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# PARITY BASED FAULT DETECTION TECHNIQUES FOR S-BOX/ INV S-BOX ADVANCED ENCRYPTION SYSTEM

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#### ABSTRACT

Concurrent fault detection plays a vital role in hardware implementation in order to prevent losing the original message This paper explores the new low-cost fault detection scheme for the S-box/ InvS-box of AES using a parity prediction technique. The predicted block was divided into seven blocks, to compare between the actual parity output and the predicted parity output results in the error indication flag for the corresponding block. The predicted blocks were developed with formulations compatible with the new S-box/ InvS-box simulated using 130nm CMOS technology, in Mentor Graphic environment. This proposed fault detection has achieved the total error coverage of about 99%. The total area implementation for the fault detection predicted parity block of the S-box/ InvS-box required 49 XORs, six XNORs, nine ANDs, one inverter, two ORs and one NAND gate. The proposed fault detection has the low hardware complexities which lead to a low cost and low power design.

Keywords: S-box/ InvS-box \* AES \* fault detection \* parity detection \*

## **INTRODUCTION**

Different countermeasures against fault attacks in Advanced Encryption System (AES) have been developed (Yen and Wu, 2006) and (Jemima Anlet, 2012). A fault detection scheme is chosen not only based on the reliability and capability of the scheme, but also on the optimal hardware complexity and critical path delay. There are various techniques for fault detection of the AES hardware implementation. The first technique is based on various forms of redundancy, either time or hardware, using the decryption module to decrypt the encrypted data and then comparing the result with the original plaintext, as proposed in (Yen and Wu, 2006) and (Karri et al., 2002). This technique has the drawback of large area, power and delay overheads is used where algorithm-level, operation-level and round-level fault detection for the AES are applied. In (Bertoni et al., 2003), fault detection is presented using look-up table (LUT) implementation, which requires more memory cells to generate the predicted parity bit.

Error detection code (EDC) is another fault detection technique which makes use of a comparison between the predicted parity outputs of a block from the input data, with the actual parity from computation of the output data of the block. This technique offers an efficient and low area hardware with high fault detection. Parity code error detection is a well-known EDC with a number of parity bits capable of detecting all single bit errors and multiple bit errors, with an odd number of errors. The output parity bits of each transformation are predicted from the inputs using the prediction boxes and compared with the actual parities using the actual block.

The only non-linear transformation in AES is the S-box, so most of the EDC methods apply on it. A concurrent fault detection scheme proposed in (Bousselam et al., 2010), applies to the joint S-box and inverse S-box. Concurrent error detection uses a double parity bit for each S-box in (Mozaffari and Arash, 2006) one parity bit for the input byte, and one parity bit for the output byte, then both parities are compared to check the correctness of the S-box.

In (Di Natale et al., 2007), (Satoh et al., 2008) and (Mozaffari and Arash, 2011), the composite fields of the Sbox/InvS-box are divided into sub-blocks and parity predictions. The composite field S-box in (Di Natale et al., 2007) is divided into five partition blocks, and the predicted parity bit of each block is compared with the actual parity to obtain the error indication flag of the corresponding block. Double parity bit method have been enhanced as proposed in (Mozaffari and Arash, 2007), by combining the designs in (Mozaffari and Arash, 2006) and (Bousselam et al., 2010). The predicted input parity bit is compared with the actual input parity of each S-box, and the indication error flag is obtained by OR-ing the 16 indication flags from each S-box. They also modified the double parity bit method in (Bertoni et al., 2003), by adding detection logic after ShiftRows transformation, in order to detect the error within the S-box and ShiftRows transformation.

This paper explores the new low-cost fault detection scheme for the S-box/ InvS-box of AES using a parity prediction based method, by enhancing the scheme in (Di Natale et al., 2007) for better protection. The S-box/ InvS-box architecture is developed using a composite field algorithm to achieve low area hardware.

#### NEW FAULT DETECTION SCHEME FOR AES S-BOX/ INVS-BOX ARCHITECTURE

#### **AES S-box/ InvS-box architecture**

The proposed fault detection is presented using the new low-power and low-area S-box/ InvS-box architecture based on a compact composite field, using a polynomial basis. The transformation of the S-box uses an irreducible polynomial of  $p(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$  to construct the binary field, GF(2<sup>8</sup>). It consists of multiplicative inversion, followed by an affine transformation.

