

POLITICAL THEOLOGY AND THE
THEOLOGY OF PASTORAL CARE:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO

JÜRGEN MOLTSMANN AND SEWARD HILTNER

by

Andrew Purves

A THESIS

PRESENTED TO

THE FACULTY OF DIVINITY

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH

1978



ABSTRACT OF THESIS

This study identifies the issues which have to be addressed by the theology of pastoral care if it is to recognise the eschatological, socio-political, and communal aspects of the gospel. To meet this task Seward Hiltner's theology of pastoral care is examined in relation to Jürgen Moltmann's political theology.

The study is divided into three parts. Part 1 is a statement of Hiltner's theology and practice of pastoral care. After introducing the background to Hiltner's theology there is a presentation of his theology of pastoral care, where shepherding is taken as the central theological motif. The theory and practice of shepherding are then outlined, and shown to consist in pastoral counselling. Developments of Hiltner's theology by Ian F. McIntosh, James N. Iapsley, and Don S. Browning are stated. McIntosh develops the notion of two-way communication within the Body of Divinity; Iapsley shows how pastoral theology can employ dynamic ego psychology if salvation, God, and man are understood in the context of process philosophy; and Browning explains the analogical relationship between psychology and theology by building on the ontology of acceptance. Part 1 concludes with a critical discussion of Hiltner's theology of pastoral care, concentrating on theological method and the content and nature of pastoral care. Emphasis is placed on Hiltner's failure to put theological questions to pastoral psychology.

Part 2 is a presentation of Moltmann's political theology. After introducing political theology and placing it in context,

its theological basis in the eschatology of the cross is outlined. It is shown how the dialectical nature of Moltmann's theology reflects his attempt to hold together both the cross of Jesus and the coming Kingdom of God. The resultant eschatology of the cross is developed in relation to the doctrines of God, history and man. Moltmann's political theology is then explained in terms of the eschatology of the cross. It is shown how history is the mediating agency for Christian faith and how hermeneutics must become political hermeneutics. The statement of Moltmann's position concludes with a presentation of the tasks of liberation, discussing concepts of liberation, liberation and the church, and liberations in the world. Part 2 concludes with a critical discussion of Moltmann's political theology, stressing the debate between Moltmann and the Latin American theologians of liberation.

Part 3 begins with a comparative analysis of Hiltner's theology of pastoral care and Moltmann's political theology. There are three areas of concentration: theological methodology, the content of theology, and the nature of praxis. In this analysis, the extent of the divergence between the theology of pastoral care and political theology is made clear.

The study concludes with a statement of the issues which must be addressed by the theology of pastoral care if it is to recognise the eschatological, socio-political and communal aspects of the gospel message. In the light of political theology, the theology of pastoral care has to question its operational methodology, its concentration on the individual

to the exclusion of society, its allegiance to pastoral psychology and implicit alliance with liberal capitalism, its omission of the ontological nature of relationship, and its lack of contextualisation in the wider mission of the church.

I hereby declare that the thesis is entirely the product of my own research, and that all ideas and written materials used are, to the best of my knowledge, appropriately acknowledged.

2nd June, 1979.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|--|----|
| <u>Preface and Acknowledgements</u> | i |
| <u>Introduction</u> | 1 |
| <u>PART ONE: SEWARD HILTNER'S THEOLOGY OF PASTORAL CARE</u> | |
| <u>Chapter 1: Introduction and Background to Seward Hiltner's Theology of Pastoral Care.</u> | |
| 1. Introduction | 17 |
| 2. Background | 23 |
| (a) Anton T. Boisen and the Beginning of Clinical Pastoral Education | 23 |
| (b) Paul Tillich | 27 |
| (c) Carl R. Rogers | 31 |
| (d) Empirical Theology | 34 |
| <u>Chapter 2: Seward Hiltner's Theology of Pastoral Care.</u> | |
| 1. Introduction | 37 |
| (a) Shepherding and Pastoral Care | 37 |
| (b) Shepherding and the Body of Divinity | 41 |
| 2. Theology and Shepherding | 45 |
| (a) The Theology of Seward Hiltner | 45 |
| (i) Method | 45 |
| (ii) Content | 50 |
| (b) Empirical Theology and Shepherding | 58 |
| (c) The Method of Correlation and Shepherding | 61 |
| (d) The Christian Heritage and Shepherding | 63 |

Chapter 3: The Christian Shepherd.

| | |
|-------------------------------------|----|
| 1. Hiltner's Ecclesiology | 65 |
| (a) Hiltner's Concept of the Church | 65 |
| (b) Hiltner's Concept of Ministry | 69 |
| 2. Shepherding | 72 |
| (a) Shepherding and Ministry | 72 |
| (b) The Principles of Shepherding | 74 |
| (i) The General Principles | 74 |
| (ii) Aims | 79 |
| 3. Resources for Shepherding | 82 |
| (a) Pastoral Counselling | 82 |
| (b) Other Resources | 93 |

Chapter 4: Developments in Hiltner's Approach to the Theology of Pastoral Care.

| | |
|---------------------|-----|
| 1. Ian F. McIntosh | 94 |
| 2. James N. Lapsley | 100 |
| 3. Don S. Browning | 107 |

Chapter 5: A Critical Discussion of Hiltner's Theology of Pastoral Care.

| | |
|--|-----|
| 1. Categorisation of Hiltner's Theology of Pastoral Care | 111 |
| (a) Functionalism | 111 |
| (b) Liberalism | 111 |
| (c) Individualism | 112 |
| (d) Developmentalism | 113 |

| | |
|---------------|-----|
| 2. Evaluation | 114 |
| (a) Method | 114 |
| (b) Content | 119 |

PART TWO: JÜRGEN MOLTSMANN'S POLITICAL THEOLOGY

Chapter 6: Introduction and Background to Jürgen Moltmann's Political Theology.

| | |
|--|-----|
| 1. Introduction | 129 |
| 2. The Background to Moltmann's Political Theology | 134 |
| (a) Radical Barthianism | 134 |
| (b) Roman Catholic Political and Liberation Theology | 142 |
| (c) The Marxist-Christian Dialogue | 151 |
| (d) Ernst Bloch | 153 |

Chapter 7: The Theological Basis of Moltmann's Political Theology: The Eschatology of the Cross.

| | |
|--|-----|
| 1. Eschatology | 158 |
| (a) The Context of Moltmann's Statement on Eschatology | 158 |
| (b) The Necessity for Eschatology | 162 |
| (c) Eschatology and Promise | 164 |
| (d) Eschatology and the Resurrection of Jesus | 169 |
| 2. The Cross | 173 |
| (a) The Context of Moltmann's Theology of the Cross | 173 |
| (b) The Centrality of the Cross | 179 |
| (c) Jesus and His Cross | 183 |
| (i) The Theological History of Jesus | 184 |
| (ii) The Historical Eschatology of Jesus | 190 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| 3. The Eschatology of the Cross | 193 |
| (a) The Eschatology of the Cross and the Doctrine of God | 193 |
| (b) The Eschatology of the Cross and the Christian Understanding of History | 198 |
| (c) The Eschatology of the Cross and the Christian Understanding of Man | 202 |

Chapter 8: Political Theology

| | |
|--|-----|
| 1. History as the Mediating Agency for Christian Faith: From Cosmology and Anthropology to History | 207 |
| 2. Political Hermeneutics | 214 |
| (a) Background | 214 |
| (i) Bultmann's Existentialist Hermeneutic | 214 |
| (ii) Marx's Revolutionary Historical Hermeneutic | 216 |
| (b) Political Hermeneutics | 219 |
| 3. The Tasks of Liberation | 225 |
| (a) Concepts of Liberation | 226 |
| (i) The Revolution in the Concept of God | 226 |
| (ii) The Liberation of Politics | 230 |
| (b) Liberation and the Church | 232 |
| (i) The Accommodating Church | 232 |
| (ii) Civil Religion | 238 |
| (iii) Messianic Ecclesiology | 242 |
| (c) Liberations in the World | 245 |

Chapter 9: Comment and Discussion on Moltmann's Political Theology.

1. The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann:
A General Appraisal 251
2. Moltmann's Political Theology and the
Theologies of Liberation 262
 - (a) Praxis or Promise 263
 - (b) Faith and Ideology 267
 - (c) Conclusion 270

PART THREE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY AND CONCLUSION

Chapter 10: A Comparative Study of Moltmann's Political Theology and Hiltner's Theology of Pastoral Care.

1. Theological Methodology 271
2. The Content of Theology 280
3. Difference in Praxis 290

Chapter 11: Conclusion.

1. Theological Methodology 299
2. The Individual and Society 303
3. Pastoral Care, Society and Eschatology 306
4. The Role of Christ 310
5. Socialism and Pastoral Psychology 313
6. Pastoral Care and the Mission of the Church 315
7. Reconciliation, Relationship and Eschatology 317
8. Conclusion 319

Bibliography:

- Books 321
- Articles 327

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I first became interested in working with political theology and the theology of pastoral care during a post-graduate year at Duke Divinity School, Duke University, North Carolina. I was fortunate in having as my principal professors, Frederick Herzog, a colleague of Moltmann's and also a political theologian, and Paul Mickey, a student and colleague of Seward Hiltner. In spite of the difference in subject matter, these teachers fired my interest in working within the two fields.

My first intention in this study was to try to integrate political theology and the theology of pastoral care. I hoped to write a socio-political theology of pastoral care. After some time, it became clear that such a project was more complex than I had realised, because it was necessary first of all to clear the ground and see what the issues were. The first intention, then, had to give way to a study aimed at locating the issues which such a re-writing of the theology of pastoral care would have to consider. This became the subject of study.

During the three years of this study I have had the benefit of support and encouragement. Many people along the way have helped me. Firstly, I would like to thank the Reverend Principal D. W. D. Shaw of New College for his help and friendship throughout all my years of theological study. Much would not have been possible without him. Secondly, I would like to state my appreciation for the courtesy and good humour with which this study was supervised. I have benefited greatly from the patient, interested, and careful supervision of my work

by the late Reverend Professor J. S. Blackie, the Reverend Doctor Alastair V. Campbell, and the Reverend Doctor Alasdair I. C. Heron. In particular I am grateful that my supervisors were never directive, but tried to help me to understand more clearly where I wanted to go. Also, any improvement in my writing style is their reward for constant admonishment! Thirdly, I would like to thank the D.A.A.D. for a scholarship which allowed my wife and myself to spend three happy months in Tübingen, West Germany. I am especially appreciative of the hospitality shown to us by Helmut and Beverley Olson-Dopffel. While in Tübingen, I also had the good fortune to talk with Professor Doctor Jürgen Moltmann. I am happy to record his kindly interest in my work. Fourthly, my thanks to Mrs. Elspeth Leishman for typing this study. Her enthusiasm and care were much appreciated, especially when my energy was flagging.

No major piece of work is possible without the support and love of family and friends. My fellow post-graduate, John Munro, with whom I shared the Post-graduate Reading Room for two years, suffered constant retelling of my progress. No thesis is born in a vacuum. The womb of this thesis was our daily dialogues on all matters theological. I hope he will recognise something of himself in what follows; that may be the best tribute I can pay him. His friendship was and is a great joy.

Throughout my student life my parents have supported and sustained me. Their faith in me was a never-diminishing reservoir

Edinburgh, April 1978.

from which I constantly drew support. I would never have started theological study without their encouragement. My thanks to them cannot be limited to a few words here.

My wife, Cathy, probably put up with more than a wife should be asked to tolerate. Certainly she was at the receiving end of all the ups and downs of thesis writing. Her confidence in me, her friendship, and her love never weakened. It was her pastoral sensitivity in the first place which opened my eyes to pastoral care. And her constant questioning of my ideas remains still a major source of whatever creative thinking I am capable of. In dedicating this study to her I acknowledge that it could never have been written without her.

This introduction will set the stage for the study which follows.

The purpose is to outline the context of the study by explaining the issues and defining the principal terms.

Pastoral care may be understood as something which a Christian pastor or pastorally-minded person does to assist another person who is in need. The concern is to bring the resources of the Christian gospel to the needs which people have, such as bereavement, marriage breakdown, broken relationships with God and their fellow-creatures, guilt and so on.

The definitions of political theology and the theology of pastoral care which are given here are purely for introductory purposes. They are not intended to be complete statements. But without a minimal statement of what the principal concepts are, it is not possible to understand the nature of the study.

Andrew Purves

Edinburgh. April 1978.

INTRODUCTION

This study will identify the theological issues which have to be faced if the theology of pastoral care is to move away from being dominated by a clinical, individualised, and problem-solving approach to pastoral care to an approach which recognises or includes socio-political and communal aspects of the gospel message. These theological issues will be identified through a comparative study of political theology and the theology of pastoral care. The intention is not just to compare and contrast political theology and the theology of pastoral care. Rather, the intention is to engage in a comparative study in order to identify the theological issues which confront the theology of pastoral care if it is to move towards meeting the political demands of the gospel.

This introduction will set the stage for the study which follows. The purpose is to outline the context of the study by explaining the issue and defining the principal terms.¹

Pastoral care may be understood as something which a Christian pastor or pastorally-minded person does to assist another person who is in need. The concern is to bring the resources of the Christian gospel to the needs which people have, such as bereavement, marriage breakdown, broken relationships with God and their fellows, guilt and so on.

- 1 The definitions of political theology and the theology of pastoral care which are given here are purely for introductory purposes. They are not intended to be complete statements. But without a minimal statement of what the principal terms mean, it is not possible to understand the nature of this study.

Pastoral care can take the form of healing broken relationships, guiding perplexed persons, sustaining those who have lost faith and hope, and the like. As pastoral care is part of the Christian ministry, its purpose is to bring the gospel to people in need. The theology of pastoral care refers to thinking theologically about the meaning and nature of pastoral care. Ultimately, the content of pastoral care is a theological issue and not a pragmatic issue.

Generally, the theology of pastoral care relates theology in some way to the pastoral dimension of ministry.² This relationship may be understood in one of three ways. Firstly, pastoral care may be understood as arising out of theology. This is in the traditional sense of the term 'practical theology'.³ Here the relationship between practical theology and dogmatic and historical theology is deductive. Practical theology is applied theology. In this case, practical theology has no independent existence of its own, and it tends to become a kind of practicalism of the 'hints and helps' variety.⁴ Secondly, the relationship between theology and pastoral care has been understood in homiletical terms, as, for example, by Eduard Thurneysen in his THEOLOGY OF PASTORAL CARE.

- 2 To speak of 'the pastoral dimension' of ministry implies that there are other dimensions of ministry. The theology of pastoral care should not be regarded imperialistically as a theology of ministry.
- 3 The term 'practical theology' made its appearance in nineteenth century Germany. See A. V. Campbell, "Is Practical Theology Possible?" SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, Vol.25. No.2. (May, 1972).
- 4 A. V. Campbell, "Is Practical Theology Possible?" SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, Vol.25. No.2. p.218-219.

Here, pastoral care is set in the context of the theology of the Word of God.

Pastoral care is understood as the proclamation of the Word of God.

This is the proclamation of the forgiveness of sins to an individual.⁵

It is the same message which is proclaimed to the congregation in the sermon.⁶ The fundamental pastoral act is, then, the pastoral

conversation, where conversation means the proclamation of the forgiveness of sins.⁷ Here again, pastoral care is in a subservient relationship to dogmatic and historical theology. In these first two ways of expressing the relationship between theology and pastoral care there is no sense in which the theology of pastoral care is understood as a theological discipline in its own right, with a contribution to make to the Body of Divinity.

Thirdly, the relationship between theology and pastoral care has been understood in inductive rather than deductive terms. Instead of having the other theological disciplines define the norms for the theology of pastoral care those who argue for the inductive approach to the relationship would maintain that the theological study of pastoral events itself produces theological insight and knowledge. The theology of pastoral care in this case arises out of theological reflection on pastoral

5 Eduard Thurneysen, THEOLOGY OF PASTORAL CARE
Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1962, p.11.

6 Ibid., p.15.

7 Ibid., p.101. "Pastoral care is accomplished in the form
of a conversation which proceeds from the Word of God."

experience. This approach to the relationship between theology and pastoral care implies a methodological division within the Body of Divinity. On the one hand, there is the traditional theological methodology, with appeal to scripture and tradition. On the other hand, there is an operational methodology, with appeal to the operational experience of the minister and the church. Here, the theology of pastoral care becomes a theological discipline in its own right, with an equal contribution to make to the Body of Divinity.

This third position is associated with the pastoral theology of Seward Hiltner. In order to avoid confusion with the deductive theologies of pastoral care, and to affirm its existence as a theological discipline in its own right, Hiltner advocates the use of the term 'pastoral theology' in place of 'the theology of pastoral care.' The two terms can be used interchangeably as long as it is clear what meaning is intended. Throughout this study, both terms will be used as they have been defined in this third statement of the relationship between theology and pastoral care, that is, to refer to theological reflection on pastoral operations. The theology of pastoral care, as it is now to be understood, is not 'practical theology' or 'applied theology.' It is held, rather, that genuine theological knowledge may be acquired through the theological study of pastoral events.⁸

8 This brief statement hardly does justice to the inductive approach to the theology of pastoral care. A full statement is given in the body of the text.

Pastoral care, as it has been developed by Hiltner and those who agree with his operational approach to the theology of pastoral care, is primarily understood in terms of one-to-one relationships, without regard to the socio-political environment of the person to whom pastoral care is given. What is dealt with in pastoral care are the personal pastoral needs of an individual. This approach takes as paradigmatic the clinical, medical, psychoanalytical model of therapy. Pastoral care focuses on the individual, and its purpose is problem-solving or problem-preventing. The agenda for pastoral care is set by non-theological criteria. As the operational approach to the theology of pastoral care has been developed by Hiltner, pastoral psychology has come increasingly to determine the nature and content of pastoral care.

This individualised or clinical approach to pastoral care, in which no regard is given to the wider socio-political or communal context of the individual in need of pastoral care, has been challenged in recent times. The following examples give an indication of the nature of this challenge.

Howard J. Clinebell writes that

"a church should have a balanced concern for both the individual roots of social problems and the social roots of individual problems. Obviously it is essential to work simultaneously on both ends of the human situation."⁹

Here Clinebell appears to recognise the need for a wider framework in pastoral care which involves setting the individual in his social contexts.

9 Howard J. Clinebell, MENTAL HEALTH THROUGH CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY (New York: Abingdon Press, 1966), p.101.

Another pastoral theologian, Robert H. Bonthius, argues that a significant shift away from giving pastoral care in individualised categories is necessary if pastoral care is to be made relevant to the needs of the urban poor. Rather than seeing pastoral care solely in terms of healing, sustaining and guiding individuals in need, as Hiltner does, Bonthius suggests that

"pastoral care of the poor is already a matter of mobilizing the moral, political, and economic resources of affluent America in such a way that major changes are made in the systems that cause poverty. A meaningful ministry of poverty is a ministry to structures."¹⁰

Bonthius recognises that pastoral care to the poor involves a political ministry. Finally, James N. Lapsley makes the general observation that

"the need for increased attention to the communal aspects of life in the church and society is facing us squarely, but we have been slow to rise to the challenge. Our concern is still too much the one-to-one relationship, even though we know we must give attention to group approaches in pastoral care and to the relevance of personal help in a society whose structures are trembling."¹¹

In this statement, given in the context of a discussion of the directions in which pastoral care needs to grow, Lapsley highlights the need to consider aspects of communal life.

10 Robert H. Bonthius, "A Theology of Poverty: Prelude to Pastoral Care of the Poor," PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY (November, 1969 p.28. Vol.20 No.198)

11 James N. Lapsley, "Pastoral Theology Past and Present" in THE NEW SHAPE OF PASTORAL THEOLOGY (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1969) ed. Wm. B. Oglesby p.44.

These three pastoral theologians have suggested that there is a need for pastoral care to move beyond the individualised, clinical model advocated by Hiltner. According to them, pastoral care must include communal, socio-political and structural aspects. However, these suggestions are advanced on pragmatic rather than theological grounds. The need for this development in pastoral care is not given a theological justification. In other words, there is no sense in which these theologians have allowed their insights to raise theological questions for the theology of pastoral care. They have not identified the theological issues which this development in pastoral care has to face.

Another challenge, issued on theological grounds, has been sounded by the English pastoral theologian, Robert A. Lambourne. In a number of brief essays, Lambourne attempted to lay the foundation for a theology of pastoral care which is not based upon the clinical, medical and psychoanalytical models which have dominated the theology of pastoral care in the United States. Lambourne tried to develop an alternative approach to the theology of pastoral care on the basis of biblical theology. In this way he hoped to demonstrate theologically why the task of the theology of pastoral care should be altered.

Lambourne argued for a biblical approach to the theology of pastoral care. In this way he tried to include into pastoral care physical and political dimensions, as well as mental, psychological and individual dimensions.¹² Lambourne derived his position from the Pauline

12 Robert A. Lambourne, "Wholeness, Community and Worship" CONTACT 44 (Spring, 1974) p.11f. See also R. A. Lambourne, "The Deliverance Map of Disease and Sin"; "Personal Reformation and Political Formation in Pastoral Care" CONTACT 44. R. A. Lambourne, "With Love to the U.S.A." JOURNAL OF RELIGION AND HEALTH Vol.8 No.4, reprinted in RELIGION AND MEDICINE ed. Melinsky (London: S.C.M. 1970). R. A. Lambourne, COMMUNITY, CHURCH AND HEALING (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1963).

understanding of man.

"The rediscovery that the Christian view of man is holistic and not dualistic is the fruit of Biblical theology."¹³

Lambourne's claim is based on John A. T. Robinson's book THE BODY: A STUDY IN PAULINE THEOLOGY. A brief statement of Robinson's argument will allow for a fuller understanding of Lambourne's challenge to individualised and clinical approaches to the theology of pastoral care.

Robinson asserts that Pauline anthropology emerges out of the Old Testament view of man.¹⁴ SOMA, body, is the Greek translation of eleven Hebrew words, although for none of these is it an adequate translation. But the most important Hebrew word translated by SOMA is BASAR, flesh. BASAR is also translated into Greek by the word SARX, flesh. Therefore, Robinson argues, the decisive words SARX and SOMA represent a common Hebrew original.¹⁵ BASAR denotes the entire life-substance of man organised in corporeal form. That is, it represents man in his physicality.¹⁶ According to Robinson,

13 Lambourne, "Wholeness, Community and Worship." p.13.

14 John A. T. Robinson, THE BODY: A STUDY IN PAULINE THEOLOGY (London: S.C.M. 1952) p.11. This assertion has been challenged by Robert H. Gundry, SOMA IN BIBLICAL THEOLOGY (Cambridge University Press, 1976) pp.117 and 135.

15 Robinson, THE BODY, p.12.

16 Ibid., p.13.

in Hebrew thought man does not have a body, man is a body. But, Robinson continues, BASAR also denotes non-individuating flesh:

"The flesh-body was not what partitioned a man off from his neighbour, it was rather what bound him in the bundle of life with all men and nature, so that he could never make his unique answer to God as an isolated individual, apart from his relation to his neighbour. The BASAR continued, even in the age of greater religious individualism, to represent the fact that personality is essentially social."¹⁷

Turning to Pauline anthropology in the New Testament, Robinson notes that the identity between SOMA and SARX, grounded as they are in the Hebrew concept of BASAR, does not mean that there are no differences between them. SOMA refers to what man is; SARX refers to flesh-substance, the whole body or person considered from the point of view of his external, physical existence.¹⁸ But there is no suggestion that SOMA, like SARX, connotes weakness or mortality.

"While SARX stands for man, in the solidarity of creation, in his distance from God, SOMA stands for man, in the solidarity of creation, as made for God."¹⁹

Robinson concludes that in Pauline anthropology man is understood in somatic and social terms. It is from this conclusion that Lambourne begins his construction of the theology of pastoral care.

17 Ibid., p.15. See also Ernest Best, ONE BODY IN CHRIST (London: S.P.C.K., 1955) p.35f and Appendix C.

Gundry describes Robinson's position as 'somatic socialism,' and he argues that Robinson has lost the notion of individuation which he believes is still appropriate to Pauline anthropology. SOMA IN BIBLICAL THEOLOGY, p.218.

18 Robinson, THE BODY, p.17/18.

19 Ibid., p.31. Rudolf Bultmann also uses SOMA to describe the whole person. In a way similar to Robinson, Bultmann states that the only human existence that there is is somatic existence. However, for Bultmann, SOMA is set apart from any necessary tangibility. Rudolf Bultmann, THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, Vol.1 (London: S.C.M. 1952) p.192f.

Lambourne suggests that the theology of pastoral care must be derived from a biblical view of man. When applied to the theology of pastoral care, the biblical view of man, which Lambourne derives from Robinson's analysis, points away from the individualised, clinical models of pastoral care to a model which includes social and physical as well as individual and psychological dimensions of human beings. It is in the light of this biblically-based approach to understanding human beings that Lambourne has subjected psychotherapeutically orientated theology of pastoral care to criticism.²⁰ Lambourne's account is important because he has arrived at conclusions which are similar to those of Clinebell, Bonthius, and Lapsley, but for theological rather than for pragmatic reasons. In spite of concentrating on a limited aspect of New Testament anthropology as interpreted by only one commentator, Lambourne has managed to raise an important issue for the theology of pastoral care, namely, that it is theologically necessary to include a social component in pastoral care.

This brief statement of the challenge issued to the theology of pastoral care demonstrates how the matter pursued in this study is not without its context. However, the challenge to include socio-political dimensions into the theology of pastoral care has not advanced beyond Lambourne's theological statement of the issue. None of the sources cited have investigated the theological problems which may be involved in moving the theology of pastoral care away from the individualised, clinical models

20 The details of Lambourne's criticism of psychotherapeutically orientated theology of pastoral care will be outlined in the body of the text.

and towards a model which includes a communal and political dimension of caring. Lambourne has suggested why it is necessary to move the theology of pastoral care toward a new understanding of its task, but he has given no indication that he is aware of the theological issues which this development is required to face. In order for the theology of pastoral care to become aware of the theological problems which have to be faced it is necessary to conduct a comparative analysis with political theology. It is now necessary for a brief introduction to political theology to be given in order that the purpose of this study may be properly understood.

The term 'political theology' originated with Stoic philosophy.²¹ Panaetius, for example, distinguished three classes of divinity: personified powers of nature, the gods of the state religion, and the gods of myth. Ancient political theory joined together the state and the gods, and, according to the Roman Stoic, Varro, political theology is to be considered as the highest form of theology because the first principle of society is to render due honour to the gods. Knowledge and worship of the gods of the state were held to be vitally necessary in securing peace and prosperity. The public worship of the state gods was an obligatory civil duty. Christians, it has been supposed, were first accused of atheism because they refused to worship the gods of the state.²²

21 Jürgen Moltmann, "The Cross and Civil Religion" in RELIGION AND POLITICAL SOCIETY ed. The Institute of Christian Thought. (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), p.22. See also, Jürgen Moltmann, "Political Theology" in THE EXPERIMENT HOPE (London: S.C.M., 1975), p.104.

22 Moltmann, "The Cross and Civil Religion," p.23.

Later, the Christian Emperors Theodosius and Justinian made Christianity into a state religion after the fashion of earlier Roman civil religion. Non-Christian religions then came to be regarded as atheistic, reversing the situation in which the first Christians had found themselves.

"Through the Christianization of Europe, Christianity became heir to the traditional and official Roman state religion. Christianity became a political religion in the sense that its religiosity expressed a political *raison d'être*."²³

Christian apologists united Christ's kingdom with the idea of the peace of Rome. In this there emerged the first Christian political theology: one God, one Saviour, one church, one emperor, and one kingdom. Christianity surrendered its independent and critical existence to the purpose of the state.

According to Erik Peterson, this political-religious monotheism was overcome firstly, by the formation of the doctrine of the Trinity. The doctrine of the Trinity freed Christian theology from religio-political monotheism in which the doctrine of God was used as a religious background for ratifying claims to power on earth. Power on earth cannot claim to be in the image of the Creator. Secondly, the understanding of eschatology, in which peace with God is grounded in Christ and not in Caesar, led to a fundamental break with political theology. The eschatological message of the gospel meant that the peace of Christ is something other than the peace of Rome. Eschatology implied that Christian faith could not be identified with the political status quo.²⁴ Peterson concluded that

²³ Ibid.,

²⁴ Ibid., p.26, and Moltmann, "Political Theology," p.107.

See also Jürgen Moltmann, THE CRUCIFIED GOD (New York: Harper & Roe, 1974), p.325/326.

political theology was, therefore, impossible. Contemporary political theology, as it will be understood in this study, may be said to begin with Peterson's criticism of classical political theology, although it rejects his conclusion.²⁵ Moltmann writes:

"For Erik Peterson, the development of the doctrine of the triune God and of the eschatological concept of peace, has forced Christian theology into a fundamental break with every political theology. For him, there is no longer any political theology in Christianity. But it seems to me that the political problems of Christian theology only begin at this point."²⁶

Contemporary political theology is not to be understood in terms of some Christianised form of Roman Stoic political theology. Political theology, as it is intended henceforth, begins as critical theology, in which the eschatological peace of the trinitarian God is brought into conflict with the absolute claims of power on earth. As J. B. Metz has written,

"every eschatological theology, therefore, must become a political theology, that is, a (socio-) critical theology."²⁷

Political theology adopts a critical attitude towards the political religions in society and in the churches. It challenges the state's political service of idols by demythologising the state and society. In so doing, political theology attempts to liberate men from political alienation and loss of rights. Moltmann states that

"a critical political theology today must take this course of desacralization, relativization and democratization."²⁸

25 This is true at least as far as Moltmann and J. B. Metz are concerned.

26 Moltmann, "Political Theology," p.108.

27 Johannes B. Metz, THEOLOGY OF THE WORLD (London: Burns & Oates, Herder & Herder, 1969), p.113.

28 Moltmann, THE CRUCIFIED GOD, p.328.

In this way, political theology tries to anticipate in the present the eschatological peace of God through liberative praxis.²⁹

The proposition that the theology of pastoral care should have a socio-political dimension suggests the need for a comparative study of political theology and the theology of pastoral care. The theological issues which are involved in redirecting the theology of pastoral care towards socio-political awareness can be brought to light by way of a comparative study. Only when these issues are clearly seen can the possibility of the task suggested by Clinebell, Bonthius, Lapsley and Lambourne be properly assessed. This study is concerned with uncovering the theological issues which have to be confronted if the theology of pastoral care is to grow out of its present clinical model toward a model which recognises the socio-political and communal aspects of the gospel's message. In a sense this study is a ground-clearing investigation in which the nature of the task involved in redirecting the theology of pastoral care will be identified.

This study begins with a statement of Seward Hiltner's theology of pastoral care. This is followed by a statement of Jürgen Moltmann's political theology. The comparative study will be between these two theologies. It is necessary to state why Moltmann and Hiltner have been selected for detailed statement.

The manner in which and the degree to which different theologians have developed political theologies makes it difficult to offer a united or integrated account of political theology in general. Many different types of political theology, in the contemporary sense of the term, can be identified:

29 This statement is necessarily brief and general. A fuller statement will be given in the body of the text.

Latin American theology of liberation, North American black theology, Southern African black theology, Neo-Marxist political theology, and European non-Marxist political theology. These theological categorisations could all claim some degree of affinity with the brief statement of political theology which was just given. Yet each approach is, in many ways, quite different from the others; further, even within each category there can be considerable difference of emphasis and theological opinion.³⁰ It is not in fact possible to provide an overall statement of the nature of political theology without sacrificing detail or making the presentation longer than is necessary for the purposes of this study. If the intentions of this study are to be fulfilled, political theology should be presented in a detailed and systematic way. To do this, one representative political theologian should be selected for presentation. The political theology of Jürgen Moltmann has been selected. Moltmann cannot be said to speak for the whole of political theology. Neither is he the leader of a 'school' of political theology. However, in theological terms his political theology is the most highly developed. He is generally regarded as a major contributor to the discipline and the value of his work is widely acknowledged. Moltmann, then, will be taken as a representative political theologian. The relationship of his theology to other political theologies, and to theological and philosophical traditions in general, will be discussed when necessary in the presentation.

30 I have not considered the theology of political care in the context of the North American black theologians J. Deotis Roberts and James Cone. I have greatly benefited from conversations with Roberts, who has made clear to me his disagreement with Cone. Cf. James Cone, BLACK THEOLOGY AND BLACK POWER (New York: The Seabury Press, 1969); GOD OF THE OPPRESSED (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975). Unfortunately I have not been able to get access to Robert's books. I have relied, rather, upon many conversations with him.

The selection of Seward Hiltner's theology of pastoral care (or pastoral theology) is demanded by the central role which this theology holds in the theology of pastoral care. His work in developing an operational approach to the theology of pastoral care set the direction of contemporary theology of pastoral care. And in his dialogue with pastoral psychology, Hiltner has introduced the insights and techniques of psychotherapy into pastoral practice in a new way. Of all the contemporary pastoral theologians, Hiltner alone has written enough for the student to be able to present a systematic and detailed statement. A presentation of Hiltner's theology of pastoral care best serves to illustrate the nature of contemporary American theology of pastoral care.³¹

This study is divided into three parts. Part One is an account of Hiltner's theology of pastoral care. Part Two is an account of Moltmann's political theology. Part Three consists of a comparative study of Moltmann and Hiltner, and concludes with a statement of the theological issues which this study identifies as being involved in the redirection of the theology of pastoral care.

Many of the quotations cited in this study are from American publications. The spelling will be taken as it has appeared in the texts. Otherwise, British spelling will be used. Thus, 'counseling' is used in quotations. 'Counselling' is used in discussion.

31 I have not considered the theology of pastoral care in the conservative evangelical tradition. For the difference between it and Hiltner's approach, see J. S. Hielema, PASTORAL OR CHRISTIAN COUNSELING (Leeuwarden: De Tille, 1975).

Chapter 1

Introduction and Background to Seward Hiltner's

Theology of Pastoral Care

PART ONE

1. Introduction

2. Background

SEWARD HILTNER'S THEOLOGY OF PASTORAL CARE and Education

(a) Paul Tillich

(c) Carl R. Rogers

(d) Empirical Theology

Chapter 1

Introduction and Background to Seward Hiltner's

Theology of Pastoral Care

1. Introduction
2. Background
 - (a) Anton T. Boisen and the Beginning of Clinical Pastoral Education
 - (b) Paul Tillich
 - (c) Carl R. Rogers
 - (d) Empirical Theology

1. Introduction

Five chapters make up the first part of this study. The first chapter examines the background and context of Seward Hiltner's theology of pastoral care; the second outlines Hiltner's theological methodology; the third, explains Hiltner's concept of the Christian shepherd; the fourth looks at developments in Hiltner's theology; and the fifth consists of comment and discussion.

What is pastoral care? From an historical perspective, Clebsch and Jaekle define it as

"helping acts, done by representative Christian persons, directed toward the healing, sustaining, guiding and reconciling of troubled persons whose troubles arise in the context of ultimate meanings and concerns."¹

They emphasise that pastoral care is exercised by persons who are taken to possess the resources of the Christian faith, the wisdom distilled from Christian experiences, and the authority of a company of Christian believers. Pastoral care begins when an individual recognises or feels that his trouble is insoluble in the context of his own private resources and he becomes willing to take his trouble to a person who represents to him the resources, wisdom, and authority of religion. The troubles which require pastoral care must evoke profound concerns and question ultimate meanings in the individual's life. In this case, pastoral care is not the same as acts of mercy, works of charity or neighbourliness.

1 William A. Clebsch and Charles R. Jaekle, PASTORAL CARE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, (Englewood Cliff, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964), p.4.

Clebsch and Jaekle suggest that historically the four functions of pastoral care are healing, which includes a new level of spiritual insight; sustaining, which consists in helping a person to transcend a circumstance which is not immediately able to be healed; guiding, where perplexed persons are helped to make choices; and reconciling,² where broken relationships between man and God and man and man are re-established. Seen from an historical perspective, pastoral care is a ministry of helping which has a specific character.

In their survey of the history of pastoral care, Clebsch and Jaekle indicate how one or other of the four functions of pastoral care appears to have dominated pastoral ministry at different times in the history of the church, although not to the exclusion of the other functions.³ Clebsch and Jaekle suggest that our present age, characterised as 'the post-Christendom era,' is an age of transition for pastoral care, in which there is little clarity about the nature of pastoral ministry.

"Since the dawn of a new awareness of man, traceable to seminal thinkers of the nineteenth century. . . . we have witnessed the rise of non-pastoral professions capable of healing, sustaining, guiding, and reconciling troubled individuals. In this circumstance, the ministry of pastoral care has fallen into the position of a junior partner to many other helping professions. The reaction to this circumstance of pastoring has been to raise serious questions about its own validity while at the same time borrowing techniques from psychology, law, medicine, education and social work. These questions and borrowings indicate that ours is indeed a time of transition."⁴

- 2 Reconciling is not included by Hiltner in his list of the functions of shepherding. His list of functions consists of healing, sustaining and guiding.
- 3 Clebsch and Jaekle, p.11f.
- 4 Ibid., p.14.

The cultural and intellectual changes which have characterised the modern era since the Enlightenment resulted in a tendency to regard religion as a private matter of individual, personal life. Church membership became a matter of voluntary association. This led to an ecclesiastical pluralism which was concomitant with the stress on the individual's conscience in matters of religion. These changes forced pastoral care to adapt its procedures to suit the different circumstances and expectations. The question of the identity of pastoral care arose as the secular healing and caring disciplines increasingly met an ever wider range of need, forcing pastoral care to concentrate on the private, personal and individual aspects of peoples' lives. That is to say, pastoral care compliantly followed the church and religion into the private, personal and individual dimensions of life, and away from the corporate, public, and productive dimensions of life. According to Clebsch and Jaekle, in an attempt to understand its role in this new situation of concentration on the personal, private needs of troubled individuals, pastoral care built the foundation for a later preoccupation with psychology.⁵

Contemporary pastoral care, certainly as represented by the Clinical Pastoral Education movement in the United States, increasingly engaged in dialogue with psychology in general, and the personality sciences in particular. This dialogue is not, however, a radical or novel move on the part of the church. Clebsch and Jaekle state that

5 Ibid., p.30.

"in every historical epoch, pastoring has utilized – and by utilizing has helped to advance and transform – the psychology and psychologies current in that epoch. Those who would object that modern pastoral use of contemporaneous psychology betrays the Christian tradition are, in fact, themselves the innovators. Nowhere in history has Christianity adumbrated solely from its own lore a distinct psychology, either theoretically or popularly understood. To appreciate traditional pastoring is to stand ready to adopt and adapt current psychological insights and applications without abdicating the distinctly pastoral role."⁶

What, however, is novel in the dialogue between contemporary pastoral care and psychology is the major, and perhaps dominating, role which psychology has come to play in pastoring. Although pastoral care is more than the application of psychological insight and therapy to ministerial practice,⁷ psychology has come more and more to supply the data for pastoral theological reflection and to structure the practice of pastoral care. The contemporary form of the relationship between psychology and pastoral care has been called by one writer,

"Hiltner's pioneering thesis."⁸

6 Ibid., p.68-69; see also p.76f. ,

7 Seward Hiltner, PREFACE TO PASTORAL THEOLOGY, (New York: Abingdon Press, 1958), p.36-37. Hereafter cited as PREFACE.

8 William B. Oglesby Jr., "Introduction" to THE NEW SHAPE OF PASTORAL THEOLOGY ed. Oglesby, (New York: Abingdon Press, 1969), p.15. The relationship between the theology of pastoral care and contemporary psychology is not limited to Hiltner's work, as is seen by the essays which make up this book.

Before describing the immediate background to the development of Hiltner's psychologically oriented theology of pastoral care, it is necessary to outline in general terms the theological tradition in which Hiltner places himself. Hiltner calls himself a liberal in theology, and the theology of pastoral care which has arisen from his work indicates his allegiance to the liberal theological tradition.

In a non-technical sense, 'liberalism' means freedom from bigotry and a readiness to welcome new ideas. Generally, liberalism can be described by the word 'openness.' But in theology, liberalism has a more technical meaning. Liberal theology is regarded as having had its primary expression in the work of the nineteenth century German theologian, F. D. E. Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher tried to vindicate religion in terms of the philosophical context which prevailed during the early decades of the nineteenth century. This context was dominated by the philosophy of Kant. Kant's critique of metaphysical knowledge meant for Schleiermacher that religion had to be considered as something sui generis from the rational activity of philosophy, science or morality. Kant had made it impossible to talk about the being of God, except in moral terms. It was Schleiermacher's intention to find an alternative way to talk about God, a way which was not blocked by Kant's scepticism. Schleiermacher argued that this alternative way was to be found in the 'feeling of being absolutely dependent' which was common to all people. For Schleiermacher, this 'feeling' had a non-cognitive relation to reality, although it had cognitive implications. The doctrines of the Christian faith were then worked out on the basis of this primary feeling. Schleiermacher brought into theology a subjective, experiential, individualistic spirituality. Through his work, theology was opened out to meet the demands of the secular culture.

As theological liberalism developed during the course of the nineteenth century, its major features may be characterised as a notion of the indwelling of God in man, a readiness to utilise contemporary modes of thought, an optimistic assessment of man's potential, an avowal of literary and historical criticism, and an anthropological individualism. This theology was humanistic and anthropocentric, and was expressed, as lived faith, in ethical action. It was strongly romantic, antidogmatic, and monotheistic rather than trinitarian.

Liberal theology since 1914 has been challenged both in Europe and in the United States. This challenge, in many ways instigated by the First World War, was led in the main by Karl Barth. Barth questioned its value as theology. In occupying that area of human experience which was not subject to Kant's scepticism, namely, feeling, liberal theology was believed by Barth to have forsaken theology's own ground in the Word of God. But in spite of the attacks, liberal theology has survived with its motifs of humanism, individualism, ethical action, anti-dogmatism, and optimism, still intact. As far as contemporary pastoral care is concerned, the willingness of liberal theology to appropriate to itself the secular, social-scientific analyses of human existence has been of considerable importance. The liberal theology, in particular, has increasingly attended to developments in psychology. The liberal view, in which there is no radical break between creation and redemption, permitted theology to appropriate psychology as a valuable addition to the resources for theological construction.

In the remainder of this chapter, the primary influences on Hiltner's theology of pastoral care will be outlined. The statement of these influences will indicate some of the ways in which liberal theology has entered into dialogue with the intellectual culture of the present age.

2. Background

(a) Anton T. Boisen and the Beginning of Clinical Pastoral Education

The debt which the contemporary pastoral care movement in the United States owes to Anton Boisen is widely acknowledged.⁹ Specifically, Boisen's influence on Hiltner is significant and his acknowledgement of this influence is unequivocal.¹⁰ Boisen did not begin his working life as a pastor. Not, in fact, until his forty-fourth year, and following a nervous breakdown, did he find his vocation in ministry to the mentally ill. Out of his personal experience of mental illness Boisen found a new level of religious awareness and vocational insight.

The two most important contributions which Boisen made to the theology of pastoral care and pastoral practice were his avowal of empirical case-study as a valid tool in theological construction and his insistence that clinical training should be an integral part of theological training.

9 Cf. Paul Pruyser, "Anton T. Boisen and the Psychology of Religion" JOURNAL OF PASTORAL CARE, Vol.21, 1967; Henri J. M. Nouwen, "Anton T. Boisen and Theology Through Living Human Documents" PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol.19, (September, 1968); James N. Lapsley, "Pastoral Theology Past and Present" in Oglesby, THE NEW SHAPE OF PASTORAL THEOLOGY.

10 "The person who has done more than any other in our century to prepare the soil for a new pastoral theology is Anton T. Boisen." Hiltner, PREFACE, p.51. James Lapsley assesses Boisen to have been seminal in the development of Hiltner's theology of pastoral care. op. cit. See also Seward Hiltner, "The Contribution of Liberals to Pastoral Care" in James Luther Adams and Seward Hiltner (eds.), PASTORAL CARE IN THE LIBERAL CHURCHES (New York: Abingdon Press, 1970); Seward Hiltner, "The Debt of C.P.E. to Anton T. Boisen" JOURNAL OF PASTORAL CARE Vol.20, 1961. The debt which Hiltner owes to Boisen has also been noted by J. S. Hielema, PASTORAL OR CHRISTIAN COUNSELING (Leeuwarden: De Tille, 1975).

With respect to case-study analyses, Boisen was influenced by the Unitarian medical doctor, Richard C. Cabot.¹¹ It was through Cabot's teaching and patronage that Boisen first began to develop the study of 'living human documents.' That is, he advocated the study of concrete case histories in order to increase theological knowledge. Boisen later argued that theology must

"deal at first hand with the raw material of some definite segment of human life."¹²

His autobiographical reflections of his own case history in OUT OF THE DEPTHS is a case in point.¹³ Empirical case-study of the various forms of pathology opened the way to allow pastoral care to employ psychological insights and therapies. Boisen, as a hospital chaplain, became involved with the psychotherapeutic care of the mentally ill. To facilitate him in his task he developed an understanding, derived from his own illness, of the relationship between religious experience and mental illness.

11 For Cabot's influence on Boisen see Anton T. Boisen, OUT OF THE DEPTHS, (New York: Harper & Row, 1960); see also Nouwen, op. cit.; Charles E. Hall Jr., "Some Contributions of Anton T. Boisen to Understanding Psychiatry and Religion," PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol.19, (September, 1968).

12 Anton T. Boisen, EXPLORATION OF THE INNER WORLD (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1936), p.185.

13 This view is advanced by Pruyser, op. cit., "Of all the case studies (Boisen) assembled, (his own) is the richest and most purposive." p.219.

Boisen conceived of mental disorder as a failure in the problem-solving experience, when these problems have to do with personal destiny and ultimate loyalties and values.¹⁴

"The end of all religion is not states of feeling but the transformation of the personality."¹⁵

Fellowship with God, for Boisen, amounts to mental health.¹⁶ The close conjunction between salvation and mental health, which was advocated by Boisen, prompted contemporary pastoral care to equip itself with psychological tools.

The second contribution which Boisen made to pastoral care was his notion of clinical training as a vital part of theological education. In 1925, Cabot published "A Plea for a Clinical Year in the Course of Theological Study." Cabot's vision matched Boisen's hopes, and in that year the first clinical course for theological students began under Boisen's supervision. In 1930, this study method was incorporated, with Cabot as its first president. Through the work of Carroll Wise, Wayne Oates, and Seward Hiltner, clinical training began to enter the curriculum of the theological schools. Hiltner, in particular, has been especially significant in advocating, extending and integrating clinical training within the theological curriculum.

14 Boisen, EXPLORATION OF THE INNER WORLD, pp.54, 80, and elsewhere.

15 Ibid., p.212.

16 Ibid., p.307.

"It is the point of method, the injunction to study 'living human documents' with theological questions in mind, the suggestion that the study of theology is abstract and incomplete unless we have got down to cases, that will be Boisen's permanent contribution. But, think of Boisen's theology as one may, the fact remains that Boisen saw clinical pastoral education as an aspect of theological education. And this insight is, I believe, of permanent significance."¹⁷

Hiltner's commitment to Boisen's methodology is indicated in the former's PREFACE TO PASTORAL THEOLOGY.¹⁸

The growth and success of Clinical Pastoral Education in the American theological curriculum has been marked. As the report by H. Richard Niebuhr, Daniel Day Williams, and James Gustafson indicates, clinical pastoral education has now become an accepted part of the theological curriculum.¹⁹ At present, most major seminaries in America now offer clinical courses.

"It makes an analysis of the human situation out of which the existential questions arise, and it demonstrates that the symbols used in the Christian message are the answers to these questions."²⁰

Edward Hiltner, "Paul Tillich and Pastoral Psychology," PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 3, December, 1953, p. 7-8.

Boisen also notes the influence which Tillich has had on Hiltner, op. cit., p. 16. In general terms, Tillich has had considerable influence on American pastoral theology. See, for example, "Memorial Letter to Paul Tillich," PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 19, no. 181 (February, 1968); Thomas C. Oden, CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967).

17 Hiltner, "The Debt of C.P.E. to Anton T. Boisen," p. 132.

18 This will be discussed later in the study.

19 H. Richard Niebuhr, D. D. Williams, and J. M. Gustafson, THE ADVANCEMENT OF THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION (New York: Harper & Row Brothers, 1957), p. 112f.

(b) Paul Tillich

Hiltner is explicit in his use of, and attraction to, Tillich's theology.

Hiltner writes :

"What attracts me most to Tillich's (theology), is his concern for the relation of theology and culture, the sympathetic and relevant and yet always critical juxtaposition of faith and the actual human situation (or with any person, group or nation) at this particular point in human history. With all his reinterpretation of the meaning of Christian faith, and his rejection of many kinds of alleged orthodoxy, I do not believe he sold faith down the river, as some have charged. . . . But he did insist – and his has been the most potent theological voice of our time – that faith takes culture and situation seriously."²⁰

The two aspects of Tillich's theology which have engaged Hiltner's attention are the method of correlation and the principle of acceptance.²¹

The method of correlation

"makes an analysis of the human situation out of which the existential questions arise, and it demonstrates that the symbols used in the Christian message are the answers to these questions."²²

- 20 Seward Hiltner, "Paul Tillich and Pastoral Psychology" PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol.3, (December, 1952), p.7-8.
- 21 Hielema also notes the influence which Tillich has had on Hiltner, op.cit., p.16. In general terms, Tillich has had considerable influence on American pastoral theology. See, for example, "Memorial Issue on Paul Tillich," PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol.19, no.181 (February, 1968); Thomas C. Oden, CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967), Chapter 4. For Tillich's own writing on the matter, see Paul Tillich, "Theology of Pastoral Care," PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol.10, (October, 1959) and THEOLOGY OF CULTURE (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p.112f.
- 22 Paul Tillich, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY, Vol.1. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p.62.

And again:

"The method of correlation explains the content of the Christian faith through existential questions and theological answers in mutual interdependence."²³

By listening to the culture and man's deepest and most personal questions concerning his own existence, theology can locate the area to where religious symbols should be brought. Hiltner provides the commentary:

"Theology does not talk in a corner by itself but speaks to the vital questions men ask."²⁴

As both Oden and Hielema note Tillich's method of correlation involves a shift of emphasis from that presented by traditional or orthodox Christian theology.²⁵ Traditionally, God has posed the questions to man's existence. Tillich, on the other hand, argues that man poses the questions.

"The method of correlation replaces inadequate methods of relating the contents of the Christian faith to man's spiritual existence. The first can be called supernaturalistic. . . . Man must become something else than human in order to receive divinity."²⁶

As Oden notes of Tillich's assumption,

"it is impossible to receive an answer to questions man has never asked."²⁷

23 Ibid., p.60.

24 Hiltner, PREFACE, p.223.

25 Oden, CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY, p.61f and Hielema, PASTORAL OR CHRISTIAN COUNSELING, p.21f.

26 Tillich, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY, Vol.1. p.64-65.

27 Oden, op. cit. p.61.

In order to understand better the questions which man asks, Tillich has engaged philosophical and psychological analyses.

"Theology has received tremendous gifts from existentialism and psychoanalysis, gifts not dreamed of fifty years ago or even thirty years ago. We have these gifts. Existentialists and analysts themselves do not need to know that they have given to theology these great things. But the theologians should know it."²⁸

Hiltner's pastoral theology is built in part upon Tillich's method of correlation. The details of this will be outlined later in the presentation of Hiltner's theological method. The second aspect of Tillich's theology which Hiltner finds helpful is his concept of acceptance. As Hiltner indicates, acceptance is a primary component of pastoral care.²⁹

"Acceptance is required not only at the horizontal level of interpersonal relationships, but also in order to convey, beneath all the difficulties, the acceptance by God Himself."³⁰

In his sermon "You are Accepted," Tillich proclaims that the essence of grace is the acceptance of the fact that you are accepted by God through no merit on your own part.³¹ Elsewhere, he talks of the 'objective power of acceptance.'³² This power is 'being-itself,' who accepts as not

28 Tillich, THEOLOGY OF CULTURE, p.126.

29 Seward Hiltner, THE CHRISTIAN SHEPHERD, (New York: Abingdon Press, 1959), p.32f.

30 Seward Hiltner, FERMENT IN THE MINISTRY, p.65.

31 Paul Tillich, "You Are Accepted" in THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948).

32 Paul Tillich, THE COURAGE TO BE (London: Collins, 1962), p.165.

estranged those who are, in fact, estranged. Man's task is to accept this acceptance.³³ In the discussion on healing in his PREFACE TO PASTORAL THEOLOGY, Hiltner acknowledges as valid the general principle of acceptance in spite of unacceptability.³⁴ It is, however, by way of the educative psychotherapy of Carl R. Rogers that Hiltner works through what this means in practice.

33 For a discussion of Tillich's soteriology, see J. Haywood Thomas, PAUL TILlich: AN APPRAISAL (London: S.C.M. Press, 1963), Chapter 4.

34 Hiltner, PREFACE, p.111.

(c) Carl R. Rogers

Hiltner is content to rest his basic approach to counselling upon Rogers' eductive methodology.³⁵

"As I use the word 'eductive' to give a thumbnail description of my approach, I believe it to be in the same direction as Rogers' 'non-directive' or 'client-centered' approach."³⁶

In eductive psychotherapy, acceptance of the client is paramount.

Before the nature of Rogers' work is described, a general comment on the ontological foundation of acceptance, with respect to pastoral care, is required. Don S. Browning writes;

"The therapist's empathic acceptance announces, proclaims, and witnesses to the fact that the client is truly acceptable, not only to him as a therapist, but to some structure which transcends all finite referents, i.e., to the universe and whatever power that holds it together."³⁷

The therapist's acceptance of the client is a representative acceptance which derives from an ontological acceptance. The client's worth and dignity transcend all finite attitudes. Acceptance is an ontological principle by which all else is measured.

