatory culture and promote citizen engagement.” (OSCEBiH 2004b: np).

⁷¹ The statement reads as follows: „Dieser Zusammenhang führte mich auch zu meiner provokanten Eingangsbemerkung, daß die OSZE keine Möglichkeiten zur Konfliktlösung habe” (Roloff 1996: 182).

⁷² Muslim delegates had been invited but could not attend owing to the siege on Sarajevo at the time.

⁷³ Roloff 1996: 186.

Roloff's voice is important, both in its forthright critique of the OSCE and in its challenge to religious leaders. In addition to monitoring, reporting and arbitrating conflicts at the international level, the OSCE also recognised the need for engaging the parties of conflict at the societal level, called 'Citizen Diplomacy' by the OSCE. 'Citizen Diplomacy' refers to "an entire class of informal and unofficial procedures for application at the international or inter-communal level where there are different cultures and an apparent need for better understanding than can be achieved through more formal contacts and interactions."⁷⁴ The goal of Citizen Diplomacy is "to break through the barriers of distrust that characterise relations based on mutual threat"⁷⁵ and functions as a parallel track of negotiation to international diplomacy between heads of state and their chosen representatives. It moves forward important - though often unseen - negotiations in the societal dimension of conflict prevention and resolution.⁷⁶

Roloff's assessment provides insight into several aspects of conflict resolution related to Bosnia-Herzegovina. First is the admission that peace-making at the highest levels, that of diplomats and their chosen representatives, is quite limited in its capacity for social restoration on the ground. These negotiations are necessary to initiate the peace-building process, but cannot govern the overall effort.

Second, Roloff believes the effort on the ground must include local actors. Effective peace-building is impossible by using external sources alone. Local persons are a key aspect of 'Citizen Diplomacy', even if the concept of 'citizenship' is still relatively unclear.

Third, Roloff asserts in no uncertain terms that the religious element, so endemic to the Balkan conflict but often overlooked by Western analysts, can play a foundational role in peace-building by providing the moral framework for tolerance and understanding. Religion can serve as an appropriate plausibility structure for peace-building and social restoration. This assertion is deserving of further exploration.

⁷⁴ Roloff 1996: 175.

⁷⁵ Roloff 1996: 175, 6.

⁷⁶ Roloff 1996: 176.

4.3. The Case for Religion in Peace-Building and Social Restoration

To suggest that religious leaders have a fundamental role to play in social restoration is groundbreaking because of the uneasy tension between politics and religion in the secularist West that carries over into diplomacy and policy making. But as Roloff points out, religion offers a framework for discussion of social issues that military and political-economic schemes have difficulty addressing. A religious framework moves the discussion from a mechanistic to an ethical and moral realm that the *Realpolitik* school of international relations - so dominant in twentieth century politics - long ago chose to disregard.⁷⁷

Further, the involvement of religious leaders and communities moves peace-building discussions from the closed door sessions of power politics to the public space of ordinary citizens. Involving religious leaders and communities enhances democratisation by distributing the peace-building processes beyond the elitism of the diplomatic corps. This is an important step for post-communist lands in which decision-making rested with a centralised authority. Inclusion of the religious communities in the decision-making process recognises how traditions of faith work within existing frameworks for positive societal transformation, and thereby offers a degree of contextual sensitivity to culture-specific norms and mores.

Moreover, the religious dimension appropriately addresses the human element absent in structuralist approaches that focus primarily on institutions. The prophetic dimension of religion condemns wrongdoing and injustice, and brings the necessary resources for conflict resolution and healing by extending forgiveness and reconciliation. Religion offers a perspective for properly addressing the 'other', even one who is potentially or previously an enemy. The religious dimension in peace-building seeks to find the balance between the need for just restitution and the burden that retributive demands have on perpetuating the cycle of violence. The great economic resources of the international community and the specially created courts and tribunals cannot begin to address the common loss of so many. Precisely where the mechanisms of peace-making and reconstruction are weak, religious faith is strong. Its proximity to the human element provides help to the traumatised and creates a new vision of a community living in peaceful co-existence

⁷⁷ Burnett 1994: 292-3.

(*Mitmenschlichkeit*). The intangible aspects of human volition are not easily quantified, yet are the necessary complements to structuralist efforts of peace-building and social restoration.

5. Conclusion

The foregoing analysis confirms four main arguments set forth in the introduction. First, the international community acting as an external force has not resolved the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and military success in ending the war did not translate into established peace. Despite the many resources put towards the implementation of the civil aspects of the Dayton Accord, a “climate of violence and discrimination prevails”⁷⁸ and few positive steps towards social integration are observable.

Second, this chapter has demonstrated that some efforts in the civil implementation of the Dayton Accord towards social restoration have been counter-productive. Specifically, the creation of two entities through the IEBL, the Constitution that retains the nationalist structures, and the sweeping powers exercised by the High Representative all serve to preserve the fractured and disintegrated state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Third, the chapter has demonstrated that significant problems in the society exist that are resistant to change through restructuring political and economic institutions. Although the international community recognises that a values-based approach is needed to address the human dimension, they concede that this effort is beyond what an external body can provide.

Fourth, the chapter provides expert testimony of a policy-maker intimately familiar with the limitations of Western intervention in the Balkans that makes the case for the involvement of religious actors. Religion offers the moral framework and foundation for tolerance and peace-building that materialist, structural approaches have failed to establish.

This chapter also exposes two myths assumed by the Western international community. First, the West either tacitly or explicitly assumes that liberal democratic values and methods of operating are shared, and that nations in transition will naturally and automatically aspire to these ideals. This assumption is sorely

⁷⁸ HCHR 2002: np.

mistaken. The ease with which ultra-nationalists casually dismissed peace-keeping missions was a startling awakening to Western interventionist policy-makers.

The second myth exposed in this chapter is the belief that military might together with political and economic incentive is sufficient to transform transitioning societies and build peace. However, the means by which the West implemented economic incentives served only to further entrench the factions already splintered by ethnic strife. Bosnia-Herzegovina remains a deeply divided society characterised by continuing fragmentation, and the peace-building effort within the nexus of a political apparatus and maintained by *force majeure* is a dubious foundation for enduring peace.

The realm of peace-building and restoration arguably lies beyond the secular institutions embodying a materialist worldview. The act of reconciliation is most naturally situated in the locus of the personal and relational, not the structural and institutional. Peace-building and restoration are pre-eminently human endeavours involving the moral and ethical will of individuals and communities alike. It is for this reason that religion - with all of its known difficulties in the Balkans - can play an integrally positive role. To this aspect the thesis now turns.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF RELIGION TO PEACE-BUILDING

1. Introduction

The previous chapter revealed the limited capacity of external organisations to fully address the social needs through secular means alone, and pointed to the need for a more comprehensive, values-based approach to peace-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This chapter will explore the Research Question, “What resources for peace-building do the religions of Bosnia-Herzegovina have in respect to their theological and ethical teachings?” Thus, the chapter moves the discourse farther, and will investigate the possibility that religion, while ambiguous in relation to violence and peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, embodies the potential for peace-building and social restoration in both individual and social dimensions that demonstratively eludes the secular, modernist approach of the international community. Further, the chapter will explore ways in which the potential for peace-building in Christianity and Islam finds convergence with John Paul Lederach’s paradigm of conflict resolution through a three-dimensional diplomacy. The chapter thus anticipates the hypothesis that will be tested empirically in subsequent chapters: that the religious potential for peace-building and social restoration is found in religious persons and religious faith sodalities, rather than in the institutions and official leaderships of the religious communities.

This chapter will examine five critical areas in which religion and the values of religious faith positively contribute to the peace-building process. These areas are: 1) identity formation; 2) the concept of peace; 3) global ethics; 4) human rights; and 5) reconciliation.

2. The Role of Religion in Identity Formation

The link between religion and communal identity is acutely felt in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was especially the case for the Bošnjaks who in 1968 received official recognition in the ethnic taxonomies of Yugoslavia, as noted in Chapter One. Recognition afforded them equal status with other national groups in the socialist era, but became a perilous liability in the post-communist era dominated by militant nationalists. When the formal state collapsed, a crisis of identity ensued, and new identities had to be forged from ethno-national and religious nomenclatures, the two strongest lines of identity outside of the political-state identity. Allegiances were torn between an identity shaped by the changeable aspects of statehood and citizenship, and the unchangeable properties of nationhood.

The dissonance is also seen in trying to define the nature of the conflict and address the related security issues involved. Those who viewed Yugoslavia primarily as a political entity saw its break-up as a civil war and its disintegration as a challenge to the state. Others saw the conflict primarily as an ethno-national conflict and the threat from a nation external to their own ethno-religious community. The Yugoslav military apparatus was trained to address state security matters and defend against aggression outside the political state of Yugoslavia, but Bosnia-Herzegovina presented a different kind of security issue that came from the distinct nations within the new state. In this perspective the challenges were not to the state, but to the society within the state. The issues of societal security¹ differ greatly from those of state security. Societal security draws less on military power and more from the power constructs formed from cultural and national identity. Addressing the societal security threats solely with the military, which is the state's security apparatus, is unsuitable and destined for failure. Thus the peace-building objectives must address both state and societal security threats, and for this reason societal instruments are just as critical as the military in establishing peace and stability.

In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina where the usual linguistic determinants of identity are largely absent, religious confession is the primary tool of differentiation and therefore intrinsic to identity formation. Consequently, peace-building actors trying to address societal security issues need to have an adequate understanding of the role that religion and religious leaders play in their communities. To a degree, this is

¹ Buzan 1991: 20.

where the international community has engaged the religious hierarchs through the World Conference on Religions and Peace (WCRP). This vehicle encouraged inter-religious dialogue between top religious leaders soon after the ending of the military campaigns. These leaders also have been active in drafting the Law on Freedom of Religion and the Legal Status of Religious Communities and Churches in Bosnia-Herzegovina. WCRP is thus working with important legislation that will determine the religious laws of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and their contributions will affect a wide portion of the population.

The way forward has been difficult, however, in that many of the issues left unresolved by Dayton are matters of concern for religious leaders as the primary spokesmen for their national groups. Although the effort through WCRP is meant to bring better understanding and reconciliation, it has often served to maintain barriers between the larger national communities and carve out advantages to protect partisan power bases. Smaller religious groups are also concerned that the religious laws ostensibly crafted to grant freedom do not disenfranchise non-national religious communities. It is important for the peace-building effort to include the religious leaders so that they can address the issues of societal security. It is insufficient, however, to end the effort at this juncture because some of the religious leaders are themselves too engaged in the nationalist causes of their own community to achieve supranational social restoration. A certain degree of parity between these larger organisations is to be expected, but, as will be argued in subsequent chapters, substantive reconciliation and social restoration transpires at a more grass-roots level where institutional power and control are not factors in the process.

3. The Concept of Peace in Religious Discourse

3.1. The Conceptual Domain and Expanded Definition of 'Peace'

The task of peace-maker differs from that of the peace-builder. In the conflict resolution literature peace-makers are those within the diplomatic elite who negotiate terms to end the military conflict and implement a sustainable ceasefire. While there is clearly a process involved, the task of the peace-maker is defined by the event of a signed accord, and is usually undertaken outside the arena of conflict. Peace-builders are those who are not party to the diplomatic negotiations, but to whom the task of carrying out the terms of the peace are entrusted. Peace-builders are actors representing both governmental and non-governmental organisations whose task is an ongoing process within the theatre of conflict subsequent to the signing of the

ceasefire agreement. Not infrequently disagreements arise between these two types of peace workers over implementation. Terms agreed to on paper sometimes bear little resemblance to realities in the field, making implementation of the peace terms difficult to carry out. Occasionally the chasm between the diplomatic elite who crafted the peace accord (peace-makers) and the field operators (peace-builders) working within the complexities and chaos of the post-war situation is too wide to bridge. These difficulties lead some peace activists now to call for a broader approach to the peace-making effort to ensure greater continuity and stability in the peace-building enterprise.

One expert in peace-building and reconciliation, John Paul Lederach, has called for a fundamental change and an entirely new paradigm of conflict resolution. His wide experience in more than twenty countries leads him to argue that contemporary conflicts require different “concepts and approaches that go beyond traditional statist diplomacy”.² The new paradigm requires long-term commitment in order to build an infrastructure across the various levels of society while simultaneously drawing its resources from that society.³ Lederach’s model does not exclude high level diplomacy - what he calls ‘first-track diplomacy’ - but focuses more of the effort at sustaining peace at other levels within society, or ‘second-track diplomacy’. “‘Peace’ in the early stages,” says Lederach, “hinges on achieving a cease-fire, and in the later stages on broadening and including more sectors of society.”⁴ ‘Second-track’ or ‘Track Two’ diplomacy urges respected society leaders - such as ethnic and religious leaders, academics and intellectuals, and leaders of humanitarian aid organisations and NGOs - in problem-solving workshops, training in conflict resolution and peace commissions.⁵ ‘Level three’, or ‘Track Three’ diplomacy, engages local leaders, that is to say, leaders of local NGOs, community developers, health officials and refugee camp leaders in local peace commissions, prejudice reduction, psycho-social work and post-war trauma.⁶

Lederach’s model is important for four reasons. First, his model recognises that the nature of many contemporary conflicts has changed. Today conflicts are more

² Lederach 1997: xvi.

³ Lederach 1997: xvi.

⁴ Lederach 1997: 45.

⁵ Lederach 1997: 39.

⁶ Lederach 1977: 39.

commonly intra-state rather than international in nature, which requires a re-evaluation of how peace-keeping organisations and forces are to be engaged in the conflict. The failure of UN peace-keeping troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina serves to highlight the need for a different kind of deployment in order to avoid repeating past mistakes in the future. Second, the model recognises both the necessity for, but limitations of, first level diplomatic peace initiatives. Stilling the weapons of war is a significant first step towards peace that is achieved only with subsequent steps by local actors. It recognises that the conflict is not primarily military, but ideological, political and social. Third, the model recognises the long-term dimension of post-war societal rebuilding at the second and third levels of involvement. Failure to acquire co-operation at these levels draws into question the sustainability of the peace process. Fourth, Lederach's model recognises that sustainable peace is found not in external agencies, but in internal resources among the persons most affected by the conflict. Ultimately local actors will determine the nature of the peace and how enduring it will be. The international community must see the people in the theatre of conflict "as *resources*, not recipients".⁷ Citizen-based peace-building in this model is "instrumental and integral, not peripheral"⁸ to the peace process.

Lederach demonstrates that the key element to building sustainable peace in contemporary conflicts is the middle range of society. Those who have contact both with persons of high level authority and leaders of grassroots initiatives have the most flexibility for affecting change.⁹ Track Two diplomacy clearly involves higher level religious clerics who are able to influence political leaders at the first level of power, and who also influence ordinary persons within their own communities of faith. Lederach believes that persons in the second level, such as higher level clerics, have the potential to reach in both directions of society, which therefore positions them strategically for sustainable peace-building.¹⁰

3.2. The Contribution of Religion to a Wider Concept of Peace

The holistic approach to peace-building that diplomats and secular peace-builders now promote is inherent in the meaning of the term 'peace' of the texts of the monotheistic religions. The Semitic linguistic domain for the term 'peace' affords a

⁷ Lederach 1997: 94. The italics are in the original.

⁸ Lederach 1977: 94.

⁹ Lederach 1977: 94.

¹⁰ Lederach 1977: 94, 95.

comprehensive understanding that is defined both by the absence of war and the expectation of social harmony. These values go beyond defining peace in positive and negative values to include “a set of relations characterised by harmony, wholeness and lack of fracture” and a sense of justice.¹¹ The characteristics of peace sought by secular peace-builders in post-war conflicts find a significant level of convergence with the understanding of the term *šālôm* in the richly shared Semitic tradition¹² of the monotheistic religions. A closer analysis of these terms used in the received religious texts will bear out the holistic meaning of the term ‘peace’.

3.2.1. The Meaning of ‘Peace’ in Hebrew OT and Greek NT Usage

First, the root *šlm* (שלם), from which *šālôm* (שלום) derives, conveys fundamentally the meaning of ‘totality’ and ‘completeness’, ‘sufficiency’, and ‘to have enough’. The root and its derivations convey a positive sense of ‘satisfaction’.¹³

Second, שלום has reference to ‘desire’ or ‘pleasure’, especially in speaking with or about someone, and in the showing of kindness.¹⁴ Commonly שלום is used in a similar capacity in respect of a person’s state of satisfaction. It can express both internal and external happiness with reference to a person’s well-being, success, or good fortune,¹⁵ and can directly refer to material goods in a concrete sense.¹⁶ This, by way of extension, was often used as a form of greeting (e.g., Judges 18:15; 1 Sam. 10:4), or of hospitable welcome in the form of a wish (e.g., Judges 19:20).¹⁷

Third, שלום has the secondary meaning of ‘friendliness’, especially in contrast to animosity and war.¹⁸ Sometimes it conveys the concept of contractual peace, as in a peace agreement, or terms of peace (e.g., Deuteronomy 20:10, 12).¹⁹ Thus, the word can convey an enduring state, or a one off contractual agreement securing that state.²⁰

¹¹ Dower 1998: 132.

¹² The shared linguistic domain includes Hebrew, Akkadian, Ugaritic, Phoenician, Aramaic, Syriac, Arabic and Ethiopian (Gerleman 1997: 1337).

¹³ Gerleman 1997: 1337-43.

¹⁴ See the use of the term in this context in the following references: Gen. 37:4; Jeremiah 9:7 MT [9:8 ET]; Ps. 35:20; Esth. 10:3.

¹⁵ Gerleman 1997: 1344.

¹⁶ Stendenbach 1995: 46.

¹⁷ Gerleman 1997: 1344.

¹⁸ Gerleman 1997: 1339.

¹⁹ Gerleman 1997: 1344.

²⁰ Gerleman 1997: 1344.

Fourth, in this contractual sense, לָשׁוּב can also mean ‘payment’, ‘repayment’, or ‘bring satisfaction of a debt’.²¹ It conveys the strong sense of ‘restitution’, ‘restoration’, ‘obligation’, ‘compensation’ and ‘requital’. Frequently YHWH (יְהוָה) is the subject of the action (Joel 2:25; Joel 4:4 MT [3:4 ET]; Isaiah 57:18). This usage shows the prerogative of YHWH to repay, but a person cannot repay YHWH.²²

Fifth, although no sharp distinction between secular and theological usage of the term לָשׁוּב may be drawn,²³ it is often understood from the context that God is behind the action, by blessing, ensuring health, and providing heavenly protection, security and welfare.²⁴

Finally, the breadth of the term לָשׁוּב translates into Greek only with difficulty. The LXX uses several words to communicate the intent, including $\epsilon\iota\rho\eta\nu\eta$, but also ($\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau$) $\alpha\pi\omicron\delta\iota\delta\omicron\nu\alpha\iota$, ‘to make restitution for damages’.²⁵ According to Stendebach, “*Šālôm* ist zusammenfassender Ausdruck all dessen, was der alte Orientale als Inhalt des Segens begehrt.”²⁶

3.2.2. The Meaning of ‘Peace’ in the Qur’ān and Islam

The meaning and use of the word ‘peace’ in the Qur’ān and in Islam reveal a shared conceptual and etymological foundation with Hebrew. The word ‘Islam’ derives from the verb *salima* meaning ‘to be safe, uninjured’, and is directly related to the noun *salām*, ‘peace’. *Islam* is the verbal noun of the causative form of the verb (*aslama*) that denotes the active striving ‘to make peace’. In Qur’ānic teaching, peace is achieved through active obedience to God, the Source of Peace, or *al-Salām*, one of the “Beautiful Names” of God cited in the Qur’ān (59:23). It is in this sense that *Islam* is often interpreted in English as ‘submission’ or ‘surrender’, but more accurately it denotes ‘making peace through active obedience to God as the source of all Peace’.

²¹ Gerleman 1997: 1345.

²² Gerleman 1997: 1347.

²³ Gerleman 1997:1347; Stendebach 1995: 26.

²⁴ Stendebach 1995: 26.

²⁵ Gerleman 1997:1348.

²⁶ Stendebach 1995: 18.

The Arabic cognate *salm/silm* has similar meanings of ‘Peace’, ‘Reconciliation’, ‘yielded’, ‘submission’, and ‘as one living in accord or agreement with others’.²⁷ The word *salām* has the further meaning of ‘undamaged’ (whole), ‘welfare’, ‘good health’, and ‘security’.²⁸ *Salām* means ‘to be safe or uninjured’ and used as a substantive has the meaning of ‘safety’, as in 97:5 “Peace! ... until the rise of Morn.” It is in this sense of the word that the term ‘*dār al salām*’ ‘the abode (house) of peace’ is the place to which God summons people on this earth. The *dār al-salām* also has reference to Paradise in 10:25 and 6:127,²⁹ and is the eternal abode of peace, which is reached by obeying God in this present life (10:25, 26).

Salām is used extensively as a salutation, as in the greeting of the devout to one another *al-salām ‘alaykum*, (‘Peace be upon you’). The prescribed salutation of peace upon a home before entry (24:27, 61) is comparable to examples from other Semitic traditions, such as that in the OT example of Judges 19:20 “Peace be to you. I will care for all your wants.” In this example hospitality is extended to a stranger outside of the ethno-religious community. The foreigner is provided with a place to sleep, security from the potential dangers of remaining in the public square overnight, food for the beasts of burden, has his feet washed, and is nourished with food and drink. Similar practice is also found in Semitic tradition in the NT in which Jesus instructs his disciples to pronounce peace (εἰρήνη) upon a house(hold) that receives them:

Whatever town or village you enter, find out who in it is worthy, and stay there until you leave. As you enter the house, greet it. If the house is worthy, let your peace come upon it; but if it is not worthy, let your peace [εἰρήνη] return to you (Matthew 10:11-13, cf. Luke 5:5, 6).

Salām is also used as a benediction upon the departed dead, especially after eulogy in remembrance of the prophets, as found repeatedly in 37:75ff.

Yusuf Ali gives six related definitions of the word *salām*, translated as peace:

‘Salām’... includes

- 1) a sense of security and permanence;
- 2) soundness, freedom from defects, perfection as in the word ‘salīm’;
- 3) preservation, salvation, deliverance, as in the word ‘sallama’;
- 4) salutation, accord with those around us;

²⁷ Stendebach 1995: 16.

²⁸ Stendebach 1995: 16.

²⁹ Van Arendonk 1994: 8: 915.

Ali explains that “all these shades of meaning are implied in the word Islam,” and that “Heaven therefore is the perfection of Islam.”³⁰

Abu-Nimer expands on this description and claims that peace in Islam is a state, namely, one of “physical mental, spiritual, and social harmony, in which a person is living at peace with God through submission, and living at peace with one’s fellow human beings by avoiding wrongdoing”.³¹ Peace is an outcome that is achieved conditionally, after full submission to the will of God and to Islam.³² Muslims are obligated to seek peace in all spheres of life. Peace therefore has internal, personal and social applications.³³ God is the source and sustainer of peace and therefore Muslims are to shun violence and aggression. The best way to insure peace is to be totally submitted to God’s will and to Islam.³⁴

3.2.3. Three Directions of Islamic Studies of Peace

Mohammed Abu-Nimer, a scholar in the field of International Peace and Conflict Resolution, delineates three main directions of studies of peace and non-violence in Islam. The first direction is that of war and jihad. Scholars in this area support the premise that Islam is fundamentally a religion of war and that war and violence are therefore legitimate means of settling disputes. These scholars³⁵ lay stress on the nature and use of violent jihad and exclude the Qur’ānic passages counselling the pursuit of peace for dispute resolution.³⁶ They view the writings of Islamic groups and organisations through the lens of violent jihad and focus on the emergence of radical and extreme Islamist movements. Most of these scholars are Western and their views amount to what some see as a ‘neo-orientalism’ that essentialises the character of Islam and questions the compatibility of the Islamic and modern worlds.³⁷

The second direction of study is that of Just War and Peace. Scholars in this area view Islam as a religion that upholds peace and justice, and limited use of force in jihad is justified as one of many ways of achieving the ends of peace and justice in

³⁰ Ali 1938: 19:62 n. 2512.

³¹ Abu-Nimer. 2003: 60.

³² Abu-Nimer 2003: 60.

³³ Abu-Nimer 2003: 60.

³⁴ Cited in Abu-Nimer 2003: 60.

³⁵ Abu-Nimer gives reference to Pipes 1992; Lewis 1993; Sivan 1990.

³⁶ Abu-Nimer 2003: 25.

³⁷ Abu-Nimer 2003: 25, 26.

society.³⁸ The starting point for these scholars is situated in the Qur'ān and has the following guiding principles: 1) Humanity's fundamental nature is one of moral innocence; 2) Humanity's nature is to live on earth in harmony with other living beings. In this context peace means not merely the elimination of war, but also the elimination of the grounds for conflict, waste and corruption (*fasad*) it creates. Peace is God's true purpose for humanity; 3) Individual humans will choose to contravene God's purposes and transgress the commands, and choose the path of violence; 4) Prophets will encounter opposition by the majority who choose various forms of self-delusion by *kufr* (rejection of God) and *zulm* (oppression); 5) Peace is attainable only through surrender to God's will and laws; 6) The unlikelihood of full conformity to God's will and precepts make it necessary for Muslims to fight to preserve the integrity of the Muslim faith and principles.³⁹ In this analysis, force is permitted but aggression is not, and the main objectives remain peace, justice, and the preservation of the faith and its values.⁴⁰

Scholars in the Just War and Peace category⁴¹ examine closely both the violent and non-violent nature of *jihad*⁴² and its application in the *dār al-harb* (territory of war). They acknowledge that the Qur'an permits the use of force but lay stress on the non-violent application of *jihad* for today.⁴³ Their use of the Qur'ānic passages about *jihad* focuses primarily on the moral restrictions guiding the application of *jihad*.⁴⁴ Abu-Nimer suggests that a consensus is emerging from this group that acknowledges the use of violence but with stringent guidelines. Fighting and violence must be in the defence of Islam or the oppressed so that they can be released from tyranny.⁴⁵ This group of scholars focuses discussion less on peace and choose rather to move quickly to conditions under which violence may be used, guided by the Islamic goal of establishing a more just society.⁴⁶

³⁸ Abu-Nimer 2003: 26. Abu-Nimer gives reference to Ahmad 1993; Ayoub 1997; Hashmi 1996; Kelsay 1993; Khadduri 1984; Rahman 1996; Sachedina 1996; Saiyidain 1994.

³⁹ Cited in Abu-Nimer 2003: 26, 27.

⁴⁰ Abu-Nimer 2003: 27.

⁴¹ Abu-Nimer gives reference to Abu-Nimer 1996a, b; D. Crow 1998; Kishtainy; Sai'd 1997; Satha-anand 1993a, b; Wahiduddin Khan 1998.

⁴² The four levels of *jihad* ('struggle') are the ear, tongue, hand, and sword.

⁴³ Abu-Nimer 2003: 29, 30.

⁴⁴ Abu-Nimer 2003: 30, 31.

⁴⁵ Abu-Nimer 2003: 35.

⁴⁶ Abu-Nimer 2003: 35.

The third direction of study is that of Peace-Building and Non-violence. This group of scholars focus on core values from within Islam for the basis of their analysis, and build from a premise of active non-violence. Thus, values such as *'adl* (justice), *ihsan* (benevolence), *rahmah* (compassion), and *hikmah* (wisdom) form the foundation for their analysis, rendering it conceptually antithetical to violence and war.⁴⁷ These scholars also acknowledge that the Qur'ān gives justification for limited violence, but emphasise the potential of non-violence to achieve the goals of Islam.⁴⁸ The centrality of non-violence in their position distinguishes this set of scholars from those of the second trajectory. At the heart of their effort is the understanding that human lives, like all parts of God's creation, are sacred. Related to this is their commitment to the unity of the *umma* and the oneness of humanity.⁴⁹ This group of scholars cite passages from the Qur'ān and the Hadith to emphasise social justice, brotherhood, and the equality of humanity. In their peace-building initiatives, they extol the virtues of forgiveness and mercy, tolerance, submission to God, right means, and recognition of the rights of others.⁵⁰

This model at once moves away from the emphasis on just war to peace-building, and serves as a framework to interpret the pluralist world in terms of the recognition and protection of human rights in contemporary society. A segment of the Muslim religious establishment has pressurised these reformists, issuing a *fatwah* to stop Muslim audiences in pluralist societies like North America from hearing this new perspective.⁵¹ However, the message continues to resonate with Muslims living in pluralist societies who are committed to the same social-ethical worldview expressed by this model.

3.2.4. Conclusion to the Section on Peace and Religious Discourse

From the foregoing it can be concluded that the related Semitic terms for peace, *šālôm/salām*, reveal certain holistic expectations of social harmony that are found in the Qur'ānic and Biblical sources, but are achieved only conditionally. Dependence upon God for his intervention in human affairs is a pre-condition for peace. Similarly, human effort alone cannot achieve this kind of peace, but is available to

⁴⁷ Abu-Nimer 2003: 37.

⁴⁸ Abu-Nimer 2003: 37.

⁴⁹ Abu-Nimer 2003: 38, 39.

⁵⁰ Abu-Nimer 2003: 39.

⁵¹ Abu-Nimer 2003: 40.

those who are submitted to the will of God. ‘Societal security’ in another vernacular is *šālôm/salām*, the achievement of which requires a level of peace beyond the cessation of military activity. *Šālôm/salām* does not deny the need for military or police intervention to secure peace, but fills the *lacunae* the state apparatus cannot address and is the complement to these efforts. Peace-building is only a *prima facie* military exercise. Thoroughgoing peace-building is an inter-personal and spiritual discipline. Thus, religious persons empowered and guided by God have both a contribution to make and an obligation to uphold towards societal security and peace-building.

4. Religion and Global Ethics

As Sarajevo was under siege in the 1990s, an initiative was underway to create a global peace ethic grounded on religious principles. Spearheaded by Hans Küng, the effort gained enthusiastic support from recognised religious leaders, scholars and political leaders from all over the world and culminated in the 1993 *Declaration Toward a Global Ethic*.

The effort to develop a Global Ethic is marked by several significant concepts. First, the *Declaration* recognises the shortcomings of religious persons in living up to their own tenets. It confesses that many atrocities have been committed in the name of religion and that “leaders and members of religions incite aggression, fanaticism hate, and xenophobia - even inspire and legitimate violent and bloody conflicts. Religion often is misused for purely power-political goals, including war. We are filled with disgust.”⁵²

Second, the subscribers to the *Declaration* are under no illusion that religion and ethics alone can adequately address and “solve the environmental, economic, political, and social problems of Earth”. The *Declaration* views the efforts of religions as complementary to secular efforts, providing “what obviously cannot be attained by economic plans, political programmes or legal regulations alone”.⁵³

Third, as the original subtitle suggests,⁵⁴ many societies have lost perspective and orientation in the modern - and now post-modern - world. Institutions and structures in society entrusted with the security and welfare of the people have brought greater

⁵² Küng 1996: 12.

⁵³ Küng 1996: 16.

⁵⁴ The German subtitle is: *Perspektiven für die Suche nach Orientierung*.

anxiety for the future. The *Declaration* states that the world is “experiencing a ‘*fundamental crisis*’” and that a “new global order” with a “new global ethic” is needed.⁵⁵

Fourth, the Global Ethic affirms that there is still hope today, but not in those modern structures and political realities. Rather, the hope for a more secure and peaceful future draws its strength from the religions of the world that encourage their adherents in self-control and communal existence.

Fifth, the *Declaration* seeks not to impose one religion or conviction on another. It encourages the expression and contribution that each religion makes towards affirming human solidarity and life in all its forms, while deploring violence, oppression and injustice throughout the world.

Sixth, the *Declaration* fundamentally counters the ideology and practice of *Realpolitik* in that it affirms the right of security and prosperity not only for those over whom a government is responsible, but for all.

Finally, it recognises that people of religious and spiritual conviction draw upon a power greater than themselves,⁵⁶ and that adherents of the monotheistic religions are answerable to that power for their actions. Religion, drawing upon the wisdom of the centuries, offers orientation in a troubled world. Thus, the Declaration puts forward “four irrevocable directives” for a global ethic:

- 1) Commitment to a culture of non-violence and respect for life.
- 2) Commitment to a culture of solidarity and a just economic order.
- 3) Commitment to a culture of tolerance and a life of truthfulness.
- 4) Commitment to a culture of equal rights and partnership between men and women.⁵⁷

These four statements may be contemporary in expression, but find their source in the ancient religions in the following corresponding imperative expressions:

- 1) You shall not kill! Positively expressed: Have respect for life!
- 2) You shall not steal! Positively expressed: Deal honestly and fairly!
- 3) You shall not lie! Positively expressed: Speak and act truthfully!
- 4) You shall not commit sexual immorality! Positively expressed: Respect and love one another.

⁵⁵ Küng 1996: 12, 13. The italics are in the original.

⁵⁶ Küng 1996: 13.

⁵⁷ Küng 1996: 17-25.

Küng states that “The *Declaration Toward a Global Ethic* seeks to emphasise the minimal ethic which is absolutely necessary for human survival.”⁵⁸ The *Declaration* seeks neither to establish a new religion and single ethical ideology, nor to contravene the ethical requirements of the world’s religions. Rather, the *Declaration* seeks to disseminate “*a fundamental consensus on binding values, irrevocable standards, and personal attitudes*”.⁵⁹

A global ethic with universal appeal is a well-intended effort strong on idealism. Therein lies its greatest weakness in that the document has no particularised instrumentation for implementation. The signers of the *Declaration* agreed in principle with a need for developing a global ethic, especially in the face of contemporary conflicts throughout the world. However, some also expressed reservations and placed qualifications on the project. For example, Egyptian Hassan Hanafi is concerned less with generalities and more with specifics of implementation, and with addressing the issues preventing “religious dialogue, such as oppression, exploration, domination, acculturation, dependence and so on”.⁶⁰ He goes so far as to challenge Küng’s well-known dictum, “No human coexistence without a world ethic shared by the nations. No peace among nations without peace among the religions”⁶¹ with one of his own: “No new global order without a global ethic. No new global ethic without a new socio-political reality.”⁶² Moreover, Hanafi claims that the globality of the *Declaration* reflects rather the sentiments and perspective of the West:

It may be that the Declaration is too Western, given the concentration on ecology, not on development; on human rights more than people’s rights; on individual ethics more than on social groups; on ethics more than politics; on the inside more than on the outside. In Asia, Africa and Latin America the major challenges come from the real world, not from good will; from social structure, not from individual moral consciousnesses.⁶³

Objections of a different nature come from other corners. Mahmoud Zakzoud states that surrender to the guidance of the Transcendent is what enables one to believe and act rightly. This orientation provides a destiny to life full of dignity and joy in

⁵⁸ Küng 1996: 2.

⁵⁹ Küng 1996: 15. The italics are in the original.

⁶⁰ Cited in Küng 1996: 187.

⁶¹ See Küng, et al. 1993: xiii.

⁶² Cited in Küng 1996: 187.

⁶³ Cited in Küng 1996: 187.

creation, and keeps us from being “lost by fighting against one another and destroying one another in a senseless way”.⁶⁴ Similarly, Muhammed El-Ghazali finds objectionable any ethic that places the belief in God as a secondary or side issue.⁶⁵ This finds resonance with conscientious Christians. Joseph Cardinal Bernadin invites an “articulation of the sources of morality”⁶⁶ and suggests that the source for success in ethics is the inalienability of the practice of religious faith. A careful reading of the essays ostensibly in support of a global ethic reveals a tenuous consensus that is marked by an understated scepticism about the possibility of a global ethic beyond a formal document.

The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is indicative of a different imperative for today’s sectarian violence. Any ethic developed must address two opposite but related phenomena: conflicts today are less frequently international and increasingly sectarian, while peace-building is increasingly international and global. An ethic developed on the bias of the latter phenomenon would fail to address the problematic nature of the former.

Needed today is not a “minimal ethic”⁶⁷ marginally related to a wide but shallow base of religious beliefs, but a ‘maximal ethic’ deeply anchored in the positive values of the belief-system with which a person or community identifies. Western, non-religious democratisers and religious pluralists alike espouse an ethic severed from its belief system, structures and institutions. This approach is strikingly similar to the vague and homogenised ethic practised during forty years of Yugoslav socialism that ultimately resulted in the corruption of politics and religion alike. The outbreak of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a monumental challenge for the Western international community, forcing the latter to adopt a new, post-Cold War paradigm for engaging the changing nature of conflicts. In parallel fashion, an ethic addressing today’s sectarian conflicts must be localised if it is to have any significant impact. Non-Western and non-Christian participants of the Global Ethic maintain a strong link between ethics, religion and the local culture with which they identify. Thus, when provided with a global platform to make a statement about a universal ethic,

⁶⁴ Cited in Küng 1996: 192.

⁶⁵ Cited in Küng 1996: 182.

⁶⁶ Cited in Küng 1996: 143.

⁶⁷ Küng 1996: 2.

they choose instead to make a particularised statement about regional ethical realities.⁶⁸

Ensuing chapters will explore in greater detail the impact of particularised ethics practiced by individuals of faith in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These persons have had to counter not only communist ideology of the non-religious, but also of the nationalist ideology of their co-religionists. It may be the case that a particularised religious ethic is better able to address those specific issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina than a global ethic. The balance of this issue is to be weighed in subsequent chapters. What is clear is that religious ethics offer a strong frame of reference for sustaining peace both at the particularised and global levels. Where the impact of global ethics is most evident and observable is in the area of human rights.

5. Religion and Human Rights

The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina exposed a larger struggle in the political West between disaffected realists advocating *Realpolitik* and idealists on the frontlines urging intervention of the international community based on their avowed commitment to human rights.⁶⁹ Policy makers educated in the *Realpolitik* school of international relations only reluctantly advised involvement in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina because it ultimately threatened to destabilise Western Europe and the vital interests of the United States.⁷⁰ Some political advisors viewed the conflict as an internal civil war, requiring neutrality,⁷¹ and found therefore no compelling argument for intervention. Local leaders in the war theatre accused the international community of moral cowardice for their inaction while the bloody malaise threatened to engulf the entire Balkan Peninsula. The international community first ignored and then denied claims of genocide and ethnic cleansing. They preferred to use the circumlocution ‘crimes against humanity’ which above all signalled the reluctance of the international community to become directly involved. War correspondents eventually confirmed the scope of the atrocities and, because of their commitment to human rights accords, the international community had no morally defensible alternative but to intervene.

⁶⁸ See the example of Hanafi above.

⁶⁹ Davis 1996: 116.

⁷⁰ Allin 2002: 9; Holbrooke 1998: 366-371

⁷¹ See the discussion of the different views of the conflict as a civil war in Davis 1996: 108ff.

5.1. Religion and Human Rights: Towards Convergence

The uneasy historical tension between religion and human rights is adequately addressed elsewhere,⁷² so that the following serves as a brief overview of a large and growing discipline of study. Some scholars demonstrate a clear and self-evident link between human rights and religion.⁷³ Other scholars disavow a philosophical or historically antecedent relationship between religion and human rights,⁷⁴ and prefer to establish the basis for human rights alone on reason and natural law. Some political secularists claim that human rights need now to be permanently separated from religion. If religion once played an important role towards shaping human rights in an earlier age, this age has outlived religion's usefulness. This may be seen in the developments since World War Two in which human rights are now a moral belief system of its own. A "new civic faith"⁷⁵ has replaced the old trinity of *liberté, égalité, et fraternité* of the French Revolution with the new trinity of "three generations of rights" for all humanity.⁷⁶

The uneasy tension continues today. Henley notes that political philosophers of the Enlightenment, despite their confidence in human reason, were more inclined to acknowledge the work of God in support of the "rights of man" than modern Christian Western theologians who, constrained by modernist epistemological categories, hesitate to ascribe a theological basis to human rights.⁷⁷ Thus, some Western theologians, strongly influenced by naturalism and liberal democracy, attempt to contribute to human rights discussions today without direct reference to either God or revelation.

However, other theologians today start with the *a priori* assertion that "human rights spring from human dignity and not vice versa".⁷⁸ The similar development of the League of Nations and the United Nations with the ecumenical movement demonstrates regular convergence on human rights topics. The resultant position

⁷² See, for instance, Tierny 1996; Huber 1979; Swidler 1990.

⁷³ See, for instance, Kaplan 1980; Henle 1980; Nasr 1980.

⁷⁴ Perelmann 1980: 45-52.

⁷⁵ Maritain (1951: 110-1), as cited in Witte 2001: 85.

⁷⁶ The first generation of civil and political rights expounds the idea of *liberté*; the social, cultural, and economic rights constitute the second generation and stand for *égalité*; the third generation of rights to development, peace, health and the environment and open communication stands for *fraternité* (Witte 2001: 88-9).

⁷⁷ Henley 1986: 361.

⁷⁸ Meeks 1984: xi.

documents⁷⁹ from both Protestant and Roman Catholic circles have made substantive contributions to theology and human rights.

5.2. Contributions of Diverse Churches to Human Rights

Ecclesiastical contributions from diverse circles have brought a significant element of depth, especially in the area of human dignity and the right to life. As Moltmann has put it:

The dignity of the human being is not itself a human right but a source and ground for all human rights, and all human rights promote respect for the singular worth of human beings.⁸⁰

The Roman Catholic contribution, following Aquinas, rests on the balance between nature and grace:

All human beings are distinguished with the same dignity of nature, but it is only in the mystery of the Word of God become flesh that the mystery of the human being truly becomes clear.⁸¹

The Synod of Roman Catholic Bishops, in *Pacem in Terris*, affirmed the need for human rights from a basis grounded in theology. They also affirm the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, which asserts that the “international order is rooted in the inalienable rights and dignity of the human being”.⁸² The Roman Catholic Church affirms the role of the UN in averting large-scale conflagrations and instituting human rights towards world peace:

[The UN] are the beginning of a system capable of restraining the armaments race, discouraging trade in weapons, securing disarmament and settling conflicts by peaceful methods of legal action, arbitration and international police action.⁸³

The Reformed tradition grounds the basis for the dignity of the human in his or her being in God’s image:

- 1) The image of God is the human being who co-responds to God.
- 2) Insofar as human beings co-respond to God, their Creator, they come into God’s truth.

⁷⁹ See, for instance, such documents as *Human Rights and Christian Responsibility*, 1974; *Theological Basis for Human Rights*, 1977; the German Lutheran *Theologische Perspektiven der Menschenrechte*, 1977; the 1974 Roman Catholic Synod of Bishops, *Message Concerning Human Rights and Reconciliation*; the Papal Commission 1976, *Justitia et Pax*, all in Moltmann 1984: 3-7.

⁸⁰ Moltmann 1984: 9.

⁸¹ *Justitia et Pax*, as cited by Moltmann 1984: 13.

⁸² Vatican Council II, 1984: 707.

⁸³ Vatican Council II, 1984: 707-8.

- 3) The human being co-responding to God is the beginning and the end of the history of God with human beings in creation, reconciliation, and salvation.
- 4) The human being should co-respond to God in his or her relationship to himself or herself. The human being is in this respect a person, and thus he or she has essential rights to freedom.
- 5) The human being should co-respond to God in his or her relationship to other human beings. Persons are in this respect human beings and thus have essential community rights.
- 6) The human being should co-respond to God in his or her relationship to nonhuman creation. The human being is destined for jurisdiction over and oneness with the earth and thus has essential economic rights and ecological duties.
- 7) Finally, the human being should co-respond to God in the succession of generations. The human being is in this respect a historical being and has corresponding temporal rights and duties in the succession of generations.⁸⁴

5.3. Contribution of Islam to Human Rights

Certain leaders within the Islamic community also recognise the need to support human rights, and drafted accordingly the *Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights*. The document reflects generally the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, but regards Islam as the foundation for the declaration, stating, “This is a declaration for mankind, a guidance and instruction for those who fear God (Al Qur’ān, Al-Imran 3:138).” The Foreword of the Declaration grounds human rights in God as the source of all human rights:

Islam gave mankind an ideal code of human rights fourteen centuries ago. These rights aim at conferring honour and dignity upon mankind and eliminating exploitation, oppression and injustice.

Human rights in Islam are firmly rooted in the belief that God, and God alone, is the Law Giver and the Source of all human rights. Due to their Divine origin, no ruler, government, assembly or authority can curtail or violate in any way the human rights conferred by God, nor can they be surrendered.⁸⁵

The document admits that many countries, including Muslim countries, do not today uphold human rights, and indicates that this is a serious breach of Islamic ideals.⁸⁶

The Declaration then addresses many of the same issues of human rights that are of importance to peace-building in areas of conflict. These include: 1) Right to Life; 2)

⁸⁴ Moltmann 1984: 11, 12.

⁸⁵ UIDHR 1981: Foreword.

⁸⁶ UIDHR 1981: Foreword.

Right To Freedom; 3) Right to Equality; 4) Right to Justice; 5) Right to Fair Trial; 6) Right to Protection Against Power; 7) Rights to Minorities; 8) Right to Freedom of Belief, Thought and Speech; 9) Right to Freedom of Religion; and 10) Right to Freedom of Movement and Residence.⁸⁷

These rights, and several others not listed here, present a basis from which Muslims can interact both with other Muslims and others not of their religious community. They especially afford insight for areas that see regular conflict.

It is clear from the foregoing that at the international level substantial convergence exists between the human rights agenda of secular agencies and religious bodies. Over time and with some degree of trust, a symbiotic relationship between the two has even developed. However, there remains a wide gap between the legislation and monitoring of human rights and the enforcement of the same in local conflicts. As Chandler notes, the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina may have the highest level of human rights freedoms without experiencing a secure environment.⁸⁸ In instances where a real threat exists, the policing and enforcement of human rights sometimes provokes a belligerent and violent effect. Enforcing human rights effectively brings some measure of help to the weaker party while separating the parties of conflict. Better still is the peace that results through the reconciliation of those parties.

6. Religion and Reconciliation

Theologian Colin Gunton remarked, "Reconciliation is one of the few words deriving from the Christian theological tradition to remain in vogue in the secularised vocabulary of modern politics."⁸⁹ Undoubtedly this is so not because of the success of peace-making and reconciliation in the world, but because of the continuing need for conflict resolution. A closer examination of the secular and theological meaning of reconciliation will serve to illuminate how it may contribute to conflict resolution.

Non-religious efforts of reconciliation seek to restore broken relationships through immanent processes, most frequently through economic and political incentives. The prospect for reconciliation is dependent upon the parties of dispute, and can be mediated by non-partisan, third-party involvement. Mediators seek to leverage

⁸⁷ UIDHR 1981: np. Other rights not listed above constitute the remainder of the Declaration.

⁸⁸ Chandler 1999: 94.

