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Restrictive highlighting in English: *only*, *just* and ALL clefts

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This thesis explores one type of device that helps to structure discourse – English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively (e.g. *only*, *just* and ALL cleft constructions). Speakers and writers highlight constituents in a clause and make them salient for many reasons. There are various subtypes of highlighting according to ways in which particular constituents in a clause are salient. Restrictive highlighting is one way of making particular constituents salient.

The English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively have received different degrees of attention. However, what seems to be lacking in common is detailed investigation of how the devices are actually used. The thesis has two main parts, one for each of the two main points of interest regarding the usage of the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively. The first part deals with the question as to what exactly the restrictive focusing particles, *only* and *just*, ALL cleft constructions, Reverse ALL cleft constructions and *nothing but* constructions differ pragmatically, and the second deals with the question as to what exactly are the factors affecting the form of ‘the focus construction specified by a restrictive focusing particle’.

The results of the investigation demonstrate how certain grammatical devices with the similar syntactic functions and semantics differ from each other pragmatically and the extent to which syntactic choice is related to the process of structuring discourse. This thesis also offers a more detailed account than is currently available of the systematic patterns in the form of ‘the focus construction specified by *only*’ and of the properties peculiar to each sub-variety of the construction. The findings are particularly significant, in terms of the question as to which sub-variety is the most neutral and is used most frequently. Our findings suggest that each sub-variety has its own properties and the analysis will help in the preparation of teaching materials on the use of *only*.

## Declaration

I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself and that the work involved is entirely my own.

Yoko YAMADA

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## 1. Introduction

Discourse, even if it sometimes looks disorganised with many strands of information running parallel or even overlapping, is highly structured by various language devices that contribute to the organisation of discourse; it is organised by devices that play roles in introducing information effectively, in putting an emphasis on information that is central in a given context and in helping listeners or readers achieve an understanding of all the links between the pieces of information. These tasks are part of the packaging or structuring of information to fit the knowledge deemed available to the listener or reader. Speakers or writers choose a certain device among the available options to convey some information to their listener or reader. Speakers' or writers' use of a device with a particular role in discourse organisation, then, enables the listener or reader to infer the relationship between the information represented by the utterance and other relevant information in the discourse and to relate that particular chunk of interpreted text to the rest of the discourse. If speakers or writers choose an inappropriate device, the attempt to communicate runs the risk of being unsuccessful. Thus, detailed investigation into devices that control the information flow in discourse is central in the study of discourse organisation.

This thesis explores one type of device that helps to structure discourse – English constructions for highlighting particular constituents restrictively, exemplified in (1) (Note: The devices are in italics and the restrictively highlighted constituents are in small capitals.):

- (1) a. This year John visited *only* ITALY.
- b. JOHN *alone* could solve the problem.
- c. I came *just* BECAUSE YOU ASKED ME TO COME.
- d. She is *but* A CHILD.
- e. She shops *exclusively* AT THAT DEPARTMENT STORE.
- f. I did it *solely* FOR HIS SAKE.

- g. One is *merely* POINTING OUT PARTICULAR IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS IN HARD-WORKING, DEEPLY RELIGIOUS, AND COMMITTED PEOPLE. (British National Corpus A06-0331)
- h. *All John needs is* (to) GO TO HOSPITAL IMMEDIATELY.
- i. THIS *is all he did*.
- j. His mother thought of *nothing but* JOHN'S COMING HOME.

In all the examples listed above, the constituents in small capitals are restricted as the correct value and all the other possible members of the presupposed set (e.g. *France* and *Canada*, etc. in (1a)) are rejected as incorrect. These grammatical devices have received different degrees of attention; a great deal of consideration has been given to the devices exemplified in (1a) – (1g), particularly *only* in (1a). Along with words such as *even* and *also*, they were closely examined in studies of presuppositions and non-truth-conditional aspects of meaning in the late 1960s and the 1970s (e.g. Horn 1969; Kempson 1975; Karttunen and Peters 1979). These grammatical devices were also variously discussed in generative grammar especially in the 1970s (e.g. Fraser 1971; Anderson 1972; Jackendoff 1972; Ross and Cooper 1979; McCawley 1988). These studies have concentrated on the possible positions of grammatical devices such as those in (1a) – (1g) (and words such as *even*), and on establishing some frameworks that explain them. Based on actual data, Rissanen (1980) and Vittanen (1986) explore the positional variations of *only* in writing and speech, respectively.

Moreover, the devices (and the words such as *even*) have been analysed as quantifiers in some studies (e.g. Keenan 1971; Horn 1989; Atlas 1993; Herburger 2000). Taglicht (1984) describes the syntax and semantics of *only* (and other words such as *also*). Nevalainen (1990), who focuses on diachronic aspects of the devices in (1a) – (1g), also pays considerable attention to how these devices are to be described synchronically. König (1991) presents a comparative study of the devices exemplified in (1a) – (1g) (and words such as *even* and *also*) in English, German and some other languages, emphasising their meanings. *Only* has been also considered, in connection with the ways in which it contributes to a structuring of information in discourse by Nevalainen (1987) and Vallduví (1992). These studies suggest that

constituents highlighted by *only* may not necessarily correspond to constituents marked by intonational prominence and that they do not necessarily convey new information.

In spite of the effort devoted to investigating the properties of the devices exemplified in (1a) – (1g), particularly their syntactic and semantic properties, what seems to be lacking (despite Nevalainen 1987 and Vallduví 1992) is detailed pragmatic investigation of how the devices are actually used. What kind of pragmatic properties do the devices in (1a) – (1g) have and how are the devices actually used? These questions are very crucial for discovering how the devices contribute to the organisation of discourse. This thesis has as its goal to provide a clearer picture of how the devices control the information flow in discourse.

As for the devices exemplified in (1h) – (1j), little or no attention has been paid to them: in addition to the lack of studies examining the pragmatic properties of these devices, there are hardly any studies of their syntactic and/or semantic properties, studies connecting with the devices in (1a) – (1g), nor studies connecting with other constructions, such as IT clefts as in *It was John who broke the window*.

This thesis explores English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively, as in (1), and establishes some systematic patterns relating to the use of devices. The results of the investigation will, it is hoped, enrich our understanding of how the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively help to structure discourse. This kind of information is of particular importance not only for the general study of discourse organisation, but for learners of English, who cannot rely on their intuitions and must learn property to control the information flow in discourse. In order to provide readers with a clearer picture of how closely the function of highlighting particular constituents (restrictively) is related to the packaging or structuring of information, it is worth while reviewing some earlier studies. More details of the scope and aims of this thesis will be provided in section 1.3.

### 1.1. Highlighting of particular constituents in a clause

As mentioned above, *only*, *just* and constructions such as *All John needs is (to) go to hospital immediately* restrict particular constituents as the correct value and reject all the other possible members of the presupposed set as incorrect. The function of highlighting particular constituents restrictively has to do with the packaging or structuring of information.

Restrictive highlighting is one way of making particular constituents salient. Speakers and writers highlight particular constituents in a clause for various reasons. The key concept is 'focus'. Unfortunately, in spite of the many studies and theoretical proposals, there is no fully accepted concept of focus. The study of information flow is complex and difficult. The purpose of this section is not to support a certain concept nor to present a new definition of focus. We wish simply to demonstrate the confusion in the current literature and to bring out the connection between the highlighting of particular constituents and the packaging or structuring of information and the importance of investigating grammatical devices for highlighting.

Halliday (1967) proposes that tone groups, which are units of intonation, serve to organise discourse, by functioning as the realisation of information units in the discourse. One information unit is realised as one tone group and each information unit consists of one obligatory component, the tonic segment, and one optional component, the pretonic segment. The tonic segment is marked by intonational prominence and is said to carry *information focus*. Information focus assigns the function 'new' to what is within its domain – new in the sense that the speaker presents information as not being recoverable from the preceding discourse. Halliday divides information focus into two types, unmarked information focus and marked information focus. According to him, other things being equal, the constituent at the end of a clause will carry information focus, since the tonic prominence typically falls on the final lexical item in the tone group. To take a simple example (Note: The

double slash marks tone group boundaries and the single slash marks rhythmic foot boundaries. The information focus is in bold.):

(2) //I'm/looking for the/caretaker who/looks after/this/**block**//

(Halliday 1967: 207)

*Block* in (2) carries unmarked information focus. On the other hand, if the tonic prominence falls on a constituent other than the final lexical item in the tone group, the constituent is contrastive and carries marked information focus. The following is an instance of this type of information focus.

(3) //John **painted** the shed yesterday//

(Halliday 1967: 207)

(3) implies 'what did John do to the shed yesterday?'.

Chafe (1976) deals with the question as to what contrastiveness is and gives the term *focus of contrast* to *Ronald* in the example *Ronald made the hamburgers*, where the highest pitch and stress are on *Ronald*. Chafe proposes that three factors are involved in this example: (i) background knowledge that someone made the hamburgers; (ii) a set of possible candidates for making the hamburgers; (iii) assertion of which candidate is the correct one. Focus of contrast is primarily manifested by the pitch phenomena and secondarily by the use of cleft constructions such as IT clefts and WH clefts. Focus of contrast does not need to be new information in Chafe's (1976: 30) sense (i.e., 'new information is what the speaker assumes he is introducing into the addressee's consciousness by what he says'). What is communicated by a contrastive sentence is that a certain focus item rather than other possible ones is correct; it may be given (i.e., 'knowledge which the speaker assumes to be in the consciousness of the addressee at the time of the utterance' (p.30)) or new information.

'The influence of Halliday's work in the area of "information structure" is clearly seen in Chomsky's account of surface focus' (Andrew 1980: 59). According to

Chomsky (1970[1976: 96]), ‘the phrases containing the intonation in the surface structure determine focus and presupposition’. He defines focus as ‘a phrase containing the intonation center’ (p.91) and argues that the presupposition is obtained by replacing the focus with a variable. Thus, presupposition is the complement of focus.<sup>1</sup> Presupposition in focus-presupposition articulation cannot be equated with the traditional semantic/philosophical use of this term. From his definition, it is clear that Chomsky takes focus as essentially a phonological phenomenon. ‘Under normal intonation’, which, Chomsky admits, is far more clear but which is tentatively understood as cases where ‘no expressive or contrastive intonation marked in specific expressions by other grammatical processes’ (p.97-8), the semantic representation of (4a) and (4b) must take *John* as the focus of the sentence and *someone writes poetry* as the presupposition. That is, the speaker takes it for granted that someone writes poetry and specifies the identity of the someone. In (4c), which is the natural response to (4a) or (4b), the presupposition is the same, while the focus changes to *Bill*. (Note: All the examples in (4) are from Chomsky 1970[1976: 89].)

- (4) a. is it JOHN who writes poetry?  
b. it isn't JOHN who writes poetry.  
c. No, it is BILL who writes poetry.

Jackendoff (1972: 230) defines *the focus of a sentence* as ‘the information in the sentence that is assumed by the speaker not to be shared by him and the hearer’, and *the presupposition of a sentence* as ‘the information in the sentence that is assumed by the speaker to be shared by him and the hearer’. He agrees that ‘intuitively, it makes sense to speak of a discourse as “natural” if successive sentences share presuppositions, that is, if the two speakers implicitly agree on what information they have in common’ (p.230). Jackendoff (1972: 230) also agrees with Chomsky and claims that ‘we must suppose that one aspect of the semantic representation of a sentence is a division of the reading into presupposition and focus, and that this division is reflected somehow in the syntactic structure of the sentence’. Jackendoff (1972: 237) takes containing the main stress as being a necessary but not being a sufficient condition for a phrase to be focus and suggests that ‘if a phrase P is chosen

as the focus of a sentence S, the highest stress in S will be on the syllable of P that is assigned highest stress by the regular stress rules' (p.237). To incorporate this claim into the grammar, Jackendoff, then, proposes 'a syntactic marker F which can be associated with any node in the surface structure' (p.240). Thus, in his account, the semantic material associated with surface structure nodes dominated by the marker F is the focus. As for the presupposition, it is formed as (5), after substitute an appropriate semantic variable X for focus in semantic representation to form the function  $\text{Presupp}_s(X)$ .

$$(5) \lambda X \text{Presupp}_s(X) \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{is a coherent set} \\ \text{is well-defined} \\ \text{is amenable to discussion} \\ \text{is under discussion} \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{in the present discourse} \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \quad (\text{Jackendoff 1972: 246})$$

Jackendoff (1972: 247) points out the interpretation of grammatical devices such as *even*, *only* and *also* is intimately associated with the notation of focus and presupposition.

Lambrecht (1994) claims that information is not conveyed by lexical items or constituents in a sentence; it is conveyed by establishing relations between denotata and propositions. Consider (6), for instance.

(6) Q: Where did you go last night?

A: I went to the MOVIES.

(Lambrecht 1994: 209) (Original small capitals)

The information conveyed by the answer in (6) is neither the noun *movies*, nor the noun phrase *the movies* nor the prepositional phrase *to the movies*. It is 'the abstract proposition "The place I went to last night was the movies"' (p.210). In Lambrecht's account, *(the) movies* is treated as focus in the sense that 'the denotatum of this phrase stands in a pragmatically construed relation to the proposition such that its addition makes the utterance of the sentence a piece of' (p.210) unpredictable or

pragmatically nonrecoverable information. This pragmatic relation is termed *focus relation*. Lambrecht suggests that the terms ‘unpredictable’ and ‘nonrecoverable’ capture the characteristics of the focus relation better than the term ‘new’. Consider the following.

(7) Q: Where did you go last night, to the movies or to the restaurant?

A: We went to the RESTAURANT.

(Lambrecht 1994: 211) (Original small capitals)

In the answer in (7), the noun phrase *the restaurant* is not new, since it was mentioned in the immediately preceding question and thus it is already activated in the minds of the speaker and of the listener. Nonetheless, this noun phrase has a focus relation to the proposition that the speaker went X in the way that it supplies the missing argument to the proposition. (Note: Lambrecht 1994: 212 emphasises that the accent on *restaurant* in (7) is not contrastive.)

In short, Lambrecht (1994: 213) defines focus as ‘the semantic component of a pragmatically structured proposition whereby the assertion differs from the presupposition’ (Note: In Lambrecht’s (1994: 52) definition, assertion is ‘the proposition expressed by a sentence which the hearer is expected to know or take for granted as a result of hearing the sentence uttered’. Presupposition is ‘the set of propositions lexicogrammatically evoked in a sentence which the speaker assumes the hearer already knows or is ready to take for granted at the time the sentence is uttered’.<sup>2</sup>) Lambrecht states that although his concept of focus is similar in many respects to that used by Chomsky (1970[1976]) and Jackendoff (1972), presupposition as used by Chomsky and Jackendoff in their focus-presupposition articulation is only one particular subtype of pragmatic presupposition and the accent rules proposed by them are not sufficient to capture the focus-presupposition articulation.

Focus relation is marked prosodically, morphologically, syntactically, or by a combination of prosodic and morphosyntactic devices. Three different informational



sentence patterns are distinguished in terms of their focus assignments (Note: The examples are from Lambrecht 1994: 223):

**(8) a. predicate-focus structure**

What happened to your car?

My car/It broke DOWN.

**b. argument-focus structure**

I heard your motorcycle broke down?

My CAR broke down.

**c. sentence-focus structure**

What happened?

My CAR broke down.

The answer in (8a) is the predicate-focus structure, where the assertion is VP (i.e., *broke down*) and the domain representing focus is VP. The answer in (8b) is the argument-focus structure, where the assertion is inserted by one of the arguments and the domain representing focus is *car*. Moreover, the answer in (8c) is the sentence-focus structure, where there is no presupposition and the whole sentence is an assertion and is the domain representing focus. In the case of the predicate-focus structure, an element of the predicate is marked prosodically. (This type of focus structure is also expressed by marking the subject as a topic. In English, this topic is marked only prosodically, via the absence of an accent and not marked morphosyntactically.) On the other hand, in the case of the argument-focus structure, only the subject noun receives prosodic prominence. This means that prosodically, the argument-focus structure is the reversal of the predicate-focus structure. A special linguistically codified case of argument-focus structure is WH-questions.

The sentence-focus structure and the argument-focus structure are homophonous in English, as the examples in (8) show. Of these three structures, the predicate-focus structure is the unmarked focus structure. The rest (i.e., the argument-focus structure and the sentence-focus structure) are marked and are distributionally more restricted. What should be noticed here is that the examples in (8) do not exhaust the formal

possibilities; on the contrary, there are other possibilities established by other devices such as cleft constructions. Lambrecht (1994: 225) states that ‘determining the appropriateness conditions for the use of alternative focus-marking devices for the same general focus category is a complex matter’. It is this ‘complex matter’ that this thesis investigates in Chapters 4 and 5. (See 1.3.2.)

Lambrecht (1994) discusses contrastiveness, which has been a ‘notorious problem for any information structure theory’ (Ziv 1996: 706) and has been dealt with by previous studies on focus (recall *marked information focus* in Halliday 1967 and *focus of contrast* in Chafe 1976). Providing examples indicating that contrastiveness is related to topic, Lambrecht suggests that there are two types of contrastiveness – contrastiveness related to focus and contrastiveness related to topic.

Since the term presupposition is also a traditional semantic/philosophical term, some studies such as Vallduví (1992), Rochemont and Culicover (1990), Erteschik-Shir (1986) have abandoned it. Vallduví (1992) presents *Information Packaging*, ‘a non-logical-semantic type of sentence “meaning” concerned with the retrieval of information and its entry into the hearer’s knowledge-store’ (p.53). In his account, as in Halliday (1967), focus is ‘the only informative part of the sentence’ (p.46) – the part contributing to the listener’s knowledge-store at the time of utterance. As the complement of focus, Vallduví (1992) uses the term *ground*, adapting Prince’s (1985: 65) view of salient shared knowledge as ‘what the speaker assumes about the hearer’s belief’. In this view, whether speakers believe the set of propositions to be true or not is not considered. Therefore, speakers can utter sentences containing some set of propositions which are not believed by them but which are believed by listeners. (See 2.1.5.2 for a discussion of Vallduví’s 1992 *ground*.) Ground is further divided into two – *link* and *tail*. Link is sentence-initial and is an address pointer, and tail is the complement of the link within the ground and specifies how the information must be entered under a given address. This trinomial hierarchical structure – focus, link and tail – is proposed, based on the fact that the focus-presupposition articulation cannot explain that in the non-focused component of a

sentence, there is often a topic-like element which appears in sentence-initial position, as in (9b).

(9) a. She gave the SHIRT to Harry.

(Vallduví 1992: 41, originally from Prince 1986)

b. To Harry she gave the SHIRT.

(Vallduví 1992: 41)

One of the differences between (9a) and (9b) is the position of the phrase *to Harry*. In (9a), it is postfocal and in (9b) it is sentence-initial. This difference cannot be captured by the focus-presupposition articulation, since these two sentences are similar in that they have the same focus *the shirt* and the same presupposition that she gave something to Harry. By dividing ground into two, Vallduví makes it possible to explain this difference. In his trinominal hierarchical articulation, the function of the phrase *to Harry* in (9b) is different from that of *to Harry* in (9a). In (9b), by being sentence-initial, the phrase *to Harry* is a link and an address pointer. On the other hand, in (9a) this phrase is not a link. (Note: His trinominal hierarchical articulation is also different from the topic-comment framework. The topic-comment framework does explain the difference between (9a) and (9b) derived from the position of the phrase *to Harry*. However, it does not explain the informational split within the comment (i.e., between *the shirt* and *to Harry* in (9a)).

Like Lambrecht (1994), Vallduví (1992) points to the existence of two types of contrastiveness and claims that Chafe (1976) seems to conflate these two types of contrastiveness in his *focus of contrast*.

Rochemont and Culicover (1990) introduce the term *c-construable*, which is defined as 'under discussion' (p.20). In their account, a constituent that is not a c-construable is a focus.<sup>3</sup> Rochemont and Culicover (1990: 20) recognise that this account of focus is vague, since 'under discussion' is not adequately defined and a complete and explicit theory of pragmatics is needed to provide a definition for 'under discussion'.

Accent is not sufficient to identify a focus. Rochemont and Culicover list the following grammatical devices as relating to the function of highlighting particular constituents (Note: All the examples are from Rochemont and Culicover 1990: 24-5).

(10) **a. *IT* cleft construction**

It was a brand new fur coat that John purchased for his wife.

**b. Heavy NP Shift**

John purchased for his wife a brand new fur coat.

**c. Relative Clause**

A man came into the room who everybody recognized.

**d. PP Extraposition from NP construction**

A woman appeared at the door with blonde hair.

**e. Directional/Locative Adverbial Preposing construction**

Into the room walked John.

**f. Preposing around *be* construction**

Sitting in front of her was Bill.

**g. Presentational *there* Insertion (i.e., special case of Heavy NP Shift)**

There ran into the room several overexcited fans.

Rochemont and Culicover claim that these devices except for *IT* cleft constructions form a category in a further sense, since they have in common that they subject to more severe restrictions. For example, PP Extraposition from NP constructions have varying restrictions with respect to the specificity of the NP and the characteristics of the predicate involved. One of the restrictions is that an extraposed phrase in object position may not contain a name that is bound by a phrase in subject position, as in (11).

(11) \*She<sub>i</sub> invited many people to the party that Mary<sub>i</sub> didn't know.

(Rochemont and Culicover 1990: 34)

Erteschik-Shir (1986) contends that whether wh-phrases in wh-questions function as the focus of the question or not follows from how we define focus, and introduces

the notion of *dominance* for her argument that wh-phrases in most cases are not to be identified as the focus of the sentence. Erteschik-Shir (1986: 120) defines dominance as follows:

- (12) DOM: A constituent *c*, of a sentence *S*, is dominant in *S* if and only if the speaker intends to direct the attention of his/her hearer(s) to the intension of *c*, by uttering *S*.

(Later, in her *focus structure (f-structure) theory*, Erteschik-Shir (1997) changes the term dominance to focus, applying it to the same concept.)

Dominance is defined in terms of speakers' intentions. In her definition of dominance, wh-phrases in a wh-question are dominant only in the case of echo-questions and they are not so in other cases. Consider the following.

- (13) Who gave birth on Friday? (Erteschik-Shir 1986: 124)

She argues that this is the case where the wh-phrase is not dominant; the whole question is dominant.

Erteschik-Shir (1986) notes that although her notion of dominance 'is meant to cover those cases for which focus is generally used' (p.120), this notion differs from focus in two points. One point is that she does not use presupposition as the complement of dominant constituents. She argues that 'presupposition does not exclude dominance' (p.120), since, for example, in the following question-answer, the italicised constituent is the dominant constituent of the sentence and at the same time it is presupposed as complement of *regret*.

- (14) A: John regrets *that he quit his job*.

B: Yes I know. It has been filled and he can't go back

(Erteschik-Shir 1986: 121) (Original italic)

The other point is that dominance is not defined in terms of nuclear stress assignment. However, these two points are acutely criticised by Vallduví (1992: 43) and his criticism is right. Erteschik-Shir (1986) seems to misunderstand the term presupposition used in the framework of so-called focus-presupposition articulation. There, presupposition is not used as something that is presupposed. Vallduví (1994: 43) states that ‘a sentence does not actually presuppose its “presupposition”’. However, when Erteschik-Shir says that the dominant constituent (i.e., *he quit his job*) is presupposed as complement of *regret* in (14), the term presupposition is used in the sense of the traditional semantic/philosophical term as the sentence *Her car is wreck* presupposes ‘she has a car’. In this sense, ‘he quit his job’ is presupposed as complement of *regret*. (‘He quit his job’ must be presupposed in order to regret that he quit his job.) Also, as many studies have pointed out (see, for example, Jackendoff 1972; Rochemont and Culicover 1990), intonational prominence is just one of the devices for highlighting particular constituent. Furthermore, Vallduví (1992: 43) points out that the notion of hearer’s attention seems less transparent.

Modern Prague School linguists propose the topic-focus articulation. Topic and focus are defined in terms of contextual boundness: in ‘the unmarked (prototypical) case, the elements belonging to the topic are CB [= contextually bound], while those included in the focus are NB [= contextually non-bound]’ (Sgall et al.1986: 189). Thus (15), where the prosodic prominence is on *dams*,

(15) Beavers build DAMS. (Sgall et al.1986: 57) (Original small capitals)

is three way ambiguous: (a) *beavers* has been just mentioned, is activated at the time of utterance (i.e., is easily accessible in the listener’s memory) and thus is the topic, and *build dams* is the focus; (b) *beavers build* is activated at the time of utterance and thus is the topic, and *dams* is the focus; (c) *beavers build dams* is the focus and there is no topic. It is clear from the definition that topic in the Prague School is not analogous to topic in the topic-comment framework. (In the topic-comment framework, *beavers* would be the topic.)

It should be noticed that as Sgall et al. (1986: 58) emphasise, the difference between the topic and the focus is not necessarily identical with that between contextually-bound and contextually non-bound expressions. There are cases where the topic includes contextually non-bound expressions or the focus includes contextually bound expressions. Consider the following.

(16) Next Friday I'll give your brother some of my BOOKS.

(Sgall et al.1986: 191) (Original small capitals)

Sgall et al. claim that in (16), the focus contains the contextually-bound expressions *your* and *my*.

Dik et al. (1981) discuss a typology of focus types within the framework of Functional Grammar. Functional Grammar is a framework which has been developed as an alternative to transformational grammar. In Functional Grammar, the predication is viewed in context and the relationship between the constituents of the predication and context of utterance is represented by pragmatic functions – functions specifying the informational status of constituents relative to the wider communicative setting in which they occur. Focus is one of the pragmatic functions available in Functional Grammar. Here focus is defined as representing what is relatively the most important or salient information in a predication. Constituents are made salient by intonational prominence, constituent order, focus markers such as particles or focus constructions such as clefts. Dik et al. assume that various focus types are distinguished according to the ways in which particular constituents in a clause may be salient.

Like Halliday, Dik et al. regard contrastiveness as one of a number of parameters constituting focus and not as the one and only parameter. When there is no contrastiveness, constituents that are made salient are meant to fill a gap in the stock of information of the addressee (Compleitive focus). A typical Compleitive focus is an answer to a WH-question. If there is contrastiveness, the contrast is either established between constituents that are made salient and a specific presupposition, or

established without any specific presupposition. If a specific presupposition is involved, constituents that are made salient can either be selected from among a presupposed set (Selective focus) or modify information already possessed by the addressee. In the latter case the salient constituent is either added or restricted, or replaced by other constituents. The basic typology arrived at according to a number of parameters is shown in Figure 1.1 below.




Figure 1.1. A typology of focus types (From Dik et al. 1981: 60)

Examples corresponding to each type of focus are illustrated in (17) (Note: All the examples are from Dik et al. 1981: 60-66. Constituents that are made salient are originally marked by small capitals.):

(17) a. **Completeive focus**

What did John buy?  
John bought COFFEE.

b. **Selective focus**

Did John buy coffee or rice?  
He bought COFFEE.



**c. Expanding focus**

John not only bought COFFEE, he also bought RICE.

**d. Restricting focus**

No, he didn't buy RICE, he only bought COFFEE.

**e. Replacing focus**

John went to London.

No, he went to NEW YORK.

**f. Parallel focus**

JOHN bought a BIKE, but PETER a CAR.

For Dik et al. (1981), information that is made salient is not necessarily new to the addressee. Information which the speaker knows is not new to the addressee may be made salient either to stress its importance or to reactivate it in the addressee's memory.

Three types of constituent being invariably assigned focus function in Functional Grammar: wh-phrases in wh-questions (e.g. *Why did you go to London?*), cleft constructions (e.g. *It was John who smashed the window*), and constituents presenting contrasted information (e.g. *John bought a bike (but Mary bought a moped)*), Hannay (1983) shows the necessity of making more explicit what exactly should be understood by Dik et al.'s (1981) definition of focus, 'relatively the most important or salient information in the given setting'.<sup>4</sup> Hannay also claims that we should not underestimate particular linguistic context as a factor in shaping the pragmatic information of the speaker and the addressee and also the pragmatic status of particular information in a given setting.

Sornicola (1994) deals with topic, focus and word order. Let us have a brief look at Sornicola (1994) with particular reference to her discussion of focus and the relation between focus and syntactic structure. Sornicola suggests that focus is to be considered as pragmatic function with structural correlatives. Focus should not be defined from a purely syntactic point of view. Nor should it be defined in terms of prosodic structure. Furthermore, Sornicola (1994: 4636) does not agree with the

approach taking focus 'as pragmatic primitive of grammar, with which particular structures can be associated in different languages' (p.4635). (This approach has been maintained in Functional Grammar.) Sornicola does not think that this approach is a satisfactory conclusion 'for a full understanding of how phenomena of natural languages work' (p.4639).

'In unmarked condition' (p.4638), a constituent having focus is either kept or moved rightward in the sentence, as in (18). (Note: The examples are from Sornicola 1994: 4638.)

- (18) a. What is in question is his reputation as a scientist  
b. The thing is (that) they are in trouble

(18a) is a *wh*-cleft and (18b) is what Schmid (2001) terms *the N-be-that-construction*.<sup>5</sup> Sornicola calls these sentences type B-clefting and represents the pattern of this type of cleft as follows.

- (19) X + be + Y

Here both X and Y can be any of the categories. Right dislocation of the subject (e.g. (20)) and extraposition (e.g. (21)) are the syntactic processes moving a constituent rightward in the sentence. (Note: The examples are from Sornicola 1994: 4639.)

- (20) *Hanno considerato il caso molti esperti* (Italian)

They have considered the case many experts

'Many experts have considered the case'

- (21) A critical review has just appeared of his latest book

Furthermore, Sornicola states that there are two syntactic processes where the topic function coincides with the focus function. One such syntactic process is topicalization as in (22).

(22) These problems they can't deal with

(Sornicola 1994: 4637)

The other process is what she calls A-clefting.

(23) It is me who said that

(Sornicola 1994: 4638)

This type of cleft is represented as follows.

(24) Be + NP +  $\bar{S}$

Here NP has both the function of topic and focus. In the case of English, only NPs, PPs and time and place adverbs may occur in the postcopular position.

Based on what has been mentioned so far, Sornicola concludes that there are two important correlations between focus and syntactic structure: one is that focus is related to 'syntactic processes that keep or move a constituent rightward in the sentence' (p.4639). Constituents occurring in rightward probably have prominence peaks. The other correlation is that constituents in focus lack the categorical restriction though it is certain that in the case of subject-initial languages, VP is the normal domain having the focus function 'under nonemphatic conditions' (p.4639).

In the field of computational linguistics, Grosz (1981) uses the verbal noun *focusing* rather than the noun *focus* to indicate the phenomenon of some entities being central to the dialogue at a certain point, claiming that this phenomenon is an active process; as a dialogue progresses, the participants shift their attention to new entities or to new perspectives on entities previously highlighted by the dialogue.

Moreover, if an entity is highlighted, there is always an implicit actor doing the highlighting. Grosz divides focusing into two types – local focusing (or immediate focus in Grosz 1978: 232) and global focusing. The former is used to refer to prominence in a sentence and, according to Grosz (1978: 232), influences the ordering of constituents in sentences. On the other hand, global focusing influences

matters such as what kinds of noun phrases speakers or writers choose for their descriptions, how the descriptions are interpreted and how the participants shift their attention from one entity to another. The total discourse and situational setting of an utterance determines global focusing.

The notion of focusing in Grosz (1981) is further developed and constitutes part of a theory of discourse structure proposed by Grosz and Sidner (1986). According to them, discourse structure is composed of three components: linguistic structure, intentional structure and attentional state. Linguistic structure relates to the sequence of utterances that comprise a discourse. Intentional structure relates to the intentions that the participants in a discourse have in taking part in certain discourse. Attentional state relates to entities (i.e., objects, properties, relations and discourse intentions) which are most salient at any given point. It is attentional state that is relevant to the function of highlighting constituents in a clause. Attentional state is modeled by a set of focus spaces. A focus space is associated with each discourse segment and it contains entities that are salient – entities that are mentioned explicitly or entities that become salient when the speaker and hearer produce/comprehend utterances. Various grammatical devices signal a change of attentional state – change that returns to a previous focus space or creates a new one. One of the devices mentioned is Reverse ALL clefts such as (25).

(25) That's all for point 2. (Grosz and Sidner 1986: 198)

Reverse ALL clefts function to highlight particular constituents restrictively. (That is to say, the deictic *that* is restricted to the correct value in (25).) This type of construction, according to Grosz and Sidner (1986: 198), shows the completion of a discourse segment. By showing the completion of a discourse segment, this type of construction 'seals off' a focus space and creates new focus spaces.

So far we have reviewed various concepts relating to the function of highlighting particular constituents in a clause. Some concepts overlap each other, and some have no overlaps. The complexity of information organisation is clearly reflected in the

fact that there is no absolute agreement among studies as to which devices should be regarded as the devices for highlighting particular constituents, and one and the same construction may even be regarded differently, depending on the concept of focus. For example, as has been mentioned, Rochemont and Culicover (1990: 25) regard the syntactic construction 'preposing around *be* construction' (e.g. *Sitting in front of her was Bill*) as one grammatical device for highlighting particular constituents in a clause. In contrast, in his study of inversion in English, Penhallurick (1984) regards this type of construction as a 'defocussing' device, where focus is defined as 'what the speaker's attention is centred on in relation to the event specified by the verb' (p.47). One thing is clear, however: no matter how the function of highlighting particular constituents is treated, it is certain that this function is closely related to the packaging or structuring of information, which has to do with how speakers or writers convey certain information, reflecting their assumptions about how such information fits the knowledge in the listener's or reader's mind. Choice of the wrong packaging may lead to unsuccessful attempts to communicate. This is why detailed investigation into devices controlling information flow in discourse is indispensable in the study of discourse organisation.

#### 1.2. English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively

Speakers/writers highlight constituents in a clause and make them salient. There are various subtypes of highlighting according to ways in which particular constituents in a clause are salient. As Dik et al. (1981) propose, highlighting particular constituents restrictively is one subtype. In Figure 1.1 on page 16, we clearly see the function of highlighting particular constituents restrictively under the name of *restricting focus*, as one way of making them salient. By this function, 'an antecedently given presupposed set is restricted to one or more correct values' (Dik et al. 1981: 66). For example, in (17d) (i.e., *No, he didn't buy RICE, he only bought COFFEE*), *coffee* is restricted to the correct value and all the other possible members of the presupposed set (*rice* in this case) are rejected as incorrect. A presupposed set would be either overt or covert.

How is this function expressed? As has been mentioned, constituents are highlighted in a clause by prosodic prominence, morphological markers, word order, focus words, syntactic constructions such as clefts or by a combination of prosodic and morphosyntactic devices. Different languages might use some or all of these devices in different combinations for different types of highlighting. In the case of English, prosodic prominence, morphological markers and word order are not the only devices for restrictive focus. Constituents in a clause are highlighted restrictively either by focus words or syntactic constructions, exemplified below. (Note: The focus words and the syntactic constructions are in italics and the restrictively highlighted constituents are in small capitals.)

**(26) Restrictive focusing particles**

- a. This year John visited *only* ITALY.
- b. JOHN *alone* could solve the problem.
- c. I came *just* BECAUSE YOU ASKED ME TO COME.
- d. She is *but* A CHILD.
- e. She shops *exclusively* AT THAT DEPARTMENT STORE.
- f. I did it *solely* FOR HIS SAKE.
- g. One is *merely* POINTING OUT PARTICULAR IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS IN HARD-WORKING, DEEPLY RELIGIOUS, AND COMMITTED PEOPLE. (British National Corpus A06-0331)

**(27) ALL cleft constructions**

*All John needs is* (to) GO TO HOSPITAL IMMEDIATELY.

**(28) Reverse ALL cleft constructions**

THIS *is all he did*.

**(29) Nothing but constructions<sup>6</sup>**

His mother thought of *nothing but* JOHN'S COMING HOME.

In all the examples listed above, the constituents in small capitals are restricted to the correct value and all the other possible members of the presupposed set (e.g. *France* and *Canada*, etc. in (26a)) are rejected as incorrect. We will call the italicized grammatical devices in (26) *restrictive focusing particles*. (The reasons why the term

'restrictive focusing particle' has been chosen for the devices in (26) will become clear in the next section.) Similarly, this thesis will call the syntactic constructions in (27), (28) and (29) the ALL cleft construction, the Reverse ALL cleft construction and the *nothing but* construction, respectively. The constituents restrictively highlighted may receive prosodic prominence (see section 2.1 in Chapter 2 for the discussion of this topic).

Restrictive focusing particles are clearly regarded as the central grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively by Dik et al. (1981). (See (17d) on page 17 in the previous section.) They are also taken as being intimately associated with the notation of focus and presupposition by Jackendoff (1972). König (1991: 99) states that *nothing but* constructions (or complex expressions consisting of negative existential quantifier (e.g. *nobody, nothing*, etc.) and exception marker (e.g. *except, other than, but*, etc.) in his term) have the function which restrictive focusing particles have. It should be noticed that the syntactic constructions – IT clefts (e.g. *It was John who broke the window*), WH clefts (e.g. *What you want to do is curve round that wood* (Miller and Weinert 1998)) and Reverse WH clefts (e.g. *That is what I meant in this article*) – are not taken as the devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively in this thesis. These constructions have been regarded as the grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents in a clause by various studies. (Recall Chafe 1976; Rochemont and Culicover 1990; Lambrecht 1994; Sornicola 1994, for example.) Some studies (e.g. Halliday 1985; Huddleston 1988) claim that clefts convey an implication of uniqueness/exhaustiveness. This means that in a cleft, for instance, *It was John who broke the window*, nobody other than John broke the window. However, this is not to say that IT clefts, WH clefts and Reverse WH clefts have the overt syntactic function of highlighting particular constituents restrictively. In this respect, these clefts are different from ALL cleft constructions, Reverse ALL cleft constructions and *nothing but* constructions.

Having reviewed earlier studies of how particular constituents in clauses are highlighted and showed that highlighting particular constituents restrictively is one

subtype of this function, let us now steer more toward the primary object of study, English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively, the devices in (26) – (29). In the rest of the chapter we consider some salient syntactic properties of English grammatical devices under discussion, and problems that arise in their syntactic description. This overview will make clear specific aims of the study.

### 1.3. Syntactic properties of English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively

#### *1.3.1. Syntactic properties of restrictive focusing particles: The variability of their syntactic position*

As has been pointed out in various studies, it is a characteristic of restrictive focusing particles (and other types of focusing particles such as *even* and *also*) that they can occur in various positions in sentences.<sup>7</sup> Consider the following (where the constituents highlighted restrictively are marked by small capitals):

- (30) a. John visited *only* ITALY.  
b. John *only* visited ITALY.  
c. John visited ITALY *only*.

(30a) is the example of the pre-adjacent position (henceforth, PrA), the position where *only* is placed immediately before the constituent which it highlights. (30b) is the example of the pre-verbal position (henceforth, PrV), the position where *only* is placed immediately before the verb or after the first auxiliary verb. This position is also taken when the whole sentence is highlighted. (30c) is the example of the post-adjacent position (henceforth, PostA). This position has been said to be far less frequent than the other two.<sup>8</sup> (Note: There is one syntactic constraint on the occurrence of *only* in PrV and PostA: *only* cannot occur in PrV and PostA when the highlighted constituent is a subject complement, as in *He is only a child*. In addition to this, the case where highlighted constituents function as subject is debatable




whether *only* can take the position immediately after the highlighted constituent. This position is PrV = PostA in the case of subjects occurring in a sentence without auxiliary verbs, as in *JOHN only answered that question*. Opinions have been divergent on this point. Some studies such as Jacobson 1978: 11, Quirk et al. 1985: 608 and König 1991: 10 suggest that *only* could take the position immediately after the highlighted constituent. On the other hand, others such as Jackendoff 1972: 250, Kay 1990: 96 and Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 590 propose that it takes only PrA or show the negative opinion towards the possibility of *only* taking the position immediately after the highlighted constituent: ‘*Kim only went to the movies*, for example, will normally be construed with *only* modifying *went to the movies*, not *Kim*’ (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 590.)

How can we describe restrictive focusing particles in terms of the variability of their syntactic position? Some studies regard restrictive focusing particles (and other types of focusing particles) as co-constituents of their highlighted constituent. For example, Ross and Cooper (1979) postulate that the restrictive focusing particles (or other types of focusing particles) are generated in PrA (= the position where *only* is placed immediately before the constituent which it highlights) and then moved (by optional transformations) to other positions. McCawley (1988) claims that restrictive focusing particles are left sisters of a highlighted constituent. He equates highlighted constituents with immediate sentence and verb phrase constituents. He suggests that moving *only* from PrA to PrV requires three steps: (i) *only* appears in deep structure as a sister of the scope S; (ii) *only* is separated from the constituents that it restrictively highlights and is adjoined to the predicate constituent of the scope; (iii) by a transformation called Quantifier-lowering, the constituent that *only* highlights restrictively is inserted in place of an occurrence of its bound variable. McCawley (1988: 612) schematises this in Figure 1.2.

*only*-separation

→



Quantifier-lowering

→




Figure 1.2. Movement of *only* from PrA to PrV

This approach is not free from problems: as he himself notices, it is not immediately clear that McCawley's (1988) proposal covers the full range of cases where *only*

occurs in PrV, 'since it is not clear that the constituent of which *only* is a surface sister can always be taken to be the predicate constituent of the S that is the scope of (p.612) *only*'. The following is a problematic case.

(31) He stayed for only a few days. (Taglicht 1984: 70)

As an alternative approach, some studies emphasise 'the adverb-like behaviour of' focusing particles (König 1991: 23). König (1991) mentions that Anderson (1972) stresses the adverb-like behaviour of focusing particles. Anderson (1972) objects to the proposal that associates the positional variation of the (restrictive) focusing particles directly with constituents highlighted by them in deep structure. Anderson (1972: 897) points out that this proposal violates valid constraints on movement operations such as the Complex-NP Constraint. One such case is where the highlighted constituent is inside a relative clause as below.

(32) You can do lots of things with bananas; I even know a guy who SMOKES  
them. (Anderson 1972: 897) (Original small capitals)

If *even* originates from a position in construction with the highlighted constituent, 'it would also have to originate with the relative clause, and the *even*-placement rule would have to violate the Complex-NP constraint' (p.897).

Anderson (1972: 898) proposes:

Assume that *even*, like other adverbial elements, is generated in some single position in the sentence in underlying structure, but is not interpreted at this point. Then allow it to be moved into any of the derived-structure positions where adverbs can appear by a permutation rule of some sort. Such a rule is presumably related to the general principles governing the positioning of other sentence adverbs

König (1991: 18) states that restrictive focusing particles (and other types of focusing particles) could 'be assumed to be in construction with a sentence (like sentence adverbs) or at least with a major constituent of the sentence such as the VP'. The view of restrictive focusing particles (and other types of focusing particles) as adverbs, according to König, seems to be motivated for languages where focusing 'particles occur in positions typically reserved for adverbs'(p.18), regardless of their highlighted constituents. 'Such a situation can be found in a variety of European languages, where focus particles [= focusing particles in this thesis] often also have the typical adverbial suffixes, e.g. *-ly* in English or *-ment* in French' (König 1991: 18). In the case of English focusing particles, König claims that PrV (i.e., the position where *only* is placed immediately before the verb or after the first auxiliary verb) is the position placed most frequently by focusing particles, regardless of the position of their highlighted constituents. (Note: 'Regardless of the position of highlighted constituents' seems to be equal to 'regardless of highlighted constituents'. König (1991: 18) claims that in sentences such as *You could even leave her car at the airport for a week*, 'any phrases (NP, PP, VP) or the verb could be selected as the highlighted constituent.) The PrV position is taken as the typical adverbial position by Herburger (2000: 86). She calls this position 'adverbial position'. Similarly, Viitanen (1986: 175) regards this position as the typical position 'for all adverbs ending in *-ly*'. The question now arises: is it really certain that PrV is the position most frequently occupied by restrictive focusing particles, regardless of the position of their highlighted constituents?

In order to answer this question, we need, first of all, to distinguish between speech and writing. Viitanen (1986: 171) shows that 175 of 211 occurrences of the typical restrictive focusing particle *only* (i.e., 83%) in the London-Lund Corpus of spoken English of educated British are the instances where *only* takes PrV (i.e., the position where *only* is placed immediately before the verb or after the first auxiliary verb),<sup>9</sup> whereas 135 of 358 occurrences of *only* (i.e., 38%) in the Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus of written English are the instances where *only* takes PrV. (Note: All the examples considered by Viitanen 1986 are examples where highlighted constituents are in post-verbal position and both PrV and PrA would be grammatically correct.

This means that examples where highlighted constituents are, for instance, subject complements are excluded. *Only* applying to subject complements cannot occur in PrV.)

Vittanen also suggests that in the London-Lund Corpus of spoken English, the case where the highlighted constituents are separated from the verbs is the only case where *only* favours PrA. This result indicates that the tendency towards PrV for *only* in spoken English seems obvious and it seems to be safe to suppose that the typical restrictive focusing particle *only* is 'most frequently placed at' (König 1991: 18) PrV, almost regardless of its highlighted constituents in the case of spoken English. On the other hand, the result shows that PrV is not the most frequent position in written English. What should be noticed is that Vittanen (1986) shows simply the number of occurrences and percentages of the PrV position of *only* in the Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus. That is to say, Vittanen's result does not show whether PrV is the position taken most frequently, regardless of its highlighted constituents in the case of written English.

Rissanen (1980), which is based on actual data and examines the positional variation of the typical restrictive focusing particle *only* in written English in relation to the type of highlighted constituent, demonstrates that the position taken most frequently by this restrictive focusing particle may be different, depending on constituents it restrictively highlights. Rissanen investigates possible factors influencing the position of *only*, with particular reference to the Brown Corpus, which consists of American English prose printed in 1961, excluding drama and fiction containing more than 50% dialogue. This corpus contains approximately 1,300 occurrences of *only* and more than 800 are the instances where the constituents restrictively highlighted by *only* are in the post-verbal position. Of them, some are eliminated from the discussion. To put it more concretely, besides the type 'not only ... but also', Rissanen (1980: 66-7) eliminated the following three cases as totally preventing PrV.

- (33) (i) The type subject + simple finite form of *be* + complement
- a. My brother is only FIVE YEARS OLD.
  - b. \*My brother only is FIVE YEARS OLD.
- (ii) Clauses with a non-finite predicate
- a. There was silence, broken only BY THE MURMUR OF RIVER.
  - b. There was silence, only broken BY THE MURMUR OF RIVER.
- (iii) F (i.e., constituents restrictively highlighted in this study) is an adverb ending in *-ly*
- a. He moved only SLIGHTLY.
  - b. He only moved SLIGHTLY.

(ib) is hardly acceptable with *five years old* as the highlighted constituent. On the other hand, (iib) and (iiib) are grammatical, as Rissanen admits. This raises the question of whether we should eliminate types (ii) and (iii) from the discussion.<sup>10</sup> After restricting the examples in his corpus, 386 cases out of approximately 1,300 occurrences of *only* in the corpus remained as the target of the discussion. 65 examples (i.e., 16.8%) out of them are the instances where *only* chooses PrV.

Based on these 386 cases, Rissanen (1980: 68) proposes three factors favouring PrV and another three factors favouring PrA. They are (Note: All the examples are from Rissanen (1980: 68). I have put in small capitals the constituents restrictively highlighted by *only*.):

- (34) Factors favouring PrV
- a. ***Only* occurs in direct or indirect quotations of speech**
  - b. **The constituent restrictively highlighted is a clause.**
    - e.g. There are ... fortunate souls who hear everything,  
but *only* know WHAT IS GOOD FOR THEM.
  - c. **There is an auxiliary in the clause**
    - e.g. All this had *only* taken her TWO HOURS.

(35) Factors favouring PrA

**a. In a complex NP, the constituent restrictively highlighted is a modifier rather than the whole NP**

e.g. Summary results are given for both the de facto and de jure populations; but the subsequent analysis of characteristics is reported *only* for the DE JURE population

**b. The constituent restrictively highlighted is a word indicating quantity**

e.g. The man had spoken *only* ONCE.

**c. The verb and the constituent restrictively highlighted are separated**

e.g. And the surface is driven back, in its very surfaceness, *only* BY THIS CONTRAST.

It is natural that direct or indirect quotations of speech should prefer PrV, since this kind of speech falls under the domain of spoken language (see Viitanen 1986 on the subject of the position of *only* in spoken language).<sup>11</sup> As Rissanen admits, a more detailed analysis of the remaining five factors is required if analysts are to answer questions such as whether factor (34b) applies to every type of clause or to what extent the separation of verb and highlighted constituent is necessary to put *only* in PrA. Furthermore, Rissanen (1980: 75) claims that (34) and (35) are relevant to the position of *only* in British English as well.<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, there are some studies which suggest that the position taken most frequently may be different even among the highlighted constituents occurring in the same position and having the same function. Jørgensen (1974) investigates the position of *only* when it restrictively highlights temporal expressions and proposes that the position of this word varies according to whether *only* indicates 'no other time' or it indicates 'as recently as'. Consider (36), for instance.

(36) a. John only saw Mary AN HOUR AGO.

b. John saw Mary only AN HOUR AGO.

The interpretation of (36a) is that John saw Mary an hour ago and saw her at no other time. On the other hand, the interpretation of (36b) is that John saw Mary an hour ago and it happened as recently as an hour ago. According to Jørgensen (1974), *only* indicating ‘no other time’ is normally placed in PrV, whereas *only* indicating ‘as recently as’ in PrA.

A similar proposal that *only* changes its position according to the interpretation of sentences where this particle highlights temporal expressions is also made by Rissanen (1980). He maintains that when *only* indicates ‘no other time’, ‘the restriction, paraphrasable with a negative expression, is essential to the total meaning of the message, and should be expressed early in the sentence’ (Rissanen 1980: 74). On the other hand, when *only* indicates ‘as recently as’, ‘the message centres on the action – the speaker’s meeting of the person in question – and the restriction is narrower in scope’ (Rissanen 1980: 74).

These studies suggest that in the case of written English, ‘the position after the first auxiliary verb and/or before the main verb [= PrV in our term]’ (König 1991: 18) is not always favoured by the typical restrictive focusing particle *only*, and thus it may NOT be NECESSARILY chosen most frequently, regardless of its highlighted constituents. Also, the position of *only* may not always be fixed even among constituents occurring in the same position and having the same function, such as temporal expressions. In short, as König (1991) and Herburger (2000) admit, it is not obvious what syntactic category *only* (and other grammatical devices such as *just* and *merely*) belongs to.

Instead of forcing *only* and other grammatical devices such as *just* and *merely* into some syntactic category, this thesis calls them *restrictive focusing particles* simply because the term *particle* applies well to other languages such as German and Japanese, and proposes ‘the focus construction specified by a restrictive focusing



particle'. Here the term 'construction' is used in the sense of the Construction Grammar approach (Fillmore et al. 1988; Kay 1990; Goldberg 1995; Kay and Fillmore 1999). Where Construction Grammar differs from other models such as Principles and Parameters is that it treats constructions as conventional patterns of linguistic structures which are paired with features of interpretation. Constructions thus contain lexical and syntactic properties as well as semantic and/or pragmatic features of interpretation. In this approach, 'a distinct construction is defined to exist if one or more of its properties are not strictly predictable from knowledge of other constructions existing in the language' (Goldberg 1995: 4).

As has been demonstrated above, Rissanen's (1980) empirical study of the variability of syntactic position of the typical restrictive focusing particle *only* in written English proposes that although the function of this particle does not change, its favoured position varies depending on types of highlighted constituents. Also, Jørgensen (1974) and Rissanen (1980) suggest that the position of *only* may not always be fixed even among constituents occurring in the same position and having the same function, such as temporal expressions. These studies do not assign a single general configuration to sentences containing a restrictive focusing particle; on the contrary, some sentences containing restrictive focusing particles may have the form of 'particle + highlighted constituents' (i.e., the case of PrA) and some sentences containing restrictive focusing particles may have the form of 'particle + verb + highlighted constituents' (i.e., the case of PrV). Furthermore, some sentences containing restrictive focusing particles may have the form of 'highlighted constituents + particle' (i.e., the case of PostA). Based on this suggestion, this thesis proposes that 'the focus construction specified by a restrictive focusing particle' has three sub-varieties depending on the position of restrictive focusing particles such as *only*. The three sub-varieties share the property of restrictively or exclusively highlighting but (in addition to having particles in different positions,) each has its own properties.