35 Ibid., p.154. 'Eductive' means 'drawing out' with respect to therapy; it means drawing out the resources which a person has.

36 Seward Hiltner, PASTORAL COUNSELING (New York: Abingdon Press, 1953), p.255.

37 Don S. Browning, ATONEMENT AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), p.150.

"The possibility of the therapist accepting the client is based upon an intuition of a prior or a priori ground with reference to which the client is actually ontologically accepted."³⁸

Based upon a prior intuition of cosmic significance that transcends both, the therapist accepts the client. The indicative, the client is acceptable, is followed by the imperative, the client should be accepted by the therapist.

In the light of this ontological position, grounded theologically by Tillich, Hiltner turns to Rogers. Rogers believes, and demonstrates clinically, that if a person is accepted – without judgment, and with compassion and sympathy – he is enabled to come to grips with himself, overcome his defenses and locate his true self. Rogers insists that acceptance is related to human becoming, to making manifest one's true potential. In Rogerian psychotherapeutic terms, acceptance means 'non-directive' or 'client-centered.' The client has within himself the potential for wholeness, and in therapy the therapist must facilitate his client's resources for change and growth by accepting him unconditionally. Rogers notes that

"it has been my experience that persons have a basically positive direction."³⁹

Development

"seems to be inherent in the organism. . . . provided minimally satisfactory conditions are provided."⁴⁰

38 Ibid., p.153.

39 Carl R. Rogers, ON BECOMING A PERSON (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), p.20.

40 Ibid., p.60.

The non-directive or educative approach to pastoral counselling seeks, by way of stimulating self-knowledge through the use of unconditional positive regard (acceptance), to facilitate the emergence of the fully functioning person. This approach tries to draw out the internal resources which the client has. In this sense it is educative rather than inductive.

Hiltner stresses his reliance on Rogers' basic approach.⁴¹

However, he cannot accept either 'non-directive' or 'client-centered' methodology as totally descriptive of what he is trying to say.⁴²

Hiltner wants to include in pastoral care factors other than those considered by Rogers in deciding the details of method. Hiltner develops resources for pastoral counselling which are derived from Rogers and from the Christian tradition – prayer, Scripture, religious literature, Christian doctrine, sacraments.⁴³ These 'Christian' resources, Hiltner argues should not be at variance with the educative, accepting approach.⁴⁴

"kind of thinking which seeks an appropriate conceptual interpretation of the witness of Christian faith. . . . Theology is the particular methodical task of so understanding the Christian witness at the level of reflective thought that the resulting interpretation proves to be fitting to the essential claims of that witness."⁴⁵

41 Hiltner, PASTORAL COUNSELING, p.264.

42 Ibid., p.155.

43 Ibid., Chapter 9.

The details of this will be discussed later.

44 Hiltner, THE CHRISTIAN SHEPHERD, p.38.

(d) Empirical Theology

Empirical theology is the name given to an approach to theology which tries to build on the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead and the pragmatic empiricism of William James. It is associated with the Chicago School of Divinity.⁴⁵ In recent years, this theology has been called 'process theology'.⁴⁶

What is meant by 'empirical' in this context? Schubert M. Ogden proposes

"that we understand the meaning of this word to be essentially the same as that the word 'experiential,' defined as pertaining in some way or other to our common human experience."⁴⁷

He continues:

"To call theology 'empirical' means that even a theological kind of thinking would appeal somehow to our experience simply as men in providing the final justification for its claims."⁴⁸

By 'theology' in this context, Ogden means the

"kind of thinking which seeks an appropriate conceptual interpretation of the witness of Christian faith. . . . Theology is the particular hermeneutical task of so understanding the Christian witness at the level of reflective thought that the resulting interpretation proves to be fitting to the essential claims of that witness."⁴⁹

45 See, for example, Bernard E. Meland, "The Empirical Tradition in Theology at Chicago" in THE FUTURE OF EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY (ed. Meland) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

46 Ibid., p.41.

47 Schubert M. Ogden, "Present Prospects for Empirical Theology," Ibid., p.65.

48 Ibid., p.66.

49 Ibid.

According to Ogden, then, empirical theology is a kind of thinking which is theological insofar as it seeks to understand the Christian faith, and empirical insofar as it acknowledges no final basis for its claims apart from human experience.⁵⁰

Two paragraphs from an essay by Bernard M. Loomer provide another definition of empirical theology.

"In the sense in which I am defining it, empirical theology operates with a methodology which accepts the general empirical axiom that all ideas are reflections of concrete experience, either actual or possible. All propositional or conceptual knowledge originates from and is confirmable by physical experience. The limits of knowledge are defined by the limits of the experienceable, by the limits of relationship. Reason functions in the service of concrete fact and experience."

"The meaning of 'experience' is grounded upon a Whiteheadian or Jamesian epistemology which stress the givenness of relations and the primacy of bodily feelings or causal efficacy from which sense experience is an abstraction. It also involves the notion of experience as a synthetic concrescence of the many into some unity, based upon the discontinuous becoming of ultimate drops of experience or quanta of events."⁵¹

James Lapsley notes that Hiltner has been influenced by the process empiricism of the Chicago School of Divinity.⁵² This claim is difficult to verify. Certainly, as will be indicated later, Hiltner's theological methodology appears to be 'empirical' insofar as he advocates pastoral experience as a resource for theological construction. This is a

50 A fuller discussion of 'empirical' in the setting of empirical theology is given in John B. Cobb, "What is Alive and What is Dead in Empirical Theology," *Ibid.*, p.89f. Another definition, by Daniel Day Williams, is given in Chapter 2, 2(b).

51 Bernard M. Loomer, "Empirical Theology Within Process Thought," *Ibid.*, p.160.

52 James N. Lapsley, "Pastoral Theology Past and Present," p.40.

development of Boisen's empirical thesis of theological construction through the study of 'living human documents.' But Hiltner has written very little about his relationship to empirical theology, and much has to be assumed. Hiltner has co-written an unpublished manuscript (with Bernard M. Loomer) entitled SOME IMPLICATIONS OF PROCESS PHILOSOPHY FOR PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC THEORY.⁵³ However, the influence of empirical process theology on his thought remains obscure. Hiltner has acknowledged his failure to set out more clearly the relationship between his theology of pastoral care and empirical theology.⁵⁴ He leaves his reader with the teasing statement that he retains

"some interest in moving the whole theological enterprise ahead, especially by taking process philosophy seriously."⁵⁵

53 Cf. Seward Hiltner, THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS (New York: Abingdon Press, 1972), p.217.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid., p.184.

Hielema notes a similarity between Hiltner's and Whitehead's work. Paul Mickey gives a brief reference to the matter in "Is There a Theology in Seward Hiltner's Pastoral Theology?" PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol.21, (October, 1970).

Chapter 2

Seward Hiltner's Theology of Pastoral Care

1. Introduction

(a) Shepherding and Pastoral Care

(b) Shepherding and the Body of Divinity

2. Theology and Shepherding

(a) The Theology of Seward Hiltner

(i) Method

(ii) Content

(b) Empirical Theology and Shepherding

(c) The Method of Correlation and Shepherding

(d) The Christian Heritage and Shepherding

Seward Hiltner PREFACE TO PASTORAL THEOLOGY p.19.

ibid.

ibid., p.216.

1. Introduction

(a) Shepherding and Pastoral Care

The term 'shepherding' is central to Hiltner's description of pastoral ministry. With this term, Hiltner has sought to direct his reader's attention away from understanding pastoral care as an office of ministry to an understanding which is perspectival.

An office of ministry describes a function of the church or the minister. Thus, preaching, church administration, religious education, evangelism, social outreach and pastoral care to the individual needy are all offices of ministry.¹ Hiltner recognises that the 'office of ministry' classifications are useful, but they are

"not the sole way and not necessarily the way best calculated to get at basic theory."²

The offices of ministry have an abstract character,³ as Hiltner indicates from an example drawn from preaching. If one considers preaching as an office of ministry, the typology is seen to be inadequate because it does not represent the practical range of the event. To some hearers the sermon is instructive, while to some others it may have pastoral import, and, as such, constitutes pastoral care. Similarly, Hiltner argues, pastoral care can become limited in our understanding if it is viewed solely as an office of ministry.

1. Seward Hiltner PREFACE TO PASTORAL THEOLOGY p.19.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p.216.

Pastoral care, Hiltner notes, has been understood traditionally as an office of ministry. However, as he is trying to move our thinking away from this mode of understanding, he prefers to drop the term altogether. In its place he puts the term 'shepherding.' The terms 'shepherding' and 'pastoral care' may be interchangeable as long as they are both understood in the light of the prespectival approach.⁴ Hiltner understands shepherding as a perspective,⁵ and as such he is trying to be faithful to the biblical basis of shepherding.⁶ We will outline the biblical basis and then note what Hiltner means by shepherding as a perspective.

According to Hiltner, the essential meaning of shepherding is given in the parable of the Good Samaritan. Hiltner points out two features in this parable: there was a need to be met and this need required the specific response of healing on the part of the Samaritan. In themselves, the caring and the healing were the authentic communication of the gospel. Care for the wounded traveller was legitimate testimony. Generally, Hiltner argues, we must address and meet the need:

"The mode of testimony should be according to the need in the situation. . . . The good Samaritan principle calls for the mode of testimony to be relevant to the nature of the particular need. When the need is for healing, then shepherding is called for."⁷

Shepherding does not encompass the total task of pastoring, but it is especially called to the fore in response to a particular need for healing.

4. Ibid., p.19.

5. Ibid., p.18f, and THE CHRISTIAN SHEPHERD p.14f.

6. Seward Hiltner THE CHRISTIAN SHEPHERD p.15f.

7. Ibid., p.18.

The Samaritan, Hiltner assumes, would have responded quite differently to another set of circumstances or needs. The Samaritan's shepherding describes his activity at one time. At other times he would perform different tasks, although he maintains a readiness to shepherd. Sometimes, then, shepherding is entirely to the fore and dominates the activity. At other times something else is to the fore, but the shepherding attitude is not entirely absent. Hiltner's discussion of the parable of the Good Samaritan provides the skeleton of what he means by a perspectival approach to shepherding.

By considering shepherding as a perspective Hiltner intends that it

"is in some degree present in everything done by a pastor or church."⁸

It is never absent from the pastor, though it may only be present as a readiness. In certain circumstances, however, shepherding is properly dominant. A perspective is relational. The nature of the need determines the appropriate perspective, and so, different perspectives will be dominant at different times. Different needs call forth different responses. These responses correspond to objective needs rather than to the subjective preferences of the pastor.⁹

The correct attitude in shepherding is found in the biblical story of the shepherd who devotes all his energy and attention to the one sheep that was lost, and away from the ninety-nine who were not.¹⁰

8. PREFACE p.18.

9. THE CHRISTIAN SHEPHERD p.17.

10. Ibid., See Luke 15: 3-7; Matthew 18: 12-13.

Shepherding broadly, consists of individualised care directed towards healing.¹¹ Hiltner writes,

"What we seek above all to retain for the shepherding perspective is the quest for the good of the person involved – temporarily, if need be, without thought of the larger good of larger groups or institutions. It is simply the good-Samaritan principle in operation."¹²

Central to shepherding is the shepherd's solicitous concern for the welfare of his sheep. However, when there is neither recognition of need nor receptivity to help on the part of the parishioner, shepherding cannot be the dominant perspective. Although the pastor retains his solicitous concern for the parishioner, some other perspective must be dominant.¹³ This other perspective may be communication of the gospel or organising the Christian fellowship.¹⁴

We can continue to use the term 'pastoral care;' the only requirement, according to Hiltner, is that it is understood as a perspective rather than as an office of ministry. The latter categorisation is both limiting and abstract, while the former is attitudinal and relational.¹⁵

11. Ibid., p.19.

12. PREFACE p.68.

13. Ibid., p.68/69.

14. Ibid., p.55. and THE CHRISTIAN SHEPHERD p.19.

15. Attitude and relation are the terms used by Hiltner
PREFACE p.18

(b) Shepherding and the Body of Divinity

The Body of Divinity refers to the organisation of theological knowledge and study.¹⁶ Pastoral theology is

"that branch or field of theological knowledge and inquiry that brings the shepherding perspective to bear upon all the operations and functions of the church and the minister, and then draws conclusions of a theological order from reflection on these observations."¹⁷

The concern here is with the relationship which obtains between shepherding and the Body of Divinity. The relationship which Hiltner establishes between the two marks a major contribution of his PREFACE TO PASTORAL THEOLOGY.

According to Hiltner, there are two forms or areas of theological inquiry: operation-centred or function-centred theological inquiry and logic-centred theological inquiry.¹⁸ The Body of Divinity, or theology in general, consists of the inter-relationship and inter-communication between the two.¹⁹

The distinctive nature of operation-centred theological inquiries

"is that their theological conclusions, or theory or basic principles, emerge from reflection primarily on acts or events or functions from a particular perspective."²⁰

There are three operation-centred areas of theological inquiry, corresponding to the three ministerial perspectives, namely, shepherding the needy, communicating the gospel, and organising the Christian fellowship.

16. Ibid., p.28.

17. Ibid., p.20.

18. Ibid., p.20f.

19. Ibid., p.218.

20. Ibid., p.20.

These issue in pastoral theology, educational and evangelistic theology, and ecclesiastical theology, respectively. The focus of operation-centred theological inquiry is a particular perspective upon operations or activities of the church and the minister.

The distinctive nature of logic-centred theological inquiries is that the organising principle is determined by the subject matter under examination. Hiltner maintains that

"the key to their distinctive nature lies in a 'logical' organisation of subject matter."²¹

This area of theological inquiry includes the study of the Bible, doctrine, ethics etc.. These issue in biblical theology, doctrinal theology and moral theology. By way of example, Hiltner insists that

"the study of doctrine is organised systematically and logically around the relation of doctrines to one another and their mutually reinforcing capacity to give testimony to the total faith."²²

Here the focus of attention is Christian doctrine; generally, the focus of attention is on

"something that is overridingly logical and necessary."²³

What, with respect to shepherding and pastoral theology, is the significance of this division within the Body of Divinity? Firstly and positively, Hiltner asserts that pastoral theology is a branch of theology equal to all other branches in status and autonomy.

21. Ibid., p.218.

22. Ibid., p.21.

23. Ibid.

But this means that pastoral theology is not the whole of theology. Neither can it exist in isolation from the other branches of theology. While it exists as a branch of theology organised around the shepherding perspective, it uses the common language of the faith and engages in mutually instructive dialogue with all other branches of theological inquiry. It is also systematic and rigorous in its construction and development. Secondly and negatively, pastoral theology is not practical or applied theology, if by this we mean the practice of the theory derived from theological study. If pastoral theology were concerned only with 'practicalism' and 'hints and helps'²⁴ then it would indeed become the poor relation within the Body of Divinity, divorced from theoretical and systematic study. In this case, its relationship to systematic theology would be largely deductive, being merely applied theology. Such a scheme would leave systematic theology open to the charge of irrelevance and inapplicability.²⁵ Neither is pastoral theology Christian pastoral psychology. Hiltner is adamant that it

"deals with the theological theory of the shepherding perspective."²⁶

It begins with theological questions and concludes with theological answers.²⁷

24. Ibid., p.48.

25. Alastair V. Campbell "Is Practical Theology Possible?" p.218. and PREFACE p.28

26. PREFACE 23. Stress mine.

27. Ibid., p.24.

Hiltner has argued that pastoral theology must be seen as a legitimate and necessary part of the theological curriculum. His argument depends upon the validity of the division which he makes within the Body of Divinity.

This division supports his move away from considering pastoral care as an office of ministry to regarding it as a theological discipline in its own right. As such, it will bring new knowledge into the Body of Divinity. Pastoral theology, then, must refuse to accept the imperialism of logic-centred theology when this insists that there can be no real theological knowledge unless it is organised in a certain (i.e., logic-centred) way.²⁸

Hiltner states that the division within the Body of Divinity was not his to make: he only discovered it.²⁹ If we do not have such a division, however, then the result is, as has been noted, an anti-practical bias within theology and a detheologising of operational studies.

The theoretical basis of Hiltner's method for pastoral theology and the construction of the Body of Divinity is determined by his synthesis of case-study analysis, derived from Cabot and Boisen, and Tillich's method of correlation. This synthesis will be dealt with later after examination of the general nature of Hiltner's theology and method.

28. Ibid., p.218.

29. Ibid.

Paul Barth, CHURCH DOGMATICS Vol.1, Part 1, p.2 & p.44 respectively.
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1962).

2. Theology and Shepherdin

We shall be concerned firstly with the overall method and content of Hiltner's theology. Subsequently, we shall inquire more specifically into his pastoral theology. In this, the general features of Hiltner's theology will be established before drawing out the full significance of his pastoral theology.

(a) The Theology of Seward Hiltner

(i) Method

With respect to theological method, the central issue in Hiltner's work is his advocacy of "two-way communication at all points"³⁰ between the operation-centred and logic-centred approaches to theological knowledge. This method is a rejection of the kerygmatic approach advocated, for example, by Karl Barth. For Barth, the theological task was limited by the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Two citations from Barth's CHURCH DOGMATICS illustrate what is meant here.

"Theology follows the language of the Church, so far as, in its question as to the correctness of the Church's procedure therein, it measures it, not by a standard foreign to her, but by her very own source and object."

"Left and right our first question can only be, how could it be otherwise, if the essence of the Church is identical with Jesus Christ. If that be so, then neither the precedence of an anthropological possibility nor the subsequence of a reality in the Church can be considered as the point from which to contemplate and to understand the path to dogmatic knowledge, but solely the present instant in which Jesus Christ Himself speaks and is heard."³¹

30. Ibid.

31 Karl Barth CHURCH DOGMATICS Vol.I. Part 1, p.2 & p.44 respectively. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1969).

Hiltner, on the other hand, insists that general theological knowledge can and must come equally from kerygmatic study and operational study.³²

This basic assumption in Hiltner's thought, that theology can be enriched from other than kerygmatic or direct revelational sources, can be demonstrated from many sources. Firstly, it is systematically expounded in the PREFACE TO PASTORAL THEOLOGY, as has been indicated. Secondly, in his THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS, while he comes close to talking of a reconciliation between his approach and that of Barth,³³ he remains convinced that the word of God is found in modern disciplines like psychology, as well as in the Bible. As Hiltner tries to indicate in this book, theology can be enriched by psychology.³⁴

Thirdly, material to support the thesis can be found in Hiltner's frequent contributions to the journal, PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY. In 'Pastoral Psychology and Constructive Theology,' Hiltner argues

"that our understanding of pastoral psychology contributes to our understanding, experience, and practice along various lines, and that understanding of our experience or practice along these lines deepens, corrects, or enriches our pastoral psychology."³⁵

In this article, Hiltner goes on to show how pastoral psychology can enrich our understanding of sin.

32. For Hiltner's criticism of Barth see PREFACE p.222.

33. Seward Hiltner THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS p.173.

34. Ibid., p.14.

35. Seward Hiltner "Pastoral Psychology and Constructive Theology" p.17. PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY Vol.4, June 1953.

In another article in this journal we find the same theme:

"The study of concrete experiences like those of pastoral care should lead to a branch of theological study known as 'pastoral theology'."36

Hiltner then goes on to show how the case-study of an alcoholic can shed light on our understanding of sin, reconciliation, the church, the meaning of history, and the nature of grace. He concludes:

"There is a revelation for us also not alone in the Scriptures, but also in the experience even of the alcoholic."37

Another article, 'Toward a Theology of Conversion in the Light of Psychology' illustrates the point further. Here Hiltner uses his knowledge of Alcoholics Anonymous and the psychology of Carl G. Jung to open-up his understanding of sin.³⁸

These instances indicate the thorough-going conviction which Hiltner has for deriving theological understanding from psychological examination. However, there is no doubt about Hiltner's conviction for two-way communication at all points between function-centred and logic-centred theological inquiry. His examination of the parable of the Good Samaritan is an instance of his employment of logic-centred theological analysis. This is a programmatic discussion which introduces his thinking about shepherding. And THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS is, in part, an attempt

"to delineate the ways in which theology, understood dynamically, illuminates psychology."39

36. Seward Hiltner "What We Get and Give in Pastoral Care. What We Get: Theological Understanding." p.14. PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY Vol.4, June 1953.

37. Ibid., p.25.

38. Seward Hiltner "Toward a Theology of Conversion in the Light of Psychology." p.35f. PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY Vol.17, September 1966.

39. THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS p.14.

Hiltner has directed most of his energy toward exploring the contribution which operation-centred theological study can make to the Body of Divinity. This has prevented him from opening up, beyond an initial stage, communication in the other direction. We find in Hiltner's work, for example, very little theological examination of psychological premises. Hiltner acknowledges this failure and regrets his lack of theological discussion.⁴⁰ However, this omission affects the content of the theology of pastoral care. A full discussion of this omission of theological analysis of psychological premises will be given later. This criticism apart, it is clear that, methodologically, Hiltner insists on open and constructive dialogue between the two approaches, even if he has not, in practice, consistently done it himself.

In general terms, what does Hiltner say that theology is? Firstly, he says that

"theology is a reflective and implicative enterprise, which no matter what its starting point, eventually gets round to certain consequences that go beyond religious practice however defined."⁴¹

Theology reflects on Christian faith and draws out its implications for life.

Secondly, theology begins

"from an awareness of the 'holy' in the sense of Rudolf Otto, that mysterious dimension of life that both attracts and awes in a unique sense and which is felt to be other than ourselves."⁴²

40. Seward Hiltner "Integrity in Pastoral Care." p.22f.
PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY Vol.17, November 1966.

41. THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS p.185.

42. Ibid.

Without this 'idea of the holy' there can be no religion and consequently no theology following from it. Thirdly,

"theology moves from a 'faith' and not simply from an experience."⁴³

Theology is an expression of faith. Fourthly, theology must undertake critical inquiry.⁴⁴ This involves theology in a continual appraisal of its assumptions as it seeks to be faithful both to its source in Jesus Christ and to the knowledge of the world. Finally, Hiltner believes that theology has the function

"of interpreting actual living and giving guidance about it."⁴⁵

Here Hiltner is trying to indicate that theology cannot be removed from ethics and caring.

Overall, Hiltner's intention is to engage theology in dialogue with the world. Beginning with faith, theology has the task of articulating the meaning of Jesus Christ in the light of present knowledge. Such

"dialogue does not mean capitulating to the opinions and conventions of the cognate secular discipline, but it does mean taking seriously anything known that bears upon one's own concern, and being honest in one's treatment of it."⁴⁶

43. Ibid., p.186.

44. Ibid., p.189f.

45. Ibid., p.193.

46. Ibid., p.192.

(ii) Content

Two long quotations from Hiltner's writings serve as an introduction to the apparent christological essence of his theology.

"What Christian thought has been agreed on is that the nature and character of God have been revealed in the character and acts and existence of Jesus Christ, that this revelation has involved actual events and is therefore historical and not merely symbolical, and that the nature of God as revealed is about his dealings with men and about their response to him for good or for ill in some kind of personal rather than Olympian or 'first-cause' sense. When a statement is made about God apart from God's dealings with man, an abstraction is being made from the total revelation. It may be necessary to do this, but the mischief comes if one forgets he is abstracting. The revelation in Jesus Christ is final in that no further basic clue needs to be given or new type of work needs to be done by God for the salvation of man."⁴⁷

And the second quotation:

"The Christian revelation is unique, and it is the fact or event of Jesus Christ that makes it so. Jesus of Nazareth, who was fully man, came into history at a particular time and place. Jesus the Christ, the divine Son of God, testified to God's fatherhood of sinful man and wrought the means, once and for all, of man's redemption. It is this event of reconciliation that is final."⁴⁸

It is a feature of Hiltner's theology that only rarely is explicit reference made to the person or work of Christ. From a discussion of his views on freedom, sin and providence it will be seen that Christ plays very little overt part in his theology. What Hiltner is concerned to indicate above all is that Christian life is to be seen as a direction of movement toward fulfilment.

47. PREFACE p.221.

48. THE CHRISTIAN SHEPHERD p.12.

Hiltner finds that there are three interrelated approaches to freedom. The first is freedom as self-fulfilment.⁴⁹ The concern here is freedom from any kind of bondage. This is a freedom in which people find release. The second is freedom as self-direction.⁵⁰ Having the freedom from bondage, the question becomes: freedom for what? In matters of decision, Hiltner argues, men do have a free area in which they can choose who they will be and what they will do. Although this freedom is limited by sociological and psychological factors, it is very real.

"What modern knowledge adds is some grasp of the conditions under which more self-direction may appear."⁵¹

The third is freedom as self-transcendence.⁵²

"Our fundamental notion of self-transcendence is not so much something to be won as something to be acknowledged in its ambiguity, and then courageously pursued."⁵³

What Hiltner seems to be suggesting in this third definition is the capacity in man to reach out beyond himself. It is freedom conceived as a challenge to let go of our static selves. To seek and find this freedom we require courage and perceptiveness.⁵⁴

49. THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS p.18f.

50. Ibid., p.24f.

51. Ibid., p.30.

52. Ibid., p.31f.

53. Ibid., p.32.

54. Ibid., p.36.

The only point at which Hiltner introduces Jesus into his discussion on freedom is at the beginning of his remarks on freedom as self-fulfilment.⁵⁵ Christ frees us from bondage, says Hiltner, using this as an example. Whether this activity of Christ has any significance beyond that of supplying an example, Hiltner does not say. From his discussion on freedom as self-transcendence, in fact, the impression is given that the capacity for freedom is innate in man, being that which separates him from the animals.⁵⁶ Not Christ, but the development of insight, awareness and openness seem to be the mechanics of freedom. Although Hiltner's remarks are ambiguous, one is left with the impression that freedom is a developmental and immanent reality, and that the role of Christ is, in this discussion at least, marginal.

If freedom as self-transcendence is optimal living, minimal living is sinful living. Hiltner writes,

"Bondage of the will we have always held, is of the essence of sin."⁵⁷

By this Hiltner means to describe

"the inexorable hell-bent direction which has been started by one factor of experience, buttressed by another, and so on, until the very resource on which one might call to change the direction has become wholly unwanted and unwelcome, without one's any longer recognising his distaste."⁵⁸

55. Ibid., p.18.

56. Ibid., p.34.

57. Seward Hiltner "What We Get and Give in Pastoral Care. What We Get: Theological Understanding" p.21.

58. Ibid.

A discussion of alcoholism is used to illuminate what is meant here. This 'bondage of the will' or 'hell-bent direction' is to be seen in the context of the fact that God is unambiguously for us and has given us considerable freedom within real limits.⁵⁹ It is this context that marks the direction as sinful.

"When men misuse their freedom, so that there is movement away from human fulfilment, then sin is being committed. . . . It is a basic decision against the God who wants the proper fulfilment of man."⁶⁰

Sin, for Hiltner, is not immoral actions or naughty deeds. Sin is a habit rather than any specific action in itself. The habit becomes sinful because it is no longer relevant to one's present actual situation, although the habit, at one time, may have been necessary for survival.⁶¹ This wrong life-direction describes man's alienation from God who wills man's self-fulfilment and designates man's responsibility for it.⁶² Sin is the consequence of a perverse or out-of-date life decision which prevents optimal living in the present and the maximising of functions and creativity.

Because sin is a self-limiting life-direction, it affects health in the form of a lack of optimal possible functioning.⁶³ Hiltner goes to great lengths to demonstrate how sin, as an inappropriate life-direction, is closely related to physical and mental health.

59. THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS p.81.

60. Ibid., p.82.

61. Seward Hiltner "Pastoral Psychology and Constructive Theology" p.18. One is reminded here of the early life decision which a person makes in the account of life scripts in Transactional Analysis.

62. PREFACE p.95.

63. THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS p.105.

In a discussion of the dynamics of sickness Hiltner shows how

"an increasing amount of sickness emerges as the residual of relatively successful efforts to cope with severe threats at earlier stages of life."⁶⁴

However, the relationship between sin and sickness is very complex.

Hiltner warns against

"all crudities or over-simplifications from any side about the relationship of sin and sickness."⁶⁵

We should not link sin with sickness in the primitive, causal sense.⁶⁶

"But the separation of sin and sickness has been premature if sin is regarded in a different sense – in our definition as that aspect of man's alienation from God and from his own true fulfilment for which he bears responsibility. This then becomes what has been called . . . 'decision' when this decision is wrongly or perversely made."⁶⁷

Sickness cannot be reduced solely to the failure of bodily or mental chemistry and mechanics. There is an element in sickness which is accessible to decision.

Hiltner's notion of health as functional wholeness explains what he means by the significance of decision. This notion of health is not to be understood as a state, that is, in a simple, structurally efficient way. Rather, it is to be understood in terms of restoration of direction. Health is a process and a direction towards proper, that is, open and responsible functioning in spite of functional impairment.

64. Ibid., p.102.

65. Ibid., p.105.

66. PREFACE. p.94-95.

67. Ibid., p.95.

For example, a blind person may remain blind, but healing occurs when the person is set on the way to responsible living in spite of it. Healing is the emergence of a new whole.⁶⁸ The decision involved in healing relates to recognition of one's future possibilities. Decision in healing, in other words, has to do with coming to terms with one's impairment in such a way that one has a future for which one can still claim responsibility.

Lack of self-fulfilment is closely related to sin. The focus, for Hiltner, is a wrong life-direction in which one becomes alienated from God and one's own future possibilities. A crucial component in sickness is the failure to live openly and creatively for the future. In sickness or in health we can live responsibly or sinfully.⁶⁹

Hiltner's doctrine of providence is important because it supplies the theological ground for the position advanced on sin and freedom.

Hiltner writes,

"God, is providential, but he is neither a big daddy nor a supporter of irresponsible contracts."⁷⁰

The question which the doctrine of providence tries to answer is: How is God involved in our lives at all times?⁷¹ Christology, Hiltner acknowledges, is a major part of this doctrine, but it does not exhaust it. God's providence is not confined to what he did in Christ.

68. Ibid., p.90.

69. Hiltner "Pastoral Psychology and Constructive Theology" p.25.

70. THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS p.80.

71. Ibid., p.56.

Firstly, providence is *... God has set creation on its way. But ...*

"God's clearly benevolent attention to and intention for mankind. Second, there is God's looking ahead to see what man needs, that he, unaided, will not be able to supply for himself. Third, there is the action on God's part to supply what mankind needs and cannot provide for itself."⁷²

Behind the activity of God in his providential care for us is the paradox of God's guidance and man's creative activity.⁷³

Hiltner sees the core issue in providence to be God's readiness to help us when we are unable to help ourselves. The corollary of this is that we have a large area of human freedom in which we should attempt to fulfil our potential. It is only when we cannot find our way, or are deficient in precisely what we need to find fulfilment, that God provides special resources.⁷⁴ God for us in his providential activity involves both our capacities and possibilities in their own human rights and limits, and his special activity in supplying our needs when our resources run out. Hiltner understands providence to be affirming of our freedom and responsibility for our life-direction and affirming of God's capacity to meet our needs when we cannot meet them ourselves.

72. Ibid., p. 58-59.

73. Ibid., p. 57.

74. Ibid., p. 78.

According to Hiltner, God has set creation on its way. But he has not left it to cope without his sustaining activity. God's grace is precisely that creation-affirming providential support which upholds creation's possibilities and freedom. As such, God is the constant actor in creation's history. The appropriate human responses are trust in God and energetic living in which we live out our total possibility for freedom and fulfilment. Christian life is ultimately commitment to fulfilment, knowing that this is God's will for us and that he will not let us be without the resources to achieve it. Whether we achieve fulfilment or not is ultimately, our responsibility.

empiricism as a power and process, inasmuch as it is a power and process, creating and sustaining communities of value in ways which are describable in rational categories, abstracted from concrete experience. The knowledge of transcendence is not excluded by this statement, but empirical theology asserts that God is experienced as immanent presence. Thus, knowledge of the character of things is derivable from a disciplined critical analysis of the structure of experience and the testing of historical claims of the theological propositions about God and man. Fourth, the formal structure of our knowledge has the status of tentative and correctable assertions, subject to criticism, and never exhaustive of the comprehensiveness of reality." 75

For Hiltner, the empirical method in his theology relates to operational-

practical theological inquiry. The empirical method in pastoral theology is

theological study of shepherding.

David Day Williams "Suffering and Being in Empirical Theology" p. 175-177. In THE FUTURE OF EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY by David Day Williams, ed. by David Day Williams, p. 175-177. For other definitions see chapter 1, 2, 3, 4.

(b) Empirical Theology and Shepherding

In the introductory chapter on pastoral care it was noted that the contribution of Anton T. Boisen was a major influence in the development of Hiltner's theological method. The task here is to explore that influence and present Hiltner's use of it. In this discussion it will be shown how the empirical method in theology is central to Hiltner's pastoral theology.

A definition of empirical theology has been given by Daniel Day Williams.

"First, by empirical I mean the felt, bodily, psycho-social, organic action of human beings in history. Experience includes sense-data, but is not limited to them. Second, God is experienced as a power and process immanent in the world, creating and patterning communities of value in ways which are describable in rational categories abstracted from concrete experience. The dimension of transcendence is not excluded by this statement; but empirical theology asserts that God is experienced as immanent process. Third, knowledge of the character of things is derivable from a disciplined critical analysis of the structures in experience and the testing in historical action of the theological propositions about God and man. Fourth, the formal structure of our knowledge has the status of tentative and correctable assertions, subject to criticism, and never exhaustive of the concreteness of reality."⁷⁵

For Hiltner, the empirical method in his theology relates to operation-centred theological inquiry. The empirical method in pastoral theology is the theological study of shepherding.

75. Daniel Day Williams "Suffering and Being in Empirical Theology" p.176-177. In THE FUTURE OF EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY op cit For other definition see chapter 1, 2. (d).

Following Boisen's thesis, Hiltner believes that in the empirical study of 'living human documents' one is not

"merely studying psychology or psychiatry, but also theology. . . . Behind the particular form of (Boisen's) thesis, we should note, is the assertion that the study of actual and concrete forms of human experience, especially where ultimate issues are at stake, is theological if we bring theological questions to it. It is not merely psychology or psychiatry incorporated by theologians. It is a point in theological method."⁷⁶

Pastoral theology arises from the theological study of the activity of shepherding. Other disciplines also engage in the empirical study of cases, as, for example, psychiatry, clinical psychology, and social work. These disciplines equally constitute shepherding. The difference between them and pastoral theology lies not in the fact that one is Christian and the others are not; the difference lies in the fact that pastoral theology begins with theological questions, brings them to the shepherding material, and returns either with theological answers or new theological questions.⁷⁷ In this theological method, Hiltner's concern that pastoral theology should be inter-related to the practical and scientific analyses of the human condition is seen. By theologically addressing the pastoral-scientific assessments of human existence we are able, Hiltner believes, to gain in pastoral theological knowledge. Pastoral theology includes, therefore, the actual data of the other shepherding disciplines, but it cannot be reduced to them. It remains theology.

76. PREFACE p.51.

77. Ibid., p.220.

We have the resources for theological inquiry in pastoral case-study if we ask the correct questions. The questions associated with the traditional theological curriculum are still asked by pastoral theology: in its case, however, what supplies the answers or inspires fresh questioning is the data given by the study of actual pastoral instances. If, for example, we attempt to give a theological account of human existence, part of the information would come from pastoral theology. This information would be derived from the theological questioning of concrete human experience, rather than from the direct questioning of other theological resources like the Bible or Christian doctrine. It is Hiltner's claim for the legitimacy of empirical theology of this kind that necessitates his division within the Body of Divinity.

The actual content of Christian shepherding, in which we find the activity of pastoral care, will be presented later.

ibid., p.22 and 223.

ibid., p.223.

(c) The Method of Correlation and Shepherding

In the central assumption of Hiltner's theological method, that we can gain in theological knowledge from empirical analyses of concrete cases, there is an implied relationship between faith and culture. The method of correlation is a means whereby theology, after locating the deepest existential human questions, can bring theological symbols to bear upon these questions. The method allows for culture to raise its own questions, and for Christian faith to show its relevance in addressing or answering them. It also allows, according to Hiltner, that culture may supply answers to questions posed by Christian faith.⁷⁸

An assumption behind the method of correlation is that faith and culture cannot be considered independently. Each interpenetrates the other. Without this interpenetration, theology would be unable to connect with man's questions and needs. The method of correlation says to the theologian that culture and life cannot be neglected, and to ordinary man that faith has a message for him.⁷⁹

The method of correlation has clear implications for pastoral theology. The personality sciences produce insights into the nature of man, and raise questions of significance for self-understanding. If theology does not take these insights and questions seriously, it is in danger of being both impractical and irrelevant.

78. Ibid., p.22 and 223.

79. Ibid., p.223.

Thus,

"faith can remain faithful and relevant only when it is in constant and discriminating dialogue with culture."⁸⁰

The task of pastoral theology becomes, in Hiltner's hands, a searching for ways of extending the dialogue between faith and the personality sciences. The task of shepherding becomes the employment of pastoral psychology, and the other social sciences directed towards healing, within the broad context of Christian ministry. Relating the gospel to the need and condition of men – the basic goal of shepherding⁸¹ – occurs, in practice, by the Christian use of the general pastoral disciplines. Not only can we not separate faith and culture in practice, but in our theological and theoretical constructions we must work to maintain the same interpenetration. According to Hiltner, the relation between the employment of the method of correlation and shepherding allows pastoral theology to be considered as a legitimate branch of theological inquiry within the Body of Divinity.

80. Ibid., p.22.

81. THE CHRISTIAN SHEPHERD. p.19.

(d) The Christian Heritage and Shepherdning

Shepherdning, and its issue in pastoral theology, are to be regarded as legitimate parts of Christian ministry and theology. In this case, there must be a formal link between the received or traditional subject matter and the content of theology and shepherdning. This link is established by Hiltner in his principle of 'two-way communication at all points,' which has already been discussed in general terms.

In his statement on the nature of the Body of Divinity, Hiltner connects the logic-centred areas of theological inquiry to shepherdning.⁸² This implies that the input into shepherdning, as far as the Christian pastor is concerned, is not just pastoral data or pastoral psychology, but the whole weight and range of the Christian tradition as well. The Christian shepherd carries with him not only his faith, but the accumulation of the spiritual and theological heritage of the Christian church. He has, therefore, a unique perspective on those to whom he seeks to minister, and on himself as the pastor. This is something which the secular therapist or counsellor does not have.

Hiltner is aware of the difference between the Christian pastor and the secular therapist. The Christian context or setting of the minister symbolises, to the person being ministered unto,

"everything the church stands for – doctrine, sacraments, preaching, prayer, and all the rest."⁸³

82. PREFACE p.28

83. Seward Hiltner and Lowell G. Colston.
THE CONTEXT OF PASTORAL COUNSELLING p.218.

In the attitudes and responses of those ministered unto, the Christian tradition adds a dimension which does not exist elsewhere. Christian shepherding cannot, therefore, ever become the employment, solely, of pastoral psychology. Not just the context of Christian pastoral counselling, but the resources at the shepherd's disposal, mark his distinction from the secular therapist. Resources such as prayer, the Bible, religious literature, Christian doctrine, and sacraments and rites are advocated by Hiltner as necessary tools for the pastor to have and use.⁸⁴

Concrete instances of content and resources in Christian shepherding will be outlined when we discuss the matter later. Here we have been concerned solely with the methodological principles, and to this end it has been shown how shepherding is related to the Christian heritage.

Chapter 3

The Christian Shepherd

1. Hiltner's Ecclesiology

- (a) Hiltner's Concept of the Church
- (b) Hiltner's Concept of Ministry

2. Shepherding

- (a) Shepherding and Ministry
- (b) The Principles of Shepherding
 - (i) General Principles
 - (ii) Aims

3. Resources for Shepherding

- (a) Pastoral Counselling
- (b) Other Resources

Hiltner, PASTORAL COUNSELLING, p.7.

Hiltner, PREFACE, p.199f.

Hiltner, THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS, p.102f.

Ibid., p.118-119. In none of these six accounts does Hiltner give more than a cursory account. In this case, it is extremely difficult to gain an overall impression of his theology of the church.

Hiltner's intention is to develop an understanding of pastoral ministry in which theory and practice are constantly interrelated.

"A practice without a theory is noncorrectable.

A theory without a practice is irrelevant."¹

In this chapter, the theory and practice of Christian shepherding, in the context of church and ministry, will be presented. This will demonstrate the methodological principles outlined in the previous chapter.

1. Hiltner's Ecclesiology

(a) Hiltner's Concept of the Church

In one account, Hiltner advocates the biological metaphor, the body of Christ, as being the most appropriate for understanding the church.²

In another account, he considers other metaphors to contain insights which the biological metaphor cannot offer on its own.³ The difference in the two accounts is due to the task at hand in the particular discussions. In the first, Hiltner is considering the organising perspective of ministry, and the biological metaphor suits his purpose. In the second, Hiltner is considering the church in a general way, and this is, therefore, the fuller account.

Hiltner considers that three metaphors of the church have been of major importance, namely, the body of Christ, the covenant community, and the household of God. According to Hiltner, three other metaphors have also been applied to the church: the communion of saints, school and leaven or yeast.⁴ These, however, are not discussed at any length by Hiltner.

1. Hiltner, PASTORAL COUNSELLING, p.7.

2. Hiltner, PREFACE, p.199f.

3. Hiltner, THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS, p.109f.

4. Ibid., p.118-119. In none of these six accounts does Hiltner give more than a cursory account. In this case, it is extremely difficult to gain an overall impression of his theology of the church.

The metaphor, the body of Christ, has much appeal to Hiltner.

Its principal features Hiltner states, are that Jesus Christ is head of the church and he is related to us in a way similar to the relationship between a head and a body. Each church member is organically related to every other member. Every member has a vital contribution to offer in order to make the organism work.⁵ There is, says Hiltner, an intuitive wisdom in this metaphor; it is organic rather than mechanical, it stresses the necessity for horizontal as well as vertical relationships, it allows each member his full place and dignity, and the relationship between the head and the body is not coercive.⁶ For all of its good features, however, Hiltner believes that the metaphor is open to distortion when the organic basis is replaced by a static and conservative leadership.⁷

According to Hiltner, the understanding of the church as a covenant community arose within mainline Protestantism as a protest against misuse of the organic metaphor by the Roman Catholic Church. The headship of Jesus Christ had been translated into political terms and was exercised by pope and priest.⁸ Hiltner states that the basis for the covenant comes from Old Testament covenant theology where God offered to do certain things for people on condition that they did other things in return.

5. Ibid., p.110. For a fuller account of the 'body' metaphor, see J. A. T. Robinson, THE BODY: A STUDY IN PAULINE THEOLOGY, op cit.

6. Ibid., (THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS)

7. Ibid., p.111.

8. Ibid., p.113.

The element of God's mercy and love beyond the letter of the law was built into the concept. Hiltner suggests that the strengths of this metaphor lay in the emphases on human responsibility for its side of the covenant, on the sovereignty of God, and on political realism.⁹ The problem with the covenant metaphor Hiltner insists is that it can lead to an exclusive self-righteousness on the part of the church or some group within it. This metaphor can lead, then, to a legalistic and static conception of the church.

For Hiltner, understanding the church as the household of God stresses interpersonal relations.¹⁰ The image is of an extended family to which all members fully belong. This metaphor has been historically associated with renewal groups within the church.¹¹ The stress on belongingness has had great appeal for some Christians. The danger, however, is that such inclusiveness may lead to ingrownness and uncritical like-mindedness.¹²

Each of these metaphors highlights necessary definitional components of the church. All have some contribution to make toward understanding. Hiltner, therefore, argues that no one should be placed over the others.

9. Ibid., p.113-114.

10. Ibid., p.116. For a fuller account see Lesslie Newbigin, THE HOUSEHOLD OF GOD (London: S.C.M. Press, 1964). cf also, Paul S. Minear, IMAGES OF THE CHURCH IN THE NEW TESTAMENT London: Lutterworth Press, 1961.

11. Hiltner, THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS, p.117.

12. Ibid., p.118.

From his brief analysis of the metaphors some conclusions about what Hiltner understands of the church can be drawn out. As in his theology in general, he is wary of static, dogmatic assertions. The church is an institution, and, he says, it is naive to think otherwise.¹³ The church must exist in tension, both in its internal relations and in relation to the world. The non-static nature of the church is bound to create conflict, but that, according to Hiltner, need be no bad thing because conflict leads to growth. The church is made up of members who have tasks to accomplish. The task of church membership is service.¹⁴ This service should be understood functionally, as will be seen in the next paragraph. The church exists to serve God and not itself. This is the basic category.¹⁵ Both the body of Christ and the covenant community metaphors stress this. The church exists because of the will of God, and it can only continue in existence for as long as it maintains its relationship to him.

13. Ibid., p.108 and Hiltner, THE FERMENT IN THE MINISTRY, p.25.

14. Hiltner, THE FERMENT IN THE MINISTRY, p.35.

15. Hiltner, THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS, p.108.

Hiltner's discussion of the church is really too brief to be of much value. He is required to say much more if the theology of pastoral care is to be grounded on an adequate ecclesiology.

Ibid., p.8.

Ibid., p.37.

Ibid., p.33.

(b) Hiltner's Concept of Ministry

A fundamental conviction in Hiltner's ecclesiology is that Christian ministry is to be identified by function rather than by status.¹⁶ Hiltner derives this conviction from the concept of 'monoepiscopacy'.¹⁷ The roots of monoepiscopacy Hiltner finds in the early church, where every Christian was to exercise service or ministry. This general ministry did not obviate the need for leadership or oversight, but this was a functional need and not a necessary status. The Reformers, according to Hiltner, recognising that ministry was service to be exercised by all Christians, though each in his own way, developed the doctrines of the universal priesthood and the vocation of all Christians.¹⁸ The ordained ministry existed, firstly, by virtue of its participation in this general ministry, and secondly, by virtue of its special leadership functions. This special function did not confer status, privilege, or administration of the 'keys.' With this argument, Hiltner is trying to recapture a theological emphasis which he finds in both the early church and the church of the Reformation. The conclusion which he draws is that the special function of ministry, according to both, is the leadership of some segment of the Christian community. Ordained ministry

"means not special privilege but particular responsibility."¹⁹

16. Hiltner, THE FERMENT IN THE MINISTRY, p.31f and p.77.

17. Ibid., p.8.

18. Ibid., p.37.

19. Ibid., p.33.

The special function of ministry has two overriding features:
unity and ambiguity.

"The ordained ministry is a unity, although
a complex one."²⁰

This unity is not behavioural – it does not lie in talking or listening or in
the performance of rites of some kind.²¹ The unity is defined by the minister's
role as a leader of a segment of the Christian community. The range of a
minister's functions must all be related to this role.

This unity in the role is ambiguous.²²

"Unity contains ambiguity if it is the kind of unity that,
in the mind of the minister, makes it hang together for
him despite the variety of his activities seen in the
usual categories."²³

Hiltner also links tolerance of ambiguity with mental health:

"In many respects, as we now know, the capacity
to tolerate ambiguity is a kind of final mark of
mental health."²⁴

Ambiguity, then, seems to have something to do with both competent ministry
and mental health.

In what specifically does Hiltner see the ambiguity of unity?

It appears to lie in the diversity of tasks which a minister is called upon to
perform.

20. Ibid., p.206.

21. Ibid., p.211, and Hiltner, PASTORAL COUNSELING
p.169–170 and p.187.

22. Hiltner, THE FERMENT IN THE MINISTRY,
pp.8, 24, 134, 211 for cited instances.

23. Ibid., p.211.

24. Ibid., p.22. In general terms, with reference to freedom,
see THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS, p.31–32 and p.70.

The minister as preacher, administrator, teacher, shepherd, evangeliser, celebrator, reconciler, theologian and discipliner²⁵ finds himself in a tangle of tasks and expectations. In themselves, these tasks and expectations can only find a common reference point in the leadership role.

But they exist ambiguously in relation to each other and in relation to the central role. This complex unity of many varied tasks is not easy to hold together. Competent ministry may only exist if the minister can, however ambiguously, hold together the complex range of tasks.

Hiltner comments:

"It seems to me it is just this ambiguity that adds to the zest of ministry."²⁶

On one hand, this zest can only come if the minister has emotional and psychological health. Recognition of the ambiguity, on the other hand, prevents a false perfectionism and creates a willingness to work at improving weaknesses,

25. This is Hiltner's list of the functions of ministry in THE FERMENT IN THE MINISTRY.

26. THE FERMENT IN THE MINISTRY, p.211.

2. Shepherding

We are concerned in this section with the details of shepherding.

The discussion will be set in the context of Hiltner's view of ministry.

(a) Shepherding and Ministry

Ministry, it has been noted, is concerned with the functions associated with the leadership of some segment of the Christian community. Insofar as pastoral care is a major function of competent ministry, expertise in the theory and practice of shepherding is necessary.

"There is no way of referring to pastoral care that omits the shepherding analogy."²⁷

Shepherding, or pastoral care, however, is neither a substantial overall description of everything done by the minister, nor is it one kind of ministerial activity along with others.²⁸ Hiltner writes,

"My solution to this problem has been to regard pastoral (care) as a perspective, to note that no event in which a minister is involved is devoid of some pastoral intent and significance, but that in some events the pastoral motif becomes dominant or of overriding importance."²⁹

27. Ibid., p.98. In a way similar to his conception of the church, Hiltner's concept of ministry is undeveloped, without sufficient exegetical and historical reference. A fuller discussion is required from him if his ideas are to carry the conviction he would wish.

28. Ibid. and PREFACE, p.15-16.

29. THE FERMENT IN THE MINISTRY p.99.

As a function of ministry, shepherding stands alongside many other functions – preaching, administration, evangelising, celebrating and so on. As co-functions of ministry they are interrelated, and we cannot place any one function above the others. What unites the function is the larger perspective of the leadership role. In terms of fundamental aims and attitudes there is a unity of purpose and intention. This unity does not detract from procedural differences. Rather, the various procedures should all point to the one task. For Hiltner, this task is to relate the gospel to the need and condition of men.³⁰ As a perspective on ministry, shepherding has a vital role to play in addressing this task, but as such, it is not the whole of ministry nor merely a segment of it.

Shepherding is a metaphor used to describe a function of ministry, and its essence lies in the pastor's tender and solicitous concern for his parishioner. The image which Hiltner hopes to suggest by shepherding is not one in which the sheep are seen as stupid or innocent agents and the shepherd as an omnipotent leader. Rather, the sheep, in the image, represent need, while the shepherd represents concern. The image is not to be understood as emphasising collectivity at the expense of individuality. In defining the posture of the shepherd, the image communicates an attitude which he should have. This attitude is not, however, emphasised to exclude skills and procedures.

30. THE CHRISTIAN SHEPHERD p.19.

(b) The Principles of Shepherding

(i) General Principles

By the general principles of shepherding we mean Hiltner's theory of the shepherding perspective on the operations of the pastor and the church. As a perspective on operations, shepherding is a unity with its own special principles and aims. As was noted in a previous section, Hiltner does not regard shepherding as the practice of theological theory, but as the theory and practice of an operational branch of theological inquiry in its own right. Christian shepherding is one of the modes of outreach of the gospel to men in need.³¹ It is a part of the total function or task of a pastor, understood as a perspective.

The basic element in shepherding is the pastor's genuine interest in, and concern for, the person in need.

"No matter how refined they may be, techniques alone, of any kind, will not be sufficient to help a person as a person."³²

The attitude of the pastor is paramount. If the attitude is wrong, and does not relate to the person's welfare, no amount of sound technique will cover up the deficiency. This attitude of tender and solicitous concern, however, must harness sound technique if pastoral care is to be successful.³³

31. Ibid., p.14.

32. Ibid., p.24.

33. Ibid., p.25.

According to Hiltner, the first operating principle of shepherding is the need to feel, and express appropriately, the pastor's own genuine concern for the parishioner. This means acceptance of the parishioner as he is.³⁴ In practice this involves acceptance and expression of both the positive and negative feelings of the person in need.

"Acceptance does not necessarily mean agreement. It means accepting the person through the one thing that makes it possible at the time, namely, accepting the very feeling that threatens the relationship."³⁵

The pastor accepts the parishioner in terms of the fact that he has feelings and they are his right, and not in terms of the acceptability of the feelings.

"If we had to get all our feelings to the point where the shepherd would wholly agree with them, either we should not need shepherding or we should be deceiving ourselves. If we operate as limited and fallible undershepherds in our ministry of help and healing, the crucial test is always what we do in relation to that which is unacceptable. If we, representing the Great Shepherd, can accept only that which is acceptable (what we agree with), then we certainly communicate to the person in need the idea that he must become wholly acceptable before God in Christ will accept him. Such a conclusion is mistaken theologically and psychologically."³⁶

In general, without acceptance there is either repression of feelings or fruitless striving leading to self-deceit on the part of the parishioner. Specifically, if there is not acceptance of negative feelings, there is no acceptance of the person who holds them.

34. Ibid., p.28.

35. Ibid., p.30.

36. Ibid.

"Without acceptance of the person, with all his conflicts, negativities, defiance, misinformation, and sin, no Christian shepherding is taking place."³⁷

In order to communicate acceptance to a person the pastor has to give undivided and concentrated attention to the person as he is.

The second operating principle of Christian shepherding involves clarification and judgment.³⁸ When a person has his negative feelings accepted, then, according to Hiltner, the result is the emergence of some positive feeling, usually mixed in with negative feeling.

