IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN CATALUNYA

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Ph.D.
University of Edinburgh
1999

ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores links between immigration into Catalunya and Catalan nationalism. This topic is important since sixty percent of present day Catalans are immigrants, or their descendants. In this light the following questions are investigated: How has immigration influenced conceptions of Catalunya as a nation? How has Catalan nationalism managed to include these members of its society in the Catalan project? What is 'the Catalan model of integration'? How is the more recent immigration from outside the European Union viewed? How has the notion of 'integration' been translated into citizenship rights for these immigrants? And, how do immigrants themselves view this process of 'integration'?

Earlier literature on immigration in Spain and Catalunya tended to focus on understanding Spain's new role as a country of immigration. These studies were mostly policy-driven and quantitative. Their main aim was to provide a map of immigration in terms of numbers, places of origin and settlement, gender and sectors of employment. This dissertation aims to provide a more historical and wider analysis of the phenomenon. The historical roots of immigration are examined in order to understand the present situation; a more qualitative approach is taken with reference to immigrants' views and experiences; and finally issues of immigration are linked to wider debates surrounding citizenship rights and Catalan nationalism.

The dissertation is based on research carried out in Catalunya. There are three main aspects to this research: a historical and statistical study of immigration; an analysis of the legislation and policies surrounding immigration and fieldwork among non-EU immigrants in Barcelona.

The main results of the dissertation can be summarised as follows: first, Catalan nationalism has been fairly successful in including immigrants in its project; this has been possible because of its civic nature. Accordingly, a person who 'lives and works in Catalunya' is defined as a Catalan. Likewise, the Catalan language has become a core symbol of Catalan nationalism and a key instrument of integration in to Catalan society. Second, an analysis of the debates surrounding 'historic immigration' highlights the way in which the 'Catalan model of integration' developed. This model continues to shape present day debates regarding the more recent immigration from outside the European Union. Third, a close study of the most recent immigration shows the following characteristics: it is extremely heterogeneous in terms of places of origin; in spite of attempts to curb its rise, immigrants continue to arrive and settle in Catalunya. Fourth, the legislation and policies surrounding this immigration are a reflection of these trends: the emphasis has shifted from control to integration. In Catalunya, legislation has sought to integrate immigrants by granting them citizenship rights. Fifth, immigrants' views of their situation in Catalunya are mixed. On the one hand, immigrants identify with certain aspects of Catalan nationalism. However, they feel that the citizenship rights they have been granted do not allow them to become fully integrated members of Catalan society.

DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself and that the work is

my own.

Sarah Gore Cortés

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

INTRODUCTION

Throughout its history, Catalunya has been a country of immigration, a country that has welcomed and integrated people from everywhere. The open and optimistic character of our people, the economic dynamism, the ability to welcome and integrate have been, without a doubt, decisive factors of attraction for all those people who have chosen our country as a place to live and work. And we have been able to do this without losing our identity, which is something that every country needs to preserve. But now we have a new challenge: the arrival of people who come from countries of the Third World.

Jordi Pujol, President of the *Generalitat de Catalunya*[1] in Preface to the **Informe de Girona**, 1992.

Immigration has played an important role in Catalunya. First and foremost it has been important demographically: 60% of present day Catalans are immigrants, or their descendants. Immigration has also played a role in the way Catalunya has defined itself as a nation.

Historically, immigration to Catalunya has been from other areas of Spain. In more recent times this immigration has been from, to use Jordi Pujol's terms, 'the third world'. How is this recent immigration different? Is this new immigration regarded as a 'challenge' or as a 'problem'? A second quote from Jordi Pujol shows the way in which cultural differences are believed to make integration harder:

After all, it is easier to integrate a western atheist than a Muslim because the cultural ways of thinking are different ... In Catalunya, or in any European country ... it is easy to integrate Polish people, Italians or Germans, but not an Arab who has a strong Muslim experience, even if they are not a fundamentalist.

Jordi Pujol in (Stolcke 1995).

Immigration from outside the European Union (EU) is a new phenomenon not only in Catalunya, but throughout the Spanish state. However, the number of immigrants residing and working in Spain is low - only 540,000 foreign residents (less than 2% of the Spanish population) and they account for only 0.3% of the working population (Anuario de Migraciones 1997).

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[1] The '*Generalitat de Catalunya*' is the Autonomous Government of Catalunya. In 1979 Spain was divided in to 17 autonomous communities with different levels of self-government.

Catalunya is especially interesting for various reasons. Firstly, due to its long history of immigration arriving from other areas of Spain, Catalan nationalism has had to find a way to include these newly arrived people into its project[2]. Secondly, Catalunya attracts a high number of immigrants from outside the EU. Finally, within the Spanish context, Catalunya has been one of the most active autonomous communities in terms of passing policies on immigration.

This dissertation aims to explore the links between immigration[3] and nationalism in Catalunya. The main way in which this link is explored is through an investigation of citizenship rights, that is, the rights that immigrants are granted in Catalunya. In this context citizenship is defined broadly to include both aspects of formal and informal citizenship[4].

There has recently been an increase in Spanish literature on non-EU immigration. However, outside Spain, the country is still regarded (on the whole) as a country of emigration. Recent studies on the links between immigration, the development of citizenship rights and issues of national identity have not considered Spain. In Catalunya, very few studies have focused on the development of citizenship rights for immigrants. Likewise the link between immigration, citizenship rights and wider debates on Catalunya and Catalan nationalism have remained unexplored. Various studies have focused on citizenship rights and issues of integration by analysing the legislation. However the application of the policies is not analysed. Likewise the views of the non-EU immigrants, to whom this legislation is directed, are not considered.

This dissertation is based on research carried out in Barcelona, the capital of Catalunya. There are three main aspects to the research: a historical and statistical analysis of immigration (from other areas of Spain as well as from outside the

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[2] As is discussed in Chapters Three and Four, there are many different versions of Catalan nationalism (and the role of immigrants play in Catalunya).

[3] The main focus of the dissertation is on immigrants from outside the European Union. Immigrants from outside the European Union are the focus of politicians, legislation and the media. The main point of contrast is the 'historical' immigration of workers from other parts of Spain. As will be discussed throughout the dissertation, there are many perceived similarities between these types of immigrants.

4 .I use 'formal citizenship' to refer to the legal status of being a national of a country. 'Informal citizenship' or 'substantial citizenship' includes the wider social, political and economic issues as well as the feelings of 'belonging'.

2

European Union); an analysis of the legislation and policies surrounding immigration; and fieldwork among immigrants in Barcelona.

Due to time constraints I limited the research in a number of ways. Firstly, I decided not to do comparative research, but to focus solely on Barcelona. At one stage I had thought of doing comparative research - between Barcelona and a rural area of Catalunya, between Catalunya and the Basque country, or between Catalunya and Scotland. I was, however, committed to doing an ethnography and simply did not have the time or resources to do a thorough ethnography of two locations. I felt that the final ethnographies would be too superficial. For this reason, I decided to do an in-depth study of one location. This would provide an in-depth case study which other people could then draw comparisons from. I restricted my study to the city of Barcelona. Barcelona, and its industrial belt, has attracted a large number of immigrants, both 'historic' and new. Secondly, I decided to focus on 'economic immigration', leaving aside asylum seekers. While the legislation on asylum seekers is different, their day-to-day experiences of life in Catalunya are similar to those of 'economic immigrants'. Finally, most of my interviews were with people who participated in non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and immigrant associations. I was interested in the views of immigrants who were most active in these associations, because they were in contact with many immigrants, with other associations, and with the different tiers of government. The views presented in the final chapters of the dissertation should therefore be seen as those of people who are actively involved in the struggle for citizenship rights for immigrants in Catalunya.

A DISCUSSION OF TERMS

In this section I discuss some of the terms used in debates surrounding immigration in Spain. These terms gain a specific meaning in the Spanish context so a brief introduction to them is necessary.

The term 'immigrant' has got a number of meanings in Catalunya. When I was in Barcelona I was often asked what my research was on and when I replied 'immigration', people would inevitably ask 'what immigration: the Spanish immigration or the extracommunitarian one?' In the Catalan context 'immigration' refers both to people who have moved to Catalunya from other areas of Spain and to people who come from outside the European Union. Although many of the people who originate from other areas of Spain have lived in Catalunya for

decades, they are still referred to as 'immigrants'. The anthropologist Manuel Delgado has asked 'when does one stop being an immigrant?' (1997) and it seems that in some cases people will always be 'immigrants'. While aspects of this 'historic immigration' are discussed in this dissertation, the main focus is on more recent immigration from beyond the frontiers of the European Union.

Before turning to immigrants from outside Spain, I want to look at the related notion of *extranjero*. An *extranjero* is a foreigner; the term has both a legal meaning (that of nationality) and a social one (that of being an outsider) (Smith and Blanc 1996: 72). In a survey carried out in Spain in 1992, people were asked who they immediately thought of when *extranjeros* were talked about; 72% thought of Africans and only 16% thought of Europeans (Alcobendas Tirado and Arnal Torres 1993: 170).

As stated above, the term 'immigrant' has a number of meanings. In the first place, a distinction is made between *comunitario* (Communitarian - a person who comes from the European Union) and *extracomunitario* (extracommunitarian - someone from outside the European Union). People who originate from other countries of Europe are rarely referred to as 'immigrants'. People who work for multinationals or British and German pensioners settling on the coasts (to give two examples) are not regarded as 'immigrants'. In their case other words, such as foreign resident or *comunitario*, are used. The word 'immigrant' is reserved for those people who arrive in Spain in search of employment, 'whose destiny is to occupy the worst places in the social system which receives them' (Delgado 1997: 9). It is this group of people who are percieved as needing special welfare provisions. It is the extracommunitarians who receive most atention from academia, from the media, and from politicians.

The main focus of policy making is 'extracommunitarian immigration'. In the legislation passed by the central state, this immigration is portrayed as mostly single, male, and uneducated. In the policies of the *Generalitat* immigrants are given the following characteristics: they come alone; they do not have stable jobs; they work in less well paid jobs; they have housing problems; and their judicial status in Spain is unstable. All these factors demand more welfare provisions for immigrants (Generalitat de Catalunya 1993).

There is a clear confusion in the legislation as to whether this immigration is temporary or permanent. On the whole, immigration is portrayed as temporary and yet the fact that immigration might be more permanent is acknowledged by the recent changes in the focus of the legislation to include aspects of integration.

Extracommunitarian immigrants are made visible by the media (Droukas 1998). The central images are those of 'moral panic': poverty and economic need, clandestinity and 'swamping'. The following headline (one of many) highlights this clearly:

> Illegal immigration invades the southern coasts of Spain during the summer months (**El País**, 8.8.99)

The dichotomy of 'legal' versus 'illegal' immigrants is also important. Legal immigrants are those who have valid and up-to-date work or residency permits in Spain. Who does the term 'illegal immigrant' refer to? 'Illegal immigrant' refers to people who do not have a work or residence permit in Spain. Immigrants may have had these papers in the past but have been unable to renew them due to the complicated bureaucratic process involved. Various organisations have argued that the widespread use of the term 'illegal', especially in the media, has created a negative image of this group of people - it identifies them with crime, drugs and other activities of the sort. However, in many cases 'illegals' live and work in conditions similar to 'legals'; the only difference is the papers they have been given by the Spanish state. Colectivo IOE's report (1987) claimed that the immigration legislation of the 1980s intensified the difference between those classified as 'legal' and 'illegal'.

Malgesini (1997: 199) states that 'integration', in spite of its ambiguous and contested meaning, is possibly the most common concept used in policies directed towards immigration. The heterogeneous and dynamic nature of immigration means that policies towards integration must be equally flexible and dynamic. In the policies surrounding immigration, 'integration' is defined as a dynamic process. There are various aspects to this integration which include 'considering the immigrants in all aspects, not only as a worker but as a citizen, with needs in the areas of education, culture, health and social participation' (Dirección General de Migraciones 1994: 36). Drawing from my own research, I would add participation in the labour market as a crucial aspect of integration.

In the Spanish context the ideas of 'assimilation' and 'multiculturalism' are generally rejected as too static. The term *interculturalitat* (interculturality) is preferred as an active, 'dynamic process that depends on the process of interaction and interconnection of all members of society' (Generalitat de Catalunya 1993: 43). Many of the policies analysed in this dissertation reflect this idea of exchange.

OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS

Chapter One explores the relationship between immigration, citizenship and ideas of national identity. It points to the ways in which immigration has contributed to putting citizenship back on the political agenda in Western Europe. In the first half of the chapter, I highlight the different models of citizenship and argue that states continue to be the key decision-makers when it comes to granting citizenship rights to immigrants. In the second half of the chapter, I outline the development of citizenship rights in Spain's history: I focus mainly on the development of nationality laws but also point to the informal aspects of citizenship.

Chapter Two discusses the methodological issues concerning how the research was carried out. It discusses general issues regarding research on 'sensitive topics' and then provides an account of the fieldwork carried out in Barcelona. The issue of access to a 'hidden population' is discussed in detail since this involved constant negotiation; issues of access had a decisive influence on the final contents of the dissertation.

Chapter Three highlights some key aspects of Catalan history and nationalism. It outlines the historical development of Catalunya as a nation and the roots of Catalan nationalism. In the final section it looks at more recent developments since the transition to democracy in 1975: the creation of the State of the Autonomies and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy The chapter discusses the civic nature of Catalan nationalism and its main features, amongst which language plays a key role as a 'core symbol'.

Chapter Four analyses immigration of people from other areas of Spain into Catalunya. I outline the way in which immigration, due to its demographic importance, has been crucial in shaping the debates about the nature of Catalunya. I look at demographic factors (places of origin and settlement, and areas of employment) of the different waves of immigration. These waves of immigration

have led to the idea of the 'Catalan model of integration'. In the final section of the chapter I analyse the situation of this 'historic immigration' in present day Catalunya and conclude that while immigrants may be integrated into Catalan society, cultural aspects particular to them have not been as easily accepted.

Chapter Five is an analysis of Spain as a new country of immigration. It outlines the way in which Spain has moved from being a country of emigration to being a country of immigration. Since the mid-1970s Spain has attracted immigration from outside the European Union - mostly from North Africa and Latin America. Catalunya has attracted a large percentage of this immigration. This immigration has been very heterogeneous both in terms of its places of origin and in its areas of employment. The aim of this chapter is to explain these trends, and provide a general picture of immigration into both Spain and Catalunya.

Chapter Six analyses the legislation and policies surrounding immigration. It analyses the formalisation and codification of citizenship rights in the legislation and treats this as social and political phenomena (Shore and Wright 1997). Legislation on immigration is passed at both the level of the central state as well as the autonomous governments. The chapter highlights the way in which the legislation at the various tiers of government has different aims and has granted different rights to immigrants. At the level of the Autonomous Community of Catalunya, the final aim has been to promote 'integration' and 'interculturalitat'. But, what is meant by these terms? How is this aim translated into policies and measures?

Chapters Seven and Eight are based on in-depth interviews with immigrants in Barcelona. These chapters aim to present immigrants' attitudes to life in Catalunya. Chapter Seven concentrates on the immigrants' views of their legal, political and social citizenship rights. Their responses highlighted the ways in which some groups of immigrants are perceived to be in a better position than other groups. Latin Americans are perceived to be in a better position because they speak Castilian and have privileges in terms of acquiring residence and nationality. The final section of the chapter highlights immigrants' attitudes towards the concept of 'integration': what did they think it meant and what did they think it should be about?

Chapter Eight focuses on immigrants' attitudes to various elements of Catalan nationalism: its nature; its symbols (including the central role played by the Catalan language); stereotypes associated with Catalans; and reactions to different definitions of what it means to be 'a Catalan'.

The Conclusion summarises the findings of the different chapters of the dissertation in order to highlight the tension between inclusion and exclusion in various aspects of life in Catalunya.

CHAPTER ONE

IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Everywhere, and from now on as much in the society of origin as in the host society, [the immigrant] calls for a complete rethinking of the legitimate bases of citizenship and of the relationship between the state and the nation or nationality (Pierre Bourdieu in Stolcke 1995).

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I investigate the relationship between immigration, citizenship and ideas of nationhood. Ideas of nationhood and citizenship rights are interlocked - the one defines the other and immigration questions them both. This chapter aims to explore some of these links. The first section deals with the relationship between immigration, citizenship rights and ideas of nationhood. This is done through looking at different models of citizenship. The main focus is on the work of Rogers Brubaker and Yasmin Soysal. While Brubaker argues that the 'nation-state' continues to be central in the definition of citizenship (1992), Soysal talks about postnational citizenship (1994). Soysal's model of 'postnational citizenship' states that 'national citizenship is losing ground to a more universal model of membership, anchored in deterritoralised notions of persons' rights' (1994: 3).

The second section of the chapter explores how Spain fits the different models of citizenship. It examines the changes and developments in Spain's nationality laws and then highlights the informal aspects of citizenship. This section provides an overall picture of the citizenship rights granted to immigrants. These rights will be explored and analysed in more detail in the following chapters.

Immigration, in the sense of the arrival of people from outside the national borders, has forced the issue of citizenship onto the political agenda of many countries[1]. It is in this context that citizenship rights become important:

Citizenship is *prima facie* uninteresting because it is formal and official. But this neglects the fact that the formalisation and codification are themselves social phenomena with sociologically interesting effects (Brubaker 1992: 22).

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[1] This is true for many countries of the world, but in this thesis I will concentrate on Western Europe and Spain in particular.

Citizenship is generally defined as 'full membership of a community' (Marshall 1983: 6). And, 'historically this 'community' has been the nation' (Joppke 1998b: 315). However, this definition includes two constantly changing, interrelated issues: what do we mean by 'membership'? And what does 'community' refer to? Both of these issues are open to constant discussion and redefinition. Membership of a national community was previously assumed to be internally inclusive and non-problematic. Although membership may never have been straightforward, it is true that issues of membership are becoming increasingly complicated; there are many ways of 'being a member'.

This leads on to the second issue: the definition of the national community. It is no longer possible to see the national community as an unproblematic, homogenous entity. The 'national community' was previously equated to the 'nation-state'. This equation is now under reassessment, both from above and below. From above, the challenge comes from processes like the creation of the European Union and wider processes of globalisation. From below, groups within the 'nation-state' are claiming the right to be treated as different. These groups can be 'neo-nationalists' (McCrone 1998) or people who have arrived from beyond the 'nation-state', that is immigrants.

In the Spanish context, there are many debates on issues of membership and definitions of 'national community'. Regarding membership, the increase in immigration arriving in Spain has meant an increase in the legislation about who is (and the extent to which they are) included as members. Definitions of the 'national community' are also changing. The 1979 constitution created a new concept of Spain which transformed the internal configuration of power. Spain was divided in to seventeen autonomous communities and three communities were given the status of 'historic nations'. As one of these 'historic nations', Catalunya has increased its powers over the past decades. Regarding immigration, the legislative power to do with aspects of formal citizenship still lies with the central state; but some aspects of substantive citizenship are decided at the level of the Generalitat[2].

Spain joined the European Community in 1986. As yet, there is no European immigration policy. However, working groups on immigration and treaties such as

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[2] This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.

Schengen, Maastricht, and Dublin all show different attempts to harmonise issues to do with immigration and citizenship rights across the European Union (Mitchell and Russell 1996). Spain, as the Southern border of the EU and along with Italy and Portugal '[occupies] the first line of 'defence" (Miles 1993: 199). Spain also has a special relationship with Latin America. In many ways, Spain acts as an 'intermediary' between Latin America and the European Union. Regarding immigration legislation, Spain has maintained its links with Latin America by granting nationals from these countries preferential treatment.

CITIZENSHIP AS MEMBERSHIP AND IMAGINED IDEAS OF NATION

Stuart Hall and David Held have commented on the fact that except in the areas of race and immigration 'citizenship has been largely absent from political discussion and debate for more than two decades' (1989: 173). While more recently people have discussed citizenship around issues to do with social class (Bottomore 1992), and the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990) it is around issues of immigration that I wish to discuss citizenship.

Citizenship defines who is, and who is not, a member of a nation. It also defines the extent and manner in which one is a member. Below, I analyse the different ways in which citizenship has been defined and the ways it has been used to discuss membership of a national community.

In **Citizenship and Social Class** (1950) Marshall defined citizenship as 'a status bestowed on all those who are full members of a community' (1950: 28). Likewise Barbalet states: 'citizenship can readily be described as participation in or membership of a community' (1988: 2). Citizenship extends beyond its formal definitions to include more subtle aspects of membership: the 'cultural and social rights'.

Citizenship is therefore a broad, flexible concept. I use citizenship in its widest possible sense, in both the formal and informal sense. In the first instance I look at issues of formal citizenship, more specifically, the legislation surrounding naturalisation. I also look at the informal aspects of citizenship, the possession and granting of certain social and cultural rights, and citizenship as a form of belonging and membership.

Marshall's classification of citizenship rights is a place to start since it provides a framework through which to analyse the different aspects. Although there is a clear need to go beyond his work, Marshall divided rights into three types: social, civil and political. Civil rights were defined as 'the rights necessary for individual freedom - liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice' (1983: 249). Political rights were the 'rights to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body'(1983: 249). Finally, social rights were loosely defined as 'the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society' (1983: 249). Marshall based his definitions on the way in which these rights developed historically in Britain, civil rights in the eighteenth century, followed by political and then social rights in the nineteenth century[3].

Citizenship is a flexible and fluid concept. Hammer makes the point effectively:

> The meaning of the term citizenship varies from country to country, following legal traditions, the history of each particular nation and state, and aspirations for the future (1990: 4).

The arrival of people from outside the political community has contributed to forcing citizenship back on the agenda in two ways. Firstly, it forces on to the agenda, the definition of what it means to be a member of a particular 'nation-state'. The definition of membership is especially important at a time when the nature of the 'nation-states' in Europe is changing. It is also important because member states of the European Union are trying to harmonise policies which derive from the definitions of 'nation-states'. Secondly, immigration forces us to recognise that citizenship is not internally inclusive: there are wide discrepancies between the rights of members and non-members (Bauböck 1991; Hammar 1993). Although the division between members and non-members exists, there are many degrees of belonging. Hammar uses the term 'denizen' to refer to 'foreign citizens with a legal and permanent resident status' who are 'entitled to equal treatment in all spheres of

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[3]There have been various criticisms made of Marshall's theory of citizenship: it is seen as too English based, too evolutionary in its character and ignores both the gender and the 'ethnic dimension' of citizenship (Bottomore 1992).

life, with full access to the labour market, business, education, social welfare [and] ...' (1990: 12).

Hammar uses the concept of citizenship in a way that is more specific and relevant to immigration and issues of inclusion, exclusion and belonging. When looking at the exclusionary nature of citizenship, Hammer's analysis of the different kinds of citizenship rights given to immigrants is important. Who is defined as a member? Who is defined as a non-member? On what basis are these decisions made? What implications do they have?

In his analysis Hammar distinguishes four aspects of citizenship. The first aspect is legal membership; this is the most straightforward aspect since it is a formal status that is attributed to the individual according to rules laid down by the state. Secondly, there is political membership - having the right to vote - and this 'involves loyalty to the state; it involves support for its fundamental principles of government and for its basic shared values'. The third aspect is social and cultural membership. Finally, Hammer points to the psychological dimension where citizenship is considered 'an expression of individual identification'. Hammar focuses on the relationship between long term permanent residents (denizens) and the state[4]. He also looks at the relationship between formal and informal citizenship (Hammar 1990).

MODELS OF CITIZENSHIP

In the section below I discuss two models which analyse the relationship between citizenship and the 'nation state' and how this relationship has been affected by immigration. In the first instance I turn to Brubaker's position of 'citizenship traditionalism'[5] where the 'nation-state' continues to be the key player in the decisions about citizenship. I then move on to analyse Soysal's theory of 'postnational citizenship'. Soysal argues that the 'nation-state' is no longer relevant for citizenship; people are granted rights through international bodies and agreements.

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[4]Hammar believes that states still grant citizenship rights and that the situation of denizens is an anomaly that has to be solved in the future.

[5] This is the term Joppke (1998a; 1999) uses to refer to Brubaker's models.

Brubaker's 'citizenship traditionalism'

In **Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany** (1992), Brubaker examines the historical development of citizenship rights in these two countries. He wants to explain why these two countries, whose experience of immigration is so similar (in terms of numbers as well as in the timing and characteristics of it) have responded so differently when granting citizenship rights to 'non-members'. He examines the German and the French models of citizenship - ethnic and civic respectively - and links them to the development of Germany and France as 'nation states'. He argues that the modern state is bounded and history determines the way they are bounded. Brubaker concludes that citizenship is about closure and exclusion of non-members, and that the state continues to be the most important player in the granting of rights. The state has always been, and continues to be, a very stable institution where there is little room for change: 'understandings of nationhood have remained surprisingly robust' (1992: 3).

The ethnic model of citizenship is a restrictive model, based on *jus sanguinis* (the law of blood) where citizenship rights are attributed through lineage. The prime example of this ethnic model is Germany where the idea of nationhood is centred on the *volk*. The Germans had a 'romantic understanding of nationhood as ethnic and cultural community' where political unity was secondary (for more details see Schmidt 1999). This is reflected in the 1913 Reich citizenship law (also true of the 1949 Basic Law) which granted citizenship to Germans and their descendants outside the German state (Klusmeyer 1993: 83).

> [T]he German definition of citizenry as a community of descent, restrictive toward non-German immigrants yet remarkably expansive toward the ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, reflects the pronounced ethnocultural inflection in German self-understanding (Brubaker 1992: 14).

What are the outcomes of this ethnic model for immigration? As far as naturalisation (formal citizenship) is concerned, in practice it is much easier to become a German citizen if you have German blood in your veins than if you have simply resided there for a long period of time, as is the case for many of the 1.4 million Turks resident in Germany.

Naturalisation figures for Germany are low. In 1984 there were 14,695 naturalisations of non-Germans compared to the 23,351 naturalisations granted through claims to German ancestry (Hailbronner 1989: 68). In 1990 and again in

1993, there was a relaxation in the conditions that non-German residents had to meet to become German nationals: a shorter period of residence in the country and fewer conditions to be met (Kreuzer 1997). This change was reflected in the naturalisation figures: the number of naturalisations 'rose in 1994 at about 54% and in 1995 at about 23% to the preceding year' (Kreuzer 1997). However, in spite of this slight move to include territorial rights in the conception of German citizenship, its acquisition remains a discretionary process (Bryant 1997: 161)[6].

With regards to other rights for immigrants (informal citizenship) the reforms of 1990 showed the closed nature of German immigration laws regarding foreign workers:

> The German government argued that immigration of people from alien cultures is not in the national interest as social and political stability are tied to the national homogeneity of the state (Schmidt 1999: 99).

The 1990 reforms banned the entry and recruitment of workers. Nevertheless exceptions were made to this restriction by introducing a quota system and allowing people to enter on short-term contracts. This legislation was therefore very similar to that which faced, and continues to affect, the guestworkers of previous decades (Fulbrook 1996; Schmidt 1999; Weil 1996).

The French model of citizenship is 'civic', based on *jus soli*. The French nation 'has been conceived in relation to the institutional and territorial frame of the state: political unity, not shared culture, has been understood to constitute nationhood' (Brubaker 1990: 316). The 'Revolutionary birth' of France meant that the state, with its social and civic institutions, existed before the nation. People could become members as long as they were willing to 'assimilate'.

> Assimilation - a definite policy of making similar - is incompatible with all consistently 'organic' conceptions of membership, according to which 'natural' ethnolinguistic boundaries are still prior to and determinate of national and (ideally) state boundaries (Brubaker 1992: 8).

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[6]Although radical changes were announced by the SPD-Greens alliance in 1998, the final changes were not as radical. The time of residence for naturalisation was lowered (now eight years instead of fifteen) and double *jus soli* (this is when nationality is granted if born in the territory if at least one parent was also born in the territory) was introduced, although a choice would have to be made between nationalities at the age of 23 (Joppke 1999: 640).

15

So what implications does this civic model have for citizenship rights for immigrants? Formal citizenship is obtained through birth in the territory. Up until the 1980s a person born in France, even if their parents were not French, would automatically be granted French nationality at age 18; this was also possible after 5 years' residence in France[7]. The assumption here is that a person who has spent time in France and has been educated in France would automatically identify with 'the French way of life'.

The events in the mid 1980s showed the ways in which the principle of *jus soli* was not as straightforward as it first appeared. President Chirac's proposed reform of the Nationality Act, which withdrew the automatic acquisition of citizenship by birth in the French territory, led to so many disputes that it was finally removed (see Favell 1997). In 1993, under a different legislature, the Nationality Law was finally amended. Children born in France who would have previously been granted French citizenship automatically, now had to apply between the ages of 16 and 21 - the emphasis was on expressing a desire to be French (Bryant 1997; Smith and Blanc 1996).

The reform of this act, as well as the debates surrounding it, showed the ways in which the assimilationist model was double-sided:

> While open at the level of political incorporation, the assimilationist aspect of this idiom is closed to cultural difference (Hargreaves 1995: 176).

Dissent came from two main areas. On the one hand the so-called 'second generation immigrants' (many of whom were born in France), felt they had no element of choice, they were automatically made French citizens though in many cases they neither identified, nor wished to identify, with France (Brubaker 1992; Silverman 1992). Granted, anyone could become part of the French community but the price they had to pay - the embracing of the 'French way of life' and subjugation of their own sense of identity - was high.

On the other hand, and for a very different set of reasons, the Right was also critical of the automatic *jus soli* element of French citizenship. The Right criticised the present citizenship law because it desacralised the idea of French citizenship by

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[7] The French naturalisation figures, which are four to five times higher than in Germany (Brubaker 1992: 79), reflect the difference in concepts.

giving it to everyone and anyone, irrespective of whether they wanted it, or in fact 'deserved' it. The phrase of the extreme Right, '*Etre français, cela se mérite*' ('To be French, you have to deserve it') summed up the feelings. There was also the feeling that people were becoming French citizens on paper without being 'French at heart' (Brubaker 1992: 142)[8].

Brubaker himself admits that the models of civic and ethnic citizenship are ideal types which do not capture all nuances:

> French and German understanding of nationhood have not been fixed and immutable. They have been more fluid, plastic and internally contested than I have suggested (1992: 13).

In conclusion then Brubaker does not consider immigration to change ideas of the nation-states (Joppke 1998a: 7). By analysing the ways in which France and Germany have responded to issues of immigration, he shows the different responses based on different ideas of 'nationhood'. Within the context of the European Union there has been increasing pressure, in recent years, for policies to do with citizenship rights to converge. Policies on the admission of immigrants have converged - they have become more restrictive - and yet those to do with citizenship rights have barely changed since the underlying assumptions to do with the nature of the state have not altered.

Soysal 's post national citizenship

Yasmin Soysal (1994) agrees with Brubaker's analysis in so far as national citizenship is about exclusion. However she is in fierce disagreement with Brubaker's conclusion that citizenship has remained basically unchanged and that the 'nation-state' remains at the centre of its definition. In Soysal's view, immigration in the post-war era has led to a fundamental transformation of citizenship. These changes have 'complicated the national order of citizenship and introduced new dynamics for membership in national polities' (1996: 18). National citizenship does indeed remain a form of exclusion, but this is not vitally important

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[8]A second element which fed into these debates was the negative perception of Islam. Islam was portrayed as a threat for a number of reasons, in the first place it is seen as an obstacle to assimilation (Favell 1997: 182; and Silverman 1992 for discussion on the head scarf affair). At the same time Islam is portrayed as being on the rise, especially in certain areas, although, as Hargreaves points out, there is no clear indication on the loyalty of the 'second generation' to Islam (1995: 163).

because other forms of citizenship have become more important. She refers to these as 'postnational citizenship'.

What does Soysal mean by 'postnational citizenship'? Soysal argues that 'classical conceptions of national citizenship are no longer adequate in understanding the dynamics of membership and belonging in contemporary Europe' (1996: 21). Partial membership of the nation-state has become the norm. She claims that guestworkers have gained full civil and social rights, a relatively safe and permanent resident status, and in this context formal state citizenship is not important. She concludes that a new and stable model of postnational membership is widespread and full citizenship is not needed[9].

I agree with Soysal's claim that citizenship has been challenged by immigration, by decolonisation, by international rights, and by multi-level politics[10]. It is also true that the social and civil rights of immigrants have increased over time. However political rights, and in particular the right to vote in the country of residence, continue to be denied to the majority of immigrants. Soysal does not think this is important because in some countries (albeit a limited number) immigrants have local voting rights and because immigrants are politically organised through associations and trade unions. However most analysts of the situation of immigrants in countries of Europe would not be that optimistic. The disenfranchisement of immigrants continues to be a form of discrimination (Hammar 1990; Layton Henry 1990). This is one instance where the 'nation-state'

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[9]To support the claim that 'postnational citizenship' is a stable and new model, she uses the statistic of 15 million immigrants in Europe living as non-citizens and to support her claim that full citizenship is not what immigrants want she states: '...restrictive procedures for citizenship are only a partial reason for their foreignness. Surveys have repeatedly shown that there is not an urgent demand among immigrants themselves to take on the citizenship of their country of residence, either' (Soysal 1996: 20). I do not think that this supports her point. Firstly, the fact that 15 million people are living as denizens does not make it a good thing, or a thing they are happy with. In the second instance, it is true that first generation immigrants are reluctant to give up their nationality of origin to take up the nationality of the country they live in - they would want dual nationality. However this is not the case for second and third generation immigrants who feel they have the right to the nationality of the country in which they have been born and socialised (Mitchell and Russell 1996: 70).

[10]She lays these out as reasons for the need to change ideas of citizenship radically (Soysal 1996: 20).

18

clearly remains the main actor in the granting of citizenship rights, but there are also more subtle ones[11].

In the section above I have looked at different models of the relationship between citizenship and the 'nation-state'. In the following sections I want to turn to Spain, to see how, and to what extent, Spain fits the different models.

THE SPANISH CASE

As mentioned above, Spain has historically been regarded as a country of emigration. In the section below I outline the historical development of the formal aspect of citizenship as codified in the nationality laws. The notions of who was, and who was not, considered a Spanish national changed through time. I look at the way in which the principle of *jus soli* was replaced by one of *jus sanguinis* as Spain became an exporter of people. The second section sketches some informal aspects of citizenship (these will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters). In the final section, I look at how Spain fits into Brubaker's models of civic and ethnic citizenship or into Soysal's idea of 'postnational citizenship'.

LEGAL CITIZENSHIP: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPANISH NATIONALITY LAW

In the Spanish case there is not a single, all-encompassing law on nationality: there are various regulations scattered through the different Spanish constitutions, *Códigos Civiles* (Civil Codes) and laws (Espinar Vicente 1994; Fernández Rozas 1987; Oliván 1998). There have been numerous changes in the definitions of who has the right to Spanish nationality[12] and what rights and obligations nationality actually brings with it. In the section below I discuss the main stages in the development of these laws and regulations and show the way in which the definitions have changed through time.

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[11] See Chapters Seven and Eight for the way in which the immigrants I interviewed in Barcelona continued to use discourses of residence in a territory in order to legitimate their demands for more rights. They were not appealing to human rights to gain citizenship but to the fact that they lived, worked and paid taxes in a territory and therefore had the right to be treated equally. The debate is framed in terms of living in a territory, clearly a reference to the nation-state.

[12] Fernando Oliván says that the aspects of the *Código Civil* referring to foreigners are 'perhaps one of the articles that has most been changed of the Spanish Civil code'(1998: 28).

19

In medieval Spain, the focus was on religious differences rather than nationality. There was a certain degree of *convivencia* (coexistence) between Jews, Muslims and Christians (MacKay 1977: 4; Oliván 1998: 58). Although there was an acceptance of difference, rifts - that were to last throughout the following decades - began to appear soon (Oliván 1998: 61). Jews and Muslims lived in ghettos and most of their relationships were within their own religious group. Although they were not really considered part of the wider Christian community, there was a degree of collaboration with it (Díaz-Plaja 1995: 300; Oliván 1998: 60). However with the *Reconquista*[13] the situation began to change and the final expulsion of Jews and Muslims in 1492, put an end to the earlier level of tolerance. Finally, the 'discovery' of America meant that the debates shifted from the difference of 'others' (in legal terms) to whether they were human at all, since some argued that the natives of America did not have souls (Oliván 1998: 67).

In the first Spanish constitution, the *Constitución de Cádiz* of 1812, foreigners were defined as all those who lived outside the nation. This definition originated from the nationalist and historical tradition based on *jus soli* (Fernández Rozas 1987: 67)[14]. The constitution also laid out the way in which nationality could be lost through living abroad for more than five years without permission from the King. Another interesting aspect was the distinction made between 'Spaniards' and 'Spanish citizens'. The main difference was that the latter could lose their citizenship if they did not fulfil certain conditions: for example, if they lived outside Spain for a long period of time.

One could stop being a foreigner if one changed one's allegiance - like religion, one could simply convert from one to another (Oliván 1998: 77). The obligations of Spaniards included instances of allegiance: among them was the love of the *patria* (homeland); the obligation to be faithful to the constitution and to defend the *patria* when called upon.

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[13] The *Reconquista* was the conquest of Spain by the Catholic Kings, Isabel and Ferdinand.
[14] Article Five. Spaniards are:
Firstly: All free men born and resident in the Spanish dominions, and the children of these.
Secondly: Foreigners who have got a Naturalisation Card from the Cortés.
Thirdly: Those who without a Naturalisation Card, have been living for ten years in any village of the monarchy.

Allegiance was especially important for military purposes. Control over foreigners was linked to the politics of war and was in the hands of the *Ministerio de la Guerra y de la Marina* (Ministry for War and the Navy). It was this Ministry who issued authorisations, passports and *salvoconductos* to foreigners[15]. In 1815, anyone involved with Napoleon's troops was banned entry to Spain. In 1817 a law was passed which claimed that foreigners in the army were potentially dangerous and should therefore be given less important posts (Oliván 1998: 126), and by 1843 foreigners were completely banned from the army on the grounds that they did not have the special vocation needed to love the *patria* and fight for it like nationals (Oliván 1998: 129).

In 1817 the first regulation which protected the riches of the nation from foreigners was passed. This legislation prohibited foreign clergy from begging in Spain: 'with this the national wealth was protected from plundering by non-nationals, and solidarity was limited to those who were nationals' (Oliván 1998: 131).

Jus soli had been the main criterion for the acquisition of nationality until a circular in May 1837 which stated that birth in the Spanish territory did not automatically make a person Spanish (Espinar Vicente 1994: 68). From that point on, *jus sanguinis* was given preference. In the 1837 constitution, there was a prominence of the principle of *jus sanguinis*[16]. Fernández Rojo (1987: 68) attributed this change to the long absence of emigrants from the Spanish territory. This position continued in the 1876 constitution. At the same time, this constitution recognised the existence of foreigners living permanently in Spain and granted them full rights, with the exception of access to posts of authority.

The Civil Code of 1889 did not bring much change; nationality was still attributed by birth in the territory and by being born of Spanish parents if outside Spain. However, the main way of becoming a national was through *jus sanguinis*, since

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[15]*Salvoconductos*, (safe-conducts), issued by the military, were introduced in 1817 and passports in 1818. If a person did not have a passport, they were open to suspicion. Also in 1818, there was a separation between foreigners and traders, previously they had included under the same law, but now different legislation applied to them (Oliván 1998: 131).

[16]Article One. Spaniards are:
1. All the people who are born in the Spanish dominions.
2. The children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they have been born outside Spain.
3. Spaniards who have obtained a Naturalisation Card.
4. Those who do not have a card but have become residents of any village of the Monarchy.

although *jus soli* existed it was not automatic, as parents had to apply for it. At this stage, dual nationality was not a possibility. At the same time there was an increase in the control of foreigners. In 1902, foreigners had to register at the local government offices and consulates. The first rules on immigration and the recognition of employment of foreigners appeared around this time (Oliván 1998: 135).

The 1931 Republican constitution aimed to introduce substantial changes. Many of these changes, however, were not introduced because of the short-lived nature of the Republic. The constitution aimed to expand Spanish nationality to include both aspects of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*. It also included dual nationality; eliminated discrimination due to gender; and protected Spaniards abroad if the country they were residing in did not do so (Fernández Rozas 1987: 73). However, preference was still given to *jus sanguinis* since descendants of Spaniards would automatically get Spanish nationality, while nationality due to birth in the territory was granted only when applied for.

Following the 1929 economic crisis, there was an increase in control over the entrance of foreign workers into Spain. A decree in 1935 recognised the existence of foreigners living in Spain and gave them some rights (Oliván 1998: 136). It also introduced a work permit, called the *Tarjeta de Identidad Profesional* (Professional Identification Card), which was issued by the Ministry of Employment (Gonzalez Campos 1979: 180).

The reform under Franco, in 1954, did not mean a radical change in the law. However, it did introduce for the first time, the idea of double *jus soli* - this was the automatic attribution of Spanish nationality to those born in Spain of foreign parents, as long as the parents were born in Spain and were resident in Spain at the time of birth (Article 17). The law also laid down rules for the acquisition and loss of Spanish nationality. One could opt for Spanish nationality if one had been born in Spain of foreign parents, or if one had been born outside Spain of parents who had been born in Spain (even if they were no longer Spanish nationals). One could also apply to become a Spaniard through residing in Spain - ten years was the required residence time but it could be reduced to five years if one had made an important contribution to the economic or cultural life of Spain.

Privileges were granted to nationals of those countries who were considered to have 'historic links' with Spain. Preference was given to those people from Latin America and the Philippines - the residency requirement for them was only two years. In 1969, nationals from these countries were exempted from getting a work permit - this also included people from Portugal, Andorra and those who had treaties with Spain, for example Germany.

Various elements survived the democratic reforms after 1975 and entered the new nationality laws. Among the elements which survived were: firstly, the privileges given to Latin Americans and people from the Philippines remained. Secondly, the protection of the Spanish emigrants abroad continued.

Once again, these reforms took place in different documents. The constitution did not deal with the issue, but referred to the laws to be drawn up in the future:

> Article 11.1 Spanish nationality is acquired, maintained and lost due to the terms established by the law.

Following the 1978 constitution, a new nationality law was finally passed in 1982. Fernández Rozas (1987: 84) stated that not much parliamentary time or effort was put into the discussion of the law, because this was the time when the LOAPA (Law for the Harmonisation of the Autonomic Process) was being discussed[17]. The final law was so unclear, that a new *Reglamento* (Rules of application) had to be passed in 1983 to clarify its application and a new law was passed in 1990.

Fernández Rozas claims that some areas suffered from this lack of discussion:

> For example, the interest in dignifying the figure of the emigrant, although praiseworthy, stopped the overall text being more progressive (1987: 85-86).

However the law did make important changes. There was an increase in the ways in which nationality could be attributed - one instance was if a person was born in Spain of stateless parents. *Jus soli* was made applicable to those born in Spain to stateless parents and those born in Spain to foreign parents (if at least one of them had also been born in Spain). However, the simple fact of being born in Spain did not automatically give you Spanish nationality; but it did allow you to apply for it after a year of residence. As can be seen, the emphasis is favourable to *jus sanguinis*.

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[17] See Chapter Three for more details.

Having a Spanish parent, automatically and in every case, makes you a Spanish citizen. Gaining Spanish nationality through birth in Spain requires a series of conditions to be met.

The latest law on nationality, passed in 1990 *(Ley 18/1990 del 17 de diciembre)* , was an attempt to 'establish a more harmonious and clear system, both in its principles and in its practical applications' (SOS Racismo 1995b: 220). The law remained unchanged with reference to the acquisition and attribution of nationality. Countries with historic links were also given privileges but the list of countries was widened to include Latin America, Andorra, Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, and Portugal. Sephardic Jews were also included in this list.

Privileges given to these countries can be found in two areas: in the acquisition of Spanish nationality through fewer years of residence and in the fact that there are 'dual nationality' treaties with these countries[18]. People from these privileged countries have no obligation to give up their previous nationality when acquiring Spanish citizenship (Article 24 of 1990 Nationality Law). This is based on individual agreements with other states and each individual agreement is different[19]. Espinar Vicente (1994: 333) argued that these bilateral treaties are not strictly speaking models of dual nationality since only one nationality can be active at a time, depending on what the person chooses. There does not seem to be a pattern to them - some require registration in a country before the nationality can be activated (for example Chile and Peru) while others only give the right to those who are Spaniards *de origen* (for example Nicaragua and Guatemala). The agreements between Spain and Latin American countries have been called 'dormant nationality' models[20].

In summary then, what are the implications of the present day nationality laws for non-European Union immigrants? In the first place there is a division between those countries with a 'historic link' with Spain and those which do not have a

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[18] Dual nationality was treated as a privilege in the constitution:
Article 11.3. The State can make dual nationality agreements with Latin American countries and with those countries that have had a special link to Spain. Spanish citizens can gain naturalisation in these same countries without losing their original nationality, even if these countries do not grant this to their own citizens.

[19] A full list of the treaties is provided by Espinar Vicente (1994: 334-339).

[20] Various authors (Brubaker 1989: 117; Hammar 1993: 127) see these as the way to solve the problem of, and resistance to, dual nationality in other European countries.

link[21]. This historic link translates into privileges in terms of rights of residence and for acquiring Spanish nationality.

In terms of the acquisition of nationality two aspects reflect the fact that Spain has predominantly been a country of emigration: firstly, the increasing role of *jus sanguinis* and secondly, the attribution of nationality through double *jus soli*. While *jus soli* exists it is no longer automatic. Clearly these measures were implemented with the protection of the Spanish emigrant in mind.

Naturalisation can also be obtained through residence in Spain. In the case of the privileged countries, the time of residence is two years, however in the case of other countries it can be up to ten years. The problem arises from the fact that this period of residence has to be legal and continuous. This is not easy to achieve with the present legislation and bureaucracy regarding work permits in present-day Spain[22].

BEYOND LEGAL CITIZENSHIP

In the preceding paragraphs I have discussed the development of the Spanish nationality laws. This is only one aspect of citizenship. In the following section I want to look at other aspects of membership which affect non-European Union immigrants[23]. In order to do so I use Hammar's concepts of political and social and cultural citizenship.

Regarding political membership, immigrants have limited rights. At present immigrants from outside the European Union do not have any voting rights in Spain. Their political rights are restricted to involvement in trade unions, the formation of associations and participation on governmental consultative bodies[24].

Hammar also looks at social and cultural membership and psychological membership[25]. Once again there is a division between those countries with a

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[21] See Chapter Six for the arbitrary nature of the notion of 'historic link'.

[22] For more details on this see Chapters Five and Six.

[23] The legal and political aspects of membership - the legislation on permits to enter, reside and work in Spain - remain in control of the central government in Madrid. Other aspects of citizenship have been transferred to the government of the Autonomous Community.

[24] These issues are discussed in Chapters Five and Six. In Chapter Seven I present the view of the immigrants I interviewed on issues of citizenship rights.

[25] At this stage I will treat this as one category since it is discussed in more detail in the following chapters.

historic link to Spain and those without. This dissertation looks at Latin Americans and Africans. While Latin Americans share language and religion with the rest of the population of Spain, most Africans share neither. In the interviews I carried out, both language and religion were important factors in terms of cultural, social and psychological feelings of belonging. In this sense, there was a clear divide between Latin Americans and Africans.

I wish to add immigrants' rights to employment to Hammar's list of aspects of citizenship. Participation of immigrants in employment is crucial to their sense of membership. At present most immigrants in Spain are restricted to low-status, unstable and badly-paid jobs. In the early 1990s a new system was introduced whereby permits were given to immigrants through a quota system. These permits are limited to particular sectors of employment and specifically prohibit movement into other areas. Given these restrictions, immigrants do not have equal access to employment and this is a clear source of discrimination[26].

IS CITIZENSHIP IN SPAIN CIVIC, ETHNIC OR POSTNATIONAL?

In the preceding section I have presented the formal and informal citizenship rights of immigrants in Spain. The question now is, what citizenship model does Spain fit?

The Spanish state continues to be responsible for work and residency permits and immigration laws. Some aspects of this legislation have been influenced by the wider issues of the European Union[27]. Harmonisation has been limited to issues of control. Legislation on integration of immigrants and on nationality has not been harmonised - they vary from state to state.

Undoubtedly the history of Spain has been central to definitions of formal citizenship. As the configuration of Spain changed, so did the definition of who was a Spaniard. Spain had lost its Empire by the nineteenth century but many Spaniards went to the Americas throughout this century and at the beginning of the twentieth century. In an attempt to maintain a link with these emigrants, *jus sanguinis* was given more importance. Spaniards have continued to emigrate in

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[26] This is discussed in more detail in the following chapters.
[27] See Chapter Six for more details.

recent times, generally to northern European countries. The principle of *jus sanguinis*, and more recently that of double *jus soli*, has maintained Spanish nationality for the children of these emigrants.

Spanish legislation on formal citizenship has managed to maintain its privileges to those countries with whom it considers to have a 'historic link'. These privileges mean that naturalisation through residence can be achieved more easily (the period of required residence is considerably lower) and dual nationality agreements have been signed with many of these countries. However, the principle of *jus soli* does allow for the eventual naturalisation of people arriving from other countries.

Regarding the informal aspects of citizenship, the legislation in Spain is very recent and *ad hoc*. The rights of immigrants are very different from those of nationals. Immigrants have no access to voting rights and their political rights are limited. Access to housing, health and education is restricted to those who have full residence and work permits. This is not surprising in itself, but the very difficulty of maintaining this legal status means that immigrants' informal rights are extremely vulnerable.

In summary, then, in Spain both civic and ethnic elements play a role but the emphasis is on the civic elements. In the Spanish case it is impossible to speak of 'postnational membership'. Immigrants do not have full political, civil and social rights. The present system of work and residency permits means that immigrants do not have a secure residency status.

CHAPTER TWO

METHODS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the methodological issues of how the research was carried out. I discuss some general issues to do with research on 'sensitive topics' (Lee 1993; Renzetti and Lee 1993) and argue that the research I carried out on immigration can be defined as 'sensitive' which raises particular ethical concerns and practical problems. The vulnerable legal position that immigrants find themselves in meant that building trusting relationships was crucial. The result was that access was constantly negotiated throughout my fieldwork, and it played such a decisive factor that it is worth examining 'the social dynamics of access processes' (Lee 1993: 121).

This chapter is divided into four main sections. In the first section I provide a description of the research I carried out. The second section moves on to general issues relating to researching sensitive issues. In the third section I discuss issues of access in great detail because gaining access was a particularly time consuming aspect of the research. I had to be extremely flexible in the way I went about this and, to a certain degree, issues of access marked the nature of the dissertation. I also provide information of other sources of data which I use throughout the dissertation. The final section presents the process by which the data was analysed. I used HyperResearch, a qualitative data analysis computer package to facilitate the coding and retrieval of data.

THE RESEARCH: BARCELONA 1997

The research for this dissertation is primarily based on the fourteen months (from November 1996 to December 1997) I spent in Barcelona. My research in Barcelona consisted of various elements: analysis of statistical data and historical studies on immigration and Catalan nationalism; analysis of legislation and policies surrounding immigration; and fieldwork among immigrants.

Firstly, I analysed historical and statistical studies. In order to understand issues of immigration in present-day Catalunya it was important to understand immigration trends through Catalunya's history. A review of the literature provided a wider

framework in which to understand my own study and conclusions drawn from it. This review gives an understanding of the characteristics of immigration: the number of immigrants, their places of origin, their arrival, and settlement into life in Catalunya. I draw on statistical data from various governmental and non-governmental sources. This statistical data is problematic[1] but it allows for an overall analysis of the phenomenon. Of equal importance was an analysis of the debates taking place across society, surrounding the different stages of immigration, and the extent to which they continued to the present day.

Secondly, legislation and policies on immigration were analysed. Legislation and policies on immigration codify ideas of membership.

> Policies are inherently and unequivocally *anthropological* phenomena...Not only do policies codify social norms and values, and articulate fundamental organising principles of society, they also contain implicit (and sometimes explicit) models of society (Shore and Wright 1997: 7).

In the case of Catalunya I was also interested in the way the various tiers of government - the central government, the autonomous community and the town hall - passed legislation on immigration. The Spanish central state still has legislative powers over many issues of immigration. Since 1993 the *Generalitat de Catalunya* (the Catalan Autonomous Government) has increasingly taken responsibility over some aspects of immigration. During my stay in Barcelona, I collected numerous official documents and policies (at all levels of government) to do with immigration.

Finally there was 'fieldwork among immigrants'. Given the nature of the issues to be researched, qualitative research methods were the most appropriate. I conducted in-depth interviews with immigrants and secondly I was involved in various non-governmental organisations (NGOs)[2] which were involved with immigration and where immigrants themselves participated. As is discussed below, my involvement varied from association to association.

While the citizenship rights of immigrants are laid out in the legislation and policies, the impact that this legislation has on immigrants themselves is not visible

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[1] This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Five.

[2] A list of the non-governmental organisations and immigrant associations I contacted is given in Appendix Two.

by simply analysing the legislation. The interviews I carried out with immigrants aimed to explore the impact of policies on the day-to-day life of immigrants. I was interested in how they viewed the legislation and to what extent they felt the legislation included or excluded them from wider Catalan society.

The interviews also aimed to explore the attitudes of immigrants towards Catalan nationalism. I was interested in knowing how immigrants, arriving from outside Spain, had made sense of Catalan nationalism, and in finding out the extent to which they identified with it.

I carried out interviews with 22 immigrants[3]. I divided these immigrants into two categories: those from Latin America and those from Africa. I based this decision on two factors: Latin Americans have certain privileges *vis-à-vis* Spanish immigration and nationality laws[4]. In addition, Latin Americans have an advantage since they can speak Castilian. The people I interviewed tended to be highly visible politically - most were, or had been, involved in non-governmental organisations or associations. This meant that they were very aware of the political and social issues surrounding immigration. Likewise, they had lived in Catalunya for several years.

Interviews were supplemented with participation in arenas where immigrants themselves were involved. Participation in these organisations (and the events they organised) provided a more rounded, in-depth account of immigrant issues. Involvement in these associations was also important for reasons of trust and access to the population and it also meant I came into contact with many issues and people who I might not have become aware of otherwise.

RESEARCHING SENSITIVE ISSUES

Lee comments that the way in which a topic is defined as 'sensitive' is 'less in the specific topic and more in the relationship between that topic and the social context - defined both broadly and narrowly - within which the research is conducted' (Lee 1993: 5).

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[3] See Appendix Two for more details.

[4] These privileges are justified in terms of countries which were 'former colonies'. These are set out in Chapter One and discussed in more detail in Chapters Five and Six.

The social context of immigration in Catalunya does in fact make it a 'sensitive topic', in the sense that it has been politicised. Although the politicisation of immigration in Spain has not been as high as in some other European countries, as time goes by immigration is increasingly becoming an issue.

The Catalan context is a special case because of the long history and scale of immigration. In Catalunya, immigration from other areas of Spain has raised issues to do with Catalan national identity. Similar issues and arguments are now being rehearsed around non-EU immigrants, in addition to others linked with the difficulties of integrating those from 'different cultures'.

The sensitivity of an issue is subjective:

> Sensitivity and the perception of risk are highly subjective. What the research participant or gatekeeper perceives as a risk or as a sensitive matter may not be perceived as such by the investigator. Some perceived risks or sensitivities may be connected only with imagined outcomes and not with outcomes that will actually arise (Sieber 1993: 18).

However inaccurate these 'perceived risks' may turn out to be, they have to be taken seriously; not only because of the possible and unintended consequences that research may have, but also in understanding people's reaction to the research (May 1993: 48). In my own fieldwork, these perceptions affected the ethical considerations I had throughout and also affected the way in which people reacted to my research.

Informed consent is a key issue in order 'to safeguard the rights of human subjects to know that research is being conducted and to approve their own participation' (Homan 1991: 2). Although it is impossible to achieve full informed consent, especially in research settings which involve large numbers of people, I made sure that the people I was most directly involved with throughout my fieldwork knew about my research. This was especially true for those with whom I carried out in-depth interviews. Besides providing them with information on my research, I also assured them of confidentiality and anonymity regarding their participation.

Additionally, the immigrant population can be seen as being disadvantaged in many respects - especially regarding their unstable economic and legal situation. This too had an effect on my research.

> Where the members of some group to be studied were powerless or disadvantaged, they may fear exploitation or derogation, or be sceptical about research (Lee 1993: 7).

I came across various instances of scepticism expressed by the immigrants in a number of ways, from hesitation to participate in my research to outright refusal. I met only a few people who did not want to be interviewed because they were worried about confidentiality and anonymity. In two cases, the women in question had been promised both confidentiality and anonymity by people who had interviewed them in the past. Subsequently these promises had been broken and this made them refuse to take part in another study. Another immigrant expressed her fear in a joking, yet outright, manner after our interview. She said: 'if they[5] found out all that I have said in all my interviews, they would throw me out of the country!'

Central to concerns over carrying out ethical research are concerns over the relationship with the people involved in the research. Throughout my fieldwork I was aware of issues to do with exploitation. I wanted my relationship with the people I researched to be one of exchange rather than exploitation:

> Reciprocity and exchange, particularly where members of deviant or disadvantaged groups are involved, can simply reflect a desire by the researcher not to be parasitical (Power in Lee 1993: 138).

Along the same lines Hammersley and Atkinson recommend that the researcher 'give something back, in the way of services or payment' in order to lessen the exploitative potential of research (1995 [1983]).

Did I give something back? Did I not exploit my 'informants'? In the following sections I outline my fieldwork experiences in Barcelona, and discuss the ways in which I attempted to give something back and create a relationship of exchange rather than exploitation.

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[5] It is not clear who she meant by 'they', but she seemed to be referring to the government or the authorities.

FIELDWORK AMONG IMMIGRANTS - ISSUES OF ACCESS

> The problem of obtaining access to the data one needs looms large in ethnography. It is often at its most acute in initial negotiations to enter a setting and during the 'first days in the field'; but the problem persists, to one degree or another, throughout the data collection process (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995 [1983]).

Access both to my scene of research and to the immigrant population proved to be a constant process of negotiation during my year in Barcelona. Every situation was different and this in turn meant a new negotiation for access at every stage. However, the most important decision I took was to contact non-governmental organisations working in the area of immigration. It was through this initial contact that contacts snowballed.

In his study of immigrant workers, Grillo (1985) describes the way in which he carried out fieldwork in the French city of Lyon. At the outset the aim of his study had been to research immigrants living in Lyon, but he soon changed the focus to include a number of French institutions with which the immigrants interacted. The final research included the relationship between the immigrants and wider French society. Grillo argues (and I agree) that '[i]mmigrants are sociologically members of the society into which they have migrated - the receiving society - and their position must be understood, in part at least, in terms of the institutions and practices of that society ...' (1985: 22). Grillo's final study analyses the relation between immigrants and institutions in urban, industrial France.

Besides the change of focus of his research, Grillo had to modify his initial ideas of how to approach his research subjects. In the first instance he had attempted to contact immigrants through the cafés at which immigrants spent time, but soon realised the shortcomings of this way of contacting immigrants since immigrant could be there one day and not come back in a long time. Many of the issues he discusses are remarkably similar to my experiences in Barcelona[6].

Grillo argues that life in the urban setting of Lyon is highly privatised and he had to incorporate 'the privatisation of behaviour and relationships' (1985: 16) into the

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[6] I had read Grillo's study before I did my undergraduate dissertation on immigration in Southern Spain in 1992 and realise that my approach to my research then, and subsequently, was influenced by Grillo's account.

way he carried out his research. In practical terms, this meant that people either spend time at work, at home, or involved in other formal structures. If life goes on in formal structures of employment and in the private confines of home, a social researcher's access to the research population is restricted. On the whole, contact has to be made outside the workplace, but how and when? The rhythm of the immigrants' working life is often fine-tuned between their various commitments leaving little time, or energy, for other meetings.

There are occasional open, public events when freer access is possible (Grillo 1985: 17). These include occasions such as ceremonies, celebrations, and meetings of various kinds. The cafés (where Grillo had first intended to carry out his research) are also included in these 'open events'. On all these occasions, it was important to be introduced by a third person if the contact was to be followed up in any way; 'in this way the researcher's credentials were above suspicion' (1985:19)[7].

As time went by, Grillo found 'the networks arising from the trade-union movement and certain private associations' an important source for establishing contacts (1985: 19). These associations were crucial for a number of reasons: the fact that there was a wide range of them in place meant that they must serve an important role to both immigrants and wider society. Secondly, the fact that both the organisations and their personnel were linked in ways that revealed much about the workings of urban social and political systems; thirdly that they provided factual information (which was not otherwise available) and finally that they were open to researchers (1985: 20-21). By being involved in these organisations, Grillo was able to establish many contacts. While the organisation provided him with the institutional framework in which to do this, there were many respects in which these contacts could be just as precarious and volatile as those established in other ways. Given the highly privatised setting in which he carried out his research, it was up to Grillo to establish and maintain these contacts (1985: 19).