In Construction Grammar it is quite usual for clauses/sentences to be treated as specified by grammatical devices for highlighting (restrictively) particular

constituents. For example, Kay (1990) considers the construction specified by the focusing particle *even*, in particular the meaning of this construction. For the purpose of his study of information structure, Lambrecht (1994) focuses on his concerns with sentence-level-constructions whose function is to express differences in information structure proper, e.g. express differences in the respective scope of presupposition and the assertion and express differences in topic-focus structure. Let us consider 'the deictic *here*-construction', for instance. Lambrecht (1994: 39) describes it as calling 'the attention of an addressee to the hitherto unnoticed presence of some person or thing in the speech setting'. Consider the following from Lambrecht (1994: 39).

(37) Here comes the CAT.

In (37), the subject noun *cat* is focus, occurring after the verb and getting prosodic prominence. On the other hand, in (38) which is 'made by someone with an allergy to cats who was sitting in the house of a cat owner and who was hoping the animal wouldn't show up' (Lambrecht 1994: 41),

(38) And here the cat COMES! (Lambrecht 1994: 41)

the subject noun *cat* is not the entity newly introduced into what Lambrecht (1994) calls 'the text-external world' – the world which comprises speech participants and a speech setting such as place, time and circumstances where a speech event happens. Lambrecht emphasises that the difference in word order between (37) and (38) is directly associated with the difference in the discourse status of the referent. Schmid (2001) calls expressions of the type of *the thing is that ...* or *the problem was that ...* (which are called type B-clefting by Sornicola (1994: 4638) – see 1.1) as 'N-be-that-constructions' and suggests that this type of construction triggers different kinds of presupposition, depending on the meanings of the nouns used and on the degree to which the nouns bring in expected or new information.

It must be emphasised now that although the term ‘construction’ is used in the sense of the Construction Grammar approach, this thesis does not use the entire framework of Construction Grammar but exploits the insight of Construction Grammar that individual constructions need to be recognised and that particular constructions have their own syntactic properties as well as semantic and/or pragmatic features of interpretation which are not subject to general rules of syntax.

What exactly are the factors affecting the form of ‘the focus construction specified by a restrictive focusing particle’? That is, what exactly are the factors yielding the three sub-varieties of ‘the focus construction specified by a restrictive focusing particle’? Although many studies have pointed out the variability of their syntactic positions of restrictive focusing particles, hardly any of them have answered this question: English grammar books simply take either one of the views, allowing (or even recommending under certain conditions such as having clear context) PrV (i.e., the position where a restrictive focusing particle is detached from the highlighted constituent and is placed either immediately before the verb or after the first auxiliary verb, as in *John only visited Italy*) not only in spoken English but also in written English (see, for example, Chalker 1984; Quirk et al. 1985; Sinclair et al. 1990; Huddleston and Pullum 2002), or regarding PrA (i.e., the position where a restrictive focusing particle is placed before the constituent which is highlighted restrictively, as in *John visited only Italy*) as the best position in written English (see, Leech and Svartvik 1975; Greenbaum 1991).

(Restrictive) focusing particles were widely discussed in generative grammar especially in the 1970s (e.g. Fraser 1971; Anderson 1972; Jackendoff 1972; Ross and Cooper 1979; McCawley 1988). However, these studies concentrated on possible positions of (restrictive) focusing particles and frameworks to explain them. They do not answer the question raised at the beginning of this paragraph; nor do studies which noticed the variability of syntactic position of (restrictive) focusing particles (e.g. Taglicht’s 1984 descriptive study of the syntax and semantics of some focusing particles; König’s 1991 comparative study of focusing particles in English, German and some other languages, emphasising the meanings of particles; Herburger’s 2000

study of focusing particles as quantifiers). As has been mentioned, the empirical studies such as Rissanen (1980) attribute the variability of the syntactic position of the typical restrictive focusing particle *only* to some syntactic/semantic/pragmatic factors emerging from constituents that *only* highlights restrictively, e.g. to types of constituents as Rissanen (1980) suggests and to the meaning of constituents having the same function such as temporal expressions, as Rissanen (1980) and Jørgensen (1974) suggest. However, even Rissanen's (1980) empirical study, although it is the most thorough empirical examination of positional variation of *only* in written English we have had so far, is not detailed enough to answer the question – the question as to what exactly are the factors affecting the form of 'the focus construction specified by a restrictive focusing particle'. Rissanen suggests that, for example, *only* applying to clauses favours PrV. As we have pointed out on page 31, a more detailed investigation is required to answer the questions such as whether his suggestion that *only* highlighting clauses favours PrV applies to every type of clause or not.

It is one of the aims in this thesis to explore in detail factors influencing the form of 'the focus construction specified by *only*' in present-day written English. We restrict the scope of the discussion to the case of *only* in present-day written English. This is due to the fact that *only* is the prototypical restrictive focusing particle and that it is *only* that has been discussed when researchers have paid attention to the syntactic property of restrictive focusing particles, namely the variability of their syntactic position. The results of our detailed investigation will give us the systematic patterns in the form of 'the focus construction specified by the prototypical restrictive focusing particle *only*' in present-day written English and the properties peculiar to each sub-variety of the construction.

### *1.3.2. Range of constituents restrictively highlighted*

Researchers largely agree that another characteristic of restrictive focusing particles is that they restrictively highlight various syntactic categories and grammatical functions of constituents (e.g. Quirk et al. 1985; Herburger 2000): e.g. noun phrases

functioning as subject, as in *Only John solved the problem*, noun phrases functioning as object, as in *This year John visited only Italy*, verb phrases as in *You can only guess*, prepositional phrases as in *Last year John went only to Japan*, adverbial phrases as in *Mary moved only slightly*, clauses as in *Mary will go only if John goes too* and so on. Given this situation, Herburger (2000: 89), for example, claims that ‘*only* is an “admanythings” in that it attaches not only to verbal phrases, but in fact to all sorts of constituents’. (Note: The exceptional case is *alone*. The syntax of *alone* is different from that of other restrictive focusing particles. This restrictive focusing particle normally takes PostA and not other positions. The difference between *alone* and other restrictive focusing particles is also seen with respect to types of constituents it highlights. Different from other restrictive focusing particles such as *only*, it highlights only noun phrases. Thus while, *only reluctantly did he relent* is acceptable (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 591), where the highlighted constituent is the adverbial phrase *reluctantly*, *reluctantly alone did he relent* (Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 591) is not.)<sup>13</sup> The range of constituents restrictively highlighted is not confined to the immediate clause or predicate constituency, as mentioned very briefly in 1.3.1 (see page 27). Constituents such as *a few* in the sentence *He stayed for only a few days* (Taglicht 1984: 70) can be also highlighted. This highlighted constituent is not an immediate constituent of the predication or the clause, being inside a prepositional phrase.

What should be noticed is that contrary to restrictive focusing particles, other grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively, namely ALL cleft constructions, Reverse ALL cleft constructions and *nothing but* constructions, are severely restricted in the range of constituents that they can highlight. ALL cleft constructions highlight restrictively only verb phrases/complete clauses and noun phrases functioning as object, as in (39). Reverse ALL cleft constructions normally highlight deictic *that* or *this*, as in (40), and *nothing but* constructions highlight restrictively only noun phrases functioning as subject, noun phrases functioning as object, subject complements and post-verbal NPs in existential constructions, as in (41).

(39) **a. verb phrases/complete clauses**

e.g. All you have to do is (to) do your best.

**b. noun phrases functioning as object**

e.g. All that is heard is the sound of waves.

(40) This is all I know about that incident.

(41) **a. noun phrases functioning as subject**

e.g. Nobody but John answered that question.

**b. noun phrases functioning as object**

e.g. I've got nothing round about there apart from the lost steps

(The Map Task dialogues)

**c. subject complements**

e.g. It is nothing but a joke.

**d. post-verbal NPs in existential constructions**

e.g. there's nothing below you, er, apart from safari truck

(The Map Task dialogues)

Given that these constructions are severely restricted in the range of constituents they highlight, how do we account for the fact that, e.g., ALL cleft constructions also highlight particular constituents restrictively? Why do they exist alongside restrictive focusing particles? The answer must lie in differentiation at the level of pragmatics. These constructions have the same syntactic function as restrictive focusing particles and highlight the same types of constituent. Also, from a semantic point of view, we assume that restrictive focusing particles, ALL cleft constructions, Reverse ALL cleft constructions and *nothing but* constructions basically are similar, with the same 'exclusive' meaning. By assuming this, we disagree with Wierzbicka (1986: 599). Wierzbicka argues that the restrictive focusing particles *only*, *merely* and *just* are semantically different from each other: *only* is neutral, *merely* is depreciative and *just* easily lends itself to mildly positive. However, *only* is not necessarily neutral, as Nevalainen (1990: 80) claims following some examples from N. Finnis such as *You've only ruined my life's work* (sarcasm) and *He's only a plumber* (condescension). The implicatures expressed in the sentences such as *You've only*

*ruined my life's work* and *He's only a plumber* are highly dependent on context and are cancellable.<sup>14, 15</sup>

The question to be addressed now is this: what exactly is the pragmatic differentiation among restrictive focusing particles, ALL cleft constructions, Reverse ALL cleft constructions and *nothing but* constructions? To the best of my knowledge, there are no studies answering this question. Interestingly, despite their clear status as cleft constructions, little attention has been paid to ALL cleft constructions and Reverse ALL cleft constructions in the study of clefts so far. Previous studies of cleft constructions normally deal with IT cleft constructions and/or WH cleft constructions (and/or Reverse WH cleft constructions). See, for example, Akmajian (1979), Taglicht (1984), Quirk et al. (1985), Sornicola (1988), Miller and Weinert (1998) and Huddleston and Pullum (2002). Little or no attention has been paid to ALL cleft constructions and Reverse ALL cleft constructions in these studies. The same applies to *nothing but* constructions. There are hardly any studies examining this type of construction.

My second main point of interest has to do with the question raised at the beginning of the previous paragraph. By paying special attention to the distribution of the restrictive focusing particles *only* and *just*, ALL cleft constructions, Reverse ALL cleft constructions and *nothing but* constructions in some types of discourse, and factors influencing it, we will give some answers to the question as to what exactly is the pragmatic differentiation among the grammatical devices under discussion. (As space is limited, with respect to restrictive focusing particles, we will concentrate on *only* and *just*, and will not consider other restrictive focusing particles such as *merely*.) It is presumed here that the distribution of devices with similar syntactic and semantic properties is influenced by their pragmatic properties. The results of our investigation will, it is hoped, demonstrate how the grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively contribute to discourse organisation.

#### 1.4. Structure of the thesis and the main findings in the analysis

The thesis has two main parts, one for each of the two main points of interest regarding the usage of the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively. The first part deals with the question as to what exactly the restrictive focusing particles, *only* and *just*, ALL cleft constructions, Reverse ALL cleft constructions and *nothing but* constructions differ pragmatically, and the second deals with the question as to what exactly are the factors affecting the form of 'the focus construction specified by a restrictive focusing particle'. Chapter 2 discusses some pragmatic properties suggested by previous studies. Then following on from the discussion in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 predicts the distribution of the English grammatical devices for restrictively highlighting particular constituents in a set of empirical data. It also presents the methodology of investigation and the materials used. Chapters 4 and 5 then investigate the hypothesis that the grammatical devices for restrictively highlighting particular constituents have different pragmatic functions, paying attention to the choice and distribution of the grammatical devices in two different types of discourse. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 deal with the factors affecting the form of 'the focus construction specified by a restrictive focusing particle'. To answer this question, as mentioned on page 36, the thesis restricts the scope of the discussion to the prototypical restrictive focusing particle *only*. Based on previous studies on the positional variation of *only*, we predict that there is the potential that the following four linguistic/extralinguistic properties may be the factors affecting the form of 'the focus construction specified by *only*'. The linguistic properties are scalarity, scope and rhythmic balance; the extralinguistic property is formality. Chapter 6 encompasses an extensive review of those four possible factors affecting the positional variation of *only*. It will also give information on the experimental design. Chapters 7 and 8 concentrate on investigating to what extent the hypothesis is valid, by means of an experimental procedure which systematically controls for the factors. Finally, Chapter 9 summarises the results of the thesis.



The main findings emerging from the investigation are as follows.

1. The English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively have different pragmatic functions with respect to:

- (a) discourse functions and the structures of discourse organised by the grammatical devices;
- (b) the ways in which the devices contribute to a structuring of information in discourse;
- (c) whether they have an interpersonal function or not;
- (d) sensitivity to context and to the semantic and pragmatic properties of highlighted constituents.

2. Rhythmic balance and formality affect the position of *only*.

- (a) the sub-variety with *only* in PrA is associated with high formality
- (b) the sub-variety with *only* in PrV is associated with one-syllable verbs preceding the highlighted constituent functioning as object
- (c) the sub-variety with *only* in PostA is associated with high formality and three-syllable verbs preceding the highlighted constituent functioning as object

On the other hand, scalarity does not affect the position of *only* being peculiar to one of the sub-varieties. Furthermore, in the case of scope, it was unclear whether sentences containing *only* are affected by differences in scope and whether the latter are peculiar to a particular sub-variety.

The results of the investigation in this thesis demonstrate how certain grammatical devices with the similar syntactic functions and semantics differ from each other pragmatically and the extent to which syntactic choice is related to the process of structuring discourse. The results of the investigation enrich our understanding of the

way how the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively help to structure discourse.

This thesis also offers a more detailed account than is currently available of the systematic patterns in the form of ‘the focus construction specified by *only*’ and of the properties peculiar to each sub-variety of the construction. The findings are more detailed than in grammar book descriptions such as ‘PrV is allowed or even recommended under certain condition such as having clear context’ (e.g. Huddleston and Pullum 2002). We do not deny the role of context, but such description does not address the positional variation of *only*, which requires a more delicate explanation. As pointed out in 1.3, even Rissanen’s (1980) empirical study is not detailed enough to make it clear the systematic patterns in the form of ‘the focus construction specified by *only*’ and the properties peculiar to each sub-variety of the construction. The findings are particularly significant, in terms of the question as to which sub-variety is the most neutral and is used most frequently. This question has long been discussed in English language classrooms and grammars but there is no generally accepted answer. Our findings suggest that each sub-variety has its own properties and the analysis will help in the preparation of teaching materials on the use of *only*. In short, this thesis provides a clearer picture of the usage of the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively.

## 2. Pragmatics of English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively: Preliminary discussion based on the suggestions of previous studies

Sub-section 1.3.2 in the previous chapter predicted that the restrictive focusing particles, *only* and *just*, ALL cleft constructions, Reverse ALL cleft constructions and *nothing but* constructions must be different pragmatically. Before investigating this hypothesis in detail, let us discuss the pragmatics of these grammatical devices, based on the suggestions of previous studies. As has been mentioned, previous studies of these grammatical devices are restricted mainly to the restrictive focusing particles, *only* and/or *just*. So far little or no attention has been paid to ALL cleft constructions, Reverse ALL cleft constructions and *nothing but* constructions. For this reason, this chapter discusses previous studies of the pragmatics of *only* and *just*. The first half deals with the ways in which *only* contributes to a structuring of information in discourse. The second half deals with the interpersonal function of *just*, the function by which we may 'recognise the speech function, the type of offer, command, statement, or question, the attitudes and judgments embodied in it, and the rhetorical features that constitute it as a symbolic act' (Halliday and Hasan 1989: 45). The discussion is meant to prepare the ground for the detailed investigation of the pragmatics of English grammatical devices under consideration in subsequent chapters.

### 2.1. English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively and information structure: The case of *only*

Traditionally, the structuring of information in discourse has been analysed in terms of Theme-Rheme; Topic-Comment; and Given-New. These notions, according to Östman and Virtanen (1997: 96), are not hierarchically ordered. They are different parameters that together contribute to information structure. The restrictive focusing particle *only* (and other grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively) has to do with the distinction between given and new.

As mentioned in 1.3.2, *only* restrictively highlights various syntactic categories and grammatical functions of constituents. In a large number of cases, constituents restrictively highlighted by *only* are marked by intonational prominence, as in (1). (Note: Constituents marked by intonational prominence are in bold. Constituents highlighted by *only* are marked by small capitals.)

(1) John *only* introduced **BILL** to Sue.

(Vallduví 1992: 145)

In (1), *Bill* is the constituent restrictively highlighted by *only*. It is also marked by intonational prominence. Intonationally prominent elements are said to carry new information.

Let us illustrate this point. The difference between the B sentences in (2) derives solely from the placement of intonational prominence and new information conveyed by the intonationally prominent elements.

(2) a. A: Who met Mary yesterday?

B: **John** met Mary yesterday.

b. A: Who did John meet yesterday?

B: John met **Mary** yesterday.

c. A: When did John meet Mary?

B: John met Mary **yesterday**.

The constituents in bold convey new information in that they provide the answers to the questions. (That is to say, they represent the addition of information in the current discourse.) The remainder of each clause repeats information that is conveyed by the question and therefore given. The difference between the constituents in bold and the remainder of the clauses, with respect to informational status, is further supported by the fact that strictly speaking, each answer in (2) is not the most natural way to utter the questions; the most natural way is simply to answer the constituents marked by intonational prominence and to ellipt the remaining parts of the clauses as in (2').

- (2') a. A: Who met Mary yesterday?  
B: John.  
b. A: Who did John meet yesterday?  
B: Mary.  
c. A: When did John meet Mary?  
B: Yesterday.

The constituents in bold in (2B) cannot be ellipted. Considering what has been mentioned above, it is safe to say that the constituent *Bill* in (1) is new information.

In many cases (e.g. 91% in Nevalainen's 1987 examination of the London-Lund Corpus of spoken English of educated British), the constituents highlighted by *only* are marked by intonational prominence completely or at least partially if the highlighted constituents are lengthy (see Quirk et al. 1985: 1357). (3) illustrates the latter type. (Note: The symbols used in Nevalainen 1987 and corresponding to the London-Lund Corpus transcription are deleted.)

(3) I've only been there **THREE YEARS**.

(Nevalainen 1987: 146; Originally from the London-Lund Corpus)

What should be noticed, however, is that as Nevalainen (1987), König (1991), Vallduví (1992), Dryer (1996) and Partee (1999), among others, point out, this high frequency does not mean that the constituent highlighted by *only* coincides with the intonationally prominent element carrying new information. Constituents highlighted by *only* do not necessarily correspond to constituents marked by intonational prominence. (Herburger 2000: 63 calls this kind of constituent *second occurrence focus*.) That is to say, they do not necessarily carry new information. Consider the following.<sup>1</sup>

(4) A: I hear that John only gave **A BOOK** to Mary.

B: True, but John only gave **A BOOK** to **many people**.

(Dryer 1996: 477)

- (5) but some of these there's just a **few** but (there's)  
 even if it's **only** A FEW some of those children that **come** there  
 (Nevalainen 1987: 158)<sup>2</sup>
- (6) A: Eva only gave xerox copies to **THE GRADUATE STUDENTS**.  
 B: (no,) **Petr** only gave xerox copies to THE GRADUATE STUDENTS.  
 (Herburger 2000: 63; originally from Partee 1991)
- (7) A: Who did John only introduce **BILL** to?  
 B: John only introduced BILL to **Sue**. (Vallduví 1992: 149)
- (8) It's **John** who only eats RICE. (Vallduví 1992: 146)

According to Dryer (1996), the only sensible interpretation in (4B) is one in which the constituent highlighted by *only* is *a book*, but the constituent marked by intonational prominence, which is new information, is *many people*. In (5), the constituent highlighted by *only*, *a few*, is not new information and the constituent marked by *only* is a repetition of *just* in *there's just a few*. According to a native speaker of British English, what is new is the speaker putting the proposition as a concession-condition: *even if ...*. In B's reply in (6), *the graduate students* is clearly understood as the constituent highlighted by *only*. This constituent is not new information, since the part *only gave xerox copies to the graduate students* is the repeated part and it is now familiar to the participants in the dialogue. (*Petr* is new information.) In (7B), *Bill* is the constituent highlighted by *only*, but the new information is *Sue*. This sentence is felicitous with such contexts as one in which John introduced Bill and Mary to Andrew, but Bill and not Mary to Sue. Furthermore, what conveys new information in (8) is *John* and not the constituent highlighted by *only*, namely *rice*.<sup>3,4</sup>

In short, the constituents restrictively highlighted by *only* in (4B), (5), (6B), (7B) and (8) are not new. (Notice that this is consistent with Dik et al.'s 1981 claim that salient information is not necessarily new to the addressee.) The question now arises: what kind of information is conveyed by the constituents restrictively highlighted by *only* in (4B), (5), (6B), (7B) and (8) convey? Different terms such as *given/old/presupposition/ground* have been used to describe the type of information

conveyed by them, as the complement of new information, and the same terms have been interpreted differently by different researchers. That is, despite having been argued over for decades, there still remains continued misunderstanding and considerable confusion in the literature as to the notion of new and its complement.

In what follows in this section, in 2.1.1, we review some major literature on the complement of new information, based on Prince (1981) which is often cited as an important study. Then we explore one of Prince's distinctions – the distinction between *saliency* and *shared knowledge* –, drawing on work by Dryer (1996). Whereas Prince (1981) focuses on the status of cognitive entities corresponding to noun phrases, Dryer focuses on the status of propositional entities in the discourse and emphasises the necessity of the distinction between *pragmatic presupposition* and *activation*, similar to the distinction that Prince drew between saliency and shared knowledge. In 2.1.3, we show that it is this distinction that characterises the information conveyed by constituents which are restrictively highlighted by *only* and which do not correspond to intonationally prominent elements. Constituents that are highlighted by *only* and that do not correspond to intonationally prominent elements relate to activation in some cases (e.g. (4B), (5) and (6B)) and to pragmatic presupposition in others (e.g. (8)). We also show that some examples, such as (7B), relate both to activation and to pragmatic presupposition. Furthermore, 2.1.4 shows that constituents highlighted by *only* can be activated (but not pragmatically presupposed) even though they are marked by intonational prominence. 2.1.5 examines some previous literature relating to the discussion in this section. Finally 2.1.6 summarises the section.

### 2.1.1. Three different types of 'givenness'

Prince (1981) distinguished the following three types of 'givenness'.

(9) Givenness in the sense of predictability/recoverability

Givenness in the sense of saliency

Givenness in the sense of shared knowledge

We will have a brief look at them restrictively.

#### 2.1.1.1. Givenness in the sense of predictability/recoverability

Prince (1981: 226) describes this type of givenness as follows (Note: The small capitals are in the original.):

- (10) The speaker assumes that the hearer CAN PREDICT OR COULD HAVE PREDICTED that a PARTICULAR LINGUISTIC ITEM will or would occur in a particular position WITHIN A SENTENCE.

She represents Kuno's (1972) 'old information' and Halliday's (1967) 'given information' as this type of givenness. Kuno defines old information in terms of recoverability. He claims that this definition plays an important role in the phenomena of English pronominalisation. On the other hand, Halliday (1967) defines what he calls given in terms of intonation. As discussed briefly in 1.1 in Chapter 1, Halliday (1967) proposes that tone groups, which are units of intonation, serve to organise discourse by functioning as the realisation of information units in the discourse. One information unit is realised as one tone group and each information unit consists of one obligatory component, the tonic segment, and one optional component, the pretonic segment. The tonic segment is marked by intonational prominence and is said to carry *information focus*. Information focus assigns the function 'new' to what is within its domain – new in the sense that the speaker presents information as not being recoverable from the preceding discourse. He divides information focus into two types, unmarked information focus and marked information focus.<sup>5</sup> In the case of marked information focus, the rest of the information unit, namely the pretonic segment, is given, but the status of the information unit in the case of unmarked information focus is not specified: the domain of unmarked information focus may be the whole of the information unit, since unmarked information focus does not imply any preceding information, and therefore an item with unmarked focus may be ambiguous, as having the structure of given-new or simply new.<sup>6</sup>



### 2.1.1.2. Givenness in the sense of saliency

Chafe's (1976) notion falls under this type of givenness. Chafe (1976: 30) defines given information as 'that knowledge which the speaker assumes to be in the consciousness of the addressee at the time of the utterances'. He takes it to be a binary distinction.<sup>7</sup> The key notion for his definition is consciousness. Consciousness, according to Chafe (1976: 32), has the property that its capacity is very limited. He states that as 'new ideas come into it, old ones leave. The speaker's treatment of an item as given, therefore, should cease when he judges that item to have left his addressee's consciousness' (p.32). Thus, in his definition, for example, *your father* in the sentence *I saw your father yesterday* can be regarded as new information, in the sense that the speaker introduces *your father* by saying the sentence *I saw your father yesterday* into the consciousness of the listener who, the speaker assumes, was not thinking of his/her father at the time of the utterances. This point is very different from Clark and Haviland (1977) who, as we will see in section 2.1.1.3, define the status of information, according to whether it is already in the listener's knowledge or is introduced into his/her knowledge for the first time. Moreover, for givenness to be established, the referent expressed by a noun 'must have been explicitly introduced in the discourse or be present in the physical context or be categorized in the same way as a referent previously introduced or physically present' (p.32).

### 2.1.1.3. Givenness in the sense of shared knowledge

This type of givenness is represented by Clark and Haviland's (1977) 'given information'. They define given information as information that the speaker believes 'the listener already knows and accepts as true' (Clark and Haviland 1977: 3). According to Clark and Haviland, listeners take three steps: at Step 1, they divide the current utterance into the given and new information. Then at Step 2, they search memory for a structure containing propositions that match the given information. Finally, at Step 3, they attach the new information to the memory structure. At Step 2, the listener's memory structure may not necessarily contain propositions that match the given information precisely. In such cases, s/he may construct an indirect

structure by building an inferential bridge from something s/he already knows or may add ‘a new node (a nominal associated with one or more propositions)’ (p.7) to his/her memory structure to serve as the given information. (This often happens at the beginning of conversations, as with the sentence, for example, *The old woman died* (Clark and Haviland 1977: 7), where with no prior context, the listener does not know such a woman.) Or, even though it is relatively rare, the listener may restructure what is new and what is given in the utterance. This occurs when the speaker has violated the given-new contrast altogether.

Some word-order phenomena such as (11) are, as Prince (1981: 231) notes, sensitive to givenness in the sense of shared knowledge: the oddness of (11b) is derived from the tendency to put old information before new information – old information in the sense of shared knowledge and not in the sense of predictability/recoverability or saliency, as both *John* and *a boy* are equally unpredictable/unrecoverable and unsalient in (11).<sup>8</sup>

- (11) a. John hit a boy on the head. (Prince 1981: 231)  
b. ?A boy was hit on the head by John. (Prince 1981: 231)

Prince (1981) rejects the term shared knowledge and proposes the term *assumed familiarity*, reflecting the fact that only an omniscient observer can truly know what knowledge is in fact shared by the speaker or writer and the addressee. She further claims that a binary distinction between given information and new information is inadequate.

### 2.1.2. Dryer’s (1996) ‘pragmatic presupposition’ and ‘activation’

Of the three types of givenness distinguished by Prince (1981), two – givenness in the sense of saliency and givenness in the sense of shared knowledge – are similar to two notions proposed by Dryer (1996).<sup>9</sup> Dryer (1996) argues that we should distinguish givenness in the sense of *presupposed* from givenness in the sense of *activated* (in the mind of the listener). He calls the former *pragmatic presupposition*

and the latter *activation*. According to him, with respect to the pragmatic property characterising the complement of new information (or *nonfocus* in his term), while it may be pragmatic presupposition that characterises the complement of new information in cleft constructions in English, it is activation rather than pragmatic presupposition that characterises the complement of new information in what he calls simple focus sentences in English, in which new information is indicated solely by intonation. His claim that it is not pragmatic presupposition that characterises the complement of new information in simple focus sentences in English is close to Chafe (1976). We now give a brief overview of what he calls pragmatic presupposition and activation.

#### 2.1.2.1. Pragmatic presupposition

Pragmatic presupposition is loosely characterised as a ‘set of propositions that the speaker of an utterance believes and assumes the hearer to believe as well’ (Dryer 1996: 478). This notion apparently corresponds to the notion of givenness assumed by Clark and Haviland (1977) – the notion of givenness in the sense of shared knowledge. Showing the following examples, Dryer claims that pragmatic presupposition is involved in cleft constructions<sup>10</sup>; (12a) is appropriate when the speaker assumes that the listener believes (12b).

- (12) a. It was Mary that John saw.  
b. John saw someone (or something).

#### 2.1.2.2. Activation

The notion of activation is equivalent to the notion of givenness proposed by Chafe (1976) – the notion of givenness in the sense of saliency. It is important to note that activation is a property of cognitive entities. This notion relates to the assumption that of the very large amount of knowledge in one’s mind, only a small amount of it is activated or ‘lit up’ (Dryer 1996: 480) at a given point in time, while most of the knowledge in one’s mind is not activated at that point in time. Dryer (1996) claims

that activated elements may be considered to be the elements in short-term memory and that, therefore, the activation status of elements ‘changes rapidly through time’ (p.481), and they ‘often become deactivated within a short period of time’ (p.481). Linguistically the role of activation is reflected in the usage of third person pronouns vs. noun phrases headed by nouns.<sup>11</sup> This claim is consistent with Chafe’s (1976) claims that the capacity of consciousness is very limited.

Dryer suggests, in contrast with Chafe (1976) who takes a binary distinction and similar to Chafe (1987), that the distinction between activated elements and nonactivated elements is not a discrete binary distinction, but a continuum one, since the process of deactivation seems to be gradual. Also, there is degree of activation in the sense that even among elements that are fully activated, some may be particularly activated in the sense that more attention is paid to some than to others.

Furthermore, pointing out that Chafe (1976) discusses givenness in the sense of saliency (or activation in Dryer’s term) with respect to the status of cognitive entities corresponding to noun phrases, Dryer extends his notion of activation to the status of propositional entities. He points out that the difference between cleft constructions and what he calls simple focus sentences, in which new information is indicated solely by intonation, is that while the former involve pragmatic presupposition, the latter do not. Consider the following contrast in the acceptability of the B sentences in the question-answer pair. (Note: The examples are from Dryer 1996: 487-8. Constituents marked by intonational prominence are in bold.)

(13) A: Who saw John?

B: \*It was **nobody** that saw John.

(14) A: Who saw John?

B: **Nobody** saw John.

According to Dryer (1996: 488), the unacceptability of (13B) is derived from the fact that the cleft construction presupposes that someone saw John, which contradicts the assertion that nobody saw John. On the other hand, (14B) is acceptable, since in

(14B) the proposition that someone saw John is not presupposed but activated. It is certain that the question in (14A) does pragmatically presuppose this proposition. But this question also causes the proposition to become activated in the mind of the listener (i.e., B in (14B)), in the sense that the listener thinks at the time of utterance about the proposition.

A similar contrast is exemplified by (15) and (16), from Dryer (1996: 489).

(15) A: Did anyone see John?

B: \*It was **Mary** that saw John.

(16) A: Did anyone see John?

B: **Mary** saw John.

Again the example containing the cleft is unacceptable: while (15B) involves the presupposition that someone saw John, it is certain that from (15A), this is not a proposition that the speaker believes and assumes the listener to believe as well. On the other hand, the corresponding example with the simple focus sentence is acceptable: (16B) does not involve a pragmatic presupposition that someone saw John, since (16A) implies that A does not have such belief.

Here one question arises: although the complement of new information (or nonfocus in Dryer's term) corresponds to an activated proposition in the examples (14) and (16), is any part of a sentence corresponding to an activated proposition the complement of new information? According to Dryer (1996: 498), it is possible for constituents that represent new information to be activated as well, even if the rest of a sentence, namely the complement of new information, must be activated. The following from Dryer (1996: 496) serves as an example<sup>12</sup> (Note: The constituents marked by intonational prominence are in bold.):

(17) A: Did **Mary** kiss John or did **Sally** kiss him?

B: **Mary** kissed John.

In (17B), not only *kissed John* corresponds to the activated proposition that someone kissed John, but also the entire sentence *Mary kissed John* corresponds to the proposition that Mary kissed John, which is activated by A's question. These two activated propositions are different from each other as to degree of activation. The proposition that someone kissed John is more highly activated, since this proposition alone is activated by the question in (17A).

It is important to bear in mind that the notion of activation is not necessarily enough to characterise the pragmatic property of some complements of new information in sentences falling under what Dryer calls 'simple focus sentence'. The notion of pragmatic presupposition is also needed. This is particularly so in the case of some (but not all) straightforward answers to wh-questions, as in (18). (Note: (18) is from Dryer 1996: 486.)

(18) A: Who saw John?

B: **Mary** saw John.

Dryer admits the existence of examples such as (18); yet he does not regard them as counter-examples to his argument. He points out that there is a widely held view that wh-questions involve a presupposition that something exists that will satisfy the question. Thus, if the wh-question in (18A) pragmatically presupposes that someone saw John, this means that this proposition is treated by the speaker as part of the common ground. And unless B chooses to challenge this presupposition, it remains part of the common ground. So his interpretation of (18B) is this: it is apparent that in (18B), it is presupposed that someone saw John and that this proposition corresponds to the complement of the new information (or *nonfocus* in his term) *saw John*. However, this is because the wh-question 'involves pragmatic presupposition and unless the individual answering the question wants to deny this presupposition, the answer to the question will share the same pragmatic presupposition' (p.496). He claims that the cases such as (14) and (16) are crucial to his discussion and that 'we do not need to explain it [i.e., the proposition that someone saw John is presupposed

in (18B)] in terms of what is nonfocus [i.e., the complement of new information]' (p.486).

His explanation of (18B), however, is not persuasive. In my view, (18B) should be interpreted as follows: both pragmatic presupposition and activation are relevant to the proposition that someone saw John. The proposition that someone saw John in (18B) is activated at the time of utterance both in the mind of the speaker (i.e., B) and that of the listener (i.e., A) by the utterance of (18A). At the same time, this proposition is pragmatically presupposed in (18B). That is, the speaker believes this proposition and assumes that the listener to believe it as well. The speaker believes this proposition; otherwise s/he does not answer like (18B). It is also certain that in (18B), B assumes that the listener, namely the speaker in (18A), believes that proposition: (18A) must be inappropriate if the speaker does not believe that someone saw John. To sum, the proposition that someone saw John in (18B) is different from the proposition that someone saw John in (14B) and (16B), where the proposition is activated but not pragmatically presupposed. It could be said that (18B) is a borderline case where both activation and pragmatic presupposition are related. It is not clear whether pragmatic presupposition or activation characterises the constituent highlighted by *only* more strongly.

Such is an outline of Dryer's proposals for the pragmatic properties characterising propositions corresponding to the complement of new information in sentences.

### 2.1.3. Status of constituents restrictively highlighted by 'only'

Let us now return to our original question: what kind of information is conveyed by constituents that are restrictively highlighted by *only* and do not correspond to intonationally prominent elements? We will consider examples (4) – (8) repeated here as (19) – (23). (Note: Constituents marked by intonational prominence are in bold. Constituents highlighted by *only* are marked by small capitals.)

(19) A: I hear that John only gave **A BOOK** to Mary.

B: True, but John only gave A BOOK to **many people**.

(Dryer 1996: 477)

(20) but some of these there's just a **few** but (there's)

even if it's **only** A FEW some of those children that **come** there

(Nevalainen 1987: 158)

(21) A: Eva only gave xerox copies to **THE GRADUATE STUDENTS**.

B: (no,) **Petr** only gave xerox copies to THE GRADUATE STUDENTS.

(Herburger 2000: 63; originally from Partee 1991)

(22) A: Who did John only introduce **BILL** to?

B: John only introduced BILL to **Sue**.

(Vallduví 1992: 149)

(23) It's **John** who only eats RICE.

(Vallduví 1992: 146)

In (19B), the constituent *many people*, which is marked by intonational prominence, is new information and *John only gave a book to* is the complement of new information. (19B) does not presuppose that John only gave a book to someone. What occurs in (19B) is that the proposition that John only gave a book to someone is activated: it has been mentioned in the preceding context and is something that both A and B are thinking about at the time of utterance. This proposition cannot be a pragmatic presupposition, since what A in (19A) says is that s/he hears (from someone) that John only gave a book to Mary. The characteristics of this type of sentence – which we may call hearsay sentences – are that the source of information is not the speaker himself/herself and that what the speaker does is simply to relay information to the listener (which is also speaker B in (19)). Whether s/he believes that information is left uncertain. This point is clearly supported by the fact that we can deny the information by adding, for example, *but I do not believe it*. All B in (19B) assumes is that the proposition that John only gave a book to someone is activated in the mind of the listener (i.e., A in (19A)) at the time of utterance.

The important point to observe is that there is a degree of activation: although *John only gave a book to* corresponds to the activated proposition that John only gave a book to someone in (19B), *a book*, which is the constituent highlighted by *only*, is



less activated than the remainder of the activated proposition by the fact that the remainder of the activated proposition (i.e., the proposition that John gave only something to someone) alone is relevant to (19A). Since *John only gave to Mary* is the complement of new information (*a book* is new information) in the *that*-clause of (19A), the part of the activated proposition, namely John only gave something to someone, is plausibly more highly activated than *a book* in (19B).

In (20), what is new is the speaker putting the proposition as a concession-condition: *even if ...*. The constituent *a few*, which is restrictively highlighted by *only*, is the part of the activated proposition that it is only a few. It has been mentioned in the preceding context (i.e., *there's just a few*) and is lit up in the minds of the speaker and the listener. At the time of utterance, there is no clear evidence to suppose that the constituent *a few* is believed both by the speaker and the listener. Thus, it cannot be said that this constituent is a pragmatic presupposition.

Here again, there is a degree of activation: although *a few* is the part of the activated proposition that it is only a few in (20), it is less activated than the remainder of the activated proposition by the fact that those parts alone are relevant to the preceding clause *there is just*. (It should be noticed that the constituent *a few* is new information and marked by intonational prominence in *there's just a few*. It also should be noticed that *only* in (20) is a repetition of *just* in this clause.)

In (21B), the constituent *the graduate students*, which is restrictively highlighted by *only*, is not new information but the part of the activated proposition, since it is part of the preceding utterance and is lit up in the minds of the speaker and the listener. At the time of utterance, there is no clear evidence to suppose that the constituent *the graduate students* is believed both by the speaker and the listener. It should also be noticed that, similarly to the cases of (19B) and (20), there is a degree of activation in (21B): *the graduate students* in (21B) is less activated than the remainder of the proposition that somebody only gave xerox copies to the graduate students because only the remainder is relevant to (21A).

(22) is similar to cases where straightforward answers to wh-questions (e.g. A: Who saw John? B: **Mary** saw John) are related to both pragmatic presupposition and activation. In (22B), the constituent restrictively highlighted by *only* relates both to activation and pragmatic presupposition. To put it more concretely, the proposition that John introduced only Bill to someone in (22B) is activated at the time of utterance both in the mind of B (i.e., the speaker) and that of A (i.e., the listener) by A in (22A) uttering the wh-question. At the same time, this proposition is pragmatically presupposed in (22B) by both B (i.e., the speaker) and A (i.e., the listener). B (i.e., the speaker) believes this proposition; otherwise s/he does not answer with (22B). It is also certain that B assumes that A (i.e., the listener) believes that proposition: (22A) must be inappropriate if A does not believe that someone saw John. It may be reasonable to suppose that the constituent restrictively highlighted by *only* in (22B) is a borderline case.

Example (23) has a different explanation. (23) is the case where it is pragmatic presupposition and not activation that characterises the constituent highlighted by *only*, namely *rice*. As was mentioned in 2.1.2, it is pragmatic presupposition that characterises the complement of new information in cleft constructions. In (23), the cleft presupposes that someone eats only rice. Hence, the constituent restrictively highlighted by *only*, *rice*, corresponds to part of that pragmatic presupposition.

It follows from what has been said that there exist two cases: in one case constituents are highlighted by *only*, do not correspond to the intonationally prominent element and are activated; in the other case they are pragmatically characterised not by activation but by pragmatic presupposition. (19B), (20) and (21B) clearly fall under the former case. On the other hand, (23) is an example of the latter. (22B) can be said to be the borderline example between these two cases. It is not clear whether pragmatic presupposition or activation characterises the constituent highlighted by *only* more strongly. It is also reasonable to suppose from (19B), (20) and (21B) that there is degree of activation and that constituents highlighted by *only* are less activated than the remainder of activated propositions.

#### 2.1.4. Further cases where highlighted constituents are not new but activated

Interestingly, in some cases, constituents highlighted by *only* can be activated even though they are marked by intonational prominence. Nevalainen (1987: 153) found such cases in the London-Lund Corpus. Consider the following. (Note: The symbols used in Nevalainen 1987 and corresponding to the London-Lund Corpus transcription are deleted. The constituent highlighted by *only* is marked by small capitals and the intonationally prominent element is in bold.)

(24) where the **husband did** become **suspicious** and **only** WHEN HE BECAME  
SUSPICIOUS the **wife then** took **steps**

(Originally from the London-Lund Corpus)

Here the highlighted constituent *he became suspicious* is the repetition. Thus although *suspicious* is marked by intonational prominence, in our analysis, it is treated as activated information in the minds of the speaker and the listener at the time of utterance.

We can find similar examples in other data. For example, the Map Task dialogues obtained from the Map Task experiments (see 3.3 for details of the data) offer three examples where the constituents highlighted by *only* are not new but activated.<sup>13</sup> They are:

(25) G1: Okay. So you're gonna come up, and then you're gonna come  
about the old mill and turn ...

F1: Old mill?

G2: Old mill.

F2: Oh right, I've just got the mill wheel.

G3: (**check**) Mill ... You've only got a mill wheel?

(26) G1: ehm, underneath the field station.

F1: Right. That's way over the far left-hand side of the page on my  
map.

G2: Where is field station?

F2: Field station's way over the far left.

G3: It's the far ... Well, there's two field stations on my map.

F3: Well, there's not one on mine.

G4: Right,

(**check**) So you've only got one there.

(27) F1: You want me to go ... You want to curve up to about the level of the great rock? I don't know if you have that

G1: No, not as far as that

F2: See ...

G2: (**clarify**) [I want you to take] Only a small curve.

The data consists of recorded dialogues, which makes it clear that these highlighted constituents are marked by intonational prominence. However, these constituents are not new: in (25), *only* highlights *a mill wheel*, which is activated in the minds of the speaker and the listener at the time of utterance, since it was mentioned in F2. This constituent cannot be a pragmatic presupposition, since as the function coding is 'check', it is uncertain whether the speaker believes the proposition that the follower has only got a mill wheel. Similarly, the highlighted constituent *one* in G4 in (26) is *the field station* mentioned in G1. Thus it is activated in the minds of the speaker and the listener. (It is not safe to suppose that this constituent is pragmatically presupposed.) In (27), not the whole (i.e., *a small curve*) but the part of the highlighted constituent (i.e., *a curve*) in G2 is activated, since it is relevant to the question *You want to curve up to about the level of the great rock* by F1. (*Small* is new information.)

#### 2.1.5. Reexamining previous literature as to the status of constituents restrictively highlighted by 'only'

So far this section has proposed that while in a large number of cases, constituents restrictively highlighted by *only* are new information, there are cases where constituents highlighted by *only* are either part of an activated proposition or part of a

pragmatic presupposition. In this sub-section, we will have a brief look at some previous literature relating to the discussion in this section and indicate some problems.

#### 2.1.5.1. Nevalainen (1987)

Nevalainen (1987) explores the question to what extent constituents highlighted by *only* coincide with intonationally prominent elements, based on conversational data sampled from the prosodically transcribed the London-Lund Corpus of educated British English, which consists of some 435,000 words. The data contains 429 instances of the restrictive focusing particle *only*.

Nevalainen's results are as follows: while the vast majority (i.e., 91%) of constituents highlighted by *only* are marked by intonational prominence completely or at least partially, there exist cases where constituents highlighted by *only* are left fully unmarked by intonational prominence (i.e., 9%) in the data. To take an example,

(28) the Talbots have had this business of syndactylism only in the male line  
we've all got Talbot blood but only TALBOTS **have** it

(Nevalainen 1987: 148)

In this example, the highlighted constituent, *Talbots*, is not marked by intonational prominence.

Based on her results, Nevalainen suggests that the relationship between constituents highlighted by *only* and intonationally prominent elements is a scale ranging from complete overlap at the one end to complementarity at the other. Nevalainen proposes that constituents which are highlighted by *only* and which are not marked by intonational prominence are presumably considered 'fully established, backgrounded information by the speaker' (p.148). Nevalainen claims that the status of what she calls fully established, backgrounded information is 'given, or more precisely evoked' (p.148) and that it 'must hence be ideally recoverable from the

context' (p.148). However, Nevalainen's claim is obscure. It drives us to the following questions: is 'evoked' equivalent to activation (or, in other words, givenness in the sense of saliency). Or is it equivalent to givenness in the sense of predictability/recoverability in that the status of fully established, backgrounded information is ideally recoverable from the context? These questions are derived as a result of lacking a clear definition of her 'fully established, backgrounded information by the speaker'.

#### 2.1.5.2. Vallduví (1992)

Vallduví (1992) too draws attention to cases where constituents restrictively highlighted by *only* are not necessarily marked by intonational prominence. How does he analyse constituents that are highlighted by *only* and that are not new information? He takes them as 'part of ground' (p.148). He defines the term *ground*, adapting Prince's (1985: 65) view of salient shared knowledge, as 'what the speaker assumes about the hearer's belief'. In this view, whether speakers believe the set of propositions to be true or not is treated as irrelevant. Therefore, speakers can utter sentences containing some set of propositions which are not believed by them but which are believed by listeners. For example, speakers can utter the sentence *I saw nobody at the party* if they assume that their listeners believe the proposition that the speakers saw somebody at the party to be true, even when they themselves do not believe that proposition to be true. The ground must be listener-old and the informational function of ground is to anchor the informative part of the utterance so that listeners 'may retrieve the information of the sentence and enter it into' their knowledge-store (Vallduví 1994: 147).

However, Vallduví's (1992) notion of ground does not necessarily cover the pragmatic property characterising the constituents restrictively highlighted by *only*. Take (19) for example. In (19), as was mentioned, because of the characteristics of the hearsay sentences, it is not certain whether the listener in (19B) (i.e., A in (19A)) believes the proposition that John only gave a book to someone or not. In other words, in (19B), the speaker B responds to A, without knowing whether his/her

listener believes that proposition or not. All B in (19B) assumes is that the proposition that John only gave a book to someone is activated in the mind of the listener (i.e., A in (19A)) at the time of utterance. In this respect, Vallduví's argument as to constituents that are restrictively highlighted by *only* and that are not new information is problematic.

#### 2.1.5.3. Buysschaert (1982)

Some literature uses not the notion of new information and its complement but other notions relating to information structure in discourse. Buysschaert (1982: 127) is an example of such an approach. He takes the distinction between topic and comment as the relevant distinction to explain the pragmatic characteristics of constituents highlighted by *only*. Buysschaert (1982: 128) assigns the restrictive focusing particle *only* (and other focusing particles, question and negation as well) the role of comment-highlighter.<sup>14</sup> Buysschaert (1982: 120) defines the topic of an utterance as the subject-matter about which something is asserted or asked in the utterance and the comment of an utterance as what is asserted or asked about the subject-matter. Hence within his framework, *shot* in (29) is the comment. (Note that *shot the president* is also comment.)

(29) He only shot the president (He did not torture him before shooting him,  
for instance.) (Buysschaert 1982: 128)

Buysschaert's (1982) argument regarding the status of constituents restrictively highlighted by *only* in terms of the notion Topic-Comment at first sight seems to throw a different light on the discussion in this section.

Why do we have not taken Buysschaert's view in this section? There is one reason for this: as Buysschaert's (1982: 120) definition of the notion Topic-Comment suggests, this notion has to do with the way in which newly introduced information is linked to some other information that is already present. That is to say, this notion is essentially related to the concept of coherence. This is not (at least the primary)

function of the restrictive focusing particle *only*. So while it is apparent in (29) that *shot* is the comment, it is also new information and it is the notion of new information plus its complement that is fundamentally relevant to the pragmatic property of constituents restrictively highlighted by *only*. Thus, even though it is certain that in many cases (and not all cases) constituents restrictively highlighted by *only* are comments, we cannot bring ourselves to accept that the restrictive focusing particle *only* is what Buyschaert calls the comment-highlighter.

#### 2.1.6. Summary of the section

This section has dealt with the ways in which *only* contributes to information structure. In many cases, constituents highlighted by *only* coincide with the intonationally prominent element carrying new information. However, as Nevalainen (1987), Vallduví (1992), Dryer (1996) and Partee (1999), among others, point out, there are cases where constituents highlighted by *only* are not new. Such cases are difficult to analyse because different terms such as given/old/presupposition/ground have been appealed to in describing the type of information conveyed by them, as the complement of new information, and the same terms have been interpreted differently by different scholars. This section has demonstrated that it is Dryer's (1996) distinction between pragmatic presupposition and activation that is related to the status of constituents which are highlighted by *only* and which are not new information: in some cases they are activated and in other cases they are pragmatically characterised not by activation but by pragmatic presupposition. Furthermore, there exist borderline examples between these two cases. This section has also indicated cases where constituents highlighted by *only* could be activated and not new even though they are marked by intonational prominence.



## 2.2. English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively and the interpersonal function: The case of *just*

In their politeness theory, Brown and Levinson (1987) assume that people have a public self-image or *face* and that they cooperate in maintaining face in interaction. Here face is 'something that is emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction' (p.61). Face is, according to Brown and Levinson (1987), divided into two types, positive face – 'the positive consistent self-image or "personality" (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants' (p.61) –, and negative face – 'the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction' (p.61). The backbone of Brown and Levinson's model is thus the idea that interlocutors are aware of two basic kinds of desire regarding their face, namely 'the desire to be unimpeded in one's actions (negative face), and the desire (in some respects) to be approved of (positive face)' (p.13). Brown and Levinson say that certain illocutionary acts, even when in accordance with Grice's (1975) *cooperative principle* (maxims of quality, quantity, relation, and manner), threaten a person's face. They call such acts face-threatening acts. For example, a listener's positive face may be under threat when speakers do not care about a listener's feelings, wants, etc., or his/her negative face may be threatened when speakers do not intend to avoid impeding the listener's freedom of action. Similarly, speakers' positive face may be damaged when they have to admit to a mistake, or their negative face may be damaged when they are forced to make an involuntary offer or promise. To minimise the threat, speakers take some 'redressive action' (Brown and Levinson 1987: 69), the action that restores face to the addressee. Redressive action takes one of two forms, depending on which face (negative or positive) is being stressed. One form is *positive politeness*, which is oriented towards the listener's positive self-image that s/he wants to be appreciated and approved of. Brown and Levinson suggest 15 strategies that realise positive politeness. The other form is *negative politeness*, which is oriented towards satisfying the listener's negative face, his or her basic want to maintain claims of territory and self-determination. Ten strategies are suggested as the realisations of negative politeness.

It is negative politeness to which Brown and Levinson (1987) relate the restrictive focusing particle *just*. Of ten strategies suggested as the realisation of negative politeness, Brown and Levinson relate *just* to two strategies, (i) using hedges<sup>15</sup> and (ii) minimising the imposition. A “hedge” is a particle, word, or phrase that modifies the degree of membership of a predicate or noun phrase in a set; it says of that membership that it is *partial*, or true only in certain respects, or that it is *more* true and complete than perhaps might be expected’ (Brown and Levinson 1987: 145; original italic).<sup>16</sup> Brown and Levinson relate *just* as hedge to Grice’s Maxim of Quantity. Consider the following example from Brown and Levinson (1987: 167).

(30) I’ll just say he’s not easy to get on with.

(30) is the example which gives notice that not as much or not as precise information is provided as might be expected. By giving this kind of notice, *just* allows for other opinions, which would constitute negative politeness toward the listener, and simultaneously protects the speaker’s negative face against critical comments from the listener. Providing not as much or not as precise information as might be expected violates Grice’s (1975) Maxim of Quantity (saying neither more nor less than is cooperatively necessary; see Brown and Levinson 1987: 164). Brown and Levinson (1987: 166) call this type of hedge the *Quantity* hedge, and claim that it may be used to redress complaints or requests.<sup>17</sup>

Indicating that the speaker’s imposition on the listener is not in itself great is also part of the strategy for realising negative politeness. *Just* is one device, Brown and Levinson (1987: 177) state, for minimising the imposition on the listener.

(31) I *just* want to ask you if {I can borrow/you could lend me} a  
{tiny bit of/little/single sheet of} paper.

(Brown and Levinson 1987: 177) (Original italic)<sup>18</sup>

(32) I *just* dropped by for a minute to ask you if you ...

(Brown and Levinson 1987: 177) (Original italic)

In (31) and (32), by using *just*, the speaker intends to tell his/her listener that his/her request is not great.

