

Ideological Cleavage under Open-list Proportional Representation: Parties' Position toward the 2019 Indonesian Presidential Threshold

Ridho Al-Hamdi

Department of Government Affairs and Administration, Faculty of Social and Political Science,
Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (email: ridhoalhamdi@umy.ac.id)

Abstract

This article examines the ideological position of Indonesia's political parties in addressing the 2019 presidential threshold under the open-list proportional representation system. The article aims to determine the political cleavage among Indonesian political parties, whether classified into the ideological spectrum or the organisational degree. From a methodological standpoint, it is qualitative research by employing in-depth interviews and online news collection as a data gathering technique. The study's finding depicts that the ideological cleavage is no longer relevant under the open-list proportional representation system because political parties eventually have pragmatical orientations rather than ideological considerations. It can be proven that the position of nationalist secular parties is not merely in the approval side but also in the denial and dilemma sides. Likewise, the position of nationalist Islamist parties can be found on two sides: denial and dilemma. This finding verifies that Indonesia's ideological contestation is waning and inactive when political parties cope with power issues. On the contrary, the ideology is revived when it deals with religious and tribal affairs.

Keywords:

Presidential threshold; parties; 2019 election; ideological cleavage; Indonesia

Introduction

Indonesia is the third-largest democratic state of the world after India and the USA consisting of multiple religions and multiple ethnicities. Based on Geertz's (1960) framework, Indonesian society can be catalogued into three variants: *abangan* (nominal Muslim), *santri* (devout Muslim), and *priyayi* (aristocrat). Therefore, Indonesia applies the multiple party system with dozens of parties in each national election. Although political parties are the vital democratic institution that contributes to consolidating the state democracy, Indonesia's electoral system is always changing due to the process of seeking the most relevant system for Indonesian democratic transitions. Although the system is changing, the open-list proportional representation system has remained and been applied in Indonesia since

the 2009 election until the present. In the recent Indonesian political debate, the presidential threshold is one of the fascinating issues.

The presidential threshold conceptually is the minimum level of support, which the candidate pair needs to earn representation (Reynolds & Reilly, 1997, p.88). If such a pair cannot collect the support, it is not allowed by the applied system to run for the competition. In Indonesia, the presidential threshold applied for the first time in the presidential election in 2019. According to the 2017 Election Act, only parties having a minimum of 20 percent of the parliamentary seats or 25 percent of valid vote in the previous election can nominate the president and vice president candidate pair. Nonetheless, pro and contra still exist among political parties. Some concur with the presidential threshold, while others reject it.

The debate of the presidential threshold has been taking place since the 2014 election. At the time, the Constitutional Court judges deliberated in 2013, but they did not immediately make a quick verdict, and, in turn, the verdict was close to the 2014 election. Was the public ever informed about why the Court postponed the verdict? What was the motive? The answer is that the decision cannot be separated from the political situation at the time. If the verdict was applied immediately in 2013, the presidential threshold would no longer have been relevant in the 2014 election. The situation could have been unstable due to a lot of presidential candidates running to the stage.

Broadly speaking, Randal (2006, pp. 387-388) and Mainwaring (1991, pp. 21-43) assume that studying political parties in developing countries is commonly connected with topics of the party system, institutionalism, democratisation, and ideology. On the one hand, Ufen (2009, pp.160-161) puts forward that parties in Indonesia have good performance. They are quite in line with democratic values and can participate in free and fair elections. The military involvement in parties decreases and voters can deliver their alert to parties that have disappointing performances. On the other hand, Ambardi (2008, p. 327-328) argues that the competition among parties terminated after the election and followed by the invention of a cartel. The cartelised party system's source is the parties' collective dependence on rent-seeking to meet their financial necessities. Nevertheless, Mietzner (2013, p. 223) is sure that not all Indonesian parties are cartelised because some parties still have solid ties to civil society.

In terms of the institutionalisation of parties, Tan (2012, pp.154-176), Tomsa (2008, p.189), Choi (2010), and Hamayotsu (2011, pp.133) hypothesise that the party system in Indonesia is feebly institutionalised. Nonetheless, in the worldwide trend, Ufen (2008b), Hamayotsu (2011), Croissant & Völkel

(2012), and Mietzner (2013) argue that the party system in Indonesia is well institutionalised if contrasted to remaining South American and Asian countries, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. It designates that, consistent with Noor's (2012, p.2) finding, parties in Indonesia have a greater opportunity to maintain cohesion, but it is possible for them to be fragmented parties if they are feebly institutionalised. Fionna (2013, p.187) believes that the parties can operate various programs if they are more institutionalised. On the contrary, the parties are inclined to be ineffective and passive if they are less institutionalised. Furthermore, Liddle & Mujani (2007, pp. 832-851) postulate that Indonesia's recent democratic situation demonstrates that the leadership and party ID are more influential on voting behavior rather than religious consideration. It is also reinforced by Ufen (2009, pp.160) who believes that nowadays parties are not social movements anymore with their robust link of organisations like in the period of the 1950s.