In conclusion, Grillo stresses the slowness of establishing contacts. A variety of his approaches, including those made through cafés as well as the organisations, finally materialised into the long-term relationships he had been looking for, 'but it had taken a year to reach that stage' (1985: 20).

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[7] Lee (1993: 67) also talks about intermediaries in the referral chain who are 'able to vouch for the researcher's *bona fides*'.

Negotiating access to non-governmental organisations

My own decision to approach NGOs was based on similar reasons to Grillo's, especially regarding access to, and the maintenance of, contacts. Similarly, I was not only interested in researching the immigrants themselves but also in looking at the relation between immigrants and the host society in an urban and industrial setting.

Like Lyon, Barcelona is a big, busy city and behaviour is highly privatised. Non-governmental organisations and associations[8] proved to be a good starting point for contacting people. Many immigrants spent time in these organisations - they came to use the services they provide, were passing through to say hello, or used them as meeting points[9].

Immigrants, on the whole, tended to trust non-governmental organisations more than the social work offices[10]. In many studies carried out on immigration in Spain, access has been gained through the social work institutions: records were looked at and a sample was selected. I did not do that. In my experience immigrants have a more 'utilitarian' relationship with social work departments: they go to them in search of certain papers, benefits etc. The social work department is the main contact the immigrant has with the state. On the other hand, non-governmental organisations and associations act as more of a bridge between the state and the immigrant: they help the immigrant with filling in paperwork and accessing resources. They do not have the final say in the decision being made but simply act as facilitators to access resources from the state. This means they are viewed positively by immigrants.

Spending time at these organisations meant that immigrants saw me there and I had a lot of informal conversations with them. Immigrants became familiar with

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[8] Throughout the dissertation I made the distinction between associations and non governmental organisation. The former are created and run by immigrants themselves while the latter are part of wider organisations, one section of which dedicates itself to immigration (Cassey 1995).

[9] It is difficult to assess the number of immigrants involved in the associations. Different associations keep records of what they have done throughout the year in order to get subsidies. From these records it is clear that immigrants' main use of organisations is to do with matters linked to their work and residence permits.

[10] I had seen this in my previous research and is discussed in Layton-Henry (1990).

my presence and would eventually ask me what I was doing there: this would give me a chance to explain and ask them for an interview. These informal conversations were a valuable source of information.

By spending time in and around the non-governmental organisations I picked up a lot of information. This included publications and annual reports, which were not always publicly available.

Attitudes towards my research: presenting myself and my research
When I arrived in Barcelona I was very aware of the difficulties ahead. I knew I wanted to access the immigrant population through these non-governmental organisations or similar associations. And yet, I did not want to 'blow my chances' as it were, by approaching them before I felt ready and confident to do so.

My initial concern was about presenting myself and my research. On the one hand, I felt I needed time to think about this particular aspect. I spent the first weeks in Barcelona reading recent, often unpublished, studies on immigration in both Catalunya, and more specifically, in Barcelona. These studies ranged from surveys to more qualitative accounts[11]. Besides providing me with essential factual background information, they also gave me a clear idea of who (in terms of organisations and researchers) were most active in the field and in what ways.

On the other hand I was aware that establishing access would take a while and the earlier I got started the better. I thought about writing a letter of introduction to the organisations. I drafted a letter but finally decided to abandon that idea and contact the associations directly over the phone in order to arrange a face-to-face meeting. In retrospect I am glad I did not write a letter since I am sure it would have been ignored or lost in the chaotic environment of the associations.

Due to the variety of ways in which I contacted immigrants and immigrant associations I came across various reactions towards my research; each new contact posed a challenge to the way in which I was going to present myself and my research.

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[11] Some of these studies are reviewed in Chapter Five

Two factors affected these 'presentations': the context and the point in time of fieldwork. My initial presentations were not very clear, yet they became increasingly clear over time. By context I mean who I was talking to: whether I was presenting it to the people responsible at the non-governmental organisations or whether I was explaining it to immigrants who I was wanting to interview. Although I did attempt to cover all aspects of my research, I inevitably put a different emphasis on different aspects.

One of the main obstacles I felt I had to overcome was that of 'over-exposure'. People working at non-governmental organisations have become points of information for people carrying out research on the subject, and for the media. While they were expected to talk about this, and were generally happy to do so (Grillo 1985: 21), there was also an element of fatigue about yet another social scientist doing yet another study on immigration.

In an attempt to minimise the negative effects of this 'over-exposure', I exploited various 'differences' to attract interest. In some ways my study was different to studies that people at NGOs were used to: both in terms of the time I was willing to give, and its angle. I made it clear that being involved in the organisation was an essential part of my research, that it was part of the reason why I was in Barcelona for such an extended period.

Furthermore, my research was not about immigration only, but also included wider issues of citizenship, belonging in Catalunya, and related aspects of Catalan nationalism. This caught some people's interest while others looked at me in disbelief, thinking that what I was trying to do was 'impossible', as one person told me. One afternoon at *ATIME* (*Asociación de trabajadores inmigrantes marroquís en España* - Association of Moroccan immigrant workers in Spain), as I was waiting for someone I had arranged to interview, a Moroccan man asked me what I was doing. I explained, mentioning my intention to link immigration and nationalism. He looked puzzled and said that I should be talking to the other side, talking to politicians and asking them what they thought about immigration. I said I would do that too. He then said that he did not think that many of the immigrants were affected by nationalism or whether they knew anything about it, 'because they aren't very educated'.

Another 'difference' which I played on was my 'semi-foreigner' status. When asked where I was from I said I came from Edinburgh but was in fact half-Spanish and born and brought up in Madrid. It was interesting to see what people chose to pick up from that. On the whole people chose to pick up the 'foreigner' side, (especially since I don't look 'Spanish'), and yet were puzzled by the fact that I 'could speak Spanish so well and knew so much about Spain'. Many labelled me as Scottish because of where I lived. To a large extent, and in so far as it worked in my favour, I let them believe that. In some cases that meant there was a sort of instant bonding on the basis of Catalunya's and Scotland's struggles against Spain and Britain.

First steps of negotiation

After arriving in Barcelona in early November, it took me a couple of weeks to get settled and feel ready to start making contacts. I first started at those associations I had known in Almería[12]: *Cáritas* and the *Centro de Información al Trabajador Extranjero* (*CITE* - Centre for Information of the Foreign Worker). The first is linked to the Catholic Church and the second is a department of the *Comisiones Obreras (CC.OO)* trade union.

I reached the *Departamento de Migraciones* (Department of Migration) at *Cáritas* first. My first telephone contact with the woman at *Cáritas* was not the smoothest. I started off saying I wanted to volunteer and when asked in what way, I mentioned I was doing some research on immigration and wanted to speak to them about it. She agreed to meet me the following week.

Spurred on by that little success, the following day I phoned *CITE*. This time I was a bit more articulate, telling the woman who answered the phone that I was interested in learning more about the organisation and becoming involved in some way (at this stage I did not mention my research). She suggested I drop by the following day with a copy of my CV and we could talk then. On the following day, when I went to the trade union with my CV and a copy of my research proposal, the office was extremely busy with people running around and phones ringing. One woman asked me what I wanted, I explained I had spoken to Montserrat the previous day and she had suggested dropping off my CV. Montserrat[13] was not

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[12] This is the city in the south of Spain where I had carried out my undergraduate dissertation.

[13] Personal names have been changed throughout the dissertation to ensure anonymity.

there and as I was digging in my bag to find my CV and leave it with them, one of the people in the office, Pablo, asked if anyone wanted coffee. At first I did not think he was asking me too, but it turned out he was. This proved to be my 'entrance-ticket' to *CITE*. As we went to fetch the coffees from the vending machine down the corridor, I explained to Pablo that I wanted more information on the organisation and that I was interested in volunteering with them as I was doing research on immigration in Catalunya.

Once we had got coffee and were back at the office, I explained more about my research. He gave me data on the organisation, of the different *CITE* offices distributed around Barcelona and beyond. At the same time, he said that if I wanted to carry out a survey of any sorts they would be willing to help[14]. He also suggested that I could sit in with the social workers and listen to the type of problems the immigrants came with and the advice they were given. At this stage I thanked him for both offers and explained that initially I simply wanted to get involved with the organisation to see how it worked, and I would take up his offer in the future. He then explained a number of volunteer-run projects that they were hoping to get going in the following year, and told me about a volunteers meeting the following week. I attended this meeting and this was how I first got involved with *CITE*.

Meanwhile my meeting with *Cáritas* went differently. I met the head of the *Departamento de Migraciones*, Angela, who told me about the structure of the department, the activities they ran, etc. I told her what I was doing and she gave me data that *Cáritas* had collected on the subject. I expressed my wish to become involved. As this was the main office they did not run activities as such (these happened in other neighbourhoods), but she mentioned that they were looking for someone to help the lawyer with processing applications for Spanish nationality. I also mentioned I wanted to interview people. She asked for details and said she could put me in touch with a few immigrants, but that she would first have to talk it over with her colleagues. Again, I left her a copy of my CV and research proposal. A week later I heard back from them, and a few days after that I spent the morning in *Cáritas*, helping the lawyer to process requests for Spanish nationality. Meanwhile, Angela had been contacting people for me to interview.

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[14] The CITE was involved in the early 1980s with one of the first studies on immigration carried out in Spain (Solé 1982).

Both my introduction to these organisations and my subsequent relationships with them was very different. In the case of *Cáritas* I was not actively involved in the organisation, and although I went a couple of times to help the lawyer process nationalities, this eventually petered out. However, Angela acted as an intermediary, putting me in touch with some immigrants she knew personally and then this snowballed, leading to other interviews.

My relationship with *CITE* was very different. I got actively involved in many of their activities and though they never acted as intermediaries in the same way as Angela did, it was through my involvement here that I got to know, and subsequently interview, many immigrants. Through the activities organised and the friendships I formed there I learnt a lot about issues of immigration in Catalunya; things I might not have learnt in other situations.

However, my role in the organisation did change as time went by, depending on the activities that were being organised. My most active involvement in *CITE* was between February and May. I was involved in various activities linked to the European Year Against Racism: including a demonstration against racism and a 'mixed wedding'[15]. At other times, when there were fewer activities going on, I spent less time at the trade union and would pursue contacts elsewhere.

Contacting other organisations

As time went by, and I realised the slowness of the access process, and the fact that contacts which had seemed firm at one stage did not work out, I began to contact more organisations. This increase in the contacts happened after two 'slumps' in my research - one in January and one after the summer - when I felt my research was going a lot slower than I had both hoped and expected.

Before Christmas I had spent six weeks in Barcelona and made some contacts which looked promising. However, by mid-January when nothing seemed to be happening and my contacts did not seem to be leading anywhere, I decided to contact more organisations.

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[15] This took place between a Sudanese man and a Catalan woman and was a 'protest' against a recent law which required non-EU citizens who married Spaniards to be residents in Spain for a year before they could apply for a work permit.

In early February I contacted *SOS Racisme*. I went to an introductory meeting at *SOS Racisme*, where the structure and various projects of the organisation were explained[16]. My decision to attend this introductory meeting was crucial, not so much because of the meeting itself, but because of what it revealed about the informal relations behind the different organisations and how they were all interlinked[17]. As I was waiting to go into the meeting I saw Pablo from *CITE*. He was at *SOS* looking for their collaboration for a number of activities that *CITE* was organising. He later explained that *SOS* and *CITE* did a lot of things together and that he used to be a more active member in *SOS Racisme*, but no longer had time[18].

This chance meeting with Pablo improved my relationship with *CITE* in a way that might not have happened otherwise. At this stage, and after the initial November meetings, I had not heard from *CITE* at all, and so when Pablo asked me how I was and what I was doing at *SOS*, I explained that I felt stuck with my research and was looking for more contacts. That evening when we had both finished at *SOS* we went for a beer and talked about my research, my disappointment at not having heard from them (*CITE*) and that I was still interested in being involved in their activities. He was surprised I had not heard from the people organising the activities run by volunteers as they were organising various things. He told me to drop by the office the next day if I wanted to get involved. I did this and from that point on I became more actively involved in their activities.

The second 'slump' in my research was after the summer. During the summer, from July until about mid-September, very little happened; people (at organisations, in government bodies) were either on holiday or planning ahead to the following autumn. I spent the summer researching in libraries and, in September, began once again to contact organisations and immigrants. I was getting anxious about time, since I had to return to Edinburgh in January.

At this stage, I contacted more immigrant associations. I made initial contact with a few, agreed to meet with a person from them but then they did not show up. I did

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[16] After this initial meeting, I only went to one other meeting and although I came across the people from SOS at various events, I did not have time to be more actively involved with them.

[17] This refers back to Grillo's experience.

[18] This was true for a number of people I knew at CITE.

get involved with: *ATIME, Ibn Batuta* and *La CLACA*[19]. I had a different relationship with these three organisations depending on the amount of time I spent at them. For example, I only went to *La CLACA* a few times to talk with a couple of people and to pick up information they published. I had a more lasting relationship with *Ibn Batuta* and *ATIME*. At *Ibn Batuta* I was persuaded to teach English (as a volunteer) to the adolescents, so I spent a lot of time there. At *ATIME*, I would drop by in the evenings, when it was most busy. People came in and out and sat around talking.

Fruitful friendships

As a way of snowballing, I asked all the people I interviewed whether they knew someone else who might be willing to be interviewed too. I got very different reactions to this request. Some people refused to do it (or said they did not know anyone), others agreed but never got back to me and there were others who actively helped me along by introducing me to others. Margarita was an example of the latter; I had met her through *CITE*. I had interviewed her, and she then put me in touch with other Latin Americans. She was very active in issues to do with immigration and also informed me of conferences and meetings which she had been invited to and which I could come along to.

Public occasions

In his study Grillo (1995: 17) mentions the importance of the few occasions when access to immigrants is available in the public sphere. In my own research most of these public events happened through my involvement with *CITE*: the wedding of a mixed couple and the demonstrations.

Another important occasion of this type was the voluntary organisation stalls[20] set up in the *Plaça de Catalunya* during the *Festas de la Mercé* in late September[21]. During the week that the stalls were up, I went several times, picked up a lot of useful material and made more contacts.

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[19] ATIME stands for the *Asociación de Trabajadores Inmigrantes en España* (Association of Immigrant workers in Spain). IBN BATUTA is a Moroccan 'cultural' association and La CLACA is the *Casal Latinoamericano a Catalunya* (Latin American centre in Catalunya).

[20] These included some immigrant associations.

[21] See Chapter Six.

Blind alleys

During my fieldwork I also made contacts which did not take me anywhere in the end.

One of these instances was my contact with a group of Moroccan students at the university. I had met one of them at a seminar and he had been encouraging about carrying out research with them. After a few exchanges I did not hear back from him, and could not reach him either, since he was no longer where he had been when I first met him. Other instances of 'blind alleys' included trying to contact a teacher who taught Castilian to immigrants, and contacting a neighbourhood association of *Cuitat Vella* (this is the neighbourhood of Barcelona with the highest concentration of immigrants).

I have often wondered why these contacts did not work. I feel that part of the reason was because I did not have enough time to persevere with these contacts in the way I would have liked to, or needed to. Also, as in the case of the Moroccan students, it highlights the difficulty of doing research with a group which is highly mobile.

Negotiating with individuals

Having negotiated access to the organisations, which provided the general framework, I next had to negotiate individual access to those immigrants I wanted to interview. My contacts for interviewees were made in a variety of ways (through the organisations or through third-person introductions) so each situation posed a new challenge.

In the first place, it was often hard to contact people to arrange a time for the interview, especially as most of these final arrangements were made over the phone. I had various experiences of calling people, they were out, they called back, I was out and in some cases it was days before we actually spoke.

Apart from the difficulties of when to meet, there was the issue of *where* to meet. In some cases I went to their houses; at other times we met at the organisation and other times in public spaces. All these locations placed different constraints on the interview. In the case of public spaces there were issues of privacy and of background noise. The former was most difficult when I interviewed two people (separately) at *ATIME*. Since there was no private place to talk, the interviews were

carried out in the open 'office space'. Both interviews were interrupted by the phone going, people calling in or just hanging around. In both cases I was aware that the people being interviewed were distracted and conscious of people listening in.

Even when we had agreed on a time and a place I did not take that as a firm confirmation that my interviewees would keep the appointment. On the whole they did show up, but there were some occasions when I arrived at the agreed time and place, waited, and they did not turn up. The first times this happened I would have mixed feelings: on the one hand I was upset because they had not turned up and on the other hand I was relieved because that meant I could go home (most of my meetings were in the evenings). As time went by, I began to assume that they would not come and when they did it would make me feel better. I also learnt to chase up people. Very often they had not shown up because something else had happened, but they were willing to re-arrange the interview.

INTERVIEWING

Before I started the interview, I would repeat what my research was about and assured them that the interview was confidential and anonymous. I would be the only one to read the transcript and when I used it for my dissertation I would change their names and any other characteristics which might identify them. I asked their permission to tape the interview. I let them know I was happy to stop the tape at any moment. None of them asked me to do this, but there were times when they would look at the tape-recorder before answering some questions, as if suddenly more aware of its presence. In a number of cases, once the tape had been stopped, they continued talking to me, sometimes in a more relaxed manner.

I would then transcribe the interview and give it back to them to read. This would give them the chance to clarify things which might have come across inaccurately; expand, modify or ask me to remove them. My initial idea had been to give immigrants a chance to have some sort of 'control' over what they had spoken to me about, and what I would go away with (Spradley 1979: 39).

Although I returned around half of my transcripts, interestingly enough, only one person got back to me about it. She was puzzled because the interview did not read right, it did not flow. I assured her it was a *verbatim* transcription and would be

edited if used. Another person hid the transcript straight away and was slightly nervous about seeing all the things he had said on paper.

The immigrants' perception of me as a 'semi-foreigner' was particularly relevant during interviews. I tried to maintain a degree of ambiguity throughout the interview, and 'use it' during my interviews (Song and Parker 1995). A couple of interviewees made a direct reference to my 'foreignness', albeit acknowledging that being 'white and European' did make a clear difference to the way I was perceived by Catalans and my position *vis-à-vis* the Spanish state[22]. In other cases there were implicit references to this shared experience of being an 'outsider' which seemed to increase rapport. In some ways my own experiences in Catalunya, especially to do with the Catalan language and living in Catalunya, were similar to theirs. The fact that I was not from Catalunya meant I could get away with asking 'naive' questions on Catalan nationalism. It also meant that the immigrants were often just as inquisitive about me and my own background as I was about them, something which I encouraged during the interview and our subsequent meetings. This curiosity and their questions to me made the interview slightly more equal in terms of exchange of information[23].

The interview was semi-structured. It aimed to cover a number of issues[24]. It covered issues to do with history of their migration, their present situation in Catalunya and then moved on to look at more subjective issues about living in Catalunya and how interviewees defined and felt about Catalan nationalism. The main focus of the interview was on the subjective issues of how they saw their life in Catalunya[25].

The order in which the issues were discussed was determined by the interviewees. Inevitably some interviews were more structured than others. On the whole I was able to cover most questions, linking them in with what they had said, but at the end of every interview there was always a couple of 'let's see what we have not covered' questions.

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[22] I am actually a Spanish citizen, but all European Union citizens have a special position in terms of work and residency permits.

[23] Bristow and Esper (1988 in Lee 1993: 178) talk about self-disclosure promoting a lesser feeling of 'interrogation' in the interview process.

[24] See Appendix One for a copy of the interview guide.

[25] The data from these interviews is discussed in Chapters Seven and Eight.

All of the interviews were carried out in Castilian, since this was the language that was strongest for most of the people I interviewed. Most of the people I interviewed had been in Spain for at least a couple of years and expressed themselves well in Castilian.

The question of paying for interviews was at the back of my mind throughout my research. When arranging the interview with Helen and Abdel, she said they had been joking, (and stressed over and over again that 'it was only a joke'), about how much they were going to charge me per question. When I got to the interview we joked about it again, but they had become friends and I knew they would not have accepted my money. Strangely enough I only paid one person for an interview, this was the very last interview I did in Barcelona and although nothing had been mentioned prior to the interview, I offered to pay Etna at the very end of the interview.

OTHER SOURCES OF DATA

Apart from the above direct fieldwork with immigrants and immigrant associations, I also collected 'documents' of different kinds and from various sources. As Hammersley and Atkinson (1995 [1983]: 159) commented there is a 'bewildering variety of documentary material that might be of some relevance to the researcher'; in my case these ranged from pamphlets to official documents and publications.

Document collection

Organisations and associations provided an invaluable source of documents, including pamphlets, newsletters, and unpublished reports. Most of these were not publicly available; I came across them as I was involved with the organisations or at events (such as demonstrations) where they were distributed.

Given that I was also looking at the official response of the government to immigration, I contacted various governmental bodies in search of documents laying out their policies, and also spoke to various people in these bodies. These included the *Departament de Benestar Social* (Department of Social Welfare) at the *Generalitat de Catalunya*, and various bodies in charge of immigration at the *Ajuntament* and the *Diputació de Barcelona*. I have subsequently analysed this material, and this is discussed in Chapter Five and Chapter Six.

I contacted all political parties to enquire about their policies to do with immigration. In the first instance, I did this through a letter and received no answer, so a few months later I rang up and finally did get some information on their policies, though not much is actually published on the subject.

Only one political party that I contacted, *Iniciativa per Catalunya*[26], had a study group on 'immigrants and ethnic minorities'. I attended a one-day seminar on immigration, and also went to a meeting of the study group. The 'meeting' turned out to be two people who, given the turn-out, had decided to move to the bar downstairs. Once again, what became clear during this meeting was the way in which the various organisations involved with immigration, and the people active in them, were linked. One of the men was actually employed by *CITE* as a social worker, as well as running the Libya-Catalan association, and the other man had been president of *CITE* a few years earlier.

Bibliographic searches

There are many small-scale studies written on immigration in Catalunya. Similarly, I was aware that a lot of the literature on the issues I wanted to research in Catalunya would not be available in Scotland. This included the small-scale studies on foreign immigration, data on national migration and various sources on Catalan history and nationalism. I spent time in libraries researching these themes, especially when my 'fieldwork' was less demanding in terms of time.

Media

Throughout the year in Catalunya I also read the press daily, trying to alternate between Catalan papers and those published in Madrid. I used these for information of wider social, political and economic issues happening at the time. Throughout the year there were constant references in the news to Catalan nationalism (especially since a new language law was being debated at the time) and the relationship between Madrid and Catalunya.

Fieldnotes

I kept fieldnotes throughout my year in Barcelona, where I recorded ideas, thoughts and what I had been doing. While at the time it was often exhausting to write up

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[26] This is the coalition between *Izquierda Unida* (United Left) and *Els Verds* (The Greens).

the events of the day I have subsequently relied heavily on them; not only for the more 'factual' information they contain but also because I can see the way in which my ideas developed and changed during the year of fieldwork.

ANALYSIS OF DATA

The different kinds of data I gathered required different forms of analyses. In the case of written material such as pamphlets, documents and official publications I have used them to provide me with 'factual' information (statistics, legislation). I have also analysed the use they make of terminology (such as 'immigrant' and 'integration' to give a couple of examples) and the rhetorical devices mobilised. Hammersley and Atkinson highlight the way in which documents can be analysed:

> The presence and significance of documentary products provides the ethnographer with a rich vein of analytic topics, as well as a valuable source of information. Such topics include: How are documents written? How are they read? Who writes them? Who reads them? For what purposes? On what occasions? With what outcomes? What is recorded? What is omitted? What is taken for granted? (1995 [1983]).

It was the interview material (and to a lesser extent my fieldnotes) which I analysed in most great detail. I used HyperResearch, a qualitative data analysis computer package, to help with my analysis. I used it as an aid to help code and then retrieve information in a faster fashion. As I was transcribing the interviews I felt I was already doing preliminary analysis. However what I describe below refers more directly to a more intensive period of data analysis before embarking on the writing up stage of the dissertation.

All my interviews were carried out in Castilian. I transcribed and analysed them in Castilian. It was only at the last stage of writing up the data that I translated the segments of interview material into English.

In the first instance I printed out all the interview transcripts and read through them carefully, picking out themes of interest - some of the codes began to emerge here, others came later. Using HyperResearch, I coded the transcripts; the coding was very broad, and the same section of transcription could be placed under many codes[27]. This process of coding ensured that I re-read transcripts in a very careful, detailed manner. I then used HyperResearch to make a 'Report'. A 'Report' pulled together all the data I labelled under one code: it displayed the material from the

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[27] See Appendix One for the list of codes used.

interview and told me what transcript it originally came from. The end result was that I had everything that I had coded under one code in the same place. I printed this 'Report' and read through it on paper. At this stage, I could see more clearly what different people had said on key themes and begin to think of ways of presenting them in the dissertation.

CONCLUSIONS

In this section I have provided a detailed account of my fieldwork in Barcelona in 1997. Immigration can, without a doubt, be defined as a 'sensitive issue' due to the social context in which it occurs. The immigrants see themselves in a threatened position, largely due to their precarious legal situation[28].

I responded by adopting research methods which were sensitive to this. My decision to access informants through non-governmental organisations and associations gave me the wider framework in which to build trusting relationships. The informal meetings, conversations and activities in which I participated were extremely important in this sense. On reflection, it is slightly ironic to think that I was so worried about approaching these organisations and yet it was being in the right place, at the right time and making the most of the situation then and there, which provided me with the opportunity to 'access' people.

Building trust and contacts was extremely time consuming, and not always stimulating. There were days when I would drop in to an association and spend a few hours talking to people and come away at the end of it in total despair at having 'wasted my time'[29]. I realised that trust and familiarity would take a while to build up, but I had to keep reminding myself of this fact. The sensitivity of the issue meant I could do nothing but accept this.

However, real time constraints were at work. I realised I only had a year in Barcelona, and then I would have to come away and write up my dissertation. Granted, I could go back but that was an uncertain possibility - again due to constraints of time and finances. Towards the end of my fieldwork I was beginning

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[28] See Chapters Five and Six.

[29] As Lee (1993: 135) puts it: 'Spending considerable amounts of time in the setting - especially at inconvenient hours - also aids acceptance because it is taken as an indication of the researcher's seriousness and commitment.'

to feel happy with my contacts but, like Grillo (1985), it had taken me a long time to reach this stage.

It is often the case that accounts of fieldwork research turns into 'heroic tales' of survival in adverse conditions (Lee 1993: 121). The intention of this chapter is not one of this sort. Rather, I have tried to give an honest and open account of how my fieldwork developed throughout the year.

CHAPTER THREE
CATALAN NATIONALISM

INTRODUCTION

> To understand nationalism, we have to understand the practical uses of the category 'nation', the ways it can come to structure perception, to inform thought and experience, to organise discourse and political action (Brubaker 1996: 7).

Throughout the dissertation I follow Benedict Anderson's definition of a nation as an 'imagined political community' (1991). The nation is imagined in so far as 'members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the mind of each live the images of their communion' (1991: 6). There are three further aspects to the way the nation is imagined. Firstly, the nation is imagined as limited because it has 'boundaries across which lie other nations'. Secondly, it is imagined as sovereign. Finally, it is imagined as a *community*, because, 'regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation which may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship' (1991:7).

Following Anderson and Bhabha, Stuart Hall has asked the key questions: 'But how is the modern nation imagined?...How is the narrative of the national culture told?' (1992: 293). Hall provides five possible elements:

1. First, there is the *narrative of the nation*, as it is told and retold in national histories, literatures, the media and popular culture. These provide the a set of stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national symbols and rituals which stand for, or *represent*, the shared experiences, sorrows, and triumphs and disasters which give meaning to the nation (1992: 293)...

2. Secondly, there is the emphasis on *origins, continuity, tradition and timelessness*. National identity is presented as primordial ...

3. A third discursive strategy is what Hobsbawm and Ranger call the *invention of tradition*; 'Traditions which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented...' (1983: 1)...

4. A fourth example of the narrative of national culture is that of a *foundational myth*: a story which locates the origin of the nation, the people and their

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national character so early that they are lost in the mists of, not 'real' but mythic time.'(1992: 294)...

5. National identity is also often symbolically grounded on the idea of a *pure, original people or 'folk'. '*(1992: 295)

This chapter aims to outline the way in which the Catalan nation is imagined and narrated. In the following paragraphs I summarise key aspects of Catalan nationalism which are discussed in more detail throughout the chapter.

History, or rather 'myth history', plays a key role in the narration of the origins and nature of nations (Anderson 1991; Llobera 1996; Renan [1882] 1994). In the Catalan case, the foundational myth (Hall's fourth point) dates back to 988. Various characteristics are represented as being timelessly Catalan and are used to emphasise continuity, tradition and timelessness (Hall's second point). These characteristics include: the role of industrialisation in the development of Catalan nationalism; the role of civil society in the maintenance of Catalan culture; and the constant negotiation of Catalunya with the Spanish state.

Various theories have pointed to the influence of industrial development on the development of nationalism (Gellner [1964] 1994; Llobera 1994; Nairn 1977). In Catalunya, industrialisation has played an important role in the development of Catalan nationalism. Catalunya has always been, and continues to be, one of the most industrialised areas of the Spanish state. In the nineteenth century, the advent of industrialisation gave rise to *Catalanisme* - at first it was a cultural movement, the *Renaixença*, but eventually this led to more political movements. In the twentieth century, Catalunya's industrial development attracted large numbers of immigrants from other parts of Spain. This phenomenon was to become central in the redefinition of Catalan nationalism in the 1960s (Keating 1996: 120).

Catalunya's association with the Spanish state is portrayed as highly ambiguous. On the one hand, Catalunya's relationship with the central state has been beneficial for the development of Catalunya. In the nineteenth century, Catalan industrialists depended on protection by the Spanish state in order to export their products (Balcells 1991: 14).

On the other hand the relationship is seen in terms of the Catalan struggle against repression from the Spanish central (and centralising) State. At the centre of the struggle is Catalunya's strong civil society and the cultural elements of Catalan nationalism. Civil society helped to maintain Catalan culture; the Catalan language was a main site of this struggle. The role of civil society and Catalan culture were especially important at times when political manifestations of Catalanism were not permitted.

Civil society was also important in the development and maintenance of traditions which highlight the national characteristics of Catalunya (Hall's third point). Some of these features were officially recognised in the 1979 Catalan Statute of Autonomy. The Statute recognised the Catalan flag, the *senyera* (1979: Article 4). However, the main characteristic was the Catalan language (1979: Article 3). Other traditions, although not mentioned in the Statute, have become equally important. Firstly, there are the public ceremonies and official commemorations which are celebrated annually. In the case of Catalunya, Llobera (1996) points to the *Diada* (see below) and *Saint Jordi*. Secondly, there are more 'folkloric' elements, such as music, dance and literature to name a few. All these cases are examples of 'banal nationalism':

> The term 'banal nationalism' is introduced to cover the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced. ... Daily, the nation is indicated, or 'flagged' in the lives of its citizenry (Billig 1995: 6).

The Catalan nation is predominantly narrated in civic terms. The emphasis is on participation in the rights and obligations of Catalunya. The fact that Catalunya emphasises its civic nature, makes it important to deny any idea of 'pure, original people or 'folk'' (Hall's final point) (Guibernau 1998; Vila 1984). The very opposite is true: Catalunya is portrayed as a 'melting pot' of cultures. Since there are no pure original people, anyone can become a Catalan by participating in Catalan ways of life.

As with other 'stateless nations', the present political framework in which Catalunya finds itself is important: the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 1979 have shaped debates of Catalan nationalism within Catalunya. The Constitution and the Statute have also shaped the relationship that Catalunya has with the Spanish state.

The fact that historically Catalunya continually had to negotiate with the central state has given rise to the idea that compromise, negotiations and pactism are features inherent to Catalan politics (Giner 1980: 5-7). Present-day Catalunya continues to present itself as being in a constant negotiation over its powers with the Spanish central state. The position of Catalunya within the Spanish structure also influences the stated final aims of Catalan nationalism. As will be discussed below, the Catalan nationalist party currently in power is ambiguous with respect to whether its final aim is an increase in autonomy or full independence.

Outline of the Chapter

The chapter begins with an ethnographic description of the *Diada Catalana* (Catalunya's National Day) which highlights many aspects of Catalan nationalism today, these are discussed in the rest of the chapter. The chapter moves on to provide an outline of the development of *Catalanisme* - its transformation from a cultural movement to a more political one. This historical section provides the background for the following sections on Catalan nationalism since the Spanish transition to democracy which followed the death of Francisco Franco in 1975. Since the first autonomous elections in 1980, Catalunya has been ruled by a nationalist party, *Convergència i Unió* (CiU), led by Jordi Pujol. CiU's version of nationalism has been crucial in the recent past. One of the main respects in which Catalunya differentiates itself from the rest of Spain is through the Catalan language and for this reason the debates surrounding the language are discussed in detail. Language is a key theme throughout the thesis as it is central in the debates surrounding immigration in Catalunya.

ETHNOGRAPHY OF '*LA DIADA CATALANA*'

'*Avui es respira Catalanisme*' ('Today one can breathe Catalanism') I heard a young man, in his mid twenties saying to his friends as they walked towards the statue of Rafael Casanova[1]. At the foot of the statue, a band was playing *Els Segadors*, the Catalan national anthem, as wreaths were being laid by different political parties, trade unions, cultural associations and football clubs. Around 1000 people had gathered there: they clapped or booed as the different wreaths were put down. There were *senyeras*, Catalan flags, everywhere - some big cloth ones and some smaller plastic ones which were being handed out for free. Many balconies on the

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[1] Rafael Casanova led the fight of Barcelona against the invading troops at the end of the War of Succession (see below).

streets of Barcelona were covered in *senyeras*. In spite of the heat there were even some people wearing *barretinas*, Catalan hats made of wool.

In the area surrounding the statue, different stalls had been set up. Some of these stalls were run by political parties and cultural associations - they were giving out information about their activities. Others were selling merchandise; one stall was selling jeans where the pocket was made in the colours of the *senyera* and the belt label at the back of the jeans had 'ERC'[2] written on it. Language played a major role at the event: ERC's slogan was '*Una nacio, una lengua*' (One nation, one language) and *Omnium Cultural* - a cultural organisation that has been promoting Catalan since 1961 - was also present.

In the evening a demonstration had been called by the independence parties: *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC) and *Partit per la Independència* (PI). While the morning events had included people of all ages, most of the participants at the evening demonstration were young. According to the police, there were 5,000 people at the ERC demonstration (10,000 according to ERC) and about 1,000 people at the PI demonstration (2,000 according to the party). There were also 500 people who belonged to neither group and these were the ones suspected of causing disturbances later on in the night, at the end of the demonstration (**La Vanguardía**, 12.9.97). As the people were waiting to start the demonstration, they were singing anti-Spanish slogans. These included a person on a loudspeaker shouting: 'sit down, sit down, you're a Spaniard if you don't sit down' and the crowd would sit. A variation on this was 'jump, jump, you're a Spaniard if you don't jump'. The crowd would also walk backwards when the person said: 'with Spain we are going backwards' and then run forwards to the shout of 'independence'.

The 11 of September is *La Diada Catalana*, Catalunya's national day. Its origins date back to the end of the War of Succession in 1714. During this war the Catalans supported (along with Britain, Holland, and Austria) Archduke Charles of Austria to become the next king of Spain, while France and Spain backed Philip of Anjou. The Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 meant that Philip V received international recognition but Catalunya continued the fight for Charles of Austria until the fall of Barcelona on 11 September 1714 (Balcells 1996: 13). This defeat was followed by the *Decret de la Nova Planta* in 1716 whereby all Catalan institutions except Catalan civil law were

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[2]This stands for *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* - the left wing, independence party.

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abolished and Castilian law and order was imposed (Balcells 1996; Farrés i Busquets 1997).

Rather than being seen as a defeat, the Catalans have turned this historical event into a celebration of Catalan nationalism, a celebration of the resistance of Catalans to the new regime which tried to suppress their national characteristics. The celebration itself brings out many elements of present-day Catalan nationalism: the active involvement of civil society, the mix of cultural and political nationalism and the different aspects of historical and present-day nationalism (Llobera 1996).

La Diada began to be celebrated on the streets of Barcelona around 1901, but it was not until the Second Republic (1930s) that it became more established as a celebration (Generalitat de Catalunya and Museu d'Història de Catalunya 1997; Llobera 1996). During Franco's dictatorship the statue of Rafael Casanova was taken away (Llobera 1996: 198) but the celebrations continued in a clandestine manner with the Catalan anthem and music coming out of loudspeakers until the police found the source of the music and put an end to it (**La Vanguardía**, 11.9.96).

In 1976, not even a year after Franco's death, the first *Diada* took place in Sant Boi (a town near Barcelona where Rafael Casanova is buried). It was possible to organise this *Diada* due to the existing structure of the *Assemblea de Catalunya*[3] and it was 'tolerated but not authorised'. According to an article in **La Vanguardía** (11.9.96) some of the speeches made at this *Diada* were censored by Radio Barcelona who thought they broke too many taboos too soon after Franco. A year later, however, the 1977 *Diada* was another matter - over one million people gathered in Barcelona under the slogan of: *'Llibertat, Amnistía i Estatut d'Autonomia'* ('Freedom, amnesty and a Statute of Autonomy')[4]. It was a popular demonstration with a broad slogan which brought together people of many political and non-political backgrounds.

During my fieldwork, in 1997, twenty years had passed since the huge mobilisation of 1977 and the day continued to be significant in Catalunya.

> The national holiday of the eleventh of September makes us reflect every year on the state of the Catalan nation (**Avui**, 11.9.97).

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[3] The *Assemblea de Catalunya* was a anti-dictatorthip, multi-party political platform formed during the Francoist dictatorship.

[4]These were the demands of the *Assemblea de Catalunya*.

Apart from the celebrations, there were also political events taking place. The 11 September was the start of the new parliamentary year; this was celebrated by a reception at the *Palau de la Generalitat*. It was not only the political parties who were invited, but the guests included leading personalities of Catalunya and members of the Catalan church (**El País**, 12.9.97).

The president of the *Generalitat* always gives an address speech on this day. Jordi Pujol has been the president since 1980 and all his *Diada* speeches have aimed to 'evoke the past, reflect on the present and give encouragement for the future' (Pujol 1993: 9)[5]. Pujol's speeches are an excellent example of his idea of nation-building (*fer pais* in Catalan)[6].

CATALUNYA PRIOR TO 1714

La Diada Catalana commemorates an important date of Catalan history and highlights aspects of current day Catalunya. However, Catalunya's sense of national identity had been well formed and developed long before 1716 when the *Decret de la Nova Planta* was passed by Phillip V.

In this section I provide a 'hegemonic' account of Catalunya's history (Llobera 1998). That is, the 'myth history' through which the narrating of the nation is achieved (Hall 1992: 263). The aim of this section is therefore not to give an exhaustive account of Catalan history or even to dismantle the myths. The aim is to provide the reader with the key ideas of Catalan history and the way in which these are used and mobilised in present-day Catalunya. It is interesting to see the way certain aspects of Catalan history are emphasised and 'transported' through time.

The origins of Catalunya are often said to lie in the year 988 when the Count of Barcelona Borell II broke off ties of vassalage from the French king Hug Capet (Farrés i Busquets 1997: 13; Keating 1996: 116). Although in 1988, Catalunya

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[5]In 1997 Pujol's speech included all of the above elements but some saw it as controversial due to the following section: 'If asking for that to which we have the right provokes confrontation, we have to accept that. To not do it would be to give up our rights thus damaging, not an abstract idea but the citizens of Catalunya, the people.' While some interpreted this as going too far, others (like the **Avui** newspaper) did not see this as inadequate.

[6] See the section below for more details.

celebrated a Millennium since the political birth of Catalunya, reference to this territory as Catalunya was not till much later:

> It is towards the end of the eleventh and the beginning of the twelfth centuries that we find the first documents in which the term 'Catalan' is used to designate the inhabitants of the area (Balcells 1996: 3).

The twelfth century brought important changes. The two main ones were the formation of the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation[7] and the signing of the *Usatges*. In 1137, the count of Barcelona (Ramon Berenguer IV) agreed to marry the daughter of Ramir d'Aragó, thereby linking Catalunya to Aragon and forming the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation. While this agreement did not affect the political or juridical entities of either countries (Farrés i Busquets 1997: 20; Puigjaner 1992: 19) it did lay the grounds for the future Mediterranean expansion that took place primarily in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (Keating 1996: 116).

In the twelfth century, 'Catalunya was one of the first societies to grant itself what amounted to a written feudal constitution' (Giner 1980: 5). These were the *Usatges*: the writing down of the already existing "uses' and established customs and practices' (Giner 1980: 5). Giner sees this document as a prime example of pactism, contractualism and negotiation, all of which are often highlighted as lasting traits of Catalan politics (1980: 5-7).

The thirteenth century saw further political development: frontiers and the creation of both the *Corts* and subsequently the *Generalitat* (Balcells 1996: 8). In 1258 the Treaty of Corbeil established the frontiers with France; at this stage (and until 1659) Rousillon and Cerdany were part of Catalunya. The *Corts*, consisting of members of the nobility, the church and the different boroughs along with its subsidiary body, the *Generalitat*, is presented as one of the first parliaments in Europe (Balcells 1996).

These changes were accompanied by an important expansion of the Catalan-Aragonese Confederation along the Mediterranean. At its height in the fourteenth century this included Naples, the islands of Corsica, Majorca, Menorca and Ibiza, Sicily, Sardinia, and went as far as some areas of Greece (Balcells 1996; Trueta 1946: 66).

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[7] This is otherwise called the Kingdom of Aragon or the Crown of Aragon, though some historians argue that this is a misnomer as both Catalunya and Aragon were equal partners (Balcells 1996: 6; Farrés i Busquets 1997: 20; Vilar 1977: 16).

But the benefits of this expansion did not last long: the fifteenth century was a time of decline, referred to as '*La Decadència*' in Catalan history. Among other factors the marriage of Fernando and Isabel in 1469 was a crucial one (see Balcells 1996 ; Farrés i Busquets 1997). Although once again both kingdoms remained governed by their own laws (Puigjaner 1992: 22), when America was 'discovered', the main trade routes now shifted away from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic and America. The Catalans were not granted access to these new trade routes which were reserved for Castille.

In the following centuries there was an increasing distance between the central power and Catalunya which slowly and eventually led to a straining of relationships, especially as:

> [t]he Spanish monarchy from the seventeenth century sought to reduce Catalonia's autonomy and establish a centralised and absolute state on French lines (Keating 1996: 116).

In 1640, the peasants revolted against Philip V[8] and later, in 1659 the Treaty of the Pyrenees meant that Catalunya lost one-fifth of its territory to France (Balcells 1996: 31; Sahlins 1993).

Although the last 25 years of the seventeenth century were apparently stable, there was a clear debilitation of Catalan political institutions: the *Corts* met very rarely and the *Generalitat* became increasingly oligarchic and inefficient (Balcells 1996: 10). It is against this background that the Catalans decided to back the Archduke Charles of Austria in the War of Succession. This led to the fall of Barcelona in 1714 and the *Decret de la Nova Planta* in 1716.

THE BEGINNINGS OF CATALANISME

> The Catalans possibly had, in the nineteenth century, a more intense feeling of being Catalan that in the twentieth century, but that feeling lacked a political will (Balcells 1991: 18).

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[8] This is known as the *Revolta del Segadors*. It plays an important role in the myth history of Catalunya, as not only was it an example of the Catalan people defying centralist authority, but also the *Cant dels Segadors*, which was later to become (and is at present) the Catalan national anthem became popular.

The roots of *Catalanisme*, first as a cultural and then as a political movement, can be traced back to the nineteenth century[9]. The economic development brought about by Catalan industrialisation often led to conflicts of interests between Catalunya and the rest of Spain (Conversi 1997: 11). There was an increasing emphasis on cultural differences - especially language - and as the century progressed there was a growth in the political aspects of *Catalanisme*.

Although industrialisation in Catalunya was important, especially in the textiles industry, there were also important deficiencies in the process. There was too much emphasis on light industry; Catalunya did not have its own coal or iron; it was not possible to have economies of scale; and the high cost of labour meant a lack of international competitiveness. The success of industrialisation depended on exporting to the rest of Spain and survived due to protectionism (Balcells 1991: 14; Keating 1996: 117; Pi-Sunyer: 265). Protectionism, however, was not a popular measure in the rest of Spain, whose development was based around agriculture and mining and relied on exporting beyond Spain (Masgrau 1992: 10). This led to an increasing strain in the relationship between the economic power which was held in the periphery and the political control at the centre (Keating 1996: 117).

There have been numerous debates regarding the origins of Catalanisme, but it is clear that the role of the middle classes in this period was important. The increase in economic development and the debates about protectionism led to an increasing sense of cultural difference in Catalunya. The cultural movement which emerged was known as *La Renaixença*. The activities of *La Renaixença*, especially the yearly *Jocs Florals* (literary competitions) led to an important revival of the Catalan language. Contrary to what is often claimed, *La Renaixença* was not only a bourgeois phenomenon since it included new and varied forms of literature which appealed to all classes (Conversi 1997: 14; Masgrau 1992: 17-21; Reglà 1974: 176). The most important outcome of the *Renaixença* was that it acted as a base for political Catalanisme in years to come.

Many elements of Catalan identity had been provided by the cultural aspects of the *Renaixença*. The early political manifestations of Catalanism were not very successful; for example the attempt to proclaim Catalan independence from Spain

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[9] Catalunya is an example of the complex relationship between cultural and political nationalism which is a feature of neo-nationalism (McCrone 1998).

on 8 March 1873 during the First Republic led nowhere. However with the formation of the association *La Jove Catalunya*, political manifestations increased. *La Jove Catalunya*, under the new name of *La Renaixensa*[10] was to take part in the First Catalan Congress in 1880.

The *Primer Congrès Català* was an attempt to bring together the two main streams of Catalanism: on the one hand *La Renaixensa*, which concentrated on the historical and literary aspects of Catalanisme and on the other hand the stream of Republican federalism led by Valentí Almirall. The Congress had three important outcomes: firstly the *Renaixensa* abandoned the Congress due to the radical ideas of Almirall; secondly a document defending Catalan law was made public; and finally the *Centre Català* was formed (Farrés i Busquets 1997: 129).

In 1886 Almirall wrote **Lo Catalanisme**; its importance lay in the fact that it was the 'first explicit nationalist programme ... which outlined the transition from regionalism to nationalism in a federalist framework' (Conversi 1997: 71). It aimed to reconcile the traditional and progressive strands and was supported by the industrial classes. The more conservative elements did not agree with the interclassist solutions laid out and this caused a split (Balcells 1996: 36). From this split, the *Lliga de Catalunya* was created in 1887. Almirall's *Centre Català* became increasingly marginalised and eventually dissolved in the mid 1890s (Balcells 1996: 37).

Once again, in 1891 there was an attempt to bring together the different Catalanist parties with the formation of *Unió Catalanista*. In 1892 they drew up the *Bases de Manresa*. Although this was an important document in terms of what it laid out[11], it did not have popular support. This was the main document used by the *Lliga Regionalista* until its leader Prat de la Riba wrote **La Nacionalitat Catalana** in 1906 (Masgrau 1992).

At the same time as these schisms were taking place in the political spheres some very important events were happening in the formation of Catalan civil society. This was the time when *Els Segadors* began to be used as the national anthem (Keating 1996: 118); when the *senyera* (Catalan flag) became more widely used;

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[10] This is not to be confused with the wider cultural movement of the time.
[11] It declared the Catalan language as co-official with Castilian and laid out important aspects of political autonomy (Conversi 1997: 21; Keating 1996: 118).

when choral music became more widespread, and when the *Orfeo Català* was formed (Masgrau 1992: 24).

The Catalan church also began to play a role in Catalan nationalism: in 1892 the Bishop Torres i Bages wrote **La Tradició Catalana** which positioned the Church closer to regional nationalism than any other kind of nationalism (Masgrau 1992: 47).

The final event of major political importance to Catalan nationalism in the twentieth century was the loss of the last Spanish colonies, Cuba and the Philippines, in 1889 (Reglà 1974: 176). From this 'crisis' the three currents of Catalanisme which were to continue into the following century began to emerge: conservative regionalism, republicanism, and working class republicanism (Reglà 1974: 188).

Moving into the twentieth century, it was conservative regionalism which was dominant until the Primo de Rivera dictatorship in the early 1920s (Cucurull 1980). In 1901 the *Lliga Regionalista de Catalunya* was formed. In 1906 its leader, Prat de la Riba wrote **La Nacionalitat Catalana** which Conversi has called 'the key text for the study of Catalan nationalism up to the present day' (1997: 30). It aimed to redefine Catalanism as modern, secular, anti-military as well as supporting the idea of a federal Spain.

In 1906 *Solidaritat Catalana* (a coalition of all parties except Lerroux's Radical Republicans[12]) was formed as a reaction to the *Ley de Jurisdicciones* passed by the central government[13]. Also in 1907 *Solidaritat Catalana* won the elections and these years were important for the consolidation of the Catalan language and culture. In 1907 the *Institut d'Estudis Catalans* was created and in 1912 Pompeu Fabra began the standardisation of Catalan language and grammar (Roser i Puig 1999).

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[12]Lerroux's Radical Republicans attracted support due to its working class anti-nationalism combined with anti-clericalism, populism and Republicanism (Conversi 1997). This support, largely due to the fact that *Solidaritat Catalana* (with *La Lliga* at the head) was too conservative, sent signals to the left wing nationalists for the need to reform. *Esquerra Catalana* was formed; elements of this eventually formed *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* in 1931.

[13]With this law the central government allowed military intervention in any cases where there was a written or verbal attack against the symbols of Spain (Farrés i Busquets 1997: 146).

In 1914 the *Mancomunitat Catalana* was formed, when the four provisional councils (Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona) joined together. Although at this stage it had mainly administrative duties it was also involved in the revival of Catalan culture and it laid the foundations for the *Estatut d'Autonomia* of 1931. However the *Lliga* supported Primo de Rivera's dictatorship; it trusted that it would respect the existing administration and Catalan language. When this did not happen[14], the *Lliga* lost support and the left-wing nationalist parties began to dominate (Keating 1996: 119).

In 1931 amidst the fall of the dictatorship, Francesc Macià, as leader of *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, proclaimed the Catalan Republic a member state of the Iberian Federation (Puigjaner 1992). While this call for a Catalan Republic was not accepted, it did lead to the creation of the *Estatut d'Autonomia* in 1931 which granted 'considerable powers of self government' (Giner 1980: 33), and the reformation of the *Generalitat* within the wider framework of the '*Estado integral*' of the Second Republic. Michael Keating describes this as:

> a semi-federal system in which regions could accede to full autonomy only after a lengthy and difficult process designed to stop other regions following the example of the historic nationalities (Catalonia, the Basque country and Galicia) (Keating 1996: 119-120).

This system was not to last long after the civil war (1936-1939) since the elimination of 'minority nationalisms' was one of Franco's main aims (Cucurull 1980: 71; Keating 1996).

CATALUNYA UNDER FRANCO

Franco's idea of Spain was '*una, grande y libre*'. Leaning on the institutions of the army, the church and the *Falange* (the only legalised political party), Franco aimed to create an united and homogenous '*estado nacional*' (national state) (Carr and Fusi 1979: 21; García de Cortázar and González Vesga 1993). 'Minority nationalisms' had no place in this scheme which aimed to impose the Castilian language and culture throughout the Spanish territory.

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[14] In 1924 Primo de Rivera abolished the Catalan flag and language (Conversi 1997: 36).

What effects did this have on Catalunya? Between 1938 and 1953, 500,000 Spaniards went into exile - 200,000 of these were Catalans (Conversi 1997: 110); 4000 Catalans were executed and of the 300,000 people in concentration camps, half were Catalans (Farrés i Busquets 1997: 184). Catalunya was seen as a threat to Spanish unity:

> If we were to abandon Cataluña to its own destiny, it would be a great danger to the integrity of the country [*patria*] (General Franco to the press in Benet 1988: 52).

Repression took place in both the cultural and political spheres. The focus of the former was, once again, the Catalan language. In the latter the political structures of self-government were abolished and all political parties banned. As put by Farrés i Busquets:

> It was simply the continuation of the Civil War through other methods...the persecution of the '*rojo-separatistas*'[15] was presented as a social necessity, an issue of public health, which was why betrayal and reporting were encouraged (Farrés i Busquets 1997: 183).

Initially repression was brutal; attempts were made to wipe out all instances of separatism (Llobera 1989; Moreno 1995). However as time went by there was a greater degree of freedom. In any case, the outcome of this repression was to unite Catalans in a fight against two common enemies: centralism and dictatorship.

> [T]he ironical outcome of repression was to strengthen Catalan identity (Keating 1996: 120).

Resistance to this repression came in many forms; initially located in the more private spheres of the family and slowly becoming more public. Pi Sunyer has identified three main sites of resistance: the family; a variety of groups and associations; and the underground political parties that would eventually move into the public sphere (in Llobera 1996: 192-193). In a study carried out in Catalunya in the late 1960s, Hansen concluded that Catalan national identity had been eradicated (Llobera 1989; Llobera 1996). What Hansen did not bear in mind was 'that under conditions of severe repression, nationalist sentiments are to be found as different registers from the usual ... Where there is no free press and where political parties are banned, the culture of resistance will of necessity express itself in subtle ways' (Llobera 1996: 192).

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[15] Rojo-separatistas were Franco's main focus for repression - it referred to people who were socialists and regionalists.

As in other periods of repression, cultural nationalism was the first aspect for Catalans to turn to:

> Cultural nationalism became a surrogate for political nationalism when political nationalism was perforce a clandestine activity (Carr and Fusi 1979: 157).

Repression was strongest against the Catalan language: Catalan was banned from the public sphere. The existing Catalan press was shut down, publications in Catalan were banned, the *Institut d'Estudis Catalans* was closed, and names of places written in Catalan were Castilianised (Conversi 1997: 112; Farrés i Busquets 1997: 185). Castilian became the language of the institutions: education was in Castilian and Castilian was the language of the law.

The maintenance of Catalan in the private sphere - it was spoken in the family - ensured its survival. Civil society was also important in the maintenance of a sense of Catalan identity (Conversi 1997: 133). Associations included anything from hiking groups and folklore groups to *Associacios de veins* (neighbourhood associations), 'which addressed the lack of welfare provision and urban planning typical of Francoist development schemes' (Conversi 1997: 134).

Catalan national identity was also kept alive in exile. Texts in Catalan were published in exile and the *Jocs Florals*[16]continued, for a few years at least, to take place in exile (Llobera 1996).

Other symbols of Catalan life were also attacked by the Francoist regime: the Catalan flag and anthem were banned and the monument to Rafael Casanova was taken down (Llobera 1996: 198). Only those folkloric elements which were regarded as 'harmless' were permitted (Carr and Fusi 1979: 156; Conversi 1997: 114). Some elements were considered 'dangerous' in one setting but 'harmless' in others: this is the case of the *sardana* (Catalan dance) which was prosecuted in Barcelona but was tolerated in some areas of rural Catalunya (Goward 1980).

Over time, there was a gradual relaxation of the control over manifestations of Catalan cultural identity. In the sphere of language there was an increase (albeit small) in the number of publications: while in 1946 only 12 books had been published in Catalan, by 1966 there were over 400 books published. In the 1960s

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[16] The *Jocs Florals* were yearly literary competitions in Catalan.

Omnium Cultural was allowed to teach Catalan and the *Nova Cançó* movement[17] became an important form of protest. Likewise, in the early seventies, movements calling for an increase in the use of Catalan in education came into existence (Balcells 1996: 147; Ferrer 1979: 282).

The Catholic Church played a crucial role in the maintenance of Catalan identity. In early periods the Church in Catalunya (as in the rest of Spain) was closely linked to the new regime. However as time went by, the Catalan clergy moved away from the regime. An example of this is that the Church was the first place where Catalan was heard in public (Balcells 1991: 142). The Monastery of Montserrat became the 'centre and symbol of this resistance' (Conversi 1997: 125) by publishing in Catalan and in 1947 holding the celebrations of the *Virgen de Montserrat* which brought together people of all political viewpoints and where the *senyera*[18] was flown (Balcells 1991: 155).

In 1963 the Abbot of Montserrat, Aureli M. Escaré, criticised Franco's regime in the French newspaper **Le Monde**[19]:

> Catalunya is a nation amongst other Spanish nations (...) we are Spanish but we are not Castilians (Ferrer 1979: 281).

The Church was also involved in more political aspects[20] of Catalan resistance. In 1960, Galisonga, the director of **La Vanguardía** called all Catalans 'shits'[21] after being angered by hearing part of Sunday Mass in Catalan. This led to a mobilisation of many groups[22] against the paper: a call to sabotage the paper led to a fall of 10,000 in the number of copies sold and Galisonga was forced to resign (Farrés i Busquets 1997: 208). In 1966, when the Barcelona students formed a new, unauthorised trade union, they did so in a church in Barcelona and the first meeting of the *Assemblea de Catalunya* took place in a church as well (Colomer 1993).

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[17] This was protest movement which stood for 'anti-fascism, nationalist revivalism, pan-Catalanism' (Giner 1980: 62). It was also a revival of folk music and had a wide audience.

[18]The Catalan flag.

[19]He was immediately sanctioned for this and two years later he was forced into exile (Balcells 1991: 155).

[20] Though they always referred to them as 'civic'.

[21] *'Todos los Catalanes son una mierda'*.

[22] At the head of this was the group *Cristians Catalans* of which Jordi Pujol was a member.

Franco's repression also affected the existing political institutions: the *Generalitat* was disbanded, the Statute of Autonomy was revoked and a new layer of government, the *Diputaciones*, were introduced. The *Diputaciones* 'acted basically as agents of central government and carried out functions as political controllers of the municipalities' (Moreno 1995: 15).

At the end of the Civil War the *Generalitat* was exiled. Its president at the time, Lluis Companys, fled to France. He formed the *Consell Nacional de Catalunya* (National Council of Catalunya) but, in 1940, following the German occupation of France, he was captured by the Gestapo and returned to Spain where he was executed. In 1954 Josep Tarradellas was elected president in exile (Benet 1988: 52). Tarradellas did not form a government in exile but was a crucial mediating figure in the transition to democracy after Franco's death in 1975.

Political resistance inside Catalunya depended, to a large degree, on the liberalisation of the Spanish state. In the early 1950s Spain began to open up to the exterior and this was accompanied by an internal relaxation. The Catalanist movement began to be increasingly political (Conversi 1997: 130). In 1960 when Franco visited Barcelona, a concert at the *Palau de la Musica* was organised and the *Cant de la Senyera* was removed from the repertoire. However the public sang it none the less (Balcells 1991: 151) [23]. Various people were arrested, among them Jordi Pujol. Pujol, who was very active in the CC (*Cristians Catalans*), was arrested and spent two and a half years in prison (Farrés i Busquets 1997: 205; Ferrer 1979: 297). In 1964 the *Diada* was celebrated; three thousand people were present and over the years the numbers increased.

After 1968, as the regime became weaker, new political forces and initiatives began to appear in Catalunya (Ferrer 1979: 284). In 1969 the *Comissió Coordinadora de Forces Polítiques* was created (Ferrer 1979: 297; Keating 1996: 120). This was formed by parties across the political spectrum. In 1971 the *Assemblea de Catalunya* brought together many movements under one main idea - the need for a political alternative - in the form of their four demands: amnesty; a Statute of autonomy; right to fundamental democratic liberty; and co-ordination of all peoples of the Peninsula to fight against the dictatorship. The first meeting, which was attended by 300 people, was held in a church in Barcelona (Colomer 1993).

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[23] Franco was not actually present at the concert but many of his top officials were.

Catalan identity was kept alive during the Franco regime in the private sphere at first and then through civil society and at later stages, political parties. At the same time there was a re-definition of Catalan identity. The main reason for the need to redefine Catalan identity was brought about by the major social changes which took place. The economic development of Catalunya attracted huge numbers of immigrants from the less developed areas of Spain to the industrialised areas of Catalunya. This is analysed in more detail in the following chapter.

The events that took place during the Francoist dictatorship are crucial for understanding the changes which took place during the transition to democracy and the legal framework of present day Catalunya in the Spanish state. Franco's repression had made the idea of democracy and decentralisation inseparable. These were the main ideas of the transition.

TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

In the transition to democracy, it became clear that the demands of 'minority nationalisms' had to be taken into account in the reconstruction of Spain.

In Catalunya, the *Assemblea de Catalunya*, which was later to become the Assembly of Political Forces, played a fundamental role in providing continuity from the struggles and demands of the Franco era, as well as presenting a relatively united political front open to negotiations with the central government (Bilbeny 1988: 223). The Assembly had recognised Tarradellas (still exiled in France) as its leader and Tarradellas agreed a strategy of negotiation when Suárez approached him in 1977 (Giner 1980: 69).