Brown and Levinson (1987) is not the only study suggesting that the restrictive focusing particle *just* functions to satisfy the listener's negative face, his or her basic want to maintain claims of territory and self-determination. A similar suggestion is also made in other studies. For instance, Lee (1991) divides the meanings of *just* into four types: 'restrictive' meaning as in (33), 'depreciatory' meaning (i.e., minimising the significance of speakers' utterances, actions, etc.) as in (34), 'specificatory' meaning as in (35) and 'emphatic' meaning as in (36). (Note: All the examples are from Lee 1991.)

(33) Just in one heel it lifted but not its back in both.

(34) I just don't like it.

(uttered, say, in response to the question *Why don't you buy it?*)

(35) It happened just before midnight.

(36) He just infuriated everyone.

However, as Lee himself points out, there are cases where the distinctions between the meanings are blurred, and this is serious especially in the case of the distinction between the depreciatory and restrictive meanings. Consider the following. (Note: All the examples are from Lee 1991: 63.)

(37) A: Ever had anything seriously wrong with you?

B: No, just this eye thing.

(38) I just want a prescription for my pill.

In (37B), the speaker 'seems to be expressing the idea that the category of "things wrong with him" is highly restricted – to his "eye thing" – but also that this is therefore a situation that should be minimised' (Lee 1991: 63). In (38), 'the speaker is indicating that the purpose of her visit is concerned **only** with obtaining a prescription (restriction) but also suggesting that this is a trivial situation

(downtoning)' (Lee 1991: 63; original bold). What should be noticed is that while the meanings of 'restrictive', 'specificatory' and 'emphatic' could belong to the semantic domain, what Lee calls the meaning of 'depreciatory' should be regarded as a pragmatic function. (The meaning of 'restrictive' applies to the restrictive focusing particle *just*, that of 'specificatory' to particularizer *just*, and that of 'emphatic' to emphasizer *just*.) In this sense, it must be better to interpret the existence of examples such as (37) and (38) as supporting the view that the restrictive focusing particle *just* has the interpersonal function. Such an interpretation agrees with Brown and Levinson (1987).

### 2.3. Other English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively and the interpersonal function

Thus far, we have discussed how the restrictive focusing particle *just* functions to save the listener's (and/or speaker's) negative face. It raises the question whether the interpersonal function fulfilled by *just* applies to other English grammatical devices such as *only* and ALL cleft constructions. To my knowledge, this question has not yet been dealt with. In this section, we will briefly survey the relationship between other English grammatical devices such as *only* and ALL cleft constructions and the interpersonal function, based on the range of constituents they highlight.

To begin with, as mentioned in section 1.3.2, ALL cleft constructions highlight restrictively only verb phrases/complete clauses and noun phrases functioning as object, as in (39).

**(39) a. verb phrases/complete clauses**

e.g. All you have to do is (to) send out the letters.

**b. noun phrases functioning as object**

e.g. All I have now is some pieces of chocolate.

In (39a), the speaker commands/requests the listener to send out the letters. From this example, it would be predicted that, like *just*, ALL cleft constructions may minimise

the speaker's imposition on the listener to save the listener's negative face, and that this type of construction may fulfil an interpersonal function when they are used to highlight verb phrases/complete clauses. On the other hand, as far as example (39b) is concerned, ALL cleft constructions applying to noun phrases functioning as object would not have the interpersonal function.

Secondly, Reverse ALL cleft constructions normally highlight deictic *that* or *this*, as in (40).

- (40) a. This is all you have to do today.  
b. Is this all we have to do today?

As far as (40a) is concerned, Reverse ALL cleft constructions would have the interpersonal function. However, as far as (40b) is concerned, this type of construction would not have this function.

Thirdly, *nothing but* constructions do not seem to occur in the context of speakers' command/request to listeners, and thus they may not have the interpersonal function. *Nothing but* constructions could restrictively highlight noun phrases functioning as subject, noun phrases functioning as object, subject complements and post-verbal NPs in existential constructions, as in (41).

(41) **a. noun phrases functioning as subject**

e.g. Nobody but John answered that question.

**b. noun phrases functioning as object**

e.g. His mother thought of *nothing but* John's coming home.

**c. subject complements**

e.g. It is *nothing but* a joke.

**d. post-verbal NPs in existential constructions**

e.g. There is *nothing but* an old post office at the corner.

No example in (41) explicitly has the context of speakers' commanding/requesting something to a listener.

Let us return to *only*. With respect to the range of constituents highlighted by *only*, there seems to be no difference between *only* and *just*. Both of them can highlight various syntactic categories and grammatical functions of constituents, and no analyst has suggested that these two restrictive focusing particles highlight different ranges of constituents. (See 1.3.2.) Thus theoretically speaking, *only* could substitute for *just* in examples (30) – (32) from Brown and Levinson (1987), as follows.

(30') I'll *only* say he's not easy to get on with.

(31') I *only* want to ask you if {I can borrow/you could lend me} a  
{tiny bit of/little/single sheet of} paper.

(32') I *only* dropped by for a minute to ask you if you ...

It must be pointed out that it is not clear whether the examples we have dealt with in this sub-section are prototypical manifestations of the usage of each type of construction. To be more precise, if we considered only (40a), we would conclude that Reverse ALL cleft constructions have an interpersonal function. On the other hand, if we considered only (40b), we would conclude that this type of construction does not have an interpersonal function. Which example is more typical of Reverse ALL cleft constructions? The same problem applies to other types of constructions. Furthermore, as mentioned above, it is certain that theoretically speaking, *only* would substitute for *just*. However, there exist some studies which claim that these two restrictive focusing particles differ from each other, with respect to the text type in which they occur.<sup>19</sup> That is to say, *just* is in general preferred to *only* in spoken English and *only* is preferred to *just* in written English (see, for example, Tottie 1986; Biber et al. 1999). For instance, Tottie (1986) claims that in her face-to-face conversation data, 67% of the examples restrictively highlighted by restrictive focusing particles are *just* and 24% are *only*. She also claims that in her written data, 69% of the examples restrictively highlighted by restrictive focusing particles are *only* and 11% are *just*. If Tottie and Biber et al. are correct, (30') – (32') might not be

typical examples and *only* would not have an interpersonal function, since interpersonal functions are more closely connected with (some types of) spoken discourse such as conversation than with (some types of) written discourse such as academic monographs. (See Chapter 3.) All these matters indicate that we need to investigate whether the grammatical devices under consideration have the interpersonal function (and/or functions for other kinds of pragmatic ends), what kind of discourse the devices occur in and how they are actually used.

#### 2.4. Summary

This chapter has discussed the ways in which *only* contributes to a structuring of information in discourse. In many cases (e.g. 91% in Nevalainen's 1987 examination of the London-Lund Corpus of educated British English), constituents highlighted by the typical restrictive focusing particle *only* coincide with the intonationally prominent element carrying new information. However, there are cases where constituents highlighted by *only* are not new: in some cases they are activated and in other cases they are pragmatically characterised not by activation but by pragmatic presupposition. Furthermore, there exist borderline examples between these two cases. There are also cases where constituents highlighted by *only* could be activated and not new even though they are marked by intonational prominence. To my knowledge, there is no study that discusses the relationship between the other grammatical devices under consideration and information structure. Do constituents highlighted by grammatical devices such as *just* and ALL cleft constructions always coincide with the intonationally prominent element carrying new information? Or in many cases but not always, as is the case with *only*? Or rarely? These questions cannot be answered without consideration of how the devices are actually used.

Owing much to Brown and Levinson (1987), the chapter has also dealt with the pragmatic property of *just*. This restrictive focusing particle functions to save the listener's negative face, his or her basic want to maintain claims of territory and self-determination. Furthermore, we have briefly surveyed other grammatical devices under consideration, with respect to the interpersonal function, and pointed out the

necessity of using some empirical data, typically some corpora, in order to gain reliable information on the pragmatic functions of the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively.



### 3. The distribution of English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively in speech and writing

In the previous chapter we have discussed the ways in which *only* helps to structure information in discourse and the interpersonal function of *just*, based on the suggestions in previous studies. The discussion pointed out the necessity of using some empirical data in order to gain reliable information on the different pragmatic functions of these grammatical devices. What kind of data is useful for this purpose? To answer this question, it is necessary to consider types of data.

#### 3.1. Types of data

Basically there are two types of data, one derived from corpora and the other from elicitation tests. They are different from each other: 'only a corpus of texts will give an idea of the typical features of particular types of language, whether of academic textbooks or informal conversation, but individual syntactic constructions or lexical items can only be fully investigated by means of elicitation tests' (Miller and Cann 1994: 815).

##### 3.1.1. *A corpus of texts*

A corpus is a collection of natural texts – a collection of naturally occurring examples of language – that are stored and accessed electronically. Normally a corpus contains various types of discourse.<sup>1</sup> One major criterion for classifying texts is the medium, whether they are spoken or written. Although this thesis does not work with finer distinction, it is worthwhile pointing out that there are many types of spoken discourse, for instance: spontaneous conversations, interviews, news broadcasts, radio talks, narrations, lectures, sermons, and so on. Similarly, there are various types of written discourse such as letters, essays, fictions, press reportage, official documents and academic prose. Furthermore, some discourse such as e-mail and chat may be on the border between spoken discourse and written discourse.<sup>2</sup>

Studies on spoken and written language have been carried out 'since the early 1980s' (Miller and Weinert 1998: 1). Among various studies on this topic, it is Biber (1986, 1988) and Miller and Weinert (1998) that are especially significant in relation to this thesis. Biber (1986, 1988) investigated similarities and differences between speech and writing, using what he calls a 'multi-features/multi-dimension' approach – the approach which uses a broad range of linguistic features and diverse text types. His motivation in using this approach was to resolve the contradictory findings in previous studies, with respect to similarities and differences between speech and writing. He insists that 'no single dimension adequately accounts for the range of linguistic variation across spoken/written texts' (Biber 1986: 385) and distinguishes various dimensions such as 'Involved vs. Informational Production'.

Miller and Weinert (1998), who analysed spoken language, particularly spontaneous spoken language – the language of spontaneous conversation for instance –, suggest that spontaneous language possesses constructions that do not occur in formal written language – 'the language of academic monographs and textbooks, heavyweight newspapers, official documents, and serious literature' (p.21) –, and vice-versa and that these two different varieties of language have different devices for discourse organisation. They further point out that 'major differences in syntax and vocabulary are associated with formality as opposed to informality' (p.3) and that the constructions that occur in discourse of spontaneous language reflect the properties that characterise one pole of Biber's (1988) dimension – affective interaction – along with other dimensions such as situation-dependent reference and real-time constraints on language production. From their discussion, it is assumed that Miller and Weinert (1998) take discourse of spontaneous spoken language as informal discourse and discourse of certain types of written language such as language of academic prose and of official documents as formal discourse. (Note that this is not to say that every type of spoken discourse is informal and every type of written discourse is formal. 'Spoken language can be formal as well as informal and oral societies have formal spoken texts such as the language of religious and social ceremonies' (Miller and Weinert 1998: 3).)

The following, according to Miller and Weinert (1998: 22), are linguistic properties reflecting the properties of spontaneous spoken language.

- (1) a. Information is carefully staged, a small quantity of information being assigned to each phrase and clause.
- b. Spontaneous spoken language typically has far less grammatical subordination than written language and much more coordination or simple parataxis.
- c. The syntax of spontaneous spoken language is in general fragmented and unintegrated; phrases are less complex than phrases of written language; the clausal constructions are less complex. A central role in signalling relationships between chunks of syntax is played by deictics.
- d. The sentence is not a useful analytical unit for informal spoken language.
- e. The patterns of constituent structure and the arrangement of heads and modifiers do not always correspond to the patterns recognized by syntactic theory.
- f. The range of vocabulary in spontaneous language is less than in written language.
- g. A number of constructions occur in spontaneous spoken language but not in written language, and vice-versa.

Some of the above properties have been noted by other researchers. For instance, the linguistic property 'phrases of spontaneous language are less complex than phrases of written language' in (1c) coincides with Fjelkestam-Nilsson's (1983) claim that formal texts tend to be made up of longer phrases.

The existence of a large number of studies using corpora indicates the value of corpora for investigations of language. (See Biber et al. 1998, for instance, for information about studies using corpora. Every chapter in Biber et al. 1998 provides a brief list of this type of study.) Miller and Cann (1994: 816) claim that using corpora has the following four advantages:

- (a) analysts cannot influence existing written texts and can easily avoid influencing spoken texts that they are recording by allowing the informants to talk for themselves
- (b) a representative sample of the relevant genre can be gathered
- (c) a large enough corpus will present unexpected constructions that might not occur to the analyst relying on intuition
- (d) a given corpus is typically useful for more than its original purpose – no body of data gathered by researchers in the last 20 years has been exhausted and many still await thorough exploitation

However, using corpora has some disadvantages. For example, Hunston (2002) claims that the outcomes of the data are no more than the outcomes of the data.

A corpus can show nothing more than its own contents. Although it may (justifiably) claim to be representative, all attempts to draw generalizations from a corpus are in fact extrapolations. A statement about the evidence in a corpus is a statement about that corpus, not about the language or register of which the corpus is a sample. Thus conclusions about the language drawn from a corpus have to be treated as deductions, not as facts. (p.22-23)

This claim is right. However, this disadvantage can be counter-balanced by the use of different corpora with different types of data and by cross-checking.

Miller and Cann (1994) point out several disadvantages of using corpora, such as time-consuming of collecting a corpus, particularly a spoken corpus. One of the most serious is that even a very large corpus may not contain sufficient examples of a particular syntactic construction or a lexical item. This disadvantage is solved by elicitation tests.

### 3.1.2. Elicitation tests

Greenbaum and Quirk (1970: 3) display the types of elicitation test and the relation between them as follows.




Figure 3.1. Types of test (From Greenbaum and Quirk 1970: 3)

Operation tests and completion tests consist of performance tests. The difference between operation tests and completion tests is that operation tests require subjects to effect some change in a given sentence, while completion tests require them to make some addition to a given sentence. Operation tests comprise compliance tests and selection tests. 'In compliance tests, some deviance is suspected in the sentence presented to subjects or in the sentence resulting from the change they are asked to make' (Greenbaum and Quirk 1970: 3). On the other hand, in selection tests subjects are asked to choose between two or more variant forms, e.g., make the verb present form in *None of the students answered that question.*

Completion tests comprise forced-choice selection tests, word-placement tests and composition tests. In forced-choice selection tests, subjects are asked to make a forced choice, e.g., insert either *learned* or *learnt* in *I ----- the poem* and *I have ----- the poem*. On the other hand, word-placement tests are designed to examine word position and subjects are asked to put a given word into a given sentence, e.g., put *usually* in *My brother plays the guitar*. Furthermore, composition tests are open-

ended. Subjects are given part of a sentence and are asked to complete the rest of sentence in any way they like, e.g., *I entirely -----*.

As Figure 3.1 illustrates, evaluation tests, preference tests and similarity tests consist of judgement tests. In evaluation tests subjects are asked to evaluate sentences on a three-point scale. On the other hand, preference-tests 'are normally complementary to selection-tests' (Greenbaum and Quirk 1970: 5). Subjects are given two or more variant forms of a sentence, e.g., *None of the students answers that question* and *None of the students answer that question*, and they are required to rate the sentences, using the three-point scale that evaluation tests use. Subjects are also required to rank the sentences in order of preference. Furthermore, similarity tests show subjects two sentences with minimal lexical and syntactic differences, and ask them to estimate the degree of similarity of meaning between the sentences on a three-point scale.

Greenbaum and Quirk (1970) examine the validity of the tests illustrated in Figure 3.1 and draw conclusions about the merits of various procedures and factors influencing the tests results. Based on some studies about elicitations, including Greenbaum and Quirk (1970), we can summarise that the following four points are particularly important to gain reliable data (e.g. Greenbaum and Quirk 1970; Kempson and Quirk 1971; Miller and Cann 1994).<sup>3</sup> It is important:

- (a) to prevent possible influences of order from skewing the results of the test
- (b) to prevent subjects from guessing the purpose of the test
- (c) to prevent subjects from giving time to compare the answers to the various questions and to think about the 'best/ideal' answer to each question
- (d) to use enough informants so as to get major and minor patterns

One further important issue which is taken into account in preparing the questions is how formal they are. Miller and Weinert (1998: 3) point out that 'major differences in syntax and vocabulary are associated with formality as opposed to informality'. They demonstrate that the linking of clauses is much looser in their spontaneous

spoken English data than in formal written English. One of their examples is the *when* clause. Miller and Weinert (1998: 95) suggest that 'the *when* clause is not a subordinate clause but a main clause and *when* can be treated as a conjunction joining two main clauses – a very common construction in spontaneous spoken English but not one that is in the canon of formal written English'. One of their examples is: *She switched off the light when the dog came into the kitchen*. This sentence could be interpreted as describing two events (i.e., event 1: the dog came into the kitchen; event 2: she switched off the light). Miller and Weinert (1998: 95) claim that 'the order of clauses does not correspond to the order of events but there may be sound discourse reasons for this; the example may be an answer to the question *When did she switch off the light?*, in which case the main clause presents the given information first (the information that has already been uttered) and the adverbial clause presents the new information.' They also claim that this example has another interpretation in spontaneous spoken English; namely, she switched off the light and the dog came in. In this interpretation, the two events have the equal status.

As for vocabulary, in general words such as *a wee* and *a couple of* are colloquial (cf. 4.2.5 in this thesis), whereas words such as *anomalous* and *peremptory* and technical words in specific fields (e.g. law) are formal. Formality of questions is an important issue particularly when linguistic expressions investigated in experiments are sensitive to formality. For example, if the linguistic expressions investigated are very informal and if the questions used in the experiment are formal, subjects must feel very strange, facing such questions and the results gained from the subjects will not be reliable.

Greenbaum and Quirk (1970) claim that experimentation with visual presentation and written response seems inevitable for the investigation of linguistic structures requiring lengthy sentential or multi-sentential context. In fact, studies using some experiments after them normally exploit visual presentation presented either as a stapled booklet (e.g. Kempson and Quirk 1971) or on a computer screen (e.g. Tomlin 1995; Arnold et al. 2000). The latter type is particularly useful when the stimuli are not sentences but pictures.

Greenbaum (1969) used four types of test in Figure 3.1, namely compliance tests, composition tests (or completion tests in his term), evaluation tests and similarity tests. Kempson and Quirk (1971) showed the validity of forced-choice selection tests. These studies and the fact that many empirical studies use some of the elicitation tests in Figure 3.1 or modified versions of the tests clearly indicate the value of elicitation tests illustrated in Figure 3.1.

We should not overlook the fact that data gained by elicitation tests has (at least) two disadvantages: one disadvantage is, that as Miller and Weinert (1998: 191) point out, it is impossible to know whether a subject has properly understood the situation; besides, what the data reflects is not what s/he actually produces but what s/he believes s/he would say. The other disadvantage is the possibility that subjects' paying attention to a particular syntactic construction or a lexical item might bias them and that the results might not reflect subjects' usage in their everyday communication.

### 3.2. Types of discourse

Which type of data is useful for the investigation of our hypothesis that the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents have different pragmatic functions? As mentioned in the end of 2.3, to investigate our hypothesis, we need to examine what kind of discourse the devices occur in and how they are actually used. Thus, corpus data are the useful sources. They allow us to base our claim on the most typical manifestations of a linguistic phenomenon rather than on untypical ones; that is, on the most frequent examples in a given corpus. The question now arises: against what kind of discourse should we test our hypothesis that restrictive focusing particles, *only* and *just*, ALL cleft constructions, Reverse ALL cleft constructions and *nothing but* constructions have different pragmatic functions?

So far with respect to the pragmatics of the English grammatical devices under discussion in this thesis, we have discovered how *only* helps to structure information in discourse and the interpersonal function of *just*. While the former does not seem to



relate to some particular types of discourse, the latter (i.e., interpersonal function), as its name suggests, must be related to discourse which contains highly affective content and direct interaction between the speaker and the addressee. In his multi-dimension approach, Biber (1988) associates this type of discourse with linguistic properties such as private verbs (e.g. *think, feel*), first- and second-person pronouns, *wh*-questions, emphatics and amplifiers. These properties 'are used for involved discourse, making high interpersonal interaction or high expression of personal feelings' (p.106). Biber suggests that discourse produced under strict constraints typically has an involved and interactive purpose, and vice versa. From now on we will use the term *personal involvement* to refer to affective content and direct interaction between the participants in discourse.

This leads us to suppose that comparing the distribution of the grammatical devices in discourse with high personal involvement and that of the grammatical devices in discourse with low personal involvement will shed light on the different pragmatic functions of the devices. It can be predicted that those which have the interpersonal function will occur in discourse containing high personal involvement more frequently than those which do not. (Note: We do not deny the possibility that other pragmatic functions may also be related to discourse with high personal involvement. In that case, devices having such functions would also occur in discourse containing high personal involvement. However, the point is that this does not affect the hypothesis that devices having the interpersonal function occur in such discourse.) To put it the other way round, it can be predicted that those which do not have the interpersonal function occur in discourse with low personal involvement more frequently than those which do have it. What kind of discourse contains high personal involvement and what kind of discourse contains low personal involvement?

It is formality that is closely associated with personal involvement. In general, the more formal discourse is, the less personal involvement it contains. Conversely, the less formal discourse is, the more personal involvement it contains. From this, it is predicted that spontaneous spoken discourse such as spontaneous conversation must

contain very high personal involvement, whereas formal written discourse such as academic prose and official documents must contain very low personal involvement. Given this, we are now in a position to answer the question, which was raised above, as to what kind of discourse we should investigate for our purpose: we will investigate the distribution of the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively in discourse of spontaneous spoken English and that of the English grammatical devices in discourse of formal written English. We expect that in the course of the investigation into the distribution of the devices in these two types of discourse, we will find: whether other devices such as *only* and ALL cleft constructions have the interpersonal function or not, the ways in which the devices contribute to a structuring of information in discourse, and what kind of any other differentiation at the level of pragmatics the devices have.

One thing should be added regarding discourse of spontaneous spoken English – the characteristics of the speakers producing discourse. This is a very important point, since academics' spoken English (even spontaneous spoken English), according to Biber (1988) and Miller and Weinert (1998), is certainly affected by formal written English. (Miller and Weinert 1998: 20 claim that 'the greatest effect of written on spoken language comes from higher education'.) In this respect, Tottie's (1986) and Biber et al.'s (1999) claim that *just* is in general preferred to *only* in spoken English and *only* is preferred to *just* in written English should be treated cautiously. (Recall that this claim was briefly introduced in 2.3.) Tottie (1986) claims that *just* is predominant (i.e., 67%) over other restrictive focusing particles in her spoken data (cf. *only* is 24%) and that *only* is predominant (i.e., 69%) in her written data (cf. *just* is 11%). Tottie (1986) uses face-to-face conversation data, which are extracts from the London-Lund Corpus, produced only by middle-class, university-educated male academics. Biber et al (1999) have the same problem as Tottie (1986). Their conversation data is derived from the spoken corpus in the British National Corpus, which is produced by people from different age, region and social classes. That the data is produced by people from different social classes means that the data is (at least partly) produced by people whose spoken English is affected by formal written English. We need to investigate discourse of spontaneous spoken English collected

from speakers whose spoken English is not/hardly affected by formal written English, instead of investigating corpora such as the London-Lund Corpus and spoken English data in the British National Corpus.

### 3.3. The data

In this section, we specify the data we will use for our investigation. We will use mainly the Map Task dialogues as the spontaneous spoken discourse, supplemented by the Scottish-English conversations, and some written informative prose in the British National Corpus as the formal written discourse.

#### *3.3.1. The Map Task dialogues*

We use the Map Task dialogues obtained from the Map Task experiments as samples of spontaneous spoken English. The Map Task dialogues are obtained from the Map Task experiments described in detail in Anderson et al. (1991). The subjects are speakers of Scottish English (i.e., 61 of them being native Scottish) and are just at the beginning of their higher education. The total number of dialogues is 128 (i.e., approximately 147,000 words). Half of them are dialogues produced in conditions allowing the subjects to have eye-contact, and half in circumstances excluding eye-contact.

The Map Task involves two participants, one in the role of instruction giver, and the other in the role of instruction follower. In the tasks, both of them have slightly different versions of a map marked with various landmarks. Some landmarks are shared, others are unique to one or the other map, and some shared landmarks have different names. One participant who plays the role of instruction giver has a route marked on his/her map, and instructs the other, who does not have a route on his/her map, in how to draw that route.

The Map Task dialogues are different from spontaneous conversations (at least) in two points. One point is that the context is controlled. In this respect, the Map Task

dialogues may be said to lack spontaneity. The other point is that the dialogues are produced under circumstances controlling the availability of the visual channel for communication: half of the dialogues are produced in conditions allowing the subjects to have eye-contact, and half in circumstances excluding eye-contact. Nevertheless, the Map Task dialogues represent discourse in spontaneous spoken English. There are two reasons for this claim: one reason is that based on their study, Miller and Weinert (1998: 11) demonstrate that the syntactic structures occurring in conversation also occur in the task-related dialogues and that such syntactic structures are different from those found in formal written English. One of their findings regarding this point is that the linking of clauses is much looser in the Map Task dialogues and in the conversation data than in formal written English. Miller and Weinert also argue that constructions missing from the Map Task dialogues are also missing from conversation. Examples are the accusative and infinitive construction (e.g. *We consider him to be honest*) and adverbial clauses of reason introduced by *since* or *as*. These constructions are constructions quite typical in (formal) written English. The other reason is that the Map Task dialogues fulfil the condition of being spontaneous spoken discourse: they are produced by speakers of Scottish English who are just at the beginning of their higher education. This means that the data are not as affected by formal written English as the data analysed in Tottie (1986), Biber (1988) and Biber et al. (1999).

The Map Task dialogues offer three advantages for our study. First of all, the data has coding for information structure, game structure and phonetic features. Such coding is helpful when we examine how clauses containing the grammatical devices under discussion function for the organisation of discourse. Secondly, in the Map Task dialogues we know which information is objectively new or given and which is TREATED by the speaker as new or given. This information enables investigators to examine the ways in which the grammatical devices contribute to the structuring of information in discourse. Thirdly, both transcripts and audio recordings are available, which makes it useful to pin down which constituent is marked by intonational prominence and to examine whether constituents marked by intonational prominence coincide with the constituents highlighted by the grammatical devices highlighting

particular constituents restrictively. Finally, because the context is clear, and because the maps used by the participants can be inspected, it is easy to understand the goals of the participants in the task and what the participants are talking about.

### *3.3.2. The Scottish-English conversations*

Although the Map Task dialogues certainly represent spontaneous spoken discourse, one may wonder whether this type of data is really spontaneous spoken discourse. For such readers, we use the Scottish-English conversations to support the results of the Map Task dialogues. The Scottish-English conversations are a computerised corpus of spontaneous conversation, produced by speakers of Scottish English. The corpus was collected in 1977-80 by Keith Brown and Jim Miller as a part of a project on the syntax of Scottish English and contains 250,000 words. It is left unpunctuated and is entirely in lower case. An approximately 43,400-word subset of the corpus is investigated here. Except for one conversation, all the conversations investigated are dialogues between some of 17- or 18- year old school pupils and one research assistant. (One exceptional conversation was made by 4 first-year university undergraduates and two academics. I included the undergraduates but excluded the academics from the data.<sup>4</sup>) This means that the data are produced mainly by speakers who had not yet entered higher education.

### *3.3.3. Some 266,000 words of written informative prose in the British National Corpus*

Since we chose the data of spontaneous spoken British English (strictly speaking, spoken Scottish English) as our spontaneous spoken discourse, we need to choose at least data of formal written British English, if not data of formal written Scottish English so as to avoid potential regional variation in written English. Due to the unavailability of a suitable computerized corpus of formal written Scottish English, as discourse of formal written English, we use some 266,000 words of written informative prose in the British National Corpus in the 1990s. (Henceforth, for the sake of convenience, the written informative prose will be called the sample of

written informative prose in the BNC.) Our sample of written informative prose in the BNC was selected so that various topics such as arts, social science and technology could be included. On the other hand, interviews and monologues originally contained in the sample of written informative prose in the BNC were excluded from the analysis. The sample of written informative prose in the BNC contains different text-types such as art criticism, a brochure about health and an article about religion.

The reason why we decided to use the British National Corpus among various corpora of written British English such as the Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus and COBUILD's Bank of English Corpus is that the British National Corpus is available on the computers in the Linguistics laboratory at the University of Edinburgh contain and freely accessible. (Various other corpora are available, but only for payment.) Moreover, the software called SARA (SGML-Aware Retrieval Application) is installed on the computers, which makes it convenient to search targeted grammatical devices. (SARA is a search tool, designed specifically for use with the BNC.)

How large should our corpus be? In order to examine the differentiation of the grammatical devices at the level of pragmatics, we have to carry out a vast amount of analysis by hand, examining in detail each context where the devices occur. Since such analysis is so time-consuming and subject to inconsistency, the corpus should remain small. A similar view is expressed in Miller and Weinert (1998). Their sample of spontaneous spoken English has 22,000 words (i.e., the Map Task dialogues (12,000 words) and spontaneous conversation (10,000 words)). Regarding their data, they state:

The task of analysing clause syntax and discourse organisation is very different from the task performed by Biber – counting the occurrences of fifty properties and carrying out a factorial analysis of the results. [...] the crucial point is that the discussion in this book rests on a deeper and richer analysis of syntax and discourse than Biber required, and the type of analysis both restricts the amount of data that can be covered in a given time and can yield interesting results on a much smaller body of data than the one examined by Biber. (p.14)

The point to observe is that their data brings some interesting insight of pragmatic functions of three types of grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents, namely WH clefts, Reverse WH clefts and IT clefts, along with the characteristics of clauses and noun phrases in spontaneous spoken English (and other languages) and in formal written English. Our study follows Miller and Weinert's rather than Biber's. We assume that the size of our spontaneous spoken discourse (i.e., approximately 190,000 words) is suitable for our study (as well as the type of our data – the Map Task dialogues and spontaneous conversations). Our corpus of formal written English discourse matches in size our corpus of spontaneous spoken discourse.

In short, methodologically, particularly with respect to data of spontaneous spoken English and size of the data, our examination of pragmatic functions of the English grammatical devices follows the methodology taken by Miller and Weinert (1998), which gain some interesting insights of pragmatic functions of three types of grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents (i.e., WH clefts, Reverse WH clefts and IT clefts).

Of course the choice of corpora places limitations on the outcomes of the study. First of all, as was introduced in 3.1.1, Hunston (2002) claims that the outcomes of our data are no more than the outcomes of the data. (See page 76.) Her claim is correct. However, this is why we have decided to use different corpora with different types of data as spontaneous spoken discourse – task-related dialogues vs. conversations and

use different texts-types belonging to written informative prose in the British National Corpus. By using different types of data, we try to provide a bigger picture and to cross-check.

Second, since the Map Task dialogues and spontaneous conversations are spontaneous Scottish spoken English discourse, the outcomes of these corpora, strictly speaking, are those of spontaneous spoken Scottish English. On the other hand, the outcomes of some 266,000 words of written informative prose in the British National Corpus are not necessarily those of formal written Scottish English. However, generally speaking, the differences between the variations of written English are smaller than those between the variations of spoken English. Thus, given constraints on time, finances and availability of accessible data, the corpora used for the thesis offered more advantages than other corpora.

A final question is whether our investigation into our data is accurate or not, especially since the researcher is a non-native speaker of English. In many cases, due to the clear context and due to coding for information structure in the Map Task dialogues, it was not a difficult task to analyse the pragmatic functions of the grammatical devices under discussion on the whole. However, to validate the results of our investigation, in the course of our investigation, we presented the results to native speakers of English, including some linguists whose native language is English, showing the grammatical devices in the data along with the context where they occur in order to make it clear whether the results are supported from the native speakers' point of view. And if necessary, we reconsidered our results.



#### 4. Grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively in the Map Task dialogues – their distribution and factors influencing it

In the following two chapters, we will use naturally occurring data to investigate our hypothesis that the restrictive focusing particles, *only* and *just*, ALL and Reverse ALL cleft constructions and *nothing but* constructions have different pragmatic functions. (See 1.3.2 in Chapter 1 for this hypothesis.) This chapter investigates this hypothesis, paying attention to the choice and distribution of English grammatical devices and factors influencing the choice of one grammatical device over others in the Map Task dialogues. (The results will be backed by those of the Scottish-English conversations.) The main findings emerging from the investigation are as follows:

- (a) *Just*, ALL cleft constructions and Reverse ALL cleft constructions have different discourse functions and yield rather different discourse structures. On the other hand, our data contains no instances where *only* and *nothing but* constructions have some discourse functions in spontaneous spoken English.
- (b) The devices contribute differently to the structuring of information. Constituents highlighted by ALL cleft constructions and *nothing but* constructions are always new. On the other hand, constituents highlighted by Reverse ALL cleft constructions are always activated. Furthermore, constituents highlighted by *only* and *just* can be either new or activated.
- (c) *Just* and ALL cleft constructions have an interpersonal function.
- (d) The grammatical devices are sensitive to context where they restrictively highlight some particular constituents, semantic properties of highlighted constituents and pragmatic properties of highlighted constituents.

The chapter begins with an overview of the distribution of the grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively. Section 4.2 investigates the pragmatic differences seen among the devices. Section 4.3 considers the validity of the investigation in section 4.2, based on data of spontaneous spoken discourse, the Scottish-English conversations. Section 4.4 explains the consequences of the results.

#### 4.1. Distribution of the grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively in the Map Task dialogues

Table 4.1 below presents the frequency of the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively, according to the syntax of highlighted constituents in the Map Task dialogues. The figures in parentheses indicate the percentages of distribution. (The highlighted constituents are divided into sub-classes, according to the syntax of the highlighted constituents. Here *the syntax of the highlighted constituents* covers both the syntactic categories of highlighted constituents and the grammatical function of the highlighted constituents. (The term *syntactic categories* is from Huddleston and Pullum 2002: 21. At the word level such as noun and verb, they are called *lexical categories* and at the phrasal level such as noun phrase and verb phrase, they are called *phrasal categories*.) Using only grammatical function is problematic: Fjelkestam-Nilsson 1983, for instance, analysed the functional distribution of constituents highlighted by *also* and *too*, in present-day English in terms of three categories – subject, predicate and other constituents such as objects. If we had followed her distinction, we would have categorised several different syntactic functions of highlighted constituents into the same section called ‘other constituents’. Such an analysis (see the discussion in section 4.2) would have distorted the results. Essentially the same possibility persists in Nevalainen’s (1991) five functional categories – subject, predicate, object, complement and adverbial. For example, here analysis could not categorise noun modifiers adequately.)

Table 4.1. *Distribution of the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively in the Map Task dialogues*

Highlighted constituents	<i>only</i>	<i>just</i>	ALL clefts	Reverse ALL clefts	<i>nothing but</i> constructions
Verb phrases/complete clauses	0	103	8	1	0
Objects	8	10	1	1	2
Post-verbal NPs in existential constructions	3	1	0	0	2
Subject complements	9	14	0	0	0
Noun-modifiers	6	30	0	0	0
Adverbs/adverbials	1	50	0	0	0
Prepositional phrases	5	1	0	0	0
Others	3	2	0	0	0
TOTAL	36 (13.80%)	211 (80.50%)	9 (3.40%)	2 (0.80%)	4 (1.50%)

The table indicates that first of all, the total number of occurrences of *just* is overwhelming. We attribute this to the interpersonal function of *just*. (Recall that in section 3.1, we predicted that spontaneous spoken discourse must contain very high personal involvement and that devices having the interpersonal function would occur in such discourse more frequently than devices which do not have that function.) However, it is worthwhile commenting that the interpersonal function is not necessarily the only factor influencing the frequency of the devices. Consider the following, for instance. (Note: “G” denotes the instruction giver and “F” denotes the instruction follower. The relevant utterances are italicised.)

(1) G1: Do you have carved stones?

F1: I have carved stones at the top followed by a ravine followed by an Indian country.

G2: Right.

In between the diamond mine and the carved stones is a graveyard. That's where it should be.

F2: Right.

G3: So, *all you need to do is continue past the diamond mine*

(2) *So you just go past the adventure playground on the ... its left-hand site*

Both (1) and (2) are the cases where the highlighted constituent is a verb phrase and both the ALL cleft construction and *just* can be said to have the interpersonal function, since both of them occur in an instruction to the listener and it could be interpreted as having the interpersonal function to satisfy the listener's negative face. The choice of the ALL cleft construction over *just* cannot be explained from the interpersonal function.

In addition, as the table indicates, although the total number of occurrences of *just* is overwhelming, it does not necessarily mean that *just* predominates over others whatever the highlighted constituent. These situations give rise to the question of what factors do influence the distribution of restrictive highlighting devices, whether they have the interpersonal function and/or how they contribute to information structure in discourse. We propose some answers in section 4.2, which will demonstrate that devices with the similar syntactic and semantic properties have different pragmatic functions. (Limitations of space will prevent us from accounting for every single choice made.)

## 4.2. Factors influencing the distribution of grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively

### 4.2.1. *The case where the highlighted constituent is as a verb phrase/a complete clause*

This sub-section discusses factors influencing the choice of one device over others in cases where a verb phrase/a complete clause is highlighted restrictively. As Table 4.2 below illustrates, there is no instance of *only* and *nothing but* constructions in the Map Task dialogues. The discussion therefore concentrates on factors influencing the choice between *just*, ALL cleft constructions and Reverse ALL cleft constructions.

Table 4.2. *Distribution of grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively when the highlighted constituent is a verb phrase/a complete clause*

<i>only</i>	<i>just</i>	ALL clefts	Reverse ALL clefts	<i>nothing but</i> constructions
0	103	8	1	0

The Map Task dialogues offer 8 instances where ALL cleft constructions (e.g., *All you have to do is (to) call him.*) are chosen. To take some examples:

(3) F1: How far?

G1: You'll see a graveyard. See a graveyard on your map? To the right of the diamond mine?

F2: No.

G2: Right. They've obviously not marked the graveyard.

F3: How far to the right of the diamond mine is it?

G3: The graveyard is almost halfway in between ... Do you have carved stones?

F4: I have carved stones at the top followed by a ravine followed by an Indian country.

G4: Right. In between the diamond mine and the carved stones is a graveyard. That's where it should be.

F5: Right.

G5: So, *all you need to do is continue past the diamond mine*

F6: The stop.

G6: The past where you think the graveyard is.

F7: Past where it is?

G7: Yeah, go route ... same under ... under the graveyard ... south of the  
Graveyard.

F8: Is the graveyard

G8: The graveyard's ...

F9: due east of the diamond mine?

G9: Correct.

F10: So I really shouldn't hit it then if I'm south of the diamond mine?

G10: Correct.

F11: Right. Okay.

(4) G1: So you move east around

F1: The carved stones.

G2: carved stones. And then ... Do you have gallows? On your map?

F2: Yes, but they're absolutely miles away.

G3: That's correct. That's correct. *All you need to do is go due south from  
the carved stones*

F3: Past ...

G4: *as far as you can see the gallows, the same level as the gallows.*

F4: Right.

G5: You should be on top of the Indian country, correct?

F5: and just south of the ravine.

G6: That's right.

(5) G1: Eh. Now you've got a ... Have you got an alpine garden?

F1: Uh-huh

G2: You have. Right. *All you're doing is you're sort of doing* see that wee  
... bump you've got over the monastery at the moment?

F2: Yeah

G3: *You've sort of doing that in reverse ... and going up towards the alpine garden.* So you do the bump in reverse ... and end up ... just going straight north up the left-hand side of the alpine garden.

Do you see what I mean?

F3: Right.

G4: So that if you turned the sheet on its side it'd be a big "S".

F4: Right, okay.

G5: Right?

F5: But I've ... have you got a west lake?

G6: Eh. I've not, so.

Have you got a west lake in the middle somewhere?

F6: Yeah, but I've missed the west lake.

G7: Aye ...

(6) G1: I have a graveyard on mine, which I don't believe you have on yours?

F1: No I haven't got it.

G2: *All you have to do is,* you have carved stones?

F2: Yeah.

G3: *is go east almost to the left of the carved stones, or, sorry, to the left of the carved stones, and come up round ... in a big curve round the carved stones.*

F3: Round the top of it?

G4: Uh-huh. So I want you to avoid the graveyard. So I want you to go due east.

F4: It's ... I'm ... I'm ...

G5: and ...

F5: underneath the diamond mine, just a straight due east from there?

G6: Due east, and then up to the left of the carved stones, that way you'll avoid the graveyard, which is to the right of the diamond mine.

F6: Fine. Okay, I'm.

G7: Right.

F7: round at the top right of the carved stones.

Examples (3), (4) and (6) are the examples where the ALL cleft construction highlights a verb phrase, and (5) is the example where it highlights a complete clause. The point to observe here is that all the ALL cleft constructions in the Map Task dialogues:

- (i) occur after a section of exchange of information about ascertaining the current position of the instruction giver and the follower, and/or the location/existence of shared and non-shared landmarks;
- (ii) express a new instruction on the basis of the previous exchange of information.

Take (3), (4) and (5), for example, to show this. This time the examples are shown with utterance function coding (i.e., dialogue moves) completed by the Human Communication Research Centre (HCRC), Edinburgh (Note: Coding is in bold).

(3') F1: **(query-w)** How far?

G1: **(clarify)** You'll see a graveyard. See a graveyard on your map?  
To the right of the diamond mine?

F2: **(reply-n)** No.

G2: **(acknowledge)** Right.

**(explain)** They've obviously not marked the graveyard.

F3: **(query-w)** How far to the right of the diamond mine is it?

G3: **(reply-w)** The graveyard is almost halfway in between ...

**(query-yn)** Do you have carved stones?

F4: **(reply-w)** I have carved stones at the top followed by a ravine  
followed by an Indian country.

G4: **(acknowledge)** Right.

**(reply-w)** In between the diamond mine and the carved stones is a  
graveyard. That's where it should be.



F5: **(acknowledge)** Right.

G5: **(instruct)** So, *all you need to do is continue past the diamond mine*

F6: **(check)** The stop.

G6: **(part of G5)** The past where you think the graveyard is.

F7: **(check)** Past where it is?

G7: **(reply-y)** Yeah, go route ... same

**(clarify)** under ... under the graveyard ... south of the Graveyard.

F8: **(query-yn)** Is the graveyard

G8: **(clarify)** The graveyard's ...

F9: **(part of F8)** due east of the diamond mine?

G9: **(reply-y)** Correct.

F10: **(check)** So I really shouldn't hit it then if I'm south of the diamond mine?

G10: **(reply-y)** Correct.

F11: **(acknowledge)** Right. Okay.

(4') G1: **(instruct)** So you move east around

F1: **(acknowledge)** The carved stones.

G2: **(part of G1)** carved stones.

**(query-yn)** And then ... Do you have gallows? On your map?

F2: **(reply-y)** Yes,

**(explain)** but they're absolutely miles away.

G3: **(acknowledge)** That's correct. That's correct.

**(instruct)** *All you need to do is go due south from the carved stones*

F3: **(check)** Past ...

G4: **(part of G3)** *as far as you can see the gallows, the same level as the gallows.*

F4: **(acknowledge)** Right.

G5: **(align)** You should be on top of the Indian country, correct?

F5: **(reply-w)** and just south of the ravine.

G6: **(acknowledge)** That's right.

(5') G1: (**query-yn**) Eh. Now you've got a ... Have you got an alpine garden?

F1: (**reply-y**) Uh-huh

G2: (**acknowledge**) You have. Right.

(**align**) *All you're doing is you're sort of doing see that wee ... bump you've got over the monastery at the moment?*

F2: (**reply-y**) Yeah

G3: (**instruct**) *You've sort of doing that in reverse ... and going up towards the alpine garden. So you do the bump in reverse ... and end up ... just going straight north up the left-hand side of the alpine garden.*

(**align**) Do you see what I mean?

F3: (**reply-y**) Right.

G4: (**instruct**) So that if you turned the sheet on its side it'd be a big "S".

F4: (**acknowledge**) Right, okay.

G5: (**align**) Right?

F5: (**query-yn**) But I've ... have you got a west lake?

G6: (**reply-n**) Eh. I've not, so.

(**query-w**) Have you got a west lake in the middle somewhere?

F6: (**reply-y**) Yeah,

(**explain**) but I've missed the west lake.

G7: (**acknowledge**) Aye ...

In (3'), the ALL cleft construction:

- (i) occurs after exchanging information about the presence and the location of the landmark *graveyard* which is relevant to the route;
- (ii) introduces a new instruction on the basis of the previous exchange of information about the landmark *graveyard*. (Note that the coordinating conjunction *so* makes it clearer that the new instruction is introduced on the basis of the exchange of information about that landmark.)

Similarly, in (4'), after a short exchange of information about the presence and the location of the landmark *gallows* which is relevant to the next instruction, the ALL cleft construction instructs the follower what to do next. (Notice that this instruction is clearly different from the instruction by G1.) Essentially the same applies in (5'). Here, G2 is coded "align" by HCRC. However, it is better to think that this applies only to *see that bump you've got over the monastery at the moment. All you're doing is you're sort of doing* constitutes an ALL cleft construction with which G3 introduces a new instruction.

At this point, we have to admit that the above observation also applies to some unclefted constructions introducing a new instruction, as shown in (7).

(7) G1: (**query-yn**) Do you have a pirate ship and the finish cross?

F1: (**reply-y**) The pirate ship's right down the ...

G2: (**acknowledge**) Right.

F2: (**part of F1**) the southern.

G3: (**instruct**) Now do a sort of "l" sharp brings you down to the pirate ship from where you are.

F3: (**query-yn**) Without going in the water?

G4: (**reply-n**) Going in the water.

F4: (**check**) Going in the water?

G5: (**reply-y**) Going in the water.

What has to be noticed here, however, is that this type of instruction is rare (i.e., only 7.6% in three dialogues). The large majority (i.e., 92.4% in the same three dialogues) are new instructions introduced without ascertaining the current position of the giver and the follower, and/or the location/existence of shared and non-shared landmarks. (8) is a typical example of that type of instruction.

- (8) G1: (**instruct**) And turn east to ... and travel right a long,  
F1: (**acknowledge**) Right.  
G2: (**instruct**) Past the shelter that's over the top.  
F2: (**acknowledge**) Uh-huh.  
G3: (**ready**) Right,

This situation makes it clear that in the context of introducing a new instruction, ALL cleft constructions and unclefted constructions differ from each other: ALL cleft constructions introduce a new instruction which is the speaker's conclusion drawn from the preceding exchange of information and in doing so they signal the end of the exchange of information and point forward to the next step of the task introduced by ALL cleft constructions. On the other hand, unclefted constructions introduce a new instruction which is, in many cases, not the speaker's conclusion. Based on this, I propose that ALL cleft constructions have a special discourse function – signalling the end of the exchange of information and pointing forward.<sup>1</sup>

Interestingly, ALL cleft constructions highlight an extremely limited range of entities. In the Map Task dialogues, except for the case where verb phrases/complete clauses are highlighted, there is only one case where a noun phrase is highlighted. This suggests that the unmarked use of ALL cleft constructions is to introduce a new instruction. For this reason, we will explore further ALL cleft constructions, paying special attention to the structure of discourse in the context of introducing a new instruction in the Map Task dialogues.

The Map Task dialogues, as was mentioned in section 3.3.1, involve two participants, one in the role of instruction giver, and the other in the role of instruction follower. One participant who plays the role of giver has a route marked on his/her map, and instructs the other, who does not have a route on his/her map, how to draw that route. According to Carletta et al. (1996), the instruction giver usually seems to break the route up into manageable pieces in his/her mind, and describes each one in turn. As a result, a typical discourse segment is a segment where the instruction giver introduces one piece of route on the map to get the follower to draw it.

However, not every discourse segment is of this type. In cases where confusion arises, participants have to review parts of the route which have already been talked about. Furthermore, participants in some cases may overview parts of the route which will be dealt with later but which are not meant to be drawn at that stage in the dialogue. In the discourse segments where ALL cleft constructions introduce instructions, 7 cases of the total of 8 examples belong to a segment where the instruction giver introduces one piece of route on the map to get the follower to draw it. The crucial point, with respect to discourse segments, particularly typical type of discourse segments, is that discourse segments are constructed with the aim of getting the follower to carry out instructions regarding a certain piece of route. This suggests that utterances in a discourse segment do not enjoy the same status: an utterance giving an instruction must be crucial and central, and other types of utterances such as utterances exchanging additional information are subordinate to it. In other words, discourse segment where ALL cleft constructions introduce a new instruction in the Map Task dialogues consist of utterances in a core-subordinate relation.<sup>2</sup>

With this observation we obtain a more detailed view of the role of ALL cleft constructions in the Map Task dialogues. As has been discussed, ALL cleft constructions signal the end of the exchange of information and point forward. As a result, this type of construction builds a boundary and divides one discourse segment into two parts – the part preceding ALL cleft construction and the part following this construction. In addition, ALL cleft constructions occupy a crucial and central position in the hierarchical structure of discourse by virtue of introducing a new instruction. Figure 4.1 illustrates this schematically:




Figure 4.1. Structure of discourse segment containing ALL cleft constructions

In this figure, the ALL cleft construction lies in the crucial and central position, as indicated with larger letters in bold. On the other hand, two sub-discourse segments divided by this construction are subordinate to it. This is the discourse structure which ALL cleft constructions organise. It is assumed that it is this role in the structure of discourse that influences the choice of ALL cleft constructions over other devices.

This assumption is supported by the fact that *just* and Reverse ALL cleft constructions in the Map Task dialogues do not have the discourse function of ALL clefts. The Map Task dialogues have one instance of Reverse ALL cleft construction, as shown in (9).

(9) Is that all we have to do?

As has been pointed out, the demonstrative *that* functions as a deictic element and is used to point to something located relatively far away from the speaker or from the speaker and listener. This is the spatial use of *that*. It can also be used anaphorically in text (e.g. *Yesterday John did not eat so much, and that surprised us very much.*). In (9), *that* refers to the whole parts of the task that the instruction giver and follower

have completed. (This utterance is located in the end of the dialogue.) The total number of occurrences of this construction in the data is too small to permit any definite statements to be made about the discourse function of Reverse ALL clefts; however it can be safely said that the Reverse ALL cleft construction has a summarising function. This treatment of Reverse ALL cleft constructions coincides with Grosz and Sidner (1986: 198). Taking the sentence *That's all for point 2*, they call this type of sentence linguistically marking completion. (See 1.1.) (*That* puts the parts of the task at a distance from the speaker. The speaker is already, as it were, moving on and away from the task. In contrast, *this* places the task close to the speaker.)

The Map Task dialogues have 103 instances of *just* when a highlighted item is either a verb phrase or a complete clause. It will be helpful to distinguish the cases where the speaker is the instruction giver from the cases where the speaker is the instruction follower. Before turning to a closer examination of the discourse function of *just* highlighting a verb/a complete clause, two things are worth pointing out. One is that as Table 4.3 shows, the frequency of occurrences of *just* in the no eye-contact dialogues is much higher than in the eye-contact dialogues both where the speaker is the giver and where s/he is the follower.

Table 4.3. *Distribution of 103 instances of 'just' highlighting a verb phrase/a complete clause*

Eye-contact dialogues		No eye-contact dialogues	
speaker		speaker	
giver	follower	giver	follower
7	15	32	49

The high frequency of occurrences of *just* in the no eye-contact dialogues appears to be associated with the fact that the participants in the tasks are not allowed to have eye-contact. Eye-contact is one of the main non-verbal tools with which we communicate with each other. (On this subject, see, for example, Goodwin 1981.) For this reason, if the participants in the tasks are not allowed to have eye-contact, that is likely to be a large obstacle hindering them in the achievement of their goals.

Utterances with *just*, I hypothesise, play a crucial role in the course of achieving their tasks which tend to be more difficult to achieve, compared with the tasks with eye-contact. We will return to this point later.

The other point has to do with the relationship between the grammatical structure of clauses and *just* highlighting a verb phrase/a complete clause. If we count the cases where the highlighted item is a verb phrase/a complete clause without considering the grammatical structure of clauses, the following are the results:

Table 4.4. *The relationship between grammatical structure of clauses and 'just' highlighting a verb phrase/a complete clause in the Map Task dialogues*

Grammatical structure of clauses	Eye-contact dialogues		No eye-contact dialogues	
	speaker		speaker	
	giver	follower	giver	follower
declarative	7	2	31	13
imperative	85	4	181	10
interrogative	0	10	1	29

It will be noticed that when the speaker is the instruction giver, the majority are imperative clauses. This is not surprising, considering the characteristics of the Map Task dialogues. This study does not include the case of imperative clauses<sup>3</sup> on the ground that *just* in imperative clauses is not syntactically equivalent to ALL cleft constructions. ALL cleft constructions do not occur in imperative clauses.

