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Foreign Policy of Pakistan: a Critical Approach

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Foreign Policy of Pakistan: a Critical Approach

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Author's Declaration

I hereby declare I declare that all the material contained in this thesis is my own work. This thesis is carried out as per the guidelines and regulations of the University of Westminster. I further affirm that that no portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

Maria Inês de Almeida Duarte Bastos

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Abstract

This thesis examines the interlinking between identity and security in the context of foreign policy in Pakistan. Foreign policy constitutes one of key national policies in Pakistan. Since the country's inception in 1947, foreign policy has had an unwavering influence on the construction of the state, and of her relations with the international community. The distressed conditions the new state of Pakistan faced in the years after her emergence, led the early leadership to procure security in relations with other international partners, like the US and China. Yet, it was mainly her relations with India that motivated this search for security, which was mostly translated into assembling a fairly large military force. Unsurprisingly, the armed forces, namely the army in association with a militarised intelligence started control the country's foreign policy decisions. The study and analysis of Pakistan's foreign policy has followed a conventional approach to International Relations theory. This approach, as the thesis argues, neither permits to investigate how foreign policy is shaped by the interlinking between security and identity, nor allows to contextualise how militarism as an ideology becomes interwoven with security, identity, and masculinity. Thus, this study uses feminist and postcolonial approaches to answer these questions. It focuses on Pakistan's relations with China, India, and the United States to identify representations of the interlinking between security and identity, as well as representations of militarism. The thesis makes an original and innovative contribution to knowledge in three ways: it applies a feminist and postcolonial approach to the study of Pakistan's foreign policy, an area that

has hitherto been dominated by mainstream IR realist/neo-realist approaches; it puts forward an innovative approach to study the links between state identity and foreign policy, and to ascertain how militarism grows out of this relationship, and it encourages and contributes to new possibilities for study and analysis in the context of South Asian foreign politics and beyond, centred around militarism.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs
AIML	All India Muslim League
AJK	*Azad* Jammu and Kashmir
BRI	Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COAS	Chief of the Army Staff
CPC	Communist Party of China
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
DG ISI	Director-General, Inter-Services Intelligence
FO	Foreign Office
GB	Gilgit-Baltistan
GWOT	Global War on Terror
GHQ	General Head-Quarters of the Army
HRCP	Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
ICK	India-Controlled Kashmir
IOR	Indian Ocean Region

ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISPR	Inter Services Public Relations (Pakistan)
J&K	Jammu & Kashmir
JI	Jama'at – e- Islami (Pakistan)
JKLF	Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front
KLR	Khan Research Laboratories
KP	Koh – e - Paima (Operation)
KPK	Khyber-Pakhtoonkwa
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
LoC	Line of Control
MDAA	Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MLNG	Muslim League National Guards
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NCA	National Command Authority
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA	National Security Adviser

NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
OBOR	One Belt One Road
PAEC	Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
PAF	Pakistan Air Force
PCI	Pakistan-China Institute
PCK	Pakistan-Controlled Kashmir
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PM	Prime-Minister
PN	Pakistan Navy
POW	Prisoners of War
PRC	People's Republic of China
SEATO	South East Asia Treaty Organization
SLOCS	Sea Lines of Communication
SPD	Strategic Division Planning
TNW	Tactical Nuclear Weapons
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	Unites States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Introduction

The creation of Pakistan on 14th August 1947 was one of the most significant international political events following the end of World War II. It marked the beginning of the collapse of the British Empire, the partition of British India, and the birth of a new state inspired by a religion: Islam. In the seven decades of her existence, Pakistan's path has been filled with internal and external conflicts, ranging from nationhood, to territorial and natural resources disputes, to terrorism and religious sectarianism. Pakistan's initial atypical geography, consisting of two wings separated by Indian territory, proved to be a political, social and governmental challenge, while it lasted. In 1971, after a civil war and an interstate war with India, Pakistan lost her Eastern wing, resulting in the liberation of Bangladesh.

In Pakistan, the construction and representation of concepts such as sovereignty and national identity were in constant tension. The unclear and conflicting views on the role of Islam in the newly formed state helped to generate this tension between the two ideas. Main state actors like the military-bureaucratic and religious elites maintain this tension. In turn, they

consolidate their power around those representations that are best suited to maintaining their status in governance.

The demanded creation of Pakistan on the pretext of becoming a homeland for the Muslims of India, despite their wide diversity, agglomerated a culturally and ethnically diverse population into a "multi-nation" state. However, the state of Pakistan continues to validate its existence via her othered relation with India. Identity/alterity processes, contested cartographies, including the Kashmir question, and war are the most conspicuous elements that constitute this relationship. It is essentially characterised as an external relation oriented by conflict, whilst both states continue to share relevant cultural, religious, and linguistic ties, particularly in the northern part of the subcontinent.

The centrality of India to Pakistan's foreign relations is expressed in various ways. The country's initial leadership developed a sense of threat involving Pakistan's reintegration with India, which would signify a return to a Hindu-dominated form of government. One of the ways to deal with this was to further assert the state's Islamic identity. Ijaz Khan notes that a "gradual growth of religion in governance, and policy making and implementation, especially in its relations with India and Afghanistan and dealing with ethno-national identities, has strengthened the religious content of the Pakistani identity question" (2006, p55). Hence, Islam-based discourses were constructed to consolidate national identity, and have been simultaneously used as a tool for domestic and foreign policies.

The association of a Pakistani national identity with Islam draws heavily on the controversial concept of the two-nation theory, believed to be "the founding premise of Pakistan" (Haqqani, 2013, p55). The two-nation theory, drawn along the religious and cultural differences between Muslims and Hindus, was used to ensure the impossibility of a common form of government for the two major religious communities in an independent India. Pakistan's early leadership rallied behind it, and to this day the theory continues to be used as the perceived guarantor of otherness in relation to India.

Whilst Pakistan's relations with India have been of prime importance to her foreign relations and policies, relations with the United States and China have also been pivotal in how Pakistan's state elite has constructed the country's representations of a Pakistani identity and nationhood. The political processes that constitute these three relations have emerged as a result of a complex relation between religion, the security of the state, and identity/alterity issues.

Pakistan's foreign policy has been predominantly constructed as one that privileges state security (Rizvi, 1993; Sattar, 2017; Amin, 2001). However, it is also firmly established in identity. As this thesis argues, in Pakistan, security and identity discourses are interlinked and are expressed in the way that foreign policy discourses are constructed and represented by the main state actors, chiefly the military establishment. One of the results of these mutually linked discourses is the ascendency of militarism as a political

ideology (Eastwood, 2018; Stravrianakis and Selby, 2013). Militarism in Pakistan, as this thesis examines, results from the political dynamics generated by the interlinking of security and identity. In the construction of these dynamics, the centrality of India is overriding, notwithstanding the importance of China and the US.

This study evaluates these external relationships to explain how, in Pakistan, state security, identity/alterity, and religion are mutually interlinked. Instead of adopting a parochial approach to the study of foreign policy and international politics, mainly dominated by realist and neo-realist approaches to IR, the present study adopts a critical approach, leading to a critical engagement with foreign policy analysis of Pakistan's relations with the aforementioned countries. Post-colonial and feminist approaches to IR and foreign policy are helpful in explaining the interlinking of security, identity/alterity, and religion. Their focus on rethinking and critically analysing essentialised concepts and categories – such as the state, sovereignty, national and ethnic identities (Seth, 2013) – is helpful to build a critical approach to the interconnections between state security, identity/alterity, and religion.

Feminist IR and Militarism

Feminist IR has seen an exponential growth in importance in the last three decades. Once identified by A. M. Agatangelou and L. M. H. Ling (2004) in the "House of IR" as the *fallen daughters*, in its version of post-modern

feminisms and queer theory, or as *Caretaking Daughters* in the form of neoliberalism, liberal feminism, and standpoint feminism, the reality is that "Feminist IR has also challenged the epistemological monism of mainstream IR, not only by offering post-positivist critiques of IR's positivist pretensions, but in the fact of the overt and often celebrated methodological and epistemological plurality of feminisms" (Squires and Weldes, 2007, p193). Moreover, feminist IR scholars[1] have demonstrated how IR has

> traditionally been a male-dominated (and great-power dominated) discipline, [and] most of the standard research questions have been those that these scholars have found interesting – questions about the foreign policy behavior of powerful states and, most importantly, about their attempts to achieve (military) security in what is conceptualized as an anarchical world. (Wibben, 2011, p17)

A central theme in this study is the relationship between security and identity in the context of Pakistan's three key foreign relations. A feminist approach to security is relevant as "feminists have played an important role in proposing alternative conceptions of power and violence that go beyond the traditional military configurations of the discipline of IR, including ideas of common and cooperative security arrangements, and non-state-centric perspectives on security" (ibid, p5).

These approaches offer the possibility to deconstruct and reveal the gaps and oversights in analyses of how, in the post-colonial state of Pakistan, a

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[1] The list of feminist IR scholars who have demonstrated how IR, Security Studies, and International studies are male-dominated fields of study and enquiry is extensive. See, for instance, Tickner (1988, 1992, 2001); Enloe (1990, 2000, 2007); Ackerly, Stern, and True (2006); Sjoberg (2010); Wibben (2011).

nationalist identity and its interlinking with security is rooted on gendered and gendering masculinist narratives. For instance, foreign relations narratives of Pakistan, either produced by Pakistani or international scholars, have followed a traditionalist, non-critical IR/foreign policy analysis, which is mostly focused on strategic balances of power, anarchy, war, and conflict. These narratives describe the state of Pakistan as being in a permanent state of war-preparedness, without acknowledging the importance of militarism or how foreign policy has been militarised. Moreover, those narratives do not demonstrate how security and its representations, particularly the ones linked to militarism, are gendered and gendering. They also do not contemplate how this is reflected in foreign and security policies, and in the national identity of the state. Furthermore, these narratives have remained silent about the relation between identity and security.

Feminist IR approaches have played an important role in the attempt to disclose how militarism is a gendered, masculinised ideology. Cynthia Enloe's feminist scholarship is germane in this regard. Enloe views militarism as a "complex package of ideas that, all together, foster military values in both military and civilian affairs. Taken together, the package that is militarism also justifies military priorities and military influences in cultural, economic, and political affairs" (2016, p11). For Enloe, militarism gets inculcated into societies, through militarisation, thus transforming values, gender assumptions, and national identity narratives (ibid). Enloe corroborates her theoretical points by way of historical examples, national holidays, and rituals. Victoria Basham also suggests that "militarism thus

gives meaning to the national identity of states, but also to identities within constituent societies" (2016, p884). Stavrianakis and Selby argue that militarism relates to "the social and the international relations of the preparation for, and the conduct of, organised political violence" (2012, p3). According to Laura Sjoberg and Sandra Via, who make a distinction between militarism and war, the former is "much broader than war, comprising an underlying system of institutions, practices, values, and cultures. For them, militarism is an extension of war-related, war-preparatory, and war-based meanings and activities outside of 'war proper' and into social and political life more generally" (2010, p7). Still centred on war, Bernazzoli and Flint maintain that militarism "is generally viewed by social scientists as an ideology that takes root in a society via a process of perpetually preparing for war, reshaping cultural values, and reorienting the society's collective worldview" (2009, pp399-400).

A key theme associated with militarism is the relation between society and violence. In this respect, Chris Rossdale argues that "militarism provokes an account of how particular wars, coercive state practices and other forms of violence are embedded within, legitimised through, and function to reshape a wide range of social relations" (2019, p3). He further reflects on how, through militarism, violence becomes glorified and even rendered banal (ibid, p4). Rossdale concludes that militarism "links macro-level topics of war, conflict and state violence to more intimate relations of power, authority, and domination" (ibid).

In the context of South Asia, Anuradha Chenoy describes militarism and militarisation by tracing it to the colonial period: "militarization was necessary for maintaining the colonial state and the communal ethnic/caste divisions within these societies. These divisions were used to strengthen colonial rule and give it legitimacy" (1998, p104). This is particularly relevant as it mirrors how the leadership in Pakistan (both civilian and military) has dealt with political dissent in Balochistan, Sindh, and more recently with the Pashtun community.[2] These definitions are useful to frame how militarism has taken root in Pakistan's governance and society. Ijaz Khan (2006) attempts to articulate a religious-based identity with militarisation and religious extremism, in the context of post-colonial Pakistan. He asserts how and why the Pakistani military has carved out a hegemonic position, having assumed

> the responsibility of guarding the Islamic ideological identity and frontiers of the country. The threat perception from India, viewed as a Hindu power which cannot bear the existence of an Islamic Pakistan, has provided a certain ideological justification to the argument that it is only the military establishment that can provide security to this ideological state. (Khan, 2006, p58)

Ijaz Khan's assertion is important because it highlights how the religious identity of the state has become intertwined with militarism (a gendered ideology) and with representations of security (the supposed threat posed by Hindu India). Thus, whilst a feminist approach to IR is significantly important

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[2] The case of the PTM. See, for instance, Mir (2018). For a scholarly unsympathetic, state-centric account of PTM, see Shah (2020).

to deconstruct the gendered power relations that mediate the interlinking of security and identity, a post-colonial approach to IR will help to analyse how identity, culture/religion, and security are interlinked. The combination of these approaches is thus relevant to build a critique of Pakistan's foreign policy. Together, these approaches, understood as critical discourses, as Swati Parashar notes, "have enriched the understanding and explanatory potential of international relations … [T]hese two theoretical approaches have grown exponentially in their capacity to embrace the diversity and unpredictability of global politics and social life" (2016, p371). Yet, accounts of Pakistan's foreign policy have remained disconnected from post-colonialism and feminism in IR, and as such remain limited in their explanatory and analytical potential. Hence, this study aims to help to construct and complement other possible analyses of foreign policy in Pakistan.

Post-colonial IR and its relevance to Pakistan's foreign policy, security, and identity

Pakistani literature dedicated to the country's foreign relations and politics also ignores the country's post-colonial position in global politics. There are various advantages in following a post-colonial IR approach in order to construct a critique of foreign policy and its relationship with security and identity. First, it is necessary to explain what the term "post-colonial" entails, and how it is relevant in constructing a critique of foreign policy, including the interlinking of security and identity. Various fields in the social sciences and humanities theorise about the "post-colonial"; indeed, it is important to

acknowledge how comprehensive the term is. For instance, in the introductory chapter of *An Introduction to Post-colonial Theory*, Childs and Williams (1997) foreground the questions of *when*, *who*, and *what* constitutes the post-colonial. These interrogations reveal a vast scholarship extending knowledges between the so-called "Third World" and the West during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Similarly, the very critique[3] of postcolonial theory provides multiple theorisations, thus complementing the complexity of relationships between the West and other parts of the developing world. Thus, the relevance of post-colonialism and decoloniality[4] resides in

> their challenge to the insularity of historical narratives and historiographical traditions emanating from Europe. This has been particularly so in the context of demonstrating the parochial character of arguments about the endogenous European origins of modernity in favour of arguments that suggest the necessity of considering the emergence of the modern world in the broader histories of colonialism, empire and enslavement. (Bhambra, 2014, p115)

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[3] See, for instance, the critique set out by Aijaz Ahmad (1992, 1998) in his *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures*, particularly on the articulation of "third-worldism" with post-structuralism. Chowdry and Nair (2004) also provide an enlightening account of the controversies that the term "post-colonial" has generated, and how it is relevant for the study of international relations.

[4] The difference between post-colonialism and decoloniality is clearly laid out in Bhambra (2014).

However, situating post-colonialism also requires reflecting on what colonialism[5] (still) happens to be,[6] and how it has been produced and reproduced, particularly within the context of different Western imperialist projects. Edward Said's seminal work *Orientalism* (1978) has influenced many in how to think the "post-colonial", as well as how to interpret colonial discourses and practices. Following the publication of *Orientalism*, a number of social sciences and humanities scholars turned their attention to questions of identity, difference, and the politics of representation (Said, 2000). Williams and Chrisman note that "*Orientalism* focused on what could be called colonial discourse – the variety of textual forms in which the West produced and codified knowledge about non-metropolitan areas and cultures, especially those under colonial control" (1993, p5). The colonial production of knowledge and representation of the "Other" are thus central to the concept of Orientalism. However, in post-colonial states like Pakistan and India, the structures of power that characterise what Said referred to as Orientalism continue to exist. For instance, state and religious elites continue to produce and reproduce colonial representations of colonial modes of power and

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[5] A possible definition of colonialism may be: "the settlement of people and so the colonisation of lands by powers from other, usually economically richer, more powerful lands. Colonialism needs colonies, people settled in new lands. Imperialism implies control of other lands and people by a power which can be defined as having an empire which is itself a collection of lands (countries, islands), all part of a governed whole. An empire most usually will also have an emperor or empress ruling it (such as the Roman Emperor, or Queen Victoria defined as the Empress of India). While imperialism does not necessarily settle its people in other lands, it can rule many other peoples from a distance, economically as much as politically" (Wisker, 2007).

[6] There are several arguments as to whether colonialism belongs to the past, or whether it still persists. The discussion of both arguments can be found in Chowdhry and Nair (2004), as well as in Shohat (1992), Shome (1998), and Darby and Paolini (1994), with the latter suggesting that colonialism is a "continuing set of practices that are seen to prescribe relations between the West and the Third World beyond the independence of the former colonies" (p375). I concur with Chowdhry and Nair when they suggest that "the postcolonial does not signify the end of colonialism, but rather that it accurately reflects both the continuity and persistence of colonizing practices, as well as the critical limits and possibilities that has engendered in the present historical moment" (2004, p11).

domination, with the intention of producing a homogeneous and unchallenged national identity.

In respect of the discipline of IR, there is a growing engagement with non-traditional, mainstream themes. Race, gender, sex, class, identity, and culture are among those topics that have been silenced by decades of Eurocentric IR research and theorisation (Krishna, 1993; Doty, 1996; Chowdhry and Nair, 2004; Anand, 2007; Seth, 2011). On the specific case of analysing issues of identity construction and representation, L. M. H. Ling (2002) suggests that the importance of post-colonial theory on the construction of identity is reflected in how the identities of "coloniser" and "colonised" are "intimately constructed identities that lead to an inseparable subjectivity … born, literally as well as figuratively, from the intercourse between *conquistador* and *indigène*, West and Non-West, Self and Other, masculine and feminine" (2002, p69, italics in the original). Hence, in order to understand how state identity in Pakistan has evolved, it is crucial to contextualise it in terms of its colonial origins.

The Eurocentric nature of mainstream IR theories has come to the fore as the result of several scholarly considerations such as the study of North-South relations and their implications for issues of agency and representation (Doty, 1996), the recognition that non-Western knowledge and discussions on international issues are more often than not side-lined in the main debates (Acharya and Buzan, 2017), and the acknowledgement that the conventional understanding of power relations in IR "fails, with some exceptions, to

systematically address … the intersectionality of race, class, and gender in the production of power in IR" (Chowdhry and Nair, 2004, p3). Moreover, there is a persistent level of parochialism within the discipline. To that end, Dibyesh Anand discusses the pressing need to "deparochialize IR" (2007, p3). He makes the case for recognizing IR's Eurocentrism and the "poverty of IR when it comes to matters concerning the majority of the world's people who live in areas formerly under direct or indirect colonial rule of Western European states" (ibid). This supports the fact that IR and foreign policy theories and discourses have been built on practices of silencing (Gergis and Lugosi, 2014). Hence, post-colonial scholars highlight the lack of historical content and engagement within mainstream IR (Krishna, 2001; Grovogui, 2001; Anand, 2007; Seth, 2011; Gergis and Lugosi, 2014), particularly in terms of imperial and colonial history. Imperialism, colonialism, and their global expansion[7] did not happen in isolation from the implementation of the "Westphalian system" or the expansion of capitalism. In fact, the latter "coincided with the colonial conquest and trade" (Seth, 2011, p173), and the former was not centuries apart from "the subjugation and settlement of the Americas, the rise of the slave trade, the founding of the British East India Company and the Dutch East Indian Company, Macartney's mission to the Middle Kingdom, and so on" (ibid).

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[7] As to what concerns imperialism, it "was typically driven by ideology, belief and power, controlled from the metropolitan centre, and concerned with the assertion and expansion of state power (for example, the French invasion of Algeria can be seen as an act of imperial control by the French Empire). Imperialism operated as a policy of state and a drive for power, and also has attached to it the meaning of 'command'" (Wisker, 2007).

The absence of history in mainstream IR has contributed towards the political marginalisation of entire populations. A post-colonial critique thus aims to demonstrate how mainstream IR and foreign policy analysis privilege the study of war and balance of power, without analysing historical narratives. As Sankaran Krishna suggests, the need for a "postcolonial engagement" is vital in "deconstructing, historicizing, and denaturalizing all identities (national, ethnic, linguistic, religious) *as well as* envisioning and struggling for a future that does not seek to transcend or escape identity politics so much as fight for justice and fairness in the worlds we inhabit" (1999, pxviii, italics in the original). Krishna's theorisation is relevant to this thesis. Pakistan's foreign policy narratives are often silent on issues of identity and ethnicity, and the historicity associated with them. A notable exception in this regard is Mehtab Ali Shah's (1997) book, *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy, 1971-94*, in which the author traces how domestic and ethnic politics have impacted the country's foreign policy.

The silencing of race in IR is another shortcoming of the field with which post-colonial IR scholars take issue. Krishna suggests that mainstream IR theories, including those of a critical, poststucturalist character,[8] have produced "an amnesia on the question of race" (2001, p404). Siba Grovogui (2001) argues that Western theorists, and in particular IR ones, follow an egocentric ontology, which marginalises the history of Europe's periphery,

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[8] Sankaran Krishna provides an important position for post-colonial IR in his 1993 review article "The Importance of Being Ironic: A Postcolonial View on Critical International Relations Theory", in which he points out not only the Eurocentric nature of some post-structuralist IR works and their association with French, continental philosophy, but also the question of amnesia in IR, particularly in the context of the analyses developed after the First Gulf War. The issue of the "denial of subjectivity" and the need for "strategic essentialism" (in the Spivakian sense) are also themes articulated by Krishna (1993).

together with numerous non-Western/European epistemologies. Grovogui's critique brings to the fore the question of the "whitening of history and the human experience" (2001, p439). Concerning the case of Pakistan's narratives on foreign relations and their intertwinement with security and identity, the same pattern is followed. The amnesia and relegation to the margins of peripheral minorities (as in the case of Baloch and Pashtuns, for instance), in the context of relations with China or the US, and the ways in which foreign policy decisions continue to impact specific ethnic groups are significant. Furthermore, the succession of governmental practices carried out by West Pakistan in East Pakistan provide another example of how issues of race, ethnicity, and gendered relations remain absent from indigenous accounts of Pakistan's relations with India.

Thus, engaging with feminist and postcolonial critical approaches when studying foreign policy and its relation to the interlinkage between security and identity opens up the possibility to rectify the amnesia of macro-narratives, by engaging the micro-narratives of unrepresented people and reckoning with the effects of high-politics on them. Consequently, traditional foreign policy analysis remains incomplete by ignoring the exposure to and the extension of "controversial" domestic/regional issues.

Research Questions and Contribution

This thesis aims to illustrate how, in the case of Pakistan, its foreign relations with India, China, and the United States contribute to the interlinking of

security and identity. The thesis also seeks to explain how militarism, understood as an ideological framework for political practices, reinforces the interconnection between security and identity. Hence, the study addresses two main research questions: 1) how does the interlinking of security and identity shape foreign policy in Pakistan? To answer this question, the study examines feminist and postcolonial approaches to international politics in order to articulate how gendered power relations, as well as ideological and cultural factors contribute towards the interlinking between security and identity. The study attempts to illustrate how these processes happen in the context of the above-mentioned key relationships. 2) how is militarism as an ideology interwoven with security, identity, and masculinity, and how has it been enhanced by the state of Pakistan? In order to answer this question, this study engages with Pakistan's foreign relations with China, India, and the US, and examines the role of Pakistan's main foreign policy actor – the military. This engagement happens by using feminist and postcolonial approaches, which, as I mentioned earlier, have been critical to study and identify how militarism works.

This study makes an original and innovative contribution to knowledge in three ways: 1) it applies a feminist and postcolonial approach to the study of Pakistan's foreign policy, an area that has hitherto been dominated by mainstream IR realist/neo-realist approaches; 2) it offers an innovative approach to study the links between state identity and foreign policy, and to ascertain how militarism grows out of this relationship; and 3) it encourages

and contributes to new possibilities for study and analysis in the context of South Asian foreign politics and beyond.

Methodology

As mentioned above, this study follows a feminist and postcolonial approach to IR. In this study, methodology is understood, following Ackerly and True, as a

> theoretical approach that does not require a set of lock-step rules for research like a protocol. Rather, it entails a commitment to use, and a process for using, any constellation of methods reflectively and critically. For us, this commitment has four aspects involving attentiveness to (1) unequal power relations, (2) to relationships, (3) to boundaries of inclusion–exclusion and forms of marginalization, and (4) to situating the researcher in the research process. (2013, p136)

Feminist research is deeply concerned with questions of reflexivity and subjectivity (Tickner, 2005). My experiences of living and working in Pakistan have impacted my ontological and epistemological positions, and led me to interrogate beyond merely "how things are" and towards "how things came to be". As Jennifer Maruska notes, "most feminist IR theorists (and IR constructivists) share an 'ontology of becoming', where the focus is on the intersubjective process of norm evolution, for example, than on the final result" (2010). Thus, this thesis follows a feminist "ontology of becoming".

Both prior to and during the research period of this study, I spent several years living and working in Pakistan, mostly in the city of Lahore. Due to family/personal circumstances, I embraced this opportunity as one that would contribute towards my learning and unlearning about Pakistan, including its culture, history, and current and past political histories. During this learning/unlearning process, it became clear that what I knew about Pakistan from visiting two weeks during the year was limited. At that time, I enjoyed, in an unreflective manner, the exoticised life of a middle/upper middle class family and its hospitality. Upon shifting to Lahore, I learned that what I knew did not correspond with the social and political reality. Gradually, I learnt about numerous narratives of inequalities of power and marginalisation concerning gender, across civil society, and in state and private institutions. I became particularly interested in issues of identity, as I learned that the national identity sanctioned by the state elite did not align with how different ethnic and minority groups (for instance, Baloch, Pashtuns, Hindus, Christians and Ahmadi Muslims) in the country have historically related to the centre; it also became clear how the state elite establishes its claims to difference in relation to India. Moreover, I became interested in how Pakistan's foreign policy appeared to have shaped identity, and how the military dominated foreign and domestic politics. This is reflected in how this study is concerned with not just "how, in Pakistan, security and identity are interlinked", but also "how this came to be".

Hence, as suggested by Ackerly, Stern, and True, "the distinctiveness of feminist methodologies inside and outside IR lies in their reflexivity, which encourages the researcher to re-interrogate continually her own scholarship" (2006, p4). During the time in which this study was conducted, I had several opportunities to interrogate my own scholarship and epistemological positions. Concerning epistemology, this study follows a postcolonial feminist approach, which has its origins in Black feminist thought (Achilleos-Sarll, 2018) and privileges the intersectionality of gender with other social categories such as class, ethnicity, race, and sexuality. Columba Achilleos-Sarll (2018) attempts to move beyond the limitations of post-positivist Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) by highlighting the importance of intersectionality in the constitution of a postcolonial feminist approach to FPA. She suggests that "intersectionality moves beyond universalist or group accounts of a feminist 'standpoint'" (Achilleos-Sarll, 2018, p42). This leads to the adoption of a gender-relational approach wherein the intersection of the above-mentioned categories allows for "power relations to be analysed in a more dynamic way … The intersections of these social categories – which in turn creates gendered, sexualised, and racialised hierarchies – structure relationships between states and between peoples, remaking the content of foreign policies and conditioning how foreign policy issues are framed, prioritised and perceived" (ibid, pp42-43).

This study privileges language as the key material with which to analyse and discuss the interlinking of security and identity within the construction of Pakistan's foreign policy. Concerning data, this thesis uses linguistic and

non-linguistic data, understood as discourse(s). As Ruth Wodak suggests, discourse "means anything from a historical monument, a *lieu de mémoire*, a policy, a political strategy, narratives in a restricted or broad sense of the term, text, talk, a speech, topic-related conversations, to language *per se*" (2008, p1). Primary data was collected from various sources, including semi-structured interviews, a visit to the Army Museum in Lahore, foreign policy documents, speeches from official state representatives, and my personal experience while living in Pakistan.

Fieldwork and interviews

The literature on qualitative research methods reveals that interviewing is an exploratory method, which provides the researcher with "information on understandings, opinions, what people remember doing, attitudes, feelings and the like" (Vromen, 2010, p258). As also suggested by Alvesson, qualitative interviews are "beneficial in as much as a rich account of the interviewees' experiences, knowledge, ideas and impressions may be considered and documented" (2002, p108).

Concerning interviewing, I conducted semi-structured interviews in order to obtain raw primary data on Pakistan's foreign policy, foreign relations, and national identity. I chose to interview individuals who, during the course of their professional activity, had had direct contact with foreign policy discourses and practices. Semi-structured interviews provide the possibility

to induce a conversation, a dialogue, and as such appear to be an adequate method through which to collect data, particularly when Pakistan's foreign policy remains a theme that overlaps with what is sanctioned to be the state's national interest.

For this study, I have interviewed Pakistani academics, ex-Ambassadors and diplomats, think tank directors, and retired bureaucrats who have dealt with foreign policy narratives and discourses during their professional life. Interviewing individuals who have dedicated their life to the practice and study of Pakistan foreign policy constitutes a valuable source of data, as those individuals, acting as respondents, are potentially able to convey information that helps to delineate how foreign policy and national identity are co-constructed. To be sure, all the interviewees belong to the so-called elite class in Pakistan, whose members converse fluently in English. Within the group of potential respondents I have mentioned and selected, a total of 38 contacts were made in order to obtain an interview with this researcher. Most of the contacts were made via email. Of those 38 contacts, 15 did not reply, including after a follow-up email. I note that from the number of women potential respondents, only two accepted the offer of an interview. All the remaining respondents were men. Foreign policy-related think tanks proved rather difficult to be interviewed, and I was only able to obtain a single interview from a think tank and had a last-minute cancellation that could not be rescheduled, due to travel arrangements.

In total, I have interviewed seven academics, four retired Ambassadors, two retired senior bureaucrats, and one think tank director. Most of the interviews took place in Islamabad. Travelling from Lahore to Islamabad is relatively easy. However, since I do not drive, I had to make specific arrangements in order to commute between Lahore and Islamabad, and then within the latter. I was fortunate enough to have relatives working at key places and they facilitated my stay, the commute, and most importantly provided me with access to two former Ambassadors and a prestigious academic at one of the most influential universities in Pakistan. The interviewees were provided with a confidentiality form, assuring that their identity will not be revealed in the study. Thus, I have codified their identity as follows: for academics, AC1, AC2, AC3, AC4, AC5, AC6, AC7; for Ambassadors, AM1, AM2, AM3, AM4; for think tank, TT1; and for Government Officers, GO1, and GO2. During the interviews, I took written notes, which I have included in different parts of the chapters. Three interviewees, while being interviewed face to face, asked to provide answers in writing, as they wished to have more time to answer in greater detail. Thus, the questionnaire was sent to those individuals via email, and it was returned the same way.

Concerning my ethnographic experience, I had the opportunity of living and working at a private university in Lahore. The life of an academic institution often exhibits a national ethos concerning social organisation, values, culture, and customs. I could observe how social and organisational practices reflected a permanent nationalistic, military, and religious ethos. For instance, in terms of spatial organisation, the campus resembled a military cantonment.

The campus was limited by high walls and barbed wire. It was organised, and clean, with flower beds, yellow and black painted kerbs, and paved roads. This environment contrasted with its surroundings of unpaved dusty roads and heavy, unorganised traffic. I encountered the same thing when visiting other universities in Lahore, as well as military cantonments[9]. As part of academic engagement, I had the opportunity to participate as a guest, as well as a speaker, in a few conferences, seminars, and talks related to Pakistan foreign policy, as well as with other themes that are part of the country's national identity.

In Lahore, I included a visit to the Army Museum as part of my research for analysing data, as well as ethnographic experience. The fairly new Army Museum is a representation of nationalist discourses, their association with militarism, and how both are produced and reproduced. At the museum, the Army has combined its tailored version of national and military histories. I visited the museum during the weekend, when it was busy with families on a day out. They arrived in large groups, and there were numerous small children. The museum's architecture is the prototype of an overground military bunker, surrounded by large lawns adorned with old tanks, cannons, and helicopters. The museum exhibits in chronological order what the military imagines to be the "history of Pakistan". For instance, in one of the panels it is possible to view a map of Pakistan in which all "invasions" the country has faced are represented. The description reads: "Introduction of

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[9] My ethnographic note is in line with the scholarship on the history of colonial urbanism in South Asia, which describes in detail the organisational purposes of the cantonment. (see for instance Glover, 2008; Cowell, 2016; Berverley, 2001)

organised military due to foreign invasions of Pakistan" (Pakistan Army Museum, Lahore). From the East, according to the imagined historical narrative of the Pakistan Army, the country was invaded by the Mauryan Empire in 323 BC, the Gupta Empire in 319 AD, the Pala Empire in 770 AD, and the British in 1843 AD. At another panel explaining the history of Pakistan, one can read that her history can be "traced back to millions of years". The bilingual board tells of the ancient civilisations that lived in present-day Pakistani territory, such as the Indus Valley Civilisation. The last paragraph is significant in understanding how the army (re)writes Pakistan's history and identity:

> Historically, the landmass of Pakistan has been invaded both from the east as well as from the west. However, in the entire over 9000 years of Pakistan's known history, Pakistan and Republic of India have been forced into a political unification for only about 200 years; around one hundred years under the Mauryan Empire and for similar time frame under the British colonial rule. For 500 odd years, sub-continent was ruled by the Muslims. For the remaining over 8000 years Pakistan remained a separate identity. The people and landmass of Pakistan have an identity embedded in their Islamic ethos and glorious settled history and heritage, since over 9000 years. (Pakistan Army Museum, Lahore)

The content of this paragraph is significant at several levels. Firstly, the act of displaying this re-interpretation of history at a military museum is a significant event in itself. Secondly, the arithmetic deployed is staggering, particularly in terms of establishing how Pakistan and India were "united" for 200 years, and how Pakistan remained a separate identity for 8,000 years. While this is a deliberate attempt to re-inscribe Pakistan into a territory that it

was not identified with, it also reveals how the army attempts to extend the concept of "Islamic ethos" by fusing it with territorial imaginations that predate Islam. And thirdly, "200 years of Pakistan and India in political union" is an attempt to invest Pakistan with a separate political identity during the colonial era, in an extraordinary re-interpretation of Indian Muslim nationalism, which in its initial stages was never associated with any specific territorial demand. Clearly, if national identity narratives in Pakistan are loaded with controversial facts, this attempt to restate a "national history" infused with ideational overtones reveals how the army wishes to be not only the custodian of national identity, but also its re-definer.

The Pakistan Army museum[10] is thus a place of citation and performativity. The institutional museum works as a privileged space of repetition and sedimentation. Hence, the army museum represents a re-appropriation and re-articulation of historical narratives, some of which are factually wrong. Pakistan has existed only since 1947. Therefore, such an utterance as "Pakistan and Republic of India have been forced into a political unification for only about 200 years" does not ring true. During the British occupation, there was no "Republic of India" or Pakistan.

This demonstrates that the Pakistani military has attempted to forge a discourse that represents Pakistan as an ancient country. Pakistan's insecurity is thus ideational and identity-related as well. The military has tried to

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[10] During previous trips to Pakistan, I visited two other military museums: the Pakistan Air Force Museum and the Pakistan Maritime Museum. The nationalistic display at these museums is highly conspicuous. They, too, function as sites of citation and performativity for the nationalistic discourses woven by the state elite.

eliminate ambiguity around issues that still mark the nation's identity. The construction of the historical basis for Pakistan's national identity is therefore sanctioned by the army and performed within a militarised space inspired by militarism. Hence, visiting citizens, including school children, are inculcated with a historical narrative aiming to construct a specific national identity, while their bodies become militarised as they become exposed to values and attitudes such as the use of force, political violence, obedience, and hierarchy. That said, since performative processes are inherently mutable and contingent, this imagined national narrative of the Pakistan Army remains unstable and precarious.

Limitations of the Study

In Pakistan, foreign policy remains a sensitive theme. I have noted that foreign policy debates and decisions are dominated by men. There are a few women who work in foreign policy, in government or in academia. I have tried to interview them; however, I have obtained no answer, most likely due to the high-profile posts they held at the time.

One limitation of the present study is that I did not formally interview anyone in the military. While I had a few conversations with military-related individuals, perhaps I acted overcautiously, given the dominant role of the military in Pakistani society. Perhaps I was also overly cautious about my own positionality, as a foreigner researcher in Pakistan, asking questions about foreign policy and national identity, which could have generated some

degree of suspicion, and in turn risked jeopardising the whole research project. Therefore, in regards to the military, I have used published sources by military figures, including Twitter statements, official videos and publications.

Chapter Structures and Outlines

Concerning the chapter structure, this study consists of an introductory chapter, six chapters, and a conclusion. Chapter I examines and introduces the South Asia foreign policy literature, with a focus in Pakistan. I use a feminist and postcolonial approach. I identify the main realms of focus within the study of South Asia foreign policy, which is largely dominated by the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. I also note that a common form of discourse within this literature is linked to war, aggression, and military power. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to Pakistan's foreign policy, with a focus on the key stages that comprise its history:

the 1950s; the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War; and nuclear Pakistan. In analysing these stages, I discuss how identity and security are interlinked and how militarism emerges in association with these processes.

Chapter II is dedicated to examining and discussing militarism and its agents in Pakistan. In order to understand how militarism has become embedded as a state ideology, I provide an analysis of the origins of the state of Pakistan. The main objective is to understand how agents like those linked to religion, to the military, and to intelligence have intervened in foreign policy issues,

and therefore have shaped the interlinking between security and identity. In the introductory section of the chapter, I provide an overview of existing theories about the emergence of Pakistan. I also examine how these theories give support to contested views as to the country's origins. The second section of the chapter explores how religion has shaped the construction of foreign policy, and the interlinking between security and identity. In section three, I map and analyse the role of the military[11] in association with the civil bureaucracy, as well as with the intelligence services in shaping foreign policy. This section also contains a subsection in which I analyse the direct role of the ISI, Pakistan's intelligence services, in Afghanistan and Kashmir, as these were the places where the ISI sponsored the expansion and growth of radical Islamist groups, at the time perceived as promoting and safeguarding Pakistan's state interests. This chapter sets out the context of Pakistan's foreign policy, which is intimately associated with defence and war issues, in order to understand why her relations with China, India, and the US are critical to the construction of the linking between foreign policy and identity, and how militarism becomes enhanced and entrenched in the process.

Chapter III is the first of the case study chapters, and deals with Pakistan's relations with China. In the introductory part of the chapter, I provide an overview of the origins of Sino-Pakistan relations, explain its importance, and then move to show how militarism has taken root in Pakistan, as a

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[11] By "the military" I mean the three branches of the armed forces: army, navy, and air force. However, in the specific context of Pakistan, the army has been the main actor in influencing foreign policy. Thus, I use the military and army interchangeably.

consequence of this relationship. The chapter's main focus, however, is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The next section of the chapter introduces CPEC, its main features, and notes how both countries have been committed to mobilise a discourse that enhances the strength of this relationship. In the following section, I examine CPEC's contentious issues, which include the social and political consequences of the seaport of Gwadar as a key project of CPEC in Pakistan's Balochistan. In the next subsections, I also analyse and historically integrate the geopolitical issues associated with Gwadar, and its militarisation, which are connected to colonial practices of exploitation and domination of natural resources, territories, and people. In the subsequent section, I integrate and examine the "Kashmir Question" and the impact of CPEC on this issue. I centre the discussion on CPEC's impact on the Kashmiri region of Gilgit-Baltistan, and how it affects Pakistan's claims on Kashmir. In the next subsection, I examine how CPEC is contributing towards the enhancement of militarism as a state ideology, and how the governing processes linked to it are becoming further under the control of the military. In the chapter's concluding remarks, I highlight the importance of the potential that CPEC represents to Pakistan's economic future, whilst existing political practices inspired by neo-colonial and militaristic values continue to dictate how CPEC is actually developing in Pakistan.

Chapter IV analyses the relations between Pakistan and India, with a focus on the Kashmir question. The introductory part of the chapter maps out the key features of this relationship, particularly those centred on security and

identity. In the second section, I examine the history of the "Kashmir Question"; in the following subsection, I discuss Pakistan's unabated efforts to gain control over Kashmir, including the provision of support for non-state actors in order to control and manipulate Kashmiris' identities. In the following section, I discuss how Pakistan has used militarisation to try to control Kashmir, including resorting to war, and control over discourses on Kashmir, including becoming the "saviour" of Kashmir. In the concluding section, I note how the conflict over Kashmir is one that is served by the use of the masculinised language of militarism, deployed by Pakistan, which ultimately serves her state-centric interests of seeking to control the territory of Kashmir.

Chapter V is dedicated to Pakistan's relations with the US. For decades, this relation has functioned as the cornerstone of Pakistan's foreign policy. In the introductory section, I examine the key events that have constructed this relationship, including Pakistan-India relations, before proceeding to integrate these findings with the importance of Afghanistan to the development of this relationship, post-1979. In the second section, I analyse Pakistan and US relations in the context of the Afghan War, after the Soviet invasion. I examine the role of Islamic ideology on how Pakistan and the US masterminded the fight against the USSR, and how discourses of existing masculinisation of the Pakistan state were further enhanced to bolster the idea of it being a "front-line state". In this section, I also explore the role of the ISI as a foreign policy agent, as the main interlocutor of Pakistan in Afghanistan, and how this further enhanced the presence of militarism. In the last section

of the chapter, I examine the US's "AfPak" strategy devised during the Obama administration, and consider how that policy served to enhance and make militarism more visible in Pakistan. I also focus on the importance of the use of armed drones by the US and subsequently by the military in Pakistan to demonstrate how masculinity in its different expressions contributes to shaping the interlinking of security and identity. The chapter concludes by reflecting on how Pakistan-US relations constitute a significant background factor in the militarisation of Pakistan, and how Pakistan's foreign policy decisions towards Afghanistan have contributed to the militarisation of the state.

Chapter VI utilises a postcolonial feminist approach to build a critique of Pakistan's foreign policy and the study thereof. In the introductory section, I explore the analytical tools afforded by this approach to examine and explain foreign policy-related issues. I then move on to explore what colonial practices are still a reality in postcolonial Pakistan. In the following sections, I revisit the case studies of Pakistan's relations with China, India, and the US, and I apply a postcolonial feminist approach to each. In the section dedicated to Sino-Pakistan relations, I explain how CPEC enhances colonial practices of domestication, growth, and civilisation, and connect this with China's global, imperialist-like designs. I note that, despite the presence of these practices, Pakistani scholarship on CPEC remains largely oblivious and opts instead to focus on state-centred discourses of power that reinforce militarism and neo-colonial politics. In this section, I also link China's alarming policies

in Xinjiang with CPEC, and show how the Pakistani leadership ends up fulfilling the role of a collaborator.

The following section of chapter VI is centred on a postcolonial feminist analysis of Pakistan's relations with India. I revisit the significance of Pakistan's use of a tailored human rights discourse to expose Indian human rights abuses in Kashmir, in order to argue that a postcolonial feminist critique of foreign policy considers all the struggles for rights, broadly understood, as being interlinked and intersecting, thus not privileging one over the other. That is precisely what Pakistan does. I also discuss the importance of identifying China and India as "Postcolonial Informal Empires", following Dibyesh Anand's (2012) lead, as well as the highly relevant connection that exists between Kashmir and Xinjiang, identified and examined by Nitasha Kaul (2020). I conclude that Pakistan's foreign policy discourses are unconcerned with imperialist politics of domination, and that her discourses on Kashmir rights, from a critical postcolonial feminist approach, remain selective, incomplete, and destined to serve state-centred interests.

In the last section of the chapter, I return to Pakistan-US relations and revisit the origins of this relationship in order to demonstrate the importance of acknowledging how Pakistan's early leadership prized its relations with the US/West to understand how the interlinking between identity and security is intimately connected with relations of identity/alterity in relation to India. I also examine how these processes are intrinsically linked to colonial thinking

and practices, much of it absorbed by the Americans from the British colonial rulers. I also examine how Pakistan-US relations have contributed towards the enhancement of the global structure of patriarchy, as the relationship was built on concepts that are ideologically masculine and rooted in a tendency to represent a colonial mode of thinking, which is deeply gendered and gendering. In the concluding section, I note the importance of adopting and/or adding a postcolonial feminist critique to the study of foreign policy. I outline the need to consider the intersectionality of different factors like gender, sexuality, class, and ethnicity, and their importance in establishing a context for studying and analysing foreign policy, whilst remaining committed to ethical principles that are often forgotten by state-centred accounts of international relations and foreign policy studies.

The study ends with a concluding chapter in which I establish how security and identity are interlinked, and how militarism as an ideology emerges as a result of the foreign policy processes involved this interlinking. I revisit the consequences of militarism in Pakistan, before summarising how Pakistan's relations with China, India, and the US are constituted by foreign policy processes that are masculinised and that together contribute to the continuation and expansion of patriarchy globally. Briefly, I also make the argument that foreign policy analysis in general, and that of Pakistan in particular, will be enriched by integrating a postcolonial feminist approach. This approach, as the study as a whole demonstrates, is helpful to explicate how identity and security processes associated with foreign policy are deeply

gendered and grounded on colonial political practices, which persist in these postcolonial times.

CHAPTER I

KEY ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA AND PAKISTAN

1.1   Introduction

In this chapter I aim to examine the existing foreign policy literature on South Asia, with a specific focus on Pakistan. My aim is to contextualise the key areas upon which foreign policy in South Asia/Pakistan have been constructed and analyse them through postcolonial and feminist lenses. As Laura Sjoberg notes, "feminist scholars have argued that states' foreign policy choices are guided by their identities, which are based on association with characteristics attached to masculinity, manliness, and gender generally" (2010, p5).

However, foreign policy accounts of South Asia in general, and of Pakistan in particular, follow a more parochial, state-centric route, and eschew feminist and postcolonial analysis. My objective is to highlight how existing foreign policy narratives and practices in Pakistan are constructed in order to portray

her as a 'hard country', whilst hiding the existence of representations of power structures which are intrinsically gendered and gendering.

Approaches to Pakistan's foreign policy do not differ from the realist/neo-realist school that dominates foreign policy narratives in South Asia. However, it is the study of India's foreign policy that dominates those narratives. Ganguly and Pardesi (2017) note that South Asian foreign policy and security studies have not been effectively integrated into the IR mainstream literature. The authors find this situation puzzling given how India has now acquired the status of a key actor in global politics; her regional hegemonic role is also noteworthy. Yet, Ganguly and Pardesi explain the marginalisation of South Asia foreign policy studies on account of its countries' independent positioning during the Cold War (with the exception of Pakistan). India's NAM policy under Jawaharlal Nehru has vastly contributed towards this development. Moreover, the colonial legacy, as the authors point out, dictated that only a few "South Asian colonial elites had any exposure to questions of foreign policy, security, and international relations" (Ganguly and Pardesi, 2010, 2017, Online).

South Asia foreign policy literature is concentrated around seven main themes: India-Pakistan relations; regional nuclearization; the politics of regional associations (SAARC, BIMSTEC, IORA); external influences in the region (China and the US); the Afghan conundrum; terrorism; and territorial disputes, including natural resources. These themes have generated a

substantial amount of literature[12], from regional and external scholars. These themes often overlap. Most of the literature analyses these themes through realist/neo-realist lenses, privileging security and strategic studies approaches. The present study, thus, is working towards providing an alternative approach to analysing foreign policy related themes in South Asia.

South Asia foreign policy literature, including work focused on Pakistan, often deploys a discourse based on images of aggression, power politics, war, conflict, and military might. This certainly denotes an inclination towards foreign policies shaped by realist conceptions of international politics, dominated by concerns over anarchy and state power. While this constitutes the general background that has influenced Pakistan's foreign policy since her inception, India's foreign policy has followed a different trajectory. Until the 1990s, Indian foreign policy remained committed to nonalignment (see Mohan, 2003; Ganguly, 2003; Pant, 2016; Pande, 2017). To be sure, post-independence India's leadership was mostly concerned with keeping foreign influence out of the region (Pande, 2017). This general trend of inward-looking is in contrast to Pakistan's urge to seek an ally status with the US, and more recently with China. India, which nevertheless was perceived to be closer to the USSR, has averted the convulsions of Cold War international politics. However, Indian foreign policy has undergone a shift particularly since the 1998 nuclear tests. India has increasingly sought to be perceived as

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[12] In their essay "South Asia and Foreign Policy", Sumit Ganguly and Manjeet Pardesi (2010, 2017, online) provide a substantial list of the main works that explore foreign policy issues in South Asia. Notably, most of the works mentioned are focused on Indian foreign policy and diplomacy. Accounts of the foreign policy of Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are scarce or non-existent.

the natural major regional power and as such expects external actors within the region (the US, the EU, Japan, and China) to accept and recognise her role (Pande, 2017).

This chapter consists of a main section dedicated to Pakistan's foreign policy. The section is then divided into three sub-sections in which I analyse what I consider to be the key stages in Pakistan's foreign policy that have decisively shaped the interlinking between security and identity: the decade of the 1950s; the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War; and nuclear Pakistan. These stages, as I will explain, are significant and representative of how identity and security are interlinked, and how gender and militarism are associated with these constitutive processes. The chapter concludes by noting that the above-mentioned three key stages are mostly constituted and constitutive of a state identity that is highly militarised and hyper-masculinised.

1.2   Foreign Policy in Pakistan

In this section I analyse how, over the course of the past seven decades, Pakistan's foreign policy became militarised. My aim is not to historically chart a series of foreign policy events, but rather to focus on specific ones which were decisive in transforming Pakistan's foreign policy into a fully-fledged exercise in militarism. Feminist scholar Cynthia Enloe (2004) explains how this transformation occurs:

the militarization of any country's foreign policy can be measured by monitoring the extent to which its policy: is influenced by the views of Defense Department decision-makers and/or senior military officers, flows from civilian officials' own presumption that the military needs to carry exceptional weight, assigns the military a leading role in implementing the nation's foreign policy, and treats military security as national security as if they were synonymous. (2004, p122)

Enloe applies this definition to the US's foreign policy. It also dovetails with the case of Pakistan, not only because the country endured long periods of military dictatorship, but also due to the conspicuousness of the extensive power amalgamated by what sociologist Hamza Alavi has labelled a "bureaucratic-military oligarchy" (2002, p65). This partnership never ceased to exist, even during civilian rule, and it has been enhanced by the military continuing to gain access to key bureaucratic structures of governance, including foreign policy. The origin of this civil bureaucratic-military oligarchy can be traced back to the first decade post-independence (Jalal, 1991; Chaudhry, 2011). I will return to this theme in the next chapter.