"What we need to do is to acknowledge and accept both types of feeling – which means accepting, understanding, articulating, and clarifying the fact that a conflict exists between the two feelings."³⁹

The danger facing the pastor is that he will rush to highlight the emerging positive feeling, by-passing the remaining negative feeling. If the conflict is not articulated and clarified, repression of negative feeling is the result.

Clarification is the process in which shadowy, vague feelings are brought into awareness. Hiltner's fundamental conviction, that the pastor must help people to help themselves, comes into the foreground. The pastor's task is to help the parishioner to articulate the conflict, to see it for himself, by accepting his conflict. Only when clarification is achieved can a parishioner then go to work to deal with the conflict himself. The pastor does not solve the conflict for him; rather he helps him to understand it in a new way.

37. Ibid., p.31.

38. Ibid., p.35f.

39. Ibid., p.36.

Judgment, in this context, does not mean evaluation from outside and imposed onto the parishioner. By judgment, Hiltner means

"something that comes from within rather than something imposed from without, and we mean good news of release rather than bad news."⁴⁰

Hiltner explains this with an analogy drawn from the conviction of sin.

In the Christian tradition conviction of sin is good news and not bad news.

It points to release and forgiveness. The judgment is an indication of release.

"Clarification, then, leads to the potentiality for experiencing judgment in the Christian sense, internally and as good news, for it betokens something beyond itself."⁴¹

The third basic principle of Christian shepherding has to do with the ways in which the shepherd may reflect on his own part in the shepherding activity. It refers to the shepherd's self-understanding. According to Hiltner, there is a great deal that we can do to improve our shepherding. Learning about our own attitudes, becoming aware of how we function in different situations, and developing the capacity to change ourselves are vital if we would be competent shepherds.

"If we change ourselves, we automatically change the potentialities in the relationship and, therefore, the possibilities of help for the parishioner."⁴²

40. Ibid., p.39.

41. Ibid.

42. Seward Hiltner, THE COUNSELOR IN COUNSELING, (New York: Abingdon Press, 1952), p.7.
This is an instance of Hiltner's use of Boisen's thesis of learning through case-study analyses.

Learning about ourselves is a subtle task, especially when we come to see negative factors in our personality. Hiltner's approach to teaching his students the correct therapeutic approach utilises verbatim reports of shepherding. The true learning situation for the student emerges out of the discussion of his failures in shepherding. Here, his fears, anxieties, and incapacities are brought into view so that he can see how they have related to the shepherding. Self-knowledge is as vital an aspect of competent shepherding as knowledge of personality theory or clinical experience.

In his elucidation of the basic principles of Christian shepherding Hiltner has tried to use modern psychology and Christian theology in a way in which they supplement each other. The principles of shepherding are neither exclusively psychological nor exclusively theological. Acceptance, for example, while a basic caveat in therapy, is also understood by Hiltner to refer to the real meaning of the Protestant doctrine of justification through grace by faith. Here

"psychological and theological understanding reinforce each other to give the clue to a basic aspect of shepherding."⁴³

The harmony of theological and psychological insights is a recurring feature of Hiltner's theology of pastoral care.

43. THE CHRISTIAN SHEPHERD p.31.

(ii) Aims

"The aim of shepherding is to help the person (or the group smaller than the whole fellowship) to move as far in the direction of healing as circumstance permits."⁴⁴

Although healing may not be feasible, the aim at the very least is movement in the direction of healing.

Healing is a complex term for Hiltner. As he uses it, healing involves the restoration of functional wholeness that has been impaired as to direction or timing. Health is a process and cannot be equated with structural efficiency. It involves the whole organism in movement toward the utilisation of the creative potential which is possible at any particular time. No part of the organism should be separated off from the other parts.

"If man is to be healed, all aspects or organs or relationships must be touched; whence it follows that each of these levels or orders or perspectives must somehow affect the others even though it need not by any means wholly determine them. It follows that our attempts to shepherd and to heal never exist in some walled-off compartment labeled 'religious'.⁴⁵

Within the general aim of shepherding as movement in the direction of healing, Hiltner provides three sub-headings in order to communicate his meaning – healing, sustaining and guiding. They are all of a piece, and yet each is necessary in order to do justice to the full dimension of the shepherding perspective.⁴⁶

44. Ibid., p.19-20 and PREFACE p.69 and p.89f.

45. THE CHRISTIAN SHEPHERD. p.23.

46. Hiltner, PREFACE, p.69. Hiltner's typology is a little unclear. Healing is the overall aim in shepherding, yet it is also part of the sub-division of shepherding into healing, sustaining and guiding.

In developing these three aspects, Hiltner is trying to indicate that shepherding happens on different levels and has to address different needs. The differences are neither absolute nor categorical.⁴⁷

Healing means

"binding up wounds in the precise sense of the good-Samaritan story."⁴⁸

Sustaining means comforting, upholding, or standing by.

"Unlike healing, in which the total situation is capable of change, sustaining relates to those situations that as total situations cannot be changed or at least cannot be changed at this time."⁴⁹

In brief, sustaining has to do with 'keeping alive,' and operates when healing does not seem possible. The function performed in sustaining is 'obstetrical' rather than 'presentational,' aiding the sufferer to find the resources that are potentially available to him.⁵⁰ In keeping with the general aim of shepherding, the task of sustaining is to encourage movement, eventually, in the direction of healing. As such, Hiltner believes that sustaining also has the task of keeping hope alive.⁵¹

Guiding is an elusive term for Hiltner. It does not mean coercion.⁵²

Guiding, rather, proceeds by 'leading out' or 'evoking' through making contact with that which is internal. Hiltner uses the word 'eductive' to describe the procedure.⁵³

47. THE CHRISTIAN SHEPHERD p.22.

48. PREFACE p.69.

49. Ibid., p.116.

50. Ibid., p.119.

51. Ibid., p.141.

52. Ibid., p.145.

53. Ibid., p.171.

The guide functions as a facilitator who steers the person in need to discover the resources which are latent in him, or only dimly felt by him. The methodology described by Hiltner is drawn from the non-directive client-centered approach to therapy developed by Carl R. Rogers.⁵⁴

"Guiding of a shepherding kind helps clear away the underbush or relieve the ache, or perhaps helps hang on until the ache vanishes later on."⁵⁵

The three categories of healing, sustaining and guiding are the basic elements of shepherding. They facilitate movement in the general direction of healing as functional wholeness. Healing, in the analysis, while supplying the overall aim, is not possible at all times.

"If we had only healing, it might wrongly be assumed that all wounds could be bound up, would heal, and that the focal infection in any situation could always be cured or changed in essence, which plainly is not true. If we had only healing and sustaining, we should be tempted to think of the shepherding function solely as removing obstacles and not also a guiding the person to find a path."⁵⁶

54. Ibid., p.154.

55. Ibid., p.172. COUNSELING AND THE SHEPHERDING COUNSELLOR

56. Ibid., p.69. COUNSELING p.19.

3. Resources for Shepherding

(a) Pastoral Counselling

A survey of Hiltner's writings indicates that he has spent a considerable amount of literary effort in developing pastoral counselling as a basic shepherding resource.⁵⁷ It may not be the only resource, but Hiltner has given it most prominence.

In a general sense, Hiltner sees the aims of pastoral counselling as being similar to those of the church itself:

"Bringing people to Christ and the Christian fellowship, aiding them to acknowledge and repent of sin and to accept God's freely offered salvation, helping them to live with themselves and their fellow men in brotherhood and love, enabling them to act with faith and confidence instead of previous doubt and anxiety, bringing peace where discord reigned before."⁵⁸

Pastoral counselling also has a specific therapeutic aim:

"The attempt by a pastor to help people help themselves through the process of gaining understanding of their inner conflicts."⁵⁹

Hiltner lists six points which are basic to his approach to pastoral counselling.⁶⁰ (1) A counselling situation exists when a parishioner recognises that something is wrong and is convinced that a professional person may be able to help him by aiding clarification.

57. Cf. PASTORAL COUNSELING and THE COUNSELOR IN COUNSELING

58. PASTORAL COUNSELING p.19.

59. Ibid.

60. These are given on p.10-11 of THE COUNSELOR IN COUNSELING.

"The criterion of counseling lies, therefore, not in the intention and attitude of the pastor but within the readiness and need of the parishioner."⁶¹

(2) Most of a pastor's work is done in precounseling pastoral work.

Precounseling is necessary when the parishioner has not yet recognised his need. The pastor's task is to facilitate this recognition.

(3) The attitude and approach of the pastor in both counselling and precounseling is 'eductive.' The pastor does not coerce, moralise, push, divert, or direct. Rather, he attempts to draw out resources and strengths which are within the parishioner.

"The eductive approach implies an acceptance and understanding of what the parishioner is prepared to communicate, not in the sense of agreement but in receiving this material which must be examined if clarification is to be achieved."⁶²

(4) Counselling is not a mechanical process, but an interpersonal relationship.

(5) "In terms of basic attitude, approach and method, pastoral counseling does not differ from effective counseling by other types of counselors."⁶³

The difference is in context, resources, and the dimension at which a pastor will view human nature.

(6) Advance in pastoral care and counselling involves both practical and theoretical study.

61. THE COUNSELOR IN COUNSELING p.10.

62. Ibid., p.10-11.

63. Ibid., p.11.

Ibid.

PASTORAL COUNSELING, p.26.

Ibid., p.28.

"The two essential bodies of theoretical knowledge are theology, broadly conceived, and dynamic psychology, similarly viewed. The practical knowledge is observation of all the kinds of actual situations in which the pastor tries to help people."⁶⁴

Underlying Hiltner's attempt to develop these aims and approaches to pastoral counselling are assumptions about human nature. In order to clarify his own position, Hiltner discusses four views of human nature in relation to the counselling task. We shall present this discussion before putting flesh on the skeleton provided by the six basic points. It should be noted that Hiltner's discussion is brief, and at times very unclear, especially with respect to the 'objective-ethical' view of human nature.

Firstly, Hiltner discusses the social-adjustment view of human nature in relation to the counselling task. This view is dominant among non-pastoral counsellors. It assumes that when something is emotionally wrong with an individual, the trouble can be explained by saying that he has failed to adapt himself properly to the society in which he lives.⁶⁵ Clearly this view sustains an uncritical assessment of society. But it has the merit of recognising that individuals must develop adequate capacities to change unsatisfactory or painful patterns of life.

Secondly, Hiltner discusses the inner-release view of human nature, and he is broadly in support of it, though not without reservation. He marks the emergence of this view with Freud. Man has certain biological needs; they either find expression or become repressed, leading to later difficulties.⁶⁶

64. Ibid.

65. PASTORAL COUNSELING. p.26.

66. Ibid., p.28.

Hiltner is critical of Freud's biological limitation of needs. He argues, instead, for human nature to be seen in terms of the whole personality.

The essential point

"is that we know there are within the individual, despite his enormous capacities for malleability, limits beyond which change is ruinous, needs which must somehow be met regardless of what any particular society may say about their legitimacy."⁶⁷

As far as counselling is concerned, the point of therapy is to facilitate the expression of inner needs. Hiltner judges, however, that this view is not entirely adequate. We must recognise, he writes,

"that the criterion of expression of even the deepest individual inner need is not sufficient, however important it is."⁶⁸

Hiltner realises that we have to be sensitive to conflicts of interest between the individual and the group to which he belongs. The assumption that what is good for the individual is good for mankind is not self-evident.

Thirdly, Hiltner discusses the objective-ethical view of human nature. It is not entirely clear what he intends in this discussion. What appears to be suggested is that while man may be partly conditioned by his culture, there is something in human nature itself that has to be dealt with. There are certain basic personality demands over and above the cultural demands.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., p.30.

"According to the demands of his particular culture and the conditions of his own rearing, the individual may develop one or another pattern of personality. But if in the process the most essential human needs of personality – distinguished from purely biological needs – are denied, the struggle for their release and expression cannot be understood merely in the terms of the individual who is struggling, but must be viewed as the inexorable revolt of human nature against that which has denied fulfillment of the most basic needs."⁶⁹

Hiltner suggests a fourth view, the 'Christian-theological view,' as the basis of his acceptance of what is sound in the other views. This view undergirds the pastor's reception of therapeutic approaches to human nature. It grounds the pastor's understanding on the fact that God has made man, and sustains him by grace through the agency of the Holy Spirit. Hiltner, therefore, sets the three views of human nature within a prior context. This context enables the pastor to see the deficiencies in the other views if they are left to themselves.⁷⁰

According to Hiltner, each of the therapeutic approaches to human nature contains insights and carries significance. The social-adjustment view helps the counsellor to be aware that he begins to deal with problems only at the immediate pragmatic level. The inner-release view points to the necessity for the parishioner to articulate his conflicts for himself. The objective-ethical view contains the realisation that the culture impresses its stamp on an individual, and that this cannot be disregarded.

69. Ibid., p.31. This statement leaves the reader unclear as to Hiltner's meaning. He does not clarify what he intends.

70. Ibid., p.32. Hiltner is required to say much more about the Christian view of man than he does here if we are to understand what he means.

With these conclusions, Hiltner indicates his willingness to accept tension and ambiguity between the demands of society, the needs of the individual, and objective ethical prescriptions. But his discussion is overly-ambiguous, and it is not entirely certain what he is advocating.

Hiltner, as was noted, presents six basic elements appropriate to proper pastoral counselling. These should now be discussed at length.

(1) The parishioner must recognise his need and be ready to accept help. The need is always specific, although recognition of its nature need not be clear and distinct.⁷¹ Recognition of need is vital to the counselling procedure if the basic aim of self-understanding is to be achieved. Without such a recognition on the part of the parishioner, the counsellor can only coerce or direct. If the parishioner is to understand his problems and needs for himself, he must be brought to the point of realising his need and be willing to do something about it. This activity which is prior to counselling is called precounselling.

(2) There is nothing manipulative in precounselling. Hiltner insists that

"there is nothing basic in the counseling situation which is foreign to the precounseling situation. Acceptance of the parishioner's feelings as a fact, understanding them so far as he wants to disclose them, absence of coercive pressure, moralizing, generalizing, or distracting are all involved in both types of situations."⁷²

In the precounselling situation the pastor presents himself to the parishioner with a willingness to help. The initiative remains with the parishioner,

71. PREFACE p.68.

72. PASTORAL COUNSELING p.133.

and he is clearly given the right to accept or reject the help offered.

In precounselling there is no exploitation.⁷³

All of the pastor's activities have a significance, for or against, in relation to counselling.⁷⁴ The pastor's total work can be either a help or a hindrance to useful counselling in the future. Hiltner does not imply by this that all of ministry is useful only insofar as it facilitates counselling. What he is implying, rather, is that all of ministry has some bearing on counselling. The pastor has the one role, defined as the leader of a segment of the Christian community. His different functions all meet at this one point.⁷⁵ Hiltner is quite clear that there must be no imperialisation by any one function over the tasks allotted to another function.⁷⁶ But, all the functions are interrelated, and as much as this is true, they have a bearing on counselling as precounselling.

(3) The basic attitude in counselling is described by the term 'eductive.' This is a major concept for Hiltner. Eductive means 'leading out' something that may be regarded as either within the person or potentially available to him.⁷⁷ Hiltner writes,

"I have characterized my basic approach in the word 'eductive,' drawing or leading out."⁷⁸

73. Ibid., p.128f and also the case study and discussion in ch.3 of THE COUNSELOR IN COUNSELING.

74. PASTORAL COUNSELING p.149.

75. Ibid., p.170.

76. Ibid., p.149.

77. PREFACE. p.151.

78. PASTORAL COUNSELING. p.254.

Eductive counselling proceeds primarily through the counsellor accepting the parishioner's feelings. As Hiltner puts it:

"Counseling proceeds by understanding, and not by agreement or disagreement."⁷⁹

The pastor's words and actions must be totally related to understanding the parishioner's feelings, and communicating that understanding to him.⁸⁰

The purpose of this procedure is to let the parishioner know that his feelings are accepted, can be brought out into the open, and, when conflicts arise within these feelings, accepted and dealt with.

In order for the parishioner to experience the freedom to explore his feelings and conflicts he must know that he is totally accepted. In eductive counselling, therefore, there is an absolute prohibition on moralising judgments.⁸¹ Moralising most often arises when the pastor sees a conflict in the parishioner's feelings. As moralising is not a substitute for understanding, it only succeeds in telling the parishioner what the pastor thinks about how he ought to feel. This goes no way toward fulfilling the aim of counselling, which is to lead out the resources which are within the parishioner. Without understanding, the parishioner will be unable to have his conflicts clarified in his terms, and will not, then, be able to help himself.

79. Ibid., p.20.

80. Ibid., p.47.

81. Hiltner, PREFACE, p.152 and Hiltner, PASTORAL COUNSELING, p.49.

- (4) Counselling happens within interpersonal relationships.⁸²

What Hiltner is seeking to express here is the idea that pastoral counselling is not the mere application of a technique. He writes,

"The counseling situation, involves real respect for the parishioner, and does not proceed through use of a bag of tricks."⁸³

If the counsellor concentrates on method and thereby neglects the real emotional tone of the situation, he only succeeds in communicating non-acceptance. In this case, the counsellor has inadvertently diverted the parishioner away from the task of clarification.

- (5) There is a similarity of method in all effective counselling. The aim of all counselling is achievement of new insight with proof in action.

"If a person is troubled about his situation or some aspect of it and seeks a helper through counseling, the end which all such professional helpers have in common is to aid the person to get a sufficiently clear view of his situation, with the conflicting trends and pulls and motives and ideals and desires, that he may then see his situation in a freer, clearer, more objective way and consequently be able to act in a similar new fashion."⁸⁴

The essence of all counselling is the relationship between a person who seeks help and a helping person.

82. Hiltner, THE COUNSELOR IN COUNSELING (New York Abingdon Press, 1950), p.7.

83. Hiltner, PASTORAL COUNSELING, p.23.

84. Ibid., p.95.

The difference between pastoral counselling and other types of counselling lies in the context of counselling, the resources used, and the perception by the counsellor of the human situation. But within these differences there is a unity of method; that is, educative procedures are employed.

The context of pastoral counselling is particularly important with respect to setting and expectation.⁸⁵ Setting symbolises everything the church stands for, while the expectation of the parishioner is related to his view of the counsellor as pastor. The pastor who is aware of these contextual factors has a vital instrument at hand in his counselling.

The pastoral context makes available to the counsellor a whole range of religious resources. The parishioner expects these resources to be used. They supply a channel of access to personality.⁸⁶ By using the opportunities which religion offers, the pastor can gain access to the parishioner's personality. The specific resources which Hiltner mentions are prayer, the Bible, religious literature, Christian doctrine, and sacraments and rites.⁸⁷ They all have a proper place in pastoral counselling provided they are not used in a judgmental or coercive way. Such a use would block the parishioner's expression of internal conflict of feelings.

85. Seward Hiltner and Lowell G. Colston,
THE CONTEXT OF PASTORAL COUNSELING, p.218.

86. Hiltner, PASTORAL COUNSELING, p.187-188.

87. Ibid., p.189f.

The remaining difference between pastoral counselling and other counselling, and which articulates in another way both the Christian context and the use of religious resources, is the view of human destiny which the pastor has. To see the parishioner as a child of God, who has a future given to him by God, and who has available to him the power of the Holy Spirit, provides the pastor with a special and unique perspective.

(6) Successful counselling cannot proceed without knowledge about how the human personality works. Such knowledge can come through participation in the counselling process and in our dealings with people, through clinical pastoral training, and through academic courses. None of these educational methods is sufficient in itself.⁸⁸ In this there is an indication of a prevailing theme in Hiltner's writing, namely, that theory and practice should never be separated.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the specific principles of pastoral counselling are in effect, the employment of the general principles of shepherding. Both sets of principles insist on acceptance of the parishioner's feelings in order to educe clarification of inner conflicts, and these lead to judgment which is to be expressed in action. This does not mean that pastoral counselling is the whole of shepherding. It is, rather, a particular way in which shepherding may be done. Although Hiltner does not draw the connection, pastoral counselling is close to the guiding concept of shepherding.

88. Ibid., p.250.

(b) Other Resources

Although shepherding cannot be limited to pastoral counselling, it is not at all clear what Hiltner suggests in addition to pastoral counselling. The principles of shepherding and pastoral counselling are parallel, and their aims are similar. While Hiltner insists that not all shepherding is pastoral counselling, all shepherding appears to be the totality of pastoral counselling and precounselling.

In THE CHRISTIAN SHEPHERD, Hiltner gives nine instances of shepherding, covering such situations as shepherding grief and loss, the family, the class structure, housewives and so on. These instances point to shepherding being either pastoral counselling or precounselling. If the case-studies in, for example, PASTORAL COUNSELING, THE COUNSELOR IN COUNSELING and THE CHRISTIAN SHEPHERD are compared, little difference appears in approach and method, although the direction and purpose of each book is different, as the titles indicate. What does appear uniquely in the last-named book is the need for the pastor to understand the peculiar dynamics of each situation. But this is a requirement generally for pastoral counselling and precounselling, and is nothing other than the pastor taking the parishioner's context seriously.

We are forced to the conclusion that the resources for shepherding as healing, sustaining and guiding are pastoral counselling and precounselling. Precounselling, it should be noted, is, according to Hiltner, a legitimate pastoral task in itself, and does not always have to lead to pastoral counselling to be effective shepherding.⁸⁹

89. Ibid., p.125f.

Chapter 4

Developments in Hiltner's Approach to the

Theology of Pastoral Care

1. Ian F. McIntosh

2. James N. Lapsley

3. Don S. Browning

Ian F. McIntosh

McIntosh has tried to expand the theological methodology which

was expanded in his PREFACE TO PASTORAL THEOLOGY.

In the analysis of an extended pastoral conversation, McIntosh

tries to show how Hiltner's pastoral theological method and concept

of ministry can be applied. McIntosh writes:

"What is being upheld is the use of pastoral care
for theology. That is, the intention is to
make a case for 'pastoral theology' as Hiltner used
the term - reflections on aspects of the life and
work of the church as valid contributions to the
task of reconstructive theology."¹

Ian F. McIntosh, PASTORAL CARE AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY
(Edinburgh, The Saint Andrew Press, 1977), p. 116.

In this chapter, the work of three pastoral theologians who have tried to develop Hiltner's theology of pastoral care in one way or another will be outlined. These theologians are Ian F. McIntosh, James N. Lapsley, and Don S. Browning. McIntosh, Lapsley and Browning are in substantial agreement with Hiltner's justification of pastoral theology, the methodology which Hiltner tries to construct, and the psychotherapeutic identification of pastoral data. In spite of common convictions shared with Hiltner, however, each in his own way tries to offer a more sophisticated statement of the theology of pastoral care. Thus, McIntosh develops Hiltner's notion of two-way communication within the Body of Divinity; Lapsley attempts to construct a more secure basis for Hiltner's theology by utilising process philosophy; and Browning sets out to show how psychology can contribute to the theology of pastoral care through the use of analogies drawn from psychology.

1. Ian F. McIntosh

McIntosh has tried to expand the theological methodology which Hiltner expounded in his PREFACE TO PASTORAL THEOLOGY. Through the analysis of an extended pastoral conversation, McIntosh attempts to show how Hiltner's pastoral theological method and concept of the Body of Divinity can be applied. McIntosh writes,

"What is being upheld is the use of pastoral care for theology. That is, the intention is to try to make a case for 'pastoral theology' as Hiltner used the term – reflections on aspects of the life and work of the church as valid contributions to the task of constructive theology."¹

1. Ian F. McIntosh, PASTORAL CARE AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY (Edinburgh, The Saint Andrew Press, 1972), p.116.

It is also McIntosh's intention to analyse pastoral encounters from a theological perspective. In this way, McIntosh is utilising Hiltner's notion of two-way communication within the Body of Divinity.

On the one hand, McIntosh sees validity in analysing pastoral encounters in the light of the theological formulations of the Christian faith, especially if this analysis deepens the insight and understanding of what has happened in the concrete pastoral situation. On the other hand, McIntosh suggests that theology itself can be enriched when pastoral experience is allowed to be used as evidence for theological construction. In this way, McIntosh tries to relate theology to pastoral experience, and pastoral experience to theology.

With respect to bringing theology into dialogue with pastoral care, McIntosh does not have much to contribute. In his discussions at the end of the verbatim reports of pastoral conversations McIntosh tries to see the pastoral conversations in a theological light. However, his occasional insights never penetrate to the level of a theological consideration of the nature of pastoral care; neither does he question theologically his use of Rogerian psychotherapy. The critical dialogue between theology and pastoral care has to be extended beyond what McIntosh has offered. In terms of this dialogue, he has not made any advance on Hiltner's conclusions.

With respect to McIntosh's other intention, of utilising pastoral care for theological construction, he has tried to advance Hiltner's attempt to justify pastoral theology as a legitimate branch of theology. Here, the problem concerns the decision as to what is the nature and source of evidence for theological statements. Following Hiltner, McIntosh suggests the use of what are, traditionally, extra-curricular sources of evidence.

In order to explain what he intends, McIntosh builds upon a paper written by Daniel Day Williams: "Truth in the Theological Perspective."²

Williams advocates a 'perspectivist theory of truth.' Williams writes,

"The meaning of the term 'truth,' in any and all of its senses cannot be stated except with reference to the presuppositions of the perspective in which it appears."³

A perspective denotes the total outlook and conceptual scheme of any inquirer.

"Perspective is roughly equivalent to 'world view,' provided this be understood not simply as the 'general sense of things' but as the configuration of these factors which determine how a particular mind thinks and evaluates."⁴

Williams asks if the criterion of theological truth resides within Christianity itself. He answers negatively, because theological statements, if true, are true not only for Christians, but for all men. Yet, if theology arises peculiarly out of the Christian experience and has its own perspective, it need not submit to the criterion of truth pertaining to another perspective. The problem between truth and perspective forces Williams to investigate the nature of theology itself.

2. Daniel Day Williams, "Truth in the Theological Perspective" JOURNAL OF RELIGION Vol. 28, (October, 1948). McIntosh's reliance upon Williams' paper appears to be considerable, yet he has not outlined its content in anything like sufficient detail. The following presentation of Williams' argument is much more extensive than that given by McIntosh.
3. Ibid., p.243.
4. Ibid., p.244.

"The perspectivist analysis discloses that if the theological perspective is absolutized, that is, if something which is known only from within the Christian experience is made the absolute norm over all Christian belief, then there is nothing more to be said. But it is also true that such a claim involves a denial of the perspectivist principle that, whatever we see, or believe, or think, our own peculiar angle of vision is involved and hence may be corrected or enlarged by reference to another perspective."⁵

Williams argues that truth cannot be tied solely to any one perspective.

He does not mean to deny the uniqueness of Christianity and the perspective associated with it. But,

"Christian beliefs are corrigible by what is discovered through the meeting of the Christian perspective with the experience and conceptions imbedded in other perspectives. From this viewpoint, faith, regeneration, revelation, Bible, and creed are conditions of discovery of the full truth of Christianity; but they are not self-authenticating criteria of truth."⁶

The test of truth is not within any one perspective. Neither does it lie in the coherence of all perspectives.

"The test of truth is fruitfulness in a dynamic process. It is the capacity of an interpretation of the world to become more inclusive, more coherent, more adequate through a continuing discussion, criticism, and reformulation in contact with other interpretations of the ever widening range of human experience."⁷

5. Ibid., p.250.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., p.251.

In his paper, Williams provides for an interdisciplinary, culturally related, and rationally plausible theology. He has not tried to advance a thorough-going relativism, but rather a theory of truth in which every perspective points beyond itself. The perspectives are not isolated, but

"participate in the clash and flux of the great democracy of experience itself. They are always in process."⁸

McIntosh uses Williams' perspectivist approach to theology in order to support his contention that

"pastoral relationships are a potentially valuable source of evidence for theology."⁹

What is claimed, then, is the possibility of knowledge of God from many sources in the world. As far as McIntosh's particular purpose is concerned, however,

"it is only a limited aspect of this method that has to be granted as legitimate, namely, the value of evidence, not from the whole range of 'secular' knowledge, but from pastoral operations themselves."¹⁰

What McIntosh intends his employment of the perspectivist theory of truth to mean in practice is given in his discussion of hope, in which he tries to indicate how Moltmann's treatment of hoping is too limited in scope to shed light on all the issues raised by a concrete pastoral instance.¹¹ Here, theological reflection on pastoral experience is used to challenge and correct a theological statement.

8. Ibid., p.247.

9. McIntosh, PASTORAL CARE AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY, p.119.

10. Ibid., p.121.

11. Ibid., p.131f.

The level of McIntosh's criticism of Moltmann, in which he argues that Moltmann does not take sufficient account of short-term hopes, does not, however, add very much to theological knowledge. In terms of the claims made for pastoral theology, as this has been defined by Hiltner and McIntosh, perhaps more could have been expected. But whatever the inadequacies of McIntosh's conclusion, he has at least tried to engage in two-way communication at all points within the Body of Divinity. His development of the perspectivist theory of truth, although brief, is an interesting use of philosophical theology. However, the general position requires a more adequate justification than McIntosh has given, and he has not significantly advanced Hiltner's own contribution.

1. James N. Lapsley, SALVATION AND HEALTH
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1972)

2. Ibid., p. 3.

3. Ibid., p. 145.

4. Ibid., p. 18.

2. James N. Lapsley

It is Lapsley's intention to develop a relationship between salvation and health¹² within the framework outlined by Hiltner in his PREFACE TO PASTORAL THEOLOGY. In this, he hopes to work out what he calls a 'professional theology' which will be able to guide responsible ministry.¹³ Lapsley tries to meet his task by the use of process philosophy and dynamic ego psychology, in order to

"see what the dynamic process model and its theological implications can mean for ministry."¹⁴

In this case, Lapsley is developing an underdeveloped aspect of Hiltner's theology of pastoral care, namely, the relationship between process philosophy and personality development.

Lapsley contends that the theological understanding of the relationship of man to God is vital to a proper theology of pastoral care.¹⁵ However, he believes that the church has failed to understand this relationship, in the main because of the dualistic tendencies between body and soul, individual and society, sacred and secular, which have permeated Christian theology. This failure, Lapsley believes, can be overcome through knowledge about how the personality operates in relationships.

12. James N. Lapsley, SALVATION AND HEALTH
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1972)

13. Ibid., p.9.

14. Ibid., p.145.

15. Ibid., p.19.

"In what has come to be called psychoanalytic ego psychology we have the essentials for a dynamic understanding of persons in relationship, and in process philosophy we have the framework."¹⁶

By thinking of the relationship between the relative maturity of the ego and a process understanding of God and salvation, Lapsley attempts to construct a theology of pastoral care in which increased ego development increases our participation in salvation.

In order to understand what Lapsley is suggesting, it is necessary to give a brief outline of the pertinent aspects of Alfred North Whitehead's process philosophy of organism. Whitehead endeavoured to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in which every element of our experience can be interpreted. He attempted to write an inclusive cosmology. The basic category of Whitehead's system is change; the character of the universe is such that it produces ever new syntheses. The world is perpetually being created. Reality is, therefore, to be described in dynamic rather than static terms. In opting for becoming, rather than being, as the essential category of reality, Whitehead did not try to occlude the idea of being; rather, being is to be understood in becoming.

The world is a process, and this process is the becoming of actual entities – the finally real things of which the world is made. Actual entities are events.

16. Ibid., p.24.

This 'di-polarity' has been compared to Teilhard de Chardin's concept of the 'without' and the 'within' of things.
cf. Peter Hamilton, THE LIVING GOD AND THE MODERN WORLD (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1967).

"How an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is: so the two descriptions are not independent. Its 'being' is constituted by its 'becoming'."17

This is the principle of process. An actual entity emerges through the coalescence of a selected number of possibilities into the one actuality. An actual entity 'becomes' as it absorbs influences from other entities, of which God is also one. This process of absorption of influence Whitehead calls 'prehension.'

Prehension means grasping or seizing, though, for Whitehead, this does not imply consciousness. As Whitehead uses the term, it also includes being influenced by or affected by what one seizes.

Every prehension consists of three factors:

- (a) the 'subject' which is prehending, namely the actual entity in which that prehension is a concrete element;
- (b) the 'datum' (or object), which is prehended;
- (c) the 'subjective form' which is how that subject prehends that datum.

Prehensions are both active and passive, containing something that the entity does and something that happens to it. This is the basic datum of all experience, and exhibits the metaphysical nature of becoming as 'di-polar,' with both a physical and a mental pole.¹⁸

- 17. A. N. Whitehead, PROCESS AND REALITY Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929. p.34. I am indebted to Principal D. W. D. Shaw for help on this statement of Whitehead's philosophy. This presentation is not intended to be a full statement of Whitehead's philosophy. The intention is to provide a basis for understanding Lapsley's argument.
- 18. This 'di-polarity' has been compared to Teilhard de Chardin's concept of the 'without' and the 'within' of things. Cf. Peter Hamilton, THE LIVING GOD AND THE MODERN WORLD (London: Hodder & Stroughton, 1967).

To understand what Lapsley means salvation to be it is necessary to give an account of Whitehead's concept of God.

"For Whitehead, God is an actual entity but not an occasion. Occasions perish, but God is everlasting. . . . God is unique in that he supplies each entity with its initial aim: but he resembles other entities in being 'di-polar.' Corresponding to an entity's inwardness or 'mental pole' is God's primordial nature, which is the primordial (not derived) fact in the universe. Corresponding to an entity's outwardness or 'physical pole' is God's consequent nature: as with the physical pole of an entity, this grasps, takes into itself, and is in turn affected by all other entities. This is of momentous importance. God and the world affect, and depend upon, each other: his primordial nature is unchanging, but his consequent nature is related to the world's happenings."19

It is God's relationship to the world's happenings which is important for Lapsley.

The novel thrust of Whitehead's theism lies in his statement of God's consequent nature.

"What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world. In this sense, God is the great companion – the fellow-sufferer who understands."20

God, then, is involved in and with the world. He 'prehends' our activities,

19. Hamilton, THE LIVING GOD AND THE MODERN WORLD, p.87 and John B. Cobb, A CHRISTIAN NATURAL THEOLOGY (London: Lutterworth Press, 1965), p.132f.
20. Whitehead, PROCESS AND REALITY, p.497.

Hamilton, THE LIVING GOD AND THE MODERN WORLD, p.126.

Lapsley, SALVATION AND HEALTH, p.53.

ibid., p.54.

these prehensions becoming a part of his consequent nature; likewise, we 'prehend' him and participate in his love for us. Peter Hamilton sums up:

"God is everlasting, and if we affect God that effect is everlasting. So far from perishing when we die, we have during our lives achieved an everlasting effect which cannot perish."²¹

Everlasting life, from a process perspective, is our 'objective' existence in the consequent nature of God.

We are now in a position to appreciate Lapsley's definition of salvation. Salvation, he writes,

"must refer primarily to the preservation in the life of God of the values realized in the world, especially in the lives of men."²²

What is 'saved' are

"the qualities that form the gestalt of his person, and represent the contribution that he made to the stream of life. These qualities are preserved as active dimensions of the life of God, contributing to his development."²³

The other pole of Lapsley's thought is dynamic ego psychology.

In dynamic ego psychology the ego is viewed as having its own autonomy and development pattern. Arising out of classical psychoanalysis, dynamic ego psychology attempts to explain the development of the ego. According to Lapsley, this can proceed in one of two ways: epigenetically, in which the ego develops by way of a process of unfolding; or hierarchically, in which every stage of ego development is marked by increase in complexity of structure and function through interaction with the environment.

21. Hamilton, THE LIVING GOD AND THE MODERN WORLD, p.126.

22. Lapsley, SALVATION AND HEALTH, p.53.

23. Ibid., p.54.

The first model Lapsley associates with Erik Erikson, and the second model he associates with Jane Loevinger. Whatever approach is adopted, Lapsley sees health as a function of the relative maturity of the ego.

More specifically:

"Health generically refers to the relatively active potential for appropriate functioning which any individual possesses at any given time."²⁴

Health is not seen as an ideal state; rather, it is seen as a process which is directly related to the state of development of the ego. This notion is identical to Hiltner's concept of health as a direction of movement towards the best possible functioning. But Lapsley is quite unequivocal in relating the best possible functioning to the relative maturity of the ego.

When health, as a function of the relative maturity of the ego, is thought of in relation to the process understanding of God and salvation, the result is what Lapsley calls the 'dynamic process model of the relationship between health and salvation.' Put simply, increase in ego maturity leads to increase in the quality of life, and this leads in turn to increased participation in the active life of God. The quality of a human life increases the effect of that life on God, and, therefore, more of that life is preserved in the active life of God. The task of ministry, in this case, is directly related to encouraging ego development so that increased participation in the life of God may result. In other words, increase in the relative maturity of the ego becomes an evangelical task.

24. Ibid., p.71. Lapsley's statement on health is brief.

As with Hiltner, so now with Lapsley, pastoral care is constitutively bound up with psychology. In Lapsley's case, it is bound up with dynamic ego psychology. The novelty in Lapsley's account lies in his attempt to set psychologically oriented theology of pastoral care in the context of Whitehead's doctrine of God. Lapsley, however, has taken over the assumptions which lie behind Hiltner's theology of pastoral care and developed them in a slightly different way. Apart from matters of detail, there is little difference between Hiltner's and Lapsley's accounts.

24. Don A. Browning, ATONEMENT AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press), 1966, p. 5-6.

25. Ibid., p. 23.

26. Ibid., p. 25.

3. Don S. Browning

Browning has attempted to develop further the methodological framework which was outlined by Hiltner. In other words, Browning is concerned with the contribution of psychology to theological knowledge. In particular, Browning explores the possibility of using psychological analogies for theological construction:

"There is a need for empirically discernible analogies that will both clarify and confirm the biblical witness to the saving event of Jesus Christ."²⁵

He is seeking to answer the question: Can we make positive theological statements on the basis of insights derived from psychology?²⁶

By the term 'psychotherapy' Browning means that

"branch of psychology that attempts to specify those elements in interpersonal interactions which tend to be therapeutically efficacious for people with broken, unhappy, and distorted lives. It is a perspective on healing. It studies individual and group pathology with a view toward cure."²⁷

Theology, too, is a perspective on healing. Can one perspective clarify the meaning of the other? Or, can the study of shepherding – which is directed toward healing – provide insight into theological truth? This question addresses the basic methodological assumption behind Hiltner's construction of pastoral theology.

25. Don S. Browning, ATONEMENT AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press), 1966, p.9.

26. Ibid., p.23.

27. Ibid., p.25.

Browning is sufficiently theologically aware to observe that the premise which will permit a positive answer to this question is theological in nature. The premise may be stated thus: The God who created the world and who also saves it, is one and the same God; there is only one world; there is a oneness in all healing; and there is a oneness to all brokenness.²⁸ This premise maintains the disappearance of distinction between healing and salvation.

The ontological assumption behind this premise is that there is an acceptance which transcends the therapeutic situation.

"The therapist's empathic acceptance announces, proclaims, and witnesses to the fact that the client is truly acceptable, not only to him as a therapist, but to some structure which transcends all finite referents, i.e., to the universe and whatever power that holds it together."²⁹

The therapist's acceptance of the client is a representative acceptance. The client's worth and dignity transcend all finite attitudes. Thus, the humanist affirmation of empathic acceptance, which is found in the psychotherapy of Carl R. Rogers,

"pushes us toward an ontological principle or reality by which all worth, value, and significance is measured ultimately."³⁰

Browning inquires into the ontological relation between the therapist's

28. Ibid., p.26.

29. Ibid., p.150.

30. Ibid., p.151.

acceptance of his client and the larger structure it assumes. He argues that there is an analogical relationship between the two.

"The possibility of the therapist accepting the client is based upon an intuition of a prior or a priori ground with reference to which the client is actually ontologically accepted."³¹

As the argument thus far is not yet sufficient to support the thesis that psychology can contribute to theology, Browning proceeds toward a synthesis of Christocentric revelation as understood by Karl Barth, and the general ontological relations that exist between God and man as stated by Charles Hartshorne. Although God is supremely revealed in Jesus Christ, God has a general relation to the world in the natural processes of creation and providence.³² Theological knowledge can, according to Browning, be found in Christ and in the world.

The analogical process, according to Browning, works both ways, a priori and a posteriori. The empirical analysis provides, under the guidance of the Christ event, a clarifying analogy of that event or that to which it points.

It is this mode of analogical thinking which Browning believes underlies Hiltner's construction of pastoral theology.

"A study of concrete empirical processes, be they pastoral or psychotherapeutic, can reveal positive theological truth, for Hiltner, because finally all of reality is undergirded by God's relationship. . . . One can bring theological questions to concrete processes because of a prior confrontation with the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. But the perfection revealed

31. Ibid., p.153.

32. Ibid., p.158.

by Jesus Christ is also a perfection that intersects the depths of all empirical realities. Hence, theological truth can be found in both places."³³

This statement assumes that God's acceptance predates, and is the ground of, therapeutic acceptance.

4. Conclusion

The three theologians who have been presented here have explored some aspect of the relationship obtaining between pastoral data and pastoral theology. With respect to Hiltner's method, the validity of this relationship is vital. If pastoral data has no possibility of making a contribution to theological construction, Hiltner's whole frame of reference collapses. It has been important, therefore, that the development of this relationship should have been examined beyond Hiltner's initial presentation.

McIntosh has tried to show how the notion of two-way communication within the Body of Divinity can be developed. Lapsley has tried to show how pastoral theology can employ dynamic ego psychology if salvation, God, and man are understood within a process framework. Browning has explained the analogical relationship between psychology and theology by building on the ontological foundation of acceptance. Each has, in this way, tried to contribute to the sophistication of Hiltner's thesis.

33. Ibid., p.161.

Chapter 5

A Critical Discussion of Hiltner's

Theology of Pastoral Care

1. Categorisation of Hiltner's Theology of Pastoral Care

(a) Functionalism

(b) Liberalism

(c) Individualism

(d) Developmentalism

2. Evaluation

(a) Method

(b) Content

"are characterized by their spirit and attitude rather than by their content."²

"which enchains the mind and prevents the encounter of Christian insight with modern knowledge."³

Hiltner, THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS, p.169.

Adams and Hiltner, PASTORAL CARE IN THE LIBERAL CHURCHES p.222.

Ibid., p.224.

1. Categorisation of Hiltner's Theology of Pastoral Care

(a) Functionalism

It was noted, that, for Hiltner, pastoral theology is an operation- or function-centred area of theological inquiry. He writes that

"insight into function is not an inferior form of theory."¹

Pastoral theology exists as an operation-centred area of legitimate theological inquiry, with its own theory and practice. Hiltner considers ministry in terms of function. These functions – preaching, shepherding, evangelising, organising, and so on – are not offices of ministry in water-tight compartments. Each function of ministry is related to the other functions, and together they indicate the nature of the role of ministry as leadership of some segment of the Christian community.

(b) Liberalism

Hiltner stands within the liberal theological tradition. Liberals, he writes,

"are characterised by their spirit and attitude rather than by their content."²

By this he means that liberals advocate a freeing from ideas

"which enchained the mind and prevented the encounter of Christian insight with modern knowledge."³

1 Hiltner, THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS, p.169.

2 Adams and Hiltner, PASTORAL CARE IN THE LIBERAL CHURCHES p.222.

3 Ibid., p.224.

In theology, liberals are not chained to the literal interpretation of the Bible, they view persons developmentally and the world historically, and they do not let hope get swallowed up in despair.⁴

Behind Hiltner's ideas on health and development lies the liberal doctrine of continuity between creation and redemption. Health is not a status for Hiltner, but a direction. He comes close to abolishing any distinction between salvation and health if this distinction involves a dualism.⁵ There is only one healing. Salvation, then, becomes a direction of movement towards self-fulfilment. Any break in this movement constitutes sin; as something can be done about this sinfulness, man exists with a developmental hopefulness. Evil, ultimately, is only an aberration.

Hiltner has written of the considerable influence which liberals have had on the development of pastoral care. This has been due, he suggests, to their willingness to take seriously the gains in knowledge achieved by the personality sciences.

(c) Individualism

In pastoral care,

"the theory and approach follow from the study of concrete situations."⁶

As Hiltner's case analyses show, he is dealing with individuals or small, intimate groups. Pastoral care or shepherding, as pastoral counselling

4 Ibid., p.226.

5 Hiltner, PREFACE, p.100.

6 Hiltner, PASTORAL COUNSELING, p.253.

and precounselling, is organically tied to individuals. The starting point is always the individual's problem or need, and the solution is seen as being within the individual himself. Interpersonal psychology is utilised insofar as it facilitates the individual's self-understanding.

Health and salvation are conceived in terms of an individual's direction of movement. Hiltner talks of self-fulfilment, self-direction, and self-transcendence.

(d) Developmentalism

Hiltner's concept of man is developmental. Man has a great deal of freedom, although within limits, to achieve his goal of self-fulfilment. The Pelagian strain in Hiltner's thinking⁷ leads him to believe that man has at his disposal, immanent within the creation, the necessary resources for health and salvation. The availability of resources is the mark of God's grace. Sin, as such, is merely the movement away from self-fulfilment for which we are responsible.

This doctrine of man is the basis for Hiltner's avowal of developmental psychology. Although Hiltner is not fully committed to self-actualising theories of psychotherapy, he is persuaded that there is no ontological or created impediment to man's development toward health. This view is fundamentally optimistic with respect to what the future may contain for man if he seizes the opportunity. In this scheme of things, such theological features as evil or original sin play no significant part.

7 Hiltner, THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS, p.43.

2. Evaluation

(a) Method

The relationship which Hiltner sees obtaining between operation-centred and logic-centred theological inquiry is one of intercommunication. This methodological point is perfectly clear in Hiltner's writings. In practice, however, he lays considerable stress on the contribution which pastoral theology, as he conceives it to be, can make to theological construction in general, and to logic-centred theological inquiry in particular. Hiltner neither offers nor solicits substantial contributions in the other direction. While logic-centred theological inquiry has, according to the method, a significant role to play in the construction of pastoral theology, Hiltner gives no clue as to what such a contribution might involve.

(i) The failure, in practice, to construct pastoral theology in consistent relationship with logic-centred theological inquiry, opens up Hiltner's theology to internal criticism. On the one hand, it leaves logic-centred theological inquiry with an impractical bias. He warned against this, but he has done nothing to mitigate the danger. On the other hand, the lack of input from the orthodox theological curriculum allows for no theological check on the validity of the pastoral data. Hiltner never tries to justify theologically what happens in pastoral care or shepherding.

Pastoral data, derived from operational experience, is the major component in constructing pastoral theology. Pastoral theology, in this case, can be uncritical reflection on church activity. It can only theorise

about what has happened. The justification of pastoral data becomes pragmatic success. It is not theologically self-evident that Hiltner's method is correct.

"Surely what the churches and their ministers are, or do, at any given time or place is bound to be sociologically and culturally conditioned to a very large extent. It is hardly a place from which to begin theologising from whatever perspective. The very existence of the churches needs a theological justification and what their ministers do is open to more radical questioning than simply whether they are effective communicators, organisers and pastors."⁸

Although Hiltner's method allows for the theological questioning of pastoral data, he does not do so from the side of logic-centred theology. By attending solely to pastoral operations, corrected and controlled in the light of clinical data, Hiltner is covertly advocating an ecclesiastical and cultural conservatism.

Operationally, the division within the Body of Divinity which Hiltner makes is helpful insofar as it allows theology a systematic opportunity to respond to secular knowledge and experience. The internal problem with the method arises, however, when the rule of communication at all points within the Body of Divinity is not rigorously applied. Hiltner warned against de-theologising operational studies. He has not heeded his own advice in that there is no input from logic-centred theological inquiry in his theology of pastoral care.

8 Campbell, "Is Practical Theology Possible?" p.223.

(ii) The second point of comment on Hiltner's theological methodology has to do with his division within the Body of Divinity. Hiltner claims not to have made the distinctions within the Body of Divinity, but only to have discovered them.⁹ While it is not entirely clear what he means by this, it is clear that his statement of the division has been developed into a methodological principle which is his own. There are two fundamental laws, according to Hiltner, which must operate in all theology: all theology proceeds from and through revelation, and all theology involves a relationship between faith and culture.¹⁰ In this case, pastoral theology shares fundamental methodological principles with all the other branches of theological inquiry. The difference between the two components within the Body of Divinity is that logic-centred inquiry studies the faith, while operation-centred inquiry studies the Christian life, or, put differently, acts, events, and functions from a particular perspective. Each type of theological inquiry is regarded as autonomous.

But this typology is not self-evidently correct. Firstly, Hiltner has tried to justify the division within the Body of Divinity on what appear to be phenomenological grounds. He observes that the division is the case. He makes no effort to justify the division of theological grounds. Having made his observation, he moves on to a pragmatic utilisation of his discovery. However, if it is true that in some way or another theological methodology

9 Hiltner, PREFACE, p.218.

10 Ibid., p.218.

should make appeal to its ultimate 'object' of study, Jesus Christ, in order to be justified, then we must ask to what extent Hiltner's statement of the nature of the Body of Divinity is, in fact, a theological statement. Hiltner does not ground his statement by way of appeal to theological criteria. It remains quite uncertain how his concept of the Body of Divinity is to be theologically justified.

Secondly, the division within the Body of Divinity is intended by Hiltner to reflect different organisational principles. On the one hand, there are theological studies which are organised around the logical demands of the subject matter; on the other hand, there are theological studies which are organised around functions. Organisation- or function-centred theological inquiry is not, according to Hiltner, derived from logic-centred inquiry. Each type of inquiry has a legitimate autonomy, but shares in a legitimate appeal to what Hiltner calls the 'common currency of the faith.' It is unclear, however, how operation-centred theological inquiry can make appeal to this common currency of the faith without employing the results of logic-centred theological inquiry, like, for example, biblical theology or systematic theology. While it seems possible for logic-centred inquiry to go about its work without the necessity of appeal to operation-centred theological inquiry, the reverse does not seem to be the case. In order for operation-centred theological inquiry to ask theological questions of its subject matter – for example, the operations and functions of the pastor and the church – it must previously have made itself familiar with exegetical, systematic and historical theology. These areas of theological study, at least in some minimal way, are necessary

if one is to ask responsible and appropriate theological questions of operations. It is inevitable that operational theological study should be dependent upon logic-centred theological study. If this is the case, then Hiltner's concept of the relations within the Body of Divinity is much too simple. It seems that these relations may be more complex than Hiltner imagines.

Thirdly, it should be noted that the definition of logic-centred theological inquiry is unclear. Is it sufficient to state, as Hiltner does, that systematic theology, for example, is to be defined in terms of the logical arrangement of doctrines? Hiltner is extremely vague about the relationship which should obtain between the logical arrangement of doctrines and the constitutive event of the Christian faith, Jesus Christ. Hiltner is required to explain what the relationship of Christ to the Bible, and to theology in general, should be. Systematic theology cannot be defined merely as a discipline concerned with organising doctrines in a logical way. What is the logical organisation of doctrines? What validates a doctrine? Is systematic theology not required to ask what the doctrines of the Christian faith mean? Questions such as these are not addressed by Hiltner, and the consequence is that his discussion is left in an ambiguous state.

(iii) More positively, it should be noted that Hiltner, in his method, has attempted to provide a constructive basis for pastoral theology. In moving it away from practicalism, where pastoral theology is the practice of theological theory, Hiltner has done theology considerable service. He has been instrumental in supplying a basis for operational theological studies, and he has extended the dialogue between psychology and theology. The general direction of his endeavour has been both expansive and influential.

(b) Content

Shepherding, for Hiltner, amounts to pastoral counselling and precounselling. Is this adequate as an account of Christian pastoral care?

At bottom, pastoral counselling and precounselling are psycho-therapeutic devices to facilitate direction towards psychological health. In Hiltner's hands they are eductive, in that the emphasis is on leading-out the sufficient resources which are within the parishioner. There is a psychotherapeutic identification of pastoral data. Pastoral care is limited to individualistic psychotherapeutic categories.

It is not self-evident that this limitation should be the case. Argument has been given to suggest that eductive pastoral counselling can be applied to individuals in need. The basis for this application is the ontology of acceptance. This does more than insist on the worth and dignity of the individual. It describes certain characteristics about the nature of man, and implicitly, about the nature of man in society. It implies a developmental approach to health and a view of sin, which, as wrong life-direction, can be avoided or overcome. God is conceived in terms which allow no disjunction between his activity for our salvation and his activity for our health.

(i) Psychotherapeutic pastoral care has a well-documented record of success in meeting individual human need. But critical points can be raised. If pastoral care employs psychotherapeutic techniques, it must not do so uncritically. As Christian pastoral care, it must thoroughly examine the premises of psychology, and not be blinded by apparent

clinical success. Thomas C. Oden has summed up this point:

"However important may be the concrete application of tested therapeutic attitudes to pastoral care, the theological dialogue with therapy cannot rest content to remain at the instrumental level of pragmatic borrowing or professional cooperation, but must plumb to the depths of the theological assumptions of therapy itself."¹¹

Oden's point has been developed more thoroughly by Robert A. Lambourne. According to Lambourne, pastoral care has come to be dominated by what he calls 'the myths and symbols' of much of the psychotherapeutic community of faith of the last fifty years.¹² This statement by Lambourne applies directly to the theology of pastoral care developed by Seward Hiltner. According to Lambourne, salvation, which in the Judeo-Christian tradition is rooted in a physico-historical Word, was turned by psychotherapy into words and mental processes. In spite of recent attempts by psychotherapy to ground itself more securely in somatic existence, Lambourne argues that this has been frustrated by the prevailing mythology of the original Freudian psychoanalysis which still remains central to the movement. In particular, Lambourne sees the persistence of the concept of the super-ego as the supreme symbol of evil at the centre of the mythology. In this case, the aetiological factor in personality deformation is believed to be the encroachment of the super-ego into the place where the ego should be.