Presidentialised parties are also a common trend in Indonesia since the direct presidential election in 2004 (Ufen, 2018). It can sacrifice the parties' policy, and, in turn, the party organisation will be marginalised in inventing the party activities and formulating its ideology (Samuels, 2002, pp. 471). However, Kawamura (2013, pp. 1-27) puts forward that presidentialised parties can happen merely in huge parties which have a robust organisational structure and have an opportunity to contest in the executive election rather than small-middle parties which are not aggressively engaged in the executive election because they desire to maximise votes only in the legislative election. Thus, Poguntke & Webb (2005, pp. 1-22) hypothesise that it is a worldwide fact in most democratic countries affected by the enlarged ability of parties' leaders to avoid party mechanisms and appeal electors immediately. The result is the rise of dictatorial leaders. Hence, Ufen (2008a, pp. 5-37; 2009,

pp.161-168), Tan (2012, pp.175), and Al-Hamdi (2017) postulate that political ideology is feeble and claim seven constraints which cause the feebleness of ideology: the increase of presidentialised parties, the rising intra-party dictatorial person, the rampant use of vote-buying, the absence of the party's meaningful platform, feeble loyalties to parties, cartel-like collaboration, and the rise of new elites at the local level.

Different from previous studies, this article analyses the response of Indonesia's parties in addressing the 2019 parliamentary threshold. The upshot is to prove whether the ideology is still robust, vague, or submerged. The study's focus is mapping the political cleavage among Indonesian political parties in addressing the 2019 presidential threshold. With such a map, the difference of position of each party can be known. Based on this consideration, the article aims to determine the political cleavage among political parties based on their ideological spectrum and the organisational degree. As a considerable suggestion, the House of Representatives could pay serious attention to the electoral justice approach in deciding the presidential threshold.

Political Cleavage and Party Classification

In Mair's (2006, p. 372-373) concept, the cleavage is frequently related to belief systems like religion or class; thus, there are three critical characteristics of cleavage. Firstly, a cleavage encompasses a social separation like religion, ethnicity, or status. Secondly, it includes a shared identity where the cleavage is justified on collective identity and issues such as workers, farmers, Muslims, Christians, etc. Thirdly, it needs to look for an institutional expression, whether through a trade union, a religious organisation, a party, and the like.

Randall (2006, pp. 389) and Vassallo & Wilcox (2006, p. 415) identify prospective cleavages: state and religion, center and

periphery, urban and rural areas, land and industry, or workers and owners. Ambardi (2008, p. 35-80) categorises three political cleavage patterns in Indonesia: the religious-secular cleavage, the national-regional cleavage, and the class cleavage. The first two pairs of cleavages were invented during the colonial period. In the meantime, the latter shows the conflict between working classes and the one created by capitalism during the New Order Era when vast industrialisation took place. This article intends to examine the religious-secular cleavage.

Parties can be categorised into various distinctive standards, based on the organisational degree, the social and political aim, the social classes which they tend to represent, the positioning toward the political system, or the name that symbolises particular social and political aims that the parties want to be recognised with (Hofmeister & Grabow, 2011, p. 20-23). This article categorises parties based on two primary considerations. First is a social and ideological conviction in post-1998 by applying the concept of Geertz (1960) on *abang* and *santri* and Machmudi (2006) of *Jemaah Tarbiyah* because lots of parties institute their programs based on ideological orientations. Second is the organisational degree, as parties invent their programs based on their human and financial abilities. In the ideological classification, considering various scholars' classifications (Liddle, 2003, p.5; Baswedan, 2004, pp.672-684; Mietzner, 2013, p.169-176; Al-Hamdi, 2017, p.80-88) on political parties, this study catalogues them into three main groups: nationalist-secular, nationalist-Muslim, and nationalist-Islamist. According to Al-Hamdi (2017), these three groups are categorised as nationalist because the first two groups declare Pancasila as their ideological foundation. Although the latter does not adopt Pancasila as its ideological base, it welcomes Pancasila as the core values within the party platform. Thus, the third group is friendly towards Pancasila.

In the degree of organisation, this article adopts Feith's theory (1957, p.61) regarding the party classification into three different categories. First, major parties, which reach the minimum vote of 10 percent in the 2014 election, such as PDIP, Golkar, Gerindra, and Demokrat. Ideologically speaking, these four parties are nationalist-secular. Second, medium parties, which collect the vote between 3.5 and 9.9 percent in the 2014 election. PAN, PKB, PKS, PPP, Nasdem, and Hanura can be included here. Third, small parties. Parties that have not gained the minimum parliamentary threshold of 3.5 percent in the 2014 election but still participate in the 2019 election, they are categorised in this group, such as PBB and PKPI. New parties established after 2014 are also part of this group, i.e., Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, and Garuda.

Therefore, this article classifies Indonesian political parties into three categories. First is nationalist secular. In this category, there three kinds of parties: major parties (PDIP, Golkar, Gerindra, and Demokrat), medium parties (Nasdem and Hanura), and small parties (PKPI, Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, and Garuda). Second is nationalist-Muslim, which consisting of PAN and PKB. Third is nationalist-Islamist, which encompassing PKS, PPP, and PBB. These three categories are applied as the analytical framework of the study. It can be seen in Figure 1.