Foreign policy in Pakistan ranks as one of the most significant of its national policies. Since the country's inception, foreign policy has been equated with the need to promote the new state in the international community (Sattar, 2017). However, it has also become closely associated with the country's relations with India, mainly as a result of the dispute over Kashmir. However, it is often noted that the sharing of assets, including military ones, the water flow in common rivers, and trade disputes (Hussain, 2016) have also shaped and directed Pakistan's foreign policy towards India. Hence, Pakistan's

foreign policy came to be known as 'India-centric' (Yasmeen, 1994; Pande, 2011).

In 2016, former Ambassador Sardar Masood Khan (currently President of Azad Jammu and Kashmir – AJK[13]) wrote an article in *Hilal Magazine* (published by the armed forces) regarding foreign policy objectives. According to Masood Khan, the principal objective is to make Pakistan a 'hard country'. Despite the fact that this objective has now been seven decades in the making, Pakistan's state elite continues to represent it as an unfinished task. Yet, the historiography of Pakistan's foreign policy (Sattar, 2017; Amin, 2000; Rizvi, 1993) is replete with events describing how foreign relations with the US and China have helped to strengthen defence capacity, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons. With the military at the centre of this intertwining of defence and foreign policy, it becomes clear that foreign policy has gradually turned into a representation of a certain type of hegemonic masculinity that valorises particular qualities such as being 'aggressive', 'hard', and 'tough'. Thus, one could argue that Pakistan's foreign policy is based on masculine-oriented conceptions, particularly in terms of her relations with India and Afghanistan. However, despite the exponential militarisation of the country's foreign policy and its consequent masculinisation, the sense of a constant encircling threat lives on.

As a result, foreign policy in Pakistan can be described as a series of decisions taken to counter India's threat to her identity and sovereignty. Regional and

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[13] This is how Pakistan-controlled Kashmir is officially referred to in Pakistan.

global politics, namely the Cold War, have also shaped and dictated foreign policymaking. The literature on Pakistan's foreign policy (Burke, 1973; Rizvi, 1993; Yasmeen, 1994; Amin, 2000; Faruqui, 2003; Pande, 2011; Sattar, 2013, 2017) is univocal in pinpointing security as the backbone of the country's foreign policy. The "search for security" (Sattar, 2017) is principally centred on the "fear of India" and the need to counter this fear. According to Samina Yasmeen (1994), the fear of India and the attempt to achieve a "balancing act" have constituted the country's foreign policy since 1947. The fear of India has been constructed largely by resorting to narratives that portray the former as a threat to Pakistan's sovereignty and existence. As Yasmeen (1994) explains, the "balancing act" can thus be seen as a reaction to the supposed threat posed by India. This led the state leadership to seek "external patrons" who could assist in "balancing the India threat" (Yasmeen, 1994, p115).

1.2.1   Foreign Policy in the 1950s

The extent to which Pakistan's foreign policy accounts revolve around the India threat is evident in the country's foreign policy choices throughout the 1950s. To counter the alleged threat posed by India, Pakistan's preferred response has been to seek assistance in order to achieve what foreign policy actors (both civil and military) envisage to be a 'balancing act', and as such become a permanent feature of foreign policymaking. Most realism-based accounts are unanimous in identifying the US and China as Pakistan's external patrons. Pakistan acquired membership of the SEATO and CENTO

military alliances in the 1950s (Ali and Patman, 2019). Yet, these alliances, however economically beneficial they might have been in the short term, complicated foreign policy towards India and the Middle East, whilst China waited patiently[14]. However, these defence pacts led by the US played a critical role in shaping how Pakistan and the US developed their bilateral relations, at both civil and military levels, and they continue to do so to this day.

The existing foreign policy literature mostly centres on analysing whether these alliances brought disadvantages or benefits to Pakistan (Rizvi, 1993; Sattar, 2017). The literature is filled with important details trying to explain why Pakistan felt compelled to join the alliances (threats from India and Afghanistan/USSR), and why disenchantment followed. However, this literature makes no reference to what military alliances represent, namely the institutionalisation of violence as a result of a foreign policy decision, and the enhancement of militarism.

Broadly, those parochial discussions are therefore centred on the extension and conditions of US support towards Pakistan's security needs, the extension and impact of military assistance, (see Kux, 2001; Fair, 2014), the adverse impact on other Muslim states (Rizvi, 1993), and the subsequent disenchantment with the alliances formed, following Western military aid being provided to India during and after the 1962 border war with China.

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[14] See the chapter on Pakistan's relations with China, where I explain the details of China's position in relation to Pakistan's options for forming military alliances.

However, these foreign policy decisions associated with military alliances have become associated with manifold representations of the US as the epitome of imperialist power relations, aggression, war, conflict, and military might. The Pakistani leadership looked upon foreign policy alignments through alliances with the US as the "sheet anchor of Pakistan's foreign policy" (Sattar, 2017, p57). Indeed, this 'anchoring' contributed towards the institutionalisation of these representations, yet the literature usually follows the 'India threat' and the troubled relations with a Soviet-friendly Afghanistan as explanations for Pakistan's decision.

I note that these discussions do not analyse how, by joining these military alliances[15], Pakistan's foreign policy was transformed by becoming further militarised and masculinised. Nor do such accounts consider how these alliances represent a desire to join a Western foreign policy and security design that Pakistani state elites perceived as more 'robust', 'rational', and 'tough', whilst ignoring US imperialist designs in the Middle East and South-East Asia.

The act of engaging a country's foreign policy with international military organisations as a strategy to guarantee the state's defence and survival carries a number of implications that are not discussed in traditional accounts of Pakistan's foreign policy. Pakistan's participation in military alliances may

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[15] The literature on feminist analysis of military alliances is very limited, and does not include SEATO or CENTO. However, it is worth mentioning the scholarship developed by Cynthia Enloe (1993) and Wright, Hurley, and Ruiz (2019).

be taken as a departing point to analyse how security and identity are interlinked, and how these processes are intrinsically gendered and gendering. As Annica Kronsell argues, "militaries are institutions that have largely been governed by men and have produced and recreated norms and practices associated with heterosexual masculinity, surprisingly consistent across both cultures and time" (2012, p44).

The fact that Pakistan's cultural orientation differed from that of the US did not prevent the former from embarking on the latter's security designs. Moreover, it enhanced the army's heterosexual masculinity, perceived as the only acceptable form of manliness. The overall involvement of Pakistan in integrating with Western military alliances reveals how military organisations and alliances are supported by ideas of masculinity associated with force and combat capabilities.

The historical context of the Cold War and US relations in South Asia suggest that Pakistan's membership in the military alliances indeed signified more than merely a way to limit the 'Indian threat', and contributed towards Pakistan's militaristic and masculinised identity. For instance, in *The United States and Pakistan 1947–2000: Disenchanted Allies*, Dennis Kux (2001) describes a conversation at a dinner party between the foreign policy columnist Walter Lippman and former US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The conversation was about the benefits of the military alliance. Dulles reportedly told Lippman that he needed "to get some real fighting men into the south of Asia. The only Asians who can really fight are the Pakistanis.

That's why we need them in the alliance" (Dulles, cited in Kux, 2001, p72).

In the same conversation, Dulles also associates 'Moslems' with the perceived fighting inclination of the Pakistanis. This view fits well with how Pakistani state elites imagined their identity to be constructed – that is, on ideas of manliness and masculinity associated with combativity and virility.

To be sure, since her independence, Pakistan's state elites sought an identity that would be differentiated from Hindu India. Whilst Islam as an identity marker is the most common feature of this identity/alterity relationship, the normalised contrast between traits of masculinity and femininity is also present. Over centuries of colonial rule, India and Indian men in particular were consistently represented in the West by way of features that are usually associated with femininity, such as being weak, servile, effeminate, emotional, and conveying 'heterosexual ambiguity'. This became all the more salient since the 1950s, when the Pakistani army shifted from its perennial inherited British ethos, and started to benefit from direct exposure to US military practices, which included innovative military technology and doctrine (Cohen, 2004; Siddiqa, 2017).

Henceforth, the normalisation of military practices and their inculcation into the society, including the permanent appeal to a zealous support for the military, has not ceased. Springing out from the US military philosophy, the American-inspired Pakistani military, as Stephen Cohen suggests, "had an exaggerated estimate of their own and Pakistan's martial qualities, with some believing that one Pakistani soldier equaled ten or more Indians" (2004,

p103). I argue that the Pakistani state elite integrated these Western perceptions, aided by the fact that the US also made use of them. This enhancement of militarism, powered by Pakistan-US relations, has become part of a discourse controlled by the army, used to produce a 'Hindu Indian' as Pakistan's 'other'. This Indian other is then represented as being weak, passive, and effeminate. Exemplary of this otherness relation is *India: A Study in Profile*, a book intended as a reference text at the Command and Staff College, Quetta. In 1990, the then Lt Col Javed Hassan (now a retired General), while discussing "practical politics on National Integration", wrote: "the most critical factor that has given stability to the Indian polity is the passive character of the Hindu public. … The passive nature of the Hindu majority is evidently an important element in the political stability of India" (Javed, 1990, pp122–123). While the book has been written for military indoctrination, given the extension of the military's influence on the discourse of national identity, the idea of an inferior, weaker, and passive Hindu India has infiltrated this wider discourse.

Moreover, Andrew Rotter (1994) highlights how such stereotypes about Indian men continued during the Cold War period, particularly among Americans and British politicians, and how they were linked to Pakistan's and India's relations with the US. For instance, Rotter demonstrates how the leadership in the US interpreted the dilemma of weapons supply in South Asia:

> In 1954, the former law partner of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote that Indians had "an almost feminine hypersensitiveness with respect to the prestige of

their country." President Dwight D. Eisenhower agreed. Reading of Indian objections to the administration's plan to provide arms for Pakistan, Eisenhower wrote Dulles: "This is one area of the world where, even more than most cases, emotion rather than reason seems to dictate policy". (1994, p525)

Rotter further explains that the Americans continued to mirror British colonial thinking on martial races and manliness in South Asia[16]. Rotter cites Elbert G. Mathews, State Department Director for South Asia Affairs (1948–1951), noting that in the US Government, there was "a strong view, based on the reading of Kipling, that the martial races of India were in the north, and much was now Pakistan. And therefore, the sensible thing for us to do was to cozy up to these martial races; they would be a great value to us in the fight against communism" (Rotter, 1994, p538).

Hence, Pakistan, despite sharing common cultural and ethnic relations with India, continued to produce and reproduce America's orientalised and gendered view of South Asia. As a product of British colonialism, the US followed suit and incorporated it into its foreign relations[17]. Pakistan thus benefited not only from the desired military equipment that would enhance her capacity towards war-preparedness with India, but also from an orientalist and gendered conception of South Asia, used to reproduce colonial discourses

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[16] For an in-depth account of race, martial races and links to masculinity, see Streets (2017), who demonstrates how the so-called martial races were integrated through pro-Empire political discourses, whereas anti-colonial subjects were usually perceived and represented as effeminate. This applied in particular to men from the Bengal region, "from whence many nationalists originated", since Bengali men had "long been believed to be 'of weaker frame and more enervated character' than other Indians" (2017, p162). This is particularly important in understanding the relationship between West and East Pakistan.
[17] Andrew Rotter's cited article (1994) offers a rich collection of examples from which one can observe how US relations with South Asia during the first years of the Cold War were gendered and orientalised.

on martial races. In the case of Pakistan, this was also reflected in how Punjabis ascended further in the political and military domains in the 1950s, exercising greater control over the other provinces, including East Pakistan where the majority of the population lived.

Thus, by entering security and military agreements with the US, Pakistan replaced one imperialist power with another, in her desperate attempt to contain the Indian menace. If the independence process that ultimately ended British colonial rule was practically negotiated by civilians with little interference by the military, the newly independent Pakistan invited the interference of a neo-colonial power to South Asia. However, the result turned out to be altogether different. For instance, as historian Anita Inder Singh notes, "neither American military assistance nor the displacement of the British gave Pakistan security against India. (…). In 1954, the main American achievement was to dislodge the British from Pakistan and simultaneously to quicken the ebbing of British influence in the Middle East" (1993, p156). This certainly supports the argument that Pakistan's foreign policy not only became increasingly militarised since the 1950s, but also contributed towards the continuation of imperialistic politics in the Middle East, where war and conflict continue to this day.

Whilst the 1950s may be seen as crucial to the establishment of a foreign policy orientation that is deeply rooted in ideas of masculinity, there are two other key moments in the country's history through which it is possible to establish how a militarised and masculinised foreign policy is related to the

interlinking of security and identity. Those moments are the 1971 war and the nuclearisation of Pakistan. Let us examine each in turn.

1.2.2 The 1971 War and Bangladesh Independence

In this sub-section I analyse in what ways the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971 represents yet another example of how foreign policy in Pakistan is militarised, gendered, and how it reproduces past colonial practices. It is also another moment in which the interlinking between security and identity shaped the country's foreign policy, perhaps most strikingly so since 1947. Whilst the liberation of Bangladesh is mostly perceived as an inter-state war between India and Pakistan, in fact the moment comprises several wars[18], and still generates different meanings for the various parties involved.

Feminist and postcolonial scholars have demonstrated how nationalist zeal, gender, war, and militarism are intrinsically connected (see Sjoberg and Vita, 2010). The Bangladesh Liberation War constitutes a distinct moment associated with Pakistan's foreign policy that mirrors these connections. Whilst there is now a considerable amount of literature about the 1971 war, a critical reading of Pakistani foreign policy focusing of the connection between colonial practices, gender, sexuality, and war still seems to be

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[18] Ananya J. Kabir (2013) and Yasmin Saikia (2011), in studying how the politics of memory and amnesia are discussed in relation to the creation of Bangladesh, make reference to this four-fold war: a war between Pakistan and India (international); a war between West and East Pakistan (civilian); a war between Bengalis and Biharis (ethnic); and a gender war carried out by all the factions involved in the other wars against vulnerable women (Saikia, 2011; Kabir, 2013).

lacking. Accounts of Pakistan's foreign policy usually refer to the 1971 war as a "disaster" (Sattar, 2017), with the event usually being perceived as a national humiliation, as the Pakistani army had to surrender to India on 16 December 1971. Most foreign policy narratives analyse the 1971 war from a realist India-centric perspective, focusing on how Pakistan and the US related during this period, and how India and the USSR entered into a Friendship Treaty. These macro-narratives reproduce the logics of the Cold War, and therefore leave no space for an alternative understanding of what happened in East Bengal, particularly in respect of genocide and the widespread rape of women.

An unsurprising lacuna within Pakistani foreign policy accounts and the state-sanctioned narrative of the 1971 war is the dismissal of genocide perpetrated by the Pakistani army. Reportedly, Bengalis and Bengali Hindus were the preferred targets of the army and its collaborators, leading to claims of a concerted genocidal plan (see Alamgir and D'Costa, 2011). Moreover, Wardatul Akmam takes up a definition of genocide proposed by the UN, and concludes that what happened may be qualified as such, since it

> includes as victim group "any recognizable group which the perpetrator defines" and requires the "intent to destroy the victim group either fully or in part." Judging on the basis of this definition, the massacre in Bangladesh can be called genocide in terms of the Bengali nation and the Hindu Bengalis as the victim group. It can also be called genocide on the basis of the systematic mass rape carried out by the West Pakistanis. (2002, p557)

Thus, a civil and inter-state war and a genocide are usually dismissed as a 'disaster'. Pakistanis have produced a specific kind of amnesia, often justified by the whims of geography, and India's desire to destroy their country. Behind it, state-sanctioned narratives provide a smokescreen for the atrocities perpetrated by the Pakistani army. Concerning the major significance and consequences of the 1971 war, only one interviewee, AC1, raised the issue with me. Significantly, I found that the Pakistani Army Museum in Lahore includes a zone dedicated to the 1971 war. According to their interpretation, what happened in East Pakistan was "India's State Sponsoring of Terrorism" (Pakistan Army Museum, Lahore). In the same section of the museum, the army justifies the 1971 war with reference to "India's defeat in the 1965 war", and the latter's wishes to weaken and destroy Pakistan. The Pakistan Army denies the existence of 93,000 prisoners of war and invokes "massive acts of human rights violations" (ibid.) carried out by the invaders.

This interpretation of the war on the part of Pakistan's main foreign policy actor reveals the military's capacity and willingness to revise history. For instance, the 1965 war with India is widely considered to be a stalemate (Burke, 1973; Sattar, 2017). Yet on every 6 September, the Pakistani military celebrates the event as a victory. The "massive acts of human rights violations", however, have been documented as being mostly perpetrated by the Pakistani army. Whilst there is evidence that extreme wartime violence was carried out by both sides – the Pakistani army and the *Mukti Bahini*[19] – the former carried the weight of being a professional state institution,

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[19] On the Mukti Bahini, see Bass (2013), Ch. 12.

allegedly constituted to defend citizens and not to exercise violence against them.

The narration of the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War continues to be based on disagreements, particularly as to the extent of the violence perpetrated by the Pakistani army (Zakaria, 2019). Whilst the latter continues to promote narratives that deny the genocidal violence[20], research has concluded that the Pakistani military is responsible for the death of nearly three million people[21], including the use of rape as genocide (Jahan, 2013; Sharlach, 2000; Akmam, 2002; Rummel, 1997). Moreover, the genocidal violence exercised by the Pakistani army has been described as an example and a consequence of the hegemonic masculinity that characterises military institutions.

In the case of the 1971 war, this hegemonic masculinity was combined with the reproduction of colonial concepts in relation to gender and ethnicity. Bina D'Costa (2014) provides an important account of the relationship between military hegemonic masculinity and the reproduction of a colonial ethos by the Pakistani army during the 1971 war. She examines the memoirs of four Pakistani generals who participated in the war. In those books D'Costa found that those generals viewed the Bengalis through the lens of colonial Britain. The Pakistani generals reproduced the meaning created by the British

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[20] For instance, an article published in *Hilal English* (December 2020 edition) clearly intends to contribute towards the denial of the Pakistan Army's war atrocities. The article may be found here: https://www.hilal.gov.pk/eng-article/1971:-the-need-to-reconcile-with-actual-facts/NDcxMg==.html

[21] Ronaq Jahan highlights the fact that "the genocide in Bangladesh, which started with the Pakistani military operation against unarmed citizens on the night of March 25, continued unabated for nearly nine months until the Bengali nationalists, with the help of the Indian army, succeeded in liberating the country from Pakistani occupation forces on December 16, 1971" (2013, p254).

concerning the existence of certain 'martial races' and therefore of an idealised masculinity best suited to the military. Thus, the Bengalis were described as weak, short, and with darkened skin in comparison to the emasculated, predominantly Punjabi, Pakistani army.

This is relevant for understanding how Pakistanis could not, and indeed still do not, accept the humiliation they faced upon being defeated by those whose combat skills and masculinity were deemed inferior. In the same work, D'Costa notes that the generals dismissed and delegitimised the role of the *Mukthi Bahini* on this account of being a 'weak race' and claimed that "the military conflict was fought between the Indian and Pakistani armies" (2014, p464). Because the Pakistani army could not come to terms with the defeat they encountered at the hands of a less manly enemy, and because they were also perceived as being associated with Hindu India, the army seems to have justified its genocidal actions by resorting to what D'Costa calls 'genocidal masculinity', in order to save the state (2014, p465). D'Costa goes on to note that

> the Pakistani military believed that Hindus were responsible for the revolt and that as soon as the Hindu problem was solved, the trouble would cease. As such, the construction of Hindus as enemies and disloyal citizens resulted into the annihilation strategy of the Pakistani military that could clearly be recognized as genocide, and a variety of rituals formed the social practices within a meaning system governed by genocidal masculinity. (2014, p466)

The fact that to date Pakistan has never officially apologised for the 1971 events and is unable to acknowledge the genocidal practices carried out by her army might explain why in the Army Museum one can read about "massive acts of human rights violations". The Pakistani army believes, and wishes to normalise the narrative, that only an enemy of inferior military formation and inferior rationality and manliness could carry out human rights violations, and not a professional army. Thus, it is possible to understand how Pakistani identity after 1971 became further masculinised, further 'Punjabinised', and yet the 'Hindu India' threat became further enhanced.

It is important to note that the centrality of India remains intact on this interlinking between identity and security. The 1971 events and the consequent liberation of Bangladesh are an example of how the state of Pakistan is able to use its monopoly of violence to the extreme to preserve what it has imagined as the 'ideal Pakistani identity', i.e., one that must be disentangled from its Indic origins, one that fits into the binaries created during the British Empire, where certain concepts of masculinity and racial hardiness are associated with power, virility, strength, and combativeness which are opposed to those of an Other that is viewed as weak, effeminate, lazy, irrational, and therefore unable to effectively engage in combat.

However, whilst a new Pakistani identity emerged after 1971, arguably the flawed two-nation theory that had been used to justify India's partition collapsed against her Other. The very act of capitulating to India took on a specific meaning. The idea of a Pakistan equated with the 'homeland' for Indian Muslims collapsed. This collapse was certainly fuelled by how West

Pakistanis and the Punjab-based army perceived East Pakistanis – namely, as 'Hinduised Muslims', not true Muslims, or Hindus. The Pakistani leadership was unable to sustain the idea of a 'Muslim homeland', based on cultural and religious diversity. While the 'two-nation' theory was never abandoned by the state elite, the reality is that in present-day Pakistan, the 'two-nation' theory has been principally enacted and appropriated by the Sunni, Punjab-based leadership. In an interview with GO2 during 2017, he corroborated the idea that it is Sunni institutions that built Pakistan's national identity narrative.

To worsen Pakistan's foreign policy options in South Asia, after 1971 India reconfirmed her hegemonic status in the region, and an independent Bangladesh did not become an Islamic state and instead adopted a secular constitution. The outcome of the 1971 war confirms how the Pakistani leadership was unable to govern in a multi-ethnic society, whose demands and feelings never fully coincided with how Pakistan was imagined and then amalgamated. To be sure, ethnic/sub-national conflicts did not end in 1971, nor did the blame cease to be directed at India. A key example is how, a few years after Bangladeshi independence, Z.A. Bhutto once more became involved in the suppression of a 'rebellion' in Balochistan, with brutal force (Cohen, 2016). Under Bhutto's orders, "The Pakistan army sent in approximately 80,000 soldiers to crush the rebellion with logistical support from the Shah of Iran who was afraid that the disturbance would spill over into western Balochistan" (Jaffrelot, 2015, p364).

Pakistan may have partially recovered from self-inflicted damage, by skilfully controlling a politics of amnesia and distorting the facts. Pakistan never apologised to Bangladesh (see D'Costa, 2011). Rasul Bakhsh Rais suggests that in the case of Bangladesh, "Pakistan was unable to translate emotive Muslim nationalism into a concrete social contract which would have been broad and open, and flexible enough to provide room for the accommodation of interests" (2017, p199). Whilst this is true, it does not explain why the elite based in West Pakistan acted in a typical colonial manner towards citizens living in the East (Ahmed, 1973; Zakaria, 2019; Jahan, 2013). A possible explanation is offered by D'Costa (2011), as she enumerates four factors, based on findings by South Asian scholars that possibly led to the break-up. These factors are: territorial; economic; cultural; and political. The interlinking of these factors, however, reveals how a postcolonial state put into practice the colonial practices of British India, as I explained earlier.

However, the desire of attaining a 'truly Islamic' identity, which would not be associated with perceived Hindu cultural and linguistic practices, appears to be Pakistan's great achievement after being defeated in the 1971 war. A lost war was seen as an opportunity to not only further militarise, given that the 'Indian threat' indeed materialised, but also to imagine an identity that could finally part ways with Indic origins. Hence, the possibility of having an identity that could be distinguished from perceived physical weakness, enervation, and effeminacy came to be viewed as compensation for the humiliation suffered, which state-sanctioned narratives portray as 'saving

Pakistan'. The army's masculine genocidal practices have enabled this process. Yet, the 1971 war also accelerated the militarisation and masculinisation of Pakistan's identity and foreign policy. It opened the door to the nuclearization of Pakistan, as I will examine in the next sub-section.

1.2.3   Re-affirming Islamic identity: a pathway to nuclear Pakistan

In this sub-section, I am interested in analysing how the nuclearization of Pakistan became a decisive factor in consolidating military might and its associated hyper-masculinity, and how this impacted the interlinking between identity and security. In the previous sub-section, I explained how the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War constitutes a moment of great humiliation for the state of Pakistan, and yet the latter has created a specific kind of amnesia that veils the genocidal atrocities.

The post-war moment in Pakistan became one of redefinition with regard to state identity. This redefinition happened via the pursuit of two interlinked goals: to redefine the Islamic credentials of state identity, and to achieve the status of a nuclear power. Feroz Khan, a former Brigadier General closely associated with the nuclear project, suggests that in the quest to become a nuclear power, national identity is a driving factor and becomes its own symbol (Khan, 2012, p9). The author also highlights how the scientific and technological challenges associated with the whole process of mastering nuclear energy (for civilian use or otherwise) are crucial in constructing a national identity discourse bound up with modernity. Khan suggests that "for

countries that might have quite a mixed bag of indicators of modernity and progress, nuclear weapons are a potent symbol of the national scientific establishment" (2012, p10).

This is certainly true in the case of Pakistan. Whilst some nuclear armed countries do not usually associate this symbolism with their national identity discourses (France and the UK, for example), others like Pakistan and India have fully integrated this symbolism into the discourse around their national identities. In the case of Pakistan, there are two sub-factors that are articulated in the nuclear weapons' discourse on national identity. One is that of sacrifice, while the other is Islam, with the latter spanning several different levels of the discourse of national identity.

Whilst the 1971 war increased Pakistan's perceptions of the 'India threat', it also caused further dissatisfaction with security alliances and bilateral agreements with the US. These did not produce the predicted goal of preventing a war with India. Ultimately, as I will examine later, this sense of renewed insecurity prompted Pakistan to end the policy of nuclear abstinence (Sattar, 2017). Abdul Sattar justifies Pakistan's choice in this regard as being based on "India's exploitation of Pakistan's internal political troubles, encouragement and assistance to separatism in East Pakistan, violation of the principle of non-interference in internal affairs … the reluctance of allies to come to Pakistan's rescue, and the powerlessness of the United Nations … [As a result,] Pakistan had to devise its own means to ensure its security and survival" (2017 p165). Feroz Khan, however, justifies the pursuit of a nuclear

weapons programme on account of it being "the only way to prevent such humiliation in the future and to preserve Pakistan. Never Again would Pakistan be subject to disgrace at the hands of others" (2012, p8).

It is problematic to dismiss 'internal troubles' when these have often been described as genocide, or as 'genocidal masculinity' (D'Costa, 2014). Pakistan's leadership sought to make up for its humiliation by constructing a national identity narrative that involved a re-asserting of its Islamic elements and powerful weaponry. This is the pervasive rationale that underpins Pakistan's justification to go nuclear. Ultimately, Pakistan's decision on nuclear weapons helped to iterate the representation of India not only as an enemy, but also as an Other belonging to a different civilisation.

The state leadership's need to re-design a new context for the flawed two-nation theory is significant. Whilst the 1971 war exposed the flaws of the two-nation theory, the state elite perceived it otherwise and retained it at the centre of the country's *raison d'être*, together with the belief that Pakistan must defend Islam. Thus, the 'defending Islam' narrative was incorporated into the state's identity as a departure from its Indic South Asian origins, as it also became a foreign policy goal. In this respect, C. Christine Fair notes that Pakistan and India are thus locked "in a civilizational struggle", as Pakistan "must defend Islam and the two-nation theory against what many Pakistanis believe to be an India dedicated to undermining it and thus the very legitimacy of the Pakistani state" (2014, p10).

This perspective on how Pakistani state-based identity constructs her Other (India) is further intensified by the Hindu nationalist theory of *Akhand Bharat* (or Undivided India) in India, and the representation of the same in Pakistan as hegemonic designs on the part of India. Aparna Pande suggests that whilst this 'theory' "has been disproved by historic reality […] its salience endures in Pakistani strategic thinking" (2011, p57). The Pakistani state is also represented as being solely responsible for its insecurity predicament, mainly because of its smaller territorial size and resources. Avtar Singh Bhasin (2018), for instance, makes a pertinent observation that connects Pakistan with a masculine, 'hard rule' legacy of the Mughal Empire in India. Bhasin notes:

> Pakistan believed that the legacy of the Mughal Empire had fallen on its shoulders, and its superiority over the Hindu India was a historical fact. The believers of the two-nation theory had a misplaced faith on the superiority of the Muslims vis-à-vis the Hindus. Obsessed with history, they believed that in any war against India, their victory was assured as they were the ghazis or the chosen people. (2018, p415)

In addition, Dibyesh Anand notes that, in Hinduised India, particularly amongst the proponents and defenders of Hindutva, it is Pakistan/Muslims that "are solely responsible for the partition of *Akhanda Bharat* (united India)" (2016, p15). Thus, Pakistan is represented in India as a state that has created the conditions to endure self-inflicted insecurity, based on a shared Indian past, whilst being held responsible for having partitioned India. Yet, in Pakistan, *Akhanda Bharat* theory also lives on. In September 2017, I

interviewed AC6,[22] who added that "if India would have the opportunity, it will attack us". Therefore, Pakistan's state elite, and a large percentage of the public, perceives and represents India as an enemy. The threat here is perceived as being directed toward the 'Muslim identity' and Pakistan's territorial sovereignty.

Until now, I have examined how different foreign policy related events have accentuated Pakistan's alterity in relation to India, and how defending an Islamic identity and territorial sovereignty entered into and inflected the main goals of the country's foreign policy. However, post-war isolation did not last very long. In 1974, with the Islamic Summit held in Lahore, isolation subsided, as Pakistan was desperately looking to improve her image in the international community. As Tahir-Kheli suggests, "the fact that a Pakistani leader was elected Chairman of the Conference reflected the new-found identity which enabled Islamabad to play a more dynamic role in Islamic affairs than warranted by virtue of its size and economic resources" (1983, p82). The Lahore Summit was of cardinal importance for Pakistan's foreign relations, and it had a significant impact on domestic politics as well. It consolidated Z.A. Bhutto's leadership, as he could easily oscillate between a Pakistani nationalist and a Muslim socialist (Syed, 1982, p132). Pakistan expressed solidarity with the Arabs thus attempting to dissipate the consequences of previous closer ties with the US. This solidarity, as mentioned earlier, would be converted into economic benefits. Crucially,

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[22] During the same interview, AC6 affirmed: "I'm a hawk"; "I'm in favour of nukes"; and "I'm a military child".

Ishtiaq Ahmed suggests that the "Islamic Summit was a grand exercise in national projection by Bhutto. It greatly exaggerated Pakistan's military capabilities but was consistent with earlier examples of Pakistani leaders marketing their state and nation to foreign powers in the hope that such services would return dividends in the form of economic and military aid" (2013, p221). Furthermore, economically it proved crucial to Bhutto's ambitions to develop nuclear technology.

The instrumental role of Z.A. Bhutto in Pakistan's politics since 1971 would now bear fruit in terms of foreign policy and the recasting of a new identity for Pakistan. At Bhutto's hands, Islamic ideology was extensively manipulated and pragmatically introduced into foreign policy. The dislocation of identity throughout the Middle East[23], where oil revenues easily mixed with religious orthodoxies, extended their influence into Pakistan's domestic policies, where legitimacy was given at the expense of further undermining the already weak basis for Pakistani citizenship[24].

After a chaotic period initiated with the 1971 civil war, Pakistan was able to re-engage itself into its international community of choice, the Muslim world. With it, the conditions of possibility for finding a new identity, one dislocated

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[23] In 1992 at a seminar dedicated to foreign policy, organised by the Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, a senior associate, whilst discussing the media impact on foreign policy, suggested that: "Today, if we have this intense longing for pan-Islamism, if we entertain those notions of establishing a universal Islamic State, it is only because the essence of our nation is Islam, because it is committed historically and constitutionally to the Islamic aspirations of the Muslim Ummah. Likewise, when we turn our back on the Indian continent and face radiantly the emerging Muslim nations of Central Asia and Middle East, it is because ours is a Muslim people" (Tarik Jan, 1993, p107).
[24] The Ahmadi controversy became the exponent of Bhutto's government towards the Islamisation of the country. Marc Gaboriaeu correctly observes that Bhutto opened the gates to fundamentalism (2004, p247).

from South Asia and South-East Asia towards West Asia, were forged. Barbara Metcalf cites a 1977 publication by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which it is stated:

> After the confusion of the past … after the hypocritical separation of the Islamic loyalty from the Islamic imperatives of justice between people and regions which was responsible for the disaster of 1971, Pakistan has now rediscovered its Islamic identity and set its feet firmly on the path ordained for it by its everlasting faith. The path is that of promoting the brotherhood of all Muslim peoples and helping to banish divisive prejudices. (Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited in Metcalf, 2004, p230)

This desire to disengage from the ideational origins of the subcontinent also emerged during my fieldwork in Pakistan. The interviews I conducted revealed that Pakistanis wish to be seen differently from India. AC2 mentioned that Pakistan's "historical and cultural ties with Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey and Central Asian states have been overshadowed by the history of animosity with Indians – more specifically 'Hindus'", while AM1 intimated that "because of national identity", "Pakistan opens to three predominantly Muslim regions: Middle East, West Asia, and Central Asia". Also, in the words of GO1: "Pakistan tends to have closer relations and affinity with the Middle-East"; "Iran and Turkey are important to Pakistan"; "Persian language is part of culture, and Iqbal wrote better in Persian"; "The Mughal Empire lasted for a long period of time, and Pakistan shares this cultural identity with the Mughal Period".

With an imagined identity now freer from Hinduised South Asia, the Pakistani state elite could concentrate on striving for what it saw as the ultimate solution to the India threat: a nuclear weapon. Thus, after a moment of re-orientation in search of a national origin and identity away from a perceived weaker, effeminate Hindu, in preference of those perceived as stronger and of a combative nature. To be sure, the establishment of the Mughal Empire in South Asia constitutes a proud and glorious memory in Pakistan's identity and culture.

US opposes a nuclear Pakistan

President Z.A. Bhutto initiated the démarches towards the establishment of a nuclear weapons programme. Plans to construct a reprocessing plant were implemented. Also, India's 1974 nuclear explosion reinforced Bhutto's commitment to turn Pakistan into a nuclear power. Initially, Pakistan trod carefully in persuading the UN to approve a resolution to make South Asia a nuclear-weapons-free zone (Sattar, 2017). However, Z.A. Bhutto had different plans, and under his leadership, Pakistan tried to pursue a foreign policy based on bilateral relations, which, to a certain extent, was successful in maintaining a proactive relationship with the US. The latter continued to provide economic and military aid to Pakistan in the post-war period.

However, as soon as Bhutto announced Pakistan's intentions to begin a nuclear programme, the US[25] voiced its disapproval. The latter tried unsuccessfully to persuade Pakistan to give up its nuclear ambitions. Though Bhutto was determined, so too was Henry Kissinger, who had latterly been fully against the weaponisation of Pakistan. Kissinger visited Pakistan on several occasions, offering more advanced military aid, but also threatening to cut funds, thus attempting to dissuade Pakistan from pursuing its plan (Ahmed, 2013, p222). Nixon's exit and the transition to Gerald Ford's administration brought no significant changes to Pakistan-US relations. The major theme remained confined to military aid, backed by Washington. However, the nuclear issue did not disappear. The US continued to reiterate its opposition to a Pakistan-owned nuclear programme.

While a more forceful US stance on Pakistan's nuclear programme ambitions was toned down during the Reagan administration, the US did not leave the issue unchecked. The US promoted 'incentives' for Pakistan not to go nuclear, which included the sale of F-16 fighter jets, under a relaxation of the Symington Amendment (Ahmed, 2013). These offers notwithstanding, Pakistan resisted the bait, and continued clandestinely to pursue its first nuclear bomb. During the 1980s, however, the United States chose to bypass non-proliferation legislation, so that Pakistan could continue to receive aid in support of the Afghan war (Chakma, 2002). In view of non-proliferation legislation and in order to maintain Pakistan's key strategic status as a

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[25] The Unites States and Britain laboured intensively to prevent Pakistan from obtaining a nuclear weapons programme. See Craig (2016).

frontline state, the US had to turn a blind eye to Pakistan. As Chakma explains:

> from 1985 to 1989 President Reagan and President Bush certified every year that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device … They did so despite strong evidence that Pakistan had been making significant advances in acquiring nuclear weapons capability … Pakistan crossed the nuclear threshold by 1987 … The Reagan and Bush Administration in 1987, 1988, and 1989 improperly certified that Pakistan did not possess this capability, in order to avoid the imposition of sanctions under the Pressler Amendment. (2002, p896)

Yet, Pakistan remained undeterred. With the end of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the consequent loss of US patronage, the nuclear programme shifted from a nuclear energy one to a military-oriented project (Chakma, 2002, p873). Pakistan perceived there to be a rise in insecurity, and the state elite remained committed to their desire to go nuclear.

The pursuance of nuclear weapons was, to a greater extent, made possible because in the first stages, the US could not fully implement the NPT requisites or its domestic legislation. The fact that the US turned a 'blind eye' (Akhtar, 2018) must be accounted for. The US's interests in the Afghan war overlapped with non-proliferation policies, and that certainly benefited Pakistan. The relationship that initially sought to bring about security, after many decades of disappointment, finally bore results, if one believes that nuclear weapons are the ultimate security provider for a state[26]. Pakistan's

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[26] I am opposed to the existence and possession of nuclear weapons by any country, as well as an international order determined by their existence. The question posed within the critical

irreversible decision to opt for the most radical security solution altered not only the ways in which the US related to Pakistan, but also how Pakistan performed her national identity from that point on.

If until the end of the Afghan war, Pakistan escaped the non-proliferation sanctions regime, namely the famous Pressler Amendment, the same did not happen during the 1990s, when the US President stopped certifying Pakistan. However, Pakistan denied that it possessed such capacity and reportedly dismissed the fact that the US would implement the Pressler Amendment, a move that would prompt heavy sanctions (Kux, 2001). The Pakistani leadership wrongly assessed the US's intentions, which, coupled with the irreversible decision of rolling back the nuclear programme, led to the effective implementation of the Pressler Amendment, which was on hold since 1985.

The imposition of sanctions under the Pressler Amendment resulted in important losses for Pakistan in terms of arms and military supplies, as "all US military assistance and government-to-government transfers of weapons and equipment were halted" (Kux, 2001, p309). The impact of the sanctions was thus felt at both civilian and military levels; however, it did not stop Pakistan from continuing to develop nuclear weapons. The implementation of the Pressler Amendment carried an important meaning for Pakistan-US relations. Unlike in past decades, when the relationship had endured several

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security studies literature of 'whose security?' in relation to nuclear weapons is rather pertinent as a starting point to question the real value of nuclear weapons.

challenges, including sanctions, this time Pakistan had already endured the traumatic experience of a loss of territory, and the Afghan war, compounded with other regional developments, including the Iranian Revolution, all of which aggravated the country's sense of insecurity. Once the possibility of obtaining the ultimate security assurance had been opened up, Pakistan engaged in the dual task of pursuing security and forging a national identity that could compensate for previous losses. Pakistan endured the severity of the Pressler Amendment, helped by China. The rupture with the US created sufficient space for Pakistan to enhance her security capabilities, to bolster her relations with China, and to assert her national identity vis-à-vis India, as if Pakistan had to prove once and for all that she was no longer vulnerable to her Eastern neighbour.

AC6 stated in an interview in 2017, while discussing whether Pakistan had a foreign policy[27], that this question arose merely to "show Pakistan as a weak state, and to create a dependency engineered narrative". AC6 went on to suggest that the nuclear programme, "which was obtained under a strict regime of sanctions", showed that "Pakistan is not a weak state, it is not cunning, it is clever [and] it has used its space". Indeed, sanctions did not deter Pakistan, and, taking into account the restrictions imposed, the fact that in 1998 Pakistan conducted a nuclear test, thus making official her status as a nuclear power, certainly leaves room to examine not only the determination of Pakistani state elites to pursue a long-term plan, but also how security came

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[27] This question has been raised on several occasions by different commentators. To be sure, even if the foreign policy of a country may appear inadequate, or ineffective, by definition, foreign policy will always exist so long as a nation-state exists.

to occupy such a central place within Pakistan's external and internal relations.

Hitherto, I have explained how nuclear weapons played a significant role in the construction of a state-level imagined national identity, which is perceived to be supported by a generalised national solidarity[28]. While there are critics and so-called 'nuclear cautionists' in Pakistan, in general, and for the duration of my fieldwork, I found evidence of acceptance and pride in the idea of a nuclear Pakistan. During an interview with AC6, I was told that "if it was not because of nuclear weapons, India would have already invaded". When I asked the interviewee which international political event(s) posed a bigger challenge for Pakistan foreign policymakers, she stated: "guarding Pakistan's nuclear weapons development (which was clandestine to begin with) has been the biggest challenge throughout the decades of 1970s and 1980s".

Nuclear Pakistan has generated and indeed continues to generate a significant number of representations that are reflected in the construction of the interlinking between security and identity. Earlier I analysed how the 1950s marked an important phase in Pakistan's foreign policy, and how the 1971 war contributed towards the militarisation and masculinisation of the state

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[28] I had the opportunity to see first-hand how close A.Q. Khan is to the hearts of (young) Pakistanis, and how he is revered as a 'national hero'. He was the Chief-Guest at the annual convocation of the university I worked at during my fieldwork in Lahore. As soon as he reached the main stage, he received a prolonged standing ovation, in front of nearly 5,000 people. I recall being taken by surprise, somehow shocked, given Khan's direct involvement in illegal nuclear proliferation, which caused Pakistan to be represented as an irresponsible and dangerous nuclear state, and more like a 'nuclear bazaar'. As my research progressed, I became more aware of how 'national heroes' are narrated, how replicas of nuclear missiles serve as urban decorations, how during national holidays – 23 March and 14 August, for instance – national flags with printed missiles are displayed. In sum, Pakistanis display a great degree of outward support for their nuclear weapons.

identity. Nuclear Pakistan is not just a continuation of these processes, which are seen to structure the country's relations of power specifically towards India; it is also considered to be the ultimate strategy in striving to make Pakistan invincible and most powerful, again specifically in relation to India.

A feminist approach to IR, which valorises anti-militarism, is useful in analysing how Pakistan's nuclear weapons are interlinked with security and state identity. Several scholars (for instance, Cohn, 1987, 1997; Duncanson and Eschle, 2008; Cohn, Hill, and Ruddick, 2005) have analysed how language associated with nuclear weapons is highly gendered and sexualised to invoke notions of masculine potency[29]. This translates into how for instance the nuclear jargon is a technostrategic one (Cohn, 1987), whilst at the same time it is expressed in euphemisms. In her work, Cohn highlights how this language is a "sanitized abstraction" full of "sexual imagery" that "seemed to fit into the masculine world of nuclear war planning" (1987, p19). She also mentions expressions such as "escalation dominance", "preemptive strikes", or "strategic stability", which are strongly connected with the symbolism associated with gender roles and the masculine sexual imaginary. Also, Duncanson and Eschle (2008) identify how the feminist critique of nuclear weapons exposes the language that states use: "first, the deployment

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[29] The work of Helen Caldicott (1984) is also noteworthy in this regard. She discusses the post-WWII arms race and how "missile envy" can be likened to "penis envy". Interestingly, an article published in *Hilal Magazine* (July 2020) on "India's Arms Obsession and Power Psychosis" uses an image representing a Hindu Indian, dreaming of becoming a strong, muscly man, while two large nuclear missiles are also pictured side by side. It can be seen here: https://www.hilal.gov.pk/eng-article/india%E2%80%99s-arms-obsession-and-power-psychosis/MzgxNw==.html

of sexualised, phallic imagery; second, a tendency to abstraction; and, third, a reliance on gendered axioms" (2008, p548).

Cohn, Hill, and Ruddick note that weapons of mass destruction are political objects whose "gendered terms and symbols are an integral part of how political issues are thought about and represented, and an integral part of the image-production associated with political leaders" (2005, p3). Thus, when AC6, talking about nuclear weapons, mentioned to me that Pakistan is not a 'weak' or 'cunning state' and that it is a 'clever state that used its space', she is providing a representation of Pakistan that is highly heterosexually masculinised;[30] it is a state that should not be portrayed as a 'transgressor' (despite the clandestine nuclear weapons plans). This speaks to the interrelation of identity and security through a conception of a state that could achieve a nuclear weapons programme because it is perceived to be strong, intelligent, and rational. These representations are in line with the findings of the feminist, anti-military critique of nuclear weapons.

Another aspect that is relevant in seeking to understand how nuclear weapons in Pakistan have contributed towards the militarisation and consequent

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[30] Charlotte Hooper provides important insights on the importance of contextualising masculinity, and of considering it a "fluid and plural construction as soon as it is historically contextualized" (2001, p75). Thus, as she notes, whilst the feminist critique of masculinism is often useful in terms of establishing identifications of masculinity with power, it tends to provide a monolithic view of it (ibid.). Thus, masculinities can be represented in different categories, including subordinated masculinities. To be sure, heteronormativity means that heterosexual masculinity is represented not only as hegemonic, but also as the kind of masculinity that is not 'transgressive' and therefore can be associated with power, control, and performance. In this case, reiterating that Pakistan is not weak, that despite its clandestine nuclear programme the country was able to undertake and control it, is but an enforcement of a masculinity that is perceived as the 'right' one capable of being 'in control' and of 'performing'.

masculinisation of the state concerns how Pakistan's nuclear doctrine and the language employed appear to emulate that of NATO. In an article published in the 2019 Winter edition of *The Washington Quarterly*, Sadia Tasleem and Toby Dalton explain how the Pakistani discourse and thinking on nuclear weapons has less of an indigenous influence, and instead appears to be adapted from Western nuclear and strategic thinkers, who inspired the Western Cold War and NATO approaches to deterrence. The authors highlight that several writings by Pakistani nuclear strategists perform a kind of emulation in what appears to be an attempt to secure legitimacy, borrowing concepts and language, and in some cases deducting lessons from Western nuclear experience (Tasleem and Dalton, 2019, p137).

Thus, the nuclearisation of Pakistan also represents how power relations between the West and developing countries is articulated. As Pakistan endured a continuous process of militarisation, following a strategic line of thinking associated with a military alliance seems unsurprising given that NATO is considered to be an institution of international hegemonic masculinity (see Kronsell, 2005; Wright, Hurley, and Ruiz, 2019). This dovetails with what nuclear weapons represent and how Pakistan's search for greater empowerment is closely linked to a notion of attaining the status of a strong, hard country. It is also possible that those Pakistani nuclear scholars have an orientalised notion that the West is technologically more advanced, rational, and better able to control risk (all features that are attributed to a gendered symbolic system that represents a dominant heterosexual masculinity), and therefore are aiming to be perceived as such. For instance,

Hugh Gusterson notes the existence of a "nuclear orientalism", based on the fact that the Western, and in particular the US, defence establishment believes that the existence of nuclear weapons in Third World countries, and particularly Islamic ones, is extremely dangerous (1999, p112). Gusterson further develops this argument and concludes that nuclear policies often represent neo-colonial power relations between developing/Third World countries and the West. He argues that existing non-proliferation policies are derived from a system of domination of 'us' versus 'them', which represents the latter as ineligible to possess nuclear weapons (Gusterson, 1999, p132). There are several reasons why Western leaders perceive other countries as unfit to have nuclear weapons. Third World countries are represented as 'criminals', 'infantile', and 'emotive', and therefore lacking the legitimacy and rationality deemed necessary to have nuclear weapons.

However, whilst introducing a caveat that nuclear weapons must be abolished, an orientalist discourse on nuclear weapons is not acceptable. It reinforces a colonial view of international politics where different states are positioned within a hierarchy that is represented by pejorative terms, and, as Zubairu Wai observes, these representations create "a paradigmatic binary opposition between what is constructed as normal and what is pathological: if what is Western is defined as normal, then the non-Western … Other has to be abnormal, inadequate, deviant or pathological" (2012, p37).

In the concrete case of Pakistan, this orientalist view on the part of Western-centric narratives has been partly reinforced, mainly due to the actions of a few men involved in the nuclear weapons programme. Some of Pakistan's

nuclear scientists developed key connections with international terrorist groups. A certain Mahmood Sultan Bashir-Ud-Din, as described by Levy and Scott-Clark (2007), developed connections with the Taliban. He also wrote and published a pamphlet entitled "Mechanics of Doomsday and Life after Death" in which he argued that natural catastrophes were inevitable in countries that succumbed to "moral decay"[31], while predicting in another treatise that "by 2002 millions may die through mass destruction weapons … terrorist attack, and suicide" (Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, p310). Mahmood, according to the authors, was forced to retire when, following the 1998 nuclear tests, he described them as "property of the Muslim Ummah, and publicly advocated that KRL should provide gas centrifuges and enriched uranium to arm other Islamic states" (ibid.). According to the authors, Mahmood and another colleague had joined a religious-militant-group-cum-charity[32] named *Ummah Tameer-e-Nau* (translated as "Reconstruction of the Muslim Community") and entered into contact with Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan. Allegedly, the latter showed great interest in obtaining nuclear weapons.

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[31] "Moral decay" in Pakistan is often referred to certain aspects of culture associated with the West, and with Indian culture too. Such culture is perceived as yet another threat to Pakistan. A full catalogue of what is perceived as "moral decay" may be found in the following article, written by a retired Brigadier General in 2018, under the title "Pakistan: Declining Moral Standards". Available at: https://www.globalvillagespace.com/pakistan-declining-moral-standards/.