11 Oden, CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY, p.83.

12 Lambourne, "Personal Reformation and Political Formation in Pastoral Care" CONTACT 44 (Spring, 1974) p.33.

Thus:

"The typical conversion experience of the individual in the psychotherapeutic community of faith has always been and still is the rational ego delivering itself from the defilement of the super-ego. . . . Despite all the new psychological theories, the movement still preaches ego delivering itself by reason from the id and super-ego, from matter and from politics."¹³

In spite of some attempts by psychotherapy to uphold a connection between matter, self, and politics, the key symbol of the self-deliverance of the rational or existential ego from defilement of the super-ego still prevails.

When pastoral care receives instruction from psychotherapy there is always the danger of taking into itself the psychic, individualistic, and non-material images of sickness and deliverance which continue to dominate psychotherapy. In this case, pastoral care would forsake a biblical understanding of human being in favour of a deliverance myth which is one-sided, not taking into account the material and corporate aspects of human being. According to Lambourne, the biblical symbols of deliverance range through the psychic to the material to the political.

"These symbols combine in deliverance myths in which the personal and the corporate symbols, the material and the psychic symbols, so intertwine that they are inextricable."¹⁴

The individual-inwardness of the traditional symbols of psychotherapy, however, fail to grasp corporate-outwardness, and, therefore, Lambourne concludes, psychotherapy is dealing with an abstraction; it deals with one aspect of human being in separation from the other aspects.

13 Ibid., p.34.

14 Ibid., p.35.

Without doubt Hiltner has been a pressing force in the dialogue between pastoral psychology and pastoral theology. Through his writings he has steered pastoral theology towards a close working relationship with pastoral psychology. Hiltner has been so successful in his task that pastoral psychology, and especially pastoral counselling, have become primary tools in his structure of the nature and content of pastoral care. The integration which Hiltner has achieved between pastoral psychology and Christian pastoral care has resulted in the redirection of the latter away from tending to the spiritual welfare of people (especially people's relationship to God) and towards tending to their inner needs, understood primarily in psychological terms. As was seen when examining Hiltner's theology, he has succeeded in explaining psychological, inner need in such a way that it does duty for what was regarded in previous times as a spiritual matter. Sin, for example, Hiltner describes as a life-direction which is no longer relevant to one's present situation, and which, therefore, prevents the self-fulfilment which God desires of us. Pastoral care of sin, in this case, involves the stimulation of internal psychological resources in order to facilitate a new, and relevant, life decision which will lead to optimal living. Here the goals of pastoral care come to be directed by psychotherapeutic insight and method.

In order to exploit psychotherapeutic insight and method in pastoral care, Hiltner has had to develop a theological understanding of the human person, on the one hand, and health and salvation, on the other, in line with what Lambourne called the myths and symbols of the psychotherapeutic community of faith. Pastoral care became preoccupied, thereby, with ego-identity, self-formation, and what amounts to the psychological salvation

of the individual. The stress on these matters has led Hiltner to omit from the sphere of pastoral care such other matters as the bodily, corporate and political dimensions of human being and experience. Hiltner has uncritically assumed the veracity of the psychotherapeutic deliverance myth. In his hands, pastoral care has become a Christianised version of psychotherapeutic method and practice, differing from 'secular' psychotherapy only in virtue of the context within which pastoral care is given. This context affirms an ontological ground for therapeutic acceptance in God's acceptance and love for his people.

(ii) Hiltner conceives of scripture, worship, doctrine, the sacraments, and so on, in an instrumental way. At no point in his theology are these aspects of Christian faith and life allowed to raise their own questions for pastoral care. They function as 'religious resources' for shepherding.

In this case, the religious resources have value for pastoral care only inasmuch as they facilitate the previously determined goals and methods of shepherding. An instance of Hiltner's functional use of religious resources is seen in his attitude to prayer. He argues that in prayer, the need of the person in distress is the point from which to begin.¹⁵ This pragmatic, functional use of prayer is determined in advance by psychotherapeutic requirements. Similarly, the Bible is only to be used in pastoral care when it can be usefully employed for solving the problems of pastoral need. The Bible is never used by Hiltner to question his understanding of the pastoral situation or the psychotherapeutic approach to it. Also, religious symbols and sacraments are only given a functional

15 Hiltner, PASTORAL COUNSELING, p.193.

role to play in the pastoral drama. At no point are they allowed to interfere with or question the prevailing educative methodology of shepherding.

Hiltner's use of religious resources in this functional way implies that he has no place in shepherding for proclamation. Preaching, in fact, is specifically mentioned by Hiltner as having a pre-counselling significance, where it can prepare a person for pastoral counselling. But no mention is made of preaching, as proclamation, challenge, or exhortation, having a place in pastoral care. On the contrary, where preaching is proclamatory, it is denigrated by Hiltner for being outside of the all-pervasive educative principle. Similarly, the sacrament of the Lord's Supper is not considered to have a major part to play in pastoral care. There is no justification for absorbing preaching and Holy Communion into the general framework of educative pastoral counselling.

(iii) It has already been noted that Hiltner's concept of shepherding is individualistic. While Hiltner throws occasional glances towards sociological, economic and political categories, he remains firmly wedded to individualistic psychological categories. Hiltner's Princeton colleague James Lapsley, has recognised the matter in principle:

"The need for increased attention to the communal aspects of life in church and society is facing us squarely, but we have been slow to rise to the challenge. Our concern is still too much the one-to-one relationship."¹⁶

However, as was seen in Lapsley's book, SALVATION AND HEALTH, he has not managed to move beyond individualised categories. Lapsley,

16 Lapsley, "Pastoral Theology Past and Present," p.44.

indeed, calls the social responsibility of pastoral care an 'unknown territory'.¹⁷ He goes on:

"We must learn to relate to communal man or find that we have by degrees become completely irrelevant."¹⁸

It is one thing to recognise the problem, but another to do something about it. Lapsley's comments are pertinent, and they raise the correct sort of doubt about the relationship between pastoral care and individualistic pastoral psychology. For as long as pastoral care takes its bearings from pastoral psychology it is difficult to see how it will shake free the problem-centred individualism which characterises and dominates it.

(iv) The use of the parable of the Good Samaritan in Hiltner's doctrine of shepherding was pointed out. The shepherding metaphor which he draws from the parable plays a dominant role in his theology of pastoral care. His exegesis of the parable leads him to suggest a perspectivist understanding of shepherding. A perspective is vaguely and subjectively defined as

"a certain point of view in the subject who is performing the viewing or feeling or helping."¹⁹

Thomas Oden has summed up the critical point in this way:

"Hiltner begins with a generalized, methodological conception of shepherding that is derived largely from psychodynamic assumptions and only then reads this already presupposed definition back into the New Testament."²⁰

17 Ibid., p.45.

18 Ibid.

19 Hiltner, PREFACE, p.18.

20 Oden, CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY, p.90-91.

Oden does not prove his point by specific reference to Hiltner's work. However, this would be difficult to do for one may suppose that Hiltner would not openly advocate such an uncritical use of scripture. Yet Oden's point fits in with the general pattern, namely, Hiltner's a priori use of psychodynamic categories. In which case, one has to raise a critical question about Hiltner's exegesis of scripture: if Hiltner has imposed a psychological model on to the interpretation of scripture, what is his justification for this hermeneutical principle?

(v) Hiltner's failure to indicate the place of Christ in his theology is a remarkable omission. Apart from a few sweeping and vague references, Christ appears to play only a functional role. Certainly, christology is never allowed to play a significant part in the construction of the theology of pastoral care. It is difficult to be certain why this should be so.

Perhaps the reason might be that christology has no apparent 'cash value' in terms of theological reflection on pastoral operations. But if this is the case, to what extent is the theology of pastoral care a Christian theology? And to what extent is pastoral care Christian pastoral care?

(vi) On what basis can sin be considered solely in terms of wrong or inappropriate life-direction? It can be argued that there is much more to sin than Hiltner seems to realise. To suggest, as Lapsley does, that our failure to combat sin is due to previous ignorance about ego dynamics is to claim too much for ego dynamics and too little for sin. Man's sinfulness is greater than the range of issues which can be addressed by educative psychotherapy. This is not to deny that psychotherapy can mitigate some of the consequences of sin; to suggest otherwise is to stand in the face

of experience. But to claim that we can solve the human situation of suffering, despair and anxiety, as well as evil, by the application of psychological techniques, is to reduce the gospel to personality sciences and therapies.

Hiltner sees a distinct link between the divine activities of grace and the activity of healing. In one general sense he is correct because healing is surely an aspect of grace. But there is an aspect of the need for healing which goes to the root of human being, namely, the need to conquer or overcome death. The aspect of grace in this situation is focused, for the Christian, on the resurrection of Christ and our future participation in it. Because of death, healing in history before the Parousia cannot be equated with possible healing in history after the Parousia. To think otherwise is not to face up to the radicality of death. In the face of death, Hiltner's link between grace and healing does not penetrate deeply enough.

A similar problem with Hiltner's thought arises in relation to evil and suffering. There is a dimension of purposelessness in evil and suffering which cannot be tied down to psychological inadequacy. Grace may in some ways be immanent within creation, but there is a point in human experience where contact with evil and suffering defies a glib notion of immanent grace. There remains an aspect of human experience which cannot be overcome by resort to facilitating internal resources. However, we tie-in sin with death, evil and suffering, it is clear that psychology and a doctrine of immanent grace are not sufficient to meet the task which Hiltner assigns to them. In all, Hiltner claims far too much.

(vii) The value of Hiltner's approach to shepherding lies in the strength of the educative principle. By insisting that pastors free themselves from directive or coercive relationships with their parishioners, Hiltner highlights the rights, dignity, and capacities of the parishioner. The pastor is relieved of the responsibility to be the omnipotent problem-solver, and the parishioner is freed from the danger of coming under the influence of the pastor's prejudice and misunderstandings. Positively, the parishioner is encouraged to affirm himself and locate his own resources.

By opening up pastoral care to dialogue with psychology, Hiltner has derived insights which must help the pastor to do a more competent job. Theology and the church cannot minister if they are out of touch with the world and its resources. The problem, however, is to find out just how far the pastor and the church should go towards accepting and employing these resources.

The three pastoral theologians who have developed Hiltner's framework fall foul of the criticisms which have been put to Hiltner. McIntosh identifies the pastoral conversation solely in Rogerian terms. He does not depart from the psychotherapeutic identification of pastoral data. Lapsley, similarly, does not free himself from the limitation of pastoral care to individualised psychotherapeutic categories. The value of his account lies in the development of the process view of salvation. Browning has gone farthest in explaining the necessity of an ontology of acceptance in pastoral care. But he has not questioned whether pastoral care should be limited solely to psychotherapeutic categories.

Chapter 6

Introduction and Background to Jürgen Moltmann's

Political Theology

1. Introduction

The Background to Moltmann's Political Theology

PART TWO

(a) Radical Barthianism

(b) Roman-Catholic Political and Liberation Theology

(c) JÜRGEN MOLTMAN'S POLITICAL THEOLOGY

(d) Final Block

Chapter 6

Introduction and Background to Jürgen Moltmann's

Political Theology

1. Introduction

2. The Background to Moltmann's Political Theology

(a) Radical Barthianism

(b) Roman Catholic Political and Liberation Theology

(c) The Marxist-Christian Dialogue

(d) Ernst Bloch

With reality as it is, but begin to suffer under it, to contradict it. Faces with God means conflict with the world, for the god of the promised future stands incurably into the flesh of every unfulfilled present."¹

But political theology becomes concrete, and finds the necessary power of resistance, in the theology of the cross of Christ.² The theology of the cross is the reverse side of the theology of hope. The future of Christ is present in this world in the form of the cross of Christ. The theology of the cross develops the eschatological anticipation of the theology of hope and qualifies it by moving from concentration on the future to concentration on the cross and the history which necessitated it.

Jürgen Moltmann, THEOLOGY OF HOPE (London: S.C.M. Press, 1967), p.21.
Hereafter referred to as T.H.

Jürgen Moltmann, THE CRUCIFIED GOD (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1974), p.5.
Hereafter referred to as C.G.

1. Introduction

Four chapters make up Part Two of the thesis. These chapters deal with the background to and context of Moltmann's political theology; the theological basis of Moltmann's political theology in the eschatology of the cross; the content of Moltmann's political theology; and comment and discussion.

Jürgen Moltmann's political theology arises out of the relationship between the theology of hope and the theology of the cross. The latter develops and qualifies the former. Critical political theology begins with the recovery of the centrality of eschatology:

"Those who hope in Christ can no longer put up with reality as it is, but begin to suffer under it, to contradict it. Peace with God means conflict with the world, for the goad of the promised future stabs inexorably into the flesh of every unfulfilled present."¹

But political theology becomes concrete, and finds the necessary power of resistance, in the theology of the cross of Christ.² The theology of the cross is the reverse side of the theology of hope. The future of Christ is present in this world in the form of the cross of Christ. The theology of the cross develops the eschatological orientation of the theology of hope and qualifies it by moving from concentration on the future to concentration on the cross and the history which necessitated it.

1 Jürgen Moltmann, THEOLOGY OF HOPE (London: S.C.M. Press, 1967), p.21.
Hereafter referred to as T.H.

2 Jürgen Moltmann, THE CRUCIFIED GOD (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1974), p.5.
Hereafter referred to as C.G.

Moltmann's political theology, therefore, has to be explained in terms of this development which goes beyond difference of emphasis.³

For Moltmann, political theology is not a theology of Christian social ethics. It is, rather, a theology which, from its inherent basis in Jesus Christ, is constitutively political. This does not mean that politics is everything; it does mean that every aspect of theology and Christian life has an inescapable political dimension. The basis for such a claim lies in the central christological fact of all Christian theology. It is the task of political theology to show how this is so, and to work out the nature of the responsibility which ensues.

Moltmann recognises the antecedents of his political theology in the post-War theology of socio-political ethics: Barth's 'political sermon,' E. Wolff's 'political morality,' E. Käsemann's stress on the daily service of God in the realm of routine work, and H. Gollwitzer's concept of 'political obedience.'⁴ These approaches to political ethics, however, fail to work out sufficiently thoroughly the relation of theory to practice. They are the socio-political aspects of theological theories

3 See Richard Bauckham, "Moltmann's Eschatology of the Cross," SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, Vol.30, No.4 (October, 1976); and Walter Holden Capps, HOPE AGAINST HOPE: MOLTSMANN TO MERTON IN ONE THEOLOGICAL DECADE (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), p.136f.

4 Jurgen Moltmann, "The Cross and Civil Religion" in RELIGION AND POLITICAL SOCIETY, Edited and Translated by The Institute of Christian Thought (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1974), p.16.

which have been derived independently of social and political reality. They also fail to include the inherent political nature of the history of Jesus Christ in their theological constructions. As such, these political ethics depend upon a 'pure theory' of theology, and therefore remain abstract.

If the church, theology, and the Christian life are to be understood in a political and critical way, theologians must overcome the Enlightenment assumption which separates faith from public political life. Here matters of faith and belief are seen as relative and personal. They are regarded as unnecessary for public political life. Faith is pushed into the private sphere of life. However, as politics come more and more to dominate man's destiny, politics do not become more human. Christianity, which should be a humanising and liberating force in public political life, is only allowed to exist as a private and politically neutral aspect of life. It is Moltmann's conviction that this dualism between a private and personal Christianity, on the one hand, and a public politics, on the other, has no basis in a biblically based Christianity,

Moltmann contends that there is no such thing as an apolitical theology or church life. If the Christian puts himself above politics he merely becomes politically involved in an unconscious way, usually in support of the prevailing political order. For Moltmann, the question is not whether the churches should become political or not, but whether they can extricate themselves from the unconscious compromising support for prevailing social patterns and political ideologies. To this end, the churches must ask themselves whether they supply people with a religious opium or with a real ferment for freedom. Is the church speaking of the God of the cross of Jesus Christ or the gods of political idolatry and sectarian interest?

Along with J. B. Metz, Moltmann argues that political theology must be critical theology. There is no place in Christian theology for a theological justification of the socio-political status quo or the prevailing political ideologies. Eschatology forces theology to assume that the present experience of history does not yet correspond to the kingdom of God. However, without a qualifying theology of the cross, the eschatological 'not yet' becomes a future utopia, or else leads to escapism, with the difference between the present and the future conceived solely in quantitative and temporal terms. The anti-utopian 'not yet' of Christian theology, with its ground in the cross of Jesus Christ, is qualitative and trans-temporal.⁵ The eschatology of the cross does not merely show the provisional nature of the present, but also indicates that critical political theology arises from the incarnation of the risen Christ in the cross present in the world and its history. This complicated formulation will be explained in the body of the text.

Christian theology is necessarily Christ-centred theology.⁶ The central theological problem is then: 'Who is Jesus Christ?' The constant in Christian faith is Jesus Christ, and he must govern all christological predicates.

"Christologies rise and are broken down in reference to him."⁷

5 Ibid., p.20.

6 Moltmann, C.G., p.82.

7 Ibid., p.87 and Moltmann, T.H., p.17.

Christian eschatology speaks of Christ and his future, and is thereby distinguished from the spirit of utopia. But Christ and his future are comprehensible solely as the future of the crucified Jesus.

"Either Jesus who was abandoned by God is the end of all theology or he is the beginning of a specifically Christian, and therefore critical and liberating, theology and life."⁸

Only if we understand Christ's future in the light of his cross, and his cross in the light of his future, do we have, according to Moltmann, a properly Christian theology. This theology speaks of historical liberation, and it is, thereby, political theology. And because political theology is grounded in the eschatology of the cross, it is necessarily a dialectical theology.

8 Moltmann, C.G., p.4.

2. The Background to Moltmann's Political Theology

It is not the purpose here to outline the origins of Moltmann's theology.⁹ Rather, the purpose is to ground Moltmann's political theology by setting it in a context. The presentation will survey those general intellectual influences, the awareness of which will facilitate understanding of political theology.

(a) Radical Barthianism

Political theology in general, and Moltmann's in particular, may be said to have a contemporary starting point in Karl Barth's critique of theological liberalism. Theological liberalism, as it developed during the nineteenth century, began by accepting the theses of liberal thought, namely, the natural freedom of man and the veracity of human reason. Theological liberalism tried to present a coherent statement of the Christian faith in the light of these assumptions. The following are characteristic of liberal theology: the indwelling of God in man; a readiness to utilise contemporary modes of thought; an optimistic view of man as being responsive to truth and goodness; a fostering of literary and historical criticism, especially with regard to the Bible; and an individualistic anthropology. The first systematic expression of liberal theology was Frederick Schleiermacher's THE CHRISTIAN FAITH, published in Germany in 1821-1822.

9 The philosophical and theological origins of Moltmann's theology have been documented by M. Douglas Meeks, ORIGINS OF THE THEOLOGY OF HOPE (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974).

Barth, in opposition to the accommodation by liberal theology of prevailing philosophical systems of thought, argued that Christian theology must seek to develop its own modes of thought derived entirely from the fact and nature of God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ. The content of the gospel must determine the way in which theology comes to expression.¹⁰

10 Barth's theological methodology has been extensively discussed by

T. F. Torrance. In his THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) Torrance writes that

"Barth found his theology thrust back more and more upon its proper object, and so he set himself to think through the whole of theological knowledge in such a way that it might be consistently faithful to the concrete act of God in Jesus Christ from which it actually takes its rise in the Church, and, further, in the course of that inquiry to ask about the presuppositions and conditions on the basis of which it comes about that God is known, in order to develop from within the actual content of theology its own interior logic and its own inner criticism which will help to set theology free from every form of ideological corruption." p.7.

Elsewhere, Torrance writes that Barth has shown

"that we can never look for the truth in ourselves but must look for it beyond ourselves in God. It means that we can never claim the truth of our own statements, but must think of our statements as pointing away to Christ who alone is the Truth. Theological statements do not carry their truth in themselves, but are true in so far as they direct us away from ourselves to the one Truth of God."

GOD AND RATIONALITY (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p.68. For a further discussion see T. F. Torrance, KARL BARTH: AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS EARLY THEOLOGY 1910-1931 (London: S.C.M. Press, 1962). For a more critical discussion, see Gordon H. Clark, KARL BARTH'S THEOLOGICAL METHOD (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1963). Clark notes that

"in the Word, in revelation, and not in any independent anthropology or the like, Barth locates the source of religious authority. The Word, then, is the substantial core of Barth's theological method; it is the Logos or logic which governs his thought." p.13.

Two political theologians, Frederick Herzog and Jürgen Moltmann, have attempted to begin with Barth's methodological caveat that our knowledge of God is prescribed by his self-revelation. Both, however, enter into critical debate with the way in which Barth developed his theological methodology.

Frederick Herzog has tried to work out a political or liberation theology which is relevant to North America on the basis of Barth's approach.¹¹ Herzog isolates two primary problems which he believes must be addressed: the racial divide between black and white, and the tendency to begin theologising with the quest of the modern subject for self-certainty.¹² Employing striking metaphorical language, Herzog insists that Christians have to

"learn to 'think black' theologically. To 'think white' is to turn in upon the Cartesian self, to engage in 'navel-gazing'."¹³

However, to 'think black,' to do theology from the perspective of the under-dog, has theological criteria.

"Thinking black has to be radically tied to the originating event of the Christian faith in order to be theological. In fact, ultimately we can 'think black' only if we are bound to the originating event."¹⁴

- 11 Herzog is Professor of Systematic Theology at Duke University. I have selected him for presentation because he has been influenced by Barth and is a collaborator with Moltmann in developing a political theology. Herzog's work is an instance of the radical use of Barth. In a similar way, the work of the American black theologian James Cone could also have been cited as an instance of the 'radical Barthianism' approach to political theology.
- 12 Frederick Herzog, LIBERATION THEOLOGY (New York: The Seabury Press, 1972) p.10f.
- 13 Ibid., p.15.
- 14 Ibid.

Herzog argues that Barth has done most in modern theology to free the discipline from the ground of 'bourgeois self-analysis'.¹⁵ However, according to Herzog Barth has done his theology 'from a Swiss mountain top'.¹⁶ He works within his own cultural setting. Barth has, therefore, to be 'deculturated' if his theology is to be communicated to American audiences. This can only be achieved if Barth is read in relation to his own methodological principles. That is, he must be read critically in the light of the constitutive events for Christian faith.

"Liberation theology as distinct from liberal theology begins not with any question, but with Christ as the question. It presupposes a community that has experienced the liberating effect of the question."¹⁷

Insofar as Moltmann's theology is an attempt to draw all Christian theology out of its own subject matter, and thus to make it eschatological and dialectical, it follows along the path marked out by Barth. While taking this path, however, Moltmann enters into critical debate with Barth.

"Remarkably, I see the critical limitation of Barth in the fact that he still thinks too theologically, and that his approach is not sufficiently trinitarian."¹⁸

15 'Bourgeois self-analysis' is Herzog's description of the starting point used in liberal theology. Ibid., p.12.

16 This is a phrase Herzog often used in talking about Barth; I am not aware of this phrase having been used in any of Herzog's published writings, however.

17 Ibid., p.16.

18 Moltmann, C.G., p.203.

Moltmann means by this that Barth has not completely freed his thinking from 'radical monotheism' or a metaphysical concept of God. The theology of the cross, as it is conceived by Moltmann, is the criticism of all philosophical monotheism.¹⁹

Barth identified the reconciliation of man with God in the completed event of Jesus Christ.²⁰ The eschatological future has significance as the revelation of the totality of reconciliation; that is, it discloses an event which is already completed. Moltmann, on the other hand, argues for a different view. For him, the future contains something other than the making known of a completed past event.²¹ Thus, the resurrection is seen as an anticipation of a coming, future reconciliation in which God will be all in all. Reconciliation is, then, understood dialectically and eschatologically.²²

It has been noted that Moltmann accepts the methodological presuppositions laid down by Barth. He also accepts Barth's criticism of the Enlightenment humanism which is found in liberal theology.²³ However,

19 Ibid., p.215-216.

20 Cf. Karl Barth, CHURCH DOGMATICS, 4.1.
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1969)

21 Moltmann, C.G., p.184.

22 The details of this will be outlined in a later chapter. Moltmann sums up his position over against Barth on this matter in T.H., p.228.

23 See Moltmann's criticism of liberal theology in "Response to the Opening Presentation" in Ewert H. Cousins (Editor), HOPE AND THE FUTURE OF MAN (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972).

in a way which is not developed by Barth, Moltmann wants to share in the critical approach derived from the Enlightenment tradition.²⁴ The political theology of the cross demonstrates the radicality of this critical function by refusing to justify any political situation.²⁵ The major reason for this stance is Moltmann's understanding of the present in terms of the subject of eschatology. In the light of the future of Jesus, present political life is judged to be not yet the demonstration of the Kingdom of God. It is the task of the church to exist in a critical and restless relationship to society. Moltmann sums it up:

"Peace with God means conflict with the world,
for the goad of the promised future stabs
inexorably into the flesh of every unfulfilled
present."²⁶

Barth clearly recognised that the gospel should not be viewed in a non-political way.²⁷ Moltmann and others have acknowledged Barth's contribution.²⁸ However, both Moltmann and Barth see the matter quite

24 See Jürgen Moltmann, "The Revolution of Freedom" in Jürgen Moltmann, RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1969).

25 Moltmann, C.G., p.327, and Moltmann, "The Cross and Civil Religion."

26 Moltmann, T.H., p.21.

27 Karl Barth, "The Christian Community and the Civil Community" in Karl Barth, AGAINST THE STREAM (Edited, R. G. Smith) (London: S.C.M. Press, 1954), and Karl Barth, COMMUNITY, STATE AND CHURCH (Glouster, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1968).

28 Moltmann, "The Cross and Civil Religion," pp. 15 and 32. See also Joseph Bettis, "Political Theology and Social Ethics: The Socialist Humanism of Karl Barth," SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY Vol.27. No.3. (August, 1974), and Gerald A. Butler, "Karl Barth and Political Theology," SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY Vol.27. No.4. (November, 1974).

differently. The fact that God has, in Christ, reconciled the world to himself means, for Barth, that Christ is Lord of the world as well as Lord of the church. Although this reconciliation is not yet visible, socio-political reality must be taken seriously. The problem for Barth is how to relate reconciliation to socio-political reality. He solves this problem by the use of analogies.²⁹ There is a qualitative distinction between faith and politics, but a bridge can be built by analogy, thereby introducing faith into politics. Existing reality can reflect the Kingdom of God, though tangentially and inexactly, through the church's developing ethical principles as guideposts for socio-political action. Barth insists that these guideposts must be seen in a fluid and critical way for fear that they might become static rules and be used to justify a political programme. In this way Barth developed a theology of socio-political reality and the relationship between faith and political life.

Moltmann, on the other hand, regards that to which the church points as anticipations and promises of free society rather than as parables of what is perfect.

"The identity and difference of God and man, of Kingdom of God and the history of liberation, would then be associated dialectically."³⁰

Moltmann argues that we should not begin from the notion of a completed reality forcing a qualitative distinction between the Christian and the

29 See Barth, "The Christian Community and the Civil Community."

30 Moltmann, C.G., p.321.

civil communities, but

"from the start understand God in the world,
the beyond in the this-worldly, the universal
in the concrete and eschatology in the historical,
in order to arrive at a political hermeneutics of
the crucified Christ and a theology of real
liberations."³¹

Generally the influence of Barth runs through Moltmann's thinking,
not least in the approach to methodology. However, Barth's understanding
of the relationship between church and civil society is contested by
Moltmann and this marks the difference between Barth's theology of
socio-political reality and Moltmann's political theology.

Moltmann, *C.C.*, p.130, Note 1.

Johannes B. Metz, *THEOLOGY OF THE WORLD* (London:
Burns & Oates/Herder & Herder, 1969).
Johannes B. Metz, "Prophetic Authority," in *RELIGION AND
POLITICAL SOCIETY*. Johannes B. Metz, "The Future
Ex Memoria Passionis," in Cousins, *HOPE AND THE FUTURE
OF MAN: Cousins Converses, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION*.
London: A.C.W. Press, 1974). Gustavo Gutierrez,
TRAJES OF LIBERATION AND CHRISTIAN FAITH (San Antonio,
Texas: Mexican American Cultural Center, 1976).
For a summary, see Monica Hellwig, "Liberation Theology:
An Emerging School," *SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY*
Vol.30, No.2, Church, 1977.

Moltmann, *C.C.*, p.5.

Gutierrez, *A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION*, pp.292 and 293
respectively. Gutierrez's comments on Moltmann are with
reference to the latter's earlier work, before publication of
THE CRUCIFIED GOD.

Metz, *THEOLOGY OF THE WORLD*, p.103 and

31 Ibid. See also Moltmann, "Toward a Political Hermeneutic of the
Gospel," in RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE.

(b) Roman Catholic Political and Liberation Theology

Moltmann notes that his political theology is developed in dialogue with the idea of a theology of liberation.³² With respect to Roman Catholic theology, this theology can be sketched through an examination of the work of J. B. Metz and Gustavo Gutierrez.³³ Moltmann has identified his programme of political theology with Metz's work,³⁴ while Gutierrez has attempted to think through the notion of liberation theology in Latin America in critical dialogue with both Metz and Moltmann.³⁵

For Metz, modern theology must work in the context provided by the Enlightenment.³⁶ With the Enlightenment, the unity of religion and

32 Moltmann, C.G., p.338. Note 1.

33 Johannes B. Metz, THEOLOGY OF THE WORLD (London: Burns & Oates/Herder & Herder, 1969).
Johannes B. Metz, "Prophetic Authority," in RELIGION AND POLITICAL SOCIETY. Johannes B. Metz, "The Future Ex Memoria Passionis," in Cousins, HOPE AND THE FUTURE OF MAN. Gustavo Gutierrez, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION (London: S.C.M. Press, 1974). Gustavo Gutierrez, PRAXIS OF LIBERATION AND CHRISTIAN FAITH (San Antonio, Texas: Mexican American Cultural Center, 1976).
For a summary, see Monika Hellwig, "Liberation Theology: An Emerging School." SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY Vol.30, No.2, (March, 1977).

34 Moltmann, C.G., p.5.

35 Gutierrez, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION, pp.216f and 220f respectively. Gutierrez's comments on Moltmann are with reference to the latter's earlier work, before publication of THE CRUCIFIED GOD.

36 Metz, THEOLOGY OF THE WORLD, p.108f and Metz, "Prophetic Authority" p.179f.

society was shattered, and Christianity came to be seen as one phenomenon amongst others. Christian faith was no longer understood to have universal applicability or be unquestionably true. Christian theology, in the face of this attack on the status of Christianity, failed to respond by thinking through the changed situation between religion and society. Theology continued to think in terms of the old unity between religion and society which had been superseded. According to Metz, this failure on the part of theology was not unconscious. Theology reacted to the changed situation, but in such a way that Christian faith was not brought into critical discussion with it.

"It did not pass through the Enlightenment, but jumped over it and thought thus to be done with it. The religious consciousness formed by this theology attributes but a shadowy existence to the socio-political reality. The categories most prominent in this theology are the categories of the intimate, the private, the apolitical sphere."³⁷

According to Metz's analysis we are confronted, in modern theology, by a theology which has failed to appreciate the new way in which the world both understands itself and Christianity. The self-understanding of the church has developed in isolation from the modern history of freedom (Freiheitsgeschichte).³⁸ The theological form which this self-understanding has taken is

"a theology of transcendental, existential personalist orientation."³⁹

This predominant theological orientation displays one vital characteristic: a trend towards the private.

37 Metz, THEOLOGY OF THE WORLD, p.109.

38 Metz explains the notion of 'Freiheitsgeschichte' in "Prophetic Authority."

39 See Metz, THEOLOGY OF THE WORLD, p.109. where he outlines briefly what he intends by these terms.

When the church fails to face up to the world's new self-understanding, and instead privatises its belief and activity, it is in danger of becoming a sect. Metz means this theologically rather than sociologically or psychologically. In this context, sect describes the theological mentality of the church rather than an identifiable scientific status. The consequence of theological sectarianism in the church is loss of identity.⁴⁰ The reason for this lies with the fact that the church is constituted by Christ claiming the 'unlike' as his own.

"The orientation to the 'foreign' does not enter the church as an afterthought. It is an element of its very constitution; it belongs to the Church's specific essence."⁴¹

Engagement with the world's self-understanding, therefore, is an essential component of being the church.

From this analysis, Metz marks out two considerations: one, reflecting on the meaning and task of political theology, and the other, investigating the relations between the church and the world in the light of it.

Political theology functions as a critical corrective to modern theology, and

"the deprivatizing of theology is the primary critical task of political theology."⁴²

Political theology, then, in its negative task, enters into dispute with the privatising tendency in present-day theology. The positive task of political

40 Metz, "Prophetic Authority," p.195f.

41 Ibid., p.196.

42 Metz, THEOLOGY OF THE WORLD, p.110.

theology is to explore anew

"the relation between church and societal
'publicness,' between eschatological
faith and societal life."⁴³

Commenting on this task, Metz argues that theology must relate to
social practice if it is not to be left at a 'pre-critical' stage.⁴⁴

"More and more, practical political reason
will be the centre of the classical discussion
of the relation between fides and ratio,
and the problem of the responsibility of
faith will find the key to its solution again,
in practical public reason."⁴⁵

Metz insists that the essential relation between eschatological
faith and societal action is part of the biblical tradition.⁴⁶ The goal
of Christian faith is not private salvation but public witness to the
public scandal of the cross.

"Political theology seeks to make contemporary
theologians aware that a trial is pending between
the eschatological message of Jesus and the
socio-political reality. It insists on the permanent
relation to the world inherent in the salvation merited
by Jesus, a relation not to be understood in a
natural-cosmological but in a socio-political
sense."⁴⁷

It is impossible to remain faithful to biblical faith and also privatise
the gospel.

In the light of this political theology, the world must be seen as
a socio-historical reality.⁴⁸ That is, the world is demystified and released

43 Ibid., p.111.

44 Metz does not fully clarify the meaning of the term 'pre-critical.' What
he seems to mean is that there should not be an a priori identification
of eschatological faith with societal life. Metz seeks a new determination
of the relationship between Christian faith and society. Ibid., p.111.

45. Ibid., p.112.

46. Ibid., p.113.

47. Ibid., p.114.

48 Ibid., p.115.

from cosmological considerations which see it as pregnant with deity.

As an historical reality, the world and its structures can be seen critically in the light of God's eschatological proviso.⁴⁹ This means, practically,

49 The eschatological proviso is an important concept for Metz. It

"makes every historically real status of society appear to be provisional."

Ibid., p.114.

This does not imply invalidity in the present conditions of society; it does not impose a negative judgment, but a critical judgment. Metz elsewhere develops the basis for eschatological judgment of present reality by means of the memory of suffering. Metz, "The Future Ex Memoria Passionis." There is a parallel between Metz's concept of the memory of suffering and Moltmann's concept of the memory of the cross.

For the sake of clarity, a distinction should be made between eschatological Christianity and secular Christianity. By 'secularism,' as a theological category, is meant the 'de-divinisation' of the world, the freeing of the world from the ordered cosmology of Greek metaphysics. Christ, it is argued, is free for the world by being free from the deified power of the world. In Christ, the world is affirmed in its secularity as world. The world is allowed to be itself.

For a critical discussion of secular Christianity see R. Gregor Smith, SECULAR CHRISTIANITY (London: Collins, 1966). So-called secular Christianity is similar to critical eschatological Christianity in its affirmation of the worldliness of the world and the historicity of existence. But the two are to be distinguished in that for eschatological Christianity, it is the future which confirms the secularity of the world, while for secular Christianity it is the de-divinisation of the world by Christ who, as the man of faith, frees the world and confirms its secularity. For a sociological account of secularism, see Peter Berger, THE SACRED CANOPY (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., 1967). For an important theological statement of secular theology, see Harvey Cox, THE SECULAR CITY (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968).

Gustavo Gutierrez is a Peruvian priest. He has experience of post-graduate study in Europe.

For a sympathetic discussion of Gutierrez's theology and other Latin American liberation theology, see Jose Miguel Escobar, REVOLUTIONARY THEOLOGY COMES OF AGE (London: S.P.C.K., 1979).

Gutierrez, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION, p.133.

the criticism of absolute and totalitarian claims in the world by the eschatological message which proclaims the coming of the Kingdom of God. This Kingdom is not yet here, and its absence forces theology to reject all premature claims of its arrival. Metz can insist that

"every eschatological theology, therefore, must become a political theology, that is, a (socio-) critical theology."⁵⁰

Gutierrez, unlike Metz, is Latin American, though like Metz, he is Roman Catholic.⁵¹ A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION is an attempt to write a theology which is free from historical dualisms and which affirms the need to do theology in relation to the questions posed by the socio-political context. Firstly, Gutierrez argues that

"there are not two histories, one profane and one sacred, 'juxtaposed' or 'closely linked.' Rather there is only one human destiny, irreversibly assumed by Christ, the Lord of history. . . The history of salvation is the very heart of human history."

This history he calls a 'Christo-finalized' history.⁵² Gutierrez means by this that salvation is not something other-worldly. Salvation is an 'intrahistorical' reality. To support his contention Gutierrez develops, firstly, a link between salvation and creation, and, secondly, a link between eschatology and history. The first link is derived from the

50 Metz, THEOLOGY OF THE WORLD. p.115.

51 Gustavo Gutierrez is a Peruvian priest. He has experience of post-graduate study in Europe. For a sympathetic discussion of Gutierrez's theology and other Latin American liberation theology, see Jose Miguez Bonino, REVOLUTIONARY THEOLOGY COMES OF AGE (London: S.P.C.K., 1975).

52 Gutierrez, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION. p.153.

historical and liberating experience of the Exodus which indicates that God saves in history.

"Creation and liberation from Egypt are but one salvific act."⁵³

In this act Yahweh inaugurates Israel's history,

"a history which is re-creation."⁵⁴

The work of Christ is also considered by Gutierrez to be a new creation, and like the old creation, it is an event of liberation. The second link is derived from a consideration of the eschatological promises of God.⁵⁵

"The Promise orientates all history towards the future and thus puts all revelation in an eschatological perspective. Human history is in truth nothing but the history of the slow, uncertain, and surprising fulfillment of the Promise."⁵⁶

In the light of this argument, Gutierrez concludes that salvation in Christ is a part of the historical current of humanity.

Secondly, Gutierrez argues that there is a need to do theology in relation to the process by which the world is transformed.

"To speak about a theology of liberation is to seek an answer to the following question: what relation is there between salvation and the historical process of the liberation of man?"⁵⁷

His disavowal of historical dualism becomes concrete when theology finds its point of departure in the

"questions posed by the social praxis of liberation."⁵⁸

53 Ibid., p.155.

54 Ibid., p.157-158.

55 Ibid., p.160f.

56 Ibid., p.160.

57 Ibid., p.45.

58 Ibid., p.143.

These questions only emerge through socio-political analysis, and the analysis which Gutierrez favours, though not uncritically, is supplied by Marx. This can be indicated if we look at Gutierrez's remarks on the class struggle.

"The class struggle is a fact, and neutrality in this matter is impossible."⁵⁹

Conscious participation in the class struggle is mandatory if a just society is to be built. To deny its existence

"is really to put oneself on the side of the dominant sectors."⁶⁰

Christian love and brotherhood in the light of this class struggle is

"only an abstraction unless it becomes concrete history, process, conflict; it is arrived at only through particularity."⁶¹

Liberation theology is

"a theology which does not stop with reflecting on the world, but rather tries to be part of the process through which the world is transformed. It is a theology which is open – in the protest against trampled human dignity, in the struggle against the plunder of the vast majority of the people, in liberating love, and in the building of a new, just, and fraternal society – to the gift of the Kingdom of God."⁶²

The task of theology is, then, the liberation of man within history.

59 Ibid., p.273.

60 Ibid., p.275.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid., p.15.

These remarks on Metz and Gutierrez are not intended to be complete summaries of their theologies. The purpose has been to give the general flavour of the Roman Catholic contribution to the field. When these contributions are deemed useful to the exposition of Moltmann's political theology they will be employed. Certainly it is clear that Moltmann's programme is part of an ecumenical theological concern, and ought not to be considered apart from the work of his co-explorers in the field of political and liberation theology.

The Marxist-Christian dialogue began in recent times with the publication of Roger Garaudy's book, FROM ANATHEMA TO DIALOGUE.⁶⁵ In this book Garaudy argues from the Marxist side for an open dialogue between Marxists and Christians. V. Garavsky, in his book GOD IS NOT YET DEAD, suggests that Marxists have much to learn from Christians.⁶⁶ From the Christian side, Moltmann and Gutierrez are not untypical of Christian theologians who find much of value in Marx.

65 Cf. Jose Niguez Bonino, CHRISTIANS AND MARXISTS (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1970); Elio Sclero, REVOLUTIONARY THEOLOGY COMES OF AGE; Eudem Alves, A THEOLOGY OF HUMAN LIFE (St. Meinrad, Indiana: Abbey Press, 1972); Leo J. J. van den Berg, THE LIBERATION OF THEOLOGY (London: Gill & Macmillan, 1977).

66 Moltmann, "The Revolution of Freedom's Hope," THEOLOGY OF THE WORLD. For the lack of such references, I refer to LIBERATION THEOLOGY.

Roger Garaudy, FROM ANATHEMA TO DIALOGUE (London: Collins, 1967).

67 V. Garavsky, GOD IS NOT YET DEAD (Hampdenworth, England: Penguin Books, 1973).

(c) The Marxist-Christian Dialogue

The dialogue between Christians and Marxists is important background in most texts on political and liberation theology. Gutierrez, it was noted, utilises Marxist analysis of society as an aspect in theological methodology, and in this respect his theology is typical of most Latin American liberation theology.⁶³ And Moltmann, as will be noted in detail later in the presentation, finds material in Marxism which is helpful in the construction of political theology.⁶⁴

The Marxist-Christian dialogue began in recent times with the publication of Roger Garaudy's book, FROM ANATHEMA TO DIALOGUE.⁶⁵ In this book Garaudy argues from the Marxist side for an open dialogue between Marxists and Christians. V. Gardavsky, in his book GOD IS NOT YET DEAD, suggests that Marxists have much to learn from Christians.⁶⁶ From the Christian side, Moltmann and Gutierrez are not untypical of Christian theologians who find much of value in Marx.

63 Cf. Jose Miguez Bonino, CHRISTIANS AND MARXISTS (London: Hodder ' Stroughton, 1976); Bonino, REVOLUTIONARY THEOLOGY COMES OF AGE; Rubem Alves, A THEOLOGY OF HUMAN HOPE (St. Meinrod, Indiana: Abbey Press, 1972); Juan Luis Segundo, THE LIBERATION OF THEOLOGY (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1977).

64 Moltmann, "The Revolution of Freedom": Metz, THEOLOGY OF THE WORLD. For the lack of such reference, see Herzog, LIBERATION THEOLOGY.

65 Roger Garaudy, FROM ANATHEMA TO DIALOGUE (London: Collins, 1967).

66 V. Garavsky, GOD IS NOT YET DEAD (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1973).

In fact, Moltmann often takes over Marxist terminology in order to develop his political theology.⁶⁷ The influence of Marx can also be seen in Moltmann's advocacy of praxis as the criterion of truth.⁶⁸ It would be wrong to give the impression that Moltmann is a Marxist or that his appropriation of Marx is of an uncritical kind. Throughout his writings, and those of other political and liberation theologians, there is continual critical discussion of Marx.⁶⁹ But Marxism, in one form or another, is constantly in view. Political theology in general has advanced the Marxist-Christian dialogue, and is in some measure building upon it.

According to Bloch,⁷³ the essence of religion is hope, and hope is grounded in the difference between what is and what is not yet. There is a dichotomy between present appearance and nonpresent essence. Hope is not grounded in a psychological state; it is not wishful thinking or projection.⁷⁴ Rather, hope is grounded in the ontic difference between

70 Jürgen Moltmann, "Hope and Confidence" in RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE; "Eternal Bloch and Hope without Faith" in THE EXPERIMENT HOPE (London: S.C.M., 1975); "Introduction" by Jürgen Moltmann to Ernst Bloch, MAN ON HIS OWN, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1970); and Wolfhart Pannenberg, "The God of Hope" in BASIC QUESTIONS IN THEOLOGY, Vol. 7 (London: S.C.M., 1977).

67 Cf. Moltmann, "The Revolution of Freedom"; "Towards a Political Hermeneutic of the Gospel."

68 "The new criterion of theology and of faith is to be found in praxis." Jürgen Moltmann, "God in Revolution" in RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE, p.138.

69 Cf. Jürgen Moltmann, MAN (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), p.47f and Gutierrez, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION, p.30.

73 In this way Bloch distinguishes himself from Feuerbach. See Moltmann, "Hope and Confidence," p.149f.

(d) Ernst Bloch

The contemporary theology which has emerged out of the recovery of the centrality of eschatology owes a considerable debt to the philosophy of Ernst Bloch.⁷⁰ Wolfhart Pannenberg notes that Bloch has given theology

"the courage to recover in the full sense its central category of eschatology."⁷¹

And from Bloch, Moltmann derived a vocabulary and conceptuality which is a feature of the THEOLOGY OF HOPE.⁷²

According to Bloch,⁷³ the essence of religion is hope, and hope is grounded in the difference between what is and what is not yet. There is a dichotomy between present appearance and nonpresent essence. Hope is not grounded in a psychological state: it is not wishful thinking or projection.⁷⁴ Rather, hope is grounded in the ontic difference between

70 Jorgen Moltmann, "Hope and Confidence" in RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE; "Ernst Bloch and Hope Without Faith" in THE EXPERIMENT HOPE (London: S.C.M., 1975); "Introduction" by Jorgen Moltmann to Ernst Bloch, MAN ON HIS OWN, (New York: Herder & Herder, 1970); and Wolfhart Pannenberg, "The God of Hope" in BASIC QUESTIONS IN THEOLOGY, Vol.2 (London: S.C.M., 1971).

71 Pannenberg, "The God of Hope," p.238.

72 Cf. Jorgen Moltmann, "Theology as Eschatology" in F. Herzog (Ed.), THE FUTURE OF HOPE (New York: Herder & Herder, 1970). For an account of the influence of Bloch on Moltmann see M. D. Meeks, ORIGINS OF THE THEOLOGY OF HOPE, pp.16-19 and 80-89.

73 For a brief biographical appraisal of Bloch, see "Introduction" by J. Moltmann to E. Bloch, MAN ON HIS OWN. Bloch's major works are not translated into English.

74 In this way Bloch distinguishes himself from Feuerbach. See Moltmann, "Hope and Confidence," p.149f.

the present and the future. This means that man is not fully present to himself. To be human is to be on the way to being something new.⁷⁵

The essence of man lies ahead of him. It is not yet. In discussing Bloch's ontology, Pannenberg talks of the 'ontological priority of the future'.⁷⁶ The focus of hope, or religion, is, therefore, the open possibilities of the future.

What does Bloch say of this future? He calls it an 'open space': it transcends all the images which seek to fill it.

"It is the still open and unattained depth of man and the world, into which all hope's images reach out. . . . It is the realm that keeps moving ahead; ever and again uncomprehended and eluding our grasp, it is the open realm that beckons and excites."⁷⁷

This future contains the open possibility of attained or frustrated identity. Attained identity (or the 'home of identity') can only occur if there is a

"permanent transcending of present conditions and achievements through an orientation toward the objects of hope which promise a 'home of identity' for all who are now suffering, laboring, and open to the future."⁷⁸

The 'home of identity' cannot simply be identified with Marx's utopian future. It is not the conclusion of an immanent process. Although the relations of production may be changed, the very force of negativity still

75 It can be summed up in the equation 'S is not yet P'.
See Harvey Cox, "Forward" to E. Bloch, MAN ON HIS OWN, p.9.

76 Pannenberg, "The God of Hope", p.241.

77 Moltmann, "Hope and Confidence," p.157.

78 Moltmann, "Ernst Bloch and Hope Without Faith," p.30.

remains to be dealt with and it reveals itself ever anew. The negative

"no longer encounters us in identifiable form as hunger, misery, and injustice, but in the intangible form of boredom, of life at the ebb, and of feelings of absurdity."⁷⁹

Consequently, structural change in society does not yet allow man to find himself. He remains Homo absconditus, though in an unheard-of radicality. Not all hopes, for Bloch, turn to Marx for their realisation.

The future, where the contradiction between presence and essence ceases, has to overcome death and subsequent non-entity. In dealing with the issue of hope in relation to death Bloch arrives at the core of existence which he believes is 'extra-territorial' towards death. Hope ultimately cannot be confounded by death because human existence has not yet fully arrived. The essence of man, which is not yet present, cannot be subject to death. Death cannot defeat the 'not-yet-alive.'

Insofar as religion is hope, what is to prevent Christianity from being swallowed up by the principle of hope? In trying to face up to this question Moltmann pushes Bloch to the point where the philosophy of hope and Christianity become incompatible. Moltmann asks whether the concept of the extra-territoriality of life takes seriously enough the deadliness of death.⁸⁰ The ultimate negative, death, must be overcome

79 Moltmann, "Hope and Confidence," p.162. The future is not achieved through economic and class management alone. Other factors remain to be changed. For a similar critique of Marxist-Leninism see Erich Fromm, THE SANE SOCIETY (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), and Herbert Marcuse, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

80 Moltmann, "Ernst Bloch and Hope Without Faith," p.364.

if hope is to be other than an empty notion which is finally confounded. The extra-territoriality of life is meaningless in the face of lack of existence. For Moltmann, hope must find a ground which creates out of nothing, an 'impossible' event which guarantees the future and overcomes death. This ground is not given through philosophical speculations, but by the resurrection of the crucified Christ.

Although in the final analysis Moltmann distinguishes himself from Bloch's conclusions, we do find him appropriating some of the vocabulary and conceptual framework of the philosophy of hope. The development of eschatology as the medium of Christian faith as such, with the emphasis on the future as the embodiment of something new, shows an appreciation of Bloch's conceptual framework. There is a similar employment of Blochian categories in Moltmann's doctrine of God.⁸¹ In the idea of God's eschatological being, of thinking of the future as the mode of God's being, Moltmann stretches the framework of Bloch's ontology to give it an eschatological grounding in Christ. The resurrection of Jesus, as the promise of the parousia, gives us the basis for talk about the being of God. In this way, Moltmann tries to ground his talk of God in God's own revealed nature in Christ, and not in any reality which is foreign to it. We cannot say that Moltmann has 'Christianised' Bloch or fitted Bloch into Christian theology. Rather he has employed the formal categories supplied by Bloch in order to describe the thorough-going eschatology which he believes to be the Bible's message about God.

81 Cf. Moltmann, "Theology as Eschatology."

Meeks considers that Moltmann's view of knowledge as the anticipation of the not-yet-realized

"is the single most important contribution of Bloch to Moltmann's thought. It was here that Moltmann appropriated the categories for defining faith principally in terms of hope."⁸²

That which is not yet can only be known as an object of hope. It is a hoping knowing, the marks of which are anticipation, signs, and symbols which point the knower to a new future reality. Knowledge of God is

"an anticipatory knowledge of the future of God, a knowledge of the faithfulness of God which is upheld by the hopes that are called to life by his promises. Knowledge of God is then a knowledge that draws us onwards – not upwards – into situations that are not yet finalized but still outstanding."⁸³

When we come to outline in more detail Moltmann's political theology, we shall make specific reference to Bloch where it contributes to the understanding of the account. In this section we have merely indicated the general nature of Moltmann's appreciation of Bloch and shown aspects of his indebtedness to him.

82 Meeks, ORIGINS OF THE THEOLOGY OF HOPE, p.87.

83 Moltmann, THEOLOGY OF HOPE, p.118.

Chapter 7

The Theological Basis of Moltmann's Political Theology:

The Eschatology of the Cross

1. Eschatology

- (a) The Context of Moltmann's Statement on Eschatology
- (b) The Necessity for Eschatology
- (c) Eschatology and Promise
- (d) Eschatology and the Resurrection of Jesus

2. The Cross

- (a) The Context of Moltmann's Theology of the Cross
- (b) The Centrality of the Cross
- (c) Jesus and His Cross
 - (i) The Theological History of Jesus
 - (ii) The Historical Eschatology of Jesus

3. The Eschatology of the Cross

- (a) The Eschatology of the Cross and the Doctrine of God
- (b) The Eschatology of the Cross and the Christian Understanding of History
- (c) The Eschatology of the Cross and the Christian Understanding of Man

¹ Jürgen Moltmann, "Introduction to the THEOLOGY OF HOPE," in Moltmann, THE EXPERIMENT HOPE (Grand Rapids: E.C.M. Press, 1975), p.44; Moltmann, "Hope and the Eschatological Future of Man" in E. R. Conrad (ed.), HOPE AND THE FUTURE OF MAN (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1973), p.94. And Moltmann, C.Q., p.2.

The presentation will proceed in the following way:

firstly, there shall be an account of the eschatology developed by Moltmann; secondly, the nature of his theology of the cross will be described; thirdly, the dialectical nature of the eschatology of the cross with respect to the doctrines of God, history, and man will be indicated.

1. Eschatology

Eschatology is not one aspect of theological inquiry; rather it constitutes the theological essence of the Judeo-Christian tradition. As such, eschatology must penetrate all theological thinking.

