Bloc Party: Investigating the Strategies of AILAC in the UNFCCC

PhD in Human Geography

Department of Geography and Environmental Science

School of Archaeology, Geography, and Environmental Science

Daniel Waite

May 2020

Declaration: I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all

material from other sources has been properly and fully

acknowledged.

Daniel Waite

<u>Abstract</u>

As climate change has become a pressing global political issue, academic interest in the negotiations within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has grown. However, whilst the outcomes, and levels of parties' influence, have produced much scholarship, a lacuna remains on parties' strategies. Specifically, strategies used by coalitions have been understudied. This thesis contributes with an investigation of strategies used by AILAC, a group of Latin American states co-operating to advance ambitious global climate action, between 2013 and 2018. As a relatively new coalition, AILAC has received little scholarly attention, with limited study assessing its positions and contributions towards the Paris Agreement. This thesis examines AILAC's strategy choices and the reasoning behind them through a governmentality theoretical lens. Primarily a theory of power, it sees relations between actors as processes, questioning how actors interact with each other, making it a natural fit for the study of strategies and an attractive alternative to rational choice theories overlooking processes. To determine AILAC's strategy use, the thesis employs Critical Discourse Analysis. CDA uncovers evidence of strategies within AILAC's UNFCCC submission texts and interviews with AILAC delegates, providing insights into influences on AILAC's strategic decision-making. It finds AILAC overwhelmingly preferred less aggressive strategies such as constructive proposals, persuasion, and coalition-building over more aggressive strategies like exerting moral pressure, demands, and threats. This primarily resulted from power relations between AILAC and its negotiating partners; while AILAC is resource-poor vis-à-vis material power, it is rich in power/knowledge, allowing it to use less aggressive strategies with a reasonable expectation of success where more aggressive strategies reliant on material power would likely fail. The thesis also finds influence on AILAC strategies from various other factors; e.g. AILAC's bridge-building identity reinforces the attractiveness of less aggressive strategies, while its delegation dynamics drive use of informal spaces.

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been a calm and reasonable voice, and his door has always been open whenever I have needed his advice or reassurance. He helped me to keep the various facts of PhD life in perspective and his contribution has been greatly appreciated.

Next, my second supervisor, Professor Jonathan Golub. Jonathan has provided me with vital critical yet constructive feedback, and I would like to thank him especially for helping me to determine the both the nature and framing of my research questions, and how to go about answering them. His forensically logical take on my work has helped to make it more robust. Thank you for keeping patience with me while I worked out what I was doing!

Special thanks must also go to my main supervisor, Professor Filippo Menga. Filippo has always been ready to help me in a multitude of ways – from providing me with thoughtful and useful feedback on my various chapter drafts, to reassuring me that he was always there if I needed him to listen, to making sure to ask me how I was every time we spoke before ever mentioning anything to do with work. While Filippo was not my original main supervisor, I feel extremely lucky that I was assigned to him 2 years ago. It has been fantastic to learn from him both from an academic perspective and to have the benefit of his wisdom on how to keep a PhD in balance with the rest of life. I would like to think we have a good friendship now and I hope we can keep in touch (and have a beer every now and again when the chance occurs!). Thank you sincerely for all your help.

Finally, I would like to thank my family - my parents Leigh and Jo, my siblings Maeve and Jerome, my grandma Ann, and my girlfriend Sarah - for your constant support, emotional and otherwise. You have all picked me up at various points when I felt I wouldn't be able to make it to the end of the PhD, so I hope you feel that you've played a significant part in the culmination of this thesis. I am very fortunate to be surrounded by such wonderful and loving people, and it means the world to me that you've been there along the way. Long may it continue.

List of Tables and Figures

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABU = Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay

ADP = Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action

AGN = African Group of Negotiators

AILAC = Asociación Independiente de América Latina y el Caribe (Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean)

ALBA = Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America)

AOSIS = Association of Small Island States

APA = Ad Hoc Work Group on the Paris Agreement

AWG-KP = Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol

BASIC = Brazil, South Africa, India, and China

BAT = Best Available Technology

CACAM = Central Asia, Caucasus, and Moldova

CARICOM = Caribbean Community

CBDR = Common-But-Differentiated Responsibility

CD = Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action

CDA = Critical Discourse Analysis

CDM = Clean Development Mechanism

CER = Certified Emission Reduction

CfRN = Coalition for Rainforest Nations

CLA = Corpus Linguistic Analysis

CMA = Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement

COP = Conference of the Parties

CO_2 = Carbon Dioxide

CSD = United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development

CVF = Climate Vulnerable Forum

C2ES = Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions

DA = Durban Alliance

EIG = Environmental Integrity Group

EIT = Economies in Transition

ENB = Environmental News Bulletins

ETF = Enhanced Transparency Framework

EU = European Union

GDP = Gross Domestic Product

GHG = Greenhouse Gas

GST = Global Stocktake

G77 & China = Group of 77 and China

HAC = High Ambition Coalition

HoD = Head of Delegation

ICAO = International Civil Aviation Authority

IGES = Institute for Global Environmental Strategies

IPCC = Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

ITMO = Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcome

JUSCANNZ = Japan, United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand

KP = Kyoto Protocol

LAS = League of Arab States

LDCs = Least Developed Countries

LEG = Least Developed Countries Group of Experts

LMDCs = Like-Minded Developing Countries

LOB = Lancaster-Oslo-Bergen Corpus of Modern British English

LT-LEDS = Long Term Low-Emission and Resilient Development Strategies

LULUCF = Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry

MLDCs = Mountainous Landlocked Developing Countries

MPG = Modalities, Procedures, and Guidelines

MRV = Measurement, Reporting, and Verification

MoI = Means of Implementation

NDC = Nationally Determined Contribution

NGO = Non-Governmental Organisation

NIR = National Inventory Report

NWP = Nairobi Work Programme

OPEC = Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries

PA = Paris Agreement

PAWP = Paris Agreement Work Programme

PDF = Portable Document Format file

PSIDS = Pacific Small Island Developing States

REDD = Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation

SB = Subsidiary Body

SBI = Subsidiary Body for Implementation

SBSTA = Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice

SCF = Standing Committee on Finance

SDG = Sustainable Development Goals

SICA = Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (Central American Integration System)

SIDS = Small Island Developing States

TACCC = Transparency, Accuracy, Consistency, Comparability, and Completeness

TEM = Technical Expert Meeting

TEP-A = Technical Examination Process on Adaptation

UFI = Up-Front Information

UG = Umbrella Group

UN = United Nations

UNEP = United Nations Environment Programme

UNFCCC = United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

US = United States of America

WTO = World Trade Organisation

Chapter 1: Introduction

The UNFCCC negotiations have been the object of considerable scholarly attention over the last 20 years as responding to the threat of climate change has become one of the biggest challenges of the 21st Century. Research has revealed just how complex the UNFCCC as a negotiating arena has become, with a multitude of highly technical issues being negotiated by 196 state parties and the input of civil society and private businesses (Carter, 2015). The negotiating landscape is yet more complex as a result of the presence of numerous and overlapping negotiating coalitions (Stephenson et al, 2019), and the number of coalitions has increased markedly in the last decade or so (Blaxekjaer and Nielsen, 2014). Despite the prominence of coalitions in the negotiations, they remain relatively understudied as negotiating actors, and in particular the strategies they use and their reasons for doing so have been overlooked in the literature. One such coalition is AILAC, a bloc of 8 Latin American countries which formed at the end of 2012 (Edwards et al, 2017).

This thesis aims to make a novel contribution to existing research by examining the strategies of AILAC between 2013 and 2018 in the UNFCCC and the influences on its strategic choices. Studies on coalitions' strategies in the UNFCCC are rare, as are studies on the participation of AILAC (Edwards et al, 2017). The thesis aims to make a further contribution to existing literature by utilising a governmentality perspective on social relations as the lens through which AILAC's strategy use is understood, adding to climate governmentality studies of the UNFCCC which have so far focused largely on alternative areas of climate governance, and on discourses as their primary objects of analysis rather than actors themselves when the negotiations have been studied. Furthermore, it breaks new ground in its use of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a methodological framework by

applying its analytical techniques to primary data from AILAC submissions to the UNFCCC and interviews with AILAC delegates and triangulating these with insights from Corpus-Linguistic Analysis (CLA). It argues that AILAC preferentially uses less aggressive strategies over more aggressive options, chiefly as a result of the power dynamics operating within the UNFCCC, but that other factors such as the bloc's bridge-building identity, timings, and delegation dynamics influenced AILAC strategy choice and deployment of different strategies.

This introductory chapter begins by setting out the aims of the research and defining the key terms used within them. The following two sections demonstrate the novel contributions the thesis makes, both in relation to the background context of the literature and in the context of the empirical reality of the UNFCCC negotiations themselves. The chapter then presents the research questions, and provides a brief overview of the theoretical and methodological approaches used in the thesis. The final section presents a chapter-by-chapter outline of the rest of the thesis and a short summary of the main findings and conclusions.

1.1 Research Aims and Definition of Terms

The main aim of this thesis is to elucidate the strategies used by the AILAC bloc within the multilateral climate change negotiations of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and to explain their reasons for choosing these strategies, from 2013, immediately after AILAC's establishment in 2012 at COP18 in Doha (Edwards et al, 2017) until 2018 inclusive. Such an analysis of AILAC's strategic decision-making has not been carried out before. Coalitions in the UNFCCC have not garnered a great deal of research; most of that which has been carried out on coalitions' participation examines either their

formation and maintenance of cohesion, processes of their internal dynamics and potential fragmentation, or analyses of their negotiating success. In addition, the sparse analysis of strategy choice within the UNFCCC, whether by blocs or individual state parties, largely focuses on identifying which strategies were used and how they were deployed rather than the reasons for their selection, while that which does examine influences on strategy choice does not do so for individual actors. Part of the aim of this thesis, in *explaining* AILAC's strategy choices as well as identifying them, is to add to the small number of studies which identify drivers of the strategies as well as the strategies themselves of individual blocs (see Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012; Oculi and Stephenson, 2018). Furthermore, this thesis aims to make a novel contribution in applying a governmentality theoretical perspective of social interactions to analyse strategy choice in the UNFCCC negotiations, and by employing Critical Discourse Analysis - incorporating Corpus-Linguistic Analysis - as a methodology by which to analyse the deployment of strategies by a specific actor.

1.1.1 Definition of Terms

It is therefore important to begin by defining the key terms within this aim. AILAC - the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean[1] group within the UNFCCC - is composed of 8 states: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru. AILAC is a coalition, defined by Hamilton and Whalley ((1989:547); in Narlikar (2003:29)) as "any group of decision-makers participating in…a negotiation and who agree to act in concert to achieve a common end." Within the sub-divisions of coalitions, AILAC is a

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[1] The AILAC acronym derives from the Spanish-language version of this name: the *Asociación Independiente de América Latina y el Caribe* (AILAC, 2014f)

bloc; according to Narlikar (2003:31-32), blocs are "characterised by the fact that they combine only 'like-minded' states…bloc-type coalitions may utilise pre-existing similarities with other states. The noteworthy characteristic is the conscious restriction of membership to states sharing the same set of ideas or identity". These can be distinguished from alliances, which are issue- rather than identity-based: "temporary coalitions of self-interested states who come together for instrumental reasons in response to a specific threat" (Wendt, 1994:386; in Narlikar, 2003:31). AILAC can be seen to fall into the bloc category given the geography of its member states, their shared Latin American identity (Watts and Depledge, 2018) as exemplified by AILAC's name, and the similarity of their economic profiles as small-to-medium economies invested in economic liberalisation and the removal of trade barriers (Edwards et al, 2017; Watts and Depledge, 2018). This thesis, unless specifically differentiating between blocs and alliances, will therefore refer to AILAC interchangeably as a bloc or a coalition given the applicability of both terms.

A strategy "usually refers to the overall pattern of behaviour of a negotiator or delegation", as opposed to a tactic, which is used "to refer to a move within an overall negotiation plan or strategy" (Bailer, 2012:535). It is also important to distinguish between a bloc's strategy and its positions; these should not be read as equivalent. This thesis will take a bloc's position as signifying the stance it takes on any particular issue of the climate negotiations – that is, what the bloc "thinks" about an issue. By contrast, a strategy is a medium through which a bloc seeks to further its aims - whether to put forward a viewpoint, present a suggestion, or effect a behavioural change in another party – in accordance with its positions on particular issue areas.

1.2 Research Aims in Context of Existing Literature

Two main strands of literature provide the background to this thesis' contributions to research: the study of coalitions within the UNFCCC negotiations, and the study of strategies within international negotiations.

1.2.1 Coalitions in the UNFCCC

Firstly, relatively little research has been conducted on the participation of coalitions within the UNFCCC. Although Dupont (1994:152) states that "coalition analysis is a key to explaining processes and outcomes of multilateral negotiations", until the early 2010s coalitions' participation within the UNFCCC lacked recognition in the literature and remained relatively understudied, with much of the focus of research remaining on individual states and "theorising conditions for a global climate change agreement" (Carter, 2015:207). This is despite the fact that coalitions were evidently an integral part of the UNFCCC, helping to make negotiations logistically possible in a forum of 196 individual state participants by reducing the number of voices at Conferences of the Parties (COPs) and Subsidiary Body meetings (SBs) (Carter, 2015). While the initial 1992 division by the UNFCCC of parties into Annex I and non-Annex I categories (depending respectively on their status as a developed or developing state and subsequent attribution of historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions) still holds (Carter, 2015), parties have organised themselves into smaller coalitions. To date, 23 participating coalitions have been identified (see Table 1, below).

Table 1: Coalitions in the UNFCCC Negotiations[2] (Sources: Blaxekjaer and Nielsen (2014:3); Carter (2015:209); ABU (2019))

Annex I	Non-Annex I	Both Annex I and Non-Annex I
Economies in Transition (EIT)	African Group of Negotiators (AGN)	Durban Alliance (DA)
European Union (EU)	Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)	Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)
Umbrella Group (UG)	Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay (ABU)	High Ambition Coalition (HAC)
	Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC)	
	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA)	
	Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (BASIC)	
	Central American Integration System (SICA)	
	Central Asia, Caucasus, and Moldova (CACAM)	
	Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF)	
	Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN)	
	G77 & China	
	League of Arab States (LAS)	
	Least Developed Countries (LDCs)	

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[2] Blaxekjaer and Nielsen and Carter include the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action (CD) as a coalition; whilst this is a group of 40 states, in practice the CD serves as a space for discussions within and outside the UNFCCC rather than an entity speaking with one voice on behalf of its members (Cartagena Dialogue, 2010; Herold et al, 2011, 2012)

	Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs)	
	Mountainous Landlocked Developing Countries (MLDCs)	
	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)	
	Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS)	

Between 2009 and 2014, 7 new coalitions were established (Blaxekjaer and Nielsen, 2014), as "growing dissatisfaction with the sub-optimal progress in the overall UNFCCC negotiations [saw] a swing towards the forming of new alliances (both formal and informal)", and led states to explore new options when they felt misrepresented by their memberships of existing coalitions (Goulding, 2015:194).This reorganisation of the UNFCCC's membership prompted calls for the academic literature to provide a revised understanding of the negotiation dynamics within the UNFCCC (Blaxekjaer and Nielsen, 2014). To a certain extent, these calls were heeded; however, the lion share of coalition scholarship mirrored Dupont's (1994) identification of the 3 main areas of coalition studies within trade research, namely coalition formation and maintenance, internal workings and potential fragmentation, and judgements of coalition success, while overlooking the strategies they use in multilateral negotiations.

Firstly, research was carried out into coalitions formation and the processes involved in maintaining coalitions' cohesion throughout the negotiations. Blaxekjaer and Nielsen (2014) investigate formation of coalitions since COP15 in Copenhagen in relation to the principle of common-but-differentiated responsibility (CBDR) and the Annex I/non-Annex I divide (or "firewall") in the UNFCCC, while Carter (2015) examines how a Pacific voice was brought to bear on the UNFCCC through the establishment of the PSIDS coalition, and the

benefits thereof for them. Kasa et al (2008) and Najam (2011) argues that the basis of the G77 & China's coalition maintenance is the shared Global South identity of economic underdevelopment of its members, while Happaerts (2015) attributes the G77's stability to the dominance of the BASIC coalition in determining the coalition's positions while other sub-coalitions within it such as AOSIS, the LDCs, OPEC, and indeed AILAC, are side-lined. Hallding et al (2013) consider the origins of the BASIC coalition to be the result of its 4 member states being singled out by Annex I parties for inclusion in binding mitigation commitments because of their status as rising economic powers; thus binding together made strategic sense for protection. Chasek (2005) also investigated the formation and maintenance of AOSIS, concluding that it arose from its members' common vulnerability to the effects of climate change for small island states.

Secondly, a similar amount of research was devoted towards coalitions' internal dynamics and potential for fragmentation. Rayner and Jordan (2013) ascribe the EU's development of ambitious climate policies in the negotiations to its polycentricity, in that because "no one EU institution has offered a consistent lead" (2013:80), the component parts of EU governance have been allowed to pursue different approaches and innovate, meaning that the EU has emerged as a global leader in climate change. Brenton (2013:543) identifies a "battle" between AOSIS and BASIC within the overarching G77 & China coalition as a result of strong disagreements as to relative prioritisation of immediate, ambitious action on climate versus economic growth and action tied to financial assistance from developed country parties respectively. Najam (2011:219) note a similar tension between AOSIS and OPEC within the G77 & China along the same action versus economic growth lines, meaning that the G77's unity is "forever tentative". Betzold et al (2012) find increasing evidence of differences between AOSIS members themselves regarding the coalition's proposed positions on land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) and

reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) schemes, but that the coalition has remained a "tightly co-ordinated negotiation coalition" (2012:607) through unity of position on other areas, such as adaptation and financial and technology transfer. Goulding (2015) spots divisions within AOSIS as well, as a result of PSIDS' decision to break AOSIS ranks by participating in REDD+ and stating their positions independently of the coalition, and she attributes this to the influence of Australia and New Zealand moderating PSIDS' stance on ambitious climate action.

Thirdly, research has focused on the impact, or success, of coalitions in the UNFCCC. Oberthür (2011) assesses the EU's performance in multilateral climate change negotiations in terms of its goal achievement and its relevance, finding that whilst it improved markedly in the 1990s and 2000s, it failed to effect high levels of influence on proceedings at the 2009 COP15 in Copenhagen. Studies also consider the extent to which the EU's behaviour can be characterised as leadership, such as Zielonka (2008), Kelemen (2010), Postolache (2012), Fernandez Martin (2012), Groen et al (2012), and Rayner and Jordan (2013). Groen et al (2012) set the criteria for leadership of being able to drive other actors towards particular goals and the achievement of these goals deriving from this driving force. Attributing performance as determined by a mixture of domestic factors and external contexts such as intra-EU cohesion and changing global geopolitics, they conclude that the EU improved in the 2010 Cancún COP16 compared to Copenhagen as a result of greater participation in UNFCCC decision-making and greater influence on outcomes than at COP15. Zielonka (2008) and Kelemen (2010) view the EU as the global leader in international environmental governance as a result of its model of regulatory politics, allowing it to spread environmental protection norms from its domestic politics across the world, although it is seen as either a story of quasi-imperial imposition (Zielonka. 2008) or "virtuous environmental leadership" (Kelemen, 2010:346) respectively. Fernandez Martin (2012:194) disagrees, however, arguing

that the EU is losing influence in the UNFCCC as its share of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions decreases, and that it has only been viewed in a leadership rôle because "nobody else wanted to take it".

Brenton (2013:542-543) identifies the EU, G77 & China, and a "loose association" of the United States (US), Canada, and Japan[3] as the 3 "great powers" of the UNFCCC's early years which have "disproportionately moulded the negotiation outcomes" as a result of their "economic weight, global political influence, and level of GHG emissions" which accounts for approximately 70% of the global total. However, he goes on to note that BASIC usurped the EU in terms of influence at COP15, in which "the final deal was done between the US and BASIC, with the EU not even in the room" (2013:546). Nhamo (2010:353-354) argues that BASIC adopted a leadership rôle in the wake of COP15, again attributing the coalition's subsequent influence to its "significant global muscle in terms of geopolitics, land space, population, economics, and military power." Finally, Goulding (2015) also studies the influence of AOSIS, noting that it has reduced as its PSIDS members found greater success in influencing the UNFCCC negotiations outside the coalition at COPs in Cancún, Durban, and Doha.

1.2.2 Strategies in the UNFCCC[4]

As a result of the foci of formation and maintenance, internal workings and potential fragmentation, and judgements of coalition success in studies on coalitions' participation in the UNFCCC, a crucial component of the Convention's negotiation dynamics have been

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[3] The United States, Canada, and Japan form part of the Umbrella Group, along with Australia, Belarus, Iceland, Israel, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, and Ukraine (UNFCCC, 2014)

[4] See Chapter 2 for an in-depth analysis of the literature on strategies and strategic reasoning.

overlooked in the literature, namely the strategies employed by coalitions to further their goals and embed their positions within eventual UNFCCC outcomes. According to Odell (2010), literature on multilateral negotiations has understudied strategies, despite it being a well-researched area in other disciplines such as psychology, law, and business. This is particularly evident in the case of the climate change negotiations. While strategies in the UNFCCC are considered in some studies for which strategies are not the focus of research, within a 20-year period, only 10 studies focusing on states' strategies, comprising 7 about particular states and 3 examining broader patterns of states' strategy use could be identified, while only 6 studies explicitly investigated the strategies used by coalitions within the UNFCCC. When considering research into the reasoning behind parties' strategic choices, these numbers drop even lower, with 9 studies of states and only 3 studies of individual coalitions attributing the strategic decision-making to specific selection pressures. Furthermore, these 3 studies make the argument for single specific factors, such as power dynamics (Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012) or coalition members' domestic vulnerability to climate change (Oculi and Stephenson, 2018) determining strategy choice, rather than considering a multiplicity of influences at work. In order to gain an appreciation of the range of possible factors in strategy selection in multilateral negotiations, it is necessary to consider other negotiation areas, such as trade negotiations (e.g. Odell (2005) and Frenhoff Larsen (2007)) or intra-EU negotiations (e.g. Da Conceiçao-Heldt (2006) and Elgström and Jönsson (2000)), which have larger bodies of research on the topic. As such, there is an opportunity for a study of the strategies used by an individual coalition and its reasons for selecting them to make a novel contribution to existing knowledge of the negotiation dynamics of the UNFCCC.

1.3 Research Aims in Context of Empirical Reality and Climate Change Policy-Making

The mitigation of the threats posed by anthropogenic climate change, and the governance of the solutions to do so, have rightly attracted considerable scholarly attention. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2014:8) states that "continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive, and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems" and that "climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems" (2014:13). This is particularly true for Latin America. Whilst the region does not face the sorts of existential threats from climate change as do the members of AOSIS, the member states of AILAC, which comprise almost the entire western coast of Central and South America, are nevertheless extremely vulnerable to its effects. According to two different indices of states' vulnerability to the effects of climate change, member states of AILAC rank among the top ten globally: Peru and Honduras in Brooks and Adger's (2003) rankings of states affected by natural disasters related to climatic activity, and Guatemala and Honduras in Kreft et al's (2015) Global Climate Risk Index, based on considerations of fatalities and economic damage from extreme weather events. Indeed, in both studies, Honduras is even ranked first among all states around the world.

The IPCC (2019) projects that over the coming century, Central and South America are likely to be affected by increased warming, with the result of yield reductions for cereal crops and threats to food security, increases in wildfires, and increases in the frequency and intensity of droughts. AILAC's Central American members are likely to be subject to more intense hurricanes (Vergara et al, 2007; CAF, 2014) and the destruction of their Caribbean coral ecosystems which protect them from storm surges and host fish nurseries (Vergara et al, 2007;

de la Torre et al, 2009), while all AILAC member states are likely to suffer coastal flooding and extreme precipitation events, increased exposure to tropical diseases, and the salinization of coastal aquifers (Vergara et al, 2007; de la Torre et al, 2009; CAF, 2014; Rojas Hernández, 2016). Andean AILAC states are also likely to experience severe glacial retreat (Vergara et al, 2007; de la Torre et al, 2009; CAF, 2014). This is especially important, as it is likely to result in floods, avalanches, dam ruptures, and landslides (Rojas Hernández, 2016), as well as "a dramatic decline, in the long-term, in water availability in the dry season in areas fed by glaciers", which will result in "growing conflict over the distribution of water resources" (Painter, 2008:1). Peru in particular is vulnerable in this way, as South America's most water stressed country, with 98% of its population living west of the Andes, where less than 2% of its water supplies are situated; as such, the population is reliant on glacial meltwater runoff (Painter, 2008). Furthermore, with each of these impacts comes the associated damage to socioeconomic systems within AILAC member countries. It is estimated that across Latin America, total economic losses could reach approximately US$91 billion by 2050, although this estimate does not take into account damage to non-economic sectors or the "possibility of increased frequency or potency of natural disasters" (de la Torre et al, 2009:10-11), which seem likely to occur.

Given AILAC members' vulnerability to climate change, there is a justice-based imperative to acknowledge the bloc's participation in, and contribution to, global policy-making for solutions in the UNFCCC so as to avoid what Fraser (1997:14) describes as recognitional injustice through "being rendered invisible". According to Schlosberg (2012:450), "lack of recognition is an injustice in itself; insulting, ignoring, degrading, and devaluing individuals or their communities is a type of harm." In the case of the UNFCCC negotiations, this is particularly important, as a lack of recognition entails a lack of political status (Schlosberg, 2012); without recognition as valid and equal actors, parties cannot achieve

parity of participation in the negotiations, as "communities require processes that give them some locus of control over their destinies as part of a recognition of identity and place" (Adger et al, 2011:21). This is surely even more the case for those who stand to lose significantly from the effects of climate change, yet to which they have contributed little, with AILAC member states' contributions to global GHG emissions accounting for only 0.75% of the total (Carbon Atlas, 2019).

Nevertheless, Edwards et al (2017) note that AILAC is scarcely mentioned in literature on global climate governance. Indeed, their article is one of only 2 pieces of scholarship identified to date which make AILAC their focus (Edwards et al, 2017; Watts and Depledge, 2018), while only 2 others acknowledge AILAC's participation in the UNFCCC. Costantini et al (2016) make a passing reference to AILAC as one of a series of new UNFCCC coalitions since 2012, while Blaxekjear and Nielsen (2014) map AILAC's negotiating positions as a bridge-builder in relation to various UNFCCC features such as the Annex I/non-Annex I firewall and CBDR, as one of 7 new coalitions as the focus of their study.

Both Edwards et al (2017) and Watts and Depledge (2018) note AILAC's bridge-building identity and examine the bloc's positions in the UNFCCC and their contributions to the outcomes of UNFCCC decision-making. Edwards et al (2017) chart AILAC's formation, citing a shared identity and a wish to make their voice heard as key drivers of unity, and Watts and Depledge (2018) concur that this stemmed from a desire to present a Latin American voice other than that of ALBA in the UNFCCC. Edwards et al (2017) conclude their article with considerations of whether AILAC can continue to wield influence in the UNFCCC, noting that the group's organisational structure, with a dedicated support unit of experts in climate policy and negotiation and a governance committee for administrative and political decision-making, has given it a solid foundation to maintain its levels of visibility and impact. Watts and Depledge (2018) ask the same question, writing that AILAC's continuation

as an active UNFCCC participant is tied to its ability to act domestically in keeping with its ambitious positions on climate action in the negotiations, and that whilst so far AILAC members are meeting this challenge, it is not guaranteed to remain the case in future.

However, neither of these studies specifically examines the strategies used by AILAC in the UNFCCC. Given the "protracted lack of effective policy response to global climate change" (Nasiritousi and Bäckstrand, 2019:24), it is surprising that there has not been an investigation of *how* a bridge-building actor like AILAC, wishing to forge ahead with ambitious action and to find common ground between parties, has operationalised these intentions in choosing specific strategies in the negotiations. This thesis aims to make such a contribution.

1.4 Research Questions, Theory, and Methodology

This thesis seeks to answer two main questions. These are:

1. Which strategies did AILAC use in the UNFCCC negotiations between 2013 and 2018 inclusive?
2. What were the reasons for AILAC choosing the strategies that it did?

As shown above, these are questions which have not been addressed before in the literature. The 2013 – 2018 timeframe has been chosen as 2013 was the first full year of AILAC's participation in the UNFCCC, and 2018 was the most recent year of data availability during the project's data collection phase. The timeframe could have been shortened to solely an

analysis of AILAC's strategies in the periods either before or after the finalisation of the Paris Agreement (PA) in December 2015, but there was judged to have been a manageable quantity of data available to conduct an analysis on AILAC's strategy choices over the whole period.

1.4.1 Theoretical and Methodological Approaches

In keeping with Betzold's (2010) assumption that at least one of several potential drivers behind actors' choices of strategy is the power dynamics within which they are situated, this thesis adopts a power-based theoretical perspective on negotiations. However, such a perspective must be able to account for alternative drivers of strategy choice as well, such as domestic politics, institutional influences, and intra-coalition dynamics. Governmentality is one such theoretical perspective. This thesis aims to contribute to another small but growing body of existing research which applies a Foucauldian governmentality understanding of social relations to settings of multilateral climate negotiations. This research has embraced perspectives from global governance literature which have investigated the "network-like modes of governing on the global stage" and have led to a "recognition of new forms of agency in the international arena" (Stripple and Bulkelely, 2014:5-6). Climate governmentality applies Foucault's dialectical conception of power as both the constitution of relations between actors and the processes which determine their nature (Foucault, 1978) to the politics of climate change and to the recognition of these new forms of agency. If power consists of these mutually-constituting relations and processes, then this implies that "new spaces of governance may generate new forms of power…Critically, power, and the processes of governing through which it is manifest, are not simply held by agents, but

realised through practices" (Stripple and Bulkeley, 2014:14). As Lövbrand and Stripple (2014:34) therefore note, climate governmentality studies are "an effort to redirect the analysis and understanding of power and government in the contemporary study of climate politics. Whereas global governance studies have helped us to ask questions about the *who* and *locus* of climate governance, students of climate governmentality typically draw attention to the *how* of climate governance: how the climate is conceptualised and construed as a domain of government, [and] how climate governance is accomplished in practical and technical terms".

As negotiation strategies are by definition questions of how particular actors interact with each other within social relations, the application of governmentality to the aims of this thesis is a natural fit. Despite this, the majority of climate governmentality literature has examined the "day-to-day, micro-practices of environmental governance" (Death, 2011:4), non-state actors' rôles in shaping climate governance within state governance, or "the growth of standards and codes of conduct in distinct social spheres such as the carbon marketplace and urban life" (Lövbrand and Stripple (2014:35). Furthermore, the small amount of literature which has applied climate governmentality to the UNFCCC negotiations themselves, such as Death's (2011) study of the theatricality of climate summits and Bäckstrand and Lövbrand's (2006, 2016) analysis of discourses permeating the negotiations, have tended to focus on the processes of social interactions and largely overlook the agency of actors. This is in keeping with Foucault's original understanding of power, which argues that actors should not be seen as "autonomous agents wielding the power of discourse on behalf of transparent interests" (Litfin, 1994:23). This thesis aims to strike more of a balance between the *how* and the *who* of climate governance by analysing the strategies of AILAC in particular whilst still understanding them as discursive processes in the Foucauldian sense by adopting the insights of Hajer (1995:53, emphasis added), who calls for an "argumentative turn" in governmentality

studies, such that "the object of research is the practices through which *actors* seek to persuade others to see reality in the light of the orator or rhetorician". Chapter 3 provides a more in-depth consideration of the theoretical basis of this thesis and how it can be applied to the study of AILAC's strategies.

Furthermore, this thesis aims to break new ground in using a Critical Discourse Analysis methodology to uncover the AILAC strategies and explain the reasoning behind them. CDA is grounded in Linguistics, and to date there has been little crossover in its use between Linguistics and social science (Van Dijk, 2008). In relation to climate change, discourse analysis has been used in studies of media coverage (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005; Boykoff, 2008; Billet, 2010) and to a lesser extent in the examination of discourses prevalent within the negotiations themselves, as in the case of Weisser's (2014) study of the practices of documents in the UNFCCC, or the aforementioned studies by Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006, 2016). This latter sub-group, however, in keeping with the trend of climate governmentality studies, has not sought to analyse the discursive strategies employed by individual actors, instead focusing on the discourses themselves which permeate the UNFCCC negotiations. This thesis, by focusing specifically on AILAC, aims to add such a contribution to the literature.

It employs CDA's 3 analytical levels of textual analysis, processing analysis, and social analysis (Fairclough, 2010). Textual analysis describes in detail the multimodal features of AILAC's technical submission documents to the UNFCCC such as the discourses contained within them and particular linguistic features which contribute to the deployment of strategies, e.g. framing concepts in particular ways, as well as the responses from interviews with AILAC delegates. Processing analysis draws on both of these data sources in order to interpret the findings of textual analysis and to identify particular strategies used by AILAC in the negotiations. Finally, social analysis provides an explanation through consideration of the responses from interviewees as to the reasons for choosing particular strategies as well as of

the wider social context in which AILAC is situated, such as the UNFCCC institutional framework, and the distribution of power resources among parties. Corpus-Linguistic Analysis is used to triangulate the CDA methodology, allowing the thesis to make another contribution to a small body of literature (Baker et al, 2008) in blending the methods of CDA and CLA together. Chapter 4 discusses the CDA methodology used in the analysis in greater detail.

1.5 Thesis Layout and Findings

After this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature specific to strategy choice and use in the UNFCCC, as well as reasons for the use of particular strategies, which draws on literature from both within and outside of the UNFCCC negotiations. Chapter 3 presents the governmentality theoretical perspective in greater depth, describing its rationale and applicability to the aims of this thesis whilst providing responses to criticisms made of its internal logic. Chapter 4, as mentioned, provides an overview of the analytical structure of the CDA methodology. It specifies the sources of data and methods of data collection, and how CDA's tripartite framework was applied to these. It also introduces a triangulating method of CLA into the CDA framework to add to the methodological robustness of the thesis.

Chapters 5 to 9 cover the analysis of the thesis. Each chapter assesses the evidence for AILAC's use (or lack thereof) of different strategies. Chapter 5 looks at AILAC's use of technical submissions to the UNFCCC; Chapter 6 its use of constructive proposals and rhetoric, and compromise offers; Chapter 7 its use of persuasion and rational argument; Chapter 8 its use of coalition-building, bilateral meetings, informal negotiating spaces, and concessions trading; and Chapter 9 AILAC's use of moral pressure, blocking, demands, and threats. Chapter 10 comprises the discussion of the interpretation and explanation of AILAC's strategic choices

in relation to knowledge from existing literature, while Chapter 11 presents some conclusions and evaluative reflections of the thesis as a whole before offering some suggestions as to future avenues of research.

The main finding of this research is that AILAC overwhelmingly chose less aggressive strategies such as constructive proposals, persuasion, and coalition-building over more aggressive strategies such as demands and threats. While multiple factors influenced AILAC's individual strategy choices in various ways, this trend was primarily down to two factors: AILAC's position in the power dynamics of the UNFCCC negotiations and its relative levels of different power resources, as well as the group's self-identification as a progressive, bridge-building bloc. AILAC lacks the material power resources required to be able to use more aggressive strategies credibly and therefore did so sparingly, even though blocking strategies would have been guaranteed under the UNFCCC's consensus-based decision-making rules. According to rational choice perspectives, this should mean that less aggressive strategies were used by AILAC simply because they have no other options.

However, AILAC confirmed the reasonable assumption that the bloc only uses a strategy if it believes there is a reasonable chance of it delivering a satisfactory outcome. AILAC's continued use of less aggressive strategies therefore shows that the bloc did believe these could prove successful. By expanding the definition of power resources, the governmentality theoretical perspective reveals that AILAC is rich in power/knowledge resources, meaning that, through attempts to ground the negotiations in technical and scientific knowledge of climate change, strategies based on knowledge resources such as constructive proposals and persuasion can be used with a reasonable belief of success, while strategies reliant on tactical knowledge such as coalition-building and the use of bilateral meetings can also be used with expectations of effectiveness. These strategies were also dependent on AILAC's delegation dynamics as sources of power/knowledge, such as the experience, skill,

and personalities of the individuals involved and the rôle of the support unit, especially given AILAC's policy of individual negotiators' decision-making on strategy in face-to-face negotiations as long as they remain within pre-agreed positional red lines. Furthermore, AILAC's pro-multilateralism, bridge-building identity only served to reinforce the attractiveness of these less aggressive options in the eyes of the bloc, as strategies such as coalition-building, persuasion, and constructive proposals naturally fit with AILAC's stated aims of building spaces for consensus whilst advancing ambitious, progressive positions.

In identifying AILAC's preference for less aggressive strategies over more aggressive strategies and specifying which strategies were used to what degree, the analysis successfully answers the first question of the thesis. It also successfully provides explanations as to its pattern of strategy use, thereby answering the second question as well. However, in seeking to be an exploratory study on AILAC, the thesis is subject to the criticism that its scope was too broad, meaning that had specific factors on strategy choice been selected as the research object, a more detailed analysis of their influence on AILAC could have been made. Furthermore, the methodology was beset by some technical issues, such as an inability to find on the UNFCCC Submissions Portal some AILAC submissions referenced in those which were collected, and difficulties with the conversion of documents into files to be used in CLA. Nevertheless, the thesis demonstrates the applicability of both a governmentality theoretical perspective and a CDA methodology to studies of multilateral negotiations, and contributes to the growing literature on climate governmentality. It finishes by suggesting future avenues of research, such as similar studies on other UNFCCC coalitions in order to determine the extent to which influences on AILAC's strategy choices hold true for other actors; studies of other influences such as the gender balance of delegations; and a comprehensive study of AILAC's levels of negotiating success in the post-Paris period.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Odell (2010) argues that while strategies have been relatively well explored within fields like psychology, law, and business, the concept has been under-studied within international relations. This is particularly true of the UNFCCC negotiations. Research into strategies used by any party – whether a bloc of states or an individual state – is scarce. While there has been some scholarship on the participation of blocs within the UNFCCC negotiations, research into their strategies is especially limited. Over a 20-year span, only 6 studies (Larson, 2003; Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012; Audet, 2013; Bhandary, 2017; Oculi and Stephenson, 2018) explicitly focusing on blocs' strategies within the UNFCCC were identified at the time of writing, although more consider strategic behaviour in the context of other foci, as will be seen below. Even less research (Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012; Oculi and Stephenson, 2018) examines both the strategy use of a specific bloc and the reasoning behind its strategic choices.

This chapter divides into 3 sections. The first section examines evidence of the use of different strategies within the UNFCCC negotiations from the literature; first by blocs, and secondly by states. These are organised by actor rather than strategy, to convey the range of strategies potentially available to an actor. The second considers how to categorise strategies, drawing on existing typologies from literature outside of the climate change negotiations, arguing that seeing strategies on a spectrum rather than within categories is preferable. The third section addresses the reasons behind strategy choices; given the limited

amount of such scholarship situated within the UNFCCC negotiations, it branches out to other areas of negotiation literature, such as WTO and intra-EU negotiations.

2.2 Strategies of UNFCCC Blocs

2.2.1 AOSIS

Interestingly, 4 of 6 studies focusing on blocs' strategies within the UNFCCC centre on AOSIS, while other blocs, even longstanding parties to the UNFCCC, are noticeably underrepresented. Ostensibly, another AOSIS-focused study could have been included, though Ashe et al's (1999) study on the rôle of AOSIS in the negotiations leading to the formation of the UNFCCC does purport to examine the group's strategy. However, using the definition of strategies in Chapter 1, their analysis centres more on the group's positions on particular issue areas, and assesses the effectiveness of AOSIS in incorporating their positions into the final UNFCCC text, than considering the strategies the group used to make this happen.

Larson (2003), however, does make the strategies of AOSIS the centrepiece of her study, asking how a party low in traditional resources of power (military and economic might) like AOSIS can reach its objectives in multilateral negotiations, using a conflict resolution systems framework to answer it. From examining AOSIS position papers from 1994, she finds AOSIS uses 3 categories of strategies – collaboration, co-operation, and competition – in response to 3 challenges that the group has as a result of its low-power status. These are the symbolic challenge of climate change as an abstract threat to small

island states, the social challenge of AOSIS being on the margins of international

policymaking, and the economic challenge of coping with poverty while attempting to take

on powerful interest groups in the climate negotiations. She finds the group's contributions

revolve mostly (87.8%) around collaborative and co-operative approaches, such as

constructive proposals pressing the UNFCCC for "collaborative research and information-

sharing systems", and parties to the UNFCCC to "develop valid and predictable UN

communication and knowledge-building systems" (2003:140). In fact, the majority of her

research shows AOSIS' use of constructive proposals, although given that the focus of her

work was 1994, in the relative infancy of the UNFCCC and before any legal instruments such

as the Kyoto Protocol (KP), the proliferation of constructive proposals is not surprising, as

there was a need for ideas and suggestions before other strategies, like persuasion or

coercion, could be used to support them. Larson hints at the use of persuasion by AOSIS to

support preventative measures on climate change, when she describes AOSIS as "a

committed advocate" (2003:143), although it is unclear whether this entails persuasion, or

simply the proposal of preventative measures in the first place, given this description is

immediately followed by the statement that "AOSIS was the first party to propose a protocol

response to the global security risks associated with greenhouse gas emissions" (2003:143).

Larson does note, however, that AOSIS engaged in coalition-building with the EU and

members of the G77 & China to build support for its protocol proposal, implying the use of

persuasion in order to achieve this (2003:144).

Larson also cites another example from outside of climate change negotiations

to demonstrate how a low-power state can achieve success when negotiating with another

state possessing greater military and economic power than itself, namely the case of Iceland

in the "cod wars" with the UK between 1949-1976. Here, she notes Iceland's use of

persuasion within international forums, concessions trading using positive inducements

towards the UK, coercion in the form of the harassment of UK fishing vessels, and bilateral meetings between Icelandic and UK communities.

Betzold (2010) also focuses on AOSIS strategies within the UNFCCC. She uses the categories devised by Zartman and Rubin (2000b) for strategies which "borrow power" (Zartman and Rubin, 2000a) – that is, which use sources of power external to the party under examination. These are: "context-based" strategies, such as appeals to principles, morality, and norms; "target-based" strategies appealing to other parties' self-interest, such as proposing solutions to common problems and persuasion "that A's preference is ultimately in B's interest"; "third parties-based" strategies, which harness support of NGOs, lobby groups, and epistemic communities to influence negotiations outside of the formal negotiation environment or provide expertise and knowledge for use within formal negotiations; and "process-based" strategies which "level the playing field" by skilfully 'playing the game'", e.g. by building coalitions with other actors, or being first to propose ideas (Betzold, 2010:136). She finds that between 1990 and 1997 in the UNFCCC negotiations, AOSIS used all 4 of these strategy types. Using a context-based strategy, the group utilised a discourse of vulnerability to climate change as moral leverage over other parties to pressure them to take more ambitious climate action. Using target-based strategies, AOSIS employed persuasion and rational argument to attempt to convince less ambitious parties to step up their pledges of action by "refut[ing] laggards' objections" over short-term and long-term costs of action and inaction. This enabled them to use a process-based strategy and build coalitions with other parties like the EU (2010:139-140). As to third party-based strategies, AOSIS sought to base its participation strongly on scientific evidence acquired from NGOs, and bolstered its attempts at persuasion with justificatory references to the IPCC and other scientific reports. This borrowed power in the form of knowledge allowed the group also to deploy a process-

based strategy, namely putting forward technical submissions and proposals, especially in the early stages of negotiations to ensure consideration of their views.

Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) also take a cross-section of AOSIS negotiation strategies at a particular point in time, at COP15 in Copenhagen, 2009. They identify 5 AOSIS strategies. Firstly, the group attempted to frame climate change as a moral issue through its slogan of "1.5 to stay alive", and by explicitly linking it to questions of justice along a discourse of vulnerability and equity with future generations, to strengthen any moral pressure it brought to bear on other parties by "delegitimis[ing] bargaining strategies that relied on power resources that AOSIS members themselves overwhelmingly lacked" (2012:358). For the same reason, the group also attempted to frame climate change as an objective problem, to be addressed only in accordance with advice provided by scientific and technical expertise, and it did so by making "demands" (2012:358) based on scientific predictions, especially with reference to the IPCC. Thirdly, AOSIS built coalitions with other blocs, such as the LDCs and the EU, as well as civil society to build public pressure in support of their demands. Deitelhoff and Wallbott also imply AOSIS used persuasion alongside these demands, commenting that the group "built on integrative negotiation strategies, emphasising win-win scenarios" (2012:359). Finally, they observe the proactivity of AOSIS in drafting and putting forward proposals for the UNFCCC's consideration.

Betzold et al (2012) also consider AOSIS strategies, and agree with the previous two studies that AOSIS attempted to exert moral leverage and build coalitions especially with more progressive parties such as the EU. They hint at AOSIS' use of constructive rhetoric when they note the "co-operative nature and consensus orientation of small island state diplomacy" (2012:594). Although their main focus is whether AOSIS as a bloc is fragmenting, part of their analysis examines the group's use of technical submissions, noting that they continued to use this strategy between 1995 and 2011. The article also flags another

possible strategy, although does not provide any evidence that AOSIS used it, namely side payments and concessions trading between parties across multiple negotiation topics, i.e. quid pro quo agreements of support in one or more negotiation topics or even negotiations outside of climate change.

Oculi and Stephenson (2018) specifically focus on AOSIS' use of a vulnerability discourse to attempt to exert moral pressure on others. They find that before the Cancun COP, AOSIS referenced the Bali Action Plan's identification of SIDS, LDCs, and flood- and drought-affected countries in Africa as particularly vulnerable (2018:75), thus also attempting to persuade other parties of the legitimacy of this view with an appeal to authority in the form of the Bali Action Plan. However, they also find this was not well received among LDCs and Latin American states (although the authors do not mention AILAC specifically, they cite Colombia in particular, an AILAC member state) because in practice their claims excluded Latin America from qualifying as particularly vulnerable, although SIDS did consider them vulnerable. To maintain the existing coalition between SIDS, LDCs, and Latin American states, SIDS at COP16 "had to make a major compromise to appease the Latin American constituency, which included a promise from SIDS not pushing that they are only ones most vulnerable" (2018:76). Thus, as Oculi and Stephenson's Table 1 states, the small island states that comprise AOSIS engaged in coalition-building, attempting to gain the support of "many ally constituencies within the G77 such as LDCs and Latin American countries."

2.2.2 Multiple Blocs

Audet (2013) adds a different dimension to the scholarship on bloc strategies in the UNFCCC by approaching it from an explicitly discourse-based perspective, then tying this to an analysis of blocs' positions on climate justice issues. He analyses ways in which blocs utilise discourses of climate justice, in particular through use of "enouncements" at COP meetings, which he defines as "a strategic way of speaking of an object in the context of a discursive space constituted with references to other (past or competing) statements and specific discursive rule", where a discursive space constitutes "an arena for power struggle" (2013:375). Obviously, then, such enouncements could take the form of official submissions and statements by a bloc, but they could theoretically form part of other strategies, such as constructive proposals, attempts at persuasion, or even making demands or blocking, and he showcases a number of these with references to a wide selection of blocs including the EU, AGN, ALBA, BASIC, EIG, and LDCs.

Indeed, Audet identifies the ALBA bloc at the Cancun COP as proposing an enouncement on a responsibility-based climate justice discourse as part of a wider "strongly oppositional stance" targeting the US in particular (2013:376-377), and that ALBA members Venezuela and Bolivia have also historically used blocking strategies, especially at the Copenhagen COP in 2009. Interestingly, however, ALBA also used such an "oppositional" discourse within a strategy of making proposals. At Cancun, the group proposed "measures that would promote climate justice", such as "acknowledging a climate debt owed by developed countries, respecting human rights and indigenous people's rights, adopting a 'Universal Declaration of Rights of Mother Earth' [and] establishing an 'International Court of Climate Justice' (2013:377). The EU also proposed new ideas through its enouncements

on climate justice, putting forward "a series of considerations regarding how intergenerational responsibility could be assumed" (2013:377), while, in keeping with other studies in AOSIS, AOSIS chose to pursue less a discourse of out and out climate justice, thereby avoiding confrontation, and instead focused efforts on building and exerting moral pressure by making enouncements on the urgency of climate action as necessary for its members' survival. Both BASIC and the EIG are implied to have used enouncements for persuasion purposes, as Audet writes that "compared to the EIG's discourse, the BASIC group discourse places emphasis on 'development' instead of 'transition' and on balanced texts instead of balance in responsibility" (2013:379).

2.2.3 OPEC

Barnett (2008) examines some of the strategies used by the OPEC coalition in his investigation of the relationship between OPEC and the G77 & China as a whole, writing that OPEC "work very hard to block and delay progress in the climate regime." He identifies Saudi Arabia as the leader of OPEC within the UNFCCC, instrumental in "obstruct[ing] progress in the climate negotiations through tactics such as outright refusal to agree, insisting on linking progress on the compensation issue with progress on other issues (including on assistance for adaptation – a key concern of G77), blocking discussion of ideas and issues, stressing scientific uncertainty and contesting the validity of IPCC reports, wasting time, fomenting mistrust among parties, misrepresenting the G77 position, and introducing meaningless text or text that is clearly going to be unacceptable to other parties" (2008:4). Furthermore, he writes that there has been speculation that OPEC engaged in informal coalition-building with the United States in the 2000s, noting that "OPEC (and the Saudi

regime in particular) shares a common interest with the United States government and its corporate allies in maintaining high oil prices" (2008:4).

2.2.4 The European Union

Oberthür's (2011) study of the EU's performance within the UNFCCC negotiations touches on the strategies the bloc has used, albeit within the greater context of analysing its success in achieving its policy goals on the international stage. The article uses generic language to describe the bloc's strategic behaviour, writing of the EU's "support" for a position calling for reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions from 2020 onwards (2011:670), without specifying whether this was a proposal that the EU put forward or one by another party which the EU could support as part of a coalition-building strategy. It describes the EU's unsuccessful "pressure" for developed states to be given binding greenhouse gas emissions reduction commitments, and "pushing for" binding emission targets ahead of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 1997 (2011:669), though it does not describe the strategies which the EU attempted to achieve these policy goals. It does, however, mention the EU's brokering of a compromise, by accepting "a weakening of the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol" to achieve developed states' agreement to Kyoto's implementation rules in the early 2000s (2011:669), and the group's use of bilateral negotiations with other parties within the UNFCCC sessions. Further, Oberthür identifies two strategies the EU should have utilised after its failed leadership bid in the 2009 Copenhagen COP: concessions trading with "linkages to other issue areas where the EU enjoys more influence (e.g. economy)", and coalition-building with similarly-minded progressive parties, especially small island states and certain Latin American and African states (2011:678-679).

The EU's strategy choices also form part of Bang et al's (2005) study, although they focus on domestic changes of position and portray them as strategy, which does not meet Bailer's aforementioned definition. Nevertheless, they do identify the EU as having increasingly relied on granting concessions to other parties between 1997 and 2005 to foster progress towards their ambitions and assume leadership in the negotiations. Belis and Schunz (2013) also examine the EU within the UNFCCC, although they focus specifically on its relationship with China, and specifically on this relationship outside of the UNFCCC. Regardless, in terms of the bloc's negotiation strategies within the UNFCCC, they note the use of bilateral meetings with China to develop joint commitments on climate action – even describing the relationship between them as a "fully fledged strategic partnership" (2013:194) - and temporary efforts at coalition-building to secure the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol after the withdrawal of the US in the early 2000s. Besides these fleeting mentions, however, the language around the EU's strategy uses is also somewhat vague – for example, Belis and Schunz write that at COP17 in Durban, "the EU arguably re-emerged as a successful negotiator in a last-minute showdown around the launch of the Durban Platform, setting the stage for a novel negotiation process on a global agreement" and "the EU had thus again stepped up its diplomatic activism in 2011" without specifying exactly how the bloc did so (2013:195).

2.2.5 The MLDCs

Bhandary (2017) examines the case of a small bloc within the UNFCCC, namely the Mountainous Landlocked Developing Countries (MLDCs), composed of Afghanistan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. He writes that the MLDCs recognise their inability to

operate fully as a bloc within the UNFCCC because of their capacity and resource constraints, but that – perhaps in an attempt to rectify this problem – the bloc has adopted a similar strategy to AOSIS by "heavily emphasis[ing] the vulnerability of its members to glacial retreat, the lack of extensive research on the risks and impacts of climate change on mountainous systems and the vertical zoning of the countries, that is topography that does not allow habitat migration" (2017:184). Bhandary says the bloc has identified the preamble of the Convention as a basis to push for recognition of the MLDCs as particularly vulnerable, and thus has attempted to exert its moral pressure to bring this about, although he notes that progress has stalled, with the bloc suffering from internal disagreements about how it should operate within the UNFCCC. Additionally, in a section on lessons which the MLDCs could learn, Bhandary observes the CfRN used technical submissions and proposals to try to raise the profile of the REDD scheme at the 2005 Montreal COP, and attempted persuasion of developed country parties by framing REDD as a cost-effective emissions reduction scheme and therefore in their interests as well.

2.2.6 AILAC

Finally, very little has been written about AILAC strategies. In their paper on the content and contribution of the bloc's positions, Edwards et al (2017) do illustrate some of the strategies it uses. For example, they state AILAC made use of informal spaces such as the Cartagena Dialogue outside of the UNFCCC and the High Ambition informals at COP21. However, unsurprisingly, given it was not the goal of the paper, they do not go into specifics regarding strategy use and the language used to describe AILAC's strategic behaviour is relatively vague; Edwards et al (2017:76) write that "AILAC stated that the principles of the

Convention should be applied in a contemporary context and evolve with changing national circumstances", but they do not explain whether this was put forward in a technical submission or in negotiation sessions, or whether it constituted an example of persuasion, a specific constructive proposal, or even a demand. Similarly, statements that AILAC "called for a legal anchor that would link national contributions to the legal agreement" (2017:77) and "argued" the importance of a global adaptation goal (2017:80) also cannot be definitively tied to specific strategies, or even strategy use at all – it may be the authors' explanation of the AILAC positions on different issue areas. Watts and Depledge (2018) compare the contributions of ALBA and AILAC in the UNFCCC, but like Edwards et al, do not explicitly analyse AILAC strategies. Instead, they also consider the AILAC's positions but mostly mention AILAC strategic behaviour non-specifically, writing of AILAC's "co-operation with developed states", its "consensual pursuit of pragmatic solutions", its participation in the Cartagena Dialogue, and that AILAC "pushes" for ambitious climate action, although they do note AILAC's joint submissions with the EIG and EU (2018:8).

2.3 Strategies of States Within the UNFCCC

While there is limited literature specifically examining the strategies used by blocs within the UNFCCC, there has been more scholarship on the strategies of individual states in the climate change negotiations, although still not a great deal in absolute terms. This is especially surprising given the length of time the UNFCCC has been operating and the sheer number of parties involved. The literature review could only identify 10 studies focusing on states' strategies, comprising 7 about particular states and 3 examining broader patterns of states' strategy use. Those which consider particular states unsurprisingly look exclusively at

the bigger emitters, so smaller emitters - mainly developing country parties which make up the vast majority of the UNFCCC membership - are overlooked.

2.3.1 Japan

The earliest identified study of a state's strategies in the UNFCCC was Hattori's (1999) analysis of Japan's rôle in the lead-up to the 1997 Kyoto COP. He examines the "dual role" of Japan in the negotiations as both mediator and negotiator, which had implications for their choices of strategy (1999:168), and as such, the delegation was instructed to "leave some room for flexibility" (1999:174). As a negotiating party, Japan's delegation had been told not to accept emissions reductions for the country of more than 2.5% vs 1990 for carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide, and therefore, to block proposals which designated the country as committed to greater reductions, should the situation arise.

As the incoming host, however, Japan in its mediating rôle – the function of which Hattori states is to "pave the way to agreement" (1999:169) - attempted to build broad support among parties for a spirit of co-operation at COP3. Essentially, Japan attempted to build an alliance of parties who would do their utmost to ensure a successful COP outcome with a new binding protocol. It proposed a numerical target in October 1997 for global emissions reductions (5% vs 1990 levels, distributed among participating countries) and a timeframe to achieve this (2008 to 2012), and attempted compromise on the number of greenhouse gases to be included in this reduction, amending its proposal to include 3, rather than one (carbon dioxide). These compromise efforts were again part of a wider strategy of bridging the gap between developed parties, namely the EU and US, as they had disagreed over the issue of reductions being weighted according to different parties' emissions

contributions. Both before and during the COP itself, Japan made use of a variety of spaces, such as bilateral meetings and other informals, to "reduce tension reigning between and among the North and the South by providing opportunities to exchange information and interests" (1999:181) and "to mediate the issues in these informal meetings by proposing specific compromise wording for the draft protocol" (1999:182), but also "to break the stalemate and bring about agreement" (1999:180-181). This implies that Japan attempted to persuade other parties within these meetings to pledge support for their compromise proposals. Indeed, Hattori mentions that Japanese ministers in bilateral meetings "tried to encourage flexibility" from their counterparts (1999:183). Furthermore, during the COP process, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto called US President Clinton, UK Prime Minister Blair, and German Chancellor Kohl "to instruct their negotiators in Kyoto to show more flexibility in settling the negotiation" (1999:184).

2.3.2 United States

As well as examining the strategies of the EU, Bang et al (2005) consider how the United States' strategies changed between the 1997 negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol and 2005. While they still focus largely on domestic position changes, they describe the US as having "opposed" the EU and China's positions on issues such as exemptions from emissions reductions for developing parties, and having "insist[ed] against them" (2005:7). This description subtly implies both that the US made demands, and also blocked proposals, and Bang et al also describe the US as having "pushed for maximum flexibility" (2005:7), which could also be interpreted as having applied pressure to other parties to support them – the degree of rhetorical force could determine whether this counted as persuasion or coercion,

although Bang et al do not provide any further clues on the matter. Bang et al, however, do note the US built coalitions with other parties more sceptical of the KP provisions, such as Australia, India, China, Italy, and South Korea, and used bilateral meetings with them to switch the focus of negotiations away from binding emissions reduction commitments to carbon storage and technology-based solutions.

2.3.3 Russia

Bang et al (2005) also study Russia's changing strategies between 1997 and 2005. They note that Russia went from forming an alliance with the US in opposing EU ambition for the Kyoto Protocol, to making demands of the EU to engage in concessions trading in exchange for Russian ratification of the Protocol, aware Russia would be the tipping point to bring the KP into force in the mid-2000s after the US withdrawal. For example, Bang et al state the EU's endorsement of Russian membership of the WTO had a major impact on accelerating Russian KP ratification.

Andonova and Alexieva (2012) examine both the positions and strategies of Russia in the UNFCCC. Like Bang et al, they note the initial volatility of the latter, beginning with its "obstructionist statements and prolonged ratification of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol" (2012:614), before changing to "a more positive rhetoric of engagement in climate co-operation" at COP15, and then to further obstructionism by blocking a second emissions reductions commitment period under the KP alongside the US, Japan, and Canada two years later at COP17 in Durban (2012:615). Thus, Russia used submissions and statements, a more constructive strategy of compromise, blocking, and coalition-building within the Umbrella Group at different negotiation stages, although its support for the UG has remained stable

since the KP negotiations. For example, their research shows Russia made several joint submissions with Australia and Canada, fellow UG members, between 2007 and 2009. Furthermore, they note Russia also used concessions trading, made proposals to the UNFCCC, such as its proposal to the Copenhagen Accord in 2009 on an overall emissions reduction largely dependent on US and Chinese action, and made demands, such as its insistence on the absorption capacity of Russian forests being taken into account in its emissions reductions targets. However, Andonova and Alexieva report that, overall, Russia's primary strategy in the UNFCCC up to 2012 was passivity and caution, manifested by supporting no greater than 2.81% of any one of its' allies statements, or not following up on a coalition of BRIC countries alongside China, India, and Brazil because of disagreements about historical responsibility for climate change . They write that "Russia's approach is perhaps best described as 'waiting for the best deal'", and "in the absence of any clear commitments from other key actors, the Russian government prefers to avoid making premature vows" (2012:624). Therefore, although it used a mixture of strategies, its overall engagement with the UNFCCC negotiations was relatively low, and the country "has opted to let everyone guess what its next move will be" (2012:625).

2.3.4 India

Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2012) conduct a similar analysis of India's participation. They note that traditionally within the UNFCCC, India has attempted to build a grand coalition to support its positions across the G77 & China and has made strong opening demands. This has been coupled with a refusal to accept compromise or any trading of concessions, and attempts to exert moral pressure on its negotiating. Despite this, they refer to one example, early in the

UNFCCC's lifespan, of India deviating from these patterns and making a constructive proposal for compromise on CBDR. However, they argue that from the late 2000s, India's strategies have changed, gravitating more towards the country being "a transparent negotiator, with firm convictions, one that is ready and flexible enough to search for compromise and suggest new solutions" (2012:582). Their research indicates India stands out amongst non-Annex I parties as having made significantly more constructive proposals, as well as being willing to exchange concessions with others late in negotiation sessions, while building the new BASIC coalition along with China, Brazil, and South Africa and refocusing this as its priority rather than the wider G77. They also argue India has moved away from its previously preferred confrontational approaches. That said, their findings indicate India did not abandon them altogether, as, while it made no threats nor refused to compromise, it did make demands, while rejecting or ignoring those of others. Additionally, their findings are based on only one interview with an Indian delegate, and thus they note that the answers acquired may not be representative of all of India's delegation; furthermore bias may have arisen because less confrontational strategies are generally seen as normatively superior, and the delegate may have wished to present the Indian delegation in a more favourable light.

2.3.5 China

Part of Bang et al's (2005) study also examines China's strategies between 1997 and 2005. China is described as having blocked any movement in the negotiations that would see developing country parties take on any emissions reduction commitments, but Bang et al do state that the country ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Somewhat frustratingly, they also state that China "generally has a great influence on the G77" without specifying how this is exerted

(2005:14). More recently, 3 other articles have examined China's strategies in the climate change negotiations. While Belis and Schunz (2013) report that China has previously adopted more confrontational strategies such as refusing to accept any binding emissions reduction commitments at the Copenhagen COP while demanding the same, and technological assistance, from developed parties, Dong (2017) reports that since COP21 in Paris, China has changed its strategic approach to climate negotiations. He writes that it exercised flexibility on issues such as adaptation, loss & damage, and finance, to foster co-operation and compromise among parties, thereby attempting to assume a leadership rôle within the negotiations, and now embraces a strategy of concessions trading, exchanging financial and technical assistance in return for co-operation on climate action. Indeed, this is combined with a coalition-building strategy on various negotiation issues with parties from the developing world, with Dong reporting Chinese commitments between 2011 and 2015 of 410m yuan to foster greater climate co-operation with the LDCs, SIDS, and African parties in particular. Godbole (2016) reports a similar Chinese offer of US$3.1bn for a climate change co-operation fund, and even that the US and Chinese presidents issued joint statements to the UNFCCC in 2014, 2015, and 2016 in support of their proposed domestic action, which could be interpreted as coalition-building to boost the legitimacy of their respective domestic climate measures.