[32] The group has been classified as a terrorist organisation linked to Al-Qaeda. According to the United Nations: "Ummah Tameer e-Nau (UTN) was founded by Pakistani nuclear scientists with close ties to Usama bin Laden (deceased) and the Taliban. UTN provided Usama bin Laden and the Taliban with information about chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. UTN's directors included Mahmood Sultan Bashir-Ud-Din (QDi.055), Majeed Abdul Chaudhry (QDi.054) and Mohammed Tufail (QDi.056)" (UN, 2015). Available from: https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/ummah-tameer-e-nau-%28utn%29

Moreover, when it was revealed in 2004 how A.Q. Khan ran his "nuclear bazaar", Pakistan's aspirations to match India's global image were buried. Pakistan's foreign policy, already facing much discredit, except for in the US, due to the GWOT, had hit a new low (see Levy and Clark, 2009, p2). The critical question here is how and why Pakistan's military clique risked so much, theoretically putting in danger the stability of a world order, given that A.Q. Khan proliferated with countries like North Korea and Libya, together with close contacts with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Yet, despite the serious proliferation issues that took place in parallel with the development of the whole nuclear weapons programme, Pakistanis continue to feel great pride in their nuclear weapons, including on the part of the man who contributed both to their "glory" and "shame": A.Q. Khan. What threat could indeed justify the dangerous and clandestine activities of a network headed by someone who has become a national hero. There is only one answer: India.

Thus, in the domestic realm of politics, nuclear Pakistan is now represented as a fusion between the needs of security and a much sought-after identity. This identity is infused with vainglory that is compared to other great achievements of the Muslim Civilisation, and is seen as being on a par with India. However, this new state identity is also internationally equated with discourses that construct nuclear weapons as abhorrent and morally indefensible. Because of the orientalist perspective of the Western nuclear-armed states, which portray themselves as "responsible, prudent, rational, advanced, mature, restrained, technologically and bureaucratically competent

(and thus 'hegemonically masculine')" (Cohn, Hill, and Ruddick, 2005, p8), Pakistan, a highly masculinised country, finds itself at a crossroads.

Despite Pakistan's hyper-masculinity and desire to be recognised as a 'hard' country with aims of becoming a leader in the Muslim world, time and again her leadership has been confronted with the problem of being one of the West's Others. The country is often represented as an 'unruly other', a realm of unpredictable politics and incompetency, thus relegating her to a position of perceived 'subordinated masculinity'.

However, nuclear apologists in Pakistan are unwilling to accept the narrative of subordination. For instance, Rabia Akhtar (2018) examines how US administrations from Ford to Clinton have turned a blind eye to Pakistan's nuclear activities. She argues that "each administration shifted non-proliferation goalposts and red lines for Pakistan and prioritized foreign policy over non-proliferation policy" (Akhtar, 2018, p15). The sense of defiance toward the US one can detect in the book is indeed significant. Thus, defiance, security, and nuclear weapons form an integral part of Pakistan's foreign policy and have helped to shape the nation's state identity. In the case of Pakistan, a neo-colonial and orientalist discourse on nuclear weapons has not deterred the state elite from building a powerful nationalist narrative, or from remaining oblivious to the consequences that a militarised and heterosexual masculinised establishment may have on a multi-national,

multi-ethnic population living amid challenging economic, social, and political conditions.

1.3 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have explained how three key moments of Pakistan's foreign policy have helped to shape the interlinking between identity and security. These key moments are but representations of aggression, war, conflict, and military might, despite the losses incurred therein. Pakistan's aligned years in the 1950s, represented by her decisions to join international military alliances, the Bangladesh Liberation War and its aftermath that led Pakistan to become a nuclear armed state, all contributed towards the construction of a new state identity based on the pursuit of security.

These foreign policy stages, which generated the interlinking between security and identity, represent a state identity that is deeply gendered and gendering, and which is reiterated in the process. The hyper, heterosexual masculinity associated with military alliances, war, including rape and genocide, and nuclear weapons, have all been performed by Pakistan's main foreign policy actor, namely the military. To be sure, it is the militaristic background of bureaucratic-military leadership that has accentuated (and perpetuates) the conditions of possibility for it to happen, thus enhancing an ideological militarism.

Hence, whilst the majority of literature on Pakistan's foreign policy highlights security and the 'India threat', it largely ignores how militarism has shaped the state's security and identity. This chapter also demonstrates how militarism became enhanced at critical foreign policy moments, and how this enhancement created the conditions for the following moments to happen. From military alliances, which are institutions of hyper-masculinity, to genocidal practices, and to building nuclear weapons, the Pakistani state elite has sought to construct an identity that is clearly distinct from that of India. This process has been aided by militarism and notions of heterosexual masculinity linked to violence. In the next chapter, I will explain how militarism has been inculcated in Pakistan, with a focus on its actors and proponents.

CHAPTER II

PAKISTAN, MILITARISM AND ITS AGENTS

2.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to provide a background on the origins of the state of Pakistan in order to understand how the distinct roles of religion, the military, and intelligence agencies contributed to shape the country's foreign policy, which continues to be sustained by a focus on security. In the previous chapter, I outlined how key stages of Pakistan's foreign policy have contributed to the militarisation and masculinisation of foreign policy. This chapter engages more intimately with militarism in order to demonstrate how it has been a determinant factor in Pakistan's foreign policies with China, India, and the US.

In the introductory section, I provide an overview of the main theories related to the emergence of Pakistan, and how they have generated contested views on the country's origins. In the subsequent sections, I analyse the roles of religion, the military, and the intelligence agencies, as the main intervening factors in the construction of Pakistan's foreign policy narratives.

The emergence of Pakistan as an independent state in 1947 results from the assemblage of political initiatives carried out by a group of Indian Muslims. These political initiatives were mostly headed by the All-India Muslim League, and may be perceived as a dual struggle against British Colonialism and the political dominance of a Hindu majority. Thus, the idea of a Pakistan as a product of Muslim politics involved a struggle to obtain more political rights. However, as a minority, Indian Muslims did not form a unified front, neither in their political claims, nor in respect of their ideas about nationhood[33]. Notwithstanding, a more consensual narrative that serves the state of Pakistan's claims for existence as a nation independent from India is the one that describes its origins as "a civic, republican project of the modernist Muslims in undivided India under the British rule (…) intellectually influenced by the enlightenment ideas of European modernity (…) which they skillfully applied to the question of Muslims' empowerment" (Rais, 2017, p15).

This description of the origins of Pakistan overlooks a variety of issues which have been highlighted by different scholars, and to date there is no consensus on the real motivations behind the creation of this new state in South Asia. Muslim politics during British colonial rule in India were neither unidirectional nor consensual in relation to themes like Muslim nationalism. However, modernist Muslims' politics were controlled by an educated elite with strong roots in Northern India, mostly in the United Provinces, and just a few in the regions that would become Pakistan (Adeel Khan, 2005, p69).

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[33] See for instance Qasmi and Robb (2017) and Shamsul Islam (2015).

The question of separatism based on the idea of being distinct from and opposed to the numerically dominant, more affluent Hindu population, became central in those regions of India, and by the end of the nineteenth century, Muslim separatism had firmly settled in Muslim elite politics.

Christophe Jaffrelot (2015) notes that socio-political interests and cultural factors constitute the main explanations for this separatism. The former are part of an instrumentalist approach, highlighting how nationalist ideas become established, whilst offering "a convenient repertoire to elite groups whose domination over society is threatened by upwardly mobile others and which therefore try to mobilise behind them 'their' community by manipulating identity symbols (including religious and linguistic ones)" (Jaffrelot, 2015, p181). The latter, framed as a the main approach, defends the view that the "Muslims of India were so clearly different from the Hindus in civilisational terms that they were bound to become separatists" (ibid, p182).

These two approaches have been of service in providing and perpetuating the idea that the new country of Pakistan, based on the idea that Muslims are a separate nation, became an inevitability. The primordial approach had gained much currency amongst the AIML leadership; it continues to form the basis of the two-nation theory as it is sanctioned by the Pakistani state narrative. However, the two-nation theory – either the Muslim argument, or the Hindu one[34] – reflects how nationalism, essentially a Eurocentric concept, was

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[34] See Shamsul Islam (2015, pp55-61) for a detailed discussion of what each one entails, and particularly how Hindu Nationalists have also constructed a variant of the two-nation theory before the Muslim League.

exported to and assimilated by those struggling against British/European colonial rule.

The diversity of nationalist views among Muslims during British colonial rule is often glossed with the nationalist narrative of the AIML. The latter indeed followed the "colonial argument of two nations" (Thapar, 2016), thus prolonging the exercise of colonial thinking throughout the creation of Pakistan and beyond. As this argument has been cited and repeated time and again by Pakistan's state elites, other histories of Muslim nationalisms in Colonial India were seen as less relevant. This led to "dangerous over-simplifications that actually hinder deeper understandings of nationalism themselves" (Sarkar 2008, p432). This act of glossing over the diversity of nationalist narratives, including key elements relating to class and gender, is significant. For instance, Ayesha Jalal (2007) suggests differences in nationalist sentiment amongst Indian Muslims:

> Even as far afield as Bengal, it was Muslims from the *ashraf* classes with knowledge of Urdu and Persian who seemed most eager to make common cause with their co-religionists in northern India and the Punjab. … For the vast majority of Indian Muslims, outside the realm of privilege bestowed by the colonial state, the concerns and activities of Muslim *ashraf* classes were for the most part distant, if not altogether irrelevant. (2007, p153)

Jalal also notes how, in general, women were detached from the Muslim nationalist discourse in pre- and post-partition moments[35], which contributed to the "silencing and erasing of suffering of those women which bespoke of the inhumanity that had greeted the arrival of independence in South Asia. The women from the lower social strata remained on the margins" (ibid, p565). Thus, any explanation of Pakistan's creation will be subjected to critique, given the diversity of political motivations, as well as in light of those who opposed the country's very creation.

Whilst the prevalent narrative used by the state of Pakistan suggests that there was a consensus of all Indian Muslims in respect of the creation of a separate state, which they imagined as a "homeland", there is now research that proves otherwise. In *Muslims Against the Partition*, Shamsul Islam (2015) builds this case. He demonstrates how and why "patriotic Muslims", i.e., those who believed that "religion could not be the basis of a nation" (Islam, 2015, p167), opposed the creation of a state based on the amalgamation of religion and nation. Those "patriotic Muslims" were also often targeted and attacked by a quasi-military body associated with the Muslim League – the Muslim League National Guards (ibid, p168).

The existing literature on the history of the origins of Pakistan does not directly focus on the role of the MLNG. In *The Sole Spokesman*, Ayesha Jalal (1985) includes two footnotes from which it is possible to grasp its

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[35] Jalal also notes that the same happened across the border, and highlights the feminist literature on the partition as a source for further readings.

communalist, para-military, and violent nature, as well as its role in the carnage before and during partition. In *Creating a New Medina*, Venkat Dhulipala (2015) briefly mentions the group as a youth body with strong links to Aligarh[36], which has contributed towards Muslims' social mobilisation. However, it is Ian Talbot (1996) who provides a more extensive account of the MLNG in *Freedom's Cry*. Talbot notes the lack of research and available resources on this group. He dedicates a full chapter to the para-military group, highlighting its origins and its changing role in the years that led up to the partition. The group, whilst initially in charge of providing law and order to where the AIML political activities were taking place, increasingly engaged in acts of violence, including the use of live ammunition and the bombing of bridges and railway lines in Punjab (Talbot, 1996, p70). Interestingly, it was in the Punjab where MLNG activities found less support due to the political importance of the Unionist party.

Another relevant characteristic of the MLNG is its meaningful symbolism that linked concepts of hyper-masculinity, militarism, nation, and religion. Talbot (1996) highlights the importance accorded to the ideals of "discipline, truthfulness, and social service with a concern to meld together a cohesive Muslim community" (1996, p63). Reportedly, the para-military group had also dedicated time to "drilling in order to improve physical fitness and instil discipline and *esprit de corps.* Guards were trained in club-handling and exercised with dummy rifles. During the exceptionally tense period of May

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[36] Ian Talbot's (1996) research mentions that large numbers of MLNG were drawn from Bengal and Bihar, based on the autobiography of the para-military group commander.

1947, illegal training with live ammunition was given in some camps in the western districts of the United Provinces" (ibid, p67). These characteristics fit into a masculinised representation of a Muslim national identity, which by then was already associated with representations of a "Hindu threat", which instilled the need to guarantee protection through discipline. The MLNG appear to have taken up such a role with great commitment.

Talbot (1996) also observes how the group played a significant role in uniformising an imagined identity for Pakistan, through symbolic actions and attire. He highlights the importance of the group's flag salutation, and in particular the uniform, which "contained a deeper meaning than the 'surface' show of smartness and discipline. It also epitomized a commitment to a sense of Islamic community which transcended loyalties to particularist identities. Turbans, caps and clothes which bespoke of regional or *biraderi* allegiances were replaced by the common uniform and Jinnah cap of the Muslim volunteer" (ibid, p71). Another historian, David Gilmartin (2014) concurs with Talbot concerning the role of the MLNG, and notes how the group adopted "trappings associated with the state, helping thus to define the Muslim League, like a state, as both the expression and the guarantor of the cultural identity of the Indian Muslims" (2014, p285).

It is significant that the political group that was a leading proponent of having a separate government for the Muslims of India had adopted a militaristic ethos from the outset. This cultural identity that the MLNG helped to inculcate pre-partition has been irremediably linked to a process of

militarisation of a Muslim national identity that is also idealised as masculine, and that continues to be prevalent in present-day Pakistan. Pakistan's national symbology, whilst interlinked with religion, also carries a militaristic component. During my fieldwork in Pakistan, I was able to ascertain the importance carried by national symbols, and how they continue to be applied so as to make every effort to attain a representation of a coherent imagined national Muslim identity. They are on display almost everywhere. Wearing *shalwar kameez*, particularly by men, not only represents a commitment to Muslim culture, but also serves as a symbol of unity (that armies represent well) and perhaps a higher morality through religiosity.

Hoisting and lowering the flag, a militaristic ritual, carries great significance. The daily ritual and theatrical flag lowering before sunset at the Wagah border is a notable example of how the militarisation of national identity happens, through processes of citation and repetition. I had the opportunity to go to the border on what constituted a significant symbolic moment of my fieldwork. The whole parade is fully controlled by the army. Whilst the objective is to lower the flag, simultaneously with the Indian counterpart, the performance that takes place is a display of powerful, vigorous movements intended to enhance the belief that Pakistan and Pakistanis are stronger and more masculinised than the Indian side, which, for its part, does exactly the same.

As such, this is exemplary of how militarisation is carried forward over the course of decades and how it continues to be performed. Furthermore, educational institutions take great pride in hosting flag ceremonies,

particularly during national holidays. I noted this at the university where I was placed during my fieldwork. During an interview with AC2 in September 2016, he mentioned that every 14 August, his family, wife and children assemble to hoist the flag at their home. These examples reflect how the creation of Pakistan, despite the sanctioned version favoured by the present-day state elites, may be seen as resulting not only from the perspective of the historical competing interests of high politics, but also through representations that would later mirror current state practices, and, more importantly, a pre-independence inclination towards a militarised and masculinised national identity, through which the association between religion and the nation could be expressed.

2.2   The role of religion in constructing foreign policy, identity and security

In this section my aim is to highlight how religion has contributed towards a sustained focus on security in Pakistan's foreign policy. As Islam is a state religion, Pakistan is considered to be an ideological state (Nasr, 2001; Roy, 2002). Islamic ideology is an undeniable attribute of the state of Pakistan. The importance of the ideological leanings of the Pakistan Movement are often overshadowed by Jinnah's secularist credentials. However, the Movement is believed to have tilted towards ideology for the sake of expediency. Historian Ayesha Jalal (1991) notes: "the role of Islam in the processes leading up to the partition of India was to amplify and dignify what remained from first to

last a political struggle launched by the Muslim League under the secular leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah" (1991, p277).

However, soon after partition, Islam started to be asserted in politics, despite Jinnah hinting at a separation between politics and religion. The Pakistani leadership created a new political identity, whilst not being certain about how best to work it out; it also urgently needed a constitutional frame. Constitutional arrangements to frame the role of Islam in governing the new state became a matter of controversy and disagreement in Pakistan's early leadership. However, the ideological role of Islam framed as a process of alterity appears to have remained well defined. Ayesha Jalal explains how Islam became also a source of legitimacy and of "non-Indianess":

> proclaiming Islam, however defined, as the ideology of the state proved to be an irresistible expedient for the temporal authorities quite as much as for the religious, although for very different reasons. It emphasised Pakistan's distinctiveness in relation to India; gave the "appearance" – if not the reality – of unity to an otherwise disparate people and allowed the state more room in which to manoeuvre its way towards establishing dominance over a society with highly localised and fragmented structures of authority. (1991, p278).

Once Islam had become an incorporated feature of Pakistan politics, despite the difficulties encountered, particularly at the constitution-making level[37], at the level of foreign policy things were more straightforward. Pakistan needed to engage with the international community and her desire to acquire a unique

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[37] For an in-depth account of the process, including the first constitutional efforts under "The Objectives Resolution" of 1949, see Hamid Khan (2009).

status within the Muslim world led to a particular emphasis on Islam. The construction of such status has been maintained, albeit with fluctuations in external recognition, by a strong ideological imprint in foreign policy (Askari-Rizvi, 1983, 1993).

2.2.1 Mapping Islamic religion in Pakistan's foreign policy

In this subsection, I chart the historical importance of Islam in Pakistan's foreign policy. Whilst Islam has had a chequered influence on Pakistan's foreign relations, its relevance resides in helping to cement Pakistan's state identity as Islamic, and concomitantly exposing the state's ambitions to become an international leader within the Muslim world.

The history of Pakistan's foreign relations reveals that Islam is part and parcel of foreign policy making. Pakistan's external relations have shaped the affinity Pakistan has tried to maintain with the Muslim world. This affinity has been moved, on the one hand, by historical, cultural and traditional elements in society, and on the other, by the skilful use of these elements to advance Pakistan's interests. Furthermore, Article 40 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan demonstrates how enshrined the religion is in the country's last constitution of 1973:

> 40 – The State shall endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic Unity, support the common interests of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, promote international peace and

security, foster goodwill and friendly relations among all nations and encourage the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. (The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, p20)

The 1973 Constitution was written after the breakup of Pakistan in 1971, and it coincides with a new stage in the relationship between foreign policy, security, and identity. Islamic ideology became even more central in the construction of a newer version of Pakistan. Until 1971, Pakistan had sought close relations with Muslim countries; however, that led to some unpredictable results concerning foreign policy goals. Pakistan's support for the anti-colonial struggles across the Muslim world translated into an *aggrandisement* of her Pan-Islamic[38] sentiments. As S.M. Burke suggests, "the unification of a part only of the Muslims of the world under the flag of Pakistan was thus not viewed by the founding fathers of Pakistan as the culmination of their efforts but merely as a necessary milestone on the journey towards the ultimate goal of universal Muslim solidarity" (1973, p65).

Pakistani foreign policy towards Muslim countries in the 1950s was marked by the former's leadership ambitions. However, a different social, cultural and political reality, particularly in terms of what concerns the Arab people in the Middle East, led to some disappointment, due in part to a certain level

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[38] Chengappa uses the term "Pak-Islamism", as flowing from "the idea that the Islamic crescent runs from Morocco to Indonesia" (2004, p105). In the context of the discussion, the term to use would be "Pan-Islamism"; however, "Pak-Islamism", whether a typo or used on purpose, expresses quite well the motivation of Pakistani leaders post-independence.

of naivety. This much is acknowledged by Z.A. Bhutto when, in November 1962, as Minister of Commerce, he stated:

> Relying too literally on the Islamic precept that all Muslims are brothers, we sought to create a brotherhood of Muslim peoples at a time when the force of Arab nationalism was in full flood; and its ideological basis was different from that of our own nation. The Arab States were under various types of political regimes, and were divided amongst themselves. (1962, p20)

Bhutto rightly identified how until 1954 Pakistan's naïve Islamic leanings towards foreign policy were about to complicate its relationship with the Middle Eastern countries, whose nationalist movements were not driven by Islam, but rather by anti-Western/anti-imperialist sentiments (Rizvi, 1993). The different nature of the struggle against Western colonial dominance carried out by the Muslims of India and by the Arabs was not fully understood by Pakistani leaders. Instead, the Muslim-Hindu binary remained central to the construction of their processes of otherness. Subsequently, the Pakistani leadership became oblivious to the socio-cultural differences between Muslims across the world. For instance, this was reflected in how Pakistan perceived the Arab nationalism question, and how the Suez Crisis threw Pakistan into a rather obscurantist position concerning her foreign relations, since, at that time, she was already engaged in SEATO and CENTO, and hence allied with the West.

Muslim solidarity and the search for a new identity both served the urge of Pakistan's leaders to part ways from India, now a foreign country dominated

by a different religion, despite the country's official secular character. Indian scholars have been able to grasp this fact in a more detached way, as, for instance, Bidanda Chengappa notes:

> The Muslim nation was founded in order to thwart the threat of Hindu domination. This inspired Pakistan to distance itself politically, historically, culturally and geographically from India. In the process, Pakistan sought to disown her linkages with the subcontinent and align herself with the Islamic states of West Asia. (Chengappa, 2004, p93)

Chengappa's suggestion becomes particularly relevant in the wake of the 1971 events, together with Z.A. Bhutto's foreign policy options. This desire to disengage from the ideational origins of the subcontinent also emerged during my fieldwork in Pakistan. The interviews I conducted revealed that Pakistanis wish to be seen differently from Indians. AC2 mentioned that "[Pakistan's] historical and cultural ties with Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey and Central Asian states have been overshadowed by the history of animosity with Indians – more specifically 'Hindus'", while AM1 intimated that "Because of national identity", "Pakistan opens to three predominantly Muslim regions: Middle East, West Asia, and Central Asia".

2.2.2   Bhutto's Islamic imprint on Pakistan's foreign policy

Muslim nationalism, which had defined Pakistan, suffered a major set-back with the rise of Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan. Eastern Pakistanis did not receive the same degree of fraternal Islamic warmth emanating from West

Pakistan, in comparison with, for instance, the Middle East. After 1971 Pakistan was a doubly defeated country. Pakistan's state leadership had to re-invent and re-structure itself. It sought to revive ties with the Middle East and the Arab world. During my interviews, the events of 1971 were mentioned only twice as being of relevance to the construction of national identity. AC1 highlighted the critical relevance of the historical event for the country's national identity, while AM1 commented: "Pakistan gained a new opportunity for an Islamic identity".

Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto became the main architect of Pakistan's makeover. During that period, foreign policy came to be of chief importance as a way to advance the country's national interests, and as a tool to rebrand the nation's identity. Tahir-Kheli (1983) highlights the main aspects of Bhutto's usage of Islamic ideology and their impact on Pakistan. This rapprochement with Islam permitted a reinforcement of national interests based on one of the main world's religions, and at the same time opened the door to more comprehensive relations with oil-rich Muslim countries. However, the use of Islam in foreign policy did not supersede security as the main driver. After being defeated by India, Mr Bhutto's intentions to develop nuclear weapons were turned into a national priority. Middle East monarchies, once brought close to the imagined realm of Islamic solidarity, were then expected to disburse the funds needed to pursue the nuclear programme.

The organisation of the 1974 Islamic Summit in Lahore marked the peak of Bhutto's foreign policy endeavours. To be sure, by 1974 Pakistan was desperately in need of improving her image in the international community, after the 1971 war. Pakistan had yet to recognise Bangladesh, and "the conference presented an opportunity for Pakistan to afford recognition to Bangladesh without losing its face" (Pasha, 2005, p90). Bhutto's diplomatic experience was instrumental. Not only did he create a situation in which Pakistan's damaged reputation and ego could somehow be repaired, but at the same time it brought Bangladesh closer to the Muslim world, turning the whole political issue into a "multilateral affair of the Muslim states" (ibid, p91).

The Lahore Summit was of major importance for Pakistan foreign relations and it had a significant impact on domestic politics. It consolidated Z.A. Bhutto's leadership, as he could easily oscillate between the identities of a Pakistani nationalist and a Muslim socialist (Syed, 1982, p132). Pakistan expressed solidarity with the Arabs, thereby attempting to dissipate the consequences of previous closer associations with the US. This solidarity, as mentioned earlier, would be converted into economic benefits.

2.2.3   The Zia-ul-Haq legacy or the politics of continuation

The dismissal of Z.A. Bhutto at the hands of his chosen COAS, Zia-ul-Haq, has been widely debated, and is well documented within the literature on Pakistan's political history (Nawaz, 2008; Talbot, 2012; Ahmed, 2013; Jalal,

2008, 2014; Jaffrelot, 2015). Shuja Nawaz suggests that "Zia's regime was a watershed for Pakistani politics" (2008, p361). General Zia followed a very strict interpretation of Islam. The Islamisation programme that Pakistan underwent during his eleven-year rule is usually attributed to his personal influence aided by the country's religious parties, particularly the Jamaat' Islami. As far as foreign policy is concerned, Zia's dictatorship did not depart from the ideological turf laid down by Bhutto. However, Zia would be confronted with external pressures that exacerbated the ideological nature of the country's foreign policy. Shuja Nawaz (2008) highlights that India's fast-growing military and nuclear capacity, the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, and the Iranian Revolution all impacted Pakistan's foreign policy.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan revealed how ideology further became entrenched in foreign policy in Pakistan. While Pakistan's rapprochement with the US impacted and drove foreign policy, Sujah Nawaz (2008) argues that the Americans were not the first to initiate opposition against the Soviets: "immediately after the Soviets rumbled into Kabul, Prince Turki recounts how the Saudi king received a call from Zia, who wished to send General Rahman to the kingdom to brief its leadership" (ibid, p372). Certainly, the US was instrumental during the ten-year-long war in Afghanistan, by funding an ultra-ideological training programme for rebels on Pakistani soil. However, the Saudi link proved to be of great significance, not only during the Afghan war, but in the continuation of an ideologically driven support for the Taliban during the 1990s.

As noted by Pasha (2005), due to the Afghan war, Central Asia turned out to be a fertile ground for the propagation of conservative Islamic ideology, fuelling the Pan-Islamic sentiment that had never been abandoned by Pakistani leaders. The consolidation of a conservative ideology notwithstanding, with the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, Pakistan had at her disposal organised jihadist machinery, ready to be transferred to Kashmir, the perennial source of conflict with India. If during Bhutto's government the ideological imprinting on foreign policy was mainly aimed at obtaining economic gains and repairing the country's identity both internally and externally, during Zia's era, an ideological foreign policy became an instrument of political violence.

Of course, conflict in Afghanistan persists to this day. The surge of the Taliban and how successfully they controlled the country is associated with the support Pakistan lent to the group, under the imagined "strategic depth". Riaz Mohammad Khan, a former Foreign Secretary and Ambassador with extensive experience in Afghan politics, explains how Pakistan incorporated into her political and social settings an Afghanistan dominated by the Taliban:

> the religious elements in Pakistan vociferously eulogized the Taliban for their simplicity, honesty, piety and commitment to Islam and as harbingers of peace in Afghanistan … At times, these exaggerations were deliberate and calculated to bolster public acceptance of the Taliban in Pakistan. A combination of political ambitions of religious forces and the prevailing military view that Afghanistan under Taliban could best serve the interests of Pakistan in the area [so-called

"strategic depth"] was the underlying impulse of this campaign, a heady blend of a revivalist Islam and simplistic Realpolitik. (2011, p85).

The tribulations that Pakistan has continued to experience since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and their aggravation post-9/11, result from the foreign policy decisions taken by her leaders ever since. Zia-ul-Haq, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, and Pervez Musharraf all sustained a foreign policy which ultimately generated political violence and dehumanisation. Pakistani leaders relied on ideology to defend a perceived national interest, which itself was grounded on the precarious security complex constructed around perceived threats emerging from her inimical relations with India.

Pakistan never abandoned the idealist and ideological imprint of her foreign policy, and continued to pursue it beyond Afghanistan. Despite some irritants and disagreements, Pakistan maintains straight relations with Iran and enjoys almost unconditional support from Saudi Arabia. Further afield, Pakistan considers Turkey as not just a "brother", but a role model[39]. Furthermore, since the collapse of Soviet Union, reaching Central Asia has been an important objective for Pakistan. According to the former Ambassador Akram Zaki, "developing friendship with the Muslim nations is one of the cardinal principles of Pakistan's foreign policy and reflects the ethos of the Pakistani people" (1992, p10). After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the consequent independence of the Central Asian republics, Pakistan saw a unique opportunity to forge closer ties with those countries which, according

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[39] The same has been recently reciprocated by the Turkish President. See: https://tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/100428/-turkey-and-pakistan-are-two-brotherly-countries-whose-friendly-ties-date-back-a-long-time-in-history-

to Zaki, have been cut off from South and West Asia, where they share historical, cultural and traditional ties (ibid, p13). As such, Pakistan saw a significant opportunity to embrace the Central Asian region.

2.2.4   Foreign policy and Islamic ideology – making the Indian Other

In the previous sections, I discussed how Islam as a religion was deployed for the creation of Pakistan, and how it has been relevant in historically significant foreign policy developments. Relations with Afghanistan and India have played a central role in how religious ideology has shaped the interlinking between identity and security. The complexity of these two foreign relations will be dealt in the next chapters. However, before doing so, the specific role of religion in the construction of the interlinking between security and identity needs to be grasped.

Relations with India, which are mostly represented as ones of enmity and as a source of threat, form the key context for understanding the importance of religious ideology, as the latter has a constitutive role in shaping the relationship. The "ideology of Pakistan", based on the two-nations theory, continues to constitute the background of Pakistan's engagements with India, including the former's incessant efforts towards preparedness for war.

As the military continues to be the state institution that most influences foreign policy, it is relevant to understand how religious ideology has also shaped the military's thinking about the perceived threat of a hostile India.

For instance, using texts produced by the Pakistani military, C.C. Fair demonstrates that the military continues to use "Islam, the ideology of Pakistan, and the two-nation theory to sustain popular appetite for unending conflict with India and the army's continued dominance over Pakistan's internal and external affairs" (2014, p394). Fair's detailed analysis of a few texts from defence literature highlights how the military has nurtured the idea that an Islamic ideology builds national character (2014, p383). Through those texts it is possible to acknowledge how this articulation takes place. For instance, Fair cites an essay written by a Brig. Jamshed Ali, who suggests that:

> National culture and military performance and achievements are closely inter-linked. An army *mirrors the true state of its society* and is as good and as bad as the people who constitute it … the armed forces must at all times maintain a state of cultural purity and mirror the idealistic virtues of an army steeped in Islamic military traditions. It is only by maintaining an integrated, cohesive and puritanical military system that the armed forces can retain their pristine, tradition oriented military way in a liberal society. (Ali, cited in Fair, 2014, p390, italics as in citation)

Another excerpt that Fair cites relates to a text published in the Pakistan Army Green Book (2000). The author, Maj. Gen. Asif Duraiz Akhtar, criticises the country's politicians, accusing them of failing to "capitalize on [the] Two-Nation Theory and consolidate the national integration" (Akhtar, 2000, cited in Fair, 2014, p397). He also makes an interesting reference to foreign policy and suggests that the army "has tried to provide stability, pursued aggressive foreign policy and developed a semblance of cohesion in the society based on

Nationalism or Pan-Islamism" (ibid). Further in her discussion, Fair engages the writing of another military figure, who explicitly establishes this articulation between the two-nation theory, militarism, and Islam. An essay written in 1992 by Major Qaisar Farooqi, entitled "Islamic Concept of Preparedness" (ibid, p402), exemplifies this. The excerpt that Fair cites is particularly interesting. As she mentions, it relates to the Pakistani military's "perpetual struggle", which, in turn, gets articulated with the militarist concept of a permanent status of "war-preparedness". Major Farooqi thus writes: "if the conflict is everlasting between the believers and the non-believers, or in other words between the forces of light and darkness, the fight has to go on till one of the belligerent forces is completely wiped out" (Farooqui, 1992, cited in Fair, 2014, p402). Fair quotes a lengthy passage from Major Farooqi's essay, which is relevant for understanding how militarism, religion, and national identity are interlinked in Pakistan:

> Preparation for war is thus a sacred duty not only of an individual but of the entire Muslim Ummah; the Quranic message (read out on every passing out parade in the Pakistan military Academy, Kakul) enjoins upon all Muslims to take to the highest standards of preparedness, as it says, "And make ready your strength, to the utmost of your power including sinews of war, to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies of Allah, and your enemies, and others besides them, whom you know not but Allah doth know. And whatever you expend in the cause of Allah shall be repaid until you and you shall not be treated unjustly." (Al Anfal-60) … Islam does not visualize the total annihilation or complete extinction of the non-Islamic forces and people but ordains the Muslims to keep their enemies either subjugated or restrained. (ibid, p403).

Thus, a military whose ethos is shaped by sedimented binaries of believers/non-believers (read: Muslims and Hindus), pure/impure, subjugator/subjugated, and by the notion that war-preparedness is a duty associated with the realm of the sacred, creates the conditions of possibility for a concept of security that is also gendered and patriarchal. In turn, such a concept of security is also bound up with the gendered notion and duty of protecting the "nation", including going to war to protect women and children (Enloe, 1990; Yuval-Davis, 1997), as the latter are perceived and represented as those who can assure the "biological reproduction of the nation" (Yuval-Davis, 1993; 1997). This is particularly relevant in the relatively newly created state of Pakistan, in order to understand how security and identity are interlinked and how they retain a central role in foreign policy.

Interpretations of Islam as a religious ideology are frequently associated with male-dominated, patriarchal, and gendered forms of cultural and societal organisation, albeit to varying degrees, in view of local constructions of cultural beliefs (see for instance Moghissi, 1999; Ross, 2008). These patriarchal constructions often aim to control women's sexuality and bodies, associated with the need to defend motherhood, wifehood, and fertility, and as such they are vital to the sustained reproduction of the nation. The role of the military, given its power to shape Pakistani societal and cultural norms, in association with religious ideology, thus calls for more in-depth analysis.

In October 2018, *Hilal Magazine* (published and controlled by the ISPR) began publishing a separate online edition for women and children. The

women's edition is labelled *Hilal for Her[40]*, while the children's version is called *Hilal for Kids*. Both publications use English, whilst, interestingly, *Hilal for Kids* is bilingual and downloadable in PDF format. This fact raises a few questions as to why Urdu is used for children and not for women, and how women and children are represented. As my analysis is based on *Hilal for Her*, it suffices to say that the children's version is often infused with Pakistani religious nationalism, so that the latter may be inculcated into the minds of the younger generations.

The cover of the first edition of *Hilal for Her* is worth studying. The title of the first issue is *Empowered Women, Empowered Nation*[41]. The portrayed women, mostly well-known, celebrated women, from the fields of politics, music, the military, are those whom the state accepts, sanctions, and deems to be suitable role models. However, it is interesting to note who is not portrayed: Malala Yousafzai, the Nobel Peace Prize winner and human/girls'/women's rights activist; Asma Jahangir, an internationally renowned human rights lawyer and activist; and Sharmeen Obaid-Chinoy, a film director, documentary maker, and recipient of two Academy Awards. It is little surprise that such prominent figures have been omitted from the magazine cover since they have all documented and exposed the parlous situation of women in Pakistan. In their work, Yousafzai and Obaid-Chinoy have denounced and uncovered Pakistan as an international and human and women's rights offender. They have also challenged the role that the state has

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[40] See the online version here: https://www.hilal.gov.pk/hilal-her-magazine/2018-10
[41] Unfortunately, the image of the magazine cover is not included in the online archive. It is, however, available by searching Google Images.

constructed for and peddled to women. As a result, the military publication refuses to acknowledge them.

The magazine has become a regular publication. However, the first issue is the most revealing for our purposes, since it includes a message from the patron in chief, the director of the ISPR, Major General Asif Ghafoor, which unveils the relationship between religion, militarism, and the state-idealised woman. The text is a prime example of how militarism shapes and controls the country's identity and security. First, Ghafoor addresses the readers, expressing his appreciation of Pakistani women's achievements, and how the latter are linked to Islam, by quoting the exemplary first wife of the Prophet who was a successful businesswoman. Two paragraphs later, he finally addresses the women: "Dear Ladies", he begins. The following passage is worth quoting at length:

> Thanks to the institution of motherhood, and the willingness on part of their male partners; women have withstood difficulties and paved their way through challenging environments. Today's woman is greatly contributing to actually revolutionizing and bringing positive fortune to the society. Now she is in every field; she is a banker, a soldier, an artist, an astronaut etc. We have women excelling and outshining in the defence forces, law enforcement & intelligence agencies, government and semi-government organizations, private and industrial sectors, IT and communication, media and transport and more importantly, at home. *Hilal for Her* is a tribute to this fact of life. Pakistan Armed Forces are providing women full representation and opportunity of a career. We believe in encouraging them, promoting and protecting their sense of identity and conviction, galvanizing their talent and potential through education and knowledge. *Hilal for Her* is just one part

of the role the Armed Forces are playing in contributing to the cause. We are confident that this will inspire and educate our womenfolk, who can play an effective and vibrant role towards bringing a progressive change in the society. (Asif Ghaffor, 2018)

This quote exemplifies how the Pakistani military, an active agent on the building of security, identity, and foreign policy, selects and attempts to integrate the role of women into their imagined idea of nationhood. The willingness of the armed forces to represent women, to educate them, and to promote and protect their identity is a sign of the gendered and patriarchal role of the military. The latter's role is thus extended beyond guarding the state's sovereignty. It expands into controlling and regulating women's bodies and livelihoods in order to ensure the production, reproduction and control of the imagined nation-state.

As highlighted by Sylvia Walby, "the relationship between feminism and nationalism is crucially mediated by militarism, [and] militarism is often seen as an integral facet of a national project" (Walby, 2012, pp838-839). Thus, the publishing of *Hilal for Her*, using a medium of communication with the potential to reach a vast number of readers, contributes to the growing evidence that shows how feminist approaches are useful to understand how militarism and nationalism are often interlinked. It also suggests that the Pakistani military, which embodies an ethos shaped by an articulation of religious ideology and hyper-masculinity, strives to exercise control over Pakistani women, as a way of ensuring the continuation of the nationalist project. The military, then, represents and enacts this production and

reproduction of the tight connection between security and identity that is both gendered and masculinised.

In this sub-section I have examined how religious ideology impacted the construction of Pakistan and its main foreign policy actor: the military. In this construction, the interconnection of security and identity occupies a central space, with the military controlling and dominating both areas. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Indian-centric orientation of foreign policy determines how issues of security and identity become dependent on the role of religious ideology, as the latter continues to be an important signifier and guarantor of Pakistan's relation of hostile distinction from India. Thus, perpetuating a status of war-preparedness, which determines foreign policy decision-making, involves more than mere control over weaponry. It also requires control over civilian and in particular women's bodies and nationalistic views. In the next sub-section I analyse how the military has reinforced that status by controlling a key element of the state: the bureaucracy.

2.3   The role of the military in foreign policy

Masculinist, militarised representations of the nation do not occur in vacuum. They are closely connected to the Pakistani military and its affiliates as institutions. The military has managed to occupy a ubiquitous role in the country's institutions, extending its influence into different sectors of society. Concerning foreign policy formulation and decision-making, Pakistan's

military and the army in particular constitute more than simply another influential factor. Their input has extended to foreign policymaking almost since the country's independence, a fact that continues to be reflected in the current moment and which could well persist in future challenges facing Pakistan's foreign policy.

The military in Pakistan, and particularly the army, has attracted a substantial amount of research concerning its organisation and historical foundation (Cohen, 1984, 1998; Rizvi, 2001; Nawaz, 2008; Cloughley, 1999; Schofield, 2011), as well as analysis of its involvement in political and economic affairs (Jalal, 2001; Siddiqa, 2007; Shah, 2014; Ahmed, 2013; Fair, 2014). The literature dedicated to Pakistan's politics and history usually offers at least one chapter dedicated to the military (Cohen, 2005; Shaikh, 2009; Lieven, 2012; Jalal, 2014). The scarce indigenous literature dedicated to Pakistan foreign policy (Amin, 2000; Sattar, 2013, 2016) does not include any specific sections or chapters dedicated to the military and foreign policy. Kasuri's (2015) long book of memoires evolves through his professional appointment during General Musharraf's regime, thus providing a tailored account of the matter. Aparna Pande's (2011) *Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy* also does not dedicate a specific chapter to the army's influence on foreign policy, although the matter is addressed at least. Under these circumstances, in order to grasp the involvement of the military in Pakistani foreign policy, it is necessary to navigate through a multifarious body of literature.

Pakistan is often portrayed as a praetorian state, with the army assuming the role of the "guardian of the state" (Waseem, 2009; Siddiqa, 2007, 2016). The army's ascendency to this status is deeply rooted in the post-partition chaos of domestic politics compounded by external conflicts. Several factors are responsible for this construction, all of which have immediate connections with foreign policy.

What is unique about constructing an army as a "guardian of the state"? After all, armies around the world are dedicated to the ultimate end of defending the state. Yet, in Pakistan, the role of "guardian" was supplanted by that of "state-builder", hence the different manifestations the Pakistani Army often takes: "guardian of the state" or a "state within a state". Stephen Cohen makes an accurate observation about the nature of the Pakistani Army: "There are armies that guard their nation's borders, there are those that are concerned with protecting their own position in society, and there are those that defend a cause or an idea. The Pakistan Army does all three" (1984, p105).

Pakistan's militarised foreign policy has its origins in its conflict with India over Kashmir. This propitious domestic scenario, which led to the formation of a coalition of interests between the senior civil bureaucracy and the military, has enhanced foreign policy militarisation. Pakistan's first decade of existence turned out to be a game-changer, in which foreign policy decisions would guide not only the country's external engagements, but also its domestic politics. In the next sub-section, I analyse how the Pakistani bureaucracy and the military forged a strong partnership and how this

strengthened the connection between identity and security and its militarisation. In the chapters to follow, I will examine this further, with a particular focus on Pakistan's relations with China, India, and the US.

2.3.1 Bureaucrats and militaries

The study of civil-military relations occupies a specific niche in political science. The topic has generated a considerable amount of research, albeit mostly focused on the case of the US. While the term "civil-military relations", as Charles Byler explains, is used to describe the relationship between civil society and the military, the broader character of the term encompasses "political, economic and cultural relationships between civil society and the military at all levels" (2013, p323).

A civil-military relationship involves agency, recognition, and power-sharing. In Pakistan, these two institutions have mutually created the conditions to retain and enhance their own power and to enable some degree of power-sharing to be institutionalised (Ahmad, 2006). In the pursuit of mutual advantage, the civil bureaucracy and the military, particularly the army, have formed what the sociologist Hamza Alavi has labelled a "bureaucratic-military oligarchy" (2002, p65), a centralised authority. This co-habitation, despite some setbacks, has always been present. The army has framed the civil bureaucracy as an ally to counter the politicians (Waseem, 2009). The latter have been regarded with disdain, a flawed group in the society. With the exception of the period between 1971 and 1977, when Z.A.

Bhutto held the office of Prime Minister and to a certain degree curbed the army's further consolidation of power[42], the military establishment has enjoyed an accumulation of political and economic power in Pakistan. The origin of this civil bureaucratic-military oligarchy can be traced back to the first decade post-independence, and it has been the subject of research (Jalal, 1991; Chaudhry, 2011). Hassan Askari Rizvi notes that

> the Army served as the brain and the civil servants as the hands of the new regime. The Army was conscious of the fact that it needed the help of the civil servants to run the administration. The civil servants knew that they could not continue in service if they worked against the wishes of the new leaders. (2011, p92).

The oligarchy was directly responsible for the control of power, and for controlling the state's means of coercion and violence. The rise of this oligarchy emerged out of two military coups, the first in 1958, and then a second in 1969, with the latter often being seen as an extension of the former (Siddiqa, 2019, p226).

In *The State of Martial Rule*, Ayesha Jalal (1991) provides an in-depth account of the processes that led to the formation of the oligarchy, as well as its domestic and international consequences. Pakistan's first decade was, according to Jalal, crucial to the formation of this coalition of powerful interests. In the international realm, the mutual interests of the oligarchy found their main interlocutor in the US, which resulted in Pakistan becoming

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[42] During this period, the Army's image and morale was at a low ebb, due to the defeat in East Pakistan.

a member of the former sponsored military alliances (CENTO and SEATO). These treatises were successfully joined because the bureaucracy and the army had privileged international connections. As Jalal (1991) notes, this also shaped the country's internal politics. Whilst Jalal focuses on demonstrating that the advent of military rule in Pakistan cannot be simply attributed to a weak political party system, she highlights the relevance of international factors. For instance, she brings to the fore the question of how Pakistan's involvement in American-led projects of international security created a financial burden, as it increased the cost of maintaining its defence systems. Hence, Jalal suggests that "the interplay of domestic, regional and international factors had brought about a decisive shift in the institutional balance of power; bureaucrats and generals had triumphed over politicians and the complex dynamics of Pakistan's political process were no longer relevant to the actual building and consolidation of the state" (1991, p193).

The history of how the military dominated and controlled Pakistani society, however, is not just restricted to military coups. The clientelist web of partners that the military built around itself over the course of decades includes sections of the media, the judiciary, and even some NGOs and foreign expatriates (ibid, p232). Hence, as Ayesha Siddiqa (2019) notes, the military appears to have learned from its permanent involvement in politics, and is now mastering how to simultaneously deploy hard and soft power to target civil society and to maintain its dominance. It is thus of great significance that the institution responsible for security has converted its primary role into one that targets practically all spheres of the polity.

The advancement and availability of electronic and social media platforms has enhanced the military's practices of state control, whilst continuing to deploy soft power where necessary. Not only has the military increased its presence on these platforms, thus enhancing its national militarised narrative, but it has also enabled a more visible form of censorship (see for instance Ellis-Petersen and Baloch, 2019). The urge to dominate a soft apparatus of coercion, however, may be read in two different ways. On the one hand, it represents how the military appears to have mastered the neoliberal interlinking between economics and electronics, while on the other, this move speaks to the military's own insecurities, given the need to continue to reiterate concepts like national unity against the perpetual Indian threat. Evidence may, for instance, be gathered from commemorative videos produced and released by the ISPR[43] to mark occasions like 23rd March (Pakistan Day), 14th August (Independence Day), or 6th September (Defence and Martyr's Day).

In recent years, the events of February 2019 (the Pulwama attack in ICK and the Balakot incident), which culminated in Pakistan capturing an Indian pilot, reiterate that militarism – even outside war – involves a permanent extension of war-related activities and into social and political spheres, following Sjoberg and Vita's (2010) definition of militarism. As in previous nationalistic commemoration videos, Pakistan Day (23rd March) is an

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[43] ISPR videos from the past four years may be seen at: https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=ispr+pakistan

expression of how the military desires to dominate Pakistani society. The video from March 2019 portrays the moment when the Indian pilot is shot, followed by the moment when presumably university students are attentively waiting for the "good" news of the pilot's capture. The rest of the video deviates little from those of previous years, where images of cheerful, chanting civilians are interposed with images of military combat and parades, including the police force and women in military uniform. In sum, in keeping with other visual productions launched by the ISPR, the outcome is an assemblage of militaristic values, translated by the use of force (in this case live combat), obedience, and hierarchy.

2.3.2 A secret foreign policy tool? The role of the ISI

The Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence agency (the ISI) is often praised in Pakistan as one of the top intelligence agencies in the world. It is considered to be the country's "first line of defence" (Pakistan PM, Imran Khan, 2018). The agency was established in 1948, resulting from the first war between Pakistan and India. The reasons behind its establishment relate to the residues of colonial power in South Asia. Hein Kiessling suggests that "the creation of the ISI was therefore not only a consequence of the 1947–8 war over Kashmir but also the result of British political interests in the post-colonial region" (2016, p14). Indeed, the independence of India and Pakistan certainly did not mark an end to British interests in Asia and in the Middle East region. Whilst South Asia saw the beginning of decolonisation, the British Empire continued to exist and exert power in Asia, chiefly due to her links with

Pakistan and with India, as historian Anita Inder Singh notes (1993, p48). Thus, Pakistan's newly established intelligence services contributed towards Britain maintaining its colonial presence in Asia, which perhaps may be indicative of how a post-colonial state like Pakistan never really abandoned colonial practices of government; rather, it perpetuated them.

Shuja Nawaz refers to the ISI as "one of the world's better known and most effective counter-intelligence agencies" (2008, p577). However, the ISI's involvement in the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War and the role it played – whether gathering information about India's army operations with the *Mukti Bahini* (Pakistan lost the war) or acting as a brutal force against Bengalis in East Pakistan (Ali and Patman, 2019) – suggest the opposite. Yet, the agency's most significant role in political processes, particularly those related to foreign policy, started in 1979, following the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan. Previously, the ISI had participated in external operations in collaboration with counterpart agencies, and on India-centred operations[44]. The events in Afghanistan led to an intensification of its involvement in foreign affairs. Although the prevalent narrative is that the ISI collaborated with the CIA soon after the Soviet invasion, a less explored version relates to the immediate contacts established with the Saudi Arabian government and its secret services (Nawaz, 2008; Sinnott, 2009).

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[44] Allegedly, the ISI has been involved in supporting separatist groups in India's Punjab, North East of India (Assam), and of course Kashmir (Jaideep Sakia, 2002). Kiessling dedicates a chapter of his *Faith, Unity, Discipline: The ISI of Pakistan* to the theme, where he mentions ISI support for separatist movements in Northern India, particularly in relation to arms procurement, from Thailand and China (2016, pp163,164).

However, Christine Fair is of the opinion that the ISI's influence in Afghanistan started in the late 1950s, where it supported Islamist parties as a strategy to gain influence (2014, p101). Indeed, relations were strained since 1947. Afghanistan did not recognise Pakistan as an independent state until 1948. However, in 1955 Afghanistan received much encouragement and economic aid from the Soviet Union, following Khrushchev's visit, to maintain its hostile stance towards Pakistan[45] (Leake, 2013, p791). Pakistan's ever-present sense of threat, with hostile neighbours, may have pragmatically deployed Islam to gain what would later be called "strategic depth".

Hence, Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan had started before the Soviet invasion of December 1979, with the background of the Cold War developments in the Middle East and the close ties between the Soviet Union and India. Pakistan's gradual perception of an Afghan-Soviet-India threat led Z.A. Bhutto's leadership in the mid-1970s to play the Islamic card, which translated into supporting Islamic dissenters (Pande, 2011, p71). Furthermore, an "Afghan cell" was also created in the Foreign Office, an official site on which the influence of the ISI has been acknowledged (ibid).

However, the Soviet invasion marked the beginning of a new phase of Pakistan's external politics. General Zia imposed a strict and authoritarian Islamic orthodoxy across Pakistani society. Islam would be instrumental in

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[45] This is corroborated by Arnold Fletcher in his analysis of Soviet and US economic aid to Afghanistan, as he suggests: "in this new economic battleground of the Cold War, the U.S.S.R. has had the advantages of proximity to Afghanistan, freedom from concern over internal political considerations, and a willingness to support the Afghans against Pakistan" (1965, p270).

the conduct and formulation of foreign policy. This time, the ISI became the main player, in a movement that would confer on the intelligence agency "a permanent role in foreign policy" (Nawaz, 2008, p360). This permanent role would not be confined to the Afghan War. It would be extended to Kashmir, where the ISI has used non-state actors, the mujahedeen, as a strategy to promote unrest within the Indian-controlled territory.