(a) The Context of Moltmann's Statement on Eschatology

Moltmann's major statement on eschatology is contained in the THEOLOGY OF HOPE. It was first published in German in 1964, and in English in 1967. Its immediate historical context was the prevailing mood of hope and expectation which characterised the 1960's. People expected a future which would be better than the past. Technological expansion, inspired visions of an open future in lands where racism and oppression were being challenged and overcome, and the new approach to church and Christian life indicated by Vatican II and Geneva, drew people out of apathy and instilled hope for a new freedom.¹ In the context of the future-

1 Jürgen Moltmann, "Introduction to the THEOLOGY OF HOPE," in Moltmann, THE EXPERIMENT HOPE (London: S.C.M. Press, 1975), p.44; Moltmann, "Hope and the Biomedical Future of Man" in E. H. Cousins (Ed.), HOPE AND THE FUTURE OF MAN (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), p.90; and Moltmann, C.G., p.2.

oriented movements of hope, Moltmann believes that theology found itself with nothing significant to contribute. The theologies written since the end of the Second World War tried to adjust Christian thought to the prevailing scheme of things. Thus, Bultmann's programme of demythologising the New Testament, Gogarten's secular theology, and Altizer and Hamilton's 'death of God' theology sought to accommodate Christian theology to the modern world's understanding of itself. But these theologies forsook the possibility of criticising the times in which they lived.

Theology was unable to present a gospel which called into question ongoing assumptions in society. Theology found itself with little or no connection to the critical and liberative forces at work in the world. The church and theology lost their power to criticise and oppose. In Moltmann's words, Christianity found itself in a new 'Babylonian captivity'.²

But the theology of hope was not a theology which set out to reflect the 'signs of the times.' Rather, it took up and developed the modern history of freedom following the Reformation and medieval periods, and set it in the context of the originating events of the Bible's promissory history which called Judaism and Christianity into being.³ The theology of hope was primarily an

"interpretation of the biblical promissory history for the understanding of the present-day mission of Christianity in the world."⁴

2 Jürgen Moltmann, "New Frontiers of Christianity in Industrial Society" in Moltmann, RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND SOCIETY (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), p.117.

3 Jürgen Moltmann, "On Hope as an Experiment: a Postlude," in THE EXPERIMENT HOPE, p.187.

4 Moltmann, "Introduction to the THEOLOGY OF HOPE." p.45.

It was an attempt at a theological renewal which, on the basis of the promises of God, attacked the accommodating post-War theology.

The immediate theological context of the theology of hope was the discovery of the centrality of eschatology for understanding the message and mission of Jesus. This discovery had its beginning at the end of the nineteenth century in the work of Johannes Weiss and Albert Schweitzer.

"The recognition of the eschatological character of early Christianity made it clear that the automatically accepted idea of a harmonious synthesis between Christianity and culture was a lie."⁵

However, the effectiveness of the discovery of the centrality of eschatology was suppressed by a theological idealism which insisted upon abstract concepts of man and history. In 1921, Karl Barth asserted again the centrality of eschatology.⁶ Barth advocated a transcendental eschatology in which eternity breaks into time, bringing history to its final crisis. But Barth still considered eschatology in absolute and unhistorical terms. Eschatology did not break through into all the categories of theological thinking. Eschatology still referred to the final, closing events of history, and was not permitted to direct the theological task as such. The reason for this, according to Moltmann, lay in Barth's avowal of a Greek mode of thought

"which sees in the logos the epiphany of the eternal present of being and finds the truth in that."⁷

5 Moltmann, T.H., p.37.

6 Ibid., p.39.

7 Ibid., p.40.

What gave Moltmann the clue to develop a thorough-going eschatology was the concept of the promises of God.

The immediate philosophical context of the theology of hope lies in Moltmann's criticism of the Enlightenment view of history. The Enlightenment failed to comprehend the concepts of the new and the future in historical terms. Enlightenment approaches to history sought to control historical contingency by way of an ahistorical logos of history. History was seen as analogous to natural science, with general laws governing historical possibility and historical knowledge. These general laws, it was assumed, would assist in planning for the future and the avoidance of historical crisis and catastrophe.⁸ For Moltmann, history is not to be understood in terms of ahistorical, ideal concepts. History is to be understood from the history-creating event of the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Christian theology speaks of God historically, and of history eschatologically.⁹ The theology of hope is, therefore, an attack on the way in which we have come to understand historical existence. This attack reaches far into the contemporary self-understanding. Moltmann's view of history is a vital component of eschatological theology. It will receive more extensive analysis later.¹⁰

8 Ibid., p.232.

9 Moltmann, "Hope and History" in RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE, p.203.

10 Some other aspects of the context of Moltmann's theology are found in the introductory chapter on Moltmann's theology.

(b) The Necessity for Eschatology¹¹

Moltmann writes:

"The eschatological is not one element of Christianity but it is the medium of Christian faith as such, the key in which everything in it is set."¹²

It is the eschatological outlook which characterises all Christian proclamation, every Christian existence, and the church. This is so because Christianity's object of faith, Jesus Christ, forces upon us the problem of the future as the essential problem. All predicates of Christ not only say who he was and is, but imply further who he will be and what is to be expected from him. Believers are turned towards hope for his still outstanding future.¹³

"If we analyse the direction of the inquiry more carefully (in the New Testament), we find that it begins with the special, contingent history of Jesus Christ, the resurrection of the crucified and his Easter appearances, and aims at the universal deity of God. It inquires after the kingdom of God who raises the dead, on the basis of the appearances of the risen Christ. It inquires after the future of God and proclaims his coming, in proclaiming Christ. Christian theology begins with the eschatological problem."¹⁴

11 Due to the nature of Moltmann's theology, a certain amount of repetition and circling around the same issues is unavoidable.

The eschatological theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg has sometimes been associated with Moltmann's eschatological theology. This association is not developed in what follows. While it is true that both Moltmann and Pannenberg have tried to place eschatology into the centre of the theological stage, it is quite misleading to regard their work as similar. There is little agreement between them on the nature and task of theology. Differences will be pointed out where this is appropriate. And in no way can Pannenberg be considered to be a political theologian.

12 Moltmann, T.H., p.16.

13 Ibid., p.17.

14 Jürgen Moltmann, "Theology as Eschatology," in (F. Herzog, Ed.) THE FUTURE OF HOPE (New York: Herder & Herder, 1970). p.7.

Christian eschatology is neither an apocalyptic explanation of the world, nor is it the basis for a private illumination of existence. It is, rather, the horizon of expectation for a world-transforming initiative. Eschatological faith directs its attention to the promised new future which God will bring about, and places its hope in that. This future is an historical future. Following Ernst Käsemann, Moltmann asserts that the question of God in the Bible is placed on the ground of historical experience and, defined in temporal terms, it turns into the question of his coming.

"On the basis of the Christ event, Christian theology raises the question of God as the question of the future of God in which God will be God universally."¹⁵

In other words, Christian theology is

"historico-eschatological thinking about God between cross and parousia."¹⁶

The relationship which Moltmann sees obtaining between the cross and the parousia is dialectical. In Christ's death and resurrection eschatology became historical and history became eschatological. The meaning of the future is dialectically related to the cross, and so to contingent history. Thus, the resurrection is not solely an announcement of the future in general terms, but it gives meaning to the cross by grounding it eschatologically. Likewise, the cross gives meaning to the resurrection by grounding it historically and thereby provides the negativity of historical human existence with a new future. The theological basis for the dialectic between history and eschatology is given by the nature of Jesus' own identity in cross and resurrection.¹⁷ Insofar as Christian theology takes the events of Jesus' life, death, and resurrection as constitutive for its task, it must be thoroughly eschatological, and this eschatology must be historical.

15 Moltmann, "Hope and History," p.207.

16 Ibid.

17 Moltmann, T.H., p.85 and p.200. The dialectical identity of Jesus will be discussed more fully later in this chapter.

(c) Eschatology and Promise

The theological understanding of Jesus in the New Testament is, according to Moltmann, developed in the light of the promissory history of Israel. Moltmann's theology as eschatology is based on the Old and New Testament experience of the revelation of God which is in the form of promise and in the history which is marked with promise.

For Moltmann, revelation has

"constitutively and basically the character of promise and is therefore of an eschatological kind."¹⁸

A promise announces a reality which is coming, and which does not exist at present. If in revelation we have to do with God revealing himself in his promises, we are forced to see eschatology as a necessary correlate. Eschatology, in this case, cannot be relegated to the end of dogmatic inquiry, but it is implied at the beginning by the nature of revelation and our knowledge of God. Eschatology is not, however, mere speech about the future. Because knowledge of God begins from a definite reality in history through which God announces his promise, a future is called into being which is the future of that promise. Promise, history, and future are theologically bound up together.

18 Ibid., p.85.

'Promise' is a central category in Reformed theology. For example, Calvin's definition of a sacrament is of a sign given to confirm a promise. It should be noted that Moltmann is Reformed rather than Lutheran.

The revelation of God cannot be placed into categories which are derived from a prior ontology.¹⁹ From Gerhard von Rad, Moltmann learned that revelation creates its own categories. The divinity of God is known by way of the concrete historical events in which God appears to particular men in time and space. The formal principle of revelation moves from the particular to the general, from the concrete to the universal. According to von Rad, the revelation of God is constituted by the uttering of the word of promise. It is a declaration which announces the coming of a new reality, binding the receiver and the giver of the promise to the future.²⁰ The promise is not fulfilled in the uttering of it; the promise, rather, stands in contradiction to present reality. It creates what Moltmann calls an 'interval of tension' between its utterance and its redemption.²¹ The promises of God were not fulfilled within Israel's history. In fact, Israel's experience of history gave the promises of God an ever wider interpretation. Especially in the prophetic period, the conviction grew that God was creating a new time and future for Israel. The categories of the new and the future became determinative for Israel's self-understanding. The prophets of Israel eschatologised Israel's hopes. Citing von Rad, Moltmann notes that

19 Moltmann is critical of the discussion of revelation by Barth, Bultmann and Pannenberg. Cf. Moltmann, T.H., p.45f. and Moltmann, "The Revelation of God and the Question of Truth" in Moltmann, HOPE AND PLANNING (London: S.C.M. Press, 1971).

20 Moltmann, T.H., p.103.

21 Ibid., p.104.

"the prophetic teaching is only eschatological when the prophets expelled Israel from the safety of the old saving action and suddenly shifted the basis of salvation to a future action of God."²²

Israel's past history came to be seen in the light of a future and expected action of God.

The prophetic message which pulled Israel's attention away from the old redemptive acts and towards hope in the future saving actions of God arose out of political and military failures. These failures were seen as the judgment of God on his apostate people. The nations which attacked Israel were viewed as the instruments of God's justice, and so they came to be included into Israel's understanding of God's salvific plan.

"On its political deathbed Israel brings the nations, as it were, into the hands of its God and into his future. By this very means Yahweh's threats and promises for the future are set free from their restriction to the one specific people and its particular future in history, and become eschatological."²³

The God of Israel came to be seen as the God of all the nations: an eschatology centred in Israel is replaced by a universal eschatology into which all peoples and nations are called. This new experience for Israel forced a theological reorientation. The judging God became the God who saves in the future. The hope for the future rested on the activity of God in overcoming the negative aspects of life, including death. In this way,

²² Ibid., p.128.

²³ Ibid., p.129.

the promised future of God is intensified and universalised, thereby becoming truly eschatological.

The New Testament understands the God who reveals himself in Jesus Christ to be the same as he who is the new hope of Israel. Jesus was a Jew, and not a particular case of human being in general. He must, therefore, be understood in relation to the Old Testament history of promise, and in conflict with it.²⁴ According to Moltmann, access can only be gained to the meaning of the New Testament if we proceed in the light of the promissory history which constitutes the message of the Old Testament.

In the New Testament, God is described as the 'God of promise.' The life, work, death, and resurrection of Jesus have the character of expectation appropriate to the God of promise. But Moltmann contends that a new dimension to promise has entered in with Jesus. He announces not merely continuity with the past, but points to himself as the new basis for hope in the future. The Old Testament history of promise is not negated. It is, rather, taken up and given breadth and depth.

"The gospel has its unabrogable presupposition in the Old Testament history of promise. In the gospel the Old Testament history of promise finds more than a fulfilment which does away with it; it finds its future."²⁵

24 Ibid., p.142.

25 Ibid., p.147.

Hope focuses on the future of Christ and the promises of God take on the form of gospel. The movement of thought is from the Old Testament promissory history to the history initiated by the resurrection of Jesus. With this latter event the messianic hope for promissory fulfilment, which was the basis for Israel's hope, is concretised and actualised in Jesus Christ.

identity is thereby a dialectical identity, known through his life on earth and his resurrected being. When Rahmann speaks of the resurrection of Jesus, he means the resurrection of the crucified Jesus whose identity is given in terms of the contradiction between death and resurrection. The relationship between his death and the resurrection is dialectical.²⁶

If it is correct to regard the resurrection of Jesus as being in dialectical relation to his death, we are forced to look in the resurrection for the future of history. Rahmann writes:

"If, as the Easter story implies, Jesus identified himself, his judgment and his solidarity with the crucified Jesus, his own helplessness, then conversely the crucifixion of the crucified Jesus into the resurrection of God contains within itself the promise of the incarnation of the coming God and his death in the crucified Jesus."²⁷

A new future for history, a qualitatively different one which no longer

26 *Ibid.*, p.163.

27 *Ibid.*, p.163.

28 Rahmann, *C.G.*, p.163.

(d) Eschatology and the Resurrection of Jesus

New Testament faith starts a priori with the resurrection of Jesus Christ.²⁶ But the risen Christ is also the crucified Jesus. For Moltmann, therefore, the identity of Jesus between his cross and his resurrection reveals the faithfulness of God, and his solidarity with and affirmative judgment on the life and death of Jesus. Jesus' identity is thereby a dialectical identity, incorporating his life on earth and his resurrected being. When Moltmann talks of the resurrection of Jesus he means the resurrection of the crucified Jesus whose identity is given in terms of the contradiction between cross and resurrection. The relationship between the cross and the resurrection is dialectical.²⁷

If it is correct to regard the resurrection of Jesus as being in dialectical relation to his death, we are forced to see in the resurrection the future of history. Moltmann writes:

"If, as the Easter vision implies, God has identified himself, his judgment and his kingdom with the crucified Jesus, his cross and his helplessness, then conversely the resurrection of the crucified Jesus into the coming glory of God contains within itself the process of the incarnation of the coming God and his glory in the crucified Jesus."²⁸

A new future for history, a qualitatively different life which no longer

26 Ibid., p.165.

27 Ibid., p.168f.

28 Moltmann, C.G., p.169.

lives solely unto death, is announced. This announcement, however, is not in the 'language of facts' but in the 'language of promise.'²⁹ It is an announcement of divine righteousness which is particularised in the history of Jesus.

Moltmann regards the resurrection of Jesus as a history-creating event. It demands a future in which what happened to Jesus will happen to us. This conclusion arises out of the nature of the resurrection itself. If the resurrection is inquired about on the basis of a prior understanding of what is historically possible, its essential meaning can never be grasped. Any prior concept of history has logically been derived from the experiences of history which have not included resurrections from the dead.³⁰ The resurrection of Jesus is a totally different type of event from all other events in history. History, as such, can make no judgment about the resurrection other than to find it incomprehensible.

"The resurrection of Christ does not mean a possibility within the world and its history, but a new possibility altogether for the world, for existence and for history. . . . By the raising of Christ we do not mean a possible process in world history, but the eschatological process to which world history is subjected." ³¹

Christian theology is required, therefore, to construct its own understanding of history, with the resurrection of the crucified Jesus as the

29 Ibid., p.173, and Moltmann, T.H., p.190.

30 Moltmann, T.H., p.174.

31 Ibid., p.179-180.

definitive element.

"The raising of Christ is then to be called 'historic,' not because it took place in the history to which other categories of some sort provide a key, but it is to be called historic because, by pointing the way for future events, it makes history in which we can and must live. It is historic, because it discloses an eschatological future."³²

Moltmann argues that the resurrection narratives of the New Testament have to be read in the context of the promissory history of Israel. These narratives do not point back to this history, however, but take it up into Christ's future, thereby giving this history new meaning.³³ Fellowship with Christ replaces obedience to the Torah and life under the Law. The new basis for eschatological hope is found in the 'inner tendency' of the resurrection,³⁴ in that particular future to which it points. But this future cannot be known directly. It is known only in anticipation. Knowledge is 'knowledge in hope,' and as such it is provisional and prospective, illuminated solely by the promise of the righteousness of God, the promise of life as a result of resurrection from the dead, and the promise of the kingdom of God in a new totality of being.³⁵

Unlike the eschatology of Israel, Christian eschatology tells of Christ and his future. Like the eschatology of Israel, Christian

32 Ibid., p.181.

33 Ibid., p.193.

34 'Inner tendency' is Moltmann's own phrase, Cf. Ibid., p.194.

35 Ibid., p.203.

eschatology speaks the language of promise and understands its history in the light of the future which the promise demands. For both, the promise of God creates mission,³⁶ because the present reality stands in contradiction to the unrealised, but coming, future. For as long as the experience of history is not yet the experience of the presence of God and his kingdom in a direct way, hope remains unreconciled to the present, and presses forward in active expectation for its coming fulfilment. The present historical sign of hope for Christians remains the cross of Jesus. The dialectic between the cross and the resurrection of Jesus demands an eschatology of the cross. Ultimately, as will be shown later in this chapter, this becomes political theology. If the resurrection is understood in this historical and eschatological way, the future righteousness of God means that the executioners will not finally triumph over their victims, nor will the victims triumph over their executioners.³⁷

36 Moltmann calls mission the 'outward tendency' of the resurrection. *Ibid.*, p.194.

37 Moltmann, *C.G.*, p.178.

2. The Cross

Moltmann writes that

"there is no true theology of hope which is not first of all a theology of the cross."38

In this section we will inquire into what constitutes Moltmann's theology of the cross. In the last section we looked at Moltmann's view of Christian theology in the light of the future of the crucified Christ as this is determined by the resurrection. Here we are concerned with Moltmann's view of the presence of the risen Lord by way of the invocation of the memory of the cross.

(a) The Context of Moltmann's Theology of the Cross

In writing of the personal context behind his development of a theology of the cross, Moltmann cites two instances which impressed him. Both are associated with the Second World War. Firstly, as a prisoner of war in Scotland, and later as a student in post-War Germany, he experienced at first-hand the brokenness of his time. He writes:

"A theology which did not speak of God in the sight of the one who was abandoned and crucified would have had nothing to say to us then."39

Secondly, recalling a visit in the early 1960's to the remains of the

38 Moltmann, "The Crucified God and Apathetic Man," in THE EXPERIMENT HOPE, p.72.
See also Moltmann, C.G., p.5.

39 Moltmann, C.G., p.1.

concentration camp at Maidanek in Poland, he tells of his horror and shame when he realised what had occurred in that place. He concluded that a theology which does not see God himself in the concentration camps, suffering and being murdered, would be blasphemy.⁴⁰ In connection with such experiences, and his assessment of their theological significance for him, he cites Elie Wiesel's account of Auschwitz, NIGHT. A statement by Wiesel appears to have had considerable influence on him:

"The S.S. hanged two Jewish men and a youth in front of the whole camp. The men died quickly, but the death throes of the youth lasted half an hour. 'Where is God? Where is he now?' someone asked behind me. As the youth still hung in torment in the noose after a long time, I heard the man call again, 'Where is God now?' And I heard a voice in myself answer: 'Where is he? He is here. He is hanging there on the gallows. . .'"⁴¹

The immediate theological context of the theology of the cross is provided by the identity crisis of contemporary Christianity. Moltmann links the identity crisis to the crisis of relevance.⁴² In order to retain its identity, the church withdraws into social irrelevance; the more the church tries to be relevant to present-day problems, the more clearly it is drawn into a crisis of identity. Moltmann's key idea is that the church must discover the relevance of Christianity in that which gives it its identity, namely, the crucified Christ himself. In sharp theological

40 Moltmann, "The Crucified God and Apathetic Man," p.73.

41 Moltmann, C.G., p.273-274, and Moltmann, "The Crucified God and Apathetic Man," p.73.

42 Moltmann, C.G., p.7f.

terms Moltmann poses the questions which the theology of the cross must answer:

"Behind the political and social crisis of the church in modern society stands the christological crisis: From whom does the church really take its bearings? Who is Jesus Christ, really, for us today? In this identity-crisis of Christianity, the question of God lies hidden: Which God governs Christian existence – the one who was crucified or the idols of religion, class, race, and society?"⁴³

The link between a hopeful Christianity and the godforsakenness described by Wiesel lies, for Moltmann, with the God who suffered and died and was raised. Christianity takes its identity from this God, and seeks to find its relevance for today solely in the forsakenness of the crucified God.

The social context of the theology of the cross is provided by the theological equation which holds together the 'God of success' with apathetic man.⁴⁴ Moltmann calls present Western society an 'officially optimistic society.' By this he means to suggest that society is dominated by action and the will to succeed. We live in a society which emphasises 'having' at the expense of 'being.' Thus, Moltmann supports Marx's later criticism of the fetish character of commodities;

43 Moltmann, "The Crucified God and Apathetic Man," p.69.

44 By 'apathetic man' Moltmann means the man who is shut off from suffering and emotion. He is dominated by self-control and control of his environment. He is unable to care because he is unable to feel.

the creators have bowed down before their creatures.⁴⁵ The God who is worshipped is now the idol of man's history of success. He has become a God of action and power. Life in obedience to this God involves acting and producing, making and prevailing, but at the expense of weakness, feeling and sensitivity. The society describes those who suffer as 'sick,' and those who weep and mourn as showing no stamina. Love is not any longer a passion, but only a sexual act.⁴⁶ Moltmann thereby equates the God of success and power with apathetic and self-interested man. The ecclesiastical expression of this 'political theology' Moltmann calls 'civil religion,' religion which supports the status quo by functioning as the religious ratification of society.⁴⁷ The crucified God contradicts this God of success and power. The God of the cross, rather, calls into being a new humanity in the place of the old establishment. Because the theology of the cross condemns the 'God' of success and power, contradicts the sanctification of social ideology, and refuses to ratify the status quo, it becomes political, that is, critical and liberating, theology.

The immediate philosophical context of the theology of the cross is Moltmann's appropriation of the 'negative dialectics' and 'critical

45 Moltmann, "Political Theology," in THE EXPERIMENT HOPE, p.113.

46 Moltmann, "The Crucified God and Apathetic Man," p.71.

47 The concept of civil religion will be discussed in the following chapter.

theory' associated with the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research.⁴⁸

"Critical theology and critical theory meet in the framework of open questions, the question of suffering which cannot be answered and the question of righteousness which cannot be surrendered."⁴⁹

T. W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, with whom negative dialectics and critical theory are associated, are critical of all dogmatism in reason in order to free true needs and impulses from the images, dogmas and concepts which tie them down. Both attempt to wage war against the static thinking of absolute concepts. In intention, Adorno and Horkheimer present a negative, anti-utopian, and materialistic atheism.

- 48 Critical theory has an aversion to closed philosophical systems. As developed in particular by Horkheimer, critical theory was concerned with the integration of philosophy and social analysis through the use of Hegelian dialectic. Critical theory stresses two lessons which come from theology. Firstly, original sin, because of which there is no possibility of present happiness, is the responsibility of all; and secondly, the prohibition of images. The task of philosophy is then a critical task, in which the historical roots of injustice are investigated and the absolutisation of ideas attacked. Critical theory, in this way, does not have a political programme, but seeks rather to understand present reality in a critical and open-ended way. In this, there is a similarity with Moltmann's 'critical theory of the cross' in which the cross is the criticism of all absolute ideas and images of the world or God.
Cf. Dick Howard, THE MARXIAN LEGACY (London: The MacMillan Press, 1977) p.91f and Martin Jay, THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1973), p.41f.

- 49 Moltmann, C.G., p.226.

However, in a way similar to Moltmann's employment of Bloch in the THEOLOGY OF HOPE, they provide a framework within which Moltmann attempts to develop his 'critical theory' of the cross. The 'critical theory' of the cross tries to liberate the concepts of God, history, and man from all idolatries, ideologies, and superstitions. In this way, it objects to absolute concepts which prevent theology from speaking of the pathos of God, the future of history, and the coming humanity of man.

"The more the 'cross of reality' is taken seriously, the more the crucifixion of Christ becomes the general criterion of theology."⁵⁰

The Christian identity of theology depends on its identification with the crucified Christ. It is the cross which distinguishes faith from nihilism and superstition. Without attention to the cross, theology tends to become either moral teaching or a speculative and abstract theology of glory. The cross designates theology as crucifixion, as such, it is the criticism of all theology which believes in a triumph as the essential feature.

According to Moltmann, teaching about Jesus, and hence, truly christology, stands teacher as it has its origin in Jesus and his history. Christian teaching cannot have as its basis either a speculative concept

⁵⁰ Ibid., p.6.

(b) The Centrality of the Cross of Jesus Christ

As Moltmann notes in the sub-title of THE CRUCIFIED GOD, the cross of Christ is the foundation and criticism of Christian theology. Following Ernst Käsemann, Moltmann stresses the dialectical unity of the risen Christ with the crucified Jesus. If this dialectical unity is forgotten, the cross tends to have less significance for Christian faith, coming to be seen as a stage on the way to the resurrection. The scandal of the Christian gospel has to do with the fact that the one who was raised from the dead was the condemned, forsaken, and executed Jesus. Moltmann writes:

"The more the 'cross of reality' is taken seriously, the more the crucified Christ becomes the general criterion of theology."⁵⁰

The Christian identity of theology depends on its identification with the crucified Christ. It is the cross which distinguishes belief from unbelief and superstition. Without attention on the cross, theology tends to become either moral teaching or a speculative and gnostic theology of glory. The cross designates theology as Christian, and as such, it is the criticism of all theology which takes something other as the essential feature.

According to Moltmann, teaching about Jesus, and especially christology, stands insofar as it has its origin in Jesus and his history. Christian teaching cannot have as its basis either a speculative concept

50 Ibid., p.4.

Ibid., p.57.

Ibid., p.75.

Ibid., p.256. See also the brief reference in Moltmann, T.H., p.57.

of God, derived elsewhere than from Jesus and his history, or a speculative concept of the world and history, derived from experience. The critical point for theology, inasmuch as it tries to find its basis in Jesus and his history, arises with the problem of what it means for the Christ, the Son of God, to have been crucified.

"It is he, the crucified Jesus himself, who is the driving force, the joy and the suffering of all theology which is Christian. . . . The cross of Christ is the source of a permanent iconoclasm of the christological icons of the church and the portraits of Jesus in Christianity."⁵¹

The centrality of christology in Moltmann's theology is not an arbitrary aspect of theological method. Christology is central for Moltmann because it deals with the cross of Jesus and finds its meaning in that event. The reality of Christian teaching about Jesus cannot be identified with any word, such that another word could replace it. Only the cross signifies that in Jesus which makes him the object of preaching.⁵² What the disciples proclaimed was the future of the crucified Christ, the future of the executed Jesus of Nazareth. The nature of the life and death of this man are determinative, therefore, for all Christian theology. The offence of Christianity, and its particularity, according to Moltmann, lie with the claim that the deity of God is revealed in Jesus' death and the life which necessitated it.

The centrality of the cross is describable only in the light of the epistemological principle, derived from Hippocrates, Schelling, and Bloch, of the 'dialectical principle of knowledge'.⁵³ The explication

51 Ibid., p.87.

52 Ibid., p.75.

53 Ibid., p.26f. See also the brief reference in Moltmann, T.H., p.57.

of this principle is central to the development of the theology of the cross. In face of the cross, the epistemological principle of 'like is known only by like' collapses. The application of this latter principle demands that God can only be known from the analogies to him in the world, through the order of creation, or his self-manifestations in history.

"If the principle of likeness is applied strictly, God is only known by God. But if like is known only by like in this way, then revelation in something else which is not God, and in what is alien and not of God, is in fact impossible. . . . If like is known only by like, then the Son of God would have had to remain in heaven, because he would be unrecognizable by anything earthly."⁵⁴

By contrast, the epistemology of the dialectical principle of knowledge finds God in his opposite, in that which is not God. Concretely, God is revealed in the cross of Christ who was abandoned by God. The epistemological principle deriving from the cross is then: the deity of God is revealed in the 'not God' event of the cross of Jesus Christ.

Following Luther, Moltmann replaces the natural knowledge of God from his works with the knowledge of God in the cross of Christ. God is not known through his works, but through suffering and abandonment.

This knowledge is a

"crucifying form of knowledge because it shatters everything to which a man can hold and on which he can build."⁵⁵

54 Moltmann, C.G., p.27.

55 Ibid., p.212.

The crucified God has no equivalents which can provide an indirect, analogical knowledge of God.⁵⁶ But the analogical principle is not replaced entirely, however. In that God is revealed in his opposite, he can be known by the godless and those who are abandoned by God. This partisan knowledge of God by those who are unlike God brings heaven down to those who are abandoned.⁵⁷

The epistemological principle of the revelation of God in the godforsakenness of the cross of Jesus Christ has as its *corollary* the ontological principle that God loves what is unlike himself. As God the Father loves the Son in his godforsakenness and abandonment, likewise the Father loves us in our godlessness and abandonment. In Christ, God entered into solidarity with sinful men and became the God and Father of the godless and godforsaken.⁵⁸ The cross, as the depth of godforsakenness unto death, reveals the profundity of this solidarity.

56 Ibid., p.68.

57 The development of the dialectical principle of knowledge takes further Moltmann's criticism of revelation as the epiphany of the eternal present – Moltmann, T.H., p.45f.

58 Moltmann, C.G., p.192.

Moltmann, C.G., p.133.

(c) Jesus and His Cross

Moltmann maintains that the starting point for christology is the scandal and folly of the cross of Jesus.⁵⁹ Either the cross makes everything Jesus stood for and said in his life of passing significance, or else, as a part of the dialectic of his history and resurrection, and therefore as a part of his identity, it commands a radical interpretation of his life. The dialectic of the cross and the resurrection does not make us forget the cross; rather, it forces us to see in the cross the very activity of God himself.

Moltmann approaches his understanding of the cross from two directions: from the direction of history and from the direction of the resurrection and eschatological faith. These two directions must be held together. Each exists only as a different perspective on the one movement of God. The identity of Jesus, while one, is, nonetheless, dialectical. Jesus must be understood within historical and eschatological dimensions.

"The identity of Jesus can be understood only as an identity in, but not above and beyond, cross and resurrection – that is, that it must remain bound up with the dialectic of cross and resurrection. In that case the contradictions between the cross and the resurrection are an inherent part of his (Jesus') identity."⁶⁰

Moltmann is working within the reciprocal relationship between historical and eschatological method.⁶¹

59 Ibid., p.125.

60 Moltmann, T.H., p.200.

61 Moltmann, C.G., p.113.

(i) The Theological History of Jesus

It is Moltmann's contention that the history of Jesus which led to his death and abandonment by God was a theological history. His life and death cannot be understood apart from the God for whom he lived.

Jesus must be seen in terms of his proclamation of his God and Father over against the deities of legalistic Judaism and imperial Rome.

"An interpretation of his death in the context of his life therefore goes beyond his life as a private person and must understand the life of Jesus as that of a public person. Consequently, a retro-active interpretation in the light of his resurrection by God must consider the death of Jesus as the consequence of his ministry and as the consequence of the reactions of the Jews and Romans to his ministry."⁶²

Jesus' resurrection from the dead is, for Moltmann, a commentary by God on the legitimacy of his ministry which was carried out within the context of the Jewish Law, the political authority of Roman imperialism, and the universal human situation of suffering unto death.

Firstly, Jesus' death cannot be understood apart from the conflict between his life, on the one hand, and the Jewish Law and its representatives, on the other. According to Moltmann, Jesus placed his preaching of the righteousness and deity of God, and thereby himself, above the authority of Moses and the Torah. He contradicted the Jewish representation of the righteousness of God. The Jews taught the righteousness of God

62 Ibid., p.127-128.

63 Ibid., p.129.

64 Ibid., p.131.

according to the Law, with the exaltation of the righteous who suffer injustice and the diminishment of the lawless. But,

"anyone who preaches the imminent kingdom of God not as judgment, but as the gospel of the justification of sinners by grace. . . contradicts the hope based upon the law."⁶³

Jesus' authority derived from God whom he called 'My Father.' In bypassing the traditions of Israel through direct appeal to God, Jesus was bound to provoke conflict with the Jewish authorities of his time. What, however, was most distasteful to the Jews about Jesus was that 'one without office or dignities' should abrogate the Law and claim to reveal divine righteousness in a wholly new way. This man, who associated with undesirable people, dared to promise the kingdom of God to the unrighteous as a gift of grace.

"The source of the contradiction is that he, a human being who was powerless, should anticipate the power of God as grace among the rejected and the powerless."⁶⁴

The issue of the validity of Jesus' teaching over against the validity of the Law was focused in the question of the righteousness of God: was the righteousness of God to be associated with gospel or with Law? This theological clash provoked a legal trial. Only in the light of the resurrection could a claim be made for the legitimacy of gospel as the way of God's righteousness.

Secondly, according to Moltmann, attention must be paid to the fact that Jesus was not executed for blasphemy, for which the punishment was death by stoning, but for crimes against the state, for which the punishment

⁶³ Ibid., p.129.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.131.

was death by crucifixion.

"Crucifixion at that time was a political punishment for rebellion against the social and political order of the Imperium Romanum."65

Jesus was executed by the occupying Roman forces in the name of the state gods of Rome who assured the peace of Rome. Jesus' true trial, therefore, was not a religious trial, but a political trial, made possible by the collusion of the Sanhedrin and Pilate.⁶⁶

65 Ibid., p.136.

66 Moltmann is critical of Bultmann's view that Jesus was executed as a result of a misunderstanding. Bultmann assumes an unwarranted separation of religion and politics. Moltmann argues that we cannot assume that Jesus' ministry was inherently non-political. At that time, the religious and political contexts were indissoluble. Jesus has affinity with the Zealot movement. Both taught the imminence of the Kingdom of God; both saw purpose in working to bring the Kingdom nearer; Jesus never directed polemic against the Zealots; like the Zealots Jesus called Herod 'a fox'; Jesus attracted Zealots to his company; Jesus' entry into Jerusalem and cleansing the temple could be seen as Zealot symbolical actions. But Jesus should also be distinguished from the Zealots. The Zealots anticipated the coming of the Kingdom by struggle against Rome, while Jesus disassociated himself from such determinism; the Zealots were a radically legalist Pharisee party; Jesus did not call on the oppressed to avenge themselves as did the Zealots; Jesus included tax-collectors in his company, and they were enemies of the Zealots; in his Temptations, Jesus rejected the way of the Zealots. See Ibid., p.137f.

In that Jesus challenged the peace of Rome and its gods and laws, he provoked a political confrontation. Pilate, therefore, did not misunderstand Jesus.

"Thus as a second theological dimension to the history of Jesus which led to his crucifixion as a 'rebel,' we can definitely add the political dimension of the gospel of Jesus within a world in which religion and politics were inseparable."⁶⁷

The history of Jesus does not give us a 'pure theology.' His history is not non-political, neither is it purely private. Jesus taught the law of grace in opposition to the political religion of Rome. For this reason, his execution was properly an execution by the state.

Thirdly, Moltmann notes that Jesus' condemnation as a 'blasphemer' and execution as a 'rebel' do not explain the inner pain of his suffering and death. Jesus did not die stoically as had Socrates, nor with the righteous confidence of the Zealot martyrs. Jesus died with every expression of horror. This can only be understood if it is seen in terms of Jesus' relationship to his Father. Jesus' horror raises the inner meaning of the theological dimension of his life and death.⁶⁸

Moltmann begins his consideration with the assumption that Jesus died with the signs and expressions of a profound abandonment by God.⁶⁹ In his life Jesus proclaimed the imminence of the kingdom of God and the solidarity of God with the unrighteous and the dispossessed. He went beyond the bounds of Israel's covenant with God and introduced a new

67 Ibid., p.144.

68 Ibid., p.146.

69 Ibid., p.147.

basis of relationship with God based on his fellowship with God. It is understandable, therefore, that Jesus should experience his cross as rejection by the God whom he had called 'My Father' and whom he so festively proclaimed.

"It is the experience of abandonment by God in the knowledge that God is not distant but close; does not judge, but shows grace. And this, in full consciousness that God is close at hand in his grace, to be abandoned and delivered up to death as one rejected, is the torment of hell."⁷⁰

It is Jesus' closeness to God in his life which marks his death as abandonment by God. Ultimately, Moltmann believes that Jesus died because of his God and Father. What happened on the cross was something that took place between Jesus and his God, and this happening is the origin of christology.⁷¹

Psalm 22 is of special importance in Moltmann's interpretation. The cry of dereliction ('My God, why have you forsaken me?') was Jesus' cry to his God to whom he stood in special relationship. For Jesus, God's deity and righteousness were at stake. Jesus was laying claim to the faithfulness of his Father. He was seeking a justification for his theological existence. Thus, Moltmann writes in exaggerated style:

"The cry of Jesus in the words of Psalm 22 means not only 'My God, why hast thou forsaken me?' but at the same time, 'My God, why hast thou forsaken thyself?' In the theological context of what he preached and lived, the unity of Jesus and God must be emphasised as strongly as this."⁷²

70 Ibid., p.148.

71 Ibid., p.149.

72 Ibid., p.151.

Jesus' life ends with an open question concerning the faithfulness and righteousness of God.

For Moltmann, the cross is an event within God, an event experienced by God.⁷³ Moltmann construes this situation in the paradoxical statement: 'God against God.' This is the most important dimension of the theological history of Jesus, and it distinguishes his cross from the other crosses in history. It is the task of a theology of the cross to take up this dimension and think it through into all aspects of theology.

"In the face of Jesus' death-cry to God, theology either becomes impossible or becomes possible only as specifically Christian theology."⁷⁴

73 Moltmann, "The Trinitarian History of God," THEOLOGY Vol. 78 No.666 (December, 1975), p.643f, and Moltmann, THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT, p.62f.

74 Moltmann, C.G., p.153.

(ii) The Historical Eschatology of Jesus

We are concerned here with Moltmann's understanding of the life and death of Jesus in the context of his resurrection and eschatological faith. The Easter faith does not merely stand in a chronological relationship to the history of Jesus; rather, it is from the cross that the resurrection and the doctrine of hope find their real meaning, relevance, and significance for the living and the dead. As a consequence of his resurrection, Jesus' life and death are seen, in a dialectical way, to be the incarnation of the coming God.

"If God raised this dishonoured man in his coming righteousness, it follows that in this crucified figure he manifests his true righteousness."⁷⁵

Because of the resurrection, Christian faith proclaims that God's righteousness is revealed in the life and death of Jesus. The resurrection forces us back to the cross.⁷⁶

Moltmann is trying to show how a resurrection-based Christianity, and so an eschatological Christianity, must refer directly to the life and death of Jesus. Easter does not solve the riddle of the cross;

75 Ibid., p.176.

76 Moltmann has distinguished himself from both Bultmann and Pannenberg. For Bultmann, Jesus is risen into the Kerygma. Consequently, Jesus' future tends to be disassociated from his cross. For Pannenberg, the resurrection is a proleptic event which proclaims the end of history. But Pannenberg has worked this out in a one-sided way, stressing the resurrection's significance for universal history and diminishing the question of the cross and God's righteousness.

78 Ibid., p.186.

Easter makes the cross a mystery. In the light of Easter, the cross ceases to be merely a contingent historical event, but becomes also an eschatological event. The resurrection qualifies the cross because it reveals who suffered and died. By way of the resurrection of the crucified Jesus we do not develop a theology of glory, but we come back again to the cross, and find our hope in it. In historical terms, the resurrection follows the cross; in eschatological terms, the cross is seen as the cross of the risen Christ. Eschatologically considered, therefore, the cross becomes the present form of the resurrection.

"The cross is the form of the coming, redeeming kingdom, and the crucified Jesus is the incarnation of the risen Christ."⁷⁷

It is Jesus' death which makes the meaning of his resurrection manifest for those who suffer under their own righteousness and who live in the shadow of death. For those who are closed to the future and without hope – those whom Moltmann designates with the phrase 'homo incurvatus in se' – the future of the cross is the true hope. In Christ's death we find the significance of his resurrection for us through his solidarity with our plight, and in the resurrection we find the significance of the cross for us, because the risen Christ is the crucified Jesus.⁷⁸

Atonement means, therefore, that the coming God is one in Christ with man in his life of suffering unto death. God is in solidarity with man in his lostness, and he gives man a future which he could not otherwise have.

⁷⁷ Moltmann, C.G., p.185.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p.186.

Because of the complexity of Moltmann's argument, we will summarize.

1. Moltmann has argued that we are required to think dialectically. We have to hold together the theological history and the eschatological history of Jesus. If we fail to do this, we separate the cross and the life which led to it, on the one hand, from the resurrection, on the other.
2. The life of Jesus is lived in conflict with the religious and political authorities. Eschatologically, God is identified with Jesus in his ministry. His ministry must, therefore, be viewed theologically, and his conflicts must be seen to have been theological in nature.
3. The death of Jesus is due not only to his conflicts with the authorities, but also to his abandonment by his God and Father. Because Jesus in his death is identical⁷⁹ with Jesus in his resurrection, God must be regarded as having been in solidarity with Jesus in his abandonment and execution. We must, therefore, speak of abandonment and execution as a part of the 'experience' of God. This is atonement. God's 'experience' of abandonment and execution brings him into oneness with the corresponding human experience.
4. The resurrection is the future of the cross. Moltmann often uses Hegel's language of the negation of the negative to describe the advent of this future. Because of God's solidarity with man on the cross of Christ, we must speak of man's future with Christ in his resurrection. Hope, then, is indissolubly linked to the cross and the future of Jesus.

79 i.e., the same person.

3. The Eschatology of the Cross

Moltmann states that the theology of hope must be a theology of the cross,⁸⁰ and the theology of the cross must be an eschatological theology. Eschatology and the cross are the poles of Moltmann's dialectical theology. Chronologically in his publications, Moltmann moves from concentration on anticipations of the future of God in the form of promises and hopes to concentration on the 'incarnation' of that future by way of the sufferings of Christ.⁸¹ In this move there is a development in Moltmann's thinking which may be more than a change of emphasis. But within this development there is a continuity throughout which results in the 'eschatology of the cross.' Here we are concerned to indicate what the eschatology of the cross means for the theological understanding of God, history, and man. This discussion will complete the presentation of the theological basis of Moltmann's political theology.

(a) The Eschatology of the Cross and the Doctrine of God

Eschatologically, we have to think of God as having

"future as his essential nature."⁸²

We have also to think of God in the light of the cross of the risen Christ.⁸³

80 Moltmann, T.H., p.160; Moltmann, C.G., p.5; and Moltmann, "The Rose in the Cross of the Present" in RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE, p.147f.

81 Moltmann, C.G., p.5.

82 Moltmann, T.H., p.16.

83 Moltmann, C.G., p.204f.

On the one hand, we have to think of the future as the new paradigm of transcendence,⁸⁴ and on the other hand, we have to think of the presence of God in the form of the cross of the risen Christ.

Moltmann derives the initial form of his concept of God from Ernst Bloch. But over against Bloch's concept of utopian being Moltmann places the concept of eschatological being. While for Bloch the future (futurum) comes from nature (physis), for Moltmann future must be defined as adventus or parousia or Zukunft. Futurum is a projection of physis. Parousia alludes to the coming of something new and which is known about only insofar as it is announced. God is not a

"God with futurum as his mode of being, but with Zukunft as his mode to act upon the present and the past."⁸⁵

Future as adventus Dei is not as extrapolation from history, but can only be anticipated insofar as it announces itself. With this argument, Moltmann attempts to rid Christian talk of God from the substantial categories of Greek metaphysical thought. Metaphysical theism replaces historical disclosure of the 'coming God' with abstract discourse about the 'eternal God.' God's future, however, is not a dimension of his eternity, but is the mode of his being. In this case, we have to talk of the 'ontological priority of the future.'⁸⁶

84 Moltmann, "The Future as the New Paradigm of Transcendence" in RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE, p.177f.

85 Moltmann, "Theology as Eschatology," p.13.

86 This phrase is from Pannenberg.
Wolfhart Pannenberg, BASIC QUESTIONS IN THEOLOGY, Vol.2. (London: S.C.M. Press, 1971), p.241.

God has not made himself present. He has only promised his presence in the future as an act of faithfulness. God's divinity will only be fully revealed in the new creation of all things. Moltmann, therefore, has placed eschatology at the centre of his doctrine of God, and in so doing he has tried to free talk of God from the hold of metaphysical speculation.

God is not the primum movens, as with Aristotle, pulling history to its future but without being involved in history.⁸⁷ In his incarnational theology of the cross, Moltmann grounds any further talk of God on the unity between Jesus and his Father. In this way, he hopes to avoid the charge of non-historical idealism. God is present in history, not in an epiphany of his presence, but in the life and death of Jesus. The eschatology of the cross, therefore, is essentially a trinitarian theology.⁸⁸ The Christ event on the cross is a God event, and it stands at the heart of the trinitarian life of God.⁸⁹ In the identification of the Father with the Son we have to do with the history of the Father's relationship to the Son and vice versa. Consequently, Moltmann argues, we have to speak of the 'trinitarian history of God' in order to catch the livingness of God which has moved out of itself.⁹⁰ From the relationship of the Son and the Father, and the Spirit, which have within them the experience of the death of the Son, there emerges who God is and what his Godhead means.

87 Rubem Alves claims that Moltmann's doctrine of God is Platonic. Rubem Alves, A THEOLOGY OF HUMAN HOPE (St. Meinrad, Ind.: Abbey Press, 1972), p.59.

88 This at least is Moltmann's claim. But the essential movement in the eschatology of the cross is between the Father and the Son. It remains unclear how this is trinitarian. This is discussed more fully later in the study.

89 Moltmann, C.G., p.207.

90 Moltmann, "The Trinitarian History of God," p.634f, and Moltmann, THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT, p.50f.

In this case, metaphysical and moral concepts of God must be abandoned.⁹¹

It was noted earlier that Moltmann speaks of the Son's abandonment by the Father. If this is thought through in trinitarian terms, it has to be said that as the Son suffers dying, so the Father suffers the death of the Son.

"The Fatherlessness of the Son is matched by the Sonlessness of the Father, and if God has constituted himself as the Father of Jesus Christ, then he also suffers the death of his Fatherhood in the death of the Son. Unless this were so, the doctrine of the Trinity would still have a monotheistic background."⁹²

In the Son's forsakenness and the Father's grief we see the nature of the contradiction which is within God himself; it is a contradiction as trinitarian relationship. Moltmann sees the history of man being taken up into the trinitarian history of God and given a new future as a gift. Thus Moltmann speaks of 'history in God.'⁹³

"If one conceives of the Trinity as an event of love in the suffering and death of Jesus - and that is something which faith must do - then the Trinity is no self-contained group in heaven, but an eschatological process open for men on earth, which stems from the cross of Christ."⁹⁴

The trinitarian history of God, which includes the cross and the resurrection, history and the future, is the corollary to the eschatology

91 Moltmann, C.G., p.215.

92 Ibid., p.243.

For Moltmann, monotheism is a speculative, metaphysical, and non-Christian concept.

93 Ibid., p.247.

94 Ibid., p.249.

of the cross. Here God is understood in christological terms, and Christ is understood in terms of his God and Father. This dialectical understanding is grounded in the history of the cross and the life which necessitated it. Insofar as the suffering of Jesus was historical, and thereby in solidarity with all earthly suffering, there can be no Christian talk of God which does not begin here. The dialectic of the Father and the Son in the power of the Spirit demands, further, that our understanding should seek to grasp the historical grounding in terms of the out-going love of God which wills to gather all things to himself. The historical cross and the eschatological resurrection belong together as the one movement of God within which he moves out of himself into worldly solidarity with creation. Insofar as this is the case, the Christian doctrine of God can only be thought through within the framework of the eschatology of the cross.

95 For the following works by Moltmann: T.M., p.220; "Exegesis and the Eschatology of History" and "The End of History" in HOPE AND HISTORY; "Hope and History"; and Moltmann, THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT, p.196. The following remarks are a summary of Moltmann's position.

(b) The Eschatology of the Cross and the Christian Understanding of History⁹⁵

With the Enlightenment, history took the place of tradition as the means of bringing the past to bear upon the present. This happened because the traditions no longer corresponded to present experience. Through natural science man was experiencing a liberation from predetermining forces and the influence of his origins. With the Enlightenment man sought to find the same liberation in his assessment of the meaning of the present. He found the possibility of this liberation in historical science which subjected the received traditions to critical scrutiny. Cut loose from the traditions, men were then able to offer alternative interpretations of the past and the present.

Increasingly in the nineteenth century, the experience of the present was an experience of crisis. The old political orders had either been replaced or were being challenged, and the metaphysical stability of hierarchical cosmology, likewise, came under severe attack. Men came to expect a future which would be quite unlike the past. The problem for philosophy was how to control this process of criticism and replacement. The sweeping away of the old orders unleashed such wholly unexpected possibilities that catastrophe threatened the structuring of the future. Control of history became the object of search. Men began to

95 See the following works by Moltmann:

T.H., p.230f; "Exegesis and the Eschatology of History" and "The End of History" in HOPE AND PLANNING; "Hope and History"; and Moltmann, THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT, p.19f. The following remarks are a summary of Moltmann's position,

look for the general in the specific, for the constant in the changeable. In a way analogous to physics, men assumed general laws in history which would allow history to be controlled, thereby initiating a future of progress.

"History is subjected to the influence of an apocalyptic millenarianism and an apocalyptic enthusiasm of spirit, for which the end is other than the origin, and the goal greater than the beginning, and the future more than all the past."⁹⁶

The paradox which the scientific investigation of history produced, however, was the loss of history.⁹⁷

If history is associated with upheaval and crisis, their elimination means the end of history. Historical science confers freedom from history.⁹⁸ The constant which allows for control, and which has validity for all times, is a non-historical, ideal concept. What comes to be of ultimate truth is not the contingent events of history, but the eternal logos of history.⁹⁹ History is given meaning by way of a speculative concept which is ahistorical. This concept certainly need not be non-eschatological. Any philosophy of history which insists upon the 'essence of history,' the constant amid the change, implies an eschatological 'end' of history. The question is: What future is being discussed?¹⁰⁰

96 Moltmann, T.H., p.234.

97 Ibid., p.236 and Moltmann, "The End of History," p.163.

98 Moltmann, T.H., p.237.

99 Ibid., p.259.

100 Moltmann is critical of Bultmann. This criticism has to do with the fact that Bultmann sees 'future' as present. Faith, for Bultmann, places the believer in the 'end of history.' History is, therefore, overcome.

Cf. Moltmann, "The End of History," p.169f.

It is Moltmann's claim that the primitive Christian Easter faith teaches about Jesus and his future. The word of promise in the resurrection of the crucified Christ provokes history to find its identity in that which is still to come.

"The 'end of history' is not yet present in such a way that time and history stand still and no longer exist, but rather in such a way that this 'end of history' allows time, makes the future possible and affects history. . . . The present is qualified by the eschatological future as history."¹⁰¹

No appeal can be made by Christian faith to a universal concept. Rather, appeal is made to Jesus and his future. The centre of the Christian view of history, according to Moltmann, does not lie in the surmounting of transience by that which is permanent and abiding, but in the anticipation of the coming goal of history. Christian history must be Christ-centred history, and, as such, it is eschatological and particular. It takes its beginning from Christ and looks forward to his future which will reveal the divinity and righteousness of God, inaugurate the resurrection of the dead, and establish the kingdom of God in a new totality of being.

If history exists insofar as there is a future, and that future is the future of Christ, we must understand the present experience of history from the cross of the risen Christ, which is the incarnation of the future. Through Christ, God 'experiences' history, the history of suffering unto death, the history of conflict, and the history of

101 Ibid., p.172.

rejection and abandonment. In a real way God has taken history into himself, into his experience in a direct way. There is no depth of the human experience of history in its negativity which is not now part of God's experience. The phrase which Moltmann uses to communicate his point has a dramatic quality: 'Auschwitz in God.'¹⁰² Our lives in the present have meaning insofar as God has assumed history and identified the future for history with his own future. History is opened up by God in Christ for the future of God. Life in the present is, therefore, life in anticipation. Anticipation is the mode of the presence of the future for us within the conditions of history.¹⁰³ This anticipation is not just hopeful expectation for the coming of a God who is transcendentally future, but is the acceptance of responsibility for life in world-transforming obedience to the God whose future is present in the cross of Jesus Christ.

102 Moltmann, C.G., p.278.

103 Moltmann, THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT, p.193.

(c) The Eschatology of the Cross and the Christian Understanding of Man

Following Calvin and Barth, Moltmann writes that

"for faith knowledge of God and self-knowledge fall together as knowledge of Christ."¹⁰⁴

Christian anthropology is, for Moltmann therefore, an anthropology centred in the cross of the risen Christ. The cross is, for Moltmann, the point of difference between Christian anthropology and the ideological and humanistic images of man. As the cross is both an historical and an eschatological event, Moltmann is forced to inquire about man in the light of the eschatology of the cross. Biological, cultural, and religious anthropologies are not made superfluous, but Christian anthropology cannot begin with them or be reduced to them.¹⁰⁵

Moltmann wants to talk about a 'theological criticism of man'.¹⁰⁶ He means by this the theological criticism, in the name of the crucified Jesus, of the speculative images of man. As was found in Moltmann's doctrines of God and history, so now with his doctrine of man, the cross is the criticism of all speculative concepts and images. Just as God has future as his mode of being, and as history becomes

104 Moltmann, MAN (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974) p.18.

105 Ibid., p.21.

106 Ibid., p.108.

historical by virtue of the future, man can only encounter his humanity as a future event. As the presence of that future is given in the cross of Christ, all talk of man in the present must be derived from that event.