2.3.6 Multi-State Studies

Several studies identify patterns in strategy choices without focusing on particular states, across the UNFCCC as a whole or in groupings larger than any single bloc. Castro et al (2011) examine the impact of the Annex I status for the dynamics of the UNFCCC

negotiations. Through multivariate statistical regressions, they find it has effectively "split UNFCCC members into two distinct groups…It thereby generated two separate fora for discussion in addition to the already existing ones" (2011:8). Thus, parties almost inadvertently engaged in a form of alliance-building in supporting parties on their side of the Annex I divide by default, as their results "impl[y] that the split between Annex I and non-Annex I membership has indeed been responsible for some of the negotiation dynamics observed during the UNFCCC negotiations" (2011:22). Castro et al also recognise parties' use of statements and submissions, as these form the basis of their dataset for analysis, as well as Saudi Arabia's often-used strategy of blocking progress in the negotiations. This accounts for the authors' result that while Saudi Arabia has supported more non-Annex I parties' statements, it does not strongly align with either side of the divide, having blocked both.

Costantini et al (2016) also widen their focus beyond one individual state, although they limit their consideration to coalition-building. They conduct a cluster analysis of developing countries to predict coalitions that developing country parties might build with others based on common factors, such as vulnerability to climate change, geography, demographics. As such, they predict rather than analyse existing strategy use, although they do note that coalition-building has clearly been widely used for bloc-building.

2.4 Strategy Typologies

Bailer's (2012) study is perhaps the most thorough assessment of states' strategies within the UNFCCC, and provides a good overview of the types of available strategies identified in the literature thus far. Table 1 in her article (reproduced below) lists 5 typologies of strategy

classification with a focus outside of the climate change negotiations. Dür and Mateo (2009)'s hard/soft and McKibben's (2011) non-co-operative/co-operative distinctions come from work on analysis of strategies used within internal EU negotiations and distinguish the two categories by the level of conflict they introduce to proceedings while Hopmann's (1996) bargaining/problem-solving comes from international conflict resolution, and Walton and McKersie's (1965) distributive/integrative and Odell's (2000) value-claiming/value-creating focus on labour and international trade negotiations respectively.

TABLE 1 Definitions of negotiation typologies

Distributive	*Integrative* (Walton and McKersie, 1965)
Dividing a fixed resource between the parties such that the goals of one party are in basic conflict with those of the other	Attainment of objectives which are not in fundamental conflict with those of the other party
Value-claiming	*Value-creating* (Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Odell, 2000)
Insistence on agreements under which one side will gain at the expense of the other relative to the *status quo ante* (Odell, 2000, p. 32)	Promoting the attainment of goals that are not in fundamental conflict with one another (Odell, 2000, p. 33)
Bargaining	*Problem solving* (Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992; Hopmann, 1996)
Behaviour designed to affect or modify the behaviour of targets without necessarily implying a substantive change in the position on the part of the actor	Behaviour intended to approach negotiations as a problem to be solved rather than as a contest to be won, for example, perspective taking, brainstorming, formula creation, collaboration, information sharing, joint search for common interests and a win–win attitude (Elgström and Jönsson, 2000, pp. 685–686)
Non-cooperative	*Cooperative* (McKibben, 2011)
A refusal to offer concessions; the extraction of concessions from other states	Offering concessions that indicate a state's willingness to adjust from its position that signify a willingness to accept the outcome preferred by opposing states on at least one of the central issues
Hard	*Soft* (Dür and Mateo, 2009)
Conflictive or aggressive tactics	Cooperative or friendly tactics

Figure 1: Bailer's (2012:536) Table 1 on Strategy Typologies

Bailer (2012:536) rejects use of distributive/integrative, value-claiming/value-creating, and bargaining/problem-solving typologies for strategies on the basis that describing strategy in

these ways conflates the ways an actor negotiates with other parties with the actor's true motivations and preferences, which are "generally extremely challenging to identify". Her article uses Dür and Mateo's (2009) hard/soft distinction, arguing it focuses not on the interests of the actor, but the observable level of conflict added to negotiations by the use of a strategy. She also argues this is fundamentally similar to McKibben's (2011) distinction, in dividing strategies into categories depending on whether they are non-co-operative or co-operative, thus also concerning itself with the resultant effect of the strategy's use on the wider negotiations rather than the logic behind its use in the first place. Within Bailer's preferred hard/soft distinction, she gives a few examples of where certain strategies would fall: making threats, shaming or criticising other parties, and deliberately blocking progress[5] would be considered as hard strategies; while offering concessions, showing flexibility and willingness to compromise, and making constructive proposals, would qualify as soft strategies. Weiler (2012), whose study uses the same dataset as Bailer, also adds making demands to the list of hard strategies.

There are two fundamental problems with setting up dichotomies of strategies. Firstly, depending on the context, a strategy could be located on either side of the typology's divide. Coalition-building, for example, by party A towards party B may please party B as a show of support, but anger party C who was hoping to be able to outmanoeuvre party B within the wider multilateral negotiations. Concessions trading with certain parties but not others may have similar effects, as may particular forms of compromise or use of submissions and statements, depending on their content.

Secondly, how particular strategies are deployed can create difficulties in categorising a strategy on one side of the hard/soft divide or the other. This is particularly evidenced by

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[5] Either by refusing to change a position causing an impediment to progress, or by ignoring demands of other parties

potential uses of persuasion, which Bailer's work does not even categorise as a hard or soft strategy, and is not included in her analysis, despite it being a strategy noted in other studies on strategic behaviour in the UNFCCC, such as Betzold's (2010) and Bhandary's (2017). Persuasion neatly shows that tactics within an overall strategy can affect the level of conflict it may or may not create. For example, persuasion is reasonably considered a non-conflictive strategy on principle, given its reliance on strength of argument and logic of its ideas; as Odell (2010:624) notes, "Persuasive arguments are made during efforts to reduce conflict and reach mutual-benefit agreements." However, it is easy to imagine that persuasion could also produce different levels of conflict with target parties depending on tone of voice or framing used, e.g. framing the climate negotiations not at all as a question of justice in persuasion attempts at ALBA, or even making rational arguments in person in an aggressive or hostile tone of voice towards any party. The same principle can be applied to other strategies, too – coalition-building, or another apparently constructive proposal, for example, if framed so that it does not at all appeal to the target party, may end up antagonising them, despite contrary intentions and expectations. This highlights the problem with Dür & Mateo's categorisation system, which is based on the expected *outcome* of a strategy. Whilst preferable to typologies which conflate strategy with a party's intention, their typology overlooks potential variations in the actual *process* of executing a strategy which in one context may lead to its classification as hard/conflict-increasing, and in another as soft/conflict-reducing.

2.4.1 Specifying Strategies on a Spectrum

Litfin (1994) offers a possible solution to this problem. She examines the negotiations over the establishment of the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol for the Protection of the

Ozone Layer, focusing especially on the rôle of scientific discourse. However, albeit framed as power relations, Litfin proposes a spectrum of interactions. Some of these qualify as strategies, although the spectrum does not encompass every identified strategy in international negotiations. She writes:

"*One can imagine a spectrum of power relations, ranging from those most rooted in domination and control to those characterised by mutuality and intersubjective understandings. At one end we would find force, where a powerful actor removes the effective choice to act otherwise. Following force might be coercion, where one actor threatens another; then manipulation, where some level of deceit is involved; then authority, where an actor is recognised as having either a legal or a moral right to impose decisions. Finally, the knowledge-based power of persuasion relies upon evidence and argumentation*." (1994:18)

As well as the obvious benefit of including persuasion alongside strategies like coercion and manipulation, Litfin's arrangement of strategies on a spectrum avoids the problem of potentially unjustified artificial distinctions between strategies. Viewing strategies as existing on a spectrum recognises there is the potential for overlap between them – for example, a party may use submissions and statements as a strategy for putting forward its views, but the discursive content of those submissions and statements may involve the use of persuasion, demands, threats, proposals, or compromises, among others. This spectrum-based perspective on strategies can be combined with a focus on the actual process of strategy use, rather than underlying motivations or expected strategy outcomes. A variable which could be used for such a spectrum is the tone most expected for a given strategy's use in negotiations, ranging from more to less aggressive, with the caveat that in theory, most strategies can be deployed

with a variety of framings and tones[6]. Figure 2 below demonstrates this, and places the

strategies identified from the literature on this spectrum.

Technical Submissions & Statements

Persuasion & Rational Argument

Concessions Trading   Coalition-Building

Use of Force   Demands   Compromise

Bilateral Meetings

Use of Informal Spaces

More Aggressive Tone   **Less Aggressive Tone**

Blocking Outcomes

Coercion & Threats   Exerting Moral Pressure   Constructive Proposals

Figure 2: A Spectrum of Negotiation Strategies

Having gathered evidence of strategy use within multilateral environmental negotiations from

the literature, the thesis will investigate use of 12 of the strategies depicted on the above

spectrum; any of the above strategies is theoretically available to any party with the exception

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[6] It is difficult to imagine, however, coercion or threats being deployed with a constructive framing, while it is also difficult to imagine a constructive proposal being made aggressively without this becoming a threat in and of itself.

of the use of force, as participation in UN institutions prohibits parties from using it as a

negotiation strategy, as per Article 2.4 of the UN Charter (United Nations, 1945). The thesis

will henceforth use the definitions listed below in Table 2 for each strategy. Where possible,

these are based on definitions from existing literature, although in some cases where no

specific definition existed, either dictionary definitions or original definitions had to be used.

Table 2: Definitions of Strategies to be Investigated

Strategy	**Definition**
Use of Technical Submissions	The provision of official documents to the UNFCCC Submissions Portal[7] in order to present the positions and views of a party or group of parties to other negotiating parties; as opposed to doing so in face-to-face negotiating sessions
Constructive Proposals & Rhetoric	The proposition of ideas and use of language by a party with the aim of making progress within a particular issue area towards universal agreement
Compromise Offers	The proposition of ideas and use of language designed to overcome disagreements between parties by "partial surrender of one's position for the sake of coming to terms" (OED, 2020a) within a

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[7] http://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx

	particular issue area in order to make progress towards universal agreement
Persuasion	The use of rational argument, logic, and evidence in order to change the opinion of another party on a particular issue area (Litfin, 1994)
Coalition-Building	The offer to another party to work together "in order to support their position in the bargaining process with greater emphasis" (Costantini et al, 2016:129) on a particular issue area
Bilateral Meetings	The arrangement of private meetings between two parties away from formal UNFCCC negotiating sessions (Tenzing, 2016)
Use of Informal Spaces	The engagement in negotiations away from formal UNFCCC negotiating sessions, such as external fora, social occasions, corridor conversations, or "informal informals" for problematic issue areas in which "parties concerned meet, without anyone necessarily facilitating the discussion (parties will typically do away with country flags and

	will refer to one another by name)" (Tenzing, 2016:31)
Concessions Trading	Also known as issue linkage; the concession of a position by one party in one issue area in order to secure concessions from another party in a different issue area (Da Conçeicão-Heldt, 2006)
Exerting Moral Pressure	The use of appeals to principles, morality, and norms in order to effect behavioural change in another party (Betzold, 2010)
Blocking	The withholding of consent to, or use of veto on, a proposal, by a party within a particular issue area in order to prevent it from forming part of an official UNFCCC agreement; alternatively, a party's refusal to change a position causing an impediment to progress (Bailer, 2012)
Making Demands	The submission of peremptory requests to another party by virtue of authority (OED, 2020b)
Coercion & Threats	A "declaration of hostile determination…or damage to be inflicted

	in retribution for or conditionally upon some course" (OED, 2020c)

2.5 Reasons for Selecting a Strategy

A variety of factors may result in selection of a particular strategy in a particular context. Firstly, all parties have the option of blocking negotiation outcomes, as the UNFCCC operates a system of decision-making by consensus, in which all that is required to impede progress is for one party to veto an agreement (Weiler, 2012). The nature of climate change as a global environmental problem which requires every party to act to solve the problem for everyone's benefit also means that such blocking options are theoretically feasible, which leads to what Litfin (1994:203) labels "the peculiar phenomenon of the 'power of the weak'."

However, when parties attempt to engineer more "positive outcomes", i.e. something which may at least provide a route to eventual adoption of a decision or some form of consensus agreement, a major consideration must be the extent to which the party expects the strategy selected to deliver what it would deem a successful outcome. For example, Wagner (1999:108) writes that most negotiations analysts believe that "problem-solving" – i.e. less aggressive - strategic behaviour by parties leads to "superior results". Based on this expectation, parties may choose to adopt such strategies, e.g. identifying potential concessions trades, making constructive proposals, or coalition-building, if they consider substantive progress in addressing climate change a successful outcome. This is a reasonable assumption given their participation in the UNFCCC in the first place and the demonstrably negative impacts of climate change forecast for the coming century.

2.5.1 Power Dynamics

Key to this, however, is the concept of power in the negotiations, which in turn depends on a party's resources. Within traditional conceptualisations, a party's economic strength (Weiler, 2012) is viewed alongside its military strength as a proxy for its negotiating power, as theoretically a strong party should be able to ensure that parties with relatively fewer material resources adapt their behaviour in line with its preferences, given the potential threat a strong party may hold for them (Weiler, 2012).[8] Such threats may take the form of consequences outside of the climate change negotiations, such as economic sanctions (Weiler, 2012), the withdrawal of international agreements, or even loss of prestige from public criticism of a party by another with greater power resources. However, within the UNFCCC negotiations, given the nature of action required to meet the UNFCCC's stated goals of temperature stabilisation, a party's greenhouse gas emissions can be considered a significant power resource in negotiations. As these emissions need to be reduced as much as possible to keep global average temperature increases within the limits cemented in the Paris Agreement, a party with significant emissions is afforded leverage, as other parties need them to take action in order for progress towards the Agreement's goal to be made (Happaerts, 2015). In practice, a party's high level of greenhouse gas emissions usually results from significant industrial activity, and therefore power as a result of significant emissions can generally be equated to power because of economic strength. Powerful parties, therefore, because of other parties' reliance on their action, can feasibly use the full range of strategies available and have the credibility to use more aggressive strategies such as threats, demands, and blocking outcomes (Dür and Mateo, 2008; Weiler, 2012). Bailer (2012) hypothesises that because of this

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[8] For further discussion of the theoretical aspects of power, see Chapter 3.

credibility, powerful parties in the climate change negotiations are more likely to use more aggressive strategies, which was confirmed by her findings (2012). In their analysis of internal EU negotiations, Dür and Mateo (2008) find a similar result: under circumstances where context, stage, issue, and level of negotiations remain constant, more powerful parties are more likely to use more aggressive strategies because they are less reliant on the outcome of negotiations than their negotiating partners, and their greater economic resources make the use of aggressive strategies more credible. Bang et al (2005) cite China as a good example of a party with all types of power resources; as a high emitter of greenhouse gases, other parties rely on Chinese action to resolve climate change. Its population size and military strength also give it political power on the international stage in various fora, affording it the credibility to use more aggressive strategies such as blocking outcomes and making demands.

Conversely, parties with less economic or military strength, or lower current emissions totals, may struggle to use more aggressive strategies with any credibility, given their inability to follow through on the threat (implied or otherwise) of consequences should other parties not adjust their behaviour to their liking (Dür and Mateo, 2008)[9]. Furthermore, per what Axelrod (1984:13) dubs the "shadow of the future", i.e. the chance of parties interacting more than once – which in climate change negotiations, is naturally very high – weak parties are also incentivised to maintain the best possible relationship with stronger parties because they rely on them to follow through with climate action, or because they fear retaliation from more powerful parties if they attempt any more aggressive strategies against them (Dür and Mateo, 2008). Even though, as mentioned above, blocking strategies are in theory an option given the nature of climate change as a collective action problem and the institutional set-up of the UNFCCC, there is, therefore, a disincentive for weaker parties to

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[9] However, as mentioned before, every party to the UNFCCC can in theory veto any negotiating outcome as a result of the UNFCCC's system of decision-making by consensus.

use strategies which may be considered more aggressive. Bailer's (2012) findings echo this logic, with weaker parties making less use of more aggressive strategies in the UNFCCC negotiations. As such, it may be that less powerful parties instead use less aggressive strategies, such as proposing constructive solutions or offering compromises (Weiler, 2012), or coalition-building, evidenced by AOSIS' attempts to build broad coalitions with other groups such as the LDCs and the EU (Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012).

Litfin (1994), however, conceives of another form of power resource within international environmental negotiations, namely knowledge. Since climate change negotiations are deeply technical and based in scientific knowledge, as are most international environmental problems (Litfin, 1994), having a good level of understanding of the scientific and technical issues can give a party an advantage. For example, grounding persuasion attempts in technical knowledge adds credibility to the party's arguments, suggesting they are the product of rigorous analysis, and in turn potentially boosting the likelihood of acceptance by the target parties. Furthermore, a good level of tactical knowledge – for example, understanding the positions and preferences of negotiating partners - is also advantageous for a party, as it may then be able to predict the moves of others, or frame its advances to maximise the strategy's chance of success with another particular party.

Litfin (1994:15) describes this knowledge-based power as "discursive", defining a discourse as "a set of linguistic practices and rhetorical strategies embedded in a network of social relations" (1994:3). Use of knowledge-based power, therefore, relies upon deployment of such linguistic practices and rhetorical strategies. In other words, the process of the communication of ideas, concepts, and values to a particular strategic end depends on the language used for it, as well as other features. These can include selection of information to be communicated in the first place (Litfin, 1994) or the framing of concepts so as to provoke interpretation in a particular manner by the recipient, which makes the communicant's

preferred outcome in theory more likely. Indeed, Litfin argues that viewing knowledge-based power as discursive in this way is particularly helpful when examining international environmental regimes, such as the UNFCCC, as "the framing of information is decisive" (1994:191). It is easy to imagine how awareness of the discursive nature of knowledge-based power is beneficial for strategies across the spectrum; knowledge of the positions of other parties may allow for tailoring threats or persuasion attempts specifically to them, and framing offers for co-operation within a coalition so as to make acceptance more appealing to the target party. Indeed, Lewis (1998:499), writing in the context of negotiations within the European Council, argues his research shows "Communicative rationality matters; small states with good arguments can still win", thereby demonstrating the importance of the process of discursive communication to persuasion strategies. Another especially obvious benefit of such knowledge could be seen within concessions trading, as offering concessions specifically desired by the target party would likely raise the chance of the offer's acceptance, or perhaps allow the party to request higher priority concessions.

This broader conception of the basis of power, and its focus on the discursive processes of its utilisation in strategies, allows for the possibility that parties traditionally regarded as weak because they lack conventional power resources may in fact be able to wield significant power within negotiations by resorting to other sources, and can help to make sense of such parties' strategic choices which would not otherwise fit conventional conceptions of power structures in the UNFCCC (Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012). Betzold (2010:135) and Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012:359) argue exactly this point by referring to AOSIS' ability to "borrow" power from external sources to make its influence felt within the UNFCCC. Drawing on work by Zartman and Rubin (2000b), Betzold argues the group derived moral power by utilising a discourse of vulnerability of its member states, which promoted the idea that AOSIS members would be hardest hit by climate change impacts they

had done the least to cause, thereby appealing to principles of equity and fairness. Furthermore, she writes that AOSIS appealed to the self-interest of other negotiating parties, thereby drawing on other parties' conventional negotiating power to use it for itself, by using persuasion strategies that climate action benefitted all parties to build a broad coalition of support for its proposals.

AOSIS also used the knowledge-based power provided by NGOs and lobby groups through their expertise in the technicalities of climate change policy and science, as well as tactical knowledge and legal advice for the negotiations themselves, both improving their ability to participate and use strategies of persuasion and constructive proposals (Betzold, 2010). Betzold argues that AOSIS accessed a fourth source of external power – knowledge and use of the intricacies of the UNFCCC process itself - to be better able to "play the game", e.g. by organising its member states into a "tight negotiating coalition which actively participated in the negotiations" and putting forward submissions so that AOSIS positions were considered in the wider negotiations (2010:141). Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) also attribute use of these alternative power resources to AOSIS. They refer to AOSIS' discursive power, noting that through skilful use of language, tone, and communication media, AOSIS made questions of morality and legitimacy central while deploying its technical expert knowledge effectively in persuasion attempts.

2.5.2 Domestic Politics - Vulnerability

The domestic politics of a coalition's member parties can also influence the strategies it chooses. How far member parties are vulnerable to climate change may affect the salience of climate change as an issue domestically (Weiler, 2012; Costantini et al, 2016), as it is

plausible that parties highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change will take the phenomenon more seriously as a threat. Therefore, climate change is likely to occupy a more prominent rôle in the parties' domestic political discourses. This may then cause the coalition to favour certain strategies, or use particular tactics within strategic behaviour. Odell (2010:622) argues "the perceived alternatives to agreement" – here the effects of climate change on a party should no international agreement be reached – "are more accurate guides to behaviour and outcomes than state power and size." For example, a high degree of vulnerability to climate change effects among coalition members may mean they perceive climate change as an urgent political issue requiring international action. The coalition may, therefore, frame climate action as such within negotiations, potentially resulting in the coalition lobbying for greater levels of international action, e.g. by exerting moral pressure on other parties to accelerate negotiation progress (Weiler, 2012), or perhaps reaching out to other parties who are similarly vulnerable to form larger coalitions through which to negotiate in the UNFCCC. By contrast, Costantini et al (2016) reason that more vulnerable parties, given their "impatience" for a swift conclusion of agreements towards climate action, could be expected to use less aggressive strategies to secure a quicker negotiating conclusion by not risking confrontation. Less vulnerable parties, then, less concerned with concrete outcomes, could credibly adopt more aggressive strategies, such as demanding lower levels of ambition requiring less action on their own part, as the prospect of such gains is worth risking delays to a timescale on which they are not so dependent.

Bailer (2012) tests the hypothesis that, the greater the salience of climate change as a domestic political issue to a party, the greater the chance it will use more aggressive strategies, such as exerting moral pressure or making threats. She finds this is confirmed when salience is equated to vulnerability to climate change, as parties felt that the potential to accelerate progress towards international agreement was worth risking a breakdown in

negotiations. However, Weiler (2012) points out that literature on intra-EU negotiations, albeit not on climate change, shows parties for whom an issue is especially important are actually more likely to favour less aggressive strategies such as concessions trading, as the urgency of the relevant issue requires some form of action, however insufficient, over none at all. Weiler (2012:556) also notes the degree to which a party's interests are vulnerable to global climate action may affect its strategic choices, writing that "Politically vulnerable countries might try to slow the negotiations down, or they might demand compensation for their expected losses". Good examples include fossil fuel-producing countries dependent on export revenues, such as Saudi Arabia using obstructionist strategies of blocking and delays (Barnett, 2008; Weiler, 2012). Costantini et al (2016) add that such countries tend to have higher GDPs per capita than other developing country parties, and therefore can be seen as less vulnerable to the effects of climate given their potential to adapt.

2.5.3 Domestic Politics - Identity

Another element of the domestic politics of parties potentially influencing their strategy choice within the UNFCCC negotiations may be their particular identities and values within their domestic political cultures. A party which places great emphasis on the importance of national sovereignty within international negotiations might be reluctant to agree to any form of compromise which it feels may impinge on this, or could resort to making demands or blocking measures to prevent any decisions which, from its perspective, threaten national sovereignty of UNFCCC parties. Developing country parties who view the UNFCCC as an arena in which equity is a central but as yet unfulfilled tenet may also resort to such strategies to ensure that developed country parties take the lead on action (Costantini et al, 2016) as per

Article 3.1 of the Convention (UNFCCC, 1992).Likewise, developed countries may stonewall requests to take on greater proportions of climate action because they deem them unfair burdens on their economies (Costantini et al, 2016). By contrast, a party self-identifying as a leader may be more inclined to use strategies which allow it to act as such (Weiler, 2012). For example, it may seek to broker compromises among disagreeing parties, or be proactive by putting forward a number of constructive proposals for other parties' consideration as a way of advancing negotiations towards a concrete outcome. Hattori (1999) cites Japan, as host of the 1997 Kyoto COP, making constructive proposals and attempting to persuade parties to follow its lead, as it wanted to conclude a successful conference in order to save face and preserve national prestige while in the global spotlight as COP host.

China represents a good example of a strategic shift from a focus on sovereignty to leadership. Dong (2017:35) attributes China's shift towards a more constructive rôle and its use of less aggressive strategies, such as making constructive proposals and coalition-building, to a desire for what he terms "international prestige", with China wanting to be portrayed as the global leader on climate action. However, he does also note China's vulnerability to climate change effects as another factor driving this alteration. Godbole (2016:361) agrees, adding "The Chinese government is highly sensitive to criticism and negative publicity", that the country is "highly conscious of its global image", and is making a "serious effort to cultivate an image as a benign, normal power. Which is claiming its rightful position in the international order without trying to disrupt the present order" (2016:363). Godbole notes a particular feature of China's domestic political situation as especially relevant, namely its environmental challenges and failings, which "have come as a huge embarrassment to the regime", leading to China shifting its strategies to try to regain a positive image on climate change internationally (2016:364).

2.5.4 Domestic Politics – Democracy & Lobby Groups

Furthermore, Bailer (2012) produces some interesting findings about the degree to which a party exhibits the traits associated with democratic politics, particularly in terms of the effects of domestic NGO and industry lobby groups. She finds that in parties with lower democratic ratings, the effect of domestic lobby groups is to shift a party's strategy choices away from more aggressive options, whereas "this negative effect on the use of hard strategy becomes weaker the more democratic the countries are" (2012:545) . Rietig (2016:271) argues that ability of NGOs to interact with governmental decision-makers, and by extension to influence a party's strategic choices in climate international negotiations, depends on "how approachable and open the respective home government is", which in turn depends on funding structures and the institutional culture of domestic politics. However, her research based on COP15 at Copenhagen does indicate that at least in the UNFCCC negotiations, "environmental lobbyists have limited influence on the negotiations according to government representatives" as, unlike lobbyists from industry and business, they have little leverage to influence governmental choices (2016:282). Rietig does distinguish between their influence on parties *in the negotiations* – i.e. the strategies they use while there - and on the domestic politics which may in turn form parties' positions going into negotiations, and it is on the latter which her research focuses. She states activists "used information politics to frame climate change as a danger requiring urgent action and pushed the climate change issue by the domestic agenda by organising demonstrations drawing media attention" (2016:281). However at the negotiation sessions themselves, where there could be more opportunity to influence strategy, she notes that lobbyists can have influence by joining government delegations and negotiating on their behalf.

Bailer (2012), however, finds that overall, democratic parties are less likely to use more aggressive strategies than autocratic parties, because of the sets of rules, norms, and values within them which tend away from more aggressive strategies and favour more co-operative approaches on the international stage. Conversely, more autocratic parties do not need to factor in the values of their domestic populations as much, and this argument is supported by Barnett (2008) in the case of Saudi Arabia and OPEC's frequent blocking strategies, given the former's lack of democratic elections. This would explain the aforementioned effects of domestic lobbying in both democracies and autocracies, with lobbying moderating autocracies away from their initial choices of more aggressive strategies towards less aggressive choices, with the inverse true for democratic parties. This, according to Bang et al (2005:8), also explains the US' decisions to make demands and block proposals in the period of negotiations towards the Kyoto Protocol, with influential industry lobby groups and business representatives successfully adopting "strong political pressure and outreach campaigns" to modify American UNFCCC strategies towards these more aggressive strategies in order to avoid greater responsibility for American domestic actors. They also attribute the US' coalition-building and bilateral meetings with other parties sceptical of the Kyoto Protocol's requirements to this domestic political situation.

India's domestic political situation is also the variable to which Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2012) attribute a change in its choices of negotiation strategy in the UNFCCC. They write that traditionally, India has made strong demands of its negotiating partners and used blocking strategies and attempts to exert moral pressure on others; indeed, they go so far as writing that "India has become increasingly known as a redoubtable 'nay-sayer' that insists on its positions and accepts neither compromise nor side payments" (2012:576). However, 4 factors have led to a rise in the prominence of certain domestic actors' voices and levels of influence – termed by Dubash (2012b) as "progressive realists"

and "progressive internationalists" (2012:577) – which in turn has shifted Indian strategic choices towards less aggressive approaches, with the delegation adopting concessions trading, compromises, and constructive proposals alongside its traditional choices of demands and criticisms. These factors are a growing awareness among the population of India's vulnerability to climate change; greater awareness of the financial benefits available to India from climate action, like those from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM); a growing domestic energy demand leading to greater energy security concerns as the level of imported energy has increased; and finally public criticism from other states such as the Maldives at India's perceived inaction on climate change. All 4 have generated greater media coverage of climate change in India and have influenced the government towards a more constructive and less aggressive approach when negotiating. Andonova and Alexieva (2012) take a similar view as to the reasons behind Russian changes in UNFCCC negotiating strategies. They argue that greater awareness of climate change impacts on Russia, awareness of the financial opportunities for Russia from joint implementation projects and carbon trading and an increasing focus on energy efficiency and modernisation domestically have led the country to depart from its largely obstructionist behaviour since the Kyoto Protocol negotiations towards a greater mix of more and less aggressive strategies, e.g. concessions trading and constructive proposals alongside making demands and blocking tactics. Andonova and Alexieva argue this mixture of strategies is largely designed to make Russia unpredictable, maximising room for manoeuvre as determined by the negotiating context.

2.5.5 Delegation Dynamics

The dynamics of a party's delegation can also influence its strategy choices in international negotiations. Weiler (2012:556) notes this is an understudied element of negotiations, and may "be a crucial factor in understanding bargaining processes", as the influence of delegation characteristics "can lead to negotiation dynamics that cannot be explained by appeal to [material] power resources alone." Frenhoff Larsen (2007:876) supports this argument, and links it neatly to the discursive nature of negotiations as mentioned previously by Litfin, writing that "…the negotiator is the channel through which information flows between the domestic constituencies and the negotiating opponent in the international negotiations. This position gives the negotiator considerable control over communications."

Thus, dynamics such as the size of a delegation, the experience levels of negotiators, the personalities and backgrounds of the individuals involved, and their personal preferences, styles, and relative skill levels can reasonably be expected to be relevant considerations for strategy choice. A bigger delegation makes a party better equipped to react to developments in the negotiations, in theory improving chances of selecting a strategy more likely to provide the party with its desired outcomes (Bailer, 2012) – Andonova and Alexieva (2012) argue that Russia's ability to be unpredictable by choosing a mixture of strategies stems from its large delegation - although as Weiler (2012) notes, parties may field bigger delegations as a result of having comparatively greater power resources, e.g. better ability to finance a greater number of delegates attending negotiations. Barnett (2008) argues that this is the case for OPEC, with its fossil-fuel financial backing allowing it to field a bigger delegation than almost all other developing country parties, in turn giving it greater negotiating capacity and protecting it from challenges to its blocking strategies from

dissenting voices within the G77. Nevertheless, Bailer finds the size of a delegation has no significant impact on a party's use of more or less aggressive strategies (2012).

A more skilled and/or experienced negotiator may be better able to select an appropriate strategy for a particular context, e.g. knowing when best to apply moral pressure to produce desired results and when to opt for persuasion strategies, where attempting to use moral leverage would not be received well by a target party.[10] This could be because, as Weiler (2012:555) argues, skilled negotiators are "generally better prepared, ask more questions, explore more options, set clearer limits, and are more likely to consider long-term goals than their less skilled counterparts". Bailer (2012) hypothesises and finds that experienced delegations are more likely to use more aggressive strategies to secure their governments' desired outcomes, although she does not explain exactly why she arrives at this hypothesis. Dür and Mateo (2008), by contrast, find little evidence that within internal EU negotiations, the length of EU membership of a country – acting as a proxy for a delegation's experience– has any significant impact on its strategy choices in negotiations; as stated, they favour an explanation revolving around a party's power resources.

Likewise, the background, personality, styles and preferences, and even psychology of a negotiator may influence strategy selection; of the penultimate of these, Da Conceição-Heldt (2006:148) writes that, at least in the EU negotiation process, "the preferences of national-government representatives are crucial variables". Likewise, a timid or quiet negotiator may be less likely to use more aggressive strategies such as threats or coercion if they feel uncomfortable doing so, and perhaps is more likely to attempt to build coalitions or use persuasion. By contrast, naturally confident negotiators may be more likely

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[10] There is also an obvious link to knowledge as a power resource here; a party with good technical and tactical knowledge is able to provide its negotiators with more information, which may help their decision-making as to particular strategies in particular contexts.

to attempt to make demands or threats, or perhaps use persuasion because they are sure of their arguments (whether justified or not!). Odell (2010:623) also notes the influence of partisan bias on negotiators' strategy choices, writing: "We know that the negotiator framed to take the perspective of one side in a dispute overestimates the value of her outside option, underestimates the degree to which the other side's objectives are compatible with hers, and uses a self-serving definition of fairness" compared with non-partisan individuals presented with the same situation and information. This may mean that negotiators with a keen sense of attachment to the party they represent may be less inclined to compromise or offer concessions for trading, and more inclined to pursue more aggressive strategies to prioritise achieving their party's negotiating goals unaltered. He later notes that greater negotiation experience "often reinforces rather than offsetting biases" (2010:624), which could lead to more aggressive strategic choices, although this does not preclude the effects of partisan bias in comparatively inexperienced negotiators.

Chasek's (2011) work, however, has implications for partisan bias as its effects can be mitigated by the possibility of good working relationships between negotiators from different parties. The long periods of time that delegates spend together can build trust or even friendships between them, resulting in a more relaxed atmosphere in negotiation sessions, which may be conducive to less aggressive strategies such as offering compromises, coalition-building, or constructive proposals. Indeed, negotiations can even be punctuated by "private and confidential problem-solving workshops" dedicated to exactly such interactions between parties (2011:93). Consequently, she argues, the climate change negotiations are characterised by what Montville (1990:162) terms as "two-track diplomacy": "an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations aiming to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organise human and material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict." Her article goes on to argue for the existence of such

diplomacy by reference to meetings of the AWG-KP in 2007, as well as to Martinez and Susskind's (2000) work on two-track diplomacy during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in 1997. Elgström and Jönsson's (2000:697-698) work is also relevant for considerations of partisan bias, as they write that when negotiators are technical experts in their field, selection of less aggressive strategies is more likely, citing evidence from intra-EU negotiations that with expert negotiators, "much more consideration is given to substantially successful agreements…than to national political concerns" and that "integrative solutions are seen as 'technically optimal'".

2.5.6 Intra-Bloc Dynamics

Another variable potentially influencing a coalition's particular strategy selection in a particular context is the dynamics within the bloc. For example, a coalition's nature may predispose it towards certain strategies over others, perhaps because of the way and spaces in which it makes decisions on its climate diplomacy, or the way the coalition is organised. Oberthür (2011:671) states that the EU's climate strategies are agreed at Council of Ministers level, and that during the 1990s, the rotating Council Presidency became the EU's "exclusive voice and main external representation" in international climate negotiations. However, he adds that during the Irish presidency of 2004, EU external policy reform was enacted, leading to negotiating responsibility being delegated from the Council and Presidency to expert negotiators and members of the European Commission, which then resulted in "enhanced continuity and expertise of EU negotiators", "more time for outreach" to other UNFCCC parties, and "the emergence of a European identity among negotiators" (2011:672). Clearly, then, this formal centralisation but also multi-level delegation of climate diplomacy

responsibility has repercussions for the delegation dynamics of the EU. Oberthür does not explicitly tie these changes to any particular strategic direction. However, given the aforementioned work of Odell (2010) and Elgström and Jönsson (2000), this reorganisation of the bloc's climate diplomacy responsibilities may have played its part in the shift from the EU "pushing" in the 1990s for binding emissions reduction commitments to its "second major diplomatic victory in the campaign to save the Kyoto Protocol in 2004, when, in exchange for concessions concerning Russia's bid for WTO membership, it convinced Russia to ratify and thus bring the Protocol into force" (Oberthür, 2011:669). As AILAC also has a supranational Support Unit, this Unit may also have an equally pivotal rôle in the bloc's selection of strategies for use in the UNFCCC negotiations.

The coalition's cohesion - i.e. the degree to which its members share opinions over negotiating issues (Wagner, 1999) may affect its choice of strategies. For example, it may mean that one member has more say in determining the coalition's overall strategy than its counterparts, which in turn may be based on the parties' respective power resources. Odell (2010) discusses the impact of a coalition's dynamics in relation to the use of blocking strategies under consensus-based institutional decision-making, such as that of the UNFCCC. He argues 3 factors affect the credibility of a coalition using blocking strategies, and that a coalition's credibility in using them is a determinant of whether it will choose to block in the first place. These factors are: the relative power of the coalition's members, which has a material impact on its credibility in using blocking strategies; how far coalition members share the same positions and preferences, i.e. its likelihood to fragment over disagreement in strategy choice; and the coalition's size, which may boost its ability to withstand fragmentation if use of blocking strategies is not a universally popular choice within its members.

Wagner (1999), albeit in the setting of negotiations within the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), focuses on the second of these factors, namely the level of coalition cohesion as a determinant of strategy selection. She hypothesises that highly cohesive coalitions will tend to use more "convergent bargaining" behaviour – i.e. more aggressive strategies such as blocking, a refusal to change positions and compromise, and attempts to coerce others to change their positions (1999:110) – because their differences compared with other coalitions are more sharply defined, which leads to them having more of a "we-they" attitude (1999:112). Coalitions with low degrees of cohesion, by contrast, will adopt problem-solving behaviour, such as those less aggressive strategies mentioned above, being less likely to possess a pan-coalition identity and therefore also less likely to perceive the negotiations in terms of their coalition versus other parties. This gives rise to the belief that concessions trading and compromises with others may be viable. According to Wagner (1999:117), the data and analysis confirmed these hypotheses, with the high-cohesion G77 & China and EU coalitions favouring more "convergent bargaining" and fewer "problem-solving" strategies than the low-cohesion JUSCANNZ coalition, thereby demonstrating the relevance of coalition cohesion in strategy choice.

2.5.7 Timings

Additionally, the concept of timings within the negotiations can also affect a party's strategy choice. A party may favour different strategies at different stages of negotiations. Although their study on negotiations between teachers and school boards in the US is situated in a completely different issue area, Putnam et al (1990) identify 3 distinct phases in a negotiation session and associated commonly used strategies. Firstly, in the early stages of negotiations,

parties attempt to determine the relevant issue and required action. In the second phase, persuasion is commonly used as parties attempt to convince others of their views, whereas the third phase sees greater problem-solving behaviour and collaboration, which could take the form of compromises, constructive proposals, and concessions trading. Odell (2005) also notes parties' strategies vary according to the stage in WTO negotiations. More aggressive strategies like demands and blocking at the start give way to concessions trading, followed by compromises and constructive proposals in the run-up to the deadline, often in bilateral and small group meetings. Coalitions in the UN Commission on Sustainable Development negotiations, however, did the opposite. The proportion of problem-solving-esque strategies dropped over time, being replaced by "convergent" strategies, as parties began with submissions and proposals, before negotiating more robustly and only being prepared to trade concessions towards the end (Wagner, 1999:119).

Timings longer than individual negotiation sessions may also have an impact on strategy selection. In their study on negotiations within the EU, Elgström and Jönsson (2000) connect timescales and delegation dynamics as linked factors in strategy selection. They write that "The time aspect is essential. 'Permanent' negotiations seem to be a pre-condition for a co-operative mode of behaviour to be established, and for joint codes of conduct to develop" as "members get to know each other and interpersonal relationships are formed…Attitudes of 'belonging together create pressure for members to reach consensus solutions, and this necessitates joint problem-solving" (2000:688). They do note, however, that at least for EU negotiations, such "permanent" negotiations do not entirely remove the preponderance of more aggressive strategies, as their evidence suggests that "conflictual behaviour and bargaining are not totally absent" (2000:689). To sum this up, they quote Iklé's (1964:2) pithy summation that "without common interests there is nothing to negotiate for; without conflict there is nothing to negotiate about".

Wagner (1999) identifies a difference in strategies used between intersessional meetings and official conferences of the UN CSD. Her findings indicate that because of a more relaxed atmosphere, a greater proportion of delegates being experts rather than political figures, and the absence of any need for delegates to forge a consensus there and then (unlike the official conferences), intersessional meetings are marked by greater levels of problem-solving-esque strategies than the official CSD conferences. Given the UNFCCC also uses a COP and intersessional meeting structure similar to the CSD, it might be logical to assume that similar patterns are seen within the climate change negotiations.

In terms of examples from within the UNFCCC itself on the impact of longer-scale timings, Bang et al (2005) argue that the EU changed its strategic approach to one based more around concessions trading in the early 2000s after the Kyoto Protocol had been agreed but had not yet garnered enough ratifications to enter into force. This was to incentivise other parties to ratify rather than abandon the Protocol as the US had done, therefore increasing the pace of progress. This is consistent with Spector and Zartman's (2003) argument that within international organisations, once overarching principles and goals have been established and attention turns towards the organisation's governance, parties' strategies typically switch from more adversarial forms of interaction where they attempt to outmanoeuvre and compete for advantage – i.e. typically more aggressive strategies such as blocking outcomes, making threats, and making demands – to strategies more focused on problem-solving, such as making constructive proposals, compromising, and coalition-building. However, Odell (2010) says this is not a settled argument, as there remains evidence from arenas like the WTO, the UN Security Council, and the EU which shows that the aforementioned patterns of behaviour continue despite these organisations having been established some time ago. Indeed, there is ample evidence of a variety of strategies continuing to be present within the

UNFCCC negotiations long after its initial establishment, or after the agreement of its protocols, as seen in the previous section.

2.5.8 UNFCCC Institutional Dynamics

Finally, the nature of the institutional arena and its dynamics – i.e. the UNFCCC – should be considered a potential influence on parties' choices of strategy. Linking its relevance to negotiators' preferences as an equally important factor, Da Conceição-Heldt (2006) sees the institutional setting as key to determining strategy choices in the context of intra-EU negotiations, and particularly highlights decision-making rules as a crucial variable. As mentioned above, that the UNFCCC requires consensus for decisions to be officially adopted (UNFCCC, 19992)[11] means in theory every party has a viable strategy of blocking outcomes, although each will have to weigh up the impact both within and outside the UNFCCC negotiations of blocking an outcome, such as attracting public criticism. For example, Barnett (2008) writes that because of Saudi Arabia's lack of democratic elections, it has little to fear in terms of a domestic political backlash from engaging in blocking and obstructionism, and was also able to rely on the US for support within the UNFCCC. The credibility of this blocking strategy for a party is therefore a material consideration in its use. Odell (2010) argues that the formation of minority coalitions can be more likely in such institutions requiring consensus or unanimity for decision-making, as use by coalitions rather than individual parties, may boost the credibility of blocking as a strategy. However, Elgström and Jönsson (2000) caution against inferring too strong a connection between decision-making rules and strategic choices, noting that, at least in the context of intra-EU negotiations, any

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[11] See Articles 7.2(k) and 15.3

form of decision-making can involve parties' use of a wide variety of strategies. They specifically state that "None of the decision rules *per se* can be logically linked to creative problem-solving" (2000:691) given the complex relationship between decision-making rules and strategy and the multiple intervening factors between them.

Nevertheless, other features of the UNFCCC could also affect parties' choice of strategy. Da Conceição-Heldt (2006) argues that within intra-EU fishing negotiations, different patterns of negotiation strategies are seen under consensus-based decision-making depending on the number of topics for negotiation. More aggressive strategies are more likely when only a single topic is at issue because of parties' ability to veto; less aggressive strategies, such as coalition-building and concessions trading, are more prevalent when the negotiating topic comprises multiple policy areas, as this allows parties to simplify negotiations by consolidating their power resources behind fewer positions and to negotiate side deals to make progress across topics. Thus, the UNFCCC's highly complex nature, with multiple sub-topics being negotiated concurrently at subsidiary body meetings and COPs, may mean parties are more likely to use these less aggressive strategies.

Castro et al (2011:7) suggest the "constructed peer group hypothesis" as a part-determinant of parties' strategy choices. Within the UNFCCC context, this hypothesis contends that the division of parties into Annex I and non-Annex I categories has meant parties are more likely to exhibit more co-operative behaviour towards parties on the same side of the "firewall", and more likely to use more aggressive strategies towards those on the other side. Their reasoning for this is that parties on the same side of the Annex I/non-Annex I divide, given they have been grouped together by the UNFCCC regime, are likely to meet and converse more often – e.g. the G77 & China meeting as the de facto non-Annex I grouping - leading to a "more trustful atmosphere conducive to more fruitful deliberations" as members feel more closely related (2011:8). Furthermore, the fact that the Annex I/non-

Annex I division centres on differentiating binding responsibilities and privileges among parties gives members on either side of the divide an incentive to make a distinction in their choice of strategies towards members of the same side of the divide and those across the firewall. Co-operation with those on the same side can help to further a common aim, i.e. a reinforced united front from non-Annex I parties against acceptance of binding emissions reductions on them, and an insistence on exactly that from Annex I parties. Castro et al conduct statistical analysis of data consisting of parties' statements in negotiating sessions between 2007 and 2009. When controlling for other variables - such as country size and education levels, government ideology and political freedom levels, and indices of vulnerability to climate change - the regressions they undertake "clearly indicate a role of Annex I versus non-Annex I membership that holds over and above the influence of relevant country characteristics" (2011:19) in favour of their hypothesis, i.e. that the "mere existence of the split between Annex I and non-Annex I seems to have amplified the divide between developing and industrialised countries" (2011:22) However, this finding may be less relevant to this thesis, given the well-publicised High Ambition Coalition (HAC), of which AILAC formed part, which bridged across the firewall at COP21 (European Commission, 2015), thus providing evidence of the bloc's more positive interactions with Annex I parties such as the EU.

Additionally, although to date no comparable study exists for the UNFCCC context, Odell (2005) examines the influence of the chair of WTO negotiations on parties' strategic choices, in particular different forms of mediation designed to promote compromise and consensus among parties. He states that, at least in WTO negotiations, given the complexity of the relevant technical and legal issues, most delegates are not fully informed of exactly what they are negotiating, which creates a space for the chair as an (often experienced) expert authority figure to wield some influence in their decision-making processes. Odell identifies

3 main forms of chair mediation in the WTO as a result: the more passive set of "observation, diagnosis, and communication tactics", such as meeting with delegations to identify impediments to consensus and feed information to delegations to reduce the effect of partisan bias (2005:431); the more interventionist set of "formulation tactics", such as the organisation and establishment of specific negotiating groups involving particular parties, interventions such as jokes to diffuse hostility and tension at appropriate times, and the proposal of ideas and concepts by the chair, often through informal meetings such as dinners or groups with small numbers of targeted individuals; and "manipulation tactics", which he notes in the WTO have mostly consisted of "pushes" to accept an outcome just before its deadline, after most of its constituent parts have already been agreed by consensus (2005:441-442). Odell cites an example of a WTO chair refusing to let delegates leave a meeting room until they had agreed to choose a text for development; another of a chair pressuring specific delegates by threatening to contact their capitals to complain about their inability to reach a consensus should one not be secured; and a chair shaming delegates into action by threatening to withdraw from the mediation rôle. It is possible, then, that UNFCCC secretariat members, or chairs of the various working groups through which negotiations are conducted, may use these means to attempt to influence parties' strategy choices.

Hattori's (1999) study of Japanese participation in the 1997 Kyoto COP also hints at a similar factor in parties' strategy selection, namely the rôle of the conference's host. Japan used its legitimacy as host of COP3 to persuade parties to reach a consensus on the level of emissions reductions to which developed country parties would be committed, and achieved this through the use of informal meetings with key stakeholders and propositions which specifically addressed what the international community would accept. Thus, it may be that parties are influenced by both the architecture of the Convention and the host party in their selection of particular strategies in particular contexts.

Chapter 3: Theory

3.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 presents the theoretical basis of the study, namely a Foucauldian governmentality perspective on interactions between negotiating parties. As governmentality places great emphasis on power relations as an explanation for the nature of governance and the behaviour of social actors (Okereke and Bulkeley, 2009), the study shares the assumption that power is at the very least one among several drivers of the choices parties make with regard to the strategies they use (Betzold, 2010). This chapter builds on the shorter discussion of power as a driver of strategy choice found in Chapter 2, with its first section addressing theoretical problems with rational choice perspectives identified by studies such as Litfin (1994), Betzold (2010), and Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012). It argues that rational choice approaches to power within international relations make unfounded assumptions regarding the nature of parties' self-interest and the nature of power resources which parties possess, meaning that a different theoretical perspective is required. The second section presents governmentality as such a theory, and examines its understanding of power as discursive, productive, and a set of relational processes. The final section of the chapter responds to 4 major criticisms of governmentality: an ignorance of actors' agency in favour of the power of discourses, its discursive view of power relations, its explanatory power, and its ability to transition to supranational scales of investigation. In each case, it is shown why governmentality remains an applicable and suitable theoretical underpinning in order to answer the questions of this thesis: which strategies does AILAC use in UNFCCC negotiations, and why?

3.2 Problems with Rational Choice Theories

Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) argue that orthodox rational choice theories of power are ill-equipped to explain negotiation dynamics. These theories, such as neorealism and neoliberalism (Sterling-Folker, 2010), tend to see negotiations as pre-determined according to the distribution of material power resources among parties, and the choices and constraints actors have (Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012). From their perspective, parties make cost-benefit analyses of negotiating choices and outcomes based on their levels of material power resources (Litfin, 1994) and "a set of self-interested priorities" (Sterling-Folker, 2010:117), and the decisions they actually make are in turn based on these analyses. Under neorealism, parties are assumed to be alike in terms of their interests (sometimes referred to as "black boxes") and to differ only in their relative power capabilities (Mearsheimer, 2010), while under neoliberalism, parties' interests are seen as being determined by their domestic political situations (Wendt, 1999).

Waltz (1979:153), a neorealist, writes that "the political clout of nations correlates closely with their economic power and their military might", while Mearsheimer (2010:78-79), another neorealist, argues that "power is based on the material capabilities that a state controls. The balance of power is mainly a function of the tangible military assets that states possess" and "Latent power [which] is based on a state's wealth and the size of its overall population…and a state's latent power refers to the raw potential it can draw on when competing with rival states." Neoliberals take the same interpretation on the source of power; Keohane and Victor (2011:8) write that "power is a function of both the impact of one's own decisions on others (which depends mainly on size and economic output) and on favourable asymmetries in interdependence leading to better default (no-agreement) positions for the

state", and Russett (2010:101) agrees, equating power with "material capabilities – economic, demographic, and military." Following this conceptualisation of power, this should mean, as Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) state, that parties with greater material power resources control negotiations given their ability to make credible threats or provide incentives because of their power resources, and the lack of constraints on them doing so. In terms of strategy choice, then, this would resemble Bailer's (2012) hypothesis and findings that such parties more often use more aggressive strategies while parties without such resources have no choice but to resort to less aggressive strategies.

However, Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012:347) point out that parties' interests and subsequent negotiating positions "are not often determined at the outset because states are uncertain about the viable options or the positions of other states." Litfin (1994:2) points out that this is even more the case in environmental multilateral negotiations, as "a nation's interests are often unclear under conditions of scientific uncertainty." In the case of climate change, whilst there is overwhelming consensus on the science of its anthropogenic causes (IPCC, 2014), the solutions proposed as necessary to deal with its effects are contested. As a result, parties' interests should not be assumed to be entirely alike, nor solely determined by domestic politics. Viewing them as such understates the level of uncertainty in parties' strategic decision-making as a result of not having perfect knowledge of both the negotiating context (e.g. the issues to be negotiated) and their negotiating partners.

Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) identify two consequences of this criticism. Firstly, the fact that parties' interests are not a given prior to negotiations suggests that they are open to change as the negotiations themselves progress, which could have implications for the analyses parties make with regard to the strategies they use. This in turn suggests that rational choice theories overlook influences contained within the *process* of negotiations as potential variables in strategy choice, in favour of viewing strategic choices as the results of static pre-

determined factors: either the distribution of material power resources or parties' domestic political situations. Secondly, they argue that as a result of the complexity of multilateral negotiations in terms of the number of issues being negotiated by a multitude of parties - especially apt in the case of the UNFCCC – material power resources cannot explain some of the proceedings in these negotiating arenas. This is borne out by the literature, which provides examples that these theories' expectations do not hold, particularly in the case of AOSIS in the UNFCCC. Betzold (2010) and Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) demonstrate that AOSIS chose to use discourses of vulnerability to exert moral pressure on its negotiating partners and to justify its demands for more ambition within UNFCCC outcomes. Given AOSIS member states' lack of material power resources, these should not have been viable options according to rational choice power theories. Instead, AOSIS relied on other power resources to legitimise its strategy choice, such as moral power derived from its members' vulnerability in the face of climate change (Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012). Furthermore, parties with greater levels of material power resources have been observed to use less aggressive strategies, such as the EU offering compromise solutions to negotiating impasses (Oberthür, 2011) and engaging in coalition-building (Belis and Schunz, 2013).

The above criticisms of rational choice theories are not to suggest that parties in negotiations do not weigh up the potential benefits and drawbacks of choosing to use particular strategies before making their decisions. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 2, it is an intuitive assumption that parties analyse the potential for strategies to provide them with satisfactory outcomes before committing to any one course of action. Rather, the criticisms posit that such analyses are not solely based on the pre-existing combination of domestic political influences and actors' relative levels of material power resources versus other parties to the negotiation. Other factors may also be at play, in particular during the process of negotiation itself; for example, Chapter 2 identified a plethora of other influences on strategy

choice from other areas of multilateral negotiation, such as delegation dynamics, institutional dynamics, and timings that could impact on strategy choice while negotiations are taking place. Nevertheless, while orthodox conceptualisations of power resources are unsatisfactory, it is still assumed that power dynamics between parties are a driving force of the process and outcomes of multilateral negotiations (Betzold, 2010), and therefore the strategic choices parties make within them. The majority of research on global environmental politics has investigated power asymmetries between states (Carter, 2015), while studies considered in Chapter 2 such as Betzold (2010), Bailer (2012), Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012), and Weiler (2012) demonstrate that power is an influential driver within the UNFCCC and on its parties' strategy choices in particular.

Clearly, an alternative theoretical perspective to rational choice approaches is required for a fuller understanding of how and why parties use particular negotiation strategies. This perspective needs to retain a centrality of focus on power dynamics whilst being open to the possibility of influences besides material power resources and domestic politics on an actor's choice of strategy within negotiations. Indeed, a multiplicity of influences on strategy choice is arguably likely rather than possible, given the complexity of the UNFCCC negotiations and the multiplicity of negotiating issues and parties involved (Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012; Carter, 2015). As a result of this complexity, it seems likely that factors at play in other negotiation arenas may well also be so within the climate change negotiations. Furthermore, such a theoretical perspective must be able to investigate the negotiation process as well as conceptualise power dynamics as being based on more than simply material power resources.

3.3 Governmentality

A Foucauldian perspective – often referred to as governmentality - is one able to meet these demands. Very little work has applied governmentality to the UNFCCC setting, let alone deployed its insights to make sense of parties' strategy choices and the reasoning behind them within these negotiations. Lövbrand and Stripple (2014:35) point out that the majority of governmentality work on climate change negotiations has focused on the "role of non-state actors in shaping and carrying out climate governance functions (Okereke et al, 2009; Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2012), [and] the growth of standards and codes of conduct in distinct social spheres such as the carbon marketplace and urban life (Lovel and Liverman, 2010; Paterson and Stripple, 2010; Rice, 2010)". Death (2011) does apply governmentality perspectives to the UNFCCC, but his article examines the processes through which the "theatrical dimension" of international diplomatic summits such as the annual UNFCCC COP meetings "plays a key part in inspiring, directing, and governing the conduct of global politics" (2011:3), rather than focusing on particular actors or the process of negotiation itself. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2016) apply governmentality's insights to the UNFCCC negotiation process but rather than examining the strategies used by particular parties, they consider the extent to which, and how, 3 prominent discourses - green governmentality, ecological modernisation, and civic environmentalism - permeate the negotiations as a whole and are influential in determining how climate governance is enacted at COPs 17, 19, and 20.

3.3.1 Governmentality, Process, and Power

To date, no studies have explicitly used governmentality to analyse and explain parties'

choice of strategies and their reasoning for them within the UNFCCC despite the fact that

governmentality possesses the appropriate features to do so. Firstly, governmentality focuses

specifically on "the actual dynamics of governance – the *hows* of governing" (Okereke et al,

2009:71). If the UNFCCC regime is taken to encapsulate the global governance of climate

change, as it is responsible for deciding on and co-ordinating international responses to the

effects of the phenomenon, then one "how of governing" is how its parties come to determine

what those responses should be and how they are operationalised; in other words, the

strategies parties use in negotiating the UNFCCC's outcomes. As such, governmentality's

focus on the processes of governance can be applied to the processes of negotiating, meaning

that it should be capable of identifying influences on strategy choice which are not pre-

determined by either material power resource distribution or domestic politics of parties, and

which affect parties' strategic decision-making during the negotiations themselves.

Governmentality views power expressions as falling into two broad categories.

Firstly, power can be expressed as "sovereignty", instances of domination in which "power

[is] exerted by autonomous agents imposing their sovereign wills" (Litfin, 1994:21)

reminiscent of "a historical form [of power] that is characteristic of our societies: the juridical

monarch" (Foucault, 1978:89). Sovereign power is not an appropriate lens through which to

see the UNFCCC negotiations, as participation in UN institutions prohibits the use of force as

a negotiation strategy, as per Article 2.4 of the UN Charter (United Nations, 1945). Indeed,

Foucault sees sovereign expressions of power as increasingly rare, writing that they "are

utterly incongruous with the new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right

but by technique, not by law but by normalisation, not by punishment but by control"
(1978:89).

The second category of power expressions is what Foucault terms "discipline"
(1977:27). Disciplinary power is to be understood as a relational process – it is, as Foucault
(1978:92) writes, "the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they
operate and which constitute their own organisation", "the process which, through ceaseless
struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them", and "the strategies
in which they take effect". These mutually-constituting relations and processes are covert,
subtle, and not often immediately obvious to analysis. Key to a governmentality
understanding of disciplinary power is a departure from rational choice perspectives by
viewing knowledge and ideas as central to the processes of power dynamics between actors.
Foucault considers knowledge and power to be bound together, and in fact uses the term
"power/knowledge" (Foucault, 1978:98-99), in that the basis of power is accepted forms of
knowledge and understanding. He writes that "relations of power are not in a position of
exteriority with respect to other types of relationships (economic processes, knowledge
relationships)…but are immanent in the latter; they are the immediate effects of the divisions,
inequalities, and disequilibriums which occur in the latter, and conversely they are the
internal conditions of these differentiations" (1978:94). In other words, power relations both
are driven by and drive the relationships which actors have with knowledge, as both the result
of the processes through which actors communicate and interpret knowledge, and the impetus
behind different ways of them doing so.

If power dynamics between actors are inherently bound together with
knowledge, then the nature of knowledge becomes all-important. Governmentality further
differs from rational choice approaches by rejecting a positivist epistemology – i.e. that
information or empirical data can be directly observed and measured, and subsequently

understood and communicated as knowledge and ideas objectively and with no presuppositions. Instead, the processes and language used in analysing and relaying information should not be viewed as value-free or "transparent" (Campbell, 2010:218). Rather, the information which is communicated between actors is a representation of the original information or objective empirical data (Lövbrand and Stripple, 2014), as a result of choices made by communicant actors regarding how to do so. These could include decisions regarding the language used in the transmission of information, the setting in which to express knowledge or ideas, or the format of expression itself. These choices are in turn determined by the social context in which actors finds themselves, as are the ways in which recipient actors interpret the received information (Litfin, 1994). As such, the reproduction of knowledge as a representation of the original knowledge can be said to be constructed from the social context[12]. On an individual level, this social context could be composed of the people with whom individuals have interacted, whom they have influenced and been influenced by, the experiences through which they have lived, the ideas to which they have been exposed, and the subsequent values, identities, beliefs, and ideas to which they subscribe or reject.

In the context of the UNFCCC negotiations, the actors are parties or groups and the strategies they utilise are the processes of communication of ideas and knowledge. These are primarily language-based interactions with other parties, but also involve decisions as to the format of strategic interactions – e.g. within a technical submission or face-to-face negotiations – or the setting in which to negotiate, such as formal vs informal spaces. The social context parties find themselves in and which affects strategic decision-making certainly includes factors identified by rational choice approaches as influential on strategy

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[12] This epistemological perspective is sometimes known as social constructivism – not to be confused with constructivism as a theory of international relations.

choice, i.e. the distribution of material power resources between parties alongside their domestic political situations. It could also include, however, any of the other factors identified in Chapter 2 as being relevant to strategy choice, such as the institutional dynamics of the UNFCCC as a negotiating arena, the particular dynamics of the delegation of the party, the dynamics between members of the negotiating bloc, and so on.

A governmentality approach to power relations holds that there is a multiplicity of actors embedded within a web of power relational processes. Foucault (1978:94) writes that *"power comes from below; that is, there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations, and serving as a general matrix - no such duality extending from the top down and reacting on more and more limited groups to the very depths of the social body"*. Therefore, the entities which exist within the field of social relations, such as states, have only arisen, and are sustained, as a result of the different power relations between different actors in society, according to the prevailing discourses. This has a considerable implication when applying governmentality to the study of international negotiations. It necessarily entails a rejection of the neorealist conception of state parties as "black boxes", i.e. that they are assumed to be alike in terms of interest and differ only in their relative power capabilities (Mearsheimer, 2010:78), as the variety of social variables in the social contexts of actors which make up a state means that no two states are likely to be identical. This in turn dictates that their choices within negotiations are unlikely to be identical either, thus addressing a key concern of Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012).

Governmentality understands power dynamics as discursive (Litfin, 1994), in that they are dependent on, and expressions of, the various processes of communication and interpretation of information and ideas by actors, and the values which they ascribe to them (Campbell, 2010). This naturally leads to investigations of the ways in which parties in

negotiations interact with each other in terms of the information they exchange – in other words, the strategies they choose, and the ways in which they deploy them, as a result of power dynamics or other potentially relevant factors. But this understanding of power dynamics also has implications regarding power resources themselves in negotiations. If power is a function of the knowledge relationships between actors, then material power resources – military and economic capacity, as well as contributions to global GHG emissions in the context of climate negotiations - are "powerful" because of their ideational content as well as their material reality; it is the status and value of being able to effect change in the behaviour of others ascribed to them which means that actors come to view them as being worth having, fearing, or envying, and able to legitimise the use of more aggressive strategies such as threats or demands. To coin a phrase, the power of a resource is in the eye of the beholder.

Therefore, if this is the basis of power stemming from material resources, then the same can be said of ideas and knowledge themselves; their "powerfulness" is a product of their representations and interpretations by communicant and recipient actors, according to their respective social contexts. If such immaterial power resources are perceived as legitimate by negotiating parties, then they can underpin the viable use of strategies reliant upon them; alternatively, parties may attempt to legitimise immaterial power resources with which they are well endowed. This allows governmentality to broaden its conception of power resources available to parties in negotiations, and which may form part of the social context in which parties analyse which strategies to use. This can include moral sources of power such as ideas regarding equity and vulnerability as identified by Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) and Betzold (2010) in the case of AOSIS, scientific knowledge, as identified by Litfin (1994) in multilateral negotiations in the ozone regime, or tactical knowledge on other parties or ways to negotiate skilfully (Betzold, 2010). Doing so allows for an

understanding of why, for example, AOSIS chose to use the strategies it did even on the assumption that it made its strategy decisions off the back of the type of cost-benefit analysis envisioned within rational choice approaches; these strategies were weighed up as viable and worthy of pursuit in light of considerations of self-interest and the distribution of power resources given that these are not limited to material sources alone.