The agency's financial independence enabled its involvement in foreign policy, a role that has been widely acknowledged[46]. Large cash sums were flown in by the CIA, Saudi public and private entities, and other elements[47] allegedly to finance the Afghan Jihad, which have enabled the ISI to extend its jihadist strategy to Kashmir (Ali and Patman, 2019). The exponential growth of the ISI is linked to how the organisation became involved in the war in Afghanistan, which involved the training of 83,000 mujahedeen (Winchell, 2003).

The involvement of the ISI in Afghanistan was sponsored by the military dictatorship of General Zia. After consulting with the DG of the ISI (Lieutenant General Akhtar Abdul Rehman), Zia followed the former recommendations in favour of extending support to the mujahedeen (Kiessling, 2016, p50). Furthermore, the anti-communist rhetoric dovetailed

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[46] See for instance former Pakistan High Commissioner in Britain to the BBC, where he describes the ISI as a "State within a state" and admits that "Pakistan foreign policy has been run by the ISI rather than the foreign office" (Shamsul Hassan to the BBC, January 2002). Furthermore, Schofield, in her book *Inside the Pakistan Army*, was able to confirm that foreign policy towards Afghanistan was decided by the ISI (2011, p107).
[47] In *The Pakistan-US Conundrum*, Yunus Samad writes of the important Saudi influence on the Afghan Jihad, in a process that tried to bypass the ISI and the CIA, under the guise of humanitarian intervention (2011, p101).

with the Islamisation project that Zia chose for Pakistan. Carey Schofield, who has gained privileged access to a former DG of the ISI, relays what she was told: "this was the first-time intelligence-gathering had become mixed up with running operations, but the system worked well. It was an odd situation. Afghanistan's politicians were all in exile in Pakistan, while the fighters pitched themselves against the Soviet troops" (2011, p107, citing a former DG of the ISI).

These observations are worth considering, given the lack of access to the institution and the prevailing narratives about the mujahedeen fighters in Afghanistan. Whilst the leadership stayed in Peshawar, hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees were kept in camps. These camps subsequently turned into recruiting centres for the Jihad. The pragmatic mindset of the ISI and the Pakistani leadership was mostly concerned with safe-guarding Pakistan's national interests, which were directed towards the conflict with India. Anatol Lieven contends that "the Islamists were initially intended to be tools, not allies; and the goal was not Islamic revolution as such, but to further Pakistan's national interests (as perceived and defined by the Pakistani military and security establishment), above all when it came to attacking those of India" (2012, p185).

While the Afghan War was a decisive factor in strengthening the ISI's role in foreign policy matters, the agency's engagement in the country's external affairs can be traced and shown to have an important link with state identity and foreign policy. In order to map out these connections, it is necessary to

go back to the 1970s period of Z.A. Bhutto's government, when the ISI's activities grew in both volume and significance. Mr Bhutto understood the importance of having a strong profile in South Asian intelligence, and with the nuclear weapons plan on the table, the need to procure nuclear technology also turned out to be a key aim for the ISI (Kiessling, 2016). The growing influence of the ISI during the Z.A. Bhutto years cannot be dissociated from the East Pakistan war of 1971. While an enhancement of its role and competencies may be read as a consequence of perceived insecurity, the reality is that, as Shaun Gregory suggests:

> the breakup of Pakistan burned into the psyche of the Pakistan military and the ISI the overarching importance of safeguarding, at almost any cost, the territorial integrity of what remained of Pakistan. It is this that has since shaped the ferocity of the military and intelligence community's response to separatism in Pakistan, whether in Balochistan, in Jammu and Kashmir, in Sindh, or among those dreaming of uniting the Pashtun communities across the Durand line dividing Pakistan and Afghanistan. (2007, p1015).

This "ferocity", associated with ideological and material factors, led the ISI to occupying an idiosyncratic role in Pakistan's foreign and domestic political affairs, a role that has expanded from Afghanistan to Kashmir and to Balochistan. The significance of the loss of East Pakistan is beyond the scope of this chapter. It suffices to say that the consequences of the 1971 war are usually understated. The loss of territory is a highly meaningful event at different levels, including geopolitical and geo-economic, since Pakistan ceased to belong to South-East Asia. However, the meaning of the defeat by India, and by East Pakistanis/Bengalis, when the latter were patronised by the

Punjab-based statist elite as "Hinduized Muslims", and a 20 per cent Hindu population, created still greater rancour[48].

The events in Afghanistan, the association and collaboration between the ISI and the CIA, which translated into important sums of money and weapons that would be directly administrated by the ISI leadership, infused with ideological overtones, help to explain why and how the role of ISI was extended to key areas of Pakistan's governance. From foreign intelligence to political issues, the institution enjoyed the status of a centre of power, which could not be controlled by different governments, but only managed (Stratfor, 2008).

The same intelligence firm suggests that the ISI's relations with Islamist militants, which were nurtured both during and after the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan resulted in the use of the former as a foreign policy tool. The next sub-sections illustrate how it was possible for the ISI to gain the upper hand in foreign policy, particularly in terms of the Afghanistan and Kashmir issues.

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[48] Gary Bass's (2013) *The Blood Telegram* offers an important account of the events, thus joining the literature that explains the 1971 events in Bangladesh, while capturing the extension of such rancour.

2.3.2.1   The ISI's influence in Afghanistan and Kashmir

Pakistan in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, the post-war period did not bring an end to conflict. The withdrawal of Soviet troops did not stop attempts to exert political influence. After the Geneva Accords, a pro-Soviet government in Kabul was headed by Najibullah. This situation was, however, averse to Pakistan's interests. Pakistan's preferences, orchestrated by the ISI and General Zia, were directed towards a Pashtun-dominated government of Islamist orientation. The ISI's pressure on the Tanzeemat (an organisation that represented the Islamists' mujahedeen) to be part of an Afghan Interim Government (Khan, 2011) was a sign of Pakistan's intentions to maintain political control over Afghanistan. Indeed, Pakistan continued to interfere with Afghan politics[49], and instead of helping to usher in a stable solution for the war-torn country, it acted in accordance with its perceived national interests. Pakistan has forged alliances of convenience with different factions of mujahedeen. This situation continued after Zia's death, with civilian governments in Pakistan (Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif) unable to negotiate a viable and stable solution in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan fell into the hands of warlords, who retained control of different regions of the country. The different mujahedeen groups began major infighting, bringing the country to the brink of civil war. The Southern

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[49] See the chapter in which I analyse Pakistan's relations with the US for a more detailed account of this situation.

provinces of Kandahar and Helman were the most affected, as no clear warlord power was imposed, leaving the population at the mercy of rival commanders (Khan, 2011, p57). The dire situation into which Afghanistan fell prompted the rise of the Taliban, the so-called "theology students" raised in the madrassas of Pakistan. These madrassas experienced a great influx not only of Afghan students during and after the war, but also of cash from the Gulf monarchies. The latter saw a window of opportunity to propagate a most rigid and orthodox interpretation of Sunni Islam. Afghan students were groomed towards armed jihad. In Kandahar, these students are believed to have started actions against the "corrupt and rapacious commanders and bring peace to the city. The local population supported the Taliban action and welcomed the new rulers, who appeared to bring safety and order to the city" (ibid, p58). The rise of the Taliban would be rapid, given the disorder and chaos sown by the warlords and commanders, and the promise of safety offered by the latter. According to Riaz Mohammad Khan, Pakistan's initial position on the Taliban was one of:

> considerable suspicion, especially among the religious-political elements who sided with Gulbadin Hekmatyar or other Mujahedin parties. Outlandish speculation included the conjecture by the Jamaat e Islami-backed *Weekly Takbeer* that the British and the CIA conjured up the Taliban after their failure to prop up pro-King Zahir Shah elements in Qandahar. (ibid, p59)

Pakistan's support for the new actors in Afghanistan increased gradually and continued after the fall of Kabul to the Taliban. The Taliban regime was

backed by Pakistan[50] and Saudi Arabia, albeit for different reasons. The former's main concern was to maintain Pashtuns in power so Islamabad could put a term to the idea of an independent Pakhtoonistan, particularly on Pakistan territory (Cohen, 2005), whereas the latter's support was driven by the Taliban's extreme orthodoxy, closer to Wahhabi interpretations of Islam, thus a form of extending influence to South Asia, as well as curbing the rise of Shia politics and Iran's influence in Afghanistan.

Despite the often noted direct influence of the ISI on the creation of the Taliban, there appears to be no consensus over the issue[51]. Carey Schofield, in her conversation with an ISI general (DG), recounts what she was told: "Pakistan retained its presence in Afghanistan but did not influence the course of events as the country collapsed into brutal civil war … The ISI did not create the Taliban or plan its takeover of Afghanistan. But we certainly interacted with it, once it emerged" (2011, p107). The extension of Pakistan's ISI interaction with the Taliban turned into a foreign policy practice, such that the ISI was seen as an institution that was able to deal with the ruthless regime in Kabul. As Schofield comments:

> whenever anyone had to deal with the Taliban, even on fundamental foreign policy issues, the ISI was consulted and so its ownership of the relationship was strengthened … The Afghan issues as a whole came to be seen as an ISI

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[50] It is important to note the support for the Taliban during Benazir Bhutto's government. Although the reasons for why support was extended to the extremists are debatable and linked by some to a forthcoming pipeline project with its origins in Turkmenistan, thus crossing Afghan territory (see Jaffrelot, 2015, p504), the paradoxical nature of Bhutto's policies are striking, taking into account the supposedly secular inclinations of the Pakistan's People Party.

[51] The ISI may not have directly created the Taliban, but it certainly produced the conditions for the Taliban's rise. As Jaffrelot points out: "Beyond the Afghan mujahideen, the Pakistanis equipped Islamists who came from all over the world … The ISI relied on the JI, which had gained a share of power under Zia, to carry out its strategy" (2015, p502).

responsibility. Nothing could happen without ISI clearance, and this habit became

so ingrained that even the ISI itself came to believe it. (ibid, p108).

Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan War and the consequences for the Afghan people who saw the socio-political fabric of the country torn apart were arguably only grasped after the 9/11 attacks. The prevailing narrative is the one that attributes to Pakistan almost a glorious role in the war effort in Afghanistan, since it represented, according to Amin, "perhaps the only occasion in Pakistan's 50-year existence when it has been able to directly influence global history" (2000, p98). The former diplomat congratulates General Zia for the achievement, acknowledging his "determination and clairvoyance" (ibid, p98), and for holding on "to Pakistan's risky role in Afghanistan in the belief that any other option would be still worse. In the end, Pakistan managed to come out successfully through this critical test over a decade" (ibid, p98). This uncritical view of one of Pakistan's most significant foreign policy moments is noteworthy. The post-war devastation of Afghanistan is silenced. General Zia wanted to extend patronage to a fundamentalist government in Kabul that would be convenient in placating Pakistan's insecurity towards India. In 2000, the harsh reality of an Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban had become clear. Pakistan was already experiencing the consequences of religious extremism which had been brewing since the 1980s.

The effects on Pakistani society at large were striking and have complicated the ways in which Pakistanis see themselves in relation not only to religion, but also to the world. Zia's legacy, aided by ISI interference on external

matters, did not crash with him in the same plane. As Riaz Mohammad Khan puts it:

> the decade of Zia ul Haq's rule and the rhetoric of the Afghan Jihad, which had boosted Pakistan's international profile, served to fuse ideas of security, religiosity, and patriotism to create a mental makeup that suited the interests of the military, the clergy, the pro-status quo feudal classes, and the religiously inclined urban middle-classes. The same period also saw a depletion of courage and intellect in the country and erosion of the capacity to withstand and counter the spreading of obscurantism and bigotry. (2011, p282).

Sectarianism and a violent jihadist disposition turned out to be acceptable in many quarters of society, fuelled by the state-sponsoring of terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET). This group, whose origins can be traced to the Afghan War and which reportedly maintained contacts with Osama bin Laden during late 1990s (Jaffrelot, 2015), would also be instrumental in the jihad efforts in Kashmir and beyond.

Pakistan's sanction of the Taliban regime was made possible thanks to the ISI's role, which was transformed into a foreign policy practice. The ISI's role in Pakistan's foreign policy has left its discourses associated with a national state identity where militarism and Islam have become conflated. Through unconventional practices, successive Pakistani governments have opted for foreign policy practices that have co-constructed a national identity associated with religious extremism, which was used domestically to perpetuate an anti-India discourse that in turn would help to continue the country's war-preparedness against India with a focus on Kashmir.

Kashmir

With tensions rising in Kashmir after the 1989 riots, Pakistan sought another

opportunity to achieve her aspirations over the territory[52], and with the help

of the ISI, Pakistani jihadists would open another source of conflict (Jaffrelot,

2015). The ISI, emboldened by the results of the Afghan jihad, continued its

unconventional foreign policy practices and expanded the mujahedeen's role

as a foreign policy tool. General Zia and his coterie envisaged Kashmir as the

next jihad target. As Kiessling writes,

> from 1988, the ISI began to organize training camps for young militants from the
> Valley. At the beginning their partner was the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front
> (JKLF), who were responsible for recruiting the fighters, while the ISI delivered
> training and equipment. Funding came from the Gulf region and the drug trade, and
> donations were collected in the mosques of Pakistan, US and Western Europe. All
> this ensured the recruitment and training of new young volunteers and the
> deployment of battle-hardened mujahedeen from Afghanistan. (2016, p192).

Pakistan's foreign policy choices gave rise to more issues with India. It also

led to the radicalisation of many Kashmiris. Furthermore, it made Kashmiris'

lives even more vulnerable to India's occupation. The latter responded with

further militarisation of the Kashmiri territory it occupies. If Pakistan's

strategy was to "bleed India" (Jaffrelot, 2015), its chief result was further

oppression of the Kashmiris. However, Pakistan's position is to refuse to

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[52] Victoria Schofield (2003) mentions that "Indian commentators maintain that as early as
1982, almost immediately after Sheikh Abdullah's death, General Zia has instigated a plan
to train Kashmiri youth to launch an 'armed crusade' in the valley. But it did not meet with
much success and it was not until the mid 1980s that the plan was again revived" (2003,
p140).

provide military assistance to Kashmiris, thus limiting her role to political and moral support. Pakistan's intentions over Kashmir could be seen as the desire to gain territory rather than offering support for independence. Anatol Lieven notes that the ISI "used pro-Pakistan Islamist groups to side-line the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, which initially led the Kashmir uprising. This strategy included the murder of JKLF leaders and activists – even as these were also being targeted and killed by Indian security forces" (2012, p189).

It is not possible to summarise Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir in a few paragraphs, for its complexity goes beyond the role of the ISI. It suffices to say that Pakistan's foreign policy decisions in respect of India have contributed to the further dehumanisation of Kashmiris, while state-centric interests prevail. Pakistan has tried to instrumentalise Kashmiris and their lives. The influx of religious extremists into the territory, and in particular the Valley, since the 1990s has exposed Kashmiris to alien religious beliefs. Altering the ways in which religion is lived and understood has been one of the consequences of Pakistan's sponsoring of resistance to India.

The role of Pakistan-sponsored terrorist groups, like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, and particularly of the group's leader Hafeez Saeed, is notable. In a speech at the end of 2000, Saeed said: "Jihad is not about Kashmir only. About fifteen years ago people might have found it ridiculous if someone told them about the disintegration of the USSR. Today I announce the break-up of India, inshallah. We will not rest until the whole of India is dissolved into Pakistan" (cited in Jaffrelot, 2015, p515). Saeed's discourse results from the

empowerment given to his group and others like it. This empowerment was envisaged as a foreign policy practice.

2.4   Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed how some aspects of the history of Pakistan's formation and independence are closely linked to the processes of militarisation that would subsequently take root in Pakistani society and its leading institutions. The militarisation processes are also at the core of the interlinking between security and identity, which, in turn, have gained a prominent place in the country's foreign policy. As the military has been able to control and inculcate a religious, identitarian and nationalist narrative that is intrinsically gendered and gendering, foreign policy has increasingly become an instrument that ensures that such control over the polity remains in place. Pakistan's hostile relations with India remain the major reason as to why security remains so central to foreign policy, while the latter remains anchored in patriarchal processes that seek to control, shape and dominate the domestic realm.

Throughout the decades of Pakistan's existence, the influence of religious ideology and of the armed forces, including the ISI, has ensured the enhancement of militarism. As a result, the national identity narrative, the transformation of values, and the sedimentation of a gendered, masculinised identity are transformed to ensure the continuation of military power, and

consequently the centrality of security. Hence, the military constructs a representation of the state which includes the interlinking between security and identity. Indeed, the conspicuous display of military might is destined to represent the state as one that is fully ready to confront her enemy, India. As a result, the country's foreign policy is shaped by primary concerns with defence and war. In this way, the state's representation through foreign policy maintains the close connection between security and identity not only as a cornerstone that shapes relations with other countries, but also as one that generates processes of identity/otherness. The next chapters, which examine in detail these foreign relations, will demonstrate how the state elite in Pakistan has deployed foreign policy to keep security at its core.

CHAPTER III

THE CONSTRUCTION OF PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH CHINA

3.1   Introduction

This chapter critically examines Pakistan's relations with China, with a focus on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Currently, China is seeking to a consolidated place in global leadership. In Asia, this position already appears a *fait accompli* (Shambaugh, 2005). As such, Pakistan and China's relations form part of the latter's plans to establish its position within the global order. However, Pakistan-China relations have evolved over seven decades, under very specific political conditions. Whilst Pakistan's relations with the US and India embody discourses of hostility, mistrust, enmity, and political violence, here relations with China have been constituted differently. Sino-Pakistan relations, from Pakistani side, as this chapter will show, have been shaped by how the interlinking of identity and security has been constructed in Pakistan, and how, in turn, this relationship has contributed to Pakistan's militarisation.

The history of Sino-Pakistan relations involves other relevant actors in the international community, namely India, the US, and the USSR/Russia. There is a vast literature that establishes the importance of these actors. However, it is scattered across different fields, ranging from work that focuses on Pakistan's foreign policy, which invariably includes a chapter on Pakistan-China relations (Burke, 1973; Amin, 2000; Sattar, 2013, 2016; Ali, 2001), to literature that specifically looks at Pakistan-China relations (Jain, 1974; Syed, 1974; Vertzberger, 1983; Jacob, 2010; Beckley, 2012; Small, 2015; Ali, 2017; Garlick, 2018; Boni, 2020), to other works on Sino-India relations and foreign policy (Malik, 995; Foot, 1996; Roy, 1998; Malone and Mukherjee,

2010; Garver, 2001, 2016). In the following sections I engage with these works.

In historical terms, both Pakistan and the People's Republic of China have contemporary origins. The PRC was created in 1949, after the struggle that saw the Communists (Mao's Red Army) fight against Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces. Pakistan[53] recognised the PRC in 1950. It was the first Muslim country and third non-communist one to do so (Azeemi, 2007). Initially, Sino-Pakistan relations experienced a period of tension, in view of China's opposition to the US's imperialist role and closeness to Pakistan. China followed its preference for postcolonial unity between African and Asian countries. Thus, Pakistan's first foreign policy decisions associated with the US and participation in Western military alliances caused discontentment in Peking. However, it has been established (Sattar, 2017) that the latter understood the former's motives, and thus did not perceive it as posing any threat to China.

The 1955 Bandung Conference became an important moment in Sino-Pakistan relations, as both countries' foreign policy intentions were clarified (Syed, 1974; Burke, 1973; Garver, 2016). Subsequently, both countries forged a strong bond, enhanced by a shared hostility towards India, their

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[53] Pakistan considered Chiang's nationalists as the "lawful Government of China" (Burke, 1973, p101), despite Pakistan's unfavourable opinion on Chiang-Kai-shek, most likely due to the latter's "partiality for Gandhi and Nehru" (ibid, p101). As such, there was no diplomatic exchanges until Mao's victory in 1949, while India had established an Ambassador even during the period of struggle between Communists and Nationalists. It was with India, not Pakistan, that earlier in 1950–51 Communist China developed friendly relations (Sen Gupta, 1970, p111).

geographical proximity, and a genuine interest in amicably resolving border issues. The latter led to the Sino-Pakistan border agreement in 1963 (Syed, 1974). Hence, the Bandung Conference marks one of the key events in Sino-Pakistani relations. China's initial displeasure with Pakistan's involvement with Western security alliances was reversed. Pakistan's PM Mohammad Ali Bogra was able to convince his Chinese counterpart of the logic attached to joining the alliances (Garver, 2016, p109). As Garver notes:

> Zhou tested the sincerity of Bogra's assurances by reporting them to the Political Committee of the Bandung conference, lauding them as creating mutual understanding and agreement among conference participants on the key question of peace and cooperation. Zhou added, "I am sure the Prime Minister of Pakistan will have no objection to these views of mine." Bogra rose to the occasion by publicly repeating his assurances to Zhou. (ibid, p109).

Thus, the Bandung Conference served as a catalyst for the two countries to forge a relationship that would be tested time and again. However, during the mid-1950s, China also had a warm relation with India; something that deteriorated rapidly by the late fifties. This souring of Sino-Indian relations was a key factor in bringing China and Pakistan together. The following sections will demonstrate how Sino-Pakistan relations became one of the most close-knit foreign relations in Asia, enabling both to pursue common goals as well as specific national interests, namely in relation to India and the US. Of course, the initial years of Sino-Pakistan relations were profoundly shaped by the India-Pakistan conflict (Jacob, 2010) and the effects of the Cold War in Asia. These are crucial historical factors necessary to understand how

and why China and Pakistan, with two different ideological backgrounds, could form an *entente cordiale*.

The Sino-Pakistani entente can be traced back to 1964. This entente was primarily based on a security relationship through which shared perceptions of security risks were tackled. Consequently, Pakistan's relations with India were further aggravated by mistrust. However, to a certain extent, Pakistan's security anxiety diminished somewhat due to her close relations with China. The entente with China also generated new dynamics concerning the Kashmir question, as "Beijing firmly supported Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute" (Roy, 1998, p172). China's former position of isolation must also be acknowledged. As John Garver argues, since China "was on the threshold of the Cultural Revolution, the Sino-Pakistan entente was one of the very few of China's diplomatic relations to survive that upheaval without disruption" (2016, p192; Garver, 2004).

Two more key features of this relationship are security and militarism. Andrew Small suggests that Sino-Pakistani relations are "a friendship forged by war" (2015). The relationship with China has helped Pakistan to enhance her permanent "war-preparedness" status; historically, China's support for Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 wars (Small, 2015; Sattar, 2017; Burke, 1973) proved to be relevant not only in further cementing the countries' bond and perceived interests, but also in advancing the militarisation of Pakistan. More specifically, post-1965, Sino-Pakistan relations were further

strengthened in the military domain, thus initiating a long and ongoing process of militarisation.

Whilst China has never committed with "boots on the ground"[54], it has handed key support by issuing credible threats to India. The importance of Chinese support during the 1971 war is also considered an important landmark in the development of this relationship. It is, however, Pakistan's diplomatic role in bridging relations between the US and China that has gained historic importance in this relationship, in a year in which the country would be dismembered and defeated at the hands of a common enemy: India.

Andrew Small further notes that China has been Pakistan's "chief arms supplier" (2015, p2). During the 1965 and 1971 wars in India, despite China refusing to get involved directly, the supply of weapons was not interrupted. China's internal problems, compounded by the delicate Cold War situation in Asia, a hostile USSR, and the Vietnam War discouraged the Chinese leadership from going beyond some moral, diplomatic, and arms support. Hence, China has made a constant contribution to Pakistan's military build-up and war-preparedness. Post-1965 war, the US withdrew military aid to Pakistan. In response, China stepped in and in the late 1960s, it "equipped at least two divisions of the Pakistan army" in addition to providing "substantial hardware to Pakistan's air and naval forces" (Naqvi, 1986, p31). All this despite Pakistan's insistence that China never committed to a defence pact

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[54] Filippo Boni (2020) notes that it is very difficult to ascertain whether China would ever carry out operations on the ground on behalf of Pakistan.

with them (Small, 2015). Yet, China was instrumental in the development of the military industrial complex, particularly between the years of 1979 and 1999 (Siddiqa, 2001), together with Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme.

Thus, the growth of militarism in Pakistan is closely associated with the state's relations with China. To date, the Pakistani military, through ISPR's statements, celebrates the country's military bond with China. For example, Major General Asif Ghafoor tweeted a statement made by the former Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan, Mr Sun Weidong, during the celebrations of the 90th Anniversary of the foundation of the PLA that took place in Islamabad: "Pak China Military to Military coop is the pillar of our bilateral relation" (Ghafoor, 2017, abbreviations in the original).

The Pakistani Army has continued to celebrate PLA's Anniversary in subsequent years. The celebrations of 2020 were also marked by Pakistan's COAS stating that the "Pakistan Army and PLA are the key components of Pak-China strategic relations and we are proud to be brothers in arms" (The News, 2020). On the same occasion, China's ambassador to Pakistan reiterated the aim of "expanding and enhancing military cooperation to make new contribution to the consolidation of bilateral relations" (ibid). I will return to the militarism issue in Sino-Pakistan relations in the context of CPEC in due course.

Whilst historical factors remain relevant to understanding the context of Sino-Pakistani relations, it is in the countries' contemporary relations that security

and militarism have entered into a new phase, with a greater regional and international footprint. With the advent of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (hereafter CPEC), this foreign relation has reached a transformational point for both countries' foreign relations. The current chapter is interested in analysing CPEC through the lenses of security and militarism, so as to unveil its representations, especially in respect of the interlinking between security and identity. Hence, the objective here is to discuss and analyse how it is that beyond parochial definitions linked to geopolitics and geo-economics, CPEC is a discourse that represents security and militarism. The chapter proceeds in three sections. The first frames CPEC within the broad context of Sino-Pakistani relations. The second explores critical issues associated with the project, including the seaport of Gwadar, CPEC's impact on Balochistan, and on Kashmir. The third builds on the two previous sections and attempts to explain how Pakistan-China relations have contributed to Pakistan's militarism, and therefore to a gendered conception of state identity.

3.2   Introducing CPEC

CPEC is a land corridor that aims to link the geographically distant Pakistani seaport of Gwadar to China's most Western region of Xinjiang. However, CPEC continues to take in the above-mentioned dimensions and acquire a diversity of meanings to the different actors involved. At the outset, I should add that my fieldwork and experience of living in Pakistan practically coincided with the official launch of CPEC. During that time, I noted several

changes associated with it, particularly in the economic and infrastructure sectors. Academics also welcomed the opportunity to organise and host thematic workshops and conferences on the topic of CPEC. I had the opportunity to attend some of these events, including one hosting the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan[55]. Moreover, I noticed a greater influx of Chinese citizens in Pakistan, and social media and online platforms engaged with CPEC, not only to promote it, but also to debate its various dynamics.

The change in China's Presidency in 2013 has been marked by a renewed global strategy to expand the country's reach. Economic, financial, military, and diplomatic factors have been articulated under the leadership of Xi Jinping in order to place China at the centre of international politics. To be sure, it is necessary to also acknowledge the transition from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping. Deng's visionary plans, associated with economic reforms linked to the role of science and technology, have helped to generate the conditions for China's "opening to the world", as the country's post-1978 stage is usually called (see Garver, 2016).

The current, most prominent stage is marked by the BRI[56], previously the OBOR. The BRI, also known as the "New Silk Road" (Li, 2016; Shen and Hui, 2015), beyond being a global project for trade and connectivity, with specific implications for the lands it crosses, is also the result of China's

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[55] For details see: https://lcpr.pk/policy-dialogue-pakistan-china-relations-in-the-21st-century/.

[56] See PRC's National Development and Reform Commission for a full insight into the country's expansion and connectivity plans associated with the BRI: http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html.
See also: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1249618.shtml.

combination of national and foreign policies, under the leadership of Xi Jinping. The latter, according to Shen and Hui (2015), is trying to distinguish himself from the previous leadership by enhancing the role of nationalism. To this end, Xi aims to put forward the idea of the "Chinese Dream". As the authors note:

> Xi often highlights dignity in his grand country's patriotic expression, and that shows rooted sceptics on the current international order. That also unveils the intention to use nationalism as a means to gain popularity and support of the communist regime at home. Second, Xi changes the situation of the past decade. He focuses more on patriotism and less on social ideology and liberalism at the ideological level. To achieve that, Xi advocates the Chinese Dream slogan overseas and creates a set of shared value in Asia. (…) Xi revises the discourse around "Peaceful Development" by referring to the "New Asian Security Concept," highlighting China's strong economy and military power, thus turning her identity as a stakeholder into a "co-decision maker". (Shen and Hui, 2015, p2)

Thus, it is within the ambitious agenda of Xi's leadership, which conflates Chinese nationalism and global expansionism, that CPEC is nested. Whilst CPEC is mostly portrayed as project of economic development, its links to the security and military realms are now widely discussed. I will return to this point later in the chapter. CPEC, which has been described as one of the flagship projects of OBOR/BRI (Virk, 2018), may also be envisaged as a "rebranding of the long-term cooperation between the two countries which has been in progress since the 1950s" (Garlick, 2018, p519).

The announcement of CPEC took place in 2013 during the Chinese PM's visit

to Pakistan. Both countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation for the Long-term Plan on CPEC. Significantly, this happened after the administration of the southern seaport of Gwadar in Balochistan had shifted from the Singapore Port Authority to China (Ali, 2017, p204). However, its formal launch only took place in April 2015 when the Chinese President finally visited Pakistan, his visit having been delayed by political protests in the country (BBC, 2014). Xi announced investments of GBP 30 billion (The Guardian, 2015), and thereafter, Sino-Pakistan's contacts have intensified under the premiership of Nawaz Sharif.

The Chinese and Pakistani governments have outlined their versions of CPEC. The former's foreign ministry provides a concise one: an "economic corridor is mainly about cooperation in three areas, namely, transport, energy and industrial parks. It builds a new platform for the growth of China-Pakistan strategic cooperative partnership in the next five to ten years" (FMPRC). In China's *Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road*[57], issued in March 2015, the Chinese government suggests that "the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor are closely related to the Belt and Road Initiative, and therefore require closer cooperation and greater progress" (NDRC, 2015).

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[57] This is a comprehensive document in which the aims and imagined results of BRI are mapped out.

Pakistan, by contrast, provides a more ostentatious definition. Pakistan's Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform introduces CPEC as:

> a framework of regional connectivity. CPEC will not only benefit China and Pakistan but will have positive impact on Iran, Afghanistan, India, Central Asian Republic, and the region. The enhancement of geographical linkages having improved [the] road, rail and air transportation system with frequent and free exchanges of growth and people to people contact, enhancing understanding through academic, cultural and regional knowledge and culture, activity of higher volume of flow of trade and businesses, producing and moving energy to have more optimal businesses and enhancement of co-operation by [a] win-win model will result in [a] well connected, integrated region of shared destiny, harmony and development. (CPEC.gov)

Similarly, the Pakistan-China Institute based in Islamabad issued ten fundamental points in relation to CPEC, defining it as:

> a major and pilot project of the Belt and Road Initiative which is proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping. CPEC has become the framework and platform for comprehensive and substantive cooperation between China and Pakistan. CPEC is the important consensus reached by the leaders of both countries. … CPEC is of great significance to the development of China-Pakistan's all-weather strategic cooperative partnership and the building of the community of shared destiny between China and Pakistan. (CPEC.info).

Terms such as "strategic cooperative partnership", "regional connectivity", "co-operation by [a] win-win model", "integration of development strategies", and "shared destiny" are to be found within the respective

countries' definitions of CPEC. Both countries' foreign policies are currently aligned around these objectives. Pakistan's governing elites have engaged in different fora to promote CPEC. For instance, since 2013 the number of academic conferences and seminars on CPEC and/or Pakistan relations with China has multiplied significantly. There is a burgeoning scholarship both indigenously and internationally on Sino-Pakistan relations, including CPEC, with a considerable number of articles and reports dedicated to the theme, from various points of view – economic, geopolitical and strategic (Rizvi, 2015; Ahmar, 2015; Javaid, 2016; Adnan and Fatima, 2016; Hameed, 2017; Ahmad and Singh, 2017; Ali, 2017).

3.2.1   Shaping CPEC's discourse

The construction of CPEC-related projects including the construction of motorways, dams, railways upgrading, power plants, and a seaport and airport at Gwadar, Balochistan, is currently underway. Pakistan and China are also engaging in a parallel discourse, based on a combination of public diplomacy and soft power tools, which are well managed by China (Chang and Lin, 2014; Welsh and Fern, 2008; Nye, 2004, 2005; Wang, 2008). A good example is the Pakistan-China Institute in Islamabad[58], launched well before CPEC, in 2009. PCI is established as a non-partisan, non-governmental, non-political think tank. It promotes cultural exchange between the two countries and coordinates Chinese language courses in Pakistan.

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[58] See: http://www.pakistan-china.com/index.php.

The PCI is also responsible for two online publications, with noteworthy names: *Youlin* (*Good Neighbours*), a cultural journal; and *Nihao-Salam*[59], words for greeting in Mandarin and Urdu, respectively. Concerning *Youlin*, its online edition has been regularly updated since 2012. Monthly online archives are available. It is a bilingual publication in English and Mandarin. Its content is primarily focused on cultural activities and events taking place in Pakistan and China. While the Pakistani section highlights cultural events in Pakistan's three main cities (Islamabad, Lahore, and Karachi), the section on China entitled "Travel in China" is far more extensive. One can obtain information on a comprehensive selection of cultural and touristic events across China. Significantly, Xinjiang alone has gathered a total of twenty posts in five years, on what may be understood as an attempt to bridge the region with Pakistan, in an effort to represent the "Islamic bond". It appears that there is also an intention to focus on places and regions which constitute the "Ancient Silk Road", perhaps to draw attention to the present BRI. In cuisine-related posts, there is a focus on foods that are compatible with Muslim dietary requirements.

Youlin magazine thus marks an attempt to frame China's cultural diversity, albeit by resorting to a representation of what comes across as being culturally

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[59] As of April 2019, *Nihao-Salam* is no longer available online. Since the new government of Imran Khan took office, the PCI appears to have downgraded its activities; however, *Youlin* magazine continues to be updated online. A new online magazine has been launched in 2019. It is called *Diplomag*. Unfortunately, there is no mention of who manages the online publication. The magazine is dedicated to publishing news related to CPEC, BRI, Pakistan and China. While it is not possible to establish the extent of its operations, the magazine appears to operate within the same frame as *Nihao-Salam*. It may be perused here: http://diplo-mag.com/category/pakistan/.

accepted Pakistani Islamic norms. The Silk Road receives a great deal of attention in this publication. The intention is to create a narrative that links China and Pakistan as having a centuries-old and significant history, so that BRI's success may be contextualised, addressed and turned into a relational bond between Pakistan and China. However, the efficacy of this strategy is a point of contention. As a country of 207 million people, in Pakistan, access to the internet and to the English language is restricted to the privileged classes. It may be argued that it is precisely this niche of the population that must be primarily targeted. In this light, the benefit of CPEC to the whole of Pakistan can be called into question. For instance, one might ask who becomes excluded from this imagined relationship? Conversely, will the majority of Chinese citizens living and working in Pakistan be able to travel around the country and enjoy local cultural events and hospitality?[60] I raise these questions as a result of empirical observation. During my experience of living and working in Pakistan, I noticed that Chinese citizens are mostly found living in heavily guarded and gated societies[61], or frequenting shopping malls with high levels of security. Therefore, the full extent to which Chinese citizens are being targeted by the content of *Youlin* remains a matter of debate.

Concerning *Nihao-Salam*, whilst also "dedicated towards promoting [the] Pakistan-China friendship and multi-sector cooperation, from diplomacy to economic development, from technological co-operation to enhancing people

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[60] In January 2019, I had participated in a roundtable at the University of Lahore with a group of students from Tsinghua University, who were touring Pakistan. They have reported that while interacting with fellow Chinese citizens working in different projects, namely energy-generating ones, the latter expressed distaste about their lack of mobility in the country. This was countered by some participants as preventive measures related to security.

[61] See for instance: http://cn.dailypakistan.com.pk/story/pakistan/2659/.

to people contacts" (Nihao-Salam, 2017), its content is unmistakably politically driven, as it is identified as a "public diplomacy E-magazine" (ibid.). The magazine's relevance resides in the fact that it republishes a selected number of articles from China-controlled media outlets such as *Global Times*, *China Daily*, *Xinhua*, or *People's Daily Online*. Those articles and many others appear to have been carefully curated in order to build a representation of how China has been imagining a non-Western world order, and how China has brought Pakistan within her sphere of influence, with the latter's consent.

The collection of articles – organised both by "location" (China, Pakistan, China-Pakistan relation, and Xinjiang) and by "discipline" (which includes diplomacy, politics, Pakistan-China Friendship, military, or culture) – provides an interesting insight into the importance of Sino-Indian relations, how China's economic development is geared towards a changing world order, or how non-Western, anti-American sentiments are a reality within the politics of the Middle East and the wider Muslim world. The significance of this wide range of dialogues China and Pakistan have gathered on this electronic platform goes beyond the scope of China-Pakistan friendship, as many are linked to other regional and global interests of both countries. For instance, by acknowledging the existence of an anti-American sentiment among Muslim populations, China attempts to build the conditions for an approbation of her global politics in regions so far subject to American influence.

Nihao-Salam, under the pretence of being an e-magazine that celebrates and promotes the Pakistan-China friendship, has constructed an archive of highly significant texts, which, when read together, may acquire additional meaning, allowing one to discern how China views the world and how China has engaged globally since 2011 (the date of the first archived material from the e-magazine).

The Sino-centric content is certainly one of the features of this constructed discourse. By assembling these texts under the banner *Nihao-Salam*, the CPI engages dialogically and performatively in the construction of Sino-Pakistan relations. In turn, national identity and foreign policy become co-constructed, due to existence of the archive that allows for the three dialogical dimensions of an utterance to occur. The set of texts comprises a unique utterance, through which Pakistan's relationship with China is given a voice: on the one hand, theoretically, it addresses a global audience and expresses China's dominant role in her relations with Pakistan; on the other, it idealises how foreign policy discourses enable the production of national identity narratives. Pakistan becomes a part of China's constructed discourses in its quest to become a leading global power. The result is the construction of a national identity discourse linking Pakistan to the global sphere through China's political practices.

Simultaneously, the assembling of these texts is also performative, enhancing the co-construction of foreign policy and national identity. *Nihao-Salam*, as mentioned earlier, collects articles that reflect the voice of China's ruling

Communist Party, serving not only to inform, but also to discipline global audiences, including Pakistani ones. On the other hand, the Pakistani-controlled platform engages in the very same disciplinary task, through her own choices and actions. Hence, the dual task of discourse disciplining – by using processes of repetition (re-publishing) and citation (re-voicing CCP doctrines) – aims to normalise and naturalise this nexus of foreign policy and national identity. China's indoctrination practices thus result in bringing Pakistan into her orbit of political influence, indicating that her national identity will be part of both countries' perceived "shared destiny".

3.3   Contentious issues within the CPEC

The impact of CPEC in Pakistan's social and political spheres is diverse. Benefits and costs of CPEC continue to be central to political debate. Whilst there is great interest in CPEC's economic impact and associated issues, my analysis is centred on its domestic and international political dimensions, which are involved in the interlinking of identity and security, and generate issues pertaining to militarist expansion. I will also consider how CPEC serves as a vehicle to enhance militarism.

The media, particularly the English press, has acted as a lever for the domestic debate on CPEC, and in general criticisms and concerns about the project have been voiced. This is despite ongoing issues over freedom of expression. In the 2016 yearly report, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported that:

Freedom of speech and media, protest, movement and assembly are being violated and curbed on the pretext of "national security" or "national interest". Even expression of genuine apprehensions over development plans or commitments made by the government are being rubbished as being against "national interest" […and] in particular, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has acquired an aura of such official sanctity that any information sought on its details or airing reservations over its implementation are being denounced as acts of flagrant anti-nationalism. Smaller provinces and Gilgit Baltistan have voiced numerous reservations, including with regard to issues of CPEC's impact and discriminatory application in various federating units of the country: these merit urgent consideration. HRCP also demands an immediate and thorough environment impact assessment of the CPEC project. The impact on the people being dislocated and the economic benefits to the local people should also be assessed. In Balochistan, development of the Gwadar port has deprived thousands of fishermen of their livelihood and shelter. The local population is intimidated when they express their concern over the development policy in Gwadar. (HRCP, 2016, p300)

During an interview with me in September 2016, AC3 expressed similar concerns in view of the "aura of sanctity" that CPEC has acquired. The senior academic mentioned the harsh criticism he once experienced by a member of the government, while attending a seminar. The "aura of sanctity" was also reflected in how the government reacted to a piece published by the daily *Dawn*[62]. On being granted access to a document labelled "Long Term Plan for China Pakistan Economic Corridor 2017-2030", *Dawn* published a detailed summary of CPEC. From industry to agriculture, tourism and recreation, and perhaps more importantly, "fibre optics and surveillance", it

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[62] See: https://www.dawn.com/news/1333101.

appears that China and Pakistan have engendered a complex plan through which China's presence will become almost irreversible. Interestingly, for the discussion that follows later in the chapter, there is little attention given to Gwadar Port in Balochistan.

The *Dawn* piece of 18th May was quickly followed by a rebuttal in another media outlet ten days later. In a piece entitled "The Real CPEC", by Hassan Khawar, a government adviser, the *Daily Times* tried to counter any possibility for speculation given by *Dawn.* While it is a healthy sign that CPEC is being widely debated, it must be added that such discussion will remain limited to the educated English-speaking elite, and most likely will not reach the masses. Furthermore, Chinese and Pakistan's soft power discourses are also constructed by Chinese diplomats in Pakistan. The Chinese Embassy in Islamabad appears to be setting the rules of engagement with Pakistan's civilian and military spheres. The use of metaphors and hyperbolic language has had an important role in the generation of discourse. Terms like "all-weather friends", "higher than the Himalayas", "deeper than seas", "sweeter than honey", "iron brothers" or "steel sisters"[63] have gained currency within both official and unofficial utterances by Pakistanis and Chinese alike. Whilst the language used by both countries to describe their relationship is one that invokes trust and commitment, scholars and analysts have raised questions about the main purposes of CPEC and the project's viability. Indeed, the reality on the ground seems challenging.

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[63] The phrase "steel sisters" was first used by Pakistan Foreign Secretary Tehmina Janjua, in a recent visit to China, where she said that "China and Pakistan are not only iron brothers as President Xi Jinping has said, but also steel sisters" (cited in Mo, 2017). Janjua is the first woman to hold the post of Foreign Secretary.

For instance, Jeremy Garlick (2018) highlights some critical aspects concerning the economic viability of transporting oil and gas from Gwadar to Xinjiang, given that the latter is one of China's regions that produces more oil and gas, notwithstanding the fact that supplies already flow from Central Asian countries through Xinjiang. He also makes reference to some notable geographical impediments. For instance, Gwadar port's location is very distant from Pakistan's main industrial belt (Lahore, Faisalabad, and Gujranwala in Central Punjab), with no reliable highways linking the regions. Moreover, the Karakoram Highway, a road built in partnership with China, crossing the mountainous northern areas of Pakistan towards China, despite a recent update, remains at the mercy of geomorphic features, like "hanging valleys, waterfalls, glaciers, snow-fields (…), extremely difficult terrain for the building and maintenance of pipelines [and] sections of the highway are subject to frequent landslides and rockslides" (Garlick, 2018, p524). Thus, whilst Gwadar is often viewed as a geopolitical advantage to Pakistan, including being at a location furthermost away from India (Khetran, 2014), indicating that state leadership cannot dissociate CPEC from a representation of the Indian threat, geography does not present a well ordered, trouble-free, logistical framework.

3.3.1 The Port of Gwadar: impact on security and identity

The seaport of Gwadar is one of CPEC's projects that generates questions about the overall viability and purpose of the Sino-Pakistani venture. Located at the Southwest coast of Pakistan's Balochistan, this seaport has been hailed as the fulcrum for CPEC in terms of connectivity, acting as a doorway to Western China. In its appealing geographical location, one can certainly imagine its potential as a connector, as well as becoming a source for development at national and regional levels (see Xinhua.net, 2020). However, port calls have been rather modest since it became operational (Boni, 2020). For instance, whilst recently the "CPEC Authority chairman said that the Gwadar port is becoming fully functional and Afghan transit trade has started to divert towards Gwadar" (Xinhua, 2020), in reality, marine traffic at Gwadar remains virtually non-existent[64]. Thus, Gwadar's viability and purpose have prompted concerns to be raised over the different discourses generated around the project.

The discourses generated by Gwadar are relevant in two principal ways. On the one hand, the relevance of geopolitical and historical factors are useful in analysing how colonial and post-colonial strategies of control and dominance persist in the region. On the other hand, the ambiguity about the real purpose of the port of Gwadar has raised concerns that the port may be utilised for military purposes. I will explain and analyse in turn how these two parallel discourses are constituted.

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[64] Gwadar Port vessel movements may be viewed at:
https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ports/19578/_:84c99f758ebcd3dbc08713be9e40a68d. This website maintains a detailed update of all vessels and port movements around the world.

3.3.1.1 Geopolitics of control around Gwadar: past and present

Concerning Gwadar as a locus that has come to represent control and dominance, it is necessary to understand Balochistan's role in the geopolitical calculations of powerful neighbouring states. During British rule in South Asia, Balochistan was taken over in 1884, to prevent the rival Russian Empire from reaching the Indian Ocean, and to control a passage from Sindh to Afghanistan (Khan, 2009, p1073). Presently, China is the foreign actor that is seeking to increase and consolidate her presence; China's current regional assertiveness, enabled by CPEC, is thus poised to benefit from any geo-military strategies that may accompany this bilateral relationship. However, there are some narratives about how geopolitics are entangled with socio-political struggles in Balochistan. The Pakistani state elite, time and again, has attempted to silence dissent in Balochistan. Despite its scarce population, Balochistan is rich in natural resources such as natural gas, copper and gold. The exploitation of resources, typical of colonial relations, particularly of the Sui natural gas fields, has helped Pakistan's national economy to develop in past decades, while Balochistan's population remains largely impoverished, in an under-developed region. The people of Balochistan have been unable to fully benefit from the wealth generated from natural resources. The ethnonationalist movement in Balochistan has exploited these two dimensions – that of geo-strategy (with a particular focus on Gwadar port) and that of energy – at different moments in their struggle and demands. As Farhan Siddiqi explains:

one of the defining hallmarks of the Baloch nationalist movement since 2002 has been its association with the "energy" dimension and the probable exploitation of the province's natural resources and raw materials by China and global multinational companies [and] regarding Gwadar, the Baloch grievance relates to the fact that the Baloch are non-participants in the operation and management of the port. … The Baloch nationalists charge that the development of the Gwadar Port has the undesired effect of condemning the Baloch into a minority with the in-flux of non-Baloch blue and white collar workers from the Punjab, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. (2012, pp167-168)

Yunas Samad, however, notes that unlike other conflicts, in Balochistan, resources

are not a motive and opportunity for violent conflict. However, they are an important driver that underpins the discontent among the Baloch. At present resources are mainly hypothetical, as extraction has yet to take place, and the Baloch concern is that outsiders will reap the benefits at the expense of locals as the case of Sui gas. (2014, p305)

To be sure, at the time of writing, it not possible to get a fully developed picture of CPEC's real potential for economic transformation, or of the political outcomes for regional and international politics. Hence, the varied contours of the enterprise do not allow for any accurate forecasts for the Balochistan region and for Pakistan as a whole under CPEC[65]. For instance, the newspaper *Daily Times* recently reported that the province's secretary for

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[65] In November 2017, *Dawn* reported that China is set to receive 91 per cent of Gwadar port's income. According to Ifthikhar Khan: "This was disclosed by Federal Minister for Ports and Shipping Mir Hasil Bizenjo after senators expressed concern over the secrecy surrounding the CPEC long-term agreement plan, with many observing that the agreement tilted heavily in China's favour".

mines, Mr Saleh Baloch, hinted that "the plan is for Chinese companies chosen by Beijing to team up with local firms to mine marble, chromite, limestone, coal and other minerals and set up steel mills and other plants" (*Daily Times*, 2017).

That said, there are, however, possible scenarios that can be outlined by looking at past narratives on the role chosen for Balochistan as a land of routes and logistics. CPEC may turn out to be a continuation of those earlier narratives, reiterating earlier colonial narratives in support of their former political practices. The map in Figure 1 reveals that the area corresponding to Balochistan will, under CPEC, be a target for projects related to logistics, trade and mineral exploitation, whereas the area corresponding to Punjab and Sindh will be associated with "industrial and economic development".


Figure 1: Map published in *Dawn*, 18th May 2017

The map appears to support China's plans for Pakistan. Balochistan's role remains confined to what it has been for decades: a region to be utilised as a

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connector, oriented towards logistics, with extraction industries as key investments.

Yet, the focus on the importance of routes in Balochistan is a longstanding one. In her book *Roads and Rivals*, Mahnaz Ispahani discusses the importance of routes in Balochistan during imperial times, as well as how access problems in Balochistan were a cause for US concern during the 1980s, as they were deemed vital to "its renewed political-military association with Pakistan, an association that was to result in U.S. economic aid for the infrastructural development of Baluchistan" (1989, p69). Those were the days of Cold War politics in South Asia, and Pakistan was embroiled in the war in Afghanistan. A nationalistic guerrilla movement in Balochistan was provoking domestic security concerns, reviving recent memories of East Pakistan/Bangladesh. The Soviet Union and India were allegedly supporting Baloch nationalist movements. Hence, General Zia pondered the costs of Baloch insurgency particularly in view of the ongoing Afghan War, and instead focused on US-sponsored development. Ispahani highlights key aspects of the plan for the year 1980-81, which "allotted the largest amount for the transport and communications sector. … Among the proposed roadworks were Makran's coastal routes. The roads from Liari to Ormara and the whole route from Karachi to Pasni and onward to Gwadar and Turbat were to be improved" (ibid, p72). Ispahani states that the staff's report assessment of the programme was unable to recognise that "any broader improvements in transport infrastructure could not be justified on economic grounds [and] the huge transport investments proposed by the government of

Pakistan were unlikely to improve the routine economic conditions of Baluchistan's peoples in any substantial fashion" (ibid, p75). Thirty years later, the people of Balochistan are still the most under-privileged in Pakistan. Security concerns, masked with "economic development" that would trap Balochistan people in the quandary of regional power politics, infused with the politics of American aid was the choice made by the Pakistan state three decades ago. While the current political scenario is different, the similarities with the past are noteworthy.