Let us now return to the main point – the discourse function of *just* highlighting a verb/a complete clause. To begin with, let us look closely at the case where the speaker is the instruction giver, and then look at the case where the speaker is the instruction follower.

Typical examples in the data are:



- (10) G1: **(query-yn)** Do you have an adventure playground?  
F1: **(reply-y)** Yeah.  
G2: **(ready)** Right,  
**(instruct)** you go up ... you go south, I mean you go north, up  
past it on the ... on its right ... its left-hand side.  
F2: **(query-yn)** So I'm just going to be going past the site of the  
forest fire?  
G3: **(reply-w)** Just about. Just below it, just below  
F3: **(check)** Until just below?  
G4: **(instruct)** it on my map.  
**(instruct)** *So you just go past the adventure playground on the  
... its left-hand site.*  
F4: **(check)** And no more. Aye?  
G5: **(reply-y)** And no more.
- (11) G1: **(instruct)** And, well you cut down to below it, you curve right cut  
down to it, and go below it,  
F1: **(acknowledge)** Right.  
G2: **(instruct)** So you're going southeast.  
F2: **(query-yn)** So you're going ... So that's just to the east of where I  
went beyond the quarry?  
G3: **(reply-y)** Yeah.  
F3: **(acknowledge)** Yeah.  
G4: **(explain)** It's just about ... Fallen cairn is above the quarry and to  
the right.  
F4: **(acknowledge)** Yeah.  
G5: **(acknowledge)** Yeah.  
**(instruct)** *You just cut down to that, then go down the .. round the  
bottom of it.*
- (12) G1: **(instruct)** Right now go down ... to bottom left  
F1: **(check)** Diagonally?

G2: **(reply-y)** Yes,

**(explain)** to miss the ... to get below the plane crash

F2: **(check)** The plane crash at the top right?

G3: **(ready)** Right,

F3: **(query-w)** Where does route end?

G4: **(reply-w)** Sort of middle ... above middle right

F4: **(query-w)** What's down there?

G5: **(explain)** Oh, there's another plane crash down here though

F5: **(explain)** No, there's only one

G6: **(instruct)** Right, well *we'll just do that anyway, right?* Go down  
diagonally to the bottom left of the page

F6: **(acknowledge)** Right

What should be noticed here is that all the utterances with *just* in my data:

- (i) occur after some information/questions given by the instruction follower concerning an instruction newly introduced by the instruction giver;
- (ii) express the previous instruction either in the same way or in a different way or in a modified way, on the basis of such information/questions.

For example, in (10), the utterance with *just*:

- (i) occurs after the instruction follower's question regarding the instruction introduced just before it;
- (ii) repeats the previous instruction.

Examples (11) and (12) can be explained on similar lines.<sup>4</sup> In short, in contrast with ALL cleft constructions, *just* does not introduce a new instruction, but repeats/modifies the instruction which is already introduced and is not yet carried out. In this sense, *just* has a discourse function of engaging the giver and the follower in

the instruction currently under discussion. We can represent the structure of discourse segments with *just* schematically as follows.




Figure 4.2. Structure of discourse segment containing utterances with *just* in a context of giving instructions

That is, the utterance introducing a new instruction (G2 in (10), G1 in (11) and in (12)) lies in the crucial and central position, and a series of information/questions raised due to the new instruction is subordinate to it. Following this, the utterance with *just* is attached to the utterance introducing the new instruction. The former is subordinate to the latter, since it repeats/modifies the instruction; nevertheless, it has a more important discourse-organising function than utterances about information/questions in that it is not merely expressing information ancillary to the instruction. It is followed by another series of questions or requests for information arising from the repeated or modified instruction.

When *just* has the discourse function of engaging the giver and the follower in the instruction currently under discussion, the interpersonal function, which *just* has, is very effective and has the advantage of not presenting a threat to the listener's negative face – his or her basic need to maintain claims of territory and self-determination. We assume that the interpersonal function is effective in indicating that the speaker's imposition on the listener is not in itself great.

One point is worth mentioning in passing. In my dialogue data, unlike utterances with *just*, utterances without *just* in a context of repeating/modifying the original instruction are not necessarily introduced in connection with the series of information/questions raised by the follower. Consider the following.

- (13) G1: **(instruct)** And then up north,  
F1: **(acknowledge)** Mmhmm.  
G2: **(ready)** Now,  
    **(query-yn)** have you got anything down that side?  
F2: **(reply-n)** Not in that corner.  
G3: **(ready)** No, well,  
    **(query-yn)** have you got a collapsed shelter?  
F3: **(reply-w)** ... Over a bit.  
G4: **(ready)** Right,  
    **(instruct)** go straight up north,  
F4: **(acknowledge)** Mmhmm.  
G5: **(instruct)** Until you got to a kind of level above the shelter  
F5: **(acknowledge)** Right.

G4-5 are the more detailed version of G1. The point to observe here is that the detailed version of G1 is not introduced in response to questions raised by the follower; the original instruction is detailed based on the giver's intention. (Note that it is the giver who starts a section ascertaining the location/existence of some landmarks.) 7 dialogues, for example, contain 16 examples of this type, repeating/modifying the original instruction, and 14 examples having the same type as utterances with *just*. In this sense, it could be said that utterances with *just* in the context of introducing an instruction have one type repeating/modifying the instruction which is already introduced and is not accomplished yet, whereas utterances without *just* have two types – one type triggered by the follower's questions and the other type triggered by the giver.

It is of interest that the discourse function of utterances with *just* is not the same when the speaker is the follower. The Map Task dialogues have 64 instances of this type. To take some of them:

- (14) G1: **(instruct)** so you go right up to the ... eh ruins  
F1: **(acknowledge)** Uh-huh  
G2: **(instruct)** And then  
F2: **(check)** *Just keeping on the edge of the page, yeah?*
- (15) G1: **(instruct)** but you ... just right near the end of the page.  
F1: **(check)** *So I just go down to the right of pebbled shore?*  
G2: **(reply)** Year, uh-huh.
- (16) G1: **(instruct)** Just curve from the point, go right ... go down and  
curve into the right until you reach the tip of the pirate  
ship  
F1: **(check)** So across the bay?  
G2: **(reply-y)** Yeah, through the water  
F2: **(check)** *So I just so straight down?*  
G3: **(reply-y)** Straight down  
**(clarify)** and curve to the right until you're in line with the pirate  
ship
- (17) G1: **(query-yn)** Do you have an adventure playground?  
F1: **(reply-y)** Yeah.  
G2: **(ready)** Right,  
**(instruct)** you go up ... you go south, I mean you go north, up  
past it on the ... on its right ... its left-hand side.  
F2: **(query-yn)** *So I'm just going to be going past the site of the  
forest fire?*

These examples suggest that there is a relationship between an utterance with *just* and the utterance function of requesting the partner (i.e., the instruction giver in these examples) to confirm a piece of information. 36 cases of the total of 64 examples fall under this.<sup>6</sup> The interpersonal function must be effective in these examples as well. When s/he requests the partner to confirm some information, *just* protects the speaker's negative face against crucial comments from the listener.

The observation in the last few paragraphs has shown why the frequency of occurrences of *just* in the no eye-contact dialogues is much higher than in the eye-contact dialogues. Accomplishing the giver's instruction would not necessarily be easy. This is particularly so in the tasks done in circumstances excluding eye-contact. It is natural in such cases for the giver to have to repeat and/or modify the instruction already given. Likewise, it is natural for the follower frequently to request the giver to confirm some information.

It was observed in this sub-section that all the grammatical devices that highlight a verb phrase/a complete clause restrictively in the Map Task dialogues are different from each other in terms of the following three points at the pragmatic level:

- (a) *Just*, ALL cleft constructions and Reverse ALL cleft constructions have different discourse functions and the structures of discourse organised by these grammatical devices are significantly different. Utterances with *just* produced by the instruction giver repeat/modify an instruction that has already been given and function to engage the giver and the follower in the instruction currently under discussion. On the other hand, utterances with *just* produced by the follower are associated with the function of requesting the partner to confirm a piece of information. Furthermore, ALL cleft constructions function to signal the end of exchange of information and to point forward, and because of the usage of introducing a new instruction, the constructions lie in the crucial and central position in the hierarchical structure of discourse. Reverse ALL cleft constructions seem to have a summarising function.

(b) From (a), it is clear that different grammatical devices contribute differently to information structure: constituents highlighted by ALL cleft constructions are new information. On the other hand, constituents highlighted by Reverse ALL cleft constructions are not new but activated. In (9), the constituents highlighted by the Reverse ALL cleft construction are the whole parts of the task that the instruction giver and follower have completed. They are in the minds of both giver and follower at the time of utterance. (See section 2.1.2.2 for the notion of activation.) Furthermore, constituents highlighted by *just* are also activated, since utterances with *just* in cases where the speaker is the instruction giver repeat/modify the instruction that is already introduced once and utterances with *just* in cases where the speaker is the follower are associated with the function of requesting the partner to confirm some information.

(c) *Just* has an interpersonal function as discussed in the previous chapter. From the transcripts of the dialogues *just* is an effective instrument for that particular interpersonal task. Moreover, ALL cleft constructions seem to have the interpersonal function. As has been shown, this type of construction introduces a new instruction. While introducing a new instruction, ALL cleft constructions function to satisfy the listener's negative face, his/her basic need to maintain claims of territory and self-determination.

#### 4.2.2. Case where the highlighted constituent functions as an object

The Map Task dialogues have 22 examples where nouns functioning as objects (strictly speaking, direct objects) are highlighted restrictively. Table 4.5 below presents the distribution of those examples.

Table 4.5. *Distribution of grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively when the highlighted constituent functions as an object*

<i>only</i>	<i>just</i>	ALL clefts	Reverse ALL clefts	<i>nothing but</i> constructions
8	10	1	1	2

What influences the distribution of the grammatical devices under discussion? In this sub-section, we look first at factors influencing the choice between *only* and *just* and then factors favouring constructions other than *only* and *just*.

#### 4.2.2.1. *Only* or *just*

*Only* and *just* are different from each other, with respect to the context where they are used. Consider the following.

- (18) G1: Okay. So you're going to come up, and then you're going to come about the old mill ... and turn ...  
F1: Old mill?  
G2: Old mill.  
F2: Oh right, I've just got the mill wheel.  
G3: **(check)** Mill ... You've only got a mill wheel?
- (19) G1: ehm, underneath the field station.  
F1: Right. That's way over the far left-hand side of the page on my map.  
G2: Where is field station?  
F2: Field station's way over the far left.  
G3: It's the far ... Well, there's two field stations on my map.  
F3: Well, there's not one on mine.  
G4: Right,  
**(check)** So you've only got one there.
- (20) G: Do you have any other obstacles?  
F: **(reply-w)** Only an overnight accommodation place
- (21) F1: Have you got a great viewpoint?  
G1: Yeah, I've actually got two great viewpoints.  
F2: **(explain)** Oh, I've only got one that's not fair.
- (22) G1: Good, good. Right. Well, I've got two boathouses, right.  
**(explain)** I think ... you've only got  
F1: I've got one and it's on the right-hand side of the page.



- G2: **(part of G1)** one, because Lynn only had one.
- (23) G: Right. We go wh ... eh ... left right along because it's a lake. Just underneath that the ... it's west lake. Have you got that?  
 F: **(explain)** No, I've only got east lake. I've not got west lake.
- (24) F1: You want me to go ... You want to curve up to about the level of the great rock? I don't know if you have that  
 G1: No, not as far as that  
 F2: See ...  
 G2: **(clarify)** [I want you to take] Only a small curve.
- (25) G1: Whereabouts is the picket fence?  
 F1: Picket fence ... is below the mill wheel ... which is below the Caravan park  
 G2: Right okay well  
 You want to have the old mill on your right-hand side so if that ... fence is below the old mill you want to keep that on your right-hand side  
 F2: Okay  
 G3: Okay?  
 So you're going to come up and then you're going to ... come Above the old mill and turn ...  
 F3: Old mill?  
 G4: Old mill.  
 F4: Oh right.  
**(explain)** I've just got the mill wheel
- (26) **(explain)** I'll just do a slight detour
- (27) **(explain)** We're just trying to avoid all these other things.
- (28) **(explain)** Just an empty space
- (29) **(instruct)** So you just need to run along the bottom of the map until you get to just below the gorillas ... or the banana tree.
- (30) **(instruct)** Just do what I tell you

- (31) (**instruct**) Just tell me what you ... what it is to you
- (32) (**align**) can you just see it?
- (33) (**reply-w**) It just says public footpath
- (34) (**reply-w**) I ... just a remote village

*Only* has a strong tendency to be used in context where the possession of a certain landmark is under discussion and to highlight a landmark. 7 cases of the total 8 examples fall under this. (The exception is (24).) On the other hand, *just* does not have this tendency. As shown in (25) – (34), a variety of noun phrases/clauses can be highlighted by *just* and only two cases ((25) and (34)) out of the total of 10 examples fall under the cases where the possession of a certain landmark is under discussion.

While examples (20) – (23) are the cases where the constituents highlighted by *only* are new, (18), (19) and (24) are the cases where the constituents highlighted by *only* are not new but activated (or partially activated): in (18), *only* highlights *a mill wheel*, which is activated in the minds of the speaker and the listener at the time of utterance, since it was mentioned in F2. This constituent cannot be pragmatically presupposed; since the function coding is ‘check’, it is uncertain whether the speaker believes the proposition that the follower has only got a mill wheel. Similarly, the highlighted constituent *one* in G4 in (19) relates to *the field station* mentioned in G1. Thus it is activated in the minds of the speaker and the listener. In (24), not the whole (i.e., *a small curve*) but the part of the highlighted constituent (i.e., *a curve*) in G2 is activated, since it is relevant to the question *You want to curve up to about the level of the great rock* by F1. (*Small* is new information.) Constituents highlighted by *just* are not necessarily new, either. They are new in some cases such as (34). But they are activated and not new in other cases such as (25).

When the highlighted constituents function as an object, *just* could have the interpersonal function as in examples (29) – (31). This does not apply to *only*: none of the examples are those threatening the listener’s or the speaker’s negative face.

#### 4.2.2.2. *Nothing but* constructions

The Map Task dialogues have two instances where *nothing but* constructions are chosen.<sup>7</sup> They are:

- (35) G: **(query-yn)** And then have you got a soft furnishings store?  
F: **(reply-n)** No,  
**(explain)** *I've got nothing round about there apart from the lost steps and directly below the mountain I've got gazelles.*
- (36) G1: **(align)** Oh, right see where see where your caravan park is then?  
F1: **(reply-y)** Yeah.  
**(explain)** *I've got nothing above it. I've nothing above the caravan park*
- G2: **(query-yn)** Have you something below it?  
F2: **(explain)** *except the west lake*
- G3: **(query-yn)** Have you got a Have you got a fence below it?  
F3: **(reply-y)** Yeah,  
**(explain)** *the picket fence*

Both (35) and (36) are in a context where the possession of a certain landmark is under discussion. This gives rise to the question why *only* is not used in these two examples. (As has been clarified in 4.2.2.1, *only* has a strong tendency to be used in such a context.) The important point to note is that although *only* and *nothing but* constructions are used in similar contexts, there is a subtle difference between them: in (35) and (36), the *nothing but* construction is used where the speaker pays attention to the fact that s/he does not have the landmark under discussion, whereas except for example (23),<sup>8</sup> *only* is not used under such circumstances. In other words, in (35) and (36), the *nothing but* construction is derived from its preceding negative answer - *No* in (35) and *I've got nothing above it* in (36), and this makes it natural for the following utterance to start with a construction containing a negative expression instead of using *only*. In short, forms of the preceding utterance of the devices influence the choice of *nothing but* constructions over others.

As for the constituents highlighted by *nothing but* constructions, they can be regarded as new: *the lost steps* in (35) occurred in the dialogues once before F mentioned this landmark in (35). It occurred when the giver asked about *the lost steps* in the middle of the map. As Figure 4.4 illustrates, the follower does not have that landmark. Their dialogue at that part of the route is:

(37) G1: have you got some lost steps there?

F1: erm yes I have

but ... quite a bit above maybe something like five inches or something above

G2: oh no

these ... these are in the middle




Figure 4.3. Giver map




Figure 4.4. Follower map

As the figures above show, there are several parts of the route on the map that the follower has to draw before the giver and the follower reach the part of the route which is associated with the landmark *a soft furnishings store* and at which the follower utters ‘*I’ve got nothing round about there apart from the lost steps and directly below the mountain I’ve got gazelles*’, as in (35). As mentioned in 2.1.2.2, Dryer (1996) claims that activated elements may be considered to be in short-term memory and that thus the activation status of elements ‘changes rapidly through time’ (p.481), and that they ‘often become deactivated within a short period of time’ (p.481). This thesis supposes that the parts of the route on the map that the follower has to draw before (35) are likely to deactivate the landmark *the lost steps* which was once activated in the minds of the giver and the follower in (37).

In (36) the highlighted constituent *the west lake* is certainly new. It has not been mentioned in the course of the dialogue until (36).

#### 4.2.2.3. Reverse ALL cleft constructions

Below is the example where a Reverse ALL cleft construction is chosen to highlight an object.

- (38) G1: (**query-w**) Have you anything like to the left of the burnt forest?  
F1: (**reply-w**) I've got a burnt forest and then straight below it I've got a carpenter's cottage then a ravine. *That's all I've.*  
G2: (**explain**) Well I haven't got the carpenter's cottage.  
(**query-yn**) Is that  
F2: (**uncodable**) It's ...  
G3: (**query-yn**) directly beside the ravine?

The use of the Reverse ALL cleft construction in (38) is derived from the speaker's need to use a summarising function of this construction discussed in 4.2.1. In (38), *That's all I've got* explicitly summarises what the speaker has on the map around the landmark *burnt forest*, with the use of the demonstrative *that*. (Thus the constituents highlighted by this construction are not new but activated.) F1 uses the Reverse ALL cleft construction to summarise what s/he has and consequently to signal the end of the topic of what s/he has around the burnt forest. Utterances with *only* do not summarise what the speaker has, as in (38').

- (38') G: Have you anything like to the left of the burnt forest?  
F: I've only got a burnt forest and straight below it, only a carpenter's cottage and a ravine.

What F is doing in (38') is making a list.

It was observed in this sub-section that:

- (a) Different grammatical devices are used in different contexts: *only* applying to highlight constituents functioning as object has a strong tendency to be used in the context where the possession of a certain landmark is under discussion and to highlight a landmark. *Nothing but* constructions are used where their preceding utterances contain negative forms such as *no*. Furthermore, Reverse ALL cleft constructions are used to summarise what the speaker has claimed. Contrary to these devices, *just* is used under the circumstance lacking the conditions requiring either *only*, *nothing but* constructions or Reverse ALL cleft constructions.
- (b) *Just* could have an interpersonal function when it highlights constituents functioning as object. This function is not relevant to *only*, *nothing but* constructions and Reverse ALL cleft constructions.
- (c) Constituents highlighted by *nothing but* constructions are new in my data. On the other hand, constituents highlighted by *only* are not necessarily new. The same applies to *just*. Furthermore, constituents highlighted by Reverse ALL cleft constructions are activated.

#### 4.2.3. *The highlighted constituent as a post-verbal NP in the existential construction*

As Table 4.6 illustrates, the Map Task dialogues have six instances where a post-verbal NP in the existential construction is highlighted restrictively.<sup>9</sup>

Table 4.6. *Distribution of grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively when the highlighted constituent is a post-verbal NP in the existential construction*

<i>only</i>	<i>just</i>	ALL clefts	Reverse ALL clefts	<i>nothing but</i> constructions
3	1	0	0	2

#### 4.2.3.1. *Only*

Consider the following examples.

- (39) G1: (**align**) Now you should ... come to a ...fenced meadow on your  
right  
F1: (**reply-y**) Aye  
G2: (**instruct**) Well you turn left ... so you're going up the map again  
F2: (**acknowledge**) Right, up the map  
G3: (**instruct**) Up the map.  
(**explain**) You'll then come to an abandoned cottage ... it should  
be on your left-hand side  
.  
.  
.  
.  
G19: (**instruct**) You should see a fenced meadow in front of you  
F19: (**check**) Another one?  
G20: (**reply-y**) yes  
F20: (**explain**) No, I've had a fenced meadow but *there's only  
another ...* There's nae more fenced meadows.
- (40) G1: (**instruct**) to miss the ... to get below the plane crash  
F1: (**check**) The plane crash at the top right?  
G2: (**ready**) Right,  
F2: (**query-w**) Where does route end?  
G3: (**reply-w**) Sort of middle ... above middle right  
F3: (**query-w**) What's down there?  
G4: (**explain**) Oh, there's another plane crash down here though  
F4: (**explain**) No, *there's only one.*
- (41) G1: (**query-yn**) You should see ... um a fenced meadow down at the  
bottom?



- F1: **(reply-y)** Aye.
- G2: **(ready)** Okay,  
**(ready)** ehm,  
**(instruct)** if you're heading along that way turn up ... left,  
**(explain)** you should see an abandoned cottage ... up the way.
- F2: **(ready)** No wait a minute,  
**(query-yn)** do you want me to go past the fenced meadow?
- G3: **(query-yn)** Eh?
- F3: **(query-yn)** Or just ... look at it?
- G4: **(reply-n)** Don't go near no,  
**(instruct)** don't go near e ... either of the fenced meadows.
- F4: **(explain)** Can only see one fenced meadow.
- G5: **(explain)** There are two.
- F5: **(explain)** Nah.
- G6: **(explain)** There's one above the caravan park and one over from  
the old mill.
- F6: **(explain)** No it's no on my map.
- G7: **(acknowledge)** Oh well okay.
- F7: **(explain)** *There's only the one at ... there's only the one at the  
bottom.*
- G8: **(acknowledge)** Oh well ... right.

The existential construction is 'sensitive to the information status of the post-verbal NP' (Ward and Birner 1996: 465) and is the device for introducing new entities into discourse (e.g. Huddleston 1988). For this reason, the post-verbal NP in the existential construction is normally indefinite.<sup>10</sup> However, what should be noticed here is that the entities introduced by the existential construction in (39) – (41) are not new, since they are activated; they have been mentioned in the preceding context and are in the minds of both giver and follower at the time of utterance. For example, from the context it is clear that the highlighted constituent *another* in the existential construction in (39) is the fenced meadow that was negotiated between G1 and F1. Why, then, is the existential construction chosen in these examples?

Ward and Birner (1996: 466) claim that the existential construction (or existential *there*-insertion in their term) is sensitive to hearer-familiarity and that thus the post-verbal NP needs to represent information that is hearer-new (i.e., information that the speaker believes is not familiar to the hearer). However, there are, according to them, three cases where the activated entity in the mind of the speaker and in that of the listener (or hearer-old entity in their term) is construable as new information and is used in the existential construction. The first case is when the speaker/writer intends to remind the addressee that the post-verbal NP has been mentioned and that it is identifiable, believing that the addressee may have temporarily forgotten it. The second case is when the post-verbal NP represents a new instance of a known type. Their example is:

(42) A: We had another one of our delighted faculty meeting today.

B: My God, what do you have? Three a week?

A: I know. And they're always the same.

*Today there was the usual bickering ...*

(Ward and Birner 1996: 467)(Original italic)

In this example, the post-verbal NP *the usual bickering*, as the definite article indicates, is activated and is uniquely identifiable. However, at the same time it is new in that it is 'the newly instantiated bickering that held of the particular faculty meeting in question' (Ward and Birner 1996: 467). The third case is when the entity is activated but at the same time it is new in the sense that it instantiates a variable in an open proposition. Consider their example from Chicago Tribune.

(43) [Khalili] joined the staff of the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago, a nationally prominent 20-story medical facility, which at the time was just a handful of doctors working in a former warehouse at Ohio Street and McClung Court. "At times, *there were just the two of us*, and he and I had to see all the patients", recalled Dr. Henry Betts, the institute's medical director and chief executive officer.

(Ward and Birner 1996: 468)(Original italic)

Ward and Birner (1996: 468) claim that in this example, the post-verbal NP specifies the uniquely identifiable set of two individuals evoked in the prior discourse. However, this set of individuals also constitutes a hearer-new instantiation of the variable in the salient open proposition “X-many doctors were at the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago”.

(39) – (41) fall under the third case. All the post-verbal NPs in the existential construction in the examples are the activated entities. But at the same time the NPs are construable as new information in that they instantiate a variable in the open proposition “the speaker has X-many a particular landmark such as fenced meadow and plane crash”.

At this point, we have to admit that the above observation also applies to one case where *only* highlights the object, as shown in (21), which is repeated as (44).

(44) F1: Have you got a great viewpoint?

G1: Yeah, I've actually got two great viewpoints.

F2: (**explain**) Oh, I've only got one that's not fair.

The highlighted constituent *one* in F2 of (44) and *a great viewpoint* in F1 are identified. Thus, this highlighted constituent is activated in the mind of the speaker and in the mind of the listener at the time of uttering F2. However, this highlighted constituent is construable as new information in that it instantiates a variable in the open proposition “the speaker has X-many great viewpoints on the map”. In short, the situation in (44) is the same as the one in (39) – (41).

What has to be noticed here, however, is that this is the only example where the object highlighted by *only* satisfies the conditions holding in (39) – (41). Other examples where the objects are highlighted by *only* do not satisfy the conditions.<sup>11</sup> This makes it clear that utterances in which objects are highlighted by *only* are different from utterances where post-verbal NPs are highlighted by *only*: in the case of the former, it is because of the context where the possession of a certain landmark

is under discussion that the speaker uses monotransitive constructions and chooses *only* to highlight objects. The highlighted objects are activated at the time of utterance in some cases (i.e., (18), (19) and part of (24)) and are new in others (i.e., (20), (21), (22) and (23)). On the other hand, it is to instantiate a variable in an open proposition that the speaker uses the existential construction and chooses *only* to highlight post-verbal NPs. Consequently, all the highlighted post-verbal NPs in the existential construction are construable as new information.

Before moving on to the next subject, let us pause here to consider the relationship between utterances with *only* and utterance functions. As the above examples show, all the highlighted constituents share the following two properties: the utterance function coding is 'explain' (i.e., stating information which has not been elicited by the partner), and the speaker is the instruction follower. Is it just a casual coincidence or does it mean that there is a relationship between *only* and a particular utterance function?

Table 4.7, which presents the main utterance functions of utterances with the existential constructions in half of the total of the Map Task dialogues, provides one answer to this question.

Table 4.7. *Main utterance functions of utterances with the existential construction*

Utterance function coding	Speaker	Numbers of occurrences
explain	giver	44
query-yn	giver	30
explain	follower	19
reply-w	follower	8
others	giver/follower	21

This table shows that in the Map Task dialogues, existential constructions are frequently used by the instruction follower for some explanation. If we ignore the

difference between giver and follower, there are 63 occurrences of the existential associated with 'explain'. This suggests the relationship between existential constructions and the utterance function 'explain'. Given this, it is likely that the utterance coding of all the utterances with *only* is 'explain', but it does not necessarily mean that an utterance with *only* has some particular relationships with the utterance function 'explain'.

#### 4.2.3.2. *Nothing but* constructions

The Map Task dialogues have two instances of *nothing but* constructions. They are:

(45) G1: (**query-yn**) Is that huge, big, and there's *nothing* at all in that space?

F1: (**clarify**) Uh-huh, *except*

G2: (**query-yn**) About halfway up the page?

F2: (**reply-w**) *a vast meadow*

(46) G1: And once you get to above highest viewpoint, eh, you go horizontal

F1: Above highest viewpoint?

G2: Yes

F2: Uh-huh.

G3: above ... Right, then go, eh, uh, to your right, horizontally. Then, eh, come ... Once you're ... Once you've, eh, passed highest viewpoint, and

(**instruct**) *there's nothing below you, er, apart from safari truck, if you can see that there?*

Why are *nothing but* constructions used in these examples? It is possible to suggest that the factor influencing the choice of *nothing but* constructions over other grammatical devices is related to a form of the utterance which precedes the *nothing but* construction. In (45), the *nothing except* construction is derived from the word *nothing* in the preceding utterance (i.e., G1), and this makes it natural for the

following utterance to start with the word *except* (or with other similar words such as *but*) instead of using some other grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively.

Essentially the same thing happens in (46). Notice the filler *er*. First the giver denied the existence of any landmarks on a certain part of the follower's map (i.e., *below you*). Then after the filler, s/he changed his/her information from none of the existence to the existence of just one *safari truck*, using the *nothing apart from* construction derived from word *nothing* which s/he used previously.

It has been observed in this sub-section that:

- (a) Post-verbal NPs in the existential construction can be restrictively highlighted mainly either by *only* or by *nothing but* constructions. As where the highlighted constituent functions as an object, forms of the preceding utterance of the devices are the factor influencing the choice of *nothing but* constructions over *only*.
- (b) Due to the property of the existential construction, post-verbal NPs highlighted by the grammatical devices are construable as new information.
- (c) When *only* and *nothing but* constructions highlight post-verbal NPs in the existential construction, the interpersonal function does not seem to be needed and thus these devices do not seem to have this function. Utterance function coding in G3 in (46) is instruction. However, this utterance is unlikely to threaten the listener's negative face, since it does not instruct the follower to do something. Consequently, the *nothing but* construction in (46) does not seem to have an interpersonal function.

#### 4.2.4. *The highlighted constituent as subject complements*

As Table 4.8 shows, *only* and *just* can highlight subject complements: *only* highlights quantitative expressions, whereas *just* highlights non-quantitative expressions. In

other words, *only* and *just* are used in different ways, according to the semantic properties of the highlighted constituents.

Table 4.8. *Distribution of grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively when the highlighted constituent functions as a subject complement*

	<i>only</i>	<i>just</i>	ALL clefts	Reverse ALL clefts	<i>nothing but</i> constructions
Quantitative expressions	9	0	0	0	0
Non-quantitative expressions	0	13	0	0	0

Table 4.9. *The detailed results of Table 4.8.*

- 
1. it's only about one and a half centimetres
  2. We're only about a third of the way along it.
  3. is that only an inch from the side?
  4. That's only about like a centimetre long
  5. you should only be like about a third of the way up the page
  6. Mine are only about three inches away.
  7. I'm only about an inch from the bottom of the page
  8. you're only, say, about a centimetre from the edge
  9. This line was only about two centimetres long?
  
  10. it's just a diagonal from that first crest to above ... pebbled shore?
  11. It's just a really, really shallow curve.
  12. So it's just a shallow
  13. It's just to avoid haystack.
  14. It's just a fence.
  15. it's just to tell you where to stop the line
  16. That's just a habit of mine
  17. It's just a curve.
  18. It's just on line with ravine.
  19. It's like just a curvy line
  20. It's just a straight line, right.
  21. it's just a thing.
  22. it's just mountain stream.
-

The highlighted constituents are new information in some cases and activated in others. To take some examples,

(47) G1: Have you got cornfields?

F1: mmhmm

G2: the top ... you should be like ... at the right ... to about two inches  
below them at the right-hand corner of that

F2: of the cornfield?

G3: the left-hand corner

F3: just made a right coo's or so out of that one

G4: right

F4: okay

We've got the west highland way on this one ...

G5: shit

And I ... hope it's not the way I done it aye *we're only about third  
of the way along it*

(48) G1: see what I mean?

F1: oh away round here ... below the start?

G2: yeah

So it's ... that's the level you're going to

F2: ah right

So it sort of curves round like that ... backwards "c" as you've said?

G3: it's not it's just ... to the le ... it's to the left of the haystack ... *it's  
just a really shallow thing*

(49) F1: where are we going to go anyway are we going try to get up the?

G1: thing is right ... you go along the bottom right ... and my ... route  
... about ... just over an inch ... from the side of the ... page

F2: mmhmm

G2: goes up again ... until you're almost ... on a level with footbridge

F3: well *is that only an inch from the side?*



G3: uh-huh

(50) G1: is there is there a picket fence underneath it?

F1: mmhmm

G2: really

Could you make it a line go round it and then  
is it bet ... is it like down and then the old mill's ... above from it?

F2: yeah

the the old mill's like ... nor the east of it

G3: so can you not got round the picket fence ... and round the old mill  
... Do you not have to go round the picket fence no?

F3: I don't think so

that that's what we did first of all ... the the ... the first line

G4: uh-huh uh-huh

F4: when I was asking you whether I could you know I have to eh ...  
stop

Before I got to the picket fence or not ... so ... but

G5: well

do you not have to go round it?

F5: why *it's just a fence*

In (47), *about third of the way along it*, which is highlighted by *only*, is new: it is something that the instruction giver is thinking about at the time of utterance but that the instruction follower is not. Similarly in (48), the constituent *a really shallow thing*, which is highlighted by *just*, is new: it is lit up in the mind of the giver but not in the mind of the follower. On the other hand, the highlighted constituents in (49) and (50) are activated. They have been mentioned in the preceding context and are lit up in the minds of the giver and the follower at the time of utterance.

#### 4.2.5. Noun-modifier as the highlighted constituents

As Table 4.10 illustrates, the Map Task dialogues have 36 instances where the highlighted constituent is a noun-modifier.

Table 4.10. *Distribution of grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively when the highlighted constituent functions as a noun-modifier*

<i>only</i>	<i>just</i>	ALL clefts	Reverse ALL clefts	<i>nothing but</i> constructions
6	30	0	0	0

20 cases of the total of 30 examples of *just* are the cases where colloquial words such as *a wee* and *a couple of* are highlighted, whereas all the examples of *only* are the cases where neutral words such as *one* are highlighted (see Table 4.11).

Table 4.11. *Some examples where noun-modifiers are highlighted in the Map Task dialogues*

- 
1. just **a wee** touch to your left of the peak
  2. just **a wee** touch more
  3. just **a wee** angle
  4. just **a wee** curve
  5. there's just **a wee** totty bit of monkeys or baboons or whatever you call them
  6. it's just **a wee** shallow curve
  7. Just **a couple of** inches
  8. Just **a couple of**
  9. Just maybe **a couple of** inches
  10. so it's just **a sort of** a big circle
  11. Just a **slight** curve
  12. It's just **a few** centimetres out from the left-hand side of the page.
  
  13. You only have **one** fenced meadow?
  14. I've only got **one** boat house.
  15. [I] can only see **one** fenced meadow.
  16. So it's only a **slight** curve
  17. I've only got **half** an "S"
- 

Note: Highlighted constituents are in bold.

The highlighted constituents are new in some cases and are activated in others. To take some examples,

(51) I've only got half an "S".

(52) just a wee touch to your left of the peak

(53) G1: and start going ... right across the page ... to the east ... ehm ...  
at a five degree angle ... can you do that ... *just a wee angle*

F1: how far?

a five degree angle?

G2: *just a wee angle*

(54) G1: so you're coming down ... come slightly down sort of ... south

F1: mmhmm

G2: south west or ... just slightly and then you're going to ... pass about  
a fenced meadow do you have a fenced meadow?

F2: and my fenced meadow is away down the right-hand corner ...  
below the forest

G3: so *you only have one fenced meadow?*

F3: uh-huh

The highlighted constituents *half* in (51) and *a wee* in (52) are surely new, since no remarks relating to these constituents occurred previously. On the other hand, the highlighted constituents *a wee* in (53) and *one* in (54) are activated: *a wee* in G1 and G2 is substituted for *a five degree* in G1 and F1. Similarly, in example (54), the number of the fenced meadows that the follower has has been mentioned in the preceding context and is lit up in the minds of the giver and the follower at the time of utterance.

#### 4.3. The Scottish-English conversations

Table 4.12 below presents the number and distribution of the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively in an extract from the

corpus of Scottish-English conversations. The figures in parentheses indicate the percentages of distribution.

Table 4.12. *Distribution of the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively in Scottish-English conversations*

	<i>only</i>	<i>just</i>	ALL clefts	Reverse ALL clefts	<i>nothing but</i> constructions
Verb phrases/complete clauses	0	41	1	0	0
Objects	10	17	1	2	0
Post-verbal NPs in existential constructions	7	2	0	0	0
Subject complements					
Quantitative expressions	6	0	0	0	0
Non-quantitative expressions	9	33	0	0	0
Noun-modifiers					
Neutral modifiers	7	1	0	0	0
Colloquial modifiers	1	5	0	0	0
Adverbs/adverbials	11	11	0	0	0
Prepositional phrases	3	8	0	0	0
Others	1	10	0	0	0
TOTAL	55 (29.40%)	128 (68.40%)	2 (1.10%)	2 (1.10%)	0 (0.00%)

The results in an extract from the corpus of Scottish-English conversations support the discussion in the previous section. Table 4.12 shows that the distribution of *only* and that of *just* in the cases of adverbs/adverbials<sup>12</sup> and of noun modifiers are different from those in the task-related dialogues. However, the above discussion of the pragmatics of the English grammatical devices in the Map Task dialogues is

pertinent to the pragmatics of the devices in an extract from the corpus of Scottish-English conversations:

(a) The grammatical devices have different discourse functions and the structures of discourse organised by these grammatical devices dramatically differ from each other. Reverse ALL cleft constructions have a summarising function, as in (55).

(55) that's all i can think of at the present moment

ALL cleft constructions are less frequent in spontaneous conversations than in task-related dialogues (i.e., approximately 1 per 16,300 words in task-related dialogues and 1 per 21,250 words in spontaneous conversations). Consider the following example found in the conversation data.

(56) A: it will self destruct in fifty minutes yes they have a junior  
school they had a the choirs made a performance of the tom sawyer  
story

B: I might have had to have been tom my mum doesn't think I'm very  
good at singing I was in the choir but I didn't think I was very good  
at singing neither did anyone else in my family and we were having  
this sort of um auditions *all you had to do was read something out  
of this script* it was just a book that you can buy the words

As this example shows, the use of ALL cleft constructions to introduce an instruction is similar. However, this instruction is not directed to the addressee: the example explains the instruction given to the speaker at the audition. The lower frequency of ALL cleft constructions in spontaneous conversations is derived from the role of ALL cleft constructions in the structure of discourse. To put it more concretely, as has been discussed in 4.2.1, ALL cleft constructions have the discourse function of signalling the end of the exchange of information and pointing forward. As a result, this type of construction builds a boundary and divides the current discourse segment into two. In addition, because of the function of introducing a new instruction, ALL

cleft constructions lie in a crucial and central position in the hierarchical structure of discourse. This discourse function and the discourse structure organised by ALL cleft constructions are not so common in spontaneous conversation, compared with the Map Task dialogues consisting of instructions that get the follower to draw a piece of route and information/questions/confirmation ancillary to the instructions. In other words, the low frequency of ALL cleft constructions in spontaneous conversation indicates that the function of this construction found in the Map Task dialogues is not confined to task-related dialogues but is the main discourse function of ALL cleft constructions.

The use of *just* to engage the participants in the instruction currently under discussion is found in the conversation data as well.

(57) A1: you should let it spin back really

B1: yeah you should but the tendency is

A2: you don't i mean you don't sort of go hard round and then go hard  
back again

B2: no *you just let it spin back*

However, this usage is less common in the spontaneous conversations. In conversations, *just* tends to be used in a context of giving explanations about what the speaker does/did or giving answers to the questions raised by the listener. To take some examples,

(58) A1: and the flaming police sat outside the door all night in their bloomin  
car lookin in the window and *we just sat there*

B1: you're keepin you language nice so what happened nothing

A2: well *we just had to sit and drink orange juice and play darts*

because we couldn't get to the bar well we couldn't but i mean they  
came in well came in

(59) A1: did you start skiving did you

B1: oh aye but i got caught

A2: how come

B2: eh well it was the registration teacher yin time i was off i had a note  
from ma ma he never asked for it so *i just used it for another time*  
and then *i just started to write me ain and stay off aw the time*

(In the Map Task dialogues, this use of *just* is found when the speaker is the instruction follower. See the notes 6 in this chapter to confirm it.)

(b) The ways in which the devices contribute to information structure are confirmed.

(c) It is confirmed that *just* has an interpersonal function. This function is particularly effective in cases where the speaker explains what s/he did/does, as in (58) and (59). *Just* protects the speaker's negative face against crucial comments from the listener. Also ALL cleft constructions, which introduce a new instruction, seem to have the interpersonal function.

(d) The grammatical devices are sensitive to context where they restrictively highlight some particular constituents, semantic properties of highlighted constituents and pragmatic properties of highlighted constituents. For example, when the highlighted constituent functions as an object, the different grammatical devices are used in different contexts: *only* has a tendency to be used in a context of possession. Reverse ALL cleft constructions are used to summarise what the speaker has claimed. Contrary to these devices, *just* is used under the circumstance lacking the conditions requiring other grammatical devices. Some examples are given below.

(60) i only got twenty one per cent though

(61) but some in ma class have got lower than i actually did and they're  
keeping it on but he said *you'll only get about sixteen per cent* more than  
your prelim mark was so i would just pass it and nae mair if i tried but i  
didnae like it at all

(62) that's all i can think of at the present moment (= (55))

(63) they'll just tell you not to bother with emergency stop

(64) A: what does she say

B: well you can hear her aw over the shop *she just says you've nae right*  
cos i cannae come in to this time

It turned out that in our task-related dialogues, the grammatical devices are also sensitive to semantic properties of highlighted subject complements. This applies to the case of the spontaneous conversations to some extent. As Table 4.12 shows, *only* highlights not only quantitative expressions (e.g. *the ones and twos* as in *it's only the ones and twos*) but also non-quantitative expressions (e.g. *rugby teams* as in *it's only rugby teams*). However, this factor is valid to some extent in that *just* is restricted to highlight non-quantitative expressions. Furthermore, the grammatical devices are sensitive to pragmatic properties of highlighted noun-modifiers: a glance at Table 4.12 shows that *only* highlights neutral noun modifiers such as *one*, whereas *just* highlights colloquial noun modifiers such as *a wee*.

#### 4.4. Implications of the results

This chapter has demonstrated that the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively have differentiation at the pragmatic level in the following four points:

- (a) discourse functions and the structures of discourse organised by the grammatical devices
- (b) the ways in which the devices contribute to information structure in discourse
- (c) whether they have the interpersonal function or not
- (d) sensitivity to context where they restrictively highlight some particular constituents, to semantic properties of highlighted constituents and to pragmatic properties of highlighted constituents

The results provide us with some insight into how deeply and significantly syntactic choice is related to the process of structuring discourse. Some of the claims made in



previous studies (e.g. Fjelkenstam-Nilsson's 1983 study of *also* and *too*), relating e.g. to the length of the highlighted constituent and the distribution of the grammatical devices having the similar syntactic function, do not apply to the distribution of the devices under discussion.

The results revealed in this chapter are valid: the possible limitation of the results arising from the characteristics of task-related dialogues is removed by the examination of another corpus of spontaneous spoken discourse – Scottish-English conversation data. No contradictory empirical evidence was found.

Before moving on to the next investigation, we must draw attention to one thing: the data from spontaneous spoken discourse did not reveal discourse functions of *only* (and *nothing but* constructions). The fact that our data did not reveal discourse functions of *only* does not imply that *only* has no discourse functions and does not help to structure discourse. I predict that this fact is associated with the characteristics of spontaneous spoken discourse. As mentioned in 3.2, spontaneous spoken discourse is informal and associated with very high personal involvement. My spontaneous spoken data certainly has this characteristic, given the high frequency of *just* having the interpersonal function. Based on the finding that *only* highlights neutral noun modifiers, whereas *just* highlights colloquial noun modifiers, and the finding that *only* does not have an interpersonal function, I predict that contrary to *just*, *only* must occur in formal written discourse more frequently than in spontaneous spoken discourse and that *only* does indeed have some discourse functions and contribute to the structuring of formal written discourse. The next chapter sets out to examine this hypothesis and the validity of our investigation in this chapter.

5. Grammatical devices for highlighting constituents restrictively in the sample of written informative prose in the British National Corpus – their distribution and factors influencing it

In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively differ pragmatically in several ways. In this chapter, we extend the investigation into the case of some 226,000 words of written informative prose in the British National Corpus. The main findings emerging from the investigation are as follows:

- (a) The discourse functions that *only* has are different from those that *just*, ALL cleft constructions and Reverse ALL cleft constructions. Sentences with *only* make salient the co-ordinate relation, particularly a contrast relation, with their immediately preceding/following sentences. As in spontaneous spoken discourse, our data contains no instances of *nothing but* constructions associated with some discourse function.
- (b) The previous chapter's findings are confirmed: *just* is not used in formal written discourse so often and prefers less complex context. ALL cleft constructions have the discourse function demonstrated in the previous chapter, together with an interpersonal function and the constituents highlighted by them are new. Reverse ALL cleft constructions have the discourse function which we investigated in the previous chapter, do not have the interpersonal function, and constituents highlighted by Reverse ALL cleft constructions are activated. Furthermore, *nothing but* constructions are sensitive to negative form/context.

The chapter begins with an overview of the general results of the distribution of the grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively. Section 5.2 investigates the pragmatic differences seen among the devices. Section 5.3 summarises the outcomes of the investigation in these two chapters.

5.1. Distribution of the grammatical devices in the sample of written informative prose in the BNC

Table 5.1 in the next page presents the number and distribution of the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively in the sample of written informative prose in the BNC. The figures in parentheses indicate the percentages of distribution.

Table 5.1. *Distribution of the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively in the sample of written informative prose in the BNC*

Highlighted constituents	<i>only</i>	<i>just</i>	ALL clefts	Reverse ALL clefts	<i>nothing but</i> constructions	other restrictive focusing particles
Verb phrases/complete clauses	17	0	3	1	0	1
Objects	17	4	0	1	3	1
Post-verbal NPs in existential constructions	5	0	0	0	2	0
Noun-modifiers	18	3	0	0	0	1
Prepositional phrases	68	2	0	0	0	10
Subjects	33	1	0	0	0	2
Adverbs/adverbials	15	0	0	0	0	0
Adverbial clauses	15	0	0	0	0	2
Subject/object complements	30	2	0	0	0	1
Complements of a preposition	20	1	0	0	0	2

Highlighted constituents in a non-finite construction	10	0	0	0	0	2
Conjunctions	9	0	0	0	0	0
Clefted constituents	4	0	0	0	0	0
Others/?	5	1	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	266 (85.26%)	14 (4.49%)	3 (0.96%)	2 (0.64%)	5 (1.60%)	22 (7.05%)

Note: Miller and Weinert (1998) borrow the term *clefted constituent* from J. L. Delin. For example, *John* in *It was John who broke the window* is the clefted constituent. We also borrow this term.

The table indicates three crucial things. First of all, in the case of formal written discourse, *only* predominates over others. This corresponds with the results in the previous chapter showing that *only* does not have an interpersonal function and that it highlights neutral noun modifiers such as *one* and not colloquial noun modifiers such as *a wee*, because based on the results in the previous chapter I suspect that *only* occurs in more formal language and *a wee* does not. (In section 3.2, we predicted that the grammatical devices which do not have an interpersonal function would occur in discourse containing low personal involvement more frequently than those which do.)

Secondly, unlike in spontaneous spoken discourse, cases where the highlighted constituent is a verb phrase/complete clause are less frequent in formal written discourse. As the table above shows, it is prepositional phrases that are highlighted most frequently. Consider (1a-c).

- (1) a. Our service is completely confidential and only with your permission do we liaise with others involved in your case.  
b. This sort of reading is only for the dedicated follower of the history of taste.  
c. Only in his more recent work *The Power of the Center*, published in

1988, has he been looking from art to the resources offered by psychology.

This situation gives rise to the question of whether this is because formal written discourse contains prepositional phrases far more than any other types of constituent or not. As the table below indicates, the answer is no: the frequency of occurrences of prepositional phrases is not extremely high, compared with the frequency of occurrences of other types of constituent. (Note: But does formal written discourse contain a higher frequency of prepositional phrases than spontaneous speech? The answer is yes.)

Table 5.2. *Number of occurrences of several types of constituent in the sentences containing one thousand words elicited randomly from some written informative prose in the sample of written informative prose in the BNC*

Types of constituent	Number of occurrences
Subject NP	52
Object NP	32
Subject/object complement NP	26
Verb phrase/complete clause	47
Prepositional phrase	49
Adverb	6

Note: The case where *only* has no possible constituent to highlight is excluded. For this reason, the case where subjects occur in SVC clause structure, for example, is not included, since it turned out from the data that almost all the examples where a subject noun phrase is highlighted by *only* do not have SVC clause structures. For the same reason, the case in which a verb phrase is a copula verb is not included in the number of verb phrase/complete clause, and prepositional phrases that have the reposition *of* as the head of the phrase and that cannot be highlighted by *only* (e.g. the room *of my brother* and a man *of ability*) are not counted.

We suppose that this is associated with the fact that formal written discourse contains very low personal involvement. As the results in the previous chapter show, the possibility of threatening the listener's (and/ the speaker's) negative face tends to occur when the highlighted constituent is a verb phrase/complete clause.

Finally, as shown by Table 5.1 above, constituents which are not/hardly highlighted in spontaneous spoken discourse could easily be highlighted in formal written discourse. Constituents in a non-finite construction, as in (2), complements of a preposition, as in (3), subjects as in (4) and adverbial clauses, as in (5) are such constituents.<sup>1</sup>

(2) These forms of art, however, can generally be believed to have only a friendly connection with their inspiration.

(3) After only three years we are now caring for one in four of those dying with AIDS in the UK.

(4) Only time and scholarship eventually sort out the various relationships of artists who worked together.

(5) for art historians, incomplete schemes or dismembered works such as altarpieces have the attraction of needing detective work; but a critic takes an interest in a reconstruction only if it throws new light on surviving art

These constituents are NOT restrictively highlighted AT ALL in spontaneous spoken discourse. This phenomenon is assumed to be associated with the findings by Miller and Weinert (1998) that formal written discourse is much more complex.

5.2. Factors influencing the distribution of the grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively in the sample of written informative prose in the BNC

5.2.1. *The case where the highlighted constituent functions as a verb phrase/a complete clause*

This sub-section discusses factors influencing the choice of one device over others in the case where a verb phrase/a complete clause is highlighted restrictively. Table 5.3 below presents the distribution of the grammatical devices.

Table 5.3. *Distribution of grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively when the highlighted constituent is a verb phrase/a complete clause*

<i>only</i>	<i>just</i>	ALL clefts	Reverse ALL clefts	<i>nothing but</i> constructions
17	0	3	1	0

As the table shows, there is no instance of *just* and *nothing but* constructions in our data. So the discussion concentrates on factors influencing the choice between *only*, ALL cleft constructions and Reverse ALL cleft constructions.

The sample of written informative prose in the BNC offers 17 instances of *only*. Consider some instances in the data. (Note: My italic.)

(6) #1133

In effect, they were tending to the view that the very change in law brings about a change in the nature of society and human relationships within it.

#1134

The bishops also argued that any so-called restricted form of divorce was impossible to maintain in practice and that divorce might solve the partners' problems but *only created them for the children*.

(7) #0704

A person who accepted love was like a passenger.

#0705

Maybe on a boat, at night, on some vast lake.

#0706

Whichever way you looked there was nothing but calm black water.

#0707

It was true that the water might rise and swamp you.

#0708

But to love someone meant to fly; to rise above the earth yourself.

#0709

So high that you could see everything.

#0710

Even if the world looked different from that height, even if it looked changed, even if what on the ground seemed important was transformed into insignificance.

#0711

She'd say, moreover, that you could always get out of a boat and go ashore, but *from that height you could only crash.*

#0712

The blessed piece of earth over which float these balloons, over which are poised these acrobats, is a corner of painful Czechoslovakia.

(8) The combination seems to point to some underlying form of "essential history" of which each individual provides his variant but *which can only be hinted at, not revealed*, because when the voices join across time they never quite marry, though their coming together is an attempt to generate something which like a collective emotion is necessarily felt as something more than the experience of the individual, as something dominant and external.



(9) #1531

Most new actors have tremendous optimism, as indeed they must, for without belief in themselves training is just a huge waste of time.

#1532

Remember that *drama school has only prepared you to work.*

#1533

Your diploma is a mark of that preparation --- nothing more and nothing less.