As stated in Chapter 2, investigations regarding knowledge as a power resource in the UNFCCC may be particularly fruitful, as "the framing of information is decisive" in international environmental negotiations (Litfin, 1994:191). Given the complexity of the UNFCCC negotiations (Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012; Carter, 2015), a good understanding of the myriad technical issues at stake, as well as tactical knowledge of other parties' positions and strategic tendencies, may allow parties to use particular strategies that they may otherwise not have been credibly able to use, such as persuasion and rational argument, or may allow parties to tailor the use of strategies through particular tactics within them, such as employing framings of information such that the recipient party is more likely to agree to the behavioural change desired.

3.3.2 Power Relations as Productive Processes

Furthermore, the orthodox conception of power as repressive, in that it simply imposes constraints on the possible range of actions and knowledges of an actor (Campbell, 2010), is challenged by governmentality. Instead, power is to be considered as productive, because knowledge which is communicated involves its repackaging according to the social context of its communicator. Therefore, a new representation of this knowledge is produced as discourse (Litfin, 1994). Similarly, when an actor receives knowledge, it is unpackaged and

interpreted according to the audience's social context, thereby producing in the recipient

actor a new cognitive form of representation of the knowledge. However, the goal of power

expressions such as negotiation strategies, is to effect behavioural change in other actors. If

actors' discursive choices are influenced by their social context, it follows that the

interpretation and subsequent repackaging of novel knowledge can alter the social context of

the recipient actor, which in turn can further produce new representations of knowledge, and

arguably even new forms of actors. This is why Foucault refers to disciplinary power as the

"conduct of conduct" (2000:341; in Okereke et al, 2009:67), in that its expression regulates in

some way the behaviour of others by producing novel social variables which relate to actors.

This could result in shifts in the self-interest of negotiating parties, and in turn, changes in

subsequent strategic choices which could not have been foreseen at the outset of negotiations,

thus reinforcing Deitelhoff and Wallbott's (2012) suggestion that such interests, and the

strategies they lead to as actors assess their options, may be susceptible to change during

negotiations.

3.4 Criticisms of Governmentality

3.4.1 Governmentality's Focus on Discourses Rather than Actors

Foucault (1980) considers power relations to be similar to a web, made of up many connected

networks of actors, practices, ideas, and knowledges. He writes of the "omnipresence of

power", which "must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique

source of sovereignty from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate; it is the

moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender

states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable" (1978:93). According to Foucault (1980), it is not possible to be exterior to this web of power because of its productive nature through its discursive processes. As Litfin writes (1994:21), "Because individuals are themselves the effects of power, becoming so entwined in networks of power that they are both agents and victims of social control, there is no autonomous subjectivity for Foucault." Litfin (1994:23) goes on to argue that because of the centrality of discourse to the expression of power relations, actors should not be seen as "autonomous agents wielding the power of discourse on behalf of transparent interests"; their links to the broader discourses to which they subscribe, and the ways in which they fit into these networks of power, must be taken into consideration when examining their patterns of behaviour, as "discourse itself is a source of power, facilitating the production of identities and interests" (Litfin, 1994:29).

Given this dual status of actors within the power web, it is argued that actors should not be seen as the bases of power in networks of social relations; rather, it is in discourses that power resides (Litfin, 1994). As Litfin (1994:37) writes, "the emphasis on discourse calls into question the traditional focus on agents…what is entailed is the decentring of the subject, engendered by a refocusing of one's methodological lenses on the study of discursive practices rather than agents. Just as power necessarily entails some degree of subjectivity, even if only in contingent form, so too do discursive practices". Following directly from this line of thought poses a problem for scholars of governmentality and for this thesis in particular, as it makes the selection of AILAC as the focus of the study – an actor in the UNFCCC negotiations – problematic. Bieler and Morton (2008) make the valid criticism that under a purely Foucauldian interpretation, attributing to discourses the status of the source of all power expression neglects the "who" questions of power expression in favour of the "how" questions. Rather than considering the actors involved and their particular power

dynamics in the variety of relationships they hold, it becomes all too easy simply to skip over these and point to the underlying discourse as the driver of power expression.

2 points can be made to address this agency-related gap left by Foucault (Hajer, 1995) within governmentality theory. Firstly, as Death (2014) points out, governmentality scholars are right to be wary of discussions of interests, motivations, and descriptions of agency that treat these concepts as given for any one actor, and do not explore their socially constructed nature in relation to the wider discourses in which they are situated. Secondly, Hajer (1995) nevertheless provides a way of marrying governmentality principles together with considerations of the agency of actors within discourses. He refers to the "social-interactive perspective", which sees actors as "active, selecting and adapting thoughts, mutating and creating them, in the continued struggle for argumentative victory against rival thinkers" (Billig, 1989:82; in Hajer, 1995:54). He argues for an "argumentative turn" within governmentality studies, writing that the meaning embedded within a discourse can only be fully understood if one also considers the discursive practices and representations of counter-positions and discourses (1995:53). As such, "the object of research is the practices through which actors seek to persuade others to see reality in the light of the orator or rhetorician", and therefore "environmental politics becomes an argumentative struggle in which actors not only try to make others see the problems according to their views but also seek to position other actors in a specific way" (1995:53).

This "argumentative turn", then, provides a justification for a honing in of research to focus on the variety of discursive processes employed by particular actors in their power relationships with others within a given discursive field – in the case of this thesis, the strategies used by parties and blocs within the UNFCCC negotiations. As Hajer (1995:55) himself writes, "this exposition of the social-interactive discourse theory [presents] ways in which the subject can be studied as actively involved in the production and transformation of

discourse" and it "allocates a central role to the discoursing subjects, although in the context

of the idea of duality of structure: social action originates in human agency of clever, creative

human beings but in a context of social structures of various sorts that both enable and

constrain their agency. The transformational model of social reality then maintains that

society is reproduced in this process of interaction between agents and structures that

constantly adjusts, transforms, resists, or reinvents social arrangements" (1995:58). As a

result, politics is conceived of as a struggle for hegemony of discourse, carried out by actors

which form part of the discursive power networks over which contestations have emerged

(Hajer, 1995). This, then, allows for the governmentality researcher to ask questions of

"who" in the study of power relations.

3.4.2 The Discursive Nature of Power Relations

Bieler and Morton (2008) make a theoretical criticism of epistemologically social

constructivist accounts of power relations when they assume that all such accounts are

derived from the umbrella term of poststructuralism. For them, this appears to entail a

relativist epistemology – i.e. the idea that there is no objective truth or reality, and therefore

that the very essence of an object or feature within the world is not absolute, and only exists

in relation to context, be it historical, cultural, or material. It is from this assumption that they

source the title for their article, referring to Jessop's (1990:295; in Bieler and Morton,

2008:114) claim that "if the only properties which entities have are the product of discourse

then one could discursively turn base metal into gold". However, to claim this is

fundamentally to misunderstand the ideas of Foucault and governmentality. Whilst some

poststructuralist scholars may subscribe to a relativist epistemology, it does not appear in

governmentality scholarship, which instead opts for a social constructivist epistemology. Therefore, poststructuralism and governmentality are not synonymous.

A social constructivism epistemology, unlike a relativist epistemology, does not argue for the non-existence of objective truth, reality, and a universe. On this point, it shares common ground with positivism. As such, a governmentality-based perspective on any entity recognises its objective existence and certain material properties of that existence. Unlike positivism, however, it makes central the contested and varying practices of knowledge production, representation, communication, and interpretation, and argues that social variables direct any one observer's interpretation of an objectively existing entity. The subsequent representation of the entity in communication is akin to a viewing through a filtered lens. Its social properties, therefore, such as the meaning that is attached to it relative to other social actors, are constructed and are malleable, but the same is not true for its objective, material dimensions. For example, a material power source such as a state's military strength may be represented as ineffectual within a negotiating arena in which the use of force is prohibited by international law, yet this does not make the state's military strength impotent in absolute terms; it is purely specific to the social context in which the representations of military strength are produced and interpreted by different actors. As Miller and Rose (2008) set out, a governmentality-based study is one of the ways in which an entity is understood and subsequently represented, and the ways in which it can be acted upon and socially altered. As social constructivist it can, therefore, be seen as the mid-point on the epistemological continuum between positivism and relativism; knowledge, from this perspective, neither mirrors reality, but nor is it arbitrary – instead it is to be seen as inherently social (Litfin, 1994).

3.4.3 The Explanatory Power of Governmentality

The above example on military strength as a power resource illustrates another criticism that has been made of a governmentality perspective on power relations and interactions between actors, i.e. that they are specific to the social contexts which constitute the processes of power and the decisions actors make. As such, the explanatory power of the theory is seen to be limited to the set of circumstances within the case study under investigation, which are unlikely to be replicated exactly in other contexts. For example, the choices regarding strategy use and the particular driving forces behind them for AILAC are likely to differ from those of, say, the AGN, or the LDCs. As Litfin (1994:7) remarks, governmentality studies resist "unidirectional causal explanations", and as a result offer "little in the way of methodological tidiness".

However, to criticise that aspect of governmentality studies is to overlook the important point that reality "is always particular, it is always dependent on subject-specific framing or time-and-place specific discourses that guide our perceptions of what is the case" (Hajer, 1995:17). This has two important implications. Firstly, the fact that revelations of power dynamics are context-specific does not make them any less representative of reality purely because they are context-specific. If the provision of an understanding of power relations that is as representative of reality as possible is the overriding concern of the researcher, then the fact that the underlying principles of said representation do not necessarily abstract neatly into an established explanatory and predictive theory does not make it any less valid for the use of a governmentality approach. In other words, one should not be desperate to make reality fit into preconceived theoretical boxes for the sake of neatness or regularity of a pattern if it does not do so of its own accord.

Secondly, some scholars such as Bieler and Morton (2008) have criticised discourse-based accounts of power relations such as governmentality on the grounds that whilst they may be able to provide an assessment of the processes at play in shaping power dynamics and interactions between actors as a whole, they are unable to make any headway towards an explanation of why the situation in question is as it is,. In other words, as Death (2014:83) writes, such scholars criticise governmentality by arguing that considerations of "how" questions neglect the "causal why". Death (2014:83) himself provides a retort to this point when he writes that "Causal conversations are *not* one of the limits of a governmentality analysis. Analyses of how forms of governance work in practice are an important contribution to showing why world politics looks the way it does." This answer leads back to the first point: governmentality-provided answers are not worthless when it comes to explanatory power purely because they are context-specific; instead, "trying to map and grasp the case-specific constellation of power configurations and governmental technologies provides the researcher with a detailed understanding of the specific dynamics of each regime of practice" (Stephan et al, 2014:61), which in turn allows the researcher to consider why these dynamics have arisen in the first place. In the case of this thesis, an elucidation of how AILAC interacts with other parties within the UNFCCC – the strategies it chooses to use – is a prerequisite for understanding why it behaves in the ways it does.

3.4.4 Applicability of Governmentality to International Scales

A governmentality analysis of these power relations is unique in that it makes central to its analysis the processes through which they operate. These are what Foucault terms the "microphysics of power" (1983; in Litfin, 1994:20). Critics of governmentality argue that its

focus on said "microphysics" necessarily dictates that its ideas do not translate to any spatial scales other than the local; indeed, as Okereke and Bulkeley (2009:35) note, most applications of governmentality "have remained within the bounds of the nation-state", given the attention to detail of particular processes, both linguistic and practice-based. For example, Death (2011:4) acknowledges that to date, "the eco-governmentality literature has tended to focus on the day-to-day, micro-practices of environmental governance". As with the aforementioned criticism of governmentality regarding its perspective on actors and discourses as the wielders of power, this scalar criticism of the perspective poses a problem for this thesis which seeks to understand how and why AILAC, a supranational bloc, interacts with its negotiating partners in the ways it chooses.

This inability for governmentality to apply to different spatial scales, however, is not the case. As Okereke and Bulkeley (2009) point out, there is no a priori reason why the process-based analysis provided by governmentality should be limited to any one spatial scale; it is equally valid to examine the processes of governance – in this case, negotiations towards internationally co-ordinated effects to address the effects of climate change - at a local scale as it is at a national, international, or supranational scale. This is especially valid given the fact that governmentality does not feature an a priori assumption about the distribution of power among and across different spaces and spatial scales (Lövbrand and Stripple, 2014). International climate politics, then, are just as valid an analytical target as any form of political struggle at any spatial scale.

Chapter 4: Methodology

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 outlines the methodology used in the analysis to identify the strategies of AILAC in the UNFCCC, which is Critical Discourse Analysis. CDA is a methodology which comprises 3 forms of analysis: textual analysis, processing analysis, and social analysis (Fairclough, 2010). It naturally complements a Foucauldian governmentality theoretical perspective given its focus on social relations between actors, its recognition that these are discursive in nature, and its understanding of relationship dynamics as processes (Fairclough, 2010). Rydin (2005) and Fairclough (2010) note the utility of CDA for the analysis of strategies in particular, as CDA aims to demonstrate the ways in which the linguistic meanings and forms of texts realise particular discourses, narratives, and arguments, through the use or omission of particular means of rhetoric and features of language or other communicative modes such as symbols or images. As Fairclough (2010:19) writes, an analysis of the linguistic manifestations of strategies can "bring such a specifically semiotic focus to analysis of the proliferation of strategies, strategic struggle, the dominance of certain strategies, and their implementation in social transformations".

However, CDA has not been used a great deal to study political discursive interactions outside of Linguistics (Van Dijk, 2008), and there remains a general ignorance of each other's theories and concepts on the parts of Linguistics and other disciplines of social science (Van Dijk, 2008). Climate change negotiations as a topic follows this pattern; to date, only Audet (2013) and Backstrand and Lövbrand (2006, 2016) have employed discourse analysis to identify prevalent discourses within the negotiations, while Weisser (2014) has

studied the performativity and practices of documents within the UNFCCC, and Paterson and Stripple (2007) have examined discourses of territoriality within climate change policymaking more broadly. This thesis therefore breaks new ground in applying CDA to identify the strategies used by a single actor, AILAC, within the UNFCCC, and its reasons for selecting them. It makes a further novel contribution to scholarship by drawing on research techniques from Linguistics and integrating Corpus-Linguistic Analysis as a form of triangulation within the CDA methodological framework. Following this short introduction, the first section of Chapter 4 demonstrates the applicability of the CDA framework to a governmentality perspective of social interactions by providing an overview of its rationale. The following 3 sections present the framework's tripartite analytical techniques and the data sources used to answer the research questions. The penultimate section responds to criticisms of CDA regarding questions of its explanatory power, the rôle of interpretation, and positionality, before the last section introduces CLA as a triangulation component within the overarching CDA methodology, outlining its benefits and limitations alongside how it was utilised in this thesis.

4.2 Critical Discourse Analysis as an Overarching Framework

According to Fairclough (2010), arguably the leading figure in the development of Critical Discourse Analysis, 3 main properties pertain to CDA. Firstly, it is relational, i.e. it is concerned with social relations between different actors: a discursive approach elucidates different actors' perspectives, shows how their discursive power is contingent on a broader context and social resources, and how actors can use language to further their own interests (Rydin, 2005). Secondly, it is transdisciplinary, in that CDA may draw on a variety of

theoretical underpinnings and may utilise a broad array of techniques for the collection and analysis of data (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). Thirdly, it is dialectical: it examines "relations between objects which are different from one another but not what I shall call 'discrete', not fully separate in the sense that one excludes the other" (Fairclough, 2010:4). He gives the pertinent example of power and discourse as being different but not discrete, overlapping with each other, and references Harvey (1996) when he says that "discourse can be 'internalised' in power and vice versa; the complex realities of power relations are 'condensed' and simplified in discourses" (2010:4). The dialectical relationship between power and discourse is a central concept of CDA, and it focuses in particular on the "discursive aspects of power relations and inequalities" (Fairclough, 2010:8), and the ways in which discourse can (re)produce social domination of one group over others (Van Dijk, 2008) as well as whether and how power relations have or have not changed over time (Van Dijk, 2008). A key goal of CDA is the "demystification" (Wodak and Meyer, 2009:3) of the discursive aspects and effects of power relationships, which may appear at face value to be opaque and not immediately obvious either to participants or to outside observers (Carvalho, 2008; Wodak and Meyer, 2009; Fairclough, 2010).

The use of a CDA methodology is a natural fit for studies grounded in governmentality theory, as CDA often takes a Foucauldian explanation of the nature of power relations (Wodak and Meyer, 2009), and sees the use of language as inherently linked to Foucault's concept of disciplinary power, given that language "has the capacity to make politics, to create signs and symbols that shift power balances" (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005:179) and that the discursive enactment of power is inherently language-based (Van Dijk, 2008). Specifically relevant to the purposes of this thesis, a discursive perspective "problematises what conventional policy analysts take for granted: the linguistic, identity and knowledge base of policy making" and "allows one to ask if environmental policy is about

nature and the environment at all, or rather about a redistribution and reconfiguration of power in the name of the 'environment'" (Feindt and Oels, 2005:163). As such, it therefore necessitates a social constructivist epistemology, although Fairclough (2010:4) terms this "critical realism", stating that it is "a recognition that the natural and social worlds differ in that the latter but not the former depends upon human action for its existence and is 'socially constructed'."

CDA entails the investigation of semiotic - i.e. that which contains meaning – data (Wodak and Meyer, 2009), in which discourses are embedded, such as written, spoken, or visual forms of communication (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005; Van Dijk, 2008). In practice, this can include written texts, visual images, symbols, body language, music, and sound effects, to name but a few forms of media (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005; Van Dijk, 2008; Van Leeuwen, 2008; Fairclough, 2010), and analysis of such media is generally known as textual analysis (Fairclough, 2010). However, CDA views the relationship between discourse and such texts as dialectical, viewing such use of language as both representation of social variables and practices as well as social practice itself (Wodak and Meyer, 2009), in that the semiosis of texts is performative in and of itself because it impacts on social relations and social practices (Fairclough, 2010).

Therefore, critical discourse analysis is more than just analysis of textual data, as discourse itself entails more than just the rôle of language in influencing social relations; it also includes practices (Carvalho, 2008). For example, a CDA approach would also consider relevant the format of the communication of semiotic data, such as the spaces in and the processes by which they are communicated. CDA attempts both to "understand the links between texts and social relations, distribution of power, and dominant values and ideas" (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005:1460-1461), and to explain "why and under what circumstances and consequences the producers of the text have made specific linguistic choices among

several other options that a given language may provide" (Baker et al, 2008:281). As a result, CDA encompasses a tri-partite framework as seen below in Figure 3, also requiring analysis both of what Fairclough (2010:132) terms "discoursal practice", i.e. processes of text production and text interpretation, as well as "sociocultural practice" in the wider context of social relations surrounding the text. Therefore, according to Fairclough (2010:132), "the method of discourse analysis includes linguistic *description* of the language text, *interpretation* of the relationship between the (productive and interpretative) discursive processes and the text, and *explanation* of the relationship between the discursive processes and the social processes."

Figure 3: Fairclough's (2010:133) Tripartite Framework for CDA

4.3 Textual Analysis

4.3.1 Interdiscursive Analysis

Textual analysis, the primary dimension of CDA as demonstrated in Figure 3 above, allows the researcher to reconstruct discourses from the "texts" - semiotic data such as written texts, visual images, symbols, body language, music, and sound effects and so on - in which they are embedded (Van Leeuwen, 2008). Fairclough (2010) argues that textual analysis has two primary functions: *interdiscursive analysis*, and *linguistic* (or *multimodal*, depending on the nature of the text) *analysis*. He writes that interdiscursive analysis considers the discourses, genres, and styles featured within the text, under the assumption that most texts are usually composed of multiple discourses, genres, and styles. Fairclough (2010:7) calls interdiscursive analysis "a mediating 'interlevel'", as analysis of such discourses, genres, and styles is "analysis of orders of discourse, which are the discoursal element or moment of social practices, social organisations, and social institutions." In other words, these discourses, genres, and styles are the crux of the dialectical relationship between text and social practice: they are the embodiment of social practice in textual form (Wodak and Meyer, 2009).

Fairclough (2010:232) describes genres as "semiotic ways of acting and interacting", such as news articles or policy documents, which have particular impacts on social relations. Discourses are taken to be "semiotic ways of construing aspects of the world (physical, social, or mental) which can generally be identified with different positions or perspectives of different groups of social actors", while styles are "identities, or 'ways of being', in their semiotic aspect" (2010:232). Discourses, then, are essentially the ideational and knowledge content of texts, which may frame topics in particular ways, including or omitting information according

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to particular social relations such as power inequalities in order to evaluate, ascribe purpose to, or justify particular representations (Van Leeuwen, 2008). Styles relate to a particular identity-based way of communicating: Fairclough (2010) gives the example of the identity of a "manager" within a business entailing a particular way of communicating with others which is reflected in the language used or not used. Within the UNFCCC, we might think of the examples of parties constructing texts in such a way as to assume leadership responsibilities e.g. the EU (Bang et al, 2005; Oberthür, 2011), or perhaps AILAC adopting a style conducive to its bridge-building rôle (Blexekjaer and Nielsen, 2014; Edwards et al, 2017) between Annex I and non-Annex I parties.

4.3.2 Linguistic/Multimodal Analysis

The second form of textual analysis is linguistic or multimodal analysis. This analysis of specific linguistic features of texts reveals "actional, representational and identifying meanings" and "their realisation in the linguistic forms of the text" (Fairclough, 2010:75). Furthermore, linguistic analysis reveals "how these meanings and forms realise the interdiscursive 'mix' of genres, discourses, and styles" (Fairclough, 2010:75), as "it is the grammar that does the work: this is where knowledge is constructed" (Halliday, 2004:212). To this end, there is a wide variety of linguistic features which can be considered, yet CDA researchers vary in their focus and extent of linguistic analysis (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). Some of the more common features to be studied, although this is by no means an exhaustive list, include choice of vocabulary (Wodak and Meyer, 2009) or images[13] (Blair, 1996);

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[13] Van Leeuwen (2008) also notes the potential significance of the *positioning* of images within texts.

implicatures, i.e. communication in such a way that the meaning conveyed is more than or different to what is actually "said" (Alba-Juez, 2009); and the ascription of (non-)agency to actors (Van Dijk, 2006) to obscure responsibility of actors or to reify abstract ideas as "objective things" (Billig, 2008:786) via nominalisations – "choosing noun phrases over verbs" e.g. the headline "Attack on protestors" rather than "Police attack protestors" (Billig, 2008:785) - or passivisations – "the passive voice over the active voice" (Billig, 2008:785). Van Dijk (2008) further suggests analysis of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation e.g. through the use of hyperboles and euphemisms; consensus-building - attempts to show that suggestions or policies are in the interests of everyone; and "the numbers game" - the use of figures, statistics, and references to external knowledge authorities in order to boost credibility and give a sense of objectivity of information.

4.3.3 Data Sources for Textual Analysis – AILAC Submissions

The texts for textual analysis in this thesis originated from two sources. Firstly, 62 English- and Spanish-language AILAC official submissions to the UNFCCC from between January 2013 – immediately after AILAC's formation in December 2012 during COP18 (Edwards et al, 2017) - and December 2018 (inclusive) were identified and collected from both the AILAC website[14] and the official UNFCCC Submissions Portal[15]. The submissions were then ordered chronologically and assigned a number[16] within a coding scheme in which features of textual analysis were identified and categorised – the researcher has a near-fluent level of Spanish, allowing for textual analysis of both English- and Spanish-language texts. However,

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[14] http://www.ailac.org/en/remisiones-documentales
[15] http://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissionsstaging/Pages/Home.aspx
[16] See Appendix I

this may not be an exhaustive list of AILAC submissions: AILAC's opening plenary statement to COP24 in December 2018 (AILAC, 2018j) refers to a submission from the special session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice, (SBSTA), the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), and the Ad Hoc Work Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) in Bangkok in September 2018, on the relationship between COP24 and the Talanoa Dialogue. Despite repeated searches of the Submissions Portal, this was not located. Additionally, Table 2 in Watts & Depledge's (2018) article states AILAC made a total of 46 oral statements during COP plenaries between 2013 and 2015, based on evidence in daily summaries from a series of Environmental News Bulletins (ENBs), which mention AILAC contributions in the negotiations in passing without actually documenting what was said. Therefore, it can be assumed these were reactive statements during the flow of negotiations, rather than pre-prepared official statements such as those collected for this research. There is therefore no obvious reason to believe there are any other *available* submissions missing from those considered by this thesis; indeed, inclusion of every available submission text is important in order to avoid the problem faced by some CDA research of particular texts being chosen for analysis to "prove a point" (Baker et al, 2008:283) with the result of skewing findings in an unrepresentative manner. There is considerable precedent for using UNFCCC submissions in studies of international climate change negotiations (e.g. Betzold, 2010; Betzold et al, 2012; Audet, 2013; Blaxekjaer and Nielsen, 2014; Weisser, 2014; and Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2016). Weisser (2014:51) argues that the UNFCCC documents play a performative rôle by "constitut[ing] the organisation's [the UNFCCC's] conditions of possibility" in that they dictate and govern the actions taken against climate change around the world, as well as representing particular views of climate change and its politics, and the discursive struggles that took place in order for their creation.

4.3.4 Data Sources for Textual Analysis - Interviews

Secondly, textual analysis was conducted on the responses of 35 AILAC national delegates and support unit advisors in interviews. Interview data formed an important supplement to data from AILAC submission documents, as much of the UNFCCC negotiations takes place verbally and its content is not recorded in documentary form. As such, responses from delegates participating in behind-closed-doors meetings are the only source of information on potential AILAC strategy use in these settings, and can be subjected to the same processes of textual analysis – identifying interdiscursive and linguistic features - as submission documents when transcribed to form texts.

In order to arrange interviews, the researcher attended COP23 at Bonn in November 2017 and made contacts with AILAC delegates, although time pressure meant that no interviews could be conducted there and then. Business cards were exchanged to secure e-mail addresses for arranging future interviews, and delegates were asked to assist with approaching other delegates for participation where possible. Additionally, the researcher consulted UNFCCC documentation regarding participant lists from national delegations[17] in order to determine which delegates had been present at negotiations and which might be able to offer some insight into the research questions based on their rôles within government ministries. The researcher was then able to search for e-mail addresses on government departmental websites and to get in contact through these. Each invitation for an interview contained a summary of the background of the researcher in order to foster open and honest communication between interviewer and interviewee, and the invitation explained that any data collected would be used for research purposes only, in order also to put the interviewee

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[17] E.g. For COP23: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/cop23/eng/PLOP.pdf

at ease and to allow them to speak candidly should they accept. For the same reason,
delegates were informed that their responses would be subject to anonymity, as well as to
avoid any negative ramifications in their future work which might be created were they to be
identifiable.

49 invitations for interviews were sent to AILAC delegates and support unit
members, of which 35 were accepted; those which were not accepted either did not reply to
the interview request, initially accepted but later were too busy, or suggested that they did not
feel they would be able to provide useful data for the thesis. Every delegate who responded
positively to an invitation was interviewed in order to provide as representative data as
possible regarding AILAC's strategic choices in the negotiations. Interviews were conducted
either at a location of the individual delegate's choosing (whilst adhering to ethical safety
concerns regarding location e.g. by meeting in public places), or over Skype where face-to-
face meeting was not possible, in order to put the interviewee at ease as much as possible and
encourage open dialogue. Interviews took place between July and November 2018, and were
semi-structured in nature so as to keep to the topic at hand but not to lead the interviewees
down any particular path in their answers, thereby prejudicing the results of the analysis by
imparting the researcher's presuppositions on the research.

The interviews focused on the ways in which AILAC engaged with its negotiating
partners within the face-to-face negotiations at the UNFCCC's annual COPs and subsidiary
body meetings.[18] Interviews lasted between 30 and 90 minutes depending on the time
constraints on the interviewee. Interviewees spoke in either English or Spanish depending on
their preference in order to allow them to answer as fully as possible; as the researcher has a
near-fluent level of Spanish, they were able to look up and translate any particular words or

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[18] See Appendix II for interview questionnaire

expressions which were sources of confusion on the day. All interviewees were again reminded on the day of the provision of anonymity for their responses for the same reason, and to avoid any negative ramifications directly linked to them as a result of this thesis. One interview with 2 EIG delegates was also conducted, with the original aim of gaining the perspective of AILAC's negotiating partners on its strategy choice. However, it proved difficult to obtain enough interviews from a wide enough array of other additional coalitions to gather a representative sample size as a result of a lack of replies to interview invitations, and so the views of these interviewees on AILAC were not included in the analysis.

Following Alba-Juez's (2009) recommendations, interview recordings were transcribed and included variables such as the time and location of each interview, as well as interruptions, pauses, hesitations, and any laughter which occurred in order to provide as full a descriptive account as possible for textual analysis. These could be potentially significant; for example, a hesitation in a response may qualify the answer given, or a pause after a question could hint at an interviewee choosing to think through and be very selective with their subsequent response. The transcriptions were subsequently coded as well to allow for identification of features of textual analysis in the same manner as had been carried out on AILAC submission documents. All interview data were stored on a secure external hard drive kept with the researcher at all times.

4.4 Processing Analysis

Fairclough (2010) sees processing analysis as the intermediate level of CDA. The function of this level of analysis is to interpret the findings from textual analysis, as "the production process shapes (and leaves 'traces' in) the text, and the interpretative process operates upon

'cues' in the text" (2010:94). The aim, then, is to build a picture of the discursive strategies embedded within the texts which can be identified from these traces and cues. In the context of this thesis, the question therefore becomes: which, if any, of these strategies are evidenced by the genres, discourses, styles, or linguistic features identified in AILAC's submissions to the UNFCCC or the responses of the AILAC interviewees?

Behind the texts are the actors responsible for the processes of text production. Producers of texts have control over discourse (Van Dijk, 2008) and aim to use semiotic forms of communication in order to position themselves in a particular way relative to other actors (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005). Furthermore, "producers endeavour through the rhetoric of their verbal and visual communications to position readers and viewers so that they interpret texts in the way intended" (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005:1459). This can be achieved by the management of the release and withholding of information: producers of texts are able to dispense information favourable to their positions and interests, and constrain the dissemination of information which is not (Van Dijk, 2008). As such, the members of the AILAC delegation acted as "discursive strategists", as they made decisions regarding the discursive and strategic content of both the submission documents and the bloc's face-to-face interactions with other UNFCCC parties at COPs and subsidiary body meetings. Interview data therefore again played an important rôle in this processing analysis level. Alongside questions regarding the specificities of AILAC's interactions with other parties, interviewing these delegates allowed for questions regarding the strategic goals behind their interactions both through the AILAC submission texts and within the face-to-face negotiations. Furthermore, one interviewee provided the researcher with an internal AILAC document constituting the group's rulebook (AILAC, date unknown) and a PowerPoint presentation delivered to delegates (AILAC, 2018o), which provided an insight into the group's identity, objectives within the UNFCCC, and the processes of text production within the bloc.

Fairclough (2010:59) writes that "the constitutive work of discourse necessarily takes place within the constraints of the complex of economic, political, and discoursal/ideological structures" and that "processes of text production and interpretation are shaped by (and help shape) the nature of the social practice" (2010:94). Therefore, the relationship between discourse and the wider context in which social relations are expressed - or, as Fairclough (2010:77) puts it, "the relationship between semiotic and non-semiotic elements of social events" - is dialectical: they are separate yet also mutually constitutive, and shape each other (Van Dijk, 2006).

CDA's third level of social analysis seeks to explain why social interactions take the forms they do. This means that CDA needs to look beyond the contents of texts and their linguistic features in order to construct a fuller picture of discursive interactions, to marry the understanding of discursive strategies from textual analysis and processing analysis with an equivalent contextual "understanding of actors' interests and resources and the social networks within which they are positioned" (Rydin, 2005:77). Fairclough (2010:95) identifies this social context in which actors are positioned as constituted by 3 levels of social organisation: "the context of situation, the institutional context, and the wider societal context". In the case of this thesis, social analysis seeks to explain why AILAC chose particular strategies and the particular ways in which they used them. As discussed in Chapter 2, it may be as a result of factors relating to the delegation itself which utilised them, such as characteristics of the delegates responsible for the processes of text production or intra-bloc dynamics, or there may have been influences from the wider social context. For example, the distribution of material and immaterial power resources among parties, the nature of the

UNFCCC as a negotiating arena and its rules on decision-making, or the vulnerability of AILAC member states to the effects of climate change may have helped to shape AILAC's strategic choices and the deployment of their strategic interactions. Interviews with AILAC delegates, as the authors of the group's texts and those responsible for the bloc's strategic decision-making, allowed questions to be asked specifically on the reasoning behind AILAC's strategy choices in order to determine which factors influenced it and how they did so. This was supplemented by research into the situational context of AILAC member states with regards to the effects of climate change, as discussed in Chapter 1, and the nature of the UNFCCC as an institution. Whilst at COP23, the researcher was able to attend a wide variety of side events and plenary sessions hosted by a variety of parties, civil society stakeholders, and the Fijian COP presidency, which revealed the sheer scale of the complexity of the negotiations, in terms of both the number of participants and the number of issues to be negotiated. They were also able to see first-hand the prevalence of use of informal spaces by negotiators, e.g. corridor conversations and discussions taking place over lunch in the canteen each day, and to gain an appreciation of the UNFCCC institutional architecture and its wide array of rôles in the negotiations.

4.6 Criticisms of CDA: Explanatory Power, Interpretation, and Positionality

4.6.1 Explanatory Power

The brunt of the criticism towards CDA centres on the issue of bias and subjectivity. Fairclough (2010) reminds us that the CDA researcher produces his/her own discourse purely by carrying out his/her research; therefore, what is the researcher's justification for claiming

that the results and insights gained from the research project are more representative and logical than another interpretation which places different levels of emphasis on different factors accounting for the social relations under investigation? Fairclough (2010) argues that the explanatory power of the results gleaned from the research is the chief criterion for an assessment of its validity. He argues that "The explanatory power of a discourse (or a theory, which is a special sort of discourse) is its ability to provide justified explanations of as many features of the area of social life as possible. So we can say that it is a matter of both quantity (the number or range of features) and quality (justification)" (2010:8-9). Jäger and Maier (2009:51) support Fairclough's view of research validity; they argue that CDA should continue until the arguments seen therein start to repeat themselves, at which point "completeness (in the sense of theoretical saturation) has been achieved", as a result of the research having captured the range of discursive features in the texts and contexts of the study. Therefore, CDA's main "validity tests" are logic and credibility of argumentation (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005:1461); in the case of this thesis, following Fairclough's (2010) reasoning, its explanatory power will be determined by how many strategies the research can identify and explain the use thereof, and how well it can do so.

A focus on explanation as the intended endpoint of CDA research allows it to demonstrate the dialectical relationship between the "micro" level of individual discursive linguistic formations (akin to Foucault's "microphysics" of power) and the "macro" level of social relations (such as a broader web of power under a Foucauldian interpretation) and to "see the latter as both the conditions for and the products of the former, and which therefore reject[s] rigid barriers between the study of the 'micro' (of which the study of discourse is a part) and the study of the 'macro'" (Fairclough, 2010:31). This emphasis within CDA on the dialectical nature of discourse at different scales, and its insistence on seeing the interlinkages between text, discourse practice, and context, allows CDA to rebuff one of Widdowson's

(2004) strongest criticisms, in which he accuses CDA of opening the door wide to the consequences of selectivity bias in its interpretation and explanation phases by analysing fragments of texts in isolation from the rest. Van Dijk (2006:129) recognises this issue but again returns to the dialectics of CDA to address this problem, therefore writing that "data should never be described in isolation, but in relation to the text (co-text) as a whole and in relation to the context – who is speaking to whom, when, and with what intention."

4.6.2 Interpretation

Nevertheless, CDA has come in for criticism because of the centrality of interpretation to its analysis as the intermediary level of the framework. Widdowson (2004:103) criticises CDA because of the "explicit socio-political pretext" which "motivates the selection of features for special attention", and therefore, in his view, leads to nothing more than the demystification of "workings and effects of texts on readers who are pretextually positioned to derive discourses from them which suit their purpose. In short, what we find in CDA are critical discourse *interpretations*." Van Dijk (2011:612) responds to this criticism by arguing that CDA "is more descriptive and explanatory than normative. It does not tell readers how they *should* understand a text, but rather studies how different types of readers actually do so in different contexts". Thus a distinction is drawn between critical study and prescriptive study: CDA aims to expose and critique the "reality" (in as much as is ever possible) of discursive social relations embedded within texts, rather than to insist that its interpretation is how readers must understand them.

Even with this useful explanation, however, Mackay (2017) argues that to acknowledge one's interpretative bias should not be seen inherently as a drawback to CDA

research; indeed, these principles are held specifically because they are considered to be "right", and worthy of intellectual defence. She writes that interpretation, as a feature of CDA based on these principles, should be acknowledged rather than avoided:

"*My argument is that [CDA] would be strengthened if the attention paid to identifying the influences which have shaped the texts we study was – to a greater extent than is presently the case – paid to ourselves and the influences which shape our interpretation of the texts – or our 'reading' of our results (which amounts to the same thing)…One can present one's socio-political agenda…and then rigorously, systematically, and explicitly apply the method that you have made democratically available for all to employ…we, as politically committed social scientists, must invite those who disagree to use the same method to argue their case*." (2017:10, 12)

4.6.3 Positionality

Acknowledging the significance of interpretation within CDA entails a recognition that "*we* [researchers] are one of the 'filters' through which the questions pass and the 'results' come, and each of us is uniquely situated – indeed, embodied – in culture, in time, in place, in history, as well as in our ever-evolving personal narratives" (Mackay, 2017:9-10). As such, CDA researchers must remain mindful of how their positionalities have an impact on the work produced (Wodak and Meyer, 2009), as this could lead the research towards the researcher's preconceptions even if they are not valid. Given the impossibility of completely "objective" research in discourse analysis (Wodak and Meyer, 2009), CDA should therefore adhere to an ethical code in order to be considered as a valid methodology, namely being as open and transparent about the values and position of the researcher as possible, as well as

the objective of the work, as Mackay (2017) suggests. She writes that "to equip the student in the most democratic way possible, it would surely be better to declare one's interest as an analyst and, to the extent both possible and deemed necessary, furnish our students, our readers, our audience, with some information about *us*" (2017:11).

What is then revealed, however, should be a question of what is deemed relevant to the reader, though bearing in mind that what a researcher and a reader deem relevant may not be the same things; but also the researcher must consider that it can be advantageous to withhold certain information, on, for example, grounds of safety (Mackay, 2017). It is also important, though, to "draw the attention of our readers to this omission, and to the implications of our decision to leave certain aspects opaque, as opposed to transparent" (Mackay, 2017:11). This should not be taken, however, as an admission that a critical take on discourse analysis weakens the legitimacy and validity of the research outputs or implies that CDA involves less scientifically rigorous methodology (Van Dijk, 2008).

As such, it is important the positionality of this research is established before any discussion of its findings. This doctoral thesis is by a British-Irish researcher based within a UK university. They have an academic background in Geography (both Human and Physical), and are therefore well-versed in the science and policy-making of climate change. They have previously conducted CDA research on the media coverage of climate change in the Peruvian print media, and as such, have a strong interest in, and fondness for, South America. It is therefore possible that this research may contain biases in favour of the conduct of AILAC as a negotiating bloc given its reputation as a bridge-building group with a genuine desire to advance ambitious solutions to climate change (Blaxekjaer and Nielsen, 2014; Edwards et al, 2017; Watts and Depledge, 2018), which may have an impact on the interpretation of AILAC's strategic choices.

While the interpretative nature of CDA research is worthy of defence according to Mackay's (2017) arguments above, its centrality of interpretation is still vulnerable to human error. For example, it may be the case that findings are skewed as a result of the researcher misreading or misunderstanding the meaning of texts through fatigue or even boredom (Baker and Egbert, 2016). Alternatively, unconscious or inadvertent selectivity of samples may lead to overstating discursive significance and intentionality when there is none (Van Dijk, 2006). CDA has been accused of "reduc[ing] to a rather random enterprise" (Widdowson (2004:97) without coherent descriptive techniques grounded in linguistic theory. From Widdowson's (2004:110) perspective, if textual analysis is to be conducted credibly, it cannot be conducted selectively and instead must be "as systematic and comprehensive as possible."

One way of addressing this criticism is to employ triangulation. This is defined as "cross-referencing between independent entities…within a single data set or comparatively, performed by one analyst or by a number, using one method or a number of methods" (Mackay, 2017:5-6), in order to hold in check the researcher's "propensity to allow their subjective view to skew their analysis" (Mackay, 2017:5). Triangulation is often employed with CDA research (Mackay, 2017), as CDA is a methodology as opposed to a method – it neither limits itself to any one specific method nor has methods associated exclusively with it (Baker et al, 2008; Wodak and Meyer, 2009). As such, CDA is open to the use of other methods of analysis providing they can contribute to its overall aim (Fairclough, 2010). Triangulation within qualitative research enables scholars to address limitations relating to their own biases, or those resulting from the use of only a single method (Baker and Levon, 2015; Mautner, 2009) in order to validate their data (Baker and Egbert, 2016). In the case of

this thesis, the use of interviews triangulates CDA's textual analysis by allowing the researcher to question the actors responsible for the formation and enactment of AILAC's negotiation strategies, thereby providing a check on any misrepresentations of discursive features of the bloc's submission texts and the subsequent misinterpretations that would follow as a result.

4.7.1 Corpus-Linguistic Analysis

Triangulation can also take the form of the integration of quantitative methods with predominantly qualitative methodology such as CDA (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). In particular, the quantitative methods of Corpus-Linguistic Analysis can be used alongside qualitative methods in CDA in order to boost the validity of results by demonstrating similar or converging results from, in the case of CLA, a more deductive methodology (Wodak and Meyer, 2009; Mackay, 2017). Indeed, Widdowson (2004) himself suggests the use of CLA in order to mitigate his criticism of CDA as running the risk of employing unsystematic and seemingly random analysis with consequences of unrepresentative findings. However, Baker et al argue that, despite the fact that the "theoretical and methodological cross-pollination" of CDA and CLA benefits both methodologies (2008:297), the number of studies employing a combination of CDA and CLA methods in proportion to the number of studies using either CDA or CLA on their own is "extremely small", and the majority of those which do use the two together have generally overlooked the use of quantitative analysis within their research outputs (2008:274-275). In utilising both CDA and CLA and employing some quantitative analysis in the process, this thesis adds to this small body of literature.

CLA inputs large corpora – bodies of naturally occurring, electronically stored and coded text, as well as metadata (information relating to the texts themselves, their authors, the contexts of their production etc) – into computer software in order to produce measures of statistical significance for particular linguistic features within a group of texts (Baker et al, 2008; Mautner, 2009; Baker and Levon, 2015; Berglund and Wynne, 2015). Such features might include *keyness* – "the statistically significant higher frequency of particular words or clusters [or lemmas (word stems), word families, or functionally-related words] in the corpus under analysis in comparison with another corpus" in order to give a sense of the "aboutness" of texts and reveal salient uses of language (Baker et al, 2008:278; McEnery, 2016:20); *collocations* – "the above-chance frequent co-occurrence of two words within a pre-determined span, usually five words on either side of the word under investigation (the *node*)" (Baker et al, 2008:278); and *concordances* – "instances of a word or cluster in its immediate co-text" (Baker et al, 2008:279). The strength of CLA, therefore, is its ability to identify "repetitive lexical combinations that indicated more subtle ideological representations and would perhaps otherwise have been missed, even if researchers had access to the full dataset", and to provide measures of both relative and absolute frequency of articulation of these constructions (Baker and Levon, 2015:230; Mautner, 2009; Berglund and Wynne, 2015). As Wodak and Meyer (2009:30) conclude, CLA "adds a quantitative methodology to CDA. Therefore, CLA applies a rather deductive methodology in selecting specific words which are relevant for analysis" while also allowing further qualitative interpretation of these features.

CLA as a triangulating method for the CDA methodology also allows the latter to mitigate some of its other aforementioned criticisms. While Van Dijk (2006) defends CDA from accusations of selectivity bias in its textual analysis (Widdowson, 2004) by arguing that textual analysis never describes fragments of texts in isolation and instead does

so in relation to their co-text, there is still the possibility of human error. CLA, however, both explicitly examines co-textual relations through its analysis of concordances and analyses texts in their entirety, as well as providing a greater likelihood of reliability of results given the large size of its corpora datasets (Widdowson, 2004; Mautner, 2009; Baker and Levon, 2015). CLA can therefore help to "act as a corrective" (Widdowson, 2004:124) to any instances, however unintentional, of misrepresentative selection and interpretation, or "cherry picking" on the part of the researcher (Baker and Levon, 2015:222) by removing "human cognitive, social, or political biases which may skew analysis in certain directions or even lead to faulty conclusions" (Baker and Egbert, 2016:3). This is not to say that there is no interpretation or subjectivity involved in CLA: the researcher must decide which texts to include in a corpus, which linguistic features will be analysed, and which "cut-off" points of statistical significance to use, even before they then interpret and explain the results provided by the software (Baker et al, 2008). Therefore, CLA should not be seen as entirely subjectivity-free, but instead a way of triangulating some of the more criticised features of CDA. If anything, this subjectivity is to be embraced: CLA can "find examples of a phenomenon one has already noted", "reinforce, refute, or revise a researcher's intuition and show them why and how much their suspicions were grounded", or even "reveal patterns of use previously unthought of" (Partington, 2003:12).

However, CLA also has its limitations without the overarching CDA methodology to complement it. CLA analyses the linguistic features which actually do explicitly make up texts, rather than "what *could have been* written but was not, or what is implied, inferred, insinuated or latently hinted at" (Baker et al, 2008:296). As such, qualitative analysis from CDA is needed to recognise what has been omitted that CLA techniques have missed (Baker and Levon, 2015), such as features relating to format, layout, and visuals, given the need for "plain text" files with many software packages (Mautner, 2009). Furthermore, a key

determining factor of the usefulness of CLA in relation to broader CDA analysis is the capability of the software used, as particular features of language use and "semantic subtleties" cannot be identified "if you cannot program your computer to identify them, and so you end up with those which are manifest in forms that can be counted" (Widdowson, 2004:118). This provides only a descriptive analysis if CLA techniques are utilised in isolation (Baker and Levon, 2015). In summary, as Berglund and Wynne (2015) note, "the computer can help, but it doesn't do the research", and as Mautner (2009:124) amusingly puts it, "at an Oscar night of methods, my vote would be on corpus linguistics as Best Supporting Actor".

The combination of CDA and CLA, therefore, provides this thesis with another opportunity to make a novel contribution to the academic literature, by providing a "best-of-both-worlds" scenario incorporating the use of large volumes of data whilst still providing analysis of linguistic details (Mautner, 2009). All of the 62 official AILAC submissions to the UNFCCC were converted from PDF files to "plain text" Notepad files and input into the #LancsBox corpus software package developed by the University of Lancaster (Brezina et al, 2017) in the same chronological order as used for textual analysis. The software recognised each word and produced a token for each one as a different part of speech, recognising words as nouns, adjective, verbs, pronouns and so on. The AILAC submissions produced a corpus of 119,987 tokens. As this is a relatively small corpus compared to most used in CLA research (most exceed 5 million words (O'Keeffe and Farr, 2003)), the corpus was used in its entirety rather than subjected to a process of sampling; the fact that it was a manageable size helped to avoid the problem of sampling selectivity bias. The software was then used to identify instances of keyness, collocations, and concordances within the AILAC submissions. The Brown Corpus, a corpus of modern American English of approximately 1.01 million tokens which was downloaded along with the #LancsBox

software, was used as a reference corpus against which to compare for measures of keyness in order to determine the statistical significance of keywords within the AILAC submissions. This was selected over the alternative of the Lancaster-Oslo-Bergen (LOB) Corpus of modern British English, as American English provides a better comparison with AILAC texts given the likelihood of AILAC delegates to have learned American rather than British English as a result of AILAC countries' greater proximity to the United States than the UK. Corpus-linguistic analysis of the AILAC texts was conducted after the researcher had undertaken textual analysis of the AILAC submissions to avoid skewing the textual analysis towards features already identified by #LancsBox. Instead, this allowed the corpus-linguistic analysis to act as a triangulation of the CDA method.

Chapter 5: Technical Submissions

5.1 Introduction

The analysis is divided into 5 chapters (5-9), with each chapter covering different strategies. Chapter 5 covers AILAC's primary strategy in the UNFCCC negotiations as identified by critical discourse analysis: putting forward technically rigorous submissions. This strategy was also most commonly cited by interviewees, in 33 of 35 responses. Use of detailed submissions has served two purposes: presentation of AILAC's substantive ideas in the negotiation process on wide-ranging interconnected topics[19], and as evidence of the group's technical capacity and rigour[20] enhancing its credibility in the eyes of others. One AILAC support unit advisor stated, "*the most consistent approach has been to rely very heavily on, on the technical coherence and providing very specific technical inputs to the process.*"[21] This chapter considers the types, timings, and topics of submissions, before analysing notable features: their visual presentation, structure, and key discourses of the primacy of technical knowledge and universality.

5.2 Submission Types

The research identified 62 AILAC submissions between January 2013 and December 2018 (inclusive). 56 were made by AILAC alone, while 6 of the 62 submissions were made jointly with other parties: Submission 3 with Mexico and the Dominican Republic, Submissions 8 and

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[19] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018
[20] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018
[21] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

51 with the EIG, Submission 54 with the AGN, Submission 59 with Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Switzerland, and Submission 60 with AOSIS, the European Union, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, and Switzerland. Of the overall 62, 49 were technical submissions (including all made with other parties) outside of formal negotiation sessions. 13 were statements made during meetings of the annual COP in November/December or intersessional meetings of the Subsidiary Bodies to the UNFCCC in Bonn in May (and the special session in Bangkok in September 2018).

An AILAC delegate said the group submits documents to the UNFCCC in response to open calls for participation, but that "we are not the type of group that is sending all the time different positions" because of reluctance to show AILAC's hand to other negotiating parties.[22] This would account for most (33 of 49) AILAC submissions (excluding statements) beginning either with a standardised paragraph explicitly expressing that AILAC "welcomes the opportunity to submit" its views (see, for example, *inter alia*, Submissions 16 (AILAC, 2016g), 29 (AILAC, 2017g), and 44 (AILAC, 2017v)), or even one where an invitation to submit is specifically mentioned (see, for example, i*nter alia*, Submissions 2 (AILAC, 2013b), 4 (AILAC, 2014b), 10 (AILAC, 2016a), 28 (AILAC, 2017f), and 30 (AILAC, 2017h)). It also accounts for the fact that the majority of statements (11 of the 13) being delivered at the opening or closing plenaries of negotiating sessions, i.e. when parties are invited to speak. That there are considerably fewer statements than technical submissions probably reflects the fact there are usually only 2 formal negotiating sessions annually - SB meetings in May, and the annual COP at the year-end – whereas the UNFCCC Submissions Portal is open between these sessions to allow parties to respond to calls from UNFCCC bodies, like the Secretariat, the SBs, and various subject-specific committees (UNFCCC, 2019a).

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[22] Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

5.3 Submission Timings

The group's submission activity differed considerably either side of the signing of the Paris Agreement in December 2015: 9 submissions were put forward between January 2013 and December 2015 inclusive (2 in 2013, 5 in 2014, and 2 in 2015), whereas 53 were presented between January 2016 and December 2018 inclusive (13 in 2016, 26 in 2017, and 14 in 2018). The mismatch between numbers of submissions pre- and post-Paris is probably explained at least partly by the fact that the support unit was not established until April 2014[23]. The support unit, according to the AILAC rule book, (AILAC, date unknown:4) comprises "international specialists" in climate change policy, whose rôle includes to "prepare the technical documentation for the negotiations in the core of the UNFCCC". These full-time, professional expert advisors draft the group's submissions, whereas each AILAC member state's national delegates, organised by technical co-ordinations according to individual negotiating topics, negotiate for the group in the negotiating sessions (AILAC, date unknown). National delegates request the support unit to draft a submission on a particular topic given their greater technical expertise[24]. Delegates then provide feedback on the text and amend it before it passes to the overarching governance committee for sign off before submission to the UNFCCC[25]. As one AILAC support unit advisor stated:

"*The first draft comes from, from the support unit, from the advisors, err, it goes through a first reading with the co-ordinators and then it is presented to the group, discussed, and we request, err, comments and, err, any additions or inputs that they would like to provide to that. Err, this*

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[23] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018
[24] Interview with AILAC delegate, 10th July 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 6th September 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018
[25] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018

usually takes two to three rounds, so it's, it's about three to four drafts that we produce until we have a, a final version, and then that goes to the, to the governance committee for, for the final approval. Err, this is something very concrete, very specific for submissions."

Before the support unit's formation, the group's delegates would have written the submissions whilst simultaneously carrying out their rôle as negotiators with portfolios of domestic climate policy work simultaneously[26], because AILAC countries had limited domestic capacity. This would have put pressure on delegates to produce submissions for every UNFCCC call.

Of the 6 joint submissions with other parties, 2 were pre-Paris (in 2014 and in 2015), and 4 post-Paris (all in 2018). Of the 13 AILAC statements, all were put forward between 2016 and 2018 – 2 in 2016, 4 in 2017, and 7 in 2018. It is surprising that no statements were found from before 2016, and unlikely that the group did not take opportunities to make statements at COPs 19, 20, and 21, nor the SB meetings between 2013 and 2015, especially for 2014 and 2015 because the support unit had been established by then, and Peru, an AILAC member country, was hosting COP20 in 2014. Therefore, it seems most likely that statements were made, but are simply not available on the UNFCCC submissions portal, nor the AILAC website.

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[26] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October, 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 30th July, 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October, 2018

The submissions cover a wide range of topics, and Table 3 below reveals the breakdown of submissions by theme from 2013 to 2018, referencing the corresponding article of the Paris Agreement to each theme where applicable.

Table 3: AILAC Submissions by Topic, 2013 - 2018

Topic	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Paris Agreement Legal Status & Goals (Article 2)	1	4					**5**
Mitigation & NDCs (Including Ambition and Common Timeframes) (Articles 3 & 4)				1	4	1	**6**
Markets (Article 6)				1	2	2	**5**
Adaptation (Article 7)		1		2	5	1	**9**
Loss & Damage (Article 8)					1		**1**
Finance (Article 9)				1	1		**2**
Technology & Capacity Building (Articles 10 & 11)				1	2	1	**4**
Transparency (Article 13)				1	2		**3**
Global Stocktake (Article 14)				2	2		**4**

							Total
Compliance and Implementation (Article 15)					2		**2**
Agriculture	1						**1**
Gender			1	1			**2**
Human Rights			1				**1**
Paris Agreement Work Programme				3	5	9	**17**
Total	**2**	**5**	**2**	**13**	**26**	**14**	**62**

The subject matter of the AILAC submissions is reflected in Table 1. However, for clarity, the category referenced as Paris Agreement Work Programme refers to submissions relating to agendas of future negotiation topics, e.g. agenda items for the APA or subsidiary bodies to the Convention. They cover a variety of issues; for example, Submission 11 (AILAC, 2016b) addresses the functionality of the APA (chair, agenda, and outputs), whereas Submission 49 (AILAC, 2018a) deals with the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP) for improving parties' understanding and knowledge of vulnerability to, and impacts of, climate change. Several submissions identified in the Work Programme group cover multiple topics; for example, Submission 36 (AILAC, 2017n) is a statement from the closing plenary of an SBSTA meeting, commenting on the progress of negotiations on finance, technology transfer, and transparency; whereas Submission 46 (AILAC, 2017x) is a statement from the opening plenary of the following SBSTA and SBI meeting, referring to upcoming discussions on finance, technology, capacity building, NDCs, adaptation, and loss & damage.

The AILAC submissions address most of the Paris Agreement's main themes. Of substantive negotiating topics with dedicated Articles (excluding procedural matters such as

the Secretariat – Article 17 - or ratification and entry into force – Articles 20 and 21), only forestry (Article 5) and public awareness, education, and participation (Article 12) are not the focus of specific submissions. However, whilst covering many broad topics, the data from the table show the group's attention has focused on certain themes. Their biggest contribution has been proposals and reflections on the Work Programme (17 out of 62 submissions in this category (27.4%)), followed by adaptation in 9 submissions (14.5% of the total). The group's work then spans 6 topics with corresponding Articles in the Paris Agreement, generally evenly spread. Legal status & goals of the Paris Agreement, mitigation and NDCs, markets, technology & capacity building, transparency, and the global stocktake all featured in between 3 and 6 submissions. Topics without a dedicated section in the Agreement e.g. agriculture, gender, and human rights appeared in 2 or fewer submissions. 3 themes with corresponding Paris Agreement Articles that did not feature in many AILAC submissions are loss & damage, finance, and compliance and implementation, with 1, 2, and 2 respectively.

The timing of submissions follows a clear pattern for some topics. Unsurprisingly, submissions on the legal status of the Paris Agreement are all from 2013 to 2015, before the Agreement was written, when questions about its status were pertinent in the formative process. Likewise, the Paris Agreement Work Programme submissions all date from 2016 to 2018, as planning of the programme could only take place once the Agreement had been drafted. These submissions have gradually become more frequent, from 3 in 2016 to 9 in 2018. Surprisingly only one submission in the pre-Paris Agreement period (Submission 3, on adaptation) addressed a substantive issue which would progress to be the focus of an Article of the Paris Agreement, whereas AILAC only made submissions on other substantive issues which resulted in PA Articles (e.g. mitigation, transparency, markets etc) between 2016 and 2018.

However, the initial picture of attention in AILAC's submissions is not entirely representative. Corpus-linguistic analysis of these texts (see Table 4, below) reveals use of specific terms across all submissions does not quite mirror the number of submissions by topic. For example, of substantive topics, adaptation is used most frequently, (1254 times across 50 submissions), consistent with its higher number of submissions, but mitigation, ambition, and NDCs together produced a total of 1095 tokens across 50 texts - greater than expected from the 2:1 ratio of submissions on adaptation and mitigation respectively. Implementation and compliance produced 671 tokens in the text across 56 submissions, despite being the subject of only 2 submissions, whereas transparency produced 298 tokens across 43 submissions while the stated subject of 3submissions – a lower token total than the 1:3 ratio of tokens versus adaptation that would be expected from submission theme numbers alone. Gender is also interesting, producing 168 tokens across 18 texts, despite being the focus of 2 submissions: a lower-than-expected ratio (circa 1:7.5) of use of the word across submissions versus adaptation than would be expected, inferred from the number of submissions on these themes (1:4 or 1:5).

Table 4: Corpus-Linguistic Word Tokens in AILAC Submissions by Substantive Topic

Topic	Tokens	Number of Tokens	Number of Submissions Containing Tokens	Number of Topic-Focused Submissions
Paris Agreement Legal Status & Goals (Article 2)	Legal, binding, legally- binding	134	6	5
Mitigation & NDCs (Including Ambition and Common Timeframes) (Articles 3 & 4)	Mitigation, mitigate, NDC, ambition, ambitious	1095	50	6
Markets (Article 6)	Markets, non-markets article 6	172	28	5
Adaptation (Article 7)	Adaptation, adapt, adaptive	1254	50	9
Loss & Damage (Article 8)	Loss & damage	46	11	1
Finance (Article 9)	Finance, financial	338	46	2
Technology & Capacity Building (Articles 10 & 11)	Technology, capacities, capacity building	572	46	4
Transparency (Article 13)	Transparency, transparent, transparently	298	43	3

Global Stocktake (Article 14)	Global stocktake, GST	313	27	4
Compliance and Implementation (Article 15)	Compliance, implementation	671	56	2
Agriculture	Agriculture, farm, farmer	32	9	1
Gender	Gender	168	18	2
Human Rights	Human rights	65	9	1
Forestry	Forest, REDD+	69	14	0

The corpus-linguistic analysis of the numbers of tokens of different negotiating topics broadly correlates with interviewees' responses, when asked which topics were high priority areas for AILAC (see Table 5, below), although interviewees were not asked whether the legal status of the Paris Agreement was a priority area, given the Agreement was signed in 2015 and has since been legally-binding. Of the 35 AILAC delegates and support unit advisors interviewed, 32 cited adaptation as a priority, the most for any issue area, consistent with the highest number of tokens in the submissions. This explains the prevalence of the topic in AILAC documents, given the support unit advisors draft the submissions, and the delegates amend and revise the support unit's drafts. Similarly, 28 interviewees (80%) cited mitigation and NDCs, also in keeping with the high number of tokens found by the corpus-linguistic analysis. Compliance and implementation accumulated 671 tokens, broadly in line with the ratio of token totals to priority status as determined by interviewees - with 17 interviewees deeming it a high priority issue. The 5 topics least deemed a priority by interviewees (i.e. at most 5 of the 35 interviewees) – loss & damage, gender, human rights, agriculture, and forestry – also accumulated the fewest

tokens in the corpus-linguistic textual analysis, as would be expected given who drafts AILAC submissions. Markets produced 172 tokens, only 4 more than gender, but was cited as a priority by just under half of interviewees; this number is likely higher because Article 6, being a substantive issue under the Paris Agreement, has its own technical co-ordination under the AILAC group, whereas gender, human rights, agriculture, and forestry do not, and loss & damage is yet to have a co-ordination set up as of 2018 (AILAC, 2018o). The global stocktake was designated a priority by 9 interviewees, and accrued 313 tokens, broadly in proportion with the interviewees-to-tokens ratios of the aforementioned subjects.

Table 5: Interviewees' Priorities by Topic

Topic	Number of Interviewees Designating Topic as High Priority Area (out of 35)
Mitigation & NDCs (Including Ambition and Common Timeframes) (Articles 3 & 4)	28
Markets (Article 6)	17
Adaptation (Article 7)	32
Loss & Damage (Article 8)	3
Finance (Article 9)	28
Technology & Capacity Building (Articles 10 & 11)	8
Transparency (Article 13)	30
Global Stocktake (Article 14)	9
Compliance and Implementation (Article 15)	17
Agriculture	1

Gender	5
Human Rights	3
Forestry	3

However, some results are surprising: as for mitigation, 28 interviewees also cited finance as a high priority, though finance only accumulated 338 tokens in the AILAC submissions compared with mitigation's 1095 tokens. This could be because, as stated by nearly one third of interviewees, finance is the most difficult topic on which to make progress in the negotiations, being "deadlocked" by disputes between developed and developing countries[27]. If, therefore, the chance of progress is small, a better use of limited group resources would be to devote them to areas where progress is seen as more achievable. Such is the level of frustration on finance that one support unit member even remarked "*I'm not emotionally qualified to answer your questions on finance, thank you!*[28]" Furthermore, a former AILAC delegate, previously part of the group's finance technical co-ordination, stated the group prefers to leave finance negotiations to the wider G77 & China bloc, of which AILAC is part, because of its tough stance on the topic[29]. That progress is hard to come by on finance, coupled with the fact that AILAC lets its finance negotiations work through the G77 & China, would explain the lower number of tokens in the group's submissions than one might expect given interviewees' prioritisation of the topic.