In the light of the promised future of God, man finds himself as homo absconditus – man hidden from himself.¹⁰⁷

"Man learns his human nature not from himself, but from the future to which the mission leads him. . . . The real mystery of his human nature is discovered by man in the history which discloses to him his future."¹⁰⁸

Man learns from the necessity for the future that he is still on the way.

He has no subsistence in himself. He is still in process and has not yet acquired a fixed nature.¹⁰⁹ In Moltmann's language, the future gives man self-knowledge in spe but not in re. Knowledge in hope is realistic because it alone takes seriously the possibilities which the future entails.¹¹⁰

The self-questioning of man about his identity is not, therefore, due to an innate property which man has nor does it come from an immanent openness to the world,¹¹¹ but is provoked into existence by the coming future of God.

What the future means for self-knowledge is found in the cross of Christ.

107 Moltmann, "The Revelation of God and the Question of Truth," p.24 and Moltmann, T.H., p.91 and p.286.

108 Moltmann, T.H., p.286.

109 Moltmann, "Exegesis and the Eschatology of History," p.80.

110 Moltmann, T.H., p.25.

111 Thus against Pannenberg. Cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg, WHAT IS MAN? (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1974).

"If the whole of man's reality is accepted by God in the cross, then at the same time man's reality is revealed to him in the cross as a reality which is both directed and forsaken by God. . . The worldly reality of man is revealed in the dialectic of the God-forsakenness of the Son of God."¹¹²

Present existence is seen in its reality as abandoned, yet historical, profane, yet with a future. In other words, man has manness (hominitas) but not yet humanity (humanitas). What men share at present is their inhumanity.¹¹³ This is taken up by Jesus on the cross and given a future. Only in Christ, therefore, can man find a future for himself, and thereby his identity.

"In spite of Auschwitz and Hiroshima and thalidomide children, (man) can remain true to the earth, because upon this earth the cross of Christ stands. . . This gives him the power to hope when there is nothing more to hope for, and to love, when he hates himself."¹¹⁴

It is the resurrection of the crucified Jesus and his future which gives continuity to man's existence. It has been seen that, for Moltmann, this future is grounded in God's solidarity with man on the cross. Man's question 'Who am I?' cannot be answered from any other source. The question of meaning in personal life - the question of identity - is the obverse side of the question of meaning in history - the theodicy question. Both questions have their resolution only in the God who suffers through participation in the world's suffering and who gives that

112 Moltmann, "Understanding of History in Christian Social Ethics" in HOPE AND PLANNING, p.106.

113 Moltmann, "Religion, Revolution and the Future," in RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE, p.30.

114 Moltmann, MAN, p.114.

suffering a future. It is the faithfulness of God in providing a future for man and history that is the constant.

"In the hidden faithfulness of the Spirit, man is directed ahead of himself; he acquires future – not an automatic future but rather a historical future. . . . He acquires continuity in the midst of changing conditions in as far as he acquires future."¹¹⁵

The eschatology of the cross provides Moltmann with an understanding of human existence in the world which is not derived from an extrapolation from past or present experiences or from some ideal, ahistorical concept. By beginning with the cross of the risen Christ, Christian anthropology ventures a view of man which is totally different from the views of man which are derived from the interpretation of experiences or from a priori concepts. The truth of God in Christ over and against the speculative images of truth means that an anthropology ventured in the light of Jesus and his future is grounded in the truly concrete reality. The future for man in the world is ahead of him in the form of a new creation. Christian existence involves the criticism, therefore, of all self-understanding, individual or corporate, derived from the interpretation of experience or the employment of prior ideal concepts.

115 Moltmann, "Understanding of History in Christian Social Ethics," p.108.

"Only Christians who no longer understand their eschatological mission for the future of the world and of man can identify their call with the existing circumstances in the social roles of their callings and be content to fit in with these."¹¹⁶

Eschatological faith forces men to criticise and transform the present images of man because these images do not yet correspond to the future reality of the kingdom of God. The Christian view of man demands that man should go out in search of the future, and he should refuse the identity which is given to him by the world.

116 Moltmann, T.H., p.334.

For a general review, see G. Clarke Chapman, Jr., "Moltmann's Vision of Man," ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol.LVI, No.3, (July, 1974).

Chapter 8

Political Theology

1. History as the Mediating Agency for Christian Faith:
From Cosmology and Anthropology to History
2. Political Hermeneutics
 - (a) Background
 - (i) Bultmann's Existentialist Hermeneutic
 - (ii) Marx's Revolutionary Historical Hermeneutic
 - (b) Political Hermeneutics
3. The Tasks of Liberation
 - (a) Concepts of Liberation
 - (i) The Revolution in the Concept of God
 - (ii) The Liberation of Politics
 - (b) Liberation and the Church
 - (i) The Accommodating Church
 - (ii) Civil Religion
 - (iii) Messianic Ecclesiology
 - (c) Liberations in the World

POLITICAL THEOLOGY

The presentation of Moltmann's political theology will be in three sections. In the first section it will be shown how history is the mediating agency for Christian faith. In the second section, Moltmann's political hermeneutics will be outlined. The third section will detail the three tasks of liberation. In all this it will be indicated how the eschatology of the cross is the basis for Moltmann's political theology.

1. History as the Mediating Agency for Christian Faith: From Cosmology and Anthropology to History

There are three immediate sources of Moltmann's account of history as the mediating agency for Christian faith. The first is his criticism of theology as cosmology and anthropology. The second is his avowal of Marx's critique of religion. The third is the eschatology of the cross, and this is the most important. By way of these Moltmann comes to see that concrete political activity in history is the setting within which the gospel is true. It is in this setting also that the theodicy question should be tackled today.

(1) Christian theology began with the union of the biblical tradition with cosmological metaphysics.¹ Divinity is the transcendence of the

1 Moltmann, "Hope and History," p.204; Moltmann, "The Future as the New Paradigm of Transcendence," p.180f; Moltmann, T.H., p.272f; Moltmann, "Understanding History in Christian Social Ethics," p.103f.

divinely ruled cosmos; man understood himself as a part of the cosmos. This position became untenable, however, in the face of scientific and technical advance. Cosmological theology saw God as the orderer of creation. With the rise of the natural sciences man developed the ability to order creation for himself, and no longer expected the divinity in the cosmos to do it for him.

"The old cosmological-theistic world view which spoke of God in relationship to the cosmos of the natural world is antiquated and is experienced as mythical by man, who has become the master of his environment."²

Man now views himself as the Lord of nature. Nature is an object under his control. Consequently, man no longer found transcendence in the outermost periphery of the cosmos: he found it in himself.³

In face of the demise of the cosmological conceptions of God, the world, and man, the psychological (Descartes), moral (Kant), and existential (Kierkegaard) world views began to dominate theology.⁴ Theology became anthropology. Christian faith was joined to the question of human existence. Transcendence came to be experienced in subjectivity: man objectified the world and subjectified himself. The move was from a theistic metaphysics of the world to a theological illumination of existence. The revelation of God is, accordingly, seen as a matter of man's coming to himself.⁵ The question of God

2 Moltmann, "Hope and History," p.204.

3 Moltmann, "The Future as the New Paradigm of Transcendence," p.181.

4 Moltmann, "Hope and History," p.205.

5 Moltmann, T.H., p.65f for criticism of Bultmann.

is considered, primarily, in terms of the question of man about his identity and authenticity. However, the problem with this approach to theology and the world is that it assumes that man can come to self-identity and fullness of life apart from the political battle for a just and human society. Social and political reality is given no place in the search for authentic human existence. Authentic human existence is considered to be a private, personal affair with no public, political mediation. Further, the anthropocentrism, personalism, and humanism of this theology had to do with generic man on the one hand, and individual man on the other. Concrete man, with historical, social, political, and economic determinations, was given no place in the dualism between the species and the individual.⁶ Both man and God were conceived of in a way which was unhistorical and non-political; such a conception was abstract.

(2) The second mediating source of history as the matrix within which Christian faith must be expressed is Moltmann's avowal of Marx's critique of religion.⁷ This critique begins with Marx's criticism of Feuerbach's anthropological reduction of theology. God, for Feuerbach, is the projection of the self's subjectivity into an abstract object. While explaining man's alienation from himself in this projection, Feuerbach

6 Cf. Moltmann, "Hope and History," p.206 and Alfredo Fierro, THE MILITANT GOSPEL (London: S.C.M. Press, 1977), p.83f.

7 Moltmann also includes Freud's critique of religion. See Moltmann, "The Cross and Civil Religion," p.7 and Moltmann, C.G. p.291f.

did not criticise that which forced man to make the projection in the first place. Feuerbach's criticism of heaven does not result in a corresponding criticism of the earth. This is exactly the case with theology as anthropology: while it was a criticism of theistic cosmology, it never resulted in a criticism of the world. It accepted the scientific and technical world as it was.

For Marx, the criticism of religion must become radical. He means by this that criticism must locate that evil reality in the world which forces men to deceive themselves with religious projections, and change it. In other words, the criticism of religion becomes the criticism of those forces in society and history which necessitate religion. In this way, Marx reached beyond Feuerbach by penetrating to the root of religious expression as he saw it. Marx, therefore, tried to overcome religious myths by attacking those structures in society – in particular, the relations of production – which oppress people and force them to flee to religious mythology. Moltmann argues that it is necessary to accept Marx's insight into the criticism of religion or else

"the gospel becomes the religious basis for the justification of reality as it is and a mystification of the suffering reality."⁸

Moltmann's avowal of Marx's criticism of religion, as in fact a criticism

8 Moltmann, "Toward a Political Hermeneutic of the Gospel" in RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE, p.95.

of society, forces him to see history as the mediating agency for Christian faith, and theology as having a critical function in the world.⁹

(3) For Moltmann, it is only by way of the eschatology of the cross that the Christian faith can come to terms with the criticism of religion by becoming the criticism of the earth. If theology is not concerned with criticism, protest, and liberation, it does nothing to change the world. Today the theodicy question is focused on the future of the hopeless: the theodicy question of evil and suffering has become a political question. For Moltmann, the principal question of God's righteousness must be answered in relation to the reality of suffering: will God's righteousness triumph over evil and pain?¹⁰ According to Marx, if theology cannot practically answer this question, it is of little use and must be challenged as a mystification of suffering. Moltmann accepts this, but not solely on authority from Marx. Moltmann sees the necessity for the transformation of the earth on grounds other than Marx's analytical grounds.

At its deepest level, the question of the righteousness of God lies

9 Moltmann builds upon Marx's critique of religion rather than Barth's. Barth made a fundamental distinction between 'religion' and 'theology.' Religion he regarded as something entirely human, as man's search for God. Theology, on the other hand, is man's response to the Word of God that has already been spoken to man. While Moltmann would agree with Barth's methodology, he still finds Marx's critique the more useful and pertinent.

10 Cf. Moltmann, C.G., p.175.

in the resurrection of the crucified Christ.

"If God raised this dishonoured man in his coming righteousness, it follows that in this crucified figure he manifests his true righteousness."¹¹

The righteousness of God is, then, to be associated with the dereliction, abandonment, and dishonour of the crucified Jesus. It is not associated with a speculative future or cosmology, but with a specific historical event. The dialectic of the eschatology of the cross is the true ground for associating the righteousness of God with the future of the world's pain, evil and death.

It has already been seen that eschatology reveals the reality of the world as history, and that the incarnation of the future is the cross of Christ. The eschatology of the cross, then, holds the world (history), and the future (Christ) together. It is from the history of the risen Christ, therefore, that Christianity finds itself identified solely with the temporal, spatial and historical realm. In other words, Christianity is public and not private, and historical, in solidarity with the earth. Christianity cannot be reduced either to anthropology or the Marxist concept of religion.

Moltmann writes:

"Man and the world are mediated today in the realm of history, and that means in social, political, and technological history."¹²

The question of human identity can only be resolved in historical, that is,

11 Ibid., p.176.

12 Moltmann, "Hope and History," p.206.

political and social, terms.

"The theodicy question and the identity question are two sides of the same coin."¹³

And again elsewhere:

"The question of man's identity becomes more and more pressing the more man becomes a historical being. But he becomes a historical being only in connection with the social changes of world history. Therefore, this agonizing and impelling question is, in fact, the reverse side of the theodicy question which seeks the meaning of history. Practically speaking, this means that persons and groups of men are to find their identity in history – not apart from it. Their identity is to be found only in concrete historical identification with projects directed to overcoming human misery and enslavement."¹⁴

Here Moltmann ties practical ethics in the world to the quest for identity as the matrix for the solution to the theodicy question. This

"general ethical field theory of Christian hope"¹⁵

Moltmann began, around 1966, to call 'political theology.'¹⁶ Ethics is not an appendix to dogmatics, but, as action in history, it is the manner in which talk of God must be made relevant.

13 Ibid.

14 Moltmann, "Toward a Political Hermeneutic of the Gospel," p.101.

15 Moltmann, "Understanding of History in Christian Social Ethics," p.129, f/n.44.

16 Moltmann, "Hope and History," p.128.

2. Political Hermeneutics

Biblical hermeneutics are concerned with understanding the scriptures and bridging the gap between the past and the present. Yet hermeneutics fall into the danger of formalism if they seek merely for an understanding of the past under the conditions of the present. Biblical hermeneutics must try to understand the past by way of action that transforms the present. This raises the issue of the relation of theory to practice.

(a) Background

Moltmann develops his hermeneutics in critical dialogue with Bultmann's existentialist hermeneutic¹⁷ and in line with Marx's critique of religion insofar as this is demanded by the content of the biblical tradition itself.¹⁸

(i) Bultmann's Existentialist Hermeneutic

Following Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, and in opposition to Ernst Troeltsch, Bultmann argued that Man's 'historicity'¹⁹ should be considered apart from so-called 'objective' or contingent history.²⁰

17 Moltmann, "Toward a Political Hermeneutic of the Gospel," p.88f and Moltmann, T.H., p.58f. and p.273f.

18 Moltmann, "Toward a Political Hermeneutic of the Gospel," p.93f.

19 'Geschichtlich'

20 'Historisch'

Historical science relativised history. For Bultmann, the resurrection, as the heart of the gospel, could not be subject to the canons of historical investigation. The resurrection was to be saved from historical relativity by considering it as something other than an 'objective' historical event. Faith in the resurrection liberates the believer from history by placing him in an ahistorical 'now,' in which the gospel challenges him to make a decision for Christ. In this the believer has his identity disclosed to him in his own 'historicity.' Faith is private and individual. As far as the biblical texts are concerned, a certain self-understanding expresses itself. The event of understanding occurs when this self-understanding is addressed to us and we appropriate it. The question about God becomes the question of the authenticity of human existence.

Behind Bultmann's hermeneutic lies the search for the meaning of the history of existence, the search, in the individual's case, for his own being. Bultmann stresses the search for self-identity. His hermeneutic is based on a prior doctrine of revelation. This doctrine of revelation presupposes the timeless presence of God, and this presence provokes the decision for authentic human existence. This existence, however, is not touched by the theodicy question. Man finds his identity apart from the pain of the world. Faith, then, is deliverance from the world and its problems. The meaning of the past is not sought for its own sake, but in order to answer the problem of identity posed by existentialist analysis.

21 Bultmann, "Toward a Political Hermeneutic of the Gospel," p.92.

22 *Ibid.*, p.93.

In response, Moltmann criticises Bultmann's notion of private history.

Moltmann writes:

"Participation in history is participation in the history of mankind, in political, social, and scientific-technical history. This participation, however, leads far beyond the search for the meaning of one's own being."²¹

Bultmann has replaced the quest for meaning in history with the quest for the meaning of existence; or, in other words, he has replaced the search for a just world with the quest for the identity of private existence.

If the 'end of history' has already come in Bultmann's authentic existence, man is relieved of responsibility for the social and political history of the present.

"In the horizon of the theodicy question the resurrection of the crucified Jesus by God is understandable as the beginning of the new creation of God's righteousness, which corresponds only provisionally to faith but conclusively to a new world. In effect, this transforms faith from deliverance from the world into an initiative that changes the world and shapes those who believe into worldly, personal, social, and political witnesses to God's righteousness and freedom in the midst of a repressive society and an unredeemed world."²²

(ii) Marx's Revolutionary Historical Hermeneutic

The point of Marx's critique of religion is the reversal of mysticism into revolution. Rather than become a mere interpretation of past history, hermeneutics becomes an effort to realise in the present what is historically announced.

21 Moltmann, "Toward a Political Hermeneutic of the Gospel," p.92.

22 Ibid., p.93.

For the young Marx, religion is nothing other than the expression of real misery and the protest against real afflictions. But, as ineffective expressions and protests, religion does nothing to alter the prevailing conditions in society. Religion, which has the potential to be progressive through its vision of a better order, becomes reactionary by turning people's minds towards heaven, and away from the earth. The consequence of this is the ratification of existing social structures. In Marxist terms, religion functions as a counter-revolutionary force.

Moltmann seizes upon the revolutionary inheritance of religion, the inheritance which Marx believed was transferred into heaven, and argues that Marx's dismissal of it must be overcome. Religion must not be solely a consolation to the exploited, but must itself become radical by promoting action in history in the face of distress and suffering. For Moltmann, faith is the categorical imperative which demands action in history for freedom. He writes:

"The radical consequence of the criticism of myths is not existentialist interpretation, but the revolutionary realization of freedom within present conditions."²³

For Moltmann, the resurrection of Jesus is, ultimately, the true protest against human suffering, and it leads the believer, by way of the cross, back to the earth to protest against all conditions which produce suffering. Christianity has intrinsically, for Moltmann, the character of protest and action in history.

23 Ibid., p.95. Stress added.

The biblical texts outline a 'horizon of concern' between Christ and his future. The task of hermeneutics, according to Moltmann, is to ask how the biblical horizon of freedom can be mediated to the oppressions of the present.

"From this vantage point, then, textual exegesis is no longer merely a peculiar concern of self-understanding. . . . It is more a matter of a special understanding which strives for practical congruence between the biblical tradition's horizon of concern and the conditions of the present. It is therefore an understanding which perceives the needs and the opportunities of present social reality."²⁴

The criterion of theology and faith, in other words, is to be found in world-transforming praxis.²⁵

To Moltmann, the language of the New Testament is the language of apostolicity. Hermeneutics must correspondingly be the hermeneutics of the apostolate. Moltmann notes by this that hermeneutics must become the hermeneutics of mission to the world.

"The real point of reference for the exposition and appropriation of the historic Bible witness, and the one that is their motive and driving force, lies in the mission of present Christianity - and to the universal future of God for the world and for all men, towards which this mission takes place."²⁶

Hermeneutics is not concerned exclusively with proclamation and language. Proclamation and language stand within a social and political matrix. Hermeneutics cannot be, therefore, as with Dilthey, the 'act of understanding written expressions of life,' but is the understanding of the historical

24 Ibid., p.96-97.

25 Moltmann, "God in Revolution," p.138 in RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE.

26 Ibid.

28 Y.H., p.263.

(b) Political Hermeneutics

"Theological hermeneutic is abstract as long as it does not become the theory of practice and sterile when it does not make 'the entrance of future truth' possible."²⁶

The Bible contains the written promises of freedom. The task of hermeneutics is to outline the means and methods of practical liberation in the present, and to demonstrate the gospel's horizon of concern in the current life situation.

"This hermeneutic can therefore be called a political hermeneutic because it apprehends politics. . . as the inclusive horizon of the life of mankind."²⁷

To Moltmann, the language of the New Testament is the language of apostleship. Hermeneutics must correspondingly be the hermeneutics of the apostolate. Moltmann means by this that hermeneutics must become the hermeneutics of mission in the world.

"The real point of reference for the exposition and appropriation of the historic Bible witness, and the one that is their motive and driving force, lies in the mission of present Christianity, and in the universal future of God for the world and for all men, towards which this mission takes place."²⁸

Hermeneutics is not concerned exclusively with proclamation and language.

Proclamation and language stand within a social and political matrix.

Hermeneutics cannot be, therefore, as with Dilthey, the 'act of understanding written expressions of life,' but is the understanding of the historical

26 Moltmann, "Toward a Political Hermeneutic of the Gospel," p.98.

27 Ibid.

28 T.H., p.283.

expressions of life within their political context.²⁹ In this, the spirit of freedom and the new future of God are brought into the misery of the present.

As far as Christian faith is concerned, the constant in the hermeneutic is Jesus, the crucified Christ. The crucified Christ alone can legitimate the content of Christian theology and life. The identity of Christianity is to be found in the cross of the risen Christ, and in the life which necessitated such a death. The invariable in hermeneutics is the future of Jesus. Christian teaching cannot conserve old concepts and representations of hope, because they are time-related. The images and tasks of hope are variable to each age; their orientation toward the future of Jesus and the coming new age are invariable. Thus, the poles within which Christian hermeneutics move are the cross and the future of Jesus. In this case, Christian hermeneutics must become the hermeneutics of the eschatology of the cross in which the truth of the gospel is irresolvably bound up with the negativity of history and its future. The task in each age is to develop this dialectic in relation to the particular forms of man's needs in the present day. This cannot be done by adjusting men to being or to private subjectivity; rather, men must be adjusted to the rectifying future of God.³⁰ Only if this future is the future of the crucified Christ can the future of our present negativities belong with the future of Jesus.

29 Moltmann, "Towards a Political Hermeneutic of the Gospel," p.102.

30 T.H., p.220f.

32 Moltmann, THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT, 7.79.

The kingdom of God does not lie in readiness in the future, so that one only has to await it. Christians have to seek the kingdom in order to find it.

"Christian hope anticipates the future in the spirit of Christ and realizes it under the conditions of history. In that this future is anticipated in hope and obedience, it is itself conceived as in the process of coming. . . This means that Christian hope is a creative and militant hope in history."³¹

The Christian hope must be derived from Christ. Christ informs our understanding of the meaning of the future in the present, and it is in terms of him, therefore, that political hermeneutics must be measured. Political hermeneutics must show the relevance of the theological history of Jesus for life today.

The synoptic writers present Jesus as 'the One who brings the good news of the expected last time.' Jesus preaches his gospel of the kingdom to the poor and calls captives into the liberty of the coming kingdom. His ministry

"begins with the broken, the captives and the blind, as Luke says, or, in Matthew's words, with the blind, the lame, the lepers, the deaf and the dead."³²

Enslavement and dehumanisation are understood in both a spiritual and a socio-political sense. Jesus' solidarity with the 'poor' is a social solidarity with the totality of their plight. This solidarity binds them into

31 Moltmann, "Hope and History," p.271;
See also, Moltmann, "Understanding of History in Christian Social Ethics," p.129 n.44:

"Good works do not build the Kingdom of God, but hope in the coming Kingdom assumes ethical forms within history."

32 Moltmann, THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT, p.79.

a 'fellowship of the wretched.'³³ It also binds them to the future.

In his ministry, Jesus provoked conflict between the powers of the past and the power of the future because he bound the concrete liberation of the people to himself and his future.

This event of solidarity provoked specific clashes with the powers of religion, the state, and death. The new righteousness of God is manifest in the 'blasphemous' and 'rebellious' Jesus. The rights and ordinances of the religious law have been replaced by the regime of grace. Because the punishment of Jesus was a political event, his cross has an irrevokable political dimension.³⁴ The cross forbids the separation of private faith and public practice. The trinitarian history of God, which includes cross and resurrection, history unto death and the future as a new creation, means that death is given a future. Jesus' fellowship with those without hope overcomes the religious, political, and mortal powers in an unmerited act of grace.

The range of Jesus' solidarity with men in his life proclaims the range of interest of the kingdom of God. The eschatological kingdom of God means 'Behold I make all things new.' (Rev. 21.5)

"It is not a 'purely religious kingdom' which could be realized through the power of a new religion. Nor does it merely hold sway over man's personal relationship to God, which could be represented in the private religion of the heart. It is not a moral authority, confined to a changed way of life on the part of men. It is not even kingship only over the living, from which the dead would be excluded. . . . It embraces the religious life as well as the political one, the private as well as the social, the living as well as the dead."³⁵

33 Ibid., p.80.

34 Ibid., p.90.

35 Ibid., p.100.

Christian life which follows Christ and lives in hope for his future cannot be split up into vertical 'before God' and horizontal 'in the world' dimensions.³⁶ The way of Christ reveals that the divinity of God is found solely in the realm of history, the history of religion, politics and death. The eschatology of the cross means precisely this. It is the task of hermeneutics to work out concretely what the way of Christ means for Christian theology and life today.³⁷

36 Ibid., p.107.

37 Moltmann has briefly developed a 'psychological hermeneutic of liberation.' This is outlined here in footnote form because it is not an essential aspect of political hermeneutics, but it is important for the overall statement of Moltmann's position.

According to Moltmann, theology has to translate the dialectic of the eschatology of the cross on to the specific level of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. That is, the mentally ill and the psychologically disturbed must be seen in the light of the situation created by the crucified God (C.G., p.292). Moltmann attempts to do this by way of a discussion of Freud's psychoanalysis. Moltmann is of the opinion that Freud's psychoanalysis can demonstrate the psychological barriers against which Christian faith must exercise its liberating power.

Firstly, Moltmann sees a correspondence between Freud's analysis of religion and repression, on the one hand, and the cross's destruction of idols on the other. In the face of guilt and anxiety, people flee to rituals and idols to survive. Such rituals and idols include the fatherland, race, class, profit, consumption, and anti-social attitudes. For as long as people identify themselves with such as these, and find their identity in them, they remain unfree. Attack on these rituals and idols produces the severest hostility. People, therefore, seek only after like. This is a motive behind xenophobia, anti-semitism, racial hatred, and persecution of both Christians and communists. Christian faith in the crucified God renounces the security of these idols. Christ has taken up suffering, guilt-ridden, and anxious people into himself.

"In becoming weak, impotent, vulnerable and mortal, (Christ) frees man from the quest for powerful idols and protective compulsions and makes him ready to accept his humanity, his freedom and his mortality. In this situation of the human God the pattern formations of repressions become unnecessary. (C.G., p.303)"

Secondly, Moltmann sees a correspondence between Freud's law of parricide and 'father-religion,' on the one hand, and the liberation from external authorities wrought by the crucified God, on the other. Freud believed that the Oedipus complex explained the necessity for religion. Religion allows men to erase the primal guilt caused by the primeval son's rebellion against his father. Christian faith has often assumed the conceptions of authority and atonement corresponding to the Oedipus complex. The crucified God, however, breaks with Oedipal images.

"The crucified Christ makes earthly fathers and earthly sons alike sons of God and brings them in community to the freedom which lies beyond the Oedipus complex." (C.G., p.307)
Christianity is not a 'father-religion.'

Thirdly, Moltmann sees a correspondence between Freud's analysis of illusion and religious wish-fulfilment, on the one hand, and the realistic hope for the future of Christ, on the other. For Freud, religion is the appearance of what we desire and wish for. Religion is dependent upon the pleasure principle. In place of this, Freud advocated an anti-utopian reality principle of resignation to fate. The theology of hope overcomes this unsatisfactory resignation. In so doing, it does not lapse back into wish-fulfilment, however. If hope is the corollary to the coming future of God which is present as the cross of Christ, then hope is grounded in the 'cross of reality' and the pathos of God.

"Christian faith understands itself as faithfulness to hope as it is mindful of the resurrection of Christ, and as faithfulness to the earth as it is mindful of the cross of Christ. Because it leads man into this history of God, it frees him for an acceptance of human life which is capable of suffering and capable of love." (C.G., p.313)

In these three points, Moltmann has tried to show what the concept of the eschatology of the cross means in relation to Freudian analysis. Moltmann's account, however, is both cursory and inadequate. He does not investigate the relationship between Freudian psychoanalysis and the eschatology of the cross at a deep enough level. He fails to indicate what practical meaning the eschatology of the cross might have for psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. We need to know whether the eschatology of the cross would challenge the assumptions and practices of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, and on what basis it could do so. If the discussion is not carried out on this level, the eschatology of the cross remains abstract with respect to psychology.

3. The Tasks of Liberation

Within the dialectic of the eschatology of the cross, the cross is seen as the incarnation of the risen Christ. Political theology attempts to join theology to the crucified rule of Christ on earth on behalf of the coming historical liberation which God has announced. This conjunction involves a threefold liberation. Firstly, the liberation of the concept of God from speculative, political metaphors, and the liberation of politics from the hold of absolute, ideal, and quasi-divine authorities. Secondly, the liberation of the Christian church from political or civil religion. Thirdly, the liberating work of Christians in the world to relieve suffering and humanise society. The first and second tasks of liberation are not entirely negative; they include a positive stance on the proper nature of God and politics, on the one hand, and the proper constitution of the church, on the other.

... by definition God cannot suffer and
... he is more causality. But Christian theology
must think of God's being as suffering and dying
And finally to the death of Jesus, it is to die to
surrender itself and lose its identity.³⁸

This totalitarian notion of God, in which there is 'death to God,'
separates itself from philosophical notions of God. Without a totalitarian
understanding of God, Christianity as a religion would not become the
religious ratification of society. God is totalitarian, in this case,

38. *E.C.*, p.207, and Robinson,
"The Crucified God and Apocalypticism," p.92.

39. *E.C.*, p.63 and p.205.

40. *Ibid.*, p.205, and Robinson,
"The Crucified God and Apocalypticism," p.92.

(a) Concepts of Liberation

(i) The Revolution in the Concept of God

The liberation of the concept of God from the hold of speculative metaphors arises from thinking about God in the light of the godforsakenness of Jesus on the cross.³⁸ It has been seen in a previous section that the eschatology of the cross demands trinitarian thinking about God. As such, there can be no speculative, moral, or metaphysical talk of God in Christian theology. Instead of a 'pure theory' of God, Christian theology has to develop a 'critical theory' of God.³⁹ Here God is known in the cross of Christ and in the suffering which it involved.

The theistic or metaphysical concept of God stands in opposition to the life of suffering unto death.

"If this concept of God is applied to Christ's death on the cross, the cross must be 'evacuated' of deity, for by definition God cannot suffer and die. He is pure causality. But Christian theology must think of God's being in suffering and dying and finally in the death of Jesus, if it is not to surrender itself and lose its identity."⁴⁰

This trinitarian notion of God, in which there is 'death in God,' separates itself from philosophical notions of God. Without a trinitarian understanding of God, Christianity assimilates itself into becoming the religious ratification of society. God is understood, in this case,

38 C.G., p.200f, and Moltmann, "The Crucified God and Apathetic Man," p.69f.

39 C.G., p.69 and p.208.

40 Ibid., p.214.

as a God of order and structure. For Moltmann, God is not to be monotheistically conceived. Christian faith is not a 'monotheistic form of belief' (Schleiermacher); neither is it 'radical monotheism' (H. Richard Niebuhr).⁴¹

"As a theology of the cross, Christian theology is the criticism of and liberation from philosophical monotheism. . . . It brings liberation from the divinized father-figures by which men seek to sustain their childhood."⁴²

It is by way of trinitarian thinking, in which God is conceived of in terms of

"the unity of the dialectical history of Father and Son and Spirit in the cross on Golgotha,"⁴³

that Moltmann introduces the important notion of the pathos of God.

The 'pathetic' theology of the cross stands over against the 'apathetic' theology of Greek antiquity.⁴⁴ Apatheia, as a predicate in speech about God, derives from Plato and Aristotle. It means 'incapable of being affected by outside influences and feelings.' It is associated with unchangeableness and insensitivity. In an ethical sense it denotes freedom. Apatheia came to be the primary designation of God's perfection. This notion of the apathetic God came into Christian theology, and, in particular, affected the doctrine of the two natures of Christ.

41 Ibid., p.215.

42 Ibid., p.215-216. For Moltmann's answer to 'protest' atheism, which is dependent upon a philosophical notion of God, see C.G., p.219f.

43 Ibid., p.247.

44 Ibid., p.228f and 267f. Also see Moltmann, "The Crucified God and Apathetic Man," p.73f.

Here Christ did not really suffer. The consequence of this was a dualism in Christian theology between the higher, apathetic way of God, and the lower, mundane way of the world.

"The God-situation of apatheia leads man into transcendent freedom from his body and environment. Faith in the apathetic God leads to the ethics of man's liberation from need and drive, and to domination over body and nature."⁴⁵

Pathos denotes need, compassion, drives, dependence, lower passions, and unwilling suffering. Abraham Heschel first described the prophets' proclamation of God as 'pathetic.'⁴⁶ God is not apart from history, and his history cannot be separated from the history of his people. Heschel developed, correspondingly, a dipolar theology wherein God is free in himself and at the same time affected by his covenant relationship with Israel. Christian theology, according to Moltmann, must develop this idea further in the direction of a trinitarian theology of the cross. If we think of God in terms of the new 'situation of God' in the crucified Christ, we find that the direction of Greek theology is reversed:

"it is not the ascent of man to God but the revelation of God in his self-emptying in the crucified Christ which opens up God's sphere of life to the development of man in him."⁴⁷

45 Moltmann, "The Crucified God and Apathetic Man," p.75.

46 "Divine ethos does not operate without pathos. Any thought of an objectivity, or Platonic self-subsistence of ideas, be it the idea of beauty or of justice, is alien to the prophets. God is all-personal, all-subject. His ethos and his pathos are one." Abraham Heschel, THE PROPHETS, p.218.

47 C.G., p.275.

In place of a dipolar theology of call and response, Christian theology puts the dialectical theology of the eschatology of the cross, for only in and through Christ is a dialogical relationship with God possible.

In Christian theology there is a christological basis for talk of God; this basis is trinitarian,⁴⁸ because in Christ, God entered into total solidarity with man's forsakenness. Thus,

"no one need dissemble and appear other than he is to perceive the fellowship of the human God with him. Rather, he can lay aside all dissembling and sham and become what he truly is in this human God."⁴⁹

Moltmann has tried to derive talk of God from its origins in Old Testament prophetic history and the history of Christ. The God of the cross is the contradiction of the religious God of righteousness, beauty, and morality. Moltmann calls this a 'revolution' in the concept of God.⁵⁰ God and suffering are not in contradiction to each other. Suffering has become a part of the experience of God. It is this notion of the trinitarian and crucified God which becomes the cutting edge of Moltmann's attack on the false divinities in religious and political life.

48 Moltmann himself calls his theology 'trinitarian.'

That the eschatology of the cross is not self-evidently trinitarian will be discussed later.

49 Ibid., p.277.

50 Ibid., p.4.

(ii) The Liberation of Politics

Moltmann writes:

"If the one profaned with crucifixion by the authority of the state is the Christ of God, then what is lowest in the political imagination is changed into what is highest. What the state had considered the deepest humiliation, namely, the cross, bears the highest dignity. . . . If this crucified one becomes divine authority for the believers, the political-religious faith in authority ceases to hold sway over them. For them, the political forces are deprived of direct religious justification from above."⁵¹

Political authority is deprived of its religious ratification. Moltmann works out this view in terms of two theses. The first derives from the Second Commandment which forbids all images of God. This not only initiates a world view freed from religious idolatry, but also a political life freed from idolatry. This prohibition of images is radicalised by the theology of the cross, and this is the second thesis. Every claim of divinity in man or nature is relativised and secularised by the cross of Christ.

The Old Testament prohibition of images drew nature away from divine provenance and into the responsibility of man. In this, the iconoclasm of the Second Commandment and the Enlightenment programme of critical reason shared a common cause.⁵² It was Hobbes who interpreted the Second Commandment politically. He argued that men should not make any image to represent them. The republicans of the

51 Moltmann "Political Theology," p.111;
cf. also Moltmann "The Cross and Civil Religion," p.35f.

52 Moltmann "The Cross and Civil Religion," p.38f.

Enlightenment saw this quite clearly when they argued that the true character of democracy is iconoclasm. Democracy is the political fulfilment of the Second Commandment.⁵³

In a similar way, belief in the Lordship of the crucified Christ differentiates Christianity from other religions and ideologies.

"Belief in Christ crucified occupies that space claimed and opened up by the Old Testament's prohibition of images. . . . Belief in him implies the abandonment and destruction of all earthly images and representations of the divine."⁵⁴

The cross of Christ secularises and relativises politics. Faith in the crucified God forces the believer into a permanent iconoclasm against political personality cults, natural religion, and the fetishism for money and commodities.⁵⁵ Christianity, therefore, must always seek to criticise the nature, limits, and purpose of the state in order that the state may remain truly secular: no power, authority, or state can be considered to be divinely sanctioned. Thus Moltmann believes that Christianity has the task of assisting the political world to affirm its worldly character, and to criticise it when it tries to claim a divine sanction.

53 *Ibid.*, p.39.

54 *Ibid.*, p.40.

55 Moltmann, "Political Theology," p.115.

56 For this section see T.H. p.305f and Moltmann "New Frontiers of Christianity in Political Society," p.143f.

(b) Liberation and the Church

Here we are concerned with institutional and ideological criticism of the church. There are two stages in this criticism. The first is the concern to isolate the role of the church in its accommodation to society. The second is to locate the way in which the church can free itself from serving the vested interests of society instead of the crucified Christ. Here Moltmann lays the foundation for a messianic ecclesiology in the light of the eschatology of the cross.

(i) The Accommodating Church⁵⁶

Moltmann tries to explore the roles of the church in modern society, and to inquire whether they are appropriate to the eschatology of the cross. Beginning with the Roman Emperor Constantine, the Christian religion took over the social place of the old Roman state religion. Christianity assumed responsibility as protector and preserver of the state. It became the religion of society, placating the gods and guaranteeing the well-being of the state. Religion and society pursued a common course. Religion was the 'centre' of the society, integrating and stabilising the society.

Modern industrial society acquired its nature precisely through its emancipation from this religious centre. Society became a 'system of needs' and men began to relate to each other for the social necessity of production and consumption. Any other social intercourse – culture,

56 For this section see T.H. p.304f and Moltmann
"New Frontiers of Christianity in Industrial Society," p.108f.

nationality, religion - was removed from the sphere of necessity to the sphere of voluntary association. This became the sphere of freedom and individual decision. The age of mass industrial organisation is at the same time, dialectically, the age of individuality; the age of socialisation is also the age of free association. Religion, as an area of free association, became quite unnecessary and superfluous to the administration of the public realm of production and consumption. Christianity is released from the burden of providing a religious integration of society. Moltmann identifies three forms of the church's life in this society. In the light of the eschatology of the cross, these three forms are inadequate representations of the necessary constitution of the Christian church.

(1) Faith as the Religion of the Personal. In contemporary industrial society, religion is assigned the task of preserving personal, individual, and private humanity. Religion is considered to be a private matter, a matter of inwardness and feeling. If society is inhuman and objective, faith is the guardian of the uniquely human and subjective. Cosmological theism has been replaced by a metaphysic of subjectivity. Faith is localised in that ethical reality which is determined by man's free decisions and encounters, and not in the pattern of social behavior, political responsibility and economic intercourse. As there is no room for God in the sphere of worldly knowledge, the question of God must be asked in relation to the question of man's identity.

In the relationship between the public and the personal spheres of activity and existence, religion serves as a means of inner unburdening and spiritual adjustment. As a consequence of this relationship, religious questions cannot be put to social reality. Moltmann is clear in his condemnation of this relationship:

"A cultural saving of humanity by means of the cultivating and deepening of our subjectivity in constant metaphysical reflection, in art and religion, is romanticist escapism as long as social conditions are not changed. Where conditions are left as they are, this cultural saving of humanity automatically acquires the function of stabilizing these social conditions in their non-humanity, by providing the inner life of the heart with the things which it has to do without in the outside world."⁵⁷

Religion, relieved of social and political obligation, has given up any prophetic potential which it may have for public criticism, and has assumed in its place the function of providing personal stability.

(2) Christianity as the Religion of Fellowship in Society.

Christianity is seen as providing the transcendental determination of co-humanity as community. Moltmann regards the assumption of this role as an attempt to actualise an idyllic memory which has its origin in the age of romanticism.⁵⁸ Over against artificial and arbitrary organisation in society, community as co-humanity is personal. In community, the loneliness and isolation experienced in society are deterred. Here people can find their human being; people are allowed to be human.

57 T.H., p.315.

58 Ibid., p.317.

In this analysis, the Christian congregation has the function of creating the community and fellowship which are lacking in the realm of production and consumption. Congregations provide warmth and nearness, spontaneity and authentic life. Again Moltmann is definite in his criticism:

"The subliminal existence of free communities of this kind is for modern society a most salutary thing, because in the domestic economy of the human soul it can provide a certain compensation for the economic and technical forces of destruction. This, however, does nothing to alter the stern reality of the loss of the human in 'society.' It provides only a dialectical compensation and a disburdening of the soul, so that in the alternating rhythm of the private and the public, of community and society, man can endure his official existence today."⁵⁹

In community as co-humanity, over against society, the church becomes a non-worldly phenomenon. The church gives up its remit to change society, and becomes instead a dialectical counterbalance to society.

(3) Christianity as Religious Institution. The modern organisation of society works to the advantage of religious institution. Institutionalisation provides stability and order amid rapid social change. It gives temporal existence a permanent character. Questions of meaning hold no terror if people have confidence in the authority of the institutional church. People delegate to the institutional church the theological problems involved in their believing decisions; questions of faith are left to the institutional 'theological specialists.' But by finding security in the institution and in the abrogation of personal responsibility, the believer develops a non-committal outlook. One is no longer required to understand, because

59 Ibid., p.320.

the institution makes the decisions. An anonymous Christianity is created, and no effort is directed toward challenging the social or political context of life.

In these three roles, Christianity has accommodated itself to the prevailing social organisation. Christianity meets the needs which modern society leaves untended. In none of these three roles does Christianity bring critical awareness to bear on the structures of society. These roles leave

"Christianity with nothing to say to the world other than what the world wants to hear."⁶⁰

Christianity finds itself in a new 'Babylonian captivity.'⁶¹ In its accommodation to society, Christianity has tried to find relevance in the world, but it has done so at the expense of an identity derived from the crucified Christ.

Over against the view of the church which is set within society's expectations and analysis of need, Moltmann argues that the church should exist within the horizon of expectation of the kingdom of God.⁶² Christianity is constitutively eschatological, and the Christian community lives from the standpoint of the sovereignty of the risen Christ and his coming future. This eschatological orientation means that mission is the essential mode of being for the church.

60 Moltmann, "New Frontiers of Christianity in Industrial Society," p.117.

61 Ibid., and T.H., p.324.

62 T.H., p.325f and "New Frontiers of Christianity in Industrial Society," p.118f.

"This mission is not carried out within the horizon of expectation provided by the social roles which society concedes to the Church, but it takes place within its own peculiar horizon of the eschatological expectation of the coming kingdom of God, of the coming righteousness and the coming peace, of the coming freedom and dignity of man. The Christian church has not to serve mankind in order that this world may remain what it is, or may be preserved in the state in which it is, but in order that it may transform itself and become what it is promised to be."⁶³

This means that the church, as the community of hope, must act as a critical force in the governance of the world because the world does not yet correspond to the kingdom of God.

Mission means not just the propagation of Christian faith and hope, but also the historic transformation of life. Life includes persons and things, relationships and history.⁶⁴

"The Christian life no longer consists in fleeing the world and in spiritual resignation from it, but is engaged in an attack upon the world and a calling in the world."⁶⁵

The Christian life is a life which works for the coming kingdom of God, and this includes criticising and transforming the present. The church, therefore, may be called a revolutionary force within history.⁶⁶

63 T.H., p.327.

64 Ibid., p.330. and C.G., p.23.

65 T.H., p.331.

66 For Moltmann's understanding of the term 'revolution' see RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE. p.32.

(ii) Civil Religion⁶⁷

In Moltmann's more recent analysis of the church's role in society he moves away from the consideration of the church's accommodation to society's expectations to the consideration of the church's role in supporting the symbolic integration and mythical ratification of society by civil religion. The criticism of the accommodating church and its privatised religiosity is radicalised to become the criticism of the church's refusal to call into question the civil religion which preserves the social and political status quo. This radicalisation is not a change of opinion on Moltmann's part, but a deepening of his analysis.

Civil or political religion is not a Christian invention. The old political religion of Rome provided the integration and self-confirmation of society. Political religion served the primary function of bonding the society. From the time of the Emperor Constantine, Christianity took over the role as the political religion of society. Christianity was politicised in accordance with the standards and requirements of the state. Although the medieval union of church and state was challenged by the Enlightenment, the substance of political religion has not disappeared from society. New forms of political religion have come about which are more appropriate to the needs of modern society. Moltmann cites the nationalism of the nineteenth century, the divinisation

67 Cf. C.G., p.321f and Moltmann "The Cross and Civil Religion" p.14f and "Political Theology," p.101f.

of particular cultures, and the 'religious' characteristics of both capitalism and socialism as examples.

"Imperialistic religions are completely monotheistic, in order to lend religious support to the central authority. Patriotic religions are for the most part polytheistic, because each fatherland has its especial gods. In socialism the political religions tend towards pantheistic materialism. Capitalism in turn displays primitive forms of fetishism, involving gold and possessions."⁶⁸

Moltmann illustrates contemporary civil religion by a presentation of the analysis of American civil religion by the sociologist, Robert Bellah. Bellah has shown, from the inaugural speeches of American Presidents, that there is a civil religion in the United States. In the pilgrim fathers it is messianic; in its social critique and Revolution it is prophetic; and in Lincoln and the civil war it is martyred. American civil religion has its national worship and holy days. Civil religion is the motivation behind Roosevelt's New Deal, Kennedy's New Frontier, and the civil rights movement. It has also been used as the basis for national arrogance as in planting the United States' flag on the moon instead of the flag of the United Nations'. And, as recent black theology has shown, American civil religion is white rather than multi-racial.⁶⁹

In general terms, modern political or civil religion is derived from the political humanism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

⁶⁸ C.G., p.323.

⁶⁹ See James Cone BLACK THEOLOGY AND BLACK POWER and GOD OF THE OPPRESSED.

According to Rousseau, political religions have four dogmas: the existence of the Almighty, belief in providence, an afterlife, and reward for the good and punishment for the wicked. According to Moltmann this is a 'post-denominational' natural theology.⁷⁰ It is monotheistic, has a belief in the natural rights of man, and is inherently conservative in its support of the culture.

Christianity has assumed a self-understanding which is above all political understanding, and which, thereby, does not threaten the 'political' theology of political or civil religion. For as long as Christianity remains the cult of the private or of the community or of the institution, it sanctions the public civil religion and consequently ratifies the religious sanctification of society. However,

"Christian faith, for the sake of the crucified one, cannot accommodate itself to the political religions of the societies in which it lives. Rather, if it wants to maintain its identity as Christian faith, it must become the power of liberation from them."⁷¹

Moltmann's position over against the accommodating church and its lack of opposition to civil religion derives from the eschatology of the cross. While eschatology forces Christianity to refuse to identify the present structures of society with the kingdom of God, the cross of Christ forces Christians to become involved in the concrete struggle for public freedom. The genesis of Moltmann's thinking on this matter is found in the thesis of E. Peterson. In his MONOTHEISMUS ALS POLITISCHES PROBLEM (1935), Peterson demonstrated that

70 Moltmann "The Cross and Civil Religion" p.27f.

'Post-denominational' means that it cuts across denominational barriers. It is universal.

71 Moltmann, "Political Theology," p.111.

political-religious monotheism was incompatible with the inner essence of Christian faith. This inner essence consists of the trinitarian doctrine of God and the eschatological concept of peace.⁷² For Peterson, Christianity fundamentally breaks with all political religion. Christianity cannot be mis-used to justify a political situation.⁷³ The doctrine of the Trinity forbids Christian avowal of political monotheism and political metaphysics,⁷⁴ and the eschatology of peace forbids Christian avowal of the peace secured by political authority.

Peterson's thesis does not go far enough for Moltmann. According to Moltmann, we are required to think through the dialectic of the eschatology of the cross into political and social life. We find in the cross of Christ the incarnation of the future. The cross is the point at which we distinguish between Christian faith and civil religion, and the cross designates the beginning point and criterion for a proper Christian political theology. If the cross is the truly political point in the history of Jesus, Christianity cannot put itself above and beyond political activity and life. The eschatology of the cross, therefore, must be employed to demythologise civil religion. This is, at bottom, a political task.

"The liberating memory of the crucified Jesus compels Christians to a critical political theology."⁷⁵

72 Ibid., p.107. See also the Introduction to this study.

73 C.G., p.326.

74 "The liberal sacrifice of the doctrine of the Trinity is the sign for the unconscious dissolution of Christian faith in the political religion of a 'Christian world'." Moltmann, "Political Theology" p.107.

75 Ibid., p.118.

(iii) Messianic Ecclesiology

Moltmann is critical of the church which accommodates itself to the present structures and needs of industrial society, on the one hand, and which does not attack the divinisation of the nation and the political and economic order, on the other. The basis of this critical position is the eschatology of the cross. While this critical stance is an essential part of Christian existence as far as political theology is concerned, the theology of the cross of the risen Christ remains abstract if it does not contribute to the positive task of constructing a proper understanding of the church.⁷⁶ In the light of the eschatological person of Christ, the church exists as a factor of present liberation between remembrance of his history and hope for his kingdom.⁷⁷

The Christian church is the church of Jesus Christ. Thus Moltmann calls his ecclesiology a 'messianic ecclesiology.'⁷⁸

"The true church is to be found where Christ is present. . . . We cannot start from the concept of the church in order to discover the happening of Christ's presence; we have to start from the event of Christ's presence in order to find the church. In this sense we start from the proposition: ubi Christus - ibi ecclesia."⁷⁹

Christ is present where he promised to be present. Firstly, in his identifying assurance Christ promised his presence with the apostolate,

76 Moltmann "The Cross and Civil Religion," p.42. Although Moltmann's ecclesiology is fully developed in THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT, the essential features are outlined in "The Cross and Civil Religion," and "Political Theology."

77 Moltmann THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT p.75.

78 Ibid. Subtitle.

79 Ibid., p.122.

in the sacraments, and in the fellowship of the brethren. Secondly, in his identifying assurance Christ promised his presence with the 'least of the brethren.' Thirdly, Christ is present as his own self in his parousia.⁸⁰

Firstly, Christ is present in his identification with the apostolate, the sacraments, and the fellowship of believers.

"This means that Christ arrives at his identity in the world by way of his identifications with something else, and that conversely his parousia is anticipated in the realization of his presence through word, sacrament and fellowship."⁸¹

This is a Real Presence in the Spirit through identification, and an identification on the basis of promise. Secondly, the 'least of the brethren' have the latent and hidden presence of Christ. Matthew 25. 31-46 belongs to ecclesiology first of all, and only secondly to ethics.

"If we take the promises of Christ's presence seriously, we must talk about a brotherhood of believers and a brotherhood of the least of his brethren with Christ . . . Evidently there are two brotherhoods of Christ, the professed and professing brotherhood which is the community of the exalted one; and the unknown and disowned brotherhood of the least of men with the humiliated Christ. If the church appeals to the crucified and risen Christ, must it not represent this double brotherhood of Christ in itself, and be present with word and Spirit, sacrament, fellowship and all creative powers among the poor, the hungry and the captives? . . . The apostolate says what the church is. The least of Christ's brethren say where the church belongs."⁸²

The presence of Christ with the least of the brethren is the presence of the cross in the world. There is a worldly solidarity between Christ

80 Ibid., p.123.

81 Ibid., p.125.

82 Ibid., p.129.

and his cross and the suffering of the present age. Thirdly, Christ is present as himself in the parousia. Parousia literally means presence. What this involves is as yet beyond our experience. It can only be expected and anticipated. As such, it brings the historical present under the dynamism of the 'not yet.'

To sum up:

"If we try to link Christ's presence in the apostolate and his presence in the least of the brethren with his presence in glory, then on the one hand the dynamism of the provisional in the apostolate and in the poor runs to meet his consummating and redeeming appearance in glory. On the other hand the one who is to come is then already present in an anticipatory sense in history in the Spirit and the word, and in the miserable and the helpless."⁸³

The church of Christ exists in two ways: in those who are sent and in those who wait. The first is the brotherhood of believers, and the second is the brotherhood of the poor. The first is the fellowship of the resurrection, and the second is the fellowship of the cross.⁸⁴

In this way, the doctrine of the church is a corrolary of the eschatology of the cross.

83 Ibid., p.132.

84 Moltmann "The Cross and Civil Religion," p.44.

(c) Liberation in the World

It has been seen how the political theology of the eschatology of the cross must adopt a critical attitude towards political religion in society and in the church. It has also been seen how political theology must liberate the state from the divinisation of idols and absolute political concepts. And centrally, the appropriate revolution which must take place in the concept of God was described. We are concerned now with the practical initiatives in the world which are demanded by critical political theology. If the kingdom of God is to be anticipated in politics, and not in a separate sphere called 'religion',⁸⁵ concrete political actions must be called into being. Put in the form of a question: If Christian theology is the theology of the eschatology of the cross, how are Christians to anticipate practically the future of Christ amid the history of the cross?

For Moltmann, the crucified God, while a stateless and classless God, is not an unpolitical God. In Christ, God entered into a partisan solidarity with the poor, the humiliated, the hopeless, and the oppressed. Thus:

"The rule of Christ who was crucified for political reasons can only be extended through liberation from forms of rule which make men servile and apathetic and the political religions which give them stability. . . . Christians will seek to anticipate the future of Christ according to the measure of the possibilities available to them, by breaking down lordship and building up the political liveliness of each individual."⁸⁶

85 Moltmann "Christian Theology and its Problems Today," p.12.

86 C.G., p.329.

The political hermeneutic of the cross is made actual in concrete political initiatives in the world whereby people can come to political maturity and assume responsibility for themselves and their communities.