This new S-box/ InvS-box merges the subcomponent of the typical multiplicative inverse, using a circuit minimisation technique to optimise and reduce the © 2006-2013 Asian Research Publishing Network (ARPN). All rights reserved

hardware complexity of the circuit consists of Stage 1, the inversion and the combination of multiplication in  $GF(2^4)$ . Stage 1 includes a logic optimisation of multiplication in  $GF(2^4)$ , multiplication with constant, squaring in  $GF(2^4)$ , and addition included in one circuit. CombineXAXB is minimised for multiplication in  $GF(2^4)$  after multiplicative inversion in  $GF(2^4)$ . The implementation of differential blocks and predicted parities are obtained by using the best choice of  $\varphi = \{10\}_2$  and  $\lambda = \{1000\}_2$  to obtain the low area and critical path delay. The new architecture as shown in Figure 1 reduces the gate count compared to a typical circuit using typical composite field architecture.



Figure 1: New S-box/ InvS-box architecture

#### New proposed fault detection scheme architecture

The fault detection scheme has been developed by comparing the actual parity output, and predicted parity output results in the error indication flag for the corresponding block. The architecture of S-box and inverse S-box have been divided into seven blocks that cover each sub-structure inside it, with seven predicted parities. Seven error indication flags are observed, and for zero error computation, the output of flags should be zero when compared with the actual parities. The predicted parity is obtained using the input of each block, while the actual parity is obtained from the output of each block. XOR gate implementation is utilized to compare the two parity outputs and to obtain the fault indication flag. We optimized the logic area complexity for each of the predicted parity units, to cover all faults, in every output of the S-box/ InvS-box. Each block of the S-Box is modified in order to detect all single faults leading to an odd number of errors in the output.

Figure 2 illustrates the block diagram of the proposed parity prediction fault detection blocks, for the composite field S-box and InvS-box. Blocks 1 and 6 cover the fault detection for isomorphic and inverse isomorphic, while blocks 2 and 7 consist of affine and inverse affine predicted parity. Blocks 3, 4 and 5 were developed to implement the fault detection for multiplicative inversion transformation, consisting of Stage 1, inversion in  $GF(2^4)$ , and multiplication in  $GF(2^4)$  (CombineXAXB).



Figure 2: Proposed parity prediction fault detection blocks for the composite field S-box and InvS-box

#### Sub-block of Fault Detection Scheme

# A. Blocks 1 and 6: Predicted Parity of Isomorphic and Inverse Isomorphic Mapping

Blocks 1 and 6 represent the isomorphic and inverse isomorphic mapping based on  $\varphi = \{10\}_2$  and  $\lambda = \{1000\}_2$ , for the best optimum logic implementation to obtain the low area and critical path delay.

**Lemma** 1: Let  $\zeta = \{\zeta_7 \zeta_6 \zeta_5 \zeta_4 \zeta_3 \zeta_2 \zeta_1 \zeta_0\}$  be the input of isomorphic mapping in GF(2<sup>4</sup>) and  $\Gamma = \{\Gamma_7 \Gamma_6 \Gamma_5 \Gamma_4 \Gamma_3 \Gamma_2 \Gamma_1 \Gamma_0\}$  be the input of predicted parities of isomorphic mapping. The derivation for the predicted parities of block 1,  $\rho_{iso}$  is as follows:

$$\rho_{iso} = \varsigma_0 + \varsigma_1 + \varsigma_2 + \varsigma_5 \tag{1}$$

The total number of XOR gates needed for implementation of block 1,  $\rho_{iso}$  in the S-Box/ InvS-box is three XOR gates illustrated in Figure 3.



Figure 3: Predicted Parity of Isomorphic Mapping

**Lemma** 2: Let  $\Lambda = \{\Lambda_7 \Lambda_6 \Lambda_5 \Lambda_4 \Lambda_3 \Lambda_2 \Lambda_1 \Lambda_0\}$  be the input of inverse isomorphic mapping in GF(2<sup>4</sup>), and  $\Gamma' = \{\Gamma'_7 \Gamma'_6 \Gamma'_5 \Gamma'_4 \Gamma'_3 \Gamma'_2 \Gamma'_1 \Gamma'_0\}$  be the input of the predicted parity of inverse isomorphic mapping.

The predicted parity of block 6,  $\rho_{inviso}$  is obtained as follows:

$$\rho_{inviso} = \Lambda_0 + \Lambda_2 + \Lambda_6 + \Lambda_7 \tag{2}$$



Figure 4: Predicted parity of of Inverse Isomorphic Mapping

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Figure 4 shows the hardware implementation complexity for the predicted parities of block 6,  $\rho_{inviso}$  consists of three XOR gates.

#### B. Block 3: Parity Stage 1

Block 3 of the S-Box/InvS-box implements Stage 1 architecture, which consists of multiplication in  $GF(2^4)$ , multiplication with lambda, squaring in  $GF(2^4)$  and a modulo-2 addition process based on composite field arithmetic.