Methods

This article utilises qualitative method as theorised by Denzin & Lincoln (2011, p. 3-4)

by applying the case study as the research approach. According to Creswell (2013, p. 97) and Flyvbjerg (2011, pp. 301-302), this article conceptualises the case study as the intensive investigation that describes one or more cases for particular aims within a tied case or multiple cases through in-depth data collection by gathering various sources.

In-depth interviews and a compilation of news media stories were utilised as data gathering techniques (Silverman, 2001, p.83-144). The in-depth interviews with elites of 16 political parties were carried out over roughly eight months between November 2017 and June 2018. One informant was interviewed twice. Meanwhile, the collection of news stories was conducted before, during, and after the field research, namely compiling stories from reputable online media. After the data was collected, as postulated by Creswell (2013, p.179-180), the last step is a four-step analysis: reducing data, displaying data, verification, and conclusion.

Results and Discussion

This article classifies three parties' distinctive positions in addressing the presidential threshold: approval, dilemma, and denial. Each party has its own arguments. The approval position consists of four parties (PDIP, Golkar, Nasdem, and PKB). The dilemma position includes PPP, Hanura, and PKPI. Meanwhile, the denial side encompasses nine parties (Gerindra, Demokrat, PAN, PKS, PBB, Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, and Garuda).




Figure 1. The Flow of Analysis

Source: Compiled by the Author.

argument was backed up by Cornus Dwisptha Hekseko, secretary of Nasdem in Yogyakarta.³ In addition to that, Teuku Taiqulhadi, a member of the expert board of Nasdem, assumes that the threshold is enough to represent the people who vote.

‘Small parties could join other parties to support one candidate 20 percent,’ Teuku said to Tirta (Nathaniel, 2017a).

PKB advocates the PDIP, Golkar, and Nasdem’s positions. Agus Sulistiyono, chairperson of PKB in Yogyakarta, underlines that there is no term of advantaged or disadvantaged because if a party can perform well, it obtains the people’s support. Likewise, Umaruddin Masdar, the PKB cadre in Yogyakarta, states that if the presidential election has many candidates, voters have difficulties recognising them one by one so that the 20 percent can help voters to acknowledge the small number of the candidates.⁴ Nevertheless, although Muhaimin Iskandar, general chairperson of PKB, already proposed the threshold of 10 percent (Nugraheny, 2017), PKB can situate Ma’ruf Amin as the Jokowi partner in running for the presidential election.

The approval of PDIP, Golkar, Nasdem, and PKB is caused by the fact that they are in the same coalition in nominating the presidential candidate. Moreover, they tend to restrict the emergence of other potential candidates and, in turn, can guarantee Jokowi as the elected president for a second-term period because of the small number of the candidates. In other words, they are solid in winning the pair of Jokowi-Ma’ruf Amien.

³ Interview with Hekseko was on 28 November 2017 and 28 April 2018.

⁴ Interview with Sulistiyono was on 20 November 2017 and 22 May 2018 while Masdar was on 15 December 2017.

Three Parties Are in the Dilemma Position

While other parties are in a strong position between approval and denial, three parties face a dilemma where their cadres have different responses. It cannot be separated from the situation where PPP has a long-term internal conflict, Hanura is scared not to pass the parliamentary threshold, but it somehow should support the Jokowi coalition, and PKPI has no stable internal organisation.

Some cadres of PPP are in the approval position toward the threshold of 20 percent. Achmad Baidowi, vice secretary of PPP, said that the Constitution Court allows the 2014 election result for the 2019 election (Septianto, 2018). Thus, 20 percent avoids the elected president from the parliament’s political trap (Puspita, 2017).

‘We did not want the 2019 elected president to be held hostage by the parliament,’ Asrul Sani, secretary-general of PPP, said to Antara (Jingga, 2017).

If 20 percent of the presidential threshold does not meet the agreement, PPP proposes another alternative between 10 and 15 percent (Ibrahim, 2017).

Baidowi and Sani’s opinion is rejected by other PPP cadres such as Lukman Hakim Saifuddin. Saifuddin even rejects the presidential threshold since the 2014 election because he argues that the threshold is unconstitutional. He underlines that any percentage is not in line with the 1945 Constitution in Article 6A, which states that political parties, and the election participants, have the same right to nominate the president and vice president (Akuntono, 10 July 2013).

‘Article 6A does not mention the minimum requirement of seat or vote. The Presidential Election Act should understand the main value of the 1945 Constitution,’ Saifuddin said to Kompas (Akuntono, 2013).

Other PPP cadres strengthen Saifuddin's statement. Syukri Fadholi, the PPP cadre, rejects the threshold because it violates the 1945 Constitution. Fadholi also believes that the Election Act seems to be ruined by the Jokowi regime. The 20 percent demonstrates that the existing regime has a big ambition to take over the power and eliminates small and new parties. The 20 percent is not in line with the people's interests and real life in the democratic state.⁵

Hanura is also in a dilemma situation. On the one hand, Hanura should back up the Jokowi coalition, where the coalition agrees with the threshold of 20 percent. On the other hand, this party is concerned that it cannot pass the parliamentary threshold. According to Hasnanto, for the Hanura cadre in Yogyakarta, anyone can be nominated if there is no threshold, and it is very unsafe. Other Hanura cadre in Yogyakarta, Abe Nindito Radite, agrees that the 20 percent violates the 1945 Constitution so that it is okay if all parties have the same chance to nominate their presidential candidates.⁶

The dilemma situation in Hanura is also proven by the internal elite conflict in 2017, disturbing the party's solidity and electability. Therefore, as Kompas (Tashandra, 2017) and Viva (2017) cited, Hanura wanted to eliminate the presidential threshold to be zero percent.