(10) in a land no one can define or remember, *only desire.*

The point to observe here is the relationship between the sentence with *only* and its immediately preceding/following sentence. For instance, in (6), the sentence with *only* (i.e., [*divorce*] *only created them for the children*) and the immediately preceding sentence (i.e., *divorce might solve the partners' problems*) are related to each other by a contrast relation. (Note that the coordinating conjunction *but* makes it clear that these two sentences contrast with each other.) The crucial point is that when two (or more) separate sentences contrast with each other, they are co-ordinated with each other. For this reason, the relationship between the sentence with *only* and its immediately preceding/following sentence will be termed the co-ordinate relation. Similarly, in (7), the relationship between the sentence with *only* (i.e., *from that height you could only crash*) and its immediately preceding sentences (i.e., *you could always get out of a boat and go ashore*) is a contrast relation. Thus it is a co-ordinate relation. Essentially the same applies to (8), (9) and (10). (8) is an example where the sentence with *only* (i.e., *which can only be hinted at*) is co-ordinated not with its immediately preceding sentence but with its immediately following sentence (i.e., [*which can*] *not [be] revealed*). 12 cases out of the total of 17 examples fall under the co-ordinate relation.

As regards the type of co-ordinate relation established between the sentence with *only* and its immediately preceding/following sentence(s), out of these 12 examples

containing the co-ordinate relation, 10 examples are cases where the relation is the contrast relation. This strong tendency to have a contrast relation is attributed to the syntactic function of *only*. By *only*, 'an antecedently given presupposed set is restricted to the correct values' (Dik et al. 1981: 66). For example, in the sentence *Only John answered that question*, *John* is restricted to the correct value and all the other possible members of the presupposed set (e.g. Bill, Andrew and Mary) are rejected as incorrect. What should be noticed is that in many cases, all the other possible members of the presupposed set are not salient and that thus they are implicitly rejected as incorrect, as in (11).

(11) #0708

This aside, when the reader has found a monograph, what will it contain?

#0709

An older book, that is one published before around 1900, will only have black and white plates, which are unlikely to be photographs.

In this example, *only* highlights restrictively the correct value *black and white plates* and all the other possible members of the presupposed set are implicitly rejected as incorrect.

The interesting point regarding the characteristics of the case where the highlighted constituent is a verb phrase/a complete clause is that all the other possible members of the presupposed set are always explicit and are adjacent to the sentence where *only* restrictively highlights the correct value. Consequently, the contrast is always salient between the sentence where *only* highlights particular constituents as the correct value and its immediately preceding/following sentence containing all the other possible members of the presupposed set. We suggest the essential role of this type of sentence in discourse is to make the contrast relation salient.

On the other hand, ALL cleft constructions have the core-subordinate relation as discussed in 4.2.1. ALL cleft constructions in formal written discourse are used in a

similar way to those in spontaneous spoken discourse: they tend to be used in the context of introducing a new instruction. Consider all the examples in the sample of written informative prose in the BNC.

(12) #234

Is a covenant complicated?

#235

Not really.

#236

A Deed of Covenant is a legal document which needs to be correctly drawn up and signed.

#237

The law related to covenants is quite complex but basically a covenant is a legally-binding document by which you transfer some of your income to a charity for a stated period.

#238

ACET is a charity, registered with the Charity Commission under Registration Number 299293.

#239

As far as you are concerned, a covenant can be exceedingly simple.

#240

There is a simple covenant form attached to this leaflet which is quite sufficient.

#241

*All you have to do is to fill in the details, including your name and address and the amount you wish to give, and sign and date the document in front of a witness.*

#242

You will also be asked to sign a Certificate of Deduction of Tax once a year confirming that you are a UK taxpayer.

(13) #603

How do I get our money back?

#604

You can get back the gross amount of SMP you have paid out, plus an additional amount (4.5% of the total gross SMP from 6<sup>th</sup> April 1991) as compensation for the NI contributions you have paid on SMP.

#605

*All you have to do is deduct both amounts from your monthly NI and tax payments.*

(14) #190

What am I expected to do on a regular basis?

#191

At the end of each month

#192

Within 14 days of the end of each income tax month you must pay to the Inland Revenue Accounts Office:

#193

the NI contributions taken from your employee's earnings during that month

#194

your own contributions

#195

any income tax due

#196

You will be sent, by the Inland Revenue, a booklet containing payslips.

#197

*All you need to do is send one of these payslips with each month's payment*

#198

One payment can cover both tax and NI contributions.

#199

Follow the instructions on the payslips.

#200

They tell you how to complete the payslips and how to pay.

The point to observe here is that all the examples of ALL cleft constructions in the sample of written informative prose in the BNC are from texts whose purpose is to introduce something or make an appeal to readers. All the ALL cleft constructions in the data:

- (i) occur after an implicit or explicit question;
- (ii) give a detailed and concrete instruction in answer to the question.

That is, in (12), along with the sentences #235 and 239 which give a simple answer, the sentence with the ALL cleft construction gives a detailed and concrete instruction to answer the question raised in the sentence #234, i.e. *is a covenant complicated*. This sentence is followed by a sentence whose semantic content is part of the detailed instruction given by this sentence. (In (12), sentence #242 is the sentence whose semantic content is part of the detailed instruction given by the ALL cleft construction.) All these things suggest that sentences in a discourse segment would not be co-ordinate with each other in this case: a sentence giving a detailed and concrete instruction to answer the question must be crucial and central, and other sentences such as sentences giving a simple answer or sentences supplementing the detailed and concrete instruction are subordinate to it. Examples (13) and (14) can be explained on similar lines. In short, the structure of the discourse segment containing ALL cleft constructions is that schematically illustrated in Figure 4.1. Moreover, as discussed in 4.2.1, while introducing a new instruction, ALL cleft constructions function to satisfy the reader's negative face, his/her basic need to maintain claims of territory and self-determination. (This will be supported by showing that sentences

with ALL cleft constructions emphasise to readers how easy it is to carry out some action.)

Interestingly, as Table 5.3 shows, this type of construction is less frequent in formal written discourse (i.e., approximately 1 per 16,300 words in task-related dialogues, 1 per 21,250 words in spontaneous conversations and 1 per 88,660 words in written informative prose). This is not surprising, considering the discourse function of ALL cleft constructions. Grammatical devices are chosen, depending on the purpose of the text.

Let us turn our attention to another construction that occurs where a verb phrase/a complete clause is highlighted restrictively. Our data has one instance of the Reverse ALL cleft construction. It is:

(15) #241

All you have to do is to fill in the details, including your name and address and the amount you wish to give, and sign and date the document in front of a witness.

#242

You will also be asked to sign a Certificate of Deduction of Tax once a year confirming that you are a UK taxpayer.

#243

*This is all you need do for the tax benefit of covenant giving to work.*

#244

The value of your gift then increases by 33.3% in ACET's hands, with the blessing of the Inland Revenue.

The cleft head *this* refers to part of sentence #241, i.e. *fill in the details, including your name and address and the amount you wish to give, and sign and date the document in front of a witness*, and part of sentence #242, i.e. *sign a Certificate of Deduction of Tax once a year confirming that you are a UK taxpayer*. By referring to

the previous sentences, the Reverse ALL cleft construction summarises what is needed for the covenant to be created.

It may be worth mentioning, in passing, that the choice of *that* or *this* seems to be related to the remoteness of discourse chunks which are referred to by the demonstratives. Recall the case where the Reversed ALL cleft construction is used in task-related dialogues in 4.2.1:

(16) Is that all we have to do?

Here *that* refers jointly to the parts of the task that the instruction giver and the follower have achieved. (This utterance is located at the end of the dialogue.) This means that in (16), *that* refers to a lengthy discourse chunk and that some part of it, particularly the beginning part, is surely remote from the speaker and the listener. (Note: *That* is also used where a referent or chunk of discourse is in the past – i.e., the speaker and listener are already moving away from it and it is perceived as remote.) On the other hand, in the case of (15), the discourse chunk referred to by the demonstrative *this* is the discourse chunk that was just mentioned. Thus it is not remote from the writer and the addressee. One thing needs to be emphasised, however: whether a certain discourse chunk is remote from the addressee or from the speaker/writer and the addressee is not something that can be measured objectively but something that is dependent on the speaker's/writer's subjective perspective.

It has been observed in this sub-section that:

- (a) Sentences with *only* make salient the co-ordinate relation, particularly a contrast relation, with their immediately preceding/following sentences. On the other hand, ALL cleft constructions and Reversed ALL cleft constructions have discourse functions similar to those they have in spontaneous spoken discourse.
- (b) Different grammatical devices contribute differently to the structuring of information. Section 4.2.1 has revealed that the constituents highlighted by

ALL cleft constructions are new, whereas those highlighted by Reverse ALL cleft constructions are activated. This result is equally pertinent to ALL clefts constructions and Reverse ALL cleft constructions in formal written discourse. Furthermore, constituents highlighted by *only* are new in my data.

- (c) ALL cleft constructions seem to have the interpersonal function, as discussed in 4.2.1.

### 5.2.2. *The case where the highlighted constituent functions as an object*

Let us turn to examples where the highlighted constituent functions as an object (strictly speaking, direct object). Table 5.4 below presents the distribution of those examples.

Table 5.4. *Distribution of grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively when the highlighted constituent functions as an object*

<i>only</i>	<i>just</i>	ALL clefts	Reverse ALL clefts	<i>nothing but</i> constructions
17	4	0	1	3

#### 5.2.2.1. *Only or just*

*Only* and *just* are different from each other with respect to the degree of formality of the discourse. Consider the following.

- (17) An older book, that is one published before around 1900, will only have black and white plates, which are unlikely to be photographs.
- (18) the ground rules for the forum only allowed parties accepting constitutional, nonviolent politics to participate
- (19) After a quick tidy-up they took the next train back to the Gare de Lyon where Monique had only twenty minutes to wait.



- (20) After the 1986 Tax Reform Act, however, such gifts were subject to an Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) whereby donors could deduct only the original purchase price
- (21) but the passing of Christianity has left only the refinement without the morality ...
- (22) It takes lot more than just physical attraction to make a lasting, happy marriage.
- (23) Sotheby's sold three, but Christie's got away just two of their six at 30% under low estimate.

Compared with the case of *only*, *just* is used in the examples where a subject noun phrase is less complex. (The mean word number of subject noun phrases in the examples where *only* highlights object noun phrases is 3.29 words, while the mean word number of subject noun phrases in the case of *just* is 1.00 word.) This is a crucially interesting point, since the mean word number of the highlighted constituent is not so very different between these two restrictive focusing particles. (The mean word number of highlighted constituents in the case of *only* is 5.82 words, and that of highlighted constituents in *just* is 4.50 words.) According to Miller and Weinert (1998 : 141), complex noun phrases occur as subject as well as object in the most formal written English texts and such noun phrases tend not to occur as subject in less formal written texts (see also Quirk et al. 1985 : 1350-2) and not in spontaneous speech (Jim Miller (personal communication)).

The situation mentioned so far demonstrates that in the case where the highlighted constituent functions as an object, *only* and *just* are different from each other, with respect to the degree of formality of the discourse. This matches the findings in the previous chapter that *only* highlights neutral noun modifiers and *just* highlights colloquial noun modifiers.

#### 5.2.2.2. *Nothing but* constructions

When the writer pays much more attention to the existence of particular constituents highlighted restrictively than to the point that there is nothing else, s/he chooses some construction containing the affirmation.<sup>2</sup> Consider, for instance, (24) and (25) below.

(24) An older book, that is one published before around 1900, will only have black and white plates, which are unlikely to be photographs. (= (17))

(25) the ground rules for the forum only allowed parties accepting constitutional, nonviolent politics to participate (= (18))

In (24), the writer pays much more attention to the existence of the restrictively highlighted monochrome plates, namely black and white plates, in an older book than the point that this type of book does not have any other colour plates (e.g., red, blue and green plates). Similarly in (25), the writer pays much more attention to the parties allowed by the ground rules for the forum than parties that are not allowed.

On the other hand, if the writer pays much more attention to the fact that there is nothing except for the highlighted constituent, some construction containing the negation is chosen. The results are exemplified in (26) – (28).

(26) The last of these was the excavation at Alexandrov led by Academician Boris Rybakov, which unearthed *nothing but* ancient foundations.

(27) Cries, Eliot knew, were vital to the most basic corroboree when “on every side one sees *nothing but* violent gestures, cries, veritable howls, and deafening noises or every sort”

(28) He relates this to the state of culture of his own age, facing dangers of over-specialization, which impoverishes both the religious and artistic

sensibilities by separating each from the other, so that only “the vestige of manners may be left for those who, having their sensibility uninformed either by religion or by art, ... have *nothing* left *but* an inherited behaviour which ceases to have meaning”.

In all these examples, the writer pays much more attention to the point that there is nothing else. In short, the writer’s focus is reflected in the choice of grammatical devices.

As concerns the constituents highlighted by the *nothing but* construction, they are new as in (26) and (28). (We exclude example (27) from our examination of the ways in which *nothing but* constructions contribute to a structuring of information, since the sentence containing this construction is quoted from some text and we are not sure whether the highlighted constituent *cries* in *nothing but violent gestures, cries, veritable howls, and deafening noises or every sort* is new or activated in the original text. If this sentence is not the quotation, *cries* is certainly activated, since (27) starts with *cries*, which makes the highlighted constituent *cries* lit up in the minds of the writer and the reader.)

#### 5.2.2.3. Reverse ALL cleft constructions

My data has one instance where the Reverse ALL cleft construction is chosen. It is:

(29) #1082

We cannot expect voters to leave their conscience behind them when they go to the polling booth.

#1083

Inevitably we would expect that those who freely accept the teaching of our Church will vote according to their consciences.

#1084

*This is all we ask of them.*

But we must have the right to carry our duty to impact the moral convictions, the moral teaching of our Church to our own members.

The use of Reverse ALL cleft constructions reflects the writer's wish to summarise – see the discussion in 4.2.1 of the summarising function of this construction. By referring to the previous sentences with the demonstrative *this*, the Reverse ALL cleft construction in (29) summarises what the writer asked voters. (Thus the constituents highlighted by this construction are not new but activated.)

It has been observed in this sub-section that:

- (a) As before, the different grammatical devices are used in different contexts. *Just* is used where a subject noun phrase is less complex. *Nothing but* constructions are used when the writer pays much more attention to the fact that there is nothing except for the highlighted constituents. Reverse ALL cleft constructions are used to summarise what the writer has claimed. Elsewhere, *only* is used.
- (b) Constituents highlighted by *only*, *just* or *nothing but* constructions are new in my data. On the other hand, constituents highlighted by Reverse ALL cleft constructions are activated.

### 5.2.3. *The highlighted constituent as a post-verbal NP in the existential construction*

The sample of written informative prose in the BNC has seven examples where a post-verbal NP in the existential construction is highlighted restrictively. Table 5.5 below presents the distribution of those examples.

Table 5.5. *Distribution of grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively when the highlighted constituent is a post-verbal NP in the existential construction*

<i>only</i>	<i>just</i>	ALL clefts	Reverse ALL clefts	<i>nothing but</i> constructions
5	0	0	0	2

What factors control the choice of *nothing but* constructions over *only*? Consider the following.

(30)

#0704

A person who accepted love was like a passenger.

#0705

Maybe on a boat, at night, on some vast lake.

#0706

Whichever way you looked *there was nothing but calm black water*.

#0707

It was true that the water might rise and swamp you.

#0708

But to love someone meant to fly, to rise above the earth yourself.

#0709

So high that you could see everything.

(31) All the actors interviewed seemed to feel, and state quite naturally and simply that *there was really nothing else for them to do but act*.

Given that the *nothing but* constructions are chosen despite their complex syntax, there might be strong factors favouring their occurrence. Two factors suggest themselves. One factor is related to 'clear structural parallelism' (Hoey 2001: 55). This applies to the case of (30). In this example, one chunk of discourse (i.e., sentences #0704-0707) and the other chunk (i.e., sentences #0708-0709) are related

to each other by a contrast relation. (Note that the coordinating conjunction *but* in #0708 makes it clear that these two contrast each other.) Moreover, within this contrast relation, the sentences #0704 and #0705 are contrasted with the sentence #0708, and the sentence #0706 is contrasted with the sentence #0709. In the case of the latter contrast pair, the parallel becomes salient through the expressions containing *thing*. Since there is no difference between *only* and *nothing but* constructions with respect to the syntactic function, I suggest that it is to make the contrast salient that the speaker used the *nothing but* construction in #0706.<sup>3</sup> The structural parallelism becomes clear by using expressions which have the similar forms but which have the opposite meaning such as *nothing* and *everything*.

Viewed in this light, it becomes clear that in the instances with *only*, there is no strong reason to use the *nothing but* construction for this effect. Consider the instances in my data.

(32) #0274

The contradiction can be viewed in two ways.

#0275

Either there are two different groups among the loyalists, subscribing to two different loyalisms.

#0276

Or *there is really only one group*, but sharing a dual identity, with now one dominating their consciousness, now the other.

(33) #1086

There are too many.

#1087

Students all trying.

#1088

Besides, *there's only one for the top of the class*.

(34) I say there are no great, there is no beautiful, *there is only the thin filth of getting old*, the thin layer of filth that gets to cover everything.

(35) *there are* no aesthetic objects, *only physical objects*

(36) there is nothing there, or *there is only some petty squalor*

In (32), the sentence *there are two different groups among the loyalists, subscribing to two different loyalisms* and the sentence *there is really only one group, but sharing a dual identity, with now one dominating their consciousness, now the other* has a contrast relation. In the latter sentence, there is no strong motivation to use the *nothing but* construction here, since the sentence with which it contrasts does not contain the form *thing*. The same applies to examples (33) – (35). In the case of (36), the sentence contains the form *nothing*. However, the sentence *there is nothing there* and the sentence *there is only some petty squalor* do not need the structural parallelism, since the relationship between these two sentences is that the latter sentence rephrases the former. Thus there is no reason for the speaker to use some alternative construction instead of *only*. To sum up, the effect of the structural parallelism functions as the factor favouring the construction *nothing but* over *only*.

The other factor is related to a tendency for new constituents to come towards the end of the sentence. This applies to the case of (31), which is repeated below as (37).

(37) All the actors interviewed seemed to feel, and state quite naturally and simply that *there was really nothing else for them to do but act*.

Note that in (37), the construction *nothing else but* is separated into two by the insertion of some words, and that the constituents highlighted restrictively come towards the end of the sentence. It would be clear that (37) is a much more satisfactory sentence, compared with the following where the construction *nothing else but* is not separated.

(38) There was really nothing else to do but act for them.

As introduced in 1.1 in Chapter 1, some studies relate the syntactic phenomenon of rightward movement in the sentence to the function of making particular constituents salient (recall Rochemont and Culicover 1990; Sornicola 1994). This function is related to the packaging or structuring of information (see 1.1). Thus many studies have investigated this syntactic phenomenon in terms of information structure (e.g. Birner and Ward 1998). This syntactic phenomenon has also been investigated in terms of the grammatical complexity of constituents (e.g. Quirk et al. 1985).

To answer the question as to whether both information structure of constituents and grammatical complexity are relevant to rightward movement or whether just one of them is relevant, Arnold et al. (2000) demonstrate that both information structure (newness) and grammatical complexity simultaneously and independently have significant effects on word order variation: the relatively newer and more complex constituent come later in the sentence. Arnold et al. (2000) also suggest that moving complex and new constituents rightward in the sentence facilitates the processes of comprehension for listeners and planning and production. (See also Hawkins 1994 for the relationship between grammatical complexity and the process of comprehension, Chafe 1994 for the relationship between information structure and the process of comprehension, Wasow 1997 for the relationship between grammatical complexity of constituents and the process of production and Tomlin 1998 for the relationship between information structure and the process of production.)

What is important in Arnold et al. (2000) is that their empirical data provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that the role of each factor depends in part on the strength of competing factors. That is, 'when there is a big weight difference between constituents, there is a strong tendency to produce the light argument early, and discourse status may not play as large a role. In contrast, when one argument is extremely accessible, by virtue of having been mentioned in the immediately preceding clause, discourse status will influence constituent ordering more than



weight' (p.50). Arnold et al.'s evidence that when one factor is less constraining, the other has more chance to influence the choice of constituent order supports the idea that a tendency for new constituents to come towards the end of the sentence is the factor controlling the choice of *nothing but* constructions over *only* in (37). In (37), the highlighted constituent *act* is not complicated at all and neither is the other constituent *for them*. This means that there is no big weight difference between constituents and that grammatical complexity does not play as large a role. On the other hand, there is a big difference between constituents with respect to information structure. The highlighted constituent is the only constituent in the sentence *there was really nothing else for them to do but act* that is new information. The pronoun *them* is equivalent to *all the actors interviewed* in the previous sentence and is extremely accessible. This situation is consistent with Arnold et al.'s (2000: 50) evidence.

Moreover, it is noteworthy that *only* cannot put the highlighted constituent towards the end of the sentence in the context of (37). Consider the following.

(39) \*There was for them only to act.

Cf. There was only to act for them.

Only *nothing but* constructions can put the new constituent towards the end of the sentence. The simpler forms of grammatical device such as *only* do not satisfy the writer's need. The total number of occurrences of examples such as (37) is too small to permit any definite statements to be made; however, only the *nothing but* construction can put the new constituent towards the end of the sentence and this is a plausible explanation for why the *nothing but* construction is used in (37).

It has been observed that in this sub-section that:

- (a) Similar to spontaneous spoken discourse, in formal written discourse, post-verbal NPs in the existential construction can be restrictively highlighted either by *only* or by *nothing but* constructions.

- (b) Due to the property of the existential construction, post-verbal NPs highlighted by the grammatical devices are construable as new information.
- (c) The interpersonal function does not seem to be needed.

In short, it appears that the properties that determine when a highlighted constituent functions as a post-verbal NPs in the existential construction in spontaneous spoken discourse correspond to those operating in formal written discourse.

### 5.3. Conclusion

We are now in a position to answer the question as to what exactly is the differentiation at the level of pragmatics seen among restrictive focusing particles, *only* and *just*, ALL cleft constructions, Reverse ALL cleft constructions and *nothing but* constructions. The outcomes in our investigation are summarised as follows:

Table 5.6. *Pragmatics of English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively*

	<i>only</i>	<i>just</i>	ALL clefts	Reverse ALL clefts	<i>nothing but</i> constructions
Discourse function	○	○	○	○	×
Information structure	new/activated	new/activated	new	activated	new
Interpersonal function	×	○	○	×	×
Being sensitive to	(a) semantic properties of highlighted constituents (b) formality of discourse	(a) semantic properties of highlighted constituents (b) formality of discourse			(a) negative form/context

The table above illustrates how the grammatical devices having the similar syntactic functions and semantics differ from each other at the level of pragmatics and how deeply and significantly syntactic choice is related to the process of structuring

discourse. Native speakers of (British) English select these devices effectively to build the discourse structure intended by them.

One thing should be added before moving on to the next topic. One might claim that the discourse function this study has demonstrated as the function of ALL cleft constructions is the function of ALL cleft constructions highlighting verb phrases/complete clauses, and not the discourse function of ALL cleft constructions highlighting objects (e.g. *All that is heard is the sound of waves*). This claim might be true. We have concentrated on ALL cleft constructions highlighting verb phrases/complete clauses because, despite the differences between spontaneous spoken discourse and formal written discourse, both our spoken data and written data contain many more examples of ALL cleft constructions highlighting verb phrases/complete clauses than highlighting objects (see Tables 4.1, 4.12 and 5.1). The point to emphasise is that although we are used to ALL cleft constructions highlighting direct objects as a result of The Beatle's song *All we need is love*, for instance, our spontaneous spoken English data and formal written English data have hardly any such examples, and we do not have enough examples to examine this construction. (It is not clear whether there actually are text-types containing many examples of ALL cleft constructions highlighting objects.) Consequently, as far as the results of our data are concerned, our investigation is valid and the discourse function of ALL constructions is what we have demonstrated in this chapter and the preceding one, as illustrated schematically by Figure 4.1 in 4.2.1.

6. Linguistic and extralinguistic factors affecting the form of 'the focus construction specified by *only*'

The thesis has focused on the hypothesis that the grammatical devices for restrictively highlighting particular constituents have different pragmatic functions. The discussion now moves on to ask: what exactly are the factors affecting the form of 'the focus construction specified by a restrictive focusing particle'. To answer this question, this thesis restricts its scope to a single grammatical device for highlighting particular constituents restrictively, the typical restrictive focusing particle *only*, and its occurrence in present-day written English. The reason for the restricted scope is that *only* is the prototypical restrictive focusing particle and that it is *only* that has been discussed when researchers have paid attention to the variability of the syntactic position of restrictive focusing particles.

It is a characteristic of *only* (and other (restrictive) focusing particles) that it can occur in various positions in sentences. Consider the following (where the constituents highlighted restrictively are marked by small capitals):

- (1) a. John visited *only* ITALY.
- b. John *only* visited ITALY.
- c. John visited ITALY *only*.

(1a) is an example of the pre-adjacent position (i.e., PrA), the position where *only* is placed immediately before the constituent which it highlights. (1b) exemplifies the pre-verbal position (i.e., PrV), the position where *only* is placed immediately before the verb or after the first auxiliary verb. This position is also taken when the whole sentence is highlighted. (1c) is an example of the post-adjacent position (i.e., PostA). This position has been said to be far less frequent than the other two. (Note: As mentioned in 1.3.1, there is one syntactic constraint on the occurrence of *only* in PrV and PostA: *only* cannot occur in PrV and in PostA when the highlighted constituent is a subject complement, as in *He is only a child*. Also, where highlighted constituents function as subject it is debatable whether *only* can occupy the position

immediately after the highlighted constituent. This position is PrV = PostA in the case of subjects occurring in a sentence without auxiliary verbs, as in *JOHN only answered that question.*)

As discussed in Chapter 1, it is not easy to describe focusing particles in terms of the variability of their syntactic position. Regarding restrictive focusing particles as co-constituents of their highlighted constituents is not adequate. For example, Ross and Cooper (1979) postulate that the restrictive focusing particles (or other types of focusing particles) are generated in PrA (= the position where *only* is placed immediately before the constituent which it highlights) and then moved (by optional transformations) to other positions. McCawley (1988) claims that restrictive focusing particles are left sisters of a highlighted constituent. He equates highlighted constituents with immediate sentence and verb phrase constituents. He suggests that moving *only* from PrA to PrV requires three steps: (i) *only* appears in deep structure as a sister of the scope S; (ii) *only* is separated from the constituents that it restrictively highlights and is adjoined to the predicate constituent of the scope; (iii) by a transformation called Quantifier-lowering, inserts the constituent restrictively highlighted by *only* in place of an occurrence of its bound variable. However, McCawley's approach is not free from problems: as he himself notices, it is not immediately clear that McCawley's (1988) proposal covers the full range of cases where *only* occurs in PrV, 'since it is not clear that the constituent of which *only* is a surface sister can always be taken to be the predicate constituent of the S that is the scope of (p. 612) *only*'. As mentioned in 1.3.2, constituents highlighted by *only* are not confined to the immediate clause or predicate constituency. (This is empirically supported in this thesis. See Table 5.1 in Chapter 5.) Consider the following.

(2) He stayed for only A FEW DAYS.

(Taglicht 1984: 70)(My small capitals)

In this example, *only* occurs in PrA, but the highlighted constituent *a few days* is not an immediate constituent of the predication or the clause, being inside a prepositional phrase. It is also not adequate to regard focusing particles as having an adverb-like

behaviour (i.e., occurring in positions typically reserved for adverbs (i.e., the position immediately before the verb or after the first auxiliary verb). Empirical studies such as Rissanen (1980) demonstrate the position taken most frequently by *only* in written English differs, depending on types of highlighted constituents.

Following this discussion, in Chapter 1, instead of forcing *only* (and other grammatical devices such as *just* and *merely*) into some syntactic category, it was decided to call them restrictive focusing particles, and to refer to 'the focus construction specified by a restrictive focusing particle'. The form of 'the focus construction specified by *only*' is not assigned a single general configuration; in the case of written English it is sometimes represented as '*only* + highlighted constituents' (i.e., the case of PrA) and as '*only* + verb + highlighted constituents' (i.e., the case of PrV). Furthermore, in some cases the structure is 'highlighted constituents + *only*' (i.e., the case of PostA). This proposal is motivated by the empirical studies such as Rissanen (1980). As mentioned in Chapter 1, Rissanen's (1980) empirical study of the variability of syntactic position of *only* in written English concludes that there is no single most frequently chosen position. Rissanen (1980: 68) proposes three factors favouring PrV and another three factors favouring PrA. They are (Note: All the examples are from Rissanen 1980: 68. I have put in small capitals the constituents restrictively highlighted by *only*.):

(3) Factors favouring PrV

**a. *Only* occurs in direct or indirect quotations of speech**

**b. The constituent restrictively highlighted is a clause.**

e.g. There are ... fortunate souls who hear everything,  
but *only* know WHAT IS GOOD FOR THEM.

**c. There is an auxiliary in the clause**

e.g. All this had *only* taken her TWO HOURS.

(4) Factors favouring PrA

**a. In a complex NP, the constituent restrictively highlighted is a modifier rather than the whole NP**

e.g. Summary results are given for both the de facto and de

jure populations; but the subsequent analysis of characteristics is reported *only* for the DE JURE population

**b. The constituent restrictively highlighted is a word indicating quantity<sup>1</sup>**

e.g. The man had spoken *only* ONCE.

**c. The verb and the constituent restrictively highlighted are separated**

e.g. And the surface is driven back, in its very surfaceness, *only* BY THIS CONTRAST.

Jørgensen (1974) and Rissanen (1980) further suggest that the position of *only* may not always be fixed even among constituents occurring in the same position and having the same function. Jørgensen (1974) investigates the occurrence of *only* when it restrictively highlights temporal expressions and concludes that the position of this word varies according to whether *only* indicates 'no other time' or it indicates 'as recently as'. Consider (5), for instance.

(5) a. John *only* saw Mary AN HOUR AGO.

b. John saw Mary *only* AN HOUR AGO.

The interpretation of (5a) is that John saw Mary an hour ago and saw her at no other time. On the other hand, the interpretation of (5b) is that John saw Mary an hour ago and it happened as recently as an hour ago. According to Jørgensen (1974), *only* indicating 'no other time' is normally placed in PrV, whereas *only* indicating 'as recently as' in PrA. Rissanen (1980) makes a similar proposal: where it highlights temporal expressions *only* changes its position according to the interpretation.

In short, the empirical studies such as Rissanen (1980) attribute the varying the syntactic position of *only* to certain syntactic/semantic/pragmatic factors associated with the constituents that it restrictively highlights. Based on this suggestion, in 1.3 we proposed that the form of 'the focus construction specified by *only*' has three sub-

varieties depending on the position of *only*. The three sub-varieties share the property of restrictively or exclusively highlighting but in addition to having *only* in different positions, each has its own properties. What exactly are the factors affecting the form of ‘the focus construction specified by *only*’? That is, what exactly are the factors yielding the three sub-varieties of ‘the focus construction specified by *only*’? As pointed out in 1.3, although many studies have noticed the varying syntactic positions of restrictive focusing particles, hardly any of them have answered this question.

The point is that although the syntactic position of *only* has been explained in terms of the constituents that it restrictively highlights, some syntactic/semantic/pragmatic properties of highlighted constituents are linked with some linguistic properties of *only* or with extralinguistic variables such as formality of text. For example, the different interpretation of temporal expressions (Rissanen 1980; Jørgensen 1974) derives from the fact that *only* has two types of scope. Some types of constituents highlighted by *only* may be linked with formality. As will be discussed in 6.1.4, Biber (1986, 1988) suggests that different types of clauses (or subordinations to use his term) function in different ways and have different distributions: the distribution of *to*-clauses is related to genres such as professional letters and editorials (Biber 1988: 148). If his suggestion is right, Rissanen’s (1980) proposal that *only* applying to clauses favours PrV (= (3b)) will be linked with formality of text.<sup>2</sup> Given this observation, we predict that the following four linguistic/extralinguistic properties may affect the form of ‘the focus construction specified by *only*’. The linguistic properties are scalarity, scope and rhythmic balance; the extralinguistic property is formality.<sup>3</sup> The rest of this thesis will concentrate on investigating to what extent the hypothesis that the four linguistic/extralinguistic factors mentioned above may affect the form of ‘the focus construction specified by *only*’ is valid, by means of an experimental procedure in which these four possible factors are brought into the foreground in a systematically controlled way.

Our account of positional variation of *only* offers a more detailed account than is currently available of systematic patterns in the form of ‘the focus construction



specified by *only*' and of the properties peculiar to each sub-variety of the construction. The findings are more detailed than in grammar book descriptions such as 'PrV is allowed or even recommended under certain condition such as having clear context' (e.g. Huddleston and Pullum 2002). We do not deny the role of context, but such description does not address the positional variation of *only*, which requires a more delicate explanation. As pointed out in 1.3, even Rissanen's empirical study is not detailed enough to make it clear whether his suggestion that *only* highlighting clauses favours PrV applies to every type of clause. The rest of this chapter reviews the possible factors affecting the form of 'the focus construction specified by *only*' and discusses the experimental design.

### 6.1. Possible linguistic and extralinguistic factors affecting the form of 'the focus construction specified by *only*'

#### 6.1.1. *Scalarity*

As has been pointed out in various studies, restrictive focusing particles can induce an ordering for the value under consideration. Consider the following.

(6) He is only a PLUMBER. (König 1991: 100) (Original small capitals)

*Only* in (6) induces an ordering and evokes the inference that 'the person in question has no higher social rank than that of a plumber' (König 1991: 100).

How should we treat this phenomenon? Three analyses have been proposed: the first, suggested by Shanon (1978), assumes that *only* always involves a scalar reading. The second is that *only* has two meanings (i.e., has a scalar reading and a non-scalar reading). This analysis is argued by Horn (1969), who proposes that *only* applying to verbs or verb phrases has a scalar-reading, whereas *only* applying to noun phrases does not. Thus in his example *Muriel only voted for Hubert* (Horn 1969: 100), if the sentence is spoken with a normal contour and it is paraphrased into *Muriel voted {only for/for only} Hubert* (and is derived from it), *only* does not have a scalar-

reading; if the verb in the sentence is stressed, the resultant reading is something like *Muriel only voted for Hubert, she didn't campaign for him* and *only* has a scalar-reading. However, as Horn (1969: 102) points out, there are sentences like the following. (Note: The examples are from Horn 1969: 102.)

- (7) a. Brigitte Bardot is only pretty, (... she isn't beautiful)  
b. Brigitte Bardot is only pretty, (... she isn't intelligent)

While *only* in (7a) induces an ordering, *only* in (7b) does not. In Horn's argument, (7) is an ambiguous sentence. The analysis that *only* has two meanings (i.e., has a scalar reading and a non-scalar reading) is also taken by Taglicht (1984: 90), who calls *only* having a scalar reading 'limiting *only*' and *only* having a non-scalar reading 'exceptive *only*'. The third analysis takes *only* as vague with respect to scalarity. This is adopted by Nevalainen (1990) and König (1991).

This thesis takes the third analysis as the most plausible, assuming that scalar reading is induced when the highlighted constituents are quantifiers or when the semantic potential of highlighted constituents in specific contexts requires pragmatic inference. This assumption derives from Westney's (1986) general discussion of scalarity. Westney argues that strict scalarity, demonstrable in terms of entailment, is manifested by quantifiers or quantifier-like sets and is relatively rare, and that in the vast majority of cases 'scolarity rests in the semantic potential of individual lexical items and is realised in specific contexts by pragmatic inference' (p.352).<sup>4</sup> One example falling under the latter type of scalarity is:

- (8) ... moving about dramatically, even rather tragically, in the back-ground  
(Westney 1986: 345)

In (8), '*tragically* further specifies *dramatically* (i.e. not *comically*, *pathetically*, etc.)' (Westney 1986: 351), which makes a hyponymous relation. In this example, scalarity is realised by making a hyponymous relation between *tragically* and *dramatically*. Nevalainen (1990) appears to follow Westney's analysis.

The second analysis does not account for the role of context in the realisation of the semantic potential of highlighted constituents. In addition, as Kay (1990: 85) points out, *only* applying to verbs/verb phrases does not necessarily have a scalar-reading, as in *Mary only fries her chicken*. Kay claims that in this sentence, *only* highlights the verb *fries* but that it does not seem to induce a scalar-reading. Sentences such as this also explain the inadequacy of the first analysis, in which *only* always involves a scalar reading. Another example which does not have a scalar-reading is:

(9) Only the Prime Minister attended the meeting. (König 1991: 100)

König (1991) claims that the evaluative presupposition is cancelled in contexts like (9). Often *only* does not have a scalar-reading.

In the case of *only*, one typical case where strict scalarity is manifested by explicit quantifiers is where numerals functioning as noun modifiers are highlighted. Examples found in previous studies on *only* illustrate this.

(10) a. I only bought THREE apples.

(König 1991: 100) (Original small capitals)

b. I have four dogs and only ONE kitten.

(Shanon 1978: 35) (My small capitals)

Notice that in the case of *only*, the fact that the highlighted constituents are numerals is not sufficient for us to say that strict scalarity is demonstrable in terms of entailment. (See example (12b) below.) Is the position of *only* influenced by strict scalarity associated with entailments and manifested by numerals functioning as noun modifier? Rissanen (1980: 68) proposes that highlighted constituents functioning as noun modifiers favour PrA (see (4a)). It is possible that strict scalarity manifested by numerals functioning as noun modifiers might influence the position of *only*.

One claim by Rissanen (1980) is quite plausible. Rissanen (1980: 72) claims that 'there is no significant difference between the influence of this type of attribute [= a numeral or a quantifier] and other premodifiers; in fact, the non-quantifying attribute allows pre-verbal position in proportionally fewer cases than the quantifying attribute'. Nonetheless, given the suggestion by Rissanen (1980: 68) that highlighted constituents indicating quantity favours PrA (= (4b)), we cannot ignore the possibility that scalarity affects the form of 'the focus construction specified by *only*' and it is worth examining this possibility.

In order to investigate whether strict scalarity affects the form of 'the focus construction specified by *only*', we need to compare the case where *only* highlights numerals functioning as noun modifier with the case where *only* highlights non-numerals functioning as noun modifier. If, as Rissanen (1980) suggests, instances of *only* applying to both numerals and non-numerals functioning as noun modifier choose the same position more frequently than other positions, this will lead support to the hypothesis that the property of functioning as noun modifier affects the form of 'the focus construction specified by *only*' but not scalarity. On the other hand, if *only* applying to numerals functioning as noun modifier prefers a different position from that occupied by *only* applying to non-numerals functioning as noun modifier, the hypothesis that scalarity affects the form of 'the focus construction specified by *only*' will be supported.<sup>5</sup>

When scalarity is induced by the realisation of a semantic potential of highlighted constituents in specific contexts by pragmatic inference, *only* applying to several different types of constituents can induce an ordering for the value under consideration. Two types of constituents typically found in previous studies of *only* are:

(11) **subject complements**

He is only a PLUMBER. (= (6))

(12) **constituents functioning as subject**

a. Only a MIRACLE can save us (i.e. nothing short of a miracle).

(König 1991: 101)(Original small capitals)

b. Only \$1,000 would solve all my problems (no smaller amount would do). (König 1991: 101)

As for the scale orientation associated with *only*, the alternatives excluded by *only* may rank higher than the value given by the highlighted constituents, as in (10) and (11), or may rank lower than the value given by the highlighted constituents, as in (12). König (1991) regards the scales in (10) and (11) as 'natural' or 'absolute' ones and those in (12) as not 'natural' or 'absolute' ones. König (1991: 102) suggests that the scales like those in (12) are induced when *only* occurs in the context having a generic or conditional quality. He calls this type of context 'contexts expressing sufficient conditions' (*X is enough/sufficient/adequate*), which is contrasted with necessary and factual contexts (*X is required/necessary/needed/essential*) in (10) and (11).

6.1.2. *Scope*

Along with scalarity, scope is also an important semantic property of (restrictive) focusing particles. In the case of *only*, its scope can be identified with a whole sentence/clause, as in (13), but not necessarily so, as shown by (14). (The examples are from König 1991: 46; original small capitals.)

(13) They see only NEIGHBOURS very often.

(14) Very often they see only NEIGHBOURS.

The whole sentence is the scope of *only* in (13), whereas some part of the sentence (i.e., *very often*) is not the scope of *only* in (14). Following König (1991: 47), we will call the scope in (13) *wide scope* and that in (14) *narrow scope*.

Does the position of *only* depend on whether the scope of *only* is wide or narrow? Nevalainen (1990) proposes that the scope of *only* may affect the position of this particle, following Taglicht (1984). Taglicht (1984: 154) points out that if the highlighted constituents occur in a postverbal position, placing *only* in PrV disambiguates the wide scope of *only*. An advantage of this analysis is that it takes into account the view of Jørgensen (1974). As mentioned in Chapter 1 and again at the beginning of this chapter, Jørgensen (1974) investigates the position of *only* when it restrictively highlights temporal expressions and proposes that the position of this particle varies according to whether *only* indicates 'no other time' or 'as recently as'. (A similar proposal that *only* changes its position according to the interpretation of sentences where this particle highlights temporal expressions is also made by Rissanen 1980.) Consider (5), which is repeated below as (15), again.

(15) a. John only saw Mary AN HOUR AGO.

b. John saw Mary only AN HOUR AGO.

The interpretation of (15a) is that John saw Mary an hour ago and saw her at no other time. On the other hand, the interpretation of (15b) is that John saw Mary an hour ago and it happened as recently as an hour ago. According to Jørgensen (1974), *only* indicating 'no other time' is normally placed in PrV, whereas *only* indicating 'as recently as' in PrA. From the light of types of scope of *only*, the interpretational difference between (15a) and (15b) will be explained that *only* in (15a) has wide scope, whereas *only* in (15b) has narrow scope.

The point to observe here is that although in (15a) *only* clearly has wide scope, this sentence may not clearly identify the highlighted constituent. König (1991: 52) points out that the requirement to identify constituents highlighted by *only* and to identify its scope may conflict each other: it is the best to place *only* in PrA (= the position where *only* is placed immediately before the constituent which it highlights) to fulfil the former requirement, whereas it is the best to place *only* in PrV (= the position where *only* is placed immediately before the verb or after the first auxiliary verb) to fulfil the latter requirement. Thus when *only* occurs in PrA, the scope of this

particle may be ambiguous between wide scope and narrow scope. On the other hand, when *only* occurs in PrV, the scope of this particle is clearly wide scope but may not identify the constituents highlighted by this particle.

What should be noticed is that in practice narrow scope of *only* is rare. Taglicht's (1984: 180) empirical analysis demonstrates that wide scope is by far the more frequent of the two. Taglicht's data of spoken and written English was drawn from some samples of the Survey of English Usage at University College London. (270,000 words of writing and 440,000 words of speech.) There were 561 instances of *only* functioning as the restrictive focusing particle. Of them, only 18 instances (i.e., 12 instances from writing and 6 instances from speech) are narrow scope. Based on this analysis, we predict that scope differences will not affect the position of *only* more than other possible factors.

### 6.1.3. *Rhythmic balance*

Even in the case of written language, (at least occasionally) we choose one expression over others, on the basis of rhythmic balance. Intuitively, rhythmic balance seems to affect the form of 'the focus construction specified by *only*'. The following serves as an example (Note: To simplify the discussion, we will restrict our attention to the case where the highlighted constituents are noun phrases functioning as direct object. The highlighted constituents are in small capitals.):

- (16) a. John only respected BILL.  
b. John respected only BILL.

*John only respected Bill* sounds awkward, whereas *John respected only Bill* (or *John respected Bill only*) sounds far better.

Another example is:

- (17) a. John only met SUSANNA.  
 b. John met only SUSANNA.

(17a) sounds better than (17b) (at least to me).

One interesting comment is found in Bolinger (1986). Bolinger (1986: 67) claims that 'a word in running discourse gets at most one accent, and if there happens to be a secondary stress the speaker has a certain play in fitting the accent to the rhythm'. The secondary stress can be preferred to the primary in order for a better rhythmic succession, as in (18).

- (18) The óne respónsible was his íllegítimáte sòn. (Bolinger 1986: 68)

This sentence is fairly well balanced with its 2-5-5 succession. In this sentence, the secondary stress is preferred to the primary on *illegitimate*, since using the primary on *-gi-* would yield a 2-7-3 succession and it is an awkward succession. However, if the word *own* is inserted to the left of *illegitimate*, the primary stress is chosen (i.e., (19)), giving a 2-5-3-3 succession, which is a better rhythmic succession than *The óne respónsible was his ówn íllegítimáte sòn*, 2-5-1-5.

- (19) The óne respónsible was his ówn íllegítimáte sòn.

Consider one more example from Bolinger (1986: 67).

- (20) a. They were dóing it to counteráct the interféring accelerátiún.  
 b. They were dóing it to cóunteract the ínterfering fórcé.

Different from (20a), in (20b) we cannot keep the accent on the syllable *-fer-* of *interfering* and the accent on the last syllable of *counteract*. If we kept it, we would have a 5-4-2 succession. This is an awkward succession. To avoid this, we change the accented syllables of *interfering* and *counteract* in (20b), which yields a 3-4-4 succession.



It seems that the similar thing happens in (16) and in (17), not by changing the accented syllable but by changing the position of *only*. We will put accents on every content word, following Bolinger's (1986: 99-100) claim that 'a neutral sentence would be one in which *all* words, or at least all content words, carry an accent and a non-neutral or marked sentence would be one in which one or more words have been deaccented' (original italic). (This claim is similar to Bing's (1980) proposal with respect to recognising accents other than the terminal accent, but differs from Bing 1980 in that Bolinger does not limit accents to nouns.) According to Bolinger (1986: 112), the following are some factors affecting deaccenting: meanings that are already implied in the context, meanings that are so ubiquitous that we take them for granted and meanings that we share so intimately with our interlocutor that they need no emphasis. It seems that some of his factors (e.g. meanings that are so ubiquitous that we take them for granted) are related to pragmatic presupposition and others (e.g. meanings that are already implied in the context) are related to activation. (See 2.1 for the concepts of pragmatic presupposition and activation in this thesis.) A different view is found in Lambrecht (1994). Lambrecht (1994: 324) claims that there are two conditions on unaccented constituents: a 'constituent is unaccented if and only if the speaker assumes: (i) that a mental representation of the referent is activated in the addressee's mind (or can be accommodated by the addressee as such); and (ii) that the addressee expects this referent to be a topic in the proposition at the time of utterance'. In Lambrecht (1994), the concept of activation is different from activation as discussed in 2.1. For Lambrecht (1994: 324), to activate a referent is 'not simply to conjure up a representation of it in the mind of the addressee but to ESTABLISH A RELATION between it and a proposition' (original small capitals).

Since there is no context in (16) and (17), let us suppose that the sentences in these examples are neutral sentences and have accents on every content word. The main accent on the words in (16) are inviolable: none of the content words, *John*, *only*, *respected* and *Bill*, have the secondary stress and except for changing the position of *only*, we have no way to improve the rhythmic balance in the sentence. In (16), a better rhythmic balance would be yielded by placing *only* either in PrA or in PostA and not in PrV. We get a 1-3-2 succession with *only respected Bill*, whereas we get a

2-2-2 succession with *respécted óly Bill* or a 2-2-1 succession with *respécted Bill óly*. PrA and PostA make a better rhythmic succession than PrV. What has been discussed also seems to apply to the case where the number of syllables in highlighted constituents is three like *Susanna*. For example, we get a 1-3-3 succession with *óly respécted Susánna* in *John óly respécted Susanna*, whereas we get a 2-2-3 succession with *respécted óly Susánna* or a 2-3-2 succession with *respécted Susánna óly*. PrA and PostA make a better rhythmic succession than PrV.

In the case of (17) where a one-syllable verb *met* is used, a better rhythmic balance would be obtained by placing *only* in PrV and not in PrA. With *óly mét Susánna* we get a 1-2-2 succession, whereas with *mét óly Susánna*, we get a 1-1-3 succession. Also, the awkwardness of the succession of *Jóhn mét óly Susánna* is assumed to be related to the unnecessary pitch movement within the one-syllable verb *met*. The two-accent shape has been designated as *the hat pattern* (Cohen and 't Hart 1967):

(21)



Following this shape, the phrase *mét óly Susánna* is schematised something like this:

(22)

		sán
mé	ón	
t	ly su	
		na

As noticed, this schematisation has one unnecessary pitch movement within the one-syllable verb *met*. Contrary to *mét óly Susánna*, *óly mét Susánna* does not require such an unnecessary pitch movement within syllables. Consider (23).<sup>6</sup>

(23)                   sán  
           ón  mét  
           ly   su  
                           na

The comparison between (22) and (23) is of interest in that it leads to the hypothesis that *only* occurring in sentences containing one-syllable verbs such as *met* and *saw* may prefer PrV to PrA.

Based on what has been discussed, we predict that rhythmic balance affects the form of ‘the focus construction specified by *only*’. As would be noticed from the discussion so far, the rhythmic balance is closely associated with the number of syllables in verbs preceding the highlighted constituent and/or with the number of syllables in highlighted constituents. The question arising from (16) and (17) is whether the number of syllables in verbs affects the form of ‘the focus construction specified by *only*’ or whether the number of syllables in highlighted constituents does so, or whether both do.

One important point must be made: this hypothesis does not apply to cases where verbs and/or highlighted constituents have the secondary stress, since in such cases there is the possibility that a better rhythmic succession may be established by choosing the secondary stress to add an accent and not by changing the form of ‘the focus construction specified by *only*’.

#### 6.1.4. Formality

Nevalainen (1990: 39) proposes that register regulates the position of *only*. There are various types of discourse. (Recall the various types of spoken and written discourse listed in 3.1.) Although it is not clear what Nevalainen (1990) actually intended by saying that register where *only* is used regulates its position, we would like to focus on formality. There is a continuum of ‘formality’. At the informal end of the continuum is spontaneous spoken discourse such as spontaneous spoken conversation and at the formal end is formal written discourse such as academic

monographs. (See also 3.1 for the discussion of this topic.) As pointed out in 3.1, this is not to say that every type of spoken discourse is informal and every type of written discourse is formal. 'Spoken language can be formal as well as informal and oral societies have formal spoken texts such as the language of religious and social ceremonies' Miller and Weinert (1998: 3). Miller and Weinert (1998) suggest that spontaneous language possesses constructions that do not occur in formal written language and vice-versa and that these two different varieties of language have different devices for discourse organisation. They further point out that 'major differences in syntax and vocabulary are associated with formality as opposed to informality' (p.3).

The importance of formality is supported by diachronic study of the development of preverbal *only* (e.g. Nevalainen 1986). Examining material from three different periods (i.e., period (1500-1560), period (1570-1630) and period (1640-1700)) and consisting of about 1.4 million words, Nevalainen (1986) shows that historically, the positional shift from PrA to PrV is connected with the spoken rather than the written mode of expression. This is supported by the finding that the positional shift is particularly frequent in imitations of the colloquial spoken idiom such as play, and less frequent in more formal discourse such as sermons. Nevalainen (1986) also comments on PostA. In Nevalainen's material, the number of instances of PostA falls from 26% of all occurrences of *only* in the period (1500-1560) to 8% in the period (1640-1700). This means that PostA is an old type, which is more easily associated with formal than with informal discourse. From this, it is predicted that when highlighted constituents are under informal context and/or are informal expressions, PrV tends to be the position chosen more frequently even in present-day written English, whereas when highlighted constituents are in more formal context and/or are formal expressions, PrA (and PostA) must be the position chosen more frequently.

How do we examine whether formality affects the form of 'the focus construction specified by *only*'? One linguistic measure associated with formality difference is the length of constituents highlighted by *only*. Miller and Weinert (1998: 22) point out

several linguistic properties reflecting the properties of spontaneous spoken language (see (1) in 3.1 in this thesis). One property is that phrases in spontaneous language are less complex than phrases in written language. A similar view is also found in Fjelkestam-Nilsson (1983), who claims that formal texts tend to be made up of longer phrases.

Another linguistic measure associated with formality relates to constructions that occur in spontaneous spoken language but not in written language, and vice-versa (Miller and Weinert 1998: 22). Biber (1988: 112) suggests that passive sentences containing a *by* phrase are related to discourse that is abstract, technical and formal. This suggestion is supported by Miller and Weinert (1998: 89). In their spontaneous spoken data (i.e., the Map Task dialogues and the spontaneous conversation), the number of passive sentences with *by* phrase is very small: there are only 4 instances of passive sentences with *by* phrase (all of them from the spontaneous conversation), whereas there are 43 instances of passive sentences without *by* phrase, 25 from the conversation, 16 from the Map Task dialogues with eye-contact and 2 from the Map Task dialogues without eye-contact. It follows from what has been said that *by* phrases in passive sentences can serve as a linguistic test of whether formality affects the form of 'the focus construction specified by *only*'.