⁸⁹ Gunton 2003: 2.

aspects of common need against aspects of dispute, with the hope that mutuality will overcome animosity. The success of the effort rests on a combination of human volition and external mechanisms. A mediator can often be the bridge builder to a new relationship based on mutual need. However, mutual need may not be strong enough for enduring peace. The balance of peace is consequently relativised by the circumstances of the moment. Economic incentives re-establish trade links and bring parties into contact again, but lack substantive depth to overcome deep-seated animosities, and cannot therefore qualify as reconciliation. As in the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, political incentives meant to encourage cooperation succeed mostly in keeping one national group from disadvantaging another. External mechanisms often either do not address the causes of the enmity, or minimise them. Consequently, root causes of animosity are trivialised and remain unresolved. Buried in one generation, they are left to resurface in a later generation, perpetuating the cycle of violence.

A Christian view of reconciliation presupposes a different framework. Transcendental estrangement between Creator and created requires in the first order a reconciliation between God and humanity. It asserts the fundamental incapacity of humans to negotiate reconciliation with God. Reconciliation is wholly the action and gift of God to humanity through the mediating work of Jesus Christ:

[T]hrough him [Christ] God was pleased to dwell, and through him God was pleased to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, by making peace through the blood of his cross. And you who were once estranged and hostile in mind, doing evil deeds, he has now reconciled in his fleshly body through death, so as to present you holy and blameless and irreproachable before him... (Col. 1:20-22 NRSV).

Further, a Christian perspective recognises the capacity for evil within all humans and cannot therefore share the unabashed optimism of moral positivists. A Christian framework anticipates enmity rather than mutuality in human endeavours. Because Christianity is neither surprised by the human capacity for evil nor expects redemptive moral good through human agency, it points to a need for unilateral, supernatural agency from God to humanity.

The implications are far-reaching at the human level. Because God recognises the universality of humanity's sinfulness, the gift of reconciliation is offered unilaterally and pervasively to all humanity. Claims of superiority based on ethnicity, gender, class or culture are dispossessed of importance in view of God's mercy universally extended. By relegating race and nationhood to a lesser level of importance, the prospect for conflict resolution and reconciliation is raised. Moreover, the act of

redemption overcomes the essential and existential estrangement from the Creator, and redefines identity primarily in relationship *to* God, not *against* others. For this reason, the apostle Paul urges believers to recognise their newly created self, regenerated by the redemptive act of unilateral reconciliation:

...[Y]ou have stripped off the old self with its practices and have clothed yourselves with the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge according to the image of the creator. In that renewal there is no longer Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave and free; but Christ is all and in all! (Col. 3:9-11 NRSV).

In contrast to a naturalist process of reconciliation dependent upon the volitional goodwill of human agency, Christianity offers the possibility of reconciliation between persons that is enabled through the power of God that exceeds human agency and volition. Christian Schwöbel highlights this critical point with a caution:

There is no direct analogy between God reconciling the world to himself and reconciliation between humans so that in our attempts at achieving reconciliation in the political realm we could somehow continue and make effective God's work in politics.... Rather, God's reconciliation of the world in Christ qualifies human relationships in a way that is in accordance with this promise of reconciliation and thus opens up new possibilities of achieving reconciliation between humans. The analogy is strictly an *analogia transcendentalis*.⁹⁰

The Christian believer is distinctly advantaged over the materialist because both the possibility and the enabling for reconciliation are available from a transcendent source. S/he is not constrained by resources available only from within her/himself, but may draw from those available in the Creator.

Moreover, God's reconciling act is ethically motivational. In his cogent analysis, which consciously moves beyond the theological to the pastoral and meditative, Robert Schreiter asserts that reconciliation has both spiritual and strategic dimensions. As a human endeavour, reconciliation must be a way of living,⁹¹ but it also must be employed strategically if it is to see any degree of success. Schreiter believes "a balance between spirituality and strategy" must be maintained, but he clearly places the emphasis on the spiritual dimension and is tacitly critical of efforts that place a primary emphasis on techniques to be learned.⁹² Westerners with many resources at their disposal often rely on strategies that place most of the responsibility and control in human hands. According to Schreiter, reconciliation is

⁹⁰ Schwöbel 2003: 36.

⁹¹ Schreiter 1998: vi.

⁹² Schreiter 1998: 17.

in the first order a work of God who initiates and completes the process through Christ.⁹³ Drawing upon the classic biblical texts of 2 Corinthians 5:17-22 and Romans 5:6-11, Schreiter places both victim and wrongdoer in the centre of the reconciliation process. The reconciliation found and envisioned is the restoration of humanity, which is the very heart of reconciliation.⁹⁴

Schreiter makes a distinction between individual and social reconciliation.

“Individual reconciliation occurs,” says Schreiter, “when the victim’s damaged humanity is restored”, which often happens through a supportive community.⁹⁵

Social reconciliation is different from individual reconciliation, but necessarily includes and draws upon the latter for the former. It involves the human element of those individuals that have experienced reconciliation firsthand. In contrast to materialist efforts of reconciliation, which focus on rebuilding civil society and sustaining its ability to function, social reconciliation is “a process of reconstructing the moral order”,⁹⁶ the chief ingredient of which is justice.⁹⁷ Social reconciliation works in two directions simultaneously. As it corrects and restitutes past offences, social reconciliation must also act in public ways to secure the future from similar atrocities.⁹⁸

Social reconciliation will necessarily have a communal expression, addressing the common needs of public truth telling and justice.⁹⁹ The appropriate vehicle through which this social and communal act finds expression is the church, the community of believers. Reconciliation is both a responsibility for the church (2 Cor. 5: 17ff.) and a challenge to it, as the following passage indicates:

All this is from God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ, and has given us the ministry of reconciliation; that is, in Christ God was reconciling the world to himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and entrusting the message of reconciliation to us. So we are ambassadors for Christ, since God is making his appeal through us; we entreat you on behalf of Christ, be reconciled to God (2 Cor. 5:18-20 NRSV).

⁹³ Schreiter 1998: 14.

⁹⁴ Schreiter 1998: 15-17.

⁹⁵ Schreiter 1998: 111.

⁹⁶ José Zalaquett, as cited in Schreiter 1998: 112.

⁹⁷ Schreiter 1998: 113.

⁹⁸ Schreiter 1998: 113.

⁹⁹ Schreiter 1998: 117-123.

Schreiter claims that the Church offers a different approach and dimension to reconciliation through its message and its capacity for creating communities of reconciliation.¹⁰⁰ This in turn may be a way of defining mission in the world today.¹⁰¹

Reconciliation is the place of common ground in two ways. It is first the place where parties in dispute come together and resolve their conflict. It is also the place where secular and religious peace-builders can find common ground, if perhaps not in the means and source of their efforts, then certainly in the result.

7. Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the potential of religion – specifically Christianity and Islam – to contribute to peace-building in several critical domains. First, religion offers a strong contribution to peace-building through identity and values-clarification. Especially during periods of ideological, political and economic transition, religion offers stability in identity (re)formation that is rooted in historic cultural communities and institutions. Religion offers a framework for defining self in a historical-cultural community, and in relationship to others outside of the community. Additionally, the received texts of the Christian and Muslim religious communities contribute to values-clarification defining the domain of peace, both in the sense of contractual agreements of disarmament and in the realm of societal security and wholeness of being.

Second, the chapter points to the capacity of religion and the religious communities to offer local resources for social restoration. The religions of Bosnia-Herzegovina already offer the basis for social ethics and human rights. When they are not compromised and relegated to sectarian practices of politicised nationalism or pietistic isolationism, the religious communities can serve as a dynamic presence for peace-building. Religions offer principles for the treatment of others who are outside one's own community. Here, in the impassioned areas of ethics and human rights, the objectives of the international community's peace-building initiatives find convergence with the religious communities. Precisely where first level diplomacy and secular initiatives are weak, the religious communities demonstrate strong potential for social transformation. The contributions of the religious communities

¹⁰⁰ Schreiter also includes the power of the Church's rituals in the Roman Catholic Church.

¹⁰¹ Schreiter 1998: 127-130.

are confirmation of Lederach's model advocating dimensions of peace-building from second and third level diplomacy that incorporates resources from within the society and theatre of conflict.

Finally, the chapter has demonstrated how religious actors have the potential to extend the peace-building factors of ethics and human rights to reconciliation. Religion's contribution to reconciliation in its conceptual, personal, communal and political expressions fosters peace-building by shifting the social situation from fragmentation and division towards wholeness and unity. In the next three chapters the religious expressions of peace-building will be explored in the specific context of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

PART TWO

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION FOCUSING ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS, WOMEN, AND STUDENTS TO PEACE-BUILDING AND SOCIAL RESTORATION

CHAPTER FOUR

VIEWS OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS ON PEACE-BUILDING AND SOCIAL RESTORATION

1. Introduction

This chapter probes whether religious faith can contribute to peace-building and social restoration by analysing the views of religious leaders from the Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant communities. Specifically, the chapter will explore the Research Question, “What empirical evidence is there of religious leaders engaging in peace-building on the basis of their theological and ethical teachings?” Thus, the aim of the chapter is to assess the degree to which their commitment to peace-building reflects their faith convictions.

The chapter is also interested to examine what the religious leaders perceive as the barriers to peace-building and social restoration, and from what theological, philosophical and sociological basis they address these difficulties. Of approximately twenty aspects of peace-building that emerge from the data analysis,¹ the findings of four of the most prominent are here presented for examination. These four related areas are: 1) Identity Formation and Transformation; 2) Religion and Politics; 3) Ethics and Morality; and 4) Justice and Forgiveness. In handling these

¹ Some of the issues that emerge from the data are the Dayton Accord, the Hague, nationalism, ethnic dissonance and exclusion, religion and national differentiation, religion and politics, *djemma* and security of minorities, the historical/mythological past, ‘faith’ and ‘religion’, perceptions of ‘true’ vs. ‘false’ religion, justice, peace and hope, reconciliation, values-clarification, forgiveness, ethnic harmony/dissonance, healing, peace-making vs. peace-building, holy books, evangelism and the Gospel, Jesus Christ, Creation, ethics and morality, and *diakonia*.

four issues some general parity and continuity with previous chapters is maintained, adding now the particular and contextual dimension to the discourse.

Biographical and narrative accounts punctuate the discussion at appropriate points and serve to highlight the important dimension of context. To further distinguish the personalities, each person is assigned a code beside their name in the footnote reference, indicating religious affiliation, their profile as religious leaders, and the city in which they live. This coding is elaborated on page xx.

2. Identity Formation and Transformation

In the absence of a confederate Yugoslavia, the question of identity is framed largely by communal parameters. Community leaders clamber to retain ‘their’ people and protect their rights in the new free market of ideologies represented in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only exceptionally have religious leaders opposed the sectarian use of religion, and those who do incur the paroxysm of their co-religionists, often becoming targets of violence in the process.

2.1. Identity and Barrier Setting

Monsignor Mato Zovkić, who is the representative for Vinko Cardinal Puljić on Inter-Religious Affairs, articulates clearly the dilemma faced by religious leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In a democratic, pluralist society, he is a citizen with full rights, but he is also part of an ethnic and religious minority group within a multi-ethnic country.² He also finds the “coincidence of religious and ethnic identity” to be “a terrible problem” which challenges all religious leaders.³ Zovkić considers himself to be a pluralist in the spirit of Vatican II,⁴ but his Catholic co-religionists expect him to support the Croatian national cause, and speak a Croatian dialect.⁵ Speaking for all of the nations in general, Zovkić relates the following:

[It is difficult] to cherish your true faith and to neglect [y]our ethnic cause. By cherishing primarily your ethnic cause, you develop into a nationalist. It takes a lot of internal self-education to respect your ethnic identity, to study your poems, your writers, your history and at the same time to get informed about the poetry and history of others, and live together in one nation.⁶

² Zovkić [RC.RL.SA.05]: 2.

³ Zovkić [RC.RL.SA.05]: 12.

⁴ Zovkić [RC.RL.SA.05]: 1.

⁵ Zovkić [RC.RL.SA.05]: 2.

⁶ Zovkić [RC.RL.SA.05]: 12.

Persons in rural areas are especially oriented to a collective identity rather than individual expressions of citizenship, which is necessary in the “developed Western countries with stable democracies”.⁷ For many, national mythologies and ideologies are stronger than living faith, and because persons respond according to community mores and expectations, “it is hard to be a dissident or a rejected prophet in your community - suspected by your own and not trusted by others”.⁸

One well-known community leader known throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina is Franciscan Ivo Marković of Sarajevo. Marković has been recognised for his reconciling work with the Peace Activist Award of the Tannenbaum Center of Interreligious Understanding (New York), and is the founder of *Oči u Oči* (Face to Face) Inter-Religious Service. In 1993 Marković lost his father, nine relatives, thirty two neighbours and eighty four parishioners at the hands of Bošnjak forces moving through Central Bosnia.⁹ Marković emphasises language as a marker of identity that can affirm or offend. Language carries the markers of identity, and language in Bosnia-Herzegovina today is a tool of exclusion. He asserts that the language spoken in Bosnia-Herzegovina “is one language, but as cultures, as civilisations, as a spirit of one nation, it can be distinguished. Certain kinds of language are content-laden and meant to divide. This misuse of language constitutes an evil, and ‘the violence of language.’”¹⁰ All the national communities now try to create discrete terms so that the dialects eventually become mutually unintelligible.¹¹ Marković continues:

The issue of language here in our environment in the Balkans is very important, because nationalists used the language for misunderstanding, but we reconcilers would like to revive good relations that we had before the war. We look for one language of understanding. I will not use, for example, new words that were created in Croatia... I look for language of understanding. I have to use the words that you understand. Sometimes I am reproached because my language is not Croatian enough. I think I speak very fine Croatian, but my language is different because I insist that Muslims and Serbs understand my language. That's it. I want to have a language of understanding, not misunderstanding.¹²

⁷ Zovkić [RC.RL.SA.05]: 15.

⁸ Zovkić [RC.RL.SA.05]: 15.

⁹ Pope 2000: np.

¹⁰ Marković [RC.RL.SA.01]: 5.

¹¹ Marković [RC.RL.SA.01]: 4.

¹² Marković [RC.RL.SA.01]: 5.

2.2. Identity Historically and Politically Determined

Several religious leaders strive to clarify their identity through historical and traditional elements. A recent study traces the development of Bošnjak identity from the time of Muslim encounter with the West under Austro-Hungarian hegemony over Bosnia-Herzegovina in the late nineteenth century to modernity. Bošnjak intellectuals were challenged by Western concepts of the nation-state and the attendant questions of the public role of Islam in society, Muslim unity, the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, *Shari'a*, legal reforms and court systems, economic transactions, endowments (*wakf*), the status of women in society and family laws, and external symbols of the adherence to Islam (attire).¹³ Muslim leaders interviewed in this research continue to be concerned with similar questions of identity, especially as it relates to the past.

The *Reisu-l-ulema*, Mustafa Cerić, is seen as the political leader of the Bošnjaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He makes a territorial claim to Europe through spiritual roots to the soil of Bosnia determined by birth.¹⁴ It is his home and, by extension, the home of other Bošnjaks born in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is therefore no question of being uprooted and leaving to another land. Cerić believes the *umma* of Bosnia-Herzegovina must be vigilant in guarding its identity or it will be lost through assimilation. At the same time the *umma* must guard against becoming isolated and alienated from other peoples around them, and steer a course towards co-operation.¹⁵ Co-operation strikes a balance between assimilation and isolation while retaining the richness of one's own cultural and religious identity. Cerić openly rejects the Islamists who advocate an Islamic state in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the *Shari'a*, and keeps a marked distance from sectarian Wahhabi¹⁶ followers now proselytising in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁷ But, he wishes that the international community would recognise the Bošnjaks as European, and is critical of the West for not coming to the aid of their own people when the Bošnjaks struggled for their existence.¹⁸

¹³ Karčić 1999: 31.

¹⁴ Cerić [MU.RL.SA.01]: 12, 13.

¹⁵ Cerić [MU.RL.SA.01]: 4.

¹⁶ For the origins and views of the Wahhābīs, see Al-Yassini 1995.

¹⁷ Šaje [RC.RL.SA.03]: 13.

¹⁸ Cerić [MU.RL.SA.01]: 12.

The International Relations Director for the *Reisu-l-ulema*, Ifet Mustafić, bristles at any suggestion that Bošnjaks are not Western.¹⁹ Speaking from the office of the *Reisu-l-ulema*, he acknowledges a strong regional identity between the Bošnjaks of Bosnia and those in Hercegovina, but rejects any notion that Bošnjaks are Turks,²⁰ a common reference used by non-Bošnjaks with derogatory intention. Mustafić thus assigns identity partly by apophatic means, that is to say, Bošnjaks are not Turks, Serbs, nationalists, secularists, and, in the case of those living regionally in Bosnia, are not Hercegovčiks. Professor Nedžad Grabus of the *Faculty of Islamic Studies* in Sarajevo also affirms strong regional ties through historical connections that link persons of Bosnia-Herzegovina across confession. Each week Grabus co-hosts an inter-religious radio programme with a Serbian Orthodox priest and a Roman Catholic priest where contemporary issues are looked at from the different religious perspectives. Grabus believes that Bošnjaks can be culturally closer to some Catholics and Orthodox in Bosnia-Herzegovina than to Muslims from other nations.²¹ He sees no comparison between Bosnia-Herzegovina and other predominantly Muslim states such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia or Iran because Bosnia-Herzegovina is European, and a pluralist, democratic society.²² Bošnjaks today see themselves as Western and European and are clearly setting a course towards integration.

In Banja Luka, Orthodox deacon Vladislav Radujković makes a distinction between “traditional believers” and “true Orthodox believers”, the former being those who claim Orthodox identity through birth and heritage, “a title and nothing else”.²³ He notes that this phenomenon is also observable in other religions, having personally witnessed it in Islam,²⁴ which Mustafić confirms.²⁵ Correspondingly, this has significant consequences for how persons conduct their lives and especially how they relate to others. Radujković cannot understand how someone who sincerely believes in God could commit the atrocities so common in the war, whether they are

¹⁹ Mustafić [MU.RL.SA.03]: 1, 2.

²⁰ Mustafić [MU.RL.SA.03]: 1-3.

²¹ Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 3.

²² Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 1.

²³ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 4.

²⁴ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 4.

²⁵ Mustafić draws a distinction between those who are Muslim by heritage and culture and those who are Muslim out of a “sense of religion” (Mustafić [MU.RL.SA.03]: 5).

Orthodox or from other religious communities. His assessment is that “people who were hiding behind religion led this war and didn’t know the basic things about their religion”.²⁶ Such persons of all nationalities and faiths call themselves believers, but “are not what they think they are” and are rather “people of the lie who live in a constant lie to themselves and others”.²⁷ Radujković thus raises the issue of national identity defined by religious tradition.

2.3. National Identity Defined by Religious Tradition

Radujković addresses identity issues of inclination and disinclination for Serbs. The community, says Radujković, is Serbian nationally and Orthodox religiously, and together these two elements have preserved the community’s knowledge and tradition. Throughout the centuries ‘Serbian’ and ‘Orthodox’ were virtually synonymous terms, but in the last sixty years there has been a division in meaning. Today there are also ‘non-Orthodox Serbs’ who have separated themselves from the faith and who Radujković likens to trees without roots.²⁸ As a seminarian in Belgrade, Radujković marched the streets with other Orthodox clergy in opposition to the nationalist regime of Slobodan Milošević. Today he heads a restoration and renewal movement in Banja Luka named after the venerated founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church, *St Sava Youth Fellowship (Svetosavska Omladinska Zajednica)*. It aims to introduce young persons who grew up under socialist atheism with no religious faith to the history and tenets of Serbian Orthodoxy through attractive and contemporary media and means, and revive the positive elements of Serbian national identity without denigrating those of other national origins. Identification with St Sava is a difficult concept to translate, but is as much a way of life as the true spirituality of Serbian Orthodoxy that allows the follower to enter into the heavenly Serbia. Bremer explains the principle thus:

Nach ihm ist das „Svetosavlje“ benannt, ein Ausdruck, der nur schwer zu übersetzen ist. Man könnte ihn etwa mit „Lebensprinzip nach dem hl. Sava“ umschreiben. Damit ist nicht so sehr der Kult des Heiligen gemeint, obwohl der auch eine große Rolle spielt, sondern vor allem die These, daß die Serben, wenn sie nach dem Svetosavlje leben, ihre wahre Religiosität verwirklichen und so in das himmlische Serbien eingehen können. Es ist interessant, daß die Prinzipien des Svetosavlje dabei oft gar nicht konkretisiert werden. Sava hat auch nicht etwa eine Schrift hinterlassen, in der er seine Spiritualität besonders darstellen würde. Vielmehr wird vorausgesetzt, daß die Zugehörigkeit zur orthodoxen Kirche und die

²⁶ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 3.

²⁷ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 7. He is referencing a popular bestseller of the 1980s. See Peck (1983).

²⁸ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 2.

Anerkennung ihrer Lehre und ihrer Frömmigkeit das zentrale Element des Svetosavlje sind.²⁹

Boško Tošković is a young Orthodox priest from Lukavica, a Serbian suburb of Sarajevo. He is eager to share the Serbian perspective on historical and contemporary events, and is an articulate co-host on the weekly radio programme with Muslim professor Nedžad Grabus. Tošković understands national identity as something inherited and internal.³⁰ This is the true self, which he contrasts to artificial external sources that lead to prejudice and hatred.³¹ As Tošković says, “I am not a Serb because I am a non-Muslim or a non-Croat but because, in a true way, I inherited my own culture. But that must not push me to hate others.”³² Tošković insists on the right of others to their own identity expressed in their own terms and therefore believes that the Bošnjaks have a right to exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina without assimilation.³³ This view carries strong implications for rights in a political state, but these issues Tošković sees as secondary and subordinate to the foundational issues of national identity.

Tošković believes the Serbian Orthodox Church has a defining role in shaping identity. Because humanity is both material and spiritual, the SOC helps to define the essential self. Religious communities provide a locus of identity for their people through their institutions that are living, functioning organisms that endure through time.³⁴ Tošković cites the Jews as the best case of his point. Despite losing a homeland and language, their religion allowed them to retain a conscious identity traceable to their ancestral forefathers, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.³⁵ So it is, according to Tošković, with every nation. A genetic and organic connection works together over time to form a nation. Additionally, the moral values of a nation laid down in seasons past contribute to defining a nation today.³⁶ Nationhood, then, is a progenitorial heritage with a moral code and value parameters, which a person can affirm or deny.³⁷

²⁹ Bremer 1992: 47.

³⁰ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 8.

³¹ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 8.

³² Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 8.

³³ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 10.

³⁴ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 15.

³⁵ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 15.

³⁶ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 15.

³⁷ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 15.

Tošković defends the Orthodox principle of organising the Church on the principle of nationhood, and supports it by use of scripture. He reads the Galatian (3:26-29) and Colossian (3:11ff.) passages that abolish ethnic distinctions between believers as a reference to a future, heavenly existence.³⁸ He also claims the Matthean passage (28:16ff.) supports the embodiment of a national Church:

We testify to that which is very important for our nation. The Orthodox Church is organised by a national principle referring to the Gospel, which says, ‘Go and teach all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father, Son and the Holy Spirit.’ So, in this life, we have our own ministries. We are children of our parents, we should be the best children as possible. Then we became parents and we should behave ourselves as good parents. We are members of our Church and we put our efforts in that to be as good as possible.... Then I can say that we are also sons of our nation and we should not be afraid of that feeling because that’s a positive feeling. Every man of sound mind will admit the importance of that feeling and he will allow others to be proud of their own nation, and that he has love for his nation. That doesn’t mean that he negates me as a member of another nation. It’s the same as when someone loves his family. These are complementary loves. Somebody can love his wife and children and still love me as a friend. And this is what you said, that ‘there is no Greek or Jew’ speaks about general human principles, and that still at the end, we are sons of God.³⁹

This explicates the Orthodox understanding of the relationship between nationhood and the Church, but several religious leaders from all of the confessions want to ground identity in something deeper.

2.4. Identity Defined by God in Creation

Like Tošković, Orthodox priest Vanja Jovanović sees identity organically related to nationhood. Jovanović is one of only two remaining priests in Sarajevo, where worship services at the cathedral rarely see any followers in attendance. Most Serbs have left for newly formed enclaves where Serbs are a majority, such as Lukovica, where Tošković serves, and where a new Serbian Orthodox church was built to accommodate the growing Serb community. Speaking from the office of Metropolitan Nikolaj in central Sarajevo, Jovanović argues that the suppression of both religion and national expression during the communist period resulted in the emergence of a false identity.⁴⁰ Jovanović holds that the essential elements of personhood are indivisible from God because “every man and woman is created by God, whether... an Orthodox Christian or not”.⁴¹ He believes that human beings “are

³⁸ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 15.

³⁹ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 15, 16.

⁴⁰ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 12.

⁴¹ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 5.

homo religiosus by nature”; individuals may be anti-theistic, in the sense of standing against God, but there is no such condition as atheism in the strict sense of the word.⁴² Moral responsibility and individual acts of the will are expressions of personal autonomy, and each individual may choose to accept or deny his or her theological and moral foundations of identity. God’s presence is in each individual and the relationship the individual has to God is personal and therefore the “concept of repentance is accessible to everyone”.⁴³ Those who affirm their theological and moral nature constitute the *laos*, or ‘people’, specifically, the people of the Church. Individual acts can be positive or negative, and are dependent upon the will of the individual.⁴⁴ Because each individual has the potential to do good or evil, and may have a personal relationship to God through the repentance of sins, it follows that no one has a right to condemn.⁴⁵

Jovanović illustrates this position with references to the majority of people who stood against Christ, and those early Christians who stood against Saul, who became the eloquent apologist for Christianity.⁴⁶ “The transformation of the interior of the soul”⁴⁷ is a personal matter between the individual and God, and it is therefore not the role of the priest to condemn but to encounter people in the Church and engage them over matters of their soul.⁴⁸ The problems from the war and the issues of social justice must take a secondary role to the matter of the salvation of souls.⁴⁹ Jovanović therefore does not want to spend his energies condemning acts of wrongdoing; rather, he wants to extend love to others, which enables transformation and brings salvation.⁵⁰

Muslim professor Nedžad Grabus grounds identity first in relationship to God, and then in shared relationship with other humanity. As creations of God, Muslims and Christians alike have a responsibility to show love and respect, which he feels is a duty often forgotten in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁵¹ Grabus believes that it is a bigger sin

⁴² Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 5.

⁴³ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 6.

⁴⁴ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 6.

⁴⁵ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 6.

⁴⁶ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 6.

⁴⁷ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 6, 7.

⁴⁸ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 6.

⁴⁹ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 6, 7.

⁵⁰ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 6.

⁵¹ Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 13.

to hurt another human being than to destroy the Ka'ba, because human hands created the Ka'ba, but God alone creates originals.⁵² Grabus therefore identifies inter-religious tolerance as one of the key characteristics of the new expression of religious identity. Remaining true to one's own religious identity while also recognising the validity of other religious groups can be done through a return to the holy books "in order to understand what God wants to say to people".⁵³ Those who perpetuate the bloodshed of historical conflicts belong to the past, whereas people of the future will discover through the holy books the true intentions of God.⁵⁴ For the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, Bošnjaks who are also religious, religion both defines them and creates a bond with other religious people who work together for the good of Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁵⁵

Franciscan Marko Oršolić argues a similar case. Oršolić is a tireless worker for peace and the restoration of a multi-religious, multi-cultural civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Before the war started in Bosnia-Herzegovina he founded the International Multireligious Interculture Center (IMIC), also known as *Zajedno* ('Together'), a faith-based NGO that aims to help overcome division between persons through inter-religious dialogue and social activism. During the war he assisted thousands of Muslims to fleeing Bosnia-Herzegovina to escape certain death. He also was forced to live as a refugee for a time in Germany, where he continued to be an outspoken critic of injustice and intolerance, whether in the political or religious sphere. Not infrequently he challenges leadership within all three religious traditions, and believes they must all change, as is related with the following:

I must admit that the churches, because of traditionalism and unwillingness to accept change, belatedly realised what was in question. All three churches [sic]. The Catholic church is burdened by traditionalism. The deliberations of the Second Vatican Council, with the exception of the most learned and highest members of the hierarchy, have not yet permeated the feelings and views of the believers at large. The Orthodox church is also burdened by traditionalism and anachronism, the sediments of newer political history. Our Islam, on the other side, does not realise that it is a kind of European Islam very specific as compared to Saudi-Arabian and other Islams. If it wants a dialogue with Christianity it must embrace the principles of enlightenment, human rights and humanism. Only when

⁵² Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 22. Islamic tradition believes that God created the original, primordial Ka'ba that exists in heaven.

⁵³ Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 4.

⁵⁴ Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 4.

⁵⁵ Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 12.

monotheistic communities succeed in emancipating themselves along these lines, will they be able to contribute the establishment of civilized relations among nations. I am convinced that a dialogue among the nations in our country cannot be established without a dialogue among religions, because religions so fatally correspond to nations here.⁵⁶

Oršolić explains the basis for understanding and co-existence by that which is common to all persons. He holds that the key to the reconciliation process and human rights is the understanding that all of humanity belongs to God as his children.⁵⁷ He draws a clear distinction between the essential identity of humans and artificially constructed identities. His point of reference is the creation account in which God made humankind (*čovjek*), both male and female, and that humankind's true identity (*pravi identitet čovjeka*) is found in this primordial event. "Other kinds of identities, including the national one," says Oršolić, "are historical products."⁵⁸ Finding one's true identity requires the (re)cognition that "we are all God's children" which will have significant meaning for how we treat one another, and in human rights.⁵⁹ While Oršolić defines humanity's essential nature by a religious and spiritual source, he believes the role of agnostics in the process of social restoration is also important, provided that they take religion seriously. He accepts that we cannot know who is a believer and who is not "because the line between the believer and unbeliever goes through people and not between people",⁶⁰ and so people must refrain from practices which exclude others.

2.5. Identity Shaped by the *Imago Dei* in Created Humanity

Christians find still a further source of identity that at once binds them together with all of humanity. Protestant leader Kuzmić says that "All of us share *Imago Dei*, and all of us have a common original parent in God."⁶¹ Similarly, Radujković finds the locus of humanity's true self in the divine image that God invests in every human creature.⁶² This image is completed in Christ, the second Adam, who rectified the failure of the first Adam. Thus, all Christians, whether Orthodox, Catholic, or Protestant, have the task to demonstrate by personal example the reason for Christ's

⁵⁶ AIM 1993: np.

⁵⁷ Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 3.

⁵⁸ Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 3.

⁵⁹ Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 3.

⁶⁰ Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 1.

⁶¹ Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: 5.

⁶² Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 5.

coming.⁶³ This is accomplished by personal union (*theosis*) with Christ through communion. Baptism, which qualifies the believer to be a carrier of the Holy Spirit, and *theosis*, or union with Christ, then become fundamental to the way in which Christians relate to other persons. So long as we are united with Christ, we may also be united with all who also have the image of Christ, regardless of gender or race.⁶⁴ Liturgical renewal is important, then, to bring Christians back to a proper understanding of themselves in relationship to God and his ordered cosmology, and to unity through communion with Christ and all who bear the divine image. Guarding against the possibility of becoming a lightning rod for chauvinistic nationalists, Radujković also teaches in the youth fellowship that he leads about how the essential self can relate to God in *theosis*, based on the theology of St Athanasius (c.296-373), and Gregory Palamas (c.1296-1359), which the Byzantine Council of 1351 received into general practice as affirming the Sixth Ecumenical Council (680). Thus, local exploration and discovery of self goes well beyond exclusivist Serb references to that which is universally Orthodox, and is ultimately related to God.

2.6 Identity Defined through New Creation

Others still find renewal and transformation available in identity with Christ. Bernard Mikulić pastors a Protestant church in the Croat stronghold of Čapljina in Herzegovina, where he spent his childhood. There he has begun an outreach ministry to Trebinje, a Serbian stronghold of the Republika Srpska. He observes many different groups organised around political views, ethnic groups, and religious creeds. These groups provide an identity, but in so doing also divide people. All of these groups demonstrate the human desire to belong somewhere or to something. The division itself is an attempt to explain one's circumstances and make sense of a chaotic situation. But Mikulić cannot justify the hatred on any grounds, and identifies it as sin.⁶⁵ The centre of the hatred lies not in historical antecedent or in political ideology, but in the heart of the person.⁶⁶

Mikulić relates the identity change autobiographically, and senses that what he now has in Christ is a new identity above all other identities.⁶⁷ The compelling need to

⁶³ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 6.

⁶⁴ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 16.

⁶⁵ Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 7.

⁶⁶ Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 2.

⁶⁷ Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 7, 8.

belong to one of these groups is lost when a person belongs to heaven, and affords greater value than the group.⁶⁸ Although he is no longer a Catholic, he remains a Croat, and this will not change. But his primary identity is now defined by belonging to God, and as a child of God. The new identity also has given him a fresh perspective and orientation, and is the antithesis of that given by society. As Mikulić puts it:

Your whole perspective has changed when you meet Christ. This was also a big surprise for me. Everything I valued, those things which I thought were moral and good, you know, how to live, when I met Christ, everything was opposite.⁶⁹

Similarly, Protestant leader Nikola Škrinjarić speaks about the development of “a new identity in Christ” which allowed him to recognise the artificiality of nationalism. He subsequently became “dead to [his] national feelings”.⁷⁰ He deplores the notion that one national group is better than another and believes that whether people act for good or evil is an individual matter of the will.⁷¹

Škrinjarić believes religious leaders have an especially important role in the rebuilding of society, which is predicated on his own experience and on the witness of transformed lives. He believes there must be change in society, but knows the limitation of political efforts. Peace held together by external means is weak,⁷² and laws may regulate society, but the kind of change society needs is internal. Peace with one’s enemy derives first from peace with God, and then in re-envisioning one’s neighbour no longer as enemy, but as a brother created by God.⁷³ Škrinjarić views the Protestant churches as a multi-national model of this kind of transformation and peace potentiality. Transformation is foundational for the churches:

[I]n Mostar, when the war was going on in the streets, we had different ethnic groups together and they were really having peace with one another. Of course, some of them had personal problems, you know, within the groups sometimes, but they really had this peace that comes from above. And they had been in peace worshipping the Lord together.... And some of them of course, they had their own bitterness, their own problems in their lives. But they saw this model in the church, they accept that this is a possibility for their life as well. And little by little they experienced love

⁶⁸ Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 7.

⁶⁹ Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 8.

⁷⁰ Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 2.

⁷¹ Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 10.

⁷² Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 3, 11.

⁷³ Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 3.

and help from someone from another ethnic group, and people... didn't look at them through... national glasses.⁷⁴

Škrinjarić also emphasises the responsibility of individuals. He believes that people of Bosnia-Herzegovina undervalue their own self-worth, and believes that if this were corrected, they “would go around to cities and villages and bring good news of reconciliation and forgiveness”.⁷⁵ The basis for forgiveness and living in peace with one's once-considered enemy, however, is the transformation effected in the individual by God in Christ Jesus. Škrinjarić points to the biblical idea of becoming a “new creation” which is not, in his conviction, available in Islam or the traditional churches.⁷⁶ It is a supernatural experience of true love, which casts out all fear. True faith, which can overcome fear and hatred, is not comprehensible by those who don't have the same experience.⁷⁷ Škrinjarić is sure to point out, however, that although this is a strong power, it is not one that is generated from oneself. It is a spiritual phenomenon and the “power of the Gospel” which bears fruit.⁷⁸

The current president of the Evangelical Church *sabor* (governing council) and pastor of the West Mostar church, Karmelo Krešonja, links the identity crisis after the demise of socialist Yugoslavia with those who “found trust in the Lord in a completely different way”.⁷⁹ They retain their cultural heritage, but it is no longer the defining element of identity. Krešonja describes the situation thus:

I believe that nobody in the Church looks at another to identify who is from a national group. They are trying to help each other. They are visiting each other. Many times when we do evangelism, for example, we mix three ladies from three different groups, so people are shocked. If they come to a Croatian, they say, how can Serbians and Muslims and Croats be together? Or how is it that a Muslim is now sharing the gospel of Jesus Christ to me, or such things. So, it is a challenge really for the people to start thinking. Because people are surprised when the Muslim knows more about the Bible than the Croatian does, or the Serbian does! So they start to think, you know. There must be something deeper there to change those people, because in their mindset, for so many Croats, for so many Serbians or for Muslims, there are certain areas that people just cannot cross over. They start to think it can be a good feeling to live together. So they

⁷⁴ Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 3.

⁷⁵ Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 6.

⁷⁶ Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 6.

⁷⁷ Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 8.

⁷⁸ Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 8, cf. Romans 1:16 “For I am not ashamed of the gospel; it is the power of God for salvation to everyone who has faith, to the Jew first and also to the Greek.”

⁷⁹ Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 5.

lose their barriers, and we see people are crossing them and actually changing.⁸⁰

Krešonja relates the new identity to the biblical concept of ‘new citizenship’⁸¹ and the transitions the republics of former Yugoslavia are now undergoing. Citizenship provides both identity and freedoms. “Our people in the church,” says Krešonja, “look at their identity as new creatures in Christ.”⁸² This identity has both transcendent and immanent manifestations. A new creation identity shapes an entire worldview that relates the local church to ethno-political realities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Krešonja puts it this way:

We believe that we should have a new identity here on earth but also we should think of a united Bosnia-Herzegovina, but we think globally. So I would also express that I believe that one day the Republika Srpska will disappear, because we believe it is the will of God that Bosnia-Herzegovina is united and that all people can come to faith and that we will not see the barriers between the people and that we will not be looking on their social income or something like that, but we will be looking at their identity in what they really are.⁸³

Krešonja is sober about the social realities of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a result of the war and the needed transition to a healthy situation. He participates in inter-religious meetings to actively encourage change in the divided city. However, the religious communities in Mostar rarely effect positive change for the community, and inter-communal efforts are frequently rebuffed. Krešonja believes that an improved situation will not happen by becoming religious or through a traditional church, but by transformation which “is bringing light and his [Christ’s] kingdom to Bosnia-Herzegovina”.⁸⁴ Krešonja would like to see the influence of the churches grow and even become politically engaged in order that a healthy situation might result in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁸⁵ This will happen with the transformation of a mindset and

⁸⁰ Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 6.

⁸¹ The reference is to Philippians 3:20, 21: “But our citizenship is in heaven, and it is from there that we are expecting a Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ. He will transform the body of our humiliation that it may be conformed to the body of his glory, by the power that also enables him to make all things subject to himself.”

⁸² Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 7, referencing 2 Corinthians 5: “So if anyone is in Christ, there is a new creation: everything old has passed away; see, everything has become new!”

⁸³ Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 17.

⁸⁴ Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 20, referencing Matthew 5:14: “You are the light of the world. A city built on a hill cannot be hid. No one after lighting a lamp puts it under the bushel basket, but on a lampstand, and it gives light to all in the house. In the same way, let your light shine before others, so that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father in heaven.”

⁸⁵ Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 20.

“standards of believing and behaving towards other people”,⁸⁶ which must go beyond the social and cultural protocols of politeness and hospitality for which Bosnia-Herzegovina is known. It is an internal transformation accomplished by the Spirit of God.⁸⁷

2.7. Conclusion to the Identity Formation Section

From the foregoing discussion on Identity Formation and Transformation some commonalities from the religious leaders may be discerned. First, several religious leaders from both Muslim and Christian perspectives point out that the factors of identity as defined by nationhood are artificial and human constructs. While these are important in forming a communal identity, they remain secondary to a deeper, primordial identity. Second, primary identity is found in relation to God, especially in his creative act that establishes parity between all peoples. Third, proper relationship to God and his precepts gives new understanding and orientation that is supranational. It motivates persons to self-examination, the first necessary dynamic for individual and communal change. Fourth, rightly relating to God is a sufficient cause for properly relating to others in ways that lead to social restoration and peace-building.

3. Religion and Politics

The ambivalence about the relationship of religion and politics is analysed in this section. Some religious leaders believe they can and should make positive contributions to society through engagement in the political sphere. However, most find that strong ties between religion and politics failed to act as a corrective to political abuse, and succeeded in co-opting key religious figures for nationalist objectives. Insofar as the religious leadership became involved in nationalist causes, they lost their independent and prophetic voice for leading people. At the same time, they felt an obligation to remain politically engaged in order to protect the rights of their ethno-religious community at a time when no one else would. Fundamental security issues required that leaders in all segments of society remain vigilant and involved. The following then explores the views of religious leaders on the topic of religion and politics.

⁸⁶ Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 20.

⁸⁷ Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 21.

3.1. The Nature of Politics and Religion during the Socialist Period

Marković makes an important distinction both about atheism in Europe and socialism's atheistic practice in Yugoslavia. The various expressions of atheism in Europe were forms of social protest specifically addressed against the repressive power of the (medieval) Church.⁸⁸ Social philosophers sought to weaken the power base of the Church by redefining the personal God of revealed Scripture as the impersonal philosophical abstraction of *deus* and offering deism as an alternative to theism. The god of rationalism undermined the power that was traditionally believed to reside in the Church. Anti-religionists in socialist Yugoslavia were concerned less to attack the existence of God in philosophical terms than to subvert the basis of ecclesiastical power and its hold over society. Communism in its Yugoslav context was not atheistic *per se*, but rather anti-theistic and anti-Church.⁸⁹ The communist political elite sought to substitute politics for religion, and, insofar as politics has its own belief system, it became a quasi-religious ideology. Thus, in his endeavours of reconciliation and mediation, Marković wants to convert people away from ideology and rediscover religious faith.⁹⁰

Protestant leader Kuzmić is of a similar mind as Marković regarding the dynamics of politics and religion in the political realm from the communist past. He is a well-connected religious leader who had significant influence in the political sphere through his testimony in US Senate hearings on Balkan affairs.⁹¹ He also addressed the issues of rising nationalism after the death of Tito and before the collapse of Yugoslavia.⁹² Kuzmić is the founder of the Evangelical Theological Faculty in Osijek, Croatia where in 1992 critical peace negotiations between Serbs and Croats took place when no other neutral meeting place could be found. His efforts during the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina brought thousands of tonnes of aid to the Balkans over several years, and kept the flow of aid coming to destitute IDPs when most agencies pulled out. Kuzmić also participated in reconciliation meetings with high level religious leaders in the Balkans over the Kosovo crisis in 1999. With this level of involvement from a non-national Church body, Kuzmić is vigilant to warn against

⁸⁸ Marković [RC.RL.SA.01]: 6.

⁸⁹ Marković [RC.RL.SA.01]: 7.

⁹⁰ Marković [RC.RL.SA.01]: 7.

⁹¹ Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: 13, 14.

⁹² Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: 13.

the fusion of religion and politics, assessing this dynamic in the wider context of post-communist Europe as follows:

...I would come back to my interview done back in 1989... to point out the danger of religion or faith instrumentalised by nationalistic ideologies and therefore reduced and stripped of its universal truth claims. And we have seen it all across Eastern Europe in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of communist totalitarian states. So you have communist ideologies similarly replaced by conflicting nationalistic ideologies supported by the nationally employed religion and faith communities. That, of course, is a betrayal of faith.⁹³

Many of these religious leaders see a similar danger as Kuzmić, and view political engagement with some wariness. At the same time politics plays differently for each religio-national community, and leaves each community with a perception of vulnerability, as is explored in the following segment.

3.2 Religion and National Politics

The *umma* in Bosnia-Herzegovina finds itself precariously situated between expansionist Croat nationalists in the southwestern stronghold of Herzegovina⁹⁴ and Serb expansionists in the east and north of Bosnia. Muslim leaders thus take great care to place the *umma* within a European framework that embraces Western political ideals.⁹⁵ Grand Mufti Cerić affirms that a secular state is an acceptable political structure, but not in a philosophical or ideological sense. He accepts a separation between religion and politics, but that each must be able to influence the other. “Politics is,” according to Cerić, “too important to be left to the politicians alone, in the same way that theology is too important today to be left to the theologians alone.”⁹⁶ Security is understandably a high priority for the *umma* of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and despite recent interventionist failures in this area, they clearly see their future with the West and democratic ideals.

Mustafić is exercised over the political failures of ‘Christian’ Europe to protect the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He points out that protection of non-Muslims was guaranteed under Islamic law during the Ottoman period.⁹⁷ Although the principle of *djimme* is reserved for predominantly Muslim states and is anachronistic for Bosnia-Herzegovina today, Mustafić relates the principle rights of citizens stemming from

⁹³ Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: p13.

⁹⁴ This is the so-called region of Herzeg-Bosna.

⁹⁵ Mustafić [MU.RL.SA.03]:10, 11.

⁹⁶ Cerić [MU.RL.SA.01]: 6.

⁹⁷ Mustafić [MU.RL.SA.03]: 10, 11.

djimma for today, as often expounded by Grand Mufti Cerić: the right to life, property, religion, freedom, and dignity.⁹⁸ Speaking from the office of the *Reisu-l-ulema*, Mustafić draws upon recent Balkan history as a guide to a future model of interaction between religion and politics. Consistent with the teachings of the Qurʾān,⁹⁹ he is adamant that no political regime should force citizens into religion, as was the case during the Second World War in Yugoslavia.¹⁰⁰ Neither should citizens be forced into no religion, as was tacitly attempted during the socialist period. Mustafić affirms the secular state but rejects a secular ideology.¹⁰¹ He thus believes that there ought to be no compulsion in politics, just as there should be no compulsion in religion.

Grabus asserts that democratic processes must take precedent in a pluralistic society like Bosnia-Herzegovina. *Djimma* worked well for its time in Muslim-dominant societies, but there is no application of such means of protection in Bosnia-Herzegovina today, because the government protects the individual.¹⁰² Grabus is interested in the platforms of political parties as a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and as a Muslim believer, he is keen to discuss social issues from a religious perspective, as he does in the radio programme each week.

Orthodox priest Tošković is critical of the West's interventionist policies and wants to see the international community take more responsibility for the wrongdoing at Srebrenica. At the same time he only mildly acknowledges the mass murder that occurred at the hands of Serbs.¹⁰³ Tošković views his priestly role as an intermediary to help people make sense of the war. Family members want to be assured that their loved ones sacrificed their lives for a noble cause, such as the freedom of the nation,

⁹⁸ Mustafić [MU.RL.SA.03]: 10.

⁹⁹ 2: 256, "Let there be no compulsion in religion."

¹⁰⁰ Mustafić no doubt has in mind here the forced baptisms of Orthodox believers to Catholicism under state policies of the Ustaše in the Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Država Hrvatska*) between 1941-45. The policy was part of the campaign to create a homogenous Croatian state through the expulsion, killing and conversion of Serbs. Supporters of the Ustaše often conducted Baptisms under compulsion of threat of torture or death. The regime considered the (re)baptised to be converts and officially Croat. The scheme was instigated by the Ustaša regime and expedited through the 'Ministry of Justice and Religious Affairs'. Although the Roman Catholic Church did not officially sanction the effort, Catholic clergy loyal to the regime frequently participated. See Velikonja 2003: 164-74.

¹⁰¹ Mustafić [MU.RL.SA.03]: 11, 12.

¹⁰² Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 1, 14.