Transparency was a priority theme for 30 of the 35 interviewees, 4 interviewees flagging it as the biggest priority of all, yet only 298 tokens were recorded in the texts. This could be because, as one AILAC support unit advisor explained, the Paris Agreement's

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[27] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018
[28] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018
[29] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018

Enhanced Transparency Framework is an overarching component of the rule book[30], and therefore affects virtually every other topic in the Agreement. For example, it is inherently linked to the NDC portion of mitigation, as this is based upon the provision of information about national emissions reduction targets, as well as the adaptation communication part of adaptation, which provides similar information; and the global stocktake is based entirely on provision of information at regular intervals. That its tokens occur in more than two-thirds of all AILAC submissions is consistent with its priority status as a topic with many issue linkages, and that many uses of these tokens in non-transparency-focused submissions appear in the explanation of other features' connections to transparency. For example, *inter alia* Submission 16, paragraph 3 (AILAC, 2016g) on markets states:

 "*At the outset, AILAC would like to emphasize that transparency and overall ambition are key for the implementation of Article 6. Hence, robust guidance for Article 6.2 as well as robust rules, modalities and procedures for Article 6.4 need to be delineated in order to ensure that mitigation outcomes are real, measurable and verifiable. Likewise, results achieved through the implementation of activities under Article 6.8 should also be transparently shared including on these results support the implementation of NDCs*."

Submission 55, paragraph 11 (AILAC, 2018g) also states:

"*AILAC welcomes the exchanges held on developing the guidance for the adaptation communication and that a basis for negotiations at the next APA session has been agreed. For AILAC, the guidance for the adaptation communication must help achieve the global adaptation goal. Fortunately, a limited amount of work on this guide is pending, including its linkages with the Enhanced Transparency Framework, since adaptation efforts may be reported within it*."

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[30] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

5.4.1 Cross-Cutting Submissions

Furthermore, every topic was referred to in a much wider spread of submissions than just those which focused on each subject, demonstrating another characteristic of AILAC's submissions: they are cross-cutting and wide-ranging, often incorporating many themes in each text. As well as the fact that the submissions from the Work Programme category often cover more than one theme, shown by the aforementioned examples of these statements, submissions in other topic categories perform a similar function. For example, Submissions 41 (AILAC, 2017s) and 42 (AILAC, 2017t) were categorised into the adaptation and mitigation groupings, as they address a public registry for countries' national communications to the UNFCCC under Article 7 and Article 4 respectively, yet the subject of a public registry is inherently related to transparency, given it would provide access to information about each party to the UNFCCC and their proposed actions on adaptation and mitigation. Even topics which were not the main subject of an AILAC submission are discussed, such as forestry and REDD+ (a total of 69 tokens across 14 submissions).

The cross-cutting nature of the AILAC submissions reflects a recognition of the technical intricacies linking issues in the UNFCCC regime, and can be interpreted as AILAC aspiring to make its submissions technically rigorous. This claim was found to be supported through discourse analysis of the texts. For example, Submission 27 (AILAC, 2017e) discusses AILAC's views on modalities, procedures, and guidelines (MPGs) for the Transparency Framework on Action. It begins by referencing the specific relevant established text from the Paris Agreement as a basis for the discussion in paragraph 3:

"*For AILAC, each of the main sections of the MPGs should respond to mandates received from Article 13 paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the Paris Agreement.*"

The submission is organised around 4 key questions about the nature of the future Transparency Framework: the components of its MPGs, how it should build on existing transparency arrangements under the UNFCCC, how it should provide flexibility for developing countries, and whether other elements should be considered in the development of its MPGs. All these questions require technically detailed answers, given these negotiation areas will fundamentally determine the functioning of as key a mechanism of the Paris Agreement as the Transparency Framework for Parties, affecting their legal obligations under the Agreement. Under each question heading, it provides several paragraphs of more general thoughts, e.g. paragraph 8:

"*...the current reporting guidelines for developed and developing countries and the ICA and IAR processes were designed to meet different purposes. Under the Paris Agreement, all Parties have NDCs and common objectives. If all Parties wish to respond to these objectives, it is essential to generate common MPGs that consider the flexibility for developing countries that need it in light of their capacities in order to, over time, have robust reports and reviews that contribute to the evaluation of the implementation of action.*"

It then refers the reader to the submission's two annexes (see Figures 4-6 below). These provide an itemised breakdown of every component AILAC considers should form part of the MPGs for the Transparency Framework, and the group's suggestions about building on existing arrangements for each element in the Transparency Framework. This, by definition, also covers areas related to NDCs and adaptation. The annex provides thorough, detailed suggestions relating to each issue which the group identified as unresolved in the negotiations. This level of detailed analysis and consideration of topical issues is a constant theme throughout AILAC submissions (see, for example, Submission 14 on the modalities for the accounting of publicly mobilised finance (AILAC, 2016e) Submission 33 on NDCs under the APA mitigation agenda

item (AILAC, 2017k), and Submission 50 on a proposal and justification for use of common

reporting timeframes for NDCs (AILAC, 2018b)).

Figure 4: Submission 27's Annex I (AILAC, 2017e)

ANNEX I - ELEMENTS OF THE MODALITIES, PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES OF THE ENHANCED TRANSPARENCY FRAMEWORK

1. **GENERAL GUIDELINES** (including timing, structure of the reporting guidelines, objectives, principles, among others)
    1.1 **National Circumstances** (that allow understanding of the evolution of the country's GHG emissions)
    1.2 **Institutional arrangements** (for planning, preparation and management of National GHG inventories and tracking NDCs)
2. **REPORTING**
    2.1 **Reporting vehicles** (role of national communications and biennial communications under Paris Agreement)
    2.2 **National Inventory Report**
        2.2.1 Format of the GHG Inventory submission
        2.2.2 Methodologies for the elaboration of the National GHG Inventories
        2.2.3 Reporting of the National GHG Inventories
    2.3 **Tracking progress of implementation and achievement of NDCs within the scope of Article 4 of PA**
        2.3.1 Description of the NDC (including summary or update of the upfront information NDC).
        2.3.2 Quantitative reporting of progress made towards the achievement of emission reduction targets/policies under NDCs.
        2.3.3 Information on projections of GHG emissions and removals.
        2.3.4 Information on policies and actions and their progress.
        2.3.5 Information related to the implementation of Article 6 of PA.
        2.3.6 Report at the end of the implementation period of the NDC.
    2.4 **Information related to the implementation of Article 5 of the Paris Agreement**
    2.5 **Information on adaptation**
        2.5.1 Methodological approaches.
        2.5.2 Reporting of climate change scenarios, impacts, vulnerability assessments and adaptation measures and actions.
    2.6 **Information on support provided**
        2.6.1 Reporting on financial support.
        2.6.2 Reporting on technology transfer.
        2.6.3 Reporting on capacity building provided to developing countries.
    2.7 **Information on support received**
        2.7.1 Information on constraints and gaps, and related financial, technical and capacity-building needs.
        2.7.2 Information on financial resources, technology transfer, capacity-building and technical support received.
3. **REVIEW**
    3.1 **Objectives of the review**
    3.2 **Reviewing cycle** (including times for every step)
    3.3 **Structure and elements of the technical review report** (output)
    3.4 **Modalities of the technical review** (including, for instance, in desk, centralized and in country reviews or other emerging options)
    3.5 **Composition and functions of expert review teams and institutional arrangements**
4. **MULTILATERAL CONSIDERATION OF PROGRESS (MCP)**
    4.1 **Objectives of the MCP**
    4.2 **Inputs for the MCP**
    4.3 **Modalities for the MCP**
    4.4 **Outputs of the MCP**

Annex II HOW TO BUILD ON AND ENHANCE THE TRANSPARENCY ARRANGEMENTS AND REFLECT THE FLEXIBILITY IN THE MPGs OF THE ETF

PROPOSED ELEMENTS OF MPGs FOR THE ETF	HOW TO BUILD ON AND ENHANCE EXISTING TRANSPARENCY ARRANGEMENTS?	FLEXIBILITY ON SCOPE, FRECUENCY, LEVEL OF DETAIL AND REPORTING VEHICLES BASED ON NATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND CAPABILITIES
1. GENERAL GUIDELINES	(Including timing, structure of the reporting guidelines, objectives, principles, among others)	
1.1 NATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES	Information should be as specific as possible in order to describe national circumstances that can help understand the evolution of greenhouse gas emissions and removals, as well as atypical deviations in emission trends.	Flexibility will not be necessary for reporting on national circumstances.
1.2 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS	Countries should make every effort to establish, maintain and report on institutional, legal and procedural arrangements for the implementation of NDCs and GHG inventories.	Reporting on these arrangements does not require flexibility per se, but capacity building for building up arrangements is required.
2. REPORTING		
2.1 REPORTING VEHICLES	Common guidelines for biennial communications should draw upon current reporting guidelines for both developed and developing countries. Parties should consider a way to introduce a common time frame for biennial communications and this time frame should be decided in 2018. National communications will continue to play an important role in reporting information on climate action, specially, as a vehicle to report progress on adaptation, until Parties are in a position to report biennially. Reporting under national communications will continue and be complemented by Biennial communications prepared under common guidelines of the ETF.	Flexibility for developing countries relates to the type of vehicle that they should use for reporting national adaptation actions and plans. In the year where a national communications and biennial communications coincide Parties may choose to present a joint report. National Communications will continue to be an important reporting vehicle for adaptation.
2.2 NATIONAL INVENTORY REPORTS		

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Figure 5: Submission 27's Annex II Page 1 (AILAC, 2017e)

Information on financial resources, technology transfer and development, capacity-building and technical support received	impact and estimated results, especially in the context of NDCs. b) From a technical standpoint it must be noted that reporting on support received will be more feasible if there are clear guidelines and definitions related to what constitutes provided support, as well as for mobilized support and if there is more transparency on methodological approaches and underlying assumptions used by developed countries.	The new reporting responsibilities for developing countries will require new and enhanced technical capabilities and the development and consolidation of domestic systems and institutional arrangements to improve the coordination among different stakeholders. Therefore, flexibility will be needed in the scope and frequency of reporting of support received.
3. REVIEW		
3.1 TECHNICAL REVIEW	As established in the Paris Agreement, common MPG should be developed for the technical review of information that will be communicated biennially.	
a) Objectives of the technical review	The review process has to serve to improve technical capacities in the country both for transparency purposes as well as for facilitating the implementation of NDCs and it should thus be designed accordingly. To fulfill this purpose, technical experts in charge of review process should be able to provide straightforward recommendations and assistance to identify capacity building needs to improve their reporting and other related national process.	
b) Timing	Technical review should be conducted every two years for all Parties (except SIDs and LDCs).	Flexibility provisions should be considered for developing countries according to the progressive enhancement of their capacities, for example, by allowing a more flexible timeframe for implementing any recommendations by the technical experts and by identifying those recommendations that may be implemented only if sufficient financial support and capacity building are made available.
c) Structure and elements of the technical review report (OUTPUT)	The main output of this technical review should be a report that includes: a. Consideration of the information provided to report implementation and achievement of the respective NDC b. Consideration of information related to support provided; c. An assessment of consistency with MPGs. d. Recommendations by expert review teams to Parties e. Identification of capacities needed to improve quality and level of information reported to track NDCs, including national GHG inventories.	
d) Modalities of the technical review (PROCESS)	The technical review process under ETF could be conducted using the same modalities of the current transparency framework: desk, centralized, and in-country reviews. However, it should be considered that certain type of review as	Flexibility on review should be reflected through the identification of new modalities for this process. For example, a review could be conducted among peers that comes from Parties with similar national circumstances.

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Figure 6: Submission 27's Annex II Page 2 (AILAC, 2017e)

5.5 Visual Presentation

The way AILAC submissions are presented also helps reinforce the idea that they are written by a group with expertise and technical rigour. That the majority of AILAC-only submissions (47 of 56) were presented with the AILAC logo in the top right-hand corner of every page, as well as a recreation of the AILAC logo as the background to the page (present in 30 of 56 submissions) presents AILAC as a professional group, focused only on climate change negotiations, as indeed it is. Furthermore, this appears to set AILAC apart from some of the other negotiating groups, especially those in the developing world. Initial examination of submissions, shows neither the AGN[31], the LMDCs[32] (LMDCs, 2017), nor the G77 & China[33] as a whole include any logo or non-textual representation of their grouping in submissions, and while AOSIS[34] and the LDCs[35] do employ logos, these are only displayed at the top of the first page of a submission, unlike AILAC submissions where the AILAC logo appears on every page. This creates the impression of a professional group which has technical credibility and official status. That AILAC has its own professionally-run (albeit, rarely updated) website, from which several of the submissions for this research were sourced, and a Twitter account used to boost its outreach activities (Watts and Depledge, 2018), enhances this.

Use of the AILAC logo in group submissions – seen above in Figures 4-6 - began in 2014 with Submission 4 on the Durban Platform's work stream for enhancing pre-2020 mitigation action. This is traceable to 2014, coinciding with the start of another feature of AILAC negotiating - the establishment of the support unit as AILAC's permanent secretariat.

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[31] https://africangroupofnegotiators.org/document-library/agn-submissions-to-the-unfccc/
[32] https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Iran_On%20behalf%20of%20_LMDC_18Sept.pdf
[33] https://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/application/pdf/dsubmission_g77_11_june_2014.pdf
[34] https://www.un.org/depts/los/biodiversity/prepcom_files/streamlined/AOSIS.pdf
[35] https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/LDC%20submission_March6.pdf

As mentioned, this group of full-time, professional expert advisors draft the group's submissions and are therefore responsible for the appearance of the documents, including the use of the group's logo.

5.6 Structure

The support unit's rôle in drafting the group's texts also can account for the almost template-like formats evident in the structuring of most AILAC submissions. The texts begin with references to legal or decision texts from previous negotiating sessions, followed by an introductory section on background context, before addressing substantive issues at hand in the submission. The opening paragraphs, which either "welcome the opportunity to submit" AILAC's views to the UNFCCC, or present AILAC's thoughts "following an invitation", reflect the standard format used, as the wording is reproduced in each submission.

The introductory sections demonstrate the group has considered relevant earlier developments, both legal/decision-based and substantive progress in the negotiations, adding further to the impression of technical rigour. However, a different template is followed in statements to UNFCCC negotiating sessions, adopting a more obviously diplomatic style. This template format addresses the chairs and co-chairs of the relevant negotiation session at various points throughout each statement. It always ends by thanking chairs and presiding officers, reiterating AILAC's willingness to continue participating in negotiations. For example, paragraph 11 of Submission 12 (AILAC, 2016c) states that AILAC "…is ready to continue moving forward together with our partners in a constructive spirit…", and paragraph 15 of Submission 52 (AILAC, 2018d) states "…AILAC is willing to continue supporting these efforts, along with our fellow negotiators, in a constructive spirit…" This phrasing is used

almost verbatim in each AILAC statement to the negotiating sessions. Recognition of the protocols of diplomatic engagement within the UNFCCC forum also adds to the credibility of AILAC as a serious negotiating group whose contributions to climate change discussions are worthy of consideration.

5.7 Key Discourses: Primacy of Technical Knowledge

AILAC use their technical submissions and statements, boosted by credibility derived from their technical rigour, to promote certain discourses embedded within their texts, though they are not the designated topics of the submissions themselves. First amongst these is the primacy of technical and scientific knowledge within the climate change negotiations. AILAC seeks to establish climate scientific and technical knowledge as both the *lingua franca* of the negotiations – that is, the prism through which all negotiations take place between parties – and as the acid test of whether the commitments of parties under the Paris Agreement have been met. This has been a consistent discursive push from AILAC before and after signing of the Paris Agreement, and takes various forms: from calling for scientific knowledge to underpin the entire negotiations, to boosting the agency of technical expert bodies like the IPCC. Among many examples, section 2 of Submission 6 (AILAC, 2014d) lists among AILAC's requirements for the preamble of the Paris Agreement the need for "the fundamental basis of the agreement on science", and calls for the establishment of "a mechanism to periodically review nationally defined contributions (on all issues) based on science and respective capacities." Submission 10 (AILAC, 2014a), immediately after the signing of the Paris Agreement, states "targeted support should be provided to developing countries to increase the participation of technical experts and policy practitioners from developing

countries…", effectively calling for an increase in the level of technical discussions in the negotiations. Submission 15 (AILAC, 2016f) begins by quoting the Paris Agreement's Article 14.1, which states collective progress towards the Paris Agreement's goals must be assessed "in a comprehensive and facilitative manner…and in the light of equity and the best available science", and later discusses the "specific areas and modalities by which the Group considers the IPCC could provide information to support the collective assessment of progress." It further states that "For AILAC, the IPCC bears strong scientific legitimacy in the context of the work of the Convention", and therefore that "the best available science in the form of the latest Assessment Reports of the IPCC should clearly form part of the inputs to the GST." Submission 33 (AILAC, 2017k) asserts the importance and fundamental status of verifiable, rigorous methodologies and quantifiable technical data, stating that guidance on the accounting of parties' NDCs "should drive the use of the more appropriate and scientifically accurate methodological approaches and metrics for estimating and accounting for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and removals provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in order to reduce uncertainty", while Submission 59 (AILAC, 2018k), with several other parties, reinforces this point, stating that "In order to quantify carbon dioxide equivalents Parties must use methodologies and common metrics asserted by the IPCC and adopted by the CMA."

By seeking to establish scientific and technical knowledge as a dominant discourse within the UNFCCC negotiations, AILAC attempts to give itself greater negotiating power versus other parties. AILAC understands that if the negotiations are reduced simply to expressions of traditional sources of power in international negotiations – namely, economic (and its proxy in climate change negotiations, namely CO_2 emissions) and military power, and latent power in the form of population sizes – it cannot hope to have meaningful influence on the outcome of the climate change negotiations. According to the World Bank (2018a, 2018b),

of the AILAC countries, only Colombia sits ranks within the top 40 wealthiest states by GDP (ranked fortieth), and none ranks within the top 40 of gross CO_2 emissions. Indeed, total AILAC countries' CO_2 emissions amounted in 2018 to 293.4 Mt, of a global total of 36573 Mt (Carbon Atlas, 2019); this is equivalent to 0.80% of the global total. The total population of the AILAC countries in 2018 according to the World Bank (2018c) was 143,331,000, which amounts to only 1.89% of the global total of 7,594,270,360, while the total of the AILAC countries' military spending accounted for merely 1.12% of the 2018 global total (World Bank, 2018d).

However, if negotiations are conducted so that technical knowledge and expertise is a source of power able to affect the outcome, AILAC becomes a much more relevant participant, given the plentiful expertise of its support unit advisors. A support group member stated it is in the character of AILAC, and in particular that of the support unit, to be grounded in science:

"*The support unit is like-minded professionals who have worked on climate change in previous jobs, who have a passion for the topic, and who believe that the process could be made more effective if a certain line were followed…what I've seen is that the internal dynamic of the support unit, in a handful of individuals with quite a lot of knowledge, with a high level of professionalism and pretty informed views, converge on how it might work. And then what you see is different documents along different topics that radiate from an overall view that the support unit has put together.*"[36]

AILAC countries' national delegates have a strong grounding in technical and scientific expert knowledge as well as the support unit advisors. 22 of the 35 interviewees specifically noted the majority of delegates are drawn from national environment or foreign affairs ministries, and

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[36] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018

several also stated that most are technical negotiators from environmental science backgrounds rather than being diplomatically trained[37], although foreign affairs personnel with negotiations training are still integral to AILAC's activity.

This push to establish scientific and technical knowledge as the bedrock of the UNFCCC negotiations through the use of submissions – as one support unit advisor put it, "*to rely very heavily on, on the technical coherence and providing very specific technical inputs to the process*"[38] – separates AILAC's behaviour, both in relation to the concept of power/knowledge and its selection of a primary strategy to use, from AOSIS. Where AOSIS deployed moral power by appealing to vulnerability discourses (Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012) as its primary strategy, AILAC focused on establishing the primacy of technical knowledge through its technical submissions to boost its negotiating power by steering the setting up of the "rules of the game" towards a rulebook which would play to its strengths. Where AOSIS "borrowed" power in the form of specialist scientific and technical knowledge from outside NGOs (Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012), AILAC utilised the in-house expertise of its technically-capable delegates and expert support unit advisors to achieve its primary aim.

AILAC's drive to cement scientific and technical knowledge as the *lingua franca* of the UNFCCC negotiations enabled the bloc to utilise other strategies which rely on knowledge and expertise for legitimacy, like constructive proposals and persuasion. Both are used within submissions and the discussions of the negotiating sessions at the COP or SB meetings[39].

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[37] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

[38] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

[39] See Chapters 6 and 7 respectively.

5.8 Key Discourses: Universality

Another discourse which emerged from the critical discourse analysis was AILAC's drive for universal participation in both signature and ratification of the Paris Agreement, and the subsequent implementation of its rulebook to achieve its long-term goals. Tokens for either "all parties", "all countries", or "universal" were recorded 105 times across 34 of the 62 submissions by the corpus-linguistic analysis, showing a relatively consistent drive to call for universality of engagement from parties. This feature was also recognised as being repeatedly emphasised during the textual discourse analysis of the submissions in several different ways. Sometimes AILAC's submissions actively called for universal participation in fighting climate change, as in Submission 7 (AILAC, 2014e), which states "the 2015 Agreement should include a global goal on MoI, to be achieved through efforts by all Parties in accordance with the principles of equity and CBDR-RC", or Submission 58 (AILAC, 2018j), which states:

"*It is essential for AILAC that what is adopted under the Paris Agreement Work Program [PAWP] respects the integrity of the Agreement, including in particular the consideration of flexibilities for developing countries and the obligation of all Parties[40] to undertake efforts in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement*."

In other submissions, the universality of participation in the implementation of the Paris Agreement is taken as read, as if it would never be in doubt once the rule book has been agreed. For example, Submission 11 (AILAC, 2016b), on the logistics of the APA agenda, states "Ideally…there would be no more than 2 contact groups scheduled in parallel, in order to ensure the highest possible participation by all Parties, especially those with smaller

[40] The original text also highlights the underlined text by presenting it in italics, unlike the rest of the surrounding paragraph; the entire quotation here is italicised for differentiation from the main body of text.

delegations". Similarly, Submission 41 (AILAC, 2017s), on a public registry for adaptation communications, states "…the guidance of the adaptation communication would provide for common elements that will serve as a level playing field for all Parties". Phrasings such as these suggest that, by assuming that universality will necessarily follow agreement of the rule book, AILAC is trying to ensure that this is exactly what happens, by embedding the concept of universal participation into the normal discourse of climate negotiations.

All the tokens for "universal" in particular were situated within submissions from 2014, before the signing of the Paris Agreement. This makes sense given more than half (5 of 9, and, indeed, 4 of the 5 submissions from 2014) of AILAC's pre-Paris submissions centred on the legal status and goals of the Paris Agreement, and AILAC viewed the development of a "balanced and fair and universal and ambitious agreement" as a top priority[41]. That the research identified this repeated discourse of universality of participation matches the findings of Watts and Depledge (2018:8) when they write that AILAC pushes for an ambitious response to climate change "in a way that does not exclusively focus on historical wrongs, and instead looks to the benefits of ambitious actions by *all* Parties, with a strong international regime promoting ambitious domestic policy, and vice versa."

Only one slight deviation from this discursive pattern was identified within the textual analysis of the submissions. In Submission 57 (AILAC, 2018i), paragraph 4 states:

"*We note the dissimilar progress achieved in this session under the different agenda items, with respect to which we express our deepest concern. We understand the importance of incorporating the interests and considerations of all the Parties in the rules of the Agreement, but we must take into account the common interest of having a set of clear and precise rules.*"

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[41] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018

For the first time, AILAC implies that reaching agreements that every party is happy with is secondary to agreements being based on robust rules and procedures. AILAC here appears to be advocating a "deep-but-narrow" agreement, where participation is less widespread among parties but the agreement itself does a better job of fighting climate change, contrasted against a "broad-but-shallow" agreement, adhered to by far more parties but whose contents provide less effective ways of fighting climate change, even factoring in wider participation among parties. However, the very next paragraph, paragraph 5, seems to contradict this, again reverting to the original discourse of universality and stating:

"*We must be pragmatic, recognizing that the pace of under discussions under the current modality will not allow us to complete the mandate of the PAWP. In that sense, and in the spirit of good faith and that Paris is and must be an Agreement of all, with all and for all, we believe that it would be convenient to allow you, Madame Co-Chairs Mr Chairs, to give us a decisive and strong guidance towards our objective…*"

If anything, the language in the above quotation is even more unequivocally in favour of universal participation in the negotiations than paragraph 4 is in running counter to the usual AILAC discourse. Furthermore, the fact that support for the universality discourse is expressed in the paragraph immediately following one where it is questioned leaves the idea of AILAC's support for universality lingering in the reader's mind, and thus the submission as a whole still does not run counter to the established pro-universality discourse of AILAC documents as a whole.

The reasoning behind the universality discourse can be traced back to the AILAC rule book. In paragraph 1, the rule book states that one of AILAC's 3 objectives is "to create bridges between the different negotiating groups, building trust and favouring the creation of propitious spaces for consensus" (AILAC, date unknown:1). Therefore, as a bridge-

building group, it is in AILAC's DNA, as it were, to encourage universal participation, as this is the only way to build the consensus AILAC desires. This is reflected in interviewees' responses. 30 of the 35 delegates and support unit advisors questioned on the rôle of AILAC in the UNFCCC negotiations stated it aims to act as a bridge-builder, and more than half (22 of 35) stated that this identity was a conscious factor in the way the group chooses strategies and how to deploy them. One former delegate stated that one of AILAC's main features is that it has always been "multilateralism-orientated" and has "a respect for multilateralism in general" because the AILAC countries have "this traditional respect for international law"[42], while a support unit member who previously worked as part of another party's delegation stated they could see a clear bridge-building identity at the genesis of AILAC in 2012[43]. Another delegate responded that the group has always "*called ourselves like that…we want to be, like, a bridge group…So, I think, yeah, it's part of our DNA*", and therefore its behaviour accords with this[44]. Yet another delegate confirmed that the group continues to embrace its bridge-building persona by describing the approach of preparing rigorous submissions and pursuing a discourse of universal participation as the group's "heritage"[45]. This heritage was described thus by a former AILAC support unit advisor:

"*We always created the group with the idea of being a group that bridges, that generates solutions for consensus, that wants to bring different sides of the table into a middle ground. I remember one of the delegates at the time wanting to use the slogan 'The middle is beautiful'. Right, so AILAC always wanted to be, to be the broker between the different extremes…I think it is part of its character.*"[46]

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[42] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018
[43] Interview with support unit advisor, 13th November 2018
[44] Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018
[45] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018
[46] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

A support unit advisor stated the group's aim is always to achieve the most ambitious common denominator possible within the negotiations, and commented on the reason behind this approach:

"*And there is this genuine effort because of the genuine interest of AILAC countries in multilateralism that – and all AILAC countries – and I'm very proud of this – are, I would say, very respectful and believe in the strength of multilateralism, no? And so that's something that drives this bridge-building intent, and it's very genuine.*"[47]

However, the self-described bridge-builder identity is not the only reason behind the group's push for universality of participation in the climate change negotiations. Paragraph 1 of the AILAC rule book also states that another of AILAC's 3 core objectives is "to drive innovative and viable proposals in order to accelerate the fulfilment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol and the implementation of the Paris Agreement, as well as the construction of sustainable long-term agreements." Given the AILAC countries willingly signed the UNFCCC, it is reasonable to assume that they did so motivated by self-interest. Considering the AILAC countries' particular vulnerability to climate change, it is not hard to see why universality of participation is a discourse that the group pushes consistently. All interviewees noted that AILAC countries are likely to suffer disproportionately from climate change effects. As climate change is a collective action prisoners' dilemma problem, this suffering can only be averted by an effective agreement. Given the global nature of the problem, an agreement realistically can only be effective if all parties act together. This is only reinforced by the fact that as per the UNFCCC's (1992) decision-making rules, any outcome can only be formally adopted by consensus among all parties.

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[47] Interview with support unit advisor, 27th September 2018

Chapter 6: Constructive Proposals & Rhetoric, and Compromise

6.1 Introduction

After use of technically rigorous submissions, AILAC's next-most common strategies are use of constructive proposals and compromises. CDA identified evidence supporting this conclusion from the submission texts, and 31 of the 35 AILAC interviewees cited constructive proposals and compromises as frequently used strategies in face-to-face negotiations. These strategies' use is inherently linked to the use of technically rigorous submissions, the latter legitimising the former, as mentioned in Chapter 5. On the basis that technical and scientific knowledge is the established foundation for contributions to the climate change negotiations, AILAC's negotiating partners must take its proposals seriously, given they are grounded in sound understanding of the science, despite the group's lack of material power resources. The first section of this chapter examines AILAC's use of constructive proposals, examining its use of "should", "shall", and "would"/"could" terms, discourses of positivity and opportunity running through AILAC submissions, and the use of proposals in negotiation sessions. The second section considers AILAC's use of compromise, highlighting 2 examples from submissions before turning to compromise offers in sessions.

6.2 Proposals and Use of "Should"

AILAC submissions are littered with examples of their proposals in the climate change negotiations, aligning with interviewees' responses on use of constructive suggestions as a

strategy. One interviewee explained submissions are a vehicle for suggesting ideas, citing an example where NDCs were described as an "anchor" to the Paris Agreement[48]. This intention is most obvious in the group's use of the word "should", evidence of AILAC putting forward ideas it would like included in the UNFCCC rule book and governance structures, but which are not yet formal rules. One of many examples is in Submission 2 (AILAC, 2013b) which, referencing assessments of vulnerability, options for adaptation measures and costs, and therefore the most cost-effective solutions, states "…the Convention should provide guidance on common methodologies to undertake such assessments (and include scientific, technical and socio-economic data)…". Submission 40 (AILAC, 2017r), referring to the design of the global stocktake, states that "the institutional framework that assists the CMA in the development of the GST should build on existing arrangements under both the Agreement and the Convention…" Submission 61 (AILAC, 2018m), on the provision of information by parties under the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF), states "…we would like to propose that Parties that would like to report additional information on adaptation that is not included in the ETF MPG [modalities, procedures, and guidelines] should follow the guidance developed by APA4."

Corpus-linguistic analysis of AILAC submissions produced 918 tokens for "should" in the context of proposals, with a relative frequency of 76.508288 per 10,000 tokens. This figure may actually be higher but for the ambiguity of the Spanish verb "deber", which can be translated into English as "should", "shall", or "must", and would have added a further 3 tokens to the total. Nevertheless, the relative frequency of "should" in the Brown Corpus of American English, is 8.754280, given a relative frequency ratio between the AILAC submissions corpus and the Brown corpus of 8.739529:1. The log likelihood of there being a statistically significant difference between the relative frequencies of "should" of the 2 corpora is 1819.85, which,

[48] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018

according to the University of Lancaster's Centre for Computer Corpus Research on Language, exceeds the critical value needed (15.13) for evidence of such a statistically different difference at 99.99% confidence (UCREL, 2019).

Of the 918 "should" tokens, 443, or 48.26%, are collocations with the word "be" within a window size of 5, i.e. that "be" can be found within five words to the right of "should". Brezina (2018:69) presents a calculation for an expected frequency of collocations, multiplying the total node frequency (918) by the collocation frequency (443) and the window size (5), divided by the total number of tokens in the corpus (119,987). Incorporating the window size into the calculation corrects for the possibility that the bigger the window size, the greater the chance of random co-occurrences of "should" and "be" (Brezina, 2018). The calculation here gives a result of 16.9466, clearly less than the number of recorded collocations at 443. Therefore, more have occurred than would be expected due to chance. At face value, this could imply a high degree of passive verb constructions with agency deletion, in turn implying that AILAC does not make specific suggestions about who might, or how to, put into effect the idea in question. For example, Submission 6 (AILAC, 2014d) states "Support should be given to countries who need it most and who are willing to go beyond their capacity", again without specifying by whom, or how, this support should be provided. However, from textual analysis, it is evident that more often than not, agency can be inferred by the context of the relevant sentences. For example, Submission 50 (AILAC, 2018b) states "…the first round of NDCs should be updated by 2020", and given the national nature of NDCs, it is clear that updating should be carried out by parties to the Convention. Similarly, Submission 41 (AILAC, 2017s) states "As the guidance of the adaptation communication would be revised iteratively the registry should also be updated accordingly", which follows a passage of text where AILAC states "Furthermore, the Registry must allow for Parties to update their adaptation communication at any point in time", thus clarifying agency beforehand.

Other examples of this collocation also do not imply agency deletion because agency is not a relevant consideration. For example, Submission 28 (AILAC, 2017f) states that "The Global Stocktake should be a process that tangibly reflects the functional linkages between mitigation and adaptation action." That less than half the total number of "should" tokens forms a collocation with "be" within a window size of 5, and that even those which do more often than not do not contain agency deletion, shows AILAC usually makes its proposals in a specific manner, identifying how or by whom an idea should be performed, rather than leaving it open to interpretation. This aligns with the first strategy of making technically rigorous submissions, as specificity is a key part of this approach.

6.2.1 Use of "Shall" vs Use of "Should"

By contrast, AILAC's use of the word "shall" - in the context of international negotiations more associated with demands than proposals as its use also signifies obligation in treaty texts (D'Acquisto and D'Avanzo, 2009; Krapivkina, 2017) - is considerably more limited, producing only 105 tokens in the group's submissions, at a relative frequency of 8.750948. The use of "shall" is found in 2 sets of circumstances; firstly, when referencing established texts from previous agreements, such as the Paris Agreement, or decision texts from previous negotiating sessions. For example, Submission 33 (AILAC, 2017k), when discussing features to be included in parties' NDCs, states "For AILAC, the features of NDCs are already reflected in the Paris Agreement and decision 1/CP.21, as described below", before listing points such as "That parties shall account for their NDCs" and "That NDCs shall be communicated every 5 years". It is also used, however, in AILAC's identified priority areas, to emphasise their importance. This can be seen in the fact that use of "shall" is concentrated in certain discourses

and in under half of the total submissions. All 105 tokens for "shall" are found in just 27 of the total 62 submissions, and 87 (82.86%) of these can be found within just 16 submissions which use the word relating either to transparency or the provision and reporting of information, or in relation to the Paris Agreement's legal status. Both are clear priorities for AILAC, shown by the fact that more than half of the pre-Paris submissions focused on its legal status, and the that 30 of 35 AILAC interviewees cited transparency as a high priority. Indeed, 34 of all "shall" tokens appear in Submission 43 (AILAC, 2017u), which focuses on the Enhanced Transparency Framework. For example, it states "Parties shall report their estimates of emissions and absorptions for all IPCC categories, gases and C pools considered in their National GHG Inventories throughout their inventory period", and "In the case of developing country parties, Parties shall submit every two years, a National Inventory Report that should include the inventory for the calendar year no more than two years prior to the date of submission…"

Of the 105 "shall" tokens in AILAC submissions, only 8 (7.62%) form a collocation with "be" within a window size of 5. As the corrected expected frequency of collocation calculation produces a value of 0.035 ((105 x 8 x 5)/119987), the collocation is more frequent than would be expected due to chance, but, much like the use of "should", in most cases AILAC does not use "shall" with agency deletion. Either it is used to specify the nature of an idea the group is proposing – for example, Submission 32 (AILAC, 2017j) states "…the use of ITMOs [internationally transferred mitigation outcomes] to achieve NDCs under this Agreement shall be voluntary" - or, "shall" is used in contexts where agency can be inferred elsewhere in the text. For example, Submission 43 (AILAC, 2017u) states "Recalculations shall be reported in the NIR, with explanatory information and justification for recalculations", where an NIR is identified elsewhere as the National Inventory Report, and therefore the responsibility of each party to the Convention. That the majority of "shall" tokens occur in contexts relating to

AILAC's priority topics and very few involve passive verbal constructions with agency deletion, along with its use of "should", is consistent with the argument that its submissions are specific in nature as part of the strategy of being technically rigorous.

Nevertheless, the ratio of "should" versus "shall" relative frequencies in AILAC submissions is 8.742857:1. This ratio shows AILAC is not generally seeking to impose its views on negotiating partners by making demands or being too rigid, but rather embodying a constructive spirit by putting forward ideas for others to consider. This constructive approach is in keeping with AILAC's identity as a bridge-builder, identified by interviewees, and AILAC's stated aims, per its internal rule book (AILAC, date unknown:1). Indeed, it meets all 3 requirements of the rule book, namely the following (the relevant sections which the ratio of "should" to "shall" in submissions fulfils have been italicised):

1) To "*generate co-ordinated, ambitious and progressive positions that positively support the balance in the multilateral negotiations on climate change*, considering a coherent and responsible vision of sustainable development and the environment and future generations"

2) To "*drive innovative and viable proposals* in order to accelerate the compliance of the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and implementation of the Paris Agreement, as well as the construction of sustainable, long-term agreements"

3) To "*build bridges between the different negotiation groups, promoting trust, and favouring the creation of propitious spaces for consensus*"

6.2.2 Use of "Would" and "Could"

This constructive approach to putting forward proposals is also bolstered by use of other terms. Frequently, AILAC seeks to build on its initial suggestion, which often uses a "should" verb, by following up with "would" or "could" in subsequent clauses or sentences to develop the idea, for example by more detailed explanation of meaning or ways of application. 243 tokens for "would" appear in AILAC submissions, and the textual analysis identified instances of this word being used to develop a constructive follow-up to an initial idea in 23 submissions. Similarly, "could" tokens numbered 249, and were used in this manner in 33 submissions.

A few examples demonstrate the use of these features in practice. Paragraph 7 of Submission 7 (AILAC, 2014e) suggests that to help countries tackle climate change domestically, the then-future Paris Agreement "should be accompanied by the contributions that each Party will commit to implement." Paragraphs 8 to 10 discuss the nature of these contributions, with paragraph 10 providing adding that "…the contributions would be inscribed in individual contribution documents, to which the Agreement will make an explicit reference…" Paragraph 13 also states these contributions "should be subject to an ex-post review", and the very next sentence provides additional detail, stating "Country contributions would be subject to the Convention's and the 2015 Agreement's MRV and transparency requirements." Submissions 24 (AILAC, 2017b) and 26 (2017d) use a follow-up "would" to explain the implications for the ideas in their proposals. The second point in Section I.B of Submission 24 states "…the goal of assessing adaptation needs should ensure that all required adaptation efforts…are covered. This assessment would also contribute to having a clear picture of the adaptation needs and a better understanding of each country´s capacity to respond to its current and expected climate change impacts." Paragraph 3 of Submission 26 states

"AILAC considers that the remaining sessions…should continue under the current APA agenda…" and follows up by further stating that "This would enable discussions to advance with a focus on substance, avoiding having to spend valuable negotiating time in aspects pertaining to process."

There are similar examples of the use of "could". In paragraph 19 of Submission 4 (AILAC, 2014b), AILAC supports the creation of an online platform for countries' policy plans and actions, stating this platform "should also include a searchable database with the contact information of all the experts who have participated in the TEMs [technical expert meetings]", before proceeding to examine the implications of such a database, adding "their collective knowledge could be extremely useful for actors who are working to develop and implement policy." Submission 32 (AILAC, 2017j) uses "could" similarly, with paragraph 6 affirming the possibility of learning lessons from implementation of the Kyoto Protocol with regards to the accounting of internationally transferrable mitigation credits, which "could be used as inputs to avoid double counting and ensuring environmental integrity." Paragraph 9 of Submission 15 (AILAC, 2016f) uses "could" to add detail to a proposal, stating "…the best available science in the form of the latest Assessment Reports of the IPCC should clearly form part of the inputs to the GST", before going on to say that "a summary of information derived from the ARs could be provided in an ad-hoc manner as an input to the GST." Likewise, Submission 61's final section on APA5 uses "could" to develop an idea, stating that "Regarding adaptation…we would prefer to have a text in Chapter IV.D that reflects the importance of having all stakeholders' perspectives. It could read as follows: '*How best available science, gender perspectives, and comprehensive stakeholders* [sic] *knowledge are integrated into adaptation.*'"

6.2.3 Positivity and a Discourse of Opportunity

Building upon the constructiveness of regularly presenting its ideas to the negotiations, AILAC frames such climate action as a series of opportunities, and a discourse of opportunity runs through the submission texts. This resonates with the argument by Watts and Depledge (2018:8) that "AILAC's approach is based on a framing of climate change less as a burden, and more as an opportunity… with opportunity justifying ambition and bridge-building." The group even goes as far as to title Submission 10 (AILAC, 2016a) "Submission…on Opportunities for the Technical Examination Process on Adaptation." The tokens "opportunity" or "opportunities" are shown by corpus-linguistic analysis to occur 107 times – more than some of the (albeit minor) substantive topics, across nearly three quarters of the submissions, 45 of 62. These tokens have a relative frequency in the Submissions corpus of 8.917633 per 10,000 tokens, versus 172 tokens at a relative frequency of 1.695649 per 10,000 tokens in the Brown reference corpus, which gives a log likelihood of 147.70; therefore, there is a 99.99% confidence level of statistically significant difference between the frequency of use of these terms between the AILAC submissions and the reference corpus.

3 instances of climate action as opportunity particularly stand out. Firstly, climate action is portrayed as an opportunity to tackle a global problem effectively. For example, Submission 3 (AILAC, 2014a), jointly made with Mexico and the Dominican Republic, states that "We see the post-2020 climate regime as a unique opportunity to promote robust and determined action by all Parties", while Submission 58 (AILAC, 2018j) states "The COP which begins today in Katowice is a unique opportunity so that Parties can implement the Agreement in an effective and progressive manner over time." Secondly, climate action is framed as an opportunity to foster understanding, agreement, and co-operation between countries. For

example, Submission 8 (AILAC, 2015a), jointly made with the EIG, states "For AILAC and EIG, it is important that the in-session workshop on gender-responsive climate…is viewed as an opportunity to increase a common understanding among Parties", while Submission 62 (AILAC, 2018n) states "On the issue of the long-term goal on finance, and under the same spirit of trust…we have an opportunity here at COP24 to make progress by agreeing it all parties together, in order to reflect needs and priorities of developing countries." Thirdly, climate action is presented as an opportunity for development and improvement of human wellbeing. For example, Submission 9 (AILAC, 2015b) states "…the Paris Agreement presents a crucial opportunity to ensure that climate policies and actions are informed by and grounded in existing human rights obligations and maximise the effectiveness of the actions and the benefits to people and the planet". Similarly, Submission 23 (AILAC, 2017a) states "Adaptation is a crucial yet costly task that can also be considered an opportunity to enhance the development potential of countries…"

AILAC's attitude towards the climate change negotiations as a series of opportunities is further reinforced by the aforementioned fact that most AILAC submissions (excluding statements) begin with a standardised paragraph explicitly expressing that AILAC "welcomes the opportunity to submit its views" (e.g. *inter alia*, Submissions 16 (AILAC, 2016g), 29 (AILAC, 2017g), and 44 (AILAC, 2017v)). Thus, even the chance to participate is seen as a positive occurrence. AILAC builds on this positivity by regularly framing individual points in its submissions as opportunities to improve the substance of negotiating topics in terms of their effectiveness. For example, among many instances, on adaptation, Submission 21 (AILAC, 2016l) presents the idea of a regular adaptation communication as part of parties' NDCs thusly, stating "AILAC considers that this periodic momentum will enable an opportunity to assess overall adaptation efforts". Additionally, in finance Submission 29 (AILAC, 2017g) positively frames the coinciding of the work of the Standing Committee on

Finance (SCF) on the Paris Agreement's financial mechanism, both in terms of its implementation and its governance structure, stating "AILAC considers that this conjunction presents an opportunity for the SCF to assess the current financial architecture under the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, in light of the implementation of the latter." Furthermore, Submission 35 (AILAC, 2017m) on technology and capacity-building states "AILAC believes the formulation of long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies…presents a valuable opportunity in which include such technology pathways within national planning."

6.2.4 Vocabulary Choice

The discourse of positivity is evident in AILAC's submissions, both in its choice of vocabulary and its labelling of ideas as opportunities. In its in-session statements, which are the most visible of its submission texts as they are read out to all parties in the plenaries (there being no guarantee that AILAC's technical submissions will be read by other parties), on 12 out of 13 occasions, AILAC concludes with a paragraph emphasising its upbeat attitude towards the negotiations and full commitment to constructive participation. In 6 of the statements, AILAC ends by stating "AILAC is willing to continue supporting these efforts", either "together with our negotiating colleagues" or "along with our fellow negotiators". In the remaining 7, AILAC is either "ready to continue moving forward together with our partners" (AILAC, 2016c), "would like to express its willingness to continue advancing together with our partners" (AILAC, 2016d), "looks forward to continuing these efforts" (AILAC, 2017n), "willing to continue promoting these efforts, together with our negotiation colleagues" (AILAC, 2017x), "prepared to continue advancing these efforts" (AILAC, 2017y), "reiterates its commitment to

continue participating in this process" (AILAC, 2017z), or "ready to continue to support all efforts" (AILAC, 2018j). 8 of these statements say that AILAC intends to do so "in a constructive spirit", and the 4 which do not, nevertheless echo the same sentiment stating:

"...our group looks forward to continuing these efforts and to honour the collective commitment to fully comply with the Paris Agreement" (Submission 36: AILAC, 2017n)

"*Our group is prepared to continue advancing these efforts and to honour the collective commitment to fully comply with the Paris Agreement*" (Submission 47: AILAC, 2017y)

AILAC "…reiterates its commitment to continue participating in this process" (Submission 48: AILAC, 2017z)

"*AILAC stands ready to continue supporting these efforts, together with our negotiating colleagues towards this goal. You can count on our full support in this effort*." (Submission 62: AILAC, 2018n).

Other uses of positive vocabulary occur throughout the AILAC submissions. AILAC uses the verb "welcome" 44 times across 31 submissions, giving a relative frequency across the Submissions corpus as a whole of 3.667064 per 10,000 tokens, versus a relative frequency in the Brown reference corpus of its use as a verb of 0.394337, which gives a log likelihood of 90.37. There is therefore a 99.99% confidence level of statistically significant difference between the frequency of use of these terms between the AILAC submissions and the reference corpus. 23 of these tokens are concordances with the token for "opportunity" or "opportunities", and thus form part of the aforementioned discourse of opportunity. The remaining 23, however, across 10 submissions, 5 of which are the high-profile in-session statements, further contribute to AILAC's strategy of constructive input. For example, Submission 12 (AILAC, 2016c) states AILAC "welcome[s] the progress made regarding the consideration of the manner in which the IPCC reports relate to the global stocktake under the

Paris Agreement…", and Submission 55 (AILAC, 2018g) states AILAC "welcomes the progress made across the different agenda items of the Paris Agreement Work Plan", and additionally that it "welcomes the exchanges held on developing the guidance for the adaptation communication, and that a basis for negotiations at the next APA session has been agreed." This is clearly AILAC expressing support for the negotiations process and participation of all involved. Indeed, on 15 occasions and in 3 in-session statements, AILAC says it "looks forward" to such things as "engaging with other Parties in fruitful discussions" (AILAC, 2017l; 2017s), continuing exchanges (AILAC, 2016i), progress (AILAC, 2017y), discussions (AILAC, 2017o), or efforts (AILAC, 2017n). Its use of this verbal concordance in submissions has a relative frequency of 1.250135 versus its equivalent in the reference corpus of 0.157735, producing a log likelihood of 28.03 and a statistically significant difference at a confidence level of 99.99%.

6.2.5 Recognition of Progress

Another positive feature of AILAC's submissions is that they frequently acknowledge and highlight progress already achieved in the negotiations. In 11 of its 13 in-session statements, all highly visible to the rest of its negotiating partners, AILAC uses various phrases to achieve this, implying that the group views developments favourably, thus contributing to their air of support for the negotiations and constructive attitude towards them. For example, in Submission 13 (AILAC, 2016d), the group states "…for AILAC it is of the highest relevance that during the last two weeks substantive discussions were begun aimed at implementing the Paris Agreement", and that "AILAC celebrates the progress made in the core of ICAO to regulate CO_2 emissions in international air transport…"; while Submission 36 (AILAC, 2017n)

states "We underline the progress made in relation to the mandate to develop the modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions…" and "We also highlight the progress made in relation to the Nairobi Work Program". However, this emphasis of negotiating progress appears redoubled from the end of 2017 onwards, as 3 consecutive statements (Submissions 46 – 48) from the subsidiary body and COP meetings in Bonn in December 2017 are laden with examples of this linguistic practice. For example, Submission 46 (AILAC, 2017x) recognises the chairs' efforts to "ensure that the Local communities and indigenous peoples platform is successfully established", while Submission 47 (AILAC, 2017y), among a plethora of examples of positivity towards progress, states "We express our particular satisfaction at the progress made in gender issues, agriculture, indigenous peoples, and loss and damage". Likewise Submission 48 (AILAC, 2017z), the closing statement of AILAC from COP23, states "We see the outcomes of this conference as a sign that with compromise and political will, it is possible for us to finalise the guidelines of implementation of the Paris Agreement Work Program in Katowice in a timely manner".

This emphasis continues in statements from 2018, with Submissions 52, 53, 55, 56, and 62 all publicly recognising and praising negotiating progress. For example, Submission 52 (AILAC, 2018d) states AILAC "receive[s] with satisfaction the adoption of the initial strategy of the International Maritime Organisation that will contribute to the global mitigation effort"; Submission 53 (AILAC, 2018e) "praise[s] the co-ordination efforts that the four of you [subsidiary body co-chairs] are developing to ensure coherence, balance and consistency"; Submission 55 (AILAC, 2018g), *inter alia*, states AILAC "considers that important progress was achieved on the development of specific elements of the Global Stocktake…"; Submission 56 (AILAC, 2018h) states AILAC "is grateful for your [subsidiary body co-chairs'] efforts to prepare the 'tools' to structure and advance in our negotiations under the diverse themes of the agenda…"; while Submission 62 (AILAC, 2018n) states AILAC "would like to start by

thanking all of you [chairs of the subsidiary bodies, the APA, and delegates present], and the co-facilitators, for your hard work in guiding us over the last three years in the continued progress of our work up to this moment…"

However, praise for progress appears in AILAC's technical submissions as well as in its statements, albeit to a much lesser degree. Submission 18 (AILAC, 2016i) asserts "AILAC is encouraged by the discussions held at the 44th Session of the SBI", while Submission 35 (AILAC, 2017m) frames the Paris Agreement positively, describing it as a "watershed in the efforts of the international community to tackle climate change…" 2 of 5 submissions including this feature also fall within the timeframe when it is most frequently seen in the group's statements, namely late 2017 to 2018, with Submission 49 (AILAC, 2018a) confirming that "AILAC believes the NWP has made important contributions and progress in its thematic work…" and has "created a wealth of knowledge that is relevant to the needs of developing Parties", while Submission 51 (AILAC, 2018c), made jointly with the EIG, states "AILAC and the EIG support the recommendation put forward by the Paris Committee on Capacity Building that the 7th meeting of the Durban Forum should be centered on the 2017-2018 focus area…" and that "the 6th Meeting of the Durban Forum demonstrated the usefulness of addressing capacity building…"

That AILAC's recognition of and appreciation for progress in the negotiations increases in frequency from the end of 2017 onwards is likely because by this time, there has been more progress towards the successful implementation of the Paris Agreement and its rule book; indeed, before 2015, the Paris Agreement itself had not been developed. However, 3 interviewees from the AILAC support unit and one further AILAC delegate interviewee

highlighted frustration with the negotiations from mid-to-late 2018[49]; indeed, one of the support unit interviewees attributed these frustrations across several negotiating topics to game-playing and broken promises of other negotiating partners[50]. Therefore, drawing attention to negotiating progress by trying to maintain whatever momentum had been generated by work completed despite frustrations and obstacles to progress from parties' game-playing is consistent with AILAC's progressive nature as set out in its internal rule book (see above).

6.2.6 Proposals in Negotiation Sessions

According to interviewees' responses, AILAC also pursues this strategy of constructive proposals in the face-to-face negotiation sessions, which correlates with Watts and Depledge's (2018:8) point that, "in terms of negotiation style, AILAC prides itself on the consensual pursuit of pragmatic solutions." One delegate reported that a strength of the group is its ability to contribute new ideas to the process, and that AILAC continues to act as bridge between groups through constructive proposals in a variety of settings:

"*…in the middle of negotiations we will say, 'OK, I have this new idea – why don't we try this?' And, err, this is something that we have done during the negotiations, like an in-session paper or an idea or a conversation in the hall or whatever, just to try to bridge these positions.*"[51]

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[49] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

[50] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018

[51] Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

A former AILAC support unit advisor added that part of the reason for pursuing this strategy of constructive proposals was to help parties understand the necessity of climate action – thus bridging the gap between different viewpoints about how much and what kinds of action are needed – and then catalysing that action in the negotiations:

"So, what we wanted to do was take away the myths around how hard things were done, and just put things on the table on the most technical basis to really understand what was at stake."[52]

This statement further shows the close relation between AILAC's first strategy of making technically rigorous submissions in order to be seen as a group with deep technical expertise, and to provide its delegates with legitimacy in discussing such technical matters when it comes to the face-to-face negotiating sessions in the COPs and SB meetings. Given the vulnerability of AILAC countries, the group needs action to be taken, and one way of catalysing that is to participate actively, supplying the negotiations with ideas and suggestions for consideration, and possibly even adoption within the UNFCCC regime. The strategy can also be considered in the context of power relations. If AILAC can establish technical knowledge as the bedrock of the climate change negotiations, the use of substantive proposals based on this expertise will add weight to the group's words, as their ideas will be put to other parties for consideration and possibly even adoption within the UNFCC regime. Therefore, the more proposals AILAC puts forward, the more attention the group garners, and, given the sound technical footing on which they are made, the more AILAC can affect the direction of the climate change negotiations. Again, this strategy allows AILAC to try to influence the negotiations, despite lacking material power resources.

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[52] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018

<u>6.3 Compromise</u>

Part of AILAC's constructive rhetoric is the pursuit of compromise between parties and ideas, as reflected in the group's third stated aim of building bridges and promoting trust between groups. The data gathered indicate this strategy is adopted more in face-to-face negotiating sessions than in submissions, which is logical given compromise requires that different ideas are put forward first, a task which is addressed in the submissions. Nevertheless, some constructive compromises can be seen in AILAC texts. Firstly, there is symbolic compromise in the group's logo which appears on the majority of their submission texts; a former support unit advisor present at the group's formation explained "*what we originally had envisioned was that it would be a bridge…between developing and developing…and so it was kind of this middle of the ground group that could find issues and unlock things*"[53]. AILAC's logo is indeed a bridge (see Figure 7, below), consistent with the group's aim of building bridges between coalitions.

Figure 7: AILAC logo (AILAC, 2019)

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[53] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018

A total of 5 tokens for "compromise" were identified across 4 submissions: one technical submission, and 3 statements. That nearly a quarter of AILAC statements, therefore, mention compromise indicates the group is openly pursuing this strategy, as these are the most visible textual contributions, coming during negotiating sessions. "Compromise" is found in contexts which encourage the concept among parties. For example, Submission 13 (AILAC, 2016d) states "AILAC would like to express its willingness to continue advancing with our partners with a constructive spirit…", while Submission 48 (AILAC, 2017z) says the group "highlight[s]…the openness and compromise of all the parties that allowed us to adopt the Gender Action Plan" and other features of the negotiation outcomes, as well as asserting that AILAC "see[s] the outcome of this conference as a sign that with compromise and political will, it is possible for us to finalise the guidelines of implementation of the Paris Agreement Work Program in Katowice…" Submission 62 (AILAC, 2018n) also sees AILAC "encourag[ing] Parties to continue working in the spirit of constructive compromise to adopt a Technology Framework that can be made operational in an effective manner…"

6.3.1 Common Timeframes

However, contextual knowledge of 2 contentious subjects within the negotiations is needed to demonstrate better examples of AILAC pursuing compromise in submission texts. Firstly, "common timeframes" - in the UNFCCC this is the notion that reporting and implementation of countries' contributions in their NDCs should be along timelines common to all parties, which then involves considerations of transparency, the global stocktake, and mitigation ambition to name but a few. As such, common timeframes are divisive, given both related complexities and the questions they raise regarding timings of action and the agency behind

deciding timings, with potential implications for national sovereignty over NDCs. One former AILAC support unit advisor indicated the difficulties in reaching agreement among parties on common timeframes, revealing that the omission of a concrete commitment to common timeframes in the text of the Paris Agreement "*was one of my biggest, saddest – I mean, saddest let-goes of, of Paris*."[54] Indeed, the only commitment in the Agreement was in Article 4.10, for the next COP to "consider common time frames for nationally determined contributions at its first session" (UNFCCC, 2015). Another AILAC delegate also cited negotiations around common timeframes in sessions on NDCs and the global stocktake as the most difficult area in the entire negotiations, describing it as "a nightmare"[55] in which there is no agreed basis to begin negotiating towards a formal text.

Recognising the difficulties around common timeframes, one of AILAC's submissions on this topic (Submission 50 – AILAC, 2018b) proposes 4 scenarios for NDCs: no common timeframes, common timeframes of 5 years with synchronisation beginning in 2020, common timeframes of 5 years with synchronisation beginning in 2030, and common timeframes of 10 years with synchronisation beginning in 2020. AILAC's submission examines how each scenario could be implemented, the resulting implications for NDCs, and advantages and drawbacks. The group therefore purposely does not write off any outcome, although it does express a preference for avoiding a no-common timeframes scenario. However, that it considers each possibility shows AILAC is willing to compromise and consider different views from its negotiating partners to find an acceptable consensus outcome.

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[54] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018
[55] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018

6.3.2 Non-Market Approaches

The second good example of AILAC pursuing compromise as strategy is evident from its submission references to "non-market approaches" within Article Six negotiations. The UNFCCC describes non-market approaches as forms of co-operation between countries which "can be anything and everything, provided it's not market- based. It's a broad basket, but based on what Parties have expressed since Paris, the non-market approaches mechanism will focus on co-operation on climate policy, it could include fiscal measures, such as putting a price on carbon or applying taxes to discourage emissions" (UNFCCC, 2019b). Given the vagueness of this description, it is unsurprising that AILAC interviewees stated there is a lot of confusion amongst all parties' negotiators as to what this approach actually entails. One former AILAC support unit advisor said "*nobody knew what the fuck non-markets were*"[56] at its inception, while another AILAC delegate confessed at present, "*we don't know what is this non-markets thing*"[57]; another former support unit advisor added that the non-markets approach is "*in this moment, a black hole – nobody knows what it is*."[58] Another support unit advisor believed that non-markets is "*not even a sound, technical thing, it's just a principle*"[59]. Numerous AILAC delegates attributed the origin of the non-markets approach to the ALBA group[60], and ALBA is certainly its proponent, given its preference for state-led economies and aversion towards market mechanisms in climate policy (Watts and Depledge, 2018). The IETA (2015) reports that ALBA opposed use of the phrase "market mechanisms" in the Paris Agreement, and

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[56] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018
[57] Interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018
[58] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018
[59] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018
[60] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; Interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018

indeed, this term is not used in the final text, as only "co-operative approaches", "a mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions" and "non-market approaches" are discussed in Article Six (UNFCCC, 2015).

It is safe to assume, then, given that the focus on non-markets stems from a political philosophy not shared by the AILAC countries, and that the group's negotiators do not seem to know what exactly the topic signifies nor its current status, that non-market approaches are not a high priority for AILAC. However, AILAC does recognise the topic is important to ALBA and it is willing to engage with them on this to secure overall progress on Article Six. One former support unit advisor stated "*the key to get something on markets – it may be having something on non-markets – and the key for that may be Ecuador*"[61], while another stated explained AILAC engaged with ALBA on non-markets "*because it gave them a space, and they needed, politically they needed the space to discuss their, to feel like they were being heard.*"[62] Another delegate explained the kind of dialogue AILAC aims for with ALBA negotiators in face-to-face meetings on non-markets is akin to saying "*OK guys, it's your invention, that's what you want to see in the Article, but please try to explain to us what is your approach and why you're doing that*"[63], while another said "*We might agree or disagree or whatever, but as long as we can engage on [non-markets], then we can start making progress*".[64]

This compromise approach of giving time and effort to something AILAC does not see as particularly important except to placate its negotiating partners is evident within AILAC submissions. Passing references to markets are matched by the same brief attention to non-market approaches. For example, Submission 6 (AILAC, 2014d) proposes the then-future Paris

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[61] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018
[62] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018
[63] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018
[64] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018

Agreement's mitigation section should address "provisions related to market and non-market mechanisms and their rôle in the national and global mitigation efforts…", while Submission 20 (AILAC, 2016k) suggests that "for the market and non-market components of Article 6, it is especially important to achieve coherence with the enhanced transparency framework when these are used to make progress towards achieving the NDCs…". Similarly, Submission 46 (AILAC, 2017x), as a visible statement in the negotiating plenary, states "AILAC also considers that Article 6, paragraphs 2, 4 and 8 is important for achieving nationally determined contributions and increasing ambition thereof…In this regard, it is essential to design guidelines and robust rules that ensure that the results of mitigation **market approaches** are real, measurable and verifiable. A similar approach should be applied to **non-market activities** with regards to the transparent presentation of results."

In 3 of AILAC's 5 submissions focused on Article Six, non-markets are covered, although the amount of text dedicated to this in Article Six is considerably less than that dedicated to markets, and where non-markets are discussed, much more text focuses on defining the topic than occurs in text on market approaches. Submission 16 (AILAC, 2016g) dedicates 3 paragraphs to non-markets, versus 5 paragraphs each for Article 6.2's ITMOs and 6.4's market mechanism, and the first paragraph simply clarifies AILAC's understanding of non-markets:

"*With a view to pursue the design of the work programme for non-market approaches to sustainable development as per Article 6, paragraph 8 of the Paris Agreement, AILAC would like to state its understanding that non-market approaches are those cooperative approaches, involving two or more parties, where no transfer of ITMOs occurs in the implementation of NDCs.*"

The following 2 paragraphs then suggest that work on Article 6.8 be undertaken in collaborative spaces outside of the UNFCCC – "For AILAC this work programme should be circumscribed to international collaborative initiatives that are not developed anywhere else under the UNFCCC process" - also suggesting that all results should still adhere to the transparency framework's rules. By contrast, the rest of the submission suggests such details as metrics for quantification of ITMO outcomes, reporting protocols thereof (e.g. to avoid double counting), and lessons learned from implementation of previous market mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. Submission 44 (AILAC, 2017v) is similarly structured, but to an even more extreme degree – just 3 paragraphs out of 40 are dedicated to non-market approaches, which state that the non-markets section of the Paris Agreement work programme "should be focused on providing a general description on how main guiding principles of the Article 6 of the PA will be operationalized", and that "a decision on this issue should include a list of criteria that non-market approaches implemented by Parties should fulfil". Each gives 3 brief suggestions, but no more detail, while the last of these paragraphs simply says that "a decision on this issue should include modalities through which Parties exchange experiences or joint implementation of non-market approaches should be facilitated". Submission 32 (AILAC, 2017j) follows a similar pattern, with only 4 of 20 paragraphs on non-markets, whereas market approaches also feature illustrative diagrams and tables to support the suggestions in these sections (see Figures 8 and 9, below). In the group's remaining 2 markets-focused submissions, non-markets are ignored completely, as these submissions focus on 6.2[65] (AILAC, 2018k) and 6.4[66] (AILAC, 2018l) respectively, although these were made jointly with several other parties.