The first change at the level of the Spanish State came in December 1976 with the referendum for the Law of Political Reform[24]. Giner comments that although this measure might not have been very hope-inspiring in itself, as time went by and political parties were legalised, it became clear that the process was moving towards democracy (1986: 449). The first general elections were held on the 15 June 1977. *Unión de Centro Democrático*, led by Suárez[25], obtained a majority in most

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[24] This was approved by 69% of the Catalan electorate (Conversi 1997: 142).

[25] Adolfo Suarez had been appointed by the King as President during the transition. He had previously been involved in the *Movimiento* which meant that he could maintain trust (Heywood 1995: 41).

parts of Spain, but '[t]he defeat of his party in Catalonia obliged Suárez to negotiate' (Balcells 1996: 171). When Suárez decided to negotiate directly with Tarradellas, the President of the *Generalitat* in exile, the *Assemblea de Parlamentaris* had no choice but to give its support to Tarradellas (Balcells 1996: 171). In September 1977 a provisional *Generalitat* was created and Tarradellas returned to Catalunya, triumphant, in October 1977[26]. For the next two years, what was to become the Statute of Autonomy was under discussion. The *Assemblea de Parlamentaris* was the body which began to elaborate the Statute of Autonomy. The Statute was finally approved on the 25 October 1979 (Colomer 1986: 261).

The Spanish Constitution

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 acknowledged the pluri-national and pluri-lingual nature of the Spanish State. The preamble to the Constitution claims as its aim:

> To protect all Spaniards and the nations of Spain in the search for human rights, its cultures and traditions, languages and institutions.

In attempting to gain the support of all political parties, the 1978 Constitution is a 'product of consensus' (Guibernau 1997: 93; Heywood 1995: 55).

> The 1978 Constitution was an integrating constitution which was looking for support from all political sectors (Murillo de la Cuerva 1985: 492).

In its attempt to satisfy all those involved in the process of democratisation, the final text left many issues open and 'has later been open to many interpretations' (Colomer 1986: 261). This ambiguity has resulted in constant conflict between the Autonomous Communities and the Central government (Conversi 1997: 114)[27]. In some cases the terminology itself is ambiguous: this is the case of the term 'nation' and 'nationality' (Guibernau 1997: 94; Ribó 1988: 74).

Article Two of the Constitution is at the centre of this 'tension between unity of Spain and the social pressure to recognise historic nations, such as Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country' (Guibernau 1997).

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[26] This was after the *Diada* on the 11 September where over 1 million people took to the streets of Barcelona.

[27] This has mostly been to do with the speed and extent of the competencies transferred from the Central State to the Autonomous Communities.

> Article 2: The Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, common and indivisible country [*patria*] of all Spaniards and recognises and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is comprised and solidarity amongst them ...

While stating the indivisible nature of Spain, the Constitution also recognised the rights of nationalities and regions, and lays out a relationship of solidarity between these regions and nationalities (Conversi 1997: 143; Heywood 1995: 52; Murillo de la Cuerva 1985: 494). The terms 'nationality' and 'region' are not defined: what is to be considered a 'nationality' and what is to be considered a 'region'? But more importantly the word 'nation' is used to refer both to Spain as a whole - 'the Spanish nation'[28] - and as 'nationality' to refer to the nations constituting Spain.

The Constitution also lays out issues to do with language and flags: both of which are important symbols for Catalan nationalism today. Article Three of the Spanish Constitution states that Castilian is the official language of the State and that other languages are also official in their Autonomous Communities and shall be protected as such:

> 1. Castilian is the official Spanish language of all the State. All Spaniards have the obligation to know it and the right to use it.
> 2. The other Spanish languages will also be official in their respective Autonomous Communities in agreement with their Statutes.
> 3. The richness of the different languages of Spain is a cultural heritage which will be specially respected and protected.

This article provides the framework for official bilingualism, which is also present in the articles to do with language in the Statute of Autonomy[29]. Likewise, in the case of the flags, the Constitution describes the flag of the Spanish State and then goes on to recognise the flags of the Autonomous Communities:

> Article 4.2
> The Statutes will be able to legalise the flags of the Autonomous Communities. These will be used alongside the Spanish flag on their public building and acts.

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[28] The term 'the Spanish nation' is also used in the Preamble of the Constitution:
'The Spanish nation, wanting to establish justice, liberty and security and to promote the well-being of those in it, with its sovereignty proclaims its wish to:...protect all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercising of human rights, their cultures and traditions, languages and institutions'.

[29] It is argued that given the pressure under which both texts were elaborated, there was a need to reach a compromise and so a short-term agreement was given priority. This agreement exchanged the granting of autonomy to Catalunya with making it a bilingual autonomy (Ferrer 1984: 105 and Colomer in interview in **El País**, 12.12.96).

Colomer summarises the Constitution as having created 'an idea of a democratic State with plural bases, different from the mystical and uniformist idea of a united and essential Spain'. Although there is a rejection of centralism Spain remains indivisible, in part because of the concept of solidarity between the Autonomous Communities (Colomer 1986: 261-262).

Some analysts (Balcells 1996; Conversi 1997; Farrés i Busquets 1997) have argued that the aim behind the creation of the State of the Autonomies[30] was to lessen the potential powers of the autonomy of the 'historic nations':

> the State of Autonomies generalises autonomies as a way of diluting the Basque and Catalan 'problems' and as a half-way point between the unitarian decentralised state and the federal model (Farrés i Busquets 1997: 221).

The Catalan Statute of Autonomy

The Spanish Constitution which was approved on the 6 December 1978 was the framework for the Catalan Statute of Autonomy approved a year later. The Preamble to the Statute sets the tone of the document that follows. It links the idea of democratic freedom to the idea of self-government; it pays tribute to those who made this new development possible; and places Catalunya within the framework of Spain. There is an appeal to history in order to justify the present and move into the future:

> The collective freedom of Catalonia finds in the institutions of the Generalitat a link with a long history of emphasis on, and respect for, the fundamental rights and public freedoms of individuals and peoples: a history which the people of Catalonia wish to continue, in order to make possible the creation of a forward-looking democratic society.

The Statute is also important in the definition of key symbols of Catalunya. The first articles define the territory of Catalunya, the flag, and the language. The territory is defined as the four provinces of Barcelona, Girona, Lleida, and Tarragona (Article 2) and the flag as the *senyera*: 'the Catalan flag is the traditional one of four red stripes on a yellow background' (Article 4). But the most controversial article has been Article 3 regarding the Catalan language:

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[30]The extension of the process of autonomism, of dividing Spain into 17 Autonomous Communities, has meant that at the end of the process when full autonomy is reached, they will all have the same powers (Guibernau 1997) .

71

1. Catalunya's own language is Catalan.
2. The Catalan language is the official one in Catalonia, as is Castilian, official throughout the Spanish State.
3. The *Generalitat* will guarantee the normal and official use of both languages, will take the necessary measures to ensure adequate knowledge of them and will create the conditions which will allow them to attain full equality with respect to the rights and duties of the citizens of Catalonia.
4. The Aranese language[31] will be taught, and will be the object of special respect and protection.

Once again, as in the Constitution, there is an ambiguity of terms: what is meant by *'llengua pròpia'* (proper language) and what is a 'normal use' of a language? These ambiguities have played parts in the debates around the languages in Catalunya.

The Statute also defines who is a Catalan; this is done in terms of residence in Catalunya.

Article 6
1. For the purposes of this Statute, the political status of Catalan shall be accorded to all Spanish citizens who, in accordance with the general laws of the State, are legally resident in any of the municipalities of Catalonia.

Some analysts have argued that the Statute was important as it finally recognises Catalunya as a nationality and granted it powers of self-government (Aja i Fernández 1988; Llobera 1998). On the other hand, others have criticised the Statute for being too restrictive. Giner says it is actually more restrictive than the 1932 Statute on which it is based (1980: 68). Balcells states that 'in the arduous negotiations in Madrid, the Catalan parliamentarians had to make numerous concessions' (1996: 173). These concessions included issues over the language, as well as control over education, law and order and finances amongst other things[32].

POLITICS SINCE 1980

Once the Statute of Autonomy was approved, elections to the *Generalitat* were held.

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[31] This is spoken in the Vall d'Aran, an area of Catalunya.
[32] For more details on this also see Carod-Rovira (1995) .

Table 3.1 Results of autonomous elections to the *Generalitat*[33]

	1980 (%)	1984 (%)	1988 (%)	1992 (%)	1995 (%)
CiU	27.6	47.0	46.0	46.4	40.9
PSC	22.3	30.3	29.3	27.3	24.9
PSUC/IC-EV	18.6	5.6	7.8	6.4	9.7
ERC	8.8	4.4	4.1	8.0	9.5
AP/PP	2.3	7.7	5.3	5.9	13.1
UCD/CDS	10.5	4.1	4.1	0.9	-
OTHERS	9.9	5.0	3.4	5.1	1.0

Source: Anuari d'estadistica (1997: 710), Balcells (1996: 184) and Keating (1996: 122).

In the first elections to the *Parlament de Catalunya*, CiU got 27.6% of the votes. CiU, led by Jordi Pujol has been elected four times since then; Pujol himself has been President of the *Generalitat* for 19 years at the time of writing. In fact Pujol has been the only Catalan President and therefore of great influence to the development of the Statute of Autonomy. Once elected in 1980, Pujol began the implementation of the Statute immediately and within two years had transferred 80% of the powers from the central state to the *Generalitat* (Balcells 1996: 178). Since then, and as is outlined below, Pujol has continued to fight for full transfer of powers and to expand the powers of the *Generalitat*.

The fulfilment of the Statute of Autonomy has not been without problems. In 1982 UCD and the PSOE reached an agreement on a law to restrict the process of autonomy - the LOAPA (*Ley Orgánica de Armonización del Proceso Autonómico* - Organic Law for the Harmonisation of the Process of Self-government). However, the *Tribunal Constitucional* (Constitutional Court) declared that over one third of its provisions were not constitutional and other aspects were taken to the *Tribunal Constitucional* throughout the 1980s (Balcells 1996: 179; Keating 1996: 123; Moreno 1995: 17).

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[33] CiU stands for *Convergència i Unió*. PSC stands for *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* - Catalan Socialist Party. PSUC is *Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya*. It became IC-EV (*Iniciativa per Catalunya – Els Verds*) in 1987. AP stands for *Alianza Popular* which later became PP (*Partido Popular*). UCD stands for *Unión de Centro Democrático* which became CDS *Centro Democrático y Social*) in 1982 (Balcells 1996: 182).

CiU has also been important at the level of the Spanish state, by giving its support to parties in government in Madrid. In 1993 Pujol gave his party's support to the socialist PSOE, and in 1996 when the PP narrowly missed getting overall majority CiU gave them support. Clearly this has caused some discontent among the more nationalist supporters of CiU who see the PP as a centralist party, that has never been particularly sensitive to Catalan issues.

Another interesting feature of Catalan politics is differential voting. Depending on the level of government (central government or autonomous community) to be elected, voters elect different parties. As can be seen by comparing Table 3.1 (above) and Table 3.2 (below) CiU wins the elections to the *Generalitat*, but it is the socialists who get the majority of the votes for the central government.

Table 3.2 Results of the General elections to the *Cortes*

	1982 (%)	1986 (%)	1989 (%)	1993 (%)	1996 (%)
CiU	22.2	31.8	32.5	33.0	30.2
PSC	36.5	40.6	35.3	36.2	40.0
PSUC/IC-EV	4.6	3.9	7.2	7.7	7.8
ERC	4.0	2.7	2.6	5.3	4.3
AP/PP	14.5	11.3	10.5	17.7	18.3
UCD/CDS	2.0	4.1	4.2	-	-

Source: Balcells (1996) for data on 1982,1986 and 1989 and **El País** 5.3.96 for data on 1993 and 1996.

Hernández (1986: 88) points to the fact that at autonomic elections there is a higher level of abstention than at the central government elections. He believes that those who vote at the autonomic elections are those who believe most in the powers of the *Generalitat* and so will vote for a party who will defend Catalan interests at this level. There are also other aspects to be taken into account such as the economic situation and the attitudes of the different parties at the level of the Spanish state[34].

CATALAN NATIONALISM TODAY

Present day Catalan nationalism fits many aspects of 'neo-nationalism' (Keating 1996; Nairn 1977; McCrone 1998). Neo-nationalism 'is in many ways analogous to

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[34] For more details see Riba (1995).

historical or mainstream nationalism. But a more careful consideration shows its different place in history, and its different character and potential' (Nairn 1977: 127). Likewise McCrone states that 'conventional theories of nationalism have found them [neo-nationalisms] difficult to accommodate' (1998: 128-129).

Along with Catalunya, the term neo-nationalism is most commonly applied to Scotland and Quebec. In all three cases, the recent development of nationalism has been regarded as unexpected and abrupt (Nairn 1977; McCrone 1998). Talking about the Scottish case (and the same can be said of the Catalan case), Nairn states that nationalism had been confined in the 1960s to 'a relic from before the Flood of Europe's mainstream nationalism, as it were, more suitable for jokes than serious political analysis' (1977: 130). However, with the advent of new political, cultural and economic readjustments these neo-nationalisms have had to be taken seriously and given the analysis they are due (McCrone 1998: 125-128). In the following paragraphs I summarise some similarities and differences between mainstream nationalism and neo-nationalism[35].

Both nationalisms are a 'forced by-product of the grotesquely uneven nature of capital development' (Nairn 1977: 128). However, the appearance of neo-nationalism is very different in terms of the point in time of this capitalist development. Neo-nationalism has appeared in highly industrialised areas. Likewise, the areas in which neo-nationalism has appeared are relatively (to the state in which they are located) advanced in economic terms (McCrone 1998; Nairn 1977).

In both nationalisms there is a constant tension between looking backward and the need to move forward. As Nairn states: 'new movements cannot help wearing old clothes' (1977: 127). On the one hand the existence of these 'old clothes' or 'raw materials' (Nairn 1977) meant that neo-nationalisms could 'moblise their history and culture by calling up flags, hymns and icons which are available to them' (McCrone 1998: 128). This mobilisation meant that neo-nationalism could progress quickly. On the other hand, neo-nationalism has to look to the future. In the Catalan case, an attempt to resolve the tension between the past and the need to

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[35] For a more thorough discussion see Nairn (1977) and McCrone (1998). McCrone (1998: 128-129) provides twelve characteristics of neo-nationalism, some of which are discussed below.

75

move forward, is encapsulated in the idea of *'fer pais'* (nation building), which is discussed below.

Although both mainstream nationalism and neo-nationalism place an emphasis on culture, the role that culture plays is different. In mainstream nationalism, common culture was a central feature in achieving political ends (Giner 1980: 63; Nairn 1977: 155). However, in the case of neo-nationalisms there is a more complex relationship between cultural nationalism and political nationalism. McCrone states:

> Simply put, it seems that until recently culture was an alternative, an antidote, to political nationalism in these stateless nations, rather than an integral part of if (1998: 135).

Referring to Catalunya, Guibernau goes as far as saying:

> to speak of nationalism, is to speak of culture, since the basic elements of the national conscious come from the experience of sharing a common culture which includes language, the symbols, myths and the 'ways' of the society (1998: 796).

Having briefly outlined some differences between mainstream and neo-nationalism, in the following section I focus in more detail on three further aspects of neo-nationalism in the Catalan case: civil society, multiple identities within Catalunya and the variable geometry of power that Catalunya finds itself in with relation to the Spanish state and Europe. The section then goes on to look at the political discourse of Jordi Pujol and CiU. It would be wrong to equate Catalan nationalism with Pujol and CiU; there are other political and cultural stances. I wish to focus on CiU as the one which has had most influence in present-day Catalunya. Given that the rest of the dissertation analyses aspects of policy of the *Generalitat* towards immigration from outside the European Union, it is clear that CiU is the most important party in this definition. Finally, the last section of the chapter turns to the language issue. Language has been, and continues to be the core symbol of Catalan national identity. As such, it is a key debate in issues of immigration and integration.

'Coherent civil societies'[36]

As has been highlighted above, civil society[37] has played an important role in the formation and maintenance of Catalan nationalism. To a large extent it has been

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[36] McCrone (1998: 129).

civil society which has developed the institutions and values which are held at the centre of present day Catalan nationalism (Keating 1996: 152; Llobera 1996: 196). Civil society have been crucial in 'nation-building' and creating a sense of an 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991).

Giner highlights the way in which civil society has brought together different aspects of Catalan life and emphasises the fact that progress has not 'damaged' these institutions:

> The people of such small 'advanced' stateless nations must find their collective identity by falling back on the institutions of their civil societies, as public and state institutions are alien and often hostile to them. This search for a common identity and strength results also in the conscious participation of the people in many symbolic acts of ethnico-cultural affirmation. In this respect Catalonia must be one of the very few industrial countries where the progress of technology and capitalism has not meant that relegation of a vast number of traditional festivities, dances and ritualistic games of all sorts either to remote rural areas, or to certain pockets of the popular classes (Giner 1980: 10-11).

In present-day Catalunya, civil society carries out a wide range of activities. There are a large number of organisations and associations which cover a wide range of interests going across the political spectrum and cutting across different classes (Sarasa 1998: 996). They range from those which protect and promote the Catalan language to sports associations[38] and finally more folkloric elements such as those who practice *sardanas* or *castellers* [39] (Giner 1980; Sarasa 1998).

It is difficult to measure the extent to which the commonly-held idea that Catalans are very involved in civil society is correct. Since 1975 there has been an increase in the number of associations which have legalised their position (Sarasa 1998: 985). It is difficult to measure participation in these associations. There has only been one survey carried out to measure participation (for more details see Sarasa 1998: 993)

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[37] Civil society refers to both 'those institutions that lie between the citizen and the state' (Paterson 1994: 12) and 'those areas of social life - the domestic world, the economic sphere, cultural activities and political interaction - which are organised by private or voluntary arrangements between individuals and groups outside the direct control of the state'(Held 1992: 73).

[38] The Barcelona Football Club is one of the most visible aspects. It has been and continues to be a symbol of Catalan national identity. In this respect it is often said that '*Barça* is a lot more than just a team'. For more details see Duke and Crolley (1996).

[39] The *Sardana* is a typical Catalan dance which is danced in a circle. *Castellers* are human towers.

and this in fact concluded that there was a fairly low rate of participation in Catalunya.

The wide range of associations shows how civil society is involved in both cultural and political issues. It is sometimes hard to draw a line between them, or see the precise nature of the relationship between them (McCrone 1998; Pi-Sunyer 1985). In recent debates in Catalunya, it has become hard to draw the line between the political and the cultural. This is particularly true of the issue of language. The new language law passed in 1998, combined cultural and political elements in a complex manner[40].

'Multiple national identities are a feature of political identity'[41]

Since 1990 there have been surveys asking people to describe their national identity[42]. There are two things worth noting about the results of these surveys. Firstly is the fact that Catalans tend to have dual identity (that is feel as Catalan as Spanish) rather than exclusionary identity. Secondly, this trend towards dual identity has increased through time.

Table 3.3 . Identity in Catalunya

Do you feel:	1990 (%)	1991 (%)	1992 (%)	1993 (%)	1994 (%)	1995 (%)
Only Catalan	6	15	17	12	11	11
More Catalan than Spanish	23	21	17	18	21	17
As much Catalan as Spanish	36	37	37	42	42	44
More Spanish than Catalan	10	7	6	9	15	16
Only Spanish	22	18	21	19	11	12
Don't know	3	2	1	1	1	1
n=	557	2191	1684	1695	1704	1297

Source: Moreno and Arriba (1996: 83).

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[40] This is discussed in more detail below.

[41] McCrone (1998: 129).

[42] Asking people to position themselves on the scale below is a clearly a useful tool in many ways. However it is also too crass a method of measuring identity. Undoubtedly it would be interesting to have more sensitive data which would allow the content of labels such as 'Catalan' and 'Spanish' to be deciphered and also to disentangle (if possible) issues of political and cultural belonging. In my own research with non-EU immigrants I teased out ideas of what it meant to be Catalan and an amazing variety of symbols and stereotypes were drawn upon.

Age and sex do not appear to be significant variables. The most significant variable in the question of identity is place of birth. Although dual identity is also the most common positioning among those born outside Catalunya, it is lower for this group than for those people born in Catalunya (Moreno and Arriba 1996; Sànchez 1998: 1073)[43].

Politically, these multiple national identities are reflected in the different voting patterns for state elections and autonomous community elections. The 'shared loyalties'[44](Castiñeira 1998: 96) to Spain and Catalunya mean that more people vote CiU in the autonomous election and vote PSOE at state elections.

'Variable geometry of power'[45]

The variable geometry of power, where political debates take place across various dimensions is another characteristic of neo-nationalisms (McCrone 1998: 129). Moreno (1997: 24) suggests that this 'permanent political bargaining among local, regional and central governments is bound to remain as the most characteristic feature of the - yet unfinished - Spanish process of decentralisation'.

In the case of Catalunya there is constant conflict between the government of the *Generalitat* and the central government in Madrid. The ambiguity of the Spanish constitution and the Statute of Autonomy has been the main source of conflict. Pujol has 'pursued a policy of both firmness and compromise *vis-à-vis* the Spanish state. Although not a supporter of outright independence, he is still in favour of taking the Statute of Autonomy to its virtual limits' (Llobera 1996: 200).

The way the State of the Autonomies has evolved has led to conflict. It remains unclear what the final outcome of the present process was meant to be and this is a source of debate. In Catalunya there is a clear wish to maintain certain privileges as a 'historic nation', which other communities would not have access to. CiU rejects federalism as it reduces the status of Catalunya to a mere region (Keating 1996: 161).

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[43] This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.

[44] Castiñeira argues that although people may feel culturally Catalan only, when it comes to political aspects they may have shared loyalties with the Spanish state.

[45] McCrone (1998: 129).

One of the main sources of conflict between the central state and the *Generalitat* has been over finances; the contribution that Catalunya makes to the central government and the amount it receives back. Between 1987 and 1989, Catalunya's GNP was 24% above the Spanish average, but the average public investment made in the territory was 40% below the average (de Jouvenel and Roque 1993: 280). In 1997 Pujol managed, through negotiations with the PP, to increase the amount of taxes collected and spent directly to 30% (**El Mundo**, 29.10.97).

At an international level, Catalunya has made many efforts to gain recognition. The European dimension has been important for various factors. Catalunya presents itself as 'the north of the south' in Europe: it has always considered its connection to Europe to be strong. Within the European Union the *Patronat Català pro Europa* lobbies for the interests of Catalunya in Brussels (Keating 1996: 156-157). One of the main links is in the economic sphere. In many of his speeches and writings, Pujol highlights the importance that Europe has for the economic life of Catalunya (Pujol and Pi 1996).

PUJOL, CiU AND FER PAIS

Jordi Pujol has been President of the *Generalitat de Catalunya* since 1980, and it is impossible to understand present-day Catalunya without understanding elements of what he and the coalition he leads (CiU) advocate (Guibernau 1997; Llobera 1996 et al). Pujol's nationalist discourse combines a wide range of elements and draws support from very diverse sectors of society. It fits McCrone's description of a 'niche nationalism' where 'the party recognises its capacity to tailor its appeal according to political contingencies, and to naturalise itself as the party of 'all the nation', a category which can be redefined as the moment allows' (1998: 144). CiU blends together aspects of nationalism and religion; as Guibernau puts it, it presents a 'religious patriotic mysticism' (1997: 103). Although CiU continues to have a wide support base there has been an increasing move to the right; in earlier writings (especially during the Franco dictatorship) there was more emphasis on the working class and its promotion, whereas in recent times its discourse has become increasingly conservative (Guibernau 1997: 104). However its religious orientation and the existence of left-wing nationalist parties, such as ERC and PI, means that CiU has to bear in mind social issues (Vilar 1990: 16).

In the following paragraphs I turn to the nationalist discourse of Jordi Pujol. I follow Guibernau's (1998: 795) analysis of Pujol's discourse, as well as adding

elements from the yearly speeches Pujol gives on the *Diada*. I agree with Llobera when he says that the speeches are 'an indispensable tool for the understanding of contemporary developments in Catalonia' (1996: 200). Llobera highlights the rhetorical way in which Pujol uses history as a way of intensifying national identity by highlighting the heroism and tenacity of the Catalans and linking it to issues of economic progress, social integration and a commentary of the development of Catalan autonomy (Llobera 1996: 200). In addition to this, in every speech he makes a call for everyone to be involved in the process of *fer pais* (nation building).

Guibernau first points to Pujol's rejection of racial and ethnic factors in defining Catalunya (1998: 796). Catalan nationalism is defined in civic terms. As early as the 1960s Pujol defined a Catalan as 'someone who lives and works in Catalunya'. This wide, inclusive, and territorial definition of belonging was important at a time when large numbers of immigrants were arriving into Catalunya and there were fears of a split in Catalan society into 'us the Catalans' and 'them the Spanish'. At a later stage, the idea of *voluntat de ser* (will to be) Catalan was included: it was not enough to simply live and work in Catalunya but a commitment had to be made to Catalan issues. The idea of *fer pais* relies on this notion of commitment and will to be. Hence the definition became: 'Catalan is everyone who lives and works in Catalunya and who wants to be Catalan' (Pujol and Pi 1996: 56).

Secondly, there is the idea that the willingness to belong has its roots in common history and language. Like all nationalist movements, history plays a key role in Pujol's political discourse:

> The roots are historic. We are the result of a history ... that history explains the present (Pujol 1991: 12).

History is used in practically every *Diada* speech as a means, not only of understanding the present, but also as a way of going forward. The focus on the future fits in with the ideas of Catalan nationalism as being civic: people are encouraged to participate in it daily. As Llobera states:

> they [nationalists] become more involved in forward-looking communal projects in which people can participate in a rational-instrumental way (Llobera 1989: 257).

The actual historical date of 11 September is seen as important due to the spirit of resistance of the Catalan people. It demonstrates the way in which Catalans are

used to fighting for what they want, and this same spirit and effort is called upon for the future:

> The eleventh of September is the day of the country, it is the day that symbolises our will to be (Pujol 1993: 15).

Another aspect is the will to create a modern nation, that can adapt its identity to recent changes without forgetting its roots. Once again, the history of Catalunya is called upon to present it as open to change. Likewise Pujol's references to social integration in the *Diada* speeches highlight this:

> We will build an open society, which is the one we want, capable of taking in Catalans of 20 generations, Catalans of 20 or 50 years, men and women who have just arrived (Pujol 1993: 15).

The final point is the way in which Pujol wishes to improve the position of Catalunya within the Spanish state:

> Pujol condemns the lack of trust, knowledge and understanding between Catalonia and the rest of Spain (Guibernau 1997: 105).

Convergència i Unió's final political aims are ambiguous and Pujol plays on these ambiguities. In turn, analysts interpret CiU's aims differently. Guibernau claims that:

> The CiU offers a nationalist discourse which does not require independence for Catalonia. The novelty of its message has an insistence on Catalan identity within the framework of the Spanish State (Pujol and Pi 1996)

She goes on to say that the fact that CiU gave its support to the PSOE in 1993 and to the PP in 1996 illustrates 'Pujol's idea that it is actually feasible to be a Catalan nationalist and at the same time to contribute to the governance of Spain' (1997: 99). Others however, including myself, feel that CiU plays on the ambiguities of what its final aims are:

> CiU takes care not to rule out independence as a legitimate aspiration but it continually reiterates that it is not on the agenda (Keating 1996: 126).

Pujol wishes to push the Statute of Autonomy to its limits, claiming there is a lot more to be achieved within its framework. In one speech he has compared the present situation regarding the Statute to a peasant who thinks he has a harvest

simply because he has a tractor (Faulí 1988: 18), forgetting the daily hard work that the farmer has to put in order to collect the harvest. Pujol believes the Statute is a useful tool but it has to be used continuously and properly.

LANGUAGE

Language is the core symbol of Catalan nationalism today: it is Catalunya's *fet diferencial* (differentiating trait) which sets it apart from the rest of Spain. Language is also important in providing a link between the past and the present, and provides a focus point for future struggles. Catalan has been repressed at various stages of history and yet it persevered as a core symbol of national identity due to resistance within the family and civil society[46]- this resistance was particularly strong at stages when Catalan identity could only be manifested culturally, not politically.

In present-day Catalunya, language continues to be a site of struggle. The Catalan language is a manifestation of civic nationalism. Catalan identity is primarily about residence in Catalunya and desire to be Catalan. The language is interpreted as the ultimate test of this desire for integration:

> language is a precise indicator of willingness and possibility of integration (Colectivo IOE 1992: 65).

The status of Catalan has increased through time - it is clearly needed for social mobility. In a Centre for Sociological Research (CIS) survey, 66% of those surveyed thought that knowledge of Catalan made it easier to find work in Catalunya[47].

As has been outlined above, the legal framework for the issue of language is provided by the Spanish Constitution and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy. In this context, it is the *Generalitat de Catalunya* that is responsible for the protection of the language. In 1983 the Law for Linguistic Normalisation was passed. At this stage

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[46] These two factors - civil society and the family - are important to CiU's discourse (Pujol and Pi 1996: 157-159).

[47] Centro de Investigacciones Sociológicas (CIS) survey 2228 on National and Regional Identification, 1996.

there was a widespread feeling that there was a need for a new law regulating Catalan and a high degree of consensus as to what it should include[48].

The preamble to the law deals with three issues: the symbolic meaning of the language, the reasons why there should be a law and finally it outlines the legal framework in which it operates. Firstly, it claims that the Catalan language has been historically important in the creation of Catalunya:

> The Catalan language, an essential element in the formation of Catalonia, has always been the nation's mother tongue and natural vehicle of communication, as well as the symbol of a cultural unity with deep historical roots.

The fact that Catalan has survived is testimony of the fidelity of the Catalan people to their land and culture. There is also a reference to immigration; Catalan has always been an integrating factor for people, regardless of their geographic origins.

Secondly, the preamble states that the language is in a precarious situation and gives reasons for the need of the law. There is the fact that Catalan stopped being the official language of Catalunya after the 1716 *Decret de la Nova Planta*, after which Castilian became the only official language, and the Catalan language and culture have been persecuted since[49]. Secondly, the language taught has always been Castilian as it was the language in which education was carried out, except for a few short periods of time where this was not the case. Thirdly, the arrival of many Castilian speakers into Catalunya, at a time when Catalunya did not have the infrastructure to incorporate them fully into Catalan society. Finally it is stated that the appearance of mass media, mainly in Castilian, had an important (negative) impact on the Catalan language.

The Law is then divided into five sections, dealing with: the aims of the law; the official use to be made of Catalan; the use of Catalan in education and media; and the institutional backing that is to be given to it. The law ends with a series of measures about how it is to be put into practice.

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[48] *Llei de normalització lingüística de Catalunya. Llei 7/1983 de 18 de abril.* When it was approved in parliament only one person abstained; this was Joan Besa of the Centro Democratico Social who objected to the preamble of the law (**El País**, 7.4.83).

[49] This is a good example of the use of 'myth history' and the importance of forgetting in history.

Although the law was finally passed unanimously, this did require some negotiations and compromises which meant that the law does not fulfil many of the objectives it set out to. Legislating on language is bound to be controversial and difficult. Ferrer (1984: 104) gave three reasons for this: in the first place the law is constrained by an overruling framework, the Constitution and the Statute which means that some decisions are limited by what is laid out there. Secondly, Catalan has been a language that was banned and persecuted in many spheres and this has meant that its use is very uneven and full normalisation has to take this into account. Finally there is the issue of immigration, as the social reality of Catalunya means that the rights of non-speakers living in Catalan have to be respected, especially if you want to avoid the issue of 'dual societies'[50].

The increasing use of the Catalan language

Since the introduction of the 1983 law there has been an increase in the use and knowledge of the Catalan language. This can be seen in the table below.

Table 3.4 The increasing knowledge of Catalan

percentage of the population who can:	1981	1986	1991	1996
Understand	81	91	94	95
Speak fluently	64	64	68	80
Read	61	61	68	84
Write correctly	32	32	40	53

Sources: Census and Leprêtre (1997) and Reixach (1997).

The situation in the media has also improved, though it remains low in relative terms. In 1995, 13% of the weekly press was in Catalan. These include **Avui;** which was set up in 1976 and has a circulation of 41,000. Until 1997 **Avui** was the only newspaper distributed throughout Catalunya which was printed in Catalan. In October 1997, **El Periódico** launched a Catalan edition - it now publishes in both Castilian and Catalan. The most recent data available for publications in Catalan is from 1995. In that year only 5,800 publications (out of a total of 16,500) were in Catalan (Anuari d'Estadistica 1997: 569).

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[50] Similar problems were encountered in the discussions of the 1998 law (see below and Chapter Four).

There has also been an increase in the use of Catalan in radio and television transmissions. There are five public radios which broadcast in Catalan, throughout Catalunya, and about 200 local stations do the same (Leprêtre 1997). There are two television stations which broadcast fully in Catalan, both of these are subsidised by the *Generalitat*. Since 1987 TVE2 emits in Catalan in the afternoons (Leprêtre 1997). As far as the private television channels go, there is a negligible presence of Catalan (Vallverdú 1996: 252).

Catalan has also increased its presence in education. The levels of Catalan are highest in primary school education: 73% of public schools teach only in Catalan (the figure for private schools is 58%) and 27% teach in both languages (private schools: 42%). While there are no public schools which teach only in Castilian, 4% of private schools do so (Romaní and Strubell i Treuta 1998: 811).

From the data it is clear that there has been an increase in the knowledge of Catalan, and in its use in public areas such as education and the media. However, whether the situation of Catalan is now 'normalised' is open to debate: in fact the very meaning of what 'normalisation' means is debated (Sabater i Siches 1984).

Six years after the approval of the 1983 law, the *Generalitat* announced that it was working on a new language law. Due to various political issues this law was not passed until late 1997. Politically this was a good time for CiU to put forward a new language law. Since giving its support to the PP in March 1996, the more nationalist elements of CiU felt that their interests were not being fully represented or defended by CiU. The linguistic law benefited both the PP and CiU: CiU could be seen as doing something independent of the PP and the PP benefited in so far as they were not giving in to pressure from the nationalists - something they were regularly accused of (**El País**, 30.12.97).

The general question was whether there was a real need for a new law when the 1983 law had not been fully implemented. There were also fears that a new law would create conflicts where they did not exist. Throughout the nine months of parliamentary debate there was a general feeling that there was no 'linguistic conflict' on the streets and that it was all a 'political show' (**El País**, 25.2.97).

The proposal of the law included various controversial aspects. The idea of sanctions was introduced, and linked to this was the idea of *disponibilidad linguistica*

- whereby people (this referred mostly to people working in the service sector) had to reply to clients in the language which they used. At this early stage, the law suggested that if people refused to do so they could be sanctioned for it. However, in the final law, sanctions could only be applied to firms but never to individuals. Other controversial issues were the labelling of products and broadcasting quotas for radio and television[51]. Besides these controversial issues the new law had also set out to clarify some ambiguities of the previous law. The meaning of *llengua pròpia* (proper language) and *llengua official* (official language) were to be clarified but the final definitions are still open to interpretation[52].

The Law was finally approved on the 29 December 1997, with support of all political groups except ERC and PP, who voted against it but for radically different reasons. ERC felt that the law was 'a huge lie ... it only hides an apparent peace'(**El País**, 30.12.97). They felt that the law had not gone far enough, that it had not made any real changes. At the other end of the political scale the PP voted against the law, in spite of not having the approval to do so from the party headquarters in Madrid. They felt the law had gone too far and wanted to close the language debate

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[51] Regarding labelling, Catalan is only compulsory for those products that are made within Catalunya and are mostly for distribution in Catalunya. Regarding quotas: local television stations have to broadcast 50% of their product in Catalan and the radio stations subsidised by the Generalitat have to broadcast in Catalan fifty percent of the time.

[52] Article Two

The *lengua pròpia*:

1. Catalan is the '*llengua pròpia*' of Catalunya and distinguishes it as a people.

2. As a '*llengua pròpia*' Catalan is:

    a) the language of all the institutions of Catalunya, especially the *Generalitat's* administration, local authorities, public corporations, public enterprises and public services, the means of mass communication, education and the designation of place names [toponymy]

    b) The preferred language used by the Spanish state administration in Catalunya in the form in which it itself determines, by other institutions and in general by enterprises and entities which offer services to the public.

3. Regulation 2 implies a special commitment of these institutions to promote its knowledge and encourage its use among citizens independently of the official character of Catalan and Castilian.

Article Three

The official languages:

1. Catalan is the official language of Catalunya, as is also Castilian.

2. Catalan and Castilian, as official languages, can be used without distinction by citizens in all their activities, public and private, without discrimination. Legal acts undertaken in either of the two languages have full validity and effectiveness, with reference to language.

as soon as possible because they felt that 'the exemplary *convivencia*, the most precious treasure of Catalunya' was under threat (**El País**, 30.12.97).

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this chapter has been to provide a brief discussion of Catalan nationalism through history in order to provide an understanding of key issues of Catalan nationalism today.

As has been summarised above, the Catalan language is important for present-day Catalan nationalism. There is however a difficult balance between the protection of the Catalan language and the official stance of bilingualism that is laid out in the Constitution and is a central aspect of *convivencia*. In the following chapter I look at the debates surrounding language to do with immigration and integration. The language issue has been widely discussed in relation with immigration from other areas of Spain. The Catalan language is also a crucial factor of integration of those immigrants coming from outside the European Union. Although this immigration is recent, and not as large in numbers as that from other areas of Spain, attempts are being made to teach these 'new' immigrants Catalan. Knowledge of Catalan is seen as a step towards their integration into Catalan society.

As in any nationalism, history is an important factor for the definition of present-day Catalunya. While Catalan nationalism draws on history, its main emphasis is on the future: about moving forward and about progress (Keating 1996: 130). This focus on the future fits in with the idea of Catalan nationalism as civic. The notions of '*fer país*' and '*voluntat de ser*' both encourage and allow people to participate daily. As Llobera states:

> they become more involved in forward looking communal projects in which people can participate in a rational-instrumental way (1989: 257).

This idea of participation is particularly relevant due to the historical importance of immigration in Catalunya, and the implication that this has had for Catalan identity. The following chapter highlights the importance of immigration in Catalunya and looks at the debates on immigration (arriving from other areas of the Spanish state) and the consequences this may have had for Catalan identity and Catalan nationalism.

CHAPTER FOUR

HISTORICAL IMMIGRATION IN CATALUNYA

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to look at the way in which immigration has always been important in Catalunya. Migration, both internal and external, has been a central aspect of Spain's history[1]. However, in the twentieth century it was the industrial areas of Spain which attracted people from other areas. Because employment could be found there, Catalunya, the Basque Country and Madrid were the main destination for workers. Catalunya attracted people to work in the textile industry, mining, metal-works and the chemical industry. In the Basque Country people were needed to work in mining. Madrid had overall general industrial development.

Catalunya has been one of the areas of Spain to receive most immigrants (Rodenas Calatayud 1994). Immigrants have continued to arrive into Catalunya in the recent past; it is only since 1980 that there has been a negative rate of immigration (Alabert 1994: 211). Due to its demographic importance, immigration has shaped political debates about the nature of Catalan nationalism in the past, and continues to be on the political agenda in present-day Catalunya.

Catalunya has always been considered a *'terra de pas'* - a corridor between the Iberian peninsula and the rest of the European continent:

> Catalunya, as a geographical corridor and bridge between different cultures, open in all its best moments, at all points of unrest throughout its history, has welcomed numerous sets of immigrants (Martinez-Mari Odena 1964: 38).

In **Noticia de Catalunya** (1954), Vicens Vives describes Catalunya as:

> a frontier country, always linked to the realities of its strong mixture (in Jutglar et al. 1968: 20).

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[1] See Chapter Five.

There are many more references in the literature to the importance of Catalunya's mixed heritage, due to the Catalan-Aragonese expansion in the fourteenth century, and the role of Barcelona as a main trade route and port in later centuries. This means that 'traditionally it [Catalunya] has absorbed multiple cultural influences and movements of people' (Conversi 1997: 188). Conversi argues 'that this helps explain why the assimilative traditions of Catalonia are often treated as 'primordial''. This characteristic is mobilised in periods of mass immigration. In the debates to do with assimilation during the 1960s and 1970s, appeals were regularly made to these attributions of Catalan society (Conversi 1997: 194).

Although immigration is portrayed as a characteristic of Catalunya through time, with the turn of the century it began to take a more prominent role due to the increase in numbers. This was especially true in Barcelona because of the building for the Universal Exhibitions (which took place in 1888 and 1929) and the onset of industrialisation. Earlier studies on the nature of immigration in Catalunya tended to focus largely on the demographic aspects, looking at the changes in the population. As time went by, the emphasis switched from the demographic aspect to the economic and social consequences of immigration. Economically, immigration has been vital to the industrial development of Catalunya. As Nadal put it:

> from the economic point of view, immigration has been a huge business for Catalunya (in Jutglar et al. 1968: 19).

Writing in the 1930s, Josep Vandellós was the first to combine the demographic changes in Catalunya with the wider social implications this might have. Vandellós' position, which is outlined below, borders on the racist. However it is not until the 1960s and 1970s that debates about the nature of immigration began to take a prominent position. These immigrants, coming from other areas of Spain, were seen as a 'threat to the Catalan way of life'. Those wishing to emphasise this threat pointed to the fact that both waves coincided with centralist dictatorships, the first with Primo de Rivera's (1923-30) and the second with Franco's (1939-75). These waves of immigration were interpreted by some as an attempt to neutralise the Catalan culture through the large presence of Castilian speakers (Balcells 1996; Hall 1979; J.M. Ainaud et al. 1980).

The Franco regime did not allow a full analysis of the issue, so most studies were non-critical. Any reference to a distinctive Catalan culture had to be implicit or restricted to merely folkloric elements. Debates on immigration and the impact of this on Catalan nationalism flourished after Franco's death. Issues of immigrants' 'integration into the Catalan way of life' were combined with debates to do with their position in the class structure and social mobility. Following the Catalan Statute of Autonomy in 1979, the Catalan language became an official language in Catalunya (alongside Castilian). The Catalan language has become the 'core symbol' of Catalunya. Debates and issues surrounding immigration have been crystallised by the Catalan language.

DEMOGRAPHY: 'The modern Catalan system of demographic reproduction'[2]

In 1900 there were under 2 million inhabitants in Catalunya. This represented 10.5% of the population of all of Spain. Before the First World War Catalunya had one of the lowest birth rates in Europe (Vandellós 1935: 26). Its death rate was also high: it had the sixth highest death rate (Jutglar in Muntaner et al. 1968: 19). This led to many concerns, especially among demographers, over the future of Catalunya and Catalan customs and characteristics (Jutglar et al. 1968: 17).

However, by 1986 Catalunya represented 15.5% of the Spanish population, with just under 6 million inhabitants (Cabré 1989b: 8). Immigration has played a vital role in this population increase. Anna Cabré has calculated that had it not been for immigration, Catalunya today would have approximately 2,400,000 inhabitants (1989b: 4) and would represent 6% of the Spanish population (1989b: 283). In present-day Catalunya 60% of the population are the 'direct or indirect result of immigration' (Cabré 1989a: 283). In the following sections I break down these immigration figures, by looking at the years in which immigrants arrived, the reasons why people were attracted to Catalunya, their social conditions on arrival, and how these have developed to the present.

As immigration has played a central role in the demographic recovery of Catalunya, it has also played an important role in debates about Catalan nationalism. Conversi points to the fact that 'all nationalisms attach enormous importance to population figures' (1997: 191); Catalunya is no exception. At first,

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[2] This is a term used by Cabré (1989b : 5).

some Catalans may have viewed the arrival of immigrants as a threat, and yet, as time went by and these immigrants made a vital contribution to the Catalan economy (by providing labour), the emphasis changed to search for ways of integrating these workers into Catalan society.

Pre-1900

All demographic studies in Catalunya emphasises the unreliable nature of early data; there are gaps in the data and they are not always comparable. However some general trends can be highlighted. Following the population crisis prior to 1500 (due to the Catalan expansion along the Mediterranean), the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw significant immigration from France, mainly to work in agriculture. By the eighteenth century, Catalunya was demographically stable, but then the population doubled due to (among other things) the increase in trade. The first half of the nineteenth century saw the last increase in the birth rate. In spite of the emigration to America, the population remained stable due to immigration from other areas of Spain. In the second half of the century the population was stable in spite of the low birth rate - this was because of the arrival of people from other areas.

Prior to the first official Spanish census of 1787 (*Censo de Floridablanca*), the only way to measure population was by church records or by the use of *fotgages*. Starting in 1359, the *fotgages* measured the number of households and then multiplied by 4.5 to get an estimate population figure[3] (Vandellós 1935: 36). Using these *fotgages* Vandellós (1935: 19) concluded that there was a population crisis between 1365-1500. This is attributed to the expansion of Catalunya along the Mediterranean as well as internal struggles[4]. Maluquer attributed this crisis to a high rate of mortality (rather than a low birth rate) due to various epidemics, including the Black Death, and bad diet. In subsequent centuries the population remained 'just about stable' (1965:45).

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[3] Vandellós (1935:36) acknowledged the fact that the average number of members of a family does not remain at 4.5 through time but none-the-less uses it as the only source of information.

[4] These internal struggles include the struggles for succession that led to the *Compromis de Casp* (1412), the *Revoltes Remences* and the Civil War between 1462- 1472 (once again over succession to the crown)(Farrés i Busquets 1997).

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, French immigration from Occitan was important (Nadal 1966:64; Sàez 1980: 25):

> The *fotgage* of 1516 allows us to say that around 10% of the total immigrant population in the Llobregat delta were of French origin(Codina 1980: 228).

Most of these people were agricultural workers, attracted by higher wages in Catalunya. At first, single men migrated, followed by women and children, but after 1660 it was once again only single men. Drawing from data collected in church records, Maluquer argued that 1660 also brought a clear change in the 'quality of immigration' as there was less need for agricultural workers:

> The common entrance of workers without skills was substituted by that of artisans (Maluquer i Sostres 1965: 49)

By the eighteenth century improvements in medicine and diet meant that mortality was controlled. Catalunya became more demographically stable. According to the censuses the population doubled in that period: from a population of 407,000 in 1718 to one of 814,000 in 1778. Maluquer (1965: 63) and Simón Tarrés (1996: 16) highlight the disputes over this, because of the lack of reliable data[5]. While it is generally accepted that there was an increase in population during the eighteenth century, some argue that the data record an exaggerated growth, while others argue that the big increase is because previous studies had been inaccurate and so underestimated numbers.

At the same time, the Catalan *Principat* began to develop and this pre-capitalist growth led to economic imbalance and migration. The social structure of Catalunya at the time helped in this development: the people working on the land had more rights over it than those in similar positions in other areas of Europe[6] (Sudirà 1990: 26) and in the city of Barcelona there was a commercial bourgeoisie that can be equated to a pre-capitalist entrepreneur class (Maluquer i Sostres 1965: 52). Trade

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[5] There are four main censuses used to measure population in 18th century Spain, the 1717 *Vecindario de Capflorida*, the 1768 Aranda census (this did not include Catalunya), the 1787 *Floridablanca* census and the 1797 Godoy census. The 1787 Floridablanca census is considered by many to be the most reliable census (Nadal 1966; Simon i Tarres 1996), due to the fact that it is the most thorough and the information on the population is divided by age and professions.

[6] These rights were granted in the 1484 *Sentencia de Guadalupe,* whereby the peasants had more control over what they wanted to do with the land they worked on, and were less open to exploitation. This lead to a certain amount of stability (Vilar 1987 :234).

with the countries of Northern Europe was at first based on silk and high-quality wines, but demands changed and soon it was based on cheaper wines and spirits. This trade allowed the development of routes which were later used for the trading of textiles. Catalunya's later industrial development was based on textiles; these were to become Catalunya's main export (Schubert 1990: 15; Sudirà 1990: 26).

Moving into the nineteenth century, the first official Spanish census was carried out in 1787. This is sometimes referred to as the first 'modern' census because it included all of Spain, using the same method for all areas - previous ones had been carried out by different institutions, using different methods and geographical areas (Simon i Tarres 1996: 105).

There was a population crisis at the beginning of the century due to the 1793 *Gran Guerra* against France (Simon i Tarres 1996: 19). However, this was overcome by what was to be the last autochthonous growth in the population of Catalunya, between the years 1820 to 1857 (Gómez Olivé 1992). Although this was followed by a sharp decrease (between 1857-1877) in population - mainly due to emigration to the Americas (Gómez Olivé 1992: 37) - the overall population of Catalunya remained stable throughout the century due to immigration from other parts of Spain (Maluquer i Sostres 1965: 57).

Vicens i Vives (in Maluquer i Sostres 1965: 136) pointed to the fact that there was a first wave of immigration around 1845, attracted by the emerging industry, but consistent immigration did not happen until 1877-1887. In these years 77% of the increase in population was attributed to immigration. Some (Maluquer i Sostres 1965: 135; Vandellós i Sola 1935: 22) have concluded that the increase was caused by the return of soldiers and entrepreneurs from the colonies about to be 'lost' in 1889 (Philippines and Cuba).

In addition, industrial development in Catalunya attracted labour. Trade routes increased and also included the Americas. With increasing trade and contact, there was enough income to invest in new machinery. In the early decades of the century, the first steam machines were used for textiles in what can be considered the first modern factories in Barcelona (Sudirà 1990: 28) and between 1838-1847 there was a growth in the textile industry using this system. Likewise, there were developments in transport. In 1848 the *Junta de Carreteres de Catalunya* was formed, and the

building of the first train-line in Spain, between Mataró and Barcelona, started (Gómez Olivé 1992: 39).

In the second half of the nineteenth century there was yet another crisis in the birth rate, which was 'blamed' on the influence of the French fashion to restrict natality (Gómez Olivé 1992 : 56; Maluquer i Sostres 1965: 39). Although there was some movement of people out of Catalunya (mostly to the rest of Spain and the Americas) this was balanced by immigration into Catalunya from other parts of Spain. In 1887 the population of non Catalans living in Catalunya was 1.3% and by 1897 it had gone up to 3.3% (Termes 1984: 129).

Various aspects of the demographic traits of the end of the nineteenth century remained similar up to 1972 (Gómez Olivé 1992: 42). These traits are: firstly the overall fall in the birth and death rates, secondly the increase of immigration to Catalunya from the rest of Spain which compensated for the fall in the Catalan birth rate, and finally the dominance of the city of Barcelona, since most industry was concentrated around this area.

Post-1900

Moving onto the post-1900 period, data on population movement and growth are both more reliable and collected at more regular intervals. The widespread concern over the low Catalan birth rates, continued into the beginning of the twentieth century. The earliest study found with reference to the critically low birth rate in the twentieth century is a 1915 study by Puig i Sais. Puig i Sais talked about 'the need to increase the number of pure breed Catalans to fight in all areas' (**El problema de la natalitat a Catalunya. Un perill gravissim per a la nostra pàtria,** (quoted in Termes 1984: 139).

However the most important and comprehensive studies were carried out in 1935 by an economist, Josep Vandellós. In **Poble Decadent** (1935), Vandellós argued that the Catalan birth rate was low and this would lead to a fall in population. The second study, **La immigració a Catalunya** (also 1935), continued to analyse this low birth rate and the way in which immigration, arriving to fill gaps in the labour market, may affect the future of the Catalan *poble* (people). The book dealt with the following main aspects: Catalunya's need for these immigrants, their characteristics (with special reference to the 'racial' characteristics), the social, political and

economic consequences of immigration, and finally a call for policies of 'assimilation'.

The first section dealt with the need that Catalunya had for immigrants, given its low birth rate. The concern at this stage was not to do with the number of immigrants but with the consequences immigration might have. The study traced the demographic ups and downs, from the fourteenth century population crisis to the present-day situation. Vandellós was critical of the reasons behind the low birth rate, attributing it to the 'selfishness that grows with the increase of material well-being' (1935:38) and on the '*vaga de ventres*' (wombs' strike) of working class women. Part of this, Vandellós argued, was due to living in urban centres and the increased accessibility that people have to books, translated from French, on birth control (Candel 1978 (13th edition) [1964]; Vandellós i Sola 1935: 41). Vandellós thought that appeals to religiosity, morality and patriotism would increase the birth-rate. He thought that this appeal would be hard to carry out without the help of the central state, whom he felt used immigration as a way of putting an end to Catalanisme (1935: 43). The study then went on to highlight the nature of immigration in Catalunya, its changing nature through history, and finally focused on the racial characteristics of present-day (1930s) immigration. With reference to the first aspect, he concluded that no *poble* was ethnically pure and Catalunya was no exception (1935: 56). His analysis of the racial characteristics of immigration in 1930s Catalunya, was very much linked to wider ideas about race at the time (Cabré 1989b; Conversi 1997), and although he claimed to believe that no race was superior to another, he talked about the moral and physical weakness of immigrants, and their primitive energy which allegedly made them violent (1935: 71-74).

The 'peaceful invasion' of immigration became both an economic necessity for Catalunya, and made a significant contribution to its development. Vandellós argued that much of Catalunya's economic development was thanks to immigrant labour. This labour had allowed development in areas which required a lot of manpower and if this development continued, so would the need for labour (1935: 53). Nevertheless, he foresaw problems in the future, in times of economic crisis when there was no further need for this labour.

The study concluded that if the low Catalan birth-rate continued, immigrants would continue to arrive. Having a higher birth rate than the native population, immigrants would play an important role in the future of Catalunya. Vandellós was

very adamant on the need to assimilate these immigrants. Political action should be carried out, both on issues of control over the number of immigrants as well as a policy of assimilation. It was necessary to Catalanise the immigrants, by convincing them that Catalanisation was a good thing for them and in order to avoid ghettos.

Later demographic studies have highlighted the accuracy of Vandellós's prediction regarding the fall in birth-rate among the upper classes, and the rise of birth-rate in the lower classes (Maluquer i Sostres 1965: 95), although few agree with the solutions he proposed to this 'problem' (Cabré 1989b). In her study of demography in Catalunya and the role played by Vandellós, Cabré argues that everything that she sees as 'vital to my idea of everything Catalan' (1989b: 17) were things that Vandellós was vehemently opposed to - urban life, emancipation of women, modernity, self promotion, to name a few.

From 1950 onwards censuses were carried out every ten years and the results published two years later. The town censuses which were also collected (in 1955, 1965...) likewise act as important sources of data (Recolons i Arquer 1979: 18). In the section below I move on to the importance of immigration in Catalunya by looking at the main waves of immigration in the post-1900 period.

THE TWO MAIN WAVES OF IMMIGRATION: 1900- 1930 AND 1950-1975

There have been two main waves of immigration into Catalunya in the twentieth century. During the first wave (1900-1930), the population grew from 1,966,382 to 3,240,313: seventy five percent of this increase was due to immigration (Recolons i Arquer 1979: 10). During the second wave (1950-1975) Catalan society grew by 75% (from 3,240,313 to 5,663,125). Immigration accounted for 1,393,052 of these people, that is, nearly 25%.

Places of origin

There has been a major shift in the places of origin of the immigrants arriving in Catalunya. As is outlined below, the 'catchment area' of immigration increased as time went by. In the post-1900 period immigration first arrived from Aragon,

Valencia and the Baleares (Cabré and Pujadas 1990: 65) and then in the 1920s from Murcia and Almería, especially during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship[7].

Barcelona (and its immediate surroundings) has always been the main centre of attraction since it was here that work could be found. Vandellós (1935: 65) argued that immigration had been mostly of individuals on their own initiative, until the work for the *Exposició Universal* (Universal Exhibition) in 1929, when workers were recruited in large numbers. At first immigration to Barcelona was from the *comarques*, the rural areas of Catalunya, and gradually increased to include people from further away. The table below compares the places of origin in the 1920s and the 1960s for the city of Barcelona and gives a picture of the changes that took place through time.

Table 4.1. Percentage, by places of birth, of inhabitants of Barcelona city

Places of origin	Year	
	1920	**1960**
Catalunya	67.5	62.6
Aragon	6.7	6.6
Levante	12.7	9.4
Baleares	0.9	0.6
Alto Ebro	0.9	1.2
Andalucia	2.8	7.0
Galicia y Asturias	0.9	2.2
Cantabria	0.6	1.1
Central	2.3	3.3
Extremadura	0.2	0.5
Castilla-Leon	1.6	3.1
Canarias	0.1	0.1
Foreigners	2.6	1.8
Colonies	0.1	0.1
No data	0.4	0.3

Source: Adapted from (Martinez-Mari Odena 1964: Quadre 18)

The two waves of immigration were similar. The immigrants came from less developed areas of Catalunya, and then Spain, in search of work. Their experiences were therefore similar in so far as their position in both the labour and the housing

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[7] According to Candel (1965 : 24) in the neighbourhood of La Torrosa (about 5 kilometres from the centre of Barcelona) there was a sign which said: 'Cataluña acaba aqui, aqui empieza Murcia'- 'Catalunya ends here, Murcia begins here'.

market was concerned. The change in the place of origin of immigrants influenced debates about immigration: a distinction was drawn in the literature between the possible 'assimilation' of the two groups. The immigration of the 1920s consisted mostly of Catalan speakers, who were believed to be closer to Catalunya in terms of cultural and racial attributes. The presence of Castilian speakers from areas of Murcia and Andalucia began to pose questions about the future of Catalan culture. These debates were to become more acute during the second wave of immigration between the 1950s and 70s.

1900-1930s: First wave of immigration

Table 4.2. Average annual increase of Catalan population

Year	Total Increase	Natural increase	Difference
1888-1897	101,758	57,523	44,235
1898-1900	21,075	5,894	15,226
1901-1910	118,486	84,799	33,687
1911-1920	259,851	52,897	206,854
1921-1930	446,578	124,578	321,995
Totals	947,748	325,691	622,097

Source: Vandellós, 1935: 24

As can be seen from the tables above, immigration has accounted for most of the growth in Catalan population, especially from 1911 onwards. Vandellós pointed to these decades as the first time that Catalunya had seen such a significant increase in immigration figures. According to the 1930 census, the population of Catalunya was 2,791,292 of which 550,602 (20%) were immigrants (Jutglar et al. 1968: 12).

As mentioned above, Barcelona became a megalopolis. Due to the concentration of industry in the city of Barcelona and the surrounding areas, there has always been an imbalance between these areas and the other *comarques* (Martinez-Mari Odena 1964:12). By 1930 the city of Barcelona had over one million inhabitants, and a third of the total Catalan population lived in the city. Immigrants accounted for 37.1% of this population (Jutglar *et al*. 1968: 12).

Places of origin

Table 4.3. The population of Catalunya (1930) by place of birth (percentage)

	1930 (%)
Catalunya	62.9
Andalucia	4.2
Extremadura	0.3
Aragon	8.1
Castilla	4.8
Murcia	13.2
Pais Valenciano	-
Galicia	1.0

Source: Saez, 1980: 28 from INE

The figures here confirm the trend visible in Table 4.1 for 1920. Immigration from Murcia (a province of the Levante area) remains the highest, followed by that from Aragon. While the former was seen as harder to 'integrate', the latter was regarded as being more culturally similar.

Employment and Housing

The immigrants arriving to work in Catalunya, occupied the worst places in the labour market. In the first three decades of the twentieth century their work was linked with the industrial development of Catalunya and the building of public works, especially in and around Barcelona. In 1929 the *Exposició Universal* was held in Barcelona (in Montjuic) and Jutglar has estimated that around 25,000 to 30,000 workers arrived in Barcelona per year, between the years of 1921 and 1929 (1968: 13). It was around this time that the Barcelona underground was built and this too needed and attracted labour (Candel 1978 (13th edition) [1964]). Work was also available in the iron and steel industries, the chemical industry, and hydroelectrics (Gómez Olivé 1992: 48-50).

The housing conditions of these workers were not good. In 1929 there were 6,478 shanty huts registered in the *Patronato de la Habitación* in Barcelona (Candel, 1965 (6th edition): 117). These were found in the outskirts of Barcelona, areas where cheap housing was built later. This number refers to the official *barracas* (huts), which could not be demolished, but there were many more unregistered huts which could be demolished at any stage. The *Guardia Civil* demolished unregistered *barracas* regularly (Candel 1978 (13th edition) [1964]). The location of the houses depended not only on the cheap land available but on their proximity to the work sites. *Barracas* also existed in areas near industry and factories: it was ironic that

these housing conditions should exist in the areas where wealth was being generated (Candel 1978 (13th edition) [1964]).

Even at these early stages of migration, where the figures were lower than what they would be in the following decades, a feeling of impotence and discomfort began to appear in some sectors of Catalan society. Vandellós warned that care should be taken not to blame 'foreigners' for things that were going wrong in Catalunya. They were accused of unfair competition by offering their labour cheaply and so bringing down the wages. Immigrants were often accused of crime and especially of upsetting political stability. The association between the '*Murcianos*' (a generic term used to describe all immigrants) and anarchism is highlighted in various places (see Termes 1984: 141-147).