Furthermore, as one of the Jokowi coalition parties, PKPI agrees with the threshold of 20 percent. Although many small parties reject it, the party with a military family network still supports it (Majid, 2018). Nevertheless, while the central board of PKPI agrees with the 20 percent, some local cadres reject it. Supri Tapir, the chairperson of PKPI in Yogyakarta City, assumes that the threshold is more beneficial

for major parties, and the success of PKPI being the election participant is part of the reward of its approval to the threshold of 20 percent. As the cadre in the grassroots, Tapir regrets the lousy performance of PKPI due to a lack of solidity.⁷

The dilemma position suffered by PPP, Hanura, and PKPI can be seen from two interrelated sides. On the one hand, they are in the same coalition with the parties nominating Jokowi as the presidential candidate. On the other hand, these three parties have an internal conflict that is causing two opposing views toward the presidential threshold: approval and denial. Thus, they are not in solid agreement.

Nine Parties Concur that the Presidential Threshold Violates the 1945 Constitution

Nine parties reject the presidential threshold of 20 or 25 percent. Among them are those having the parliamentary seats, namely Gerindra, Demokrat, PAN, and PKS. The remaining are small and new parties that fail to reach the threshold: PBB, Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, and Garuda. These parties principally concur that the 20 percent violates the 1945 Constitution, harms small parties, and is more beneficial for major parties.

Gerindra is one of the parties which believes that the threshold violates the 1945 Constitution because the presidential candidate primarily can be nominated by any political parties which were part of the election participant. Dharma Setiawan, secretary of Gerindra in Yogyakarta, thinks that the constitution implies that each party can propose its candidate to be the president. Nonetheless, Gerindra is not scared of that threshold because this competition does not depend on the party power but the candidate image to the public. In Jakarta, the Anis-Sandi case is one of the good examples where the party power is not the only driving factor that

⁵ Interview with Fadholi was on 13 December 2017 and 26 May 2018.

⁶ Interview with Hasnanto was on 03 December 2017 and 02 April 2018 and Radite was on 04 December 2017 and 22 May 2018.

⁷ Interview with Tapir was on 02 December 2017.

can win the election. Thus, Gerindra is always ready to fight in the electoral campaign.⁸

Likewise, Demokrat asks to change the threshold to zero percent (Simanjuntak, 2017a). Demokrat believes that 20 percent is no longer relevant to the 2019 simultaneous election (Prasetia, 2017). The Demokrat's denial is based on three considerations: the threshold is not in line with the 1945 Constitution, it hurts democratic values, and it is not logical because the 2019 election is simultaneous while the guidance is the previous election. Benny K. Harman, the Demokrat politician, who originated from East Nusa Tenggara, claims that the more the threshold is restricted, it makes people more apathetic due to limited candidates (Nathaniel, 2017a).

According to Didi Irawadi Syamsudin, Vice Secretary of the Demokrat, if the 2019 election is an agreement, the threshold of 20 percent refers to what kind of guidance? This is strange. Thus, it is normal if people eventually presume that the incumbent is scared and wants to eliminate his opponents (CNN Indonesia, 2017). The Demokrat cadre in Yogyakarta, Heri Sebayang, is in an agreement with the other Demokrat politicians who believe that 20 percent is castrating mainly small parties and preventing them from being able to nominate their presidential candidates.⁹

PAN strengthens the denial position with three arguments. Firstly, if a party can pass the election commission (KPU) verification, then it should be eligible to nominate its candidate. Secondly, the threshold of 20 percent restricts citizens' choices. Thirdly, the threshold seems to benefit the single candidate and gets rid of other potential candidates. Ahmad Hanafi Rais, the Vice General Chairperson of PAN, states that his party officially rejects the threshold of 20 percent because of those three arguments.

'It is impossible if we nominate the president in 2019, but we use the result of 2014. If this happens, the parliament can also use the 2014 result, and we do not need to organise the election again,' Hanafi was annoyed.¹⁰

Zulkifli Hassan, the general chairperson of PAN, reinforces Hanafi's statement. He argues that the presidential threshold should be removed from the Election Bill because of the Constitutional Court verdict No. 14/PUU-XI/2013 on the 2019 simultaneous election between president and parliamentary. If the threshold is not removed, Hassan proposes that the percentage between the president and parliament is similar to logical consideration (Simanjuntak, 2017b).

However, PAN already proposed three alternative options regarding the presidential threshold. The first option is zero percent (Viva, 2017). The second option is between 10 and 15 percent as the middle ground between two contrasting factions: the zero percent faction and the 20-25 percent faction (Mursid, 2017b). Otherwise, PAN follows the government option of 20 percent but with *quota hare* as the vote allocation method (Prasetia, 2017).