The predicted parity of block 3, P<sub>stage1</sub> as follows:

**Lemma** 3: Let the input of Stage 1 be  $w = \{w_3 \ w_2 \ w_1 \ w_0\}_2$ and  $q = \{q_3 \ q_2 \ q_1 \ q_0\}_2$ , while  $\gamma = \{\gamma_3 \ \gamma_2 \ \gamma_1 \ \gamma_0\}_2$  is the input of the predicted parity of Stage 1. The predicted parity of block 3,  $\rho_{stage1}$  as follows:

$$\rho_{stage1} = (w_0 \cup (q_0 + q_1 + q_2 + q_3)) + w_1(q_0 + q_2) + w_2(q_0 + q_1 + q_3) + w_3(q_0 + q_2 + \overline{q_3}) \quad (3)$$

where U represents the OR operation.

The hardware implementation of the predicted parity for block 3 requires seven XOR gates, three AND gates, one OR gate, and one inverter gate, as shown in Figure 5.



Figure 5: Predicted parity for Stage 1 implementation

#### C. Block 4: Parity Inversion

**Lemma** 4: Let the input of the inversion in GF(2<sup>4</sup>) be  $\gamma = \{\gamma_3 \gamma_2 \gamma_1 \gamma_0\}_2$  and  $\theta = \{\theta_3 \theta_2 \theta_1 \theta_0\}_2$  is the input for the predicted parity of the inversion. The derivations of the predicted parity inversion,  $\rho_{inversion}$  are obtained as follows:

$$\rho_{inversion} = \gamma_0(\overline{\gamma_2 \overline{\gamma_1}}) + \gamma_3(\gamma_0 + \gamma_1) \tag{4}$$



Figure 6: Predicted parity for inversion in GF(2<sup>4</sup>) implementation

Figure 6 illustrates the hardware implementation for the predicted parity of inversion, which utilizes two XOR gates, two AND gates, one NAND gate and one inverter.

#### D. Block 5: Parity CombineXAXB

Block 5 consists of two multiplications in  $GF(2^4)$ , after the multiplicative inverse of nibble in  $GF(2^4)$ . The architecture is optimised using a Boolean simplification technique in order to achieve a low gate count.

**Lemma 5**: Let  $\theta = \{\theta_3 \ \theta_2 \ \theta_1 \ \theta_0\}_2$ ,  $m = \{m_3 \ m_2 \ m_1 \ m_0\}_2$ and  $q = \{q_3 \ q_2 \ q_1 \ q_0\}_2$  be the input of CombineXAXB, while  $\Lambda = \{\Lambda_7 \ \Lambda_6 \ \Lambda_5 \ \Lambda_4 \ \Lambda_3 \ \Lambda_2 \ \Lambda_1 \ \Lambda_0\}_2$  is the input for the predicted parity of CombineXAXB. The derivation of the the predicted parity is:

$$\rho_{CAB} = (\Psi + \theta_3)(q_3 + m_3) + (\pounds + \theta_0)(q_2 + m_2) + \Psi(q_1 + m_1) + \pounds(q_0 + m_0)$$
(4)

where  $\Psi = \theta_2 + \theta_0$ ,  $\pounds = \theta_1 + \theta_3$  and  $\pounds = \Psi + \pounds$ 



Figure 7: Predicted parity of CombineXAXB implementation

The number of gates required for implementing the predicted parity of block 5,  $\rho_{CAB}$  is 15 XOR gates and four AND gates, as shown in Figure 7.

#### E. Blocks 2 and 7: Parity Affine and Inverse Affine

**Lemma** 6: Let  $\Gamma' = \{ \Gamma'_7 \Gamma'_6 \Gamma'_5 \Gamma'_4 \Gamma'_3 \Gamma'_2 \Gamma'_1 \Gamma'_0 \}$ be the input of affine in GF(2<sup>4</sup>). The derivation for the predicted parities of block 2 is as follows: ARPN Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences

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$$\rho_{affine} = \overline{c+b} + b + e + \Gamma'_{6} + a + d + \Gamma'_{1} + \overline{d+c} + b + e + d$$
(5)

where

 $a = \Gamma'_{4} + \Gamma'_{5}, c = a + \Gamma'_{6}, b = \Gamma'_{0} + \Gamma'_{7},$  $d = \Gamma'_{2} + \Gamma'_{3} \text{ and } e = \Gamma'_{1} + \Gamma'_{5}$ 



Figure 8: Predicted parity circuit of affine implementation

Hardware implementation for the predicted parity of block 2,  $\rho_{affine}$  requires 12 XOR gates and four XNOR gates, as shown in Figure 8.