At both this early stage and later during the Franco regime, there was a commonly-held opinion that the central state was not helping Catalunya with the arrival of these people. Vandellós highlighted the way in which the absence of borders, meant Catalunya had little power to control the flow - he felt this might be especially dangerous at times of economic crisis, when resentment towards immigrants might grow.

1950-1975: A second wave of immigration

The second of the major waves of immigration to Catalunya took place during the Franco regime, during the years 1951- 1975.

Table 4.4. Natural population growth, growth due to migration and total growth in Catalunya from 1951- 1975 (per thousands of inhabitants/ per year):

Years	Natural growth	Growth due to migration	Total growth
1951-1955	5.6	11.7	17.3
1956-1960	8.1	12.9	21.1
1961-1965	9.6	16.8	26.4
1966-1970	10.9	15.2	26.2
1971-1975	11.5	8.6	20.1

Source: Recolons i Arquer (1979: 12). Compiled from *Instituto Nacional de Estadística* data.

While there is more literature available on immigration in these decades than for the previous ones, there are limitations, due mainly to the political circumstances of

the time. In the period after the Civil War, the few studies concentrated on the demographic aspects of immigration. It is not until the 1960s that the more social aspects of immigration came to the fore. To a large extent it was the Catalan Catholic Church which carried out and influenced these studies, by denouncing the conditions in which immigrants were living and working (Castellanos 1978: 175). As can be imagined, there were limitations on what could and could not be written about, many things were left implicit and the outlook of these studies has been criticised as being 'paternalistic due to their Christian origins' (Hall 1979: 176). Franco's regime did not encourage, or in fact allow, a full analysis of the phenomenon.

Two of the most influential studies on the situation of immigrants in the 1960s, Francesc Candel's **Els Altres Catalans** (1964) and Jordi Pujol's **La immigració, problema i esperança de Catalunya** (1958)[8], were largely anecdotal and did not provide a full analysis of the issue. However, they did open up the issue to wider public debate. Candel's book was especially popular as it discussed immigration (both the cultural and economic aspects of it) from the immigrants' point of view and was written by an immigrant himself. The debates that followed its publication were based around issues to do with integration and assimilation (the difference between them and which was more desirable) and with an analysis of what was meant by both cultural and economic integration and assimilation. The most influential reply to Candel's book came from Manuel Cruells in 1965 and titled: **Els no Catalans i nosaltres**. In this book, Cruells accused Candel of sitting on the fence, not being clear enough about what is meant by integration. Cruells felt that the fact that the communities lived side by side was not enough proof of integration and considered that the immigrants were not really taking root in Catalunya in the way that he would like to see in the future (Cruells 1965). It is this debate which gave rise, in the late 1960s, to arguments over whether Catalunya was breaking up into two societies (and so raising the ghost of Lerrouxism[9]) or whether immigrants were becoming part of the one, previously existing, Catalan society.

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[8] This was published by the Nova Terra publishers which were linked to the church.

[9] Alejandro Lerroux was an anti-Catalan, left-wing Republican who appealed to the immigrants to fight against the Catalans in the *Setmana Tragica* (Tragic Week) of 1909.

Places of origin

The table below shows the place of birth of the Catalan population in the 1970s. When this table is compared to Table 4.3 on the place of birth of the Catalan population in 1930, it becomes clear that the 'catchment area' of immigrants arriving in Catalunya had increased. In the 1930s, Murcia and Aragon provided most immigrants, 13.2% and 8.1% respectively. Yet it is interesting that in the 1970s their percentage had fallen and the largest percentage was now of people born in Andalucía, at 17.4% in 1975.

Table 4.5. Place of Birth of the inhabitants of Catalunya in 1970 and 1975

Place of Birth	Inhabitants (present and absent residents)		% of the population of Catalunya	
	1970	1975	1970	1975
Catalunya	3,181,559	3,486,310	62.3	61.6
Andalucia	840,206	982,223	16.5	17.4
Aragon	175,579	178,418	3.4	3.2
Extremadura	145,675	184,096	2.9	3.6
Castilla la Nueva	143,990	163,458	2.8	2.9
Murcia	139,202	140,179	2.7	2.5
Valencia	109,789	104,766	2.2	1.9
Leon	84,083	101,178	1.7	1.8
Castilla la Vieja	82,051	86,953	1.6	1.5
Galicia	77,777	89,935	1.5	1.6
Outside Spain	59,124	71,636	1.2	1.3
Pais Vasco	14,324	15,751	0.3	0.9
Navarra	13,977	14,841	0.3	0.3
Ceuta and Melilla	12,889	6,456	0.3	0.1
Asturias	12,626	15,014	0.6	0.3
Baleares	9,778	10,410	0.2	0.2
Canarias	3,614	3,927	0.1	0.1
No answer		3,021	-	0.5
TOTAL	5,106,243	5,658,572	100.00%	100.00%

Source: Recolons i Arquer (1987:285).

What attracted immigrants?

As with the previous wave of workers, both push and pull factors influenced the decision to move to Catalunya. On the one hand, workers were attracted by the 'possibility of both economic and status promotion' (Esteva 1984: 153). On the other

hand, the economic conditions in their places of origin were not at all promising: thus migration was an escape from poverty.

The Government's 1959 *Plan de Estabilización* (Stabilisation Plan) was a turning point, a policy which actively encouraged migration, not only abroad but also from rural areas to urban, industrialised ones. While the *Plan* encouraged foreign investment, liberalised some external trade and promoted tourism as a source of foreign capital, it did not benefit all. The working class suffered due to unemployment and salary freezes (García de Cortázar, 1993: 613; Balfour, 1989: 39)and there was an increase in the imbalance between the different areas of Spain. Catalunya attracted workers due to its high productivity (Hernández and Mercadé 1986: 111; Sudirà 1990: 39).

Once in Catalunya, immigrants tended to find employment in the lower echelons of the labour market. Balfour (1989: 52) points to three areas: industry, services (domestic service and transport) and self-employment (including 'bartenders, taxi-drivers and street hawkers') as the main areas of employment. While people did carry out work in the construction industry, it was mostly temporarily until something else (something better) could be found. Factory work, on the other hand, was more attractive, since not only did it provide a more secure source of income but also allowed for more social mobility (Pinilla de las Heras 1973).

From his study on **Immigration and social mobility in Catalunya**, Pinilla de las Heras (1973) concluded that education was central to social mobility. Other analysts (outlined in Balfour 1989: 53) pointed to the important role played by knowledge of the Catalan language. There was also the fact that the 'Catalan workers were in a better position to defend their pay and conditions of work than immigrants', because they knew how the system worked. However the arrival of immigrants gave rise to new forms of labour movement. The difference in the forms of labour movement is highlighted by Balfour (1989: 123-124) in his discussion of the labour movements of Sabadell and Terrassa, two industrial cities near Barcelona. The Terrassa labour movement, where immigrants had arrived in the forties, became a 'more direct and violent class struggle' (Balfour 1989: 124) which was typical of that found in the south, sooner than the movements of Sabadell where the trend continued to be mainly of 'negotiation and moderation more typical of Catalan traditions' (1989: 124). The movements changed in the

1970s, when the immigrants, who had not arrived in Sabadell until the 1960s, began to influence it.

The distribution of immigration.

As with the previous waves of immigration, most of the immigrant workforce was attracted to Barcelona and the surrounding areas: the *Area Metropolitana* (which include the areas of the Barcelonès, Baix Llobregat, Vallès Oriental, Vallès Occidental, Maresme, Garraf and Alt Penedes). By 1975, once immigration had practically ceased, the city of Barcelona had 1,754,714 inhabitants. The *Area Metropolitana* had 4,017,078 inhabitants which accorded for 71% of the population of Catalunya (Rebagliato 1978a: 12).

While it was relatively easy to find employment, the housing situation was not as easily solved, and yet it was considered a vital aspect towards the 'integration' of immigrants. At this stage it was no longer possible to build new *barracas*, but the existing ones were still standing in some areas and could be bought (Candel 1978 (13th edition) [1964]). Most of the housing on the peripheries of Barcelona was low quality (Alabert 1994: 216). Houses were built as dorm towns and had few amenities (schools, shops etc.). The vast majority, if not all, of the people moving into this housing were immigrants and so 'immigrant neighbourhoods'[10] were created, where there was little Catalan influence. The administration's attitude towards housing did not help: little investment was made into public housing or financial aid towards housing (Martorell 1968). Immigrants were forced to rely on private investment, and as a result were exposed to exploitation.

Issues to do with housing were important in most of the sixteen experiences of immigration into Catalunya collected in **El Somni Català** (Pernau 1995). A present-day CiU member of parliament recounts how his family first moved into a *barraca*, and then into a flat that his father had bought with his savings and the financial help of the parish priest.

During the earlier stages of immigration into Catalunya, the labour market was the prime source of contact between immigrants and Catalans. As time went by there was an increase in social mobility and also an increase in collective action. This can be seen in the *Associaciós de Veins* (Neighbourhood associations) which 'began to

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[10] *Hospitalet, Santa Coloma* and *Cornellà* are some of the main ones.

mushroom in the early seventies' (Balfour 1989: 195) in the 'immigrant neighbourhoods'. These organisations demanded services which were lacking in the neighbourhoods.

INTEGRATION

Debates in the late 1960s and early 1970s, surrounding the integration of immigrants revolved around various issues. There were various discussions about the definition of 'integration' and, linked to this, were issues of class versus national struggle. Both debates were embedded in the crucial question of how Catalunya was defined, both at present and in the future. 'Integration' suggested there was something to 'integrate' into, but this itself was part of the ongoing debate.

In order to outline the main positions of these debates I use Jacqueline Hall's framework (1979). Hall divided the debates and writing on the integration of immigrants into four main positions incorporating all aspects of the debate. She divided them into the nationalists, subdivided into those who are anachronistic and the neo-nationalists, and the anti-nationalists who are again subdivided into left-wing and right-wing sectors. In the section below I illuminate the main debates in each area, including issues to do with the terms used to refer to immigrants and definitions of 'integration'.

In the first instance I turn to the nationalist positions, divided into the anachronistic and the neo-nationalist positions. The former position relied on a romantic, even primordial, idea of Catalunya's ability to integrate people; they saw integration as both possible and necessary. However, alongside this, there was a feeling of apprehension; a degree of uncertainty as well as a feeling of threat regarding what might happen in the future. The consequences that inter-marriage and the subsequent *mestissatge* (mix of people) would have for Catalan culture, were examined by many (Maluquer i Sostres 1965; Martinez-Mari Odena 1964)[11]. Another aspect of this uneasiness was due to the lack of support and interest from the authorities, who they felt should be doing more to help immigrants adapt to life in Catalunya: they worried that this lack of interest would be especially crucial at times of economic crisis. This position saw language as important but also acknowledged that speaking Catalan did not necessarily mean identification with

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[11] These studies, carried out in the mid-1960s, are often criticised for not being based on factual data, and so not necessarily a true potrayal of the actual issue.

Catalan culture. Martinez-Mari (1964: 37) added a curious dimension to the debate on integration. He argued that integration was not difficult due to the characteristics that immigrants shared with Catalans. The areas bordering the *Principat* (Aragon and Valencia) had a lot in common with Catalunya (historical links and language) and therefore any differences that might exist were soon eliminated. As for those people coming from Murcia and most parts of Andalucia, they shared the Mediterranean connection and he felt that this common feature should be emphasised more in the future.

The neo-nationalist perspective based itself on a dynamic idea of Catalunya; it saw Catalunya in a constant process of change and redefinition in which immigrants were included as active participants. Integration was a two way, a dialectical, process. Given this, the biggest fear was the formation of 'ethnic' ghettos where there would be no contact between Catalans and immigrants. The term used to refer to the immigrants, *nous catalans* (new Catalans), reflected this dynamic nature, although the ultimate aim was that they be referred to simply as 'Catalans' with no qualifier attached. Unlike other positions it took an all-round approach to integration, stating that economic equality was not enough, that cultural integration was also needed. Although neo-nationalists considered language to be an important element of Catalan culture, it was more of a long-term goal for integration. The language's instrumental use (as a means of upward social mobility) and its role as a sign of identification with Catalan culture were regarded as two separate issues which should not be fused into one. At the same time this position called for the need to disassociate Catalanisme with bourgeois nationalism, thus allowing a much wider definition of what Catalunya and being Catalan meant. Francesc Candel's work was seen in a favourable light, since Candel concluded that working in Catalunya was an important aspect of the process of integration into Catalan culture. Candel also gave a balanced account of immigrants' experience, and provided an overall positive and optimistic outlook to future developments.

The anti-nationalist position was divided into two sub-positions: the left wing anti-nationalists and the right-wing ones. The position of the right-wing anti-nationalists was linked to Franco, centralism, the idea of '*España, una y unida*' ('Spain, one and united'), and the classes that supported this. In this view they underestimated the significance of immigration (both in terms of its numbers and consequences), seeing the problem as an issue of adaptation from the rural setting and way of life to the urban. This viewpoint avoided debates about 'integration'

and stated that the solution was up to the individual immigrants themselves. It was their responsibility to adapt to the new circumstances.

The left-wing anti-nationalists on the whole also denied the existence of a national character, though for very different reasons than those outlined above. While some analysts denied the existence of a national character (and therefore of its oppression), others (Perez and Jutglar among them) believed in the existence of a *hecho diferencial* (differentiating factor) but, like the neo nationalists, saw it as a dynamic, changing idea. The emphasis here was on the class aspect of integration. The argument was about the fact that most immigrants were manual workers who needed to become part of Catalan society; not in the bourgeois ideal of Catalan society, but in a way which reflected Catalunya's *pluralisme de vivencies* (plurality of life experiences) (Perez Gonzalez in Jutglar et al. 1968). This position argued there was too much emphasis on the cultural aspects of integration and more attention should be paid to the economic dimension. In many ways immigrants shared the experience of exploitation (due to an unfair employment structure) with certain groups of the autochthonous population. On the cultural level, they argued that there was too much emphasis on the Catalan language, which they did not see as the language of the country, but of a certain group of people. Likewise they were opposed to integration if this meant the complete repression and denial of the cultural characteristics of the places of origin of the immigrants.

Overall, the four positions above were in favour of 'integration' of immigrants into Catalan society. Integration was defined in different ways by each group and different degrees of it are seen as necessary. Castellanos (1978: 222) said it is paradoxical that the arguments most opposed to integration came from the left-wing antinationalists, who feared the existence of a *societat binacional* (binational society). Running implicitly through these debates of integration are discussions of what is seen, meant and desired as 'the Catalan way of life'. Occasionally the discussion is made explicit, but on the whole it remains implicit, even though it determines all other aspects of the debate.

TWENTY YEARS LATER: PRESENT DAY DEBATES ON 'INTEGRATION'

So, if these were the debates taking place in the 1960s and 1970s, what is the situation today? Over twenty years have passed since the first studies on immigration were published, a whole generation of 'other Catalans' has grown up

in Catalunya and most have been educated in Catalan. In the section below I outline the main public debates around issues of 'immigration' today. However, the crystallisation of these present-day issues is in debates to do with language. As argued in Chapter Three, language is a 'core symbol' to Catalan identity (Conversi 1997), and the debates surrounding the new 'Politics of Language' law passed in 1998, confirms this further.

Debates on 'integration of immigrants' broadly continue to revolve around the framework used by Hall (1979) in her discussion of the 1960s and 1970s debates. The romantic idea of Catalunya, with a 'primordial' ability to 'integrate' people, still exists. In this conception, economic progress and cultural integration are rolled into one[12]:

> Immigrants integrate well into this society which is basically spurred on by a common will for economic progress and individual development, given that Catalan identity is not defined in terms of *ius sanguinis* but in terms of its own culture which has always been nourished by the mixture of different populations that are fundamentally inspired by a common will (de Jouvenel and Roque 1993: 220).

However others wish to analyse issues of cultural integration as separate from economic integration and social mobility (Delgado 1998; Martín-Díaz 1991). Delgado argues that: 'Catalans are those who live and work in Catalunya but not the things they do' (1998: 16). He goes onto illustrate the point with various instances of intolerance (even hostility) towards expressions of what is seen as non-Catalan culture[13]. Once again, the view taken on these expressions and the response given to them depends on the idea of Catalunya held.

Social mobility: education and position in the labour market

In terms of labour mobility it is necessary to look at the definition of 'immigrant' carefully in order to understand the trends. If by immigrants we take the people who arrived from other parts of Spain, then their possibility for upward mobility is limited. This does not mean it is impossible, but that it is limited because of the

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[12] Francesc Candel (1985) likewise treats economic and cultural integration as one. He argues that in day-to-day life there is not a 'problem' in Catalunya. His book is full of ancedotes of situations where the constructed divide of Catalan-Castillian, is bridged unproblematically by both. It is only in the political sphere that these issues are 'problematised' and manipulated politically.

[13] Martin-Diaz (1991: 306) is even more pessimistic about this ever happening, in spite of integration being achieved in other areas.

point at which they entered the labour market, their age, and often the fact that they are not as likely to be fluent in Catalan (Solé 1982: 28). In their offspring the issue is not as clear-cut, especially because of access to the Catalan language and higher education, and there is not a big difference between their employment patterns and those of Catalans born of Catalan parents.

Political integration

The data available which breaks down vote by place of origin dates back to the July 1977 general elections. It is important to remember that while this data is significant, it is also over twenty years old and there have been many political changes since 1977. Of the people surveyed, 28% of those who had been born outside Catalunya voted for PSC-PSOE, followed by UCD (18%) and PSUC (13%). The data on the votes of the children of immigrants show that their voting patterns followed the same trends.

A more recent (albeit smaller) survey[14] shows that the offspring of immigrants identify with political parties. It is surprising that 71% do not identify with any party, but the next highest figure of identification is with the PSC (10%), followed by CiU(6%) and PSUC (5%).

Other aspects of political integration are best highlighted by the role which parties and trade unions took over the discussion of the 1998 *Ley de Política Lingüística* (Linguistic Law) which is discussed below.

On socio-cultural integration: cultural manifestations of 'otherness'

As discussed above, cultural integration is different from integration of immigrants in other spheres. In present-day Catalunya there are many examples of these manifestations of 'otherness'. There are over 350 registered *Casas Regionales* (Regional Centres), each of which organise activities, ranging from *flamenco* (Andalucian dance) and *jota* (Aragonese dance) classes, to providing a meeting place for people. Martín Díaz (1991: 305) argues that 'most of these activities are subject to a process of instrumentalisation by a small politicised minority, which comes from the upper-middle class'. I partly agree with this statement given the

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[14] The survey (Breu Pañella 1989) was carried out in Hospitalet de Llobregat, a city which grew as it received thousands of immigrants from all areas of Spain. The city is representative of others which form the industrial belt surrounding Barcelona. The survey was carried out on 387 children of immigrants in 1987.

role played by Casas Regionales in the 1998 language law debate and by what I saw during my fieldwork in Barcelona. However, it would be unfair to ignore the valuable contributions these centres have made for everyone. By providing social spaces for immigrants to gather, share, and organise themselves they have managed to put immigrant issues relatively high on the Catalan political agenda.

One of the most visible expressions of Andalucian culture in Catalunya is the yearly *Feria de Abril*. For about two weeks an industrial park in the suburbs of Barcelona is turned into a little bit of Andalucia[15]. *Casetas* (marquees) with a bar selling Andalucian products and playing music are set up, either by different associations, or groups of people. Visitors come to roam around, eat, drink, and dance in the different tents. It is estimated that around three million people visit the Feria every year, and although mainly an Andalucian occasion, other immigrants (and immigrant associations) also play an active role.

Religious festivals are likewise an expression of 'otherness'. This is especially true for Easter celebrations, when there are processions in various parts of Barcelona. The reaction of the Catalan church has been varied, yet on the whole these processions and masses, have not been supported since they are considered 'pagan' and 'backward'. This has led to improvisation when people celebrate their festival. For example in one area of Barcelona this means that the procession does not leave from a church, but from a tractor shed (Delgado 1998: 59). These processions are known as 'lay processions' because there is often no priest involved. The procession does not stop at churches and the image is not blessed. All of which would normally happen if the procession was taking place in Andalucia. Most of these processions make some acknowledgement to Catalunya, for example by carrying an image of the *Virgen de Montserrat* or by dressing in typical Catalan clothes.

Although the above two examples of expressions of 'otherness' are based on Andalucia, there are many other examples of fiestas and activities held by other immigrant groups. I have chosen to concentrate on these because they stand out as the most emblematic. Delgado also points out that the high profile of celebrations of

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[15] There is also a huge cardboard structure of the *Giralda de Sevilla* (an emblematic Andalucian landmark) as well as various recreations of the famous Andalucian patios. All of these have led Delgado to ask: 'What is the Catalan Feria de Abril, other than a kind of ethnic Disneyworld, a province consisting of pure fantasy?' (1998: 83).

111

Andalucian identity in Catalunya means that the emphasis is on the Andalucian-Catalan dichotomy, rather than the more confrontational Castilian-Catalan dichotomy (Delgado 1998: 50).

Language

The 'language issue' crystallises the role of immigrants in present day Catalunya; it is around this issue that most debates about 'integration' and the corresponding individual rights take place. Debates about language are divided into the protection and increased use of Catalan versus the protection of individual rights of Castilian-speakers. In the preamble to the 1983 Law, Castilian is portrayed as the language of invasion, and part of this invasion comes from the people who speak it, the immigrants[16].

There has been a huge increase in the learning of Catalan in recent years, and this includes the Castilian speaking immigrants who are learning Catalan. The table below shows the knowledge of Catalan among people arriving from the rest of Spain.

Table 4.6 Knowledge of the Catalan language of people coming from Spain (excluding Valencia and the Balearic islands)

	Rest of Spain (%)
Understand Catalan	80
Speak Catalan	28
Read Catalan	30
Write Catalan	7

Adapted from: **El coneixement de la llengua Catalana** , 1990

Likewise the attitude towards 'linguistic normalisation' (this refers to the application of the 1983 *Llei de Normalització Lingüística* which aimed to increase the use of Catalan) is positive[17].

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[16] See Chapter Three.

[17] Although it is impossible to distinguish from the data, it is important to bear in mind that the positive attitude to the Catalan language may be for purely instrumental purposes (of social mobility) rather than making the assumption that it carries the same symbolic value for all those who speak it.

Table 4.7 Attitude towards 'linguistic normalisation' according to place of origin.

	Autochthonous population	Immigrants	Total of population
I agree that everyone in Catalunya should speak Catalan	90	81	85
I do not agree that everyone in Catalunya should speak Catalan	4	11	8
It doesn't matter	1	2	1
It depends	5	6.	6
No answer	1	1	1

Source: Estradé and Treserra **Catalunya Independent?** (1990: 57)

The debate on the 1998 law once again brought to the fore many aspects of the attitudes towards language. Many people, including political parties, doubted the need for a new language law (they felt the 1983 one still had a long way to go and was therefore still valid). Likewise a survey published in the **Diari de Girona** (1.04.98) showed that 69% of those interviewed did not feel language was a problem for living in Catalunya. However, after a year of public discussion the law was finally approved in December 1997 and became effective in January 1998.

The discussions that led to the final approval of the law were interesting. Political parties, *Casas Regionales*, the Church as well as groups of people getting together to sign manifestos, were all given a say in the final outcome, both through the media but also by being given time to present their views in front of the Catalan Parliament. By putting the debate out into the public sphere there were heated arguments which were reported in the press daily. The participation of civil society led to a generalised sense of satisfaction once the law had been approved (or at least by those who had voted in favour of it!).

Perhaps the place to start is the reaction of the *Casas Regionales*, divided into different Federations and Confederations[18]. The first reaction was to question the

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[18] There are two main ones, the *Confederación de entidades culturales regionales en Cataluña* (CECREC), which includes the *Federación de entidades culturales Andaluzas* (Fecac). The CECREC is presided by García Prieto and encompasses over 300 organisations in Catalunya. The other significant federation (which is completely seperate from the one above) is the

need for a language law. The *Casas Regionales* also feared that the new law being drawn up as an aggression against Castilian. During the *Feria de Abril*, the language became a central issue as the *Casas Regionales* started collecting signatures against the new law and declared Pujals, the CiU culture counsellor, a *persona non grata* at the Fair. However a few days later the president of the CECREC Federation 'made peace' with Pujals who finally visited the fair (**El País,** 30.4.97).

In September when the first draft of the law was made public the CECREC launched a campaign against it. They disagreed with the new text and would campaign against it, as they did not feel it reflected any of the points they had presented to the Parliament, and continued to give Catalan more privileges than Castilian. In many ways the *Casas Regionales'* point of view coincided with the Partido Popular (**El País,** 1.7.97) and yet in September CECREC wanted the support of the socialists, and approached Manuel Chaves (the socialist president of the Andalucian Autonomous Community) to mediate with the party in Catalunya (**El País,** 26.9.97)[19].

Apart from the *Casas Regionales* there were a few more groups which represented either the protection of Castilian in Catalunya or the protection of bilingualism. Among the former was the *Associación Miguel de Cervantes* which asked the Spanish central government for the protection of Spanish in Catalunya (**El País,** 25.2.97). Another group was the *Foro Babel* (**El País,** 30.4.97), a group of intellectuals in favour of bilingualism. *Foro Babel* feared that conflict was being created where there previously had not been any. *Foro Babel* also felt that care had to be taken to protect the individual rights of people to choose the language they wanted to talk in, especially given the bilingual social reality of Catalunya.

The Church was also involved in the debate, though not directly. The debate surrounding the church was around the possible publication in the *Hoja Parroquial* (the Church newsletter distributed throughout Catalunya) of an article encouraging Castilian speakers to learn Catalan in the same way as the bishops had had to learn their language, asked Catalans to get over their 'crisis of national identity' and to

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Federación de Casas Regionales y Provinciales de Catalunya which is presided by Gregorio Lopez Montoto.

[19] According to Jaume V. Aroca in an article published in **La Vanguardía** (28.1.98) this search for support from the different parties has to do with García Prieto's personal friendships with the different parties.

take in Castilian-speakers. The article was finally not published since the archbishop of Barcelona did not agree with its contents but the issue continued to be controversial and debated publicly.

Identity integration

The 'Moreno question', where respondents are asked to place themselves on an identity scale (from only Catalan to only Spanish), provides an initial idea of the issues of identity in Catalunya.

Table 4.8. Self-identification by place of birth.

I feel	In Catalunya	Outside Catalunya	% Total
Only Catalan	17.8	5	12.7
More Catalan than Spanish	27.7	6.2	19.2
As much Catalan as Spanish	41.5	37	39.7
More Spanish than Catalan	5.2	17.7	10.1
Only Spanish	6.7	32.7	17
Don't know/ no answer	1	1.5	1.2

Source: Aggregated data by years from monthly surveys carried out by CIRES 1990-1995 from (Moreno and Arriba 1996).

Moreno and Arriba (1996) then aggregate the data into: Catalan identity (only Catalan, and more Catalan than Spanish), shared identity (as much Spanish as Catalan) and Spanish identity (more Spanish than Catalan or only Spanish).

Table 4.9 Self-identification by place of birth (aggregated)

I feel	In Catalunya	Outside Catalunya	% Total
Catalan identity	46.1	11.3	32.3
Shared identity	42	37.6	40.2
Spanish identity	12	51.1	27.5

Source: Aggregated data by years from monthly surveys carried out by CIRES 1990-1995 from (Moreno and Arriba 1996).

From these tables we can conclude that more people (irrespective of place of birth) are prone to having a dual (shared) identity than just a single identity (be it Catalan or Castilian). Dual identities are found in a higher percentage in those born in

Catalunya (75%) than those born in the rest of Spain (62%). As expected, Spanish identity is strongest among those born outside Spain, and Catalan identity is strongest among those born in Catalunya. However, it is interesting that 11% of those born outside Spain self-identify with a Catalan identity, and 38% claim to have a shared identity.

Although this data provides an idea of the issues of identity, it would be interesting to find out what lies behind these self-identifications: what do people mean when they say they feel (more) 'Catalan'? In what ways is this different from being 'Spanish'?[20] Another factor is the fact that the 'place of birth' category might not be clear enough, in the sense that many of the children of 'immigrants' (especially those who arrived in the earlier waves of immigration) might have been born in Catalunya and yet identify more with Spain.

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this chapter has been to outline the important role played by immigration in the demographic constitution of Catalunya and in the debates surrounding Catalan nationalism and national identity.

The waves of immigrants shared various characteristics. Firstly, they occupied similar positions in the labour market. The majority of immigrants arrived to work in the lower echelons of the labour market. Secondly, housing was a problem for immigrants. Finally, the debates about the relationship between immigrants and Catalans revolved around the same issues. In the 1930s the discussions were framed in terms of 'race', while in the 1970s they were about language.

The presence of large numbers of immigrants throughout its history has led some people to portray Catalunya as a country of immigrants, where they are easily integrated in to the 'Catalan way of life'. However, this romantic idea of 'primordial' assimilation skills had (in the 1950s to early 1970s) a tense relationship with the Franco regime, when in spite of everything, immigration was viewed by some Catalans as a strategic move to eradicate Catalanisme. Although the more realistic debates, which questioned what 'assimilation' and 'integration' actually meant and presented a more dynamic picture of Catalan society, started to appear

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[20] During the course of my interviews with foreign immigrants I tried to tease out what they meant when they used the terms. The results were incredibly varied (see Chapter Seven) which makes me feel this might make interesting future research.

in the late '60s and '70s it was not until the death of Franco, and the reformation of Spain into a State of the Autonomies that these issues were openly discussed.

Even today, immigration continues to shape debates about Catalan nationalism. It is also interesting to see the ways in which general issues are politicised as 'immigrant issues'. An example is the debate discussed above surrounding the Catalan Language Law of 1998. In this sense, it is true that social and economic mobility and integration may no longer be an issue of concern, but the reluctance to accept the cultural manifestations of 'otherness' remains. This rejection of cultural difference is similar to the 'cultural racism' visible in other parts of Europe.

The following chapter will turn to look at the new wave of immigration that has arrived to Spain and Catalunya from outside the European Union.

CHAPTER FIVE

NEW IMMIGRATION IN SPAIN AND CATALUNYA

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally Spain has been a country of both internal migration - people from one area of Spain moving to other areas - and emigration - people leaving Spain in search for work in either Latin America (predominantly in the nineteenth century), or more recently (in the 1960s to mid-1970s) in Northern Europe.

At the same time as Spaniards were being recruited to Northern Europe so were other nationalities, such as Italians, Greeks, Portuguese and North Africans (Castles et al. 1984; Cohen 1987). Given its geographical location, this meant that Spain was for many years, and continues to be, a country of transit for North Africans. During the summer months the immigrant workers living in Northern Europe travel through Spain on their way 'home' for a holiday. Along the main motorways which connect the north to the south of Spain, there are road signs in Arabic as well as Spanish. Up until the mid-1970s, very few immigrants decided to stay in Spain. Those who came to Europe for the first time were on their way further north as they had family and friends there and so knew they would be able to find a job there, or they had a work contract waiting for them. Once the 1973 crisis hit the central and northern European countries the situation changed. Employment was not as readily accessible and frontiers were effectively shut. This was one of the factors that made workers turn to Spain in search of employment.

Other factors which influenced the arrival of workers were the increasing demand for labour in Spain due to its economic development. And, geographical proximity has been important in the case of North Africans.

In the case of Latin America historical links make Spain a country of destination. The common language, the fact that people could enter Spain without a visa (this is no longer the case), and that they were (in principle) given preference to get work and residency permits and Spanish nationality, increased the attractiveness of Spain. Some researchers (Colectivo IOE 1992; Ramírez Goicoechea 1996) have pointed to the fact that the arrival of Latin Americans to Spain coincided with dictatorships appearing in the countries of origin.

Data on this 'new immigration' are not easily available - for example there was no information on work permits until 1987 (Solé et al. 1998: 333). It is not reliable either, as it depends on how you define 'foreign residents'. Antonio Izquierdo Escribano (1992: 30) used three sources of data - the Spanish census, statistics from the Ministry of Interior and statistics from the Employment Ministry - to try to build a coherent picture and sketch the trends. He divides the arrival of 'foreign residents' into four stages: the first period (1960-1970) in which there is a steady and considerable increase (from around 65,000 in 1960 to 148,000 in 1970), a second period (1970-1980) of moderate increase (148,000- 200,000), a third period (1980-1985) of rapid increase (200,000 to 275,000), and finally a fourth period (1985-1990) of a greater increase (275,000 to 410,000)[1].

In Chapter Four, I analysed the role that internal migration has played in Catalunya. In this chapter, I focus on the present-day 'new immigration' in Catalunya. The chapter begins by briefly outlining the emigration of Spaniards to Latin America and Northern Europe and then turns to look, in more detail, at immigration to Spain and in Catalunya in particular. Although the focus of this dissertation is on Catalunya, processes of immigration into Spain as a whole must be considered for a number of reasons: the demographic characteristics of immigration are similar in both Spain and Catalunya. Secondly the debates about integration and discrimination are alike. Thirdly, the legislation concerning immigrants is a constant negotiation between the central government and the *Generalitat*; the legislation concerning the right of entry and residence is the responsibility of the central state while the *Generalitat* has competencies over social welfare issues. This division of responsibilities is discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

SPAIN AS A COUNTRY OF EMIGRATION

Between 1882 and 1930s Spaniards were emigrating in large numbers to South America[2]. The phrase *'hacer las americas'* ('do the Americas') was coined for these

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[1] This last stage, coincided with the passing of the 1985 Foreigner's Law and the subsequent regularisation process. See Chapter Six.

[2] Emigration had existed prior to this. Between 1493-1650, 438,000 Spaniards emigrated while the data for the period 1650-1800 is less reliable data 1/4 million people are believed to have emigrated (Rodenas Calatayud 1994: 31).

people who left Spain in search of a better lifestyle [3] (García de Cortázar and González Vega 1993: 543). At the end of the nineteenth century, the rate of emigration to Northern Africa was very similar to that to South America (Bodega et al. 1995: 802; Cazorla Perez 1989: 1). After the Civil War (1936-39) emigration to South America started to increase again.

Emigration to Northern Europe

However, by 1960-65 emigration to South America was lower than that to Northern Europe (Anuario de Migraciones 1995: 35). Europe was nearer than South America, making emigration an easier decision to take. There were also labour agreements made with Spain; for example in 1960 Germany signed a labour agreement with Spain whereby agencies were set up in Germany to recruit Spanish workers (Castles and Kosack 1985: 40). Information about employment possibilities would also reach people in Spain through informal networks of those who were already in Northern Europe. In many ways this emigration was more flexible (than that to South America), as people could go for less time, or come and go as they needed to (Cazorla Perez 1989: 3). In other cases people stayed longer, and some are still there.

Calculations based on the 'assisted emigration' programme[4] estimate that between 1960 and 1979, 1.2 million Spaniards emigrated to Northern Europe. The concentration was highest in France, followed by Germany and then Switzerland.

According to a 1976 International Labour Organisation report (conclusions in Cazorla Perez 1989), Spaniards suffered some of the worst working conditions, mainly in the construction and service industries. Those who did not go through the official channels were more vulnerable to exploitation, working for low wages and had no rights to social security.

Much of the literature examines emigration into Northern Europe in the post-war period in terms of push-pull factors. A few of the pull factors have been mentioned

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[3] Laraña (1993: 130) comments on how the literature uses the idea of an 'adventurous spirit' to interpret the emigration to South America, while later emigration to Europe is interpreted in terms of economic needs.

[4] This programme run by the *Instituto Español de Emigración* (The Spanish Institute for Emigration). These figures have often been criticised for being on the low side since it only refers to 'assisted emigration' and many more migrants went 'unassisted'.

above (demand for labour and direct recruitment), but what were the push factors? Firstly the conditions in rural areas and in the south meant there was a lack of opportunities in comparison to the conditions of the urban and northern areas. Secondly, there was active encouragement in the form of policies. The main one was the 1959 *Plan de Estabilización* (Stabilisation Plan) which 'pushed' emigration to Northern Europe (Bodega et al. 1993; García de Cortázar and González Vesga 1993). The remittances workers sent back were all part of the Spanish 'economic miracle' of the 1960s and 1970s. Thus emigration to northern Europe can be seen as a 'safety valve', both politically and economically.

> Emigration to Latin America had been the safety valve in the nineteenth century; serious unemployment in the 1960s was avoided only by the new emigration to Europe (Carr 1980: 158).

Various sources point to 1973, and its crisis, as a decisive year. Following the crisis Spanish workers began to return to Spain from Northern Europe. However other sources point to the fact that this return migration had started before 1973 due to other causes. This was a time when Spain's pace of industrialisation was increasing, and opportunities increased there, combined with the fact that people had also made enough money or simply wanted to return home to their families (Cazorla Perez 1989: 10; Izquierdo Escribano 1992: 22). Figures quoted in Cazorla Perez (1989: 91) estimate that nearly 250,000 workers had returned home between 1963-73. Nevertheless, the rate of return did increase after the 1973 crisis[5] since the conditions in Europe were not encouraging: the areas of employment where the Spaniards worked were among the worst hit and the governments of the European countries were restricting the entrance of foreign workers. In 1973 Germany stopped recruiting from outside the European Economic Community, France followed in 1974, and Switzerland stopped issuing annual permits in the same year (Colectivo IOE 1987: 63).

The situation in 1978 meant that the new Spanish Constitution included an article protecting Spaniards abroad:

> The State will safeguard the economic and social rights of Spanish workers abroad and will orient its policies to their return (Article 42).

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[5] Figures from Cazorla Perez (1989: 91) state that in the five year period between 1973-77, the absolute figure of people who returned to Spain went up to 76,000.

Policies created to protect Spaniards abroad include health care for those who have not worked, or have worked in countries with no national health agreement with Spain and pensions for those residing abroad[6]. There is also help for those wanting to return to Spain, both for their journey back as well as for their 'integration' back into Spanish society - this help is both financial and work-related, that is, training relating to entrance into the labour market (Anuario de Migraciones, 1995).

Although long-term emigration to Europe in search of work has practically come to a halt, there is still seasonal migration in search of work, especially to France and Switzerland (Izquierdo Escribano 1992). Estimates for 1987 stand at around 60,000 seasonal workers a year (Izquierdo Escribano 1992: 28), but by 1994 the figure had dropped to around 3,000 (Anuario de Migraciones 1995: 41). The main focus, in both policy and research, has shifted to the new arrival of immigrants into Spain.

SPAIN AS A NEW COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION

As outlined in the introduction, since the mid-1970s there has been an increasing presence of immigrants in Spain. Attracted to work in areas which are under expansion, or under conditions which do not make the job attractive to Spaniards, they have settled mostly in Catalunya, Madrid and Andalucia.

In 1984, a review of the literature published on migration in Spain (Pascual de Sans 1984) pointed to the lack of studies concerning the arrival of immigrants into Spain. However, since then, there has been a 'boom' in research to do with immigration in Spain. The studies have focused on various aspects of immigration including: demography, legal and political issues, and economic aspects. Recently, this has expanded to include more social dimensions to do with integration.

Demographic data

Demographic accounts of immigration into Spain, especially to do with the interpretation of official statistics, have been important. Official statistics of the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística* (National Institute for Statistics in **Anuario de Migraciones**, 1997) claim that the number of foreign residents in Spain is 538,984. The breakdown of this data shows that Europeans form the largest group of foreign residents.

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[6] Figures from the 1991 and 1993 Electoral census data claim there is a total of 1,174,102 Spaniards (defined as those who are registered and have kept their Spanish passport) residing abroad (Anuario de Migraciones, 1995).

Table 5.1. Foreign Residents by Nationality (1996)

Europe	273,291
Central and South America	100,052
Africa	98,813
Asia	43,466
North America	21,211
Other	1,219
Oceania	929

As can be seen from Table 5.2, most of these Europeans do not work (Izquierdo 1992: 39). The data on foreign workers shows a greater number of Africans, Latin Americans and people from Asia.

Table 5.2 Foreign Workers by Nationality (1996)

Africa	78, 383
Central and South America	51,709
Asia	24,640
Europe	8, 392
North America	3, 083
Other	162
Oceania	121

As far as places of residence, the table below shows that the autonomous communities with most foreign residents are Catalunya, Madrid, and Andalucía.

Table 5.3 Foreign Residents by place of residence (1996)

Catalunya	114,264
Madrid	111,116
Andalucia	70,725
Valencia	59,952
Canary Islands	56,233

A number of studies (Colectivo IOE 1987; Izquierdo Escribano 1992) state the problem with this official data. The data only shows those immigrants who have work and residency permits but give no indication of those who do not; the 'illegal' immigrants who are not visible in the above statistics. Estimates of 'illegal' immigrants vary from between 131,789 (Izquierdo Escribano 1992: 205) through 172,682 (from the Instituto Español de Emigraciones (Spanish Institute for Emigration) in Bodega et al. 1995) to the 294,000 calculated by IOE (1987). The last

figure may be exceptionally high given that it was calculated before the 1991 Regularisation process[7].

Demographic studies are useful in so far as they provide a better picture of the phenomenon, even if this is not always as complete or reliable as could be desired. However, demographic studies cannot be 'self-sufficient' (Laraña 1993). Laraña feels these studies are too 'cold' and argues for a more theoretical framework which links wider issues, for example, in order to explain the effect of immigration on social structures and the more symbolic meaning attached to 'immigrants'. Some of the more recent studies mentioned below focus on these issues.

Legal Issues

Another main area of writing on immigration has come from the legal profession, both by academics working on international and constitutional law, as well as practising lawyers who are frustrated by the legal situation (often a *cul-de-sac*) in which immigrants find themselves due to the Spanish legislation on immigration. While some of these studies focus on a more detailed analysis of the laws and legislation themselves (see Mariño Menéndez 1995), others turn to look at the ways in which the precarious legal situation affects immigrants in other areas of life, for example when looking for housing, employment and access to resources (Aja 1995; Borras and Beilfuss 1994).

Economic aspects

The economic aspects of immigration have also been researched. Like past migration into northern parts of Europe, economic immigrants into Spain tend to take employment at the lower end of the job market, either because of their lack of opportunity in other sectors or because of lack of qualifications (Castells 1975; Castles and Kosack 1985; Cohen 1987). Immigrant workers (irrespective of whether they have work permits or not) often work under some of the worst labour conditions: low pay, long working hours, and poor working conditions. If immigrants have a contract it is short-term, does not include national insurance payments, and is often vulnerable to other forms of exploitation from the employers (Ramírez Goicoechea 1996: 571).

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[7] This was a process whereby all immigrants living in Spain could apply to become 'legal'. See Chapter Six on legislation.

The sectors in which the official governmental *cupos*[8] are open to is indicative of the distribution of immigrants in the job market. Since the *cupos* were implemented in 1993, the highest number of jobs have gone to the service industry, including catering, hotel staff and domestic helpers. The 30,000 *cupos* given in 1999 were distributed in the following areas:

Table 5.4. Distribution of *cupos* in 1999

Services	18,393
Agriculture and farming	8,987
Construction	1,576
Others	1,044

Studies on immigrant employment in other Southern European countries confirm these trends (in both conditions of employment and sectors) across Portugal, Greece and Italy (Baganha 1998, Droukas 1998, Reyneri 1998 respectively). Whether the jobs are in the formal or the informal economy, they tend to be limited to those sectors which are unstable, poorly paid and with low social status.

From his study of immigrant employment across Italy, Reyneri concludes:

> Common features of these jobs are low skill levels, a need for physical effort or great endurance, heavy or unpleasant working hours, poor opportunities for professional advancement and the lowest social status. Even when they are registered, labour contracts are precarious...Finally, wages are usually very low (1998: 320).

Another concern is the accusation that immigrants take jobs away from Spanish nationals. Many studies analyse the role played by immigrants in the national labour market. Studies across the Southern European countries showed this accusation to be false. The labour market is extremely fluid and immigrant labour, with its flexibility, fits its demands. Likewise the informal economy (where most immigrants are concentrated) plays an important role in these economies.

In the Italian case, Reyneri takes a closer look at the structure of unemployment and concludes that 'few Italians are really in competition with immigrant workers for low-level jobs' (1998: 326).

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[8] *Cupos* (also known as *contingentes*) is the quota system set up by the government to give work permits to a pre-established number of workers wanting to come into Spain: the idea is that the numbers as well as the sectors and geographical areas are pre-established, in accordance to demands.

The real problem lies in the level of working conditions - in terms of income, safety and social prestige - which are acceptable to the job seekers (1998: 328).

In her study of immigrants in the Portuguese informal economy, Baganha (1998: 375) suggests that some sectors of the informal economy, sectors which are open to immigrants in other countries like Spain and Italy (agriculture, textiles and footwear industries), remain shut to immigrants. This would suggest that the straightforward demand and supply macro-economic explanations do not give an accurate picture of how the market works and the role immigrants play in it. Existing jobs in these sectors are filled primarily by locals because the conditions and status attached to them are acceptable; they are simply not made available to immigrants. In contrast, in Spain and Italy jobs in these sectors are filled primarily by immigrant workers.

In the Spanish case, and in direct response to accusations that immigrants are to blame for increased unemployment[9], the *Foro para la Integración Social de los inmigrantes* (Forum for the Social Integration of Immigrants) report of 1997 states:

In spite of the existence of high levels of unemployment (the Spanish government confirmed) the configuration and fragmentation of the labour market means there are 'labour niches' that, due to their precariousness, their informality or nature of the pay will be rejected by the national workers, and on the other hand, will be attractive for the new immigrants (1997: 20).

It is also important to acknowledge the role of the informal economy in Southern Europe. Estimates suggest that 'unregistered labour, including second jobs, by 1988 exceeded 20 per cent in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Southern Italy'[10](Reyneri 1998: 321). In Spain, *Colectivo IOE* (Solé et al. 1998: 337) estimates that about 75% of all immigrants from the third world work in the hidden economy[11].

Across all Southern European countries there is a geographical distribution of the type of employment which immigrants are involved in. In Italy, for example, two thirds of those employed as housekeepers are in the central and southern areas of

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[9] A CIS survey in 1995 asked about this: 74% thought that immigrants did work the Spaniards did not want to do while 54% said they thought immigrants took away jobs from Spaniards. Another source of discomfort is to do with wages: 54% agree that immigrants, by accepting lower wages, are forcing down the Spaniard's wages too (data from SOS Racismo 1995a).

[10] In contrast it is 'below 10 per cent in Germany, Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands and between 12 and 18 per cent in France, Belgium and Northern Italy' (Reyneri 1998: 321)

[11] Immigrants account for 5% of the total informal economy (Solé, 1998).

the country. In the northern regions immigrants were originally involved in 'activities outside the core of local economic systems' (Reyneri 1998: 318) and have slowly moved into industry where the conditions are, in some ways, better. Likewise in Portugal, Baganha states that immigrants are involved in construction in industrialised areas and in the domestic services in urbanised areas where there is no industry (1998: 374-376).

A similar geographical division of labour can be seen in Spain. The three main areas where immigrants live and work are Catalunya, Madrid, and Andalucía. In the period between 1992 and 1994, Madrid had 43,902 foreign workers, of which 30,612 were employed in services and 4,269 in construction. Catalunya had 37,973 foreign workers, of which 16,355 were in services (13,405 in Barcelona), construction (4,062), industry (4,110) and agriculture (3,491). Andalucia had 14,399 workers of which 6,469 were in services (mostly in the province of Malaga) and 1,961 in agriculture (mostly in the province of Almería)[12].

Various studies have pointed to the 'ethnic division of labour' among immigrants (Colectivo IOE 1987; Ramírez Goicoechea 1996; Solé et al. 1998). There are two factors which seem to contribute to this division: firstly, the way immigrants find out about, and get, jobs. Secondly, the existence of what Ambrosini has called 'statistical discrimination'. Regarding the former, immigrants often get jobs through informal networks of relatives or friends who are often among their own nationality groups. By 'statistical discrimination' Ambrosini refers to the fact that a large number of immigrants working in one sector leads to the creation of stereotypical beliefs such as 'the Senegalese are skilful construction workers and the Filipinos are good domestic workers' (Ambrosini 1997: 71) and this feeds back into more being employed in that area.

Moroccan men tend to work mostly in the construction and agricultural industries (Solé et al. 1998: 335). Both sectors are precarious and the construction industry is sporadically subjected to economic crisis and loss of jobs. In order to have year-long employment in the agricultural sector, workers have to move around the different

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[12] These statistics are adapted from **Anuario de Migraciones** (1995). They are based on the work and residency permits granted by the *Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social*. The distribution (both geographical and by sector) of the 1994 contingentes confirms this pattern, permits going to Madrid and Catalunya are mostly for domestic workers (and other services) while those going to Andalucia and Murcia are mostly for agriculture (1997: 252).

areas in Spain, following the harvests. In some cases they also work as street-sellers, though this is less common. Women are mostly employed in domestic service, especially in urban areas. Women's employment tends to be more stable and less affected by economic crisis. Algerians tend to suffer a greater fall in professional status when they arrive in Spain. Most of them work as nomadic agricultural labourers, following the different harvests.

Immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa tend to work mostly in agriculture (especially on the Mediterranean coast) and as street-sellers (Colectivo IOE 1987: 157). Ramírez Goicochea (1996: 187) found that a lot of the women were not actually in paid employment, but stayed at home looking after the children.

Latin Americans are another group whose professional qualifications are higher than needed for the jobs they are presently doing in Spain. This is mostly because of the difficulty and delays experienced when trying to get their educational and professional qualifications validated in Spain, as well as the general lack of jobs. Speaking the language makes access to employment easier, thus they often work in bars, restaurants and hotels. The other main source of employment is in the sale of craft goods, particularly from Latin America, but unlike Sub-Saharans, Latin Americans tend to sell these out of small shops or stalls. Domestic service is an important source of employment for women: while some are employed to clean and do housework, many Latin Americans look after people who are old or sick.

The immigration of workers from the Philippines is long-established. Domestic workers from the Philippines arrived in Spain a long time before other nationalities, and due to this they are often better organised, have their papers in order and access to social security. While women work in the house, cleaning, cooking and looking after the children, men work as gardeners or chauffeurs. Adverts looking for domestic help, especially those which will involve looking after children, often specify that they are looking for a Filipino who can speak English so the children can learn it.

As can be seen by the above summary, in the same way as there is an ethnic division of labour, there is also a gendered one. While men work primarily in the construction and agricultural sectors, women tend to work in the service sector, especially in the domestic service (Anderson and Phizacklea 1997; Solé et al. 1998).

'Here for good': new issues arising

As time has passed, immigration is no longer regarded (by the legislators and by researchers) as a temporary phenomenon. This has meant that a new set of issues and concerns has attracted research. The arrival of families, mostly through the governmental programme for family regrouping, has increased the interest in education and housing conditions. The legislation to do with family regrouping states that immigrants living in Spain, wishing to bring their families over must have, among other things, decent housing conditions: 'a house with the characteristics and size considered normal for the Spanish citizens of the area'[13]. As immigrants applied for family regrouping, the poor conditions in which they (mostly men at this stage) lived came to light.

Housing

In Madrid and Barcelona, the main urban areas which attract immigrants, immigrants tend to live in the run down areas of the centre or in the industrial outskirts (Perales 1992: 151)[14]. In his study of Madrid (and the conditions of other urban areas are similar) Perales highlights three ways in which immigrants are excluded from housing: one is socio-economic exclusion as the rents are too high in comparison to the salaries they earn. Secondly there is institutional exclusion: they cannot access public housing and have difficulties in securing a mortgage. Thirdly there is exclusion due to their legal and employment situation: immigrants may not have their permits up to date so were not able to get a job, and even if they get a job, they are not likely to have a fixed contract, which means that there is no way of guaranteeing that they will be able to pay the rent (Perales 1992).

As outlined above, one of the main areas of employment for immigrants is as agricultural workers in rural areas. While there is a 'circuit' which immigrants move through (going from place to place according to the harvests), there are also more settled populations of agricultural workers; these are mostly in Catalunya and Almería (Giménez Romero 1992). In the areas around Almería, where most of the employment is in the greenhouses producing fruit and vegetables under intensive methods, immigrants live in *cortijos*. These *cortijos* are run down houses scattered among the greenhouses: they often have neither running water nor electricity.

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[13] Some analysts (Martínez, 1995) have highlighted the ambiguous terms in which this is set out and the fact that this means that decisions are taken on an individual basis.

[14] In the literature these are often equated to Park's and Burgess' 'zones of transition' (see Martínez-Veiga 1997).

While in some cases the owners of the greenhouses (who often own the *cortijos* too) allow their employees to live there free of charge, in other cases the employees are charged rent. Apart from the poor living conditions the main problem with these *cortijos* is their isolated location among the greenhouses, which makes it difficult to move around and interact with other people.

Many non-governmental organisations have set up housing programmes. These range from those that act as intermediaries between the immigrants and the owners (often by acting as guarantors of rent payment) to those who have reached agreements with town halls to improve immigrants' access to housing.

Education

The arrival of families also means that the education of children has become an increasingly important issue. Some aspects of education have been constructed as a problem, for example how to deal with children who arrive at schools with little knowledge of the language. Others have concentrated more on the content side of the issue; for example in analysing the way in which issues of cultural diversity are portrayed in books, the way they are taught and the changes that must be made to textbooks to avoid racist, stereotypical portrayals (Calvo Buezas 1992).

There has been a clear trend towards more research on integration and issues of *interculturalidad*[15] in recent years (Giménez Romero 1996). Once again this comes as a response to the fact that immigration is not a passing phenomenon and more attention had to be paid to wider issues of immigrants' lives in Spain.

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[15] '*Interculturalidad*' is a widely used term in the Spanish context. Defined in contrast to the concept of multiculturalism, it refers to the dynamic nature of different cultures in society. Through contact and interaction, cultures influence each other and rather than living as independent entities next to each other (an (simplistic) attribution made to multiculturalism) synthesise into something new (Malgesini and Giménez 1997).

Attitudes towards non-EU immigrants[16]

The attitudes of Spaniards towards non-EU immigrants is another area of research, mostly carried out through surveys. Two social research centres have carried out yearly surveys on the attitudes of Spaniards towards non-EU immigrants and ethnic minorities; the Centre for Research on Social Reality (CIRES - between 1991-95) and the Centre for Social Research (CIS, since 1990). A significant source of data on racist attitudes towards immigrants and other groups[17] comes from the annual reports of the anti-racist organisation *SOS Racismo*, which compiles some of the complaints of racism filed at the organisation.

Discriminatory or racist attitudes manifest themselves in many ways. *SOS Racismo*'s annual reports use a broad definition of racism which includes 'discrimination, aggression, humiliation, ill-treatment, and limitation of rights' that a person suffers 'due to the colour of their skin, their origin, their status as a foreigner, their culture or their socioeconomic status' (1998: 8 and 1999: 9). I agree with this broad definition and these different aspects of discrimination are discussed throughout the dissertation[18]. At this stage, however, I turn to the surveys in order to provide an initial outline of attitudes of Spaniards towards non-EU immigrants.

One of the standard questions in this type of survey asks people how they perceive the number of immigrants living in Spain. It is interesting to see that although the number of people who think there are too many immigrants is relatively low, since 1991 there has been an increase in those who think there are many or too many.

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[16] Once again, it is interesting to see the way in which the surveys take the term 'immigrant' to refer primarily to those immigrants from outside the European Union. In the surveys presented below, data about people coming from other countries of the European Union are not included. The term 'immigrant' is reserved for those who come from outside the European Union. This is no indication that people from other countries of the EU do not suffer some aspects of discrimination. However, as has been discussed in the Introduction, the attributes linked to extracommunitarian immigrants, make them a clearer and easier target for racist and discriminatory attitudes.

[17] Both the surveys and the *SOS Racismo* annual reports conclude that is it gypsies who suffer most discrimination in Spain.

[18] Chapter Four has looked at these issues regarding Spanish immigration in Spain. Chapter Six analyses the legislation and policies surrounding non-EU immigration and the discriminatory effect of the policy. Finally, Chapters Seven and Eight present immigrant accounts of discrimination in various settings.

Table 5.5. Perception of the number of people of another nationality, race, religion or culture who live in our country.

	1991 (%)	1995 (%)
Too many	12	27
Many	34	41
Not many	44	27
Don't know/No answer	10	5
	N=1,200	N=1,200

Source: CIRES (in SOS Racismo 1995: 202)

One of the most striking aspects of data from these surveys is how little interaction people have with immigrants or ethnic minorities:

Table 5.6. Percentage of people who have a family or friendship relationship with:

	%
South Americans	13
Gypsies	11
North Africans/ Arabs	7
Black Africans	5
Eastern Europeans	3
Asians	2

n=1,200

Source: CIRES 1995 (in SOS Racismo 1995a: 215).

The attitudes towards the different minority groups were also surveyed. The main group which caused dislike was gypsies - where 19% of those interviewed said they did not like them - followed by Arabs and Muslims (17%), Jews (9%), Black Africans (8%), South Americans (6%)[19].

Two other questions were asked around issues of discrimination: one was who they would like to have as neighbours and secondly what they would think if their daughter married a member of an ethnic minority. When asked who they would not like to have as neighbours, the group which was most discriminated against was gypsies, as shown in the table below.

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[19] People were asked to give their appreciation of different groups by answering the question: 'tell us how much you like...'

Table 5.7. Percentage of people who would be 'quite annoyed'[20] to have the following as neighbours:

	%
Gypsies	26
Moroccans	15
Black Africans	11
South Americans	10
Eastern Europeans	8
Indians	-
Chinese	9

n=1,200

Source: CIRES 1995 (SOS Racismo 1995a: 201)

Table 5.8 Prohibition or advice against daughter having a relationship with

	%
Gypsies	19
Black Africans	16
North Africans	16
Asians	14
South Americans	10
Eastern Europeans	4

n=1,200

Source: Data from CIRES, 1995 (SOS Racismo 1995a: 200).

Finally I want to turn to the way people perceive levels of racism in Spain *vis-à-vis* other European countries.

Table 5.9. Would you say that in comparison with other European countries, in Spain we are:

	%
More racist	11
As racist	58
Less racist	22
Don't know/ No answer	9

n=1,200

Source: CIRES, 1995 (SOS Racismo 1995a)

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[20] The translated Spanish wording is: 'Percentage of people who would be quite annoyed to have as neighbours...'

The *SOS Racismo* report shows the difference between giving 'verbal solidarity' to immigrants and daily reality. Racist attitudes do exist in spite of few people identifying themselves as racist. Racism cannot be narrowly defined to only include physical violence from right-wing groups but has more diverse manifestations[21]. However, the commonly held idea seems to be that you live better in Spain than in other countries of Europe (Ramírez Goicoechea 1996: 367). As put by one of the people I interviewed in Barcelona:

> Well, I think that it is easier for immigrants to live here than in other more northern countries, because of the character of the people ... because it is a lot more open that in those countries and daily life is easier, no? ... it is not like in other countries, where you arrive and immediately you feel this rejection ...

General remarks on immigration in Spain

Bustos Cortes (1993) argued that recent research on immigration had been in response to a perceived crisis and was, to a large extent, policy driven. The administration had to understand a particular phenomenon and a short, intensive study was carried out on it. The results would be published and the policy recommendations made. In this context, issues surrounding immigration are presented as 'problems' of exclusion and marginality, as Andrea Rea put it, a 'culture of clandestinity' (in Martiniello 1995: 183). One way in which this is reflected is through the distinction made between 'legal' and 'illegal' immigration. Although this distinction is slowly becoming less acute due to recent legislative efforts to legalise the 'illegals', the terms are still widely used and a distinction is still made between them[22]. This is especially true in the summer months when the media is full of stories of 'illegal immigrants' crossing the Strait of Gibraltar.

Is this criticism of research as short-term and policy-driven still valid today? Immigration is clearly 'here for good' (Castles et al. 1984) in Spain and research has expanded to include wider issues such as education and housing. On the whole, studies on immigration have remained restricted to a particular issue or area, and little attempt has been made to fit this into wider theories on immigration. Two studies merit attention in their attempts to cover, link together and theorise about,

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[21] Violent physical attacks on immigrants continue to occur in Spain (as everywhere) but according to *SOS Racismo* (1995) these attacks are relatively low in comparison to other manifestations of racism: such as denial of access to housing, to enter night clubs, to employment and in educational settings.

[22] See Introduction for a discussion of these terms.

the wide range of issues which affect immigrants' lives today: the first was a study by *Colectivo IOE* (1987) and the second is a more recent study by Ramírez Goicoechea (1996).

Colectivo IOE's first major piece of research on immigration, published in 1987, attempted to bridge the quantitative-qualitative gap. At a time when very little was known about immigration, it aimed to provide a 'map of immigration' (1987: 15); to analyse the wider structural causes of migration; and to describe the conditions affecting immigrants with reference to housing, employment, poverty and discrimination. The study also went on to look at the personal trajectory of immigrants and their situation in Spain. It included the way in which the legislation affects immigrants and the associations they formed. It also focused on the attitudes of Spaniards towards immigration[23].