¹⁰³ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 8.

when in fact they were little more than instruments in the hands of ruthless politicians.¹⁰⁴ Nevertheless, there is still an aspect of sacredness to the sacrifice that a priest must honour, without being caught up in the media frenzy. As Tošković relates it:

The role of religion is to avoid polemics or convincing who is guilty, or listing the number of victims, who gave more victims, and, in some other but harder process, to build a platform from which the situation in Bosnia will be seen.... I think that every step of goodwill, which maybe is not seen immediately, is still important and needed, and that it has its own power, which is against the antagonism.¹⁰⁵

Thus Tošković wants to avoid naming offences, judging and accusing, because this only perpetuates the animosities. He prefers rather, through sincere dialogue, to move in the direction of peace.¹⁰⁶

Orthodox priest Vanja Jovanović in Sarajevo prefers to leave politics to the politicians, as it is not a topic of discussion for members of the clergy. Nevertheless, he was willing to discuss the relationship of the national church to nationalism, and holds an uncommon view:

The question of nation and nationalism is not a question for me to say that this and that are not good. My part as a priest is to teach them, if they want, what the faith is and that the Church is not a guardian of the nation. That means my part is to educate them in what they are, to understand Orthodoxy as it is and not as what they think it is. It's the same with Roman Catholicism and Islam. When you give them a healthy concept about something, all of these other concepts, that go with each other, are lost.¹⁰⁷

In each of the interviews the religious leaders were concerned to move away from politicised religion and extreme forms of nationalism, and some prefer to stay away from politics altogether.

3.3. Separation of Religion and Politics

Jovanović sees all ideologies in opposition to the principles of the Orthodox Church. More importantly, he does not see nationalism as the real problem. Rather than addressing external effects of the problem, he wants to focus on its root cause that resides in the consciousness and psyche of the people.¹⁰⁸ He contrasts the political and the spiritual, the temporal and the eternal, by stating that nationalism is a reality with a relatively recent appearance when compared to the presence of the Church.

¹⁰⁴ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 10.

¹⁰⁵ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 10.

¹⁰⁶ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 10.

¹⁰⁷ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 9.

¹⁰⁸ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 9.

He therefore does not want to give over his energies to that which is ephemeral. Instead, he wants to focus his efforts on addressing the essential problem of fear, which is a spiritual reality connected to God. The role of true faith is to overcome fear and hatred through love, which is the essence of Orthodox Christianity.¹⁰⁹ He wants to communicate this expression of religious faith above all others. Thus, by an interesting twist of logic, the interdictory and prophetic role of the Church or priest is minimised. Matters of morality are individual, not political or national. If a person inclines himself or herself to God, then it is needless to speak about the violence, as they are not implicated. “If the [person] is in faith, then there is no circle of violence; there is a circle of goodness”.¹¹⁰ But the person who has turned against God has also turned against the Church, and therefore any condemnation of wrongdoing by a priest is pointless.

Most of the Protestant leaders are disengaged from the political sphere as a matter of conviction, believing that this is where expressions of religious faith become corrupted. Škrinjarić has observed that when religious clerics openly talk about politics, they try to manipulate their people into the nationalist causes. By so doing they forfeit their authority to talk about moral virtues:

As a Croat, if I put my national identity above moral or God’s commands, I cannot be authentic or I can’t have authority. And somewhere deep within there is some kind of red light saying, “This is not really true.”¹¹¹

At the same time Kuzmić regrets the lack of a comprehensive worldview found among pietists who withdraw from social and political involvement, and argues instead for a ‘spirituality of engagement’.¹¹² Kuzmić believes that the three religious groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina have developed a spirituality of aggression and militarism, which must be countered by engaged Protestants. The development of a spirituality of engagement is a “major theological task that will be constructive and peace-building”, says Kuzmić.¹¹³ Thus Kuzmić desires to address the militarism in the nationalist expressions and the reductionistic escapism within his own religious

¹⁰⁹ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 10, 11.

¹¹⁰ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 10.

¹¹¹ Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 10.

¹¹² Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: 13.

¹¹³ Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: 13.

expression by developing religious communities that live as transforming agents in the world.¹¹⁴

The Protestant communities enjoy a measure of political neutrality owing to their small size and multi-national character. But they sometimes find that religious laws strongly influenced by the larger religious groups disadvantage religious minorities. How this dynamic will affect the current leaders of the Protestant community remains an open question. Their existence and profile demonstrates, however, that religion and nationality need not necessarily be fused, and that multi-national unity can be achieved even in the most nationally divided regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3.4. Conclusion to the Religion and Politics Section

Several noticeable characteristics emerge from the interviews with religious leaders on the difficult subject of religion and politics. First, they all deplored the use of religion to advance political agendas, believing that collusion between religion and politics strains the credibility of the faith communities. This in turn remains a continuing barrier to social restoration. Second, the Muslim, Catholic and Protestant religious communities are clearly oriented to the West and to the European Union, while Orthodox leaders are guarded about the West and its ideals, and find grounds for discord with the Western-oriented international community. This orientation comes as no surprise, given the events of Kosovo in the late 1990s. Third, expectations across religious communities vary widely. The *dialectical approach* employed by the Western-oriented (*i.e.*, Muslim, Catholic and Protestant) religious communities seeks to correct perceived moral and ethical failures through direct confrontation. They also expect the Orthodox clergy to respond in the same way. However, Orthodox leaders are more disposed to hierarchal structures, and choose to work with leadership for resolution. They see their effort in a spiritual sense, in righting or correcting false understanding, as in a return to 'ortho-doxy'. They do not accept that this can be accomplished through confrontation. Confronting error is not part of their remit, but it is rather the role of the courts, or, spiritually expressed, the work of God to convict an individual of wrongdoing. A priest cannot confront a member of the Church of wrongdoing without himself participating in and perpetuating the wrong. This *positivist approach* of Orthodox leaders emphasises only the right path that people should follow in order to bring correction. The

¹¹⁴ Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: 15.

methodological differences the religious communities employ to address political wrongdoing has led to wide scale misunderstanding, unfulfilled expectations, and continuing tensions. Each community is addressing wrongs in their own way and time. Thus, it is necessary to investigate in greater detail the basis for Ethics and Morality that contributes to peace-building and social restoration.

4. Ethics and Morality

The interviewees generally agree that religiously-based ethics, where properly understood and applied, can make important contributions to peace-building, and are essential ingredients of social restoration. Grabus asserts that together the religions can address the post-war societal ills common to all. He attributes the war to a minority who disdain morality and prefer power, and argues that it is the responsibility of those who stand by the traditions of Bosnia-Herzegovina to promote good deeds and inter-communal respect for each other.¹¹⁵

4.1. The Ethic of 'Life Dialogue'

Zovkić speaks of a first and important level of “life dialogue,”¹¹⁶ or “dialogue of good neighbourhood” which in times of peace has its own set of social guidelines in Bosnian society, expressed by shared holidays and family celebrations. Although this level of interaction failed to secure lives in a time of crisis, it is the starting point of rebuilding social cohesion. He explains it as follows:

We have an experience of living here as different for centuries. And we respect the laws of good neighbourhood in normal peaceful times. So this is the first and very important level of our life dialogue. We need the others who are nearby. When in a neighbouring family somebody dies or marries or is being born, there is a way of expressing your good wishes or sympathy or condolence to your neighbours who are different. And when somebody's family or son or daughter finishes his or her education, there is a public celebration about it.¹¹⁷

4.2. Religious Ethics and Secular Society

While pointing out the doctrinal differences between Islam and Christianity, Krešonja finds ethical similarities in their respective teachings about a loving God, obedience to God and concern for others.¹¹⁸ Religious ethics, he argues, can have a

¹¹⁵ Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 29.

¹¹⁶ Zovkić is here bridging the concept of ‘dialogue of life’, the Vatican’s recommended starting point for inter-religious relations, and an often repeated phrase of Pope John Paul II, with the context of ‘good neighbourhood’ in multi-national, multi-religious Bosnia-Herzegovina. For more information, see USCCB 2003: n.p.

¹¹⁷ Zovkić [RC.RL.SA.05]: 15.

¹¹⁸ Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 7.

constructive role in mitigating the effect of extremists in each of the ethno-religious communities, and he emphasises that non-religious persons also see value in the ethical codes of the Ten Commandments:

...[E]ven in the midst of all circumstances [people] can have peace, they can have blessing and they can have everything sufficient for their lives.... My grandfather's brother was a very well-known Communist leader in Yugoslavia, and he always said that if he were in charge of something even bigger, he would put the Ten Commandments from the Bible as the law for the whole country and that would be sufficient for every case that you would encounter.¹¹⁹

He regrets, however, that many religious leaders are consumed by other issues and are not prepared to address the social ills of drug addiction, prostitution and child abuse. In divided Mostar, religionists are challenged by the moral platform of the SDP, that is, former communists who raised the issues of correcting social ills.¹²⁰ Krešonja believes that it is important for religious bodies to take up this challenge, and demonstrate that religiously-based ethics can provide a platform for co-operation by addressing the social ills plaguing their city.

Other leaders recognise commonality between religious ethics and the ideals of communism and atheism. Protestant Branko Erceg pastors a church in Banja Luka where among Serbs anything other than Orthodoxy is disdained. He is nonetheless relentless to reach beyond the clichés of Serbian sectarianism to find commonalities with other faith expressions. In the religions of Islam, Judaism and both Western and Eastern Christianity he finds common aspects that promote peace. He believes that an appeal to a wide audience is necessary because the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina includes so many who are consciously non-religious. While favouring a religiously-based ethic, he emphasises the importance of appealing to those citizens who seek to live a moral life guided by principles not directly associated with religion.¹²¹ Non-religious socialist-era ethics promoted good relationships with its “Brotherhood and Unity” slogan, which is a point of commonality between religious and non-religious persons.

Franciscan Oršolić sees the restoration of post-communist society as an important opportunity for persons of Bosnia-Herzegovina to become theologically and ethically enriched. As religion moves again into the public domain, it can aid in the

¹¹⁹ Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 11.

¹²⁰ Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 19.

¹²¹ Erceg [PR.RL.BL.02]: 5.

restoration of society. *Zajedno* ('together'), the peace-building and reconciliation organisation that Oršolić founded in conjunction with IMIC, chiefly uses the vehicles of ethics and dialogue to build understanding across national barriers and combat political and religious ideology.¹²² Similarly, Marković affirms the high moral ideals of the agnostics in the multi-national, multi-confessional choir he founded in Sarajevo that performs religious music from the three religious traditions. As a sign of multi-ethnic, multi-religious solidarity, an orchestra from Banja Luka joins the choir, *Pantonima*, when they perform internationally. *Pantonima* invites persons of all religious confessions to be enriched through the encounter with others and seeks to create a vision of the future in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Insofar as they stand against the injustice of powerful and repressive religious systems, agnostics too are welcome because they exercise a kind of honest faith of a true seeker after God.¹²³

4.3. Religious Ethics and its Contribution to Social Restoration

However, Radujković cautions against drawing a close parallel between religious and secular ethics. He believes that morality divorced from its supernatural source is illusory and weak, inauthentic and easily counterfeited. He points to religious groups that fell victim to persons hiding their real intentions behind a smokescreen of ethics and morality. Immorality and war crimes, he argues, resulted from a basic godlessness stemming from religious ignorance.¹²⁴

Orthodox priest Tošković is representative of several religious leaders who consciously employ religious ethics grounded in a supernatural worldview. As a participant of a weekly radio programme co-hosted with a Muslim professor and a Catholic priest, Tošković works from the "ethical foundation for the restoration of trust and dialogue" to put forward the case for restoring a multi-cultural, multi-religious society.¹²⁵ Respect for human dignity is the foundation for morality, which cannot be divorced from the understanding that all of humanity is created by the hand of God.¹²⁶ For Tošković Christians are constrained and compelled by a moral imperative to help one another and to build peace by loving their neighbours. He holds this to be the mark of Christian authenticity.¹²⁷ Because God stretched forth

¹²² Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 4.

¹²³ Marković [RC.RL.SA.01]: 6.

¹²⁴ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 2.

¹²⁵ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 8.

¹²⁶ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 11.

¹²⁷ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 8.

his eternal hand to a fallen humanity, so too the Christian is obliged towards ethical excellence, responding “with love on love”.¹²⁸

Franciscan Mato Topić, who is now warden of the reconstructed *House of Peace* (*Dom Mira*), also indicates that a moral imperative based on religious ideals compelled him to continue non-partisan humanitarian aid efforts throughout the war. He faced death threats from co-nationalist Croats in Central Bosnia during a particularly violent period and earned the label “Muslim priest” for helping non-Catholics.¹²⁹ He drew his strength from the model of St Francis¹³⁰ and the Bible during the war and now seeks to create a space of spirituality as an essential ingredient of peace-building.¹³¹ The *House of Peace* in the once hotly contested Rama Valley of Central Bosnia stands for these ideals and is open to people of all faiths who wish to be in communication with God.¹³²

Similarly, Protestant leader Nikola Škrinjarić faced death threats during the war for delivering humanitarian aid across front lines to needy persons of all nationalities. Škrinjarić is unusual in that he lived and worked on both sides of the IEBL, in the Croat-Muslim predominant Federacija (Mostar), and in the Republika Srpska (Banja Luka). While most persons living in Mostar tried to escape the city during the war, Škrinjarić moved to Mostar from Croatia to better co-ordinate humanitarian aid distribution, pastor a church, and help people in need regardless of ethnic or religious background. Once settled, he brought his fiancé, Sandra, and together they celebrated a highly visible public wedding during the war with the wedding party processing through the streets. Škrinjarić points to a low level of trust currently in society, and reflects the common belief that the conflict would re-ignite were the peace-keeping troops removed. He believes that only a countrywide change with new moral criteria would adequately secure the future.¹³³ He sees this as the most urgent area for religious leadership to take up in the current societal malaise.

¹²⁸ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 11.

¹²⁹ Topić [RC.RL.RA.04]: 2, 6.

¹³⁰ St Francis of Assisi (c.1181-1226) gave up a life of luxury and dispossessed himself of material wealth in order to help the disenfranchised and powerless that he encountered in the world. The impetus for doing this was a spiritual vision that awakened him to the needs of others, and the commitment to live as Christ lived on earth.

¹³¹ Topić [RC.RL.RA.04]: 8.

¹³² Topić [RC.RL.RA.04]: 8.

¹³³ Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 2.

Grand Mufti Cerić also calls for a high level of integrity from religious leaders, both on a country-wide and global scale. Cerić believes that both the Western and Muslim worlds are in a critical state of transition, finding the current world order inadequate to address the pressing needs of the contemporary global community. Tracing a sweeping history of humanity, he illustrates how the *Hakîm*, or ‘Holy Man’,¹³⁴ of Muslim culture, has been replaced by the ‘Renaissance Man’ of the West. The latter, he argues, has today consumed himself and has nothing more to offer. A new model of humanity is needed, which Cerić identifies in terms of the ‘Moral Man’ who will combine the spiritual wisdom of religion and the reason of the Renaissance. Religious leaders and politicians have the vital role of defining this new morality. However, Cerić is sceptical that the religious leaders - be they Muslim or Christian - have the will or fortitude to take on the risk of defining the new world order, and thus wonders from what source this morality will arise.¹³⁵

4.4. Conclusion to the Ethics and Morals Section

These religious leaders demonstrate that religious ethics and standards of morality can make a contribution to peace-building. The theological frameworks of the religions motivate persons to act, which is demonstrated by non-partisan assistance offered to the needy at great personal risk. The ethic applied in these circumstances is one of particularity. That is to say, the basis for the ethic is in a specific text and context in order to be relevant. The framework for the ethic is based on selective texts either from the Qur’ân or the Bible, which provide worldviews that depict humanity in relation to God, and serve as a basis for application into the contemporary context. The specificity of the ethic affords credibility. At the same time the particularised ethic makes a wider appeal and serves as a bridge across sectarian boundaries to those outside of its own community. In this capacity religious ethics finds a modicum of convergence with secular ethics, and is able to include others from another community, even when there is substantive disagreement between communities. How this expression of religious ethic engages others in the face of injustice and disparate power structures is the topic of the next section.

¹³⁴ *Hakîm* literally means ‘wise man’ where wisdom (*hikma*) is based in divinely-revealed knowledge and holiness.

¹³⁵ Cerić [MU.RL.SA.01]: 2-5.

5. Justice and Forgiveness

Although virtually all the religious leaders interviewed agree that justice and forgiveness are key ingredients of peace-building, no unanimity exists on the nature of these issues, or the procedures needed to deal with them. The first part of this section focuses on justice externally administered through the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), at the Hague. The particulars of this Court's origins were already addressed in Chapter Two and will not be reviewed here. Focus is placed instead on the specific views of interviewees to the court, and to the processes involved. Then the focus shifts to local needs for justice and forgiveness in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Two aspects need to be addressed in anticipation of this section. First, the remit of the Hague Court addresses only the worst war crimes and therefore seeks to bring to trial only the alleged worst offenders. A need for local courts and mechanisms of justice was therefore always implicitly understood. Second, at the time of these interviews in 2002-03, local courts were not yet in full operation and many questions about their nature, legitimacy, impartiality and authority were in discussion. These issues still remain today. An October 2004 report acknowledged that the domestic courts were riddled with serious problems, including "ethnic bias on the part of judges and prosecutors, poor case preparation by prosecutors, inadequate cooperation by the police with investigations, poor cooperation between states on judicial matters, a lack of witness protection mechanisms, and uncertainty on prosecuting command responsibility".¹³⁶

5.1. Justice Externally Administered: The Hague Tribunal

Interviewees assess the Hague Court differently, and generally reflect national opinions within the theatre of conflict. Several of the leaders support the Court and find its processes and decisions legitimate and fair.

Oršolić believes there is a need for leaders and the media alike to recognise their collective responsibility for the condition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Only by accepting their responsibility will they recognise the value of the Tribunal, through which "the ground for real reconciliation and forgiveness" can be realised.¹³⁷

Professor Nedžad Grabus from the *Faculty of Islamic Studies* in Sarajevo supports the activities of the international court because it attempts to clarify issues of justice

¹³⁶ Human Rights News. 2004a.

¹³⁷ Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2.

for all of the nations of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In his view the ICTY overcomes the paralysis of the local courts caused by partisanship.¹³⁸ Support for the Hague by political and religious leaders, intellectuals and the media demonstrates a recognition of collective responsibility for the reforms necessary to rebuild society.

Kuzmić supports the Hague processes because it properly places the blame on those most responsible:

...[W]ar criminals, the leaders, the chief engineers, have to go to the Hague so that we stop the collective blaming.... All three sides have sinned... but not all of them have sinned equally. And the leaders are the most responsible, and they must be made responsible for their atrocities.... The process of reconciliation and inter-ethnic bridge-building and confidence building... becomes much easier once the blame is shifted from the collective of the nation or religious group and is transferred to those who are really most guilty, to the leaders.¹³⁹

However, dissent may be heard from other religious leaders. Orthodox priest Baško Tošković echoes the widespread sentiment among Serbs that the Hague Court is predisposed to the Western-oriented nations, will disfavour the Serbs in its judgments, and therefore can neither fairly arbitrate nor administer justice. For him a clear indication of the Court's bias is that it accuses only political leadership from the Serbian nation. Other political leaders, such as the Muslim SDA party leader and former President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegović, were never accused of war crimes although, Tošković contends, Izetbegović was implicated in military actions considered to be war crimes.¹⁴⁰ He therefore finds the international community partisan in their motives and guilty of criminal intent by consciously refusing to issue an indictment for non-Serb political leaders. This, he contends, is neither a true search for justice nor an effective way of building peace.¹⁴¹ Tošković adds that this is yet another indication of how the Serbian nation suffers at the hands of the international community. He believes this only serves to strengthen the resolve of the Serbs in that they find a kind of nobility in suffering injustice, and solidarity with the martyrs of Christianity.¹⁴²

¹³⁸ Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 25.

¹³⁹ Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: 6, 7.

¹⁴⁰ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 14. On the day of his burial the ICTY announced that Izetbegović was being investigated for possible war crimes activity.

¹⁴¹ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 12.

¹⁴² Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 13.

Orthodox priest Radujković takes a more conciliatory tone. He admits that the general perception of the ICTY in the Republika Srpska is negative, but attributes this less to the Tribunal itself, and more to the media's portrayal of the hearings.¹⁴³ Mostly, however, he perceives the lengthy court processes of the Hague to be foreign. Justice in this part of the Balkans is historically disposed to swifter procedures summarily administered from an authoritarian figure. He points to absolutist regimes under the Serbian monarchy, Ottoman Empire and Tito's communism as the legacy in which justice was swiftly administered, and for certain crimes, summarily executed through decapitation.¹⁴⁴ Serbia's long break with Western Europe created many discontinuities. He believes more education is necessary.¹⁴⁵ These remarks notwithstanding, Radujković supports fair trials so that truth may prevail, wherever the cases are held. He recognises that for now the Hague "serves to bring to justice the top criminal offenders but there will have to be one day a tribunal that will deal with 'small' crimes."¹⁴⁶

It is clear from the foregoing that no agreement is at hand regarding the fundamental aspect of justice handled externally at the Hague. The disagreement between the Serbs and others exposes a pro-Western versus anti-Western cleavage dividing the different nations. Muslim, Catholic and Protestant leaders strongly support the efforts of the international community and do not seem to question the legitimacy of the court or its processes. Leaders from the Serbian nation view the effort as foreign, and as support for the conspiracy theory that the international community is determined to disenfranchise the Serbian nation, and that they therefore cannot find justice in the international arena. It raises the question of whether justice locally administered can fair any better.

5.2. Justice Locally Administered: Two Barriers

Two issues frame the discussion of justice beyond the Hague at the local level, namely, the partisan nature of the courts, and the large number of cases to be tried.

¹⁴³ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 11. The prominent court case of Slobodan Milošević is telecast live and in its entirety in the Federacija, whereas in the Republika Srpska and Serbia-Montenegro it is selectively broadcast and generally seeks to favourably depict Serbs. Accordingly, the hearing airs in prime time in the Republika Srpska and Serbia-Montenegro and garners a large percentage of the viewing audience. In the Federacija the hearing airs during the day, is not popular, and fails to capture much of the viewing audience.

¹⁴⁴ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 13.

¹⁴⁵ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 13.

¹⁴⁶ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 10.

Regarding the first issue, Zovkić points to an inherent distrust of the legal system in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a corrupt vestige of the communist era in which judges handed out decisions in accordance with the guidelines of the party secretary. He therefore welcomes Western judges into the judicial system in order that trust may be established.¹⁴⁷ Current evaluations by independent agencies confirm the partisan nature of the local courts, calling into question the ability of the courts to carry out justice.

The second issue addresses the number of cases to be tried. Because the ICTY was not meant to rectify all of the injustices created by war criminals, local courts in Bosnia-Herzegovina will need to pursue perpetrators of smaller war crimes. This translates into normal citizens coming to terms with the realisation that personal injustices will endure. The General Amnesty already clears lower ranked soldiers and citizens not accused of war crimes. Were all of the guilty to be tried at the local level, the judicial system would be overwhelmed, and society would be fixated on the issues of the past when it needs to focus on building the future. Oršolić contends that punishment and prosecution of those who constitute a stumbling block to the rebuilding of society is necessary, just as the General Amnesty is necessary for those who would conceivably contribute to the rebuilding of society.¹⁴⁸ The General Amnesty is an acknowledged compromise,¹⁴⁹ allowing many of the smaller crimes to go unprosecuted in the interest of moving society beyond the issues of the war. But by leaving unaddressed significant and enduring injustices at the local and personal level, hope and expectation for restitution is extinguished. War weariness has set in characterised by what Vjekoslav Šaje describes as an indifference to continuing injustice.¹⁵⁰ Šaje, a Catholic married to a Muslim, is the Director of the *Center for Religious Dialogue* and regularly conducts inter-religious seminars throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo aimed at fostering reconciliation. He is a resident of Sarajevo and knows firsthand the mood of the city. Šaje cites the example of former JNA officers who once commandeered the shelling of residential areas of Sarajevo now returning to purchase flats and live in the city. The absence of moral outrage at such action demonstrates the desire of most people to put the dark cloud of

¹⁴⁷ Zovkić [RC.RL.SA.05]: 13.

¹⁴⁸ Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 3.

¹⁴⁹ Šaje [RC.RL.SA.03]: 8.

¹⁵⁰ Šaje [RC.RL.SA.03]: 8.

the war behind them.¹⁵¹ The situation throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina is more characteristic of resignation than reconciliation, and may yet prove the seedbed for future violence.

5.3. Varieties of Justice from Different Traditions

The religious leaders draw upon their own religious traditions to define justice and how it should shape the ethical-theological framework for their society while recognising that other religious traditions also hold a high place in their societies for justice.¹⁵² In his frequent encounters with members of the Muslim community, Marković sees a notable distinction between the Christian and the Muslim emphases:

[The Muslims] use more the utterances of justice. We Christians are more idealistic with the image of God in Jesus, who is a God of love. It is contrasted to a God who forbids, which is more often stressed in Islam. Very often I say Islam is more practical, especially related to their tradition. They organise society along these levels. Our Christianity is often more idealistic. It is poetry sometimes, such as prayer.¹⁵³

Grabus confirms this general distinction made by Marković above:

“You have so many different approaches in the Bosnian situation. If you talk from the Catholic perspective or the Orthodox perspective, they’re trying to talk about forgiveness, and the Muslim insists on ‘*adel* [justice].¹⁵⁴”

Grabus believes that justice is a difficult concept for people to grasp, but is an essential ingredient to the reconstruction of society.¹⁵⁵ Mustafić concurs and elaborates for the current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mustafić sees truth as foundational to justice, and the suppression of truth regarding war crimes as fundamentally unjust. It is indicative of worldly values, and ultimately communicates the wrong message in Bosnia-Herzegovina, namely, that criminality is not only profitable, but honourable.¹⁵⁶ Further, to leave personal injustices unaddressed is asking too much of the victims who require some form of restitution and seek justice through formal recognition of the grievance. This is necessary in order that persons of the same neighbourhood can again live together.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵¹ Šaje [RC.RL.SA.03]: 8.

¹⁵² See, for example, Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 2-4.

¹⁵³ Marković [RC.RL.SA.01]: 87.

¹⁵⁴ Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 2.

¹⁵⁵ Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 25.

¹⁵⁶ Mustafić [MU.RL.SA.03]: 21.

¹⁵⁷ Mustafić [MU.RL.SA.03]: 21, 22.

Grabus argues that God is very concerned with justice, for he is the one who will hear and judge each one at the end of their lives.¹⁵⁸ He understands justice through a relationship to God by means of personal prayer, concluding that those who pray understand the meaning of justice because they are asking for justice from God.¹⁵⁹ Justice and restitution are necessarily prior to forgiveness, but if a way to achieve justice cannot be found, then forgiveness is the only way forward. This takes the believer to the level of *taqwa* (piety, or God-fearingness).¹⁶⁰ Mikulić echoes the sentiments of Muslim professor Grabus¹⁶¹ and Franciscan Oršolić¹⁶² when he relates that earthly judgment is a reminder that one day God will judge all, and that God alone can fairly judge all persons.¹⁶³

5.4. The Role of the Courts Versus the Role of the Religious Bodies

While they support a fair judicial system, several leaders view justice as an issue of the courts, and forgiveness the domain of the Church. Correspondingly they lay more stress on forgiveness than justice. The chief question for Radujković is not whether justice should be carried out, but by whom. The courts have the responsibility to carry out justice, but this is distinctly not the task of the religious communities. Radujković separates the legal task according to sharply delineated realms, and wants to emphasise that Christ's Kingdom "is not of this world".¹⁶⁴

Similarly, Jovanović maintains a strong demarcation between the sacred and secular, between the heavenly and earthly. It is therefore not the role of the priest to condemn anyone, for all have within them the possibility to be transformed.¹⁶⁵ The courts and the Hague must be concerned with 'secular justice,' but a priest must be concerned with the person's soul and salvation.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, even the impossible prospect of trying and punishing all of the guilty through penal institutions would not solve the problems of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for it only addresses the effects and not the causes. The real issues are "deep and entangled constructions of the human soul"

¹⁵⁸ Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 26.

¹⁵⁹ Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 25.

¹⁶⁰ Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 26.

¹⁶¹ Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 25, 26.

¹⁶² Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2.

¹⁶³ Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 8.

¹⁶⁴ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 12.

¹⁶⁵ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 6.

¹⁶⁶ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 8.

and until the conscience of the people is affected, then the problems will persist.¹⁶⁷ Justice must therefore move beyond punitive measures to be “exclusively connected with God and his love that transforms”.¹⁶⁸ Protestant leader Mikulić acknowledges the limitations of the courts and knows many must live with injustice. Earthly courts will not bring peace or reconciliation,¹⁶⁹ and therefore he works to see forgiveness transpire in the church. Forgiveness goes beyond justice in rebuilding peace, and has a restorative dimension of its own.

5.5. Forgiveness Overcomes The Legacy Of The Past

Forgiveness can address the wrongs of the past and make lasting contributions to the resolution of conflicts. Zovkić speaks to the issues of the 1990s war in Bosnia-Herzegovina by referencing the legacy of World War II. He was personally disappointed that the Bishops’ Letter marking the fiftieth anniversary of the end of that war did not use stronger language to acknowledge wrongs committed. Although the letter admitted that Croat members of the Catholic Church were complicit in killing innocent persons, Zovkić believes the apology was too vague in addressing those wrongs, which adversely affected efforts towards reconciliation. In this regard he believes the religious leaders must address the issues of this war, pursuing simultaneously justice and reconciliation.¹⁷⁰ Erceg concurs with this view and asserts that unforgiven events from past conflicts become the seedbeds for future conflicts.¹⁷¹ However, the act of forgiving arrests the cycle of revenge and violence.¹⁷² Further, he sees the usual approach of conflict management through use of power as a short-term remedy, but forgiveness is a long-term solution.¹⁷³ Several leaders share this opinion and believe that forgiveness makes significant contributions to peace-building.

5.6. The Contribution of Forgiveness to Peace-Building

Krešonja acknowledges that a sense of wrongdoing, or contrition, is necessary for forgiveness to become effective,¹⁷⁴ but that if people in Bosnia-Herzegovina were

¹⁶⁷ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 10.

¹⁶⁸ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 11.

¹⁶⁹ Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 9.

¹⁷⁰ Zovkić [RC.RL.SA.05]: 6.

¹⁷¹ Erceg [PR.RL.BL.02]: 10.

¹⁷² Erceg [PR.RL.BL.02]: 7.

¹⁷³ Erceg [PR.RL.BL.02]: 7.

¹⁷⁴ Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 7. On this point see also Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 1.

willing to reflect on their own misdeeds, the country would be at a turning point in social restoration.¹⁷⁵

Radujković sees the reconciling work of the Church both in contrast to the court system and in relation to other religious communities:

The court should do its job and convict the criminal. But the responsibility of every religious community is to alleviate, by way of forgiveness, his crime over his victim or alleviate pain for the victim of that crime. If the Serbs oppressed the Muslims or the Muslims oppressed the Serbs, some tribunal, the Hague or some other, will convict the criminals on both sides. But the task of both the Orthodox Church and the Islamic religious community is to work on reconciliation of these two peoples through sincere forgiveness.¹⁷⁶

Oršolić recognises a legitimate place for religious faith in the largely secular environment of peace-building because “only faith has the categories of forgiveness and reconciliation” and “every other kind of forgiveness will be tactics or fake compromises”.¹⁷⁷ In contrast to philosophy or politics, “only faith can penetrate a man’s heart because eventually God is the one who forgives”.¹⁷⁸ As he says,

Politics has to have this general amnesty as well as punishing war criminals. But the rest of us also have to deal with the process of forgiveness and reconciliation because all justice cannot be done in court. Without forgiveness there cannot be real reconciliation.¹⁷⁹

Dubatović believes that the religious communities can make a substantial contribution to peace-building by communicating forgiveness.¹⁸⁰ Dubatović, whose formal theological education included a challenging class on the theology of forgiveness taught by Croat Miroslav Volf, now the Henry B. Wright Professor of Systematic Theology at Yale Divinity School, links the necessity of forgiveness in the face of personal suffering to being a committed Christian.¹⁸¹ Forgiveness flows from the nature of God himself¹⁸² and is manifest in Christ. He is the example of forgiveness of others, and the one through whom forgiveness is possible. The imperative for change is both internal and personal, beginning with one’s own heart.¹⁸³ He reverses the process of forgiveness and justice from the view of Muslim

¹⁷⁵ Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 7.

¹⁷⁶ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 13.

¹⁷⁷ Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2.

¹⁷⁸ Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2.

¹⁷⁹ Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2.

¹⁸⁰ Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 14.

¹⁸¹ Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 20.

¹⁸² Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 15.

¹⁸³ Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 21.

professor Grabus, wanting first to see forgiveness from all sides, and then justice.¹⁸⁴ This prevents revenge or retribution from creeping into the process. Forgiveness can be taught and practiced, and the Baptist Church has a process of leading willing people from hatred to forgiveness.¹⁸⁵ He emphasises that forgiving is a process that involves different dimensions, and, although a person can extend a genuine act of forgiveness, emotional healing may take longer.¹⁸⁶

5.7. Conclusion to the Justice and Forgiveness Section

Several significant points emerge from this element on justice and forgiveness. First, among the religious leaders interviewed a general consensus exists that justice is foundational to the restoration of civil society. This is especially the case for the Muslims for whom justice is central to the Islamic worldview. Second, the religious leaders recognise in principle the sovereignty of the courts to undertake the legal task of carrying out justice. However, there is no unanimity about the nature of those courts or the procedures necessary to secure justice. This is especially evident over the role and legitimacy of the Hague court. To date, it has had the most far-reaching effect on addressing perceived wrongs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but perhaps without the desired affect of moving the country towards social restoration. Third, religious leaders generally concede that complete justice - either through external or local judicial mechanisms - cannot be accomplished, leaving many persons to deal with private and personal injustices. Left unaddressed, residual fears and insecurities will remain, and will contribute to enduring animosity. Fourth, the resources of the religious faith communities can adequately address the injustice and fear left unresolved by the court systems so that animosities dissolve and social restoration may result. This is demonstrably so in and through the lives of the religious leaders interviewed in the research.

6. Conclusion

The foregoing analysis of the thoughts, motives and efforts of religious leaders has demonstrated that religious faith can contribute to peace-building and social restoration in several ways. First, all religious leaders function with a strong sense of Transcendence that shapes and informs their worldviews. This is expressed in their view of God and creation, which is definitive for humanity and society. The sense of

¹⁸⁴ Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 15.

¹⁸⁵ Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 18.

¹⁸⁶ Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 18.

the Transcendence enables forgiveness and transformation, and moves persons and communities from fragmentation to wholeness.

Second, this affects their approach to peace-building in the following ways. The 'enemy' is not people or communities, but ideology, especially the ideology of nationalism. Identity is defined in terms of self and community without disenfranchising others. Consequently, there is a readiness to deal with root causes of the conflict, which demonstrates promising results for sustainability of the peace-building initiative.

Finally, the evidence of the interviewees confirms in concrete terms the validity of John Paul Lederach's conceptualisation to sustainable peace-building through inclusion of a wider spectrum of civil society. Some of the interviewees represent Lederach's second-level of 'civilian diplomacy' wherein religious leaders influence both high level political elites and the masses. Insofar as these leaders have access to all levels of society through formal and informal mechanisms, they are key figures for sustainable peace-building and social restoration. However, the analysis of the interviews also reveals that at times these leaders are encumbered by their position. They have to address simultaneously the freedoms a multi-national, multi-religious democratic society brings, and at the same time confront the real and present security issues of protecting their own community. Their power to bring effective change is also dependent on support from the third level of society, the masses. For this reason, the thesis now turns its attention to the roles that Women (Chapter Five) and Students (Chapter Six) play in peace-building and social restoration.

CHAPTER FIVE

VIEWS OF RELIGIOUS WOMEN ON PEACE-BUILDING AND SOCIAL RESTORATION

1. Introduction

With over forty women's groups organised throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina,¹ women constitute a strong foundation for rebuilding society. The 1998 UNHCR Regional Strategy Report also names women as "essential participants" in the process of peace-building.² This chapter therefore makes inquiry into the nature of peace-building and social restoration by *religious* women in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The inquiry makes use of interviews carried out in Bosnia-Herzegovina and asks, "What empirical evidence is there of women having a special role in peace-building on their religious convictions?" It probes the question of how religious faith informs and instructs women, and asks whether women of religious faith make distinctive contributions towards peace-building. The chapter is thus an exploration of Lederach's Level Three, or grassroots, peace-building initiatives.

The chapter proceeds along the following line. First, it describes the social context of women in socialist Yugoslavia, noting the general trends resulting from urbanisation and modernisation. Second, the chapter will look at ideologically-motivated narratives of women in relation to the war. This section examines the mythological imagery created by nationalists to win the support of women, and reviews two competing feminist images of women and war from the West. Third,

¹ ODZO: np.

² Cited by Hart 2001: 296.

the chapter examines in detail the basis from which women of religious faith engage in peace-building and social restoration. This section is especially interested to know if these women believe that they have a special contribution to make in a male-dominant society, and what power sources and mechanisms are present in the process. The chapter concludes by assessing the critical role women of religious faith play towards peace-building and social restoration.

2. Women in Yugoslav Society

Women's roles in socialist Yugoslavia varied in accordance with the significant cultural differences within the state. These were most striking in a North-South polarity in which the richer, better-educated and more Westernised areas of Slavonia (Croatia) and Vojvodina (Serbia) sometimes clashed with the poorer, less Westernised southern provinces of Črna Gora, Kosovo and Macedonia. This influence was also felt in Bosnia-Herzegovina where its mountainous topography contributed to its isolation and rural character.

2.1. Women in Rural Bosnia, and the *Zadruga*

Anthropologist Tone Bringa has made an insightful study of women in rural central Bosnia.³ The focus of the study is Muslim women, but is also well informed about Catholic women in an undisclosed pre-war village of Central Bosnia. It examines the Bosnian *zadruga*, or extended family community, which can sometimes exceed seventy five members.⁴ The *zadruga* is the definitive pre-modern feature of society⁵ through which roles and expectations of family members are assigned. Although still largely patriarchal, the *zadruga* is technically distinct from a strictly patriarchal arrangement. One of the expected roles of women in the *zadruga* is that of moral guardian. Although they have no particular religious function either in the mosque or the church, women are the moral adjudicators in the *zadruga* and ultimately the community.⁶ Peccadilos of both sexes do not escape the scrutiny of the women of the *zadruga*, and a person quickly earns a reputation within the community. Women of the community might have more to say about an extra-marital affair or a man's drunkenness than the local imam or priest, who may not know about the situation.

³ Bringa 1995.

⁴ Cited in Allcock 2000: 353-4.

⁵ Allcock 2000: 353.

⁶ Bringa 1995: 86ff.

The *zadruga* still functions in rural areas, but urban women live in a different context.

2.2. Modernisation, Urbanisation and the Changing Role of Women

Urbanisation and modernisation contributed to the decline of the *zadruga*, and brought change to the mores of the extended family. Some village codes migrated to the urban setting with an older, more traditional generation. However, the roles of women in urban areas reflect patterns of change consistent with those throughout the rest of Europe as it transitioned from traditional to modern society.⁷

Notable during the communist period was the general acceptance of women in public life. Women attained this recognition while maintaining their primary responsibility in the home, creating a 'double day' for many urban women.⁸ Even those who did not officially constitute part of the work force were gainfully employed in the 'parallel markets', or underground economy, of Yugoslavia.⁹ And statistics do not bear out the commonly held notion that socialism afforded equal opportunity for employment and pay in Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁰

In the current post-war situation of Bosnia-Herzegovina women are especially affected. Gender equality regulation is a new concept and poorly observed. A glass ceiling is noticeable in political appointments and executive managerial positions.¹¹ Women suffer more from the destruction of the industrial sector since they were over-represented in factory work, especially textiles.¹² According to one report

⁷ Allcock points to a general improvement for women during the inter-war years, in the advent of a women's movement in Yugoslavia. The decline in birth rate allowed women to enter into gainful employment outside of the home; by 1921 they constituted 41.0% of the work force, a statistic that remained stable for the next sixty years. During the war years in the 1940s women took on increasingly non-traditional (*i.e.*, non-domestic) roles as part of the war effort, necessitated by the absence of men. Illiteracy for women was reduced from 60% (40% for men) in 1921 to 15% (4% for men) in 1981 (Allcock 2000: 354ff).

⁸ Allcock 2000: 356.

⁹ Cited in NGO Report 1999: 155.

¹⁰ As late as 1986 a woman's average earnings were 86.9% of a man's, and concentrated largely in the manufacturing industry (Allcock 2000: 356). Because occupations in Bosnia-Herzegovina were gender-typed, equal access to certain jobs for women was precluded. Women were vastly under-represented in managerial positions and infrequently achieved the ranks of upper management in medicine or education (NGO Report 1999: 155-7).

¹¹ NGO Report 1999: 156, 7.

¹² Many of these industries were state owned during the communist period, and now face long delays while they seek investment and move towards privatisation. Back pay, benefits and pensions for women in these sectors are unlikely to be recovered (Cited in NGO Report 1999: 156).

commissioned for the World Bank, women headed up twenty percent of the post-war households in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In these male-absent households women have lower employment rates, and were paid wages 20-50% lower than men.¹³ Only in two non-industrial areas were women over-represented, namely, in the schools, and centres for social work. These areas are considered to be 'female occupations', demonstrating that if an organisation had profits to be earned, the positions of power generally went to men.¹⁴

2.3. Women and the Legacy of Violation During the War

A significant factor in understanding the place of women in society today is recognition of the long-term effects of their victimisation in the war, especially through inter-ethnic rape. Always a tragic accompaniment to war,¹⁵ rape took on a strategic dimension in this conflict, being used as part of the concerted plan of ethnic cleansing by reproducing the enemy in the womb of the raped woman.¹⁶

Statistics on rape in the conflict are difficult to assess because of the use made of them for propaganda purposes. During the war statistics given by the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina about the number of rapes of Bošnjak women were generally accepted and widely disseminated. The fact that Serbian women were also raped was ignored.¹⁷ As a result there is little certainty about the accuracy of any single statistical representation.¹⁸

¹³ Cited in NGO Report 1999: 156.

¹⁴ NGO Report 1999: 157.

¹⁵ See, for instance, Elizabeth Neuffer's historical survey of rape as a violent accompaniment of war, and the meagre attempts to make rape a war crime (Neuffer 2000: 271-277). Significantly, rape was subsequently recognised as a 'war crime against humanity' in February of 2001 by the ICTY for the systematic rape, forceful detention and sale of Bošnjak women (HCHR-BH 2001: np).

¹⁶ Because nationhood is determined patrilineally, rape had the twofold effect of increasing the absolute numbers of the rapist's ethnic group and making the woman undesirable to the men of her own ethnic group, thus limiting her future reproductive capacity.

¹⁷ Nikolić-Ristanović. 2000: 44.

¹⁸ Initial reports in the summer of 1992 spoke of 'rape camps' in which Bošnjak women were singled out and sexually abused before their expulsion from Bosnia-Herzegovina (Neuffer 2000: 47). A UNHCR briefing document, citing a report originating with the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, claimed that as many as 35,000 women were held in these rape camps (cited in Allcock 2000: 403). While it is commonly agreed that rape was part of the violence committed within the camps, no 'rape camps' *per se* were ever found by independent human rights groups. The difficulty of quantifying instances of war-time rape is complicated by the inability to verify the crime at the time of the act. Reports thus vary, citing from 16,000 to 50,000 instances of rape (cited in Allcock 2000: 402-3).

Underreporting by women is also common in that public knowledge of the act carried its own social stigmatization, shame¹⁹ and rejection. Many women from all nationalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina live with this legacy today. It is now realised that such acts committed in the lawless situation of war were extensions of power imbalances in the society between men and women, and between different national peoples.²⁰

2.4. Women and Empowerment

Although women have been recognised for their work in peace-building at high level places outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina, they remain largely unrecognised and unempowered in the country.²¹ Interviewees expressed the sentiment that women continue to be under-empowered in the post-war period in the male-dominant Balkan societies.²² Despite the many efforts of women's groups to educate women about their rights, roles and responsibilities in the new society of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a sense of resignation remains. Thus, women interviewed for this research do not expect that the male-dominated political apparatus will provide a voice or opportunity for women. Women consequently have low expectations that genuine and long-lasting peace can be achieved through the political process, because they observe the same inability to resolve conflicts in the political realm as they regularly observe in the private sphere. While they believe the state would be better off with women in decision-making positions of government, most women are unwilling to battle the chauvinistic attitudes of men that impede their efforts. This - coupled with the unwillingness of men to work together - discourages women from taking any significant part.

While it is at least theoretically possible for women to attain leadership in the political sphere, and indeed was the case in the Serbian community with Biljana Plavšić and Mirjana Marković, leadership in the religious institutions is altogether precluded. For this reason it is interesting to compare attitudes of the women interviewed towards the respective authorities of politics and religion.

Women from various religious traditions expressed considerable criticism of the religious authorities for the way they use their positions to manipulate and defend,

¹⁹ HCHR-BH: np.

²⁰ See Nikolic-Ristanovic 2000: 41-77.

²¹ See OSF 2001: np.

²² This theme is explored in a subsequent section of this chapter.

but not reconcile or rebuild. They are specifically critical of the politicisation of religion, which Katrina Kovać from the Orthodox community identified as one of the direct causes of the war:

Even today, when I look at TV and those religious gatherings, it doesn't matter which religion they are, what I don't like with these priests and imams is that they also take part and they enter into politics. And politics actually brought us the war. And that's why I say there are just a few true believers.²³

Similarly, Mojce Leban from the Catholic community argues that religious leaders place too much emphasis on national identity at the expense of spiritual nourishment:

Now, in this situation six years later, a lot of people in the society are confused in this process of radical secularisation. It is true, we have a large number of Croats who are Catholic, but who really practices their religion? [People] are disappointed in one way. The religious communities don't offer them food for the soul. They are simply saying, come here and you will be saved.²⁴

At the same time, the interviewees acknowledged the positive role that religious leaders can play when they address spiritual concerns. Kovać sees the really spiritual as those who have sacrificed much in life for the spiritual disciplines, such as monks who live alone, study and pray, and those who dedicate their lives to God, including imams. But other religious leaders simply abuse their positions for political or national gain.²⁵

Zilka Šiljak's own work with women brought her into contact and involvement with the inter-religious movement, IMIC, or *Zajedno*, founded by Franciscan Marko Oršolić in Sarajevo. She is also critical of the politicisation of religion, citing especially the open support of religious leaders from all religious communities for nationalist political parties:

Of course, abuse could be found on all sides. One of my professors (Bianchini) wrote an article about Political Culture in the Balkan area, and explained that the biggest abuse was on the Serbian side, their Church supported openly Karadžić and Mladić. You know about that. Then, the Catholic Church in Sarajevo also openly supported the HDZ, and the Islamic community supported the SDA. So they supported openly the nationalistic parties and nationalistic ideas. And even during the elections I saw some imams saying to people, 'You know, you have to vote for the SDA party because they defend your interests and your nation,' etc.²⁶

²³ Kovać [SO.WO.ŠI.03]: 5.

²⁴ Leban [RC.WO.SA.01]: 8.