The political initiatives advocated by Moltmann must confront what he calls the five 'vicious circles of death' which maintain people in servitude. Firstly, Moltmann identifies the vicious circle of poverty. He means this term to include hunger, illness, and early mortality. Poverty is provoked by exploitation and class domination,⁸⁷ and may drive life towards death. Secondly, Moltmann identifies force as ultimately leading to death and the loss of the liveliness of life. Force is bound up with keeping people in a condition of poverty. Displays of force can be seen in dictatorships, upper classes, and the exercise of privilege. Force may be military, but it need not be. Thirdly, Moltmann identifies the deadliness of racial and cultural alienation. Once robbed of identity and dignity, people become manipulable factors in the preservation of social systems. Fourthly, Moltmann refers to the industrial pollution of nature caused by mindless faith in progress and industrialisation. Men destroy nature in pursuit of wealth. And lastly, Moltmann identifies the senselessness and godforsakenness of human existence. People are perplexed, disheartened, and without sense of purpose. Human life without meaning is deadly.

87 For the following see: C.G., p.330f; Moltmann RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE p.38f.

"Bringing Peace to a Divided World" p.176. *The Experiment Hope*
 "New Frontiers of Christianity in Industrial Society" p.122f. *Religion, Revolution and the Future*.

These five 'vicious circles of death' work together as a linked system leading to dehumanisation and death. They describe the needs which must be met and overcome. Some of these needs reflect the nature of our time, while others reflect the condition of human existence throughout history. To address these needs, and obey the political and liberation imperative of the gospel, political theology must employ contemporary social, economic and political analyses. In using these analyses, however, political theology has to be on guard against encouraging their absolutisation.⁸⁸ Liberation must be pursued in response to particular circumstances. Moltmann lists three sets of circumstances in which liberation must be sought: economic, social, and political. Thus he talks of 'liberations' in the plural. The work of liberation has to take place in several dimensions at the same time. These different dimensions cannot be separated. Neither can they be construed hierarchically, as if liberation in one dimension was required before liberations could occur in the other dimensions.

Corresponding to the five integrated vicious circles of death are five ways of liberation, five fronts on which Christians must work for the economic, social, and political liberation of men. Firstly, economic liberation means the satisfaction of the material needs of men for health, nourishment, clothing and housing. The present tendency of industrial development indicates that we have the capacity to feed, heal,

88 "The Kingdom of God can be socialism, but that does not mean that socialism is now the Kingdom of God."
C.G., p.320.

clothe, and house the population of the world. However, because this development is tied to capitalistic and nationalistic ends, the capacity to meet economic needs is not extended to the poor. The division between the poor and the rich, in fact, is increasing. Thus,

"social justice can only be achieved by a redistribution of economic power."⁸⁹

Moltmann means by this that capital cannot any longer be allowed to triumph over labour. Socialism, therefore, is the symbol for the economic liberation of men and women. Socialism means economic co-determination and control of economic power by the producers.

Secondly, political liberation means the establishment of democracy. This is the establishment of political responsibility and participation in the exercise of economic and political power. The economic liberation of men must be accompanied by the political liberation of men. There is no question of priority between the two. Democracy is demanded on the common ground of human worth and the need to destroy dependency and subservience.

Thirdly, cultural liberation means the mutual recognition of the worth of one man by another. The human humiliation of men by other men on any grounds whatsoever cannot be tolerated. As far as Christian faith is concerned, men cannot find their identity in distinction and distance from other men. In fact,

"the recognition of racial and cultural and personal differences and the recognition of one's own identity belong together."⁹⁰

89 Ibid., p.332.

90 Ibid., p.333.

Cultural alienation is an instrument of political, economic and social domination which cannot be overcome solely by way of change in individual consciences. Changes in the structures of society are necessary if society is to be free from defensive and alienating practices.

Fourthly, the liberation of nature demands a radical change in the relationship which obtains between man and nature. The domination and exploitation of nature by man has led to ecological collapse. There must be a new relationship of intercommunication between man and nature. Nature is not an object, but man's environment. Men must relearn how to live in harmony with nature. This will involve social, political and economic changes in our current patterns of life.

Fifthly, the liberation of life means the finding of meaning in all events and relationships of life. The poisoning of life cannot be overcome simply by victory over economic need, political oppression, cultural alienation, and ecological crisis.

"The absence of meaning and the corresponding consequences of an ossified and absurd life are described in theological terms as godforsakenness; the presence of meaning is termed the presence and indwelling of God in a new creation."⁹¹

In the situation of godforsakenness and meaninglessness, the incarnation of God on the cross of Jesus Christ is the sign of hope and meaning. This leads to the courage to do what is necessary to overcome the vicious circles of death. This is also the actuality of the Christian life.

⁹¹ Kolman, "New Frontiers of Christianity in Industrial Society," p.335.

⁹² Kolman, "God in Revolution," p.140.

"Christianity has no future in the modern society if it does not bear witness to this society of that future which God has prepared for it. This is the future in which God is, and correspondingly a future of abundant, upright, sovereign, and purposeful humanity."⁹²

In the five ways of liberation, Moltmann has presented the areas in which Christianity must bear witness to the future of God. In the establishment of socialism, democracy, emancipation, peace with nature, and hope for the future of the crucified Christ, Moltmann has briefly set out the practical manifesto of liberation. In the practice of these five ways hope becomes practical in transforming the present.

"A messianic stream of renewal runs through history from the Christ of God who died in this world and was raised into the coming new world of God's righteousness. In him there are, and always were found, not only the inner repentance and liberation of the heart but also the reformations, renaissances, and revolutions of eternal conditions. For Christian hope the world is not an insignificant waiting room for the soul's journey to heaven, but the 'arena' of the new creation of all things and the battleground of freedom. Christian hope. . . must draw the hoped-for future already into the misery of the present and use it in practical initiatives for overcoming this misery. Through criticism and protest, on the one hand, and creative imagination and action, on the other, we can avail ourselves of freedom for the future."⁹³

92 Moltmann, "New Frontiers of Christianity in Industrial Society," p.128.

93 Moltmann, "God in Revolution," p.140.

Chapter 9

Comment and Discussion on Moltmann's Political Theology

1. The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann: A General Appraisal
2. Moltmann's Political Theology and the Theologies of Liberation

(a) Praxis or Promise

(b) Faith and Ideology

(c) Conclusion

"The completion of the creative process in the kingdom of glory is conceived in the new creation as the indwelling of God."²

The indwelling of God means the prospective unity of God with himself and with creation:

"In the eschatological view the unity of God is combined with the salvation of the world, just as his glory is combined with his glorification through everything that lives."³

The shalom of the kingdom means the free participation of men in the unlimited freedom of God. This vision is rooted by Moltmann in the

1. Jürgen Moltmann, "Creation and Redemption" in Edl. A. W. A. McElroy) CREATION, CHRIST AND CULTURE. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1970); Jürgen Moltmann, "The Trinitarian History of God."

2. Moltmann, "Creation and Redemption," p. 129.

3. Moltmann, "The Trinitarian History of God," p. 662.

Moltmann's eschatology of the cross will be commented upon and discussed in two stages. In the first stage Moltmann's theology will be assessed in general terms. In the second stage the critical debate between Moltmann's political theology and the theologies of liberation will be presented.

1. The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann: A General Appraisal

Behind Moltmann's theology is his vision of the shalom of God, in which God will be united in peace and relationship with his creation. This vision is demonstrated in Moltmann's doctrines of creation and the Trinity.¹

"The completion of the creative process in the kingdom of glory is conceived in the new creation as the indwelling of God."²

The indwelling of God means the prospective unity of God with himself and with creation.

"In the eschatological view the unity of God is combined with the salvation of the world, just as his glory is combined with his glorification through everything that lives."³

The shalom of the kingdom means the free participation of men in the unlimited freedom of God. This vision is rooted by Moltmann in the

1 Jürgen Moltmann, "Creation and Redemption" in (Ed. R.W.A. McKinney) CREATION, CHRIST AND CULTURE, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1976); Jürgen Moltmann, "The Trinitarian History of God."

2 Moltmann, "Creation and Redemption," p.129.

3 Moltmann, "The Trinitarian History of God," p.642.

suffering and death of Jesus Christ in which God is open for the world and the world opened for God. Here the eschatological transcendence of God is grounded in a dialectical process of reconciliation which takes up the contradictions and negativities of history and opens them up to a new future.

For Moltmann, the eschaton is the horizon of the incarnation. The eschaton propels his thought toward regarding both God and history as open processes: God is open for history in his ingathering love, and history is an open system in the process of being created. All static, cosmological, ahistorical, or closed concepts of God and history are replaced, in Moltmann's theology, by an open dialectic which takes its bearing from the transforming future of the kingdom. Thus the presence of God must be conceived of as anticipation and announcement of the time in which God will be all in all.

Prior to the publication of THE CRUCIFIED GOD, it could be thought that Moltmann had merely replaced a vertical concept of transcendence with a horizontal-eschatological concept of transcendence. Thus Rubem A. Alves regards Moltmann's theological structure as basically platonic, involving a ninety-degree rotation of the idea of transcendence which is found in the writings of the early Barth.⁴ Alves interpreted Moltmann to be stating that the future is a transcendent future which negates what is. He recognised that the cross

4 Rubem A. Alves, A THEOLOGY OF HUMAN HOPE, p.61.

Carl A. Braaten, "A Trinitarian Theology of the Cross," THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION, Vol. 55 No. 3-4 (January, 1975), p.120.

of Christ has a part to play in the incarnation of transcendence in Moltmann's theology, but he could not see how the cross and the eschatology of the resurrection were to be interwoven.⁵ At the time Alves wrote his book, Moltmann had not fully developed the thorough-going dialectical structure of the eschatology of the cross. However, Alves did have access to HOPE AND PLANNING, RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE, as well as to the THEOLOGY OF HOPE at the time of writing. THE CRUCIFIED GOD merely explores at greater depth the arguments developed in the earlier works. Alves' charge of platonism appears to be the result of a failure to recognise the pristine eschatology of the cross. As has been shown, the cross is an essential component of Moltmann's theology from the beginning. The dialectical structure of the eschatology of the cross avoids the charge of platonism in Moltmann's theology. For Moltmann, there is no future which is not the future of the crucified and, therefore, historical Jesus.

Perhaps a more pertinent critical perspective on Moltmann's theology has been suggested by Carl A. Braaten when he refers to the tyranny of the single concept in Moltmann's theology. Braaten notes that

"we are told by Moltmann that the cross is the criticism of all theology. Only the cross is the test of everything to be called Christian. The cross is the center of all Christian theology. The cross is the origin of Christian theology. The only true knowledge of God is by way of the cross. It is the principle of the doctrine of the Trinity. Theologia crucis is the key signature for all Christian theology. The crucified Jesus is the driving force of all theology which is Christian. It is the cross that makes Christian theology truly contemporary because it shares in the sufferings of our day."⁶

5 Ibid., p.62.

6 Carl A. Braaten, "A Trinitarian Theology of the Cross," THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION, Vol. 56 No.1 (January, 1976), p.120.

While Braaten is appreciative of Moltmann's reinstatement of the cross to a central position in Christian theology, he remarks that

"it will scarcely do to spin the whole of theology out of a single principle, no matter which one or how important."⁷

He continues:

"The multiplicity of New Testament confessions and theologies cannot be unified by reduction to a theology of the cross."⁸

Braaten observes that the Pauline corpus is the main source for a theology of the cross, but that corpus is not the whole of the canon of the New Testament. The theology of Luke-Acts, for example, is not a theology of the cross. Braaten concludes:

"Such an overworking of a single motif of primitive Christian faith and of one important but admittedly sporadic theme in the history of theology, leaping from Paul to Luther as it does, represents a reduction of Christian theology to a scope even more narrow than the theology of hope."⁹

In spite of Braaten's failure to notice the significance of the dialectic of the eschatology of the cross, in which the cross is never considered apart from the resurrection, his observations point to a feature of Moltmann's theology. It appears that Moltmann does force the record of primitive Christian faith into the all-pervasive category of the relationship between the cross and the resurrection. The theological

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., p.120-121.

10 Alan P. Callaway, "The New Hegelians," RELIGIOUS STUDIES, VI (December, 1972), p.367-371.

value which Moltmann makes of this organisational procedure is not in question. But the central status of the eschatology of the cross as the primary focus of Christian faith and theology must be more carefully justified. In other words, it is not sufficient to ground the eschatology of the cross by reference mainly to the writings of St. Paul. This is not to suggest that Moltmann misinterprets St. Paul, but rather that the New Testament should not be assumed into prior Pauline categories.

Without doubt, Moltmann's theology is thoroughly dialectical. This is one of the features of his theology. Alan D. Galloway refers to Moltmann as a 'new Hegelian.'¹⁰ As far as Moltmann's theology is concerned, his use of dialectical method is derived from Hegel and Marx. But a question must be raised about the role of dialectical method in Moltmann's theology. Moltmann has argued against the employment of absolute and a priori categories in theology. In spite of this, dialectical method seems to occupy an a priori place in his theology. Certainly Moltmann would argue that dialectical method is necessitated by the nature of the relationship between the cross and the resurrection; but it remains a speculative methodological principle, and it would be as well if Moltmann were to recognise it as such. However, Moltmann has used dialectical method in a creative and worthwhile way. It is difficult to see how one could develop an eschatological theology which is grounded in the cross of Christ without the use of dialectical method. But the point remains that there may be an internal conflict between the disavowal of absolute concepts and Moltmann's insistence that eschatological theology must be dialectical theology.

10 Alan D. Galloway, "The New Hegelians," RELIGIOUS STUDIES, VII (December, 1972), p.367-371.

Moltmann's failure to ground his eschatology with empirical historical references has been raised by Van A. Harvey. If, as Moltmann insists, the resurrection of Jesus is a unique event, without precedent and analogy, then, Van Harvey argues,

"it undercuts all the formalities of argument that make assessment possible."¹¹

If analogy is necessary for reasoning and inferring on the basis of present knowledge, it becomes difficult to see what is meant by an historical resurrection to which no historical analogies apply. What principle of material discrimination can be employed in this case? Or, more generally, how can theology verify the historical truth of its statements? In spite of the apparent force of these questions, it is not at all clear that Van Harvey's comments are entirely appropriate. If, with the resurrection, we are dealing with an event which is not just unique but totally unconditioned by historical antecedents, then logically, historical knowledge through the use of analogies with what has gone before cannot be sought in this case. According to Moltmann, all other historical events have to be understood in relation to the resurrection rather than the resurrection having to be determined through analogical relation to all other historical events. It is not self-evident that historicity should always be determined by the use of analogies, unless, that is, we presuppose a particular definition of historicity which states that historicity is that to which historical analogy applies. As far as theology is concerned, such a definition would have to be theologically justified. However, Van Harvey's

11 Van A. Harvey, "Secularism, Responsible Belief, and the 'Theology of Hope'," in THE FUTURE OF HOPE, p.142.

general observation, namely, that Moltmann refuses to appeal to public canons of verification and meaning which are based on what has gone before and which can be experienced by every observer remains true, although perhaps of limited value.

Moltmann argues that the criterion for the truth of theology and faith is to be found in liberative praxis rather than in correct formulations.¹²

For Moltmann, theology is true insofar as it brings the hoped-for future of God into contact with the sufferings of the present age. The strident style of language employed by Moltmann is not meant to describe 'truths,' but rather to facilitate liberative praxis in history. In this regard, Moltmann's theology is a worthwhile counter-balance to the over-propositionalisation of theology whereby theological truth is found only in correct literary formulations. According to Moltmann, only insofar as theology is concerned with liberative action – orthopraxis – rather than correct credal statement – orthodoxy – is it true. But this practical criterion of theological truth still relies upon the veracity of the historical sources and the correct interpretation of them. It is impossible for theology to get around the necessity for dealing with reports of events. Van Harvey's question to Moltmann, then, amounts to a challenge to clarify how he can check the validity of his sources when the events described in them are without historical precedent. The question still remains: what canons of verification does Moltmann

12 Jürgen Moltmann, "God in Revolution," p.138.

employ to verify the correctness of his sources? While it is not self-evident that this question must be answered in terms of historical analogies and public verification, the need for clarification remains.

We now turn from these general remarks on Moltmann's theology, to look at some specific aspects of his theology. Firstly, to what extent is Moltmann's theology of the cross trinitarian? Moltmann insists upon a trinitarian theology of the cross. To this end, he develops a dialectical understanding of the relationship between the Father and the Son. However, at no point in his presentation can the Holy Spirit be found playing any part in the drama of the cross. There is no discussion of the necessity for including the Holy Spirit into the account. According to Moltmann's statement, what occurs is an event in which the Father and the Son are the principal agents. Yet Moltmann insists that the theology of the cross is trinitarian:

"The theological concept for the preception of the crucified Christ is the doctrine of the Trinity. The material principle of the doctrine of the Trinity is the cross of Christ. The formal principle of knowledge of the cross is the doctrine of the Trinity."¹³

And he goes on:

"To understand what happened between Jesus and his God and Father on the cross, it is necessary to talk in trinitarian terms. The Son suffers dying, the Father suffers the death of the Son."¹⁴

13 Moltmann, THE CRUCIFIED GOD, p.241.

14 Ibid., p.243.

But why is this trinitarian? Moltmann keeps insisting that it is trinitarian, while mentioning a drama played out solely by the Father and the Son.

It remains unclear how or why Moltmann's theology of the cross is trinitarian.

Secondly, there is a lack of clarity in Moltmann's doctrine of God.

To what extent is Moltmann's doctrine of God panentheistic? Panentheism describes a view of God in which God is in everything and everything is in God, although God is more than and is not exhausted by the universe.

Panentheism is to be distinguished from pantheism, in which God is everything and everything is God; God and the universe are identical.

Richard Bauckham writes that

"for Moltmann the God who condemns the sinner and the 'human God' who justifies the sinner are so far opposed as to be either two Gods or to represent such a transformation of God as amounts to much the same thing. It seems that it would be less accurate to say that Moltmann's God is love than that he becomes love. For in a manner akin to that of process theology and in firm opposition to the aloof and self-sufficient God of philosophical theism, Moltmann so concentrates on God's involvement with his creation as virtually to make that involvement his whole being. So in the event of the cross in which God's love for the godless is enacted a change in God is revealed. In the process of salvation history God not only reveals himself but actually becomes himself."¹⁵

Moltmann states his own position quite clearly.

"A trinitarian theology of the cross perceives God in the negative element and therefore the negative element in God, and in this dialectical way is panentheistic."¹⁶

15 Richard Bauckham, "Moltmann's Eschatology of the Cross," p.10.

16 Moltmann, THE CRUCIFIED GOD, p.277.

However, Moltmann's doctrine of God is to be distinguished from that advanced by process theology. Moltmann's 'panentheism,' in which God will be in everything and everything will be in God, is ultimately an eschatological reality rather than a present reality. What is 'in' God now is the suffering of the cross, and it is this which 'changes' God. Moltmann does not mean that God is changeable in the sense in which we are changeable; God is free to change himself by an act of will, actively rather than being involuntarily acted upon.¹⁷ The problem which remains with this, however, is that it can be interpreted as meaning that an unchanged God allows himself to be changed. That is, is Moltmann advocating the notion of an unchanged God who allows himself to be affected by circumstances in the world, and thereby to be 'changed'? In other words, is Moltmann employing substantial and dynamic or passible concepts of God? Principally, the problem here is lack of clarity about what exactly Moltmann intends when he uses the term 'panentheism' as a description of God.

The ambiguity in Moltmann's doctrine of God is also seen in his talk of the suffering of the Father. Moltmann draws away from patrispasionism, the doctrine, condemned as heretical in the Third Century, which states that the Father suffered as the Son. Moltmann remarks that the Father does not suffer in the same way as the Son, for the Father did not suffer death.¹⁸ But Moltmann has not developed the difference between

17 Cf. Ibid., p.193 and p.229.

18 Ibid., p.243.

the suffering of the Father and the Son in anything like enough clarity. Can Moltmann have it both ways: that there is real meaning to the notion of the 'crucified God' and that his teaching is not patripassian?¹⁹

Thirdly, Moltmann seems to suggest that the power and presence of God is seen dialectically in the crucified Jesus. But Moltmann makes very little mention of the power and presence of God in Jesus' ministry. What, for example, would the eschatology of the cross be able to make of Jesus' healing miracles? What is the significance of Pentecost and the charismatic ministry of the first Christians for our understanding of political theology? Is it sufficient to talk of the power of the Spirit of God only in terms of God's solidarity with the oppressed? These questions inquire into the pastoral implications of political theology and they seek an answer which allows for consideration of individual and social need. By concentrating on eschatology and the kingdom of God it may appear that Moltmann has lost sight of that aspect of Christian life which is specific care for the personal, private needs of distressed individuals. From the Gospel accounts, Jesus' ministry involved caring for a whole range of personal human needs. Theology, then, must include into its frame of reference the reality of the presence and power of God which is evident in Jesus' ministry. There is more to Jesus' ministry than his journey to the cross. It is not sufficient to give an account of God's presence in Jesus solely in terms of solidarity with the poor and the oppressed. Some account has to be given of the power for healing which characterised Jesus' ministry and what this means for Christian faith today.

19 Cf. Braaten, "A Trinitarian Theology of the Cross," p.117-118.

2. Moltmann's Political Theology and the Theologies of Liberation

Moltmann has identified his political theology with the theologies of liberation, especially as these have been developed in Latin America.²⁰ The critical discussion of Moltmann's political theology by such as Rubem A. Alves, Gustavo Gutierrez, Jose Miguez Bonino, Hugo Assmann and Juan Luis Segundo is important in the light of the common task to which they are all joined. To date, this discussion has issued in a brief reply from Moltmann.²¹ The criticism of Moltmann by the Latin American theologians of liberation may, for convenience, be divided into parts. The first concerns the nature of political and liberation theology. The second concerns the relationship between faith and ideology. This is not a strict division of subject matter, and a certain amount of overlapping may be necessary.

20 Moltmann, THE CRUCIFIED GOD, p.338.

21 Jürgen Moltmann, "An Open Letter to Jose Miguez Bonino" p.6, CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS, Vol.36, No.5, (March, 1976).

22 Ibid., p.12, and Moltmann, "God in Revolution," p.138f.

23 Gustavo Gutierrez, PEACE OF DISSENT AND THE CHRISTIAN FAITH, p.234ff.

(a) Praxis or Promise

Both Moltmann and the theologians of liberation agree that theological truth must be seen at the level of praxis and not at the level of ideas. But each means something quite different. For Moltmann, all Christian theology must be biblical theology.²² He does not intend that theology should correspond to a naive biblicism or to fundamentalism. Rather, the Bible, as

"the book of the poor, the oppressed, and the hopeless,"²³ is the book of promise and gospel. As was seen in the exposition of Moltmann's theology, promise is the primary category in revelation. And it is only through the Bible that the promises of God can be known. Only in the Bible can access be gained to the history of liberation which has been initiated by God. Moltmann begins theology with the apostolic witness to the promises of God. He does not advocate biblical positivism, however. Biblical faith must be verified from political praxis, for the kingdom of God is to be anticipated in the realm of politics.²⁴

The theologians of liberation begin theologising from praxis as this is interpreted by way of ideological analysis. They do not begin from the biblical promises of God. According to Gutierrez, theology

"will be critical reflection from and on the historical praxis. . . It will make a start from a real and effective solidarity with discriminated races, despised cultures and exploited classes."²⁵

22 Moltmann, "Christian Theology and its Problems Today," p.6.

23 Ibid., p.7.

24 Ibid., p.12, and Moltmann, "God in Revolution," p.138f.

25 Gustavo Gutierrez, PRAXIS OF LIBERATION AND CHRISTIAN FAITH, p.42-43.

And elsewhere, Gutierrez writes that

"theology must be man's critical reflection on himself, on his own basic principles."²⁶

Theology

"must start with facts and questions derived from the world and from history."²⁷

In this case, it is not enough for theology to be derived from faith and the biblical witness, as for Moltmann; theology is required to begin from the historical experience of man.

It is in the light of this difference in theological method that both Alves and Gutierrez suggest that Moltmann has difficulty in finding a vocabulary which is sufficiently rooted in man's experiences of exploitation and oppression.²⁸ For Moltmann, it is argued, the present is denied because of the promises of God and not because of bad human experiences. Gutierrez writes:

"The hope which overcomes death must be rooted in the heart of historical praxis; if this hope does not take shape in the present to lead it forward, it will be only an evasion, a futuristic illusion."²⁹

Thus, it is concluded, Moltmann runs the risk of neglecting a miserable and unjust present. In this, these theologians believe that they recognise a docetic tendency in Moltmann's theology.

26 Gutierrez, A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION, p.11.

27 Ibid., p.12.

28 Ibid., p.217.

29 Ibid., p.218.

This criticism of Moltmann is hardly fair. In spite of the difference in theological method and Moltmann's stress on eschatology, his theology of the cross is firmly grounded in history. It is in the light of the eschatology of the cross that Moltmann believes he can see better the nature of the need in the present. It is not correct to say that Moltmann neglects history. The point to make against Moltmann would be to say that the eschatology of the cross is an inappropriate theological model for understanding present historical need, but these theologians have not advanced this criticism, and the burden of proof rests with them.

The refusal on Moltmann's part to develop his political theology out of an analysis of need has been taken up by Hugo Assmann.

Assmann comments:

"There is no point in a political theology that fails to rise to the dialectical challenge of openly naming the components of the infra- and super-structures of power, and the implications of strategic and tactical attacks on them."³⁰

It is argued that European political theology fails to find concretion because it does not begin with the organs of oppression. Assmann continues:

"Proclaiming a hope that does not articulate and motivate the actual stages in the struggle, but feeds on promises 'already given,' runs the risk of leaving man as an inactive spectator."³¹

30 Hugo Assmann, PRACTICAL THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION, (London: Search Press), 1975, p.34.
This criticism also applies to Metz.

31 Ibid., p.95.

Perhaps Assmann has a point here. Certainly Moltmann is insistent that theology must begin with the promises of God, and it is unclear how he can get from these promises to dealing with the specific issues involved in liberation. As a Reformed theologian, Moltmann refuses to begin theology with an analysis of the organs of oppression. However, as a political theologian, he is required to articulate how liberation in history should be tackled. Assmann's argument that political theology should name the structures of power and outline the strategy of attack is valid, for without this, political theology is left hanging in the air. The practical implications for liberation remain the least satisfactory aspect of Moltmann's political theology.

According to Bonino, what emerges from Moltmann is one sort of the liberal social democratic project,

"A feature of Latin American liberation theology is the belief that as all human activity is bound up with relative contexts, it is impossible to get beyond ideologies. Thus, Segundo argues that the only course is to avoid the use of ideologies."

"There is an empty space between the conception of God that we receive from our faith and the problems that come to us from an ever-changing history. So we must build a bridge between our conception of God and the real-life problems of history. This bridge, this provisional but necessary system of means and ends is what we are calling ideology."³²

32. José Miguel Bonino, EVOLUTIONARY THEOLOGY CONDS OF AGH, (London: S.P.C.K., 1975), p.143.

33. Ibid.

34. Juan Luis Segundo, LIBERATION OF THEOLOGY, (Dublin: Gill & MacMillan, 1977), p.116.

(b) Faith and Ideology

Bonino asks:

"Why is it that at the crucial point, Moltmann – and most European theology – draws back from these 'materialisations' and finds refuge in a 'critical function' which is able to remain above right and left, ideologically neutral, independent of a structural analysis of reality?"³²

Bonino argues that, implicitly, Moltmann's critical position implies the support of a political ideology.

"When they (Moltmann and Metz) conceive critical freedom as the form in which God's eschatological kingdom impinges on the political realm, they are simply opting for one particular ideology, that of liberalism."³³

According to Bonino, what emerges from Moltmann is one form of the liberal social democratic project.

A feature of Latin American liberation theology is the belief that as all human actions are bound up with relative contexts, it is impossible to get beyond ideologies. Thus, Segundo argues that theology cannot avoid the use of ideologies.

"There is an empty space between the conception of God that we receive from our faith and the problems that come to us from an ever-changing history. So we must build a bridge between our conception of God and the real-life problems of history. This bridge, this provisional but necessary system of means and ends is what we are calling ideology."³⁴

32 Jose Miguez Bonino, REVOLUTIONARY THEOLOGY COMES OF AGE, (London: S.P.C.K.), 1975. p.149.

33 Ibid.

34 Juan Luis Segundo, LIBERATION OF THEOLOGY, (Dublin: Gill & MacMillan), 1977. p.116.

He goes on:

"It makes no Christian sense at all to try to separate ideologies from faith in order to safeguard the latter. Without ideologies faith is as dead as a doornail, and for the same reason that James offers in his epistle: it is totally impractical."³⁵

Segundo argues that Moltmann attempts to begin theology from a metahistorical, that is, non-historical, foundation, which is free from relativisation.

It is undoubtedly true that Moltmann refuses to subscribe to the necessity of beginning theology with an ideological analysis of society. It is not true, however, that to do so he has to resort to a metahistorical font of revelation. As has been noted throughout the presentation on Moltmann's political theology, he argues that theology begins with the cross of Christ as this is attested to by scripture. He does not appeal to a body of truth that has 'dropped from heaven' as it were. Segundo's analysis of the relationship between ideology and theology is useful; but when he goes on to criticise Moltmann, his argument is simplistic and incorrect.

Moltmann has said that the major difference between himself and his Latin American critics is over the use of Marxism.³⁶ The Latin American theologians of liberation are avowedly Marxist, while Moltmann is avowedly not a Marxist. Thus, Bonino's point about

35 Ibid., p.121.

36 From a personal communication.

Moltmann's democratic socialism amounts, in the first place, to a disagreement over political theory. But, in the second place, Bonino does point to a theological issue, namely, that Moltmann allows democratic socialism unconsciously into his theology. If this were the case, then Moltmann would need to clarify further the relationship between faith and ideology in his theology. But as it stands, Moltmann does not intend to build ideology into faith, and the responsibility for proof rests with his critics to show more clearly just how he may have done so.

Where the Latin American critics of political theology are pertinent in their observations, as in the practical implications of political theology, they help political theologians to see the need to clarify further where they stand. But when these critics try to force political theology into a Marxist mould, then it is difficult to see what justification can be given. On matters of theological methodology there is clear disagreement, and to some extent this may be due to the historical theological differences between Roman Catholicism and Reformed Christianity, although it should be noted that Bonino and Alves are Protestant Christians. On the relationship between faith and ideology there is disagreement over political theory and how that theory interacts with theology. It is in the area of the relationship between the practical tasks of liberation and theology that Moltmann's political theology is seen to be unclear.

(c) Conclusion

To date, Moltmann has only published a brief response to his Latin American critics. He recognises that he may be open to the charge of assuming an untenable neutral position, but this is not his intention. In an effort to provide some detail to his own political programme, Moltmann advances the necessity for democratic socialism.³⁷ Socialism, he argues, cannot be established at the expense of democracy. This, at least, is the necessity in Europe. Moltmann makes no claim that his theology is relevant to the Latin American situation, and he does not see that as a fault.

37 Moltmann, "Open Letter to Jose Miguez Bonino," p.61.

Chapter 10

A Comparative Study of Kollmann's Political Theology and Jüngel's Theology of Pastoral Care

1. Theological Methodology
2. The Content of Theology

PART THREE

3. Differences in Works

A COMPARATIVE STUDY AND CONCLUSION

Chapter 10

A Comparative Study of Moltmann's Political Theology and Hiltner's Theology of Pastoral Care

1. Theological Methodology
2. The Content of Theology
3. Difference in Praxis

1. Theological Methodology

At the heart of Hiltner's theological method is the idea that theological construction arises from both traditional sources, like the Bible and the theological tradition of the church, and operational sources. As outlined in the PREFACE TO EXISTENTIAL THEOLOGY, Hiltner advocates complete two-way communication between what he has called operation-*can* and logic-centred approaches to theological knowledge. Operation-centred theological inquiry derives from theological reflection on acts, events, or functions from the perspectives of shepherding, communicating, or organising. Logic-centred theological inquiry derives from the organisation of theological knowledge around a central religious subject-matter.¹ This means, as far as Hiltner

¹ It is not at all clear whether Hiltner perceives operation-centred theological inquiry to be derived solely from operational sources, or from operational and idiosyncratic sources.

Jurgen Moltmann's political theology and Seward Hiltner's theology of pastoral care have been outlined and discussed. The study now turns to a comparison of political theology and the theology of pastoral care in order to identify the theological issues which confront the theology of pastoral care if it is to take cognisance of the political dimension of the gospel. The comparative study will examine three areas: theological methodology, the content of political theology and the theology of pastoral care, and the practical initiatives which each suggests.

1. Theological Methodology

At the centre of Hiltner's theological method is the idea that theological construction arises from both traditional sources, like the Bible and the theological traditions of the church, and operational sources. As outlined in his PREFACE TO PASTORAL THEOLOGY, Hiltner advocates consistent two-way communication between what he has called operation-centred and logic-centred approaches to theological knowledge. Operation-centred theological inquiry derives from theological reflection on acts, events, or functions from the perspectives of shepherding, communicating, or organising. Logic-centred theological inquiry derives from the organisation of theological knowledge around a central determining subject matter.¹ This means, as far as Hiltner

1 It is not at all clear whether Hiltner perceives operation-centred theological inquiry to be derived solely from operational sources, or from operational and kerygmatic sources.

is concerned, that pastoral theology – an instance of operation-centred theological inquiry – is properly a branch of theology equal to all other branches of theology.

According to Hiltner, the revelation of God in Christ is final.² However, our understanding of revelation is always incomplete and distorted. Theology is charged with the task of clarifying and correcting our understanding of revelation. All theology deals with the 'common currency of the faith': God, man, sin, and so on.³ But this common currency is organised in different ways, according to the different organising centres. Thus, the common currency of the faith, when organised around the Bible, leads to biblical theology; when organised around doctrine, it leads to doctrinal theology. If the common currency is organised around a function, such as shepherding, it leads to pastoral theology. Pastoral theology begins with theological questions arising out of the faith – expressed in the common currency of the faith, brings these questions to the shepherding material, and returns with theological answers or new theological questions.

While Hiltner talks about the revelation of God in Christ and the common currency of the faith, he leaves the reader unclear about what he means by these terms. For example, it is difficult to determine what role scripture plays in his theological methodology. Further, he provides little discussion of the role played by the theological tradition of the church

² Hiltner, PREFACE, p.221.

³ Ibid., p.219.

in determining the common currency of the faith. Just to define this as "God, man, sin, and so on" is hardly adequate. Consequently, it is difficult to be entirely sure how Hiltner determines the criteria for theological truth. To this extent, his theological methodology is incomplete.

As has already been seen, Hiltner's theological method is influenced by the empirical theology of Anton Boisen and by Paul Tillich's method of correlation. The empirical method in pastoral theology is the theological study of the events of shepherding. Following Boisen, Hiltner argues that case-study analysis can contribute to the body of divinity. The method of correlation allows culture to raise its own questions, and for Christian faith to show its relevance by addressing or answering them. In Hiltner's hands, this leads to a thorough-going dialogue with the personality sciences. Shepherding becomes the employment of pastoral psychology within the broad context of the Christian ministry. The theological consequence of this is that culture, and especially pastoral psychology, is allowed, indirectly, to contribute to the body of divinity.

The problem to be stressed with the practice of Hiltner's theological method is that it is never clear how kerygmatic sources contribute to pastoral theological construction. Hiltner never thoroughly engages in two-way communication between operation- and logic-centred theology. But it should be noted that non-kerygmatic sources are allowed to inform the fabric of theological thought, and, at least as far as pastoral theology is concerned, are accorded equal authority with the traditional contributions to the theological task. Thus, Hiltner ranks personality theory

and the demands of the culture, as they are expressed in pastoral experience, alongside the Bible and the theological traditions of the church, as legitimate sources of evidence for theological construction.

For Moltmann, Christian theology must be a biblical theology.⁴

As the book

"of the poor, the oppressed, and the hopeless"⁵

the Bible is the book of promise and gospel. Moltmann begins theological construction with the message of the Bible; but he does not advocate a kind of biblical positivism. The truth of the promises of God which are recorded in the Bible leads the theologian to anticipate in history that future which is to be expected from God. Consequently, biblical faith must be verified in historical praxis. The truth of theology does not lie primarily in allegiance to the biblical tradition or the teaching of the church, although these are not to be excluded from consideration.

Rather,

"the new criterion of theology and of faith is to be found in praxis."⁶

Theology is true insofar as it works to bring the hoped-for future of God into practical contact with the present age. Theological truth is not to be found in correct literary, doctrinal formulations but in historical, liberative praxis directed to changing the present by opening it up to the coming future action of God.

4 Moltmann, "Christian Theology and Its Problems Today," p.6.

5 Ibid., p.7.

6 Moltmann, "God in Revolution," p.138.

The following points are worthy of note: firstly, unlike the Latin American theologians of liberation, Moltmann begins his theology from the biblical record of the promises of God rather than from analyses of prevailing conditions of need; secondly, Moltmann tries to keep his theology free from political ideology; this means, thirdly, that Moltmann constructs theology apart from particular or indigenous contexts. In spite of his advocacy of 'orthopraxis,' as opposed to 'orthodoxy,' Moltmann's theological methodology is consistently kerygmatic. While it may be argued that Moltmann's early reliance on Ernst Bloch invites the charge that speculative philosophical concepts play a part in his theological construction, his intention throughout is to respond to the biblical witness to the historical promises of God.

For Moltmann, the cross of Christ is the foundation of Christian theology.

"The more the 'cross of reality' is taken seriously the more the crucified Christ becomes the general criterion of theology."⁷

All Christian teaching has its basis in Jesus and his message, and what it means for him, the Christ, to have been crucified. Christology is central to Moltmann's theological method because it is the future of Jesus of Nazareth which is the object of apostolic preaching. The poles of Moltmann's theology – summed up in the phrase 'the eschatology of the cross' – are the future of the crucified Christ as this is determined

7 Moltmann, THE CRUCIFIED GOD, p.4.

by the resurrection, and the presence of the risen Lord by way of the invocation of the memory of the cross and the history which led to it. The relationship between these two poles is consistently dialectical. The Easter faith does not merely stand in a chronological relationship to the history of Jesus; rather, it is from the cross that the resurrection and the doctrine of hope find their real meaning, relevance, and significance. As a consequence of his resurrection, Jesus' life and death are seen, in a dialectical way, to be the incarnation of the future of the coming God. In historical terms, the resurrection follows the cross; in eschatological terms, the cross is seen as the cross of the risen Christ. In this way, Moltmann speaks of the cross as the present form of the resurrection.

In the light of these brief statements of the theological methodologies behind Moltmann's political theology and Hiltner's theology of pastoral care, the differences between the two approaches can be seen. Generally, Hiltner's neo-liberal approach to theological methodology permits him to include non-kerygmatic sources of evidence for operational theological inquiry. In particular, pastoral experience interpreted through pastoral psychology is admitted into theological construction. Hiltner writes that

"it is so obvious that the pastoral theologian can learn from contact with the other shepherding disciplines (psychiatry, clinical psychology, social work) that the case need not be argued here."⁸

8 Hiltner, PREFACE, p.220.

And again:

"Material of tremendous potential significance for the questions of theology is now available in the personality sciences. When pastoral theology studies this material, as it pertains to the perspective of shepherding, it is following not a nontheological or an extratheological method but something that is part of method in every branch of theology."⁹

This approach to theological construction is antithetical to Moltmann's biblically based methodology. For Moltmann, the content of the biblical message is marked by the promises of God. Moltmann states that

"if it is correct to say that the Bible is essentially a witness to the promissory history of God, then the role of Christian theology is to bring these remembrances of the future to bear on the hopes and anxieties of the present."¹⁰

Christian theology, for Moltmann, is charged with making known the meaning of the biblical promises of God. It is the biblical message of promise which provides the data for theological construction. Although Hiltner advocates a consistent appeal to the Bible, it is unclear what this means for the theology of pastoral care because he has not applied his rule of two-way communication at all points with the Body of Divinity. However, operation-centred theological inquiry stands opposed to Moltmann's understanding of the nature of theology. Moltmann, as is seen in his debate with the Latin American theologians of liberation, excludes cultural, ideological and political influences in theological construction.

9 Ibid., p.22.

10 Moltmann, "Christian Theology and Its Problems Today," p.8.

If the Latin American critics of Moltmann's political theology are considered, it can be seen that they employ methodological assumptions which are similar to those found in Hiltner. While Moltmann and the theologians of liberation agree that theological truth must be seen at the level of history and not at the level of ideas, and Hiltner would agree with this, the theologians of liberation argue that theologising must begin from praxis rather than from the Bible or the history of dogma. That is, theology begins from a specific socio-political analysis rather than from historical biblical promises.¹¹ The stress on extra-kerygmatic sources (however understood or applied) in both Hiltner and the theologians of liberation marks a degree of methodological similarity between them, and distinguishes them methodologically from Moltmann. This similarity is in spite of the difference between the extra-kerygmatic source of liberation theology – critical reflection on, usually, a Marxist analysis of historical experience – and that of Hiltner's pastoral theology – critical reflection on a psychotherapeutic analysis of pastoral experience.

The methodological centrality of the dialectical identity of Christ in his cross and resurrection, which is essential to Moltmann's political theology, has no parallel in Hiltner's theological methodology. For Moltmann, Christ is central in theology. It is the person and work of Christ which prescribes the dialectical structure of the eschatology of the cross. Christian theology is necessarily Christ-centred. Hiltner,

11 Cf. Bonino,
REVOLUTIONARY THEOLOGY COMES OF AGE,
 p.72f.

on the other hand, makes only occasional reference to Christ in his theology,¹² and nowhere does the person and work of Christ appear to play a significant role in his theological methodology. It seems, in fact, that the personality sciences occupy a prescriptive role in his concept of pastoral theology. In this case, there is a fundamental difference of opinion between Hiltner and Moltmann on the nature and task of theology. Each represents distinct and divergent options in theological methodology.

12 Hiltner, PREFACE p.221, and
THE CHRISTIAN SHEPHERD, p.12.

2. The Content of Theology

As noted above, the person and work of Christ plays little part in Hiltner's theology of pastoral care. Hiltner is concerned to indicate above all that the Christian life is to be seen as a direction of movement towards self-fulfilment. Thus, Hiltner's doctrine of God, and this includes a strong emphasis on the providence of God, is discussed in terms of man's development towards optimal living. The core issue in God's providence, for Hiltner, is his willingness to help us when we cannot help ourselves. According to Hiltner, men have a large area of freedom in which they should attempt to fulfil their potential. God has set creation on its way, and his grace lies precisely in the creation-affirming providential support which upholds creation's possibilities and freedom. Hiltner believes that God will not allow mankind to be without the resources which are necessary to achieve fulfilment. God is envisioned as an accepting God, and this lies behind the ontology of acceptance which has become a basis for Christian pastoral counselling. In all this, God appears to fulfil a functional role. The assumption behind this concept of the supporting activity of God is the notion of continuity between creation and redemption. Creation has no ontological impediment within it in its movement of growth towards full potential. As such, sin is only an aberration, a break in the movement towards self-fulfilment, which can be overcome through the employment of an immanent resource such as pastoral counselling. This concept of God implies a developmental anthropology. Mankind must have the possibility of attaining the God-given goal of self-fulfilment.

Hiltner's theology has already been summed up under the categories of functionalism, liberalism, individualism, and developmentalism. As noted in the previous chapter on Hiltner's pastoral theology, he rarely mentions the nature of evil; I am aware of no discussion in Hiltner's work on the theology of death; and I know of no presentation on eschatology beyond his arguments for developmental optimism. Also missing from Hiltner's theology is any adequate discussion on the nature and work of the Holy Spirit, the Trinity, or the resurrection: surely central items in any complete Christian theology.

A constant theme in Hiltner's theology is the relationship between sin, as inappropriate life-direction, and physical and mental health. Sin, as man's alienation from God, or which is the same thing for Hiltner, as man's turning away from self-fulfilment, is the result of inappropriate or wrong life-decision. Sickness should not be reduced to the failure of bodily or mental chemistry, but also includes life decisions preversely made, which direct our lives along paths which prevent optimal living. Salvation, in this case, becomes the reestablishment of the direction of movement towards self-fulfilment. Hiltner comes close to abolishing any distinction between salvation and health, because ultimately there is only one healing.

The content of Hiltner's pastoral theology is, by and large, determined by the sciences of man. His doctrine of God, for example, is not directed by a christology, but by an anthropology which is earthed in the personality sciences. God is understood as a facilitating agency

who helps man to achieve optimal living as this is described by depth psychology, sociological theory and group dynamics. Similarly, sin is explained in terms of in-appropriate life-direction, and Hiltner has made little effort to set this view in a biblical context. The content of Hiltner's theology is functionally related to the tasks of pastoral care as these are determined by non-theological sources. Yet, Hiltner has gone some way towards harmonising the sciences of man with theology. He has introduced psychotherapeutic sensitivity and awareness into pastoral care and tried to develop a theology of pastoral care which takes account of this. Consistently he has employed psychological analogies of theological doctrines, perhaps to good use. But his failure to bring theological insights to bear on psychological assumptions gives his theology a rather one-sided and uncritical appearance. Also, the lack of a discussion of central theological aspects of the Christian faith makes his theology appear sparse. One can only guess at the reason for some surprising omissions in his theology: perhaps the doctrines of the Trinity and the resurrection seem to have little functional effect on the pragmatic demands of pastoral care. Whatever the reason, not just the content, but also the omissions in Hiltner's theology, are significant.

The centrality of Christ for Moltmann's theology has already been noted. For Moltmann, the central theological problem is 'Who is Jesus Christ?' Christian theology only exists as Christian in relation to Christ. In concentration upon Jesus Christ theology is forced to

consider the problem of the future as the essential problem, because in trying to address the question 'Who is Jesus Christ?' theology must not only say who he was and is, but also say who he will be and what is to be expected from him. Theology, then, moves between the life and death of Jesus, and the parousia. Perhaps Moltmann's most significant contribution to theology has been to see the dialectical requirements which such historical-eschatological thinking demands. This dialectic forces theology to understand the events of Jesus' life and death eschatologically, and his resurrection historically, in such a way that the resurrection gives meaning to the cross and the life which led to it, while the cross gives meaning to the resurrection. This dialectical method results in Moltmann's 'eschatology of the cross' in which the future of Christ is present in this world in the form of the crucified. Moltmann's theology can be categorised, then, as 'incarnational eschatology.'

The centrality of eschatology in Moltmann's theology arises out of his understanding of the content of the biblical message. Thus:

"God reveals himself in the form of promise and in the history that is marked by promise. . . (And) if promise is determinative of what is said of the revealing God, then every theological view of biblical revelation contains implicitly a governing view of eschatology."¹³

In particular, the resurrection of Jesus is the promise of his still outstanding future. Jesus, according to Moltmann, is recognised in the

13 Moltmann, THEOLOGY OF HOPE, p.42-43.

14 Ibid., p. 43.

15 Ibid., p. 46.

resurrection appearances as what he really will be.

"'Revelation' in this event has not the character of logos – determined illumination of the existing reality of man and the world, but has here constitutively and basically the character of promise and is therefore of an eschatological kind."¹⁴

In the light of the centrality of promise for understanding God's revelation it is clear why Moltmann makes the sweeping claim that

"the eschatological is not one element of Christianity, but it is the medium of Christian faith as such, the key in which everything in it is set, the glow that suffuses everything here in the dawn of an expected new day."¹⁵

The eschatology that is ultimately grounded in the resurrection of Jesus cannot be separated from the cross and the life which led up to it. The resurrection is the future of the cross, and the cross cannot and should not be interpreted apart from the resurrection. Similarly, the resurrection cannot and should not be interpreted apart from the cross. Thus, Moltmann argues, the dialectical interpretation of the cross and the resurrection forces us to see the cross eschatologically, and the resurrection historically. According to Moltmann, it is only in this way that the historical event of the cross can become a part of the history which is marked with promise. In the resurrection, the history of suffering is opened to a new future.

As far as the statement on the content of Moltmann's theology relates to specific doctrines, the following should be noted. Firstly, and especially in his more recent work, Christian doctrine is thought

14 Ibid., p.85.

15 Ibid., p.16.

through within the framework of the eschatology of the cross. Although Moltmann's initial statement on the doctrine of God is influenced by Blochian categories, his later position is structured in strictly trinitarian terms, commensurate with the eschatology of the cross. From the relationship of the Son to the Father in the power of the Spirit, which has within it the experience of the death of the Son, there emerges who God is and what his Godhead means. Thus Moltmann comes to speak of the 'trinitarian history of God' in which God is understood in christological terms.¹⁶ Secondly, the Christian doctrine of history has a central place in Moltmann's theology. At the heart of history is the anticipation of the coming goal of history; history, therefore, is Christ-centred and thereby eschatological and particular. Present history can only properly be understood dialectically, in the light of the cross of the risen Christ. Life in history is life in anticipation in which there is acceptance of responsibility for life in world-transforming obedience to the coming God of the cross of Christ. History is marked, then, by mission towards the future of Christ for the world. Thirdly, man can only find self-knowledge, can only encounter his humanity, in the eschatological event of the cross. All talk of man, for Moltmann, must be related to that event. But because it is an event which is the incarnation of the future of God, man remains hidden from himself. Man has self-knowledge in spe but not in re. What men share at present is their inhumanity. Meaning in personal life –

16 The christological stress tends to infer a 'di-theism.'
See the comments on Moltmann's trinitarian theology in a previous chapter.

the question of identity – is, for Moltmann, the obverse of the question of meaning in history – the theodicy question. And as history only has meaning inasmuch as it has a future, so men have personal identity only inasmuch as they have a future. The future for man in the world is ahead of him in the form of a new creation. The consequence of Moltmann's doctrines of God, history, and man is that theology must criticise all absolute, static, and a priori concepts of God, history and man: that is, all concepts of God, history and man which do not derive from the foundation of Christian theology in the dialectic of the eschatology of the cross of Jesus Christ.

This brief summary of the central aspects of Moltmann's theology will be concluded with some remarks on his doctrine of hope. According to Moltmann, hope sets faith open to the future of Christ. While hope is merely utopian without faith, without hope faith falls to pieces, becomes fainthearted, and eventually dies.¹⁷ Hope keeps the believer on the way and makes the church a source of disturbance in human society because hope forces faith to remain unreconciled to the world as it is. Hope, therefore, is not just a benefit of faith, but is vital for keeping faith alive. Hope, concentrates faith on a God whose

"name is a wayfaring name, a name of promise that discloses a new future, a name whose truth is experienced in history inasmuch as his promise discloses its future possibilities."¹⁸

17 Moltmann, THEOLOGY OF HOPE, p.20.

18 Ibid., p.30.

For Moltmann, hope is not an arbitrary concept; on the contrary, it refers to the meaning of Christian faith.

What theological differences between Hiltner and Moltmann have been brought to light? Firstly, as has already been indicated, Moltmann's theology is consistently Christ-centred while Hiltner's theology is only loosely and carelessly so. In fact, it may be quite correct to say that Hiltner's theology is man-centred. In terms of the fundamental organising principles behind Moltmann's and Hiltner's theologies, therefore, there is considerable divergence of theological opinion. Secondly, Hiltner's doctrine of God is essentially theistic while Moltmann derives all talk of God from the basic notion of the eschatology of the cross. There is little reference in Hiltner's writing to a trinitarian concept of God; God, for him, plays a functional role in man's movement towards self-fulfilment. In fact, his understanding of God is organised in terms of the demands of the prior categories of pastoral psychology. Moltmann, on the other hand has tried to work towards a thoroughly trinitarian concept of God which is grounded in his understanding of the person and work of Jesus Christ. Thirdly, insofar as Hiltner has a notion of eschatology it is subsumed under the categories of the developmental optimism of movement in the direction of self-fulfilment. For Moltmann, eschatology is a primary theological concept which refers to the future action of the Son in bringing in a new creation. Hiltner emphasises gradual movement, or progress, from history to the Kingdom of God; with Moltmann, the opposite is the case, for he envisions no possibility of progress towards the institution of the Kingdom without a new creation as an act of God.

Here, the Kingdom is a new creation which is only present in promise and anticipation. History, for Moltmann therefore, can only be understood in the light of the promised and anticipated future, while for Hiltner, as far as he has anything to say about it, history is to be understood in developmental and progressive terms. Fourthly, man in the world is seen in quite divergent terms by these two theologians. Hiltner conceives of man in individualistic and developmental categories. Again, his understanding appears to be uncritically predicted upon the assumptions of pastoral psychology. For Moltmann, man is on the way to being human, and he will finally be human only in the new creation of all things. Contrary to Hiltner, Moltmann is not immanently and developmentally optimistic about man's historical possibilities. There is in Moltmann, also, a strong anti-individualistic strain; for him, man has to live in search of the community of the Kingdom of God. Fifthly, there is clear difference in the respective doctrines of hope which each develops. For Hiltner, hope is related to the employment of therapeutic techniques which facilitate man's development towards self-fulfilment. God's role in this drama is that of the provider of providential grace who keeps alive the possibility of movement. For Moltmann, on the other hand, hope is consequent upon faith in the promises of God which will find their resolution only at the inauguration of the new age. Life in hope keeps the believer open to the future action of God. Hiltner's notion of hope remains within the possibilities of history as it is normally experienced; Moltmann's hope reaches out

for a new creation which is beyond present history. Sixthly, it should be noted that the problem of evil – and this includes theological reflection on death – is a central thrust in Moltmann's theology. Above all, Moltmann attempts to take evil seriously, and his theology is in some respects an attempt to construct an answer to the questions which evil and death pose to the righteousness of God. Moltmann's sensitivity to this issue has no corresponding echo in Hiltner's theology. For Hiltner, evil is a minimal concept, and death is discussed only insofar as it raises serious psychotherapeutic problems for ministry to the dying and the bereaved.