Ramírez Goicoechea's (1996) more recent study is equally comprehensive. The study gathers life histories of immigrants of different nationalities[24] living in various areas of Spain. The study looks at the processes, structures and circumstances of migration as well as the cultural and life experiences. It then goes on to the subjective and biographical sense that immigrants make, as active participants, of their situation. The life histories are divided into the following sections: history of immigration into Spain, socio-demographic elements, 'cultural practices', and aspects of 'ethnic distance and experience of otherness'. These are carried out for seven nationalities and provide a rich source of data which can be compared across the different groups.

Although there has been an increasing amount of work done on issues of 'integration' and 'interculturality', the heterogeneous and recent nature of immigration in Spain means that a lot more research will arise on these issues. As with early studies on immigration in other countries such as France and Germany, the focus has changed over time from mapping and describing a phenomenon which was new and to a large extent unknown, to more critical analysis of issues of social exclusion and inclusion. Studies have also gone beyond looking at

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[23] It is interesting to see that both this study and the one carried out by Ramírez Goicoechea (1996) include Portugal among their countries of immigration.

[24] These are clustered under the following categories: Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Asia, Europe (Portugal and Eastern Europe).

immigrants as separate from the autochthonous population, to looking at the dynamic relationship between them, where they both interact and define the other.

Catalunya is interesting in the context of this dynamic idea of exchange and interaction. In Chapter Four I looked at the historical role that immigration has played in Catalunya. In the section below I outline the role that present-day immigration continues to play. This new immigration is often portrayed as being of a 'different kind'[25] to the immigration from other areas of Spain, and yet in many ways it is similar. Issues of similarity and difference emerge both below, in so far as it gives a demographic picture of new immigration in Catalunya, and also in subsequent chapters where wider aspects of this immigration are analysed.

IMMIGRATION IN CATALUNYA

After the 1991 regularisation process, Catalunya had 19.3% of all the immigrants living in Spain. Immigrants are present in Catalunya's four provinces, but it is the city of Barcelona which has the highest percentage. While immigration is very heterogeneous in terms of places of origin, the fact is that more North Africans and Moroccans live in Catalunya than elsewhere in Spain: it is Moroccans who make up the largest immigrant population. Regarding employment, the trends in Catalunya are similar to those for Spain as a whole: agriculture, construction work and the services (especially female employment in the domestic services) are the largest employers. In the section below, I outline the demographic make-up of the immigrant population in Catalunya and look at aspects of employment and housing. In this section I highlight results from surveys on attitudes towards these immigrants.

Demographic data

The arrival of foreign immigrants in Catalunya fits with the trends for Spain as a whole. While the figure for the number of immigrants between 1970 and 1980 remains stable, there has been a sustained increase since 1980. It has to be remembered that this is the period when the legalisation process (see above) took place and the increase may be a result of this (Direcció General de Planificació i Acció Teritorial 1993: 43). After regularisation, there was a 346% increase of

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[25] This is a direct reference to Jordi Pujol's speech (see Introduction) though he is not the only one to view it in these terms.

immigration in Catalunya. Clearly this is more to do with the fact that these people are now 'counted' rather than any real increase.

Table 5.10. Foreigners resident in Catalunya

Year	Number	% over total population
1970	32,194	0.63
1975	36,207	0.64
1980	38,656	0.65
1985	45,246	0.75
1990	65,994	1.09
1996	114,264	1.89

Source: Adapted from **Entre el sud i el nord. Els treballadors immigrants estrangers a Catalunya** (1993: 44) and **Anuario de Migraciones** (1997: 231).

Table 5.11. Immigrants living in Catalunya and Spain by place of origin

	Spain (%)	Catalunya (%)
Maghreb	11	17
Black Africa	4	8
Latin America	20	16
Asia	12	10
Rest of the world[26]	53	49

Source: Adapted from **Entre el sud i el nord. Els treballadors immigrants estrangers a Catalunya** (1993: 46).

The oldest, and most numerous, immigration is from the Maghreb; beginning in Catalunya in the 1960s when it was easy to enter and work in Spain. While some sources state a fall in arrivals between 1970 and 1980, caused by the economic crisis (CITE in Direcció General de Planificació i Acció Teritorial 1993), others argue that the shutting of the French frontier meant people were more likely to stay in Catalunya. In any case, from 1985 onwards there has been a steady increase and the population is clearly in Catalunya to stay (Colectivo IOE 1992). As from May 1991, an entry visa was required for North Africans to enter Spain. While this measure may have controlled the official number of entries, people continue to enter Spain without visas[27].

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[26] 'Rest of the world' refers to North America, Western Europe, Japan, Israel, South Africa and the block of ex-communist countries of the Eastern Europe.
[27] See Chapter Six.

Other nationalities arrived in Catalunya later. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africans, most began to arrive in the mid-1970s. Initially, they settled in the Maresme and they have slowly spread to live in other areas of Catalunya. Latin Americans are very diverse in their history of migration. The earlier migration of the 1980s was more from the Southern areas of South America: on the whole this was for political reasons and people were more educated than those who arrived later, which was for economic reasons.

Different provinces within Catalunya have different distributions of nationality of immigrants.

Table 5.12. Distribution of foreigners in Catalunya in 1990

	Number	Total % in Catalunya	Total % of the population
Barcelona	46,422	70	1.0
Girona	12,349	19	2.4
Lleida	1,164	2	0.3
Tarragona	6,059	9	1.1
Total	65,994	100.00	1.1

Source: Adapted from **Entre el sud i el nord. Els treballadors immigrants estrangers a Catalunya** (1993: 45).

By 1995 there had been an increase in the absolute numbers of immigrants but the distribution through the different provinces remained similar.

Table 5.13. Foreign Residents in Catalunya. December 1995

	Number	Total % in Catalunya
Barcelona	77,907	73
Girona	17,365	16
Lleida	3,020	3
Tarragona	8,517	8
Total	106,809	100.00

Source: **Anuario de Migraciones** (1997a: 22)

This geographical distribution is partly to do with the sectors of employment that the different nationalities work in. The existing immigration networks are also important since people tend to settle where fellow nationals already live. People from the Maghreb are the most numerous in all provinces. The second largest country of origin varies according to the different areas. For example Girona's

second largest population are Gambians who work in agriculture, while Tarragona attracts more Senegalese people working as street sellers (Direcció General de Planificació i Acció Teritorial 1993).

As can be seen by the above tables, the city of Barcelona has the highest number of immigrant residents.

Table 5.14. Place of origin of foreign residents in Barcelona (1991)

	Number	Percentage (%)
Maghreb	15,567	53
Latin America	6,858	23
Asia	3,486	12
Black Africa	2,337	8
Rest of the world	1,137	4

Source: Adapted from **Entre el sud i el nord. Els treballadors immigrants estrangers a Catalunya** (1993: 47).

Economic aspects

In August 1997 a hotel and restaurant owner was arrested by the police in Girona, charged with violating the rights of one of their employees, a man of Turkish origin. In spite of not having the necessary permits to work in Spain, the employee reported the employer. The employee was made to work up to 20 hours a day and was not paid the salary he had been promised. The employer pleaded guilty to the charges and was passed to the judges to be tried (**El País,** 14 August 1997). This incident shows the vulnerable position of immigrants regarding employment.

There has been a lot of research carried out on the employment of immigrants, and the role of immigrants in the labour market in Catalunya. Once again many set out to investigate the misconception that immigrants take away jobs from Catalans. In the INITS survey, 31% of those surveyed said immigrants took away jobs from Catalans (INITS S.A. 1992: 82). Likewise the majority of people (65%) felt that immigrant workers should only be admitted when there were not enough people in Spain to cover the posts (INITS S.A. 1992: 110). As the studies below show these commonly-held ideas cannot be sustained.

Studies point to the fact that immigrants are, on the whole, in paid employment. The conditions of employment are often not very good. Immigrants work in the sectors with little status, in jobs which they are overqualified for, have short term

contracts (if at all) and work under poor conditions. The sectors of employment are in the areas of agriculture, industry, construction and services (Colectivo IOE 1992; Direcció General de Planificació i Acció Teritorial 1993; Solé and Herrera 1991).

Table 5.15. Work permits held by foreigners in Catalunya by sector of employment (1995).

	Agrarian	Non-agrarian			
		Industry	Constructio n	Services	Not specified
Catalunya	30,091	4,098	17,270	21,736	3,123

Source: from CITE (1997a: 22)

The 1997 *cupos* for Catalunya reflected these trends. There were 15,000 *cupos* allocated to Catalunya in the following manner:

Table 5.16. Allocation of *cupos* in Catalunya (1997)

Agriculture	5,820
Domestic services	5,620
Other services	2,940
Construction	620

Source: CITE (1997: 23)

Once again there is an ethnic division of labour which is largely to do with the fact that most immigrants hear about jobs by word of mouth and through friends and relatives (Solé and Herrera 1991: 120).

North African men work mostly in construction and agriculture but also in the textile industry and as street sellers. Women work mostly in the domestic services. People from Sub-Saharan Africa work in various sectors, depending on where they live in Catalunya. In general, however, they work in agriculture, construction and as street-sellers. Women also work in the domestic services and the textile industry. Latin Americans work in a great variety of areas, mostly as domestic workers but also in other services and in liberal professions. Finally, Asians work mostly in the domestic services (especially Philippine nationals). Those from the Middle East mostly work in importing and exporting goods.

As Table 5.17 shows there is a clear gendered division of labour: women work mostly in domestic service while men work mostly in construction.

Table 5.17. Employment by sector and gender.

	Men (%)	Women (%)
Primary sector	**18**	**0**
agriculture	16	-
farming	2	-
Industry	**25**	**12**
wood	2	4
metal	2	2
food	7	-
textile and leather	8	6
various industries	3	-
Construction	**13**	-
Services	**46**	**89**
commerce	4	4
street selling	11	-
catering	8	2
land transport	3	-
health	-	8
recreation	6	8
domestic	4	61
various services	10	6

n=222

Source: Adapted from **Entre el sud i el nord. Els treballadors immigrants estrangers a Catalunya** (1993: 58).

In a study carried out in two *comarques* (regions) of Catalunya (Osona and Baix Llobregat), researchers analysed the role of immigrants in the labour market as well as seeing to what extent they were in direct competition with the indigenous labour force. From interviews with immigrants themselves, as well as various organisations involved with them (e.g. trade unions) they concluded that immigrants occupied a niche in the labour market: 'people hire them because they work well, they do the jobs that Catalans do not want to do, they get paid less and they work in conditions which the Catalans would not accept' (Direcció General de Planificació i Acció Teritorial 1993: 62).

They give three reasons for the existence of this niche and then go on to outline why immigrants fill this niche. The three reasons are the following: first, the sectors in which growth is occurring are those sectors which rely on labour with little training and low wages in order to maintain their competitiveness (like textiles or intensive agriculture). Secondly the indigenous population has increased its level of education and has higher expectations of work. Finally immigrants have lower

qualifications[28] and so have to accept the jobs that are less well paid (Direcció General de Planificació i Acció Teritorial 1993: 128).

Immigrants' precarious legal situation in Spain also means they have less choice in the jobs they accept. If immigrants have a valid work and residence permit, its renewal depends on having a contract. The majority of jobs available for those who do not have papers are in these sectors and under poor conditions. The very fact that immigrants are 'illegal' results in them having to accept a whole series of unfavourable conditions.

Hector, one of the people I interviewed during my fieldwork, arrived in Spain from the Dominican Republic as a student. However this grant fell through and he had to give up the idea of studying and start earning a living. When I asked him about the jobs he had done he replied:

> Everything, from being a painter, rubbish collector, looking after old people, looking after blind people, cleaning houses to being a guide in an exhibition on Latin America ... a bit of everything, anything that came up at the time, because the work is always short term, it's over and you are left waiting, and as things are not easy here, you always have to produce ... You sail and sail and you always end up in the jobs that are the most marginalised. They are decent jobs, but they do not solve your life nor do they allow you to go beyond a certain threshold.

Housing

Conditions of housing in Catalunya follow similar patterns to those of other areas of Spain. The biggest divide is, once again, between rural and urban housing. In this section I will concentrate on urban housing since this is where I carried out my research. Immigrants living in Barcelona face the classic problems of housing in urban areas: high prices elsewhere force them to take poor housing in run down areas where the rent they are charged is in excess of what the property is worth.

In the city of Barcelona, most immigrants live in *Cuitat Vella* (Observatori Permanent de La Immigració a Barcelona 1997). *Cuitat Vella* is a neighbourhood in

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[28] This cannot be generalised to all groups, as many groups actually drop in employment status. For example, many Latin Americans (especially those who came over in the 1980s) are over-qualified for the jobs they are carrying out at the moment. In the case of North Africa, while there are some people who have come from rural areas and with few qualifications, recently there has been an increase in the arrival of university students. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa people come over with fewer qualifications than the other groups, though once again this depends on the areas of origin .

the centre of Barcelona. In spite of recent development in the neighbourhood it continues to have very poor housing and services. Housing needs and conditions are similar for both immigrants and the native population who live there. In this light, any measure that has been carried out for immigrants has been very careful to also include the native population who need it to the same extent (Comissionat de L'Alcaldia per a la Defensa dels Drets Civils 1993). *Cuitat Vella* continues to attract immigrants. It is in the city centre and there are plenty of cheap hostels (where immigrants first stay when they arrive). The fact that other immigrants already live there means that there is an important network of support and information. In recent years specialised food stores and *halal* butchers have opened in the area and there are two mosques in the neighbourhood.

The commonly-held picture of immigrants as single young men living in hostels or sharing flats is no longer valid. According to data from the 1991 census most housing in *Cuitat Vella* is occupied by families or by people living on their own (young men and women, but also old people) (Consell Assessor d'Immigració 1997).

Immigrants normally rent, rather than buy, housing (Consell Assessor d'Immigració 1997). Buying is often not an option in terms of finances. Immigrants tend to work in unstable sectors, on low wages and very often have short term contracts. These factors make it hard to get a mortgage.

Buying is also too much of an emotional investment. Etna, one of the African immigrants I interviewed said that at first she would not buy anything, because she thought that 'any day we might leave, but then we began to realise that the myth of return is further and further away'. She slowly began to buy things, especially as she realised she could ship them back to Gambia. As she said: 'it is not so much about the economic investment as the psychological factors'. In fact she was aware it made economic sense to buy: 'We have been paying rent for 20 years, if we had bought a house, the house would be ours by now'.

With specific regard to immigrants there is a need to improve information about housing, especially in terms of the rent they are charged, since they are often overcharged. There is also discrimination due to their origin. Solé's survey (1991: 149) states that 79% of those interviewed had been denied access to housing and this was particularly true if they were single and especially high among Africans

and Asians. It is also true that among immigrants there is a greater number of people on their own and in need of temporary housing (Comissionat de L'Alcaldia per a la Defensa dels Drets Civils 1993: 103).

In an attempt to alleviate this situation, the *Generalitat's Pla Interdepartamental d'immigració* has included immigrants registered on the census among those people who can apply for funding to do up or buy a house. The *Generalitat* has also become aware that new types of public housing have to be made available to meet the needs of immigrants (Generalitat de Catalunya 1993: 30).

At a non-governmental level, *Proyecto Xenofilia* works in *Cuitat Vella* in Barcelona. In order to counteract the poor housing conditions of the neighbourhood, *Xenofilia* has carried out various programmes. It has also created a housing information service, where information about available housing is advertised. Once housing has been found, the organisation acts as an intermediary, often giving advice on rent contracts and necessary work to be done on the house. *Xenofilia* created a course on building which combined the theory with practice. Immigrants would carry out improvements on rented properties in *Cuitat Vella*. As part of this campaign *Xenofilia* has also run an awareness raising campaign directed at the indigenous community, as well as the authorities, on issues to do with immigrant housing.

In Rubi, a town outside Barcelona, *Centro de Información al Trabajador Extranjero* reached an agreement with the town hall's social work department in order to provide temporary housing for immigrants. After doing an exploratory study on immigrants' housing needs, they set up a housing co-operative. With the financial backing of the town hall to obtain mortgages, various houses were bought and immigrants were divided into groups which moved into these houses once they had been done up. This is seen as a temporary measure that will give immigrants time to find appropriate housing.

Legal issues

Legal studies on immigration in Catalunya concentrate mostly on the division of power between the central state and the *Generalitat* with reference to powers to legislate over immigration. The central state has competencies over areas to do with entrance and residence in the country, while the *Generalitat* have slowly taken responsibility over issues to do with life in Catalunya. The most in-depth study is one carried out by Borras and Beilfuss (1994) where the competencies of the

Generalitat are in the areas of political rights, social welfare, health, education, housing, employment and culture relating to foreigners. This division of legislative powers, and the way in which the different layers of government has acted, is analysed in the following chapter.

Education and Health

Health and education are two of the areas where most attention has been focused in Catalunya in terms of research; largely because research was policy-driven. Regarding health, those people who have a work and residence permit have access to the national health service, however those who are 'illegal' will only be attended in cases of emergencies.

As children began to arrive in Barcelona, the need to give them access to education arose and provisions had to be made. Although children of immigrant origin only make up 1.5% of children in school, they are concentrated in particular areas. Since a large number of the immigrants live in *Cuitat Vella* most of the children go to school there; the two main schools with immigrant children in Barcelona - *Mila i Fontanals* and the *Colegio Cervantes* - are in this area. Solé highlighted the fact that while immigrant children have normal levels of schooling at primary level, this changes at secondary level, where more students are dropping out and so access to employment in the formal economy is very much restricted (Solé et al. 1993: 132).

Other areas of research have followed the trends outlined above for Spain as a whole: research of the materials used and analysis of the stereotypical images given of people from another culture. Another aspect of this research is aimed at knowing the situation of children of immigrants in order to give training and support to teachers working with these children.

Moroccans in Catalunya: a profile of the largest group

Immigrants from Morocco are the most numerous in Catalunya. In fact, data from 1992 show that 25% of all Moroccans living in Spain lived in Catalunya. The number of Moroccans in Catalunya stands at 35,368 (this figure is for people with residence permits in 1995) (Generalitat de Catalunya 1997: 5). This is 43% of all foreign immigration in Catalunya.

Moroccan immigration in Catalunya dates back to the 1960s. Moroccans came to work on the construction of roads and motorways. Most people came from the

areas which had formed the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco. In fact up until the 1970s most of the immigrants came from the northern areas of Morocco (the Rif and Jebala, as well as the city of Tangiers): it was from these same areas that people emigrated to Northern Europe (Planet Contreras 1993: 118). Different areas of Catalunya attract people from different areas of Morocco, and the trends continue as networks continue to exist and provide support.

The 1970s saw a second stage of immigration from Morocco into Catalunya and there was a clear increase in numbers. Immigrants were slightly older than those arriving in the 1960s and more people came to work in the construction industry. Also, while Moroccans had first lived in the city of Barcelona, in the 1970s they began to move to the surrounding areas. These trends continued in the 1980s, with a slight increase in the rate of arrival which continued in to the 1990s (Colectivo IOE 1994: 125-143 and 285).

Recolons concluded (1989) that, from a demographic point of view, people would continue to move between Morocco and Spain as long as the differences in population and wealth continued to increase. At the same time the networks for migration are already established in Spain and most importantly the geographical proximity of the two countries makes it relatively easy to move from one to the other. This is in spite of the increasing controls, such as the tightening of border controls and the requirement for an entry visa as from May 1991. He also points to the fact that immigration will be of a more permanent nature.

While at first most of these immigrants were young men, this has changed since the late 1980s, when there was an increase in women. This is both to do with women arriving through family regrouping, but also because more women are migrating on their own. The recent arrival of families adds to the existing families from the very first phases of immigration in the 1960s. These developments have meant an increase in the so-called 'second generation'.

In terms of housing and employment, Moroccan immigrants occupy some of the most marginal sectors. They tend to live in rented housing, mostly in family groups or with fellow nationals.

Leila (one of the people I interviewed) lives with her family in a rented flat in *Cuitat Vella*. The day I interviewed her she was about to go to talk to a lawyer about

problems she was having in her flat. When Leila and her family moved into the flat, nobody had lived in it for a long time and they had installed new water pipes, a new kitchen, etc. as best as they could. It was now a little better:

> Now it is a little bit better ... well ... better ... but with dampness, leaks from the upstairs shower, well ... the problems of old houses.

They had great difficulty in getting the owner to come to fix anything, he kept saying he would but never showed up. She had had enough of the upstairs shower constantly dripping into her kitchen, which was why she was going to see a lawyer that day.

In terms of employment, there is a gendered division of labour. Moroccan women tend to work in domestic services or the textile industry and catering, while men work in construction, in factories, or in agriculture just outside Barcelona.

In his study of Moroccans in Viladecans (a town just outside the city of Barcelona's parameter), Narbona looks at the work and living conditions of the agricultural workers of the area (1995). Immigration to the area started as seasonal migration dependant on the agricultural seasons, and slowly migrants settled. He emphasises the fact that this immigration is from rural areas[29], and immigrants are mostly illiterate and work on temporary contracts.

Attitudes towards immigrants
Several studies have been carried out to measure the attitudes of people from Catalunya and Barcelona towards immigrants and ethnic groups. The results of these studies are outlined below.

In the study on immigrant workers in Catalunya, Solé pointed to the different spheres of discrimination. Concerning the treatment immigrants receive from the authorities: 70% of those surveyed had experienced racist attitudes at frontiers and 68% had experienced the racist attitudes of the police (Solé and Herrera 1991: 154). While the relatively low figure of 27% said that they have experienced racist attitudes on the street, 70% had been insulted, 46% had been prohibited entrance to

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[29] Most immigrants arriving in Catalunya, come directly from rural areas in Morocco to urban areas in Catalunya (Planet Contreras 1993).

a night-club and 68% had suffered racist attitudes (the nature of these is not specified). Clearly, this is not a good state of affairs.

A survey on the attitude of people towards foreigners carried out in Barcelona concluded that the small presence of foreigners meant that 'racial problems' *(els problemes racials)* are not highest on the list of things that people are worried about: the highest worry is to do with safety on the streets (16%) and unemployment (15%) whereas concern over 'racial problems' less than 1% (INITS S.A. 1992: 36) When the question 'is immigration a problem?', 42% said it was and 51% said it was not (INITS S.A. 1992: 83) .

Table 5.18. Perception of immigrants in the city of Barcelona:

% by column	from other countries	from other races or ethnic groups	from other religions
Too many	15	15	12
Many	50	47	39
Few	27	30	30
Don't know/ no answer	8	9	19

n=900

Source: INITS survey (1992: 88).

When asked whether they thought immigration would increase in the future, 64% said it would and the majority of these immigrants would come from the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa (INITS S.A. 1992: 74-75).

I have not been able to find survey results for Catalunya which match the same question asked in Spain as a whole regarding opinions over having different ethnic groups as neighbours, and how they would feel if a daughter married a member of a different ethnic groups. The closest questions I could find were the following:

With reference to neighbours, people were asked who would you never have as neighbours:

Table 5.19. Who would you never have as a neighbour?

	%
Maghrebis	33
Gypsies	31
Arabs	18
Any foreigner	5

n=900

Source: INITS (1992: 149)

The question relating to marriage was the following: supposing that one of your sons or daughters wanted to marry someone with the characteristics we have mentioned (from a different country, different race or different religion) would you like it a lot/ quite a bit/ very little/ wouldn't like it at all?

Table 5.20. Attitudes towards child marrying someone from different country, race or religion:

	%
Would like it a lot	6
Would like it quite a bit	21
Would like it very little	31
Wouldn't like it at all	16
Doesn't know	17
No answer	9

n=900

Source: INITS (1992: 116).

The presence of organised right-wing groups is believed to be high in Catalunya, and in Barcelona in particular. Police had files on 2,331 members of various right-wing organisations (especially right wing skinhead organisations) in 1995, of which 1,227 lived in Catalunya (SOS Racismo 1995a: 122). In 1996 nine racial attacks by violent groups were reported to *SOS Racisme* in Catalunya (**El País,** 25.3.97).

Issues of integration

Debates about issues of immigration and their integration into Catalan society revolve around issues that have been discussed above: immigrants' position in the housing and employment markets, as well as attitudes of the autochthonous population towards them. Definitions of what integration into these spheres means can be found in many official documents. In the following chapter I analyse these

definitions at the level of the central state, the *Generalitat* and the *Ajuntament de Barcelona*, and go on to look at the policies and measures taken by these governmental bodies to aid integration into these areas. However, issues of integration do not stop at official definitions and measures and in the final chapters I present the views of immigrants themselves towards meanings of integration and belonging in Catalunya.

One aspect of the debates about immigration and integration cannot be ignored at this stage. This is to do with the perceived cultural and religious differences of foreign immigration. Immigrants are perceived to be culturally different from the indigenous population. Religion plays a key role in this differentiation; a lot of attention is drawn to this cultural difference and yet it is important to remember the other economic and social factors discussed above. Discrimination due to economic factors is central. In the INITS survey (1992: 119) people were asked whether they agreed with the following statement:' When it comes down to it, any discrimination between foreigners is not as much to do with the country of origin, their race or religion as with their economic position'. Of the people surveyed, 61% agreed with the statement.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has discussed the way in which Spain has gone from being a country of emigration to becoming one of immigration. As the data presented above shows, the arrival of immigrant workers from outside the European Union started to develop slowly from the mid-1970s onwards and is very heterogeneous in origin.

Within the Spanish context, Catalunya has played an important role, since it was one of the areas which attracted most immigration. The figure stands at about 19%; that is to say, one fifth of all immigration in Spain is located in Catalunya. Immigrant workers were attracted to Catalunya due to the possibility of employment and once the first people had arrived, this created social networks. The data presented above has shown that immigrants continue to occupy the most marginal areas of employment and housing.

It is also clear that immigration is 'here for good' and deserves serious consideration and long term measures:

> foreign immigration is no longer a marginal and exotic issue, but has become an urgent reality which requires thorough knowledge, an increase in awareness and determined measures in order to prevent and resolve the different problems that inevitably appear and will continue to appear (Direcció General de Planificació i Acció Teritorial 1993: 126).

In the following chapter, I analyse legislation and measures taken around issues of immigration. Focusing on Catalunya (and the city of Barcelona in particular) Chapter Six looks at the different tiers of government involved in making legislative decisions over immigration and the way in which these measures have changed through time.

CHAPTER SIX

LEGISLATION AND POLICIES ON IMMIGRATION

INTRODUCTION

As has been highlighted in the previous Chapter, immigration of non-European Union citizens is a relatively recent phenomenon in Spain. This chapter outlines the legislation and policies passed in Spain as a result of this immigration. Legislation and policies have been implemented at various levels of government - the central state, the autonomous communities, and at the level of the town hall. The central state legislation continues to be the most influential, since it controls issues to do with entrance, residency and employment. Other layers of government have recently taken on responsibilities for other aspects of immigration.

Catalunya was the first autonomous community to pass legislation on immigration in 1993. Prior to this the *Generalitat* had argued that it could not interfere with issues of immigration since immigration did not fall within its jurisdiction. However a report carried out by non-governmental organisations, the *Informe de Girona* (The Girona Report) stated the areas in which the *Generalitat* could, and in fact should, act. It stated that it was no longer valid to 'blame' the central government for all aspects of social exclusion in which immigrants lived. It was clear that different aspects could be legislated at different levels of government. The recommendation of the *Informe de Girona* were turned in to the *Generalitat's Pla Interdepartamental d'immigració* (Interdepartmental Plan on Immigration) in 1994.

At the more local level of the town hall, the issue of immigration became increasingly important, especially in the areas of housing, education, and social services. In this sense, the Barcelona town hall has worked closely with the *Generalitat*; in fact, it can be said that both have increasingly worked in similar directions and supported each others' policies, in spite of their opposed political ideologies - the *Ajuntament* is run by the socialists (PSC) and the *Generalitat* by the nationalists (CiU).

This chapter outlines the competencies of the different tiers of government and then moves on to look at the legislation passed, and the policy measures taken, on immigration at each level. I highlight the way in which the different levels overlap,

interact and reinforce one another. The way in which concepts and issues are defined at the different levels of legislation is also examined. I focus on three questions: Firstly, what are the main trends of the legislation? Secondly, who is policy being directed at and how are the 'immigrants' defined? While some policies include everyone who is not a Spanish national, others only include those from 'non-developed countries'. Thirdly, what does 'social integration' mean? While all policies state this as their ultimate aim, there is no clear definition of what this actually entails.

It would be impossible to try to cover all areas of legislation and policies so I focus on a few case studies. The criteria by which I selected these were heavily influenced by my experience during fieldwork in Barcelona. In some cases the immigrants I interviewed mentioned these policies as relevant to their lives. In other cases I saw the policies 'at work' throughout my fieldwork.

LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

In the first instance it is important to outline the legislative framework surrounding issues of immigration. This includes various levels of government, from the European Union to the different administrative bodies within Spain. In the section below, I outline the areas of legislation that are the sole jurisdiction of the central state, then go on to look at areas of shared responsibility, and finally focus on the areas in which competencies to do with immigration have been granted to, or taken up by, the *Generalitat*.

The Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy of 1979 are the two documents which lay out the powers of the central state and of the autonomous community of Catalunya. The powers devolved to the autonomous communities are not always clear-cut (Borras and Beilfuss 1994: 2). The distribution of competencies are constantly changing, as agreements between the central government and the autonomous communities allocate more competencies to the latter. The areas discussed below are not an exhaustive list, they are simply those that are relevant to the area of immigration.

The Spanish Constitution lays out the general legislative framework regarding the division of competencies. There is great ambiguity and debate about this division of responsibilities between the central government and the autonomous

communities. The Constitutional High Court is often called upon to resolve such matters (for more details see Heywood 1995: 147).

Article 148 lays out the competencies that can be granted to the Autonomous Communities, while Article 149 lays out the areas where the central state has sole jurisdiction. The Constitution sets out that the central state has full powers to decide over:

- voting: at present only Spanish nationals can vote at all elections. Citizens of the European Union can vote at municipal elections and European elections. Immigrants from outside the European Union have no voting rights;
- 'nationality, immigration, emigration, foreigners and right of asylum';
- 'regulating of conditions of obtaining, authorising and issuing of academic and professional degrees'. Regarding immigration this is important because many immigrants need to legalise their qualifications in order to find work in Spain;
- international relations. In the case of immigration, it is important as it makes it hard for the Autonomous Community to deal directly with the countries of origin of the immigrants.

There are some areas which the Constitution lays down as 'shared responsibilities'. These include areas such as housing, health, education, culture, welfare and public security. These are areas where the state:

- provides the general framework, that is, the basic legislation;
- shares the general legislative powers, with specific elements left to autonomous communities;
- retains the planning powers or determines the basic administrative policy of the sector;
- is given a co-ordinating role over the autonomous communities;
- determines the economic parameters for public service management;
- retains certain managerial responsibilities, allowing the rest to be undertaken by the autonomous communities; and
- retains responsibility for public service, excluding its management (Heywood 1995: 148).

With direct reference to issues of immigration the central state has passed one law, the 1985 *Ley de Extranjería* (Foreigners' Law) and the *Generalitat* has assumed competencies in the following areas: health, education, welfare, culture and employment. These responsibilities are found in the Interdepartamental Plan for Immigration which lays down the objectives for the subsequent creation of policy.

Although the *Generalitat* may not have any direct legislative powers in other areas, it has been able to put pressure on the central government. For example, the *Generalitat* has made demands for the legalisation process to be more flexible. Likewise the new immigration law, currently being debated, was a Catalan initiative.

The town halls provide yet another tier of government. Town halls are mostly responsible for the local administration of the services over which the *Generalitat* has competencies (Serra 1982). The responsibilities of the Town hall include[1]:

- participation in the administration of primary health care;
- provision of social services and of social
  promotion and reintegration;
- cultural and sport activities and installations, leisure activities;
- participation in the educational programme.

As will be discussed below, the *Ajuntament de Barcelona* (Town Hall) has been very active in the provision of these services to immigrants.

EUROPEAN UNION

At the European Union level there have been numerous calls for harmonisation on legislation to do with immigration. On the whole there has been little success regarding this harmonisation, and the debates still continue. The harmonisation that *has* taken place means that there is freer movement of people within the European Union. In contrast entry into, and movement within, the EU has been made harder for 'third country nationals'. The Schengen Convention and the Maastricht Treaty have been the most important steps in this process.

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[1] *Ley 7/85, de 2 de abril Reguladora de las Bases de Régimen Local.* Article 25.

The Schengen Convention was first signed in July 1985 by France, Germany and the Benelux countries. Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece had joined by 1991. Schengen aimed to create a space within Europe where internal borders were abolished and there was free movement of people. Nationals from other Schengen countries can move around freely, as can third country nationals who have a permit in any Schengen country.

In contrast to the fall of the internal borders, there is a strengthening of external borders; entry into the Schengen space has become more regulated. It is now controlled through a common visa policy. A list of nationalities requiring a visa for entry had to be agreed by all, since a veto system operates. For Spain this has allowed it to maintain its 'historic links' with South America; only Cuba and the Dominican Republic require visit visas. As far as the Mediterranean countries are concerned, several require a visa, including Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. As Lirola Delgado has argued, visas 'become a guarantee of entry and stay in the country, as well as an obstacle to the entry of persons posing a threat to public policy, public security and health' (1993: 224).

A separate article (Article 26) provided back-up for the decisions taken: it made airlines and other 'carriers' responsible for passengers having the correct visas. Transport companies can be fined if they allow a person without the appropriate visa to enter the Schengen countries. This decision has been criticised since transport agents are obliged to make decisions that they should not be asked to take:

> This is forcing airline staff to act as immigration officers by proxy in order to minimise the financial liability (Butt Phillip 1994: 178).

Although Schengen does not include direct legislation on the immigration policies of the states that have signed it, it certainly influences them (Ochoa de Michelena 1993: 108).

It was hoped that Maastricht would finally provide a commitment to the harmonisation of immigration policy. This did not happen in all areas. Maastricht accentuated the distinction between European Union immigrants and immigrants from outside the European Union. Regarding nationals from other states of the European Union there would be: free movement, free residence and the right to

vote and be elected in municipal elections as well as the right to vote in European elections (Treaty of the Union in Schermers et al. 1993: 606).

The controls regarding people from outside the European Union space became stricter, but these did not amount to a comprehensive immigration policy.

> Maastricht, however, adds little that is new to the EU's 12 activities in the field of immigration although it does place fully on public record the range and nature of the intergovernmental agendas for this subject (Butt Phillip 1994 : 181).

Article K1 of the Treaty states:

> Member States shall regard the following areas as matters of common interest:
> 1. Asylum policy;
> 2. Rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States and the exercise of controls thereon;
> 3. Immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries:
> a) conditions of entry and movement by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States;
> b) conditions of residence by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States, including family reunion and access to employment;
> c) combating unauthorised immigration, residence and work by nationals of third countries on the territory of Member States' (Treaty of the Union in Schermers et al. 1993: 606).

There have been further moves towards policy harmonisation, various working groups and other intergovernmental bodies have been formed with this aim. Although this harmonisation is regarded as an area of common interest, immigration policies still lie within the sovereignty of each member state. In both the case of the asylum bills and the immigration policies, decisions 'directly touch upon national jurisprudence. Harmonisation of such policy elements is therefore difficult to achieve' (Kpenou 1996).

THE CENTRAL STATE

Regarding immigration, the Spanish Central State has sole competencies over issues of nationality; control over immigration; and the political citizenship rights granted to immigrants. The legislation passed on immigration at the Spanish state level has been, on the whole, for short-term purposes: more to do with the 'control' of migration flows and their employment than with the 'integration' of immigrants already resident in Spain. This has led analysts to agree with the following statement:

In this way an institutional procedure is consolidated, one which, in practice ...treats the foreigner not as a *subject of rights*, but as an *object* of administrative decisions more, or less, favourable, or harmful, depending on the situation at the time, on the geographical place, or the internal security aspect or the mood of the civil servant you have to deal with (Posada in **El Racismo en el Estado Español. Informe**. 1995: 77).

However, in more recent years the emphasis has changed. The central state has acknowledged that immigration is not a short-term phenomenon. Issues of integration have increasingly been included in the legislation.

Naturalisations

As has been highlighted in Chapter One, the nationality laws are a reflection of various historical processes. Although the most recent Spanish law on nationality, passed in 1990[2], was an attempt to simplify the procedure, naturalisation is not an easy process. In the first place, the procedure involves many documents, the acquisition of which is both time consuming and expensive. Likewise the requirement of long periods of continuous residency is a deterrent: ten years for most countries, five years if granted asylum, 2 years if Latin American (or from the other groups on the list of those with 'historic links' (see below), and one year if you are married to a Spaniard or if you are born in Spain. Also, the fact that people have to give up their previous nationality makes less people apply.

The table below shows the naturalisation figures from 1990-1994, by place of origin of the applicants. As can be seen, the number of Central and South Americans acquiring Spanish nationality is significantly higher than those from other countries, thus reflecting the privileges outlined above.

Table 6.1 Naturalisation figures between 1990-1996

Year	Total	Europe	North America	Central & South America	Africa	Asia	Other
1990	7,037	1,086	138	3,173	1,847	744	49
1992	5,280	874	119	2,697	779	780	31
1994	7,801	1,003	138	4,294	1,227	1,086	53
1996	8,435	816	120	5,412	1,471	1,424	29

Source: Figures from *Ministerio de Justicia e Interior* in **Anuario de Migraciones** (1997: 326).

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[2] Ley 18/1990 del 17 de diciembre

158

The Foreigners' Law

The most recent major piece of Spanish legislation to do with immigration is the 1985 *Ley Orgánica 7/1985, de 1 de julio, sobre los derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España* (Law for the rights and liberties of foreigners in Spain)[3]. This law was an attempt to have a single, comprehensive act of legislation that would replace all previous legislation on the subject.

The timing of this law was extremely important to its contents. The early 1980s saw a turning point in terms of the nature and numbers of immigrants arriving in Spain from outside the European Union. At the same time, Spain was under pressure from Europe to control its frontiers. Spain was trying to join Europe and its geographical position as the Southern border of 'Fortress Europe' had to be taken into account. A condition for Spain to enter Europe was that it should have tighter control over its frontiers. Given both these factors, the government's main concern was to curb and control the entrance of non-European immigrants into Spain as well as to 'protect' the Spanish labour market from the arrival of these workers. Through the *Procesos de Regularización* (Processes of Legalisation) that ensued in 1986 and 1991, the Spanish government gave those who were illegally working in Spain a chance to become legal, while effectively shutting the door for those who would arrive later.

The Foreigners' Law covered three main areas. Firstly, it provided a framework for the different ways in which it was possible to enter and remain in the Spanish state, as well as outlining reasons for expulsion from the Spanish state. Secondly, it dealt with work permits, which run simultaneous to residency permits. Finally, there was a section on the rights of immigrants.

In order to enter Spain, people had to have a valid passport, and if this was from outside the European Union, a visa. People would then be granted a visitor's visa for a maximum of 90 days, a short-term temporary residence permit, or a full permit[4]. Rules of entry were mirrored by those of expulsion. Those people who were found to be residing or working without the adequate permit in Spain (and could no longer sustain themselves) would be sent back to their country of origin.

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[3] This is shortened to *Ley de Extranjería* (Foreigners' Law)

[4] Although the wording of the law suggests this is a possibility, the Spanish government no longer gives these, this possibility has effectively disappeared.

Foreigners arrested under these circumstances could be detained for up to forty days while the legal decision came through. Once they had an expulsion order they were required to leave the Spanish territory within the next 72 hours; they were granted the right to appeal in that time, though few actually acted on this[5].

Once in Spain people needed a work-permit if they wanted to work. Permits were extended by the Ministry for Work and Social Affairs, if a work contract or a clear business proposal were presented[6]. Permits could be limited to a certain geographical area or to a particular activity, for example agriculture or the construction industry. If there was a change in the province of work or the type of activity then the Ministry of the Interior had to be informed.

Linked to the granting of work-permits was the issue of protecting the Spanish labour force. The law justified the denial of permits if there were unemployed Spaniards in that geographical area, or area of activity[7]. There was a provision to sanction those who were involved in any illegal activity to do with foreigners; whether giving 'illegals' work or being involved with, and helping to promote, illegal activities of any kind.

Although most of the law was to do with entrance and control of immigrants in Spain, some aspects of political and social rights were covered. Foreigners had no right to vote[8] and could not hold public office. Among the most controversial articles were articles 7 and 8: they prohibited foreigners who were 'illegal' to assemble. Only those who had permits could form an assembly and, even then, only under strict conditions. For example, if they formed associations and had more foreigners than Spaniards as members, they were obliged to inform the Ministry of the Interior.

As far as other political rights are concerned, those who were 'legal' had the same rights as Spanish nationals to strike, join political parties, and trade unions. As an attempt to compensate the lack of representation at a political level (since they have

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[5] The application of these measures is highly problematic. People are meant to be detained in special centres, but this does not happen. Likewise, although people are given an expulsion order, they are not deported but released from detention and expected to return to their countries of origin on their own accord.

[6] Article 17 of the law.

[7] Article 18 of the law.

[8] Only European Union citizens can vote at the municipal and the European elections.

no voting rights) various consultative bodies have been created[9]. Likewise immigrants have organised themselves through various associations in order to appeal for their rights.

Criticisms of the *Ley de Extranjería:* a look at its sociological effects

The *Ley de Extranjería* was immediately criticised at various levels and by various organisations. Criticism came from non-governmental organisations, the Catholic Church, trade unions, political parties and academics (especially from the legal and sociological disciplines). Critics of the law focused on the following aspects: the fact that it did not reflect the real situation of immigration in Spain; the wording of the law (both ambiguity of the terms used and the negative connotations they carry); the complicated and rigid bureaucratic process involved; and the arbitrary preference it gave to some groups and nationalities over others.

The Law has been criticised for not being based on an accurate knowledge of the immigrant population, in terms of numbers, work conditions and other aspects of the immigrants' lives (Colectivo IOE 1987: 326). The law was based on the assumption that it was dealing with temporary labour migration. The issues it deals with reflect this - entrance into the country, and work and residency permits. Clearly immigration in Spain today does not consist of single men in a temporary situation: many have been living in Spain for a number of years and have families too.

Regarding the wording of the law, Colectivo IOE's report (1987) claimed that the law intensified the difference between those classified as 'legal' and 'illegal'. Other aspects of the law itself were also seen as ambiguous in their wording. Posada (in **El Racismo en el Estado Español. Informe.** 1995: 76) went as far as to suggest that the government did not want to provide clear legislative procedures, leaving it up to other governmental bodies (the police, the ministries) to make the final decision.

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[9] Layton Henry looks at similar bodies in North European countries, and sees these as short term and not very effective: 'Consultative procedures are...only likely to be a short term expedient. They do not tend to work well because of problems of unrepresentativeness. They also tend to emphasise the distinction between foreign citizens and the native community' (1990: 191).

The rigid and complicated legal procedure meant that it was extremely hard to obtain and renew a permit. As outlined above, the process took so long that once a permit was obtained it was time to ask for another. To renew the permit the immigrant once again had to secure an employment contract, be up to date with social security payments, etc. In a situation where most were not working regularly or with proper contracts, this was not straightforward.

The law did not give any rights to those immigrants who were not 'legal'. 'Illegal' immigrants would therefore remain marginalised, with little opportunity to integrate into society. Martin Serrano (1993: 38) reached this same conclusion. Under the current legislation immigrants with no papers have no choice but to live on whatever they can and show themselves in public as little as possible to avoid being arrested. Not only do they limit their relationships to their own kind, but in not being able to find steady work they are more likely to become dependent on charities.

Finally, the law gave preference for the acquisition of permits to certain groups and nationalities. It gave preference to those people who had a 'historical link' with Spain. This included Sephardic Jews and people from Central and South America, Portugal, the Philippines, Andorra, Equatorial Guinea, and Gibraltar[10]. Losada criticised this list and said it showed a 'discriminatory practice with racist undertones' (in Colectivo IOE 1987: 325). Losada believed that the fact that people from Portugal, Gibraltar and Andorra were given preference made sense if you saw them as European countries. Those from the Philippines, Central and South America and Equatorial Guinea were also given preference due to the former colonial relationship. Sephardic Jews also had preference, yet this was denied to the Muslims who were likewise expelled from Spain in the fifteenth century. The law omits Morocco, ignoring the fact that Morocco was a former colony and had a 40 year protectorate relationship with Spain (in Colectivo IOE 1987: 325).

Immediate changes made to the law in 1986

When the Foreigners' Law appeared in 1986, it was denounced as unconstitutional by the *Defensor del Pueblo* (ombudsman). In the first instance four of its articles were taken to the *Tribunal Constitucional* (Constitutional High Court). These included

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[10] Although stated clearly in the law, it is not clear whether this preference is respected in the bureaucratic procedure by which permits are given.

articles 7 and 8 which prohibited foreigners without papers from holding meetings or forming associations. Article 26 stated that people without papers could be arrested and kept in custody for up to 40 days - in this case it was not only the law that was criticised but also its application; people were often detained in inappropriate centres[11]. Finally article 34 meant immigrants had no right to appeal any decision taken about them (Colectivo IOE, 1987: 26). It was argued that these articles did not keep to the principles laid out in the Spanish Constitution and also violated basic human rights.

Amendments to these articles were made in July 1987. The section of article 7 which required the immigrant organisation to get authorisation from the government disappeared. The second half disappeared from article 8. This section had given the government the right to suspend associations if they went against 'national interests and security, public order, health or morality or the rights of Spaniards'. And finally in article 34, the denial of the right to appeal was withdrawn. However article 26 (on temporary detention) still stands and remains a widely debated issue.

Processes of legalisation

Following the 1985 Foreigner's Law there have been two main amnesty periods granted for those people working in Spain wanting to 'legalise' their situation.

The first amnesty was from July 1985 to March 1986 for those people who could prove that they had arrived in Spain before the 24 July 1985. In this first amnesty very few people actually tried to legalise their situation. According to official statistics only 45,000 people legalised their situation. This is estimated to be around 12% of the number of immigrants living in Spain (Colectivo IOE 1987: 325). These low figures have been attributed to the fact that the amnesty was hardly advertised and not all immigrants could get the necessary paperwork ready in time.

The second (and more successful) amnesty, known as the *Sal a la luz* ('Come out into the light') process, was granted between June and December 1991. This time people had to prove that they had arrived in Spain prior to 15 May 1991, the day when entrance visas were first required. They also needed written proof of a job for the next six months. The table below shows the results of the process.

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[11] Legally they are meant to be special, purpose-built detention centres but often the infrastructure doesn't exist so they are retained in ordinary prisons.

Table 6.2 General Data on work permits 1991-1992

General Data on process of regularisation	Permits granted	Permits denied	Total
Petitions dealt with	108,321	22,085	130,406
Foreign Workers			
Sex:			
Men	77,117	19,730	96,847
Women	31,204	2,355	33,559
Civil Status:			
Single	70,978	13,333	84,311
Married	35,160	8,624	43,784
Divorced	1,235	78	1,313
Widowed	565	34	599
Separated	383	16	399
Type of permit:			
Contracted	92,209	10,439	102,648
Self -employed	16,112	11,646	27,758
Areas of work:			
Agriculture	18,494	2,373	20,867
Non- agriculture	88,869	19,712	108,581
Industry	8,103	1,070	9,173
Construction	16,548	4,419	20,967
Services	64,218	14,223	78,441
Others	959	---	---

Source: Dirección General de Migraciones (**Anuario de Migraciones** 1995: 246)

NEW DEVELOPMENTS: CHANGES TO THE 1985 LAW AND A MOVE TOWARDS 'INTEGRATION'

Although minor amendments were made to the 1985 Foreigners' Law, discontent with the overall law continued. Many of the changes called for in 1990 are still relevant today. The changes called for were:

- changes in the way visas were given in the countries of origin;
- easing of the 'red tape' to get first, new permits;
- quicker and easier ways of applying for and renewing permits;
- closure of the special detention centres where illegal immigrants could be kept for up to 40 days while a legal decision is taken on them;
- political rights. There were demands for full participation in trade unions including being able to be elected as representatives and also the right to vote at municipal elections (*Hacer* 1990: 11).

In recent years there have been an increasing number of policies and bodies created to move towards making these changes. Although these new developments have been considered to be steps in the right direction, Pajares (voicing the view held by many) stated that 'they will be unlikely to lead to any real integration while the present foreigner's law is not changed radically' (**El Racismo en el Estado Español. Informe** 1995: 74).

In 1991 a report on the situation of foreigners was presented to the Spanish Parliament[12]. It was decided that various changes would be made to governmental policies in order to 'develop an active immigration policy that channels the rate of legal immigration according to the needs of the labour force and society's ability for integration' (in Ochoa de Michelena 1993: 106).

Changes followed: the two separate permits (work and residency) were joined into one. Later in that year the old *Instituto Español de Emigración* (Spanish Institute for Emigration) was substituted by the *Dirección General de Migraciones*. The function of the new body was to control the flow of immigrants as well as determining the future need for immigrant workers. At the same time changes were introduced to make the administrative process faster and simpler. Two bodies were created; the *Oficina Unica de Extranjeros* (Single office for Foreigners) - all bureaucratic procedures are dealt with by this one office. The second body was the *Comisión Interminsterial de Extranjería* (Interministerial Commission for Foreigners) which was to co-ordinate the different departments involved with immigration.

As far as work and residency permits were concerned, after the 1991-92 amnesty ended, the only way to enter and work in Spain legally has been through the yearly governmental *cupos*. This quota system was first set up in 1993. After consultation with NGOs and trade unions the quota was set at 20,600 permits, the areas of work being the following:

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12 *La situación de los Extranjeros en España, Proposición no de Ley del Pleno del Congreso de los Diputados sobre la situación del las extranjeros en España,* **Boletin de las Cortes Generales** , *Serie D, de 22.3.91*

Table 6.3 *Cupos* granted in 1993

Agriculture	
Seasonal	7,000
Permanent	3,000
Construction	1,100
Services	
Seasonal	3,500
Permanent	6,000
Total	20,600

Source: (Arresté in Borras and et al. 1995 : 93)

The following year in 1994, the overall number of '*cupos*' stayed at 20,600 but the distribution through sectors was different due to the changed needs of the economy. More permits went to those working in the service sector (especially domestic staff) and seasonal permits were abolished. Although the administration has admitted that the '*cupos*' system is a 'patchwork policy', it has continued to exist. In 1998 the quota was set at 28,000 workers, a figure much lower than the 60,000 people who applied for legalisation. In 1999 the number went up to 30,000[13].

Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants

In 1994, the Ministry of Social Affairs created the Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants. The Plan had three main aims which had been neglected in the previous legislation: to give money for overseas development; to gain clearer knowledge about the characteristics and number of people who enter Spain and finally to ensure social integration of immigrants once in Spain. Although the immigrants it had in mind were mostly single, male and on the whole uneducated[14], it also acknowledged the fact that these immigrants were 'at the stage of settling down' and so needed a certain amount of judicial stability in order to 'integrate'[15].

'Integration' was defined as a dynamic process, which needed to be based on an accurate knowledge of reality and involve all areas of society. 'Integration' was not seen as something which could be achieved immediately but was a long-term goal, that would happen slowly as immigrants became more and more involved in the

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[13] See Chapter Five.

[14] 'foreign workers often have a not very high level of qualification and training' (Dirección General de Migraciones, 1994: 49).

[15] This aspect is vital for employment stability, which the Plan sees as one of the main ways to avoid social exclusion.

social and economic life of the country. Although the first step in this process was judicial stability, full integration would entail 'considering the immigrants in all aspects, not only as a worker but as a citizen, with needs in the areas of education, culture, health and social participation' (Dirección General de Migraciones 1994: 36).

In order to help with this integration the Plan created two bodies: the *Observatorio Permanente de la Inmigración* (Permanent Observatory for Immigration) and the *Foro para la Integración de los inmigrantes* (Forum for the Integration of Immigrants). The former was to report on the 'real situation of immigration', to provide predictions, (both in terms of numbers and effect immigration may have on society), and finally to provide the media with information on its findings. The *Foro de la Integración* was a consultative body formed by various associations whose aims were to provide a means of dialogue and to channel demands and suggestions made by immigrants, especially with reference to ideas on how to improve *convivencia* (Dirección General de Migraciones 1994: 53).

In February 1996, and after negotiations between various NGOs, political parties and trade unions, changes were implemented to the *Ley de Extranjería*[16]. The changes included the possibility of acquiring a permanent residence permit after six yearly ones, whatever your nationality. Another amnesty was created specifically for those who had had a work and residency permit in the past, but had subsequently not been able to renew it. The amnesty period ran from April to August 1996, allowing another 50,000 immigrants to make their situation legal (**El País,** 23.4.96).

Recent events, especially the 'human traffic' between the north of Morocco and Spain, increased the calls for changes in the 1985 law.

The enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla have been at the fore of many of the recent controversies to do with immigration. Formerly cities with frontier check-points across which Moroccans would travel to work daily, Ceuta and Melilla have increasingly become fortresses. Access into these Spanish territories means being a step nearer to Europe. In both places there are immigration camps for those who, because of an administrative loophole, can neither be deported back into Moroccan

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[16] *El Nuevo Reglamento de Extranjería de 2 de febrero de 1996*

territory nor move on to the Spanish mainland. Melilla has built a double steel fence along its six kilometre frontier, which includes outlook turrets, sensors and cameras.

People in both cities are also believed to be involved in the 'trafficking of people' across the Strait of Gibraltar. The movement of people on *pateras*[17], fragile fishing boats, across the Mediterranean increases during the summer months when the weather is better. Over 1000 people are believed to have drowned, in 1998, when attempting to make this crossing. It is known that *pateras* are built in Ceuta and Melilla. In 1997, 60 legal proceedings were opened against the owners of such small boats with no licence or number plate (**El País,** 12.8.98). The suspicion was that they were waiting to transport people across the Mediterranean.

This traffic of people across the Strait has been a lucrative business for some. A survivor of a crossing (who had been arrested when he reached Spain) said he paid over 1000 pounds sterling to be taken from Northern Morocco to Spain. Given that one *patera* is filled with between 30 and 40 people, a single journey means over 30,000 pounds for the 'mafias' that run them. Between 1997 and 1998, over one hundred networks for the illegal trafficking of people were disbanded and over 500 people arrested as a result (**El País,** 9.8.98).

Proposal for a new law

In the last months of 1997, the government announced that it intended to change the existing law for a new law with a higher emphasis on issues of 'integration'[18]. The changes required were based on the above criticisms; most of these were to do with the need to acknowledge immigration as a 'permanent social reality'. Both the Civil Guards and the Police had made statements about the need for a new law to include harsher punishments for those involved in the 'traffic of humans' across the Strait of Gibraltar - at present these 'mafias' can only be accused of violating the 'freedom of workers', with a maximum sentence of three years. The police demanded harsher measures to stop the traffic of people and saw it as a first step towards avoiding the subsequent exploitation that immigrants suffer in the hidden labour market. While some (ATIME - Association of Moroccan Immigrant Workers in Spain) argued that a new law will not stop the arrival of people since this is a

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[17] Droukas (1998) writing about the Greek case calls these 'bullboats'.

[18] This initiative came from the CiU group in the *Parlament de Catalunya*.

symptom of the political situation elsewhere, others (including *SOS Racisme*) felt the aim of the law should be to equalise the rights of foreigners to those of Spaniards.

The title of the proposed law was: *Proposición de Ley (Orgánica) de medidas para favorecer una mayor protección e integración de los inmigrantes* (Proposed Law on measures to favour greater protection for, and the integration of, immigrants). The need for a new law was justified in the preamble due to the change in the reality of immigration. This new law aimed to reduce the number of 'irregulars' (notice that they are no longer called 'illegals') and, at the same time, increase the rights of those resident in Spain (especially in areas of health, education, employment and legal aspects to do with representation, to name a few).

A second criticism of the previous legislation was the complicated bureaucratic process so this new law sought to make these more flexible. One of the main areas in which administrative flexibility became most important was regarding family re-unification. Family re-unification was seen as the cornerstone for 'social integration'. At the same time there was to be an increased co-ordination between the administration and the different levels of government. To this effect, a proposal for the creation of a *Consejo Superior de Política de Inmigración* (High Council of Immigration Politics) was made. Apart from co-ordination between bodies of government, the *Consejo* was also to consult a range of people involved with immigration.

Solutions to potential conflicts over cultural differences were also laid out. The law states that if there was a conflict, then the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other universal treaties that Spain has ratified will take priority (*Capítulo III*).

At the time of writing, the law is still under discussion. It will be interesting to see how many of these proposals make it into the final legislation.

THE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITY

As outlined above, Spain's legislative framework allows autonomous communities to make some decisions over issues of immigration. In 1993 the *Generalitat de Catalunya* decided (or was pressurised into deciding) it was time to take responsibility over some aspects of immigration. The result of this decision was the

Pla Interdepartamental d'immigració (Interdepartamental Plan for Immigration) a programme stating the areas (and ways) in which the Catalan Autonomous Government was to create and carry out policies to do with immigration. The decision to create the *Pla* had been an outcome of the influential Girona Report which had been published a year before.

Informe de Girona

El Informe de Girona: cinquanta propostes per la immigració (The Girona Report: fifty proposals for Immigration) was the final document drawn up in 1992 by the *Comissió d'associaciones i organitzacions no governamentals de Girona* (Commission of associations and non-governmental organisations of Girona). The body was created after the legalisation process of 1991 as a response to the widely-made criticisms that the *Ley de Extranjería* was not based on 'reality'. The *Comissió* therefore set out to study this 'reality' in Girona[19]. A wide range of people were involved in the study, including associations, representatives from town halls and trade unions and other social actors already working with immigration (Cassey 1995).

The final report was divided into three main sections. The first dealt with legal issues; the second dealt with more social aspects such as housing, employment etc. The third section drew up fifty recommendations, addressed to the central government, the *Generalitat*, town halls, and to the 'social agents' (lawyers, associations and political parties) involved in immigration.

The *Informe de Girona* made the following suggestions at the level of the *Generalitat*. Its main recommendation was for the *Generalitat* to create and implement a global immigration policy to co-ordinate actions in the areas in which it had jurisdiction: education, health, housing, social services, literacy and vocational training, amongst others. Other proposals included issues to do with educational campaigns (at all levels) and to encourage solidarity and discourage ethnocentric attitudes, as well as providing constant training to people involved with immigration. In the area of health, it urged the *Generalitat* to provide emergency treatment to immigrants, even if it was not able to provide preventive health care. In order to avoid immigrant ghettos, it also encouraged the *Generalitat* to create a good housing policy. In the area of employment the *Generalitat* was to provide immigrants with free access to further training thus making their entrance into the labour market

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[19] Girona is a province of Catalunya.

170

easier. Finally, it was to encourage immigrants themselves to become agents for cultural development.

Although the Girona Report was based in Catalunya, it had an impact across the Spanish state. This impact was more to do with the novelty than with the changes it demanded. The report asked for flexibility within the existing framework. It did not ask for any radical changes to the law. For example, in the section to do with the Foreigners' Law, it asked for the bureaucratic process to be reduced. However other immigration experts have argued that this is its very strength; that is, the fact that the changes it suggested were realistic, could be carried out easily and could then lead to further changes. In any case, it was extremely influential, especially as it acted as a catalyst to the *Pla Interdepartamental* which is of great importance in Catalunya.

Pla Interdepartamental D'Immigració

Following the publication of the *Informe de Girona*, the *Generalitat* set up the *Comissió Interdepartamental per al seguiment i la coordinació de les actuacions en materia d'immigració* (Interdepartmental Commission for the monitoring and the co-ordination of the policies in the area of immigration) in November 1992. The *Comissió* consisted of representatives from eleven departments: the presidency, interior, education, culture, health and social security, public works and territorial politics, employment, agriculture, farming and fishing, and welfare.

The Commission's final report was the *Pla Interdepartamental d'immigració*, (Generalitat de Catalunya 1993). This was approved by the Catalan government on the 29 September 1993. The Pla has various objectives:

- to promote a global policy for the integration of foreign immigrants in Catalunya;
- to set up and develop a coherent and co-ordinated programme of resources and services to allow the full personal and social development of foreign immigrants;
- to increase the participation of foreign immigrants in the national construction of Catalunya, taking into account their contribution to collective identity and heritage;

- to promote information and general awareness regarding the reality of foreign immigration in Catalunya to the population in general and to the professionals who deal with this population.