²⁵ Kovać [SO.WO.ŠI.03]: 5.

²⁶ Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 5.

After the fall of communism religious leaders became embroiled in the nationalist issues, which did nothing to forestall the conflicts that eventually led to war. But Šiljak is also critical of the Inter-Religious Council, represented by the highest leader of each of the religious communities. She believes that reconciliation must engage people at the grassroots level throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the leaders demonstrate little willingness to become involved at this level:

[O]ur official faith communities don't work much on it, or work very little... [T]he [members of the] Inter-Religious Council... meet each other, shake hands, drink coffee and make statements to the media and that's all. They are doing nothing, I can say simply, because they don't want to go among the people in BH and to talk with them and to tell them openly that they support multi-religious dialogue and each believer is obliged to contribute to these processes. But this centre [IMIC] is trying to go among the people, to talk with people, to give lectures, to do workshops. You know, you can't speak about reconciliation or about life, a multi-cultural, multi-religious life here, if you do not go to Livno or to Banja Luka. You have to go there and to see people and to talk to them and to find out what they think and what they want. That is the best way but that is the hardest way. We have a lot of experience. We travel around and talk to people but it is very hard. Some people fear, or some people don't want to talk. Some people don't want to forget, or others don't want to forgive. But our duty is to try again and again.²⁷

Despite sometimes harsh criticism of the religious leadership, and lack of empowerment within the hierarchies of the religious institutions, women interviewed remained positive about their own religion and religious community as a whole. This contrasts sharply with their own views of the political parties and organs, and is in part attributable to the fact that the political system and parties disdain women, while religious bodies honour and protect them. In the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches women hold honourable positions vicariously symbolised through Mary as the *theotokos*. In the Orthodox Church she is always represented on the iconostasis holding the infant Jesus opposite the icon of Christ. The position of prominence afforded Mary in the Church is due to her role as mother, and it is in this role that women are most esteemed. According to SOC deacon Vladislav Radujković, there is no person closer to God than Mary, and a woman's position is higher than that of a priest. While the priest is honoured with the task of representing the people before

²⁷ Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 8.

God - and unofficially the man plays this role in the family - a woman is a life giver and nurturer. This role, he asserts, is more important than a priest's.²⁸

In the Roman Catholic tradition women are similarly honoured through Mary, but in Herzegovina this takes on an added dimension owing to the claimed appearances of Mary at Međugorje in 1981. Many millions of pilgrims have visited this remote village, including Pope John Paul II. Some come to pay homage and pray to Mary, or pray through the stations of the cross. Others hope to witness another of her appearances. Still others hope for healing of a physical ailment. Mary represents both protection for and honour of women that are wholly absent in the political sphere. For this reason it is not unusual to see women fully engaged in the religious communities in service to God, nation and family. In contrast to their social situation elsewhere, women find sanctuary in the churches, which in turn become natural outlets for nurturing others.

3. Constructed Narratives of Women and War

3.1. Depictions of Women from Nationalist Constructions

Women are depicted emblematically in nurturing roles in the mythology of the Serbian nation. Among the most recognised motifs of Serbian art is the painting by Uroš Predić entitled *Kosovo Girl*, which dates from the resurgent nationalist period of the early twentieth century. The painting was inspired by one of the many epic poems celebrating the Battle of Kosovo, and contains a pieta-like depiction of Serbian womanhood. Surrounded by fallen Turkish warriors at the battle site, a Serbian maiden is kneeling at the side of a mortally wounded soldier propped up on the fallen body of his Turkish foe. She lifts the soldier's head in order to give him wine from a golden jug to ease his pain as he dies from his wounds.²⁹ This mythological depiction of women supporting the heroic Serbian warrior fighting for the fatherland was successfully employed by the Serbian media to enlist the support of women for the nationalist cause in the recent Balkan wars.

The nationalist regimes in both Serbia and Croatia consciously rebuffed challenges to this image-making. In the autumn of 1991, Serbs and Croats were fighting in Croatia, but the conflict had not yet come to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Women in

²⁸ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 13, 14.

²⁹ Judah 2000: 69.

Sarajevo protested against the war and began to march towards Belgrade. Croatian and Serbian women protestors joined them *en route*. They brandished no weapons and carried only pictures of their conscripted sons. The intended destination of the march was the headquarters of the Yugoslav national army in Belgrade, but soldiers turned them back before they could reach their goal. The next day the Serbian media countered the women's anti-war march with a televised spot depicting weeping Serbian mothers heroically sending their sons to the military to do battle for the fatherland. Two days later the Croatian media placed their own images on the screen. Croatian mothers were shown holding oversized pictures of Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, who would later hand out medals to the widows and mothers of "brave Croatian knights who had laid down their lives on the altar of the homeland".³⁰ The media campaigns were effective, especially in rural and less educated areas, and many women adopted the position that it was their "sacred duty" to play out the sacrificial role for the greater good of the fatherland.³¹

Womanhood, and especially motherhood, were thus co-opted into the nationalist causes by both sides. They lost their ability to counter the nationalist rhetoric and thereby lost control of their choices about their own lives and of their loved ones. Nationalist image-makers honoured women as the life givers who represented the "biological salvation of the Serb nation".³² Serbian leaders drew upon the mythological mediaeval figure of mother Yugovitch who reproduced in order to send sons off to fight for the fatherland and salvation of Serbia against infidels.³³

Women and their bodies were used for the war cause in other ways. Abortion was common in socialist Yugoslavia, yet new restrictions were placed on the practice during the war period in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia.³⁴ Although the laws regarding abortion remained unchanged, social pressure was put on women to reproduce in the interest of preserving the national identity. At the same time the availability of contraceptives decreased. The churches and clergy found new material for their pro-life campaigns, combining them with nationalist rhetoric. In his 1995 Christmas message, the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church called upon women to "stop

³⁰ Nikolić-Ristanović 1998: 234.

³¹ Nikolić-Ristanović 1998: 235.

³² Allcock 2000: 358.

³³ Allcock 2000: 358.

³⁴ Nikolić-Ristanović 1998: 235.

'killing' their unborn children, to bear more children despite economic hardship, and to learn from mothers who lost their only sons in the war and who now regret not bearing more sons who could bring them consolation".³⁵ Similarly, in Croat strongholds of Bosnia-Herzegovina, nuns assisted in obstetric examinations and encouraged the women to carry each developing child to birth in the national interest.³⁶ The narratives constructed by nationalist leaders reached to every aspect of women's lives. Competing narratives arrived in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the war with intervention from the international community.

3.2 Two Depictions of Women from Western Constructions

Western constructions of the relationship women have to war can be expressed within the framework of two competing narratives. A segment of the *feminist-pacifist view* suggests that men are life takers, women are life givers.³⁷ The assumptions of this view are rooted in the literature of traditional Western thinking, and related in the following by one scholar on feminist roles related to war:

We in the West are the heirs of a tradition that assumes an affinity between women and peace, between men and war, a tradition that consists of culturally constructed and transmitted myths and memories. Thus, in time of war, men and women – locked in a dense symbiosis, perceived as beings who have complementary needs and exemplify gender-specific virtues – take on, in cultural memory and narrative, the personas of Just Warriors and Beautiful Souls. Man construed as violent, whether eagerly and inevitably or reluctantly and tragically; woman as nonviolent, offering succor and compassion: these tropes on the social identities of men and women, past and present, do not denote what men and women *really* are in time of war, but function instead to re-create and secure women's location as noncombatants and men's as warriors.³⁸

This view holds that women are by nature the peace-makers, the arbiters of conflict who will settle the disputes of men. Women are thus the victims of men's wars, helpless as the 'weaker sex' to stop the conflict. Subsequently they become the moral architects in the post-war society who nurture and 'take care of' the victimised, especially children.³⁹

³⁵ Cited in Nikolić-Ristanović 1998: 235.

³⁶ Nikolić-Ristanović 1998: 236.

³⁷ Elshtain 1987: 161ff.

³⁸ Elshtain 1987: 3, 4.

³⁹ The contemporary feminist-pacifist construction is tempered by ideals of modern society. Women too may support a war effort as engaged non-combatants, and may even be employed by the military complex in support capacities and still retain the role of peace-maker. See the interesting historical account by Elshtain who traces the development of

In contrast to the pacifist-feminist view, the competing *equal rights view* sharply redefines the roles of women, and demonstrates a cleavage in the Western feminist positions. The equal rights construction seeks parity with men and downplays the differences of masculinity and femininity.⁴⁰ For equal rights feminists, access to combat roles in the military affords women legal and social equality, which are the sign and seal of equal citizenship.

3.3. Assessment of the Narratives

These three constructions – the nationalist view as a construct from within the Balkans, and the two Western views - compete for the attention and commitment of women in Bosnia-Herzegovina today and constitute an ideological battlefield of a different kind. In the post-war situation the militancy of the equal rights feminist position has few followers, but the other positions are well represented. The Nationalist view is stronger in the Republika Srpska and the Western feminist-pacifist view is stronger in the Federacija. The latter is especially visible from the influence of Swanee Hunt, former US Ambassador to Vienna and director of the Women in Public Policy Program at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. A book she wrote was published only in the local language(s) of Bosnia-Herzegovina and carries the title in English, *This Was Not Our War: Bosnian Women Reclaiming the Peace*. Telling the stories of twenty six women of various nationalities, it "aims to give Bosnian women a voice in the 'man's world' of war and post-war politics that make up Bosnia today".⁴¹ In the book and the organisation she founded, called *Women Waging Peace*, Hunt looks beyond the war to the creation of a sustainable peace through "inclusive security".⁴² Women, she notes, "are often the most powerful voices for moderation in times of conflict", and contribute to peace negotiations because they are directly involved in both civil

women's involvement in war from the Crimean War through to the late twentieth century (1987: 180ff.).

⁴⁰ In Western societies, especially the United States, women are increasingly integrated into the military complex, not only in time of war, but as a normal course of employment. As a result, it has been increasingly difficult to maintain the myth that women are the antithesis of masculine militancy. In the more traditional view, women's roles in the military were seen as temporary and necessary in times of war, after which they would return to domestic roles. But now women constitute approximately 15% of the US military, with 85% of jobs open to them (Feinman 1998: 133), including combat pilots. The equal rights position views integration into the armed forces, and especially combat roles, as "the 'last bastion' for women to conquer" (Klein 1998: 148).

⁴¹ Kampschror 2002: np.

⁴² Hunt and Posa 2001: np.

activism and family care.⁴³ Furthermore, she claims that although women are traditionally overlooked for peacemaking roles, they have a special contribution to make.⁴⁴ Her *apologia* for women begins not from a position of “gender fairness” but from efficiency in that women are “crucial to inclusive security since they are often at the centre of NGOs, popular protests, electoral referendums, and other citizen-empowered movements.”⁴⁵ Structural and psychological barriers prevent women from being included at the circle of negotiations, but she claims their presence there ought to be a matter of “common sense” because “everyone recognizes just how good women are at forging peace”.⁴⁶

While Hunt’s analysis contains some accurate insights, it errs in its uncritical acceptance of feminist-pacifist presuppositions that lack empirical evidence. For Hunt, male peace-makers and female warriors are “exceptions”.⁴⁷ The war situation was not this simple or tidy, however. There is ample evidence that men too disagreed with the war and did what they could to avoid fighting.⁴⁸ Many men fled the country in order to avoid conscription into a war that had no winners. Other men fought in their own capacities against the war, and were victims of someone else’s ideology. All varieties of atrocities occurred in the camps and were not limited to women. Male prisoners also were raped, tortured and genitally mutilated, rendering

⁴³ Hunt and Posa 2001: np.

⁴⁴ Hunt and Posa 2001: np.

⁴⁵ Hunt and Posa 2001: np.

⁴⁶ Hunt and Posa 2001: np.

⁴⁷ Hunt and Posa 2001: np.

⁴⁸ This researcher is personally acquainted with men of conscription age who fled the country rather than fight in a war conducted by nationalists. Additionally, two persons interviewed for this research indicated that they opposed the fighting although they were conscripted and served. One, Dragan Nedić, a Protestant now overseeing the country-wide humanitarian aid and development effort of the Evangelical Church known as *Agape*, gives thanks to God that each time there was major fighting in Sarajevo he was off duty and did not have to kill anyone. The other, Saša Nikolinović, pastor of the Evangelical Church in Sarajevo, also was an unwilling conscript. On more than one occasion while on duty he encountered enemy forces fleeing, and refused to fire at them. Kovač’s husband, a physical education teacher by profession, found himself an unwilling conscript forced to fight on the side of the Serbs in order that his family was guaranteed safety. On his honeymoon after a celebrated wedding in Mostar (see Chapter Four), Nikola and Sandra Škrinjarić unexpectedly found themselves surrounded and on the front lines of a military offensive through Central Bosnia. Even in this circumstance where many on both sides were killed and their own lives were in danger, Škrinjarić refused to shoot. Škrinjarić attributes their survival of the fire fight to the protection of God. See the account in Kelly and Shepherd 1995.

them incapable of reproducing.⁴⁹ Insofar as rape is used as a power mechanism it is as much addressed against the woman as men. In a more balanced feminist approach, Nikolić-Ristanović relates:

[W]omen had to 'pay' for real or alleged, previous or actual ideas and acts of their husbands, sons, brothers, fathers. Or, more precisely, rape was used as a means to punish a woman's male relatives. This is a way to explain the abduction, rape, torture and murder of the women whose men were absent and presumed to be fighting on the opposite side.⁵⁰

The crime was directly carried out against the woman, but had larger intentions and implications of power, control and victimisation. The woman was not the end; she was the means to victimise the men of the other nation. Men too, even in the heat of the confrontation, took stands to be people of peace. For these men, this was not their war either.

Furthermore, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina presents examples of militant women in positions of power; leading politicians who fought in their own capacities and sent powerless men into battle. Some women, such as ideologue Mirjana Marković, wife of Slobodan Milošević, are now in hiding, wanted by the Hague. Marković remains unrepentant of her activities or views, and denies any wrongdoing. Ultra-nationalist Biljana Plavšić became SDS party leader when the High Representative prevented Radovan Karadžić from holding the position in the post-war period. Plavšić gave herself up to the Hague and pleaded guilty to crimes against humanity. Ultimately Plavšić accepted responsibility for her part in the war and in inflicting violence on innocent victims, and was subsequently sentenced to eleven year of imprisonment. These women are exceptional because of their rise to power in a man's world, but not for their views. Too much evidence exists that women can use nurture as a weapon to instil hatred and racism in their children. Drina Nikolinović is especially sober about this factor:

Still there is a lot of hatred among women, also. I can see it. I can see my neighbours, for example, who would say, 'I would kill the child in a cradle of Serbian nation'. And she is a wife and a mother and, speaking secularly now, because I am a mother, I would never kill anyone's child. No way.... And I know that there are many who think that way. And maybe they would not

⁴⁹ See, for instance, the testimony of B-1461 at the Hague Tribunal who witnessed sexual abuse of male Bošnjak prisoners in one camp. Genitalia were torn from the body. Male prisoners were serially raped. Others were ordered to perform oral sex on each other, and then were commanded to bite off and swallow the penises of others. That this happened on the Muslim day of *Bajram* was of particular degradation (CIJ 2003: np.).

⁵⁰ Nikolić-Ristanović 2000: 61.

actually kill a child, but sometimes it is enough just to hear her saying [such things], and those words will feed hatred in the hearts of people.⁵¹

Nikolinović offers her own personal experience, which also is supported in the literature. Seka Kundačina encounters embittered women determined to kill in order to avenge a lost child, and offers counsel to address their hatred, loss and intentions to take revenge.⁵²

The literature on the topic also demonstrates how women can be active agents in the conflict. Barry Hart, a peace worker in Bosnia-Herzegovina, relates the difficult questions of a Bošnjak grandmother from Srebrenica, whose own father and brother were killed by a Serb military unit in World War Two. After their deaths her own mother taught her to ‘forgive the enemy’, but she now believes that advice to be wrong. She is raising her grandchildren because their father and mother were killed in the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995. She asks, “What should I tell my grandchildren about this war – who is going to tell what happened to their parents and why?”⁵³ In a separate incident, Volf refers to an account by Serbian journalist Želko Vuković in which a Bošnjak mother names her new born child ‘Jihad’ so that he will never forget the torture she underwent at the hands of Serbs during this conflict. Vuković writes, “How many mothers in Bosnia have sworn to teach their children hate and revenge! How many little Muslims, Serbs, and Croats will grow up listening to such stories and learning such lessons!”⁵⁴

Men may seem dangerous because they project a brutish, warmongering image, and women may appear benign in the conflict, but prove just as dangerous with a subtle and latent effect on a new generation. Correspondingly, Nikolinović does not automatically regard women as reconcilers. She is sceptical that some of the women’s associations will bring reconciliation because they make no effort to reach beyond their own national group:

[Y]ou have, for example, now all those gatherings of women, Mothers and Wives of Srebrenica or Serbian Sisters.... [A]ll these gatherings are again very limited by nation.... They are sharing their pain but they just share it within their nation.... [W]hen I hear of Serbian Sisters or such kind of gatherings, [it] just makes me sick, because I don’t think that that’s a step toward bringing some peaceful ideas, actually. Women could, really, if they

⁵¹ Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 6.

⁵² Kundačina [PR.WO.MO.01]: 9.

⁵³ Hart 2001: 304.

⁵⁴ Vuković 1993: 134, as cited in Volf 1996b: 111.

wanted to.... [E]specially for the future, you know, because they are the ones who influence their children most. And they are ones who are bringing up the next generation. But I'm afraid in the situation that we have now, this generation brought up in this era [is] going to get a lot of poisonous ideas from their mothers. I'm sad to say this, but it is true.⁵⁵

Set against this body of empirical evidence, it has to be concluded that women too make choices to be active participants in the conflict. Without essentialising women, men, or the conflict, a more realistic path forward must be found.

4. Women, Religious Faith, and Social Restoration

It is clear from the interviews that religious women believe that they have a special role to play in peace-building and restoration.⁵⁶ Kristina Kovać knows this from her own experiences in Šipovo in the Republika Srpska near the IEBL border. She offers the following from her experiences there:

Right away after people came back [women] started to hang out together. And I think that women were the first ones to take part in humanitarian organisations and they crossed the lines while the men were afraid to do that.⁵⁷

Catholic Vesna Liermann's experience is similar in recovery efforts among women in Vukovar, a heavily destroyed border city to Serbia in Croatia. She also quickly recognised the common needs women had in the city, and began to organise Serbian and Croatian women to support each other. Her work grew to other cities, such as Osijek where she is the Director of the *Centar za Mir (Centre for Peace)*, and eventually aided efforts throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina when the war moved there. Liermann witnessed that women were more open to reconciling than men, and that women approached each other more easily than men:

I think they do [have a special role to play]. For a period of time I worked in this island of Brač especially with women from Srebrenica and their kids. I was pleasantly surprised to discover that these victimised women were more tolerant and they were ready to be a part of these peace efforts, reconciliation efforts. I saw that also in Tenje with these women. They were ready to make the first step always. We also worked with their husbands but as men, of course, they weren't as open as women. It was as if they withdrew themselves for some reason. I believe there's a desire to make such efforts

⁵⁵ Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 7.

⁵⁶ Kovać [SO.WO.ŠI.03]: 6, Ilić [SO.WO.BL.01]: 4, Kundačina [PR.WO.MO.01]: 16, Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 12, Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 3 are all of this persuasion. Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 6, 7 believes women could play this role, if they so chose.

⁵⁷ Kovać [SO.WO.ŠI.03]: 6.

but just showing emotions, to make also that first step is difficult for men. I just noticed that women were more ready to make those first steps.⁵⁸

Women's perceptions of those special roles take on various dimensions ranging from private and domestic to public and political. Three of the women suggest that if more women had been in positions of authority and were decision makers in Yugoslavia during its break-up, the war might have been averted altogether because women are more able to resolve conflict without resorting to violence. Kovać expresses it thus:

I think that [women's way of] thinking is quite different than men's. They are more flexible. There are also nice men but [most of them] are stubborn and they need time to put that in their head, to settle that in their head and then come to the conclusion that we women are right. Even today I say that if women were more in the positions of authority and power that the war wouldn't have happened.⁵⁹

Jelena Ilić works in the archdiocese offices of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Banja Luka, and is a volunteer with the St Sava Youth Organisation (*Sventosavska Omladinska Zajednica*) organised and directed by deacon Vladislav Radujković. Ilić agrees with Kovać about the possible outcomes of the war if women had been better placed in positions of authority:

[A woman] would have to be present in these official positions so that maybe these things that happened would have been prevented; in different ministries and the police so she could spread her positive energy.⁶⁰

Protestant Seka Kundačina from Mostar is a grandmother in her seventies and lost her son in the war. She is also of this sentiment, and sees that women are marginalised in these affairs by men in society:

And if you would ask the women, they would never have started the war. But the Bosnian woman is still left on the side. There are a few of them that are sitting and deciding about big things. And I think if they would give the possibility to women so that they could also be involved in great decisions in one state, then it would be more efficient and much better for us today.⁶¹

Women assessed their ability to be reconcilers higher than that of men, largely based on their superior verbal communication skills, as Šiljak indicates:

⁵⁸ Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 3.

⁵⁹ Kovać [SO.WO.ŠI.03]: 7.

⁶⁰ Ilić [SO.WO.BL.01]: 4.

⁶¹ Kundačina [PR.WO.MO.01]: 11.

[W]omen communicate easier in daily life. I communicate with other mothers in school easier than my husband and also in the market and in stores. Everywhere. So it is easier for them to make some connection than for men. Men are more interested in political issues, or in political representatives here but, as I told you, through the women's associations, they can do a lot. Perhaps even more than our politicians.⁶²

A man's temperament is sometimes described as stubborn⁶³ or emotionally withdrawn⁶⁴ and their disagreements more often led to fighting, as Kovač relates:

In general, in life if [men] don't agree they fight. And they solve problems with fighting. And women are those who will solve problems with dialogue. There are a thousand ways to solve a problem without a fight.⁶⁵

Ilić attributed this disposition to a male-centred 'Balkan mentality' that refused to recognise the opinion of a woman to any significant degree:

This is the Balkans and it's this mentality. Women were not seen in politics before the war and women are just not... you don't think about women, you don't ask her anything.⁶⁶

Kovač and Nikolinović⁶⁷ sense that women are 'more religious' than men, citing greater regularity and participation in the church or mosque to substantiate their observations. However, Liermann and Šiljak⁶⁸ could not make such an assessment based on personal experience. These women also sensed that factors more substantive than attendance in the church or mosque were more important for peace-building. These factors are explored in the following sections.

4.1. Distinguishing 'Religion' and 'Faith'

One of the questions that the research was interested to examine was whether religious women made a distinction between the terms 'religion' and 'faith' and, if so, how might this effect their peace-building efforts. The local language has a word for each of these, *religija*, and *vjera*. The latter term is usually translated as 'faith', but with the additional meaning of 'belief', 'religion', 'creed', or even 'credit'. Also, these terms are often used interchangeably.

⁶² Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 15.

⁶³ Kovač [SO.WO.ŠI.03]: 7, Ilić [SO.WO.BL.01]: 5.

⁶⁴ Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 3.

⁶⁵ Kovač [SO.WO.ŠI.03]: 7.

⁶⁶ Ilić [SO.WO.BL.01]: 4.

⁶⁷ Kovač [SO.WO.ŠI.03]: 8; Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 8.

⁶⁸ Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 5; Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 15.

Zilka Šiljak, a graduate of the *Faculty of Islamic Studies* in Sarajevo, acknowledges a sociological distinction between the words ‘religion’ and ‘faith’, but otherwise she finds it difficult to draw a distinction between the two terms and uses them interchangeably:

[A]ccording to my opinion, religion is a view of believers, attitudes towards life and it is my own way through life. Also, through religion I see the world in which I live and everything around me. It is my view through which I live my own life. And also, it is some kind of meeting the sacred, to God. This is what it is to me, and accordingly, my whole life has a religious dimension. I am not religious only in the mosque. I am religious now when I am sitting here and talking to you. It is a whole way of life for me.... [T]here are two terms, but to me there is no difference. It is the same for me. You can make a distinction sociologically, but for me my own faith is everything. It is my life.... Because my faith determines all things in my life. All things.⁶⁹

She expresses the concepts of religion and faith in terms that are both definitional and personal. Although she does not draw a distinction between ‘religion’ and ‘faith’, she draws a marked difference between a superficial and deeper understanding of religion. Her own childhood was marked by the former, her family practising “some kind of traditional way of religion, mainly worship and customs”.⁷⁰ Only when she was afforded the opportunity to study Islam more deeply and formally at the Gazi-Husref-Begova Medresa and the *Faculty of Islamic Studies* in Sarajevo did her faith become determinate in her life.⁷¹ She also indicates that her own early experience is not exceptional. Now engaged in working with women and youth, she sees the same variables at play. Most young people have inherited from their parents a traditional understanding of their religion, which is very superficial. There is, consequentially, great ignorance about one’s own religion, in which most persons cannot articulate its basic tenets.⁷² Nevertheless, Šiljak is seeing an interest by young people to know more about their religion and the religion of others:

I know that in a women’s centre we had a project of gender studies, and young people were interested in religion very much, but they didn’t know about their own religion, or very little. It was traditional heritage inherited from their parents or their family. Nothing more. But they really wanted to learn about other religions. I was surprised when half of them decided to write essays about religion. So it was a sign to me that they’re really interested, even after all these things, they’re really interested to know about

⁶⁹ Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 4.

⁷⁰ Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 3.

⁷¹ Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 3.

⁷² Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 7.

others, about ourselves and about others and to understand how to live our future. So we have to deal with young people and to talk to them.⁷³

The phenomenon of resurgent religion is an indication to Šiljak that young people want to understand themselves and their community better. They also want to understand more about others, and how to create a future together in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Other women interviewed do make a difference in the terms 'religion' and 'faith'. Vesna Liermann from the Catholic community makes two kinds of distinctions between 'religion' and 'faith'. The first is an expression of superficiality and depth:

Religion for me is when you belong to some church as an institution. But faith is something much deeper and is about spirituality.⁷⁴

Her experience as a negotiator for reconciliation among women leads her to believe that people often mix the two terms. "I think that they live on this level of religion, they don't go any deeper into faith," says Liermann. Second, she differentiates 'religion' and 'faith' in relation to her work as a peace activist at the Centre:

Religion is some kind of theory, but faith would be a way in which to engage in some kind of practice.⁷⁵

Linking these two sets of distinctions, she draws out their implications for peace-building:

It would help if representatives of different religions would go deeper in their faith and read their Qur'ān or Bible where they can find a source, helpful source how they can build peace. And if they believe in that sincerely and start to put it into practice then the result would be this kind of reconciliation and peace. If faith stays just in this religious level, superficial faith, then nothing will be changed.⁷⁶

Like Liermann, Mojca Leban is also Roman Catholic. At the time of the interview she was the director of *Abraham/Ibrahim*, a religiously-based NGO headquartered in Sarajevo. It works especially among young people throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and emphasises common aspects of the monotheistic religions and the pluralist religious history of Bosnia-Herzegovina to foster understanding between youth. The organisation especially addresses the needs of the next generation, and sponsors seminars, dialogues, exchange trips and youth events to bring youth of the different

⁷³ Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 7, 8.

⁷⁴ Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 2.

⁷⁵ Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 2.

⁷⁶ Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 5.

nations together. Leban is educated as a theologian, which lends expertise to her insights into the religious nature of reconciliation and peace-building. She suggests that a large part of the problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the ignorance of religion across all of the national groups. Religion, she emphasises, is often identified with a national expression at the expense of the spiritual dimension.⁷⁷ The repercussions are significant for peace-building and restoration:

[T]hat segment of reconciliation, that segment of forgiveness, that segment of love, all of those things are just slipping away, perhaps into the future. But nobody is talking about it today.⁷⁸

Jelena Ilić from the Orthodox tradition differentiates between ‘religion’ and ‘faith’ thus:

Faith is something personal that is between me and God. I’m not a theologian, that’s how I see it. Religion is church as an institution, priests, then customs and habits and everything. Tradition.⁷⁹

This personal and relational understanding of faith, in contrast to the institutional character of religion, is also drawn out by Protestant Drina Nikolinović:

I don’t have any good opinion about religion, you know. And I would never consider myself religious. Religion is set of rules.... And it doesn’t have to do a lot with real faith, with what you really believe.... In my opinion [faith is] a relationship to the Lord. Yes. And it’s knowing God. It’s something that I’m growing in during this period. But very often when I speak about my God it’s [pause], I know him. I mean I know him as I know my friend or something. And still God can surprise me, you know, but it’s relationship.⁸⁰

Similarly, Protestant Sandra Rakić from the Protestant community in Sarajevo was seventeen when she lost her best friend and father in the daily shelling of her city. She also sees a difference between religion and faith and defines the latter relationally:

I was not religious. I was a bad believer because every time I needed something, I knew that, you know, there was a God. When I was in school and I didn’t learn enough, I said, “God, God, please, don’t let the teacher ask me anything.” Today when somebody comes and tells me, “You changed your faith,” my first reaction was always, “I have never had faith.” I didn’t have faith, actually. Concerning religion, I come from a mixed family, but that was religion that is something you cannot choose, that you are born in and that’s it. You are born in an Orthodox family and you have to be

⁷⁷ Leban [RC.WO.SA.01]: 8.

⁷⁸ Leban [RC.WO.SA.01]: 8.

⁷⁹ Ilić [SO.WO.BL.01]: 3.

⁸⁰ Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 4.

Orthodox. Or vice versa, or a Catholic. But faith is something... should I quote Hebrews 11:1? I know today that I know a living God, that I have the relationship with the living God and that nobody pushed me or forced me to do that. It is something that I chose. It's a big difference.⁸¹

Kovać from the Orthodox community in Šipovo also emphasises the personal aspect of faith in contrast to something more impersonal:

[F]aith is believing in God and religion is teaching about God as a science. But faith in my opinion is believing in that divine being.⁸²

In Mostar Seka Kundačina comes from a culturally Catholic heritage and is married to a Serb, but like many Yugoslavs of her generation, rejected all religion and raised her children under the atheistic ideology of socialism. She sees her gradual pilgrimage to Christianity through the Evangelical Church as a clear and conscious departure from her earlier years. Although she did not attempt to make a difference between the terms 'religion' and 'faith', she makes a clear distinction between credal confession in God and personal trust in God. She relates the difference to traditional Christians thus:

The difference is that we say "I believe in God" and that person does those things that are not right. But those that say "I trust in God" they do things right and if they make mistakes they know to ask forgiveness because of the Holy Spirit.... That's the difference between my faith and your faith. I have a living relationship with God because he's alive and you don't have it because you trust in your saints.⁸³

From the foregoing it may be observed that several of the women interviewed make a definitional distinction between the terms 'religion' and 'faith',⁸⁴ while others⁸⁵ may use the terms 'religion' and 'faith' interchangeably. However, all of them make a distinction between the traditional and/or institutional dimension, and a personal-relational dimension of what they practice. It is this latter expression that informs them for their efforts in peace-building, often in contradistinction to the former. A closer examination of this dynamic is in order.

4.2. The Transcendent Element of Peace-Building and Restoration

⁸¹ Rakić [PR.WO.SA.03]: 5.

⁸² Kovać [SO.WO.ŠI.03]: 4.

⁸³ Kundačina [PR.WO.MO.01]: 12, 13.

⁸⁴ Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02], Leban [RC.WO.SA.01], Ilić [SO.WO.BL.01], Rakić [PR.WO.SA.03], Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02], Kovać [SO.WO.ŠI.03].

⁸⁵ Kundačina [PR.WO.MO.01], Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01].

Several of the women interviewed undertake their efforts in peace-building from a strong sense of obedience to God. Šiljak points out that God created all humanity, and if he so willed, he could have created us in one religion, but the Qur'ān teaches that he created us differently in order that we might have the opportunity to learn from our differences.⁸⁶ Seen in this way, our differences are not liabilities, but opportunities to learn from and about each other.⁸⁷ The basis for this understanding is also from the Qur'ān, that all of life is sacred and thus no one has the right to kill others. Šiljak puts it this way:

So we have to show respect to all human creatures because human life is sacred. No one has the right to kill other people. According to Islam, if you kill a person with intention, it would be as if you killed all mankind. And God is teaching us about love because God gives love to us every day. Why don't we give it to other people and be merciful?⁸⁸

Seka Kundačina started a multi-national women's group out of her experience of a vision from God, encouraging her to use her knitting abilities to reach out to war-destitute women in need of affordable clothing for their children. Beginning in 1995 with just three women from the Protestant church in West Mostar, the group has grown to over thirty from all religious backgrounds, and atheists as well. Three things especially impacted her willingness to reach out to others. First, she received physical and spiritual help from the Evangelical Church in her hour of need following the loss of her son in the daily shelling of the city. With time, she experienced a personal conversion and transformation from atheism to Christianity, which motivated her to help others similarly traumatised. Second, she was attracted to the multi-national aspect of the West Mostar Evangelical Church where Croats, Serbs and Bošnjaks all worship together. In the divided city of Mostar it was difficult to imagine people from all these national groups gathering peacefully together for anything. It reminded her of the pre-war days in which there was no hatred towards people of another nation. Third, although she has no special theological training, she learned from the Bible that all humanity is one in the eyes of God:

⁸⁶ This is a summary of the verse (5:51) "If God had so willed, He would have made you a single People, but (His Plan is) to test you in what He hath given you: so strive as in a race in all virtues. The goal of you all is to God; It is He that will show you the truth of the matters in which ye dispute."

⁸⁷ Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 17.

⁸⁸ Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 17.

Maybe this is good what has happened because I don't have hatred towards another nation. Or when we were in the communist time then we all were together. And there was no hatred because we had no clue about who is Serbian, or Catholic or Muslim. We were one. And maybe this church has drawn me because all the nations are in there. And most of time I would stop on Genesis because it says clearly that God created man and his wife, that God created man from the dust of the earth. And I would say to my ladies in the group that God has created a man, not a nation, and that we are one. That's why for me you don't exist like this nation or that. We are one in the eyes of God. He loves man but he hates sin. And that's the difference, there's no nationality. God created man, not nationality. In my group there is maybe one or two Croatian ladies and the rest are Serbian and Muslim.⁸⁹

The sense of God's presence and oversight in people's lives is also an important part of the message Kundačina gives to others. Many of the similarly distraught and disoriented women received these words and experienced transformations of their own, becoming followers of Christ. It is precisely this kind of transformation that encourages her to think optimistically about the future possibilities for reconciliation. She is cautious to point out, however, that this is a work of God through faithful believers:

I'm an optimist and I believe [peace] will come, especially if the Word of God will go forth. And the churches would be raised up and Christianity would go up and even when people would give their living testimony so that other people could see what they're saying [and that] they're living it. And each of us in their community could change. And if we will do this it would come. God made wonderful things in Bosnia-Herzegovina and this time of peace among all nationalities will come. But we need to do what is our part, to speak and to go to women, to children, to men with no difference of nationality.⁹⁰

Reconciliation and peace-building have a pronounced supernatural aspect for Protestant Nikolinović. Her convictions stem from her own pilgrimage from atheist to Christian believer. Having once been part of the young and relatively affluent societal cliques of the capital city, her conversion gave her a sense of freedom to be herself because her acceptance rested not in the trendy circle with her friends, but in God:

No, honestly, I found rest in just being myself. And not putting emphasis on what people expect you to be, moved pressure of my life. I know Almighty accepts me, and that gives rest to my soul. That helped me also to know

⁸⁹ Kundačina [PR.WO.MO.01]: 10.

⁹⁰ Kundačina [PR.WO.MO.01]: 14.

myself better because it's definitely the other kind of light – light that God shines onto you when he shows things the way they really are.⁹¹

She describes knowing God as she knows a friend,⁹² and links reconciliation to a qualified supernatural work of God in people's lives:

But that reconciliation is possible only in Jesus, really. I don't see any other way because maybe you can have some temporary reconciliation that cannot be called actually like that.... I mean it's too big to be overcome only by human strength.... With human strength and with even forgiveness and everything it's not possible.⁹³

While the majority of society now carefully scrutinises the nationality of individuals, the spiritual transformation of persons in the church fellowship allows Bošnjaks, Serbs, Croats and Roma (Gypsies) to worship together without distinction or discrimination.

Roman Catholic Vesna Liermann also noticed that even non-religious women open to reconciliation with other women could have a faith-awakening experience in an informal spiritual environment. She points to a kind of spiritual awakening for some of the women that came through being together with women from other national communities:

It was interesting to work with women who didn't identify themselves as believers but they were coming from different national backgrounds. They were trying to work ...among different nationalities on reconciliation. Faith wasn't an issue at all and we didn't have this sense that they were active in their churches. It was our desire to work with women who would work together in their communities, and then their sense of faith would wake up at some moment. After they spent some time together with different groups they have this desire to look over to the other side and learn more about other religious groups. That was interesting. It was some kind of inward guidance, it was just interesting to see that they wanted to work together.⁹⁴

She sees that God is part of this process even if persons involved see themselves as non-believers:

You don't have to be a card-carrying believer but the way of life can testify to that. Sometimes we do things instinctively, and I put these two things together, man and God.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 4.

⁹² Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 4.

⁹³ Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 16.

⁹⁴ Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 4.

⁹⁵ Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 4.

The expression of the Transcendent in people's lives then translates into the social networks in which these women are most naturally involved. For most of them, this is through the family.

4.3. Peace-Building and Restoration Through Family Networks

A woman's centrality to the family is common across national boundaries. Not unexpectedly then, women undertake peace-building most effectively through family networks. Family issues and especially the needs of children are a natural conversation and bonding point for women, regardless of religion and nationality.

For Orthodox school teacher Katrina Kovać, the family is the starting point for efforts in overcoming conflict. She believes that if the conflict were viewed from a *family* orientation rather than political perspective, the war might have been avoided:

I think for common people, if we think of them, that the war would never come, that you have these politicians and people with these heads, greedy heads and maybe international community as well. Different influences that make people to hate each other.... I start from the point of every normal person who has a family and children, and think that no family would ever do anything to encourage war.... But I really think - actually this is repetition - I think 99%, maybe even more people here do not want war. But just these few heads, a few of them who want to make this hatred.⁹⁶

Family orientation led her to become involved in helping displaced persons at the height of the war. She and her daughter were forced from their Central Bosnian town of Šipovo once shared by Orthodox and Bošnjaks, and her husband was conscripted to fight for the Serbs. The Croat (counter-) offensive drove Bošnjaks and Orthodox alike from the town and Kovać and her family took up temporary residence in Banja Luka. Although a displaced person herself, she led a woman's organisation called *Sisters of Serbia*, helping other displaced persons, regardless of their national background. Once the signing of the Dayton Accord allowed for the peaceful resettlement of Šipovo, Kovać became a spokesperson to direct humanitarian aid first from Banja Luka to Šipovo, and then co-ordinated efforts with SFOR troops in town to distribute aid among local families, regardless of nationality. As a result, Šipovo became the first 'open' town in the Republika Srpska, a status that many villages have not yet achieved. As a regular participant in inter-religious dialogue seminars between believers of different confessions from Bihać, Brčko and Šipovo, she personally vetted the safety of the unnerved Muslim women, obvious by their head

⁹⁶ Kovać [SO.WO.ŠI.03]: 10.

covering, in Serbian territory.⁹⁷ The same careful disregard for national differences carries over into her teaching in the classroom. In a situation where isolation and ostracisation is common, she attempts to integrate the two Muslim children in the class as much as possible:

If I don't show favouritism and division among children from different backgrounds, I think that says a lot. And in my class where there are twenty children two of them are Muslim.... And if I do not show favouritism in the class between these children, and if I teach them to have friendship with each other and to help each other, to play together, and when they do certain exercises or tasks to help each other and I never say in any moment, "Don't play with them" because they are Muslims. No, they are all the time together. And as much as I try to have boys and girls together regardless of religion, in the same way I try to make these children of other backgrounds sit together with the others, not to separate them. If I were to take these two and make them sit together separately from others, that is division. But in my class the two of them sit with the Serb children. And I think even in that way I did a lot.⁹⁸

Kovać regrets that strained budgets do not allow more frequent competitions in sports or dancing across national lines, as was the case before the war.⁹⁹

As a Muslim, Šiljak thinks along the same lines, and asserts that women are playing a special role in social restoration out of this position as the "main factor in the family".¹⁰⁰ Children's natural curiosity allows mothers to interact with their children in informal moments of instruction as to how they should respond to and treat other children. It is critical for her to teach her own children that not all Serbs are 'Četniks', for instance, and that the Qur'ān teaches Muslims to respect not only the Peoples of the Book, but all human beings:

You know, I told you how I teach my children. I have messages from my holy book, from the Qur'ān, about that, and I have to respect and follow that. First of all, we have to respect followers of the holy books, Jews and Christians especially. But according to other Qur'ānic passages, we have a lot of messages about respecting all human beings, all human creatures.... We know that God created us into a man and woman and divided us into two tribes, races and nations to meet each other and to learn from each other.¹⁰¹

From the Orthodox community, Ilić also sees the family as the centrepiece of influence for peace and restoration of the social order. She speaks about the 'positive

⁹⁷ Kovać [SO.WO.ŠI.03]: 7.

⁹⁸ Kovać [SO.WO.ŠI.03]: 8, 9.

⁹⁹ Kovać [SO.WO.ŠI.03]: 9.

¹⁰⁰ Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 12.

¹⁰¹ Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 17.

energy' that women, more than men, exercise in the home. Family is the 'first priority', and she believes women have the greatest influence in society through their children. A woman fights for her family and brings the same tenacity to politics for the sake of her country or some other cause.¹⁰² She finds that the Serbian Orthodox Church places a strong and correct emphasis on the family, and for this reason is involved in a restoration movement operating out of the SOC archdiocese in Banja Luka. She describes the effort of the *St Sava Youth Organisation* thus:

I think this approach that we are like modern day missionaries among our people but also those on the side of Muslims, Catholics, I think that's one of the solutions. So that they attract many more people because real believers, true believers would not engage in war. And bringing back faith into families. So we don't let that thing that's happening in the West happen to us, too, that there are so many broken homes.¹⁰³

The organisation focuses its efforts on young people who otherwise are neglected, troubled and disoriented in the post-war society. It works in religious education in schools, and addresses such topics as the dangers of drug abuse and seeks to appeal to young people through artistic expression. One such project set texts of theologian and spiritual leader bishop Nikolaj Velimirović (1880-1956) to music in a work called *Songs Above the West and the East*. Rather than giving the recording a traditional and ecclesiastical sound, the text has been given the hard and contemporary edge of a popular Serbian rock band.

Ilić is representative of women who carry significant responsibility through family networks to influence society. The effort that she is involved in is unapologetically nationalist, but consciously non-chauvinist. This church-based organisation endeavours to reawaken Serbs to their original heritage and faith, claiming that its core is positive and non-disparaging of other ethnic groups or religions. The effort to reclaim Serbs to a new identity in the SOC and its historical-spiritual meaning focuses great attention on young people, who are arguably the largest at-risk group in the poverty-stricken post-war society of the Republika Srpska.

4.4. Forgiveness as a Spirituality of Healing and Wholeness

Several of the interviewees point to forgiveness as the defining issue of renewed relationships, reconciliation and wholeness. Ilić senses that if women were given a chance, they would demonstrate reconciliation and forgiveness in society and politics

¹⁰² Ilić [SO.WO.BL.01]: 4, 5.

¹⁰³ Ilić [SO.WO.BL.01]: 6, 7.

in the same way as they do in the family.¹⁰⁴ Both Leban¹⁰⁵ and Nikolinović also believe that this factor is missing in society, and connect it with the spiritual dimension of believers and churches. Nikolinović recognises that this is a great need in society and seeks to motivate believers in her fellowship to pray for reconciliation and forgiveness in Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁰⁶ At the same time she recognises that those outside of her believing community may not understand her methods, because they do not understand the ways of God:

[I]t's really hard to speak to people who are not believers about reconciliation and about forgiveness. I found it hard. I found it hard to say to people, "You've got to forgive." Why? Because God forgave us. They don't really believe that God forgave us. So it's not a good reason for them. But what we're really trying to do is to prepare things in prayer. And then to take another step in reconciliation among like representatives of certain nations, among believers, to have this statement of forgiveness, to have this statement of willingness to reconcile, and things like that. I really believe in a spiritual sense that it's important. When I look around me there is not much willingness for true reconciliation.¹⁰⁷

Šiljak finds that forgiveness is also related to God's love and his purposes:

Regarding forgiveness, we have in the Qur'ān two options. The law of Talion, eye for eye, tooth for a tooth. You can answer on the same way, but it is better for you to forgive and because your enemy may be your friend in the future. You don't know. Only God knows what is good for you.¹⁰⁸

For others forgiveness is a spirituality that is both deeply personal and defining for their faith. Kovać sees forgiveness as an inherent expression of her personal faith, as she relates, "Faith and goodwill is the same for me because my faith taught me to help all people of goodwill and to forgive those who did wrong."¹⁰⁹ Sandra Rakić gives the clearest expression of how personal faith and forgiveness have had an effect in her life. The following relates her process of healing after her father was killed by a mortar during the war:

Actually I just wished if I could find that [soldier] and just, you know, take him apart in little pieces. And when there was a funeral I said, "The war will stop and I know this can be done. I know that my hatred will lead me to do this. I will find out who was on [the line] that day at that kind of placement, and then I am going to kill that man, but slowly, so that he will suffer." And

¹⁰⁴ Ilić [SO.WO.BL.01]: 5.

¹⁰⁵ Leban [RC.WO.SA.01]: 8.

¹⁰⁶ Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 5.

¹⁰⁷ Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 6.

¹⁰⁸ Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 17.

¹⁰⁹ Kovać [SO.WO.ŠI.03]: 4.

the whole time of the war my friend, Enisa told me about some God. Actually she started to talk to me about Jesus.... I didn't understand it all, but still I took many books from her.... And there were some books about forgiveness and maybe that stopped me from coming to Jesus for some time because I didn't want to forgive the Serbs. But as God leads us, at the end, on September 10, 1995, I gave my life to Jesus and I was really happy. And of course I couldn't forgive right away. Actually not for a long time. And the first time that I forgave was maybe a year after that, and it was really a slow process, maybe even two years, I'm not quite sure. First, I forgave that man who killed my father. And I really cannot forget the moment when God brought forgiveness into my heart. Even now I would really like to find that man, not to kill him, but just to tell him about Jesus who loves him and who wants him to be saved and to tell him of this powerful love that can erase all of that hatred. But still after that this was not the complete forgiveness towards the whole Serb people, a nation. And I loved them only because it was God's commandment that we have to love our enemies and all other people. And it really was a slow process, and in the church there were many sermons and seminars on inner healing, healing of the soul. And I always again and again brought that before God. I still don't know when this came, when God really changed all that and so that there was no hatred anymore.¹¹⁰

Rakić goes on to explain how she now feels the liberty to travel throughout the country and to the Republika Srpska without animosity or feeling troubled.¹¹¹ The healing she speaks of began with personal circumstances, and eventually extended to a whole nation. She also relates it as a work of God in her that changed her, and which she believes can change others.