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[65] Submission made jointly with Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Switzerland
[66] Submission made jointly with AOSIS, the European Union, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, and Switzerland

Figure 8: Submission 32's Diagram for Articles 6.2 and 6.4 (AILAC, 2017j)

TABLE 2. PROPOSAL FOR ELEMENTS OF THE RULES, MODALITIES AND PROCEDURES ON THE MECHANISM ESTABLISHED BY ARTICLE 6 PARAGRAPH 4

1. Overarching principles
2. Definitions
   2.1. Additionality
   2.2. Overall mitigation
   2.3. Others
3. Modalities of the mitigation mechanism under 6.4
4. Scope of activities of mechanism under 6.4
5. Relationship between article 6.2 and article 6.4
6. Governance and institutional arrangements
   6.1. Role and functions of the Governing Body
   6.2. Role and functions of DNAs
   6.3. Role and functions of DOEs
7. Accounting and transparency
   7.1. Methodologies
   7.2. International registry
   7.3. Using of mitigation outcomes to be counted towards NDCs goals
8. Cycle of the activities eligible to the mechanism
   8.1. Monitoring
   8.2. Validation
   8.3. Registration

4

   8.4. Verification
   8.5. Issuance of mitigation outcomes
9. Accreditation of DOEs
10. Periodic certification of mechanisms outside the UNFCCC
11. Share of proceeds

Figure 9: Submission 32's Table for Suggested Components for the RMPs of Article 6.4

(AILAC, 2017j)

6.3.3 Compromise in Negotiating Sessions

Besides examples of compromise in AILAC submissions, interviewees reported that pursuit of compromise is a strategy used often by AILAC delegates in negotiating sessions[67], as it aligns with AILAC's stated aims of bridge-building and seeking to build spaces for consensus. One delegate stated the group is "*very flexible with the language*"[68] in negotiating sessions to allow for phrasings and terms that are acceptable to the broadest range of parties possible – as one support unit advisor put it, to find "*the most ambitious common denominator*" "*because we are very interested in protecting multilateralism and building bridges*"[69]. The group does try to infuse its compromise positions with as much ambition as possible, in line with AILAC's other aims of generating ambitious and progressive positions and driving viable proposals forward. One delegate explained "*normally we try to bring the, like, the positive elements from other positions and put [them] inside of our submission as part of the consensus.*"[70] 2 interviewees cited use of compromise in relation to other strategies[71]; two delegates reported that AILAC uses compromise as a strategy in spaces outside the large plenary negotiating sessions, and cited examples of compromise in bilateral meetings with other groups[72], and in informal spaces. In particular, corridor conversations are used to steer the mode of negotiation away from concessions trading in the plenaries:

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[67] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; Interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018
[68] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018
[69] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018
[70] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018
[71] These will be analysed in more detail below.
[72] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018

"Or, err, but I don't think it's really the way we do things, actually [concessions trading]. *So we just try to move things directly from the microphone, or directly with the negotiators in the halls, err, just to try to get to an agreement – 'Hey, this position from you is really difficult for me, so let's try to find a way out'."* [73]

However, there are disadvantages to pursuing compromises in negotiating sessions. One interviewee stated that because AILAC tends to seek the middle ground from the beginning, when the presidency of a COP or SB chair convenes selected parties to find agreement on a text, AILAC can be isolated. In their words:

"...that leaves us in a space of vulnerability. Why? Because then sometimes we are left out of the room, in the last, last nights of the COP, because what the presidency is trying to do is bring together those two extremes. So, who's called into that room? It's the LMDCs, or the Umbrella Group and the LMDCs"[74]

AILAC is therefore discounted on the assumption that it will support a compromise. Ironically, then, the presidency's attempts at bridge-building can inadvertently exclude the group actively seeking the same objective. Furthermore, because AILAC's identity is tied to seeking compromise and consensus, the group has much less room for manoeuvre with other strategies, as other parties will expect AILAC to revert to type in crunch moments. As one former delegate put it:

"…and that [bridge-building identity] *makes us not great negotiators, because presidencies tend to know that we will probably concede unless it's really major. Other countries are much more willing to just be a pain for minor things, and we, we don't play that way, but that's costly in terms of your political liberty for the negotiations."*[75]

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[73] Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018
[74] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018
[75] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018

Therefore, it allows other parties to try other strategies with AILAC, or perhaps to make stronger requests or demands on the group, safe in the knowledge that AILAC will concede at least some ground "*for the sake of a greater good*"[76].

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[76] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018

Chapter 7: Persuasion and Rational Argument

7.1 Introduction

A third strategy which AILAC uses in the climate change negotiations is persuasion and rational argument. As with constructive proposals, persuasion is inherently linked to AILAC's use of technical submissions to legitimise its technical power/knowledge underpinnings, while also relying on tactical knowledge for deployment in negotiation sessions. This chapter analyses AILAC's persuasion strategies in 3 parts. It considers first, how AILAC uses persuasion and rational argument within its submission texts, citing direct evidence from the texts themselves to demonstrate 5 methods; secondly, the group's attempts to persuade within in-session negotiations, providing examples targeting different coalitions and states and of how persuasion links to other strategies; and third, different influences on AILAC's rationale for using persuasion and rational argument, both in terms of when using the strategy and the reasons for doing so in the first place.

7.2 Uses of Persuasion and Rational Argument in Submission Texts

There is evidence throughout AILAC submissions of attempts at persuasion although not addressed to any specific party. Instead persuasion appears in the form of justifications for suggestions and rational arguments for AILAC's case. These were identified through textual analysis in 50 of the 62 AILAC submissions, including 8 of the 13 in-session statements.

Justifications for AILAC proposals were made in 5 ways: through forceful language, using references, examples, further explanation, and visual presentation.

7.2.1 Forceful Language

A common set-up in the submission texts is to make a substantive proposal using forceful language (i.e. beyond use of the word "should"), for example presenting an idea in a proposal as "necessary", "fundamental", "urgent", "crucial", "pivotal", with AILAC "urging" or stressing the "urgency" that a proposal is accepted, or that a proposal "must", "needs", or "has to" be enacted, preceded or followed by a justification. Linking words and phrases such as "therefore", "in order to", "for this purpose", and the use of infinitives connect the clauses and sentences containing proposals with supporting justifications. This clearly demonstrates AILAC recognises the need to present readers with a well-reasoned proposition for the proposals it supports most strongly, reflected in initial use of more forceful language in place of or alongside use of "should" phrases associated with constructive proposals. Textual analysis identified this syntactic construction in 38 of 62 submissions, while corpus-linguistic analysis pinpointed frequencies of the above terms in this justificatory context, as well as their comparative frequencies in the Brown reference corpus, as shown in Table 6 below. This also allows for the calculation of their log-likelihoods and therefore the confidence levels where a statistically significant difference between the 2 corpora can be reasonably assumed. Only 2 terms do not reach the critical value for 99.99% confidence of a statistically significant difference – the verb construction "has/have to", and the adjective "pivotal", although the latter has an extremely small incidence rate.

Table 6: Frequencies of Corpus-Linguistic "Forceful" Language Tokens

Token	Frequency in AILAC Submissions	Frequency in Brown Reference Corpus	Log-Likelihood (99.99% Confidence Threshold = 15.13)
"Need/s/ed"	488	751	699.07
"Must"	197	1013	36.39
"Necessary"	107	222	115.34
"Fundamental/ly"	58	69	100.91
"Critical"	34	58	44.52
"Urge/s/nt/cy"	33	62	37.07
"Crucial"	30	30	58.32
"Has/have to"	22	337	8.71
"Pivotal"	2	1	5.39

A few examples help illustrate how AILAC uses these terms to persuade the reader of its viewpoint. Submission 10 (AILAC, 2016a), on the technical examination process on adaptation (TEP-A), argues that parties have not committed to enough action in the pre-2020 period, and that this should be rectified. It begins its section A by stating that:

"*AILAC remains concerned with the existing emissions gap of 10 to 17 GtCO₂e per year between Parties' resulting from mitigation commitments and actions, versus the level of mitigation ambition needed to achieve the aforementioned average global temperature goal. Particularly vulnerable countries, including those of AILAC, will be disproportionately affected by the increased costs and risks associated with delayed and insufficient action on mitigation and adaptation.*"

Using the above reasoning as a pre-emptive justification, the same paragraph goes on to state:

"*Therefore, the Enhanced Action Prior to 2020 must address the gaps in climate action that we are currently facing.*"

AILAC therefore feels enabled to use stronger language than the advisory "should", arguing instead, that action gaps "must" be addressed because it has made the case for doing so, here by invoking a moral aspect in its reasoning alongside technical detail on emissions gaps and temperature goals. A further proposal and justification builds on this in the following paragraph:

"*AILAC believes that the TEP-A must provide a political and technical setting under the Convention for Parties to identify opportunities to dramatically increase implementation of adaptation actions in all countries.*"

AILAC can again use the word "must" because it is providing a justification. To give extra credibility to these ideas and demonstrate how they might work in practice, the rest of the submission then sets out a more detailed clarification of what the proposed TEP-A should entail in terms of process and topics.

Submission 29 (AILAC, 2017g), on the Standing Committee on Finance, contains various suggestions from AILAC about the scope of the work the SCF should undertake. The fourth of these proposes the SCF "should play a more active role in the work related to the mobilization of finance." The same paragraph develops this proposal further, stating "it is crucial that work is done in this regarding building upon lessons learned and previous experiences from different actors and sources of information". However, the first word of this sentence clause is "therefore", and it follows 2 sentences of rational argument as justification for both the original proposal vis-à-vis the SCF's purview and the latter idea on lessons learned:

"From the establishment of the SCF, several questions were raised in terms of the scope of this function. Throughout time, it has become evident that the reporting, monitoring and verification of private climate finance poses significant methodological challenges for the existing system; therefore it is crucial…"

Nevertheless, AILAC is seemingly wary of appearing dictatorial, as frequently use of stronger language than a simple "should" proposal is attenuated by use of qualifying phrases at the beginning of a sentence. To take one example among many, Submission 11 (AILAC, 2016b), on the work programme for the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement, contains a paragraph on the APA agenda which reads as follows:

"As particularly vulnerable countries, AILAC underscores that adaptation to climate change continues to be of the utmost importance for our Parties and that adaptation must further be given parity in the preparation of the entry into force of the Paris Agreement. Currently, the Paris Agreement and decision 1/CP.21 have decided that many tasks related to adaptation will be carried out by the Adaptation Committee in some cases in conjunction with the Least Developed Countries Group of Experts (LEG) and in other provisions with other bodies including the Standing Committee of Finance… For AILAC, it is essential that the APA Agenda provides a space to coordinate with these other bodies on the preparation of entry into force of Article 7, and that this work be coherent with that of the APA…."

Through this careful use of strong language ("must further be given parity", it is essential"), AILAC argues robustly for priority status for adaptation within the work programme of the APA through a justification invoking the importance of adaptation measures for countries especially vulnerable to climate change effects. However, the use of "it is essential" is preceded by "For AILAC", implying this is only AILAC's perspective, thereby allowing room for interpretation as to AILAC's intentions. In other words, it allows the reader to interpret this

sentence not as AILAC demanding that the APA agenda give a dedicated space for adaptation, but rather as a signal of the topic's importance for AILAC evidenced through its reasoning, and therefore as a justified proposal which still fits within the group's identity as a constructive actor in the negotiations rather than a difficult partner making demands and trying to control the UNFCCC agenda.

7.2.2 References

AILAC submissions seek to persuade that their proposals are justified through the use of references. These primarily reference either existing legal and/or treaty texts within the UNFCCC, such as the Paris Agreement and COP decisions, or scientific reports, e.g. from the IPCC or UNEP. In referencing these texts, and therefore the bodies which have authored them, AILAC seek to situate their proposals within the context of authoritative perspectives, namely text already approved in UNFCCC negotiations, or scientific and technical experts on climate change. AILAC can therefore "borrow" persuasive power for their ideas, albeit not as directly as AOSIS (Betzold, 2010), given AILAC has its own in-house technical experts in the support unit and national delegations able to interpret and utilise scientific data to support their arguments, rather than relying on external NGOs.

Textual analysis of AILAC submissions identified instances of references to external text in 29 AILAC submissions, showing this was a commonly used strategy. For example, Submission 9 (AILAC, 2015b) outlines the "rationale that support[s] keeping and strengthening…human rights language in the Paris Agreement." Part of the case for this proposal, continuing the rational argument at the beginning of the text where AILAC explains links between climate change and human rights, is made by referencing existing UNFCCC

decisions which have made similar connections. It specifies 4 COP decisions where human rights have been promoted, as well as REDD+ safeguards, and 3 published decisions of the Green Climate Fund, to demonstrate a precedent for human rights-focused language within the Convention and therefore that it is legitimate to preserve the inclusion of such topics. Several of these decisions are quoted directly, such as Decision 1/CP.16. Submission 9 states that:

"*Decision 1/CP.16 states that 'Parties should, in all climate change related actions, fully respect human rights'. The same decision notes the Resolution of the United Nations Human Rights Council on human rights and climate change, 'which recognizes that the adverse effects of climate change have a range of direct and indirect implications for the effective enjoyment of human rights and that the effects of climate change will be felt most acutely by those segments of the population that are already vulnerable owing to geography, gender, age, indigenous or minority status, or disability.'*"

Submission 4 (AILAC, 2014b) details AILAC's proposals for accelerating the implementation of climate action pre-2020. The rationale for these proposals is that acceleration of action is necessary given the available scientific information on the "emissions gaps" between parties' emissions reduction commitments at the time, and the commitments required to hold warming to below increases of either 2°C or 1.5°C, which would go on to be the stated aim of the Paris Agreement. The submission references a UNEP report in its footnotes, from where it can cite the relevant data, namely the "existing emissions gap of 10 to 17 $GtCO_2e$ per year between Parties' existing mitigation commitments and actions, versus the level of mitigation ambition needed to hold the global average temperature increase to below 2°C or 1.5°C." It references again to support AILAC's argument, citing the Summary for Policymakers of the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report, stating that "Recent scientific information presented in the Fifth IPCC Assessment report has confirmed that global greenhouse gas emissions are still accelerating despite the current existing reduction efforts".

7.2.3 Examples

AILAC also uses persuasion in its submission texts is by providing specific examples to justify their arguments. Examples help to illustrate AILAC's points in greater detail and clarify the context in which they are situated in several instances. In Submission 6 (AILAC, 2014d), AILAC argues "Adaptation is a matter of *collective responsibility* on addressing climate change, ensuring sustainable development and eradication [of] poverty, and should be treated as such under the Convention and in the new Agreement." The following sentence elaborates on how adaptation can assist with sustainable development and poverty eradication: "Climate change impacts, and thus adaptation opportunities are central to development efforts in developing countries in several sectors such as health, culture, water, food security, biodiversity and ecosystem services, affecting the most vulnerable and causing migrations and climate refugees." By providing more detail with these examples – namely, the numerous ways in which these countries will be affected without adaptation - AILAC shows fellow developing countries why they should take adaptation seriously and contribute towards the collective responsibility they advocate. AILAC does the same for developed countries, identifying issues more likely to resonate with them, such as biodiversity and ecosystem service loss, and proliferation of climate refugees. Examples are used similarly in Submission 33 (AILAC, 2017k), where AILAC considers the links between NDCs and transparency. It states that "…AILAC is of the view that having clear and well described mitigation goals, through the presentation of clear and complete upfront information, will facilitate tracking their progress in an easier and more transparent manner." The following sentence uses an example to clarify why such clear goals are beneficial and worthy of inclusion in NDCs: "For example, if a Party provides complete information that helps to understand how the LULUCF sector is included in

its NDC, it would be easier to track the progress of mitigation actions in this sector and, therefore, progress of its NDC."

AILAC further uses examples as persuasion to justify its arguments by illustrating how ideas can be put into practice in specific contexts. Submission 23 (AILAC, 2017a) contains a section on steps "necessary to facilitate the mobilization of support for adaptation in developing countries" in the context of a 2°C warming limit. One of these steps, AILAC suggests, would be to "…enhance the use of public finance and policy interventions to create regulation and incentives to promote the mobilization of resources for adaptation action." The submission then provides 5 specific examples of how this could be achieved, namely:

"*a. Identifying co-benefits in public and private investment opportunities that deliver both adaptation and mitigation outcomes in strategic areas such as energy, land use, land-use change and forestry, as well as cities and major infrastructure projects.*

b. Improve information disclosure in financial markets so risks can be priced and better managed.

c. Strengthen the co-benefits between adaptation and mitigation actions.

d. Develop incentives to investment of adaptation action i.e. financial incentives to develop certain crops that are more apt for specific territories (considering expected climate change impacts) than in others.

e. Create and strengthen adequate norms and institutional arrangements."

By providing this list of suggested examples, AILAC bolsters its argument for resource mobilisation regulation and incentives by demonstrating concretely how this could be achieved. This transforms AILAC's argument from a vague proposal to one with practical

solutions for implementation, making it a more credible proposal deserving serious consideration, rather than one to be dismissed for lack of detail. Similar uses of examples occur in numerous other AILAC submissions, such as Submission 8 (AILAC, 2015a), made jointly with the EIG, about the organisation of an in-session workshop on gender in climate policy. This provides examples of how 5 AILAC countries have already integrated gender into their national climate policies, thereby justifying an in-session workshop as there are already lessons to be shared. Submission 21 (AILAC, 2016l) also uses examples to bolster an argument by showing how AILAC's proposals could be put into practice. Here, AILAC argues any adaptation communication by parties to the UNFCCC must be consistent with existing methods of providing information to the Convention. It justifies this, arguing that existing instruments "can serve as a basis for the adaptation communication and its consideration would help to avoid unnecessary additional efforts." The next sentence then details 3 examples of existing informational instruments – the National Communication, the National Adaptation Plan, and the NDC, In a sub-section for each of these instruments, the submission elaborates on AILAC's vision as to how they relate to the adaptation communication. For example, the group describes the National Communication as providing input and "a basis to identify needs to be submitted in the adaptation communication", while the NDC should be the "main vehicle for the adaptation communication" because of its success thus far in building political support for adaptation in the Convention.

7.2.4 Further Explanation

AILAC submissions attempt to persuade the reader of the reasonableness of its perspectives by dedicating extra text to more extensive explanations. As several delegates identified, AILAC

values highly the tactic of explaining the group's positions within an overall strategy of persuasion, as persuasion is less effective when the target audience has little or no understanding of the positions being communicated or the perspectives from which they originate[77]. Rather than an extra sentence or clause within a sentence to justify a proposal, the submission texts can explain the underlying thinking in more depth, or where the justification is multifaceted, in a paragraph or two to press home the point more forcefully and head off any potential criticisms of the proposal before delegates reach the negotiating room. An example of this is found in Submission 6 (AILAC, 2014d) on the nature of the then-future Paris Agreement. The second paragraph of the section entitled General Considerations makes the case for the Paris Agreement explicitly recognising a link between climate action and development, as shown below:

"*The link between climate change and development options should be clearly reflected on the legally binding agreement. Climate change is a direct threat to development. This threat is represented in the impacts that climate change has in all countries, and especially in those developing countries that are particularly vulnerable, which directly undermine the efforts to achieve sustainable development by inflicting incalculable losses in their economic, social and environmental structures and development trajectories, and undermining efforts to guarantee the well-being of their populations. Thus, climate change is a threat to the equitable right to development, not because the need to limit emissions, but because its impacts limit development opportunities and undermines development gains. Poverty eradication efforts are therefore challenged.*"

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[77] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

Given the initial suggestion is vague at face value, it requires further elaboration in the paragraph that follows, which allows for greater explanation of the links between climate change and development, equity, and poverty to make the point more forcefully and convincingly. It also allows AILAC to link this paragraph to 2 further suggestions in the following paragraph, that the Paris Agreement's focus should "be on options and actions that all countries can pursue in order to pursue sustainable development pathways compatible with climate protection" and that "The new legally binding agreement should set the conditions for a global economy of growth that is climate sensitive: a 'Climate Global Economy'".

Submission 7 (AILAC, 2014e) attempts to persuade by using extra text in a similar way. In it, AILAC argues that the then-future Paris Agreement "should include an aspirational goal on adaptation" incorporating 4 features which it then sets out. The fourth of these is that the goal should include "the undeniable relationship" between mitigation ambition, climate impacts, adaptation needs and costs, and loss & damage. It then elaborates on this claim, which forms the basis of the justification, with 2 further sentences, spelling out the ramifications of more or less mitigation ambition on adaptation needs and costs, and losses & damages, which are inversely proportional. Other examples of AILAC taking time to develop justifications in more detail appear in Submissions 23 (relating to the incorporation of socio-economic data into climate models) (AILAC, 2017a), 34 (relating to AILAC's proposal for adaptation communications to report on future plans rather than progress already made) (AILAC, 2017l), and 40 (relating to AILAC's concern about the GST being "over-designed") (AILAC, 2017r), among others, and in particular, the aforementioned example of AILAC's constructive proposals on common timeframes (Submission 50 – AILAC, 2018b). These still amount to persuasion given AILAC's view that common timeframes of some kind should apply to NDCs, and Submission 50 deliberately presents 3 scenarios of common timeframes of different lengths and harmonisation dates *after* outlining the scenario of NDCs with no common timeframes.

This means that these subsequent ideas linger for longer in the mind of the reader, especially given that the Submission is set up to present the difficulties of a no-CT scenario ("If common timeframes for NDCs are not agreed, several important challenges will be faced" and then considering them in 3 substantial paragraphs) versus the benefits – albeit with rational thought on potential disadvantages – of CTs, e.g. "…a common timeframe of implementation based on a periodicity of 5 years would be the most consistent choice for the timing feature of NDCs…"

7.2.5 Visual Presentation

AILAC submissions use persuasion to support their proposals also through visual presentation. Using a list format to set out reasons justifying proposals allows for clear and concise representation of ideas. The clearer the information, the greater chance of gaining other parties' support given that delegates are required to read and interpret huge volumes of text, often in a language other than their mother tongue, potentially presenting linguistic challenges. Formatting text can offer similar benefits. Since 2014 (AILAC, 2014c), AILAC submissions have used bolding of text, italicisation, and underlining to emphasise key or specific points and improve the clarity of messages. A good example is found in Submission 5 (AILAC, 2014c), on the proposed nature of NDCs under the then-would-be Paris Agreement. The text says "AILAC has stated that the scope of INDCs should include contributions on mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation." The adaptation component of this proposal is justified in a separate section below, beginning with a paragraph reading: "Having national contributions on adaptation serves multiple purposes and these purposes will shape the potential UFI [up-front information]." The following paragraph is then sub-divided 5 times,

with each sub-division focusing on an individual purpose, thereby clearly spelling out the AILAC rationale:

"*1. To communicate how parties will contribute to the global goal on adaptation*

2. To help the international community further understand the actions to be undertaken by parties, thereby facilitating collaborative efforts amongst countries.

3. To foster national ambitious action on climate change

4. To recognize parties' efforts to combat climate change

5. To facilitate potential adaptation action as Parties distinguish adaptation contributions made with their own resources from additional adaptation efforts they would carry out with support."

Submission 15 (AILAC, 2016f), on the relationship between the IPCC and the Global Stocktake provides further evidence of improved clarity in AILAC submissions due to text formatting. This submission uses all 3 formatting options noted above. Paragraph 2, in the background context section, uses both italics and underlining to clarify the precise aim of the submission:

"Following the first session of the APA in May 2016, Parties were invited to submit their views on *the identification of the <u>sources of input for the global stocktake; and the development of the modalities of the global stocktake</u>, noting the work under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on advice on how the assessments of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change can inform the global stocktake.*

Here the italicised font is also used to signify that the wording is not originally AILAC's, but taken from the aforementioned APA session. Nevertheless, the formatting clearly signposts

that the focus of the rest of the submission is the IPCC-GST relationship. Paragraph 7 contains the submission's key point, and uses a bold font for emphasis:

"Building on this extensive experience and bearing in mind the benchmarks established under Article 2 of the Paris Agreement as well as the long term goals under Article 4 paragraph 1 and Article 7 paragraph1 and the guidance included in Article 7 paragraph 14, **AILAC foresees that the IPCC should be requested to include the periodical preparation of special reports to serve as input on the year that the GST is to take place. This should be done in a timely manner that is consistent with the timings of the GST**."

The rest of the submission develops this initial idea and presents AILAC's suggestions for the content and manner of delivery of the IPCC's special reports, but remains based on the initial idea highlighted in bold. This makes the "take-home" message clear for the reader. Use of these formatting options is common across several other AILAC submissions, and is found in both technical documents and statements to negotiating sessions (see, for example, Submission 23 (AILAC, 2017a), Submission 40 (AILAC, 2017r), and Submission 56 (AILAC, 2018h) amongst others).

Diagrams and tables are used similarly to achieve clarity in AILAC's submission texts. In addition to the benefits of clear and concise presentation, diagrams and visual representation may allow for the simplification of complex ideas and concepts which a reader may not otherwise find immediately easy to process. Submission 34 (2017l) uses a diagram to make AILAC's proposal for the components of a party's adaptation communication more easily intelligible. The submission has 2 dense paragraphs of text in small font outlining AILAC's ideas on the National Communication, National Adaptation Plan, and NDC as a basis for an adaptation communication. However, bearing in mind time pressures on delegates to read other groups' submissions, the submission includes a diagram (see Figure 10) succinctly

summarising the fundamental relationship between these components as they relate to an adaptation communication from AILAC's perspective. This allows AILAC to put its proposals across more effectively, improving the chances of a reader understanding and accepting them.

Figure 10: Submission 34's "Potential Linkages Amongst Vehicles Mentioned in Art. 7.11 if Party chooses to use the range of instruments made available to them" (AILAC, 2017l)

7.3 Uses of Persuasion and Rational Argument in Negotiation Sessions

As well as within the "textual space" of the AILAC submissions, AILAC negotiators use persuasion within in-session negotiations at COPs, SB meetings, and bilaterals with other groups and parties. 8 of the 13 statements, delivered aloud by AILAC delegates in plenary negotiation sessions, contain evidence of persuasion and rational argument. According to most AILAC interviewees (24 of 35), this is built on using persuasion and rational argument in face-to-face meetings with other parties' and groups' negotiators. However, an important point made by an AILAC delegate – and reflected by the fact that persuasion was not cited by every single AILAC interviewee - is that it should not be assumed that persuasion is used uniformly

by AILAC across every topic of negotiation, and that its use depends on the dynamics of each negotiating track[78].

Nevertheless, the strategy is clearly well-used by the group across a wide range of UNFCCC negotiations. Asked about the group's use of persuasion in in-session meetings, a former support unit member, responded:

"*How would you do this otherwise? How would you negotiate differently than that? ...I think we generally always try to change people's minds because there's no other way to argue in good faith in a negotiation. Otherwise, there are some points where it becomes to impossible or too difficult*"[79]

One AILAC delegate labelled negotiation by persuasion as "*our main construction, always*"[80]. Another even bemoaned that AILAC negotiators "*don't know how to negotiate – they only use persuasion*" without understanding the reasons for other parties taking the positions that they do[81], although this latter point is questionable, given the research conducted by the support unit on other groups and parties, which will be discussed in the following section. The latter perception is also challenged by information provided by another former AILAC delegate, who stated the group is "*super careful with the framing of the words*" in delivering its arguments "*because we're always trying to...we use certain words that we know will speak to certain groups*"[82], thus implying an understanding of other groups' rationale.

Interviews with AILAC delegates and support unit members yielded numerous examples of AILAC negotiators using such framing of persuasion attempts to suit particular negotiating partners. When AILAC knows that a particular group or party shares its position

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[78] Interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018
[79] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018
[80] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018
[81] Interview with AILAC delegate, 10th July 2018
[82] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018

on an issue, the group attempts to persuade them to join forces in making the case for an AILAC proposal, even though their particular preferences on the issue may differ slightly from those of AILAC. AILAC does this by framing its approach to them in terms of the need for a united front [83], and to reinforce the idea that they essentially share ideas with AILAC, even if they are expressed slightly differently, meaning that together they can have more of an impact on the negotiations' outcome.[84]

7.3.1 LMDCs

Several interviewees provided evidence of thorough and even somewhat cautious approaches when persuading the LMDCs group. Within the GST negotiating track, one AILAC delegate stated the group's attempts at persuading the LMDCs depend on framing the group's proposals as the product of rigorous analysis, backed up by technical evidence: "*when I talk to the LMDCs…the conversation gets, or has to be, like, really structured in AILAC's position, and it has to be presented that we have worked on it, that we have been doing our homework, and if we want something, it's because we have thought about it.*"[85] A support unit advisor agreed, remarking that AILAC attempts to persuade the LMDCs have to be "*constrained and scripted*"[86]. In the transparency negotiations, one support unit advisor stated a key element of AILAC's relationship with the LMDCs is to recognise their position - that they will not agree to further obligations because they believe developed parties have not yet met their own commitments, in particular relating to finance. The advisor stated AILAC recognises the power

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[83] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018
[84] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018
[85] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018
[86] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018

of this position politically, but the group still attempts to persuade the LMDCs to support its proposals for greater universal transparency commitments because of AILAC's ambition for effective climate action, and therefore when putting proposals to the LMDCs, "*only when you show that what you might do could get the developed countries to also move are they more open.*"[87] Another support unit advisor agreed with this view of persuasion attempts towards the LMDCs: "*you need to find a way of striking that nerve from a place that appeals to them, and what appeals to an LMDC position is, naturally, finance. So you want to emphasise that you're willing to go all the way as the G77 and stick it to the developed world, but for that to have an echo, we need to have some movement in such and such.*"[88] However, wary of the political power of the LMDCs, and that they often oppose AILAC's views, the support unit advisor also stated that sometimes AILAC needs to feed its ideas to other parties in order that they are seemingly the originators of these proposals as far as the LMDCs are concerned: "*sometimes you get resistance from the LMDCs just because it came from us – so it can't come from us. So, sometimes it's about floating the ideas in the right way so that they fly, and that they come from a neutral ground.*"

7.3.2 AGN

AILAC interviewees also spoke of similarly cautious approaches to persuasion of the AGN. Indeed, the delegate who remarked on the need for a structured AILAC position, framed as the product of rigorous analysis and technical expertise when approaching the LMDCs, said the same of negotiations with the AGN[89]. 2 support unit advisors explicitly described the AILAC

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[87] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018
[88] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018
[89] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018

approach to persuading the AGN as "*cautious*"[90] – "*given that, as I say, they can stab us very badly, and wound us, and we are very, I would say, defensive of that*"[91] The fears referenced here by the advisor relate to a dispute between AILAC and the AGN within the UNFCCC negotiations over whether African countries should be given the same special circumstances in the Paris Agreement as the LDCs and SIDS countries have, as under Article 9.4 this would enable African states' access to prioritisation for support from developed states alongside the LDCs and SIDS. According to a former support unit advisor, since 2016, and particularly during 2018, the AGN has put forward proposals for an agenda item to discuss making this change[92] after Latin American states vetoed it at COP21. This remains unacceptable for AILAC, "*because basically if you have LDCs, SIDS, and Africa – the only region that is not there from the developing world is Latin America*"[93], thus signifying that Latin America would be at the bottom of the priority list for support from developed states. As a support unit advisor remarked:

"*We respect the key vulnerability and recognise the key vulnerability of SIDS and LDCs, but we don't want our vulnerability to be taken for granted. That's, that's a very big red line for AILAC. Err, as you know, Latin America is, is one of the, err, continents with greater inequalities, and, err, and we need that to not be invisibilised. And we cannot come back to capital with, err, the legal, the rule book of the legally-binding agreement we just adopted with us out of the mix, no? So having something like SIDS, LDCs, and Africa is a total no-go for us.*"[94]

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[90] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018
[91] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018
[92] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; the item can be seen on UNFCCC meeting agendas, such as in item 16 in the provisional agenda for COP24 (UNFCCC, 2018a)
[93] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018
[94] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018

Indeed, the delicate situation is even addressed in AILAC submissions. Submission 48 (AILAC, 2017z) states:

"*AILAC recognizes very respectfully the particular conditions of the Least Developed Countries and the Small Island Developing States, as is also recognized in the Agreement and in Decision 1/CP.21. In this sense, we note with concern the intention to continue the informal consultations focused on the circumstances and special needs of Africa, despite the fact that already for a long time it has been shown that this subject puts at risk the delicate balance achieved in Paris to attend to the circumstances of all developing countries.*"

Because of this profound disagreement with the AGN, therefore, AILAC's attempts at persuading the group on other matters are understandably cautious, as it is wary of creating tensions with the AGN that may hamper the progress of the negotiations as a whole – something which both groups need to advance rapidly, given their own vulnerabilities to climate change effects.

7.3.3 ALBA

AILAC adopts a particular framing approach when attempting to persuade ALBA to back its proposals. As mentioned in Chapter 6, ALBA states are known to prefer state-led economies and for an aversion towards market mechanisms in climate policy (Watts and Depledge, 2018). AILAC is aware of this, and as a result attempts persuasion with sensitivity to ALBA's principles, adjusting its wording accordingly when putting forward proposals or speaking to them. As one former support unit advisor stated, *"…you balance the text, and you say these*

words in different places, and that helps them see themselves in different places."[95] Another AILAC support unit advisor spoke of recognising the importance to ALBA of climate justice and equity[96], epitomised by its adoption of the discourse of the "rights of Mother Earth" (Watts and Depledge, 2018:7). Although they noted that the current relationship between AILAC and ALBA is difficult because of the two blocs' fundamental differences in political philosophy, an AILAC delegate did state that any AILAC outreach attempts towards ALBA would need to be transmitted through a prism of climate justice and equity to have any chance of being received positively[97].

7.3.4 Developed Parties

AILAC's approach to persuading developed states also follows a particular framing pattern which is, in a sense, not to use framing. According to several interviewees, AILAC engages straightforwardly with developed states, like the EU or Umbrella Group members, without any particular political angle. One delegate stated their conversations with developed states' negotiators, at least in the GST work stream, are always "*really frank and open – 'OK, I want this, I don't want this, we have common ground in this' – really fluent*"[98], while a support unit advisor added that the group interacts with developed states "*from a very realistic point of view on what's possible for them politically or not, and we bear that in mind to achieve an outcome, because we are very mindful of the fact that if they're not on board, then we might have, like, the shiniest thing altogether and it's not going to produce and result in a solution to the*

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[95] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018
[96] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018
[97] Interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018
[98] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018

problem."[99] Therefore, AILAC is mindful of the importance to climate action of developed states' participation, given their sizable contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions, and is as straightforward as possible with these parties to encourage their active participation. The same advisor even characterised the engagement with developed parties as "*honest*", perhaps differentiating this approach from the group's persuasion attempts with other parties in that with developed parties, there is no particular angle with which to frame persuasion other than pragmatism:

"*So, with each player, you know what's going to work for them. I think, when you speak to developed countries, you tend to do that less, because you speak to them from a pragmatic point of view. Like, 'I know that you're developed and everything, and that you want China to do their share, but that's not what's written down in the Convention. And we need to work with what we have.' And so you speak to them in the context of Cartagena, or when you speak to the US, from a very honest place. 'Help me help you', you know? Like, 'If you want me to help you from this side of the aisle', so it's very honest.*"

This pragmatic approach to developed parties is evident in examples from other interviewees. A former delegate explained how they attempted to persuade developed countries in the finance negotiation stream to improve their financial commitments to developing countries. AILAC framed the situation as one where, if developed countries did not pledge to contribute more finance, AILAC would have no choice but to support the wider G77 position on finance - which was generally perceived as more confrontational towards developed parties than AILAC's – even though it did not want to "*set loose the G77*" because of additional complications it brings in reaching an acceptable compromise for all parties.[100]. A former support unit advisor also provided an example from the negotiations over the content of the Paris Agreement in which

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[99] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018
[100] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018

AILAC successfully persuaded the US to compromise on the structure of the Enhanced Transparency Framework. The advisor explained how AILAC negotiators managed to soften their US counterparts' position towards "flexibility" for parties' requirements under the ETF, persuading them that, while AILAC, like the US, did not want a bifurcated classification between Annex I and non-Annex I parties, a singular system which did not differentiate between the capacities of developed and developing countries was not achievable based on positions AILAC knew other parties held at the time[101]. As such, it was AILAC's straightforwardness and decision to be pragmatic in this situation which yielded results from the US delegation.

7.3.5 Persuasion's Links to Other Strategies

Other interviewees identified links between persuasion and constructive proposals and compromise, noting in particular the relationship with the latter in in-session negotiations. A former AILAC delegate stated that compromise and persuasion go hand in hand, explaining that AILAC attempts to persuade others of its positions "*all the time, but with concrete proposals. Concrete and progressive and tactical proposals, because not everyone is going to agree with us, so we try to find the minimum ground – in other words, we know that we have to give in to some of our tactical lines, but we want to get something back*."[102] A former AILAC support unit advisor commented on the timing element to the persuasion – constructive proposals relationship, noting that the group first attempts to persuade others of its positions, but then follows with new constructive proposals when initial ideas are not accepted in their

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[101] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018
[102] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018

original form or when negotiation becomes difficult, thus sparking a cycle of persuasion and proposals, gradually driving towards compromise[103]. Interestingly, another AILAC delegate observed that the group's grounding in technical and scientific knowledge inoculates its negotiators at least to some degree from against parties' attempts to persuade them of their positions, as they can discern what is or isn't a viable proposition from a technical standpoint, thus allowing them to defend AILAC views which are grounded in the science and thus have solid logical reasoning behind them[104].

In addition, AILAC delegates noted the variation in the spaces where the group uses persuasion and rational argument strategies. As well as face-to-face formal negotiation sessions in UNFCCC events to which the previous interviewees' comments refer, both bilateral meetings[105] and informal spaces, such as corridors or social meetings over drinks or meals,[106] were identified as where AILAC has utilised persuasion[107]. One delegate cited how AILAC negotiators were able to persuade AOSIS negotiators to support AILAC proposals on the global stocktake to represent the G77 as a whole[108], by reminding them during an informal corridor conversation of the two groups' similar interests. AILAC negotiators raised the BASIC position, which involved provision of a carbon budget based on the principle of historical responsibilities that would allow BASIC countries to continue to emit at business-as-usual levels, something AOSIS opposed. Thus, framing AILAC proposals strategically as opposition to that which AOSIS also opposed was key to winning AOSIS support. However, such an example is not as commonplace as some AILAC delegates would like, because AILAC delegates have large portfolios of domestic work to accomplish in addition to their work on

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[103] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018
[104] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018
[105] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd August 2018
[106] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018
[107] The use of informal and different spaces as an AILAC negotiating strategy is discussed in Chapter 8.
[108] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018

international negotiations, thus limiting their time to focus on the latter.[109] Nevertheless, the same delegate did mention that the support unit, because they are employed by the AILAC group rather than national governments, have considerably more time to invest in negotiations outside of the formal spaces of plenaries and work stream sessions, and thus are able to attempt to persuade other negotiators of AILAC positions and proposals here.

7.4 The Rationale Behind Using Persuasion and Rational Argument

7.4.1 Power Dynamics

AILAC's use of persuasion and rational argument is clearly influenced by power dynamics between parties. AILAC lacks the leverage required to attempt more aggressive strategies, such as making threats or demands. If the negotiations are reduced simply to expressions of material power resources (upon which such strategies are based) – namely, economic (and its proxy in climate change negotiations, CO_2 emissions), military, and latent power in the form of population sizes – AILAC cannot hope to have a meaningful influence on the outcome of the climate change negotiations. Its member states are not big emitters, do not possess significant economic clout, nor have strong military power or large populations in a global context. Interviewees demonstrated the group knows its shortcomings in these power resources limit its range of credibly available strategies[110]. One former delegate remarked *"If you are actively trying to engage, but also if you're just a country that's not really important – unless you're very compelling on the mic, it's, like, 'OK, thanks, next'."*[111], while a support unit member

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[109] Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018
[110] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with AILAC support unit member, 16th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018
[111] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018

simply stated "*persuasion's all we have*"[112]. While perhaps an oversimplification, as AILAC does in fact have other strategy options (see Chapters 5, 6, and 8), the basic point rings true, in that AILAC can only credibly use "soft" strategies to pursue its goals within the UNFCCC.

Using persuasion links neatly to strategies discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 – technically rigorous submissions, and constructive proposals and compromise –therefore playing to AILAC's strengths. The credibility required for AILAC's attempts to use persuasion derives from its deep technical and scientific knowledge, which the group aims to convert into political capital for persuasion purposes through its use of technically rigorous submissions, with the intention of making such technical and scientific knowledge the *lingua franca* of the UNFCCC negotiations. Several delegates explicitly stated AILAC's attempts at persuasion are grounded in scientific and technical knowledge[113]. One support unit member went further still, summarising how AILAC's attempts to persuade with rational argument are linked both to technical and scientific knowledge and to the group's constructive proposals and rhetoric:

 "*...so yeah, of course, the aim of, of providing these technical inputs is to inform others, and then as a second, err, phase, or as, as a second step of, of the process, to try to persuade them that by undertaking these very in-depth technical processes within AILAC, we've considered and we've evaluated many different scenarios and many different possibilities and then come up with these as a suggestion or a recommendation to, to others – it's based on, on that specificity of the process and in that very strong consideration of the issues…So I would say that has been very consistent in, in how the group has, has been working since its inception.*"[114]

Therefore, if AILAC is perceived as a serious and credible participant in negotiations which values highly the rôle of technical and scientific knowledge, this carries with it the (justified)

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[112] Interview with AILAC support unit member, 16th October 2018
[113] Interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018
[114] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

implication that its positions are the product of rigorous analysis of the state of play of requirements to address climate change, based on its aforementioned knowledge. This is further boosted by delegates making the conscious decision to maximise clarity in explaining the group's ideas and proposals, a common feature in AILAC negotiating, as numerous delegates stated in interviews[115]. Consequently, AILAC is afforded power/knowledge to attempt to persuade other parties to support any constructive proposals which AILAC puts forward, as they originate from this perceived sense of scientific validity and negotiating credibility based in the group's technical knowledge, which the group attempts to frame as the arbiter of validity across the negotiations as a whole through its technical submissions.

However, such technical power/knowledge can be a blunt tool without an understanding of the ways in which to wield it most effectively. Here AILAC is rich in another form of power/knowledge, namely tactical knowledge about the state of play in the negotiations. The AILAC support unit conducts research in advance of negotiations to determine other groups' and parties' positions, landing zones, and any other useful information which AILAC may use to better its chances of succeeding with persuasion, or indeed any other strategy[116]. This is especially important given 32 of 35 interviewees stated any strategy selection decision depends on the logic of the negotiations at hand, i.e. which option is most likely to yield a satisfactory outcome. 2 former support unit advisors revealed that one of the unit's key tasks since its creation has been the development of a matrix of other parties'

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[115] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

[116] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 9th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

positions, preferences, and potential trade-offs which might allow AILAC delegates to gain traction with them in their negotiations[117] - in simple terms, which buttons to push - or not - on their negotiating partners. This allows AILAC delegates, therefore, to "borrow" power from others' self-interest (Betzold, 2010), by tailoring their attempts at persuasion to suit particular parties and framing their interactions according what the group's knowledge of the target party, as in the aforementioned ways for the LMDCs, AGN, and developed parties, or in the example of persuading AOSIS delegates to support AILAC proposals within the area of the G77 GST negotiations. The support unit provides this information to AILAC delegates as talking points, presentations, and colour-coded documents containing key information on other parties[118], which is often invaluable to AILAC delegates as most of the group's negotiators have little time to dedicate to work on the UNFCCC negotiations because of their demanding domestic work portfolios[119]. Furthermore, as one former AILAC delegate stated, this affects AILAC persuasion attempts both within in-session meetings and submission texts:

"*And we are super careful with the framing of the words, which is, together with who gives the message, it's important, because we're always trying to…we use certain words that we know will speak to certain groups, right? …And so, the text itself, when it's a fully-written intervention, the text itself is super carefully crafted.*"[120]

Tactical knowledge also extends to factors outside of the negotiations which may affect negotiations between parties within the UNFCCC – e.g. the geopolitical relationships between parties. This too is part of the support unit's briefings to the group's negotiators, and can help AILAC negotiators to understand the reasoning behind other groups' positions and

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[117] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

[118] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018

[119] Interview with AILAC delegate, 30th July 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018

[120] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018

preferences; in other words, geopolitical tactical knowledge can inform UNFCCC-specific tactical knowledge. One AILAC delegate gave the example of the African Group: *"…in the case of the African Group…you will understand their positions only if you have the, the vision of what is happening at the UN, and other processes, in finance for development, in SDGs implementation – so it's always important to have an overall view."*[121] Additionally, AILAC's delegation is essentially composed of delegates from the member states' environment and foreign affairs ministries, the latter being more attuned to international relations between AILAC and other parties outside of climate change, and therefore also able to share their insights with their environmentally-focused colleagues.

However, interviewees gave a somewhat mixed response when asked about the degree to which geopolitical considerations affect persuasion attempts. Those from foreign affairs ministries were largely of the opinion (9 of 13) that while geopolitical relations were at the back of the minds of AILAC delegates, framing of persuasion relied mostly on information about other parties' behaviour specifically within the UNFCCC negotiations, as well as technical knowledge from the AILAC support unit and delegates from AILAC member states' environment ministries. As one AILAC delegate stated, *"…the negotiation in climate change, err, at least from our countries, is more related with, with the logic of our environmental policies, and not necessary with the trade or the international relations policies."*[122]

9 of the 13 interviewees from environment ministries also agreed that geopolitical considerations were not at the forefront of the framing of persuasion attempts towards particular parties, although this seems to be more because delegates from ministries of environment have technical and scientific backgrounds, and therefore focus on the technical

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[121] Interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018
[122] Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018

details of the climate change negotiations[123]. As one AILAC delegate from a ministry of environment stated, "*So, we try to stay in the technical considering that if we cross that, we can hurt those* [geopolitical considerations]*, err, and that's not our competence. I mean…but we know there is a context behind.*"[124] Support unit members answered similarly, noting that because AILAC has a support unit which is not employed by any one country in particular, the group can focus on issues specific to the UNFCCC negotiations without being drawn into geopolitical considerations, as it is "*removed from the government position*"[125].

Furthermore, another support unit member noted that because the AILAC delegation contains negotiators from member states' foreign affairs ministries, this brings a level of experience which is useful to the group in its persuasion attempts: "*I think they're old hands, so the diplomats are old hands in diplomacy, so actually that's fine, they'll just avoid the pitfalls. It means that, err, that's how you maintain credibility with the more developed nations.*"[126] AILAC foreign affairs-based delegates therefore have the experience to know the importance of not framing persuasion attempts according to geopolitical factors, as it presents AILAC as focused on the climate change issue rather than trying to score geopolitical points or obtain geopolitical advantages over its negotiating partners. This, therefore, boosts the credibility of AILAC as an honest participant in the UNFCCC negotiations, which in turn can help to persuade other parties of the reasonableness of the group's proposals and ideas. This geopolitically-neutral approach was highlighted by several AILAC interviewees, who identified the importance of caution in framing persuasion attempts, especially with close neighbours such as ALBA, given its stark difference in political philosophy from that of AILAC member states, and ABU[127]. Ironically, then, this approach emphasising absence of

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[123] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd August, 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018
[124] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018
[125] Interview with former AILAC support unit member, 23rd October 2018
[126] Interview with AILAC support unit member, 16th October 2018
[127] Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018

geopolitical framing in persuasion attempts can arguably be for strongly geopolitical reasons as well as to benefit AILAC's position within the UNFCCC negotiations.

7.4.2 Identity

Use of persuasion is also in keeping with AILAC's identity, as described in Chapter 5. Given that AILAC self-identifies as a bridge-builder, and embraces multilateralism to solve global problems, the use of persuasion is perfectly acceptable to the group, alongside its technical submissions, constructive proposals, and compromise offers, as it does not impinge its ability to perform this rôle within the UNFCCC negotiations. If anything, it actively boosts its attempts to build bridges between different parties. Indeed, as well as being ineffective, the use of more aggressive strategies would run counter to AILAC's proclaimed identity and rôle in the negotiations, and so AILAC has no need to deviate away from its three-part strategy of technical submissions, constructive proposals, and persuasion, as one support unit advisor pointed out:

"AILAC, as a group of countries, is trying to show that they play by the rules. So, they will not be the spoilers. They will not do what China has been known to do, or what some of the African countries are willing to do, or what Saudi Arabia is willing to do, and say 'No, because…' So, as minor countries that don't invest in other countries, who are unwilling to throw their toys out of the crib, there is no leverage whatsoever."[128]

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[128] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018

7.4.3 Delegation and Intra-Bloc Dynamics

The responses of interviewees regarding the influence of geopolitical factors also flag the importance of recognising that the characteristics of the people involved in the negotiations can also make a big difference to how effective persuasion can be. Therefore, knowledge is also required about who exactly AILAC negotiators will be interacting with, as well as reflection on the characteristics of the AILAC delegates attempting persuasion. 34 of the 35 AILAC interviewees responded that the individuals involved, both within AILAC and other parties and groups, are a significant factor in their negotiations, and this extends to persuasion attempts. This is particularly important because the consensus view from interviewees was that, within the red lines set by the group's overall position on negotiation issues, AILAC delegates are essentially free to negotiate however they see fit towards the group's goals, although they are required to report what they have done back to the group and get consensus approval for any particular tactics they want to try later that day, e.g. a more aggressive tone, or to play up a particular technical aspect[129]. The group holds meetings before negotiation sessions and at the beginning of each day of a negotiation session, when the support group provides the aforementioned intelligence and recommendations. AILAC negotiation co-ordinators can also update the group on the previous day's events[130], but, as one former delegate explained, "*...in most cases, I would say we don't design a strategy as such as a group...There's a discussion*

[129] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 21st August, 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegates, 31st October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018
[130] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

about the position but not the way to present it, or the strategy. And then that is, in fact, up to the co-ordinator…many times you have to adjust the strategy day by day, so it falls to the co-ordinator of that issue."[131] Indeed, the same former negotiator elaborated that because of the highly complex nature of the negotiations on climate change, the large number of parties, and potential for negotiating scenarios to change daily, if not more frequently, the group recognises it would be "almost impossible" for AILAC to micromanage all of the strategic decision-making of its negotiators"[132].

As such, individuals' decisions on how exactly to operationalise persuasion attempts can make all the difference. Interviewee responses identified 3 main variables of personal characteristics which have a material impact on these decisions within AILAC attempts at persuasion, although obviously the effects are not uniform due to the natural variability in people's characteristics.

Firstly, 25 interviewees specifically mentioned that the personalities and cultural backgrounds of individuals involved in persuasion attempts were an important dynamic. How confident an AILAC negotiator is on the microphone can affect the way in which persuasion attempts are pursued within negotiation sessions, and this is a function of the personality of the negotiator in question – whether a person is naturally outgoing or shy. For example, as several AILAC delegates explained, a less confident negotiator on the microphone may prefer to pursue persuasion attempts in corridor conversations or in informal spaces rather than in the formal spaces of sessions themselves[133]. Similarly, a more confident speaker may be more likely to use the freedom to improvise, where someone less confident may stick to

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[131] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018
[132] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018
[133] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

reading out the pre-arranged talking points or statements provided by the support unit[134].

Furthermore, the personality of the negotiator may affects the tone of voice used, and one delegate even mentioned a variation in the "*levels of politeness*" as causing variations in the way persuasion attempts play out[135], e.g. whether an AILAC proposal is presented and justified in an aggressive way[136]. One delegate remarked that AILAC delegates tend to be passionate in their persuasion attempts, as "*We are Latins*", while a former delegate stated that, on the whole, the AILAC delegation has been such that its members are "*relatively vocal and ready to speak*", though obviously some more than others, as one would expect from natural variation among people[137]. A support unit advisor also offered the view that while the personalities of the bloc's negotiators generally mean they are vocal, they prefer to be so more in informal meetings and situations rather than on the microphone in formal settings.[138]

Several interviewees drew particular attention to the high proportion of female AILAC negotiators over time[139]; indeed, of the interviewees for this thesis, 21 of 35 were female. These responses typically characterised AILAC's female negotiators as "strong", or "star negotiators" – one male AILAC delegate even described his female colleagues as "*like rock stars*"[140], while another described them as "*kick-ass, powerful women*". In their view, this allowed them to be blunt when necessary – such as with the aforementioned framing when persuading developed parties – but also able to improvise if they felt that a particular line of argument was not proving fruitful. The second of the 2 abovementioned male delegates also

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[134] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018
[135] Interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018
[136] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018
[137] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018
[138] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018
[139] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018
[140] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018

suggested the high proportion of women negotiating for AILAC may be at least in part responsible for the group's generally constructive approach to persuasion as a strategy, and negotiations in general:

"*I have a hard time believing that does not play a rôle in the, in AILAC's personality. Even our support unit is mostly women. And this is not on purpose, right, this is just the way the cookie crumbles…And so, I think – again, no data to back this up – but there is…it changes the leadership style. And that tends to change the dynamic* [of negotiations]. *And that's not to say that every male is hard, and, I mean, I'm not trying to draw that – but in general terms it does tend to change, to shift the dynamic. And I have a hard time believing – even when it* [AILAC] *was conceived, it was conceived mostly by a group of women. Err, I have a hard time believing there is no link there. Because we have a personality, and AILAC as a group has a personality, and that personality, that's, err, being friends with everybody even when we don't necessarily agree. Being able to cross these divides, but then having this deep technical capacity, because these people who I have the privilege of working with in AILAC in the vast majority of cases are monsters at what they do. It makes for a very uncommon – I think, at least – it makes for a very uncommon combination.*"[141]

Secondly, 26 interviewees opined that personal relationships with negotiators from other parties were an important dynamic in AILAC's use of persuasion. They cited how far the group can foster trust with other parties as particularly important for persuasion[142]. Of course, a large part of this dynamic is determined by the personalities of both AILAC delegates and other parties' negotiators, but it can also be affected by the length of time a delegate has spent within

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[141] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018
[142] Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

the UNFCCC negotiations – a point addressed below. Nevertheless, a trust-based relationship can help AILAC negotiators to pinpoint tactics more likely to succeed with particular negotiators, as more time spent getting to know the other person cam boost AILAC's ability to predict how they will react to certain arguments or framings, allowing the AILAC negotiator to adjust accordingly[143]. Additionally, having good relationships with other parties' negotiators allows AILAC to change the dynamic of a negotiating room in their favour when attempting to persuade the wider UNFCCC to support an AILAC proposal; one delegate remarked on their good relationship with an EU negotiator enabling them to call for their support for a proposal on the legal architecture of the Paris Agreement, which in turn convinced other parties to follow suit.[144]

Furthermore, it can broaden negotiating options available to delegates – e.g. tone of voice or framing arguments in particular ways - without risking offending or irritating their counterparts. One delegate stated a good relationship with other negotiators, built on trust, can open doors for persuasion attempts by allowing the possibility of using different spaces to pursue the strategy, as over a drink or a meal, because "*you can take off the costume*"[145] of a negotiator and perhaps speak more plainly or in a more relatable manner[146], unbound by diplomatic protocols of formal negotiation sessions, which may prove more fruitful. Another delegate even agreed with this point by reference to something they had heard during the negotiations:

"*You need relationships with these people so that you can actually have a conversation. And it goes back to this personal, err, personality and personal, err, issue, where – I've heard this, and it, it was said half in jest by a senior negotiator from another party, but – "I cannot*

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[143] Interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018
[144] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018
[145] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018
[146] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018

negotiate with you if I haven't gotten drunk with you!" I get that. I mean, it's not a black and white thing, but I get that."[147]

Thirdly, 23 interviewees cited experience, knowledge, and negotiating skill of AILAC negotiators as affecting persuasion attempts, and these contribute to negotiators' personalities as well. Several interviewees raised concerns that while the group has many negotiators with deep technical and scientific knowledge of their issue areas, many are relatively inexperienced in the UNFCCC negotiations, and the number of experienced negotiators is dwindling[148], which they felt could hamper AILAC's ability to persuade other parties of their proposals and ideas. They attributed this to 2 main causes. Interviewees reported that the ministries from which the AILAC delegation draws most of its negotiators tend to rotate their delegates relatively frequently (approximately every 2-3 years), meaning most delegates are at least somewhat new to the UNFCCC negotiations and have insufficient time to accrue experience before being rotated out again; those from foreign affairs ministries may have experience of international negotiations and diplomacy, but tend not to have experienced the climate change arena before[149]. This lack of topic-specific negotiation experience is important, given the necessity of developing trust and relationships with their peers. One delegate remarked that sessions are much harder for new negotiators simply because they do not yet know all the other established negotiators, making it harder to attempt to persuade others - although this can be

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[147] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018
[148] Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018
[149] Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit member, 13th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

mitigated by certain personalities[150] - as well as because of difficulties in understanding the complexity of the UNFCCC negotiations, which can be confusing to those not used to its dynamics. Indeed, a guide manual to the UNFCCC negotiations written for developing parties' negotiators (Tenzing, 2016:5) specifically states:

"Attending UN climate negotiations for the first time is daunting, especially if it's a Conference of the Parties (COP) session. With so many meetings happening in parallel — some open, some closed — and jargon and acronyms that constantly roll off people's tongues, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process is notoriously complex."

Added to this lack of negotiating experience, interviewees highlighted lack of holistic training as a factor impeding their ability to use persuasion to its full effect. A former delegate noted that delegates from environment ministries *"are not trained negotiators, they're just experts in their field"*[151] - often the science of climate change - which means that they are not as able to assess and anticipate developments as foreign affairs-based delegates, despite their deep technical knowledge[152]. One support unit member even credits this influx of new negotiators without specific negotiation training as responsible for AILAC drifting towards more reactivity than proactivity across all strategies in the years since the adoption of the Paris Agreement[153]. However, this is not to say that interviewees felt total reliance on trained foreign affairs-based delegates would improve their ability to negotiate – as one former support unit advisor noted, when discussions in UNFCCC negotiations become very technical, "the people in the ministries of foreign affairs don't necessarily understand what that has to do with anything"[154]. Furthermore, one delegate argued that negotiators based in environment ministries understand

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[150] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018
[151] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018
[152] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018
[153] Interview with AILAC support unit member, 13th November 2018
[154] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018

the effects of the agreements they are negotiating because of their technical knowledge, and therefore are better placed than foreign affairs delegates to offer flexibility, a key tool in negotiations. Foreign affairs delegates, conversely, may not necessarily understand the substance of what is being negotiated and become too focused on terminology. They gave the following example:

"*'Yeah, you want to call this blue? Fine, you can call it blue – as long as it is number one, two, three, four, five, I don't care what you call it.' But that is something that you have to have enough technical background, and enough technical comfort to be able to say that. Otherwise, if you came in with a political mandate that it had to be called red, it is going to be called red regardless of what else happens. And I think that gives us some degree of, of flexibility that is often not found* [with foreign affairs delegates]."[155]

That AILAC's delegation is composed of members of both environment and foreign affairs ministries helps circumvent these problems in theory, by sharing the technical and tactical knowledge of these 2 sets of delegates, but the lack of UNFCCC-specific training mentioned above, according to interviewees, hampers this somewhat. Several interviewees reported variation in the level of training amongst AILAC member states, as a result of the differences in the capacities of the AILAC national governments[156]; governments with greater funding and expertise resources are unsurprisingly better able to provide training to their delegates, whereas those less with fewer resources are not able even to provide a delegate for every negotiation topic. As such, while group decisions on AILAC's positions are made by consensus (AILAC, date unknown), in practice that some member states do not have a voice in some of the technical

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[155] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018
[156] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

co-ordinations where approval for particular tactics within strategies in sessions is decided (either by having no one present or no one with enough training to be able to participate effectively), nor have delegates in sessions to negotiate for the group[157], means that AILAC strategy can be more of a reflection of the preferences of the better resourced AILAC member states. AILAC can crudely be divided in two along this axis, with Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru generally better able to train delegates than Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and Paraguay. As one delegate put it: "*Yes, those four, four big countries - at least one of those four big countries is usually one of the big voices in most streams - but that has a lot to do with how big the delegations are, and how big, or how well developed their capacities in climate change in general tend to be in those countries.*"[158] A former Guatemalan delegate even blamed the Guatemalan government for "silencing" the country's participation in AILAC because of domestic corruption and instability, with cronyism meaning those appointed to rôles in the country's environment and foreign affairs ministries are unqualified and unsuitable for their positions.[159]

However, one support unit member did identify the support unit's important rôle in at least partially mitigating the problem of a lack of training, given its members are both experts in the climate change negotiations – often both technically and tactically – and able to dedicate their time and energy entirely to AILAC in the UNFCCC negotiations, unlike delegates whose domestic work often leaves little time to dedicate to preparation for negotiating sessions. They

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[157] Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegates, 31st October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018
[158] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018
[159] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018

pointed out support unit members (who are not affiliated to any one member state's government and do not align themselves with any particular AILAC states), while prevented from negotiating for the group (AILAC, date unknown) in sessions, do accompany AILAC delegates to negotiations to assist and advise where needed or requested, which can be especially useful given the general lack of climate negotiations-specific experience among delegates: "*So if a person, err, who's new to the process is sent to a meeting room for the first time, and they have the support unit person next to them, they're going to listen to that support unit person, because really they're pretty much at sea without them.*[160]"

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[160] Interview with AILAC support unit member, 16th October 2018

Chapter 8: Coalition-Building, Bilateral Meetings, Informal Spaces, and Concessions Trading

8.1 Introduction

Chapter 8 discusses AILAC's use of the remaining strategies on the less aggressive half of the spectrum. The section on coalition-building is divided into sub-sections for the evidence of the strategy in submission texts and formal sessions, preceding a sub-section on the influences on use of the strategy. The section on bilateral meetings is divided in half between a discussion on evidence of the strategy and analysis of influences on it. The section on informal spaces divides into 6 sub-sections: 2 short discussions of textual and interview evidence of the strategy's use, before analysis of the reasoning behind use of 4 types of spaces: informals and informal informals, social meetings, corridor conversations, and external forums. The final section addresses concessions trading as a strategy. This section is presented with analysis of evidence from submissions and interviews mixed with each other and explanation of the reasoning behind concession trading's use, as only through a retrospective analysis of submissions, bearing in mind evidence from interviewees, can the extent of the strategy's use by AILAC be fully understood.