At the same time the *Pla* created an institutional structure which would enable the above recommendations to be put into practice. The Interdepartamental Commission was to continue working: its functions included directing, co-ordinating and implementing the *Pla*. The Commission was also to continue gathering information on the situation of immigrants in Catalunya. A second consultative body was created, the *Consell assessor d'immigració*. This consisted of representatives from the *Generalitat* as well as from local government, non-governmental organisations working with immigrants, various immigrant associations, representatives from the two main trade unions (*Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) and Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT)*), from the neighbourhood associations, agricultural organisations, business associations, teacher-parent associations and experts on the subject. The *Consell*, which consisted of a total of 34 people, has met 16 times since it was formed in December 1994. The discussions have included issues to do with medical assistance of immigrants, the access of immigrant children to schools, the access of immigrants to learn the Catalan language, the situation of immigrants in prisons as well as the media's treatment of immigration issues. Most of the issues discussed were aimed at the level of the *Generalitat*, however central state legislation has been discussed throughout and especially recently over the discussions of the new immigration law. In the meeting held in February 1998, five working groups were formed - education, prisons, language 'normalisation' (i.e. access of immigrants to Catalan lessons), legislation and housing - thus reflecting the main areas where action is needed at present[20].

Principles on which the Pla is based: towards 'integration'

The main aim of the *Pla* was to:

> achieve the full integration of immigrant people into our country [Catalunya], and achieve the conditions that will lead to their personal and social development with full rights and duties (1993: 9).

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[20] These groups will still form part of the *Consell* but will meet for more specific purposes too.

172

In the section below I highlight the use of key ideas and concepts around the issue of immigration, then move on to look at the ways these are put into practice in the *Pla*'s actual policies. It is interesting to see that this 'new immigration' was framed by the terms of reference that were previously used for immigrants from other areas of Spain[21].

The 'primordial' idea that Catalunya has always been a land of immigration is once again referred to. Its tradition of receiving and welcoming immigrants is called upon to give a 'good welcome' to the 'new' immigration of the eighties and nineties. Although the *Pla* admitted that the immigration of the eighties and nineties was a new phenomenon, both in terms of the different cultural values it brought with it, as well as the legislative framework around it, it stated that Catalunya was more prepared to deal with immigrants than other places.

A lot of attention was paid to the heterogeneous nature of immigration arriving into Catalunya, since it was vital to understand this heterogeneity in order to provide adequate measures of integration. Immigrants were divided into those from the 'developed countries' and those from the 'non-developed countries'. Although the *Pla* stated that its aims had to be sensitive to both types of immigration, and their different integration needs, it was quite clear that the emphasis of the *Pla* was on those immigrants from non-developed countries. General characteristics attributed to the former include the fact that they came over with their families, settled in the rich areas of town, had well paid, stable jobs and were able to look after their basic needs (such as health and education). In contrast, those immigrants from the 'non-developed countries', normally arrived alone, were in less stable, less well-paid employment, found housing in the more run-down areas of town, had a precarious judicial status, and due to all the above, needed to be provided with more welfare help. An important distinction was also made between those immigrants who were in Catalunya because of economic circumstances, to make money and leave, and those who wanted to settle there, since their needs and desires were very different[22].

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[21] See Chapter Four.

[22] Most of the legislation on immigration in Spain so far has assumed that immigration was temporary. But as time has gone by this has clearly changed and hopefully the new law being drawn up will reflect this. The appearance of this legislation at this stage (1993) is important.

The heterogeneous and dynamic nature of immigration meant that the policies towards integration had to be equally flexible and dynamic. Although the differences in terms of language, culture, religion, and ethnicity were acknowledged, the emphasis was on seeing these differences as a positive attribute, rather than a drawback. The *Pla* rejected notions of 'assimilation' and 'multiculturalism' as too static (1993: 43) and favoured the term *interculturalitat* as an active, 'dynamic process that depends on the process of interaction and interconnection of all members of society'[23]. The *Pla* highlighted two things as important. The first was the need to be able to base this interaction on knowledge of 'the other' and on having the opportunity to meet and interact at different levels of social life. At the same time it was important for both groups to reach a middle-ground to avoid extreme positions, to 'preserve and strengthen [one's] own identity, while accepting interactions with other cultural expressions and therefore respecting the socio-cultural traits of immigrants' (1993: 43)[24].

The Catalan language, the core symbol of Catalan identity, was seen as a locus of the 'meeting of cultures' as it favoured communication and social ties. By learning Catalan the immigrants contributed to strengthening the national community in a way which showed tolerance towards its values. The civic aspects of Catalan nationalism were called upon; the belief that the cohesion of the country depended on the ability to create a sense of solidarity and protect individual rights in order to have a collective future. This was reflected in the number of activities carried out, and also in the active encouragement given to immigrants to join and form associations.

There were three more concepts which referred to the way in which immigrants were involved, and played an active part, in Catalunya. The first was the idea of *access normalitzat* (normal access). Immigrants were encouraged to participate in society at every level and in a form that may not be specific to their status as immigrants. For example they were encouraged to participate in neighbourhood associations and local sports teams. In a more institutional setting, such as health and education, the aim was to allow immigrants the same access as any other Catalan. The second idea was related to 'social progress': immigration had to be

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[23]This refers to the different groups of immigrants as well as to the autochthonous population.

[24]The example given are the strong family ties which many immigrants have and how these can strengthen relationships within society.

seen in this positive context, as contributing directly to this dynamic change, both economically and culturally. The final idea was that of *convivencia*, which means living alongside (together) but also includes notions of a harmonious relationship and exchange of information about each other's culture.

Some policy case-studies

I now want to look at how the principles on which the *Pla* is based have been turned into concrete policies. The principles cover many areas of policy but I concentrate on three areas: firstly, those areas which were mentioned by the immigrants I interviewed in Barcelona. Secondly, the general awareness campaign run by the *Generalitat* around the European Year Against Racism. Finally, I look at health and education which are areas where the *Generalitat* has an important level of jurisdiction.

The immigrants I talked to mentioned the *Generalitat* in various contexts. If they belonged to associations they talked about the funding they received from the *Generalitat*. These subsidies were given for the running of the association or for specific activities such as courses (for example, courses on Catalan language and more vocational courses to become electricians or kitchen assistants[25]), seminars, or other activities such as '*Els immigrants coneixem Catalunya*' (Immigrants get to know Catalunya); a series of subsidised day trips (Generalitat de Catalunya 1997).

The second area where the *Generalitat* placed a lot of emphasis was on awareness-raising of the general public[26]. The year I spent in Barcelona (1997) coincided with the European Year against Racism. The *Generalitat* created a committee (based at the *Departament de Benestar Social*), which organised various campaigns and activities to raise public awareness[27].

The *Comite Català de l'any Europeu contra el racisme* (Catalan Committee for the European year against racism) was formed in February 1997. Its members included

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[25] These are a couple of examples taken from the courses run by CCOO trade union in 1997. They lasted about three or four months and only those with a work and residence permit could attend them.

[26] I will concentrate on only one of the many campaigns carried out.

[27] A similar committee was set up at the state level, which was independent from the Catalan committee. When I interviewed the man responsible for the campaign in Catalunya, he proudly informed me that Catalunya had been the only Autonomy to set up an independent campaign.

various institutions: non-governmental organisations, immigrant associations, representatives from town halls, trade unions, lawyers, social workers and universities. It also included *Unió Romani*, an organisation representing gypsies' interests, who, although not foreigners, suffer racial discrimination in Spain[28].

The *Comite* signed a European-wide declaration drawn up in The Hague in January 1997. Its objectives were to increase awareness of the dangers of racism in society, as well as providing more information, especially through exchange of ideas and personal experiences, on how to fight it.

At the beginning of the year, the *Comite* did not have a fixed plan of activities for the year. It had a budget, and as ideas were put forward to it by the different associations involved, the money would be distributed and the activities held. Activities included the showing of a series of films against racism, a concert with foreign musicians living in Catalunya, and subsidising the *Festa de la Diversitat*. The aim of the *Festa* was to bring knowledge of 'the other' nearer in the hope of fighting racism.

Finally, I turn to the areas of health and education. Prior to the *Pla*, health and education were controlled by the central government, but since 1993, the *Generalitat* has been responsible for them.

In the area of health, immigrants who were in a 'legal' position and had been paying their social security had the same access to the public health services as Catalans. The 1993 *Pla* laid out special areas that the Catalan health Service had to deal with, such as special training in tropical medicine, prevention of specific illnesses and adjustment of treatments to suit immigrants' needs. Children were guaranteed full health care, irrespective of their legal status. The total budget spent specifically on immigrants' health between 1993-96 was 73 million pesetas (about 290,000 pounds)[29].

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[28]Although the *Comite* was only formed to last for the year, the people involved in it hoped its work would continue into 1998, given that it was the fiftieth anniversary of the declaration of Human Rights.

[29] The 1997 budget for health and social security was 582,668 million pesetas (2,330,672,000 pounds) (Anuari Estadístic de Catalunya, 1997: 455)

The 'problem' arose with the immigrants who did not have documents. The *Pla* set out that public health centres had to provide emergency treatment to everybody. Preventive medicine, or any illnesses that were not urgent, were not included. Prior to 1990, there was a *Cartilla Municipal de Beneficiencia* (Municipal Charity Card) which was handed out by the town halls and covered initial and follow-up treatment, as well as pharmaceutical costs. Since its withdrawal, however, immigrants with no papers had to depend on individual agreements between town halls and health services to get treatment (Comissió Mixta ACM-FMC 1995: 23). Recognising this situation, in 1997, the *Generalitat* provided 102 individual health cards which allowed people full access to the health service. And, in the same year it attended to 898 people who had no papers (Generalitat de Catalunya 1997: 30). In spite of these policies, immigrants' health is still discussed since their access to the health service is not straightforward, and often relies on individual agreements or charities. In 1994, a motion was presented in the Catalan parliament and the point referring to health was approved. This called for an improvement in the flow of information regarding health. It targeted both the immigrants (through associations) and the people working in the health sector to ensure that everyone understood the rights and services available to immigrants (**Diari de Sessions de la Generalitat de Catalunya,** C-Num 219, 9 de noviembre 1994: 5273).

The presence of immigrant families has been increasing in Catalunya and this means provisions have to be made for the education of children. The *Generalitat's* Education Department has full competencies in this area. In the 1993 *Pla*, the *Generalitat* had set out the following objectives: to educate immigrant children; to teach the Catalan language to the children of immigrants resident in Catalunya; to train the teachers and other professionals in 'intercultural issues'; to encourage the learning of non-European languages, and finally to provide guidelines for authors who write text books[30].

The most important aspect was to ensure that the children of immigrants have access to schools in the first place[31]. Everything else followed from this main objective. To this effect the *Generalitat* extended its free education to all children, irrespective of their legal status. The problem then became one of getting the children registered in schools, since often parents were not aware of the

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[30] The budget for the years 1994-1996 was over 1,110,000 pesetas (4,440 pounds).

[31] In 1997, the number of immigrant children was 16,971, 1.5% of the total school population.

procedures; they may have arrived recently and many did not speak the language. To mitigate this, the Department of Education published information on enrolment in Catalan, Castilian, Arab, French and English and distributed it in places (like associations) where immigrants would come across it. Once registered in schools the children were automatically eligible for all other financial aid, including free school lunches and help with the purchase of textbooks.

Borras and González Beilfuss (1994) point to two possible sources of tension in the future: firstly the concentration of immigrants in some neighbourhoods has meant that some schools have a higher number of immigrant children enrolled and this has caused some concern. The 1997 *Pla* offered two solutions to this: there was the *Programa de Educació compensatoria*, which provides extra lessons to children so that they can 'catch up' - these were mostly taken up regarding language. The second solution is to try to distribute children out to different schools. The later is presently being implemented and it is therefore unclear how it will work.

The second point of conflict was between the Central State and the *Generalitat*. Although the *Generalitat* had jurisdiction over education, it was the central state which deals with the final exams and certificates. This meant that although the *Generalitat* was able and willing to educate children in an 'illegal' position, they might not be given their final certificate before leaving school.

As can be concluded from the above discussion, the Interdepartmental Plan has been extremely influential in Catalunya. Drawn up in 1993, as a response to criticisms of 'inactivity', the *Generalitat* has taken up its competencies and developed policies and measures in numerous areas. An important element of this *Pla* focuses on the increasing the co-ordination and harmonisation of policies, not only between its different departments but also with the central government and with the *Diputació* and town halls.

THE DIPUTACIO

The *Diputació* is the level of government between the town halls and the *Generalitat*. The function of the *Diputació* is to co-ordinate the activities of the town halls of the province, as well as their relationship with the *Generalitat* and the central state.

The *Programa d'immigració* (Immigration Programme) of the *Diputació* was set up in 1995. Since 1995 there has been an increase in the co-ordination of activities at a

municipal level. In 1996, the *Diputació* produced various documents to do with the aims, objectives and measures that it would carry out. The *Diputació* aimed to provide a global solution to the 'challenge of immigration' by encouraging the participation of both the immigrant and the native populations. Once again, the dynamic nature of social integration and *interculturalitat* were emphasised as prime objectives.

The *Diputació*'s definition of immigrants is interesting:

> all those people who, coming from extra communitarian countries, have come to our country to work and improve their quality of life as well as that of their families (1996: 4).

and then goes onto highlight issues of 'difference':

> given the variety of differences in the countries of origin: due to ethnicity, culture, religion, etc., they are very different among themselves and also with relation to our cultures[32] (1996: 4).

Unlike the *Generalitat*'s *Pla*, it did not mention immigrants from 'developed' countries at all. It also pointed to the existence of many immigrants without papers, but did not directly specify whether or not they were to be included in the measures that the *Diputació* carried out.

The three main aims of the programme were to increase co-operation between town halls and other administrations; to give support to immigrant associations; and in general to work 'for a new social structure and the full participation of the newly arrived in all aspects of social life'. The programme aimed to carry out special measures directed specifically at immigrants, expand their access to the existing social services, and increase solidarity and understanding between the immigrant and autochthonous populations. It was also made clear that given the diverse nature of immigration, the programme must be sensitive to, and able to incorporate, social demands made by people.

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[32] Notice cultures, in the plural!

AJUNTAMENT DE BARCELONA

The final tier of government is the town hall of Barcelona. As outlined in previous chapters Barcelona has a tradition of immigration and this is called upon when implementing policies to do with foreign immigrants.

The Ajuntament's definition of 'immigrant' was similar to the *Diputació's*, that is, workers who have come from less developed countries (or, to use their term 'countries of the south') and who are in a precarious situation both economically, socially, and legally. Policies were therefore directed specifically at this group of people. The legal-illegal dichotomy was ignored: the Ajuntament provided services to everyone who was included in the Barcelona census[33]. As from 1996, all foreigners resident in Barcelona, irrespective of legal status, were encouraged to add their name to the town's census. The present-day figure of foreigners in the census is 29,354 people (2% of the total population according to census), of which 11,113 are from the 'countries of the south' while 18,241 are from 'countries of the north' (Ajuntament de Barcelona 1998: 134).

Within the Ajuntament I came across a number of bodies which were involved in issues of immigration. These were:

- the *Grup de refugiats i estrangers* (Group of Refugees and Foreigners);
- the *Comisionat de L'Alcaldia pel drets civils* (Town Hall Commission on Civil Rights - which includes the *Observatori Permanent de la Immigració en Barcelona-OPIB* (Permanent Observatory for Immigration in Barcelona));
- a section to do with the *Promoción de inmigrantes y minorias etnicas* (Promotion of immigrants and ethnic minorities);
- and finally a series of bodies linked around the newly formed *Pla Municipal de la Interculturalitat* (Municipal Plan for Interculturality).

These bodies have played a key role in researching the 'reality of immigration' in Barcelona.

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[33] There is a clause stating that if this is not met, then other proof of residence is sufficient for access to public services.

Policies and measures taken

I want to examine two instances of town hall policies that immigrants themselves mentioned when I interviewed them. The first aspect was to do with the subsidies associations received from the town hall. Secondly, a number of immigrants mentioned their participation in the Municipal Council for Integration, one of the consultative bodies of the recently created *Pla Municipal*.

A number of associations I spoke to received subsidies from the Town Hall. Subsidies were granted for a number of activities, including payment of rent for the association's office or language lessons, depending on the project presented and whether they fitted the broad criteria laid out in the *Pla Municipal*. There was a clear interest in increasing and supporting new projects and associations so the allocation of subsidies could vary greatly from one year to another. The creation of a *Commssió d'immigració* (Immigration Commission) meant that subsidies would be more co-ordinated in the future. On the other hand there are a series of longer-running *Convenios* which had long term funding and objectives.

Consell d'immigració

The Immigration Council was formed in 1997. It was founded as a consultative body (meeting twice a year unless more meetings were specifically called for) which encouraged social participation of immigrants in society by promoting their full citizenship. It also promoted actions to avoid racism (both social and institutional), and recognised and supported the different cultures present in Barcelona. It aimed to represent all immigrant groups. However, this was not an easy matter since old disputes and struggles meant that some members refused to participate if others were involved[34]. This was especially the case for trade unions, with whom some associations have a love-hate relationship. Likewise, a couple of groups hesitated to join because of fear of reprisals from the consulate of their country of origin: they feared that they would be targeted as doing something too political for the consulate's liking. The final draft of the document was approved on 24 October 1997, with 16 founding associations.

Discussions over the *Consell's* aims required some clear explanation of the powers the Ajuntament actually had. For example, immigrants kept talking about *'los*

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[34] I would like to thank Lydia Graells at the Ajuntament de Barcelona and Sebastia Serasa at the Universidad Pompeu Fabra for this information.

papeles' (work and residency permits) and the Foreigners' Law as important aspects which required change. However this was not within the *Ajuntament's* competencies; the *Ajuntament* could exert pressure on the central government but it could not directly change the Law. The *Consell* aimed to focus on more local issues. For example, the *Guardia Urbana* (Municipal Police Force) had been stopping people in the streets because of the colour of their skin. In this case, the *Ajuntament* did have competencies to file a complaint and demand an explanation and change of attitude.

Finally six functions were given to the *Consell*:

- encourage the formation of associations;
- encourage participation of all groups of immigrants in this body;
- actively cooperate with the town halls to develop, monitor and evaluate actions carried out regarding this sector of the population;
- obtain information which is debated in other areas of the municipal bodies that may be of interest to this section;
- study and evaluate reports on subjects that are of interest to immigrants.

'Contra el racisme: cultura'

Finally, I want to focus on one particular event, organised by the Barcelona town hall over the *Festas de la Mercé* in 1997[35].

In 1996 there had been a *Mostra d'associacions de voluntariat de Barcelona*, a series of information stalls run by different voluntary associations. In 1997 and coinciding with the European Year Against Racism, the slogan was *'Contra el Racisme: cultura'* (Against racism: culture). Pasquall Maragall (who was to retire as mayor of Barcelona shortly after) saw the *Mostra* as yet another sign of Barcelona's openness and invited everyone to participate.

The event took place in the *Plaça de Catalunya*, in the centre of Barcelona, and lasted for four days. During this time there were over 125 stands with associations and two stages with shows. The associations present were mostly linked, in one way or another, to fighting racism. They included immigrant associations and

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[35]These are the fiestas of the city of Barcelona, and include a week long programme of music, dancing and fireworks.

organisations, those advocating human rights (like Amnesty International), as well as those representing ethnic minorities and different neighbourhood associations from the different districts, including many Catalan associations.

Some of the stalls simply provided information on the activities they carried out throughout the year, while others sold products from the country they were representing, made henna tattoos, or wrote your name in Arab script. Meanwhile on the two nearby stages, different shows were taking place as large crowds gathered around them. The shows included dancing and singing from places as far as Bolivia and Africa, passing through different regions of Spain (Andalucian dances, Aragonese jigs etc.), to Catalan folklore. The closing act consisted of a human mosaic, 13,000 people wearing red noses in the centre of the square while a small plane overhead took a picture and called it 'the big smile against racism' (**El País,** 25.9.97).

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has discussed the legislation, policies and measures taken by the different layers of government in Spain regarding immigration. The multiple layers of government have increasingly co-ordinated their policies, and the criteria on which these measures are based are very similar. The chapter has aimed to explore the following questions: What are the main trends of the legislation? Who are the policies directed at? How do the policies define social integration? Finally, what do these policies tell us about the Spanish model of citizenship?

The legislation on immigration in Spain has been piecemeal and fulfilling short-term needs rather than long-term goals. The 1985 Foreigner's Law was a product of its time. It was the first law on immigration and aimed to solve and control some of the perceived 'problems of illegal immigration'. At the same time, Spain was trying to join the European Union and was under pressure to control its frontiers. Although changes have been made to the 1985 Law to increase the rights of immigrants, the basic law remains the same. However, the proposed new law, presently under discussion, focuses more on issues of integration.

The division of the competencies of the different levels of government shows how the central government has been more concerned with the control of immigration while the *Generalitat* has focused more on issues of integration. Following the influential Girona Report in 1991, the *Generalitat* has concentrated its efforts on the

integration of immigrants into Catalunya. The *Pla* has directly created policies in the areas of health, education and housing. It has also encouraged immigrants to participate in other areas of life in Catalunya.

Who are the policies directed at? In essence, the different layers of government direct their policies at the extra-communitarian immigrants who arrive in Spain in search of work. The central state focuses its efforts on the economic immigrants, although recently there has been an increased concern with the high number of 'illegal' immigrants. Both the *Generalitat* and the *Diputació* make a clear distinction between immigrants from developed, and from non-developed countries. The *Diputació* points to the ethnic, cultural and religious differences between immigrants and the native population of Catalunya. At the level of the town hall, the legal status of immigrants is ignored: policies are directed at anyone who lives in Barcelona.

How do policies define social integration? The main definition of integration is found in the *Pla Interdepartamental d'immigració* of the *Generalitat*. This has influenced the policies of the *Diputació* and the town hall. The *Pla* appeals to Catalunya's primordial ability to integrate people and draws on the main facets of Catalan nationalism. History, the Catalan language and the dynamic nature of Catalunya are mobilised as key features to achieve integration. The policies of the *Generalitat* and the Diputació define integration as a two-way process of exchange between the immigrants and the Catalans - this is referred to as '*interculturalitat*'.

The analysis of the different policies has shown that there has been an increasing involvement of social forces in the drawing up of laws and policies. There has been an active involvement of political parties, trade unions, the Church and immigrant associations themselves. Although the immigration legislation does not grant direct political rights to immigrants, the creation of consultative bodies is a way for immigrants to voice their concerns.

Finally, what do these policies tell us about the Spanish model of citizenship? Chapter One discussed two different, and opposed, models of citizenship: Brubaker's 'citizenship traditionalism' (1992) and Soysal's 'postnational citizenship' (1994). To summarise the main difference, Brubaker's model states that the 'nation-state' continues to be central in the definition of citizenship. In contrast, Soysal

argues that, in the area of citizenship, the role of the 'nation-state' is diminishing, as more universal forms of citizenship come to the fore.

As has been discussed above, the Spanish central state continues to be the key player in deciding the citizenship rights of immigrants. In this sense, the Spanish case fits Brubaker's notion of 'citizenship traditionalism'. The central state controls formal and legal aspects of citizenship rights - it controls issues of nationality, entrance into Spain, work and residence permits. The central state also controls the most important aspect of political citizenship - voting rights.

Has the Spanish state's sovereignty (in areas of immigration) changed in recent times? Is there any indication of Soysal's 'postnational citizenship'? Two changes might lead to the conclusion that 'postnational citizenship' is at work. On the one hand, there has been an increase in European (EU) influence on Spanish legislation. The 1985 Foreigners' Law was passed in 1985 - this was largely a response to the demand of the European Union. Spain would have to control its borders if it wanted to join the European Union. On the other hand, many legislative powers have been handed over to the Autonomous Community. In the Catalan case, the Generalitat has powers over education, health, housing, social services and training.

In spite of these demands, many fundamental notions of the Spanish state remained. In the dimension of the European Union, these fundamental notions were maintained by the fact that Spain was allowed to maintain many of the historical privileges it granted nationals of Latin American countries. Latin Americans would continue to have privileges when entering the country[36], when seeking work and residence permits and in terms of acquiring Spanish nationality. Within the frontiers of the Spanish state, there are two ways in which the central state remains the key player. Firstly, the legislative powers of the Autonomous Community are ultimately decided by the central state. Secondly, access to citizenship rights is limited to those who have work and residence permits. And it is the central state who controls these.

In the following chapters I present data from the in-depth interviews I carried out with immigrants in Barcelona. The issues discussed include the effect that the

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[36] They did not, at least at this stage, require entry visas to Spain.

185

legislation and policies have on the everyday lives of immigrants as well as the immigrants' opinion about them.

CHAPTER SEVEN

BELONGING IN CATALUNYA: IMMIGRANTS AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS IN CATALUNYA

INTRODUCTION

The following two chapters present the data from the in-depth interviews with immigrants. In the previous chapters I focused on the history of immigration in Catalunya and Spain and the main aspects of legislation on immigration. In the following chapters I want to turn to the immigrants. Immigrants are not passive subjects of legislation, but are actively engaged with it on various levels. I was interested in investigating how immigrants viewed their own position in Catalan society, and how they responded to legislation and policies regarding them. I was also interested in their views on key aspects of Catalan nationalism. This first chapter looks at immigrants' views about their citizenship rights and issues of integration.

In the first instance the chapter looks at political aspects of citizenship. At present immigrants have no voting rights in Spain[1]. But, how involved did immigrants feel in politics? And, who would they vote for if they were given voting rights? The questions I asked provided discussion on the various political parties that they might or might not consider voting for and led on to talk about how they felt towards Catalan nationalism. While participation in national, autonomous and council elections is not an option for immigrants, they are politically active in other ways. Through the formation of, and participation in, various associations immigrants aimed to influence their position in Spain. Some associations were run by immigrants themselves, others were run by trade unions or Spanish charities.

Secondly, I turn to legal aspects of citizenship. In this section I include issues affecting the immigrants' legal status in Spain; issues to do with work and residency permits, as well as nationality. *Los papeles* (the work and residency permits) continue to be a constant source of stress and instability. They also affect access to employment. Thirdly, I turn to look at immigrants' attitudes towards naturalisation. Naturalisation is often regarded as the final step towards full

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[1] See Chapter Six.

integration, since this grants people full legal and political rights (Hammar 1993; Weil 1996). It is interesting to see the interplay of factors affecting the decision to become, or not become, a Spanish national.

The third section concentrates on social and cultural aspects of citizenship. In this section I look at the response of immigrants to various social and cultural aspects of Catalunya in terms of attitudes to the Catalan language as well as to Catalan holidays.

The chapter then discusses wider issues of 'belonging': the present-day situation of immigrants, integration, and the intentions of immigrants in the future. As has been outlined in Chapter Six, the aim of policies and legislation relating to immigrants is their 'integration'. However, it is unclear what is meant by 'integration'. For this reason, I was interested in exploring immigrants' views on the way this idea was used. Immigrants' responses varied, though there was a general distrust of the word due to its ambiguity. I also asked immigrants what they felt 'integration' should be about, and who should be responsible for it.

In the final section of the chapter I highlight how immigrants see the future, both their own personal future, but also wider issues to do with the future of immigration in Spain.

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CITIZENSHIP

In this section I focus on three aspects of the political involvement of immigrants in politics. In the first place, I present the general attitude of immigrants towards politics; secondly, I look at who they would vote for if they had the vote in Spain, and in the final section, I look at other ways that immigrants are politically active through various associations and organisations.

When I asked immigrants about politics, most of them felt distant from it.

> Sonia[2]: ... I don't know a lot about politics. Firstly because I don't like it and, because of this, I notice I get a bit annoyed when I listen to anything to do with it (laughter).

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[2] All names have been changed to ensure anonymity.

Amina: When politicians talk, I don't even listen to them ... It is something that I should be interested in, it is my country, I am living in it and what they are saying should really interest me, me and all citizens ... but I am not interested.

Doudou: ... I don't like politicians at all, that's the truth, not in Senegal nor here [Catalunya]. When I watch television I watch films and sports. Not politicians, ... they are not worth anything. They talk a lot but ...

Doudou went on to say that there was not a lot of communication from the 'grassroots' to the higher levels of politics. Along the same lines, Margarita felt that the ideals of politics were often far from reality:

At times politics has a lot of ideals and then when it comes to the practice they move away from them. I don't have one party which, on its own, defends all my interests (laughter).

At present immigrants cannot vote in Spain. I asked immigrants who they would vote for if they were given the vote. This thought made many of them smile since they saw the possibility as very distant from the reality they were living. As they did not have the vote, they had not really thought about it. Amina went as far as to say that 'in a way they are doing me a favour, I don't have to think about it'. Another Moroccan woman said she would like to have the vote but did not answer my question.

Sarah: And when you're able to vote, who would you vote for?
L: Ah yes, I would like to [vote] (laughter). But I don't know who I'd vote for, and I can't tell you ... it's a secret (laughter) ...
S: A democratic secret?
L: Yes, that's it! (laughter).

Although they had not thought about who they would vote for, on first reaction they said they would not vote 'for the right'; by which they meant the *Partido Popular*.

Amina: For example the *Populares*[3], for a start, have said 'foreigners out'.

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[3] This refers to the *Partido Popular*.

All the people I interviewed defined themselves as *'de izquierdas'* (left-wing) and yet most would consider voting for *Convergència i Unió* (CiU)[4]. Abdel attributed a large part of this support to Jordi Pujol himself:

> A: For example, I quite like Pujol, I like him. I think he is intelligent and cunning ...
> S: Cunning, in what sense?
> A: Well, you can see this in the occasions when he formed a coalition. He had to form a coalition to support the socialists and now he has done it with the Right. He's not in Madrid and yet he is the one who carries out the politics of the country ... and he gets benefits for his region. He is very clever at this ... It is the advantage that democracy gives him, he is making the most of it, being able to play both sides.

Motaz defined himself as a socialist but said he would vote differently at the different elections. He said he would vote for the PSOE (Socialist party) at the Spanish general elections and vote for CiU at the autonomous elections. He gave two reasons why he would consider voting for CiU. Firstly the fact that the party (especially Pujol) had fought to bring many benefits to Catalunya (and succeeded), and secondly that although Pujol has fought for Catalan national interests he has never asked for independence.

> S: Imagine that one day you were allowed to vote, who would you vote for?
> M: ... mm ... Well ... but there are two elections, those of Catalunya and those of the state? Which are you referring to?
> S: Let's start with the autonomous community ones.
> M: I would vote for Pujol, for *Convergència i Unió* ... At the autonomous elections I would vote for Jordi Pujol ... Politically, I really like some of the ideas of Convergència i Unió ...
> S: For example?
> M: Well ... for example the idea that we are equal but different, that I feel different but I am the same as the rest. I like that idea. Jordi Pujol has always agreed with that, that Catalunya is a nation ... and I think this is right, it is a nation. It forms part of the Spanish State, he has never asked for independence. He has fought to get benefits ... like all politicians he has made mistakes. I don't mean to say that he has not made mistakes ... but at the autonomous elections, I prefer *Convergència i Unió* ...

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[4] Only two of the people I interviewed clearly stated that they would not vote for CiU. This was because of their opposition to any form of nationalism.

S: And for the state?

M: To the state I go more towards the left ... more to the left than the *Partido Popular,* its ideas, its ideology, don't convince me, I would vote for the Socialist Party. The only bad thing that happened in Spain is that the Socialist Party has made mistakes, very big mistakes, especially with the corruption cases. These have destroyed their image. But I like them.

When I asked immigrants if they would vote for a party which protected Catalan interests, on the whole the answer was yes. Margarita said she would vote for it, given that she lives in Catalunya.

S: And you, if you could vote in Spain, who would you vote for?

M: Well ... (laughter) ... I think that is very personal because of the politics and the mentality you have. But I am very much on the left, I am very open minded ... although you don't find this often in politics ...

S: And would you vote for a party which defended Catalan interests, a Catalanist party?

M: mm ... well, I am here in Catalunya, if I am here, and it defended Catalan things, I would say yes. Because on one hand I don't criticise it ... I agree that every nation has a right to defend what is theirs or what they think is theirs ... but not if they do that too forcefully, with too much pressure ... nobody can go to their neighbour's house and start giving orders.

Immigrants are politically active in other ways. Immigrants' involvement in associations is, amongst other things, an important part of this political activity. As Layton Henry (1993: 94) states:

> ... the ability to organise in autonomous associations to protect their interests, to mobilise support over issues of concern and to make representations to political authorities is an important political right and resource.

Associations and non-governmental organisations involved with immigrants carry out various activities and functions and have a variety of aims. As Hector put it: 'the associations and immigrant groups are as ambivalent as the situation they find themselves in'. At different points in time people have different needs and

priorities[5] which the associations have to adapt to. Another aspect is that people are very busy so it is hard to organise meetings. Etna said that although over eighty people turned up at the activities they organised, there were only three or four people who run the association on a permanent basis. Both these aspects mean that there was a lack of continuity in the aims of the association, and so short-term goals were valued over longer term ones.

In all cases associations act as meeting points, providing support among people of the same nationality[6]. In this sense they act as a resource centre and an information point. Many of the associations have a social worker or a legal representative. In other cases, associations are involved in educational aspects (teaching people specific skills or languages, both Catalan and Castilian). Associations carry out representational roles on consultative bodies involved with the creation of policy. Members of associations also give informal talks about issues to do with immigration[7].

Another important aspect of associations was to carry out activities which present aspects of their culture. Etna talked about how she gave talks in schools and in cultural centres, as well as reading African stories to children in schools. Leila made Arabic biscuits and gave talks on Arab culture to many different groups of people.

> L: We carry out workshops, every week, well, we have a meeting every week to talk about workshops. We do old people's workshops, workshops at primary schools and secondary schools. When we do workshops with 14 year olds we take all the ingredients to the schools and there we make the biscuits in front of them, we show them how we do them ... they also write the recipe down. And when we do workshops with old people, we take the biscuits made and we make the tea there and we explain what is in the biscuits and so on ...

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[5] Layton Henry (1990) lays out the different aims and objectives of immigrant organisation in terms of length of residence in the country as well as the orientation that a group has, whether it maintains close links to the country of origin or its orientation is more towards the country of residence.

[6] Most of the immigrant associations I came across were organised by nationality except bigger ones like La CLACA.

[7] As mentioned in Chapter Six, 1997 was the European year Against Racism and during this year various cultural centres and neighbourhood centres had a series of talk about immigration to which people from various associations were invited to give talks.

While practically all of the people I interviewed were very actively involved in associations, a few were not. Some of the latter told me they did not participate in associations because they felt that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) acted in their own interests. When I asked Abdel whether he was a member of an association he replied that he felt they acted mostly in their self-interest:

> S: And are you a member of any organisation?
>
> A: No, no, no
>
> S: Why's that?
>
> A: I don't know, I see it as ... I haven't yet seen an organisation that does not have interests of some sort, it seems. They all, whatever ideals they state, go for their own self-interests ... it is true, isn't it? At least that is what I think ...
>
> S: In what way do they go for their own self-interests?
>
> A: ... I don't know, for example, take *SOS Racismo*, because I have seen people who have gone there and they have been used as statistics for the organisation ... when it comes to helping them, they do not do it effectively. They want statistics ... and other associations are similar.

Likewise Amina did not see the point of some of the activities carried out by associations. Personally she did not feel prepared to give talks[8], and did not feel it was worth doing unless you had something to say. At the same time she felt that being a member of an association would be a constant reminder that she was not from Spain.

> S: And do you participate in any association?
>
> A: No, I don't participate. They have not asked me to either, and those that have asked me I don't really like. There have been times when they have said: 'ah, you could come along and do ... ' I don't know, firstly because it is a constant reminder that you are not from here and so you have something to say. That is fine for the people who know how to do it, who can earn some money doing it, they travel a lot, give talks ... that's good. And if one day I feel able to do it, able to give information, then I would, maybe I would do it too, but as I can't ... and there are people who say: 'Don't be silly, of course you can do it, what you have to say would be really useful' ... but as at the moment I would rather not ...
>
> S: And for example, what do you think of using associations to fight for rights?

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[8] By this she meant giving talks in different settings, like cultural centres or schools.

A: What happens is that sometimes they have told me about an association ... well firstly I have never been in an association ... I don't know the world of associations very well ... I have known associations which look out for their own interests.

Some people I interviewed had been involved with associations in the past but had not liked them. They had not felt comfortable at the association, or did not believe they fully represented their interests. Liviana told me that she used to belong to a Peruvian association which performed folkloric Peruvian songs and dances, but as she could neither sing nor dance, she stopped meeting them. She then went to some meetings at *La CLACA*, and although she agreed with the struggle to improve conditions of work and residency permits, and fight against the *Ley de Extranjería*, she felt that other issues that were equally important were not being addressed. She also said these meetings required a lot of commitment in terms of time, which was something she did not really have with her job and the courses she was taking.

On the other hand, Zora who had previously[9] had no contact with the work of NGOs, liked it and wanted to continue working in this area. She even talked about maybe one day setting up her own association. She said that at first she thought it would be an association for Moroccan women, since she felt this group was often ignored because they spent so much time in 'invisible places' such as the home or working in people's houses as domestic workers. But, as she had given it more thought she realised that she wanted to set up an association whose aim was to exchange information between Catalans and non-Catalans since this would be the way to get some level of 'integration'.

In summary then, although immigrants have limited political rights, the existence of associations is an important aspect of their political involvement: they provide support, information and act as advocates for their rights.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF CITIZENSHIP

Los papeles continue to be regarded as the main source of instability, discrimination, and concern for immigrants living in Spain. All the immigrants I interviewed

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[9]She was now doing a HORIZON course and doing an internship at AMIC (UGT). HORIZON is a project funded by the European Union. Zineb was doing a course on 'dinamizadores en el medio socio-cultural', part of which was the internship in the section of the UGT trade union to do with immigration.

talked about the difficulties they had faced in obtaining, and maintaining, legal status in Spain.

Problems with *los papeles* also had repercussions in other areas of life; they restricted access to jobs in a number of ways. In the first place '*cupos*' (permits) were handed out in a narrow range of areas of employment[10]. Work and residency permits had to be renewed at regular intervals (the length of these varied, but it can be as short as a year). This system for renewal meant that some immigrants felt they were on a treadmill: by the time they had the permit, it was time to apply for its renewal. Things were complicated further because work and residency permits were not only tied into one another but also tied to employment contracts; you needed a work permit to get an employment contract, and you needed a contract to renew your permit. This meant that many people became illegal, and regaining their legal status was not an easy process. If immigrants were self-employed, they had to make regular contributions to national insurance. Failure to meet the payments may mean falling into illegality.

Issues of control of *los papeles* were also a source of concern: a few people mentioned they were often stopped on the street and asked for papers. Doudou used to be stopped for papers frequently and would hardly go out because of this. He felt that the situation had improved recently, for him personally because he now had his papers, but also in general because the police no longer make the same assumptions about all Africans.

> No, the truth is that I don't like to go out a lot. Before, when I went out on the street, the police were always asking me for papers. I don't like that. When I came back from work, I went to buy merchandise and then went home, watched television and nothing else ... Sometimes on a Sunday I went to the park downstairs, just to the park and the harbour ... that was it ... because when I was in the street I would always be asked for papers, and, I don't like that. That hurts a lot, a lot, a lot, but as there are people who do bad things, not everyone knows the Africans. We, as Africans, have to put up with it, we have to accept it all ...

Zora, on the other hand, marvelled that she had never been stopped for papers, while people she has been with had been asked for papers.

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[10] See Chapter Five.

195

Zora: Because wherever I go, they are not going to ask me for papers ... I go along the street, just like you do, and I have never been asked for papers. It is not obvious that I am Moroccan so I don't have a problem ...

S: Are you an exception then?

Z: ... Well, yes ... sometimes they have stopped people who have been walking beside me ... I think that I am really lucky.

Naturalisation

Naturalisation is an important issue in terms of immigrants' attitudes towards it, and how they see their relationship with both the country of origin and the country of residence. With this in mind, I asked immigrants about their nationality, whether they had applied for Spanish nationality and under what conditions they would, or would not, consider doing so. Finally I asked them how they would feel about taking up Spanish nationality, whether it would make any difference to their lives.

No-one I interviewed linked getting Spanish nationality to feeling more Spanish or being considered more Spanish: everyone had pragmatic reasons to do this. However the reasons for applying for citizenship, and feelings towards this, varied.

People felt that having Spanish nationality would make life easier, because it would mean the end of problems linked to work and residency permits.

S: And if you could apply for Spanish nationality, would you?

Sonia: Yes, it's a lot better. Yes, because all this paperwork is quite tedious ...

Cheb said he would feel 'calmer' knowing that he did not have to renew permits yearly, and fearing that they could be denied.

S: And can you ask for Spanish nationality or ...

C: Yes, yes ... when I have a permanent permit for 5 years, then I have the right to ask for nationality, no problem ...

S: And will you ask for it?

C: Yes, yes, of course. Because everything is better, when you have it you are more relaxed ...

For Latin Americans the decision to apply for Spanish nationality is not as hard since they can hold on to their original citizenship. In these cases, applying for citizenship was justified by more pragmatic reasons:

> Margarita: Well, I intend to do it ... But you have to make clear that you do this, not to feel more Catalan or more Spanish, you don't do it to say: 'look I am Spanish' ... No, you do it for your interests ... that you are going to get rights, more opportunities ... in inverted commas because due to your colour, wherever you go you are going to be a foreigner.

Liviana (a Peruvian who had been in Spain for over seven years) had just recently applied for Spanish citizenship. Prior to this she had not felt she needed Spanish nationality, and had also thought she might one day go back to Peru:

> I did not ask for it because I thought I already had my own nationality, no? And I had a residence permit, a work permit and ... you always have the feeling that you are going to go back to your country, you want to go back ... I don't know ... time passes ... and it is not that you forget about it, but time goes on and you don't realise and so many things happen ... (laughter). You miss your family and all that but ... I have gone back to my country, when you go back you don't feel the same ... you love your country and your family, but you also feel a bit strange.

As time went by she felt she might stay in Spain, and she thought that having Spanish nationality might give her more stability in terms of employment. Being a Spanish national would make it easier to get contracts, and she could one day become a civil servant if she wanted to.

Zora felt the same way: she would apply for Spanish nationality to help her find work. In the past she had been able to work without a permit so had not worried about applying. However she was thinking of taking a job in a new area of employment where she would need either a working permit or Spanish nationality.

All Latin Americans said they would have given the matter a lot more thought if they had had to give up their own nationality.

S: And can you also keep the Peruvian nationality?

Liviana: Yes, you don't lose it ... that means I would have both ... because I suppose that if I lost it ... then I would think about it a lot ... it would be a lot harder ...

Juan: In the end you get dual nationality, we don't have to give up our nationality, because if we did I would not have it.

S: If you were to lose it [your own nationality] would you give it more thought?

Margarita: Aaaah yes, of course (laughter) ... If I were to lose my own nationality, it would be another matter. Yes, because it was the same before, there were agreements before, where everything Spanish was considered Dominican, and everything Dominican was considered Spanish, but if I were to lose it completely I would not do it.

Other people are less attached to their own nationality. Amina would not have a problem giving up her Moroccan passport for two reasons, on the one hand because she saw her future in Spain and although she loved Morocco she has only been there on holiday and has never lived there. Secondly, she felt that nationality was something that you carried inside you.

S: And if you had to give up your Moroccan nationality ... would you think about it?

A: No, I think I would give it up ... because I have been here for so long that to live there [Morocco] ... I would not know how to adapt ... Morocco is very beautiful of course, but I have only ever been there on holiday, I have been there for a month at most ... You see things there that no longer happen here, which is not to say that they did not exist. Now there is democracy and the standard of life is better here [Catalunya], but there, that has not happened yet ... I would not be able to walk along the street, the fact that they could ask me to behave in a certain way. A way of walking ... it is not a way of talking but it is a way of behaving ... In the past this was also expected here ... I could not put up with that, after being here for so long ... that strict authority, and another thing is the bureaucracy. You go to do something at the administration and it is as if you are asking them a huge favour ... I could not put up with that. If I go there, and I talk to someone and they talk to me like that, well I blow up and they would say: 'listen, you keep quiet because you aren't in Spain, you are in Morocco', and I would have to keep quiet ...

Neither Abdel or Motaz had given the matter any serious thought, but both made it clear that they would be extremely pragmatic about making this decision. Abdel preferred to get dual nationality but if he had to choose he would choose the one which would give him less problems.

> S: And do you have Sudanese nationality?
>
> A: Yes
>
> S: And if you ever had the option to get Spanish nationality, would you ask for it?
>
> A: Well ... well, if the Spanish one did not bring problems with it, then I would chose whichever. That is it, if I can chose both, then that would be better, no? And if you can't ... I have not really thought about it, to be honest.

Motaz was at a stage (after finishing his Ph.D. in biology) of looking for work and so unless he got a job in Spain, he did not see the use of having Spanish citizenship[11].

The large amount of paperwork involved in applying for nationality was also given as a reason for taking so long to apply. Leila said that her husband could apply for nationality but they had to wait until they had enough time and money to go to Morocco to find the necessary documents there. Once he had obtained Spanish nationality, then the rest of the family would also apply for it.

Juan also talked about the amount of paperwork involved:

> ... a lot of papers, papers, papers, they [administration] drive you mad with so many papers that have to be presented, make one lose countless working days, travelling around, looking for papers.

Hector did not really see applying for Spanish nationality as something he would do lightly. He did not feel comfortable with having to swear to a flag when he knew he had been born, and brought up, elsewhere. He also thought that people would continue to consider him a foreigner:

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[11] This is interesting because at another point of the interview he said he had been turned down from two jobs because he was not Spanish and the Spanish constitution stated Spanish people have the right to get the job first.

No, because to be honest it is not much use. If I go somewhere and say I am Spanish and people say 'right' and they grab my identity card and start laughing ... they look at your ID card and smile as if to say 'yes, you are Spanish according to your papers, but not by blood or through customs'.

Other people also said that having a nationality had not really changed the fact that they were still regarded and treated as foreigners. Juan said that his situation had not really changed in spite of having Spanish nationality.

That's fine, I have Spanish nationality, but my situation is the same, how has it changed? It does not change at all. They know that I am still a foreigner even if I have Spanish nationality in my pockets, I have the passport, but ... I will never be accepted, even if I were super-intelligent.

This section has outlined some of the legal rights of citizenship that immigrants have in Spain. *Los papeles* and the *Ley de Extranjería* were the main source of concern for immigrants. The final section on naturalisation shows that most immigrants would prefer to have dual identity, but would be happy to adopt Spanish nationality for pragmatic reasons, though they felt they would always be regarded as 'foreigners'.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ASPECTS OF CITIZENSHIP

In this third section I look at the social and cultural aspects of citizenship. I focus on two main aspects of social and cultural citizenship in this section: language and the celebration of holidays. The social and cultural aspects of citizenship linked to issues of Catalan nationalism are discussed in the following chapter.

Language

Catalan nationalism defines itself as civic and 'integrating' and a large part of its definition is the central role that language plays. In this section I look at language as a measure of integration of the immigrants. It is often assumed that speaking the Catalan language is the final benchmark of integration into Catalunya (Colectivo IOE 1992; Solé 1981). As put by *Colectivo IOE*: 'language is a precise indicator of the willingness and/or possibility of integration' (1992: 65)[12].

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[12] I am here talking about 'immigrants' as defined in the Introduction. Not all foreigners arriving in Catalunya need Catalan to the same extent or in the same way (see Colectivo IOE 1992; Consell Assessor d'Immigració ; Perarnau 1993).

I carried out my interviews in Castilian and when I asked immigrants if they spoke Catalan they replied by saying: *'una miqueta'* (a little bit). Most did have a good understanding of it, but found it hard to bring themselves to speak it.

Latin Americans and Africans were in very different positions regarding the languages of Catalunya. While Latin Americans could speak Castilian (except for those from Brazil), Africans were faced with a double language barrier of both Catalan and Castilian.

> Safhid: Well, there is a difference ... for example the South Americans. They have an advantage, don't they? At least regarding language.

> Liviana: Well, I suppose that the Arabs, the Moroccans too, have a worse time because of the language ... And for us [Latin Americans], we have it a bit easier because of that, no? Because we speak Castilian and at least we can understand and be understood.

In this situation everyone first had to learn Castilian since this was the language they had needed most:

> Mourad: The first thing you do is learn Castilian, no? It's the language of the streets, to get by in the streets, no?

It was only with time that they turned to learning Catalan. Figures from the 1991 census provide the following information about knowledge of Catalan of those people 'born outside Spain'.

Table 7.1 Knowledge of Catalan of people born abroad

Understand Catalan (%)	Can speak Catalan (%)	Can read Catalan (%)	Can write Catalan (%)
80	40	48	21

Source: adapted from Hall (1997: 119) based on 1991 census.

Although most people felt that they did not really need to learn Catalan, as they could get by in Castilian in their daily lives, many had learnt it because of work

(they had needed it at work or thought it would improve their chances of finding work) or in order to study at university.

For others learning Catalan was still an 'unresolved issue'. Hector explained that he had not found the right time to do it.

> What happens is that the issue of immigration, like the issue of language is a bit complicated, in as far as the immigrant does not live in a stable situation. That is to say, the first stage is very hard, there are lots of ups and downs, regarding economic stability, regarding housing ... this does not allow you to make concrete plans and even less so with something that doesn't deal with your immediate survival, so you keep delaying it and then there is a moment of economic and housing stability and therefore emotional stability too, and you begin to do this sort of thing ... but at first you postpone that sort of thing ...

Those immigrants who had learnt Catalan told me about their frustration at not being given the chance to speak Catalan. Mohamed had taken a course in Catalan where the teacher had encouraged them to speak Catalan in the shops:

> But I would get very annoyed when for example you would talk to the shopkeeper in Catalan, and knowing for sure, that he is Catalan and serves people in Catalan, he replies to you in Castilian. And I wanted to say to him: 'can't you see I am talking to you in Catalan, why are you replying in Castilian?'

Immigrants also said that people on the streets would talk to them in Castilian. Margarita said people made the assumption that they would not understand Catalan. This assumption seems to be based on appearance.

> They speak to you in Castilian, they say 'she won't understand', they have that mentality, they see you are black and so you won't understand ... or that you are a foreigner.

Liviana talked about the different reactions she got when she spoke to people in Catalan:

Well, there are people who say ... 'oh, that is great, we like the fact that you speak Catalan' ... And one person said to me: 'Oh, that is so funny, that you speak Catalan' (laughter) and I thought that there was nothing funny about that.

In summary, immigrants agreed that Catalan was an important aspect of 'integration' into life in Catalunya, especially in terms of improving opportunities of employment. However, as 'foreigners', people still assumed that they would not understand Catalan and were talked to in Castilian, thus frustrating them in their effort to learn Catalan.

Fiestas celebrated

Most people had a fairly open attitude to *fiestas*; immigrants celebrated all fiestas, both the Catalan ones and the ones from their country of origin.

Amina: We celebrate them all. Those from here and those there ...

Liviana: We celebrate both things, you keep some of your own and you celebrate things from here ...

Catalan fiestas are seen as a way to participate in, and get to know more about, Catalunya[13]. Muslims celebrated the *fiestas* from their country of origin, especially the end of *Ramadam* and *Id-al-kabir*. Various associations saw these holidays as a way of gathering people together to celebrate[14]. In the case of both *ATIME* and *IBN BATUTA*, they used these occasions as a meeting point where people could get to know each other:

M: Yes, we do fiestas, but people want more fiestas because we hardly manage to celebrate one or two a year. The one that is most regular is *Ramadam* and we hope ... I would also like to do *Id-al-Kabir*, because of its spirit ... it brings people together ...

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[13] Immigrants associated some fiestas, such as Sant Jordi, directly with Catalan nationalism.
[14] Although these were often celebrated at the level of the association many people preferred to celebrate them with family. I interviewed two women who did not celebrate them because they had no family in Barcelona to celebrate with.

S: And it is not celebrated?

M: Well, no ... not as much as we celebrate Ramadam, where more people come. Perhaps it is celebrated more at an individual level, with the families, and I would like it to be wider ...

The timing of holidays was also important. People had time off for Spanish and Catalan holidays and so part of the reason why they celebrated was 'because it's a fiesta and we have no choice' (Zora)[15].

On the other hand, because most Muslim holidays fell on working days in Catalunya, when people did not have time off work, these were celebrated more informally with family. Sometimes the holiday was moved to the weekend when immigrants could celebrate with more time.

Abdel: Look, if our fiestas coincide with fiestas here, then we celebrate them. And if not we move them to a Saturday or a Sunday. Generally our weekends have to be on Fridays. But nobody does it. Because we are here and ... life goes on on Fridays so we move it to Saturday or Sundays and that's it. Then during the year we have two fiestas, two or three ... The fiesta of *Ramadam* and *Id-al-Kabir*, we do celebrate those, though not always properly (laughter)

S: And who do you celebrate with? With other Sudanese people or ...

A: Yes, with other Sudanese people only ... what we do is go to pray and that is it. And then, if there is another thing we celebrate it on a Sunday, we get together and we celebrate it on Saturdays and Sundays ...

In Muslim households with children, Catalan holidays were also celebrated for the children's sake, especially because the children were given a holiday from school.

S: And do you celebrate fiestas that are specific to Catalunya?

Leila: ... Yes ... I can't remember which ones right now ... any fiesta where the children have time off school then you have to do something, so that they feel comfortable with the other children. So we do it ... more than anything because of the age, because of the children ...

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[15]Some immigrant organisations also celebrated Catalan fiestas in conjunction with Catalan associations or neighbourhood associations.

S: And do you celebrate Christmas like the Spanish children do, with presents and food?

L: (laughter) yes ... yes ...

In Fatima's eyes this did not conflict with the Muslim religion. Neither was it seen as a conflict in Zineb's household where her sister put up a Christmas tree and the nieces and nephews came round to open presents. Zineb's mother (who was a practising Muslim) did not see this as 'harmful', as long as she saw her family happy and enjoying themselves.

PRESENT-DAY SITUATION

Immigrants felt that the main difference in the situation of the different groups of immigrants was due to their place of origin. Latin Americans have various characteristics that makes their situation in Catalunya easier in many ways. Safhid, when comparing the situation of his own nationality (Moroccan) to Latin Americans highlighted the differences in the following terms:

S: And compared with other groups of immigrants?

Safhid: Well, there is a difference ... for example South Americans have an advantage because of the language. Then there is religion - they are Christians, just like people here. We are Muslims and the other thing is the language ... finding work is a bit harder for a Moroccan, an Arab immigrant, than it is for a South American.

S: In what way is it harder?

Safhid: Because people here prefer someone who speaks Castilian well ... language is a very important thing because a South American can find work in the service industry with more ease ... they do not have problems finding work ... but a Moroccan or an Arab does ...

On the other hand, while Liviana did not deny the advantage that Latin Americans had with respect to the language, she said that all groups of immigrants faced the same problems regarding *los papeles*.

Liviana: Well, I suppose Arabs, or Moroccans, have a worse time because of the language ... And that is why it is easier for us ... because we speak Castilian, or at least we understand it and they understand us. I think we have the same difficulties regarding papers and those things ... everyone has to have a contract to have a work

permit. You have to have a work permit ... but I think the law is the same for everyone.

Amina on the other hand contradicted this since certain groups did have preferences *vis-à-vis* the legislation[16]:

S: And do you think that some people have an easier time?

A: Of course ... it is in the law ... South Americans have it easier, South Americans, Filipinos, they all have it easier, and those from the European Union have it really easy ... But of course there are differences ...

Monica also felt that the advantages people had depended on the 'type' of immigrants:

Of course language is also important, but it is not the only thing ... it depends on the type of people who come here ... the training they have. Latin Americans in general, not in particular, because amongst the Africans there are people who come with good training, are professional, but in general immigrants work in agriculture, in the Maresme. Very few Latin Americans work in agriculture, in general it is the African immigration which is most exploited ... but in either case, they both have a hard time.

Abdel and Motaz emphasised the fact that the situation of Sudanese people was different because they had come to study and had then stayed on in Spain for different reasons. They did not want to compare the situation of people from Sudan with those from other places because most people from Sudan had come to study, in contrast to other groups who had come in search of work:

Abdel: You can't compare the Sudanese case. Most of the people that I have met here from Sudan have come for one reason: most of them have come to study ... a lot of people have come to study but very few have actually finished ...

Sarah: They come here and return without finishing?

Motaz: They go back because they can't finish, because of the language, because of the customs, because of economic issues ... Those who have come here to study, some have finished and have settled here and have work here. There are others who have

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[16] See Chapters One and Six.

already studied in Sudan, ... they have come here with training ... You can't compare this to the groups from South America. Those who come from Sudan, 99% have not come to work, they have come to study. Of the 99%, 77% have failed in their studies ... or have met women and have got married, and have stayed. But the aim, the main aim was not employment ...

From her perspective as a Sub-Saharan, Etna felt that it was easier for Moroccan women to find employment in homes. This is an example of 'statistical discrimination' (Ambrosini 1997) discussed in Chapter Five.

I think Sub-Saharans and North Africans receive the same treatment, maybe the Moroccans have it easier, even though it might not look like it, in the area of agriculture, when they look for work. For example Moroccan women can find work more easily ... I suppose it depends ... but I think that Moroccan women can find work more easily than Sub-Saharan Africans.

Juan pointed out the negative conditions of women working in the domestic service, and described their condition as 'modern slavery'.

I find the position of women very worrying. There is a modern slavery regarding women, most women work as domestic servants for 24 hours a day. These women are working there [in homes] day and night without going out, 6 days a week, they go out on Saturday afternoon ... they have no rights. There is no legislation, I am not only talking about the foreign workers, I also include Spanish women who work as domestic workers who are in the same situation. There is no legislation to protect them, to defend them, that looks after them, there is not a political will to solve this situation, to improve this situation.

A couple of people pointed out that there have been changes regarding immigration: in the first place immigrants were coming to Spain for different reasons from the past[17]. Secondly, there had been economic changes in Spain, which meant that it was not as easy to find employment.

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[17] Wahid also said the same thing as he saw that people now: ' come for the sake of coming ... for the adventure'.

Monica: I suppose the main migration that arrived here was from the 1970s onwards because it was people who were escaping from the political situation [in Latin America], most of which were dictatorships. At the time the situation in Spain was different and even if it was hard for them at first, they were able to settle down ... in those days there was less unemployment than there is now. Since then, there is more unemployment in Spain and when they arrive there is no work ... but there is no work for neither Spaniards or Latin Americans.

The situation of *los papeles* has also changed through time. Prior to 1985, it was pretty easy to settle and find work in Spain. Etna who had arrived in Spain over twenty years ago said:

... in those days, the only thing they asked for, was that the husband had a job and a house and a salary to prove that he could keep you. Then they would give you a certificate in the factory itself and then the Ministry of Employment would write you a letter telling you about these obligations. So with both these things you would get a special entry visa, I came with that visa and didn't have a single problem.

However once the *Ley de Extranjería* was passed in 1985, foreigners had to get official work and residence permits. When I asked Leila what it was like to live in Catalunya her reply reflected the central role played by *los papeles*.

It depends if you have work here and you have a work permit. If you have been here for many years then you are fine, but if you don't have a job or a permit, then things are a lot harder.

Amina believed that although efforts are being made to improve conditions, permits still make it hard to feel settled, and additionally they were a constant reminder that you did not really belong:

because believe it or not it has been the documents that has really made me feel I don't belong ... that is the thing that has made me feel most unwelcome, it was a constant reminder that I did not belong here ...

While on legal issues, the circumstances may have got harsher, in other ways things were becoming easier for immigrants. Monica felt that while associations did not make the situation miraculously better, they did support people through the bad

208

times. Likewise, Etna said that those who arrived now found an existing support structure that they could turn to for help and advice.

> Etna: I think that people who arrive now have an easier time. Because they arrive and we have already built bridges and we can help ... the husband will have been here for a while by the time she arrives. I think that is good, because they have arrived and they have found people [Catalans] who know about immigrants although there is a lot left to do, but there is a will, an interest. They have met organisations who do fiestas and through these fiestas they can meet people from here, their culture, their customs ... and this helps the integration of the people who have just arrived.

'INTEGRATION'

The 'integration of immigrants' was stated as the aim of much of the legislation and policy directed towards immigration. However when I asked immigrants what they thought about the use, and meaning, of the word 'integration' their reactions were not all positive. Only one person, Amina, considered herself to be 'integrated' but even then, it was in her own terms.

> S: What does the word 'integration' mean to you?
> A: I have always felt the same about it. For me integration is about the way I am now, that I can accept differences between people but without criticising them ... without saying that this is better, or that is better. But many people think that integration is to give up everything that is yours and integrate totally in what belongs to others ... that is not right.

For all those who I interviewed the meaning of the word 'integration' was ambiguous. While Magdalena dismissed it as a 'fashionable word', Abdel felt it was an empty word:

> S: I was going to ask you what you think 'integration' means?
> A: In my view it is an empty word ... to be honest, it does not make sense to me ...

Margarita said that everyone used it but in their own way and everyone gave it their own meaning.

> Well, it is a bit of a stupid word ... Everybody uses it but in different ways, everyone gives it their own meaning.

Hector felt that it was used a lot politically. Integration was more a utopia than a fact.