Biber (1986, 1988) also suggests that different types of clause (or subordination in his term) function in different ways and that different types of clause have different distributions. The distribution of *to*-clauses (e.g. *We eat to live*) is related to genres such as professional letters and editorials (Biber 1988: 148). On the other hand, *wh*-clauses (e.g. *I believe what he told me*) and *if*-clauses (e.g. *If you are tired, we will go straight home*) are 'important strategy for expressing fuller content under real-time production constraints' (Biber 1986: 395). We need to be cautious about Biber's suggestion, however: one reason is that as Biber (1988: 232) admits the distribution of *to*-clauses seems to be less marked than other types of clause.

The second reason has to do with the characteristics of speakers producing spoken data. Biber (1986, 1988) used the London-Lund Corpus, representing six speech

situations: private conversations, public conversations, telephone conversations, radio broad-casts, spontaneous speeches and prepared speeches. This corpus was produced only by middle-class, university-educated male academics and whose spoken English, even spontaneous spoken English, is certainly affected by formal written English.

The third reason is that I have not found empirical studies which deal with undoubted spontaneous spoken data and which get results supporting Biber (1986, 1988). Nonetheless, it may be worth while considering Biber's (1988) claim that different types of clause function in different ways and that thus the distribution of clauses in discourse is different from each other, since he has proposed 'a more subtle approach' (Miller and Weinert 1998: 18) to the controversial field of clauses (or subordinations) in written and spoken discourse. We will use clause types as a secondary linguistic measure of whether formality affects the position of *only*. (The primary linguistic measures are the length of constituents highlighted by *only* and *by* phrases in passive sentences.)

Do these four possible factors have the same weight? As was predicted in 6.1.2, scope difference does not have a greater effect on the position of *only* than other possible factors. On the other hand, as has been mentioned, the importance of formality with respect to the position of *only* is supported by the diachronic study of the development of preverbal *only*. From this, formality can be expected to have an important effect. Furthermore, considering the fact that some sentences are awkward and others have a better rhythmic succession, rhythmic balance can be expected to have an effect on the position of *only*. The effect of scalarity is not clear at present.

## 6.2. The experiments

### *6.2.1. Marked and unmarked position of 'only'*

So far we have discussed four possible linguistic/extralinguistic factors affecting the form of 'the focus construction specified by *only*'. Affecting the form of 'the focus

construction specified by *only*' means that the possible factors we have discussed let *only* choose one sub-variety of 'the focus construction specified by *only*' most frequently, namely one of PrV, PrA and PostA. The various positions can be seen as *marked* or *unmarked*. The most frequently chosen position will be called *the unmarked position*, while the other positions will be called *the marked positions*. Thus our investigation will concentrate on whether the four linguistic/extralinguistic factors let *only* have the unmarked position or not.

The concept of marked and unmarked is used, following Greenberg (1966). Greenberg (1966) demonstrates the criteria of the marked/unmarked oppositions such as:

- (24) (i) addition of a feature
- (ii) syncretism
- (iii) neutralization
- (iv) universal implication
- (v) frequency

By 'addition to a feature', it is meant that if phenomenon A has all features of phenomenon B plus one, A is marked, B unmarked. By 'syncretism' is meant that 'distinctions existing in the unmarked member are often neutralized in the marked categories' (Greenberg 1966: 27). One example of syncretism from Greenberg (1966: 27) is that in 'German the article and both weak and strong forms of the adjectival declension have the same forms for all three genders in the plural'. 'Neutralization' means that 'when in a particular class of environment no contrast occurs within a set of {lexemes/phonemes which differ from each other only in a single feature, it is the unmarked feature which appears in this environment' (Greenberg 1966: 58). Greenberg states that in languages such as Hungarian, only the singular form of nouns may appear with cardinal numbers. This is one example of neutralization. By 'universal implication', Greenberg (1966: 60) claims that 'it is the unmarked member which is the implied or basic term and the marked which is

the implying or secondary'. By 'frequency' is meant that the more frequent member of an opposition is unmarked, the less frequent is marked.

All these things lead to one thing: unmarked structures are the most neutral, basic and the most frequent. For example, Halliday (1967) says that the tonic prominence typically falls on the final lexical item in a clause. That is unmarked. On the other hand, if the tonic prominence falls on a constituent other than the final lexical item, that constituent is contrastive and the pitch pattern is marked. (See 1.1 in this thesis.)

### 6.2.2. *Design of the experiments*

Considering the purpose of this thesis, naturally-occurring data, typically some corpora, are not useful for the current investigation: the number of examples related to our possible factors may be too small and/or examples may not be suitable for investigating the hypothesis, including some extra features. Consider the following sentences from the British National Corpus.

- (25) a. the ground rules for the forum only allowed parties accepting constitutional, non-violent politics to participate  
b. After a quick tidy-up they took the next train back to the Gare de Lyon where Monique had only twenty minutes to wait  
c. After the 1986 Tax Reform Act, however, such gifts were subject to an Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) whereby donors could deduct only the original purchase price

In these sentences, *only* highlights the direct objects. Are these examples suitable for investigating whether rhythmic balance affects the position of *only*, for instance? The answer is 'no': each sentence in (25) has different subjects and different verbs, the complexity of sentences is different, etc. This thesis has opted for an experimental procedure in which the four possible factors are brought into the foreground, in a systematically controlled way. What exactly is brought into the foreground?



(a) **scalarity:**

We focus on the strict scalarity which is demonstrable in terms of entailment and is manifested by quantifiers or quantifier-like sets. We do not deal with scalarity induced by context. The reason is that as examples (11) and (12) illustrate, in the case of scalarity induced by context, highlighted constituents typically found in previous studies on *only* are subject complements or constituents functioning as subject. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, *only* cannot occur in PrV when the highlighted constituents are subject complements, as in *He is only a child*. As mentioned earlier, it is debatable whether *only* can occur in non-PrA position when the highlighted constituents function as subject. For this reason, we will focus on the case of strict scalarity manifested by numerals functioning as noun modifiers, and as mentioned in 6.1.1, we compare *only* highlighting numerals functioning as noun modifiers with *only* highlighting non-numerals functioning as noun modifiers.

One question arises immediately: do we need to consider functions of the heads modified by numerals. Numerals functioning as noun modifiers modify not only nouns functioning as object as in *I bought three apples*, but also nouns functioning as complement of preposition, for instance. (26) illustrates this.

(26) John paid for three tickets

The current investigation will concentrate on direct object head nouns modified by numerals. The reason is that grammaticality judgements of sentences such as (26) differ from study to study. Bayer (1995: 37) developed his account on the basis of the following type of sentence where *only* restrictively highlights a complement of a preposition.

(27) These days, Mary talks to only grandpa. (Bayer 1995: 37)

In contrast with Bayer (1995), Taglicht (1984) does not accept the PrA position in cases where *only* highlights a proper noun or a common noun inside a prepositional

phrase, whereas he accepts it in cases where *only* highlights numerals inside a prepositional phrase. This is shown in (28).

(28) a. He spoke to only a few of his friends.

(Taglicht 1984: 71) (Original underline)

b. \*He spoke to only his friends.

(Taglicht 1984: 71) (Original underline)

Given this situation, we concentrate here on direct object head nouns modified by numerals in order to investigate whether scalarity affects the position of *only*.

**(b) scope:**

We target examples where the highlighted constituents are temporal expressions in order to examine whether the scope of *only* really affects the position of *only*.

**(c) rhythmic balance:**

We again restrict our attention to the case where the highlighted constituents are direct object noun phrases. As pointed out in 6.1.3, (16) and (17) raise the question whether the number of syllables in verbs preceding the highlighted constituent affects the position of *only* or whether the number of syllables in the highlighted constituents does so, or whether both affect the position of *only*. To answer this question, we will examine four cases: the combination of one-syllable verb and one-syllable noun, the combination of one-syllable verb and three-syllable noun, the combination of three-syllable verb and one-syllable noun and the combination of three-syllable verb and three-syllable noun. We will deal with only words having one stress. This is because, as we mentioned in 6.1.3, our hypothesis may not apply to cases where verbs and/or highlighted constituents have secondary stress. In such cases, a better rhythmic succession may be established via secondary stress and not by changing the position of *only*.

**(d) formality:**

As mentioned in 6.1.4, we investigate whether formality affects the position of *only*, by examining *by* phrases in passive sentences, varying the length of phrases, and by examining cases where highlighted constituents are either *wh*-clauses, *if*-clauses, or *to*-clauses, varying the length of clauses.

In short, we will obtain data gathered under conditions which systematically control for (a) *only* applying to numerals modifying direct object nouns and *only* applying to non-numerals modifying direct object nouns; (b) *only* with wide scope applying to temporal expressions and *only* with narrow scope applying to temporal expressions; (c) *only* occurring in the combinations of one-syllable verb and one-syllable noun, one-syllable verb and three-syllable noun, three-syllable verb and one-syllable noun, and three-syllable verb and three-syllable noun, and (d) *only* applying to *by* phrases in passive sentences, and *only* applying to three different types of clause (i.e., *wh*-clauses, *to*-clauses and *if*-clauses), varying the length of phrases/clauses.

One additional point must be mentioned: as has been empirically demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, constituents highlighted by *only* can be either new or activated (see particularly Table 5.6). (See also Chapter 2.) However, to simplify the investigation, we restrict our investigation to highlighted constituents carrying new information.

One concern arising from the nature of elicitation tests is this: a large number of questions are required in order to permit a general conclusion to be drawn. This demands considerable time and effort from subjects. It is possible that subjects would be unable to keep answering consistently or would feel that their competence as native speakers was at stake. To lessen the burden on the subjects and to reduce the risk of the experiment being perceived as a threat, we conducted a pilot test with a limited number of questions per possible factor. The goal of the pilot test was to find out which linguistic/extralinguistic factors would be worth examining via detailed tests. (See Chapter 7.) The pilot test enabled us to delete factors which were not likely to affect the position of *only*. After delimiting the number of factors, we designed the main experiment so as to yield enough data for a general conclusion to be drawn. (See Chapter 8.) This methodology reflects the hypothesis that the four possible factors may not have the same weight. Thus if, for instance, as we have predicted, scope turns out not to be likely to affect the position of *only* as a result of our pilot test, then it will be deleted from the target of our main experiment, which will reduce the total number of questions and lessen the burden on subjects.

Our pilot test has two parts – a sentence-production test and a sentence-comprehension test. The pilot test was designed on the basis of Greenbaum and Quirk (1970), discussed in section 3.1.2. The types of test are repeated below in Figure 6.1.




Figure 6.1. Types of test (From Greenbaum and Quirk 1970: 3)

Our sentence-production test contains three sections relevant to completion tests. The first section involves word-placement test, where subjects were asked to fill one of the gaps with *only* to make the sentence describe the context. For example:

- (29) context: John got one A grade and got no more than one.  
 John [        ] got [        ] one A grade.

The second section involves forced-choice selection test. Since the only one word is stake, namely *only*, subjects were asked to choose one of a set of complete sentences describing the context and containing *only* in different positions. (30) is an example.

- (30) context: John got one A grade and got no more than one.
- a. John only got one A grade.
  - b. John got only one A grade.

Kempson and Quirk (1971) investigate inflectional variation, aspectual variation and a range of lexical contrasts, by means of some tests including forced-choice selection. They suggest that the test is reliable, though at the same time they point out that forced-choice selection is a rather clumsy tool for investigating lexical contrasts. Fortunately it is not a clumsy tool for investigating the position of *only*, since the possible positions of this particle are limited and there are no lexical contrasts.

What should be noticed here is that the second section of our production test differs from what Greenbaum and Quirk (1970) term a preference test. Their preference test contains rating and ranking, and in this type of test, subjects are asked to rate sentences, using a three-point scale. Subjects are also asked to rank the sentences in order of preference. On the other hand, what we investigate in the second section of our production test is subjects' preference when they are forced to choose one position from two or three possible positions.

The third section is composition test, where subjects were asked to rewrite the sentence or sentences as one sentence describing the event and containing *only*. To avoid possible influence on the position of *only*, we did not give subjects any part of a sentence. (See Appendix II for the full set of instructions and questions.)

On the other hand, in the sentence-comprehension test, subjects were asked to read a pair of context and sentence containing *only* on a computer screen (e.g. (31) below) and were asked to judge whether the sentence described the context or not.

(31)

John got one A grade and got no more than one.

John only got one A grade.

Subjects recorded their answers by pressing either a Yes-button or a No-button connected to the computer. We used software called PsyScope, available on computers in the Linguistics laboratory in the University of Edinburgh. This test is a

modified version of the evaluation test in Greenbaum and Quirk (1970). The difference between our sentence-comprehension test and Greenbaum and Quirk's evaluation test is that in our test, subjects were asked to judge sentences on a two-point scale, namely 'yes, the sentence describes the context' or 'no, it does not', while subjects were asked to evaluate sentences on a three-point scale in Greenbaum and Quirk's evaluation tests.

As pointed out in 3.1.2, to gain reliable data, it is important

- (a) to prevent possible influences of order from skewing the results of the test
- (b) to prevent subjects from guessing the purpose of the test
- (c) to prevent subjects from comparing the answers to the various questions and thinking about the 'best/ideal' answer to each question
- (d) to use enough informants so as to get major and minor patterns

Precautions were taken. First of all, to prevent possible influences of order from skewing the results of the tests, we prepared four different versions of the production test, consisting of the same questions but arranged in four different random orders. We checked whether a particular answer to a given question was associated with a particular order, by conducting these four versions of test to a small number of subjects. The result is that there are no possible influences of order. Given this result, we used one of the versions for the production test. As for our comprehension test, it was on-line and the software automatically presented the questions on the screen in a different order to each subject.

Second, to prevent subjects from guessing the purpose of the pilot test, the questions where the four possible factors are brought into the foreground were interspersed among the questions concerning, e.g., the position of *only* applying to a noun phrase functioning as subject (see Appendix II).

Third, to prevent subjects from comparing the answers to the various questions and thinking about the 'best/ideal' answer to each question, in the production test

subjects were instructed to answer quickly and were given a short time to produce an answer. This explains why as will be noticed from the overall results presented in 7.1, the number of answers to our production test is not the same from section to section. This production test was conducted in some large class rooms; the instructor was unable to check whether the subjects answered the questions as quickly as possible. The instructor split the questionnaire into two smaller parts, one part containing one section and the other part containing two sections. The instructor presented each part to a different set of subjects, and gave subjects only about five minutes to answer the questions. This does appear to have prevented subjects from comparing the answers to the various questions and from thinking about the 'best/ideal' answer. In the comprehension test, subjects were also instructed to answer quickly and not to think about the 'best/ideal' answer to each question. The test was designed to bring up the next question as soon as subjects pressed either a Yes-button or a No-button. This prevented subjects from reflecting on previous answers.

Finally, Miller and Cann (1994: 816) claim that 30 is the minimum required to elicit major and minor patterns. 44 subjects completed the production test and 30 completed the comprehension test. All participated voluntarily. Subjects were all native speakers of British English and undergraduate university students. (Note: In the production test, the total number of the answers does not necessarily correspond to the number of the subjects who answered a particular section/particular sections, since some questions were left blank. This probably happened because time ran out. In the comprehension test, four of 30 subjects were disregarded and some answers to some pairs of context and sentence by other subjects (i.e., 26 subjects) were also disregarded.<sup>7</sup>)

As mentioned in 3.1.2, one further important issue which was taken into account in preparing the questions was how formal they are. This is important, since one of the possible factors is formality. For the analysis of scalarity, scope and rhythmic balance, questions consisting of single sentences containing neutral words were used. (See (29) - (31).) That is, the questions were neither formal nor informal. With

respect to formality, the research question is whether formality affects the position of *only*, and as has been mentioned, the length of highlighted constituents and *by* phrases in passive sentences were used as the primary linguistic measures and clause type as the secondary linguistic measure. The questions in the pilot test concentrated on *by* phrases in passive sentences and on clause types such as *wh*-clauses, and/or *if*-clauses and/or *to*-clauses, without varying the length of the phrases/clauses. The questions consisted of neutral words, as in (32).

(32) context: Mary goes out if John goes, and does not do so if he does not.  
 Mary [            ] goes out [            ] if John goes.

The intention was to vary the length of phrases and clauses in the main experiment if the results of the pilot test suggested that formality may affect the position of *only*. The questions in the sentence-production test and those in the sentence-comprehension test were essentially the same; because of the width of the screen, some questions in the comprehension test were shorter than those in the production test and there were minor changes of lexical item in some questions (e.g. *stopped* was replaced by *broke off*). (See the discussion in 7.4.2.) The grammatical structure of the questions was checked by some native speakers of British English before the pilot test was conducted.

As the test method shows, the sentence-production test gives direct information about the most frequently chosen position of *only* (i.e., the unmarked position). How is frequency to be interpreted? Consider (33).

(33)

Section 1 (word-placement test)		Section 2 (forced-choice selection test)		Section 3 (composition test)	
PrV	PrA	PrV	PrA	PrV	PrA
11	6	6	3	8	0

(33) shows that PrV is the position chosen most frequently in every section and that one of the factors affects the position of *only*. On the other hand, in (34), neither PrV



nor PrA can be said to be the position chosen most frequently. Cases such as (34) show that none of the factors affect the position of *only*.

(34)

Section 1 (word-placement test)		Section 2 (forced-choice selection test)		Section 3 (composition test)	
PrV	PrA	PrV	PrA	PrV	PrA
3	3	7	7	2	1

Furthermore, suppose we obtain data like (35) under conditions which systematically control for *only* applying to numerals modifying direct object nouns and for *only* applying to non-numerals modifying direct object nouns.

(35)

Highlighted clauses	Section 1 (word-placement test)		Section 2 (forced-choice selection test)		Section 3 (composition test)	
	PrV	PrA	PrV	PrA	PrV	PrA
numerals	3	1	9	2	4	1
non-numerals	5	3	7	4	4	2

Cases such as (35) should be treated cautiously. The general tendency is for *only* to occupy the same position, PrV, with both numerals and non-numerals. From this, it seems that scalarity does not affect the position of *only*. However, there is a difference in the relative frequency of the choices, with PrV more strongly chosen when *only* highlights numerals. Would it mean that our pilot test simply did not show the difference which an experiment containing large number of questions would reveal and in the main experiment would it be worth examining the possibility that scalarity affects the position of *only*, and including sufficient questions to permit a general conclusion to be drawn? We decided to include the factor as the target in our main experiment if obtained data such as (35) in the pilot test.

The sentence-comprehension test does not give information about the frequency of a certain position directly, since this test addresses whether a sentence with *only* in a

certain position is comprehended as describing the context. The significance of the sentence-comprehension test, a modified version of the evaluation test in Greenbaum and Quirk (1970), lies in the fact that it shows subjects' reactions to sentences containing *only*, including sentences where *only* is in the unmarked position (i.e., the most frequently chosen position) in the sentence-production test. Thus the results of the production test might be supported by those of the comprehension test. Suppose that PrA were the unmarked position for *only* applying to *by* phrases in passive sentences in our production test. If subjects favoured sentences with *only* in PrA in the comprehension test, PrA would be the unmarked position. It would turn out that formality affected the position of *only*, since *by* phrases in passive sentences are associated with high formality. (See 6.1.4.) However, the results of the production test might not be supported by those of the comprehension test, which would indicate that PrV, PrA and PostA were equally acceptable. To sum up, both the performance test and the judgement test are required, as shown by the experimental research by Kempson and Quirk (1971).

We should not overlook the fact that data gained by the method adopted in our pilot test has three disadvantages: first of all, as Miller and Weinert (1998: 191) point out, it is impossible to know whether a subject has properly understood the situation; besides, what the data reflects is not what s/he actually produces but what s/he believes s/he would say. The second disadvantage is the possibility that subjects' paying attention to *only* might bias them and that the results might not reflect subjects' usage in their everyday communication, e.g. choosing the least ambiguous position rather than the position, they believe, they actually use. The third disadvantage is that it cannot be denied that at least some of the results may be derived by chance and that even if the results are statistically significant, they apply only to the sentences examined. This comes from the characteristics of our pilot test: as has been mentioned above, it does not contain questions large enough to permit a general conclusion to be drawn. It should be emphasised, however, that both the results of the production test and those of the comprehension test give us some interesting insight into which linguistic or extralinguistic factors we should examine in the main experiment, with a large number of questions.

For the main experiment, we used the word-placement test in Greenbaum and Quirk (1970): we presented subjects with pairs of sentences and asked them to make the second sentence equivalent in meaning to the first by inserting *only*. The reason is that among various types of tests displayed in Figure 6.1, this type of test, as the term indicates, is designed to investigate word position most straightforwardly. Subjects were instructed to choose the best version if they thought that *only* could be inserted in more than one of the gaps. This experiment contained approximately 20 questions belonging to the same constituent, which is enough to permit a general conclusion to be drawn. The experiment has the Latin Square design; that is, 10 versions were set. (See Appendix III for the full list of instructions and the extract from one version.) The subjects were native speakers of British English and undergraduate university students. A total of 48 subjects participated in this experiment and were paid £5 each. (The factors investigated in the main experiment are discussed in Chapter 8.)

As in the pilot test, to prevent subjects from comparing the answers to the various questions and thinking about the 'best/ideal' answer to each question, we instructed the subjects to answer quickly and allowed a short time for them to answer, about 20 minutes for 80 questions. The main experiment was carried out with at most five subjects each in a small laboratory, which made it possible for us personally to instruct the subjects not to reflect on previous answers and to answer quickly.

The results of the main experiment were analysed as follows. Take the factor 'formality' as an example: if there were statistically significant differences between *only* applying to *wh*-clauses, *only* applying to *if*-clauses and *only* applying to *to*-clauses, with respect to the position of *only*, and if PrV were the unmarked position for *only* applying to *wh*-clauses and *if*-clauses and PrA were the unmarked position for *only* applying to *to*-clauses, then it would be proved that formality does affect the position of *only*. However, if the results of a statistical test show no significant differences between *only* applying to *wh*-clauses, *only* applying to *if*-clauses and *only* applying to *to*-clauses, with respect to the position of *only*, then it will turn out that formality does not affect the position of *only*.

Also, as has been mentioned, *by* phrases in passive sentences are one primary linguistic measure associated with formality difference. If the results showed statistically significant differences between different types of prepositional phrase, including *by* phrases in passive sentences, with respect to the position of *only*, and if PrA and/or PostA were the unmarked position for *only* applying to *by* phrases in passive sentences, then it would be proved that formality does affect the position of *only*. To investigate this point four different types of prepositional phrase including *by* phrases in passive sentences were targeted: *by* phrases in passive sentences (e.g. *This novel was written by Scott*), adjuncts (e.g. *They go out on Friday evening*), complements of a prepositional verb (e.g. *They blamed John for being late*) and complements of a non-prepositional verb (e.g. *John went to the pub*).<sup>8</sup>

The issue of how formal the questions are is important. The policy we used for designing the pilot test applies to the case of the main experiment as well. That is to say, if the results of the pilot test suggested that scalarity, scope and rhythmic balance might affect the position of *only*, the questions in the main experiment for examining this suggestion would be designed to consist of simple sentences containing neutral words, as in (36).

(36) John met Bill and nobody else.

John [        ] met [        ] Bill [        ].

If the results of the pilot test suggested that formality might affect the position of *only*, the questions would be designed to consist of sentences containing (i) four different types of prepositional phrase including *by* phrases in passive sentences (i.e., *by* phrases in passive sentences, adjuncts, complements of a prepositional verb and complements of non-prepositional verb), varying the length of these prepositional phrases, and (ii) three different types of clause (i.e., *wh*-clauses, *if*-clauses and *to*-clauses), varying the length of these clauses. The words used would be neutral. (37) – (40) illustrate some examples.

(37) This song is loved by teenagers and is not loved by any other people.

This song is [       ] loved [       ] by teenagers [       ].

(38) This song is loved by the rock-'n'-roll generation and is not loved by any other people.

This song is [       ] loved [       ] by the rock-'n'-roll generation [       ].

(39) As for Ann, John heard what she studied in London and he heard nothing else.

As for Ann, John [       ] heard [       ] what she studied in London.

(40) As for Ann, John heard what she spent a year in France studying and he heard nothing else.

As for Ann, John [       ] heard [       ] what she spent a year in France studying.

(37) and (38) are the examples of *by* phrases in passive sentences. (37) is an example of a short phrase and (38) is an example of a longer phrase. (39) and (40) are the examples of *wh*-clauses. (39) is an example of a short clause and (40) is an example of a longer clause. The adequacy of grammar in the questions was checked by two native speakers of English.

As before, the disadvantage is that what the data reflects is not what a subject actually produces but what s/he believes s/he would say. Nevertheless, the data turned out to provide some reliable information about our hypothesis and demonstrated highly systematic patterns in the position of *only*.

## 7. The results of the pilot test

This chapter presents the results of the pilot test<sup>1</sup> and delimits the number of factors for the main experiment.

### 7.1. Scalarity

The following sentences were tested (Note: *Only* is deleted in the examples. The highlighted constituents are marked by small capitals):

(1) Context: John got one A grade and got no more than one.

John got ONE A grade.

(2) Context: John has detective novels and has no other type of novels.

John has DETECTIVE novels.

(1) is an example of *only* applying to numerals functioning as noun modifier and (2) is an example of *only* applying to non-numerals functioning as noun modifier. Consider the results of the sentence-production test presented in Table 7.1 below.

Table 7.1. *The position of 'only' when it highlights a noun modifier*


Highlighted noun modifier	Section 1 (word-placement test)			Section 2 (forced-choice selection test)			Section 3 (composition test)			
	Example number in the test	PrV	PrA	Example number in the test	PrV	PrA	Example number in the test	PrV	PrA	PostA
<i>one</i>	[1]	10	7	[6]	5	5	[16]	2	6	1
<i>detective</i>	[8]	12	5	[8]	5	5	[3]	10	3	

The results suggest that *only* applying to numerals functioning as noun modifier may occur in different positions: though PrV and PrA are equally frequent in section 2, *John only has detective novels* is more frequent than *John has only detective novels*

in sections 1 and 3. On the other hand, in those sections, it is not certain which is more frequent, *John only got one A grade* or *John got only one A grade*.

Although in the sentence-production test, *John only has detective novels* tends to be chosen more frequently than *John has only detective novels*, it turns out in the sentence-comprehension test that both sentences are comprehended almost equally well (see Figure 7.1).

Figure 7.1. The case where the highlighted constituent is a noun modifier



1: John only got one A grade.    2: John got only one A grade.    3: Only John got one A grade.  
 John only has detective novels.    John has only detective novels.    Only John has detective novels.

For the sentences in which *only* applies to the numeral *one*, the sentence-production test did not reveal whether *John only got one A grade* or *John got only one A grade* is more frequent; however, it turned out that the subjects reacted to both sentences equally well.

## 7.2. Scope

The sentences tested were:

(3) Context: John saw Mary an hour ago and saw her no other time.

John saw Mary an hour ago

(4) Context: John saw Mary an hour ago and it happened as recently as an hour ago.

John saw Mary an hour ago

(3) is an example of *only* taking wide scope and (4) is an example of *only* taking narrow scope. As Table 7.2 illustrates, the sentence-production test shows that in every section when *only* has wide scope, *John only saw Mary an hour ago* is more frequent than *John saw Mary only an hour ago*.

Table 7.2 The position of 'only' applying to a temporal expression


	Section 1 (word-placement test)			Section 2 (forced-choice selection test)			Section 3 (composition test)			
	Example number in the test	PrV	PrA	Example number in the test	PrV	PrA	Example number in the test	PrV	PrA	others
'no other time'	[23]	11	6	[7]	6	4	[10]	9	2	1
'as recently as'	[5]	8	9	[12]	5	5	[17]	1	7	

On the other hand, in the case of *only* taking narrow scope, the results are not consistent between the sections: *John saw Mary only an hour ago* is more frequent in section 3 in Table 7.2, but *John only saw Mary an hour ago* and *John saw Mary only an hour ago* are equally frequent in sections 1 and 2.

The results of the sentence-comprehension test are presented in Figure 7.2.



Figure 7.2. The case where the highlighted constituent is a temporary expression



- 1: John only saw Mary an hour ago.
- 2: John saw Mary only an hour ago.
- 3: Grammatically incorrect sentence was presented.

The significant outcome emerging from the figure is that half of the subjects did not regard *John only saw Mary an hour ago* as the sentence describing the context ‘John saw Mary an hour ago and saw her no other time’ and that nearly two-thirds of the subjects did not regard *John saw Mary only an hour ago* as the sentence describing that context.

### 7.3. Rhythmic balance

The following sentences were tested:

- (5) Context: John visited Italy and visited nowhere else last year.  
John visited ITALY last year.

- (6) Context: John visited France and visited nowhere else last year.  
John visited FRANCE last year.

- (7) Context: Mary likes Italy and likes no other places.  
Mary likes ITALY.

(8) Context: Mary likes France and does not like any other countries.

Mary likes FRANCE.

*Visited Italy* in (5) is a combination of three-syllable verb and three-syllable noun, *visited France* in (6) is three-syllable verb and one-syllable noun, *likes Italy* in (7) is one-syllable verb and three-syllable noun, and *likes France* in (8) is one-syllable verb and one-syllable noun.


The results of the sentence-production test in Table 7.3 show that (6) – (8) have a different pattern from (5). In (6) – (8) PrV is more frequent than PrA in every section; *John only visited France last year*, *Mary only likes Italy* and *Mary only likes France* are more frequent than *John visited only France last year*, *Mary likes only Italy* and *Mary likes only France*. On the other hand, in (5) *John only visited Italy last year* is more frequent than *John visited only Italy last year* in sections 1 and 3 but is slightly less frequent in section 2.

Table 7.3. Relationship between the position of ‘only’ and the number of syllables in the verb/highlighted object

Highlighted object illustrated in bold	Section 1 (word-placement test)			Section 2 (forced-choice selection test)			Section 3 (composition test)		
	Example number in the test	PrV	PrA	Example number in the test	PrV	PrA	Example number in the test	PrV	PrA
<i>visited Italy</i>	[7]	11	6	[4]	4	6	[12]	6	1
<i>visited France</i>	[11]	11	6	[18]	6	3	[20]	8	
<i>likes Italy</i>	[14]	14	3	[15]	5	4	[9]	12	
<i>likes France</i>	[9]	4	2	[9]	9	2	[14]	6	

The results of the sentence-comprehension test are presented in Figure 7.3.

Figure 7.3. The relationship between the position of 'only' and the number of syllables in the preceding verb/highlighted object



- 1: John only visited Italy last year.  
 John only visited France last year.  
 Mary only likes Italy.  
 Mary only likes France.
- 3: John visited Italy only last year.  
 John visited France only last year.  
 Mary likes Italy only.  
 Mary likes France only.

- 2: John visited only Italy last year.  
 John visited only France last year.  
 Mary likes only Italy.  
 Mary likes only France.
- 4: Only John visited Italy last year.  
 Only John visited France last year.  
 Only Mary likes Italy.  
 Only Mary likes France.

There was no difference between PrV and PrA in the comprehension test, although *John only visited Italy last year* was chosen slightly less frequently. It is interesting that some subjects did not associate *John only visited Italy last year* with the given interpretation, though it is perfectly grammatical.<sup>2</sup>

Why are the results of (5) different from those of (6) though both (5) and (6) consist of the same lexical items except for the highlighted constituents? Why are the results of (5) different from those of (7) though (5) and (7) have the same highlighted constituents?

## 7.4. Formality

### 7.4.1. The results of 'only' applying to 'by' phrases in passive sentences

The sentence tested was:

(9) Context: Mary was misunderstood by John but not by anyone else.

Mary was misunderstood by John.


The results of the sentence-production test illustrated in Table 7.4 below show that *Mary was only misunderstood by John* and *Mary was misunderstood only by John* were equally frequent in sections 1 and 2 and that *Mary was only misunderstood by John* was more frequent than *Mary was misunderstood only by John* in section 3.

Table 7.4. The position of 'only' applying to a 'by' phrase in passive sentence

Section 1 (word-placement test)			Section 2 (forced-choice selection test)			Section 3 (composition test)			
Example number in the test	PrV	PrA	Example number in the test	PrV	PrA	Example number in the test	PrV	PrA	others
[17]	3	3	[14]	7	7	[8]	5		1

On the other hand, the subjects' reaction to *Mary was misunderstood only by John* was the best in the sentence-comprehension test (see Figure 7.3).

Figure 7.4. The case where the highlighted constituent is a 'by' phrase in a passive sentence



- 1: Mary was only misunderstood by John.
- 2: Mary was misunderstood only by John.
- 3: Mary was misunderstood by John only.
- 4: Only Mary was misunderstood by John.

#### 7.4.2. The results of 'only' applying to clauses

The following sentences were tested:

(10) Context: Mary goes out if John goes, and does not do so if he does not.  
Mary goes out IF JOHN GOES.

(11) Context: I thought about what to do during the summer holiday, and thought about nothing else.  
I thought about WHAT TO DO DURING THE SUMMER HOLIDAY.

(12) Context: John stopped to smoke and did not stop for any other reason.  
John stopped TO SMOKE.

Table 7.5 shows that *I only thought about what to do during the summer holiday* and *Mary only goes out if John goes* were chosen more frequently than *I thought about only what to do during the summer holiday* and *Mary goes out only if John goes* in the cases where either a *wh*-clause or an *if*-clause is highlighted by *only*. In contrast,

the table shows that in the case of the *to*-clause, the frequency of *John stopped only to smoke* and that of *John only stopped to smoke* are almost equally frequent in sections 1 and 2.


Table 7.5. *The position of 'only' when it restrictively highlights a clause*

Highlighted clauses	Section 1 (word-placement test)			Section 2 (forced-choice selection test)			Section 3 (composition test)			
	Example number in the test	PrV	PrA	Example number in the test	PrV	PrA	Example number in the test	PrV	PrA	others
<i>wh</i> -clause	[13]	16	1	[20]	7	2	[19]	7		1 <sup>1</sup>
<i>if</i> -clause	[4]	15	2	[19]	6	3	[5]	12	1	
<i>to</i> -clause	[24]	9	8	[22]	4	4	[7]	12	1	

<sup>1</sup> *I thought only of what to do during the summer holiday*

The results of the sentence-comprehension test reveal the difference between *only* applying to *wh*-clauses and *only* applying to *to*-clauses. In the sentence-production test, PrV seemed to be the unmarked position for *only* applying to *wh*-clauses. This result was supported by the comprehension test: the subjects interpreted *I only thought about what to do during the summer holiday* better than *I thought about only what to do during the summer holiday* (see Figure 7.5).

Figure 7.5. The case where the highlighted constituent is a clause



(Note: N=26 in all the cases except for 3 in 'if'-clause)

- 1: I only thought about what to do during the summer holiday.  
 Mary only goes out if John goes.  
 John only broke off to have a cigarette.
- 2: I thought about only what to do during the summer holiday.  
 Mary goes out only if John goes.  
 John broke off only to have a cigarette.
- 3: Only I thought about what to do during the summer holiday.  
 Only Mary goes out if John goes.  
 John broke only off to have a cigarette.

Contrary to the case of *only* applying to *wh*-clauses, the sentence-production test did not show a preferred position for *only* applying to *to*-clauses: PrV and PrA were almost equally frequent in sections 1 and 2. However, in the comprehension test, while almost all the subjects comprehended *John broke off only to have a cigarette*, only half of the subjects comprehended *John only broke off to have a cigarette*. (Note: The reason why *stopped* in (12) was replaced by *broke off* in the sentence-comprehension test is that an ungrammatical sentence – *John broke only off to have a cigarette* – was needed in order to check subjects' competence as native speakers.)

### 7.5. Delimiting the number of factors for the main experiment

What emerges from the results of the pilot test? The most significant outcome is that half of the subjects did not regard the sentence containing *only* as the sentence describing the context 'John saw Mary an hour ago and saw her no other time'. None of other sentences tested in the pilot experiment got this kind of result. As pointed out as one disadvantage of our pilot test in 6.2.2, this outcome may be due to chance. Nonetheless, the fact is that our subjects are ordinary native speakers of British

English and half of them did not regard the sentence containing *only* as the sentence describing the context 'John saw Mary an hour ago and saw her no other time'. We must take this fact into account. If the sentence containing *only* does not describe the context, the investigation whether the difference between *only* with wide scope and *only* with narrow scope affects the position of *only* is pointless. In addition, considering that the sentences tested are the sentences targeted in Jørgensen (1974) and Rissanen (1980), it will not be adequate to investigate whether scope affects the position of *only* without including the sentences tested in the pilot experiment. Based on what has been discussed, we decided to delete 'scope' from the target of our main experiment. In the main experiment we will concentrate on scalarity, rhythmic balance and formality.



8. The unmarked position of *only* in present-day written English and factors affecting it

In the previous chapter, the results of the pilot test suggested that one of the possible factors, scope, is unlikely to affect the position of *only*. This is not a surprising suggestion at all; from the beginning, this account has allowed for four possible factors not having the same weight. (See 6.1.) Based on the results of the pilot test, the main experiment will concentrate on analysing whether three factors, scalarity, rhythmic balance and formality, affect the position of *only*. The constituents investigated in the main experiment were as follows:

(1) **Rhythmic balance**

- (i) one-syllable verb followed by one-syllable noun
- (ii) one-syllable verb followed by three-syllable noun
- (iii) three-syllable verb followed by one-syllable noun
- (iv) three-syllable verb followed by three-syllable noun

(2) **Formality**

a. prepositional phrases

- (i) adjunct
- (ii) *by* phrase in passive sentence
- (iii) complement of prepositional verb
- (iv) complement of non-prepositional verb

b. clauses

- (i) *wh*-clause
- (ii) *if*-clause
- (iii) *to*-clause

(3) **Scalarity**

- (i) numeral
- (ii) non-numeral

This experiment, as Table 8.1 shows, tested approximately 20 examples belonging to the same constituent, which is enough to permit a general conclusion to be drawn.

Table 8.1. *Target constituents and numbers of questions in the experiment*

Target constituents	Numbers of questions
<b>Rhythmic balance</b>	
one-syllable verb followed by one-syllable noun	20
one-syllable verb followed by three-syllable noun	20
three-syllable verb followed by one-syllable noun	20
three-syllable verb followed by three-syllable noun	20
<b>Formality</b>	
Prepositional phrases	
<i>by</i> phrase in passive sentence	20
adjunct	20
complement of prepositional verb	20
complement of non-prepositional verb	20
Clauses	
<i>wh</i> -clause	21
<i>if</i> -clause	21
<i>to</i> -clause	21
<b>Scalarity</b>	
numeral	
non-numeral	20

The experiment had the Latin Square design; that is, 10 versions were set.<sup>1</sup> The subjects were native speakers of British English and undergraduate university students. The total number of subjects was 48. (See 6.2.2 for more detailed information about the design of the experiment.)


## 8.1. Rhythmic balance

We examined four cases: the combination of one-syllable verb and one-syllable noun, the combination of one-syllable verb and three-syllable noun, the combination of three-syllable verb and one-syllable noun and the combination of three-syllable verb and three-syllable noun. Each combination, as shown in Table 8.1, contained 20 questions. 20 nouns were used in both the case of the one-syllable noun and the case of the three-syllable noun – half of them were proper nouns such as *Bill* and *Marguerite* and half of them were a combination of article (or possessive) and common noun such as *his aunt* and *his relatives*. Five one-syllable verbs and five three-syllable verbs were used. We dealt with only words having one stress. This is because, as was mentioned in 6.1.3, our hypothesis that rhythmic balance affects the position of *only* may not apply to cases where verbs and/or highlighted constituents have a secondary stress. In such cases, a better rhythmic succession could be established by choosing the secondary stress to put an accent and not by changing the position of *only*. All the sentences had the same subject noun phrase, *John*. The Latin Square design meant that every subject saw 5 combinations of one-syllable verb and one-syllable noun (e.g. *John met Bill* and *John saw that guy*), 5 combinations of one-syllable verb and three-syllable noun (e.g. *John met Susanna* and *John saw the novelist*) 5 combinations of three-syllable verb and one-syllable noun (e.g. *John supported Bill* and *John respected his boss*), and 5 combinations of three-syllable verb and three-syllable noun (e.g. *John respected Susanna* and *John supported the novelist*).

The data was analysed using a two-way related ANOVA; the two variables were the number of syllables in the verb preceding the highlighted direct object and the number of syllables in the highlighted constituent, within subjects.<sup>2</sup> The results of the ANOVA revealed that there were significant differences between one-syllable verbs and three-syllable verbs, with respect to PrV ( $F(1,47) = 10.966$ ;  $P=0.002$ ). ( $P=0.002$  represents the probability of obtaining a chance result of 2 times in 1000. This gives us great grounds for rejecting any suggestion that the results of the experiment are due to chance.) As the following figure shows, PrV (i.e., the position where *only* is


placed immediately before the verb or after the first auxiliary verb) is chosen more frequently when the one-syllable verbs precede the highlighted constituent.

Figure 8.1. The relationship between the mean number of PrV and the number of syllables in the verb




Similarly, the results showed that there were significant differences between one-syllable verbs and three-syllable verbs, with respect to PostA ( $F(1,47) = 16.72$ ;  $P < 0.001$ ): PostA (i.e., the position where *only* is placed immediately after the constituent which it highlights) is chosen more frequently when the three-syllable verbs precede the highlighted constituent.

Figure 8.2. The relationship between the mean number of PostA and the number of syllables in the verb




On the other hand, there was no significant difference between one-syllable verbs and three-syllable verbs, with respect to PrA (i.e., where *only* immediately precedes before the constituent which it highlights) (see Figure 8.3 below).

Figure 8.3. The relationship between the mean number of PrA and the number of syllables in the verb



The figure below illustrates the overall results of the position of *only* in terms of number of syllables in the verb.



Figure 8.4. The position of 'only'



However, the results of the ANOVA showed no significant differences between one-syllable nouns and three-syllable nouns, with respect to the position of *only*. Furthermore, the interaction between the number of syllables in the verb and the number of syllables in the highlighted constituent was not significant in the cases of PrV and PrA. Contrary to the cases of PrV and PrA, in the case of PostA, there was a trend towards a significant interaction between the number of syllables in the verb and the number of syllables in the highlighted constituent ( $F(1,47) = 4.019$ ;  $P=0.051$ ). We will return to this point later.

Several observations in the last few paragraphs have supported our hypothesis that rhythmic balance affects the position of *only* and have answered the question raised in 6.1.3: does the number of syllables in the verb preceding the highlighted constituent affect the position of *only* or the number of syllables in the highlighted constituent does so, or both the number of syllables in the verb and the number of syllables in the highlighted constituent? The results of the experiment have demonstrated that it is the number of syllables in the verb preceding the highlighted direct object that affects the position of *only*. What Figures 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 indicate is illustrated schematically as follows:

Table 8.2. *The direction of change of position of 'only'*

Number of syllables in the preceding verb	Direction of change of position of <i>only</i>
one	
three	

Notice that Table 8.2 shows a tendency; it does not mean that one-syllable verbs ALWAYS choose PrV. In the experiment, there is one case where the one-syllable verb chooses PrV less frequently than other one-syllable verbs and where it chooses PostA frequently. It happens when *only* applies to the three-syllable nouns following the one-syllable verb *called*. However, the crucial point is that the results presented in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 were not affected by this verb and that therefore this verb is not a counterexample to the discussion so far. *Called* might have some property that prevents *only* from choosing PrV often and pushes it into PostA.

The results of the experiment indicate two interesting points. One point is that the direction of change of position of *only* affected by rhythmic balance applies whether the number of syllables in the highlighted constituent is one or three. This is interesting particularly in the case of one-syllable verbs. In 6.1.3, we suggested that in addition to a 1-1-3 succession with *mét óny Susánna*, the awkwardness of the

succession of *Jóhn mé t ónly Susánna* might also be related to the unnecessary pitch movement within the one-syllable verb *met*: *met ónly Susánna* has one unnecessary pitch movement within the verb *met* (i.e., (4)), whereas *ónly mé t Susánna* does not require such an unnecessary pitch movement within syllables (i.e., (5)).

(4)

		sán
mé	ón	
t	ly	su
		na

(5)

		sán
ón	mét	
ly	su	
		na

Based on the comparison between (4) and (5), we predicted that *only* occurring in sentences containing one-syllable verbs such as *met* and *saw* might prefer PrV to PrA.

The experimental result showing that PrV is preferred in the case of one-syllable verbs does not contradict with our hypothesis when *only* highlights three-syllable nouns such as *Susanna* and *the novelist*, and when it highlights one-syllable nouns preceded by an article (or possessive), *his aunt*: placing *only* in PrV does not require any unnecessary pitch movement within syllables (see (5), (6) and (7)).

(6)

		nóv
ón	mét	
ly	the	
		elist

(7)                      áu  
       ón    mét  
       ly    his  
                           nt

What happens when there is no way to avoid unnecessary pitch movement within syllables, as in the case of one-syllable proper nouns such as *Bill* and *Kim*? Consider (8) and (9), where the sequences *only mét Bill* and *mét only Bill* have one unnecessary pitch movement within the verb *met*.

(8)                      bí  
       ón    mé  
       ly    t  
                           ll

(9)                      bí  
       mé    ón  
       t    ly  
                           ll

What the results of the experiment have revealed is that PrV is the position chosen by *only*. Some results in the case of one-syllable proper nouns are presented in Table 8.3.

Table 8.3. *Some examples showing the position of 'only' when one-syllable proper nouns is preceded by a one-syllable verb*

	PrV	PrA	PostA
<i>met Bill</i>	8	4	0
<i>knows Kim</i>	10	2	0
<i>knows Nick</i>	8	3	1
<i>saw Chris</i>	9	3	0
<i>saw Fred</i>	7	4	1



The other point concerns three-syllable verbs. In 6.1.3, we suggested that a better rhythmic balance would be obtained by placing *only* either in PrA or in PostA and not in PrV. For example, we get a 1-3-2 sequence with *only respected Bill*, whereas we get a 2-2-2 sequence with *respected only Bill* or a 2-2-1 sequence with *respected Bill only*. PrA and PostA make a better rhythmic succession than PrV; the results of the experiment demonstrate that either PrA or PostA tends to be the position chosen by *only* with a three place verb. Some examples are:

Table 8.4. *Some examples showing the positional difference of 'only' when direct object is preceded by a one-syllable verb and by a three-syllable verb*

	PrV	PrA	PostA
<i>met Bill</i> (one-syllable verb)	8	4	0
<i>supported Bill</i> (three-syllable verb)	2	5	5
<i>met his aunt</i> (one-syllable verb)	12	0	0
<i>supported his aunt</i> (three-syllable verb)	4	4	4
<i>knows Kim</i> (one-syllable verb)	10	2	0
<i>respected Kim</i> (three-syllable verb)	4	5	3
<i>knows Nick</i> (one-syllable verb)	8	3	1
<i>invited Nick</i> (three-syllable verb)	4	4	4
<i>met Susanna</i> (one-syllable verb)	8	3	1
<i>respected Susanna</i> (three-syllable verb)	4	6	2
<i>saw the novelist</i> (one-syllable verb)	9	3	0
<i>supported the novelist</i> (three-syllable verb)	2	7	3
<i>knows that producer</i> (one-syllable verb)	4	5	3
<i>respected that producer</i> (three-syllable verb)	3	4	5
<i>loves his accountant</i> (one-syllable verb)	5	6	1
<i>invited his accountant</i> (three-syllable verb)	2	4	6


The key point is that, as Figures 8.2 and 8.3 show, the results of the experiment have revealed that PostA shows significant differences between one-syllable verbs and three-syllable verbs. On the other hand, the results have presented no significant differences between one-syllable verbs and three-syllable verbs, with respect to PrA.

This does not mean, however, that PrA is not chosen in the case of three-syllable verbs; in fact, the mean number of PrA is larger than that of PostA in the case of three-syllable verbs. What prevents the number of PrA from increasing in the case of three-syllable verbs?

One possible reason may be that, as Tomlin (1986) observes, a transitive verb and its object are syntactically and semantically more tightly bonded to each other than a transitive verb and its subject. Tomlin (1986: 73-74) calls this phenomenon *the Verb-Object Bonding principle*.<sup>3</sup> From the point of view of this principle, PostA is an ideal position in that it does not intervene between the verb and the object. However, considering the result that the mean number of PrA is nonetheless larger than that of PostA in the case of three-syllable verbs, the possible reason mentioned can only be a partial explanation of why the number of PrA is not significantly different between one-syllable verbs and three-syllable verbs.

Interestingly, although the interaction between the number of syllables in the verb and the number of syllables in the highlighted constituent is not significant with respect to PrV and PrA, PostA is different. As was mentioned, the interaction between the number of syllables in the verb and the number of syllables in the highlighted constituent was marginally significant in the case of PostA ( $F(1,47) = 4.019$ ;  $P=0.051$ ). As Figure 8.5 below indicates, the mean number of PostA is the biggest in the combination of three-syllable verb and one-syllable noun (e.g. *John supported Bill*), followed by the combination of three-syllable verb and three-syllable noun (e.g. *John invited Joanna*).

Figure 8.5. The interaction between the number of syllables in the verb and the number of syllables in the noun



This means that, in sentences containing a three-syllable verb, if the number of syllables in the highlighted constituent is one, *only* is more likely to be placed in PostA in order to make a better rhythmic balance.

## 8.2. Formality

### 8.2.1. *The linguistic measure associated with formality difference – ‘by’ phrases in passive sentences and length of phrases –*

We examined four different types of prepositional phrase: *by* phrases in passive sentences (e.g. *This novel was written by Scott*), adjuncts (e.g. *They go out on Friday evening*), complements of a prepositional verb (e.g. *They blamed John for being late*) and complements of a non-prepositional verb (e.g. *John went to the pub*). The experiment contained 20 questions for each type of prepositional phrase. Some of them had short prepositional phrases (e.g. *by Scott*) and others rather longer prepositional phrases (e.g. *by my friend’s father*). The questions remained unchanged except for the prepositional phrase. Inside the prepositional phrase, the preposition remained the same but the noun phrase and the length of the noun phrase change, as

shown in (10). (Note: *Only* is deleted. The highlighted constituent is marked by small capitals.)


(10) a. This novel was written BY SCOTT.

b. This novel was written BY MY FRIEND'S FATHER.

This experiment too was of Latin Square design; every subject saw 5 *by* phrases in passive sentences, 5 adjuncts, 5 complements of a prepositional verb and 5 complements of a non-prepositional verb.

The data was analysed using a one-way related ANOVA with one variable, namely the type of prepositional phrase, within subjects. The results of the ANOVA showed significant differences due to the type of prepositional phrase, with respect to the position of *only*. First of all, there were significant differences between the four different types of prepositional phrase, with respect to PrV ( $F(2.242,91.928) = 22.616$ ;  $P < 0.001$ ).<sup>4</sup> As the following figure shows, adjuncts choose PrV most frequently.


Figure 8.6. The relationship between type of prepositional phrase and the mean number of PrV



Secondly, there were significant differences between the four types of prepositional phrase, with respect to PrA ( $F(3,135) = 4.952$ ;  $P = 0.003$ ). Complements of a

prepositional verb choose PrA most frequently. (*By* phrases in passive sentences follow the complements of a prepositional verb.)

Figure 8.7. The relationship between type of prepositional phrase and the mean number of PrA



Thirdly, there were significant differences between the four types of prepositional phrase, with respect to PostA ( $F(3,138) = 7,696$ ;  $P < 0.001$ ). As the figure below shows, *by* phrases in passive sentences choose PostA most frequently.

Figure 8.8. The relationship between type of prepositional phrase and mean number of PostA





Figure 8.9 below presents the overall results of the position of *only*.

Figure 8.9. The position of 'only' when it highlights a prepositional phrase



In short, the results demonstrate that with respect to the position of *only* there are significant differences associated with type of prepositional phrase<sup>5</sup>, and that non-PrV (i.e., PrA and PostA) is the unmarked position for *only* applying to *by* phrases. (See also Table 8.5.)

Table 8.5. *The position of 'only' when it highlights 'by' phrases in passive sentences*

		PrV	PrA	PostA
(i)	This song is loved <i>by teenagers</i>	7	3	2
	This song is loved <i>by our generation</i>	2	4	6
	This song is loved <i>by the rising generation</i>	1	5	6
	This song is loved <i>by the rock-'n'-roll generation</i>	1	8	3
(ii)	John was asked to be quiet <i>by Bill</i>	2	6	4
	John was asked to be quiet <i>by his father</i>	1	9	2
	John was asked to be quiet <i>by his next door[neighbour]*</i>	2	8	2
	John was asked to be quiet <i>by the guy living downstairs</i>	5	4	3
(iii)	This novel was written <i>by Scott</i>	0	5	7
	This novel was written <i>by my friend</i>	3	4	5
	This novel was written <i>by my friend's father</i>	3	4	5
	This novel was written <i>by a friend of mine</i>	4	4	4
(iv)	The kids were given too much homework <i>by him</i>	2	7	3
	The kids were given too much homework <i>by their teacher</i>	5	3	4
	The kids were given too much homework <i>by the French teacher</i>	5	4	3
	The kids were given too much homework <i>by the biology teacher</i>	2	7	3
(v)	The winner was presented with a gold medal <i>by John</i>	0	5	7
	The winner was presented with a gold medal <i>by the Emperor</i>	0	6	6
	The winner was presented with a gold medal <i>by Mr John Smith</i>	3	1	8
	The winner was presented with a gold medal <i>by one of the committee members</i>	0	3	9
	TOTAL	48 (20.0%)	100 (41.7%)	92 (38.3%)

\* After carrying out the experiment, I was suggested to add *neighbour*.