The interviews of these women about forgiveness and reconciliation are not words unaccompanied by action, nor are they religious platitudes based on ethical theory. The interviews are the experiences of women in relation to others, and how their efforts - largely unknown and unheralded - have served to bring forgiveness, reconciliation and healing. These personal encounters, small and individual though they may be, are the hallmark of social restoration.

5. Conclusion

Several noteworthy points emerge from the foregoing analysis of religious women and peace-building. First, women's societal roles are changing in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a result of several powerful influences. The nationalist and feminist-pacifist narratives compete for the support of women with opposing portrayals. The nationalist narrative asks that women accept their victimisation heroically, in the

¹¹⁰ Rakić [PR.WO.SA.03]: 2, 3.

¹¹¹ Rakić [PR.WO.SA.03]: 3.

name of the nation. Women are lauded for their sacrifice and reminded that their loss was not in vain, but for the sake of the nation. The feminist-pacifist portrayal wants women to know that their victimisation is caused at the hands of men, and that if things are going to change for the better, then women will have to become involved to make changes in society.

Both narratives are powerful because they contain strong elements that ring true with the experiences women have known. Each narrative acknowledges that women were victimised during war, and each communicates a bond of sympathy with the woman through her loss. Each also paints strong images of an enemy, and women are always portrayed on the side of good in the struggle against evil.

While it is important to acknowledge the elements of truth in these narratives - namely, increased victimisation during a period of war at the hands of the enemy, and at the hands of men - it is also important to recognise the intention and limitation of the narratives. The nationalist narrative lauds women but demonises 'the other' who is of a different nationality. It thus draws women into the conflict, and asks them to fight for the nationalist cause without technically becoming weapon-carrying combatants. The feminist-pacifist narrative also lauds women but demonises men, failing to recognise or admit that men also can be victimised by women or war, or that men also can stand for peace. While it avoids the more obvious nationalist dynamics of conflict, this narrative draws the protagonist-antagonist line between genders. Both narratives exonerate women, while accusing the other, be it an individual or a group, and each narrative tends towards oversimplification. Insofar as women participate uncritically in these mythologies, they contribute to a continuing fragmentation and division. Wholeness requires both a broader and deeper perspective.

The women of religious faith reported for this chapter demonstrate that they are not immune to these compelling narratives, but that they have another worldview from which to criticise them, and overcome their essentialising mythologies. These women are informed by the respective holy texts of Christianity and Islam which assert the intrinsic value and sacredness of all humanity as creations of God. At the level of experience, and most importantly the family, they participate in efforts of peace-building and social restoration, and avoid the perils of the nationalist and feminist-pacifist constructions.

The women reported in this chapter are commonly engaged in multi-national peace-building and restoration efforts through the channels of influence that are most natural to them. While not opposed to efforts to empower women through structural changes of the social order, they do not depend upon them, and often do not expect much from them. In the political institutions women are neither honoured nor empowered. In the religious institutions women are honoured but not empowered. Nevertheless, women make their contributions through their influence with other women, in local NGOs, through their local religious community, in the home and with children. They go about accomplishing a very serious business of peace-building, whether or not men take them seriously. In so doing they embody the strong moral characteristics found in the *zadruga* of rural communities; that is to say, in the face of significant societal upheaval and trauma, women remain the moral guardians in community rebuilding efforts.

The religious and spiritual dimension, experientially known and lived, allows women to trespass barriers of nationalism, reach out to others, and extend forgiveness that rebuilds community. They are motivated by their faith to take risks in order to break down barriers and to extend themselves so that others may be assisted. In so doing they inject hope in an otherwise despairing situation. Their expressions of faith and encounter with God are different in each case, reflecting their diverse religious backgrounds. Yet their faith in God is central for their conduct and practice. For some, faith serves as a determinative norm for responding to others, even those who might otherwise oppose them. For others, acts of courage and kindness are not mere extensions of themselves, but an extension of God in them. Faith in God necessarily leads to an ethical response to others.

The testimony and efforts of these women is among the strongest in support of the thesis, that the religious faith dimension can make significant contributions to peace-building and social restoration.

Chapter Six

VIEWS OF RELIGIOUS STUDENTS ON PEACE-BUILDING AND SOCIAL RESTORATION

1. Introduction

The inclusion of students and young people in this study is crucial because they represent the single greatest asset for long-term stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Young people 14 to 25 years old constitute nearly one quarter of the population, and an understanding of their situation acts as a kind of sociological barometer of the future. Although young people also constitute a significant part of *today's* society, they are largely dismissed by those in positions of power. The marginalisation young people encounter contributes to the general societal malaise currently found in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which, if not soon rectified, threatens to ossify into fatalism and despair among those most able to make lasting changes.

This chapter examines the Research Question, “What empirical evidence is there of students engaging in peace-building on the basis of their religious convictions?” It addresses questions of personal identity and values, and probes the religious influences that direct them towards peace-building and multi-national co-existence (*Mitmenschlichkeit*).

The chapter first seeks to portray the general situation of young people in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. It then examines religious factors that influence peace-building as related by four students, one each from the Bošnjak, Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant communities. Specifically, four related topics emerge as vital for peace-building and social restoration, and are therefore explored in detail: 1) Identity Formation and Values-Clarification; 2) the Nature of Religious Faith; 3) Multi-National Co-Existence; and 4) Forgiveness, Restoration and Healing.

The students were chosen from more than 150 young people initially addressed, and from among twelve recorded interviews. Each has faced hardship, dislocation and

dispossession during the war, yet finds that, because of their religious faith, they are able to overcome their trauma and contribute to social restoration among young people. Their dramatic life experience during the war, ability to articulate their religious convictions, and involvement in local community efforts, have earned them a hearing in the research.

2. The Societal Context of Young People

Surveys addressing the youth sector confirm a general discouraging outlook that is common throughout society. Both substance abuse and suicide are on the increase in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Young people account for one quarter of the suicide rate that has nearly doubled from 11 per 100,000 in the pre-war years to 20 per 100,000 in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹ The increase is attributed to trauma from the war, the ailing economy, and an enduring refugee problem.² The rate is highest among young men.

A report commissioned in 2003 found that 92,000 young people left the country in the post-war period between 1996 and 2001.³ It made inquiry of young people who desired to leave Bosnia-Herzegovina, and found that about one quarter (24%) would choose to emigrate, while 40% desired to leave to find temporary work, and another 13% would leave to study at a university elsewhere. Only 21% indicated that they would not leave Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴ The report attributes the unsettled state of the youth to persistent societal ills that plague the country. The sectors of education and employment especially show little promise of meeting the needs of young people.

The fragmented educational system has 13 different structures overseeing c.630,000 students and pupils, resulting in a budget that is “four or five times higher than those of other European countries”.⁵ The report reveals a general apathy among students who have little communication with their teachers, and sense they are not respected by them. The educational system is marked by a legacy of the pre-war socialist past that affords little opportunity for self-expression.⁶

¹ UNDP 2003: 20.

² ABC 2003: np.

³ Cited in UNDP 2003: 25.

⁴ UNDP 2003: 25.

⁵ UNDP 2003: 8, 9.

⁶ UNDP 2003: 8, 9.

Some of the educational issues directly impact peace-building and social restoration. Student and professor mobility is greatly reduced because each canton only manages funding for its own universities. The standardisation of the educational practice on EU criteria remains a long-term goal, the first step toward which is a harmonised curriculum among the cantons.⁷ Dayton entrusted curriculum policy to the entities, which resulted in three different curricula. The five Bošnjak majority cantons use a core Federation curriculum. This is supplemented by a Croat curriculum in the three Croat majority cantons, and a 'mixed' curriculum in the two 'mixed' cantons. Additionally, the Republika Srpska has its own curriculum.⁸ The so-called 'national subjects' in the humanities - history, mother tongue, language and social studies – present the greatest challenge to harmonisation. One report states, "The current educational programmes present a dangerous influence on young persons,"⁹ because the focus of these subjects serves only political elites seeking to profit from nationalist causes. The Textbook Review Commission already rejected two attempts to produce textbooks free of discriminatory content, and a third is currently underway.¹⁰

Widespread debate is focused on whether religious education in the schools should be mandatory or optional. In an attempt to promote religious freedom in the schools, canton educational ministers passed legislation stating that all major religions practised in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be taught in the schools. Problems are foreseen in the implementation of this legislation, however. In many areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina the communities and schools are sufficiently segregated that minority religious educators are under-represented, making implementation of the legislation unfeasible. A greater fear is that religious education will be used as a vehicle to indoctrinate pupils in nationalist ideology, defeating the intended purposes of learning from each other. Further, there is some concern that children of a minority ethno-religious persuasion may find they are disadvantaged in the classroom should they choose not to attend religious education classes of the majority national group.¹¹ Religious education remains an unresolved issue with no apparent solution.

⁷ Soros 2001: np.

⁸ UNDP 2003: 9.

⁹ Soros 2001: np.

¹⁰ UNDP 2003: 10.

¹¹ UNDP 2003: 11, 12.

Segregation of pupils is also a problem. In some instances communities practise segregation through bussing so that children will not have to be integrated with the other national group. In other instances the practice of “two schools, one roof” - wherein a building is shared by two national groups, but with separate classrooms and curricula - continues to physically and psychologically alienate pupils from each other.¹²

The educational system is ill-equipped to prepare young people for the current labour market and only a small minority of young people (8%) are confident that their education will help them find a job.¹³ Young people cite the state of the economy as one of the primary factors for wanting to leave the country. The official unemployment rate is 40%, and 59% of the population live at or below the poverty line.¹⁴

With the demise of communism came also the end of state-sponsored youth organisations. Although the communist youth organisations were committed to the indoctrination of young people to party ideology, they also provided a coordinated programme of activities. By contrast, today’s programmes designed to strengthen the youth sector in society and sponsored by international bodies such as CARE International, UNDP, UNV (United Nations Volunteers), and UNICEF are often criticised for emphasising the needs of the sponsoring agency rather than those of the young people themselves. External funding for youth programmes was used to maintain the NGO and its workers rather than benefiting young people. Further, until the foundation of the Joint Youth Program in December 2001, which integrated the efforts of over 200 youth organisations (nearly 50%), internationally sponsored youth organisations characteristically wasted funds owing to duplication of projects and poor co-operation.¹⁵

Today more than 50% of youth organisations report insufficient funding and 23% report having no facilities whatsoever,¹⁶ which is a contributing factor to low participation among youth. Recent research shows that the vast majority of youth (72%) rarely participate in youth projects¹⁷ because young people receive little

¹² UNDP 2003: 10.

¹³ UNDP 2003: 14, 15.

¹⁴ UNDP 2003: 14.

¹⁵ Soros 2001: np.

¹⁶ Cited in UNDP 2003: 28.

¹⁷ Cited in UNDP 2003: 23.

respect and support in society.¹⁸ Widespread disinterest and apathy among young people has ramifications in the political sphere.

In one survey 95% of the respondents indicated that they “have little or no influence on political events in Bosnia-Herzegovina”,¹⁹ and that young people are marginalised in the decision-making process. Despite this, data collected from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Election Commission shows that 45.5% of registered voters aged 17-30 voted,²⁰ which is high compared to the same aged group of voters in Western Europe. Disenchantment with the political process and its ability to bring substantive change to society is reflected in low participation (6%) in political parties.²¹ Most young people believe that politicians are more interested in gaining and holding power than they are in benefiting the country.²²

Although identification with politics and specific political parties is low among youth, attachment to religion is high. Almost half (48%) of young people polled indicated a strong attachment to religion, and a slightly lower attachment to their nation (43%). By contrast, less attachment was expressed toward their entity (31%), city (39%) or to Bosnia-Herzegovina (29%).²³ While attendance at religious meetings is low, it is still appreciably higher than attendance at political activities, where only 4% of young people report any kind of regular participation, and 90% report they never or rarely attend a political activity.²⁴ These statistics are shown in the table below:

How often do you attend:	Never	Rarely	Special events only	Often	Regularly
Religious meetings	38%	25%	2%	12%	4%
Political activities	75%	15%	5%	3%	1%

The statistics bear out the generally dismal prospects for young people, and are indicative of the pervasive attitude among youth that the situation will not soon

¹⁸ UNDP 2003: 29.

¹⁹ UNDP 2003: 23.

²⁰ Cited in UNDP 2003: 24.

²¹ UNDP 2003: 23.

²² Cited in UNDP 2003: 23.

²³ UNDP 2003: 26.

²⁴ UNDP 2003: 28.

change. Few wonder why the brightest and best young people seek their future beyond the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

3. Religious Factors Influencing Peace-Building

Each of the interviewed students in this chapter has undergone a transition from a nominally religious or secular background to a place in which religious faith is central, defining who they are, what they do, and how they relate to other people. Their narratives are striking exceptions to the account of apathy and social malaise given in the first section of this chapter. The following section examines the transition each of the students underwent, in order to understand how religious faith has contributed to their identity formation and values-clarification.

3.1 Identity Formation and Values-Clarification

3.1.1. Mirheta Omerović

Mirheta Omerović relates that religious faith helped her in times of great anxiety and insecurity, and it remains determinative for her life in the post-conflict era. Omerović is Bošnjak with a secular family background but chooses today to wear the *hijab* as a sign of her obedience to God. She spent her childhood in France where her father was employed on a foreign worker's permit in order to secure a home and a better future for the family in Yugoslavia. In France she acquired the values of secular, Western European culture.²⁵ By 1990 her father had succeeded in earning enough money to move back to Višegrad in eastern Bosnia, a town near the Serbian border made famous in a book by Pulitzer Prize winning author from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ivo Andrić. *The Bridge on the Drina* graphically depicts a tortuous public execution by impalement under the Ottoman *vezir*, and conferred on Višegrad a literary legacy of ethnic turbulence that made the town an early target for Serb aggression in 1992. Not long after the family finished building their house, Serb forces swept through Višegrad, killing or displacing the Bošnjak populace. Fourteen-year-old Omerović survived by escaping into the surrounding wood, but was separated from the rest of the family. She found her way to French UN troops in the area and was transported to safety in Zagreb, Croatia. There she was reunited with the rest of the women of her family, and learned that her father was one of many who did not survive the massacre in Višegrad. After a sojourn in Zagreb, Omerović and her family became refugees in Jordan. There she began to study Arabic and

²⁵ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 1.

Islam. She and her family returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1997 and, with no home to return to in Višegrad, settled in the capital city of Sarajevo. There she continues her studies and is active in the Muslim religious community.

The material loss in the war reduced her life from relative prosperity to sheer indigence, and the loss of family members brought her to a point of deep despair and contemplation of suicide. The reliance on self and a materialistic worldview was largely replaced by dependence on God and a spiritual worldview.²⁶ The sense of needing something beyond the material realm became urgent while still a refugee in Zagreb when she learned that she had lost her father.²⁷ In Jordan she began to study Islam and adopted a disciplined practice of religion according to Islamic *Shari'ah*. Today she chooses this lifestyle over expressions of Islam found in Bosnia-Herzegovina that reflect a more permissive European practice.

Omerović describes her time as a refugee in Zagreb as a period of helplessness that made her reach out for a talisman of protection:

At the time I took the Qur'ān and I was holding it. It was like taking something like a crystal, or something magical, and you want to have some kind of power, some kind of extra power that is not from this world but from another world. That is like asking for help. It is like grabbing your mother or your father and to say, "Help me, and protect me." I wanted something to rely on, you see?²⁸

Her search for understanding was borne out of fear, but developed into a compulsion to know more about Islam and her circumstance:

...Personally, I wanted to be religious because I was afraid of what was going to happen to me. But also, something was pushing me, and I was asking myself, what is really Islam? Why do they really hate us so much? Why do they hate us so much that they want to get rid of us?... But now, after that, after the war was over, I have really been thinking and asking myself why is this happening? So there are many questions that are deep. I live today and tomorrow and I will just keep reading and asking questions to go deeper and deeper. I'm asking you, I am asking others.²⁹

For Omerović, Islam continues to be a means of shaping identity and clarifying values.

3.1.2. Svetljana Kurjak

Svetljana Kurjak, a student in the faculty for physical education at the University of Banja Luka, was raised in a Serbian home in Zagreb that observed only the major

²⁶ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 2.

²⁷ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 7, 8.

²⁸ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 8.

²⁹ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 8.

religious holidays. She moved to Banja Luka in the Republika Srpska in 1993 as part of a house exchange with Croats so that each family could live in the relative safety of their respective majority national environment. She thus considers herself a refugee. Her uncle was killed in the war in Zagreb and her father later died in an accident unrelated to the war.

Her awakening in faith began spontaneously when she felt compelled to go to the Orthodox church and light a candle. There she became acquainted with young people involved in the St Sava Youth Fellowship (*Svetosavska Omladinska Zajednica*). It emphasises the historic teachings and practices of the Serbian Orthodox Church and especially Serbian national identity through the model of St Sava.³⁰ Kurjak describes how she was drawn to the Orthodox Church at a time of great uncertainty:

[My spiritual interest] somehow just came spontaneously. I just went inside the church and I felt like I had a need to go inside and light a candle and believed that I had things to learn in church.... I wanted to stay after the liturgy and hang out with people that I could learn something from, so I didn't go maybe another wrong direction.... Now I can deal with some situations with a little bit more patience. Something that's terrible will not last forever but there's going to be a better time. There's this feeling that I'm never alone and especially when I think of my Grandmother, my Mom, my sister, wherever I go I'm not alone.³¹

Her religious faith also helps her clarify her values about persons of non-Orthodox or non-religious convictions. She believes she could marry someone non-Orthodox, although it would create tensions with her family. A greater difficulty for her would be marrying a non-believer, which she relates as a "terrible thing".³² Living her "life in faith"³³ is now very important to her, and clearly impacts her choice of a marriage partner:

I have to be so strong in my faith and to tell my husband [pause]. I don't know [pause]. I don't think I'm like a super person, but I believe you should live your life in faith, not just to be called a believer.... [H]e must be a believer, not just going physically to church.³⁴

Kurjak's faith is something deeply personal and qualitatively more than a marker of national identity. It also indicates a desire for a deeper spirituality than the

³⁰ See the historical sketch of St Sava in Chapter One.

³¹ Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 3.

³² Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 12.

³³ Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 12.

³⁴ Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 11, 12.

traditional and nominal religious expression characteristic of her childhood. Kurjak's faith now defines the essence of who she is and what she will do.

3.1.3. Entoni Šeperić

Entoni Šeperić was born in Sarajevo to a Bošnjak mother and a Croat father. His father was a career military man, and Šeperić was raised in a non-religious home in which the values reflected those of the socialist state. Nationalist tensions in the late 1980s contributed to the divorce of Šeperić's parents even before war broke out in Croatia in 1991. His father became a hard-line Croat nationalist and left the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) to join the Croatian army, and his mother returned to Central Bosnia.

Šeperić's spiritual awakening began through the influence of a close friend who was ostracised for his Baptist beliefs. At the same time Šeperić attended mass in a Franciscan church where he received a clear calling to ministry. Šeperić was instrumental in the development of an ecumenical centre in Rijeka, Croatia that succeeded in bringing persons from the Roman Catholic, Serbian Orthodox and Protestant communities together even as the rest of the country was disintegrating along ethno-religious lines. Šeperić completed his first year of theological studies in Rijeka, and then moved to Sarajevo to continue his studies. Šeperić remains active in encounter and reconciliation ministries through the youth organisation *Oči u Oči* ('Face to Face') founded by Friar Ivo Marković.

Šeperić is consciously aware that his move from Rijeka to the capital city of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a transition in which he is attempting to come to terms with his multi-national heritage. His mother's Bosnian and Muslim background and his father's Croatian and Catholic heritage contributed to significant unresolved tension in the home during the Croatian conflict. His move to Sarajevo was also a spiritual exploration in which both Protestant and Catholic influences played a role. Šeperić was also impacted by Marković, who continues to be a role model for him.³⁵ Šeperić's deepening spiritual understanding aided him in the process of values-clarification, and enabled him to steer clear of nationalism's siren call. At the same time, it placed him on a collision course with his ultra-nationalist father.³⁶

³⁵ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 4.

³⁶ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 6.

3.1.4. Anesa Delalić

Anesa Delalić spent her childhood on the West and Catholic side of the multi-cultural city of Mostar in Herzegovina. Neither her Serb father nor her Bošnjak mother was religious. During the war her Croat neighbours contacted the local authorities about the ‘Muslims’ living next to them and suggested that they should be removed. The next day soldiers came to the house and took the entire family away to a detention camp in which the women were separated from the men. There ten year old Delalić witnessed many atrocities, including beatings and rapes, and was part of an all-night forced march intended to eliminate the weak. After four months of imprisonment, international humanitarian intervention ended the military conflict in the area and Delalić and her family were released. Her parents returned to their own home on the West side, resisting efforts of officials to segregate the city through forced relocation. Not long thereafter a mortar fired from a Serb military placement killed her father. Delalić’s family was moved by the non-partisan food parcels and care they received from *Agape*, the humanitarian aid arm of the Evangelical Church of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and eventually they became Christians. Delalić began her university education on the West side, but has switched to the East side as a statement of her desire to embrace all of the peoples of her city.

Delalić gives clear indication of a transformation in both identity and values-clarification. Indeed, that is the intent of her testimony and what gives meaning to her life. Prior to her conversion she had a sense of a transcendent “something”, as she relates in the following:

...I believed that there is something, but is not in this world. You can be connected with that something. Whatever you do, it is something separated from us totally.³⁷

However, she did not find the connection to God through the ritual prayers she practiced, imitating her Muslim grandmother.³⁸ Because her other grandmother and mother had already embraced Christianity, her initial vocal rejection caused tension in the home.³⁹ Her gradual acceptance of Christianity came through the regular contact of Christians who were able to laugh despite their circumstances, and demonstrated joy and love to her.⁴⁰ Her embrace of Christianity was tentative and

³⁷ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 4.

³⁸ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 4.

³⁹ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 4.

⁴⁰ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 4, 5.

conditional, and she intended to give it up if she did not like it.⁴¹ But her decision “to receive Jesus into her life” was an experience she describes as a “walk with God” that is “always something new”.⁴² She is now convinced that “God is the only thing that can satisfy your life”.⁴³

The transformation Delalić underwent secured for her an identity completely apart from the usual national nomenclatures so important in the rest of society, and allows her to embrace everyone, regardless of their background:

...I am so happy that I can hug someone who is Croat and I know that in the past he did something bad, I mean his people did something bad, but I can still hug that person and say, “I love you, brother, because we have the same God.” It doesn’t make any difference who you are. It is important that we serve the same God. And I think that is amazing.⁴⁴

Each of these students found that religious faith helped clarify issues of their own identity. It also clarified issues about the nature of religious faith apart from the institutions of religion, as the following examines.

3.2. The Nature of Religious Faith

All of the student interviewees make a distinction between a religious label and a personal expression of faith by which they live and conduct their lives. Omerović now experiences Islam not only as a marker of identity, but as a way of life that provides meaning, a worldview and instruction in how to address the difficult situations of life. It is, as she says, “the practise of Islam”.⁴⁵ She now has a deeper understanding of Islam, which is “a spiritual way to carry on with life”.⁴⁶ This she gained with regular teaching from the Qur’ān and learning how to pray,⁴⁷ which now gives her patience to encounter the many obstacles she faces.⁴⁸ She also found solidarity with the *umma* beyond Bosnia-Herzegovina, and continues to practice Islam with the forms and mores she acquired in Jordan. She now describes her life and work as a serious mission:

[F]or me being here is like a mission, I take it seriously. So anyone I meet I want to talk with them, I want to know them and I want them to know me and they don’t want us just to forgive each other. It’s so important for me to

⁴¹ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 5.

⁴² Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 6.

⁴³ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 6.

⁴⁴ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 9.

⁴⁵ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 8.

⁴⁶ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 2.

⁴⁷ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 2.

⁴⁸ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 8.

be here and perhaps from the people I meet I will learn something and they will learn something from me.⁴⁹

Kurjak believes that those who participated in the aggressions of the conflict “really didn’t know anything about their faith”.⁵⁰ She draws a distinction between those who “think they are believers but they are far from it. They say they are believers but they don’t go to church, everything they do indicates that they are not believers.”⁵¹ She believes that part of the problem is that people claim they are religious but are ignorant of the tenets of their own religion:

People tend to say, “I’m an Orthodox or Catholic or Muslim.” And that’s the only thing they know and nothing more. It’s not the matter of just being in the church or mosque or whatever, physically there present. They would need to read something from the Bible or Qur’ān.... so that we can understand, if I can understand myself, if I can understand what is religion, if I can understand why I am going to church. It’s not just to light a candle, it’s not just to look on the icons, it’s not just kissing the cross. It’s not just like it. I think it’s here [pointing to her chest],... in your heart. It’s not in some books that say that you are Muslim or Orthodox, [or that] you have to hate some other religion or something like that. You must know the basic things about ourselves and a little bit basic [teachings of] other religions.⁵²

Her first inclination is to equate the terms ‘religion’ and ‘faith’,⁵³ but with some reflection she draws a distinction. “‘Religion’” she says, “is something we confess and ‘faith’ is something that you believe in.”⁵⁴ Kurjak thus delineates a distinction between the public creed and the personal credo.

Šeperić believes that religion was falsified during the war, leading to division and xenophobia between the nations.⁵⁵ Speaking from the Roman Catholic and Croatian point of view, he finds various reasons why so many of the clergy are nationalists, noting that it is “deeply rooted in the historical experience”.⁵⁶ He also believes that Croatian nationalists fell victim to imitation of the Serb minority in Croatia.⁵⁷ The Croatian clergy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, he says, believe it is their responsibility to retain the Croat culture, which he views as Western-oriented and a counter-culture to

⁴⁹ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 10.

⁵⁰ Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 4

⁵¹ Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 4.

⁵² Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 7, 8.

⁵³ The interview was conducted in English.

⁵⁴ Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 4.

⁵⁵ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 5.

⁵⁶ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 6.

⁵⁷ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 7.

the Eastern spirituality of Islam and Orthodoxy.⁵⁸ The substitution of national identity for spirituality is what he finds false in religion:

... [M]ost of the leaders in the Catholic Church are more national workers and preservers of national identity, which is obviously false. If you recognise Christ as your model, then nationalism is totally wrong. I wouldn't say that Christ has nothing to do with nationality and difference, because the idea of nation has Jewish origins and Jesus was Jewish and has a strong witness to them. But also, the basic issue is how we deal with that. I think that reconciliation is more about spirituality and if you think that some of your brothers sinned against what you think is original Christianity, then the first things that you can do is to pray. If you believe in the power of prayer, then you can do much. I also think that for me personally, it was very hard to pray for those leaders to whom I could not relate to as a moral standard for me. But also, the only thing that you can solve is to be clear yourself of what Christ is for you, and to pray for those who sinned.⁵⁹

Šeperić believes that both the Catholic and Orthodox clergy have lost their credibility as a result of accommodating nationalism. This is especially felt among young people, who he believes are genuinely interested in spiritual matters, but are confused. Because they have lost respect for the clergy, they question the message also.⁶⁰ He contrasts the self-serving nationalism with Christ's example of serving others.⁶¹ This is another way in which Christ can be falsified, according to Šeperić.⁶²

Delalić also draws a distinction between 'religion', which she views with some derision, and something living inside of her that is 'more than just religion'.⁶³ She describes the difference thus:

I don't like the word religion because religion is something I connect with all the rituals. I connect it with doing things just because somebody else is doing them. But the faith and life, that's *real* life... If you belong to a religion, I believe, then you are just doing something that somebody else is doing. But if you are living your life with God, and you have faith, then it makes your life much more. It's a full life. It's a complete life.⁶⁴

Religion for Delalić is then the externals and ritual practices, contrasted with 'life'. But in another clarification regarding marriage, she qualifies what she means even further: spiritual life is in a "personal relationship with God," and in her experience is

⁵⁸ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 6.

⁵⁹ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 6.

⁶⁰ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 16.

⁶¹ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 18.

⁶² Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 18.

⁶³ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 5.

⁶⁴ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 12, 13.

found in a person who has “received Christ as his personal saviour”.⁶⁵ It is something intensely personal.

Each of the interviewees clearly distinguishes between what they know as a deep and intense religious experience and that which is ritualistic or superficial. Their religious faith is also instructive as to how they are to treat and live with others.

3.3. Multi-National Co-Existence (*Mitmenschlichkeit*)

The following line of investigation regarding living with others is coloured by the local environment. Both Šeperić and Omerović live in Sarajevo where multi-national encounter is unavoidable and common. Delalić lives in the divided city of Mostar where encounter is possible but often confrontational, and Kurjak lives in Banja Luka where multi-national encounter is infrequent and undesired. Given their different environments, questions relating to this aspect of the study are concrete to those living in Sarajevo and Mostar, but more hypothetical to Kurjak in Banja Luka. Their answers reflect this dynamic.

None of the students believes that the situation of segregated nations is optimal for the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kurjak is unaware of organised activities in Banja Luka that bring young people of different confessions together, and knows of no Bošnjaks on her faculty at the university. Nevertheless, she maintains friendships with Bošnjaks she knew in school before the war.⁶⁶ If her work were to take her to the now predominantly Bošnjak capital of Sarajevo, she would not hesitate to take up residence there.⁶⁷ Kurjak believes that the Ferhadija mosque must be rebuilt because it was a cultural treasure of Banja Luka and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that its presence in the city makes a statement that Bošnjaks are again welcome.⁶⁸ She calls for reciprocity and a sense of equality, however, meaning that Catholic and Orthodox churches should also be rebuilt in Bošnjak-dominant areas.⁶⁹ She insists that nationalists in Banja Luka are a minority, but concedes that they could create problems for returning Bošnjaks.⁷⁰ She believes that segregation of the ethnic groups is not good and that it would be a ‘normal thing’ for Bošnjaks to return. In time,

⁶⁵ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 17.

⁶⁶ Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 5.

⁶⁷ Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 10.

⁶⁸ Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 6.

⁶⁹ Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 6.

⁷⁰ Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 7.

things will settle down and it will be ‘natural’ for them to return to their homes.⁷¹

Kurjak points to some of the Bošnjak families that have returned and claims they live normal lives without threat, and that there were many people who did nothing wrong to them and therefore can “look them straight in the eye” because their hands are clean.⁷²

Omerović believes that a mono-cultural, mono-religious situation is unhealthy and fears that this is now the circumstance in her ethnically cleansed hometown of Višegrad near the border with Serbia.⁷³ Through the university-sponsored French club, an NGO called *Women to Women*, and an inter-religious youth organisation, *Abraham/Ibrahim*, she regularly encounters non-Muslims and desires to learn from others:

I like connections with other people. I like international connections. I don't want Bosnia to be closed. It is important for us to have people from everywhere, from America, from Italy, from France, it's very important to meet other cultures, the clothes, the music, everything, because this is changing the narrowness of the people. They are opening.⁷⁴

After returning from Jordan, she did not know how to relate to Serbs, but in the course of daily life, she felt unthreatened. She also sensed that many Serbs in Sarajevo wanted to be helpful, put the war behind them, and move forward with their lives together.⁷⁵ She discovered that they have the same concerns regarding the lack of flats, work, money, and food that she has.⁷⁶ She realises the borders are artificial, and knows that if they were truly needed, then God would erect them. She believes the Qur'ān can be instructive on how to relate to others:

Even in the Qur'ān there's a very important verse, “I created diversity, so that people meet.” I have milk, you have wood. I have gold, you have silver... So let us remember the beautiful things, and the bad things, let's just put it away.⁷⁷

Like Omerović, Šeperić also lives in Sarajevo where multi-national encounter is frequent. He works with people of all nations and religious persuasions at the youth organisation of *Oči u Oči* (‘Face to Face’) and through the multi-national choir

⁷¹ Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 10.

⁷² Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 7.

⁷³ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 11.

⁷⁴ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 10.

⁷⁵ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 5, 6.

⁷⁶ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 6, 7.

⁷⁷ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 10. The paraphrased reference is to 49:13: “O mankind! We created You from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (Not that ye may despise each other).”

Pantonima. He believes that the notion of ‘tolerance’ is a “pseudo-religion, or secular religion”⁷⁸ and rejects it as a Christian ideal. For him, tolerance is an unstable foundation to build on. He believes that the fear of God already has signs of love embedded in it,⁷⁹ and likens his encounter with others to the encounter of Moses with the burning bush:

Try to relate how Moses felt in front of the burning bush. He took his shoes off... That’s how I feel whenever I meet the other person. It’s like a burning bush... It’s a revelation. And how you relate to it is to take your shoes off and wait for the calling. That’s how you meet the other.⁸⁰

His view, then, is that Christianity is an expression of personhood and of personal relationships, not of nationhood and nations. For this reason, broken relationships require healing, just as he awaits healing in his relationship with his own father.⁸¹ Analogously, countries with broken relationships, such as Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, also need healing.⁸²

Like Šeperić, Delalić is regularly involved in a multi-national community through her local church in Mostar. Delalić contrasts the national tension in the city of Mostar with the unity enjoyed by the young people in the church fellowship:

There is only one reason that we are all coming together, and that is to worship our God....There is no difference between us. And we never, never, never speak about being different, because we’re all the same. I mean, it still hurts for me to say like [pause]. I don’t know [pause]. I can’t look at them as coming from different backgrounds, because it doesn’t make any sense to me.... We go everywhere together. And I cannot even imagine it otherwise. Now I am sitting here, I’m trying to think how it would be if we were all separated. I can’t even make a picture in my head, to be separated.⁸³

The Protestant church has all three ethnic groups (and Roma Gypsies) worshipping together without tension or fear. Delalić explains how this is possible:

In God’s eyes, on the cross, he didn’t die for Croats or for Serbs or for Muslims. He died for everyone, for all three of us. And if he didn’t separate us on the cross, then why do we need to separate each other?⁸⁴

Delalić also maintains close friendships outside of the church with Bošnjaks and Croats on both sides of the river that largely divides the city and national groups.

⁷⁸ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 21.

⁷⁹ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 21.

⁸⁰ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 21.

⁸¹ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 3.

⁸² Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 3, 23.

⁸³ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 15, 16.

⁸⁴ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 9.

Although they do not believe as she does, Delalić is able to literally and metaphorically embrace them because she sees them as fellow creations of God.⁸⁵ She admits that people sometimes view her as abnormal, but this does not prevent her from having strong friendships with those from a different nation or religious community.⁸⁶

Achieving this level of mutuality is rare, and is a transformation that comes as a result of the exercise of forgiveness in the lives of these students.

3.4. Forgiveness, Restoration, and Healing

Upon returning to Bosnia-Herzegovina from Jordan, Omerović faced the serious issue of how she was going to live among those who hated Bošnjaks.⁸⁷ She found helpful instruction in the Qur'ān:

I mean, this feeling, this is very difficult to hate, because for Muslims, we are supposed to forgive, because in the Qur'ān, it says even though they did harm to you, only God can judge people. You see, he's the one who is forgiving and you have both love and hate, but we are supposed to carry on with love, because what happened was the madness of war.⁸⁸

Initially she wanted retribution, but these feelings were mitigated through attendance at the mosque where she “cried and prayed to God to give [her] strength to carry on and not to hurt anybody”.⁸⁹ Ultimately she left retribution in God's hands, and hopes that the consciences of the wrongdoers will bring them to the realisation of the evil they caused.⁹⁰ She senses that it is useless to carry hatred, especially if it is misdirected at individuals who were innocent of wrongdoing.⁹¹ Although she cannot articulate a response to those anonymous soldiers who killed her father, she believes it is important to be free of prejudice and to encounter other persons positively and tolerantly.⁹² Her conflict management strategy is twofold. She first attempts to learn more about others in order to understand them.⁹³ Then, her practice of Islam, especially regular prayer, helps her avoid negative thoughts, and motivates her to good deeds. She offers this insight from her own experience:

⁸⁵ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 17.

⁸⁶ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 17.

⁸⁷ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 5.

⁸⁸ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 5.

⁸⁹ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 6.

⁹⁰ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 6.

⁹¹ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 6.

⁹² Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 6.

⁹³ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 6.

[E]verybody says Islam is very difficult. For me it is very easy. You have to pray five times a day. When you think about praying, you don't have time to think about hating. You don't have time to sit hours and hours and drink coffee and backbiting, or something. It means you are always doing something. Praying may only take you five minutes or ten minutes, but afterwards, it is always reminding you to do something, you see?⁹⁴

Omerović believes that reconciliation is possible, but that it requires several elements. The process is gradual, and requires regular contact with others. Both parties must co-operate in the process and focus on creating a better future together. Importantly, an internal change of heart and mind are prerequisites to the process:

It's always step by step. Building reconciliation. I would wish people would be like me because I said to myself, we cannot change the past, but we now have the present and the future, and this we can change. But to change it we have to have a lot of energy, and to be patient and love and to really believe that it is possible to live together, but only if the other side works on himself and I work on myself. It won't help if you only talk and talk and write books, but inside your heart and mind you don't work with this.⁹⁵

Omerović suggests role reversal to facilitate alternative thinking. This allows the parties to "feel"⁹⁶ for each other, producing empathy, pity, understanding and even love and compassion. The entire process of encountering the other requires courage, but is necessary to remove hatred and to ultimately help people.⁹⁷

Kurjak sees a direct relationship between faith and forgiveness and suggests that reconciliation is aided by a willingness to be the first to forgive.⁹⁸ Her fellowship has helped her to be discriminating in what she believes about others and helps her when she doesn't understand something in the Bible.⁹⁹ Although she cannot quote any particular passage, she knows that the Bible has important things to say about forgiveness.¹⁰⁰ She can articulate a sense in which forgiveness offers liberty:

If you hate someone it's a kind of crazing... you know, you are obsessed with this feeling, I think so. Maybe you're obsessed with this feeling of hatred, and unforgiveness and it's kind of crazing, it's not freedom, it's freedom to be not obsessed with those things.... And forgive[ness] is freedom. I think so. I relate it that way.¹⁰¹

⁹⁴ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 7.

⁹⁵ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 9.

⁹⁶ She uses the term four times.

⁹⁷ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 9.

⁹⁸ Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 12.

⁹⁹ Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 12.

¹⁰⁰ Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 13.

¹⁰¹ Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 15.

When asked to relate forgiveness to the concrete loss of her uncle, she admits that a sense of remorse and loss are greater than any other feeling. She neither understands nor seeks to understand why someone would commit such acts, and hopes that one day the wrongdoers will come to terms with what they did. Nevertheless, because they remain anonymous and therefore amorphous, she cannot hate them, and indicates that she has feelings of forgiveness for them.¹⁰²

Delalić relates her views on forgiveness from personal experience. Forgiveness came to her subsequent to conversion to Christianity, and required a process of healing. She focused her hatred specifically on the soldiers who held her captive, and the neighbours who sent her to the camp, but she also expressed hatred generally against everyone, not just Croats.¹⁰³ For nearly two years after her conversion she believed that the only good people were Christians, and this limited her ability to relate to others. She admits that she derived a sense of joy from the news that one of her captors met with a violent death, believing that no judgment against him could be severe enough.¹⁰⁴ But this critical event precipitated a significant change of heart:

But then, I believe that God really spoke to my heart, “Is there really any difference between you and him?” And I admitted, that no, because he is a sinner and I’m a sinner and even if I am ten and he is twenty, that doesn’t make any difference, because we are all sinners. And then I remembered about the love that God showed me when I became a Christian. And after I saw that love, and that that love could heal me, and that that love could give me strength to live my life, then I said, “Well, I have just accused someone. And that could happen also to me. And if I die, I will go to heaven, but if he died, and he went to hell...” And that is the time when my healing started. And that is the time that I experienced that God really wants me to forgive. It is not something that I will forgive in my mind and then I will always remember those things, but that I will forgive them in the love that God showed me in his love. Because he forgave me, and I need to forgive them. And I forgive them.¹⁰⁵

She draws a direct connection between love and the ability to forgive¹⁰⁶ relating that she came to the recognition that she needed healing herself. She relates the incident anecdotally:

...[I]t was during the worship time, and I lifted my hands and they were singing a song that our hands and our lives because of the blood of Jesus will be cleaned up, and we will have like a white new dress, or something like that. It’s an old song. And then I realised that that’s something, that’s the healing I need. I needed my dress to be white, and to be pure for my God.

¹⁰² Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 14.

¹⁰³ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 6.

¹⁰⁴ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 7. Her captor died in a car accident.

¹⁰⁵ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 7.

¹⁰⁶ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 9.

And that was the healing. Yes, I was crying because I released something that I was holding onto really strong. And instead of that hatred, I asked God, can you pour your love there, because there is a part in my heart that is empty now, and I want to fill it with good things, and the only thing that is good is you.¹⁰⁷

Forgiveness is at the centre of her worship of God and her relationships to others. She senses that if she is not able to forgive her brother, then she is also unable to worship God.¹⁰⁸ The corollary is also true, that if a person holds onto hatred, it will separate that person both from others and from God.¹⁰⁹ The Bible is her authority on the instruction to forgive, and she says that even Christians are wrong when they are not completely obedient to the command to ‘forgive your enemies’.¹¹⁰ Delalić is actively searching for her other captor, who she believes is in hiding to avoid trial at the Hague for war crimes. She seeks him in order to give him her testimony, and to forgive him, and others like him:¹¹¹

I hope that I will [find the guard from the camp]. I pray that I will. Because I think that he lives in that village all alone and he doesn't care about his life. But there's still hope. And I really believe that I will find him before he goes there, because I want to tell him that he is forgiven. And... somebody needs to go to the Hague and show to those people and tell them that there is something that they still can believe in. And that it's not too late.... I wish [Milošević] would become a Christian. It's abnormal for people to believe that he could become a Christian, but there is no difference between him and somebody else. He is a sinner and maybe he did some bad things, but if God forgave him, who are we to judge someone?¹¹²

Šeperić uses his own experiences to draw out theological principles about forgiveness and reconciliation. He sees the decision to forgive as a free act of the individual, and no one can be compelled to forgive. Šeperić believes that injustice is universal in that everyone experiences it, and that all persons commit injustices.¹¹³ As recourse to addressing injustice, a person can go in one of two directions. One path is in the direction of hatred, in which the offended individual seeks revenge and retribution. The other path is in the direction of love, which expresses itself in redemption, grace and forgiveness.¹¹⁴ Hatred can motivate and strengthen to act, but

¹⁰⁷ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 8.

¹⁰⁸ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 9.

¹⁰⁹ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 12, 13.

¹¹⁰ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 14.

¹¹¹ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 7.

¹¹² Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 19.

¹¹³ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 10.

¹¹⁴ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 20, 21.

it always demands new motives in order to justify actions and drive the cycle of violence.¹¹⁵

The path of love, however, requires the difficult, personal and free decision to forgive, which is the heart of the Christian message¹¹⁶ and the command of Christ towards others in every circumstance.¹¹⁷ Šeperić believes this is what makes Christianity unique, and he contrasts it with Islam:

[T]here is something unique about Christianity. The Muslim understanding of justice... is more oriented toward restitution. I would say the Christian perspective is more oriented toward restoration. I think that this is nothing to do with the criminal system, because criminals *should* be charged and prosecuted for the crimes they committed. But the ultimate goal of Christianity is to reconcile, is to restore the relationship, no matter how hard it is. But the ultimate goal of Christianity is not restitution. I can falsify Christianity by saying that justice is what ultimately matters, but I basically don't believe it is. And if I find that hard to do myself, I cannot falsify Christ.... But I also think there is a unique relationship in Christianity and *that* is the way in how to reconcile people with God and with one another. And I believe that happens through Christ.¹¹⁸

The personal emphasis and aspect Šeperić puts on forgiveness reflects his theological view that Christianity is pre-eminently inter-personal. Šeperić believes that the Muslim understanding of Christians as 'Peoples of the Book' is a misnomer:

The holy scriptures for Christians are a medium, it is a book in order to get into a relationship with the person.... The person is there and that person is Christ and if you meet Christ as the power, then no book can restore a relationship because restoration is basically an inter-personal category. Only in inter-personal communication can you achieve restoration.¹¹⁹

The personal and inter-personal emphasis Šeperić places on Christianity reflect his view of God as a triune being. God himself is in community, and there can be no unity without diversity.¹²⁰ God is in communion with and in himself in "trialogue", which Šeperić believes has implications for our own spirituality. Where we try to communicate with an 'other', it is not only a dialogue, but is a "trialogue" insofar as it also includes God. Šeperić realises that this view places him at odds with those

¹¹⁵ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 21.

¹¹⁶ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 20.

¹¹⁷ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 20.

¹¹⁸ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 10.

¹¹⁹ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 12, 13.

¹²⁰ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 7, 8.

who cannot view God as community, such as Muslims, yet he holds this as a fundamental element of Christianity and his own witness.¹²¹

Šeperić states that forgiveness is still incomplete because it is unilateral, but reconciliation always creates community.¹²² Reconciliation begins with the victim, just as God has modelled it in his own interaction with humanity:

I remember also from Romans that there is a point where Paul says that God reconciled us with him while we were enemies.¹²³ So the initiative is on God's side. It is always the victim who makes the first step. From this point of view, we were the ones who were committing the injustice to God. But the victim makes the first step forward. And that also has something to do with the process of healing in Bosnia-Herzegovina. No persecutor will begin with the process of healing. The victim has the important role in healing. I think it is more about the victim because the victim and perpetrator share the same story. It is a story of violence. But how to come out of that violence, I think that we are very, very much in need of understanding the role of the victim.¹²⁴

He believes that God came to earth to heal wounded sinners, and that the healed sinner makes the strongest witness.¹²⁵ Healing manifests itself in restored relationships and the (re)establishment of community, which is how the Church is created.¹²⁶ Since the Church is a community of sinners,¹²⁷ it understands its witness not imperialistically, but with a spirit of humility.¹²⁸

Finally, Šeperić believes that a healthy community is one in which reconciliation is taking place. He believes the same is possible analogously for Bosnia-Herzegovina:

And when you see Bosnia as a healthy community, you will know that reconciliation has taken place or has begun. But there is no community now. We don't yet live in a community.... I'm not saying it has to be a community of faith. I'm just trying a parallel. If you see Bosnia-Herzegovina as a society, to live a communal life, then it will be a good sign that there are positive things happening here.¹²⁹

Forgiveness is the key for each of these individuals for moving beyond their own personal traumas and to relate to others again. They also believe that what has

¹²¹ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 8. Šeperić uses the term 'trialogue' to mean a 'dialogue among three' although the term 'dialogue' does not have reference to any specific number of participants.

¹²² Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 22.

¹²³ The reference is to Romans 5:10, "For if while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of his Son, much more surely, having been reconciled, will we be saved by his life."

¹²⁴ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 10.

¹²⁵ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 17.

¹²⁶ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 23.

¹²⁷ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 6.

¹²⁸ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 13.

¹²⁹ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 23.

happened to them is possible for others, and that Bosnia-Herzegovina would be better able to cope if their experiences were more widespread. To this end each of them is engaged in their own communities. They hope to see change in many with whom they have influence, especially the young people of their communities.