**Lemma** 7: Let the input of the inverse affine be  $\Gamma = \{\Gamma_7 \Gamma_6 \Gamma_5 \Gamma_4 \Gamma_3 \Gamma_2 \Gamma_1 \Gamma_0\}$ . The predicted parity of Stage 1 is derived as follows:

$$\rho_{invaffine} = \overline{\Gamma_2 + \Gamma_5 + \Gamma_7} + \overline{\Gamma_1 + \Gamma_4 + \Gamma_7} + \Gamma_0 + \Gamma_3 + \Gamma_6 + \Gamma_7$$
(6)

The number of gates needed for implementing the predicted parity of block 7,  $\rho_{invaffine}$  shown in Figure 9 is seven XOR gates and two XNOR gates.



Figure 9: Predicted parity circuit of inverse affine implementation

#### DISCUSSIONS

The total area implementation for the fault detection predicted parity block of the S-box/ InvS-box required 49 XORs, six XNORs, nine ANDs, one inverter, two ORs and one NAND gate. Table 1 summarises the hardware complexities for each of the predicted parities for blocks 1- 7. Table 2 shows a comparison of the total hardware complexities between the proposed predicted parity and S-box/ Inv S-box with design of (Kermani and Masoleh, 2011). Design of (Kermani and Masoleh, 2011) only for S-box and their predicted parity architecture with the same  $\varphi = \{10\}_2$  and  $\lambda = \{1000\}_2$  as the proposed design.

According to the table, the proposed fault detection scheme achieves the lowest core area through the circuit level optimization.

Table 1: Hardware complexities for proposed predicte	ed
parity of S-box/ InvS-box	

Block	XOR	XNOR	AND	INV	OR	NAND
1, <b>p</b> <sub>iso</sub>	3	-	-	-	-	-
2, $\boldsymbol{\rho}_{affine}$	12	4	-	-	-	-
3, <b><i>p</i></b> <i>stage</i> 1	7	-	3	1	1	
4, <i>p</i> inversion	2	-	2	-	1	1
5, <b>ρ</b> <sub>CAB</sub>	15	-	4	-	-	-
6, <b>p</b> <sub>inviso</sub>	3	-	-	-	-	-
7, $\boldsymbol{\rho}_{invaffine}$	7	2	-	-	-	-
Total	49	6	9	1	2	1

Table 2: Comparison of total hardware complexities for different predicted parity of S-box/ InvS-box

Architecture	Area of S-box/ Inv S- box	Area of parity prediction	Total area of S-box/ Inv S-box and parity prediction
Mozaffari and Arash, 2011	122X + 36A	42X + 9A + 3O + 1I	164X + 45A + 3O +1I
*only S-box	0011	100111	
Proposed	105X +	49X + 9A	154X + 47A
	38A +	+ 20	+ 3N + 3O +
	3N + 10	+6XN +1I	6XN + 1I

$$X = XOR, A = AND, O = OR, I = NOT, N = NAND, XN = XNOR$$

The proposed fault detection scheme was simulated using 130nm CMOS technology, in the Mentor Graphic environment. The evaluation for single stuck-at errors was carried out to evaluate the fault coverage of the proposed fault detection.

The actual parities for each block of the S-box/ InvS-box required an XOR gate to obtain the output parity, to compare with the predicted parity. Furthermore, seven XOR gates are needed to obtain the indication flag, by comparing seven of the predicted blocks with the actual parities. All possible single stuck-at errors were inserted randomly on the input and output nodes of the logic gates of the S-box. Fifty data inputs for the S-box/InvS-box were selected and the correct input of each block was replaced by an erroneous value, corresponding to a stuck-at fault at an input line of each block. The output error is detected by comparing the parity bit with the actual parity of the outputs. All the single faults will result in single errors in an odd number of erroneous bits at its output, and all the possible faults are detected by parity checking at each of the blocks and ends of the S-box/ InvS-box block.

The proposed fault detection was also injected with multiple stuck-at errors, whereby 50 nodes were made faulty for a multiple fault. This simulation proves that the predicted parity fault detection has almost 100% fault coverage at the byte level. For a single stuck-at error, it shows that the faults are covered 99.9 % for both entire

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SubBytes and inverse SubBytes. For multiple stuck-at errors, a 96% fault coverage resulted, which covers 48 nodes that were identified from the 50 injected nodes in both the S-box and the inverse S-box. Table 3 represents the fault coverage for single and multiple stuck-at errors for the S-box and inverse S-box.

Table 3: Fault coverage for fault detection scheme

Faults	Fault coverage (%)
Single stuck-at errors	99.9
Multiple stuck-at errors	96

## CONCLUSION

In this paper, the new fault detection scheme, based on parity bits, has been developed for the S-box/ Inv S-box architecture. It has been shown that the proposed fault detection scheme, using the new optimum composite field S-box/ InvS-box, has lower complexities and delay overheads than other previous designs. Based on the simulation results, high fault coverage was obtained for the proposed fault detection scheme. This scheme also offers low hardware complexities, which leads to a low cost and low power design estimated about 20uW.

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