> S: And you mentioned that the word 'integration' was a bit of a cliché ... what does it mean for you?
>
> (Pause)
>
> H: ... The word integration is another one of those words that is used a lot, it is used a lot politically but in reality, it may be an aim, it can be an utopia but it is not a reality.

Most immigrants were clearly opposed to the use of the word 'integration'. Many wanted to draw the distinction between integration and adaptation. The latter was as a more flexible, two-way process where differences were accepted and did not mean that immigrants had to 'forget about their own culture', as implied by 'integration'.

> Zora: Integration? I don't like that word ... I think that what you can do is come here and adapt ... that is not integration, because integration means that you might lose something of what is yours. It is simply to adapt to something else ... to continue doing things your way but to adapt to life here, but without losing anything ... it can be done ...
>
> S: Do you think integration sounds more like assimilation or ...
>
> Z: It does to me ...
>
> S: And what word would you use?
>
> Z: I really don't know, I think a person has to adapt to the present situation.

Others felt that it did not make much sense to talk about 'integration' because people were always having to integrate in one way or another. It was more about an adaptation to a change in circumstances.

> S: Why does it not make sense for you?
>
> A: I don't know ... I think that any person who is here is integrated ... whether they adapt or don't adapt, but the idea of integration is a farce ... Because no-one can be fully integrated, that is to get people and to want everyone to be a certain way and this is impossible, it is impossible.
>
> S: So would you talk more about adaptation or ...

A: Yes, adaptation and that is it ... One adapts or one does not adapt and that is all there is to it ...

Likewise, Leila felt that everyone had to integrate because hardly anyone lived in the place where they were born.

S: Everybody speaks about 'integration' ... what does it mean for you?

L: I don't really understand it, because I don't know what it is, to be honest. Nobody is totally integrated anywhere ... a person hardly ever lives where they were born, where they have lived, where they have grown up ... so they always integrate ... whether they go to a part of Europe or elsewhere they are always looking for where they can live or ... how would I put it? I can say it in Arabic but it is harder in Castilian ... The land does not belong to anyone, it belongs to God, therefore you will be wherever God sends you ... you can be happy working, living, and eating there ...

While Etna agreed that when people moved, they had to adapt to different circumstances, she was also a bit wary of words such as integration. Depending on who used the term 'integration' and where it was used its meaning was closer to 'assimilation'.

Etna: I think it is to fit in to a place. Then integration ... the idea that we have to integrate ... it is a strange word. It can be used but it depends on how and when and where, I think we should talk about fitting in to places. Because integration, when you say integration, you try to integrate and they ask for more, and this then leads on to assimilation, but I don't think anyone likes this. Personally I think that I live here, I am happy, I have friends ... I know many people but I also believe that what is mine is mine, and I don't have to forget about it, it can be changed, it can be added to, but I don't think we can ever forget anything. I think this [forgetting] would be assimilation, to leave everything that is yours because other things seem better than what you have ...

In the same way Juan presented the difference between integration and assimilation:

Why not look for the way to integrate? But integrate in the real sense of the word, without excluding your own customs, your own characteristics and thoughts, that is what I would like. But, we accept them [immigrants] but under our set of rules, not

giving them a chance, not allowing them to go to school, to become professionals ... we only allow them to work as domestic servants.

Monica, who was involved in *La CLACA*[18] felt that integration was primarily about rights and that the present legislation needed changing before anything could be done about this. Motaz said that the legal situation had to be solved in order to begin to achieve a position of equality:

> S: You hear the word 'integration' very often, what does that word mean to you?
> M: Integration ... yes ... that you are part of, even if you come from outside, that you are accepted and form part of society ... they give you the same opportunities ... if you fulfil the legal requirements you have the same rights as the nationals. But unfortunately this has not happened, and will not happen, anywhere in the world. We have to be realistic, it is not going to happen, there will always be differences.

Mohamed agreed with this view, since he felt integrated to some extent 'but at the level of rights there is inequality'. In terms of employment rights, Hector felt that immigrants were only allowed access to certain jobs - those that were unstable and not socially valued. Immigrants were allowed to have these jobs but not 'to sail outside the pre-established route'.

Educational qualifications from South America were either not fully recognised or simply not recognised at all in Spain. Julian for example talked about the case of the Dominican dentists who were not allowed to practise in Spain, and thought this was a violation of the agreements between Spain and the Dominican Republic. Others, like Liviana, found it either hard to legalise their degree - it was a lengthy and complicated process - or found that when she wanted to get into university to do another course, her previous degree from Peru was given a grade five (out of ten). With this grade she could not get on the course she wanted to do and they would not count her years of experience working in the field to increase the mark. This highly inflexible procedure was a source of discrimination.

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[18] La CLACA is an association of Latin Americans, whose main point of meeting and organising has been around issues of legislation, and work and residency permits. They are involved in the Catalan-wide *'Asamblea de Papeles para todos'* (Assembly of papers for everyone).

While legal and employment rights were essential, integration also included historical and cultural factors. Hector felt that integration did not happen because knowledge about different cultures was not transmitted easily and there were many historical reasons why it did, or did not, happen. Integration was also about the future. Monica felt that integration was a process that would eventually be achieved:

> you can't get rid of differences in the first generation, but it is possible in later ones, integration can be achieved there.

Hector referred back to the fact that integration was about more than just working and living in Catalunya, it should be about accepting and respecting difference:

> Integration is not the fact that you can work and produce and live in this country and fit in with the Spanish way of doing things, that is not integration. The fact of marrying a Spaniard, to have a mixed marriage, and to have children, and that your child goes to the same school as the children of your Spanish neighbours, that it not integration. I think integration is a wider thing, more general in that you are accepted as such ... integration would be, to respect one another, within the framework of difference and vice versa, I respect you and you respect me, we sit together and talk, we talk about anything but we communicate with respect.

A number of people mentioned the ability to *convivir* as an aspect of integration. This included aspects of daily life in Barcelona, and relationships with neighbours.

> Monica: Well, ... the important thing is to live side by side. What happens is that the receiving country always feels that what it offers is enough. Logically everyone defends what they believe in, their language, their customs, their way of being. It might not be the right one but in any case it is the one they want ... when you go to rent a house, there are lots of hurdles - you don't have a guarantor, you are black. Even if you have it all, it is not enough. If one plays music, the neighbour complains because of the music, or there are the smells of the food ... those are the small things that are involved in living side by side. Well, I might not like the music ... but everyone can play the music they want. Well, you can say, don't play it as loud ... there are ways of living side by side, ways of reaching an agreement.

213

Margarita included the personal day-to-day relationships with neighbours as a testing trial of issues of *convivencia* and integration.

> S: And do you have a lot of contact with the neighbours?
>
> M: Well, from the moment you arrive you realise that everything is very different, it is a cultural shock. Where I come from there is a lot humanness, neighbours are like family, we live in one-storey houses and if we need something we ask the neighbour for it. When you come here you realise that it is different, you realise you hardly know anyone, you hardly even say 'good morning' to anyone. I was also shocked by the fact that there are lots of old people ... all this makes you question things and find things strange. At first there was very little contact with the neighbours and slowly I tried to change things. I would say: 'If you need anything, please let me know ... ' and then I saw that they would invite me in because they are very old people and they would invite me for Christmas ... but it has all been frustrating. I can see why this happens, I see why. I have slowly got used to it, it is better this way, that there is no link between the neighbours ...

Finally people felt that integration should be a two-way process:

> Liviana: Integration is more about you taking on new things, isn't it? It is about making your life and your culture richer. I think integration also means that people from here also know and respect the fact that there are people who have other customs. Integration does not mean you forget your own customs and you take on other peoples' customs.

> Mohamed: For me integration is very different from assimilation ... To live with another culture, which is not your own and which of course you respect. And of course they have to respect your culture ... this would be equality, the respect of difference.

Juan talked about respecting differences as a two-way process:

> I believe in integration, but integration has to come about with an equality of conditions, of opportunity, without excluding others, accepting them with their faults, their errors, their customs ... you can't change people overnight, you can't force them to change. I have to accept you as you are, with your faults, your defects and you have to accept me in the same way. When that happens, and you give me the same

opportunities ... then that is real integration. There is no integration of any type, an acceptance of the other as they are, because we are not going to be able to change the Arab way of being, their customs, their beliefs, their things, their scarves, well, that is even beautiful ... I like seeing that.

Liviana felt that exchange was important. If immigrants were allowed to integrate they would, otherwise it would be hard for them to do so.

Integration goes both ways. If you allow them to integrate, then they will integrate but if you don't, then they won't. This is why there are people who feel chased ... or who feel rejected.

Issues of who was responsible for the 'integration' of immigrants have been widely debated in Catalunya. In this light, I asked immigrants who they felt was responsible for integration, whether it was up to the individual or whether the different tiers of government also had a role to play. Zora said that the administration had no choice but to cooperate because immigration was not a passing phenomenon.

S: And do you think it should be the associations, the town hall or the administration [who helps] ... what do you think?
Z: I think it has to be both ... the administration, I think it doesn't have a choice but to help ... or at least to help the people who come here and don't know how to get around ... they have to do that. There is always going to be immigration, as long as there is hunger there will be immigration because people will leave ... no matter how many borders are put up ... .

Something could be done, because there was the will, but the different actions had to be more coordinated to be effective.

Mohamed: No, it is better if the Spanish institutions can work with the associations, the consulate and so a common project can be elaborated, that would be productive because there are funds to do this here, if there is a minimum amount of political will, then it can be productive. But of course they do not work together, the town hall can do things here and there, but it shouldn't only be entertainment, but should be more productive because there are people here who ... I knew a woman who said to me with tears in her eyes, I used to work as an accountant and now I have come here to

wash dishes ... of course that is sad, why? Because if there were a big project that took into account the different institutions, the associations and the like, and there is money, then you could do this big project, run courses ... right now there is a NGO which runs courses on basic computing for immigrants, we advertise it and more and more Dominicans go to it. Imagine if we ran that course ourselves, to run it properly and follow it up with other courses and give it a final aim ... Of course, if there isn't an alternative, there are immigrants who begin to steal wallets.

Safhid agreed with this; there was a clear need for more cooperation:

I don't see integration as an easy thing, a thing that can be done with words or projects or activities. Integration has to be everything, not only because it is the European Year against Racism and we are going to spend a lot of money and do silly things with it ... We have to do things that will last, not just decorative things ... which is what most things are ...

S: Have there been many things like this?

Safhid: Yes, there has been a lot, they spend a lot of money but that is it; there have been lots of shows. Integration is too complicated for that sort of thing.

S: You talk about continuous work ...

Safhid: Yes, for example I say let's work with the trade unions who also work on issues of immigration ... but you have to follow what they are doing, they do not let you work independently. We have to work, but we have to be supported, we have to be supportive ... it is no good if we just have to do what they tell us to do, in the end that will be bad ...

Liviana felt that at the level of the legislation passed by the Spanish state, the *Ley de Extranjería* did not help integration. The fact that educational qualifications were not legalised, or other assumptions about immigrants did not make matters easier:

S: And do you think this happens at a personal level or at a level of organisations, or the government ...

L: The *Generalitat* does not help ... for example the *Ley de Extranjería* is unfair ... they see we look different and ask us for our papers. See, if you were a foreigner they would not ask you for your papers, even if you were illegal they would not ask you ...

S: And at the level of the Spanish state ...

L: Let me think ... for example there is what I did, I came here, I legalised my studies and yet I am still different. They still see my degree as different ... it all depends on

what you do and who you are ... you are not equal ... you do not have the same rights ...

S: And do you think that the *Generalitat* does anything at the level of Catalunya to help integration?

L: I don't know ... they always concentrate on the worst and forget that people like me also exist. The image of my country is always a bad one ... if something bad happens it is always the Peruvians or Colombians who you see ... But there are people who have studied, are well educated ... not the very very rich, or the very very poor but normal people like us ... you don't see those. I don't think a lot of things are done to achieve integration ... or at least I haven't seen it.

Amina claimed that some sort of policy was needed to aid integration, to avoid the formation of ghettos, but was not sure whether the *Generalitat* or the *Ajuntament* did anything in this sense:

S: And regarding integration, help towards integration, do you think that it is a personal thing or are there organisations which help it ...

A: ... I think it is a process that needs help. Lots of people would like to feel integrated but if society rejects them, forces them into a ghetto, then it is difficult for them to be able to integrate. They do not really give this person a chance.

S: And are there any policies from the town hall or from the Generalitat which aids this integration ...

A: Hmmm ... I don't really know ... how embarrassing not to know, given that I work here [*Cáritas,* an NGO]. I think efforts are made towards it but I don't know if it is achieved.

S: For example, does Pujol ever talk about immigration?

A: I don't know, because I never listen to him ... .

In summary then, 'integration' had a range of meanings for immigrants. Immigrants tried to define it by saying what it should be about in contrast to what it should not be about. 'Integration' should be about adaptation to new circumstance and a two-way process rather than assimilation.

Future intentions and situation of children as a 'measure' of integration
Future plans were, on the whole, undecided and in most cases dependent on employment; as long as there was work people were happy to stay in Catalunya. Other factors, such as personal relationships, or feeling 'integrated' and happy in

Catalunya meant people wanted to stay. Likewise, the longer they stayed in Spain, the less likely they were to return to their country of origin.

The decision to stay or return to their home country was largely to do with the links they had maintained there. Fatima felt 'nearly like a tourist' when she went to Morocco: home was now in Catalunya:

> S: Do you see yourself here in the future?
> F: Yes, I will be here all my life, I am happy here. I have my life here and my home is in Catalunya.

Sonia also imagined her future in Spain:

> S: And how do you see your future, do you see it in Barcelona or ...
> Sonia: Yes, I see it here. I feel quite integrated as I have a job and I am planning to study social work here and I have my house and my friends ... I have my space here. I can imagine my life here more than I can imagine it in Brazil, no? Well, I don't say no to Brazil but I think I shall live here. I have my own space, my friends, my routine and I am happy here ...

On the other hand Etna had maintained contacts in Gambia and talked about returning there one day. However she herself was slightly sceptical about this actually happening and laughed at way the 'myth of return' had shaped her life. For example, in the first years of being in Spain, when her children were small, she did not buy a washing machine since she thought she would not be able to get it back to Gambia.

Doudou, from Senegal, also wanted to return to Senegal where his family lived:

> S: And where do you see your future?
> D: No, I have never seen my future here ... in the future I will have to go to Senegal. I never forget Senegal, because that is where my mother and brother are. But while I am working, I only want to work in Spain.

When asked about the future, Margarita said it depended on employment here and the conditions in her country of origin. She saw herself living in Spain, since going back to the Dominican Republic would mean starting from scratch again:

S: And how do you see your future, in Spain or ...

M: (laughter) ... It is like everyone else, the years go by and you are still here ... A lot is to do with your country of origin. Because if the conditions don't change, if they don't improve ... If I thought I could go back there and the situation would be better, but it is not better and you move away from there, you feel better here, because you have your friends, your work and you aren't used to life there. Then you think that in the near future you will stay here. But if conditions change, if the conditions that are on offer there get a bit better then you would go there. So it is all a bit uncertain ... it also depends on the ties you have here, if you get married here or if you are working here, then you have to be where there is work. To go back there is to start a new adventure ... that is why it is better to stay here although it is all a bit uncertain ...

As has been concluded through other studies on immigration, the children of immigrants often live 'between two cultures' (Watson 1977): this might, or might not, be seen as problematic.

Leila said her children felt very adapted to life in Catalunya and 'have friends, have everything like any child who lives here'. She said that while her children loved going back to Morocco for the summer holidays she did not think they would like to live there permanently. In Barcelona, she took her children to the Mosque after school where they would learn Arabic and about the Muslim religion.

However, Etna talked about her children being caught between two cultures since they were born and brought up in Catalunya and yet were African:

I think they are living from day to day, they know they are African, they feel that, but they are as much influenced by the Catalan culture as by the other one ... I think they are, I don't like the word, but I think they are victims of immigration. Because they have Catalunya in the heart but they carry Africa on their skins, they can love and adore Catalunya but whatever happens first and foremost they are Africans ... but there is a difference between feeling and reality ... they love this land where they have grown up..

I asked Etna whether her children had taken up Spanish nationality and she said that they had not, they had always had residency permits, as she and her husband

had thought they would go back to Gambia one day and take the children with them so that they could find out more about their roots.

The learning of the parents' language was also an important issue. In Fatou's case the children spoke Catalan and Castilian but not *wolof* (the parent's mother-tongue). Etna had been so eager to practise her Castillian when her children were small that she did not teach them *wolof*, and now felt that might have been a mistake. While some parents felt that children would pick up Arabic as they get older, others made more of an effort for them to learn Arabic from an early stage[19]. Likewise, both *Ibn Batuta* and *ATIME* provided Arab language lessons to young people, and provided a series of activities in the association to give the young people a chance to learn Arabic (for example they had satellite television and watched the channels in Arabic) and make them aware of Muslim traditions.

In the case of the people from the Dominican Republic, language and religion may not be an issue, and yet there was a clear need to provide an alternative space for adolescents:

> H: There are lots of adolescent boys who come here and have new horizons which they did not have before: consumerism, freedom, pleasures they did not have there [country of origin] ... When they come here, when they discover drugs, night-clubs and bars, all these sorts of things ... As there is no alternative - and this alternative should be provided by us through the association and with the help of the consulate - then there are lots of young people who are becoming vegetables, they lose it all and become cocky figures in the night-clubs, giving in to a life of leisure and forgetting the reasons why they came here ... because they are always going to night-clubs, taking drugs, chasing women ... But it does not make sense to come all this way to do that, that is a waste of time. This is the situation at the moment which means that the group is not doing very well, it is not making the most of the situation in Spain. People have to have the possibility of saying: 'today I am not doing to a night club but I am going to our association to play chess', or to the library to read a book, or to meet some friends, or something like that. This alternative has not been created and this has its costs for the community.

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[19]For example, Leila who sent her children to Arab lessons at the Mosque.

All these associations were worried about the future of the immigrants. This concern was reflected in their worry towards the children. As more children began to arrive or be born in Spain, more attention had to be paid to schooling. Safhid said that schooling was not a problem if the parents had a work and residence permit, but if they did not then schools would not automatically take the children. *ATIME* was trying to liaise with neighbourhood associations and schools to ensure that children were given access to education.

SUMMARY OF MAIN THEMES

In this section I summarise the main points made by the immigrants and how they are linked to the issues discussed throughout the dissertation.

Political citizenship

The Spanish legislation on immigration grants no direct political rights to immigrants. Immigrants themselves felt excluded from politics in Spain.

When I asked immigrants who they would vote for if they were given the vote, there was a range of answers. One immigrant talked about differential voting; how he would vote for the nationalist CiU at the autonomous community elections, but for the socialist PSOE at the central government elections. As has been discussed in Chapter Three, differential voting was a common feature in the Catalan context.

Other immigrants, who defined themselves as being on the left, said they would nevertheless vote for CiU. They believed CiU was the best party to defend the interests of the Catalan nation. Jordi Pujol himself was regarded as a charismatic and clever leader who had managed to obtain many privileges for Catalunya. Immigrants' views confirmed the important role that CiU has played in Catalunya in recent decades. Pujol has been the only Catalan president since the Statute of Autonomy came in to existence in 1979, and has been a crucial negotiator of the transferral of powers from the central state to Catalunya.

The only political right available to immigrants was participation in political parties, trade unions, and associations. There was a range of responses when I asked immigrants what they thought of associations. Some felt that associations acted in their own interests and did not really help immigrants. Other immigrants felt associations they had come across did not represent their interests and so they did not participate in them. The heterogeneous nature of immigration meant that

associations could not always represent all immigrants. However, the majority of the immigrants felt that associations had an important function for immigrants. The most basic aim of associations was to bring people together. Associations also acted as a bridge between the state and the immigrants. They provided free information and advice, and helped immigrants access state resources.

In the Spanish context, associations have put pressure on the government to modify the existing legislation. Pressure coming from associations and other organisations has achieved a relaxation of the existing legislation. Associations have also disseminated information about the conditions of immigration - some of this knowledge has been considered by the government when drawing up the legislation. More recently, the different layers of government have formed consultative bodies which involve immigrants in the decision-making process. A number of associations represent immigrants' interests on these bodies.

The different activities that immigrant associations carried out reflected the idea of *interculturalitat*. The aim of the *Pla Interdepartamental d'Immigració* was *interculturalitat*, which referred to a coexistence based on knowledge of the other, and on creating the opportunities to meet and interact. The idea of '*interculturalitat*' was put in to practice through activities that showed Catalans the cultures of immigrants, and vice versa. Immigrants mentioned activities such as giving talks and making biscuits - this brought their experiences closer to the Catalans. Associations also play an important role in teaching immigrants Catalan, and showing them different aspects of Catalan culture.

While associations could cooperate and exert pressure on the central state, the focus of the associations was on improving conditions at the local level (Hammar 1990; Layton Henry 1992). This is reflected in the policies at the local level - the *Generalitat* and the Barcelona town hall have been open to taking the views of immigrants on board.

Legal Citizenship
Legal citizenship refers to the membership of the state: this can either be full membership (nationality) or a permit to work and reside in the state. Legal citizenship is the most formal aspect of inclusion and exclusion. The codification of legal citizenship is the way in which other assumptions about who belongs and who does not belong are turned into legislation. Hammar (1989: 85) states that

'considered in this purely formal, legal sense, citizenship can be regulated in a pragmatic, dispassionate manner'. However, data presented above shows that legal citizenship is far from being a dispassionate affair. One immigrant I interviewed felt that it was '*los papeles*' that had constantly reminded her that she was a foreigner and which had made her feel most unwanted in Spain.

For immigrants the problem was how to maintain legal status in Spain. The difficulties caused by the constant renewal of *los papeles* had repercussions in other areas of social life, such as employment and housing. *Los papeles* were also the object of control. Immigrants mentioned they were often stopped and asked for papers on the streets.

Aspects of legal citizenship have been heavily criticised in Spain. Opposition to the present system of work and residence permits has been a central focus for mobilisation. Associations and trade unions have pressurised the central government to make the process easier. As discussed in Chapter Six, the legislation regarding legal citizenship has become more flexible, but it continues to be the main problem faced by immigrants.

Naturalisation is often seen as the last step of integration since it grants full political and legal rights (Hammar 1989). However, many aspects of integration were not achieved by naturalisation. Naturalisation did not grant social, cultural or psychological rights. In spite of the fact that naturalisation made life easier in some respects, other aspects of exclusion remained.

The immigrants I interviewed did not see naturalisation as a way of increasing their sense of belonging in Catalunya. They did not think they would ever feel Catalan, nor would they be viewed as such by other Catalans - people would continue to regard them as foreigners. In the Catalan context, immigrants from other areas of Spain (who have full citizenship rights) continue to argue for their full inclusion into Catalan society.

Some immigrants were happy to give up the passport of their country of origin. They felt that nationality was something you carried inside and having a different passport would not change that. They were instrumental about getting a passport. Many felt it would make their life easier because they would not have to go through the constant difficulties of renewing the work and residence papers. Other

people did not want to give up their own nationality because they felt that it was a central part of their identity. However, for practical issues, they were willing to take on dual nationality.

There was a significant difference in the attitudes towards naturalisation of Latin Americans and Africans. As presented in Chapter Six, the number of Latin Americans obtaining Spanish nationality is significantly higher than other nationalities. The immigrants' statements showed how the privileges stated in the legislation for the countries with 'historic links' made a difference to immigrants' experience in Spain. Latin Americans had two main privileges: firstly, they could have dual nationality. Many Latin American immigrants said they would not apply for Spanish nationality if this were not the case. Studies carried out elsewhere in Europe have also shown that more people are likely to apply for naturalisation if dual nationality is permitted (Bauböck and Çinar 1994; Hammar 1989). Secondly, Latin Americans only had to have two years of continuous and legal residence in order to be able to apply for nationality. In contrast, other nationalities[20] must reside in Spain for ten years of continuous residence and are obliged to give up their original nationality. The fact that these 'historical links' still prevail confirms the importance of the ideas of the 'nation-state' (Brubaker 1992). These 'historical links' have concrete effects on the shaping of both legislation and the experiences of immigrants in Spain.

Social and cultural citizenship
Immigrants are perceived as being different in social and cultural terms. This is highlighted by Jordi Pujol's comments on the 'new challenge: the arrival of people who come from the Third World' (Preface of **Informe de Girona**, 1992). The *Diputació's Programa d'immigració* also defined extracommunitarian immigration in term of ethnic, cultural and religious differences (1996: 4). With respect to immigrants' social and cultural rights, I focused on the Catalan language and the celebration of fiestas.

Interviewees felt that they were not really given the chance to speak Catalan. People assumed that because they looked foreign, they would only be able to speak Castilian. A study carried out by Lluis Flaquer showed the same results. Flaquer concluded that 'the rules of addressing black and foreign people in Spanish maybe

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[20] I focus on Africans but it is also true for other groups.

reveals tribalistic and closed attitudes toward strangers that might be connected with a difficulty in updating the idea of citizenship' (1996). The Catalan language was a clear boundary of inclusion and exclusion.

The importance of the Catalan language to Catalan nationalism is also reflected in the idea that 'language is a precise indicator of willingness and possibility of integration' (Colectivo IOE 1992: 65). As can be seen by the positive attitudes towards language, immigrants were definitely willing to integrate in this sense. There was not a lot of data on immigrants' knowledge of Catalan. However the data available showed some similarities between non-European Union immigration and Spanish immigration. First, passive knowledge of Catalan was higher than active knowledge. Second, Catalan was seen as a key tool for social mobility. In spite of this, immigrants (both Spanish and non-EU) often put off learning Catalan because they could get by with Castilian. Catalan was not seen as essential for their jobs.

Once again there was a difference between Latin Americans and Africans. Africans faced a double language barrier as they had to learn both Castilian and Catalan. Latin Americans already spoke Castilian, thus having an advantage.

The celebration of fiestas was another key aspect of *interculturalitat*. Immigrant associations celebrated both Catalan fiestas and fiestas of the places of origin. In the case of Catalan fiestas, these were often celebrated with Catalan associations - immigrants saw these as a way of learning about Catalunya. However, the emphasis was on the fiestas of the place of origin. These occasions were an opportunity for immigrants to meet and get to know each other. The hope was that this would lead to cooperation in other areas.

Present-day situation
The present-day situation of immigrants varied according to their place of origin and whether or not they had work and residence permits. Latin Americans were regarded to be in a better position because they shared religion and a language with the Catalans. Africans, on the other hand, shared neither. Yet both groups faced similar problems with *los papeles* and when finding adequate employment. The majority of immigrants occupy the lower echelons of the labour market.

Immigrants who had been in Spain for a long time felt that some aspects of immigration had become harder. They felt it was harder to get into Spain. This was due to the tighter visa policies and increased border controls. Once inside Spain it was practically impossible to get a work and residence permit. Immigrants also thought that it was getting increasingly hard to find employment in Spain. Although this may be the immigrants' perception, studies on immigration have not come to the same conclusion[21].

Other aspects of immigrants' lives were regarded as getting easier. The existing immigrants felt they had already carved a niche in the labour market, where newly arrived immigrants could fit in. At the same time, they had already fought for many of their rights, and built a bridge between the immigrants and the host society.

Integration

Integration was the stated aim of all levels of government. Integration was defined as a dynamic process of exchange, 'considering the immigrants in all aspects, not only as a worker but as a citizen with needs in the areas of education, culture, health and social participation' (Dirección General de Migraciones 1994: 36).

Immigrants' attitudes towards the concept of 'integration' was not positive. When I asked immigrants what they thought the word meant they said it was ambiguous, overused, a cliché, an empty and fashionable word. Immigrants believed that the definition of integration used was, in fact, closer to assimilation. They did not feel that their customs or characteristics were accepted as equal to those of the Catalans.

Many immigrants felt integration should be defined in terms of rights. Immigrants, especially if they fulfilled the legal requirements, should be given the same opportunities as Spanish citizens. This was especially relevant *vis-à-vis* employment. Various factors had contributed to keeping immigrants in marginalised, low status, and badly paid jobs. The quota system, introduced in 1993, granted permits for immigrants to work in specific sectors of the labour market. They could neither change jobs nor geographical area without reapplying for a permit.

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[21] See Chapter Five.

Other immigrants felt that integration should go beyond the possibility of living and working in a country; it should include real coexistence. Immigrants' views were close to the idea of *convivencia* which was often used in Catalunya to describe the relationship between Catalans and immigrants from other areas of Spain.

In the eyes of the immigrants, integration would be best achieved if the different tiers of government worked with each other, but also worked with the associations and the trade unions. They felt integration was a long-term goal which required constant work.

The aim of most present-day legislation was not integration. Although the focus was still on the control of immigration, issues of integration had been increasingly addressed. Integration has been treated as a completely separate matter from the work and residence permits. However, it was clear that the work and residence permits affected wider issues of integration. Immigrants stated that more permanent permits were a first step to other aspects of integration. As long as immigrants did not have these permanent permits, they were not allowed to participate fully in society.

Future intentions and children

Immigrants were not sure where they would be in the future. For some, the idea of returning to their country of origin existed. For others, the decision to stay in Spain depended on employment, on relationships they had formed, and whether they had children born in Catalunya.

Regarding the situation of children and young people it was clear that there was an increasing need to concentrate on their needs and to provide a space for them. As time goes by there has been an increase in the studies of children and in measures regarding children.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has outlined immigrants' opinions on various factors which affect their feeling of 'belonging' in Catalunya. This has been done using the framework of citizenship rights. The legal and political aspects of citizenship rights are easier to identify through the legislation and are more clear cut than the social and cultural aspects.

The restrictive nature of legal and political citizenship in Spain is perhaps the clearest indicator that the Spanish model of citizenship is closer to Brubaker's 'citizenship traditionalism' (where the citizenship rights granted by the 'nation-state' are central) than to Soysal's 'postnational membership' (1996). Soysal argues that formal citizenship is no longer important since:

> [t]he majority of the immigrant populations have a permanent resident status...which is a status not very distinguishable from a formal citizenship status in terms of the rights and privileges it confers (1996: 20).

However, non-EU immigrants in Spain do not have permanent (or even long-term) residence permits - permits have to be renewed continuously, and are subject to legislation which can be changed. In the same way, the possession of work and residence permits also determines access to other social and cultural rights. Issues surrounding the acquisition and maintenance of *los papeles* are the principle source of social exclusion.

Similarly, non-EU immigrants in Spain do not have the right to vote at any level. As has been discussed above, disenfranchisement continues to be a key aspect of exclusion, since full voting rights are only granted to those who hold Spanish nationality.

The political activities of immigrants focused on their participation and involvement in various associations and trade unions which fight for the rights of immigrants and also celebrate aspects of their own culture. This is encouraged by the official policies of *interculturalitat* and the increasing involvement of associations in the creation of policy through consultative bodies. The unstable and heterogeneous nature of the immigrant populations often means that goals are short term, or focused on particular issues. But associations are important support networks that can be mobilised when needed.

Immigrants have mainly mobilised around legal issues to do with work and residency permits. Demands such as full political rights, naturalisation and dual nationality are secondary to the demands for *los papeles*.

In the final section of the chapter I look at issues of integration, how immigrants see their present day situation in Catalunya (especially *vis-à-vis* other groups of immigrants) and how they see the future of their children. It is clear that the

concept of 'integration' arouses a lot of suspicion in immigrants: they do not like its perceived ambiguity, or fear it may be more about assimilation than adaptation. While the immigrants I interviewed were not sure where their future would take them, those who had children felt their children would probably stay in Catalunya for good.

CHAPTER EIGHT

BECOMING CATALAN: IMMIGRANTS AND CATALAN NATIONALISM

INTRODUCTION

This chapter concentrates on immigrants' attitudes to aspects of Catalan nationalism and Catalan national identity. The first section focuses on immigrants' attitudes to nationalism in general, and Catalan nationalism in particular. As has been discussed above, Catalan nationalism is defined as civic and inclusive. I was interested to see if, how, and to what extent immigrants who arrived from outside Spain would agree with this definition.

The second section deals with immigrants' response to the symbols around Catalan nationalism. The Catalan language is a 'core symbol' of Catalan nationalism, so I focus on immigrants' attitudes towards Catalan.

In the third section I look at stereotypical images of Catalans and the way in which they are often juxtaposed with images of people from other areas of Spain. In most cases, the characteristics of Catalans are defined against those of Andalucians.

In the final section, I present immigrants' views on what it means to be a Catalan. I gave them four phrases defining 'a Catalan', and asked them which one they most agreed with.

CATALAN NATIONALISM

Issues to do with Catalan nationalism arose throughout the interviews. In the section below I look at what was said with direct reference to Catalan nationalism and in direct response to my questions: 'what do you think about Catalan nationalism?' or 'would you say Catalan nationalism is open?' In many cases I asked this question after I had asked them about their voting intentions and whether they would vote for 'a party which defends Catalan interests'. In other cases, issues of life in Catalunya and of 'integration' were talked about, and this seemed a natural introduction to my question.

On the whole, immigrants accepted Catalan nationalism. They saw its struggles as legitimate even when they felt it was 'closed'. Immigrants felt that Catalunya should not see the new characteristics which immigrants brought with them as a threat, but as positive attributes.

Open/closed nature

In some cases I directly asked immigrants whether they thought Catalan nationalism was open or closed.

> S: And do you think Catalan nationalism is open?
>
> Juan: Yes, because there are various kinds of nationalism. There are nationalisms that are more open, and others that are more closed. There are nationalism that exclude and others that are more open ...
>
> S: And the Catalan one?
>
> J: It is not as open or as moderate as is said. The Catalans set up a situation of exclusion through language and this is not the best way because ... do you know how beautiful it would be if all people could understand each other in various languages, that people would know various languages, that you could talk to people wherever you are, in the language of the other, that is beautiful ... That is my final goal in life, I wish there would be only one language, only one frontier ...

Juan felt Catalan nationalism excluded people through the Catalan language (its most salient symbol). However, he also said that Catalan nationalism went beyond language:

> Not only because of the language, that is only an example, but from a deeper point of view, of feelings, that also start with the economy. That is, the Catalan project does not aim to redistribute wealth throughout the whole state. On the contrary, it aims to have a greater quota of economic power, therefore it is a non-supportive idea

Hector also felt that Catalan nationalism was not open. In his view, no nationalism was open:

> S: And do you think that Catalan nationalism, in general, is open?
>
> H: No, it is not open. And I don't think any nationalism is open ... nationalism itself sometimes borders on the reactionary and the case here, the Catalans, in general, they tend to be closed.

Margarita said that Catalans were not open to accept anything 'foreign'. From this she concluded that Catalan nationalism was closed:

> Catalans do not want to have, they do not even want contact with other people. That means that there is that fear of 'don't you change what is mine' or 'you are going to dirty what is mine'.

While there were some immigrants who had very strong views on Catalan nationalism, two I interviewed did not think that nationalism was part of their daily life in Catalunya:

> Abdel: You hear about it on the radio among politicians but ... in daily life I don't think there is any. I do not feel any, to the ordinary citizen no, no, no ... because I have never seen two fighting, Spanish-Catalan or Catalan-Spanish.

> S: Catalan nationalism is talked about a lot ... As a person who comes from elsewhere, how do you see Catalan nationalism?
> Leila: What is nationalism?
> S: When they say that Catalunya is different from other areas of Spain or ...
> L: I don't know, I don't understand that sort of thing ... I don't know ... for example to be from Spain and to be from Catalunya? I don't know, I don't have information (laughs) ... I really don't know.

Two faces of nationalism: 'good if not taken to the extremes`
Most immigrants thought nationalism was positive but it also had the potential to be negative.

> Motaz: Nationalism is good, ... as long as you take into account both sides of it, you take in to account the good side, because it has a good side and a bad side .

Pablo explicitly emphasised the way in which nationalism was exploited both politically and socially:

> of course there are people who exploit it politically. They exploit it politically and even socially, even iconographically, inventing little flags or posters ...

232

Nobody answered my question by saying directly that Catalan nationalism was open. But aspects of 'openness' were talked about. What were the good aspects of nationalism? A number of people said it was positive to feel proud of one's country. Motaz admired Pujol and his policies which have brought benefits to Catalunya without going as far as asking for independence. Motaz considered nationalism, which struggles to get economic equality, as 'not bad ... life is like that ... '.

Hector felt that it was positive to feel proud of one's nation and that nationalism was a good thing in so far as it showed a certain maturity:

> I see it as a good thing. Because I see it as a nation reflecting its maturity of what it is and what it wants to be, with independence and autonomy, and not feeling inferior to the French who are next door, or the German or the English, but you feel Catalan, just like the other is German ... I do admire that ... to maintain itself. Because there are lots of other nations around that are a lot bigger but that do not have such a clear sense of pride in themselves.

Immigrants saw nationalism in a positive light unless it was too radical or taken to the extremes. What were the 'extremes' mentioned? It is not entirely clear what was meant by this but below are some quotes which might illustrate its meaning. Motaz saw extreme nationalism as leading to 'many problems' and gave the examples of Congo, Rwanda, Yugoslavia and his own country, Sudan. In the Spanish context Motaz said that other areas of Spain saw Catalunya and its leader, Jordi Pujol, as having a lot of power, both politically and economically. In the present legislature, Pujol was seen as having more power than the prime minister Jose María Aznar in Madrid and this lead to resentment 'because people interpret it the wrong way'. Economically, Catalunya was also in a privileged position:

> the hatred that exists between the rest of Spain and Catalunya, the reason is fundamentally economic, that's what I think. It is economic ... because Catalunya is rich.

Sonia felt it was right to protect language and culture. However she was uncomfortable when it was overprotected. She gave two examples to make her point.

S: And what do you associate with Catalan culture, what do you understand by Catalan culture?

Sonia: ... (laughs) by Catalan culture? I think there is a lot of protection. I worked for a while as a manager for some artists and I saw that there is a protection of the culture here. And anything that comes from outside has a bit of a hard time. At the same time as Catalans say they want to open up, I feel it is quite closed. I see it closed regarding the music that comes from outside, for art ... a foreign artist has quite a lot of problems here. And I don't only mean South Americans, I worked with German artists and artists from other areas of Europe, from developed countries and they have quite a lot of difficulties.

S: In showing their work or ...

Sonia: Yes, in showing their work. Because there is quite a clear preference for Catalans ... as we want to protect it, but I think it is a bit bad for art.

Sonia's second example was to do with the use of the Catalan language in exhibitions.

S: So you don't see it as open?

Sonia: No, no, no ... I sometimes went to exhibitions of foreign artists here and the information is only written in Catalan, no? I went to galleries and I saw that everything was written in Catalan, the least they could do would be to put it in English given that they do not want to put it in Castilian (laughter) ... they should put it in English, because it is a bit strange [to only put it in Catalan] ... Yes, I agree with, I completely agree that Catalan should be spoken in schools but I also think that things have been completely reversed, no? As they were banned from speaking their language for so long, well now we are going to turn things around and there is a sort of rejection towards Castilian, and ...

Irrational aspects of nationalism

A couple of people saw nationalism as slightly irrational in the present political scenario of the formation of Europe and wider political processes.

Juan did not understand why Catalans felt so threatened by things which were different or new. Coming from the Dominican Republic, where there is a variety

and mixture of languages and cultures, he did not perceive these differences as a threat, but as enriching. He concluded by saying 'I see it as a futile struggle'[1].

A couple of people mentioned the fact that although it may be good to feel proud of one's country, it was strange that it happened at this moment in time:

> Hector: This ultra nationalist vision is paradoxical at this moment of globalisation ... the issue of the 'national' is paradoxical at a stage when we are in a global stage - in a process where nationality and identities are becoming less important.

Likewise Pablo felt that nationalism was a very deep feeling but that it was a strange time to be discussing it.

> It is very difficult to put people against a feeling that is so crude, so variable, no? ... I am not for a Greater Catalunya. The resources aren't there and there is no demand for it, no possibility or perspective. It has a very limited future now that we are in the Europe of the nations ... to speak of separation is madness.

Against nationalism

A few of the immigrants I interviewed were opposed to nationalism for various reasons: because they saw it as 'economically divisive', as 'backward' and because it would cause uneasiness in the rest of Spain.

Juan said that it was always the richer parts of the country which aspired to separation:

> The nationalist idea, for me, is a very divisive idea ... because it is an idea that is fundamentally based on separation ... and essentially a separation of rich states from the poor states ... For example, you can always see that the states which aspire to be separate are the richer states, so that they don't have to share their riches with the rest of the states. That is why in the Padonia, this guy Bossi is demanding separation, it is the richest part of Italy therefore they demand separation from the rest, from the Italians. But if the situation were the other way around, if they were the poorest, they would not be talking about separation, they would be talking about the better distribution of wealth. The same happens here, in the Catalan state and in the Basque

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[1] 'It' refers to Catalan nationalism.

Country, they are the richest states, they aspire to separate from the rest of the Spanish state. But if these were the poorest states and the others were the richest, they would not be talking about nationalism, or about separation. On the contrary, they would be talking about solidarity, they would act differently regarding language. And history has shown this, that nationalism is a divisive concept and from my point of view it is ... backward ... That is why it is an inhumane idea, very inhumane ...

Mustapha felt that independence would make a country weaker:

well, I think it is very easy, to say be independent and create a country. Well yes, but that is going to weaken a country. If Catalunya were to become independent from Spain then that would weaken Spain and Catalunya, because Catalunya needs Spain and Spain needs Catalunya, it is a coexistence. What needs to be done is improve coexistence, lessen the tensions to avoid conflicts ...   And the bad thing is that it creates an uneasiness, in all of Spain, for example there are lots of autonomous communities who look at Catalunya and the Basque Country with suspicion. Why? Because people say they have privileges, that they have more advantages than we have ... Why? Because they influence the politics of the government, because they have more of a say, they give it support, and that is to abuse the circumstances that favour your Community and discriminate against others ...

Others linked nationalism to demands for independence and feared the instability this would cause. Mustapha was opposed to nationalism because of its radicalism and the outcome it may have:

I don't believe in nationalism, and I personally link it to radicalism, that always looks for ... the extremes. They only look at one side. For example I think, I fear, and I hope I am wrong, that the same thing that happened in Yugoslavia does not happen here, Yugoslavia was an united country, it was a powerful country, but what happened? Let's say that when each community raised its flag, a civil war started.
S: And do you think the situation in Spain is similar?
M: ... I don't know, but I think that if Catalans continue along this path ... and I don't mean all the Catalans because there are lots of Catalans who are not nationalists, are not extremists. But I repeat there are Catalans who are extremists who insist in creating a sense of discomfort and disagreement, inside society, confuse political unity ... I think the same could happen ... I hope not, but if we continue like this, I think it will ... But imagine Catalunya wants to be independent from Spain, the Basque

country wants to be independent from Spain. What will the Galician community say? Or the Andalucian one? They will ask for the same thing and then, well, we will see if the same thing that happened in Yugoslavia happens here ...

S: And do you think that Catalan nationalism is this type of independent nationalism ...

M: Uff, I don't know, there are some things that are, that really frighten me. Above all *Esquerra Republicana* and the like, who have very strong ideas.

SYMBOLS OF CATALAN NATIONALISM

The central role of language

The majority of immigrants had not been aware of the existence of the Catalan language before they had arrived in Catalunya. However, once there, they had realised the important role language played as a symbol of Catalunya. They saw it as an important expression of Catalan culture, history and character[2]:

S: And what things, what symbols do you associate with Catalunya?

Mustapha: ... Symbols? Well Catalan, the language, and if we talk about the culture, I would chose the language ... mm ... lots of customs, of culture ...

S: You said you would vote for Pujol because he says that Catalunya is a nation, but what are the things that make it a nation, in what way is it a nation ...

Motaz: A nation, how would I define it? Because it has its own customs, it has a language ... it has a mentality ... .

S: What customs?

M: Customs. Its own customs of the nation ... for example. Own language, which is Catalan and ... mm ... its own things that form the country ... above all the language.

The Catalan language was also seen as a way in which the Catalans had maintained a sense of their identity in the past:

Margarita: As Catalans have also had to fight constantly to get what they have wanted to get, it was a very badly treated nation, by the dictatorship, by the dictatorial ideas ...

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[2] Another study carried out on immigrants living in Cuitat Vella in Barcelona drew the same conclusions about the importance of language (Comella Casanova 1997).

All this has meant that Catalans have closed ranks. And as for their customs, as for the language and all that, they want to maintain them.

Although immigrants were, on the whole, very positive towards the Catalan language some were not comfortable with the way it was 'forced on them' or used for political purposes. Motaz did not like the way in which the media treated the Catalan language; in his view they were too forceful about it:

for me, culture does not take up space, if I want to learn Catalan well, 'Benvengut!' ... I am going to learn it, because knowledge does not take up space ... what is bad is the way in which some of the media in Catalunya deal with the issue of nationalism and of the language ...

S: How do they deal with it?

M: They do not deal with it well. They do not look at it from the point of view of a neutral man ...

S: How do they look at it?

M: They look at it in a way that, those who are from outside, are obliged to learn it. Because they are in Barcelona, have to be Barça followers ...

S: What media are you referring to?

M: ... All media, TV3[3] ... eeeeeh, the newspapers ...

S: The Catalan papers?

M: Yes, the Catalan papers. They do not look at it the way they should ... as I said, it has a double meaning, it is a double-edged sword ... for example, in TV3 ... what they should do is encourage people to ...

S: Encourage?

M: Encourage, to say that if you want to learn the language, it is a very nice language. But not to be so strict, 'you study like this, you have to learn it'; that is what it is like sometimes. They do not say that directly, but indirectly they say it and that gives a bad image to the people who do not want to learn. And when you don't want to learn, then you'll find any excuse not to.

While Hector agreed with the idea that the present situation is a result of the previous repression of the Catalan language by Franco, he felt that it had become too politicised.

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[3] This is the Catalan Television, subsidised by the Generalitat and in Catalan.

S: And how do you see the issue of the language now that it is being debated[4]?

H: I think it is good, but I think it is becoming too political. It has been politicised and perhaps I think that ... it is a bit harming given the history of Catalunya. What they suffered under Franco's dictatorship is all very recent, and logically this is still present in this generation and in young people, the wound is still there and perhaps without meaning to, they take a radical position. But it is due to the unconscious defence that is still maintained even when the reality is completely different but as it is a recent historical process. Not everyone knows what has happened and that when someone says something they are not saying it in the same voice that might have been used in the 60s and 70s ... I try to understand that behind many attitudes there is an open wound from those years of repression, and of course that one element to hold onto is the legacy of language and to say: 'it is alive and I want everyone to know it' ... I understand it but it goes too far, it goes too far and basically it gets manipulated politically. Although I think that, if we all found a way of speaking the same language, we would all speak it, but without coercive means. In the same way as they weren't subtle during the dictatorship with Castilian, humans immediately react by blocking off, they block off and reject that. Therefore if it were not as politically used, if people were left to decide ... and the two languages were allowed to sail in society and neither be excluded, then people would think it was wonderful. But when that language is used for electoral means it is bad. Evidently it is a problem that stems from many years when repression was lived and felt, the wounds are there ... And to mobilise it due to the timing of elections, then clearly you are creating a situation which might not immediately affect you, because what you are interested in are the votes, but the wounds remains ...

In summary, immigrants (both Latin Americans and Africans) saw the Catalan language as a central and legitimate symbol of Catalunya. However, they felt some discomfort at being forced to learn the language, and about the way it was used politically.

Other symbols

Other symbols which people mentioned were the history and culture of Catalunya, including the clear sense that Catalans have of who they are:

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[4] The interview was carried out as the new linguistic law, finally passed in late 1997, was being discussed.

Liviana: Well, I think they have a history, no? I think they have a lot of history. They have a different way of behaving. I mean to say, they have an identity ... I think they do, they have an identity as Catalans.

Folk elements: *sardana* and *castellers*[5]

Other symbols which people mentioned were linked to folk elements, national holidays and to customs:

S: Are there any traditions which you associate with Catalunya?
Abdel: Yes, for example, do you mean the *sardana*? There are the typical *sardanas*, the dancing giants ... and then ... what are they called? The *castellers* ... yes, there are things that are typically from here ...

Juan: I like ... for example I like the music of Catalunya, they are very beautiful. The *sardana* has a musical rhythm that I love ...
S: Do you dance it?
J: No, I don't dance it but I love it ... I think that musical rhythm is very beautiful. I can say to you that perhaps it is one of the most beautiful musical rhythms there is ... if we did not have merengue [Dominican dance] of course (laughter).

One particular *sardana* had caused a strong emotional response in Pablo and had led him to become more interested in Catalunya and all things Catalan. He described this as the 'conspiracy of the *sardana*':

The experience that one has, you feel it when you go to a place, like me when I arrived in Barcelona and found myself one day, (this is a long time ago), in the middle of a *sardana*, a huge *sardana* that went around the Plaça Sant Jaume, along Via Laetana, went along the Plaça Catalunya, it went down the Rambla and all ... They had put up a series of loudspeakers and everyone was dancing the *sardana*, and when I saw this ... I saw the conspiracy of the *sardana*, as I call it ... Tears came to my eyes, I got emotional and was crying ... Not because of the dance, because the *sardana* is a very boring dance, but because it was very touching. That was ten years ago, and things were not like they are now, the transition had just happened, it had not been long since dancing the *sardana* had been banned, that speaking Catalan was banned. And

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[5] *Sardana* is a typical Catalan dance, and *castellers* are the human towers.

when I saw that, well ... I was touched. And then I began to talk, to talk to many people and to Catalanise myself, no? To understand Catalan issues, understand the reasons why ... and to see what the city is like ... I have a terrace where you can go up and see the city ... One is amazed at the things that underlie the notes of the *sardana* and the small steps of this innocent Catalan dance, and the clothes in the middle and the glances, that is what I call the conspiracy of the *sardana*.

S: And what are they conspiring then?

P: The reunification of the whole of the great country of great Catalunya, if you scratch till you reach the bottom of this, to find what the old Catalans think. The young Catalans also carry the things from their parents if you look properly ...

Football

Throughout my interviews football was mentioned at several points. In some cases the subject came out of other related issues being talked about (for example Mustapha talked about football in the context of the struggle between Madrid and Barcelona) while in other cases I directly asked about football.

When I asked Sonia what things she associated with Catalunya she thought about it and, laughing, replied: '*el Barça*'. A number of people linked football to Catalan nationalism:

Pablo: *Barça* has been the flag of Catalanisme.

Amina: Most Catalans support *Barça*, I think so, they are very nationalistic in this ... I am not a *Barça* supporter, I don't support anything, I think football is stupid ...

Zora also talked about the general assumption that all Catalans belonged to Barça:

what I found strange was a Catalan who supported *Real Madrid*.

In spite of not liking football, Margarita saw the way in which Barça had played a political role:

all that has to do with a political conspiracy And I found out that under Franco they had restrictions and only *Real Madrid* could win, not *Barça*, then I always see football at a political level ... I always see the political aspect.

When I asked Liviana about football she said that people had sometimes asked her: 'Why do most people who come from abroad support *Real Madrid*, instead of Barcelona if they are living here?'

> S: Ah, most of them support ...
>
> L: No, there are many who support Barcelona. But there are also many who support Madrid. And it is, that is a reaction, because many people feel - not me because I have been very lucky - feel chased by the police ...
>
> (interrupted)
>
> S: You were talking about *Barça* ...
>
> L: As I told you I don't, but there are people who have felt chased by the police, lots of people who even work on Saturdays and Sundays as domestic workers ... because they are afraid of going out and the police catching them ... People look at you in a different way, they look at you as if you were a stranger when in fact you are a person ... And we are equal, one colour or another but we are people. And yet, there are people, not all, as I have said I have not met people like that, but there are people who look at you ... as if you were a stranger or from Mars ... All this is picked up on and it creates a bad feeling ... integration is to do with both sides, no? If you allow them to integrate they will integrate and if not, not. Therefore there are people who feel chased ... and that creates a feeling of rejection, no? You are here because you work but then you don't want, you don't grow to love it ... (the country you are in) for all of these other reasons. Then time goes by, and you meet other people and you change. So then ... who is the rival of *Barça*? Well, *Real Madrid*. Then immigrants support *Real Madrid*, no? (laughter). That is how it goes ... there are many who support *Barça*. Yes, many ... but you can see it more because people say 'He supports *Real Madrid* ... and how come he supports *Real Madrid* if he lives here?' ...

STEREOTYPES

As part of my interview I asked immigrants about the stereotypes they had heard about Catalans. The stereotypes they mentioned were those which are attributed to Catalans in the rest of Spain. While immigrants wanted to deny the idea of stereotypes about Catalans as true, a number of stereotypes emerged: some were seen as positive while others were negative. The characteristics attributed to Catalans were compared and contrasted with the characteristics of people from other areas of Spain.

Trabajadores y tacaños - hard-working and tight-fisted

> Cheb: Catalans work a lot and spend very little (laughter) spend very little and work a lot.

In this one sentence Cheb (from Senegal) encapsulated the two main characteristics attributed to Catalans: they work hard and they are mean. Many people had heard people referring to Catalans as *tacaños* (mean). Motaz said this was the reputation they have in the rest of Spain. He made the point with the following story:

> My friend, when I go to Madrid, I go to the house of a Sudanese person there and the first thing he says to me, because he supports *Real Madrid*, is 'tight-fisted Catalan' ... That is what they want, in Spain, that is the reputation they have.

Both Mohamed and Leila, from the Rif area of Morocco, compare what is said about the Catalans with what is said about those who come from the Rif: within their respective countries both these areas have the reputation of working hard and being tight-fisted.

> Leila: Catalunya, I imagine, is the same as the Rif, they like to work hard ... very hard ... just like the Rif. They say that people from the Rif are mean, no? The area of the Rif, they say we only live to work and work hard ... well I think it is the same here (laughter) ...

Although people had heard this stereotype, there was a clear denial of it being true.

> Leila: ... But it is not like this, ... everywhere there is a bit of everything and there are good people and there are bad people in all parts of the world.

> Motaz: They like it like that, in Spain that is the reputation they have. But it is not correct. There is a bit of everything. There are Catalans who are mean, there are Catalans who are not mean ...

Zora: But more than anything, it is the older people, not younger people ... For example that image they have that Catalans are mean and things like that, I don't see it. I don't agree with the reputation they have.

Both Cheb and Etna linked this stereotype to the fact that Catalans are cautious with their money. From his experience as a seller in the markets Cheb knew that 'what they [Catalans] don't do is buy something they do not want'. Etna said that rather than mean, Catalans are meticulous in everything they do and that includes how they spend money:

everyone has their character, their way of being and Catalans have that character of being conservative, calculating, they are very meticulous people, no?

While people were quick to deny the *tacaños* aspect of the Catalan stereotype, they felt that the hard-working aspect of the stereotype was true:

Zora: They like working ... that's for sure (laughter) ... they are people who work hard.

Motaz said he knew a lot of Catalans who worked for personal satisfaction:

there is a different mentality: 'Look, they pay me to do my work, it is better if I work, and I have a clear conscience. I do it as best I can, not for the pay but for personal satisfaction' ... There are people like that. I have met quite a few Catalan people who are like that. Not all of them, because there are lazy Catalans too (laughter) ... like anywhere else. But I know Catalunya has its own mentality.

Other areas of Spain, mostly Andalucía and Madrid, are used as a point of comparison:

Amina: In Catalunya they work more than in ... I don't know ... That is what I have always heard ... than in Madrid ... on the other hand they say that the Andalucians are the other way, that they spend all day ... olé ... doing this and that ...

Leila: They like to work ... a lot ... Not like what they say about the Andalucians - all they like to do is sing and dance (laughter).

244

As mentioned above with reference to Catalan nationalism, Catalans have the reputation of being very closed and conservative. Once again, some people drew the comparison with other areas of Spain:

> Amina: What is true, and this is true, is that the Catalans aren't ... they don't give you friendship as quickly as a Andalucian. But if they give it to you, it is forever ...

However they both went on to say that Catalans were more 'reliable' in the long term. Etna linked this back to them being 'formal':

> They are more formal, but when you know a Catalan, when you are really with them you feel good. And through them I think you learn the behaviour, civilisation and responsibility ...

Both Sonia and Margarita felt that there is a mistrust of things coming from outside:

> Sonia: There is always a lot of mistrust of Catalans in relation to people who come from the outside, people from outside, their ideas ...

Margarita 'justified' this general mistrust and closing off to anything foreign as an attempt throughout history to maintain their Catalan roots and customs:

> Then they try to deal with this by closing themselves off, closing barriers, as they have had to fight constantly to achieve what they have wanted, and with the dictatorship when it was a very badly treated nation, due to the ideas of the dictatorship ... all this has made them cluster together.

As can be seen from the above data, the particular characteristics of Catalans were often juxtaposed and contrasted with traits of people from other areas of Spain. While some saw a clear difference in the culture, mentality and lifestyle of Catalunya with other areas of Spain, others found it harder (or even impossible) to make this distinction.

Zora talked about the Catalan's character as very different and contrasted it with other areas of Spain:

I have gone to parts of Andalucía and I have seen that people there are more open ... more open when it comes to talking ... They have a very different way of life from the Catalans. I have also been to Madrid and I have seen that they too are different from the Catalans.

Others found it hard to separate out the difference between Catalunya and Spain:

Etna: The truth is that I find it hard to differentiate when they talk about Catalunya and when they talk about Spain, because it is something that I have lived through, simultaneously, since I arrived ...

Safhid said he found it hard to tell the difference between Catalunya and Spain and yet he went on to say that Catalans and Andalucians could distinguish each other and that facets of the way of life were different.

Safhid: No, no, that is not true. Well ... they know there is a difference between the Catalans and the Andalucians, they can tell each other apart. An Andalucian and a Catalan ... you can tell the difference ...
S: How can you tell the difference?
Safhid: Well ... first the language ... also the Andalucians, when they first come here they do not understand the language. And in daily life for example, in Andalucía there is another way of life.
S: How do they live here?
Safhid: Well, here they live ... I can see it in the Catalans, they are very hard working and shall I say, they are not people who ... like in Andalucía where people are fun, no? Here in Catalunya it is work, work, work ... (laughter). At least that is what I have seen, eh? (laughter).

While Abdel said:

I don't know ... I see it all as Spanish culture and that is all ...

Although Abdel said he could not tell the difference, he then went on to talk about the differences between Barcelona and Jaen, a small town in Andalucía where he had lived:

246

S: And you, who has lived in other areas of Spain, do you see differences in mentality of Catalunya and other areas of Spain?

A: I see Barcelona, because it is a big city, I see that people are more open than in other areas of Spain, and nothing else ...

S: More open ... in what sense?

A: More open, they are more diverse, they have more diversity in lots of things ... I don't know, the mentality of the people is more open to everything, to a lot more things ... to lots of cultures and ... and, there is good coexistence.

Barcelona was also perceived as being different from other areas of Spain in terms of the type of immigration and the type of work available. The main point of comparison was Andalucía. People had either worked in Andalucía or had heard about the situation there. Cheb talked about the situation of Senegalese immigrants in Almería who go to a particular street every morning in the hope of being picked up for a day's work in the greenhouses. He felt that things were easier for immigrants in Catalunya. Safhid agreed that the situation of immigrants in rural areas was very different from that of urban areas. He could not, however, see a difference between the cities of Madrid (where he had also worked) and Barcelona.

In summary, it can be said, that while immigrants were at first reluctant to make stereotypical attributions to Catalans, stereotypes did emerge throughout the interview. In particular it is interesting to see the ways in which Catalan characteristics were opposed to those of Andalucians and to a lesser extent those of Castilians. Most people agreed that life in Catalunya is peaceful:

Cheb: They are very calm people, very calm, very good ... most of the people are honest people.

Both Sonia and Etna felt that people in Catalunya were very 'humane', and both compared Catalunya favourably to other European countries. They said that life in Catalunya was relatively easy regarding day-to-day relationships:

Etna: The Spaniards are very sensitive people, they are very human people because they really are sensitive towards other human beings. This in turn helps a lot because it makes things easier for the Sub-Saharan African immigrant ... to be able to fit into this society, because they have a little bit of what we recognise as human beings, coexistence, the love for one another ...

247

Sonia: It is easier for immigrants to live here than in France, than in other northern countries. Also because of people's character ... because it is a lot more open in this country and daily life is easier, no? And in spite of what I say about that lack of trust and that they are conservative ... they leave you alone. They do not disturb you, you don't have that racial hatred, no, no ... I don't feel that ... I feel good here ... and no immigrant, well, the people that I am in contact with, no-one complains about this. At first, when I got here I did not feel the closed character. As time goes by, you start feeling all this. You start noticing the attitude that is more closed, more conservative. It is not like other countries, when you arrive and immediately feel that rejection.

WHO IS A CATALAN?

The most frequently-heard definition of a Catalan is: 'A Catalan is a person who lives and works in Catalunya'. Clearly this is an official position which is used for political reasons but is seen as too rhetorical[6]. In order to tease out immigrants' perceptions of what it means to be Catalan I asked immigrants how a Catalan person could be defined. In some cases they answered this question without prompting, but in others I showed them four options, and asked them which, if any, they agreed with most. The options were as follows:

- A Catalan is a person who speaks Catalan.
- A Catalan is a person who lives and works in Catalunya.
- A Catalan is a person who is a child of a Catalan.
- A Catalan is a person who lives and works in Catalunya and feels Catalan.