Two Islamist parties, PKS and PBB, are also refusing the realisation of the presidential threshold of 20 percent. PKS rejects it with a fourfold argument. First, while new parties are emerging, the zero percent of the presidential threshold is appropriate by referring to the 1945 Constitution and the Constitution Court's verdict on the 2019 simultaneous election (Tribun, 2017). Second, zero percent aims to avoid the hegemony of major parties toward the elected president. Third, 20 percent is not logical for the simultaneous election. Fourth, 20 percent is more beneficial for major parties and getting rid of small parties. For PKS, such a threshold is detrimental to people.

⁸ Interview with Setiawan was on 06 December 2017 and 28 May 2018.

⁹ Interview with Sebayang was on 18 December 2017.

¹⁰ Interview with Rais was on 16 December 2017.

'Deleting the presidential threshold makes the election is fairer, and all parties can propose their candidates,' Tifatul Sembiring, former PKS president, said as cited by Tirto (Nathaniel, 2017a).

Hence, PKS believes that 20 percent tends to benefit a single candidate. According to M. Darul Falah, chairperson of PKS in Yogyakarta, this is not good for Indonesian democracy because citizens can only choose between limited candidates. Dwi Budi Utomo, secretary of PKS in Yogyakarta, also underlines that if there is a potential candidate who is not supported by major parties, he/she can be advocated for by small parties.¹¹ These arguments are strengthened by Hidayat Nur Wahid, chairperson of the Syuro Council of PKS. Wahid stresses that if the choices of candidates are limited, we are afraid, many citizens do not want to give their vote (Firdaus, 2017).

Afterward, PBB is one of the leading parties in rejecting the presidential threshold. Yusril Ihza Mahendra, the general chairperson of PBB, argues that the threshold is unconstitutional and violates the 1945 Constitution Article 6A point 2 because the legislative and presidential elections in 2019 are held simultaneously (Hakim, 2017). Mahendra sued based on the Election Act Article 222 on the presidential threshold consisting of 20 percent or 25 percent (Rakhmatulloh, 2017) because this regulation harms small parties, including PBB so that his party cannot nominate its presidential candidate (Fachrudin, 2017).

PBB rejects the threshold that is rooted in a twofold consideration: constitutional and political interest. The former is based on the 1945 Constitution Article 6e and 22e so that the simultaneous election does not adopt the threshold. The latter is because there is no

chance for Mahendra to run as the presidential candidate in the 2019 election (Firmanto, 2017). This is contrary to common sense. The threshold is not applied when the legislative and executive elections co-occur (Saubani, 2017). Mahendra's argument is strengthened by Ray Sitoresmi Prabuningrat, chairperson of PBB in Yogyakarta. Prabuningrat states that the 20 percent intends to minimise other potential candidates so that there are merely two candidates.¹²

Although PBB vehemently denies the presidential threshold, Mahendra's position is on the Jokowi coalition side. It can be seen with his engagement as the lawyer of Jokowi-Ma'ruf during and after the electoral campaign. It causes the PBB position in the 2019 election, where mainly Muslim communities disbelieve it anymore so that the party failed in passing the parliamentary threshold. Thus, the refusal of Gerindra, Demokrat, PAN, and PKS is affected by the fact that they are in a similar coalition in nominating Prabowo Subianto, although the Demokrat seemingly demonstrated its 'half-hearted' support. Despite part of the Jokowi coalition, PBB attempted to strive for Muslim interests in rejecting the presidential threshold to earn the popular vote. Regarding the denial argument of small parties, this article presents it further.

Small Parties Reject the Presidential Threshold Due to It Causing Them Harm

Four small parties reject the presidential threshold: Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, and Garuda. These four parties are new participants in the 2019 election. Although three parties are part of the government coalition excluding Berkarya, they still insist on removing the threshold.

According to Perindo, if the election is held simultaneously, there are no different rights between old and new parties participating in the legislative and executive elections.

¹¹ Interview with Falah was on 23 November 2017 and 28 April 2018 while Utomo was on 30 March 2018.

¹² Interview with Prabuningrat was on 02 December 2017.

All parties have equal rights. Ahmad Rofiq, secretary-general of Perindo, argues that his party already made a proposal to the special committee of the Election Bill regarding removing the presidential threshold so that zero percent should be eliminated from the Bill because there is no percentage. Perindo's denial is supported by the argument that this threshold is unconstitutional and only causes major parties to re-take over the government (INews TV, 2017). Rofiq's argument was reinforced by Nanang Sri Roekmadi, chairperson of Perindo in Yogyakarta, who states that there is no relationship between the 2014 election result and the 2019 election. This regulation gives a public impression that the existence of a threshold is the forced logic.¹³

Similarly, although PSI is part of the Jokowi coalition, it assumes that the threshold of 20 percent is too high, and new parties cannot reach it. According to PSI, if the party already succeeded in passing the KPU verification, it can nominate its presidential candidate (Nathaniel, 2017b). Grace Natali, the general chairperson of PSI, believes that the realisation of such a threshold merely strengthens the oligarchic politics and obstructs citizens' right to elect the best leader (Teresia, 2017).

'The 2014 election result is no longer appropriate to be the consideration to calculate public aspiration in the 2019 election because a lot of political changes take place during five years between 2014 and 2019,' Natali said (Teresia, 2017).