8.2.1 Coalition-Building in Submissions

Textual and corpus-linguistic analysis of AILAC submissions shows some evidence of the use of coalition-building. This includes subtle attempts at broad coalition-building, i.e. references to developed or developing country parties (284 tokens across 43 submissions[161]) rather than Annex I or non-Annex I parties (3 tokens across 2 submissions[162]) possibly reflecting a desire to avoid further entrenchment of divisions (Watts and Depledge, 2018), references to other parties as AILAC's "partners"[163], and references to specific parties and coalitions. For example, all 13 of AILAC's statements in negotiating sessions declare the bloc "associates itself with the G77 & China"[164], while Submission 4 (AILAC, 2014b) states "AILAC supports the proposal by AOSIS in their September submission to convene annual ministerial/high-level sessions on enhanced pre-2020 climate action." Submission 38 (AILAC, 2017p) expresses AILAC's agreement with the AGN's ideas for risk assessment inclusions in future national adaptation communications, and Submission 58's (AILAC, 2018j) statement at the opening of COP24 specifically references a presentation by AILAC, the EIG, and CARICOM at the Bangkok intersessional meeting in 2018 on the importance of COP24 producing results which reflect the inputs of the Talanoa Dialogue. All these references to specific parties demonstrate AILAC attempting to forge positive relationships, whether by expressing support for,

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[161] Submissions 1 – 7, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 19-35, 37-40, 43, 46, 47, 49, 51, 54, 55, 58, 61, and 62 – see Appendix I for references

[162] One reference in Submission 2 (AILAC, 2013b) and two in Submission 7 (AILAC, 2014e)

[163] See, for example, Submission 12 (AILAC. 2016c), Submission 28 (AILAC, 2017f), and Submission 50 (AILAC, 2018b)

[164] See, for example, Submissions 12, 13, 36, 46, 47, 48, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, and 62 (AILAC, 2016c; 2016d; 2017n; 2017x; 2017y; 2017z; 2018d; 2018e; 2018g; 2018h; 2018i; 2018j; 2018n)

association, or agreement with these parties, as the group has made a conscious decision to highlight them, which can be seen as attempts to build alliances, at least on certain issue areas.

Additionally, 6 of 62 AILAC submissions were made jointly with other parties: Submission 3 with Mexico and the Dominican Republic, Submissions 8 and 51 with the EIG, Submission 54 with the AGN, Submission 59 with Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Switzerland, and Submission 60 with AOSIS, the EU, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, and Switzerland. Clearly, that AILAC has publicly and officially put forward submissions with other parties and groups demonstrates it is seeking to present a united front with its submission author partners where they hold common positions. This can only be the result of active negotiations between delegates of AILAC and other groups and parties, aimed at formally agreeing to draft and present such submissions, given this requires active co-ordination and co-operation. Indeed, other groups' and parties' influence is noticeable in the choice of language in some of these joint submissions. Several – although the sample size of 6 is small - are markedly different in tone from the standalone AILAC submissions, in which the group generally avoids pressing its points too forcefully for all but its highest priorities, exemplified by its preference for "should" over "shall" verbs, or its tendency to cushion more forceful language – e.g. describing something as "critical" or "necessary", or stating that something "must" occur – with qualifying phrases or justifications for its approach.

For example, Submission 54 (AILAC, 2018f) with the AGN, on the adaptation communication's place on the APA agenda, adopts a confrontational tone from the beginning, declaring in the first section with a standalone line that "It is not acceptable to have no further work on adaptation under transparency (item 5)." While the submission does provide a rationale for this viewpoint, it appears in a separate paragraph, thus maximising the impact of two groups' disapproval of the lack of further work on adaptation in the transparency section of the APA agenda. The opening line of the second section of the statement reads "The position

of the AGN and AILAC is firm and unambiguous." The 2 coalitions do subsequently state that they are flexible as regards the specific details to be worked on, but the strength of feeling in the initial statement is obvious, in sharp contrast to the way most individual AILAC submissions communicate views. Another good example is in Submission 60 (AILAC, 2018l), made jointly with AOSIS, the EU, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, and Switzerland on baselines for emissions reductions within Article 6.4. The submission uses a bulleted list of 21 proposals under 5 headings; all bar 4 of these proposals use a "shall" verb construction rather than "should", thereby indicating that these proposals are intended to be definite, and by implication, non-negotiable. For example, the submission states "A BAT [best available technology] approach shall be used for establishing methodologies" and "The approach shall comprise an ambitious benchmark representing a level of GHG emissions for activities within a defined scope and boundary, reflecting best available technology (BAT), and taking into account national circumstances where appropriate".

However, this firmer tone is not present in all of AILAC's joint submissions. Submission 8 (AILAC, 2015a) with the EIG, proposing an in-session workshop on gender and climate change, contains the same qualifying phrases and conditional language as in AILAC-only submissions. For example, the submission's second paragraph (which is the first expression of the proposal) states:

"*...it is important that the in-session workshop on gender-responsive climate policy with focus on mitigation action and technology development and transfer is viewed as an opportunity to increase a common understanding among Parties as to the linkages and implications of having a gender approach to mitigation and technology...*"

The apparently strong declaration "it is important that…" is prefaced, however, with "For AILAC and EIG", thus directly presenting the firmer position specifically as a reflection of the

two groups' views, rather than as a general demand made of other parties. The rest of the submission continues in this more constructive tone, with ideas proposed through "should" verb constructions (e.g. "We believe the workshop should be organised in the early days of the second week in SBI42…") and other equally constructive sentence constructions (e.g. "Some concrete topics for further exploration and discussion during the workshop may include…" and "we would like to suggest the Secretariat to reach out to recognised intergovernmental and civil society institutions.."). Submission 8 also includes numerous justifications, as is typical of AILAC-only submissions; indeed, the submission contains an entire section citing examples of actions by AILAC countries to demonstrate what attendees could learn and share from the proposed workshop, thus justifying its existence.

That only some of AILAC's jointly-made submissions adopt a different tone and language compared with AILAC-only submissions is potentially attributable to the identity of the partners with whom AILAC is making them. It could be that AILAC is conscious of the power dynamics within the UNFCCC, and knows that, for example, a submission made jointly with parties better endowed with material power resources – whether economic power, as in the case of the EU and other developed country parties e.g. Japan and Switzerland – or latent power such as the AGN, representing over 1bn people – is likely to have greater political clout within the negotiations than submissions made by AILAC alone, making the use of more forceful language more credible. Submissions made with the EIG, however, adopted similar linguistic practices to those of AILAC-only submissions. This could also be because of the EIG's profile within the power dynamics of UNFCCC negotiations - the EIG only represents 6 countries with a total population of 138,514,920 (World Bank, 2018c) – equivalent to 1.82% of the global total - and is responsible for only 3.24% of global CO_2 emissions[165] (Carbon Atlas, 2019). Another factor for joint AILAC-EIG submissions in particular could be identity. The

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[165] 1184.20Mt/year of 36573Mt/year global total

EIG portrays itself similarly to AILAC as a bridge-builder between developed and developing country parties[166], whereas other groups with whom AILAC has made joint submissions do not necessarily subscribe to this promoted identity – for example, the EU portrays itself as a leader (Oberthür, 2011), while AOSIS has historically played the rôle of the "innocent victims" pushing for strong climate action from those with moral and historical responsibility (Betzold, 2010:138). Consequently, submissions made by 2 groups self-identifying as bridge-builders require the bridge-building discourses and discursive practices to be evident throughout to maintain the credibility of these identities, whereas submissions made by an assortment of groups and parties identifying with different rôles does not need to adhere to one set of discursive practices to be credible, relying instead on the political clout – or even potentially sheer numbers - of the members involved.

8.2.2 Coalition-Building in Negotiation Sessions

Interviews with AILAC delegates suggest they also regularly engage in coalition-building efforts within negotiating sessions and meetings, with 29 of 35 identifying this as a strategy used by the group in such spaces. One interviewee remarked that AILAC goes about coalition-building and using its alliances "on a daily basis"[167], while another said AILAC engages in this "all the time"[168]. One former support unit advisor went as far as describing coalition-building as AILAC's modus operandi[169]. Another former delegate went further still, identifying this strategy as the most important part of AILAC activity in the negotiations[170]. According to

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[166] Interview with EIG delegate, 13th August 2018
[167] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018
[168] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018
[169] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018
[170] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018

delegates interviewed, the ways in which coalition-building takes place within negotiation sessions varies. AILAC uses bilateral meetings with other groups and parties to create communication channels, which then enables the group to agree common positions and commitments to present joint submissions with other parties[171]. AILAC volunteers to lead and chair negotiation sessions with other groups[172], and co-ordinates with others sharing their views in advance of negotiation sessions on topics of particular importance. This is to ensure that in these sessions, a variety of voices is heard at different times to build momentum towards those parties' common goals, with parties echoing and openly supporting each other[173]. All these tactics within this overall strategy aim to promote as much consensus as possible for positions which AILAC proposes or with which the group agrees[174] This is especially important bearing in mind the UNFCCC's requirement for consensus among parties before outcomes can be formally adopted (UNFCCC, 1992).

8.2.3 Influences on Coalition-Building Strategies

Interviewees' responses also suggest AILAC delegates are equally conscious of the UNFCCC power dynamics and their implications for the success of strategic efforts when going about coalition-building as might be inferred from analysis of linguistic trends in the group's joint submissions. A former support unit advisor explained an understanding of such dynamics underpins AILAC's fervent coalition-building activity:

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[171] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018
[172] Interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018
[173] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018
[174] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 21018

"...the, the value of the group was that we could do that type of work, that soft power work and that coalition-building across every single pillar of the agreement, of the Paris Agreement, which we hadn't been able to do before, which actually had sacrificed some of our credibility."[175]

In other words, AILAC's coalition-building strategy is designed to borrow power in the way described by Zartman and Rubin (2000b) as a process-based strategy – as Betzold (2010:136) puts it, "skilfully playing the game" of negotiations. AILAC is aware it does not have the resources – economic- or personnel-based – to field delegates for every single area of what are extremely complex negotiations, and therefore by building and operating coalitions with other groups and parties, it can take advantage of their power resources for its own ends. Besides the obvious power benefits of presenting joint submissions with others, echoing another group in a negotiating room may not require the AILAC delegate present to have read in detail the agenda for the meeting and to have prepared talking points and interventions. If an issue area has been agreed in advance as the responsibility of another party for a particular objective, the AILAC delegate need only attend and repeat or support what their delegate(s) say(s), saving their time and energy for work on another issue where they have responsibility. One former support unit advisor gave the example of working with EIG and AOSIS delegates, with whom they would co-ordinate. The interviewee stated they would share notes in different negotiating rooms with these delegates to minimise the amount of advance work required of each delegate to be ready for a session, and to make sure the points that each participating delegate made on the microphone would tally with those made by other parties' delegates within this coalition[176].

According to the majority (25 of 35) of interviewees, decisions about which parties to build and make use of coalitions with unsurprisingly depends on 2 factors: firstly the

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[175] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018
[176] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018

negotiating issue in question, as AILAC agrees with some parties but not others on different issue areas; and secondly the support unit's ability to gather information on the positions and delegations of other groups and parties, so as to know which may be open to some form of co-operation with AILAC and thus which to target[177]. This speaks of AILAC's consciousness of its identity as a progressive bridge-builder, willing to ally itself to parties backing proposals and ideas leading to the sorts of concrete actions AILAC desires and not to those who do not, instead attempting to persuade them to change their positions and accept either their proposals or compromise versions. As such, some interviewees felt AILAC has "natural allies" on certain issues, or at least these parties have been natural allies since the negotiations over the Paris Agreement in 2015, when party positions were clarified as the UNFCCC moved to formalise negotiations into legal text[178]. For example, interviewees said AILAC enjoys a good relationship with the EU on issue areas such as transparency and the general level of ambition it wishes to see within the negotiations outcome as this is generally high, and combined with a rigorous approach to transparency[179], but AILAC does not support the EU's positions universally, withholding support on issues like those relating to finance provision to developing country parties[180]. Likewise, AILAC and the Umbrella Group can find common ground and argue in tandem with each other in negotiations over the importance of market mechanisms under Article Six[181], though they are at odds on questions of mitigation and how much action

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[177] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018

[178] Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

[179] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit member, 27th September 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

[180] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018

[181] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018

is required.[182] Assessments of which parties with whom to ally and for which issue areas also reveal, however, a consideration of the domestic situations of AILAC member states, as clearly such ambitious proposals are supported by the bloc because they are in the interests of its member states, given their extreme vulnerability to climate change effects (Edwards et al, 2017).

One example evidences further consideration still of the impact on AILAC member states' domestic situations, which is the relationship between AILAC and the AGN. 23 interviewees characterised the relationship as positive, with 12 specifically mentioning the positivity and efforts at co-operation on issues relating to adaptation measures in the negotiations[183], as demonstrated by the joint submission mentioned above. 26 interviewees, however, including some in the abovementioned 23, also characterised the relationship between AILAC and the AGN as "difficult". That AILAC has a "love/hate" relationship, as one delegate put it[184], with the AGN results from the coalitions' differing views on the issue of the "special needs and special circumstances of Africa", which was initially put forward at COP21 in Paris, before gaining traction once again in negotiations in 2018 (AGN, 2018)[185]. 23 of the 26 interviewees cited this issue as responsible for this negative relationship dynamic between the groups[186]. The perception of AILAC interviewees was that the AGN was

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[182] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 10th July 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 21st August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018

[183] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 9th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

[184] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018

[185] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018

[186] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC

proposing this measure to gain the same recognition of the vulnerability of African countries as for countries specifically mentioned in the UNFCCC legal texts, namely the small island developing states and least developed countries, referenced in the UNFCCC preamble (UNFCCC, 1992) and the Paris Agreement, as in Articles 9.4 and 9.9 (UNFCCC, 2015), among other instances. Articles 9.4 and 9.9 are particularly relevant in this context from AILAC interviewees' perspective, as formal recognition of African vulnerability equivalent to that of SIDS and LDCs would therefore add African parties to a priority list for the provision of financial support. As a former AILAC support unit advisor explained, "This is a major thing – because basically if you have LDCs, SIDS, and Africa [with this funding priority status] – the only region that is not there from the developing world is Latin America"[187]. The perceived exclusion of AILAC members from priority access to funding, therefore, is a domestic consideration, as the potentially smaller share of UNFCCC funding, or at least delayed access to it, would have material consequences on AILAC member states' ability to proceed with climate action. However, because the issue impacts particularly on funding, broader domestic politics of AILAC member states would be affected, as it could affect government budgeting.

Another factor which has an impact on AILAC's strategy of coalition-building, which interviewees mentioned repeatedly, is the relationship between individual AILAC negotiators and their counterparts from other parties. As shown in Chapter 7, AILAC's deployment of a strategy in in-session negotiations, while constrained to the boundaries of the group's positional red lines, depends greatly on the character and personality of delegates, and according to interviewees, this also holds for coalition-building. How far AILAC can pursue a strategy of

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support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 9th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with three AILAC delegates, 31st October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

[187] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018

coalition-building depends on how positive the relationship is between its delegates and those of the target parties, meaning the group has vary its approach to different parties given the variety in the strength of the relationships between different delegates[188]. One AILAC negotiator explained both the fact that a positive personal relationship is a prerequisite for attempts at coalition-building with another party's delegate, and the rôle of individual personalities in the process:

"*You like people or you don't, and you get along with people or you don't…And so we'll have these relationships where we can actually come up to people and – people tend to think about relationships with people who you agree with, which obviously is a thing, but you need relationships with people you don't agree with. You need relationships with these people so that you can actually have a conversation. And it goes back to this personal, err, personality and personal, err, issue, where – I've heard this, and it, it was said half in jest by a senior negotiator from another party, but – "I cannot negotiate with you if I haven't gotten drunk with you!" I get that. I mean, it's not a black and white thing, but I get that. Err, and so, we build these relationships with both sides.*"[189]

A former support unit advisor agreed on the importance of personal relationships, and emphasised the importance of developing trust between individual delegates to facilitate coalition-building. They gave an example of a conversation with an EU negotiator, who told them that they agreed to present a united front with AILAC on a particular issue in a session because they knew the AILAC delegate well, and knew them to be a "sensible person usually with common sense in the negotiations", despite the fact that the EU negotiator "didn't know what on Earth [they] were talking about"[190]. The same former advisor also suggested a shared

[188] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 21ˢ August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018
[189] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018
[190] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018

Latin American culture could be an important factor in how positive an AILAC delegate's personal relationship is with a counterpart, and gave the example of coalition-building with delegates from the EIG, and from Mexico in particular:

"...people are fond of Mexicans – Latin Americans in general – and, and they will usually be good friends, err, and, and have close positions, and be more inclined to generate common positions or submissions, joint submissions, because they know each other."[191]

Another delegate added that the aforementioned tactic of co-ordinating in advance of negotiating sessions on priority issues with other parties' negotiators to build discursive momentum in the group's desired direction is a much more viable option when the relationship between the AILAC delegate and their counterpart is strong. They gave an example of a particularly strong relationship with a lead EU negotiator, which was used to ensure there would always be a voice supporting AILAC's position in negotiations sessions where they were involved[192].

8.3 Use of Bilateral Meetings

The AILAC submission texts provide no obvious evidence that bilateral meetings are used as a conscious strategy by the AILAC group. Corpus-linguistic analysis of the submissions produces only 6 tokens for "bilateral" across 3 texts - none refers to bilateral meetings, instead mentioning proposals for bilateral funding sources for climate finance. It seems reasonable, however, to infer that bilateral meetings occurred with other parties before the publication of joint submissions, although not explicitly stated. By contrast, 30 of 35 AILAC interviewees

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[191] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018
[192] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018

stated the group uses this strategy regularly. Indeed, several AILAC support unit advisors said the group is always seeking to meet and discuss with other parties[193], while one former AILAC negotiator, when asked about the frequency with which AILAC uses this strategy, replied "Oh God, so many bilaterals!"[194] Interviews with AILAC negotiators revealed the group consciously decided to make bilateral meetings with other parties and groups a common occurrence when it was formed at the end of 2012[195], and that since then, AILAC has not limited itself to formal negotiating sessions in order to institute such meetings. One support unit member stated the bloc's "preferred approach" has been to "try to keep up the communication throughout the intersessional period as well, err, with many of the partners"[196], and therefore the group engages in bilaterals all year round[197]. Of course, a significant proportion of AILAC's bilateral meetings do occur within formal negotiating sessions of the annual COP or intersessional subsidiary body meetings. These are often planned ahead of formal meetings and are based upon the support unit's research as to whether target groups or parties would welcome discussions on certain issue areas, what AILAC would seek to gain or achieve in such meetings, and whether any particular strategies are likely to be successful therein, e.g. coalition-building, compromise offers, persuasion, etc[198]. Indeed, interviewees reported bilaterals are used for a wide variety of strategic purposes – one delegate mentioned that compromises are very often offered through this medium[199], while a support unit advisor referenced the co-ordination planning ahead of key negotiation sessions as discussed in the section on coalition-building[200].

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[193] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018
[194] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018
[195] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018
[196] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018
[197] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018
[198] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018
[199] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018
[200] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018

As such, the group begins formal negotiation sessions with lists of parties or groups to approach for a bilateral, which are discussed in its internal meetings just before the session starts, or at the start of each session day[201]. Another AILAC delegate added that the group does not just attempt to instigate bilateral meetings with other parties and groups; it has also reached out to working group chairs or COP presidencies when it has felt that the execution of its strategy required closer conversation with these actors[202]. The strategies and tactics which could be used in such bilaterals are then discussed, although not formalised and put into writing as a brief[203] - for example, one delegate outlined the occurrences of a typical pre-session internal meeting on planning for bilaterals with other parties:

"*Yeah, normally, err, we have these two parts. Err, so we, we discuss what is the position, we discuss why we have that position, and we discuss how we're going to bring this position – meaning strategy. So, err, strategy is always there, you know? Like, 'OK, we might be able to do this, or we might be able to do this" – but strategy is, most of the time, never written anywhere…But at least we discuss it, and we say, 'OK, we're going to do this, and then do that, and then we can approach this team, and then we can approach the other team, we're going to keep quiet on this topic and we're going to be really vocal on that one.' And, err, we agree on something, but we don't, we don't write a lot of things about the strategy. It's not something that we do.*"[204]

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[201] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018

[202] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018

[203] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018

[204] Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

8.3.1 Influences on Bilateral Meetings

The same delegate reported bilateral meetings are most often instigated initially through informal meetings with other parties' negotiators, when more formal bilaterals under the guise of AILAC and another party or group can be organised[205]. As such, as with the execution of other strategies like persuasion and coalition-building, the characteristics of the individual delegates involved in arranging these meetings can be crucial. A recurring theme from interviews was that a high degree of trust between AILAC delegates and counterparts from other parties or groups allows bilaterals to be arranged much more easily, or even at all[206], which in turn, as with aforementioned strategies, can be attributed at least partly to how far delegates can create an atmosphere of bonhomie with each other. One former support unit advisor suggested that a contributing factor to this may be shared culture; as with the strategy of coalition-building, they gave the example of AILAC delegates finding it easier to arrange bilateral meetings with their Mexican counterparts from the EIG[207].

Despite this, interviewees reported the same could not be said of relations with the ALBA group. The groups' strong differences in political ideology (Watts and Depledge, 2018), especially on the rôle of market mechanisms within the UNFCCC agreements[208], and the difficult political situation involving AILAC and ALBA member states – for example, the establishment of the Group of Lima in 2017 by states involving AILAC members refusing to

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[205] Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

[206] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

[207] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018

[208] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 10th July 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

recognise the national assembly of Venezuela, and condemning "the rupture of democratic order" in Venezuela (Rathbone, 2017; Taj et al, 2017), an ALBA member[209] - have overridden the shared Latin American culture and background. As a result, there is essentially no formal relationship between the groups, so bilaterals essentially do not occur[210]. According to interviewees, this is not for want of trying by some AILAC delegates, at least in the past. 8 AILAC delegates reported their past attempts to secure bilateral meetings with ALBA but no longer attempt to do so[211]. Several AILAC delegates reported offers made by AILAC to ALBA for bilaterals were rejected[212], while one former support unit advisor revealed that from personal experience, ALBA negotiators either declined or did not turn up at the appointed time and place[213].

However, as another delegate pointed out, a delegate's level of experience can have a material impact on this ability to foster trust and therefore make the arranging of bilateral meetings easier, with delegates newer to the UNFCCC negotiations, finding it harder to arrange meetings, as they do not yet know negotiators from other parties or groups. Experienced

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[209] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegates, 31st October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

[210] Interview with AILAC delegate, 30th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

[211] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 21st August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with 13th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

[212] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 21st August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

[213] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

negotiators already have the connections, and therefore at least in theory the trust-based positive relationships and even friendships with other parties' negotiators necessary to instigate bilaterals[214]. This delegate however also stated that this can be overcome through force of personality – i.e. if a delegate is naturally outgoing and prepared to "jump in" to negotiations. Another AILAC delegate was strongly of the opinion that compatibility in terms of negotiators' personalities is key to making fruitful use of the strategy of interacting with other groups and parties through bilateral meetings. They stated:

"*You know, I think building trust in all of this is, is really important. But this is something that you don't learn at school, this is something that nobody tells you in a, in a position paper, err, this is something that is really personal. So that's why it really, unfortunately, it really depends on the type of people that you're talking with, the type of negotiators, and, err, the more trust you build, of course, you can come together…I think it depends on the trust that you have on the negotiator itself. I, I don't think it's a matter of the groups – I think it's a matter of the negotiator itself.*"[215]

However, the first of these 2 delegates disagreed, and suggested that the aforementioned lack of UNFCCC-specific experience can be overcome if a delegate has previous experience from other arenas of international negotiations, which, as discussed in Chapter 7, is often the case with delegates from foreign affairs ministries. They gave the following example:

"*We, in Bangkok, err, had a delegate from Costa Rica – she was new in the process, and she did it really, really well. Because she knew how negotiations work – not on climate change, but rather in other spaces – err, but she knew that she has to talk to people, she knew that it was*

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[214] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018
[215] Interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

OK to talk to people, to approach to, to other parties, and to discuss openly, to take the mic and talk. But, err, because she was experienced. Not in the process, but in other processes."[216]

8.4 Use of Informal Spaces

8.4.1 Evidence from Submissions

Tenzing (2016) states that informal meetings take place within the UNFCCC to promote further discussion on an agenda item which was not concluded during formal working group or plenary sessions, although these are not listed in the daily programmes of negotiating sessions such as COPs and SB meetings. He also explains the existence of what are known as "informal informals" for particularly difficult agenda items, in which "the parties concerned meet, without anyone necessarily facilitating the discussion (parties will typically do away with country flags and will refer to one another by name) to try to reach a compromise" (2016:31). The AILAC submission texts make only one reference to such meetings. While the word "informal" produces 9 tokens through CLA, 8 refer to informal notes prepared by chairs of sessions on such topics as conclusions of sessions or summaries of parties' opinions[217]. Only Submission 58 (AILAC, 2018j), a statement at the opening plenary of COP24, acknowledges the existence of informal negotiating spaces, when it states that "…AILAC is ready to work actively and constructively from the beginning of the session in formal and informal negotiation spaces that allow us to advance the common understanding." This statement

[216] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018
[217] See, for example, Submissions 26 (AILAC, 2017d), 37 (AILAC, 2017o), 38 (AILAC, 2017p), and 40 (AILAC, 2017r)

implies the group is willing to go beyond formal negotiating spaces and actively use such spaces to pursue its negotiating goals. This aligns with the third goal in the AILAC rule book, listed as to "Build bridges between the different negotiation groups, promoting trust, and favouring the creation of *propitious spaces* for consensus" (AILAC, date unknown: 1; emphasis added).

8.4.2 Evidence from Interviews

Interviews with AILAC delegates, however, provide evidence that the group actively negotiates in more spaces than those listed by Tenzing, with 25 of 35 interviewees confirming their use of such spaces. Alongside informal meetings and informal informals, these can be grouped into 3 primary categories: social meetings both during and outside formal negotiation sessions negotiation, corridor conversations during formal negotiation sessions, and forums outside the UNFCCC process. One former AILAC delegate summed up this approach as follows: "I think our strategy is to get involved in as much as possible, in as many as possible of possible groups of negotiating"[218], while another AILAC negotiator, alluding to the panoply of spaces where AILAC delegates actively choose to negotiate, stated "You can see AILAC almost everywhere."[219]

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[218] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018
[219] Interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018

8.4.3 Informals and Informal Informals

Informal meetings take many forms. They may be more "official" informal meetings and informal informals as described by Tenzing (2016), or they may involve meetings of particular parties in various configurations on specific negotiation issues, such as the Friends of the Chair (UNFCCC, 2018b), the High Ambition Coalition (European Commission, 2018), the Friends of the Oceans (SPREP, 2018), or even individual groups meeting with the Secretariat or the presidency of a formal negotiation session. According to interviewees, AILAC participates in a broad range of these meetings. 2 delegates mentioned the group participated in informal meetings of the High Ambition Coalition[220], one specifying this was so that AILAC would be able to pursue compromises in HAC meetings in the run-up to COP21 towards more legally-binding language for what would become the Paris Agreement[221]. Numerous interviewees stated that AILAC attends informals on specific negotiation topics, like the discussions on Article Six, to open direct channels with facilitators and chairs of meetings[222]. Furthermore, several interviewees said AILAC engages in informal meetings specifically with the Secretariat and the presidencies of particular negotiation sessions[223].

Exactly which meetings AILAC attends, however, depends on several factors. For example, in the case of informals with the Secretariat and session presidencies, these are usually consultations run by the Secretariat and presidencies, and therefore AILAC attendance

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[220] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018

[221] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018

[222] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

[223] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

is first by invitation[224]. However, AILAC's reason for attending such informals is often based in information-gathering; one support unit advisor stated that AILAC engages with the Secretariat and session presidencies to ask questions about their views, or how they are planning to run particular sessions[225]. This information-gathering can prove useful in the later selection and use of other strategies, as it can help AILAC anticipate scenarios within formal negotiation rooms. Attendance in such meetings also allows AILAC to put forward constructive proposals - one delegate explained that AILAC support unit advisors have attended informals with session presidencies where they have offered draft AILAC texts, intended to be a basis for discussion within formal negotiation sessions as a potential way to break deadlock[226]. Of course, this opportunity to deploy other strategies is another obvious reason for AILAC's participation in other informals, like official topic-specific meetings or informal informals, or small-group meetings of particular parties on certain issues.

8.4.4 Social Meetings

The relationship between individual AILAC delegates and their counterparts is another factor potentially impacting on whether AILAC delegates make use of particular informal spaces in negotiating with other groups and parties. This may be a prerequisite for an invitation to a particular meeting, such as an informal small-group configuration of particular parties. This personal relationship factor is most obviously relevant in social meetings, as a good personal relationship between negotiators is an obvious prerequisite for a social meeting, and can help

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[224] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018
[225] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018
[226] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018

make conversation easier, allowing attendees to speak openly without fear of overt diplomatic consequences[227]. As one delegate put it, social meetings such as dinners or going for a drink allows one to "take off the costume" of a negotiator while still being able to negotiate[228]. Of course, in this situation, a delegate with experience of the UNFCCC process also has an advantage, as they already have networks of contacts for such social meetings[229].

According to interviewees, AILAC uses social meetings between delegates for a variety of purposes. One support unit advisor reported dinners with other parties' delegates "have proven to be very effective in gaining insight on different positions, on where landing zones are, and where alliances can occur"[230]. Other delegates stated that sitting down over a drink with a negotiator from another group or party can be an effective way of defusing tension generated by the stressful situations which negotiators experience, and can therefore lead to parties finding common ground and eventually proposing a form of a compromise[231]. One former delegate reported taking part in confidential social meetings, often in the house of one of the negotiators in question, in order to use a variety of strategies while eating dinner; in particular, they named coalition-building in the form of agreeing shared positions, information sharing, but also persuasion attempts through "very blunt" conversations, especially with negotiators from developed country parties on the issue of finance[232]. Another delegate mentioned going for drinks with other parties' negotiators at the end of the day in formal negotiation sessions simply as a way of building trust, facilitating a wide range of strategies to be used in future[233]. This is even the case for relationships with ALBA; while the aforementioned problems in the groups' formal relationship subsist, one former support unit

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[227] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018
[228] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018
[229] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018
[230] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018
[231] Interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018
[232] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018
[233] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018

advisor stated that there are good personal relationships between individual AILAC and ALBA negotiators, and that social meetings between the coalitions allow for contact and interaction where formal negotiations would not[234]. These personal relationships at least, strengthened through social meetings, could provide a way towards more formal negotiations between the groups should the overriding political tensions be resolved in future.

8.4.5 Corridor Conversations

Another space offering potential use of negotiation strategies is that of the corridor within formal negotiation sessions. According to interviewees, this serves 3 primary functions for AILAC. Firstly, corridor conversations as negotiators move from one negotiation room to another, or en route to or from lunch during sessions, are a prime space in which the support unit is able to gather tactical information on other parties, such as landing zones and issues to avoid for particular strategies[235]. Secondly, and similarly to use of social meetings, corridor conversations, removed from the tense and sometimes difficult atmosphere of formal sessions, allow delegates to foster trust and develop personal relationships with negotiators from other groups and parties as a precursor to then deploying other strategies once bonhomie has been established[236]. This can result in greater flexibility for AILAC negotiators by widening the range of strategies available to them within formal negotiating rooms. One delegate gave the example of sharing a cigarette break with other parties' negotiators as a way of relating to them and breaking through tension or formality:

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[234] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018

[235] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

[236] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

"I'm a smoker, for example, and that's one of the things where you'll see – smoking is very interesting…It is so interesting, how you connect with different people – because when we're outside, we're all smokers. There are no heads of delegation versus, versus, err, grunts. There are no groups. 'Can I bum a cigarette?' is the type of phrase that you will hear in any accent from any level to any level at any given time, and I think that's huge. And so it gives you a different dynamic, right? Err, I think that, that, err, that speaks very much to how…I mean, we've, we've had a five minute break in the midst of a negotiating session for Article Six, and we will go outside and have a cigarette, and in those five minutes that we have within the session, I will still have a different conversation with the same guy I was talking to than I will have when I go back to my room. It is that big of a deal."[237]

Thirdly, one support unit advisor stated they have recommended that AILAC delegates specifically use corridor conversations to address the perceived problem mentioned in Chapter 7, that the AILAC delegation as a whole no longer contains a high proportion of negotiators with UNFCCC-specific experience. As such, the advisor felt the delegates' personalities are better suited to informal conversations for deployment of the group's strategies rather than speaking on the microphone in formal negotiation sessions:

"So, I would say now we are doing much more of a corridor approach as well, err, trying to use some of the soft skills of, of the negotiators and of the different members of, of the delegations, whereas before, in the run up to Paris, I would tell you that, err, it seemed…like AILAC had this array of negotiators that were very well experienced, very eloquent and very outspoken. So they would use every opportunity to take the microphone, and, and be very engaged in, in the negotiation around the table, while right now, it seems to me that it's not the case in all, all of the topics that have been prioritised for AILAC. SO, we also try to do much

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[237] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018

more of the corridor diplomacy and trying to reach out, not only in, in the microphone, but also in, in doing that, err, corridor diplomacy"[238]

This temporal difference outlined in the above quotation can be attributed to a factor previously discussed in Chapter 7 and identified by interviewees, which is that the ministries from which the AILAC delegation draws the majority of its negotiators tend to rotate their delegates relatively frequently. This means most delegates are at least somewhat new to the UNFCCC negotiations and have insufficient time to accrue experience before being rotated out again, while those incoming negotiators from foreign affairs ministries may have some experience of international negotiations and diplomacy, but tend not to have experienced the nuances and specificities of the climate change arena before[239]. This may mean they feel insufficiently confident to intervene on the microphone in formal negotiation sessions, although, as stated before, this could be overcome through force of personality.

8.4.6 External Negotiation Forums

The fourth space for negotiation outside formal UNFCCC sessions is external forums. AILAC interviewees reported that the group uses the Cartagena Dialogue[240], defined by Roberts and

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[238] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

[239] Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit member, 13th November 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 20th November 2018

[240] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

Edwards (2015:138) as "an informal space rather than an official UNFCCC group" which "welcomes any country that is willing to work towards an ambitious and legally-binding regime", and whose participants "work together within and across UNFCCC negotiating blocs to discuss openly and constructively the rationale behind each other's positions, exploring areas of convergence and potential areas of joint action." However, the Cartagena Dialogue appears to be a sort of space-group hybrid, given that it does book meeting rooms for discussion at COP events[241], but also organises events outside of UNFCCC parameters[242]. The Dialogue presents an opportunity for AILAC delegates to speak to their counterparts in more technical depth on particular areas of negotiation[243], given that meetings external to the UNFCCC system do not suffer the same time pressure of COPs to conclude formal agreements at the end of discussions. This comparative lack of time pressure means AILAC negotiators can speak to particular delegates from other parties or groups for purposes such as coalition-building or persuasion; indeed, according to one former support unit advisor, the Dialogue was especially useful for such strategies directed towards the EU and Umbrella Group's members such as Australia and New Zealand[244], as members of these coalitions also actively participate in Cartagena (Bangladesh, 2013; Roberts and Edwards, 2015). In addition to pursuing specific strategies, 2 support unit advisors reported that AILAC's presence in the Dialogue can be useful for 2 other purposes already seen in other informal spaces: building trust and personal relationships with other groups' and parties' delegates given their importance as a precursor to many strategies[245]; and for intelligence- and information-gathering behind the scenes by support unit members[246]. In addition to the Cartagena Dialogue, interviewees also identified several other external spaces

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[241] See, for example, this scheduled event for the Cartagena Dialogue at COP24 in Katowice, December 2018: https://unfccc.int/event/cartagena-dialogue
[242] See, for example, this scheduled event for the Cartagena Dialogue in the Marshall Islands in April 2014: http://sdg.iisd.org/events/13th-meeting-of-the-cartagena-dialogue-for-progressive-action/
[243] Interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018
[244] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018
[245] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018
[246] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018

AILAC uses for similar purposes: the group attends workshops around the world organised by other parties when invited[247], and participates in events organised by think tanks and research centres. 2 particular examples given were the Japanese Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES), used particularly for discussions on links between Article Six and transparency issues[248], and the Centre for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES), used especially for discussions between heads of delegations[249].

8.5 Concessions Trading

There is no obvious evidence in AILAC submission texts of outright concessions trading between AILAC and other parties or groups – that is, at no point does the bloc overtly state that it is willing to adopt or drop resistance to a particular position, in exchange for co-operation from others. Corpus-linguistic analysis of submissions produces no tokens at all for "concession[s]", "side payment[s]", or any spelling variations of "trade-off[s], and no tokens relevant to this context for associated verbs like "trade", "swap", or "exchange". The phrases "in return" and "in exchange" likewise produce no tokens.

This is, according to interviewees, broadly consistent with the behaviour of AILAC delegates in both formal negotiation sessions at COPs and intersessionals. The overall picture presented by interviewees was that the group does not set out to engage in concessions trading as it does not consider it a beneficial strategy to use[250]. This seems to be for 2 main reasons.

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[247] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018
[248] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018
[249] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018
[250] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October

Firstly, interviewees felt engaging in such a strategy could harm AILAC's attempts to present itself as a transparent negotiator focused entirely on an ambitious agreement, and therefore deserving of other parties' and groups' trust, because explicit concessions-swapping could give the impression that the group was more focused on its own specific gains than the overall goal[251]. Indeed, several negotiators tried to distance AILAC from other parties whom they feel use this strategy cynically – one responded that "we fall victim to it, but we try not to do that"[252], while another stated "We are not at all, at all like other groups we know, that say 'OK, if you put human rights in there, then I will ask for the occupied territories'."[253] Secondly, interviewees stated the group is wary of embedding too many issue linkages in negotiations through concessions trading, given the potential complications produced by making agreements on certain issues conditional upon agreements on others[254]. As one delegate commented on concessions trading as a conscious strategic approach:

"We try to keep that as far away as possible, because, for us, these issues are technical issues that have their own logic and have to be resolved on their own merits. There is obviously a political element to it...but the more that we can get resolved from a strictly technical perspective, the better. We don't like horse-trading."[255]

However, 20 of 35 interviewees noted that AILAC has engaged in concessions trading whilst in the UNFCCC negotiations, albeit in a non-explicit, or even reluctant, manner. Indeed, numerous interviewees responded that some form of concessions trading is essentially inevitable in the UNFCCC because formal sessions produce agreements in an all-or-nothing

2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

[251] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

[252] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018

[253] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018

[254] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018

[255] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018

fashion: either everything is agreed as a package deal at the end of a COP, and thus every issue can be considered some form of trade-off, or there is no agreement at all[256]. Thus, towards the end of a formal session, the likelihood of AILAC being drawn into concessions trading increases as official UNFCCC texts are formalised and the group negotiates to secure particular outcomes under increasing time pressure[257]. As one former negotiator noted, AILAC is aware of the degree to which negotiating issues on climate are interlinked, and therefore, based on the tactical knowledge gathered by the support unit, plans in advance of sessions for exactly these types of scenarios as to what could be surrendered in order to secure particular commitments from particular groups and parties when time is of the essence[258].

In the knowledge that AILAC will reluctantly engage in concessions trading when necessary, as well as specific information from interviewees, a retrospective reading of the group's submission texts reveals one clear instance of trading by the group. According to interviewees, AILAC does not consider the issue of loss & damage a priority, with only 3 of 35 interviewees designating it as such[259]. This is mirrored by the fact loss & damage produced the smallest number of tokens (46) of all the topics with specific Paris Agreement articles in AILAC submissions, and that only one of the group's 62 submissions focuses specifically on loss & damage (Submission 25), in only half a page of text consisting of recaps of progress made by that point in time, and tentative suggestions phrased with conditional language in text and a table. For example, the Submission states "…AILAC reiterates its belief that the five year rolling working plan is a strong basis for upcoming efforts on Loss and Damage and welcomes the fact that it will continue efforts of the initial two year work plan the ExCom

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[256] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

[257] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018

[258] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018

[259] Interview with AILAC delegate, 30th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

originally designed" (AILAC, 2017c). However, several interviewees reported that the group began to pronounce more vocally on loss & damage as a priority topic in order to secure support from AOSIS on matters deemed more important to AILAC, such as their backing on the delicate issue of the potential redefinition of Africa's special status and vulnerability[260], or AOSIS' support for AILAC strongly calling for binding emissions reductions commitments from all developing world parties[261]. One former support unit advisor explained the situation thus:

"*So, the example I can think of mostly revolves around adaptation and loss & damage. Err, not that we didn't want loss & damage, but we weren't going to get as much from loss & damage because we're not losing as much, in the sense of, like, we aren't all islands, like, literally losing our territory. So we knew that, like, we're obviously, we were very vulnerable, all of us, and so we were into adaptation and vulnerability, but we didn't necessarily have as much to gain from the loss & damage agenda as a low-lying state. Err, and so…that was certainly one where I think we, in the end, were, like, 'Yeah, we'll play along with loss & damage, we will fight for this and we will say that it's really important, and we will go for it, knowing that we won't get as much as you, but don't fuck us over on the definition of vulnerability.*"[262]

Textual analysis demonstrates the change in tone from AILAC submissions on loss & damage before and after the resurfacing of the issue of Africa's special status and vulnerability at the end of 2017. The group goes from paying scant attention to, and tentative statements on, loss & damage - such as that of Submission 25, or the vagueness of Submission 7's (AILAC, 2014e) statement that "The Warsaw Mechanism on Loss and Damage should continue working, and be strengthened" – to strong pronouncements in statements at the subsidiary bodies pre-COP

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[260] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018
[261] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018
[262] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018

meeting and COP23 itself at the end of 2017, as well as at COP24 in December 2018. In the pre-COP meeting, AILAC's Submission 46 (AILAC, 2017x) stated "…we will actively participate in the review of the reports of Adaptation Committee and Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, both issues of utmost relevance to our countries", while Submission 47 (AILAC, 2017y) at COP23 itself stated that "In loss and damage, we specifically celebrate progress on support for the action that we need to address this issue…we must continue to strengthen the work of the Convention on action and support in this issue." Submission 58 (AILAC, 2018j), a statement at the opening plenary of COP24, makes a point of highlighting loss & damage:

"*The Special Report by the IPCC a little less than a month ago is absolutely clear and conclusive: ALL Parties must strengthen climate action in mitigation, adaptation and mobilization of support…This must happen now in order to be able to not exceed 1.5 degrees centigrade…Similarly, we must enhance action in terms of the loss and damage associated with climate change, highlighting the strategic role of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts…We recognize that the time remaining for the technical negotiations under COP24 is very short, and draw the attention of Parties to this, as there are many essential matters that will be negotiated in Katowice, including loss and damage where we expect real progress enhancing the Warsaw International Mechanism.*"

At individual negotiator level, exact strategies each negotiator chooses is down to them[263], albeit after discussions with the rest of AILAC's delegation and the sharing of tactical

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[263] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 21st August, 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegates, 31st October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

knowledge and recommendations from the support unit at meetings both before negotiation sessions and at the beginning of each day of a formal session[264]. As such, some interviewees responded that while concessions trading is not a strategy encouraged in group meetings, individual AILAC negotiators may choose – and indeed have chosen – to use it should they deem it the most effective way to secure AILAC's desired outcome in the session in question[265]. As one negotiator stated, "If, of course, a negotiator in the table sees that that's [concessions trading] an option, they will – and it's a skilful negotiator – they will do it. But not as a general principle."[266] This opinion suggests also that a negotiator's skill level – which can be affected by their experience level or level of negotiation training - can determine whether individuals use concessions trading as a strategy. Another interviewee added that positive personal relationships with negotiators from other groups or parties can determine whether individual negotiators are able to broker deals for concessions trading[267], which in turn may determine whether the strategy is used at all, as expectations of effectiveness are central to the deployment of any strategy.

What is particularly interesting on this point is that of the 4 interviewees who stated that individual negotiators may choose to use concessions trading, 3 were members of the support unit, who are, according to the AILAC rule book (AILAC, date unknown: 4), "international specialists" in climate change negotiations. Indeed, one support unit advisor stated "I would say it's inherent to the negotiation process under the UNFCCC to, to use this

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[264] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

[265] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

[266] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018

[267] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

resource [concessions trading]. So, it's the inherent trade-offs that, that lie in the process."[268] Furthermore, interviewees repeatedly stated that the support unit are well connected with members of other groups' and parties' delegations, as they work behind the scenes of formal negotiation sessions, often via informal spaces such as corridor conversations, to gather tactical knowledge and information to be fed back later to the wider AILAC delegation in group meetings[269].

This suggests that the reluctance to use concessions trading emanates more from national delegates than from the support unit, because of greater concern over the level of trust with which the group is viewed by negotiating partners, as interviewees intimated. However, it could also be because of greater levels of partisan bias in national delegates than that of support unit advisors, as they are directly employed by national governments rather than the supranational AILAC group, and therefore may, as Odell (2010:623) writes, "overestimate the value of [their] outside opinion, underestimate the degree to which the other side's objectives are compatible with [theirs], and use a self-serving definition of fairness", leading to a lesser desire to trade concessions. This seems unlikely to be a driving force, however, given the AILAC group's general bridge-building character and its offers of co-operation to any party in the name of an ambitious climate agreement, as evidenced in Chapters 5-8.

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[268] Interview with support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

[269] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

Chapter 9: Exerting Moral Pressure, Blocking, Making Demands, and Coercion & Threats

9.1 Introduction

Chapter 9 examines the levels of AILAC's use of more aggressive strategies: exertion of moral pressure, blocking, making demands, and coercion & threats, with one section for each strategy. This chapter details evidence of these strategies in submissions and face-to-face negotiations and provides explanations as to the levels of their use. The first section on moral pressure begins by sub-dividing the strategy into two variations: appealing to equity and vulnerability discourses, and naming & shaming, each considering AILAC's strategy use in its submissions and in formal negotiations. However, like Chapter 8's section on concessions trading, these sections present explanations for exertions of moral pressure intertwined with description, as evidence from interviewees necessitates retrospective textual analysis. The section on blocking finds little evidence in AILAC submissions and a general reluctance among delegates in negotiating sessions, a pattern mirrored by the sections on demands and threats, with AILAC identity and lack of leverage cited as key determining factors, although leverage was cited less for blocking.

9.2 Exerting Moral Pressure

9.2.1 Appealing to Equity & Vulnerability Discourses

According to Betzold (2010), Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012), Bhandary (2017), Oculi and Stephenson (2018), parties to the UNFCCC have attempted to exert moral pressure on negotiating partners through discourses of equity and vulnerability. Evidence from AILAC submission texts shows its attempts to exert moral pressure on its negotiating partners are modest. AILAC submissions contain only 23 tokens for the words "equity" or "equitable", and these are described in an abstract manner without elaboration of meaning, or mentioned when referencing established Convention decisions. For example, Submission 2 (AILAC, 2013b) states that according to AILAC's preferences, the then-future Paris Agreement "will be based in the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities", without explaining what this means for respective commitments and responsibilities other than stating that its provisions for financial and technology transfer "must be designed in such a way that they reflect each country's specific circumstances, priorities, development needs, responsibilities (including historical, present and future), and vulnerability to the impacts of climate change." Submission 30 (AILAC, 2017h) on the Committee to Facilitate Implementation and Compliance falls into the latter category, stating "…the Paris Agreement under paragraph 2 of Article 15 prescribes that it shall be expert based. Paragraph 102 of Decision 1/CP.21 elaborates on this composition in terms of number of members, areas of expertise and/or competence and equitable geographical representation…" In addition, corpus-linguistic analysis shows that the submissions contain only 11 tokens for the words "fair" or "fairness", which also are used without explanation. For example, Submission 5

(AILAC, 2014c) calls for the assessment of "the fair share of the contributions of developed countries of the short term collective quantified goal to be defined as part of the 2015 Agreement". As such, discourses of equity are not prevalent within AILAC submissions, and there is little to no evidence of use of the strategy of moral pressure exertion via these discourses.

AILAC does include references to vulnerability in 31 of its 62 submissions. However, corpus-linguistic analysis generated only 122 tokens for "vulnerable", "vulnerability", or "vulnerabilities", a figure considerably lower than the results for some other salient topics in the negotiations, such as mitigation or adaptation with 1095 and 1254 tokens respectively. Furthermore, the group largely refrains from using emotive language or framing in reference to vulnerability to climate change, with mentions classifiable into 3 primary categories. Firstly, 38 tokens relate to AILAC's proposals that vulnerability assessments form part of UNFCCC action, such as Submission 43 (AILAC, 2017u) proposing that parties "may provide information related to co-operation, good practices, experiences and lessons learned in many areas including scientific research in the field of vulnerability assessment and adaptation". Such references to vulnerability cannot really be classified as attempts to exert moral pressure. For a start, the fact that these tokens occur in constructive proposals means their tone is less aggressive than would be expected if applying pressure. Furthermore, the proposals do not specify any particular parties in their calls for action, so it would be difficult to establish the target of the pressure were it to be a deliberate strategy.

Secondly, 42 tokens involve measures to reduce vulnerability across all parties, as in Submission 38 (AILAC, 2017p), which states "…these elements [linkages between adaptation communications and the transparency framework] would be defined in a way that would help understand how to increase support, co-operation and political backing for present, on-going and upcoming priorities, needs, plans and action so Parties are less vulnerable". This

discussion of vulnerability is less an attempt to exert moral pressure on parties, given the lack of specific targets, than a component of the discourse of universality that runs through AILAC's submissions as a whole[270]. Of course, this can be seen as self-interested action, as AILAC's vulnerability can only be assuaged through effective outcomes, which, given that climate change is a collective action prisoners' dilemma problem, can only be achieved if all parties act together. However, that the application of moral pressure generally is predicated on self-interest, and that portrayal of the concept of vulnerability in this manner can also be attributed to self-interest, does not make these strategic behaviours the same.

Thirdly, 42 tokens reference measures to assist particularly or highly vulnerable parties, such as Submission 14 (AILAC, 2016g) stating "The successful implementation of the Paris Agreement depends upon…the adequate provision and mobilization of the means of implementation, in particular from developed to developing countries and particularly vulnerable countries". That these references distinguish highly vulnerable parties from those which are not means there is more credibility in viewing them as part of an attempt to exert moral pressure, especially given that 18 references specify such highly vulnerable parties as being developing country parties. There is, therefore, an implied application of pressure on developed country parties, as these are less vulnerable, to assist developing country parties in these instances. However, the consequences of the high vulnerability to climate change of these developing country parties – and inaction from developed country parties in particular - are never fully spelt out. Furthermore, the 68 references to "developed Parties", "developed countries", or "developed country Parties" in AILAC submissions never specify exactly whom is meant by these terms. Indeed, as stated in Chapter 8, AILAC never overtly equates developed countries/Parties with Annex I parties in its submissions, bearing in mind the difference in frequency of tokens for developed and developing countries (284) versus Annex I/non-Annex

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[270] See Chapter 5 for a greater focus on this discourse.

I (3). Therefore, if such references to vulnerability are considered exertion of moral pressure at all, they should be seen as relatively light-touch, given the indirect way in which consequences of inaction are suggested, and the lack of specificity about whom is being addressed by such a discourse of vulnerability. Furthermore, references to particularly vulnerable parties could be seen merely a part of the universality discourse promulgated by AILAC throughout its submissions; by prioritising the needs of the most vulnerable, AILAC attempts to drive up ambition levels across all parties, as only by effective collective action can these needs be met, whereas lower levels of ambition, albeit involving all parties' participation, might be sufficient to protect more resilient parties from climate change effects.

An interesting subset of the third category of vulnerability references is evident where AILAC specifically refers to its member states' vulnerability to climate change. The group does this on 13 occasions within 11 of its 62 submissions[271] - twice in 2014 submissions, 3 times in 2016, and 5 times between the subsidiary bodies' pre-COP meeting at the end of 2017 and COP24 in 2018. For example, Submission 4 (AILAC, 2014b) states "AILAC countries are particularly vulnerable and will be disproportionately affected by the increased costs and risks associated with delayed action on mitigation", while Submission 11 (AILAC, 2016b) states that "As particularly vulnerable countries, AILAC underscores that adaptation to climate change continues to be of the utmost importance for our parties". AILAC-specific vulnerability references in the group's submission texts mostly do not spell out the exact consequences of climate inaction to AILAC member states as a result of their particular vulnerability; at most, they state AILAC members will be "disproportionately affected"[272] by the adverse effects of climate change. In addition to this low "intensity" of moral pressure, the

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[271] Submissions 4 (AILAC, 2014b), 6 (AILAC, 2014d), 10 (AILAC, 2016a), 11 (AILAC, 2016b), 18 (AILAC, 2016i), 23 (AILAC, 2017a) 46 (AILAC, 2017x), 47 (AILAC, 2017y), 52 (AILAC, 2018d), 55 (AILAC, 2018g), 58 (AILAC, 2018j), 62 (AILAC, 2018n)
[272] Submissions 4 (AILAC, 2014b), 10 (AILAC, 2016a)

low frequency of these references across this study's 6-year period makes it reasonable to infer that they are evidence that the strategy is deployed at a low-level at most. Rather than a constant application of moral pressure from AILAC on the negotiations, these references to AILAC vulnerability serve more as a reminder of the group's desire for ambitious outcomes.

Interviewees suggested 2 plausible reasons why AILAC does not tend to highlight its vulnerability to pressure others into ambitious action. Firstly, AILAC recognises, as stated in Submission 48 (AILAC, 2017z), the particular vulnerabilities and special circumstances of the LDCs and SIDS, and therefore if the group claimed especially heightened levels of vulnerability, the effect of the argument would be weakened by the fact that climate-related effects in other parties are arguably even more severe than those in AILAC member states[273], as some Pacific islands are facing existential threats (Weir et al, 2017). Secondly, as one support unit advisor pointed out, credibility of an AILAC strategy attempting to harness moral pressure would be hindered by AILAC member states' continued extraction of fossil fuel resources, and thus the charge of hypocrisy could be levelled at the group[274]. Indeed, according to Strambo et al (2018), Colombia, accounted in 2017 for 1.5% of global coal production while only basing 6.5% of its domestic energy generation on coal, resulting in coal accounting for 12% of the country's total exports and generating approximately a quarter of public revenue. Peru, according to APEC (2015), increased its extraction of oil from 89,000 barrels per day in 2003 to 104,000 barrels per day in 2013, and in 2012, production was expected to exceed 500,000 barrels per day by 2021. The advisor suggested the fact that little to no fossil fuel extraction takes place in AOSIS member states explains why this strategy is viable for that group, and thus it would not be as effective for AILAC.

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[273] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018
[274] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018

Additionally AILAC's lack of vulnerability-based moral pressure may be because AILAC's rôle as bridge-builder (AILAC, date unknown) [275] could be jeopardised if it were seen as trying to "guilt-trip" other parties into taking more ambitious climate action. AILAC's core objectives call for the creation of "co-ordinated, ambitious and progressive positions that positively support the balance in the multilateral negotiations on climate change", but alongside these, to "build bridges between the different negotiation groups, promoting trust, and favouring the creation of propitious spaces for consensus" (AILAC, date unknown: 1). The latter may be hindered should certain parties feel that AILAC is attempting to use moral blackmail to secure behavioural changes. Interviewees attributed considerable importance to AILAC's identity and rôle as bridge-builder, open to working constructively with any party, with 30 of 35 affirming that this is how AILAC chooses to behave, and that the group has developed a reputation for bridge-building among onlookers (Watts and Depledge, 2018). Given this, it is unsurprising that 25 of 35 interviewees stated that continual application of moral pressure through vulnerability discourses is not something the group pursues in negotiation sessions. As one former support unit advisor put it, "The style of negotiation of AILAC countries is simply not that."[276]

However, one statement submission from the end of the subsidiary bodies' meeting in November 2018 shortly before COP24 deviates from this pattern of references to AILAC's vulnerability. Submission 55 (AILAC, 2018g) states the following:

"*AILAC attaches great importance to the success of these deliberations because our region, Latin America, is highly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. Within our group we have countries (including Honduras and Guatemala) which have suffered some of the greatest effects of extreme climate events over the past decade. It is projected that our group*

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[275] See Chapter 5 for greater discussion of AILAC's bridge-building identity.
[276] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018

of countries will suffer loss and damage of between 1 and 7% of GDP due to climate change, particularly with respect to agriculture and water. Guatemala could suffer losses of up to 23% of its GDP."

It is notable that Submission 55 was made whilst the AGN was attempting to insert a reconsideration of the special needs and circumstances of Africa into UNFCCC proceedings. The AILAC statement – Submission 55 (AILAC, 2018j) - from the opening plenary of COP24, one month later in December 2018, states the following:

"*AILAC notes that the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement will require consideration of the special circumstances of all developing countries. AILAC reiterates that the Latin American region is highly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change and that, therefore, its immediate needs and special circumstances must be addressed.*"

It seems plausible, therefore, that this change in approach from AILAC – to portraying the vulnerability of its members - and the near-simultaneous connection AILAC makes between Latin American vulnerability and the region's special needs and circumstances may have been a response to increased attempts by the AGN to secure changes to Africa's status within the UNFCCC. As such, the strategy of exerting moral pressure through a vulnerability discourse may have been used defensively at this point; in other words, AILAC may have been highlighting the vulnerability of Latin America to counter the increased efforts of the AGN to secure a re-evaluation of African special needs and circumstances, based on the argument that Africa's vulnerability has hitherto been understated and is in fact on a par with that of the LDCs and SIDS. Were Africa to be successful, as stated in Chapters 7 and 8 it would mean Latin America would be the only part of the developing world without access to prioritisation for

support under Articles 9.4 and 9.9 of the Paris Agreement, which interviewees say is a red line for AILAC[277].

The domestic situation of AILAC member states, therefore, is plausibly a material factor in its adoption of this defensive moral pressure strategy, as the potentially smaller share of UNFCCC funding, or at least delayed access to it, would have consequences for AILAC member states' ability to proceed with climate action, and could impact on government budgeting, thus affecting broader domestic politics. Of course, under the UNFCCC decision-making process, AILAC would still be able to block the adoption of an agenda item changing the status of African special needs and circumstances, as it did at COP21[278]. However, repeating this veto would risk both antagonising the AGN and jeopardising the credibility of its self-appointed rôle of bridge-builder and its discourse of universal participation, particularly as opponents would be able to point to self-interest as the driving force behind the blocking action. As such, a defensive pressure application strategy, i.e. highlighting AILAC vulnerability, may be the preferable alternative to outright blocking because of considerations relating to AILAC's image and identity in the UNFCCC.

Despite AILAC's apparent reluctance to use vulnerability discourses in its submissions or on a regular basis in negotiation rooms as a way of exerting moral pressure on its partners, more interviewees – 16 to 10 - responded that, should natural events attributable

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[277] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 9th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with three AILAC delegates, 31st October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018
[278] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018

to climate change take place in an AILAC country, they would be prepared to use specific events to exert moral pressure on their negotiating partners in face-to-face sessions, as it may help the group convince other parties to agree to AILAC proposals. Interviewees cited several examples of events used as the basis to exert moral pressure, such as severe floods in Guatemala in 2016[279], the impact of Hurricane Otto on Costa Rica in the same year[280], and the regular impacts of the El Niño phenomenon in Colombia and across western South America as a whole[281]. Some interviewees responded that negotiators' statements took on a tone of greater urgency as they were able to discuss particular examples of climate change effects on AILAC countries when negotiating, as it allowed them to demonstrate the vulnerability of the group's members[282]. Others, conversely, stressed they would not change the tone or framing of their interactions with other delegates, as the gravity of the content – i.e. evidence of a serious climate change-related natural disaster in an AILAC country – would speak for itself, particularly when the authority of science could be brought to bear on the argument, in keeping with AILAC's strategy of grounding all of its behaviour in rational argument and scientific evidence[283].

10 interviewees disagreed with this approach, however, some arguing that because other parties are recognised as being even more vulnerable than AILAC members – namely, the LDCs and SIDS – the effect on other parties' negotiating behaviour of AILAC highlighting its vulnerability would be limited[284]. Others argued that such events impact the internal

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[279] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018
[280] Interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018
[281] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018
[282] Interview with AILAC delegate, 30th July 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018
[283] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; terview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018
[284] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018

negotiations within AILAC about the priorities the group should pursue rather than the strategies the group will use to achieve them[285], while one delegate stated that were such an event to occur in an AILAC country, they would adopt a more urgent tone but without referencing the event directly[286]. 3 support unit advisors stated that whether or not they would use such events in a negotiation depends on several factors. One stated that they would not recommend using such a tactic in small group negotiations like informals, informal informals, or other informal spaces, but that events could be referenced in plenary remarks[287], while another stated the group would "silly not to use" a climate event as a way of exerting moral pressure but they didn't "know if it would be decisive if something particularly terrible were to happen" given the "cynicism" with which other groups have utilised this tactic in the past[288]. They cited an example of a negotiator from the Philippines at COP19 in 2013 who had begun crying in the opening plenary session as they did not know the whereabouts or safety of their brother due to a typhoon taking place at the time, only to be particularly obstructionist 2 days later in a session on intellectual property rights for technology transfer. Another former support unit advisor stated that whether the group would "make use" of climate-related natural disasters to exert moral pressure depended on the AILAC delegate raising the topic in the session in question[289], which is evidenced by the group being fairly evenly split as regards the number of interviewees who responded that they would or wouldn't refer to natural events as a moral pressure strategy. The advisor stated that while a speech writer from the support unit may inject more urgency into the language to be used, the personality - and indeed, the domestic workload - of the delegate delivering the speech may determine whether they recite the speech verbatim:

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[285] Interview with AILAC delegate, 10th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd August 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018
[286] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018
[287] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018
[288] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018
[289] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018

"Sometimes it's interesting because, err, that would give you a, a bigger sense of urgency for some negotiators; for some that would make you a bit more conservative. And they'd say, 'You know what? My priority is back home, I'm not going to be as ambitious in international negotiations, precisely because I have all this happening in Peru."[290]

9.2.2 Naming & Shaming

AILAC submission texts show no direct evidence of it applying another form of moral pressure, namely that of naming & shaming other parties which have hindered progress or reneged on their commitments. As discussed in Chapter 8, every mention of another group or party within AILAC submissions demonstrates AILAC attempting to forge a positive relationship, whether by expressing support for, or association or agreement with these parties. Furthermore, only 2 incidences of the group attempting to shame certain parties without specifically naming them were identified from textual analysis. The more clear-cut instance occurs in Submission 62 (AILAC, 2018n), a statement at the joint closing plenary of the subsidiary body and APA meetings, midway through COP24 in December 2018. After the 2 initial paragraphs where the delegate explains that they speak on behalf of AILAC and thanks both the facilitators of these sessions for their hard work and the Polish government for their hospitality and leadership, the first 3 substantive paragraphs read as follows:

"The implementation of the Paris Agreement on behalf of ALL Parties, enabled by the common set of rules that we are to adopt, and that have been subject of intense technical deliberations for the last three years, must decisively answer the call for urgent action that the best available

science has made through the clear and unquestionable findings of the IPCC Special Report on the impacts of climate change of over 1.5ºC.

It is regrettable that the SBSTA to the UN Convention on Climate Change could not welcome or recognize the best available science on climate change by welcoming the IPCCC report on 1.5.

Failure to do so will be a failure to meet the Paris Agreement purpose, and backsliding from the multilateral regime, to provide an effective answer, to what is arguably the most significant global challenge of our times."