This analysis has brought out the extent of the differences between Moltmann's political theology and Hiltner's theology of pastoral care at the level of theological content. Not only does each approach the construction of theology in different ways, but the content of theology, what each understands the Christian faith to mean, is also seen to be different. It may be fair to note that Moltmann is a systematic theologian, while Hiltner is a pastoral theologian. But this distinction does not nullify the validity of outlining the extent of the difference between them. Even as a pastoral theologian, Hiltner has found it necessary to construct theological propositions which can be examined in their own right. This analysis has shown that there are no points of similarity in the way in which each understands the Christian faith.

3. Difference in Praxis

In that Hiltner is a pastoral theologian, while Moltmann is a political theologian, a distinct difference in what each sees as the practice of Christian caring can be expected. Little point of contact should be anticipated. Hiltner is seen to be quite unaware of the socio-political demands of the gospel, while Moltmann is seen to consider the pastoral task in terms quite different from those proposed by Hiltner. Most importantly, Moltmann's statement on the nature of socio-critical political theology attacks the psychotherapeutic assumptions which undergird Hiltner's programme.

As a pastoral theologian, Hiltner is trying to develop structures of pastoral ministry. As a Christian, he sets the pastoral task within the framework of the church and its ministry. The task of the church is service – service to God and service to man. Hiltner understands ministry within the church in functional terms: the minister has different tasks to perform in his role as a leader of some segment of the Christian community. Insofar as pastoral care is a major function of competent ministry, Hiltner argues that expertise in the theory and practice of shepherding should be regarded as necessary. Shepherding is the metaphor used by Hiltner to describe a function of ministry, and its essence lies in the pastor's tender and solicitous concern for his parishioner in need.

As was described in the section on Hiltner's theology of pastoral care, the aim of shepherding is to help a person (or small group) to move as far in the direction of healing as circumstances permit. For Hiltner, the stress is always on movement in the direction of healing.

The basic resource for shepherding, according to Hiltner, is pastoral counselling. The goal of pastoral counselling is to facilitate self-understanding on the part of the parishioner. The difference between pastoral counselling, as the basic resource for Christian shepherding, and 'secular' counselling lies in the context within which counselling is done. The Christian shepherd has the resources of the church and the faith behind him. But in all kinds of counselling there is a similarity of method and general principles. As the previous analysis of Hiltner indicated, pastoral counselling comes to constitute the reality of shepherding. Hiltner's major contribution, perhaps, has been to integrate the principles of pastoral counselling into the structure of pastoral theology under the general heading of 'shepherding.'

While shepherding – its theology and practice – has dominated Hiltner's contribution to the theology of pastoral care, he has briefly developed other aspects of practical ministry. The cognate organisation-centred disciplines of communicating the gospel and organising the Christian fellowship have received some attention from him. But it should be noted that his comments follow the same basic assumptions which lie behind his concept of shepherding, namely, leadership of the Christian community and the value of educative methodologies.

Hiltner's contribution to caring practice must not just be reckoned in theological terms. As a pastoral psychologist in his own right he has been a leader in the Association for Clinical Pastoral Education in the United States, and he has made major contributions

to the development of counselling technique. In particular, he has been a vigorous advocate of teaching pastoral care through case-study analysis, after the fashion of Boisen.

Previously, Moltmann's contribution to liberative praxis was gathered together under the general heading of 'The Tasks of Liberation.' There are three broad thrusts to the tasks of liberation advocated by Moltmann: the liberation of the concept of God from speculative political metaphors and the liberation of politics from the hold of absolute concepts; the liberation of the church from political or civil religion; and the liberating work of Christians in the world to relieve suffering and to humanise society in anticipation of the Kingdom of God. From this it can be seen that 'liberation' involves intellectual and practical tasks, and the two must be held together. These diverse tasks of liberation all arise out of the theological structure of the eschatology of the cross and are necessitated by it. In this sense, therefore, Moltmann's theology can be called a 'practical' theology.

A large part of Moltmann's work has been to analyse how static, absolute concepts of God, the church, and politics have dominated Christian caring practice in history. According to Moltmann, a proper practice demands freeing these concepts from their basis in misunderstanding by grounding them on the centre of Christian faith, Jesus Christ. By thinking through the ground of Christian faith anew, Moltmann has been forced to apply his conclusions to attacking the theoretical (and theological) foundations of contemporary Western society. In this way, his theology issues in a critical practice.

Perhaps the weakest aspect of Moltmann's political theology has been his attempt to state how Christians are to anticipate in practice the future of Christ amid the history of the present age. The political initiatives advocated by Moltmann to confront what he calls the five 'vicious circles of death' have been called into question by the Latin American theologians of liberation because of what they regard as his unwillingness to engage in ideological commitment and analysis as a grounding for praxis. In particular, Moltmann has consistently refused to subscribe to Marxism as an adequate political, social, and economic analysis of Western society.¹⁹ Yet the fact remains that he has not developed concrete proposals; his remarks remain at a general level. This suggests that his political theology has not significantly moved beyond political neutrality in practice. But while criticism has been directed at his theology for its lack of specific political commitment, the value of his critical work in attacking the structures and ideologies which maintain the status quo may not yet have been adequately recognised.

As noted at the beginning of this section, there is a wide gap between the caring praxis advocated by both Hiltner and Moltmann. As far as their respective practical programmes are concerned, there is little point of contact. Each is addressing himself to quite distinct and different types of issues and needs. Hiltner's concern for a psychotherapeutically sensitive pastoral care has no parallel in Moltmann's work, while Moltmann's

¹⁹ From personal discussion with Moltmann, he appears to see this as a fundamental point of dispute.

concern to attack the ideologies and structures of power and oppression has no parallel in Hiltner's work. The fundamental issue of need which each isolates is different: Hiltner stresses the individual in need, seen primarily in psychological terms, while Moltmann stresses situations of, or communities in, need seen primarily in socio-political terms.

Built into the fabric of Hiltner's pastoral care is the notion of tender and solicitous concern for the individual in need. Here, the pastor is seeking to facilitate self-knowledge on the part of the parishioner through the stimulation of internal psychological resources. As such, the structure of care does not extend, in principle, beyond the individual. Hiltner does not try to discern the aetiology of pastoral need, nor a prospect for its alleviation, in a social or political context. Whatever may be the status of such an approach in psychotherapeutic terms, it is possible to see Hiltner's programme as coming within range of Moltmann's socio-critical political theology. It is at this point that the differences in theological method and content begin to show themselves.

Firstly, it should be noted that, for Moltmann, the Kingdom of God is to be anticipated in political terms. Put into other language, this means that Christian existence is constitutively concerned with societies, communities and relationships. For Moltmann, Christian existence means political existence, though the reverse is not necessarily the case. The basis for this claim lies in the hope stimulated by the promises of God; this is a hope that is compelled to live in historical anticipation of the fulfilment of these promises. Whatever may be the structure of

pastoral care appropriate to a political theology of hope, at least one thing is certain, namely, that this care must be conceived in a way that is thoroughly and consistently socio-political. There can be no stepping back from the eschatological imperatives of the Kingdom into the immanent prospects of secular deliverance, whether this be dominated by pastoral psychology or Marxism. As far as a pastoral care which is dominated by individualistic and developmental psychotherapeutic categories is concerned, it contradicts the basic socio-political imperatives of eschatological faith.

Secondly, the critical aspect of eschatological faith, when applied to Hiltner's pastoral theology, further demonstrates the difference between them. If Moltmann's analysis of the 'accommodating church' is taken as an example, what is involved can be clearly seen. According to Moltmann, religion in contemporary society is assigned the task of preserving the personal and individual aspects of humanity. Here, the question of God is asked in relation to the question of man's personal, individual identity. Religion serves as a means of inner unburdening. However, when external, socio-political conditions are left as they are, concentration on personal identity and personal wholeness acquires the function of stabilising these social conditions in their non-humanity by providing the inner life of the heart with the things it has to do without in common experience. Likewise, when religion is conceived of as providing co-humanity as community, or fellowship, over against the exploitative and arbitrary organisation of society, nothing is done to

alter the stern reality of the loss of the human in society. Here, religion gives up its eschatological remit to change society, and becomes instead a dialectical counterbalance to society. In its retreat into the 'personal,' religion tries to find its relevance in the world; but according to Moltmann, this relevance is at the expense of its true identity as Christian. The mission of the church is not to create the possibility of inward, personal humanity, but to transform the world which does not yet correspond to the Kingdom of God. In the light of Moltmann's thesis, therefore, Hiltner's pastoral care, with its orientation on the creation of humanity through movement towards self-fulfilment, appears to function as a religious ratification of the structures and ideologies of Western society by failing to attack these structures and ideologies. In Moltmann's terms, Hiltner advocates an inner unburdening and a movement towards co-humanity. The corollary of this is the maintenance of society as it is.

The same point can be made with reference to Moltmann's more recent attack on the civil religion which serves to preserve the religious integration of society. For as long as Christianity finds its identity in facilitating personal identity, it ceases to become a critical and liberating force against civil religion. In this case, society remains untroubled by Christianity. When pastoral care fails to recognise the role of civil religion in a society, and becomes instead a means of helping people adjust to the demands of society, it ceases to fulfil its prophetic and eschatological calling.

If the problem is examined from the other side, looking at what might amount to Hiltner's critique of Moltmann, points of difference can again be demonstrated. Unless pastoral psychology is totally dispensed with, it must be argued that this discipline provides insights into human needs and suggests method of addressing these needs, especially through pastoral counselling. As has been shown, pastoral psychology is the basis of Hiltner's approach to pastoral care. Whatever problems Moltmann may have with the tendency of pastoral care for providing adjustment to an inhuman socio-political situation, the fact remains that it has a long history of success in alleviating a wide range of personal pain and relationship breakdown. As far as Hiltner's response to Moltmann's proposals may be judged, it seems clear that he would stress that there can be no ministry to human need which is psychotherapeutically ignorant. The fact that Moltmann remains unappreciative at best, and hostile at worst, to the whole intention of pastoral care as instanced by Hiltner, would suggest to Hiltner that Moltmann's understanding of pastoral and theological reality is quite inadequate.

This statement of the difference in the praxis advocated by Moltmann and Hiltner is the practical consequence of the differences in theological methodology and theological content which was previously discussed. The difference in praxis is not simply the result of one being a systematic theologian, while the other is a pastoral theologian. Rather, the difference in praxis is due to different understanding of the nature of theology. In fact, the degree of difference is such that

Moltmann's socio-political theology excludes Hiltner's theology of pastoral care at the point of praxis. If pastoral care really amounts to facilitating inner unburdening, and does nothing to facilitate change in the conditions which are in some measure part of the cause of pastoral need, then pastoral care is inadvertently sustaining the socio-political status quo. Pastoral care, in other words, serves to maintain the prevailing socio-political arrangements in society by healing those who are wounded by these arrangements without having a prophetic and critical word to address to them. It is such an implicit acceptance of the present organisation of society which Moltmann wants to criticise. The failure of Hiltner's theology of pastoral care to meet this critical responsibility ultimately marks the point of practical difference between it and political theology.

Chapter 11

Conclusion

1. Theological Methodology
2. The Individual and Society
3. Pastoral Care, Society and Eschatology
4. The Role of Christ
5. Socialism and Pastoral Psychology
6. Pastoral Care and the Mission of the Church
7. Reconciliation, Relationship and Eschatology
8. Conclusion

Up to this point the study has concentrated on Moltmann's political theology and Hiltner's theology of pastoral care. In this concluding chapter, the discussion moves from the particularities of Moltmann's and Hiltner's theologies to a statement of those issues which the comparative study has brought to light. Here, the issues which confront the theology of pastoral care if it is to move towards recognising the eschatological, socio-political and communal aspects of the gospel message, will be stated. In spite of differentiating the issues by name, in what follows there will be a certain amount of overlapping. This is unavoidable because some issues arise in slightly altered form under the different headings.

1. Theological Methodology

As the comparative study indicated, theological methodology is a point of major divergence between political theology and the theology of pastoral care. Inasmuch as the socio-political interpretation of the gospel message arises out of biblical theology, it stands contrary to the theology of pastoral care which is derived from theological reflection on pastoral operations. On the one hand, there is the attempt to understand the Bible in a particular way, and on the other, there is the attempt to understand pastoral experience in a particular way. If the theology of pastoral care is to include a socio-political interpretation of the Bible into its frame of reference, it is required to extend its theological methodology beyond operational theological studies.

This is allowed for to some extent in Hiltner's notion of two-way communication within the Body of Divinity. However, a socio-political theology of pastoral care would no longer be entirely an operational theological discipline, but would be a harmonisation of operational theological study and biblical and systematic theological study. That is, the biblical basis of political theology would have to rank equally with the theological study of pastoral operations.

It must be regarded as doubtful whether a harmonisation of these two theological methodologies could be achieved. Political theology, as it has been developed in this study, stands opposed to theological reflection on operations. It does not regard operational theological methodology as a valid approach to theological construction. Further, the authenticating basis of the theology of pastoral care is operational study. Any lessening of the role which such study plays must subvert the nature of the theology of pastoral care as it is currently understood. Put simply, the problem concerns the need to harmonise two theological methodologies which are mutually exclusive.

As far as Hiltner and Moltmann are concerned, the harmonisation of their theological methodologies is an unlikely prospect. If the theology of pastoral care is to include a socio-political dimension which is grounded in the biblical witness to promissory history, an alternative route to theological construction must be found. A possible avenue of exploration is worth noting, namely, a synthesis of Hiltner's methodology with the methodology of Latin American liberation theology. Both advocate theological reflection on praxis: on the one hand, pastoral operations,

and on the other, ideological analysis of society. There is, then, a degree of methodological similarity. But the theology of pastoral care and liberation theology are unlikely allies. One is predominantly Roman Catholic, while the other is predominantly Protestant; one is Latin American, while the other is North American; one is strongly influenced by Marxism, while the other has been developed in a society which is dominated by liberal capitalism. These differences would make alliance unlikely.

The general problem of an appropriate theological methodology for a socio-political theology of pastoral care must confront the issue of the relationship which should obtain between faith and ideology. How are Christian faith and the ideologies of liberation – both political liberation and psychological liberation, as in, for example, pastoral counselling – to be related? While political theology tries to construct a socio-critical theology which is free from ideological commitment, the theology of pastoral care remains committed to ideology, namely, the personality sciences. Whether or not the political theology examined in this study has a satisfactory relationship to ideology, a socio-political theology of pastoral care must face up to this issue in its own way. Explicitly, the theology of pastoral care accepts psychological assumptions about man, health, therapy and so on; implicitly, because of its lack of a socio-critical stance, it also accepts the ideological framework and assumptions of liberal capitalism. The theology of pastoral care is required to examine its relationship to ideology, not just to determine

whether the ideology is good or bad or useful for caring praxis, but primarily to determine whether it is theologically appropriate for the theology of pastoral care to be committed to ideology at all. Expressed in specific terms: Can the theology of pastoral care take seriously the eschatological message of the gospel and continue to give overt support to psychological assumptions about man, health, therapy and so on, and covert support to liberal capitalist assumptions about the nature of society and the economic relations within it? As one aspect in theological methodology, the relationship between faith and ideology must be made explicit on theological grounds. If the eschatological basis of political theology is accepted as valid by the theology of pastoral care, it is difficult to see how the employment of ideologies could be accepted into theological methodology.

2. The Individual and Society

A distinct difference between political theology and the theology of pastoral care is the way in which each understands human being. Political theology sees human being in socio-political or communitarian terms. The dominating concept which directs this way of looking at human being is the kingdom of God. In other words, the primary category of being is social. The theology of pastoral care, on the other hand, sees human being in individualistic terms. This is directed by the assumptions inherent in pastoral psychology. Human being is understood in terms of a clinical model of therapy which is directed towards problem-solving. Here, the individual, as a self-contained unit of humanity, is the primary category of being. In this case, there is a difference of view on the understanding of human being. In fact, the difference may imply a mutual exclusiveness.

If it is correct that the theology of pastoral care is exclusively individualistic in its understanding of human being and human need, is it at all possible to include a social dimension into its frame of reference? It has been shown how the theology of pastoral care is largely influenced by psychotherapeutic categories. For as long as the marriage between the theology of pastoral care and psychotherapy continues, it appears to be methodologically impossible to include a social aspect into its understanding of human being.

An interesting area of exploration for a solution to this problem may lie in those psychotherapies and concepts of personality development which are not based on an individualised concept of human being. Thus,

for example, the psychoanalyst Erich Fromm argues that consciousness is determined by the structure of society, and states of mental illness arise as the result of the interaction of various social conditions with man's existential needs.¹ Fromm comments that

"mental health cannot be defined in terms of the 'adjustment' of the individual to his society, but, on the contrary, . . . it must be defined in terms of the adjustment of society to the needs of man. . . . Whether or not the individual is healthy, is primarily not an individual matter, but depends on the structure of his society."²

As Robert A. Lambourne has also tried to indicate, it is not necessary for pastoral care to attend exclusively to individualised approaches to personality formation and psychotherapy. Lambourne notes that

"we need the range of symbols of good and evil in the Christian history in which political, material and personal images live together, and by 'we' is meant not just the pastoral counselling movement but the contemporary psychotherapeutic community of faith."³

In other words, personal health and personal salvation are wrapped up in a man's community.⁴

Perhaps lying at the back of the distinction between the individual and society in the theology of pastoral care is the liberal theological doctrine that each individual person is the arena of God's grace.

- 1 Cf. Erich Fromm, THE REVOLUTION OF HOPE (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), and Erich Fromm, THE ANATOMY OF HUMAN DESTRUCTIVENESS, (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1977).
- 2 Erich Fromm, THE SANE SOCIETY, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1963), p.72.
- 3 Lambourne, "Personal Reformation and Political Formation in Pastoral Care," p.33.
- 4 Lambourne, "Wholeness, Community and Worship," p.17.

It is a matter of fact that individualism is a characteristic of theological liberalism. In order to move towards an understanding of human being which includes a social dimension, yet which does not lose the notion of individuality, the theology of pastoral care is required to recast certain theological assumptions. Rather than take its direction from individualistic pastoral psychology, the theology of pastoral care is required to attend much more closely to biblical theology, perhaps after the fashion of Lambourne. The idea that a social dimension – both in the theological doctrine of man and in the understanding of human need – is necessary in pastoral care involves the theology of pastoral care in a reassessment of its characteristic theological stance.

3. Pastoral Care, Society and Eschatology

The basis of socio-critical political theology is eschatology. The fact of human suffering is reason enough to protest against social structures and conditions which cause suffering. But primarily, it is in the light of the coming kingdom of God that present social and political reality is to be criticised. Moltmann's eschatology of the cross is an attempt to characterise God's protest against inhuman conditions. A feature of the theology of pastoral care is its lack of an adequate eschatology. It seems likely that it is this factor which has dulled its awareness of the socio-political imperatives of the gospel message and allowed it to marry itself to immanent resources in an uncritical way.

If Moltmann is in some way correct in his description of eschatology, there can be no equation of health with salvation in the way in which theological liberalism in general, and Hiltner's theology of pastoral care in particular, have described it. The belief that health – as self-fulfilment and movement towards optimal living – takes us further on the way towards salvation is contradicted by an eschatology which has its theological identity in Jesus' death and resurrection. Death involves a break in relationships and a break with the reality of this world. Eschatology points to a gap between history and salvation. Also, the doctrine of sin refers in some way to man's inability to attain salvation through his own resources. The failure of the theology of pastoral care to deal adequately with death and sin implies that it has no notion of the central factors of eschatology. A progressive eschatology, which implies

a development through health to salvation, takes no account of the enormity of sin or the radical break which death involves. An eschatology which begins with Jesus' death and resurrection – an eschatology of the cross – stands contrary to an eschatology which maintains a developmental progress through health to salvation.

Two consequences of replacing the inadequate eschatology in the theology of pastoral care with a biblical eschatology must be pointed out. These consequences have implications for understanding the pastoral task today. Firstly, eschatology prevents Christian faith from affirming the identification of present society with the kingdom of God. This identification can be seen to be implicit rather than explicit in the theology of pastoral care. As previously outlined in the comparative study of political theology and the theology of pastoral care, political theology challenges the role played by pastoral care in sustaining society. Pastoral care inadvertently sustains society by not protesting against the injustices in the society and by limiting its role to binding up the wounds of those who are wounded by the society. Moltmann has observed that a distinction is made between the private and public realms of existence. Pastoral care is presently a 'private realm affair,' concerned to look after the private and personal needs of individuals. It makes no intrusion into the public realm of society. Political theology is critical of this dualistic interpretation of society, where religion is regarded as a private matter and the administration of society, industry and political life is regarded as a public and non-religious matter. Here, political theology, as socio-critical

theology, refuses to be a party to a dualistic interpretation of human reality. Pastoral care, on the other hand, by refusing to criticise society and be involved in challenging the nature of social relationships, acts as a stabilising influence in society. It offers fellowship and healing in a society which is in many ways inhuman, combative and unhealthy, without challenging these social ills. Inadvertently, pastoral care maintains the socio-political status quo. There is an implicit identification of the status quo with the will of God; more specifically, there is an implicit identification of the will of God with the liberal capitalist organisation and administration of society. Eschatology challenges this identification by pointing to the facts of sin and death, and by proclaiming the resurrection of Jesus as the Father's act. The quiet acceptance of society by way of privatised pastoral care is inconsistent with an eschatology which points to the future of the promise given in Jesus' resurrection. Eschatology raises fundamental theological problems for a pastoral care which is characterised by ministry to the personal and private needs of individuals and which does not raise a critical voice against a society which is not yet the kingdom of God.

Secondly, biblical eschatology prevents the synthesis of the kingdom of God with the employment of immanent resources. While it is no doubt true that pastoral care should employ whatever resources the sciences of man have to offer, it is not at all clear that it should equate that employment with the coming of the kingdom of God. This equation is implied in the progressive eschatology which moves through health to salvation. This is the same issue which was raised in the discussion of

the relationship between faith and ideology in the context of theological methodology. In particular, the problem here is that the use of pastoral psychology – with its developmental anthropology and claims to success in therapy – is equated with the advancement of the kingdom of God.

On eschatological grounds, this equation is clearly false, for there is no way in which we can move, by the use of pastoral psychology, from the world of sin and death into the kingdom of God. This is not to say that immanent resources should not be used in pastoral care in order to heal and nurture effectively; on the contrary, it is vitally important that these resources should be used. It is to say that the use of these resources will not bring in the kingdom of God and that their use must not dull socio-critical awareness by overwhelming the eschatological aspect which should be a part of all Christian theology. Eschatology orders the way in which pastoral care should understand its employment of immanent resources like, for example, pastoral counselling.

To sum up: eschatology challenges the role which pastoral care plays in the society. It also challenges the synthesis whereby the coming of the kingdom of God is equated with the use of immanent resources. These challenges go to the roots of the theological basis of pastoral care and question two characteristic assumptions: pastoral care as care for the individual while disregarding the society, and the employment of pastoral psychology in order to move towards salvation through health. It may be that the challenge which eschatology poses to the theology of pastoral care effectively blocks the prospects for including a political dimension into pastoral care through a dialogue with political theology as it has been outlined in this study.

4. The Role of Christ

The role of Christ is important to discuss in this context.

The problems which confront the theology of pastoral care, if it is to include some of the insights of political theology, have their centre in the understanding of the person and work of Christ. It has already been noted that Christ plays very little part in the construction of the theology of pastoral care. In political theology, on the other hand, the person and work of Christ is the dominating motif. Primarily, eschatology is understood in christological terms. But, quite apart from the need to include a political dimension into pastoral care, the failure of the theology of pastoral care to give an appropriate theological place to Christ would have to be corrected. In view of the context of this discussion, the central role which Christ plays in political theology also points to the need to reinstate Christ into a central position in the theology of pastoral care.

In this study, political theology has already been called 'incarnational'; without doubt it intends to put Christ into the centre of the theological stage. Christ dominates the discussion of the issues for political theology, whether the doctrines of God, man, history, or eschatology. And the identity of Jesus is central to the eschatology of the cross. The theology of pastoral care, on the other hand, has been characterised as 'man-centred.' God in Christ, as far as can be judged, plays only a limited role. This may be seen in Hiltner's failure to develop a christology. Apart from occasional references to

Christ in a rather unstructured way, there is no significant place for Christ in the theology of pastoral care. As far as the practice of pastoral care is concerned, Jesus' story of the Good Samaritan is a paradigm of shepherding. But christology as such has no place.

Clearly christology must challenge the dominant role played by pastoral psychology in the theology of pastoral care. Instead of attempting to understand the nature of human being in the light of pastoral psychology, human being should be understood primarily in the light of God in Christ. In this case, the theology of pastoral care would have to take its identity and relevance from Christ rather than from pastoral psychology. At least as far as Moltmann is concerned, the cross of Christ is the centre of Christian faith and theology. Interpreted dialectically in the light of the resurrection, the cross is the visible, historical sign of God's participation in the human situation. It is God's physical solidarity with the plight of man, namely solidarity with life unto death, meaninglessness, abandonment, and suffering. It is only in the light of the cross that Christianity can find its identity and relevance amid the needs of the present age.

The theology of pastoral care has no corresponding theological insight into the human situation. Rather, this situation is interpreted in the light of pastoral psychology. In this case, non-theological criteria determine the understanding of human being and human need. These criteria are not grounded in the reality of God's solidarity with the earth. Without a theology of the cross of Christ, the theology of pastoral care can tend to become naive, over-optimistic, and unrealistic. The political theology of the cross raises questions for the theology of pastoral care about how it is to understand both its commission to care and the need which it ought to address.

Theologically, the meaning of pastoral care would have to be thought through in christocentric rather than anthropocentric terms. This would mean that a theological issue such as the proclamation of the forgiveness of sins would have to play a bigger part in pastoral care. The hope of faith – the resurrection of the dead into communion with God – would find a place in ministry to the dying and the bereaved. The sacraments would be reinstated into the framework of pastoral care as signs of God's grace. Lastly, mission – bringing people into a knowledge of God in Christ – would find a place in pastoral care. Pastoral care would be seen to exist within the context of the evangelical mission of the church. In this case, pastoral care would not just be pastoral counselling, but would be seen in the context of bringing people into knowledge of God in Christ. This would not exclude pastoral counselling, but would set it in the context of mission. If these suggestions for a reappraisal of the nature of pastoral care are valid, they must be accompanied by a theological reappraisal. Introducing Christ into a central place in the theology of pastoral care challenges the characteristics of the discipline as it is presently understood.

5. Socialism and Pastoral Psychology

By and large, the content of the theology of pastoral care is determined by the personality sciences, and in particular by pastoral psychology. Political theology is derived from the biblical witness to the promises of God. As this theology has been outlined in this study, it is not neo-Marxist. However, in its support for socialism, civil and human rights, liberation from oppression, and in its continual criticism of the administration and structure of Western society, political theology has a distinctly 'left-wing' bias. To what extent, therefore, is there a conflict between a predominantly American-influenced pastoral psychology and the 'left-wing' bias found in political theology?

The answer to this question depends on the extent to which pastoral psychology is a reflection of the liberal capitalist social philosophy which dominates contemporary American society. If pastoral psychology does reflect the political self-image of America - free-market economics, individualism, separation between the public and private realms of existence, and so on - then it seems likely that there would be a conflict with 'left-wing' politics. While an adequate discussion of this matter could only arise out of detailed research into the political nature of pastoral psychology, there is sufficient data in Hiltner's use of pastoral psychology to indicate that it would not be compatible with socialism. For example, socialism is communitarian while pastoral psychology is individualistic; socialism arises out of European Idealism

while pastoral psychology arises out of philosophical liberalism; socialism is antithetical to the 'American way of life' while pastoral psychology has been welcomed as congenial with it. While these examples are only intended to give an indication of some of the conflicts between the two, it seems reasonable to venture that the 'left-wing' bias of political theology would be at odds with the pastoral psychological bias of American theology of pastoral care. This non-theological issue points to a conflict which would not be easy to overcome within the North American context. Yet it is an issue which would have to be addressed in any redefinition of the theology of pastoral care which tried to include political theology into its frame of reference.

suggest a vision of the pastoral church. Certainly his problem-centred approach to pastoral care would seem to imply this.

In spite of a lack of clarity in political theology and the diversity of pastoral care about the pastoral constitution of the church, it is clear that there is a difference between them on this matter. Is pastoral care something that representative Christian people do to others or is it an expression of the community's life and faith? Is pastoral care a function of ministry or is it a part of the common life of faith and, therefore, the task of all? Political theology appears to advocate a non-functional approach to pastoral care in which all believers are pastors whose task

5. Nelmann, THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT, p. 111.

6. Pastoral Care and the Mission of the Church

In rather ambiguous terms, Moltmann has argued against what he has called the 'pastoral church.' This is the church

"that looks after people."⁵

In place of the pastoral church, Moltmann suggests a communal church, a church among the people. For Moltmann, ecclesiology begins with the teaching of Matthew 25. 35f. The church exists in the community of believers who confess Christ and in the community of the oppressed, who may not 'know' Christ. The church is where Christ is: ubi Christus—ibi ecclesia. Hiltner has no properly developed theology of the church. But as far as may be judged, it is reasonable to assume that he would suggest a notion of the pastoral church. Certainly his problem-centred approach to pastoral care would seem to imply this.

In spite of a lack of clarity in political theology and the theology of pastoral care about the pastoral constitution of the church, it is clear that there is a difference between them on this matter. Is pastoral care something that representative Christian people do to others or is it an expression of the community's life and faith? Is pastoral care a function of ministry or is it a part of the common life of faith and, therefore, the task of all? Political theology appears to advocate a non-functional approach to pastoral care in which all believers are pastors whose task

5 Moltmann, THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT, p.xvi.

6 Moltmann, THEOLOGY OF HOPE, p.327.

is to facilitate the coming brotherhood of the kingdom of God. Here, pastoral care is seen in terms of mission:

"This mission is not carried out within the horizon of expectation provided by the social roles which society concedes to the Church, but it takes place within its own peculiar horizon of the eschatological expectation of the coming kingdom of God, of the coming righteousness and the coming peace, of the coming freedom and dignity of man. The Christian Church has not to serve mankind in order that the world may remain what it is. . . but in order that it may transform itself and become what it is promised to be."⁶

Pastoral care, then, is to be seen in the context of the calling of Christians in society. In this way, pastoral care is part of the church's action in hope for the historic transformation of life.

As pastoral care is a major part of the church's life, it is necessary to develop a satisfactory theology of the pastoral constitution of the church. That is, it is necessary to understand pastoral care in terms of ecclesiology, and in this way to relate it to the wider mission of the church, expressed in preaching, sacraments, and so on. This is part of the challenge which political theology puts to the theology of pastoral care. In particular, this challenge amounts to a criticism of limiting pastoral care to problem-solving which is separated off from the total life of the church. Pastoral care understood outside of the missionary context of the full life of the church leads to the adjustment of the individual to society and thereby to the stabilisation of society. In this way, eschatologically oriented political theology forces the theology of pastoral care to reexamine the nature and place of pastoral care in the church.

6 Moltmann, THEOLOGY OF HOPE, p.327.

7. Reconciliation, Relationship and Eschatology

It has been noted that Hiltner leaves reconciliation out of the account of shepherding. As such, it may be assumed that relationship is not thereby a primary theological category in his theology of pastoral care, for reconciliation has to do with restoring relationships which are broken. Eschatological theology refers, in the last analysis, to relationship as the mode of being in the kingdom of God. That is, relationship constitutes the ontological ground of personhood which is to be anticipated as an eschatological reality. Relationship between man and God and between man and man is a large part of the hope of the gospel which is to be anticipated in history. Because relationship is the result of reconciliation, reconciliation cannot be left out of the account and must find a place again in a theology of pastoral care which seeks to respond to the eschatological nature of the gospel.

If relationship is seen at the heart of the eschatological concept of person, the theology of pastoral care must regard reconciliation as a primary pastoral category. Only insofar as relationships are established can people be said to anticipate the coming reality of personhood. The eschatology of relationship must come to pastoral expression in the work of reconciliation on earth. Without reconciliation, healing, guiding and sustaining become illusions, for they cannot by themselves constitute or create personhood. The omission of reconciliation in the theology of pastoral care must be corrected if the ontological ground of personhood is to be taken seriously.

Does the eschatology of relationship contradict the ontology of acceptance? It does if the latter is understood as a presently existing reality rather than as a future hope. That is, there is a contradiction if the eschatological aspect of relationship is left out of the account. Death breaks relationships, therefore, relationship must have an eschatological dimension or ultimately be meaningless. The ontology of acceptance has to be understood in eschatological and relational terms. Ontologically and eschatologically, the nature of acceptance is not, 'you are accepted,' but, 'you will be accepted.' Eschatology forces the theology of pastoral care to place reconciliation at the centre of pastoral care, for relationship is the primary category of being in the kingdom of God.⁷

⁷ I am grateful to John Munro for pointing out to me the relationship between personhood and eschatology.

8. Conclusion

If the theology of pastoral care is to include the insights of political theology into its frame of reference, and move towards ministry to society as well as to individuals, it is required to alter essential theological characteristics. The nature of political theology is such that it cannot be easily harmonised with the theology of pastoral care. As the comparative study indicated, there are major differences between political theology and the theology of pastoral care in theological methodology, theological content, and the nature of praxis. These differences are not superficial. In fact, the differences are sufficiently radical for political theology and the theology of pastoral care to be mutually exclusive.

A socio-political theology of pastoral care can only come about if the issues itemised in this conclusion are faced. The nature of these issues suggests that not only has the theology of pastoral care to extend its theological base, but it is required to examine its constitutive assumptions about the nature of pastoral care. The theology of pastoral care can include a socio-political dimension into its frame of reference only if it engages in a radical reassessment of the theological basis of pastoral care. In this case, it is pushed back to its foundations. It has to question its operational methodology, its concentration on the individual to the exclusion of society, its failure to include christology and eschatology into the account, its allegiance to pastoral psychology and implicit alliance with liberal capitalism, its omission of the primary ontological category of relationship, and its lack of contextualisation in the wider

mission of the church. Quite apart from including a socio-political dimension into pastoral care, these are issues which the theology of pastoral care ought to be considering in any case. But, specifically in the context of this study, these issues indicate that political theology cannot be integrated into the theology of pastoral care without the latter undergoing radical change.

The prospect of the theology of pastoral care confronting the issues raised in this study appears unlikely. Apart from the theological statement by Lambourne and the hints thrown out by Clinebell, Lapsley and Bonthius, pastoral theologians have given little evidence that they either see the issues involved or are willing to grapple with them. In spite of this, it was necessary that the ground should have been cleared in order that the way forward could be seen a little more clearly. The comparative study has shown the gulf which exists between political theology and the theology of pastoral care, and the problems confronting the realignment of the theology of pastoral care towards including the socio-political demands of the gospel into its frame of reference are now made plain.

Books cited in Text

- 1 ADAMS, James Luther & HILTNER, Gerald. (Eds.) PASTORAL CARE IN THE LIBERAL CHURCHES
New York: Abingdon Press, 1976.
- 2 ALVES, Robert J. A THEOLOGY OF FUKUJI HOTO
St. Marys, Indiana: Abbey Press, 1977.
- 3 ASSMANN, Hugo. PRACTICAL THEOLOGY BY LIBERATION
London: Search Press, 1975.
- 4 BARTH, Karl. (Ed. W.G. Sand)
- 5 AGAINST THE STREAM, London: S.C.M. Press, 1961.
- 6 CHURCH DOGMATICS (1-2)
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1969.
- 7 COMMUNITY, STATE AND CHURCH
Chicago: BIBLIOGRAPHY: Books, Articles
- 8 BEUGLY, Peter. THE SACRED CANOPY, Garden City,
New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, 1967.
- 9 BERT, Ernest. ONE BODY IN CHRIST,
London: S.P.C.K., 1955.
- 10 BLOCH, Ernst. MAN ON HIS OWN, New York:
Harper & Row, 1971.
- 11 BOISSE, Anton T. OUT OF THE DEPTHS,
New York: Harper & Row, 1960.
- 12 THE EXPLORATION OF THE INNER WORLD
A Study of Mental Disorder and Religious Experience,
New York: Harper Torch Books, 1976.
- 13 BONING, Jane Higgins. CHRISTIANS AND MARXISTS
London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1976.
- 14 EVOLUTIONARY THEOLOGY COMES OF AGE,
London: S.P.C.K., 1975.
- 15 BROWNING, Don S. ATONEMENT AND PSYCHOTHERAPY
Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966.
- 16 BULTMANN, Rudolf. THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT
Vol. 1, London: M.C.M. Press, 1962.

Books cited in Text

- 1 ADAMS, James Luther & HILTNER, Seward. (Editors)
PASTORAL CARE IN THE LIBERAL CHURCHES
New York: Abingdon Press, 1970.
- 2 ALVES, Rubem A. A THEOLOGY OF HUMAN HOPE
St. Meinrod, Indiana: Abbey Press, 1972.
- 3 ASSMANN, Hugo. PRACTICAL THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION
London: Search Press, 1975.
- 4 BARTH, Karl. (Ed. R. G. Smith)
AGAINST THE STREAM, London: S.C.M. Press, 1954.
- 5 _____. CHURCH DOGMATICS 1.1.
4.1.
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1969.
- 6 _____. COMMUNITY, STATE AND CHURCH
Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1968.
- 7 BERGER, Peter. THE SACRED CANOPY, Garden City,
New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, 1967.
- 8 BEST, Ernest. ONE BODY IN CHRIST,
London: S.P.C.K. 1955.
- 9 BLOCH, Ernst. MAN ON HIS OWN, New York:
Herder & Herder, 1971.
- 10 BOISEN, Anton T. OUT OF THE DEPTHS,
New York: Harper & Row, 1960.
- 11 _____. THE EXPLORATION OF THE INNER WORLD
A Study of Mental Disorder and Religious Experience.
New York: Harper Torch Books, 1936.
- 12 BONINO, José Miguez. CHRISTIANS AND MARXISTS
London: Hodder & Stroughton, 1976.
- 13 _____. REVOLUTIONARY THEOLOGY COMES OF AGE,
London: S.P.C.K., 1975.
- 14 BROWNING, Don S. ATONEMENT AND PSYCHOTHERAPY
Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966.
- 15 BULTMANN, Rudolf. THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT
Vol. 1. London: S.C.M. Press, 1952.

- 16 CAPPS, Walter Holden. HOPE AGAINST HOPE:
FROM MOLTSMANN TO MERTON IN ONE THEOLOGICAL
DECADE, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976.
- 17 CLARK, Gordon H. KARL BARTH'S THEOLOGICAL METHOD
Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing
Company, 1963.
- 18 CLEBSCH, William A. and JAEKLE, Charles R.
PASTORAL CARE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1974.
- 19 CLINEBELL, Howard J. (Jr.)
MENTAL HEALTH THROUGH CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY
New York: Abingdon Press, 1965.
- 20 COBB, John B. (Jr.) A CHRISTIAN NATURAL THEOLOGY
London: Lutterworth Press, 1966.
- 21 CONE, James. BLACK THEOLOGY AND BLACK POWER
New York: The Seabury Press, 1969.
- 22 . GOD OF THE OPPRESSED
New York: The Seabury Press, 1975.
- 23 COUSINS, Ewert H. (Editor)
HOPE AND THE FUTURE OF MAN
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972.
- 24 COX, Harvey. THE SECULAR CITY, Harmondsworth,
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968.
- 25 FIERRO, Alfredo. THE MILITANT GOSPEL,
London: S.C.M. Press, 1977.
- 26 FROMM, Erich. THE SANE SOCIETY, London:
Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1973.
- 27 GARAUDY, Roger. FROM ANATHEMA TO DIALOGUE
London: Collins, 1967.
- 28 GARDAVSKY, V. GOD IS NOT YET DEAD,
Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1973.
- 29 GREGOR SMITH, Ronald. SECULAR CHRISTIANITY
London: Collins, 1966.
- 30 GUNDRY, Robert H. SOMA IN BIBLICAL THEOLOGY
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

- 31 GUTIERREZ, Gustavo. A THEOLOGY OF LIBERATION
London: S.C.M. Press, 1974.
- 32 . PRAXIS OF LIBERATION AND CHRISTIAN FAITH
San Antonio, Texas: Mexican American Cultural Center, 1976.
- 33 HAMILTON, Peter. THE LIVING GOD AND THE MODERN WORLD
London: Hodder & Stroughton, 1967.
- 34 HAYWOOD THOMAS, J. PAUL TILlich: AN APPRAISAL
London: S.C.M. Press, 1963.
- 35 HERZOG, Frederick. LIBERATION THEOLOGY
New York: The Seabury Press, 1972.
- 36 . (Editor) THE FUTURE OF HOPE
New York: Herder & Herder, 1970.
- 37 HESCHEL, Abraham. THE PROPHETS
New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
- 38 HIELEMA, J. S. PASTORAL OR CHRISTIAN COUNSELING
Leeuwarden: De Tille, 1975.
- 39 HILTNER, Seward. and COLSTON, Lowell G.
THE CONTEXT OF PASTORAL COUNSELING
New York: Abingdon Press, 1961.
- 40 HILTNER, Seward. FERMENT IN THE MINISTRY
New York: Abingdon Press, 1969.
- 41 . PASTORAL COUNSELING
New York: Abingdon Press, 1953.
- 42 . PREFACE TO PASTORAL THEOLOGY
New York: Abingdon Press, 1958.
- 43 . THE CHRISTIAN SHEPHERD
New York: Abingdon Press, 1959.
- 44 . THE COUNSELOR IN COUNSELING
New York: Abingdon Press, 1952.
- 45 . THEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS
New York: Abingdon Press, 1972.
- 46 HOWARD, Dick. THE MARXIAN LEGACY
London: The MacMillan Company, 1977.

- 47 JAY, Martin. THE DIALECTICAL IMAGINATION
London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1973.
- 48 LAMBOURNE, Robert A. COMMUNITY, CHURCH AND HEALING
London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1963.
- 49 LAPSLEY, James. SALVATION AND HEALTH. The Interlocking
Process of Life. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1972.
- 50 MACINTYRE, Alasdair. MARXISM AND CHRISTIANITY
Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1969.
- 51 MARCUSE, Herbert. ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN
Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.
- 52 McINTOSH, Ian. PASTORAL CARE AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY
Edinburgh: The St. Andrew Press, 1972.
- 53 McKINNEY, R. W. A. (Editor) CREATION, CHRIST AND CULTURE
Essays in Honour of T. F. Torrance. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1976.
- 54 MEEKS, M. Douglas. ORIGINS OF THE THEOLOGY OF HOPE
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974.
- 55 MELAND, Bernard E. (Editor) THE FUTURE OF EMPIRICAL
THEOLOGY. Essays in Divinity, Vol.7. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1969.
- 56 METZ, Johannes B. THEOLOGY OF THE WORLD
London: Burns & Oates/Herder & Herder, 1969.
- 57 MINEAR, Paul. IMAGES OF THE CHURCH IN THE NEW TESTAMENT
London: Lutterworth Press, 1961.
- 58 MOLTSMANN, Jürgen. HOPE AND PLANNING
London: S.C.M. Press, 1971.
- 59 _____. MAN, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974.
- 60 _____. RELIGION, REVOLUTION AND THE FUTURE
New York: Charles Scribner's Son, 1969.
- 61 _____. THE CHURCH IN THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT
London: S.C.M. Press, 1977.
- 62 _____. THE CRUCIFIED GOD, New York: Harper & Row, 1974.
- 63 _____. THE EXPERIMENT HOPE, London: S.C.M. Press, 1975.
- 64 _____. THEOLOGY OF HOPE, London: S.C.M. Press, 1967.

- 65 NEWBEGIN, Lesslie. THE HOUSEHOLD OF GOD:
Lectures on the Nature of the Church.
London: S.C.M. Press. 1964.
- 66 NIEBUHR, H. Richard., WILLIAMS, Daniel Day., GUSTAFSON, James.
THE ADVANCEMENT OF THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957.
- 67 ODEN, Thomas C. CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY
Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1967.
- 68 OGLESBY, William B. (Jr.) (Editor)
THE NEW SHAPE OF PASTORAL THEOLOGY, New York:
Abingdon Press, 1969.
- 69 PANNENBERG, Wolfhart. BASIC QUESTIONS IN THEOLOGY
Vol. 2 & 3. London: S.C.M. Press, 1971.
- 70 _____. WHAT IS MAN? Contemporary Anthropology in
Theological Perspective. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1974.
- 71 RAD, Gerhard von. THE MESSAGE OF THE PROPHETS
New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
- 72 ROBINSON, John A. T. THE BODY: A STUDY IN PAULINE THEOLOGY
London: S.C.M. Press, 1952.
- 73 ROGERS, Carl R. ON BECOMING A PERSON
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961.
- 74 SEGUNDO, Juan Luis. THE LIBERATION OF THEOLOGY
Dublin: Gill & MacMillan, 1977.
- 75 The Institute of Christian Thought (Editors)
RELIGION AND POLITICAL SOCIETY
New York: Harper & Row, 1974.
- 76 THURNEYSSEN, Eduard. THEOLOGY OF PASTORAL CARE
Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1963.
- 77 TILLICH, Paul. SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY, Vol. 1.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.
- 78 _____. THE COURAGE TO BE, London: Collins,
Fontana Library of Theology and Philosophy, 1962.
- 79 _____. THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATION
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948.
- 80 _____. THEOLOGY OF CULTURE, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1959.

- 81 TORRANCE, Thomas F. GOD AND RATIONALITY
London: Oxford University Press, 1971.
- 82 . KARL BARTH: AN INTRODUCTION TO HIS EARLY
THEOLOGY 1910-1931. London: S.C.M. Press, 1962
- 83 . THEOLOGICAL SCIENCE,
London: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- 84 WHITEHEAD, Alfred North. PROCESS AND REALITY
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929.
- BOWTHORN, Robert W. "A Theology of Poverty: Problems in
Pastoral Care of the Poor" PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY
Vol. 20, No. 153. (November, 1969).
- BRANTEN, Carl A. "A Trinitarian Theology of the Cross"
THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION, Vol. 56, No. 1. (January, 1976).
- BUTLER, Gerald A. "Karl Barth and Political Theology"
SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, Vol. 27. (November, 1974).
- CAMPBELL, A. V. "Is Practical Theology Possible?"
SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, Vol. 25, No. 2. (May, 1972).
- CROFTMAN, C. Clarke. "Moltmann's Vision of Man"
ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, Vol. 171, No. 3. (July, 1973).
- COBB, John B. "What is Alive and What is Dead in Empirical Theology"
in (Ed. Nelson) THE FUTURE OF EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).
- GALLOWAY, Alan B. "The New Heidegger" RELIGIOUS STUDIES VII
(December, 1972).
- HALL, Charles E. "Some Contributions of Arno T. Hansen to
Understanding Psychiatry and Religion." PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY
Vol. 13, No. 156. (September, 1969).
- HARVEY, Van A. "Secularism, Responsible Belief, and the
Theology of Hope." In Otterson, Ed. THE FUTURE OF HOPE
(New York: Harper & Row, 1976).
- HELLWIG, Norman. "Liberation Theology: An Emerging School"
SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY, Vol. 30, No. 2. (March, 1977).
- HILYNNE, Seward. "Integrity in Pastoral Care"
PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 17, No. 155. (November, 1968).
- . "Pastoral Psychology and Constructive Theology"
PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 4, No. 25. (June 1959).
- . "Paul Tillich and Pastoral Psychology"
PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. 16, No. 159. (December, 1969).

Articles cited in Text

- BAUCKHAM, Richard. "Moltmann's Eschatology of the Cross"
SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY Vol.30. No. 4.
(October, 1976).
- BETTIS, Joseph. "Political Theology and Social Ethics:
The Socialist Humanism of Karl Barth"
SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY (August, 1974) Vol.27.
- BONTHIUS, Robert H. "A Theology of Poverty: Prelude to
Pastoral Care of the Poor" PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY
Vol.20. No.198. (November, 1969).
- BRAATEN, Carl A. "A Trinitarian Theology of the Cross"
THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION Vol.56. No.1. (January, 1976).
- BUTLER, Gerald A. "Karl Barth and Political Theology"
SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY Vol.27. (November, 1974).
- CAMPBELL, A. V. "Is Practical Theology Possible?"
SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY Vol.25. No.2. (May, 1972).
- CHAPMAN, G. Clarke. "Moltmann's Vision of Man"
ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW Vol. LVI. No.3. (July, 1974).
- COBB, John B. "What is Alive and What is Dead in Empirical Theology"
in (Ed. Meland) THE FUTURE OF EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).
- GALLOWAY, Alan D. "The New Hegelians" RELIGIOUS STUDIES VII
(December, 1972).
- HALL, Charles E. "Some Contributions of Anton T. Boisen to
Understanding Psychiatry and Religion." PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY
Vol. 19. No.186. (September, 1968).
- HARVEY, Van A. "Secularism, Responsible Belief, and the
'Theology of Hope'." in (Herzog, Ed.) THE FUTURE OF HOPE
(New York: Herder & Herder, 1970).
- HELLWIG, Monika. "Liberation Theology: An Emerging School"
SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY Vol.30. No.2. (March, 1977).
- HILTNER, Seward. "Integrity in Pastoral Care"
PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY Vol.17. No.168. (November, 1966).
- _____. "Pastoral Psychology and Constructive Theology"
PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY Vol.4. No.35. (June 1953).
- _____. "Paul Tillich and Pastoral Psychology"
PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY Vol.16. No.159. (December, 1965).

HILTNER, Seward. "The Debt of C.P.E. to Anton T. Boisen"
JOURNAL OF PASTORAL CARE Vol.20. 1961.

_____. "Toward a Theology of Conversion in the Light of Psychology"
PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY Vol.17.No.166. (September, 1966).

_____. "What we get and give in Pastoral Care. What we get:
Theological Understanding." PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY
Vol.5.No.42. (March, 1954).

LAMBOURNE, Robert A. "Personal Reformation and Political Formation
in Pastoral Care" CONTACT 44 (Spring, 1974).

_____. "The Deliverance Map of Disease and Sin"
CONTACT 44 (Spring, 1974).

_____. "Wholeness, Community and Worship"
CONTACT 44 (Spring, 1974).

_____. "With Love to the U.S.A." in RELIGION AND MEDICINE
(Ed.) Melinsky (London: S.C.M. Press, 1970).

LAPSLEY, James N. "Pastoral Theology Past and Present" in
THE NEW SHAPE OF PASTORAL THEOLOGY (Ed.)
Wm. B. Oglesby (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1969).

LOOMER, Bernard M. "Empirical Theology within Process Thought"
in (Ed. Meland) THE FUTURE OF EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

MELAND, Bernard E. "The Empirical Tradition in Theology at Chicago"
in (Ed. Meland) THE FUTURE OF EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

METZ, Johannes B. "Prophetic Authority" in
RELIGION AND POLITICAL SOCIETY (Ed.)
The Institute of Christian Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).

_____. "The Future Ex Memoria Passionis" in (Cousins Ed.)
HOPE AND THE FUTURE OF MAN
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972).

MICKEY, Paul. "Is there a Theology in Seward Hiltner's Pastoral Theology?"
PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY Vol.21.No207. (October, 1970).

MOLTMANN, Jürgen. "An Open Letter to Jose Miguez Bonino"
CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS Vol.36. No.5. (March, 1976).

_____. "Creation and Redemption" in (R. W. A. McKinney Ed.)
CREATION, CHRIST AND CULTURE. Essays in Honour of
 T. T. Torrance. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1976).

_____. "The Cross and Civil Religion" in
RELIGION AND POLITICAL SOCIETY (Ed.) The Institute of
 Christian Thought. (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).

_____. "Hope and the Biomedical Future of Man" in (Cousins Ed.)
HOPE AND THE FUTURE OF MAN (Philadelphia:
 Fortress Press, 1972).

_____. "Response to the Opening Presentation" in (Cousins Ed.)
HOPE AND THE FUTURE OF MAN (Philadelphia:
 Fortress Press, 1972).

_____. "Theology as Eschatology" in (Herzog Ed.)
THE FUTURE OF HOPE (New York: Herder & Herder, 1970).

_____. "The Trinitarian History of God" THEOLOGY
 Vol.78. No.666. (December, 1975).

NOUWEN, Henri J. M. "Anton T. Boisen and Theology Through
 Living Human Documents." PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY
 Vol.19. No.186. (September, 1968).

OGDEN, Schubert M. "Present Prospects for Empirical Theology"
 in (Ed. Meland) THE FUTURE OF EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY
 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

PRUYSER, Paul. "Anton T. Boisen and the Psychology of Religion."
JOURNAL OF PASTORAL CARE. Vol.21. 1967.

TILLICH, Paul. "Theology of Pastoral Care"
PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY Vol.10. No.97. (October, 1959).

WILLIAMS, Daniel Day. "Suffering and Belief in Empirical Theology"
 in (Ed. Meland) THE FUTURE OF EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY
 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

_____. "Truth in the Theological Perspective"
JOURNAL OF RELIGION Vol.28. (October, 1948).