Several observations in the last few paragraphs have supported our hypothesis that formality affects the position of *only*. In 6.1.4, we predicted that when highlighted constituents are in an informal context and/or are informal expressions, PrV tends to be the position chosen more frequently even in present-day written English, whereas when highlighted constituents are in more formal context and/or formal expressions, PrA (and PostA) is chosen more frequently. *By* phrases in passive sentences are the primary linguistic measure associated with high formality. As has been discussed, it is non-PrV (i.e., PrA and PostA) that *only* applying to *by* phrases in passive sentences chooses frequently. This result clearly supports our hypothesis.

As for the length of phrases, the ANOVA has revealed that the length of *by* phrases in passive sentences does not affect the position of *only*. *Only* applying to *by* phrases in passive sentences occurs most frequently in non-PrV positions, independently of the length of phrases. (See Table 8.5.) In other words, any *by* phrase in a passive sentence ensures the occurrence of *only* not in PrV.

There is one interesting point relating to the length of *by* phrases: as is seen in Table 8.5, in some cases almost all the *by* phrases in passive sentences in the same context choose PrA, in some cases almost all the *by* phrases in passive sentences choose PostA and in other cases, they choose PrA and PostA equally frequently. For example, almost all the *by* phrases in the context where John was asked to be quiet only by somebody (i.e., (ii)) choose PrA most frequently among three possible positions whether the *by* phrases are short or long. On the other hand, almost all the passive *by* phrases in the context where the winner was presented with a gold medal only by somebody (i.e., (v)) choose PostA most frequently. Furthermore, in (i) and (iii), both PrA and PostA are equally frequent. In other words, in the cases of (i) and (iii), the favourite position of *only* can only be characterised as non-PrV and does not allow further specification.

Why is there this inconsistency between the cases? It admits of one possible explanation, that it is caused by the status of the remaining elements present such as the subject and the verb. As shown by Table 8.5, each case (i.e., (i), (ii), etc.) uses different subjects and verbs (and other elements such as objects). Further research is needed to answer this question.

### 8.2.2. *The linguistic measure associated with formality difference* – *clause types and length of clauses*–


We examined *wh*-clauses (e.g. *John asked Ann what to do this weekend*), *if*-clauses (e.g. *John comes if Ann asks him to*) and *to*-clauses (e.g. *John told a joke to make Ann feel better*). The number of question for each type of clause was 21. The length of the highlighted clauses varied from 3-words to more than 8-words. The



experiment was designed so that every subject saw 7 *wh*-clauses, 7 *if*-clauses and 7 *to*-clauses.

The data was analysed using a one-way related ANOVA; the variable was the type of clause, within subjects. The results demonstrated no significant differences due to the type of clause, with respect to the position of *only*. On the whole, PrV is favoured by *only* applying to all three types of clause (see Figure 8.10 below).

Figure 8.10. The position of 'only' applying to clauses



How should we interpret the results of the experiment? At first sight, it seems that the results run counter to our hypothesis that formality affects the position, since the ANOVA did not reveal any significant differences in the position of *only*, whether applying to *wh*-clauses, *if*-clauses or *to*-clauses; PrV is the unmarked position for *only* applying to *to*-clauses, whose distribution is, according to Biber (1988), related to genres such as professional letters and editorials.

What should be noted is that the results of the experiment do not necessarily contradict our hypothesis that formality affects the position of *only*. It is possible that not all clause types are a linguistic measure of formality affecting the position of *only*. As pointed out in 6.1.4, there are three reasons why we need to be cautious about Biber's conclusion. The first is that, as Biber (1988: 232) admits, the distribution of *to*-clauses seems to be less marked than other types of clause. The second reason concerns the characteristics of speakers producing spoken data. Biber (1986, 1988)

used the London-Lund Corpus, representing six speech situations: private conversations, public conversations, telephone conversations, radio broad-casts, spontaneous speeches and prepared speeches. This corpus is produced only by middle-class, university-educated male academics and whose spoken English, even spontaneous spoken English, is certainly affected by formal written English. The third reason is that we have not found other studies which deal with spontaneous spoken data and give results supporting Biber (1986, 1988). These considerations led us, in 6.1.4, to regard clause type as a secondary linguistic measure.

The possibility that the results presented in Figure 8.10 do not necessarily counter our hypothesis is reinforced by the finding that the length of clauses, which is the primary linguistic measure associated with formality, actually tends to support our hypothesis: in the case of *if*-clauses, shorter clauses tend to prefer PrV and longer clauses tend to prefer PrA, as illustrated in Table 8.6.

Table 8.6. *Detailed results of some cases where 'only' highlights 'if'-clause*

<i>if</i> -clause	PrV	PrA
John does this <i>if it goes wrong</i> .	10	6
John does this <i>if the project goes wrong</i> .	6	10
John jollies Ann <i>if she is depressed</i> .	10	6
John jollies Ann <i>if he needs somebody's help desperately</i> .	7	9
John calls Liz <i>if he feels lonely</i> .	10	6
John calls Liz <i>if he fails in business</i> .	8	8
John smokes <i>if he is alone</i> .	14	2
John smokes <i>if there's nothing to do</i> .	8	8
John speaks to Bill <i>if he needs to</i> .	11	5
John speaks to Bill <i>if his research requires it*</i> .	8	7
John calls Ann <i>if he has problems</i> .	10	6
John calls Ann <i>if he cannot finish his assignment</i> .	9	7
John comes <i>if Ann asks him to</i> .	10	6
John comes <i>if we cook dinner for him</i> .	13	3

\* One subject forgot to answer this examined sentence.

Less clearly but still the same tendency can be found in the cases of *to*-clauses<sup>6</sup> and *wh*-clauses. Consider Tables 8.7 and 8.8.

Table 8.7. Detailed results of some cases where 'only' highlights 'to'-clause

<i>to</i> -clause	PrV	PrA
John asked Ann <i>to give him a ring</i> .	11	5
John asked Ann <i>to return the money she borrowed</i> .	5	11
John told a joke <i>to make Ann feel better</i> .	9	7
John told a joke <i>to make his girlfriend feel better</i> .	8	8
John called his girlfriend <i>to say goodnight</i> .	8	8
John called his girlfriend <i>to tell her silly joke</i> .	8	8
John bought a new car <i>to attract Ann</i> .	13	3
John bought a new car <i>to show off his riches to others</i> .	11	5
John called Ann <i>to say hello</i> .	9	7
John called Ann <i>to find out what she was doing</i> .	11	5

Table 8.8. Detailed results of some cases where 'only' highlights 'wh'-clause

<i>wh</i> -clause	PrV	PrA
John told Bill <i>what Ann looks like</i> .	11	5
John told Bill <i>what the weather is like in that country</i> .	8	8
John told his friends <i>what his girlfriend looks like</i> .	8	8
John told his friends <i>what he would do if he were a millionaire</i> .	7	9
As for Ann, John heard <i>what she studied in London</i> .	7	9
As for Ann, John heard <i>what she spent a year in France studying</i> .	7	9
John supported <i>what Ann pointed out</i> .	7	9
John supported <i>what his girlfriend pointed out</i> .	9	7

Does formality affect the position of *only*? Since the primary linguistic measures of formality do support our hypothesis, we conclude that formality does affect the position of *only*. As predicted in 6.1.4, the results of the experiment demonstrate that non-PrV is preferred for *only* applying to *by* phrases in passive sentences associated with high formality and that the length of clauses tends to support our hypothesis. As for the results of the position of *only* applying to *wh*-clauses/*if*-clauses/*to*-clauses, there is room for further investigation: we need to examine the extent to which clause types are a valid linguistic measure of formality, and the extent of which Biber's (1986, 1988) proposal is valid.

### 8.3. Scalarity


The experiment contained two types of questions: questions where *only* highlights numerals functioning as noun modifiers and questions where *only* highlights non-numerals functioning as noun modifiers. 20 sentences were prepared for each type of noun modifier and one sentence in each type of noun modifier made a pair. Except for the noun modifier, the sentences almost remained unchanged, as in (11) and (12). (Note: *Only* is deleted. The highlighted constituent is marked by small capitals.)

- (11) a. John read ONE novel.  
      b. John read HISTORICAL novels.
- (12) a. This town has TWO pubs.  
      b. This town has SHABBY pubs.

The Latin Square design meant that every subject saw 10 sentences containing *only* applying to numerals and 10 sentences containing *only* applying to non-numerals.

The data was analysed using a one-way related ANOVA, the variable being the type of noun modifier, within subjects. The overall results showed no significant differences in the position of *only* applying to numerals functioning as noun modifiers and *only* applying to non-numerals functioning as noun modifiers. See Figure 8.11 below.

Figure 8.11. The position of 'only'



It turned out that scalarity does not affect the position of *only*.

#### 8.4. Conclusion

Instead of forcing *only* into some existing syntactic category, we decided to call it restrictive focusing particle, and proposed the term 'the focus construction specified by a restrictive focusing particle'. The form of 'the focus construction specified by *only*' is not assigned a single general configuration; on the contrary, in the case of written English it is sometimes realised as the sequence '*only* + highlighted constituents' and sometimes as '*only* + verb + highlighted constituents'. Furthermore, in some cases the sequence may be 'highlighted constituents + *only*'. This proposal is motivated by empirical studies such as Rissanen (1980) which attribute the variability of position to the constituents that it restrictively highlights. We propose that 'the focus construction specified by *only*' has three sub-varieties depending on the position of *only*. The three sub-varieties share the property of restrictively or exclusively highlighting but (in addition to having *only* in different positions,) each has its own properties.

What is interesting is that previous empirical studies attribute the variability of the syntactic position of *only* to the constituents that it restrictively highlights. It has emerged that some syntactic/semantic/pragmatic properties of the highlighted

constituents are linked with linguistic properties of *only* or with extralinguistic variables such as formality of text. Based on this, in 6.1 we predicted that four linguistic/extralinguistic properties might be the factors affecting the form of 'the focus construction specified by *only*'. The linguistic properties were scalarity, scope and rhythmic balance; the extralinguistic property was formality. The validity of this hypothesis has been investigated by means of an experiment in which these four factors were systematically controlled.

The main findings are:

- (a) Rhythmic balance and formality do affect the position of *only*, but differently in the three sub-varieties of 'the focus construction specified by *only*'.
  - (i) the variety with *only* in PrA is associated with high formality;
  - (ii) the variety with *only* in PrV is associated with one-syllable verbs preceding the highlighted constituent functioning as object;
  - (iii) the variety with *only* in PostA is associated with high formality and three-syllable verbs preceding the highlighted constituent functioning as object.
- (b) Scalarity does not affect the position of *only*.
- (c) In the case of scope, the judgements of the participants in the experiment indicate that some speakers do not interpret sentences containing *only* as relating to scope differences.

The results with respect to formality are supported by the corpus data used in Chapters 4 and 5. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Map Task dialogues represent spontaneous spoken discourse and samples of written informative prose in the British National Corpus represent formal written discourse. As Tables 4.1 and 5.1 illustrate, *only* highlights various types of constituents, particularly in formal written discourse. As a sample case, we compare the position of *only* applying to objects and noun modifiers. The results are that while there is no example placing *only* either in PrA or PostA in the Map Task dialogues, more than two-thirds of the examples place *only*

either in PrA or PostA in samples of written informative prose in the British National Corpus. This clearly supports our investigation. (As mentioned in section 6.2.2, the corpus data do not confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis of rhythmic balance.)

What is the unmarked position of *only* in written English? In other words, which sub-variety of 'the focus construction specified by *only*' is the most basic and neutral and is used most frequently? This question has long been discussed in English language classrooms and grammars but there is no generally accepted answer. The study shows that part of the difficulty in obtaining an answer is that there are several highly systematic patterns.

## 9. Conclusions

This thesis has investigated the usage of the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively and has established some systematic patterns for their use. Discourse is highly structured; it is organised by devices that play roles in introducing information effectively, enabling speaker and writers to signal information that is central in a given context and helping listeners or readers achieve an understanding of all the links between the pieces of information. These tasks are part of the packaging or structuring of information to fit the knowledge deemed available to the listener or reader. If speakers or writers choose an inappropriate device, the attempt to communicate runs the risk of being unsuccessful. Thus, detailed investigation of devices that control the information flow is central in the study of discourse organisation.

The English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively (e.g. restrictive focusing particles such as *only* and *just* and constructions such as ALL cleft constructions) are one type of device that help to structure discourse. These devices have received different degrees of attention; a great deal of consideration has been given to restrictive focusing particles, particularly *only*. However, the effort devoted to investigating the properties of restrictive focusing particles was concentrated on their syntactic and semantic properties and no attention has been given to how the devices are actually used and what kind of pragmatic properties the restrictive focusing particles have. These questions are crucial for discovering how the devices contribute to the organisation of discourse. Devices such as ALL cleft constructions suffered from the same lack of attention; their syntactic and/or semantic properties have not been examined, far less how their use relates to the use of restrictive focusing particles and constructions such as IT clefts.

This thesis has two main parts, one for each of the two main points of interest regarding the usage of the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively. Chapters 2-5 deal with the pragmatic differences between the restrictive focusing particles, *only* and *just*, ALL cleft constructions, Reverse



ALL cleft constructions and *nothing but* constructions. Chapter 2 discusses some pragmatic properties suggested by previous studies and the ways in which *only* contributes to information structure. In many cases, constituents highlighted by the typical restrictive focusing particle *only* coincide with the intonationally prominent element carrying new information. However, there are cases where constituents highlighted by *only* are not new: in some cases they are activated and in other cases they are pragmatically characterised not by activation but by pragmatic presupposition. Furthermore, there exist borderline examples between these two cases. There are also cases where constituents highlighted by *only* could be activated and not new even though they are marked by intonational prominence. Owing much to Brown and Levinson (1987), the chapter also deals with the pragmatic property of *just*. This restrictive focusing particle functions to save the listener's negative face, his or her basic need to maintain claims of territory and self-determination. Furthermore, we briefly survey other grammatical devices under consideration, with respect to the interpersonal function, and point out the necessity of using empirical data, typically corpora, in order to gain reliable information on the pragmatic functions of the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively.

Following on from the discussion in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 predicts the distribution of the English grammatical devices for restrictively highlighting particular constituents in a set of empirical data. It also presents the methodology of investigation and the materials used.

Chapters 4 and 5 investigate our hypothesis that the restrictive focusing particles, *only* and *just*, ALL cleft constructions, Reverse ALL cleft constructions and *nothing but* constructions have different pragmatic functions, paying attention to the choice and distribution of the grammatical devices in two different types of discourse – spontaneous spoken discourse (i.e., the Map Task dialogues and the Scottish-English conversations) and formal written discourse (i.e., some 266,000 words of written informative prose in the British National Corpus).

The second half of the thesis (i.e., Chapters 6-8) deals with the factors affecting the form of 'the focus construction specified by a restrictive focusing particle'. To answer this question, the thesis restricts the scope of the discussion to the typical restrictive focusing particle *only* and its occurrence in present-day written English.

Instead of forcing *only* into some syntactic category, it was decided to call it restrictive focusing particle, and to refer to 'the focus construction specified by *only*'. The 'focus constructions specified by *only*' is realised by different structures. In written English the most frequent structures are '*only* + highlighted constituents' and '*only* + verb + highlighted constituents'. Furthermore, in some cases the structure is 'highlighted constituents + *only*'. The analysis offered here is motivated by empirical studies such as Rissanen (1980). These studies attribute the varying syntactic position of *only* to certain syntactic/semantic/pragmatic factors associated with the constituents it restrictively highlights. Based on this suggestion, in section 1.3 we propose that 'the focus construction specified by *only*' has three sub-varieties depending on the position of *only*. The three sub-varieties share the property of restrictively or exclusively highlighting but (in addition to having *only* in different positions,) each has its own properties. The important point is that although the syntactic position of *only* has been explained in terms of the constituents that it restrictively highlights, some syntactic/semantic/pragmatic properties of highlighted constituents are linked with some linguistic properties of *only* or with extralinguistic variables such as formality of text. Given this, in Chapter 6 we predict that the following four linguistic/extralinguistic properties may affect the form of 'the focus constructions specified by *only*'. The linguistic properties are scalarity, scope and rhythmic balance; the extralinguistic property is formality.

After an extensive review of these potential factors, Chapter 6 discusses the experimental design: we employ an experimental procedure which systematically controls for the factors. One concern is the large number of questions required for a general conclusion to be drawn. This demands considerable time and effort from subjects. It was possible that subjects would be unable to keep answering consistently or would feel that their competence as native speakers was at stake. To

lessen the burden on the subjects and to reduce the risk of the experiment being perceived as a threat, we conducted a pilot test with a limited number of questions per possible factor first. The goal of the pilot test was to find out which linguistic/extralinguistic factors would be worth examining via detailed tests. (See Chapter 7.) The pilot test enabled us to delete factors which were not likely to affect the position of *only*. After delimiting the number of factors, we designed the main experiment so as to yield enough data for a general conclusion to be drawn. (See Chapter 8.)

The main findings emerging from the investigation in this thesis are as follows:

1. The English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively have different pragmatic functions with respect to:

- (a) discourse functions and the structures of discourse organised by the grammatical devices;
- (b) the ways in which the devices contribute to a structuring of information in discourse;
- (c) whether they have an interpersonal function or not;
- (d) sensitivity to context and to the semantic and pragmatic properties of highlighted constituents.

2. Rhythmic balance and formality affect the position of *only*.

- (a) the sub-variety with *only* in PrA is associated with high formality
- (b) the sub-variety with *only* in PrV is associated with one-syllable verbs preceding the highlighted constituent functioning as object
- (c) the sub-variety with *only* in PostA is associated with high formality and three-syllable verbs preceding the highlighted constituent functioning as object

On the other hand, scalarity does not affect the position of *only* being peculiar to one of the sub-varieties. Furthermore, in the case of scope, it was unclear whether sentences containing *only* are affected by differences in scope and whether the latter are peculiar to a particular sub-variety.

The results of the investigation presented in this thesis demonstrate how certain grammatical devices with similar syntactic functions and semantics differ from each other pragmatically and the extent to which syntactic choice is related to the process of structuring discourse. The results of the investigation enrich our understanding of how the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively help to structure discourse.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the analysis has applications in the language classroom, particularly the investigation of which sub-variety is the most neutral and most frequent. The question has long been discussed in English language classrooms and grammars but there is no generally accepted answer. Our findings suggest that each sub-variety has its own properties and the analysis will help in the preparation of teaching materials on the use of *only*. In short, this thesis provides a clearer picture of the usage of the English grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents restrictively.

Chapter 1

<sup>1</sup> Werth (1984: 123) points out that 'it is in this dichotomy that the term 'focus' has received its most widespread recent attention'.

<sup>2</sup> Like other studies regarding the information flow in discourse, Lambrecht (1994) is not rid of problems. For instance, Dryer (1996) points out that Lambrecht's definition of presupposition is ambiguous. It seems that what Dryer points out is right: Lambrecht (1994) takes a presupposed proposition as a proposition being 'shared knowledge between the two [i.e., the speaker and the addressee]' (p.272) on one hand and as a proposition being 'active in the mind of the addressee' (p.227) on the other hand. However, it should be emphasised that although his definition of presupposition is ambiguous as has been just mentioned and contains two different concepts (i.e., shared knowledge and activation), Lambrecht (1994) notices that not knowing something is different from not thinking of something. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, it is crucial to distinguish the shared knowledge and activated proposition in order to characterise pragmatically non-focused component of a sentence.

<sup>3</sup> What should be noticed is that, as Rochemont and Culicover (1990) emphasize, a constituent may be c-contruable and nevertheless be a focus. Consider the following.

(42) a. Who does John's mother like?

b. John's mother likes JOHN/HIM.

(Rochemont and Culicover 1990: 21) (Original small capitals)

In (42b), *John* is a focus though it is clearly c-construable (= under discussion). Rochemont and Culicover term this kind of focus *contrastive*. They account that contrastive is not a distinct notion of focus, but simply a 'different use of a syntactic notion of focus, what we [= they] in earlier work have termed the "Contrastive", in contrast to the "Presentational," use' (p.21). The problem regarding Rochemont and Culicover (1990) is that there exist counterexamples of their account. Birner (1996) shows the following as such a counterexample.

(43) Nusseibeh's unusual predicament causes concern all around.

His friends fear that Arab hard-liners will turn on Nusseibeh, thinking he is an Israeli ally.

The Israelis, who certainly want to squelch the 17-month-Old uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and under intense Pressure from the United States not to jail moderates who may Figure in their election proposal for the territories occupied Since the 1967 war.

<Most immediately affected> is <Nusseibeh himself>.

(Birner 1996: 60) (Originally from Chicago Tribune)

(Italicised and bracketed by Birner)

Birner (1996: 61) claims that the post-verbal NP in an inversion *Nusseibeh himself* is not presentational focus, since they are c-construable and they do not seem to be contrastive, either.

<sup>4</sup> While Hannay (1983) regards Dik et al.'s (1981) definition of focus as being broad rather than vague, Siewierska (1991) and Dryer (1996) regard it as being vague.

<sup>5</sup> Schmid (2001: 1536) claims that *N-be-that*-constructions are grammatical devices for highlighting particular constituents, marking 'certain parts of the sentence for special attention'. Besides being similar in that they have the focusing function, Schmid points out that *N-be-that*-constructions and *wh*-clefts are also similar in that the beginnings of both *N-be-that*-constructions and *wh*-clefts contain presupposed information – information 'which the speaker/writer assumes is known to the hearer/reader' (p.1538).

<sup>6</sup> Other similar constructions such as the *nothing apart from* construction and the *nobody except but* construction are included.

<sup>7</sup> There are some exceptions. For example, *alone* normally takes PostA. On the other hand, *just* does not take PostA. (See, for example, Nevalainen 1990: 40; König 1991: 23.)

<sup>8</sup> In addition to these three positions, some studies regarding the positional variation of focusing particles mentioned the fourth alternative position – the position where focusing particles are placed further away from the constituent which they highlight in postponement. However, as long as *only* is concerned, this position seems to be too rare to be considered. (Rissanen 1980: 63 claims that no instance having this position was found in the Brown Corpus.)

<sup>9</sup> All examples taken in consideration in Vittanen (1986) are the examples where both PrV and PrA could occur and neither would be grammatically wrong. Some examples were excluded. They are: the instances without an explicit verb form in the clause, the instances with *not only ... but also* and the instances having the structure 'subject + simple finite form of *be* + complement'. As will be mentioned in 2.1.5.1, Nevalainen (1987) also investigated the London-Lund Corpus. She claims that the corpus contains 429 instances of the restrictive focusing particle *only*. This inconsistency between Vittanen and Nevalainen with respect to the number of instances of *only* would be derived from the fact that Vittanen excluded some instances of *only* in his discussion.

<sup>10</sup> Contrary to Rissanen, Vittanen (1986) included such two cases in his data in his discussion about the position of *only* in a certain spoken corpus in English.

<sup>11</sup> Nevalainen (1986) relates the factor (34b) to the spoken language domain.

<sup>12</sup> His corpus of British English consists of a small sample of spoken English from the Survey of English Usage and written English from the Lancaster-Oslo/Bergen Corpus.

<sup>13</sup> Strictly speaking, there are some constituents that restrictive focusing particles cannot highlight. Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 587), for example, list the following constituents as the constituents that restrictive focusing particles (or restrictive focusing modifiers in their term) cannot highlight.

- (44) a. Any other kind of main clause than an imperative  
e.g. A: What's the matter?  
B: \*Just there's nothing to do.

b. A vocative element

e.g. \*Hey, only Pat, would you like one of these biscuits.

c. Coordinators

e.g. \*You can have cheese and biscuits only or dessert  
– i.e. you can't have both

d. Part of idioms

e.g. \*My opponent gave only in.

<sup>14</sup> Similarly, this thesis does not assume that the meaning which Tannen (1977) suggests is the one inherent to *just*. (Tannen 1977: 509 suggests several examples containing *just* in her data contrast what actually happened with the expectation that more might have happened, as in *I just had ... two p ... particular incidents that I remember*.)

<sup>15</sup> There certainly exists at least one semantic difference seen among restrictive focusing particles. Consider the following (Note: The examples are from König 1991: 106. The particles are italicised by me and the highlighted constituents are originally in small capitals).

(45) *Only*/\**Merely* an EXCELLENT performance will please the boss.

As (45) shows, contrary to *only*, *merely* cannot take context expressing a sufficient condition as scope. König (1991) explains the difference between *only* and *merely* in (45) is derived from that the evaluation associated with the restrictive focusing particles like *merely* have (i.e., 'minimal') seems to highlight only an expression expressing a relatively low value on a natural scale – 'natural' in a sense that the context does not express a sufficient condition. Although we agree with König (1991), we do not pursue the question what kind of evaluative aspects other grammatical devices such as ALL cleft constructions have, since the evaluative aspects, even if they exist, are unlikely to be the prime factor differing one device from other. (All the examples from König 1991 containing the context expressing a sufficient condition have either noun modifiers highlighted as in (45) or complements of prepositional phrases, as in (46).

(46) You can *only*/\**just* /\* *merely* [get a B grade for THAT ANSWER].

(König 1991: 106)

(My italic and bracket; the brackets indicate the scope of the particles)

These constituents, as in (39) – (41) show, are not restrictively highlighted by ALL cleft constructions, Reverse ALL cleft constructions and *nothing but* constructions. Thus evaluative aspects are not effective to account for the difference between restrictive focusing particles, ALL cleft constructions, Reverse ALL cleft constructions and *nothing but* constructions even if they are effective in showing the semantic difference seen among restrictive focusing particles.)

<sup>1</sup> Vallduví (1992) also gives the following example to show that constituents highlighted by *only* do not necessarily correspond to constituents marked by intonational prominence.

- (42) A: What food would you only eat IF YOU HAD TO  
B: **Liver**, I would only eat IF I HAD TO. (Vallduví 1992: 144)

However, (42B) is not accepted by one native speaker of British English (strictly speaking, Scottish English). One way to increase the acceptability of (42B), according to him, is to delete the comma after *liver* though the oddness of the sentence still remains.

<sup>2</sup> Nevalainen (1987) cited this example from the London-Lund Corpus.

<sup>3</sup> Since there are two clauses in (8), one, who follows Halliday's (1967) *information focus* assigning the function 'new' in the sense that the speaker presents information as not being recoverable from the preceding discourse, might say that each of these two clauses would be expected to contain new information.

<sup>4</sup> Jim Miller (personal communication) commented that this sentence is odd particularly in spoken English. He interpreted this sentence as the answer towards the question such as *I'm told someone here only eats rice*. In this case, the natural answer is *It's John*. Since Vallduví (1992) does not give any context where this sentence occurs, I do not explore this comment further.

<sup>5</sup> See section 1.1 for further details of the distinction between unmarked information and marked information.

<sup>6</sup> Illustrating the following example, Prince (1981: 227) states that Kuno's old information and Halliday's given information are not necessarily the same and what is old for Kuno is not necessarily given for Halliday.

- (43) John<sub>i</sub> paid Mary and he<sub>i</sub>/Ø bought himself<sub>i</sub> a new coat.

Prince argues that if (43) were uttered with unmarked information focus – that is to say, the position of the tonic prominence is in the end of a clause –, '*he* would be old for Kuno and neither given nor new for Halliday' (Prince 1981: 227). However, *he* in (43) must be given for Halliday (1967), since he clearly mentions that 'anaphoric items are inherently 'given' in the sense that their interpretation depends on identification within the preceding text' (p.206).

<sup>7</sup> In his later work, Chafe (1987) makes a three-way distinction between given (or *active concepts* in his term), which is regarded currently being lit up in the speaker's mind and which s/he judges to be lit up in the mind of the listener as well, intermediate (or *semi-active concepts*), which is in a person's peripheral consciousness, and new (or *inactive concepts*), which is neither lit up nor peripherally lit up.

<sup>8</sup> Jim Miller (personal communication) points out that 95% or so of passives in spontaneous speech are short passives. This implies the possibility that the situation that old information in the sense of Clark and Haviland (1977) is followed by new information may not be the only reason of the oddness of (11b).



<sup>9</sup> As for the notion of givenness in the sense of predictability/recoverability, Dryer (1996: 479) does not discuss it, saying that he is not sure what role, if any, it plays in pragmatic theory.

<sup>10</sup> Dryer (1996: 479) restricts this claim to clefts in which the subordinate clause is presupposed.

<sup>11</sup> Givón (1992: 94) lists the grammatical devices which signal continued activation of the current topical referent and the grammatical devices which signal terminated activation of the current topical referent. They are:

(44) **Grammatical devices signalling continued activation**

(a) Zero:

... The woman came in and [Ø] stopped ...

(b) Anaphoric pronoun :

... The woman came in and stopped. Then **she** moved again

...

(45) **Grammatical devices signalling terminated activation**

(a) Indefinite noun (modified by an adjective):

... The woman came in and stopped. **There was a tall man** sitting there ...

(b) Demonstrative plus noun:

... The woman came in and stopped. "There's something wrong with **this room**" she thought

(c) Definite noun:

... They went in together. The woman stopped, but **the man** kept going ...

(d) Definite noun (modified by a relative clause):

... The woman came in and stopped. She saw **the man who had questioned her earlier** sitting there ...

(e) Word-order device

... The woman came in and stopped. She was finally home. But **the man, he** never came back.

(f) Grammatical role and voice change (passive):

... The woman came in and braced herself for a long wait. **The man was still being searched**, so it seemed ...

<sup>12</sup> Some of the examples from Dryer (1996) may not be natural. For instance, (16B) and (17B) are such cases. The most natural way is to answer simply *Mary*. Dryer (1996: 485) says that 'some of my examples will be more spelled out than is perhaps natural, but this is only to make clear what is the' complement of new information.

<sup>13</sup> This corpus contains eight examples where the objects are highlighted by *only*. Except for three cases where the highlighted objects are activated (or partially activated), the rest of the examples are the cases where the highlighted objects are new information.

<sup>14</sup> Buysschaert (1982: 128), however, points out that this is not necessarily the case. When *only* (and other focusing particles) clearly belongs to the topic, it does not affect the comment. He illustrates this with the following example which is not the example of *only* but the example of *also*.

(46) (Why did he also shoot the president's counsellor?)

He also shot the president's counsellor, because he didn't like his face.

(Buyschaert 1982: 128)

In (46), *also* is the part of the topic, highlighting *shot the president's counsellor* and does not affect the comment (i.e., *because he didn't like his face*).

<sup>15</sup> The suggestion that hedges are the realisations of negative politeness is also found in other studies. Hübler (1983), for example, claims that his *understatements* and hedges are the linguistic means against a face threatening speech act. Hübler regards linguistic indeterminacy as a means of reducing the negatability of sentences. He claims that there are two kinds of indeterminacy – phrastic indeterminacy and neustic indeterminacy. According to Hübler, phrastic indeterminacy concerns the proposition itself and the world, and is a device for forming understatements. On the other hand, when indeterminacy reducing the negatability of a sentence is found within “that part of the illocution which expresses the attitude of the speaker to the hearer regarding the proposition” (p.11), Hübler invokes the concept of hedge.

<sup>16</sup> This definition would be taken as the one explicating Lakoff (1972), who emphasises that natural language sentences do not offer entirely true, false, or nonsensical, but rather somewhat true and somewhat false, and that membership in conceptual categories is not a simple yes-no question, but a matter of degree.

<sup>17</sup> Brown and Levinson (1987: 171) claim that other hedges addressed to Grice's Maxims, namely Quality hedges, Relevance hedges and Manner hedges, are used as follows: Quality hedges may redress advice or criticisms, Relevance hedges may redress offers or suggestions and Manner hedges can be used to redress all kinds of face threatening acts.

<sup>18</sup> Jim Miller (persona communication) thinks that the past tense is more likely: *I just wanted to ask you ....*

<sup>19</sup> Nevalainen (1986) and Chambers English Dictionary (1998) claim that *only* tends to be used in literary English and that its synonym word *just* is used typically in colloquial English. This claim has support from some studies of the distribution of *only* in some types of texts.

### Chapter 3

<sup>1</sup> In addition to this type of corpora, Hunston (2002: 14-15) presents several other types of corpora, such as a corpus of texts of a particular type and a corpus in different languages (e.g. English and Spanish) or in different varieties of a language (e.g. Indian English and Canadian English).

<sup>2</sup> Davis and Brewer (1997) call this type of discourse *electronic discourse*. Some studies such as Herring (2001) regard discourse such as e-mail and chat as one produced via computer network which is distinct medium from speaking and writing. In this case, there are not two mediums as in this thesis but three, namely speech, writing and computer network.

<sup>3</sup> Greenbaum and Quirk (1970) also suggest that explicit instruction and practice make it easier to evaluate results. However, they point out that these two points are less important than to prevent possible influence of order from skewing the results of the test.

<sup>4</sup> Recall that as was mentioned in 3.2, according to Biber (1988) and Miller and Weinert (1998), spoken English (even spontaneous spoken English) by academics is certainly affected by formal written English.

## Chapter 4

\* The discussion about the function of ALL cleft constructions and *just* used by the instruction giver to highlight verb phrases/clauses was published. (i.e., Yamada, Y. (2003). Constraints on the occurrence of ALL cleft constructions. *Gengo Johokagaku (Language and Information Science) 1*, The University of Tokyo: 277-292.) Permission has been obtained to include the content of the paper in this thesis. (See Appendix I.)

<sup>1</sup> This function is very similar to the discourse function of WH cleft constructions (see, Miller and Weinert 1998). The difference between ALL cleft constructions and WH cleft constructions lies not in the discourse functions but in the syntactic functions: while the former highlight particular constituents restrictively, the latter do not (though they imply 'exclusiveness' in some cases).

<sup>2</sup> The view that discourse is a hierarchical structure and that there are two types of relations between separate discourse units (e.g. utterances), namely, the co-ordinate relation and the core-subordinate relation, has been suggested by some studies, especially by studies on written text (see, for example, Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) by Matthiessen and Thompson 1988; Mann, Matthiessen and Thompson 1992). However, this paper does not choose one specific framework among the studies on the ground that the frameworks differ from each other in various points and that it is uncertain whether those written-text-based frameworks apply to spoken data.

<sup>3</sup> Ten imperative examples produced by the follower are, however, repeats of what the giver instructed and they are rather utterances requesting the giver to confirm some information. In this respect, they are not imperative clauses and are included in this investigation.

<sup>4</sup> There are two examples which cannot be explained on this line. They are:

(65) Okay. I'll just relay mine, okay?

(66) Okay you've got a tree. Now, I'll just have to relay the route on the map, okay?

<sup>5</sup> This parenthesis is necessary, since as has been discussed, the majority of unclefted constructions introduce a new instruction without exchanging information about the location/existence of landmarks.

<sup>6</sup> *Just* is also used in a context of giving some explanation. (67) is such a case.

(67) G1: (**instruct**) You go up the map, past the abandoned cottage, turn left.

F1: (**check**) Oh, by the ... by the abandoned cottage and turn left?

G2: (**reply-y**) Yes

F2: (**acknowledge**) Right, I've got that.

(explain) *I just misread you.*

The data yields 11 examples of this type of *just*.

<sup>7</sup> As was mentioned in the notes in Chapter 1, other similar constructions such as the *nothing apart from* construction and the *nobody except but* construction are included under the name of *nothing but* constructions.

<sup>8</sup> One possible explanation for the reason why *nothing but* constructions are not chosen in (23) is that in this example, the speaker's intention of using some grammatical devices for highlighting the landmark *east lake* does not seem to make it salient among other landmarks; it seems to contrast the existence of *east lake* with the missing of *west lake*. This seems to be a valid explanation on the ground that the following where the *nothing but* construction substitutes *only* does not sound equivalent to (23).

- (68) G: Right. We go uh ... eh ... left right along because it's a lake. Just underneath that the ... it's west lake. Have you got that?  
F: No, I've got nothing but east lake. I've not got west lake.

<sup>9</sup> One point which needs to be clarified is which constituent in the existential construction is defined as subject. Huddleston (1988: 182), for example, regarded as a pronoun *there* as subject though he has admitted that it is not a prototypical subject in that in the existential constructions 'the usual subject properties are shared between *there* and the post-verbal NP' (Huddleston 1988: 182). A similar treatment is found in Quirk et al. (1985). Quirk et al. (1985: 1403) have distinguished two types of subjects in the existential construction. One type of subject is the one which may be called the notional subject of the existential construction. This applies to the post-verbal NP such as *a tree* in *There is a tree in front of the station*. The other type is the one which is the grammatical subject. This applies to *there*. Based on these, this study calls *there* subject.

<sup>10</sup> This is supported by a survey by Quirk et al (1985: 1410). They investigated the distribution of existential constructions in a sample of Survey of English Usage Corpus (SEU) and found that the ratio of post-verbal NP being indefinite to it being definite is about nine to one. However, this is simply the tendency, as shown in (40) where the post-verbal NP is definite.

<sup>11</sup> Two examples mentioned in 4.2.2.1, i.e. (19) and (22), need some explanation.

- (19) G1: ehm, underneath the field station.  
F1: Right. That's way over the far left-hand side of the page on my map?  
G2: Where is field station?  
F2: Field station's way over the far left.  
G3: It's the far ... Well, there's two field stations on my map.  
F3: Well, there's not one on mine.  
G4: Right,  
(check) So you've only got one there.

- (22) G1: Good, good. Right. Well, I've got two boathouses, right.  
(explain) I think ... you've only got  
F1: I've got one and it's on the right-hand side of the page.

G2: (part of G1) one, because Lynn only had one.

Like (21) and (39) – (41), at first sight, the highlighted objects in these two examples seem to be the activated entities and, at the same time, to be construable as new information in that they instantiate a variable in an open proposition. However, this is not true: *You've only got one there* in G4 in (19) is the repeat of *there's not one on mine* in F3 and thus it is not new information with respect to instantiating a variable in the open proposition "F has X-many field stations". In (22), the highlighted constituent *one* in G is overlapping with the constituent *one* in F, according to the Move overlap illustration by HCRC. Thus, this constituent is uncertain whether it is new or activated.

<sup>12</sup> The difference with respect to the distribution of *only* and *just* in cases where adverbs/adverbials are highlighted could be explained by the fact that the Map Task dialogues contain a large number of colloquial adverbs/adverbials (e.g. *a wee bit* and *a bit*). These adverbs/adverbials are highlighted not by *only* but by *just*.

## Chapter 5

<sup>1</sup> These constituents, along with prepositional phrases, could be highlighted by other restrictive focusing particles such as *merely* and *alone* (see Table 5.7 below).

Table 5.7. *Distribution of focusing particles other than 'only' and 'just' in the sample of written informative prose in the BNC*

Highlighted constituents	<i>merely</i>	<i>alone</i>	<i>solely</i>	<i>exclusively</i>	<i>but</i>
Verb phrase/clause	1				
Object	1				
Subject complement	1				
Subject		2			
Prepositional phrase	3	5	2		
Adverbial clause	1		1		
Constituent in a non-finite clause	1			1	
Noun-modifier					1
Complement of a preposition	1	1			

To take some examples:

(40) **Prepositional phrases**

- a. Help can be summoned from ACET or other services merely by pressing a button of a pendant worn around the neck.
- b. In Ealing alone we have received over 30 referrals for Home Care.
- c. politicians were elected on the basis of local reputation and solely with reference to local issues

(41) **Constituents in a non-finite construction**

It fulfilled none of my expectations and seemed to be merely trying to make me laugh at the fact ...

(42) **Complements of a preposition**

The key point about all the objects collected is that their provenance is known; they are not collected for aesthetic merit alone.

(43) **Subjects**

These factors alone could make the book most valuable but the data is by no means complete, and as such could be misleading by its omission.

(44) **Adverbial clauses**

But when you are looking for a suitable speech you can't really reject anything familiar solely because you think it might bore the panel.

Interestingly, the restrictive focusing particles *merely*, *alone* and *solely* are associated with a specific preposition. Table 5.8 presents the details of prepositions highlighted by these focusing particles in the sample of written informative prose in the BNC.

Table 5.8. *Prepositions highlighted by focusing particles 'merely', 'alone' and 'solely'*

	<i>merely</i>	<i>alone</i>	<i>solely</i>
<i>by</i>	3	1	
<i>in</i>		4	
<i>with</i>			2

To take some examples:

- (40a) Help can be summoned from ACET or other services merely by pressing a button on a pendant worn around the neck.
- (45) talent is not merely being judged by local civil servants
- (40b) In Ealing alone we have received over 30 referrals for Home Care.
- (46) An educator only has to prevent one new HIV infection a year to save the NHS his or her entire salary in future AIDS treatment costs alone.
- (40c) politicians were elected on the basis of local reputation and solely with reference to local issues

(47) but it is unlikely solely with a spotlight on quality

This suggests that these restrictive focusing particles hardly overlap each other, with respect to prepositions which they highlight restrictively: *merely* always highlights prepositional phrases having the preposition *by* as the head of the phrase. *Alone* tends to highlight prepositional phrases having *in*. *Solely* always highlights prepositional phrases containing the preposition *with* as the head of the phrase.

<sup>2</sup> We have one piece of syntactic evidence that sentences with *only* are affirmative sentences. As Nevalainen (1991: 66) points out, sentences with *only* take negative question tags, as in (48). (Note: The highlighted constituent is marked by small capitals.)

(48) John *only* takes MILK, doesn't he? (Nevalainen 1991: 66)  
(My small capitals)

Sentences with negative expressions such as *not* cannot take negative question tags.

<sup>3</sup> The suggestion that #0706 and #0709 are paralleled might be objected to on the grounds that the two sentences are distant from each other in the text. But distance is not a barrier to parallelism. Consider the following example from Hoey (2001: 54) (Note: The numbers in the example are original):

(49) (1) Aesop, the Greek writer of fables, was sitting by the roadside one day when a traveller asked him, 'Tell me, my friend, what sort of people live in Athens?' (2) Aesop replied, 'Tell me where you come from and what sort of people live there, and I'll tell you what sort of people you'll find in Athens.' (3) Smiling, the man answered, 'I come from Argos, and there the people are all friendly, generous and warm-hearted. (3a) I love them.' (4) At this Aesop answered, 'I'm happy to tell you, my dear friend, that you'll find the people of Athens much the same.'  
(5) A few hours later another traveller came down the road, and he too stopped and asked Aesop, 'Tell me, what are the people of Athens like?'  
(6) Again Aesop replied, 'Tell me where you come from and what the people are like there and I will tell you what the people are like in Athens. (7) Frowning, the man answered, 'I'm from Argos and there the people are unfriendly, mean, deceitful and vicious. (7a) They're thieves and murderers, all of them.' (8) 'I'm afraid you'll find the people of Athens much the same' was Aesop's reply.

Hoey (2001) claims that the sentence (1) is parallel to the sentence (5). The distance between the sentences (1) and (5) is farther than the distance between the sentences #0706 and #0709 in my data.





## Chapter 7

<sup>1</sup> In the sentence-comprehension test, the computer automatically recorded the subjects' answers and total time for reading pairs of context and sentence and for judging the sentence. We checked whether there was the correlation between the number of Yes-answers to a certain position and the reaction time for Yes-answers to that position. However, it turned out that except for some cases, there was no/little difference between the positions of *only*, with respect to the reaction time for Yes-answers. This means that when the subjects judged the examined sentences as the sentences describing the context, on the whole it took almost the same amount of time for their judgement despite the different positions of *only*.

<sup>2</sup> One salient difference should be noted in the sentences containing *only* in PostA (i.e., *John visited Italy only last year*, *John visited France only last year*, *Mary likes Italy only* and *Mary likes France only*): this position was comprehended by 20 subjects in the case of the highlighted objects following the one-syllable verb *likes*, whereas it was comprehended by 10 subjects in the case of the highlighted objects following the three-syllable verb *visited*. One possible explanation for this is that in the case of three-syllable verb in the examined sentences, putting *only* in PostA may have caused subjects to misinterpret *only* as highlighting not the object but the adverbial expression *last year* which follows the highlighted object. (The expression *last year* does not exist in the case of one-syllable verb.) If this explanation is correct, the results in Figure 7.3 are due to chance and more detailed investigation is necessary.

## Chapter 8

\* Part of this chapter was published. (i.e., Yamada, Y. (2003). The positioning of focus particles in English: A case study of *only* in written English. *Proceeding for the University of Cambridge First Postgraduate Conference in Language Research, Cambridge Institute for Language Research*) Permission has been obtained to include the content of the paper in this thesis. (See Appendix IV.)

<sup>1</sup> The target constituents for rhythmic balance were divided into four:

- (13)
- |           |  |
|-----------|--|
| 1-5 (a)   | 5 combinations of one-syllable verb and one-syllable noun<br>5 combinations of one-syllable verb and three-syllable noun<br>5 combinations of three-syllable verb and one-syllable noun<br>5 combinations of three-syllable verb and three-syllable noun |
| 6-10 (b)  | 5 combinations of one-syllable verb and one-syllable noun<br>5 combinations of one-syllable verb and three-syllable noun<br>5 combinations of three-syllable verb and one-syllable noun<br>5 combinations of three-syllable verb and three-syllable noun |
| 11-15 (c) | 5 combinations of one-syllable verb and one-syllable noun<br>5 combinations of one-syllable verb and three-syllable noun<br>5 combinations of three-syllable verb and one-syllable noun<br>5 combinations of three-syllable verb and three-syllable noun |

- 16-20 (d) 5 combinations of one-syllable verb and one-syllable noun  
 5 combinations of one-syllable verb and three-syllable noun  
 5 combinations of three-syllable verb and one-syllable noun  
 5 combinations of three-syllable verb and three-syllable noun


The same applies to prepositional phrases, which were divided into four groups. On the other hand, noun modifiers were divided into two groups:

- (14) 1-10 (a) 10 numerals  
 10 non-numerals  
 11-20 (b) 10 numerals  
 10 non-numerals

Clauses were divided into three groups:

- (15) 1-7 (a) 7 *wh*-clauses  
 7 *if*-clauses  
 7 *to*-clauses  
 8-14 (b) 7 *wh*-clauses  
 7 *if*-clauses  
 7 *to*-clauses  
 15-21 (c) 7 *wh*-clauses  
 7 *if*-clauses  
 7 *to*-clauses

Consequently, the Latin Square design yielded the following ten versions (Note: The version is numbered):



<sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Greene and d'Oliveira (1999) for further information about statistical tests. For ANOVA design, if *F* score is around 1, the null hypothesis is correct. However, if *F* score is significantly greater than 1, the null hypothesis is rejected. How big should *F* be to reject the null hypothesis? *P* reports the significance level.

<sup>3</sup> Huddleston (1988: 66) suggests two reasons why a clause like *I washed the car* is first divided into *I* and *washed the car*. The one reason is that when a transitive verb is reduced by ellipsis, the object of that verb is also reduced. His example is:

(17) She can speak Dutch but I can't.

In this example, the transitive verb *speak* and the object *Dutch* are reduced by ellipsis after *I can't*, but not *speak* on its own nor *Dutch* on its own. The other reason is that there are various non-finite constructions lacking a subject (e.g. *She began to like him*). See also Lyons (1968: 320-321).

<sup>4</sup> The Greenhouse-Geisser test was used, since the Mauchly test was significant (P=0.038) in the case of PrV.

<sup>5</sup> There are two interesting points emerging from the experiment, with respect to other types of prepositional phrase. They are:

(a) The results of the experiment support Huddleston and Pullum's (2002: 661) claim that in the case of *with*, it is not easy to draw the distinction between adjunct and complement. As Tables 8.9 and 8.10 below show, there are very few instances of PrV in the case of the adjunct *with* and the results for *only* applying to the adjunct *with* are very similar to those for *only* applying to the complement *with* to a considerable extent. (PrV is the unmarked position for *only* applying to adjuncts. See Figure 8.6 again and Table 8.11 below.)

Table 8.9. *The position of 'only' applying to 'with' functioning as an adjunct*

	PrV	PrA	PostA
John overcame the hardship <i>with his wit</i>	2	5	5
John overcame the hardship <i>with his wife's support</i>	3	5	4
John overcame the hardship <i>with his patience and wit</i>	1	6	5
TOTAL	6 (16.7%)	16 (44.4%)	14 (38.9%)

Table 8.10. *The position of 'only' applying to 'with' functioning as a complement of the prepositional verb 'changed'*

	PrV	PrA	PostA
They charged John <i>with speeding</i>	3	3	6
They charged John <i>with perjury</i>	0	4	5
They charged John <i>with tax evasion</i>	3	4	8
They charged John <i>with embezzling corporate funds</i>	3	5	4
TOTAL	9 (18.8%)	16 (33.3%)	23 (47.9%)


Actually the degree of similarity is greater than between the results for *only* applying to prepositional phrases introduced by *for* and *at* for instance and the results for *only* applying to the adjunct *with* (compare Tables 8.9 and 8.11).

Table 8.11. *The position of 'only' applying to 'for' and 'at'*

	PrV	PrA	PostA
John stayed in London <i>for a day</i>	6	2	4
John stayed in London <i>for a few days</i>	5	2	5
John stayed in London <i>for a couple of days</i>	6	5	1
The bell in this school rings <i>at noon</i>	7	5	0
The bell in this school rings <i>at lunch time</i>	9	2	1
The bell in this school rings <i>at 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock</i>	6	4	2
TOTAL	39 (54.2%)	20 (27.8%)	13 (18.0%)


(b) As Figures 8.6, 8.7 and 8.8 show, there is no favourite position for *only* in complements of a non-prepositional verb. However, the detailed results in every sentence examined imply that this class of prepositional phrase is not homogeneous, with respect to the position of *only*: as Figure 8.12 shows, the position of *only* may vary according to the type of verb preceding the highlighted prepositional phrases.

Figure 8.12. The relationship between the type of preceding verb (or verb phrase) and the position of 'only'



The ANOVA revealed that there were significant differences between types of verb (or verb phrase), with respect to PrV ( $F(2,6) = 14.867$ ;  $P=0.005$ ). As the figure below shows, the one-syllable verb *went* chooses PrV most frequently and the verb phrase *paid a brief visit* chooses PrV least frequently.

Figure 8.13. The relationship between the verb length and the mean number of PrV



On the other hand, there were no significant differences between types of verbs (or verb phrase), with respect to PrA and PostA.

<sup>6</sup> As Table 8.7 shows, two types of *to*-clauses were examined. One type was the adjunct purpose clause (e.g. *to make Ann feel better* in *John told a joke to make Ann*

*feel better*). The other type was the complement clause (e.g. *to give him a ring* in *John asked Ann to give him a ring*).

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## Constraints on the occurrence of ALL cleft constructions

Yoko YAMADA

## 要旨

ALL cleft 構文(e.g. *All he needs is (to) go to hospital immediately*)は、談話のタイプによってその頻度が異なる。すなわち、この構文は、written informative prose や spontaneous conversations といったタイプの談話よりも、task-related dialogues (与えられたタスクを遂行する過程で生じる対話)により多く見られる。同程度にくだけた談話である task-related dialogues と spontaneous conversations の間でも出現頻度に差が見られることから、ALL cleft 構文の出現状況は、談話の formality 度の観点からでは説明できない。本稿は、ALL cleft 構文が task-related dialogues により多く見られるのは、この構文の談話レベルの機能とこの構文が作る談話構造が、この種の談話により適したものであるからであると仮定し、この構文を分析した。その結果、次の二点が明らかになった。(i)この構文は、それまでなされていた話題の終焉を合図し、聞き手/読者に必要な新たな指示(new instruction)を談話に導入する機能を持つ、(ii)この構文が現れる discourse segments は、情報の重要度からみて、新たな指示を導入する ALL cleft 構文を中心に、構文の前後の発話(utterances)がその周辺に位置する core-subordinate の関係をなす談話構造である。(i)(ii)は、task-related dialogues タイプの談話に好まれるものである。このことは、ある言語形式が使用されるかどうかは、その言語形式が話し手/書き手が意図する談話構造の組み立てに役立つ役割を担っているか否かにかかっていることを示す。また、本稿の分析観点から、同じ統語機能を有する ALL cleft 構文と *just* の選択も説明しうることが明らかになった。

**Key Words:** ALL cleft constructions, roles in the structure of discourse, the Map Task dialogues

## 1. Introduction

ALL cleft constructions (e.g. *All he needs is (to) go to hospital immediately*) are interesting constructions in that despite their clear status as cleft constructions, little attention has been paid to them in the study of clefts. (Quirk et al. 1985, for instance, contains little/no description of ALL cleft constructions.) Nevertheless, ALL cleft constructions deserve to be

investigated in that they throw new light upon the study of factors controlling the occurrence of constructions. ALL cleft constructions are not used evenly among different types of discourse. Take the distribution of ALL cleft constructions in three text types, for example.