4. Conclusion

The narratives of these four students reveal common features important for peace-building within the youth culture today. Significantly, none of these students allowed the poor situation of the current youth culture to discourage them, a fact that is largely attributable to the impact of their religious faith in their lives. Although each of them was raised in a non-religious environment, today their faith is their primary feature of identity. They claim a personal faith that seeks first to correct their own attitudes and beliefs before judging the beliefs and actions of others. The spiritual transformation in each of them is an ongoing process of personal discovery that clarifies values, and aids them in choices of love and acceptance rather than hatred and rejection. Forgiveness is a central ingredient of their spirituality and determines how they encounter others. Most of them (Omerović, Šeperić, Delalić) are able to articulate a common identity as creations of God, which at once draws the circle of inclusion wider than that of sectarian nationalism, and defines a basis for social restoration. Some of them (Šeperić, Delalić) articulate a personal experience of healing through a power beyond themselves. This healing power in Christ allowed them to overcome their natural inclination towards hatred, and replaced it with love.

Along with the commonalities in their spiritual experiences, there are also differences worth noting. Two of them (Šeperić, Kurjak) find inspiration in historical figures (St Francis and St Sava, respectively) that are not particularly meaningful in the other's community. Another (Omerović) centres the practice of her faith on striving to act rightly according to the will of a moral God. Two of them (Šeperić and Delalić) centre their faith on Christ as both the power and agency of forgiveness.

While there may be doctrinal or theological differences that are irreconcilable, their beliefs demonstrate a need for personal transformation that becomes the basis for new and peaceful encounter with others. In their expressions of religious faith is found a dynamic that leads from fragmentation to wholeness in the person, in relationships and in newly-formed communities. Their words and actions amply

support the thesis that religion, expressed through personal faith, can be a source of mediation towards peace-building. Set against the sober realities young people face today in Bosnia-Herzegovina, these persons offer a bright and compelling ray of hope. They demonstrate by example that the power and direction afforded in spiritual realities can overcome difficult social circumstances to create an environment of care and mutual respect towards personal and social restoration.

PART THREE

**ANALYTICAL AND THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON
PEACE-BUILDING AND SOCIAL RESTORATION
GENERATED FROM THE CONTEXT
OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA**

CHAPTER SEVEN

ANALYSIS AND THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION

FROM THE CONTEXT AND INTERVIEWS

1. Introduction

The thesis now moves from the interviews to analysis and theological reflection, and incorporates the additional element of the sacred texts. Specifically, this chapter is concerned to address the Research Question, “What issues emerge from the grounded research that may contribute to the theological and ethical understanding of peace-building?” The chapter addresses the theological and ethical issues by retaining the voices from the context, thereby allowing the theological, ethical and contextual elements to dialogically interact with each other. The Qur’ān and the Bible inform, instruct and guide Muslims and Christians precisely because these texts are held to be authoritative as the acclaimed revelation of God. However, two points of clarification regarding the employment of the Bible and Qur’ān are in order. First, the thesis acknowledges that these texts are authoritative only within their own religious communities. Thus, no attempt is made to impose either written authority upon the other community, even in the event of commonalities between the texts.

Second, it is acknowledged that each of these texts has its own historical setting and context, the analysis of which lies outside the scope of this thesis. However, examination of relevant portions of these texts is vital to understand how the texts influence the religious communities towards peace-building and social restoration. In this regard the texts become an integral part of the analysis.

Four related areas have been selected for examination: 1) Claims to Authentic Religious Faith; 2) Power, Powerlessness, and Peace-building; 3) Overcoming Adversity Through Diversity; and 4) Restoration as a *Leitmotiv* for Peace-building. Each of these themes arises from the research. The first three emerge from the interviews as critical elements contributing to peace-building, while the last is an extrapolation from foundational research and the interviews. The concept of restoration is also analysed more fully using the Bible and Qur'ān to ascertain how it may be theologically understood and what contribution it may make to the research context. Together the interviews and the sacred texts define and delimit the concept of restoration in its social and theological contexts. Because of its centrality as a key research question, the theme of restoration thus commands the lion's share of the chapter and is a fitting harbinger of final themes to be analysed in Chapter Eight. Finally, this chapter will conclude by exploring how each of the themes may be a means through which religious groups forge unity from diversity.

2. Claims to Authentic Religious Faith

A common element emerging from the research is a distinction between authentic and inauthentic religious faith expressions. Before formal research questions were drawn up, a distinction of this kind began to emerge through onsite discussions with individuals in each of the religious communities. This was then developed into an explicit question¹ and posed to religious leaders in a manner that reflected the terms used in the pre-interview period of inquiry. Although this question was not posed to women or students, the same distinction also emerged in their interviews. This raises several points for analysis. First, the common thought expressed in the interviews is that people of 'real' or 'authentic' religion (faith) could not have committed the kind of atrocities witnessed during the war, and that persons who committed these offences acted out of the fervour of ideologically-based nationalism, co-opting religious symbols in support of their cause. Interviewees recognised that persons of faith - be they Christians or Muslims - cannot commit these crimes and remain true to the core tenets of their respective religions. Religious persons thus made a clear assessment about faith based on observed practice.

¹ It is Question 8 of the research questions posed to religious leaders.

Second, religious persons can more easily define what ‘true faith’ is not than identify what it is. The expressions of what constitutes a departure from authentic faith are varied, but relate most often to a perceived misalliance between religion and politics. Oršolić, for example, says that “nationalistic ideology is a real enemy of true faith, because it is a false god, which tries to abuse faith itself. True faith in its essence is anti-nationalistic; it is universally globalistic.”² For that reason, the organisation that he directs, IMIC, *Zajedno*, is consciously apolitical.³ Radujković marched on the streets of Belgrade in protest to the Milošević regime at a time when the SOC claimed that the true embodiment of Serbian identity rested not with the cadre of political nationalists in Belgrade, but with the Church.⁴ The multi-national Protestant churches consciously avoid politics, endorsing neither party nor candidate for political office.⁵

However, the call for authentic faith exceeds mere appeals to be non-nationalistic in the political arena. Religious persons are calling for something both spiritually different and deeper; something ‘other’ in both kind and degree. Interviewees draw distinctions between an ‘inherited’ or ‘traditional’ religious identity⁶ and the personal and spiritual experience of inner renewal. Traditional religious identity is perceived as a cultural confession and is usually marked by nominal religious practice and a general ignorance of the tenets of the confession.⁷ Interviewees testify to a meaningful and personal encounter with God that is marked by a memorable act or moment in their spiritual life.⁸ It is a departure from a former way of living to a new orientation marked by regular worship or prayer and a growing knowledge of the tenets and practices of their respective confession.

Moreover, the interviewees acknowledge incongruence between their own spirituality and that which they see practised in the name of religion. For those who

² Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 3.

³ Oršolić 1998: 266.

⁴ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 11.

⁵ Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 16.

⁶ Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 3; Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 2-4; Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 2; Rakić [PR.WO.SA.02]: 3, 5; Kundačina [PR.WO.MO.01]: 3, 4; Kovač [SO.WO.ŠI.03]: 4, 5.

⁷ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 3; Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 3; Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 2, 3.

⁸ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 4-6; Kurjak [SO.SF.BL.12]: 3; Rakić [PR.WO.SA.02]: 2; Kundačina [PR.WO.MO.01]: 6; Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 3; Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 2; Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 3-5; Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 2, 6.

hold to a strong personal faith, *right practise* (orthopraxis) is the expression of *right belief* (orthodoxy). The reverse also holds true, namely, unethical practice mirrors beliefs that cannot be reconciled with real or authentic faith.

Inauthentic faith expressions may be the result of ignorance or manipulation. The former is characterised by lack of knowledge of the religious tenets of the respective confession, owing to the marginalisation of religion during the socialist era. The education of many of the religious leaders, for example, is so rudimentary that they cannot recognise the incongruity of militant nationalism and authentic Christianity. Thus, Šeperić, for instance, can speak of how religious leaders “falsify religion”.⁹

Most people maintained only a cultural religious affiliation and, with the support of religious leaders, were easy converts to religious nationalism in return for the promise of greater security in a time of economic, social and military turmoil. They failed to see the discontinuity between the claims of exclusivist nationalism and the tenets of their confession because they are largely ignorant of those tenets. These Radujković, for instance, refers to as “non-Orthodox Serbs”.¹⁰

However, the expression of ‘inauthentic faith’ is more involved than this, and points to wilful manipulation. Many religious leaders consciously misused their position and office and, in some cases, were literally bought off by nationalist parties.¹¹ Many religious leaders were so eager to walk the corridors of power and regain a position of recognition and authority in society that they colluded with political leaders who saw advantage in having the Church sanction their activities. Their integration of religious symbolism and national mythologies distorted the *kerygma* so essentially that the Gospel (*evangelion*) was lost.¹²

Third, while the interviewees drew a distinction between authentic and inauthentic faith, they each identified ‘authentic’ as ‘true’ faith in relation to the core beliefs of their respective confessions. They therefore express divergent opinions as to what ‘authentic faith’ is. Moreover, interviewees sometimes saw authentic faith as an expression of individual credo and showed disdain, disappointment or distrust in hierarchal or institutional religion. Authentic faith is that which is authentic *for*

⁹ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 5, 7.

¹⁰ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 2, 3.

¹¹ Marković [RC.RL.SA.01]: 8, 13, 14.

¹² Marković: unrecorded interview, December 2001.

them. For a Roman Catholic, it is the orthodoxy and orthopraxis of Roman Catholicism rightly understood; for a Muslim believer, it is the correct belief and praxis of Islam. So it is too for the Orthodox and Protestants.

In each tradition the same perception exists, namely, that that which they consider propositionally and practically to be right and true can be misinformed, counterfeited or manipulated. Interviewees especially single out for criticism clergy and religious leaders who deviate from the acceptable path of their confession, and they consciously move to distance themselves from the institutional leadership. Some of the interviewees come into direct conflict with religious hierarchs, and are forced to live as *personae non grata* within their own religious institutional circles.¹³ Their challenges to institutional leaders focus on the misuse of positional authority and the concomitant power vested in the position, making the interplay between power and peace-building deserving of closer analysis.

3. Power, Powerlessness, and Peace-Building

The interviews reveal an interesting relationship between power and peace-building. Some clerics act as guardians of national identity, and equate preservation of the nation with religious fidelity. They believe that their position obligates them to engage in national issues in order to protect their culture and people. Their ability to tease financial favours from the international community is, however, to the long-term detriment of their own people.¹⁴ Other clerics play religious and national orientations off each other. In high profile, media-rich settings they eschew national politics; but before their own partisan crowd they promote national agendas and nationally-oriented parties.¹⁵ Still other clergy seek to steer a course that denies neither nation nor confession. For their weak stance on national issues they incur rejection and ridicule from the more nationalistic co-religionists. On the whole, clerics in Bosnia-Herzegovina use the power of their position to advance nationalist causes, and ostracise those few clergy willing to reconcile with persons of other ethno-religious groups.

¹³ Marković, for instance, enjoys immense popular support but is ostracised by some leaders in both the Catholic and Muslim communities for his efforts in reconciliation.

¹⁴ Leban [RC.WO.SA.01]: 7.

¹⁵ Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 5.

In regard to peace-building a difference in power structures and domains is observable in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This difference can be expressed as ‘power-as-authority’ in contrast to ‘power-as-capability’. In the Christian scriptures these two kinds of power are distinguished by the words ἐξουσία and δύναμις.¹⁶ In the first instance power is the exercise of authority and, in the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina, resides in institutional position. The office is a trust granted by consensus of the constituency in exchange for leadership that will defend the community. The extension and limitation of this authority thus rests with the constituency. When the constituency perceives an external threat, power of the leader is commensurate with the security threat; power-as-authority is increased to the degree that the leader is able to secure the constituency from the threat. Conversely, the rise of constituency insecurities diminishes the power-as-authority of the leader. The war situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina presents two examples of this dynamic. In the first instance, the Bošnjak community became increasingly threatened under the moderate *Reis-u-ulema* from Macedonia, Jakub Selimoski. His inability to secure the community in the face of threat led to a decrease of his power-as-authority to the point where the constituency replaced him with the current Reis, Mustafa Cerić, who is perceived by many in the community to be better able to secure the safety of the Bošnjak community.¹⁷ Šiljak points out the shift to more nationalist leaders by referring to the support the Islamic community gave to the SDA, and also the support the Catholic Church gave to the HDZ.¹⁸

In the second example, Leban confirms the designs of the Catholic hierarchy to retain power with partisan messages:¹⁹

[The Catholic hierarchy] don’t have a good sense of the present social situation in the country and with their people as a result of losing their role in the community. And here at this moment they don’t have the right approach. They are not choosing the positive part of their tradition... They just want to put themselves in a position that nobody will be able to move them from, even if this position is far, far away from real life, real religious life....²⁰

¹⁶ Gorrige 2004: 150ff.

¹⁷ See this discussion in Chapter One, pages 47-48.

¹⁸ Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 5. Šiljak’s allusion is to Cardinal Puljić, who became increasingly nationalist in the face of the inability of Western intervention to end the war and secure the cause of the small Catholic community.

¹⁹ Leban [RC.WO.SA.01]: 7, 8.

²⁰ Leban [RC.WO.SA.01]: 9.

Marković also makes reference to the power-as-authority dynamic and the correspondent choices made by the Catholic hierarchy:

Also many Croats and among Croats many in the churches, many bishops are also now supporters of HDZ, which is a fascist political party. I can tell you, when I came back from the Zagreb - I was a refugee in Zagreb during the war - I went to my bishop and asked him, I am one of your priests and I have the right to ask something of you. I insist that you openly write and give a message that the Croatian National Community, the HDZ, is not a Christian Party and that they commit ethnic cleansing, they are racist, and so on. You have to tell people, we cannot give a voice of support to this party. He agreed that this was so, but he said to me, "If I do it, then 90 percent of Catholics would be against me." He didn't choose the prophetic role.²¹

By exercising their power-as-authority to secure their people, religious hierarchs built walls that served only to antagonise the other communities, and to a good measure, the leaders distanced themselves from their own people who genuinely seek peace. Brokering a peace settlement with those who wield this kind of power-as-authority *while the perceived threat remains in place* is virtually impossible, and working towards establishing structural parity between the groups in conflict will serve not to diminish the hostilities, but to maintain them, because the potential security threat remains. A degree of stability for guarded negotiation may be achieved, but establishing enduring peace is out of the question. In these circumstances power-as-authority translates into conciliatory weakness, and the power dynamic moves in the direction of entrenchment.

A different kind of power dynamic is in play in Bosnia-Herzegovina that is much more effective in terms of building peace. Significantly, this power-as-capability (δύναμις) is observable outside of the power-as-authority (ἐξουσία) realm of the political and clerical elites. This power dynamic is the ability to accomplish the task (in this case, of peace-building and social restoration), and is carried out more readily at a level of perceived 'powerlessness' in relation to institutional authorities and their domains, and frequently in opposition to them. Unfettered by the constraints of preserving nationhood, individual clerics, women and young people are at liberty to contravene rigorous codes of conduct, and encounter each other in effective and meaningful ways. They are able to trespass the barriers of cultural and national identity because they consciously choose to respond less to the values and constructions of nationalists and more to what they perceive as the essential nature of humanity as created by a merciful and moral God.

²¹ Marković [RC.RL.SA.01]: 12.

values and constructions of nationalists and more to what they perceive as the essential nature of humanity as created by a merciful and moral God.

Persons of religious faith are frequently accused of naiveté for not observing the protocols of the power structures, and for trusting the ‘other’ at the risk of their own reputations, positions and lives.²² But they are better equipped to understand an alternative power structure in which their own power-as-capability is not dependent upon institutional power-as-authority figures, but *under* the authority of the singular omnipotent Being who is both just and merciful. Their significant yet understated achievements in the face of public scorn are often accompanied by a knowing smile that betrays an alternative epistemology reminiscent of Kierkegaardian paradox. Their illumination is dependent less upon reason and rationality and more on faith in that which is not less certain for being intangible. They actively participate in what they believe to be the righteousness that belongs to the very order of creation itself, providing both the vision and motivation for responding as peace-builders. By twist of circumstance, institutional powerlessness is that which empowers peace-building. This is eloquently summarised by Marković, who says, “Jesus didn’t choose power.”²³ Many involved in the peace-building process are virtually invisible owing to gendered or age exclusion or, in the case of clerics, marginalisation from religious elites in their own ranks.

Their reliance upon an omnipotent God who is engaged in the created order effectively exposes the relativity of the power of the state apparatus and international community to act as ultimate protectors of persons. Nationalists have not been able to secure their constituency in Bosnia-Herzegovina through warfare. Further, nationalists have failed to establish little more than a fragile stability in a segregated and dysfunctional society. By contrast, religious reconcilers articulate an understanding of the human individual and community in relation to the omnipotent God that fosters respect and awe for persons regardless of national heritage. Often the result is a demonstrable shift from social fragmentation to wholeness. The move from power to humility stands in contradistinction to the hubris of the corporate egoism advanced by nationalists. Power only apparently resides with the egoists, but the terms of engagement in peace-building are asymmetrical. Religious peace

²² Marković [RC.RL.SA.01]: 12; Topić [RC.RL.RA.04]: 2, 6; Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 3; Zovkić [RC.RL.SA.05]: 3, 4.

²³ Marković [RC.RL.SA.01]: 13.

builders are individualists who strive neither for the immediate nor the territorial, but the right and true. Theirs is a practice of spirituality with its own share of physical and ideological battles, challenging the political and social stalemates by contending for a hard-fought peace. Although the major religious communities have this power dynamic in common, it is expressed variously and in accordance with the specific circumstances of each community. The diverse expressions towards peace-building are therefore analysed in greater detail in the next section.

4. Overcoming Adversity through Diversity: Four Models

One of the key principles this thesis brings out is that building peace requires various channels, and a search for a methodological singularity is both fruitless and artificial. Four models of peace-building can be identified in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The *Nationalist Model* uses exclusion to create its own realm of peace from which foreign and perceived hostile entities are debarred. It advocates an identity towards singularity by creating a narrative and ethos from a particular ethnogenesis. Fitting the ‘skin’ of a particular nation requires the removal of the ethnic parties who do not fit, and social conformity to received shibboleths. For this reason, Erceg, for example, can personally claim Serbian identity, having most of the national characteristics of Serbian nationhood, but is nevertheless rejected by the wider Serbian community because he is Protestant, or more accurately, because he is not Serbian Orthodox.²⁴ Nationalism is a sociological force driving society and individuals towards a particular and exclusive singularity of identity, with no intention of building unity outside of its own state.

The *Ecumenical Model* also espouses singularity, but unlike the nationalist model, has intentions of inclusion. Its basis for building unity is a common ethic and religious monotheism. As was seen in Chapter Three, ethics shift disparate groups towards singularity, which has a homogenising effect. Unlike nationalism, however, ethics may be applied with an intention of inclusion and universality. A form of this is evident, for instance, in the invocation of Abraham as a symbol for religious unity. The organisation *Abraham/Ibrahim* employs the imagery of the patriarch as the father and progenitor of many nations in order to point out that which is common to the adherents of the three monotheistic religions of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Friar Ivo Marković speaks of ‘Abrahamaic ecumenism’ as a fitting basis for co-operation

²⁴ Erceg [PR.RL.BL.02]: 15, 16. See also Topić [RC.RL.RA.04]: 2-6.

between people of diverse religious confessions, and even those of none.²⁵ Oršolić has also premised his efforts and the work of *Zajedno* on those elements common to the three Abrahamaic confessions, emphasising the monotheistic claim of each.²⁶ A similar ethic is a correlative expression of identification with the same God. These efforts have clear resonance with Hans Küng's *Towards A Global Ethic* in which political and religious leaders from the major religions emphasise their common ethic.²⁷ The Global Ethos does not seek to create a new religion with a new set of ethical mores; it seeks rather to find an ethical common denominator for the world religions. By doing so, however, the theological and doctrinal particularities of the religions are relegated for the sake of achieving unity. In so doing some argue that the integrity between belief and ethic may be compromised.

The *Pluralist Model* of peace-building seeks to reconcile plurality and particularity in its approach. Monsignor Mato Zovkić, a tireless advocate for reconciliation, desires to keep the distinctives and argues against syncretism:²⁸

I would like to remind all of us, both believers and agnostics, that a claim for absoluteness is an integral part of faith and doctrine in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism.... In inter-religious dialogue, especially in peace-building and reconciliation process, we accept this belief and teaching of each other, respecting each others' religious conscience, because we who are believing partners of the reconciliation process reject syncretism as the way to peace and tolerance. We reject the notion that all religions are equally good, but we accept our responsibility to build a more humane world, together with followers of different religions and cultures.²⁹

The pluralist model refuses to minimise substantive theological, ethical and cultural differences that exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Zovkić is dissatisfied with the simplistic claims that Bosnia-Herzegovina was an oasis of ethnic and religious harmony before the war. He points out that real differences and tensions were present, and that the 'harmony' achieved through socialism was at the expense of marginalizing minority communities and suppressing substantive differences. By contrast, he sees a pluralist and particularist direction as the way to move in order to preserve the proper Croatian and Catholic identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He is thus

²⁵ Marković, unrecorded interview, December 2001. Also, Marković [RC.RL.SA.01]: 3.

²⁶ Oršolić 1998: 263.

²⁷ See the discussion in Chapter Three on this topic.

²⁸ Zovkić [RC.RL.SA.05]: 4.

²⁹ Zovkić 2002: 185; Zovkić [RC.RL.SA.05]: 3. Zovkić is a pluralist in the sense of Vatican II, as he clarifies, and not in the sense of pluralism today.

opposed to the exclusive particularism of Croatian Catholic nationalists in the secession-minded region of Herzeg-Bosna, arguing that the loss of this region to Croatia would so politically weaken the Croat Catholic minority of Central Bosnia as to make them nationally inviable. Their plight then would not be unlike that of the Bošnjaks. In this same respect, *Reis-ul-lema* Cerić also opposes a syncretism that would inevitably lead to assimilation and the ultimate demise of the Bošnjak nation.³⁰

The differences that exist between the nations must remain, for in them identity is maintained. The pluralist model builds peace by advocating a 'separate and equal' position, and is common among ethnic minorities. Numerical inferiority in an immature democratic state in which nationalist identity is still the dominant paradigm translates into a constant threat and potential marginalisation. Extensive checks and balances are required in order to avoid this outcome, but this is perceived as preferable to the alternative of cultural annihilation.

The fourth model of peace-building can be termed *Christo-centric* in that it is consciously centred in faith in Jesus Christ and in a biblical ontology of the divine-human relationship. This position is found pre-eminently, but not exclusively, among the Protestants.³¹ This model is nationally pluralist and culturally inclusive, emphasising the universal predicament of humanity, and the common need for all to be reconciled with God through Christ. God's salvific action towards humankind creates a supra-national identity in Christ that is the basis for social restoration. For this reason advocates of the Christo-centric model make no significant separation between reconciliation and soteriology.³² Both are acts of divine grace in Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit in the life of the individual. Peace and reconciliation are exemplified in the new humanity recreated in the God-man Jesus Christ.³³ Reconciliation is made possible in Christ both on the vertical axis between God and human beings, as well as the horizontal axis with other persons.

Church leaders from other religious communities often describe the Protestants as 'sectarian' in ways that are calculated to be pejorative,³⁴ and it is true that some

³⁰ Cerić [MU.RL.SA.01]: 4.

³¹ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14] also advocates a Christo-centric model.

³² Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 7; Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 20, 21; Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 3,4; Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 3, 4. But see also Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.14]: 12.

³³ See, for instance, Ephesians 2:10-15; Col. 3:11-15.

³⁴ See Šaje [RO.RL.SA.03]: 13-15. Also Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 2; Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 20.

Protestants are reluctant to become involved in joint events with other churches that do not share their soteriological views. However, the Protestants are doctrinally no more sectarian than other religious groups, and culturally and nationally the least sectarian. The combined presence of Serbs, Croats and Bošnjaks – and in some instances Roma (Gypsies),³⁵ who are despised by all the other national communities – is a rare phenomenon in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nationality is virtually irrelevant in their ontology and identity, and for some³⁶ it is inconceivable to have an emphasis on national factors. Far more important is what unites them, and that what divides the nations is inconsequential for their unity.

Three of the four models offer possible expressions of peace and restoration for a pluralist state. Only the nationalist model, reflecting a force towards a particularised singularity through exclusion, does not aid reconciliation but moves in the direction of isolation. The other expressions of multi-nationalism can in some way build peace. Thus, no single model is appropriate for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the diversity reflects the respective particularities of each community. Diversity does not necessarily translate into incompatibility, but can lead towards social restoration.

The first three sections of this chapter emerge explicitly from the interviews. The remaining element of Restoration as a *Leitmotiv* for Peace-Building is implicit in the interviews. However, some confusion and disagreement about the term ‘restoration’ disguises the contributions the concept may have. The following extrapolation aims to clarify the difficulties, and then theologically explores the contributions that the concept of restoration may have for peace-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5. Restoration as a *Leitmotiv* for Peace-Building

5.1. *Exordium*

The peace-building literature commonly views the term ‘restoration’ as a subcategory of ‘reconciliation’.³⁷ This is so because peace-building is treated as an entity apart from a larger context or integrating schema. The opposite will here be argued, namely, that the larger context is what gives full meaning to peace-building and brings a new perspective that seeks to see different domains within an integrative

³⁵ The two Sarajevo churches and Mostar East Side each have Roma worshippers in attendance.

³⁶ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 9, 15, 16; Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 5, 6.

³⁷ See the discussion below for examples.

whole. The term ‘restoration’ is not used with reference to *temporality*, as in the restoration of another time period. A restoration of this kind is neither possible nor desirable. The term ‘restoration’ is used ontologically, and has reference to a *state of being or becoming*; it is used to mean ‘to make whole again that which was damaged; to reverse and heal fragmentation’. With reference to structures, ‘restoration’ means ‘to make sound again’. With reference to organisms, ‘restoration’ is used with a therapeutic intent and a healing effect, as in “a returning to a normal or healthy condition”,³⁸ or “the restoration of friendship between enemies; the restoration of peace after war”.³⁹ The term is here used as the central domain of the language complex that includes related terms such as ‘reconciliation’, ‘restitution’, ‘reparation’, ‘renewal’, and ‘revival’.⁴⁰ Thus, in this thesis the superaltern and subaltern are reversed, that is to say, ‘reconciliation’ (the healing and restoring of broken relationships) may rightly be viewed as a subcategory of ‘restoration’, which is treated as the universal and not the particular. This paradigm may be illustrated by the following examples taken from the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Among the first tasks undertaken following the cease-fire was the restoration of electrical power to the cities to re-establish the normalisation of urban life. However partially, electricity again lighted up homes, and trams moved people around the city. Similarly, in the rural areas of Central Bosnia, where winter temperatures typically dip well below freezing, restoring heat to flats was a priority. Less utilitarian enterprises also may be seen as elements of restoration. In 2004 Mostar city officials reopened the Stari Most – destroyed in the war in 1993 – to firework displays and great fanfare. All of these are human undertakings that *make whole again* that which was fractured, severed or fragmented. While these efforts may aid reconciliation in some indirect way, the proper term for them is ‘restoration’.

Restoration was also underway in the natural realm. Within months of the end of fighting, nature began its reclamation as bunkers and pillboxes played host to wild flowers. Decapitated trees scorched and scarred by mortar fire high above the Sarajevo skyline put out new growth, concealing the gun placements once so obvious. Birds and wildlife returned to these areas as the natural order was restored.

³⁸ MWMD 2002: n.p.

³⁹ WRUD 1998: n.p.

⁴⁰ WRUD 1998: n.p.

At times human and natural acts of restoration collide to create other difficulties. The task of clearing landmines is part of the recovery process of restoring arable land. But mine clearance is made more difficult by the land restoring itself at a rate faster than the mines can be cleared, making the task of discovery nearly impossible.

These are examples of restoration in which wholeness and healing returns to that which is dysfunctional or fractured. The environment and society undergo partial redemption in restoration, and this encompasses a wider sphere than the interpersonal restoration of human relationships, or reconciliation. Reconciliation is one of the last elements of restoration in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, while it is transpiring very slowly, it is part of the restoration process of healing to both land and people.

Thus, reconciliation is an integral part of the larger framework of restoration.

Theologically, restoration expresses God's will to see wholeness, not only in human relationships, but in the wider environment, which ultimately embraces the whole cosmological order. A final restoration will transpire in an eschatological age, but a partial restoration may be witnessed and experienced even now.

The following investigation will first look at the thoughts voiced by the interviewees about restoration in order to understand how the term and concept emerge as a guiding motif for peace-building. Second, it will explore the sociological context, focusing on how the term 'restoration' is used in the peace-building literature. Third, the investigation will explore the theological context and provide an overview of the concept of 'restoration' as it is used in the Muslim and Christian historical-eschatological contexts, drawing upon insights from religious leaders in the Balkans.

5.2. The Views of Interviewees on 'Restoration'

Two interviewees, Marković and Kuzmić, are guarded about the term 'restoration' as a guiding motif for peace-building beyond the personal level. They point out that the term could easily imply a return to the ideological past. Marković expresses this concern thus:

I find that the use of the word 'restoration' here in your question, in place of other words like 'reconciliation', 'renewal' or 'revival', 'restoration' is something ideological. Restoration means 'to bring the situation from the past into the time of the present'. And 'restoration' always makes dictators or oligarchs; groups of people who would like to have the same situation of power as they once had. This is 'restoration'.... For me, restoration is very ideological. I recommend the use of the word 'reconciliation' or 'revival'. Restoration here, you know, we can't repair the situation we had. Restoration is always technocracy. It is the power of a small group of people. Therefore, I think we can speak with restoration in the sense of renewal of life and reconciliation and so on in Bosnia.... [T]he word

restoration you're using more on a personal level, or for individuals. Restoration of the life of individuals before their sin, before they lost their reputation in life, so here it is meant as a restoration on a social level. It is something that is needed to distinguish the right meaning of these words.⁴¹

Kuzmić is also wary of exchanging one ideological era for another, or of attempting to bring back the communist past:

So, when you say in the same question, "the attempt to social restoration", it could not possibly be the restoration of that because you don't have the context for it. When you have a different context you cannot have the same text.⁴²

At the same time, Kuzmić finds that 'restoration' is the appropriate term to describe the inter-personal dynamic of social normalisation:

I have personally an enormously positive experience with women in peace-building and restoring normal life conditions and so on.⁴³

With these observations in mind, it is essential to define restoration in such a way to exclude ideological permutations that could easily overwhelm its usage in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, other interviewees view the term 'restoration' as befitting of the social context. They embrace the term on several levels without fear of returning to the ideological past. Zovkić sees restoration as a crucial element of reconciliation that aids healing:

In my Catholic and Croatian experience, reconciliation is a long-term restoration of broken or weakened relationships with others who are different and with whom we share the country in which we were born and in which we would like to continue living in peace, requesting our individual and collective rights but also granting to 'others' their individual and collective rights. 'The others' remain different and have the right to remain different, but Bosnia is a homeland for all of us. I believe that our respective faiths do enable us to contribute toward healing the existing wounds, resorting mutual trust, and living in a just peace. May God help us in this noble endeavour.⁴⁴

Mikulić uses the term to describe new parties and initiatives in the political sphere that seek to affect change in society:

Yes, I can see how society in Bosnia-Herzegovina is somehow trying to accomplish restoration.... Slowly new political parties are coming into existence, and their prominence is seen when they make speeches and promises, but later these things are forgotten. They are trying to have

⁴¹ Marković [RC.RL.SA.01]: 1, 2.

⁴² Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: 1.

⁴³ Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: 12.

⁴⁴ Zovkić 2002: 184.

restoration. On the question of whether it is possible and what would be the foundation for restoration Bosnia-Herzegovina, I believe it is possible.⁴⁵

Grabus views restoration as a process in which religious persons can have a strong contribution. He refers to a period before the war when religion played a greater mediating role between nations in society, and envisions a place where animosities will be decreased because people become better informed both about their own religion and the beliefs of others:

And I think that [if] people were religiously educated, and [if] people understand their own religion, they can help the process of restoration because if we help people who don't understand their own religion, they will always be against the other religion. And it is very important not only to educate people in their own tradition, but to also explain to them the right way of the other religions.⁴⁶

Oršolić believes that this post-communist era grants theology, religion and ethics a public role for the restoration of civil society, and he is personally involved in developing these initiatives:

Now is the time, since theology advanced, because in our post-communist society there is again the presence of religion in public life. That is why I think the chance is big that people become theologically and ethically enriched so that this restoration would be complete. Hierarchies of religious communities should be pushed to be aware of that first, which is achieved through the Inter-Religious Council of religious leaders since 1997. But at the same time you have to start working from the bottom, from something that is not hierarchical, which should be done by seminaries, universities, upbringing and things like that. The Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina designed a new program that actively engages religion and it became aware that religion *per se* can help the restoration of the society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In one document that was signed by both the OHR and the Ministry Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina there is a promise that has to do with the ethnic restoration of the society. On the occasion of a national holiday our organisation organised a so-called Spiritual Call for Monotheistic Religions under the auspices of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That means that the highest positions of power in Bosnia-Herzegovina are doing something practically.... I hope that our citizens according to, and not in spite of, religious differences will be made firm or restored. Those differences in religion will not divide citizens but unite them. World ethics should be developed there.⁴⁷

Protestant Erceg also believes that new initiatives towards restoration of society must have a theological and ethical basis:

All these things, all efforts in building peace and inter-religious dialogue can be described as a tendency to renewal and restoration.... All the efforts that people are doing concerning especially this inter-religious dialogue

⁴⁵ Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 1.

⁴⁶ Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 8.

⁴⁷ Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 1.

have their place. They can contribute to successful solving of some things.... What I'm saying is that I see all these efforts as something good and that can benefit renewing and re-establishing the peace in this country.... But the very important thing is that it is necessary to find a theological and ethical foundation for this process. It has to be part of this process.⁴⁸

Šeperić links the monotheistic religions and the concept of restoration with cosmological power constructs and redemption:

There are similarities in the beginning and the end, I would agree. Especially in the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Islam and Christianity. All of them agree on how the world was created. I was astonished to see that the Muslims also believe a lot of things that the Christians hold will happen in the eschaton, in the future. So we have the same beginning and a similar end. But what makes Christianity totally different is the intermediate. Why am I saying that? Actually, when you're saying all of that about restoration, I remember when I was reading Walter Wink's trilogy on powers, and he described it in three very distinct and simple sentences: powers are good, powers are fallen, and powers are to be redeemed. So, the redemption for me as a Christian comes through a person, God as a person. And there is something strange happening here because of some of the Jewish and also Islamic theologians who stress that Christianity is always a religion of a book. I wouldn't say so. The holy scriptures for Christians are a medium; it is a book in order to get into a relationship with the person.... The person is there and that person is Christ. And if you meet Christ as the power, then no book can restore a relationship because restoration is basically an inter-personal category. Only in inter-personal communication can you achieve restoration. I think that is what basically makes Christianity different, but not in the imperialistic sort of way, because we as Christians need to be humble.⁴⁹

These interviewees make it clear that the term and concept of 'restoration' must not mean a return to the ideologies of the past. Peace-builders see a new opportunity in Bosnia-Herzegovina and want to create something different from the ashes of communism and war. At the same time, interviewees also indicate a willingness to retain that which is good in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the peace-building process, and for this reason they view restoration as an appropriate guiding motif for peace-building. This invites a closer analysis of the way in which 'restoration' is related to peace-building.

5.3. 'Restoration' in the Sociological Context

In post-war environments the restoration of civil society is of paramount importance, and is described in the peace-building literature as having three general dimensions: civil or political, inter-personal, and judicial. In the first instance of *civil or political restoration*, the framework addresses the necessary repair of systems and structures

⁴⁸ Erceg [PR.RL.BL.02]: 2.

⁴⁹ Šeperić [RC.SM.SA.10]: 12.

in a post-conflict situation in order that society may again function. Restoration in this sense is the post-war process of societal normalisation necessary for reconciliation.⁵⁰ The first commitment of action by the Ecumenical Dialogue for Reconciliation in Belgrade on February 1996 is in keeping with this priority, as they pushed for “restoring homes to the displaced, ideally in their original regions, and providing pastoral care”.⁵¹ The restoration of civil society is usually the first concern of governments and NGOs alike. However, as Lederach points out, reconciliation is not limited to this period of post-settlement restoration, but must continue into other phases as well.⁵²

The *inter-personal* aspects of restoration move in the direction of reconciliation. Lederach here speaks of the ‘restoration of the person and the relationship’ as an important ingredient of peace-building and reconciliation.⁵³ With reference to returning refugees to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hart sees a need to ‘reconnect broken relationships and repair social injury’ before reconciliation can be addressed.⁵⁴ Drawing upon transcendent and theological resources for social restoration towards peace-building, Muhammed Abu-Nimer makes the following observation regarding restoration:

There is a need to rediscover the processes and values of restoration through forgiveness and compassion in Muslim political society.... The cycle of revenge must be broken by Muslims because restoration is a source of life (see Qur’ān 2:179) not revenge or vengeance.... Thus, humans are expected to initiate a process of restoring their relationships as part of their nature and their place in God’s order, and must act responsibly toward each other in order to gain God’s forgiveness.⁵⁵

In a similarly theological vein, this time from a Christian perspective, Schreiter defines individual reconciliation as the ‘restoration of humanity’ in which the life-giving relationship to God is re-established, and the image of God within each person is restored.⁵⁶

The importance that both these religious thinkers attach to human relationships has direct implications for the important area of justice in post-war situations, the third

⁵⁰ Lederach 1997: 151.

⁵¹ Forest 1997: 116.

⁵² Lederach 1997: 151.

⁵³ Lederach 1997: 24,26, 84.

⁵⁴ Hart 2001: 305.

⁵⁵ Abu-Nimer 2003: 68.

⁵⁶ Schreiter 1998: 15.

instance of social restoration. *Restorative justice* seeks to move beyond the punitive measures and the legal boundaries of loss and compensation to heal wounds left by the altercation.⁵⁷ Restorative justice may be an appropriate means of addressing personal injustice and loss in the absence of a realistic hope of the court system being able to guarantee restitution and just compensation.⁵⁸ The General Amnesty acknowledges several aspects of the conflict at once. It tacitly acknowledges that soldiers committed offences against a civil society and non-combatants, inflicting widespread damage. It acknowledges the incapacity of both the judicial and penal systems to address in any adequate fashion the magnitude of the offences. It recognises that many of the lower level soldiers in the regular armies were unwilling combatants, conscripted in the time of war to carry out orders against which they had little or no recourse to alternative action. It attempts to reintegrate military conscripts into civil society as part of the process of normalisation and restoration. Thus, the General Amnesty is a common and necessary element of restoring peace in post-war situations, but it necessarily leaves unaddressed grievances that remain a cause of significant social unrest in the society.

Restorative justice offers both mediation and compensation in rebuilding trust in local situations where perpetrator and victim know each other, and encounter is possible, even unavoidable. Petersen divides justice into four descriptive areas: *Punitive justice* that seeks to do harm to the offender; *distributive justice* that seeks to divide equitably the possession of goods held in ownership; *compensatory justice* that seeks to right societal injustices by favouring and redressing the imbalances of one group or another group that previously held incommensurate power; and *restorative justice* that seeks to repair damage done.⁵⁹ Appleby recognises restorative justice not as a replacement to the existent legal apparatus, but as a “complement [of] criminal courts and other structures of retributive justice” that requires forgiveness and whose primary consideration is “the reconciliation of victim and offender and the repairing of the social fabric”.⁶⁰ Restorative justice looks beyond the act of lawbreaking and commensurate punitive measures therefore, to the healing of relationships. It shifts the focus from transgression of the law to reparation of

⁵⁷ Lambourne 2001: 313. See also Estrada-Hollenback 2001: 74ff.

⁵⁸ Van der Merwe 2001: 199. See the discussion of this Dayton Accord provision in Chapter Two.

⁵⁹ Petersen 2004: 74.

⁶⁰ Appleby 2000: 167, 195.

damage. It thus elevates the role of the victim while seeking to work towards healing the victim, the perpetrator and the community.⁶¹ Restorative justice emphasises the common humanity of both victim and wrongdoer while addressing the dispossession of the aggrieved. In this regard faith communities have a particular role to play since they recognise the sacredness of each human being and the need for healing. The spirituality with which the Christian faith communities view the parties involved addresses areas of humanity the courts cannot, because the faith communities are informed by a dimension of redemptive action towards restoration. Subsequent healing is available to both victim and wrongdoer alike, bringing wholeness and reconciliation. The therapeutic element of sotieriology is manifest in individuals who viewed themselves both as victims⁶² and as wrongdoers.⁶³

These three dimensions of restoration in the sociological realm share the common perspective of re-establishing a normalised environment for human co-existence. Restoration is a re-creative act ‘making whole again’ that which is fractured and damaged in human relationships and their environment. It encompasses the tasks of rebuilding the infrastructure of a war-torn environment by restoring electrical power and water and sufficiently sustaining a displaced population with food and shelter. It functions on an inter-personal level and seeks to make whole again relationships fractured by the violence of war. Restoration also encompasses the creation of just means of addressing grievances caused by the war. In the Balkan conflicts this must go beyond the processes of the Tribunal at the Hague to address the multitude of offences and injustices outside the remit of this specialised court.

5.4. ‘Restoration’ in the Theological Context

It is at the human rather than structural level that restoration acquires a spiritual dimension and is informed theologically as a spiritual undertaking. Appleby says that “reconciliation involves a fundamental restoration of the human spirit” which is a spiritual rather than technical process that cannot be foreshortened.⁶⁴ Restoration of wholeness of the human spirit derives from the creation event, for it is in the creation that order, structure and purpose are found, in a teleological framework upon which

⁶¹ Petersen 2004: 77.

⁶² Rakić [PR.WO.SA.02]: 1, 2; Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 6ff.

⁶³ Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 2, 3.

⁶⁴ Appleby 2002: 203.

natural order is predicated. The sociological dimension thus leads to reflection on the theological dimension. An Orthodox perspective on this ontology of restoration is given in the document entitled, 'The contribution of the Orthodox Church to the realization of peace, justice, freedom, fraternity and love between the nations as well as to the elimination of racial and other forms of discrimination' submitted to the Great and Holy Council of the Orthodox Church (*Una Sancta* 42) at Chambèsy in 1987. It states:

At the centre of this document on peace... there stands the human person who, in keeping with Christian understanding is focused on God's incarnate Logos.... Through the incarnation the Logos has recapitulated in himself the entire creation, that he has restored once again man's holiness and greatness and has eliminated the causes of all disunity....

The first thing the document describes is the foundation of peace: 'there is a particular point in beginning by emphasizing that the biblical concept of peace is not identical with a neutral, negative view that would simply identify peace with the absence of war. The concept 'peace' is identical with the restoration of things in their pristine innocence before the fall, when man and woman still lived and breathed in the life-giving breath of the creation in the image and likeness of God. In other words, it means the restoration of relations between God and man, it means peace between God and man.'⁶⁵

The creation imagery of restoration resonates with several of the religious leaders interviewed. Mustafić asserts that in the creation God is the God of all people, and we are thus reviving the real picture.⁶⁶ Muslim professor Grabus⁶⁷ and Orthodox priest Tošković⁶⁸ find in the creation an image of how things ought to look ethically, and that the creation is thus instructive of how we ought to treat others. Similarly, Radujković views all of humanity as a creation of God, and people therefore have no right to harm others.⁶⁹ Several religious leaders point out that all people are created in God's image, in which the real identity of humanity is found, and that a key to reconciliation is the recognition that we are all God's creations.⁷⁰ Protestant leader Kuzmić expresses this clearly with the following:

⁶⁵ Cited by Papandreou 1988: 26.

⁶⁶ Mustafić [MU.RL.SA.03]: 21.

⁶⁷ Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 13, 22, 24.

⁶⁸ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 8.

⁶⁹ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 2.

⁷⁰ Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 25; Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 3; Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 3; Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 5.

...[T]he answer lies in the discovery of the fact that we are all bearers of the *Imago Dei*. So you have to go back to creation, to the theological anthropology, to the creation and then therefore to creation ethic and ask the question what is the divine intention for humanity. And it is obviously not to exterminate each other and to hate each other, but to build a *shalom* type of community.... Let's not start with Christian ethics, let's start with creation ethics, because that's where all of us share humanity. All of us share *Imago Dei*, and all of us have a common original parent in God. And so, based on that, you can look for common ground, and then you can address, as you said, the agnostics and non-confessional persons also, because they are also created. They also are bearers of the *Imago Dei*. They also are created in the image of God.... They still belong to God by the very act of creation, by that very gifting of conscience and mind, ... and all of the transcendent dimensions of existence. That's what makes us human. It's a search for common humanity, which becomes a search for *shalom* or for peace, even in a multi-religious or even atheistic or agnostic setting.⁷¹

The restoration of society and the healing of human relationships is thus shaped by creation imagery, but is also informed by imagery of the eschaton. Living in a peaceable fashion between the creation and the eschaton is indeed the heart of the matter of restoration. Humanity's departure from the intention of God in the created order results in the current condition of separation from God,⁷² while at the same time anticipating an age to come when God establishes a new order, restoring that which was relationally and cosmologically lost in the created realm. Theological differences on this theme across the faith communities do not exclude shared elements.

5.4.1. The Qur'ānic Basis for Restoration

The Unity of God (*tawhīd*) is the foundational principle of the Islamic worldview. While referring primarily to the unity of God, *tawhīd* is widely interpreted among Muslim religious thinkers to imply the unity of God's creation; everything in creation exists within the creative word of God who, though transcendentally other than His creation, is immanently involved in its every part. Similarly, the principle of the unity of God is extended to the entirety of Islamic thought, prompting one Islamic scholar to assert that *tawhīd* is "the foundation, the centre and the end of the [Islamic] tradition".⁷³ The integrated unity of all things reaches an apotheosis in the new creation (21:104) in which the created order will be cosmologically restored and all of humanity will return to the creator. The Day of Judgment, described as a

⁷¹ Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: 5.

⁷² Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 5.

⁷³ Royster 1987: 28.

calamity, when God will examine each individual for his or her faithfulness and deeds, will inaugurate the new creation.⁷⁴

Justice will finally and ultimately prevail (21:47), and, in the face of God's righteousness, those who have committed evil will recognise the wrongful nature of their evil deeds, will be retributed accordingly (37:39), and will realise the justice of their condemnation, being separated from God into Hell (38:55-58; 39:71-72). This is followed by the return of the righteous to the Creator (21:35; 36:77-83) through admission of the blessed into Paradise in the presence of God (54:54-55), a Garden (50:31-35) and place of joy and peace (6:127; 36:55-58) separating the righteous from the unrighteous (3:185; 11: 108, 19:60).

The holistic worldview expressed by *tawhīd* extends to the current socio-political order, creating both a frame of reference and a hermeneutic tool for addressing injustice and poverty. The application of *tawhīd* as a guiding interpretive motif in the contemporary setting means that other interpretive frameworks - the philosophical, spiritual, juristic or political - are not in conflict with each other, but are parts of the whole. Each is necessary to express the fullness of the Qur'ānic message.⁷⁵ Further, the principle of *tawhīd* resists the artificial division in human existence. *Tawhīd* recognises no division between the sacred and the secular and acknowledges the legitimate place religion and faith have in combating injustice.⁷⁶ Similarly, applying the principle of *tawhīd* in society translates into the unity of humanity and opposes the division, alienation and degradation of peoples along national or ethnic lines.