China's influence in the region (and the decline in US influence), the renewal of India's concerns, the instability generated by war, terrorism and sectarianism which are still significant in Afghanistan, all contribute towards Balochistan's instability and the continuation of conflict. The people of Balochistan are thus likely to bear the brunt of an unstable economy, while dissent *vis-à-vis* the Punjab establishment is unlikely to diminish.

Energy and geopolitical considerations are indeed crucial factors that help to understand why Balochistan people (ethnic-Baloch, but also Pashtuns living in the region) express such resentment towards the government of Pakistan, particularly in light of a recent past that coincided with Balochistan's integration into Pakistan, which, despite the valuable natural resources of the former, did not lead to economic and social development. Dissent, whether related to the quest for independence or simply with more autonomy and a fair distribution of resources among Balochistan's people, has been dealt with coercively by the state of Pakistan.

The above-mentioned issues concerning the historical relationship that involves Balochistan, logistical routes, and foreign interests in the region, together with the central role that the Port of Gwadar came to represent make it possible to question how China and Pakistan are currently renewing colonial practices of extraction and domination. If indeed Gwadar, which has been handed over to China for forty years, will be transformed into a significant hub of connectivity whose impact should improve the livelihood of Balochistan's population, then one may look upon CPEC as a vehicle to promote social justice. However, thus far, the programme's impact in Gwadar has generated more suspicion then clear blueprints for local communities' development. For instance, since 2017, local fishermen have expressed concerns about the relocation of their coastal fishing villages and facilities, due to expansion of the port (Aljazeera, 2017). Whilst these fishermen would benefit from modernisation of their fleet and better access to markets, and indeed these are their main demands (Mariyam Suleman, 2019), thus far their demands have not been met.

As Laleh Khalili notes, "Ports bind cities across the seas to hinterland economies and social relations. They are conglomerations of people from near and far" (2020, p1037). Gwadar may one day represent this kind of binding. However, the current scenario places CPEC and its key port at the centre of a number of critiques and speculations. CPEC continues to be framed as a project for economic development and regional connectivity. Whilst most these critiques have revolved around economic feasibility,

financial transparency, and compliance (see for instance, The International Crisis Group, 2018; Gillani, 2020), issues linking it to China's expansionist politics and Pakistan's militarisation generate less interest, particularly inside Pakistan. The latter, however, are key to understanding how Sino-Pakistan relations shape the interlinking between security and identity, and the role of militarism in this regard.

3.3.1.2 Militarising Gwadar

Historically, China's foreign policy was built around security and defence matters against Inner Asia (Fairbank, 1969). China's maritime expansion was mostly concentrated during the Ming dynasty, which translated into an increase in new tributaries. This turned Ming China into a naval power (Fairbank, 1969, p455), though this would not last, in view of the continued threat of Mongol invasions, from the West, and later the arrival of the Europeans in Asia by sea, which diminished China's maritime power. This scenario has changed, particularly since the last two decades of the twentieth century. China currently enjoys an extensive overseas network, which has been established primarily as the result of increasing energy and raw material needs.

Given the impact of militarism on Sino-Pakistan relations, it is worth noting China's militarisation in connection with the BRI plans. The existence of a transnational network of lanes of communication, either by land or sea, has reinforced China's sense of insecurity, which has been addressed through the

country's foreign policy and security decision-making. For instance, a comprehensive military strategy was designed by Chinese authorities and made available to the general public in 2015, wherein certain aspects are skilfully disclosed. One of the most striking features, however, is how Chinese authorities communicate their policies, which are portrayed not only as helping to defend China, but also as a means to guarantee "world peace maintenance", infused with a variety of images aimed at transmitting an idea of harmony and peaceful co-existence, a "community of shared destiny" and "neighborhood diplomacy of friendship, sincerity, reciprocity and inclusiveness" (White Paper on Military Strategy, 2015).

At present, China considers it has entered into a new historical period, particularly as to what concerns the role of her armed forces, which ultimately will serve to achieve the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" (ibid). In this vein, the Chinese government considers that the armed forces have specific strategic tasks, including:

> to deal with a wide range of emergencies and military threats, and effectively safeguard the sovereignty and security of China's territorial land, air and sea; to resolutely safeguard the unification of motherland; … to safeguard the security of China's overseas interests; … to strengthen efforts in operations against infiltration, separatism and terrorism so as to maintain China's political security and social stability. (ibid)

It is China's overseas interests and anti-terrorism operations that contribute towards a security relation with Pakistan. Seas and oceans are currently

envisaged by the PRC government as "critical security domains" (ibid). Furthermore, China's Two Ocean Strategy, which dovetails with BRI's aims (Sun and Payette, 2017), thus including the IOR, implies a Chinese encroachment in the region, together with a deepening of relations with IOR states, namely Pakistan (Walgreen, 2006). As Pakistan is one of China's key foreign policy and security actors, their partnership in the IOR grows in relevance.

Rabia Akthar (2015), a strategy and security scholar, suggests that Pakistan would benefit from facilitating the docking of Chinese conventional submarines involved in counter-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa, at Gwadar. However, Pakistani and Chinese officials have dismissed reports that Gwadar could become a military facility for China in the IOR, or that China would be willing to build a military base closer to Gwadar (VOA, 2017; The Frontier Post, 2018). For instance, in March 2017, Minnie Chan from the *South China Morning Post* reported on China's plan to increase the capacity of the marine corps to 100,000 fighting personnel, which would be deployed in different regions, like Djibouti and Gwadar in Pakistan's Balochistan. She cites "military insiders" as the source. Moreover, she writes: "Gwadar port is a deep sea port next to the Strait of Hormuz, the key oil route in and out of the Persian gulf, built with Chinese funding and operated by mainland firms. Although the port is not home to any PLA installation, navy ships are expected to dock at the facility in the near future" (Chan, 2017).

Significantly, one year later, the *Global Times*, which is CCP-controlled, published a piece emphatically titled "PLA Marine Corps conducts massive groundbreaking maneuvers". The later article includes a reference to the earlier one, which may be read as a corroboration:

China plans to expand its marine corps from 20,000 to 100,000 to better protect the country's rising overseas commitments, the South China Morning Post reported in March last year. Some marines will be assigned overseas including Djibouti and Gwadar Port of Pakistan, the Hong-Kong based newspaper reported. The information bureau of China's Ministry of National Defence said afterwards that the expansion of the PLA Navy's Marine Corps relates to the reform of the Chinese military, which is being steadily implemented. (Guo Yuandan, 2018)

In 2018, the same journalist, Minnie Chan, published another article indicating that Gwadar's and CPEC's militarisation will become a reality:

Beijing plans to build its second offshore naval base near a strategically important Pakistani port following the opening of its first facility in Djibouti (…). Beijing-based military analyst Zhou Chenming said the base near the Gwadar port (…) would be used to dock and maintain naval vessels, as well as provide other logistical support services. "China needs to set up another base in Gwadar for its warships because Gwadar is now a civilian port," Zhou said. "It's a common practice to have separate facilities for warships and merchant vessels because of their different operations. Merchant ships need a bigger port with a lot of space for warehouses and containers, but warships need a full range of maintenance and logistical support services." (Chan, 2018)

More recently, *Forbes Magazine* carried an article[66] linking China's high security facilities at Gwadar with military plans, based on satellite images. These discourses lead one to consider the real possibility of the militarisation of the port of Gwadar. Hence, China's military expansionism, which is being developed in tandem with the BRI, appears to include the port of Gwadar and its vicinity. The existence of China's 'Two-Oceans Strategy', which is enabled by Pakistan, alongside Sino-Pakistani ambiguity over military activity being planned at the Makran Coast, consolidates militarism as a central concept that structures CPEC.

While CPEC is an economic development project that is widely portrayed as a "game-changer" for Pakistan, it will also contribute to the further militarisation of the country. As Cynthia Enloe (2000) notes, as a step-by-step process, militarisation transforms individuals and societies. This transformation results in the normalisation of values, and of military needs and presumptions (Enloe, 2000, p3). In turn, militarisation "involves cultural and institutional, ideological, and economic transformations" (ibid). It thus appears that CPEC, particularly in Balochistan, is enhancing militarisation.

With Gwadar seen as being crucial to CPEC's progress, it also appears to have a significant role in the transformative steps linked to militarisation. Militarism thus continues to be a key factor that shapes the interlinking between identity and security, enabled by foreign policy decisions. The Sino-

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[66] The article may be consulted here: https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/06/02/chinas-new-high-security-compound-in-pakistan-may-indicate-naval-plans/?sh=3514a1f01020.

Pakistani partnership, which is mostly approached from geo-economic and geo-political angles, also represents how militarisation processes take place, which, in time, will create a possibility to exercise dual control: control over local and regional dissent; and control over the routes and means of extraction and exploitation in Pakistan and beyond.

Hitherto, I have examined how the various discourses around the Port of Gwadar demonstrate how militarisation has become a part of CPEC. To be sure, militarisation is a consequence of the ideological phenomenon that is militarism, with its expansion of a military ethos to the civilian realm. Whilst CPEC, since its inception, has been conceived as a civilian project, the military soon took it as a military enterprise, particularly in terms of what concerns the Balochistan-based projects. The words of ex-COAS General Raheel Shariff, speaking at Gwadar in 2016, indicate how militarism has indeed infiltrated and taken over CPEC:

> Since the onset of CPEC, Balochistan has seen unprecedented development of communication infrastructure. We mobilized Army Engineers for construction and, Army and Frontier Corps units for security of the projects. (…) As the Chief of Army Staff, I assure you that security of CPEC is our national undertaking and we will not leave any stone unturned (…) To this effect, a fifteen thousand strong dedicated force is already in place under the ambit of Special Security Division. (Raheel Shariff, 2006)

As Enloe notes, the "more militarised the understanding of what national security is (and what it is not) the more likely it will be that the conversation about national security – and international security – will be a largely

masculinised affair" (2016, p56). Indeed, when the COAS says it will leave "no stone unturned", he is representing the gendered nature of how security is being planned, as being "rigorous", "vigorous", and "forceful" in order to protect Chinese interests. Thus, CPEC generates an intertwining of national and international aspects of security, which are deeply gendered.

Additionally, there are indications that Chinese private security companies are present in Pakistan (Legarda and Nouwens, 2018). As these authors explain, whilst these kind of companies are not allowed to operate in Pakistan, some "have evidently found loopholes around this and continue to offer consulting and hands-on security services" (ibid). One such company, The Frontier Services Group, is closely linked to China's BRI projects and their security, which appears to be euphemised as "logistics businesses"[67]. It is important to note that this company is headed by the same founder of the controversial private security company, Blackwater.

Whilst it is not clear whether this company is directly working on CPEC projects related to security, one can think of how Sino-Pakistan relations enhance the gendered phenomenon of private security and its links with neoliberal forms of globalisation (Stachowitsch, 2015). Thus, militarism in the context of Sino-Pakistan relations also becomes part of a more globalised scenario, in which militarism becomes associated with private, globalised economic power structures, which are traditionally dominated by highly

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[67] See a 2018 report on from *The Financial Times*: https://www.ft.com/content/97c14e0e-2031-11e8-a895-1ba1f72c2c11.

masculine corporate interests (see Via, 2010). Hence, whilst there is still not enough evidence of the involvement of private security companies in CPEC, the scenario is conducive to produce a representation of militarism that is profoundly gendered and governed by neoliberal principles.

Concerning issues of representations and rights associated with CPEC's development, these are not limited to Pakistan's Balochistan. Kashmir, the thorniest issue in South Asian politics, is also being affected by the Sino-Pakistani venture. In the next section, I will analyse the main critical aspects of this partnership in relation to the Kashmir question.

3.4   CPEC and the Kashmir Question

In this section, I analyse how CPEC poses a challenge to the Kashmir question. I will comprehensively discuss the Kashmir question in the chapter dedicated to Pakistan's relations with India. However, in the context of Sino-Pakistani relations, CPEC has become an influential factor with regard to the Kashmir issue, and consequently relations with India. Additionally, China is one of the three countries that currently occupies territory in the disputed region. China's link with Kashmir is historically framed by her relations with Pakistan. It is important to understand how China has been politically astute in relation to the Kashmir issue. China has converted India's and Pakistan's failures into great political advantage. China has skilfully used her *entente cordiale* with Pakistan to remain relevant in respect of the Kashmir question whilst not becoming involved in direct, armed conflict.

John Garver's (2004) discussion of China's policies towards Kashmir offers a useful overview of the former's main stances on the issue over time. Garver provides the context for China's options, whilst noting that its policies on Kashmir have shifted over the years, yet without registering a radical shift. According to Garver, China held "an agnostic position in the 1950s [and shifted] to a distinctly pro-Pakistan [position] in the 1960s and 1970s, to an increasingly neutral position since Deng Xiaoping took over direction of China's foreign relations in 1978" (2004, p1). China's position on Kashmir is significant as it adopts an allegedly neutral stance, whilst demonstrating political nous in keeping the Kashmir issue alive in view of her own interest. As such, the issue does not become an irritant to China's strategic partnership with Pakistan.

As China opted for a neutral position on the Kashmir issue, thus appearing in line with other foreign policy options chosen by Deng (Garver, 2004), most statements coming out of Beijing insisted on the point that "it was a bilateral matter to be solved via peaceful negotiations between India and Pakistan" (ibid, p2). Furthermore, China considers the Kashmir question to be a "leftover from history" (ibid, p4). Hence, it discards the possibility of being seen as lending full support to either side in the dispute. However, Garver interprets it as a "slight nod towards India since it entails an implicit rejection of Pakistan's view that *Indian* aggression and expansionism is at root of the Kashmir problem" (ibid, p4). Yet, China is able to skilfully maintain a profitable ambiguity on the issue, by adjusting her discourse. For instance,

after the 1998 Indian nuclear tests, as Garver notes, China's ambassador to the UN stated that "We are opposed to any action which pursues regional hegemony" (Qin Huasun, cited in Garver, 2004, p6). Garver adds that "regional hegemony" is "a longstanding code word for Indian policies objectionable to Beijing" (ibid). Despite its neutrality on the Kashmir dispute, China's military and moral commitments towards Pakistan during the wars with India have not ceased. Moreover, China has enabled Pakistan to absorb shock-waves and injuries caused by those encounters. Thus, unsurprisingly, China's apparent neutrality on the Kashmir issue is looked upon by New Delhi with suspicion. In addition, unsettled Sino-India border disputes[68] continue to prompt India to consider China as the greatest beneficiary of the Kashmir question. As Prashant Kumar Singh suggests:

> The Kashmir problem gives China extra-ordinary leverage against India and leverage over Pakistan. Besides, POK and the more than 5000 square kilometres of Kashmiri territory, ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963, provide China with a smooth and assured connectivity to the Arabian Sea and West Asia, which has both strategic and trade significance for China. China will not like to lose this connectivity or compromise it in the event of a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue. Here, at this point, China's interests in J&K go opposite to those of Pakistan. The best case scenario for China in Kashmir is that the issue is never resolved; and if this issue inches towards any kind of resolution, China should be considered a party to the Kashmir dispute. (Singh, 2010)

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[68] The 2020 standoff between China and India in the border regions of Eastern Ladakh (an Indian Union territory since 5th August 2019) is the most recent confrontation.

As Singh notes, a key theme of the three countries' foreign policies is that of connectivity. China's ostensible neutral position dovetails with her aspirations in the IOR region, including now CPEC. The corridor, however, passes through Kashmir's regions of Gilgit-Baltistan (formerly known as the Northern Areas). This region is the only land link between Pakistan and China. As connectivity is one of the cornerstones of the project, territoriality comes to represent how identity and security issues are closely interconnected.

CPEC's relation to the Kashmir issue becomes a convoluted affair due to the territorial claims and their representation by India and Pakistan. The former considers Gilgit-Baltistan as part of the whole region of Kashmir, whereas the latter has continued to keep the region under an ambiguous constitutional arrangement which has prevented the region from being recognised as a fully-fledged province[69].

An analysis of the intricate details of power transitions in Gilgit-Baltistan is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, it is important to understand that the new state of Pakistan became a dominant political power in this region, whilst preventing its full integration into the federation. The Gilgit-Baltistan region of Kashmir represents yet another British colonial leftover, which continues to impact the livelihoods of the region's people. The colonial and post-colonial history of Gilgit-Baltistan is indeed filled with different

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[69] Gilgit-Baltistan was part of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947. The region does not have a full province status because, according to Pakistan, the full status of Kashmir is yet to be determined. Despite being administered by Islamabad, the region does not have direct representation in the Pakistani parliament.

nationalist perspectives (Sökefeld, 2005, p940). Martin Sökefeld (2005) explains how the British left the region hitherto under their control on 31st July 1947. A transition processed followed; the Gilgit Agency was placed under the control of Hari Singh, the Maharaja of Kashmir, who signed the instrument of accession to India (Sökefeld, 2005, p957). However, the author highlights how the region was under colonial rules of domination, either under British or Kashmiri control. The latter's rule was prompted by a rebellion headed by the Gilgit Scouts (a military force trained and set up by the British). They also requested that Pakistan take control of the region (Bansal, 2008). An external administrator was dispatched to control the region, and later, as Alok Bansal highlights,

> Kashmiri leaders were made to sign an agreement to transfer the administrative privileges of the region to the government of Pakistan. The agreement was the result of the government's desire to use Gilgit-Baltistan as a bargaining chip in a final settlement over Kashmir. It was assumed that in a plebiscite Gilgit-Baltistan would opt for Pakistan anyway. (2008, p86)

Soon after Pakistan had taken control, resentment with the central government began to surface. Nosheen Ali notes the continuation of the same colonial policies: "indirect rule was perpetuated through a Pakistani political agent in place of a British one, while local monarchs continued to squeeze labor, produce, and taxes from their subjects. In some ways, the rule of the Pakistan state was even worse" (2013, pp87-88). It was not until 2009 that some reforms were introduced in the region, including changing its name from a cryptic geographical label "the Northern Areas" to the more

meaningful name "Gilgit-Baltistan" (ibid, p88). In the same chapter, Ali (2013) describes how the Pakistani state has militarised Gilgit-Baltistan, and how the work of intelligence agencies in the region contributes to the "paranoid militarism" of the Pakistani state. To be sure, the militarisation of Gilgit-Baltistan is directly linked with the Kashmir question and India's claims over the region. According to Ali, the region resembles a garrison due to its military presence, whilst intelligence agencies have created the "paranoid state" (ibid, p105).

Of course, the militarisation of Gilgit-Baltistan started well before the launch of CPEC. As the corridor's success depends on border movements between Pakistan and China, and in view of India's critical position on CPEC, it is likely that militarisation will be further enhanced in this region. This implies further control and surveillance over the lives of people and their political activities. CPEC in Gilgit-Baltistan thus comes to enhance the idea that a corridor is closely linked with territoriality and with borders. Without these, a corridor's main goal – to facilitate the transit of goods and commodities – becomes compromised. Thus, in order to ensure that transit becomes possible, governing elites propagate the idea that security is paramount to ensuring that such transit happens.

As the militarisation of Gilgit-Baltistan indeed started before CPEC, questions about this economic corridor acting as a reinforcer of old colonial patterns of power relations may be raised. Thus, the question of security *for what* and *for whom* should be posed in the context of Gilgit-Baltistan/Kashmir

and CPEC. Thus far, Pakistan appears to be mostly concerned with fulfilling China's interests. Dissent and activism in Gilgit-Baltistan, including people raising questions about the local consequences of the Sino-Pakistan partnership, have been targeted and repressed (Kaswar Klasra, 2019). Moreover, the disputed status of the region and lack of constitutional status are also perceived as an issue, which may prompt China to press for governmental legitimacy in Gilgit-Baltistan.

Pakistan is thus caught in a quandary, with implications for her claims on the Kashmir question. As Siegfried Wolf (2016) suggests, the region will be integrated in the constitution as the fifth province. This move rests on the argument that Gilgit-Baltistan never integrated Jammu and Kashmir, and therefore was never under the Maharaja's rule, which is historically incorrect. If Pakistan pursues this path, her choice will mirror the regulations set by the former British colonial rulers in order to implement the transfer of power as well as the partition of British India (Wolf, 2016, p4). This would reify the idea that Pakistan is indeed a post-colonial colonial state. The downside of this option[70], as Wolf notes, is that "Pakistan will indirectly lose its normative rationale against India's incorporation of Jammu and Kashmir (the Indian administered part of Kashmir) as well as give up its claim over the respective territories" (ibid, p4).

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[70] In November 2020, Pakistan's Prime Minister announced a "provisional status of province" for Gilgit-Baltistan, which would ultimately elevate it to the status of province, thus bestowing it with constitutional recognition. There are reasons to believe that China is behind Pakistan's decision, as one more step towards consolidating CPEC/BRI. However, this decision is unlikely to happen, unless a constitutional revision occurs. This decision leaves the Pakistani leadership with less space to advocate for the Kashmir cause against Indian aggression and occupation, particularly in view of revocation of Article 370 by the Government of India in August 2019. See for instance: https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pakistan-announces-provisional-provincial-status-part-kashmir.

Thus, Gilgit-Baltistan, which has historically been part of the colonial politics of control and militarisation, is likely to continue to experience the same fate. Whilst status as a province would bring the constitutional rights long demanded by its people, therefore bringing full citizenship recognition, colonial practices of domination and militarisation, which are already present and inculcated, are unlikely to wane. CPEC's success and the need to secure it against its opponents, i.e., India, will be presented as issues of "national security" and "national interest", hence as justification to continue the militarisation of Gilgit-Baltistan. The latter could potentially be constitutionally joining one of the most militarised states in the world.

At the time of writing, it is not clear how CPEC will ever be a factor that may contribute to a peaceful resolution to the Kashmir issue. However, in September 2017, I asked AM4 whether China could be envisaged as an agent of peace in the region. He responded affirmatively, and justified his answer with reference to the amount of trade between China and India, but also with the fact that China, despite the current strong rapprochement between India and the United States, "has not yet concluded that India has gone forever to the United States, thus it is still keeping space for them" (AM4, 2017). The retired ambassador, who at the time was still affiliated with an influential academic institution, suggested that "Pakistan should be prepared for the Chinese to ask to mend fences with India, as in 2018 negotiations between China and India on the border issue may recommence" (AM4, 2017).

The above stance is in line with China's official position on creating the conditions for a "harmonious neighbourhood". Moreover, AC7, a senior academic and Dean of an influential university in Pakistan, suggested during an interview with me that CPEC could contribute to finding a solution thereby burying the Kashmir issue, if India would be slightly more generous. While he believes that a diplomatic solution is still possible, providing the three parts agree to negotiate (Pakistanis, Indians, and Kashmiris), he also noted that Pakistan is now more flexible than, for instance, during the 1980s. Whilst Pakistan's foreign policy elite has expressed hope in terms of how CPEC could contribute to a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue, subsequent political developments in Indian-administrated Kashmir, the China-India border clashes in Eastern Ladakh, and the evolving political developments in Gilgit-Baltistan appear to be less conducive to an optimistic outlook. More certain, however, are the processes of militarisation which continue to be enhanced in order to ensure the success of CPEC/BRI as expansionist projects.

Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan are two geo-politically and geo-strategically significant regions if CPEC is to become a successful economic corridor. However, as I have analysed, critical issues associated with the development of CPEC in these regions have an impact on how identity and security are interlinked. In Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan/Kashmir, the state of Pakistan faces important challenges linked to the impact of CPEC. In addition, the colonial practices of domination and extraction persist in those regions. Assuring CPEC's success has become a priority for the Pakistani state. As I

examined in this section, militarisation has become central for CPEC's execution. In the next section, I will discuss how militarism has been pursued so as to ensure Sino-Pakistani relations remain robust, like "iron-brothers", as they are often epitomised, and therefore hyper-masculine.

3.4.1 CPEC: Enhancing militarism

In this section, I analyse in more detail how CPEC, being an economic corridor, has come to represent how militarism will continue to be a state-ingrained ideology that shapes the relation between identity and security. In 2016, a Special Security Division of the Pakistani Army was created in order to protect Chinese projects and workers. It is a force composed by 9,000 soldiers, and 6,000 para-military personnel (Dawn, 2016). This force includes a "Light Commando Brigade" trained in amphibious and anti-terrorist operations (Hilal Magazine, n.d.). The SSD is thus deployed in all of Pakistan's provinces and also in Gilgit-Baltistan. Writing to the *Hilal Magazine*, a Lt Col Fawad Qasim suggests that "CPEC is confronted with multiple challenges, particularly security threats from external as well as internal inimical forces. (…) Raising of the Special Security Division (SSD) by Pakistan Army has comprehensively addressed the concerns of Chinese government" (Fawad Qasim, n.d.). It is notable that threats to CPEC thus mirror those that are imparted to the state, particularly the "external inimical forces", i.e. India.

Thus, it is evident that Pakistan's foreign policy towards China results in an expansion of military forces, such that the army has created an additional division to uphold Chinese interests. It is important to note how an economic corridor, which will provide transnational circulation of goods and commodities, has become associated with military activity and conflict. Yet, as Deborah Cowen (2014) highlights, there is an old interlinking between trade and war. She also notes that more often than not, behind stories of logistics, of which economic corridors are included, there are "histories and geographies of conflict" (ibid, p4). This certainly applies to the case of CPEC, as discussed in the previous section.

The initial vision that CPEC would be an enterprise primarily associated with civilian government has all but disappeared. Since the programme's launch, the military has continued to justify its actions with the need to provide "security". The demand for political and economic rights in Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan has resulted in an increased and brutal military presence. In Balochistan, where ethnonationalism has barely abated since the region's controversial accession to Pakistan, intensified militarisation since the early 2000s (Wani, 2016) has been the preferred response to engage a population that has been exploited and deprived of basic rights and facilities[71].

Military dictator General Pervez Musharraf had aggravated the effects of imposing militarisation, as a result of his policies to explore the region's

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[71] The region's natural resources and their extraction, which have been given to foreign companies, compound the reasons for the resentment and dissent of Balochistan's people, as they continue to see no benefits from this economic activity.

natural resources, accompanied by the establishment of new army cantonments in the region (see Rabia Aslam, 2011; Shakoor Wani, 2016). Musharraf's military dictatorship has rekindled separatist Baloch nationalism, when most of the regional political groups were trying to envisage their future as part of the Pakistani federation (Grare, 2013).

Whilst in the post-Musharraf regime, military operations have ended, human rights violations have become a constant. Enforced disappearances and "killing and dump" practices have been reported by national and international organisations. In 2012, when Baroness Catherine Ashton visited Pakistan, as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Human Rights Watch wrote her a letter setting out a long list of human rights violations in the country. Concerning Balochistan, HRW wrote:

> Across Balochistan province since January 2011, at least 300 people have been abducted, killed, and their bodies left on roadsides, in acts commonly referred to in Pakistan as "kill and dump" operations. (…) While Baloch nationalist leaders and activists have long been targeted by the Pakistani security forces, since the beginning of 2011 human rights activists and academics critical of the military have also been killed. (…) Research by Human Rights Watch suggests that Pakistani security forces are responsible for most of these killings. Human Rights Watch has documented how Pakistan's security forces, particularly its intelligence agencies, have often targeted for enforced disappearance ethnic Baloch suspected of involvement in the Baloch nationalist movement. (2012)

International media and EU institutions are not oblivious to the continuation of human rights violations in Balochistan, and have integrated this issue in

the context of CPEC/BRI[72]. More recently, an investigation by Drazen Jorjic of Reuters has linked the Pakistani military to the development of one of the largest world reserves of gold and copper, which is perceived to be a "strategic national asset", but also a Chinese economic interest (Jorjic, 2019). If this were to materialise, it would represent yet another case of how militarisation flourishes at the centre of extraction and exploitation activities.

Since CPEC's launch in 2013, the project has been nested in Pakistan's Ministry of Planning Development and Reform. However, as a new government came to power in 2018, the pace of CPEC's development has slowed, due to a hasty approach headed by the new PM who suspects the project of being host to large-scale corruption involving the previous PML-N government. Reportedly, Pakistan's new approach to CPEC has raised concerns in Beijing, whilst in Islamabad the Pakistani PM has sought to be perceived and represented as a pious, vigorous, heterosexual man, striving to reshape Pakistan's image towards one of a principled, non-corrupt, and forthright state. Months later, as the CPEC appeared to be stagnating and Chinese pressure was growing, a new governing body for CPEC was created: the CPEC Authority.

The creation of CPEC Authority is a precise example of how CPEC is a militarised project, and how militarism and masculinity are closely linked. This new governing body was to be headed by retired Lt General Asim

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[72] See for instance: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2019-001047_EN.html, and https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38454483.

Saleem Bajwa. However, the body has not stood without controversy. Concerns about CPEC Authority's legal status have been raised in Parliament[73], and a journalistic investigation has uncovered how General Bajwa and his family have built extensive businesses abroad[74]. Yet, what is significant is the real purpose of this new department. In an interview[75] in September 2020, the appointed retired General explains why CPEC Authority was created:

> the scope of CPEC is not expanding, and there is so much work to do, so many ministries involved, and then the provinces and all federating units are involved, therefore, I think, the government felt that they needed one window operation, where you could have the foreign investors come and get their job done from one place … we do the running around, we coordinate, we get things done in a coordinate[d] way and expeditious way … the mandate of CPEC Authority is more on the implementation of projects. (General Asim Bajwa, 2020)

The idea that an institution headed by a high-ranked military man can resolve bureaucratic issues that state ministries apparently were unable to do, reveals how far militaristic values are already deeply rooted in the Pakistani model of governance. It also demonstrates how the military institution, closely associated with ideas of masculinity linked to rationality, order, efficiency, achievement, etc., is seen as the guarantor of success, whereas civil

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[73] See how Pakistani media reported this issue: https://www.dawn.com/news/1586720. In November 2020, the National Assembly cleared CPEC Authority bill. Available here: https://www.geo.tv/latest/319135-na-panel-clears-cpec-authority-bill-2020.

[74] Details may be found here: https://factfocus.com/politics/1756/. Whilst there may be some speculation as to the motivations behind this investigation, it is data-driven and has caused the target general to resign from his role as a special advisor to Pakistan's PM, and also as head of CPEC Authority.

[75] The interview may be found here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNta8dlbFL8.

government institutions are perceived as unable to deliver ("so many ministries", as the General said) the services expected by Chinese/foreign investors, because they are perceived as disorganised, flawed, inefficient, and failing. Hence, CPEC, as an enterprise linked to foreign policy, has indeed turned into a deeply militarised one, represented by typical masculine features.

3.5   Conclusion

In this chapter, I analysed Pakistan's relations with China with a focus on CPEC. The Sino-Pakistani relationship has been constructed as one that raises reciprocal support for each partner amid challenging times. However, its regional extent continues to generate significant attention from other international actors, namely the US. Whilst CPEC has become a topic of research interest within China's BRI foreign policy outreach, its links to militarism and militarisation have drawn less attention. The consequences of military impact and influence on CPEC have been identified (see for instance Boni, 2020); however, discussions on how this is translated into the enhancement of militarism as an ideology appear to be lacking. This chapter has sought to identify how in the context of CPEC, militarism becomes an ideological tool of the state to further enhance the control and submission of subjects and their livelihoods.

CPEC generates geopolitical anxieties at the regional and international levels (for instance, India's uneasiness with China's presence in IOR), mainly due

its potential to raise China's expansionist plans. On the one hand, CPEC bestows China with better and easier access to the IOR, and on the other, it ensures that the country continues to hold an important stake in the contentious border issues in the Himalayas. Hence, CPEC enhances and intensifies one of militarism's key factors: permanent war-preparedness, as Pakistan stands to protect Chinese interests. Furthermore, as I explained, militarist expansion is also linked to colonial and neo-colonial practices of extraction, occupation, and exploitation. Indeed, it is no surprise that the regions through which CPEC crosses have long been associated with oppressive colonial practices, including occupation and the exploitation of natural resources.

Whilst CPEC is described as an economic corridor, which is severely dependent on efficient connectivity, the political decisions made by the Sino-Pakistani partnership are ones that will bolster militarism. As I analysed, the expanded role that the Pakistani military is taking on in relation to CPEC governing and security-related issues will result in a further inculcation of militaristic values, including the belief that the military/army is the ultimate solution to any conflict, be that ethnonationalist dissent or the perceived threat of India, and that having enemies is a normal condition, as Enloe (2014, p7) suggests.

Hence, it is to be expected that Pakistan's foreign policy towards China has an impact on the interlinking of identity and security, as the result of militarism. Additionally, in view of how militarism and militarisation, indeed

a multifaceted, socio-political process, have taken root in representations of Pakistani state identity, it is possible to suggest that the latter is one that privileges a hegemonic masculinity, represented by how CPEC is and will remain a foreign policy endeavour dominated and controlled by military, Punjabi men. Hence, as an economic development project, contrary to its main slogan of constituting a "game-changer", CPEC in reality will be nothing of the sort. So long as CPEC's governance continues to privilege practices that represent the continuation of militarised political solutions, neo-colonial forms of governance, and an archetypal ensemble of heterosexual, conformist, masculine features, this "game-changer" will merely serve to further embed the Pakistani state with the ideology of militarism.

CHAPTER IV

PAKISTAN'S MILITARISED RELATIONS WITH INDIA WITH A FOCUS ON KASHMIR

4.1   Introduction

Pakistan's relations with India constitute a vital and complex chapter within the history of South Asia. Their independence in 1947 is marked by historical origins of the anti-colonial struggles against British colonialism, and by the abysmal violence caused by the partition, from which Pakistan emerged as an independent state. Yet, the two larger states in South Asia share a history of civilisation, including religion and culture, of common struggles, but also of

conflict and war. Post-independence, the shared history of the two post-colonial states has primarily been narrated as one of war and conflict, and as the history of a territory that both countries occupy whilst claiming sovereign rights over it. Kashmir, a territory located in the Himalayan regions of South Asia, has a socio-cultural ethos that is distinct from both post-colonial states, and its right to self-determination has been disputed by Pakistan and India. Kashmir continues to be the main source of conflict between the two countries. Hence Pakistan's relations with India are for the most part dominated by conflict and discord. As such, this relationship can be seen as one marked by antagonism, set against a militaristic background.

In this chapter, I examine Pakistan's relations with India, with a focus on the Kashmir question. Whilst Pakistan's foreign relations with India include other relevant themes – such as water sharing, environmental issues, cultural, religious, and linguistic ties, nuclear weapons, terrorism, among others – the centrality of the Kashmir issue transcends all the others and yet retains a direct connection with these themes. In light of this, the main objective of the chapter is to examine how the centrality of the Kashmir issue contributes to militarism and its representations as a key factor in Pakistan's interlinking of security and identity. The chapter also aims to establish how militarism is closely linked with occupation, and how Pakistan persists with an official discourse towards Kashmir that dismisses its own role as an occupying element and instead represents itself as a liberation force.

The chapter is divided into three parts. In the introduction I outline the main aspects that constitute the history of Pakistan's relations with India. The second part is dedicated to the Kashmir issue, and the third part establishes the relation of this issue with militarism, and examines how the latter contributes to the perpetual occupation of Kashmir.

The history of Pakistan's relations with India has its roots in British colonialism. The partition of India in 1947, known to be responsible for the significant destruction of communities and the imposition of hitherto meaningless borders, represents more than the culmination of anti-colonial struggles and the creation of two independent states. The partition represents the beginning of a two-state conflict, which thus far has resulted in four wars, three of them fought over Kashmir. The partition also signals the beginning of the militarisation of South Asia, the apex of which can be seen in nuclearisation.

Pakistan-India relations have drawn a significant amount of research in international and regional studies[76]. This literature is mostly dominated by the realist school of IR and its links to strategic and security studies. War and conflict remain central themes in the literature. Thus, according to T.V. Paul, "the India–Pakistan conflict is simultaneously over territory, national identity, and power position in the region" (2005, p8), whilst Arndt Michael adds that this conflictual relationship

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[76] The academic literature on this theme is vast and is most concentrated on foreign policy, security studies, strategic studies. Going back almost as far as both countries' independence, it is not possible to cite all the relevant works produced since that time.

has been shaped by a multitude of different and differing factors, including ideology, territory, the role and actions of neighbors and external actors such as the United States and the former Soviet Union, differences in internal and external capabilities and the acts and special role of individual leaders, to name but a few. (2018, p109)

As both authors identify, territory is a common theme of this conflict. Kashmir is the territory that has come to represent interstate conflict, whilst political and human rights violations that continuously happen within that territory continue to plague Kashmiris. Hence, whilst mainstream IR literature in South Asia continues to focus on zero-sum arguments of territorial disputes, it is also important to recognise how conflict has also become de-territorialised. As Sankaran Krishna notes, South Asia conflicts are

increasingly fought not so much between soldiers in uniform over well-defined territories, but rather among shadowy intelligence organizations and covert armies, paramilitary forces and mercenary outfits, insurgents and terrorist groups, [and] the majority of casualties in such conflicts in South Asia are ordinary citizens, not professional soldiers. (1999, pxx)

Krishna also makes an important point about the de-territorialisation of these conflicts (Kashmir is one example, but the same applies to other regional ethno-nationalist conflicts such as those in Balochistan, Sri Lanka, or Northeast India) and how it is also connected with the way in which a global diaspora finances and supports these conflicts (ibid). Hence, restricting

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discussions of the Kashmir issue to a more typical regional territorialised conflict, as Pakistan and India have done for decades, tends to erase the possibilities for Kashmiris to be self-represented, regionally and internationally, and to have their plight acknowledged outside of the Pakistan-India antagonism.

However, Pakistan's relations with India also focus on identity issues, which work as a core factor in foreign policy. Aparna Pande (2011, 2016, 2018) explains that identity matters in this formulation. Pande suggests that it is India, perceived as a threat to a nationalistic ideology, that continues to provide the context for Pakistan's foreign policy (2011, p174). Whilst Pande's assertion describes correctly how Pakistan's foreign policy towards India is framed, it also opens up a space to interrogate how major Pakistani foreign policy actors (the military and intelligence agencies) make use of India-centric inimical discourses to construct this relationship as one that both generates insecurity and grounds the country's alterity. Hence, it is important to ask for whom this insecurity is generated, and if this alleged "insecurity" is perceived in the same way by the state as it is by Pakistani citizens.

It is also important to establish how Pakistan and Pakistanis, broadly speaking, perceive India. Iftikhar H. Malik suggests that both countries, "at a basic level, have been largely governed by a mutually similar politics of misperceptions and misimages" (1999, p150). The author notes that these politics are underpinned by the specific South Asian historical context produced by the interactions between Hindus and Muslims. He suggests that

"to Pakistanis, the Indians (often described as the 'Hindu communities') have never accepted Muslims as fellow South Asians, but rather emphasised the 'foreignness' of Muslims in the entire historical experience" (ibid).

It is indeed these binaries – Hindu/Muslim, native/immigrant – that are often invoked by both states, so as to articulate their contemporary nationalist discourses. Thus, as discussed earlier, narratives associated with Pakistan's state identity continue to be grounded on the two-nation theory (see First Post, 2019), which, according to C.C. Fair, "locks India and Pakistan in a civilizational struggle: Pakistan must defend Islam and the two-nation theory against what many Pakistanis believe to be an India dedicated to undermining it and thus the very legitimacy of the Pakistani state" (2014, p10). Hence, the Kashmir question has become increasingly represented by the states that occupy the territory as a civilisational struggle. Pakistan, as this chapter examines, has been using this representation as a foreign policy tool.

This perspective on how Pakistani state-based identity constructs its Other (India) is further ignited by the theory of *Akhand Bharat* (or Undivided India). Aparna Pande suggests that while this 'theory' "has been disproved by historic reality", "its salience endures in Pakistani strategic thinking" (2011, p57). She also adds that despite adjustments made to this theory, it was never abandoned. In September 2017, I interviewed AC6, who stated that "if India would have the opportunity, it will attack us". Therefore, the Pakistani foreign policy elite, and to a great extent a large percentage of the public, perceives India as an enemy. This perception of enmity is constructed in two principal

ways: as a threat to the "Muslim identity"; and as a threat to Pakistan's territorial sovereignty. This is a clear example of how the Pakistani state identity is interlinked with the state's security, and in particular her territory. The 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War is a prime example of this interlinking, as Pakistan lost her Eastern wing.

Pakistan and India have fought four wars and faced multiple crises of conflict escalation. The latest clash took place in February 2019, after a terrorist attack against Indian forces in ICK. However, since 2016, Pakistan-India relations have become further strained. The trust level has diminished and both countries have not hesitated in reiterating their preparedness for war. The absence of cordial relations between Pakistan and India, including a substantial trade relationship, which, according to a recent report published by the World Bank, would have the potential to create up to 37 billion US Dollars (Dawn, 2018), is undoubtedly a barrier that prevents both economies from growing and in turn their citizens from prospering.

Pakistan-India relations have therefore prepared the ground for militarism to flourish in South Asia. "Excessive militarism", a concept deployed by Swati Parashar to describe how militarism in India has flourished[77] with the advent

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[77] Swati Parashar notes that "In India, militaristic approaches of varying degrees of intensity are deployed to deal with the conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, secessionist movements in the northeastern states, the Maoist insurgency, illegal immigration, acrimonious neighbours such as Pakistan, and cross-border terrorism. Every perceived security situation has militaristic solutions" (2018, p4). It is noteworthy that Pakistan uses the same militaristic approaches to deal with the Kashmir conflict, the internal fight against terrorism, Balochistan insurgency,

of globalisation (2018, p3), may also be applied to Pakistan. Although India's military enhancement has different sources and motivations from Pakistan's, the latter is mostly dependent on her relations with India, and it has increased on that basis. However, the mainstream history of India-Pakistan relations[78], including those more focused on the Kashmir issue, despite describing the origins and consequences of the four wars and noting how both countries are in a permanent status of war-preparedness, pays little, if any, attention to militarism as an ideology. Nor does this mainstream history attend to the fact that this relationship has steadily contributed to the construction of these two post-colonial nation-states as the normalisers of violence in Kashmir, as well as in other regions of South Asia.

To address this lacuna, as I will discuss in the next section, the Kashmir issue, which remains one of the most intractable international conflicts, continues to be the principal reason as to why Pakistan and India have become national security states, where militarisation continues to expand. Yet, as I will examine, the rights of Kashmiris, particularly of those who inhabit the Kashmir Valley, continue to be ignored and suppressed, as state security and identity continue to be the chief guiding force behind militarised political decisions.

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the militarisation of CPEC (as it sees an Indian-originated threat to undermine the project), as well as paramilitary forces deployed in urban areas, including airports.
[78] Various works from Pakistani authors, like Abdul Sattar (2016), Shahid Amin (2000), or Hasan-Askari Rizvi (1993), are a case in point.

4.2   The Kashmir Issue

In this section I analyse what constitutes the "Kashmir issue" in the context of Pakistan's relations with India, as well as how it generates representations of militarism and reflects Pakistan's interlinking of identity and security. Most of the existing literature on the "Kashmir issue" adopts a state-centric approach, privileging Pakistan's and/or India's arguments that sustain their claims to ruling the region. In this chapter, I am specifically interested in examining how Pakistan's claims to Kashmir in the context of her relation with India continue to enhance and promote a militaristic ideology, and how this in turn shapes the state's identity.

Kashmir is a region in which military occupation, violence, human rights violations, and generalised dehumanisation are pervasive. The region of Jammu and Kashmir is a territory that is occupied by three different nation-states: Pakistan, India, and China. Yet, as Nitasha Kaul notes: "Kashmir is not India. Kashmir is not Pakistan. Kashmir is not China. Kashmir is the boundary zone of India-China-Pakistan. But it is distinctively Kashmir. And its people – whatever their religion or national identity – are Kashmiris" (Kaul, 2010). Being a Kashmiri, however, has become silenced within the discourses that Pakistan and India have engendered in the past seven decades. Regrettably, "being a Kashmiri" has also been incorporated into discourses of occupation, violence, militarisation, rape, and dehumanisation. Kashmiris,

as a people can therefore be seen as a kind of "managed" subjects by both, Pakistan and India.

One of the ways in which Kashmiri subjects have become "managed" relates to how each state handles Kashmir's cartographical representation and nomenclature. Hence, the region of Jammu and Kashmir is designated in various ways, depending on whom does it, and it represents a political statement. Indeed, Kashmir embodies a diversity of meanings, which have been simultaneously appropriated and generated by Pakistan and India in order to exercise control over the territory. Cartographical identification is turned into representations of political forces. For instance, Pakistan labels the Kashmiri territory that it controls and occupies as "*Azad*"[79] Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). The state of Pakistan[80] refers to the side of Kashmir occupied and controlled by India as "occupied Kashmir" or IOK. In August 2020, the state of Pakistan decided to undertake some cartography and adopted a new map showing the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh, not only part of Pakistan, but also designating those areas as "Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir, or IIOK" (see Dawn, 2020).

In India, AJK is known as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). In a recent United Nations report on the "Situation of Human Rights in Kashmir", the

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[79] "Azad" means "Free".
[80] Christopher Snedden notes that "Confusingly, when Pakistanis are talking about 'Held Kashmir', they often mean the Kashmir Valley, as they have almost no interest in Jammu and Ladakh" (2013, p19). In Urdu, "Occupied Kashmir" is called "Maqbooza Kashmir".

territory is referred to as the "Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (consisting of the Kashmir Valley, the Jammu and Ladakh regions) and Pakistan-Administered Kashmir (Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan)" (UN, 2018). Whilst the UN nomenclature is correct as an official discourse, I would suggest that it is also necessary to designate Kashmir, when needed to establish which side of the divide the text is referring to, the use of Kashmir (Indian controlled, IC) or Kashmir (Pakistan controlled, PC), as the word "controlled" is closely associated with colonial practices which are prevalent in Kashmir (ICK and PCK).

4.2.1   Historical contextualisation of the conflicts in Kashmir

The history of Kashmir is made up of multiple encounters with external actors. In the context of this study, the most relevant encounters are those pertaining to the British colonisation of South Asia and its aftermath. Geography is considered an important factor to explain why Kashmir raises nation-states' anxieties around territorial possession. Unlike most areas of Northern India, Kashmir resisted successive invasions from the West; however, in 1586, it was finally conquered by the Mughal ruler Akbar (Snedden, 2015). Like the majority of Northern Indian regions, including the Punjab, Kashmir was subject to Mughal rule, Sikh rule, and the consequences of British colonialism.

The decline of Ranjit Singh's empire after his death in 1839, fuelled by succession issues, and Britain's desire to expand her influence in Northern India (ibid) dictated the fate of Kashmir. By defeating the Sikhs in 1846, the British captured Kashmir for a brief period of time; the former sold it to Gulab Singh, a Dogra ruler from Jammu. Kashmir was sold by 75 lac[81] Rupees, under the treaty of Amritsar, signed in March 1846 (see *Greater Kashmir*, 2010). According to Christopher Snedden, "The losers were the Sikhs and the people of Kashmir. … Whatever political desires Kashmiris had for their homelands were totally ignored. The sale was a cold, hard real estate transaction in which the Kashmiris were never allowed to offer a bid" (2015, p60).

One hundred years later, once again British colonial politics dictated how Kashmiris' rights were stolen, and how a full-scale conflict ensued between India and Pakistan. According to Raju Thomas, "the root causes of the Kashmir problem are to be found in events leading to the partition of British India and the opposing ideological perspectives of the All-India Muslim League (AIML) and the Indian National Congress (INC)" (1992, p11). The political background that determined the demand for the creation of Pakistan, particularly in the terms articulated by Jinnah and the AIML after 23rd March 1940 (Lahore Declaration), compounded with each newly independent state and their perceptions of Kashmir, brewed into an intractable conflict, with still no solution in sight.

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[81] One *lac* is equivalent to 100,000.

The provisions of the India Independence Act 1947, regarding the case of princely states, indicate the right to remain independent or alternatively to opt for one of the new states. Kashmir, a princely state that was ruled by a Hindu, whilst having a Muslim majority population, if one follows the logic agreed by the three parties involved in the partition of India, would become part of Pakistan, or become independent, pending the ruler's decision. However, the ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, did not decide until 26th October 1947. Ever since, Kashmir has technically acceded to India. However, turmoil and revolt were already taking place in parts of the territory. A revolt in the Poonch region, together with the infiltration of "tribesmen" inbound from the NWFP region of Pakistan, allegedly triggered the Maharaja's decision to accede to India without consulting the population[82]. The circumstances in the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir remained volatile. As mentioned, "tribesmen" from NWFP entered the state. A number of scholars acknowledge that ethnic Pashtuns have entered Kashmir from Pakistani territory (Korbel, 1954; Gupta, 1964; Lamb, 1994; Malik, 2002; Schofield, 2003; Behera, 2006; Snedden, 2013; Zakaria, 2018; Fair, 2018), causing panic and a trail of destruction. Yet, there are two main sets of scholarly work trying to ascertain whether or not the Pakistani government directed and supported the invasion. For instance, Sisir Gupta (1964), Prem Jha (1996), and Fair (2018) suggest that the Government of Pakistan supported the invaders. Similarly, Alistair Lamb notes that: "as 1947 drew to a close, it was already possible to detect a pattern in the Kashmir conflict. The combination of Azad Kashmiris and the

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[82] The historiography about how and why Hari Singh opted out for India is itself a matter of dispute. The controversy between Prem Shankar Jha (1996) who authored *Kashmir, 1947: Rival Versions of History* and Alistair Lamb's (1994) *Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947* signals well that there is no definitive version of what took place.

Gilgit Scouts, with varying degrees of assistance both moral and material from Pakistan, had produced the beginnings of a stalemate" (1994, p124). Joseph Korbel (1954) states in his book *Danger in Kashmir* that the invasion by 'tribesmen' was a response to the genocidal campaign carried by the Maharaja Dogra troops against Muslims in Poonch and Jammu. Korbel, however, notes that "no one, especially the Hindus and Sikhs, was safe before their barbarous fury" (1954, p76). For Snedden,

> the evidence shows that the people of Jammu and Kashmir themselves began the Kashmir dispute. Pukhtoon raiders or outsiders did not start it, as India has repeatedly stated since 1947. India used this argument to strengthen its position in the Kashmir dispute, but Pakistan's acquiescence in it is surprising. (2013, p229)

More recently, Anam Zakaria (2018), following recent field research in PCK, highlights how the movement of 'tribesmen' is still lamented by local Kashmiris. In my view, after reading several accounts, it is not possible to reach a full authoritative conclusion as to what happened in Kashmir during September and October 1947.