Table 1. *Number of ALL cleft constructions in three text types*

Task-related dialogues (128 dialogues) (i.e. approximately 147,000 words)	Spontaneous conversations (approximately 43,400 words)	Written informative prose (approximately 266,000 words)
9	2	3

This table indicates that although it is certain that the frequency of occurrences of ALL cleft constructions is small in general<sup>1)</sup>, among these three text types, ALL cleft constructions are used most frequently in task-related dialogues (i.e. approximately 1 per 16,300 words in task-related dialogues, 1 per 21,700 words in spontaneous conversations and 1 per 88,660 words in written informative prose). The important point to note here is that the difference in frequency of occurrences happens not only between spontaneous spoken English and formal written English, namely between the two extremes of ‘spokenness’ and ‘writtenness’, but also between two kinds of spontaneous spoken data. This means that this distributional difference among the data cannot be explained in terms of degree of formality of discourse. That is, an argument that ALL cleft constructions tend to be used not in formal written English but in spontaneous spoken English does not explain the results presented in Table 1. What this situation suggests is that ALL cleft constructions may have some role which fits the structure of discourse like task-related dialogues better than the structure of other types of discourse. Based on this observation, this paper builds an assumption that the choice of a construction can be seen, at least in some cases, as the selection of a construction that serves to build the discourse structure intended by the speaker or writer. Demonstration of the validity of this assumption is the task this paper takes up.

The paper begins with an overview of the data in section 2. Section 3 investigates ALL cleft constructions, focusing on the discourse function of the constructions and appealing to the concept of the core-subordinate relation<sup>2)</sup> between utterances constituting discourse where ALL cleft constructions occur – the concept that some utterance in a discourse segment is crucial and central and others are subordinate to it. It reveals that ALL cleft constructions have a particular role in the structure of discourse and that it is not appropriate for every type of discourse. Section 4 extends the observation into the choice between ALL cleft constructions and a grammatical device, the restrictive focusing particle *just*, which has the syntactic function of

ALL cleft constructions. It demonstrates that this is also explained in terms of the roles of the devices in the structure of discourse. Section 5 summarises the conclusions.

## 2. The data

This paper explores the role of ALL cleft constructions in the structure of discourse. As Table 1 shows, there may exist a relationship between this type of construction and the discourse structure of task-related dialogues. For this reason, I will examine the Map Task dialogues obtained from the Map Task experiments described in detail in Anderson et al. (1991). The subjects are speakers of Scottish English and are just at the beginning of their higher education<sup>3</sup>). The total number of dialogues is 128. Half of them are produced in conditions allowing the subjects to have eye-contact, and half in circumstances excluding eye-contact.

The Map Task involves two participants, one in the role of instruction giver, and the other in the role of instruction follower. In the tasks, both of them have slightly different versions of a map marked with various landmarks. Some landmarks are shared, others are unique to one or the other map, and some shared landmarks have different names. One participant who plays the role of instruction giver has a route marked on his/her map, and instructs the other, who does not have a route on his/her map, how to draw that route.

## 3. The role of ALL cleft constructions in the structure of discourse

The Map Task dialogues offer 8 instances where ALL cleft constructions are chosen to focus either on verb phrases or on clauses, and one instance where this type of construction focuses on a noun phrase. For this distributional reason, our discussion will begin by considering the case where ALL cleft constructions focus either on verb phrases or on clauses. To take some examples (Note: 'G' denotes the instruction giver and 'F' denotes the instruction follower. Utterance function coding completed by Human Communication Research Centre (HCRC), Edinburgh, is in bold. The utterances of interest are italicised.):

- (1) F1: (**query-w**) How far?  
G1: (**align**) See a graveyard on your map? To the right of the diamond mine?  
F2: (**reply-n**) No.  
G2: (**acknowledge**) Right.  
(**explain**) They've obviously not marked the graveyard.  
F3: (**query-w**) How far to the right of the diamond mine is it?  
G3: (**reply-w**) The graveyard is almost halfway in between ...

- (query-yn) Do you have carved stones?
- F4: (reply-w) I have carved stones at the top followed by a ravine followed by an Indian country.
- G4: (acknowledge) Right.
- (reply-w) In between the diamond mine and the carved stones is a graveyard. That's where it should be.
- F5: (acknowledge) Right.
- G5: (instruct) So, *all you need to do is continue past the diamond mine*
- F6: (check) The stop.
- G6: (part of G5) *The past where you think the graveyard is.*
- F7: (check) Past where it is?
- G7: (reply-y) Yeah, go route ... same
- (clarify) under ... under the graveyard ... south of the graveyard.
- F8: (query-yn) Is the graveyard
- G8: (clarify) The graveyard's ...
- F9: (part of F8) due east of the diamond mine?
- G9: (reply-y) Correct.
- F10: (check) So I really shouldn't hit it then if I'm south of the diamond mine?
- G10: (reply-y) Correct.
- F11: (acknowledge) Right. Okay.
- (2) G1: (instruct) So you move east around
- F1: (acknowledge) The carved stones.
- G2: (part of G1) carved stones.
- (query-yn) And then ... Do you have gallows? On your map?
- F2: (reply-y) Yes,
- (explain) but they're absolutely miles away.
- G3: (acknowledge) That's correct. That's correct.
- (instruct) *All you need to do is go due south from the carved stones*
- F3: (check) Past ...
- G4: (part of G3) *as far as you can see the gallows, the same level as the gallows.*
- F4: (acknowledge) Right.
- G5: (align) You should be on top of the Indian country, correct?
- F5: (reply-w) and just south of the ravine.
- G6: (acknowledge) That's right.

- (3) G1: **(query-yn)** Eh. Now, you're got a ... Have you got a alpine garden?  
 F1: **(reply-y)** Uh-huh.  
 G2: **(acknowledge)** You have. Right.  
     **(align)** *All you're doing is you're sort of doing ... see that wee bump you've got over the monastery at the moment?*  
 F2: **(reply-y)** Yeah.  
 G3: **(instruct)** *You're sort of doing that in reverse and going up towards the alpine garden. So you do the bump in reverse and end up just going straight north up the left-hand side of the alpine garden.*  
     **(align)** Do you see what I mean?  
 F3: **(reply-y)** Right.  
 G4: **(instruct)** So that if you turned the sheet on its side it'd be a big "s"  
 F4: **(acknowledge)** Right, okay.  
 G5: **(align)** Right?  
 F5: **(query-yn)** But I've ... have you got a west lake?  
 G6: **(reply-n)** Eh. I've not, so.  
     **(query-w)** Have you got a west lake in the middle somewhere?  
 F6: **(reply-y)** Yeah,  
     **(explain)** but I've missed the west lake.  
 G7: **(acknowledge)** Aye .....

(1) and (2) are the examples where the ALL cleft construction focuses on a verb phrase, and (3) is the example where it focuses on a clause. The point to observe here is that all the ALL cleft constructions in the Map Task dialogues:

- (i) occur after a section of exchange of information about ascertaining the current position of the instruction giver and the follower, and/or the location/existence of shared and non-shared landmarks
- (ii) introduce a new instruction on the basis of the previous exchange of information

That is, in (1), the ALL cleft construction:





- (5) G1: **(instruct)** Now I want you to go directly south for about ... seven centimetres,  
... about two inches.
- F1: **(acknowledge)** Right.
- G2: **(align)** Right?
- F2: **(query-yn)** Have you got treas ... er ... tr ... buried treasure?
- G3: **(reply-n)** No.
- F3: **(acknowledge)** Okay.
- G4: **(instruct)** Then I want you to go directly ... west, no? To your ... just say to  
your left for the same amount to bring you up to the shore of the  
lagoon.
- F4: **(acknowledge)** Yeah, I've got it.
- G5: **(align)** Right?
- (instruct)** Now follow the lagoon round to the tip,

This situation makes it clear that basically ALL cleft constructions and unclefted constructions in a context of introducing a new instruction differ from each other: ALL cleft constructions introduce a new instruction which is surely the speaker's conclusion drawn from the preceding exchange of information and in doing so they signal the end of the exchange of information and point forward to the next step of the task introduced by ALL cleft constructions. On the other hand, unclefted constructions introduce a new instruction which is, in many cases, not the speaker's conclusion. Based on this, this paper proposes that ALL cleft constructions have a discourse function – a function of signalling the end of the exchange of information and pointing forward<sup>4</sup>).

Interestingly, the type of entities focused on by ALL cleft constructions is extremely limited. In the Map Task dialogues, except for the case where verb phrases/clauses are focused, there is only one case where a noun phrase is focused. The following is that case.

- (6) F1: **(explain)** I'm getting near the end of the ... edge of the paper though
- G1: **(check)** Ah, okay ... Are you?
- F2: **(reply-y)** Yeah.
- G2: **(acknowledge)** Okay, because ... oh all right.
- F3: **(query-yn)** Have you got a crashed spaceship down there?
- G3: **(reply-n)** No
- F4: **(query-yn)** Just below the attractive cliffs?
- G4: **(reply-w)** *All I have is a chestnut tree*

F5: (reply-n) No

(explain) I've got a chestnut tree right I've got attractive cliffs and then ...  
straight underneath that

G5: (check) You have a spaceship?

F6: (explain) I've got a chestnut tree right so ... but on the left-hand side between  
the two that's where the spaceship is.

G6: (check) On the left of the chestnut tree?

F7: (reply-y) Yeah

In (6), G4 uses the ALL cleft construction after being asked twice whether s/he has a landmark *crashed spaceship* or not. What the ALL cleft construction does in (6) is that it has a strong effect to make what s/he has (i.e. *a chestnut tree*) salient. This salience of *a chestnut tree* explicitly indicates that the giver has one landmark near the edge of the paper and that it is NOT a crashed spaceship. This kind of the salience of the constituent highlighted restrictively by ALL cleft constructions, following to the examination of WH cleft constructions in Miller and Weinert (1998), could be explained as a consequence of reducing the content of the subordinate clause (i.e. *All I have*) to a minimum. This paper, however, does not follow this matter further, since the number of occurrences of ALL cleft constructions focusing on a noun phrase is too small to do so.

What is important in connection with the current investigation is the fact that examples of ALL cleft constructions focusing on some entity other than a verb phrase/a clause are very rare in my dialogue data, and that in this sense, focusing on entities other than verb phrases/clauses is the marked usage of ALL cleft constructions. In addition, my informal observation shows that ALL cleft constructions in discourse other than the Map Task dialogues also tend to be used in a context of introducing a new instruction<sup>5)</sup>. From these two points one thing becomes very clear: the unmarked use of ALL cleft constructions is to introduce a new instruction. For this reason, in what follows in this section we will explore further ALL cleft constructions, paying special attention to the structure of discourse in a context of introducing a new instruction in the Map Task dialogues.

The Map Task dialogues, as was mentioned in section 2, involve two participants, one in the role of instruction giver, and the other in the role of instruction follower. One participant who plays the role of giver has a route marked on his/her map, and instructs the other, who does not have a route on his/her map, how to draw that route. According to HCRC (see, particularly, Carletta et al. 1996), the instruction giver usually seems to break the route up into manageable pieces in his/her mind, and describes each one in turn. As a result, a typical

discourse segment is a segment where the instruction giver introduces one piece of route on the map to get the follower to draw it. However, not every discourse segment is this type. In cases where confusions arise, participants have to review parts of the route which were already talked about. Furthermore, participants in some cases may overview parts of the route which will be dealt with later but which is not meant to draw now. In the discourse segments where ALL cleft constructions introduce instructions, 7 cases of the total of 8 examples belong to the typical type of discourse segment. The crucial point, with respect to discourse segments, particularly typical type of discourse segments, is that discourse segments are constituted, with the aim of getting the follower to accomplish instructions regarding a certain piece of route. This suggests that utterances in a discourse segment would not be co-ordinated with each other: an utterance giving an instruction must be crucial and central, and other types of utterances such as utterances about exchange of some information are subordinate to it. In other words, the discourse segments where ALL cleft constructions introduce a new instruction in the Map Task dialogues consist of utterances having the core-subordinate relation.

Based on this observation, we will have a more detailed view of the role of ALL cleft constructions in the Map Task dialogues. As has been discussed, ALL cleft constructions have the function of signalling the end of the exchange of information and pointing forward. As a result, this type of constructions builds a boundary and divides one discourse segment into two parts – the part preceding ALL cleft construction and the part following this construction. In addition, ALL cleft constructions occupy a crucial and central position in the hierarchical structure of discourse by virtue of introducing a new instruction. Figure 1 illustrates this schematically:




Figure 1. Structure of discourse segment containing ALL cleft constructions

In this figure, the ALL cleft construction lies in the crucial and central position, as indicated with larger letters in bold. On the other hand, two sub-discourse segments divided by this construction are subordinate to it. This is the discourse structure which ALL cleft constructions organise. Now it is clear why, as Table 1 on page 278 indicates, ALL cleft constructions are less frequent in spontaneous conversations and in written informative prose. As was mentioned, my informal observation shows that ALL cleft constructions in spontaneous spoken discourse and in written informative prose are used in the similar way. However, in these two text types, a context of introducing an instruction is not so common, compared with the Map Task dialogues consisting of instructions that get the follower to draw a piece of route and information/questions/confirmation ancillary to the instructions. In short, the role of the constructions in the structure of discourse accounts for the distributional difference among discourse presented in Table 1.

In the next section, let us extend the observation into the choice between ALL cleft constructions and another grammatical device, the restrictive focusing particle *just*, which has the syntactic function of ALL cleft constructions. It will turn out that this is also explained in terms of the roles of the devices in the structure of discourse.

#### 4. The role of *just* in the structure of discourse having a context of giving instructions

The Map Task dialogues have 103 instances of *just* when a focused item is either a verb phrase or a clause. Considering the characteristics of the dialogues, it is supposed that it is utterances with *just* by the instruction giver that are in a context of giving instructions. For this reason, this paper distinguishes the case where the speaker is the instruction giver from the case where s/he is the follower. Before turning to a closer examination of roles of *just* in a context of giving instructions, two things are worth pointing out. One is that as Table 2 shows, the frequency of occurrences of *just* in the no eye-contact dialogues is much higher than in the eye-contact dialogues both where the speaker is the giver and where s/he is the follower.

Table 2. *Distribution of 103 instances of 'just' focusing on a verb phrase/a clause*

Eye-contact dialogues		No eye-contact dialogues	
speaker		speaker	
giver	follower	giver	follower
7	15	32	49

I predict that the high frequency of occurrences of *just* in the no eye-contact dialogues is associated with the fact that the participants in the tasks are not allowed to have eye-contact.



(instruct) *So you just go past the adventure playground on the ... its left-hand side.*

F4: (check) And no more. Aye?

G5: (reply-y) And no more.

(8) G1: (instruct) er... and then you ... you cut down about ... er ... southeast ...  
across the page

F1: (query-y) to where ... lion country?

G2: (reply-y) Down to ... er, no.

(query-yn) Have you got fallen cairn?

F2: (reply-y) Year.

G3: (instruct) Now you ...

(explain) Which is about a third ... no,

F3: (acknowledge) Year.

G4: (explain) it's about almost halfway down the page.

(instruct) And, well you cut down to below it, you curve right cut down to it,  
and go below it,

F4: (acknowledge) Right.

G5: (instruct) So you're going southeast.

F5: (query-yn) So you're going ... So that's just to the east of where I went  
beyond the quarry?

G6: (reply-y) Yeah.

F6: (acknowledge) Yeah.

G7: (explain) It's just about ... Fallen cairn is above the quarry and to the right.

F7: (acknowledge) Yeah.

G8: (acknowledge) Yeah.

(instruct) *You just cut down to that, then go down the ... round the bottom of it.*

F8: (check) So I'm below the fallen cairn?

G9: (reply-y) Year.

What should be noticed here is that almost all the utterances with *just* in my data (i.e. 37 cases of the total of 39 examples):

- (i) occur after some information/questions given by the instruction follower concerning an instruction newly introduced by the instruction giver
- (ii) express the previous instruction either in the same way or in a different way or in a modified way, on the basis of such information/questions

For example, in (7), the utterance with *just*:

- (i) occurs after the instruction follower's question regarding the instruction introduced by G2
- (ii) repeats the previous instruction

Example (8) can be explained on similar lines. In short, in contrast with ALL cleft constructions, *just* does not introduce a new instruction, but repeats/modifies the instruction which is already introduced and is not yet accomplished. In this sense, *just* has a discourse function of engaging the giver and the follower in the instruction currently under discussion. We can represent the structure of discourse segment with *just* schematically as follows.




Figure 2. Structure of discourse segment containing utterances with *just* in a context of giving instructions

That is, the utterance introducing a new instruction (G2 in (7) and G1 in (8)) lies in the crucial and central position, and a series of information/questions raised due to the new instruction is subordinate to it. Following this, the utterance with *just* is attached to the utterance introducing the new instruction. The former is subordinate to the latter, since it repeats/modifies the



instruction; nevertheless, it has a more important discourse-organising function than utterances about information/questions in that it is not merely expressing information ancillary to the instruction. It is followed by another series of questions or requests for information arising from the repeated or modified instruction.

The observation in the last paragraph has shown why the frequency of occurrences of *just* in the non eye-contact dialogues is much higher than in the eye-contact dialogues. Accomplishing the giver's instruction would not necessarily be easy. This is particularly so in the tasks done in circumstances excluding eye-contact. It is natural that the giver's repeating/modifying the instruction which is already instructed is required in such cases.

Now that it is clear what controls the choice between two grammatical devices having the similar syntactic function. Both ALL cleft constructions and the restrictive focusing particle *just* function to highlight particular constituents restrictively. For example, in the following case the verb phrase *read books* is restrictively highlighted in both (9a) and (9b).

- (9) a. All John did yesterday was (to) read books.  
b. John just read books yesterday (and did nothing else).

However, as has been discussed, they differ from each other in the discourse level: the discourse function of *just* is markedly different from that of ALL cleft constructions and the structures of discourse organised by these two grammatical devices dramatically differ from each other. What this section has demonstrated would not be revealed if we had not paid special attention to their roles in the structure of discourse.

## 5. Conclusions

This paper has demonstrated that the choice of a certain construction can be seen, at least in some cases, as the selection of a construction that serves to build the discourse structure intended by the speaker or writer; the paper has focused on the role of ALL cleft constructions in the structure of discourse. ALL cleft constructions are not used evenly among different types of discourse; the frequency of the constructions varies among discourse-types and the difference cannot be explained in terms of degree of formality of discourse. ALL cleft constructions have a discourse function of signalling the end of exchange of information and pointing forward. As a result, this type of constructions builds a boundary and divides the current discourse segment into two. In addition, because of the function of introducing a new instruction, ALL cleft constructions lie in the crucial and central position in the hierarchical structure of discourse. This paper has demonstrated that this discourse function and the

discourse structure organised by ALL cleft constructions are more appropriate for some types of discourse than others, and that it accounts for why the frequency of the construction varies from one type of discourse to another. The paper has also proposed that the choice between ALL cleft constructions and the restrictive focusing particle *just*, the grammatical device having the similar syntactic function, is to be explained on similar lines. The results of this paper provide us with some insight into how deeply and significantly syntactic choice is related to the process of structuring discourse.

### Notes

- 1) This point would be further supported in comparison with the frequency of occurrences of another type of clefts, WH clefts (e.g. *What he needs is sound sleep*), for instance. According to Miller and Weinert (1998), the frequency of occurrences of WH clefts is approximately 1 per 1,276 words in the same task-related dialogues as the dialogues in this paper. The crucial point is that only detailed investigation with a large amount of different types of discourse would reveal that the frequency of occurrences of ALL cleft constructions varies among discourse; otherwise it would be simply said that the constructions are not used frequently.
- 2) The view that discourse has a hierarchical structure and that there are two types of relations between separate discourse units (e.g. utterances), namely, the co-ordinate relation and the core-subordinate relation, has been suggested by some studies, especially by studies on written texts (see, for example, Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) by Matthiessen and Thompson 1988; Mann, Matthiessen and Thompson 1992). However, this paper does not choose one specific framework among the studies on the ground that the frameworks differ from each other in various points and that it is uncertain whether those written-texts-based frameworks apply to spoken data.
- 3) This is an important point, since, according to Biber (1988) and Miller and Weinert (1998), spoken English (even spontaneous spoken English) produced by university graduates has a possibility of being affected by formal written English.
- 4) This function is very similar to the discourse function of WH cleft constructions (see, Miller and Weinert 1998). The difference between ALL cleft constructions and WH cleft constructions lies not in the discourse functions but in the syntactic functions: while the former highlight particular constituents restrictively, the latter do not (though they imply 'exclusiveness' in some cases).
- 5) This is supported by the following example from written informative prose.
  - (10) How do I get our money back? You can get back the gross amount of SMP you have paid out, plus an additional amount (4.5% of the total gross SMP from 6<sup>th</sup> April 1991) as compensation for the NI contributions you have paid on SMP. *All you have*

*to do is deduct both amounts from your monthly NI and tax payments.*

- 6) On this subject, see, for example, Goodwin (1981).
- 7) More detailed factors controlling the occurrence of *just* in imperative clauses are left unclarified here.
- 8) Ten imperative examples produced by the follower (i.e. 3 examples in eye-contact dialogues and 7 examples in no eye-contact dialogues) are, however, repeats of what the giver instructed and they are rather utterances requesting the giver to confirm some information. In this respect, they are not imperative clauses and are included in this investigation.
- 9) This parenthesis is necessary, since as has been discussed, the majority of unclefted constructions introduce a new instruction without exchanging information about the location/existence of landmarks.

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**1. Each item below consists of a context and a sentence of English. Each sentence has two or more gaps, marked by square brackets. For each sentence, put the word *only* into ONE of the gaps.**

1. context : John got one A grade and got no more than one.

John [       ] got [       ] one A grade.

2. context: Mary had moved her position slightly. She had not moved her position in other ways.

Mary had [       ] moved her position [       ] slightly.

3. context: It was a silent night. Sometimes that silence was broken by the hoot of some owls. There was nothing else which broke that silence.

There was profound silence, [       ] broken [       ] by the occasional hoot of some owls.

4. context: Mary goes out if John goes, and does not do so if he does not.

Mary [       ] goes out [       ] if John goes.

5. context: John saw Mary an hour ago and it happened as recently as an hour ago.

John [       ] saw Mary [       ] an hour ago.

6. context: This drama school provides an outline of how to act but does not provide anything else.

This drama school [       ] provides [       ] an outline of how to act.

7. context: John visited Italy and visited nowhere else last year.

John [       ] visited [       ] Italy last year.

8. context: John has detective novels and has no other types of novels.

John [       ] has [       ] detective novels.

9. context: Mary likes France but does not like any other countries.

Mary [ ] likes [ ] France.

10. context: John had visited Japan in 1998 but not in any other year.

John had [ ] visited Japan [ ] in 1998.

11. context: John visited France and visited nowhere else last year.

John [ ] visited [ ] France last year.

12. context: Mary moved her position slightly. She did not move her position in other ways.

Mary [ ] moved her position [ ] slightly.

13. context: I thought about what to do during the summer holiday, and thought about nothing else.

I [ ] thought about [ ] what to do during the summer holiday.

14. context: Mary likes Italy and likes no other places.

Mary [ ] likes [ ] Italy.

15. context: During the party, John spoke to Mary and spoke to nobody else.

During the party, John [ ] spoke [ ] to [ ] Mary.

16. context: He applied for one university and did not apply for other universities.

He [ ] applied [ ] for it.

17. context: Mary was misunderstood by John but was not misunderstood by anyone else.

Mary was [ ] misunderstood [ ] by John.

18. context: Last year John travelled to Japan and travelled no other places.

John [ ] travelled [ ] to Japan last year.

19. context: This drama school can provide an outline of how to act but cannot provide anything else.

This drama school can [       ] provide [       ] an outline of how to act.

20. context: During the party, John spoke to one person and spoke to nobody else.

During the party, he [       ] spoke [       ] to [       ] one person.

21. context: John and nobody else answered that question.

[       ] John [       ] answered that question.

22. context: This year first year students in this department have classes on Monday and Wednesday, and they have no classes other days.

This year first year students in this department [       ] have classes [       ] on Monday and Wednesday, and they have no classes other days.

23. context: John saw Mary an hour ago and saw her at no other time.

John [       ] saw Mary [       ] an hour ago.

24. context: John stopped to smoke, and did not stop for any other reasons.

John [       ] stopped [       ] to smoke.

**2. Each item below consists of a context and sentences. Each sentence describe the context. Circle the sentence you prefer.**

1. context: This year first year students in this department have classes on Monday and Wednesday, and they have no classes other days.

- a. This year first year students in this department have classes only on Monday and Wednesday.
- b. This year first year students in this department only have classes on Monday and Wednesday.

2. context: Mary had moved her position slightly. She had not moved her position in other ways.

- a. Mary had moved her position only slightly.
- b. Mary had only moved her position slightly.

3. context: John and nobody else answered that question.

- a. Only John answered that question.
- b. John only answered that question.

4. context: John visited Italy and visited nowhere else last year.

- a. John only visited Italy last year.
- b. John visited only Italy last year.

5. context: This drama school provides an outline of how to act but does not provide anything else.

- a. This drama school only provides an outline of how to act.
- b. This drama school provides only an outline of how to act.

6. context: John got one A grade and got no more than one.

- a. John only got one A grade.
- b. John got only one A grade.

7. context: John saw Mary an hour ago and saw her no other time.

- a. John only saw Mary an hour ago.
- b. John saw Mary only an hour ago.

8. context: John has detective novels and has no other types of novels.

- a. John has only detective novels.
- b. John only has detective novels.

9. context: Mary likes France but does not like any other countries.
- a. Mary only likes France.
  - b. Mary likes only France.
10. context: Mary moved her position slightly. She did not move her position in other ways.
- a. Mary moved her position only slightly.
  - b. Mary only moved her position slightly.
11. context: John had visited Japan in 1998 but not in any other year.
- a. John had only visited Japan in 1998.
  - b. John had visited Japan only in 1998.
12. context: John saw Mary an hour ago and it happened as recently as an hour ago.
- a. John only saw Mary an hour ago.
  - b. John saw Mary only an hour ago.
13. context: During the party, John spoke to Mary and spoke to nobody else.
- a. During the party, John only spoke to Mary.
  - b. During the party, John spoke only to Mary.
  - c. During the party, John spoke to only Mary.
14. context: Mary was misunderstood by John but was not misunderstood by anyone else.
- a. Mary was only misunderstood by John.
  - b. Mary was misunderstood only by John.
15. context: Mary likes Italy and likes no other places.
- a. Mary only likes Italy.
  - b. Mary likes only Italy.
16. context: This drama school can provide an outline of how to act but cannot provide anything else.
- a. This drama school can only provide an outline of how to act.
  - b. This drama school can provide only an outline of how to act.



17. context: Last year John travelled to Japan and travelled no other places.
- Last year John only travelled to Japan.
  - Last year John travelled only to Japan.
18. context: John visited France and visited nowhere else last year.
- John only visited France last year.
  - John visited only France last year.
19. context: Mary goes out if John goes, and does not do so if he does not.
- Mary only goes out if John goes.
  - Mary goes out only if John goes.
20. context: I thought about what to do during the summer holiday, and thought about nothing else.
- I only thought about what to do during the summer holiday.
  - I thought about only what to do during the summer holiday.
21. context: During the party, John spoke to one person and spoke to nobody else.
- During the party, John only spoke to one person.
  - During the party, John spoke only to one person.
  - During the party, John spoke to only one person.
22. context: John stopped to smoke and did not stop for any other reasons.
- John only stopped to smoke.
  - John stopped only to smoke.
23. context: It was a silent night. Sometimes that silence was broken by the hoot of some owls. There was nothing else which broke that silence.
- There was profound silence, broken only by the occasional hoot of some owls.
  - There was profound silence, only broken by the occasional hoot of some owls.
24. context: He applied for one university and did not apply for other universities.
- He only applied for it.
  - He applied only for it.

**Each item below contains a sentence, or two sentences, describing an event. Please rewrite the sentence, or sentences as one sentence describing the event and containing the word *only*.**

**e.g. I painted the house. I did not do any other work in the house.**

**I only painted the house.**

1. This drama school provides an outline of how to act but does not provide anything else.
2. John and nobody else answered that question.
3. John has detective novels and has no other types of novels.
4. This year first year students in this department have classes on Monday and Wednesday, and they have no classes other days.
5. Mary goes out if John goes, and does not do so if he does not.
6. During the party, John spoke to Mary and spoke to nobody else.
7. John stopped to smoke, and did not stop for any other reasons.
8. Mary was misunderstood by John but was not misunderstood by anyone else.
9. Mary likes Italy and likes no other places.
10. John saw Mary an hour ago and saw her at no other time.
11. It was a silent night and sometimes that silence was broken by the hoots of some owls. There was nothing else which broke that silence.
12. John visited Italy and visited nowhere else last year.
13. Mary moved her position slightly. She did not move her position in other ways.

14. Mary likes France but does not like any other countries.
15. John had visited Japan in 1998 but not in any other year.
16. John got one A grade and got no more than one.
17. John saw Mary an hour ago and it happened as recently as an hour ago.
18. Last year John travelled to Japan and travelled no other places.
19. I thought about what to do during the summer holiday, and thought about nothing else.
20. John visited France and visited nowhere else last year.
21. During the party, John spoke to one person and spoke to nobody else.
22. Mary had moved her position slightly. She had not moved her position in other ways.
23. He applied for one university and did not apply for other universities.
24. This drama school can provide an outline of how to act but cannot provide anything else.

**Each item below consists of a pair of sentences. The second sentence has two or more gaps, marked by square brackets. What we'd like you to do is to put the word *only* in ONE of the gaps to make the second sentence mean the same thing as the first. If you think that *only* could go in more than one of the gaps, choose the best. There are no right or wrong answers. We're just looking for your opinion.**

1. John met Bill and nobody else.

John [ ] met [ ] Bill [ ].

2. John called his girlfriend to say good night. He did not call her for any other reason.

John [ ] called his girlfriend [ ] to say good night.

3. John has green jumpers. He has no jumpers of any other colour.

John [ ] has [ ] green jumpers.

4. John called the bank. He did not call any other place.

John [ ] called [ ] the bank [ ].

5. They go out on Friday evening and no other day or time.

They [ ] go out [ ] on Friday evening [ ].

6. John knows Margaret. He knows nobody else.

John [ ] knows [ ] Margaret [ ].

7. Last year John travelled to Italy and Spain. He did not go anywhere.

Last year John [ ] travelled [ ] to Italy and Spain [ ].

8. This course has boring classes and no other kind of class.

This course [ ] has [ ] boring classes.

9. John pointed out what looked like a bird. He didn't point out anything else.

John [       ] pointed out [       ] what looked like a bird.

10. John saw his neighbourhood. He didn't see anybody else.

John [       ] saw [       ] his neighbourhood [       ].

11. John was asked to be quiet by Bill. He wasn't asked to be quiet by anybody else.

John was [       ] asked to be quiet [       ] by Bill [       ].

12. John paid a brief visit to his friend. He didn't pay a brief visit to anybody else.

John [       ] paid a brief visit [       ] to his friend [       ].

13. John asked Ann what was the best way to go there. He didn't ask her anything else.

John [       ] asked Ann [       ] what was the best way to go there.

14. John has one neighbour. He doesn't have any other neighbours.

John [       ] has [       ] one neighbour.

15. The kids were given too much homework by the biology teacher.

They weren't given too much homework by any other teacher.

The kids were [       ] given too much homework [       ] by the biology teacher [       ].

16. John invited Marguerite. He didn't invite anybody else.

John [       ] invited [       ] Marguerite [       ].

17. Today John read one article. He didn't read any more articles.

Today John [       ] read [       ] one article.

18. John instructed Ann to do what she was told. He instructed her nothing else.  
John [       ] instructed Ann [       ] to do what she was told.
19. John has academic books and no other type of book.  
John [       ] has [       ] academic books.
20. John respected the manager. He respected nobody else.  
John [       ] respected [       ] the manager [       ].
21. She accused John of false pretences. She didn't accuse him of anything else.  
She [       ] accused John [       ] of false pretences [       ].
22. John stayed in London for a day. He didn't stay there more than a day.  
John [       ] stayed in London [       ] for a day [       ].
23. John invited Matt. He didn't invite anybody else.  
John [       ] invited [       ] Matt [       ].
24. John saw Tom. He didn't see anybody else.  
John [       ] saw [       ] Tom [       ].
25. The regulations refer to families with three children. They don't refer to any other type of family.  
The regulations [       ] refer [       ] to families with three children [       ].
26. John knows Nick. He doesn't know anybody else.  
John [       ] knows [       ] Nick [       ].
27. John comes if Ann asks him to. He doesn't come if she does not ask him.  
John [       ] comes [       ] if Ann asks him to.

28. People appreciated his novels after World War II . They didn't appreciate them before then.

People [       ] appreciated his novels [       ] after World War II [       ].

29. John told his friends what he would do if he were a millionaire. He didn't tell them anything else.

John [       ] told his friends [       ] what he would do if he were a millionaire.

30. John loves his wife. He doesn't love anybody else.

John [       ] loves [       ] his wife [       ].

31. This town has two pubs. It doesn't have any other pubs.

This town [       ] has [       ] two pubs.

32. John met Emily. He didn't meet anybody else.

John [       ] met [       ] Emily [       ].

33. The winner was presented with a gold medal by one of the committee members, but not by anybody else.

The winner was [       ] presented with a gold medal [       ] by one of the committee members [       ].

34. John's flat has chipped plates. It doesn't have any other kind of plate.

John's flat [       ] has [       ] chipped plates.

35. John went to the town where Bill lives. He didn't go anywhere else.

John [       ] went [       ] into the town where Bill lives [       ].

36. This village has one bridge and no more than one.

This village [       ] has [       ] one bridge.

37. John needs Ann to help him with his work. He doesn't need her for any other reason.

John [       ] needs Ann [       ] to help him with his work.

38. John loves his landlady and nobody else.

John [       ] loves [       ] his landlady [       ].

39. This town has shabby B & Bs. It doesn't have any other kind of B & B.

This town [       ] has [       ] shabby B & Bs.

40. John jollies Ann if she is depressed. He doesn't jolly her if she is not depressed.

John [       ] jollies Ann [       ] if she is depressed.

41. John relies on Bill and nobody else.

John [       ] relies [       ] on Bill [       ].

42. John has one tie and no more than one.

John [       ] has [       ] one tie.

43. As for Ann, John heard what she spent a year in France studying. He didn't hear anything else.

As for Ann, John [       ] heard [       ] what she spent a year in France studying.

44. John supported his aunt. He didn't support anybody else.

John [       ] supported [       ] his aunt [       ].

45. John calls Liz if he feels lonely, and does not call her if he doesn't.

John [       ] calls Liz [       ] if he feels lonely.



46. This year the university holds the examination at the end of May and at no other time.

This year the university [       ] holds the examination [       ] at the end of May [       ].

47. John worked hard to buy a car. He didn't work hard for any other reason.

John [       ] worked hard [       ] to buy a car.

48. John respected his boss and nobody else.

John [       ] respected [       ] his boss [       ].

49. They blamed John for neglecting his duty. They didn't blame him for anything else.

They [       ] blamed John [       ] for neglecting his duty [       ].

50. John read one novel and no more than one.

John [       ] read [       ] one novel.

51. John called Ann to say hello. He didn't call her for any other reason.

John [       ] called Ann [       ] to say hello.

52. Last year John watched two films and no more than two.

Last year John [       ] watched [       ] two films.

53. John supports me if Ann supports me too. He doesn't support me if she doesn't.

John [       ] supports me [       ] if Ann supports me too.

54. John keeps one dog and no more than one.

John [       ] keeps [       ] one dog.

# The positioning of focus particles in English: A case study of *only* in written English\*

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What is the unmarked position of *only* in written English, that is, the position in which it occurs most frequently and most neutrally? This question has long been discussed in English language classrooms and grammars but there is no generally accepted answer. This paper presents the results of an experiment which explored the occurrence of *only* in sentences where it highlights either object NPs, PPs, noun modifiers or clauses. The data was gained by a sentence-production test, asking subjects to put *only* in one of the gaps to make the second sentence mean the same thing as the first. The results of the experiment demonstrate that the unmarked position of *only* is not always fixed even with respect to the same types of constituent; the unmarked position of *only* varies depending on the number of syllables in the verb of a given clause. *Only* applying to PPs varies its position according to the type of PP. Moreover, this applies to *only* highlighting noun modifiers indicating quantity to some extent. In the case of *only* applying to clauses, neither the type of clause nor the length of highlighted clause affects the position of *only*. Some of the claims made in previous studies, relating e.g. to the occurrence of auxiliary verbs and the unmarked position of *only*, seem to be debatable.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

It is characteristic of focus particles (e.g., *even* and *also*) that they can occur in various positions in sentences. *Only* is not an exception to this. It has considerable positional variation as shown in the following (where the constituents highlighted restrictively are marked by small capitals):

- (1) a. John visited *only* ITALY.
- b. John *only* visited ITALY.
- c. John visited ITALY *only*.

(1a) is the example of the pre-adjacent position (henceforth, PrA), the position where *only* is placed immediately before the constituent which it highlights. (1b) is the example of the pre-verbal position (henceforth, PrV), the position where *only* is placed immediately before the verb or after the first auxiliary verb. This position is also taken when the whole sentence is highlighted. (1c) is the example of the post-adjacent position (henceforth, PostA). This situation gives rise to the question as to what is the unmarked position of *only* in written English, that is, the position in which *only* occurs most frequently and most neutrally! This question has long been discussed in English language classrooms and grammars but there is no

\* I would like to thank Jim Miller for his comments and suggestions and Ellen Bard for her advice about the test design and the statistical test. Any remaining inadequacies are my own.

† This study defines 'the unmarked position of *only*' as 'the position in which *only* occurs most frequently and most neutrally'. Here 'frequently' and 'neutrally' are correlated with each other: if a certain position is more neutral position for native speakers of English than other possible positions of *only* applying to the same constituent, the frequency of occurrence of that position must tend to be higher in native speakers' everyday communication, compared with other possible positions of *only* applying to the same constituent. The reverse is true.

generally accepted answer. Demonstration of one answer to this question, based on empirical data, is the task this paper takes up.

The paper begins with an overview of the main suggestions emerging from two sets of preliminary tests in section 2. They will give us information about the direction of the study. Section 3 provides an overview of the data. Sections 4 and 5 demonstrate the results of the test. As space is limited, we will summarise the main results (Section 4) and investigate in detail only one point emerging from the results (Section 5). Section 6 offers a brief conclusion.

## 2 SUGGESTIONS EMERGING FROM THE PRELIMINARY TESTS

Since various syntactic categories and grammatical functions of constituents can be restrictively highlighted by *only*, it is obviously impossible to have detailed investigation of every type of constituent highlighted by *only*. Thus the first thing we had to do was select constituents to be investigated in detail. The selection was based on the results of two sets of preliminary tests – a sentence-production test and a sentence-comprehension test. (The former test contained three sections where subjects were asked to fill one of the gaps with *only* to make the sentence describe the context, to choose as their preferred sentence one of the sentences describing the context and containing *only* in different positions, and to rewrite the sentence or sentences as one sentence describing the event and containing *only*. In the latter test, subjects read a pair of context and sentence containing *only*, and were asked to judge whether the sentence described the context or not.)

The main suggestions emerging from the preliminary tests are as follows:

(a) The unmarked position of *only*, i.e. the position in which *only* occurs most frequently, may not be always fixed even among constituents having the same syntax: it may vary depending on the number of syllables in the verb preceding the highlighted direct object, as in *John only met Bill* and *John supported only Bill*. Similarly, *only* applying to prepositional phrases and clauses may vary its position according to the type of prepositional phrase and the type of clause. Moreover, *only* applying to noun modifiers may vary its position, depending on the type of noun modifier.

(b) Some of the claims made in previous studies might be open to question:

- (i) Rissanen's (1980) claim that auxiliary verbs are related to the unmarked position of *only*
- (ii) Rissanen's (1980) claim that sentences such as *John has only detective novels* are chosen more frequently than sentences such as *John only has detective novels*
- (iii) The claim by Jacobson (1978), Quirk et al (1985) and König (1991) that sentences such as *JOHN only answered that question* are possible
- (iv) Taglicht's (1984) claim that sentences such as *John spoke to only Mary at the party* are ungrammatical

Suggestion (a) is significant, since it implies that even among constituents having the same syntax, the unmarked position of *only* varies; yet there exist some systematic patterns. Since this is the most interesting suggestion in the preliminary tests, the main test was conducted to explore this suggestion, concentrating on close investigation of four different types of constituents – objects, prepositional phrases, noun modifiers and clauses.

## 3 THE DATA

The data was gained by the sentence-production test, asking subjects to put the restrictive focusing particle *only* in one of the gaps to make the second sentence mean the same thing as the first. (2) below provides one example.

- (2) John met Bill and nobody else.  
John [ ] met [ ] Bill [ ].

Subjects are also instructed to choose the best version if they think that *only* could go in more than one of the gaps. The following constituents were investigated.

- (3) a. nouns functioning as object  
 (i) one-syllable highlighted noun preceded by one-syllable verb  
 (e.g., *met Bill, saw that guy*)  
 (ii) one-syllable highlighted noun preceded by three-syllable verb  
 (e.g., *supported Bill, contacted the bank*)  
 (iii) three-syllable highlighted noun preceded by one-syllable verb  
 (e.g., *met Susanna, knows that producer*)  
 (iv) three-syllable highlighted noun preceded by three-syllable verb  
 (e.g., *respected Susanna, supported the novelist*)
- b. prepositional phrases  
 (i) adjunct  
 (e.g., *They go out on Friday evening*)  
 (ii) passive by prepositional phrase  
 (e.g., *This song is loved by our generation*)  
 (iii) complement of non-prepositional verb  
 (e.g., *John went to the pub*)  
 (iv) complement of the prepositional verb  
 (e.g., *They blamed John for being late*)
- c. noun modifiers  
 (i) quantitative expression  
 (e.g., *one novel*)  
 (ii) non-quantitative expression  
 (e.g., *historical novel*)
- d. clauses  
 (i) *wh*-clause  
 (e.g., *John asked Ann what to do this weekend*)  
 (ii) *if*-clause  
 (e.g., *John comes if Ann asks him to*)  
 (iii) *to*-clause  
 (e.g., *John called Ann to say hello*)

The current test contains approximately 20 examples belonging to the same constituent (e.g., (3i), (3ii), (3iii), etc.), which is enough to permit a general conclusion to be drawn.

The test was designed on the basis of the Latin Square design. The subjects are speakers of British English and are undergraduate university students. The total number of subjects is 48.

#### 4 MAIN RESULTS

The main results emerging from the test are as follows:

- (a) The number of syllables in the verb preceding the highlighted direct object does affect the preference of PrV ( $F(1,47) = 10.966$ ;  $P=0.002$ ) and PostA ( $F(1,47) = 16.72$ ;  $P<0.001$ ). The direction of changing the position of *only* is from PrV to PostA when the number of syllables in the preceding verb changes from one to three. It turned out that the number of syllables in the highlighted constituent does not affect the position of *only* and that there is no interaction between the number of syllables in the verb and the number of syllables in the highlighted constituent on the whole. (Note: The only possible exceptional case is PostA. In that case, there is a trend towards a significant interaction between the number of syllables in the verb and the number of syllables in the highlighted constituent ( $F(1,47) = 4.019$ ;  $P=0.051$ ). We will return to this point in the next section.)
- (b) (i) The type of prepositional phrase does affect the position of *only* (i.e.,  $F(2,242,91,928) = 22.616$ ;  $P<0.001^2$  in the case of PrV,  $F(3,135) = 4.952$ ;  $P=0.003$  in the case of PrA and  $F(3,138) = 7.696$ ;  $P<0.001$  in the case of PostA). *Only* applying to adjuncts (e.g., *They go out ON FRIDAY EVENING*) chooses PrV most frequently. On the other hand, *only* applying to passive by prepositional phrases (e.g., *This song is loved BY OUR GENERATION*) chooses PrA and PostA frequently, and *only* applying to complements of prepositional verbs (e.g., *They blamed John FOR BEING LATE*) chooses PrA most frequently. Furthermore, *only* applying to complements of non-prepositional verbs (e.g., *John went TO THE PUB*) seems not to have any position chosen specifically.
- (ii) In the case of complements of non-prepositional verbs, the number of syllables in the verb (or verb phrase) preceding the highlighted constituent partially affects the position of *only*.
- (iii) There was no correlation between the position of *only* and the semantic closeness of the highlighted constituent to the verb (or verb phrase).
- (c) (i) The type of noun modifier does not affect the position of *only*. In general, neither *only* applying to quantitative expressions (e.g., *John keeps ONE dog and John has A FEW books*) nor *only* applying to non-quantitative expressions (e.g., *John keeps BLACK dogs and John has ACADEMIC books*) has a favourite position. This means that the results do not support Rissanen's (1980) claim that *only* applying to noun modifiers favours PrA.
- (ii) However, the type of noun modifier indicating quantity affects the position of *only* in some cases. It is shown between *one* and *two*. *Only* applying to *two* (e.g., *This town has TWO pubs*) chooses PrV frequently ( $F(1,23) = 10.603$ ;  $P=0.003$ ) and does not choose PrA frequently ( $F(1,23) = 10.602$ ;  $P=0.003$ ). On the other hand, *only* applying to *one* has no position chosen frequently.
- (d) In the case of *only* applying to clauses, *only* chooses PrV frequently, despite different types of clause and different length of highlighted clause.

#### 5 WHY DOES THE POST-ADJACENT POSITION INCREASE WHEN THE VERB CHANGES FROM ONE-SYLLABLE TO THREE-SYLLABLE?

As was demonstrated in the previous section, the number of syllables in the preceding verb affects PrV and PostA positions of *only* applying to objects and the direction of changing the position of *only* is from PrV to PostA when the number of syllables in the preceding verb changes from one to three. Figure 1 below presents the overall results. Tables 1 and 2 illustrate detailed results of some examined sentences.

<sup>2</sup> The Greenhouse-Geisser test was used, since the Mauchly test was significant ( $P=0.038$ ) in this case.

Figure 1. The position of 'only'




Table 1. The positional difference of 'only' when one-syllable noun is preceded by one-syllable verb and by three-syllable verb

	PrV	PrA	PostA
met Bill (one-syllable verb)	8	4	0
supported Bill (three-syllable verb)	2	5	5
saw that guy (one-syllable verb)	8	3	1
telephoned that guy (three-syllable verb)	4	1	7
knows Kim (one-syllable verb)	10	2	0
respected Kim (three-syllable verb)	4	5	3
knows Nick (one-syllable verb)	8	3	1
invited Nick (three-syllable verb)	4	4	4

Table 2. The positional difference of 'only' when three-syllable noun is preceded by one-syllable verb and by three-syllable verb

	PrV	PrA	PostA
met Emily (one-syllable verb)	6	5	1
contacted Emily (three-syllable verb)	5	3	4
met his counsellor (one-syllable verb)	5	6	1
contacted his counsellor (three-syllable verb)	2	5	5
knows his employer (one-syllable verb)	7	5	0
telephoned his employer (three-syllable verb)	3	6	3
loves his accountant (one-syllable verb)	5	6	1
invited his accountant (three-syllable verb)	2	4	6


The important point to note is that the number of PostA increases in accordance with the increase of the number of syllables in the verb preceding the highlighted constituent, whereas the number of PrA is more or less the same between the case of one-syllable verbs and that of three-syllable verbs. Why does PostA become chosen in the case of three-syllable verbs?

One plausible explanation for this phenomenon is found in the rhythmic unbalance caused when the number of syllables in the verbs changes from one to three. From a rhythmic point of view, putting *only* in PrV does not keep the balance in the case of a three-syllable verb. This is obvious if you pronounce *only supported Bill* or *only telephoned that guy*, for instance. The three-syllable verb is located between *only*, which is the two-syllable word, and a one-syllable noun. The rhythmic unbalance is caused by the fact that the long syllable word is located between the two short syllable words. Putting *only* in PostA, like putting it in PrA, may sort out this rhythmic unbalance, since the combination of *only* in the adjacent position to the highlighted constituent and the highlighted constituent creates a similar number of syllables in the three-syllable verb. For example, either *supported only Bill* or *supported Bill only* is more

natural than *only supported Bill* from the rhythmic point of view. Moreover, I propose that the rhythmic unbalance caused by three-syllable verbs is more serious for one-syllable nouns than for three-syllable nouns. Contrary to the one-syllable noun, in the case of the three-syllable noun, the number of syllables in the preceding verb and the number of syllables in the noun is the same.

There is evidence in support of the serious rhythmic unbalance in the case of one-syllable nouns. Interestingly, the interaction between the number of syllables in the verb and the number of syllables in the highlighted constituent is marginally significant in the case of PostA ( $F(1,47) = 4.019$ ;  $P=0.051$ ). As Figure 2 shows, the mean number of PostA is the biggest in the combination of three-syllable verb and one-syllable noun (e.g., *John supported Bill* and *John telephoned that guy*).

Figure 2. Interaction between the number of syllables in the verb and the number of syllables in the noun



In addition to this, the difference between the combination of one-syllable verb and one-syllable noun (e.g., *John met Bill*) and that of three-syllable verb and one-syllable noun (e.g., *John supported Bill*) is bigger than the difference between the combination of one-syllable verb and three-syllable noun (e.g., *John met Susanna*) and that of three-syllable verb and three-syllable noun (e.g., *John respected Susanna*), with respect to the mean number of PostA. All these things demonstrate that the rhythmic unbalance caused by three-syllable verbs is more serious for one-syllable nouns than for three-syllable nouns.

What should be noticed, however, is that the rhythmic unbalance partly but not fully explains the fact that the number of PostA rapidly increases in the case of three-syllable verbs. It is equally possible, logically speaking, for *only* to occur in PrA or PostA, since the combination of *only* in PrA and the highlighted object (e.g., *only Bill* in *John supported only Bill*) also creates the three syllables like the combination of the highlighted noun and *only* in PostA (e.g., *Bill only* in *John supported Bill only*). Here another possible explanation suggests itself for the motivation to favour PostA in the case of three-syllable verbs. The motivation, I propose, is related to what Tomlin (1986:73-74) calls the *Verb-Object Bonding principle*. This principle claims that a transitive verb and its object are syntactically and semantically more tightly bonding to each other than a transitive verb and its subject are. From a point of view of this principle, PostA is an ideal position in that it does not intervene between the verb and the object. Given that, it is assumed that not only keeping the rhythmic balance but also the Verb-Object Bonding principle would be the motivation to put *only* in PostA. The phenomenon that the number of PostA increases in accordance with the increase of the number of syllables in the verb preceding the highlighted constituent would admit of no other explanation.

This paper has demonstrated that the unmarked position of *only* (i.e., the position in which it occurs most frequently and most neutrally) is not always fixed even among constituents having the same syntax: the unmarked position of *only* varies depending on the number of syllables in the verb preceding the highlighted direct object in a given clause. Similarly, *only* applying to prepositional phrases varies its position according to the type of prepositional phrase. Moreover, to some extent this applies to *only* highlighting noun modifiers indicating quantity. On the other hand, the test has revealed that PrV is the unmarked position for *only* applying to all the types of clause examined (i.e., *if*-clause, *to*-clause or *wh*-clause). Neither the type of clause nor the length of highlighted clause affects the position of *only*.

The question of what is the unmarked position of *only* has long been discussed but there is no generally accepted answer. The results raised in this study shed new light on this issue. The positional variation of *only* is more complicated than has been suggested so far. Crucially, the results clearly demonstrate that even among constituents having the same syntax, the unmarked position of *only* is not necessarily the same; yet there exist some highly systematic patterns. The significance of this study lies in the fact that, being based on empirical data, it offers a credible account and a more adequate explanation than do other studies of *only*.

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