Sigit Nugroho, chairperson of PSI in Yogyakarta, supports Natali's statement. Nugroho states that the presidential threshold of 20 percent harms new parties because they cannot nominate their candidates.¹⁴

Afterward, Berkarya and Garuda did not want to worry about the presidential issue because both are still focused on succeeding their parties in the legislative election. Nonetheless, Berkarya rejects the threshold because it has a different view of politics with Golkar, where Golkar is on the Jokowi position while Berkarya is on the Prabowo side. More specifically, Prio Budisantoso, secretary-general of Berkarya, emphasises that although Berkarya focuses on succeeding the legislative election first, it also campaigns to reject the threshold (MNC 104.6 Trijaya FM, 2018).

Likewise, Sunu Tri Waluyo, secretary of Garuda in Yogyakarta, puts forward that his party has no chance to reject the regulation because the parliament decided it. Waluyo presumes that his party is new, while the regulation was decided in 2014. 'What can we do for that?' Waluyo said.¹⁵ Some considerations trigger the rejection of Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, and Garuda. First, these four parties share the identity as new parties in the 2019 election. Second, they need to demonstrate their existence to the public by having their own presidential candidate. Thus, the threshold of 20 percent can harm their expectation to nominate their candidate.

The three parties' distinctive positions indicate that non-ideological considerations are stronger determinants of the parties' actions in responding to the presidential threshold. It can be proven by some facts. First, if PPP, Hanura, PKPI, PSI, Perindo, PBB, and Garuda are consistent with their position inside the Jokowi Coalition, they should be in the approval block. Second, from an ideological standpoint, PKS and PPP should be in the same position due to Islam as their foundation. However, because both parties are in a different coalition, it causes a dilemma for PPP. Third, the coalition, whether the Jokowi Coalition or the Prabowo Coalition, is not built ideologically. It was

¹³ Interview with Roekmadi was on 20 November 2018.

¹⁴ Interview with Nugroho was on 30 November 2017.

¹⁵ Interview with Waluyo was on 03 November 2017.

Table 1.
Parties' Position toward the 2019 Presidential Threshold

No	Position	Arguments	Parties
1	Approval	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The stable coalition should be built since the beginning to enter the presidential election. The elected president has a durable power in the parliament. It helps citizens to vote for the president due to the small number of candidates. Small-middle parties could join the existing coalition. 	PDIP, Golkar, Nasdem, PKB
3	Dilemma	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Although these parties reject the presidential threshold, they still approve it due to part to the Jokowi coalition. Some politicians in each of these parties approve the threshold, while others who reject it are still found. 	PPP, Hanura, PKPI
3	Denial	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It violates the 1945 Constitution because parties which passed the KPU verification principally can nominate the presidential candidate. The simultaneous election affects the removal of the presidential threshold. Zero percent is relevant with the emergence of new parties. It restricts people's choices. It is more beneficial to major parties to be more oligarchic. It gives an image that Jokowi has a big ambition to retake power. 	Gerindra, Demokrat, PAN, PKS, PBB, Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, Garuda

Source: Compiled by the Author.

strengthened by the fact the Prabowo Coalition was wrecked after Gerindra joined the Jokowi administration. It could be that PAN desires to join the Jokowi cabinet after the internal conflict in the 2019 Congress. Thus, although pragmatism is part of political parties' nature in gaining power, at least there is a symmetrical linkage between ideology, agenda, and actions, as was theorised by Budge (1994) and Freedden (2013). In other words, there is an unintegrated bond between the party's ideology and its actions.

Conclusion

This article provides three different cleavages among political parties in addressing the presidential threshold of 20 percent or 25 percent in the 2019 presidential election. The first cleavage is the approval position toward the threshold. This is strengthened by mainly four parties: PDIP, Golkar, PKB, and Nasdem. The second cleavage is the dilemma position that takes place in three parties: PPP, Hanura, and PKPI. The third cleavage is the denial position, which is followed by nine parties: Demokrat, PAN, PKS, PBB, Perindo, PSI, Berkarya, and Garuda.

From an ideological standpoint, the parties' position in addressing the 2019 presidential threshold demonstrates that nationalist-secular parties do not block themselves merely in the same cleavage. It is also taking place with nationalist-Muslim and the nationalist-Islamist parties. They are spreading in all positions. The approval position consists of nationalist-secular and nationalist-Muslim parties, the dilemma position encompasses nationalist-Islamist and nationalist-secular parties, while the denial position contains all kinds of political ideology. Although all new parties reject the presidential threshold, their denial consideration is not ideological but more pragmatic orientations.

From a theoretical view, this article rejects Budge (1994) and Freedden's (2013) hypothesis, positing that the ideology can be manifested in the party's agenda. The article finds that the ideology is no longer relevant under the open-list proportional representation system adopted in the contemporary Indonesian election. It indicates that the ideological contestation is waning, as there are no notable differences among parties' platforms. This article also rejects Mietzner's (2013) view, which argued that Indonesian parties have an

ideological foundation. In contrast, the article verifies Ufen (2009) and Al-Hamdi's (2017) thesis, which posit that the political ideology is feeble and waning. Therefore, the ideology is not applicable when parties address power issues. Instead, the ideology is revived when parties cope with religious and ethnic issues.