As India's Governor General after independence, Lord Mountbatten became fully involved in the accession process[83]. His oft-cited letter to Hari Singh dated 27th October accepting the accession clearly states that while the

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[83] Alex von Tunzelmann (2007) argues that the existing relationship between Mountbatten, Nehru, and their mutual dislike of Jinnah helped to forge the idea that the latter personally organised the tribesmen to invade Kashmir. She explains that "according to British officials on the scene, Jinnah was innocent – though they conceded that the Pakistani government had passively supported the invasion by keeping local supply routes open" (von Tunzelmann, 2007, p192).

Government of India accepts the accession, since there is a matter of dispute, "the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State [… and] as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people" (Lord Mountbatten, cited in Ijaz Hussain, 1998, p10). The same promise to "settle by a reference to the people", which has since been interpreted as a promise to hold a plebiscite, was also uttered by Nehru to Liaqat Ali Khan[84] in a telegram dated 30th October 1947: "Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored and leave the decision about the future of the State to the people of the State is not merely a pledge to your Government, but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world" (Nehru, cited in Ijaz Hussain, 1998, p11). Seven decades later, Kashmiris have not been heard and have not been given the chance to decide.

The arrival of Indian troops in Kashmir did not bring an end to the looting, rape and violence at the hands of the "tribesmen", nor did it avoid the Jammu massacre of 5th and 6th November in the Jammu region, which would exacerbate the difficulties in coming to a settlement. Alex von Tunzelmann (2007) is one of the few historians who refers to it[85], based on the account provided by Richard Symonds (2001) in his book *In the Margins of Independence*. The Jammu massacre, together with the overall spiral of

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[84] Nehru consistently mentioned in different telegrams to the Pakistan premier, and in different addresses to the Indian people, that a plebiscite would be held. See Arundhati Roy (2011), esp. chapter on "Seditious Nehru".
[85] See also Rifat Fareed's (2017) report for *Aljazeera.* It may be found here: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/6/the-forgotten-massacre-that-ignited-the-kashmir-dispute.

violence that took place during 1947 and 1948 in Kashmir, would then be legitimised as a war between India and Pakistan. Sumantra Bose describes it as

> an orgy of mass killing and expulsion in the Jammu region between October and December. … The entire Hindu and Sikh populations of Muslim-majority districts in western Jammu like Muzaffarabad, Bagh, Rawalakot (western Poonch), Kotli, Mirpur, and Bhimbar were killed or expelled. Mass murder and expulsion of Muslims occurred in Hindu-dominant eastern Jammu districts – Udhampur, Kathua, and Jammu city and its environs. (2003, pp40-41)

What Bose describes mirrors the massacres that took place earlier on the plains of the Punjab where Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus killed each other almost indiscriminately[86]. The Jammu massacre may represent the extreme violence of the partition, but that time around in disputed Kashmir, where the first war between Pakistan and India took place.

By the end of 1947, Pakistan and India considered appealing to the UN for mediation. According to Alistair Lamb, Pakistan would be the first to informally approach the UN, in order to obtain advice on "how the United Nations could take part in a Kashmir plebiscite, and in what way and to whom in the United Nations Pakistan could appeal" (1994, p155). This appears to have worked as a call for India, as until that point she had she had shown no interest in engagement. For a brief period of time, as Lamb explains, in

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[86] An excellent account of the killings in Punjab can be found in Ishtiaq Ahmed's book *The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed: Unravelling the 1947 Tragedy through Secret British Reports and First-person Accounts* (Ahmed 2012).

November 1947, a conciliatory document was produced, which included troops' withdrawal and a joint request to the UN to "send a commission to the Subcontinent to seek recommendations from not only the two Dominions but also the Government of Jammu and Kashmir (which was here evidently considered as an entity in its own right, presumably with Sheikh Abdullah as its political head) as to how best to set about organising a free and unfettered plebiscite" (ibid, p156).

However, internal politics, the horrific humanitarian crisis in Kashmir, and continuous mistrust and misperception from both sides derailed a plan that could have avoided an all-out war between Pakistan and India. India's insistence on Pakistan being labelled an aggressor (see Snedden, 2013, pp231-232) certainly complicated the road to negotiating a settlement, even though Pakistan showed some restraint and considered accepting and submitting that it would be "if not the guilty party, at least the party which would not at the outset protest its innocence too loudly" (ibid, p158). No great progress was made, and this marked the beginning of a history of missed opportunities.

At the end of winter 1948, the Indian Army started a new military offensive. It resulted in further gains towards Pakistan-sponsored controlled areas. The Pakistan Government followed the British[87] General's advice: regular troops were sent under what appears to have been a pre-emptive decision, in defiance of strict interpretations of international law. Pakistan feared a full-scale

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[87] General Gracey was the British Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Army.

invasion from India. After all, Pakistan's creation and independence were perceived as being not fully accepted by India. Pakistan's sense of insecurity was also a product of the developments on the ground in Kashmir during 1947 and 1948. A truce was reached in January 1949, as the belligerent sides were exhausted and judged that no further territorial gains could be obtained (Bose, 2003, p41).

UN negotiations that took place in subsequent years proved fruitless. With India focused on declaring Pakistan as an aggressor, and the latter rejoindering based on the alleged flawed and dubious accession process, an impasse was reached. The promised plebiscite did not materialise, despite several resolutions passed by the UN Security Council prior to 1957. The necessary withdrawal of troops did not take place. Kashmir remains one of the most highly militarised zones in the world.

War and violence have marked Pakistan's relations with India. The former, however, has used conflict and war to express its non-acceptance of Kashmir's accession to India. The Line of Control (or LOC) that divides the territory is controlled by both countries. Ceasefire violations happen practically on a daily basis, serving as a reminder that neither Pakistan nor India have upheld the demands for demilitarisation, nor have they allowed Kashmiris to decide on their own future. Thus, for the states of Pakistan and India, the LOC stands as the only possible trophy for a territory that they do not own.

Pakistan does not accept Kashmir's accession to India. However, the status quo that India and Pakistan produce and reproduce benefits the latter in a variety of ways. It keeps alive the "two-nation theory" that is constitutive of the imagined state's national identity. It also justifies the need to retain hostile relations with India. Consequently, the militarisation of Pakistan's foreign policy entered into a process of enhancement and continuity that persists to this day.

Yet, Pakistan did not accept the achieved status quo, and attempted to take on Kashmir by resorting to guerrilla warfare. In 1965, the Pakistani leadership's morale in terms of the possibility of winning a confrontation with India increased, due to the latter's defeat in the 1962 Border War with China. Pakistan's military success in the disputed Rann of Kutch (see Abdul Sattar, 2016) is also believed to have contributed towards the perception that Pakistan could take Kashmir. In addition, Pakistan's link to the Western military alliances, which helped the Army to become the most powerful state institution, enhanced her revisionist politics towards India. Hence, an overconfident Pakistan, which saw to profit from unrest that prevailed in ICK, undertook "Operation Gibraltar", to be followed, if successful, by "Operation Grand Slam". Basically, Pakistan's military government, albeit heavily influenced by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the Foreign Secretary Aziz Ahmed, opted for an "infiltration of trained guerrillas under Pakistan Army officers into Indian-held Kashmir to help foment local dissent and uprising" (Nawaz, 2008, p206). However, the uprising in ICK did not materialise. Both countries engaged in a full-scale war, with India crossing the international border near

Lahore. Despite heavy losses and huge costs, both sides claimed victory. According to Shuja Nawaz, "both had failed in their military objectives and the immediate effort was to put the best face on a difficult situation" (ibid, p236).

The lengthy impasse in respect of the Kashmir issue continued without any substantial resolution until 1972. On the aftermath of the 1971 War, Pakistan's and India's leaders met at Simla, India, in June/July 1972 in order to resolve the pending issues of the Bangladesh Liberation War. Z.A. Bhutto went to Simla in a precarious position. India was holding nearly 93,000 POW. To be sure, both sides had specific interests: Pakistan sought the release of prisoners, who otherwise would be tried for war crimes and crimes against humanity; India was more interested in a definitive settlement on Kashmir. Somehow, Bhutto convinced Indira Gandhi that if Pakistani military officers would be put on trial, a conducive ground to negotiate Kashmir could not be met. Thus, the Simla Agreement contemplated Bhutto's demands, together with key commitments signed by India and Pakistan.

Whilst the commitments appeared to signal a way forward for Pakistan's relations with India, they arguably came too late, as three wars had already happened. Both nations committed to the bilateral and peaceful resolution of all issues, to focus on people-to-people contact, and to uphold the inviolability of the LOC[88] in Jammu and Kashmir, considered then key to agreeing an

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[88] Zafar Khan draws attention to the fact that "Many Kashmiris do not recognize the Shimla Accord as they consider it inimical to their national interests. It is for this reason that Kashmiris often refuse to use the term 'Line of Control' to describe the de facto border since

enduring peace. Political scientist Ishtiaq Ahmed (2013) raises two important points: why did Indira Gandhi agree on the POW repatriation? This question remains unanswered. The other point relates to each party's respective interpretation of the agreement. To India, Kashmir would no longer be an international issue and the LOC would remain an international border, whereas to Pakistan the agreement meant that a solution to the Kashmir problem was yet to come (Ahmed, 2013, p211). To date, Pakistan continues to envisage Kashmir as an international dispute, in violation of the Simla Agreement.

4.2.2 Pakistan's ceaseless fight for Kashmir and its impact on state identity

Post-1972 Pakistan's relations with India remained centred on Kashmir. The growing unrest in ICK, particularly after 1989, remains important in explaining how Pakistan's relations with India became even more bitter. Pakistan continued to view the Kashmir issue through the lens of militaristic solutions. Pakistani military and intelligence services, namely the ISI, "started to use experience and resources from the Afghan jihad to begin helping the Kashmiri uprising against Indian control in Kashmir" (Nawaz, 2008, p431). Whilst the Kashmiri uprising was indigenous, Pakistan quickly transformed it into a foreign policy practice, with two key objectives, as Stephen Tankel explains: "to make Indian-administered Kashmir such a

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doing so would imply accepting it as a formal division – the decision over which they had no say and the consequences of which have devastated the state" (2021, p574).

burden that India would abandon it; and to bleed India at little cost to Pakistan" (2011, p51). According to Shuja Nawaz, the civilian government lead by Benazir Bhutto was unaware of ISI's initial plans, whilst she was advised that the army did not favour a military solution to Kashmir (2008, p432). However, the support for the Kashmiri jihad expanded to politicians. The fact that the military and the ISI, as key Pakistani foreign policy actors, have been supporting armed groups in Kashmir since the late 1980s and early 1990s is well documented by scholars like Fair (2014), Tankel (2011), or Greig (2016), as well as by international institutions. For instance, the latest UN report on the human rights situation in Kashmir adds significant institutional weight to the claims:

> Since the late 1980s, a variety of armed groups has been actively operating in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, and there has been documented evidence of these groups committing a wide range of human rights abuses … In the 1990s, around a dozen significant armed groups were operating in the region; currently, less than half that number remain active … The main groups today include Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Hizbul Mujahideen and Harakat Ul-Mujahidin; they are believed to be based in Pakistan Administered Kashmir. … Hizbul Mujahideen is also part of the United Jihad Council, which began as a coalition of 14 armed groups in 1994, claiming to be fighting Indian rule in Kashmir, that was allegedly formed by Pakistan's defence establishment. Despite the Government of Pakistan's assertions of denial of any support to these groups, experts believe that Pakistan's military continues to support their operations across the Line of Control in Indian-Administered Kashmir. (United Nations, 2018, p39)

The supporting of militants and armed groups in Kashmir suggests how the state of Pakistan privileges the use of violence. Moreover, Pakistan's foreign policy actors also made use of religious ideology to continue a relentless effort towards making territorial gains in Kashmir. A clear example relates to ISI's trajectory on supporting the JKLF[89]. However, as soon as the former perceived that the latter, which operated on both sides of the LoC and was leading the rebellion (Tankel, 2011), was seeking full independence and not accession to Pakistan, the ISI put an end to its support. To be sure, full independence from Pakistan would signify a loss of territory, which in turn carries significance in strategic/defensive terms. Tankel adds that "according to Amanullah Khan, one of the founders of the JKLF, the ISI requested the group stop calling for sovereignty and instead focus on self-determination" (2011, p51). As the JKLF identified as a secular-nationalist movement (Haqqani, 2005), this could not fit within the Islamic conception of Pakistan's national identity. A fully independent Kashmir would be a deviation from the hitherto conceived identity, with Kashmir perceived as a missing part.

With support removed from the JKLF[90], the ISI created and supported religiously inspired groups, linked with the Jammat-e-Islami in ICK (Tankel, 2011). The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen also turned into an ISI proxy to conquer Kashmir. Relatedly, Tankel explains that

> HM's agenda met with resistance from the Kashmiri population for several reasons.
> First HM's goal was accession to Pakistan and not independence. Second, the group

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[89] For an insider's account of the movement, see Zafar Khan (2021).
[90] See also Anam Zakaria (2018).

was part of the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir [JIJK] and was committed to establishing an Islamic state, which most Kashmiri Muslims had no interest in. (2011, p52).

Furthermore, according to the author, HM also sought to annihilate JKLF. In my view, this contributed to Pakistan being one of the main factors in perpetuating the lack of unity between different Kashmiri political and social forces (see for instance Snedden, 2013). The involvement of Pakistan's military and intelligence services in the Kashmir insurgency during the 1990s constitutes a clear example of how militarised foreign policy actors were able to further destabilise a population that has continuously lived in a zone of war and conflict.

Another clear example of how the military/intelligence agencies control foreign policy towards India, and in particular those aspects relating to Kashmir, can be found in the events that took place in February 1999 in Lahore, during the symbolic visit of India's PM, the late Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Pakistan was experiencing a period of civil government, which lasted until October of same year. Vajpayee's entourage travelled by bus from Amritsar to Lahore. The Indian delegation was warmly received by its counterpart. In Lahore, both signed a declaration, and the event was described as "bus diplomacy". According to Pakistan's former FM Khurshid Kasuri (2015), the visit could have been decisive in resolving the Kashmir problem. However, Islamist parties, chiefly the JI, organised strong protests in Lahore and other cities (BBC, 1999). Hussain Haqqani (2005) discusses the significance of the protests, which indeed appear to corroborate the chosen

title of his book[91]. Nasim Zehra suggests that "given the army's strong reservations about Pakistan's official India policy, it is not improbable that these scripted protests had input from the intelligence agencies. On India, especially, the Jamaat-i-Islami and the army had an ongoing nexus" (2018, p126).

Manipulating Identities

Pakistan's clear non-conformity with the status quo agreed at Simla in 1972 appears to support the argument that militarism and religious ideology (in this case, Islam) can be mutually connected, and thus shape how identity and security are interlinked. Pakistan, by supporting the enhancement of religious extremism in Kashmir, solely for the purpose of continuing its territorial and irredentist desires on Kashmir, has tried to erode Kashmiri identity, in the pursuit of attaining a full realisation of an imagined Pakistani identity.

However, Pakistan's state leadership appears to have little understanding of Kashmiriness, or *Kashmiriyat*[92]. This is the ethos of the inhabitants of Kashmir, particularly those from the Kashmir Valley, who, despite their religious backgrounds (Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus), exhibit a great deal of tolerance and have little or no antagonisms towards one another (Snedden, 2013). Snedden also highlights that "compared with Hindus and Muslims in Jammu or northern India, Kashmiri Muslims and Kashmiri Hindus (Pandits)

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[91] *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* is the title of Hussain Haqqani's (2005) book, which appears to aptly capture many of Pakistan's social and political situations.
[92] Nitasha Kaul defines the concept as follows: "the centuries-old tradition of Kashmiriyat bears testimony to the identity of Kashmiris as a people who did not let their religious affiliations overwhelm their ethnic and regional commonality" (2010, p43).

had relatively few social divisions or antagonisms. While they nevertheless had disputes and rivalries, the two groups generally were more liberal and more tolerant and, in many cases, had amicable, even close relations" (2013, p71). Snedden provides another important observation, linked to the post-1947 developments in Kashmir politics and the concept of Kashmiriness:

> Kashmiris may have been naturally attracted to secular thinking. This was partly because they were apparently not afflicted by "the majority-minority complex" that was evident among Muslims in other parts of the subcontinent, and partly because they were "a deeply religious people who abhor[red] political exploitation of their faith". Hence, the pro-Pakistan stance of the major pro-Pakistan party in J&K, the Muslim Conference, and its Pakistan ally the Muslim League was not automatically popular with Kashmiri Muslims. To join Pakistan simply because it would be a Muslim homeland was an insufficient reason. (ibid, pp73,74).

This Kashmiri stance continued for decades. Only in the 1990s was Kashmiriness targeted more significantly, due to Pakistan sponsoring religious extremism with the sole intention of consolidating her perceived territorial rights over Kashmir. The Pakistani leadership's willingness to continue a patriarchal relationship of control and submission over Kashmir is evident, for instance, in how language is used. The following tweets from ex-ISPR Director, Major General Asif Ghafoor during 2019 typify how the military perceives its relation with Kashmiris – namely as one of ownership and domination:

> Alhamdulillah. All His blessings. Credit if any goes to the leadership, brave soldiers and my predecessors. Kashmir runs in blood of every Pakistani. IA legitimate

struggle of our Kashmiris shall succeed to defeat Indian Occupation Forces. Time

for India & world to realise. (Asif Ghafoor, 29th March 2019)

It's not over. It won't be until just struggle of our Kashmiris succeeds. It will IA

succeed. We will go to any extent to let them have their right to self determination.

An illegal paper annexation won't deter anyone of us. Revoking in essence gives

occupied status 1947-48. (Asif Ghafoor, 6th August 2019)

By saying "Our Kashmiris", or "to let them have their right", the military is

but putting in place a domination relationship, whilst at the same time,

paradoxically, it erases Kashmiri subjectivity[93]. Hence, Pakistan's unfaltering

territorial desires over Kashmir are represented in how the militaristic values

of dominance and control continue to be a part of how the Pakistani leadership

narrates Kashmir. To be sure, and as is confirmed by the kind of relationship

the Pakistani state developed with the JKLF, a separate Kashmiri national

identity based on territorial sovereignty is undesirable to Pakistan (and to

India for different reasons). Yet, the Pakistani state uses Kashmiris to enhance

a specific kind of nationalism, which is identified by Nosheen Ali as "*savior*

nationalism – a nationalism that is geared towards saving a community, place

or people, which is not yet wholly part of the nation" (2016, emphasis in the

original). Ali, however, suggests that this saviour disposition "could be seen

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[93] In November 2020, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Kashmir announced on Twitter the "formation of an Advisory Board for #KashmirCommittee comprising of top professionals from cinematic & sports spheres. This board will advise on measures to preserve & nurture heritage, culture & sports of #Jammu&Kashmir and its amalgamation with Pakistan" (Shehryar Afridi, 4th November 2020). This statement is significant in two main ways. First, said advisory board is not composed of Kashmiris, but mainstream Pakistani personalities, which raises questions about how Kashmir culture is intended to be represented. However, second, it is the idea of the amalgamation of Kashmiri heritage and culture with Pakistan that adds further plausibility to Pakistan's desire to further occupy and control Kashmir, and her identity.

cynically, because it ultimately seeks to win over a territory and people into the boundary of the nation" (ibid). Pakistan thus imagines herself as the Kashmiris' saviour, while remaining a force in occupation.

However, Pakistan's leadership has chosen to be represented as the actor holding a position of higher moral authority. It is an established fact that since the 1990s, India has intensified the level of oppression and violence in Kashmir (see Nitasha Kaul, 2018), to tackle Kashmiri opposition and dissent. This has resulted in the further dehumanisation of Kashmiris, a process that has been widely documented.[94] And yet, Pakistan too has an appalling record on how it controls "Azad Kashmir" and Gilgit-Baltistan,[95] which leads one to question what kind of "freedom" the country envisages for Kashmir, or if it indeed understands Kashmir as a place of co-habitation of different religions, as inscribed on *Kashmiryat*. For instance, Nitasha Kaul notes that, "in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, the Interim Constitution stipulates that the elected politicians have to serve the cause of accession of the entire disputed territory to Pakistan and that the office holders be Muslim. Given that Pakistan-administered Kashmir claims to be liberated, the message it sends out is that religious minorities will have to accept the dominance of Muslims" (2017). Indeed, this is despite Pakistan's concerted efforts via foreign policy to internationalise the Kashmir issue, by calling attention to India's rights

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[94] The UN report may be found here:
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IN/DevelopmentsInKashmirJune2016ToApril2018.pdf
[95] See the previous chapter on Pakistan's relations with China and its implications for Gilgit Baltistan.

violations.[96] Yet, it continues to ignore the fact that the Kashmir question is not just of relevance to Kashmiri Muslims. Whilst the latter indeed bear the brunt of India's policy options in Kashmir, Pakistan's foreign policy strategy erases other Kashmiri identities. This reiterates Pakistan's intention to convert Kashmir's unique identity and societal relations into the former's, dominated by a Muslim Punjabi ethos, as is currently the case in PCK.

To be sure, as Nitasha Kaul notes, "the nations who claim Kashmir do not care for the Kashmiri people who inhabit the land of Kashmir. If they did, they would be able to see Kashmir as a 'peopled' place" (2010, p44). In the case of Pakistan, this is certainly true, as the state prefers to represent Kashmiris as Muslim victims of a Hindu India, in order to continue to validate the two-nation theory. For Pakistan, representing Kashmiris as victims signifies that it can act as a liberating power, thus continuing the narrative that justifies her existence – Muslim liberation from Hindu rule. Pakistan's involvement with Kashmir has resulted in attempts to construct a Kashmiri identity that could justify a territorial integration. This construction matters greatly in terms of consolidating domestic support for the "Kashmir cause". The Pakistani leadership is indeed increasingly determined to represent the Kashmir conflict as a Hindu-Muslim one, aided by the rise of extreme-right Hindu politics in India. Whilst the growth of Hindu-ultranationalism in India, known as Hindutva, is a worrisome reality, and whilst it has become increasingly clear that the Indian government does have a "Hindutva project"

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[96] Since 2018, Pakistan's Foreign Office has given more visibility to the Kashmir issue, and their website now includes a full dedicated section to it: http://mofa.gov.pk/jammu-kashmir-dispute/

for Kashmir (Kaul and Anand, 2020), it fits well into Pakistan's territorial aspirations over Kashmir.

To that end, the Pakistani civilian and military leadership have undertaken much effort to weave a narrative that aims to substantiate a representation of India as a fascist state, and therefore consolidate Pakistan's role as the "Kashmir liberator". For instance, Pakistan's armed forces *Hilal Magazine*, for most of its monthly editions of 2020, included an article either exposing India's human rights violations in relation to the rise of Hindutva, or exposing and explaining what this fascist ideology entails.[97]

Becoming the "Kashmir liberator", however, has implications for the enhancement of militarism and militarisation. In the next section, I will analyse how this "liberating" role has contributed towards militarism becoming central to Pakistan's relations with India, and how this is interlinked with security and identity.

4.3 Pakistan's uses of militarisation in Kashmir: from war to discourse control

In the previous section, I examined how the Pakistani leadership represents Kashmiris and how it has attempted to adapt Kashmiris' specific identity to fit her territorial claims. I have also analysed how victimisation is used to enhance Pakistan's moral high ground whilst attaining the role of "liberator

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[97] The entire archive may be consulted here: https://www.hilal.gov.pk/archive-timeline

of Kashmir". Indeed, Indian politics in Kashmir and the nefarious consequences must figure as a main concern in international politics, given extant documented evidence of the political violence that continues to occur. However, Pakistan's use of such evidence as a foreign policy tool with specific aims towards territorial claims is no less relevant. Currently, Pakistan's options beyond the articulation of the narratives that represent India's Hindu-majoritarian and aggressive government as a real threat to Muslim Kashmiris (and other Muslims in India as well), with the narrative in which Pakistan is represented as a liberator, are indeed limited.

That said, it is important to acknowledge the importance of Pakistan's last significant military stunt in Kashmir in 1999. The Kargil War remains a clear example of how a military solution to the conflict is not an option. Yet, the Pakistani Army, or more concretely a clique of generals,[98] including the COAS Pervez Musharraf, decided to launch an infiltration across the LOC, named Operation Koh Paima (Zehra, 2018; Nawaz, 2008). Whilst the strategic contours of the Kargil War are not relevant to this discussion, there are several significant aspects about it, including a ravaging impact on domestic politics. Firstly, the chosen timing to pursue an infiltration at the LOC, when the prospects for peace talks led by the civilian government were a real possibility, although against the army's will, is highly significant. As the military envisages itself as the only actor capable of engaging India, peace talks led by a civilian government were hard to accept. This signifies that the military, in constant need of following a permanent status of war-

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[98] "Clique of generals" is the term used by Nasim Zehra (2018).

preparedness, continued to prefer a militarised solution than one that involved non-military actors.

Secondly, KP operation was allegedly also Pakistan's response to a discovery in 1983 of Indian presence at the disputed Siachen Glacier, followed by India's Operation Megdoot to occupy Siachen in 1984. Having lost that race and yet having engaged her troops at the world's highest battlefield where soldiers are killed mostly by the harsh weather and not by the exchange of gunfire, this constitutes an example of how Pakistani leadership continued to prefer military solutions for contentious issues with India, in this case taken to an extreme level.

And thirdly, the KP operation was so secretive that it was unknown to most army commanders; the latter were informed of Pakistan's intentions only when early reports on Indian media started to reveal the possible presence of Pakistani elements across the LOC. Arguably, given the implications to Pakistan-India relations, not having the whole of the army aware of such an operation increases the likelihood of a munity. In a nuclear-armed country, with critical social and ethnic fractures, such a scenario could have had dire consequences, except for the clique of adventurous generals. Similarly, civilian government was not informed until 17th May 1999, as more reports from Indian media outlets surfaced, claiming that Pakistan's soldiers were providing cover for Mujahideen infiltration, with soldiers occupying strategic

positions, and that Pakistan's artillery could target a key supply route[99] in ICK – the Srinagar – Leh Highway (Zehra, 2018).

Hence, it is clear that the KP operation was clandestinely pursued by a clique of generals without prior knowledge from main state actors. When the plan was announced, the generals were not seeking permission. As Zehra suggests, "the prime minister was presented with a fait accompli" (2018, p161). PM Nawaz Sharif, despite having a divided cabinet on this issue, and notwithstanding serious concerns revealed by FO officials on how the international community would likely react negatively to Pakistan's choices, he supported the army (ibid, p165). The Kargil War is certainly a clear example of how leadership personality matters. Sharif, of Kashmiri descent, it turns out, was easily lured.

Moreover, if indeed the political aim of the operation was to seek a permanent solution for Kashmir in accordance with Kashmiris' will, as per the account of brigadier Shaukat Qadir, and yet, the military's aim, according to the same brigadier, "was to create a military threat that could be viewed as capable of leading to a military solution so as to force India to the negotiation table from a position of weakness" (cited in Haqqani, 2005, p251), the Kargil War shows how unacceptable it is to the army for a civilian government to lead any negotiation process with India.

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[99] In fact, this was one of the key strategic goals of operation KP.

Kargil had far-reaching implications for Pakistan's relations with the international community, with India, and of course with Kashmiris. In a rare reference to it in Pakistan's foreign policy related literature, Abdul Sattar writes that "misconceived policies and actions not only isolated Pakistan internationally, they also gravely damaged the heroic freedom struggle of the Kashmiri people" (2016, p257). Pakistan did not receive any diplomatic support, including from Beijing. According to Zehra, Pakistan's most reliable friend said that Kargil had to be vacated (2018, p210). In India, the Pakistani FM did not find any open door for dialogue, unless a withdrawal of troops were to happen. To be sure, India felt betrayed after the earlier process initiated in Lahore.

Secretive decisions taken by top generals gave rise to a generalised insecurity situation across South Asia, as both states had by then reached the highest level of militarisation – nuclear weapons. As a nuclear power, Pakistan's decisions conferred upon it the status of an irresponsible member of the international community. Pakistan had just joined the "nuclear club". Relatedly, when the Kargil War began, there was no formally approved nuclear use doctrine, due to a series of bureaucratic events, including a change in the army command (Naeem Salik, 2018, p52). This fact may indeed render a threatening remark by Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad[100] either totally irrelevant or a signal that rationality did not always prevail among Pakistan's foreign policy decision-makers.

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[100] The Foreign Secretary stated that "We will not hesitate to use any weapon in our arsenal to defend our territorial integrity" (cited in Zehra, 2018, p254).

Pakistan's Kargil War resulted in several parameters that would mediate relations with India from that point forward. One of the most lauded outcomes from this war, particularly by nuclear weapons apologists, is that deterrence prevented an escalation, and henceforth, war between both countries was not an option. Yet, Pakistan continues to represent India as her greatest security threat despite Pakistan's clear violation of the LOC. Shahid Amin, however, is rather dismissive, arguing that "India's overreaction, war fever, and open threats to wage larger war with Pakistan … might have done more harm to India in the long run for not being a 'responsible' nuclear power" (2000, p266). This statement indicates how Pakistani foreign policy thinking in general operates: India always represents the greatest threat even when Pakistan mounts a clandestine operation across a *de facto* border, while deliberately being oblivious to what it means to be a nuclear-armed country.

Domestically, the war had important repercussions, affecting the further inculcation of militaristic values in domestic and foreign policies. Nawaz Sharif, who had supported the army's adventure, rushed to Washington to meet President Clinton. The objective was to seek American mediation and intervention. Sharif returned to Islamabad after having agreed to retreat and to prosecute the main actors and war architects (Haqqani, 2005, p253). Once again, the military and Islamists agreed to cooperate. The latter's protests against the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif (BBC, 1999) would then be materialised in a military coup in October 1999. Pakistan entered into one of the most disruptive and violent decades of her short history.

Post-Kargil, a series of events have further strained relations with India. The attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, and the Mumbai attacks in 2008 are the most significant. In July 2001, both countries wasted yet another opportunity to find a way towards peace. At Agra, Musharraf (then Pakistan's president) and Indian PM Vajpayee nearly signed a declaration. However, eleventh-hour disagreements from the Indian side have prevented it from happening, at least per Pakistan's version of events. L.K. Advani and Sushma Swaraj were at the root of some of the rumours as to why the talks collapsed, given their insistence that Kashmir is not an international dispute – a point that Pakistan still insists on, in defiance of the Simla Agreement, and upon which has been built her strategy to gain a moral upper hand on the Kashmir issue.

Pakistan's foreign policy continues to mirror the Agra summit events. During my interviews with relevant Pakistani individuals, I found a diverse picture concerning whether space for diplomacy still exists. AC6, for instance, stated that "since India has constitutionally added J&K as part of India, I don't see that they will ever be willing to discuss Kashmir and its plebiscite with Pakistan". GO1 added that "India needs to have a larger heart; India is the key as they are most in occupation". GO2 uttered a simple "No". AC5, who has been actively involved in creating a solution for Kashmir, claimed that there is still space for diplomacy, and that Kashmir can still be resolved in keeping with Kashmiris' aspirations. "Democracy never took place", he added.

The variety of positions concerning the importance of having working diplomatic relations with India, however, seems to ignore altogether Pakistan's support for armed and militant groups. The interviewees never mentioned the need for Pakistan to speak with India on what the latter designates as terrorism. AC5 mentioned that, as did TT1 too, that the current movement in Kashmir is "indigenous", and that as such it is not perceived as terrorism by Pakistan's statist elite. This idea prevails among foreign policy pundits in Pakistan.

The representation of Kashmiri resistance as "indigenous" once again has implications for how Pakistan relates to the whole question. "Indigenous" thus serves to dissipate Pakistan's support for radical militants in ICK, what Christine Fair (2018) designates as "proxy warfare". To be sure, the considerable support that the ISI has extended to encourage a rebel war in ICK, usually known as *Jihad*, stands in contrast with Pakistan's narratives that seek to present it as having taken the "higher moral ground" whilst wanting to be perceived as the "benevolent liberator". Hence, when the Pakistani leadership assembles a narrative representing the state as the "saviour of Kashmir", it also generates a narrative related to the politics of amnesia. Furthermore, the notion of an "indigenous Kashmiri movement" is also being used to represent how Kashmiris continue to need protection and liberation, which is something only the Pakistani leadership can deliver. Thus, a critical feminist approach is useful to understand how the latter currently controls the discourse on Kashmir. It is important to understand how this

narrative of being Kashmir's saviour and the bearer of a higher morality is connected to militarism, and in turn how the latter mediates the interlinking of security and identity. As discussed in previous chapters, the Pakistani military controls and reproduces the construction of the national narrative that characterises the Pakistani self. What is more, as Enloe (2000) has noted, military institutions are embodiments of male ideological and physical domination. In turn, the Pakistani military, in partnership with the civil bureaucracy, is constituted by an assemblage of majoritarian identities: male, Muslim, Sunni, and Punjabi. These assemblages then constitute a dominant identity which is hegemonically masculine, and which characterises how ideological militarism works. The impact of this identity in terms of how main foreign policy actors represent Kashmir is therefore significant. The articulation of the "saviour/liberator" and "indigenous" via the narrative that describes India's oppression in ICK is crucial in understanding how Pakistan's relations with India are likely to continue to be shaped, given that war is no longer an option.

In the same way, Nitasha Kaul (2018) highlights how the Indian state resources to similar representations of Kashmir and Kashmiris, which are deliberately gendered. Those representations aim to generate a "feminised understanding of Kashmir" that "posits the Indian state in conventionally masculine and patriarchal terms" (Kaul, p131), and, therefore, sustains the narrative of the role of the state to act as the 'protector' and the 'saviour'.

Hence, a change in the articulations on the Kashmir narrative aims to transform the representation of her resistance to India's occupation. The resistance that was once sponsored by the Pakistani state, and which brought the latter into close associations with terrorism – either by supporting Kashmiri militant groups, most notably Hizbul Mujahideen, or outright terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LET) or Jaish-e-Mohammed (JM) – now needs to be represented as docile and disassociated from state-sponsored violence. Therefore, the army, as a heavily masculinised institution, is therefore in a favourable position to articulate domination and control over the representations of Kashmir. Consequently, the more Indian oppression and occupation in Kashmir will be cited and repeated, the more Pakistan's leadership reiterates its position as the bearer of hope for liberation, as well as that of the only international actor who displays "genuine" consternation over what happens in ICK.

Examples of how the Pakistani leadership articulates this narrative may be found in official speeches and militarised spaces. For instance, the President of Pakistan, upon addressing a Navy Course Commission parade in December 2019, "called out the world's collective conscience to stand with the people of Kashmir in their just and rightful struggle against fascist regime of India" (ISPR, 2019). And in the Pakistan Army Green Book 2020, Senator Mushaid Hussain writes that "Pakistan, as the principal defender of the Kashmiri people and leading exponent of the Kashmir cause, must maintain the resolve and stamina to sustain a long term strategy of supporting the Kashmiri people and resisting Indian hegemony" (2020, p48). The language used in these two

examples is significant. Senator Hussain, writing in the relevant Pakistani Army Green Book, restates Pakistan as the "defender" of Kashmiris, and in order to continue to do so, it will need "resolve and stamina". These terms are gendered, and represent the masculinised orientation enmeshed in the Pakistani leadership. Hence, it is possible to establish that Pakistan's representation of Kashmir and Kashmiris utilises a discourse of a dominant masculinity that has been institutionalised through an ideological militarism that has been persistently inculcated in Pakistani society. Thus, the Pakistani military has started to consistently use the language of militarism, which is inherently masculinist. Furthermore, this language also establishes and produces gendered hierarchies. It must not be forgotten that Pakistan too is an occupier state in Kashmir, and, as discussed earlier, Pakistan's predominant interest in Kashmir is territorial and geopolitical. The role of liberator and defender also confers on Pakistan a superior position that guarantees it a role of domination over the Kashmiris' willingness to attain self-determination. So long as Pakistan will produce and reproduce this narrative, it will maintain a position of power that allows it to uphold its territorial aspirations over Kashmir, particularly the Valley, while also keeping alive the two-nation theory, as a orientating principle of Pakistan's existence.

4.4   Conclusion

In this chapter, I discussed Pakistan's relations with India, by predominately focusing on the Kashmir issue. I provided an overview of the main elements

that characterise this relationship, as well as a historical contextualisation of the Kashmir issue. I then focused on analysing how the Pakistani leadership that controls foreign policy represents Kashmir, and how this is reflected in the country's interlinking of security and identity. To be sure, war and war-preparedness continue to mediate this relationship. Pakistan continues to need to represent its relations with India through the lenses of conflict, war, and the existence of a perpetual danger, of which Kashmir is the epicentre. It is no coincidence that in the Pakistan Army Green Book 2020, Pakistan COAS refers to Kashmir as a "nuclear flash point", soon after summarising the unfortunate events of 2019 involving Kashmir. Nor it is a coincidence that the Pakistani PM uses the same terms[101] to characterise the same events concerning Kashmir, Pakistan, and India.

However, as I analysed above, a critical feminist approach can help us to understand how the Kashmir conflict is represented and filtered through the masculinised language of militarism, and how this helps Pakistan to articulate a narrative about Kashmir that represents a foreign policy position in which she aims to be perceived as a "defender" and "liberator" of Kashmiris. This position, however, contrasts with Pakistan's own status in Kashmir. Hence, whilst the Pakistani leadership appears to have adopted a strategy of continuing to represent its own role in the Kashmir issue as a defender and liberator, in opposition to an occupying and oppressing India, this does not come without serious questions to Pakistan's goals. Of course, one cannot dismiss India's appalling political decisions in Kashmir, including its

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[101] See, for instance: https://www.dawn.com/news/1505188.

occupation and extensive human rights violations. Yet, Pakistan's use of masculinised and militarised narratives to represent Kashmir are also indicative of how her leadership anticipates the continuation of a politics of control and domination over the people of Kashmir. Indeed, Pakistan's choice may preserve her relevance to the overall Kashmir question, and may help it to continue to exercise a position of control and domination over the aspirations of the Kashmiri people. However, it will not eliminate her status as an occupier and controller in the region of Kashmir.

CHAPTER V

PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

5.1   Introduction

Relations with the US represent one of the most critical foreign policy undertakings by the government of Pakistan since 1947. Since then, the US has acquired the status of Pakistan's main international partner. This relationship was particularly important during the Cold War. Pakistan found herself amidst international power struggles as a result of her allied status with the US. This relationship, which was developed under the status of an alliance, remains key to Pakistan's foreign policy.

The scholarship related to Pakistan-US relations is vast and has had different points of origin. Pakistan's indigenous foreign policy literature follows the typical chronological organisation, using the country's foreign policy phases to situate Pakistan's relations with the US relations (Burke, 1973; Amin, 2000; Sattar, 2013, 2017). Research on Pakistan's history and politics (both regional and domestic) is also rich in accounts of the state's involvement with the US, spanning from 1947, specifically focusing on the Cold War/Afghanistan War, and post-9/11 (Choudhury, 1975 ; Jalal, 1991; Ali, 2008; Nawaz, 2008; Malik, 2008; Samad, 2011; Ahmed, 2013; Khan, 2011; Hathaway, 2008; Fair, 2012; Markey, 2013). US and Western-based scholars and diplomats have also contributed prolifically to the literature on Pakistan and the US, including accounts on post-9/11 US foreign policy, and its positions towards Afghanistan and Pakistan (Abbas, 2015; Kux, 2001; Woodward, 2010; Schaffer and Schaffer, 2011; Fair, 2014; Markey, 2013; Schaffer, 2017, Harrison, 2009; Rashid, 2012; Haqqani, 2013; Nawaz, 2019).

The relationship between Pakistan and the US, recently described as a "bitter friendship" (Nawaz, 2019), has played a crucial role in shaping international political events, practically since the 1950s. Of particular relevance is Pakistan's facilitating role in the process of establishing diplomatic relations between the US and China. Pakistan's close relations with the latter became vital for Nixon's administration. As the White House wished to open up a secret diplomatic channel to China in 1971, Pakistan's services were sought. This would turn into an opportunity for Pakistan to take up an important and

recognisable role within the US's strategy for a new global balance of power (Kux, 2001, p182). Thus, by virtue of Pakistan's role as facilitator, US and Chinese foreign policies were significantly transformed during the Cold War.

However, Pakistan's diplomatic capabilities would be overshadowed by the Bangladesh Liberation War. In 1971, Pakistan was fighting a civil war in East Bengal/East Pakistan, whilst conducting a genocidal policy, carried by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan. The US administration chose to pay no heed (see, for instance, Bass, 2013). Thus, whilst 1971 turned out to be an important year for Pakistan-US diplomacy, it is also marked by the gruesome realities created by the exigencies of realpolitik, at the expense of human lives.

The Pakistani Army depended heavily on US supplies, a result of a concession on the part of Nixon during the early days of his Presidency. Regardless of the civil war in East Pakistan, the US and Pakistan upheld their individual interests, while Pakistan's military massacred numerous lives in the East. Dennis Kux (2001) provides a rich account of this period, in particular what he describes as Nixon's "tilt" towards Pakistan. More recently, Gary Bass's (2013) *The Blood Telegram: India's Secret War in East Pakistan* provides a compelling account of how the US dealt with the ensuing tragedy in East Pakistan. The cables sent by the US Consul General in Dacca, Archer Blood, bore witness to the atrocities committed by the Pakistan Army whilst using American weapons. Yet, as soon as Kissinger's visit to China was discovered, the strategy that comes across as duplicitous between

Pakistan and the US became fully exposed. This was one the most horrific moments in the history of Pakistan and US foreign policy.

The 1971 events pertaining to Pakistan's relations with the US are helpful in understanding how Pakistan has foregrounded a relationship of dependency. The centrality of security to Pakistan's foreign policy, chiefly oriented by the perceived threats posed by India, has contributed to shaping the country's relations of dependency with the US, particularly when it comes to military assistance. This has generated a number of different views. For instance, Pakistan-US relations[102] have been labelled as transactional, and based on clientelism (Jaffrelot, 2016), depending on how the client state is defined.[103] Jaffrelot argues that there is a "bargaining dimension but does not reflect the intention of the American patron, clearly interested in getting something done by its 'client' (and which literally pays for the service)" (2016, Kindle Locations 3738-3739).

C.C. Fair and S. Ganguly (2015), however, offer a more charitable reading of the situation. They highlight the fact that Pakistan always claims the position of victim in the relationship, particularly because the Pakistani leadership has always felt abandoned by the US during critical moments of conflict and war. The authors debunk some of the myths in the relationship, especially in terms

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[102] Pakistan-US relations have also been described persuasively as: a "roller-coaster" (Schaffer and Shaffer, 2011); "disenchanted allies" (Kux, 2001); and even as characterised by "lies and deceit", according to President Trump's January 2018 tweet.
[103] Christophe Jaffrelot cites a possible definition of clientelism given by a French political scientist: "a relationship of dependence … based on a reciprocal exchange of favours between two people, the patron and the client, whose control of resources are unequal" (Médard, cited in Jaffrelot, 2016, Kindle Locations 3738-3739).

of the military aid claimed by Pakistan, and the latter's regional policies that are detrimental to US, for instance those in support of non-state actors.

In my view, Pakistan-US relations can be better described as combination of the two: a transactional clientelism. Despite the inconsistent behaviour on the part of both countries with regard to their status as allies, they have mutually benefited from the agreements carved out over the decades. However, in the case of Pakistan, the consequences of this transactional clientelism have had a direct impact on society, including expansive militarisation and the inculcation of ideological militarism, as I will examine later in the chapter. However, the transactional clientelist relations have had a lesser impact on American society.

In this foreign relation, it is particularly important to acknowledge how each partner represents the other. For instance, Hassan Rizvi (1993) suggests that in Pakistan foreign policy makers tend to overemphasise the country's importance to US interests in Asia and the Middle East. However, US foreign policy towards Pakistan is shaped "primarily by considerations around Pakistan rather than within it" (Rizvi, 1993, p86). Hence, Pakistan is primarily perceived as an important geo-strategic partner for the US. Yet, as Daniel Markey (2013) notes, the shared history of these allied states is marked by conflicting versions of who made use of the other on different occasions. Yet, Markey acknowledges that for the US, "when Pakistan was helpful, it enjoyed generous American assistance and attention. When Pakistan was unhelpful, the spigot was turned off" (2013, p3).

The history of a "helpful Pakistan" in US foreign policy has been mostly associated with the political events in Pakistan's neighbouring Afghanistan. In chapters 2 and 3, I have analysed aspects of Pakistan's foreign policy related to religious ideology and militarism. These are closely linked to relations with the US and to the war in Afghanistan. The historical events linked to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and subsequently the post-9/11 moment, the so-called "Global War on Terror" (GWOT), however, are vitally important to understand how Pakistan's relations with the US have generated representations of Afghanistan by the Pakistani leadership that have an impact on foreign policy and the interlinking of identity and security. Hence, in this chapter I will examine Pakistan-US relations by focusing on the events that have taken place in Afghanistan since 1979, including issues related to security and identity that can be said to have their origins in such events.

Despite close cultural and religious links, Pakistan and Afghanistan have constructed an unstable and mistrustful relationship. That said, it is important to understand the importance of Afghanistan for the Pakistani state. In 1947, Afghanistan – a Muslim-majority country – did not recognise the newly formed state of Pakistan, indeed, even voting against its existence at the UN. Hence, an unstable neighbouring situation in the West, compounded by the nefarious events of the partition in the East, made Pakistan's recognition as an independent state a tumultuous affair. The Afghan government was not ready to accept the controversial Durand line, which, as Nivi Manchanda

notes, was perceived by Afghanistan as "a manifestation of two distinct types of imperial control" (2020, p82). Whilst British India was no longer a reality, Afghanistan, despite having escaped occupation, was also the product of a colonial order (ibid, p82). Thus, adopting again a colonial border that symbolised imperialism, and one that had already caused great resentment in the Pashtun regions, was looked upon negatively. To be sure, given the precarious status of Pakistani nationalism at the time of partition, fears that the Pashtunistan nationalist movement could undo Pakistan in its westernmost regions and undermine her existence also influenced Pakistan's perception of Afghanistan as a threat.

Another key aspect to note is Afghanistan's historical, political, and cultural links with India. Practically since 1947, Pakistan has perceived this relationship as a state security challenge. Undoubtedly, both countries do share a mutual animosity towards Pakistan, which would be reinforced by the 1950 signing of a friendship treaty. Afghanistan and India have attempted to support ethno-nationalist causes in Pakistan, notably those of Pashtuns and Balochis, a situation the latter interprets as a concerted attempt to undermine Pakistan's unity. Furthermore, India perceives Pakistan's existence as obstacle to greater logistical connectivity, as for centuries trade and people's movements between the two regions was carried out without disruption. With the exception of the Taliban government, India has maintained a close relationship with all other governments in Afghanistan.

Thus, Afghanistan stands in Pakistan's foreign relations as the Indian "threat enhancer", particularly in terms of what concerns her imagined fears of India undoing the partition. The Pakistani leadership has sought to eliminate this perceived threat by trying to influence and control successive political forces in Afghanistan, in what may be envisaged as a typical colonial attitude. As I will examine further in the chapter, Islamabad's determination to control Afghanistan via Kabul was one of the primary motivations behind its support of the anti-Soviet jihad from 1979, and, after the Soviets' withdrawal, to support hard-line Islamist groups, including the Taliban in later years.

The present chapter is divided into three sections. This introduction has provided an overview of key aspects of Pakistan's foreign relations with the US. The following section focuses on the post-1979 moment and how Pakistan and the US engaged in Afghanistan. The last section examines how Pakistan and the US have related post-9/11, especially since the latter invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, in an attempt to eradicate the terrorist group Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban, who controlled the Afghan state. The latter were believed to be acting as hosts for the Al-Qaeda leadership. In this chapter, I use a critical feminist approach to analyse how Pakistan-US engagement in Afghanistan has contributed to further increasing the footprint of militarism in Pakistan.

5.2   Pakistan and the US War in Afghanistan

From the mid-1970s until the end of the next decade, Pakistan's relations with the US were full of upheavals, and yet both countries created spaces for cooperation. Pakistani internal politics from 1974 to 1977 had a significant detrimental effect on her foreign policy towards the US. The army perceived Z.A. Bhutto's disputes with the opposition as a potential threat to the internal stability of the country. Consequently, on 5th July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq imposed martial law, which led the country to remain under military rule for more than a decade.

Shuja Nawaz explains how Bhutto built his role as an "independent nationalist who was the target of an international conspiracy" (2008, p350). This conspiracy, as imagined by Bhutto, was related to Pakistan's recent intentions to acquire and develop nuclear technology, and how that could lead to a nuclear weapons programme. To be sure, the US opposed Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, and as Nawaz also notes, with the ignominious end of the Nixon administration, Pakistan's influence in Washington diminished, although a few friendly figures remained[104].

The imposition of military rule in Pakistan under the leadership of Zia-ul-Haq shaped Pakistan's domestic and international dynamics. The dismissal of Z.A. Bhutto at the hands of his chosen COAS, Zia-ul-Haq, has been widely debated, and is well documented within the literature on Pakistan's political

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[104] Shuja Nawaz (2008) provides the excerpt of an interview he conducted with General Scowcroft. The US General admits that US policy towards Pakistan was also responsible for throwing Pakistan into a nuclear weapons solution for her security predicaments. The General offered some interesting comments: "Our policy, however well intentioned, was wrong. Our policy to stop Pakistan enhanced their insecurity and acted as a perverse driver towards nuclear weapons" (General Scowcroft, cited in Nawaz, 2008, p351).

history (Nawaz, 2008; Talbot, 2012; Ahmed, 2013; Jalal, 2008, 2014; Jaffrelot, 2015). Shuja Nawaz suggests that "Zia's regime was a watershed for Pakistani politics" (2008, p361). Zia's military dictatorship was caught in the middle of important transformations during the Cold War, which would be reflected in how Pakistan and the US conducted their relations for nearly a decade. During Carter's administration, Pakistan-US relations remained strained. Pakistan's non-democratic status, and Zia's full embrace of the nuclear programme, limited the bilateral relation. Hence, Pakistan's relations with the US occurred under several themes: the continuous demand for weapons associated with perceived India-centric threats; Pakistan's nuclear defiance; and the centring of religion as a driver for foreign policy. The latter was enhanced by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For instance, as Lawrence Ziring highlights,

> the presence of the Red Army in immediate proximity to Pakistan's frontier led Zia, like others at home and abroad, to conclude Moscow's great target was not Kabul but Islamabad … [C]oncerned that the Soviets and Indians were determined to exploit Pakistan's domestic problems, especially its ethnic conflicts, Zia had good reason to conclude that Pakistan faced mortal danger. (2003, p176)

Under the conditions of a military dictatorship, values associated with militarism become more widespread. For instance, the use of force, the belief that having enemies is natural in human affairs (Enloe, 2016), and the belief that only military-oriented solutions are the most efficient in dealing with conflict are given preference. Hence, it is unsurprising that Zia's regime could

conceive that the USSR's ultimate target would be Pakistan, and that in turn would make of Islam a "religion in danger". General Zia held a very strict interpretation of Islam. The Islamisation programme that Pakistan underwent during his eleven-year rule is usually attributed to his personal influence aided by the country's religious parties, particularly the Jamaat' Islami. As far as foreign policy is concerned, Zia's dictatorship did not depart from the ideological turf laid by Bhutto. However, Zia would be confronted with external pressures that exacerbated the presence and strength of ideology in foreign policy. Hence, as Shuja Nawaz (2008) notes, India's fast-growing military and nuclear capacity, the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, and the Iranian Revolution all impacted on Pakistan's foreign policy and consequently its relations with the US.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has revealed how ideology became further entrenched in the foreign policy of Pakistan. Whilst Pakistan's rapprochement with the US influenced and drove foreign policy, for instance, Shuja Nawaz calls attention to the fact that the Americans were not the first to initiate an opposition campaign against the Soviets: "immediately after the Soviets rumbled into Kabul, Prince Turki recounts how the Saudi king received a call from Zia, who wished to send General Rahman to the kingdom to brief its leadership" (2008, p372). Certainly, the US was instrumental during the ten-year-long war in Afghanistan, by funding the ultra-ideological training of rebels on Pakistani soil (Haqqani, 2013). However, the Saudi link proved to be of great significance, not only during the Afghan War, but also

in the continuation of its ideologically driven support for the Taliban during the 1990s.