The application of *tawhīd* as a theory and praxis of integrated cosmological and sociological unity has a positive relevance to the restoration needed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Instead of two inviable political entities and three nations constantly seeking to disadvantage each other, one unified political state could be mutually nurtured from that which each of the nations positively contributes to the whole. However, advocacy for a unified political state is not support for the establishment of an Islamic state in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Rather, it acknowledges that religious and political functions within a democratic state are not mutually exclusive or

⁷⁴ See 101: 1-11, and also 21:94; 56:24; 18:49; 84:6-12.

⁷⁵ Esack 1997: 93.

⁷⁶ Esack 1997: 92.

diametrically opposed to each other; not only are they compatible, but they function best together when they are able to inform each other. The *Reis-ul-ulema* addresses this and argues against the tyranny of secular rationalism when he says, “Politics is too important today to be left to politicians alone in the same way that theology is too important to be left to the theologians alone.”⁷⁷ The tyranny of secular rationalism excludes religion’s positive moral contributions through privatisation. *Tawhīd* resists this kind of division.

Further, *tawhīd* as an integrated unity includes multiple elements that complement each other on the basis not of ethnicity or politics, but what the Qur’ān terms *taqwa*, or ‘righteousness rooted in the fear/awe of God’. *Taqwa* literally means ‘to ward off’, ‘to guard against’, or ‘to preserve’⁷⁸ and is the most basic inclusive ethical concept used in the Qur’ān.⁷⁹ On the ‘vertical plane’ it refers to belief in God (10:36; 27:53; 41:18) and to service of God (2:21). It is also used on the ‘horizontal plane’ in reference to the proper treatment of fellow humanity in such social commitments as sharing (92:5; 7:152-3), fulfilling covenants (3:76; 7:52) and showing kindness (3:172; 4:126; 5:93; 16:127).⁸⁰ *Taqwa* has the holistic sense of simultaneously ‘embracing both responsibility to God and to humankind’.⁸¹

Taqwa is the hermeneutical tool that safeguards against the misappropriation of the Qur’ān for sectarian political or theological purposes. It makes no assumption about the interpreter standing apart from the text, but seeks to actively engage the interpreter in a process of personal transformation at the same time that s/he is engaged in social transformation.⁸² The restructuring of civil society along just lines is to be entrusted to those who demonstrate justice, fairness and honesty within their own lives.⁸³

The process of moving out from the unity of God and back towards wholeness and unity is a primary concern and guiding principle of Islam. The principle of *tawhīd*

⁷⁷ Cerić [MU.RL.SA.01]: 6.

⁷⁸ Esack 1997: 87.

⁷⁹ Jafri 1980: 127, as cited in Esack 1997: 87.

⁸⁰ Esack 1997: 87.

⁸¹ Esack 1997: 87.

⁸² Esack 1997: 89.

⁸³ Esack 1997: 89. It is of particular interest that Esack has developed this interpretation of *taqwa* as a Muslim religious leader in the context of the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa.

recognises a cosmological and sociological dimension, which is fundamentally part of the whole and cannot be separate and distinct. Nevertheless, there must remain a temporal distinction between that which is possible in the current socio-political world and that, which awaits completion in the new creation. Maintaining the distinction between the teleological and the eschatological dimensions precludes theological obscurantism and political radicalism, and will at the same time provide a proper place for sober optimism. As one source points out, “The hope of something better to come has informed both theology and socio-political expectations, and the translation of the promise of a time of universal peace and justice is easily made from this age to the next (and back again)”.⁸⁴ In this sense the term ‘restoration’ is properly employed of the process of ‘making whole again’. Final restoration ultimately rests in the hands of God and in his timing. In the meanwhile restoration informs and instructs those living by the principle of *taqwa* as to how they are to conduct themselves in relation to others with a sense of purpose, wholeness, justice, and unity. In this greater sense, restoration is broader than that which reconciliation alone can identify and describe, and includes in principle the possibility of reconciliation and harmonious co-existence (*Mitmenschlichkeit*).

5.4.2. The Biblical Basis for Restoration/Reconciliation

The theological meaning of restoration (ἀποκαταστάσις) in the biblical accounts is linked to the domain of ‘reconciliation’ (ἀποκαταλλάσσω, ‘to reconcile’, from καταλλαγή).⁸⁵ In the LXX ἀποκαταστάσις is used to indicate the political realm of the Israelite nation and refers discretely to the eschatological salvation of a remnant people faithful to Yahweh. God is the chief actor in the redemption of his people, returning them to their former state (cf. Jeremiah 16:15; 24:6; Ezekiel 16:55).⁸⁶

In the first century CE a certain element of the Jewish community was prepared to place the messianic mantle of political authority on the shoulders of Jesus (Mark 9:12). He was meant to fulfil the prophetic expectations of Elijah-*redivivus*, who “will restore all things” (ἀποκαταστήσει πάντα, Matthew 17:11).⁸⁷ In the post-resurrection period Peter asserts that the Jewish prophetic expectations were indeed

⁸⁴ Smith/Haddad 1981: 70.

⁸⁵ See, for instance, Brown (1978: 145-176), where the terms ‘Restoration, Reconciliation, Propitiation and Atonement’ are placed together in a single entry.

⁸⁶ Link 1978: 147.

⁸⁷ The Matthew passage may especially reflect the prevalent Jewish apocalypticism of the inter-testamental period.

fulfilled in Jesus, the Messiah, who then must remain in heaven until the time of “universal restoration” (NRSB), or perhaps better translated as the, “restoration of all things” (ἀποκαταστήσεως πάντων) promised through the Hebrew prophets (Acts 3:21). Thus, partial fulfilment of the prophecy is found in the person of Jesus as the suffering Son of Man (Acts 3:18, cf. Mark 9:12, 13), but the final restoration of all things must await the time when God will again send the Messiah and thereby fulfil the utterances of the prophets (Acts 3:21-26). In the Colossian (1:20) passage focused on the supremacy of Christ, the same cosmological intention is combined with a similar linguistic formula, substituting the word ‘reconciliation’ for ‘restoration’, as follows:

...and through him God was pleased to reconcile to himself all things, (ἀποκαταλλάξαι τὰ πάντα) whether on earth or in heaven, by making peace through the blood of his cross.

The image of restoration and universal peace and harmony with creation that supersedes national sovereignties and power structures is inextricably connected with the saving and redeeming actions of God (Isaiah 11; Revelation 21, 22). However, the image of peace re-created in the eschaton is not the same image as that of the creation. It is not a simplistic return to a time past, but a necessary preparation for the future. The original image of the earthly garden inhabited by the original representative man and woman (Genesis 1) becomes a heavenly city in the re-creation, inhabited by representatives of all nations, peoples, tongues and tribes under the authority and in the presence of the creator (Revelation 21). The damage of the ages through the perpetration of evil is overturned by the decisive action of God against his dissenters. The Tree of Life, the common element in both creation and new creation scenarios, is a balm for the healing of the nations (Rev. 22:2). God’s teleological purposefulness in the creation leads to ultimate peace-building in the new creation. Protestant theologian Miroslav Volf sees the final redemptive act of God as a means to restore the peace of creation:

The creation of the world involved no violence... No chaotic powers need to be overcome; the world emerges through an act of pure positing.... The chaos sets in as a distortion of the peaceful creation. Redemption cannot, therefore, be an act of pure positing but entails negation and struggle, even violence. First God suffers violence on the cross for the salvation of the world. Then, after God’s patience with chaotic powers who refuse to be

redeemed by the cross has come to an end, God inflicts violence against the stubbornly violent to *restore* creation's original peace.⁸⁸

Christians in this current time period thus live expectantly of the next, having a sense both of the 'already' and the 'not yet' of the Kingdom of God. They accordingly seek to live with the practised intentionality of drawing upon a vision of the future kingdom while also participating in legitimate restorative initiatives in this era and on this earthly plain. Similarly, Orthodox theologian Stanley S. Harakas links creation in Christian theology to the re-establishment of a relationship to God and other people, which is broken through sin, as indicated by his citation of Orthodox theologian Constanstine Callinicos:

If religion is defined and is the innermost bond of man with God, and if sin is nothing other than the opposing force which seeks to destroy that bond with satanic passion and to snatch the child from the arms of its Creator, then Christianity... must needs present itself in no other light than as an enemy of this opposing power and as a restorer of the broken bond.⁸⁹

Living between the redemptive crisis of the cross and the final resurrection means living purposefully - and perhaps uncomfortably - as the redeemed of God, consciously seeking to turn aside evil when it is encountered, not just because living apotropaically is less disruptive to human co-existence, but because living in such a way draws a person closer to the intended harmonious communion with the Creator. The remarks of Radujković are here appropriate:

Our Christ came to suffer for every human being. So if we are carriers of the Holy Spirit or if we keep uniting with Christ then we are uniting with all people who have the image of Christ in them. In that kind of unification there is no male or female, black or white. All the questions directed to the Orthodox Christians and Christians in general come out of these two important facts. Everyone who knows this and lives with it feels a need to be an active part in that life. Someone who knows this and feels that way cannot be a passive observer of the world around him.⁹⁰

Radujković points to Christ as the Second Adam to give us an image of how the world might have looked.⁹¹ He asserts that the redemptive power in the resurrection is sufficient to overcome our own human nature, physical death and the final death,

⁸⁸ Volf 1996b: 300, italics added. It is fair to note, however, that Volf does not see 'restoration' as the motif around which an interpretive schema of peace should be designed. Volf believes that 'reconciliation' has a larger scope and greater embrace than restoration (Personal conversation with the author).

⁸⁹ Callinicos, as cited in Harakas 2002: 54.

⁹⁰ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 16.

⁹¹ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 6, referencing Romans 5:12ff.

and points to a Christian response for living in the world today.⁹² He elaborates this view thus:

I understand [restoration] as the task of all Christians. In our services, in the church singing, we always call Christ a new Adam.⁹³ Christ came to show on his example what Adam was supposed to do and how the world would have looked like if Adam hadn't done what he did or if he did what he was supposed to do. We still live in the world where both Adam and Christ co-exist. I think that Christians have this task, whether they're called Orthodox or Catholic or Protestant, to show on their personal example what Christ came for to live here on earth. So that Christians could show to these adamic people in their personal example how they should live.... Throughout our history a lot of things collected upon that root. I think that our common task would be to clear away those layers.⁹⁴

Working for such a peace is an effort worthy of the blessing of God (Matthew 5:9, 38-48, cf. Luke 6:27-36).

Both Muslim and Christian worldviews concerning peace and treatment of others are strongly influenced by the notion of restoration, informed first by an ideal in the creation of God, and by a new creation by God in the order yet to come in the eschaton. The picture of peace in both of these images is universal and God-created, and informs believers how they should live in the conditions and realities of this age.

5.5. Conclusion to the Restoration Section

It is clear from the foregoing that 'restoration' makes a powerful contribution to a holistic approach to peace-building. The concept of restoration must first be clearly understood in its sociological and theological context because difficulties can arise in the translation of the concept of restoration from the cosmological ideals to the *terra (in)firma* of this world. Islam, for instance, sees itself as a movement of restoration, seeking to return "to ancient, pure monotheism".⁹⁵ The irreconcilability of some Muslim and Christian views need not necessarily lead to aggression, but often has. At the same time the Islamic ideals of *tawhīd* and *taqwa* are sufficient guiding principles of restoration to mitigate against any ill will and make significant contributions to peace-building from within Islam.

Similarly, Christian restoration theologies have foundered on the treacherous eschatological shoals of time and territory, confusing the *telos* of the creation and

⁹² Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 6.

⁹³ Radujković is here referencing Romans 5:12-21.

⁹⁴ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 6.

⁹⁵ Tennent 2002: 147-8.

history with the apocalyptic events of the eschaton.⁹⁶ Most frequently this has taken the form of ‘fulfilment theology’, illegitimately assuming for this age the conditions of an age yet to come, and misappropriating for humanity the prerogative of God. It is the confusion of the *eschatological redemption*, which is the ultimate eradication of metaphysical evil, with *teleological redemption*, which is the limitation of physical evil in this world.

Religious leaders interviewed in Bosnia-Herzegovina do not exhibit this kind of naiveté, and maintain a conscious and sober understanding of the limits to peace and redemption.⁹⁷ They also realise that the term ‘restoration’ can be confused with the troubled history tainted by previous empires in the Balkans, whether under the domination of the Serbs, Ottomans, Habsburgs, Fascists, Communists or Nationalists. Leaders reject out of hand any thought of a return to one of these systems of rule. The word ‘restoration’ can evoke images of partisanship and domination of one nation over another. From a theological point of view, it is this kind of imagery that Jesus sought to dispel and transform. Luke records an important post-resurrection encounter between Jesus and the disciples, who expect that the risen Messiah would now rescue the nation of Israel from the tyranny of the Romans and establish the kingdom once again. They ask, “Lord, is this the time when you will restore the kingdom to Israel?” (ἀποκαθιστάνεις τὴν βασιλείαν τῷ Ἰσραήλ;). At this point Jesus ‘de-nationalises’ the kingdom and indicates that the new kingdom, inaugurated in the work of Christ and empowered by the Father through the sending of the Holy Spirit, would cross ethnic and national boundaries (Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria) and embrace nothing less than the ends of the earth

⁹⁶ Origen (c.185 - c.254), for instance, formulated the doctrine of ‘universal restoration’ around ἀποκαταστάσις, asserting that the entire created order would again be returned to the original created state, which gave rise to a correlative doctrine of universal salvation for all of humanity. More recently the Plymouth Brethren sought to restore the simplicity and purity of primitive Christianity in preparation for the return of Christ. Both the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormons) and the Jehovah’s Witnesses are restorationist movements with a strong focus on apocalyptic eschatology. Writing in 1922 after the apocalyptic-like events of the First World War, Albert Schweitzer called for a ‘spiritual awakening and a will for ethical good’ as the basis for the restoration of civilisation (1932: 78). Adrian Hastings sees the Roman Catholic Church under John Paul II as a huge exercise of ‘Restoration’, by which he means a return to a former age that is, “increasingly alienating its leaders both from those of other churches and from its own theologians” (1990: 2).

⁹⁷ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 4; Grabus [MU.RL.SA.02]: 4; Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 2, 4, 5; Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 3; Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 1; Cerić [MU.RL.SA.01]: 9, 10, 12-14.

the earth (cf. Acts 1:6ff). The assumption of the promise of restoration by one nation at the expense of others is antithetical to the teachings of Christ, and is to be rejected.

In the broad sense outlined above, 'restoration' can serve as an appropriate *Leitmotiv* for peace-building in today's Bosnia-Herzegovina because it offers a strong holistic framework for 'making whole again' that which is damaged, distorted or fractured. Restoration offers a cogent worldview of the universe in a threefold manner. First, restoration is set in the teleological purpose and design in the created order, which, although fundamentally and detrimentally altered by the action of humanity, will achieve its intended completion. Second, restoration offers an image of the goodness of God in the intentionality of the creation and a vision for a healed cosmological and sociological future. Third, restoration offers a vision for 'real time' interaction with those dispossessed, disenfranchised and displaced and offers hope to those who suffer under the dissonance of the current chaotic order. Moreover, the motif of restoration is advantaged over other peace-building initiatives currently employed. These attempts fail to address the lingering issues from the past that contribute to the cycle of violence each time the society is confronted with upheaval. By contrast, the theological and sociological framework of restoration creates a meaningful cosmology that can address both current antagonisms and residual animosities lingering from the past.

6. Conclusion

This chapter has examined the issues that emerge from the grounded research that contribute to the theological and ethical understanding of peace-building. Each of the foregoing topics of analysis demonstrate a common theme, namely, the attempt to forge a harmonious unity from a conflicted diversity, revealing in the process the means that the interested parties consider legitimate for the task of creating unity. In the first instance of distinguishing authentic from inauthentic religious faith, persons of faith regard religious heterodoxy as a problematic diversion that is easily co-opted by nationalist ideology. Greater awareness of core Christian and Muslim teaching serves as corrective to incidents of abuse. In the second section of analysis, the creation of power bases is focused on unifying the malleable elements within the religio-cultural base while simultaneously eliminating or marginalising dissident factions. The ongoing efforts to consolidate power bases raise serious questions about the willingness of each party to co-exist with the other parties in mutually beneficial ways. It would seem that power sharing with perceived rival factions

remains a remote concept where zero-sum politics (including the religious institutions) is the status quo.

At the same time the efforts of religious reconcilers is remarkably diverse in the common effort of creating harmonious unity in the country of diverse groups, which is the conclusion of the third section of analysis. Four models were put forth to demonstrate how unity within each group is fostered, which is then extended beyond itself to others.

In the last section analysing the concept of restoration, God is the author of unity, who acts purposefully to draw together those who are willingly under his authority. This act of re-creation has both an aspect of timeliness in accord with God's purposes, and an aspect of finality, in that it will be eschatologically achieved. The Christian account of cosmological unity under God's reign expresses diversity through the many tongues, tribes and nations, and will serve as a healing to the conflicts known today, establishing a harmonious co-existence. This unity and harmony cannot be prematurely achieved through the well-intentioned efforts of humans because it remains the prerogative and providence of God. However, the unity to be established in the cosmological restoration is, in the etymological sense of the German word, a *Vorbild*, or pre-picture and image of the intentionality of God from the very moment of creation to the re-created final cosmological order. It is thus instructive of how those submitted to God's authority should live in relation to Him and to others in today's world.

The foregoing reflection elaborates the efforts towards legitimate and harmonious unity, but leaves open the question of aggressive and violent disunity, and the obvious question of irreconcilable differences remains. The final chapter will address the mythological narratives that dominate the community imaginations in times of political and economic turmoil, and propose a way forward towards peace-building and restoration in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

CHAPTER EIGHT

A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF PEACE-BUILDING: THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS FAITH SODALITIES

1. Introduction

In this final chapter the thesis moves from theological and conceptual issues to address questions of contextual implementation. Specifically, it seeks to answer the Research Question, “How are the key peace-building issues implemented in the context, and what forms do they take?”

The chapter moves first from ‘imagined’ communities to authentic communities of faith, analysing their nature and character and how they stand in contrast to the embattled imagined communities led by nationalist elites. It will attempt to unfold how personal narrative expressed in an authentic religious community where sanctuary is offered proves stronger than national myths of the imagined community¹ where security is an illusion.

Authentic religious expressions are manifested more frequently through smaller communities, or religious faith sodalities, than in the adoption of a new worldview at the ideological level. For that reason, the chapter offers an exposé of three religious faith sodalities in Bosnia-Herzegovina that effectively transcend nationalist rhetoric and build multi-national communities of peace. The chapter will explore how the religious sodalities provide a *sacred space* where people can directly address their

¹ The term ‘imagined community’ is used by Benedict Anderson to mean nations as political communities that have a common relational bond. To describe a community as ‘imagined’ is not to indicate that it is ‘imaginary’ or ‘not real’. The community is ‘imagined’ in that the members will not know or meet most of the fellow-members, “yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (1991: 6).

differences, and give expression to the issues that have so deeply hurt them. The chapter explores in greater detail the character of these sodalities and the multiple resources they bring to the tasks of social restoration and peace-building across national boundaries. These resources are identified from the interview data, and their use is illustrated within the specific local context.

The chapter then analyses the legacy of the supra-historical past as expressed in the destructive national myths, which is one of the most intractable difficulties faced in post-war peace-building, and one which is not often addressed in the peace-building literature. The chapter examines how the authentic faith communities approach this issue, and proposes an alternative approach to Western attempts to demythologise the national narratives that perpetuate animosity from one generation to another. Drawing upon the empirical data of the research, the chapter suggests a way forward that transcends both the current debate on national mythologies and the real animosities manifest in Bosnia-Herzegovina today.

The chapter then looks more closely at forgiveness, the *sine qua non* of social restoration, or reconciliation. The religious traditions view forgiveness differently and therefore place a different emphasis on its role in social restoration. However, the research shows that each of the religious communities believes in the necessity of cultivating a spirituality of forgiveness in order to adequately address the injustices of life. Of particular importance for this thesis is the examination of the way in which forgiveness effectively encounters memory and mythology to bring healing and restore personal wholeness. This element will explore the positive effect of arresting the cycle of revenge through ‘remembering’ of personal and communal history.

2. Religious Faith Sodalities and Peace-Building

2.1. From ‘Imagined’ to Authentic Communities

Political elites in the Balkans assert that the nationalist cause achieves security for their people. Using one-sided arguments they vilify their enemy by invoking the memory of past conflicts and reinvigorating national myths. As Kuzmić points out, it is a short distance from bellicose rhetoric to *bellum*.² In reality, however, nationalist oratory has led not to security, but to open warfare with extensive losses

² Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: 10.

on all sides. The ‘imagined community’ in turmoil staked out exclusive territorial claims, and turned ancient burial sites and religious structures into hallowed ground. For this reason, much energy was given to destroying mosques and churches, and the willing complicity of institutional religious leaders lent an aura of moral righteousness and legitimacy to the undertaking.

Now it is only too apparent how insecure the nationalist cause actually was. Ultra-nationalists carved out regions on the battlefield and at the negotiating table at the cost of internal dislocation and fragmentation. Consequently, whole communities became severed from external help offered by the international community that insisted on ethnic reintegration as a condition of post-war reconstruction. Thus, the imagined community driven by hardliners proved to be a perilous ideal that failed to deliver greater peace and security. Instead, it has managed only a fragile stability characterised by social disintegration and ongoing ethnic hostility.

2.2. The Nature of the Religious Faith Sodalities

In contrast to these failed initiatives, genuine manifestations of peace are found in the authentic religious communities that promote care of all persons regardless of national identity. The authentic community is a sodality, best expressed in the local language(s) as a *zajednica* or *zbor*, which distinguishes itself from the nationalist campaigns. These sodalities are small communities operating with varying degrees of autonomy from larger institutional bodies, and consist of individuals who make a conscious choice to participate in an alternative communal experience. No one in a *zajednica* or *zbor* is there by default or birth; membership is by choice.

The existence of religious faith sodalities is imperative to the post-war development because the “established religious communities of southeastern and Eastern Europe, at this time, are not capable of nurturing sincere and open dialogue”.³ These sodalities fashion an identity discrete from the institutional faith communities, and challenge the maxims of nationalist elites who manipulate the religious bodies. The sodalities thus provide alternative platforms of peace and co-operation that demonstrate remarkable results. On the personal level, authentic spiritual communities provide a safe place where people can participate in *narrative exchange*.⁴ Narrative exchange practised within a created safe space counters the

³ Oršolić 1998: 263.

⁴ Unrecorded interview with Vjekoslav Šajc, December 2001.

destructive mythological narratives. *Dialogue*, a frequently-cited means of conflict resolution, is often organised through formal channels in higher political echelons and seeks to find means of co-operation while ultimately maintaining protective boundaries of identity. By contrast, narrative exchange transpires at the grassroots level and engages affected persons in the simple task of sharing their experience and perspective.⁵ Narrative exchange anticipates a variety of interpretations of events and reveals the great loss and pain experienced by people on all sides. People express rage and anger, hatred and fear. By listening to each other's personal narratives and participating in role reversal exercises, people find common narratives of suffering, dispossession and violation. Hatred and fear are gradually shifted and replaced by sympathy, understanding and growing trust. In the authentic spiritual communities people begin to understand themselves in relation to God, their world, and to others, especially those once perceived to be hostile. Significantly, authentic religious communities are sanctuaries of help, hope and healing. They are the altars where hatreds and fears are given away, and forgiveness is received. Not uncommonly, genuine peace and reconciliation are manifested in this sacred space.

2.3. The Nature and Role of the Leader (*Pravednik*)

The leader of the *zajednica* or *zbor* is a local religious leader who has articulated new vision and created opportunity for social restoration and healing. They are public figures who speak against social injustice. They often establish non-profit groups that provide a platform for their message, and to which people of similar convictions can gather. Commonly the leader has faced significant opposition, yet continues to reach across national barriers to the disenfranchised other. This person is a *pravednik*,⁶ or 'righteous person' who acts from a moral basis to assist others, bringing him or her into direct conflict with the power elites in high places. The *pravednik* is a dissident and a prophetic voice on behalf of the dispossessed and powerless. Their actions are not politically calculated, but righteously administered.

⁵ Steele 1998: 246-253.

⁶ The root of the word is '*prav*', meaning 'straight'. In the legal sphere it has the meaning of '*innocent*' and is the basis for the words, '*pravda*', meaning 'justice, right' and '*pravi*' meaning 'real, actual, genuine' and 'appropriate, right'. Marković remarks that the *pravednik* is one who "is persecuted in their own group" for the righteous acts they do. (Marković [RC.RL.SA.01]: 11, 12).

Today's heroes in the former Yugoslav republics remain ultra-nationalists such as Tudjman, Karadžić, Mladić, and Arkan.⁷ In this environment the *pravednik* is an anti-hero who stands against corrupt regimes. Several of them find inspiration in Christian figures, such as Franciscan friar Mato Topić. When UN forces evacuated the Central Bosnian town of Vareš owing to fierce fighting, Topić remained to distribute food supplies to Muslims and Croats alike, modelling himself on Christ and St Francis.⁸

Disheartened by the destruction of her town and the personal loss of her flat, Kristina Kovać returned to her hometown to coordinate relief supplies in Šipovo, assuring that food and medicines reached all, without regard for national distinction. As a devout Orthodox believer, Kovać knows that this is the proper response expected of believers who are obedient to a righteous God.⁹ These – and other individuals interviewed for this research – act in brave and selfless ways out of religious conviction and with personal faith to the benefit of those who cannot help themselves. The *pravednik* acts and speaks prophetically, brings conviction into the zone of ideological and military conflict, and challenges others to act justly. The presence of the *pravednik* and *zajednica* does not end the conflict, but changes its focus. Ideological rhetoric loses its potency in the *zajednica*. Together the *zajednica* and the *pravednik* engage and redress injustice and build peace in order to restore community. They fight against ideology not with guns, but with arguments and other non-violent resources.¹⁰

⁷ Franjo Tudjman was the founder and first president of the Croatian nationalist political party HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) and became the first president of independent Croatia. Radovan Karadžić was the Bosnian Serb political hardliner of the ultra-nationalist SDS party from 1990. He was indicted by the International Tribunal in 1995 for war crimes but remains at large. Ratko Mladić was the general and commander of the Bosnian Serb Army beginning in 1992. The International Criminal Court at the Hague also indicted him for war crimes. He remains at large. Željko Ražnatović, better known as 'Arkan', was the charismatic Serbian leader of the ruthless paramilitary 'Tigers' responsible for ethnic cleansing of Bošnjaks in eastern Bosnia and was indicted for war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia. In 1995 he married Turbo-Folk pop singer Ceca, and in January 2000 he was murdered in Belgrade.

⁸ Topić [RC.RL.RA.04]: 7, 8.

⁹ Kovać [SO.WO.ŠI.03]: 4, 5.

¹⁰ Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 4.

3. Analysis of the Religious Faith Sodalities

3.1. Examples of Peace-Building Through Religious Faith Sodalities

Within the religious faith sodalities people are discovering anew the old narratives of the sacred texts, are finding self-worth, and are recovering a sense of sacredness of life for all humanity. This is a marked shift in identity away from the communist and nationalist ideologies. In the sacred spaces created by the religious sodalities Muslims, for example, are learning that the Qur'ān teaches forgiveness¹¹ and promotes respect and protection of Christians and Jews (60:8). Persons of religious faith can teach others for the purpose of rebuilding a common civil society. Šiljak speaks of this from her own experiences in her lectures:

I think we need different educating for children in schools. Some kind of history of religion or ethics or I'm not sure what we should call it. But it is a good way to give them a chance to learn. When we travelled around Bosnia, some old people from workshops and lectures told me that [they never knew that] God says in the Qur'ān, that we have to respect each person and etc. You can't hate somebody because they aren't Muslim. This isn't a good reason. He is a creature of God, he is a human being and he deserves respect. And you have to do this. Especially when I told people that you have to respect Christians and Jews, people looked at me like I had told them some sort of nonsense.... And I told them that God says this in the Qur'ān or that you have to do this, that you have to respect especially Christians and Jews, people don't know that. We have to do a lot on education.¹²

Another example of peace-building comes from the largely segregated entity of the Republika Srpska. Before the war the 450-year-old Ferhadija mosque stood in the city centre of the northern city of Banja Luka. It was both the primary worship centre for the Muslim community and a cultural monument of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The structure was destroyed during the war as part of the campaign of ethnic cleansing that left this city - now the capital of the Republika Srpska - largely void of Bošnjaks. As the cornerstone of the mosque was re-laid, symbolising the reintegration of the city, ethnic tensions spilled over into street violence leaving one Bošnjak man dead and more than thirty injured. Returning Bošnjaks to the Republika Srpska often encounter strong opposition and sometimes violence when they attempt to resettle, but in the *zajednica* in Banja Luka, there are signs that attitudes can change. There a young Serbian Orthodox priest, Vladislav Radujković, founded the *St Sava Youth Fellowship (Svetosavska Omladinska Zajednica)* which seeks to rediscover the roots of Serbian Orthodox tradition and faith that, he argues,

¹¹ "But he who bears with patience and forgives, surely complies with divine resolve" (42:43).

¹² Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 17, 18.

fundamentally oppose chauvinistic (racist) nationalism. The fellowship affirms a positive Serbian identity in its historical, doctrinal and cultural teachings without denigrating other ethno-religious communities. Members of the *zajednica* support the rebuilding of the Ferhadija mosque because, more important than its value as a cultural monument, it symbolises that Bošnjaks have the right to return to Banja Luka.

Another example comes from the capital city. Despite being held captive by Serb militia and losing nine family members in the war, Franciscan Friar Ivo Marković is consciously and proactively a peace-builder. Croat nationalists despise his efforts and have threatened his life for what they perceive to be a betrayal of nation and religion. In Sarajevo he founded a multi-confessional choir that performs religious music from the three religious traditions. The choir, *Pantonima*, is joined by an orchestra from Banja Luka when they perform internationally as a sign of multi-ethnic, multi-religious solidarity. *Pantonima* invites persons of all religious backgrounds to be enriched through the encounter with others and seeks to create a vision of the future in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Yet another example of peace-building comes from the divided city of Mostar in Herzegovina, which is the much coveted city of the secessionist-minded Croatian stronghold of Herzeg-Bosna. For more than 400 years the river coursing through the city was spanned by the Stari Most, or Old Bridge, a structural wonder commissioned by Sultan Sulejman the Magnificent at the height of Ottoman power in the sixteenth century. The Stari Most also symbolised the harmonious bridging of the cultures of East and West. In 1993 Croat military forces shelled the bridge, not on grounds of its having strategic military significance, but because it symbolised ethno-religious heterogeneity that nationalist ideologues opposed. In a largely symbolic gesture more than ten years after the bridge fell casualty to nationalist aggression, it was rebuilt and opened to firework displays and great fanfare. However, the city remains just as divided as it was during the war. One official source in Mostar sees the bridge rebuilding project as a “highly symbolic and internationally driven reconstruction... designed to create the illusion of the inter-party, cross-national cooperation, rather than as a manifestation of the real thing...”¹³ He goes on to say that “apart from the symbolism of the bridge

¹³ ICG 2003: 5.

reconstruction project, there have been next to no examples of successful multi-ethnic cooperation in the city".¹⁴ On the Catholic West side the rebuilt Franciscan Church has earned the ignominious name of the 'rocket' church for its incongruously high bell tower, which, although situated in the valley, competes with the height of the minarets on the sloped East side. And today, in a symbolic gesture clearly meant to assert territorial and religious domination, a forty metre high Latin cross has replaced the military bunkers atop one mountain where artillery once indiscriminately rained mortars onto the city.

However, in this fractured city where tensions remain high and religion and politics fuse to perpetuate division, Croat, Bošnjak and Serb women defy the norm. In a local West side Protestant church they gather together weekly to knit, do needlepoint, participate in a bible study, share their losses from the war and learn to love and care for one another through the new-found presence of Christ in their lives. A Serb grandmother who lost her own son in the war started the group. Her loss awakened her to the physical and spiritual needs of those on all sides of the conflict, and prompted her to do what she could for women suffering similar losses. The church fellowship regularly sees Croats, Bošnjaks and Serbs worshipping side by side. In this *zbor* a unifying identity in Christ allows for the genuine expression of forgiveness, love for one another, and reconciliation.

These narratives are left untold in the local media that are more interested in recapitulating nationalist formulae and maintaining boundaries. But for those interested in overcoming their personal traumas and moving forward with their lives, the religious faith sodalities provide a sacred space for understanding and healing. Here new communities are at work creating hope, and shaping the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina using non-violent resources available to them.

3.2. The Resources Available to Religious Faith Sodalities

Christianity and Islam provide demonstratively useful resources for peace-building. In some instances these resources directly challenge the nationalist ideologies and exclusivist myths. In others they transcend the myths and relegate or negate their importance. The following section explores five of these resources found in the religious faith sodalities that were founded by Christian leaders of various confessions.

¹⁴ ICG 2003: 5.

3.2.1. Proclamation

A significant resource towards peace-building and social restoration is the proclamation of the Word. Through proclamation the *kerygma* is delivered to the community of faith and into the world. Proclamation shapes community identity in its relationship to God through Christ and in relationship to others.

Monsignor Mato Zovkić believes that the most effective means of combating nationalism and effecting reconciliation within the Catholic Church is through weekly interaction with laity by means of the proclaimed Word.¹⁵ The Church is the voice of hope and help when it is true to its vocation and proclaims the message of God. But what of those of priestly office who misuse the pulpit and this position for destructive purposes? The priest faces a conflict of allegiance, to his people and to his God. Often the prophetic voice is lost because the priest has lost his courage to speak.¹⁶ Sacrificing the prophetic voice means losing moral direction in a land in desperate need of guidance. Too often the voice of proclamation is used as ammunition for an ideological war, not in combating it. Consequently, many lay persons, sensing a need for greater integrity in the moral realm, express disappointment, lose respect and ultimately distrust of the clergy.¹⁷

This suggests a greater need for *intra*-religious dialogue as a course corrective within one's own religious expression. Intra-religious dialogue ideally consists of integrated theological and pastoral elements. The Word proclaimed has a twofold effect. It educates, reminding the community of faith that God is the initiator of reconciliation, which is then entrusted to the community of faith as its ministry (2 Cor. 5:18, 19). Second, it exercises a prophetic role by speaking against false teaching and ideologies that contravene the intended purposes of the Church (1 John 4:1ff.). Although proclamation can be misused, it can be safeguarded by an internal change of heart, a renewal that effectively precludes abuse of the proclaimed Word. That internal renewal is properly identified as *metánoia*.

3.2.2. *Metánoia*

A second significant resource towards peace-building is a change of heart, or *metánoia*. A *Pastoral Letter of the Bishops of Bosnia and Herzegovina* identifies the

¹⁵ Zovkić [RC.RL.SA.05]: 15, 16.

¹⁶ Marković [RC.RL.SA.01]: 8, 12.

¹⁷ Leban [RC.WO.SA.01]: 8.

human heart as the greatest obstacle to peace: “a radical renewal of heart is indeed necessary to everybody, and in religious terms it means conversion”.¹⁸ The bishops urge the entire Catholic community “to engage in a thorough spiritual renewal”.¹⁹ Similarly, Marković actively seeks to destroy ideology and to “convert individuals to God” because ideology is a poor and reduced spirituality.²⁰ For many, especially but not exclusively in the Protestant circles, the transition from hatred to helping necessitates an internal transformation.²¹ Škrinjarić relates his experience this way:

[P]eople from outside think that they can regulate everything through laws, you know, that justice can come through the system. Because people cannot - if they don't experience changes within them, in their heart - they can't see a nation-wide change. They can pass laws and the people can obey laws but it's just enforced.... [T]he only true changes, if you can have peace with your enemy... is when they have true peace with God, when they comprehend their neighbour, or their enemy, or a person from another ethnic group as their brother and God's creation. And I think our church in Bosnia-Herzegovina is an example, a model of this.²²

Internal transformation can be the catalyst to the transformation of society.²³ *Metánoia* permits a reinterpretation of the nature of the conflict because the person has experienced a change of mind leading to a change of heart and action. The person recognises their wrong thinking and wrong action and manifestly determines to “enter upon a better course of life”.²⁴ Zelinsky says that “*metánoia* is a key and a secret of reconciliation with one's own self, with one's own intimate God-like nature. It is a way of liberating one's own true personality.”²⁵ The battle for peace is fought first internally for the mind and heart and is a spirituality.²⁶ *Metánoia* is a spiritual struggle²⁷ that does not leave its combatant wounded, but instead takes the wounded through a process of healing.²⁸

¹⁸ Vrbosna 1998: 101.

¹⁹ Vrbosna 1998: 101.

²⁰ Marković [RC.RL.SA.01]: 7, and unrecorded interview, December 2001.

²¹ Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 7; Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 21; Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 3, 6; Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 3; Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 8; Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 7.

²² Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 2, 3.

²³ Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 20; Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 3.

²⁴ *Meta, noia*, in Thayer, 2001: np.

²⁵ Zelinsky 2002: 124. See also Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 4.

²⁶ Cf. Schreiter (1998) who views reconciliation as a spirituality.

²⁷ Zelinsky 2003: 123.

²⁸ Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 3.

3.2.3. Prayer

A third significant resource found in the religious faith sodality is prayer. The ability to bring resolution to a conflict is not always within human means. Prayer is the quiet acknowledgment that real strength lies in admitting one's own weakness and deferring to a higher power. The place of real change in a person and a community is the realisation that the problems are so intractable and the solutions so distant that supernatural resources are required for resolution. It is a confession of inability and a humble appeal for divine intervention.²⁹ At the same time, prayer is an invocation, for it invites God's involvement in the situation, for his righteous power and authority to bear upon evil. Prayer becomes a gift of self back to God, for at its core it desires the will of an other. Nikolinović is very active in the prayer life of her fellowship, and expresses thoughts about reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina thus:

This is really in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That's what is really on my heart. And that's what we are trying to do and maybe we are not very good at it now. But we are really looking to improve our prayer network and this is something also what we are aiming to do. And you know that we really try to motivate people to pray, and it's always reconciliation, it's always forgiveness, these topics that are to be prayed for. Because we still don't see some big improvement. But until we see it we are going to pray. Really. We are not going to give up.³⁰

Prayer is also a significant resource within the Muslim context, as Grabus indicates:

That means only people who pray every day to God - I'm not talking about people who are traditional pray-ers, but people who understand their own prayers, and why they pray to God - they can understand what justice means because we're asking for justice from God. We're asking for forgiveness.³¹

The imperative to hear the voice of God beyond the pantheon of human voices is the first step in cultivating a reconciled society and the creation of an enduring peace. Dubatović indicates that the shared vision of reconciliation prompts persons from the various religious communities to meet for corporate prayer, which is hosted in the various houses of prayer.³² He believes that this is an example to others of how religious faith can set the example of coming together peacefully and without compromise of one's own beliefs.³³

²⁹ Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 2; Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 6.

³⁰ Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 5.

³¹ Grabus [MU.RL.SA]: 25.

³² Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 5. Many worship centres of various faiths expressions in Bosnia-Herzegovina carry the inscription '*Dom molitvi*' ('House of Prayer').

³³ Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 5.

3.2.4. *Diakonía*

A fourth significant resource found in the religious faith sodality is *diakonía*, or service. *Diakonía* has its reference point in the identity of the Christian believer as *doulos*, ‘servant’ or even ‘slave’. Having received the blessing and grace of God in Christ, the Christian believer does not now find himself enslaved or disenfranchised, as the term ‘slave’ might suggest. Rather, the disciple of Christ is released from the bondage and tyranny of self to the service of others. Forgiveness received from God liberates the believer to extend forgiveness to others, even to one’s accusers and enemies. Bernard Mikulić was the national director of *Agape*, the humanitarian aid arm of the Evangelical Church, at a time when aid distribution was critical for the survival for thousands of displaced persons. He found *diakonía* and forgiveness to be related:

And even during the time when I was participating in *Agape* to try and help people through that humanitarian aid, I tried to come closer to them. I tried to demonstrate that for me it is the same that if you were a Croat or Muslim, it doesn’t matter who you are, for me you’re the same to me. And even trying to explain how they become the same through forgiveness and through Christ. Many of them couldn’t understand forgiveness, even my cousins, because I lost through this war three uncles and one aunt, and my cousins cannot understand how I can no longer hate the Serbs who killed them. And I was trying to be a testimony to them because I could not forgive them without Jesus, and I tried to show them that they could not forgive either without Jesus.³⁴

For some within the religious sodality *diakonía* necessarily follows from an identity transformation oriented from self and one’s own community to an identity defined in relationship to God and others. The expression of one’s identity is most Christ-like when *diakonía* embraces not only those who are like oneself, but serves even those who are perceived as enemies. Because *diakonía* is a selfless expression, it is worth asking some difficult questions about the motives behind the humanitarian aid that has come to Bosnia-Herzegovina over the past years. Although aid was distributed by all of the religious groups, it was not always distributed beyond the sponsoring ethno-religious community, and often overlooked those of greater destitution from a different nationality. In other cases aid was extended to win lapsed adherents back to their religious community. In these cases bread was used as leverage, and this kind of manipulation cannot be legitimately understood as *diakonía*. It is antithetical to *diakonía*. Dubatović expresses his approach thus:

³⁴ Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 3.

I am 100% convinced that the way we read the Bible that we cannot bring good news without bringing a physical good news.... You cannot say to somebody, 'God bless you' when he is hungry. We need first to give him food. With the response that we are getting from people, I think that we have an even stronger conviction that this is the right thing to do, that this is what Christ was like. We even found that there is a good theological basis in simply observing what Jesus and Paul and others did in the Bible.... A very simple example would be, whom do you help when you give physical help? Who do you select? Let's say the government administration gives you a block of the city and says that you can help this area. You have some Catholics there, you have some Orthodox there, you have some Muslims there, and what happened with some of the traditional groups and their aid was that they would help their people. But we said no to that. We don't want to help only Protestants, we don't want to help only Christians in the broader sense. We want to help everybody, and we don't want to know who they are. We just want to give them aid.... And we teach our people that this is what they have to do, or this is how we understand that this is what Jesus was like. The example, when he feeds a multitude of people, five thousand people, whom does he feed? The disciples, or only those who were in favour of the disciples, or the whole crowd? These are interesting questions that we can put on the table. Sounds very simple; the question is simple.³⁵

Christians express peace through *diakonia*, which offers bread to heal people regardless of national issues. It sees only humanity's need, not nationality or creed.

3.2.5. *Seelsorge*

A fifth significant resource for peace-building is *Seelsorge*, or spiritual counsel and welfare of a person or community. The German term inherently includes the integration of mind, body and soul. While it recognises the need for psychological catharsis,³⁶ it also recognises a need to address the spiritual illness/well-being of the soul. The competent spiritual counsellor, guided by the holy books, assists persons through encouragement in their grief and bereavement, provides a framework for evil and hatred, answers questions about the future and destiny of departed loved ones, and brings hope to an otherwise despairing situation.

Competent spiritual counsel has proved helpful as Bosnia-Herzegovina has progressed through a series of emotional stages. From the *trauma* of the war itself, Bosnia-Herzegovina moved to a period of hopeful *elation* at the end of the war. High expectations for a speedy recovery and normalisation turned to *cynicism* and *distrust* as receipt of aid and return of refugees proved to be far more protracted than anticipated. *Despondency* in the land resulted from donor-fatigue and the eventual conclusion of NGO mandates when other international crises external to Bosnia-

³⁵ Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 6, 7.

³⁶ Premeć 2002: 247-251.

Herzegovina required funding redirection.³⁷ Suicide rates, especially among young males, remained high in the post-war period owing to a sense of ‘pointlessness’ (*besmisao*).³⁸ *Resignation* echoes in the often heard expression that things will not soon change, and especially not in the political sphere where partisanship shows little sign of waning. A sense of individual *helplessness* and *powerlessness* to change circumstances internally provokes many to seek a better life beyond Bosnia-Herzegovina,³⁹ and young people talented enough to leave are creating a vacuum of those most capable of effecting positive change.

In this despairing context, it is important to hear the few voices that can give spiritual counsel and guidance for hope. By dramatic contrast, these persons have experienced a different kind of psychological progression. They have found personal clarification of self and of the war, have come to terms with ongoing injustice,⁴⁰ have found release from hatred and a sense of liberation in forgiveness,⁴¹ and have found peace (*shalom*) in their relationship to God and the religious faith community. Having experienced similar disenfranchisement and dispossession, yet finding hope and purpose in life, such persons create a community for others where help and acceptance is at hand. Thus, these five resources of proclamation, *metánoia*, prayer, *diakonia*, and *Seelsorge* complement the theological role in building sustainable peace and social restoration in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4. Overcoming the Legacy of the Mythical Past

The disparate historiographies and their correspondent ethno-religious mythologies are a present-day conundrum in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mythologies have the potential of working in positive or negative directions. The strength of a mythology is its ability to create a coherent national consciousness in uncertain and turbulent times. Evidence that mythologies can be inclusive and ideologically constructive is demonstrated in the very idea of Yugoslavia, especially as espoused by Bishop Josip Strossmayer (1815-1905).⁴² Although he did not see a unified South Slav state in his lifetime, his persistence during the seminal nation-building decades of the 19th

³⁷ Kovać 2000: np.

³⁸ Miković 2002: 252-261.

³⁹ Leban [RC.WO.SA.01]: 5-7.

⁴⁰ Rakić [PR.WO.SA.02]: 2, 3; Kundačina [PR.WO.MO.01]: 7-9.

⁴¹ Šeperić [RO.SM.SA.14]: 18.

⁴² See Chapter One for more information on both the ‘Illyrian’ and ‘Yugoslav’ conceptualisations.

century⁴³ eventually laid the foundation for what would be Yugoslavia in its distinct historical manifestations.

The danger of mythology is that it is often created at the expense of others, and not infrequently places its own people inadvertently at considerable peril. Mythologies thrive in emotionally charged situations where perceived threat to self and community are present. National myth making thus has an ideological function that is intended to motivate, defend and justify. The resurrection of stronger and exclusivist mythologies emphasising “Greater Serbia” or “Greater Croatia” are antithetical to the vision of a united Yugoslavia and preceded the state’s eventual demise. Exclusive mythologies attempt to promote a strong self-identity, but manage to do so only in opposition to the ‘other’. The invocation of past conflicts⁴⁴ and appeal to religious confession serve to highlight the apophatic nature of the identities, emphasising more what they are not than what they are.⁴⁵ Thus, past conflicts on Balkan territory are mythologised and serve as supertemporal and territorial markers of identity as *antipathy against* rather than *sympathy for* the other. An understanding of the close connection between mythicised history and self-identity is, then, of paramount importance for social restoration.