References

- Akuntono, I. (2013, 10 July). PPP: "Presidential threshold" inkonstitusional. *Kompas*. Retrieved from <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/07/10/1700057/PPP.Presidential.Threshold.Inkonstitusional>
- Al-Hamdi, R. (2017). *Indonesian political ideology: Political parties and local governance in Yogyakarta Municipality 1998-2015*. Baden-Baden: Tectum.
- Ambardi, K. (2008). *The making of the Indonesian multiparty system: A cartelized party system and its origin*. PhD Dissertation, Columbus, Ohio State University.
- Arkhelaus. (2017, 22 June). PDIP lobi partai soal ambang batas pencalonan presiden. *Tempo*. Retrieved from <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/886740/pdip-lobi-partai-soal-ambang-batas-pencalonan-presiden>
- Baswedan, A. R. (2004). Political Islam in Indonesia: Present and future trajectory. *Asian Survey*, 44(5), 669-690. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2004.44.5.669>
- Budge, I. (1994). A new spatial theory of party competition: Uncertainty, ideology and policy equilibria viewed comparatively and temporally. *British Journal of Political Science*, 24(4), 443-467.
- Choi, J. (2010). District magnitude, social diversity and Indonesia's parliamentary party system from 1999 to 2009. *Asian Survey*, 50(4), 663-83. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2010.50.4.663>
- CNN Indonesia. (2017, 20 June). *Prime News: Apakah presiden takut bersaing di 2019?* Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pHo_wInJUHI&feature=youtu.be
- Creswell, J. W. (2013). *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches*, Third Edition. Thousand Oaks, United States: Sage Publications.
- Croissant, A., & Völkel, P. (2012). Party system types and party system institutionalization: Comparing new democracies in East and Southeast Asia. *Party Politics*, 18(2), 235-265. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068810380096>
- Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2011). Introduction: The discipline and practice of qualitative research. In Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.), *The sage handbook of qualitative research* (pp. 1-19). Thousand Oaks, United States: Sage.
- Fachrudin, F. (2017, 05 September). Yusril resmi gugat ambang batas pencalonan presiden ke MK. *Kompas*. Retrieved from <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/09/05/12052231/yusril-resmi-gugat-ambang-batas-pencalonan-presiden-ke-mk>
- Feith, H. (1957). *The Indonesian election of 1955*. New York, Cornell University Ithaca.
- Fionna, U. (2013). *The institutionalisation of political parties in post-Authoritarian Indonesia: From the grassroots up*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Firdaus, R. F. (2017, 18 October). PKS takut golput menang di pemilu 2019 jika pakai ambang batas capres 20 persen. *Merdeka*. Retrieved from <https://www.merdeka.com/politik/pks-takut-golput-menang-di-pemilu-2019-jika-pakai-ambang-batas-capres-20-persen.html>
- Firmanto, D. (2017, 07 August). 2 alasan Yusril Ihza bakal ajukan uji materi UU Pemilu. *Tempo*. Retrieved from <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/897735/2-alasan-yusril-ihza-bakal-ajukan-uji-materi-uu-pemilu>

- Mietzner, M. (2013). *Money, power and ideology: Political parties in post-Authoritarian Indonesia*. Copenhagen: NUS Press and NIAS Press.
- MNC 104.6 Trijaya FM. (2018, 13 May). *Program Acara Polemik MNC 104.6 FM Trijaya, Warung Daun*. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dMIwTfUXUDc>.
- Mursid, F. (2017a, 16 June). PDIP: Wajar pemerintah ngotot presidential threshold 20-25%. *Republika*. Retrieved from <http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/politik/17/06/16/orn3si-pdip-wajar-pemerintah-ngotot-presidensial-threshold-2025-persen>
- Mursid, F. (2017b, 06 July). Fraksi PAN setuju presidential threshold 10 hingga 15 persen. *Republika*. Retrieved from <http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/politik/17/07/06/osoas-fraksi-pan-setuju-presidential-threshold-10-hingga-15-persen>
- Nathaniel, F. (2017a, 20 July). Presidential threshold 20 persen membuat masyarakat apatis. *Tirto*. Retrieved from <https://tirto.id/presidential-threshold-20-persen-membuat-masyarakat-apatish-cs8U>
- Nathaniel, F. (2017b, 23 July). Hikayat PSI dan Partai Idaman di UU Pemilu 2019. *Tirto*. Retrieved from <https://tirto.id/hikayat-psi-dan-partai-idaman-di-uu-pemilu-2019-cthc>
- Noor, F. (2012). Institutionalising Islamic political parties in Indonesia: A study of internal fragmentation and cohesion in the post-Soeharto era (1998-2008). PhD Dissertation, Exeter, University of Exeter.
- Nugraheny, D. E. (2017, 08 July). PKB perjuangkan presidential treshold 10 persen. *Republika*. Retrieved from <http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/politik/17/07/08/osrbog354-pkb-perjuangkan-presidential-treshold-10-persen>
- Poguntke, T., & Webb, P. (2005). The presidentialization of politics in democratic societies: A framework for analysis. In Poguntke, T., & Webb, P. (Eds.), *The presidentialization of politics: A comparative study of modern democracies* (pp. 1-25). Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Prasetia, A. (2017, 20 July). PAN mau presidential threshold 20%, tapi ada syaratnya. *Detik News*. Retrieved from <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3567817/pan-mau-presidential-threshold-20-tapi-ada-syaratnya>
- Puspita, R. (2017, 21 July). PPP: PT 20 Persen Hindarkan Presiden 'Tersandera'. *Republika*. Retrieved from <https://www.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/politik/17/07/21/otflkq-ppp-pt-20-persen-hindarkan-presiden-tersandera>
- Rakhmatulloh. (2017, 14 November). Sidang gugatan UU Pemilu, PSI hadirkan ahli dari Perludem. *Sindo News*. Retrieved from <https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/1257245/12/sidang-gugatan-uu-pemilu-psi-hadirkan-ahli-dari-perludem-1510642964>
- Randall, V. (2006). Political parties and social structure in the developing world. In Katz R. S. & Crotty, W. (Eds.), *Handbook of party politics* (pp. 387-395). London: Sage.
- Reynolds, A., & Reilly, B. (1997). *The international IDEA handbook of electoral system design*. Stockholm: International IDEA.
- Samuels, D. J. (2002). Presidentialized parties: The separation of powers and party organization and behavior. *Comparative Political Studies*, 35(4), 461-483. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414002035004004>
- Saubani, A. (2017, 05 September). Gugat UU Pemilu, Yusril: Ambang batas capres irasional. *Republika*. Retrieved from <http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/politik/17/09/05/ovst7v-gugat-uu-pemilu-yusril-ambang-batas-capres-irasional>
- Septianto, B. (2018, 12 January). PPP: Putusan MK soal presidential threshold