On the day of this statement, 8th December 2018, news coverage revealed that the IPCC report "took note" of the report rather than "welcoming" it – which would have been seen as endorsing its core message that global emissions reductions of 45% would be needed by 2030 to divert the planet's warming trajectory from 3ºC to 1.5ºC versus pre-industrial levels in the 21st Century – because 4 parties had objected, namely the US, Russia, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (McGrath, 2018). Therefore, given that the identities of the parties responsible for blocking the adoption of the IPCC Report were common knowledge at this point, that the AILAC statement specifically draws attention to the failure to adopt the report can be interpreted as a form of indirect shaming. The statement implies they are responsible for "a failure to meet the Paris Agreement purpose" and "backsliding from the multilateral regime" despite the IPCC's findings being "clear and unquestionable", which suggests that the relevant parties are employing a blocking strategy to protect their own political and/or economic interests, especially as all other parties in the UNFCCC had agreed to "welcome" the IPCC report.

Besides this example, which requires contextual knowledge for the shaming nature of AILAC's submission to be identified, there is little evidence of the strategy. The only other

example of indirect shaming identified, although less clear-cut, is in Submission 6 (AILAC, 2014d), before the creation of the Paris Agreement a year later. Here, AILAC states:

"*It is fundamental that in the first session of 2014 we agree to the timeline, and that we define the specific elements of the argument no later than the June session (SBs 40, ADP 2-5). We trust, however, that Parties will understand the historic responsibility that we have and ensure that we do not get caught in fruitless, tactical discussions over 'process'.*"

This statement again names no specific party, nor does it openly condemn actions that the group claims have definitely taken place; rather it is a plea to other groups and parties not to engage in blocking tactics. While it is plausible that AILAC may have issued such a plea whether or not they were aware of any party using such measures previously, given the urgency of agreeing a universal climate treaty in 2015, it seems more likely this statement is an indirect reference to certain parties' past behaviour. It is known at the very least from academic scholarship that parties such as Saudi Arabia (Barnett, 2008; Weiler, 2012) and ALBA (Audet, 2013) had engaged in blocking strategies before 2014, albeit for different purposes. It seems more than reasonable to assume, therefore, that if such knowledge is available in academia, then negotiators on the ground in the UNFCCC would have knowledge of certain parties' past attempts to stifle progress towards an ambitious agreement. This is a less concrete example of indirect shaming than that of COP24, as the statement does not seem to refer to a specific incident of hampering progress, but AILAC delegates' contextual knowledge of other parties' historical blocking strategies was demonstrated by interviewees. Indeed, when asked about the group's relationships with other groups, interviewees provided several examples of blocking. The Umbrella Group were perceived to use blocking regularly until the very end of negotiating sessions in the run-up to COP21, to quell AILAC's attempts to have adaptation included as a

component of NDCs[291]. Furthermore, interviewees reported that ALBA had frequently blocked attempts to progress on market mechanism discussions under Article Six[292], while 3 interviewees identified China as having used blocking strategies on loss & damage proposals on equity grounds[293].

Interviewees painted a similar picture to evidence from the group's submissions on how far AILAC attempts to name & shame other parties in UNFCCC negotiation sessions. 19 definitively stated that it is not a strategy they choose versus 8 who stated that they have attempted to shame parties in face-to-face negotiations, although of these 8, 4 stated they would only use the strategy as a last resort[294], while 2 others stated that they use it only indirectly, through implicatures rather than directly naming parties[295]. One other stated they would only name & shame individual negotiators rather than the groups and parties they represent[296], while another stated that they would never use the strategy in public, such as in formal negotiations where statements are recorded, instead choosing to use it in informal spaces such as social meetings and corridor conversations in order to avoid attention[297].

Clearly, then, individual AILAC negotiators have discretion about whether to name & shame others in face-to-face negotiation sessions. This tallies with interviewee responses mentioned in Chapter 7, which reveal that within AILAC's positional red lines on negotiation

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[291] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018

[292] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 21st August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

[293] Interview with AILAC delegate, 10th July 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 21st August 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018

[294] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 21st August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

[295] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd August 2018

[296] Interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018

[297] Interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018

issues (decided by the Governance Committee), AILAC delegates are essentially free to negotiate however they see fit towards the group's goals[298]. Indeed, one interviewee even felt an individual's decision on whether to shame another negotiator or their group/party depends on whether they are "polite"[299]. However, this is obviously affected by the fact that the AILAC delegation tends to change relatively regularly as member states' ministries rotate negotiators, which has the effect previously discussed of reducing the average level of experience and therefore potentially the confidence of AILAC negotiators[300]. Although this may be overcome by force of personality[301], it could also be a relevant factor in the relative lack of shaming by AILAC delegates, as (naming &) shaming another party or negotiator is not to be taken lightly in a multilateral negotiation.

Negotiators did however, demonstrate awareness of AILAC's lack of leverage, as discussed in Chapter 5, which impacts any potential decision to shame other parties, directly or indirectly, resulting in the majority view against shaming as a viable strategy. Interviewees recognised any AILAC attempts to shame other parties into behavioural change would likely

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[298] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 21st August, 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 14th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegates, 31st October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018
[299] Interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018
[300] Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit member, 13th November 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 20th November 2018
[301] Interview with AILAC delegate, 30th July 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

fail for 2 main reasons. Firstly, as with appeals to vulnerability discourses, shaming involves a moral judgement on another party's behaviour, as condemnation is seen to be deserved because of its refusal to address a global problem despite moral arguments to act; yet that AILAC's vulnerability is not perceived to be as severe as other developing country parties' may dilute the potency of such an attempt to shame should other vulnerable parties join in. Secondly, the group's lack of traditional power resources presents minimal problems for other parties should AILAC threaten inaction on its own part, or geopolitical repercussions outside of the UNFCCC, given their small membership and the corresponding (relative lack of) economic and military potency[302]. One delegate likened any potential attempts by AILAC to shame other parties as "like the runt of the litter trying to play the big boy"[303]. Another stated that while the group may wish to shame certain parties for lacking ambition or inaction, AILAC is not in a credible position to do so, and so is reliant on "somebody else – hopefully a developed country – [who] can name and shame them in the plenary and we don't have to do that"[304].

Another factor which weighs heavily on AILAC negotiators' decisions whether to shame is AILAC's identity as a bridge-builder. As discussed throughout the analysis, the importance of this constructive rôle to the group is both evidenced by interviewees (e.g. described as being in AILAC's DNA[305]) and enshrined in the AILAC rule book as one of the group's main objectives (AILAC, date unknown). This is also at least partly responsible for AILAC's aversion to shaming other parties in submissions or face-to-face negotiations, due to concerns that the strategy might tarnish AILAC's bridge-building reputation developed since

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[302] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018
[303] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018
[304] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018
[305] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

2012. As such, one interviewee stressed that AILAC's identity as non-confrontational would override most considerations from delegates to shame other parties overtly[306], while a former support unit advisor felt that identity considerations constrained such strategic choices, stating that "then it's hard, it becomes hard to bang on the table, right?"[307]. Caution over AILAC's reputation was also cited by interviewees who stated they would shame in negotiations but only as a last resort, with one delegate explaining this would only be after exhausting attempts to give target parties space to change their behaviour in some way more acceptable to AILAC's ambition[308]. Furthermore, similar concerns as for appeals to vulnerability discourses were raised regarding potential accusations of hypocrisy should the group attempt to shame other groups or parties for continued use or sales of fossil fuels[309], as this could incur further reputational damage.

Interestingly, however, 2 AILAC support unit advisors suggested the group may need to re-evaluate its perspective on naming & shaming strategies due to the changing dynamics of UNFCCC negotiations from 2018 onwards, like the aforementioned tensions with the AGN, and the US' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. One former advisor stated that the support unit has sometimes advocated the strategy to negotiators, although the latter had generally chosen not to follow this path[310], while another advisor stated that naming & shaming is now more frequently under consideration as a viable strategy:

"It's under consideration precisely because of, of the scenario that we are facing in terms of, of, err…all of these question marks regarding the, the involvement of the US, and, err, the presence of, of certainly very high-ranking officials in the, in the ministerial segment. Err, the whole situation with, with the African Group, and, err, many of, of the things that they have

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[306] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018
[307] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018
[308] Interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018
[309] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018
[310] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018

been pushing for really hard, err, could potentially require a very strong position also from, from the AILAC countries. Err,, so I, I would say it's still on, on the table, but, err, the cost of doing that is also high in terms of, of the impact that it could create in certain alliances that AILAC has been building for, for the past four or five years now."[311]

Clearly, then, certain events may prove important enough to AILAC's interests to merit the use of naming & shaming at the expense of any potential reputational damage, or regardless of expectations of effectiveness given AILAC's relative lack of leverage. Given it was identified in the above response as an event of sufficient importance to merit shaming strategies, it is particularly interesting that the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement was cited by several interviewees as an event which, though tempting, was not sufficiently detrimental to AILAC's immediate interests to merit shaming. According to interviewees, AILAC planned to release a formal statement condemning the US withdrawal, but Honduras vetoed its release in intra-AILAC negotiations[312] due to concerns it might harm Honduran-American negotiations outside of the UNFCCC arena on immigration issues[313]. As such, because AILAC's decision-making process for high-level political engagements is by consensus in its Governance Committee (AILAC, date unknown), no such statement was ever issued.

While geopolitical considerations were clearly to the fore in AILAC's decision not to shame the US over its reneging on commitments made by accepting the Paris Agreement in 2016 (Somander, 2016), according to interviewees, as with persuasion attempts, the relevance of geopolitical relations in considering potential shaming scenarios in face-to-face negotiations is mixed, varying between delegates and spaces. Of course, that interviewees recognised that

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[311] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018
[312] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018
[313] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

AILAC holds little leverage demonstrates understanding of the difference in geopolitical influence between the group and others, as this is predicated on relative levels of traditional power resources. Furthermore, some interviewees said they believed geopolitical considerations are more relevant for heads of national delegations at the higher level of the Governance Committee, responsible for responding to events such as the US withdrawal and determining the overall pattern of strategy, given their ties to their respective national governments[314].

In contrast, however, ordinary AILAC delegates attributed lesser importance to geopolitical considerations in making individual strategic decisions between negotiators in formal and informal spaces[315], like whether to shame individual delegates or to shame only in social meetings, either because of implications for or political relations with other parties external to the UNFCCC. As with persuasion strategies, interviewees gave several reasons for this, responding that they envision the UNFCCC as a stand-alone arena in which to negotiate given environment ministry delegates' technical backgrounds and foreign affairs ministry delegates' skill and training in avoiding conflation of already complex climate negotiations with other areas of international relations[316]. Some also noted the influence of support unit advice, focusing negotiation on issues specific to the UNFCCC without being drawn into

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[314] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 10th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd August 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 27th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

[315] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit member, 16th October 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegates, 31st October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

[316] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018

geopolitical considerations, as it is not directly employed by any AILAC member state's government[317].

In any case, AILAC's principal mode of negotiating does not rely on frequent applications of moral pressure. As discussed in previous chapters, given the group's lack of leverage, it makes sense for AILAC not to attempt strategies such as moral pressure which rely on traditional power resources. Furthermore, such strategies tend not to reinforce AILAC's self-appointed bridge-building identity in the UNFCCC. Instead, it makes more sense for AILAC to play to its strengths and focus on "soft power" strategies, through which the group can use the power resources of which it has more, such as power/knowledge. As stated above, should the group prove successful in "setting up the rules of the game" to play to its strengths by establishing the primacy of technical knowledge in negotiations, it would have considerably less need to revert to applications of moral pressure.

9.3 Blocking

The AILAC submission texts show little evidence of its direct use of blocking strategies within UNFCCC negotiations, although the group has the right to veto outcomes under UNFCCC decision-making processes. Only 2 examples of AILAC blocking a text could be identified: in Submission 61 (AILAC, 2018m), a mid-session submission at COP24, and in Submission 54 (AILAC, 2018f), made with the AGN. Submission 61 lists issues AILAC has identified with the then-status of the outputs of the APA3 (mitigation), APA4 (adaptation communications), and APA5 (transparency) workstreams, and for every issue bar one, AILAC presents proposed

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[317] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018

solutions to address the perceived problems. However, in the section on APA5, the group writes:

"*Under an Enhanced Transparency Framework, and taking into consideration the TACCC principles, we cannot work with the language in Chapter III.C of quantitative or qualitative indicators to track progress in implementing and achieving the NDCs, as we do not see these indicators as being mutually exclusive.*"

The group thus offers no suggested replacement or compromise to amend the specified language – it simply states that it "cannot work" with it. This can be considered blocking, as the impression is given that the group simply wants this portion of the text removed rather than replaced, as it proposes replacements throughout the submission elsewhere.

The first section of Submission 54, on the adaptation communication's place on the APA agenda, contains the stand-alone line "It is not acceptable to have no further work on adaptation under transparency (item 5)." The submission proceeds to provide a rationale for this viewpoint, but only in a separate paragraph, allowing the full impact of the two groups' resistance to the lack of further work on adaptation in the transparency section to be felt. In the second section of the statement, the opening line reads "The position of the AGN and AILAC is firm and unambiguous." While the 2 groups later state they are flexible on details, making it obvious that this lack of transparency work is unacceptable to AILAC and the AGN can be considered blocking, as it gives the impression that the groups will not permit work to continue without addressing adaptation. This can be considered an example of what Odell (2010) deems a minority coalition working together to block an unfavourable outcome.

Nevertheless, these 2 examples aside, no blocking strategies could be identified in the remaining submission texts. No tokens were produced in corpus-linguistic analysis for any variants of the word stem "block". Furthermore, no tokens were produced for other terms

potentially considered signs of blocking strategies, like stating that a negotiation outcome is "unacceptable" or that a proposal breaches the group's "red lines". Indeed, only 2 tokens were produced for "red lines" in all 62 submissions, both in Submission 62 (AILAC, 2018n), in which the group states:

"*Indeed, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We've heard constantly about red lines and critical issues. But the most critical issue of all issues MUST and SHALL always be to provide for a global response to a global problem. That is the hardest of all red lines, since failure to adopt a robust Paris Agreement Work Programme would result in an unattended disappointment for which will ALL be accountable. To this end, we make a plea to our Partners to set up a system that we can all be part of, and that delivers on its objectives of a transformation towards a low emission and resilient development.*"

This is not an example of a blocking attempt by AILAC, as the reference to red lines is clearly inserted to try to galvanise attempts to produce an agreement with universal participation, and the paragraph makes this explicit by its "plea" to continue negotiating constructively. Furthermore, nowhere throughout its submission texts does AILAC state that it "cannot accept" a proposal – indeed, only 7 tokens for "cannot" were produced across all 62 submissions[318]. These either make an explanatory point to support an AILAC position, as on the importance of continuing to negotiate on transparency by stating in Submission 62 (AILAC, 2018n) that "*Without [transparency], we cannot keep track of whether the system is delivering on its aim…*", or setting out AILAC's position, such as in the adaptation section of Submission 2 (AILAC, 2013b):

"*Particularly vulnerable countries will need greater access to international resources. Also, new and additional international non-refundable co-operation should be allocated to assess*

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[318] Found in submissions 2 (AILAC, 2013b), 7 (AILAC, 2014e), 14 (AILAC, 2016e), 21 (AILAC, 2016l), 61 (AILAC, 2018m), and 62 (AILAC, 2018n)

vulnerability and enhance capacity of countries to adapt to climate change. Funding for

adaptation cannot be solely based on sources that are subject to market speculation such as

the monetisation of CERs in the carbon market."

Asked about blocking, more interviewees stated that they did not favour it, at 19 versus 15, with one declining to answer. All 15 who considered blocking a viable option moderated their answers, however, to clarify that only after the exhaustion of the group's preferred strategies, such as constructive proposals and compromise, persuasion, and coalition-building, would they consider using blocking, i.e. as a last resort if the group's red lines were in danger of being breached[319]. Indeed, 2 interviewees gave the specific example of AILAC having blocked further proposed amendments to the special needs and circumstances of Africa once all other avenues of negotiation had proven ineffective[320]. Several others gave examples of the group being very close to blocking but ultimately not following through due to last-minute success with compromise strategies, such as formal COP decisions[321], and a dispute with ALBA over the presence of observers in Article Six negotiations in 2016[322]. Several interviewees also remarked they feel the likelihood of AILAC having to resort to blocking is increasing due to negotiating outcomes getting closer to breaching AILAC red lines and locking unsatisfactory elements into agreements, in particular in negotiations over Article Six on the rôle of markets[323]. As one delegate summarised:

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[319] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 9th August 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate 21st August, 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 22nd August 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 10th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 24th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 17th October 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

[320] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018

[321] Interview with former AILAC delegate, 23rd October 2018

[322] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

[323] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018

"We're getting closer to the point where a bad deal is worse than no deal. In Article Six, for example, it is extremely clear to me that there are circumstances where we will walk away from the table and we will say 'There will be no consensus' and we will block a decision actively if we have to. Is it from the perspective of being bullies? No, because, for us, it's very clear – we have to be…you have to be willing to be hated. Or at least to be, to be, to have people pissed off at you for a long time…'You are the ones who killed the decision!' 'Yes, well, it was a shitty decision and we had to kill it. We didn't want to kill it, we tried not to kill it, we were very clear from the very beginning that these were the things we needed to see to be able to survive, but if push comes to shove, a bad decision in accounting, in markets, in one of these core elements is worse than no decision.' If you agree to it, you will not discuss it again; if you disagree, then you will, it just means we're going to be doing it again six months later, and six months later until we hit it. Once you've given them the rubber stamp, there is no taking it away. So I think we have to be – and I think it's something that AILAC has never had to do because of the dynamics of the negotiation up to this point."[324]

The principal reason given by interviewees for AILAC's reluctance to block - whether they considered blocking as a last resort viable or not - centred on the group's self-identification as a bridge-builder between different factions within the UNFCCC, e.g. developed and developing party countries, or those with differing ambition levels. As discussed in previous analysis chapters, such a bridge-building rôle requires the group to be constructive and transparent in its positions and red lines to secure the trust of its negotiation partners. Therefore, the group prioritises strategies in keeping with this approach, such as making proposals and compromises, persuasion, and coalition-building. Interviewees felt employing blocking strategies would deviate from AILAC's intrinsic nature and hinder AILAC's bridge-building attempts, becoming an obstacle to achieving the group's goal of an ambitious outcome from

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[324] Interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018

the overall negotiations. One delegate remarked that blocking is "dangerous for us, it's really dangerous"[325], while another explained:

"*...for us inside AILAC, it's not in our genetic code to block like that, like other groups have done. I believe the rules of good faith and transparent negotiation – they're common in AILAC. We want the Paris Agreement to be successful. And for that we need to make progress in the negotiation. From this point of view, we don't want to block negotiations.*"[326]

A practical result of AILAC acting as bridge-builder is its tendency to occupy the middle ground in disputes between parties. As one former support unit advisor stated, "We see generally where there's a reasonable middle ground – we're not like ALBA, and we're not OPEC or the LMDCs, and we're not the US, and we're not the EU, and so we hopefully will have some middle ground contribution to offer, and if we can pull people in from both sides to see that we're generally wanting to get an agreement over and above everything, then they'll respect that and work with us."[327] Indeed, another former support unit advisor revealed that the group once considered formally adopting the slogan "The middle is beautiful"[328]. This led to some interviewees raising a practical reason why the group avoids blocking in all but the most necessary scenarios: because negotiations are extremely complex and full of different parties' competing interests, it is likely at least one party will object and block an issue's progress. Therefore, given AILAC occupies the centre ground, there is no incentive for them to block unless a red line is at risk of breach. As one support unit advisor explained, the group is better off focusing on its primary strategic approaches:

"*It's* [blocking] *unnecessary. If one of the traditional, if one of the usual suspects is already making noise, why bother? ...in eighty percent of the topics, there is a range, with the usual*

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[325] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018
[326] Interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd July 2018
[327] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 23rd October 2018
[328] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

suspects at each extreme of the range, and you'd be comfortable anywhere within the middle

of it. So you don't have to talk all the time. You have to watch how the pieces are falling, and

then give a little nudge to just centre wherever it's coming to."[329]

9.4 Making Demands

There is little evidence of AILAC making overt demands within its submission texts. Corpus-linguistic analysis produced no tokens for any variants of the verb "insist", and only 15 tokens for variants of the verb "demand", none being used to make a demand. 3 use the word "demand" as a noun e.g. "supply, consumption, and energy demand for decision making and investment" in Submission 8 (AILAC, 2015a), and 8 use the word "demands" as either a noun in the same way or to emphasise the urgent need for action, e.g. in the in-session statements of Submissions 46 (AILAC, 2017x), 52 (AILAC, 2018d), and 55 (AILAC, 2018g) when AILAC writes that "…AILAC is willing to continue supporting these efforts…in a constructive spirit so that this session provides the progress that urgency demands of us." At no time does AILAC use "demands" in the third-person singular, i.e. to write "AILAC demands…" "Demanded" produces 3 tokens – one is used in the same way to emphasise urgency, while Submission 58 (AILAC, 2018j), another statement, uses "demanded" on 2 occasions to emphasise the need for ambition levels to match the evidence provided by scientific reports, e.g. "Katowice gives us the opportunity to achieve a robust manual of rules that responds to the urgency of the action demanded by the IPCC special report…" "Demanding" produces one token, again used in a context of timescales, as Submission 2 (AILAC, 2013b) begins a sentence with "Given the demanding timeline that has been set under the ADP for the definition of the new legally

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[329] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018

binding agreement…" to justify an argument that means of implementation commitments needed to be defined quickly.

Variants of the verb "require" produced 128 tokens, while variants of the verb "expect" produced 61. Between them, variants of these 2 verbs produced 4 tokens which could be interpreted as demands. Submission 52 (AILAC, 2018d) states:

"*Considering the importance of the agenda of finance for the G77/China, we also require that during this session sufficient time be given for deliberations regarding the development of accounting modalities for mobilised and provided finance through public interventions, given that this is a critical element for the effective implementation of the Agreement*."

Whether this can be counted as a demand is a matter of interpretation. Use of the first-person plural voice makes the sentence feel like a demand, as it is stating specifically that AILAC wants sufficient time. Situating AILAC as aligning with the view of the G77 & China may suggest greater confidence, as seen in some submissions from the same year made jointly with other parties, e.g. in the confrontational tone adopted in the joint submission with the AGN (AILAC, 2018f), or the implications of the non-negotiable status of proposals in the submission made jointly with AOSIS, the EU, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, and Switzerland (AILAC, 2018l). However, the second clause in the sentence provides a justification for the desire for sufficient time, which presents the sentence more as a rational argument, and thus would fall under the umbrella of a persuasion attempt.

The same question of interpretation applies to the possible use of "require" in Submission 48 (AILAC, 2017z), a statement delivered in Spanish at COP23 in 2017, where the verb is used in the first-person plural:

"*Señor Presidente, requerimos que el reporte de esta sesión refleja nuestra solicitud de que en esas consultas se tomen en cuenta las circunstancias y necesidades especiales de todos los*

países en desarrollo, incluyendo los nuestros." / "*Mr President, we require/request that the report of this session reflects our request that in these meetings the special circumstances and needs of all developing countries are taken into account, including ours.*"

Here, the verb "requerimos" could be translated as "require" or "request"; however, that the sentence then references the group's "request" ("*solicitud*") for consideration of special circumstances and needs suggests the tone is one of supplication rather than confrontation. As such, "request" is a more appropriate translation, and this should not be considered a demand.

These are the only examples of "require" being used in the first-person plural; the other 35 "require" tokens are used to explain the practicalities of proposals or parties' current challenges. For example, Submissions 20 (AILAC, 2016k) and 27 (AILAC, 2017e) state "The new reporting responsibilities for developing countries will require new and enhanced technical capabilities…" while Submission 37 (AILAC, 2017o) on the Committee to Facilitate Implementation and Promote Compliance states "This reporting function of the Committee should encompass communicating the conclusions adopted by the Committee in specific situations examined by it, as well as making recommendations to the CMA for specific actions that may require decisions by the CMA…" The 19 tokens for "Requires" are used for the same explanatory function, such as Submission 9's (AILAC, 2015b) sentence that "Responding to the challenge of climate change requires co-operative action by all countries and communities…", also with no uses of the verb in the third-person singular to write "AILAC requires…", while the 3 tokens for "requiring", all in Submission 7 (AILAC, 2014e), perform the same explanatory function, such as the statement on the Paris Agreement's legal architecture: "In other words, it permits countries to ratify an Agreement, which creates an internationally legally binding obligation, without requiring that country A ratifies the content of the country contribution document of country B." The 69 tokens for "required" are also used either descriptively or in an explanatory manner, e.g. as in Submission 24's (AILAC, 2017b)

explanation of how parties formulate their adaptation needs: "As Parties develop their national adaptation planning processes a series of required adaptation measures are designed…"; as part of proposals and/or rational arguments themselves, such as Submission 1's (AILAC, 2013a) argument for greater UNFCCC consideration of agriculture: "Thus, further discussion within the UNFCCC is required in order to promote agricultural systems…"; or to refer to existing legal requirements under the UNFCCC, such as in Submission 28 (AILAC, 2017f), which reads "This consideration would serve as a further input for the GST, as required by paragraph 14(b) of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement."

The 2 variants of the verb "expect" which could be interpreted as demands are found in Submission 2 (AILAC, 2013b) and 58 (AILAC, 2018j) respectively. Submission 2 states:

"*AILAC expects that these and all the other recent reports made by scientists and practitioners of the adaptation area are taken into account in the technical paper on the assessment costs and benefits of adaptation that the Secretariat will prepare for the resumed second session of the ADP*."

Submission 58 states:

"*We recognize that the time remaining for the technical negotiations under COP24 is very short, and draw the attention of Parties to this, as there are many essential matters that will be negotiated in Katowice, including loss and damage where we expect real progress enhancing the Warsaw International Mechanism*."

The choice of the verb in each example could have been more forceful if designed to be interpreted as demands; "expect(s)" is open to interpretation e.g. as to whether AILAC is insisting on the incorporation of scientific reports or progress on loss & damage or merely what it assumes will or would like to happen. Had the group wished to imply the former, it could

have used more forceful language, such as writing that scientific reports "must be taken into account" or that progress on loss & damage "must be made". As discussed in Chapter 7, the group has done this repeatedly elsewhere, although even then it has tempered the demand-like nature of the text by couching uses of the word "must" with justifications for the idea AILAC is putting forward and/or qualifying phrases to lessen the force of the language. Given the precedent set by this use of language, and AILAC's apparent reluctance to make demands in its submissions and favour less aggressive strategies such as persuasion and proposals, it seems reasonable not to view the above example as a threat.

The remaining 4 tokens for "expect" and 3 tokens for "expects" are used to explain what the group forecasts will or can happen in future, either in negotiations or in domestic action. For example, Submission 12 (AILAC, 2016g), a statement at a subsidiary bodies' meeting plenary, states "We expect that further progress can be made in Marrakech following a round of submissions leading to COP22", while Submission 28 (AILAC, 2017f) states that "…AILAC expects LT-LEDS [Long Term Low-Emission and Resilient Development Strategies] developed by Parties to provide valuable input into this work" on linkages between capacity-building and technology transfer to the Global Stocktake. The past participle "expected" is mostly used adjectively – in 43 of 51 cases - to provide greater detail to AILAC proposals, as seen below in Figure 11 from Submission 39 (AILAC, 2017q).

Figure 11: Examples of "expected" as an Adjective in Submission 39
(AILAC, 2017q)

a) Description of the target[2]:
    i   Quantitative description of the target that should include, for instance, information of the expected emissions reduction/deviation (expressed in % for those mitigation targets that are quantified) and the expected emissions level, depending on the type of mitigation target:

Type of target	Information to describe the target
Mitigation targets based on BAU deviation	Expected emissions level in the target year
Mitigation intensity targets	Expected emissions intensity in the target year
Peaking emissions target	Expected emissions level in peaking year and emissions trajectory towards it (that should include not only the peaking year but also some

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[2] This heading represents an addition to those elements included in the paragraph 27 of the Decision 1/CP.21

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	years after it, when not included in the NDC timeframe)
Fixed level target	Expected emissions level in target year
Targets based on mitigation strategies, plans and actions or low GHG emission development or adaptation actions	- Clear non GHG goals that could facilitate the understanding of the impact of a policy, strategy or action. - Estimation in terms of GHG emissions impact, i.e. expressed in tCO2e for the purpose of informing the Global Stocktake.

    ii   For all type of quantified mitigation targets, Parties should include information on expected emissions trajectory that will be followed by the Party to meet its mitigation goal.

b) Quantifiable information of the reference point/period

Parties should strive to provide not only complete quantitative information of baselines/reference points but also all necessary information that helps to understand how those baselines/reference points were calculated. Some of these quantitative information, and depending on the type of mitigation goal, could include:

However, 8 tokens for "expected" use this word as a passive verb – e.g. something(s) "is/was/are expected" – yet these still do not constitute demands. 7 of these either explain AILAC ideas, such as Submission 2 (AILAC, 2013b) stating that "These two spheres [the international and national levels] are expected to be based on the central platform of the regime:

science", or provide forecasts, such as Submission 15's (AILAC, 2016f) note that "In the medium term, it is expected that the Assessment Cycles and their timings as well as the Assessment Reports themselves will be articulated to the information and contribution dynamics of the Agreement…" Finally, the word "expecting" produced only one token, in Submission 55 (AILAC, 2018g), where AILAC expresses disappointment at the lack of negotiating progress rather than demanding more:

"AILAC was expecting greater progress in relation to the modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the Paris Agreement."

While AILAC rarely made overt demands in submissions, it did use the auxiliary verb "shall" on 105 occasions. While some of these were references to established negotiating texts rather than being used strategically, "shall" verbs were also used to emphasise the importance of a small number of issues designated as priorities by AILAC, as discussed in Chapter 6[330]. Given "shall" is associated with obligation and mandatory action in treaty texts (D'Acquisto and D'Avanzo, 2009; Krapivkina, 2017) AILAC's use of this verb could be interpreted as making demands, as it effectively stipulates that certain actions must be performed or conditions met by other parties as part of an overall agreement under the UNFCCC. However, both D'Acquisto and D'Avanzo (2009) and Krapivkina (2017) note that use of "shall" in legal contexts is not clear-cut, and it can create ambiguity about the expected consequences of the point it is making. It is, therefore, a matter of interpretation whether AILAC's uses of "shall" in these cases count as genuine demands. AILAC's self-proclaimed (and internally formalised) identity as bridge-builder and its favouring of "should" verbs over "shall" at a rate of almost 9:1 suggests that within the overall discourse of AILAC submissions, these uses of "shall" are designed to

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[330] In particular, 82.86% of all "shall" tokens were used in relation to transparency issues or the legal status of the Paris Agreement.

emphasise topics' importance rather than to impose conditions on negotiating partners. A notable exception to this is some of the 6 joint submissions, in which the rhetoric departs from the usual AILAC patterns of cushioning forceful language and avoiding more aggressive language. Submission 60 (AILAC, 2018l), for example, with AOSIS, the EU, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, and Switzerland on Article 6.4, lists 21 bullet points of proposals. All bar 4 of these use a "shall" verb rather than "should", signifying their non-negotiable nature. That these are made by AILAC in a different context, i.e. when it speaks with the same voice as other parties and can thus "borrow" their power, suggests these may be intended to be seen as demands.

9.4.1 Reasoning for Not Making Many Demands

That AILAC makes few demands in its technical submissions tallies with its pattern of utilising less aggressive strategies like proposals and persuasion to put forward its ideas, in particular the group's preference for making suggestions with "should sentences" to avoid appearing dictatorial, allowing other parties to give views and consent to AILAC proposals. When asked about the group's tendency not to make demands interviewees cited the same reasons as mentioned above for why AILAC refrains from using more aggressive strategies – i.e. lack of leverage, and these strategies' incongruity with the established AILAC identity and rôle of an ambitious bridge-building group[331]. As one former support unit advisor stated, "AILAC always works under the premise that the group never takes hostage an issue…It's never, it has never

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[331] Interview with AILAC delegate, 9th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 3rd September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 5th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 27th September 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 7th November 2018; interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018

been a very aggressive tactic."[332] Once again, geopolitical considerations outside of the UNFCCC were not deemed key in negotiators' considerations of whether to attempt making demands, with delegates viewing the UNFCCC as a stand-alone negotiation arena. Only one interviewee specified a different factor in making such decisions, namely the impact of which party is the president of a session. As an example , they cited AILAC's feeling that while the COP presidency was held by Poland at COP24 in 2018, the group could "*ask* [the EU] *directly that they have to be stronger, and their political messages have to be stronger, and they have to take the lead…when we talk to the commissioners of the European Union, and when we talk to, err, the HoDs* [Heads of Delegation] *of the European Union, those are the kind of messages we give them.*"[333] However, this appears more as a request, especially considering the group's established patterns of constructive behaviour, and given interviewees reported that AILAC enjoys a good relationship with the EU on a wide variety of issues and across numerous relationships between individual negotiators.

This aside, only 3 interviewees recalled any example of the group's delegates making demands in face-to-face sessions, and even these were made with the group's expectation – and indeed willingness - to bargain down in order to secure compromise outcomes[334]. As a result, whilst these examples may have looked like demands to an outsider, in practice they ended up being proposals for negotiation, and depended on the dynamics of the room as to whether they were viable in the first place[335]. One support unit advisor recalled AILAC being aware of the visibility of the technology room of the UNFCCC negotiations, meaning that it was able to put out initial demands:

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[332] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 20th November 2018
[333] Interview with AILAC delegate, 13th September 2018
[334] Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018; interview with former AILAC delegate, 29th August 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018
[335] Interview with AILAC delegate, 20th July 2018

"…technology is the room where, since Paris, people really try to be nice to each other. We are the good news story. When everybody complains in their closing statements that the world is coming to an end, at least they celebrate that technology did something. And so AILAC has occasionally won ground by just being stubborn to make them realise, 'Gosh, we'll have no good news story at all unless we listen to what AILAC has to say!'"[336]

9.5 Coercion & Threats

There is also very little evidence of AILAC attempting to force other parties into any behaviour through a threat. The submissions contain no threats to any parties to adapt their behaviour according to AILAC's preferences, nor any overt suggestion that AILAC may retaliate in response to other parties' actions. However, as stated in the section on blocking, there is an implicit threat to the UNFCCC process as a whole when the group states in Submission 61 (AILAC, 2018m) that it "cannot work" with a particular set of language in a draft text, as the implication is that if negotiations proceed with this language, AILAC will veto it. Furthermore, the only example of AILAC making a threat in the UNFCCC negotiations that interviewees could identify was before the aforementioned vetoing of the AGN's proposals for a review of African special needs and circumstances at COP21[337], although the AGN was not the subject of threats in the submission texts subsequently, as Submission 48 (AILAC, 2017z) merely states that AILAC "note[s] with concern the intention to continue the informal consultations focused on the circumstances and special needs of Africa". As stated above, AILAC has continued to exercise caution and use persuasion to change the behaviour of the AGN instead.

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[336] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018
[337] Interview with former AILAC support unit advisor, 12th August 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018

However, several interviewees remarked that AILAC may soon need to engage in threats, like walking out of negotiation rooms, given the current state of negotiations but only as a last resort if desired results cannot be achieved through their preferred strategies[338].

As with other more aggressive strategies, interviewees felt the 2 main impediments to AILAC using threats were the group's lack of leverage, rendering the threats implausible, and that threats would undermine the constructive, bridge-building image – found in the AILAC rule book (AILAC, date unknown) - that the group is trying to portray to the UNFCCC. One support unit advisor neatly summarised the link between these 2 factors:

"So, part of the AILAC position is that AILAC is a bunch of countries that plays by the rules. You know, we broadly recognise, err, things like the World Trade Organisation and whatever, right? We're not Venezuela…AILAC, as a group of countries, is trying to show that they play by the rules. So they will not be the spoilers. They will not do what China has been known to do, or what some of the African countries are willing to do, or what Saudi Arabia is willing to do, and say 'No, because…' So, as minor countries that don't invest in other countries, who are unwilling to throw their toys out of the crib, there is no leverage whatsoever. Except for any credibility you have perhaps built in the room…and so the conversation moves on. That's the only thing that AILAC can possibly bring. Because the lower weight countries, all they really have is throwing their toys out of the pram…AILAC, when it comes to the crunch, won't do that."[339]

As such, the group tends to express concern or disappointment in its submissions rather than actively threatening other parties in a bid to change their behaviour. Corpus-linguistic analysis

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[338] Interview with AILAC delegate, 10th July 2018; interview with AILAC delegate, 2nd October 2018; interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 13th November 2018
[339] Interview with AILAC support unit advisor, 16th October 2018

identified 8 examples across 6 submissions[340] of the group doing this; for example, Submission 36 (AILAC, 2017n) states that "…we would like to express how disappointing it has been for our group to work in an environment without transparency or flexibility so that the observers could be part of our deliberations in this session, nor to invite them to contribute to our future work." Rather than follow through with this sentiment, and make a threat to instigate change, the submission continues by expressing hope for change: "We therefore hope that in our session at the end of the year we will be able to work in an open spirit, with political commitment and faithful to what we agreed in Paris." Likewise, in Submission 47 (AILAC, 2017y), the group writes that "…we note with great concern the slow progress in the work on the modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized through public interventions, in accordance with paragraph 7, Article 9 of the Paris Agreement." Later in the same paragraph, this sentiment is resolved simply with the statement that "We trust, Mr Chairs, that under your leadership we can conclude this work during the following sessions of the subsidiary bodies." This feeds into the group's discourse of positivity, discussed in Chapter 5, as when AILAC does express disappointment, criticism, or concern, it follows this with a more positive remark.

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[340] Submissions 10 (AILAC, 2016a), 36 (AILAC, 2017n), 47 (AILAC, 2017y), 55 (AILAC, 2018g), 57 (AILAC, 2018i), and 61 (AILAC, 2018m)

Chapter 10: Discussion

10.1 Introduction

Chapter 10 discusses the findings in the context of the existing literature on strategies and influences on their selection, determining whether they support or contradict previous research. It begins by noting the relevance of power dynamics to the main finding of AILAC's preference for less aggressive over more aggressive strategies, albeit in a way differing from the interpretation of power dynamics set out in rational choice theories. Instead, a governmentality perspective reveals AILAC's power/knowledge resources as key in boosting the attractiveness of strategies such as persuasion, constructive proposals, and coalition-building, and recognises the group's technical and tactical knowledge sources residing within its delegation dynamics. The domestic politics section also recognises the influence of the bloc's bridge-building identity and vulnerability to climate change, the former contributing to the attractiveness of less aggressive strategies while AILAC members' vulnerability in fact deterred it from exerting moral pressure, making it unwilling to jeopardise a future agreement by criticising negotiation partners. Chapter 10 then discusses the nuanced influence of intra-bloc dynamics and timings on AILAC strategy choice, with its policy of individual negotiators' strategic decision-making making delegation dynamics even more influential and timings resulting in particular less aggressive strategies' use in combination. Finally, institutional influences are seen largely as modest in their impact on AILAC strategy; while the UNFCCC's consensus rule did contribute, there was less of an impact from the (non-) Annex I divide or the UNFCCC architecture.

10.2 Power Resources

10.2.1 Material Power Resources & Leverage

Analysis of AILAC submission texts and interviewees' responses shows the group has utilised some form of 11 of the 12 strategies identified in the literature review, at least to a very modest degree, with the exception of coercion & threats. However, the analysis also reveals a clear preference from AILAC to focus efforts, regardless of the target parties or groups, on less obviously aggressive strategies, i.e. constructive proposals, compromises, coalition-building, and persuasion far more often than demands, blocking, or making threats. Even blocking – the only one of the more aggressive strategies - that a majority of AILAC interviewees considered acceptable – was only a last resort to avoid outcomes violating AILAC red lines, once all other less aggressive strategies had been exhausted, and instances of blocking in the group's technical submissions are scarce. These findings tally with expectations from orthodox theories of power relations between parties. For example, Bailer (2012) found parties to the UNFCCC with greater material power resources – economic strength, military prowess, population size etc. – were more likely to use more aggressive strategies, and weaker parties were less likely to do so because of a lack of leverage. Dür and Mateo (2008:7-8) explain, "The hard bargaining tactics used by weak actors will hardly be credible; and public commitments that are not credible have negative consequences not only in the negotiations with third actors but also for the reputation of the government in the domestic arena." AILAC interviewees frequently cited a lack of credible leverage as a major reason for preferring less aggressive strategies. This is borne out by economic data, which show that AILAC is composed of states with relatively low levels of material power resources – their contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions

equated to only 0.80% of the global total in 2018 (Carbon Atlas, 2019), while their combined military spending represents only 1.12% of the global outlay in 2018 (World Bank, 2018c). This is even low in comparison to other developing country party blocs; for example, the AGN's member states comprised 3.83% of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2018 (Carbon Atlas, 2019) while the LMDCs contributed at least 46.27% of the global total in 2017 (Ritchie and Roser, 2019), and even the LDCs contributed 4% of the global total as far back as 2005 (Bowen and Fankhauser, 2011).

10.2.2 Relative Attractiveness of Strategy Options

A reasonable assumption in strategy decision-making is that a party is intuitively most likely to select an option with the greatest prospect of success in the circumstances. AILAC interviewees overwhelmingly confirmed that this held true for the group. Relative power relations and dynamics between parties is one such circumstance. However, if, as under orthodox conceptualisations of power relations, comparative levels of traditional power resources are the key determinant of agency in such relations, it follows that weak parties with fewer power resources should not expect less aggressive strategies to have much – if any – chance of achieving their desired outcomes either. Therefore, their reason for selecting less aggressive strategies is not because they think they are inherently likely to yield successful outcomes; rather these are the only strategies which they can utilise with any credibility at all. Put simply, they are the only remaining options. This explains Dür and Mateo's (2008:7-8) interpretation, when they write:

"By contrast, weak actors should opt for soft bargaining tactics, as they have little to gain from giving the impression of being aggressive. The hard bargaining tactics used by weak actors

will hardly be credible…Moreover, weak actors fear that hard bargaining tactics will make more powerful ones respond in kind. In the context of an iterated game, they will therefore opt for soft tactics to "ingratiate" themselves with the more powerful actors (Pruitt, 1983:175). Finally, weak actors tend to be in need of a negotiated agreement, and the use of hard bargaining tactics by many actors may reduce the likelihood of an agreement."

Following this logic, AILAC should have adopted less aggressive strategies, e.g. constructive proposals and persuasion, because aggressive strategies such as demands or threats, would not appear credible, and could trigger retribution by more powerful parties, potentially jeopardising the possibility of a global agreement on climate change that its vulnerable member states desperately need. However, by merely attributing the decision to the group's lack of other viable options, this viewpoint neglects the possibility that AILAC might have deliberately selected less aggressive strategies by preference. Even coalition-building is not afforded this possibility. If choice of strategy depends on comparative levels of traditional power resources, then it makes sense for smaller and/or weaker parties to pool resources, which in turn would allow them collectively to attempt more aggressive strategies against stronger parties more credibly (Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012). This less aggressive strategy may be desirable, therefore, but only because it facilitates AILAC's ability as part of a greater collective to act as if it has greater levels of material power resources. In addition, it runs the same risk as more aggressive strategies in that it could provoke more powerful parties to do the same (Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012), restoring the initial power imbalance and potentially damaging relations with these stronger parties, which is a strong deterrent. Thus even for coalition-building, the overall logic regarding the centrality of material power resources on strategy selection remains the same.

Analysis of the AILAC data partially supports this logic. Interviewees frequently cited the group's rôle as a bridge-builder to explain why the group shied away from more aggressive

strategies - i.e. because their use could damage goodwill the group had developed over time from efforts to be a reasonable and constructive negotiating partner - and could prompt its own negotiating partners to resort to more aggressive strategies. This would be a considerable risk if used by parties with greater levels of traditional power resources, e.g. a higher proportion of global greenhouse gas emissions, as without their co-operation an effective global agreement to combat the effects of climate change could not be finalised. Indeed, on the rare occasions more aggressive strategies were utilised by AILAC, they were either last resort options to prevent problematic outcomes, where less aggressive strategies had failed to produce satisfactory outcomes, for example, a threat followed by veto on the AGN's proposal for African special needs and circumstances; or for the sole purpose of facilitating the subsequent use of less aggressive strategies, such as making demands before quickly switching to offering constructive compromises. Even blocking strategies, guaranteed to succeed because each party is afforded a veto over Convention outputs by the UNFCCC decision-making process (UNFCCC, 1992), were only utilised by AILAC sparingly and as a last resort, with interviewees citing the risk of repercussions from other parties as a major deterrent, as they could deny AILAC access to an effective global agreement on climate change. Blocking might prevent a negative situation in the short-term, but would risk jeopardising satisfactory outcomes in the longer-term. Thus the analysis shows some support for concerns resembling Axelrod's (1984:13) "shadow of the future" effect, with AILAC aware that it will need to maintain as positive a relationship as possible with negotiating partners given the recurring need to negotiate with those same parties.

However, the vast majority of AILAC interviewees (30 of 35) also stated that their decisions on strategy in a given situation depend on the aforementioned intuitive assumption, i.e. they select the strategy they believe, based on their levels of tactical knowledge, provides the greatest chance of yielding what AILAC would consider to be a

satisfactory outcome. Coupled with these results, that AILAC overwhelmingly favoured less aggressive strategies in the analysis period suggests AILAC negotiators actively believed that less aggressive strategies would be most able to provide satisfactory outcomes for the group. In other words, they were attractive options for AILAC negotiators not just because more aggressive strategies were considered unviable, but also because these less aggressive strategies held some inherent appeal and value in providing the group with satisfactory outcomes. Yet with orthodox conceptualisations of power relations, this should not be the case, given the group's lack of material power resources.

10.2.3 Knowledge as an Immaterial Power Resource

The analysis findings can be better explained, therefore, with a conceptualisation of power relations not solely based on comparative levels of material power resources. A governmentality-based understanding of power, like that provided by Litfin (1994) can provide such an interpretation. Governmentality does not ignore material power resources and thus acknowledges that certain strategies, such as making demands or threats, are more heavily dependent on possessing such resources in greater volume. This is because the status and value ascribed to them by actors in social relations elicits certain reactions from others, e.g. fear, respect, or envy. From this perspective, that AILAC uses more aggressive strategies very little is unsurprising, given the bloc's concerns over a lack of leverage. Governmentality's insistence, however, on including knowledge as a power resource – conceptualised by Foucault (1978) as power/knowledge – can help explain AILAC's overwhelming preference for less aggressive strategies, as the group is rich in knowledge-based power resources, both technical and tactical. The discursive nature of power/knowledge (Litfin, 1994) means its deployment

relies on the process of communication between parties, which in turn is affected by their choice of language and ways of interpreting information based on the context of their social relationship. The attribution of status and value to such knowledge by AILAC and its negotiating partners as a result of this social context produces its effect of "powerfulness" – for example, other groups valuing AILAC's technical proficiency in the negotiations, or AILAC valuing information discovered by the support unit on the red lines of other groups. This explains why AILAC could reasonably have expected such less aggressive strategies, with their foundations in technical and tactical knowledge, to be capable of yielding satisfactory outcomes, and why they were inherently appealing options. This was predicated upon a concerted effort to "stack the deck" in AILAC's favour and bring this power/knowledge resource – of which AILAC was aware it had plenty - into play, through particular discourses in the group's technical submissions designed to make expert knowledge the *lingua franca* of the negotiations, as discussed in Chapter 5.

The discursive nature of power relations can also explain why some AILAC interviewees were prepared to exert moral pressure on their negotiating partners should climate-related natural disasters occur in any of the group's member countries. The group was much more reluctant to use naming & shaming strategies given the aforementioned lack of leverage and usual comparative lack of moral power resources versus more vulnerable parties such as AOSIS. However, if the group were able to portray the severity of the effects of any such event on AILAC countries, AILAC's vulnerability would be heightened in the eyes of the group's negotiating partners. This would imbue AILAC with temporary moral power, making the strategy viable for a limited period, for those AILAC negotiators who were prepared to use it at all but for whom it would be unviable under normal circumstances. A governmentality-based understanding of power relations can accommodate this alternative power resource of moral power, as its discursive effects provide bargaining utility, allowing small blocs like

AILAC and AOSIS to use moral pressure strategies despite their lack of material power resources.

10.2.4 Relationship to Existing Literature

As such, the findings of this thesis accord more with the arguments of Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) and Betzold (2010) than Bailer (2012) with regard to the ability of parties traditionally regarded as weak to wield significant power in climate negotiations; i.e. such parties' strategic options were broader because they were able to draw on different power resources besides material resources. However, AILAC did not "borrow" power to facilitate its strategic choices in the ways used by AOSIS as documented by Betzold (2010) and identified by Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012), namely appealing to principles of equity via vulnerability discourses, appealing to the self-interest of partners, using the knowledge resources of NGOs, and learning from them how to "play the game" of negotiations skilfully. AILAC negotiators were generally reluctant to employ explicit discourses of vulnerability or equity as a strategy, while the group's technical knowledge derived from its own skilled negotiators and in-house expert support unit. The tactical knowledge required to "play the game" adeptly likewise was provided by the support unit and the relationships between the group's and other negotiators. This knowledge, with AILAC's technical expertise, was the basis upon which the group was able to devote much of its negotiating efforts towards submissions, persuasion and rational argument, constructive proposals, and compromise solutions, which appeal to their negotiating partners' self-interest. AILAC did borrow power, however, by building coalitions with others, identified for AOSIS by Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012), including with those more powerful by orthodox measures, such as the EU or Umbrella Group members. Again, though, ability to "play the game" skilfully

and secure strategic alliances is based upon AILAC's own internal power/knowledge resources as provided by the tactical intelligence of the support unit and its own negotiators, which in turn enables the group to borrow power from other parties to the negotiations. The findings of this thesis thus place greater emphasis on the centrality of the bloc's own power/knowledge as a vital resource for the case of AILAC than is found by either Betzold (2010) or Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) for AOSIS.

10.3 Delegation Dynamics

10.3.1 Individual Negotiators' Agency

The analysis suggests individual AILAC negotiators have a significant rôle in selecting strategies to use in the negotiations, and thus were responsible for the group largely favouring less aggressive options. How the group organises itself and makes decisions in negotiation sessions allows a relatively high degree of strategic autonomy for its delegates, albeit that outcomes must remain within the boundaries of the group's overall red lines. This is as much because of the complexity of the climate negotiations as anything; with so many issues for negotiation amongst so many parties, and the status of negotiations often changing daily at formal sessions, AILAC considers that attempting to micromanage every strategic decision by its negotiators would prove impractical. This is exacerbated by the fact that AILAC delegates have little time to devote to their UNFCCC work as it is, as they also have jobs in their member states' domestic environment and foreign affairs ministries. While not a point made in the literature for other similarly-sized/similarly-resourced blocs like AOSIS, it seems reasonable to expect that these blocs would operate in a similar manner given they face the same pressures

of engaging in a complex, ever-changing negotiating arena while (presumably) also lacking the economic power to employ delegates to focus solely on the UNFCCC negotiations without a parallel domestic work portfolio.

AILAC negotiators stated also that they adapt their choice of strategy according to circumstances, such as the specific issue(s) or the negotiating parties they face. For example, the group's negotiators frame their persuasion approaches differently depending on how receptive to AILAC's position they believe their negotiating partners to be, while coalition-building attempts are viable for some combinations of issues and parties and not others. As such, AILAC reacts according to the prevailing situation, which can change rapidly in the UNFCCC. Given the autonomy of AILAC negotiators in strategic decision-making, a process-based understanding of power relations is particularly apt as these individuals are ultimately responsible for communicating information and ideas to other parties. This is dependent on the linguistic and discursive choices they make – e.g. particular framings - which in turn are socially constructed according to the context in which the negotiators are situated (Litfin, 1994). Here knowledge can again be seen as supremely influential as a power resource, as the technical knowledge of the expert negotiators, and the tactical knowledge provided to them by the support unit inform their interpretation of the negotiating context and affect the strategic choices they make. Reducing strategic choices to pre-existing relative quantities of parties' material power resources thus overlooks how power/knowledge can be deployed through AILAC negotiators' decision-making independence, resulting in a greater use of less aggressive strategies.

10.3.2 Partisan Bias

As a result of this high level of individual negotiators' agency, the analysis can comment on discussions in the literature regarding the influence of individual negotiators' characteristics on strategy selection, as these can contribute to the discursive choices negotiators make regarding which strategies to use and how to deploy them. Odell's (2010) arguments regarding the effect of partisan bias do not appear borne out for AILAC negotiators. While the support unit advises and drafts the initial submissions for the group, the AILAC member states' national delegates actually negotiate for the bloc in sessions. Such national delegates could reasonably be included in Odell's (2010:623) definition of those likely to evidence effects of partisan bias, being "negotiator[s] framed to take the perspective of one side in a dispute" and thus could be expected to "overestimate the value of [their] outside option, underestimate the degree to which the other side's objectives are compatible with [theirs], and use a self-serving definition of fairness". In fact, AILAC negotiators were acutely aware of their group's lack of leverage to employ more aggressive strategies, the bloc regularly offered constructive proposals and compromises, and it was loath to try and exert moral pressure on its negotiating partners precisely because of concerns relating both to more legitimate equity-based arguments from parties such as AOSIS and the LDCs, and to its own member states' continuing extraction of fossil fuels, which could garner accusations of hypocrisy. That AILAC's national negotiators, endowed with considerable individual agency, chose to use mainly less aggressive strategies does not provide evidence that there was partisan bias; if it was present, this suggests that its effects did not determine strategy choice.

It would seem reasonable to expect partisan bias to be present because AILAC's national delegates from its member states' environment and foreign affairs ministries are

rotated on a fairly regular basis. AILAC negotiators expressed concerns over a lack of negotiating experience resulting from being rotated out; therefore it is plausible that partisan bias would have influenced their strategy selection. Their lack of experience could have led them to underestimate the potential for co-operation between parties and instilled in them a prejudice towards AILAC positions borne out of a lack of perspective for other parties' positions. However, following Odell's logic (2010), it would also seem reasonable to have expected fewer effects of partisan bias in less experienced negotiators as such bias would not have been reinforced from prior experiences. In fact, whether partisan bias was present for AILAC negotiators is unknowable because its detection requires the use of more aggressive strategies, whereas they largely opted for less aggressive approaches. If it was present, then clearly it did not have a decisive effect, which suggests that other influences on strategy selection overrode it. The fact that AILAC negotiators cited the bloc's lack of material leverage to use more aggressive strategies credibly and effectively, and recognised the group's relative abundance of power/knowledge for credible and potentially effective use of less aggressive strategies, also suggests the power dynamics of the group versus other parties in the UNFCCC were more influential on negotiators' strategy choices than individual partisan bias.

10.3.3 Negotiators' Experience

The analysis can better inform conceptualisations of the influence of individual negotiators' negotiating experience levels on strategy selection. The effect of the overriding power relations between AILAC and others remains in place, in that more aggressive strategies are considered unattractive and unviable, with less aggressive strategies seen as appealing and capable of delivering satisfactory outcomes. However, the results show interviewees felt that when

autonomous AILAC negotiators have higher levels of negotiating experience, it boosts the viability – and chances for selection – of the full range of less aggressive strategies, from coalition-building and constructive proposals to persuasion and concessions trading, as it results in greater tactical knowledge of how to "play the game" skilfully to produce satisfactory outcomes. For example, the experience brought to the AILAC delegation by delegates from member states' foreign affairs ministries and members of the support unit, provided the group with knowledge of how to frame persuasion attempts towards parties with whom diplomatic relations are especially sensitive for certain issues, such as the LMDCs, to maximise the strategy's chance of success while avoiding diplomatic pitfalls.

Furthermore, the results demonstrate interviewees felt high levels of UNFCCC-specific experience are important in most cases for a negotiator's ability to foster trust and good working relationships with delegates from other groups and parties, which in turn opens the door for negotiators to use less aggressive strategies with greater expectation of success. This is because, as Chasek (2011) notes, trust and good relationships between negotiators originate from long periods of time spent together. Greater experience means more time spent in the UNFCCC negotiations, and thus greater potential for such relationships to develop; this in turn can lead to co-operation and problem-solving approaches between parties resulting from a more relaxed atmosphere in formal sessions (Chasek, 2011). Interviewees felt that inexperienced negotiators, unless through sheer force of personality, found it much harder – and thus were generally less likely - to use strategies where a pre-existing network of negotiating contacts from other parties and groups was especially advantageous, such as coalition-building, arranging bilateral meetings, and using informal spaces. Coalition-building is heavily influenced by trust between negotiators, while the latter two must be arranged by invitation with other negotiators and are not UNFCCC-organised. Despite this negotiator inexperience, AILAC demonstrated strong usage of all 3 of these strategies. To overcome this

problem, AILAC negotiators placed strong emphasis on developing trust and good working relationships with other parties' negotiators; indeed, promotion of trust between parties is even cited in the group's formal objectives (AILAC, date unknown). However, that such strategies were used so frequently by AILAC can be explained by the fact that interviewees repeatedly signalled that the AILAC delegation is composed of vocal, outgoing personalities who by their very nature are enough to overcome social inhibitions derived from lack of experience, allowing AILAC negotiators to develop good relationships with their colleagues quickly. It also suggests that experience may have been gained elsewhere, as without it, inexperienced negotiators would not have pursued these strategies as they could not have reasonably expected them to result in satisfactory outcomes before they had developed sufficient trust.

Therefore, the analysis suggests the support unit, whose members accompany national delegates to both formal and informal negotiations and offer advice and assistance, has a strong influence on strategy selection. The experience of the support unit's members, and the extensive network of relationships they have developed over their time in the UNFCCC, can compensate for the inexperience of AILAC member states' delegates, thus making these strategies viable and evidently used frequently. These findings run counter to Bailer's (2012) that experienced delegations are more likely to use more aggressive strategies; the AILAC delegation benefitted from the support unit's high levels of negotiating experience and yet the group barely used any more aggressive strategies at all. The support unit's influence is most clearly seen in the group's regular use of corridor conversations, especially after the adoption of the Paris Agreement at the end of 2015, when the lack of some newer AILAC delegates' UNFCCC experience actually led to an increased use of the strategy. This was down to encouragement from the support unit, which recognised these individuals were less confident on the microphone in formal settings though still a generally outgoing, personable group. They used their own experience of the UNFCCC negotiations to reason that their newer delegates'

interactions with other negotiators were more likely to be successful when conducted in informal settings, and thus encouraged them to pursue this strategy. As per Chasek's (2011) reasoning, the support unit were able to use their networks to make it possible for AILAC national delegates to use the informal spaces, thus also following Montville's (1990) pattern of two-track diplomacy.

By contrast, concession trading, on the comparatively infrequent occasions when it was considered potentially beneficial, was used by AILAC only in cases of pre-existing good working relationships with other negotiators. Support unit members supported use of this strategy more than national delegates, but its comparative lack of use versus that of coalition-building, bilateral meetings, and informal spaces demonstrates that even support unit members' experience compensating for the inexperience of national delegates was not enough to override delegates' reluctance to use this strategy. Therefore, the analysis suggests that (an)other factor(s) was more influential in selection decisions for concessions trading, namely that of identity within the UNFCCC, which will be addressed later in the chapter.

Use of other less aggressive strategies which relied less on networks of contacts, such as persuasion and using constructive rhetoric, was less influenced by negotiators' experience, as their credibility can be assessed based on strength of argument even without good relationships with other parties' negotiators, although high levels of trust are still advantageous. With the mixed composition of the AILAC delegation, interviewees felt inexperienced members from environment ministries could still provide the technical knowledge fundamental to rational argument and specific proposals, while foreign affairs delegates inexperienced in the UNFCCC often had prior negotiating experience in other settings and thus had the tactical knowledge to deploy this technical knowledge effectively. Furthermore, both could benefit from the technical and tactical expertise and experience of the AILAC support unit in the aforementioned ways, which made these strategic choices stronger

options still, resulting in their frequent use in both submission texts and face-to-face negotiations.

10.3.4 Negotiators' Expert Knowledge

As well as experience of individual negotiators, the analysis reveals that for some strategies, interviewees felt their level of expert knowledge was influential in shaping strategy selection. Elgström and Jönsson's (2000) findings from a study of intra-EU negotiations are partially borne out for AILAC within the UNFCCC. They write that having technical experts as negotiators leads to greater use of co-operative and integrative strategies because they view such strategies as leading to "technically optimal", substantive solutions, and because they are less concerned with "national political concerns". On one hand, the AILAC delegation was aware of its own strengths and weaknesses, namely an abundance of technical expertise and material power resources respectively. It clearly used its technical submissions to attempt to establish technical knowledge as the bedrock of the negotiations, with the intention of bringing its resources into play via the legitimisation of strategies reliant on such technical knowledge, such as constructive proposals, compromise offers, persuasion, and rational argument. On the other hand, AILAC's delegation, mostly comprising delegates from environment ministries, did not discount their member states' political contexts, as they were aware of the group's lack of leverage stemming from its member states' lack of material power resources. It was this concern, rather than viewing more aggressive strategies as leading to solutions which were less substantive and "technically optimal", that led to the group almost entirely focusing on more co-operative, less aggressive strategies. Thus, the effect outlined by Elgström and Jönsson is similar, although the reasoning behind it is

different, with the level of negotiators' expert knowledge impacting on strategy selection through its perception as a power resource.

10.3.5 Negotiators' Skill

The analysis demonstrates that AILAC interviewees felt negotiators' skill levels were more of a relevant influence on decisions about the use of persuasion and rational argument than any other of the group's available options. However, even here, skill level was less seen as an issue regarding whether to use persuasion strategies, as it was still shown to be a commonly-used strategy, but rather a limiting factor on how effectively persuasion could be deployed. Interviewees expressed concerns that the relative lack of negotiating skills training they had received from their governments was hampering their ability to use the strategy to its fullest, as doing so involves considerations of the framing of issues and arguments, and the accompanying discursive and linguistic choices. Nevertheless, the technical knowledge of the majority of AILAC's national delegates, with the diplomatic tactical skills from its foreign affairs delegates and the AILAC support unit, was still felt sufficient to ensure that persuasion was a viable and appealing strategy, hence its repeated use by AILAC. As such the group again perceived its substantial technical and tactical knowledge as a valuable power resource in the UNFCCC.

Though not mentioned in relation to the use of constructive proposals and rhetoric by interviewees, logically the level of skill should also be relevant for these strategies. Negotiation skill was not a factor identified by interviewees regarding whether to employ strategies like coalition-building, use of bilateral meetings and informal spaces, and thus it does not seem to have been a determining factor for their use. This is not surprising, as these

rely more on a contact network and interpersonal relationships than tactical knowledge relating to framings and particular linguistic constructions. Skill was mentioned as a prerequisite for concessions trading, but only by one interviewee. This suggests that for the majority of negotiators skill was not a determining factor of whether or not to employ concessions trading. These overall results suggest the premise based on Weiler's (2012) point that skilled negotiators are better prepared and more exploratory in their negotiations, namely that a higher skill level may influence strategy selection based on an awareness of the viability of strategies in different circumstances, is only valid when equating this awareness to an understanding of the power dynamics between AILAC and other parties, given its aforementioned importance for AILAC negotiators' strategic choices.