Hence, the Pakistan-US rapprochement is also a consequence of heightened militarism. The rationale behind Zia's regime becoming involved in the Afghanistan War can therefore be explained as a consequence of ideological militarism. The military dictator was indeed fully set on maximising military assistance from the US, focusing on the imagined dangers represented by Soviet proximity, as well as trying to amplify the question of international security that the US had extended to other states. For instance, in an interview with ABC News, General Zia said that "If any country like Soviet Union attacks Pakistan it will be war with the free world or with the United States and the United Kingdom" (cited in Haqqani, 2013, p603). Zia argued that "if the United States could give security guarantees to South Korea, Israel, Taiwan, and Egypt, why could it not provide one for Pakistan?" (Zia-ul-Haq, cited in Haqqani, 2013, p603).

Indeed, these countries had (and continue to have) significant military assistance from the US, and have experienced the militarisation of their political and social realms. By seeking to become a state that could use a US-controlled international security apparatus,[105] the Pakistani leadership was also endeavouring to be integrated and recognised as part of an international hegemonic framework of masculinity that relies upon and benefits from

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[105] Whilst Pakistan received military assistance from the US during the 1970s and 1980s, the process was not straightforward. The Carter administration denied the sale of 110 A-7 attack aircrafts (see Akthar, 2018).

substantial militarisation. In turn, the Pakistani leadership imagined that the country would be represented as rational, strong, and prepared to deal with any conflict. Being perceived in this way, Pakistan would gain greater legitimacy, which was vital given that it was being governed by a dictator.

Due to the war in Afghanistan, however, Pakistan came to be designated as a "frontline state". Being a frontline state and allied with the US had two key implications for how Pakistan wished to be represented. On the one hand, because of the logistical and intelligence support it provided to her partner, Pakistan regained its importance in US geopolitical calculations, thus conferring the former with some form of leadership and control over events in Afghanistan. In other words, being a frontline state enhanced Pakistan's masculinised state identity. On the other hand, it also served well the purpose of being represented as "strong" and "indestructible", as part of a hyper-masculinised state identity. As I have shown, this state identity can be seen as a product of foreign policy decisions, closely linked to the country's persistent efforts to achieve security against perceived external threats, principally in the guise of India.

Hence, Pakistan's collaboration with the US was transformed into an act of performative war. The actors involved – particularly the ISI and the CIA – have simultaneously cited and repeated the same discourses of danger that justified their collaboration. Pakistan gained a new identity as a "frontline state" against a common enemy, the USSR (Shuja, 2008; Ahmed, 2013). Pakistan's ISI and the army were then responsible for the production and

reproduction of discourses that have reinforced the nation's need to be seen as constantly under threat. In turn, their role as "protectors and defenders" of the homeland and Islam were reinvigorated as the result of a foreign policy choice and practice that ultimately influenced the co-construction of the national identity-foreign policy nexus.

In *The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story* (1992), Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, who was in charge of the ISI Afghan bureau during the Afghan War, explains how both intelligence agencies cooperated during the conflict. The book is filled with interesting details about how this relationship progressed. Yousaf reveals the means by which Pakistan armed the mujahedeen,[106] and also uncovers the level of distrust between the CIA and the ISI.[107] The book describes the extent of US involvement in Afghanistan. The former delegated most of its operations to the CIA, which acted as weapons seller and courier. The extended duration of the Afghan War demonstrates the US's unwillingness to put an end to the conflict. During this decade, Afghani and Pakistani societies suffered an unnecessarily protracted period of war and dehumanisation, fuelled by the weapons trade, the rise of drug trafficking,

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[106] Mohammad Yousaf mentions that the great bulk of weapons came to Pakistan from China, Egypt, and Israel. On the latter, he writes: "I had no idea that Israel was a source until quite recently, as, had it been known, there would have been considerable trouble with the Arab nations. It would not have been acceptable to wage a Jehad with weapons bought from Israel" (1992, p58).

[107] However, In *The Pakistan-US Conundrum*, Yunas Samad (2011) refers to the important Saudi influence in the Afghan Jihad, in a process that tried to bypass the ISI and the CIA, under the guise of humanitarian intervention, based on Pakistan soil, particularly in Peshawar. Certainly, the Saudis and the ISI worked together; however, the level of interference of the former is often relegated to a second plan. Samad, for instance, mentions that the "Saudi General Intelligence Agency had close relations with the ISI, which allowed it to bypass the political leadership, which it did after the death of Zia. It paid cash bonuses to designated senior ISI officers, and financial aid and discounted oil sales buoyed up the army's and ISIS's treasury" (2011, p101).

and the growth of religious radicalism that became entrenched in both societies, aided by the politics of guerrilla warfare that favoured the prolonging of combat.

Despite issues of mistrust between both countries' secret intelligence agencies, Pakistan and the US collaborated to extend the guerrilla war against the Soviets. It is a well-established fact that Pakistan provided more than just weapons distribution. Pakistan's military dictatorship helped a US propaganda strategy that sought to indoctrinate Afghan children, which very much fitted in with its own interests too. For instance, Nivi Manchanda notes how during the 1980s, the US funded the "printing of millions of textbooks in Peshawar that were distributed to schoolchildren across Afghanistan" (2020, p2). These books[108] included images of Kalashnikovs, bullets, and guns to help learn the alphabet and to learn how to count, and more advanced mathematical questions were based on warfare and firearms (ibid, p3).

Hence, the Afghan War was not only directed at removing the Soviets from Afghan soil; it was also an ideological project based on supporting covert and proxy wars across the world (for instance, in Angola and Nicaragua) aimed at ending socialist-inspired politics, so that American imperialism could continue to grow. Yet, whilst the Pakistani leadership supported the weaponisation of the Afghan people, thus actively promoting violence, it

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[108] The long-lasting effect of US intervention in Afghanistan is indeed harrowing. Manchanda notes that "The Taliban, in another grisly turn, continued using these American-produced textbooks, but, in keeping with their fabricated scripture that denounced all pictorial representation of human images, removed the heads of people depicted in the books. What remained were images of decapitated people" (2020, p3).

continued its plan to pursue a nuclear weapons programme, despite opposition from the US.

Throughout the duration of the Afghan War, Pakistan adopted a double-dealing strategy to continue its nuclear programme,[109] whilst actively contributing towards the horrific war in Afghanistan, where her interests were closely associated with the kind of state her leadership was aiming to become. Possessing nuclear weapons and controlling Afghanistan became central national priorities. Both are relevant to understand how identity and security became even further interlinked, corroborating the fact that Pakistan is a militarised and hyper-masculine state. Despite US sanctions, Pakistan came to be seen as a state linked to power relations, war, conflict, and military might. The post-war moment in Afghanistan turned out to be important in the continuation of Pakistan's militarised foreign policy and militarised state identity. In the next subsection, I analyse the importance of Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan after the Soviets' withdrawal, and how this paved the way for her new engagement with the US after 2001.

5.2.1   Assessing the cost of Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan

When Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan, there was no sustainable peace. Soviet influence on Afghan politics and society continued, and a pro-Soviet regime remained in power in the capital Kabul, headed by Najibullah.

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[109] See chapter 2 for a discussion of the importance of Pakistan's nuclear programme as a representation of a masculine and militarised state identity.

The Pakistani leadership remained unsatisfied with this solution. Ultimately, this could have meant a more significant Indian presence and influence in closer proximity to Pakistan, namely in Afghanistan, thus reinforcing the centrality of the "India threat" to state security. Once again, Pakistan's threat perception involving India appeared to lead her foreign policy options.

After nearly a decade of supporting ideological guerrilla warfare, which entailed distributing the majority of CIA resources to Islamist groups (Haqqani, 2013), the Pakistan government was unwilling to relinquish its control over the Islamist groups it had nurtured during the war. Pakistan's preferences orchestrated by the ISI and General Zia were directed towards a Pashtun-dominated government of Islamist orientation. The ISI pressure on the Tanzeemat (an organisation that represented the Islamist mujahedeen) to be part of an Afghan Interim Government (Khan, 2011) made clear the intentions of Pakistan's leadership to retain political control over Afghanistan. Pakistan continued to interfere in Afghan politics, and instead of contributing to a stable solution for the devastated country, it kept acting in its own national interests, forging alliances of convenience with different factions of mujahedeen. This situation persisted after Zia's death, with civilian governments in Pakistan (Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif) unable to negotiate a viable and stable solution to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan fell into the hands of warlords, who controlled different regions of the country. The different mujahedeen groups began major infighting, thus bringing the country to the brink of civil war. In the South, Kandahar and

Helmand provinces were reportedly the most unstable, as no clear warlord power was being imposed, leaving the population at the mercy of rival commanders (Khan, 2011, p57). The dire situation into which Afghanistan fell prompted the rise of the Taliban, the "theology students" raised in the madrassas of Pakistan. These madrassas experienced a major influx not only of Afghan students during and after the war, but also of cash from the Gulf monarchies, who saw a window of opportunity to propagate a most rigid and orthodox interpretation of Sunni Islam. There, during the war, Afghan students were groomed for armed jihad. Groups of these students, now based in Kandahar, are believed to have started actions against the "corrupt and rapacious commanders and bring peace to the city. The local population supported the Taliban action and welcomed the new rulers, who appeared to bring safety and order to the city" (ibid, p58). The rise of the Taliban[110] would be a fast process, given the disorder and chaos sown by the warlords and commanders, and the promise of safety that was offered by the Taliban.

Pakistan's initial position in relation to the Taliban is reported by Riaz Mohammad Khan as one of:

> considerable suspicion, especially among the religious-political elements who sided with Gulbadin Hekmatyar or other Mujahedin parties. Outlandish speculation included the conjecture by the Jamat e Islami-backed *Weekly Takbeer* that the British and the CIA conjured[111] up the Taliban after their failure to prop up pro-King Zahir Shah elements in Qandahar. (ibid, p59)

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[110] For a comprehensive account of the rise of the Taliban, see Rashid (2010).
[111] This still holds much currency across Pakistan, a conspiracy theory that has been very useful in discarding Pakistan's own interference in the whole process that precipitated the forming of the Taliban. On the other hand, renowned historian Ayesha Jalal writes in

However, Pakistan's support for the new players in Afghanistan gradually increased and continued after Kabul fell into Taliban[112] hands. The Taliban regime was backed by Pakistan[113] and Saudi Arabia, albeit for different reasons. The former's main concern was to keep Pashtuns in power so that Islamabad could put a term to the idea of an independent Pakhtoonistan, particularly on Pakistan territory (Cohen, 2005), whereas the latter was persuaded by the Taliban's extreme orthodoxy, closer to Wahhabi interpretations of Islam, thus a form of extending its influence to South Asia, and curbing the rise of Shia politics and Iran's influence in Afghanistan.

Concerning the ISI's direct influence on the creation of the Taliban, though it is a widely believed view, there is no consensus.[114] Carey Schofield, in her conversation with an ISI general (DG), reports what she was told: "Pakistan retained its presence in Afghanistan but did not influence the course of events

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Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia, that "future members of Al Qaeda [the Taliban] were trained by American and British intelligence with the enthusiastic help of Pakistan's own Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)" (2008, p275).

[112] Ahmed Rashid aptly notes that the "The Taliban's emergence thus coincided with a fortunate historical juxtaposition, where the disintegration of the communist power structure was complete, the Mujaheddin leaders were discredited and the traditional tribal leadership had been eliminated. It was relatively easy for the Taliban to sweep away what little of the old Pashtun leadership was left. Thereafter, from within the Pashtuns, the Taliban faced no possible political challenges to their rule" (2010, p333).

[113] It is important to note the support for the Taliban during the time of Benazir Bhutto's government. Although the reasons for why support was extended to the extremists are debatable, and linked by some to a forthcoming pipeline project with origins in Turkmenistan, thus crossing Afghan territory (see Jaffrelot, 2015, p504), the paradoxical nature of Bhutto's policies is striking given the supposedly secular inclinations of the Pakistan's People Party. However, the pervasive influence of the military during Bhutto's government is also widely known.

[114] The ISI may not have directly created the Taliban, but it certainly brought about the conditions for the group's rise. As Jaffrelot points out: "Beyond the Afghan mujahideen, the Pakistanis equipped Islamists who came from all over the world … The ISI relied on the JI, which had gained a share of power under Zia, to carry out its strategy" (2015, p502). Yunas Samad (2011) also mentions that the Taliban were not an ISI creation. Yet, as he notes, they "saw their progress as an opportunity to fill the power vacuum and extended support to them" (2011, p155).

as the country collapsed into brutal civil war … The ISI did not create the Taliban or plan its takeover of Afghanistan. But we certainly interacted with it, once it emerged" (2011, p107). Sean Gregory explains the aspects of that overarching interaction, concluding that "it is widely commented that the Taliban were empowered by the ISI but not created by them. In fact the ISI were very much the fathers and supportive parents of the Taliban, if not perhaps the mothers and midwives" (2007, p1019). Nevertheless, Pakistan's ISI operations and interactions with the Taliban turned into a political practice with international consequences. The ISI was seen as the key institution capable of dealing with the ruthless regime in Kabul. As Schofield further adds:

> whenever anyone had to deal with the Taliban, even on fundamental foreign policy issues, the ISI was consulted and so its ownership of the relationship was strengthened … [T]he Afghan issues as a whole came to be seen as an ISI responsibility. Nothing could happen without ISI clearance, and this habit became so ingrained that even the ISI itself came to believe it. (2011, p108).

The implications of having direct and privileged contact with the Taliban in Afghanistan, a situation which was normalised into a foreign policy practice, are substantial. As the Taliban gained more power and control over Afghan territory, and the group's following expanded, mostly in the form of Afghan Pashtuns who kept arriving from madrassas controlled by the Pakistani party JUI (Ahmed Rashid, 2010), Pakistan could no deny their role in abetting the Taliban. As soon as they could, the Taliban

immediately implemented the strictest interpretation of Sharia law ever seen in the

Muslim world. They closed down girls' schools and banned women from working

outside the home, smashed TV sets, forbade a whole array of sports and recreational

activities and ordered all males to grow long beards. … Taliban were to take control

of 12 of Afghanistan's 31 provinces, opening the roads to traffic and disarming the

population. As the Taliban marched north to Kabul, local warlords either fled or,

waving white flags, surrendered to them. (ibid, p123)

It was to these governing practices that Pakistan became one of only three states who officially recognised the Taliban as an official government (the other two being KSA and the UAE). This turned out to be highly problematic for Pakistan's representation in the international community. Yet, the Pakistani leadership continued to prefer to keep its influence and control in Afghanistan, to the detriment of adopting a more critical stance, particularly in view of the numerous human rights violations that continued to occur.

Certainly, having a degree of control over Afghanistan was a core foreign policy objective almost since Pakistan's creation. With the Taliban in power, the Pakistani leadership hoped for limited or no Indian presence in Afghanistan. With the Taliban controlling Kabul, India closed her embassy in 1996. Access to Central Asia and to Iran for trade purposes came to a halt. Hence, during the time when the Taliban controlled Afghanistan, the Pakistani leadership benefited from a less assertive Indian presence on Afghan soil, which encouraged them to continue to support the ruthless Taliban regime.

Two decades later, it is possible to examine how Pakistan's collaboration with the Taliban extremist regime has contributed towards the enhancement of political violence and religious extremism in South Asia. The Taliban's takeover further aggravated the Afghan people's torment with war and violence. Pakistan's support only exacerbated this predicament. Reconciliation and development in post-war Afghanistan were not Pakistani goals. Pakistan's leadership thus actively contributed to Afghanistan being one of the world's least developed countries, a situation that continues after more than two decades since the Taliban gained power.[115]

Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban fitted well into the country's pan-Islamist agenda (Gregory, 2007), which embroiled the country in a complex network of Islamic fundamentalist groups operating in South Asia, thus extending Pakistan's sphere of influence. Whilst the Taliban's radical and extremist ideas about Islam and its role in society contrast with most of the Muslim world, they found an affinity among important sectors of Pakistani society. Ijaz Khan speaks of this situation, noting that "support to the Taliban from non-religious circles was wide, especially in Punjab and Karachi, and has been extensively published" (2007, p155). He mentions that the Taliban received support from members of major political parties, and of course from religious parties like JI or JUI. In the same article, he further observes that whilst the FO "had expressed reservations about continued support to the Taliban" (ibid, p155), the ISI deflected the civilian institution, and support to

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[115] Currently, Afghanistan ranks 170 on the UN Human Development Index, 2019. Available from: http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/AFG.

the terrorist continued until the events of 9/11. This stands as a clear example of how militarism operates, and in particular how it affects relations with civilian institutions.

Pakistan's support for the Taliban in the context of her relations with the US is important to analyse because it stands as a direct consequence of the foreign policy engagements these two allies developed. As the US disengaged from Afghanistan soon after the Soviets' withdrawal, Pakistan could continue her practices of control and domination by supporting those groups which represented a continuation of the Islamic-military ethos.

The Afghan War and its aftermath, which was instigated by the Pakistan-US partnership to become a religious-oriented conflict, served well to express how the Pakistani leadership enmeshed the ideals of heterosexual masculinity and militarism, with the imagined concepts of religion and nation. The allied status bestowed by the US drove the Pakistani leadership to reinforce and perform the desired state identity that could represent the country as invincible and impenetrable, such that it could control its western neighbour whilst keeping India's influence at bay. The Taliban's aggression – a typical masculine trait, associated with religious piety – has also attracted support from hyper-masculine, religious-political circles in Pakistan. This fits well into Pakistan's permanent need to reiterate the basis for her primordial nationalism – Muslim nationalism, as well as the need to restate her alterity in relation to India. Hence, the association with the Taliban constituted yet another opportunity to reaffirm a state identity associated with aggressive,

impenetrable masculinity, thus marking Pakistan's distinction from a Hindu India, which was represented as less virile, non-combative, emasculated, and now absent from a territory that Pakistan had longed to have influence over.

Furthermore, the interlinking of Taliban identity as being predominantly Pashtun (Manchanda, 2020) and belonging to the Sunni sect of Islam is also significant, in view of Pakistan's ambition to establish control in Afghanistan, including access to her neighbouring Central Asia, and Iran. As Amin Saikal observes "the ISI raised the Taliban as a radical Sunni Pashtun force intended, at the very least, to link the Afghan territory organically from the Pakistan border to the Hindu Kush, into Pakistan for wider national and regional purposes, including securing unfettered access to Central Asia and strengthening its position vis-à-vis India" (2010, p9). Adeel Khan also notes that,

> the Pakistani establishment's support for the Taliban was not for the ethnic Pukhtuns of Afghanistan[116], but for the Sunni Muslims of that country, which the Pukhtuns happen to be. The reason was that Pakistan did not want to see the Shia-dominated government in Kabul, … more friendly towards the Shia Iranian government. (2005, p104).

He further notes that the US favoured installing the Taliban in power, given the mujahedeen's proximity to Iran. Thus, it is possible to conclude that Pakistan's foreign policy options in Afghanistan in the pre- and post-Soviet

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[116] To be sure, it should not be dismissed that whilst supporting and encouraging the Islamist brand of the Taliban, the Pakistani leadership also sought to curtail the expansion of Pashtun ethno-nationalism, as the latter continued to be perceived as a threat to Pakistan's integrity (see Haqqani, 2013).

moments are closely associated with how the leadership envisaged the continuation of state identity, i.e. represented by a masculine, militarised association between Islam and nationalism, which is also reflected in her alterity in relation to India. This otherness relation implies placing what is perceived as security as a decisive factor in foreign policy. Afghanistan has thus provided the Pakistani leadership a space for controlling insecurity sources, whilst enabling the construction of a state identity, at the expense of the Afghan people's rights.

From 1979 to 2001, Pakistan's relations with the US enabled the former to continue to consolidate this hyper-masculine and militarised state identity. Whilst the relationship was not one of forthright trust, and was overshadowed by US non-proliferation laws and Pakistan's defiance in building a nuclear weapons arsenal, the militarisation of Pakistan was bolstered. The terrorist attack of 11th September 2001 in the US, carried out by Al-Qaeda, with full support of the Afghan Taliban,[117] would then provoke a significant change in Pakistan's foreign relations with Afghanistan, and in turn with the US.

The US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 brought an end to the Taliban government in Kabul. Pakistan's role during that period reflects the patterns of past decades of dealing with the US. Yet another military dictatorship governing Pakistan during a US intervention in Afghanistan, this

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[117] Ahmed Rashid notes that "The brutal deterioration of the social and economic conditions in Afghanistan under the sway of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the 18 months before 11 September should have signalled to the world that enormous dangers were lurking there as Afghanistan became a terrorist sanctuary for Osama Bin Laden and some 2,500 of his fighters" (2010, p701).

time headed by General Pervaiz Musharraf, extended full support to the US,[118] which resulted in an end to the international isolation it was facing due to its support for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Once again, Pakistan played a dual role with the US. According to Ahmed Rashid (2010), the ISI did not cease its support for the Taliban, despite facilitating the US's hunt for Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. As the US intervention continued, the Pakistani leadership started to fear that the US could repeat the disengagement strategy. As a result, Musharraf opted "to hold the Taliban in reserve as a proxy force for Pakistan" (Rashid, 2010, p723).

Despite these developments, Pakistan-US relations would once again be reformulated along the lines of a "marriage of convenience" (ibid, p165). In order to benefit from Pakistan's geography, the US pushed sanctions related to nuclearisation and the Kashmiri insurgency to the bottom of the agenda. However, the US revival in Pakistan was not welcomed by the *ulema* whose support for the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda remained unchanged. Abdul Sattar suggests that the *ulema* defended the position that the "right was on the side of the Taliban and religious duty therefore required Pakistan to support them, regardless of cost and consequences" (2017, p271). The costs and consequences would be felt by Pakistanis of all backgrounds. Religious parties helped to fuel a mix of religious extremism, sectarianism, and anti-

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[118] As Ahmed Rashid writes: "Pakistan had granted the U.S.-led Coalition forces enormous facilities. Unknown to Pakistanis at the time, 1,100 U.S. forces were based in Pakistan for the duration of the war, including Combat Search and Rescue Units, U.S. Special Ops and CIA paramilitary teams, Red Horse squadrons (engineering teams that repaired airfields in the midst of war), and aircraft from the 101st Airborne Division. Pakistan agreed to a list of seventy-four basing and staging activities, such as overflight facilities, medical evacuation, refueling, and the setting up of communication relay sites for U.S. forces inside Afghanistan" (2008, p303).

American rhetoric, as well as anti-Musharraf/anti-Pakistan rhetoric that became hard to control. Once again, a result of Pakistan-US relations was more suffering on the part of the common citizen, who became powerless.

Post-9/11 Pakistan-US relations, by virtue of the GWOT, were again converted into alliance-style terms. Pakistan regained the status of a military client. The numbers can be checked at K. Alan Kronstadt's 2007 CRS Report for Congress. Since 2001, the US has provided

> nearly $1.5 billion in direct U.S. security-related assistance (Foreign military Financing totalling $970 million plus about $516 million for other programs). Congress also appropriated billions of dollars to reimburse Pakistan for its support of the U.S.-led counterterrorism operations … The Bush Administration requested another $1 billion in emergency supplemental coalition support funds for FY2007 … The Administration also has requested another $1.7 billion in coalition support for FY2008. In justifying these requests, the Administration claims that coalition support payments to Pakistan have led to "a more stable [Pakistan-Afghanistan] border area". (2007, p4)

These numbers represent a considerable investment in Pakistan's military capability, which had experienced a significant reduction in foreign military financing in previous years.[119] This sudden increase in US aid to Pakistan, however, has been widely criticised. There have been accusations of a lack of transparency and accountability on the part of the donor, as well as in relation to how Pakistan has used the received funds. Furthermore, there is an

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[119] For a comprehensive analysis of US Aid to Pakistan, see Azeem Ibrahim's discussion paper for the
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs:
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Final_DP_2009_06_08092009.pdf.

increasing concern that US taxpayers' money is funding the Pakistani state, particularly the latter's military. As Ibrahim argues,

> Pakistan's military and security services have for many years been a black hole for U.S. funds. They have enriched individuals at the expense of the proper functioning of Pakistani institutions and the country's ability to fight its extremist enemies and provided already kleptocratic institutions with further incentives for corruption. Many of the incentives for Pakistani army corruption are longstanding, institutional, and remain in place today. (2009, p6)

US transfers of money and military aid during the George W. Bush/Pervez Musharraf years again bring to the fore past discourses that look upon Pakistan-US relations through the lenses of "transactional clientelism". However, with the end of Bush's administration, the US perceived that the objectives of the Afghan War had not been achieved, and that Pakistan, despite the aid it had received, was not fully cooperating with the war on terror in Afghanistan. The Obama administration therefore devised a different strategy in order to solve the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan – the so-called AfPak. The next section examines the main features of AfPak and how it affected the role of militarism in Pakistan.

5.3   The AfPak strategy and its impact on militarism

In this section I analyse the impact of what became the US policy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan, during the Obama administration. The AfPak policy was formulated after George W. Bush's Afghanistan policy had been

assessed as a failure,[120] if not an example of outright negligence (Aslam, 2012), as it was either unwilling or unable to end the insurgency in Afghanistan, including the presence of al-Qaeda. The scholarship related to this policy is primarily concerned with counter-terrorism, military strategy, and the successes and failures of Obama's policy (Ahmad, 2010; Markey, 2009; Shaikh, 2010; Aslam, 2012).

AfPak was in essence formulated as a merging strategy destined to end insurgency and militancy in Afghanistan and Pakistan respectively, treating both states as "one geopolitical unit, thus expanding the theatre of war" (Ayesha Khan, 2010, p3). This strategy also generated some concerns and critiques. The same author suggests that AfPak "oversimplifies the nature of insurgency on both sides of the Durand Line, and fails to appreciate the differences in security trajectories and capabilities of the two states" (ibid, p3). Ishtiaq Ahmad, however, notes that this strategy "has greater scope for adapting to new political and security realities of the two countries, besides reinforcing and reshaping their respective counterinsurgency campaigns through a variety of cooperative mechanisms" (2010, pp193-194). He also tries to provide a rationale for bracketing Pakistan with Afghanistan, based on US perceptions of terrorism and counter-terrorism being unidimensional challenges based at the borderlands of both countries. However, Ayesha Khan (2010) emphasises the more complex aspects of the policy, related to the use of US drones to target militants in the FATA region of Pakistan, and to the

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[120] There is evidence that Obama started working on what would become AfPak during the transition period, and not just after being inaugurated as President. See Woodward (2010); see also Khurram Hussain (2015): https://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=24_10_2015_001_004.

strength of Pakistan's military operations in the region, fuelled by US pressure to end terrorism. These operations had a devastating impact on local populations, including the creation of one of the "largest internally displaced populations in the world" (Khan, 2010, p3).

5.3.1 Drone warfare in Pakistan-US relations

One of the most controversial issues associated with AfPak, which has a direct impact on how Pakistan and US have built their relations, was the continuation of drone warfare on the borderlands of Pakistan and Afghanistan. This was indeed responsible for non-militant and civilian casualties (Bastos, 2014; Harris, 2012), and has created a vociferous debate on the use of drones.[121] For instance, C.C. Fair (2010; 2015) supports drone warfare based on its efficacy in eliminating terrorists, which is translated into a reduction in terrorist attacks and their lethality. Micah Zenko provides a number of policy recommendations in order to increase transparency and to "bring drone strike practices in line with stated policies" (2013, p26). The pro-drone arguments thus follow a state-centric approach to politics, and do not encompass issues related with gender and militarism. The latter are therefore absent from mainstream narratives on Pakistan-US relations. In the

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[121] Critics of drone warfare stress that it "vests extraordinary power in the executive office, overrides the judicial process, demobilizes the U.S. public, and militarizes the CIA, while placing terrorist suspects, including U.S. citizens, on a kill list. As suspects are killed rather than captured for trial, the executive branch, in effect, adopts a 'take no prisoners alive' approach" (de Volo, 2016, p53).

previous section, I demonstrated how this relationship is represented through hegemonic masculinity associated with war, potency, control, and combativity, which is defined against the feminine. Relations with the US thus have enhanced these characteristics of Pakistan's foreign policy, particularly in terms of foreign relations with her main neighbours India and Afghanistan.

However, drone warfare, which itself is considered deeply gendered (de Volo, 2016; Clark, 2018), also challenges "the war-masculinity nexus", as it is "less effective in conferring venerated forms of masculinity at the individual and state levels" (de Volo, 2016, p57). Thus, what was conceived as a counter-terrorism policy in the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan during George W. Bush's administration, and subsequently enhanced by the AfPak strategy, can also be seen as a disruption to the masculine, heteronormalised relations between Pakistan and the US. Here I am using an intersectional perspective linked to critical feminist approaches in order to explain how drone warfare is also a sexualised and gendered venture, and to explain how it became important to understand the relationship between security and identity in the context of Pakistan's relations with the US.

For instance, Cara Daggett suggests that hunter-killer drones render ideas of hegemonic masculinity – which are associated with the heterosexual, straight warrior, and which "provide moral and practical bearing for killing in war" – as "strange" (2015, p362). Daggett then argues that "drones are genderqueer bodies … human-machine assemblages that do not track onto male-female,

human-machine binaries" (ibid, p362), thus bringing to the fore the queerness[122] of drone warfare. Daggett thus makes the case for framing drone warfare as appearing "both hypermasculine in its technological achievements and emasculating in its removal of the US soldier's body from mortal danger; it is both penetrating in its flaunting of sovereign state borders and at the same time evidence of the impotence of the United States in ultimately securing itself against terrorism" (ibid, p347).

By focusing on this particular gendered aspect of drone warfare, it is possible to represent the US as being technologically advanced, a characteristic associated with masculinity. On the one hand, this penetrative technology, which, in the case of its relations with Pakistan, represents US supremacy and hypermasculinity against a perceived weaker Pakistan that is friend and/or enemy. On the other hand, it removes from the US attributes of the patriotic body of the soldier, which is associated with combative masculinity and mostly heterosexual. Hence US drone warfare in the context of Pakistan relations constitutes something of a challenge to hypermasculine ideas of combat and masculinity, whilst revealing how these can simultaneously be disrupted, so long as the drone performativity continues.

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[122] I understand the term queer/queerness along the lines proposed by Cynthia Weber (2014; 2016). Weber explains that their notion of "queer logic of and/or comes from Roland Barthes' description of the and/or as an 'and' that is also at the very same time an 'or.' In terms of gender, for example, this means one can be a boy or a girl while at the same time being a boy and a girl. According to Barthes, the and/or is 'that which confuses meaning, the norm, normativity' (Barthes 1976:109). To my mind, this is what makes it queer (Weber 1999), for it describes that which, in Sedgwick's terms, cannot or will not signify monolithically" (2014, p598).

Whilst Pakistan's territory becomes penetrated by a highly technological killing machine, which, arguably, would result in a reduction in the threat of terrorism within her sovereign territory. Thus, territorial sovereignty would be challenged and transgressed, and yet at the same time the territory would be liberated from militant terrorists.[123] US drone attacks therefore pose a challenge to the Pakistani state's heterosexual, masculine identity as a hard, impenetrable country, whilst the killing act of the drone could contain the potential to bring an end to the terrorist threat. In this way, it is a queer logic of *and/or* that mediates this relationship, particularly during the GWOT and the Obama administration's time in office. Hence, this phase of the history of Pakistan-US relations, involving drone warfare, may be framed as one that disrupts hegemonic forms of masculinity associated with their own constructions of the interlinking between identity and security.

A decade after the controversial US killing drone campaign, which generated a wave of protests and a revival of anti-Americanism,[124] the Pakistani military has indigenously developed a laser-guided UAV/drone (The Express Tribune, 2015). The drone, a genderqueer body, following Daggett (2015), ironically, has been named "Burraq", the magical horse that in Islamic tradition is believed to have transported Prophet Muhammad on a voyage from Mecca to Jerusalem, and then onwards to the "seventh heaven". It is

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[123] I take this as a possible representation. I personally consider the use of drone warfare to be ethically and morally challenging.

[124] See for instance the *New York Times* report of 2013 by Salman Masood Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, on Peshawar protests organised by PTI, the party of the current Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, who is supported by the military establishment. Available here: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/world/asia/in-pakistan-rally-protests-drone-strikes.html. The same party also protested in 2012 against the use of drones.

significant that an ultra-conservative state (and society) that criminalises homosexuality and discriminates against LGBTQ+ people[125] adopts a weapon that has the potential to queer the relationship between security and identity. Thus, whilst Pakistani state identity remains heavily masculinised along heteronormative lines, it is also possible to envisage it as one that is and may be queered.

5.3.2   AfPak and the enhancement of militarism

The drone warfare carried out by the US in the borderlands of Pakistan and Afghanistan remains a controversial issue within the AfPak strategy. However, this would not be the sole controversy in Pakistan's relations with the US during this time. To be sure, the Pakistani state leadership was unhappy being yoked to Afghanistan. For instance, Christophe Jaffrelot (2016) highlights one of the guiding principles of the AfPak policy, which was "not only to use Pakistan vis-à-vis Afghanistan but to highlight the fact that the Islamist problem lay in Pakistan – something the Bush administration had not been unaware of but did not pay much attention to either" (2016, Kindle Locations 4005-4009). The "Islamist problem" – which Barack Obama compared to a cancer (ibid) that he wanted to contain[126] to prevent its

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[125] For an up-to-date and comprehensive report on the state of LGBTQ+ in Pakistan, with reference to Sexual Orientation and gender identity or expression, see the 2019 UK Government report, available from: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/814050/Pakistan-SOGIE-CPIN-v3.0_July_2019_.pdf.

[126] Writing for the *Washington Post*, Bob Woodrow quotes the US President: "Safe havens would no longer be tolerated, Obama had decided. 'We need to make clear to people that the

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spreading to Afghanistan – was certainly an issue with which Pakistan society was grappling. Yet, the Pakistani leadership disliked how this issue had been framed by the US President. Not least, the idea that the "cancer" was not in Afghanistan but in Pakistan is, arguably, a gross overlooking of the whole issue, and merely represents Pakistan in a pathological way. To be sure, Pakistan's extremism problem, fuelled by a violent brand of Islamism, was, and indeed continues to be, an issue that furnishes the ideological material used to convert people to terrorism. However, portraying Pakistan in such a demeaning way demonstrates how successive US administrations have tended to adopt an attitude of selective amnesia. Of particular concern is the US's support for ideological radicalisation, including the printing of schoolbooks. Furthermore, the idea that "the cancer won't spread there" is rather problematic even for the US's own credibility. Since 1989, the US has been unwilling and unable to engage in an adequate solution for Afghanistan. The 2001 invasion is, at the time of writing, yet to be met with a stabilisation plan. Pakistan, however, is slowly and with some notable successes trying to eradicate extremism and terrorism.

The design of the AfPak policy impacted Pakistan's internal politics. For instance, the policy had recommendations including: "Increasing and broadening assistance in Pakistan"[127] and "Strengthening Pakistani

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cancer is in Pakistan,' he declared during an Oval Office meeting on Nov. 25, 2009, near the end of the strategy review. The reason to create a secure, self-governing Afghanistan, he said, was 'so the cancer doesn't spread there'" (*Washington Post*, 29th September 2010).

[127] The white paper defines it as: "to include direct budget support, development assistance, infrastructure investment, and technical advice on making sound economic policy adjustments – and strengthening trade relations will maximize support for our policy aims; it should also help to provide longer-term economic stability. Our assistance should focus on long-term capacity building, on agricultural sector job creation, education and training, and

government capacity"[128], which were then integrated into the "Kerry-Lugar" Bill.[129] The bill, despite being a bipartisan piece of legislation, generated controversy in both the US and Pakistan. In the former, detractors were mostly concerned with Pakistan's generalised corruption, and the lack of accountability for the billions of dollars sent without visible results, whereas in the latter, it was the army who expressed the strongest opposition to the bill. The army's opposition to this piece of US legislation aimed at targeting Pakistan's development was formulated on the basis that it did not include direct military aid, thus contrasting with previous dispensations of direct aid to Pakistan. As the bill sought to strengthen civilian governance in Pakistan, the military reaction appears coherent with their dominance of internal politics in Pakistan. However, by 2009, the army already understood that the future of Pakistan rested on the construction of democracy. As per the ISPR press release of 9th October 2009, reporting on the Corps Commanders meeting:

> Kerry Lugar bill also came under discussion during the conference. The forum
>
> expressed serious concern regarding clauses impacting on National Security. A

on infrastructure requirements. Assistance should also support Pakistani efforts to 'hold and build' in western Pakistan as a part of its counterinsurgency efforts".

[128] Defined in the white paper as: "Strengthening the civilian, democratic government must be a centerpiece of our overall effort. Key efforts should include fostering the reform of provincial and local governance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the NorthWest Frontier Province. We need to help Islamabad enhance the services and support in areas cleared of insurgents so that they have a real chance in preventing insurgents from returning to those areas. With international partners, we should also promote the development of regional organizations that focus on economic and security cooperation, as well as fostering productive political dialogue".

[129] See, for instance, the analysis of Pakistan's Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, provided by Najam Rafique, entitled "*Analysing the Kerry-Lugar Bill*" for an overview of the bill and its implications. Rafique suggests that: "Micro-management of programs, projects and assistance to Pakistan seems to be the aim of this bill and would be particularly focused on benchmarks relating to democracy, non-proliferation, civilian supremacy, Pakistan's role in the war on terror, and, relations with India and Afghanistan" (2009, p264).

formal input is being provided to the Government. However, in the considered views of the forum, it is the Parliament, that represents the will of the people of Pakistan, which would deliberate on the issue, enabling the Government to develop a National response. (ISPR, PR396/2009)

The military opposition[130] to the bill was made through its decades-old civilian ally: the *Jamaat-i-Islami*. The JI organised a referendum and printed 45 million ballot papers in order to show how the Pakistani people were against the bill. According to the newspaper *Dawn*, the ballot papers contained the following information:

> "It [the Kerry-Lugar Bill] is a charge-sheet against country's sensitive agencies"; "It is an American attempt to capture Pakistan's nuclear assets"; [and] "Is aimed at spreading terror through American security agency Blackwater to continue the massacre of innocent people by American drone attacks and the extension of the American embassy (converting it) into a cantonment." "Voters" were asked to put a tick-mark on "I reject Kerry-Lugar bill" or "I don't reject Kerry-Lugar bill". (*Dawn*, 29th October 2009)

Between the myths and facts about the Kerry-Lugar Bill,[131] the reality is that once again a US policy towards Pakistan exposed how the military relies on religious ideology, resulting in an interlinking of identity and security that is simultaneously militarised and oriented towards religion. The reason behind the inclusion of nuclear weapons within this narrative is related to JI's attempt

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[130] David Ignatius (2009), from the *Washington Post*, clearly states that. He further points out the causes of Anti-Americanism which have been generated, and allegedly not accounted for by the Obama administration. See: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/10/09/AR2009100902851.html.
[131] US Senator John Kerry's explanation given to Pakistan's *Dawn*: https://www.dawn.com/news/916031.

to associate the close US-India relations as representing an imminent danger to Pakistan, which also forms part of Pakistan's othering process. Yet, the Kerry-Lugar Bill does not make any reference to nuclear weapons.

The Kerry-Lugar Bill also reveals how the military enjoys hegemonic control over the state and civil society. For instance, back in 2009, Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi said to the *New York Times* that "[t]he offending part of the legislation sets up the country as hired help and puts the military in the dock, presumed guilty on many counts and having to prove its innocence to Washington" (interview with Jane Perlez, *New York Times*, October 2009). Whilst Lodhi's statement reiterates her close association with the military establishment, it also reveals how unacceptable it is for the military forces to be criticised[132] or made accountable. To have "the military in the dock" is an almost unthinkable event.[133] As such, it is hardly surprising that the Kerry-Lugar Bill came to be so controversial in Pakistan. The bill was deemed offensive, particularly to the military.

It is also important to note that the US's AfPak strategy and the Kerry-Lugar Bill were introduced at a critical moment when Pakistan was experiencing an official transition from a military dictatorship to civilian government. This transition took place within a highly volatile political environment, amidst constant episodes of violent extremism and terrorism taking place almost on

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[132] More recently, Pakistan's ruling party, PTI, has introduced legislation seeking to jail anyone who "ridicules or brings into disrepute or defames" the military (Reuters, 2020).
[133] I have personally experienced this during conversations with ex-military personnel in Pakistan. For instance, a retired General-ranking person told me that while he disliked General Musharraf, he would not like to see the latter face trial or be arrested.

a daily basis. The military was becoming increasingly engaged in counter-terrorism operations against terrorist outfits, which would continue for nearly a decade, whilst the US continued to pressurise Pakistan to "do more". The military was thus represented as being fully involved in the recondite double game of terror and counter-terrorism operations, explained in part as a response to perceived American hubris towards Pakistan, and in part by the latter's ever-present insecurity towards India.

Yet, despite criticisms of playing a double role on fighting terrorism, the military has achieved an important degree of success in eliminating terrorism in Pakistan. During my fieldwork in Pakistan, I experienced how the GWOT has impacted common people's daily lives and how they perceive themselves in relation to the world. Pakistanis see themselves as the greatest victims of the war on terror, which indeed has claimed thousands of lives in Pakistan alone; yet, they have been confronted with the fact that Osama bin Laden was captured in Pakistan territory. The military has been able to rekindle the narrative of its war against terrorism as a great episode of national bravery and pride, in what was necessary to have a peaceful, stable, and normalised Pakistan. The relatively new Army Museum in Lahore already displays a separate section highlighting not only the main military operations against terrorists, but also how the latter's actions have had a major effect on Pakistani society. Whilst the elimination of the terrorist outfits that were operating on Pakistani soil was indeed necessary, and whilst the military has played a key role in this regard, the institution has also gained yet another opportunity to further extend militarism. War-preparedness became further

enmeshed in national security practices, and the assumption that the institution is the country's sole source of authority became reinvigorated.

Hence, given that Pakistan's war on terror was inseparable from the US-led GWOT, their relationship once more paved the way for the consolidation and enhancement of the military institution. The combination of the AfPak strategy with the Kerry-Lugar Bill, however, did not diminish militarisation, nor did it slow down the entrenchment of militaristic values in Pakistani society. Whilst US payments in military aid have waned in recent years (Alex Ward, 2018), this has neither prevented the Pakistani armed forces from increasing their military power, thanks to her close relations with China, nor has it decreased the circulation of militarised ideas and values. Media and technology have been particularly relevant in the latter's enhancement.

5.4   Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined Pakistan's relations with the US by focusing on Afghanistan as one of the main themes within this relationship. The invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR in December 1979 marked another rapprochement between the two, and Pakistan's status as "allied" and a "frontline state" became representative of how her security and identity were constructed in the context of her relations with US. Militarism, and to a certain extent religious ideology (based on Pakistan's role in supporting madrassas, and later the Taliban) also returned as salient features mediating this foreign relation. This chapter also explored the aftermath of the Soviets'

withdrawal and its impact on the construction of Pakistan's interlinking of security and identity, in light of how the ISI continued to consolidate its role as a foreign policy actor. That role was extended beyond the events of 9/11, and the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. With it, Pakistan's previous militarised representations were reinstated, and so did her role within the GWOT, being simultaneously a fighter and/or a victim. The fact that the US devised a specific strategy to deal with Pakistan and Afghanistan during the GWOT, despite having antagonised the military, however, did not serve to decelerate or derail the processes of militarisation in Pakistan. That said, the role of the US in the expansion and inculcation of militarism and militarisation in the country may be ebbing, in light of the US's internal politics and also in the reduction in direct military assistance the US gives to Pakistan. Nevertheless, in Pakistan, militarism and militarisation continue without hindrance.

PAKISTAN FOREIGN POLICY: A POSTCOLONIAL FEMINIST CRITIQUE

6.1 Introduction

In the three previous chapters, I have engaged with Pakistan's main three foreign relations. I have examined aspects of those relations which are conventionally absent from Pakistan's foreign policy narratives. These aspects include critical, rather than realist and conventional approaches to issues raised by the ongoing implementation of CPEC, representations of the Kashmir question by the country's main foreign policy actor, the army, and how the influence of the US on Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan went beyond parochial strategic concerns. Through these discussions I have sought to build a critical approach to Pakistan's foreign policy which is less state-centred and more inclusive of intersubjective issues.

This critical approach to the foreign policy of Pakistan includes concepts borrowed from feminist and postcolonial IR theories. A feminist approach is particularly important to identify how militarism is enhanced by gendered

power relations of control and domination. Yet, the narration of seven decades of Pakistan's foreign policy, which follows a conventional approach to international relations, has often underplayed to this fact. Moreover, the study of foreign policy in general, and of Pakistan's in particular, fails to account for how the power relations that shape foreign relations are also mediated by race, class, and gender. Nor is sufficient attention paid to the relationships between the former empires and the effects of (neo-) imperialism. Yet, as Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair note, it is crucial to acknowledge that imperialism works as a "critical historical juncture in which postcolonial identities are constructed in opposition to European ones, and come to be understood as Europe's 'others'" (2004, 2). This is of major importance in trying to understand how in postcolonial states, which originated from colonial political practices, the production and representation of identities happen.

In the introductory chapter of this study, I discussed the importance of including post-colonial and feminist approaches to the study of IR and foreign policy. In this chapter, I will take a more in-depth examination of these approaches and apply them to the context of Pakistan's foreign policy. Thus, I aim to build the case for a critique of the foreign policy of Pakistan that is situated at the intersection of post-colonial and feminist approaches to International Relations. In this process, I will examine how feminist approaches to security and foreign policy allow one to identify how militarism and its representations serve to shape Pakistan's state identity. Already in the thesis, I have interrogated how security and identity influence

foreign policy, and how militarism as an ideology has become associated with security, identity, and masculinity. Here I will use the three previously discussed case studies of Pakistan's foreign relations (namely with China, India, and the US) in order to build this critical and interpretative approach to assessing Pakistan's foreign policy.

The consolidation of a postcolonial feminist critique emerges from the fact that both post-colonial and feminist scholars have acknowledged that their respective research areas have been too slow to engage with one another. In addition, the hegemony and Eurocentrism of white/Western feminism has also contributed towards existing disjunctions. The former did not appreciate how women's struggles were differently impacted by religion, nationality, class, race, and sexual orientation. This oversight prompted other feminists to build a powerful critique (Mohanti, 1988; McEwan, 2001; Phipps, 2020). Moreover, white/Western feminism has been inclined to reproduce the same colonial practices linked to gender and race enacted by white women in the colonies (Phipps, 2016; Hamad, 2019). Yet, despite these disjunctions between different kinds of feminist positions, feminist scholars have been able to create new spaces for analysis. One such space has been opened by legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw's (1991) concept of *intersectionality*. This inclusive concept posits that social categories like gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, and class should not be analysed in isolation from each other. The concept also posits that one category cannot be privileged over another. Thus, intersectionality is central to a postcolonial and feminist analytical approach to world politics, including foreign policy (see Achilleos-Sarll, 2018).

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Postcolonial feminist analysis therefore stands at the intersection of several features that profoundly shape politics. Anna Agathangelou and Heather Turcotte offer a compelling outline of what post-colonial feminist is about:

> A feminist grounding of postcolonial theory reads through the fingerprints of colonial history and subverts its boundaries by attending to the multiple and intersecting axis of power. Postcolonial feminisms work to expose narratives of "civilization", "domestication" and "growth" as forms of oppression; they reveal how colonial frameworks seek to exterminate and assimilate anybody who does not fit into the dominant discourse of the interstate system. (2016, p41).

One of the key features of a postcolonial feminist approach is the importance given to amnesia, particularly to the "colonial practice of amnesia that obscures IR's role in reproducing colonial genealogies" (ibid, p42). As I argue in this chapter, this has been a permanent feature of Pakistan's narration and practices of foreign policy. Yet, it is important to contextualise the genesis of the postcolonial state of Pakistan, as a new member of the interstate system, in order to depart from conventional analysis of her foreign policy. Thus, in the introductory section, I provide the necessary contextual background before going on, in the remaining sections of the chapter, to examine Pakistan's relations with China, India, and the US from a post-colonial feminist approach.

Situating colonial practices in postcolonial Pakistan

The construction of Pakistan as a postcolonial nation-state stands at the intersection of a range of crises that have taken place in South Asia since her independence in 1947. Despite other crises and conflicts that occurred in other South Asian states, such as Sri Lanka, Nepal, or the Maldives, those involving India and Pakistan have gained more prominence in the scholarship on South Asia and international studies. The partition of India, the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, and the nuclearisation of the region are widely considered to be the main crises in South Asia, as they involve India as the main hegemonic power in the region. However, one of the critical issues faced by South Asian nation-states relates to identity and territory. Sankaran Krishna observes that South Asian nation-states and various ethno-nationalist movements in the region maintain that "territory and identity must somehow be made to coincide" (1999, p221). Post-colonial South Asian states, which have continued to undergo the experience of nation-building since independence, adopted the same model followed by former colonisers, namely that of aligning territory with identity, despite the violence it has caused elsewhere (ibid, p223).