4.1. The Approach of Demythologisation

One approach to resolving this tension, usually attempted from the Western perspective, seeks to demythologise the histories through scientifically verifiable research methods. If a demythologised history can be achieved, it is assumed that the virulent nationalist exclusivities can also be excised and eradicated. Typically Western scholars seek to shift from myth to rationality, from *mythos* to *logos*. This structuralist approach identifies universal elements of myth while discounting specific meaning of the narrative in its context. In terms of the development of nationalism and identity formation, scholars acknowledge myths for their negative contribution to ethnic exclusivism, and then dismiss them as late constructs of national ideological development in favour of a more ‘factual’ reading of history. Noel Malcolm’s attempt to demythologise the Battle of Kosovo is illustrative of this approach:

⁴³ Velikonja 2001: 222.

⁴⁴ Notably, the Battle of Kosovo and Jasenovac for Serbian identity formation.

⁴⁵ Both Croatian and Serbian identities exhibit Christoslavic mythological inclinations (Sells 1996b: 28-31), but emphasise discontinuity through discrete church history and theology rather than continuity in Christ.

The story of the Battle of Kosovo has become a totem or talisman of Serbian identity, so that this event has a status unlike that of anything else in the history of the Serbs. To call this ideologically charged story 'the myth of Kosovo' is not to suggest that everything in it is false, but rather to indicate the talismanic way in which it operates. Yet some aspects of the myth of Kosovo probably are false, and it is the proper job of historians both to try to set down a more accurate account, and to explain how and why the myth arose.⁴⁶

The attempt to demythologise the epic poems and national narratives rightly highlights the accretions that have become part of the historiographies. This approach is legitimate and useful insofar as it is a means of (re)defining, and clarifying historical issues, and is valid from a position of scientific discovery intending to contribute towards conflict resolution. The historian has a responsibility to do his/her task scientifically, using all of the available tools of critical historiography. Kuzmić responds favourably to this when he advises that we must watch how history is written, taught and instrumentalised.⁴⁷

But insofar as the attempt to demythologise also seeks to attribute blame, and functions as a control mechanism with its own agenda, values and assumptions, it becomes a tool used in partisan fashion which may be a detour on the road to social restoration. Western scholars too quickly dismiss the myths and replace them with other historical constructs based on materialistic rationalism, believing that they may draw a clear and compelling demarcation between *Historie* and *Geschichte*.

However, demythologising often proves incapable of clarifying events and bringing resolution. Today no agreement either on matters of fact or interpretation can be found on substantive issues of the Second World War,⁴⁸ which so dramatically heightened fears for the conflicts in the 1990s. Zovkić laments this difficult historiographic pattern:

It will take years before we agree on how we evaluate the recent war - a war of aggression or civil war? How do we evaluate 400 years of Turkish presence here? An aggression or a golden period?... I remember I once attended a conference in Thessaloniki where experts for history were talking about how we present the others in our history books. And a Turk was present who was teaching in Germany and has a good salary, a Western salary, and he taught on the Ottoman period. He said that the Ottoman Empire was an ideal empire; it did not invest in cherishing the ethnic identity, faith, and so on but otherwise it was just and fair. The problem was when the Greeks and Serbs got poisoned from Western Christians: "Get

⁴⁶ Malcolm 1998: 58-9.

⁴⁷ Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: 10.

⁴⁸ See, for instance, the unresolved dispute on the number of Serbs killed by the Ustaše regime, as reviewed in Chapter One.

independent.” So they fought and they got independence. And then the Romanian historians said, “No! The Ottoman Empire was corrupt!” And this was the end of the discussion. They cannot produce good books where the neighbouring people would be decently presented in their own books.... Here it is very sensitive.⁴⁹

Furthermore, demythologising leaves important questions open if peace-building and restoration are the intended goals. Additional methods and means are necessary, and for this reason it is important to hear the voices of those inside Bosnia-Herzegovina who sometimes speak disparagingly about the irreconcilability of the histories, yet hold out hope for peaceful co-existence.⁵⁰ The central question is this: Is it necessary to reconcile the histories in order to reconcile the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina? The following considerations will further clarify the issue.

4.2. Re-Reading Myth as Meta-Narrative

First, the methodology of demythologisation must be questioned if the desired result is the restoration of civil society. Demythologisation as an accepted methodology is a modernist by-product from a Western tradition anchored in the rationalism of the Enlightenment. However, large segments of the Balkans never experienced the thoroughgoing rationalism of the Enlightenment, or, having encountered it, now reject it. This region of the world also views time differently from the West. One author well acquainted with the particular circumstances of recovery in post-communist lands writes, “The first lesson I had to learn was that many countries are not dealing with the past, because the past is still with them.”⁵¹ In this region, history is not necessarily consigned to the past. Another Westerner notes:

In the Balkans, history is not viewed as tracing a chronological progression, as it is in the West. Instead, history jumps around and moves in circles; and where history is perceived in such a way, myths take root.⁵²

In his review of how modernity has developed in the Balkans, Allcock states that, “the past actively interacts with the present”.⁵³ This contrasts with a linear reckoning of time and events commonly found in Western societies. A synchronic expression

⁴⁹ Zovkić [RC.RL.SA.05]: 13.

⁵⁰ Leban, personal discussion, September 2002; Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 4.

⁵¹ Rosenberg 1995: xx.

⁵² Kaplan 1993: 58. See also the extended discussion by Stoianovich on the space-time orientation of the Balkan peoples and their historical links to religion. He identifies the Balkan peoples as space-dominated (*Raumvolk* or *narod prostora*) in contrast to time-dominated (*Zeitvolk*, or *narod vremena*). Also, following Lévi-Strauss, he categorises societies as ‘cold’ or ‘hot’. The former ignore or “annul history as an agent of change” whereas the latter, to which he ascribes the Balkan peoples, “internalize historical experience in order to mobilize and bring it to their aid whenever the need may arise” (1994: 247-260).

⁵³ Allcock 2000: 18.

of time, in which historical and current events are lived parallel to each other, gives rise to myth-making, which, in turn, assists in the building of national identity. It is through the use of myth - an essentially extra-chronological phenomenon with a supra-chronological function - that historical events can be viewed synchronically. This helps explain why each participant group views territory in the Balkans as entitlement, claiming the largest borders they ever possessed. Allcock notes the following:

...[I]t is necessary to consider the interweaving of time and space A central idea which I argue here is that the symbolic freight of space (that which is actually signified by references to space in their relation to national identity) is intimately interwoven with a people's consciousness of history. Spaces are significant spaces, and the significances with which they are endowed are to be understood in terms of the historical narratives which link people to territory or places.⁵⁴

Time, current historical circumstance, or political boundaries have little bearing on territorial border claims. For this reason the partitioning of a land can only be viewed as a temporary measure toward the establishment of peace. These newly-adjusted borders are as temporary as they are artificial.

A synchronic worldview of time enormously complicates issues of social restoration. It is not simply the case that the most recent conflict can be sorted out and resolved in the present. The entire histories of the nations – with their correspondent mythologies, vendettas and territorial claims – are in conflict. Latent in the mistrust of recent events are the sins of the distant past, which, through myth-making, are recapitulated, contemporised and made relevant for the present.

History and memory, of which more will be said towards the end of the chapter, are ever-present and not at all distant. The blurring of past, present and future events in a timeless, mystical realm is especially felt in the Liturgy of the Orthodox Church. Here time and space become an amalgamated singularity. The departed saints of centuries past, represented visually by the *iconostasis*, are invoked in the worship service and believed to be invisibly present in the Liturgy.⁵⁵ Worshipers in this time period anticipate the *apocatastasis*, or final restoration on the Last Day.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Allcock 2000: 338.

⁵⁵ See Ware (1997: 269-273) for a more complete description of the Orthodox worship service.

⁵⁶ Ware translates *apocatastasis* as the “final redemption” in one place (1997: 274), and as “restoration” in another (:261). For reasons explicated in Chapter Seven, *apocatastasis* is better translated as ‘restoration’.

Spatial dimensions are also redefined - or remain undefined - as heaven and earth meet in this mystical celebration. It is a worldview and practice foreign to most Westerners.

Further, the modernist experiment that this part of the world underwent was more closely associated with its own expression of communist ideology (Titoism) than Western positivism. As the West steered a course of disenchantment and developed the tools for demythologisation and deconstructionism, Yugoslavia took a course towards re-enchantment by meticulously constructing national myths, the full effects of which would remain latent until the collapse of socialism. For this reason Western modernist attempts to demythologise and post-modernist deconstructionist efforts are not self-evidently useful tools to counter the nationalist mythmakers. The opposite is more the case.

Moreover, Western scholars often view myth and myth-making as a vestige of the pre-modern and pre-scientific age; a relic to be demythologised before becoming relevant. Discredited as unscientific, mythology is passed off as antiquated. However, it is a segment of the Serbian intelligentsia and scientific community that created and espoused the grand narrative of Greater Serbia through the 1986 *Memorandum* authored by members of the *Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts*.⁵⁷ Scientists and intellectuals loyal to the Serbian national identity will rebut western objections that this kind of mythologising is unscientific. The recorded history and literature of a nation is not simply a corpus of documents awaiting examination as some cadaver prepared for autopsy and forensic discovery. Rather, the body is very much alive and embodies meaning for persons of that nation today. Because the act of demythologising is iconoclastic by nature, it is received as invasive and destructive. People may view demythologising of their national narratives not as a means of ascertaining the kernel of historical events as they happened, but as an assault on their nation, and the tools of scholarship as an arsenal of weapons aimed at 'cultural genocide'.⁵⁸ For those living under the identity of their mythology, Western intentions are foreign and another effort to impose control. It is therefore

⁵⁷ Serbian nationalists within the *Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts* authored the infamous *Memorandum* in 1986. The *Memorandum* claims exploitation of the Serbian Republic and of Serbs by other Yugoslav republics during the communist era, and advocates direct action - including the expulsion of non-Serb and minority peoples - to amend the injustice.

⁵⁸ The expression 'cultural genocide' is taken from the *Memorandum*.

doubtful that this effort will render the situation clearer and move society towards restoration, as it affirms the very suspicions of the mythology in the first place.

Additionally, those wishing to do away with or reconstruct the myths operate on the underlying assumption that they are themselves free of ideological baggage.

However, the high view of a material and secularised world held by Western social scientists as singularly the most helpful interpretive schema for today is itself a myth.

As one Orthodox scholar points out,

[T]he view that secularisation signifies the eventual obliteration of religious beliefs and practices is rejected as an unfounded ideological presumption, an interpolation of a mythical understanding of history as the evolution of humanity from superstition to reason, belief to unbelief, religion to science.⁵⁹

Similarly, Küng makes a strong case *against* demythologisation through critical scrutiny and rationalistic analysis. This, he argues, would lead to spiritual impoverishment for the sake of intellectual clarity, and create in turn a spiritual vacuum susceptible to remythologisation. The result would be a sort of 'pious rationalism' at the expense of religious content.⁶⁰ *Reis-u-ulema* Cerić goes a step further to recognise the failure of Western modernism to provide a coherent and meaningful worldview. He asserts that the West today is moving away from rationalism in its search for meaning:

I'm not sure that Western civilisation is in control of itself... [A]re we now changing the road, going from freedom to slavery,... from right to might, from science to mythology?... [M]any scientists are now impressed by mythologies, because mythology gives them meaning. It doesn't make them excited any more about scientific discovery, as we used to be. Now they are more excited about these old images of civilisations and gods and pantheons and so on. I'm not saying that we don't also have ritual in science, but it is very indicative.⁶¹

Cerić is especially animated by the apocalyptic imagery drawn by Fukuyama⁶² as a false interpretation of history, or by the inevitability of a clash between Muslim and Western civilisations as portrayed by Huntington.⁶³ For Cerić there can only be a

⁵⁹ Clapsis 2000: 130.

⁶⁰ Küng 1993: 270-71. Küng's critique is specifically launched at 'demythification', *i.e.*, the effort to eliminate myth altogether, in contrast to the less thoroughgoing task of demythologising, which seeks to eliminate mythical elements within narratives through rationalist reinterpretation. Küng's contentions regarding demythification are equally valid for demythologisation.

⁶¹ Cerić [MU.RL.SA.01]: 11.

⁶² Fukuyama 1992.

⁶³ Huntington 1998.

clash of the *memory* of history.⁶⁴ Yet, these are today's fashionable myths of the West that in anxious and turbulent times serve to increase fear and fail to build bridges of understanding.

Finally, proponents of demythologisation fail to see national mythologies for the social, cultural and historical tapestries that they are, providing the basis for a communal memory in times of identity crisis and transformation. Romanian Vladimir Tismaneanu approaches myth not "as a necessarily mendacious vision of reality but as a narrative that is able to inspire collective loyalties, affinities, passions, and actions".⁶⁵ Slovenian Mitja Velikonja recognises the centrality of myth-making to the conflicts of the former Yugoslavia: "Myths remain very important and persuasive elements in the construction of reality in contemporary complex societies, self defined as 'disenchanted' or 'enlightened.'" ⁶⁶ He considers mythology a "dynamic internally cohesive, but continually changing system of individual myths that has some very practical functions and goals to achieve in society".⁶⁷ He suggests a division between traditional and ideological myths. *Traditional myths* "are those found in pre-modern forms of constructed social reality: folk traditions, old rituals, sacralised persons, objects and episodes, epics, ancient tales, sets of symbols, legends, beliefs, and so forth";⁶⁸ *ideological myths* "complement the original exegesis of traditional myths: they provide particular conclusions to their 'openness.' Unlike the former, ideological myths gaze into the future and solicit changes, innovation, and transfiguration – but on ancient foundations. The ideological myth complements and elucidates the deficiency of the traditional myth."⁶⁹ Velikonja insists that myth has cognitive, integrative and communicative functions even in contemporary societies.⁷⁰ While it may be difficult to find the precise dividing line between the ideological and the traditional elements of myth, Velikonja acknowledges the importance of reading a society with its mythologies intact.

⁶⁴ Cerić [MU.RL.SA.01]: 10ff.

⁶⁵ Tismaneanu 1998: 15, cited in Velikonja 2003: 9.

⁶⁶ Velikonja 2003: 6.

⁶⁷ Velikonja 2003: 7.

⁶⁸ Velikonja 2003: 7.

⁶⁹ Velikonja 2003: 7.

⁷⁰ Velikonja 2003: 7.

Thus, a nuanced approach unravels the concealed intentions⁷¹ of the mythologies and reveals the values and mores of a society's self-understanding. Self-disclosure within that perception is rather the starting point towards social restoration, not the 'brute' facts excised from the historical accretions. This approach recognises that the process of restoration is pre-eminently a human undertaking. If restoration is the goal, it is necessary to find a *via media* between the polarities of perpetuating exclusivist mythologies and the wholesale ambition to reduce them to fictional non-meaning through the imposition of modernist interpretations. National myths are better seen as *grand-* or *meta-narratives* that describe origins, provide identity, focus motives, defend actions and define community. They are both useful and meaningful towards understanding the context and working towards restoration.

4.3. Return to the Narratives, Grand and Personal

The research of this thesis suggests that a return to authentic religious expression can have positive effects for peace-building and social restoration. Just as a puzzle piece is part of a larger picture, so persons in religious faith sodalities are finding that their personal narrative 'fits' into the grand religious narrative of the Christian and Muslim communities. These grand narratives offer cogent and credible worldviews that enable persons to come to terms with their personal loss, find self-worth, and recover a sense of sacredness of life for all humanity. Their discovery begins a clear shift in identity and belonging away from both the communist ideology, which denigrated religion and marginalised its adherents, and nationalism, which instrumentalised religion and co-opted its adherents. The threshold of this experience is forgiveness.

5. Forgiveness: The Threshold to Social Restoration

Central to social restoration, or reconciliation, is the ability to overcome hatred and move to the place of forgiving the wrongdoer. The following looks more closely at the interaction between forgiveness and social restoration.

5.1. Various Perspectives on Forgiveness

Persons interviewed agree that forgiveness is a key concept to restoring relationships, but hold differing perspectives about forgiveness and social restoration. Šeperić points out that the experience of injustice is common to all, but how people deal with forgiveness distinguishes them, because forgiveness is both a free act and a freeing

⁷¹ Kearny 1988: 17.

act.⁷² The choice to forgive is an individual and conscious decision of the will⁷³ that allows the wronged to move in the path of love.⁷⁴ The corollary to this is that those who do not forgive are captive to their hatreds and need for revenge.⁷⁵ Coming to the place of being willing to forgive often requires time for changes within oneself.⁷⁶ No one can be compelled to forgive by external persons or factors. However, there is evidence of an internally-motivated compulsion that does not remove the self-will, but recognises the Spirit of God as the author of the phenomenon. The willingness to forgive finds expression because of reciprocity. That is to say, persons are able and willing to forgive because they know that God has forgiven them.⁷⁷ Dubatović and Nikolinović both indicate that forgiveness is difficult to arrive at from a naturalistic framework.⁷⁸ Radujković concurs with this sentiment and suggests that people of all religious communities know the reason why they should forgive, but he does not hold the same expectation for non-religious persons:

I'm afraid that one could conclude from what I said that there are four different communities here. Let it be so for now. So, there are Orthodox, Catholics, Muslims and non-believers in Bosnia. I think that the first three categories would come to some agreement, but we can face some problems with the fourth. Why? Because all those who strongly believe that God exists know the reason why they should forgive people. But if people don't believe that God exists then the reason why they should forgive people is foggy. That's why I come back to one of my solutions and that's religious education. Even those who claim that they are unbelievers and who will certainly stay that way must know what we believe and how we function. When I say we, then I think of us as believers of different religions.⁷⁹

Nikolinović encounters many who do not view God as forgiving. Consequently they find it hard to make the connection between a forgiving God and the will to forgive.⁸⁰ But for others there is a clear sense of reciprocity in forgiveness.⁸¹ that the

⁷² Šeperić [RO.SM.SA.14]: 19.

⁷³ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 10; Grabus [MU.RL.SA]: 14.

⁷⁴ Šeperić [RO.SM.SA.14]: 22, 23; Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 9.

⁷⁵ Kundačina [PR.WO.MO.01]: 9; Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 14, 19; Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 2.

⁷⁶ Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 11; Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 18, 21; Grabus [MU.RL.SA]: 14; Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 6, 7.

⁷⁷ Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 2; Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2; Kundačina [PR.WO.MO.01]: 9; Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 6.

⁷⁸ Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 14; Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 16.

⁷⁹ Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 7.

⁸⁰ Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 6.

⁸¹ The sense of reciprocity of forgiveness is in keeping with that expressed in the teaching of Jesus in several scriptural passages (Matthew 18:21-35; Mark 11:25), including those of the 'Lord's Prayer' (Matthew 6:12, cf. Luke 11:4).

willingness to forgive comes once they understand that God has forgiven them.⁸²

Kundačina relates this principle anecdotally with an incident from her women's group:

And as long you don't forgive, as long as you seek revenge you will eat yourself inside because you will have bitterness, and that must go." And then I told her, "You know, you cannot defeat hatred with hatred but hatred with love. And that's what I learned from the Word of God, to forgive and you shall be forgiven, don't judge and it won't be judged to you." And I would really say to her the verses that were speaking to my heart. I told her, "Can you speak blessing and curse from one mouth?" And I told her to bless, not to curse. And I couldn't see any change in her. She was confused. She left and she wasn't there for awhile. I would meet her on the market. And then I would ask her, "Where are you?" And then she would say to me, "Thank God that I met you. As you said to pray and to bless and not to curse, can you imagine I have easier sleep when I go to bed." And then I told her to continue to do that and I told her that she would see a change. Because nothing happens without the control of God. God knows everything because he sees everything. He doesn't have barriers because he has everything revealed. And today that lady is my best sister because she really was broken and I can say that she is today sharing the Word of God very powerfully.⁸³

Moreover, persons who know the transforming nature of forgiveness are convinced that what they have experienced and seen in forgiveness is transferable and can become normative. They sense a great need for teaching on forgiveness, which the faith communities should undertake to disseminate.⁸⁴

Christians and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina agree that ultimate judgment and forgiveness come from God,⁸⁵ but otherwise do not place the same emphasis on forgiveness. Oršolić acknowledges that reconciliation is impossible without forgiveness, and that this is a matter of faith:

Without forgiveness there cannot be real reconciliation.... In this process faith is irreplaceable. Only faith has these categories of forgiveness and reconciliation. Only faith can penetrate a man's heart because eventually God is the one who forgives. With his grace we can forgive. Every other kind of forgiveness will be tactics or fake compromises. I think it's a chance for religion so that it can teach people how to forgive straight from the heart of faith, by the argument of faith, because God forgives us and we have to forgive others.⁸⁶

⁸² Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 6; Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 15, 21; Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 1, 2, 4.

⁸³ Kundačina [PR.WO.MO.01]: 9.

⁸⁴ Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 14, 18, 21; Erceg [PR.RL.BL.02]: 7; Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 7; Grabus [MU.RL.SA]: 24; Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2; Radujković [SO.RL.BL.02]: 4; Liermann [RC.WO.OS.02]: 4; Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 3.

⁸⁵ Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 9; Grabus [MU.RL.SA]: 4; Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2.

⁸⁶ Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2.

Grabus emphasises that justice (*'adel*) is foundational for Muslims.⁸⁷ If justice cannot be achieved, then forgiveness is the necessary response, requiring the aggrieved person to live at a higher level of *taqwa*:

We have in our theological understanding that in the other world, God will ask us to finish our problems among ourselves and after that he will be our judge. That's very important. And definitely - there is a sentence in the Qur'ān - you have the right to ask for justice. And it is better for you and this is closer to the high level of the spirit to forgive. Close to the *taqwa*, behind the level of obedience in this world is *taqwa*. In every period of life God is present, and the meaning of God's importance in your life. And we talk about those problems in our understanding of our religion. The only way, if you cannot find justice, is to forgive.⁸⁸

Grabus indicates that pious Muslims pray for both justice and forgiveness.⁸⁹

Omerović seeks help in prayer to summon strength in order not to commit an act of vengeful retaliation.⁹⁰ She knows that the Qur'ān emphasises the need to forgive.⁹¹

Differing viewpoints about forgiveness suggest that the route to peace and social restoration will lead along similar paths, but with different expectations. Muslims expect that peace and social restoration will be achieved primarily through justice and restitution, and have the lingering sense that those in power in Bosnia-Herzegovina give too little emphasis to these ingredients. Forgiveness is a topic of discussion to be addressed once the issue of justice has been exercised.⁹² Grabus affirms that the concept of reconciliation is known in Islam, but he suggests, is not as central to the Muslim worldview as it is to the Christian. 'Reconciliation' is something they are learning from the Christians as a result of the war.⁹³

For Christians, forgiveness is the *sine qua non* and threshold of reconciliation. Western Christians (Roman Catholic and Protestant) in Bosnia-Herzegovina see reconciliation as the *process*⁹⁴ to which forgiveness is an essential ingredient. Justice and restitution are part of this process, which interested parties may pursue simultaneously to reconciliation.

⁸⁷ Grabus [MU.RL.SA]: 2.

⁸⁸ Grabus [MU.RL.SA]: 26.

⁸⁹ Grabus [MU.RL.SA]: 26.

⁹⁰ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 5.

⁹¹ Omerović [MU.SF.SA.15]: 5.

⁹² Grabus [MU.RL.SA]: 25.

⁹³ Grabus, unrecorded interview, February 2002.

⁹⁴ Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 4; Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: 6.

5.2. Healing Through Forgiveness

Several of the Christians relate forgiveness, love and healing together, building a new foundation for the treatment of others, including enemies.⁹⁵ Kuzmić articulates this point of view thus:

By 'de-demonising' the enemy, we are in a position of re-humanising him and returning to him the dignity that God the Creator has given him and recognising the *Imago Dei*.... You treat the enemy and talk with him, showing respect, and when it comes to Christian attitudes it is more than respect, it is an act of love, and later we have to come to forgiveness.⁹⁶

Delalić experienced the process of healing subsequent to her conversion. She knew that the things she had encountered during the war as a young prisoner left her with a judgmental and racist attitude. She became aware of a need for healing only after she experienced a change of her own attitude. She attributes the healing process directly to the act of God's love in her life that allowed her to forgive, which was the process of healing.⁹⁷

5.3. Forgiveness and the Healing of Memory

The healing process is inextricably linked to memory, and is a critical area of concern for the present. This may be seen in the failure of socialist Yugoslavia to come to terms with the atrocities of the Second World War, the legacy of which contributed to heightened fears for the outbreak of violence fifty years later. Ramet puts it this way:

These different memories, set atop unhealed wounds, provided the seedbed for deep bitterness, resentments, and recurrent desires for revenge.... Of all the memories, shared and disputed, the most dangerous was the memory of World War II.⁹⁸

Coming to terms with memory is an imperative for the restoration of civil society. One author who has dealt extensively with mass violence, Martha Minow, describes this phenomenon well:

Living after genocide, mass atrocity, totalitarian terror, however, makes remembering and forgetting not just about dealing with the past. The treatment of the past through remembering and forgetting crucially shapes the present and future for individuals and entire societies.... For individuals, and even for communities, traumatic violence becomes part of the current human psyche forged by past impression.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 2, 4; Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 5-7; Kundačina [PR.WO.MO.01]: 9; Šeperić [RO.SM.SA.14]: 19.

⁹⁶ Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: 5, 6.

⁹⁷ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 6-8.

⁹⁸ Ramet 2002: 53.

⁹⁹ Minow 1998: 119-20.

In very human ways, the success of the future means facing the failures of the past. Appleby addresses the issue of overcoming the past with what he refers to as a “remythologizing project”. This he defines as, “the replacement of narratives of righteous revenge with stories and practices that can bind together two historically divided peoples in a new pattern of active tolerance”.¹⁰⁰ A remythologising project grows out of revisionism by the “debunking of ideologically loaded ‘histories’”,¹⁰¹ and moves towards greater tolerance.

Minow suggests a different path, focusing not on the process of rewriting, but on remembering:

What’s needed, then, is not memory but remembering, not retrieval of some intact picture but instead a dynamic process of both tying together and distinguishing fragments of past and present. What’s needed, paradoxically, is a process for reinterpreting what cannot be made sensible, for assembling what cannot be put together, and for separating what cannot be severed from both present and future.¹⁰²

The process of ‘remythologising’, as advocated by Appleby, focuses on the aspect of *re-writing* history, or in this case, of memory, so that it is changed through a schema of reinterpretation. ‘Remembering’, as advocated by Minow, focuses on the aspect of *recall*, dynamically linking the past to the present. Both of these aspects are necessary, yet incomplete. Overcoming injustices from the past is possible through forgiveness and the subsequent healing of memory. This process may be termed ‘*rememorying*’, which incorporates both the rewriting and recalling aspects to reshape a holistic narrative. Rememorying is not a personal revision of past events built upon a new ideology and reinterpreted through a different hermeneutical schema. It is different in kind in that it does not seek to replace narratives, but to live by a qualitatively different meta-narrative. It transcends the national narratives and thereby creates a meaningful alternative to the conflict, which is apprehended through forgiveness. It is what happens when a person *experiences a transformation greater than the trauma*. When past incidents are recalled, they are remembered differently because a new narrative has been written that incorporates the subsequent experience of healing. Past events are now remembered with the absence of malice and pain, which is a sign of healing. Rememorying deals concretely with the past in the rewriting, recalling, and transmission process at once. Subsequent to a

¹⁰⁰ Appleby 2000: 171.

¹⁰¹ Appleby 2000: 171.

¹⁰² Minow 1998: 120

transformation in the individual's life, remembering is the rewriting and recalling of an experience that now *transcends* both the personal trauma and the destructive myths in which the personal hatreds once were embedded, and is a sign and evidence of healed memories. This is clearly articulated by Mikulić who contrasts the wounds of past wrongs as scars that remain to the offences that are forgiven:¹⁰³

[BM] ...And friends can sit together again and forgive each other and we can exchange forgiveness, but if we don't forget, [pause] you know. I don't know how it will work.

[SG] *Can you forget?*

[BM] That's a good question. How can I forget? It is not like losing your memory. But to forget the pain that caused the war and the pain [that] was caused to you, yes, I can forget that. And I lose the pain. And I remember that I don't have the pain.¹⁰⁴

Forgiveness is not just a reinterpretation; it is its own healing event, and the subsequent rewriting and recalling of that new narrative is best termed 'remembering'.

5.4. Healing Extended to the Greater Society

The question remains as to whether the healing phenomenon of forgiveness may be transferred from the sodalities to the wider society. Although no widespread conflict resolution or reconciliation is currently taking place in Bosnia-Herzegovina, several of the persons interviewed believe that their experiences, and those of the sodality, can be extended to society.¹⁰⁵ This is so not by the unlimited extension of the porous borders of the sodalities to include the whole of society, which in effect would render the sodality non-existent. This kind of inclusive extension is precluded both by the nature of the sodality, and by its members. The sodality exists with a conscious mission, and for those who share the vision of that mission. The sodality would quickly lose its purpose if it included all with no qualifying criteria, and consequently it would lose its effectiveness. The ability to envision and carry out its mission is what allows a sodality to operate prophetically in society. There is, then, an exclusive element to the sodality that is necessary to maintain its identity, mission, and effectiveness. However, the sodality practices a kind of self-exclusion; that is to say, persons who do not identify with the vision and mission of the sodality exclude

¹⁰³ Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 2.

¹⁰⁴ Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 4.

¹⁰⁵ Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 8; Dubatović [PR.RL.SA.01]: 6; Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2, 4; Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 10, 11; Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 3; Škrinjarić [PR.RL.ZA.06]: 5, 6; Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: 14; Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 7.

themselves and choose not to participate. As was pointed out earlier,¹⁰⁶ membership in the sodality is by choice. The practice of self-exclusion contrasts sharply with the practice of exclusion by the nationalist groups, which, through rigid criteria, proactively determine who is part of the group, or, more accurately, who is *not* part of the group. The sodality may proclaim a message of *Mitmenschlichkeit*, but those who do not share that vision exclude themselves.

Thus, the sodality cannot include the whole of society, as this would render it ineffective, and its voice to society would be lost. Rather, the active participation by members of the sodality in society is an effective agent of change. For this reason Šiljak travels throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina to lecture and conduct workshops on behalf of IMIC. In entrenched areas such as Livno or Bihać she interacts with persons to understand their concerns, address their needs and communicate a message of *Mitmenschlichkeit*.¹⁰⁷

Nikolinović believes that many persons would benefit if they believed and practiced their faith as she does, but also realises that many will not. Nevertheless, she believes she is a positive influence in society:

I really believe that we have to have some influence on the whole society. I see that as a person, as an individual, as a Christian, you can have a good impact on some people even though they don't give their life to Jesus. I saw, for example ... that some people in my presence do not curse. That's a good influence. They... are acting much better than they did when I was not a Christian. That is influence. So if I can influence someone, then the church can influence society. I really look forward to it.¹⁰⁸

Forgiveness and reconciliation are categories of faith¹⁰⁹ that can be extended to the society and create a healthy (*i.e.*, healed) environment.¹¹⁰ For this reason Kuzmić advocates a theological and social task of 'spiritual engagement'¹¹¹ that is constructive towards building peace:

The question is whether we have credible communities and whether we use credible methods in our ministry and whether we live credible lives, because I don't see how you can have moral influence if you're not credible communities. Credible communities of faith can exercise moral, or what you call 'compelling influence' on moral decisions of Bosnians. The strength of the faith is in its internal witness not the external imposition or

¹⁰⁶ See page 239.

¹⁰⁷ Šiljak [MU.WO.SA.01]: 8. See her remarks, noted earlier on page 156.

¹⁰⁸ Nikolinović [PR.WO.SA.02]: 17.

¹⁰⁹ Oršolić [RC.RL.SA.02]: 2.

¹¹⁰ Krešonja [PR.RL.MO.03]: 20.

¹¹¹ Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: 14.

threat or whatever mechanisms religious communities use, such as the sacraments. Influence is in some ways, especially a moral influence, commensurate to or credibility. And credibility is a question of authenticity, it is a question of compelling evidence of the loving, forgiving, reconciling, direction-providing of your faith and your faith community. There has to be internal evidence by transformed lives and therefore transformed communities of faith. And if you don't have that transformative power in individual lives and in individual communities, modelled by the clergy, of course, above all, because they are the most visible representatives of religious communities, if you don't have that, how can you speak about moral influence? ... It has to be qualitatively different, and that is the question of credibility to me.¹¹²

However, compelling influence on society will stem first from genuine renewal from within the faith communities before it can be extended to the wider society.

Tošković claims that this kind of life is qualitatively different from those living in fear and without an awareness of spiritual matters. Their lives are missing a sense of peace:

Peace is an incredibly great value. In inter-personal relations, it is seen as the stopping of shooting, killing and hating. But if a man could look at that spiritually, that man is not only a material being, he is also a spiritual being. If he would look at that from a perspective of eternity, then he would see how important peace is for himself.... A man who has some anxiety in himself and would like to make a quasi-paradise for himself and for a group of people that has the same thinking as he has - [including having] to sacrifice other people for that peace - such a man will not find peace either on earth, which is just passing away by all philosophies, and he will harm his soul very much. Our peace is not built on negating others. If it is necessary that others disappear so that I can be happy – can something like that be built in any kind of happiness?¹¹³

The reality for those living in the spiritual sodality is as Tošković claims, that “The man that has inner peace also has peace with other people.”¹¹⁴ The extension of what is known, experienced and shared in the religious faith sodality will have an effect on the greater society insofar as the community is credible, and its effort is extended beyond itself. These new communities are demonstrable evidence of substantive change, and the commitment of its people is making incremental differences in society. As they demonstrate and extend forgiveness, they also radiate the full expression of peace.

6. Conclusion

The religious sodality embodies authentic faith exercised in context. It creates a place of acceptance and develops both an internal and communal peace. It is a

¹¹² Kuzmić [PR.RL.OS.04]: 17.

¹¹³ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 11.

¹¹⁴ Tošković [SO.RL.SA.03]: 11.

created sanctuary characterised by *metánoia* and healing, and is a place of teaching and equipping in which the insecurities of the external world matter far less when fear is overcome. In this sanctuary persons of faith learn that the nationalist conflicts are real, but that the conflicts need not represent an insurmountable barrier to social restoration and peace. Threats to life diminish relative to the awareness of supernatural empowering. Persons of faith know that the physical body may be harmed or killed, but the spiritual essence will survive unharmed.¹¹⁵

The creation of sacred space is evident less in the external and more in the internal sphere of reality. Persons living with a sense of sacred space do not claim and cling to holy places and religio-national icons. Rather, they now view the whole of the created order, including fellow humanity, as sacred and thus potentially communal. Objects defining diversity are no longer divided into ‘ours’ versus ‘theirs’, but ‘ours shared’. For this reason, Marković can view all of the sacred religious music, whether from the Orthodox, Western (Roman Catholic and Protestant) or Muslim traditions, as ‘ours’ as peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹¹⁶ The lines of inclusion become enlarged and perforated, permitting social interaction and restoration.

In each of these representative cases religious persons employ authentic religious narratives to construct meaningful models of peace-building and restoration. Within the Muslim *umma* a model of justice (*‘adel*) guided by the Qur’ān is narrated. Within a Serbian Orthodox sodality a revivalist model is narrated, attempting to return to the roots of Serbian Orthodoxy and Serbian identity abstracted from ideological accretions. Within the Roman Catholic community Franciscans narrate a model of pluralism that recognises the legitimacy of all confessions, finding solidarity in the sacredness of humanity and a shared human predicament. The Protestant communities narrate a model of redemption which finds the locus for forgiveness and unity in a new found identity in Christ.

Three significant shifts occur in each of these illustrative cases. The first is from an ‘imagined community’ to an ‘authentic community’. The imagined community, iconically portrayed by nationalists, promised security but brought armed conflict. The authentic community, a religious faith sodality, provides a sacred space that, despite the conflict, brings inner peace and meaning.

¹¹⁵ Delalić [PR.SF.MO.10]: 7; Mikulić [PR.RL.ČA.05]: 6; Jovanović [SO.RL.SA.01]: 11.

¹¹⁶ Marković, unrecorded interview, December 2001.

The second significant shift is from *mythos* to *logos*, not in the classic exchange of ‘story’ for ‘rationalism’, but in the exchange of myth as ‘ideology in narrative form’¹¹⁷ for a personal narrative. This in turn finds meaningful expression in the authentic religious meta-narratives guided by the corresponding religious texts. In the religious faith sodalities a sacred space is created for the dissemination of the *logos*, for the development of unity among diversity, for the exchange of forgiveness, and for the offer of social restoration.

The third significant shift is in the nature of the conflict itself. While the religious faith sodalities bring peace in one arena, they create a tension between the leaders of the sodality and the leaders of the religious establishment. Regularly the sodality leaders are ostracised by their own institutional leadership and face derision and defamation. The dynamic in play is one in which the authentic religious voice of the sodality leader effectively counters the rhetoric of nationalist religious ideologues. Although currently small and weak, the prophetic message is recovering its voice, speaking into the ideological marketplace with authority and authenticity backed by the demonstrable evidence of the new communities. They in turn appropriate the grand narratives of Christianity and Islam, and provide people with a framework for understanding themselves in relation to God and to others, especially those who are perceived to be hostile. The authentic religious meta-narratives present credible worldviews that equip persons in the theatre of conflict to come to terms with their own loss and apprehend meaningful expressions of identity and alterity.

Seen in contradistinction to the nationalist myths, or meta-narratives, which have brought turmoil, conflict, loss and impoverishment, the authentic religious narratives offer a legitimate means of understanding and engaging the ‘other’ in the discourse of life. In a fractured land where division and strife are the order of the day, ordinary persons are creating sanctuaries where dignity and trust are honoured, and wholeness of being is restored. They are extending forgiveness, experiencing healing, building peace, and shaping a new future of hope in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

¹¹⁷ Lincoln 1999: xii.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has argued that although religion has been used to promote nationalist ideologies and the cause of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it also can be a positive force for building peace. It has shown that the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina are a product of the relatively recent emergence of national identities, of which religions are intrinsic and essential. By focusing on the religious variable of the equation, greater understanding of both sources and resolutions of the conflict has emerged.

The thesis has further shown that the religious dimension includes the element of myth in the self-understanding of the Serbs, Bošnjaks and Croats, and has explained the influence of myths in creating ethno-religious conflicts. It has been argued that religio-mythical elements shaped discrete narratives for each of the ethno-religious communities, and that in times of conflict, these narratives defined the respective communities, defended their causes and legitimised their actions.

Against this religio-cultural background the thesis has contended that military success in ending the armed conflict did not translate into peace in the rebuilding of civil society as intended by the framers of the Dayton Accord, and that a climate of violence, segregation and discrimination continues to pervade the society. Moreover, certain efforts of the international community have led to further fragmentation of the country, namely, the establishment of two entities that effectively divide the country along nationalist lines, and a Constitution that enshrines the ethno-religious conflict in the country's most foundational document.

Failure in the fundamental area of rebuilding civil society exposes two assumed myths in the intervention efforts of the international community. The first is that liberal democratic values and methods of operating are shared, and that transitioning nations will automatically aspire to these ideals. However, the slow advance in democratisation initiatives demonstrates that Western influence is limited in those areas where national identity is stronger. The second myth is the belief that superior military power together with political and economic incentive is sufficient to transform transitioning societies and build peace. The opposite has been shown to be

the case. The means by which the West implemented economic incentives served to entrench factions already divided by ethnic strife. Bosnia-Herzegovina remains a deeply divided society characterised by continuing fragmentation despite nearly a decade of international presence.

It has been argued that these failures cannot be attributed merely to strategy, but point to an inherent weakness in the international community's materialist, structural framework that discounts religion and religious actors. Consequently, the policies guiding the implementation of the peace plan consistently neglect the religious dimension of society that is endemic to the Balkan worldview, and ignore contributions religion and religious actors might make to rebuilding civil society. It has been shown that the international community now realises the need for a values-based approach to the democratisation process, but that it is ill-equipped to address this dimension.

To redress this problem, the thesis has advanced the new argument that social restoration lies beyond the best efforts of secular institutions embodying a materialistic worldview, and that the restoration of civil society is most naturally situated in the locus of the personal and relational, not the structural and institutional. Peace-building and the restoration of civil society are pre-eminently human endeavours involving the moral and ethical will of individuals and communities alike. The materialist, structural approach to peace-building by the international community needs therefore to be strengthened to address pressing inter-personal needs of society more effectively by engaging the moral and ethical resources that religion – with all its known difficulties in the region – has the potential to contribute. Religion in this capacity complements, rather than substitutes, secular initiative.

The empirical data presented in Part Two of this thesis clearly evidences that the religions of Bosnia-Herzegovina have resources for peace-building in several critical areas. First, religion can contribute to peace-building by clarifying issues of identity and values that are especially important factors in periods of social upheaval and transition. Religion offers a framework both for defining self in a historical-cultural community and in relation to other communities. Second, the sacred texts of the Christian and Muslim religious communities contribute to values-clarification by describing and defining the domain of peace beyond the cessation of war. Both scriptures define peace as a contractual agreement of disarmament between two

parties in dispute, and extend the meaning to the realm of societal security and wholeness of being. Third, the religions of Bosnia-Herzegovina already ascribe to, and are the basis for, ethics and human rights. When they are not compromised by sectarian practices, religious communities offer precisely the local resources that are necessary for peace-building, and can therefore be a dynamic presence for social restoration. Invoking Lederach's second and third levels of diplomacy, the religious communities demonstrate strong potential for social transformation. Finally, the empirical evidence shows that religious actors can influence their communities to extend the peace-building factors of ethics and human rights to reconciliation and social restoration. Religion contributes to the conceptual, personal, communal, and political expressions of restoration, and shifts the social situation from fragmentation and division towards wholeness and unity.

The core hypothesis of the thesis has therefore been substantiated through the research interviews of religious leaders, women, and students involved in peace-building efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Religious leaders contribute to peace-building by engaging with the theological and ethical teachings of their respective religious communities in redefining the nature of the conflict. Operating from a worldview that includes the presence of the Transcendent and drawing from the rich resources of the sacred texts, they redefine the enemy as the ideology of nationalism, not a particular nation or community. Religious leaders refer to the purposes of God for all humanity as set out in the creation narratives, and thereby expose exclusivist national ideologies as narrow and artificial constructions. Further, they positively redefine the self and community in relation to God in ways that do not disenfranchise other persons or communities. This in turn creates a measure of solidarity with communities that suffer similar fates in the conflict. Religious leaders also focus their efforts on root causes of the conflict, which, when properly addressed, demonstrate promising signs of long-term stability and sustainability of the peace effort.

Religious women demonstrate compelling empirical support of the hypothesis, and constitute a significant force for sustainable peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are informed and resourced by the sacred texts of the Bible and the Qur'ān, and are experientially aware of the changes possible in persons through spiritual transformation. The guiding principles of the sacred texts provide a new context against which women are able to critique the nationalist and feminist ideologies that

claim them for other causes. Although not particularly empowered by religious or political institutions, religious women contribute to peace-building and social restoration through the channels of influence most natural to them, namely, with other women, in local NGOs, through their presence and contributions in local religious communities, and pre-eminently in the home, and with children. Religious women are often emboldened by their faith to cross imposed barriers and reach out to others. Religious women express a strong belief in their superior verbal skills that both defuse volatile situations, and better equip them for relational tasks. When coupled with their religious beliefs, their verbal capacity affords them a special role in social restoration and peace-building. Expressions of faith and means of encountering God are different among women of different religious communities, but are nonetheless key for building solidarity with other women in similar circumstances. Their acts of kindness and forgiveness inject hope in an otherwise bleak environment.

Interviews with religious students reveal a striking contrast with the prevailing youth culture in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their willingness to remain in the country and their positive outlook places them within the youth minority. Each of the religious students interviewed claims a personal faith that focuses their own attitudes and beliefs before judging the beliefs and actions of others. Their transformation is a process of spiritual discovery that clarifies values and enables them to express love for others. A central ingredient of their spirituality is forgiveness, which is determinative for how they view and encounter others beyond their ethno-religious community. They also articulate a common identity as creations of God, which at once draws the circle of inclusion wider than that of sectarian nationalism, and defines a basis for interacting with others. Their expressions of personal faith support the thesis that religion offers a source of mediation towards peace-building and social restoration.

Four issues emerged from the interview data with religious persons that contributed to the theological and ethical understanding of peace-building. Authentic faith expressions, powerlessness and humility, and diversity of approach across religious groups, all contributed to shaping a positive and multi-national base for peace-building. Interviewees from all the religious communities offered expressions of authentic faith, which they contrasted to religious identities that are conditioned more by ideological agendas than the teachings of Christianity or Islam. Powerlessness

and humility emerged as important factors of liberty for those involved in social restoration. These factors contrast with the power – and sometimes hubris – of clerical elites who are constrained by constituent expectation to act in defensive boundary-setting on behalf of the community. The interview data also revealed a remarkable diversity in approach to peace-building, making it difficult to draw generalisations without artificiality.

Drawing from the references interviewees made both to creation and eschaton imagery, the thesis has proposed that ‘restoration’ is the most suitable sociological and theological *Leitmotiv* for peace-building. The inter-personal and social dimensions of restoration, or reconciliation, are related to the theological and cosmological dimensions of unity and harmony and shape a holistic understanding of peace that includes the concept of living with one another (*Mitmenschlichkeit*). In its proper sense, restoration is informative and instructive for religious persons who desire to live in accord with God and fellow humanity.

Finally, the thesis has demonstrated that these theological and ethical concerns are being implemented in practical initiatives towards peace-building through religious faith sodalities, non-institutional spiritual communities that embody multi-national harmony. Three significant shifts from fragmentation towards wholeness occur. The first is from the ‘imagined community’ of a nation to an ‘authentic faith community’ that re-creates a sacred space and provides inner peace and meaning to its adherents. The second shift moves from *mythos* to *logos* in the exchange of ‘ideology as narrative’ for a personal narrative reinterpreted in the framework of the religious meta-narratives and guided by the corresponding sacred texts. The third significant shift is in the nature of the conflict, which is now focused on challenging the rhetoric of sectarian ideologues. The prophetic voice emanating from within the religious faith sodality speaks with newly-won authority and authenticity, and is shaping new multi-national communities characterised by forgiveness and acceptance.

It is in these terms, therefore, that the thesis has validated its core hypothesis that religion can be a positive force for building peace. In its non-sectarian expressions, religion and religious actors demonstrate positive initiatives towards peace-building and social restoration, which adds an important and complementary dimension to secular efforts. Moreover, the meta-narratives of Christianity and Islam are providing a credible worldview and ethos that can effectively critique and replace the mythologised historiographies that drive ideological nationalism. Forgiveness,

exchanged in the sacred space created by the religious faith sodalities, is able to overcome the legacy of the violent past, heal memories, and interdict the cycle of revenge. The demonstrable result is individual and communal movement from fragmentation towards wholeness, which is a significant contribution to sustainable peace-building and social restoration in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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