- sama dengan semangat DPR susun UU Pemilu. *Okezone News*. Retrieved from <https://news.okezone.com/read/2018/01/12/337/1843812/ppp-putusan-mk-soal-presidential-threshold-sama-dengan-semangat-dpr-susun-uu-pemilu>
- Silverman, D. (2001). *Interpreting qualitative data: Methods for analyzing talk, text and interaction*. London: United Kingdom: Sage.
- Simanjuntak, R. A. (2017a, 19 May). Demokrat dan Hanura ingin Pemilu 2019 tanpa presidential threshold. *Sindo News*. Retrieved from <https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/1206462/12/demokrat-dan-hanura-ingin-pemilu-2019-tanpa-presidential-threshold-1495183014>
- Simanjuntak, R. A. (2017b, 26 May). Ketum PAN: Semestinya tak ada lagi presidential threshold. *Sindo News*. Retrieved from <https://nasional.sindonews.com/read/1208267/12/ketum-pan-semestinya-tak-ada-lagi-presidential-threshold-1495786540>
- Swasty, R. (2017, 21 June). Alasan PDIP kukuh ambang batas presiden 20 persen. *Medcom*. Retrieved from <https://www.medcom.id/nasional/politik/ObzWPRxk-alasan-pdip-kukuh-ambang-batas-presiden-20-persen>
- Tan, P. J. (2012). Reining in the reign of the parties: Political parties in contemporary Indonesia. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 20(2), 154-179. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2012.714132>
- Tashandra, N. (2017, 12 January). Hanura ingin tak ada ambang batas pencalonan presiden dan parlemen. *Kompas*. Retrieved from <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2017/01/12/16174371/hanura-ingin.tak.ada.ambang.batas.pencalonan.presiden.dan.parlemen>
- Teresia, A. (2017, 21 January). PSI tolak ambang batas pemilu presiden. *Kumparan News*. Retrieved from <https://kumparan.com/@kumparannews/psi-tolak-ambang-batas-pemilu-presiden>
- Tomsa, D. (2008). *Party politics and democratization in Indonesia: Golkar in the post-Suharto era*. London: Routledge.
- Tribun. (2017, 13 October). Politikus PKS: Parpol baru dikenakan threshold 2014, keadilan hukumnya bagaimana? *Tribun News*. Retrieved from <http://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2017/10/13/politikus-pks-parpol-baru-dikenakan-threshold-2014-keadilan-hukumnya-bagaimana>
- Ufen, A. (2008a). From *aliran* to dealignment: Political parties in post-Suharto Indonesia. *South East Asia Research*, 16(1), 5-41. <https://doi.org/10.5367/000000008784108149>
- Ufen, A. (2008b). Political party and party system institutionalization in Southeast Asia: Lessons for democratic consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. *The Pacific Review*, 21(3), 327-350. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740802134174>
- Ufen, A. (2009). Political parties and democratization in Indonesia. In Bünte, M. & Ufen, A. (Eds.), *Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia* (pp. 153-175). London: Routledge.
- Ufen, A. (2018). Party presidentialization in post-Suharto Indonesia. *Contemporary Politics*, 24(3), 306-324. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2017.1413499>
- Viva. (2017, 19 January). *Suara partai soal ambang batas parlemen dan presiden*. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LNfo6oXrRqk>
- Vassallo, F., & Wilcox, C. (2006). Party as a carrier of ideas. In Katz, R. S., & Crotty, W. (Eds.), *Handbook of party politics* (pp. 413-421). London: SAGE Publications.