The case of Pakistan is particularly interesting in this respect. At the time of its creation, neither territory nor identity coincided with the imagined nation-state, vaguely defined as a "homeland for the Muslims of India". Despite following the blueprint provided by the former colonial power, neither in her Western wing nor in the geographically anomalous Eastern wing did identity and territory coincide. In fact, the attempt to combine identity with territory resulted in a rather unstable polity. As such, past colonial political practices

of administration continued to be utilised as a form of governance, and to forcefully make an imagined identity and territory coincide. Thus, identity markers such as ethnicity, class, gender, and sexuality were brought under the control of the state.

Pakistan's early leadership, including the country's founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah, thought that by following a European representation of state symbols, including one language, one flag, a national anthem and one constitution that could provide the legitimacy of the military and of other governmental bodies, this would be sufficient to implement a nationhood in the newly imagined nation-state. The historical evidence, however, tells a different story. The lack of identification with the reasoning for Pakistan's existence was a reality in the NWFP and Balochistan, pre- and post-partition (Jaffrelot, 2002; Khan, 2005; Pattanaik, 1998; Sheikh, 2018). And the 1971 disintegration of the Pakistani state further supports the view that neither the two-nation theory nor the enforced alignment of identity and territory could work as natural glue.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, the political projects of aligning identity and territory are often met with resistance. Pakistan, as one such project of nation-state building, has since its inception continuously been challenged by its status as a multi-national country. To obtain an imagined homogenisation of identity, which would be solely oriented by religion, state elites have attempted to erase ethnicity as an identity marker. Ethno-nationalisms in Pakistan, which are mostly comprised of Baloch, Pashtun, and Sindhi groups,

have been represented by the state as one of the most serious threats to the state, often involving claims of being supported from overseas, as Iftikhar H. Malik (1997) has observed.

Yet, the dominance of the state apparatuses by two other dominant ethnic groups in Pakistan, practically since independence, is relevant here, particularly given its consequences in elevating ethno-nationalisms to the status of a "security threat". Post-1947 it was Punjabis and *Muhajirs* who held the most important decision-making positions, both domestically and internationally. A significant explanation for this may be found in how, historically, these two groups established relations with the British colonisers. As Adeel Khan notes,

> the two dominant groups, Muhajirs and Punjabis, had been the most favourably placed communities under the colonial rule. The reason for that was the colonial administration's dependence on the loyalty of the big landlords for the maintenance of its control system. The United Provinces (UP) of India, from where these Urdu-speaking Muhajirs had migrated, was the traditional power base of the Muslim landed gentry and they continued with their privileges even after the colonial takeover. (2009, p171).

The importance of integrating a postcolonial feminist approach thus starts to emerge. To this day, these are the ethnic groups that have taken control of the military-bureaucratic axis. These two groups, however, do not occupy a distinct role in their domination and control of the state by virtue of demographic factors alone. Their dominant position was made possible by the combination of ethnic belonging, with historical links to power, and class.

Thus, the history of how colonial rule happened in the Punjab and Northern parts of India is relevant here. It is important to observe how colonial structures of power continued to be exercised in the post-colonial state.

During the British Raj, military power originated primarily from the Punjab (see, for instance, Talbot, 1991; Yong, 2005; Rashid, 2020). The existing scholarship on imperial/colonial relations of the British in the Punjab has clearly demonstrated how the administrative and military practices aimed to transform that region, which was represented with significant strategic weight towards the defence of the Raj. Ian Talbot (1991) notes the importance of Punjab loyalty to the British during the 1857 revolt, and how that was represented as "loyalism". The Punjab was thus turned into a linchpin of colonial policy, where agrarian development, particularly the establishment of irrigation canals and respective colonies, and the source of military power combined to reinforce British colonial rule.

One such part of the history of British colonial rule that is specifically relevant to this study relates to the constitution of the British Indian Army. The latter followed a racist recruitment policy of attracting so-called "martial races", by which Punjabis[134] (Muslims and Sikhs) were singled out for their masculinity, combativeness, bravery, and loyalty. The British believed that only such "martial races" were capable of soldiering. This preference for the "martial races" was also extended to civilian roles. For instance, Mrinalini Sinha notes

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[134] Whilst Punjabis, Muslims and Sikhs comprised an important number of the British Indian Army, the latter also drew from other identified "martial races" including, for instance, Pashtuns, certain Hindu castes, Dogras, and Gurkhas (see, for instance, Rashid, 2020; Streets, 2004; Sinha, 1995).

that "the 'manly' native civilian from the Punjab or the North-West Provinces could serve safely anywhere in India, the effeminate Bengali civilian could serve only in such provinces as Bengal, Bombay, and Madras, but was totally useless for service in the Punjab and the North-West Provinces" (1995, p123).

Thus, in these two examples of how the British colonisers dealt with race, ethnicity, and class in order to continue and implement imperial rule, one can establish a parallel with what happened during in the newly created state of Pakistan. The new state adopted and reproduced a colonial-style administration (civilian and military), resembling colonial Punjab which became known as the "sword arm of the Raj" (Yong, 2005). In addition, the colonial-style rule that West Pakistan established in East Bengal/Pakistan resonates with how the British represented Bengalis – namely as effeminate, weaker, and of a more "enervated character" (see Streets, 2004; Sinha, 1995).

Hence, the construction of government structures in the postcolonial state of Pakistan led to a neo-colonial tendency of privileging and gendering certain parts of the population, to the detriment of those perceived as less fit for soldiering or administration.[135] This may be interpreted as reproducing and representing how colonial practices were implemented to achieve the "civilisation" and "domestication" of indigenous populations. Thus, perhaps to no surprise, seven decades later, the only ethnic group to have not voiced any collective grievances against the state continues to be the Punjabis. Thus,

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[135] A caveat needs to be introduced. During the 1950s, the PM office was held by three individuals originating from Bengal. However, all of them belonged to the Bengali privileged upper classes. Yet, civilian and military bureaucracy maintained marginalisation of Bengalis.

as Talbot observes, the phrase "Punjabization of Pakistan"[136] is a valid representation of the country, given the predominance of demographics and the military, whose recruiting strength continues to be confined to three main districts of Punjab: Attock, Rawalpindi, and Jelhum (Talbot, 2002; Rashid, 2020).

Punjabi majoritarianism is also related to gendering practices, and closely linked to the enhancement of militarism. Looking back to British colonial rule, as Jaspreet Bal suggests, "the British used the existing patriarch of Punjab and further shaped it … That which was useful to the military and political effort was honed and glorified. Thus other, non-militarized masculinities were considered effeminate" (2020, p3). In addition, Prem Chowdhry (2013), writing on militarised masculinities in colonial Punjab, notes that masculinity surfaced as a colonial ideology. In a Punjabi-dominated Pakistan, the interlinking between masculinity and colonial-inspired civilian and military governmental practices continues to be reproduced. An example of such reproduction can be seen in foreign policy processes, and their othering capacity. Moreover, as I will discuss below, by conducting foreign policy that reinforces post-colonial practices, states (in this case, Pakistan) contribute towards the continuation of colonial practices.

In the previous chapters, I have analysed how the interlinking of security and identity happens within the context of foreign policy. Thus, foreign policy, as both a political process and a political practice, is also a process of otherness.

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[136] Talbot (2002) attributes this phrase to Pakistani-origin scholar Yunas Samad.

The influential work of David Campbell (1992) is useful in understanding how foreign policy is connected with issues of ethnicity, gender, sex, and class, which inform a feminist post-colonial approach. Campbell suggests that foreign policy consists of "boundary-producing practices central to the production and reproduction of the identity in whose name it operates" (1992, p75). He calls attention to the importance of context, and to the need of "specifying the exact nature of the relationship between state-based foreign policy and political identity" (ibid). He also makes two other important distinctions – namely between "foreign policy" and "Foreign Policy" (ibid, p76). Whilst the former is associated with the processes that constitute identity and takes into account elements such as "ethnicity, race, class, gender or geography … which have operated in terms of the paradigm of sovereignty and constituted identity through time and across space" (ibid), the latter is a "conventional understanding within the discipline – is thus not implicated in the constitution of identity" (ibid). Campbell further observes that, despite the distinction, both cannot be separated, for "Foreign Policy serves to *reproduce* the constitution of identity made possible by 'foreign policy' and to *contain* challenges to the identity which results" (ibid, italics in the original).

I use Campbell's definitions of foreign policy here as they appear to be sufficiently encompassing to establish a bridge between foreign policy understood as a political concept of practice, and the need to integrate it into a postcolonial feminist analysis. In addition, Columba Achilles-Sarll notes that although Campbell's work does not directly engage with feminist theory,

he acknowledges the importance of "gender norms" and "codes of gender" in the processes of "Othering" that are inherent to foreign policy (2018, p40).

Hence, having established the importance of a post-colonial feminist approach to analyse Pakistan's foreign policy, and having contextualised it in relation to Pakistan's post-colonial predicament, in the following sections I will outline what a post-colonial feminist approach can draw out of our analysis of Pakistan's main foreign relations. I will follow the order in which the case studies were presented in previous chapters.

6.2   A postcolonial feminist critique of Pakistan's relations with China

In the chapter dedicated to Pakistan's relations with China, I discussed the importance of two key geographic places at the centre of CPEC: the seaport of Gwadar in Balochistan, and the Northern region of Gilgit-Baltistan, which is also part of Kashmir. These two places represent how Pakistan's relations with China, specifically in the context of CPEC, are enhancing the inculcation of militaristic values in governance, with the consequent rooting of militarism as a state ideology. Thus, CPEC is both a gendered and gendering project.

However, the extension of CPEC's impact, as I argue in this section, can be situated beyond the conformist Pakistani-based discourse of it being an "economic game-changer". These state-centred discourses largely ignore the impact of the corridor on local populations, specifically those who perceive

CPEC as a threat to their livelihoods, such as Gwadar's fishermen who have felt threatened since the construction of the port was announced in 2002 (Khan, 2009). Whilst the Pakistani government continues to portray CPEC as a stimulus to develop the country's most deprived province, recent concerns over the pace of the project's development (Shahid, 2020) raise the level of scepticism around the whole viability of the project. Thus, it comes as no surprise that foreign policy analyses related to CPEC remain silent about how the project is also a representation of oppression.

State-centred discourses, however, call for a postcolonial feminist analysis to identify how Sino-Pakistan relations are in fact enhancing narratives linked to "growth", "domestication", and "civilisation", which are part of (not so) old colonial strategies of governing with the objective of controlling and dominating entire populations. CPEC's state discourses are heavily pinned to "growth". In a recent interview with the Chinese media, CPEC's chairman, the retired General Asim Saleem Bajwa, reiterated that:

> We will increase our exports, and it will be a big boost to our economy … CPEC is a project which will eventually benefit the people of Pakistan. … I can assure that the people of Pakistan and the government have a very clear vision, that there is nothing which can stop or disrupt the progress of CPEC. CPEC is for the future of this country. Our economic future is linked with our iron brother China. Therefore, it will progress … nothing will be able to disrupt or slow down the progress of CPEC. (Bajwa, cited on Xinhua.net, 2021)

Whilst Pakistan urgently needs to have a sustained and sustainable plan for the future of her economy, pinning the country's hopes solely on its "iron brother" raises some key questions from a postcolonial feminist perspective. The relationship with China is represented by Pakistani officials as one that is patriarchal and masculinist. Moreover, it rests upon the notion of continued "growth", which, as the cited General mentioned, will not be disrupted. This is also connected to how "domestication" is taking place in Balochistan. Even prior to the launching of CPEC, the federal government built new military cantonments closer to Balochistan's natural resources hotspots of Sui and Kohlu, thus drawing together militarisation, domestication, and old colonial practices of territorial control for the sake of resource extraction (Akthar, 2007). With CPEC, the federal government has continued its process of control and domestication, to "start" to develop Balochistan, by promising better infrastructure and essential facilities to its inhabitants. However, Balochistan's politicians have repeatedly voiced concerns regarding either the progress or the very existence of the federal government's intended programme (Adnan Aamir, 2017).

Yet, Pakistani scholars continue to defend the importance of military control in the province as a guarantor of "economic prosperity", thus leading to peace (Khetran and Saeed, 2017). That is accompanied by renewed appeals to operate Gwadar as a military base (Akthar, 2020), with the sole purpose of pursuing state-centric, militarised, and neo-colonial politics in Balochistan, in order to shield the Sino-Pakistani partnership from threats, both real and imagined. However, the extension of neo-colonial practices associated with

CPEC are often absent from the dominant geopolitical discourses around the project. One such discourse is associated with connectivity, particularly that between the Indian Ocean and the landlocked western regions of China, namely the Autonomous Region of Xinjiang. This specific aspect of CPEC's connectivity goals constitutes a complex issue of human rights violations associated with neo-colonial politics.

6.2.1 CPEC and human rights violations in Xinjiang

In this sub-section, I will explain how CPEC potentially contributes to human rights violations and violence carried out by China against the Uighur population in Xinjiang. Post-colonial feminism analytical approaches are also interested in how geopolitics shapes hegemonic power relations and global violence (Agathangelou and Turcotte, 2010, p44). Xinjiang is a vast land-locked region controlled by China, bordering Central Asia and Pakistan. The majority of Xinjiang's population are ethnic Uighurs, most of whom are Muslim. In recent decades, China's control of Xinjiang has not resulted in any sense of autonomy, but rather in political alienation. This has been exacerbated by cultural, religious, and ethnic differences in relation to the Chinese dominant Han ethnic group (Haider, 2005). Uighurs have tried to resist Beijing's rule. To counter such resistance, the Chinese government created its own version of Uighurs' connections with the region. The government separated

Uyghurs' origins from Xinjiang, and explained their migration and assimilation with the Iranian Saka tribes and Indo-Europeans only after their arrival from Mongolia. And territorially, the Chinese government claimed that since ancient times, Xinjiang "has been an inseparable part of the unitary multi-ethnic Chinese nation". (Ang, 2016, p400)

Whilst various narratives on Uighur ethnic and territorial affiliations co-exist, the one sanctioned by the Chinese Communist Party[137] seeks to ensure that no territorial claims over Xinjiang may be linked to the Uighurs. This, together with a steady "Sinicisation" of the region, disguised as government policies to modernise and develop Xinjiang, and which a post-colonial feminist critique would designate as "domestication and civilisation", appears to have increased separatist sentiments.

Pakistan and Xinjiang are connected by a route, the Karakoram Highway, which has served to strengthen relations between the distant regions, including closer contacts between Pakistanis and Uighurs during the 1980s (Haider, 2005). Symbolically, the Karakoram Highway represents the strong Sino-Pakistan bond. With the launch of CPEC, the importance of this connection has been renewed, thus reinforcing the centrality of connectivity implied by the corridor, despite geographical issues associated with the road (see Garlick, 2018). This route, on which construction began in the 1960s by the Chinese and Pakistani armies, also had a role in weapons trading during the Afghan Jihad. The Chinese government was uneasy about the Soviet

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[137] See China's White Paper on the history and development of Xinjiang (2003). Available from:
http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2014/10/05/content_281474992384669.htm

invasion of Afghanistan. The alleged Chinese involvement in the Afghan jihad, either by trading weapons or by providing support to *mujahedeen* training in camps located in Pakistan and Xinjiang (Cooley, 2002), appears to have had an impact on Uighur separatist movements. According to Haider, "many Uighurs who fought alongside the mujahideen returned to Xinjiang along the Karakoram Highway. … Subsequently they joined the nationalist movement there, often violently agitating for independence" (2005, p530). As such, the Karakoram Highway shares a history linked to Chinese statist approaches to her perceived internal and external security threats.

However, China has been responding to Uighur insurgency/radical Islamic militancy with heavy militarisation of the region and draconian security measures (Odgaard and Nielsen, 2014), which include the banning of travel and religious activities, in what appears to be the replication of similar policies used in Tibet by the same Communist Party Leader, Chen Quangou (Zenz and Leibold, 2017). It is clear that the success of CPEC and BRI is highly dependent on how Pakistan and China will manage their perceived national insecurities. For instance, China has weaved a discourse that equates Uighur nationalism with militant Islam, which includes more recently links to ISIL (Shaw, 2014). Furthermore, China has been pursuing a policy of keeping Islam under strict state control, which includes the appointment of state-approved imams, to the exclusion of what the Chinese government denotes as "wild imams",[138] the engineering of Uighur lives and minds

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[138] See, for instance, Manaya Koetse explaining how Chinese government identifies "wild imams": https://www.whatsonweibo.com/chinas-imams-online-preaching-on-weibo/

(Byler, 2017), which, together with other forms of propaganda, including visual ones,[139] represent clear attempts to enforce strict state control over religion.

However, it is not only the Uighurs who China is determined to re-design. Pakistani Muslims also must be made to believe that their Muslim counterparts in Xinjiang are not deprived of their Islamic identity and way of life. In this task, the Pakistani leadership, through the CPI, is playing its role. The CPI website features a two-part documentary called "Rising China",[140] which engages the Xinjiang Muslims, one of the ten Muslim minorities in China, according to the film. The documentary features an interview with the Vice-President of Xinjiang Islamic, who says that "non-Muslim friends often ask whether Muslims face any problems in life. They are very much concerned about the situation of the Muslim community here". He then responds: "I believe that the CPC ethnic and religious policies are unique". Having mentioned that he has visited some foreign countries, all Muslim, including KSA, thus making him familiar with the Muslim policies of those countries, he then states that "therefore, I'm in a position to say that the CPC relevant policies which endow people with the right for religious freedom are very wise and correct". He concludes, in a happy and confident manner: "The CPC ethnic and religious policies can't be found anywhere else in the world".

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[139] See, for instance, BBC's 'The colourful propaganda of Xinjiang': http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-30722268; see also Darren Byler's comprehensive article on the theme: https://livingotherwise.com/2017/04/26/imagining-re-engineered-muslims-northwest-china/

[140] The documentary can be accessed here: http://www.pakistan-china.com/mn-documentary-on-rising-china.php

In another interview for the same documentary, the VP of the China Islamic Association says that the "first priority of Chinese Muslims in their minds is to regard themselves as Chinese citizens and make joint efforts with people from all ethnic groups of China to work on China's development undertaking. We are upholding the importance of the roles played by religious personages in the development of the socialist society. The Chinese Muslims also have such basic expectations".

These two interviews are part of Sino-Pakistani concerted efforts to cover up existing dissent in Xinjiang. The Pakistani response to this issue has been a mixture of counter-narratives. While some sectors of the media try to expose the CCP's ways of dealing with Muslims in Xinjiang, for instance when *The Express Tribune* (2015) reported on how religious freedom is being suppressed, in a piece that corroborates the above-mentioned reports by the BBC and Darren Byler, there are also efforts to counter discourses that voice how the CCP coercively controls religious freedom in Xinjiang.[141] More recently, Pakistan's Prime Minister has confirmed that he has knowledge of the issue about the Uighur crackdown by China, including the existence of "detention facilities", which are believed to be "re-education" facilities (see for instance BBC, 2020; *Financial Times*, 2019).

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[141] Amid reports that fasting during the holy month of Ramadan was restricted by Chinese authorities in Xinjiang, in 2016 the Pakistani Ministry of Religious Affairs sent a delegation to Xinjiang to probe how fasting was being observed. This was reportedly after the Chinese government had requested Pakistan to do so, after international reports on restrictions. As such, Pakistan acts not only as a prober, but also the main target of its own probe. See *Dawn*: https://www.dawn.com/news/1268006

Hence, Pakistan's strong bond with China is also represented as one that places the state's interests over and above human lives. The coordinated efforts by both governments, which involve think thanks, the media, and a growing number of CPEC centres,[142] are therefore part of an expansionist project, whose *modus operandi* resembles past colonial practices of dealing with dissent, of population control by settlement, sterilisations, and eventually of organised genocide (Smith Finley, 2020). Therefore, Pakistan's most significant foreign policy event is one that shares with her partner a neo-colonial project, marked by violence and dehumanisation.

Yet, official discourses on Pakistan's foreign policy towards China continue to be reluctant about including any analysis that goes beyond perceived national interests. One of the key concerns seems to be that of controlling discourses that are critical of CPEC outcomes, including economic and financial ones, whilst turning a blind eye to the Uighur question and human trafficking, including the trafficking of women to be married to Chinese men (see Gannon, 2019; Afzal, 2020). It is thus clear that analyses of Sino-Pakistan relations that are solely centred on state-based interests remain blind to the intersection of factors like gender, ethnicity, class, race, and sexuality. Such analyses, which privilege strategic interests, here understood as a combination of economic and military ones, are therefore problematic and restricted. They limit the scope of foreign policy research, contribute towards

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[142] In a tweet from the Director of a CPEC centre at a University in Lahore, the author shares pictures with the following caption: "Elders on the streets of #Kashigar #Xinjiang beards & covered heads expose fake propaganda of restriction of religion in China (the flag emoji is used)". A retweet says that the author took the pictures himself while traveling by road. It can be found here: https://twitter.com/HaroonkRasheed/status/926863275014451202

the silencing of dissent and critique, and, ultimately, serve the construction of a neo-colonial form of international politics, which enhances oppression across the globe. The government of Pakistan is therefore an active actor in such construction, not only as a partner to China, but also in terms of her other foreign relations, with India and the US, as I will examine in the following sections.

6.3   A postcolonial feminist critique of Pakistan's relations with India

In the chapter dedicated to Pakistan-India relations, I examined how the Kashmir issue, the main tension between the two countries, has contributed towards the militarisation of Pakistan, and how that has also shaped the interlinking of identity and security. In the same chapter, I also outlined how Pakistan enhances her role as the "saviour" of Kashmir and Kashmiris, particularly since India's occupation has taken an even more ruthless turn. However, despite Pakistan's tireless and self-serving efforts to internationalise the plight of Kashmir, which, as discussed, included the initiation of territorial invasions that led to war, India continues to govern and occupy Kashmir by using stringent colonial practices that, according to Nitasha Kaul, are comparable with "British colonial practices of centre-periphery relations" (2018, p127).

Recently, Pakistan-based scholars have been trying to highlight India's human rights violations in Kashmir. These works make reference to ethnic

cleansing and changes in demography (Shamim, 2019; Amar, 2019; Malik, 2019). Yet, whilst echoing Pakistan's official discourse on Kashmir, perhaps unsurprisingly, such scholars do not establish that India's colonial practices in Kashmir, which also include the possibility of introducing "deradicalisation camps", share a common ground with those currently underway in Xinjiang (see Kaul, 2020). Thus, what the Pakistani discourse on India's inhumane and undemocratic governmental practices in Kashmir fails to recognise is that both states, China and India, resort to colonial practices of control and domination. Hence, these two nations, which Dibyesh Anand (2012) formulates and designates as "postcolonial informal Empires", have

> at the core of their polity, center-periphery relations of power that minoritize borderland ethno-nationalist communities within the large nationalist project, that reluctantly accept cultural difference and autonomy but reject any compromise on military and political control and deny political agency to the borderlands minorities. They see themselves as continuations of historical, great civilizational empires, which sets them apart from some Western hegemonic powers, such as the United States. … PIE as a concept is different from multiethnic state because the relationship between the center and the periphery in the PIE is asymmetrical, one that has strong imperial impulses. (2012, p73).

Anand further explains how China and India operate under a politics of self-denial, which includes being perceived as a victim of Western imperialism, whilst representing themselves as being the antithesis of the former. China, he explains, does not accept accusations of being a colonial actor in Tibet or Xinjiang (ibid, p74). Concerning India, Anand observes that despite having a

foreign policy that favours close engagement with the West, the country continues to invest in a discourse that portrays her policies as being rooted in a combination of "plurality, traditional civilization, and modern democracy … even [if] the Indian state brutalizes populations in its peripheries and subverts democracy by allowing the military and paramilitary a free hand, it peddles the myth of a postcolonial democratic nation" (ibid, pp74-75).

However, Pakistan's discourses that prioritise making visible the brutalities of the Indian state in Kashmir, fail to recognise that there is another PIE, namely China, which also rules by imperial designs at her periphery, in many ways akin to India's repression of freedom and rights in Kashmir. Thus, Pakistani foreign policy-related discourses that are destined to highlight India's atrocities, to a considerable extent, contribute to enhancing existing bouts of amnesia. The latter are not only rooted in colonial practices, but are also shared by her most important international partner, her declared enemy, and are prevalent in Balochistan, and to a certain extent in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Moreover, those discourses may be considered as somewhat half-hearted, insofar as they selectively privilege certain dissent and struggles against state violence over others. India's colonial designs in Kashmir, together with her ambitions to become a dominant global and regional power, as Nitasha Kaul (2020) explains, share commonalities with the Chinese Communist Party's plans in Xinjiang. Kaul further notes that existing resonances are robust enough to overshadow issues related to border disputes and strategic rivalry.

Yet, when Pakistan's government officials make appeals to the international community[143] to take notice of India's ruthless policies in Kashmir, or try to highlight how the Hindutva-influenced government of Narendra Modi uses violence against other minority communities in India, Pakistan creates a difficult position for herself. For instance, the Human Rights Watch 2019 report on Pakistan identifies serious issues concerning the rights of minorities, including those of the persecuted Ahmadiyya community (see Human Rights Watch, 2019). In addition, structural violence continues to impact the lives of women and children. The report also highlights the existence of serious discrimination around issues related to gender and sexuality.

Nevertheless, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Kashmir, Shehryar Khan Afridi, in August 2020 struck a defensive tone, stating that "the world needed to learn from the way Pakistan had set a model of equal treatment to its minorities, as non-Muslim communities here enjoyed all rights" (2020, cited in *Dawn*). Pakistan's efforts to adjust a discourse that has foreign policy-related goals, therefore, may be interpreted as only a partial engagement with the discourse of human rights and its intersection with issues related to sex, gender, ethnicity, and class. In view of Pakistan's dubious record on human rights, and her insistence on turning a blind eye to the Uighurs' persecutions in Xinjiang, this attempt to engage human rights with a foreign policy discourse is unlikely to produce any fruitful outcomes, particularly in respect of ending the brutality of the Indian regime in Kashmir.

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[143] An example of such initiatives took place at a seminar at the Pakistan Institute of Parliamentary Affairs in August 2020. See: https://www.dawn.com/news/1573984.

Whilst the government of Pakistan is making every effort to incorporate human rights discourses into her foreign policy, it is clear that one of the main targets is an attempt to construct a representation of Pakistan as a state that is concerned with human rights, in opposition to a human rights violator in the form of Hindu India. This constitutes an example of foreign policy as a boundary-making practice, following Campbell (1992). It is also exemplary of the fact that Pakistan's foreign policy thinking lacks the capacity to integrate different approaches (feminist and postcolonial) into its core state-centric, realist orientation. Therefore, any attempt to use human rights violations or examples of colonial practices (which, interestingly, Pakistan's official discourses are unable to voice as such) will remain only half-baked, lacking self-reflexivity, and ultimately remaining oriented towards fulfilling a state-centric interest, namely gaining territorial control over the entire Kashmir region.

Here, then, we can see the importance of including a post-colonial feminist critique of foreign policy, which is particularly concerned with creating a more inclusive world by not overlooking the ways in which different struggles can indeed intersect, "whilst looking backwards to acknowledge colonial legacies when foreign policy is produced" (Achilleos-Sarll, 2018, p46). Thus, it is advantageous to build a more inclusive and transformative foreign policy discourse. In the case of this study, it is also helpful to explain how Pakistan's relations with China and India have relevance beyond strategy and regional rivalry. These foreign relations are also vital in understanding

how post-colonial states perpetuate colonial practices of government, in order to ensure majoritarian power, translated differently across the respective geographies of India, China, and Pakistan. Another important advantage of a post-colonial feminist critique is that it can bring to the fore the significance of political accountability (Agathangelou and Ling, 2004). The examples examined here, particularly Pakistan's concerns with human rights in IOK, and her role as collaborator in Xinjiang, constitute relevant foreign policy events that call for detailed scrutiny that exceeds parochial state-centred analyses of power relations.

6.4   A postcolonial feminist critique of Pakistan-US relations

Pakistan's foreign relations with the US are simultaneously central and perennial. The case of the Afghan War (1979 and post-9/11), the exponential militarisation of Pakistan, including the country's nuclearisation, are key themes in the history of this foreign relation. In previous chapters, I discussed how this relationship has enhanced a masculinist and militarist ethos in Pakistan. In this section, I will examine how issues related to representation are key to understanding this relationship, and will apply a post-colonial feminist approach.

To be sure, the history of Pakistan-US relations is conspicuous in a series of political and military engagements and subsequent fallouts, most of which coincide with the US's imperial power politics. Pakistan's neighbourhood

and geography are also key factors that influence US engagements, as noted in the literature (Sattar, 2017; Rizvi, 1993; Schaffer and Schaffer, 2011). For her part, Pakistan's initial need to have a friend-like ally in the international community in order to be able to placate her insecurities, mainly in relation to Hindu India, as a newly formed state is also the most common explanation offered for the existence of this relationship (Nawaz, 2019).

Seven decades of Pakistan-US relations are marked by foreign policy discourses related to military strategy and war. Yet, in the dedicated literature, there is a notable absence of analysis of the historical constructions of power and how the latter is constituted by gender, sex, class, and race, as well as how these are also constitutive of this foreign relationship. Moreover, there is also no reference to how representations are important in foreign policy discourses. When Pakistan became a member of the international community after 1947, the US had already established herself as the most powerful state in the world, after their key intervention that led to the Allied victory in the Second World War. Pakistan's early leadership, which was significantly influenced by Western liberalism and less so by socialist ideas, had no difficulty in joining the US as a partner and an ally. Pakistan's enthusiasm to be a closer friend[144] to the US is expressed in the significance of her first Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan, during his two-month long visit to the United States and Canada during May-June 1950. Liaquat targeted different audiences to explain what Pakistan was about, her culture, and future aims in

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[144] This enthusiasm, however, did not resonate with the US leadership. Pakistan's strategic location was indeed an attractive factor for the US, yet, as Rais Khan notes, "only a small group of professionals both in the State Department and the Pentagon were conscious of Pakistan's strategic location" (1985, p85).

the international order. He tried to spread the idea that, like the US, Pakistan was committed to the "free world", progress, and peace. The Pakistani leader tried to demonstrate that Pakistan, "poor though we may be, backward though we may be, young and inexperienced we may be", was "neither poor nor backward nor immature in our love for democracy and for freedom" (Liaquat Ali Khan, 1950, 2011, p85).

This part of Liaquat's discourse is significant inasmuch it represents how the early Pakistani leadership imagined their newly established state to become – namely closer to what the US/West represented: civilisation and growth, the narratives with which post-colonial feminist approaches take issue. In the specific case of Pakistan, the desire to be associated with a US/West representation of civilisation became a problematic if not paradoxical one, given the Islamic ethos of her polity. However, it also represented a way to construct a different process of otherness, which would include a distinct "other" in the form of India.

However, Pakistan's relations with the US would become more a representation of militarism and war, and less one of "peace", "democracy", or "freedom". In chapters I and V, I have analysed various moments in the history of this relationship that show how war and militarism have been central to the partnership, and how those evolved to create an interlinking between security and identity that is a heavily masculinised one. Indeed, the Pakistani leadership explicitly sought to engage with the full range of US foreign policy interests: imperial politics of control and domination, war, and

the creation of "discourses of danger", which, according to Campbell, are "associated with the discursive economy of foreign policy/Foreign Policy" (1992, p196). Indeed, discourses of danger have been critical in linking the foreign policies of both countries. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which was largely perceived by both Pakistan and the US as a "dangerous" expansion of Communism, and the GWOT/terrorism post-9/11 are perhaps the most significant examples of such discourse of danger. Yet, one of the most critical outcomes of Pakistan-US foreign policy engagements is reflected in the exponential expansion of the Pakistan armed forces since the 1950s. This, as explained in previous chapters, has led to militarism becoming a state ideology.

The US's status as an imperial military world power qualifies it, according to a feminist understanding of politics, as a patriarchal system that structurally and ideologically "privileges and perpetuates masculinity" (Enloe, 2004, p4). Pakistan, too, shares the same patriarchal ethos,[145] rooted in how associated former colonial practices of government, representation of different ethnicities, and social control have been perpetuated since the country's independence. The continuation of this relationship, despite its highs and lows, however, did not disrupt the enhancement of a militarised, masculinist, and patriarchal state in Pakistan. Indeed, as I mentioned in chapter I, the relationship with the US contributed towards colonial-rooted representations of the post-colonial state in Pakistan. The US leadership went even further

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[145] Here I am not associating patriarchy with Islam, or Muslim identity. Indeed, this is part of an important sociological debate. Whilst Islam may be represented as more patriarchal than other religions, there is no evidence that other religions rank higher or lower in this regard. For a full discussion of this matter, see Alexander and Welzel (2011).

and enhanced Pakistan's desired alterity framework that would grant the latter a clear distinction from Hindu India.

Andrew Rotter (2000), whom I cited in chapter I, delves into how the main South Asian religions – Hinduism and Islam – resonated in US foreign policy thinking in the 1940s and 1950s, as a result of the conservative Christian upbringing of some of their main foreign policy makers, namely John Foster Dulles. Rotter establishes that the Americans followed British colonial categorisations of Hindus and Muslims, which were deeply enmeshed in gendered and cultural/religious categories. For instance, he notes that "Dulles's version of the United States as a Christian republic had a qualified South Asian counterpart in Pakistan" (Rotter, 2000, p599). That was complemented with the idea that Muslims, unlike Indian Hindus,[146] were more masculine (and therefore more susceptible to the Christian ethos) as they were more "upstanding, fearless, vigorous, energetic, [and] good fighters" (ibid, p604). These aspects, which are absent from parochial discourses on US-Pakistan relations, and therefore, arguably, render such analyses incomplete, are very significant for seeking to understand how Pakistan became a militarised state and a "frontline state" for the conflicts in which the US involved itself in the region. As Rotter observes,

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[146] It is also important to mention that, as the US adopted the British colonial representations of Muslims, it also did the same to the overall colonial and no less Orientalist representation of India. As Rotter observes: "the Western representation of India as female conferred effeminacy on most Indian men. Caught in the enervating web of Hinduism, which Westerners regarded as less a religion than a pathology, the majority of Indian men had been deprived of their manliness and their virility. … [I]t is possible to discern three features that Westerners historically assigned to most Indian men. The first of these was passivity and its more exaggerated forms; the second was emotionalism; the third was a lack of heterosexual energy. All of these features were associated with femininity, which Westerners regarded as effeminacy if exhibited by a man, and all imposed on India the Western constructions of the feminine and the masculine" (1994, p523).

the Cold War crusade had influence on the development of U.S. policy toward South Asia following partition in 1947 … [and] Muslim men, now mostly in Pakistan, were forthright, vigorous, combative in a healthy sort of way, and monotheistic. In short, they were much like American men. Those who governed Pakistan were straight shooters and good sports. (ibid, p607)

All of which helped to shape Pakistan-US relations beyond the circumstantial joining of military alliances, the supply of arms, or the joint efforts to fight communism. Thus, when parochial literature on Pakistan-US relations traces the origins of this relationship, it overlooks the gendered and gendering nature of the processes that led both countries to engage in alliance commitments.

Hence, this gendered relationship is also intersected by class and cultural elements. The Americans, as Rotter (2000) further notes, were convinced of an existing, comparable, political affinity between both countries' founders, consisting of being "schooled in the democratic philosophy and … willing to labor for their independence" (ibid, p608). A key aspect of this imagined Pakistani identity by the Americans continued to be how they contrasted it with India, which was perceived to be less democratic and leaning more towards communism. In addition, Americans equated the polytheist Hindu religion and its influence on Indian society as a source of whimsical foreign relations and diplomacy, and therefore ill-equipped to resist communism.

To be sure, as the history of Pakistan-US relations shows, the first decade of close ties did not endure. Gradually, subsequent US administrations became

more trustworthy of India and less so of Pakistan due to her internal politics, an incessant paranoia about India's intentions, and an excessive drive to become further militarised. This led the Americans to conclude that Pakistanis, despite their hypermasculinity being compatible with US imperial designs, could also be represented as fanatical and deceitful. Indeed, the history of the past thirty years of this relationship has been narrated in such a way that blurs the affinity that both states constructed during that first decade. The supposed effeminacy of India that was perceived during her first decades after independence has not prevented the US from becoming a key partner to enhance US foreign interests in Asia. Indeed, effeminacy appears to no longer be an issue in the US imaginary, whilst Pakistan's representations of treachery and fanaticism continue to persist.

One of the main issues that has led to such US interpretations of Pakistan are closely linked to terrorism and the political landscape in Afghanistan pre- and post-9/11. Such interpretations, arguably, result from two main sets of discourses, which, once examined in tandem, result in a representation of Pakistan as an unreliable US partner. One such discourse is related to US aid to Pakistan (both civilian and military). For instance, recent research by Shuja Nawaz (2019) – published as a book *The Battle for Pakistan: The Bitter Friendship and a Tough Neighbourhood*[147] – provides significant information and discussion regarding US aid to Pakistan. Whilst I have partially discussed it in the chapter dedicated to Pakistan-US relations, with

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[147] The book launch in Pakistan was postponed by the military leadership in 2020, as the author explains. See: https://www.dawn.com/news/1527704

reference to the Kerry-Lugar Bill, which was vehemently opposed by the Pakistani military, there are other relevant aspects of the comprehensive assistance to Pakistan that are relevant to understanding how Pakistan is represented. Nawaz's exhaustive discussion of civilian and military monetary assistance, including the amounts disbursed from the Coalition Support Funds (CFS)[148] and details about the negotiations involved around the Kerry-Lugar Bill and other USAID initiatives, is indicative that regardless of whether the strategy was adequate to reform US-Pakistan relations, to produce developmental change or to support democratic institutions, the US was indeed committed to helping Pakistan to emerge from the detrimental effects of terrorism upon the country's stability. Furthermore, Nawaz cites an interview with Jasmeet Ahuja, a South Asia expert working for Congressman Howard Berman (D), in which she states:

> So we believe in democracy … the whole freedom agenda of President Bush was to spread democracy, and so part of that is helping, for instance, civilian institutions get legs. Ensuring that the military isn't involved in selecting government, and we hear, and have heard, and continue to hear voices in Pakistan who agree with us, and so we want to, as we say in US parlance, amplify those voices and give them a voice. That was the intent of the bill. Maybe it's impossible … *We want to get our hands dirty and help on women's empowerment or women's rights because we think there's profound change that can happen from empowering a mother, a sister, a*

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[148] The numbers are indeed staggering. As Nawaz adds: "Since 2001 (US FY2002), Pakistan had received some $8 billion of direct and overt security-related assistance. These flows had hit a peak in FY2011 before declining steadily, with FY2018 producing a total of only some $134 million programmed. In addition, Pakistan received CSF of some $14.6 billion from FY2002 to FY2017, though the FY2017 amount remained subject to certification requirements. It was the largest recipient of CSF money from the US worldwide. CSF monies were supposed to be reimbursement for Pakistani expenditures related to support for the US war against terrorism in Afghanistan" (2019, p790).

daughter, but it's not sexy [as a dam] and it's really hard. (Ahuja, cited in Nawaz,
2019, p763, my italics)

Ahuja's words are significant to a postcolonial feminist analysis of this
relationship, particularly as it comes from the realm of foreign relations' high
politics. The US's strategy of empowering the civilian realm in Pakistan and
trying to control the political aspirations of the military, which, in my opinion,
is largely responsible for emerging representations of Pakistan as a
treacherous and fanatical state, all the while trying to become the "saviour"
of Pakistani women, shares many similarities with past colonial policies.
From a postcolonial feminist critical perspective, there are some key concepts
that encompass the policy that Ahuja commented on, which is linked to the
Kerry-Lugar Bill. First, Ahuja's discourse is integrated into a policy
framework that is dominated by white/Western hegemony, which informs
Western/liberal/white feminism, representing a "systemic consequence of a
global historical development over the past 500 years – the expansion of
European capitalist modernity throughout the world, resulting in the
subsumption of all 'other' peoples to its economic, political and ideological
model of operation" (Ien Ang, 2003, p197). This informs and mirrors what
the US's interventionist policy is trying to achieve, particularly if this is
understood within a post-colonial feminist framework, which is interested in
the intersections of colonial and neo-colonial political practices, alongside the
categories related to sex, gender, class, nation, and ethnicity. Ahuja's
statement also raises questions around how Western/liberal/white-based
feminist thinking represents women who live and work in the Global South
as "victims", and in this case seeing "Muslim women" as victims in need of

being rescued and empowered. In this specific case, it is also relevant that "empowering women" is being used as a foreign policy tool to enhance democracy, and potentially to restrain the expansion of the military. A caveat needs to be inserted here. Whilst I think that the military in Pakistan must be prevented from interfering in political processes, the orchestration of "women's empowerment" from a Western perspective is problematic. On the one hand, it carries the potential to not fulfil specific forms of empowerment which Pakistani women actually desire, and which are not necessarily akin to those considered important to Western-tailored concepts of women's empowerment. On the other hand, it further reproduces and reinforces the patriarchal neo-imperial system, thus enhancing the representations of the interests of white, heterosexual men, and therefore it works as a continuation of colonial modes of control and domination.

However, the aforementioned statement is also useful in highlighting the importance of constructing a critique of foreign policy based on post-colonial feminism. Hence, as Alison Phipps notes, following Lugones (2008), "[women] exist at the intersections of capitalism, white supremacy, and heteropatriarchy, with little control over the means of production but raced and classed domination that requires feminine submission" (2021, p6). This is precisely what Ahuja's statement, understood as a foreign policy tool, ignores: the very origins as to why women need to be empowered are precisely the ones that should be disrupted and not reinforced by sentiments such as wanting to "*get our hands dirty and help on women's empowerment*

or women's rights", which is but a representation of those mentioned intersections.

The two examples I have discussed in this section involving Pakistan-US relations demonstrate that conventional foreign policy analyses of Pakistan's foreign policy overlook issues of gender, sex, class, and gender, and fail to pay heed to the colonial origins of political practices and representations that have constituted foreign policy since the country's inception in 1947. The case of Pakistan-US relations is particularly important because it remains closely associated with how militarism as a state ideology has expanded in Pakistan, as I have discussed in previous chapters. In addition, it is also significant to identify that the much discussed engagements and disengagements, as well as the receding moments of trust between the two states, are also processes that are gendered and gendering, whilst remaining linked to a neo-imperialist logic that is intimately bound up with white, heterosexual patriarchy. Hence the need to emphasise the explanatory potential of a post-colonial feminist analysis.

6.5   Conclusion

In this chapter, I have set out the case for the relevance of including a postcolonial feminist perspective to the analysis of Pakistan's foreign policy. Such an approach can also be extended to other studies of foreign policy. I have analysed the three main foreign relations cases in Pakistan's foreign policy, and in all three it is possible to uncover how the political processes

involved are connected to colonial modes of government, and how those are also deeply associated with gender, sex, class, and ethnicity. The cases of Pakistan's relations with China and India are significant in view of how existing struggles in both countries (Uighurs in Xinjiang, and Kashmiris in IOK) share some similarities concerning neo-colonial political practices, including territorial occupation and ethnic cleansing. Yet, these are differently narrated in Pakistan's foreign policy discourses, and, in the case of China's human rights abuses in Xinjiang, they are dismissed by the Pakistani leadership. This particular situation raises questions about the ethical import of Pakistan's foreign policy decisions about raising the Kashmir issue internationally. A feminist postcolonial critique therefore is helpful in foregrounding the vital ethical issues that surround foreign policy, albeit within a framework that takes into account the different intersections of gender, class, sexuality, and ethnicity, whilst not being oblivious to the colonial and imperial legacies that continue to shape international politics.

CONCLUSION

This study has investigated how the interlinking of security and identity shapes foreign policy in Pakistan. The study has also examined how militarism as an ideology that is closely linked with security and a masculinist identity, has been enhanced by the state leadership of Pakistan. In order to answer to these questions, I have used feminist and postcolonial approaches to analyse foreign policy events and their effects. Such approaches have been used as alternatives to prevalent approaches that privilege realist and neorealist approaches to foreign policy and international politics.

I have found that the interlinking between security and identity has been in a constant state of construction and renovation since the country's creation in 1947. In the due process, politics linked to Islam and to militarism have simultaneously become the upshots and the catalysts of such process. Foreign policy, defined as being political and boundary-making practices (Campbell, 1992,1998), therefore sets the background against which for this interlinking

takes place. Hence, in this study I have demonstrated that Pakistan's main three bilateral relations – namely with China, India, and the US constitute key foreign policy milieux where the interlinking of security and identity is produced and reproduced.

In this research I have established that each bilateral relation can be encapsulated by a specific foreign policy issue that predominantly contributes towards the enhancement of militarism. Hence, militarism, which may also be understood as a representational phenomenon (Frowd and Sandor, 2018) that is supported by evidence of extensive military influence, and being in a constant status of war-preparedness, thrives in, and is enhanced by Pakistan's foreign relations with these three countries. In the case of Sino – Pakistan relations CPEC is currently associated with the growth of militarism; the consequences of the latter are particularly felt in regions that are deemed central to CPEC's development, namely Balochistan and the Kashmir region of Gilgit-Baltistan. In addition, the geopolitical significance of those regions can be traced back to the British colonial rule in India; then, as of now, colonial political practices linked to a militaristic ethos are identifiable, as I have shown.

Furthermore, as I bring to the fore in the respective chapter, the fact that China has been identified as Pakistan's most important arms supplier over the course of seven decades, not least in throwing her weight behind Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme, make this bilateral relationship the most sustained

historical source of Pakistan's militarism originating from the latter's foreign policy decisions.

Pakistan's bilateral relation with India, due to its complexity that is rooted on a common postcolonial existence that has been persistently marked by war and conflict, continues to be the linchpin of the country's foreign policy. Any other foreign policy engagement, particularly with China and with the US, outgrows from this contentious relationship. As I have examined in this study, the 'Kashmir Question' that has generated the irreconcilable Pakistan – India relations, and which remains at the core of Pakistan's foreign policy has also contributed towards militarism to grow as a state ideology. Of particular relevance in this regard is the permanent state of war-preparedness, a key trait that defines militarism, and that the Pakistani leadership has chosen to embrace. This includes her status as a nuclear state, which, as AC7 put to me in an interview in September , is seen as "necessary to prevent any military coercion and blackmail." (AC7, interview September 2017).

Concerning Pakistan – US relations, this study has established that the collaboration that both countries established during the wars (post 1979 Soviet invasion, and post 9/11) in Afghanistan have been key sources of militarism in Pakistan. The political influence of the military on both occasions, which coincided with two separate periods of military rule in the country, was also important in nestling militarism as part of the state's already existing on constructing its identity. The military in association with the intelligence services, the ISI which simultaneously incorporated the roles of

main foreign policy actor and US collaborator in Afghanistan, has been crucial to perpetuate the militarisation of foreign policy. This research has also demonstrated that Pakistan – US relations are also constituted by, and represented through discourses originating from a colonial and gendered political ethos that the Americans learned from the former rulers of South Asia.

The inclusion of feminist and postcolonial approaches to examine these relationships has been critical to this study. By analysing foreign policy related events through these critical lenses, I have been able to establish how the prevalence of militarism operating as a "set of complex ideas and values" (see Enloe, 20016) which are predominantly associated with masculinist representations of power has been continuously influencing Pakistan's security and identity. Moreover, a feminist postcolonial critique was shown to be useful in including a genealogy of the masculinist ethos and its representations, which, in the case of Pakistan, can be traced to the British colonial domination of South Asia. Those representations, as the study has found, continue to be produced and reproduced within Pakistan's foreign relations with China, India, and the US.

One of the main contributions that this research seeks to make is to fill the existing gap in the study of Pakistan's foreign policy, particularly insofar as it is lacking a feminist and postcolonial approaches. As I argued in chapter VI, one of the key features of a feminist postcolonial critique is its engagement with intersectionality, and with making visible certain ethical

issues that may potentially be erased from foreign policy decision-making and practices. The erasure of ethical concerns from foreign policy, in the case of Pakistan, is currently processed in a selective manner, explained by the dominance of discourses that privilege the enhancement of state-centric perceived interests – which includes state security, backed by the protracted obsession with India.

In contrast, discourses pertaining to issues linked to political and human rights, in terms of Pakistan governing practices in Balochistan, and in Gilgit-Baltistan are silenced and supressed by the state, as I have found during my research. The prominent position accorded to CPEC overshadows the right to dissent in those regions, and indeed across Pakistan. However, current Pakistan leadership has adopted a foreign policy strategy of including human rights oriented discourses in order to expose India's violent control in Kashmir. A postcolonial feminist critique therefore helps us question such "rights friendly" foreign policy when we note Pakistan's official discourses on the crescent evidence of China's oppressive practices in the Xinjiang region.

As this research has shown, existing studies of Pakistan's foreign policy through its seven decades of existence have paid little to no attention to non-state-centric factors. Whilst the interlinking between security and identity has always existed, studies of foreign policy have tended to overlook its formative importance and influence on the permanent construction of state identity. Pakistan is currently a military state; studies have identified her political

regime as hybrid in form (Shah, 2019; Adeney, 2017), in view of the sizeable interference of the armed forces in different domains of democratic governance.

This research aims to constitute an additional contribution to the study of the postcolonial state of Pakistan, the study of her foreign policy, and the study of origins and development of militarism and its connection with a state identity that, is profoundly masculinist, gendering, and patriarchal. It is also hoped that this research will encourage others to take up a postcolonial feminist foreign policy toolkit, which may be applicable to foreign policy analysis associated with other states, regions, or institutions.

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Ghafoor, A. (@officialDGISPR) " "Pakistan Army firmly stands by the Kashmiris in their just struggle to the very end. We are prepared and shall go to any extent to fulfil our obligations in this regard", COAS affirmed. (2 of 2)" 6 August 2019, 2:37 am

Ghafoor, A. (@officialDGISPR) "" It's not over. It won't be until just struggle of our Kashmiris succeeds. It will IA succeed. We will go to any extent to let them have their right to self determination. An illegal paper annexation won't deter anyone of us. Revoking in essence gives occupied status 1947-48. (Asif Ghafoor, 6 August, 2019) 6 August 2019 1:15 pm

Ghafoor, A. (@officialDGISPR) "Alhamdulillah. All His blessings. Credit if any goes to the leadership, brave soldiers and my predecessors. Kashmir runs in blood of every Pakistani. IA legitimate struggle of our Kashmiris shall succeed to defeat Indian Occupation Forces. Time for India & world to realise" 29 March 2019, 12pm.

Ghafoor, A. (@officialDGISPR) "COAS Chief guest at #PLA90 reception. "Pak China Military to Military coop is the pillar of our bilateral relationship." Chinese Amb. (1 of 2)" 31 July 2017, 6:56 pm.

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