Most people hesitated before they answered the question. Mustapha thought through the different options out loud. I have included a full transcription of his answer because he touched on issues which were brought up by other immigrants:

S: What does it mean to be Catalan for you ... who is a Catalan?
M: Well, I would not dare define a Catalan, for the simple reason that I am not a Catalan. But I think that a Catalan is a person who is nationalistic. Why? Because in fact, all politicians insist a lot on the language ... that you are living in Catalan, that education should be in Catalan ...

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[6] As is discussed in Chapter Three, this definition originates from Jordi Pujol.

S: Here are four definitions that are used, which one do you agree with most?

M: (reads them) ... Well, it is a bit difficult but I would say, that it is a bit of everything. I would not agree with any because ... 'A Catalan is a person who speaks Catalan', well we know that a person does not come from the abstract, no? They have their roots, their reference points, don't they? And of course, a person who only speaks Catalan cannot be considered a Catalan ... for the simple reason that I am not French because I speak French, or English because I speak English ... I could be multinational (laughter) ... and to say 'A Catalan is a person who lives and works in Catalunya' ...

S: How do you see that? Because that is the one that is heard most ...

M: Yes, of course, if you work here and you live here ... Well, no, I don't really agree ... First is the condition, any condition, you are born in your environment, of course we know about surroundings, the surroundings are also very influential, but that does not mean ... clearly that is, that is assimilation to me ... Many people, for example the immigrants, that is the problem that we have, if you are in Catalunya, if you live in Catalunya and you work in Catalunya you have to adapt to everything that is Catalan ... I say: 'No sir, I have my own culture ... I respect your culture, but you also have to respect mine ... ' Then they impose, and of course imposition is not democratic. If Catalunya, let's use Catalunya as an example, though it could be any community, any country that is a democracy ... Let's see, if I am a Catalan because I work in Catalunya and I live in Catalunya, because I have the right, (I am talking from the point of view of the immigrant), just because I don't have a Catalan identity card or a Spanish identity card, why can't I vote? Knowing that I am also a citizen, that I pay my taxes but I do not have the right to chose the people who administer my taxes ... Well, no, I disagree. 'A Catalan is a person who is a child of a Catalan' ... Well yes, more or less. 'A Catalan is a person who lives and works in Catalunya and feels Catalan' well, the feeling, there is nothing you can do against someone feeling Catalan, I can feel Catalan, I can feel Galician, I can feel anything. But one thing is clear, that you always need a country of reference. You do not come from the abstract, you have not fallen out of the sky ... You are a Catalan, why? Because you feel it, or because you work here, or because you live in this land. Then you are denying a part, I think you are denying a part ... let's see, you say you identify yourself with Catalan, with Catalunya because you are living here, because you speak Catalan or ... I don't know ... Well, fine, I agree but as long as you, to a certain point you identify, you integrate within a society ...

Mustapha's initial reaction was to hesitate and not feel qualified to make a judgement because he was not Catalan. However his first thought was to link someone Catalan to someone who was a nationalist. The Catalan language was a central, but not fundamental, feature of Catalan identity. He felt he could not commit himself to only one of the definitions; in his view they were all valid as they all had an element of truth. He objected to the 'live and work' definition because it did not account for a number of things. In the first place it did not account for where a person was brought up and the sense of identity they might have acquired there. Secondly the clear lack of rights that many people who live and work in Catalunya experience means that they are differentiated and not fully accepted as Catalans. Finally he turned to feeling Catalan and he said there was no rule to prohibit a person from feeling Catalan. He felt comfortable with a person feeling Catalan and making efforts towards their integration into Catalan society.

A Catalan is a person who speaks Catalan.
Like Mustapha in the quote above, most immigrants did not feel that the mere fact of speaking Catalan meant that a person could be Catalan: firstly, because there was more to a person's national identity than speaking the language and secondly because there are Catalans who do not speak the Catalan language. Margarita said that there were lots of Catalans who did not speak Catalan but should still be considered Catalans:

> S: And do you think you can be Catalan without knowing the Catalan language ...
> M: Yes, you can be Catalan without knowing the Catalan language, because there are lots of Catalans who do not speak Catalan, and who consider themselves Catalan and on their birth certificate it says they are Catalan. Why? Because they do not speak Catalan and their parents do not speak it ... then ... You can't ... cultures can't close themselves off due to the fact that you don't speak their language. I think there are a lot more things.

Only Leila made a direct link between being or feeling Catalan and speaking the language:

> S: And do you ever, because you have been here nine years, feel Catalan?
> L: .. Catalan? (laughter). As I can't speak Catalan then no (laughter). But I do feel at home with the Catalans. I have a lot of friends. But if I don't know how to speak Catalan, how can I be Catalan? ...

250

S: And you have said that you do not know how to speak Catalan and so you can't be Catalan ... do you have to talk Catalan to feel Catalan?

L: ... I think so. If you can't even speak it, how are you going to be it? I don't think you can ... (laughter).

While Liviana might not personally agree with it, she did feel that language continued to play an important, if rather ambiguous, role for some people:

S: You often hear 'A Catalan is ... ' how would you define a Catalan?

L: Let's see ... a friend of mine says: 'A Catalan is someone who lives here, works here ... and loves the country' ... I think it should be like this but lots of times it is not ... because if someone is from outside and they speak Castilian they say 'look at this one who has been here for 20 years and still speaks Castilian' ...

A Catalan is a person who lives and works in Catalunya.
Hector was amused by this definition of being a Catalan - 'I don't know if that is what they tell themselves' - but could not accept this as valid because it ignored where a person was born and brought up and how a person may feel. He has lived in Catalunya for years but still feels Dominican.

Likewise Pablo was sceptical of the phrase - 'it is a political phrase of Pujol's' - but felt it was good in so far as it allowed people the possibility of feeling integrated into Catalan society.

Like Mustapha, many mentioned the lack of rights. In spite of paying taxes like everyone else immigrants did not have equal rights - they did not have the same legal or political rights. Mourad also believed that a definition of a Catalan should include having the same rights:

To be able to call myself Catalan, I should have the same possibilities, and clearly I should feel Catalan ... Feel that I fill that space, that I produce, that I have the same chances, to feel completely integrated, that is being a Catalan.

A Catalan is a person who is a child of a Catalan
There was a slight hesitation when asked about the importance of ancestry to being Catalan. On the one hand immigrants did not agree with this definition, and yet on the other hand, they have heard many references to it as an important aspect of

identity. In order to reject the fact that having Catalan ancestry is important they pointed to those people who were born (and have lived) in Catalunya all their lives, even though their parents are not Catalan. Mustapha said that ancestry could not be central because often it is 'people who come from outside' who are most extreme in their views about Catalan nationalism.

However, various people had heard claims on ancestry mentioned by people as proof that they are Catalans or more Catalan than others; ancestry was often mobilised as a sign of oneself being more Catalan than others:

> Amina: There are people who consider themselves more Catalan ... sometimes they compare it ... you can hear Catalans say: 'well ... my great-great-great-grandfather [was Catalan] ... yes ... and they consider surnames ...

> Sonia: Yes, yes, I have often heard that when someone asks if you are Catalan: 'yes, yes, parents and grandparents ... ' and things like this.

> Liviana: I have heard ... ' my parents are Catalans, my grandparents are Catalans, we are all Catalans'.

Other aspects of defining a Catalan which immigrants mentioned were ties to land and religion. Magdalena gave the example of the *pagès*[7] as the most romanticised idea of everything Catalan. Hector claimed that being attached to 'their piece of land' was important for Catalans. Religion was mentioned by two people: Mustapha defined Catalans as Catholics and Leila claimed that they felt Catalan in many ways in spite of keeping their own religion: this made her choose a dual identity for herself and her family:

> well, we are Catalan, we live here like Catalans, but we do not lose our fiestas, our religion ... We do not lose all this but we also celebrate what is from here ... Because

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[7] A '*pagès*' is a man who lives in the countryside; working and surviving from the work he does on his land. Various factors are involved in the way he encapsulates a romanticised idea of Catalunya: he lives in the countryside; he works on the land (in a context where agriculture has been important) and he is self-sufficient.

we have children who do things from here, who grow up here and who practically feel Catalan. But we don't lose the Arab religion, we do not lose anything. So we feel both things, Moroccan-Catalans (laughter).

The place where a person was born was also considered important. Birth was regarded as the central or key aspect to being Catalan:

Juan: Because you are from where you are born.

S: So if you are born here you are a Catalan?
Abdel: Of course, I think a Catalan person is someone who is born here and that is it, nothing else.

A Catalan is a person who lives and works in Catalunya and feels Catalan
A combination of many different aspects contribute to being Catalan - feeling Catalan is one of the most important aspects.

S: How would you define a Catalan person?
Zora: A Catalan? Well, a person who wants to feel Catalan.

Likewise Amina said that feeling Catalan was the most important aspect, irrespective of ancestry:

I say that a Catalan is a person who considers themselves Catalan, who feels Catalan, whether they have or have not got Catalan parents ... It is all the same to me ... Whether they are a foreigner and have lived here, if they really like what there is here and they feel Catalan, if they really feel Catalan ...

Was it enough for a person to feel Catalan or did they also have to be regarded as Catalans by others? Some felt that one could consider oneself Catalan even if not 'admitted' as such by Catalans. However others thought that in order to be treated as a Catalan, and feel fully Catalan meant adopting certain aspects of the culture. To give an example: the Catalan mentality was central for Sonia. For Hector it was having pride and love for Catalunya that was important.

Are some people more Catalan than others?

All immigrants disagreed with the idea that speaking Catalan, living and working in Catalunya, being of Catalan descent and feeling Catalan added up to a person being more Catalan than others. They agreed that some people may feel - in the sense of 'see themselves as' - more Catalan. The people who saw themselves as more Catalan often justified this by mobilising descent. In spite of numerous occasions where immigrants had heard these justifications, they had rejected them. They argued that identity was highly subjective and linked to other things and so it could not be put on a scale.

Clearly then definitions about who was a Catalan are ambiguous. All definitions were valid:

> Motaz: In reality all those phrases are correct, eh?

> Mustapha: It is a bit of them all. I would not stick to only one of them ...

Definitions of a Catalan are very flexible: they are open to interpretation depending on the context and the individual. As Juan put it, 'being Catalan is a social category' which is not pre-determined:

> what happens is that it is not established ... being Catalan or being Chinese, ... they are social categories. For example not everyone who lives in the countryside is a farmer. That is to say, to be a farmer you have to have a piece of land and work on it, even if you live in the middle of Paris, you are a farmer, and you live in the centre ... but as you have that particular characteristic you are a farmer, that is the case of the Catalans. I think that by living here and carrying out the activities of a person, by coexisting here, that is being Catalan ... But that is not how it is regarded, it is looked at differently ... It is a case of ... 'he is not Catalan, let's see, let's ask him for his documents'. He may perhaps be more Catalan, he may have more feelings for Catalunya than lots of other people. There is a discrimination which comes from taboos and prejudices, that have been accumulating for generations and generations.

Zora felt that what it means to be Catalan is flexible and open to highly subjective interpretations:

I asked that in the class [her HORIZON course], because they asked me 'what does it mean to be an Arab?' and I was a bit surprised ... so I asked her 'what does it mean to be a gypsy?' And she told me that one of the things was to have a gypsy mother or father. Then I told another gypsy and she said 'no, no, no not necessarily ... for example I think that a person can be a gypsy and not necessarily because their parents are gypsies ... ' I think it depends on the person. But I do think there are people here who do feel they are more Catalan than others.

S: But do you think the definition is quite open then?

Z: Of course, it depends on the person ...

While Zora saw these generic definitions as something positive, i.e. their strength lay in their very fuzziness and malleability, others saw these categories as being too fuzzy and generic to be of any use.

SUMMARY OF MAIN THEMES

Immigrants were ambiguous regarding the different elements of Catalan nationalism. Immigrants felt excluded from Catalunya and yet they were positive about many aspects of it. Immigrants wanted to belong, but they also wished to hold onto their own sense of identity. This tension was visible in immigrants' attitude towards the concept of 'integration' (discussed in Chapter Seven) and was also perceivable in their attitudes towards Catalan nationalism.

Catalan nationalism

Catalan nationalism was discussed at various stages of the interview with immigrants - the political, cultural, and economic aspects of nationalism were mentioned. All immigrants agreed that Catalunya was a nation. What, according to immigrants, made Catalunya a nation? Immigrants pointed to four main factors: the language, the history, the mentality of the people, and the culture.

Immigrants' view on nationalism was very similar to the ideas of *Convergència i Unió*. They drew on notions of feeling proud of one's country, of having a clear sense of history, and a sense of Catalan identity. These were seen as positive characteristics of Catalan nationalism. As was discussed in Chapter Seven, immigrants also admired Jordi Pujol as a cunning politician who had obtained many benefits for Catalunya.

Immigrants rejected the idea of an independent Catalunya. This differs from Jordi Pujol's position on independence. As has been discussed in Chapter Three, Jordi Pujol does not outwardly reject independence, but uses it as a 'threat' in the bargaining process with the central government. A few immigrants felt that extreme Catalan nationalism did not make sense in the current framework of the Statute of Autonomies and the European Union. Immigrants saw nationalism as divisive (especially in economic terms), and were afraid of what might happen if the other autonomous communities in Spain also asked for independence.

Symbols

The Catalan language played a central role in nationalism. While the *Generalitat*, and its policies, regard Catalan as a way of inclusion, the immigrants felt language excluded people. Catalan nationalism would not be as open as it claims to be if the Catalan language excludes people. After all, the Catalan language is the core symbol of Catalan nationalism.

Immigrants felt that language was becoming too politicised. I carried out my interviews as the new law on the Catalan language was being approved and the debates were discussed daily in the media (See Chapters Three and Five). Immigrants' views coincided with the feeling in those sectors of Catalan society who felt the new law was a 'political show'.

However, as was also discussed in Chapter Seven, immigrants were positive towards the Catalan language as a symbol, and as a tool for social mobility. Once again, the immigrants' views coincided with those of CiU in so far as they viewed language as an important way of maintaining Catalan identity through history and a way of fighting against repression.

Other symbols which immigrants mentioned were folkloric elements (especially the *sardana* dance) and football. The *sardana* has been one of the strongest elements of Catalan cultural nationalism through history. When more political aspects of Catalan nationalism were repressed, the *sardana* continued.

Barcelona football club prides itself in being 'a lot more than a club'. At times when other expressions of Catalan nationalism were repressed, football provided an outlet. *Barça* has been a crucial way of maintaining the Catalan 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991). While some immigrants supported *Barça*, others

rejected it and what it stood for. One immigrant explained that many immigrants joined *Real Madrid* (*Barça's* arch-rival) as form of 'protest' against Catalunya.

Stereotypes

Immigrants mentioned two main stereotypes regarding Catalans. Catalans were viewed as hard-working and mean. Immigrants felt that both these aspects were true. The 'hard-working' stereotype was seen as straightforwardly positive. The 'mean' stereotype was linked to Catalans' cautious nature.

Immigrants presented these stereotypes as the way in which Catalans were viewed in the rest of Spain - this was their reputation. However, they also stressed that this characterisation was unfair since all sorts of people could be found all over the world.

Most of the contrasts made were between Catalunya and Andalucía. In the Spanish context, Catalunya and Andalucía are often perceived as the two extremes. The large number of Andalucians present in Catalunya has meant that Andalucians have been contrasted with Catalans. Delgado (1998) commented that the opposition between Catalans and Andalucians has made the opposition between Catalunya and Madrid less acute. This has been important because of Madrid's role as a centralising power.

Who is a Catalan?

Immigrants used their own experiences and feelings about life in Catalunya to discuss who could be considered a Catalan. None of the immigrants I interviewed felt Catalan, and only one person mentioned the possibility of dual identity.

Various factors were at work when defining a Catalan. They included language, residence, ancestry, and feeling Catalan. Immigrants felt language played an ambiguous role because there were many Catalans who did not speak the language, but who felt Catalan.

Many immigrants saw the definition of a Catalan as 'a person who lives and works in Catalunya' as political rhetoric. In spite of living and working in Catalunya, they did not have the same rights as Catalans. For this reason they could not, in any

way, consider themselves Catalan. Immigrants' appeal to rights was based on residence in the Catalan territory[8].

Immigrants had heard people mobilising ancestry in order to define a Catalan person. Immigrants were uncomfortable with this definition and were quick to reject it. They pointed to all those people who had lived in Catalunya for decades, or who were born in Catalunya of non-Catalan parents. The definition of a Catalan as 'a child of a Catalan' clearly went against the civic idea of Catalan nationalism. Although immigrants did not agree wholeheartedly with the civic definition, they felt uncomfortable when they heard a definition which clearly went against it. Once again the tension between feeling excluded and a desire to belong came to light. What hope was there for immigrants to be part of Catalunya if, ultimately, having Catalan ancestry defined belonging?

When immigrants from other parts of Spain recently objected to being automatically labelled as Catalans, just because they lived and worked there, the condition of 'feeling Catalan' became important. The immigrants I interviewed said that feeling Catalan was a very important aspect of belonging. Once again there was ambiguity. For some immigrants, the fact that they considered themselves Catalan was enough, while other immigrants wanted to be recognised as Catalans by the wider population.

Immigrants' responses showed that the definition of what it means to be a Catalan is very different from the way in which these definitions are then played out in social situations and social life in Catalunya. In spite of the constant drilling of the rhetoric of 'everyone who lives and works in Catalunya is a Catalan', those very people who lived and worked in Catalunya did not feel it was true for them. The definition of a Catalan is highly subjective and context specific, but it is worth highlighting that ethnic factors were more important than they might appear at first sight.

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[8] The fact that immigrants appealed to rights because they resided in Catalunya links back to the discussion of Soysal's 'postnational membership' (1996) in Chapter One. Soysal argues that appeal to rights will increasingly be made to more universal ideas, such as 'human rights' (1996: 19). In the Catalan case, appeals to rights continue to be made to the state.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has analysed immigrants' attitudes to some key aspects of Catalan nationalism and life in Catalunya.

Regarding Catalan nationalism, immigrants had something to say on it and most saw both the positive and negative effects of it. The positive effects and aspects included the maintenance of customs and language and the way Catalunya has been able to keep its own identity. The negative aspect included the closed nature of nationalism. A couple of people felt that nationalism would inevitably lead to independence and they though that this would not be a good thing since it would weaken Spain.

With reference to symbols, the Catalan language was the symbol which was most immediately associated with Catalunya. Football, especially Barcelona FC (*Barça*) was also discussed, especially its historical role as a symbol of Catalan identity when other manifestations were not permitted.

The negative stereotypes attributed to Catalans were denied while the fact that they were hard working was seen as positive and therefore true.

When faced with the four definitions of who is a Catalan, immigrants found that in a way all definitions were appropriate. That is to say that definitions of being Catalan included elements of residence and employment in the territory, ancestry, speaking the language and the will to be a Catalan.

CONCLUSIONS

The stranger will thus not be considered in the usual sense of the term, as the wanderer who comes today and goes tomorrow, but rather as the man who comes today and stays tomorrow - the potential wanderer, so to speak, who, although he has gone no further, has not quite got over the freedom of coming and going. He is fixed within a certain spatial circle - or within a group whose boundaries are analogous to spatial boundaries - but his position within it is fundamentally affected by the fact that he does not belong in it initially and that he brings qualities into it that are not, and cannot be, indigenous to it.

Georg Simmel (1971[1908])

The aim of this dissertation has been to explore the relationship between Catalan nationalism and immigration. In the Catalan context, the word 'immigrant' can refer to people wishing to settle in Catalunya who have arrived from: other areas of Spain; other countries of the European Union; Latin America and Africa. The main focus of the dissertation has been on Latin Americans and Africans. Latin Americans and Africans are the groups for which citizenship it most problematic at present. In addition, the comparison between the two groups is interesting. Given the 'historic links' that Spain has with Latin America, immigrants from these countries are given a series of privileges. However, for comparative purposes, Spanish and occasionally EU immigrants have also been discussed.

The link between Catalan nationalism and immigration has been explored through a study of the citizenship rights granted to immigrants in Catalunya. Citizenship rights are conferred by the legislation which grants legal, political and social rights (Bauböck 1991; Brubaker 1992; Hammar 1990). However, citizenship also refers to more symbolic aspects of belonging. As stated by Fulbrook and Cesarani (1996: 209):

Citizenship has wider, affective connotations too: the sense of belonging to a broader community, expressed in symbols and values, and the often quite vehement emotional identification which may be associated with that wider community of belonging.

CATALAN NATIONALISM

Catalan nationalism is broadly defined - by both analysts and Catalan nationalists - as civic and inclusive. Various aspects play a role in this civic definition: definitions of a who is a Catalan; ideas of the 'will to be Catalan' and 'nation-building'; and the Catalan language.

Present-day Catalan nationalism defines a Catalan as a 'person who lives and works in Catalunya, and wants to be Catalan'. On one level, the concept of 'will to be a

Catalan' ('*voluntat de ser*') is inclusionary. The idea of '*voluntat de ser*' is mobilised to emphasise the way in which Catalunya has become a nation due to the daily efforts of its inhabitants. The linked notion of '*fer país* ' (nation building) encourages all residents to participate fully in the future of Catalunya. While history does play a role in Catalan nationalism, the focus is not on dwelling on past victories but on using history to understand the present and to move into the future (Llobera 1989; Pujol 1993). The emphasis is on encouraging 'the common will of the people' to work towards social and economic progress for Catalunya. Clearly, civil society plays a key role. However, the idea of '*voluntat de ser*' implies strict adherence to fixed rules. The Catalan language is perhaps the clearest example of where such adherence is expected.

The Catalan language is Catalunya's 'core symbol' (Conversi 1993), its differential trait ('*fet differencial*'), that sets it apart from the rest of Spain. Catalan played a crucial role in the historical development of political *Catalanisme* in the nineteenth century. At other stages, and most recently during the Franco dictatorship, the Catalan language was heavily repressed (Ferrer 1984a). However, in spite of this official repression the Catalan language was kept alive through the activities of Catalan civil society - Catalan was spoken in the family and in local associations.

In the transition to democracy, the Catalan language was finally recognized as the co-official language (alongside Castilian) of Catalunya. Both the Spanish Constitution (1978) and the Catalan Statute of Autonomy (1979) grant Catalan this official status. The *Generalitat* has passed legislation to protect the Catalan language from Castilian domination. The first language law, passed in 1983, aimed to increase the use and knowledge of the Catalan language. The Catalan parliament unanimously approved the law. And yet, a second law, passed in 1998, did not receive the same level of support. Many people questioned the need for a new language law, and feared that it might have negative effects on *convivencia*. *Convivencia* refers to the peaceful coexistence with mutual tolerance between Catalan speakers and Castilian speakers. Regarding immigration (of all origins), the Catalan language has been viewed both as the key tool, and as the final measure, of integration (Solé 1991).

CATALAN NATIONALISM AND IMMIGRATION

As discussed in Chapter One, nationalism influences immigration in many ways (Brubaker 1992; Cesarani 1996; Hargreaves 1995; Soysal 1994). Ideas of the nation

determine who is allowed into its boundaries. They also determine the rights that immigrants are granted once they live inside these boundaries.

In the Catalan case, immigration has also shaped the definition of Catalan nationalism. The large number of Spanish immigrants who arrived in Catalunya in the 1930s and 1950s led Catalunya to define itself as a country of immigration, as a melting pot ('*gresol*'). This idea has been constantly referred to and has become central to Catalunya's self- definition.

Although at present Catalunya defines itself as a country of immigration, this has not always been the case. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, immigrants were regarded as a threat to the Catalan way of life. In 1935, Vandellós called for a policy of assimilation and control over the numbers of immigrants arriving into Catalunya. Other analysts feared that immigrants would 'de-Catalanise Catalunya' (Conversi 1993: 194).

Why did many sectors of Catalan society chose to define Catalunya as a country of immigration in the 1960s? There were fears that Catalunya could split into two societies, a Catalan-speaking one and a Castilian-speaking one (Castellanos 1978). Catalan nationalism had to find a way of making the mass of new immigrants, arriving from other areas of Spain, sympathetic to its cause. This was especially important during the Franco dictatorship when the number of new Spanish immigrants arriving was very high, and expressions of Catalan national identity were limited. As has been show in Chapter Three, the struggle for democracy was closely tied to the struggle for Catalan recognition. Immigrants were indirectly incorporated into the Catalan struggle. By being involved in the struggle against the dictatorship, immigrants accepted the struggle for Catalunya's recognition as a nation (Martín-Díaz 1991: 302).

Spanish immigration

There have been two main waves of immigration into Catalunya from other areas of Spain. The first wave of immigration (between 1900 and 1930) was from Aragon, Valencia and Baleares. Although the places of origin expanded to include Murcia and Almería, at this stage most immigrants spoke Catalan (Cabré and Pujadas 1990: 65). The second wave of immigration (1950-70) had a wider catchment area; most of these people came from Andalucía, and all spoke Castilian. Over twenty years after Spanish immigrants stopped arriving in Catalunya, debates about their position in

Catalan society have continued to be an important feature of Catalan political life. For Spanish immigrants to Catalunya, exclusion is felt to exist in the areas of 'language, cultural differences, foods, dances [and] songs' (Vila 1984: 131).

As has been discussed in Chapter Four, Spanish immigrants have had an ambiguous relationship with the Catalan language. On the one hand immigrants have been keen to learn Catalan. The number of immigrants learning Catalan has increased since the normalisation programmes (laid out by the 1985 language law) were put into practise. On the other hand, Spanish immigrants feel that their own language, Castilian, is not fully recognised in Catalunya. They also feel that their right to use Castilian is not protected. In the debates surrounding the 1998 Language Law, representatives of the *Casas Regionales* felt that the law did not reflect the bilingual social reality of Catalunya. They also feared that the new Language Law would increase the hostility towards Castilian.

EU immigration

People from other countries of the European Union have been arriving in Catalunya since the late 1960s. There were two main groups of such people. On the one hand, retired pensioners who settled along the Mediterranean coast in search of warmer weather. On the other hand, people who came to work in the multinationals which set up in Catalunya (Colectivo IOE 1994). Increasingly, issues to do with the citizenship rights of immigrants have been decided by EU treaties (see Chapter Six). Although Catalan policy on immigration makes a passing reference to EU-immigrants, the main focus is on non-EU immigrants.

Non-EU immigration: Latin Americans and Africans

Since the mid 1970s immigrants from outside the European Union have been arriving in Catalunya. Catalunya has attracted a large number of non-EU immigrants, once again due to its geographical position and its offer of employment. Non-EU immigrants have arrived in Catalunya to work in industry, construction, services and agriculture. This 'new immigration' has been very heterogeneous in terms of places of origin, but most immigrants have come from Latin America and Africa. Moreover, in spite of attempts to curb immigration, immigrants have continued to arrive and settle in Catalunya.

The experience of the Spanish and non-EU immigrants have been similar in many ways. Both groups of immigrants were attracted to Catalunya by the possibility of

employment. Once in Catalunya they occupied similar positions in the lower echelons of the labour market. Both Spanish and non EU-immigrants have had a similar relationship with cultural aspects of Catalunya. The cultural differences which the immigrants brought with them have not been fully accepted in Catalunya. Immigrants from outside the EU have been portrayed as being harder to include in Catalan society because of cultural, religious and ethnic differences (Diputació de Barcelona 1996).

The crucial difference between the groups of immigrants is their citizenship status. Immigrants from other areas of Spain have been Spanish nationals with full political, legal and social citizenship rights in Catalunya. The cultural aspects of citizenship have been the only areas open to discussion. In contrast, immigrants from outside the European Union can take no citizenship rights for granted. The rights of non-EU citizens to enter, reside, and work in Spain are subject to legislation. Aspects of political and social rights are also legislated upon. Thus, for non-EU immigrants, the most important aspect of exclusion is their lack of legal and political citizenship rights. It is the legislation concerning immigrants' citizenship rights to which I turn next.

LEGISLATION CONCERNING IMMIGRANTS

As stated above, citizenship covers legal, political and social rights. 'Legal rights' refers to rules on entrance into a country, permits for residence and employment and naturalization. 'Political rights' deal with both voting, and the participation in political groups such as associations, trade unions or consultative bodies. Finally, 'social rights' covers access to housing, education and health.

In the Catalan context, different layers of government are responsible for different aspects of citizenship rights. The Spanish central government legislates on the legal and political aspects of citizenship. The *Ley de Extranjería* (Foreigners' Law) is the main law which lays down citizenship rights for non-EU immigrants. The *Ley de Extranjería* was passed in 1985, at a time when Spain was under pressure from the European Union to control its borders. It is not surprising that much of the law deals with issues of control. The law treats immigration as a temporary phenomenon to do with short-term labour needs. As a result, immigrants are granted short-term work and residence permits – these can be renewed with an employment contract. In addition, immigrants have no voting rights and limited social rights. Although some changes have taken place, the central aspects of the law

have remained the same. In 1993, the government introduced a quota system ('*los cupos*'), which granted permits to a given number of non-EU immigrants (20,600 in 1993, 30,000 in 1999). The '*cupos*' system continues to treat non-EU immigration as short-term labour migration. Permits are granted (subject to an employment contract) for limited periods of time, and are limited to a particular sector and geographical area.

The *Generalitat* is responsible for the social rights of non-EU immigrants living in Catalunya. Since 1993 the *Generalitat* has used its discretion to ease the integration of non-EU immigrants in Catalunya. The *Generalitat*'s policies for non-EU immigration were laid out in the *Pla Interdepartamental d'Immigració*. The *Pla* insists that the *Generalitat* needs to have full powers over issues of non-EU immigration. The *Pla* also emphasizes that the legislation of the central state is insufficient, and that it limits the *Generalitat*'s powers to act on non-EU immigration. Nonetheless, as has been discussed in Chapter Six, the *Generalitat* has made the most of its competencies on immigration. It has granted all non-EU immigrants - regardless of their legal status – access to social rights. The *Generalitat* has most visibly acted in the areas of housing, education and health.

LEGISLATION ON CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS OF IMMIGRANTS

In the following section I review the citizenship rights laid out in the legislation for the different groups of immigrants. It is clear that different groups of immigrants have been granted different citizenship rights. Inevitably this affects the 'feeling of belonging' which different groups of immigrants have. Likewise it lays out the factors which affect the 'hierarchy of membership' discussed below.

Spanish immigration

Immigrants arriving from other parts of Spain have full legal, political and social rights in Catalunya. They are, however, excluded from the cultural aspects of citizenship.

EU immigration

People arriving from other countries of the European Union have got full rights to enter, reside and work in Catalunya. Although they must apply for work and residence permits, such permits are granted automatically. Likewise, EU immigrants have full access to social rights. Regarding political rights, EU

immigrants can vote at local elections. As far as naturalization is concerned, EU immigrants have no privileges; they have to reside in Spain for 10 years in order to be eligible for Spanish nationality.

Latin American immigration

As non-EU immigrants, the legal and political rights of Latin Americans are laid out in the *Ley de Extranjeria*. However, due to Spain's 'historic links' with Latin America, the legislation grants nationals from these countries certain privileges[1].

The legislation states that Latin Americans have preference when entering the country, and when getting permits to reside and work in Spain. It is only recently that Latin Americans have been required to possess entry visas into Spain. However, as far as work-and-residence permits are concerned, it is unclear that the preference laid out in the law is actually put into practice. Once they obtain permits the same rules apply to them as to all other non-EU immigrants.

Latin American immigrants often find themselves in a very precarious situation in terms of legal citizenship. The majority have short-term work permits (one or two years). These permits have to be renewed constantly, and so can be denied during any re-application process. In addition, the legislation can be modified at any time. Many of these permits are limited in terms of geographical areas and sectors of employment.

Regarding political rights, Latin Americans have no voting rights in Spain. Their political rights are limited to participating in non-governmental organizations and immigration consultative bodies. However, in terms of naturalization, Latin Americans have a number of privileges. First, the required period of legal and continuous residence is only two years. Second, they can have dual nationality - this means that they do not have to give up their nationality of origin when they take up Spanish nationality.

The legal rights which non-EU immigrants are granted also determine their social rights. On the whole, access to social rights is only available to those who hold a work- and-residence permit. In contrast, those without work-and-residence permits have minimal access to social rights.

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[1] The countries which are defined as having 'historic links' include: Latin America, Andorra, Philipines, and Equatorial Guinea. Sephardic Jews are also part of this list.

The *Generalitat*'s policies on social rights – housing, education and health - have attempted to breach the gap between those who have work-and-residence permits ('*legales*'), and those who do not ('*ilegales*'). The *Generalitat*'s policies are inclusive; their aim is to give social rights to anyone who lives and works in Catalunya. In terms of health, according to the central government '*ilegales*' only have access to emergency treatments. However, the *Generalitat* has been working with town halls, hospitals and associations in order to give '*illegales*' access to all health treatments (Generalitat de Catalunya 1997). In the case of children, the *Generalitat* has worked to make sure that all children, regardless of their parents' legal status, should have free and equal access to education (Generalitat de Catalunya 1997).

African immigration

African immigrants[2] arriving in Spain need a visa to enter. Regarding work-and-residence permits, they are in the same precarious situation as are Latin Americans.

African immigrants, like Latin Americans, have limited political rights. They cannot vote at any level. Their political rights are limited to participating in non-governmental organizations, trade unions and immigrant consultative bodies.

However, there is a difference between Latin Americans and African immigrants in terms of naturalization. The required period of residence for Africans is much longer. African immigrants can apply for Spanish nationality after 10 years of legal and continuous residence. Dual nationality is not an option – they must give up their previous nationality.

The *Generalitat*'s policies on social rights are as inclusive of African immigrants as they are of Latin American immigrants. In contrast to some areas of the central state legislation, no distinction is made between the two groups of non-EU immigrants.

As the European Union has developed there has been an increasing difference in the status of the different groups of immigrants. On the one hand citizens from other EU countries have increased their rights within the EU. On the other hand, non-EU immigrants have been increasingly excluded. In the Spanish case, EU immigrants

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[2] In this case people from Equatorial Guinea are excluded from the category of African immigrants. They fall under the countries with 'historic links' to Spain, and so have different citizenship rights.

will continue to be in a privileged position. However I feel that long-term non-EU immigrants will be granted access to more rights than they have at present, as they are in France or Germany. Regarding the privileged position of people originating from countries which have 'historic links' with Spain, it is likely that these privileges shall remain

IMMIGRANTS' VIEWS

In this section I focus on the views of the African and Latin American immigrants I interviewed in Barcelona. In the majority of the issues discussed, there was little variation in the views of Africans and Latin Americans. It was only in the cases of legislation on political rights (especially to do with naturalisation) and the Catalan language that there was a marked difference between the two groups of non-EU immigrants. I shall turn to those last.

Catalan nationalism

The non-European Union immigrants I interviewed in Barcelona were, on the whole, positive towards Catalan nationalism. They felt that Catalunya was different from the rest of Spain, and that the desire to express this difference was legitimate. Nevertheless, all the immigrants I interviewed were against Catalunya becoming independent. They all said that independence would not make sense within the present framework of the Spain of the Autonomies and the European Union.

In spite of an overall support of Catalan nationalism, immigrants feared that more extreme views of nationalism might be more assimilative. They feared that more extreme nationalism would not give the immigrants enough space in which to express their own cultures.

Who is a Catalan?

One of the main ways in which Catalan nationalism defines itself as civic is by defining a Catalan as a 'person who lives and works in Catalunya, and who wants to be Catalan'. And yet, when I gave immigrants a choice of definitions, they said that the more 'ethnic' factors also played a role in the definition of a Catalan.

Alongside the 'official' definition, I gave immigrants the following choices:

- A Catalan is a person who speaks Catalan
- A Catalan is a person who lives and works in Catalunya

- A Catalan is a person who is a child of a Catalan

Immigrants felt that all of the above definitions were given equal importance and that different definitions were mobilized in different contexts. Issues to do with knowledge of the language, and having Catalan ancestry were still present in day-to-day discussions surrounding membership in Catalunya.

Integration and cultural aspects

The stated aim of the *Generalitat*'s policies on non-EU immigrants is to achieve 'integration'. Integration is defined as a dynamic process; it is a long-term goal. In the Catalan context, integration is defined in contrast with assimilation. Assimilation is regarded as too static, and excluding any cultural exchange between people. A second aim of the policy is the idea of '*interculturalitat*'. '*Interculturalitat*' refers to a 'dynamic process that depends on the process of interaction and interconnection of all members of society' (Diputació de Barcelona 1996).

On one level immigrants felt that the *Generalitat*'s policies granted them many citizenship rights, and so were inclusive. In other respects, immigrants felt that the meaning given to integration was actually very close to assimilation. Immigrants felt that the only way to be accepted was to take on the customs and characteristics of Catalunya. One example was to do with the Catalan language. Though they agreed with the use of Catalan in general (see below) they did not like the way they were being 'forced' to learn Catalan.

Legislation on legal rights

The immigrants I interviewed felt that '*los papeles*' (work and residence permits) were the main source of discrimination in Spain. Firstly, immigrants had often been stopped by the police and asked for documentation. Secondly, because work and residence permits have to be constantly renewed, they make the immigrants feel they were in a precarious situation. As a result, legal rights have been the main focus of the work carried out by associations which fight for the rights of immigrants. This is especially important, since issues of legal rights determine access to other rights.

Both Latin Americans and Africans had an instrumental attitude towards naturalisation. They felt that naturalisation would make their life easier in Spain, since this would end the constant renewal of work and residence permits. Under no

circumstances did they feel that having a Spanish passport would increase their 'belonging' in Catalunya.

Latin Americans have privileges regarding the requirements for naturalisation. As has been stated above, the required period of residence is only two years. Likewise, they can have dual nationality. Many Latin American immigrants stated that if they could not hold onto their nationality of origin, they would not take up Spanish nationality.

Legislation on political rights

Latin Americans and Africans have no voting rights in Catalunya. Nevertheless, this was not high on immigrants' agenda. It is as if their energies were concentrated on establishing long-term work-and-residence permits, before turning to the issue of political rights.

Language

The non-EU immigrants I interviewed acknowledged the Catalan language as the key symbol of Catalan nationalism; they saw it as an important expression of Catalan culture, history and character. This notwithstanding, Castilian continued to be the most important language in their daily lives.

Regarding the Catalan language, the situation of Latin Americans and Africans is very different. Latin Americans already speak Castilian, and this gives them quicker access to jobs, and makes life in Catalunya easier. They have learnt, or are learning, Catalan, but this is not a question of survival. In contrast, the Africans face a double language barrier since they have to learn both Castilian and Catalan.

The growing importance of the Catalan language (especially with the application of the 1998 Law) will inevitably affect immigrants who don't speak Catalan. Immigrants will be increasingly obliged to learn Catalan, and to use it in everyday life. As an increasing number of jobs require Catalan, immigrants who do not learn Catalan will weaken their social mobility in the labour market. However, if immigrants chose to learn Catalan rather than Castilian, they will limit their chances of moving to other areas of Spain.

HIERARCHY OF MEMBERSHIP

I started my conclusions by stating that the word 'immigrant' can refer to four different groups of people. In the sections which followed, I reviewed the citizenship rights available to the different groups of immigrants. The different citizenship rights granted to immigrants means that there are many ways of being a member in Catalunya. Some analysts have referred to this as a 'hierarchy of membership' (Hammar 1990; Martiniello 1995; Bauböck 1991).

In the following section I analyse the place each group of immigrants occupies in the hierarchy of membership in Catalunya. This hierarchy includes many different aspects, ranging from the rights laid down in the legislation to the more symbolic aspects of belonging. Depending on the aspect, the different groups of immigrants occupy a different position in the hierarchy. For this reason I shall analyse the hierarchy of membership in three separate respects: legal and political rights, issues of naturalization, and the languages of Catalunya.

Legal and political rights

Immigrants from other areas of Spain are at the top of the hierarchy. As Spanish nationals, they do not need work-or-resident permits in Catalunya. They have full political rights in Catalunya.

EU immigrants are next in the hierarchy - they have automatic work and residence permits in Catalunya. Although they cannot vote at general elections, they are allowed to vote at local elections.

At the bottom of the hierarchy, Latin Americans and Africans occupy the same position. Latin American and African immigrants have very precarious legal and political rights. They have short-term contracts and are vulnerable to changes in the legislation. Likewise, they have no voting rights in Catalunya.

Naturalisation

In terms of the more formal aspect of acquiring Spanish nationality, the hierarchy of membership changes slightly. Spanish immigrants are of course again at the top of the scale – they already have Spanish nationality.

Latin Americans occupy the next stage of the hierarchy. Due to being classified as countries with 'historic links' they have a number of privileges. First, they can apply

for Spanish nationality after two years. Second, they have dual nationality. The Latin American immigrants I interviewed felt that, in spite of having Spanish nationality, they would continue to be treated as Latin Americans. Nevertheless, Spanish nationality would give them full legal, political and social rights.

EU-immigrants and Africans occupy the bottom of the scale with regards to acquiring Spanish nationality. Both groups have to reside in Spain for ten years before they can apply.

However, EU-immigrants are slightly higher on the hierarchy. EU-immigrants can fulfill the required period of legal and continuous residence more easily, since they do not have to constantly renew work-and-residence permits. Also, since they are already granted many citizenship right as EU immigrants, Spanish nationality would not bring many new changes to their situation in Spain.

Languages

Regarding the language aspect, Spanish immigrants who speak Catalan are higher on the hierarchy of membership, than those Spanish immigrants who only speak Castilian.

Latin Americans are next on the hierarchy. Latin Americans already speak one of the co-official languages of Catalunya. This means that they have immediate access to many areas of the labour market. At the same time, they only have to learn one new language when they arrive.

EU-immigrants and Africans are again at the same point in the scale in terms of learning Catalan and Castilian. Both groups face a double language barrier.

However, the first language of EU-immigrants, is sometimes already spoken by the population residing in Catalunya. This makes their life in Catalunya easier. At the same time, the languages of the EU are given a higher status than the African languages by most sectors of the population.

In summary, the Spanish immigrants who speak Catalan are at the top of the hierarchy of membership in Catalunya. Latin Americans access the hierarchy at a higher level than other non-Spanish immigrants. This is because they speak Castilian and can become Spanish nationals more easily. However, EU-nationals

have more legal, political and social rights. These rights are granted to them by European Union legislation. As a result and in spite of not speaking Castilian, they have a higher status in Spain. African immigrants remain at the bottom of the hierarchy of membership – they have limited rights to enter, reside and work in Spain. In addition, they must reside in Spain for ten years before they can apply for Spanish nationality.

The hierarchy of membership presented here is open to transformations depending on economic, social and political developments. Due to the versatile nature of these changes, it is hard to predict precisely how the hierarchy of membership will develop. However, it is possible to see how present trends may
progress. Once again, it is necessary to look at different aspects individually.

In terms of legal and political citizenship, it is clear that there is an increasing gap between the rights given to EU immigrants and to non-EU immigrants. As the European Union increases its co-operation, more rights will be granted to EU nationals residing in Spain than to non-EU immigrants. The rights granted to residents will simply depend on their place of origin, rather than on their time of residence in a country. As a result, those non-EU immigrants who have been residing in Spain for decades will not have access to the same rights as the EU immigrants who have just arrived. Unless this trend is changed, Latin Americans and North Africans shall continue, in spite of their long residence in Spain, to be at the bottom of the hierarchy of membership. Although the *Generalitat* has increasingly attempted to maximise the rights of non-EU immigrants living in Catalunya, responsibility over legal and political rights lies with the central state.

Regarding naturalisation, it is unlikely that the increase in EU co-operation will change the core aspects of the nationality laws in Spain. On the whole, the hierarchy of membership shall remain unchanged. One respect which may be tightened is the issue of dual nationality in the case of Latin Americans. The trend may move towards the model of dormant nationality where only one nationality can be active at a time, depending on the place of residence[3].

Finally I turn to the issue of the languages of Catalunya. It is clear that the Catalan language is becoming increasingly strong in Catalunya as more people learn it. It is

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[3] This is discussed in Chapter One.

also true that Catalan is increasingly protected by the legislation passed by the *Generalitat*. However, Castilian not only remains a co-official language in Catalunya, but is also widely used in certain areas. Although knowledge of Castilian will still be necessary for all immigrants, knowledge of Catalan will continue to place them higher on the hierarchy of membership.

MODELS OF CITIZENSHIP REVISITED

In Chapter One, I discussed two aspects of models of citizenship. First, I looked at the dichotomy between civic and ethnic models of citizenship (Brubaker 1992). Second, I analysed two different aspects of the role of the 'nation-state' within these models. These have been referred to as 'citizenship traditionalism' (Joppke 1999 with reference to Brubaker 1992) and 'postnational citizenship' (Soysal 1996). In the following section, I revisit the different aspects of the models of citizenship in light of the issues discussed throughout the dissertation.

Civic or ethnic model?

In both the Spanish case (regarding legal and political rights) and in the Catalan case (regarding social rights), it is clear that both civic and ethnic factors are at work when granting rights to non-EU immigrants. In this final section I shall focus on the Catalan case.

As discussed above, Catalan nationalism is defined as civic because of its inclusive nature. According to this definition of Catalan identity there are no ethnic factors on the basis of which people are excluded from Catalan society (Guibernau 1998; Vila 1984).

How does this civic definition apply to non-EU immigration? First, the *Generalitat*'s policies aim to grant social rights to all non-EU immigrants residing in Catalunya. Unlike the central state legislation, they grant no preferences to those who come from the countries with 'historic links'. At the same time, they aim to include all non-EU immigrants, irrespective of whether they have work and residence permits.

In spite of the predominantly civic definitions of Catalunya, there are still 'essentialist inclinations' at work (Delgado 1998: 198). Both Spanish and non-EU immigrants are excluded in terms of cultural rights. The exclusion of non-EU immigration is also present in some aspects of the legislation. The main legislative aspect which highlights the essentialist inclinations is that to do with issues of

integration. In the eyes of the immigrants the meaning given to integration is closer to that of assimilation. Immigrants' integration involves them adopting Catalan ways and characteristics, and abandoning the characteristics of their places of origin. As Catalan nationalism increasingly strives to define itself, it is unlikely that the concept of integration will become as encompassing of the immigrants' characteristics, as the immigrants would like it to be.

If 'ethnic' factors are at work in Catalunya, how is the denial of 'ethnic' factor possible? The denial of ethnic factors is only possible because Catalan nationalism equates 'ethnic' with 'race'. Since Catalunya cannot be defined in terms of 'race', the term 'ethnic' is made redundant. Aspects of religion and language – which in other contexts might be seen as 'ethnic'[4]- are put into the category of civic. However, I would be reluctant to throw out the distinction altogether. I believe that the two types can be useful as ideal types. As ideal types they can be used for comparative purposes. In addition, their application has to be made context-specific. It is interesting to see the contexts in which given characteristics are categorized as 'civic' or 'ethnic'.

'Citizenship traditionalism' or 'postnational citizenship'?

The two positions regarding the relationship between the 'nation-state' and citizenship rights are as follows. Brubaker argues that the 'nation-state' continues to be a key player in decisions about citizenship (1992: xi). In contrast. Soysal believes that changes in the post-war era 'have complicated the national order of citizenship and introduced new dynamics for citizenship in national polities' (1996: 18). Soysal concludes that the 'nation-state' is no longer central, since people are granted rights through international bodies and agreements.

I agree with Soysal to some extent. As has been discussed throughout the dissertation, it is true that the 'national order of citizenship' (Soysal 1996: 18) has become less straightforward. In the Catalan case, it is the Catalan autonomous government which grants non-EU immigrants many citizenship rights. Likewise, membership of the European Union has meant that Spain's legislation on immigration is affected by decisions reached at the level of the EU. Membership of the EU has also meant that *comunitarios* have increased their rights in Spain.

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[4] For example, in the Basque country, the Basque language is seen as an 'ethnic' feature.

However, this is where my agreement with Soysal ends. The data discussed above points to the fact that national citizenship remains central to the experiences of non-EU immigrants in Catalunya. Likewise, the Spanish central state continues to be the key player, as the Spanish state controls access to work-and-residence permits. In this light, I conclude that Brubaker's position is the most relevant in the Spanish case.

THE EU DIMENSION

Harmonisation of immigration policy for people coming from outside the European Union has been controversial across the European Union. Various analysts have pointed out that immigration touches on central issues of national jurisdiction (Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Cesarani and Fulbrook 1996; Miles 1993; Mitchell and Russell 1996). Policy made towards harmonisation has to bear in mind 'the importance of national specificity in terms of migration flows, nationality and citizenship legislation, state controls over immigration, the structure of the welfare state, colonial history and so on' (Thränhardt and Miles 1995: 4). As has been discussed in Chapter One and above, citizenship and nationality laws continue to be intrinsically tied to the traditional concepts of nationhood (Brubaker 1992).

In light of this 'citizenship traditionalism' (Joppke 1999), the harmonisation which has been achieved across the European Union has been around issues of control. Policies of admission to the European Union have become stricter and more co-ordinated. Although the policies introduced within the individual member states have led to slight harmonisation, this co-operation has not been as successful as that regarding issues of control.

Control and integration of immigration

Immigration policies within the individual member states, as well as across the European Union, have had two aims: control and integration. Integration is seen as a possibility only when the immigration flow has stopped (Miles 1993: 201).

The main focus has been on control of the number of immigrants arriving in the European Union. As den Boer states, 'agreements aim at exclusion rather than inclusion' (den Boer 1995: 93). The control of immigration effectively refers to stopping the arrival of new immigrants in the European Union. Policies directed at control have focused on policing borders. However, immigrants continue to arrive. Some arrive with legal work and residence permits, through family reunification,

contract of employment and so on (Miles 1993: 201-205). Other immigrants have either entered without work- and-residence permits, or have overstayed the duration of their existing permits.

The issue of control has been central. Spain plays a key role in the policing of one of the European Union's southern borders. When Spain applied to join the European Commission, one of the conditions of membership was that Spain tighten its control over borders. As a result the 1985 *Ley de Extranjería* was passed. More recent measures, such as the recent increase in control of frontiers and the quota system introduced in 1993, form part of this trend of control and exclusion.

For extracommunitarians it is becoming increasingly difficult to enter Spain legally. As a result, people enter illegally. Once in Spain, the conditions of those who have work and residence permits and those who do not, are becoming increasingly divergent. For those who have work-and-residence permits conditions are improving. However, for those who do not have work-and-residence permits conditions are becoming increasingly difficult.

In terms of control and integration, the relationship between Catalunya and Spain is similar to that between the individual member states and the European Union.

In Spain, integration and control are situated at different levels of government. Integration takes places at a local level and control takes place at the higher level of the state. The Spanish central state focuses on the control of immigration. It does so through border control and the granting of work-and-residence permit. Although the Spanish central state has made weak attempts at integration, these have not been influential. Integration remains the aim and responsibility of the local level of the autonomous communities.

Across the European Union, integration and control is similarly divided between the super-state structure and the individual state. The harmonization of EU policy has focused on control, security, and policing the borders. Issues of integration, of which citizenship rights are a central aspect, are left to the individual states.

This points towards a three-ties system for managing immigration. The European Union controls the entry into 'Europe'. Moreover it attempts to harmonise citizenship rights of immigrants across member-states. Nevertheless, the granting of

legal and political citizenship rights has remained within the discretion of the 'nation-states'. Finally, within the 'nation-state', sub-state tiers of government, for example autonomous communities, are responsible for integration.

APPENDIX ONE

INTERVIEW GUIDE AND CODES USED FOR ANALYSIS

Background information:
- Date and place of birth, and of parents
- Nationality and legal situation in Spain
- Arrival in Barcelona, Catalunya, Spain
- Single? Married?
- Profession
- Present job

1. Time in Catalunya

Education:
- Was your education here? (or in country of origin?)
- Has your legal situation affected access to education/training? In what way was it affected? When was it affected?
- If went to school here: any problems at school? How resolved?
  Did you get any religious education at school?
- After studying did you start working?

2. Migration trajectory
- Where did you first arrive at in Spain?
- Why Catalunya? Why Barcelona?
- What did you know about Spain? What had you heard about it? Who had you heard it from?
- What did you know about Catalunya? Did you know there was another language?

3. Employment
- What do you do now?
- What jobs have you done in the past?
- How did you find work?
- Did you have any problems looking for it?

- Have you had any problems at work: conditions, hours, holidays, pay?
- Who do you work alongside: Catalans? People from other parts of Spain? What type of relationship do you have with them?
- Who's the boss?
- Language: is Catalan necessary?

4. Language

- What languages do you speak?
- Do you think it is necessary to speak Catalan to live in Catalunya?
- Do you know and speak the language of your parents? How did you learn it?

- What were the circumstances which made you learn and how did you learn: Castilian? Catalan?
- What language do you use :
  - -with friends?
  - -with family?
  - -at work?
  - -on the street?
  - -with neighbours?
- How do people address you in shops?
- Do you feel people treat you differently when you use one language or another?

5. Housing

- Where do you live?
- How long have you been living there?
- What condition is the house in?
- Is it rented, or do you own it?
- How did you find it?
- Who do you live with?
- How do you get along with the neighbours?
- Is there a 'neighbours' association', and do you take part in it?

6. Health and social services

- Do you have access to national health?
- Do you use other social services?

7. Personal identity

- If they ask you where you are from, what do you say?

- Where would you say your home is?
- Do you feel ever feel Catalan? When?
- In what ways do you feel Catalan? And in what ways don't you?

8. Who is a Catalan?

- Who would you say is a Catalan?

  -Is it based on language?

  -Is it based on blood?

  -Is it based on residence?

With which of these phrases do you most agree?
(SHOW CARD)

- 'A Catalan person is a person who speaks Catalan.'
- 'A Catalan is a person who lives and works in Catalunya.'
- 'A Catalan is a person who is a daughter/son or descendent from Catalans.'
- 'A Catalan is a person who lives and works in Catalunya and feels Catalan.'

- Explore their answers

  -Can you be a Catalan without speaking the language?

  -Are some people more Catalan than others?

9. What *fiestas* do you celebrate at home?

- Do you celebrate any Catalan fiestas?
- Which Catalan fiestas do you know about? Celebrate? How?
- Are you religious? And at home (i.e. others living there)?
- What about the *fiestas* from your place of origin:

  -Are they important for you? why?

  -How do you celebrate them? with family? with friends?

10. What is Catalunya?

- Do you know other places in Catalunya, besides Barcelona?
- What do you understand by 'Catalan culture'?
- What do you associate with Catalunya? Its symbols?

  - Barça?

  - sardanas?

  - Montserrat?

  - the Catalan flag?

281

- other?
- Do you watch TV3 or buy books/newspapers in Catalan? Why? Why not?

11. 'The Catalans'

- How would you describe the Catalans?
- What are the stereotypes associated with them? People say 'The Catalans are...'
- Is the character or mentality of the Catalans different from that of other Spaniards?

    -In what ways? What are the Catalans and the Spaniards like?

- What do you think about Catalan nationalism?

    -Is it open to people who come from elsewhere or is it closed?

    -What is your attitude towards the Generalitat and the autonomies?

12. Political participation

- If you could vote, who would you vote for?
- And would you consider voting for one that defends Catalan interests?
- Are you thinking of applying for Spanish nationality when you can?

    -Why?

    -Would you feel Spanish when you got it?

- Are you a member of :

    -any association?

    -trade union?

    -political party?

    -other organisations?

- What do you do as a member?

13. Immigration and Catalunya

- How do you see the situation of immigrants in Catalunya?
- What does 'integration' mean for you personally?
- Who is responsible for this integration:

    - individual person?

    - NGOs?

    - Town halls?

    - Generalitat?

    - Spanish State?

- What does each institution do?

- Who does most, in your opinion?

- How do you see the situation of immigrants from you country?
    - -compared to those from other countries?
    - -compared to Spaniards who are also 'immigrants'?

- Do you think you can have your own identity?
    - -In what ways do they/don't they?
    - -Why/ why not?
    - -Is it a good thing or a bad thing?

- There are people who say that immigration should be stopped. Would you agree?

14. Generation conflicts
- If the parents are not Spanish, are there conflicts. e.g. with religion, food...

15. Plans for the future
- Do you plan to go back to your country of origin?
- Are there any circumstances under which you would?

16. If have children...
- What languages do your children speak?
- Where do they go to school?
- In what language are they being educated?
- How are things in school for them?
- Do they have religious education at school? Do they go elsewhere for it?
- Do you think migration has been a good experience for your children? In what ways?

17. Thanks

- Well, I think we have finished. Would you like to add anything else?
- Do you know anyone else who might want to talk to me?
- Thanks for your time. As I mentioned at the beginning, I will give you a copy of the interview for you to read over and we can meet again to talk about it if you want to.

LIST OF CODES USED IN HYPER-RESEARCH

I coded issues to do with language first, and separate to the rest, because I was writing a conference paper on the immigrants' attitudes to language.

Catalan as integration
Catalan at work
Get by with Castilian
Knowledge of Castilian
Knowledge of Catalan
Learning Castilian
Learning Catalan
Pre-arrival knowledge
Speaking Castilian
Speaking Catalan
Spoken to in Castilian
Treatment of Castilian
Treatment of Catalan
View of Catalan

Other codes:

Association
Stereotypes of Catalans
Children
Discrimination due to nationality
Discrimination at work
Discrimination due to papers
Feeling Catalan
Fiestas celebrated
Football
Future
General aspects of life in Catalunya
Identity - national
Image of Moroccans
Importance of exchange
Integration

Interaction with people

Knowledge of Catalunya

Knowledge of Spain

Nationalism - general

Nationalism - Spain

Nationality - attitude towards

Non-governmental organisation - views of

Own nationality - situation of immigrants

Papers

Politics - view of

Racism

Religion

Relation with own nationality

Situation of immigrants

Stereotypes - Catalans

Stereotypes - Catalans versus Spaniards

Vote

Who is a Catalan?

Why did they come to Catalunya?

APPENDIX TWO

INTERVIEWS WITH IMMIGRANTS AND
ORGANISATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS CONTACTED

Details of in-depth interview participants:

Name	Place of Origin	Situation in Catalunya
Motaz	Sudan	student
Nadia	North Africa	no papers
Doudou	Sub-Saharan Africa	work and residence permit
Leila	North Africa	work and residence permit
Etna	Sub-Saharan Africa	work and residence permit
Cheb	Sub-Saharan Africa	work and residence permit
Safhid	North African	work and residence permit
Ray	Sub-Saharan Africa	work and residence permit
Mustapha	North Africa	work and residence permit
Mourad	North Africa	work and residence permit
Amina	North Africa	work and residence permit
Abdel	Sudan	work and residence permit
Zora	North Africa	work and residence permit
Fatima	North Africa	work and residence permit
Sonia	Latin American	work and residence permit
Juan	Latin America	Double nationality (Spanish and country of birth)
Liviana	Latin America	work and residence permit and asked for Spanish nationality
Maria	Latin America	work and residence permit
Margarita	Latin America	work and residence permit
Hector	Latin America	work and residence permit
Pablo	Latin America	work and residence permit
Monica	Latin America	Dutch nationality (lived there before moving to Spain)

286

State Agencies

Ajuntament de Barcelona
- Comissionat de L'Alcaldía per a la Defensa dels Drets Civils
- Consell d'immigració
- Pla Municipal de la Interculturalitat
- Promoción Social de Inmigrantes y Minoria Etnicas

Diputación de Barcelona
- Pla d'immigració

Generalitat de Catalunya-Departament de Benestar Social
- Pla Interdepartamental d'Immigració
- Pla Any Europeu Contre el Racisme

Trade Unions
- Comisiones Obreras - Centro de Información del Trabajador Extranjero
- Unión General de Trabajadores

Immigrant Associations
- Asociación de Dominicanos
- Asociación de Estudiantes Marroquíes
- Asociación de Senegaleses
- Asociació Socio-Cultural Ibn Batuta
- ATIME - Asociación de Trabajadores Inmigrantes Marroquíes en España
- CLACA - Casal Latinamericano de Catalunya

Casas regionales
- Casa de Andalucía
- Casa de Aragon
- Casa de Murcia y Albacete

Social services and solidarity organisations
- Caritas Diocesana - Departament d'immigració
- Sos Racismo
- Asociación de padres de almunos del Colegio Pere Villa   (Barcelona)
- II Mostra d'associaciones de voluntariat de barcelona

Research Centres and Libraries

- Centre d'Estudis a L'Hospitalet
- Centre Internacional de documentació de Barcelona
- Fundación Paulino Torras Domenèch
- Fundació Jaume Bofill

Political parties

- Iniciativa per Catalunya
- Partit dels Socialistes Catalans
- Partit Popular
- Convergència i Unió

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