10.3.6 Negotiators' Personalities

The analysis did reveal a rôle for the personalities of individual AILAC negotiators in their choices of strategy selection. While the group's delegation was conscious of the effects of the power dynamics between AILAC and its negotiating partners and veered towards less aggressive strategies accordingly, interviewees felt that for one more aggressive strategy, a negotiator's personality could act as a sort of wild card in bucking the pattern caused by power dynamics. In most normal negotiating scenarios, AILAC delegates were loath to try to exert moral pressure on others, either by using vulnerability discourses or by naming & shaming their less progressive negotiating partners. Some interviewees did state, however, that they would deem such strategies worthwhile where a negotiator was more confident and outgoing. This could involve use of vulnerability discourses in circumstances where AILAC is imbued with temporary moral power resources, e.g. in the event of a climate-related natural disaster in

AILAC member states, or the use of naming & shaming where all other strategies have been exhausted. In the former, the strategy's use is still dependent on the availability of a different type of power resource; while in the latter, the number of delegates who responded that naming & shaming could ever be a viable strategy even in such circumstances was still a minority. Furthermore, interviewees did not consider a negotiator's personality accounted even for the very small number of instances where the group's negotiators had used strategies such as making demands or threats, as these were used either as a precursor to transition into a less aggressive strategy such as persuasion, or as a last resort to avoid situations which risked breaching AILAC positional red lines. This suggests that negotiators' personalities, at least in the case of AILAC, do not generally affect decisions regarding the use of more aggressive strategies.

By contrast, negotiators' personalities were seen to influence the choice of strategy within the less aggressive options available to AILAC. Data from the support unit revealed the group has been more likely to use informal spaces such as corridor conversations and social meetings because its delegates are more comfortable speaking in these environments than on the microphone in formal sessions post-Paris. Furthermore, the viability of coalition-building attempts and use of bilateral meetings was identified by one delegate as being reliant on compatibility of negotiators' personalities, allowing development of trust and good working relationships with those of other parties. Logically, this takes precedence over negotiators' experience in terms of the importance to these strategies' viability, as interviewees felt that by force of personality negotiators could – and did - overcome the disadvantages of inexperience, i.e. lacking pre-existing social networks, by being friendly and vocal. In addition, it seems reasonable to think that if a negotiator were experienced and yet was not compatible personality-wise with other negotiators, this would lessen the expected viability of using these strategies, and therefore the likelihood of using them at all.

The impact of negotiators' personalities on persuasion strategies seems to be less a question of whether they were used at all – clearly the group did use them frequently because of the perceived power resources of AILAC – and more of where and how they were utilised. As mentioned, the support unit encouraged AILAC delegates in the post-Paris delegation to use informal spaces to play to the strengths of their outgoing personalities in these situations, minimising the effect of their lack of confidence in formal sessions. It was therefore within these informal spaces that persuasion could be used, in a more relaxed setting. In addition, because the confidence of AILAC negotiators increased in these spaces, persuasion could then be used with more tactical variation, e.g. via unplanned deviations from the talking points provided by the support unit, or by using particular framings in terms of linguistic choice or tone of voice.

An interesting potentially related variable is the high proportion of women within the AILAC delegation as a whole. 21 of the 35 interviewees (60%) were female, which differs significantly from the UNFCCC average for female party delegates of 37% at COP23 and 38% at COP24 (UNFCCC, 2019c). One interviewee did suggest the gender imbalance within AILAC could be linked to the personable and engaging personalities of the delegates, which in turn could account for the fact that AILAC has generally favoured less aggressive and more constructive strategic choices. Ruane (2012:343) comments that while existing literature has demonstrated a "small but significant influence" of negotiator gender on their strategic choices "consistent with stereotypes, with women in aggregate behaving more co-operatively and men in aggregate behaving more competitively", these results "are full of inconsistencies without context" and have identified "conditions under which negotiator sex promotes negotiation behaviour that is either consistent, neutral, or contrary to gender stereotypes." It seems unwise, then, to infer any definitive link between the gender composition of the AILAC delegation and its strategic choices given the lack of comparable studies exploring this relationship.

10.3.7 Delegation Size

The fact that no interviewees identified the AILAC delegation's size as an influence on their strategic choices suggests that AILAC conforms to the findings of Bailer (2012) that the delegation size has no significant impact on a party's tendency to use more or less aggressive strategies. Interviewees did say, however, that they felt their negotiating capacity was limited by also having domestic work portfolios to address, leaving less time to devote to the UNFCCC negotiations. It seems reasonable that a larger delegation, even composed of similarly time-pressured delegates, would lead to an increase in the individual negotiator's capacity, as the amount of UNFCCC work could be spread across more people and individuals would have comparatively less to do. This could free up some negotiator time, meaning that strategies relying heavily on activity outside of formal negotiation sessions, i.e. bilateral meetings and using informal spaces, become more viable given negotiators have more time. This could mean that AILAC would even more strongly favour such less aggressive strategies over more aggressive options, although without data from larger delegations as to whether their size influences strategy choice, this is hard to conclude definitively.

10.3.8 Delegation Dynamics' Relationship to Power Dynamics

From a governmentality perspective, the influence of delegation dynamics on strategy selection is part of the underlying power dynamics between parties. Greater levels of individual negotiators' skill and experience are a non-material power resource for a delegation in the form of tactical knowledge – the fact that these negotiators know how to negotiate in particular ways because of their skill and experience provides them with a wider array of credibly viable

strategic options to choose from. Likewise, negotiators' technical knowledge is a non-material power resource which can be utilised credibly through strategies reliant upon it, e.g. constructive proposals and persuasion if, as AILAC has attempted to ensure, legitimacy is based on science and expertise in the negotiation arena. The governmentality perspective runs counter to the reasoning of Dür and Mateo (2008) therefore, that a delegation's experience has any significant impact on strategy choice because determination of strategy choice results from the power dynamics between parties. While a governmentality perspective would agree that strategy choice is a result of power dynamics, it would include delegation factors such as experience and skill within the resources upon which power dynamics depend, given the rôle of power/knowledge. This is not to the exclusion of the importance of material power resources, however; delegation size can be seen as an effect of a delegation's economic power, as greater financial resources can support bigger delegations, and therefore impact on strategy choice as outlined above. Finally, a governmentality-based understanding of power relations places great emphasis on the processes by which these take place, as a result of the discursive choices made by delegates actually doing the negotiating. Considering the characteristics of negotiators as relevant to strategic choice is important, as power relations depend on the ways in which negotiators communicate and interpret information (Frenhoff Larsen, 2007); these in turn are the product of the social context in which negotiators find themselves.

10.4 Domestic Politics

10.4.1 Political Identity

AILAC's member states' political identity did have a significant impact on the group's strategy choices in the UNFCCC, albeit not in the way one might have assumed from the literature. While AILAC did recognise the importance of equity as a negotiating issue within the UNFCCC, this did not, as per Costantini et al (2016), lead to the group utilising blocking strategies or making demands on a regular basis. Interviewees did note that equity was a tool to be used when interacting with ALBA, and the group's submissions do make reference to the concept at various points, but it was not the focal point of AILAC's strategic decision-making such that it was prioritised above all other outcomes. Instead, AILAC's strategic choices were predominantly made up of less aggressive strategies, particularly use of technical submissions, constructive proposals, persuasion, and coalition-building.

While the underlying power dynamics of the UNFCCC negotiations make these strategies that AILAC can use more credibly, as discussed above, there are also reasons for AILAC to find them attractive in their own right because they can be viable. Another reason is one identified by Weiler (2012), albeit for more powerful parties, that less aggressive strategies might be chosen in order to take on a leadership rôle, such as Japan's use of constructive proposals and persuasion as the host of COP3 (Hattori, 1999). AILAC interviewees did not describe the group as a leader in the UNFCCC, but the vast majority cited the group's identity as a bridge-builder, and identified it as a key influence on their strategy selections. For example, the group shied away from blocking or exerting moral pressure through naming & shaming

specifically because it would have been out of keeping with this identity, and was keen to make constructive proposals specifically because they could further the bridge-building agenda.

Furthermore, AILAC outlines its aim of occupying a bridge-building rôle in its rulebook (AILAC, date unknown), and evidence of its efforts to achieve this is plentiful in the group's technical submissions, through frequent use of discourses of universal participation. Whether this bridge-building effort can be equated to leadership depends on the definition of leadership used; however, the end result is certainly similar. Leadership is typically associated with more powerful parties attempting to effect positional change in others, such as the EU leading calls for progressive climate action in the 2000s (Oberthür, 2011). AILAC attempted to shepherd all parties to a middle ground which could lead to an acceptable compromise. Whether this can be described as leadership might perhaps be assessed by analysing whether AILAC achieved its objective. However if leadership is determined by self-serving motivation, as in the case of China which adopted less aggressive, more constructive strategies to cultivate a more positive international image (Godbole, 2016; Dong, 2017), then AILAC does not fit with this. AILAC interviewees repeatedly stated that bridge-building is simply in the "DNA" and the "heritage" of the group's member states, which embrace multilateral approaches to solving transboundary problems. As such, AILAC was set up in 2012 specifically with this attitude to multilateralism in climate change politics. AILAC's identity as bridge-builder does not appear to be a product of the power relations in which it finds itself in the UNFCCC - it has not adopted this rôle simply because it lacks the material power resources to use more aggressive strategies credibly. The ALBA group comprises similar Latin American states, which also lack these power resources, yet it has adopted a very different persona in the UNFCCC, with ALBA acting as "minority dissenting voices blocking a consensus" (Watts & Depledge, 2018:7).

10.4.2 Salience & Vulnerability

The analysis demonstrates that for AILAC, the reasoning of Costantini et al (2016) and Weiler (2012) on the impacts of vulnerability and climate change salience on strategic behaviour appears borne out. Highly vulnerable parties – of which AILAC is composed - are more "impatient" for an agreement in the UNFCCC, and thus more likely to prefer less aggressive strategies - which AILAC certainly did – to avoid creating any risks to agreements from confrontation. This runs directly counter to the findings of Bailer (2012), who argued that greater climate change salience derived from high vulnerability results in more aggressive strategies in the UNFCCC because of their potential to accelerate progress towards an agreement despite the risks. The only connection between AILAC's rare use of more aggressive strategies and the group's vulnerability was that they were used as last resort options to prevent outcomes which could heighten the AILAC member states' vulnerability, as in the case of vetoing an AGN proposal on African special needs & circumstances; this would have seen Latin American states excluded from priority funding from the UNFCCC and less able to carry out climate action to protect themselves from climate change risks.

AILAC recognises its member states are highly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, and this is evident from the fact that the group refers to its own vulnerability 13 times in its technical submissions. Furthermore, all interviewees recognised the highly vulnerable nature of AILAC member states to the effects of climate change in the coming century. Therefore AILAC needs an effective agreement, which, because climate change is a collective action problem, requires universal participation among parties. As discussed above, the underlying power dynamics of the UNFCCC meant that AILAC generally did not feel it could credibly use more aggressive strategies, and instead, used less aggressive options,

although not merely because it had no choice. Less aggressive strategies still held some innate appeal, e.g. the ability of AILAC to play to its strengths with power/knowledge resources for persuasion and constructive rhetoric. The high vulnerability of AILAC member states led the group to make extensive use of technical submissions with strong universality discourses, as well as to use coalition-building; these strategies were attempts to garner maximum support for the progressive positions supported by AILAC and to involve all parties in any finalised outcomes from the UNFCCC, given AILAC's need for universal participation. Indeed, as mentioned in Chapter 9, one AILAC delegate stated that "*We're getting closer to the point where a bad deal is worse than no deal*", which shows that so far, the priority has been to ensure an agreement based on universal participation, however imperfect it may be.

However, it is likely the group would have used universality discourses in submissions and coalition-building strategies even if vulnerability concerns of its member states had not been so pressing, given AILAC's identity as bridge-builder and its members' affinity for multilateralism, as well as the benefits of borrowing power from other parties to boost any strategic option's chance of success. These less aggressive strategies are more attractive because AILAC needs an effective universal agreement, although they were already attractive given the group's proficiency in the use of its rich power/knowledge resources. Whether the group's enthusiasm for multilateral co-operation and its bridge-building identity in the UNFCCC would have existed if AILAC member states not been highly vulnerable to climate change is unknowable. It seems reasonable to assume, however, given the distribution of material power resources among parties, that AILAC would have retained this identity given its members' comparative lack of power in other international negotiation arenas and their consequent need to avoid "shadow of the future" effects therein. Therefore, it further seems reasonable to conclude that, while serving to make less aggressive strategies

even more attractive options, AILAC vulnerability was less influential on strategy choice than the power dynamics of the UNFCCC and the group's identity.

Interestingly, AILAC member states' vulnerability to climate change was not sufficient an influence on strategic decision-making that the group attempted to exert moral pressure on other parties on a regular basis. This runs counter to Weiler's (2012) suggestion about highly vulnerable parties' strategy choices that a party's vulnerability to climate change, and thus reliance on effective international action, would result in it using its moral power resources. If anything, the group's vulnerability only deterred them from doing so overtly, as interviewees felt that, while AILAC member states are highly vulnerable, there are other parties which face an even greater existential threat, such as members of AOSIS or the LDCs. The only exception to this was at the time of climate change-induced natural disasters in AILAC member states, as these events imbued the group with sufficient temporary moral power resources to exert pressure credibly through vulnerability discourses.

10.4.3 NGOs and Lobby Groups

Unsurprisingly, textual analysis revealed no influence of NGOs or lobby groups on AILAC's strategic decision-making. Furthermore, such an influence was not identified by any AILAC delegates in interviews, which makes it difficult to assess the comparability with Michaelowa and Michaelowa's (2012) and Bailer's (2012) arguments on the influence on strategy of such domestic actors in combination with the degree to which parties are more democratically-inclined. This is likely because AILAC delegates possess relative strategic autonomy, without strong governmental oversight - albeit within the confines of the group's positional red lines set out at pre-session meetings - through which the influence of domestic groups could be

more easily detected. Furthermore, all AILAC's delegates were employed by their respective national government ministries to negotiate on their behalf as opposed to being recruited from civil society, as has been the case for groups such as AOSIS (Betzold, 2010). This would obviously have provided lobbyists with much greater influence over AILAC strategy choice given the group's negotiator autonomy, and even being part of the delegation could have given them influence over strategic decisions (Rietig, 2016), yet it was only the support unit members aside from national delegations who were permitted to plan strategy. Though employed by the AILAC group rather than national governments, even they were not permitted actually to negotiate.

10.5 Intra-Bloc Dynamics

10.5.1 Decision-Making

The analysis evidences nuanced impact of intra-bloc dynamics on AILAC's strategic choices. The group allows its individual negotiators to make the majority of strategy decisions within negotiation sessions, as mentioned above, because of the complexity of the UNFCCC negotiations and the limited resources AILAC possesses to support its delegation. Responsibility for decision-making is not discussed in the literature for other similarly-sized and -resourced blocs such as AOSIS, and it seems reasonable to assume that because they face similar resourcing challenges, they are also likely to allow their individual negotiators to make most decisions on strategy. Parallels can be drawn from Oberthür's (2011) work with the EU, however, as since 2004, the EU has delegated strategic decision-making to expert

negotiators and the European Commission, so these expert negotiators may have similar levels of autonomy to AILAC delegates.

Despite individual negotiators' autonomy, AILAC holds pre-session meetings to discuss possible strategies, and the group has daily meetings of its issue-specific technical co-ordinations for negotiators to update the group on actions taken and get consensus approval for particular tactics for use later that day. Here intra-bloc dynamics can come into play, as consensus decision-making in theory allows each member state to exercise influence on strategy choice by requiring every party's consent to outcomes. Differences in funding and training provision between AILAC member states means some states can support multiple, well-trained delegates for each issue, while others' delegates do not feel able to participate as effectively, or these states are unable even to propose a delegate for each technical co-ordination. This means that they miss the chance to participate in forging a consensus on these tactics, and the opportunity to suggest alternatives. This disparity crudely divides AILAC in half, with Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Peru able to put forward delegates to participate in more technical co-ordinations, and better able to support their negotiators effectively than Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and Paraguay. Thus, while individual negotiators still ultimately decide on most strategic choices rather the whole group choosing particular strategies such as persuasion or using informal spaces, the individuals in a position to decide are influenced by the relative resources of AILAC member states, and still require consensus-based approval for particular tactics.

The analysis did, however, reveal a particularly interesting example of the intra-bloc dynamics of AILAC impacting on strategy use as a result of the overall group's way of making decisions. AILAC had planned to issue a statement condemning the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement in 2017, but the actual use of this strategy was vetoed by Honduras in internal discussions. Disagreements over the group's position on

US withdrawal, and that its decision-making process for group positions is by consensus at the Governance Committee level, meant that AILAC did not use the strategy at all. Similarly, an awareness of AILAC red lines led to occasional use of more aggressive strategies in a bid to prevent them from being breached, such as blocking the AGN's proposals relating to Africa's special needs and circumstances.

10.5.2 Cohesion

The analysis can also inform thought on the level of influence of AILAC's internal cohesion on its strategic decision-making. Wagner (1999) suggests highly cohesive coalitions tend towards more aggressive strategies because the differences between their members and other parties are more sharply defined, resulting in a "we-they" dichotomy in their negotiating perspective. AILAC interviewees did not specifically mention the group's cohesion, though they did make clear that AILAC possesses a shared identity of supporting multilateralism and a progressive bridge-building agenda. If this is counted as evidence of cohesion, which seems reasonable given cohesion is taken to be a group's members sharing negotiating opinions (Wagner, 1999), then this means that evidence from AILAC runs counter to Wagner's findings; the shared AILAC identity interviewees mentioned specifically focused on common negotiating principles rather than on other characteristics such as geographical proximity of members or comparable strength of economies. AILAC adopted discourses of universality and inclusion while attempting to forge a consensus among all parties through less aggressive strategies. The group did not adopt a "we-they" mentality; if anything, the clear rôle AILAC assumed was designed to bring the maximum number of parties together to produce as effective agreements as possible.

10.6 Timings

10.6.1 Temporal Relationships Between Different Strategies

The analysis showed timings had a significant impact on AILAC's use of strategies in two main ways. Firstly, use of some strategies was temporally dependent on use of others, either affecting their efficacy or facilitating their use at all. AILAC used very few of the more aggressive strategies such as exerting moral pressure through naming & shaming, or blocking. On the rare occasions they were prepared to use them, however, it was as a last resort, once all other less aggressive options had been exhausted. Furthermore, interviewees stated they would only do so when there was a genuine possibility of AILAC's positional red lines being breached by proposals from parties. AILAC's use of demands, another more aggressive strategy, was only ever as an initial strategic move, with the expectation and willingness to switch to less aggressive options once a starting point was reached from which the group could attempt to persuade other parties towards its own positions, or present constructive proposals or compromises. The group did not consider making demands as a stand-alone strategy and thus any use at all was predicated on immediate follow-ups with others. Timing demands at the beginning of a negotiation session matches what Odell (2005) found at WTO meetings, with more aggressive strategies compromising parties' initial strategic moves.

Less aggressive strategies also had temporal relationships with each other. AILAC's regular use of strong discourses of the primacy of technical knowledge in its technical submissions meant the group could also include constructive proposals and attempts at persuasion concurrently within these submissions with a greater expectation of their success, which they did regularly. Attempting to underpin the UNFCCC negotiations with scientific and

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technical knowledge, as discussed above, legitimises AILAC's use of these strategies, as the group is well equipped with power/knowledge resources. The analysis also shows that within formal sessions, constructive proposals and persuasion strategies were used in tandem, with a strategy cycle beginning with persuasion and moving onto proposals when the initial ideas are not accepted in their original form, and then repeating until a new proposal is agreed, or a compromise solution is found.

In addition, the analysis suggests that submissions made jointly with other parties or groups depend on the creation of formal communication channels, which often stem from formal bilateral meetings between AILAC and other parties or groups. These bilateral meetings are mostly arranged during meetings between negotiators in informal spaces, such as at external forums, or in as corridor conversations or social meetings. These various informal meetings also provide spaces where other less aggressive strategies can be used, e.g. negotiating compromises within Secretariat informal informals, or using more "blunt" persuasion in more relaxed social contexts where negotiators can speak plainly off the record. Use of informal spaces is particularly beneficial because they enable AILAC negotiators to improve their tactical knowledge resources and to develop and expand networks which are needed for strategies which rely more heavily on contacts e.g. coalition-building and arranging bilateral meetings. They also play to the strengths of AILAC's delegation in the post-Paris negotiation period, given negotiators' more natural affinity for negotiating in informal spaces than formal sessions.

10.6.2 Timeframe Considerations Across the Year

Secondly, AILAC considered timeframes longer than a single negotiating session when deciding to use certain strategies in the UNFCCC. The group's main strategies - constructive rhetoric & proposals, compromises, persuasion, and coalition-building - were facilitated by regular use of technical submissions where AILAC attempted to make scientific and technical knowledge the bedrock of the UNFCCC. Making these submissions, containing strong discourses of the primacy of technical knowledge, between negotiating sessions throughout the calendar year meant that by the time the subsidiary body meetings in May or the COPs in November/December arrived, AILAC could credibly expect to use successfully these other less aggressive strategies reliant on knowledge, which the analysis shows they did as the majority of their in-session strategic choices. Furthermore, as seen in the previous sub-section, offering compromises as a strategy obviously only works after initial proposals (or demands) are made from which to negotiate towards a centre ground. As well as the follow-on between these proposals/demands and compromises within negotiating sessions, the same temporal relationship between these strategies occurred between proposals made during the calendar within submissions, and compromises stemming from them being offered in formal sessions such as COPs.

Timings were also relevant for the group's sporadic use of concessions trading as a strategy. Interviewees recognised that because the UNFCCC is organised around all-or-nothing package deals at the end of COP sessions, concessions trading can become the way in which agreements are finalised as time runs out at the end of a COP. This can only happen, however, after proposals have actually been made and parties have attempted to steer consensus towards their own preferences. Because AILAC recognises this is how UNFCCC negotiations can

develop, using in particular the support group's expertise and experience, in the run-up to formal sessions the group plans for the sorts of concessions that could be made in exchange for particular gains from other parties. Planning in the months before the COP is vital given the complexity of the UNFCCC negotiations, and the numerous permutations it presents, which AILAC must understand if its negotiators are to have a chance of obtaining satisfactory outcomes and using the strategy in the first place.

The pattern of AILAC's strategy use in the UNFCCC corresponds to a hybrid of the arguments of Odell (2005) and Wagner (1999) on variations in strategy choice during a negotiation cycle. Odell's findings suggest more aggressive strategies are used at the beginning, while Wagner's research on UNCSD negotiations suggest these are more likely to be used at the end in combination with concessions trading. In fact, when AILAC did make demands, this strategy was used at the beginning to provide a starting point for negotiations towards a consensus, while blocking and naming & shaming strategies were used only as last resorts. For less aggressive strategies, evidence from AILAC suggests at face value a similarity with Wagner's (1999) analysis, with these being used mostly at the start of sessions; however, it is hard to ascertain whether this comparison is fair, given AILAC overwhelmingly used less aggressive strategies at every stage of the negotiations anyway, especially with persuasion-proposals cycles throughout sessions. Therefore, an argument that the group specifically used them in the initial stages is reasonable – the group made technical submissions throughout the year containing proposals and rational argument, as well as the same strategies at the beginning of sessions - but not, as in the pattern identified by Wagner, that their use declined as negotiations progressed. Likewise, AILAC's strategy use in a negotiation cycle matches Odell's (2005) findings that less aggressive strategies are used especially at the end of sessions, with the group continuing to make proposals and offer compromises, and occasionally trading concessions; but AILAC used almost all of these throughout negotiations anyway. Putnam et

al's (1990) broader depiction of changing strategy use by negotiation phase is perhaps the best comparison precisely because of its less specific description; in the early stages, parties define the issue, before moving to persuading other parties of their views in the second phase, and finally more problem-solving and collaboration in the third phase.

AILAC interviewees did not distinguish between the group's strategy use at COPs versus SB meetings, which means that conclusions between AILAC and the findings Wagner (1999) makes about differences between official conferences and intersessional meetings are difficult. She notes intersessional meetings tend to feature a more relaxed atmosphere and do not require delegates to deliver concrete outcomes there and then, meaning greater levels of less aggressive, problem-solving strategies are used. While the analysis did not reveal a difference between COPs and SB meetings specifically, it showed that this point seems to be true for AILAC delegates negotiating in informal spaces versus formal sessions, the former of which saw greater uses of persuasion, coalition-building, and constructive proposals & rhetoric as a result. This was evident in AILAC negotiators' participation in external forums such as the Cartagena Dialogue, for which meetings take place earlier in the year than the annual UNFCCC COP and do not require formal outcomes, a feature which interviewees connected with greater use of less aggressive strategies.

10.6.3 Strategy Use Over the Longer Term

AILAC has consistently preferred use of less aggressive strategies over more aggressive strategies within the timeframe of this study, namely 2013 to 2018. The group exerted moral pressure, made demands and threats, and blocked sparingly, often only as a last resort to avoid breaching AILAC positional red lines, and favoured technical submissions, persuasion,

constructive proposals and rhetoric, as well as coalition-building and the use of informal spaces. As discussed above, this was primarily because of power dynamics between the UNFCCC parties and the group's self-determined bridge-building identity. This study also spans the introduction of the Paris Agreement in 2015, which provided a framework for implementation towards which parties could work. That AILAC has been consistent in its strategic approach both pre- and post-Paris seems to run counter to Spector and Zartman's (2003) argument that once overarching goals of an international organisation have been established – here, the implementation of the Paris Agreement's rule book – the proportion of more aggressive to less aggressive strategies tends to decrease. If anything, interviewees remarked that because of frustrations with implementation from 2017, they are beginning to see little option but to increase use of more aggressive strategies to prevent unacceptable outcomes being locked in place for the long-term.

However, the group's strategy use did show some signs of variation over time. One example is the use of vulnerability discourses to exert moral pressure; while AILAC shied away from using this strategy mainly because of the aforementioned factors, some individual negotiators were prepared to use it when any AILAC member states had been affected by a climate-related natural disaster, as it afforded the group greater levels of moral power derived from its member states' exposed vulnerability. In addition, AILAC's use of submissions markedly increased after the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015, which is likely due to two factors. Firstly, the establishment of the support unit gave AILAC a full-time group of dedicated specialists in the UNFCCC negotiations, responsible for drafting the group's submissions before approval first by topic-specific national negotiators from each technical co-ordination, as well as the Governance Committee. Given the volume of domestic work of AILAC's national delegates for their governmental ministries, having the support unit means that AILAC can produce far more submissions, and this could partly explain the increase in the

number of AILAC submissions once the support unit became operational, albeit with a small lag time. Secondly, post-Paris, the framework of the Paris Agreement was in place, allowing specific features to be assessed, critiqued, and developed according to AILAC's positions. Use of constructive rhetoric increased markedly from 2017 onwards, probably because there had been more progress towards the implementation of the Paris rule book, and the number of submissions increased as one vector through which AILAC could use their strategy of constructive proposals and rhetoric. In addition, that several AILAC interviewees judged the negotiations to have become more frustrating in 2017 and 2018 means that AILAC probably has to work harder to maintain their discourse of positivity, to sustain momentum towards the rule book implementation and continue to build bridges with other parties in keeping with the group's identity.

Temporal variation can also be seen in AILAC's strategy choice, in its decision to focus particularly on use of informal spaces since 2017. This was encouraged by the support unit, which recognised individual AILAC negotiators' comparative discomfort in participating on the microphone in formal sessions versus their ability to engage other parties' negotiators in social contexts and corridor conversations using the power of their personalities. This recognition, as explained above, can be seen as AILAC once again understanding its power resources lay in the technical knowledge and particular negotiating skills of its national delegates, and playing to its strengths. In a similar vein, increasing the number of technical submissions following establishment of the support unit allowed AILAC to take advantage of its increased levels of technical and tactical knowledge brought by the support unit advisors.

10.7 Institutional Dynamics of the UNFCCC

10.7.1 UNFCCC Consensus & Complexity

The nature of the negotiating process in the UNFCCC can account for some of AILAC's strategic behaviour. Each party has a veto over Convention outputs by the UNFCCC's consensus-based decision-making process (UNFCCC, 1992) and thus blocking strategies were available to AILAC. The group took advantage of this on rare occasions - one of these corresponding to Odell's (2010) identification of a minority coalition blocking - when AILAC made a joint submission with the AGN to block work on the APA's transparency agenda from progressing without addressing adaptation issues. Nevertheless, although AILAC could have been sure that blocking would be guaranteed to succeed on other occasions as well, overcoming the problem of a lack of leverage, blocking was only utilised sparingly and as a last resort because of "shadow of the future" concerns and damage to AILAC's bridge-building identity. This implies the aforementioned case of the APA agenda was deemed close enough to violating AILAC's red lines to merit blocking and jeopardising the positive image the group had cultivated for itself from its bridge-building identity.

These identity-based concerns also sufficed to deter the group from using concessions trading as a main strategy, as interviewees were concerned it could present AILAC as a cynical negotiator only concerned with its own gains rather than trying to forge a consensus to produce an agreement. This runs counter to Da Conceicao-Heldt's (2006) argument that consensus-based arenas with multiple negotiating topics will favour concessions trading to allow package deals to provide all parties involved with benefits sufficient to override losses and make agreeing to a consensus worthwhile. If anything, AILAC felt that concessions trading, rather

than allowing parties to see a way through multi-issue negotiations, could lead to even greater levels of complexity, potentially hampering resolution of differences between parties and impeding progress towards an agreement.

The UNFCCC's consensus requirement, however, was a big reason for AILAC's frequent use of universality discourses within its technical submissions; with AILAC's vulnerability to climate change meaning that the group needs an effective agreement, and the only way to achieve that enshrined in UNFCCC rules as being with the consent of all parties involved, AILAC's incentive to encourage universal participation is strong. The same reasoning contributes towards AILAC's propensity to engage in coalition-building, to formalise as big a consensus as possible for positions proposed or supported by the group – in other words, to borrow other parties' power to make AILAC positions more likely the basis for a future consensus. A simplification of the negotiations to facilitate more concessions trading, however, as could have been expected from the arguments of Da Conceicao-Heldt (2006), was not identified by interviewees as an impetus behind coalition-building.

While the UNFCCC's decision-making process can account for AILAC's use of these less aggressive strategies in particular, which they did on a regular basis, it is harder to see the requirement for consensus as a determinant of AILAC's preference for less aggressive rather than more aggressive options generally. Had power resource distribution been different and AILAC had had the leverage to ensure other parties would back the positions they put forward or supported, there is no guarantee that the group would not have demanded the acquiescence of others, or threatened them with repercussions if they were unwilling to do so. It seems unlikely AILAC would have taken this more aggressive route, but this is more attributable to AILAC's bridge-building and pro-multilateralism identity in its member states. There are numerous ways to achieve consensus, thus the fact that consensus was the end goal does not necessarily preclude the use of more aggressive strategic pathways to achieve it. As such, it

seems power dynamics and domestic identity concerns influenced AILAC's choice of strategy more than the consensus nature of the UNFCCC or its complexity. This broadly seems to confirm Elgström & Jönsson's (2000:691) argument that no decision rules "per se can be logically linked to creative problem-solving" given the complexity of factors in deciding to use less aggressive strategies.

10.7.2 The Annex I/Non-Annex I "Firewall"

The analysis casts doubt on the validity of Castro et al's (2011) constructed peer group hypothesis in the case of AILAC's strategic behaviour. AILAC mostly avoided using more aggressive strategies regardless of the intended target because of power and identity concerns, and clearly utilised less aggressive strategies with parties from both sides of the "firewall" created by grouping parties into either Annex I or non-Annex I categories, evidenced by the wide range of parties with whom the group put forward submissions. These included developed country parties such as the EU, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland, and developing country parties and groups such as Mexico, AOSIS and the AGN. That AILAC made these joint submissions shows it was able to build issue-specific coalitions with them and did not confine its coalition-building efforts to its own side of the firewall. The group's bridge-building identity is specifically designed to interact with the widest range of parties possible to develop a universally acceptable consensus; this necessitates participation by developed country parties and therefore AILAC's attempts to interact with them. AILAC's strong use of universality discourses in submissions, as well as constructive proposals and compromise offers operationalise this bridge-building identity further.

Furthermore, Castro et al's (2011:8) argument - that more meetings mean a "more trustful atmosphere conducive to more fruitful deliberations" between parties on the same side of the Annex I/non-Annex I divide, and that this leads to less aggressive strategies' use between them - is contradicted by evidence from AILAC interviewees. The analysis revealed a good working relationship and strategy partnerships between AILAC and the EU, and ability to find common ground on a number of issues with the Umbrella Group, whereas interviewees provided a decidedly more mixed picture of AILAC's relationship with the AGN and noted a virtually non-existent relationship with ALBA, despite positive interactions between the two groups' individual negotiators. Differences in the political ideologies of the groups were cited as a major reason for this breakdown, while the "love/hate" relationship with the AGN was attributed to sharing positions on issues such as adaptation despite being at odds on others such as Africa's special needs and circumstances. This meant AILAC was not able to deploy any less aggressive strategies towards ALBA given their failed attempts to arrange bilateral meetings with them, while AILAC actively blocked the AGN proposal on African special needs and circumstances.

10.7.3 Secretariat & Presidency Influences

The influence of the UNFCCC architecture – structures such as the Secretariat, the presidency of a COP, or particular negotiation groupings and their chairs[341] – seems to have had only a modest impact on AILAC's strategy choice. The group puts forward its technical submissions throughout the year via the UNFCCC Submissions Portal as responses to calls from these

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[341] E.g. a negotiation grouping on capacity-building, as opposed to a negotiation group from AOSIS or another bloc.

bodies on particular negotiation issues, rather than submitting them uninvited, as the group is wary of showing its hand before attending formal sessions. By contrast, AILAC makes statements at formal COPs or subsidiary body meetings. However, the difference in strategies within the submissions and statements is not great; both contain numerous examples of constructive rhetoric and positivity discourses as well as persuasion strategies. Furthermore, coalition-building attempts are evident in both types, albeit in different ways. All AILAC's in-session statements make clear that the group is associating itself with other parties e.g. the G77 & China, and there is also reference to a joint presentation by AILAC, the EIG, and CARICOM in the group's opening statement at COP24. All AILAC's submissions with other parties, however, are technical submissions rather than statements at formal sessions. The only marked difference between AILAC's technical submissions in response to calls and its in-session statements is greater evidence of the group offering compromises in its statements. This is hardly surprising, given these were made in the actual sessions where AILAC's delegates could work on compromise solutions with other parties and groups. As such, this seems more attributable to the environment in which the statements are made than the fact that they are not directly responding to calls for input.

The clearest impact of the UNFCCC's architectural structure on AILAC's strategy use was on its use of bilateral meetings and informal spaces. The analysis shows AILAC volunteered to lead negotiation groupings on various topics in order to use the chair positions to try to build coalitions for the positions it supported or had proposed. Furthermore, AILAC used the informal meetings set up by the COP president or Subsidiary Body meeting chairs to gather tactical information about the positions or tendencies of other parties, as well as to put forward constructive proposals or compromise solutions to specific parties. However, this was dependent on being invited by the president or chair in the first place, which was not always guaranteed; the fact that AILAC consistently sought to make constructive proposals and

compromises towards a middle-ground, universally acceptable solution to a deadlock, and its ever-present bridge-building identity, was sometimes an obstacle to invitation, as it was assumed AILAC would accept the outcome of the informal meeting anyway. On other occasions, AILAC would invite the presidency or chair to an informal meeting or a formal bilateral themselves, thus avoiding this obstacle which would then provide similar opportunities to gather intelligence or use other strategies such as proposals or compromises.

Influence of the presidency or chair on AILAC's strategy choice resembles a mixture of two forms of chair/presidency mediation identified by Odell (2005:431, 433-434): more passive "observation, diagnosis, and communication tactics", allowing parties to share views on the causes of hindrances to consensus; and "formulation tactics", where the chair invites particular parties into small groups so they can negotiate more directly. AILAC was given opportunities in these informals and bilaterals to present proposals and compromises, such as draft texts suitable for wider negotiations, and to negotiate with other parties in small groups. The analysis showed no evidence of Odell's (2005:441-442) third category of chair mediation – "manipulation tactics" – where chairs push parties to accept outcomes just before a deadline after most parts have been already agreed. As stated, AILAC's natural tendency to compromise and be constructive means that there is usually little need to push the group to agree a solution. Likewise, the analysis did not produce evidence of AILAC being persuaded into accepting consensus solutions or compromises by the presidency or chair, as Japan tried to do to parties when host of COP3 at Kyoto (Hattori, 1999).

The identity of the party holding the presidency or chairing a session was not deemed an important factor in strategy selection by almost all interviewees. Only one identified an example where AILAC made quasi-demands because of the nationality of a COP president, (the Polish COP24 presidency) because it is a member of the EU, with whom AILAC enjoys a good working relationship. Even here, however, the interaction presented more as a request

than a demand, and so the identity of the presidency clearly did not lead AILAC to use more aggressive strategies here either.

Chapter 11: Conclusions & Evaluation

11.1 Introduction

Chapter 11 presents the overall conclusions of the thesis. It discusses the multi-factorial influence on AILAC's strategy choice and deployment, but recognises power dynamics as the main driver of the overall strategic pattern of preference for less aggressive strategies. The second section evaluates the thesis in several contexts. It considers the overall scope of the research questions, before reflecting on how appropriate both the theoretical perspective of governmentality and its accompanying methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis were to the questions. The final section builds on the findings of the thesis to suggest 3 avenues of future research. Firstly, it suggests analysis of the strategic choices, and the reasons behind them, of other blocs in the UNFCCC to determine whether influences on AILAC are common across the negotiations or if AILAC is an unusual case. Next, the study of alternative factors not considered in this thesis is proposed, such as the gender balance of delegations. Finally, a study of AILAC's levels of influence in the UNFCCC post-Paris would build on the work of Edwards et al (2017) and this thesis.

11.2 Conclusions

11.2.1 Multi-Factorial Influence on Strategy Choice

The findings of this thesis suggest that for AILAC in the UNFCCC negotiations, a range of factors were involved in the bloc's choice of strategies. AILAC's identity as a bridge-building group, composed of member states with an affinity for multilateral approaches to solving transboundary problems, made the use of more aggressive strategies less appealing, as it would conflict with the group's desired image and the stipulation in its rule-book to build bridges and foster consensus wherever possible. Instead, AILAC's identity enhanced the appeal of less aggressive strategies, such as coalition-building, proposals, compromise offers, and persuasion, because of their coherence with this constructive, internationalist approach. AILAC member states' vulnerability to climate change, and the UNFCCC's requirement for consensus decision-making, also made certain less aggressive strategies more appealing, such as coalition-building, compromise offers, and universality discourses within submissions. That is to say, a global agreement is required to minimise the severity of climate change impacts within AILAC member states, and every party must consent for a global agreement to be forged in the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC's consensus rule did allow AILAC to use blocking strategies with guarantee of success, although blocking and other more aggressive strategies were used sparingly, only to prevent the bloc's pre-determined positional red lines from being breached and after every less aggressive strategy option was exhausted. Timings also visibly influenced the use of certain strategies in combination, with AILAC making submissions containing discourses of the primacy of technical knowledge throughout the year to try and make such knowledge the bedrock of the negotiations, thereby giving greater credibility to its main

strategies of constructive proposals and persuasion, which were also used in cycles together. Informal meetings and bilaterals were used as the precursors to other strategies' use, such as submissions with other parties, and strategies more reliant on negotiators' social networks, such as coalition-building.

11.2.2 Primacy of Power Dynamics

However, the findings also clearly demonstrate that power dynamics between AILAC and other parties are the driving force behind their strategy choices in the UNFCCC negotiations. AILAC's relative lack of material and moral power resources stopped the group utilising more aggressive strategies on a regular basis because of lack of leverage and "shadow of the future" concerns, despite blocking remaining a viable option because of the UNFCCC's decision-making rules. Only when AILAC was temporarily imbued with moral power resources, due to climate change-related natural disasters in its member states, did the group countenance exerting moral pressure on parties through vulnerability discourses or naming & shaming, and even then this was because confident individual negotiators believed they could use these strategies successfully. By contrast, AILAC's depth of power/knowledge resources, derived from its delegation dynamics, made less aggressive strategies attractive, either relying on its negotiators' technical knowledge to make credible arguments, or using their tactical knowledge to utilise strategies dependent on good working relationships between delegates. Had AILAC not possessed these rich power/knowledge resources, the group would have considered themselves unable to use these strategies with any realistic prospect of success, which interviewees cited as a key consideration in their strategic decision-making. Consequently, since any proposed strategy needed to have a realistic chance of "success", none of the other

factors which made these less aggressive strategies appealing, e.g. the group's identity, AILAC member states' vulnerability, or UNFCCC consensus rules, would have been sufficient for AILAC to justify actual use. The only exceptions to this arose through force of personality of individual negotiators, which permitted a small number of confident AILAC delegates to use more aggressive strategies considered unviable by most; or allowed outgoing delegates to use less aggressive strategies reliant on social networks despite a lack of negotiating experience and tactical power/knowledge.

11.3 Evaluation

11.3.1 Thesis Scope

This thesis is the first study identified to date to investigate multiple potential influences on an individual bloc's strategy choices within the UNFCCC; prior research has either examined multiple factors on strategy choice patterns across the entire UNFCCC (e.g. Castro et al, 2011; Bailer, 2012; Costantini et al, 2016), or focused on specifics, such as power dynamics or domestic politics, within individual parties or blocs (e.g. Hattori, 1999; Betzold, 2010; Godbole, 2016). Furthermore, the thesis is the first to focus on AILAC's strategic behaviour, with prior research on the group more concerned with its positions rather than strategies. As such, the thesis has been an exploratory study, breaking considerable new ground in this particular context. However, the disadvantage is this limits the amount of attention that can be given to research and discussion of individual factors in strategy choice. In hindsight, limiting the thesis scope to a smaller number of specific potential factors behind AILAC's strategy choice, to provide deeper analysis and perspectives from other disciplines, may have been

better. For example, the project's entire focus could have been the relationship between power dynamics and individual negotiators' agency; examining whether, and if so how, the individual negotiators' psychology and their perceptions of power dynamics played a part in their strategic decisions. Existing research suggests powerful individuals do not process and take into account individuating information about their negotiating partners as much as less powerful actors, resorting instead to stereotypes (Hogeveen et al, 2014). Given AILAC negotiators' high levels of strategic autonomy in the UNFCCC, closer examination of their perceptions of their own power could have been used to determine whether this research also holds true for this group.

11.3.2 Applicability of Governmentality

Nevertheless, the thesis has shown governmentality, as a theory of power relations, can help make sense of how actors interact with each other at spatial scales greater than the local, and why they do so in particular ways. Governmentality's attention to what Foucault (1983; in Litfin, 1994:20) terms the "microphysics of power", i.e. choices made in the processes of interactions between actors as to representation and communication of information, does not mean it is restricted to any particular spatial scale (Okereke and Bulkeley, 2009). Indeed, this thesis shows linguistic and discursive choices were made by AILAC, a supranational bloc, as part of particular strategies which explicitly factored in the relative distribution of power resources between parties to the UNFCCC. This brings these processes of negotiation to the forefront of analysis, addressing a key critique of Deitelhoff and Wallbott (2012) about power approaches to international negotiations. This thesis could be critiqued for adopting a governmentality approach to understanding AILAC's motivations in strategy choice, thereby predisposing the analysis to identify power dynamics as the overriding driver. However, as

governmentality is a theory of power relations and encourages focus on the process of negotiation, this exposed other factors in interviewees' responses, as they were the ones making the final strategy decisions. Had factors such as domestic politics or intra-bloc dynamics proved most influential, these would have been revealed, and accommodated by governmentality as influences on the social contexts in which the negotiators found themselves. As it was, responses identified power dynamics as the main driver.

Furthermore, a governmentality understanding is beneficial here because it makes no assumptions about the distribution of power among different spaces and spatial scales (Lövbrand and Stripple, 2014). As such, understanding of power is not limited to material resources such as economic and military strength, and expands beyond traditional rational choice perspectives to include immaterial sources of power, such as power/knowledge and moral power. Power is exercised in the representation and communication of information, which in turn depends on the social contexts in which actors interact. As such, intangible resources like these can be powerful if the actors consider them as such, e.g. if, as AILAC intended within the UNFCCC, technical, scientific knowledge was perceived as the bedrock of the negotiations and as the final arbiter of the credibility of ideas exchanged by parties. Such an understanding of power resources can explain neatly why AILAC favoured less aggressive strategies so strongly.

11.3.3 Applicability of Methodology

The tripartite approach of CDA ensured attention was given to multiple potential factors on AILAC's strategy choices. Strategic decisions within the texts of AILAC submissions, e.g. use of particular discourses or framings, could then be considered within the contexts of both

AILAC as a bloc of 8 member states, and the UNFCCC as an institution with its own decision-making rules and spaces of interaction. The methodology was particularly useful for considering AILAC's power relations with others, unsurprising given CDA is a well-established methodological approach for examining power relations between actors (Fairclough, 2010). Furthermore, use of a CDA methodology fits naturally with studies grounded in governmentality theory, as CDA often takes a Foucauldian explanation of the nature of power relations (Wodak and Meyer, 2009), and sees power as inherently language-based (Van Dijk, 2008). A limitation of using CDA, however, may have been that its predisposition for analysis of power relations led to overstatement of the importance of power dynamics for AILAC's strategy choices.

Furthermore, in practice, analysis at the second (discoursal practice) level revealed the importance which CDA assumes of text as the medium through which power dynamics are played out is not necessarily appropriate for the UNFCCC negotiations. While interviews with AILAC negotiators helped to explain the reasons for strategies the group deployed in its technical submissions, they also showed the group utilises numerous strategies in spaces beyond submission texts which cannot be seen from textual analysis alone. Thus the value of the intermediary analysis level was not solely to understand the processes behind text production and interpretation but to broaden the spatiality of analysis of AILAC's strategic behaviour within the thesis.

Corpus-linguistic analysis provided a useful form of triangulation to the textual analysis of CDA. By utilising CLA software after initial textual analysis, linguistic patterns and devices, such as AILAC's differing use of "shall" and "should" in submission texts, were revealed without relying entirely on interpretation and judgement of the author, necessarily subject to human error, thus avoiding problems of cherry picking (Baker and Levon, 2015). In addition, using the two methodologies in this order avoided predisposing the author to looking

for evidence already identified by CLA, exposing the thesis to justified criticisms of confirmation bias. However, CLA was not problem-free; the #LancsBox software which analysed the AILAC corpus required all documents be Notepad files, whereas almost all AILAC submissions were accessed as PDF files. Copying the content of submissions into Notepad files did not work, however, as they contained a lot of background code e.g. for page layout. Consequently, the author had to type submissions into Notepad files, and while care was taken to ensure accuracy, human error cannot be entirely ruled out of this process. The #LancsBox software listed some entire sentences as one-word results, probably because of error in determining page layout during the transcription to Notepad files; again, while care was taken in manually calculating totals for particular keywords searches and including any faulty hits as appropriate, human error cannot be entirely ruled out.

11.4 Suggestions for Future Research

11.4.1 Strategies and Selection Reasons of Other UNFCCC Blocs

How far are the thesis findings on strategy selection and the underpinning rationale representative for other blocs within the UNFCCC? It seems likely that this combination of strategy use and determining factors, i.e. generally favouring less aggressive strategies because of power dynamics supplemented by additional factors – in particular identity - is unique to AILAC, given that other blocs are unlikely to be subject to exactly the same circumstances as AILAC. However, without research on other blocs' strategy choices and their underlying rationale, this cannot be stated definitively. Very few individual blocs' strategies have been analysed in depth, if at all, aside from AOSIS (Larson, 2003; Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and

Wallbott, 2012; Oculi and Stephenson, 2018), the MLDCs (Bhandary, 2017), and the EU (Oberthür, 2011; Belis and Schunz, 2013), although the EU studies did not focus specifically on strategies. This provides numerous questions for further research, e.g. how common is the pattern of strategy use identified in this thesis for AILAC – favouring less aggressive strategies – among other blocs in the UNFCCC negotiations? Which blocs follow this pattern and which deviate, and how far? Research may also focus on particular characteristics of blocs - for example, whether AILAC's disregard for more aggressive, and general preference for less aggressive strategies is common among developing world blocs; how does this compare with strategy choices for developed world blocs like the EU and the Umbrella Group, or a bloc of both developed and developing world parties like the EIG? Furthermore, studies on AOSIS and the MLDCs suggest AILAC is unusual among developing country blocs in not using moral pressure in particular more extensively. Investigations into the strategies of other developing world blocs, such as the AGN, LDCs, ALBA, or the LMDCs, could also reveal how true this suggestion is.

Other blocs' rationale for strategy use can be examined once the patterns of use have been clarified. Again, barring a small number of studies on AOSIS considering power dynamics (Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012), blocs' reasons for strategy selection have been largely ignored. This too provides plentiful research opportunities, as previous research in the UNFCCC tended to assess either arena-wide trends rather than identifying the reasons behind particular parties' – and especially blocs' – strategic choices (e.g. Castro et al, 2011; Bailer, 2012; Costantini et al, 2016), or the reasons behind specific individual parties' – as distinguished from blocs - strategy choices (e.g. Hattori, 1999; Bang et al, 2005; Andonova and Alexieva, 2012; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2012; Godbole, 2016; Bang, 2017). There are numerous questions along the same axes of differentiation as for research identifying blocs' patterns of strategy use, e.g. do power dynamics influence strategy selection in developed

world blocs, or as-yet-unstudied developing world blocs? If so, how, and how far are they the primary determinant of strategy choice? Do other developing world blocs use alternative power resources like AOSIS utilises moral power (Betzold, 2010; Deitelhoff and Wallbott, 2012) and AILAC utilises its internal power/knowledge resources? Per Edwards et al (2017), AOSIS, the LDCs, and the LMDCs also possess support units, making their respective rôles in their blocs' strategic choices as sources of power/knowledge, a fruitful avenue of research. Further, as green technology grows globally, will a party's economic strength continue to serve as a power resource once decoupled from its contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions?

Are other factors, such as intra-bloc dynamics, important in determining blocs' strategy selection? If so, how does this make blocs differ from individual parties in the UNFCCC? Would a bloc's larger delegation evidence better financial resource and greater ability to co-ordinate its negotiators' strategy use through training or better logistical oversight, or would more delegates only add negotiating complexity and increase individual negotiators' agency in strategy choice? Does identity influence other blocs' strategy choices? Brief consideration of the literature suggests this may apply for ALBA, which comprises other Latin American countries with similar material power resources, facing similar problems of vulnerability to AILAC states (Watts and Depledge, 2018). Given ALBA is known to have made considerably different strategic choices to AILAC, regularly acting as "minority dissenting voices blocking a consensus" (Watts & Depledge, 2018:7), is this attributable to variations in non-material power resources between the two blocs? Might ALBA's identity within the UNFCCC, with the group using ideas of climate justice as a "discursive weapon against industrialised countries" (Audet, 2013:376), alone suffice to override its lack of leverage and make regular use of more aggressive strategies worthwhile? Finally, how far do individual negotiators' personalities affect blocs' strategy choices – as exceptions to the dominance of power dynamics as for AILAC, or by being influential for other blocs' delegates?

11.4.2 Alternative Factors

This thesis explores AILAC's strategy choices but for practical reasons has not investigated all potential factors in depth. Gender balance of the AILAC delegation is one such factor, although some interviewees hinted that AILAC's high proportion of female delegates may have been influential in steering it towards less aggressive strategies. Ruane (2012:343) states that notwithstanding widely varying conclusions in literature to date around stereotypes of female co-operative approaches and male confrontational strategy choices within negotiations, there is a "small but significant influence" consistent with these regarding gender influences on negotiating behaviour. Further research could examine whether AILAC evidences this pattern and/or whether gender balance of a delegation also influences other blocs' strategy choices.

Deception in negotiations could be usefully investigated as research appears extremely limited within any international relations context, and practically non-existent for the UNFCCC, falling mainly within fields such as ethics (e.g. White, 1980; Burr, 2001; Fulmer et al, 2009), mathematical game theory (e.g. Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1993), or behavioural sciences (e.g. Aquino and Becker, 2005). The thesis did not consider whether AILAC was truthful or bluffing in its negotiation strategies. These tactics are difficult to detect when the primary data source consists of written submissions. It may therefore be useful to investigate whether this was the case for AILAC, and its prevalence within overall UNFCCC negotiations. This would be especially interesting as the analysis reveals AILAC's national delegations tend to rotate fairly frequently, which could override the fact that bluffing is less likely in information-rich environments (Bailer, 2010) such as the UNFCCC. Deception could have wide-ranging ramifications for strategy choices and their underpinning rationales. For example, bluffing could entirely alter the concessions trading process if a concession strongly desired by

one party is presented by the other as violating a red line, potentially prompting greater concessions still to secure it. Many AILAC interviewees cited trust between negotiators as key in strategy use, especially for strategies reliant on social contacts, so it may be the case that delegates do not consider deception at all for fear of damaging relationships or even shadow of the future effects. Alternatively, a known "bluffer" from another party may find themselves subject to other parties' bluffs to "play them at their own game", depending on the relative skill levels of the negotiators in question.

11.4.3 AILAC's Negotiating Success?

Aside from posing questions raised in this thesis within the different contexts of other blocs in the UNFCCC, numerous related opportunities for future research also present themselves. As stated, AILAC delegates required any strategy selected to be reasonably capable of delivering a satisfactory outcome in the UNFCCC negotiations. Therefore, an obvious question in the light of the findings of this thesis is whether the strategies used by AILAC actually led to such outcomes. This could be investigated through methodologies derived from Political Science, such as process tracing methodologies discussed by Collier (2011). Edwards et al (2017) suggest AILAC contributed significantly to the eventual content of the Paris Agreement in 2015, although given some interviewees' growing frustrations with the state of the UNFCCC negotiations, as identified by this thesis, this may not have continued. Negotiations now focus on implementing the Paris rule book rather than drafting the Agreement. Furthermore, even in the pre-Paris era, Edwards et al do not specify which AILAC strategies are successful.

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Appendix I: AILAC Submissions by Chronology

Number	Title	Year
1	Agenda Item: Matters related to Agriculture	2013
2	Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) Workstream 1	2013
3	Adaptation in the ADP: Joint Submission of AILAC, Mexico and Dominican Republic	2014
4	ADP Ad-Hoc Working Group: Submission on Workstream 2: Enhancing Pre-2020 Mitigation Ambition	2014
5	Submission on Ex-Ante Information Requirements for the Communication of INDCs and Ex-Ante Assessment Process	2014
6	Submission on the Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform (ADP)	2014
7	Submission on the Legal Architecture and Structure of the Elements of the 2015 Agreement	2014
8	AILAC and EIG Submission for Organization of an In-Session Workshop on Gender, Mitigation and Technology; Advancing Actions under the Lima Work Program on Gender	2015
9	Submission of Chile on behalf of AILAC to the ADP on Human Rights and Climate Change	2015
10	Submission of Colombia on Behalf of the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean, AILAC, on Opportunities for the Technical Examination Process on Adaptation	2016

11	Views on the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement	2016
12	Statement for the Stocktaking Plenary at the SB44 and APA1 Session	2016
13	SBSTA44 Closing Plenary Statement	2016
14	Submission on the Modalities for the Accounting of Financial Resources Provided and Mobilized Through Public Interventions in Accordance with Article 9, Paragraph 7, of the Paris Agreement	2016
15	SBSTA Agenda Item 6 (b): Advice on How the IPCC can Inform the Global Stocktake Referred to Article 14 of the Paris Agreement	2016
16	Guidance on Cooperative Approaches Referred to in Article 6, Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement; Rules, Modalities and Procedures for the Mechanism Established by Article 6, Paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement; Work Programme under the Framework for Non-Market Approaches Referred to in Article 6, Paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement	2016
17	APA Agenda Item 6: Matters Relating to the Global Stocktake Referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement	2016
18	Views on Possible Elements and Guiding Principles for Continuing and Enhancing the Lima Work Programme on Gender, Taking into Account Recommendations and Insights Resulting from Activities Already Completed under the Work Programme; and, Information on Progress Made in Meeting the Goals of Achieving Gender Balance and Gender-Responsive Climate Policy	2016
19	Submission on the Technology Framework	2016

20	Item 5 Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines of the Transparency Framework on Action and Support Pursuant Article 13 of the Paris Agreement	2016
21	Item 4 Further Guidance in Relation to the Adaptation Communication, Including Inter Alia, as a Component of Nationally Determined Contributions, Referred to in Article 7, Paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement	2016
22	Item 3 Further Guidance in Relation to the Mitigation Section of Decision 1/CP/21	2016
23	Mandates of Adaptation Committee and LDC Expert Group Based on Paragraphs 41, 42 (b) and 45 of Decision 1/CP.21	2017
24	Mandates of Adaptation Committee Based on Paragraph 42 of Decision 1/CP.21	2017
25	Submission on Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM)	2017
26	Views on How to Progress the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) Following the Third Part of its Resumed First Session	2017
27	Item 5 Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines of the Transparency Framework on Action and Support Pursuant Article 13 of the Paris Agreement	2017
28	APA Agenda Item 6: Matters Relating to the GST Referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement	2017

29	Review of the Functions of the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF), Based on the Terms of Reference Contained in the Annex to Decision 9/CP.22	2017
30	APA Agenda Item 7: Modalities and Procedures for the Effective Operation of the Committee to Facilitate Implementation and Promote Compliance Referred to in Article 15, Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement	2017
31	Paris Committee on Capacity-Building (PCCB)	2017
32	Guidance, Rules, Modalities, Procedures, and Work Programme for Article 6 of the Paris Agreement	2017
33	Item 3 Further Guidance in Relation to the Mitigation Section of Decision 1/CP/.21	2017
34	APA Agenda Item 4 – Further Guidance in Relation to the Adaptation Communication, Including, Inter Alia, as a Component of Nationally Determined Contributions, Referred to in Article 7, Paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement	2017
35	Principles and Structure of the Technology Framework and Scope and Modalities for the Periodic Assessment of the Technology Mechanism	2017
36	Closing Statement for the SBSTA46 Closing Plenary	2017
37	APA Agenda Item 7: Modalities and Procedures for the Effective Operation of the Committee to Facilitate Implementation and Promote Compliance Referred to in Article 15, Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement	2017

38	APA Agenda Item 4 – Further Guidance in Relation to the Adaptation Communication, Including, Inter Alia, as a Component of Nationally Determined Contributions, Referred to in Article 7, Paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement	2017
39	Further Guidance in Relation to the Mitigation Section of Decision 1/CP.21	2017
40	APA Agenda Item 6: Matters Relating to the GST Referred to in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement	2017
41	SBI Item 7 Development of Modalities and Procedures for the Operation and Use of a Public Registry Referred to in Article 7, Paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement	2017
42	Development of Modalities and Procedures for the Operation and Use of a Public Registry Referred to in Article 4, Paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement	2017
43	Item 5 Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines of the Transparency Framework on Action and Support Pursuant Article 13 of the PA	2017
44	Guidance on Cooperative Approaches Referred to in Article 6, Paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement; Rules, Modalities and Procedures for the Mechanism Established by Article 6, Paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement; Work Programme under the Framework for Non-Market Approaches Referred to in Article 6, Paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement	2017
45	SBI Agenda Item 7: Common Time Frames for Nationally Determined Contributions Referred to in Article 4, Paragraph 10, of the Paris Agreement	2017

46	SBSTA47 and SBI47 Opening Plenary Statement	2017
47	SB47 Closing Plenary Statement	2017
48	Closing Plenary Statement of the COP/CMP/CMA	2017
49	Inputs to SBSTA 48 on Further Improving the Relevance and Effectiveness of the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP)	2018
50	SBI Agenda Item 7: Common Time Frames for Nationally Determined Contributions Referred to in Article 4, Paragraph 10, of the Paris Agreement	2018
51	7th Durban Forum for Capacity Building (Joint Submission with the Environmental Integrity Group)	2018
52	APA 1-5, SBSTA48 and SBI48 Opening Plenary Statement	2018
53	APA 1-5, SBSTA48, SBI48 Heads of Delegation Statement	2018
54	Conference Room Paper (CRP) Submission on APA Agenda Items 4 and 5 (Joint Submission with African Group of Negotiators)	2018
55	APA 1-5, SBSTA48 and SBI48 Closing Plenary Statement	2018
56	APA 1-6, SBSTA48.2 SBI48.2 Opening Plenary Statement	2018
57	APA 1-6, SBSTA48.2 and SBI48.2 Closing Statement	2018
58	COP24 CMP14 APA 1-7, SBSTA49 and SBI49 Opening Statement	2018
59	Views on the Need for Corresponding Adjustments in Connection with Transfers of Mitigation Outcomes and Emission Reductions under Article 6 (Joint Submission with Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand and Switzerland)	2018
60	Views on Baselines and Ensuring Additional Emission Reductions and/or Removals Through the Mechanism Referred to under Article	2018

	6, Paragraph 4 (Joint Submission with the Alliance of Small Island States, the European Union, Japan, Mexico, South Africa and Switzerland)	
61	APA Critical Elements on Last Iteration	2018
62	APA 1-7 SBI/SBSTA/49 Joint Closing Plenary Statement	2018

<u>Appendix II: Interview Questionnaire</u>

<u>Context of the UNFCCC Negotiations</u>

- How would you describe the UNFCCC as a forum for negotiations?

- How has it changed over time?

- What has been the impact of new coalitions?

<u>AILAC Participation</u>

- What is your view of the rôle of AILAC in the UNFCCC negotiations? How has this changed over time?

- How active is AILAC?

- With which parties or groups does AILAC have good/bad relationships? Why?

<u>AILAC Positions</u>

- Which are the most important topics for AILAC in the negotiations? Why?

- Which are the easiest/most difficult topics in which to make progress?

<u>AILAC Decision-Making</u>

- How would you describe AILAC's decision-making process for its positions and strategies in the negotiations?

- How much variety is there in AILAC's strategic behaviour?
  - o Potential prompts of strategy examples e.g. persuasion, coalition-building etc

Influences on AILAC Strategy

- What have been the most important factors to consider in selecting a strategy?

- How important in strategy selection is:

    o The domestic political context of AILAC member states?

    o AILAC's decision-making process and intra-bloc dynamics?

    o AILAC's delegation dynamics – the size, experience, personalities, preferences, values, skill of its delegates?

    o The relative power of AILAC to other parties?

    o The institutional culture and architecture of the UNFCCC?

    o The vulnerability of AILAC member states to climate change?

    o The geopolitical context of AILAC member states relative to other parties, e.g. international trade, politics etc?

    o The principle of equity, and climate justice considerations?

    o AILAC's knowledge of other parties?

Timings of AILAC Strategic Behaviour

- How does AILAC's strategic behaviour vary over time?

- Which strategies were used in different stages of the negotiations?